A Quest for Belonging: Anatolia Beyond Empire and Nation (19th-21st Centuries) 9781463225582

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A Quest for Belonging

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

97

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies are brought together in Analecta Isisiana. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

A Quest for Belonging

Anatolia Beyond Empire and Nation (19th-21st Centuries)

Hans-Lukas Kieser

The Isis Press, Istanbul

QÛÏQiaS pre** 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2007 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

o

ISBN 978-1-61719-103-9

Printed in the United States of America

Hans-Lukas Kieser is a Privatdozent of Modern History at the University of Zurich and has been a visiting Professor in Paris, Bamberg (Germany) and Istanbul.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction Part I: Challenging Ottoman Identities 1. Missionary America and Ottoman Turkey. The seminal break of World War I 2. Ottoman Urfa and its Western missionaries 3. Muslim heterodoxy and Protestant Utopia. The interactions between Alevis and missionaries in Ottoman Anatolia 4. Les Kurdes Alévis et la question identitaire: le soulèvement du Koçkiri-Dersim (1919-21) 5. The Anatolian Alevis' ambivalent encounter with modernity in late Ottoman and early Republican Turkey Part II: Born at the Fin de siècle 6. Dr MehmedReshid (1873-1919): a political doctor 7. Beatrice Rohner ( 1876-1947) and the Armenian genocide 8. Ethno-nationalist revolutionary and theorist of Kemalism: Dr Mahmut Esat Bozkurt ( 1892-1943) 9. "Garib ellerde ve bî-kestim": l'exil chez Nun Dersimi (1892-1973) 10. Alevilik as song and dialogue: the village sage Melûli Baba (1892-1989) Part III: From Imperial Thinking to Turkish Ethno-Nationalism 11. Djihad, Weltordnung, 'Goldener Apfel'. Die osmanische Reichsideologie im Kontext west-östlicher Geschieht 12. Turkey's elite diaspora in Switzerland (1860s to 1920s) 13. Macro et micro histoire autour de la Conférence sur le ProcheOrient tenue à Lausanne en 1922-23 14. Modernisierung und Gewalt in der Gründungsepoche des türkischen Nationalstaats (1913-1938) 15. Die Herausbildung des türkisch-nationalen Geschichtsdiskurses (spätes 19,-Mitte 20. Jahrhundert) 16. Türkische Nationalrevolution, anthropologisch gekrönt: Kemal Atatürk und Eugène Pittard

11 67 115 133 165

180 219 235 245 257

271 293 325 337 355 395

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Part IV: Facing History; European Candidacy 17. Deplorable, unavoidable, functional, salutary: some remarks on the élites' acceptance of mass violence around World War I 18. Armeniermord 1915/16 19. Armenians, Turks, and Europe in the shadow of World War I: recent historiographical developments 20. Spätosmanischer Brudermord. Zeit, die Toten des Ersten Weltkriegs zu begraben 21. Geschichtliche Verantwortung und Rechtskultur statt Kulturpathos. Zum Historikerstreit über die Türkei und die Grenzen Europas

473

Index of Names

489

411 435 445 465

INTRODUCTION:

A Quest for Belonging: Anatolia beyond Empire and Nation (19th-21st centuries) This book brings together a number of essays that I wrote in the last twelve years. Their common theme is the question of, and the quest for, Anatolia's historical identity. This quest for identity became more and more urgent towards the end of the Ottoman Empire and it still continues today. In some important respect, Anatolia and the people living in, or coming from, Anatolia have not yet been able to find huzur, the peace of mind and social peace they rightly aspire to. Therefore, the question of, and quest for, belonging still is prominent. Huzur, in my view, must be based on a sovereign and all-encompassing understanding of one's own identity and history beyond imperial, national or religious constraints. The pictures on the cover of this book tell stories of the quest for belonging in Anatolia. One revealing story concerns Mustafa Kemal A tat (irk, the central figure in the building of a Turkish nation-state in Anatolia. In the picture we see him in his villa Florya, on the Sea of Marmara, together with the renowned anthropologist Eugène Pittard and Pittard's wife, the author Noëlle Roger. Pittard was his friend and Ph.D. supervisor of Ayge Afetinan, Atatiirk's adoptive daughter, at the University of Geneva. When Pittard met him, Atatiirk was on the look out for pre-historical and linguistic evidence to prove both Anatolia's belonging to the Turkish race and its cultural ties with Europe. This is what he was doing on this afternoon in September 1937, when the picture was taken, shortly before the second Turkish Congress of History in Istanbul, a meeting of the intellectual elite of the young Republic of Turkey. The quest for pre-historical foundation of the Turkist (Turkish ethno-nationalist) claim has always led to a dead-end. But the quest itself is meaningful and instructive if we know how to understand and contextualize its failure.1 The situation on the second picture is completely different. Here we see a woman holding a book while teaching a crowd of rural people in the open air. This is not, of course, the communist penetration of rural youth which happened in Anatolia in the 1960s and 1970s. It took place some seventy years earlier, when Christian missionaries, mostly American, sent out native 1

See below ch. 16.

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women as bible teachers to the villages. The scene is near the village Çûriikkoz west of Marash. The Protestant vision of Asia Minor as a promising "Bible Land" corresponded with that of the socialist youth of the 1960s in as much as it focussed upon underprivileged people and believed in a universal modern social Utopia to be realized in the near future. But it was entirely different as far as the means were concerned. Moreover missionary teaching in village schools and colleges particularly targeted Ottoman minorities and thus implemented a first stage in the Westernization of Anatolia. Armenians were the most diligent students of those missionaries. The destruction of Christianity in Anatolia during and after World War I was a catastrophic failure of the missionaries' project for Anatolia. Their educative, cultural and historiographical impact, however, proved to be lasting.1 All these nationalist, universalist-utopian, or culturally Westernizing agencies, which struggled for Anatolia's belonging and its future by peaceful or violent means, seriously challenged traditional identities and hierarchies within the Ottoman world. "Challenging Ottoman Identities" is the title of the first part of this book. Besides looking at Americans and other Western missionaries in the late Ottoman world, this first part deals with Kurds and Alevis, two partly overlapping groups which since the 16th century had never fully, nor with equal rights, been integrated into the Ottoman order. 2 In late Ottoman times, both groups were, therefore, particularly susceptible to new ideas that seemed to promise them a better future, e.g. an autonomous Kurdistan according to President Wilson's principle of self-determination as claimed by the protagonists of the Koçkiri uprising. The strongly centralist and Turkist Republic, as it was established in the Interwar period in Anatolia, could not, or only very partly, fulfil their long held expectations. Part II focusses upon the biographies of five very different people, all "born at the Fin de siècle", three of them in the same year 1892, who spent most of their lives in the late Ottoman and the early post-Ottoman world. Their biographies reflect the hopes, ruptures and interactions between Ottomans and Europeans of their time. Mehmed Re§id was a founder of the Committee Union and Progress at the Military Medical School in Istanbul, which was then a secret committee of patriotic students opposed to sultan Abdulhamid II and eager to save the Empire. Dr Regid was to become an antiChristian hardliner during the Balkan Wars and World War I. In contrast, Beatrice Rohner, a missionary teacher from Basel, had lived in Anatolia since 1900. In 1915-1917 she led efforts in and around Aleppo to save Armenians whom the CUP regime had deported and condemned to die in the desert.

1

See below chapters 1-3. "Alevi" is the term for a number of different groups whose common characteristics are the adoration of Ali, the fourth caliph; their refusal of the Shari'a; an almost exclusively oral tradition; and an age-old history of marginalization under the Sultans after 1500. 2

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Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, born in 1892, was a Young Turk of a second, firmly Turkist generation. In the 1910s he did his Ph.D. in law in Switzerland, became Minister of Justice of the newly founded Republic in 1924 and transferred the Swiss Civil Code to Turkey in 1926. The long exile in Syria of the Kurdish nationalist Nuri Dersimi testifies to the failure of the Kurdist project in the interwar period in contrast to the Turkish nationbuilding in the whole of Anatolia. Dersimi's name indicates his origin from the Dersim, a mountainous region and Alevi stronghold in Eastern Anatolia, where he was born in 1892. Meluli Baba (1892-1989), too, was an Eastern Anatolian Alevi with Kurdish roots. In contrast to Dersimi this "village sage" and Bektagi poet, who had been educated in a provincial Armenian high school, managed to live a self-determined and remarkably un-ideological, spiritual life in Anatolia through all the transformations of the 20th century. Part III addresses the principal change in Anatolia in the 20th century: the transformation of multi-cultural and multi-religious Ottoman Asia Minor to a centralist Turkish nation-state in the period between 1913, the establishment of the CUP dictatorial regime, and 1938, when Atatiirk died and the military campaign against the Dersim came to an end. This part particularly focuses upon mental, intellectual and ideological history, i.e. the winding road "from imperial thinking to Turkish ethno-nationalism" as its title states. Part III begins with an essay on Ottoman imperial ideology since the 16th century and follows the transformation, in the early 20th century, of the traditionally imperialist motive of the Golden Apple to a symbol of the reconstruction of Anatolia by means of modern education. This part also deals with the role of a political and academic Ottoman diaspora in Europe, particularly Switzerland, the Conference of Lausanne in 1922-1923, the development of a Turkish post-Ottoman historiography in the first half of the 20th century, and the interactions between Atatiirk and Pittard. Part IV, the final part, examines one of the most explosive historical topics internationally, the destruction of Anatolia's Armenian population during World War I. On the basis of extensive recent research, it describes this darkest chapter of the First World War's human catastrophe, analyzes the political elites' acceptance of mass violence in the early 20th century and investigates why, in contrast to Europe after World War II, Turkey was not able, nor in a position, to chase away the demons of the past. But things have recently started to move, at least outside Turkish officialdom, as recent historiographical developments show. Facing the history of 1915-1917, the memory of which has for long time been suppressed for political reasons, and assuming the responsibility for it, are two of the major challenges not only for Turkey on the road towards entry into the European Union, but particularly for Anatolia and for all people in and from Anatolia in their quest for huzur. I would like to thank Sinan Kuneralp of the Isis Press who suggested, and made possible, the publication of this volume and Hilary Kilpatrick Waardenburg, Christoph Maier and Maryse Thommen-Strasser, for the stylistic polishing of some of my English and French texts.

Äl L, ^ mir V

'

• H P I H I ¿r - • ¡ « i i i S M

y

d

*

111 ¡¡¡I

— "Bible woman" teaching a crowd west of Marash, ca. 1900 (Archiv des Deutschen Hilfsbunds f ü r christliches Liebeswerk im Orient, Bad Hombur/Germany) [for comments see the Introduction].

1. MISSIONARY AMERICA AND OTTOMAN TURKEY. THE SEMINAL BREAK OF WORLD WAR I

This paper1 argues that the First World War in Ottoman Turkey marked a fundamental break in the history of the relationship between "missionary America" and the Near East. It does so first in religious, mental and intellectual terms, but also touches briefly on diplomatic history, including relevant personal networks involved. I argue that those years were a passage from a prevailing postmillennialist, historically optimistic perspective on the "Bible lands" (for missionaries then synonymous with the Near East) to a more ambivalent perspective. In late Ottoman times American missionaries were considered on the spot as the representatives of America. Moreover they strongly influenced American diplomacy in the 1910s. While mostly suppressing the catastrophic disappointment of the 1910s, the new American attitude towards the Near East, which began to prevail in the interwar period, combined humanitarism, realpolitik, and premillennialism. This form of millennialism anticipates inevitable global catastrophes. It is true that the period of the World Wars (1914-1945) gave a tremendous impetus to a premillennialism, whose rise paralleled the fundamentalist movement in U.S. evangelicalism in the 19th century.2 But in particular the relevant experience of the postmillennialist Turkey Mission in the 1910s needs to be emphasized. The analysis of the interactions and respective perceptions of Young Turks and American missionaries in Turkey will shed light upon the emergence of a specific blend of American gestures, expectations and attitudes towards the late Ottoman and post Ottoman world. The term "Young Turks" designates on the one hand the broad oppositional, constitutional movement against the sultan Abdulhamid II (ruled 1876-1909) who pursued an autocratic policy of Islamic unity. On the other hand "Young Turks" is mostly used as a synonym for the strongest political group within that opposition, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). This Committee took control of

Unpublished paper, first intitled "American missionaries and the Young Turks: Hope and disappointment - a seminal break (1908-1923)", read on 21 November 2005 at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) in Washington, Panel "American Protestant Missionaries and Their Influence in the Middle East, 19th-(early)20th Centuries". For a good introduction to the topic of premillennialism in America see Boyer, Paul S., When time shall be no more: prophecy belief in modern American culture, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 80-112.

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the Empire partly in 1908/09, and fully in 1913, leading the Empire into and through World War I. Most leaders of the Turkish War of Independence (1919— 22) and the Republic of Turkey (founded in 1923) were closely linked to the CUP until 1918. American Protestant missionaries began to be sent from the recently founded Republic of the USA to the "Bible lands" in the early 19th century. They believed in "apocalypse" i.e. in history in the light of prophetic biblical revelation ( a p o k a l y p s i s ) . At the same time, they identified with Enlightenment and liberalism in the sense of political and human rights. Together with evangelization, they therefore began early on to spread values of Enlightenment, and, most visibly, to build up modern institutions. Instead of Palestine, as was planned, Asia Minor became the central focus of missionary America. Prophecy and Enlightenment were two crucial, inseparable elements of those missionaries' intellectual world. These, together with the evangelical imperative of practical charity, guided their often lasting activities, establishing schools, hospitals, manufactories, and printing presses. This genuine and fundamental American encounter with the Middle Eastern world challenged head-on an order that was based on the dominance of Sunni Islam, submissive non-Muslim communities, and the repression or marginalization of heterodoxies. The missionaries of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) in Boston, the first and most important American organization, above all supported these non-ruling non-Sunni groups. The ABCFM combined its criticism of the Ottoman system with depreciation of Islam as a religion, culture and history. As the missionaries' idea of Islam was known to be derogatory, hostile, or at least critical, the ruling class always saw their efforts as subversive of the foundations of power. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the ruling class was deeply worried about the preservation of Sunni and Turkish domination. It believed more and more in the virtues of centralization, social homogenization and technical modernization for the reconsolidation of power. Missionaries on the contrary strove for an equal participation of non-Sunni and non-Turkish groups and the establishment of self-confident distinct identities - in some analogy to America's and especially Boston's poly-ethnic society.1 Unsurprisingly, the emergence of Islamism in the late 19th century was strongly linked to Sultan Abdulhamid's fight against "subversive" Protestantism, and not only against European imperialism. The same link also existed in the anti-Armenian violence of the 1890s, a social earthquake that caused the ABCFM to discover its responsibility for the whole Ottoman society.

Cf. Gal, Allon, "The enigma of Louis Brandei's 'Zionization': His first public Jewish address", in: Gamber, Wendy, Grossberg, Nichael, and Hartog, Hendrik (eds.), American public life and the historical imagination, Notre Dame (Indiana): University of Notre Dame Press, 2003, p. 139-162, here p. 147 f.

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In that situation, in contrast to the attitude two generations earlier, the ABCFM placed its hope in a "New Turkey", i.e. the democratic and spiritual regeneration of the Ottoman Empire. It wanted now to contribute to an Ottoman civil society, whereas eighty years earlier the pioneers of this same mission had expected the end of the Ottoman Empire together with fall of Muslim power. The ABCFM placed its hope particularly on the oppositional, constitutional opposition, the Young Turks, Abdulhamid's successors after 1908/09. It began to articulate its vision of "Young Turkey" as a "New Turkey" in a secularist language. Nonetheless missionary America's main message - the Kingdom of God in each individual, in society and coming upon the whole world - remained valid. The key term "Kingdom of God" continued to be broadly used, although its vision was mostly translated into terms of responsibility, education, charity, fraternity, etc. Its background, though, remained a strong belief in apocalyptical history progressing towards the Kingdom of God. Many leading representatives of the ABCFM hoped that the secularist discourse in the public space would finally open the door to Muslim society, or at least to its young elites of education. But this was only partly the case and for a short time, since this elite's "basic discourse" was another, nationalistic one. It was grafted onto Sunni beliefs of the Muslim ruling group's ( m i l l e t - i hakime) legitimate sovereignty, and quickly translated into Turkish ethno-nationalism (Turkism). Marked by the late Ottoman experience of territorial and political loss, this elite was dying to become full players again, instead of reactors and victims, in the national and international political game. In 1908 strong hopes of a common Ottoman future were shared by the American missionaries and the Young Turks. The belief in the Kingdom of God on Earth - the distinctive note of American Christianity - 1 indeed corresponded with Young Turkey, if understood as the project of a strong, modern and just Ottoman Near Eastern order. That History fell far short of that vision remained in a way a thorn in the flesh of both. At a unique juncture of global history America and Turkey missed each other.

1. American missionary hopes, visions, and strategies Before concentrating on ABCFM-CUP interactions and the missionary strategy of building up Ottoman citizenship after 1908, we must examine in this section more precisely what hopes the missionaries had cherished up to

Niebuhr, Helmut Richard, Der Gedanke des Gottesreichs im amerikanischen Christentum, deutsche Ausgabe von Tichard M. Honig, New York: Church World Service, 1948, p. 109.

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then, and why there was and remained a pronounced American interest in the Near East from the early 19th century on. A London paper rightly observed that "the American people are more generally and keenly interested in Turkish affairs than are the people of Great Britain", relating this to the work of American missionaries in the Near East. 1 The initial missionary strategy followed the belief in the "restoration of the Jews to Jesus and to Palestine". This palestino-centric approach was soon replaced by an armeno-centric strategy of "Christianity revived in Asia Minor", the main American missionary strategy in the Ottoman world before 1908.

Mouldings of the early 19th century The foundation of the overseas mission ABCFM in Boston in 1810 was, in a broad sense, part of the foundation period of the United States of America, a time of new departures on different levels in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The ABCFM was founded in 1810. The Declaration of Independence dates from 1776, the Great Awakening began in the 1740s, and the Second Awakening lasted from about 1770 to 1820. These Revivals were seen in terms of the end of time; society was to be remade, in America and elsewhere, in anticipation of the coming global Kingdom. "Disinterested benevolence", in contrast to individual and national egoism, was a key term of the Second Awakening. Many educational institutions were established at that time, the first overseas missions launched, and voluntary organizations emerged, among them the American Bible Society, the American Anti-Slavery Society, and the ABCFM. Before and after the establishment of the great Republic of the USA, the New World in America had indeed proved not (yet) to be the coming Golden Age. Puritan prophecy-believers hoped Palestine to be the starting point of the real Kingdom of God on earth. Missionary America was called to be its midwife. In terms of prophecy and vocation, the missionaries of the early 19th century anticipated the Wilsonian globalism of the 1910s. Politically, most of the ABCFM pioneers were progressive liberals; they belonged to groups that fought against slavery, for the women's emancipation, and the equality of the Jews in law and public life. American overseas missionaries of the 19th century had mostly graduated from universities soon to become prestigious like Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. They formed an intellectual and religious

1

Refered to in Missionary Herald July 1909, p. 281.

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avant-garde. At the beginning they met considerable resistance within the churches and society to their "audacious projects".1 In general, the missionary Protestantism of the early 19th century in the USA combined a strong, unbroken religious faith with the postulates of the Enlightenment and the successful American experience of having set up what was broadly acclaimed in the West as the most modern and democratic state on earth. In contrast to France and the French Revolution, which shaped the continental European notion of Enlightenment, in the Anglo-Saxon world religion, prophecy, and Enlightenment did not stand in a sharp antithesis. The famous physician Isaac Newton's Bible studies on the restoration of the Jews are one among many examples of this. 2 Unlike established Catholic and Protestant churches, both allied with secular power, American Protestantism, that is, the widespread Puritanism, had undergone a long history of persecution in Europe. Influenced by this experience, a strongly eschatological view of history, i.e. the vision of a teleological historical development towards the millennium or Kingdom of God on Earth, including the restoration of the Jews to Palestine and to Jesus Christ, was cultivated within Puritanism. Minority groups in Europe, particularly in Germany and Switzerland, and, with a particular stance, in Great Britain, shared these views that had emerged in marginal Protestant circles during the troubled Reformation period in the 16th century. Their roots, however, go back to the birth of Christianity and (rabbinical) Judaism, in the first and second centuries after Jesus Christ, and to the Prophetic Books of the Hebrew Bible. The apocalyptical and restorationist line of the overseas missionary project was clearly set out from the start. Despite many strategic changes and some interesting shifts, this line remained the same throughout the last Ottoman century (1820s to 1910s). The pioneers did not anticipate a destructive apocalypse (as do American premillennialists), but they understood their missionary engagement as a response to the great challenge of building the Kingdom gradually. That meant - in their postmillennialist vision preparing the world for the Lord's visible omnipresence (parousia), that should arrive without an apocalyptical break. The feeling was, as an orator See Chaney, Charles L., The Birth of Missions in America, South Pasadena, 1976, and Hutchison, William R., Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions, University of Chicago Press, 1987; Niebuhr, Gottesreich, p. 88 f.; Tibawi, Abdul Latif, American interests in Syria 1800-1901. A study of educational, literary and religious work, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 10 f.; Anderson, Rufus, Foreign Missions: their Relations and Claims, New York: Charles Scribner and Comp., 1869, p. 24-27; Anderson, Rufus, Memorial volume of the first fifty years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Boston: The Board, 1861. 2 Cf. Force, James E., und Popkin, Richard P. (Hg.), The millenarian turn: millenarian contexts of science, politics, and everyday Anglo-American life in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. p. 95-118.

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expressed it during the Fourth Annual Meeting of the ABCFM in 1813, that "Still the period is advancing; it is hastening; in which Christians will be most honourably united in the present world. The morning [...] will actually arise on this dark world, when all distinctions of party and sect, of name and nation, of civilization and savageness, of climate and colour, will finally vanish." 1 The first American overseas missionaries saw themselves on the eve or at the beginning of a New Era. They were expecting the Fall of Islam, the Fall of the Pope, and the Restoration of the Jews to Palestine and to Jesus. They considered these historical moves as necessary conditions for the achievement of the Kingdom of God on Earth, that would result in the Parousia. The missionaries understood themselves as workers engaged in this "plan of God", particularly in worldwide evangelization, and the struggle for the global unity of Christians. The centrality of the Near Eastern world is obvious in this whole vision. The most spectacular changes - the Fall of Islam and the "restoration of the Jews" - had to take place in the Bible Lands. From there - from a transformed, "leavened", and "regenerated" Near East - the global Kingdom had to be built. Bonaparte's Near Eastern campaign in 1798/99 had made clear politically and militarily that at any moment the end of the Ottoman power could be expected. That was an important stimulus for apocalyptical and restorationist visions in a West that excluded religion more and more from the public space. On the eve of the Modern Period (19th/20th centuries), religious hopes were more than ever projected on the Near East. In a sermon before the departure of the first ABCFM-missionaries, sent to Palestine, on 31 October 1819 in Boston, Levi Parsons said: "Admit that the Jews are to be restored to their own land [...] Destroy, then, the Ottoman Empire, and nothing but a miracle would prevent their immediate return from the four winds of heaven. [...] They will return. The word of promise is sure. [...] It may be your privilege to prepare the way of the Lord. [...] That land belongs to him." This was not meant figuratively but concretely, as future real history, as was the vision of the "ransomed", restored Jew: "The ransomed Jew, as he ascends the hill of Zion, will mingle his songs with the whole Church militant and triumphant, saying, Worthy is the Lamb [Jesus] that was slain to receive power [...]." 2 The view of the Muslims, articulated on the same occasion, was partly negative in dogmatic, and wholly negative in ' Dwight, Timothy, A Sermon, Delivered in Boston, September 16, 1813, Before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions at Their Fourth Annual Meeting, Boston: Samuel T. Armstrong, 1813; cited in Chaney 1976, p. 283 f. 2 Sermon, preached in Park-Street Church Boston, Sabbath, Oct. 31, 1819, just before the departure of the Palestine Mission, by Levi Parsons, A. M., missionary to Palestine, Boston: Published by Samuel T. Armstrong, 1819, S. 11 f. and 14.

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historical perspective: "They assert the unity of God, the immortality of the soul, and future rewards and punishments. They have, indeed, much of truth in their system: but their customs, established by the usage of centuries, the despotic nature of their government, the prominent articles of their faith, and the very genius and spirit of their religion, shield the Mahommedans almost impenetrably from the influence of Christianity." 1 Parsons emphasized particularly the persecution of Jews: "So long as Mussulmauns [sic] consider it a duty to persecute them, every artifice will be employed to increase their wretchedness, and to add horror to despair itself. [...] And while one judgment has followed another in rapid succession; judgments which must have blotted out the existence of any other nation under heaven, the children of Israel have been continued by an invisible hand, as a standing monument of the veracity of God." 2 The restorationist factor was crucial in the scheme of the ABCFM pioneers, and within the restoration of Israel, the conversion of the Jews before or after their return to the Holy Land. Parsons went so far to praise the "unexampled benevolence of the Emperor of Russia [Alexander I], whom Divine Providence has raised up as a second Cyrus, to gather together the outcasts of Israel", because Alexander combined his liberal, modernizing policy towards the Jews with the hope that they would convert. Many Jews themselves had dignified Alexander in these terms (as a second Cyrus), as had done French Jews a few years ago with Napoleon. British and American restorationists, however, had difficulty in accepting that the heir to the atheistic French revolution was seen in the Biblical role of a Cyrus during and after his Near Eastern campaign. They hoped that Great Britain, and much later the USA would take on this role.

Shifts and changes during the 19th century The postmillennialist stance of the missionary enterprise remained valid until the early 20th century. Nevertheless, important shifts and changes took place. Not Jerusalem, Palestine, and the Jews, but Istanbul, Asia Minor, and the Armenians were, by mid-19th century, the primary focus of the ABCFM. The strategy changed, the conversion of Muslims and Jews was more or less abandoned, and the "revival" of the Eastern Christians became central. But still the first orientation and attachment were not forgotten, on the

^ Ibidem, p. 26 f. Ibidem, p. 7.

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contrary, a post-missionary American "Holy Land mania" 1 emerged in the second half of the 19th century. "The East! The birth-place of history, the cradle of religion. There was Eden; and there is Ararat, Bethlehem, and Calvary. Jerusalem is the mother of us all. A home-feeling have we towards all the prominent places of Judea. [...] Our hearts have an inalienable property in those localities, which are associated with our religion", as Reverend William Adams wrote in 1853 in the introduction to a book by William Goodell. Goodell was one of the ABCFM pioneers, a translator of the Armenian Bible, who had arrived in Beirut in 1823 and finally settled in Istanbul instead of Jerusalem. 2 Asia Minor was now the central and major field of the ABCFM. When in 1870 it gave up Syria to the new American Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church (ABFMPC), it abandoned only a fraction of what it had acquired meanwhile in Asia Minor. 3 Even if it was a sort of unwanted "accident", due to persecution by the Rum (Greek Orthodox) and the Gregorian (Armenian Apostolic) Churches, which felt threatened, the establishment of a separate Protestant community {millet) in 1850, the elaboration of a "progressive", democratic constitution for this new millet, and the prevailing spirit of political and legal reform during the first half of the Ottoman Tanzimat (1839-76) changed the attitude towards Ottoman power. "But those dark times [1820s] have passed away, and can hardly be expected to return. The sun is up at Constantinople, and, with the enlightened policy of the present reigning Emperor [Abdulmecid I], nobody can make it again dark", Goodell wrote in 1853.4 The initial view of Muslim power was not fundamentally revised, but hopes were pragmatically set upon the Tanzimat. Practical work prevailed. Enterprising men and women used the doors opened by the Tanzimat, they founded many mission stations and important institutions, and penetrated Eastern Asia Minor in those decades. 5 A revised prophetic vision behind this mission was not articulated. Instead of the conversion of Jews and Muslims, which proved to be infeasible, most hope was set on "Christianity revived in the East", above all on the

' Cf. Obenzinger, Hilton, American Palestine - Melville, Twain, and the Holy Land Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.

2

Mania,

Goodell, William, The old and the new; or the changes of thirty years in the East, with some allusions to oriental customs as elucidating scripture, New York: M. W. Dodd, 1853, p. V, cf. p. 3 9 - 4 2 where Goodell explains his redirection from Jerusalem, where he never went, to Istanbul. 3 Cf. e.g. the statistics in Tibawi, American interests, p. 228, with those in Kieser, Hans-Lukas, Der verpasste Friede. Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei 1839-1938, Ziirich: Chronos, 2000, p. 565-568 (Turkish edition Iskalanmi§ bari§. Dogu vilayetleri'nde misyonerlik, etnik kimlik ve devlet 1839-1938, Istanbul: Ilctigim, 2005). 4 Goodell, The old and the new, p. 47. For the importance of this missionary agency see Kieser, Friede.

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"great work of reform" among the Armenians. 1 Relatively easily accessible heterodox Muslims, particularly Anatolian Alevis, were integrated into the vision of natives to be built up as favored protagonists in the eschatological preparation for the "Kingdom". 2 The harsh reaction of the Ottoman authorities to missionary contacts with Alevis and other setbacks during the second half of the Tanzimat reconfirmed some old convictions that Muslim power could not be reformed. Nevertheless representatives of the ABCFM lobbied at the Congress in Berlin in 1878 for efficient reforms towards religious freedom and backed the Armenian claims for more security in the precarious eastern provinces (this postulate resulted in the article 61 of the Berlin Treaty). 3 After the Congress, the ABCFM strategists in Boston declared that a "new era" had begun, that the Ottoman world could now better be evangelized than ever, that the Great Powers now highly esteemed the social force of Puritan Christianity, and that Protestant England would establish security for life, property, and law in the Ottoman eastern provinces through an agreeable protectorate. 4 This was an illusion, since the handful of military consuls dispatched to that region after 1878 could never offer any protection of this kind. In the 1880s the young Sultan Abdulhamid II, traumatically marked by the Turco-Russian war in the Balkans and eastern Anatolia in 1877-78, began to carry out a socio-political strategy oriented toward the restoration of the ummet/ummah i. e. of Islamic unity in the face of the danger of final disintegration of his Empire. Abdulhamid's particular fin de siècle Islamism can also be called Muslim nationalism as he worked for Muslim cohesion within a modern state. His defensive policies were by no means synonymous with the promotion of social and religious equality which the men of the Tanzimat had declared to be their policy, particularly not in poly-ethnic eastern Asia Minor. Protestantism, as represented by the ABCFM, became a main ideological enemy in the eyes of the Sultan. From its beginning, the Protestant mission fundamentally distrusted Muslim power; and it was not only a major factor in the renaissance of Armenian and Syriac selfconsciousness, but had the ideological potential to initiate an Alevi renaissance, giving Alevis more confidence in their distinctiveness. Seen from 1 Cf. Dwight, H. G. O., Christianity revived in the East; or, a narrative of the work of God among the Armenians of Turkey, New York: Baker and Scribner, 1850, p. III. 2 Cf. my article Kieser, Hans-Lukas, "Muslim heterodoxy and Protestant Utopia. The interactions between Alevis and missionaries in Ottoman Anatolia", Die Welt des Islams 41-1 (2001), p. 89-111. See chapter 3 in this book. 3 Kieser, Friede, p. 117 f. 4 Annual Report of the ABCFM 1878, Boston, 1878, p. XXVI f. Cf. the article "The World Evangelized in Twenty Years", Missionary Herald 1881, p. 277 f., and "American Influence in Turkey", Missionary Herald 1885, p. 120-122.

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this angle, missionary work was clearly subversive and seditious, fesad-peztr, as Yildiz Palace documents from the 1890s stated over and over again. The Catholic mission was not seen in this way at that time. It had earned the reputation of being loyal to the government, and it profited from the diplomatic rapprochement between the Sultan and the Pope in the late 1880s.1 Despite a growing anti-Protestant atmosphere in the Hamidian administration, in the 1880s and the early 1890s the ABCFM extended and cultivated successfully its prosperous missionary "islands": schools, hospitals, printing and publication, and, last but not least, the evangelical communities.

The break of 1895/96 The large-scale anti-Armenian pogroms in the 1890s, reaching a climax in autumn 1895, had a complex historical setting and can be seen from different perspectives. 2 The pogroms of 1895/96 cost the life of about 100,000 Armenians, murdered by mostly local Sunnis. What happened then had nothing to do with an "inter-communal war" between native Christians and Muslims, or Armenian nationalists and Islamists. In one important perspective these massacres were the bloody expression of a clash between a threatened Sunni hegemony and Western, particularly American Protestant, modernity. Linked to this modernity was a revolutionary apocalyptic - if fully peaceful postmillennialist - vision for the Ottoman world. In the prosperous missionary "islands" and the millet institutions, above all in the schools, a dynamic development, co-sponsored by Protestant diplomacy, had taken place since the Tanzimat that was bearing its fruits among non-Muslims. Many Muslims considered that the harbinger of a new order in which an outclassed millet-i hakime would definitely lose its traditional dominance and traditional self-esteem. The mass violence of 1895 deeply affected the groups to which the missionaries were closest. It also led to some destruction within missionary compounds. For the first time, it seems, Puritan self-confidence, postmillennialist optimism, and relevant strategies were seriously questioned. The terrific blow and the humanitarian challenge however brought the different denominations together. The ABCFM and the Gregorian Church cooperated in 1 Kieser, Friede, p. 137 f. and 173 f. Cf. Deringil, Selim, The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire. 1876-1909, London: I.B. Tauris, 1998; Karaca, Ali, Anadolu Islahâti ve Ahmet §âkir Pa$a (1838-1899), Istanbul: Eren, 1993. 2 Perhaps the most sophisticated recent analysis on this topic is Verheij, Jelle, "Die armenischen Massaker von 1894—1896. Anatomie und Hintergründe einer Krise", in H.-L Kieser (ed.), Die armenische Frage und die Schweiz / La question arménienne et la Suisse (1896-1923), Zürich: Chronos, 1999, p. 69-129; cf. Kieser, Friede, p. 154-234.

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humanitarian aid and other matters. New German and Swiss Protestant organizations arrived on the scene. It is true that missionaries had warned for a long time that a highly destructive anti-Christian potential existed in their regions, but they had not really questioned their presence as an important factor within the game. Missionaries and Young Turks shared independently one from the other in those years the conviction that reactionary and "fanatical Islam", as they believed it to be represented by the Hamidian system, was the main reason for the catastrophe of 1895 and for other problems in the country. In contrast to the CUP, who aspired to shed the tyrant's blood, missionaries refused revolutionary violence and watched the problems not from the center of power in the capital, but the grassroots in the provinces. After 1895 a consensus grew up within the ABCFM that missionary work had to be compatible with a pragmatic, constructive project for the entire Ottoman society, and that its liberal criticism of the Ottoman authorities must be not misunderstood by revolutionaries as a licence for violence. On 7 July 1896 a missionary in Van wrote to Bible House with regard to the Armenians: "It seems clear that hope that has been placed on Europe has been misplaced, and that no human source of help remains except the Sultan and the Turkish government. It seems then plain that the only course remaining for those who are not able to leave the country, and not willing to accept the Moslem faith, is to secure the confidence of the Government and persuade it that all rebellious movements have ceased, that so some tolerable modus vivendi may be secured."1 The Eastern Turkey Mission (ETM), which worked in the region where most rural Armenians lived, felt compelled to proclaim in 1904 that "the E.T.M is a hand laid upon that portion of the empire, not to snatch it from the Turk, but to dispense Gospel blessings upon it that shall make the Christian populations thereof more loyal to the home of Othman, more lawabiding citizens, more sincere and evangelical in their faith, more intelligent, honest and progressive tradesmen and artisans and in short, genuine and manly Christian men, and cultivated, spiritual and womanly Christian women." 2 The ABCFM's antinationalist and, a fortiori, anti-separatist stance was sincere. It resulted at different times in disciplinary measures against or the exclusion of revolutionary students.3 Nonetheless it was for many missionaries an unhappy situation to preach loyalty within a system which they often considered as intolerable. With regard to the effects of American education a younger missionary doctor in Van, Clarence Ussher, wrote drastically in 1904: "The effort has always 1 2 3

Cited in Kieser, Friede, p. 220. ABC 16.9.7, Vol. 17. Cf. Kieser, Friede, p. 219 f.

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been and is to train Armenians to love their country and to be loyal to their government, but every thought that leads a man to respect himself and distinguish himself from a beast leads him to rebel inwardly against being treated as a beast. Every particle of education and every thought of America and her institutions tends, in this sense, to unfit Armenians and others to live quietly under existing oppression. As our work has touched many thousands of lives we are forced to say that a very large number in this vilayet are so unfitted to consider themselves as mere beasts."1 Despite a reappraisal of its policy under some pressure from American diplomacy, and the resumption of missionary rhetorical business as usual, the ABCFM remained uneasy under the Hamidian system. Abdulhamid had not attempted at all at punishing the perpetrators of 1895/96. The main problem for the Hamidian authorities was not the supposed cooperation between ABCFM and Armenian nationalists (such accusations were merely a diplomatic trick played against the missions) but the very fact that the American missionaries promoted a successful modern Christian education. Therefore the millet-i hakime again turned out to be not strengthened, as had been the aim of Hamidian Muslim nationalism, but weakened. The ABCFM's strategy of revitalizing the Christian populations stood in the way of the Hamidian politics of Muslim unity through new institutions, including schools, the Hamidiye regiments, and a mission spreading Hanafi Sunnism. Hypothetically, peaceful synergies could have been created between both. Both policies were supra-nationalist and articulated social perspectives in religious terms. The way these terms were given, however, could hardly be compatible. The American missionaries saw in the Hamidian system a harmful, even murderous combination of Sunni dogmatism, claims to power, arrogance, corruption, and an anti-liberal, authoritarian tradition. Two years after he had risen to power, Abdulhamid suspended the Constitution in 1878 and in the 1880s successfully obstructed efficient reforms in the eastern provinces according to article 61. These policies were measures intended to defend, in his eyes, legitimate Muslim power. Abdulhamid was early on aware of the American missionaries' fundamentally opposite stance.2

1

Archives of the ABCFM, Houghton Library, Harvard/Boston (=ABC), Pers. Papers J. Barton

11:2. 2

Cf. Deringil, Selim, The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire. 1876-1909, London: I.B. Tauris, 1998, p. 68-164.

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1908 - a moment of the highest expectations, and the beginning of strategical changes Against this background, the American missionaries considered the Young Turk pronunciamento on 24 July 1908 and its reinstatement of the Ottoman Constitution a great relief. In 1908 the US Progressive Era met the Era of the Young Turks, the men of Union and Progress and their strong (positivist) belief in progress. Americans and Young Turks both hoped for a "Young Turkey", their terms however were proving not to be the same. The Young Turk Revolution was for the American missionaries a "nation's sudden conversion", comparable to the conversion from Saul to Paul. 1 The ABFCM had learnt a lot about the Ottoman world since 1819 and possessed a long experience on the ground, but they knew very little about the oppositional Young Turks until 1908. This lack of knowledge may be one reason for the high and sincere expectations that particularly the ABCFM, but also many other generally well-informed groups and individuals held at the beginning of the Young Turk period. For the Turkish authoress and nationalist Halide Edib (Adivar) "It looked like the millennium", as she wrote retrospectively.2 The same was also, in a special sense, the feeling of many contemporary American missionaries. Again a New Era was proclaimed in specific missionary terms, an era of peaceful progression towards, this time, a democratic Ottoman Near East. The main change from the ABCFM perspective lay in a new holistic approach that had already germinated, but had not yet been proclaimed and implemented, during the Hamidian period. The Turkey mission now meant, in the words of James Barton, the Foreign Secretary of the ABCFM and a former missionary at Harput, the "advancement of the kingdom of God in Turkey" by building up a plural, equal, and liberal "Ottoman nation". In schools and the press it had to promote "modern Ottoman citizenship", poly-ethnic "constitutional patriotism", "civic force", "progress", "humanitarian leadership", and "moral contagion" instead of conversion. Such were the new watchwords of the Turkey mission after 1908 - keywords that were again emphasized on the important platform of the interdenominational World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in June 1910. 3 In other words, missionaries whose grandfathers had expected, in religious terms, the imminent fall of the Ottoman Empire now loudly

1

Cf. Missionary Herald October 1908, p. 455-58. Adivar, Halide Edip, Memoirs, London: Murray, 1926, p. 259. 3 World Missionary Conference. Reports of Commissions, Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1910, nine volumes. 2

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promoted a particular Protestant form of Ottomanism (belief in the coexistence of different communities and ethnicities) in secularist terms! Barton was enthusiastic about the new era; "never before in the history of Moslem and Christian intercourse", he wrote shortly after July 1908, "have believers in these two religions so drawn together and publicly demonstrated their purpose to exalt patriotism above creed and love of country above religious hatreds. A long step has been taken towards a better understanding between Mohammedans and Christians as these hitherto widely separated classes join in a common purpose to make the constitution a success. This fact alone reveals unmeasured possibilities for the future. [...] We have reason to expect that the so-called revolutionary Armenians will now [...] unite their efforts for a free Turkey, which is already beginning to be." 1 Barton's book Daybreak in Turkey2 exemplifies the optimistic belief that a modern Ottomanist civic society could soon be achieved and that America's mission, the ABCFM, had a privileged role to play in it - in contrast to counterproductive European pressures and intrigues. From Macedonia to Mesopotamia there now existed the most promising mission field, Barton argued. He strongly emphasized the ABCFM's right to play a key role. "We, and we alone, as a mission board are upon the ground. [...] Our duty is inevitable; our privilege is unsurpassed. [...] The field is ours; we occupy the great centers of influence and population; ours are the missions and colleges, schools, printing presses, hospitals, and Christian institutions. Shall we use all these to the limit of their capacity for the purpose for which they were established, and for the advancement of the kingdom of God in Turkey?" 3 Even when, with the Balkan wars in 1912/13, decisive catastrophes began for the Empire, the ABCFM remained confident on two points. First, the revolution of 1908 had been a highly promising moment in world history, both as a peaceful revolution and as a time of fraternization between different religious groups, and second, the American institutions taught what was needed for the new era, i.e. "right government", "real brotherhood", and "mutual toleration". Charles T. Riggs of Bible House wrote in 1913: "[...] the effects of the true missionary aim and teaching were seen in our schools and colleges, where, right through the bitter, cruel war, Turk and Bulgarian, Greek and Servian, Jew and Armenian studied side by side in peace, expressing

^ Barton, James L., "What the changes mean to us", Missionary quotation p. 468.

3

Herald

Barton, James L., Daybreak in Turkey, Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1908. Missionary Herald 1908, p. 469.

1908, p. 467-69,

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mutual regret for the outbreak that was so contrary to the principles embodied in those institutions." 1

Visions and illusions The ABCFM representatives believed that it could, through its institutions of higher education, do "more towards the settlements of the Eastern question than the joint action of all the European Powers". 2 (Since the late 18th century, in diplomacy and far beyond, the Eastern Question had designated the challenge of how to conceive the future of the insecure, but mysterious and promising Ottoman world). The ABCFM's "secularist turn" made its missionary scope converge with the conviction that America had to bring "a light unto all nations". Probably more than ever before, the ABCFM felt sure that its work in Turkey was now supported by the political leaders at home. The Missionary Herald, its journal, proudly quoted in March 1909 an address by President Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt praised the ABFCM policy of making Muslim students "good citizens" and making "them vie with their fellow-citizens who are Christians" for the development of a modern, pluralist and democratic "New Turkey". 3 The ABCFM's (partly) "secularist turn" did not mean it distanced itself from the fundamental postmillennialist stance based on a Puritan reading of the Bible. It still identified with a specific American historical imagination: the American as (hopefully) the "new Adam", committed to a divinely ordained morality and the good, enlightened future of this world. It is true that more explicit biblical terms of eschatological and restorationist visions of the Kingdom seem to have, at least partly, faded away after 1900; few missionaries would explicitly have approved of the apocalyptic terms the ABCFM had used in the early 19th century. These terms, however, were not revoked. Moreover, though the attitude towards Islam may have evolved, it did not arrive at explicit integrative terms, even not among convinced Ottomanist

1

2

The Orient IV, no. 2 1 , 2 1 May 1913, p. 5. World, Missionary Conference, vol. Ill, p. 223.

"Personnally, I have always been particulary interested, for instance, in the extraordinary work done by the American schools and colleges in the Turkish Empire [...]; and this, although among the Mohammedans there has been no effort to convert them, simply an effort to make them good citizens, to make them vie with their fellow-citizens who are Christians in showing those qualities which it should be the pride of every creed to develop. And the present movement to introduce far-reaching reforms, political and social, in Turkey, an effort with which we all keenly sympathize, is one in which these young Moslems, educated at the American schools and colleges, are especially fitted to take part." "From an address in the Metropolitan Memorial Methodist Episcopal Church, Washington, D.C.", Missionary Herald March 1909, p. 130.

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ABCFM members after 1908. Islam was still seen primarily as deficient. Nevertheless there were important changes, and steps toward changes, in the few years after 1908. Probably nowhere else, surely not in the Muslim world, did missionaries identify so much with a broad societal departure as did ABCFM's Turkey missionaries. The Ottoman Muslim world was no more called "strongholds of evil", for whose end evangelical Christianity had to pray, but, hopefully, a promising Ottoman nation. 1 Some American Near East missionaries were present at the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh. In the relevant discussions on the Ottoman Near East they expressed much more self-criticism than, for example, one could read in the Missionary Herald that addressed itself to a large public at home. The strong focus on Christian minorities and the unsatisfying relation with the Muslim majority, as well as a failed approach toward Islam as a religion and too close ties with Western governments were openly questioned. All agreed that Americanizing or Europeanizing people could not in any way be the purpose of Christian mission. Mission was on the contrary supposed to offer an "antidote" to the bad influences of Western civilization.2 A lofty tone was set in many discussions and reflections of that short period before World War I. Howard S. Bliss, the president of the Syrian Protestant College (later American University of Beirut) pleaded for a new, sincere, and "politically correct" vocabulary concerning Islam: "We must, in the first place, approach Islam with the humbling, not to say humiliating realization that our difficulties in the approach have been largely created by ourselves. [...] one result of this effort to approach Islam in the spirit of sympathy and appreciation will be to prune our missionary vocabulary of many disfiguring and irritating words. We shall not talk about 'modern crusades'; we shall not speak of Islam as a 'challenge to faith'. Except indeed as applied to our struggle against weaknesses and temptations common to humanity, we shall drop the whole vocabulary of war." 3 The struggle against the missionaries' own ethnocentrism went together with a strongly internationalist spirit that, occasionally, criticized American policies in harsh terms. One occasion was when the United States under President Taft was unwilling to submit to the Hague Tribunal an international case, i.e. the claim - or open "blunder", as the men in the ABCFM's Bible House in

^ Cf. Makdisi, Ussama, "Reclaiming the Land of the Bible: Missionaries, Secularism, and Evangelical Modernity", American Historical Review June 1997, p. 680-713, here 697. 2 World Missionary Conference, vol. I, p. 21-34 and 184-187. International review of mission 3 (1913), p. 652-55.

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Istanbul wrote - to exempt some US ships from duties when passing through the Panama Canal. 1 Various innovative projects were put forward. Edward B. Haskell of the ABCFM station in Salonica developed a plan for social work. He criticized European Turkey Mission because its appeal had been "chiefly on traditional lines", and the American missionaries were not "sufficiently in touch with the view point of their natural allies [sic], the socialistic and other liberals of the country". He found fault with the fact that the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations could not reach people outside of Protestant circles. "All atheists, skeptics, Moslems and Jews, are barred from active membership in the Y.M.C.A. by the rule that active members must have accepted Christ 'as God and Saviour'." Therefore he proposed the establishment of an inter-religious club called "Loving Service" or "Brotherly Service", hoping that all those "who cannot unite on a basis of [religious] belief, might respond to a call to service and unite on a basis of action." The new club's credo had to be the "recognition of all men as brothers, and the practice of the law of love by and towards all", and it was the "duty of those of us who grasp this truth to begin acting on it at once and trying to persuade other to act upon it." For Haskell this movement should nevertheless be "religious" and "guide the socialistic and other liberalism into spiritual channels." Above all, it would be favorable "to welding together the discordant elements of Turkey and to strengthening the New Régime. Hence it ought not to be discouraged by the Government." 2 Haskell and his colleagues stressed "religion" as a pivotal source of spirituality inspired by humanism and a foundation of civic responsibility in the late Ottoman situation. Were there illusions? In retrospect certainly. That holds true for the benevolent assessment of contemporary nationalisms, including that of the CUP; it concerns too, as we will see, the "forgotten" gap between postmillennialist missionary and (economically and militarily) nationalist, "jingoist" America. There was illusion insofar as the "growing spirit of nationalism" in Japan, China, India and Turkey fundamentally did not want the foreigner - not only because of imperialism, but particularly for his (missionary) challenging of identities. The missionary think-tank in Edinburgh was partly conscious of this; because Christian mission was universal in its aim, the report wrote, it was seen as "antagonistic to the intense national spirit of Japan, which many Japanese are taught to regard as

* The Orient vol. IV, no. 3, 15 January 1913, p. 5. 2

The Orient II, no. 35, 13 December 1911, p. 2 f.

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divine both in origin and in world-wide mission." 1 Similar things could be said of Turkist or Islamist Ottoman admirers of Japan. For the commission in Edinburgh however, in "some respects the recent Turkish revolution has been the most remarkable which has ever taken place in any nation", not least because of the "fraternising of members of different religion". 2 The mentors of the worldwide missionary movement firmly believed that their mission could side with the Asian national awakenings, because Christianity was "universally indigenous". 3 Those who held positions of responsibility in the ABCFM wanted to believe the more in Ottoman patriotism as it signified in their view a progressive, supradenominational civic sense. They did not, or did not wish to, take into account the fact that their on-going challenge of identities and promotion of Christian values simply met with hate: with open or disguised hate among Turkist nationalists, and with particular resentment among Muslims who felt they were being treated as inferior religiously and culturally. What, a few years later, definitely appeared as an illusion, when World War I waged, was the wishful thinking in Edinburgh that "Christianity must show [...] that the socalled Christian nations really believe in Christianity, and that, although they are still far from attaining to the Christian position, they are yet in the lead in character among the nations".4 World War I was welcomed as a window of opportunity by nationalists, in particular by leading figures of the CUP. It allowed them to take drastic measures against "foreigners". This general war confirmed them and many others in their belief that social Darwinism, coupled with nationalism, was the ideology to be openly followed, the universal ideology of the 20 th century.

2. ABCFM-CUP interactions With regard to backgrounds, networks, places of socialization and intellectual history the Young Turks lived in a quite different world than the missionaries. The Young Turks' language of culture and education was French, the language of the "Protestant International" of the 19th and 20th centuries was English. The Young Turks felt themselves to be part of the "wretched Ottoman nation" (bigare millet-i Osmaniye), and hopefully its ' World Missionary Conference, vol. I, p. 33. 2 World Missionary Conference, vol. I, p. 27. 3 World Missionary Conference, vol. I, p. 35. World Missionary

Conference, vol. I, p. 35.

