A Strategy of Peace in a Changing World [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674498464, 9780674498457

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A STRATEGY OF PEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD

Μ A STRATEGY OF PEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD

Arthur N. Holcombe

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS · 1967 Cambridge, Massachusetts

© Copyright 1967 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 67-27085 Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

Prologue Part One | American Government and World Order 1

ι 13

THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN COMMITMENTS ON THE PRESIDENCY

22

2

THE PRICE OF LIBERTY

37

3

THE UNITED NATIONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

48

Part Two | Organizing Peace within a Federal Union 4

73

THE ROLE OF WASHINGTON IN THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION

89

5

THE COERCION OF STATES IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

110

6

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

141

Part Three | Organizing International Peace

*57

7

EDWIN GINN's VISION OF WORLD PEACE

172

8

EDWIN GINN'S COMMITMENT TO WORLD GOVERNMENT

200

9

THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

Epilogue

216

299

A STRATEGY OF PEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD

C o n f i d e n t and unafraid, we labor o n — not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace. President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Commencement Address, American University, June 10, 1963

Prologue

That ideas as well as money and tangible goods may become valuable legacies is my reason for bringing together in this volume some scattered writings of my later years. These writings relate in one way or another to an idea of increasing importance in my lifetime up to now which seems likely to continue to increase in importance. This is the idea of insuring a reasonable degree of tranquillity in a disorderly world by suitable political arrangements, as modern constitutional government has insured domestic tranquillity in well-organized contemporary states. The idea of organized world peace is not an idea which can stand by itself alone; but, closely associated with the concomitant ideas of justice and liberty under law, it can unite the peoples of the world. This unfortunately is not a self-evident proposition, but the possibility of supplying acceptable proof of its soundness has intrigued me for many years. My personal introduction to the study of the organization of peace began in October, 1899. The principal of the Winchester (Massachusetts) high school, where I was then taking the college preparatory course in the hope of eventually getting a college education, knew my need to earn money in order to go to college and introduced me to Edwin Ginn, a successful educational book publisher, who, wishing to spare his weakening eye-

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sight, wanted somebody to read to him in the evenings. Mr. Ginn gave me the job, thereby inaugurating a happy professional and personal relationship which lasted until the end of his life and led eventually to my becoming a trustee under his will. This farseeing and thoughtful testament contained a definition of world peace in terms of political structures and processes designed to maintain a reasonably tranquil world order compatible with the nature of mankind. Mr. Ginn's confidence in the practical efficacy of his plans for the organization of peace was attested by the carefully studied directions in his will for the further use of money set aside for the support of his World Peace Foundation following achievement of the Foundation's purpose. At the time of my first acquaintance with Edwin Ginn his plans for the peace cause, as he called it, had not been fully matured. He was already deeply interested in international arbitration as a substitute for war in the settlement of international disputes, and his enthusiasm for the cause was infectious. Later experience and further reflection caused him to reject arbitration as an adequate way of insuring international tranquillity and to recognize the need for more elaborate measures to form a stable world order, but his confidence in ultimate victory for the cause was only strengthened by his further study of ways and means for keeping the peace. I accepted my appointment as trustee under his will with no more than the dimmest notions about the actual establishment of world peace, but with imperturbable belief in the feasibility and eventual triumph of the cause. The unforeseen course of events in the turbulent and rapidly changing world I have known has only confirmed my feeling of intellectual kinship with my early benefactor. The formation of the League of Nations after the first world war raised high hopes that the "war to make the world safe for democracy" had accomplished its purpose. The refusal of the United States senate to ratify the peace treaty containing the

Prologue

[3

League of Nations Covenant without reservations unacceptable to President Wilson dashed these hopes. But even before it became clear that the United States would not join the League, the trustees of the Ginn estate had convinced themselves that the covenant could not be the instrument of a peace that would satisfy the definition of peace in Edwin Ginn's will. The system of peace-keeping contemplated by the framers of the covenant was doubtless a substantial improvement over the conventional system of the balance of power, which had been discredited by its failure to prevent a disastrous world war. The proposed League of Nations system possessed the solid merit of putting a legal, and hopefully also a moral, foundation under the balance-ofpower system; but the system remained a balance-of-power system still. The essence of this particular system of peace-keeping was the practical capacity and resolute willingness of a great power to throw its weight on the side of the weaker of two states or combinations of states against the stronger, in order to discourage the latter from threatened aggression against the former. The efficacy of the system depended upon the capacity of a particular great power to hold the balance between potential combatants and its willingness to support the weaker against the stronger regardless of the merits of the current controversy between them. The great-power statesmen holding the balance could justify their indifference to the merits of a particular dispute by their claim that in the existing state of the world the keeping of the peace was a greater service to mankind than any contribution they might make toward a theoretically just settlement of the dispute. Indeed, they might contend, the keeping of the peace was the indispensable condition for any rational consideration of the dispute on its merits. The League of Nations was designed to make possible a rational consideration of every dispute that might threaten the peace of the world and a deliberate effort to settle it on its merits before an appeal to arms.

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The decision of the Ginn estate trustees that the peace negotiated at Versailles in 1 9 1 9 was not the kind of peace contemplated by the will of Edwin Ginn was unanimous. T w o considerations enabled the trustees to reach their decision quickly and easily: one was that war was not actually outlawed by the League covenant; the other was that under the covenant the political structures and processes designed to facilitate the just settlement of disputes growing out of fighting issues fell far short of the arrangements called for by Edwin Ginn's testamentary definition of peace. It was not necessary to wait for evidence that the member states of the League would neglect to perform the most important obligations of membership and thus would fail to live up to their commitments. T h e United Nations Charter marked a substantial advance over the League covenant. It outlawed aggressive war. It established the Security Council, with definite powers for dealing with aggression. It restricted the application of the rule of unanimity to the five permanent members of the Council representing the major powers in the world at the close of World W a r II, thereby establishing a more convenient procedure for the exercise of the Council's powers than the complete unanimity rule of the League covenant. It made tentative arrangements for putting military forces at the disposal of the Security Council to assist in the enforcement of its decisions; and it authorized the employment of competent staff services, both civil and military, for the Council's assistance, and provided for continuous Council sessions when needed. Nevertheless, it was evident to the Ginn trustees that the United Nations Charter did not immediately bring the kind of peace contemplated in Edwin Ginn's will. Though under the charter aggressive war was outlawed, there was no clear definition of aggression. T h e arrangements under the charter for reaching a decision in a particular case, whether or not the employment of military force was or would be an act of aggression, were

Prologue

[5

inconclusive. A decision in the Security Council would require the concurrence of the five major powers, which had fought together on the victorious side in the second World War; but their alliance had been a strange and uneasy one, and only time would tell whether they could work together harmoniously in the postwar years. In default of prompt action by the Security Council a complaint of threatened or actual aggression could be transferred to the General Assembly. This body, however, possessed only a power to make recommendations for action in such cases. The weight to be attached to its recommendations would depend upon various circumstances, one of the most important of which would be its own composition. At first the membership of the General Assembly was limited to the victorious powers and associated states in World War II. Eventually, if the United Nations Organization proved durable, its membership presumably would include all independent states, but their participation would be based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of states, regardless of differences in population, wealth, military capacity, or political development. What was meant by the principle of sovereign equality under these circumstances was not made clear in the charter. The privileged position of the five major powers in the Security Council seemed to assure an inferior position in the Organization for all the other member states. The eventual expansion of the United Nations from an organization of victors in World War II into a genuine world organization would mean the admission to membership not only of the former neutral and enemy states, but also of the new states to be formed from the mandated and trusteed territories and other liberated dependencies resulting from the liquidation of disintegrating colonial empires. The new member states would possess equal voting rights in the General Assembly, but could not realistically expect to gain at once an equal influence in its deliberations. The

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principle of sovereign equality could offer a convenient slogan for inexperienced delegates at sessions of the General Assembly, but could hardly furnish helpful guidance for effective leadership in the Organization. Moreover, an acceptable performance of the Organization's commitment to keep the peace in a rapidly changing world would require an appropriate lawmaking capacity. The legislative powers expressly conferred on the Organization by the charter were limited and clearly inadequate. An important but uncertain source of such power was the recognized body of public international law as it stood at the end of World War II. For instance, the statute of the International Court of Justice (which at the end of the war replaced the earlier so-called Permanent Court of International Justice) conferred jurisdiction over justiciable controversies between independent states, but made no provision for the trial of criminal prosecutions against defeated generals and discredited statesmen accused of fomenting unlawful wars. The victorious powers established a special court at Nuremberg for the purpose of trying the Nazi war criminals on charges growing out of their alleged violation of the Pact of Paris, better known as the Kellogg Pact, renouncing resort to war as an instrument of national policy, and a similar court was established at Tokyo to try the Japanese war criminals. Though the charter contained no provision expressly authorizing the establishment of such tribunals, neither did it forbid such action. Whatever power to try war criminals the United Nations possessed under public international law before the adoption of the charter, the U.N. Organization, it may be presumed, possessed after its adoption. How extensive the lawmaking powers of the Organization derived from this source might be is an interesting topic for speculation. A flourishing Organization would certainly find this source of power more productive than one crippled by a "cold war" between major powers. Because the extent of the Organization's authority to act

Prologue

[η

under the law of nations and to revise and expand the existing body of international law was uncertain, it would be necessary to make the most of its other implied legislative powers. The power to appropriate money carried with it a concomitant power to determine the conditions under which the money might be spent. This could open the way for an unpredictable flow of legislation. The spending power, however, was limited in practice by the limitations on the power to raise revenue, which made the Organization dependent on the willingness of the member states to make the contributions assessed against them by the General Assembly. Failure to pay the assessments within two years could result in loss of voting rights in the General Assembly, but uncertainty surrounded the extent of the obligation to pay assessments designed to finance military operations recommended by the General Assembly contrary to the wishes of dissenting member states. Not only was the lawmaking power under the charter illdefined, but the legislative process was excessively slow, laborious, and uncertain. Any rule of policy compatible with the purposes of the United Nations could theoretically be enacted into law in the form of an amendment to the charter; but a proposed amendment could be defeated by a single one of the privileged powers in the Security Council or by one more than one-third of the member states in the General Assembly. If it successfully passed these barriers, it would still have to be ratified by twothirds of the member states, including all five privileged powers. Upon the ability of these same five powers to act in harmony with one another would depend the efficient working of all the arrangements under the charter for keeping the peace of the world. These peace-keeping arrangements were obviously highly speculative. The outlook for a flourishing United Nations Organization was soon clouded by the outbreak of the cold war. The struggle between the two superpowers cast grave doubt on the Security

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Council's capability of functioning as guardian of the peace in the manner contemplated by the framers of the charter. This doubt was increased by a basic difference of opinion between them over the essential nature of the Organization. The Russians regarded the Council as little more than an open forum for the discussion of international problems which might lead to breaches of the peace: they did not hesitate, therefore, to veto all proposed actions to which they objected. The Americans, on the other hand, seemed to regard it as a genuine, though imperfect, instrument of government in which, if there were no consensus on some pending matter of business, a minority should submit to the majority specified in the provisions of the charter relating to voting. They accordingly claimed a right to act whenever they could muster the specified majority of the votes in the Council, and denounced the Russian vetoes. The assumption that the major powers had learned by hard experience in two ruinous world wars the folly of fighting among themselves soon appeared to be invalid, and the primary condition for a flourishing world peace organization was thereafter wanting. The United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, which agreed on the final form of the text of the charter, recognized that the price of agreement was acceptance of numerous compromises between conflicting views concerning the kind of organization most suitable for international peace-keeping. These compromises were generally dictated by expediency rather than by principle, and were not accepted in all cases as permanent solutions of troublesome conflicts. The conference accordingly inserted in the charter a provision designed to facilitate the holding of a second conference ten years later. In 1955 this projected charter-review conference was duly authorized by the U.N. General Assembly, but on account of the unfavorable state of international relations no date was fixed for its actual meeting. The cold war was raging; and the Organization was not yet a genuine world organization.

Prologue

[9

There was no doubt in the minds of the Ginn trustees that Edwin Ginn's vision of world peace was far from realization in 1955. Mr. Ginn's vision as finally recorded in a statement of his plans for the World Peace Foundation in 1910 was more explicit than in earlier proposals he had made for an international school of peace. His idea, he then declared, was to bring constantly before the people the advantages of cooperation, adopting the policy of taking a portion of the present armaments, say 10%, and establishing an international army and navy. Thus, the establishment of an international power would be the natural beginning of a world congress, and the more complete development of an international court would follow. In this way an international government with authentic executive, legislative, and judicial branches would come into existence. But in 1955 there was an accelerating arms race of unprecedented ominousness, and the immediate problem was to preserve the existing imperfect U.N. Organization rather than to improve it. Ten years later the projected charter-review conference had still not been convened, but a special meeting of representatives of the member states was held at San Francisco to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the charter's framing. It was a depressing celebration. The character of the Organization had been radically changed by the admission of numerous African and Asian states springing from the dissolution of obsolete colonial empires. Though the membership of the Organization had more than doubled, it was still not a genuine world organization. One of the most important major powers, China, was represented only by a government-in-exile; another, Germany, was also divided against itself and wholly without representation. Two other important states, which had been involved in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, were also divided into hostile parts which the Organization was unable to reconcile with one another. One outstanding European neutral, Switzerland, was still unwilling to join. The latest session of the General

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A Strategy of Peace

Assembly had been paralyzed by a dispute among the major powers concerning the right of the Assembly to assess all its members for the costs of peace-keeping operations to which some of them objected. No one ventured to suggest to the trustees of the estate of Edwin Ginn that the state of the world satisfied, or was about to satisfy, Mr. Ginn's tests for the existence of world peace; on the contrary, the realization of his vision seemed as remote as ever. The question might even have been raised of whether the prospect of its realization was sufficiently bright to justify the further use of his money for so visionary a purpose. More than half a century had passed since his death, and the principal powers in the world still seemed to rely for the protection of their special interests and the preservation of international peace chiefly on regional military alliances and a precarious balance of terror rather than on a general international organization and a genuine reign of law. Was the future of the United Nations really any more promising than that of the League of Nations had been at the corresponding stage of its existence? The disposition of the strongest and most influential powers to take the law into their own hands seemed to be growing despite their hard experience in the two world wars. Armistices had been declared, but no general peace had been made since the formation of the United Nations Organization in 1945. Nothing had been done by way of amending the charter to improve the Organization except the enlargement of the Security Council in 1965 to make more room for representatives of the recently admitted member states. The new states certainly seemed to put a high value on membership in the Organization; but was the sense of world community more highly developed than before? The trustees of the Ginn estate had no difficulty in finding that in the summer of 1965 world peace, as understood by Edwin Ginn, still did not exist. But they did not yet feel called upon

Prologue

[ιι

to consider whether his concept of world peace was so excessively visionary as to justify use of the money left by him for the peace cause to help his other favorite charity, which he had made the residuary legatee and ultimate beneficiary under his will, the Charlesbank Homes. It was necessary to be mindful of Mr. Ginn's personal approach to the peace cause as reflected in his will: in this carefully drafted document not only did he indicate the nature of world peace in positive terms as a state of the world in which there would be an effective world government, but he also put on record his conviction that this happy state — as he believed it would be — should be reached by an appropriate strategy of peace. It was to the pursuit of this strategy that his money was to be devoted. The struggle for world peace, as Edwin Ginn envisioned it, was not to be won merely by praising the virtues of peace. It was to be a by-product of an intermediate and more tangible goal; disarmament. An acceptable process of disarmament would involve the establishment of a worldwide inspection system and other suitable arrangements for promoting due confidence in the good faith of the disarming military powers, including an adequate world peace force under effective international control. Thus world peace, regarded in institutional terms, would be the necessary and proper result of the gradual limitation of national armaments to the requirements of domestic peace-keeping. The primary task of the peacemakers would be to stimulate an effective worldwide demand for national disarmament. The most influential peacemakers seemed to have caught up with the thinking of Edwin Ginn when John F. Kennedy took over the presidency of the United States. His masterly First Inaugural, his two addresses to the General Assembly of the United Nations, and his eloquent Commencement Address at the American University in Washington on June 10, 1963, caught the attention of the world. His instructions to the American spokesmen in the Eighteen Nation Committee on

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Disarmament, meeting at Geneva in 1962, committed his government to a scheme for a gradual reduction of national forces and a gradual establishment of a world force. The text of the American plan for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, presented to the Geneva Disarmament Committee on April 18, 1962, envisaged the creation of an international disarmament organization under the supervision and control of the United Nations. As developed in the third stage of the proposed disarmament process, this combination of organizations would give the world a genuine world government. The papers which I have brought together in this volume relate to the three major steps in this struggle for world peace. The first group of papers deals with various aspects of the developing demand in the United States for a better world order. The second group deals with the significance for organizers of world peace of the American experience with the organization of interstate peace in a federal union. The third group deals with certain problems in the organization of international peace in a world inspired by a due sense of common interests. Some further reflections on the requirements of an organized world peace are set forth in an epilogue.

PART

ONE

American Government and World Order

The people of the United States need a more perfect union of the nations for two reasons. The principal reason is that emphasized by President Kennedy in his epoch-making first address to the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1961. Mankind must put an end to war, he declared, or war will put an end to mankind. The other reason is more specifically American. The waves of change, which have already inundated a great part of the contemporary political world, threaten the stability of the American constitutional system. At the beginning of the present century forward-looking and thoughtful Americans were not free from fear as they contemplated the state of the political world, but their fears did not come close to home. They were not afraid for their personal safety. The Monroe Doctrine seemed capable of keeping the European system of warmaking, regarded as an instrument of imperial policy, out of the Americas. To such Americans the great objection to sanguinary warfare was its threat to the future of mankind. Born into a world under the spell of the Darwinian biology and bred in a dogmatic faith in the beneficent workings of an inexorable struggle for existence, they came to believe

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that the survival of the fittest, and hence the further progress of mankind, would increasingly depend on the refinement of the struggle by raising its level from the plane of brutish physical combat to that of a free-enterprise system providing greater opportunity to individuals of superior intellect. The prime function of the state, according to late-Victorian liberals, should be to keep the peace, both at home and abroad, and thus smooth the way for the victors in a progressively more intellectual struggle for survival. The fear from which realistic pacifists sought to free themselves and their fellow citizens was that of statesmen too much bound by tradition and not enough guided by reason. Late-Victorian liberals put their trust in rational progress and in democracy as the necessary condition for progressive politics. They believed that an educated people could not fail to constitute a firm foundation for intelligent self-government. Those who lived to witness the first world war responded with dutiful zeal, if not with genuine enthusiasm, to Woodrow Wilson's appeal for support of a war to make the world safe for democracy. This was the one kind of war that could have commanded their approval. Democracy, progress, and peace formed in their minds an inseparable trinity. Unhappily, the first world war brought to democracy its most formidable challenge. Italian fascists, German nazis, and Japanese militarists combined to give tyrannical dictatorship its greatest opportunity in history to set back the march of progress. Moreover, Russian communists threatened to subvert the essential idea as well as the established institutions of democracy. Liberal democrats saw more clearly than before that peace is something more than absence of war. The conviction spread, as realistic pacifists had anticipated, that world peace — like domestic peace — needs to be organized. For the first time in history freedom from fear of war became a recognized component of the general idea of political freedom. But it was the development of new and more destructive

American Government

and World Order

[ 15

weapons that brought the fear of unregulated war home to the masses of mankind. Thermonuclear explosives and lethal chemicals and biologicals threatened entire populations with destruction in wars fought with the most modern weapons. Profitable victory in such wars became incalculable even for the most powerful nations. Even ordinary men, lacking the vision of realistic pacifists, could see at last the necessity of some kind of international organization in order to secure the full blessings of liberty. The idea of political freedom gained new substance and value. The exigencies of the cold war invoked the use of ideas as weapons, and rival conceptions of freedom animated the competing propaganda of the cold-warring powers. To the communist powers freedom meant the defeat of the noncommunist powers in the class struggle. To the latter it meant the repulse of communism. The confusion of ideas was compounded by the confusion of political systems in what the anticommunist propagandists liked to call the free world. Democracy in the late-Victorian liberals' use of the word did not exist in most of the states involved (or urged by the propagandists to become involved) in the cold war. Realistic pacifists would have declared that an unorganized world of so-called sovereign states was not a free world in any proper sense of the term, and that nothing short of membership in a world organization inspired by such purposes as those of the United Nations Organization, and endowed with adequate powers of lawmaking and peace-keeping, could secure the blessings of a general and complete political freedom. Unhappily, the existing United Nations Organization, operating within the constitutional limitations imposed by its charter, is not strong enough to put an end to war. It can keep the peace among the minor powers and ordinary states not in possession of the most modern weapons if the nuclear powers are united in a purpose to make the most of the influence they can

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constitutionally wield within the Organization. But it cannot keep the peace among the nuclear powers themselves, unless these powers are agreed in renouncing every resort to war or the threat thereof as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. World peace cannot be established by a military victory of any superpower over its chief rival, as peace was once established for a time in the ancient Greek world by the triumph of Sparta over Athens, or in a larger world for a longer time by the triumph of Rome over Carthage. In the ultramodern world there can be no triumph for superpowers except by a rational process of political accommodation between them. Rational processes of international political accommodation seem to be more difficult for the statesmen of superpowers than old-fashioned appeals to arms. Nevertheless science and technology are producing great advances in other fields as well as in the art of war. Above all, there has been a great advance in the art of communicating intelligence. Radio, television, and communications satellites enable international statesmen to come as close to the members of a world community as those operating on the lesser stage of strictly national politics came to their fellow nationals in the age of printing. A commitment to world organization begins to seem no more impracticable than the commitments of early nineteenth-century visionaries to dreams of national democracy. The second reason of forward-looking and thoughtful Americans for advocating a more perfect union of the nations could not have been imagined at the beginning of the century. Doubt about the future stability of the democratic republic under the American constitution was unthinkable. The national-federal union, having survived one great lesson-teaching civil war, seemed capable of enduring forever. T h e intricate and salutary system of constitutional checks and balances seemed to supply automatic and efficient safeguards against the abuse of govern-

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mental power by short-sighted and narrow-minded politicians, who might occasionally happen to get into important public offices. The wide extent of the country and wholesome variety of economic and social interests apparently assured a pluralistic political system dedicated to rational aims and exemplary selfcontrol on the part of the people and to moderation in the exercise of power by their leaders. T h e American constitutional system, however, is a dual system. It possesses radically different arrangements for the management of domestic and foreign affairs. In dealing with domestic affairs the president is a chief executive with powers carefully limited by law, to the end that there may be a durable balance between his office and the other principal branches of government. If he threatens to get out of control, the congress may withhold necessary appropriations or the supreme court may withhold an indispensable sanction for objectionable activities. T h e character of the man and the circumstances of the time may improve or impair his actual position in the governmental process, but they cannot augment or diminish his constitutional authority. In dealing with foreign affairs the original intention of the founding fathers was to make the president more nearly the equivalent of an eighteenth-century British king. As commanderin-chief of the nation's armed forces he could be as strong as the comparative state of armaments in the contemporary world might permit. Though he could not make a formal declaration of war without the approval of the congress, nor conclude a treaty without the consent of two-thirds of the senators, he could resist aggression with all the forces at his command, wherever it might occur, and enter into executive agreements at his pleasure with the heads of foreign states with whom he might choose to negotiate. This quasi-royal prerogative was theoretically limited by the law of nations; but in default of a higher power to enforce the law of nations against him, he was for most

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practical purposes a sovereign ruler in his relations with foreign sovereigns. It was an anomalous position for a public officer who, like other American public officers, was supposed to be a lawabiding subject of the sovereign people. The quasi-royal presidential prerogative in the field of foreign policy did not cause a serious breach in the constitutional system as long as the nation's standing armies were small and foreign relations played a minor role in American political affairs. But with the increasing importance of foreign policy in modern times and the tremendous growth of the armed forces in recent years came a corresponding growth in the importance of the presidential office. The actual authority of the president greatly expanded during the two world wars and continued to expand during the cold war that followed World W a r II. Its further expansion is inevitable if the active practice of power politics in America's international relations and preparations for an eventual third world war are to dominate the political scene. It is in this ill-defined area of discretionary presidential power that there is the greatest danger of the abuse of power under the American constitutional system. This is the situation that gives importance to the reaction of a worldwide organization of peace on the conduct of government in the United States under the constitution. If the authority of the president is not to become excessively expanded and throw the constitutional system dangerously out of balance, new kinds of power will have to be found that are capable of redressing the failing balance of the old. Otherwise, some form of guided democracy seems inevitable in no distant future. It is not surprising that serious interest in the drastic limitation of armaments and the better organization of peace should manifest itself in American politics. The blessings of American liberty, a realistic pacifist may well believe, can become more secure under an acceptable system of world peace under law. From the specifically American viewpoint the proper measure

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for dealing with the impending crisis is to replace an inefficient system of imperialistic international law with an efficient system of genuine world law. International law, as it developed after the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, became associated with the interests and policies of the Western imperial powers. The accompanying development of the convenient doctrine of absolute state sovereignty produced a system of international legal relations favorable to the operations of self-centered and aggressive empires. But two ruinous world wars destroyed these empires and made obsolete the legal system under which they had flourished. A system of law that has never possessed more than an uncertain moral authority needs to be replaced with a system that can impose beneficial limitations on the arbitrary powers of so-called sovereign national states. The most practicable means of accomplishing such a change in the discredited system of imperialistic international relations is to strengthen the existing United Nations Organization so that it may exercise suitable lawmaking and peace-keeping powers efficiently. It is not important that the precise extent of these powers or that the precise form of the accompanying institutional arrangements be known in advance. Under favorable circumstances competent statesmen can manage to bring about the desired changes if public opinion in the leading countries demands it of them. The task for realistic pacifists is to encourage the development of the worldwide sense of community that must precede the formation of an effective public opinion. Practical politicians will do the rest of their work for them. It is not possible to create efficient political structures and processes that will support a worldwide reign of law in matters of worldwide concern without at the same time restoring the equilibrium of the American constitutional system. Effective world law means acceptable guidelines for the president in the exercise of his quasi-royal powers in the field of foreign affairs. Instead of excessively wide and ill-defined discretionary author-

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ity over international relations, there will be exemplary processes of fact-finding, mediation, and conciliation in controversial situations which threaten the peace of the world; convenient arrangements for getting helpful advisory opinions from impartial judges; a world court with incontestable jurisdiction over justiciable conflicts under world law; and authoritative rules of good behavior for parties to disputes which have been traditionally regarded as suitable for settlement by appeals to arms. World politics, like national politics in its proper field, will provide attractive opportunities for master politicians to adjust dangerous conflicts of interest involving more than a single country by legislative action acceptable to the peoples concerned. Thus the president of the United States can become at last as law-abiding a servant of the American people in his dealings with foreign affairs as in his dealings with domestic affairs. Worldwide recognition of the obsolescence of war between major powers armed with the most modern weapons, and of the bankruptcy of power politics as formerly practiced by imperialistic statesmen of the major powers, is the foundation, not only of an effective world security system, but also of a more perfect system of democracy in America. There is no genuine freedom for self-governing states in the contemporary world, not even for states as strong as the United States of America, except within a well-designed system of world peace through world law. There are no adequate checks against the abuse of power by the rulers of so-called sovereign states in their relations with one another, not even by the rulers of states with such wellbalanced systems of constitutional government as the American commonwealth, except under the rule of world law. Rational world organization; a universal sense of security; general and complete disarmament: these three are inextricably bound together in this matchless age of thermonuclear bombs and worldwide communications satellites. The American people, working together with the other intelligent peoples of the world, can

American Government and World Order

[21

share in the blessings of universal ordered liberty; standing by themselves alone, they cannot be sure of maintaining even those liberties heretofore taken for granted as theirs. Nevertheless, any judgment by Americans on the outlook for a better world order through general and complete disarmament as envisaged in the official American disarmament plan will weigh carefully the probable effect of a monopolistic world peace force on the security and other special interests of the United States. This judgment must take into account the cumulative impact of entangling foreign commitments on the power and behavior of American presidents.1 It must take into account also the price of national liberty in a world where national armaments are growing ever more dangerous to their possessors as well as to others.2 It must take into account further the changing relations between national and international government.3 Eventually it must take into account likewise the effect of holding worldwide popular elections and of organizing worldwide political parties on the interests of the United States.4 1. 2. 3. 4.

See See See See

Part One, Chapter 1, of this volume. Part One, Chapter 2. Part One, Chapter 3. Epilogue to this volume.

I. THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN COMMITMENTS ON THE PRESIDENCY

The magnitude of the foreign commitments of the United States since the end of the war far exceeds anything that was anticipated only a few years ago. The plans for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration reveal how dimly the most intelligent statesmen in the midst of the war could foresee the future needs of the peoples at the scene of hostilities. A clearer understanding of the postwar needs of the British brought agreement on a more generous and realistic program for the relief and rehabilitation of that one of the European peoples whose plight first aroused the American people to awareness that their sympathies and their interests were closely allied in a policy of foreign aid. The astonishing speed with which the British ran through their credits under this program gave sharp warning that much more would be required of the United States unless the policy of foreign aid were to be repudiated. The sudden abandonment of the U N R R A experiment could be explained only on the assumption that, in the light of unexpected necessities, more heroic measures were to be adopted. The acceptance of a more active role by the United States in NOTE: This paper is reprinted from International Commitments and National Administration (Charlottesville: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1949), pp. 23-38.

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foreign relief and rehabilitation was prompt and decisive. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was tacitly pushed aside. First, the Greek-Turkish Aid Act of 1947, then the much more ambitious Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 with its various provisions for aid to western Europe, to the Near East, and to China, and finally the proposed North Atlantic pact, implemented the new policy with assurances of economic and military assistance on a scale without precedent in time of peace. Billions of dollars were to be appropriated and spent in the course of a few years. American economic and military missions were to be scattered far and wide. GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETION

The impact of these mounting commitments on the presidency was immediate and direct: one important effect was a prodigious growth of the president's discretionary authority. It was inevitable that wide discretionary authority should be delegated to the president — much wider than was customary in the field of domestic legislation or would have been deemed prudent even in the field of foreign relations only a few years ago. The practice of granting carefully defined authority, illustrated by the neutrality acts of the nineteen-thirties, was cast aside, and the broader precedent of the Joint Resolution of 1934 was followed. By this resolution congress authorized the president to impose an embargo on the sale of munitions to the countries at war in the Chaco, when he should find that such an embargo might "contribute to the re-establishment of peace between those countries"; this delegation of authority certainly left a wide range of discretion to the president. LEND-LEASE:

A MODEL FOR LATER LEGISLATION

The model for the recent legislation was the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. The significance of this epochal piece of legislation

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upon the distribution of power between the president and the congress in the field of foreign relations has been made clear by Robert E. Sherwood in a chapter in his instructive book, Roosevelt and Hopkins, significantly entitled, "The Common-Law Alliance": "There was little serious argument over the essential principle of giving aid to Britain, Greece, or China. The big sticking point was over the provision that Lend-Lease could be extended to 'any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.'" Sherwood's comment emphasizes the importance of this provision. "That," he declares, "put the decision squarely in the President's hands; it meant that, if he so decided (as he eventually did), aid could be rendered to the Soviet Union." 1 It meant that the president could commit the country to a policy which the congress not only had not expressly authorized, but presumably would have refused to authorize at that time, if the question had been presented to it. Such a grant of power enabled the president to take all measures short of war in aid of Britain in her war against Germany and presently also in aid of the Soviet Union in her war against Germany. These were very important decisions which the president was authorized to make at his discretion; it is difficult to imagine a more important delegation of power to the president except that to engage in war itself, if and when he finds acts of war to be necessary and proper in the public interest. The recent legislation, committing the United States to the new policy of foreign aid makes the most of the example of the Lend-Lease Act. The Greek-Turkish Aid Act of 1947 provides that "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the president may from time to time when he deems it in the interest of the United States furnish assistance to Greece and Turkey, upon 1. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins Dunlap, Inc., i960).

(New York: Grosset &

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request of their governments and upon terms and conditions determined by him," in the form of loans, credits, grants, or otherwise, by detailing civilian and military personnel, and by other means. The president is directed to withdraw aid under certain circumstances and may of course terminate all assistance at any time, if he finds that his conditions are not being met to his satisfaction. Assistance may also be terminated by concurrent resolution of the two houses of the congress, even though the president might be disposed to continue it. Beyond this congress has no control over the determination of policy by the president, except to refuse to appropriate the necessary money or to impeach him. The delegation of wide discretionary authority to the president is carried further by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. Title I, the Economic Cooperation Act, contains a declaration of general policy designed to give the president some guidance in the exercise of his discretion under the act. The act also specifies its immediate purposes: namely, to promote production, to further the soundness of currencies, and to facilitate international trade. It further provides for the appointment of an administrator for economic cooperation, who possesses authority to determine requirements and makes programs "under the control of the President." Subject to the provisos that "no assistance to the participating countries herein contemplated shall seriously impair the economic stability of the United States," and that all assistance shall be dependent upon "continuity of cooperation among countries participating in the program," the president seems to have a free hand in the development of the policy of economic cooperation with western Europe. But Title IV, the China Aid Act, goes further. It authorizes "additional" aid to China, that is, military aid, through grants of money "on such terms as the President may determine and without regard to the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948" within the

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limits of the appropriation contained in the act. The difference between this delegation of authority and that of power to make war itself is hardly perceptible. The ancient royal prerogative of the British king in the field of international relations is more explicit, but little, if any, more ample. Its exercise, however, unlike that of the discretionary power of the president, is now contingent upon the advice and consent of responsible ministers.

HAPHAZARD ORGANIZATION OF OFFICIAL

THOUGHT

There has been no uniform policy concerning the publication of the facts and considerations on the basis of which the president exercises his wide discretionary authority in the field of foreign affairs. The organization of official thought in this field of presidential action has been haphazard and inchoate. The decisions affecting economic aid have on the whole been well fortified with evidence concerning the needs to be met and the results to be expected from the proposed grants of aid. Before the Marshall Plan bore fruit in the form of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 and the Economic Cooperation Administration, there were the illuminating reports by the Committee for European Economic Cooperation, the Harriman and Krug Committees, and the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid. The public was in an excellent position to understand the policy decisions of the administration and to give them intelligent support. Presidential decisions affecting military aid, on the other hand, have not been supported by adequate evidence previously communicated to the public. Even the sources of the advice on which the president presumably has relied in reaching his decisions have not been clearly disclosed. W h e n Winston Churchill advised a change of policy in his famous Westminster College address in March of 1946 at Fulton, Missouri, the immediate

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public reaction was unfavorable, and the president hastened to disclaim any responsibility for his distinguished guest's recommendations. A year later, when the president suddenly urged congress to adopt the so-called Truman Doctrine as the basis of a new policy, the explanation offered by the administration was that the British government was no longer able to give the necessary aid to Greece and Turkey. The public was left in the dark concerning the reasons for the original adoption of the policy by the British government and the causes of its failure to achieve its objectives with the resources at its disposal. Another important decision reached on the basis of evidence not previously disclosed to the public was that concerning the continuance of military aid to the Kuomintang government of China. General Marshall, on his return from China before becoming secretary of state, had published an unfavorable report on the Kuomintang government; but the subsequent report by General Wedemeyer, to which great importance had been attached at one time, was never made public. Military aid was freely extended when the Kuomintang seemed still to have a chance to unify the country. The dismal reversal in the fortunes of the government at Nanking, apparently sudden but long foreseen by many observers, compelled the American government to change its policy with little notice to the public of the grounds for a change at that time rather than earlier or later. It was obvious that neither the public nor the congress could have exerted much influence upon the presidential action. Whether aid should be continued, and if so on what conditions — decisions which could be conclusive on the main question of peace or war — remained within the discretionary authority of the president. The China Aid Act of 1948, as the editor of Life Magazine plainly implied in a widely noticed editorial urging more drastic measures of intervention, practically delegated to the president the power to create a state of war.

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INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS

The importance of the decisions which the foreign commitments of the American government impose upon the president is likely to increase. Consider the implications of American policy regarding international control of atomic energy. A report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board, dealing with the lessons of "Operations Crossroads," has been in the hands of the president for some time. Rumors have been circulating that in the opinion of members of this board the tests of atomic bombs at Bikini call for radical developments in the control of American foreign policy. One of the authors of the report published an article in the Atlantic Monthly, demanding to be informed why the report had not been made public. If the report contained a recommendation that power should be delegated to the president under certain determinate circumstances to declare war (or, what amounts to the same thing, to recognize the existence of a state of war) lest the country be caught at a serious disadvantage at the outbreak of hostilities in the coming age of atomic warfare, the reluctance of the president to precipitate a public discussion of this delicate subject can be imagined. But is it desirable that he should assume the possession of such a power without previous public discussion? The importance of determining in advance whether the power to declare war is really vested in the president is obvious. Under the proposed North Atlantic pact the president is likely to find himself presently in a position throughout western Europe similar to that in which he was placed in the Far East by the China Aid Act of 1948. Large sums of money will be put at his disposal to complete the rearming of west European countries. The obligation, implicit in the United Nations Charter, to go to their aid with appropriate military forces if they become the victims of

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aggression will be accepted as explicitly as possible by a treaty made under the authority of the United States. Little will remain of practical importance of the constitutional power of the congress to make the actual declaration of war. It may be that the essential question has already been decided in principle as well as in fact. The power of the president to make many important decisions in the field of foreign relations, according to the supreme court, is derived from a different source than those portions of the executive power which relate to domestic affairs. In the Curtiss-Wright Export Company case, decided in 1936, the opinion of the court seemed to say that the president's power to intervene in the war between Bolivia and Paraguay in the interest of international peace did not depend upon any affirmative grant by congress or by the constitution itself, but was derived directly from the law of nations. Whether the congress has the practical capacity to keep the power to declare war in its own hands, even if it has the will to do so, may be questionable. But there can be no question concerning the desirability of establishing procedures designed to secure due deliberation on the part of the President in the exercise of whatever discretionary authority he may possess over the moneys and armed forces placed under his control in pursuance of recent foreign commitments.

CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO

PRESCRIBE

ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES

Congress has not failed to recognize the importance of improving the procedures in accordance with which the president exercises his wide discretionary authority in the field of foreign relations. The organization and procedures for administering the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 were left to be determined by the president, but a beginning was made with the development of more deliberate procedures in the Bretton Woods Agreement Act of

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1945. T h e National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems was established with the duty to recommend to the president general policy directives for the guidance of the representatives of the United States on the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This council consists of three cabinet members, the secretary of the treasury (who acts as chairman), the secretary of state, and the secretary of commerce, together with the chairman of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, the chairman of the Board of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, and (since 1948) the administrator for economic cooperation. T h e effect of this arrangement is to take away from the president's cabinet an important area of public policy and vest it in a body of cabinet rank which is authorized to meet without the presence of the president himself. T h e result of this division of power upon the authority and responsibility of the president is dubious. T h e National Advisory Council has a clear mandate to advise, but the president has no enforceable obligation to listen to the advice, much less to heed it. Apparently he remains as free as before to issue such instructions as he pleases to the American representatives on the fund and the bank. More important in the guidance of presidential discretion are the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board, established by the National Security A c t of 1947. T h e council includes, besides the president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the three secretaries for the several armed services, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board. T h e president is authorized to add other members, particularly the chairmen of the Munitions Board and of the Research and Development Board. T h e N S R B

includes,

besides its chairman, seven of the regular cabinet members (all except the attorney general and the postmaster general). T h e function of the N S C is to advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating

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to the national security. This might cover almost anything that could be involved in the performance of foreign commitments under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 or the proposed North Atlantic pact. The function of the N S R B is to advise the president concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization. This might cover almost anything in the field of national planning that could affect the productive capacity of the country in a future war. It differs from earlier legislat i o n — like the National Defense Act of 1916, which created the cabinet committee called the Council of National Defense — by adding a chairman from outside the cabinet. This chairman could easily become an assistant president in fact, like the director of the Office of W a r Mobilization and Reconversion, Mr. Byrnes, during World W a r II. Another advisory agency is provided by the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948: this is the Public Advisory Board, the duty of which is to advise the administrator for economic cooperation on "general or basic policy matters." This board consists of the administrator together with not more than twelve other members of "broad and varied experience in matters affecting the public interest," appointed by the president and senate. It is to meet at least once a month and will presumably make its advice to the administrator a matter of public record. The relations between the administrator and the secretary of state under this act are none too clear, but the ultimate responsibility of the president is made clear enough by a provision in the act that differences between the two officers shall be referred to the president for final decision. T h e need for better organization of official thought before action by the president in the exercise of his great discretionary authority in the field of foreign affairs has received impressive recognition. T h e effects of the procedures established, however, are uncertain. The N S C is heavily loaded with advisers connected with the military establishment, and is furnished with a

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permanent military staff drawn from the army, navy, and air force. Its advice inevitably reflects a militaristic approach to the problems arising out of the various commitments for foreign aid, both military and economic. W i t h military leadership in the state department, also, a suspicion could hardly fail to arise abroad that the foreign policy of the United States is more concerned with winning the next war than with settling by political methods the controversies which might lead to war. The National Security Resources Board may be regarded as an actual rival to the council, as well as a potential rival to the cabinet itself. Its chairman, if a man of superior intelligence and force of character, could even become a rival to the president. T h e president of course could legally dismiss him if he threatened to get out of hand, but this the president might find impracticable if his dissatisfaction with the chairman grew out of the latter's strength rather than out of any demonstrated weakness. The board is in effect a permanent agency of national planning on a great scale. Equipped with a competent staff and vigorous, farsighted leadership, it could become a center for the development of policy capable of rendering services of inestimable value to the president or of causing him grave vexation and embarrassment in the discharge of his heavy responsibilities..

M O V E M E N T TO PREVENT OF PRESIDENTIAL

DISPERSION

CONTROL

It is not surprising that the president's official advisers in matters of administrative organization and procedure should warn him against the establishment of offices by act of congress which threaten the disintegration of his control over the executive branch of the government. Twelve years ago President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management reported against statutory arrangements tending to hinder the President from maintaining the integrity of his administration. It advised

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him to keep the control of his official advisers in his own hands and sought to help him make his control more effective by furnishing him with administrative assistance of various kinds for the better supervision of executive agencies. The Administrative Reorganization Act of 1939 and the War Powers Act of 1941 gave him a comparatively free hand in the organization of his executive office and of emergency agencies made necessary by the war. President Roosevelt was particularly successful in keeping a free hand for dealing with the various kinds of advisers upon whom he depended for assistance in the performance of his gigantic task. The Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government has now completed its survey of the existing arrangements and is bringing in a series of reports on current problems of administrative organization and procedure. It seems to be following the lead of President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management, and to be likely to recommend a stricter adherence to the constitutional theory of the presidency than is reflected in the recent legislation of the congress. It apparently recognizes the dangers in the statutory creation of advisory bodies which disturb the traditional relations between the president and those whom he chooses to consult for advice. The Hoover commission, judging by its early reports, would strengthen the primacy of department heads within their own fields of action and enhance the competence of the cabinet as the principal body of presidential advisers. The creation of a cabinet secretariat and other improvements in the executive office of the president would be a solid contribution to the realization of these ends. Yet no improvements in administrative management seem adequate to meet the crisis in executive organization and procedure precipitated by the extraordinary growth of the president's discretionary authority in recent years. The LaFollette-Monroney Committee on the Organization of Congress recognized one

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important defect in the present arrangements when it recommended in its report to the Seventy-ninth Congress the formation of a joint legislative-executive council. The President needs to maintain closer relations with the congressional leaders if he is to preserve their confidence in his capacity to make satisfactory use of his wide discretionary authority in the performance of foreign commitments under recent legislation. Unfortunately the house leaders refused to go along with the senate in making the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 a vehicle for inaugurating the modest experiments in legislative-executive collaboration recommended by this able committee. Their recalcitrance strengthens an uneasy suspicion that the problem of preventing the discretionary authority of the president in the field of foreign relations from becoming as arbitrary as the British royal prerogative used to be in matters of war and peace cannot be solved by any changes in the internal organization or procedure of the executive branch of the government.

A MORE SATISFACTORY

SOLUTION

A harbinger of a more satisfactory solution of the problem may be found in the legislation regulating the relations between the president and the United Nations. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 recognized the acceptance by the United States of important political commitments to the other member nations. The president was expressly authorized to instruct the American representatives in the General Assembly and in the various councils of the United Nations how to vote on the questions that might come before them. But he was not to appoint these representatives without the advice and consent of the senate, or to enter into agreements with the Security Council governing the use of American contingents to enforce peace without the approval of the congress. The congress was manifestly determined to reserve to itself suitable opportunities to

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review and, if deemed desirable, to modify the policies of the president as disclosed in his actions under the United Nations Charter. It was determined also that its views on questions of international policy should not be ignored by the president. But at the same time congress was asserting its purpose to try the processes of open discussion at the meetings of the United Nations councils and of the General Assembly in the hope of finding another acceptable way of limiting the discretionary authority of the president in the field of international relations. T h e U.N. must be regarded as something more than an instrument for collective action in the interest of world peace: its procedures offer a remedy also for what threatens to become, under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, a serious defect in the American system of checks and balances. There is a lesson in the embarrassing experience of President Truman with his sudden proposal at the height of the presidential campaign to send Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow. There was more than one precedent for the use of the chief justice of the United States as a special emissary in the cause of peace. President Washington sent Chief Justice Jay to London and President Adams sent Chief Justice Ellsworth to Paris in the hope of averting war by the timely settlement of international disputes. Could not President Truman wisely follow their example as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated under the strain of conflicting purposes and clashing interests? The answer of course was that the president was no longer free to send a special emissary on such a mission, when the regularly appointed representatives of the United States were actually engaged in an effort to settle the same disputes at the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. The discretionary authority of the President is not so wide as it would be if there were no agencies under the authority of the U.N. for the settlement of international disputes. T h e discretionary authority of the president cannot develop into anything like the ancient

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British royal prerogative in the field of international relations while the United Nations provides an open forum for the public discussion of the grievances of the nations against one another. It may be said that the United Nations has not yet proved its capacity to settle disputes between great powers which threaten the peace of the world, and may eventually fail to give the security sought by its founders. It does not follow that the effort should be abandoned to mitigate the dangerous impact of foreign commitments on the presidency by limiting the arbitrary exercise of presidential power in the field of international relations. On the contrary, greater efforts should be made to strengthen the United Nations to the end that an unforeseen defect in the American system of constitutional government may be cured by timely arrangements for the redistribution of power in harmony with the traditional spirit of American institutions. The American system of the separation of powers has proved its worth in the field of domestic affairs. The time has come to perfect the system in its application to the field of foreign affairs.

2. THE PRICE OF LIBERTY

Thoughtful Americans have never been satisfied with the established methods of conducting the nation's foreign affairs. The original method, embodied in the constitution by the founding fathers, was designed by men who were more concerned to provide for the national defense than to secure novel privileges for the representatives of the people in the management of their relations with foreign potentates. They did not anticipate the extraordinary progress of American democracy in the nineteenth century, nor did they foresee the remarkable adaptation of the original republican institutions to the needs of a democratic people through the development of the party system. The constitutional arrangements for the conduct of foreign affairs were deliberately made less democratic than those for the conduct of domestic affairs. They were also less adaptable to the requirements of a more democratic age through the development of a system of responsible party government. In President Washington's administration the relations between the United States and the major European powers became the paramount issue in national politics. The President gave the constitutional arrangements for the conduct of foreign NOTE: This paper is reprinted from America Learns to Lead, Proceedings of the Institute of World Affairs, 32 (December, 1 9 5 5 ) , 1 7 4 - 1 8 1 , with the permission of the copyright holder, the University of Southern California.

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affairs a fair trial. He understood as well as any man what the framers of the constitution had had in mind when they made the chief executive the principal agent of the people in the determination of foreign policy and rightly made strenuous efforts to stop political partisanship at the water's edge. But President Washington was eventually compelled to make support for the Jay Treaty the decisive test of loyalty to the administration and to substitute party government for constitutional government in foreign as well as in domestic affairs. T h e original constitutional arrangements for the conduct of foreign affairs broke down even more quickly than the original arrangements for the election of presidents. Party government in the area of foreign policy eventually proved as great a disappointment as the original system of constitutional government. Happily, foreign policy during the century between the end of the W a r of 1 8 1 2 and the beginning of our involvement in World W a r I furnished few paramount issues to distract American politicians from the ordinary course of the partisan struggle for power. But in 1844 and again in 1 9 1 6 our relations with foreign countries, despite the efforts of prudent politicians to keep them out of partisan politics, supplied the paramount issues in the presidential compaigns. T h e war with Mexico, which logically and quickly followed the Democratic victory in 1844, produced unmanageable dissensions in the victorious party and led to its fall from power at the next elections. The war with Germany, which even more quickly and perhaps with not inferior logic, followed Democratic victory in 1916, brought even greater disaster to the victorious party. Failure to stop partisan conflict at the water's edge in time of war, no matter how successfully the war might be conducted, was punished with prompt and catastrophic defeat at the polls. The nation's politicians learned their lesson, and in 1940, when involvement in foreign wars again seemed imminent, the principal leaders of both major parties joined in concerted efforts to lay aside the

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conventional system of partisan government in foreign affairs and to substitute a new system of bipartisan government. Bipartisanship received a systematic trial during the second world war. President Roosevelt, who had observed at close range the grave defects of the traditional partisanship in World War I, made vigorous and intelligent efforts to keep it out of World War II. He introduced prominent Republicans into important executive positions; he kept partisan politics out of military appointments; and in planning the general international organization which was to replace the defunct League of Nations and to constitute for Americans the principal fruit of victory, he chose his confidential advisers regardless of party. At the close of the war the bipartisan system seemed to have served the people well. The treaty embodying the United Nations Charter was promptly ratified by an all but unanimous senate. Under President Roosevelt's successors the bipartisan system worked less well. At first, to be sure, Secretary Byrnes and General Marshall maintained good relations between the state department and the congressional party leaders. The former conducted the difficult negotiations with the Soviet Union over international regulation of atomic energy with the support of both parties, and the latter enjoyed ungrudging bipartisan support in the development of the Marshall Plan. The nearly unanimous approval of the Vandenberg Resolution by the senate in June, 1948, as the presidential campaign was about to begin, was a spectacular triumph of bipartisanship. But the normal stresses and strains of domestic politics gradually weakened the disposition of partisans in the executive branch of the government and in congress to collaborate in the formulation of foreign policy. The overpublicized Truman Doctrine was sprung upon an astonished congress without benefit of consultations with Republican leaders; and the White House proposal, as the presidential campaign was drawing to a close, to send Chief Justice Vinson on a special diplomatic mission to Moscow with the im-

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plied promise to keep the country out of war, at the very moment when Secretary Marshall was in the midst of a foreign ministers' conference in Paris, nearly ended all pretense of respect for the bipartisan system. The failure of the Republicans to make a partisan campaign issue out of the administration's faux pas can be explained only by their serene assurance of effortless superiority on election day. Truman's triumph over Dewey at the polls dispelled the serenity; and Dean Acheson's appointment to the office of secretary of state marked the beginning of a new era in the conduct of foreign affairs in which a partisan system of any kind seemed destined to frustration and a return to the original plan of constitutional government inevitable. Under President Eisenhower the changing methods of managing our foreign relations completed a full circle. The Democratic party leaders in the senate eventually warned the President that Democratic cooperation on foreign policy would have to be based on what they called true "bipartisanship as well as information." Senator Lyndon B. Johnson served notice on the administration, after a meeting of the Democratic Policy Committee, that without "real bipartisanship" on the President's part he could not count on Democratic cooperation. In the Eightythird Congress both partisanship and bipartisanship became equally impracticable. The administration quietly reverted to the original method of conducting our foreign affairs, as practiced in the beginning by President Washington. The conduct of American foreign policy is further complicated by the establishment of the United Nations. The president of the United States is now not only the commander-in-chief of our own armed forces but also the commander, actual or potential, of armed forces operating under the direction of the United Nations. He thus has duties, and presumably also powers, outside of and in addition to those he possesses under the Constitution of the United States. He may seem to be conducting our relations with foreign countries in the manner originally contem-

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plated by the framers of the constitution. In fact his task is more complex than that which confronted President Washington in 1789, and the problem of enforcing a suitable responsibility to the congress and to the country is correspondingly more difficult. The participation of the United States in the U.N. causes other worries among nostalgic admirers of the Age of Washington. The president may negotiate such treaties with other member nations as the projected covenant to enforce the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, if ratified by the senate, might disturb accepted interpretations of traditional American rights in some of our states. Moreover, the power to make executive agreements with the United Nations Organization itself may be used to enter into arrangements that, even if in conflict with state laws, might be regarded by the supreme court as part of the supreme law of the land. Agreements of this kind, relating to the supply of armed forces to aid the U.N. in resisting international aggression, require the approval of congress, but such approval is not now required for other executive agreements. These various possibilities increase the dissatisfaction among backward-looking people with the present methods of conducting the foreign relations of the United States. The remedy most strongly supported in congress for this unsatisfactory situation in the management of our foreign relations is a proposed amendment to the constitution, called after its principal sponsor, Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, the Bricker Amendment. In its present form, as introduced at the beginning of the Eighty-fourth Congress, the Bricker Amendment calls for two important changes in the distribution of power to conduct our foreign affairs as originally planned by the framers of the constitution. The first proposed change would prevent a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with the constitution or is not made in pursuance thereof from becoming a part of the supreme law of the land or having any force or effect. The second proposed change would prevent a treaty or other in-

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ternational agreement from becoming effective as internal law in the United States except through a separate act of congress, which would be valid under the constitution in the absence of any international agreement. The effect of these proposed changes, if adopted, would be to weaken the office of president, regarded as the principal agency of the people in the management of their relations with the outside world. The first of these two proposed changes would put the president at a material disadvantage in his dealings with foreign governments. The official spokesmen for foreign powers engaged in international negotiations possess all the authority enjoyed by independent governments under the recognized law of nations, and it was plainly the intention of the framers of our constitution to confer the same authority upon the official spokesmen for the United States. Consequently the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, possesses a treaty-making power which is not subject to the substantive constitutional limitations resting upon the lawmaking powers of the president and congress when dealing with ordinary internal affairs. His power to make executive agreements not requiring the consent of the senate is equally broad. If the Bricker Amendment were adopted, such important international measures as the migratory wild fowl treaty or perhaps even the treaty containing the United Nations Charter could be adopted hereafter only by means of the slow and laborious process of constitutional amendment, requiring ratification by three-fourths of the states before becoming effective. The second of these proposed changes would in effect put a new and substantial constitutional limitation upon the power of the supreme court. Under present practice the supreme court may decide all questions concerning the effect of executive agreements upon the activities of state officers operating under state laws. For instance, the supreme court enforced the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement providing for the disposition of the

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assets of a Russian-owned insurance company which had done business in the United States under the laws of New York in a different manner from what was proper under those laws. The supreme court in appropriate cases can give effect to other presidential agreements in preference to conflicting provisions in state laws. If the Bricker Amendment were adopted, the supreme court could give effect to such presidential agreements only when incorporated in an act of Congress, which would be valid in the absence of international agreement. It is not surprising that our presidents have not been alone in opposing the adoption of these drastic changes in the constitutional distribution of powers in the field of foreign affairs. The advocates of the Bricker Amendment profess to be concerned not only with what they regard as bad precedents established in past cases, but also, and even more gravely, with what might result from the further aggrandizement of presidential power in the future. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948) or future international covenants designed to provide for the better enforcement of the provisions of the declaration might serve in the hands of a compliant supreme court, they fear, to bring about the subordination of state laws regulating the relations between the individual and the state, or between persons within the states, to regulations of a different kind which the government of the United States would not have the power to enforce in the absence of a treaty with other members of the United Nations. The Genocide Convention, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1949, seemed to supporters of the Bricker Amendment a horrible example of such a threat to the supremacy of state laws within the field reserved to the states by the Constitution of the United States. These fears were not shared by other senators who, when the Bricker Amendment was debated in the senate in the Eighty-third Congress, first substituted Senator Walter F. George's much milder

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proposal to limit presidential power in the field of foreign affairs, and then rejected the George Amendment by a narrow but decisive majority. These senators, like most Americans, possessed confidence in the sound judgment and good sense of the presidents of the United States, of the judges of the supreme court, and of most members of the senate itself. To weaken the presidency in its conduct of our foreign relations is clearly the wrong way to secure the blessings of liberty for the American people under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. W e need presidents who can act promptly and vigorously in international emergencies. W e do not want them to be handicapped by substantive limitations upon their authority under the constitution, as designed by its framers, or by procedural restrictions which will make their task even more difficult than it has been heretofore. If the methods of managing our foreign affairs are unsatisfactory, as indeed they are, we want changes which will not expose our liberties to greater perils than have ever threatened through alleged abuses of the presidential power to make treaties and executive agreements. W e want changes based upon a correct appreciation of the price of liberty itself. The logical and practical alternative to the weakening of the presidency is the strengthening of the United Nations: the price of liberty is not only eternal vigilance, but also the observance of law. This is no less true of the relations between nations than of those between individual men and women. Men do not secure the blessings of liberty by asserting a right to do as they please in matters in which other men are concerned. They cannot enjoy a true liberty in the society of their fellow men except under law. Nor can a sovereign people enjoy a true liberty in the society of nations except under law. The fatal defect in the United Nations Charter, regarded from this viewpoint, is clear. It is the encouragement afforded to a narrow interpretation of the purposes and principles of the

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U.N. by the language of the first and seventh sections of Article Two. The former section states that the United Nations Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. Unhappily the word "sovereign," as used in this connection, is what Theodore Roosevelt called a weasel word: it sucks the meaning out of the context. How does the sovereign equality of the members of the United Nations differ from their equality, unqualified by the mysterious adjective "sovereign"? The mystery would be dispelled if this section of the charter provided simply for the equality of the members before the law of nations. Then it would be obvious that the first principle of the U.N. is to secure the blessings of liberty for all the nations in the modern world by securing their equality before the law. A narrow interpretation of this first principle leads to the ruinous conclusion that a member of the United Nations possesses a right to put its special and local interests ahead of the general welfare of mankind. A universal claim to such a right reduces the family of nations to a state of anarchy. All the other high purposes and principles of the general international Organization are downgraded to the level of empty promises. They sound sweet to the ear but lack operational meaning in the presence of an international crisis. A narrow interpretation of the first principle of the U.N. Organization leads inevitably to an excessively broad interpretation of the seventh section of the second article of the charter. This section provides that nothing contained in the charter authorizes the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or requires the members to submit such matters to settlement under the charter. But what matters are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state? Any member of the United Nations taking a narrow view of the obligations of membership is apt to conclude that all questions concerning the interpreta-

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tion of this section are to be decided finally by each member for itself. Such a contention also sounds sweet in the ear of shortsighted individuals not rightly understanding the price of liberty. But it is fatal to harmony in the family of nations, and it sets up obstructive roadblocks in the way of the achievement of the purposes of the United Nations Organization. In an age of supersonic speeds and atomic weapons of unlimited lethal force it is not wise to let the general interests of mankind become the sport of so-called sovereign states claiming a self-determined right to do as they please in matters of universal concern. T h e common welfare of the nations calls for effective measures to secure the blessings of the kind of liberty that rests upon the observance of laws sanctioned by the general consent of mankind. There is no open road to such a liberty of the nations except through the strengthening of the United Nations Organization. Those who seek to preserve the liberty of the American people by piling up fresh obstacles in the way of fruitful cooperation between the president and the authorized agencies of the U . N . within their legitimate field of action mistake the teaching of the American experiment in the implementation of liberty. W h a t we need is not further constitutional limitation on the authority of the president acting as the agent of the people in foreign affairs; the real and urgent need is for more serviceable arrangements by which the president can act as the agent ot the United Nations in affairs in which the interests of the American people are held in common with the peoples of all the nations. T h e full price of liberty, it cannot be too often repeated, includes the observance of law. T h e important matter, if our inherited system of ordered liberty is to meet the challenge of this neotechnic age, is to make suitable improvements in our lawmaking processes. If atomic energy is to become the benevolent servant of a peaceful world instead of the tyrannical master of a world in arms, an effective system of international control

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is obviously indispensable. This involves the extension of international law to the end that freedom from fear of the atomic bomb may be secured to all the nations. Mankind cannot successfully assert its mastery over the new sources of physical power without developing new methods of generating and distributing political power. The price of other important international liberties is the same. There is now no rational alternative for those who understand the price of liberty but to strengthen the United Nations Organization and improve the processes for efficient cooperation between its guiding organs and the governments of its member states, including particularly the leader among them all, the government of the United States.