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saviours. Whether willingly or in opposition to it, the missionaries were part of a globally leading "Protestant world" (with Great Britain, USA, Germany, etc.). Whereas the Young Turk educated elite was strongly influenced by more or less atheistic French positivism and German biologism, including social Darwinism, the missionaries combined their belief in science and progress with decidedly Biblically inspired views on human beings and society. Could these differences be overcome, or was there enough common ground for promising and long-lasting collaboration? The ABCFM and the CUP disliked Abdulhamid's system and militant Islam. Both shared notions of progress, modern education, and women's equality. Both stressed reforms, constitutional government and civic equality. Where lay the primary loyalties? Let us first look at the Young Turks' movement and their mindset. Young Turk hopes and fears (late 19th—early 20th centuries) The Young Turks came mostly from the middle class and from outside the capital, but they had generally studied at the élite state schools in the capital. The seminal intellectual experience of the "second Young Turk generation" was the Turkist awakening, i.e. the ethno-nationalist selfarticulation as members of a "Turkish nation" in the 1910s. The primary concern of the first Young Turk generation, in the 1890s, was how to save the Ottoman Empire, considered as the last defence of the Muslim world against imperialist European powers. This was particularly true for the "Turks" (a term used as a synonym for the Muslims) from Russia who lived as émigrés in Istanbul, the seat of the Caliphate. Deeply politicised and partly traumatised, this stratum had cultivated an exclusive Turkish Muslim solidarity at an early date. It is within the circles of Turkish-speaking Muslims from Russia that from the outset Islam was integrated into Turkish nationalism, and Turkism was born. This prepared the way for the general ethno-national awakening among educated Turks in the 1910s within the broad movement of the Foyers turcs (Ttirk yurdu and Turk ocagi).1 Whereas the influential movement of the Foyers turcs, founded in 1911, had a strong ethno-national Turkist moulding, the CUP, founded 22 years earlier, was nationalist in an Ottoman Muslim sense. Significantly,

On the Young Turks see Hanioglu, Mehmed Çiikrii, The Young Turks in opposition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995; idem, Preparation for a revolution. The Young Turks, 1902-1908, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. On Turkish nationalism: Georgeon, François, Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), Paris: Ed. ADPF, 1980. For a recent sophisticated approach to the Russian Turks in late Ottoman Istanbul see Adam, Volker, Russlandmuslime in Istanbul am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002.

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both movements originated at the Military Medical School Mekteb-i Tibbiyei Askeriye, in Constantinople. At the end of the century, the Military Medical School was the meeting point of three elements fundamental to the Turkish national movement of the following decades: Western science, elitist political conspiracy and the military institution. If, during the first fifteen years or so, the CUP was still relatively open, the hard core of the committee, including the two military doctors, Bahaeddin §akir and Nazim, would exhibit a pronounced anti-Christian and Turkist tendency from as early as 1906, while using a language suited to winning over the non-Muslim opposition for tactical reasons. The political language employed within the conspiratorial group, however, was substantially different. 1 After 1910, the non-Muslim communities within the Empire began to be described as religious, racial and class enemies partly in medical terms. At the Military Medical School most students had more or less lost their religious faith. Nevertheless, they remained profoundly attached to Sunni Islam, both as an identity and as a culture, as well as to the idea of Islamic unity. They began to view Islam more and more in terms of ethnicity, coupled with Turkishness, rather than as a theological confession and ethical reference. Ludwig Büchner, Ernst Haeckel, Carl Vogt, Emile Boutmy and Gustave Le Bon were among the influential figures they most adored; the strand of French positivism connected to the revanchist right exerted a particular influence on the Young Turks. This reception focused on the progressive, but antidemocratic, anti-egalitarian, and anti-humanist elements (races of different value, contempt for the masses). It left aside the idea, as dear to the father of French positivism, Auguste Comte, as to the materialist Ludwig Büchner, of a "church of humanity". Büchner, one of the icons of the Young Turk intellectuals, 2 was himself a doctor, as well as a materialist and a Darwinist. To him, reality equalled nature, as described by scientists. God was replaced by impersonal nature. Man was nature's product, determined by the laws of nature, by race, and by the "law" of the survival of the fittest. These trendy doctrines were cultivated both in the elite schools in the Ottoman capital and at universities in Europe, where many Young Turks fled in the 1890s. In their European exile, many of them strongly missed the supra-religious human solidarity they had hoped to find.

E.g. a letter by Bahaeddin §akir and Nazim of 1906 says that "our party is a purely Turkish party [halis bir Turk cemiyeti] that will never admit opinions of people hostile to Islam and Turkdom [islamlik ve Turkluk]." Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, Turk inkilabi tarihi, Ankara: Turk tarih kurumu basimevi, 1991, vol. 2, part 4, p. 115. Cf. Hanioglu, Opposition, p. 213-216, and Hanioglu, Revolution, p. 173-178. 2 Hanioglu, Revolution, p. 313.

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One of the CUP's first members, an émigré from Russia, was Ali Bey Hüseyinzäde [Turan] (1864-1940), who was born in Baku. He introduced his naive young fellow students at the Military School of Medicine (where the CUP was founded) to the history of ideas, particularly Western ideas. According to Yusuf Akçura, Ali explained his move to Istanbul in 1889 with these words: "I'm a Turk, I'm a Muslim. Turkey is a Turkish and a Muslim state. Therefore Turkey is more my home than Russia." 1 After his flight from the Hamidian police, Ali published the journal Fiiyuzat in Baku in 1906/07; it coined the seminal slogan "Europeanize, Turkify, Islamize" and called for a revolution in Turkey. 2 Ali Hiiseyinzâde's biography shows significant developments and continuities. After his return to Istanbul in 1911 he obtained the post of a senior consultant and, on Talat's initiative, was elected to the CUP's central committee. The same year he began to engage in the Turkist movement of the Foyers turcs and their journal Türk Yurdu. In 1913, at their congress in Petit-Lancy (Geneva), members of the Foyers turcs declared Anatolia to be their national motherland (anayurt), or "Promised Land", as Tekin Alp would later write.3 These Turkists could go so far as to positively anticipate the end of the Empire - provided the Turkish nation was awakened and saved. For most Young Turks in leading position, however, when they spoke about nation it was not about a virtual ethnonation to be awakened and constructed, but in the first place about the millet-i hakime, the "dominant nation" of the past, now in a wretched state (biçare). Non-Muslims were excluded from this community. World War I was the moment when the CUP and its sympathizers saw themselves totally engaged in a struggle to maintain the Empire and the nation in both senses. The synergy of the first and second Young Turk generations and of their respective projects is crucial for the understanding of what led to the Armenian genocide. The key figures of the war régime managed this synergy pragmatically and ensured the Foyers' close dependence on the government. Both generations had a "revolutionary" touch, and they were right-wing in the sense that the revolution they wanted had to serve an ethno-religious project, be it imperial or national. The pride of believing themselves to be the chosen intelligentsia charged by the nation with a mission left an imprint on

1 Ak9ura, Yusuf, "Hüseyinzäde Ali Bey", Türk Yurdu 5-81 81 (15 April 1915), new edition Ankara: Tutibay, 1998, vol. 4, pp. 104-6. 2 Adam, Russlandmuslime, p. 137. 'J

Yurdcular Yasasi. Isvigre'de Cenevre §ehrine yakin Petit-Lancy Köyünde Pension Racine'de kurulan ikinci Yurdcular Dernegi'nin muzakerat ve mukerrerati, Istanbul: Yeni Turan Matbaasi, 1914, p. 69-70, translated in my book Vorkämpfer der "neuen Türkei". Revolutionäre Bildungseliten am Genfersee (1870-1939), Zürich: Chronos, 2005, p. 149.

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both Young Turk generations.1 A main element of revolution in the political history of the 19th and 20 th centuries is the justification of violence against those considered enemies of the project to be carried out. The revolutionary project to be carried out in the fin de siècle was the abolition of Abdulhamid's despotism in order to strengthen the empire with modern methods. The Turkist project to be implemented in the 1910s was different. It was, as the founders of the Foyers put it, to inject a whole academic generation with the great national goal, i.e. the building up of a modern ethno-nation among the Turkish speaking Muslims of Anatolia. 2

First contacts In intellectual and political terms, there were obvious divisions between the Young Turk élite and the American missionaries from the outset. The missionaries - and with them the whole Protestant Internationale - were very critical of the trendy doctrines of the European fin de siècle. The CUP movement and its clubs, as they emerged after July 1908 in all the provinces, varied however and were not yet under the strong control of the center. The center itself, despite its leading members holding contrary beliefs, proclaimed Ottomanism. In 1908/09 the provincial clubs mostly behaved in a very friendly way towards the ABCFM and its institutions, and vice versa. American missionaries were respected as "pioneers of progress", and invited for talks and discussions. The old missionary Herman Barnum, in Harput since 1858, was among those invited. Was it perception, or a projection of old hopes, or a blend of both, when he wrote in March 1909, taking some CUP's proclamations at face value: "The Society of Union and Progress, as its name indicates, has for its object the union of the different hitherto divergent races into one patriotic body of Osmanlis, and also the awakening of enterprise and thrift." The last point was primarily a postulate of Prince Sabahaddin's League of Private Initiative and Decentralization, Sabahaddin being himself a Young Turk (in the broad sense of the word), but a rival of the CUP. Barnum continued: "The parent society is in Salonica, but there are branches in all the important towns throughout the country. [...] This city [Harput] has a strong society of this order, composed of its best citizens, Turks, and Christians, upon an

1

Cf. Nur, Ri za, Hayat ve Hatiratim, 3 vols, Istanbul: Igaret, 1992 (1967-68), vol. 1, pp. 115 and 124, and Yurdcular Yasasi, p. 21. 2 Yurdcular Yasasi, p. 21.

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equality." 1 In similar positive terms Edward Riggs described the opening of the "Club" in Marsovan (Merzifon) in October 1908 in which two professors of the local American College participated actively.2 Reverend James L. Fowle was enthusiastic when he met with two CUP members, Tahir Bey und Faik Bey, on 14 September 1908 in Kayseri. "I confess that my faith has been weak. I did not expect in my lifetime to see Turks, Armenians, and Greeks mingling as brothers, or to hear Moslems speak in a Christian church in praise of liberty for all and equality before the law." Fowle listened to a speech by Tahir in the Greek church, which was crowded with Turks, Greeks and Armenians. Tahir started with the Apostle Paul's words on love (1 Corinthians 13), which the Greek priests had chanted in Turkish; he conjured up an Ottoman coexistence in full liberty, equality, and mutual respect. Soon after he made a similar speech in the Armenian Gregorian church. There Faik talked with Fowle. "As soon as I told him I was an American missionary he spoke most cordially of the work done by the Americans and the English in teaching the principles of real liberty in this land. He told the Armenians that it was through our efforts that they (the Armenians) were better able to understand was liberty and equality meant, and thus they, first of all, had been ready to make sacrifices for it. He said openly to them, 'You owe all this to the American and English missionaries.' He spoke, too, in the highest terms of our schools and colleges. This was all said in the simplest, sincerest fashion, with no hint of flattery. It does not need to be said that I was as surprised as I was delighted." For Fowle this was "nothing other than the birth of a genuine Ottoman nation". 3 One could cite many more examples of the kind. The American missionaries were most optimistic from 1908 on. They were more optimistic than the Catholic and Protestant missionaries of other countries, like Switzerland and Germany, who too felt and warmly welcomed the peculiar spirit of July 1908.4 The differences however had to do with the deeply rooted postmillennialist expectations of the Americans, and with the new, excellent role they saw for themselves and their institutions in a free, new Near East, or Young Turkey. One may note that the big names of the CUP's Central Committee were not present when the cordial encounters took place in the provinces.

' Missionary Herald May 1909, p. 211. 3

Missionary Herald January 1909, p. 33 f. Missionary Herald December 1908, p. 568 f. For a comparison see Kieser, Friede, p. 281-286.

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The ABCFM showed its on-going loyalty towards Young Turkey and the CUP even during and after the anti-Armenian pogrom of Adana in April 1909. These local pogroms recalled the Anatolia-wide ones of 1895/96. Both local authorities and troops officered by Young Turks sent from the Dardanelles did a nasty piece of work in April 1909. Some 20'000 people lost their lives, among them about 1,000 Muslims, the rest being Armenians. In other places like Urfa and Mamuretiilaziz however, the authorities under the influence of Young Turks resolutely resisted those who wanted to plunder and murder the Armenians again like 15 years earlier. Some American missionaries went so far as to put blame on the Armenian revolutionary youth in Adana. Eager to show their loyalty to the new authorities and to what they believed to be Young Turkey, they took assertive action against politicised Armenian students in their institutions, since in those days young Armenian and other politicians from minority groups "sprang up like mushrooms" (some analogies to Turkey of the 1970s come to mind). 1 William Peet, the head of Bible House in Istanbul, headed an international aid committee under the honorary chair of the Grand Vizier and the patronage of the Sultan. Despite much friendly interaction between the ABCFM and the Ottoman authorities, in particular with the new Vali of Adana after August 1909, the CUP-member Ahmed Jemal (later Jemal Pasha), first rifts became clear. Jemal primarily wanted a strong state, plainly sovereign in educating the orphans of Adana as "Ottomans"; the ABCFM perceived this as an attack on both communitarian cultural rights and the very possibility of giving a Christian education. The Protestant missionaries began to realize that, against the background of what had happened in the 1890s, they not only analyzed the anti-Armenian violence differently but had also a divergent understanding of Ottomanism. Theirs was a (naive?) liberal pluralistic civic sense; the CUP's was a state-led, growingly Turko-centric authoritarianism. But still the ABCFM directive was "to be very careful not to antagonize the Young Turk party" and to be "a little careful" what to publish. 2

Thomas D. Christie from Tarsus wrote in a letter to William W. Peet, on 19 April 1909: "The Armenian young men of Adana are nearly all revolutionists - different from here. [...] the Armenians [of Adana] were incited by a very bad man, their bishop [Musheg], now safe in Egypt. If he and a few others had been put in prison last fall this thing would not have happened." Fred Goodsell from Ainteb in a letter of 13 May 1909 to Peet: "You will be interested to know the testimony of a prominent Turk in Aintab as to the connection of the college difficulty with the present situation. He said to one of the professors very openly: 'We have worked hard to prevent an outbreak in Aintab because we knew that there were a great many Armenians here who thoroughly discountenanced the Armenian revolutionary propaganda. We have come to understand very clearly that the College is thoroughly opposed to that sort of thing from its recent action with regard to the sixty students who were not permitted to return."' See Kieser, Friede, p. 288 and 454. See Kieser, Friede, p. 289-292.

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perceptions

American missionaries hoped that the "last shall be first", that the Turks "may surpass the Armenians in their appreciation of and devotion to the principles of real liberty and genuine civilization", and that thus the long desired conversion of the Muslim majority might finally take place in secularist terms. 1 The reality Young Turk observers began to discover in the provinces was, however, the existing one: obvious gaps between gloomy Muslim and charming Christian quarters, the latter often with institutions promoted by the ABCFM. The journalist Ahmet §erif of Tanin, a paper close to the CUP, was a tireless traveller. He wrote in March 1910, after visiting an American school in the town of Hajin, some 150 km northeast of Adana (today renamed Saimbeyli), where a majority of Armenians then lived: "From the faces of the schoolgirls and schoolboys life and vitality burst forth. Let us not lie: I did not feel admiration for this, but jealousy. I did not want to see this. Men were coming from America and I don't know where, and creating in the most remote villages of Turkey models of civilization. Sad and ashamed as an Ottoman, I left." Ahmet §erif observed too that the Armenians of the district of Hajin were loyal towards the government, wishing nothing more than justice and a well functioning administration, and that they lived in close contact with their Muslim neighbours. 2 With some satisfaction the missionaries read Ahmet §erif's texts, particularly his observation that provincial Armenians were more loyal to the Young Turk government than were Muslims. 3 In a very different place, Samsun on the Black Sea, the same journalist thought he discovered the same reality (this time without any tie to the ABCFM, if not for a final remark that the Christian students could attend the American College at Marsivan for higher education): "It is as if a general orphan-like spirit floats over the [Muslim] quarter. Laziness, an apathic attitude towards life is the character that appears among the Muslims. In contrast, if you enter the quarter of the Christians, your heart feels happiness; you find superbly constructed houses, which testify to proprietors interested in life, and to their beautiful disposition, and clean and broad streets. In contrast to the immobility of the Muslims, the Christians are always on the move. In this respect, they enjoy the good things of life much more. [...] The difference is even more obvious in regard to education. Whereas the Christian citizens

' Missionary Herald December 1908, p. 569. Tanin 18 April 1910; transliterated edition: Ahmet §erif, Tanin, edited by Mehmed C. Borekci, Ankara: TTK, vol. 1, p. 186 f. 3 The Orient 1,27 April 1910, p. 2.

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generally know how to read and write more or less, the Muslims are very much behind."1 A strong feeling of inferiority emerged in this Young Turk observer. During a journey in Ottoman Albania, Ahmet §erif wrote that the children of remote villages attending beautiful missionary schools took "pride in Americanism [Amerikalihk], whereas they were Ottomans like their fathers and forefathers before them." With bitter self-criticism, the Young Turk journalist concludes: "This and its effects clearly show us the collapse of our morals, and what now are our own duties. We must agree with those [missionaries and others] who say that [Muslim reactionaries], who cannot penetrate the sources of Islam, to true humanity and general fraternity, [...] are an obstacle for progress. Yes, with our blindness and insolence we merit such libels." 2 What shold be done? "Fulfill our own duty" - meaning, after 1911, providing a solid education for Muslim Turks in Turkist terms. 3 Like many CUP members, in 1911 Ahmet §erif began to single out the missionaries as "the fundamental foes of our Ottoman and Muslim identity [Osmanlilik, tslamhlik], They always work against this identity." Even if, "thanks be to God, no Muslim was made Protestant", there were "many Muslims who had, in effect, forgotten that they were Muslim and Ottoman", due to the Americans' influence, he concluded. 4 A deep resentment and a distressing feeling of exclusion existed. The Americans believed in a new Ottoman world that, in the Young Turks' eyes, was new indeed, but it was not theirs. Theirs was passing away, they feared. How could they calmly bid farewell to it, if the future looked very strange and they themselves felt excluded? Departing from Beirut, in June 1911, the journalist looked back from the ship: "The city in front of us is a picture of a passage [from one era to another]. My eyes automatically turned to the American Protestant Establishment [Syrian Protestant College, later AUB] and remained fixed on those great, majestic buildings. But they could not penetrate inside the walls. There is the spirit of today's Beirut, in these and similar buildings. There, a young world is nourished. But this nourishment is poison to Ottoman identity [ O s m a n l i l i k ] . " 5 In the mind of the CUP people, the divorce was consummated. Mission was Western and Christian, thus part of Western liberalism and imperialism; the CUP's way had to lead in the opposite direction. Missionary work, even the most humanitarian help, was seen as 1

Tanin 27 July 1911, §erif, Tanin, vol. 1, p. 257 f.

2

Tanin 25 June 1910, §erif, Tanin, vol. 2, p. 33 f.

3 4 5

Cf. Kieser, Vorkämpfer, p. 57-64. Tantn 28 April 1911, §erif, Tanin, vol. 2, p. 155 f. Tanin 13 June 1911, §erif, Tanin, vol. 2, p. 204 f.

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part of an evil force that came from outside and strove for an unwanted future. Unwanted, because it fundamentally questioned what was believed to be the Ottoman and Muslim, or Turkish, "essence". 1 In contrast to Tanin we find a very different discourse in the weekly The Orient, published by Bible House after April 1910 and printed by H. Matteosian in Istanbul; the masthead indicates Charles T. Riggs as its editor. This paper sought to be a secular interface reaching out to a more general Ottoman public. It covered Ottoman news, regularly including events in Parliament and a review of the Ottoman press, and sometimes of the international press treating Ottoman topics. In particular, however, it addressed those interested in Protestant issues in and outside the Ottoman Empire. It is true that already at the World Missionary Conference in June 1910 a certain scepticism had been expressed about a Young Turk progressiveness that linked European atheism and its "armoury" with ideological anti-Christian Islamism. 2 The CUP's secretiveness too was criticized early on. 3 While, however, a fundamental anti-missionary and anti-American stance was already explicit in the CUP journal Tanin, the American missionary optimism about Young Turkey, including a benevolent attitude towards the CUP, prevailed in The Orient until 1912. The Dashnak's instrumental attitude towards the Church was criticized no less than atheistic attitudes among CUP members. 4 Furthermore, American and other missionaries were the fiercest critics of European politics in the Balkans, seeing that they destabilized the fragile Young Turkey. 5 They paid much attention to the question of the muhacir (Muslim refugees from the Balkan) and their settlement in Asia Minor. As the American Red Cross, which was in close contact with the ABCFM, brought them humanitarian help, this was also an opportunity to show that the Americans took "deep philanthropic interest in people of another race and religion". 6

1 Cf. Tantn 15 March 1910, §erif, Tanin, vol. 1, p. 160; Tanîn 28 April 1911, §erif, Tanin, vol. 2, o. 155. "Islam is linking itself up with the atheism and deism of western lands, and is securing much protection and also added prestige by the support it receives at the hands of officials from the West who have broken with Christianity. These men carry over to the Moslem camp all the armoury of the deistic and atheistic school." World Missionary Conference, vol. I, p. 19. 3 Concerning the CUP's annual meeting in Salonica in September 1911, The Orient wrote: "We are told that the sessions of the Committee are to be behind closed doors [...] if the Committee is worthy of the confidence of the country, certainly the country should be deemed worthy of the confidence of the Committee." The Orient II, No. 21, 6 September 1911, p. 2. 4

The Orient I, 11 May 1910, p. 3. Cf. International Review of Missions (London, 1913), p. 643-56; Études (Paris, 1913), vol. 184, p. 175-80; Richard Schâfer, Geschichte der Deutschen Orient-Mission, Potsdam: TempelVerlag, 1932, p. 78. 5

6

The Orient IV, No. 1, 1 January 1913, p. 6; cf. IV, No. 7, 12 February 1913, p. 3 f.

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With regard to the education of women, the ABCFM believed itself to be pioneering a movement perfectly agreed to by the Young Turks. It was a wonderful feeling for Joseph Greene, who had been a Turkey missionary for fifty years, when on 18 September 1908, during an assembly in the park of Bebek, he listened to a talk by Prince Sabahaddin. Sabahaddin, himself a Young Turk, but rival of the CUP, eloquently supporting the education of girls. Many Muslim girls applauded enthusiastically and put off their veils.1 Missionary teacher Mary Patrick wrote in 1911 that "all prominent Turkish patriots at the present time express themselves with great enthusiasm regarding the necessity for the higher education of Turkish women". In that year more than 50 Muslim girls attended the American College for Girls in Scutari (Uskiidar), Istanbul. 2 American schools were strongholds of "Occidentalism" (Baticihk). To be Western despite the West was the logical slogan of the patriotic Ottoman women's rights groups which emerged in those years, in particular around the journal Kadin Dunyasi (Women's World). 3 With smiling satisfaction, under the title "Are we dreaming", the journalists of The Orient reported this new movement and the fact that Kadin Dunyasi had reproduced a photo with unveiled Muslim women on its front page, without indicating that the photo had been taken a few years earlier in the American missionary school in Scutari.4 The Orient's lead story of 31 January 1912 dealt with the CUP politician Ahmed Riza, for a long time a head of the Young Turk movement, whom the Sultan had elevated to the rank of senator. Laudatory terms were used: "He has been fearless and impartial in his treatment of the Deputies, and has upheld the tradition of parliamentary law and usage to a degree that most men in a similar position would have found impossible." 5 A week later, page one was devoted to the parliamentary elections. A critical attitude towards the CUP began to crystallize. In Izmir an organized "great crowd of hooting, jeering Union and Progress partisans" had broken up an election meeting of the Liberal Lutfi Fikri Bey. The Orient concluded: The "Unionist machine is a powerful one, and those who get in its way may expect a tough struggle." 6 ^ Greene, Joseph K„ Leavening the Levant, Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1916, p. 163. 2 Patrick, Mary M., "Among the educated women of Turkey", in: A. von Sommer and S. M. Zwemer (eds.), Daylight in the harem. A new era for Moslem women. Papers on present-day reform movements, conditions and methods of work among moslem women read at the Lucknow conference 1911, New York, 1911, p. 89. ^ Cf. £akir, Serpil, Osmanli Kadin Hareketi, Istanbul: Metis, 1994, p. 257. 4

The Orient IV, No. 50, 10 December 1913, p. 3 f.

5

The Orient III, No. 5, 31 January 1912, p. 1. Riza had left the Central Committee of the CUP in 1910 after political murders against journalists; after the putsch in January 1913 he took definitely his distance to the Central Committee. 6

The Orient III, No. 6 , 7 February 1912, p. 1.

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The elections in April turned in fact out to be sopah seçim, i.e. the CUP won by means of coercion, threat and beating (sopa). Considered as illegitimate by the opposition, the CUP cabinet had to resign in July, and the Parliament was closed in August 1912. The review of the year 1912 in the first issue of 1913 saw the "fate of the Union and Progress party" as "variegated, the darker shades predominating; and its quondam leaders are now reported to be in Brussels, plotting against the present Government." The outlook however, set out during the Balkan wars, was as hopeful as ever for the men in Bible House: "the real and effective solution of the vexatious Balkan problem, and the consequent inauguration of an era of peace and prosperity for that storm centre." Henceforth the editorialist of The Orient criticized the CUP openly as undemocratic, inexperienced and incompetent. 1 Accordingly, the commentaries on the coup d'état of 23 January 1913, when the CUP began its dictatorship, were negative: "It becomes us to speak circumspectly regarding the events of the past week, lest censorial wrath be upon us. But an administration founded on violence and murder is seldom a success; and no one can approve of the method by which the present ministry has come into power." 2

On crumbling ground The same editorial, which began with the political statement quoted just above, ends by expressing eschatological hopes about a new generation of students in the ten American Colleges in the Ottoman Empire: that "the lives of all these students may be transformed by the power of the living Christ, and leaders for the cause of righteousness may be prepared, that the Kingdom of God may soon come." 3 Was this again wishful thinking? The missionary archives allow us to perceive open suffering on the part of mission teachers, due to the lack of interest in their spiritual message. Young men in the Ottoman Empire, Christians, Muslims and Jews, saw education mostly as an instrument for a professional career or a political commitment. Young women had a more holistic orientation, their understanding of the deeper concerns of missionaries was generally better, they were more willing to translate spiritual content into their social lives. 4 Men were subject to rather different, perhaps

* The Orient IV, No. 1, 8 January 1913, p. 1 and 8 January, p 5. The Orient IV, No. 1, 29 January 1913, p. 5.

2 3

The Orient IV, No. 1, 29 January 1913, p. 5.

Cf. Charles C. Tracy, president of the Anatolie College, Marsivan, in World Conference, vol. Ill, p. 231.

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more compelling group dynamics. They were focussed on "high politics", and often subscribed to positivist and biologist views of the world according to contemporary trends. Individual spirituality and care for human relations and good neighbourliness were hardly attractive for them as a pre-condition for a successful political culture. That the missionaries' message often did not pass in the Colleges of that time, had also to do with ethnocentric forms of devotion, an appropriate religious language and a specific ("Americanizing") background. The challenge though of teaching a convincing Gospel in the late Ottoman situation, where religious affiliations had become deeply politicised, was very difficult. After 1912, two levels of thought were increasingly incongruous, or in growing tension: a postmillennialist view of the future, and pragmatic political and social analysis. If, in this paper, we call the ABCFM's view of history a postmillennialist one from the 1810s to the 1910s, this designates a general attitude and does not exclude a multiplicity of views among individual missionaries. In particular, it does not exclude sceptical views of man and society. Nonetheless, a strong optimistic tendency prevailed, advocating peaceful historical evolution towards the new good order, the Kingdom on Earth. Catastrophe was hardly anticipated. At the beginning of the critical and for the Ottoman Empire decisive year of 1913, Charles Riggs wrote in The Orient that it was "fitting that all unite in humble supplication that the turning and overturning [in contemporary history] may result in the incoming of His kingdom." 1 For the ABCFM, the few years after 1908 were a time of experiments and new conceptual fermentation, abruptly ended by World War I. The urgent and leading idea was "how to reach Turks", i.e. Muslims. A multi-religious Young Men's Club which "reaches Turks" was created in Cesarea (Kayseri). 2 "Facts to ascertain the missionary problem in the Turkish Empire", i.e. information on the social and ethnic context of each missionary station, were collected by Bible House. 3 A Plan for Social Work 4 was developed (see above), and so on. But there was not enough time to implement fundamental change. In fact, many missionaries were probably not ready to do so. In 1913 an important real hope was still represented by the new reform efforts for the Eastern provinces that crystallized in the international reform plan signed on 8 February 1914 (the revised Mandelstam Plan, or Armenian Reforms). For many international observers, contemporary and later, like the 1

2 3 4

The Orient IV, No. 1, 1 January 1913, p. 5. Missionary Herald October 1912, p. 445 f. See Kieser, Friede, p. 303 f. The Orient II, No. 35, 13 December 1911, p. 2 f.

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American historian Roderic Davison, these reforms were a compromise where no-one lost out. 1 There was hardly any other way of creating pacified and functioning multi-ethnic eastern provinces. After such bloody events and the government's failures since the Congress of Berlin, the establishment of a balanced system under effective international control seemed unavoidable. The CUP's choice to go to war in August 1914 was co-determined by the intention to avert the Armenian Reforms, seen as a first step to regional autonomy and Russian hegemony. 2 The CUP was particularly suspicious of the Alevis, especially the eastern, mainly Kurdish-speaking Alevis. This suspicion increased rapidly on the eve of World War I, as the CUP now sided openly with Abdulhamid's Kurdish irregulars (the former Sunni Hamidiye alaylari, now called A§iret Süvari Alaylari), early on a plague for the local Armenians and Alevis, and with other Sunni tribes. Many Alevis adopted political and social ideas similar to the Armenians, that is, they welcomed international reforms. The Young Turks interpreted the close relations between Armenians, Alevis and missionaries as the result of unscrupulous propaganda on the part of the Protestants and Armenians, and as a dangerous threat to the Turko-Muslim unity they strove for. 3 The makers of The Orient saw the problem of the Armenians in the eastern provinces not as "one of autonomy nor of any change of laws, but merely one of the enforcement of law." They agreed that if the Ottoman Government was chronically "unable or unwilling to guarantee these loyal [Armenian] subjects such basal [sic] rights [security for life and property and honor], then they must appeal to Europe to take measures to enforce the provisions of the Berlin treaty relating to security and order in these provinces." 4 But the ABCFM's positive attitude towards international reforms, its opinion that not foreign influence but the neglect of great domestic problems and promised reforms had weakened the country, 5 and news from missionaries on the spot about on-going anti-Armenian violence were

^ Davison, Roderic H., Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923. The impact of the West, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990, p. 196. 2 Jemal and Talat Pasha filled dozens of pages in their memoirs justifying this viewpoint: Ahmed Djemal (Pascha), Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes (München, 1922), 33754, esp. 353 f.; Talät (Pa§a), ed. A. Kabacali, Talät Pa§a'nm hätiralari, Istanbul, 1994 (first ed. 1946), 58-71. 3 Cf. Hasan Re§it Tankut, "Zazalar hakkinda sosyolojik tetkiler", in: M. Bayrak, Afik-GizlU Resmi-Gayriresmi Kürdoloji Belgeleri (Ankara, Özge, 1994 (1935)), 409-90 (472); Riza N m , Hayat ve Hatiratim. Riza Nur-Atatürk Kavgasi (Istanbul, I§aret, 1992 (1967-8)), vol. 3, 112. 4

The Orient IV, No. 4, 22 January 1913, p. 5.

5

The Orient IV, No. 1 , 1 January 1913, p. 6.

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understood by the rulers as detrimental propaganda, just as Abdulhamid had done so 20 years ago. Some warning voices among CUP members themselves focused on the "bitter experiences" of the Armenians with the on-going persecution and the government's incapacity to carry out reform in the East. These voices, however, could not stop the increasing anti-Armenian and anti-Christian attitude in which resentful forces both on the spot and in the centre of power converged. "Let us for a moment put ourselves in the place of the Armenians; let us judge of the facts soberly according to their ideas, their point of view [...] Let us not be hypnotized by our way of thinking [...] Let us establish among the various elements of our country a brotherhood born of really liberal agreement; otherwise we must lose all hope of safety", CUP journalist Hiiseyin Cahit [Yalgin] wrote, after Ottoman dailies had violently accused the Armenians of appealing to international diplomacy, instead of to the national authorities, for efficient reforms. "Living in a dream and floating about in abstractions, we have been too blind to see realities", Hiiseyin Cahit continued, in the article that was reprinted in The Orient. The road through the Sublime Porte and the Chamber of Deputies being "a blind alley, they [the Armenians] are compelled to look wherever else they can for a door of safety." For himself, however, Hiiseyin Cahit had made the same choice as the whole CUP - as he put candidly in these terms: "Rather than enjoy reforms under pressure of the European States, I should prefer for my country the rule of despotism." 1 Among nationalists, there was a basic fear of losing "one's own": in political terms the last remains of Ottoman sovereignty; in terms of identity self-confidence and social dominance as Turko-Muslim Ottomans. There was, furthermore, a basic social envy on the part of Sunni Turks and Kurds side, their hate being directed against the native Christians and the foreign missionaries. The nationalists increasingly considered the native Christians as "foreign", inassimilable elements among a Muslim majority in Asia Minor. The political language of important CUP members since 1912 is revealing in this respect. 2 Obvious gaps, partly due to missionary assistance, hate, and envy, coupled with anti-imperialist plot theories, formed an explosive complex - both locally and, above all, in the capital. Missionary observers, however, did not note such virulent social tensions on the ground, even not after autumn 1914, as to make them fear mass murders by local perpetrators as

1

The Orient IV, No. 2, 8 January 1913, p. 6. Cf. Kieser, Hans-Lukas (ed.), Aspects of the political centuries), Istanbul: ISIS, 2002, p. 78-82. 2

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in 1895.1 They confirm that the destruction of 1915 was made up by the center. For the American missionaries there was a basic problem: how convincingly to convey a universal message and not to Americanize. It was not only because of deep prejudices on the other side that the ABCFM failed to a large extent in the crucial period after 1908. For Ahmet §erif, the missions were a strange, impenetrable world. It was American, not Ottoman, despite the ABCFM's insistant claim that it was. Missionary America did not make feel him "true humanity and general fraternity" - what he called the source of Islam, even if the missionaries paraphrased their Gospel in these same words. Theoretically, there was some common ground, even in religion, but in the reality of those days estrangement, distrust, and hate prevailed on the eve of the crucial World War I. Both for Turkists and Turkish Islamists, religion was highly political and tied to nationalism. Military mufti Fahreddin of Edirne put it in these terms: "Turkness and Islam are one. If Islam disappears, one can no more speak about [Turkish] nationality. The missionaries are the bacillus of cholera that poisons our nation's existence."2

3. The seminal catastrophe (1913-23) The Ottomans' entry into World War I of their own free will placed the CUP in a position of definite and profound antagonism to the ABCFM. During World War I, the destruction of Asia Minor's Christians signified the brutal end of the missionaries' 1908 social Utopia. M o r e , it w a s a traumatic

blow to the century-old hope of regenerating the Levant, of peacefully building up the global millennium from the regenerated Bible Lands. Those cast as the principal actors of eschatological change, the native Christians, primarily the Armenians, had become the victims of mass murder and expulsion. In 1915-23 the missionaries lost not only their principal clients, but also most of their confidence and their concepts. This meant a fundamental downturn of missionary America. In this section I describe some elements both of the complete breakdown of confidence between the missionaries and the Young Turks, and of the traumatic experience of war and genocide that was at complete variance with the Kingdom hoped for. And after the lost hopes of Young Turkey and the genocide there came a third disaster: the utter defeat of the missionaries' readjusted visions for Asia Minor and the Near East in 1918-22.

1 Cf. Riggs, Henry H., Days of Tragedy in Armenia. Personal Experiences in Harpoot, 19151917, Michigan: Gomidas Institute, 1997, p. 45 f. Fahreddin, Sirat-i Müstakim 11 July 1910, cited in Awetaranian, Johannes, Geschichte eines Mohammedaners, der Christ wurde, Von ihm selbst erzählt, Potsdam, 1930 (first edition 1905), p. 147 f.

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War: sin and stupidity The majority of CUP members considered war as a remedy for the problems of the Empire. The CUP rulers, exercising dictatorial power from 1913 on and all between 32 and 42 years old, with few exceptions believed in war. So did the nationalist and social Darwinist young elites in France and Germany, in the summer of 1914. This belief in necessary and salutary war put the CUP yet more in contrast to the missionaries. Most of them could never accept political violence, or war as part of the "nature" of human history. "Why all this carnage and butchery?" the editorialist of The Orient asked during the second Balkan war. "Primarily because modern civilization continues to teach the barbarous arts of war; because the state trains men to take a gun and stand up in front of his brother man and murder him by legalized murder." Charles Riggs finished on an eschatological note, with unorthodox socialist connotation: "They [the nominally Christian nations] will probably continue to do these things [war and arming] until the Church of Jesus Christ, or, shall I say, Socialism or some other kind of 'ism' can teach the nations the way of peace." 1 In the eastern provinces, the people and the missionaries understood early on the drive towards war, when in August 1914, after the secret treaty with Germany, military requisitions began. Dr Daniel Thom, a long-time missionary in Mardin, wrote to William Peet on 16 August 1914: '"War is hell' and it seems to me the Powers that have rushed into it headlong, regardless of life or limb, are finding it out to their sorrow, and the end is where? Even here, with no declared war we are finding it 'hell'. [...] The Government has robbed the city, and the country around, of its men, of its animals, of its money, leaving the threshing floors loaded down with a richer harvest than has ever been laid upon, to rot where they are, for lack of men and beasts to tread them out and care for them. The millions that will be lost to the people and the Government cannot be estimated. Such suicidal conduct of a government I have not seen, during this variegated life I have lived. Other brains than Turkish are navigating this ship of State, through the rapids, and on the rocks, to be dashed to pieces, and helplessly wrecked, then will come in the foreign firms and bargain for the salvaging. Poor Turkey, poor Turkey, going it blindly, with a man at the head of the army, whose name is LIGHT [Enver], but he has certainly turned on the dark slide on his lantern, and is rushing head long, pell-mell over the precipice, to sure destruction, was there ever such blindness?" 2 This was strong and perspicacious language, even if 1

2

The Orient IV, No. 29, 5 February 1913, p. 5. Fully cited in Kieser, Friede, p. 336.

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like many American missionaries - Thorn tended to see too much direct foreign (German) agency at work in those days. Why did they? Because such a chauvinist, auto-destructive conduct was "foreign", not Ottoman, for men who had put their full hopes in a new Ottoman nation. After the entry into World War I, and definitely when in spring 1915 systematic anti-Armenian policies began, the ABCFM considered itself to be in an emergency situation in its interactions with the CUP government. The "absolute obedience to the laws of the land" in the relation between missions and governments, which was "accepted mission policy", was now called into question; civil disobedience, particularly with regard to refugees, became legitimate. Related to Turkey and relevant experiences in the 1890s, the report of the concerned commission in Edinburgh had stated anticipatively that "where Government itself becomes an instrument of violence and massacre, the ordinary principles governing the relations between Missions and Governments cannot be applied, because one of the related terms has ceased to carry its true meaning." 1 Tacy Atkinson, an experienced nurse in the ABCFM hospital at Mamuretülaziz, had razor-blades smuggled into prison in June 1915, so that at least a few of those who were to be murdered outside the town could cut their ropes and flee to Dersim. Dersim (today's Tunceli) was a region of Alevis, the only place relatively safe for the persecuted Armenians. Concerning the risk she herself ran in this and other illegal actions, she wrote then: "I am not one bit afraid of prison, nor of anything man can do, nor of death, if it be necessary, but I am afraid of sin, and this is sin." She believed she would one day be in a common heaven with the man in charge of the local Red Crescent Hospital, a Muslim, who too did all he could to help Armenian deportees.2

Deeply damaged, interactions Henceforth, the encounters of missionaries with CUP officials during World War I were strained confrontations between opposing systems of reference and different generations: elderly missionaries versus relatively young CUP actors; men of Biblical beliefs and ethical values versus heroes, men of action and saviours of a world; missionaries functioning in a way as (Freudian) superegos versus (Nietzschean) hyperegos of (would-be) Übermenschen. The following relationships can all be analyzed in these World Missionary Conference, vol. VII, p. 47-49. "[...] whom I hope to meet some day in the kingdom of Heaven" (Atkinson, Tacy W., Account of the events in Turkey during the past three years as I have seen them and as they have had an effect upon our work in the Annie Tracy Hospital, ABC 16.9.7, 1917, p. 12 f.).

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terms: Clarence D. Ussher's interaction with Enver's brother-in-law Tahir Cevdet, attorney vali in Van, in 1915 (whom Ussher had known already as a child); Floyd P. Smith's relation with, and expulsion by, Mehmed Re§id, vali of Diyarbekir; George P. White's confrontation with the governor, military officers and, indirectly, with Minister of War Enver Pasha, in Marsivan; William W. Peet's mostly indirect interactions with leading CUP members in the capital; the German missionary Johannes Lepsius' famous interview with Enver Pasha on 10 August 1915; and the German missionary Johannes Ehman's interactions and interviews with Sabit, vali of Mamuretiilaziz, in May-June 1915.1 Striking otherness, precise if mute accusations, skilled observation and documentation, and help for groups the regime wanted to destroy led the CUP to loath the missionaries. If they had dared and had not feared the consequences, the CUP leaders on the ground would have treated the missionaries "like the Armenians", as they put it threateningly on several occasions. Most hated was the ABCFM for its symbolic capital, its quasi immunity, and, last but not least, its representing (missionary) America. Enver Pasha is a good example of this attitude. Even if he felt compelled to make some public shows of respect for the ABCFM, since its services to the Ottoman world were unquestionable,2 he considered the American missionaries fundamentally as adversaries. What a strange tension therefore, when during a visit mid-July 1916 to Mamuretiilaziz, Enver kissed Henry Atkinson, the twelve-year-old son of Tacy Atkinson and the late Dr Atkinson, and gave him a war medal as a symbolic reward for the American hospital staff's great services in Mamuretiilaziz on behalf of wounded Turkish soldiers. Dr Henry H. Atkinson, the founder of the hospital, had died in autumn 1915, "sick at heart, not wanting to live any longer on this wicked earth", as his wife wrote, after he had made a tour of inspection at Lake Gölcük, where the corpses of several thousand murdered women and children lay.3 From his pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist standpoint, Enver was correct when he saw the missionaries as enemies. In an article which he wrote for Ottoman papers in 1918, he denounced the American missionaries as "fighters and representatives of all America". "For their religious fanaticism, the Americans basically do not like Muslims", and do not wish "any Islamic state to exist upon earth." America, by entering World War I in 1917, aimed "to 1

Cf. Kieser, Friede, p. 355,434 f., 4 2 2 - 4 2 5 , 4 4 9 f., and my article "Dr Mehmed Reshid (18731919): A political doctor", in Kieser, Hans-Lukas, and Schaller, Dominik (eds.), Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah / The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah, Ziirich: Chronos, 2002, p. 264 f.

2 Missionary Herald January 1917, p. 28. 3 Kieser, Friede, p. 430.

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wipe us off the face of the earth", he argued. Although he knew well that the United States observed strict neutrality toward Turkey, he wrote that America wanted "to wage war against Turks and Muslims, in order to save Christianity in the Near East." This sentence contains an eloquent ellipsis; Eastern Christians were not to be saved, but destroyed. Enver furthermore accused the missionaries of setting Armenians, Kurds and Syrian Christians against their Muslim rulers, and urged that Turkey should profit from the state of war to eradicate the ABCFM. 1 Even more than all the other members of the Young Turk elite, the young Enver - he was 34 in 1915 - saw himself called to save Islam and Turkdom. Probably influenced by some German anti-Americanism, he angrily observed the missionaries' long-lasting commitment to non-Muslims and nonTurks, and he understood that missionary America radically challenged Islamic power - though he did probably not know that it had even started by anticipating the "fall of Islam" in the Near East. Enver globally denounced the missionaries' work, allegedly carried out "in the name of civilization and humanity", for being a purely political instrument of anti-Islamic forces. He waged war against them to rescue a Turkish-led Muslim world. If, however, he had really been a modern Ottoman patriot, as he claimed to be, he could not have suppressed the more complex reality, and one simple truth - that after 1908 the ABCFM policy had been strongly pro-Ottoman, though, indeed, not pro-Islamist or pro-Turkist. Missionaries reacted in three ways during the catastrophe. Many experienced and shrewd missionaries, particularly advanced ABCFM members, had no doubt about the criminal nature of the CUP's war regime. They used their international network and their prestige on the ground (the Capitulations having been annulled in September 1914) to protect themselves, to witness events and to provide humanitarian assistance to needy people, like Peet in Istanbul, Ussher in Van, Mary L. Graffam in Sivas, 2 or Jakob Kiinzler in Urfa. Second, there were those who trusted authority, or trusted Germany backing Turkey, like the German Ehmann, who suffered a dramatic breakdown of his faith when the destruction began in June 1915; he nonetheless recovered. Third, often younger missionaries and women, who were close to the victims despaired of life, like the American Francis H. Leslie in Urfa (who committed suicide after mental breakdown), the German missionaries Helene Laska in Harput and Martha Kleiss in Bitlis (who died in despair), and the 1 "Misyoner tehlikesine kar§i", Sebilurre§ad, 15, 366, August 1334 (1918), p. 3 6 - 3 7 (transliteration and translation in Kieser, Friede, p. 561-564).

Cf. the essay by Sulsan Billington Harper, "Marie Louise Graffam: witness to genocide", in Winter, Jay (ed.), America and the Armenian genocide of 1915, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 214-239.

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Swiss teacher Beatrice Rohner, who had a mental breakdown, and only recovered years later. 1 With money sent by Peet, Rohner had done a magnificent job with Armenian orphans and among thousands of deportees in the Syrian camps. The regime, however closed down her orphanage in February 1917 and took hundred of orphans into government orphanages designed to assimilate them to the Turko-Muslim identity. 2 Humanitarian assistance of any kind to the targeted Christian populations was understood as intolerable resistance to the will of the rulers. Little children in particular were a bone of contention: If they survived but were not assimilated to the Turko-Muslim identity, they continued to bear a heritage considered as subversive. Nevertheless, American missionaries in autumn 1915 succeeded in initiating what was to become the biggest humanitarian organization until then, the Near East Relief, that directed most of its help to destitute Eastern Christians. Many missionaries of different countries, beyond the leading ABCFM, worked together in this organization. 3 The CUP could not destroy this international humanitarian resistance that was, interestingly enough, also supported by German diplomats on the ground, even after the United States entered the war. The NER's impressive activism and assistance in an emergency, which went on in the 1920s, nonetheless contributed in a way to suppressing the traumatic experience of the 1910s. The failure of cherished concepts and the obvious loss of profound hopes and Utopias were hardly debated, at least not in public. Missionaries were deeply troubled and sensed defeat where both faith and concepts were concerned. This fact could partly be covered up or disguised by the humanitarianism of the Near East Relief.

Squandered visions However one looks at it, whoever one blames, World War I was a catastrophe for the Ottoman world, causing a terrible loss of population, and establishing a fatal connection between mass violence and nationalist renewal. It was in particular a catastrophic failure for missionary America, that had hoped to play a leading role as a peaceful "civic force" in Young Turkey. The failure of missionary America was all the more complete as after World War I ' Cf. Kieser, Friede, p. 476.

o

Cf. Kaiser, Hilmar, in collaboration with Luther and Nancy Eskijian, At the Crossroads of Der Zor. Death, survival, and humanitarian resistance in Aleppo, 1915-1917, Princeton NJ: Gomidas, 2001, p. 69-71. See chapter 7 in this book. 3

Barton, James L„ Story of Near East relief (1915-1930), Friede, p. 348-53.

New York: Macmillan, 1930; Kieser,

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it could not implement its vision of a new order either. The missionaries had not worked out a coherent plan for a new political order in the Near East after the war. A set of ideas had been developed before, and they were adapted to the new situation in 1918. Key words were federalism (at least in Asia Minor), return of the Armenian and Kurdish refugees (in order not to accept the result of coercive and violent population policies), an American mandate (over the whole of Asia Minor or even beyond), and the installation of a new liberal government. The anti-Islamic attitude, where government and social order were concerned, turned out to be reinforced after the experience of war. Such attitudes had been questioned in the Belle Epoque before. Contrary to widespread beliefs, the national independence of native peoples was not a primary goal of Wilsonian and missionary "Protestant diplomacy" in the Near East, nor was political Zionism. Caleb Gates, the president of Robert College and a former missionary at Harput, argued when the Peace Conference in Paris had begun: "The attention of the Peace Conference should be centered upon giving the Turks a good government rather than upon delivering the Armenians and Greeks from Turks government. Because it will be of little profit to establish an Armenia, more than half of whose people will be Turks, if alongside of this new State there remains a Turkey of the old type [...] To save the Armenians and Greeks you must save the Turks also." 1 In accordance with Kurdish liberals in the Ottoman capital, Clarence Ussher, prepared plans for the return of refugees to the Eastern provinces. He arrived at Paris in June. Beside him other American missionaries attended the Peace Conference. Ussher's ideas are representative for those of many other ABCFM members: "Suggestive Summary. 1. One mandatory for the entire Empire. 2. Internationalize the waters from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. 3. Make Constantinople a free City. 4. A foreign Commission to control all governments, thereby eliminating the question of religious control of the state. 5. Declare absolute religious liberty for all, including Moslems. 6. Grant statehood for those sections showing fitness for same, and govern all others as territories under central government. Pre-war racial predominance should be a paramount consideration in fixing boundaries of states. 7. Establish a central representative governing body under control of mandatory. 8. Define qualifications on which territories will be admitted to statehood and make ability to read and write essential to the franchise." 2 Quoted in Grabill, Joseph L., The Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, MinneapolisUniversity of Minnesota Press, 1971, p. 174, cf. 102-104 and 124). From Plan for the peaceful Repatriation of the Armenians and Kurds, ABC Ussher Personal Papers. Cf. Hovannisian, Richard G„ The Republic of Armenia, vol. II: From Versailles to London, 1919-20, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 44-48, and Kieser Friede p. 364-369.

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Ussher did not advocate a tabula rasa of the existing system, as the Kemalists did a few years later, and he did not hold religious feelings in contempt. In another paper of 1919 he explained: "To abolish too suddenly an organized system of government from a recognized center might produce anarchy. The various nationalities of Turkey including the Turk, have been clamoring for a change in the government and a common prayer of the Turks was 'Allah Sahabi geundersen' (May God send us a master). The time has come for that 'Sahab'." Ussher's anti-Islamic stance however was clear, and corresponded in a way with that of many CUP members and Kemalists, who equally saw Islam as a hindrance to progress and modern civilization. But those actors desperately needed and used Islam in those years to mobilize the people, particularly the Kurds, behind them. Since the fin de siècle they had taken Islam as a constitutive, distinctive element for defining Turkish ethnicity. In contrast to the Turkish nationalists, Ussher did not link his stance to an anti-cosmopolitan attitude. He wanted the crimes of the War regime to be examined, and no particular ethnic element to dominate the others. Istanbul should become a center of international organization and solidarity, if possible the center of the League of Nations. Ussher did not propagate any "clamorous Armenianism", as seems to have been the rule among "Protestant diplomats", in the eyes of later authors. 1 His criticism of Turkish rule had to do with very bitter experiences during World War I, even if, indeed, they were too sweeping: "The Turk has forfeited his right to rule even himself & Islam has demonstrated that it cannot justly govern other races, nor wisely govern its coreligionists. The Kurd, a nation with fine possibilities, has been held back by Islam and cannot claim even a written language in which to make his communications, but the Turk and Kurd are human beings, and as such are entitled to our consideration. In fact, for our own sake that consideration is necessary. Islam because of its fatalism and clannishness is retrogressive and unproductive. [...] The Armenians have been oppressed and held back for centuries and now need years of tutelage before they can be fit to govern themselves. [...] To place anyone of the component elements of the Turkish Empire in control of the others would be a mistake and to break up the empire would be inexpedient." Ussher's vision for the future was nothing but a unitary, ethnonationalist state - it was a confederation of autonomous regional entities: "Recent experience in the Caucasus demonstrates the extent to which such disintegration will retard the development of each. Prosperity depends on inter-

1

E.g. Grabill, Protestant

Diplomacy,

p. 2 4 7 - 2 6 8 .

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communication and freedom of trade; while the autonomy of the Empire should be preserved, the government should be completely re-organized under one mandatory, eliminating all Turkish control, except locally. The existing machinery of administration can be gradually modified so as to bring about the reform without shock or violence. Local self government can be granted as the people show themselves fit for responsibility, the object being to eventually create a confederation of states with large local powers."1 Retrospectively, one is struck by the confidence the missionaries still placed first in America, but also in the international system dominated by nominally Christian powers, and in a mandate system depending on them. This vision would have needed a strong League of Nations with an established common political philosophy. The report of the King-Crane Commission of August 1919 to the American delegation in Paris favored a limited Armenian autonomy in parts of Asia Minor, but refused Greek and Italian claims to Anatolian territory. It argued for the US taking over a mandate, appealing to the USA's spirit of international solidarity, as did the missionaries and also the Harbord Report of October 1919. "If we refuse to assume it [a mandate], for no matter what reasons satisfactory to ourselves", Harbord argued, "we shall be considered by many millions of people as having left unfinished the task for which we entered the war, and as having betrayed their hopes." 2 Many Near Easterners indeed who in those decisive months had put their hopes in the American missionaries, saw themselves disappointed, or, in a way, betrayed a few years later. They much overestimated missionary America's political influence. Real America did not correspond with missionary America. It did not assume a mandate. Civilization was not connected to democracy. Recent traumatic history was not clarified. Not liberal rulers, but dictatorial ones, not pluralists, but Turkists, won the political game in Asia Minor. Asia Minor had been the ABCFM's biggest, privileged and nearly century old "field": It turned out to be a broken mirror of hope both for missionary America and for the local people that had trusted on it. Worse, opportunist, naive or cynical interpretations of recent history appeared in American papers, like Admiral Colby Chester's "Turkey reinterpreted" (which infuriated the experienced Harput missionary Henry H. Riggs), or journalist Clair Price's series of articles, which both contained elements of CUP war propaganda, antiArmenian stereotypes, and the diplomatically useful, if incorrect, opinion that

^ ABC Ussher Personal Papers. 2 Harbord, James G., "The Chief of the Military Mission to Armenia (Harbord) to the Secretary of State" [report of 16 October 1919], in: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States 1919, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934, p. 840-889, here 874.

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the Kemalist officials fundamentally differed from the CUP. 1 If these and similar statements were obviously biased, they nevertheless pointed to the painful truth that the new situation proved to be incompatible with the hopes of missionary America and Protestant diplomacy. Even more concrete and limited projects failed, such as an office of the League of Nations - so dear to the ABCFM internationalists - in Turkey, headed by a representative of the ABCFM. The League in fact voted to set up "an office and a 'Chief Commissioner of the League of Nations in Turkey"' in Istanbul. The post was offered to Peet, but diplomatic pressure caused this plan to fail. Another provisionally successful project was a School of Religion, a theological school serving various Christian denominations. It started in Istanbul after World War I, but finished when Istanbul passed under the rule of the Kemalists. 2 The missionaries of Harput/Mamuretiilaziz cherished hopes of new interaction with the Kurds, in particular with the Alevi Dersimis. "Exiled" in the USA in 1917, Tacy Atkinson wrote in 1918: "How I envy the man or woman who goes filled with the love of God, to those Dersim Kurds. How I have loved and admired them and how I have prayed that God would give them a chance." 3 But these hopes, cherished both in spiritual and political perspective, broke down too. Fifteen years after the American missionaries had been forced to leave the Eastern provinces for good, Dersim (Tunceli) became the theater of a destructive, nearly genocidal military campaign in 1937/38. Outside help and indépendant eye witnesses were completely absent then.

4. Not coming to terms Inevitably, missionary America's premises centred on the Near East had to be questioned in the 1920s. America itself turned out to be different from the hopes of the men and women on the spot. It had declined the role that Protestant diplomacy had foreseen: a mandate of the Society of Nations at least for Armenia, and even better for the whole of Asia Minor. Things developed differently, globally and on the ground. No supra-national order was rebuilt under international cooperation and protection. Exclusive nationalism triumphed, and America's political representatives began to side with the strong man on the spot, the Kemalist winner. If the missionaries did not want ' Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy, p. 265 f. 2

Henry H. Riggs, A. B. C. F. M. History 1910-1942. Section on the Turkey Missions, 1942, ABC Ms. Hist. 31, chap. IV: Beginning again in the Turkey Missions, p. 18-22, citation p. 18. 3

Her letter to James Barton of 28 January 1918, ABC 16.9.7.

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to be completely evicted, they too had to compromise and to keep silent. They could not come to terms with the Christian catastrophe in Asia Minor in 1915-1923 and the shattering of their hopes. Neither did they come to terms with their attitude towards Islam, which had evolved since 1908, nor with their initial, un-revoked, but more or less suspended vision of the restoration of the Jews.

Ruins, suffering, silences - or the broken mirror of missionary America Missionary conceptions of multiethnic civil society and of federalist autonomies in the Ottoman world, particularly Asia Minor, had proved to be wrong in "real history". From the 1920s on, the men and women of the Turkey Mission, still on the ground or back home, were mostly alone with a traumatic memory; eyewitnesses of a genocide, they faced the breakdown of the missionary work of four generations and the large-scale failure of their plans for beloved Turkey. They were evicted from eastern Turkey and from many other places in the Anatolian provinces. Not only the few missionaries who stayed, but also those who returned to the USA, found themselves in a post-war society that suppressed the trauma, and refused to interrogate the recent past. In Turkey itself, silence was the price the former missionary institutions paid for cooperation with the nationalistic winners of the Anatolian wars of 1919-22. Most members of these victorious elite were closely related to the CUP war regime that had been sincerely detested by the ABCFM. Contrary to the new political elites in the State Department and their think tanks, the missionaries could not change their language about what had happened and what they had witnessed. Thus they fell silent. Most serious were the conflicting emotions the memory of the Armenians' destruction aroused, when at the beginning of the 1920s the ABCFM's Turkey Mission had to ask itself how to go on in Turkey, if ever. The shattering memory jeopardized all missionary work for the future. Henry Riggs formulated it as follows: "During the preceding decade the Turkish people, and again especially their leaders, had been guilty, before God and man, of one of the most revolting crimes in history [1915]. The triumphant reestablishment of the Turkish sovereignty not only left that crime unpunished, but, in the mind of probably a majority of the Turks, the horrid course which they had pursued had been gloriously vindicated. In the minds of many members of the Mission were two questions which demanded an honest answer: first, could there be any hope of a regeneration of the Turkish people, and real progress toward a decent national life, without some real repentance and repudiation of that crime, in which now they glory? And second, can any

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missionary have any influence spiritually and permanently of value if, by keeping silence, he seemed to condone the crime?" 1 The frustration and selfquestioning of Central and Eastern Anatolia missionaries went particularly deep. They had lost everything. Most of "their" people had perished, the rest were homeless. Humanitarian help by the NER and other organizations did the best it could for the hundreds of thousands of homeless people abroad. But they were deprived of any hope of return to their homes and of any satisfying political perspective. Had all the hopes and constructive work of nearly a hundred years been in vain? How could a shattering memory hardly anybody was ready to share after 1923 be borne? The missionaries' silent agony on this point persisted in the following decades without finding a satisfactory response either in Turkey or in established international historiography. It goes without saying that neither the international nor the new American diplomacy encouraged clarification of these matters. The ABCFM had made one early attempt to break its silence. In its January meeting in 1923, it drew up a "statement of attitude sternly condemning the massacres and horrors of the past, and giving repentance as the one hope for a better day in Turkey." Although aware that "such a stern rebuke of the actions of the government would probably result in the summary closing up of all our work", some members submitted a motion to present the statement to the Ankara authorities, regardless of results. But it was voted down. 2 A lot of relevant recollections were set down in unpublished memoirs. Significantly, missionaries did not publish anything more on this topic. Speaking about the recent past would have made both the Kemalist and the American authorities uneasy. Henceforth the "missionaries of the Board [ABCFM] found themselves hated and despised because of what had been done to the Christian races of Turkey", Henry Riggs wrote, shortly before he died in 1943, referring to his experience in Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s.3 In 1927 the United States resumed normal diplomatic relations with the Republic of Turkey. 4 The price they paid was the absolute dismissal of the Armenian question.5 Leading figures like Chester, Mark L. Bristol and Joseph Grew had early on begun to flatter the emerging winners of the political game in Anatolia. Logically they had to silence uncomfortable truths, and they had

2 3

Riggs, Turkey Missions, chap. IV, p. 19-20. Riggs, Turkey Missions, chap. IV, p. 20-21. Riggs, Turkey Missions, chap. IV, p. 13.

4 Cf. Hurewitz, Jacob C., "Turk-Amerikan ili§kileri ve Atatiirk", in: Çagda§ du^uncenin i§igmda Ataturk, Istanbul: D. Nejat F. Eczacibagi Vakfi, 2004 (first edition 1983), p. 483-514, here 507 f. Cf. Suzanne E. Moranian, The American Missionaries and the Armenian Question: 1927, PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1994, p. 549-80.

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their own good reasons to do so. They preferred America to gain economic advantages in its competition with the European powers - as Imperial Germany had done in the previous three decades. 1 Since the lack of an approved treaty jeopardized the major interests of all American institutions in Turkey, missionary leaders like James Barton also supported America's adherence to the Lausanne Treaty early on. 2 Adapting to the authoritarian nation-state, however, involved a much deeper conversion of the ABCFM and its heritage, as the always optimistic language of this missionary strategist indicates.3

Conversion of the ABCFM heritage to the Turkish nation-state Instead of giving up its work and its still rich infrastructure in Asia Minor, the ABCFM in 1923 decided to adapt its work to the requirements of the remaining Muslim population in the Republic of Turkey. Three institutions, however, followed the community they had mainly served into exile. The Central Turkey College in Anteb and the Girl's College in Marash were integrated into the Aleppo College of the ABFMPC, while the Anatolia College in Marsivan, which both Hamidian and CUP and Kemalist representatives had considered a particular seat of conspiracy, was relocated to Saloniki. But there still remained the high schools in Istanbul, Izmir, Adana and Marsivan (Merzifon), colleges in Izmir and Tarsus, and hospitals in Anteb and Talas (near Kayseri). Furthermore Robert College and the American College for Girls in Istanbul, and the International College in Izmir, although independent institutions, were in close touch with the ABCFM. 4 The new guideline was moral education, or apolitical character formation, without any direct reference to the Gospel. Thus both civic and spiritual education, the main points after 1908, were abandoned or strongly diluted. New key formulas were "unnamed Christianity", a "personal and

Cf. Bloxham, Donald, The great game of genocide: the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians in international history and politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 185-206 here p 198 f. 2 Cf. Trask, Roger R., The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform: 19141939, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1971, p. 37-64. A critical intellectual, political and religious biography of James Barton would be desirable. What is the precise picture of the evolution that a very influential American missionary went through in those decades? Barton began in Harput in the bloody fin de siècle, hoped enthusiastically for Young Turkey after 1908, and became a missionary strategist, political adviser and humanitarian diplomat in the 1910s and 1920s. Biographical approaches would also be useful for other important Turkey missionaries like Henry H. Riggs, Charles T. Riggs, or Tacy Atkinson. 4

Kieser, Friede, p. 373 f.

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sympathetic approach", "Christian radiance", "the missionary home - a social centre", "personal talks on vital subjects, "publications with a high moral tone", and "cooperation with sympathetic Turks for the uplift of their country". A considerable struggle, self-denial and some illusions were involved in adaptation to a nationalist Turkey that prohibited all religious teaching in missionary schools. But the memory of the recent past could not be suppressed in the mind. What the ABCFM had been doing for a century appeared as a complete failure, any spiritual ambitions as illusory, and history itself as guided by cynical logic. In Henry Riggs' view: "A century of effort with all the advantages of strong churches in Turkey had signally failed to win the Turks [...] There was also the feeling that the Turks had proved themselves criminals in all that had passed, and had now been confirmed in the criminal position by securing their complete independence. The possibility of bringing about any spiritual regeneration among them under those conditions seemed fantastically remote." 1 In the 1920s the missionaries hoped that the restrictive measures against their education would soon be removed, a "hope which, it must be said, has not yet been fulfilled", Riggs wrote twenty years later. Again and again, the own unsatisfying work had to be "re-evaluated" in the interwar period. 2 There were serious incidences whose explosive nature lay in the simple fact that a few Turks decided to believe in Jesus Christ, which was interpreted as a betrayal of the national identity, unacceptable to the society and the rulers. For "acceptance by a Turk of the name Christian" was "a desertion to the adversary", and "that name denotes exclusively the national groups now excluded from Turkey". 3 On the other hand, a few younger missionaries seem to have been receptive to and impressed by Kemalism. William Sage Woodworth Junior, director of the Tarsus American College, published in 1940 a hymn of praise of Mustafa Kemal Atattirk by blatantly reproducing the myths of the new Republic. 4 Henry Riggs and his "old generation" 5 could never go so far as Woodworth Junior. Riggs could not accept the way in which "Turkey re-established herself on a basis excluding the Christian races", and kept his

' Riggs, Turkey Missions, chap. IV, p. 13. 2 Riggs, Turkey Missions, chap. IV, p. 14. "Re-evaluation" then became "one of the watchwords of the Mission". 3 Riggs, Turkey Missions, chap. IV, p. 33, cf. Kieser, Friede, p. 374. 4 Some lines of this poem: "Mustafa Kemaldir, devlet banisi,/ Kemal Atatiirktur, Turk sevgilisi./ Zafer, istiklâli emanet etti,/ Tiirklerçin yaratti Cumhuriyeti./ Inonii, Sakarya, sonradan Lozan/ Turkun Zaferidir, ïdmete [Ismete] §iikran!" Woodworth, William Sage, "Ne Mutlu Ben Tiirkflm diyene", ÎÇEL, Mersin Halkevi Aylik Dergisi April 1940. For some thoughts about this see Riggs, Turkey Missions, chap. IV, p. 28 f.

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doubts about how ABCFM had to adjust itself after 1923. Nevertheless he ended his history in 1942 with the hopeful thought that the "seed so patiently planted during the earlier [Ottoman] years, nurtured by patient friendliness of Christian workers there today, is coming to manifest fruition." 1 About twenty years later, Ephraim K. Jernazian, a former student of the ABCFM's Marash Theological Seminary, was more pessimist: "I cannot help but wonder what St. Paul and the dedicated missionaries after him would say about the work of our contemporary American Board of Foreign Missions that supports schools which forbid the mention of Jesus Christ and teach the gospel of Mammon and Materialism. What, in fact, would the early founders of the American missions say about today's Board, which joins our politicians and businessmen in defense of those who justify or deny the Genocide and ongoing minority persecution, lest the truth jeopardize business opportunities, covering all beneath the veil of 'national security'?" 2 Jernazian wrote after the Truman Doctrine had made Turkey a close partner of the USA. NATO personnel then obtained more privileges and immunities than missionaries and other foreigners had ever enjoyed under the Ottoman Capitulations - which had so provoked the CUP's national pride. 3 Several missionaries and observers raised the question whether "Americanizing", instead of evangelizing, in collaboration with the Turkish nationalist elites had not become the ABCFM's real job in Turkey. This had also to do with a new generation of missionaries that lacked both the missionary vocation of the former generation and the contact with the provinces and the mass of the people.4 Had the self-confident, self-determined American Near East Mission of late Ottoman times finally become, in its reduced and "adjusted" form, a servant of geopolitics, that is, of the new strategic US-Turkish alliance after World War II? 5 The truth lays probably in between Jernazian's pessimistic and Rigg's optimistic note. Contrary to what they had been, the ABCM schools became very centred on the elite, and they lost much of the fundamental distance to the center of power which they had possessed. But despite the corset of Kemalist bureaucracy and the compulsion of the Turko-American alliance, not a few young men and women were educated who acquired an intellectual and spiritual potential far beyond these constraints.

Riggs, Turkey Missions, chap. IV, p. 8 and chap. V, p. 5 f. Jernazian, Ephraim K., Judgment unto truth. Witnessing the Armenian genocide, N e w Brunswick und London: Transaction Publishers, 1990, p. 121 f. 3 Cf. George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute-Hoover Institution 1972 p 9-30 and 54-7. ' 4

5

Cf. Kieser, Friede, p. 376 f.

Cf. Dittos, James E„ "The Christian Mission and Turkish Islam", The Muslim World 45 (1955), p. 141 f.; Trask, Roger R., '"Unnamed Christianity' in Turkey during the Atatiirk Era" The Muslim World 55 (1965), p. 101-108, here 109-111; Grabill, Protestant diplomacy, p. 296-98.

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Reflection on Islam and dialogue with Muslims suspended The situation of triumphant Turkism and nationalism in Kemalist Turkey did not favor reflection on and a dynamic dialogue with Islam. This leads us back to the period of 1908-1923 and to what remained of it. In some way, what had been gained or squandered in that period could not be redone or surpassed in the following decades. At the beginning of the 20 th century, the missionary work among Moslems had seriously been questioned, and with it that among Jews. But the questioning had not yet resulted in the implementation of comprehensive new attitudes, approaches and historicotheological insights. At the First Missionary Conference on behalf of the Mohammedan World held at Cairo in 1906 many discussions went back to the foundation periods of Islam and Christianity: it was argued that the early church had "made a mistake in insisting on uniformity between Jewish and Greek Christians", that there "should have been a Jewish form of Christianity", that "Islam is an attempt to attain that [Judeo-Christian] position - hence they are Gentile-Jews of a Gentile-Judaizing sect", and that "in his earliest years Mohammed himself was a nominal Christian". Consequently the Muslims should not be approached like heathens, as was still often the case. According to this historical background, mission to Muslims should focus not upon conversion, but upon "reconversion of those who have lapsed". For the German pastor and director of mission, Johannes Lepsius, the "reform of Islam" (he avoided the term "mission") was part of a general movement of global spiritual and mission history that was returning from the West to the East, after the long-lasting movements of mission from the East to the West from the first to the 18 th centuries. People like ABCFM missionary George F. Herrick, who also attended the conference, or others like Howard Bliss, Jakob Kiinzler, Johannes Awetaraianian, shared a respectful or humble approach to Islam, even if coupled with fundamental criticism. Other voices at the conference in 1906, however, and perhaps the majority of American missionaries in the 1900s and 1910s, insisted on the unyielding position that "Mohammed was really an idolater because his conception of God was really a caricature", and that his conception of God lacked love or holiness. Or the problem was seen as one of practical tactics: "It would only irritate the Moslems if we deny that they worship the one true God", who was in fact an

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"unknown God" to them, as W. K. Eddy from the ABFMPC of Syria said.1 There is no doubt that the ABCFM's public in the United States held a derogatory view of Islam as a religion, a culture and a history. An ABCFM book "written to make our work in Turkey interesting to the people in our churches", in 1913, has an appendix for church study classes and reading circles. Its suggestive questions and material - "Five minute exercises on Turkey", e.g. "VII. the evils of Islam" - prove that more humble approaches and revised historico-theological visions were hard to find, except among some missionaries on the ground. Sharp contrasts were emphasized between conditions in Turkey, "the great evils" and the "weakness of Islam", and the "lofty morals of the New Testament" and conditions in America. The book derived hope, of course, from the change in 1908, but focused upon a heroic 93-year-old ABCFM story and the "splendid results attained". In this tone it hoped to "deepen the conviction of our Congregational churches in the sure triumph of the Kingdom of Christ in Turkey". 2 In the following decade, the reverse of this vision happened, and nothing "splendid" remained. How could the missionaries readjust such a misunderstanding of mission, history and approach towards the Muslim other? It is important to know that a leading figure like the ABCFM Foreign Secretary James Barton himself held pejorative views of Islam. As in the case of Clarence Ussher, this also, but not only, had to do with the extremely negative experience of World War I. This experience re-enforced negative stances that had partly been questioned during the years before. In a book published in 1918 Barton concluded that "Islam is wholly inadequate to meet the needs of the [Turkish] race. It has been weighed in the balance of the centuries and has been found wanting." He argued that Muhammed's character was "defective", thus Islam was, "at its very source, corrupted, its conception of God without love, the Muslims' worship "mechanical", and its attitude towards women simply unacceptable. For Barton, the "absence of spiritual power has produced in Islam a mighty force for the destruction of spiritual impulses and religious ideals in the individual as well as in society. When it fails to save, it has become a dominant force for evil." Did the former Methods of mission work among Moslems. Being those papers read at the First Missionary Conference on behalf of the Mohammedan World held at Cairo April ^ - l ) " 1 , 1906, and the discussions thereon, which by order of the conference were not to be issued to the public, but were to be privately printed for the use of missionaries and the friends of missions, London: Fleming H. Revell company, n.d. (1906), p. 23-26. Cf. also Smith Jane I., "Christian missionary views of Islam in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries", Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 3-9 (1998), p. 357-373, here 360-363, and Khalaf, Shamir, "Protestant images of Islam: disparaging stereotypes reconfirmed", Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 2-8 (1997), p. 211-229. 2 Eddy, David Brewer, What next in Turkey?, Boston: The American Board, 1913, p. IX f., 185-191.

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missionary of ABCFM's Eastern Turkey Mission at Harput too much confuse Islam in general with the mass murders of the 1890s, perpetrated in the name of Islam, and the mass crimes of World War I in a context of formal jihad? As said before, the situation in the Republic of Turkey did not favor continuing the development of promising innovations in the theological thought and missionary approaches of the early 20 th century. Nor did it encourage addressing critical and fair questions about the role of Islam as a religion, as a community and a constitutive element of a nation during the genocide of 1915/16 and the large-scale pogroms of the 1890s. The Turkish nationalist elite anyway lived in the belief that they had created a completely new society after the zero point of Kemalist national history, the magic year of 1919. They hoped they could evacuate the whole religious question by subordinating Islam to the secular Republic and thus controlling it, and by instilling a quasi-religious Turkism in society.

The ambivalent relationship with Zionism - a few remarks In a broader view of modern history (19th-20th centuries) and its hidden religious scripts, the ABCFM's attitude towards Zionism in Young Turkey may be of interest. Here are just a few remarks on a topic that would perhaps deserve more elaboration. We will remember that in the early 19th century the ABCFM had been part of millennialist Christian Zionism, and thus had had a strongly restorationist attitude. Its prophetic, eschatological, postmillennialist roots remained always alive, as we have observed. The initial fundamental vision of the restoration of the Jews, nonetheless, was in a way suspended or left aside, even if never revoked. At the Conference in Cairo, the conversion of Israel, indissolubly linked to the Jews' return to Palestine reappeared as the last step of the spiritual movement from West to East, after the reform of Islam.1 It is striking that contrary to other powerful groups and individuals within Christian Zionism, the American missionaries maintained a remarkable distance towards political Zionism or Jewish nationalism, after this nationalism had emerged in the European fin de siècle. When, at the end of World War I, the struggle for a new order in the Near East began, the grandchildren of the restorationist pioneers hardly brought together Zionist visions with their ideas of a new Near East. Quite the contrary, as we see for instance documented by the report of the King-Crane Commission, that was

Methods of mission, p. 26.

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close to the Protestant missionary establishment. 1 Despite the missionaries' sympathy in principal, their somewhat critical distance towards Zionism had crystallized already in the decades before the War. Various factors explain this: the shift of missionary America's interest from Palestine to Asia Minor by the mid-19th century (after 1870 the ABFMPC, not the ABCFM, was concerned with mission in Syria and Palestine); the missionaries' identification with the natives (thus scepticism vis-à-vis ambitious East European newcomers); and after 1908, the identification as described above, with the new Ottoman order under construction and a strong scepticism towards separatist movements. In fact the ABCFM early on considered Zionism as a potentially separatist ethnic nationalism like all the others it had seen grow up since mid19th century in the Balkans and the Caucasus, including the Armenian Hinchak and Dashnak (the Dashnak however openly favored the reform of the Ottoman system, not Armenian autonomy, until the CUP chose to enter World War I). American missionaries particularly disliked this kind of eastern nationalism's instrumental use or open depreciation of religion. The missionaries, including the College professors, believed in "the fundamental place spiritual [as opposed to formalist or ritual] religion must hold in the life and character of every intellectual man". 2 That made possible some deeper affinities with the cultural Zionists (Kulturzionisten), who also gave priority to intact human relations beyond ethnic boundaries - even if in this strand of Zionism too, there was a tension between some features of romanticist cultural essentialism and postmillennialist universalism. ABCFM representatives cooperated with Rabbi Stephen Wise 3 who was a leader of American Zionism along with Louis Brandeis. For them Zionism, in the sense of Jewish restoration to Palestine, was a complement to Jewish life in the diaspora, not a substitute for it. They saw the first struggle as the one for fulfilment of shared democratic universal values in ethnically pluralistic, not homogenized societies. 4 For American missionaries in the 1910s this ideal held good for Palestine too. This made them sceptical about political Zionism. The editors of The Orient in Bible House looked at the Ottoman Jews, be it professing Jews or dônme (Jews converted to Islam in the 17th century), not without sympathy. They saw them as a "wideawake, progressive element, [who] may be looked to furnish future leaders of the Empire". They counted Cf. Fishman, Hertzel, American Protestantism and a Jewish state, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973, p. 23-29. 2 "Syrian Protestant College", The Orient III, no. 5, 31 January 1912, p. 3. 4

E. g. during the campaigns for the Near East Relief, cf. Kieser, Friede, p. 351. Cf. Gal, "Enigma", p. 156.

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not only the CUP minister of finance, Djavid, but also the CUP minister of the interior, Talat, among the donme from Salónica. 1 Concerning Arab complaints about "undue privileges given to Jews in Palestine, owing to the influence of the Jewish Deunmehs of Salónica" the editors wrote that they were "much in doubt", since the government "has not been nearly so much inclined to grant privileges to the Jews as their adversaries would have us believe." 2 As scepticism towards the CUP grew, however, criticism about "certain scheming Jews from Salónica" was not absent.3 Zionism was principally welcomed, but the sympathy The Orient expressed towards it was part of a general philo-semitic attitude, prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries for a long time already. There was hardly anything more, i.e. no eschatological enthusiasm about political Zionism. "All true friends of the Hebrew race sympathize strongly with the scheme of repatriating the Jews in their ancient home in Palestine", the editorialist of The Orient wrote in 1913. The same editorial, however, states, in response to a letter by Israel Cohen from the Zionist Central Office in Berlin to The Orient, that Zionist literature left few doubts about the nationalist goal of a Jewish state and that this obviously must meet with "bitter opposition" from natives and the Ottoman government.4 The editors in Bible House read the contemporary Zionist books and papers carefully, as several references to them show. In good Christian Zionist tradition however, the men in Bible House considered a nationalist return to Palestine without spiritual renewal "a mockery" of the prophets.5 Some ABCFM missionaries had a certain weakness for the universal values of socialism. But all were sceptical of ethnic nationalism, even when it was combined with socialism as in the case of the Hinchak and the Labor Zionists. They refused the revolutionary violence inherent in this kind of nationalism. Since it resulted in policies of exclusion or discrimination of other ethno-religious groups, ethno-nationalism fundamentally contradicted the missionaries' commitment to civic equality, political liberalism and

* "Jews and deunmehs", The Orient II, no. 5, 31 January 1912, p. 3. 2 "Editorial", The Orient IV, no. 6, 5 February 1913, p. 5. S "Editorial", The Orient IV, no. 1, 1 January 1913, p. 5. 4

"Editorial", The Orient IV, no. 1, 1 January 1913, p. 5.

"The one disappointing feature of the Zionist program is the lack of adequate emphasis on the religious side of the Return of the Diaspora. The mere physical return to the land of their forefathers without a return to Jehova, and insistence on a life in accord with the teachings of the prophets of the Lord, is a mockery. The only real and solid ground for a successful Zionist movement is on the basis of a return to the Lord, as urged by Isaiah, Jeremiah and Malachi." The Orient IV, no. 16, 16 April 1913, p. 4. For more on later liberal internationalist Protestant viewpoints concerning Zionism see Merkley, Paul Charles, Christian attitudes towards the state of Israel, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001, p. 21-50.

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supranational ties. What made them moreover distrustful was the impression that Zionism speculated on the end of the Ottoman world, not on its renewal and democratization - a goal to which the ABCFM had wholeheartedly committed itself in 1908. In this perspective neither the New Turkey of 1923 nor the New Israel of 1948 - the two post-Ottoman states with the strongest ethno-nationalist features - could be a true fulfilment of the ABCFM's old eschatological hopes.

Conclusion and outlook The highly conflictual relationship between the CUP and the ABCFM has been a main topic of this paper: the honeymoon after 1908, the complete breakdown of confidence during WWI, including the Armenian genocide, and the failed peace, from a missionary perspective, when the Muslim resistance to the Allies, led by ex-CUP members, won the war over Anatolia and an ethno-nationalist Turkey was proclaimed in 1923. The failure of missionary America's project of new Young Turkey was somewhat masked by the humanitarian activism of the Near East Relief, and also by the conversion of some institutions to the needs of the nation-state, and thus their maintenance. But a painful memory remained, first, of the catastrophe of Asia Minor's Christians, above all the Armenians, second, of the missionaries' own hopes in 1908-1914 for a peaceful Near East, and third of the ideas after 1918. This memory was largely suppressed for the sake of an economic and strategic Realpolitik that began to prevail towards the Near East in the interwar period. World War I was a seminal catastrophe not only for Europe, as is always rightly said, but also and even more for the Ottoman world, as the continuing profound problems which have their origin in the wider context of this war show. But World War I was also a seminal catastrophe for America if we take seriously the founding mentality and the impressive investments of missionary America in the Near East up till 1914.1 argue that World War I was a passage from a postmillennialist, historically optimistic perspective on the "Bible lands" - for missionaries then significantly synonymous to Near East - to a perspective that began to combine humanitarism, Realpolitik, and premillennialism. The catastrophic disappointment of the 1910s was suppressed, but it opened the way to a millennialism fascinated by great geostrategic scenarios and catastrophes. After the crash of Young Turkey, an evangelically motivated social Utopia centred on the Near East lost most of its appeal. The millennialism, which re-appeared some years later, was a premillennialist Christian Zionism

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without direct contact with the region and without close responsibility for people in it. The cataclysm of World War II and the Shoah acquired pivotal relevance as the background of this new millennialism. Instead of the long lasting Armeno-centric axis in religious, historical and humanitarian thought, a "passionate attachment" with Israel within a strongly geo-strategic setting began after World War II. 1 In the interwar period, politics, analysis and concepts about the Near East began to be made by different elites, among them many recent immigrants from Germany and Eastern Europe. For fifty years or so, from the 1930s to the 1980s, the USA turned most of its attention to Europe and the Soviet Union. The new keywords were "open door", the struggle against Nazism and Communism, and stability even if without democracy, as in the Near East. In this perspective, the close Turko-American strategic partnership after World War II was a sometimes helpful, sometimes cynical and antidemocratic small substitute for what both had missed in 1908: a new Ottoman Near Eastern order coupled with a strong Turko-American friendship. Neither the Turko-Ottoman elite nor America were really ready for the great challenge in 1908. The Turko-Ottoman elite was not democratic, and America was not congruent with the missionary avant-garde on the spot. This avant-garde moreover attributed too much agency to itself, giving missionary America a too central role in the wonderful process it hoped for. The great challenge would have been to build up - as missionaries then began to articulate - a "secular" civic society, nourished by a spirituality beyond the boundaries of churches, mosques, synagogues, but also beyond the trendy revolutionary, nationalist and social Darwinist ideologies. What mainly took root instead in that time was ethnic nationalism among the educational elites and protofascist behaviour among young imperial elites. If the late Ottoman missionaries' fears of what would result from ethnic nationalism unfortunately proved to be true during the 20 th century, the same missionaries were shown to be wrong in their optimistic visions of contemporary history before 1914. Insofar as those actors' evangelical thought refused to anticipate wars and catastrophes, but did all it could to prevent an apocalypse, in the popular sense of the word, it is unfair to blame missionaries for being unrealistic. But criticism can be levelled at the missionaries' biased historical imagination and at the wrong expectations they awakened in people trusting them. And a sober conclusion is that despite interesting departures after 1908, the "turnaround" towards an integrative, if critical, vision of Islam, as history and religion, was not achieved. ' Cf. Ball, George W., and Ball, Douglas B., The passionate attachment: America's involvement with Israel, 1947 to the present, New York: Norton, 1992.

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America never fully came to term with the collapse of its ongoing postmillennialist project for the Near East. Thus the traumatic past, including the frustration of World War I, conserved its topicality in all subsequent new contexts. An unfulfilled, uneasy, resentful American relationship with the post-Ottoman world was the legacy of that seminal break.

2. OTTOMAN URFA AND ITS WESTERN MISSIONARIES

In the final decades of the Ottoman Empire, strong links connected Urfa with the West through the Protestant and Catholic missions.* The three organizations present in Urfa were the Missione dei Fratri Minori Cappuccini nella Mesopotamia ed Armenia (Mission of the Capuchin Friars Minor for Mesopotamia and Armenia), the Boston-based American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), and the Deutsche OrientMission (German Orient Mission). 1 Urfa had also a special tie with Basel, Switzerland, which was an important source for the personnel and financial backing of the Swiss (commonly referred to as German) Hospital in the city. The anti-Armenian pogroms of the Fin de siècle had provoked indignation among the Swiss population and led to a strong phil-Armenian movement. A handful of women and men became engaged in helping the victims on the spot. They wanted to contribute to rebuilding life in various places in multiethnic Asia Minor. Until World War I the missionary hospital in Urfa belonged to the Deutsche Orient-Mission headed by Dr. Johannes Lepsius in Berlin. The medical staff and the missionaries wrote much. Their papers, letters, articles, and books thus constitute important archival sources for the historical reconstruction of the regional scene of that time.2 Amid the different ethnic groups and social classes, humanitarians such as long-time residents Jakob and Elisabeth Kunzler, Josephine Ziircher, and Andreas Vischer had gained insight into the prevailing situation from different perspectives. Their testimony serves a supra-ethnic history from below, which is so lacking in the First published as a book chapter entitled "Ottoman Urfa and its missionary witnesses", in: Hovannisian, Richard (ed.), Historic Armenian Cities and Provinces, vol. 6, Costa Mesa CA: Mazda Press, 2006, p. 399-466. i For a detailed study on this topic, see Hans-Lukas Kieser, Der verpasste Friede: Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei 1839-1938 (Zurich: Chronos, 2000), or the same in Turkish, Iskatanmis bari§: Dogu vilayetleri'nde misyonerlik, etnik kimlik ve devlet 1839-1938, trans. A. Dirim (Istanbul: lleti§im, 2005). ^See the Archivio Generale dei Frati Minori Cappuccini (hereafter AGC) in Rome and the archives of the ABCFM (hereafter ABC) in the Houghton Library at Harvard University. Unfortunately, there is no special repository for the documents of the phil-Armenian movement in Switzerland. The Dr. Johannes-Lepsius-Archiv (hereafter LAH) in Halle, Germany, however, contains much Swiss material; cf. its microfiche edition, Deutschland, Armenien und die Türkei 1895-1925, prepared by Hermann Goltz and Axel Meissner (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1999). Other material can be found in cantonal and private archives in Switzerland; cf. the references in this chapter as well as in Christoph Dinkel, "Die schweizerische Armenierhilfe: Chronik von 1896 bis in die Zwischenkriegszeit," in Kieser, Armenische Frage, pp. 187-210.

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historiography of twentieth-century Turkey. Several texts of Jakob Kunzler, who remained in Urfa during World War I, are important documents relating to the Armenian Genocide.1 Foundation of the Missions at the Time of Abdul-Hamid Urfa developed into a missionary center during the reign of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1876-1908/09). A Capuchin mission station had already been established there, however, since the beginning of the Ottoman reform era ('Tanzimat) in the 1830s. Socially more significant, Urfa had quickly been caught up in the maelstrom of the Protestant movement. This had gripped the towns of Aintab (Anteb), Marash, and Urfa in the 1830s and Diarbekir in the 1840s, although not yet the remaining eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Even before the arrival of American missionaries, the most influential in nineteenth-century Turkey, Armeno-Turkish scriptures distributed by itinerant Anglican preachers were circulating. While Aintab became a permanent residence of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in 1847 at the request of "reformist" and "awakened" circles in the Gregorian (Armenian Apostolic) Church, Urfa was frequently visited from Aintab, but it did not become a permanent station until 1892.2 The actual Protestant boom in Urfa began in about 1860. As elsewhere its principal foundations lay in the creation of the quasi-official Protestant millet or confessional community in 1850 and the Hatt-i Humayun reform decree issued by the sultan in 1856. The tangible basis for the Protestant movement was the trust earned at Urfa by the missionaries within a ten-year period. The high expectations of the Armenian "reform party," which collaborated with the ABCFM with the goal of modernizing the Armenian Church from within was also a contributing factor. The size of the Protestant congregation quickly increased from 22 at the end of 1857 to 57 in 1859 and 210 in 1863. Similar growth occurred in the out-stations. Above all, the Protestant schools began to develop as did adult education, especially for women who

' See, for example, Jakob Kunzler, Im Lande des Blutes und der Tränen: Erlebnisse in Mesopotamien während des Weltkriegs (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1921; enlarged new ed., Zurich: Chronos, 1999). ^Frank Andrews Stone, "The Educational 'Awakening' among the Armenian Evangelicals of Aintab, Turkey, 1845-1915," Armenian Review 35:1 (1982): 30-31. See also Vahan H. Tootikian, "The Rise of Armenian Evangelicals," Armenian Review 35:2 (1982): 130-31. °>The Missionary Herald (1859): 246, and (1863): 216; published in Boston for the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.

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wanted to learn to read and write. 1 Since the early 1860s the American mission fostered female education both in the region of Cilicia and at Urfa. The prestige of the Protestant schools became so high that in 1864 nonProtestant parents began enrolling their children, for which they paid a fee. A new chapel was built in 1864 and enlarged in 1875. Even then it was unable to accommodate all communicants who numbered about 800 by that time. Beginning in 1871, the Protestant community was led by Hagop Abuhayatian, a pastor who had studied theology in Switzerland and Germany. He was the first Armenian in the region who, thanks to his Protestant connections, had been able to travel to Europe to pursue his studies.4 The Capuchin monks Giuseppe da Burgos, Angelo da Villarubia, and Pietro da Premia arrived in Urfa in 1841 and concerned themselves primarily with the needs of Catholic families, although from the beginning they also pursued the aim of reaching out to "schismatics" (Armenians and Assyrians) whose reaction was not very favorable. Muslims were also decidedly distrustful of this foreign Catholic presence. Thanks to the intervention of the French ambassador, Father Giuseppe obtained from the sultan the requisite authorization to build both a chapel and a house for himself. 5 With the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856, which proclaimed equal rights for Christians and Muslims and granted greater freedom for the millets, the situation began to stabilize for the Capuchin mission. It tended to the small Catholic Armenian and Assyrian communities, sought to expand them, and operated primary schools for their children. It did not, however, experience a boom comparable with that of Protestantism. It was not until the 1890s that the missions began to make a distinct impression on the landscape of Urfa. The rather discreetly run Capuchin mission station was increasingly finding itself in competition with the American and then, following the 1895 massacres, the German missionaries. The Americans visited Urfa on a regular basis during and after the Tanzimat period and supported the Protestant community there, which even before the ^Missionary Herald (1862): 247. ^"Indeed, one of the most interesting facts in the progress of the missionary enterprise in this field is the interest awakened in behalf of female education. Already a large number of the graduates in the out-stations, and high school girls are called for in five or six cities [among them Urfa]." Missionary Herald (1880): 52, from the Annual Report of the Central Turkey Mission for 1879. 3

Missionary Herald (1864): 271, and (1875): 171. S e e Missionary Herald (1897): 80-84; Johannes Lepsius in Der Christliche Orient (1900): 192, (1913): 174; Jakob Kiinzler, in Der Christliche Orient (1906): 170; Aram Sahakian, ed., Diutsaznakan Urfan ev ir hayordinere [Heroic Urfa and Its Armenian Sons] (Beirut: Atlas, 1955), pp. 334-37. -'Clemente da Terzorio, Le missioni dei minori cappuccini, sunto storico, voi. 6: Missione die Persia e Mesopotamia (Rome: Cooperativa Tipografica Manuzio, 1920), pp. 232-33, 241-42, 259-60. 4

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establishment of the American mission station in 1892 numbered more than 1,000 persons. It was administered locally by the native inhabitants. While the Catholic station became greatly reinforced by the addition of the Sisters of Lons-le-Saunier, Protestantism, which had struggled at the time of its foundation, engaged in a dramatically enlarged field of activity because of the pogroms of 1895. The mass murders resulted in a visible strengthening of foreign Christian elements in Urfa. The ethnic groups lived in more-or-less divided quarters spreading out from the bazaar. Turks and Arabs lived to the south (by the castle hill); Turks, Assyrians, and Jews in the east; and Armenians in the west. The Armenian quarter was dominated by the massive cathedral, built in 1849 with space for several thousand people. In the northern part of the quarter stood the Protestant church with the buildings of the American mission next door. Adjacent to the quarter lay the suburb or "new town," which attracted mostly Arab, Assyrian, and Kurdish residents. The Turkish and German hospitals and the German orphanage, as well as the houses of the Swiss families Kiinzler and Vischer, were built in that district in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Capuchin mission station, permanent since 1841, stood in the Assyrian quarter in the eastern part of the city. In 1883, it was joined by nuns from Lons-le-Saunier, who supervised a sewing studio and a girls' school. Unlike the Catholics, the Protestants did not have a church of their own until 1888, and there was no permanent American missionary presence in Urfa until Corinna Shattuck, who had been working in the Central Turkey Mission since 1873, settled there in 1892 and became principal of the Protestant school. At the beginning of the Hamidian era in the 1870s, about 18,000 Muslims, 10,000 Armenian Apostolics, 1,000 Protestants, 1,500 Assyrians, 120 Catholics, and 120 Jews lived in the city.1 In 1880, according to statistics kept by the ABCFM, about 1,000 towns-people, 100 residents of the nearby village Garmuch, and 200 in the small town of Severek were Protestants. In Urfa, 315 pupils attended the Protestant school, in Severek, 40. 2 Marash and Aintab each had three times as many Protestants. At the time, there were thirty-two churches with about 12,000 registered members in the region covered by the Central Turkey Mission. In 1890, a few years before the great massacres, the Protestants in the Central Turkey Mission numbered around 17,000, including 1,300 in Urfa, 3,422 in Aintab, and 2,375 in Marash. In

^ABC, 16.9.5 , Letter of Corinna Shattuck , Dec. 25, 1877. ^Missionary Herald (1882): 55.

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some places, Protestants constituted between a fifth and a quarter of the Christian population.1 The Armenian revolutionary movement was less conspicuous in Urfa than in other places in the eastern provinces, such as Van, and therefore was rarely noted in the records of the Urfa mission and in British and Ottoman sources. 2 Yet it was also here in 1895 that rumors of a general Armenian uprising began to spread.3 In fact, it was the thriving educational, cultural, and economic life of the Armenian community in which the missions played an important role that led to a growing social gulf between the Armenians and the rural-dwelling Kurds and Arabs, many of whom were in debt to urban Armenians. Also in the months following the Sasun massacres of 1894, the question of reforms in the eastern provinces resurfaced, thus arousing the passions of Muslims. When in the fall of 1895 it was reported that the sultan had reconciled himself to reforms, this was misinterpreted as a concession granting autonomy to the Armenians.4 On October 28-29, 1895, Urfa, like so many other eastern towns in 1895-96, was the site of pogroms that resulted in considerable material damage and thirty-four deaths, although later reports put the number at sixty.5 The relatively low death toll was due in part to the fact that the Armenians remained indoors in the face of mounting tension and also offered some resistance against the rampaging mob. According to British Vice Consul Gerald H. Fitzmaurice, five or six Muslims were killed. Many houses and approximately 700 Armenian shops and businesses were damaged and looted.6 From the end of October onward the Armenians found themselves practically besieged, without regular supplies of food or water. Some 400 to 500 Armenians converted to Islam either under direct death threats or simply because they saw no other way to survive. Futile attempts were made to send out messengers to Aintab or Aleppo with news of their plight. In the large village of Garmuch, the Kurds and Arabs could only be repelled by means of a fake military camp placed in such a manner as to give the impression of a

U B C , MS Hist. 31:4, pp. 36,38. ^Cf. Bilal §imgir, ed., British Documents on Ottoman Armenians, 4 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1982-1990); idem, Documents diplomatiques ottomans: Affaires arméniennes, 4 vols. (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque d'histoire, 1985-1999). ^Herbert, Constantinople, to Foreign Secretary Salisbury, Oct. 28, 1895, FO 424/184, p. 119, (no. 187, in §im§ir, British Documents, vol. 4, p. 379). ^See the investigations of British Vice Consul Fitzmaurice in his report of March 16, 1896 to Ambassador Philip Currie (misinterpretation of the reforms, pp. 2-3, indebtedness of Muslims to Armenian creditors, p. 10). A copy of the report is in ABC, Bible House Reports, 1895-1896. ^Fitzmaurice report, p. 3. 6 Ibid„ p. 4. 7 Ibid.,p. 11.

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protecting force, coupled with armed resistance. 1 The inhabitants of Garmuch successfully refused to hand over their weapons to the government. Armenian leaders in Urfa, as elsewhere, were obliged to sign declarations holding Armenian hotheads responsible for the pogroms. 2 This first declaration was made at the beginning of November and included representatives of the other religious communities. On a second occasion in mid-December, twenty-five distinguished Armenians had to sign a telegram that placed blame for tensions on Armenian elements and contained an obsequious declaration of loyalty and gratitude to the sultan, delivered to him at their own expense. Here, too, Christians were made to hand in their weapons. The connection between the Balkan-related trauma of the Turks and their interpretation of Armenian hopes for reform were also obvious. When fifteen Armenian notables were summoned to the government offices on November 12 to hand over weapons, Nazif Pasha, the local army commander, declared that he had been in Bulgaria in 1876 and therefore knew how to deal with "rebellious rayas." On the morning of December 28, he let it be known to the non-Armenian Christians that they should assemble in their churches, 3

remain inside, and on no account grant asylum to Armenians. Renewed massacres took place on December 28 and 29 following the stirring up of elements resentful of the Armenians. Participants in this second pogrom, from which the culprits reaped a substantial material profit, were Muslims from the towns, the military, both local and non-local, and Kurds and Arabs from the countryside. The Armenian victims were mostly men— Apostolic, Protestant, and Catholic—though many women and children perished when the large Armenian cathedral in which 3,000 people had sought refuge was set on fire. In the Urfa region, as in others previously, statements were circulated characterizing the slaying of Armenian males as a matter of urgent necessity in accordance with sound orthodox Islamic moral principles. In Urfa, this religious tone gained particular significance when a sheikh named Jelal single-handedly slaughtered about 100 male infants in the name of his religion. 4 Further, Mullah Said Ahmed set an example for others by personally beheading an Armenian in public while issuing an appropriate

ilbid. 2

Ibid., pp. 5-6; Individual Biographies, 54:21, Letter of Corinna Shattuck to Julia S. Concant, Jan. 24, 1896. Fitzmaurice report, pp. 5, 7. 4 J a k o b Künzler, Köbi der Lückenbüsser im Dienste des Lebens (Kassel: Johannes StaudaVerlag, 1951), p. 75; Fitzmaurice report, pp. 8-9.