3. THE UNITED NATIONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

There are two radically different ways of approaching a discussion of the role of the United Nations in American foreign policy. One is to assume that the proper use of the international organization known as the U.N. is to promote the national interests of the United States, regardless of the interests of other nations except insofar as it may be in our own interest to give them consideration. A favorite slogan for such a policy is "America first." The other way to approach the problem is to assume that there are universal interests which the American people share with the other peoples of the world and which may be well served by common action with the spokesmen for other nations in the United Nations Organization. This way leads to recognition that all nations live in one world.

CONFLICTING

VIEWS

OF

THE

PUBLIC

INTEREST

The first way seems the more attractive to politicians and political theorists who pride themselves upon making what they NOTE: This paper was delivered as the Edmund J. James Lecture on Government at the University of Illinois, February 20, 1957; it was published in the University of Illinois Bulletin, vol. 55, no. 16 (October, 1957), pp. 3-22.

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claim to be a realistic approach to the problems of national policy. They often tell us that the idea of a truly public interest is an illusion. They contend that in reality the essence of politics is the struggle between private and special interests, each of which seeks to gain control of the power of the state in order to promote its particular ends, and that the victor in the struggle cloaks its triumph with a garment of respectability by calling its own interest the public interest. They contend further that to sophisticated observers the illusory nature of the idea of a public interest is apparent in the practical politics of every modern national state, where the processes of actual government involve a multitude of special interests among the people. They conclude that on the wide stage of world politics, public interest is an obvious sham and humbug. There have been in recent years an impressive number of writers holding this view, who have favored us with their socalled realistic views concerning American foreign policy. However, these writers do not offer the best examples of realism in· modern political literature. The most consistent and insistent in their adherence to so-called political realism are the leaders of international communism. The Marxist creed makes a virtue out of its denial of the reality of such concepts as national interests, national duty, and national honor. These leaders' dogmatic repudiation of obligations resting upon the moral force of such concepts leaves no room whatever for the idea of a worldwide public interest. It must not be supposed that the political regimes committed to international communism and hence to a course of action in world politics which they regard as genuinely realistic are unable for that reason to find any good in the United Nations. Quite the contrary! They have always recognized that the meetings of the Security Council and General Assembly afford most convenient opportunities for aggressive propaganda. Moreover, the veto power in the Security Council and the votes of communist

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delegations in the General Assembly are defensive weapons, which, although of limited efficacy, are not to be despised. Furthermore, the facilities of the U.N. headquarters can be used advantageously in private negotiations with spokesmen for other powers. The adherence of the communist bloc to the U.N. rests on the solid basis of a fixed conviction that participation in its proceedings can be made to serve the special interests of international communism everywhere. Communist leaders presumably believe that in reality the U.N. cannot command a higher loyalty than theirs. The official theorists of the Kremlin do not insist that there can never be a genuine public interest. It is only in countries where a class struggle rages and one of the classes dominates ithe others, according to their peculiar creed, that the public interest breaks down into a medley of private interests, one of wiiich is imposed upon the others in the name of justice and the general welfare. This must always be the case, they contend, in capitalistic states and also in dictatorships of the proletariat •during the period when hostile classes are in process of liquidation. But in the classless society, which will follow the proletarian dictatorship, private interests will disappear with the classes to which they belong. When the state, regarded as an instrument of class rule, ceases to exist, only the public interest, they argue, -will remain. Meanwhile international communists avowedly use the power of states under their control in the interests of their own party. Logically enough, by their methods of reasoning, the U.N., like other political structures, is regarded as an instrument of class rule, which they should exploit for their own purposes whenever they can. This extreme partisan view, repugnant as it is to the political instincts of the people of modern democracies like our own, contributes to a better understanding of the true nature of the public interest. Genuinely democratic peoples believe that the interests of the whole body of people in a democratic state are

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always and everywhere as real as those of any part of the people. Through democratic political processes, the government of such a state can adjust the conflicts of interest between individuals or groups in such a manner as to promote the general welfare of the whole body. Such adjustments of conflicting individual or group interests may serve the public interest in various ways. The standard list of public interests for Americans is that contained in the preamble to the federal constitution; justice, domestic tranquillity, the common defense, the general welfare, liberty — these are concepts full of meaning to Americans. These general concepts can be, and should be, particularized in more explicit forms; but, despite controversy over the particular forms, the conviction that governmental action ought to be and often is in the public interest is basic in the political faith of the American people. It is not necessary to prove that governmental action always is in the public interest in order to maintain the belief in the validity of the concept. What is necessary is faith in the capacity of democratic peoples to establish political processes which offer acceptable assurance that the public interest can be made to prevail over private, local, and special interests competing for public recognition. Politics in a modern democracy, we think, is an art by which the people may promote the public interest if they can equip their states with suitable political processes and procure the services of enlightened and public-spirited statesmen. It is not unreasonable, therefore, in a modern democracy to regard public office as a public trust. This view, in a well-constituted democracy, is no less realistic than the so-called political realism which denies the existence of a genuine public interest. It is also realistic to believe that it should be possible to act in the public interest in a general international organization as well as in particular national states. Statesmen who represent national states in an international organization will do well if they make the organization serve the special interests of their

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own particular states; but they will do better if they can identify their national interests with the universal interests of mankind. For they may then count on the ungrudging aid of statesmen from other countries with a similar understanding of the broader interests to be served. Anyone can understand the practical utility of an organization which can stop yellow fever or bubonic plague, wherever it may be found, before it spreads abroad and contaminates other nations. Anyone can understand the utility of an organization which can stop a little local war before it spreads and embroils a whole world in fratricidal slaughter. Anyone should be able to understand the desirability of utilizing a general international organization to protect and cherish all the universal interests of mankind. Since Wendell Willkie popularized the idea of one world, it has been the method of protecting and fostering worldwide public interests, not the fact of their existence, that has provoked controversy and differences of opinion among thoughtful people.

AMERICA FIRSTERS VS. ONE

WORLDERS

America firsters and one worlders alike, if they are really realistic, must agree that American foreign policy should be at least as tolerant of the United Nations as is that of the Soviet Union. The international communists get much publicity at little cost by utilizing the organs of the U.N. as amplifiers. T o be sure, they do not always use U.N. channels of communication when it might seem advantageous to do so. Their announcement in November of 1956 of the possibility of bombarding London and Paris with long range missiles, in evidence of their displeasure at the Anglo-French military operations in the area of the Suez Canal, might have been made during the discussions in the General Assembly which ended in the demand that the Anglo-French and Israeli forces be withdrawn from Egyptian territory. The Kremlin doubtless could time its announcement

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more precisely and issue it more quickly by broadcasting it from Moscow than by proclaiming it from the rostrum by the East River in New York. Whether its effect was greater is less certain. Those who know best are unlikely ever to tell whether public Soviet menaces, or private American remonstrances, or formal U.N. resolutions exerted the decisive influence on the British and French statesmen who so suddenly reversed their field in the critical hours of November 6, 1956. In general, however, the Soviets' persistence in propagating their peculiar views from the U.N. chambers attests their belief in the high value of that resounding communication medium. Is it not worth at least as much to the United States? It is difficult to understand the reasoning of those Americans who profess to believe that the proper answer to Russian propaganda at the United Nations is to get ourselves out of the U.N. and to get the U.N. out of our country. Do these confused persons really think that our cause is inferior to that of the Russians? Or that our advocates in the American delegation to the U.N. are incapable of presenting truth as forcibly as the Russians present error? Or that our own people, nurtured in the land of the free and the home of the brave, cannot stand exposure to hostile forensic attacks, even when their own champions are ready to rush to their defense? And should we deny ourselves the spectacular opportunity afforded by the rostrum of the U.N. for proclaiming to all the world the faith that is in us, because by our presence we make the same opportunity more valuable to those who compete with us for the attention and confidence of mankind? These questions answer themselves. It is more profitable to inquire not how little, but rather how much use of the U.N. should be made by those charged with the making and management of American foreign policy. This inquiry has become more urgent since the dramatic challenges to the authority of the U.N. in Hungary and Egypt in October, 1956. At first President Eisenhower chose to wait for action by

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the U.N. and to accept the findings and recommendations of the General Assembly even when these involved him in conflict with America's most important allies. But later, in announcing the Eisenhower Doctrine, he proposed a more independent course of action, putting greater reliance upon special military alliances though still keeping within the framework of the United Nations. Administration policy in recent months obviously gives no clear answer to our main question. In November, 1956, the government of the United States seemed to commit itself to the practice of making policy decisions, applying to the area of the Middle East, contingent upon the findings and determinations of the United Nations. President Eisenhower risked a grave breach of our good relations with Great Britain and France in order to oppose their resort to war as an instrument of their policy in the dispute with Egypt over the operation of the Suez Canal. He based his action in this case on the finding by the U.N. General Assembly that the Anglo-French attack upon Egypt was a violation of the United Nations Charter. There was no pretense by the President that this attack was a direct and immediate threat to the security of the United States. He justified his decision to go to the aid of the Egyptians on the broader ground that a properly constituted international authority, namely the U.N. General Assembly, had found such action to be in the general interest of mankind. In January of 1957, on the other hand, in announcing the Eisenhower Doctrine to congress, the President declared his intention, if congress approved, of giving economic and military aid to Middle Eastern nations on the basis of a unilateral finding by the American government that efforts by international communism to bring such nations under its domination constitute a danger to the security of the United States. In this instance President Eisenhower was following the precedent of

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the Truman Doctrine—: announced nearly ten years earlier — in proposing to take personal responsibility for finding the facts upon which the execution of the policy would rest. He proposed to do this, subject to the proviso that military force would not be used by the United States contrary to the United Nations Charter or to the recommendations of the Security Council or General Assembly. The distinction between the two Eisenhower policies is important. The former, adopted in November, 1956, involves the possibility of making war in support of action taken by the United Nations. The latter, proposed in January, 1957, involves the possibility of making war on the initiative of the United States, provided only that such warmaking is not opposed by the United Nations. In each of these two cases the choice of policy by the President may be defended on the ground that it was in the public interest. Each choice may be justified by the plea that the findings, upon the basis of which the public interest is determined, should be made by the most suitable agency. In the case where the public interest is a universal interest of mankind, the proper agency is that which best represents mankind. Where the public interest is primarily the interest of a particular nation, the proper agency is the one which best represents that nation. Upon this reasoning the existence of a threat to the peace of the world is best determined by the Security Council or General Assembly of the United Nations; and one involving the security of the United States is best determined by the president and congress of the United States. At this point a technical question arises. How far is it proper, under the Constitution of the United States, for the president to rely upon the U.N. for assistance in making and conducting American foreign policy? This question was recently discussed with characteristic candor and vigor by former President Tru-

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man in an article prepared for distribution by the North American Newspaper Alliance. 1 "The United Nations," he wrote, "was established largely through the initiative and support of the United States and has its home here. It is growing in influence and power as a force for peace. But," he added, "the United Nations was never intended to assume any of the burden of making foreign policy for the United States." This statement was made by Mr. Truman in the course of a discussion of the new Eisenhower Doctrine. Mr. Truman did not charge President Eisenhower with seeking to shift the burden of foreign policy-making to the U.N. On the contrary, he took pains to make clear his approval of the President's action in asking the congress in advance for authority to use the armed forces of the United States against a communist or communistdominated aggressor in the Middle East. This was similar to Mr. Truman's own request to congress for authority to resist communist aggression in Greece and Turkey. In both cases presidential action was to be contingent upon a call for help from the state threatened by international communism. In both cases also it was to be contingent upon a finding by the president that help was needed. There can be no doubt that it would not be proper under the American constitution for any of the constitutional authorities, which share the power to make foreign policy for the United States, to delegate their responsibility to an international agency. The constitutional powers conferred upon the president, the senate, and the congress as a whole, must be exercised by them and cannot be passed over to others. The president may constitutionally refuse to take action of any kind, if he thinks such inaction will be in the public interest, when wise and timely action might seem to be advantageous to the United States — as Mr. Truman thought had happened during the months preceding the hostilities in Egypt. But the president cannot ask the ι . N e w York Times, January 3, 1957,.pp. 1, 6.

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United Nations to take over any essential part of his office or to perform any of its constitutional duties. If this is all that President Truman meant when he wrote that the United Nations was never intended to assume any of the burden of making foreign policy for the United States, there can be no dissent from his dictum. But this dictum should not be construed to mean that the president cannot make his choice of policy in the field of foreign affairs contingent upon findings of fact by a suitable international agency, when proper standards of judgment have been provided for the guidance of the president in utilizing the designated agency. In cases of alleged aggression by one power against another, for instance, the president may constitutionally choose to act only when the United Nations has formally declared that an act of aggression has been committed. Or, he may refrain from adopting measures to reduce tension between different states in any area until he finds that the United Nations has investigated the situation in that area and recommended measures for redressing the grievances which have caused the tension. In such cases the decision to act, or not to act, is his. The choice of policy, though contingent upon the actions of others, is finally made on the responsibility of the president as prescribed by the constitution. In the Suez Canal case the President chose to support the finding and recommendations of the U.N. General Assembly when it found that the employment of military forces in the area of the canal by the British and French was contrary to the United Nations Charter. He chose not to commit himself to a policy concerning the future operation of the canal until the merits of various policies should have been duly considered by tfie U.N. In all this action, or inaction, he must be exonerated from any violation of the Truman dictum, rightly understood. Likewise, in the future, an American president may properly accept determinations by the United Nations that proposed ac-

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tion is in the general interest of mankind. If he wishes to make American foreign policy contingent upon such determinations, he may do so without violating the American constitution. Foreign policy for the United States will still be the product of decisions by the proper constitutional officers.

PROPER USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

What, then, will be the relationship between the U.N. Organization and the government of the United States in making American foreign policy? The Eisenhower Doctrine, like the Truman Doctrine, seems to put the security of the United States before the peace of the world. Under both doctrines the president reserves to the American government the authority to determine when to employ military force for the purpose of resisting aggression in a designated area. This authority, of course, is already possessed under Article Fifty-one of the United Nations Charter, which expressly reserves the right of individual and collective self-defense to all member nations. But the U.N. was organized by statesmen who believed, or professed to believe, that they should put the peace of the world before the security of any particular nation. In the light of their experience with warmakers, the universal interest of mankind seemed to transcend the special interest of any one state. Regarded from this point of view, the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines may be criticized more easily for making too little use of the U.N. Organization than for utilizing it too much. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, moreover, the president claims a new freedom to enter into military alliances with Middle Eastern states without further consultation with congress. This, indeed, seems to be the most important innovation introduced by the new doctrine. It reveals as great a lack of confidence in the ability of the congress to act promptly and

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effectively in case of an emergency in the Middle East as in that of the United Nations. But are we to release our president from the obligation to consult either congress or the U.N. before organizing warlike coalitions in the Middle East? D o we really wish to shift power from the congress to the commanderin-chief and the Pentagon without any effort to redress the balance by strengthening the authority of the U.N.? T h e proposed new relationship to congress under the Eisenhower Doctrine is a logical consequence of President Truman's experience with congress in the case of the so-called international police action in Korea. It is easy to understand why President Eisenhower should wish to avoid the charges of contempt of congress brought against President Truman at that time. President Truman's course of action, though doubtless technically correct, caused a sense of frustration among congressmen. On the other hand, President Truman's course of action in the Greek and Turkish cases, though more considerate of congressmen's feelings, was not compatible with that degree of promptness in action which has become necessary in this age of supersonic speeds and supercolossal explosives. But if we are to give the president greater independence of congress in the management of foreign policy, can we afford also to give him greater independence of the U.N. than is clearly consistent with the general interest of mankind? Ought we not rather to require him to make the utmost use of U . N . facilities that is consistent with the security of the United States? T h e answers to these questions should provide us with a better formula than we now possess for determining the role of the U . N . in American foreign policy. In subscribing to the United Nations Charter, the government of the United States accepted an obligation to comply with duly-made decisions of the Security Council and to give fair consideration to the recommendations of the General Assembly. T h e proper performance of this obligation in ordinary cases, in-

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volving simple breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, offers no great difficulty to our government. President Eisenhower's decision to support the resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly in November, 1956 — painful though it was — to censure the conduct of our best friends in the contemporary world, was generally regarded by Americans as necessary and proper. But people everywhere are recognizing more clearly that the coercion of belligerent states by military force, or even the mere intimidation of bellicose states by the threat of force, is a poor substitute for genuine peace. The conviction is certain to grow, that a better way to keep the peace is to promote the pacific settlement of international disputes, before they become threats to peace, by timely investigation of situations which may lead to friction and give rise to disputes. The aim must be to stop the drift toward war by the adoption of measures designed to improve relations between the parties before they become intolerable. W e Americans have shown great confidence in the practical efficacy of economic aid as an alternative to intimidation and violence in tranquilizing international relations. The Marshall Plan stands out in history as convincing evidence of our faith in this method of war prevention. But the prevention of war by political methods, particularly those involving economic measures, encounters formidable difficulties. It is difficult enough for a political agency, national or international, to determine how much economic aid should be extended to a needy nation with unfriendly neighbors, if the aid is actually to be in the public interest. Determining what conditions the aid should be extended under is still more difficult. In seeking a pacific settlement of the present disputes in the Middle East, we may not encounter excessive difficulties in finding the money to support a vigorous policy of economic aid, nor even in determining how the money may be wisely spent. But upon what conditions should money be furnished to a country likely to possess a government without experience in

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the employment of large quantities of capital, and without adequate technical skill for the management of modem industry? If sufficient security is required for the efficient use of the money, there will be complaints that the United States is intervening improperly in the domestic affairs of an independent and soverign state. If further stipulations are added, to ensure that the "beneficiary of our largess will not use its increased strength to our disadvantage in the event of hostilities between ourselves and another power, we are likely to be accused of a new and oppressive form of colonialism. W e may avoid these difficulties by utilizing the facilities of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies affiliated with the U.N. W e may try to protect our capital outlays against unnecessary waste by enlisting the aid of experts in the service of these international organizations. W e may preserve political friendships, purchased by generous investments in the development of underdeveloped areas, by inviting the participation of the U.N. in arranging the conditions upon which the investments are made. But then the question arises of whose interest is to prevail in all these arrangements — that of the United States or that of mankind? When it is a question of stopping lawless aggression, the answer is comparatively easy. The interests of mankind are directly at stake. But when it is a question of financing the development of neglected natural resources, the correct answer is less clear. Mankind can wait a little longer, if necessary, for such developments. The difficulties multiply as the measures that may be indicated for the prevention of war become more complex. In the Middle East the conflict between the users of the Suez Canal and the owners of the soil through which the canal runs continues to lead to international friction and threatens to give rise to further dangerous disputes. Measures for the adjustment of these disputes can be devised. The deliberations of the Security Council in October, 1956, illustrate one possible method for the elabora-

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tion of such measures. Other methods, notably mediation by a friendly and disinterested power, might also be tried. When President Eisenhower announced his doctrine, he manifestly preferred the former method. One reason for his preference is obvious: if he should essay the role of mediator, he might have great difficulty in convincing all the parties of his disinterestedness. The more profound conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs presents still greater difficulties. This is not only a case of conflicting economic interests and national prestige, complicated by factitious sentiments of national pride; there are also deepseated attitudes springing from the practices of religion and the consciousness of race. These attitudes cannot be reconciled by any ordinary feat of diplomacy. Their effects perhaps can be brought within tolerable limits by skillful mediation. The greater resources for such mediation at the seat of the United Nations give the Organization an obvious advantage over any national government as the agency of action in the public interest. President Eisenhower was manifestly of this opinion when he presented his doctrine to congress. Does that mean he was planning to let the United Nations assume the burden of making foreign policy for the United States on this point? Mr. Truman seemed to be in some doubt. Mr. Truman did not discuss at that time the propriety of the President's working within the framework of the U.N. for the prevention of war by the development of measures for improving the conditions in the Middle East which tend to breed wars. It was for this purpose that the President asked congress for two hundred million dollars to be used at his discretion in the Middle East. Doubtless he intended to use this money in the public interest, but evidently he wished to be free to determine the public interest through agents of his own selection. Some critics thought he ought to make as much use as possible of the U.N. in determining what outlays of capital would serve the public

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interest in the Middle East. Others thought he ought to make more use of congress for this purpose. Perhaps the President deemed it to be in the public interest to keep everybody guessing as long as possible. But should a president make that decision? I suggest a more explicit formula for determining the role of the United Nations in the conduct of American foreign policy. The most important service to be rendered by the U.N. Organization, regarded as an agent of the president, is to determine what is in the public interest from the viewpoint of mankind. It is for the president to consider to what extent the interests of the American people are involved in a situation where the U.N. has made such a determination. He may then take appropriate action, if congress has authorized him in advance to act in such cases upon his judgment of what the national interest may require. Otherwise, he may recommend to congress that he be authorized to take such action in a particular case as will be in the national interest. He should not attempt to determine what is in the universal interest of all nations. That is not a proper function of the government of any particular state. The usefulness of a properly constituted international organization in this new age, in aiding in this way the president's foreign policy-making, would be beyond measure. Whether the U.N. is actually such an organization is a question which calls for further investigation.

THE IRRATIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY

Now it must be admitted that the present U.N. Organization leaves a great deal to be desired. It was not designed for the atomic age, and it has not been possible even to execute fully the original design. When the Security Council, regarded as the principal organ for the preservation of peace, foundered upon

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the abuse of the veto by the Soviet Union, American leadership, through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, improvised a process by which the General Assembly could be used as a substitute for the Security Council. In this unanticipated role the General Assembly has performed unexpectedly well. But it is prevented by the nature of its structure from representing the peoples of the world satisfactorily, and consequently cannot receive the full confidence of statesmen charged with making foreign policy for genuinely democratic nations. The greatest defect in the structure of the U.N. is the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. In fact, this principle was disregarded in planning the Security Council. In this part of the Organization, the five major powers reserved for themselves special privileges of major importance. But these special privileges proved to be ill-conceived. By grasping for too much privilege in the Security Council the major powers overreached themselves and wound up with underprivileged positions in what has become the principal organ of the U.N., the General Assembly. The principle of the sovereign equality of all member nations seemed to call for equal voting rights in the General Assembly. But this arrangement has proved to be unrealistic. In all important respects, except voting power in the General Assembly, the members are far from equal. In population, natural resources, industrial development, military strength, and political prestige the inequalities are so great as to make the assumption of political equality a transparent cloak which cannot conceal the privileged position of the ordinary and petty states now so numerous among the member nations. Only by a tenuous legal fiction can Panama be regarded as equal to the United States, Iceland to Great Britain, or Luxembourg to France. Such inequalities would not be serious if the interests of these ill-matched pairs of states were the same; but they are far from the same. The most spectacular disparities have arisen from the

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breakup of the obsolete empires which could not survive World W a r II. There are now a dozen states represented in the U.N. General Assembly which only a few years ago were British possessions of one sort or another — colonies, protectorates, or dependent territories administered under mandate from the League of Nations. They have twelve votes to Britain's one, but their contributions to the U.N. treasury amount altogether to little more than one-half of the British contribution. There are six former French possessions now represented in the General Assembly whose total contributions to the expenses of the Organization amount to less than one-tenth of the French contribution. Former Italian possessions possess twice as many votes as Italy, and contribute also less than one-tenth as much money. These former dependent territories control one-quarter of all the votes in the General Assembly; and, unhappily, they are likely to be arrayed on the opposite side to the former imperial powers on all issues relating to what they call colonialism. In general, practical responsibility for the execution of the measures of the U.N. Assembly bears no rational relationship to the distribution of power to choose the measures. Petty states, which contribute less than one-tenth of one percent each to the U.N. budget, possess more than one-third of the total votes in the Assembly. If they act together, they can block any important action in that body as effectively as a major power can block action in the Security Council. It may be said that agreement of these petty states among themselves is even less likely than that of the five major powers. That may be true, but the fact remains that the effort to make states, as unequal in most significant respects as are the members of the United Nations, equal in influence in the General Assembly is excessively unrealistic. This fatal defect in the political processes of the U.N. was reflected in the refusal of the framers of the charter to entrust the Organization with any but the most elementary lawmaking

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powers. Important measures were left to be adopted by the same process as the charter itself; that is, by the negotiation of multilateral treaties, which become effective only when ratified by a stipulated number of the negotiating states, and which bind only those parties joining in their ratification. There are no limitations under the charter upon the laws which may be made in this way; but there is no authority vested in the General Assembly to make such laws, or any other important laws, binding upon all the member nations. The General Assembly does possess a broad power to spend money — such money as it may be able to persuade the member nations to contribute to the U.N. treasury out of their own revenues — but it possesses no power to tax its members, nor can it be trusted with such a power as long as it remains committed to legislative processes dictated by the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. This irrational principle is the greatest obstacle to the satisfactory functioning of the U.N. in aid of national governments seeking to act in the general interest of mankind. It is not surprising that eminent statesmen, naturally welldisposed toward the United Nations, should take a dim view of the future of the Organization as now constituted. For instance, Paul-Henri Spaak, the eminent Belgian statesman who was the first president of the General Assembly and has recently accepted the office of secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is a proven friend of practical efforts to preserve international peace. Writing in Foreign Affairs he declared: "Never before has the inefficiency of the U.N. as at present constituted stood out so clearly." Continuing, he added: "I fear, much as I'd like to be mistaken, that it is quite incapable of making the right prevail." 2 The extent of his dismay was attested by his preference for a leading position in NATO over further efforts through the agency of the U.N. 2. Paul-Henri Spaak, " T h e W e s t in Disarray," Foreign uary, 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 4 - 4 1 ·

Affairs,

3 5 (Jan-

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Spaak put his finger on the fatal weakness of the Organization "The San Francisco Charter," he declared, "seems to me dangerously incomplete and so ineffectual that I do not see how, in its present form, it can long endure. To eliminate war as a political weapon is certainly a great moral step forward. But if no alternative recourse is provided, then the system is handicapped from the start and can only lead to chaos." Pending the adoption of effective measures for strengthening the U.N. Organization, he chose to cast his lot with the most congenial military alliance at hand. It is surprising, nevertheless, that practical statesmen should consider NATO a more promising instrument of action in the public interest than the U.N. Organization. The British and French governments were no less contemptuous of their obligations toward their associates in NATO when they issued their unhappy ultimatum to Colonel Nasser than of their obligations under the United Nations Charter. Confronted by the challenge of the dispute over the control of the Suez Canal, NATO was manifestly more ineffectual than the U.N. The latter organization ascertained which parties were the aggressors and then censured them. This action certainly contributed something to the cessation of active hostilities. But NATO did nothing. When a time-tested international statesman like Spaak chooses to work through NATO rather than through the U.N., it is obvious that, for the moment at least, his confidence in the U.N. has been all but lost. Another conclusion is also clear. If the U.N. Organization is to become an acceptable instrument of national policy in matters of general international concern, it must be strengthened. Above all, the international legislative process must be improved. If the Organization is to serve effectively as an agency for procuring agreement upon measures for preventing war — by cleaning up situations which produce threats to the peace and acts of aggression — it must be able to adopt constructive measures

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by a more convenient method than that of calling a general conference to negotiate a multilateral treaty, subject to the hazards of ratification by a sufficient number of the states concerned. This method is excessively slow, laborious, and uncertain. Enlightened statesmen cannot afford to commit their governments to foreign policies which are contingent for their success on the serviceability of a general international organization unless that organization is worthy of their confidence. They may sincerely desire the aid of a general international organization in dealing with matters of universal concern; but if they think that the U.N. is unable to determine satisfactorily what is in the universal interest of mankind, there can be little faith in its practical utility as an instrument of national action in the interest of all nations. It is necessary that the U.N. be equipped with suitable political processes for ascertaining the interests of mankind and for authorizing actions which will serve those interests. This condition must be satisfied before genuinely democratic peoples can put much faith in the Organization as an agency for aiding national statesmen to determine what is in the public interest. THE OUTLOOK FOR PEACE

Despite the crude arrangements for international lawmaking, there is a lengthening record of creative legislation since the establishment of the United Nations. The most impressive achievements are the specialized agencies, dealing with various public interests of the international community which could not wait until more adequate legislative authority was conferred upon the U.N. Organization. Outstanding among these specialized agencies are the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-

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tion. There are also two useful financial agencies, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. Awaiting ratification are the treaty to establish the Organization for Trade Cooperation and, perhaps the greatest legislative achievement of all, the treaty completed only last October to establish the International Atomic Energy Agency. Precursors, of course, were the Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunications Union, and the International Labor Organization, originally affiliated with the League of Nations. The establishment of these specialized agencies attests an important truth: war is already being prevented by constructive measures to put more justice and more charity into the relations between nations. It is impossible to determine the extent to which these measures have prevented the development of situations which breed wars; but it is clear that measures of this kind are full of promise for a more peaceful future. James T . Shotwell has stated most effectively the case for the prevention of war by political action as an alternative to the enforcement of peace by military action: "The structure of the U.N. should not be thought of in terms of courts and police, but of adjustment to changing realities. The courts and police should be there as well, but entirely subordinate to the political instrumentalities." 3 These great multilateral treaties, however, cannot stand forever unaltered. They require amendment in order to be kept abreast of the changing times. The authority conferred upon the various operating organizations needs to be enlarged, the methods of operation need to be improved, the recruitment of superior personnel needs to be facilitated. It is necessary also to develop processes of amendment that are quicker, less laborious, 3. James T . Shotwell and Marina Salvin, Lessons on Security and Disarmament (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1949), P· 2.

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and more certain than that by which the specialized agencies originally came into existence. In short, in order to deal more effectively with the situations which breed wars, the international legislative process must be simplified and made more dependable. This is not the place to discuss in detail the various changes in the United Nations Charter which would make the organization as a whole more serviceable. It is enough to make clear that if the U.N. is to be helpful to national statesmen, seeking to act in the general interest of mankind in matters of general concern, it must possess political processes which can give general confidence that its actions will actually be in the general interest. As the charter stands now, the U.N. Organization can usefully serve the purposes of statesmen who wish to exploit the opportunities it offers for pursuing their particular national interests. As the charter might be, if thoughtful people everywhere would join in the necessary effort to strengthen it, the Organization could also serve the purposes of statesmen who would like to use it as an aid in the development of policies in the general interest of all nations. In this country our special national interests demand the support of the U.N. in the full possession of at least its existing limited powers. If the U.N. Organization were made into what it might be, it could be used equally well to serve the interests of our country regarded as an important part of mankind.

A UNIVERSAL

PUBLIC

INTEREST

In conclusion, I wish to call attention to an observation by Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which occurs near the end of a thoughtful editorial entitled "The First Year of Deterrence." 4 He discusses the Egyptian claim for sovereign power over the Suez Canal, supported 4. Eugene Rabinowitch, "The First Year of Deterrence," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 13 (January, 1 9 5 7 ) .

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by the allegation that a denial of this claim must be regarded as an objectionable survival of colonialism. He comments: "The supremacy of national sovereignty and national interests in situations involving wider groups of people must first be challenged as a matter of general principle." Then he concludes with irrefutable logic: "A break in principle with the recognition of national interests in areas where many nations — or all mankind — have a legitimate interest, is necessary, if mankind is to advance toward a stable peaceful future — and it has no other." W e all know in our hearts that we live in an age of critical change. The improvements in the means of communication, as well as the advance in the technology of war, mark the passing of what we used to call modern times. In this new ultramodern age radio and television, as well as thermonuclear explosives and the threat of germ warfare, will upset the old order as surely as printing and gunpowder brought down the Middle Ages. W e have to adjust our thinking to the demands of this changing world. The greatest of the weapons at our disposal for the defense of our evolving civilization are new ideas. The beginning of wisdom for ultramodern times is recognition of the reality of the public interest in its universal form. As long as the rulers of national states remain entrusted with the responsibility for the protection of public interests, they must be aided by competent international institutions capable of ascertaining and declaring the general interest of mankind. For our own country, the president and congress must continue to bear the burden of making foreign policy. But there is no bar in our system of constitutional government to an act of congress authorizing the president to take official notice of findings of fact and recommendations of measures by the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly. He need give such acts of the U.N. Organization no more consideration than is consistent with his oath of office, but he should give them no less. The great obstacle to a wider use of the U.N. Organization,

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regarded as an instrument of national policy in determining what is in the public interest, is its defective structure and processes. T h e foundation of effective functioning by the U.N. is the legislative process and in its present form this process is all but nonexistent. The actual process of international lawmaking by means of multilateral treaties is, as I have said before, excessively slow, laborious, and uncertain. The first task of the practical peacemaker at the dawn of ultramodern times is to improve this international legislative process. Peace cannot be preserved, as Sir Winston Churchill once remarked, merely by praising its virtues. It can be preserved only by establishing suitable methods of action in the public interest of all nations, when such action is found to be necessary. This means a systematic and purposeful revision of the United Nations Charter at the first opportunity.

PART TWO

Organizing Peace within a Federal Union

Any sound judgment concerning the present prospects of a worldwide peace and security organization must take ac-. count of past experience with the organization of interstate and international peace. Outstanding are the experiments with federal unions in various parts of the world; most significant to Americans are the experiments with our own federal union and with federations more or less influenced by the American example. The second part of this volume contains some papers of mine relating to the organization of interstate peace under a federal constitution. They throw some light, I believe, on the problem of organizing international peace. George Washington was the principal leader of the successful campaign for the better organization of interstate peace in the United States. His circular letter to the governors of the states, despatched from his military headquarters at Newburgh, New York, when a victorious end of the Revolutionary War was at last in sight, was his campaign platform. This letter called for "an indissoluble union of the States under one federal head," and for a "pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the United States." In his subsequent farewell address to his

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soldiers he urged them to return to their fellow citizens as missionaries, preaching the gospel of a firm union of the states and a strong general government. There could be no doubt that in Washington's mind the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, originally approved by the Continental Congress in 1777, and finally ratified in 1781, furnished no more than a temporary framework for the government of the United States pending the formation of a more perfect union, capable, among other services, of keeping the peace between the thirteen states. Washington's leadership in the campaign for a more perfect union is reflected in his correspondence with his former military aides, of whom in this connection Alexander Hamilton was outstanding, and with rising young Virginian politicians, some of whom — notably James Madison — may be described in this stage of their careers as his political aides. These young brain trusters, as they would be described in modem political terminology, were fertile producers of ideas for reforming the unsatisfactory Confederation, hastily organized by the Continental Congress in response to the exigencies of war. Service in the Congress of the Confederation taught them the difficulty of persuading men in power to reform the institutions which are the basis of their power; but in general, as is the way with youth, their ideas were the fruits of academic logic rather than of personal experience. A few of Washington's correspondents, completely out of patience with the weakness of the Confederation, ventured to suggest to him the alleged advantages of an American monarchy with the obvious thought in the background that Washington himself would be the inevitable candidate for the throne; but Washington would not consider such extreme ideas until a thorough trial could be made of more moderate proposals for reform. With exemplary prudence he steadily emphasized the main objectives of the reformers while persistently avoiding commitments in matters of detail. 1 1. See Part T w o , Chapter 4, of this volume.

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One of the main objectives of the campaign for a more perfect union was the preservation of peace between the member states of the Confederation. Interstate peace would clearly be at the hazard of unpredictable circumstances under the Articles of Confederation. Each state was entitled to regulate its relations with other states in its own interest regardless of the effect of self-centered interstate regulations on its neighbors: each state could maintain a standing army, if it wished, in order to negotiate with other states from strength; each state possessed the right to declare war, if pacific measures to promote its own interests should fail and an appeal to arms should seem attractive. Armament races were predictable. Domestic tranquillity for any length of time on a national scale seemed to thoughtful Americans highly unlikely. The first impulse of the political reformers who hoped to gain power and looked forward to eventual responsibility for keeping interstate peace was to demand authority for coercing recalcitrant states by the use of military force.2 One of the conspicuous features of the original Virginia plan for a more perfect union was a proposal to authorize the general government to use force against a state found to be violating the proposed Articles of Union. The Virginia delegation to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was a fair sample of the most thoughtful and experienced public men in the United States. This delegation, the first to arrive in Philadelphia, spent the better part of a fortnight, while awaiting the arrival of a quorum to enable the convention to get down to work, in the preparation of its plan. Thus power to coerce a member state in a federal union by military force became one of the first measures to come before the Federal Convention for consideration. It is impossible to know whether Washington personally favored a general power to coerce the member states of what was to become the Federal Union. The Virginia Plan was 2. See Part T w o , Chapter 5.

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obviously a product of compromise between seven delegates with differing ideas of what would be essential for the formation of a more perfect union of the states in the existing confederation. The theoretical advantages of a general power of state coercion in a federal union are at first sight attractive. The central government possesses a duty to keep the peace among the member states and presumably possesses also the physical force, or means of mobilizing it, that may be necessary for the purpose. If the sense of community among the people of the union is strong enough, it may be argued, there should be adequate popular support for whatever measures of coercion might be deemed necessary and proper by the central government. The great objection to the military coercion of the states in a federal union is obvious. The use of military force by the central government against such force as may be at the command of a state government is indistinguishable in principle from war, and in practice represents a form of war that will be repugnant to a people with a strong sense of community. It is a method of preventing interstate war that calls for a form of union in which the executive authority is strong, and it is likely to be acceptable only in political unions with a relatively weak sense of community. In the Federal Convention of 1787 the opposition to the military coercion of a state was so general and resolute that the spokesmen for the Virginia planners dropped this proposal before it even came up for discussion. Its original sponsors in the Virginia delegation, whoever they were, maintained a discreet silence on the floor of the convention. The delegates most likely to have supported the military coercion of member states in order to preserve interstate peace were those who most strongly advocated what was then called a "high-toned" system of government. This system was characterized by a powerful centralized executive branch sustained by a legislature divided into two houses, one strongly aristocratic and the other democratic in compositon. The youthful Alex-

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ander Hamilton, who wanted a chief executive chosen for life, or at least to serve during good behavior, with authority to remove state governors in whom the executive had lost confidence, was an outstanding member of this group of delegates. The still younger Charles Pinckney, who wanted a chief executive possessing at least one hundred thousand dollars worth of property — a large sum in eighteenth-century America — and persistently supported a proposal that the national government should have power to veto any measure of a state government contrary to national policy, was another leading member of this group. These comparatively inexperienced brain trusters seemed to favor a political relationship between the central and state governments resembling that between the contemporary British imperial government and the Crown Colonies. They might have been called the imperialists, if a name had been needed for them. They were devoted admirers of the British constitution, as described and praised by Montesquieu, de Lolme, and other respectable foreign authorities. The sober second thoughts of the Virginia planners on the preservation of interstate peace in their projected more perfect union called for the adoption of political rather than military methods of maintaining the supremacy of the national government. They aimed to prevent the development of interstate conflicts into fighting issues by establishing a national government with a supreme legislature, a supreme executive, and a supreme judiciary. The national supreme court would, of course, have jurisdiction over interstate controversies of a justiciable nature, but the Virginians' principal reliance for the maintenance of domestic tranquillity was a suitable arrangement of the political branches of the national government. They wanted a strong national legislature with ample power to deal with all matters which could not be left to the separate states without danger of unmanageable interstate conflicts. They wanted also a strong national executive that could enforce national laws

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against individual citizens regardless of their distribution among the states. T h e supreme legislature and executive, they contended, should have power to disallow state legislation trespassing on the authority of the national government. Popular support for the national government would be insured, they argued, by popular participation, directly or indirectly, in the selection of the members of its political branches. This part of the Virginia Plan was essentially a project for a national government which would operate directly on the people of the United States in national affairs as the best of the state governments operated on the people of the individual states in state affairs. Its sponsors called themselves nationalists and showed little patience with schemes for patching the discredited Articles of Confederation as recommended by the Congress of the Confederation. They intended to build a new system of government on the solid basis of popular elections, and looked to conventions of the people in the several states rather than to the existing state governments for eventual approval of their new structure. T h e Virginians, like most of the other delegates, were greatly influenced in the development of their plan by their previous experience with more or less popular governments in their own state. While not rejecting the natural right of revolution claimed in the Declaration of Independence — indeed, their own plan for a more perfect union called for a political revolution based on repudiation of the Articles of Confederation— they seemingly assumed that the successful establishment of their projected national government would insure sufficient domestic tranquillity to make interstate warfare highly unlikely. T h e leading spokesmen for the nationalists in the Federal Convention of 1787 were James Madison and Edmund Randolph of Virginia, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania. All three were persistent and persuasive advocates of a strong national government with a powerful lawmaking department, an ener-

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getic executive, and a self-reliant body of voters actively participating in regular elections for the choice of responsible representatives in the popular branch of the national legislature. They resolutely opposed all avoidable dependence of the national government on the governments of the states. In their struggle for a strong national government they were supported by their own state delegations and in most of their proposals by the delegations from four other states: Massachusetts, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia. N o delegation, however (except those from Virginia and Pennsylvania), was opposed to some degree of dependence on the state governments in the operation of the national system. Several of the delegations, notably that from Connecticut, regarded the mutual interdependence of the central and state governments as an essential feature of a practicable federal union. This difference of opinion on a leading feature of the Virginia Plan seemed to the original nationalists a deplorable threat to their projected arrangements for interstate peace-keeping without resort to military force. Several of the delegations favoring greater dependence on the state governments in the structure of a more perfect union offered as an alternative to the plan of the nationalists the socalled New Jersey Plan. This plan proposed to retain the general form of government under the Articles of Confederation with some additional lawmaking powers for the Congress of the Confederation, a reorganized and improved executive, and a greatly strengthened supreme court. Many of the delegates looked to a strong court for the maintenance of a reign of law, which could protect the states in the exercise of their proper powers and do more for the preservation of interstate peace than could be expected from the government of the existing Confederation. A few of the delegates, however, wanted no change in the Articles of Confederation; but they controlled only one state delegation, that from New York. History has neglected to give them a spe-

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cial name, but for convenience they may be termed confederationists. The confederationists did not have much to say on the floor of the convention, though one of them, Judge Yates of New York, kept a record of the debates — later published under the title Secret Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention — which preserves some interesting notes on the ideas of the nationalists and imperialists. Yates' notes do not contain any specific discussion of the problem of interstate peace-keeping, though Governor George Clinton of New York, from whom the majority of the New York delegation received their instructions ±o oppose the plans of the nationalists and later to leave the convention with its work unfinished, was sponsoring a commercial policy which greatly exasperated the governments of neighboring New Jersey and Connecticut. Neither the New York delegates nor other supporters of the New Jersey Plan offered one argument for the organization of political parties which might have interested some of the other delegates. National political parties, the argument runs, not only exploit conflicts of interest between different states, but also serve to conciliate such conflicts and to that extent promote domestic tranquillity and interstate peace.3 According to this view, interstate peace may be preserved in a federal union by the authority of a national political party capable of imposing its partisan policies on the governments of the states as well as on the national government itself. Such an argument might be founded in modern times on the theory of international communism and illustrated by the history of communist parties in the Soviet Union and its satellites. But party government in its modern forms was unknown in 1787, and Karl Marx was an unsuspected product of an unimaginable age. Though nearly all the founding fathers were Whigs, there was no discussion in the convention of a role for the Whig party in 3. See Part Two, Chapter 6.

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the building of a more perfect union. Delegates occasionally warned of the evils of what they called faction, but that was something to be avoided or kept within the narrowest possible bounds. Most of the supporters of the New Jersey Plan wanted substantial improvements in the government under the Articles of Confederation. They had been brought up in the Whig political philosophy which called for a government of laws and not of men. They recognized that the form of the Confederation fell far short of this ideal. Opinions differed concerning the kinds of improvements needed for insuring domestic tranquillity as well as the other objectives of a more perfect union. These delegates were agreed, however, that equal representation of the states in the Congress was more important than direct representation of the people regardless of their distribution among; the states. Most of them believed that the people would continue to look chiefly to their state governments for the protection of their liberties and the promotion of their welfare. These were the original federalists in American politics. William Paterson of New Jersey, who presented the New Jersey Plan to the convention, emphasized the argument that a strong national government, like that called for by the Virginia Plan, would not be acceptable to the peoples of the states. He left the impression that he personally would prefer something stronger than the strictly limited federal system recommended by his fellow federalists. But the important differences among them concerning the structure of an efficient government of laws compelled them to put first things first. That meant concentration upon the task of protecting the peoples of the states by securing equal representation for the states in the congress. In fact the federalists were deeply divided concerning the nature of an efficient government of laws. Some of them wanted a federal system based on a logical definition of the three main

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governmental departments, legislative, executive, and judicial, and a careful separation of their respective powers. Others believed that under such a system the men in the political departments, especially the legislative, which would have unchecked power to make the laws, would gain the mastery over the others and establish in practice an arbitrary government of politicians. They wanted a distribution of powers among the departments, regardless of logic, which would enable each to check the others and establish a balance between them. Under a suitable system of checks and balances the subordination of the men in office to the laws, they contended, could be maintained. The original federalists controlled three delegations in the convention: New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. Two of these represented what were then small states and the third a state of barely average size. Another small state, New Hampshire, was not at first represented in the convention, and Rhode Island was not represented at any time. It was evident that the views of the federalists would have to be reckoned with if the projected more perfect union were to be acceptable to the peoples of the confederation. The federalists obviously were more interested than the nationalists in strengthening the influence of the judiciary in the government of the more perfect union. T h e advocates of a clearly defined separation of powers would want a supreme court as independent as possible of the other departments of government. The advocates of a stable system of checks and balances would want a supreme court endowed with sufficient powers, political as well as judicial, to hold its own in competition with the political departments. The preservation of interstate peace called for the reconciliation of the various views of the federalists and nationalists. In addition to the conflicting interests of the states arrayed behind the Virginia and New Jersey Plans, respectively, there were other sharp conflicts of interest between the states with large numbers of slaves and those without slaves; between states with

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well-developed commercial interests and those largely dependent on the production of staple crops for export; between states with relatively large settlements on the western frontiers and those more closely identified with the eastern seaboard. The unequal distribution of these various conflicting interests presented a sharp challenge to the statesmanship of the convention. This was a challenge which the original nationalists, with their professed confidence in political methods of insuring domestic tranquillity, could not refuse. But the leadership of the compromisers was seized by the delegation from Connecticut, which alone possessed from the beginning a majority in favor both of a strong national government and a heavy dependence on the state governments in the structure of the more perfect union. The celebrated Connecticut Compromise, which divided the congress into a national house of representatives and a federal senate, was not accomplished without a severe struggle. Indispensable assistance came from veteran politicians in other states, notably from Dr. Franklin — the first great democratic nationalist in American politics — and from John Dickinson, who represented Delaware in the convention though he had long been a leader in Pennsylvania politics. But the most effective leadership must be assigned to Judge Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, whom President Washington later appointed chief justice of the United States; and to Ellsworth's fellow delegate Dr. Johnson, who in the last stage of the convention, when the original nationalists had regained its leadership, became chairman of the committee of style and arrangement which put the text of the constitution into its final form. By that time the original nationalists were calling themselves federalists, and those original federalists who, like the New York confederationists, could not reconcile themselves to the results of the many compromises required to bring agreement on the evolving national-federal form of union, were being called anti-federalists. History has

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given the Connecticut compromisers no special name of their own, but an appropriate name, if needed, would have been unionists, the name adopted by those who fought to the finish in the American Civil W a r to defend the results of the compromises of 1787. T h e process of compromising conflicts of interest, which might otherwise develop into fighting issues, was carried further in the convention's committee of detail. Here the first draft of the actual constitution was prepared and the economic problems arising from the struggle to form a closer union of the states were first squarely faced. This committee substituted for the highly generalized grant of national lawmaking power contained in the Virginia Plan a careful enumeration of specific legislative powers to be transferred from the states to the union. Outstanding among them were laboriously defined powers to tax and otherwise regulate interstate and foreign commerce, including the slave trade, which composed the substance of the famous bargain between Massachusetts and South Carolina that became the cornerstone of the economic policy of the later Federalist party. This bargain showed most convincingly how practical politicians like John Rutledge of South Carolina and Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts could be efficient interstate peacemakers as well as constructive constitution-makers. Of the other compromises found necessary in the convention for agreement on a frame of government for the more perfect union the most important were those reached by the last of the six grand committees created for the purpose, the committee on postponed matters and unfinished business. It was in this committee that the various advocates of a logical separation of powers and of a pragmatic system of checks and balances composed their differences. The original nationalists gained the strong independent executive, on which they based great expectations for a vigorous union government capable of effectively promoting the general welfare; and the original federalists

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gained the strong independent supreme court, on which they chiefly relied for securing the blessings of liberty under a national reign of law. On the other hand, the federal senate, a special favorite of the original federalists, was deprived of some of its special powers, and the national house of representatives, a special favorite of the original nationalists, was further strengthened. This committee's report was an impressive example of the kind of work that can be done by skillful politicians bent on disposing of fighting issues by shrewd political arrangements. The leading members of the committee on postponed matters and unfinished business must be included among the most influential framers of the constitution. The chairman of the committee, Judge David Brearley of New Jersey, had been a member of one of the first state courts to declare a legislative act unconstitutional, and together with Judge Roger Sherman of Connecticut he represented the original federalists in making the final constitutional compromises. The original nationalists were represented by Madison of Virginia, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, and Rufus King of Massachusetts. No delegate was completely happy over the final outcome of the convention's labors. Probably most nearly satisfied were the delegates from Connecticut, but at least a majority of every delegation present at the end was willing to support the national-federal constitution as an acceptable foundation for a more perfect union. The great test of the compromises of 1787 came in 1861. President Buchanan was of course correct in stating that he possessed no power under the constitution to coerce a state by military force, even one the government of which was planning to secede. But he was gravely remiss in concluding that he was therefore helpless before the Southern leaders who wished to break up the union. President Lincoln was equally correct in affirming throughout the war that he was not coercing the states in which violent resistance existed to the enforcement of the supreme laws of the land. He properly held the view that

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he was bound to prosecute men who disobeyed the laws of the land, even men who claimed that their disobedience should be condoned because they were acting under the orders of statesmen claiming a right of secession from the union for any dissatisfied state. From Lincoln's viewpoint there was no war between the states, but only a process of law enforcement against misguided individuals requiring the employment of armed forces on a big scale. Thus, in the end happily, Lincoln preserved the national-federal constitution as well as the more perfect but not wholly perfect union on the theory that he was using the national police power to maintain the rule of law. The coercion of states in a federal union has been systematically practiced in several of the Latin American republics. The results vindicate the judgment of our founding fathers in rejecting that method of insuring domestic tranquillity. Political are clearly superior to military methods of keeping a constitutional system in good working order. American experience does not support the view that international power to coerce national states by resort to military force would help to keep the peace between independent nations. On the contrary, it points to the conclusion that international peace would be more secure if it were maintained by political arrangements and judicial decisions. Such methods of peace-keeping are inherently contingent upon the existence of a sufficiently developed sense of common interests among the nations of the world; what constitutes a sufficient development of worldwide community sense is doubtless the sixty-four-dollar-question for international statesmen trying to organize a peaceful and durable world order. The outstanding instance of reliance upon military power to coerce the member states in an international political system as an important method of insuring the tranquillity of the system is the contemporary Soviet Union. The unity of the Soviet system has rested primarily on the practical capacity

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of the Communist party to impose an integrated policy on the governments of the satellite states as well as on that of the Soviet Union. The use of military force against the government of a satellite has been no more than a secondary peace-keeping measure. The forcible change of government in Hungary in 1956 is a precedent of uncertain authority among the ruling circles in Moscow. Since the split between the Russian and the Chinese Communists it is questionable to what extent the Russian Soviet system is regarded by communists as an acceptable working model of an efficient worldwide political system. The ruling circles in Peking profess a firm confidence in the use of military force and official violence. In Moscow, however, the ruling circles seem no longer to consider old-fashioned war an indispensable instrument of the communist struggle for world power. The exhaustive debate between Russian and Chinese Communists over the role of military force in the stabilization of an international political system, depending primarily on the supremacy of a monopolistic ideological party, has raised some interesting questions concerning the relative efficiency of one-party and two-party or multiparty systems in populous modern republics. A monopolistic party is apparently stronger than either party in a two-party system, but intolerance of open opposition drives discontented opponents into secret resistance which may result in successful revolution unless repressed by military force. Or at least so the leaders of monopolistic parties seem to fear. Under a two-party system, when regular elections are conducted honestly with a fair count and full return of the votes, the enduring opportunity for an opposition party to come into power without any resort to violence makes for greater domestic tranquillity. The experience of modern states with wellestablished bipartisan or multipartisan political systems points toward the superior stability of an international order in which the free-enterprise system of party politics prevails.

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The American system of constitutional government depends for its stability on the party system as well as on its unique fusion of nationalist and federalist political ideas.3 The founding fathers built better than they knew. Washington and his associates distrusted partisanship and came to depend on a governing party with reluctance. Jefferson believed in party government but gave little thought to the constitutional role of a permanent two-party system. The organization of the Whig party as a functional opposition to the Jacksonian Democrats was an empirical development in American politics which, though it did not prevent a great civil war, laid the foundation for a durable system of interstate peace. The two-party system requires for its successful operation an ample supply of practical politicians, reasonably even-tempered and skilled in factional conciliation. It requires also a politically experienced body of people capable of choosing intelligently between partisan candidates for public office who do not stray too far in either direction from the middle of the political road. 3. See Part Two, Chapter 6.