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to justify the deed.1 They, like all the others, were never prosecuted and even boasted about their feats. As in many other places, bugles sounded at the onset and the end of the massacre. These signals were acted upon promptly almost without exception. The Jews were assigned the job of disposing of the corpses. 2 The authorities made no attempt to halt the violence. With only a few dozen police officers at their disposal they summoned reservists ( r e d i f ) who then became culprits themselves.3 Only foreigners were protected—Corinna Shattuck, the Capuchin monastery under the leadership of Father Apollinaire, and the Franciscan nuns.4 Everywhere, both the central and provincial authorities were careful to prevent any eyewitness statements from reaching the outside world. In the province of Aleppo, not only did they block postal traffic for those months but also imprisoned any messenger attempting to bring news to the consuls in Aleppo. 5 The rapid transfer of those responsible for the bloodshed to high positions in far-flung places (as was the case with both police officer Hasan Bey and troop commander Nazif Pasha) meant that not only did they avoid criminal prosecution but also that no serious criminal investigation could be conducted.6 fetva

Apart from the workers at the Capuchin-Franciscan Mission, Corinna Shattuck was the only foreigner to witness the massacres. She sent a detailed account in a letter, dated January 24, 1896, to a cousin, Julia S. Concant. Charles Sanders, a ABCFM missionary at Aintab, arrived in Urfa at the end of January to lend his colleague support. He apparently left there with this letter for dispatch to the United States. Consul Fitzmaurice's own report seems to base many of its essential points on Shattack's written record. 7 Although sympathetic to the Armenians, her description was not simplistic. As a foreigner she found herself placed on an inviolable middle ground. She was patronized, indeed practically courted, by those very notables whose complicity in the violence she did not doubt. Shattuck quoted a variety of figures of the victims at various times and locations, of those in hiding, of ' Kemal Mazhar Ahmed, Birinci Dttnya savasi yillarinda Kurdistan [Kurdistan during the First World War] (Ankara: Berhem Yayinevi, 1992, 1st ed„ Baghdad: Kurt Bilim Komitesi Yayinlari, 1975), p. 61. 2

ABC, Individual Biographies, 54:21, Letter of Corinna Shattuck, Urfa, Jan. 24, 1896; Fitzmaurice report, pp. 8-9. ^Herbert to Salisbury, Constantinople, Nov. 2, 1895, FO 424/184, pp. 152-53 (no. 246, in §im§ir, British Documents, vol. 4, pp. 425-26). 4 See the anonymous report of a Franciscan nun, Diarbekir, Feb. 23, 1896, Soeurs de Lons-leSaunier, Lyon. ^Consul Barnham to Currie, Aleppo, Nov. 24, 1895, FO 424/184, pp. 443-48, no. 783/1 ('im'ir British Documents, vol. 4, pp. 633-34, 636-37). ^Fitzmaurice report, p. 10. 7 ABC, Individual Biographies 54:21 (handwritten copy of her letter); a typewritten copy is in

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soldiers, and so forth. She estimated the number of Armenian victims to be 5,000, which was a modest assessment (Vice Consul Fitzmaurice quoted a figure, possibly slightly exaggerated, of 8,000). 1 Shattuck, who had known Urfa for twenty years, had supervised schools with hundreds of children, and had organized efficient assistance for the survival of many victims, undoubtedly had much experience with statistics. Following a field investigation by Johannes Lepsius in the late spring of 1896, what was later to become the Deutsche Orient-Mission began to establish itself energetically as an Armenian aid organization in Urfa. Shattuck had urged Lepsius to create a home for orphans there and actually directed it with money from Germany until the arrival of Franz Eckart and Pauline Patrunky in March and Dr. Josephine Zürcher in July 1897. The first two assumed care of the orphans who then numbered about 200, while the doctor established a hospital in an old townhouse. Upon Zürcher's arrival in Urfa, evidence of the massacres was not limited to the operating room but was found everywhere. On the opening day of the mission clinic, July 22, more than 200 people pressed themselves into the inner courtyard of the house. From then on, not only the previously injured but also Muslim civilians and even a pasha found themselves consulting the first independently practicing female physician in Turkey. 2 On her way to Urfa, Zürcher had already operated on the arm of no less a personage than that of a commander of one of the semi-regular Hamidiye regiments, Ibrahim Pasha, at his spacious lodgings in Birejik. 3 In Urfa, she was assisted medically and as an interpreter by Dr. Abraham Attarian, who had trained at the American hospital in Aintab without receiving an official diploma. There were also other men supporting her: the pharmacist Sarkis Aprahamian, the servant Arush, the soldier Hasan, as well as Heinrich Fallscheer, her future husband who was in charge of administrative aspects. 4 Completely worn out and weakened by illness, Zürcher had to resign her post in December 1897. Until 1932, she remained as an independent doctor in the Near East. The statistics compiled by the young physician in January 1898

^Fitzmaurice report, p. 9. The Capuchin report mentions 10,000 victims (Soeurs de Lons-leSaunier: "Récit des massacres en Arménie 1895," typewritten, pp. 15-16). ^In Ottoman Syria before her there was Dr. Mary Eddy. "It remained for the valiant Dr. Eddy of Syria [1864-1922] to break down the visceral interdiction, and open Turkey to equal doctoreal privileges between men and women." See ABC, 16.9.7, reel 693: 409. ^Josephine Fallscheer-Ziircher, "Wie ich den Rauberfiirsten Ibrahim Pascha operierte," Hygieia, no. 3-5 (1932). ^Sincc the years of his service as curate (assistant pastor) in Palestine, 1884-86, Lepsius had become well acquainted with Fallscheer.

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were impressive. In the space of six months, she had 11,970 consultations and performed 142 operations. Three-quarters of her patients were Christians.1 On her part, Corinna Shattuck built up an embroidery works for Armenian widows, which integrated old Armenian know-how. She did this on her own initiative as at the time the ABCFM was not yet engaged in this kind of work. She created a market for the goods in America, England, Germany, and Switzerland. With the assistance of an Irish friend, George Gracey, she managed to furnish workshops for the training of the orphan boys at her school. Then, in 1902 she founded a school for the blind. Seriously ill, Shattuck left Urfa in 1909 and died in the United States the following spring.2 Franz Eckart, having gained experience in Lepsius' former parish in Germany and inspired by Shattuck, constructed a carpet workshop for the Deutsche Orient-Mission, which began to employ Armenian widows in May 1897. School life in Urfa at the turn of the century was diverse, with major disparities between Christians and Muslims. The yearbook of the Ministry of Education for A.H.1316 (1898 A.D.) gave a total figure of 284 students, 88 of whom were female, attending the Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Protestant, and Assyrian Protestant high schools, as opposed to 165 Muslim students in the state schools. 3 Only a few of the students enrolled in the Christian secondary schools were Protestant, yet 126 of them or nearly half attended the Protestant schools. Aside from several Jewish and Muslim pupils, nearly all the students belonged to the Oriental Christian churches. At the primary school level, the gap was undoubtedly greater, especially as the Franciscans alone taught 300 pupils, two-thirds of them girls. 4 From the outset, their school had to be polyglot, placing heavy demands on the teachers. Besides Turkish, Arabic, and Armenian, for Catholics learning French was "considered indispensable."5 Demands of another type were created by the Turkish-Armenian tensions which extended to the children and made police protection necessary in the Franciscan school. 6 Bands of Turkish and Armenian children fought against each other, both hand-to-hand and with stones. As in most of the mission schools, the Franciscans in Urfa also had a handful of Muslims and ^ Aus der Arbeit des Armenischen Hilfswerks (April 1898): 60-61. S e e Emily C. Peabody, Corinna Shattuck: Missionary Heroine (Chicago: Women's Board of Missions of the Interior, 1913); Missionary Herald (1908): 111-12; Der Christliche Orient (1908): 24-25, and (1910): 113-19, 153-55. Salname-i Maarif, 1316. 2

4 Rapport sur l'état de la mission de Mésopotamie 1901, AGC H 72 II, 9, p. 4. Cf. Vital Cuinet, La Turquie d'Asie (Paris: E. Leroux, 1892), vol. 2, p. 261. -'Letter of Raphaël de Mossoul, Dec. 21, 1901, AGC H 72 IV. ^Ibid.; Ephraim K. Jernazian, Judgment unto Truth: Witnessing the Armenian Genocide (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 52.

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Jews, and, in spite of its being forbidden, even a few state officials entrusted their children's education to the missionaries. 1 Although the Protestant schools in Urfa, with the exception of the German orphanage, were locally financed and supervised, in emergencies they could count on help from the missions with which they were associated. The ABCFM made the most significant contributions. The Assyrian Protestant School would have disappeared had not the deacon of the mission hospital, Jakob Kiinzler, at the request of the pastor Djurdji Shammas, opened financial channels to Switzerland which resulted in a new building and funds for teachers' salaries. It was not, however, an entirely new foundation, as the readers of Der Christliche Orient, the organ of the Deutsche Orient-Mission, were led to believe. 2 In Hamidian Urfa, school appeared to be essentially, but not strictly, religious-communal. On the one hand, a modest number of Muslims and Jews attended the mission schools, while, on the other, it was not only children of the Ummet (Sunni-Muslim community) who attended state schools (idadi). In 1901, of the 140 students at the state high school, there were 125 Muslims and 15 non-Muslims. 3 Doctor Hermann Christ of Basel took charge of the mission hospital in 1898. Being well to do, he waived a salary. Unlike his predecessor he had been able to obtain the requisite Ottoman credentials in Constantinople. In his report on the first six months of 1899, Christ emphasized the disastrous connection between chronic poverty and public health. It was essential that a hospital be built for the poorest of the poor and to win the trust of the Muslims, who made too little use of the clinic—only 15 percent out of all patients— despite their constituting two-thirds of the urban population. 4 Reaching out to the poor and inclusion of the Muslims were two points in the hospital's program to which it remained true until its end in 1922. In 1899, Christ received support in the person of Deacon Jakob Kiinzler from the public municipal hospital, the Burgerspital, in Basel. Thanks in no small measure to this very dutiful and communicative orderly who committed himself beyond the call of duty, there existed a good, efficient working relationship between the Swiss and Armenian personnel. The trust of the inhabitants was quickly obtained, and the number of patients grew, as did the proportion of Muslims, reaching one-third by 1903. Among the Muslim ^ Letter of Raphael de Mossoul. Der Christliche Orient {1906): 169-73, (1907): 58-62, and (1912): 107-10. 3 1321 senesi Maarif Nezareti salnames [The 1321 (1903-04) Yearbook of the Ministry of Education], p. 457, cited in Mahmut Karaka§, Cumhuriyet oncesi §anliurfa'da kultiir ve egitim [Culture and Education in §anliurfa before the Republic] (Ankara: T.C. Kultiir Bakanligi, 1995), p. 146. 4 Letter of Hermann Christ, May 12, 1899, printed in A us der Arbeit des Armenischen Hilfswerkes (Oct. 1899): 145-46. Cf. Vischer in Der Christliche Orient (1914): 61. 2

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patients the Kurds, who were the poorest of the inhabitants, made up the largest element. From the beginning they frequented the ethnically- and religiously-mixed hospital, whereas it was not until the end of 1901 that the first Turk, a fourteen-year-old boy, was hospitalized. His father pleaded to be allowed to remain at his son's side day and night. The healing of this youth, who had sustained a leg injury, led to a breakthrough with the Turkish inhabitants. To allow oneself to be hospitalized in the house of foreign gavurs (infidels) represented a large and significant step for the Urfa Ummet. In 1903, in order to provide an alternative, the mutasarrif (county governor) Ethem Pasha had a Turkish hospital built in the record time of eleven months; naming it "Hamidiye" in honor of the sultan.1 The success of the interethnic strategy of the hospital was not a matter of course, though after 1895 it can be considered to have bridged the deepest divisions. Sheikh Jelal, one of the perpetrators of the massacres, guaranteed access to the clinic by a conscious act of "love thy enemy" (he brought his sick daughter). Jelal would only accept medicines directly from Jakob Kunzlcr's hand, fearing that the Armenian pharmacist who was a "fanatical nationalist" might poison him. 2 The ill health of Christ's wife forced him to relinquish his post in 1904, but before his departure he was witness to the laying of the cornerstone of a new hospital, thanks to donations from friends in Basel. Their generosity was to remedy the problem of having to rent the facilities. Hermann Christ's replacement, Andreas Vischer, also came from an old, well-established, and wealthy Basel family. Upon his arrival in Urfa in 1905, the work of the Deutsche Orient-Mission became consolidated from the point of view of infrastructure, regional roots, and relationship to the authorities. Dr. Lepsius explicitly praised the goodwill of the Ottoman authorities, although up to that point the Orient-Mission had been an aid organization almost exclusively for A r m e n i a n s . 3 The friendship between Abdul-Hamid and the German government, which after initial reluctance had begun to support its missionaries, certainly played a role in improving relations on the local level. In Basel, there was also a network of moral and material support based on a philanthropically-inclined circle of friends of Christ, Vischer, and Ktinzler. In 1907, they founded the Verein der Freunde des medizinischen Liebeswerkes in Urfa (Society of Friends of the Medical Charity Foundation in Urfa). In public appeals, the society emphasized the supra-religious

'Karakag, §anhurfa, p. 146. ^Ktinzler, Lückenbüsser, pp. 75-76. Concerning the ethnic composition of the patients, see Dr. Andreas Vischer's letter to his mother of June 11, 1905, Vischer estate. ^Der Christliche Orient (1904): 161-62.

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orientation of its work motivated by Christianity. It did not seek to gain converts: "But the institution should bring a gleam of Christian brotherly love to a country that is desperate, poverty-stricken, and where a wind of bloody hatred rages through the differing confessions. It should be an island of European culture in the land between the Euphrates and Tigris which once blossomed splendidly but is so unhappy now." 1 The conditions laid down by the sponsors explicitly included the annual provision of an assistant doctor from Switzerland, though this occurred only once, with the young doctor Rico Pfister spending 1907-08 in Urfa. The Swiss in Urfa received many letters and newspapers from their homeland. 2 Sometimes cards would arrive addressed in an irresponsible manner, written by acquaintances who clearly lacked any political sensibilities— "Urfa-Mesopotamia; Urfa-Armenia (how awful!)." In Urfa, Andreas Vischer and Jakob Kiinzler could move about freely and unhindered, largely because of their affable dispositions. They would be greeted in the streets or invited to tea by all kinds of people. Kiinzler was occasionally kissed in public by the Mevlevi Dervish Mahmud, who regarded him as a brother ever since the orderly treated him at the clinic for a broken nose. On Sundays, the Swiss usually attended the Assyrian Protestant church. Vischer wrote to his mother: "So we can attend the Protestant churches, either that of the Syrians, where the service is held in Turkish, or of the Armenians, where it is Armenian mixed with Turkish." He had made it a priority to learn Turkish but not Armenian, further evidence of upholding the interethnic principle by making pragmatic use of the country's lingua franca.4 It was possible to move about fairly safely outside Urfa, not least because Ibrahim Pasha, the Hamidiye commander and leader of the powerful Kurdish Milli tribes that had great influence in the Urfa and Diarbekir regions, described himself as a friend and protector of the missionaries, even though he was very critical of them in conversations with Kiinzler. The pasha was visited frequently by the missionaries, including the Franciscans, and himself visited the Deutsche Orient-Mission on at least one occasion. 5 Der Christliche Orient (1908): 14. The first members of the Society included Rudolf Burckhardt, M.D., Hermann Christ-Werner, Hans Fichter, Ph.D., Georg Finsler, V.D.M (divinity degree), Th. Iselin, M.D., Albert Lötz, Ph.D., A. Mez, M.D., Achilles Miiller-Kober, Ph.D., Albert Oeri, Ph.D., Eduard Preiswerk, Dr. iur. Edgar Refardt-Koechlin, A. von Salis, Ph.D., W. Sarasin, Carl E. Vischer-Speiser, and Ernst B. Vischer. ^Vischer letter to his mother, Urfa, July 9, 1905, Vischer estate. a Kiinzler, Lückenbüsser, pp. 73-74. 4 Urfa, June 11, 1905, Vischer estate. 5 Jakob Kiinzler in Der Christliche Orient (1902): 65-70, and (1908): 12-14. Cf. Franz Eckart in Der Christliche Orient (1908): 139-41; Der Christliche Orient (1907): 183; Giannantonio da Milano, in Les Missions Catholique: Bulletin hebdomadaire illustré de l'Oeuvre de la propagation de la foi (1908): 311-12. On the end of Ibrahim's "regional rule," see Jakob Kiinzler, "Das Ende des Nomadenfiirsten Ibrahim Pascha," Christlicher Volksbote aus Basel, no. 52 (1908): 413.

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Young Turk Urfa In 1908, "Islamic Urfa," where radical groups invoking the name of Islam had carried out the worst massacres of the 1890s, experienced a promising Young Turk revolution with seemingly strong interethnic links and officials who were willing to lay down the law to reactionary and extremist forces. At this time, all three Christian missions strove to extend their work, above all the Deutsche Orient-Mission whose exponents, with the exception of Swiss and Danish workers, increasingly saw themselves as a part of the ambitious German Eastern policy, especially as Urfa lay near the route of the Berlin to Baghdad Railway. Soon, however, the Adana massacre of April 1909 and the Balkan wars of 1912-13, were to cast dark shadows over the prospect of continued cohabitation of Christians and Muslims. Although behind the front lines in World War I, Urfa in certain respects stood at the center of the catastrophe. The missionary observers had to look on not only as the Armenian community was extinguished but also as the caravans of Armenian deportees and then of Kurdish exiles from all the eastern provinces passed near the city. And after the war, the so-called Turkish War of Independence found particularly fertile ground in Urfa. On the one hand, there were the remaining Armenian "inner enemies" who had recently returned with the Allies and had to be cleansed from the "national area" once and for all, and, on the other hand, there was for the first time an actual "foreign enemy" in the area—some 500 French soldiers with light weapons—to be driven out. A glorious battle against a powerful adversary is an event that continues to appear in the national myth. The Young Turk (Committee of Union and Progress) seizure of power in 1908 also took Urfa by surprise. Here, too, there was fraternization and celebration. The politically-motivated manifestations were one of the most promising aspects of this era. A mixed crowd of Muslims and Christians took part in applauding "the play of freedom" in the courtyard of the Armenian cathedral. Young Turk officers announced the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution, which Abdul-Hamid had suspended in 1878, and the new meaning of the slogan "Liberty, Fraternity, Justice." They excoriated the tyranny of the previous regime and explicitly distanced themselves from the massacres of 1895. Yet, while it was true that the new government "controls the freedom committee placed in every town to keep order," it was all too obvious that these committees were continuing to work with the old officials. Optimism, therefore, was tinged with anxiety. Kiinzler wrote: "Can it hold out, will it stay this way? Quite a few can only suspect a new massacre

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behind these proceedings." 1 Consequently, many meetings took place, speeches were made, and young Armenian politicians began to spring up "like mushrooms." In contrast, Djurdji Shammas, the Assyrian Protestant pastor and new member of the local Young Turk committee, preached caution for the new era. The committee put him and a Muslim forward as candidates for the Parliament in Constantinople, but in the end a sheikh and a wealthy Turk with liberal tendencies were elected. The opening of Parliament on December 17, 1908, was once again cause for a multiethnic celebration in Urfa. That evening Vischer voiced his skepticism in a letter to his mother. "Today, the opening of the Turkish Parliament was celebrated with cannon fire, speeches, fireworks, and processions. Of course, it is only a minority who organize these events. The others join in. The vast majority of the people look upon the thing with fairly bewildered amazement. It will take a great deal until the situation here really changes. Nevertheless, it is quite something to see Christian and Mohammedan now celebrating together. Hopefully, there won't soon be a reaction." Tensions rose in Urfa following the attempted reactionary putsch associated with Abdul-Hamid in Constantinople in the spring of 1909, but no outrages occurred in the city. At the same time, a telegram from the capital, which was read out from every minaret, proclaimed the reinstatement of Islamic law. Henceforth, the Christians would no longer be allowed to mount a horse in the same manner as Muslims—a flowery way of saying that equal political participation should be suspended. But the following day another telegram arrived from both Urfa deputies, confirming that the Constitution was still in force. Not long after but before the Adana massacre in April 1909, news arrived of the murder of twenty-two Protestant teachers and pastors, among them Djurdji Shammas and the Armenian Protestant pastor from Urfa. These local Protestant leaders had been on the way to their annual regional church assembly, which was to take place in Adana. Their murderers belonged to a circle of people who, shortly afterward, carried out the Cilician massacres in Adana, Tarsus, Antioch, and elsewhere. At the funeral service in the Assyrian Protestant church, two friends, Young Turk officers in uniform, and the party elite of Urfa delivered addresses in which they thanked God for having let them know a person such as Djurdji. Andreas Vischer was there and remarked: 1 Jakob Kiinzler in Der Christliche Orient (1908): 173-75. ^Der Christliche Orient (1909): 84-85; Jakob Kiinzler, Garabed und Djurdji: Vater und Sohn: Lebens- und Sittenbilder aus dern christlichen Mesopotamien (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1925), pp. 110-11; Kiinzler, LUckenbiisser, p. 89. Urfa, Dec. 17, 1908, Vischer estate.

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"Moving words uttered by a Mohammedan in a Christian church. It is a fact that the Young Turks whom we know here in Urfa and who hold the reins of power have our full sympathy."1 It was at this point in time that inter-religious mistrust reached a climax. Everyone armed; the Armenian quarter prepared for an attack; trade came to a halt; the bazaar remained closed for many days; communication with Aleppo was severed; police patrolled the city day and night. Young Turk officers spoke in the cathedral in an attempt to calm the Armenians. They accused Abdul-Hamid of being the instigator of the troubles. On the night of April 27, a telegram arrived announcing the deposition of the sultan and the accession of Mehmed V. Already on the following morning a public ceremony took place with gunfire salutes, a speech by the governor, and prayers. Remarkably, a Catholic priest pushed him-self forward to deliver a long prayer—previously it would have been unthinkable for a Christian clergyman to partake in a public ceremony. Still, the Muslims refused to enter the mosque and pray for the new sultan, as he had not yet been proclaimed as successor to the caliph. Thereupon, the governor let it be known on the streets of the market that a telegram from the capital ordered prayers be offered for the life of the new caliph. He himself proceeded to the Ulu Jami, the central mosque, and made an address. It was only then that the situation in Urfa gradually began to settle down. 2 The description of another incident, which almost resulted in a pogrom in 1911, illustrates how explosive the nature of interethnic relations remained even before the Balkan wars in 1912-13, which would once again sow deep mistrust in the city. A journal reported: "According to a dispatch from Ourfa, a panic occurred in that city as a consequence of a quarrel between two shopkeepers, an Armenian and a Turk, which quarrel became a small-sized race-riot before the police succeeded in restoring order. Eighteen of the rioters were arrested." Francis H. Leslie arrived in Urfa in 1911 in order to carry on the work begun by Corinna Shattuck: "carpentry and cabinet shops, iron and machine shops, tailor and shoe shops, besides the women's department with its extensive lace and handkerchief, the Shattuck School for the Blind, and the general Evangelistic and church work radiating from that center." Leslie became a close friend of the Ktinzlers. In 1912, textile factories were employing 2,600 workers, who in turn were able to provide for 15,000 people. This realization of a firm employing locals with a profitable exportable product, ninety years before the "Max Havelaar" project based on a 1

Der Christliche Orient (1909): 85. ^ Andreas Vischer and Franz Eckart, in Der Christliche Orient (1909): 84-88. ^The Orient (Constantinople, Aug. 16, 1911): 5.

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fair-trade philosophy and employing non-European producers, is remarkable. Many workers were taught to read and write.1 The clinic of the Deutsche Orient-Mission provided regular medical care for the children at the American orphanage. Urfa was the showpiece of the Deutsche Orient-Mission. In 1908, what was left of the orphan foundation was about to become amalgamated with the workshops. "The example of Urfa is regarded as impressive proof. Karen Jeppe, on a visit to Germany, proudly pointed out that the clothes she was wearing, from head to toe, were produced in their own workshops in Urfa, the weaving looms, cotton mill, dying vats, tannery, shoemaking, and lace works." 2 The orphanage supervised by Danish missionary Karen Jeppe was a profitable cotton-weaving mill with clothing production and other workshops attached to it.3 This combining of school with vocational training was based on the "Pestalozzi Method." 4 As Jeppe wrote one could not possibly demand that children from such neglected backgrounds to undertake a one-sided education. "Three to four hours of schoolwork daily is the maximum they can tolerate; apart from that the hands must also be trained; and then they need plenty of opportunity to use and develop their physical strength."5 Johannes Lepsius reported from Urfa, in a letter dated June 15, 1913, that the three families of Kiinzler, Vischer, and Eckart, together with with Karen Jeppe, made up a total headcount of twenty-two for the Deutsche Orient-Mission. In addition, there were probably five times as many local personnel. About 600 women worked as weavers in the carpet factory, which Franz Eckart had founded and directed since 1896. Various workshops, drawing studios, wool carding, twine and washing units were attached to it.6 In 1908, the "Teppichfabrik," as it was collectively known, became independent of the Deutsche Orient-Mission and joined the German Trade and Industry Company whose (unprofitable) shares lay largely in the hands of wealthy philanthropists in Basel, Zurich, and Geneva. Conditions in the factory were not without problems. Women and children had to work day and night when an urgent

1

Missionary Herald (1912): 364-65, and (1916): 18-19. ^Richard Schäfer, Geschichte der Deutschen Orient-Mission (Potsdam: Missionshandlung und Verlag, Lepsius, Fleischmann und Grauer, 1932), p. 59. 3 S e e Der Christliche Orient (1908): 175-80; (1909): 39-41; (1910): 84-86; (1911): 81, 179, 182-84; (1912): 192-195; (1913): 70,146,182-87. 4 Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827), a native of Zurich, whose educational principles were based on learning through activity and direct concrete observation rather than words and through free investigation leading to one's own conclusions. 5 Der Christliche Orient (1913): 186-87. 6 Ibid.,pp. 171,211-14.

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order needed to be filled. 1 On one such occasion in 1913, this caused a strike among the "girl laborers." The Assyrian Protestant School, which was linked only informally with Jakob Kiinzler and the Deutsche Orient-Mission, had about 100 pupils. The language-teaching curriculum of this institute, described as a "Deutsche Schule," 3 was characterized by more than merely linguistic patriotism. Initially, lessons were given in Turkish, and the foreign languages taught were Arabic, English, and, for the choirboys, old Assyrian. Then, in Kiinzler's school report of 1912, there was an abrupt turnabout. English and old Assyrian were abandoned and instead twice as much time was devoted to German, "a language already in great demand here, but now, because of the Baghdad Railway, is almost set to become the European language of the future for this region." In charge of this strategy was none other than Dr. Johannes Lepsius, with Jakob Kiinzler following. 4 The statistics of the medical work and the observations of those responsible for it (Vischer and Kiinzler) provide evidence that this aspect was steadily gaining recognition. 5 There was close rapport with the Catholic mission, whose medical needs were met by the hospital staff. 6 The relationship with the authorities assumed a quality that had never been known. There was an increasing awareness of working together for the progress of the region. The appointment of Vischer to the post of chief surgeon at the Turkish hospital by the governor in 1912 furthered the integration of medical services on the local level. 7 At the laying of the foundation stone for the new mission hospital on June 15, 1913, a group posing before the photographers consisted, apart from Vischer and Kiinzler, just about everybody of name and rank. The celebrants sent a telegram to Kaiser Wilhelm II on the occasion of the twenty-fifth jubilee of the emperor's coronation. 8 The hospital and medical staff were doing very well. With the prospect of a long-term residence in the city, the Vischer and Kiinzler families each had a house built. In 1908, Andreas Vischer wrote his mother: "The advantage of the conditions are that we receive all newspapers and journals, including the 1 Swiss traveler Eduard Graeter learned of this from Willy Seeger, a former assistant in the carpet factory (Graeter's diary, August 31, 1913, p. 114, private). ^Letter of Warschuhi Sumukian to "Lieber Werther Vater" (Dear Beloved Father [Franz Eckart]), LAH 384: 3982. 3 Graeter's diary, June 28, 1913, p. 13. 4 Der Christliche Orient (1912): 109. •\Scc the annual data published in Der Christliche Orient. 6 Graeter's diary, June 28, 1913, p. 13.

"T

'Der Christliche Orient (1913): 26-27. In the same text Andreas Vischer wrote that the city hospital was built as a reaction to the missionary hospital. He interpreted this as a successful instance of the missionary presence serving as a model of self-help. S Der Christliche Orient (1913): 209.

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Christliche Orient, on a regular basis, that we can build our house free from any sort of interference and may well be able to move in soon." 1 From then on, it was possible to hold deeds of ownership as it was no longer necessary to purchase property through a friend or associate with Ottoman nationality. Documents were also drawn up for the hospital, fortunately in the name of a Swiss (apparently Vischer) and not a German, in view of the fact that Germany would become a defeated power in 1918. In order to escape the summer heat, a holiday home and vineyard with chalets were also acquired for the hospital staff. 2 From the beginning those responsible for the clinic had worked to build a trusting relationship, on the one hand, with politically influential Muslims, and, on the other, with the poorer sections of Muslim society. Behind this lay the diplomatic consideration that trust and integration of the service would guarantee its future and the theological viewpoint that the city of Urfa, in which thousands of Christians had been murdered during the massacre of 1895, should be approached with "love for one's enemy." It had been quickly realized that concentrating the work on one religious group stirred up tension and that the hospital should benefit everyone. The patients lay in rooms that were divided according to sex but not religion. 3 The ethnicreligious mixture stopped, however, at the hospital staff, which, apart from the Kiinzlers and Vischers, consisted exclusively of Armenian doctors, nurses, and assistant pharmacists. 4 There were Muslims (Kurds and Arabs) in the other services. In this classic contrast between professional staff and servants, it was impossible to find or train Muslim medical personnel—even in the Turkish hospital all the nurses were Armenian. 5 Cooperation with Jewish and Turkish doctors in Urfa during World War I indicated a pragmatic ability to adapt (these native doctors took over formal control during the absence of the mission doctors). The Urfa clinic was one of the few missionary medical institutions that strictly avoided connecting medical service with religious teaching. 6 Dr. Hermann Christ had already thought, the Urfa clinic must be "seen, run and supported purely as a compassionate project" which is why they had to rely on continuous support, they "after all have to work on the poorest of the poor whose poverty is rendered extreme through their ilnness." 7

^Urfa, March 16, 1909, Vischer estate. ^Concerning the holidays of the clinic staff , see Der Christliche Orient (1912): 170-75; Andreas Vischer, Eine Badereise im Morgenlande (Basel: Separatdruck aus dem Basler Anzeiger, 1914). 3 Der Christliche Orient (1914): 50-52. 4 Der Christliche Orient (1912): 90-91. 5 Der Christliche Orient (1913): 28,205. ®Cf. the evangelization of Dr. William Dodd in the missionary hospital in Kaiseri and in its traveling dispensary, Missionary Herald (1908): 243, or the daily Bible lectures in the missionary hospital of the German Hiilfsbund in Marash, 25 Jahre im, Orient: Deutscher Hilfsbund 1896 1921 (Frankfurt: Verlag Orient, 1921), p. 167. 7 Der Christliche Orient (1900), p. 74-75.

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It was only after World War I that the clinic could adopt the Swiss label. The local inhabitants knew it as the "German" hospital, and Andreas Vischer as the "German" mission doctor. The same labels were conveyed to the public by the publications of the Deutsche Orient-Mission.1 It would be an unfair representation of Johannes Lepsius, who had painted a picture of an inter-religious Urfa clinic, to suggest that his interest in inter-ethnic harmony in the region around the Baghdad Railway was based on imperialist economics. In his travel account of June 16, 1913, Lepsius described with satisfaction the everyday scene in the paved courtyard in front of the clinic: In the morning the sick gather here, mostly poor people from the town and villages. Large and small, men and women, Christians and Mohammedans, Armenians, Syrians, Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Jews settle here, squatting on the pavement or leaning on the wall. Here there is no division of religion and confession. Suffering makes everybody equal. The Mohammedans are perhaps surprised, but they accept, that here they have no priority over Christians, that they have to queue, and are given a number upon arrival which shows them when it is their turn to be allowed into the examination room.

Lepsius rightly viewed it as a "piece of missionary success, to have attained equality and brotherhood among the followers of the various religions." It is made clear by the statistics that most patients were Christian, with three-quarters of these being Armenian. The Muslims were more evident in the outpatient section, with its high percentage of free treatment, than in the hospital which, for financial reasons, made wealthy Muslim patients more than welcome in the private rooms that were opened in 1909. The Kurds definitely accounted for the largest proportion of Muslim hospital patients. On many occasions, well over half of the patients in the hospital came from outside of Urfa. As far as gender is concerned, there were more female clinical consultations, but the number of males far outweighed females in the hospital section. The statistics also raise questions. In 1908, the curve of patients climbed only a little, perhaps because Vischer spent that year in Switzerland. The plateau in the total number of patients and even a temporary decline in

Schäfer, Geschichte. Johannes Lepsius wrote in Der Christliche Orient (1913): 208: "Our mission wants to be a German mission, and Mesopotamia, where our hospital is doing pioneering service, is our German sphere of influence in Turkey." See also the appeal with patriotic arguments for supporting the new hospital building to readers of Der Christliche Orient (1912): 87. 2 Der Christliche Orient (1913): 203, 205.

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1910-11 seem to be linked with the revival by the Young Turks of the previously ill-functioning municipal hospital, which had been erected in 1903 by Mutasarrif Ethem Pasha as a reaction to the foundation of the mission hospital. The financial statistics for 1906-12 show that the hospital was largely self-sustaining (about 70 percent in 1913) and also received sizable donations. Although not revealed in the annual reports, it was made clear in other ways that most of the contributions came from Switzerland, especially from Basel. The Society of Friends of the Medical Charity Foundation in Urfa covered, among other things, the fees for the first assistant doctor.1 At the end of 1913, the Urfa clinic showed a deficit of 6,793 marks. 2 "A large sum from the [Basel] Society of Friends" made it possible for medical work to continue.3

The First Months of the World War and the Harbinger of Extermination In July 1914, while the Vischers began a vacation in their homeland and were then unable to return for the time being because Andreas Vischer had been called up for military service, the Kiinzlers journeyed to Palestine for a holiday, but they cut short their trip because of the outbreak of war and arrived back in Urfa on August 20. Jakob Kiinzler's accounts of the first months of the war were sober and dealt with the practical: logistical, financial, and medical questions. He was angered by officers who, during requisitioning at the outbreak of the war, shamelessly lined their own pockets with goods which had nothing to do with the army's needs. Such requisitioning was still continuing into 1916.4 Dr. Vischer, who corresponded regularly with Kiinzler, was of the opinion at the beginning of 1915 that the missionary work in Urfa was in no danger, as it lay at a considerable distance from the theaters of war. He added, however, that the proclamation of Holy War (jihad) in November 1914 had caused deep concern among Christians. "It seems as though the Mohammedans are, in part, of the opinion that the time has come to exterminate every Christian without exception." Vischer drew attention to the increasing burden that war was placing on the population, including unemployment and traffic hold-ups. Fortunately, the harvest had been ' Der Christliche Orient (1910): 159, and (1913): 157. Some money given directly to Andreas Vischer probably does not figure in the annual statistics; cf. (1913): 14-15. ^The deficit of the German orphanage in Urfa was 10,325 marks. See Der Christliche Orient (1913): 197. •'Andreas Vischer in Der Christliche Orient (1915): 4. ^Künzler, Im. Lande des Blutes, pp. 36-37.

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exceptionally good, and some work could be found on the extension of the Baghdad Railway near Urfa (Tel Abiad-Ras ul-Ain section).1 Whereas there was an absence of extravagant, shrill, and provocative tones from the two Swiss, such tones—of German origin —could be heard coming so stridently from Franz Eckart, supervisor of the industrial works, that it became too much even for the pro-German Jakob Kiinzler.2 Francis Leslie wrote to the ABCFM in Boston that Eckart "has been making stirring speeches to the Muslims, telling them that the cause of the war was that the powers of the Triple Entente [Allied Powers] had been intending to partition Turkey among themselves and that Germany had begun the war to protect Turkey from such a fate ... [He] has been telling the Armenians that they will surely bring another massacre on themselves if they do not stop speaking against Germany and has been talking in the same way to the Turks." As news of heavy losses on the eastern front arrived in Urfa, Elisabeth Kiinzler, the wife of Jakob Kiinzler, initiated an Ottoman interethnic goodwill campaign. Together with the distinguished Turkish woman Ermine Hamm, the mentally-handicapped but respected Kurd Subha, and an Arab woman, she went out in winter and knocked on the doors of numerous Muslim houses in order to collect money for the Red Crescent—quite a new kind of activity for the women of Urfa. She sent another group of women friends around to Christian families. Money equivalent to 1,500 Swiss francs was collected with which the Kiinzlers obtained medicines and bandages and had them sent to the front at Van. 4 Franz Eckart took pride in the keen attention the locals paid to the war dispatches, which were regularly being read out in the mosque, and thought he could detect strong admiration for Germany among them. 5 During the same weeks, Kiinzler was hearing something altogether different from Kurdish mouths. People in Urfa were aware of the debacle of the Ottoman army on the ^ Der Christliche Orient (1915): 5. o In a letter from Urfa on March 15, 1915, Eckart wrote:, "The confidence in us as Germans has grown. That justifies the best hopes for our work in the future. . . . And concerning the future, can one think that after the purifying effect of this war the old game of intrigue among the Russian, French, and English Gentlemen should again begin in Constantinople? . . . It is known that only Germany is not a member of the company of partitioners but rather strives for the strengthening of Turkey." Der Christliche Orient (1915): 49. 3 ABC, 16.9.5, vol. 25, Letter to James Barton, Nov. 23, 1914. The same tone is reflected in Eckart's text of May 27, 1915, Der Christliche Orient (1915): 59. See also Schäfer, Geschichte, p. 86. In his memoirs about the war years in Urfa, Ephraim Jernazian, pastor of the Protestant Assyrians at the time, makes bitter comments about Eckart (Judgment unto Truth, pp. 66-69). 4 Der Christliche Orient (1920): 42-44. -*"In those days we always heard repeatedly in Kurdish and Arabic conversations the word 'Aleman, Aleman' [German] spoken with special emphasis. Yes, even the women, and among them—it is unbelievable!—the veiled ones asked us on the street: 'Do you have trustworthy news, tell us honestly, is the situation really good?'" See Der Christliche Orient (1915): 48.

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Caucasus front and the deaths of tens of thousands of young Kurdish soldiers. In March 1915, as Kiinzler was returning from an expedition with two Persian princes, a Young Turk officer, and the heavily pregnant Swiss wife of one of the princes, he met a woman from Urfa who was "somewhat agitated, as she had been stopped on the way by Kurdish women who thought they detected something German about her and said, with threatening gestures: 'When will the time come that we can have our revenge on the Germans who have plunged us into this war?'" 1 Jakob Kiinzler s pessimistic premonitions were reinforced during the aforementioned trip, which he accompanied as a medical adviser, when Young Turkish officer Nefis Bey declared openly that the war would allow Turkey to settle the Armenian question once and for all, either by extermination or deportation.2 Apart from Kiinzler's serious case of typhus, Vischer also had good news to report from Urfa in the July-August 1915 issue of the Christliche Orient? But in the following issue the tone changed completely. Eckart wrote: "all the demands being placed on us to be met. They are not slight. ... distributed bread to the homeless. Almost torn to pieces by the hungry whilst doing so. ... Bless all those not at all hungry or thirsty any more! But woe to the blind leaders of the blind who plunge thousands into misery." Jakob Kiinzler: "In these months the medical practice among the poorest assumed horrific dimensions ... What we need for the winter is plentiful resources, as the medical assistance to the unfortunate places the greatest demands on us." Within a few weeks the circle of readers realized that a catastrophe had occurred. In appeals for help, it read of the deported, poorest, homeless, hungry; of exercises in "relief of the dire needs," which were "ten times greater than after the massacres of Abdul Hamid." All these were no more than indications but nevertheless much more than the average German knew at the time about the elimination of the Armenians. What had happened in Urfa? 5 At the end of August 1914, word was circulating that the Armenians in Zeitun had resisted the general mobilization,

^National Zeitung, no. 297 (Basel, June 18,1920): 2. S e e Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 34, letter to Johannes Lepsius, Basel, Dec. 2, 1919, LAH 2303, and Jakob Kiinzler, Dreissig Jahre Dienst am Orient (Basel: Emil Birkhäuser, 1933), pp. 44-48. 3 Der Christliche Orient (1915): 57-58. 4 Ibid., (1915): 76-77. The uncensored original letter of Jakob Kiinzler read: "Just in those months the practice among the Armenians assumed enormous dimensions [nahm die Armenierpraxis riesige Dimensionen an]." See LAH 09066; cf. Hermann Goltz's edition of some letters of Jakob Kiinzler, in Kieser, Armenische Frage, pp. 343-54, esp. p. 344. 5 S e e , from the Turkish perspective, Cemal Anadol, Tarihin isiginda Ermeni dosyasi [The Armenian File in the Light of History] (Istanbul: Turan Kitabevi, 1982), pp. 317-24, and Ismail Öz9elik, "1915'te Urfa'da ermeni olaylari ve isyani" [The Armenian Events and the Armenian Insurrection in Urfa in 1915], Askeri Tarih BUlteni, no. 21 (1986): pp. 23-33; from the Armenian perspective, see Sahakian, Diutsaznakan Urfan, pp. 813ff., and Jernazian, Judgment unto Truth; from the mis-sionary perspective, see Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes and Dienst, pp. 36-77; Cinq ans d'exil, de 1914 ä 1919 (the anonymous Franciscan report, probably based on a personal diary); Bruno Eckart (brother of Franz Eckart), "Meine Erlebnisse in Urfa," Orient (1921): 54-58, 119-26, 133-46, 154-60, and (1922): 20-24 (subsequently published separately, Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1922). 2

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making the Muslim inhabitants suspicious of the Christians. A short time later, one of the two European inspectors-general who had been appointed to oversee the final Armenian reform program (February 1914) but who was returning home because of repudiation of the agreement by the Young Turk government, passed through Urfa. Following the declaration of jihad in November, which again incited the Turks, there was an atmosphere of deep distress among the Christian population. Those who would not take part in festivities to celebrate exaggerated reports of victories were described as hain (traitor, used as the standard description of an inner enemy to the present time). Those Armenians who took part found themselves being branded traitors by their own side. 1 Like the Muslims, many Armenian recruits deserted from their barracks or even before arriving there. In the spring of 1915, an exceptionally bold apprentice tailor shouted to the Muslims at a victory celebration: "You yourselves don't believe you'll be victorious!" For this he was badly beaten and his master was imprisoned for many days. At the beginning of March, a rumor went around that Armenian soldiers were deserting en masse to join the enemy ranks. Shortly thereafter, the government confiscated the weapons and clothing of the Christians and placed their men in labor battalions. The worries of the Armenian population mounted. Bruno Eckart, brother of the German industrial leader Franz Eckart, who in April had matters to attend to in Aleppo, met refugees from Zeitun and listened to their stories. Meanwhile in Urfa official news of an Armenian "revolt" in Van was circulating.2 Dispatches were being spread stating that Arme-nians allied with the Russians had killed thousands of Muslims. Among the Christians in Urfa there was now great fear; among the Muslims, bitter fury and hatred. The Muslims were making open threats and seemed to be preparing for butchery. They would take revenge for losses suffered on the furthest fronts. Kiinzler recorded their exclamations: "It will be the worse for you Armenians if the enemies of Turkey should manage to step as victors onto Turkish soil! No Armenian in the interior will remain alive; we shall see to that."3 One of Urfa's Franciscan Sisters voiced her fear: "Here, all signs foresee that the war will degenerate into horrible massacres."4 It

^Anadol, Ermeni Dosyasi, p. 318. aJBruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 55-56. Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 38. ^Cinq ans d'exil, p. 14. 2

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would seem that sheer terror gripped the Muslims that after taking Van the Russians would reach Urfa via Severek.1 Toward the end of April, as the Armenians secretly made preparations for defense, Armenian teachers were put in prison, and searches were made for weapons and incriminating documents. A few days later police officers attempted to apprehend deserters in Garmuch, the only all-Armenian village near Urfa. They were met by gunfire at a nearby mountain where deserters had dug in. This event worsened the situation of the Urfa Armenians. In mid-May, the authorities banished eighteen of the most prominent families to Rakka, 150 kilometers (90 miles) to the south. They had hardly arrived there when the menfolk where taken back to Urfa, thrown into prison along with other notables, and tortured in order to extract information about the whereabouts of hidden weapons. The authorities confiscated sacks full of Armenian literature and documents and anything that might be considered to have "revolutionary" characteristics in order to use them as proof of guilt. The first eyewitness accounts of the extermination of the Armenians were brought to Urfa by Floyd Smith, the American missionary doctor who arrived in Urfa en route to Beirut. Dr. Mehmed Reshid Bey, the vali (provincial governor) of Diarbekir, a Unionist hardliner, 2 had him deported after he had made a nuisance of himself with protests. Jelal Bey, the vali of Aleppo who had intervened to protect Christians, was ousted at the beginning of July by Eyub Bey, special envoy of the central government and a close collaborator of military commander Fakhri (Fahri) Pasha. 4 In July, Armenians from Zeitun appeared in worker battalions near Urfa, as did deported women and children, in miserable condition. 5 Kiinzler, who had barely recovered from a serious case of typhus, had set off to Aleppo and arrived there in mid-June to inform the consulates of Germany (Walter Rossler), the United States (Jesse Jackson) and Austria, as well as the German envoy (Baron Max von Oppenheim) about the crisis. He warned that unless the Germans did something to alleviate the situation, they would be unable to defend themselves from accusations of complicity. 6 During Kiinzler's absence, 500 civilian deportees arrived in Urfa. Learning of this, the U.S. Consulate in ' Anadol, Ermeni Dosyasi, p. 319. ee "£erkez" Mehmed Re§id, Dr. Re$id Bey'in hattralan: Surgunden intihara [The Memoirs of Dr. Reshid Bey: From Exile to Suicide], A. Mehmetefendioglu (Istanbul: Arba, 1993); Johannes Lepsius, Deutschland undArmenien, 1914-1918 (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919), pp. 114-15. ^Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 56; Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 52. ^See the telegram of Consul Walter Rossler to Ambassador von Wangenheim, June 3, 1915, in Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien, p. 75. Cf. Orient (1921): 57. ^Jernazian, Judgment unto Truth, pp. 53-55. 6 Kunzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 39-40; Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1919): 66. See also Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien, p. 128.

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Aleppo named Francis Leslie as consular agent and asked him to assist the internees. The authorities in Urfa, however, denied Leslie the right to raise the American flag above his residence. On the return journey from Aleppo, Künzler saw many corpses of deportees which had been gnawed and partially eaten. Back in Urfa at the beginning of July, he no longer had a hospital pharmacist, as the Armenian sat in prison. At that time, Künzler came across the first deportation caravans, exclusively women and children from the north who had been marched from Sivas and Erzerum via Kharpert. Those who could hid in Christian homes in order to avoid the next stage of transport to the desert. The rest remained in a transit station, a caravanserai outside the city. A hundred—a thousand times even—they gave the same account: The men had vanished; they themselves had been robbed, abused, raped; many had died on the way from exhaustion or through the violent acts of gendarmes and armed irregulars and bandits known as chete. At first, there were also reports of gendarmes who had tried to protect the women from bandits. 1 Pressured by their womenfolk, some Urfa Armenians now began to take the only remaining means of salvation, namely conversion to Islam. In July the military court, which was staffed by Urfa Turks and had been on standby since January, was taken over by newly-arrived outside officials who were prepared to confront the Armenians with brute force. The militia now harassed the Christians in public. 2 The actual deportations from Urfa began at the end of the month. These had nothing in common with an orderly resettlement. All were made to go on foot; wagons were forbidden. Those sent in the direction of Aleppo stood some chance of survival. Anyone driven northward toward Diarbekir immediately met a violent death, as did Hovhannes Serengulian (known everywhere as Vartkes) and Krikor Zohrab (Grigor Zohrap), two esteemed Armenian members of the Ottoman •3

Parliament. Künzler considered traveling to Europe in order to mobilize Lepsius and the general public but had to abandon the idea for lack of funds. The arrival in Urfa on August 10 of the Circassian Ahmed Bey and Khalil (Halil) Bey, uncle of Minister of War Enver Pasha, both high-ranking Unionists in officer ' See "Aufzeichnungen eines Österreichers, dem Deutschen Konsulat von Aleppo am 11.8.1915 übergeben," in Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien, pp. 130-31. ^Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 120; telegram of the Emniyet-i Umúmiye Miidiriyeti (hereafter EUM), to the Mutasarrif of Urfa, 21 Shaban 1333 (July 4, 1915, Julian calendar) (Ba§bakanlik Osmanh Argivi (hereafter BOA). DH, §FR.54/294. 3 See the homage to them by their co-deputy Fä'iz El-Ghusein, "Armenisches Märtyrertum," in Orient (1921): 5. The Jewish city doctor, a colleague of Jakob Künzler, had to write a false certificate attributing their death to typhus (Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 41). Cf. the telegraphic demand of the Ministry of Interior to the mutasarrif of Urfa for a medical attestation and an ecclesiastical death certificate (Aug. 15, 1915, BOA, DH, §FR.55/24-l).

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uniforms, represented a decisive turning point. They had previously implemented the anti-Armenian policies of the CUP in Diarbekir. 1 The two emissaries of the central government arbitrarily ignored the local Urfa authorities and, despite accepting a substantial bribe through the prelate of the Armenian Apostolic community, ordered the deportation toward Diarbekir of all interned notables, as well as the prelate himself, and arranged for the slaughter of the disarmed Armenian military worker battalions made up of around 1,000 men in the vicinity. Kurds actively participated in these murders. 2 The systematic elimination of the Armenian presence in Urfa began with the arrival of these two prominent Young Turks. During the following weeks, more and more deportees in extremely desperate conditions reached the transit station in Urfa. Meanwhile, it was forbidden to visit them in their camps outside town where dreadful conditions prevailed. Whole caravans of people perished for lack of water. Some deportees managed to steal away into the city's Armenian quarter. Their reports were utterly shocking. 3 On one occasion, several hundred women arrived stark naked. The government filled the large Armenian cathedral with the deportees; guards stood in front of it, while police officers, gendarmes, and "normal" townspeople went in and out. The cathedral had become a den of prostitution. The "client" either dragged his victim to a private house or made do with the room of the murdered prelate. 4

Elimination of the Armenian Quarter In October 1915, the entire population of the Armenian quarter was either killed or deported. In a letter dated November 19, 1915, Kiinzler wrote: "What we have been through here is not written down. That comes later. What lies behind me is the most eventful month of my life." On their part, the Franciscan nuns began their account of those weeks with the words: "How to relate the story of our unfortunate city of Urfa during August, September, and October! A time of indescribable horror and carnage." 5 On August 19 gendarmes undertook searches in the Armenian quarter, claiming that the purpose was to round up deserters. Shots were fired; a gendarme was hit and fell. This incident provided both party managers of the Committee of Union and Progress with the opportunity to incite the violent 1 Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 43; Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 120-21, 125-26. Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 125-26. Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 54-61, reproduces the testimonies of three deportees. 4 Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 134. ~*Der Christliche Orient (1916): 3; Cinq ans d'exil, p. 28. 2

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element among the Muslim population, many of them Kurds, to a massacre of the infidel gavur.1 Ahmed Bey shot the tailor Hagop who pleaded for pity with the retort: "That is pity for you, Armenian dog." Assyrians as well as Armenians were targeted indiscriminately. About 200 people were massacred in the bazaar alone. Bruno and Franz Eckart themselves evaded the mob with difficulty, after first being taken for mere gavurs and not as the German carpet manufacturer and his brother. Kiinzler appealed to the mutasarrif for police protection for the hospital, which was immediately granted. In the evening the rabble had its eyes on the house of Shiko, a butcher with a large family who lived there with his elderly brother: "The Kurds were shouting so loudly that we heard it with fear in the hospital. They were demanding the two old people and wanted to abuse all the women of the house that very night. This they shouted while fanatically swearing and cursing to the four winds." At Kiinzler's request, the gendarmes sent to guard the hospital, together with colleagues, drove away the ruffians. But Shiko already lay dead in front of his house. As commerce was in the hands of the Armenians, supplies were becoming short because for days on end the survivors would neither leave their houses nor resume their businesses. For this reason, the government exerted pressure on some bakers and offered them protection in order to get them to prepare and sell bread again. After August 19 many Armenians sought refuge in the German, Franciscan, and American missions. There was room only for a fraction of them. Those who were taken in had to fend for themselves. In the masbane, as the German carpet factory was called, more than a thousand people found shelter. The two avaricious officers of the CUP summoned the merchant Nishan to them and promised him that they would show their gratitude if he were to pay them a large sum of money. Neither Nishan nor the other Armenians believed such words. The Armenian merchant disappeared into the carpet factory.4 U.S. Vice Consul Samuel Edelmann, who had arrived in Urfa at the beginning of August to relieve Leslie, left again following the killings on August 19. In Kiinzler's opinion, things had become too hot for the American, which is why he moved to Aleppo "where he was safer than in the cauldron of Urfa." Kiinzler on his medical rounds to Turkish homes sensed a readiness to put an end to all Armenians. On a visit to the mutasarrif in mid' Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 52. Orient (1921): 122-23. Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 50. 4 Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 121-22. Z

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September, he learned that the Armenians by their "provocative attitude" —barricading houses and not going back to work—could henceforth expect no mercy whatsoever.1 Mugerditch Yotneghperian, a young Armenian leader, disguised himself as a Turkish officer and some of his friends as soldiers. They made their way to Aleppo where they bought weapons and ammunition. By taking a circuitous route via the villages, they managed to return unobserved. The smiths were given the task of making hand-grenades. On September 29, shots were heard in the Armenian quarter. The gendarmes who wanted to investigate the incident were met with rifles. When they arrived a second time with reinforcements at a locked house, one or two were killed and several injured. The Armenians occupied the twelve entrances to the streets leading to their quarter. From then on, any Muslim showing himself in the Armenian quarter was fired upon, as well as any muezzin who tried climbing a minaret to call the faithful to prayer. There were no soldiers stationed in Urfa, and the gendarmes were occupied elsewhere with the deportation caravans. The mutasarrif telegraphed that same day to Aleppo for help. An Arab battalion with artillery quickly arrived on October 4, as did the military commander Fakhri Pasha, and the next day an Anatolian battalion with two field guns entered the city. They were greeted by the Muslims with joyful trilling: "From the terraces of their houses the women make heard their strident 'lili,' cries of savage joy to honor the heroes who eliminated the 'giaours'." 4 On the border between the Turkish and Armenian houses lay the masbane with its storage and workrooms for spinning, dyeing, and handknotting. Their large buildings towered above the quarter and were therefore of strategic importance. Staying there at the time were 427 people, the majority of them women and children. Somebody informed Franz Eckart, the industrial director, of the Armenian intent to occupy the establishment. In order to forestall damage and possible plundering of the building, he decided to negotiate with General Fakhri. The general demanded the removal first of the Armenian men, then of all others. Some of those within fled secretly into the Armenian quarter. Kiinzler wrote: "But why the Armenians even now, having been told by Franz Eckart that the Turks were going to occupy the estate, did ' Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 62,78. ^Sec the telegram of the Urfa Mutasarrif to the Ministry of Interior, Sept. 29, 1915, in Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi (1985): 101 (hereafter ATBD); Army Command to the Ministry of Interior, Oct. 21, 1915, and ATBD (1987): 41-42. Concerning the person of Yotneghperian, see Jernazian, Judgment unto Truth, pp. 51-52. 3 Cf. Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 64-65, the telegram printed in ATBD (1985): 101, and the Army Command's communication, Oct. 5 and 6, 1915, ATBD (1985): 115-16. ^Cinq ans d'exil, pp. 32-33.