4. THE ROLE OF WASHINGTON IN THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION

A problem which has always been baffling to historians is the role of the strong, silent man in a deliberative assembly. Because by definition the man is strong, presumably he should be capable of exerting a substantial influence upon the assembly's deliberations. But because he is also a silent man, he is presumably precluded from exerting his full influence by active participation in the assembly's debates. If his influence is to be substantial, it must be exerted by other methods than speechmaking, but of these other methods the records of a deliberative assembly ordinarily afford no evidence. How then can the influence of the strong, silent man be measured? T o Americans the outstanding instance of the strong, silent man's engagement in a deliberative assembly is General Washington's participation in the Federal Convention of 1787. That he was a strong man is demonstrated by his unanimous election to the presidency of the convention. That he should maintain a general silence throughout its debates was insured, not only by his natural character, but also by the rules of the convenN O T E : This paper stands substantially as delivered at a seminar at the Huntington Library on January 7, 1956, and is reprinted from The Hunting-

ton Library Quarterly, no. 4 (August 1956).

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tion itself, which afforded its presiding officer no opportunity to take part in its debates as long as he remained in the chair. He could of course influence the deliberations by a discriminating use of the power of recognition, which would enable him to favor those speakers whose views met with his approval. But in a body as small as the federal convention there was time enough for every member to put in his word on matters in which he was genuinely interested. Washington's opportunity to influence the course of the deliberations from the chair was narrowly limited. During the three weeks when the convention proceeded in committee of the whole, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts occupied the chair and Washington could have spoken from the floor as often as he wished. But he did not choose to speak during those weeks and never did participate in the debates until the last day of the convention. When on that day he finally proposed a minor change in the text of the constitution, the prompt and unanimous acceptance of his proposal attested the high degree of influence he possessed. The logical inference is that the convention could easily be swayed by Washington when he chose to exert his influence. The problem for the historian is this: To what extent did Washington exert his influence by suggestions offered under circumstances not covered by Madison's "Notes of the Debates"? The latest and doubtless the most important contribution to the effort of historians to appraise correctly Washington's role in the framing of the constitution is to be found in the sixth volume of the late Douglas Southall Freeman's biography of Washington. This volume, entitled Patriot and President, contains two chapters devoted to Washington's part in the framing and adoption of the constitution. Chapter five, "The Basic Argument for Ratification," emphasizes a quotation from a contemporary letter written by James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson. "Be assured," wrote Monroe, "that [General Washington's] influence

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carried this government." 1 This is evidently Freeman's own opinion. It is also the generally accepted opinion concerning the influence of Washington in the struggle for ratification. But how about his influence in the actual framing of the constitution? This question is dealt with at length by Freeman, whose conclusion is stated with his usual clarity and precision: Washington's "largest contribution was not that of his counsel but that of his presence." 2 Freeman continues: "Letters from members seldom mentioned him among those at the forge where the Constitution was hammered out, blow on blow. Madison, Gouverneur Morris, James Wilson, Rufus King, Edmund Randolph — these were the men, not Washington, who shaped the Constitution." 3 This opinion, of course, is in line with the opinions of the most authoritative writers. Irving Brant, for example, the able author of the definitive life of James Madison, expresses the same opinion in the third volume of this excellent work entitled James Madison, Father of the Constitution. In the chapter entitled "Appraisals" 4 there is no mention of George Washington. Brant identifies the delegates who were, in his opinion, the most influential in the actual framing of the constitution: "Madison and Wilson stand out as the constructive statesmen of the Convention." 5 The names of these two delegates stand at the head of his list of the men who were most active in setting forth the principles accepted by the convention, and they stand also at the head of the list of those he describes as leaders in the actual construction of the constitution. He adds a list of those whom he describes as leaders in the solution of problems through com1. Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, Vol. 6, Patriot and President (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), chap. 5. 2. Ibid., chap. 4, p. 112. 3. Ibid. 4. Irving Brant, James Madison, Vol. 3, Father of the Constitution (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1 9 5 1 ) , chap. 12. 5. Ibid., p. 156

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promise: at the head of this list stand the names of Benjamin Franklin and of Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut; but Washington's name is not included even in this list. The place of Washington among the leading "founding fathers" seems small indeed. John C. Fitzpatrick, the latest editor of Washington's writings and himself a well-informed and careful writer, has contributed a brief life of Washington to the Dictionary of American Biography. "As president of the Convention," Fitzpatrick concludes, "possessing the full confidence of every member, he supplied a ground anchor to the proceedings." 6 But Fitzpatrick does not explain what he means by "ground anchor," though he adds that "much of the confidence afterwards displayed in the Constitution was due to that fact." This sounds much like Freeman's conclusion that Washington's presence rather than his counsel was his main contribution to the work of the convention. Max Farrand is more explicit. In his widely read book The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (1913) he gives his considered estimate of the contribution of the leading delegates. Madison, he writes, "was the master builder of the Constitution."7 Wilson he places second to Madison and almost on a par with him. Next to these two men, he concludes, should come Washington. What he means by this rating he is careful to explain: "Madison's ideas were the predominating factor in the framing of the Constitution and it seems hardly too much to say that Washington's influence, however it may have been exerted, was important and perhaps decisive in determining the acceptance of those ideas by the Convention." 8 Farrand seems to have put more stress on the influence of Washington than the later writers, but he is in full accord with them in assigning the paternity of the constitution to Madison. 6. John C . Fitzpatrick, Dictionary of American Biography, vol. X I X . 7. Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 1 3 ) . 8. Ibid.

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It is surprising that Freeman should follow so closely the line adopted by these other recent scholars, when in general the effect of his biography is to restore Washington to the heroic stature established by the earlier writers. His ruling purpose seems to be to vindicate the traditional view of Washington's greatness against the higher criticism of modern times. The general impression created by Freeman's scholarly and impressive work is well expressed by a respectful reviewer, Bruce Bliven, Jr., writing for the New Yorker. Washington, he notes, agreed reluctantly to attend the convention, and "the announcement automatically gave the enterprise the stature it had lacked. He presided over the sessions, but had few or no ideas to offer." 9 Bliven's further comments are revealing: "Dr. Freeman never forgets that Washington is his man. Other fascinating characters appear and the temptation to wander off after them to see what they're doing is great; Dr. Freeman resists it. He tells only enough about the scene to make Washington's actions understandable. . . . The result is that in volume six there is only a summary of how others wrote the Constitution, but there is everything about where Washington drank tea in the afternoons and where he fished during the Convention's adjournments and what he thought of the farms he visited during his stay in Philadelphia. . . . " 1 0 Bliven's conclusion concerning the impact of Freeman's work seems definitive. "Volumes four and five," he writes, "proved that Washington was a superb military administrator and that that part of the legend was not an exaggeration. Volume six provides the rest of the verdict. As patriot and president Washington was greater, Dr. Freeman finds, than his exalted reputation suggests. The legend, on the whole, is understatement." 1 1 At this point a question arises which calls for further investigation. If Washington showed such greatness on so many great oc9. New Yorker, November 13, 1954, p. 196. 10. Ibid., p. 201. 11. Ibid.

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casions, why he did he fail so grievously to show greatness at the framing of the constitution? Is a strong, silent man naturally incapable of exerting energetic and effective leadership in such an undertaking as the framing of a constitution? Washington's ideas concerning the kind of constitution that was needed had been freely expressed and were widely known. Writing to Henry Knox on March 8, 1787, he declared, " I am glad to hear that Congress are about to remove some of the stumbling blocks which lie in the way of the proposed Convention; a Convention is an expedient I wish to see tried; after which, if the present government is not efficient, conviction of the propriety of a change of it will disseminate through every rank and class of people. . . . It is among the evils, and perhaps is not the smallest, of democratical governments, that the people must feel, before they will see." T h e same opinion was expressed in a letter to his former military aide, David Humphreys, written on the same day. On March 31 he wrote in similar vein to James Madison: " I am fully of opinion that those who lean to a Monarchial government have either not consulted the public mind, or that they live in a region where the levelling principles in which they were bred, being entirely eradicated, are much more productive of Monarchial ideas than are to be found in the Southern States, where, from the habitual distinctions which have always existed among the people, one would have expected the first generation, and the most rapid growth, of them. I also am clear, that even admitting the utility, nay necessity, of the form, yet that period is not arrived for adopting the change without shaking the peace of this country to its foundation. That a thorough reform of the present system is indispensable, none who have capacities to judge will deny; and with hand (and heart) I hope the business will be essayed in a full Convention. . . . I say after this essay is made, if the system proves inefficient, conviction of the necessity of a change will be disseminated among all classes of the People. Then, and

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not till then, in my opinion can it be attempted without involving all the evils of civil discord." In writing this letter Washington was manifestly mindful of contemporary discussions of the case for monarchy in the United States. Doubtless he was not ignorant of the occasional mention of himself as a suitable candidate for the throne. He clearly regarded such talk as untimely, without rejecting altogether the possibility that a monarchy would be preferable to a dissolution of the general government with the resulting threat of anarchy and civil war. It is evident that at least in the framing of the Virginia Plan the views of Washington could not be without influence. He had given thought to the problems which would come before the convention and he had taken the trouble to communicate his ideas to other members of the Virginia delegation. In this letter to Madison Washington went further in disclosing his thoughts concerning the method of establishing a vigorous and energetic government. " I confess however," he wrote, "that my opinion of public virtue is so far changed that I have my doubts whether any system, without the means of coercion in the Sovereign, will enforce obedience to the ordinances of a general government; without which, every thing else fails." This sentence suggests that Washington was prepared to go far along the road which would lead to a consolidated national government. Precisely how far he would go he prudently kept to himself. But it is clear that he wanted a general government endowed with sufficient authority to act directly upon the people of the whole country as efficiently as the governments of the best-governed states could act upon the people of those states. Irving Brant has argued convincingly that James Madison took the leading part in the actual framing of the Virginia Plan. Madison, therefore, may not improperly be called the father of the Virginia Plan, if one likes to use that figure of speech. But young Congressman Madison, as he then was, stood near the bottom of

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a very strong delegation headed by the governor of the state, Edmund Randolph, and including such veterans of Virginia politics as George Wythe, professor of law at William and Mary College and chancellor of the commonwealth; Colonel George Mason, author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights; and George Washington himself. Chancellor W y t h e was appointed chairman of the important committee on rules, which the convention elected on the same day Washington was chosen to be its president, Randolph was selected by the Virginia delegates to present their plan to the Convention and, though Madison quickly made himself the foremost expounder of the general principles upon which the plan was based, both Randolph and Mason were very active in support of its detailed provisions while it was under consideration in the committee of the whole. Under these circumstances the question of paternity in the genesis of the plan could not have seemed important to the members of the convention. Moreover, with such talented men ready, able, and willing to bear the burden of explaining and defending the plan on the floor of the convention it was not necessary for Washington to do any speaking, even if he had not been a silent man by nature. But it is most illogical to infer from his silence that he was without influence in the counsels of the Virginia delegation. For years he had been the foremost advocate in America of a more vigorous and energetic general government. He had constantly communicated his views to his correspondents throughout the land. He had made it clear that he was prepared to go far in support of a plan for genuine national government. The essence of leadership is practical capacity to make opportunities for younger and less well-known men to do constructive work. In modern parlance Madison at this stage of his career would be described as a brain truster, along with Gouverneur Morris and Rufus King and Alexander Hamilton and Charles Pinckney — brilliant young men with great careers before them, particularly if they found favor in the eyes of older

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men with greater prestige. If it is proper to regard young Congressman Madison as a brain truster in 1787, it should be easy to identify the effective leadership in the formulation of the Virginia Plan. The wisdom of Washington's course in refusing to commit himself in advance to particular details of the Virginia Plan is attested by the subsequent fortunes of the plan at the hands of the convention. It is true that the plan was accepted by the convention as the basis for its further deliberations, but it is not true that the principles upon which the plan was based were finally adopted without fundamental changes. If due weight is assigned to those features of the Virginia Plan rejected by the convention, it becomes clear that the father of the plan, whoever he may have been, cannot be heralded without major qualifications as the father of the constitution. There were three basic principles of the Virginia Plan which the convention refused to adopt. One was the provision for the coercion of the states by military force. The actual proposal was that the national government should have power to call forth the force of the union against any member failing to fulfill its duty to the union under the proposed new Articles of Union. Another rejected principle was embodied in the provision for a general grant of legislative power to the congress, and the third underlay the original provisions for a political instead of a judicial guardianship of the fundamental law. The Virginia Plan was described by its authors as a plan for a national government with a supreme legislature, a supreme executive, and a supreme judiciary. When Randolph was asked by several delegates what he meant by a national government, and what he meant by a supreme legislature, executive, and judiciary, he was not able to give a satisfactory reply. The idea of national supremacy was left to be understood in the light of its proposed practical application. Regarded in this light the idea was found unacceptable. When

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the proposal for the coercion of the states by military force came up for consideration in the committee of the whole, the opposition was so formidable that the sponsors of the plan repudiated the proposal without making any effort to justify so drastic a change in the existing system of government. T h e proposal for a general grant of legislative power, however, was not dropped without a struggle. This proposal, as formulated in the sixth of the resolutions constituting the Virginia Plan, meant that the national legislature ought to be empowered to exercise the legislative powers vested in the congress by the Articles of Confederation, and also to legislate in all cases in which the separate states might be incompetent or in which the harmony of the union might be jeopardized by state legislation. This feature of the plan, vague and alarming as it was, was accepted by the committee of the whole. But the committee of detail, which was eventually appointed to prepare a first draft of the constitution on the basis of the Virginia Plan as revised by the convention, quietly discarded this general grant of legislative power to the congress and substituted a careful enumeration of specific powers to be vested in congress in expressly limited terms. This marked another important breach in the original Virginia Plan for a national government. The substitution of specific legislative powers for a general grant of legislative power to the national government dealt a further blow to the original Virginia Plan by preparing the way for the substitution of a judicial for a political guardianship of the fundamental law. T h e Virginia planners had proposed that the national legislature should have power to veto that state legislation which it should find to be in conflict with the principles of government embodied in the Articles of Union. Some of the supporters of the Virginia Plan would have gone further and authorized the national legislature to veto also such state legislation as it might judge to be in conflict with the policies of the national government, but this proposal was much too drastic

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for a majority of the convention. A very few of the supporters of the Virginia Plan, among whom the young Alexander Hamilton and the still younger Charles Pinckney were the most conspicuous, would have gone even further in supporting a proposal to authorize the national executive to remove state governors from office when deemed necessary to maintain the supremacy of the national government. These young theorists might better be described as imperialists than as nationalists, because they supported proposals apparently designed to establish a relationship between the state governments and the proposed national government closely resembling that which had existed before the revolution between the colonial governments and the government of the British Empire in London. Washington apparently did not discourage differences of opinion among his brain trusters and was careful not to disclose his own position unless the proceedings in the convention made it necessary for him to declare himself. His general attitude toward the revision of the constitution was best expressed by himself in a letter to John Jay dated August 1, 1786: " I do not conceive that we can exist long as a nation without having lodged somewhere a power, which will pervade the whole Union in as energetic a manner as that of the state governments extends over the several states." His attitude toward particular proposals was best expressed in his letter to Thomas Jefferson dated August 31, 1788: "For myself, I was ready to have embraced any tolerable compromise that was competent to save us from impending ruin. . . ." Washington's opinions on various controversial details of the constitution are recorded in Madison's "Notes" on the occasions when the Virginia delegates were polled in order to determine how the state's vote should be cast on pending motions to amend its text. Thus Washington was recorded in favor of a single executive when the Virginia delegates were divided between a single executive and a plural executive. The majority of

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the convention agreed with Washington. Again Washington was recorded as opposing the election of the executive by the national legislature, when the majority of the Virginia delegates favored this mode of election. Once more the majority of the convention eventually agreed with Washington. In a third instance of a poll of the Virginia delegates Washington favored restricting the initiation of money bills to the lower house, desiring in the interest of harmony to make a concession to Franklin on this particular point. The majority of the Virginia delegates disagreed with Washington, but the convention agreed with him for the same reason. In another instance of controversy within the Virginia delegation Washington, again in the interest of harmony, favored a proposal to permit the taxation of exports by a two-thirds vote of congress. A majority of the Virginia delegates were opposed to the taxation of exports, especially tobacco, by the congress under any conditions and in this case the majority of the convention eventually agreed with them. Washington favored a proposition to make the proposed constitution take effect upon ratification by any seven states, a matter on which the Virginia delegates were divided; but the majority of the convention was not willing to put the new constitution in effect unless it should be ratified by at least nine states. Finally, Washington favored a proposal that the congress should not have power to overrule an executive veto by less than a three-fourths vote, though some of his Virginia colleagues wished to make it easier for congress to overrule the President in such cases. The convention at first agreed with Washington, but eventually settled upon the two-thirds rule which appeared in the final draft of the constitution. In short, Washington clearly favored a stronger and more independent chief executive than was agreeable to several of his Virginia colleagues, and in general the convention agreed with him. The last great change in the Virginia Plan was made by the committee on postponed matters and unfinished business, which

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was appointed near the end of the convention to work out the most important of the compromises in the framing of the constitution. Madison served on this committee, but manifestly the most influential spokesmen for the ideas of the original nationalists were Rufus King, who represented Massachusetts in this committee, and Gouverneur Morris, who represented Pennsylvania. They struck the decisive bargain with Roger Sherman of Connecticut and David Brearley of New Jersey, under which the original federalists gained acceptance for their project of an independent and powerful supreme court in return for their agreement to the original nationalists' demand for an independent and powerful chief executive. This bargain was a triumph for the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts nationalists over those Virginia delegates who favored the supremacy of a national legislature. In the light of Washington's votes, as recorded in private polls of the Virginia delegates, there can be little doubt where he stood on this basic controversy. As a consistent advocate of a vigorous and energetic national government, he wanted above all an independent and powerful chief executive, and for this he was willing to pay the necessary price, that is, to sacrifice the original Virginia project for a legislative guardianship of the fundamental law in the interest of harmony with the advocates of judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the constitution. Madison finally acquiesced with great reluctance in this compromise— which, however, produced the cornerstone of the American system of constitutional government. It is clear that researches into the paternity of the constitution cannot ignore the role of the great compromisers. Among them three were outstanding. In the first place stands Benjamin Franklin, whose role in the first of the grand committees, where the ultimate constitution of the senate was achieved, may have been decisive. Strictly speaking, this first of the great compromises was not a true compromise: Madison, Wilson, and the other spokesmen for the nationalists on the floor of the con-

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vention fought it to the bitter end. At last when the compromisers, so-called, had crushed their opposition, there was a caucus (according to Madison's "Notes") in which the question of whether to submit to the victors or to leave the convention and abandon the effort to form a more perfect union at that time was considered. Unable to agree upon the latter course of action, they tacitly gave up the struggle for the aristocratic senate called for by the original Virginia Plan. The second of the leading compromisers was Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut. Judge Ellsworth, though he preferred the Virginia Plan to that embodied by the original federalists in the so-called New Jersey Plan, was the most effective spokesman for the many delegates who objected to the unmitigated nationalism of the Virginia delegates. He and Gorham of Massachusetts took the lead in striking out the word "national" from the text of the Virginia Plan and substituting for "national government" the equivocal phrase "government of the United States." But Ellsworth's greatest service was probably rendered in the committee of detail, where he apparently held the balance of power between Randolph and Wilson, representing the original nationalists, and Gorham and Rutledge, who were bent on steering a middle course between the original nationalism and the original federalism. It was in the committee of detail that Gorham and Rutledge first struck the famous bargain between Massachusetts and South Carolina which influenced so greatly the specific form of the legislative powers vested in congress by the constitution. Ellsworth made clear his reason for supporting the combination between Massachusetts and South Carolina. He had more faith in the state governments than the Virginians and was determined that the more perfect union should rest upon the states as well as upon the people in order to insure the preservation of strong state governments in the general system of government. This achievement was the great contribution of the committee of detail to the work of the federal convention.

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Third among the leading compromisers was Roger Sherman of Connecticut. He took an active and influential part in all stages of the convention's deliberations. Originally a leading advocate of the view that the convention should attempt no more than a moderate revision of the Articles of Confederation, he was eventually won over to the project for establishing a more perfect union on the basis of a revolutionary new constitution. His greatest contribution was made in the last of the grand committees, that on postponed matters and unfinished business. Here he stood fast for a strong and independent supreme court as a counterweight in the proposed system of checks and balances to the strong chief executive, sponsored most conspicuously among the original nationalists by Rufus King and Gouverneur Morris. This great compromise was a genuine compromise and marked a successful fusion of the ideas of the original nationalists and the original federalists in a system of checks and balances constituting the veritable cornerstone of the American system of constitutional government. The available evidence tends to show that none of the original Virginia planners was as well pleased with this final result as Washington. Mason's discontent was most emphatic. In June he had declared on the floor of the convention that he would "bury his bones" in Philadelphia rather than return to Virginia without an acceptable new constitution; but in September, after the adoption of the report of the committee on postponed matters and unfinished business, he exclaimed with deep emotion that he would "rather cut off his right arm" than sign his name to such a constitution as was then about to be agreed upon. In the end he did withhold his signature and returned to Virginia to lead the opposition to ratification. Edmund Randolph was less dissatisfied but by no means pleased with the finished constitution. His disappointment began in the committee of detail, where his favorite projects were frustrated by the adverse combination of Massachusetts and South Carolina. At the end he

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wished to refer the work of the convention to a second convention, at which he evidently hoped for changes which would make the constitution more agreeable to Virginians. Defeated in this undertaking, he also withheld his signature from the finished constitution and returned to Virginia undecided whether to oppose or support its ratification. Madison overcame his disappointment at the substitution of judicial for legislative supremacy in the guardianship of the fundamental law and signed the finished constitution in the belief that he could not hope to secure agreement upon any plan less radically different from that originally offered by the Virginia delegation. Washington alone among the Virginia leaders retained his composure amidst the ruins of the Virginia Plan. There is abundant evidence among his letters, written after the adjournment of the convention, that he was well satisfied with the convention's work. Writing to David Humphreys on October 10, 1787, he declared, "The Constitution that is submitted is not free from imperfections, but there are as few radical defects in it as could well be expected, considering the heterogeneous mass of which the Convention was composed and the diversity of interests that are to be attended to." Writing to Edmund Randolph, January 8, 1788, he addressed himself to the latter's pet project of a second federal convention to revise the work of the first. "To my judgment," he wrote, "it is more clear than ever, that an attempt to amend the Constitution which is submitted, would be productive of more heat and greater confusion than can well be conceived. There are some things in the new form, I will readily acknowledge, which never did, and I am persuaded never will, obtain my cordial approbation; but I then did conceive, and do now most firmly believe, that, in the aggregate, it is the best Constitution that can be obtained at this Epocha, and that this, or a dissolution of a Union, awaits our choice, and are the only alternatives before us. Thus believing, I had not, nor have I now, any hesitation in deciding on which to lean."

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In a letter written to Lafayette, February 7, 1788, he gave a more elaborate statement of his good opinion of the new constitution. "With regard to the two points (the pivots upon which the whole machine must move,) my Creed is simply, ist. That the general Government is not invested with more Powers than are indispensably necessary to perform the functions of a good Government; and, consequently, that no objection ought to be made against the quantity of Power delegated to it. 2ly. That these Powers (as the appointment of all Rulers will for ever arise from, and, at short stated intervals, recur to the free suffrage of the People) are so distributed among the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches, into which the general Government is arranged, that it can never be in danger of degenerating into a monarchy, an Oligarchy, an Aristocracy, or any other despotic or oppressive form, so long as there shall remain any virtue in the body of the People." In a later letter to Lafayette written on June 19, 1788, when at last ratification of the constitution by the necessary number of states seemed certain, Washington became fairly lyrical in his description of the "energetic government" under the new constitution, to which he was then looking forward with high hopes. What was Washington's personal contribution to this happy result? At this point the written evidence leaves much to the imagination. The convention had adopted a rule designed to preserve the secrecy of its deliberations, and this rule Washington strictly observed. Neither the letters he wrote while in Philadelphia nor the entries in his diary contain any references to the convention's proceedings, but we know that Washington lodged at the residence of his good friend Robert Morris. The diary does record with painstaking accuracy how Washington divided his time between his public duties and his private affairs. There are frequent references to dinner parties and the drinking of tea here and there, and to evenings spent at concerts and other places of entertainment, and to Sundays and other holidays devoted to

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religious services, the inspection of farms, and fishing expeditions; and always the daily attendance at the sittings of the convention is recorded. But much time remains unaccounted for. There are some sixty evenings when the only notation in the diary is that the time was spent "at Mr. Morris's," or "at his lodgings," or more specifically "in his room." What was he doing during these many apparently unoccupied evenings? Occasionally the diary notes that he spent the time writing letters, but ordinarily there is a provocative silence concerning his employment during these potentially useful hours. Some light is thrown upon the nature of Washington's activities during these many hours not accounted for in the written record by evidence concerning the activities of his host Robert Morris. In Eleanor Young's interesting book Forgotten Patriot Robert Morris, there is further information concerning the goings-on at Washington's lodgings. "Material is lacking," the author notes, "concerning Morris's part in the Federal Convention. . . . some evenings were spent in great festivities and mirth," but many evenings still remain to be accounted for. But "if all the facts were known," the accomplished author concludes, "it would be found that Robert Morris was a factor of more consequence than casually appears." 1 2 What were these facts, the existence of which remains a matter of surmise and conjecture? Some of them are known: for instance, Gouverneur Morris was Robert Morris's junior partner, James Wilson was one of his lawyers, and other members of the Pennsylvania delegation were among his close business associates; is it to be supposed that none of these evenings, not otherwise accounted for, could have been the occasion for unheralded conferences between Morris and his Philadelphia associates, among whom were some of the most active participants in the convention's deliberations? And how about Washington himself? Fellow 12. Eleanor Young, Forgotten Patriot: Robert Μ orris (New York: Macmillan, 1950).

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members of the Virginia delegation could resort to his room for nocturnal conferences as readily as could Morris's fellow delegates. What, pray, may Washington be supposed to have been doing during these evenings of seeming silence and idleness in his room? Is it likely that a man with his gifts of leadership would have been doing nothing, merely meditating or lcilling the time in futile reverie? It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that if Robert Morris was a factor of more consequence in the work of the convention than casually appears, so also was Washington. In short, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that this strong, silent man knew how to exert a due influence in the convention's proceedings without intervening personally in the debates on the floor. The effectiveness of Washington's leadership is reflected in the composition of the committee on style and arrangement, appointed near the end of the convention to prepare the final draft of the constitution. The chairman was William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, who had succeeded Oliver Ellsworth on the committee of detail when Judge Ellsworth had been obliged to leave the convention in order to attend to urgent business in his state. He had been a principal advocate from the beginning of a more perfect union, which would be a union of states as well as a union of people. Washington had accepted this view of the nature of the union, agreeing that it should be both federal and national; when he and the other Virginians dropped the name of nationalists, they might more logically have called themselves unionists instead of appropriating the name of their original federalist opponents. Nevertheless, it is clear that at this stage of the convention General Washington found himself in close accord with Dr. Johnson. The other four members of the committee of style and arrangement were young men who had been conspicuous Nationalists at the opening of the convention. One of them, Hamilton, had formerly been Washington's military aide, though he was

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the least helpful of the four during the convention. Madison might well be described as Washington's political aide, when the convention opened, though in the later stages of its deliberations Gouverneur Morris, Washington's fishing companion, seemed to draw closer to him. Madison perhaps was getting tired, and was certainly distracted by the labor of writing out his "Notes" in the hot Philadelphia evenings. At the end, when the frame of the national government came to resemble most closely the Massachusetts model of state government, Rufus King was the young brain truster whose thinking seemed to have won the widest acceptance. Later, when Washington had become president and possessed patronage to bestow, Hamilton was appointed secretary of the treasury (after Robert Morris declined the office), and Gouverneur Morris was appointed minister to France; near the end of Washington's presidency King was appointed minister to England (after declining the post of secretary of state). Only Madison drifted away from Washington's leadership, ending by becoming chief political aide to Thomas Jefferson. Three of these four brilliant young men must be mentioned in any list of the principal makers of the constitution. It is now clear who must be included in such a list: Madison along with Randolph and Wilson had the principal parts in presenting the original case for a national government; Rutledge, Gorham, and Ellsworth were the leading actors in transforming the proposed national union into a national-federal union; and Gouverneur Morris, King, and Sherman were most effective in giving the frame of government its final form. But above these names must be written the names of Washington and Franklin, whose practical capacity for the necessary give-and-take of politics held the convention together at every crisis in its deliberations, and whose skill in effecting acceptable compromises made a successful end of its labors possible. In this work Franklin was a great and indispensable collaborator of Washington, but there can be no

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doubt who was the master among the makers of the constitution. Years later Gouverneur Morris in his celebrated address on the death of Washington recited some of Washington's incontestable contributions to the framing of the constitution. Washington had raised a standard, Monis intimated, to which the wise and the honest could repair. But Washington was more than a standard-bearer, although this was a high function in the struggle for a more vigorous and energetic government of the United States. He was surely one of the most influential among the compromisers, whose services in the actual framing of the constitution were of the greatest importance. Franklin, Ellsworth, Sherman — these names must stand near the head of the list of those "at the forge where the constitution was hammered out, blow on blow"; and in all probability Washington's name should stand at the head of that list. It is excessively unrealistic to attempt to assign to any one of these great compromisers the paternity of the constitution. It is enough for Washington's fame that he was one of the greatest of the compromisers as well as the standard-bearer in the struggle to establish a more perfect union.

5. THE COERCION OF STATES IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

T h e coercion of states which are members of a federal system by the government of the system, in order that the states may perform the obligations of membership in a satisfactory manner, presents one of the most difficult problems of federal politics. A principal purpose of federation is to secure peace and freedom from forcible constraint for the federated states, and the coercion of a state by its own federal government seems to be incompatible with the nature of a well-ordered federal union. But deliberate and persistent refusal by a state to perform properly its obligations to a union of which it is a member is also incompatible with a well-ordered federal union. T h e supremacy of a federal government within its proper sphere seems to require the submission of the states to authentic federal power, even if that submission must be procured by military force. On the other hand, a decent respect for the opinion of the people of a state calls for the employment of political rather than military methods to induce a state to accept an appropriate adjustment of a conflict between state and federal interests. NOTE: This paper was read at the Columbia University Bi-Centennial, 1954, and is reprinted by courtesy of the Trustees of Columbia University from Federalism, Mature and Emergent, ed. Arthur W . MacMahon (New York: Doubleday, 1 9 5 5 ) .

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I How difficult of solution this problem may be is strikingly illustrated in the pending project of a constitution for a European federal union. 1 The constitution-study committee of the European Movement, which took the initial lead in working out the details of a federal constitution for a European union, had given this problem careful thought. In their draft submitted to the official constitutional assembly there was a provision that, if the government of the union should find that the constitutional order, democratic institutions, or fundamental freedoms had been gravely violated in any member state, without the established authorities in that state being able or willing to protect or restore them, the union government might intervene until the situation should again become normal. It was further provided that in such a case the measures taken by the union government should be submitted without undue delay for the approval of the union parliament. The intention of these advocates of European federal union was clear. The union government should have authority to coerce a member state without waiting for the previous advice and consent of the union parliament. The assembly was unwilling to accept this proposal. Their draft constitution provided merely that the federal executive council, if it should find coercion to be necessary and proper, could prepare a plan for federal intervention in a member state, with the advice and consent of the Council of National Ministers, and should submit it to the union parliament for approval. T h e framers of the draft constitution recognized the importance ι . See constitutional committee of the Ad Hoc Assembly: Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community (Paris, 1953: published by the secretariat of the constitutional committee). See also Mouvement Europeen Comite d'Etudes pom la Constitution Εuropeenne. Parallele entre le Project de Traite adopte par I'Assemblee "Ad Hoc" et le Projet de Statut etabli par le Comite d'Etudes pour la Constitution Ε uropeenne (Bruxelles, 1 9 5 3 ) .

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of the problem of coercion, but were reluctant to approve effective measures for its solution. They were ready to agree that the union government should guarantee the maintenance of constitutional democratic governments in the states. But they were not prepared to authorize the prompt use of force by the government to make that guarantee good except when federal aid should be requested by a state government. The problem of coercing states in a federal system is more important and urgent in connection with plans for strengthening the United Nations and giving the organization the authority which may be necessary and proper for achieving the high purposes set forth in the preamble of its charter. The United Nations has already taken an important step toward the achievement of its purposes by adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, thereby establishing what Lincoln happily termed standard maxims for free society. The rights of individuals mark the limits of the power of governments in their dealings with their subjects, and a universal declaration of rights gives the sanction of all mankind to the efforts of portions of mankind in particular states to go forward in the development of their civil liberties. But many of the member states of the U.N. are politically backward and their institutions fall far short of what would be required to assure to their peoples enjoyment of the blessings of the kind of liberty envisaged by the framers of the declaration. Has the United Nations a responsibility to help the peoples of backward countries in their struggles to compel their governments to show greater respect for their rights, and, if so, what practical measures can they employ to bring about a closer approximation to the established standards of civil liberty? 2 For five years the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has been wrestling with this problem, but up to now all efforts to draft a covenant of human rights, providing for the effective 2. See Hersh Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (New York: F. B. Praeger, 1950).

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enforcement of the rights asserted in the declaration, have failed. Agreement upon a plan for coercing backward member states has been impossible. The United Nations must presently consider other steps toward the achievement of its high purposes, which can hardly be taken without raising similar questions concerning the relations between member states and the general international organization. How can there be any effective limitation of national armaments without some intervention in the arming, training, and disciplining of troops by the governments of member states? How can there be any effective measures against aggression without control over international airways, international waterways, and strategic land routes? Above all, how can there be effective action to keep the peace without adequate means of raising necessary revenues for supporting the proper activities of the U.N.? None of those things can be done without finding a satisfactory method of compelling member states either to take indicated action through their own governments or at least to keep their governments from obstructing necessary action by the United Nations. II The coercion of states in a federal system of government, which may be defined provisionally as the use of military force by the general government of the system for the purpose of compelling member states to perform their duties under the constitution of the system, may seem at first thought an essential means of maintaining the system in good working order. If the general government cannot compel obedience by the state governments to the law of the land — above all to the constitution itself, which is presumably the supreme law of the land — how, a reflective observer may ask, can the integrity of the system be preserved? The member states in a federal system possess important powers. Are they not to be held responsible for the

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exercise of these powers with a due regard for the rights and interests of the other states and also for those of the people of the system as a whole? And how can they be held to an effective responsibility unless the general government can intervene with the force that may be necessary for the faithful execution of its own constitution and laws despite the failure of state governments to do what may be properly required of them? T h e framers of federal constitutions have always recognized the existence of this problem. General governments in federal systems possess important powers and must be able to function efficiently if the purposes of such systems are to be realized. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the federal system must be protected and preserved; the rights of member states in their relations with one another must be defended; and the governments of member states must be kept in their proper places. If military force can not be employed by the general government against member states when apparently necessary for the discharge of its obligations, how can the federal system be maintained? Is the government of such a system to have responsibilities without adequate powers for their performance? The discussions of this problem at the meetings of the European Movement's constitution-study committee and of the constitutional assembly seem to have covered the theoretical aspects of the problem thoroughly. There is no really satisfactory theoretical solution of the problem. If a federal government possesses a constitutional authority to intervene by force in the government of a state for the purpose of insuring the state's performance of its duties as a member of the federation, there is no adequate constitutional barrier against the conversion of the federation into a centralized state by a vigorous and resolute central government. If it does not possess such authority, there is no adequate assurance that the federal government can maintain the character of the system when vigorous and resolute state governments take full advantage of their constitutional freedom

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to go their own ways. For a better understanding of the nature of modern federalism it is necessary to turn from theory to experience. The framers of the Constitution of the United States were well aware of this problem. 3 In the original draft of the Virginia Plan the sixth resolution provided that the national legislature, as its authors described the new body which was to succeed the Continental Congress, should have power "to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof." This provision of the plan, which would have authorized the government of the United States to coerce member states by the use of military force, presumably commanded the support of the Virginia delegation at the time of its introduction into the convention. James Madison, the Plan's principal author, was a persistent advocate of a strong national government and may well have believed at this early stage of the proceedings that military coercion would be an indispensable means of compelling uncooperative states to live up to their obligations under the proposed articles of union. But a few days later, when this resolution came up in the convention for consideration, Madison moved that it be postponed — observing, according to his own report, that "the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it, when applied to people collectively and not individually." 4 Madison had evidently been troubled in his own mind about this feature of the Virginia Plan and was quickly persuaded that the military coercion of states had no proper place in a well-conceived plan for a federal system of government. His "Notes of the Debates" disclose his sober second thoughts on the subject. " A union of states containing such an ingredient," 3. See Sixty-ninth Congress, first session, House Document no. 398. Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 9 2 7 ) , p. 1 1 7 . 4. Ibid., p. 1 3 1 ; see also pp. 1 7 4 - ς

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he declared, "seemed to provide for its own destruction." The use of force against a state would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment; and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped, he concluded, "that such a system would be framed as might render this recourse unnecessary." 8 The postponement was agreed to without objection. What Madison had in mind for the purpose of rendering recourse to the military coercion of states unnecessary became clear a few days later when the provision in the Virginia Plan for a congressional veto upon state legislation came up for consideration in the convention. Madison declared at once that a congressional negative, as he termed it, on state laws was the proper alternative to military coercion of the states, and was necessary because the latter was (in his words) "visionary and fallacious." The convention, however, was not ready to accept this conclusion. The New Jersey Plan for a more perfect union, which was prepared shortly thereafter, revived the provision for military coercion. Its sixth resolution proposed that "if any state . . . shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution of such acts or treaties (that is, acts or treaties under the authority of the United States), the Federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the Confederated States . . . to enforce and compel obedience. . . ." β This proposal touched off the debate which had been postponed when the corresponding provision of the Virginia Plan was before the convention. Edmund Randolph objected that the kind of coercion proposed by the authors of the New Jersey Plan was "impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals." 7 5. James Madison, Notes on Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966). 6. Sixty-ninth Congress, first session, House Doc. no. 398. Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927), p. 207. 7. Ibid., p. 214.

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George Mason exclaimed that "fire and water themselves are not more incompatible than such a mixture of civil liberty and military execution." 8 Mason was thoroughly aroused by William Paterson's acknowledgment that the New Jersey Plan could not be enforced without military coercion. "Rebellion is the only case," Mason declared, "in which the military force of a state can be properly exerted against its citizens." Luther Martin presently ended the debate with the suggestion that "the federal plan of Mr. Paterson did not require coercion any more than the national one [of the Virginia planners]." 9 Nothing more was heard on the floor of the convention about the military coercion of member states until weeks later, when Madison tersely observed in another connection that "the practicability of making laws with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands." 1 0 Like the Virginia delegation, the convention as a whole on giving the problem careful consideration concluded that the military coercion of states was out of place in a well-ordered federal union. But the convention could not finally accept Madison's alternative of a congressional veto of state legislation. The majority of the delegates eventually preferred, and Madison and his associates ultimately accepted, the method of judicial review as that best suited to maintaining the supremacy of the constitution and laws in a well-framed federal system. Ill How the military coercion of states in a federal system would actually work in practice was left by all the speakers in the convention to the imaginations of the delegates. But there are federal systems where this method of federal execution is deliberately provided for in the written constitutions, and experience discloses the implications of the method. In the Latin American 8. Ibid., p. 244. 9. Ibid., p. 246. 10. Ibid., p. 380.

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republics of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico the framers of the federal constitutions recognized the existence of the problem, which had disturbed the authors of the Virginia and New Jersey Plans at Philadelphia in 1787, and, unlike their North American precursors, adopted the practice of military coercion as a regular method of keeping states in their proper places in the federal system. 11 T h e Constitution of the United States indeed does authorize congress to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, and the explicit guarantee of a republican form of government to each state doubtless implies a duty on the part of the federal government to use these or other forces under circumstances which remain conveniently indefinite. But the constitutions of the Latin American federal systems make explicit all, and presumably more than all, that is implicit in our system. The Argentine constitution, for instance, which was drafted by statesmen professing great respect for the principles of the Constitution of the United States (and who were obviously trying to introduce those principles into their own country), offers an instructive comparison with the North American model. The central government of the Argentine Republic is expressly authorized by this constitution to intervene in the provinces in order to guarantee the republican form of government, and also when requested by the provincial authorities in order to maintain them in power, or to restore them to office if they have been deposed by sedition or by invasion from another province. 12 T h e use of the expression "to intervene" suggests a wider latitude of discretion on the part of the Argentine central authorities 1 1 . Argentine Constitution of 1853, Articles 4, 23, 67, 86; Brazilian Constitution of 1891, Articles 6, 24, 48, 80; Mexican Constitution of 1857, Article 29. 12. L. S. Rowe, The Federal System of the Argentine Republic (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1 9 2 1 ) . See especially chap. 7, "Principles and Practice of Federal Intervention."

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than was deemed necessary or proper by the framers of the Constitution of the United States. The record shows that in fact the power of federal intervention in the provinces has undergone what must seem to North Americans an astonishing development. Combined with the power to declare a state of siege in cases of domestic disturbance, it has enabled the central authorities, particularly the president, to intervene in provincial politics to an extent that has profoundly affected the nature of the federal system. The procedure of intervention is that the President, having determined that the republican form of government in a province has been subverted or is threatened with subversion, appoints a federal commissioner and supplies him with sufficient force to establish his authority in the province. This is done with the approval of the congress if it is in session, otherwise on the president's own responsibility. The commissioner may, and usually does, supplant the governor and legislature of the province and sometimes also the judges; restore or maintain order; hold fresh elections; inaugurate a new and more satisfactory government; and then make his final report to the president. In the eighty years following the final establishment of the Argentine federal system in i860 there were one hundred twenty-nine cases of federal intervention in the provinces.13 None escaped, and most were subjected to federal intervention many times. In forty-six cases federal intervention was authorized by the congress, but in a large majority of the cases the president acted on his sole responsibility. The frequency of federal intervention has increased in the present century. President Irigoyen, who was responsible for twenty-two interventions during his first term of six years, frankly employed the power for the purpose of strengthening the position of the Liberal party, which he headed, in the provinces. 13. Austin F. MacDonald, The Government of the Argentine Republic (New York: Crowell, 1942). See especially chap. 9, "Federal Intervention."

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General Uriburu, who intervened in twelve provinces (all of which then possessed Liberal party governments) within a week after his seizure of power on behalf of the Conservatives, was equally frank in his employment of this political weapon for partisan purposes. It was not always necessary for the provincial government to be actually threatened with subversion. It was enough that the president desired to have the government of a province subverted in order to replace political opponents with his own followers. T h e practice of federal intervention in Argentina can be understood only as an incident in the operation of the Argentine system of party government. T h e practical capacity of a president to carry on the government of the country is of course, as in the United States, partly a function of his own personality. But in a country as far advanced as Argentina on the road to effective constitutional government, the management of the congress by the president can not be satisfactorily accomplished by open violence or thinly veiled intimidation. It has been found more acceptable, under what may perhaps be described as normal circumstances, to gain a dominating influence over the congress by collusion with the provincial governors and manipulation of the provincial elections. If the provincial governors are not sufficiently cooperative, a federal intervention can be arranged. T h e resulting party system is doubtless more personal than that in the United States, but clearly more political and less militaristic than that in many Latin American countries. In Brazil, also, federal intervention is closely connected with the operation of the party system. 14 The Brazilian party system resembles the Argentine in many respects, though no single Brazilian state stands out above the others like the province of Buenos Aires in Argentina. In Brazil two leading states contend with one another for primacy in national politics, and as long 14. Herman G. fames, The Constitutional System of Brazil (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1 9 2 3 ) .

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as each is willing to share the control of the national government with the other, successful presidential leadership under the forms of party government faces a similar problem of aligning a majority of the lesser states and consequently of the congress also, with the presidential party. For as long as the gauchos and the landed oligarchy in general maintained their class ascendancy in the politics of these two federal republics, the system of party government served tolerably well to reconcile the practice of personal dictatorship with the fiction of constitutional government without too much open resort to military force. But in recent years the growth of urban industry, modern capitalism, and a class-conscious proletariat has complicated the traditional pattern of party government and opened the way for the demagogic dictatorships of Vargas and Peron. In both Argentina and Brazil the practice of federal intervention is associated with the use of the state of siege as an instrument of executive leadership in the system of government. The authors of the Brazilian Constitution of 1891 were greatly influenced by the Argentine Constitution of 1853 as well as by that of the United States, and in both countries the intention was clear to make the presidency a more powerful office than had been deemed prudent by the North American founding fathers. By declaration of a state of siege the president can suspend the personal rights guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions with the consent of the congress, if it happens to be in session, or otherwise without it. Thus, alleged threats to the republican form of government in a province or a state or to the peaceful execution of federal laws anywhere enable the chief executive to intervene at discretion (subject to the approval of the congress, when in session) and to assert his personal authority in a state or locality by such display of force as may be necessary until fresh elections, conducted under the supervision of his own agents, confirm the ascendency of his partisans. A Vargas or a Peron can connive at the creation of

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circumstances (particularly when their congresses are not in session) which can be made to appear to justify excessively arbitrary and tyrannical proceedings on their parts, and yet in countries so far advanced on the road toward stable governments of law and not of men, as Americans like to say, public opinion imposes no inconsiderable limits on the discretionary authority even of such masterful or, perhaps it should be said, domineering leaders. IV Supreme court judges, both in Argentina and in Brazil, have studied United States precedents and shown much interest in such significant cases as Luther versus Borden and Texas versus White.15 The distinction between justiciable and political questions, which afforded much comfort to United States supreme court judges reluctant to clash with the political arms of the government in dealing with Dorr's anemic rebellion in Rhode Island, was manifestly insufficient to afford guidance to their hard-pressed successors when trying to deal with the much more difficult problems growing out of the far greater rebellion which broke out in South Carolina in 1861. Constitutional lawyers in the United States tend to ignore the problems left unsettled by the supreme court during the period of Civil War and Reconstruction, as if the uniqueness of the occasion excused their refusal to face the lessons of the experience. Constitutional lawyers in the two greatest Latin American republics lack the same pretext for ignoring the implications of these decisions. The historic importance of the relations between the military and civil authorities in these federal republics, on the contrary, has caused them to make the most of precedents offered them by the experiences of their North American neighbors. 15. Santos P. Amadeo, Argentine Constitutional Law. The Judicial Function in the Maintenance of the Federal System and the Preservation of Individual Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943). See especially second part, "Division of Powers in the Federal System," chap. 4.

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18

The case of Luther versus Borden was comparatively simple. Political reformers in Rhode Island grew impatient with the resistance of backward-looking politicians in power in that state to the democratic trend of the times and appealed from the verdict of elections under the ancient state constitution to the arbitrament of arms. Neither of the parties had any heart for hard fighting, both preferring the rule of law under the federal constitution. The question was: What did the federal constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government to the states require of the federal government under the circumstances? Was the federal government bound to secure for the embattled Rhode Islanders the blessings of a democratic republic in accordance with the spirit of the age, or must it prevent changes in an established form of state government except by political methods, even though the authorized method under the old state constitution was so undemocratic as to defeat the will of a majority of the people of the state? Most of the United States supreme court judges at the time were, or had been, Jacksonian Democrats, but they showed little of Jackson's readiness to shoulder responsibility or his fondness for combat. Their refusal to say what was a republican form of government necessarily left to the political branches of the federal government the responsibility for determining what the constitutional guarantee required of the federal government, and the convenient distinction between a political and a justiciable question served to cover their negative attitude with a garment of respectability. An Andrew Jackson in the White House might have found a way to decide such a political question. The man in the White House happened to be John Tyler, who was no Jacksonian Democrat and even less inclined than the supreme court judges to mingle in a quarrel not of his own choosing. Congress was permitted to decide the question by the simple expedient of not challenging the title to seats of the 16. 7 Howard χ (U.S. 1849).

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senators and representatives from Rhode Island who had been elected under the authority of the established state government. Abraham Lincoln was neither an Andrew Jackson nor a John Tyler, and the supreme court judges who owed their appointments to him were also men of different temper from most of those who happened to be sitting on the high court at the time of Dorr's rebellion. History has chosen to call the rebellion with which Lincoln had to deal by an equivocal name, and in recent years the public taste has even seemed to favor the acceptance of the Southern term for the Civil War, doubtless out of consideration for the feelings of the vanquished, as there is no better reason for calling it the W a r between the States. Lincoln himself never conceded that he was waging a war against any of the states, preferring at first to regard his warlike activities as no more than necessary and proper measures for discharging his duty to take care that the laws of the United States be faithfully executed. Later he was forced to consider what measures he should adopt to re-establish state governments in areas where resistance to federal laws had resulted in the disappearance of state governments able and willing to perform the duties of such governments under the federal constitution. Lincoln showed great indifference to what he considered to be nonessentials in developing a policy for the reconstruction of state governments in the South. He saw no need to decide whether the Southern ordinances of secession had taken the southern states out of the union or not. He was satisfied to find men in those states ready and willing to operate state governments under the federal constitution, when he was able to give them the necessary protection against violent interference by the misguided individuals who were resisting the authority of federal laws. He did not deny that there might be other ways of insuring domestic tranquillity in the sorely troubled union than that contemplated by his reconstruction policy, but he did

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insist that he was entitled to try his method until some other was provided by law. A n d h e did not hesitate to use the pocket veto in order to frustrate the effort of congress to make a law which would provide a different and in his opinion less promising method. U n d e r Lincoln's less politic and less effective successor congress forced the adoption of its own m e t h o d of reconstruction. Luther

versus Borden

seemed to justify action of some kind by

the congress for the purpose of making good the guarantee of a republican form of government in the southern states, b u t there was difference of opinion concerning the constitutionality of the particular means employed by congress for this purpose. C o n gress did w h a t it could by the use of its power to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to prevent the judges from treating this constitutional question as justiciable and thus settling, if able, the validity of the congressional method

of

reconstruction. B u t congress could not prevent the supreme court from deciding, if it wished, the great (though not completely conclusive) case of Texas

versus White.11

A majority of the

supreme court including a majority, b u t no more, of the judges appointed b y Lincoln, held that the question was justiciable and that the federal union was an indestructible union of indestructible states. T h i s decision clearly justified w h a t Lincoln had done toward reconstructing the union, b u t it l e f t persistent doubt concerning the constitutionality of some of the later actions of the congress. M o r e than two-thirds of the senators and representatives in the congress presumably believed that w h a t they were doing for the purpose of reconstructing the union was within their constitutional power, because they passed the Reconstruction A c t over the presidential veto. If the question was a political one, as the judges in Luther

versus Borden

17. 7 Wallace 700 (U.S. 1868).

seemed to have conceded, con-

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gress had acted within its rights. A noncooperative president, like Johnson, had only himself to blame if he could not make the congress accept his views concerning the proper distribution of power between the president and the congress under the section of the constitution guaranteeing a republican form of government to the states. Practical people are content to leave unsettled what can not be conveniently settled if the achievement of their major objectives is not obstructed thereby. T h e constitutional question could be regarded as closed by subsequent generations in the reconstructed union. But Latin Americans, living under different political conditions in their federal unions, could not be so easily satisfied with the official interpretation of the great model constitution of the United States. The judicial theory of the process of reconstruction, set forth by the majority of the supreme court in Texas versus White, was formally challenged by the dissenting judges. One of them, Justice Grier, had been a Jacksonian Democrat and later a member of the majority of the court in the great case of Dred Scott versus Sandford.16 He was an active participant in the intrigue that led President Buchanan to connive at the judicial effort to take the problem of slavery in the territories out of politics by denying the power of congress to make the Missouri Compromise. Grier regarded himself as a judicial and political realist and, viewing the actual condition of the South under the congressional policy of reconstruction realistically, he concluded that the major generals in command of the military forces, occupying the administrative regions into which the South had been divided in pursuance of the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, were the dominating facts in the situation and that the assumed existence of the southern states was a meaningless fiction. This was a view of the process of reconstruction after the Civil W a r which could be readily understood by Argentinian and Brazilian judges and politicians, although presidents in the 18. 19 Howard 393 (U.S. 1 8 5 7 ) ·

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Argentinian and Brazilian federal unions were likely to be more successful in the management of congresses than hapless Andrew Johnson, and consequently the distribution of power between the presidents and the congresses in cases of federal intervention in the provinces and states was likely to take a different form than in the United States. The two other dissenting judges in Texas versus White, Justices Swayne and Miller, were Union Republicans. They concurred in the judgment of the supreme court in Texas versus White, but were dissatisfied with Chief Justice Chase's opinion. Though they did not take the trouble to set forth a systematic and comprehensive statement of their own theory of reconstruction, it is evident that they thought Chase had said either too much or too little. He could have disposed of the case before the court without propounding the theory that the union was an indestructible union of indestructible states. He could not have disposed of the widespread doubts concerning the validity of the process of congressional reconstruction without analyzing further the nature of the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government to the states which were or had been members of the union. If Swayne and Miller could have persuaded a majority of the court to adopt their view of the nature of this guarantee, they would presumably have written an opinion designed to dispel the existing doubts concerning the constitutionality of the congressional policy of reconstruction. Be that as it may, the result of the decision was to leave the full significance of the guarantee of a republican form of government judicially undetermined. This has happily been no serious inconvenience to the people of the United States. The precedent, however, has been duly noted in the Latin American federal unions and has doubtless encouraged to some extent the tendency there for politicians to make the most of the distinction between justiciable and political questions.

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In the Latin American federal unions federal intervention in the government of the provinces and states has provided a method of virtually coercing the provincial and state governments. One result has been to bring about a greater degree of centralization in the government of the federal unions themselves than was presumably intended by the framers of the union constitutions. Another has been to supply a great deal of evidence tending to confirm the opinion of the framers of the Constitution of the United States that the coercion of states by military force is a practice to be avoided in the interest of domestic tranquillity. In the United States Lincoln's theory — that the central government, in its use of force to insure domestic tranquillity, deals only with individuals who resist the authority of the nation's laws and does not recognize the existence of the governments such persons may claim to represent in the course of their unlawful resistance to its authority — has been tacitly accepted as authentic. How far the political branches of the central government may go in protecting the union against the subversive acts of such individuals is a political question which future presidents and congresses will have to decide, if and when circumstances require such decisions. This traditional reluctance to coerce states by forcible federal intervention in the affairs of their governments, rather than the theoretical distinction between justiciable and political questions, has limited the role of the judiciary in the adjustment of interstate controversies. 19 In general the supreme court of the United States has made an excellent record in the adjudication of interstate controversies when the controversies have been of such a nature that the judgments of the court could be executed by 19. A. N. Holcombe, Our More Perfect Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), chap. 1 1 , "The Supreme Court and the States," pp. 389-94.

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proceedings against individuals. This has been true even in those cases where the individuals were state officials, provided that the execution of the judgment has not required a positive act by an official but merely that he refrain from action objectionable to the court. The record has not been so good, however, in cases where the execution of a judgment would have required positive action by state officials, particularly in cases where the officials were elective officers — above all, governors and legislators. In such cases, uncertainty concerning the possibility of compelling state officers to take the action desired by the supreme court has seemed to constrain the court to act rather as an instrument of mediation and conciliation than as a true judicial body. The most impressive illustration of this self-imposed limitation upon judicial power is the long series of suits brought by Virginia against West Virginia in order to force the latter to assume its proper portion of the Virginia state debt as it stood at the time of the separation between the two states.20 Nine times Virginia appeared before the supreme court before the controversy was settled. In the course of the proceedings the court successively decided that West Virginia ought to assume a fair portion of the debt, determined what the portion was, asserted that it had authority to enforce the satisfaction of Virginia's just claim against West Virginia, and announced that it would listen to arguments concerning the method of enforcing its judgment — whether by seizing and selling property belonging to the state of West Virginia, levying a tax upon its people, or issuing bonds in its name and paying over the proceeds to the state of Virginia. Repeatedly in successive stages of the litigation the court postponed action on the ground that it could not assume a self-respecting state would persistently refuse to discharge its just obligation to another state, but each postponement was followed after an interval by a fresh appearance on 20. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918).

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the part of Virginia before the court with a fresh plea that W e s t Virginia had done nothing to justify further delay. Eventually, more than half a ceutury after the original separation between the states, the court was able to postpone hearing arguments concerning the method of enforcing its judgment on the ground that such a proceeding was not proper in a suit between states at a time when the United States was engaged in a foreign war of such magnitude as W o r l d W a r I. A t last the court's patience and forbearance was rewarded by an agreement between the states which rendered further judicial proceedings unnecessary. T h e outcome may be acclaimed as a triumph for the court in its self-assumed role as a mediator and conciliator of interstate controversies, but the question

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remains judicially undetermined of how a judgment against a state involving a large pecuniary payment to another state is to be executed if the government of the debtor state fails to make a timely settlement with its creditor in accordance with the decision of the court. In the recent case of Dyer versus Sims, in which W e s t Virginia was again involved in a controversy over the payment of money to meet an interstate obligation, the supreme court showed more confidence in its practical capacity to get its judgment faithfully executed. 21 In this case a W e s t Virginia state auditor had blocked the payment of a share of the expenses of the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, assessed against that state, on the pretext that the compact itself, under which the agency was operating, was one which the state government had no right to make under the state constitution, and the W e s t Virginia supreme court had declared that the auditor had construed the state constitution correctly. All the other Ohio River Valley states, which were parties to the compact, were interested in the outcome of the case although the proceedings took the form of a suit by an officer of the com21. 341 U.S. 22 (1951).

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mission against the West Virginia auditor and was brought originally in the West Virginia courts. Ordinarily the United States supreme court would accept the construction put upon a state constitution by the highest state court; and in this case it might have been supposed that the federal supreme court judges would have hesitated to involve themselves in a controversy with such high officers of a state government as the members of the state supreme court over the interpretation of its own constitution. The United States supreme court decided unanimously, however, that West Virginia should pay its share of the expenses of the water purification district though the judges were unable to agree upon the reasons for the decision. In this case circumstances strongly favored the federal judiciary in any clash of authority with the state government over the enforcement of its judgment. The case had originally been brought in the name of individuals so as to camouflage the conflict of interests between different states, and the government of West Virginia did not present a united front in the proceedings because the state legislature had originally approved the compact and presumably believed that it was not beyond its power to do so. Nevertheless the dignity of the state was involved by the action of its supreme court, and the legislature might have made an issue out of the reversal by the federal supreme court of the state court's interpretation of its own constitution. Perhaps the magnitude of the political issue was obscured by the triviality of the financial obligation actually involved in the litigation. Perhaps the myth of state sovereignty had lost so much of its earlier potency that state politicians were no longer interested in challenging undramatic federal encroachments on the traditional reserved powers of the states. Be that as it may, the United States supreme court made its decision without hesitation and the state of West Virginia accepted the result without resistance. In general the distinction between justiciable and political

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questions seems to lose importance as a weapon in the struggle between federal and state power with the decline of the myth of state sovereignty in this neotechnical age. Popular acceptance of the judgments of the federal courts becomes easier in cases in which state interests or state pride may be involved. Federal judges may still plead nonjusticiability in cases involving the processes of constitutional amendment and of congressional reapportionment and redisricting, but apparently they now face most of the issues that are presented to them without giving much, if any, thought to the problem of coercing states which might be reluctant to accept their decisions. Certainly the combination of politicians to bring about a reversal of the federal courts' decisions in the submerged oil lands cases shows that there is plenty of vitality in the fiction of state sovereignty in cases where important interests are involved. But important interests, as these cases plainly disclose, will appeal from the judicial power to the political when the audacity of the proceeding appears to be justified by the size of the stakes. Politicians, like judges, seem inclined under the changing conditions of modern times to pay less heed than formerly to the distinction between justiciable and political issues; and the national politicians with a growing sense of competence venture to assume responsibility for the settlement of controversies which in earlier years would have been left to the politicians of the particular states most directly concerned. VI Under the changed conditions the principal agent of coercion, if a state must be compelled to yield to the opinion of the nation, is the national political party. Political issues, as distinguished from justiciable ones, are issues over which people will fight, but in a constitutional state the fighting will be kept on the plane where political parties wage their contests for control of a government without recourse to physical force or violence.

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In ordinary matters which judges find to be within their competence their decisions will be accepted without protest even if important state interests are involved, and the protection of the legitimate interests of the states, like that of the United States, "becomes a normal function of the federal courts. In extraordinary cases, in which the courts might feel competent to act, the party politicians may choose to operate under the impulse of the normal political motives, and federal intervention in what might be regarded by state interests as an affair of the state takes the form of a campaign for federal legislation. But the national political parties are themselves federations of state factions, and the nature of such parties imposes natural limits upon the practical capacity of national politicians to take effective action. The relations between the parties and the judiciary are absorbed into the general system of checks and balances. A serviceable equilibrium seems to be maintained. These tendencies in the development of the American federal system are well illustrated by the treatment of the freedmen after the Civil War. Old-fashioned federalism would have left the protection of the civil rights of the freedmen to the state governments. A much more nationalistic type of federalism might have insisted upon a new and more elaborate definition of the republican form of government which would have prevented the reconstructed southern states from resuming their place in the union until the equality of the freedmen before the laws of the states, and in the practical administration of the laws as well, had been secured to the satisfaction of the dominant party in the national government. The Fourteenth Amendment supplied an answer to the problem of reconstruction which held fast to a middle way. The authority of the congress and the president to treat the interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government to each state as a purely political question was radically restricted. Instead of a partisan political definition of the meaning of the

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words "republican form of government" there was an attempt to define in the constitution itself the rights of freedmen on the same basis as the rights of other persons who were or might become citizens of the United States. Thus the actual determination of the rights of the freedmen might be transformed from a political into a justiciable question. In fact the federal courts were reluctant to assume this responsibility until the passage of time and the improvement in the economic and social condition of the Negroes gradually brought about a better adjustment between the ways of life of the two races. The supreme court refused to construe the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in such a way as to disturb the slow natural process of adjustment. 22 It put enough meaning into the new guarantees of personal rights to keep the racial question out of national politics, but not enough to freeze any temporary nonpolitical adjustment into a permanent relationship. Eventually the climate of opinion moderated to the point where national party leaders began again to talk about a settlement of the racial problem by national legislation, but meanwhile the judges were at last handing down decisions in the course of ordinary litigation between individuals which promised to make the guarantee of due process of law an acceptable substitute for an interpretation of the guarantee of the privileges and immunities of citizenship which would secure for the descendants of the slaves a position equal to that of free white men in the American republic. What neither the force of arms nor the more subtle coercion of political leaders at the head of national parties had been able to accomplish, the federal courts are gradually bringing to pass by the creation of an ever-broadening series of precedents.23 The episode records 22. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36 ( 1 8 7 3 ) . 23. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka and companion cases, 347 U.S. 483 ( 1 9 5 4 ) .

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the working of an important principle of political science: when in the fullness of time a political question becomes justiciable, the problem of coercing states in a federal union loses its importance so far as that particular question is concerned. Until that time is reached, American experience suggests that what politicians cannot readily achieve by the political techniques of compromise and pacific adjustment had better be left undone unless the tension of unadjusted controversy threatens to provoke conflicts fatal to the existence of the federal union itself. If the Latin American federal unions seem indifferent to this lesson of political experience in the United States, the answer is not obscure. There is a larger problem than that of coercing the members of a federal union with which their statesmen have to deal: the problem of maintaining the supremacy of the civil authorities over the military. The experience of modern times offers no better solution for this problem than the organization of political parties strong enough to command the respect of generals as well as the support of voters. Whether there are two major parties or a larger number seems to be less important than that there be free competition between parties for the favor of the public. A monopolistic position for a single party offers little promise of a solution of the problem unless the party so conducts its affairs as to assure that the powers it ostensibly exercises in the name of the people are actually exercised with their unconstrained and ungrudging consent. The monolithic party states of our times have not yet demonstrated that this can be done. The experience of modern federal systems everywhere seems to show that the two problems, that of guaranteeing a republican form of government to the member states and fundamental freedoms to their peoples and that of preserving the supremacy of the civil authorities over the military, are closely related. There are two ways of dealing with the latter problem. One is to keep the military power weak, which was the American way

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for many years. The other is to make the civil power strong. This means more than the elaboration of schemes on paper for the distribution of powers among the various agencies within the system. It means the political education of the people and also the strengthening of the social classes which have the most to gain from the preservation of a reign of law instead of a government of men. In modern democracies, these classes are the middle classes. American experience makes one political principle clear. The best instrument of a politically intelligent people is a well-developed party system, capable of stimulating the enterprise of politicians content to rule under the law and of maintaining free competition between them. The free-enterprise system in politics is the best answer to the schemes of political regimentation so energetically but unwisely pressed upon the nations in recent years by false friends of mankind. If there must be coercion, the answer offered by Abraham Lincoln is still the world's best answer to the basic problem: let coercion be confined to the coercion of individuals in the name of the law, and let the process, so far as is humanly possible, be judicial rather than militaristic. VII The practical operation of the federal systems of the United States and leading Latin American republics seems to show that the political theorists in the European Movement constitutionstudy committee who prepared the first draft of a federal constitution for "Little Europe" possessed a less realistic understanding of the proper role of force in a federal union than the more experienced politicians who dominated the proceedings in the constitutional assembly which revised the draft. The essential character of a federal union seems to be better protected when sharp conflicts of interest between the central and state governments are reserved for adjustment by strictly political methods than when they are exposed to attempts at settlement by mili-

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tary force. Force may be properly exerted against lawless individuals, but in a true federation it has no proper place in determining the relations between the union government and member states unless there is violent aggression by one or more of them against others. Even if the lawless individuals happen to be the chief officers of a state, American experience shows that they should be dealt with as individuals rather than as spokesmen for a state if the federal union is to retain its essential character. Violation of this principle of federal politics threatens the destruction of the federation, either by converting it into a centralized state or by bringing about its dissolution. It may be argued that this principle of federal politics is not applicable to the proposed constitution for "Little Europe" because in any case that instrument of government does not provide for a true federal union. To those who make this argument it may be conceded that the draft constitution approved by the constitutional assembly left the character of the proposed federal union in doubt, because of the powers of obstruction reserved to the Council of National Ministers representing the governments of the member states. Doubtless the position of the union government needs to be strengthened if the advantages of a federal system are to be fully realized. But the effort should not be made to strengthen the proposed union government by authorizing military intervention with the governments of member states at the discretion of the union government. It is the legislative authority of the union parliament, not the military power of the executive, that needs strengthening if the proposed European union is to be a genuine federal union. More important, perhaps, is the applicability of this principle of federal politics to plans for strengthening the United Nations Charter. It is difficult to believe that this immature agency of international politics can become a satisfactory instrument of the common purposes of mankind without being transformed into a genuine federal union of peace-loving states. Acceptable

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arrangements for the limitation of national armaments and the preservation of international peace depend upon the grant of suitable lawmaking powers to a general international organization. But authority to coerce member states by military force is neither a necessary nor a proper means of maintaining the supremacy of a universal federal union within its legitimate sphere. The principle that guilt is personal must be embodied in the scheme of federal union, even when the persons concerned happen to be officers of member states. The object of international police actions must be restricted to the coercion of lawless individuals; the actions themselves are rightly distinguished from anachronistic wars against states. In this respect the proceedings in Korea have been in line with the sound development of a universal federal union. The problem of coercing member states in a federal system will arise in a new form in connection with the general review of the United Nations Charter which will be in order in 1955. Advocates of the greater use of political instead of military methods for the settlement of international controversies will doubtless urge at that time the strengthening of the U.N. The simplest and surest way to bring about a greater use of political methods in the settlement of international controversies is to grant to the organization suitable legislative powers. The vesting of legislative powers in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, or in new agencies created for the purpose of exercising such powers, will form a more perfect union of the nations constituting a genuine federal system with limited but important lawmaking authority. These questions will have to be faced: to what extent shall the member nations be employed as agents of the union, and how shall they be compelled to perform the duties which may be imposed upon them? This is not a new problem for the statesmen of the United Nations. Already the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly has raised the follow-

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ing questions: What shall be done to secure the enjoyment of these rights by the peoples of different member nations? Shall each member nation be free to pay as much or as little respect to the articles of this international bill of rights as it pleases? If so, it is easy to imagine that among the sixty member nations, with their widely various traditions and practices in such matters as the legal relations between the individual and the state, there will be not a few which will give slight attention to the enforcement of these hard-won, and in many parts of the world up to now little-honored, rights. The declaration might eventually acquire under such circumstances an uncertain moral force, but it would remain without legal effect in the member nations whose lawmakers might choose to ignore it. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has sought to avoid such an unsatisfactory result by drafting a covenant of human rights which would provide legal sanctions for the proclaimed rights of mankind. The ratification of the proposed covenant by a member nation would create an obligation toward other member nations which might likewise ratify the covenant to transform an ideal standard of human relations into an enforceable body of laws. But what if a member nation should neglect to enforce these laws and its people should be thereby denied the enjoyment of the proclaimed rights of mankind? Will the United Nations have guaranteed the substance, if not the form, of a democratic republican government to the peoples of the member nations who become bound by the covenant? What, if anything, will it do to enforce the provisions of the covenant? The commission, though possessing in its membership legal and political talent of a high order, has been unable to find an acceptable solution to its problem. It is evident that the problem cannot be solved without vesting important lawmaking powers in the United Nations. The U.N., following the example of the United States with its first federal bill of rights, might

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make a modest beginning in the enforcement of such rights by restricting their application to the relations between individuals and the U.N. itself, leaving for a time the application of its provisions to the relations between individuals and their respective national governments to the discretion of these national governments. This was the status of the fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the American Declaration of Independence down to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution after the Civil War. Though this forbearance on the part of the federal government to interfere in the domestic affairs of the states did not prevent the war, it certainly eased the way for the gradual development of a sense of loyalty to the union which made its survival and ultimate strengthening possible. In general, the statesmen of the United Nations may be expected to go ahead deliberately with proposals for granting legislative powers to the infant organization. T o assume such obligations as the Latin American federal unions have assumed for maintaining the republican form of government in their member states means an amount of interference with the governments of the member nations which would make for less rather than greater tranquillity in the contemporary world. The more modest responsibilities assumed by the government of the United States respecting preservation of basic human rights in the states furnish a more suitable model for the builders of the new federal system with limited powers which, it may be hoped, will emerge from the deliberations of the United Nations statesmen in the years immediately ahead. The right principle of coercion is the Lincolnian. The true function of the government of a successful general international organization is to keep the peace by keeping individuals in their proper places rather than by trying to coerce member states.

6. PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

T h e president of the United States is simultaneously the head of the state, the head of the government, and at least the titular head of one of the two major parties. As head of the state he must be respected, as head of the government he must be obeyed, and as head of the party he may also be loved and treated with affectionate familiarity. H e is at once the chief executive, M r . President, and " I k e . " It is significant that one of the questions put to President Eisenhower on the occasion of the first press conference he permitted broadcast to the American people related to the use of his popular nickname during his incumbency of the presidential office. His gracious answer attested his high qualifications for at least the first of the several kinds of leadership which have been thrust upon him. T w o of the components of presidential leadership are furnished by the constitution; but the third, the leadership of one of the major parties, is a product of custom. Nor does custom prescribe definitely what the relationship between the president and his party should be. T h e president may dominate his party, thereby converting it into a powerful instrument of government; N O T E : This paper is reprinted from The Yale Review, vol. 43, no. 3 (March, 1954), pp. 321-335, copyright Yale University Press.

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or he may be content with a nominal leadership, leaving mainly to others the practical determination of party policy and the active management of the processes by which policy is transformed into law and administration; or he may even try to ignore parties, making himself as much as possible a leader of the whole body of the people, regardless of their divisions on the basis of geographical distribution, economic interests, social stratification, racial extraction, and religious affiliation, and of other considerations which give character to parties. There are interesting historical precedents for each of these three presidential attitudes. There are also various circumstances which can influence a president's choice among them, and go far to control the actual course of his administration. President Eisenhower, having spent most of his active life as a professional soldier, may have given less attention to the precedents than most of his predecessors. In that case the circumstances of his elevation to the presidency would all the more greatly influence his conception of the role of party in his administration. He won the Republican nomination only after a hard and close fight with an experienced politician, whose high position among his fellow partisans had gained him the nickname of "Mr. Republican." But he won an easy victory in the final election at the same time that the Republican candidates for congress were receiving fewer popular votes in the country at large than the congressional candidates of the Democratic party. When General Eisenhower came into office, the Republican party possessed the narrowest possible majority in the senate and an almost equally precarious hold on power in the house of representatives. Under these circumstances the new President may have done well to defer in matters of policy to the established leadership of the party in the congress, while reserving to himself a free hand in the selection of his cabinet and the organization of his administration. There was little to be gained by trying to dom-

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inate his party. He could not make it an effective instrument of government without the ungrudging cooperation of the party leaders in congress, and allowing for even a very little independence of action by Republican congressmen he could not govern the country without some support from Democrats. Senator Taft, though disgusted by some of the appointments to the cabinet, was willing to cooperate, provided he retained his leadership in the senate, and sundry Democrats also were willing to support the President, when their help might be needed, provided he retained his popularity with the country. T h e first session of the Eighty-third Congress therefore gave the Republican congressional leaders an opportunity to show the President what they could do with their control of the legislative process, and gave the President an opportunity to show the country what his administration could do in those areas of government where the possessors of the executive power can operate with a free hand. This kind of relationship between the president and his party is a familiar one in American politics. T h e standard model is that designed by Henry Clay when he was the prime leader of the opposition to Andrew Jackson during that valiant warrior's turbulent presidency. It was utilized when the W h i g party finally succeeded in putting General Harrison into the White House, while Clay remained at the head of the party in the senate. Unfortunately, the W h i g party system never received a fair trial during the lifetime of its originator. General Harrison, the first Whig president, died before it could be fully tested, and his successor, John Tyler, was unwilling to accept Clay's leadership in the formulation of legislative policy. General Taylor, the second elective Whig president, did not favor all of Clay's legislative program and came into office without a party majority in either branch of the congress. Senator Clay put through the last of his great compromises without benefit of a governing party or even of a sympathetic chief executive until

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Taylor's untimely death opened the doors of the White House to a more tractable vice-president. T h e death of Senator Taft ended the hope that the W h i g party system could serve the purposes of the Eisenhower Administration or give the country a satisfactory performance by the leaders of the national government. There was no congressional leader who could fill the shoes of Mr. Republican. T h e chief contender among congressional Republicans for the leading place in the public eye, Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin, was obviously not interested in cooperating with the administration. W h e n he challenged the administration to an ordeal by battle, insisting that the paramount issue in the midterm congressional elections would be the purging of communists from the government and the adoption of a more militant attitude toward communism in dealing both with the Soviet Union and with our allies in the so-called free world, he forced the administration into a clearly-defined dilemma. Either President Eisenhower must make himself the effective leader of his party, or he must lay ordinary partisanship aside and make himself the leader of at least that part of the country which continued to "like Ike." It was already evident that more was at stake than partisan victory in the mid-term congressional elections. Few experienced politicians can have believed that the Republican party has better than a poor chance to retain control of the Eighty-fourth Congress, whatever Republican congressmen might choose to say in public. The hastiest look at the record of congressional elections shows that almost always the party in power loses some seats at the mid-term appeal to the people, and the Republican majority in the house of representatives is too small to permit any loss without losing at the same time the control of the house itself. Control of the senate was lost when a Democrat was appointed to the late Senator Taft's seat. The mid-term outlook has always been especially bleak for administrations

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that have accepted the Whig party system. Of an even dozen presidents who have been content to leave the active leadership in the legislative process to their party associates in the congress since the establishment of the two-party system in its modern form in the age of Jackson, no less than ten have suffered the discomfiture of seeing their party routed at the polls before the end of their terms. Republican victory in 1954 could be written off in advance by realistic politicians. The real stake, hazarded by Senator McCarthy's challenge to the ordeal by battle, is a favorable position for the presidential campaign of 1956. When President Eisenhower accepted Senator McCarthy's challenge by announcing that the paramount issue in 1954 would be not "communism in government" but "a progressive and dynamic program" which he would formulate and present to the country in his own time, he made clear that he did not intend to let the mid-term congressional elections go to the Democrats by default. But that was not the same as staking the future of his administration on his ability to seize and hold the leadership of the Republican party. He could not permit Senator McCarthy to seize the leadership of the party without abdicating his title to the leadership of the country regardless of party. President Eisenhower's hold on the country can survive Republican defeat at the polls in November, 1954, because President Eisenhower stands in the eyes of the country for something more than mere leadership of a major party. But his political prestige could not endure unimpaired if he declined to accept the challenge of Senator McCarthy, because prestige depends upon a reputation for the possession of moral qualities, deemed essential for successful leadership, which are incompatible with avoidance of an ordeal by battle. President Eisenhower's hold on the country is not contingent upon his leadership of the Republican party, but his hold on the country is contingent upon his retention of the actual

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power to govern. There have been presidents who have tried to govern without benefit of any organized partisan support, but they have never succeeded well enough to make their methods a model for imitation. Washington began with the prestige of a unanimous election and ended, as his Farewell Address plainly reveals, with a deep abhorrence of the excesses of intense party spirit and grave misgivings concerning parties formed, as all major American parties have been, on the basis of geographical distinctions. Yet he began also by excluding all but friends of the constitution from his administration, and he ended by making support of the Jay Treaty the touchstone of party regularity. T h e two Adamses shared Washington's low opinion of partisanship in principle and sought to conduct their administrations with a minimum of partisanship in practice. But they left a record of good intentions in office and defeat at the polls that supplies political moralists with edifying texts and practical politicians with horrible examples. Other presidents who have sought to govern without benefit of organized partisan support, like Zachary Taylor and Rutherford B. Hayes, whose parties were in a minority and hence incapable of giving them power to govern, and John Tyler and Andrew Johnson, who broke with their parties and could find no serviceable substitutes, were manifestly, in their attitudes toward the role of parties, victims of circumstances rather than guardians of principles. Presidents who are well acquainted with the record of the parties will prefer to govern by means of organized partisan support. But it does not necessarily follow that they must stand or fall by their ability to lead that particular combination of factions with which they happen to have been associated in a general election campaign. Ordinarily, of course, a prudent politician will not lightly cast aside the ties that bind together the candidates who run for office on the same ticket and the

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voters who have supported them at the polls. Party loyalty is one of the first principles of practical politics, and party integrity is one of the most valuable assets of a democratic people who are trying to get satisfactory government under an undemocratic written constitution. Public men who wish to be leaders must find compensation for the deficiencies of the fundamental law by preserving the proprieties dictated by the auxiliary customs. But circumstances alter cases. The public interest must always come before any partial or special interest, even one so important as the payment of obligations to a political party. When a long train of events shows that a growing portion of the voters are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the services rendered by the established major parties, the question will arise whether the alignment of parties itself is as good as it should be in the public interest. When more and more voters assert their independence by refusing to enroll in either of them, or by shifting from one to the other at successive elections, or by skipping about the ballot instead of voting a straight ticket, it may be argued that at least one of the major parties is approaching the exhaustion of its popular mandate. Abnormally extensive party-shifting and split-ticket voting, as well as voting for minor parties or at least not registering as major partisans, may well be the harbingers of a new order in party politics which party leaders will disregard at their peril. W e may be on the verge of such a period in the development of the American party system. General Eisenhower ran far ahead of most of his associates on the Republican ticket at the general election of 1952. His election was a great personal triumph, but there was no real victory for the Republican party. The number of independent voters in national politics has been growing since the war and, according to the pollsters, has now reached impressive proportions. Apparently the time has

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come for reviewing the role of the major parties in national politics and of partisanship in the government of the country under the constitution. T h e primary function of the major parties is clear. It is to give the voters regularly every fourth year such a choice between two candidates for the presidency as will satisfy a strongly preponderant portion of them, say at least ninety percent, that they themselves are performing a suitable role in the government of a democratic country. But there are also two important auxiliary functions for the major parties. One is to organize the principal factions in the country at large in sufficiently wellcoordinated combinations so that, whichever party may come to power, the policy-determining branches of the government can formulate a legislative program and make effective use of the power to govern. The other is to provide an economic and social underwriting of the constitution, to adapt Charles A . Beard's expressive phrase, so that the natural tendency of the struggle for power by major party politicians will be to promote the adoption of those measures which will best serve and strengthen the elements among the people capable of making the greatest contribution to the stability and development of the American way of political life. These two auxiliary functions of the parties are sometimes obscured in the fury of the competitive struggle for office. For a sound body politic all three are essential. The performance of the first of these functions by the two existing major parties has been more than adequate, and the evidence of the last election indicates that it still is. T h e competitive struggle for the presidency between Democrats and Republicans has filled an even century and afforded the voters a decisive contest between two major contenders in twenty of the twenty-five election campaigns. In 1856 and i860 the new alignment of parties was not yet clearly established; in 1892 the Populists were able to create an important diversion; in 1 9 1 2 the Republicans were divided against themselves; and in

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1924 the LaFollette Progressives declared their independence of both Republicans and Democrats. At all other elections the candidates of the two major parties were able to divide the votes of at least ninety percent of those voters who went to the polls, and in most of these elections the regular major party candidates polled over ninety-five percent of the total vote. In 1952, Eisenhower and Stevenson between them won ninetynine percent of the vote. The two-party system in presidential elections seems to be a natural and a satisfactory result of the American free-enterprise system in politics. Some observers of the American political scene hold the opinion that this is all that should be expected of the political parties in a modern democracy. Joseph A. Schumpeter, for instance, in his thoughtful book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, defines the democratic method as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." The principle of democracy, he concludes, "merely means that the reins of government should be handed to those who command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams." 1 But this theory leaves unsettled all questions concerning the influence of public opinion upon the processes of government in a democracy. It throws little light on the role of parties in the adjustment of the relations between the rulers and the ruled. It provides no guidance for a period like the present, when the reins of government in the executive branch have been handed to men of one party without any clear decision as to who has the reins in the legislative branch. More penetrating is the political analysis in Samuel Lubell's The Future of American Politics. He shifts the emphasis from the candidates for office to the rank and file of the parties. 1. Joseph A . Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1 9 5 0 ) .

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Every presidential election, he contends, is really a "self-portrait of America." 2 Into the picture enter the feelings as well as the thoughts of the American people; their hopes and fears as well as their principles and prejudices; the tensions of race, national orgin, and religion as well as the conflicts between different economic, social, and sectional interests. T h e voter's mind, he intimates, operates at two levels — one conscious, the other unconscious. T h e traditional parties, therefore, are more than the mere instruments of self-seeking leaders; they are political entities, each with a character and purposes of its own. Lubell believes that there are relatively few periods when the major parties are closely competitive. T h e usual pattern, as he sees it, is that of a dominant majority party, which stays in office as long as its components hold together, and a minority party, which gains power only when the majority coalition splits asunder. Thus, he suggests, our party system is like the solar system: the parties are not two equal suns, but resemble rather a sun and a moon in their unequal interdependence. " I t is within the majority party," he declares, "that the issues of any particular period are fought out; while the minority party shines in reflected radiance of the heat thus generated." 3 Under this solar-system theory of party, the Democrats have been the "sun" party since the collapse of the Republicans in 1932. There is certainly much that is valid in this theory of party. The Federalists in their earlier years furnish an example of such a relationship between the parties. T h e Jeffersonian Republicans in the first quarter of the nineteenth century furnish an even more impressive example. They clearly dominated the political scene, like a sun at the zenith, reducing the factious Federalists to the role of a waning moon, until they broke up after the famous "scrub race" for the Presidency in 1824. But the later parties have been more evenly matched. Periods of 2. Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper & Row, 1952). 3. Ibid.

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partisan ascendancy have been ended by the shifting from one side to the other of the more independent-minded voters, who have held the balance of power, rather than by the actual disintegration of a dominant party. Any adequate explanation of the record of the major parties in national politics must be based on an inquiry into the mental habits of bipartisans and nonpartisans as well as those of inveterate Democrats and Republicans. The leagues of local and special interests, the factious coalitions, which constitute the major parties, may have succeeded astonishingly well in supplying the American people with acceptable candidates for the important political offices and giving the voters an effective choice between them; but they do not in fact succeed equally well in fighting out the issues of a period within the membership of a dominant party. The party in power at Washington can organize the two houses of the congress; it can control the order of their proceedings; but it cannot monopolize the business of lawmaking. Every survey of the legislative process on Capitol Hill shows how confused the operation of partisanship is in the transformation of policy into law, how limited the extent of party rule. A few spectacular measures may be carried through congress by strict party votes, but a large majority of the important controversial public bills are carried with the aid of members of the minority party, despite substantial opposition within the nominally governing party, and a considerable number of important bills are carried by a combination of a majority of the minority party with a minority of the majority party over the opposition of a majority of the majority party. There is a noteworthy amount of what may properly be called party government at the national capital, but there is also a great deal of government as originally designed by the framers of the constitution with little help from the parties. This fact should reassure President Eisenhower as he seeks to govern without a Republican majority. Last December, when Senator McCarthy declared that "com-

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munism in government" would be the paramount issue in the 1954 congressional elections, and President Eisenhower replied that on the contrary the progressive dynamic program he planned to formulate would supply the issues, there was a hastening of pollsters to find out what others were thinking. The U.S. News and World Report promptly reported that eighty-two percent of the Republican congressmen who replied to its telegrams expressed the opinion that communism in government would indeed be a leading issue in the next campaign, and that eighty percent of them included taxes among the leading issues. Among the Democrats the farm problem stood at the head of the list of issues. The farm problem ranked third on the Republican list and foreign policy fourth. Foreign policy ranked second on the Democratic list, taxes third, and labor legislation fourth. Meanwhile Dr. Gallup was polling the voters, asking them whether they wanted the President to take a stronger stand on the issues, and if so, on what issues. He reported that sixty-five percent of the voters wanted stronger leadership from the President. Republican voters wanted particularly a stronger effort to rid the government of communists, Democrats wanted more done to prevent a third world war, and the independent voters wanted a generally clearer-cut foreign policy. If it is true that independent voters are more interested in foreign policy than in the issues presented by Republican and Democratic leaders at Washington, it is likely that foreign policy will be the paramount issue. In the present state of the parties neither can win control of the congress next November without the support of a majority of the independent voters. Each party must bid for their favor and has a strong incentive to wage a campaign which will interest them. But the candidates at the mid-term congressional elections do not have to take orders from Washington about how they are to interest the independent voter. They can write their own platforms,

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and many of them will. T h e new congress will be no better disciplined than its predecessors. President Eisenhower will still be in a position to make a judicious mixture of partisanship and bipartisanship or nonpartisanship in the exercise of his leadership. Many political critics dislike the American party system. It seems to leave too much to chance in the legislative process in Washington. It certainly leaves a great deal of latitude in the choice of policy to the representatives of the congressional districts and of the states regardless of the official party leadership. It prevents the major parties from giving a good performance in their role of coordinators of the various special and local interests which are the traditional components of the partisan coalitions. Their generally poor performance in this role destroys much of their potential usefulness as instruments of government at the national capital. T h e critics like to make unfavorable comparisons between the weak coalition parties at Washington and the highly-centralized, tightly-disciplined parties which carry on the government at Westminster under the British form of the two-party system. In Britain party government is the essence of constitutional government. T h e head of the majority party and the head of the government are identical persons, leaving very little of the executive power to the crown, the nominal head of the state. But if such a party system were introduced into the United States, it would be necessary to decide an important preliminary question: W h e r e is the leadership of the party to be located? In the president? Or in the congressional party leaders? T h e record shows that those presidents who have been most successful in their efforts to put themselves at the head of their parties have not been able to put an end to the friction and strife between the chief executive and the congressional leaders so generally characteristic of the governmental process under our system of a separation of powers. T h e five Democratic

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presidents (Jackson, Van Buren, Cleveland, Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt) and the two Republican presidents (Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt) who are widely regarded as the most effective party leaders in the White House since the establishment of the two-party system in its modern form, were all able to get themselves renominated, and all but one, Van Buren, were able to get re-elected, though Cleveland had to try twice before returning to the White House for his second term. But none of them escaped serious conflicts with their party associates in the congress. Only Andrew Jackson retained his hold upon the congress until the end. All the others either lost their effective control of the legislative process to the congressional leaders, or, as in the cases of Cleveland and Wilson, suffered the humiliation of seeing their party lose its control of the congress itself. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that the power of dissolving the congress and precipitating a national election, whether vested in the president or in a majority of the congress or in both, would by itself bring about a system of responsible government by a centralized disciplined majority party, as in Britain, under the control of the congressional party leaders. It would be necessary also to centralize the nominating process for the selection of congressmen as well as of presidents. Doubtless the establishment of a system of monolithic parties might result in a more smoothly-flowing governmental process at Washington. But such systems of party government are dangerous, as modern history amply demonstrates. The founding fathers knew what they were doing when they incorporated a system of checks and balances into our frame of government. No scheme for consolidating the leadership of the parties in the hands of the congressional leaders can succeed under a political system in which a single person is both head of the state and head of the government with important powers derived directly from the constitution or from the law of nations.

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Both these sources of legal authority stand above the ordinary laws of the land, enacted by the congress. In the United States there will continue to be both constitutional government and party government. A president who understands the true nature of his constitutional position will not be too greatly downcast if ambitious copartisans in the congress challenge his leadership of the party at the mid-term elections, or even if the opposition party gains a majority of seats in both the senate and the house of representatives. He can still maintain a vigorous leadership through his possession of the executive power and hope for a due share of influence in the legislative process, though his party may fail him in the role of coordinator of factions. After all, the function of the congress under the federal constitution is not to dictate legislative policy to the president. It is rather to ensure that the policies of the administration will not be carried into execution without substantial evidence of the consent of the people in different parts of the country. More important than factional coordination in the legislative process is the role of the parties in the underwriting of the constitution. In this role their performance is impressive. A constitution planned in an age that has passed way has been made to serve the changing needs and purposes of the successive generations of the American people. The most important instrument of this astonishing process of adaptation has been the system of parties. The two major parties have served the people well in this role, because the normal performance of their primary function, the nomination of candidates and the management of election campaigns, tends naturally to establish a durable harmony between the political principles in which Americans believe and the political forces generated by the dynamic factors — economic, social, and cultural — in the American way of life. The secret of this happy achievement does not lie chiefly in the aptitude of the major parties for factional coordination, useful though this is within the limits of its ef-

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fectiveness. It lies above all in their talent for mediation between the different sections of the country and the different classes of the people. A good performance in the role of the party as a factional coordinator means effective use of legislative power by a partisan majority in the congress. It is, of course, convenient to have a legislative majority that can act promptly and decisively. But it is not desirable in a well-ordered democracy that a partisan majority should dictate legislation regardless of the legitimate interests of minorities of the people. A good performance in the role of the party as mediator between different sections and classes may contribute more to the long-run stability of the body politic. Only one major party at a time may function effectively as a coordinator of factions in the legislative process. But both major parties may serve all the time as mediators between different sections and classes. It is a great merit of the national party system that it seems well adapted to a good performance in this role. A president gifted with natural capacity for government need not be dependent upon a single political party for the success of his administration. He can utilize members of both major parties under the American party system, provided he does so in proper ways. As the head of the state as well as the head of the government, he can stand above the parties, when it suits his purposes, without forfeiting his right to stand by one of them in whatever properly belongs to the party. To be sure, such a course of action may benefit his party at the next election, the prospect of which will have to be reckoned with by partisan opponents. But by then also the alignment of the parties, regarded as bodies of voters rather than as bands of politicians, may have changed and the success of the administration may have taken on a new look in the eyes of the people.

PART THREE

Organizing International Peace

T h e third part of this volume contains some of my writings dealing more directly with the problem of world peace organization. First, there are two papers in which I have tried to set forth the essence of Edwin Ginn's thinking about the organization of peace. According to my understanding of his thought he would now be called a world federalist. He was greatly influenced by the American experience with federal union. But he realized that the organization of world peace must take account of the developing sense of world community in different parts of the world and be mindful also of the ancient political principle that the true foundation of any kind of political order is the system of political education. He knew that politics as well as law possesses an important role in the organization of peace at any level, a proposition about which much has been learned in the half-century following his death. The third of the following papers, therefore, deals with some of the lessons about international politics which have been learned from experience with the organization of peace under the United Nations Charter. Edwin Ginn's vision of world peace was the product of a

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union between two modes of thinking best represented by Immanuel Kant's idealistic political philosophy and Herbert Spencer's realistic social positivism.1 Whether the origin of his vision made him an idealist or a realist did not interest Mr. Ginn. Kant made him a confident believer in the natural and inevitable progress of mankind and in the eventual elimination of war from a civilized world. Spencer convinced him that in the imminent industrial stage of social evolution war would be an anachronism. The conclusion logically followed that world peace is a rational objective of modern man and that wellplanned work in the peace cause would be a timely activity for a successful American capitalist. Edwin Ginn's commitment to world federalism was the product of a patriotic American's admiration for the institutions of his country and a prosperous American's assurance that a proper combination of brains and money could overcome great obstacles and accomplish incredible results.2 He gave little thought to the details of a plan for a suitable world order. He knew that the Constitution of the United States was the achievement of practical politicians determined to reach the compromises that would make an improved form of union acceptable to the American people. He did not doubt that serviceable world politicians would be found, capable of devising an acceptable form of world federation, whenever the people of the world should be sufficiently educated to demand it. Thus he reached the conclusion — a comfortable conclusion for an educational book publisher — that the next task of the leaders in the peace cause was one of popular education. In 1897 Mr. Ginn first attended the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. Here he met like-minded people who shared his active interest in the peace cause and also his optimistic hope that the precedent established by the 1 . See Part Three, Chapter 7, of this volume. 2. See Part Three, Chapter 8.

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successful Alabama claims arbitration case a quarter-century earlier would be presently followed by all enlightened nations. He watched with growing concern the persistent refusal of the Senate of the United States to consent to the successive arbitration treaties negotiated under the direction of forward-looking American presidents. He watched also with growing concern the failure of the Hague Peace Conferences to agree upon effective measures for combating the evils of war. But these disappointments did not weaken his devotion to the peace cause or discourage him from continuing the search for a rational program for practical pacifists. In the light of hindsight it is astonishing that the Hague Peace Conferences should have accomplished anything for the abolition of war. Never before in the history of the West had the institution of organized war seemed stronger and more durable than at the end of the nineteenth century. The Czar's invitation for the first Hague Conference was issued to the powers represented at his court while the Spanish-American War was actually being fought. The British were about to begin a war against the Boers in South Africa. Their role of balance-keeper among the European powers had only recently brought them close to hostilities with each of the members of the FrancoRussian alliance. It was on the point of bringing them into an ominous arms race with the Germans, as the vigorous and ambitious leaders of the Triple Alliance forged to the front in a shifting rivalry of alliances. The royal navy still ruled the seas, but it would not be long before Britain would call upon Japan for help in maintaining the balance of power, the crowning achievement of the traditional war system. The Czar's contemporaries were puzzled about why he had issued his unexpected invitation to the first conference. The confusion produced in the minds of the major powers' foreign ministers is the subject of a fascinating description in Barbara W . Tuchman's brilliant portrait of the Western world before

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the first of the twentieth century's world wars.3 She records their reaction in a sententious summary: "Regarding the proposal with cold distaste, they accepted the invitation — because none wished to be the one to reject it — while expecting nothing to come of it but trouble." Such was the wide gulf between the expectations of the professional diplomats and the hopes of the amateur pacifists. The primary objective of the first Hague Peace Conference, according to its original sponsors, was to reduce expenditures on national armaments by limiting their size and cost. A secondary objective was to promote the arbitration of international disputes as an alternative to war. When the first conference was finally convened, the most that the Czar's advisers ventured to propose under the head of disarmament was an agreement not to increase armed forces or military budgets for a fixed period of years. But this was too much for the representatives of the other major powers. In the end the conference succeeded in authorizing the establishment of a tribunal at The Hague for arbitrating disputes between nations which did not wish to fight about them and in approving a few tentative measures for alleviating the horrors of war, but it did nothing to reduce the costs of preparation for it. The international scene before the second Hague Peace Conference seemed no more propitious for the peace cause than that before the first. The Czar was forced to delay the invitations until he was freed from the toils of his hapless war with Japan. The arms race between Great Britain and Germany had speeded up and was becoming ever more ominous. "Once more," as the perspicacious author of The Proud Tower neatly expressed it, "the nations found themselves committed to go to The Hague and intensely disliking the prospect." 4 The Rus3. Barbara W . Tuchman, The Proud Tower lan Co., 1966), chap. 5, p. 239. 4. Ibid., p. 244.

(New York: The Macmil-

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sian program, circulated in advance as before, proposed arbitration and laws of war as topics of discussion, but ignored disarmament. T h e second conference counted twice as many members as the first and deliberated twice as long; but, judged by Mr. Ginn's maturing pacifist principles, actually accomplished less. Its most constructive decision from his viewpoint was to authorize a third conference in 1 9 1 5 . Even before the second Hague conference Edwin Ginn had lost much of his early interest in international arbitration, having come to believe that "something more fundamental" would be needed to bring about genuine world peace. Speaking in September, 1905, at the International Peace Congress in Lucerne, Switzerland, he outlined a plan for an international school of peace. In such a school, he suggested, the objectives of the peace movement could be more precisely defined and active workers in the cause could be trained for their task. T h e school should be managed, he thought, by a board of trustees "selected from those who have shown great originality and executive ability in carrying on large business enterprises." He wanted them to devise ways and means to "limit armaments and bring the nations together to discuss international relations." A parliament of the nations, he now believed, "in time would enable them to settle conflicting interests without war." Thus his thinking moved toward the idea of world government. Four years later Edwin Ginn announced his intention to establish the International School of Peace and to provide it with the income from one million dollars. Further reflection had sharpened his concept of the ways and means of peacekeeping. The limitation of armaments, he now realized, was closely related to the creation of an international guard or police force. The nations could be persuaded, he believed, to contribute a small part of their military forces for that purpose. With the money thus saved the international force could be equipped and maintained. A growing sense of national security would

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encourage a further reduction of national armaments and a further strengthening of the international forces. There would also be, he expected, a concomitant development of the appropriate institutions of international government. In 1 9 1 0 the final stage in Edwin Ginn's thinking about world peace was reached with the reorganization of the International School of Peace to form the World Peace Foundation, dedicated to a broader educational program. T h e major problem for practical pacifists, he now concluded, was how best to take the immediate steps that would eventually lead to the ultimate goal. His answer to this problem was that practical pacifists should direct their efforts primarily to the establishment of an international police force. T h e nations would reduce their separate expenditures on national armaments as the international force grew in strength and functional capability. T h e need for organizing the international force and managing its affairs would eventually produce an international executive. T h e need for rules and regulations to govern the relations of the members of the executive with one another and with the rest of the world would produce an international legislature. The need for the settlement of disputes concerning the meaning and application of the rules and regulations would produce an international judiciary. T h e final result would be an international government. This, Mr. Ginn now believed, was the necessary and proper agency for the lasting achievement of world peace. Edwin Ginn left to the peace cause at his death on the eve of World W a r I a double legacy. First, the World Peace Foundation was a going concern capable of solid contributions to the political education of mankind. Second, there was his pacifists' road-map, showing the way to world peace from a modest but auspicious beginning with the limitation of national armaments and an international peace force. Like-minded men presently organized the League to Enforce Peace, and the campaign began to form a league of nations as a principal fruit of victory by

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the allied and associated powers. In due course the League of Nations Covenant was framed, containing a commitment to national disarmament, reserving to member states the right to maintain armaments adequate for the preservation of internal peace. But there was no commitment to an international force equal to the task of keeping the peace between the nations. The peace conference at Versailles made a great advance beyond the Hague conferences, but it did not overtake the thinking of Mr. Ginn. During the interval between the two world wars there was much discussion of the limitation of national armaments. The defeated powers were disarmed and the victorious powers limited their naval forces, particularly types of ships of uncertain future utility. But nothing was done to limit the kinds of armaments that seemed likely to be most desirable in a future war. A general disarmament conference, which met at Geneva in 1932, adjourned without producing any positive result, leaving a widespread impression that no power would knowingly agree to any disarmament scheme that did not give promise of improving its relative state of preparedness for war. Earlier, in 1928, the nations did agree to a general renunciation of the right to resort to war as an instrument of national policy, but there was no serious consideration of plans to implement this agreement by organizing an international police force. The major powers' behavior revealed an attitude toward the organization of peace reminiscent of that at the Hague Peace Conferences as described by Barbara Tuchman. They seemed to regard their commitments to the peace cause with "cold distaste" and to expect nothing from them but "trouble." The United Nations Charter, examined with the aid of Edwin Ginn's road-map of the way to peace, marked a great advance over the League of Nations Covenant. T h e Security Council was expressly authorized to enforce its decisions in cases of aggression, breaches of the peace, or threats to the

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peace, and to that end to make plans with the assistance of a military staff committee for the application of armed force. This committee was to consist of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, or their representatives, and was to advise the Council on all questions relating to its military requirements, the command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. International peace forces might be composed of contingents furnished by member states, and all member states were expected to make armed forces available to the Council in accordance with special agreements to be negotiated in advance for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. These arrangements assured the existence of a strong international executive as long as the five permanent members of the Security Council, profiting by their hard experience in World War II, worked harmoniously together. The high hopes of the framers of the charter were frustrated by the outbreak of the cold war. The Soviet Union's rejection of the original American plan for international control of atomic weapons meant that the road to world peace was to be more difficult than expected. The Security Council was rendered incapable of operating efficiently by the method of consensus. It had not been intended to operate on the principle of majority rule; it was well designed, however, for service as a forum for cold-war propaganda, and the two superpowers were quick to take advantage of their opportunities. Within a few years the Security Council was meeting infrequently for any other than propagandist purposes. The Military Staff Committee had nothing of consequence to do. The General Assembly was authorized by the charter to recommend measures for dealing with situations deemed likely to lead to disturbances of the peace, when the Security Council was unwilling to deal with them or incapable of doing so effectively, but such action would require a two-thirds majority vote.

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While the superpowers were fighting cold-war battles in the Security Council, the General Assembly functioned with considerable success as an alternative agency in international politics. It was able to put efficient international police forces or peaceobservation teams into the field to deal with several threatening situations. With impressive support from minor powers and ordinary states it organized and maintained a serviceable substitute for a standing international army. It was unable to develop an international administrative system with the aid of the Military Staff Committee according to the original plan of the framers of the charter, but it did give effective support to an expanded administrative role for the Secretariat under the lead of imaginative and enterprising secretaries-general. In 1952 the General Assembly established a U.N. disarmament commission with instructions to study ways and means of reducing national armaments then growing in size and destructiveness with unprecedented speed. The most ominous arms race was that between the two major nuclear powers; but other states threatened to become nuclear powers, and stopping the proliferation of the new and terrible weapons became the prime objective of the disarmanent movement. The U.N. commission quickly discovered that the limitation of nuclear armaments was impossible without the advice and consent of the nuclear powers themselves, and great pressure was put on their governments to lead the way. Direct negotiations between the superpowers, however, produced no immediate agreement on an acceptable disarmament plan. Arthur M . Schlesinger, Jr., has supplied a realistic description of these negotiations in his inside account of John F . Kennedy's time in the White House.5 They "degenerated," as he vividly 5. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 470.

depicted the process, "into a sort of gladiatorial combat where the contestants waged unrelenting political warfare, brandish-

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ing their schemes and retreating in confusion whenever the other side showed any tendency to accept them." The Soviet Union eventually produced a grandiose project for so-called "general and complete disarmament," and in 1959 obtained from the U.N. General Assembly a formal endorsement of the project's name, if not of its substance. The American negotiators were greatly embarrassed by this tactical defeat and sought to counter the Russian attack by producing a project of their own for "total and universal disarmament." Thus, Schlesinger concludes, "our policy remained formalistic, like the Soviet's — dedicated to developing positions, not for negotiation, but for propaganda." In 1961, however, the American government advised the General Assembly that it, too, favored "general and complete disarmament." The American negotiators had discovered that agreement on a name did not mean necessarily that agreement was near on the substance of a plan. Nevertheless, both Americans and Russians went to work on official plans for reaching their announced goal. The progress of their planning verified the prognostications of Edwin Ginn. They found that they would have to establish an international police force to insure a reasonable degree of tranquillity in a world of disarming states, and that the need for organizing the force and managing its affairs would call for an efficient international government. The American plan for general and complete disarmament was prepared with unprecedented care for presentation to the eighteen-nation disarmament committee at Geneva. The first two stages in the proposed process of disarmament were logically conceived and seemingly practicable; the third stage, in which the definitive organization of world peace would emerge, was more speculative. President Kennedy, who was dedicated to the task of taking the next step in the right direction without needless delay, maneuvered Premier Khrushchev into agreeing to the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. There the implementation of the

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American plan of general and complete disarmament has stopped. There is still a long distance to go. Widespread belief that the third stage in the process of general and complete disarmament would not be reached in the near future led to greater interest in the possibilities of the first two stages. Realistic pacifists had reached a similar position several years earlier. After the indefinite postponement of an official U.N. charter-review conference in 1955, the unofficial Commission to Study the Organization of Peace directed its attention to what it believed to be practicable measures for strengthening the United Nations and adapting its peace-keeping facilities to the changing requirements of the nuclear age. This study-group's tenth, eleventh, and seventeenth reports, containing its most systematic and comprehensive studies of this kind, were prepared with a view to the present development of the United Nations toward its ultimate success as a universal security organization. The improvement of the international legislative process and the reconciliation of an efficient world order with the principle of the sovereign equality of independent states are two problems which have received the commission's special attention.® An important contribution to the current campaign for a better world order was the international conference held in New York in February, 1965, under the auspices of the Foundation for the Study of Democratic Institutions. This conference singled out for special attention the great encyclical of Pope John X X I I I on world peace, Pacem in Terris. It strongly emphasized the need for the development of a worldwide sense of 6. See the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Strengthening the United Nations (New York: Harper, 1 9 5 7 ) ; the Commission's Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York: N e w York University Press, 1 9 5 9 ) ; and the Commission's New Dimensions for the United Nations, the Problems of the Next Decade (New York: the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1 9 6 6 ) . See also Part Three, Chapter 9, of this volume, which was originally published in the Commission's Eleventh Report, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age.

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community. The conference gave little attention to the official American plan for general and complete disarmament. Its organizers seemed not to take seriously the official commitment in stage three to the worldwide organization of peace. Another important contribution to the current campaign for a better world order was the White House Conference on International Cooperation, which was held in Washington November 28-December 1, 1965, as the climax to the official celebration of International Cooperation Year. The National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation, consisting of some two hundred forty members, which had been appointed to promote public participation in the conference, prepared for its consideration thirty reports dealing with the most vital aspects of the general subject. Of these reports, that on arms control and disarmament is especially noteworthy for its comprehensive and forceful treatment of the problem presented by the official commitment to general and complete disarmament. T h e program recommended in this report for the control of armaments and the strengthening of the U.N. peace-keeping machinery furnishes convincing evidence of the practicability of the first two stages in the official plan of 1962. But this impressive report made no attempt to show how the third and final stage might best be implemented. The most searching critique of the American plan for general and complete disarmament yet made was prepared in 1964 for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and published two years later. 7 This study firmly rejected the Soviet version of the plan, which seemed to assume that the abolition of arms would by itself establish a peaceful world order. The proposals for a close correlation, however, between 7. See the Center's The United States in a Disarmed World Johns Hopkins University, 1966).

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the successive stages of disarmament and progressively more stringent peace-keeping measures, which distinguished the American plan, were subjected to a thorough critical examination. A prime topic for investigation was the relationship between force and order in a system of independent states. The announced intention was "to look into the future on the basis of historical experience and theoretical reflection." The learned authors of this study reached the conclusion that the American proposal to form a powerful international army, navy, and air force in the third stage of the disarmament process with effective capability of maintaining world peace was "highly doubtful, if not absolutely out of the question." Many objections to the proposal from the viewpoint of its effect on American security were noted. The suggested arrangements for reconciling peaceful change with universal order were found to be particularly objectionable. One of the authors concluded his part of the critique with a particularly skeptical comment. "As an element in the United States plan," he exclaimed, "the project for a world peace force may promote an aura of abstract good intentions for United States policy. Its usefulness with respect to the credibility of United States policy is another matter." 8 "It is impossible to believe," another collaborator concluded, "that any significant military power in the world today would be willing to trade the capability for self-help inherent in its military establishment for an omnipotent United Nations peace force, envisaged in the Outline as coming into existence in Stage III." 9 A serious defect in this critique of the official American plan for general and complete disarmament is its authors' tacit assumption that the third stage in the proposed process of disarmament would deal with a world order based on a system of genuinely independent sovereign states. In fact, long before the 8. Ibid., p. 191. 9. Ibid., p. zu,

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first two stages in the process would have been completed the historical system of independent states would have been radically transformed. Already under the charter the United Nations has accepted a fatal breach in the traditional concept of state sovereignty. Because the charter can be amended by a procedure that makes it possible to overpower the opposition of a substantial part of the ordinary member states, provided that the five powers with permanent seats in the Security Council support a proposed amendment, national sovereignty no longer means the supreme power of a state to manage its own affairs unrestrained by law. Only the five privileged powers retain their traditional sovereignty unimpaired. W h a t these critics of the American plan really mean is that they cannot imagine the superpowers agreeing to a plan which looks forward to an eventual monopoly of the power to enforce peace by a world government organized on the planned basis. Their objections in the last analysis rest less on the cogency of their logic — which is conclusive, granted their premises — than on the strength of their imagination, which is limited. World peace based on a suitable form of world order is not an unknown phenomenon in world history. The Roman Empire in its best years offered an impressive example of peace in the Mediterranean world under law. The Chinese Empire, when in good working order, offered an impressive example of peace in the East Asian world under an effective rule of political ethics. T h e present objection to these weighty precedents is that both empires were first established by military conquest. No universal empire can be established under present conditions by fighting without a ruinous war between the nuclear powers. Such a war is, as President Eisenhower has declared, unthinkable. World peace under either law or political ethics must be established, if at all in foreseeable time, by agreement among the powers. The basic problem of the peacemakers is not to devise in-

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gcnious political structures and processes capable of maintaining a proper control of an efficient world peace force, but to strengthen the sense of world community among all nations so that world opinion will demand and support the kind of order best suited to its purposes. This is well understood by realistic pacifists. Nevertheless, purposeful and systematic study of political structures and processes which may be deemed suitable for a peaceful world order is an indispensable part of any competent planning for world peace. 10 Particularly, the relations between law and politics in the third stage of the official American plan for general and complete disarmament call for further study. As President Kennedy pithily observed: "Our problems are manmade; therefore they can be solved by man." 10. See Part Three, Chapter 9, of this volume.

7. EDWIN GINN 'S VISION OF WORLD PEACE

I Edwin Ginn, successful publisher of educational books, philanthropist, and founder of the World Peace Foundation, gave much thought to the problem of world peace and believed that he knew the answer. He was convinced that world peace, as he understood it, was highly desirable, was attainable, and was likely to be achieved in the not too distant future. To this achievement he devoted a third of the wealth accumulated during a lifetime of demonstrated business capacity and acumen. So confident was he of the correctness of his analysis of the peace problem that he stipulated in his will the use to be made, after world peace was attained, of the fund provided for support of his World Peace Foundation. His trustees were charged with the duty of recognizing the attainment of peace and then transferring the fund to the support of his other favorite philanthropy, the Charlesbank Homes, which he expected to flourish in a peaceful world This sturdy faith was based on a view of the world which was widely accepted by successful American businessmen toward the close of the nineteenth century. It was an age in which the NOTE: This paper is reprinted from International no. 1 (Winter, 1 9 6 5 ) , pp. 1 - 1 9 .