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not themselves take steps to occupy it, was something which I have never been able to understand." On the afternoon of October 9, approximately 400 women and children were transferred to the former German orphanage outside the city, and seven employees were imprisoned, with assurances given to Eckart, who had wanted to take them into his private home, that no harm would come to them.1 Kiinzler received orders to remove all the invalids from his hospital in order to keep the beds free for the Turkish wounded. Already, days before, the Turkish authorities had thrown the Armenians out of the municipal hospital "because it would no longer do to give assistance to the compatriots of the rebels." In the empty house of Shiko, murdered on August 19, Kiinzler improvised a hospital. A communique of October 12 from the army command to the headquarters of the Fourth Army and to the foreign ministry in Constantinople underscored the significance of the "Armenian rebellion in Urfa" and the necessity for prompt, harsh, and vigorous action "to teach those harboring similar ideas an effective lesson." 3 On October 14 the Eckart brothers were riding through the gardens to the south of the city. They came across Fakhri and his adjutant, the German officer Graf von Wolffskeel. The two military men had chosen the Apostolic cathedral, which had been retaken by the Armenians, as their target. In Kunzler's opinion, the Armenians could have held out for months. Even the 9 centimeter cannon caused little damage to the solidly-built stone structure, whereas the attackers suffered heavy casualties. The Turkish commander then sent Assyrian men forward as sappers to smash in the doors with axes; many of them fell in a hail of bullets. Mugerditch Yotneghperian, the heart and soul of the Armenian defenses, was hit by shrapnel on October 15 and rendered incapable of fighting. As the siege had continued for a fortnight, many Armenians who had not been enthusiastic about the possibility of self-defense showed themselves prepared to capitulate, but General Fakhri demanded unconditional surrender. No mercy could be expected. "Why not now put up a fight to the death?" asked Kiinzler, sadly puzzled. It seems he was influenced by a somewhat romantic idea of heroic Swiss self-defense in history.4

' Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 66. See also Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921), pp. 135-38. ^Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 69. 3 Cited in Ôzçelik, "1915," p. 30. ^Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 70. See also Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 140; Jernazian, Judgment unto Truth, pp. 52,87.

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Survivors later told the Franciscan nuns of heartrending suicides within families who faced surrender.1 The capitulation took place on the morning of October 16, 1915. Ktinzler wrote: On the way there [the police station] I came upon the long, long train of women and children. Oh, it was awful, it was gruesome, it drove one to despair. To have to look upon these appalled, forlorn faces that were well known to me and to read the despair in their expressions. Now more than ever they were facing death. Wringing their hands they called out to me: "Oh Brother Jakob, save us, save us!" But what could I do for them? Nothing. On the way home we [Ktinzler and U.S. consular agent Francis Leslie] crossed a square in front of a mosque which was cordoned off by soldiers. They ordered us to make ourselves scarce. We had hardly arrived at my house 200 meters away when a group of Armenians was shot in the mosque square. One could also hear shots from other sides. It was clear, the slaughter of the Armenians had begun.

The massacre of the defenseless continued for some days. Its instruments were the gun, the rope, and—most of all—the knife or the axe. Hagop, the porter at the hospital, escaped because the butchers took for dead the body that crashed to the ground soaked in blood. At night, he was able to make his way to Ktinzler's apartment. Once all the men who had been brought to the mosque courtyards and prisons had been liquidated, the deportation of the women commenced. Ktinzler often visited their provisional camp to tend to the wounded or to bring bread. He wrote: When once I appeared with bread, the women called out to me: "You are bringing us bread? To us, the children of death? No, don't bring us bread but poison, much poison. Oh no, don't let us be deported, help us that we can die here. You know well, what it means to be led to the steppe!" Other women showed me bottles of poison and wanted to know how much they had to take, because they did not want to take too much in order to let 3 enough poison for as many as possible.

The transport began. It was supposed to head westward in the direction of Konia, but a telegram from the army command gave the exact opposite direction—Mosul. 4 Just outside of Urfa, many Muslims awaited to grab for themselves any girl or woman who took their fancy. Some women were grateful to have this opportunity to avoid the deportation and death; others put up resistance. In such cases, bribery of the gendarmes sometimes helped to get ' Cinq ans d'exil, p. 35. ^Ktinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 71-73. 3 Ibid„ p. 83. ^A military telegram of October 24, 1915, mentions 2,000 women and children deported in the direction of Mosul; ATBD (1986): 45. See also Cinq cuts d'exil, p. 37.

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the matter settled without violence. The commandant had already chosen for himself the prettiest girls and presented his officers those who were too much for him. "The departure of our many people and their children was unspeakably sad," wrote Bruno Eckart. "To this day I am overcome by uncontrollable grief when I think about it. Then I see in my mind the critically ill, how they staggered out of the city supported by their relatives; I still hear an eighteen-year-old girl's earnest plea to me for poison so that she would not be exposed to shame. See how Tuma Hanum looked around at us with a despairing expression, how children clung distraught to their mothers, and admire every brave woman who comforted those who wept. Six mounted gendarmes hurried the banished along."1 On October 21, the army command sent the foreign ministry a report for the attention of the foreign diplomats and the press concerning the events in Urfa. Characteristic of this type of document, it spoke exclusively of "Armenian villains" who had hidden themselves in Urfa and opened fire on gendarmes, of unauthorized break-ins on foreign property, and of attacks on neighboring Muslim quarters—until October 16 when a unit destined for the front was called in and succeeded in crushing the rebels without causing any harm to nationals of either neutral or enemy states. The passages relating to Urfa in the memoirs of Minister of Interior Talaat Pasha are just as apologetic and disconnected from every reality on the spot. Seventy years later, the Turkish historian Ismail Ôzçelik, writing on "the Armenian occurrences in Urfa" used the Ottoman military sources to conclude that the Armenian allegations were groundless. "It is impossible to find a society that has behaved so justly and tolerantly towards those living under its protection as the Turks." 4 This scholar gives just as little of the victims' perspective and the causal connection of the revolt with the deportations as the communiqué seven decades earlier. At the beginning of December, a state liquidating committee began its work, lasting two years. It sold off any Armenian property still left after all the plunder. For months looters and middlemen had been doing "roaring trade in stolen goods in and outside the town." 5 The official liquidation was mainly concerned with commercial stores, houses, gardens, and land. One commission was replaced by another, which enabled as many commission members as ' Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 145-46. Tuma was one of the leading mothers of the German orphanage. She was then very pregnant and gave birth in the desert. Mother and baby died in the deepest misery. 2 ATBD (1986): 41-42. Talât Paga'nin anilari [The Memoirs of Talaat Pasha], ed. A. Kabacali (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1994), pp. 79-80. 4 Ôzçelik, "1915," p. 32. -'Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1922): 20.

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possible to enrich themselves. Kiinzler was well informed about this by the secretary of the commission, Reverend Ephraim Jernazian, who had to function as interpreter at the military court.1 When the officials auctioned off Armenian warehouses, they first put the best and most valuable items in their own houses. At the auctions where everything was sold at ludicrously low prices, only Muslims were allowed to buy. This is how Franz Eckart interpreted the proceedings at the time: "It was astounding at what low prices whole warehouses were sold, only to Turks, mind you. After a time all the prosperity of the Armenian population had passed into Mohammedan ownership, and with this the primary purpose of the dreadful exterminations was realized."2 The Armenian baker, smith, and doctor, who because they were considered indispensable to the city had initially been exempted from the elimination plan, were also made to leave on the basis of a more radical order, becoming the only men in a caravan of condemned deportees. The doctor was fortuitously spared as he fell unconscious from typhus. This disease was introduced in Urfa at the time of the siege and was a welcome release for thousands of deportees: A n y o n e w h o b e c a m e infected b y it generally lost c o n s c i o u s n e s s b y the s e c o n d day. . . . A s it w a s a comfort to the banished, s o it w a s a ruthless e n e m y to their persecutors in t o w n and country. . . . T h e n u m b e r s f a l l i n g v i c t i m t o this d i s e a s e m u s t h a v e b e e n t r e m e n d o u s b e c a u s e it gradually o v e r w h e l m e d the entire Turkish nation. O n the Haran plain s o m e v i l l a g e s died out completely, all the w a y d o w n to the children.

3

Even as the women were waiting to be marched off, the government decided in "a fit of compassion" to open a home for small children without parents. This occurred presumably in connection with the presence in the city of Shukry Bey, a high official of the Ministry of Interior. Some Armenian women were allowed to offer their services as nurses and foster mothers and thereby avoid deportation. The children were given Islamic names and an Islamic upbringing to match. 4 On her own initiative, Elisabeth Kiinzler

' Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 41-42. Cf. Jernazian, Judgment unto Truth, pp. 48-49. Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1922): 20. ^Sick persons often were thrown pell-mell with the cadavers in the mass grave in Urfa. Jakob Kiinzler and the Franciscan nuns took care of the sick as best as they could. Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 87; Cinq ans d'exil, pp. 36-37. "^Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 87-88. A telegram of the EUM to the Muhâcirîn Miidiirii §iikrii Bey on November 1, 1915, approved those measures: "Ermeni eytâmi hakkindaki tedbiriniz muvafiktir" [Your measures concerning the Armenian orphans are appropriate]. BOA, DH, ÇFR.57/228. 2

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illegally assisted a number of orphans. She placed children in two small houses which Turkish lady friends rented for her.1 Thoroughly cleansing a city of 15,000 members of its Christian communities—to which were added recently-arrived immigrants—did not proceed as quickly as intended. Many people had concealed themselves in deep wells, hidden vaults, or sewers. Occasionally, an informer would lead gendarmes to such hideaways, by this act and adopting the Muslim faith buying himself continued life. Soldiers often came across people hiding during searches or while plundering. These unfortunates were immediately killed, while those hiding in wells were entombed alive, as soldiers filled in the wells and smoked out other hiding places. For this reason sporadic gunfire rang out in the city until the end of November 1915. On the Muslim side, the conflicts in Urfa during the last six months of 1915 resulted in the death of about 200 persons, while on the Armenian side the result was the killing or deportation of the entire population with some female, but nearly no male, exceptions.2 Some girls and women would be picked out of the camps or departing caravans. The Turkish colonel responsible for the deportations had an exceptionally attractive fifteen-year-old girl who belonged to the former 250strong workforce at the carpet factory. Abducting her for himself, he promised her family safety and indeed the family was able to take up residence in the city once more.3 A considerable number of Armenian women and children fled from hiding or the camps to humanely inclined Muslim friends. Some Assyrians and the few Assyrian Catholics also took in refugees, but they showed the Armenians the door again when the government, in a rapid response, threatened to deport anyone caught providing shelter. According to Kiinzler only a few Turkish senior officials complied with the order and most of those Turks, Kurds, and Arabs who were humanely-motivated "did not care about the wishes of the government." Kunzler corrected the sweeping image of the "Terrible Turk," as he paid homage to the conscientious and merciful judge (qadi), who the second highest-ranking civil servant in Urfa. 4 It was extremely dangerous to offer the proscribed Armenian men any assistance. No urban Muslim dared to help them. That was more likely to occur in the villages. Garabed, who spent some weeks as Muhammed the Kurd enjoying hospital food despite being quite healthy, was in danger of being

^Schäfer, Geschichte, pp. 96-97; Kiinzler, Lückenbüsser, pp. 141-42. 0z5elik, "1915," pp. 31-32. A telegram of the Army Command on October 24, 1915, mentions 349 Armenian dead, an undetermined number of arrests, and 2,000 deported women and children. ATBD (1986): 45. 3 Orient (1921): 143-44. "^Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 90. See also Gertrud Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen an Urfa (Basel: [hectograph form], 1967), p. 70. 2

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exposed and returned at Deacon Jakob's request to the village Kurds who had previously sheltered him. 1 The friars of the Capuchin mission placed themselves in breach of the ban on sheltering Armenians by billeting an Armenian Catholic priest since 1915. Following the betrayal of the fugitive on September 7, 1916, the priest was executed; the Capuchins were immediately taken into custody and did not regain their freedom until the spring of 1918. The Danish missionary Karen Jeppe shattered her nerves while sheltering seven Armenian men in the cellar of her house. In spite of three thorough searches of the home, her death-defying bravery paid off. But in 1917, Kiinzler escorted her in a state of complete nervous exhaustion to Constantinople, from where she traveled on to Europe. Trusted Muslims would carry out smuggling operations, leading people disguised in Kurdish or Arab garb into the surrounding villages or far to the south. Sometimes they looked after hidden people in nearby caves, and one of them, Kiinzler's Arab employee Ali, refused under threat of torture and death to reveal what he knew. 4 In order to relieve some of the pressure imposed by collective knowledge, Elisabeth and Jakob Kiinzler acted independently of each other. If Mrs. Kiinzler sheltered a girl who had fled from a Muslim household—it was not unusual for a Turkish wife to help an unwanted Armenian concubine to escape—the police appearing soon after could be assured by Mr. Kiinzler with a clear conscience that he knew nothing. Out of politeness the police did not dare to place Elisabeth hanem under too much pressure or to force their way into the house when the husband was absent. 5 As early as the autumn of 1915, however, Fakhri Pasha had threatened to deal Kiinzler the same fate as that of the Armenians if he continued to treat sick Armenians in prison—evidence not only of the pasha's harshness but also that the gates of prison stood open even for Kiinzler, who was so well known in city. Despite his assurances to Franz Eckart, General Fakhri allowed Armenian employees of the Deutsche Orient-Mission to be mistreated for weeks before they were finally bayoneted by soldiers on the Tilfitor, the hill outside the Armenian quarter. Dr. Aziz Bey, the chief doctor of the Turkish * Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 100,110. 2Cf. Cinq ans d'exil, pp. 39-52; Henri Riondel, "La guerre et le catholicisme en Turquie," Etudes (Oct. 1919): 172-190, esp. 175. ^Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 91, and his Dein Volk ist mein Volk: Das Lebensbild einer Heldin seltener Art-der Dänin Karen Jeppe (Basel and Leipzig: Heinrich Majer, 1939), pp. 52-53, 56-63, 67-73. ^Concerning the helpers of Elisabeth Kiinzler, see Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 110. Concerning Ali, see Kiinzler, Dein Volk, pp. 57, 62. ^Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 110, and Dein Volk, p. 68. 6 Bruno Eckart, in Orient (1921): 139.

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hospital, informed the Eckart brothers of their fate. Bruno Eckart wrote: "Our prestige and influence with the Turks dwindled rapidly. We came to be regarded as troublesome spies, as embarrassing observers." 1 Although it was diplomatically unthinkable to expel protégés of the German allies, let alone eliminate them, the Turkish officials who were most compromised by their excesses showed their discontent with the Eckarts and others with antipathy, evasion, and broken promises. The thought that these awkward guests would be making detailed reports about the events must have made them particularly uncomfortable. During the war the authorities were able to intercept relevant reports by means of censorship. Not one telegram from Kiinzler, for example, got through during the war. A further report, this time uncomfortable for the German side, concerned the cooperation of German officers in measures against the Armenians. At Urfa, Graf von Wolffskeel, Fakhri Pasha's adjutant, figured prominently in the anti-Armenian actions. He spoke of the Armenians as traitors, even though his German compatriots explained to him the dismal story leading up to the desperate Armenian rebellion.3 Wolffskeel, an artillery officer, directed the guns against the Armenian quarter. He went so far as to ask his compatriots to reveal under oath the whereabouts of certain Armenians in hiding. The Deutsche Orient-Mission people insisted on a word of honor (the New Testament forbids swearing on oath) and withheld their knowledge about Karen Jeppe's wards.4

1 Orient (1921): 138-39. See also Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 75. ^See the editorial remark in Der Christliche Orient (Jan.-March 1916): 3. 3 Orient (1921): 140. 4 Ibid.; Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 82. Armenian circles confused Wolffskeel with Franz Eckart. See The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Viscount Bryce, ed. Arnold J. Toynbee (London: H.M.S.O., 1916), p. 540; Jernazian, Judgment unto Truth, p. 87. For Jakob Kiinzler's rectifying letter of December 2, 1919, in LAH 2303, see Hermann Goltz, in Kieser, Armenische Frage, pp. 347-49. Significantly, Lepsius's collection of documents in Deutschland und Armenien does not mention the anti-Armenian behavior of Wolffskeel and othe other German officers. On this subject, see Hermann Goltz, ed., Akten des Internationalen Dr. Johannes-Lepsius— Symposiums 1986 an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg (Halle: Abt. Wissenschaftspublizistik der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 1987), pp. 47-48; Christoph Dinkel, "German Officers and the Armenian Genocide," Armenian Review 44:1 (1991): 77-130; Vahakn N. Dadrian, German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity, (Cambridge: Blue Crane Books, 1996), and Hilmar Kaiser's review of this work, in Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies 8 (1997): 127-42. See also the introduction of Wolfgang Gust, ed., Revidierte Ausgabe der von Johannes Lepsius unter dem Titel Deutschland und Armenien 1914-1918, herausgegebenen Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke, Version 2.10, 1999 (See now on www.armenocide.de).

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In June 1916 the last procession of Armenian deportees passed through Urfa. The deportations had thus taken about one year. Unlike previous caravans these last ones were made up chiefly of young men. These were a few thousand out of the multitude of workers on the Baghdad Railway. One of the engineers told Kiinzler how much the German and Swiss engineers had resisted the Turkish ideas and yet finally had to give up their men. Just outside Urfa, the same fate befell them as hundreds of thousands before—massacre. Little by little the previous lawlessness in Urfa was drawing to an end, "even if numerous rapes, degradations, violations, particularly of boys also still occurred." As a rule, dealing with the Armenian "fair game" was generally freer in the villages than in the towns: "Turkish officers in particular did terrible and unspeakable things in selling off Armenian girls. And what happened to hundreds, indeed thousands of Armenian boys in unnatural crimes, no person would believe."1

Kurdish Deportees and the "Monstrous Dimensions" of Aid Work As it happened, already during the winter of 1916-17 new trains of deportees arrived in Urfa. In Kiinzler's mildly critical opinion: "Probably no European daily newspaper has reported that the same Young Turks who wanted to exterminate the Armenians were also driving the Kurds, their coreligionists who lived in the same upper Armenia, from house and home. This occurred using the same excuses as those that had been used at the beginning with the Armenians, namely that they were insecure elements, and therefore the danger existed that they would defect to the Russians." Those affected were Kurds from the provinces of Erzerum and Bitlis. About 300,000, Kiinzler wrote, had to trek southward. At first, they remained in upper Mesopotamia, particularly in the Urfa district, but also reached as far west as the areas around Marash and Aintab. In the summer of 1917, the trek took them farther, onto the Konia plateau. "It was the intention of the Young Turks no longer to allow these Kurdish elements back into their ancestral homeland. In inner Anatolia they were meant to merge further and further into Turkishness." 2 In contrast to the Armenians, nobody was allowed to harm these Muslim deportees. But still the winter, general shortages, and sickness affected

1 Kiinzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 108-09. ^Ibid., pp. 101-02. In the Kurdish journal Jin, Kemal Fevzi depicted the agony of these deportees in the Urfa region, stating that no foreign traveler wanted to see those places of suffering which starkly revealed the injustice of humanity. See Jin, ed. Mehmet Emin Bozarslan (Uppsala, 1985-1988), no. 24 (3 Eyliil 1335 [Julian calendar: September 3, 1916]).

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these people dreadfully. "When such a procession of Kurds turned up in a village in an evening, the inhabitants would quickly lock their doors with fright. ... The next morning the villagers had mass graves to dig for those who had frozen." A high proportion starved or froze to death. Nobody would take them in until Kiinzler organized an aid operation: "Because the government was now following my rescue operation with disparaging eyes and no doubt in many ways with envy and because the terrible plight of these Kurds who after all are also our fellow human beings deeply moved me, I set out in December 1916 for Aleppo. To me it was important to get the consuls warmed up for an aid operation. I also held hope that such an operation would have positive repercussions for the Armenian aid work." 1 The journey to Aleppo bore results. At the end of December, Kiinzler received favorable replies, and a short time later a messenger from the U.S. consulate handed over money value at 150,000 Swiss francs, and the German consulate contributed 300 Turkish pounds (7,000 francs). Kiinzler's calculation—to make a good impression on the authorities—appeared to have worked. In a telegram of January 2, 1917, the interior ministry requested the mutasarrif of Urfa to afford "all the necessary alleviation in these matters," namely "to distribute money to the neediest near Urfa in the name of the Americans." 2 From a letter of Kiinzler to the German Consulate in Aleppo, it becomes apparent that from the American funds alone he distributed a hundred tons of grain to almost 20,000 needy in the Haran and Besowa region. The German funds served 1,200 people in the village of Garmuch near Urfa. Kiinzler often had to be present in order to prevent the distributions from degenerating into chaos. The problems intensified once again in the winter of 1917-18, resulting in the death of most of the refugees. Because of speculation by the big landowners who had hoarded part of the harvest, the price of grain rose in late fall to unprecedented levels. Those who bought their winter supplies beforehand, as was the common practice but impossible for the impoverished Kurds, had bread that winter. The Kurdish muhajir (refugee) had nothing. 1 Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 102. ^BOA. DH, ÖFR.71/150. The Iskän-i A§ayir ve Muhacirin Miidüriyet-i Umumiyesi demanded in a telegram of October 2, 1916 to the authorities of the Urfa and Marash sanjaks that the Armenian houses taken by the local officials be given to the muhajirs (BOA, DH, §FR.68/155). A number of other telegrams from the Ministry of Interior in the autumn of 1916 dealt with the issue of the deportees (DH, §FR.69/7, 9, 18, 35, 47, 100, 141, 191, 195, and 249). Several witnesses, among them Kiinzler, show the government's failure in that matter. German Colonel Ludwig Schraudenbach wrote: "The Turks transplanted in those months thousands of Kurdish families from their mountains to Adana. They should there 'farm the land'... Will they miserably be let go to pieces?" Ludwig Schraudenbach, Muharebe\ Der erlebte Roman eines deutschen Führers im osmanischen Heer 1916/17 (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1925), n.459. Cf. Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien, pp. 339-40; Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 103.

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Most of them starved or froze under the gaze of the city's inhabitants who would not open their homes to them.1 In vain the qadi preached to the Turkish co-religionists, exhorting them to take in destitute Kurdish children and women, "after all, you also took in so many Armenian [women and children]." It is true that the interior ministry had planned to accommodate Muslim refugees from the war zone in Armenian houses, but this purpose was not served, as local Muslims often had already appropriated them and refused to vacate them. As part of the framework of its policy of stamping a Turkish identity on the mixed eastern provinces, the Ministry of Interior gave the permanent settlement of Turks in the regions of Urfa and Diarbekir absolute priority and forbade the same to the Kurds. In several telegrams from November 1916, the ministry reprimanded the local authorities on this matter.2 For the Kurdish refugees around Urfa, the planned movement farther west for the purpose of settling them there did not take place.3 The ruling elite of the city was preoccupied with itself and ignored the suffering of others. In 1917, Mutasarrif Nusret Bey (who was to be hanged as a war criminal after the war) erected a war memorial in honor of the "heroes of the jihad" a monument that stands in the city to this day. 4 Following the summer months of 1915, "the medical practice among the poor assumed monstrous dimensions." After Kiinzler had opened an auxiliary hospital in the house of the murdered Shiko, Fakhri paid a visit to the mission hospital and the affiliated auxiliary hospital in November. The only thing with which he could find fault was the fact that Muslims and Armenians (in some cases those who had fought one another) lay in the same rooms. The results of this visit were fatal. Kiinzler was ordered to vacate the auxiliary hospital immediately, in the middle of the night. He managed to gain an extension until 7:00 a.m. from the vali, who had issued the evacuation order at the instigation of Fakhri. The second, deadly consequence was that soon after a visit by Turkish military doctors and the town doctor who exercised overall control of the mission hospital (Kiinzler did not possess a medical diploma), police pulled out of their beds all those capable of walking. This time Hagop, the injured hospital porter, also had to go to the executioner. ^Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 102. See also the impressive description in Cinq ans d'exil, pp. 50-51. BOA, DH, ÖFR.69/219, 235,248,251, and 70/111. 3 B O A , D H , §FR.68/155. ^On Nusret, see Miisliim Akalm, Urfa Mutasarrifl Sehit Nusret Bey'in Nemrut Mustafa Pa$a divan-i harbindeki savunmasi [The Defense of the Martyr Nusret Bey before the Court Martial of Nemrut Mustafa Pasha] (Urfa: §urkav, 1990); Taner Ak?am, Armenien und der Völkermord: Die Istanbuler Prozesse und die türkische Nationalbewegung (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1996), p. 114.

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When typhus broke out in the whole area in October, 1915, Künzler had not only the usual average of forty hospital patients to tend to in a facility with twenty-five beds but also countless patients in private homes. Having himself recovered from this illness in June, Künzler had acquired immunity against the disease. "Days on which I made over a hundred visits were not a rarity." 1 Added to this was the care of the deportees who at that time were jammed into the Urfa area in the tens of thousands. Seeing that the unorganized arrival of 10,000 deportees led to a chaotic situation, the Central Police Office (EUM) ordered that the caravans arriving near Urfa in November 1915 should be diverted to Mosul via Diarbekir.2 The Jewish doctor under whose formal management the mission hospital was placed at the outbreak of war was transferred to Mosul in early May 1916. A "waspish" Turkish health inspector took over his post and ordered the closure of the hospital and the discharge of all the invalids on grounds that Künzler did not possess a doctor's licence. He sealed the operating room and the pharmacy. In July, a sick German major appeared who expressed a wish to be treated by Künzler, whereupon the pharmacy was reopened.3 On July 22, the police headquarters in Constantinople requested by telegram a precise clarification regarding the circumstances surrounding the hospital's closure and the arrest of the personnel on grounds of "suspicion." Were they trying to take action against Künzler or had they found themselves confronted with German pressure? 4 In August 1917, the German major left Urfa. Yet another new health inspector sealed up everything once again, though the deacon left the sliding window of the pharmacy in such a way that enabled him to gain entry when necessary. The return of the previous Armenian doctor made it possible for Künzler to run a formal practice for the poor, which in particular benefited many suffering from eye ailments. 5 Following the closure of the hospital, Künzler's chief occupation was protecting and tending to those deportees requiring help, mostly Armenian women and children who had found shelter in and around Urfa. He made monthly support payments to them. In May 1917, he was supporting 2,440 orphans, aside from providing women with clothes.6

1 Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 86, 95 (quotation). ^Telegram of the EUM, Nov. 2 , 1 9 1 5 , BOA, DH, §FR.57/245. ^It was very probably Major Blell, mentioned also in Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 3. ^Telegram of the Emniyet-i Umûmiye Miidiriyeti to the Mutasarrif of Urfa, BOA, DH, §FR.66/47. On November 2, 1915, the EUM already had asked by telegraph if the German institutions in Urfa had been harmed (BOA, DH, §FR.57/249). -'Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 97-98. ^See the letter of Andreas Vischer to the management of Deutsche Orient-Mission, received June 18, 1917, LAH 900: 9144.

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Victory of the "National Force" In September 1918, Jakob Kiinzler learned that Nablus and Nazareth had fallen to General Allenby's army and that Damascus and Aleppo would soon follow. On the basis of this news, the last Germans decided to leave Urfa.1 The Eckart family got as far as Constantinople, where at the end of the war the Allied armistice commission had Franz Eckart arrested. It seems that some Armenian informants had confused him with the artillery captain, Graf von Wolffskeel. Eckart attempted to evade deportation to Malta by escaping but was shot and killed at a border crossing.2 The Kiinzlers now administered the hospital, the carpet factory, and the American mission buildings. In the meantime, there was a rise of anti-German sentiment among many Turks. The authorities wanted to requisition the buildings of the Deutsche Orient-Mission but eventually settled on some others. Kiinzler managed to have the hospital proclaimed a Swiss institute as the documents of ownership were made out in Vischer's name. After the armistice many Armenians congregated in Urfa, about 8,000 in all, only a small proportion of them natives of Urfa.3 Their numbers grew when the Muslims had to release Armenian women and children on orders of the victorious Allied Powers. Being without funds, they turned to the Kiinzlers, causing them severe financial difficulties. The stockpiles of wool and carpets from the carpet factory were sold, but the proceeds were also soon used up. Kiinzler hoped to receive help from the British troops in Muslimiye near Aleppo. Of course, the Baghdad Railway no longer reached that far because the tracks and bridges had been torn up. He had to trek alone for nine hours through the sparsely-populated region between Chobanbey and Muslimiye. As the British would not agree to his suggestion, he made out a check for 10,000 francs in the name of a bank in Basel—"my friends in Basel would not let me down"—and cashed it in Aleppo. On the return journey, he came close to being killed by Arabs who were out hunting escaped German soldiers. By February 1919, the money was again exhausted and the crisis reached new proportions. This time, Elisabeth Kiinzler went to the British and presented the commanding general who had been stalling her for days with an ultimatum, either to be prepared to receive a throng of 600 destitute people

1

Cf. Récit d'exil: 1919, 1920,1921

(manuscript, Sisters of Lons-le-Saunier), p. 53.

^Schäfer, Geschichte, p. 101. 3Andreas Vischer, Erlebnisse eines Schweizerarztes bei den türkischen Nationalisten (Basel: Baseler Nachrichten, 1921), p. 5. Jakob Künzler, in Orient (1925): 60, mentions 3,000 Armenians in Urfa in 1920. In Mitteilungen über Armenien (Basel, 1923, p. 267), however, he gives the number of 4,000 to 5,000.

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whom she would send from Urfa or else to provide her with the necessary finances. She returned to Urfa with 15,000 francs. 1 Apart from financial issues, there were staffing problems. The relations between the Swiss and the Capuchin mission continued to be cordial. The Franciscan nuns assumed the care of many women and children who were a too heavy burden for Elisabeth and Jakob Kunzler. 2 In April the first representative of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE), which was later incorporated as Near East Relief (NER), arrived in Urfa and assumed the care of many charges of the Kiinzlers. They established themselves in the buildings of the American mission and settled the children, whose number in the course of 1920 grew to 800, in British military tents around the mission. Others were placed in the old missionary orphanage in the Armenian quarter. The NER installed a weaving mill and a tannery in what 3 had previously been the masbane. In December 1918, for the first time a British officer appeared by car in Urfa. Not very realistically, he asked the Armenians to make sure that the Turks reimburse them for their property and to stop the Muslims from using the stones of the damaged church and the Armenian houses as a quarry for their own building needs. He emphasized that, except for extraordinary circumstances, the Mudros Armistice did not allow the Allies to advance beyond the established demarcation line and that Urfa lay beyond that line. In the city tension between Muslims and Armenians who had returned began to escalate, though the police offered a hand with the rescue of Armenian women and children from Muslim homes. 4 At the beginning of March 1919, a day after the festive reopening of the Armenian Protestant church with its newly constructed belfry, news arrived that an agitated mob had massacred nearly a hundred Armenians in Aleppo. The anxiety level decreased somewhat with the arrival of a contingent of British troops that month, in part possibly in response to Kiinzler's appeals after his hospital pharmacist Karekin had barely escaped an assassination attempt. Only now did the numerous Urfa Armenians who had hidden in Aleppo dare to return. These also included Armenian soldiers who had served the Ottoman army loyally in Arabia. Kunzler asked the Indian doctor with the British troops to take over senior supervision of the "Swiss Hospital," so that the health inspector would no longer be able to bother him. 5 \üer Christliche Orient (1919): 18-19. fy Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, p. 138. ^Künzler, Dienst, pp. 79-81,85-86, and Im Lande des Blutes, p. 150; Vischer, Erlebnisse, p. 11; Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 14. \)n this problem, see, for example, Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, pp. 7-8. -'Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 144, 149-50.

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The protection and support offered by the British helped in the rapid rebuilding of the Armenian quarter, which provided hundreds of men and women with well-paid work. But protection also led to claims regarding reimbursement, not only addressed to Turks but also to Jakob Kunzler himself. He had been entrusted with a great deal of Armenian property, but most of it had been confiscated by the Turkish authorities. He later had to appear before the Turkish municipal court in response to a claim that he pointedly described as mean and pure invention. As long as the Allies were present, he was subordinate to their jurisdiction and was considered guiltless not only by them but also by the Armenian National Committee of Aleppo.1 The return of the Vischers in mid-June 1919 enabled the Kiinzlers finally to take a vacation in their homeland for the first time in ten years. The family of seven traveled to Beirut, where because of their tight financial situation they boarded ship as fourth-class (upper deck) passengers.2 Andreas and Gertrud Vischer-Oeri were no longer in the service of the Deutsche OrientMission but rather the Swiss Armenian Friendship Society (Bund der schweizerischen Armenierfreunde). In Urfa, Andreas Vischer was shaken by not meeting "one single old [Armenian or Assyrian] friend." 3 His medical work soon assumed large proportions: Paying patients are unfortunately becoming increasingly rare, but anyway we are primarily here for the poor who do not find help anywhere except with us. The Turkish doctors and pharmacists have given their work widespread propaganda, and that has had a noticeable effect on the income of the pharmacy and practice. But as before the poor Islamic sick come faithfully to us because for them there is otherwise no help anywhere, and the Turkish government is not embarrassed to send us their poorest customers.

Vischer engaged two Armenian doctors. The Near East Relief in Urfa lent him material support with beds and medicines. 5 From June 1919 until May 1920, the Swiss hospital took care of a record number of patients. The many wounded from both parties during the Turkish-French battle around Urfa were a contributing factor. On November 1, 1919, French troops under the command of Major Hauger relieved the British contingent, only intensifying the Sunni majority's ' Kiinzler, Dienst, pp. 85, 87-88, Erinnerungen, pp. 1-4. Ida Alamuddin, Papa Kuenzler 103; Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, -Vischer, Erlebnisse, pp. 4-5. "^Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p.

and Im Lande des Blutes, pp. 155-61. See also Vischer-Oeri, and the Armenians (London: William Heinemann, 1970), p. p. 4. 19.

^Mitteilungen über Armenien, p. 272; Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 9.

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dissatisfaction and revulsion toward the occupying force. 1 The name Mustafa Kemal was increasingly on people's lips. Pressure from the Nationalist side on the civil authorities grew following the Sivas Congress for the Defense of Anatolia and Rumelia in September 1919.2 By the middle of January 1920, tension in the city was so high that Christians no longer ventured out to the bazaar for fear of being attacked. On January 27, 1920, the Armenians cleared the outer part of their quarter to be well prepared for a possible defense. Many Assyrians whose houses lay between those of the Turks and Kurds either moved away or into the Armenian quarter. Andreas Vischer bought up foodstuffs, bandaging materials, and fuel in order to lay in provisions. The French commander had immediately asked the Swiss doctor to take over the medical care of his men and assigned two orderlies and two stretcher-bearers to help him. 3 A Capuchin priest visited the doctor with three Franciscan sisters, one of them Swiss, who came to assist. Besides cooperation with the Near East Relief, therefore, the hospital staff was in daily contact with the Franciscan mission.4 Along the railway line attacks against the French contingent soon began. Communication with Aleppo broke down. 5 On February 5-6, 1920, all the Muslims abandoned the quarter where the Swiss hospital was located. The Muslim patients also left the hospital. When Vischer went out for a ride, it was only by some skillful horsemanship that he was able to elude a mounted group pressing ahead from Diarbekir Street. On February 20, Namik, the local leader of the Turkish Nationalists, presented Major Hauger with an ultimatum that invoked the Wilsonian principles of self-determination and courteously but firmly demanded the withdrawal of the French troops whose "right to hospitality" could no longer be granted. 6 An attack was imminent. The Armenians wanted to remain strictly neutral, especially as the Nationalists

' Vischer Oeri, Erinnerungen, pp. 20-21. ^Cf. Mustafa Kemal's telegram of September 19, 1919, from Sivas to Ali Riza Bey, Mutasarrif of Ulfa, printed in Mustafa Kemal, Die neue Türkei 1919-1927 (Leipzig: K.F. Koehler, 1928) vol. 3, no. 108, pp. 87-88. See also no. 75, p. 51, and no. 81, p. 54. ^Andreas Vischer had known one of the captains who had been an internee in Fribourg, Switzerland, during World War I (Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 21). "^Vischer, Erlebnisse, p. 14. On the inter-confessional spirit among the helpers in Urfa, see also Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, pp. 48, 52-54, 62-63, 70. -'Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 25. ^Ali Saib Ursava§, Urfa'nin kurtulug mücadelesi ve Kilikya facialari [The Liberation Struggle in Urfa and the Calamities of Cilicia] (Istanbul: Kastag Yayinevi, 1988; 1st ed., Ankara: Kütüphane-i Hilmi, 1924), p. 74.

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gave assurances that all action was aimed solely against the occupiers. 1 Despite their good position, the encircled French soldiers, who numbered about 500, stood no chance in the long run, as the high command in Beirut failed to send a relief expedition. Hauger accepted a truce on April 9 with guarantees of safe passage to Aleppo, but the column was ambushed and most of the French soldiers were killed just outside of Urfa. The Turkish authorities shifted the responsibility to "undisciplined Kurds." 2 The French press whose national pride would not accept the humiliating defeat, published a spurious tale of an Armenian betrayal to which the troops had fallen victim.3 With the end of the shooting, all the ethno-religious groups once again frequented the Swiss hospital in which Turkish soldiers also lay. The Turkish army doctor often assisted Vischer with the operations. The Swiss had constant access to the Allied prisoners of war in Urfa. 4 The situation of the Christians in the city was more difficult, not so much because of the government's attitude as the hostile behavior of the Urfa Turks. Some forcibly claimed their Armenian second wives, and nobody dared to intervene. An Armenian smith was arbitrarily arrested and, as a matter of routine, suffered a bastinado. Ali (Kiinzler's servant during the war and now in the service of Vischer) was imprisoned, accused of owing a substantial war tax. Thanks to some polite pressure by Vischer on an old acquaintance, finance director Haji Esad Effendi, Ali was set free. The military overshadowed the jurisdiction of the state, a circumstance that angered the mutasarrif.5 A senior Turkish official in the region complained in writing to military commander Nuri Bey about plunder and abuse by armed gangs of chete associated with the Nationalist forces. The French occupiers had been much more correct, he said.6 The Muslims no longer reproached Andreas Vischer, who had protested against the attack on the withdrawing French troops, particularly as he had also acted as a mediator. The Vischers received a courtesy call from high^ Vischer, Erlebnisse, pp. 6-9; Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 78. Andreas Vischer describes the attacks of Turkish and Kurdish forces on the Allied troops at Urfa in his detailed report of 1921 (Erlebnisse, pp. 16-41); the notes of his wife give a more personal view (Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, pp. 26-65). The Turkish Nationalist perspective is detailed in Ursava§, Kurtulu.s. See also Ismail Oz§elik, "Milli Miicadele'de Urfa'da ermeni-fransiz igbirligi ve bir ermeni doktorunun Amerika'dan gonderdigi mektup" [The Franco-Armenian Cooperation during the National Sturgle and the Letter Sent from America by an Armenian Doctor], Askeri Tarih Bulteni, no. 22 (1987): 193-204, and the same author's book based almost exclusively on Turkish sources: Milli Miicalede'de gtiney cephesi: Urfa (30 ekim 1918-11 temmuz 1920) [The National Struggle on the Southern Front: Urfa (0ctober-30, 1918-July 11, 1920] (Ankara: Kultiir Bakanhgi, 1922). Vischer, Erlebnisse, pp. 53-54. %bid., p. 67; Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 83. •^Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 75; Vischer, Erlebnisse, pp. 49, 59-60. -'Vischer, Erlebnisse, p. 59; Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 79. ^Vischer-Oeri, Erinnerungen, p. 79. 7 Ibid., pp. 38, 51,64.

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ranking people such as Nationalist spokesman Namik, army commander Nuri, and the mutasarrif, who asserted that "foreigners were very welcome in their country, but not armed." 1 Namik, on his part, remarked somewhat disparagingly in one of his reports: "Vischer, the leader of the Belgian [sic] hospital, changes his nationality and loyalty according to the situation."2 Nuri Bey behaved in a friendly and open-minded way toward the Swiss doctor. His speech, as noted by Vischer, was characteristic of the emancipatory, antiimperialistic rhetoric of 1919-20. The representatives of the Turkish Nationalist elite whom Vischer encountered were inspired by a distorted picture of world events—Hindenburg as dictator in Germany and fighting against the Entente, India in total revolt, and the pro-Turkish Bolshevists soon attacking the British troops in Mosul.3 On their homeward journey on May 20, 1920, the Vischers witnessed similar excitement of the local Nationalist commander of Suruj, not far from Urfa: He spoke enthusiastically of the fight for freedom against the foreigners. ... He had courteous words for America and Switzerland and expressed the hope that these countries would show sympathy regarding the needs of Turkey following independence. I allowed myself to point out that while we might have complete sympathy for Turkey's legitimate demands, the actions against the Armenians during the war had made an extremely bad impression upon us and that in the future anything similar was to be avoided. The officer did not like to go into this subject and merely stated that now only truly guilty traitors would be punished.4

Continuing the journey from Aleppo to Beirut, the Vischers were together with 450 Armenian orphan children. It was clear that France could not sustain a protectorate in southeastern Anatolia. The time of the final exodus was approaching.5 In July 1920 the Kiinzlers traveled separately and without children back to Turkey. Jakob Kiinzler took the route via Samsun and diagonally through Anatolia. In Samsun, he inspected the Swiss orphanage that had been transferred from Sivas. He had just arrived in Urfa when he received the written notice that he was to serve a six-month prison term because of the tiresome affair with the Armenian property. The amazed Kiinzler was spared imposition of the sentence only because the plaintiff, who was supposed to speak again, had fled. Two months later, Elisabeth Kiinzler arrived by the usual way via ^Ibid., p. 67. ^Ureavaf, Kurtulu§, p. 106. ^Vischer, Erlebnisse, pp. 60-61. I b i d „ p. 65. -'ibid., pp. 67-70.

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Beirut and Aleppo. Only the American Near East Relief, which was highly regarded everywhere, had permission from time to time to cross the war zone lying between Aleppo and Urfa by automobile and was able in this way to take Mrs. Kiinzler to Urfa. Her entry alone and possibly a personal letter found in her luggage raised suspicions of spying, for which the military court decided to have the Swiss couple deported to the interior. On the basis of their good name and important work and their Swiss nationality, the senior commander in Diarbekir, Nahat Pasha, ordered strict observation rather than imprisonment. An officer attached to the military court befriended the Kiinzlers and let it be known that he had interceded on their behalf, for which he gladly received a remuneration.1 Elisabeth Kiinzler organized the repairs to the Turkish hospital. Her husband worked together with the Armenian doctor Hagop Beshlian in the Swiss hospital which he also administered. 2 Those seriously ill went to the Swiss hospital, while the others were assigned to the Turkish hospital. Like the Vischers, the Kiinzlers were not affiliated with the Deutsche OrientMission but rather with the Swiss Armenian Friendship Society: "I had been instructed to find, as soon as possible, a new home for the Swiss project somewhere in an expanded free Armenia, which was intended to be effective in an educational rather than a medical sense. The hospital work in Urfa was supposed to cease without delay." There was really no lack of goodwill on his part, Kiinzler continued, "but the Orient did not achieve peace, and because of that not only was there no expanded Armenia but once again war was spreading across the country of Armenia."3 The Kiinzlers remained in Urfa and pushed ahead with the hospital, this even when the committee of the Swiss Armenian Friendship Society failed to fund the budget for the year 1922. Thanks to the high occupancy and increased fees, the work was carried on until the fall of 1922. Apart from Dr. Beshlian there were many Armenian nurses on the staff. The Near East Relief increasingly enlisted the Kiinzlers for the transporting of orphans. They organized and accompanied the exodus by foot, on horseback, or in wagons of around 8,000 children, mainly Armenian, from the eastern regions of Urfa, Mardin, Diarbekir (Dikranagerd), and Kharput (Kharpert) to Syria. From Kharput alone there were 5,000 children, and from Urfa, 1,000.4 The NER decided upon this mass exodus because independent educational projects and work with orphans were not permitted by Kemalist Turkey, which wanted to pocket a portion of the aid money itself. Moreover, the future for non-Muslims in the eastern provinces looked extremely bleak. The NER had painstakingly to furnish the orphan children with the required 1

Orient (1925): 60-61; Kiinzler, Dienst, pp. 87-93. S e e Beshlian's letter on the war in Urfa, printed in Ursavag, Kurtulus, pp. 206-15. ^Mitteilungen iiber Armenien, p. 267. Cf. Karl Meyer, Armenien und die Schweiz Blaukreuz-Verlag, 1974), pp. 136-39. 4 Ktinzler, Dienst, pp. 104-05. 2

(Bern:

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documents. Many other Christians, including Dr. Beshlian, illegally crossed the border to Syria with the help of smugglers. Then in October 1922, Turkey opened the door for all indigenous Christians and "encouraged" them in many places, through rumors and threats of renewed persecution and massacres, to leave. In the words of Erik-Jan Ziircher, the '"ethnic cleansing' on a massive scale" on which the modern state of Turkey was to be built achieved its objective and was to be internationally recognized in July 1923 in the Treaty of Lausanne. By that time, on October 1, 1922, the Kiinzlers had closed the hospital. The missionary presence in Urfa had come to an end. The couple would then be engaged by the Near East Relief to direct a large orphanage in Ghazir, Lebanon. Although Jakob Kiinzler on leaving Urfa did not envisage a mission of re-conquest as the Franciscans hoped for, it was then in no way certain that everything had come to an end.2 He mused: "I finally decided with the heaviest of hearts to wind up at Urfa, at least for the time being. Will we be able to set up here once more? Or must we forever remain distant from the land to which we presented our best vitality, our greatest love?" 3 One reason forcing him to leave was the obstacle placed before him by the Ankara authorities who insisted that he undertake the medical training required of Turkish physicians.4 This obvious rejection hurt. "They don't even want our love!" Kiinzler could not comply with the new system of Turkish Nationalism. In keeping with the statutes of the Friends of Urfa Society in Basel, the philosophy of the Deutsche Orient-Mission, and his personal sentiments, Kiinzler had always avoided attempts to convert Muslim patients. He did not want to take advantage of their temporary dependence in the name of a Christianity, which they might understand politically but not spiritually. Even this restraint, which applied to the entire hospital staff, and an uncompromising commitment to assist the impoverished population, were no protection against being regarded by the ruling elite as a tool of foreign exploiters.5 Instead of contributing to the building up of the ravaged KurdoArmenian homeland, which in 1920 he intended as his future mission, Jakob Kiinzler was destined to continue his labors in Lebanon until his death in 1949. Through newspapers reports and one trip to Turkey, he painfully understood the thrust of Kemalist politics in eastern Turkey in the period between the two world wars: "Instead of building up, always again destruction."6

1Orient (1925): 90-91; Mitteilungen über Armenien, pp. 267-68. ^Recit d'exil, p. 38. ^ Orient {1925): 91. r 177. ^Kiinzler, Liickenbiisser, p. c J See Jakob Kiinzler's retrospective, Orient (1935): 123-24. ''"Den Türken und den Armeniern gewidmet," proofs of Orient, no.5 ,1928, p. 167, which was never published. See Basel University Library, Lieb Z 256.