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business philosophy set forth in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations was regarded as the purest source of political and economic wisdom. John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy and his essays on liberty and on representative government were regularly quoted by men of affairs when the axioms of the laissezfaire school seemed to serve their special interests. Equally serviceable was the theory of social evolution expounded by Herbert Spencer in his Synthetic Philosophy and effectively summarized for busy readers in his pithy tract for the times, Man Versus the State, the last word in the defense of the free-enterprise system. The theoretical soundness of nineteenth-century capitalism was taken for granted by the self-confident captains of industry with whom Mr. Ginn associated in the afternoon of his business career. A leading maxim of the free-enterprise system was that in a genuinely free society peaceful industrialism would eventually triumph over costly militarism. The practical benefits flowing from superior military power in the Victorian era were too real to be ignored by reflective business leaders, but these benefits apparently could be had by restricting the actual use of force to operations against the inferior peoples whose subjugation seemed essential to the full fruition of the capitalistic system, in what was then modern imperialism. War between the major powers could be prevented by the skillful manipulation of the balance of power, as experience since Waterloo seemed to demonstrate, and the eventual supremacy of industrialism over militarism could be ensured by such gradual improvements in the machinery for adjusting disputes between the powers as international arbitration and other imaginable processes. The period of the Hague Peace Conferences was one of unparalleled optimism. Sanguine industrialists like Edwin Ginn looked confidently to a bright future of ever-growing prosperity and peace. A little group of imaginative businessmen, among whom Andrew Carnegie was the most eminent and one of the most

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thoughtful, gathered each year around the turn of the century at the Lake Mohonk conferences fostered by the enterprising proprietor of a resort hotel who shrewdly exploited the opportunity to extend the season of profitable operations. Mr. Ginn was a member of this exemplary company. The first Hague Peace Conference whetted the appetite of pacific-minded industrialists for more rapid progress toward a fully-developed peaceful industrial society. Mr. Carnegie was presently incited to do something more substantial than to talk idly for peace between nations, and Mr. Ginn was moved to do likewise with the more modest means at his command. From these beginnings sprang in due course the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the World Peace Foundation. Edwin Ginn's first thought was to establish an international school of peace. Speaking on that subject at the International Peace Congress, held in Lucerne, Switzerland, in September 1905, he made a characteristic confession: "Naturally, perhaps, my thoughts turn toward the educational side of the question, and the greatest educational forces are the schools, the press and the pulpit." In that same year his firm, Ginn and Company, began the publication of a series of reprints designed to serve as textbooks at a peace school. Among these were William Ellery Channing's Discourses on War, Charles Sumner's Addresses on War, Jean de Block's The Future of War, Η. E. Warner's The Ethics of Force, Walter Walsh's The Moral Damage of War, David Low Dodge's War Inconsistent with the Religion of Jesus Christ, and Raymond L. Bridgman's World Organization. At the same time his firm began to publish a series of shorter pamphlets, beginning with Count Leo Tolstoy's Bethink Yourselves! Andrew Carnegie's rectorial address at the University of St. Andrews entitled A League of Peace, and Lucia Ames Mead's Patriotism and the New Internationalism: a Manual for Teachers. Mr. Ginn's confidence in an appeal to reason was manifest. Four years later Edwin Ginn published in The Nation, then

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a favorite journal of opinion among liberal-minded businessmen and academic scholars, a formal announcement of his purpose to establish an international school of peace.1 Thus, he redeemed the implied promise contained in his Lucerne speech mentioned above. He had then declared: "This work of education needs to be carried on systematically and continuously, and I have thought that it might be well to establish a School of Peace, with a Board of Trustees selected from those who have shown great originality and executive ability in carrying on large business enterprises." 2 His confidence in captains of industry was as strong as his faith in the beneficial consequences of the social evolutionary process. But it soon appeared that, whereas a philanthropic captain of industry could easily obtain suitable textbooks for a school of peace, finding suitable students was more difficult. Moreover, Mr. Ginn had discovered the lack of an adequate set of doctrines to be taught in his peace school. He had been convinced as early as 1905 that international arbitration alone could not cure the evil of war. The second Hague Peace Conference, held in 1907, confirmed his suspicion that something more fundamental was needed. Nevertheless, he remained a sanguine educator. In The Nation article he declared: " M y own belief is that the idea which underlies the movement for the Hague Court can be developed so that the nations can be persuaded each to contribute a small percentage of their military forces at sea and on land to form an International Guard or Police Force." 3 He estimated that five or ten percent of the money spent on armaments would suffice. "When the nations see that this international police force is ample to insure them 1. Edwin Ginn, "An International School of Peace," The Nation, September 23, 1909. 2. "An International School of Peace." An Address Delivered at the International Peace Congress at Lucerne, September, 1905. Bound by the World Peace Foundation, p. 6. 3. Edwin Ginn, "An International School of Peace," The Nation, September 23, 1909.

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all their rights, they will be unwilling to bear the present excessive burden for armament; and disarmament, or at least nine tenths of it, will come as a natural and inevitable result of a perception of the obvious uselessness of armament." * Further reflection caused Mr. Ginn to abandon his projected peace school in favor of an endowed agency which could put greater emphasis on research. More investigation and organized thought were obviously necessary if a group of approved business leaders were to sell to the public the bold idea that nations should no longer rely primarily on national military and naval forces for their safety but rather on an international police force. National security would clearly require that well-designed arrangements be established to keep that international force under proper control. Mr. Ginn's more mature thinking was disclosed in 1 9 1 1 in his announcement of the creation of the World Peace Foundation. He then declared: " T h e establishment of an international power would be the natural beginning of a world congress, and the more complete development of the international court would follow. Until these three branches of international organization are perfected there will continue to be great loss of life and property, which should be devoted to the natural, peaceful development of the human race." B Thus ended the political education of Edwin Ginn. From a somewhat na'ive advocate of international arbitration he had evolved into a resolute supporter of organized world peace. Uninterested in the theoretical aspects of the problem of sovereignty, he was fully committed to the systematic and purposeful study of the political structures and processes that could sustain and control an international police force capable of supplying mankind with an acceptable substitute for the bulk of its national defense forces. Being a "good American," Mr. Ginn was nat4. Ibid. 5. Edwin Ginn, World Peace Foundation (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1 9 1 1 ) , World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series no. 1, part 3, p. 9.

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urally disposed to believe that the answer to the problem would be some form of world federalism. He recognized, nevertheless, the continuing importance of subsidized research into the ways and means of ensuring world peace by the organization of suitable international institutions. In establishing the World Peace Foundation Mr. Ginn rejected the negative definition of peace as mere absence of hostilities or war. He deliberately adopted a more positive concept which identifies peace with the political institutions by which it may be ensured. He would have agreed with John F. Kennedy, who, in a masterly address at the American University in Washington, June 10, 1963, declared that "peace is a process — a way of solving problems." He was thus able to write into his last will and testament an elaborate set of instructions to guide his trustees in determining the advent of peace as he understood it. The attainment of peace and its recognition by the trustees would justify a transfer of the fund originally set aside by Mr. Ginn for the support of his new foundation to the custody of the Charlesbank Homes, his other favorite philanthropy, which he declared the ultimate legatee and devisee under his will. The final expression of Edwin Ginn's views concerning the quest for world peace was an address delivered at a Lake Mohonk Conference, May 1 1 , 1913. It essentially reiterated the ideas set forth two years earlier in the statement explaining his purpose in establishing the World Peace Foundation. He still wished "to bring constantly before the people the advantages of cooperation, adopting the policy of taking a portion of the present armaments, say 10 percent, and establishing an international army and navy." β He continued to set great store by the practical capacity of successful businessmen possessing superior originality and executive ability to direct a profitable study of the organization of peace. He was not unmindful of the usefulness of educators, especially educational administrators, in directing 6. Ibid., p. 8.

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such studies and was greatly pleased when the then president of Harvard University, A. Lawrence Lowell, consented to become a member of the original board of trustees of the World Peace Foundation. Mr. Ginn remained to the end of his life (which, happily for him, came before the outbreak of the first world war) a sanguine preacher of the gospel of the natural progress of mankind in a moral world. World peace would inevitably be an integral part of this progress. II Edwin Ginn's formula for world peace called for world government. This appears clearly from his instructions, expressed in his will with legalistic exactitude, concerning the final distribution of his estate "if and when the cause of Peace has achieved success in the manner and to the extent" described in the formula. The tests of success for "the cause of Peace" were of two kinds. The first was objective: The cause of peace will have achieved success "if and when the nations shall so far cooperate in the settlement of controversies by the substitution of peace methods for those of war as to constitute an International Supreme Court, an International Executive, an International Police Force, or something substantially equivalent thereto (however the same may be named or described), and an International Parliament." T h e second was subjective: T h e cause of peace will have achieved success "if and when in the sound judgment of my Trustees such changes have taken place as to the status of armament for war and prospective war as to make it wise that some or all of the income [from the fund set aside for the support of the World Peace Foundation] shall be diverted to the Charlesbank Homes. . . ." Both kinds of tests throw light on Mr. Ginn's conception of world peace. T h e objective test defines the institutional framework of the peace process regarded as a way of dealing with international disputes. T h e subjective test indicates the essential

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importance of the state of mind of nations, which must develop such confidence in an international police force as to be willing to consent to a substantial reduction in the size of their national defenses. According to Mr. Ginn's thinking, the institutional framework of a world government alone is not enough to constitute world peace. There must also be an international sense of community strong enough to persuade nations to reduce drastically their national armaments. It is evident that a third kind of test is implicit, if not explicit, in Edwin Ginn's formula for world peace. This test relates to the powers to be conferred upon a world parliament and the other organs of world government. These powers — legislative, executive, and judicial — must be equal to the needs of a government capable of maintaining among the peoples of the world a state of mind hospitable to the effective limitation of national armaments. General and complete disarmament has become a familiar phrase at recent international disarmament conferences, indicating the avowed purpose of the statesmen who organize them. If not understood too literally, this phrase describes the essential result of the kinds of actions which a suitable world government, as Mr. Ginn conceived it, should have power to take, and would be bound to take, in order to command the indispensable consent of the nations. The framers of model constitutions for world governments have devoted much thought to the definition of the powers to be conferred on an international parliament. They have had little success in reaching agreement upon the nature and extent of the lawmaking authority which a world government should possess. Some writers would restrict its legislative powers to the maintenance of an international police force capable of functioning effectively in cases of actual or threatened international violence. Others would enable a world government to intervene in cases of domestic disorder which, if not contained, might provoke international conflict. Still others would empower it to

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promote the general welfare by spending money and by taking other necessary and proper measures to prevent the growth of hostilities that might result from differences among the less developed nations and between them and the more advanced countries. All writers have found special difficulty with the problem of financing the activities of a world government. Should a world government have to depend upon voluntary and more or less uncertain payments by member states, or should its parliament have the power to tax the property or income of the peoples of the world and, if so, what kinds of taxes might be laid and what methods of collection authorized? Discussions among the framers of modern world constitutions have emphasized the differences between the maximalists, who would endow world parliaments with extensive lawmaking powers to be broadly construed, and the minimalists, who would impose narrow limits on such powers and interpret them strictly. Such differences have not been resolved by theoretical arguments. Clark and Sohn, authors of World Peace Through World Law,7 the most elaborate and most thoughtful description of a model constitution, have exposed the dimensions and complexities of the problem of international lawmaking powers. When Mr. Ginn laid aside his plans for an international school of peace to make way for the World Peace Foundation, he had gained a better appreciation of the difficulties facing the advocates of the peace cause. He understood the need for further research and study as well as for better-organized efforts to win friends for the cause and influence statesmen. But he did not lose confidence in the natural development of a better international political order, nor in the practical ability of a selected body of superior businessmen to give effective leadership to the workers in the peace cause. This confidence was an integral part of his general faith in the free-enterprise system. 7. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law, 2nded. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, i960).

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By the year 1 9 1 1 , however, when Edwin Ginn wrote his last will, he was aware that the arrival of world peace — though, as he continued to hope, not far distant — might not be easily and promptly recognized. He knew that a mere declaration of peace by the leaders of fighting nations was not equivalent to the establishment of the kind of peace he had in mind. He also recognized that the establishment of a genuine peace would require the constructive thinking and collective deliberation of many peace workers and statesmen over a considerable period of time. His ripe judgment on this point is reflected in his arrangements for the transfer of his peace fund from the support of the World Peace Foundation to that of the Charlesbank Homes. In his will he was careful to specify the gradual reduction of payments to the World Peace Foundation, to be initiated if and when such progress as he had described had been made toward disarmament and peace. He emphasized this feature of his thinking by the following words: "But the reduction in the payment of income to the World Peace Foundation should be made gradually, so as to work no injustice or hardship to any persons or employees connected with that work." Mr. Ginn presumably believed that it would not be necessary to wait indefinitely in order to be sure that peace had actually been established but, nevertheless, that it would be wrong to jump to a sudden conclusion that peace had been achieved and that nothing need be done to preserve it. In any case the interests of his peace workers were not to be neglected. For Edwin Ginn, peacemaking and peace-keeping were inseparable parts of the same general process. It follows that he would have inclined toward a maximalist rather than minimalist view of the nature and extent of the powers to be conferred upon the international parliament and other organs of world government. He must be classified among those we now call world federalists, and among world federalists he would have belonged to what we might call the left wing. He would have been puzzled

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by the recurrent differences of opinion among avowed world federalists. To him the case for a strong and widely serviceable world government seemed clear and convincing. The foundation of Edwin Ginn's strong faith in the peace cause was laid by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant's metaphysical writings formed an important component of the New England religious tradition in which Mr. Ginn grew up, but his political writings were less well known. Among the early publications of the World Peace Foundation was a selection from these political writings, which appeared in the year of Mr. Ginn's death under the title Eternal Peace and Other International Essays. Among these essays was one which better than any other single work on peace represents the type of thinking that most influenced the thought of Edwin Ginn. Entitled "The Natural Principle of the Political Order," it supplies the key to the interpretation of Mr. Ginn's instructions for recognizing the advent of peace. Kant's theory of political evolution begins with two highly significant propositions. The first is that all the natural capacities of a creature are destined to unfold themselves, completely and comformably to their end, in the course of time. The second proposition, following closely upon the first, is that in man, the only rational creature on earth, those natural capacities directed toward the use of his reason can be completely developed only in the species and not in the individual. The first proposition rests upon observations of nature which are familiar to all men. The second is less obvious, but no less acceptable to a reflective person. A man lives too short a time for his reason to produce all the fruits of which human reason is capable, and the production of a thoroughly rational world must therefore be the achievement of many generations, each profiting from the accumulated wisdom of its predecessors. By an ingenious process of reasoning, Kant concluded from these two propositions that the history of the human race,

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viewed as a whole, may be regarded as the realization of nature's hidden plan to bring about a political constitution internally perfect and for this purpose externally perfect as well. This is the only state in which all the capacities that nature implants in mankind can be fully developed. This conclusion gave Kant himself his confidence in the inevitability of world peace. He was equally certain that a philosophical attempt to work out the universal history of the world according to the plan of nature, aiming at a perfect political union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable of advancing the purpose of nature. Edwin Ginn shared this serene confidence in the rationality of man and in the perfectibility of his world. To him the achievement of world peace, as he defined it, would not mean the end of human progress, but rather the beginning of a bright new stage in the progress of mankind. Ill During the half-century since the death of Edwin Ginn, belief in inevitable progress has declined. Though Woodrow Wilson had been able to inspire the hope that this might be the war to end war, the first world war exposed the inability of leading statesmen in the most advanced industrial nations to prevent extraordinarily sanguinary and ruinous warfare. The financial panic of 1929 and the ensuing business depression exposed the incapacity of the leading captains of industry to preserve a prosperous economy with a full dinner pail for every willing worker and manifested the need for better economic planning, though the old faith in an unfettered free-enterprise system offered stubborn resistance to the new appeal of the welfare state. Although the second world war taught the art of successful economic planning on a national and even an international scale, the hope that war might be ended by war was destroyed along with many other fruits of earlier labor and human suffering. To the victims of twentieth-century troubles, the nineteenth-century

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idea of progress, particularly the concept of inevitable progress from a militant to a pacific industrial society, seemed a monstrous fiction. So-called progress in the art of war did not strengthen the weakening faith in a peaceful future for mankind. T h e tank, the airplane, and the poisonous gas of World W a r I increased the powers of destruction at the command of rulers and made warfare frightfully expensive without improving the prospects for the avoidance of war. T h e ballistic missiles and atomic bombs of World W a r II immeasurably expanded the range and the scale of war's havoc but did not directly and immediately bring compensating advances in the art of peace-keeping. T h e burden of war preparations became far greater than in Edwin Ginn's time when, already, intelligent thinkers had argued that a great war would be impossible because of its fantastic costliness; but improvements in the managerial techniques of belligerent states assured warmongers and pacifists alike that war would never be prevented by lack of funds. There grew an uneasy feeling that progress itself was a great illusion. Nevertheless, some improvements were being made in the art of peace-keeping. Although the League of Nations came to a sorry end, the once famous covenant did contain at least one new and valuable idea: the idea of putting a moral foundation under the nineteenth-century system of the balance of power. T h e balance of power had seemed an effective system of peacekeeping from Waterloo to the end of the century. Great Britain had held the balance by the shrewd use of its command of the high seas. By throwing the weight of the imperial navy and supplementary land forces against the stronger side in any threatening conflict between the powers, the government at Westminster could enable the weaker side to sustain the conflict with impressive prospects of success. T o be sure, such use of the balance of power involved a willingness on the part of the British government to choose its side irrespective of the merits of the

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particular controversy; it might even mean making its choice without regard to previous commitments or traditional ties of a sentimental character. Thus arose the unkind appellation of perfidious Albion. But the British government could endure the reproaches of bellicose statesmen as long as its policy kept the peace between the powers. It was the disproportionate growth in the strength of the Triple Alliance and the resulting excessive inferiority of the Dual Alliance that compelled Britain under the reign of Edward V I I to abandon its former policy in favor of alliances of its own. The essence of the new peace-keeping system under the covenant was the reconstruction of the balanceof-power system by substituting, for decisions of a major power strong enough to hold the balance between the other powers, the judgments of the League Council, reached by due process of law, sanctioned by the new international law, and sustained by the forces that might be available under the mediatory and conciliatory processes of the League. War was not outlawed by the Treaty of Versailles, but peace was supported by two presumptions: 1 ) that responsible powers would be mindful in the conduct of their foreign relations of their obligations under the covenant; and 2) that a sufficient number of the major powers would be members of the League to ensure a preponderance of force on the side of its judgments. Unhappily, neither of these presumptions proved valid. The abstention of the United States crippled the League in its infancy. The unwillingness of the major powers, which retained their membership until the end, to act in situations of conflict in accordance with the expectations of the covenant's authors prevented this cautious experiment in international organization from reaching maturity. The League of Nations marked an important step forward from the highly tentative attempts at international organization pioneered by the Hague Peace Conferences—rightly distrusted by Edwin Ginn. But ultimately it was the discredited original balance-of-power system, to which

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Britain, with France as its accomplice, reverted as the League weakened, that failed to prevent World War II. The United Nations Charter registered a bold advance over the League covenant in the art of peace-keeping through international organization. It definitely outlawed all international wars except wars of defense by the victims of lawless aggression. Though aggression was not clearly defined in the charter, processes for identifying the aggressor in particular cases were established and methods of bringing timely aid to the victim of aggression were authorized. Though membership in the original United Nations was restricted to the World War II victors, there could be no doubt about the practical capacity of the permanent members of the Security Council to enforce the Council's judgments, if they remained united. The continuation of such unity seemed likely at the close of the war, as long as recollection of the devastation and suffering inflicted by the most modern methods of warfare remained fresh. Nevertheless, the permanent members of the Security Council failed to maintain a united front, and the new and improved system of collective security broke down. The military operations in Korea were nominally an international police action under the direction of the Security Council, but the real difference between such an action and old-fashioned war was hard to discover. The bulk of the fighting fell upon the armed forces of the United States and upon the unhappy Koreans. The intervention of "volunteers" from China introduced difficulties further complicated by the Security Council's pretense that legal responsibility for the behavior of the Chinese was lodged in the refugee Nationalist government on the island of Formosa. Because under the charter there was technically no war in Korea, the problem of peacemaking was confused with the problem of maintaining international law and order. Those permanent members of the Security Council who continued to cooperate in the peace-keeping processes seemed

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to be reverting to what was essentially the balance-of-power system as operated in the latter years of the League of Nations. But the United Kingdom and France, strengthened by the active cooperation of the United States (or perhaps it should be written, the United States, supported by the cooperation of the United Kingdom and France) could not successfully operate any form of the discredited balance-ofpower system under the rapidly changing conditions of the nuclear age. As long as the United States possessed a nuclear weapons monopoly, it did not really need help in operating a balance-of-power system; when the United States monopoly was broken, no help could avail. The new doctrine of massive retaliation wrought a fundamental change in the efficacy of threats to resort to force in a conflict between the major powers. W h e n two major powers could wield the threat of massive retaliation at the same time, both powers became the victims of planned intimidation. The threatened peace-keeping operations could be more deadly than any ordinary war, and such operations, even in the form of an international police action to prevent war, became, as statesmen quickly learned to say, unthinkable. But the problem of its prevention still remained. Instead of collective security under the charter there was the uncertain self-restraint of two superpowers armed with weapons of immeasurable destructiveness. The Suez affair signified the real end of the luckless experiment with collective security under the charter. Two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the United Kingdom and France, ventured upon an old-fashioned war regardless of their commitment to the United Nations. Two others, the United States and the Soviet Union, severally, but not jointly, intervened with explicit or implicit threats of disciplinary action. The fifth, China, was studiously ignored by all. The collapse of the new and improved collective-security system was sealed by the Soviet Union's concurrent aggression against

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Hungary. The U.N. General Assembly stigmatized the Soviet Union's action by appropriate resolutions of protest, but nothing happened. While the British and the French doubtless repented their hasty action, faith in the peace formula of 1945 could not easily be revived. The major powers continued the search for an effective peacekeeping system by more or less well-organized efforts to limit and reduce armaments. Eminent statesmen even adopted the slogan of general and complete disarmament to describe the aim of their formal deliberations. But the arms race accelerated and the fear of war increased. Never before had preparations for war been so elaborate or so expensive, and it had been a long time since the measures for the preservation of peace, apart from the self-restraint of major powers, had seemed so inadequate. To reach agreements for the limitation of armaments without the growth of a greater sense of security seemed impossible. But how to stimulate such growth statesmen seemed to have no idea. At the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco the framers of the charter, realizing that their work was imperfect, provided a simplified procedure for calling a second conference after ten years to review the charter and consider proposals for its improvement. But in 1955 the General Assembly saw that such a conference would be untimely and authorized its postponement. It has not yet been convened. Statesmen seem to recognize that the improvement of the organization of peace and a sufficient growth of confidence in the efficacy of peace-keeping processes to make disarmament feasible are inseparably related, like the two sides of a coin. They have, nevertheless, been unable to devise ways and means of advancing toward their goal. Must we conclude that they are incapable of knowing what further powers should be conferred upon the United Nations or, if they know, of granting them to an international organization which then might appear to threaten the independence of sovereign states?

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It is interesting to speculate on the answers Edwin Ginn might have given to such questions. It may be assumed that he would have been shocked by the ruinous bellicosity of the last half century and grievously disappointed by the little progress, as he conceived it, that had been made toward the establishment of world peace. Doubtless he expected more substantial results from the efforts of the workers in the peace cause. But would he have concluded that the purposeful and systematic study of international structures and processes was not justified by its fruits? Would he have decided that the cause could not best be served by the subsidized efforts of devoted men and women working under the direction of selected business leaders and able scholars? IV Edwin Ginn's first objective test for the existence of world peace, regarded as a process of preventing war by an institutional adjustment of international controversies, was the establishment of an international supreme court. The International Court of Justice, now operating at The Hague under the statute declared to be an integral part of the United Nations Charter, was intended to be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Examination of the text of the charter shows that all members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the statute and that nonmembers may become parties. The court is in fact morenearly universal than the other organs of the United Nations^ Though the parties must be states and only states may institute proceedings, a state may presumably make an issue out of a controversy arising from the acts or claims of individual persons, and the jurisdiction of the court covers all justiciable controversies which in an unorganized world might lead to war. The charter, however, provides for an important exception to the court's jurisdiction: it does not extend to purely domestic controversies. According to its statute, the court itself decides what is a domestic controversy and has jurisdiction in a case

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threatening the peace of the world, even if one of the parties claims that only domestic issues are involved. But the senate of the United States, when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, attached a reservation asserting that the government of the United States would itself decide the question of jurisdiction in any case in which it might choose to do so. Similar reservations have been made by many other states. It is impossible to believe that Mr. Ginn would have found that the present International Court of Justice measured up to what he thought an international court should be. Edwin Ginn's second objective test for the existence of world peace called for the establishment of an international executive. The United Nations charter divides the executive power among the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat. The three former bodies are composed of representatives of the member states and are presumably political in character. The latter comprises a secretary-general and such staff as may be required. The secretarygeneral is the chief administrative officer of the Organization and his staff is clearly intended to be professional in character and as independent as possible of national politics. The duties of the secretary-general involve the exercise of important discretionary powers, which inevitably makes him an international politician of great responsibilities. The most important of these powers is that of bringing to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. An able secretary-general can ensure that the Security Council does not function as a mere meeting for idle talk or even disputatious discussion. He can do more than any other officer of the United Nations to make the Organization a dynamic agency of international politics. While the unintegrated executive branch of the Organization may leave a great deal to be desired from the viewpoint of administrative efficiency, it does seem to qualify

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as an international executive under the terms of Mr. Ginn's will. Edwin Ginn's third objective test for the existence of world peace was the establishment of an international police force or a substantial equivalent thereof. The United Nations Charter provides for all member states to make armed forces available for use in the execution of the Security Council's decisions dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. To enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, the charter further provides for member states to hold national air force contingents immediately available for combined international enforcement action. Agreements governing the use of armed forces, to be concluded between the Security Council and member states, were to have been negotiated on the initiative of the Security Council, and a military staff committee was to have been established to assist the Security Council in the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. But the agreements have never been negotiated, and this part of the charter remains a dead letter. The United Nations has raised military forces on several occasions to deal with temporary emergencies. In the Korean case sixteen member states contributed forces to the combined operation, but the bulk of the burden fell upon one of the major powers, which provided technical advice as well as the active military leadership. In the Palestine and Congo cases the major powers were excluded from direct participation in the operations, and lesser powers furnished the armed forces and military leadership. Plans for permanent U.N. forces have often been proposed, but none have been established as yet — fifty years after Mr. Ginn's death. This test has manifestly not been met. Edwin Ginn's fourth objective test for the existence of world peace was the establishment of an international parliament. The membership of the U.N. General Assembly was originally

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restricted to the fifty-one victors in World W a r II. It has become a deliberative body whose membership has more than doubled and will increase still more as dependent territories: gain their independence. The General Assembly already comprises all the important independent states except Switzerland' and the divided states of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, although the problem of which government will designate the representatives of China remains to be solved. T h e General Assembly is an impressive international body if not an all-inclusive one, but is it a parliament in the sense that Mr. Ginn used the term in his will? By parliament Mr. Ginn meant a representative body in which· the legislative powers of an international government might be vested. T h e framers of the charter clearly contemplated that the General Assembly would play an important part in the legislative process. T h e charter provides expressly that the Assembly will initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification. But such codes would be embodied in international conventions which would have to b e ratified by a stipulated number of independent states to become effective. Clearly, the Assembly was not vested with the power to enact international laws; it could prepare legislation and propose its adoption, but the role of enacting legislation was reserved to the member states. A legislative power of major importance is that of amending the United Nations Charter. Amendments may be proposed by the General Assembly, but again their final adoption depends upon action by the member states. Presumably the power to amend is limited, if at all, only by the purposes of the Organization. Here is a legislative power of almost infinite possibilities, but again the General Assembly's role in the legislative process is to propose — not to enact. A legislative body of such limited authority would not have been recognized by Mr. Ginn as a parliament.

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The General Assembly does possess the power to approve the budget of the Organization, which includes authorizing the expenditure of money. The money-spending power, as has been observed with reference to the powers of the United States congress, is a very great power. But its practical exercise is limited by the availability of funds. Without effective power to raise money by taxation or some other method, the spending power does not transform a legislative body into a parliament. Under the charter, the General Assembly may apportion expenses among the member states and borrow money on the credit of the United Nations, but the power to levy and collect taxes has been withheld from the Organization. Doubtless the peace-keeping and peacemaking powers of the Organization may in the course of time result in the creation of a line of decisions, applying to particular cases, which through the influence of precedents may eventually acquire the force of law. Thus a kind of common law of the world might arise. But such a lawmaking process would enhance the authority of the International Court of Justice more than that of the Security Council and General Assembly. Under favorable circumstances amendments to the charter conferring legislative powers on these bodies could easily convert them into a bicameral parliament, but at present there is no sign of such a conversion. T h e fourth of Mr. Ginn's objective tests for the existence of peace is the one which under present circumstances leaves the most to be desired by the workers in the peace cause. It follows that Edwin Ginn's subjective test for the existence of peace cannot be satisfied under the present circumstances. Confidence in the practical capacity of nations to settle international controversies by the substitution of peace methods for those of war has not been sufficient to enable them to change the status of armaments in such a way as to justify any slackening in the efforts of peace cause workers. Since the adoption of the United Nations Charter, purposeful and systematic efforts to limit and reduce armaments have been better organized and

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more persistent than ever before. The two superpowers have formally accepted the formula of general and complete disarmament to indicate the goal of their joint efforts. Nevertheless, except for the nuclear test-ban treaty and a few modest limitations on the arms race by what may be described as coordinated unilateral measures, there is little tangible evidence that the fear of war among the peoples of the world is less than it was in Mr. Ginn's lifetime. It is possible, however, to see more clearly than a half-century ago what legislative powers must be conferred upon the United Nations in order to satisfy the subjective test for the existence of world peace. In the first place, it is essential that the practical capacity of the Organization to raise revenue be substantially increased: the U.N. must be granted the power to levy and collect taxes independently of the member states as well as the power to exploit such underdeveloped sources of revenue as the natural resources of the oceans. T h e financial structure of the whole U.N. system, including the specialized agencies, needs to be overhauled. A rapidly developing system of world government under whatever name it is called cannot rest permanently on special assessments apportioned among irresponsible national states. Moreover, the Organization needs greater authority over the administration of public affairs in less developed areas where people are incapable of standing alone under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. A necessitous people cannot be a genuinely free people. Admission of newly independent states to the United Nations does not in itself assure their freedom from want or from fear. The dissolution of colonial empires has imposed unforeseen burdens upon the general international organization which an obsolescent trusteeship system was not designed to bear. There is still much constructive work to be done by competent international statesmen before Mr. Ginn's vision of world peace can be realized.

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V Edwin Ginn's belief in progress would have been challenged by the events of the last half-century, but not destroyed. In general, man's power over nature has been greatly extended and his practical ability to provide food, clothing, and shelter for the masses has been immensely improved. Doubtless, improvements in the art of war have been the most spectacular changes which have occurred, but improvements of many kinds in the arts of peace have made life more agreeable for those peoples which could afford them. T h e benefits of these improvements have been more widely distributed than could have been generally expected in the nineteenth century. Mr. G i n n would have been most favorably impressed by

the extraordinary

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popular education in all parts of the world. It is the less satisfactory development of man's power to control himself that would have given concern to optimistic nineteenth-century evolutionists like Edwin Ginn. Although knowledge of modern methods of self-government has spread far and wide, man's capacity to make good use of this knowledge has left much to be desired. T h e application of this new knowledge to the regulation of international relations has been particularly unsatisfactory. There is wide recognition of the need to control by the most advanced modern methods the realm of political affairs where international controversies are most apt to occur. But a universal sense of community develops slowly, and the necessary foundation for world peace, as Mr. G i n n envisaged it, follows far behind the gratifying spread of universal education. T h e present generation, looking back on two ruinous world wars, finds it difficult to understand the firm belief in progress which characterized the more sanguine generation to which Edwin G i n n belonged. Belief in the inevitability of peace is not an outstanding trait of the modern successors to the nineteenthcentury captains of industry with whom he naturally associated.

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On the other hand, belief in the inevitability of war is not as characteristic of their most widely recognized rivals, the MarxistLeninist leaders of the communist world, as it was a few years ago. The nuclear age seems inhospitable to dogmatic attitudes toward an inevitable future. The most that can generally be said for an inevitable future is that forward-looking men struggling to make their dreams come true are inevitable instruments of the historical process linking the present to the future. The effect of disappointing events upon the hopes of intelligent men is not subject to scientific measurement. But it is possible to find a rough measure of this effect in the reactions that eminent men in public life have had to the unforeseen catastrophes of modern times. James Bryce, admired author of The American Commonwealth and statesman of high prestige among American intellectuals in Edwin Ginn's later years, was such a man. Bryce's most mature work, Modern Democracies, was published shortly after the close of World War I and reflects the author's reaction to that tragic catastrophe. He was writing particularly about the future of democracy, which in his mind was closely associated with the future of peace. Bryce observed: "Hope, often disappointed but always renewed, is the anchor by which the ship that carries democracy and its fortunes will have to ride out this latest storm as it has ridden out many storms before. . . . Democracy will never perish till after Hope has expired." 8 But would Hope expire? Bryce did not venture to say. Mr. Ginn, less of a historian than Lord Bryce but more deeply grounded in nineteenth-century philosophy, would have been more hopeful. It is impossible to believe that even after the second world war he would have abandoned the struggle for the realization of his vision of world peace. Though world peace, as he defined it, has not been established in the half-century 8. James Bryce, Modern 1919).

Democracies,

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since his death and the arms race has never been more costly and terrifying, impressive advances have been made in the arts of peacemaking and peace-keeping. Of Mr. Ginn's four objective tests for the existence of peace, there is not one which does not reveal important constructive changes. This becomes clear when the development of the whole United Nations system, including the specialized agencies, is compared with a similar political structure, the United States government operating under the Articles of Confederation during the years immediately preceding the government under the constitution of 1787. Like the United Nations, the government of the United States in the 1780's can be analyzed under four heads. The judicial system of the United States in the 1780's was obviously less developed than that of the United Nations with its International Court of Justice at The Hague. The executive branch of government under the Articles of Confederation was likewise much less developed than that of the United Nations system with its several councils, its dozen or more specialized agencies, and its permanent Secretariat headed by the secretary-general. There is nothing under the United Nations to compare with the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War, but the U.N. peace forces recently active in the Congo and still operative in the Middle East surpass anything possessed by the United States after the disbandment of Washington's command. The Continental Congress was a legislative body comparable on paper to the U.N. General Assembly, but the latter's record of attendance far surpasses that of the former body. It is Edwin Ginn's subjective test that exposes the essential difference between the two confederations. The United States under its first constitution, if the Articles of Confederation may be so described, put effective restrictions on the military establishments of the member states, and the people throughout the union were clearly united in supporting the reduction of the

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armed forces. The United Nations has made persistent efforts to reduce or limit armaments, but there is little to show for these efforts except the General Assembly resolution of 1963 excluding military weapons from outer space.9 The sense of community in the United States under the Articles of Confederation was strong enough to support a constitutional guarantee of equal rights for all the people in all the states, including the right to move freely from one state to another; but under the United Nations Charter there is no hindrance to the many kinds of discriminations practiced by member states against the peoples of other member states. Despite a more highly developed government framework, the United Nations falls far behind the original United States in terms of the solidarity of its peoples. The implied third test of peace under Edwin Ginn's will is less conclusive than the other two. Both the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation and the General Assembly under the charter have been very imperfectly endowed with legislative powers. Neither has had adequate powers of taxation nor suitable authority over trade, transportation, and the monetary system. T h e Continental Congress possessed much more effective control over the territories of the United States than the General Assembly and Trusteeship Council possess over the less developed areas of the modern world, but otherwise there is little difference between their lawmaking capacities. In short, neither system has possessed enough legislative power to meet its responsibilities. The differences between these two confederations ensured a different fate for the two governments. T h e highly developed sense of community in the original United States made inevitable a growing recognition of the inadequacy of the original Articles of Confederation and quickly produced an effective demand for a more perfect union. T h e lack of such a sense of community in the United Nations is not propitious for an early 9. General Assembly Resolution no. 1884 ( X V I I I ) , October 1 7 , 1 9 6 3 .

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abandonment of the basic features of the charter. T h e development of greater unity in particular regions is likely to occur before radical changes are made in the arrangements for keeping the peace in the world as a whole. But some improvements in the government under the charter are widely demanded. W i t h good fortune they may reasonably be expected in the not too distant future. T h e firmest ground for optimism concerning the strengthening of the United Nations is the growing recognition that war between the major powers with the most modern weapons is, as leading statesmen have been saying, unthinkable. Concerning the first atomic bomb explosion at Hiroshima, Albert Einstein's comment that "the world is not ready for it" 10 proved to be well founded. But the world has now had time to think about the consequences of using the most modern weapons in international controversies. It is learning the lesson which Einstein was prepared to teach in advance. "Our defense is not in armaments," he declared, "nor in science, nor in going underground. Our defense is in law and order." 1 1 T h a t means, as Edwin Ginn recognized more than a half-century ago, the formation of a more perfect union of the nations. In the last analysis Edwin Ginn's confidence in the soundness of what he called the peace cause flowed from the nature of the man himself. He was not only a businessman of superior ability but also a well-developed nineteenth-century American blessed with a sanguine disposition. Had he lived to witness the unforeseen warfare and devastation and the unprecedented outlays for arms, Edwin Ginn would nevertheless have remained a sanguine man, preserving his faith in the cause as he observed through the years the astonishment of less sanguine men at the unexpected advances toward the establishment of institutions which could satisfy his tests for the existence of peace. 10. New York Times Magazine, August 11. Ibid.

2,1964.

8. EDWIN GINN'S COMMITMENT TO WORLD GOVERNMENT

I Edwin Ginn's vision of world peace, as recorded in his last will and testament, involved him in a commitment to world government. 1 World government, however, is an objective which seems to many mid-twentieth century observers of international politics excessively visionary. The nineteenth-century dream of a parliament of man, a federation of the world, fills a bright page in Victorian poetry. But much contemporary prose is written by men whose vision is disturbed by space rockets, intercontinental ballistic missiles, atomic bombs, and other lethal weapons of ultramodern warfare. They see only a world of heavily armed, self-styled sovereign states bent on the protection of alleged vital interests and on the defense of so-called national honor with little patience for the restraints of any higher law designed to prevent them from making war upon one another. The advocates of world government reply that there is not a so-called sovereign state in the world today which can successfully defend either the lives or the property of its citizens against N O T E : This paper is reprinted from International no. 3 (Summer, 1966), pp. 419-429. 1. See Part Three, Chapter 7, of this volume.

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attack with the latest offensive weapons. The offense has become so far superior to the defense that, where potential aggressors and victims alike possess ample stocks of the most lethal weapons, the only defense with any pretension to plausibility is the so-called balance of terror. But the balance of terror, amidst rival calculations of first and second strike capabilities, is excessively uncertain and precarious. The need is obviously imperative for a world government, its advocates assert, equipped with the authority appropriate for the enforcement of universal law against international violence, actual or threatened. Can it be possible, they ask, that civilized mankind is incapable of establishing peace-keeping institutions adequate for the maintenance of worldwide law and order? An answer to this question may well begin with an inquiry into the nature of world government. What in fact do modern advocates of world government suggest for the purpose of preventing so-called sovereign states from resorting to war as an instrument of national policy? What are the essentials of a world organization theoretically capable of putting an end to the institution of war? The latest and most explicit statement of the case for world government by its advocates is the Declaration of the Second Dublin Conference, issued at Dublin, New Hampshire, October 5, 1965, through Grenville Clark, secretary. Essential to an effective organization for the prevention of war, according to the fifty-two distinguished signers of this timely document, are: 1 ) universal membership open to every nation regardless of ideology; 2) a world lawmaking body fairly representative of all peoples and equipped with adequate power to make all laws necessary and proper for the prevention of war; 3) an executive, chosen by and responsible to the legislative body; 4) a system of courts with jurisdiction over nations and individuals with respect to conduct that threatens the peace of the world; and 5) a revenue system providing reliable and sufficient income to

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maintain the institutions and perform the functions of the world organization. In the opinion of the signers there should also be: 1 ) a strong, well-armed world police force; 2) general and complete disarmament, accomplished by stages corresponding to those in the establishment of the world police force; 3) due safeguards against the abuse of power by the world organization; 4) a process for ascertaining that the organization is supported by a preponderance of the nations and of the peoples of the world; and 5) an affiliated world development authority, designed "to mitigate the growing economic disparities between the 'have' and 'have-not' nations." T h e signers also record their belief that the United Nations through the amendment of its charter can be the best instrument for the kind of world organization they envisage. They look to leading contemporary statesmen to "make concrete proposals to bring about world peace through world law." Such a program for the prevention of war by the improvement and strengthening of the existing world organization is the kind of program that would have commanded the approval and support of Edwin Ginn. The founder of the World Peace Foundation did not consider the establishment of world peace through world law so imminent as to require of him a specific and detailed plan of the indispensable and appropriate institutions. Neither did he consider it so remote as to render useless the careful preparation of a vigorous campaign of education for effective world organization. Edwin Ginn did not pretend to know how much time should be allowed for a vigorous educational campaign to produce a solid foundation for the kind of world government he had in mind, nor do contemporary advocates of world government pretend to know how much time must still pass before a firm foundation will have been laid. Is then the future of world peace under law so uncertain as to justify the abandonment of the effort to secure it, as Bernard Shaw's posthumous project for a strictly rational method of

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writing the English language was abandoned, on the ground that the attainment of the goal is too speculative and remote? In short, is Edwin Ginn's vision of world peace excessively visionary? Would he himself abide by his commitment to world government, if he were alive today? II World government is an expression which seems to be suffering from a taboo in the minds of contemporary Americans. Those who venture to speak well of such a government are likely to be branded intemperate visionaries not to be taken seriously by sober-minded persons. The major powers in the contemporary world of sovereign states will never, the latter assert, yield the authority that would be necessary to enable a world government to function satisfactorily. Human nature, they argue, forbids the grant of sufficient power to what seems so distant a government and so likely to get out of control. The political organization of mankind, they conclude, is bound by the nature of man to stop short of an efficient universal state. Advocates of Edwin Ginn's "peace cause" may reply that the history of civilization does not support the view that a world state is necessarily unnatural and therefore a vain and idle fancy. The ancient Romans established an empire which was a kind of world state within the limits of the world they knew, and maintained it until the outer barbarians, who did not understand the spirit of the Roman law, broke it up. In Confucianist China also there was an empire (based on the general understanding and approval of the spirit of the Confucian political ethics), which maintained a suitably subordinate position for the tributary states but encountered recurrent difficulties with the outer barbarians. Each of these world states seemed natural enough to the inhabitants who understood their respective purposes and consented to their governmental processes, and who generally found their actual governmental performances at

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least tolerably acceptable. Any such system of warring sovereign states as has existed in the modern world would have seemed unnatural and intolerable to the inhabitants of these practically universal empires during the centuries when they possessed stable governments in good working order. The development of Mr. Ginn's thought on the organization of peace can be traced most conveniently in the records of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. These conferences were arranged by an enterprising Quaker hotelkeeper, Albert K. Smiley by name, who conceived the sound idea of making his fashionable resort hotel more useful at the opening of the season by calling on the friends of peace to meet there in order to discuss a project, also fashionable toward the close of the nineteenth century; that of settling international disputes by arbitration instead of by fighting. The spectacular success of the Alabama claims arbitration (by which American claims were peacefully settled for damages from Great Britain on account of depredations during the Civil W a r of a Confederate cruiser built in a British shipyard) fostered high hopes in the English-speaking world for international arbitration as a substitute for war. Later, President Cleveland's surprisingly sharp encounter with Lord Salisbury over the disputed boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela spurred on fresh efforts to establish a viable system for the compulsory arbitration of international disputes. Though the first general arbitration treaty between the United States and Great Britain was rejected in 1897 by the United States senate because it seemed to senators to limit too much their constitutional participation in the conduct of American foreign relations, the interest of statesmen in international arbitration was extraordinarily stimulated. Though the United States government gave no apparent thought to arbitrating its controversy with Spain in 1898, the Czar of Russia issued his call for the first Hague Peace Conference; and in the following year systematic arrangements for the peaceful settle-

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ment of international disputes by arbitration were duly authorized. For workers in the peace cause a new era dawned. The first Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration was held in 1895. Annual conferences were held regularly for twenty-two years, ending in 1916. The earliest conferences were attended by a few dozens of peace workers, chiefly idealistic clergymen and sympathetic businessmen. Attendance at later conferences reached the limit fixed by the capacity of the hotel, with ten times as many active participants as at the beginning. International lawyers replaced clergymen among the leading contributors to the discussions; successful businessmen and captains of industry saw to the adequacy of the arrangements. Edwin Ginn's name appears for the first time on the list of participants in 1897. His attention was probably drawn to the meetings by one of the early leaders, the Reverend Dr. Edward Everett Hale, an outstanding and forward-looking Unitarian clergyman whom Mr. Ginn greatly admired as a person and to whose sermons he liked to listen. Mr. Ginn participated in six of the eight conferences between 1897 and 1904; thereafter he appeared only twice, once in 1910 and again in 1913. Though an infrequent speaker, he served regularly on conference committees. His favorite committee was that on finance, of which he was chairman more than once. In 1901 he led the discussion on the organization of the work for peace, calling for more money from supporters of the peace cause and better planning of the work. These continued to be his favorite topics. It is evident that Edwin Ginn's primary interest lay in the propagandist activities of the peace workers rather than in the detailed development of their creed. The literature of the cause he regarded as already impressive, the practical problem being to get it read by as many thoughtful people as possible. As an educational book publisher he understood the uses of the printed book and how to get books and pamphlets into wide circulation at minimum cost. His first big project was to distribute

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reprints of selected time-tested writings on peace through his own publishing house. Later he leaned toward the establishment of an international school of peace. Finally in 1910, recognizing the need for utilizing all available forms of propaganda, he committed himself and his money to a broader foundation for the permanent support of the peace cause. He was convinced that, if the love of peace among the peoples of the world could be transmuted into effective political action, the specific forms of world government could be safely left to the creative processes of time. The growth of this conviction in Mr. Ginn's mind was reflected in his response to the challenge of current events. He lost interest in international arbitration when in 1904 the United States senate rejected the Roosevelt Administration's first draft of a permanent arbitration treaty with Great Britain. The failure of the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 to make any substantial advance over the work of the first conference did not discourage him, but rather served to strengthen his conviction that further education of the people must precede successful planning for peace by the men in power in socalled sovereign states. T h e senate's rejection of President Taft's more mature project for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty in 1 9 1 1 finally confirmed his conclusion that sound political education is the indispensable foundation for constructive political action in the cause of peace. But could a sense of world community strong enough to compel the establishment of effective world government be created by any feasible process of political education? There can be no doubt what Edwin Ginn's answer was to this question when he was planning the establishment of the World Peace Foundation. His remarks at the Lake Mohonk conferences in 1910 and 1 9 1 3 make clear his unshaken confidence in the eventual success of the peace cause, as he understood it. But what would have been his answer if he could have

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witnessed the sanguinary wars and costly preparations for war during the half-century after his death in January, 1914? Would his sturdy faith in world government as the ultimate guardian of world peace have withstood the shock of the collapse of the old order in August of that year, or the failure of the League of Nations to create a new order, and the inability of the United Nations to operate as originally intended? Could he have continued to believe in a cause which did not prevent great wars, both hot and cold, from scourging the peoples of the world, and which for so many years proved unequal to its task of developing an effective demand for a viable system of world law and order? Ill The establishment of the United Nations at the close of the second world war marked the definitive emergence of a broader sense of community; but it was not immediately evident how broad this new world-community sense might be. In subsequent years it has competed with various rival senses of lesser communities, outstanding among which have been that among the peoples of the Americas, finding visible expression in the Organization of American States; that among the peoples of the North Atlantic region, finding visible expression in NATO; and that in the so-called free world, not yet embodied in any visible institution. The United Nations Organization was not originally a universal organization; and the long struggle over the exclusion of representatives of the government of Communist China has attested the vagueness of the sense of community underlying the operations of the U.N. Human nature obviously does not forbid the development of community senses broader than that which underlies the modern national state. Nevertheless, pending the discovery of some new potential foe for a world government to contend with now that the science-fictional Martians have been eliminated from con-

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sideration, the development of a genuine sense of world community lacks one of the most powerful incentives underlying the regional and other partial organizations now competing with one another for the attention and support of portions of mankind greater than national states. Indeed, fierce national spirit, now manifestly on the decline in the older national states because of growing consciousness of their incapacity to provide adequately for the national defense in the changing state of the military art, is still struggling to be born in the newest national states, clamoring for influence in the U.N. General Assembly. Though the United Nations is nominally composed exclusively of peace-loving member states, aggressive nationalism remains the greatest actual foe of a worldwide sense of community. What most requires investigation, if Edwin Ginn's commitment to world government is to be reviewed in the light of subsequent events, is the record of the United Nations in dealing with modern aggressive nationalism. The long-heralded celebration in June, 1965, at San Francisco of the twentieth anniversary of the framing of the United Nations Charter was an unhappy occasion. The splendor of a numerous representation of the Organization's member states (there were then one hundred fourteen) was marred by the low spirits of the representatives. The featured event on the program, a ceremonial address by the President of the United States, turned into a missed opportunity. Perfunctory praise of the good intentions of the charter's framers was followed by an unceremonious plea for help to end the fighting in Vietnam. The disorderly state of the political world obviously tended to defeat the purposes of the celebration's peace-loving sponsors. Foremost among the causes of the glaring contrast between the high hopes of the framers at San Francisco in 1945 and the pervasive gloom twenty years later was the paralysis of the nineteenth session of the U.N. General Assembly by the stubborn conflict between the United States, on the one side, and the

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Soviet Union and the French Republic on the other, over the payment of the costs of the United Nations' peace-keeping operations in Palestine and in the Congo. The threatened insolvency of the Organization and the consequent loss of faith in its practical capacity to accomplish its high purposes provoked depressing comparisons between the prospects for its future on its twentieth birthday and those for the future of its unfortunate predecessor, the League of Nations, on its corresponding birthday in 1939. Pessimists, or realists as they would prefer to describe themselves, took a dim view of the outlook for the United Nations. Optimistic idealists insisted that it was time to take a closer look at the record. What were the actual results of a twenty years' struggle to establish a better world order than that existing on the eve of the second world war? The outlook for a stronger and more useful United Nations was actually better than it seemed in the summer of 1965. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly, which convened in September of that year, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to lay aside their differences over the interpretation of the power to spend money under the charter — a decision, or rather an indecision, in which France acquiesced, putting an end to the fruitless effort to make these latter two important member states pay the assessments for their shares of the cost of military operations recommended by the General Assembly but not approved by them. Later the ratification of a pending amendment to the charter increased the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen and enabled the Assembly to elect a more representative and hence a potentially more influential body of member states to exercise its important powers. A growing sense of worldwide community underlying these encouraging developments was clearly manifest. The question which finally needs to be considered, if we are to believe that Edwin Ginn would have kept his faith in world government, had he lived through the ordeal of the last half-century,

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is: What are the prospects for further growth of a world-community sense? IV There is some significant testimony from competent witnesses bearing directly on this question. The first witness is one uncommonly well-qualified by education and experience for forming an authoritative opinion, the Secretary General of the United Nations. Speaking in May, 1962, at Uppsala University in Sweden, U Thant declared: ". . . if the United Nations is to grow into a really effective instrument for maintaining the rule of law, the first step must be the willingness of the member states to give up the concept of the absolute sovereign state in the same manner as we individuals give up our absolute right to do just as we please, as an essential condition of living in an organized society. . . . It seems to me that the United Nations must develop in the same manner as every sovereign state has done. If the United Nations is to have a future, it must assume some of the attributes of a state. It must have the right, the power and the means to keep the peace." 2 To Edwin Ginn the mere existence of such a man, holding such a position and expressing such an opinion, would have meant a solid contribution to the preservation of his faith. Another impressive witness was President John F. Kennedy. Twice he addressed the U.N. General Assembly, emphasizing the importance of strengthening the United Nations and developing it "into a genuine world security system." His most carefully considered commitment to the peace cause was contained in the Commencement Address at the American University in Washington on June 10, 1963. Theodore C. Sorensen tells in his instructive book about Kennedy of the elaborate preparations for the delivery of this address and of the Presi2. "The Small Nations and the Future of the United Nations," United. Nations Review, vol. 9, no. 6 (June, 1962), p. 23.

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dent's confidence in the realism of its message. It will long remain enduring evidence of his belief in the future of the United Nations. A practical peace, Sorensen reports, quoting President Kennedy's words, "based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions," was believed by him to be not impossible. Neither was war inevitable. "Our problems," the President declared, "are man-made; therefore they can be solved by man." 3 Sorensen dwells on Kennedy's practical proposals for the immediate establishment of better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact the conclusion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty followed within a few weeks. It was Kennedy's satisfaction with these proposals, Sorensen intimates, that enabled the President to end his address on a note of hope. The closing passage in the American University address makes good reading for those who share the vision of Edwin Ginn. " T h e United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. W e do not want a war. W e do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough — more than enough — of war and hate and oppression. W e shall be prepared for war, if others wish it. W e shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. W e are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on — not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace." 4 President Kennedy was well aware that it would require a great effort to achieve the rule of world law; but he was convinced that the prospect of success was bright enough to justify the effort. He did not judge the future wholly by the past. Hu3. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy p. 731.

4. Ibid., p. 732.

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man nature may not change, but new occasions not only teach new duties, they also stimulate and strengthen new purposes; the goal of the world federalists might be distant, but not beyond reach. As Kennedy declared in a message to the United World Federalists' national convention a short time before the American University address: "World law still remains the world's best choice for avoiding world war." Fresh evidence of growing purpose has been increasingly abundant in recent years. Foremost among the witnesses testifying to this growth, and by their testimony contributing powerfully to it, have been Pope John X X I I I and Pope Paul V I . In an eloquent encyclical, Pacern in Tern's, the former called upon the Christian world to recognize the rising need for world peace and to give greater thought to the means by which this need might be satisfied. One impressive response to this appeal was the international convocation, held in New York in February, 1965, where the implications of peaceful coexistence were discussed by some sixty statesmen, diplomats, politicians, and intellectuals from twenty different nations in the presence of more than two thousand invited observers representative of the leaders of public opinion in the United States. Robert M . Hutchins, a leading organizer of the convocation and participant in the proceedings, described the encyclical as "one of the most profound and significant documents of our age." 5 T h e appeal of Pope Paul V I later in the same year was addressed to the whole world. Speaking before the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 4 to the representatives of one hundred seventeen nations and through them to all mankind, he appraised the work of the United Nations in carefully considered terms. Quoting President Kennedy's well-remembered warning that mankind must put an end to war, or war 5. Edward Reed, ed., Peace on Earth. Pacem in Terris, Proceedings of an International Convocation on the Requirements of Peace sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (New York: Pocket Books, 1965), p. ix.

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will put an end to mankind, the Pope raised the perennial question: "Will the world ever succeed in changing that selfish and bellicose mentality which, up to now, has been interwoven into so much of its history?" His answer was judicious but inspiring. "This is hard to foresee; but it is easy to affirm that we must resolutely take the road towards a new history, a peaceful history, one that will be truly and fully human, the very history God promised to men of good will." β Pope Paul did not venture to predict the day when the marchers would reach their goal. He well knew, however, that by his presence among the representatives of the United Nations and by his profession of faith in the enduring worth of their work he was speeding them on their way. Worldwide interest in the celebration of the year 1965 as International Cooperation Year attests the growing sense of world community. In the United States the celebration culminated in the White House Conference on International Cooperation, held in Washington in late November and attended by nearly five thousand leading representatives of American public opinion. The deliberations of this conference brought new confidence to workers in the peace cause. Outstanding were the discussions on the reports of the working committees on arms control and disarmament, peacekeeping operations, peaceful settlement of disputes, and development of international law. The recommendations of these committees fell far short of the program of the Second Dublin Conference, but they did reveal a firm purpose to move vigorously in the direction of a stronger world organization. World government was not a phrase to intimidate these observers of and participants in international politics. Never before had there been so impressive a call to world statesmanship to provide better security for peace than a balance of terror. 6. General Assembly Official Records meeting, pp. 3-4.

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There can be no doubt that Edwin Ginn would have endorsed the view, best expressed among recent writers by Richard N . Gardner at the close of his instructive and timely book, In Pursuit of World Order, that: "These are not times for easy optimism; neither are they times for cynicism and despair. A genuine world community is waiting to be born — and we have it in our power to hasten the event." 7 This last observation would have been most agreeable to a man of Edwin Ginn's sanguine temperament. It is not necessary to discuss further the actual outlook for world government; it is enough to know that Edwin Ginn was not a man to quail before unexpected obstacles to the performance of his commitments, and that in the existing climate of opinion he certainly could not be dissuaded from proclaiming his faith in the feasibility of organized world peace under law. V

No well-advised worker in what Edwin Ginn called the peace cause is going to predict the day when Mr. Ginn's benefaction can be transferred, as he hoped it might be eventually, from the support of that work to the support of his other favorite charity, the improvement of the living conditions of young women residing in Boston for study or self-support. It is clear that the prediction of such an event is beyond the powers of a political scientist relying solely on modern empirical methods. But neither is it possible to predict by such methods that world peace through world law will never come. Confidence in the eventual arrival of world peace may well continue to rest, as it did in Mr. Ginn's mind, 8 on the Kantian prophecy that the history of the civilized world is the history of the gradual revelation of 7. Richard N. Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order: U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organization (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 262. 8. See the discussion of the Kantian prophecy in Part Three, Chapter 7, of this volume.