3. MUSLIM HETERODOXY AND PROTESTANT UTOPIA. THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ALEVIS AND MISSIONARIES IN OTTOMAN ANATOLIA

150 years ago, the Utopia of the Protestant American missionaries in Turkey consisted in an almost millenarian belief in a new social and symbolic order, promoted not by a miraculous deus ex machina but by their own evangelistic, educative and civilizing efforts.* 1 Penetrating all the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the carriers of this impressive Puritan model of successful work, self-confident behavior and the socioreligious subversion of the existing theocratic order made a major impact on the Christian minorities and on other communities heterodox to the authoritative islamic orthodoxy - groups which thought there would be much to win and little to loose if fundamental change took place. The most important heterodox group in Anatolia - beside those grouped in the recognized non-Muslim millets - were the Alevis. This is the term for a number of different communities whose common characteristics are the adoration of Ali, the fourth Caliph, as Paraclete; their refusal of the Sharia; and an age-old history of marginalization under the Sunni Sultans. The term «Alevi» is almost identical with «Kizilbash»/fci/6a,y. 2 Still at the end of the 20 th century, «Kizilbash» remains a term of invective in many people's daily language. The partial replacement of that term by «Alevi» in about 1900 did not effectively change the deep and often mutual prejudices characterising * First published in Die Welt des Islams 41-1 (2001), p. 89-111. * For my vision of Alevism I am indebted to discussions with Hamit Bozarslan, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. For the stylistic polishing of my text I am very grateful to Paul Jenkins, University of Basel/Basel Mission. I would also like to thank Michael Ursinus, Heidelberg, and Werner Ende, Freiburg, for their helpful comments on this paper. For a more comprehensive study on missions, ethnicity and the state in the eastern provinces of Turkey see my forthcoming book Der verpasste Friede. Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei 1839-1938, Zürich: Chronos. ^ The Kizilbash opposed their integration into the Ottoman state body during the 151*1 and centuries. The latter turned out to be, with Selim I, definitely dominated by Sunnis. The Kizilbash - so called then because of their red headgear - pinned their hopes on the Persian Shah Ismail, and became, in Ottoman eyes, traitors and public enemies. The religous propaganda reviled them as immoral unbelievers without Holy books, kitabsiz, and therefore worse than Christians or Jews. They had to live at the edge of society and in remote regions, notably the Dersim - the Alevis' heartland between Sivas, Erzurum and Harput, renamed Tunceli in 1936 - and Elbistan, south-west of the Dersim. Marginality did not mean a complete exclusion, but an inferior status within the system. Without mosques, the villages inhabited by Alevis were clearly recognizable, until Sultan Abdulhamid II (and his «successors» in power till now) constructed mosques for them. Cf. «Kizil-Bash» in EI(2), V, 243-45.

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the relations between this important minority and the Sunni majority in Turkey. Alevis then and now constitute about a quarter of Turkey's Muslim population. The Alevi revival in Turkey and in the Turkish and Kurdish diaspora in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s has led to many publications about the present-day articulations of Alevism and its socioreligious and ethnic origins. Our information on the Alevis in late Ottoman times is, however, meagre. Because American missionaries continuously documented their contacts with the Kizilbash from the 1850s to the 1920s, their archives prove to be a vital source for the social history of the Alevis in the 19th and early 20 th centuries.1 Interactions between Protestants and Alevis took place during those decades in the regions of Merzifon, Sivas, Elbistan, Dersim, Harput and Malatya. Important topics to consider here are, firstly, the catalytic and conflictive interactions between the dynamic Protestant movement and heterodox groups in Anatolia; secondly, the impact in this region of age-old neighbourly contact with Christian groups, and especially of the Armenian renaissance and genocide; and thirdly the alleged support the Alevis gave to the «progressive» Unionist-Kemalist power against the Sunni «reactionaries». The first topic is more or less unknown, and the second is almost forgotten (or suppressed) in scientific discussions on Alevism; the third issue leads to frequent confusion. The missionary contributions to a possible «ethnoreligious construction» as well as to a scholarly understanding of Alevism are other interesting aspects of our subject. If the missionaries tended to overemphasize the Christian elements of the «Kizilbashism» they encountered, Young Turk, Kemalist and Occidental authors who follow their line overstressed the ethnoTurkish parts of its heritage. This article does not participate in the discussion of ethnic origins, but intends to shed light on the socioreligious distinctiveness, as interpreted in the late Ottoman encounter with Protestantism, of the Zaza-, Kurmandj- and Turkish-speaking Alevi groups with which it is dealing.

Protestant mission, Muslims and Millets The role of Christian missions in Ottoman Turkey is a delicate topic, notably because mission was concerned with minorities and had a vision of Ottoman documents, notably those of the Bagbakanlik Ar§ivi (Prime Ministry Archives) in Istanbul, also constitute important sources, but the author has not had the opportunity to evaluate them systematically for this article.

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integrating them into a new form of society which was in some ways diametrically opposed to the ideas of the ruling groups. From the standpoint of the rulers, instead of homogenizing society and strengthening its unity, missions were differentiating society in religious, ethnic and social terms. Missions worked above all with religious minorities such as the Armenians and Assyrians, heterodox groups such as the Alevis and Yezidis, and with the poorer classes. Members of the progressive Ottoman elite and Western missionaries agreed in the conviction that the Ottoman Near East should benefit from Western superiority in technical and educational matters, and in public health. In the provincial towns missionaries built up prestigious schools, among them revolutionary new institutions for girls' education, as well as hospitals. These provided a model which millets and the state were strongly motivated to emulate. As the Greek, Jewish and Armenian millets were most successful in emulating the given model, the incentive impact it gave to the Muslim community increased. Most authors, Turks and others, agree on the benefits of the educational and public health models missionaries brought to Asia Minor. They do not agree on the disintegrative or «separatist» consequences which Turkish nationalist ideology asserts this impact had. The first missionaries of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) learned early on the impossibility of evangelizing members of the Ottoman state-supporting Muslim majority (iimmet or tiss-i saltanat). The resistance in this group to changing their religious orientation was partly due to the strong legal and social sanctions against conversion in force in the Ottoman state, but not only that. Like the Jews, for deep historical and mental reasons, the Muslims remained on the whole impermeable to the enthusiastic approach of the Protestants. Therefore the ABCFM concentrated its work on the Assyrian, Armenian and Greek minorities and kept in contact only with Muslim marginals. Its eschatological view of history during the first half of the 19th century 1 was related to four expectations of great import to the Ottoman Middle East: 1. The future global spread of the Gospel. 2. The return of the Jews to Palestine and their «restoration» (acceptance of Jesus Christ). 3. The fall of the Pope. 4. The collapse of Islam. The above-mentioned Muslim resistance led to the missions developing a conceptual instrument for using the oriental Christians as agents

Cf. Chaney, Charles L., The Birth of Missions in America, South Pasadena, 1976; Hutchison, William R., Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions, Chicago, 1987.

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for «leavening the Levant». 1 So Protestantism first had to bring about a spiritual and educational revival of the «flaccid» Oriental churches before moving on to evangelising non-Christian populations. Christian minorities, but also some heterodox groups, were thus assigned a privileged place in the missionary scheme of salvation. Alevism seemed to be an open door to «reach [Sunni] Islam» not least available to the missionaries. The majority of the people, on the other hand, the Sunni Muslims, were seen as a group corrupted by a misguided faith and the abuse of power privileges. Only after they, too, had accepted enlightenment could they take part in the blessings of eschatological progress. The missionary focus on minorities had far-reaching consequences. The ABCFM contributed decisively not only to furnishing them with what appeared to be a place in the future, but likewise to constructing a collective past, in accordance with Western concepts, and to upgrading their spoken idioms by elevating them into a written language and used for publication. All that contributed to the cultural and national «renaissance» of peoples such as the Armenians and Assyrians, and to the beginning of such a renaissance among the Alevis. The missionary discovery and description of an astonishing diversity of ethnicities and the attempt to integrate them into a universal eschatological order fundamentally challenged the old Ottoman world. The egalitarian principles of the Tanzimat (Ottoman Reform) era of 1839-1876, which theoretically encouraged the missions to challenge the old order, were only very partially realized in Central and Eastern Anatolia. The missionary impact on the millets in late Ottoman Turkey was ambiguous, notably in the eyes of the Greek and Armenian nationalists and the traditional dignitaries. The missionary aim was not national reconstruction but the insertion of renewed communities into the Utopian plan of building up the global «kingdom of God». Conflicts with the traditional elites (which felt their positions threatened) and with the rising nationalist leaders (who saw culture and religion as means to the goal of national strength and union) were unavoidable. The creation of a separate Protestant millet in 1847, confirmed by imperial firman in 1850, was an inevitable development, but not a longterm project devised by the ABCFM. The ABCFM had intended to «revive» and not to split the established communities.

Cf. Greene, Joseph K., Leavening the Levant, Boston, 1916. - Michael Ursinus has argued for a close relationship between the Ottoman concept of «millet» and fending off European missionary influence in the 18th century («Zur Diskussion um ,millet' im Osmanischen Reich», in: Sudostforschungen, 48, S. 195-207, 1989). With its strategy, the ABCFM got round this Ottoman intention.

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The constitution of this new community was important as a modern model for redefining collective social relations. Unlike the Catholic millet (created 1831) and the traditional millets, all headed by patriarchs, it separated millet membership and church affiliation. The representative of the millet was not an ecclesiastic. He was elected by an assembly of deputies representing the local Protestant communities. There is no doubt that this «democratic» constitution had a major impact on the minds of the people with regard to their civil rights.1

A long-lasting love story between Alevis and Protestants The relationship between the missionaries and the Alevis begins in the 1850s, shortly after the establishment of the Protestant millet. It was one of mutual sympathy, shared values and of common hope for a new age. The reality, however, fell far short of the great expectations. But missionary enthusiasm for this people and curiosity about them remained constant. Henry Riggs, born in 1875 in Sivas of missionary parents, wrote in 1911: «The more one learns of this strange and attractive religion, the more the question is forced upon him, What is the source of this religion, and what the history of these simple, ignorant people, who possess so much that their wiser neighbours have not?» 2 It is amazing to hear a member of the expansive missionary movement before World War I referring to a non-Christian religion in these positive terms! In the 1850s the missionaries of the ABCFM were probably the first people from outside to enter the close endogamous community of the Kizilbash and were perhaps the first non-Alevis to be admitted to the secret religious assemblies called djem? They were deeply touched by this «unique people», its whole-hearted hospitality, its fine tenderness during the djem, and its persistent wish to be instructed by the missionaries. They were surprised that the Kizilbash declared themselves to have the same faith as the ' o f . Missionary Herald, Boston, 1851, p. 114-115; Arpee, Leon, The Armenian Awakening. A History of the Armenian Church. 1820-1860, Chicago, 1909, p. 139-141. 2 Riggs, Henry H., «The Religion of the Dersim Kurds», in: Missionary Review of the World, p. 734-743, London und New York, 1911, citation p. 741-742. 3 The first letter dealing with the Kizilbash was probably that of George Nutting, Arabkir, 24. 10. 1854. He wrote to Rufus Anderson, the secretary of the A B C F M in Boston: «There [ f emiggezek] is a sect of nominal Moslems scattered through this region of whom I think you have not beard. They bear the name Kuzulbash, which means literally ,ieadhead'. [../J They never or almost never go through the Muslim forms of prayer; nor do they keep their fast. They are a people by themselves. A peculiar people and open to the Gospel. [...] The Turks seem to regard them very much as they do the Koords, as worthless heretics, and not worth caring for.» A B C 16.7.1 (Archives of the A B C F M , Houghton Library, Harvard).

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missionaries and that, with no hesitation, they willingly participated with the visiting missionaries in their prayers and Bible readings. They were pleased to know that powerful Kizilbash chiefs offered protection to the young Protestant communities in their local conflicts with the Armenian Church or Sunni neighbours. They marvelled to hear about a Kurdish Kizilbash chief near Çemi§gezek who had proclaimed himself a Protestant and continued stubbornly to do so - without ever having been in direct contact with the mission. This Ali Gako and other Kizilbash in the regions of Harput und Sivas, who began to call themselves Protestants, had mostly learned from their Armenian neighbours about the new Protestant movement. Serious problems between missionaries and Alevis, especially conflicts with dedes (hereditary priests) who felt uneasy vis-à-vis Puritan self-assurance appear to have occurred only seldom. «Superstition» was, however, a frequent matter of discussion, and the attendance at missionary schools led to tensions within the families. 1 The attempt by several Kizilbash groups to redefine their identity and social role touched vital interests of the Ottoman state. In a letter from Adiyaman, the missionary George Nutting suggested a special charter {firman) for the Kizilbash based on the Hatt-i Hiimayun of 1856. Nutting's idea was no more than wishful thinking, however. The state was strictly opposed to extending to the Kizilbash the protection offered by the new Protestant millet. The people involved definitely needed this protection, but British diplomacy would never have been ready to press for an engagement of this kind.2 The missionaries found themselves compelled to reduce their contacts with the Alevis to a minimum in the 1860s and 1870s. Notably in the region of Sivas, they came to fear for the lives of their native employees and of the Alevis concerned. The ABCFM could not help the Alevis to any improvement in their precarious social position. Repression by local officials and Sunni neighbours as a response to their Protestant inclinations intimidated them. Only a handful of Alevi children could attend the mission schools. Yet many Alevis continued to avow that they were «Protes» (Protestants), a term which meant for them modern social and scientific progress in accordance with the precepts of their religion of the heart. 1 Missionary Herald, 1855, p. 338-340; 1856, p. 295-298; 1857, p. 83-85,220 and 395; 1858, p. 23-24 and 112-115; 1860, p. 45; 1861, p. 72; 1863, p. 116-118 and 309-312; 1866, 67-69; 1872, p. 315-317. The Missionary Herald reproduces excerpts of letters and station reports. The originals are in the ABCFM archives (ABC). 2 «The Moslems do not consider them as Moslems, and the only reason why they should oppose their evangelization is that now they have often opportunity to oppress them in various ways, in respect to taxes, etc., and they fear that when they become Protestants we shall inform the powers above them of their oppressions, and bring them to punishment, or prevent such wrongs», Nutting wrote in the Missionary Herald, 1860, p. 347. Cf. 1857, p. 144-145; 1858, p. 110; 1861, p. 71-73 and 100-102.

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The young post-Tanzimat Sultan Abdulhamid II, traumatically marked by the Turco-Russian war in the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia (1877-1878), began to carry on a socio-political strategy in the 1880s orientated towards the «restoration of the Ummet» i. e. of Islamic unity in the face of the real danger of final disintegration of his Empire. Within the eastern provinces, his defensive «Islamist» politics proved, indeed, to be aggressive. They were by no means synonymous with the promotion of social and religious equality which the men of the Tanzimat had declared to be their policy. Abdulhamid, however, implemented more effectively than any reformist before him centralizing and modernizing concepts in administration, telecommunication (telegraph), education and health. He tried actively to integrate the Alevis and other heterodox groups such as the Yezidis into the Ummet, i. e. to Sunnitize them. He succeeded in reintegrating the Sunni Kurds by giving numerous tribes the status of privileged cavalry units, the so-called Hamidiye (Sunni Kurds had been frustrated by the pre- and early Tanzimat state which destroyed the age-old Kurdish autonomies). Abdulhamid founded an elite school for sons of tribal chiefs (Mekteb-i Ashiret) and sent out his own Hanefi missionaries, in order to mobilize the provincial Muslims for his politics. It seems that this little-known semi-official network played an important role in the extensive anti-Armenian pogroms in 1895 and 1896. Even if his politics of incorporating Alevis and Yezidis did not win them over in a general way, it isolated them successfully from the ABCFM. Some Dersim chiefs also sent their sons to the Mekteb-i Ashiret.1 The Dersim Kizilbash' participation in the anti-Armenian violence of 1895 deserves attention. It was, as the missionary eyewitnesses stated, «strictly a matter of business». Many Dersimis participated in the raids as raids, but never in the religiously justified and politically motivated mass murders which accompanied some of them. £emi§gezek was protected by influential Dersim chiefs from any violence.2 Protestantism as represented by the ABCFM became a main ideological enemy in the eyes of the Sultan. It was not only a major factor in the renaissance of Armenian and Syriac self-consciousness, but had the ideological potential to initiate an Alevi renaissance, making Alevis more confident in

' Cf. Deringil, Selim, The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire. 1876-1909, London: I. B. Tauris, 1998, p. 68-111; Verheij, Jelle, « Die armenischen Massaker von 1894-1896: Anatomie und Hintergründe einer Krise», in: H.-L. Kieser (ed.), Die armenische Frage und die Schweiz 1896-1923, Zürich: Chronos, 1999, p. 69129. 2 «The villages near Arabkir: were plundered 6 times, - once by Dersim Koords who seldom kill and do not molest women. The slaughter was by the Turks and Kurds of the vicinity, who are cruel in the extreme.» Report from Harput, November 1895, written probably by Caleb F. Gates, ABC 16.9.9; H. H. Riggs, op. cit., p. 111.

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their distinctiveness. George E. White wrote shortly before the Young Turk revolution of July 1908: «Yet in the stronghold of Turkish power, the fair provinces of Asia Minor, about one-forth of the people are not Mohammedan at all but Eastern Christians, and of the Mohammedan population about onefourth - some suppose one-third - are not Sunnitic at all but are schismatic [Alevi] Shias. For the present this line of cleavage is kept very much out of sight, but circumstances might easily take such shape that this internal breach would come to the surface as a deadly wound.» 1 For historical reasons, the relationship between Alevis and native Christians was - at least in Eastern Anatolia - much more intimate than that between Alevis and Sunnis. A Protestant-influenced, educated and consolidated Alevi community would have stood side by side with the Armenians and would have ultimately promoted common political ideas such as social equality and regional autonomy. Abdulhamid was first to make serious inquiries about the Eastern Alevis. 2 Probably he already feared the possibility of an Alevi-Armenian alliance, something which was to become a nightmare for Young Turkish nationalists on the eve of World War I. In fact, such an alliance would have gravely challenged the demographic and political predominance of the established system in Central and Eastern Anatolia. Seen from this angle, the missionary work of the Protestants was subversive and seditious (fesad-peztr), as Yildiz Palace documents stated over and over again from the 1890s. The Catholic mission was not seen in this way at that time. It had got the reputation of being loyal to the government, and it profited from the diplomatic rapprochement between the Sultan and the Pope in the late 1880s. The Young Turk «revolution» of July 1908 abruptly ended the Hamidian regime, but did not revolutionize its structures and strategies. It brought to power an elite of young patriotic officials and officers of middle class origin. All members of the Committee of Union and Progress (also called Unionists) had been broadly influenced by the European ideologies of the time, notably positivism, social darwinism and racial nationalism. Their declared goal was the establishment of a liberal system to succeed the «The Shia Turks», in: Transactions of the Victoria Institute, vol. 40, p. 225-239, London, 1908, citation p. 225-226. - Abdulhamid saw a similar separatist danger in missionary attempts to reach Kurdish people. Printed gospels in Armeno-Kurdish (Kurmandj-Kurdish written with Armenian letters) and later in Arabo-Kurdish, modest Kurdish village schools and Christian instruction appeared as dangerous attacks on Islamic unity and as germs of ethnic selfconsciousness. Cf. letter of A. N. Andrus, Mardin, 8. 8. 1914, to James Barton, Boston, ABC 16.9.3. 2 Cf. the reports sent to him, notably by the Ankara Valisi, speaking of the «terrible» political dangers and the loyalty problems the Alevis' «wrong faith» represented. Its adherents were «completely outside of Islam [iimmet]» and Muslims «only by name». Oz, Baki, Alevilik ile ilgili Osmanh Belgeleri, Istanbul: Can, 1997, p. 143-149, citations p. 148.

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Hamidian autocracy. Yet their first aim was the gaining of unrestricted national unity and sovereignty. Nevertheless, a Utopian moment seemed near in 1908: the overcoming of religious and ethnic divisions and the common construction of a pluralistic Middle Eastern «Ottoman Nation» with a constitutional system. Perhaps nobody was more willing than the American missionaries to believe in such a future and to contribute to building it. In response to the new situation they firstly began thoroughly to question their antiislamic orientation and engage in a project for the whole society, including the Sunnis. At the same time they hoped that the Armenian question would find its solution within a free Turkey and that this would allow relations between the ABCFM and the state to be put on a more friendly basis. The pogroms of the 1890s had seriously damaged them. The Unionists' condemnation of the pogroms, their fraternization with the non-Muslims and their political cooperation with the Armenian Dashnak seemed to confirm hopes of improving relations. American missionaries suddenly gained prestige as «pioneers of progress» and were invited as speakers at the Young Turkish club meetings in provincial towns like Mezere-Harput.1 Despite the great shortage of research on the Ottoman Alevis it seems safe to say that few other ethnic groups were more interested in the promises of early Young Turk regime. The slogans «liberty», «equality», and «justice» sounded most attractive for a community that knew neither the privileges of the iimmet nor the garantees of a recognized millet. Marginalized among a Sunni majority in Central Anatolia, in constant low intensity rebellion in their heartland, the Dersim, against the state, the Alevis affirmed publicly in 1908, for the first time since the great Kizilbash revolts of the 16th century, their distinct identity and were engaged in opening their own village schools. The emissaries of Union and Progress successfully convinced the Dersimis of the benefits of the new era. Several Alevis joined the Unionist Party. According to the Harput missionary Henry Riggs, pillaging and uprisings ceased in the Dersim.2 The honeymoon between the Alevis and the state removed all previous obstacles and gave the missionaries the chance to resume and strengthen their relations with the Alevis. Materially, the missionaries did not do much for them, but morally they clearly supported their aims and brought them before an international public. «Hitherto they have had small part in office or public influence. For the general welfare of the Ottoman Empire, it is much to be ^Missionary Herald, 1909, p. 211-212. Cf. James Barton's optimism in Missionary Herald, 1908, ¡5. 467-469. Cf. Riggs, Henry H., Days of Tragedy in Armenia. Personal Experiences in Harpoot, 19151917, Michigan, 1997, p. 110; White, George E., «The Alevi Turks of Asia Minor», in: Contemporary Review, vol. 104, p. 690-698, London, 1913, here p. 698.

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desired that this section of the community should obtain its full quota of strength in the commonwealth», George E. White, the president of the Anatolia College in Merzifon wrote in the Contemporary Review} But Alevis as much as Kurds and other natives tended to overestimate the real political weight of the missionaries' verbal support. It probably influenced them more than was good for them politically; the Protestant mission in Anatolia was a private enterprise and had less diplomatic backing than they thought.

The Eastern Alevis' re-alienation from the state With the diplomatic re-emergence of the unsettled Armenian question and the establishment of a dictatorial Unionist government during the Balkan war in 1913, government suspicion against the Alevis, especially the eastern, Zaza, Kurmandj and Turkish speaking Alevis, increased rapidly. Indeed, for a single-party regime, ready to establish national unity at all costs, the scenario appeared catastrophic. The Anatolian Kizilbash, in its own eyes a group of «genuine Turks, who have preserved in the purest manner the national tradition», 2 were far from adopting the identity that the Young Turkish ideologues and scholars had designed for them. Many of these «pure Turks» happened, in fact, to adopt political and social ideas similar to those of the Armenians. In order to avoid confusion, it is important to keep in mind that despite their religious kinship, Bektashism, which aroused so much the interest among Unionists, and Alevism, are two very distinct phenomena. The first was a religious order largely present in the Balkans, and urban, the second, an ethno-religious community scattered in many Anatolian villages, and rural by nature. From 1913 the hardliners, who set from then on the tone in the Committee Union and Progress, saw the Armenians more and more as alien elements and adversaries in an imminent social-darwinist fight. Indeed secular social-darwinist apocalyptic fantasies circulated widely in the pre-war circles of the European intelligentsia influencing the Young Turks and other Near Eastern elites. Unionists interpreted the close relations between Armenians, Alevis and missionaries as the result of unscrupulous propaganda on the part

'white, George

2

E., «The Alevi Turks of Asia Minor», art. cit., p. 698.

Köprülii, Fuad, «Bemerkungen zur Religionsgeschichte Kleinasiens», in: Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte, vol. 1, p. 203-222, Wien, 1922, citation p. 215. - The Turkish and Kurdish speaking Alevis used actually in their djem liturgical texts an old Turkish that was free from the many Arabic and Persan imports characteristic of the Ottoman language.

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of the Protestants and Armenians.1 The rulers in the eastern Provinces did not doubt that the Alevis in this region supported the hated international reform plan for the Six Eastern Provinces, the «Armenian Reforms», signed by the Ottoman government under diplomatic pressure, on February 8, 1914. They feared the Eastern Alevis would vote side by side with the Armenians in the elections scheduled by this plan. And indeed, logically, the Alevis would be involved in, and could benefit from, what this plan intended for the Armenians. The reforms of February 1914 were intended as a compromise that left no-one as a loser, as Roderic Davison has suggested. 2 There was, indeed, hardly any other way forward if it was really to create pacified and functioning multi-ethnic eastern provinces. After the government's failures since the Congress of Berlin and such bloody events as the pogroms of the 1890s, the establishment of a balanced system under effective international control seemed unavoidable, but this proved to be going too far for the Turkish regime. Its choice to enter the First World War on the side of Germany was co-determined by its intention to abort the Armenian Reforms, seen as a first step to regional autonomy and Russian hegemony. 3 The destruction of the Anatolian Armenians in 1915-1916 signifies the brutal end of the 1908 vision of social Utopia. The catastrophe was fatal for a whole people, for their neighbours and for the missionaries. The latter lost not only their principal clients, but also most of their confidence and their understanding of what missionaries could do in Turkey. From the 1920s on, they were left quite alone with a traumatic memory as eyewitnesses of a genocide, the breakdown of the missionary work of four generations and the large-scale failure of their social and political plans for their beloved Turkey. Silence was the price which had to be paid to enable them to work in the future under the nationalist victors of the Anatolian wars (1919-1922).4 In the first half of 1914, the missionaries, too, had pinned their hopes on the international reform plan, the first efficient reform proposal since the Tankut, Hasan Regit, «Zazalar hakkinda sosyolojik tetkikler», in: M. Bayrak, A?ik-Gizli/ Resmi-Gayriresmi Kiirdoloji Belgeleri, p. 409-490, Ankara: Özge, 1994 (1935), here p. 472; Nur, Riza, Hay at ve Hatiratim. Riza Nur-Atatürk Kaveasi, Istanbul: Isaret, 1992 (1967-68) vol' 3, p. 112. 2 Davison, Roderic H., Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923. The Impact of the West, Austin, 1990, p. 196. 3 Cemal and Talat Pasha filled dozens of pages in their memoirs to justify this viewpoint: Djemal, Ahmed (Pascha), Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes, München, 1922, p. 337-354, especially 353-354; Talät (Paga), (A. Kabacah, ed.), Talat Pasa'nin Hätiralari, Istanbul, 1994 (1946), p. 58-71. 4 Mustafa Kemal's civil and military cadre was Unionist and almost identical with the preceding one of Talat, Enver and Cemal. Cf. Zürcher, Erik Jan, The Unionist Factor. The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905-1926, Leiden, 1984.

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vague promises of article 61 of the Berlin Treaty (1878). In the 1870s the ABCFM had substantially contributed to the internationalisation of the Armenian Question. Its political commitment was then focussed on the rights of the native Christians', and, perhaps only half consciously, on the religious liberty of the Alevis and other nominal Muslims or heterodox people. The Sunni Kurds, the dominant group in the eastern provinces, were in those days outside the missionaries' interest. The ABCFM's view of society became broader only after 1900. An important reason for this change of perspective was the haunting question of why the large-scale pogroms of 1895 had happened and how they could be prevented in the future. The Ottoman government categorically put the blame on «Armenian provocations» and accused the American missionaries after the Berlin Congress of being the spiritual fathers of social unrest. US diplomats, normally supportive and proud of their famous missionaries, felt, for the first time, really uneasy about their position.1 Relations with the Hamidian regime remained volatile. Only the détente in 1908 gave the American missionaries the opportunity to cooperate with the new rulers on the joint building of a liberal Ottomanist society. But when the friendship between the Young Turks and the ABCFM broke down in World War I, the missionaries' sense of the objectives they were pursuing had to be revised. For the missionaries the reconstruction of post-war Turkey was inconceivable without truth and justice. Therefore an energetic political adjustment was necessary. For experienced missionaries from Eastern Turkey like Clarence Ussher, who participated in the peace deliberations in Paris, justice meant three things: first, the return of hundreds of thousands of Armenian and Kurdish refugees to Eastern and Central Anatolia; secondly the reconstruction of this most ravaged area with the participation of all native groups, including the establishment of a secure home under international protection for the Armenians as the most victimized and endangered group; thirdly the prosecution of war criminals, with the logical appointment of new cadres in the Ottoman state, or an amnesty under the condition of collaboration for the above-mentioned new order. Missionaries - the first strangers to return to the provinces - appealed to the Allies for assistance with great pathos, reporting that immediate action in the interior was required to give the new order a chance.2

In 1904 they submitted a questionnaire to the Eastern Turkey missionaries with suggestive queries like: «How far have results of training in American schools and contact with American ideas unfitted Armenians here to live quietly under existing conditions?» Personal Papers J. Barton 11:2, ABC. 2 Personal Papers C. D. Ussher, ABC. - For missionaries on the ground, the Greek occupation of Izmir (15. 5. 1919), permitted by the Allies, was a fatal error, the mandate refusal by the USSenate a deep deception (1. 6. 1919). Cf. Grabill, Joseph L., «Missionary Influence on American Relation with the Near East: 1914-1923», in: The Muslim World, 32, p. 43-56 and 141-154, Boston, 1968, here p. 148.

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We have touched on the renewed sympathy in relations between Alevis, Armenians, missions and the early Young Turkish state. We have seen that, for several reasons, the Unionists of the dictatorial regime after 1913 no longer believed in a common pluralistic future. In their eyes, native Christians could definitely not be assimilated into a unitarian body, but at the same time their determination to incorporate the Alevis increased. In 1914-1915, the Unionist party earmarked some of its members to investigate and make propaganda among the Alevis. A concrete reason for this step were disturbing papers on the Alevis confiscated in the ABCFM's Anatolia College in Merzifon. In Unionist eyes these papers, probably written by George E. White, were «separatist», as they highlighted Christian affinities to the Alevis. 1 In spite of these and other efforts, the war regime did not succeed in winning over the Alevis. It is true that it succeeded in bringing on to its side Celebi Ahmed Cemaleddin Efendi, the head of the Bektashi order. But he had no great influence over the rural Alevis. When he was sent to these Alevis in the Sivas, Marash and Dersim regions, he failed completely and could not convince them actively to cooperate with tribal militias against Russia.2 The War deeply alienated the Eastern Alevis from the state. The gravest reason for this development was the extermination of the Armenians, which the Alevis witnessed. They identified themselves with their neighbours and feared they might suffer the same fate. 3 Thus the Dersim became the sole collective place of asylum for thousands of victims of the genocide. Dersimis and Harput missionaries worked hand in hand to establish an «underground railway for which our hospital back porch was a station sending people to Dersim». So they got round the orders of the hated Vali Sabit Bey, himself a Dersimi who had made his career under the new regime. 4 A Kizilbash tribal chief and friend of the German missionary Ernst Christoffel in Malatya attacked a deportation caravan, in order to liberate Armenian friends; from

Birdogan, Nejat, ittihat-Terakki'nin Alevilik Bektasilik Arastirmasi (Baha Sait Bey), Istanbul: Berfin, 1994, p. 11. 2 Ba§bakanlik Osmanli ar§ivi, DH.§FR 54-A/354; Dersimi, Mehmet Nuri, Kurdistan Tarihinde Dersim, Aleppo, 1952, p. 94-98, 115, 118, 280 and 291; Riggs, Henry H., Days of Tragedy in Armenia. Personal Experiences in Harpoot, 1915-1917, Michigan, 1997, p. 116-117 and 195. 3 Cf. Bagbakanhk Osmanli argivi, DH.§FR 54-A/128,25. 7. 1915. Atkinson, Tacy W., Account of the events in Turkey during the past three years as I have seen them and as they have had an effect upon our work in the Annie Tracy Hospital, 1917, ABC 16.9.7. - Such illegal smuggling set missionaries at risk, but it did not place them in a'moral dilemma. At their conference in Edinburg (1910) they had stated that «where Government itself becomes an instrument of violence and massacre, the ordinary principles governing the relations between Missions and Governments cannot be applied, because one of the related terms has ceased to carry its true meaning.» World Missionary Conference. Reports of Commissions, Edinburgh, 1910, vol. 8, p. 49.

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1915 to 1918 he sheltered all Christians in his territory. In March 1916 some tribes of the Dersim assaulted and destroyed the government buildings of the towns in their neighbourhood and marched toward Mamiiretulaziz, the residence of the province governor (vali). Finally a substantial military force with heavy involvement of the local Zaza Sunni Kurds repulsed them. Unionists took revenge, deporting the whole population of the tribes concerned. 1 Tacy Atkinson, a woman missionary living in Harput from 1901 to 1917, was a main responsible for the functioning of the aforementioned «underground railway». She had to leave Turkey in 1917. In a letter, written in her forced exile in the USA, she expressed both her spiritual and political hopes for the Dersim Alevis: «How I envy the man or woman who goes, filled with the love of God, to those Dersim Kurds. How I have loved and admired them and how I have prayed that God would give them a chance.»2 It is logical, therefore, that in the summer of 1919 Kurdish Alevi tribes were the first «interior enemies» to oppose Mustafa Kemal Pasha's reorganisation of the Unionist power structures (congresses of Erzurum and Sivas), and to prepare the first Kurdish uprising against the Ankara government - the revolt of Koggiri-Dersim 1920-1921. But it was Kurdist only in its declared ideology, in its organizational structures it was clearly Alevi, with the participation of several Turkish Alevi villages. 3 It follows from the same logic that the National Assembly of the Ankara Government, inaugurated in April 1920, did not even count a dozen Alevis among its 400 deputies. In vain did the Kurdist Alevis try to get political support through the missionaries. Both sides, Alevi Kurds and Unionist-Kemalist officials, overestimated the political influence missionaries were then able to exert. ABCFM contacts with Kurds aroused so much suspicion among officials that such intercourse became practically impossible, as Henry Riggs wrote sadly to James Barton in December 1919.4 A year later the missionaries of the eastern provinces, from which the nationalist War of Independence was organized, began to be expelled. They were seen as inconvenient observers and «foreign agents», carrying on a policy of reconstruction opposed to the nationalist one. 5

' Riggs, op. cit., p. 177-184; Christoffel, Ernst, Aus dunklen Tiefen, Berlin, 1921, p. 68. 2

3

Letter to James Barton, 28. 1. 1918, ABC 16.9.7.

Cf. the author's «Le soulèvement du Koçkiri-Dersim et la question identitaire (1919-1921)», in: Us Annales de l'autre Islam, no. 5, p. 279-316, Paris: INALCO-ERISM, 1998. ^Letter of 7. 12. 1919, ABC 16.9.9. 5 Riggs, Henry H., A. B. C. F. M. History 1910-1942. ABC Ms. Hist. 31, p. 39.

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The unrestricted continuity, even reimplementation of Unionist structures, cadres and ethnic policies in 1919 was nowhere more manifest than in the eastern provinces. George White was fairly cautious when writing during the War that «the purpose of the ,Party of Union and Progress' is alleged to be to create a uniform state, one in Turkish nationality, and one in Moslem Orthodoxy.» 1 In 1925, two years after the proclamation of the Republic, the basis of the new state was Turko-Sunni to an extent nobody could have foreseen. In 1924 the Sunni Kurds finally realized that the Kemalists were not keeping the promises of autonomy which they had given when they needed Kurdish military support. The «honourable fight for the Califate» against «imperialist unbelievers» had been a mere trick, seeing that the Ankara government abolished the Califate on 3 March 1924. The Sunni Zaza Kurds around Sheikh Said stood completely alone in their opposition to the newly established state, and enjoyed neither support from the Kurdish Alevis, who disdained them for their cooperation with the Unionists during the wars, nor from resident international agents, a role which the missionaries in Eastern Turkey had played in late Ottoman times. In the following 13 years the Republic of Turkey established its military and administrative control. Its gravest measure was the destruction, «ethnocide» (Martin van Bruinessen), of traditional Dersim society in 1936-1938. In vain did the Dersim leaders carry an appeal to the League of Nations in Geneva in July and November 1937.2 The only missionaries remaining in contact with Eastern Alevis were some sisters of the German Hilfsbund in Marash. Since they continued successfully to build bridges between Protestants and Alevis - expressed in other terms: to voice effective separatist religious propaganda - , the government expelled them in 1933.3

Conclusion In the mid-19 th -century members of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) were the first outsiders to 'white, George E., «Some non-conforming Turks», in: Moslem World, p. 242-248, London und New York, 1918, citation p. 248. 2 Unanswered letters of 30. 7. and 20. 11. 1937, Archives of the League of Nations, Geneva, reprinted in H.-L. Kieser (ed.), Kurdistan und Europa. Einblicke in die kurdische Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts), Zürich: Chronos, 1997, p. 211-216; van Bruinessen, Martin, «Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the Chemical War against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)», in: Andreopoulos, George, Genocide Conceptual and Historical Dimension, p. 141-170, Philadelphia, 1994. Cf. Sonnenaufgang, Frankfurt, June-July 1931, p. 48; October 1933, p. 2-3.

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open a door into the world of the socially marginalized heterodox people in the Anatolian countryside. Protestantism came to appear to many of the latter to be the modern way out of discrimination and backwardness. After the state's strict prohibition of regular missionary activity among the Alevis in the 1860s, Protestantism continued to play an important catalytic role in the development of a «modern» and more (but not purely) secular identary reinvention pursued by a large number of Alevi circles. Such people began to believe in social and scientific progress, called superstitious practises into question and emancipated themselves from certain conservative dedes (hereditary priests). We can probably say that in the second half of the 19th century, the American missionaries, in synergy with the Armenians, were instrumental in inspiring the beginnings of the Alevi renaissance which became most visible after 1908. The missionaries' penetration of the Anatolian countryside, its villages and mountains, was very important. Even before the Russian «Narodniki»movement and many decades before the Turkish state provided civil services in the provinces, missionaries showed people in Central and Eastern Anatolian the possibilities of modern life. Exploring unknown geographical regions and ethnic or social particularities was the imperative condition for a successful approach towards «unreached peoples». The Turkish historian Uygur Kocabagoglu stated correctly that «when the Ottoman intellectuals in the first quarter of the 20 th century began to discover Anatolia and wonder about it, we can say that American missionaries already knew it well. And because they did so, they probably knew much better than the Ottoman rulers the values, patterns of behaviour, desires, prejudices and expectations of the different ethnic and social groups living there.» 1 The state finally learned from the missions, using this know-how for a political - centralist and nationalist purpose: go into the country, make contact with the people and win them over by bringing them schools and medical care in order to gain a foothold, develop and control inter-regional «national» society. Yet even before Abdulhamid II and the rise of the Armenian question, the Protestant-Alevi connection alarmed the state, which feared for its Muslim unity. In central Anatolia and in the Kurdo-Armenian highlands, the representatives of the government began to side more than ever with the Sunni population. The Ottoman state was not able to play an integrative role in relation to the different religious identities in the region. After a seemingly promising intermezzo, the First World War deeply alienated the Alevis from the regime. Notably those of the Dersim region, the Alevis' heartland between Kocabafoglu, Uygur, Anadolu'da Amerika. 19. Yüzyilda Amerikan Misyoner Okullan, Istanbul: Arba, 1989, p. 220.

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Sivas and Elazig, identified with their Armenian neighbours on their road to extermination. During the War of Independence, an important part of the West Anatolian Alevis, more directly affiliated with the Bektashi order, probably set their hopes on Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who, like the Unionist war triumvirate, cooperated with £elebi Ahmed Cemaleddin Efendi. But the majority of the Eastern Alevis distrusted his Unionist reorganization, initiated as it was in their provinces. Many expected the establishment of an internationally sponsored new order, overestimating the power of the missionaries to act as its founding agents. Several Kurdish Alevis became early nationalists, believing that a Kurdish autonomy corresponded to President Wilsons Fourteen Points and the agreements of the Paris Peace Conferences. They were deceived. Thus the thesis of a categorical loyalty of the Alevis to Mustafa Kemal Pasha is an invention of the Neokemalism that grew up in some circles in the 1960s as a reaction against the Sunni-Muslim revival in the 1950s, and at a time when a majority of the Alevi youth adopted oppositional socialism and secularism. Neokemalist Alevis paid tribute in their discourse to the fact that collective social prestige in the Turkish Republic largely depended - and still depends - on the historical partisanship for the «good» side during the War of Independence.1 After the politico-religious Kizilbash insurrections in the 15th and 16th centuries, Protestantism in the second half of the 19th century encouraged the Eastern Alevis to a peaceful, but potentially very conflict-laden new comingout as a self-confident community with a claim on equal rights. Actual «conversions» were politically impossible and theologically not even necessary: Like the «flaccid» Oriental Christians, from the missionaries' point of view the Alevis basically knew the truth of Jesus; only they called him Ali and practicised a certain amount of superstition. 2 Thus contributing to a revival of more authentic Alevism could be seen as a success of the missionary «leavening process». Puritan Protestantism has introduced some rational secularization in provincial Anatolia, without cutting off traditional roots or breaking up the endogamous isolation. The Alevi Kurdist movement, even after World War I, * Most of the contemporary Occidental writers on Alevism uncritically adopt in their historical chapters this invented Neokemalist tradition. For a perspicacious historical analysis see Bozarslan, Hamit, «L'Etat, le nationalisme et la question alevie en Turquie», in: R. Kastoryano et A. Dieckhof, Les nouveaux nationalismes, forthcoming. Cf. also Dressler, Markus, Die civil religion der Türkei. Kemalistische und alevitische Atatürk-Rezeption im Vergleich, Wiirzburg: Ergon Verlag, 1999, p. 84-112. 2 The article of the ABCFM missionary Trowbridge offers a more theological view on Alevism, see Trowbridge, Stephen van Rensselaer, «The Alevis, or deifiers of Ali», in: Harvard Theological Review, 2, New York, 1909, p. 340-53, and his similary article «The 'Alevis», in: The Moslem World, 1921, p. 253-266.

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still closely cooperated with the dedes and seyyids and used Alevi symbols. Only the oppositional materialist socialism of the 1960s and 1970s almost completely cut the young Alevis from their traditional roots, but not their mental ones. In contrast, the Alevi revival of the 1990s strongly revalorizes spiritual sources. 1 At the same time it is founding new organizational structures (associations) in order to create an accepted place for Alevi identity within a «civil society», be it in the European diaspora or in Turkey. These new Alevi movements do not show a uniform ideological face nor a common attitude toward the Turkish state. The partial withdrawal from ideology, the self-confident affirmation of a distinctive identity, the spiritual revival and social reorganization in nontraditional terms remind us of elements in the early Alevi renaissance in late Ottoman times. But nowadays Alevis are active in the urban centres and have none of the Protestant stimulation of that time, and none of the illusory hopes to which it led. Some 150 years ago the Kizilbash, in their encounter with missionaries, laid great stress upon the common denominators they shared with Christians and their differences which separated them from the Sunni Muslims, and they did this not merely or primarily for opportunistic reasons. Today, by clearly maintaining their distinctiveness from Sunnism, Alevis scarcely call into question their Muslim identity, at least in their acquaintances with Europeans. They like to say that Alevism is the true Islam, freed from its function of legitimizing power. The attraction which this religious heritage exercises nowadays upon Western minds, notably in academic circles, proves that it continues to be an important spiritual bridge between Muslim and Christian culture, as it was in Ottoman Anatolia.

^ There is a good survey of the new Alevi movements in Vorhoff, Karin, Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identität in der Türkei der Gegenwart, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1995.

4. LE SOULÈVEMENT DU KOÇGIRI-DERSIM (1919-21) ET LA QUESTION IDENTITAIRE1

Au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, à l'heure des Quatorze Points du Président Wilson et des délibérations autour du traité de Sèvres, un discours "kurdiste" se greffe sur l'alévité ("kizilbaçlik") 2 qui est la structure profonde, religieuse et identitaire, de la communauté kurdophone (zaza et kurmandji) du Koçgiri-Dersim, et l'entraîne à se soulever au nom de l'autonomie kurde. Le "soulèvement du Koçgiri", comme les historiens turcophones l'appellent généralement, 3 est un événement qui concerne non seulement la région du Koçgiri, de la province de Sivas, mais aussi la partie occidentale du Dersim. Nous ferons le récit du soulèvement du Koçgiri-Dersim tout en nous interrogeant sur ses facteurs d'identité: l'alévité, les Arméniens, la "grande peur" et le discours sur le nouvel ordre qui ouvre la porte à l'idéologie "kurdiste". L'identité glisse du religieux vers l'ethnique: le kizilbaç devient Kurde alévi. Le marginalisé (mais en fin de compte toléré) sous le sultanatcalifat devient un être à qui le nouvel Etat à identité turque et sunnite niera bientôt l'existence. Le nouveau discours qui met en relief la composante identitaire kurde (et non pas zaza ou autre) n'est mobilisateur à ce moment-là que sur la base alévie. L'histoire forme et transforme l'identité et vice versa, le quotidien et ses structures (géographie, langue, religion, voisinages) autant que l'exceptionnel (catastrophes, guerres, génocide, exploits). Les moments d'anarchie, de passage d'un ordre à l'autre, aiguisent le travail de (re)construction des identités et peuvent rejeter en même temps les individus et les collectifs sur leurs liens les plus ancrés. Le lendemain de la Première 1 First published in: Les Annales de l'autre Islam, no. 5, 1998, p. 279-316. Cet article remanie un travail antérieur: Kieser 1993. Je remercie Martin van Bruinessen et Hamit Bozarslan de leurs suggestions. - Outre mon travail antérieur, on trouve, en langues occidentales, de brefs récit du soulèvement de Koçgiri dans Oison 1991, p. 26-41, et McDowall 1996, p. 184-187. 2 Désignation contemporaine pour "alévi" souvent encore "kizilba§". Les kizilbag, compromis dès la fin du XVe siècle par leur prise position aux côtés des Safavides contre les Ottomans, furent au long des siècles suivants considérés comme hérétiques. Pour plus d'information sur les kizilbag et l'alévisme kurde v. van Bruinessen 1997 ou Kieser 1994 et leurs bibliographies. 3 "Koçkiri Ayaklanmasi", ou: soulèvement de la tribu de Koçgiri, "Koçkiri A§iretitùn Ayaklanmasi". Cf. par ex. Apak 1964. Cet ancien militaire turc réserve une place importante au soulèvement de Koçgiri. Une source importante, également kémaliste, est le livre d'Ali Kemali, vali d'Erzincan autour de 1930 (Kemali 1992 [1932]). Il appelle le soulèvement simplement "Ümraniye olayi" (événement d'Ümraniye).

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Guerre mondiale, précédé par les décennies de crise du système ottoman, est un tel moment pour les habitants du Koçgiri-Dersim.

I. Koçgiri-Dersim: la rencontre des questions alévie, arménienne et kurde Le Koçgiri-Dersim est une région montagneuse plus vaste que l'ensemble de l'espace alpin suisse et se situe entre Si vas, Erzurum et Harput. Sa moitié occidentale, Koçgiri et le Dersim occidental - entre Zara, Sugehri, Erzincan, Hozat et Divrigi - est le théâtre du premier soulèvement kurde contre le nouveau régime d'Ankara sous Mustafa Kemal. Le Dersim est alors un sandjak du vilayet Mamuret-iil-Aziz, tandis que Zara et Divrigi sont des kazas (districts) dans l'est du vilayet de Sivas. L'Euphrate sépare ce dernier du Dersim. La rivière du Munzur à son tour divise le Dersim en une partie orientale et une partie occidentale. Koçgiri désigne plusieurs choses: le kaza de Zara (autre nom du kaza de Koçgiri), la grande tribu et, souvent plus vaguement, toute la région limitrophe du nord-est du Dersim, ayant une population de Koçgirilis. La grande tribu (açiret) de Koçgiri comptait environ cinquante mille membres et était composée de cinq sous-tribus (kabile): pour cette raison on parle de tribu(s) de Koçgiri au singulier et au pluriel. 1 A l'époque du soulèvement, les frères Ali§an et Haydar dirigeaient la sous-tribu d'"îbo" qui était la plus forte des cinq kabile. Les Koçgirilis parlaient kurde (kurmandji et, en moindre partie, zaza), mais savaient normalement aussi le turc. Ils étaient alévis, élevaient du bétail et habitaient dans et surtout autour des centres locaux de la partie orientale de la province de Sivas, limitrophe du nord-est du Dersim: notamment autour de Hafik, de Zara, d'Ûmraniye, de Su§ehri, de Refahiye, de Kemah, de Divrigi, de Kangal et de Kuruçay. Dans leur région on trouvait un certain nombre de villages turcs alévis. Jusqu'en 1915, la contrée eut une importante proportion d'Arméniens habitant dans les centres et dans les villages. Les voisins orientaux, les Dersimis, partagaient avec les Koçkirilis la confession alévie, mais parlaient en majorité zaza. Les Koçkirilis se disaient provenir du Dersim.2 Tout en composant une large majorité kurde alévie à la campagne, une partie considérable des villages du Koçgiri-Dersim étaient mixtes: chrétiens D'après Apak, ils comptaient à peu près 40'000 et couvraient une surface d'environ 2.000 kilomètres carrés (Apak 1964, p. 151-153). D'après l'officier anglais Sir Mark Sykes, ils étaient 10.000 familles (Sykes 1915, p. 584), d'après le militant kurde alévi Nuri Dersimi, 30.000 familles (Dersimi 1952, p. 62). 2 Sykes 1915, p. 584; Dersimi 1952, p. 61.

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(arménophones et kurdophones), alévis (kurdophones ou turcophones) et sunnites (kurdophones et turcophones, d'autres sunnites se trouvaient notamment dans les centres administratifs, comme Hozat). Les données démographiques concernant les lieux habités par les Arméniens en 1914 font état de nombreux villages au Dersim qui comptaient environ deux à trois cents habitants et possédaient une église et parfois une école arménienne. Arméniens et "kyzilbachs" y habitaient très souvent à part égale.1 Il faut également signaler la présence marquante de différentes stations de mission aux marges du Koçgiri-Dersim, notamment celles de Y American Board of Comissioners for Foreign Missions à Si vas, Harput et Erzurum, qui, outre leurs écoles et cliniques dans ces centres, avaient mis sur pied, à partir des années 1860, tout un réseau d'écoles de village, fréquentées par des Arméniens, mais parfois aussi par des Kurdes alévis. Parallèle à la poussée missionnaire et en interaction avec elle, la "renaissance arménienne" revalorisait l'identité de cette minorité en la dotant d'un sentiment national à caractère occidental. Ce courant passait avant tout dans le réseau scolaire "national" (du millet arménien) qui se développait dynamiquement au marges et à l'intérieur du Koçgiri-Dersim. A travers la "question arménienne", la diplomatie internationale interrogea dès le dernier quart du XIXe siècle la place de ce collectif dans le grand espace des provinces orientales, marquées par l'insécurité et la nécessité de réformes socio-politiques fondamentales. Vers la fin du XIXe siècle, le nombre des Arméniens semble avoir reculé pour différentes raisons dont l'une, outre la migration, est l'"alévitisation". Il paraît sûr qu'un grand nombre d'Arméniens, en situation de plus en plus précaire (dans le contexte de la question arménienne et des massacres de 1894-1896), avaient adopté l'alévisme et la langue kurde afin de s'intégrer complètement dans la société kurde-alévie.2 Cette diminution du nombre d'Arméniens dans le kaza de Koçgiri et dans les kazas voisins (pas au Dersim) ressort même d'une simple comparaison entre les chiffres que donne Vital Cuinet pour la veille des massacres de 1894-1896 à partir de sources ottomanes et la recension du patriarcat arménien à la veille de la Grande Guerre (pour le kaza de Koçgiri: 11.258 contre 7651). Alévis et chrétiens (Arméniens et Grecs) formaient même d'après les chiffres de

Kévorkian & Paboudjian 1992, p. 381-387. Ce même livre ne nous renseigne pas sur les kizilbaj au Koçgiri, il mentionne seulement quelques bourgs et villages où cohabitaient les Arméniens avec les "Turcs". Ni Sykes ni Cuinet ne donnent d'informations à l'échelle des villages. Molyneux-Seel qui avait visité le Dersim avant la Guerre, note que beaucoup de Kurdes alévis qu'il y avait rencontrés étaient d'origine arménienne. Molyneux-Seel 1914, p. 49-68. Cf. Riggs 1911, p. 742.

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de Cuinet une claire majorité de la population. 1 Autour de 1920, après la déportation et l'extermination de 1915, il n'y eut que de petits restes arméniens au Koçgiri. Les kizilbaç s'ouvraient à tout changement socio-politique susceptible d'améliorer leur situation. L'iimmet (la communauté musulmane) les appellait depuis les guerres turco-persanes du XVIe siècle avec dédain kizilba§, rebelles hétérodoxes, "sans livre" (kitabsiz). Depuis le milieu du XIXe siècle, ils étaient au courant de la constitution d'un millet protestant et des efforts civilisateurs (écoles, hôpitaux, manufactures) des missionnaires aux marges de leur habitat. Une rencontre avec la modernité, jugée prometteuse: plusieurs villages et tribus s'étaient identifiés au mouvement et déclarés protestants, dans l'espoir de jouir des mêmes prestations et surtout d'une protection efficace. Des espoirs vains: L'identification fut vue d'un très mauvais oeil par les voisins sunnites et par l'Etat, désireux d'affirmer sa présence administrative, militaire et éducative dans ces contrées-là - une rencontre avec la modernité jugée négative. 2 Les kizilbag restaient pratiquement exclus de la redistibution des biens par l'Etat, notamment aussi au moment où Abdulhamid revalorisa les Kurdes en établissant les régiments "Hamidiye". Ce n'est que vers la fin de l'Empire que quelques kizilba§ accédaient aux postes d'officier et d'administrateur subalternes, qu'un jeune comme Mehmet Nuri Dersimi allait faire ses études dans la capitale (et être nommé vétérinaire dans l'armée) et que le terme plus neutre d'alévi commençait très doucement à remplacer celui de kizilba§ que l'on n'entend plus que très rarement dans la Turquie actuelle. 3 Les tribus alévies aussi bien que les Arméniens saluèrent le rétablissement de la Constitution en 1908, alors que les Kurdes sunnites déclenchèrent des révoltes (voyant l'ummet dévalorisée par la Constitution égalitaire). Le fait d'ête kurde commença alors à gagner une nouvelle valeur politique. Un grand club kurde fut fondé à Elazig près de Harput, d'abord en parfait accord avec le nouveau pouvoir unioniste, puis de plus en plus en 1

Kévorkian & Paboudjian 1992, p. 247; Cuinet 1892, t. 4, p. 683. Cuinet donne le chiffre de 13.688 "musulmans chyites" (= alévis kurdes et turcs) dans le kaza de Koçgiri et de 27.378 "musulmans sunnites" (s'y ajoutent 5.629 "Grecs orthodoxes"). Cuinet donne également pour les kazas de Divrigi, de Hafik, de Giiriin, de Darende et de Su§ehri un tiers de "chyites" parmi les musulmans. Ce chiffre est certainement trop bas puisque l'enregistrement officiel des kizilbag ("chyites") - comme des autres minoritaires - était notoirement incomplet, surtout quand ils vivaient à la campagne. 2 Cf. Kieser 1997, p. 126-127 (avec plusieurs références); BOA HNA S-II 6139-16/ 325; National Archive Microfilm Publication: Department of State, 1906-1910, n° 10044/13 (repris dans Çay, Abdulhalûk M., Her Yôniiyle Kiirt Dosyasi, Ankara: Bogaziçi Yayinlari, 1993, p. 480485); Tankut 1994 (1961), p. 218-219; Tankut 1994 (1935), 470-473. 3

Haydar, maire de la commune d'Ùmraniye, Ali§an substitut du kaymakam de Refahiye, le colonel Hasan Hayri: voici quelques exemples contemporains de kizilbag accédés au service de l'Etat ottoman. - Pour une approche biographique de Mehmet Nuri Dersimi, intellectuel kurde alévi, mort en Syrie, cf. Kieser 1997, p. 187-216.

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disharmonie. Le ton se durcit entre les différents groupes politiques à caractère ethnico-religieux. Des affrontements eurent lieu entre étudiants turcs et kurdes à Elazig. Le pouvoir central misa de plus en plus sur l'islamisme et l'élément turc. Sous la pression russe et allemande il signa l'accord du 8 février 1914 au sujet des provinces orientaux, prévoyant entre autre le contrôle de l'administration par deux inspecteurs généraux européens et la valorisation des langues locales. Ces "réformes arméniennes", saluées par les Kurdes alévis, 1 mais dont les unionistes les plus influents voulaient se débarrasser à tout prix, étaient une des raisons pourquoi ces derniers décidèrent d'entrer dans la Grande Guerre qui leur permettrait de faire table rase de la question arménienne. Avec la Guerre proclamée sainte, l'ümmet fut revalorisée.2 Les Kurdes du Dersim n'avaient alors plus rien de commun avec les unionistes qu'ils refusèrent de suivre au front oriental et qu'ils virent organiser l'extermination des Arméniens. 3 Après la défaite, beaucoup de responsables unionistes locaux se retranchèrent dans le camp kémaliste. Pendant que Kemal Pacha mobilisait pour sa lutte de "libération nationale" à partir de l'été 1919 les sentiments antiarméniens, "antiimpérialistes" et musulmans (bien avant de prôner le nationalisme turc), la population du Koçgiri-Dersim était prise d'une grande inquiétude, les porteparoles croyaient qu'ils avaient le droit et le devoir d'agir pour la sauvegarde de leur patrimoine et de se débarrasser dans leurs territoires des fonctionnaires d'un pouvoir qui ne reconnaissait pas l'autonomie promise par le nouvel ordre international. La lutte fut mal organisée, quelques chefs de tribu et de bande agirent à leur propre compte, la cohérence manquait. La "révolte" fut brutalement réprimée par l'Armée Centrale (Merkez Ordusu) - l'une des principales forces de l'armée turque en recomposition - sous Nurettin Pacha. Elle préfigura les autres soulèvements kurdes et leur répression en Turquie kémaliste. Le commandant parlait de banditisme, de l'invention d'un problème kurde ("kürtlük meselesi")4, et fit déporter une partie des Koçgirilis. Sur la scène politique, c'était le passage de la question arménienne dans l'Empire ottoman à la question kurde en Turquie. Dans le Koçgiri-Dersim - le coeur de l'alévité -, elle se posait en même temps comme question alévie, à savoir comment sauvegarder une certaine autonomie identitaire alévie. Hasan Re§it Tankut, un des idéologues officiels du régime kémaliste, dit en 1961 à propos des provinces de l'Est durant les dernières années 1 2 3 4

Tankut 1994 (1961), p. 218-219; Tankut 1994 (1935), 472-473. Cf. Bozarslan 1992. Kieser 1997, 191-196. Tepeyran 1982, p. 70.

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ottomanes: "Les responsables de ce temps-là n'avaient aucunement étudié cette partie de la patrie. Il est probable que même aujourd'hui nous n'en ayons que des connaissances imparfaites. Le problème arménien d'hier revient en tant que problème kurde." 1 Vues à travers le soulèvement du Koçgiri-Dersim, les questions arménienne, alévie et kurde apparaissent étroitement liées. Toutes les trois peuvent se lire en tant que questions identitaires à caractère ethnoreligieux qui ont leur origine dans l'Est. Par toutes les trois, le pouvoir unitaire à dominance turco-sunnite s'est vu ou se voit menacer.

II. Le défi d'être Kurde à l'heure des Quatorze Points du Président Wilson A la Grande Guerre qui laisse l'Asie Mineure oriental dans le désarroi le plus complet, se substituent d'autres combats: les guerres gréco-turque, arméno-turque et franco-turque, l'affrontement entre les gouvernements d'Istanbul et d'Ankara, les insurrections à l'intérieur et les incursions de seigneurs locaux, et avant tout la lutte acharnée autour de la grande question du nouvel ordre à établir et des identités à construire et à convertir en valeur politique. Aux yeux des Koçgiri-Dersimis, l'identité qui, quoique loin derrière l'arménité, semble payer à l'heure des Quatorze Points du Président Wilson est la kurdicité (alors que soixante ans auparavant, face à la poussée protestante dans la région, le protestantisme semblait être à bon nombre de Kurdes kizilba§ l'identité prometteuse). Au lendemain de l'armistice de Mudros (octobre 1918) et à la veille du traité de Sèvres (août 1920) - prévoyant d'après l'arbitrage de Wilson du 23 novembre 1920 une Arménie contiguë au Dersim oriental - un climat politique très tendu règne dans les provinces de l'Est. Chaque geste est jugé en fonction des options politiques: "anglophile", "wilsonienne", "autonomiste", "proarménienne", "patriote", "musulmane"... Les missionnaires américains de Harput, qui fréquentent depuis des décennies les Dersimis, ne peuvent pratiquement plus le faire en 1919, tellement un simple contact suscite de faux espoirs de soutien politique de la part des Kurdes et de suspicion de la part des notables turcs de Harput. Fin 1920, Henry H. Riggs, une des figures proue de

1

Tankut 1961, p. 219.

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la station et traducteur des Evangiles en langue kurde, est contraint par les autorités à faire ses valises.1 "Les écoles américaines et allemandes à Elazig n'étaient rien d'autre que des transmetteurs d'espoirs propagandistes focalisés sur le Dersim", dira Tankut. 2 "Les provinces de l'Est sont la porte et la forteresse de notre patrie", écrira un autre kémaliste. 3 L'Armée de l'Est est alors la seule force militaire bien organisée du pouvoir. C'est dans la ville orientale Erzurum que Kemal l'inspecteur de l'armée envoyé par la Porte et doté des pouvoirs d'un gouverneur général des provinces de l'Est - devient le président du comité de l'Association pour la défense des droits des provinces de l'Est; c'est dans la même ville (juillet 1919) et à Sivas (septembre 1919) qu'il tient ses premiers congrès "nationaux". Des représentants occidentaux d'un esprit bien différent font dans les mêmes mois leur apparition dans cette région. C'est au printemps déjà qu'y arrive la commission de James Barton, ancien missionnaire de Harput et responsable de l'organisation qui deviendra le puissant Near East Relief (organisation humanitaire américaine en faveur des victimes de la Première Guerre mondiale au Proche-Orient). Hostile à tout nationalisme, cet internationaliste protestant prône l'idée des autonomies dans une fédération et un mandat américain pour y parvenir. En janvier 1919, il a assisté aux premières délibérations de la conférence de paix à Paris, en avril et en mai on le trouve à la tête de la première expédition d'investigation à travers l'Anatolie orientale qui n'a pour sa protection rien que le prestige de l'American Board au niveau local. Son collègue Ussher, ancien missionnaire de Van, a le plan ambitieux de rapatrier aux mois d'août et de septembre plus de 500'000 réfugiés kurdes et arméniens dans les provinces de l'Est; en juin 1919, il se met d'accord à ce sujet avec le ministre de l'intérieur, le grand vizir et le président de la Société pour le Relèvement du Kurdistan (KTC) à Istanbul, Seyit Abdulkadir. Barton prépare l'itinéraire de l'expédition du général Harbord, peu familier du terrain, chargé par le Président Wilson de faire des investigations sur les possibilités d'un mandat américain en Anatolie. Tandis H.H. Riggs de l'Euphrates College à Harput avait dû partir de cette ville en 1917 pour y revenir au printemps 1919. Il écrit dans une lettre du 7/12/1919 qu'il était impossible de fréquenter normalement les Kurdes du Dersim, "the political situation here has made it practically impossible to have much intercourse with them. What little I have had has been so misconstrued and has aroused so much of suspicion on the one side, and of false hopes and expectations on the other, that I have avoided further advances until I could hope to have any other than a political significance attached to my movements. Popular imaginations greatly exaggerates the possibilities of my influence with the Kurds, and its possible result on the political situation of the Turks in this region." ABCFM 16.9.9. * Tankut 1994 (1935), p. 472. •2 Le président d'Etat Cemal Giirsel dans sa dédicace de 1961 à Firat 1983 [1945].

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que l'expédition d'investigation du capitaine Niles et de Sutherland de l'été 1919, venant d'Erzerum, retourne avant d'arriver à Erzincan pour des problèmes de route et que l'agent britannique prokurde Noël - qui, début septembre, a rendu visite aux tribus kurdes, en grande partie alévies, de Malatya, au sud du Koçgiri-Dersim - doit rebrousser chemin, les expéditions de Barton et de Harbord traversent la région en question, faisant route de Harput vers Si vas. Le soir du 20 septembre (ou 22 septembre comme écrit Kemal?), Harbord a rendez-vous avec Mustafa Kemal à Sivas. Vis-à-vis du général américain, Kemal met en avant l'intégralité de l'Empire, le califat et l'honneur patriotique. Cela n'empêche pas que Harbord qualifie le mouvement kémaliste de "turc nationaliste". Sauf quelques fonctionnaires du Koçgiri-Dersim et le mutasarrif kurde de Malatya Khalil Bedir Khan (exécuté une semaine après l'entretien susdit), les hiérarchies civile et militaire des provinces de l'Est sont alors quasi entièrement dévouées à Kemal et suivent ses ordres. Le général américain n'a pas l'air de pénétrer les pensées de son homologue turc qui prétend être favorable à l'idée d'un mandat et, dans un mémorandum remis à Harbord, fonder de grands espoirs "sur la Doctrine Wilsonienne, qui formule le principe nationaliste, et sur l'esprit de justice et humanitaire montré par la Nation Américaine".1 L'un et l'autre côté se réclament devant les étrangers des principes de Wilson. A Erzurum, l'expédition de Harbord lit en français sur une banderole tenue par des officiers: "Vive l'art. 12 des principes de Wilson!"2 Les principes de Wilson sont également l'un des thèmes majeurs du journal kurde Jîn paraissant de 1918-1919 à Istanbul et dont les numéros circulent au Koçgiri-Dersim. Le Président Wilson jouit d'un prestige extraordinaire dans ce journal. "Avec les Quatorze Points du Président Wilson, l'instauration du principe que chaque peuple se gouvernera soi-même est enfin globalement proclamée. On déclare qu'enfin les souhaits politiques des hommes ne seront plus le jouet des puissants. Voici une proposition digne de l'évangile de l'humanité et de la vertu!" s'exclame Kamuran Bedir Khan.3 1

V. l'annexe C du rapport de Harbord 1919, p. 885. Harbord écrit (Harbord 1919, p. 849-850): "... there has come wide-spread knowledge of the Fourteen Points submitted by The President, and 'self-determination' has been quoted to the Mission by wiid Arabs from Shamar and Basra, by every government in Transcaucasia; by the mountaineers of Daghestan, the dignified and able chiefs of the Turkish Nationalist movement at Sivas and Erzerum, and the nomad Kurds who ten minutes before had fired at our party thinking us to be Armenians." On note la connotation favorable des kémalistes! Cf. aussi Harbord 1920, p. 176-193, Grabill 1971, p. 164-233, Kieser 1997, p. 137-138, McDowall 1996, p. 128-129, Kemal 1989 (1929), p. 78,114. 3 "Wilson'in ondôrt §artmda, her milletin kendisi tarafmdan idare edilmesi esasimn artik diinyada kesb-i istikrar edilecegi ilân olunuyor. Beçeriyctin siyasî makasida artik baziçe olmayacagi beyan ediliyor. t§te insaniyet ve fazilet miibeggirligine yaki§an samimî teklif !..." Jîn, n° 3. 2

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Les Koçgiri-Dersimis ont de bonnes raisons à se méfier dès le début du mouvement de Kemal et à lui barrer le chemin! 1 Ils ne partagent ni les conceptions ni les principaux soucis des membres de l'organisation influente dont Kemal est devenu le président et qui est strictement réservé aux "compatriotes musulmans". 2 Ces derniers - des gros propiétaires, des marchands, des militaires, des fonctionnaires, des avocats et d'autres - sont sunnites, ont peur de l'Arménie que les Alliés veulent créer et réclament la légalisation des biens pris aux Arméniens. La guerre arméno-turque vient de ravager leur région. Les premiers, en revanche, sont des alévis qui, tout en s'opposant à une "Grande Arménie", se sentent proches de la minorité arménienne décimée en 1915 et craignent le pire pour eux-mêmes. Grâce à leur montagne-refuge, ils ont pu se tenir à l'écart de la guerre. Ils s'appellent et sont appelés "Kurdes" tout en se distinguant des autres Kurdes qu'ils nomment chafis.3 Pour eux, "turc" veut dire sunnite proche de l'Etat (le leveur d'impôt est "turc" par excellence!).4 Les Koçgiri-Dersimis saisissent le mot d'ordre de l'autodétermination, proclamée en 1918 par le Président Wilson (et que le traité de Sèvres prévoira aussi pour les Kurdes), espérant enfin consolider leur statut social que menace depuis longtemps aussi bien l'Etat centralisateur que la majorité des autres Kurdes, attachés au sunnisme. Tolérés depuis de siècles seulement à la marge de la société ottomane, n'étant ni iimmet (communauté musulmane) proprement dite ni millet (communauté non-musulmane, juive ou chrétienne, "protégée"), les KoçgiriDersimis - les esprits lucides parmi eux - se rendent compte du moment fondateur qu'est l'année 1919 et qui décidera de leur avenir. A l'heure des Quatorze Point du Président Wilson et des projets de Sèvres, le discours sur le nouvel ordre et l'expérience de la guerre mettent les Kurdes alévis au défi de s'affirmer en tant que tels: une entité ethnique distincte. L'enjeu est l'autonomie non seulement de facto mais aussi de iure, confirmée par le droit international. Ils ont compris que l'Etat du XXe siècle est à même d'éradiquer une communauté entière si elle ne se lui soumet pas ni sait défendre ses droits.

1 Aux sens figuré et concret (quand Kemal se rend d'Erzurum à Sivas)! Cf. Kemal 1929 (1929), p. 56-57. Cf. Dersimi 1952, p. 69. 2 Déclaration du congrès de Sivas, v. annexe E de Harbord 1919, p. 888. 3 Les autres Kurdes sont en grande majorité sunnites de rite chaféite. 4 Cf. Tankut 1994 (1935), p. 424-425,428.

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III. Le Dersim, les Arméniens, l'ummet et la guerre L'expérience de la Grande Guerre fut capitale. La majorité des Dersimis ne s'engagèrent ni dans la guerre turco-russe de 1914-1917 ni dans les combats turco-arméniens (1916-1918). Ils essayèrent de tirer profit de la défaite des Turcs, sans se mettre ouvertement du côté des Russes.1 Le Dersim regagna une quasi autonomie, menacée par le retrait des Russes en 1918. Le gouvernement jeune-turc tenta, par l'intermédiaire de Çelebi Cemalettin Efendi, le plus haut représentant de l'ordre des bektachis, de solliciter la participation des Dersimis à côté de l'armée turque. L'état-major en attendait un tournant décisif dans sa guerre contre les Russes et les Arméniens. Selon Nuri Dersimi, l'état-major et le Çelebi Efendi, ne cessaient d'esquisser l'image d'une guerre sainte (djihad) à laquelle il fallait se joindre à tout prix. Abdulbaki Gôlpinarli explique que cette armée alévie aurait dû être le pendant du mevlevi alayi? Mais les tribus du Dersim se contentèrent d'observer les mouvements des armées russe et turque. A part les quelques jeunes qu'ils forcèrent à devenir soldats, le régime jeune turc ne réussit pas, malgré maints essais, à convaincre les Dersimis de participer à ses côtés. Ce n'est que vers la fin de la guerre mondiale que ceux-ci s'y décidèrent. En 1917, il y eut des pourparlers entre les Dersimis, le commandant russe Lahof et le commandant arménien Murât Pacha. Ali§er, un des meneurs du Koçgiri-Dersim à cette époque clé, faillit trouver un accord au nom des tribus du Koçgiri-Dersim avec le commandant arménien Murât Pacha à Erzincan (janvier 1918).3 Nuri Dersimi, alors jeune vétérinaire de l'armée à Erzincan, raconte dans la rétrospective de son exile syrien que Seyit Riza, le puissant chef du Dersim central (région d'Ovacik et de Hozat), avait toujours jugé dangereuse une prise de position, mais qu'il se résolut finalement avec sa confédération de tribus dites de Cheik Hasanan, jointe à une partie des tribus d'Ovacik, à contribuer à chasser les forces arméniennes d'Erzincan et d'Erzurum. On note que Riza était "seyit", se réclamait donc - comme déjà son père Seyit Ibrahim de sa descendance du prophète et jouissait par conséquent non seulement du

* Ali§er, qui savait le russe, entretint des relations avec l'armée russe afin de promouvoir la cause kurde. Sevgen 1950, p. 377, Dersimi 1952, p. 280 2 "Sultan Mehmed Re§ad'in Mevlevi olmasi dolayisiyla, Almanya ile miittefik olarak girdikleri Dunya Savagi'na dinî bir veche verebilmek için, Çelebelik makaminin da tensibiyle bir Mevlevi Alayi tegkil edilmi§, Bekta§i Çelebisi Cemaleddin Çelebi de huktimetin te§vikiyle Aleviler'den bir gônûllu ordusu toplamaya kalkmig, fakat sonra bundan vazgeçilmi§ti" (100 Soruda Tasawuf, Istanbul: Gerçek Yay., 1985, p. 154; cité dans l'édition commentée du Hatiratim de Dersimi, Ankara 1992, établie par M. Bayrak, p. 234). 3

Dersimi 1952, p. 115.

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pouvoir temporel, mais aussi d'un grand prestige spirituel parmi les alévis. Il est frappant de voir à quel point Nuri Dersimi juge nécessaire de souligner que ce chef ne participa à la guerre arméno-turque qu'après de longues hésitations, pour empêcher les Arméniens, contraints de se retirer, de massacrer la population civile.1 Un grand nombre d'indications témoignent de liens particulièrement étroits entre les Koçgiri-Dersimis et les Arméniens, voire de formes et de pratiques communes de croyance. En 1913, un dede (prêtre alévi) du kaza de Hafik aux marges du Koçgiri nie carrément toute différence religieuse fondamentale avec les Arméniens: "A la pelure d'oignon près, il n'y a pas de différence entre les Arméniens et les Alévis; ceux-là croient en Dieu en tant que père, fils et esprit, nous appelons cette triade Allah, Muhammed et Ali. Eux ont 12 apôtres. Nous avons 12 imams. Les heures de prière et de jeûne sont à peu près les mêmes chez les deux peuples. Ils n'épousent qu'une seule femme, nous aussi. Ils ne coupent ni la barbe, ni les moustaches, ni les autres poils, comme nous. Ils ne font pas les ablutions rituelles [après l'acte de coït], comme nous. Ils témoignent en faisant le signe de croix sur la poitrine, nous témoignons en appuyant la paume contre le sein. Nous avons ultérieurement suivi notre Seigneur Hazret Ali, voilà pourquoi nous nous appelons alevî. Sinon il n'y a aucune différence entre nous." Quelle distance de toute orthodoxie sunnite (aussi bien que chiite)! Régit Tankut, qui rapporte ces paroles, en rend responsable l'influence étrangère et en conclut qu'une partie importante des alévis des provinces de l'Est auraient voté pour l'autonomie partielle que les Puissances et la Porte discutaient au sujet des réformes arméniennes avant la Grande Guerre.2 Un proche de Seyit Riza dit que l'église de Vank était intensivement fréquentée par les Arméniens chrétiens aussi bien que par les Kurdes alévis.3 "... notre Saint-Karapet était un de leurs saints", écrit Rouben, un fedai arménien actif à partir de 1906 dans la région entre le lac de Van et le Dersim. 4 D'après l'auteur arménien Garo Sasuni, les fedais arméniens qui militaient au 1 Dersimi 1952, p. 46, 118 et 291; Dersimi 1986, p. 130-134. "Une fois que les Russes se furent retirés et que les forces arméniennes furent seules, une partie des Dersimis, pensant qu'il fallait flatter le gouvernement turc et lui faire oublier les soulèvements, et tentés aussi par des salaires considérables, se firent milices" (Dersimi 1952, p. 118). - D'un ton accusateur très prononcé contre les Arméniens, par contre: Dersimi 1986, p. 47. Bozarslan 1997, p. 154, interroge la différence de ton frappante entre Dersimi 1952 et 1986. Pour certains, le ton antiturc et souvent proarménien de l'oeuvre de Dersimi de 1952 y laisse entrevoir une main rédactrice arménienne. 2

Tankut 1994 (1961), p. 218-219; Tankut 1994 (1935), 470-473. Au sujet de relations interreligieuses cf. aussi Bulut 1991, p. 165-178, 193, et Molyneux-Seel 1914, p. 63-64. 4 Rouben 1990, p. 64. - Le même auteur mentionne sa condamnation en 1907, entre outre pour son "alliance avec les Kurdes de Varto et du Dersim" (p. 157). Ôzkôk note à plusieurs reprises des Arméniens qui jouaient un rôle au Dersim pendant les mouvements rebelles entre 1907 et 1916 (Ôzkôk 1937, p. 8, 35, 68). 3

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Dersim autour de 1900 entretenaient des relations amicales avec les Kurdes de cette région. 1 Pas toujours: en 1891, le chef de tribu Diyap Aga se fit rémunérer pour l'extradition de cinq militants.2 Hanté ces années-là par le spectre d'un soulèvement arménien, l'Etat ottoman tenta de gagner les responsables de la région avec de l'argent.3 Les Dersimis participèrent au pillage de certains villages arméniens lors des grands massacres en 1895, mais pas aux tueries, perpetrées généralement par les Turcs et les Kurdes sunnites qui s'en rapportaient aux ordres du Sultan. 4 En 1915, lors de l'extermination particulièrement efficace des déportés arméniens dans le vilayet de Mamuret-iil-Aziz, le Dersim fut la seule terre d'asile et surtout de passage vers la Russie. D'après Nuri Dersimi, 36000 Arméniens auraient ainsi été sauvés; ce qui aurait provoqué des critiques violentes de la part du gouvernement turc. Le chiffre est difficile à vérifier, mais semble réaliste, vu l'organisation systématique des fuites par des passeurs dersimis payés.5 Les responsables jeunes-turcs cherchèrent en effet déjà en juin 1915 à empêcher le rapprochement entre Dersimis et Arméniens.6

IV. La peur - facteur de distinction Au mois de ramadan de l'année de l'hégire 1333, le 25 juillet 1915, le ministère de l'intérieur se vit obligé d'ordonner aux valis des provinces Mamuretul-Aziz (Elazig), Erzurum, Diyarbekir et Bitlis de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour arrêter les rumeurs disant qu'à l'extermination (imha) des Arméniens suivrait celle des Kurdes. 7 Effrayés par le meurtre des Arméniens et afin que pareil crime ne fût pas commis contre elles, quelques tribus du Dersim se rendirent à Diizgiin Baba, un lieu de pèlerinage dans l'Est du Dersim, alors sous contrôle d'un seyit, et organisèrent une attaque

1

Sasuni 1986, p. 121 et 153. BOA Y.A.Hus. (Yildiz Sadâret Hususî Marûzât Evraki) 249/50 . 3 BOA MV. (Yildiz Mutenevvî Marûzât) 19/70 et Y.A.Res. (Yildiz Sadâret Resmî Marûzât Evraki) 51/25. 4 D'après les observations des missionnaires américains de Harput, novembre 1895, ABCFM 16.9.9, vol. 1. ^ Dersimi 1986, p. 42; sur le rôle important de Seyit Riza: Dersimi 1952, p. 292 (cf. aussi p. 4142). Cf. "Account of the events in Turkey during the past three years as I have seen them and as they have had an effect upon our work in the Annie Tracy Hospital" écrit par Tacy W. Atkinson, missionnaire de Harput, en 1917 (ABCFM 16.9.7.). Davis 1989, p. 98-99, 108, 111112, 170. Gazaros der Alexanian, un des réfugiés, écrit: "Il se trouvait de nombreux Arméniens réscapés dans tout le Dersim, ayant recommencé là une vie parmi les Kurdes..." Der Alexanian 1988, p. 132-144. 6 Cf. BOA DH.§FR (Dahiliye Nezâreti §ifre Kalemi) 53/222. 7 BOA DH.§FR 54-A/128. 2

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préventive contre les garnisons ottomanes des alentours. Quelques Arméniens participèrent à ce soulèvement. 1 Un grand nombre de Kurdes connurent dès 1916 également la déportation vers la mort. A en croire le directeur de l'hôpital missionnaire à Urfa, Jakob Kiinzler, qui en secourut une partie en 1916, la déportation concerna 300'000 Kurdes de Bitlis et d'Erzurum. 2 A la suite de l'attaque susdite contre le gouvernement ottoman à Nazimiye et à Mazkirt, elle toucha aussi l'Est du Dersim. A un jeune Arménien, déguisé en Mehmed, qui voyait les Kurdes alévis déportés crever d'épuisement au bord de l'Euphrate et qui plaignait le sort de ces gens, l'un des passants sur la route vers Elazig aurait dit: "Les Arméniens sont des infidèles, tout juste bons à nous servir; mais les Kurdes [alévis] ne méritent même pas de servir nos serviteurs, ce sont les infidèles de nos infidèles! Ce n'est pas de sitôt qu'ils seront jugés dignes d'être admis comme enfants de l'islam et comme citoyens à part entière." Voilà le regard sur le Kurde hétérodoxe poussé à l'extrême! 3 Après la guerre, c'est la grande pénurie. Dans une réunion que le général Harbord organise fin septembre 1919, lors de son expédition, à Erzincan, presque tout tourne autour du problème de la faim et l'on attend le miracle de la part de la petite délégation étrangère. Néanmoins, la peur est toujours là et elle est grande dans l'interrègne: une peur mêlée à la conscience des grandes injustices de la Guerre, à la misère à la campagne saignée, à la colère, à la révolte, à l'attente de changements urgents et imminents. (Par là, elle rappelle quelque peu la Grande Peur de l'été 1789 en France.) L'acuité de cette peur sépare les Kurdes alévis des Turcs et, à un degré inférieur, du reste des Kurdes. A travers elle, un lien de solidarité se noue entre les Koçgirilis et les Dersimis occidentaux dans leur mouvement insurrectionnel. Malgré l'expérience de 1916, le Dersim oriental n'y participe pas, probablement pour sa proximité avec - et la peur de - l'Arménie projetée par l'Occident. La rumeur que les Turcs extermineraient les Kurdes comme les Arméniens se répandit à nouveau partout dans la région, tout particulièrement au moment où un régiment des Kuvay-i Milliye ("forces nationales" de Kemal Pacha) apparut à Ûmraniye, la ville du canton (nahiye) du même nom à l'Est

1 La troupe ottomane qui mena la contre-attaque fut d'ailleurs largement recrutée parmi des Kurdes zazas chaféites (Bumke 1989, p. 514). - Sur ce soulèvement: Ôzkôk 1937, p. 35-69; Dersimi 1952, p. 103-109; Kemali 1992 (1932), p. 120-121; Davis 1989, p. 108. 2 Kieser 1997, p. 135-137. 3 Der Alexanian 1988, p. 145. Le témoin continua: "Durant une quinzaine de jours, de nombreux déportés kurdes furent ainsi vus, se traînant dans un état pitoyable et désespéré. Beaucoup moururent, n'importe où, comme des bêtes. La population turque, voulant sans doute donner une leçon durable et aller jusqu'au bout de sa vengeance, ne leur accorda pas le secours qu'elle avait, en définitive, bien souvent octroyé aux femmes et aux enfants arméniens."

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de Zara, en février 1921.1 Nurettin Pacha, le commandant de l'Armée centrale mobilisée peu après contre le Koçgiri-Dersim, se serait exprimé à plusieurs reprises: "Nous avons annihilé en Turquie ceux qui disent "zo" [les Arméniens], de même j'éradiquerai ceux qui disent "lo" [les Dersimis, parlant en majorité zaza]".2 Tepeyran, vali de Si vas en 1921, voit la cause essentielle du soulèvement dans la peur de la déportation/ extermination, une peur que Nurettin Pacha, qui se refusait à y percevoir un problème de fond, ne prenait à tort que pour un prétexte à la désobéissance.3 Ce sujet provoque d'ailleurs de nombreux échos dans les discussions de la Grande Assemblée Nationale à Ankara du 3 au 5 octobre 1921. "Les insurgés avaient répandu l'opinion que les Kurdes alévis seraient déportés comme les Arméniens, cela a contribué à l'essor de l'insurrection" 4 . "Je vous exterminerai complètement comme les Arméniens", aurait dit un lieutenant-colonel de passage à Ùmraniye en semant la panique.5 La peur survit à l'échec du soulèvement. Dans une réunion dans le village de Lerenk (Ovacik) le 5 octobre 1921, Ali§er dit aux tribus convoquées en présence de Seyit Riza: "Le gouvernement d'Ankara ne reconnaît pas le Kurdistan composé de quatre vilayets que les Etats d'Europe ont approuvé. En particulier, les officiers turcs portent des instructions dans leurs poches qui visent l'extermination des alévis." 6 A la rigueur, la peur paraît être instrumentalisée par le discours mobilisateur.

1

Apak 1964, p. 154. Dersimi 1952, p. 158 3 Tepeyran 1982, p. 70. 4 Le député Fevzi Efendi d'Erzincan. TBMM Gizli Celse Zabitlan, p. 252. 5 Le député Emin Bey d'Erzincan. TBMM G. C. Z., p. 269. - Concernant la répression du soulèvement: "Ce qui s'est passé à Ùmraniye, sous le prétexte de punition, est d'une telle demésure que même les barbares africains ne l'accepteraient pas et que cela remplissait les Dersimis de crainte. Une telle horreur n'avait même pas été commise contre les Arméniens". "C'est vrai, une telle horreur n'a pas été commise contre les Arméniens qui tout de même avaient attaqué Erzincan...". Les députés Hayri Bey de Dersim et Emin Bey d'Erzincan. TBMM G. C. Z., p. 270. - La comparaison aux Arméniens sera faite encore une fois une quinzaine d'années plus tard, pendant le soulèvement du Dersim en 1936-1938. "Les tribus nous ont trahis. Personne ne nous aide. Mais n'oubliez pas: s'ils [les militaires] nous suppriment, ils vous couperont la gorge comme aux Arméniens... Abandonnez cette trahison..." Bulut 1991, p. 189 (le rapport de Halis Pacha, p.143, confirme cette peur). Elle apparaîtra aussi dans le discours du Cheikh Sai'd et de Nuri Pacha (pour plus de détails: Kieser 1993, p. 24). 2

6

ATASE, KL. 732 D. 27 F. 5. Cité d'après Akgûl 1992, p. 42.

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V. Le discours sur le nouvel ordre, le courant autonomiste et la structure alévie L'aspiration des insurgés du Koçkiri-Dersim à un "Kurdistan indépendant comprenant les régions de Diyarbékir, Van, Bitlis, Elazig et du Dersim-Koçgiri" 1 est une revendication idéologique importante du jeune nationalisme kurde, formulée dans un télégramme par quelques porte-parole issus du milieu traditionellement hétérodoxe et contestataire du Dersim, en contact avec la Ligue des Kurdes de Kurdistan (tel le nom français contemporain pour Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti = KTC) 2 à Istanbul. Quoiqu'elle ne correspondît pas nécessairement aux motifs réels des tenants locaux du pouvoir qui s'étaient ralliés du côté des insurgés, ce milieu confessionnel fut alors le seul face à Mustafa Kemal à revendiquer sérieusement une indépendance kurde au sens moderne et wilsonien. Une telle indépendance kurde n'avait été ni le but d'un Bedir Khan Bey, puissant émir du Botan vers le milieu du XIXe siècle, ni des premiers clubs kurdes fondés à Istanbul après la révolution des Jeunes-Turcs (1908); la suprématie du Sultan-Calife ottoman n'était jusqu'alors jamais mise en question. La levée, à partir de 1891, de régiments de cavalerie de tribus kurdes sunnites, appelés "Hamidiye" d'après le nom du sultan Abdulhamid, pour faire face, entre autres, aux aspirations nationalistes arméniennes, exprime assez clairement le lien essentiel qui liait, jusqu'au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, la plupart des Kurdes à l'Etat turc-ottoman. Même le mouvement remarquable du cheikh nakchbendi Ubaydullah après la guerre russo-turque (1877-78) ne fait pas tout à fait exception (établissant sa nouvelle politique de révalorisation des Kurdes, le sultan Abdulhamid II a longtemps soutenu ce cheikh). Dans les dernières décennies de l'Empire, les habitants du KoçgiriDersim avaient trois canaux principaux qui les reliaient avec le "grand monde" et ses idées: les voisins arméniens qui, au contact de l'Europe, vivaient leur "renaissance" culturelle, éducative et idéologique; les missionnaires protestants et catholiques de différentes nationalités en station à Sivas, Erzurum et Harput, souvent de passage dans le Dersim; et Istanbul, le centre de la vie politique où vivait une colonie de Dersimis. De 1919 à 1922, Istanbul fut "la vraie capitale politique du Kurdistan" (H. Bozarslan). D'ici les leaders kurdes tâchaient de mobiliser une société kurde vivant à quelque mille kilomètres à l'est, marquée par le tribalisme et loin d'être homogène du point de vue social, linguistique et ethnique. La 1 2

Dersimi 1952, p. 126. Kemali 1992 (1932), p. 128. Traduction mot à mot: Association pour le Relèvement du Kurdistan.

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Ligue des Kurdes de Kurdistan fondée en 1918 à Istanbul, envoya des jeunes intellectuels dans les zones kurdes pour préparer un soulèvement général. Dans l'intention de travailler parmi les tribus de Sivas, Nuri Dersimi, nommé vétérinaire de Zara, de Divrigi et de Kangal, se rendit en juin 1919 au Dersim, accompagné par Haydar Bey, lui aussi membre du KTC. Ils emportèrent des livres et le journal kurde Jîn) En compagnie de l'agent britannique Noël, les frères Kamuran et Celadet Bedir Khan arrivèrent le 3 septembre chez leur oncle Kalil qui était mutasarrif de Malatya. Peu après déjà, on ne put pratiquement plus maintenir les relations avec la capitale et le KTC. Haydar, le successeur de Mustafa Pacha (père de Haydar) à la tête des tribus du Koçgiri, était alors administrateur (nahiye mtiduru) du canton d'Ùmraniye, l'imranli actuel. Il ouvrit une filiale du KTC à Ùmraniye, la présida et y inscrivit beaucoup de personnages influents du Koçgiri et du Dersim. Son frère Ali§an était substitut du kaymakam de Refahiye. Mustafa Kemal voulait gagner les chefs du Koçgiri à sa cause. Seul Ali§an suivit son invitation et se rendit en septembre 1919 à Sivas où il présenta à Kemal sa vision des choses: l'autonomie kurde dans une fédération ottomane avec à sa tête le sultan. Après des hésitations Ali§an refusa de se laisser porter candidat du vilayet de Sivas pour l'Assemblée Nationale que Kemal projetait. 2 Il reçut une médaille par le pouvoir ottoman en octobre 1919. 3 Ali§er, secrétaire de la famille de feu Mustafa Pacha et secrétaire du KTC à Ùmraniye, est probablement le personnage-clé de toute l'agitation kurde au Koçgiri-Dersim. D'après différents auteurs, il aurait reçu des instructions du Seyit Abdiilkadir, le chef du KTC, par l'intermédiaire de l'Arménien Migirdiç du village Armudan. 4 Bon joueur de saz (instrument à cordes), poète et agitateur intelligent, également membre du KTC, qui se ramifia grâce à lui dans le Koçkiri-Dersim, Aliger avait déjà milité pendant la guerre pour la cause autonomiste. Les officiers turcs Sevgen et Apak soulignent l'importance d'Aliger: "Il faut savoir que Haydar Bey n'était pas le type pour mener à bien ces affaires. Derrière le rideau, il y avait Ali§er qui en était le véritable agent et moteur." 5

* Ce journal comparait les Kurdes aux Arméniens, ce qui aurait contribué à la rumeur de l'extermination à l'instar de ce qui s'était produit avec les Arméniens (les députés Emin Bey d'Erzincan et Haci Ahmed Efendi de Ku§, TBMM G. C. Z., p. 270). 2 Dersimi 1952, p. 123-125. 3 BOA DH.KMS 55-3/15. 4 Kemali 1992 (1932), p. 126, Sevgen 1950, p. 378. Dersimi 1952, p. 121-22; Dersimi 1986, p. 100; Apak 1964, p. 152-53. 5 Sevgen 1950, p. 378. Et Apak 1964, p. 153: "Dès le début, le rôle du meneur Aliger qui incitait le peuple, était considérable. Pendant le soulèvement de Koçkiri, cet homme s'est lancé, en tant que promoteur et dirigeant, dans l'exécution d'un grand nombre de méfaits." - Aliger était accompagné de sa femme Zarife Hamm, son bras droit. "Se rendant chaque année à Dersim, elle y réglait, en tant que juge respecté, les divergences parmi les tribus." Nazmi Sevgen décrit Zarife semblablement et ne cache pas un certain respect pour Ali§er. Nuri Dersimi rend hommage à Ali§er et à Zarife dans: Dersimi 1952, p. 278-281.

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Début 1920, une importante réunion de préparation se tint au tekke1 de Hiiseyin Abdal à Yellice (kaz.a de Kangal). "Canbegan, Kurmegan et les autres tribus ainsi que tous les Kurdes de la région y participèrent. Ils décidèrent et jurèrent en parfaite unanimité de prendre les armes et de faire la guerre jusqu'au bout pour réaliser, selon le traité de Sèvres, la création d'un Kurdistan indépendant comprenant les régions de Diyarbékir, Van, Bitlis, Elazig et du Dersim-Koçgiri." 2 Probablement peu après cette réunion, Ali§er se rendit à Ovacik et à Hozat, se déclarant, d'après Ali Kemali, "inspecteur de l'armée du califat" (quelle prise de position contre Kemal Pacha, l'ancien inspecteur!). Il y tint des discours sur l'autonomie kurde disant qu'il fallait reconcilier et organiser les tribus et envoyer en leurs noms une délégation auprès du tout nouveau gouvernement à Ankara pour que celui-ci souscrivît à l'autonomie que l'Europe offrait aux Kurdes, et qu'en cas négatif on devait recourir à la force. Il chantait: "Bien chaussé/ J'y suis allé et tombé dans le tandir (four à même du sol)/ Le sultan n'est pas informé/ Le congrès (gouvernement kémaliste) fait tout cela." 3 Le Kurde alévi en appelle au sultan! Cela paraît surprenant, mais s'explique parfaitement par la menace kémaliste. Par le même argument on justifiait l'opposition contre toute levée de soldats dans le Koçgiri-Dersim, "celle-ci n'étant pas ordonnée par le sultan". Dans la même période, les Kurdes qui siégaient avec Kemal à Ankara, firent parvenir un télégramme aux Alliés affichant la parfaite fraternité entre Turcs et Kurdes. 4 Ali§er y répondit en envoyant par le biais du KTC une note aux Alliés dans laquelle il réitéra le postulat autonomiste et excusa l'action des députés kurdes par la pression qu'on aurait exercée sur eux. Il est intéressant de constater que dans ces mois décisifs des villages alévis turcophones se rallièrent au mouvement autonomiste et que les porteparoles kurdes firent tout pour les gagner à leur cause (tandis que les quelques villages sunnites kurdes et turcs de la région sympathisant avec le mouvement kémaliste avaient à craindre de sérieuses représailles). On a raison de croire que l'autonomie désirée était à leurs yeux une autonomie autant alévie que kurde, même si, pour de bonnes raisons (les Quatorze Points de Wilson!) cette conception n'apparaît guère à la surface du discours. Le pouvoir qui menaçait

* Tekke: une sorte de couvent-hospice, lieu de réunion, d'enseignement et auberge. Dersimi 1952, p. 126. Kemali 1992 (1932), p. 127, parle dans un contexte identique du tekke Hasan Baba, également situé entre Kangal et Divrigi. 3 Ayagimda kundura/ Gittim diigtiim tandura/ Padigahin haberi yok/ Bunu eden kongura. Kemali 1992 (1932), p. 126-127. 4 Cf. Komal 1992 (1975), P. 53-54. 2

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l'idée autonomiste en 1920 était avant tout sunnite et proche de l'armée. 1 Par conséquent, il y avait parmi les près de 400 personnalités de la jeune Grande Assemblée Nationale à Ankara à peine une dizaine de députés alévis (turcophones et kurdophones) ! 2 On y compait pourtant 72 kurdes (y compris ceux du Dersim).3 En novembre 1920, une autre réunion importante se tint à Hozat, dans le centre du Dersim. Les chefs de tribus de la région de Hozat et de Çemiggezek y déclarèrent sous la foi du serment sur Ziilfikar, l'épée d'Ali, et la pomme bénie, 4 qu'ils constitueraient une force armée de 45'000 5 hommes prêts à lutter pour le Kurdistan indépendant et que le Dersim oriental les rejoindrait. A la suite de cette réunion, une note fut transmise via Elazig à Ankara, réclamant des informations sur les intentions ainsi qu'une prise de position du gouvernement à propos de l'autonomie kurde; la libération des prisonniers kurdes; le retrait des administrateurs turcs des régions à majorité kurde et le retrait des forces militaires envoyées dans le Koçgiri. Le courant autonomiste fut alors au paroxysme. Au nord, des détachements s'aventurèrent loin sur la route Tercan-Erzincan, construite par les Russes en 1916, mais les aghas des villages kurdes (zaza) alévis à l'ouest de Çayirli ne suivirent pas leur appel à la solidarité dans la cause et se contentèrent de les approvisionner.6 Au sud, on avait établi de bons contacts

1 II se basait surtout sur les officiers ex-unionistes relativement jeunes comme Kemal, Kâzim, Ismet et Nurettin, le commandant de l'Armée Centrale lors de la répression du soulèvement du Koçgiri-Dersim. Cf. Zurcher 1984, p. 96 et 101. 2 Détail parlant: Pour l'inauguration de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, le vendredi 23 avril 1920, un cérémonial avec "une véritable débauche de prières et de dévotion" à tradition sunnite (réunion dans la mosquée, prière pour le Calife etc.) - difficile à suivre par les alévis! fut mis sur pied (Dumont 1983, p. 71). La cérémonie du "Seymen Alayi", une tradition dite de l'Asie Centrale, lors de l'arrivée de Kemal à Ankara n'est pas à même de faire contrepoids même si l'on l'appelle alévie, comme §ener 1991, p. 70! 3 Du Dersim (qui était le coeur de l'alévité): Meco Aga, Mustafa Diyab Aga, Ahmet Ramizi et Hasan Hayri. D'autres députés alévis: le chef spirituel Cemalettin Çelebi de Hacibektag, d'Erzincan Girlevikli Hiiseyin (Aksu) Bey, de Denizli Hiiseyin Mazlum Baba, de Kars Pirzade Fahrettin Bey. Cf. §ener 1991, p. 73; Dersimi 1952, p. 63, 126, 130-32; Tankut 1994 (1935), p. 448; Kemali 1992 (1932), p. 127; Bozarslan 1998. Il est difficile d'établir le nombre précis des députés alévis (surtout des turcs alévis); autant que nous sachions, il n'existe pas de travail approfondi à cette question. Les alévis étaient en tout cas très clairement sous-représentés. 4 La pomme est ici un lokma (don alimentaire), béni et partagé lors du ce m (réunion alévie). En prêtant serment, on partageait l'eau d'un endroit saint (ziyaret) ou le lokma, coupé par le Ziilfikar, et confirmait ainsi la prise de décisions importantes (cf. Kieser 1994, p. 65-66; Dersimi 1986, p. 112). 5 Chiffre grosso modo confirmé par une source turque, v. Oison 1991, p. 38-39. ^ Il campèrent à l'ouest de Sarigunek (témoignage oral, été 1992). D'autres villages kurdes (zaza) alévis limitrophes du Dersim septentrional ne suivirent pas non plus leur appel. Comme plusieurs villages arméno-kurdes de la région d'Erzincan, ils avaient souffert pendant l'occupation russe, puis arménienne; en plus, ils avaient une image plutôt péjorative du Dersim (témoignages oraux, notamment sur Tatlisu près de Çaglayan).

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avec les tribus de Drejan et d'Atma, du kaza d'Arapgir, et de Parçikan, du kaza de Divrigi (qui, au moment décisif, ne viendraient pourtant pas au secours).1 Pour remédier au danger, le gouvernement d'Ankara fit envoyer une commission d'apaisement que les Dersimis renvoyèrent. Ils menacèrent le gouvernement par la déclaration suivante: "Au Président de la Grande Assemblée Nationale d'Ankara D'après le traité de Sèvres, un Kurdistan indépendant qui comprend les provinces de Diyarbékir, Elazig, Van et Bitlis doit être crée. Nous déclarons que, si nécessaire, nous ferons valoir ce droit par les armes. 25 Te§rinisani [novembre] 1336 [1920] (signatures des chefs de tribus du Dersim occidental)" Quelques milliers de Dersimis se préparèrent à attaquer Sivas pour progresser vers Ankara. Ils commencèrent à marauder dans les endroits sympathisant avec le nouveau gouvernement. Une vingtaine des ces insurgés aurait justifié le saccage d'un hameau et le meurtre des habitants turcs (sunnites) en disant: "Ce que vous avez fait aux Arméniens, nous vous le rendons. Les tribus du Dersim arrivent! Nous occuperons Sivas, puis irons vers Ankara et renverserons le Congrès (c'est-à-dire le gouvernement kémaliste)."2

VI. Soulèvement et répression Depuis la réunion du tekke de Hiiseyin Abdal au début de l'année 1920, la tension monta continuellement. La guérilla commença en juillet de la même année. S'attaquant à des convois militaires et à des postes de police, des partisans saisirent armes et munitions et étendirent leur contrôle. Leurs actions ne donnent pourtant pas l'impression d'avoir été bien coordonnées. Le gouvernement d'Ankara essaya de calmer la situation - et de gagner du temps - en confirmant, en automne 1920, les fonctions de Haydar à Ùmraniye et d'Ali§an à Refahiye. 3 Son succès le plus payant fut de nommer quatre Dersimis importants à l'Assemblée Nationale, ce qui empêcha toute participation unanime du Dersim au soulèvement. Comme les autres députés kurdes, ils croyaient ainsi mieux défendre leurs intérêts. Dans la deuxième moitié de 1920, les acteurs suivants paraissent engagés dans le courant autonomiste: la grande tribu de Koçgiri, plusieurs tribus voisines dans le sud, l'ouest et le nord, plusieurs villages turcs alévis de 1 2 3

Dersimi 1952, p. 130; Akgiil 1992, p. 36. Kemali 1992 (1930), p. 128. Kemali 1932, p. 129; Dersimi, 1952, p. 127.