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a hidden purpose of nature to bring about, as the only condition under which the inherent potentialities of mankind can be fully realized, the federation of the world. And the final proposition in the Kantian vision of world peace, as set forth in the seminal essay "The Natural Principle of the Political Order," should also be borne in mind: namely, that intelligent efforts to help Nature in her chosen task will speed the day of its successful performance. This reasoning was sufficient for Edwin Ginn and would have continued to suffice if he could have lived through the bellicose years which followed his death. His sanguine temperament would have resisted pessimistic conclusions from depressing events during those turbulent years. He would have denied that disappointing results of peace efforts by the United Nations show that world peace through world law is impracticable. On the contrary, he would have concluded that, all things considered, the course of events tends to strengthen the original hope that the experimental international organization under the charter might eventually become the foundation of an efficient world security system. He would have approved the confidence of contemporary world federalists that intelligent and peaceloving men are capable, by taking due thought, of developing the United Nations Organization into a limited, but adequate and durable, world government.

9. THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

THE

QUEST

FOR

PEACE

IN

THE

NUCLEAR

AGE

This study in the organization of peace begins with the assumption that the quest for peace in the nuclear age will continue to be based on the purposes of the United Nations and the principles set forth in its charter. Though the charter was framed by statesmen who could not know what the nuclear age had in store for mankind, their purposes are the right purposes for an age in which war is "unthinkable," as President Eisenhower has bravely declared, meaning of course war between powers armed with the most modern weapons. The principles of the charter are likewise well suited to these purposes and will continue to be well suited to them as long as the liquidation of so-called sovereign states is also unthinkable. To look forward to a more distant future is untimely. The U.N. Organization under the charter, together with the affiliated specialized agencies forming the United Nations family, is a going concern. The immediate problem is to keep it going and to make it a more serviceNOTE: This paper is reprinted from Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age, ed. Arthur N. Holcombe, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Eleventh Report (New York: New York University Press, 1959).

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able instrument of the purposes of mankind in this new and terrifying age. By assumption the problem of keeping the United Nations family alive and active is not too difficult. In fact there is plenty of evidence to support the view that this assumption is both realistic and valid. The independent states of the world, with the sole exception of Switzerland, which have been in a position to apply for membership have done so. No state has sought to withdraw from the Organization. The Soviet Union for a time withdrew its representative from the Security Council in order to emphasize its dissatisfaction with the refusal of that body to seat a representative of Communist China. But the fighting in Korea quickly brought him back. The French delegation has walked out of the General Assembly to indicate its displeasure at a decision to consider the Algerian problem, but there has been no disposition to give up membership in the Organization. The Union of South Africa sulked for a time in the face of universal hostility to its racial policies, but it held on doggedly to its rights under the charter. At the Thirteenth United Nations General Assembly in 1958 there was a larger attendance of prime ministers and foreign ministers than ever before, attesting a general disposition to take its work seriously. The Organization is more than holding its own under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. But the problem of making the Organization a more serviceable instrument of the purposes of mankind in the nuclear age is more troublesome. To be sure, there has been no third world war since the establishment of the United Nations Organization. But talk of war between the major powers has not ceased; indeed it has grown unconscionably since the beginning of the nuclear arms race between the superpowers. Along with the growing talk has been the mounting fear of another world war. It is impossible to end the fear without abating the talk and it is impossible to abate the talk without checking the arms race; but persistent

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attempts to check the arms race have been followed by a rapidly expanding production of arms and a corresponding growth of tension. It requires no profound insight into the causes of war to foresee the end of an unchecked and ever-accelerating arms race: the arms will be used. T o prevent this result the United Nations Organization was created. U p to now, however, the world's diplomats and politicians who have attended the meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly, the organs charged with the principal responsibility for keeping the peace, have not been able to make effective use of the facilities for peacemaking under the charter. There are many opportunities under the United Nations Charter for peace-loving politicians, even if politics is defined in the narrowest sense of the term. In this sense politics may be conceived as concerted efforts to influence elections and appointments to the offices within the Organization and also to influence the deliberations of the organs charged with responsibility for determining its policies. T h e principal elective offices are the secretary-general, the president of the General Assembly, the nonpermanent members of the Security Council, the vicepresidents of the General Assembly and the chairmen of its standing committees, and also the judges of the International Court of Justice. Others, less important, are the members of the Economic and Social Council and the nondesignated members of the Trusteeship Council. These elections make much work for United Nations politicians. A glance at the record shows that the same tendency exists to form factions and parties in United Nations elections as in those of member states with representative institutions operated under a system of free enterprise in politics. Consider, for example, the elections to the Security Council. Ever since the outbreak of the cold war the parties to this conflict have exerted themselves to obtain as much representation as possible in this principal organ of the United Nations.

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The Communist party, if the delegations from the communist member states may be so described, possesses one permanent seat and in addition has always contended that eastern Europe, a region from which most of the delegations have been communist, was entitled to one of the elective seats. This contention has been successfully challenged since the early years of the cold war by the combination of delegations headed by the United States. In the year 1958 the Soviet Union was the only communist state with a vote in the Security Council. Eight votes were controlled by the United States and military allies of the United States under the N A T O and S E A T O treaties and other treaties or agreements of a similar character. One vote was controlled by Iraq, a party to the Baghdad Pact, with which the United States maintained an informal relationship until the July revolution in Iraq ended Iraqi participation in the Pact. The only Security Council member in 1958 maintaining its independence of both the major parties throughout the year was Sweden. Yet there were thirty member states which professed to be neutrals in the cold war. It is evident that the American party, if that is the proper term for the combination which has acquired such disproportionate representation in the Security Council, had played politics in Security Council elections with impressive results. At the next Security Council elections Sweden was replaced by Italy, a member of N A T O , and Iraq by Tunisia, one of the most Western-oriented of the Arab states. In 1959, but for the Soviet veto, a system of military alliances holding a bare majority of the votes in the General Assembly would have possessed complete control of the Security Council. The record of elections to other offices also is significant. Perhaps the most impressive exhibition of American leadership in this branch of United Nations politics was the filling of a vacancy in the International Court of Justice, caused by the death of a Chinese judge, at a special election in December, 1956. Elections to this Court require an absolute majority of

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the votes in the Security Council, regardless of the distinction between permanent and nonpermanent members, and in the General Assembly, each body voting separately. T h e United States delegation supported a Nationalist Chinese to succeed the deceased member of the court. T h e opposing candidate was a Japanese jurist, nominated from a country which had just been admitted to the United Nations after a long and hard struggle. T h e Nationalist Chinese candidacy symbolized one of the most divisive issues in United Nations politics. T h e Japanese was a symbol of reconciliation. By means of the most resolute arm-twisting, as high-pressure electioneering is called in the jargon of contemporary diplomacy, the election of the Chinese was procured. The margin of victory in the General Assembly was as narrow as possible, but the combination of states under the leadership of the United States was eventually successful. The influence of politics on the policies of the United Nations is less easy to measure. One test is to analyze the process of pursuing the primary purpose of the Organization: the maintenance of international peace and security. T h e framers of the charter provided three principal methods of maintaining peace and security, each of which calls for investigation. The first of these was to give the General Assembly a general, though not unlimited, commission to inquire into situations constituting threats to the peace and to recommend measures for reducing tension. T h e experience of the General Assembly with this method during the years since the Organization was first established should throw light on the role of politics in the formation of policy up to now and help in determining what it should be in the future. The record shows that the system of majority party politics as practiced in the United States does not produce the same results in terms of General Assembly recommendations as in the filling of elective offices. In the first place, a two-thirds vote is necessary for important actions in the General Assembly and

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such a majority is ordinarily beyond the capacity of a majority party. In recent years American leadership has scored some extraordinary successes in the General Assembly, like keeping out the representatives of Communist China; but these successes did not require a two-thirds vote. The outstanding American triumph in the General Assembly was the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution in November, 1950, by means of which member states supporting the international police action in Korea assured themselves of the practical capacity to maintain their control of that and similar operations at all times if they possessed a two-thirds majority of the votes. Six years later the necessary two-thirds majorities were readily forthcoming to condemn the Soviet Union for resorting to military force in Hungary, but there was no support for an international police action in this case as in Korea. In the Emergency Special Session of the Assembly, called in August, 1958, to consider the situation resulting from the American and British military interventions in Lebanon and Jordan, the United States was no more able than the Soviet Union to win a two-thirds majority for its proposals. The winning recommendations had to be initiated by member states not affiliated with either of the major parties and gained general acceptance under leadership operating outside the framework of a two-party system. In measuring the influence of American leadership on the policies of the General Assembly it is necessary to distinguish between positive and negative action. To defeat an important measure in the General Assembly only one more than a third of the votes is needed. In preventing undesired action — the establishment of a special United Nations fund for the economic development of underdeveloped regions by the investment of venture capital in large amounts, for example — the United States has seemed to be uniformly successful, though the practice of abstaining from such doubtful votes as those on issues arising from the cold war between the colonial powers and

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the anticolonial states makes any general statement inappropriate. The record of action on positive policies is more difficult of appraisal. Some apparent American triumphs, as on recent proposals to set up special commissions on disarmament and outer space, were rendered fruitless by the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate in the work of commissions the composition of which was unsatisfactory to it. Under the existing conditions in the General Assembly, as will be shown later in greater detail, the member states professing neutrality in the cold war between communist and anti-communist states possess a veto over the policies of the major parties to that war and thereby constitute a third force of substantial, though unpredictable, importance in United Nations politics. Moreover, the fact that important actions of the General Assembly in matters of policy take the form of recommendations greatly influences the role of politics as practiced by the major parties. A recommendation is merely a provisional action and depends for its efficacy upon its acceptance by the governments of the member states. T h e practical utility of recommendations is contingent upon their moral force, and after their adoption by the General Assembly the indispensable moral forces are still to be mobilized and put into effective operation. Hence the unequal results of General Assembly recommendations in different cases. In dealing with the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea in 1951 or with the Soviet Union's "regulars" in Hungary in 1956, the record of the General Assembly looks very different from that relating to the interventions at Suez in the same year, or two years later in Lebanon and Jordan. T h e moral force of its recommendations is not the same in the communist dictatorships as in the Western democracies. Under such conditions action upon General Assembly recommendations cannot be definitive and therefore cannot enter into the calculations of United Nations politicians in the same way as does action upon proposed measures in the normal legislative process. Instead of normal politics there is propaganda.

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The second method of maintaining international peace and security provided by the framers of the charter is the pacific settlement of disputes under the authority of the Security Council. This method is even more unworkable by a majority party within the Council than that of recommendations by the General Assembly. Any proposed action can be blocked not only by the veto of one of the permanent members of the Council but also by what amounts to a veto in the hands of any five of the six elective members. Minorities of one major power or five lesser states may render the majority of the Council helpless to proceed in accordance with the expectations of the framers. Any combination of major powers and lesser states, amounting to five, can defeat a measure without invoking a major-power veto. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the record of the Security Council in the pacific settlement of contentious cases so nearly a blank. Effective action requires the consent of all the nuclear powers, and the requirement of such consent in contentious cases, involving the interests of the two major parties, is incompatible with a system of majority rule. Again, instead of normal politics — if by normal politics is meant a system of effective leadership by a majority party — there is propaganda. The Security Council, like the International Court of Justice, can dispose of disputes of the kind the parties do not wish to fight over, but it cannot maintain peace by the method of pacific settlement in those cases where there is a serious threat of war. On the record there is some evidence of useful mediation in minor disputes and abundant evidence of aggressive, though inconclusive, propaganda. The third method of maintaining international peace provided by the framers of the charter is that of decisions by the Security Council in cases involving breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. Just what constitutes an act of aggression has never been authoritatively determined, and now, since the events leading up to the landings in Lebanon and Jordan, comes the new category of indirect aggression to make confusion worse

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confounded. Breaches of the peace seem to be somewhat more readily recognizable, but the area of undefined, or ill-defined, discretionary authority on the part of the Council is further broadened by the provision that it may act in situations which constitute threats to the peace. What constitutes a threat must be a matter of opinion, and opinions in the Security Council are bound to differ in contentious cases. It is not surprising to find the record of the Security Council in dealing with these cases even more nearly a blank than in those involving attempts at pacific settlement. Instead of effective action there has been more propaganda and, naturally, more bitter propaganda. Apparently only the "unthinkability" of war, involving the use of the most modern weapons, restrains the major powers from letting these situations get out of control. Instead of atomic or nuclear war there is cold war. It is evident that in the United Nations the role of politics, as politics is understood in countries when there is a system of free enterprise for party leaders, has been narrow. In the Security Council, which was intended to be the principal organ for keeping the peace, there can be no effective action in contentious cases involving the interests of the major powers except by unanimous consent of those powers. This means that either the rule of action to enforce peace by unanimous consent of the major powers must be abandoned or the effort to operate a partisan system of politics must be directed into other channels than those with which party politicians in the Western democracies are familiar. The former alternative is so unlikely to be adopted under the existing or anything like the existing circumstances that it may as well be dropped from further consideration. The latter alternative is more promising, but requires some fresh thinking on the part of Western politicians. Meanwhile the United Nations Organization becomes a theater of aggressive propaganda instead of the scene of effective decisions promoting international peace and security. It is well

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suited to the conduct of a cold war, so well suited indeed that it has long contributed to keeping the war cold. Because the system of politics in the United Nations is so well suited to a world at cold war, it is doubtful if the cold war can be ended under such a system. T o be sure, it is a great service of the U . N . that it has contributed so much toward substituting cold war for atomic or nuclear war. This is an achievement for which the world should be grateful, as the military experts are agreed that no department of defense can protect its people against devastation by the most modern weapons if war actually breaks out. They can only promise that the enemy will suffer even more than their own people, which is cold comfort in the nuclear age. Under such circumstances the maintenance of a state of cold war registers an important advance in civilization. But such a state is bound to be precarious. National leaders are irritated almost beyond endrurance by the ceaseless bombardment of aggressive propaganda which always puts the actions of their opponents in the best possible light and their own in the worst. W h e n they reject their opponents' diplomatic communications because of the alleged rudeness of the language employed therein, the strain on their nerves is obviously beginning to tell. T h e tension between their respective peoples mounts, and the cold war grows warmer. Moreover, the maintenance of peace is left too much at the hazard of the cheerless gloom of chance — a nervous radar operator misinterpreting a shadow on his screen, a mentally distraught bombardier dropping a bomb at the wrong moment, or a tragically misguided air force or ballistic-missile commander accepting a self-imposed mission to bring intolerable suspense to an end. M e n who believe that by taking thought they can become masters of their fate will naturally turn to the problem of ending the cold war by a genuine peace. If atomic or nuclear war can be superseded by cold war, why cannot cold war in turn be superseded by something less precarious and more satisfying?

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Is it really necessary to endure the cold war until it gets superheated and the arms race ends in a universal holocaust? W h y not try to make better use of rational political methods in the proceedings of the United Nations? In short, why not enlarge the role of politics in the organization of peace by suitable changes in the charter or in the practices under the charter? The theme of this study is that the solution of the problem of keeping the peace in the nuclear age lies in expanding the role of politics in the organization of peace. The scope of United Nations politics must be made consistent with a role for United Nations politicians which will discourage aggressive propaganda in the Security Council and General Assembly and encourage constructive action in the interest of mankind. What changes in the structure and processes of the United Nations this may involve will be considered more closely in the following pages. The conclusion of this study, however, may be suggested here: it is that by suitable measures, designed to expand the role of politics in the activities of the United Nations, the Organization can be made a more serviceable instrument of human purposes in the years ahead. Its representative character can be so improved that it will command the confidence of the peoples of the world. Its procedures also can be improved so that parties to a serious dispute will expect a timely and reasonable decision on the merits of the case. The scene of its action can be made hospitable to the operations of a rational system of politics instead of merely furnishing constant incitement to aggressive propaganda. In short, the cold war can be ended by making the United Nations a more efficient instrument of the purposes embodied in the charter.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Every student of international politics is familiar with Clausewitz's often-quoted aphorism on the nature of war. The nature

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of peace can be described in a similar manner. If modern war is the continuation of national politics by other means, that is, by military operations instead of strictly political measures, modern peace is the continuation of international war by other means, that is, by political measures instead of military operations. Such verbal acrobatics is obviously a vain exercise unless one or the other of the basic terms is independently intelligible. Clausewitz seemed to assume that the politics of peace was generally understood. In modern times it is the politics of war which seems to be most familiar. Hence we speak of cold war rather than of cold or hot peace. T h e point is that there are important resemblances between the politics of war and the politics of peace. This is the second point in the study of the role of politics in the organization of peace. T h e next topic for the student of international organization, therefore, is neither the nature of war nor the nature of peace, but the nature of politics, bellicose or pacific as the case may be. This is a topic concerning which the widest differences of opinion have been expressed. O n the one hand, there are those writers who have contended that the essence of politics is always the perennial struggle for public office and an influential part in the management of public affairs: in other words, the essence of politics is the struggle for power. Whether those engaged most actively in this struggle do so out of regard for the public interest or merely in pursuance of their own private interests, these writers would assert, is a matter of secondary importance. These self-styled realists in the study of politics indeed often deny that there is such a thing as a public interest. T h e important reality in politics, according to their understanding of the nature of politics, is the contest between persons, or groups of persons, with conflicting interests for control of the powers of government in order the better to protect or promote their own particular interests. T h e victors in the struggle may speak of the triumph of the public interest over adverse private interests but, if so, their

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purpose is merely to cloak with a garment of respectability the naked reality of one special interest or group of interests dominating the scene of the struggle and exploiting its position for its own private gain. At the opposite pole of opinion are those writers who defend the idea of a genuine public interest. They assert that the interests of the whole body of people in any political community are always as real as those of any part of the people and that they are or may be even more important. Through democratic processes the people of such a community can adjust the conflicts of interest between individuals or groups within it in such a manner as to protect or promote the general interests of the whole body. T h e standard list of public interests for Americans is that contained in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States. Justice, domestic tranquillity, the common defense, the general welfare, liberty: these are concepts which are full of meaning to Americans. These general concepts can be, and should be, particularized in more explicit forms; but, despite controversy over the particular forms, the conviction that governmental action ought to be, and often is, in the public interest is basic in the political faith of the American people. It is not necessary to prove that governmental action always is in the public interest in order to maintain the belief in the validity of the concept. W h a t is necessary is faith in the capacity of democratic peoples to establish political processes which offer acceptable assurances that the public interest can be made to prevail over the private and special interests competing for political influence. Politics in a modern democracy, Americans think, is an art by which the people may promote the public interest if they can equip their state with suitable political structures and processes and can procure the services of enlightened and public-spirited statesmen. It is not unreasonable, therefore, in a modern democracy to regard public office as a public trust and not merely a specially favorable opportunity for those in

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power to pursue private ends at the expense of those out of power. In a well-constituted democracy this view is no less realistic than the so-called political realism which denies the existence of a genuine public interest. In modern times the most insistent of political realists have been the Marxian communists. The Marxian creed makes a virtue out of its denial of such concepts as national interest, national duty, and national honor. Its dogmatic repudiation of obligations resting upon the moral force of such concepts leaves no room whatever for the idea of a worldwide public interest. The idea of the common interests of mankind, the Marxists contend, is an illusion, more iridescent perhaps but also emptier, if that be possible, than the ordinary idea of national interest or the idea of the interests of any other group than a ruling class or a class destined to become a ruling class. According to their way of thinking, it is only when the state, regarded as an instrument of class rule, withers away and ceases to exist that a true public interest can emerge from the welter of contending private and special interests. This extreme partisan view, repugnant as it is to the political instincts of genuinely democratic peoples, contributes to a better understanding of the true nature of the public interest. For the Marxists claim that in the classless society which they believe will follow a proletarian dictatorship, private interests will disappear with the classes to which they belong. W h e n the state, regarded as an instrument of class rule, ceases to exist, only the public interest, they assert, can remain. Under such conditions the public interest would be as real, the Marxists concede, as "bourgeois" political scientists contend it may be in any rightly constituted state. The important difference between the Marxist and the bourgeois view of the public interest is that the Marxist dreams of the public interest as the catastrophic and definitive product of the last revolution, thereafter to be enjoyed by all survivors, world without end, whereas the better bourgeois politi-

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cal scientists think of it as a natural product of historical processes gradually broadening and deepening with the progressive development of political institutions down through the years. It is evident that the concepts of national politics and international politics are closely related. T h e idea of a universal interest of mankind is no less realistic than that of a national interest. It may be less familiar to the people in modern so-called sovereign states than that of a national interest but its essential nature must be the same. T o be sure, the adjustment of conflicting interests in the general interest of all parties to the conflict necessarily takes different forms in different areas, large or small, where the conflicts may develop. In modern times the principal area in which the most important adjustments have been made, and hence in which the leading politicians have operated, has been the so-called sovereign state. But politicians may operate at all levels of political accommodation if the conditions are favorable to the employment of political methods. In principle world politics is as real — that is, as natural — as national politics. The great difference between national politics and world politics springs from the different conditions under which politicians must operate on the two levels. The national politician possesses the inestimable advantage of established political structures and processes at the national level, to which people are accustomed and in which they may place a relatively high degree of confidence. For the would-be world politician there are no corresponding institutions, and those institutions which do exist are less capable of commanding the confidence of the peoples of the world. W h a t are called in sovereign states civil wars, therefore, while still excessively frequent, at least in undemocratic countries, leave a wide scope for the political accommodation of interest conflicts. But world civil wars, or what we ordinarily call international wars, are a greater threat to peace, that is, to the adjustment of interest conflicts by the methods of

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political accommodation, under the conditions in which world politicians must now operate. At the national level pacific politics is the normal method of adjusting interest conflicts and the resort to physical force and official violence, at least in the democratic countries, is abnormal; at the world level, unhappily, bellicose politics has been more usual. But the forms of politics remain always and at every level the same. In recent years the international communists seem to have understood the nature of politics, and hence also of war and peace, better than the politicians in the genuine democracies seem to have done. The Marxist doctrines of class struggle and class war offer a far from adequate explanation of all the facts of political life, but they have helped to clarify the ideas of war and peace. The Marxists' overemphasis on the conflicts between classes, however classes may be defined, and their neglect of other forms of conflict unduly simplify the problems of politics at all levels; but they do see clearly the elementary truth that the principal distinction between war and peace is a technical one, namely the employment of organized physical force as an instrument of official policy. T h e ends of policy remain the same. Both war and peace are forms of politics, rightly understood. The Marxists' grasp of the true nature of war and peace enables them to approach the problems of a cold war with more confidence than is shown by many politicians in the genuine democracies. They understand that the distinction between cold war and hot war, like that between any kind of war and peace, is technical and depends principally upon the choice of weapons. The appropriate weapons for cold war are propaganda, infiltration, subversion, and other forms of indirect aggression. T h e latter term is new, and even less well defined than direct aggression, but presumably does not include the use of economic weapons, not even in the form of so-called trade wars. The non-Marxist peoples, less clearly understanding the distinction between war and peace, are apt to think of cold war, like

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hot war, as something evil, to be won and ended as soon as possible. But this is a mistake because cold war, like peace and hot war itself, is but a form of politics, to be pursued with the appropriate instruments and methods until its aims can be better secured by other instruments and methods or can be abandoned as not worth the efforts and sacrifices required for continuance of that kind of struggle. Politics is a natural product of the conditions under which men live. It is something not to be ended but to be improved, in order that conflicts between interests of all kinds may be suitably adjusted with a minimum of effort and sacrifice. The objection to cold war, like that to hot war, is not that it is a form of struggle but that it is waged with weapons involving needless losses and suffering. Cold wars may be fought with less fire and slaughter than hot wars, but they are capable of producing much sweat and many tears. Cold war, regarded as an instrument of national policy, may be preferable to hot war, but better still are the methods of adjusting interest conflicts which do not seek to exploit the fears and hatreds of mankind. Peace should not be defined negatively as the mere absence of war, hot or cold. Peace is that form of politics in which conflicts of interest are adjusted by appeals to reason, not involving organized violence or intimidation, or are endured as patiently as possible until rational methods of adjustment can be effectively employed. T H E A L I G N M E N T OF FORCES IN T H E U.N.

ORGANIZATION

With this insight into the nature of war and peace, and of politics both bellicose and pacific, the recent history of the United Nations becomes more intelligible. It must not be supposed that the political regimes committed to international communism, and hence to a course of action in world politics which

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they regard as genuinely realistic, are unable for that reason to find any good in the United Nations. On the contrary, they have always recognized that the meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly afford convenient and attractive opportunities for aggressive propaganda: that is, propaganda designed to impose the will of the propagandist upon his adversary rather than to appeal to the latter's reason. Moreover, the veto power of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and the votes of communist delegations in the General Assembly are defensive weapons which, although of limited efficacy, are not to be despised. Furthermore, the facilities of the United Nations headquarters are well suited for use in private negotiations with spokesmen for rival political regimes. The adherence of the communist bloc to the United Nations rests on the solid basis of a fixed conviction that participation in its proceedings can be made to serve the special interests of international communism everywhere. T h e communist leaders presumably believe that in reality there can be no higher loyalty to the U.N. than theirs. The spokesmen for noncommunist regimes in the United Nations may try to be equally realistic in their attitude toward the Organization. But they do not seem to have been equally successful in applying their political ideas to the actual problems of the cold war. Statesmen who represent genuinely democratic states in the United Nations do well if they make the Organization serve the special interests of their own particular states. They do better when they identify their national interests with the universal interests of mankind: they may then count on the ungrudging aid of statesmen from other countries with a similar understanding of the broader interests to be served. Anyone can understand the practical utility of an organization which can stop yellow fever or bubonic plague, wherever it may be found, before it spreads abroad and contaminates other nations. Anyone can understand the utility of an organization which can stop a little local war before it spreads and embroils a whole

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world in fratricidal slaughter. Anyone should be able to understand the desirability of utilizing a general international organization to protect and cherish all the universal interests of mankind. But the spokesmen for the "free world" seem not to have been clear in their own minds concerning the relations between national interests, universal interests, and the conduct of international affairs in the United Nations. The pattern of conflicting interests in contemporary international affairs may be conveniently observed in the proceedings of the Twelfth United Nations General Assembly. The accession of Ghana and Malaya in the course of the year 1957 had raised the total number of member states to eighty-two, making the Organization more nearly representative of the whole world than ever before. (The union of Egypt and Syria in 1958 reduced the number temporarily to eighty-one, which was raised again at the end of the year to eighty-two by the admission of Guinea.) Among the independent nations of noteworthy political importance only Switzerland and the divided states — Germany, Korea, and Vietnam — remained outside the fold. China also remained divided, but only Communist China was excluded from the Organization; Nationalist China continued to occupy the Chinese seat in the Security Council and other U.N. organs. In the previous year the British, French, and Israelis had resorted to war as an instrument of policy for dealing with Nasser's Arab nationalism. Bellicose prevailed over pacific politics also in the Soviet Union's harsh measures to check Hungarian independence. Never since the establishment of the United Nations had the leadership of peace-loving politicians in international affairs been put to so severe a test. Analysis of the political scene begins with the distribution of the member states among the military alliances formed since the beginning of the cold war to sustain the influence of the leading parties in international politics. Supporting the leadership of the

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United States have been: 1 ) the Organization of American States with its even score of Latin-American members; 2) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with eleven members (not counting the German Federal Republic) in western and southern Europe together with Canada in North America and Turkey in Asia; 3) the South East Asia Treaty Organization with five additional members in Asia and Australia; and 4) Nationalist China and Japan, associated with the United States under special arrangements. Including two virtual, though not formal, allies in Southwest Asia under the Baghdad Pact, Iran and Iraq, there have been altogether forty-three members of the United Nations in the grand military alliance of the so-called free world. On the opposite side in the cold war have stood the Soviet Union and its communist allies under the Warsaw Pact, accounting for nine of the United Nations member states. The remaining member states, uncommitted to either of the two sides in the cold war, have maintained a diversified and precarious neutrality. Twenty-two of these states, which had attended the great conference of Asian and African states at Bandung in 1955 and have not become affiliated with any of the special military alliances, may be described as the "Bandung neutrals" and eight — Austria, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Spain, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia — may be described as the "independent neutrals." The leadership of the United States as reflected in the elections to the Security Council, seemed firmly established. In the Security Council as it was constituted in 1957 the Soviet Union stood alone. Eight of the members — two from Latin America, three from NATO, one from the Baghdad Pact states, and two from the Far East — were American allies or associates. There was no chosen representative of the Bandung neutrals, and only Sweden maintained a position of independent neutrality in the perennial struggle between the two superpowers. If the com-

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mand of voting majorities were the clue to politics in the Security Council, the American position would have been impregnable. The leaders of the American forces in the United Nations have been former senators, trained in a democratic system of majority rule and apt to practice on the bank of the East River in Manhattan what they have learned on the bank of the Potomac. Senator Warren Austin was a peace-loving politician who never reconciled himself to the hard facts of the cold war. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was always more realistic and has proved an adept partisan in cold-war politics. In organizing a partisan majority in the Security Council, however, the United States delegation seemed to have overreached itself. T h e alignment of forces in the Security Council had little relation to the actual distribution of interests in international affairs. Under the voting formula adopted at Yalta the American bloc could use its majority of the votes, as the Soviet Union could use its veto, for defensive action but it could not make its votes count for constructive decisions on controversial cold-war issues. A Security Council more generally representative of all the various interests in the United Nations would have served equally well as an arena for the propaganda battles of the cold war and might even have contributed something to the performance of its peacemaking functions. The proceedings in the General Assembly are more instructive for the student of international politics. Though the voting system in the Assembly underrepresents the major powers as flagrantly as that in the Council overrepresents them, at least all the member states possess a voice there and can obtain a hearing for whatever interests, national or universal, they may choose to speak. T h e proceedings do serve as a mirror of the various interest conflicts in contemporary international affairs. Inspection of the roll calls on some leading controversial measures, therefore, should throw light upon the true nature of cold-war politics.

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There were a half-dozen such measures before the Assembly in the autumn of 1957, which can be conveniently utilized to test the actual alignment of forces in the struggle between the superpowers. The first of these measures, the resolution accepting the report of the special Assembly committee appointed to investigate the military intervention of the Soviet Union in Hungary, was actually adopted at a resumed session of the Eleventh General Assembly, ending in September, 1957. The vote on this measure recorded the maximum strength of the anticommunist forces in the cold war. In favor of its adoption were sixty member states, including all the members of the various American military alliances and most of the neutrals, both Bandung and independent. Opposed were the Soviet Union and its allies under the Warsaw Pact, together with Yugoslavia, casting ten votes altogether. There were also ten votes recorded as abstentions, nine of which were cast by Bandung neutrals and one by an independent neutral, Finland. This roll call affords an excellent illustration of one of the peculiarities of United Nations politics. Under the U.N. voting system, which records abstentions as freely as yeas and nays, there can be three sides to a question. Being present but not voting on a controversial measure may, and usually does, mean more than mere indifference to the measure or inability to choose a side. In a deliberative body possessing important legislative powers, those who are not for a measure, when it comes to a final vote, are presumably against it. But in a body like the United Nations General Assembly, which ordinarily does not legislate but only expresses opinion or recommends action by its members, an abstention can be a deliberate expression of a positive preference for a different policy than that embodied in the measure or favored by its principal opponents. The abstainers in the vote on the Hungarian resolution were not ready to condemn the Soviet Union for an act of aggression contrary to the prin-

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ciples of the charter. Neither did they wish to let the intervention of the Soviet Union stand unchallenged as a precedent for the future. Numerous abstentions are a sign of weakness in an ordinary legislative body. In a body whose most important function is to mobilize the moral forces of mankind, provision for recording abstentions, as if the abstainers were not only present but actually voting, gives a flexibility to the proceedings which enhances their political value. The vote on the second test measure in the autumn of 1957, which came early in the twelfth regular session of the Assembly, marked the minimum strength of the anticommunist forces. This was the American proposal to postpone action on the claim of Communist China to a seat in the General Assembly as the proper Chinese representative. T h e balloting on this proposal showed a decrease of the ayes to forty-seven, an increase of the noes to twenty-seven, and seven abstentions. The United States held the support of all its military allies and associates, including the Baghdad Pact members, with only three exceptions. Denmark and Norway, having recognized the Communist government of China long before, voted no; and Portugal, with an eye perhaps on its interest in Macao, abstained. But American support among the neutrals almost vanished. Among the Bandung neutrals most of those which, following the lead of India and Egypt, had abstained on the Hungarian question now voted no, and many of those which had voted with the United States on the Hungarian question now abstained. Those which stood beside the United States were Ethiopia, Lebanon, Liberia, and Libya, now joined by newly admitted Malaya. Among the independent neutrals only Spain and Austria continued to support the American position, Yugoslavia adhered as before to the communist bloc, Sweden, Finland, and Ireland went over to the opposition, Israel abstained, and the Union of South Africa continued to take no part in the proceedings. It is evident that other interests than

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the "containment" of communism weighed heavily with most of the neutrals. The next two test votes introduced a greater complication of interests. In November the General Assembly turned its attention to the general problem of the limitation of armaments. On November 14 it voted on fresh instructions to the Disarmament Commission, expressing confidence in American leadership of the negotiations at the London Conference which had ended in the previous August in a deadlock. On November 19 it voted on a separate resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional suspension of nuclear bomb tests. The first vote registered support for the anticommunist position almost as widespread as that on the Hungarian question. The second vote disclosed a disintegration of the noncommunist forces even more striking than that on the seating of Red China. On the fresh instructions for the Disarmament Commission there were fifty-seven ayes (supporting American leadership), nine noes, and fifteen abstentions. On the suspension of nuclear bomb tests there were twentyfour ayes (opposing American leadership), thirty-four noes (supporting the United States), and twenty abstentions. On these two votes the N A T O and S E A T O blocs held fast, but there was a wide break in the ranks of the Latin-American states, led by Mexico and Guatemala, on the question of suspending nuclear bomb tests. The trend of the voting among the various kinds of neutrals, including on these ballots the Baghdad Pact states, Iran and Iraq, was the same as on the first two test ballots. Of the three states which supported American leadership on the Hungarian question and refused their support on the question of instructions, two were Bandung neutrals, Sudan and Ghana. The third was Japan, which, as a disarmed state under its postwar constitution, had its own reasons for a more positive policy on disarmament. On the question of suspending bomb tests, the United States suffered

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a net loss of thirteen votes from the total it had been able to hold on the question of Communist China's representation in the General Assembly. Losses of support were suffered both among America's military allies and among the neutrals. In fact there was no support among the neutrals for the American position on nuclear bomb tests except by Spain and Israel. Thirteen voted against the United States and fifteen abstained. This was a virtual abdication of leadership by the United States. The last two test votes showed the consequences of an actual abdication of American leadership. One of these votes came on November 29, when the Bandung neutrals forced a showdown on their proposal that negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the possession of the former Dutch New Guinea, now called West Irian, be resumed. The other came on December 14, when the Greek delegation forced a showdown on their claim to the whole of Cyprus despite the Turkish delegation's objections in the interest of the Turkish minority and British objections to so controversial a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The United States delegation, deeply embarrassed by the bitter conflict between the colonial powers — all of whom were its allies in N A T O — and the anticolonial Asian and African states, many of whom steadily followed its leadership on other issues, declined to commit itself to a choice of sides in either of these ballots. The results of the voting clearly showed that, whatever the United States might think, anticolonialism was as real and as important an issue as anticommunism in the minds of many members of the United Nations. The United States found little support for its policy of complete abstention in the vote on the two colonial questions. The ballot on the question of West Irian showed forty-one ayes, twenty-nine noes, and only eleven abstentions. That on the Cyprus question showed thirty-one ayes, twenty-three noes, and twenty-four abstentions. The colonial issue was clearly defined in the West Irian voting, but the conflict between Greece and

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Turkey over Cyprus was embarrassing to many others besides the United States. T h e Arab states were helped to choose sides by their traditional hostility to Turkey, but the rest of the Bandung neutrals generally took refuge, like the United States, in uneasy abstentions. The N A T O members, except Greece, Turkey, Iceland, and the United States, supported the colonial powers on both ballots. The S E A T O members were divided and the solidarity of the Latin Americans was completely disrupted. Those who, like the United States, abstained on both ballots were widely scattered: Mexico, Venezuela, and Paraguay among the American allies; Finland, Liberia, and Cambodia among the neutrals. The Philippines, one of the most loyal of the American allies, abstained on the Cyprus question but took no part whatever in the voting on the question of W e s t Irian. The leadership of N A T O on these votes passed definitely to the British and French, who were supported also by Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden. T h e American effort to play the part of a neutral on the colonial issue seemed to be less successful than that of the Bandung states to make an issue of neutralism in the cold war. T h e interest-conflicts in international affairs manifestly required closer study than they had received by those American politicians who would stake American leadership in world politics on their interpretation of the containmentof-communism issue. The pattern of leadership at the twelfth session of the United Nations General Assembly may be better understood by analyzing the composition of the various power blocs. T h e most solid of the blocs was that led by the Soviet Union. All the Warsaw Pact members always voted with their leader. In addition there were those states which never voted against the Soviet Union, though abstaining on one or more of the test votes. Conspicuous among these abstainers was Yugoslavia, abstaining once on the question of instructions to the Disarmament Commission. There were no less than ten other members of the United Nations which

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never voted against the Soviet Union, though abstaining on several votes. Finland abstained four times, as did Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. India, Ceylon, and Nepal abstained three times, as did Yemen. Egypt, Syria, and Indonesia abstained twice. In these cases abstention obviously meant unwillingness to support the leadership of the Western powers, but it did not indicate unqualified subservience to the Soviet Union. The issues were more complex, the distinctions of policy more subtle, than is suggested by the simple formula that those nations which are not against the policies of the Soviet Union must necessarily be for them. The power bloc led by the United States lacked the solidarity of the communist bloc. Only two of the more than forty American military allies and associates supported the leadership of the United States on all six of the test ballots. These two, Venezuela and Paraguay, were dictatorships whose rulers may well have had private reasons for accepting American leadership straight down the line. There were in addition three member states which never voted against the United States: the Philippines and Liberia, with one abstention each, and Cambodia, with two abstentions. There were also seventeen states which managed to get through the session without voting against the United States on the test ballots more than once, but these are reluctant witnesses to the effectiveness of American leadership. Eight of these were LatinAmerican states, headed by Brazil and Mexico. The others were widely scattered: there were China, Japan, Turkey, and Thailand from the allies and military associates of the United States, Iraq from the Baghdad Pact members, the Federation of Malaya and Laos from the Bandung neutrals, and Austria and Israel from the independent neutrals. It was a disappointing showing for a superpower which had spent so many billions on economic and military aid. The achievements of British and French leadership, measured by the same six test votes, were more impressive. The two leaders

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of the colonial powers enjoyed the full support of most of N A T O and did at least as well as the United States in the other parts of the free world. Of course they received no support from the Bandung neutrals on the colonial issues, but on the other issues the correlation of votes between the English and French and other members of the free-world military alliances is higher than between the United States and the same free-world states. Despite American efforts to avoid antagonizing the anticolonial bloc on the ballots dealing with their own special interests, the United States did not attain a higher correlation with the mem.bers of the anticolonial bloc in the other test votes than did the English and French. These contrasting results suggest that American policy had not been as realistic as that of the two major colonial powers. Fortunately for the United States relations with the United Kingdom and France, notwithstanding the strain) caused by the Suez misadventure, were on the whole surprisingly good. The outstanding leader of the Bandung neutrals was India;but these neutrals were not easy to lead. Only Ceylon and Nepal voted with India on all six test ballots. Afghanistan never voted against India, but this state held an exposed position on the borders of the Soviet Union and by means of numerous abstentions escaped identification with any particular leadership. Six other Bandung neutrals — Indonesia, Burma, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen — voted against India no more than once each, but the four Arab states were manifestly preoccupied with their own special problems. A majority of the Bandung neutrals rejected the leadership of India more frequently. Regarded as a power bloc, they possessed even less solidarity than the bloc led by the United States. The independent neutrals were even less responsive to leadership by any one of their group. Sweden, because of its relationship to the incumbent secretary-general, might have tried the role of administration leader, but none of the other members of

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the group voted with the Swedish delegation on all six test ballots. The independent neutrals indeed acted like true independents, each going its own way when the votes were cast. The Spanish and Yugoslav voting records were almost exactly contrary to each other, and the Union of South Africa differed so far from all the others that it seemed close to the point of seceding from the Organization. Regarded as a bloc the independent neutrals were not only less numerous than the Bandung neutrals but also less coherent. The most cursory inspection of the voting record of the Twelfth General Assembly discloses a kaleidoscopic variety of· conflicting national interests represented in the United Nations. Some of them stood out conspicuously in the ballots on the resolutions relating to West Irian and to Cyprus. T h e anticolonial states were not always able to present a united front to the colonial powers, as the vote on the Cyprus resolution plainly revealed; but when they did stand together, as on the West Irian issue, they could make effective propaganda against the colonial powers. The conflicting national interests were less apparent in the votes on the two resolutions relating to disarmament. It may well be that representatives of the major powers in negotiations for the reduction of armaments are primarily interested in gaining an advantage over their principal opponents and can give only incidental attention to the universal interests of mankind that are involved in the proceedings. But where the technical advisers of the negotiators are professionally competent it is impossible for both sides to gain any substantial advantage from such negotiations. Unless one side makes a mistake in its calculations, which is unlikely, the real stakes in the negotiations must lie in the field •of propaganda. Regarded from the realistic viewpoint, the United States scored a propaganda victory on the resolution relating to the instructions for the Disarmament Commission and the Soviet Union scored on the resolution relating to nuclear bomb

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tests. But the universal interest in the prevention of active military hostilities involving the use of the most modern weapons was also served by a process which kept the struggle between the superpowers within the bounds of cold-warlike propaganda. The influence of the universal interests of mankind was more evident in the first two votes of the test series. The vote on the Hungarian civil war issue did not alter the actual relations between the principal parties, as established by the armed intervention of the Soviet forces; but it did assert the moral supremacy of the universal interests of mankind, and thereby contributed something to the creation of a more pacific code of international behavior for the future. The impressive shift of votes on the Chinese-representation issue likewise contributed something to the growth of respect for the universal interest in having all significant bodies of people effectively represented by authentic spokesmen in the organs of the United Nations. The proceedings of the Twelfth General Assembly surely marked a forward step, though perhaps only a short step, in the development of an international political system capable of securing consideration for the universal interests of mankind. The most convincing evidence of such progress in international politics was the final action at the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly in August, 1958, on the casesof the military intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom in Lebanon and Jordan. This action was not altogether agreeable either to the intervening powers, whose landing of troops by sea and air was obviously hasty and ill-considered; to the Soviet Union, which had objected most strenuously to their intervention; or to the leading neutrals, which had sought to vindicate the universal interest of mankind in greater respect for the processes of the United Nations by the adoption of some less ambiguous resolution than that finally concocted by the spokesmen for the Arab League. But the Arab League's resolution was adopted unanimously; and thus was set a valuable precedent

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which surely tends to secure greater respect in the future for the principles of the charter and the interests of mankind. T h e alignment of forces in United Nations politics as exhibited in the Twelfth General Assembly was maintained in the thirteenth session. American and Soviet policy, despite tactical talk about summit meetings, remained substantially unchanged and sharp skirmishes in the cold war were fought on the General Assembly floor. Three roll calls at the end of the regular session can serve well enough as test votes. The first of these came on the estimates of the cost of maintaining the United Nations Emergency Force on the border between Israel and its Arab neighbors; the second, on an American proposal relating to the membership of a committee to study the peaceful uses of outer space; the third, on an Arab resolution recognizing the right of Algeria to independence. The first vote tested the ability of the United States to lead a majority of the General Assembly in support of the established United Nations policy concerning the problem of Israel; the second, the ability of the United States to defeat the Soviet bloc in a direct contest between the two superpowers; the third, the influence of the United States in its policy of neutralism in the cold war between the European colonial powers and the Asian and African anticolonial member states. On the first test vote American leadership was sustained by a narrow majority. T h e record of the roll call shows forty-two ayes, nine noes, and twenty-seven abstentions. Voting with the United States were seven of the twenty Latin American members of the Organization of American States, sixteen of the twenty members of N A T O and the Asiatic and Pacific military alliances and consultative pacts, all of the eight independent neutrals, and ten of the Bandung neutrals. The Soviet bloc cast nine votes against the American position. Twenty-seven other members states, including a majority of the Latin Americans and :a majority of the Bandung neutrals, abstained. T h e Latin Americans generally disliked the method of apportioning the costs.

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Continued presence in the Near East of an emergency force was detested by many of the Bandung neutrals. There was general agreement upon the importance of ensuring the peaceful use of outer space, but bitter disagreement between the American and Soviet delegations over the composition of the investigating committee. Voting with the United States were all twenty Latin Americans, all twenty members of N A T O and the other military alliances and consultative pacts, six of the eight independent neutrals, and the same number of Bandung neutrals. The Soviet bloc cast its nine votes against the American proposal. Seventeen Bandung neutrals, together with Finland and Yugoslavia, abstained. The American party polled fifty-three out of a total of eighty-one votes. The United States easily gained the necessary two-thirds majority for its proposal, but the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate in the work of the committee made the American triumph a hollow victory. It was a frustration of American leadership and a defeat for the general interest of mankind. In the vote on the Algerian question the French delegation refused to participate, but the vote of Guinea, which had been admitted to the United Nations the preceding day, kept the total at eighty-one. Voting for the motion were twenty-two Bandung neutrals; two independent neutrals, Ireland and Yugoslavia; two American military allies or associates, Greece and Pakistan; and the nine members of the Soviet bloc. Voting against it were six Latin Americans; nine members of N A T O and other American military alliances or pacts; two independent neutrals, Israel and the Union of South Africa; and one Bandung neutral, Laos. Abstaining, along with the United States, were fourteen Latin Americans, eight other military allies or associates of the United States, four independent neutrals, and one Bandung neutral — Cambodia. On this vote American leadership failed conspicuously to hold together its following on either of the other test votes. N A T O and the other military alliances were badly split. The

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combination of Bandung neutrals with the Soviet bloc led the field, but could not control the action of the General Assembly. Analysis of the most significant roll calls in recent sessions of the General Assembly shows that there are two paramount issues in United Nations politics: the extension or containment of communism and the preservation or liquidation of colonialism. Because there are three sides to each issue under the United Nations system of voting and the alignment of forces is radically different in the test votes on communism and on colonialism, respectively, there are many possible combinations of factions among the eighty-two member states. Procommunists, anticommunists, and neutralists, procolonialists, anticolonialists, and again neutralists, can combine with and against one another in kaleidoscopic variations. American critics of U.N. politics have shown great impatience with the neutralists in the cold war between capitalism and communism; but when, as in the equally cold war between colonialism and anti-colonialism, the Americans have essayed the role of neutralists, the critics have been no less impatient with the nations which have tried to force a choice of sides on the Americans. The task of leadership, regarded from the viewpoint of politicians with experience in operating systems of responsible party government, seems excessively complicated and difficult. American leadership in United Nations politics is likely to be tested by its success in getting desired action, or at least in preventing objectionable action, in the General Assembly. The claim has been made that the American coalition of forces has never been defeated in an important test vote: this claim is not supported by evidence. In the cold war between colonialism and anticolonialism, the record of American leadership of the neutralists is negative. In the cold war between capitalism and communism combinations of factions large enough to produce the two-thirds majorities required for action on important questions can be formed for the containment of communism when the

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issue is clear, but not otherwise. W h e n the issue is less clear, as in the exclusion of representatives of mainland China from the General Assembly, it is increasingly difficult to hold together the bare majority needed to prevent action by the General Assembly on the merits of the question. It is in order to consider whether the organization of a permanent majority party is the proper aim of intelligent leadership in United Nations politics.

THE PARTY SYSTEM IN U.N. POLITICS

The record of international politics at recent sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations provides useful material for a study of the political methods most suitable for adjusting conflicting national interests in the general interest of all the nations. The spokesmen for the democratic powers naturally prefer the methods with which they are familiar in the conduct of public affairs in their respective home countries. This means a preference for some form of the party system. Politicians from the English-speaking countries generally prefer the two-party system. Politicians from the countries where the French model of parliamentary government has exerted a greater influence might prefer some form of the multiparty system. Either system implies habitual respect for the principle of majority rule. The rules of procedure in the General Assembly have accordingly been framed upon the assumption that this rule will be respected as far as the principles of the charter and the prescribed system of voting permit. Whether or not an expanded role for politics in the organization of peace calls for the introduction of the party system in one of its freely competitive forms into the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council is an important question, and one that cannot be answered without some preliminary inquiries. In the first place, how are the parties to be formed? An oftenquoted explanation of the formation of political parties is that

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offered by the talented French politician and historian Alexis de Tocqueville, in his widely read treatise Democracy in America. "All the skill of the actors in the political world," de Tocqueville wrote, "lies in the art of creating parties. A political aspirant in the United States begins by discerning his own interest, and discovering those other interests which may be collected around and amalgamated with it. He then contrives to find some doctrine or principle which may suit the purposes of this new association, and which he adopts in order to bring forward the new party and secure its popularity. . . . This being done, the new party is ushered into the political world." The classic illustration in American history of the formation of a political party by the method described by de Tocqueville was furnished in his own time by the founders of the Whig party: Clay, Webster, and Calhoun assembled the components of an effective opposition to the Jacksonian democracy by framing a program of policies calculated to bring together all the principal interests which found Jackson's vigorous measures not to their liking. But there is another way of forming a political party capable of managing public affairs in accordance with the principle of majority rule, which was impressively illustrated by Jacksonian democracy itself: that is the method of gathering around a magnetic personality a body of followers who esteem the gift of leadership above any program of policies. Actually, the Jacksonian democracy proved more successful at the polls than its Whig opponents. The most important fact, however, about the American party system, described by de Tocqueville, was that it was a two-party system. The original model of all two-party systems was developed in England, whose politicians showed the world three solid advantages to be derived from such a system when in good working order: it offers to a democratic-minded people a choice of candidates for the highest offices in the land which can satisfy them that they are playing a suitable part in the process of government;

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it enables an organized majority to carry into effect any legislative program upon which its leaders are able to agree; it puts a premium on temperate leadership and moderate measures and makes the way hard for extremists of all kinds, radical or reactionary. In short, it supplies an acceptable substitute for the right of revolution of which so much was heard in England in 1688 and in the United States in 1776. In the United States the existence of a comparatively rigid written constitution has tended to make the two-party system also more rigid than in Great Britain. In the first place, the method of filling the high office of president dominates the political scene in which the party system operates, making the whole governmental process more democratic than the framers of the constitution really intended it to be. Moreover, the separation of powers under the constitution results in a legislative process which works more smoothly when a majority party possesses a well-adjusted program of policies. Furthermore, the emphasis on temperate leadership and moderate measures favors the maintenance of a wholesome system of middle-class rule. This system originated when the people were mainly a nation of independent farmers, and has become even more wholesome now that the people are predominantly a nation of wage- and salary-workers and citydwellers. In short, the American form of the two-party system is a highly serviceable, though unplanned, political development which has been greatly influenced by the special circumstances of the American way of life and by the peculiar nature of the written constitution. T h e conditions for a useful form of two-party system clearly do not exist in the Organization established under the United Nations Charter. The peoples of the United Nations have nothing to do with the election of the principal officers of the Organization. The secretary-general is an office manager and universal "trouble-shooter," with unprecedented opportunities for greatness but with little temptation to seek personal popularity in the

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member states. The president of the General Assembly is a shining figure for the year of his incumbency and can exert a statesman-like influence in its proceedings, but is not in a position to make a strong appeal to the world at large. The president of the Security Council is but a temporary chairman of a body where the system of voting under the Yalta formula precludes the operation of any simple form of majority rule. The second important advantage derived from the two-party system in the countries where it operates smoothly is equally contingent upon conditions which do not exist in the United Nations. The major parties in the English-speaking countries operate as fairly efficient instruments for the adjustment of the conflicting interests of their principal components, the special interest groups and regional factions seeking to influence the management of public affairs, because control of the legislative powers under a democratic constitution enables the party leaders to give effect to their intraparty arrangements for a common program of policies. In the U.N. there are more than enough conflicting national interests to furnish ample materials for party programs, but under the charter, when narrowly construed, there is not enough legislative power to put such programs into effect. There is therefore no sufficient inducement for the leading member states to subordinate their special interests and private aims to the requirements of a common legislative program which can command the support of a majority of the members. Under such conditions the limitless opportunities for aggressive propaganda make a stronger appeal to the spokesmen of the major powers than does the barren field for legislative action. The third advantage of the two-party system is entirely irrelevant under the political conditions governing the operations of the United Nations. The members of the General Assembly and the Security Council constitute a congress of ambassadors, representing governments rather than peoples, and taking their instructions from the particular persons controlling those governments.

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They derive their class character from that of the government they represent, and there is nothing that can be done in international politics under the charter to change that situation. T h e representatives of most of the middle-class democracies, which exert an important influence in United Nations politics, doubtless do infuse a spirit of moderation and good temper into the proceedings on the bank of the East River in Manhattan. But this conciliatory influence is necessarily limited by the unequal progress of democracy in the world at large. T h e persistence of the cold war does not improve the prospects for the two-party system in United Nations politics. A state of cold war means the predominance of the private and special interests of the warring powers in their political planning over the more general interests which the Organization might be made to serve. T h e Soviet Union has been more interested in brightening the outlook for international communism than in reaching compromises with noncommunist countries which could form the basis of an effective majority party in the General Assembly. T h e United States has been more interested in "containing" communism than in creating a partisan basis for constructive action in the organs of the U . N . Under these conditions the Organization has to compete with other organizations which are primarily military in character, N A T O and the communist alliance under the Warsaw Pact, for example, for the active allegiance of the cold-warring powers. These considerations go far to explain the violent intervention of the Soviet Union in the Hungarian civil war. T h e triumph of the Hungarian revisionists

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Warsaw Pact; the disintegration of this organization threatened to defeat the purposes of the Soviet Union in waging the cold war. T h e Hungarian intervention prevented the Soviet Union from gaining new recruits for the Communist bloc in the United Nations. But this failure did not prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting its membership in the U . N . for its aggressive propa-

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ganda. At the same time it strengthened its defensive position in the event of a hot war, or so it must have seemed to the Kremlin leaders when they made their decision to intervene in Hungary. Thus the persistence of the cold war confirms the tendency to convert the United Nations into an instrument of aggressive propaganda, and the persistence of aggressive propaganda tends to postpone a peace in the cold war. It is a vicious circle which, it may be hoped, can be broken by sufficiently bold and energetic measures. These considerations go far to explain also the marked preference of recent American policy for reliance upon NATO and other military alliances rather than upon the United Nations for national security. It is questionable, however, whether this preference can be justified under the developing conditions for the conduct of a war to be fought with the most modern weapons. The use of intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads seems to doom the fixed air force bases, with which the United States through NATO and SEATO and its other alliances has encircled the Soviet Union, as surely as the development of air power during the interval between World War I and World War II doomed the battleship and the super-dreadnought. But whatever the ultimate verdict of the military experts may be upon the strategy underlying the policy embodied in NATO, there are other reasons for questioning the preference for military over political weapons in a period of cold war. These other reasons make the outlook for NATO, regarded as a principal agent of American defense policy, as uncertain as that for the Warsaw Pact. It is significant that the leading members of NATO make little use of that organization when they find occasion to resort to military measures as instruments of national policy. The British and French, when planning their Suez misadventure, not only neglected to consult their NATO allies before taking the action

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which provoked the Soviet Union to threaten the peace of the world, but even failed to give them advance notice of their bellicose intentions. The Americans and British, when determining upon their naval and air operations in Lebanon and Jordan, likewise neither consulted their NATO allies — who would have been involved in any hot war which might have ensued — nor gave them notice of their intentions. The negotiations for a restoration of peace, or perhaps it should be said for a resumption of the cold war of aggressive propaganda without violence, took place not between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers but between all the members of the United Nations at the seat of the Organization in New York. It was a great triumph of the U.N. over NATO and other regional military organizations. There are good reasons for such a triumph. The emerging role of politics in international affairs is necessarily hostile to the use of military force as an instrument of national policy. The classical theory of war, expounded by Clausewitz and other influential writers, is no longer applicable to wars between nations armed with the most modern weapons. It is doubtful whether any war, even one beginning as a war for limited objectives, can be confined to limits compatible with the true interests of the modern superpowers. Wars between weak countries, armed only with old-fashioned weapons of limited potency, might still be waged with some prospect of profit to the victor if they could be prevented from spreading and involving the superpowers also. But how can their spread be prevented? The answers to this question are painfully unconvincing. The actions of the superpowers when confronted with a serious threat of a major war in taking their problems to the United Nations, regardless of the existence of NATO and other military alliances, speak for themselves. It is not a predilection for theoretical pacifism which blights the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is the actual conditions under which international politics, bellicose or pacific, must be

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practiced that compel resort to the facilities of the United Nations by the powers which possess greater military strength than they dare to use. In default of permanently satisfactory alternatives to political action under the auspices of the United Nations the leading powers are forced to reconsider the case for the organization of political parties in the U.N. General Assembly. Under the existing circumstances this means an attempt to exploit the opportunities for a multiparty system. The foundations of such a system already exist. The communist bloc is well organized. The N A T O powers have no formal organization in the General Assembly but in practice have been able to work together more consistently than any other group except the communists. The outlook for more limited regional parties is perhaps more attractive. The growing efforts toward a European union, at least in the form of an association of the leading democratic powers in western Europe, might easily produce a working agreement in the United Nations General Assembly between the members of "Little Europe," already working together in the Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and Euratom. Similar opportunities for the development of regional parties present themselves to the Latin Americans and to various groups of Bandung neutrals. The weaknesses of a multiparty system, regarded as the framework for the operation of an energetic system of government, have been made familiar by the tragic experience of the Fourth French Republic. But such a system is better suited to the United Nations as now constituted, with its emphasis on cold-war propaganda and its lack of opportunity for the formation of major parties of the type described by de Tocqueville. Indeed, no better party system can be expected in the existing state of international politics. The preoccupation of the superpowers with the cold war compels concentration in the organs of the United Nations on the opportunities for aggressive propaganda. The

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coldly militant atmosphere of the Security Council and the General Assembly tends to frustrate the halfhearted attempts to utilize the limited legislative powers of the Organization for the general welfare of all the member nations. A multiparty system, however, operating under conditions for which it is suited, offers some solid advantages. Minor parties are more easily organized than major parties and, because the conflicts of interest within a minor party are less sharp, are likely to possess greater solidarity. They can form combinations with one another in search of legislative majorities for temporary objectives without compromising their basic principles and can resume their freedom of action readily enough when their temporary objectives have been gained. They form a more faithful mirror of opinion among the body of peoples they represent, and are less likely than the more artificial major parties to suffer sudden and wide fluctuations of popularity in consequence of changing conditions which may be beyond control by political action. They make for greater stability in a representative body and, if the executive is not too dependent on their continuing support, the price that must be paid for such a party system in terms of governmental energy and zeal for action in the public interest may not be too high. T h e conditions that are most favorable to the serviceability of a multiparty system are associated with the United Nations as it has operated heretofore under the charter. T h e secretarygeneral enjoys a substantial degree of independence during the earlier part of his term and, unless excessively eager to hold his office for more than one term, may maintain his independence until the end. T h e limited legislative authority of the Organization reduces to a minimum the need for highly organized major parties as permanent instruments of legislative policy. T h e paramount function of the General Assembly — the framing of appeals to public opinion with a view to mobilizing the moral forces of mankind — can be performed more effectively under a multi-

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party than under a two-party system. In short, the multiparty system is well suited to the requirements of international politics in a period of cold war. It is likely, if given a fair trial, to operate more or less satisfactorily as long as favorable operating conditions continue to exist. The multiparty system, as it might operate in the United Nations, offers the further advantage that it could provide an opportunity for the gradual development of an administration party. It must not be supposed, however, that such a party would come into existence by the process of gathering a band of personal followers about a strong personality in some administrative office. In the United Nations the only personality about whom a party could be formed is the secretary-general; but in the present state of world politics he would have to be an extraordinarily strong personality. The conflicting interests are too numerous and complex, the leading contenders for control of the Organization are too deeply interested and too powerful, to permit any person who might ordinarily be elected to the office of secretarygeneral to make it the instrument of effective party leadership in international affairs. Trygve Lie possessed the necessary insight into the nature of politics at the international level and the necessary ambition, but adverse circumstances were too much for him. Dag Hammarskjöld also possesses the necessary insight, is more politic by nature, and is working under increasingly favorable circumstances; but the organization of an effective administration party, even if the secretary-general were to deem it desirable, seems still to be impracticable. It is unlikely that so politic a leader would deem it desirable under the existing type of charter. T h e Jacksonian method of party organization may be dismissed as presently outside the field of practical international politics. An administration party could come into existence by the method described by de Tocqueville if some enterprising member state, perhaps an independent neutral, would take the lead in

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insisting that the universal interests of mankind must take precedence over the national interests of particular member states. Such a party would aim at stopping the cold war by improving the opportunities for the practice of pacific politics in the Security Council and the General Assembly. It would bring to bear the moderating influence of even-tempered politicians upon the more emotional operations of aggressive propagandists. It would support moderate measures of all kinds in preference to the extreme proposals of intensely nationalistic politicians. It would encourage resort to the services of the secretary-general as the instrument of the general purposes set forth in the charter and would employ him for pacific missions on all suitable occasions. In short, an administration party under the multiparty system could be one of the most promising means of maintaining the principles of the charter and enhancing the prestige of the organization in the practice of international politics. Long before such a party could command the systematic support of a majority of the member states it might gain control of the balance of power among the principal contending factions and utilize its strategic position in international politics to strengthen the influence of all genuinely peace-loving nations. The conclusion is irresistible that the United Nations Charter, as interpreted up to now, is more suitable to cold-warlike politics than to the adjustment of conflicting national interests in the universal interest of mankind. The International Court of Justice is capable of adjudicating minor conflicts not involving the vital interests of nations, or what tradition calls the national honor. But the adjustment of the kinds of conflicts that used to cause sovereign nations to resort to war as an instrument of national policy is beyond its powers. War, however, regarded as an instrument of policy for nations possessing the most modern weapons, has become "unthinkable," as President Eisenhower rightly declared. It is clearly necessary, therefore, to consider how the Security Council and the General Assembly may become

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the stages for more fruitful international politics conducted in accordance with the purposes of the charter by politicians who are free to act in pursuance of universal rather than merely national interests. These observations lead directly to recognition that there are some general principles of international politics. One is that the role of politics in international affairs is dependent on the form of international organization. Another is that such a political system as that embodied in the present United Nations not only presents the superpowers with an unrivaled opportunity to wage cold war but tends to compel them to do so. It is unlikely, therefore, that the cold war can be ended except by arrangements for endowing the Organization with greater practical capacity for managing international affairs in the general interest of all its members. The form of the Organization must become more favorable to an expanded role of politics in international affairs. Already the role of politics in the organization of peace is greater than is commonly realized. The United Nations has virtually succeeded in substituting cold war for the kind of war the nations once proposed to renounce under the Kellogg Pact. If the Organization were strengthened, as it might easily be by appropriate changes in the interpretation of the charter or in the charter itself, would it be capable of ending the cold war by substituting for cold-war politics the more rational politics of genuine peace? More specifically, can the United Nations substitute the politics of peace for cold-war politics by introducing into the organization a suitable form of the party system? T o answer these questions it is necessary to investigate further the structure and powers of the Organization.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING PROCESS

The beginning of a practical solution of the problem of expanding the role of politics in the organization of peace lies in

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the improvement of the international lawmaking process. There has been a great deal of international lawmaking in recent years, but the process has been dominated by traditional habits of political thought. It has consequently been excessively slow, laborious, and uncertain. The adaptation of traditional rules to the changing circumstances of the coming age has been excessively difficult. The growing conflict between tradition and reason has not been readily enough resolved in favor of reason. T h e nature of the difficulties is well illustrated by the proceedings of the International Law Commission, established by the United Nations to codify the existing body of law. The need for codification was clear. T h e law had grown up haphazardly in response to the troublesome lack of uniformity in the practices of the nations in their dealings with one another, and to the imperative demand for rational standards of international behavior which could protect the better practices against subversion by the worse. It could be found only by searching the records of diplomacy, the writings of scholars, the opinions of members of arbitral tribunals and of judges of courts of various jurisdictions, the agreements between heads of states, and the formal treaties in which leading states sought to put their relations with one another on a more rational basis. T h e precedents were often conflicting and there was no convenient way of reconciling them. Treaties were binding only on those states which had agreed to them, and no state could be forced to treat except by war or the threat of war. As long as resort to war as an instrument of national policy was the acknowledged right of every sovereign state the strong could find ways of accommodating themselves to the defects of the international lawmaking process. The weak might hope to save themselves from the perils of their situation by their wits, if not by their arms. Inter arma silent leges were the last words of the international lawyer. T h e International Law Commission began its work in 1949. After ten years of preparatory studies it had covered four of the

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fourteen sections of international law originally chosen as suitable for codification. A United Nations conference held at Geneva, February to April, 1958, and attended by representatives of eightysix nations used the commission's draft articles on one of these four sections, the law of the sea, as the basis for four conventions respectively on the high seas, on territorial waters and contiguous zones, on fishing and the conservation of the living resources of the high seas, and on the continental shelf. These conventions would become effective when ratified by a prescribed number of states and would be binding on those states which had ratified them. That would be the end of this particular phase of the lawmaking process relating to the law of the sea. But the ratification of these conventions will not be the end of the effort to make a satisfactory set of laws regulating the use of the seas in the nuclear age. The four conventions were written by specialists in international law and experts in the use of the seas and were necessarily restricted to matters concerning which these persons were competent to treat. They could reach agreements on technical matters, which were not the subjects of serious disputes between different states; but controversial matters, which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace, were beyond their powers to settle. Thus they could make no contribution to the settlement of the serious dispute between Iceland and the other states claiming an interest in the Icelandic offshore fisheries concerning the extent of the waters in which the people of Iceland have an exclusive right to fish. Agreements concerning the law applicable to situations constituting a threat to international peace can be made only by persons competent to speak for the policy-determining agencies of the nations concerned with the situation. The technical expert and specialist in jurisprudence must give way to the political lawmaker and specialist in politics. A better lawmaking process must be found

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than that available to the United Nations International Law Commission. This commission, or conferences assembled to deliberate upon the commission's legislative drafts, can of course refer a project of law to the United Nations General Assembly instead of submitting it for ratification to the states of the world. This is the proper procedure in cases where the project deals with topics of a highly controversial nature. The General Assembly can then recommend suitable measures to the members of the United Nations. If two-thirds of the General Assembly can agree upon an acceptable convention, the convention becomes binding upon those member states which have adopted it. It is conceivable that the International Court of Justice, acting in cases duly brought before it, might extend the application of such conventions to states which had not ratified them. Thus general rules of law might eventually come into existence by this roundabout lawmaking process. But obviously it would be slow, laborious, and uncertain. Much international law is now being made by the specialized agencies belonging to the United Nations family. This branch of the international lawmaking process in its simplest form produces bylaws or administrative regulations applicable to the internal operations of the agencies. It concerns the employees of the agencies but not as a general rule the public at large. It may even take the more complex form of establishing standards for the guidance of international officials engaged in activities involving the exercise of wide discretionary authority of a technical nature. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency has power to require the operators of approved nuclear power projects to observe health and safety measures prescribed by the agency. This grant of power to the agency could result in the production of an important body of administrative law designed to protect the public health and safety against radiation hazards

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and other dangers arising from the operation of nuclear power plants. This kind of international lawmaking is becoming ever more important in this increasingly technical age, but it does not ordinarily involve legislative action in situations which constitute threats to the peace. The process of international administrative lawmaking has been further developed by specialized agencies charged with the responsibility for developing higher standards of practice in technical situations of a more controversial character. For example, the International Labor Organization has long been actively engaged in drafting conventions for the better regulation of terms of employment and working conditions in factories and other industrial establishments. These conventions have become effective only in countries whose governments have ratified them, and have been studiously ignored in countries like the United States, which prefer their own methods and standards of labor legislation. T o the extent that they are ratified they enter into the general body of international law, and in fact a substantial body of law of this kind is now in existence. But again the process is slow, laborious, and uncertain. All these processes of international lawmaking are further complicated by the problem of amendments. Ordinarily amendments must be made by the same process as the original law itself and in those cases where ratification is necessary for effectiveness are binding only upon those states ratifying them. This leads to greater uncertainty concerning the actual law effective in different states. The framers of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency were mindful of this difficulty and accordingly provided that duly ratified amendments should apply to all the states which belong to the agency, including those which do not ratify, but a state which finds an amendment unacceptable is permitted to withdraw from membership. This in effect gives a veto over proposed amendments to the statute to states which, like the United States, are indispensable if the

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agency is to serve its purpose with success. This privileged position may be justified in this particular instance because the United States furnishes the bulk of the nuclear fuels for use by the agency. In general the problem of a suitable amending process cannot be solved so easily. The outstanding example of international lawmaking in modern times is of course the multilateral treaty establishing the United Nations Organization. Other important recent instances of international lawmaking are the treaties establishing the various specialized agencies which, together with the United Nations Organization, constitute the United Nations family. The latest treaty of this kind is that establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the subject of Professor Stoessinger's excellent case study in international lawmaking. 1 In each case every effort was made by the promoters of the legislation to obtain for their project the free and full consent of the participating states. How uncertain such projects may be is attested by the failure of some of them, notably the treaty establishing the International Trade Organization, to obtain the ratifications necessary for putting them into effect. All these important treaties were made by a similar process. One or more interested nations took the lead in developing the demand for legislation. Preliminary studies were made, consultations were held, and a tentative plan for a legislative project was prepared. A general conference followed at which agreement was obtained upon the details of the project and a draft of the proposed legislation was completed and signed. Thereafter ratifications of the treaty by the requisite number of signatory states were procured and the treaty was duly promulgated and put into effect. The process is patently slow and laborious. In the case of the treaty establishing the United Nations Organization 1. This chapter and the Stoessinger study were both published originally in Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age, ed. Arthur N . Holcombe, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Eleventh Report (New York: New York University Press, 1959).

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the formal proceedings extended over a period of more than four years, beginning with the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill in August, 1941, in Argentia Bay and ending with the ratification of the charter by the government of the Soviet Union on October 24, 1945, and the deposit of the necessary papers with the government of the United States. T h e proceedings culminating in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency followed a similar course, took almost as long, and were hardly less laborious. In general the proceedings resulting in the establishment of the specialized agencies, though quicker and easier, required extensive preparations by the initiators of the legislation and elaborate efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion. T h e most constructive legislative process at the present time for making international law is that for amending the United Nations Charter. By this process legislation may be enacted which will be binding upon all members of the Organization, regardless of the opposition of a minority of the members. Amendments may be proposed by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and become effective when ratified by twothirds of the member states, including all five members with permanent seats in the Security Council. Nothing is said in the charter about a right of secession, though a right of expulsion is explicitly provided, but presumably a right of secession is implied. Apparently any project of law whatever, provided only that it is in harmony with the purposes of the United Nations, may be adopted in the manner in which the charter may be amended and will be binding on all member states unless they should secede. This is a legislative process with interesting possibilities. The possibility of utilizing such a legislative process under the United Nations Charter as a means of making laws in the interest of the whole family of nations opens a ready prospect of enlarging the role of politicians in the organization of peace. For the lawmaking process at any level of political organization» next

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to the electoral process, offers the politician the most attractive opportunities for performing an essential function in the management of public affairs. Without the possibility of lawmaking in matters of importance the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council will continue to be suitable theaters of operations for diplomats and propagandists, but will offer little scope for the talents of the men who shine brightest in the legislative halls of so-called sovereign states. W i t h such a possibility the principal organs of the United Nations are capable of attracting the ablest men in national politics from all parts of the world. The chief special limitation upon the activities of the most skillful lawmakers is the necessity of obtaining the consent of the spokesmen for all five of the members with permanent seats in the Security Council. The voting formula in the Security Council excludes from the lawmaking process the partisan legislative practices associated with the two-party system in the English-speaking countries; therefore international lawmaking by a process similar to that of amending the United Nations Charter must be based upon the method of consensus among the five major powers. It is widely believed that this method is impracticable on account of the ideological differences between the communist and the noncommunist states. The method doubtless is impracticable during the continuance of the cold war. It becomes practicable only by agreement between the principal communist and noncommunist powers that the cold war should be ended. Such an agreement is no less conceivable in the nuclear age than an agreement to end a hot war in the age that is passing away. In view of the nature and predictable effects of a war between great powers armed with nuclear weapons, and of the near certainty that a cold war cannot go on indefinitely without turning into a hot war, such an agreement is not only possible but also more likely than the irrational and suicidal alternative. The outlook for international lawmaking by the method of consensus among

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the nuclear powers, if they can keep the technically less advanced and politically less responsible states from forcing war upon them, is good. There is no inherent incompatibility between legislation by the method of consensus and a greater role for politics in the United Nations. Lawmaking at Washington by the method of consensus is not unusual and in fact is more customary than is commonly supposed: inspection of the roll calls upon controversial measures in both the senate and the house of representatives shows that a substantial portion of such measures are adopted with the support of a majority of the members of both major parties. Votes in which a large majority of one party is recorded on one side and a corresponding majority of the other party on the other are by no means the normal form of the legislative process in national politics. Dissent from the projects of the majority party by a substantial portion of its own members and assent by a substantial portion of the members of the minority party are also frequent phenomena in the national legislative process. The large number of measures of a less controversial character which are adopted by unanimous consent in the congress further attests the normality of legislation by consensus under the American two-party system. There is no rational ground for fearing that international lawmaking by a similar process cannot develop in the United Nations, provided that there is agreement between the nuclear powers that the cold war should be ended before it turns into a hot war. A special obstacle to the use of the method of consensus by the nuclear powers as the normal international lawmaking process is the requirement of ratification by two-thirds of the members. This requirement constitutes a standing invitation to aggressive propaganda instead of rational politics in the General Assembly. A definitive condition of peace in the nuclear age is an expanded role for politics in the operation of the United Nations, and it is therefore manifestly necessary to exploit the

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opportunities for international lawmaking in the Organization by methods that do not require an appeal to the members for their express approval of each project of law after its adoption by the appropriate United Nations organ. In fact much important legislation is possible under the charter as it stands, provided the necessary and proper development of the implied powers of the Organization is not hampered by excessively narrow and strict interpretations of the text. It is of course true that little lawmaking power is explicitly conferred upon the United Nations. But there are numerous provisions of the charter, happily phrased by inspired draftsmen, which justify the belief that the charter is in general a document well suited to the needs of a fast-changing world and fully capable of serving the purposes of its framers for years to come. Consider, for example, the logical basis in the charter for the three constructive functional developments recommended by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace in its Tenth Report, Strengthening the United Nations. One was the establishment of a permanent United Nations force to assist the secretary-general in executing decisions of the Security Council (or General Assembly recommendations) respecting situations constituting threats to the peace. A second was the assertion of United Nations jurisdiction over such open territory as outer space, the Antarctic continent, and the high seas, for the purpose of adopting timely measures in the interest of mankind to prevent dangerous disputes between rival claimants for special privileges in such areas. The third was the creation of a United Nations development agency to direct capital investments into underdeveloped countries on conditions compatible with the general interests of mankind. None of these measures is expressly authorized by the United Nations Charter. There has been considerable discussion of the constitutional basis for the first of these measures since the establishment of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Suez area in 1956 and the

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U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon in 1958. Despite persistent objections from important quarters in the first of these instances, there can be no doubt of the constitutionality of the actions in the two instances by the General Assembly and the Security Council, respectively. In the first place, there is a general grant of authority by Articles 97 and 1 0 1 for the provision of such staff as the Organization may require and for its appointment by the secretary-general under regulations established by the General Assembly. Secondly, there is a special grant of authority by Articles 22 and 29 to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, respectively, for establishing such subsidiary organs as may be deemed necessary for the performance of their functions. T h e Emergency Force and the Observation Group are such subsidiary organs, and their commanding officers are a part of the staff of the Secretariat. Similar reasoning leads to a similar conclusion respecting the establishment of suitable organs for administering, or supervising the development of, such open territories as Antarctica and outer space, and for channeling capital funds into underdeveloped countries. Moreover, there is also Article 17, which authorizes the General Assembly to consider and approve the budget of the Organization. The Organization's spending power is legally limited by its purposes, as set forth in the charter, and is limited in fact by the reluctance of its members to contribute money for these purposes. Nevertheless, the secretary-general can certainly provide in his budget for whatever he may consider to be necessary and proper expenses and will presumably include the amounts required for carrying into effect the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The extent of the power of decision-making under Chapters V I and V I I of the charter is not altogether clear, but doubtless is broad enough to justify the expenditure of much greater sums of money than the Organization has been able to raise up to now in aid of underdeveloped countries and in pursu-

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ance of plans to deal with threatening situations upon conditions to be specified in the appropriation acts. Such acts will have the force of laws, and the conditions they impose upon the beneficiaries of such aid and plans will form an important addition to the general body of international law. Here there is a lawmaking power of indefinite inherent potentialities. There is another provision of the charter to which little attention has been hitherto directed which may further broaden the basis of the Organization's legislative capacity. This is the provision in Article 40 authorizing the Security Council, in order to prevent the aggravation of a situation involving a threat to the peace, to call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as may be deemed necessary or desirable. The precise meaning of the expression "to call upon" is uncertain; but it doubtless means more than merely to recommend, because it is further provided that the Security Council will duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures. Whether a situation involves a threat to the peace and how long provisional measures may be kept in effect are matters left to the sound discretion of the Security Council. What is needed to make this provision of the charter a significant factor in the international lawmaking process is not an additional grant of legislative power but such improvements in the representative character of the Security Council and in its methods of transacting business as will enable it to command greater confidence on the part of the members of the Organization. It is interesting to speculate on the future of international lawmaking by special international conferences subject to ratification as in the case of a multilateral international treaty. In this connection the history of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency carries an important lesson. In this particular case the United Nations General Assembly, by its criticisms of the proceedings instituted by the original proponents of

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the statute, forced the nuclear powers to expand the scope of their preparatory conference, thereby converting it into a general international conference closely resembling in membership the General Assembly itself. If the founding powers had invited the Communist government of China to take part in the conference, thereby making possible the extension of the statute and of the system of inspection contemplated under the statute to Communist China, a separate procedure might have been justified. Because no such inclusion was intended of a power whose concurrence in a system of international inspection to prevent the diversion of nuclear fuels to military uses would seem to be indispensable for the success of such a system, the elaborate effort to make the International Atomic Energy Agency as independent of the United Nations as earlier specialized agencies seems ill-advised. Happily it was not wholly successful. In general it is clear that future international statutes of universal interest and comparable importance may better be enacted by a process wholly within the framework of the United Nations. Should there be objection to giving to the United Nations, which is not yet a universal organization, a practical monopoly of the international lawmaking process, the answer is clear. The membership of the Organization should become universal as quickly as possible. It may be conceded that, while the cold war rages, the admission of representatives of Communist China to the General Assembly and the Security Council and the admission of Germany to the Organization itself will be difficult to bring about. But the primary purpose of giving the United Nations a practical monopoly of the international lawmaking process is to help bring the cold war to an end. Doubtless important provisions of a peace agreement capable of ending the cold war are the recognition of the government of China at Peking by all the nuclear powers and the adoption of some suitable arrangement for dealing with the division of Germany. It seems unlikely that these indispensable measures will be

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adopted until there is a determination among the nuclear powers to end the cold war. W h e n there is more general understanding that the nuclear powers are unlikely to survive long in the nuclear age without such a determination, the desirable improvement of the international lawmaking process and the concomitant expansion of the role of politics in the organization of peace will be matters of no insuperable difficulty.

THE SOLUBLE

PROBLEM

OF THE SECURITY

COUNCIL

The framers of the charter conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. T o this end they expressly provided that this Council should be responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. These plans were to be submitted to the members of the United Nations presumably for their approval, but, if not approved by all of them, they could be made effective for all by means of a charter amendment: that is, with the approval of two-thirds of them, including the five powers with permanent seats in the Council. The intention was clearly to make the Security Council a principal factor in the management of a more peaceful world. This intention has manifestly not yet been achieved. An important reason for the failure of the Security Council to fulfill the expectations of the framers is disclosed in the correspondence between Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower concerning the control of nuclear weapons tests. Writing to the President on May 11, 1958, the Premier included the following reflections with reference to the Security Council: I must dwell upon yet another question on which we should like to have everything cleared up between us. Of late the U.S.A. has been reproaching the U.S.S.R. for not agreeing to the United States proposal to establish an inspection zone in the Arctic area,

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although the majority of the Security Council had voted for that proposal. I must tell you frankly that the method used by the U.S.A. in the Security Council during the examination of the question tabled by the U.S.S.R. about the need to end the flights of United States nuclear-bomb-loaded planes in the direction of the Soviet frontier, in our opinion, does not testify to a serious desire to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable basis, but testifies to attempts to pressure the U.S.S.R. by using the majority in the Security Council. It is common knowledge that the majority in the Security Council is composed of the votes of countries dependent, in one way or another, primarily economically, on the U.S.A. Thus, the Security Council in its present composition can not be regarded as an impartial arbiter, and that is why it has of late ceased to play the important role in the maintenance of international peace and security which devolved upon it by virtue of the United Nations Charter. This communication was treated by the United States government as a dialectical skirmish in the cold war and disposed of accordingly without any attempt to discuss Khrushchev's question on its merits. Such treatment was doubtless an admissible procedure in a cold war, but if the cold war is to be ended the Security Council must be rehabilitated. This will call for an inquiry into the reasons for the Council's failure and some consideration of measures for improving its representative character and restoring its lost prestige. T h e basis of the premier's complaint about the composition of the Security Council appears clearly in the record of Council elections. At the time when he wrote his letter there was no member of the Security Council upon whom he could count for support of the Soviet Union. At the Thirteenth General Assembly in the autumn of the same year the changes made by the fresh elections of Security Council members, as has already been pointed out, were favorable to American interests. T h e subordination of the Soviet Union to the United States in the Security Council has never appeared more complete than in 1959· This is a satisfactory position for the United States as long as the principal function of the Security Council continues to be

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the production of cold-war propaganda; but if it is to function according to the design of the framers it is necessary that its composition be satisfactory to all five of the major powers. This can be achieved only by improving its representative character. It is not enough for the United States to procure the election of as many as possible of its military allies and political friends. The Security Council does not operate by the method of majority rule and cannot be used effectively by a majority party for its private purposes. The scheme of representation in the Security Council devised by the framers of the charter seemed at the time both realistic and reasonable. The strongest powers would have permanent seats, and the other members of the United Nations were to be represented with due regard primarily to their contributions to the maintenance of peace and to the other purposes of the Organization, but also with some consideration for equitable geographical distribution. The record shows that every one of the seventeen members whose financial contributions amount to at least one percent of the Organization's budget — a rough but convenient measure of contributions to the purposes of the Organization — if not provided with a permanent seat has been elected at least once to the Security Council. Most of the members in this group without permanent seats have been elected more than once. Of the thirty-four members who contribute less than one percent each, but not less than one-tenth of one percent, fifteen have been elected to the Security Council at least once; and of the thirty members who contribute less than one-tenth of one percent, five have been elected. In 1959 no less than nine members of the Security Council belonged to the group of largest contributors and two members belonged to the group of smallest contributors. It is evident that much attention has been paid to the first requirement for membership in the Security Council. The major powers with permanent seats contribute altogether 67.59 percent

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of the Organization's ordinary income under the current budget and the eleven other member states, whose separate contributions amount to at least one percent of the total, contribute collectively an additional nineteen percent. (For purposes of this calculation the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics are included with the Soviet Union.) The thirtythree members who fall into the second group of states, measured by the scale of financial contributions, collectively account for only 11.92 percent of the total and the thirty members in the third group account for no more than 1.49 percent of the total. These ordinary and small states together, though possessing more than three-fourths of the votes in the General Assembly, do not seem hitherto to have taken for themselves an undue portion of the seats in the Security Council. There has been in the Security Council elections a striking show of respect for the major contributors. The consideration shown for the claims of equitable geographical distribution has been less manifest. Including both members with permanent seats and elected members, the geographical distribution of the seats in the Security Council in 1959 appears in Table 1. TABLE 1. Geographical Representation in Security Council, 1959"

Region 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. •6. 7.

Northern America Middle and South America Western Europe Eastern Europe Asia Africa Australasia

Number of states

Contributions, Percent

2 20 13 13 22 9 2

35.62 4.89 22.61 20.46 12.87 1-34 2.21

2 2 3 1 2 1 0

i7

100.00

11

Seats

* The African state of Guinea, admitted in December, 1958, is not included in this and the following tables.

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The Soviet Union has charged that eastern Europe is underrepresented; India, which in fourteen years has been elected for only a single term and then as a representative of the British Commonwealth rather than of Asia, would like better Asian representation; and from various quarters have come complaints that there are not enough elective seats to go around comfortably. There seems to be a strong case for a larger number of elective seats to satisfy the requirement of an equitable geographical distribution. The truth is, however, that geographical distribution is not the important issue. The Soviet government wants more representation for eastern Europe because it wants more representation for the communist bloc, India wants more representation for the Bandung neutrals, and all the score and more of recently admitted states want more representation for the newcomers. The General Assembly has always recognized the importance of political factors by giving one of the elective seats to the British Commonwealth regardless of the geographical distribution of its membership. If the Security Council is to regain theconfidence of the United Nations, it will be necessary to paymore attention to political considerations, even at the cost of geographical distribution. The problem is difficult of solution because of the complexity of world politics. The distribution of Security Council seats among the military alliances and political groups existing in 1959 is shown in Table 2. If the United Nations were a sovereign state, governed according to the principle of majority rule, the American group would constitute the majority party and the opposition groups would have to get together in order to make a realistic struggle for power. But the United Nations is not a sovereign state and its affairs are not administered according to any system of majority rule. The existing alliances, blocs, and groups reflect only one of the possible patterns of political alignment. Further

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T A B L E 2. Political Representation in Security Council, 1959

Political group 1. American group American members of NATO European members of NATO S E A T O and other Asian allies Latin-American members of O A S

Number of states

Contributions, Percent

Seats

2

35.62

2

12

20.95

3

7

10.40

2

20

4.89

2

Total

41

71.86

9

2. Russian group (Warsaw Pact) 3. Bandung neutrals 4. Independent neutrals

9 23 8

19.09 4-73 4.32

1 1 0

81

100.00

11

Grand total

analysis of the political scene is necessary to determine the kind of representation that is needed in the Security Council if politics is to supplant propaganda in its proceedings. A basic fact in estimating the success of an experiment in international organization like the United Nations is the kind of political education possessed by the representatives of the member states in the General Assembly and the Security Council. T h e performance of a political body is not likely to be better than the quality of the material of which it is composed. T h e political education of a delegate from, say, Iceland, with generations of experience in local self-government behind him, is radically different from that of a spokesman from the Imamate of Yemen, where the political traditions have come down through centuries of an utterly different kind of experience in the management of public affairs. Because the General Assembly and :Security Council are not only diplomatic gatherings but also representative bodies, training in representative institutions at

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the national level should be a valuable asset for public men engaged in the business of the United Nations. If the expansion of the role of politics in the organization of peace is to serve the interests of mankind, the influence of democratic politicians in the proceedings of the U.N. should be strong and, if possible, preponderant. Democracy is a word with different meanings in different parts of the world. The ancient Greeks, who invented the word, cannot be acquitted of the charge of imprecision in its use. Aristotle, who used words more carefully than most classical writers, seems to have meant by it something more closely resembling a modern dictatorship of the proletariat than what Western peoples understand by democracy today. He distinguished between democracy and what the modern West would call a democratic constitutional government. Before saying more about the influence of democracy in contemporary world politics I will explain what I mean by the word. By democracy I mean more than merely a form of government based on universal suffrage and a system of majority rule. I mean a kind of state in which there is a general respect for basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. In such a state governments will derive their just powers from the consent of the governed and will maintain political processes by means of which the men at the head of public affairs can be changed, when the people wish a change, without resort to force and violence. In modern times this means some form of party government, in which party leaders operate under a system of free enterprise for politicians and those in power can trust their opponents to succeed them in office, when duly elected, without jeopardizing their own right to take the places of their opponents at a future election. The foundations of such a democracy are informed self-reliance on the part of the people and sturdy good faith on the part of their leaders. It is not easy to draw the line between mature democracies,

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where the foundations are well laid, and emergent democracies, which offer less assurance that democratic processes of government will be maintained through periods of extraordinary political stress and strain. In general there cannot be the same confidence in the durability of democratic institutions in a state which has been trying to act like a democracy for the first time since the second world war as in one with longer experience in operating democratic institutions. To qualify a state as a mature democracy there should be convincing evidence that the party in power will conduct honest elections and, if defeated at the polls, will yield control of the government to its political opponents without a violent struggle. Besides the new and comparatively untried democracies, other states which must be included among the emergent democracies are those with constitutionally elected governments actually in office, but also with traditions of political instability and recurrent violence in the selection of their rulers. In the emergent democracies competitive party systems exist but have not demonstrated that they are firmly established. Some of them will eventually qualify as mature democracies; others will slip back into the ranks of the party or personal dictatorships; still others may remain emergent democracies for many years. The so-called free world is not a world in which mature democracy is the only kind of state. There is another class of self-styled democracies, in which a political party dominates the government of the state but tolerates no rival and allows no change in the party system without resort to force and violence. Such a monopolistic party system possesses some, but not all, of the advantages of a true democracy. There might conceivably be a form of democracy within the dominant party, and if the party were open to all who might properly wish to join it the system could evolve into a true democracy. But in practice these monopolistic party systems are dictatorships; in the communist states they are class dictatorships.

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They may even verge on some form of military dictatorship. They cannot qualify even as emergent democracies; but they may possess a latent capacity, if they can keep out of war and thereby escape the most serious stresses and strains on democratic institutions, to evolve into one of the freer kinds of state. Besides the various forms of party government among member states of the United Nations there are two forms of personal rule. One is military dictatorship, where changes in the control of the government are accomplished by fighting, and the other is hereditary monarchy. The former is apt to be more energetic and efficient but also more violent and oppressive. The fighting which accompanies changes of government is always a threat and sometimes ruinous to the prosperity of the country. Hereditary succession offers the hope of peaceful change in the control of the government but less promise of sustained political capacity at the head of affairs. Hereditary monarchy is not incompatible with the actual control of affairs by a military dictator or by some form of party government, in which case it ceases to be a form of personal rule. The spokesmen for personal rulers may function as effectively as representatives of other kinds of government in a strictly diplomatic assembly; but in the organs of the United Nations in the nuclear age, if there should be an expanded role for peace-loving politicians, they are not likely to feel equally at home. The present distribution of these various forms of government among the members of the United Nations, together with their contributions to the budget and their representation in the Security Council, are shown in Table 3. The leadership of the democracies in the United Nations, when measured by contributions to the purposes of the Organization, is apparent, but their control of the organs of the U.N. is less certain. The existing governments in too many of the emergent democracies are excessively unstable. If a larger role

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for politics in the organization of peace is to mean a larger role for democratic politicians, the right solution must be found for the problem of representation in the Security Council. T A B L E 3. Representation of Principal Kinds of States in Security Council, 1959

Kind of state 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Mature democracies Emergent democracies Party dictatorships Military dictatorships Hereditary monarchies

Number of states

Contributions, Percent

Seats

19 14 11 25 12

61.36 9.78 23-45 4-47 •94

5 3 2 1 0

81

100.00

11

The road to the improvement of the representative character of the Security Council may be further explored by viewing the distribution of the different kinds of states, classified by their forms of government, among the different classes of states as measured by their financial contributions to the Organization (see Table 4). T A B L E 4. Politico-Scientific Classification of U . N . Member States, 1959

Kind of state 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Mature democracies Emergent democracies Party dictatorships Military dictatorships Hereditary monarchies

Major and middle powers

Minor powers and ordinary states

Small states

9 4 4 0 0

8 6 6 11 3

2 4 1 14 9

17

34

30

T h e mature democracies are strongest among the major and middle powers: that is, the states whose respective contributions

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to the revenues of the Organization amount to one percent or more of its ordinary income. They are weakest among the small states which contribute less than one-tenth of one percent each to the Organization. T h e military dictatorships and hereditary monarchies are not represented among the major and middle powers and are most strongly represented among the small states. The significance of these facts is evident. An obvious way to expand the role of democratic politics in the organization of peace is to strengthen the influence in the Security Council of the larger contributors to the purposes of the Organization. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace has already recommended in its aforementioned Tenth Report that the Security Council be enlarged by the addition of a number of seats to be determined by the Security Council and the General Assembly. This would require an amendment to the charter, but not necessarily a charter-review conference in order to prepare the amendment. The enlargement of the Security Council can readily be accomplished by the ordinary process of charter amendment. T h e General Assembly was actually planning to add two seats to the Security Council by an amendment under consideration in 1955, when the membership of the Organization was increased from sixty to seventy-six, but was restrained by opposition from states with permanent seats in the Security Council. With the subsequent and prospective increases of membership a greater increase in the size of the Security Council would doubtless be deemed desirable. Advantage should be taken of the enlargement of the Security Council to improve in other ways its representative character. Service in the Security Council should be made more attractive to the middle powers by authorizing the election of additional members who are large contributors to the purposes of the Organization, without regard to geographical distribution, and by making them eligible for immediate re-election at the expiration of their terms. As long as such a state as India is the actual

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leader of a substantial group of members, it should be possible to keep it in the Security Council while it continues to command the confidence of its followers. Additional permanent members of the Security Council with a veto are not wanted, but the opportunity should be created for group leaders to have a voice and vote there as long as they maintain their leadership. T o increase the participation of the middle powers in the Security Council means to enlarge the opportunities for the democracies to influence its actions. T h e vision of a polarized world, in which all the nations are gathered around Washington or Moscow, is a beguiling one for some democrats. It involves the establishment of a two-party system in world politics, which would seem to ensure the supremacy of the American group in the United Nations. Closer inspection of the materials for a majority party under American leadership, however, discloses that the organization of a powerful democratic party is impracticable. The political composition of the present American majority in the General Assembly is TABLE 5. Partisan Classification of U.N. Member States, 1959

Kind of state 1. 2. 345-

Mature democracies Emergent democracies Party dictatorships Military dictatorships Hereditary monarchies Total

American group

Russian group

Bandung Neutrals

14 9 1 17 0

0 0 9 0 0

0 4 0 7 12

5

41

9

23

8

Independent Neutrals

1 1

1 0

shown in Table 5. The American group is dependent for its majority upon the support of substantial numbers of military dictatorships. N o majority party is possible which does not include numerous dictatorships of some kind or small Oriental monarchies.

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In fact the two-party system in any form is unsuitable for United Nations politics. T o yield to the temptation to work for the establishment of such a system would be a great mistake. It could not be established without the complete abolition of the veto in the Security Council and other changes in the direction of a much more centralized form of government for the United Nations. Such changes are not necessary in order to end the cold war. Indeed, if they were possible, they would make its ending more difficult. W h a t is necessary is a fixed determination by the nuclear powers to operate the institutions which have been established under the charter in accordance with the intentions of its framers. The method of consensus supplies the basis of a workable system of politics under the appropriate conditions. The creation of the appropriate conditions is not beyond the capacity of the nuclear powers. Those who really wish a firmer organization of peace should give the method of consensus in United Nations politics a fair trial. T o give the consensus method a fair trial the most important condition is a fairly representative Security Council. T o satisfy this condition it is desirable to assure adequate representation to those dutiful middle powers which not only make substantial financial contributions to the work of the United Nations but also furnish efficient contingents to the emergency forces and observer corps which are occasionally needed to give effect to the decisions and recommendations of the Organization. Some of the additional seats in an enlarged Security Council should of course be made available for geographical areas not equitably represented therein, but others should definitely be reserved for large contributors to the Organization's purposes. Such an enlarged Security Council could command the confidence of the various divisions of mankind. The growth of confidence is the indispensable basis for an expanded role of politics in the organization of peace.

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THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVES OF THE NUCLEAR AGE T h e organization of peace in the nuclear age will mark the end of a gradual evolution in accepted thinking concerning the problem of keeping the peace in the family of nations. T i m e was when the best thinking concerning this problem was represented by the doctrine of the balance of power. T h e problem was conceived to be one of coercing sovereign states which threatened to exercise their legal right to make war. T h e method of coercion was to organize a combination of states, bent on peace, strong enough to resist successfully any state or combination of states bent on aggressive war. If the states prepared to meet force with force were manifestly strong enough to overpower the aggressors, the peace was likely to be preserved as long as other things remained unchanged. B u t in the longer run other things were likely to change, particularly the relative strength of different states. T h e system of peace-keeping therefore needed one or more states ever willing to support the weaker side against the stronger in a warlike situation and capable of giving the weaker side sufficient additional strength to deter the stronger from breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. In the nineteenth century the British government essayed the role of peace-keeper through manipulation of the balance of power. On the whole it did so with impressive success. There were plenty of petty wars, mainly incidental to imperial expansion by major European powers, but no great wars between the major powers themselves. Local wars, which might have spread and become great wars, were successfully limited and ended before they became great international disasters. B u t a price had to be paid for the success of the system. T h e government which undertook to hold the balance of power had to be able and willing to intervene in any threatening situation on the weaker side regardless of the merits of the particular controversy; thus

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its policy might appear in a particular case to be immoral. The British government defended its manipulation of the balance of power with the plea that its interventions were justified by the greater good of general peace, even though they might appear to involve some injustice in cases in which the weaker side might seem to be in the wrong. It could even change sides, if necessary, to preserve the balance of power, regardless of the special interests of former associates. The appellation "perfidious Albion" could be borne with dignity as long as the system continued to serve the general interest in peace. What Woodrow Wilson and the other founders of the League of Nations sought to do was to put a moral foundation under the balance-of-power system of peace-keeping. They rejected the idea that the keepers of the peace should intervene in a threatening situation regardless of the merits of the particular controversy but retained the idea that a threat of aggressive war should be countered by a threat of overpowering defensive war. The danger of violent aggression was met by the assurance of forcible coercion and, if necessary, aggression itself would be met by officially sponsored and organized enforcement-action. The founders of the League of Nations accepted the implied obligation to determine the merits of international disputes that threatened to lead to breaches of the peace or acts of aggression by suitable proceedings in an open forum of the nations, and devised what they hoped would be effective processes of collective action in the interest of collective security. The League of Nations Covenant marked a great advance in the organization of peace over the traditional balance-of-power system. But it did not abandon the basic principle that the peace was to be kept by holding the threat of coercion over sovereign states planning aggressive use of their legal right to make war. Unhappily the reluctance of the major powers to perform their duties under the covenant, together with defects in the structure and procedures of the League, prevented this more moral system

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of keeping the peace by manipulating the balance of power from achieving its objectives. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the other founders of the United Nations took another great forward step in the thinking about the problem of peace. They rejected not only that part of the traditional balance-of-power system already rejected by the founders of the League, but also the idea that sovereign states possess a right to make aggressive war. The sanction for this act of renunciation, as far as the holders of permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council were concerned, consisted in their own good faith. As far as other states were concerned, international police action, authorized by the Security Council, was to be substituted for war as a means of coercing states which might be unmindful of their obligations under the charter. Member states may still wage defensive war under the charter, but aggressive war is outlawed. The coercion of bellicose states, if they are not dangerously powerful, remains a part of the new system of organizing the peace. The framers of this system of peace-keeping obviously assumed that the major powers had learned the folly of war among themselves by their hard experiences in the two world wars. Possessing collectively a strong preponderance of power, the major powers, the framers seemed to believe, would have no need for any form of the traditional balance-of-power system of keeping the peace. Responsibility for maintaining international order was at last to be combined with adequate powers for dealing with irresponsible states which might still require coercion. How the system of peace-keeping under the United Nations Charter might have operated if there had been no major advance in the art of war cannot be known. In fact the outbreak of the cold war showed that the major powers had not fully learned the lessons of their hard experience. As long as the United States retained its monopoly of the atomic bomb it could hope to operate a balance-of-power system within the framework of

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the United Nations; when that monopoly was broken, the cold war ceased to make sense for either of the principal combatants. Efforts to intimidate an opponent armed with nuclear weapons were bound to fail. Intimidation was mutual, and the threat of massive retaliation lost its potency. If the cold war did not tragically turn hot, it was clearly destined to fade away in the dawn of a genuine peace. In short, the development of the most modern weapons has ushered in a new stage in the organization of peace. T h e principles of the United Nations Charter, rationally interpreted, are so clearly compatible with the interests of the nuclear powers that it should no longer be necessary to rely upon their good faith to make the new system of peace-keeping work effectively. Recognition by the nuclear powers that cold war, like hot war, is obsolete does not necessarily put an end to the danger of war. W a r between the nuclear powers, as mentioned earlier, might break out by accident. A clearer and more imminent danger to peace comes from the lesser states which may still hope for tangible gains from a victorious war fought with old-fashioned weapons. The classical theory of war is not wholly obsolete in a world in which there are many states with ungratified ambitions, weak neighbors, and no access to the new weapons. Under these circumstances the adaptation of the United Nations to the requirements of the nuclear age is an urgent piece of unfinishedbusiness. The first imperative of the new system of peace-keeping is that the party system in international politics must be adapted to the needs of the nuclear age — an age, it must be kept in mind, in which the lawmaking authority under the United Nations Charter will be broadly construed and the annual budgets of the Organization and its affiliated international agencies will deal with expenditures running into many billions of dollars and with corresponding revenues. This means the rejection of the two-party system in the Security Council and the General

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Assembly and the adoption of some form of the multiparty system. It seems likely that there will be at least as many parties as permanent members of the Security Council and that the method of consensus, at least among the nuclear powers, will become the normal procedure in international politics. While the cold war rages, the American and Soviet efforts to operate a two-party system seem necessary and proper. But the end of the cold war must bring the beginning of an effort to operate a more flexible and sensitive party system. T h e principle of simple majority rule cannot be an acceptable substitute in world politics for agreement by the nuclear powers. T h e traditional sanction for the principle of majority rule is convenience. Democrats do not have to believe that the majority is always right: to accept such a belief is to acknowledge that might may make right. Superiority of numbers at the polls is no more a guarantee that truth prevails over error than superiority of arms on the battlefield. It is the convenience of a rule, under which there can be prompt decision and effective action in ordinary matters, that commends it to the people of modern democratic states. But wise constitution-makers provide for longer deliberation and broader agreement before definitive action in matters of extraordinary importance. The preservation of peace in the nuclear age is such a matter. T h e Yalta voting formula, with some modification in those Security Council proceedings which take place under the provisions of the charter for the pacific settlement of disputes, is convincing evidence of the wisdom of the framers. T h e method of consensus in international lawmaking has already demonstrated its practicability. In the international conferences, which have produced the great statutes under which the International Court of Justice and the specialized agencies operate, those major powers concerned with the purposes of the proposed agencies have been able to reach agreement without too much difficulty. T h e consent of the minor powers and lesser

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states has often proved as difficult, or even more difficult, to obtain. The method, though slow, laborious, and uncertain, is capable of making law for situations of exceptional importance. The problem of the nuclear powers, which must take the lead in developing a suitable legislative process within the United Nations, is to adapt it to the kind of situation with which the Security Council is likely to be concerned. The indispensable condition is that the nuclear powers understand that mankind has no rational alternative to superseding the politics of war by the politics of peace. Politics, conceived as the practical business of arranging consent to proposed actions in a policy-determining body, is an essential function of human organization at all levels. The true relation between politics and law at any level of organization is not that in which law displaces politics but rather that in which improved political processes produce more ungrudging consent to better laws. The role of the politician in a democracy is not to impose ill-considered laws upon reluctant subjects but to contrive arrangements by means of which his fellow citizens obey a prescribed rule of action as the most effective means of accomplishing their own purposes. International organization on the eve of the nuclear age has already reached a stage where it should be possible to attract to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations statesmen who are intellectually and temperamentally capable of putting to good use the opportunities which these bodies will increasingly afford for practicing the art of politics. T o mediate successfully between contentious powers and thus to prevent war is good; to persuade them to agree upon common action in the general interest of mankind is better. The great difficulty in expanding the role of politics in the organization of peace is that the politicians cannot ordinarily deal directly with the people of the so-called sovereign states which make up the family of nations. They have to deal with

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the particular persons who operate the governments of those states, and these persons unhappily are apt to put their continued control of power ahead of the interests of the rest of the people for whose benefit such power exists, or is presumed to exist. There is the ever-present temptation to appeal over the heads of the men in power to the people behind them, but yielding to this temptation leads to subversive propaganda and other political practices better suited to the requirements of cold war than of genuine peace. If the international politicians in the Security Council and the General Assembly are to make the best use of their great opportunity they must aim at obtaining the consent of the men who have a right to speak for the member states. It is a great advance in the organization of peace that unanimous consent is no longer required except in the cases of the spokesmen for the five powers with permanent seats in the Security Council. It is clear that under the charter, as originally designed, the United Nations was to be primarily a diplomatic body. T h e Security Council, instead of conducting its deliberations in open meetings and in the manner best suited to the needs of aggressive propaganda, could have met in private, thereby greatly facilitating the process of diplomatic accommodation. In fact the popular yearning for "open covenants, openly arrived at" fostered the development of a kind of parliamentary diplomacy, a new political art for which practical politicians may be better qualified than professional diplomats. Nevertheless, the facilities afforded by the Organization for the practice of conventional diplomacy constitute an important improvement in the organization of peace: there are the ready opportunities for informal negotiations between representatives of the member states, which have already been put to good use in critical times; there is a growing body of experienced diplomats in the Secretariat itself under the skillful leadership of the secretary-general; there are interesting possibilities for the further development of a diplo-

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matic corps to serve as agents of the United Nations wherever international tensions may form threats to the peace. It is also clear that parliamentary diplomacy promises to become an invaluable advance in the organization of

peace.

Though it has contributed to the perversion of the Security Council into an instrument of aggressive propaganda, in the General Assembly it has been more than a convenient device for use in the cold wars. It is already making the recommendations of the General Assembly considerably more influential than was originally anticipated. Even without recourse to legislation the Organization can make a solid contribution to the preservation of peace. But, to a greater extent than is commonly recognized, the Organization is capable under the charter of becoming an important agency for the adjustment of disputes between member states by the potent process of lawmaking. T h e second imperative of the new system of peace-keeping is that the international lawmaking process must be adapted to the needs of the nuclear age. It is not necessary that the Security Council and the General Assembly become legislative chambers of the conventional type in national states, or that in the beginning of the nuclear age the charter be radically amended in order to confer additional legislative authority upon them. T h e Organization already possesses a substantial quantity of lawmaking power. T o say nothing of the power to enact administrative regulations, applying to its own officers and employees, it can adopt budgets, levy assessments upon member states, and spend money for the purposes proclaimed in the charter. T h e power to spend money, as Americans have learned from the history of their own federal union, implies the power to finance activities not even dreamed of by the framers of the United Nations Charter. There is no limit, except that imposed by the difficulty of raising revenue, to what the Organization can try to do by the expenditure of money to promote the general welfare of mankind. Moreover, decisions by the Security Coun-

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cil, taken primarily in order to deal with particular situations threatening to lead to serious disputes, give notice to all nations of what they may expect to happen to them in similar situations. Such decisions may include elaborate arrangements for adjusting disputes between member states. If these arrangements prove efficacious, the decisions acquire the force of precedents. T h e accumulation of precedents produces law. Both the decisions of the Security Council and the recommendations of the General Assembly in disturbing situations must carry with them the assurance of sufficient support to make any ordinary state pause before treating them with contempt. With sufficient weight of authority behind them recommendations should generally serve as well as decisions, and the General Assembly therefore should be able to act almost as effectively as the Security Council in cases involving the possibility of lawmaking by this process. In the nuclear age the indispensable sanction for such a legislative process must be a consensus among the nuclear powers. When such a consensus exists, skillful international politicians should not find too much difficulty in procuring the necessary additional support among the lesser powers and other member states. Though the legislative powers expressly conferred upon the Organization seem modest, its practical capacity to make acceptable adjustments between the conflicting interests of member states by what is in effect a kind of legislative process may eventually prove to be one of its most important attributes. When there is a recognized need for greater certainty in making international law than is possible under the decision-making and recommendation-making procedures in the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Organization can have recourse to the procedure for amending the charter. This procedure is more difficult than the traditional processes for making international conventions because it requires unanimous agreement among the five major powers, but it possesses the important

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advantage that legislation adopted by the amending process is binding upon all member states, whereas the legislative product of the traditional processes binds only those states which ratify it. Like the statute of the International Court of Justice, amendments can be annexed to the charter and become integral parts of it without actually cluttering up the basic document with masses of ordinary legislation. The history of the statute creating the International Atomic Energy Agency shows the practical utility of an international lawmaking process which is independent of that provided by the charter in time of cold war. An agreement among the nuclear powers, however, to end the cold war, which is so greatly in their interest, would clear the way for the adoption of important international statutes by the amending process. Whether a simpler legislative process, the enactment of laws by the concurrence of the Security Council and the General Assembly, for example, should be introduced for lawmaking in particular fields of international politics is a question which can be left for the future. It is enough to know at the beginning of the nuclear age that the charter, as it has been written, provides a workable legislative process for international politicians whenever there may be a general disposition to make use of it. The third imperative of the new system of peacemaking is that the international administrative process must be adapted to the needs of the nuclear age. This means that the principle of personal responsibility for official acts must be applied to the men in power in so-called sovereign states and that the coercion of such states must give way to the disciplining of offending individuals. The Nuremberg and Tokyo war-criminal trials at the close of World War II set a precedent for proceedings against persons who may be responsible for disturbing the peace in the nuclear age. Robert A. T a f t was not the only thoughtful statesman to feel misgivings about the execution of offenders against a law which did not clearly provide for a process of trial and

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punishment. But the war-criminal trials did establish the fact that the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy by the Pact of Paris, proclaimed at Versailles in August, 1928, was an enforceable part of the law of nations eighteen years later. The provision of suitable procedures for dealing with individuals who may disturb the peace of nations in the future is an important piece of unfinished business for the United Nations. The charter, rightly construed, gives power to the Security Council to provide such procedures if it finds that the lack of them is likely to lead to situations which may give rise to dangerous disputes. The Security Council should decide in advance of the next emergency how war criminals should be tried and punished. Statesmen who control powerful national armaments· and meditate their employment in offensive warlike operations should have no ground to complain, if eventually brought to justice (as did certain war criminals in 1946), that they were victims of victors' justice, administered without due notice by no other right than that of conquest. The accent in the nuclear age should fall upon peace through enforcement of law instead of peace through victory in war. Peacemaking in the nuclear age calls for the collaboration of statesmen capable of perceiving the general interests of mankind and willing to put these interests ahead of the special interests of particular states. "Who speaks for man?" should be not a rhetorical question but a realistic inquiry. What a warweary and frightened world needs most at this phase in the development of international organization is a better opportunity for leadership, animated by an intelligent concern for the general welfare of all nations and bent on framing and carrying into effect constructive international programs and policies. The annals of the United Nations already record a lengthening list of skillful politicians who have responded to the challenge of provocative events and have achieved such successes under the

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present charter as justify the expectation that an improved and strengthened Organization would supply a firmer foundation for an orderly world. It is easy to understand the nature of the measures that would improve and strengthen the Organization; to bring about action in the light of this understanding is more difficult. Effective action, however, need not wait for a United Nations charter-review conference. W h a t is now in order is prompt action to improve the opportunities for leadership in international politics by the middle powers. The major powers, those with permanent seats in the Security Council, rely too much upon violence or intimidation as an instrument of national policy. In the most recent years they have shown themselves too quick to employ their arms in military adventures, either forgetting their obligations under the charter or seeking to justify their military operations by strained interpretations of its language. The middle powers are less tempted to engage in such adventurism and more apt to combine some necessary idealism with the proper realism in international affairs. The honor roll of the member states in the United Nations is headed by Canada, which took the lead in the organization of the Emergency Force at Suez. Others on the honor roll are those which instantly responded to the call for serviceable contingents: the three Scandinavian states, India, Brazil, Colombia, and Yugoslavia. It is such states as these whose influence in world affairs needs to be strengthened. The great objection to the arms race, and to the cold war of which the arms race is the most conspicuous feature, is not the fantastic waste of money involved. It is the practical certainty that if the race is long continued the arms will be used. The middle powers, not yet possessing the most modern weapons, but competent enough in the use of weapons suitable for putting down occasional disturbances created by irresponsible ordinary and small states, command the confidence of the nations. They will more easily than others be elected to the Security Council,

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if room is provided there for additional members of the United Nations regardless of geographical distribution. This is the open road to improving the representative character of the United Nations and to expanding the useful role of politics in the organization of peace. It is of course true that mere changes in the form of an organization are not enough to bring about important improvements in the quality of its product. There must also be the will to put the better organization to good use. But in the nuclear age the will to substitute the politics of peace for the politics of war follows closely on the discovery of the ruinous potential of the most modern weapons. A new system of peace-keeping is as inevitable as it is rational. The immediate practical problem is to protect the nuclear powers against involvement in war against their better judgment and intentions. For this purpose there must be an expanded role for peace-loving politicians in the United Nations.

Epilogue

Analysis of the problem of organizing world peace under law begins with a description of the states to be brought within the world organization. Convenience suggests their classification on the basis of their relative capacity to contribute to the purposes of such an organization and their distribution among the principal regions into which the world may be divided. Their relative capacity may be measured by their assessments for contributions under the financial system adopted by the United Nations. Their geographical distribution may be shown by their location on the continents and in the Western Pacific. The following table covers the members of the United Nations Organization at the beginning of 1967. A comprehensive world organization would also include the divided states, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, in some form, together with Switzerland and numerous dependencies of European empires not yet fully liquidated. The unequal geographical distribution of the different kinds of state complicates the problem of organizing world peace under law. Further complications spring from the different political habits of peoples in different parts of the world; the unequal distribution of the ability to read and write, and of radio and television stations and receiving sets; and the unequal opportuni-

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ties for active participation in such modern political processes as voting, serving in representative bodies, and participating in party organizations. The organization of peace means the readjustment of the relations between states in different stages of political development as well as the readjustment of the relations between states in the same stage long divided against themselves by traditional rivalries and resentments. The League of Nations was mainly a European operation, little affected by the exotic wants and untried capabilities of Asian and African peoples. The United Nations, however, has become a nearly universal organization of unprecedented complexity. T A B L E 6. A n Empirical Classification of U . N . Member States, 1967

Kinds of states 1. Nuclear powers 2. Other major powers (over 1 . 0 0 % · ) 3. Minor powers ( . 5 1 % to 1 . 0 0 % ) 4. Ordinary states ( . 1 1 % to . 5 0 % ) 5. Lesser states (.05% to . 1 0 % ) 6. Mini-states (.04%) Total

America

Europe

Asia

1

3

1

—

1

7

1

—

3

5

4

8

6

3

4

1

8

5

13 26

4 28

8 24

30 39

Africa

5 2 1

—

Western Pacific Total

11 9

—

3

24

5

55 122

—

—

• Rate of assessment for contributions to U . N . treasury.

The greatest defect in the official American plan for general and complete disarmament is the incomplete description of the projected world government in the third stage of the disarming process. The authors of the plan concede the necessity of an effective government in a disarmed world of national states, but they fail to grapple with some of the chief problems in the development of a peaceful world order. They seem to assume that

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the United Nations will naturally evolve into the kind of organization best suited to an acceptable performance in its new and highly important role in world politics. The leading world federalists have shown greater appreciation of the need for facing these problems before reaching the end of the disarming process. Clark and Sohn rightly insist in their outstanding seminal treatise World Peace through World Law1 that in a government equal to its responsibilities in a disarmed world, supported by the organized opinion of an enlightened world community, the legislative department must contain a branch designed to represent the people of the world. Representation of the governments of the member states, as in the U.N. General Assembly, will not be enough. The rule of law in a world where peace is securely organized means the choice of at least a part of the lawmakers in worldwide popular elections. Experience with popular elections is already widely distributed among the independent states of the contemporary world. Governments more or less dependent upon the results of popular elections exist in a majority of these states. In many of them freely organized political parties have long flourished. Nevertheless, it must be conceded by realistic pacifists that the introduction of worldwide popular elections and of the free-enterprise system of party government involves unprecedented changes in the political practices of a large part of the world. The alleged impracticability of such changes is one of the most frequent objections to sophisticated proposals for general and complete disarmament. A summary view of the experience with popular elections in contemporary independent states is shown in the following table. First, there are the stable "free-world" governments, antedating World War II, which hold regular popular elections and maintain free-enterprise systems of political parties. Secondly, 1. See the second edition of Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace through World Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, i960).

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there are the communist governments which hold countrywide elections and maintain monopolistic party systems. Thirdly, there are the emergent governments in states which have become independent since World W a r II and in which general elections may be held at more or less regular intervals. Fourthly, there are the older, more or less unstable governments in states in which general elections have been at least occasionally set aside by military dictatorships or dominated by noncommunist party dictatorships. Fifthly, there are the more or less arbitrary governments in states without popular elections of any kind. T A B L E 7. Distribution of Popular Elections and Party Systems Among U . N . Member States, 1 9 6 7

Kind of party system 1. Free enterprise 2. Communist monopolistic 3. Emergent* 4. Unstable" 5. Without popular elections Total

America Europe

Asia

Africa

2

13

1

—

1

9 1 5

2

—

9 3

34 2

—

—

26

28

9 24

3 39

4 19

Western Pacific

Total

3

19

2

12 50 29

—

—

—

5

12 122

' In states which have become independent since 1 9 4 5 . b In older states which have experienced more or less dictatorial regimes at some time since 1 9 2 0 .

States with long-established and apparently stable governments, holding regular popular elections and maintaining freeenterprise party systems, account for less than one-sixth of the existing independent states. Thus the pure type of "free-world" state forms a small minority in the contemporary political world. Measured by population, these states contain a somewhat larger portion of the total world population. Measured by gross national product, however, as estimated by the United Nations, they account for more than three-fifths of the total

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gross national product. Their military capability, if it could be measured accurately, allowing for such intangible qualities as self-confidence and firmness of purpose, would presumably give them an even higher rating. Their accumulated political prestige ensures them a strong position in the political world. By precept and example, without resort to armed force, they should be able to exert a powerful influence in favor of popular elections and the free-enterprise party system everywhere. The communist one-party governments are less numerous than the mature and stable "free-world" governments but like them have had considerable experience with popular elections. TTiey also contain a substantial portion of the total world population and are credited with a relatively high gross national product. Together with the free-enterprise party-system states they account for seven-eighths, perhaps even nine-tenths, of the total gross national product in the modern world. They too can make atom bombs and deliver them quickly and accurately anywhere in the world. Neither of these two powerful groups of states can create one world by military conquest, though either can destroy it. Together they should be able to create any kind of world they could agree upon. But can they get together on a common design for an acceptable world order? The new states with immature governments form the most numerous group of independent states in the contemporary world. Their representatives in the U.N. General Assembly outnumber those of the two previous groups combined. Except for India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic, however, they contain comparatively small populations, and all are states of low per capita economic productivity. Several of them, notably India, have made impressive advances in the development of modem political systems, and nearly all have had some instructive experience with popular elections. Under favorable conditions vigorous and well-directed financial and technical assistance, especially in the field of popular education, would im-

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prove the prospects for effective participation in the governmental process by their peoples. The older independent states (in which military or noncommunist party dictatorships have more or less limited the importance of popular elections), though less numerous than the states with immature governments, outnumber the free-enterprise party-government states. They include most of the LatinAmerican republics, among which, however, are wide differences in the regularity and importance of popular elections. The states in this group vary considerably in economic productivity but on the average rank below the states in the first two groups. Together with the new states with immature governments these older states with imperfectly developed electoral systems account for ten percent, or thereabouts, of the world's total gross product. They are evidently not in a position to put formidable obstacles in the way of politically more developed states bent on improving popular participation in the governmental process. The states with no experience in popular elections are the least numerous of the five groups. They account for less than onetenth of the total number of independent states in the contemporary world and for less than one-hundredth of the world's total gross product. They would doubtless need much time to establish efficient systems of political education for their peoples, and much help to develop extensive popular participation in their governmental processes. Their existence, however, does not mean that the need for such great changes in their way of life make general and complete disarmament impracticable. In the existing state of the world it is clear that the major obstacle to disarmament is not the lack of regular elections and of effective popular participation in government in the underdeveloped countries but the lack of purpose and will in those parts of the world which are more advanced in matters of government and politics.

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The organization of peace at the present time is apparently a more formidable task than when the United Nations Organization was first formed. There are more than twice as many independent states. The differences between them in population, wealth, and productive power — that is, the differences reflected in the system of assessments for financing the United Nations — are greater. In the age of plutonium and hydrogen bombs the differences in military capacity, resulting from the unprecedented changes in the art of war, are far greater than in the age of gunpowder. In the age of instantaneous electronic communications and broadcasting the differences in political development also are far greater than in the simpler age of printing and publishing. The invention of gunpowder and printing put an end to the Middle Ages; the development of nuclear weapons and worldwide broadcasting are doing the same to what we used to call modern times. Further light on the problem of organizing a disarmed world in ultramodern times is shed by further analysis of the evidence relating to the differences between contemporary states in productive capacity and political prestige. The following table summarizes this evidence for the states rated by the United Nations for the assessment of financial contributions to the treasury of the Organization or its specialized agencies. The nuclear powers and other major powers each contribute more than one percent of the total revenue in the Organization's regular budget. The minor powers are those which contribute more than one-half of one percent, but not more than one percent, of the budgetary revenue. The contributors of more than one-tenth of one percent, but not over one-half of one percent, form the category of ordinary states. The lesser states are rated at from one-tenth to one-twentieth of one percent. The ministates, the most numerous class of all, are assessed uniformly at four-hundredths of one percent. Together with the lesser states they comprise a substantial majority of the membership of

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the United Nations. The disparity between the large and small contributors is greater than ever before, and it continues to grow with the continued liquidation of obsolete colonial empires. T A B L E 8. Distribution of States with Different Party Systems According to Productive Capacity and Political Prestige as Measured by the U . N . System of Financial Contributions, 1967

Kind of party system 1. Free enterprise 2. Communist monopolistic 3. Emergent 4. Unstable 5. Without popular elections Total

Other Nuclear major powers powers 6 2

3 2

1 2

— —

—

—

5

Minor powers

11

Ordinary states

Total

1 2

19 12

6 8

9 4

34 11

50 29

1 24

4 18

7 55

12 122

4 5

4

9

—

Ministates

1

4 1 —

Lesser states

—

Realistic pacifists recognize that the more advanced peoples cannot be expected to entrust their security to a world government in which there is so great a disparity between the military capacity and the political prestige of different states and their voting power as exists presently in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Many of them have proposed systems of weighted voting for the legislative branch of their projected world parliament. These weighted-voting systems are apt to founder on the problem of a suitable basis of representation. Comparative population, for example, which possesses a theoretical attraction for weighted-voting proponents, would give China four thousand times as many representatives as Iceland. This basis of representation would produce a world parliament so large as to be obviously impracticable. Clark and Sohn, who have given special attention to this

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2

problem, have proposed a system of weighted voting based on, but not proportioned to, the populations of the member states. These sophisticated authors arrange the states in seven groups, based primarily on population, and assign an equal number of representatives to each state in the same group but unequal numbers to the states in different groups. The group with the maximum representation contains four states (China, India, the Soviet Union, and the United States), each of which receives thirty representatives. T h e states in the next largest group receive twelve representatives each. One representative each is assigned to the states in the minimal group. This system is designed to give suitable effect to other qualities of states besides their population. Since no precise formula for classification is offered, the adoption of the system would depend on the give-and-take of interstate negotiation, either from strength or weakness as might be the case of a particular state. Clark and Sohn recognize that no system of representation in a world parliament based on popular elections can be extended throughout the world immediately. They concede that it will take time to develop an acceptable system of popular representation in all the different types of states in the modern world. They allow as much as forty years for the complete establishment of popular elections in the most undemocratic dictatorships and monarchies. It is enough for them that the leading international statesmen, engaged in the implementation of an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament, be ever mindful of the necessity for suitable peace-keeping arrangements at each stage of their proceedings and always aware of the right direction toward their final goal. They are confident that progress in the right direction will strengthen determination to reach the goal. Such proposals are useful as illustrations of the nature of the problem to be solved. But actual agreement on a system of 2. Ibid.

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representation is likely to be a casual incident of the total process of arranging for the implementation of an acceptable plan for general and complete disarmament. Long before the full extension of popular elections to all the arbitrary dictatorships and absolute monarchies the development of international political parties will have greatly changed the relations between so-called independent states. The establishment of a suitable party system is an indispensable feature of any general organization for international peace-keeping. Without capable political parties popular elections cannot be expected to maintain the character of an acceptable world order. The next step toward world peace will be general recognition that no state can be a law unto itself in a world of nuclear powers. The principle of sovereign equality as understood by tradition-bound international lawyers, if not by all the statesmen who wrote it into the United Nations Charter, was a necessary and proper principle in an age when an independent state could rely on its own resources for the national defense under ordinary circumstances, trusting to limited temporary alliances for special occasions of exceptional danger. Washington's advice to his fellow Americans in his Farewell Address was well suited to the conditions of his age. By the end of World War II, however, unpredictable advances in the art of war had already made such advice obsolete for ordinary states, and even the major powers had been forced to organize more durable alliances in order to maintain a suitable sense of national security. The development of atomic weapons and efficient delivery systems introduced a new age of insecurity in which the idea of national sovereignty has lost its relevance. Partial alliances of every kind yield priority to one universal and permanent alliance in which so-called independent states can find a place suited to their resources and attainments. Sovereign equality now means no more than an equal right to enjoy the

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blessings of membership in a properly-organized world community. Instead of a world of independent so-called sovereign states we now have a world of military nuclear powers, civil nuclear powers, and ordinary states. All are dependent in various degrees on the efficient functioning of different international organizations, the chief of which is the United Nations. But not all can play the same role in these organizations. The five military nuclear powers happen to be the five privileged members of the U.N. Security Council. The civil nuclear powers and ordinary states may be elected to the Security Council for limited terms but do not have an equal voice there. All alike have an equal voice in the General Assembly. If the American plan for general and complete disarmament should be adopted, all presumably would be represented in the popular branch of a world assembly by delegates chosen in accordance with an acceptable scheme for their apportionment among the member states. In such an event the political influence of the five military nuclear powers will inevitably be great. They possess not only their stocks of atom bombs but also the productive capabilities which enable them to contribute to the United Nations twothirds of its regular annual income. If they would stand together they could dominate the world. If they could not refrain from using their military strength in reckless struggles for domination over one another, they would destroy themselves and much of the world also. Their obvious interest is to seek leadership, not domination, in world politics. The influence of the civil nuclear powers is more uncertain. Many of them are potential military nuclear powers. Some of these might wish to acquire a small stock of nuclear weapons in order to intimidate weaker neighbors, if the major nuclear powers would permit such trespasses on a field of action which

3io ]

A Strategy of Peace

they naturally prefer to reserve exclusively for themselves. A few might like to acquire nuclear weapons in order to qualify for a voice in the councils of the major nuclear powers, if the latter would tolerate such a challenge to their primacy. Others, more farsighted, would prefer to qualify for a role in world politics as mediators between the major powers and the lesser states, thereby establishing the strategic importance of an independent class of middle powers. The ordinary states without nuclear capabilities of any kind or the means of exploiting a limited civil nuclear capability must be content with a subordinate position in this nuclear age. They are more numerous than the other kinds of states and possess a preponderance of votes in the U.N. General Assembly. On the other hand their contributions to the finances and to the military potential of the United Nations are comparatively small. They are, as a class, less experienced in world politics and more likely to function irresponsibly in a world assembly. They are destined to be followers rather than leaders in an organized world order. Under these circumstances the pattern of an international party system is readily discernible. There will be at least five major world parties headed by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. There is no adequate inducement for the formation of a two-party system, because no simple majority of the member states can control executive action in the Security Council or legislative action on important matters in the General Assembly. There is no possibility of a one-party system, unless the five major nuclear powers stand more firmly together in the Security Council than they are likely to do in dealing with controversial issues less important than threats to the peace or acts of war. More than five international parties are of course conceivable, as any group with more than one-third of the votes in the General Assembly can block action by that body in important matters. But there is little inducement for an ordinary

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[311

state to join a party without strong representation in the Security Council. It is of course conceivable also that the United Nations Organization will not provide the framework for an organized world order. The ordinary states do not like the veto possessed by the five major powers in the Security Council. T h e major powers do not like the veto possessed by one-third plus one of the ordinary states in the General Assembly. But the negotiating position of the major powers in an unorganized world would be far superior to that of the ordinary states. As long as they are able to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they should be able to maintain their ascendancy in the Security Council. T h e real question is how successful they can be in improving their position in the General Assembly. It is at least clear that as long as the major powers refrain from using their nuclear weapons against one another, the U.N. Organization will continue to furnish the main arena for active participation in world politics. There is, however, an important preliminary question. Is it likely that the five nuclear powers will stand together in the United Nations Security Council? W h e n China is represented there by a delegate chosen by the government at Peking, can the other nuclear powers rely upon its firm support for the policy of keeping peace in the world? The leaders of the Peking government have declared that their version of Marxism-Leninism regards old-fashioned war as an indispensable means of victory in the class struggle. If war with the new nuclear weapons will inevitably be ruinously destructive the ruin, they say, will overwhelm the capitalists but not the proletariat. In the U.N. Security Council spokesmen for Peking will encounter spokesmen for Moscow. Time was when Bolshevik leaders talked about the class struggle in the same MarxistLeninist terms now favored by the Chinese Communists. But better acquaintance with the most modern weapons brought new interpretations of the old terminology better suited to the

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changed conditions governing the art of war. Moscow began to distinguish between the economic class war, which it now recognized should be fought with economic weapons, and wars of national liberation, for which, it continued to believe, military force continued to be appropriate. Further acquaintance with the most modern weapons, however, brought further revision of the Muscovite theory of war. Spokesmen for Moscow now seem to agree with spokesmen for the Western nuclear powers that nuclear weapons have made the institution of fully armed international war obsolete. International wars may still be waged with obsolete or obsolescent weapons without irreparable damage to mankind, but such old-fashioned wars are not to be fought between the nuclear powers lest they get out of hand and destroy modern civilization, nor by minor powers and ordinary states lest they escalate into wars involving too great risk of getting out of control by the nuclear powers. Time will be when spokesmen for Peking will register a similar evolution of opinion about the institution of war. There is no good reason to fear that the special privileges of the nuclear powers in the U.N. Security Council are forever incompatible with service therein by a power as slow to recognize the full significance and implications of modern military technology as the present communist government of China. The new international politics calls for greater patience and diplomatic skill on the part of national and world statesmen and less hasty recourse to intimidation and violence. There is no place among the major powers in the nuclear age for bellicose Hitlers and Mussolinis and Stalins and Tojos. There will be plenty of fighting issues to enliven the debates in the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, but the weapons will not be military. The political parties will utilize appropriate political weapons in accordance with the rules embodied in the United Nations Charter. Political campaigns may take more

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time than military campaigns, but new developments in the art of intercontinental communication, particularly worldwide television via synchronized satellites, facilitate the adaptation of world politics to a world community drawing ever closer together. World politics, activated and vitalized by five major parties under the leadership of the five nuclear powers, will reflect, like systems of national politics, complex combinations of general principles and special interests. In world politics the special interests will be national interests, and the general principles will be worldwide in their appeal. The national interests that will possess significance for the political parties will be conflicting national interests, and the worldwide principles will be principles that can unite military nuclear powers, civil nuclear powers, and ordinary states in a durable political association. Each major geographical region will tend to support a party in sympathy with its special interests. Each major body of adherents to a principle will strive to strengthen a party capable of giving its principles the widest possible extension. Ambitious and realistic party politicians will put as much logic as possible into their plans for the organization of parties, but actual party organizations will be governed chiefly by the logic of events. The permanent foundation of party politics is not logic but experience. The particular issues around which major world parties can be most readily and usefully formed are those issues crying most loudly for attention when the need for parties first arises. At present they are such issues as: 1 ) the proliferation of nuclear weapons; 2) the adjustment of unsettled controversies left over from the European and Asian sections, respectively, of World War II; 3) the liquidation of remnants of colonial empires; 4) the economic development of underdeveloped Asian and African states; and 5) the improvement of the representative character of the legislative branch of the United Nations Organization. There is plenty of work

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ahead at the U.N. to assure the development of a vigorous international party system, whenever the major powers decide to give it the necessary and proper confidence and support. There are also some issues of great importance in the struggle for a peaceful world order that stand above partisan contention. They are not suitable for decision in eventual worldwide popular elections, but must be previously accepted as parts of an unwritten world constitution. One is that the government of the coming world order must be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. Another is that the first duty of members of the organized world community is to join in the control of lawless aggression. Neither of these axioms of world order is altogether free from vexatious doubts. International lawyers and politicians have not yet been able to agree upon a precise definition of aggression or an unambiguous description of peaceful coexistence. These will remain political concepts subject to gradual development through worldwide political education. During the most belligerent period of the cold war the Soviet Union, acting consistently with the logic of its unrealistic political creed, strove to establish a one-party system in world politics; and the United States, acting with similar logical consistency, strove to establish a two-party system. Neither of these two superpowers, despite the enormous political and military resources at its command, was able to accomplish its purpose. Their respective failures are recorded in the roll calls of the U.N. General Assembly on typical cold-war issues. A recent skirmish in one of the most spectacular cold-war battles was the vote at the twentieth regular session of the General Assembly on the seating of representatives of the Chinese government at Peking in place of the delegates from Taiwan with their questionable credentials. For years the Eisenhower Administration was successful in keeping this embarrassing question off the General Assembly's agenda, but in 1961 the Kennedy Administration decided to face on its merits the issue of which

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Chinese government should be recognized as the one entitled to speak for China in the General Assembly. The perennial Russian motion to seat the Peking delegates had been regularly lost by steadily decreasing pluralities, but the growing number of abstentions attested the increasing reluctance of member states to support either the Russian or the American leadership. The trend in General Assembly politics has clearly been toward a multiparty system. The roll call in 1965 on the motion to substitute a Peking delegation for that from Taiwan in the General Assembly recorded the frustration of both the superpowers. One-fifth of the member states refused to go on record for either delegation. They significantly abstained from voting on the question or avoided the issue by staying away from the meeting. The other four-fifths of the member states divided equally between support for Peking and support for Taiwan. Neither superpower succeeded in producing a majority for the delegation it favored. Support for the Peking delegates was distributed very unevenly through the different types of member states: all those with communist-monopolistic party systems supported the Communist party line; they were joined by one-half of the states in which there were no popular elections and no organized system of parties, and by approximately half of all the new states with immature party systems. Nearly one-third of the states which maintain the free-enterprise party system voted for the communist candidates, but (except in Cuba) the Communist party line was not followed in any of the older states in which popular elections and a modern party system were imperfectly established. As for Cuba, it was not clear whether the Cuban vote meant support for Moscow's leadership or for that of Peking. Support for the Taiwan delegates was also widely distributed. They received the votes of nearly all the older member states with imperfectly established systems of popular elections and

3i6]

A Strategy of

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party organization. In Latin America, where the influence of the United States was greatest, Chile abstained, but no state joined Cuba in voting against Taiwan. The leadership of the United States was followed in no more than a bare majority of the states maintaining a free-enterprise party system, in onefourth of the states without popular elections, and in less than one-fourth of the new states with immature party systems. Neither the United Kingdom nor France followed the American party line. T A B L E 9. Analysis of Vote in U.N. General Assembly, 1965, on Admission of Delegates from Communist China

U.N. member states 1 . Free-enterprise party system 2. Communist-monopolistic party system 3. Immature party system 4. Older unstable system 5. Monarchical system Total

For seating Taiwan delegates

For seating Peking delegates

10

6

3

19

0

12

0

12

10

23 0 6 47

14 3 3 23

47 27 12 117

24

3 47

Abstention or absent

Total

T h e reluctance of the lesser powers and ordinary states to choose between the two leviathans was imperfectly measured by the large number of recorded abstentions and of evasions of the issue by staying away from the meeting. T h e new and underdeveloped states particularly did not like to be diverted from what they regarded as more important issues, and to suffer the loss of influence that might result from supporting either of the leviathans against the other. Many of them sympathized with the desire of Formosans for representation in the General Assembly but questioned whether they were properly represented by the Chinese Nationalist government-in-exile. Many

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did not want a two-party system, to be dominated if possible by the Americans. Still less did they want a one-party system dominated by the Russians or the Chinese. Disarmament was a more popular issue among the lesser powers and ordinary states. If applied to the nuclear powers, especially if it might bring the abandonment of nuclear weapons, the balance of power in the world would be greatly altered and the opportunities of ordinary states to exert an influence in world affairs might be greatly improved. Obviously there would be no satisfactory system of arms control, to say nothing of actual disarmament, without an effective world system of peace-keeping. Security, or an acceptable prospect of security, they realized, must precede any meaningful agreement to disarm. But could there be the kind of security they wanted without a viable system of world order? The more thorough the analysis of the voting record at the United Nations the more convincing is the conclusion that world government and national security and acceptable arms control are all bound up together. If the U.N. is not to go the way of the League of Nations, the Organization must be greatly improved and strengthened. If the conflicting interests and responsibilities of the nuclear powers and of the other states are to be duly reconciled, there must be acceptable security for the nuclear powers as well as for smaller and weaker states. The times call for bold and imaginative leadership in world politics. Nevertheless, the development of the United Nations into a genuine world organization capable of acting intelligently and responsibly for all mankind cannot be an achievement beyond the power of civilized man. The case for the addition of a popular house to the existing legislative branch of the world organization has been cogently stated by a group of workers in the peace cause known as the Peace-keeping Ways and Means Committee. In a series of display advertisements in the New York Times running from

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A Strategy of Peace

February to May, 1966, the need for the popular election of representatives to improve the legislative process in the U . N . Organization was clearly explained, and the advantages to members of the world community of possessing a strengthened general government were strongly emphasized. 3 T h e introduction of popular legislative elections into the framework of world government promises many benefits, as the Peace-keeping Ways and Means Committee pointed out in its impressive advertisements. One benefit it did not point out is the contribution that the prospect of popular elections could make to the solution of the problem created by the opposition of the lesser powers and ordinary states to the veto of the nuclear powers in the U.N. Security Council, and by that of the nuclear powers to the disproportionate voting strength of the other member states in the General Assembly. An acceptable compromise between the two groups of states would be more easily reached if the basis of organization were the peoples of the world rather than the national governments. Whether a world constitutional convention would be necessary in the third stage of the official American disarmament plan, or the needed changes in the charter could be made by the regular method of charter amendment, is unpredictable. W h a t is indispensable is that the ultimate decision be made with the consent of the peoples of the world and not be subject to frustration by unfriendly national governments. It is of course true that there can be no certainty in predictions of the future course of human events. Man may be a rational animal, but he is also a creature of natural impulses and instincts. His behavior may be governed by reason, but it may also reflect the influence of the subconscious and nonrational. Ambitious and realistic politicians have long known that opinion can be influenced by other methods than appeals to reason. It can even be fabricated on a big scale by unscrupulous 3. See especially: "News of the Week in Review," New May 22, 1966.

York

Times,

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[319

politicians and made to serve their private ends. The deliberate exploitation of the subconscious and the nonrational by demagogues making unrestrained use of the techniques developed by the most modern social psychology may frustrate the plans of reasonable men. We are living in one of those epoch-making times when mankind learns anew that destiny cannot be surely known in advance — that the course of events may respond to the purposes and hopes of the most reasonable portion of mankind, or that it may be determined by arbitrary aimless force commanded by men consumed by a reckless thirst for power, or even by apparently meaningless chance. The prospect for the eventual establishment of a constitutional world order, as envisaged for the third stage in the official American plan for general and complete disarmament, will be viewed in the light of the viewer's natural temper and personal experience of life. At the beginning of the century realistic pacifists' vision of world peace reflected a sanguine and altruistic nature and was sustained by their confidence in such thinkers as Kant and Spencer. By the middle of the century Kant was no longer honored by the most influential historians as the prophet of an inevitable world peace, and Spencer had been hopelessly discredited by the unforeseen course of events in modem industrial society. Arnold J. Toynbee, who finished his uniquely comprehensive and systematic Study of History in 1952, though recognizing Kant's greatness as a philosopher found nothing to say about his theory of inevitable progress toward world peace; and Spencer he wholly ignored.4 William H. McNeill, whose masterly history of the human community entitled The Rise of the West was finished ten years later, was equally indifferent to Kant's interpretation of world history and equally neglectful of Spencer.5 Toynbee's final thinking on the prospects of "the Western 4. Arnold ). Toynbee, A Study of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), IX, 5355. William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 807.

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civilization" coincided with his full realization of the implications of the revolution in the art of war brought about by the invention of the atom bomb. In the course of a long and thoughtful discussion of technology, war, and government, he observed that "the living generation of Mankind had no choice but to reconcile itself as best it could to the disturbing knowledge that it was facing issues in which its very existence might be at stake, and that it was at the same time impossible at this stage to guess what the event would be." β But he recognized clearly the immediate problem for intelligent people everywhere with any feeling of responsibility for the course of human events. The United Nations Organization, he opined,7 "seemed unlikely to be the institutional nucleus out of which an eventually inevitable world government would develop, though it seemed likely to remain an indispensable instrument for the preservation of peace unless and until a unitary world government had grown out of some other germ." The germs which seemed to him in 1952 most promising were the governments of the Soviet Union and of the United States, "two older and tougher political 'going concerns'" which, he thought, had already in effect divided the world between them. McNeill held a solid advantage over Toynbee in his possession of ten more years in which to assess the prospects of Western civilization in the light of the latest developments in technology, war, and government. The development of the hydrogen bomb and the improvement of intercontinental delivery systems made a solution of the problem of mankind more urgent, but the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the conquest of outer space made its solution increasingly difficult. The unexpectedly rapid rise of Communist China and liberation of colonial Africa brought an unpredictable challenge to the political supremacy of the two superpowers and to the functional capability of the 6. Toynbee, A Study of History, IX, 535. 7. Ibid., p. 544.

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United Nations Organization. Nevertheless McNeill's knowledge of history, like Toynbee's, comforted him. He recalls the epochmaking struggles of the founders of the ancient Roman and classical Chinese Empires mentioned earlier, and observes that, despite great obstacles, they were able to put an end to sanguinary periods of waning states — times of great troubles like our own. McNeill's cheerfulness, however, is duly mixed with circumspection. "The warring states of the twentieth century," he observes,8 "seem headed for a similar resolution of their conflicts, unless, of course, the chiliastic vision that haunts our time really comes true and human history ends with a bang of hydrogen nuclei and a whimper from irradiated humanity." McNeill refuses to be frightened by this latter prospect. " A logical terminus," he suggests, to the expansion of political scale in the contemporary world "would be the creation of a single world sovereignty." 9 His confidence in the capability of logic, however, to determine the course of human events in a world composed of human beings so nonrationally or even irrationally constituted as the masses of mankind seem to him to be, is imperfect. W h a t his vision of the future leads him to conclude is, in his own words,10 that "foresight, cautious resolution, sustained courage never before had such opportunities to shape our lives and those of subsequent generations." McNeill does not profess to foresee the actual course of events and deliberately neglects to speculate on the future of the United Nations. "A suitable political frame for such a society," he thinks, 11 "might arise through sudden victory and defeat in war, or piecemeal through a more gradual encapsulation of a particular balance of world power within a growingly effective international bureaucracy." He apparently regards the contemporary political scene as the arena of a final contest for supremacy between two 8. 9. 10. 11.

McNeill, The Rise of the West, p. 807. Ibid., p. 795. Ibid., p. 807. Ibid., p. 806.

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bellicose superpowers, one of which may eventually overpower the other and dominate the world after its own fashion. But he allows for the possibility that reason may prevail over force or accident and bring about a tolerably peaceful world order by an evolutionary process in which a highly speculative balance of power may be gradually transformed into a durable

world

organization. This possibility, he finally concludes, 12 should be enough to give "good and wise men in all parts of the world" such peace of mind as is proper for a world where human achievement will not have lost its savor. Realistic pacifists, I believe, will find in the thinking of these two great historians much to strengthen their faith in the peace cause. It is clear that the United Nations Organization needs extensive strengthening. All independent states should be represented in it, and the principle of sovereign equality should be properly interpreted and applied to its structure and procedures. Iceland cannot carry the same weight in world affairs as the United Kingdom; Luxembourg cannot carry the same weight as France, nor Albania the same weight as the Soviet Union, nor Mongolia the same as China. India, to say nothing of other lesser powers, should carry more weight than the Maldive Islands. It is not the equality of states that is required for a serviceable world order but the equality of people. If the U . N . cannot be reorganized so as to meet the requirements of the nuclear age, the human community will have to find a more suitable instrument of government. Perhaps the international disarmament organization proposed in the official American plan for general and complete disarmament could be developed so as to compensate for some of the more serious deficiencies in the U . N . Organization. T h e military nuclear powers will have to be persuaded to consent to the necessary and proper improvements in the organization of peace. T h e civil nuclear powers should presently possess more persuasive 12. Ibid., p. 807.

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arguments than heretofore for a better arrangement of the organs of world authority. W i t h greater experience the lesser states should be helpful in creating a suitable climate of opinion for the effective functioning of a stronger world organization. There is much in the present state of world affairs to brighten the hopes of realistic pacifists and other good and wise men of foresight, cautious resolution, and sustained courage. T h e example of the statesmen who have been most successful in organizing interstate peace within federal unions is timely and instructive. It is not the details of the compromises that made the American national-federal union possible which are helpful to contemporary workers in the peace cause. The work of the framers of the American federal constitution must be judged in the light of the conditions of their age. It is the spirit in which the compromises were made and the skill of the framers in meeting the conditions of their special problem that call for the attention of ambitious and realistic leaders in the struggle for a better world order in the near future. T h e capability of wise political leadership is best exemplified for Americans by the leadership of George Washington in the struggle for a more perfect union of the American people. T h e struggle for a more perfect union of the people of the contemporary world will be aided by precept as well as by example. T h e eloquent words of forward-looking, courageous statesmen like President John F . Kennedy and churchmen like Pope John X X I I I will help greatly to lead the nations toward their rational goal. A viable world order, however, will rest on a broader basis than any strictly Western reign of law. Far Eastern political ethics will play an important role in fashioning a suitable political frame for the coming world community. All the great peoples of history will make their particular contributions to the common stock of useful political ideas. T h e peace cause has made great gains since Edwin Ginn first went to Lake Mohonk to join his pacifist friends in their

324]

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hopeful talks about international arbitration. Arbitration presently gave way to international organization as the favorite topic of pacifist conversation. Thereafter, workers in the cause grew bolder and began to talk directly about world government. World government, national security, general and complete disarmament: these three have become the associated ideas which give vitality to current planning for peace. The great merit of the way of thinking that animates the contemporary peace cause is not any complacent assurance of future victory in an uncertain struggle for a duly organized universal community, but rather the peace of mind and concomitant purposefulness which this way of thinking is able to bring now to anguished mortals in a troubled world. Franklin D. Roosevelt's fourth freedom, freedom from fear, possesses a double meaning for Americans. It means not only freedom for the American citizen from the fear of a ruinous war. It means also freedom for the American government from responsibility for the single-handed policing of a suspicious and uncooperative world. The venerable image of Uncle Sam must not be disfigured by marks of worry over his performance in the unaccustomed role of pistol-toting trigger-happy vigilante. This precious image must continue to be that of a law-abiding and serene guardian of the commonwealth.

Index

Acheson, Dean, 40 Adams, John, 35, 146 Adams, John Quincy, 146 Administration, international: adaptation to needs of nuclear age, 295-296 Africa, 9 Aggression: definition of, 4; AngloFrench and Israeli, 52, 57; indirect, nature of, 231 Aid, foreign. See Foreign aid Alabama, 159, 204 Albania, 322 American government, 2 1 ; relations with United Nations, 34-36, 4044, 58-63. See also Congress of the United States; Power, presidential; United States American University, 177, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 , 212 Anti-federalists, 83 Arabs, 62 Arbitration: international, 2, 158, 161,175 Argentina, 1 1 8 - 1 2 7 passim Armaments: limitations of, 1 5 9 1 6 1 , 1 6 5 ; regulation under United Nations Charter, 273-285 Articles of Confederation, 74, 78, 79, 81, 103, 197, 198 Articles of Union, 75, 97, 98 Asia, 9 Austin, Warren, 236

Baghdad Pact, 235 Bandung neutrals, 235 Beard, Charles Α., 148 Bliven, Bruce, Jr., 93 Boers, 159 Brant, Irving, 91, 95 Brazil, 1 1 8 , 1 2 0 , 1 2 1 , 122, 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 , 297 Brearley, David, 85, ι ο ί Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1945, 29-30 Bricker, John W . , 4 1 , 4 3 Britain, 54, 77, 99, 204, 206; and Lend-Lease, 24, 27; and United Nations sovereign equality, 64-65, 322; party government in, 1 5 3 154; and the balance of power, 159-160, 184, 188 British Guiana, 204 Bryce, James, 196 Buchanan, James, 85, 1 2 6 Buenos Aires, 120 Byrnes, James F., 39 Calhoun, John C., 250 Canada, 297 Carnegie, Andrew, 173, 174 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 174 Chaco, 23 Charlesbank Homes, 1 1 , 172, 177, 181

326]

Index

Chase, Salmon P., 1 2 7 Checks and balances, 82, 84, 1 5 5 China, 9, 24, 1 7 0 , 203, 3 0 6 - 3 2 2 passim; Aid Act, 25, 27; representation in United Nations, 3 1 4 3 1 6 . See also Chinese Communists; Chinese Nationalists Chinese Communists, 87, 1 8 7 , 207, 31 iff. Chinese Nationalists, 186, 2 3 5 Churchill, Winston, 26, 72 Clark, Grenville, 180, 2 0 1 , 3 0 1 , 306,

307

Clausewitz, Karl von, 227, 255 Clay, Henry, 1 4 3 , 250 Cleveland, Grover, 1 5 4 , 204 Clinton, George, 80 Coercion, peace-keeping by. See Peace-keeping Colombia, 297 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 167, 269, 283 Commitments, foreign, 2 2 - 3 6 passim Community, world. See World community Confederationists, 80, 83 Conference: United Nations charter-review, 8, 9 Congo, 1 9 1 , 197, 209 Congress of the United States, 40, 43, 55, 1 2 3 , 1 2 5 , 1 4 3 , 144, 159· See also Constitution of the United States; Government Connecticut, 79, 80 Connecticut Compromise, 83, 84,

85,92

Constitution of the United States, 4 0 - 4 3 , 55, 104, 1 1 5 - 1 1 9 passim, 158; fathers of, 85-86; framing of, 88-94, 1 0 5 - 1 0 9 . See also Government; Washington, George Constitutional Convention of 1 7 8 7 , 75, 92, 93, 94, 104, 106 Continental Army of the Revolution, 1 9 7 Continental Congress, 74, 78, 79, 1 1 5 , 197, 198

Controversies, interstate: adjustment

of, 128-132

Council of National Ministers, 1 1 1 , 137 Crown Colonies, 77 Cuba, 3 1 5 Curtiss-Wright Export Company Case, 29 Declaration

140

of

Independence,

78,

Declaration of Rights, Virginia, 96 Declaration of the Second Dublin Conference, 2 0 1 , 2 1 3 Delaware, 83 De Lolme, Jean Louis, 77 Democracy, 1 4 - 1 6 , 1 9 - 2 1 , 5 1 , 196, 2 7 9 - 2 8 1 . See also Partisanship Democrats. See Party, political Dewey, Thomas S., 40 Dickinson, John, 83 Diplomacy: parliamentary, 292-293 Disarmament, 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 6 3 , 176; general and complete, 166, 1 6 8 - 1 7 1 ; American plan for, 1 2 , 2 1 , 3 1 9 , 322 Dred Scott versus Sandford, 1 2 6 Dual Alliance, 1 8 5 Dyer versus Sims, 1 3 0 East Asia, 170. See also South East Asia Treaty Organization Economic Cooperation Act ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 25, 26 Economic Cooperation Administration, 25 Edward V I I , 1 8 5 Egypt, 54, 56 Einstein, Albert, 199 Eisenhower, Dwight D . , 40, 53, 60, 63; as party leader, 1 4 1 - 1 5 3 ; attitude toward war, 170, 2 1 6 , 259 Eisenhower Doctrine, 54, 56-59, 62 Elections, popular, 3 0 1 - 3 0 4 Ellsworth, Oliver, 83, 92, 1 0 2 , 1 0 7 ,

108, 109

England, 108. See also Britain Equality, sovereign: definition of,

Index 45; principle of, 5, 63-65, 308309 European Movement, 1 1 1 , 1 1 4 , 136 European union, 256 Export-Import Bank, 30 Farrand, Max, 92 Federal Convention of 1787, 75, 76, 89. See also Constitutional Convention of 1787 Federal Reserve System, 30 Federal union, 73, 75, 87 Federalism, 1 1 3 - 1 1 5 ; world, 158, 177 Federalist party, 84, 150 Federalists, original, 81, 83, 85 Fitzpatrick, John C., 92 Food and Agriculture Organization, 68 Force: military, role of in federal systems, 136-140; international police, 162, 175, 176 Foreign aid: economic, 22-26; military, 26-27 Foreign affairs: conduct of, 37-40, 48, 53-55 Foreign Assistance Act, 25 Formosa, 186. See also Taiwan Foundation for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 167 Fourteenth Amendment, 1 3 3 , 140. See also Constitution of the United States France, 64, 65, 108, 186, 187, 188, 322 Franco-Russian Alliance, 159, 322 Franklin, Benjamin, 83, 92, 93, 1 0 1 , 108, 109 Freedom: political, 14, 15; Roosevelt's fourth, 324. See also Liberty Freeman, Douglas Southall, 90, 91, 93 Gallup poll, 152 Gardner, Richard N., 214 Geneva, disarmament meeting at, 12, 163, 166 Genocide Convention (1949), 43 George, Walter F., 44

[ 327

Georgia, 79 Germany, 9, 14, 38, 159, 160, 192, 299 Ghana, 234 Ginn, Edwin: successful businessman, 1; founder of World Peace Foundation, 2; definition of peace, 2-4; vision of world peace, 9 - 1 0 , 172-199; commitment to world government, 1 1 , 200-215; peace strategy, 323 Gorham, Nathaniel, 84, 90, 102 Government: constitutional, 88, 155; republican form of, 123; international, 162. See also American government; Party government; World government Greece, 24 Greek-Turkish Aid Act (1947), 27, 56, 59 Greek world, 1 6 Grier, Robert, 126 Guinea, 234 Hague Peace Conference, 1 5 9 - 1 8 5 passim, 206 Hale, Edward Everett, 205 Hamilton, Alexander, 74, 77, 96, 99, 107, 108 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 258 Harrison, William Henry, 143 Harvard University, 178 Hayes, Rutherford B., 146 Hiroshima, 199 Holy Roman Empire, 19 Hoover Commission on Organization of Executive Branch, 33 House of Representatives. See Congress of the United States Humphreys, David, 9 4 , 1 0 4 Hungary, 53, 87 Hutchins, Robert M., 2 1 2 Iceland, 306, 322 Imperialism, modern, 173 Imperialists, 77, 99 India, 277, 297, 303, 307, 322 Indonesia, 303 Interest, public: nature of, 48-52,

328]

Index

70, 227-231; universal reality of, 70-72 International: guard or police force, 175, 178; executive, 178; parliament, 178; supreme court, 178 International Atomic Energy Agency, 69, 264-266, 271 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 68 International Civil Aviation Organization, 68 International Cooperation Year, 168, 2 1 3 International Court of Justice, 6, 1 8 9 - 1 9 7 passim, 219, 259, 263; and trial of war criminals, 6 International Labor Organization, 69, 264 International Law Commission, 261 International Monetary Fund, 68 International Peace Congress, 1 6 1 , 174,175 International School of Peace, 162 International Telecommunications Union, 69 Intervention, federal, n 8 f f . , i28ff. Iraq, 219 Irigoyen, Hipölito, 1 1 9 Israel, 52, 62 Italy, 65, 2 1 9 Jackson, Andrew, 88, 123, 124, 126, 143, 145, 154 Jacksonian party, 250 Japan, 235 Jay, John, 35, 38, 99, 146 Jefferson, Thomas, 88, 90, 99, 108, 150 Johnson, Andrew, 126, 146 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 40 Johnson, William Samuel, 83, 107 Jurisdiction, domestic: definition of, 45-46 Justice, 1 Kant, Immanuel, 1 5 8 , 1 8 2 , 183 Kellogg Pact, 6, 260 Kennedy, John F., 1 1 , 1 3 , 165-166, 177, 2 1 0 - 2 1 2 , 323

Khrushchev, Nikita S., 166, 273 King, Rufus, 85, 91, 96, 1 0 1 , 102, 108 Knox, Henry, 94 Korea, 9, 1 8 6 , 1 9 2 , 299 Kuomintang, 27 Lafayette, Marquis de, 105 LaFollette, Robert M., 149 Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 158, 174, 177, 204, 205, 206 Latin American republics, 86, 1 1 8 128 passim, 135, 1 3 6 Law, international, 7, 19 Lawmaking, international, 67, 6870, 260-273; adaptation to needs of nuclear age, 293-295 League of Nations, 2-4, 39, 163, 184-187, 207, 209, 287, 300 League to Enforce Peace, 162 Legislation, international: development under United Nations Charter, 260—273 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 34 Lend-Lease Act (1941), 24 Liberty, 1 , 44, 46, 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 Lie, Trygvie, 258 Lincoln, Abraham, 85-86, 1 1 2 , 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 , 1 2 8 , 136, 140 "Little Europe," 1 3 6 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 236 Lowell, A. Lawrence, 178 Lubell, Samuel, 149, 150 Luther versus Borden, 122, 123, 1 2 5 Luxembourg, 322 McCarthy, Joseph, 144, 145, 1 5 1 McNeill, William H., 3 1 9 - 3 2 1 Madison, James, 74, 78, 85, 90-97, 9 9 - 1 1 7 passim Malaya, 234 Maldive Islands, 322 Marshall, George C., 39, 40 Marshall Plan, 26 Martin, Luther, 1 1 7 Maryland, 82 Marx, Karl, 80

Index Marxism, 49 Marxist Leninism, 196, 229 Mason, George, 96, 103, 1 1 7 Massachusetts, 79, 84, 85, 1 0 1 , 103, 108 Middle East, 54, 56, 59, 60, 197 Mill, John Stuart, 173 Miller, Samuel F., 127 Missouri Compromise, 126 Mongolia, 322 Monroe, James, 90 Monroe Doctrine, 1 3 Montesquieu, 77 Morris, Gouverneur, 85, 9 1 , 1 0 1 103, 106, 108, 109 Morris, Robert, 105, 106, 107, 108 Moscow, ruling circles in, 87. See also Marxism Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 67 National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation, 168 National Security Council, 30 National Security Resources Board, 30 Nationalists, American, 78, 83, 85 Neutrals, independent, 235 New Hampshire, 82 New Jersey, 80, 85 New Jersey Plan, 79, 80-82, 102, 1 1 6 , 1 1 8 ; coercion of states under, 116, 117 New York, 43, 79, 80 Nigeria, 303 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 66, 67, 235, 254-255 North Carolina, 79 Nuremberg, 6, 295 Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, 130 Organization: international disarmament, 12. See also Disarmament; United Nations Organization Organization for Trade Cooperation, 69 Organization of American States, 207, 235

[ 329

Pacem in Tenis, 167, 212 Pact of Paris, 296. See also Kellogg Pact Pakistan, 303 Palestine, 1 9 1 , 209 Panama, 64 Partisanship: systems of, 1 4 9 - 1 5 6 Party, monopolistic ideological, 87 Party, political: function in federal systems, 1 3 2 - 1 3 6 ; role in American government, 1 4 1 - 1 4 9 ; role under United Nations Charter, 249-260, 284-285; international, role in nuclear age, 3 1 0 - 3 1 5 . See also names of specific political parties Party government, 80-81, 88, 155; systems under United Nations Charter, 249-260, 284-285; adaptation to needs of nuclear age, 289-292, 3 1 7 - 3 1 8 ; form in future world politics, 3 1 3 - 3 1 7 Paterson, William, 8 1 , 1 1 7 Peace, passim; definition of, 2, 1 7 7 179; interstate, 73-75; quest for in nuclear age, 216-226. See also Peace-keeping; World peace Peace-keeping: art of, 3, 184-188; coercion of states as a means of, 75-76, 85-87, 1 1 0 - 1 1 7 ; methods under United Nations Charter, 220-224, 288-298; Ways and Means Committee, 3 1 7 , 318. See also Power, balance of; United Nations Peking, ruling circles in, 87. See also Marxism Pennsylvania, 79, 83, 8 5 , 1 0 1 , 1 0 6 Pentagon, 59 Ρ iron, Juan, 1 2 1 Philosophy, political, 158, 1 8 2 - 1 8 3 Pinckney, Charles, 77, 96, 99 Plan. See New Jersey Plan; Virginia Plan Politics. See Philosophy, political Politics, international: nature of, 226-232; under United Nations Charter, 232-249; new, 3 1 2 - 3 1 7 Pope John X X I I I , 167, 212, 323

330 ]

Index

Pope Paul VI, 212, 213 Populists, 148 Positivism, 158 Power: balance of, 3; balance of as a system of peace-keeping, 1 8 4 186, 286-288; civil, supremacy of over military authority, 135, 136; lawmaking, of United Nations, 6;-68, 72; legislative, need for under United Nations Charter, 138-140; presidential, 18, 28-29, 33-34, 141; presidential, effect of relations with United Nations upon, 34-36, 40-44, 53-58 Powers: separation of, 82, 84; middle, leadership in nuclear age, 297-298; nuclear, 309-311 Prerogative, presidential, 18. See also Power, presidential Presidency, 23, 150. See also Commitments, foreign; Power, presidential; Prerogative, presidential Process: legislative, 7; administrative, 29-33 Progress, 14; belief in, 183-184; political, belief in, 195-199 Progressives, LaFollette, 149 Propaganda: use of United Nations for, 52-53; cold-war, 164 Rabinowitch, Eugene, 70 Randolph, Edmund, 78, 91, 96, 97, 102-104, !o8 Reconstruction: policy of, 1 2 4 - 1 2 7 Reconstruction Act of 1867, 126 Republicans. See Party, political Retaliation, massive: doctrine of, 187 Rhode Island, 82, 122, 123 Roman Empire, 170, 203 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 33, 39, 154, 288, 324 Roosevelt, Theodore, 45, 206 Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement, 42 Russia, Czar of, 159, 160. See also Soviet Union Rutledge, John, 8 4 , 1 0 2 , 1 0 8 Salisbury, Lord, 204

San Francisco, 8, 9, 67, 188, 208 Scandinavian states, 297 Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 165, 166 School of peace, 175. See also International School of Peace Schumpeter, Joseph Α., 149 Security, collective: under United Nations Charter, 286-298 Senate. See Congress of the United States Shaw, Bernard, 203 Sherman, Roger, 85, 101, 103, 108 Sherwood, Robert E., 24 Shotwell, James T., 69 Siege, state of, 1 1 9 , 1 2 1 Smiley, Albert K., 204 Sohn, Louis B., 180, 301, 306, 307 Sorensen, Theodore C., 2 1 1 South Africa, 159, 217 South Carolina, 79, 84, 102, 103, 122 South East Asia Treaty Organization, 235 Sovereign equality. See Equality, sovereign Sovereignty: state, 170 Soviet Union, 64, 144, 187-188, 209, 217-277 passim, 307-322 passim; and Lend-Lease, 24; and military coercion of member states, 86-87; and United States, plans for disarmament, 164, 168 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 66 Spain, 204 Spencer, Herbert, 158, 173 States: United Nations member, classification of, 299-306; ordinary, role of in nuclear age, 3 1 0 311 Stevenson, Adlai E., 149 Stoessinger, John G., 265 Suez Canal, 52, 54, 57, 67, 70 Swayne, Noah, 127 Sweden, 219 Switzerland, 9, 299 Taft, Robert Α., 143, 144, 295 Taft, William Howard, 206 Taiwan: representation in United

Index Nations, 3 1 4 - 3 1 6 . See also Formosa Taylor, Zachaiy, 1 4 3 , 1 4 6 Test Ban Treaty ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 166 Texas versus White, 1 2 2 , 1 2 5 , 1 2 6 , 127 Thant, U , 2 1 0 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 250 Tokyo, 295 Toynbee, Arnold J., 3 1 9 - 3 2 1 Triple Alliance, 1 5 9 , 1 8 5 Truman, Harry S., 40, 56, 58, 62 Truman Doctrine, 27, 35, 39, 55 Tuchman, Barbara W . , 1 5 9 , 1 6 3 Tunisia, 2 1 9 Turkey, 24 Tyler, John, 1 2 4 , 1 4 3 , 1 4 6 Union, European federal, 1 1 1 Union party, 1 2 7 Unionists, 84 United Arab Republic, 303 United Nations, passim. See specific entries following United Nations Charter, 54, 5 ; , 1 5 7 , 1 9 3 , 289; advances over League of Nations Covenant, 4, 1 6 3 , 186; and United States, 35, 39, 42, 59; present shortcomings and future potential, 44, 70, 72, 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 , 198, 259; specific provisions, 58, 1 9 1 - 1 9 3 ; at twentieth anniversary of framing, 208-209. See also Conference, United Nations charter-review United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1 1 2 , 1 3 9 United Nations Conference on International Organization, 8, 188 United Nations Economic and Social Council, 190 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 68 United Nations General Assembly, 5, 52, 66, 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 , 188, 198, 2 1 2 ; membership, 5, 1 9 1 - 1 9 2 ; voting in, 5, 64, 2 3 4 - 2 4 1 ; lawmaking powers, 7, 66, 1 3 8 , 1 9 2 -

[331

1 9 3 , 198; addressed by John F . Kennedy, 1 1 , 1 3 , 2 1 0 ; and United States, 34, 35, 54-60 passim, 64, 7 1 ; and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 43, 138; power blocs in, 49-50, 64-65, 208, 2 4 1 248; and disarmament, 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 ; at twentieth anniversary of United Nations, 208-209 United Nations Military Staff Committee, 164, 1 6 5 United Nations Organization, 6 3 68, 7 1 , 208-209, 2 1 6 - 2 1 8 , 3 1 1 ; and United States, 4 1 , 48, 58, 63; and sovereign equality, 4 5 46, 64-65; necessary strengthening, 47, 67-68, 70, 226; establishment of, 5-8, 265-266 United Nations Participation Act, 34 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 22 United Nations Secretariat, 1 6 5 , 190 United Nations Secretary General, 210. See also names of secretaries general United Nations Security Council, 7, 1 0 , 49, 64, 1 6 4 - 1 9 3 passim, 2 7 3 278, 2 8 1 - 2 8 5 ; establishment of, 4, 5, 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 , 195; and sovereign equality, 5, 64; and United States, 34, 35, 55, 59, 7 1 ; strengthening of, 1 3 8 , 282ff., 292-297; peacekeeping capability, 223-224, 273ff. United Nations Trusteeship Council, 190, 198 United Nations World Health Organization, 68 United Nations World Meteorological Organization, 68 United States: nationalist plan for government of, 73, 74, 78; military coercion of states in, 140; disarmament plan, 166, 1 6 8 - 1 7 0 ; sense of world community, 1 6 7 , 2 1 3 ; tactical policy in United Nations, 209, 2 1 9 , 3 1 4 . See also

332 ]

Index

American government; Congress of the United States United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 168 United World Federalists, 212 Uniting for Peace Resolution, 221 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 41, 43, 1 1 2 , 138 Universal Postal Union, 69 Van Buren, Martin, 154 Vandenberg, Arthur, 39 Vargas, Getulio, 1 2 1 Venezuela, 204 Versailles, 4, 163, 185 Victorians, 14, 15 Vietnam, 9, 192, 208, 299 Vinson, Carl, 3 5, 39 Virginia: delegation to Constitutional Convention, 7 5 - 1 1 5 passim. See also Declaration of Rights, Virginia Virginia Plan, 7 4 - 1 1 8 passim; preparation of, 75; fate of, 97-104; coercion of states under, 1 1 5 117. See also Virginia War: American with Mexico, 38; American revolutionary, 73; American civil, 84, 122, 124, 126, 133, 204; cold, conduct of under United Nations Charter, 224226, 273-285; Hungarian civil, 253; classical theory of, 255; revised Muscovite theory of, 3 1 1 312. See also Peace; World War I; World War II Washington, George, 35-83 passim, 88-109, 146, i97> 208, 323 Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 168

Webster, Daniel, 250 Wedemeyer, Albert, 27 West Virginia, 129, 130, 1 3 1 Whig party, 250. See also Whigs Whigs, 80, 81, 88, 143, 144, 145, 250. See also Whig party; Party, political White House Conference on International Cooperation, 168, 213 Willkie, Wendell, 52 Wilson, James, 78, 91, 92, ι ο ί , 106, 108 Wilson, Woodrow, 3, 14, 154, 183, 287 Wisconsin, 144 World community: sense of, 10, 207-210; outlook for further growth, 2 1 0 - 2 1 4 World government, 1 6 1 , 1 7 8 - 1 8 1 , 201-203; prospects for, 203-207, 215, 318-324; representation of peoples in, 306-308 World peace, 1, 9, n , 16; establishment of, 1 7 0 - 1 7 1 , 1 8 1 - 1 8 2 ; tests for existence of, 189-194. See also Peace; Peace-keeping World Peace Foundation, 2, 9, 162-182 passim, 202 World War I, 38, 39, 130, 162, 184, 196 World War II, 6, 18, 39, 65, 184, 186; and permanent members of United Nations Security Council, 4, 5, 164; victors, membership of in United Nations, 5 , 1 8 6 , 192 Wythe, George, 96 Yates, Robert, 80 Yugoslavia, 297