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la région et une bonne partie des tribus, également alévies, du Dersim occidental. 1 On compte parmi les principaux leaders du soulèvement Ali§an et Haydar, les chefs de la tribu de Koçgiri, ainsi qu'Ali§er et Nuri Dersimi, les premiers instigateurs et coordinateurs. D'autres chefs de tribus de la région du Koçgiri et du Dersim (particulièrement d'Ovacik) jouaient un rôle important. 2 Seyit Riza se profilait déjà comme la tête du Dersim antikémaliste (que les quatre députés à Ankara ne représentait pas!), 3 mais laissait pendant l'insurrection l'initiative à d'autres, particulièrement à Nuri Dersimi, le fils d'Ibrahim Efendi, son secrétaire. Mustafa Kemal fit arrêter Nuri Dersimi le 20 décembre 1920 à Divrigi, mais, sous la menace de Riza, il dut ordonner sa libération. L'éclatement de l'insurrection est dû au déplacement du sixième régiment de cavalerie à Umraniye en février 1921. Il était chargé de retrouver les nombreux déserteurs dont l'armée avait besoin au front occidental et d'arrêter Zalim Çavus qui dirigeait quelques douzaines de partisans. 4 Le kaymakam de Zara, c'est-à-dire le sous-préfet de Zara auquel appartenait alors Umraniye, exigea des villageois l'extradition de ce dernier. Ceux-ci n'acceptèrent pas de violer leur ancienne tradition d'asile, mais furent prêts à communiquer le lieu de séjour de Çavus, une fois que celui-ci aurait quitté leurs villages. Çavus proposa de se rendre lui-même si l'on l'amnistiait. Apak conclut: "En refusant les deux propositions, le kaymakam commit une erreur.''^ La confrontation armée proprement dite eut lieu en mars 1921. Le régiment turc s'étant déplaçé à Umraniye en février, les Kurdes s'emparèrent de la ville et hissèrent le drapeau du Kurdistan au centre (7 mars). Plusieurs soldats furent tués, les autres se rendirent, le commandant du régiment, le colonel Halis, f u t exécuté. Les événements d'Ûmraniye consternèrent le nouveau gouvernement d'Ankara 6 et encouragèrent d'autres tribus à se rallier aux insurgés. Ils prirent les kazas de Kangal, Koçhisar (Hafik), Divrigi, Zara, Refahiye, Kuruçay et Kemah (où les insurgés arrêtèrent de riches agas kurdes soupçonnés de collaborer avec les Turcs). En même temps qu'il déclara la loi martiale 7 et qu'il manda d'importantes troupes vers le Koçgiri, le gouvernement d'Ankara envoya, mi1 Dersimi 1952, p. 42-68, donne une description des tribus et de la région et mentionne leur participation au soulèvement. Sur les villages turcs alévis: p. 64-65 et p. 126. * Cf. liste dans Dersimi 1952, p. 159. 3

Cf. Dersimi 1952, p. 133 et 163. L'officier Apak le présente comme un bandit et voleur qui, ayant été mêlé au soulèvement de Yildizeli/Yozgat, avait dû s'enfuir au Dersim. Pour Nuri Dersimi, c'est un héros kurde (Dersimi 1952, p. 151). 5 Apak 1964, p. 154. 6 Pour cette raison, le terme "événement d'Ûmraniye" équivaut celui d'"événement de Koçgiri (Koçkiri Hadisesi)". 10 mars d'après Apak 1964, p. 156. Dersimi 1952, p. 145, donne le 15 mars. 4

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mars, une autre commission d'apaisement (avec §efik Bey) chez les insurgés et adressa par l'intermédiaire du vali de Sivas des lettres à des personnages influents afin de diviser le mouvement. Aux yeux de Rahmi Apak, le gouvernement fit ainsi preuve de bonne volonté en essayant une dernière fois de mettre fin à la révolte de manière pacifique. La réponse des "chefs de tribu et des cheikhs de Hozat" (Apak) fut négative: "L'armée est depuis un certain temps en train de faire des recensements dans notre région afin de relever le nombre de musulmans et de non-musulmans. On comprend que par la récupération de telles informations le gouvernement prévoit d'atteindre et d'exterminer les Kurdes tout comme il l'avait fait avec les Arméniens. Il s'agit donc de légitime défense; l'attitude de la tribu de Koçgiri est juste." 1 Depuis la proclamation de la loi martiale, les rebelles adressèrent à deux reprises un télégramme à Ankara, modifiant considérablement leurs revendications et réclamant, au lieu d'un Kurdistan indépendant, un vilayet autonome: "Au président de la Grande Assemblée Nationale: Nous désirons l'établissement d'un vilayet distinct où la justice et l'administration soient maintenues avec un vali kurde autochtone à sa tête. Ce vilayet doit être formé des territoires avec une majorité kurde, comprenant les kazas de Koçgiri, Divrigi, Refahiye, Kuruçay et Kemah. 11 mars 1337 (=1921) De la part des Seyit: Ali§er Les chefs de la tribu de Koçgiri Muhammet et Naki Parmi les chefs de tribus du Dersim: Mustafa, Seidhan, Muhammet, Munzur." 2

Les insurgés étaient prêts à d'importantes concessions. Mais le 13 mars 1921, le commandant de l'Armée Centrale, Nurettin Pacha, reçut l'ordre de "réprimer le soulèvement de la tribu de Koçgiri". Par un télégramme chiffré, l'état-major de l'armée lui fit savoir que les événements d'Umraniye avaient montré la nouveauté et l'importance de cette insurrection et qu'il fallait l'étouffer avec des moyens militaires massifs. 3 Par l'intermédiaire du 1 Apak 1964, p. 155. Une réponse quelque peu différente ("déportation" au lieu d'"extermination" e. a.) se trouve dans Dersimi 1952, p. 146. 2 Dersimi 1952, p. 143. - Ce même texte est repris avec une annexe de quelques lignes et des soussignés légèrement différents un mois plus tard. Voici l'annexe avec les signatures (d'après Apak 1964, p. 161): "Si l'affaire ne se règle pas de la façon proposée, le soulèvement se répandra au-delà du Dersim jusqu'à Erzincan, Van, Diyarbakir et Erzurum. Le sang sera versé entre deux peuples musulmans et réjouira les ennemis des musulmans (mot à mot: le visage des ennemis des musulmans en rira). 8 avril 1337 Pour les Seyit: Ali§er Les chefs de la tribu Koçgiri: Muhammet Naki Des chefs de tribu du Dersim: Ibrahim, Mustafa, Mahmud, Seyithan, Munzur". 3 Apak 1964, p. 156-157. - Le lieutenant-colonel (Yarbay) expérimenté Cemil Cahit avait été prévu pour cette tâche; il ne l'accepta pas prétextant sa maladie.

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commandant à Erzincan, le 14 mars, Nurettin Pacha donna les directives suivantes: "La violence des opérations se dirige contre les meneurs du soulèvement. Il faut gagner la confiance du peuple et lui faire croire que le gouvernement respecte et protège les biens, la vie, l'honneur et les droits de tous les citoyens sans considérer la différence religieuse. (...) Il faut arrêter et transférer les meneurs et instigateurs au commandement central à Sivas. Les biens de ces derniers (...) seront confisqués, leurs maisons brûlées et détruites. S'il ne s'agit pas de personnes isolées, mais de plusieurs habitants d'un village (kô'y halkï), le procédé sera appliqué au village entier." De nombreux notables adressèrent des lettres au vali de Sivas et au commandement militaire dans lesquelles ils se distançaient du soulèvement. Leur note du 18 mars 1921 propose la restitution de tous les biens pris par les insurgés et commence comme suit: "Nous, les chefs des tribus du Koçgiri, qui signons ci-dessous, servons fidèlement notre gouvernement national (Hukumet-i Milliyemize) et sommes depuis toujours prêts aux meilleurs services à l'intérieur de la communauté musulmane. Désolés par les spoliations survenues à la suite de l'événement d'Ûmraniye, qui étaient contraires à notre intention et à nos sentiments de fidélité, nous nous engageons à mettre en oeuvre les points suivants..." Pour rendre crédible sa volte-face, Murât Pacha, le chef de la tribu Ginyan, livra à l'Armée trois chefs du soulèvement qu'il eut saisis à Beypinar par la ruse: Seyit Aziz, Zalim Çavug et Hasan (frère de Zalim). Privée de ses chefs, la tribu de Kurmegan se vit par la suite attaquer par l'Armée Centrale, perdit son chef principal Giizel Agha et dut se retirer à l'est de Hafik. 1 Ebubekir Hazim Tepeyran, alors vali à Sivas, fustige dans ses mémoires la logique inhumaine (vah§i mantik) de Nurettin Pacha qui, contre toute nécessité, ne voulut pas renoncer au déploiement des forces militaires concentrées sur place, envisageant délibéremment le meurtre de milliers d'innocents au lieu de viser un règlement pacifique. 2 Le 3 avril, Nurettin Pacha fit parvenir à ses unités cet ordre: "(...) Selon le résultat des opérations répressives, il sera ordonné soit de réduire la tribu de Koçgiri à un état qui ne lui permet plus de se soulever, soit de la diviser et de la déporter du territoire où elle vit jusqu'à présent." 3 Les directives du commandant ne laissent aucun doute sur la nature des incursions à venir. On note l'écart entre ces ordres et le message tel que la population le percevait. A la surface, Nurettin parle de neutralité religieuse, de l'absence d'un vrai problème et d'une population victime de quelques meneurs criminels, eux-mêmes influencés par l'ennemi 1 2 3

Dersimi 1952, p. 150-151. Komal 1992 (1975), p. 82-83. Tepeyran expose les faits en rapport avec Koçgiri dans Tepeyran 1982, p. 69-84. Apak 1964, p. 162.

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extérieur. L'image qu'il donne à la population et qui se lit dans les rumeurs, y est absolument opposée: le commandant est un ennemi des Kurdes et des alévis, prêt à éliminer ceux qui ont l'audace d'avoir des problèmes d'identité. En fin de compte il y a un lien logique entre le discours qu'il mène et l'image qu'il donne: l'Etat a l'habitude de parler de quelques criminels, mais sait bien que les problèmes sont plus profonds. Par conséquent il s'attaque à toute la communauté d'où proviennent les problèmes. Je ne vais pas entrer dans la chronologie détaillée des actions militaires que résume Apak. Les préparations durèrent quatre semaines. Toutes les routes de Sivas, Kangal, Malatya et Elazig étaient contrôlées par l'Armée, tout voyage interdit. L'hiver se montrait particulièrement rude. Le 11 avril 1921, l'Armée Centrale commença les opérations avec toutes ses unités. Apak rapporte pour ce seul premier jour l'incendie de deux villages (Birastik et Pusans) et le "nettoyage" de la région de Çengerli: un procédé qui était régulièrement accompagné d'importantes confiscations de biens, de cruautés et du meurtre de civils, femmes et enfants. La bande armée particulièrement brutale de Topai Osman, qui était à la solde de Nurettin Pacha et de Kemal Pacha, contribua à former l'image d'une guerre sale.1 Le 24 mai, Nurettin Pacha envoya ce télégramme à l'Etat-major: "L'opération de répression d'Ûmraniye est en train de se terminer. Nous avons nettoyé jusqu'à présent la région entre l'Euphrate, Erzincan et Umraniye et nous avons tué presque 500 rebelles."2 Les escarmouches meurtrières durèrent jusqu'en juin 1921. Ali§an fut arrêté le 17 juin, mais au Dersim les affrontements continuèrent sans que l'Armée réussît sa percée. Beaucoup de civils et de combattants se réfugièrent dans le Dersim. Le nombre de victimes est bien supérieur au chiffre de tués parce qu'il faut inclure tous ceux qui, paniqués, erraient dans les montagnes et allaient mourir de faim. D'après Tepeyran, 130 villages furent totalement détruits. La logique et le caractère de la répression contre les Kurdes alévis du KoçkiriDersim fait pressentir l'ethnocide que le gouvernement de la Turquie kémaliste consolidée réalisera en 1937-1938 au nom de la "civilisation turque". L'isolement des insurgés dans l'Anatolie orientale de 1921 fut multiple: géographique, ethno-religieux, international 3 et social dans la mesure où, pour les chefs de tribus et les grands proprétaires, il était plus sûr 1 Topai Osman Agha réalisa avec sa bande également des "exploits" dans la guerre contre les Grecs de la Mer Noire (et auparavant déjà dans le massacre d'Arméniens), avant de devenir le chef de la garde du corps de Kemal Pacha. Zurcher 1984, p. 88; TBMM G. C. Z., p. 269, 275; Komal 1992 (1975), p. 79; Dersimi 1952, p. 148-156, etc. 2 Apak 1964, p. 171. D'une part, les forces étrangères ne s'intéressaient guère à cette région en marge de leurs intérêts stratégiques et pétroliers, d'autre part les insurgés eux-mêmes refusèrent l'idée d'une aide étrangère (Dersimi 1952,p. 142).

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de porter leurs espérances sur le gouvernement central d'Ankara. Trahisons, mésententes intertribales, chutes de neige (qui empêchèrent l'entraide des tribus du Dersim) et le déploiement militaire massif mirent bientôt un terme sanglant à ce soulèvement. Suite à la pression des députés de l'Est et à un long télégramme chiffré de Tepeyran au ministre de l'intérieur, le gouvernement d'Ankara envoya une commission d'enquête (Tetkik Heyeti) sur place qui, dans son rapport, dénonça Ali§er et Nuri Dersimi comme les instigateurs de la révolte. La Cour Martiale (Harp Divam) à Sivas les condamna à mort par contumace et Mustafa Kemal les exclut de l'amnistie qu'il attribua aux autres condamnés de l'insurrection. Mais au Dersim ils restaient hors de l'atteinte de la justice kémaliste. Nurettin Pacha fut congédié de son poste à la tête de l'Armée Centrale, mais Mustafa Kemal le protégea au moment où l'Assemblée demanda son châtiment.1 Les discussions à la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie (=TBMM) 2 montrent les différents regards du parlement de l'époque sur la question. Le 16 mars 1920, le Parlement Ottoman (Meclis-i Mebusan) avait été dissout par les Anglais. Le 23 avril de la même année, Mustafa Kemal et ses proches avaient inauguré une autre assemblée, la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie, à Ankara. Beaucoup d'ancien députés s'y étaient joints. En octobre 1921, l'Assemblée d'Ankara traita le dossier de Koçgiri. Après de longs débats, il fut décidé de tenir les séances sur Koçgiri secrètes, entre autres pour la raison "qu'il n'est pas nécessaire que les Etats occidentaux soient au courant" des événements. 3 L'embarras était clair, aucun député ne pouvait contester l'abus du pouvoir militaire ou nier la question de culpabilité. 4 Mais le devoir urgent de sauver la patrie en danger empêcha une enquête complète et transparente. 5 Malgré l'inconvénient de cette "maxime suprême", les protocoles secrets des séances donnent l'impression d'un débat vif et Dersimi 1952, p.162-166; Tepeyran 1982, p. 78-79. Le rapport de la commission d'enquête n'est pas disponible, il existe par contre dans une source britannique un télégramme d'Ankara du 21 octobre 1921, qui résume la stratégie du gouvernement turc: "For the present no punitive expedition will be sent against the rebels, but every effort will be made to win over the leaders of the tribes with presents ... A favourable opportunity will have to be awaited, because it will be necessary to send a force sufficiently powerful to deal with 40'000 horsemen in very difficult country." (cité par Olson 1991, p. 38-39) 2 Turkiye Biiyiik Millet Meclisi =TBMM. Leurs protocoles secrets sont accessibles dans: TBBM G. C. Z., p. 252-280 et 513-519. 3 Le député Emin Bey d'Erzincan, TBMM G. C. Z., p. 248. L'opinion contraire avait été soutenue par plusieurs députés, comme Mustafa Durak Bey d'Erzurum: "Nous devons déclarer au monde entier les abominations commises dans notre pays. Que tout le monde sache... Car tout ce mal et ces perversions dans notre pays, messieurs, se produisent parce que nous les cachons au peuple." TBMM G. C. Z., p. 249. 4 "Faisons-en l'aveu," concéda le ministre de l'intérieur Refet Pacha. TBMM G. C. Z., p. 251. 5 "Amis, débattons de la délivrance du pays. En premier lieu, nous devons libérer le pays". Le député Tunah Hilmi Bey de Bolu, TBMM G. C. Z., p. 251

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relativement ouvert. Le mot "Kurde" n'y était pas encore tabou. La façon dont les Arméniens avaient été traités n'était pas encore entièrement occultée dans le subconscient collectif. De nombreuses allusions à ces atrocités accompagnaient les discussions. Elles apparurent dans le premier débat lorsque l'on s'interrogea s'il fallait tenir séance ouverte ou non. 1 Les objectifs du soulèvement, jugés a priori inacceptables, restaient en dehors du débat. 2 "Aliger donnait une couleur politique à ce brigandage", est une phrase qui résume l'attitude générale. 3 On peut distinguer une triple disqualification des insurgés: le choix constant d'un vocabulaire péjoratif pour les désigner; 4 leur dénonciation en tant qu' ennemis de la patrie et de l'islam; 5 et, lié à cela, le reproche d'avoir empoché de l'argent étranger (russe ou anglais). Quoiqu'à peine prononcé dans les discussions, ce dernier reproche fut véhémentement refuté par les députés du Dersim. 6 Ils faisaient aussi valoir des circonstances atténuantes, plaidaient pour une amnistie et réclamaient justice pour la région. 7 Un des quatre députés du Dersim, Hasan Hayri Bey, jugea nécessaire de faire une très longue digression historique sur son patrimoine, remontant même à la bataille de Çaldiran à la suite de laquelle Yavuz Selim Sultan "fit couper la gorge à tous les Alévis présents (...). Les survivants se réfugièrent dans les montagnes du Dersim". Il exprima bien dans quelle dimension historique de persécution religieuse la répression sanglante avait été projetée par les concernés. Il essaya aussi d'expliquer pourquoi le "banditisme" s'y était répandu et s'efforça d'affirmer l'appartenance de sa région à la communauté musulmane. 8 Un autre député de la région concernée, Emin Bey d'Erzincan, raconta l'horreur commise contre une famille alévie turque de Refahiye dont les biens 1 Emin Bey réclama des séances closes, argumentant dans sa deuxième intervention que des étrangers diraient: "Quelqu'un qui commet pareille chose contre ses coreligionnaires, que ne pourrait-il faire contre les chrétiens?" TBMM G. C. Z., p. 251. On se demande dans quelle mesure la présente édition des Gizli Celse Zabitlari est incomplète. Quelques mois plus tard, en février 1922, un projet de loi fut proposé à la TBMM envisageant une "autonomie" très limitée du Kurdistan (on n'en lit rien dans les Gizli Celse Zabitlari). La loi fut rejetée. Oison donne en annexe le sommaire de ce projet de loi d'après une source britannique (Oison 1991, p. 166-168). 3 Le député Emin Bey d'Erzincan, TBMM G. C. Z., p. 268. 4 Soyguncu, çapulcu, çaki (voleur, gangster, bandit), §ekavet (brigandage) etc. 5 "...la mauvaise administration faisait pencher les Dersimis pour les Russes", estima Hasan Hayri Bey. TBMM G. C. Z., p. 252-253, cf. de même Mustafa Bey d'Erzincan, p. 275. 6 Hasan Hayri Bey de Dersim: TBMM G. C. Z., p. 253; Mustafa Bey de Dersim: TBMM G. C Z., p. 275. 7 P. ex. TBMM G. C. Z., p. 267. Q ° Ayant dû s'enfuir dans les montagnes, les hérétiques persécutés développaient un petit commerce vers l'extérieur dans lequel on les exploitait constamment. On leur prenait le peu qu'ils possédaient: moutons, chèvres et produits laitiers. "Pour cette raison, le brigandage s'est répandu au Dersim et a fait beaucoup de mal, mais malgré cela le Dersim ne s'est pas séparé de la communauté islamique et n'en avait pas l'intention." TBMM G. C. Z., p. 253.

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avaient été confisqués, la femme enlevée et le père de famille, qu'on accusait d'être alévi, sadiquement tué. 1 Rapportant le meurtre de villageois turcs (alévis), le député Mustafa Bey de Dersim souligna que l'aggression militaire ne s'était pas limitée aux Kurdes. 2 Ces déclarations laissent voir que la répression fut comprise comme anti-alévie. Au lendemain du soulèvement et suite aux sessions secrètes, le Parlement d'Ankara a pourtant essayé de régler la question surgie au KoçgiriDersim par une loi proposant une autonomie kurde très partielle. 3 Bien qu'approuvé par l'Assemblée en février 1922, ce projet de loi ne fut jamais mis en oeuvre; il n'aurait pas convenu à l'idéologie unitaire de l'Etat national turc, fondé en octobre 1923. Koçgiri 1921 a irréparablement irrité l'attitude des alévis vis-à-vis du nouvel Etat. Leur soi-disant penchant pour le kémalisme date en effet surtout des années i960, 4 quand le système alévi a pratiquement cessé de fonctionner dans l'Est et que les hasards du coup d'Etat ont porté pour la première (et jusqu'à présent la seule) fois un alévi, Cemal Giirsel, à la tête de l'Etat. Le néo-kémalisme a alors exercé son attraction sur une bonne partie des alévis, en concurrence avec le communisme et l'américanisme. Nurettin Pacha, le "massacreur des Kurdes" protégé par Mustafa Kemal, symbolise la main malheureuse de l'Etat dans l'Est. Incapable de gérer la diversité des identités, il détruit leurs patrimoines et leurs habitats sans réconstructions valables. Il en résulte le dépeuplement. Le Koçgiri est atteint en 1921, le Dersim en 19375 et de nouveau en 1994 (dépeuplement et déstruction systématique de villages). VII. La question de l'identité Dans les pages précédentes, la question identitaire nous a toujours accompagnés sans que nous l'ayons explicitement posée. L'identité apparemment bien distincte des alévis kurdes dans l'interrègne des années 1919-21, que nous affirmons dans cet article, s'est cristallisée à partir des éléments suivants: la structure religieuse, le voisinage arménien, le contact

1 Ses propres enfants durent l'étrangler en tirant une corde - une atrocité qui dura six heures. Le texte du protocole permettrait aussi d'interpréter cet étranglement comme un événement distinct du précédent. TBMM G. C. Z., p. 269. 2 T B M M G . C. Z., p. 275. 3 Oison 1991, p. 39-41 et, pour un résumé du projet de loi, 166-168. 4 Cf. Bozarslan 1998. 5 La "pacification" ethnocidaire de 1937, déjà proposée par Nurettin Pacha, fut effectuée par le beau-fils de Nurettin, le général Abdullah Alpdogan. Cf. la lettre de Nurettin Pacha à l'étatmajor du 29 mars 1921 (ATASE, KL. 1122 D. 12 F. 58; citée dans Akgul 1992, p. 37-38).

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avec le courant protestant, les différentes rencontres avec la modernité, la peur collective comme héritage de la Guerre et l'idéologie autonomiste ou indépendantiste kurde. L'identité kurde alévie s'est prononcée malgré des différences. Les Koçgirilis qui étaient au centre du mouvement, n'avaient avec raison pas l'image rebelle et de brigands des Dersimis. Ils payaient les impôts, avaient accepté les réquisitions pendant la guerre et ne portaient guère d'armes. Leurs chefs se trouvaient en assez bons termes avec l'Etat. 1 Mais ils partagaient avec les Dersimis l'alévisme, et, tout en parlant en majorité kurmandj (pas zaza), ils croyaient à leur origine commune, c'est-à-dire les montagnes du Dersim. Les différences entre Koçgirilis et Dersimis ne semblent pas avoir entravé le sentiment fort d'une identité collective commune à base alévie, tandis qu'on constate une très nette démarcation entre Zazas alévis et Zazas sunnites.2 L'alévisme offrait l'infrastructure pour la mobilisation des esprits. Il était quasiment le récipient du tout nouveau discours kurdiste que Sèvres légitimait au niveau international. Quelle occasion exceptionnelle de sortir de l'ombre socio-ethnique, de s'assurer et d'être enfin reconnu en tant que collectif! Tandis que Kemal attaquait les idées de Sèvres au nom de la séculaire communauté musulmane (sunnite) turco-kurde, les Koçgiri-Dersimis les prenaient au pied de la lettre, croyant valoriser au nom de la kurdicité leur patrimone (alévi) humilié depuis des siècles. Venus en contacts avec l'idée de l'autodétermination déjà bien avant la Grande Guerre grâce aux Arméniens - avec qui ils étaient familiers comme avec aucune autre ethnie - et grâce aux missionnaires, ils avaient salué la modernité que ces derniers leur faisaient voir à Harput, Sivas et ailleurs. La renaissance identitaire arménienne leur avait suggéré une réinvention identitaire qui, malgré la valorisation de la kurdicité, les démarquait des Kurdes sunnites, toujours attachés au califat. Par conséquent, ils croyaient au nouvel ordre wilsonien d'inspiration missionnaire dans leur contrée. C'est pour cette forme libérale de modernité qu'ils optèrent, pas pour celle que l'Etat de plus en plus centralisateur tâcha de réaliser dès les Tanzimat. Malgré cette option, la guerre arméno-turque divisa les esprits, et la crainte de la "grande Arménie" saisit non seulement les sunnites de la région, mais aussi notamment quelques aghas du Dersim oriental et les villageois dans les environs d'Erzincan. En plus, on constate chez un bon nombre de personnages influents du Koçgiri-Dersim la crainte de s'écarter du pouvoir 1 Cf. TBMM G. C. Z., p. 275. "The Koçkiri are an unwarlike people who bear no arms, and are extremely submissive"(Sykes 1915, p. 584) Apak 1964, p. 151-152. 2 Tankut 1935, p. 444-446. Dans les termes de Fevzi Efendi, député d'Erzincan: "kavmiyet ve asabiyet itibariyle aralannda [entre Dersimis et Koçkirilis] fark yoktur" (TBMM G. C. Z., p.

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sécurisant de la grande communauté musulmane kurdo-turque que Mustafa Kemal organise avec succès. La peur est un facteur essentiel très documenté dans le mouvement insurrectionnel: c'est la peur de la déportation et de l'extermination telles qu'on les a vues en 1915. L'insécurité de l'interrègne l'aiguise et la transforme en révolte. Les postulats politiques qui naissent de cet état mental manquent de fermeté. Ils oscillent entre le postulat maximaliste d'une indépendance quasi pankurde et le postulat minimaliste d'une autonomie très restreinte dans le vilayet. Cet état mental a en tout cas pour effet évident qu'on ne peut que s'opposer diamétralement à tout mouvement qui rappelle dans ses structures celles, meurtrières, de 1915, c'est-à-dire des structures étatiques, militaristes, sunnites, antiarméniennes et turquistes. S'y oppose une kurdicité militante anti-turque. "Nous ne voulons pas les Mongols," chante Ali§er tout en mettant en avant les références alévies (le "Schah des braves", "l'épée du saint Ali"). 1 Dans un autre poème, Aliger appelle le Dersim, "la rose", "le foyer des lions qui ne laissent pas entrer les renards", "le mystère des vérités", etc. 2 Ce sont bien aussi des références à l'alévisme, dont le Dersim est le coeur depuis l'échec des révoltes kizilba§ contre les sultans au XVIe siècle. Si les leaders du soulèvement développent bel et bien un discours kurdiste, celui-ci n'éveille des résonnances que dans la communauté kurde alévie. Et ceci pour des bonnes raisons: ce n'est qu'elle (et bien sûr les communautés non-musulmanes) qui, en Anatolie, puisse résister au discours du "sauvetage de Viimmet" que Kemal Pacha maîtrise alors à la perfection. La kurdicité mise en relief ne pouvait donc être, à ce moment-là, rien d'autre qu'une alévité kurde. C'est à travers le réseau traditionnel alévi que le discours autonomiste ou indépendantiste "moderne" se transmet au Koçgiri-Dersim de l'après-guerre. Cette diffusion se fait presque exclusivement par la parole parlée et chantée. Une petite minorité seulement est à même de lire les numéros du Jîn apportés d'Istanbul et de s'imaginer une solidarité kurde interconfessionnelle. La petite poignée d'intellectuels et de militants déjà imprégnés du jeune nationalisme kurde se voient "protéger par les seyits du Dersim." 3 On recourt, y compris les intellectuels, aux symboles alévis pour se faire comprendre, et l'on n'a rien que l'infrastructure alévie pour assurer la communication et la 1 "ïstemeyiz mogollan". Dans la même strophe, l'auteur assimile ces derniers aux barbares et glorifie la mort pour la patrie (vatan) kurde. L'authenticité de certains vers de ce poème paraît toutefois douteuse. Cemil 1991, p. 81-82, Dersimi 1986, p. 112, Dersimi 1952, p. 155. - Pour mieux évaluer les écrits d'Aliger, il faudrait avoir accès à ses documents personnels dont parle Sevgen 1950, p. 378! 2 Sevgen 1950, p. 381. 3 Tankut 1935, p. 446.

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direction du mouvement. Celle-là n'étant point faite pour mener à bien une lutte indépendantiste moderne, le soulèvement manque dès ses débuts de cohérence stratégique. Le large réseau alévi mobilise parfaitement les esprits, mais n'est pas capable d'assurer l'organisation efficace qu'il faudrait pour faire face au mouvement de Kemal. Ce dernier s'appuie sur une structure aussi rigide qu'est l'armée, l'institution la plus développée et moderne de l'Etat dès le XIXe siècle. A défaut d'un noyau organisationnel moderne, professionnel et cohérent, le mouvement ne pouvait qu'échouer. Néanmoins, il ne faut pas sousestimer sa puissance. Il réussit à mobiliser toute une communauté sur un vaste terrain. Toute une élite capable de gérer l'autonomie y participe. Son potentiel militaire est considérable. Avant tout, le tissu symbolique du mouvement est dense. Il joint à l'univers alévi un nouveau discours apparemment prometteur. Il a le potentiel de percer tout l'espace alévi de l'Est, y compris les villages alévis turcophones et quelques restes arméniens. Cet espace aurait pu s'organiser et constituer une zone autonome dans une nouvelle Turquie fédéraliste. 1 Mais il est resté difficile à gouverner, précaire, peu prospère jusqu'à nos jours. Pour le député contemporain Fevzi d'Erzincan, le soulèvement n'avait aucune finalité politique, mais les trois raisons suivantes: le banditisme, la mauvaise administration et la peur des Kurdes alévis de subir le même sort que les Arméniens. C'est le regard borné et instrumental d'un pouvoir central pourtant encore relativement ouvert à la critique. 2 Tout en dénonçant le rôle néfaste du tribalisme, la rétrospective kurdiste par contre met toute l'emphase sur la lutte nationale, sans valoriser la matrice alévie (et avec elle le voisinage inspirateur arménien, le courant protestant et la grande peur de l'extermination). Loin d'être un nationaliste kurde comme Kadri Cemil, Nuri Dersimi ou d'autres, Celâl Bayar, ancien premier-ministre et président de la Turquie, sut mesurer l'impact idéologique et le nouveau ferment identitaire du soulèvement, sans relever, à son tour, le facteur alévi sous-jacent: "Cheikh Saïd voulait établir une république kurde-islamique.(...) La pensée du soulèvement du Dersim était complètement celle d'une politique kurde. Ils voulaient tout directement établir un gouvernement kurde autonome. (...) Les Dersimis les plus idéalistes se rassemblaient et s'unissaient à Koçkiri pour promouvoir la cause kurde. (...) A mon avis, le soulèvement de Koçkiri est plus important que tous les autres."3 1 Histoire au conditionnel: Une telle Turquie aurait davantage eu la chance de s'épargner son problème kurde, et, autre sujet de taille, de guérir ses relations avec les Arméniens et de développer des rapports moins ambigus avec l'Occident... 2 TBMM G. C. Z„ p. 252. < 3 J Cité d'après la note de Mehmet Bayrak dans Cemil 1991, p. 243.

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La tradition de révoltes et de conflits de tribus n'explique pas ce soulèvement à l'heure de Sèvres, mais nous aide à comprendre son échec. Il ne faut pas surestimer le poids des facteurs locaux et tribaux au détriment des grands courants dont le Koçgiri-Dersim n'était pas à l'abri dès les Tanzimat. Le fait que les Koçgirilis, pourtant réputés tout à fait paisibles avant 1919, se soient mis à l'avant-garde, indique bien l'émergence de nouvelles forces mobilisatrices et avec elles la tentative d'une réinvention identitaire au Koçgiri-Dersim. La lutte quelque peu maladroite pour l'autodétermination a échoué en 1921, mais a toutefois eu des conséquences - passagères - sur la scène politique à Ankara et préservé le Dersim d'une subjugation immédiate. Une fois l'Etat national turc consolidé, la suppression du Kurdistan en tant que projet identitaire n'était qu'une question de temps; les Koçgiri-Dersimis l'avaient pressenti bien avant le reste des Kurdes. Bâle, janvier 1998

Bibliographie

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archives

ABCFM: Archives de 1'American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Boston AKGÜL, Suat, Yakin Tarihimizde Dersim isyanlari ve Gerçekler, Istanbul: Bogaziçi Yayinlan, 1992 der ALEXANIAN, Jacques, Le Ciel était noir sur l'Euphrate, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1988 APAK, Rahmi, Türk istiklal Harbi - ïç Ayaklanmalar (1919-1921), t. 6, Ankara: Gnkur. Basimevi, 1964 ATASE: Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etiid Dairesi Bagkanligi Arçivi BIRDOGAN, Nejat, Anadolu'nun Gizli Kültürü Alevilik, Hamburg: Alevi Kültür Merkezi Yaymlari, 1990 BOA: Ba§bakanlik Osmanli Argivi, Istanbul BOZARSLAN, Hamit, Entre la 'umma et le nationalisme: L'islam kurde au tournant du siècle, Amsterdam: MERA, 1992 —, "Histoire des relations kurdo-arméniennes", in H.-L. Kieser (dir.), Kurdistan und Europa. Einblicke in die kurdische Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, Zürich: Chronos, 1997, p. 151-186 - , "L'Etat, le nationalisme et la question alévie en Turquie", à paraître en 1998 dans un ouvrage sur les nouveaux nationalismes, dirigé par R. Kastoryano et A. Dieckhof

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van BRUINESSEN, Martin, '"Aslini inkar eden haramzadedir!' The debate on the ethnie identity of the kurdish Alevis", in: K. Kehl-Bodrogi, B. KellnerHeinkele & A. Otter-Beaujean (dir.), Syncretistic religious communities in the Near East, Leiden: Brill, 1997 —, Kurden zwischen ethnischer, religiöser und regionaler Identität, in: C. Borck, E. Savelsberg, S. Hajo (Hg.), Ethnizität, Nationalismus, Religion und Politik in Kurdistan, Münster: Lit, 1997, p. 185-216 BULUT, Faik, Belgelerle Dersim Raporlari, Istanbul: Yön, 1991 BUMKE, Peter J., "The Kurdish Alevis - Boundaries and Perceptions", in P. Andrews: Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, Wiesbaden, 1989, S. 510-518 CEMIL, Kadri (= Zinar Silopî), Doza Kurdistan, Ankara: Özge, 1991 (1969) CUINET, Vital, La Turquie d'Asie, 4 tomes, Paris, 1892 DAVIS, Leslie A., The Slaughterhouse Province. An American Diplomat's Report on the Armenian Genocide. 1915-1917, ed. with an introduction and notes by Susan K. Blair, New Rochelle & New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1989 DERSIMI, Mehmet Nuri, Kiirdistan Tarihinde Dersim, Halep, 1952 —, Hatiratim, Stockholm: Roja NÛ, 1986 DUMONT, Paul, Mustafa Kemal invente la Turquie moderne, Bruxelles: Editions Complexes, 1983 FIRAT, M. §erif, Dogu illeri ve Varto Tarihi, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Aragtirma Enstitüsü, 1983 (1952) GRABILL, Joseph L., The Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East. Missionary Influence on American Policy 1810-1927, University of Minnesota Press, 1971 HARBORD, James G., The Chief of the Military Mission to Armenia (Harbord) to the Secretary of State, = rapport officiel de Harbord, daté du 16 octobre 1919, réproduit dans Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States 1919, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934, p. 840-889. —, "Investigating Turkey and Transcaucasia", in The Worlds Work, vol. 40, Londres et New York, 1920, p. 35-47, 176-193, 271-280 JÎN, Haftalik Gazete, Istanbul, 1918-1919, réédité, transcrit, traduit en turc moderne et introduit par Mehmet E. Bozarslan, Uppsala: Deng, 1985 KÉVORKIAN, Raymond H. & PABOUDJIAN, Paul B., Les Arméniens dans l'Empire ottoman à la veille du génocide, Paris: ARHIS, 1992 KEMAL, Mustafa, Nutuk, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1989 (1929) KEMALI, Ali, Erzincan Tarihi, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 1992 (1930) KIESER, Hans-Lukas, "Les Kurdes alévis face au nationalisme turc. L'alévité du Dersim et son rôle dans le premier soulèvement kurde contre Mustafa Kemal (Koçkiri 1919-1921)", Amsterdam (MERA Occasional Paper 18), 1993 —, "L'Alévisme kurde", Peuples Méditerranéens 68-69, Paris, 1994, p. 57-76 —, (dir.), Kurdistan und Europa. Einblicke in die kurdische Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, Zürich: Chronos, 1997 (KOMAL), Koçgiri Halk Hareketi. 1919-1921, Istanbul: Komal, 1992 (1975)

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MCDOWALL, David, A Modern History of the Kurds, Londres et New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996 MOLYNEUX-SEEL, "A Journey in Dersim", Geographical Journal 44, 1914, p. 4968 ÖZKÖK, Biirhan, Osmanlilar devrinde Dersim isyanlari, Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1937 OLSON, Robert, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism 1880-1925, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991 (1989) RIGGS, Henry H., "The Religion of the Dersim Kurds", Missionary Review of the World, London et New York, 1911, p. 735-743 ROUBEN, Mémoires d'un partisan arménien, La Tour d'Aiguës: édition de l'aube, 1990 SASUNI, Garo, Kürt Ulusal Hareketleri ve Ermeni-Kürt iliskileri, Stockholm: Orfeus Yaymevi, 1986 (1929-31) SEVGEN, Nazmi, "Koçkirili Aliter", in Tarih Dünyasi, sayi 9, Istanbul, 1950 SYKES, Mark, The Caliphs' Last Heritage, London, 1915 §ENER, Cemal, Atatürk ve Aleviler, Istanbul: Ant Yayinlari, 1991 TANKUT, Hasan Regit, "Dogu ve Güneydogu Bölgesi Üzerine Etno-Politik Bir inceleme", in: M. Bayrak, Açik-Gizlil Resmi-Gayriresmi Kürdoloji Belgeleri, Ankara: Özge, 1994 (1961), p. 218-232 - , "Zazalar hakkinda sosyolojik tetkiler", dans le même recueil (1935), p. 409490 TBMM (Tiirkiye Büyük Millet Medisi) Gizli Celse Zabitlari, Ankara, 1980, tome 2 TEPEYRAN, Ebubekir Hazim, Belgelerle Kurtuluç Savagi Andari, Istanbul: Çagda§ Yayinlari, 1982 ZÜRCHER, Erik Jan, The Unionist Factor. The Rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Türkisch National Movement 1905-1926, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984

5. THE ANATOLIAN ALEVIS' AMBIVALENT ENCOUNTER WITH MODERNITY IN LATE OTTOMAN AND EARLY REPUBLICAN TURKEY*

The Anatolian Alevis, an important heterodox minority, an offshoot of Shiism, are estimated to be a quarter of Turkey's population.1 Focusing upon the Alevis, this paper studies a little-known example of how religious affiliation, social change, and attempts at "modernization" were connected. It deals with the "modernization" of a state that, as the home of the Caliph, occupied a central position in the Muslim world. Islamization and Turkification - in a somewhat paradoxical combination - were the major social and demographic changes in Asia Minor during the 20 th century. They resulted from politics that impacted first on the Anatolian Christians but also influenced "heterodox" peoples, as the Alevis were and are. Abolishing the Caliphate, changing from Muslim to Turkish nationalism and declaring itself secular, the Kemalist movement, heir of the Young Turks, after 1924 won over many Alevis who, as members of a minority, had suffered persecution and marginalization in the Ottoman Empire. But contrary to the proclaimed egalitarian, supra-religious idea of the Republic founded in 1923, the Sunni Muslim Turks continued to dominate national and regional power relations, including where culture and identity were concerned. This made life difficult in "modern" Turkey, particularly for the Eastern, mostly Kurdish-speaking Alevis, who will receive most attention in this paper. They were confronted with conflicting models of modernization and finally experienced the dark side of state-centered coercive modernization.

*

A slightly different previous version of this paper is to appear in Monsutti, Alessandro/ Nacf, Silvia/ Sabahi Farian (eds.), The Other Shiites: From the Mediterranean to Central Asia, Bern: Peter Lang. Official data are not available.

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The onset of modernity among the Anatolian Alevis1 The Anatolian Alevis are a large religious minority living amongst the majority Sunnis in today's Turkey. They formed the most important nonSunni Islamic group in Ottoman Asia Minor. Nominally Muslims, they were not grouped in the recognized non-Muslim communities (millet) like the Christians and the Jews. American missionaries were the first Westerners to come into touch with them in the 1850s; they described them as "the most abused people", considered by Sunni Turks and Kurds as "worthless heretics, and not worth caring for", thus more oppressed by the "dominant race" than "any class of the Christian subjects".2 "Alevi" is the term for a number of different groups whose common characteristics are the adoration of Ali, the fourth caliph; their refusal of the Shari'a; an almost exclusively oral tradition; and an age-old history of marginalization under the Sultans after 1500. Traditionally, Alevism was largely a rural phenomenon. The multi-ethnic Eastern Alevis, who are partly (Kurdish) Kurmandjiand Zaza-speakers, were and are a minority compared to the mainly Turkish Alevis in Anatolia, who have been affiliated to the Bektasiye since the 16th century. 3 The existence or non-existence of the organizational affiliation of the dede (hereditary priest) with the Bekta§iye is in fact the main feature distinguishing what I call "Western" from "Eastern" Alevism, a distinction which goes back to the 16th century. Eastern Alevis do not have any common umbrella organization. Different dede lineages exist, each one independent of the others. However, enjoying both an age-old autonomy from the Ottoman state and the undisputed influence of its dedes, called Seyit, the region of Dersim (between Erzincan and Elazig) became something of a center of Alevism. 4 Dedes generally are said to be descendants of the family of the Prophet through his son-in-law Ali. That is the meaning of the term "Seyit" (Arabic: sayyid). The title of privilege, berat, and the genealogical tree, secere, written texts by which the Eastern Alevi dedes claim legitimacy, do not come from the Bektagi order, but from spiritual centers like Erdebil, For more detailed information on the Alevis' encounter with Ottoman reforms and the missionaries' "Protestant modernity" see my "Muslim Heterodoxy and Protestant Utopia. The Interactions Between Alevis and Missionaries in Ottoman Anatolia", Die Welt des Islams, vol. 41, no. 1, Leiden: Brill, 2001, p. 89-111, and Der verpasste Friede, p. 69-79 and 167-170. 2 Letter of George Nutting, Arabkir, 24.10.1854, ABC 16.7.1 (Archives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard); Sanford Richardson, "Arabkir", in Missionary Herald 1856, p. 295-98. 3 For this distinction see my "Die Aleviten im Wandel der Neuzeit", in Tamcke, Martin (ed.), Orient am Scheideweg, Hamburg: Dr. Kovac, 2003, p. 35-61. 4 Cf. Trowbridge, Stephen van Rensselaer, "The Alevis, or Deifiers of Ali", Harvard Theological Review, no. 2, 1909, p. 340-353, here p. 343 and 345.

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Kerbela and Meshhed. Sometimes these dedes also probably acquired titles of privilege from Ottoman religious officials ( n a k i b i ï l e ç r a j ) . In the 20 t h century migration, urbanization and a degree of Westernization were the principal factors of change for the Alevis. The West was not only welcomed on a technological or ideological level, as it was by state élites, but also early on affected ideas of political, social and individual life among many Alevis. The ambivalent attitude towards the authorities, still ultimately seen in the old tradition as Yezid,2 "the Prince of this world", persisted on the whole, notwithstanding the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. This is particularly true of the Eastern Alevis. As non-Turks and nonSunnis they were doubly excluded from a state traditionally based on Sunni Islam and, since 1923 (but beginning in 1913), Turkishness. The marked orientation towards the West has been an interesting element of continuity among Alevis (or Kizilba§3) throughout the 19th and 20 th centuries. It began with the Eastern Kizilbag's movement towards Protestantism in the mid-19 th century (a phenomenon not to be confused with pietistic conversion, but which constituted the Eastern Alevis' hopeful turning to the "Puritan modernity" of the American missionaries); it led to the great expectations aroused by President Wilson's idea of self-determination during World War I, the turning to socialism in the 1960s and, finally, the widespread approval of Turkey's joining the European Union. Too often, I think, Bekta§i-led Western Alevis are taken as representative of Anatolian Alevism in general. For better historical understanding, it can be helpful to choose a perspective focusing on an Alevism not molded by the Bekta§iye. As a matter of fact, international research of the last two decades has been concerned mostly with the Western Alevis. 4 Research in Turkey before the 1990s, beginning with the scholars affiliated to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 80 years ago, dealt exclusively with Western Alevis. The theory of Aleviness as genuine

For concrete insights into the region of Adiyaman cf. Neubauer, Anna, Dede'ye ziyaret (Visite au dede). La figure du dede chez les Alévis de la région d'Adiyaman, Turquie, mémoire de licence en ethnologie (unpublished), Université de Neuchâtel, 2001, p. 61-62. 2 Yazîd I. ibn Mu'âwiya, sixth caliph (680-83), considered as responsible for the tragedy of 3Kerbela (680). As they were normally called before 1900. This term refers only to the rural Alevis, especially the Eastern Alevis, not to the Bektashis. 4 Cf. the substantial chapter on Alevis in the Republic of Turkey in Shankland, Islam and society, p. 132-168, where he complains of this onesidedness (p. 135).

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Turkishness which it developed corresponded to the ethno-nationalistic need for early origins.1 From their beginnings in the second quarter of the 19 th century, the Ottoman Reforms (Tanzimat) had ambivalent consequences for Alevis and other Ottoman groups that hoped their status would be improved through fundamental changes. The banning of the Bektashiye in 1826, the official explanation of this measure, and the appointment of members of the Naqshbendi order to the Bekta§i organization early betrayed the reactive, defensive tendency of Sunni restoration inherent in the Tanzimat, despite the declarations of equality and progress based on European models. In fact, the proclaimed religious liberty was only very partially realized in the Eastern Provinces. The Alevis first started to lose confidence in their socio-religious system dominated by hereditary priests, the dedes, in the second half of the 19th century. Missionaries, above all American missionaries, built prestigious schools and hospitals in the Anatolian provinces. In their self-confident Puritan habit of mind, they penetrated the countryside, put up schools and hospitals, explained God and the world. They made a deep impression, especially on the heterodox. The result was an important movement toward Protestantism among Eastern Alevis, which was immediately repressed by the Ottoman authorities. This movement, however, had a strong and lasting symbolic impact. In the same period the Armenian educational renaissance took place, and the Ottoman state implemented its policies of centralizing and modernizing administration, army, education and health, but with uneven success in the Eastern Provinces. Under Sultan Abdulhamid these endeavors were closely related to harsh Islamist 2 policies to enforce Muslim unity, which escalated in the large-scale anti-Armenian pogroms of the 1890s. Sultan Abdulhamid II. himself implemented centralizing and modernizing concepts more effectively than any reformist before him. He worked actively to integrate the Alevis and other heterodox groups such as the Yazidis into the traditionally state-supporting iimmet (Muslim community), i. e. to turn them into Sunnis. He partly succeeded in reintegrating the Sunni Kurds by giving numerous tribes the status of privileged cavalry units, the so-

Cf. notably Kopriilu, Fuad, "Bemerkungen zur Religionsgeschichte Kleinasiens", Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte, vol. 1, Wien, 1922, p. 203-222, here p. 215; Baha Sait Bey, "Tiirkiye'de Alevi Zumreleri", Tiirk Yurdu, September, sequels in October and November 1926 On the new transliterated edition, Ankara: Tutibay, 2001: vol. 11, p. 105-12, 163-78, 201-8). For historians of the Ottoman world, Islamism as a modern and militant anti-imperialist call to Muslim unity is largely a product of the Ottoman Fin de siècle, especially when the Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) resacralized his power, patronizing revivalist movements and sheikhs. Cf. Karpat, Kemal H., The politicization of Islam. Reconstructing identity, state, faith, and community in the late Ottoman state, Oxford University Press, 2001.

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called Hamidiye. He founded an elite school for sons of tribal chiefs (the Mekteb-i A§iret), and sent out his own Hanefi missionaries to teach the numerous heterodox groups orthodoxy and mobilize the Muslims in the provinces for his policies. An important aspect of the destructive evolution of that region is that the Protestant and the Ottoman, especially Hamidian models of modernity clashed and thus could not achieve a creative synergy. The Alevis generally sided with the Protestants; during the anti-Armenian massacres in 1895/96, perpetrated mostly by local Sunnis, they were not involved, except in some cases of looting. The Alevi reactions to the reforms introduced by the state were mixed. They had welcomed the Tanzimat proclamation of equality, but feared the state's tighter control and its demand for taxes and soldiers. They naturally distrusted Abdulhamid's re-instatement of the Caliphate and suffered under the Hamidiye militias. In part, however, they also gained from the expropriation of many Armenians during the pogroms, even if they themselves did not participate in the slaughter. Some Dersim chiefs also sent their sons to the Mekteb-i A§iret. The request of certain Alevi tribes, however, to be accorded the title of Hamidiye was refused with the argument that only Sunnis could be accepted.1

The Young Turks' right-wing modernism: From Muslim nationalism to Turkism Many Alevis enthusiastically welcomed the Young Turkish revolution of 1908, but they experienced disappointment when five years later an antiliberal single-party dictatorship was established that made use of Islamic propaganda. Thus, what we have said with regard to the second half of the 19th century, in essence also holds good for the decade of Young Turkish rule (1908-18). However, and this is the important difference, for the first time since the Kizilba§ revolts in the 16th century, the watershed of 1908 briefly led the Alevis openly and collectively to reaffirm their identity. Emulating their Armenian neighbors, they even engaged in establishing village schools.2 In the fervent Turkish nationalist Riza Nur's biased view, the fact that the "Kizilba§ Turks" (the Alevis) were then emphasizing their own identity,

Cf. Sunar, Mehmet Mert, "Dogu Anadolu ve Kuzey Irakt'ta Osmanli Devieti ve Arretier: II. Abdülhamid'den II. Mesrutiyet'e", in Kebikeg, no. 10, Ankara, 2000, p. 115-130, here p. 123; Deringil, Selim, The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire. 1876-1909, London: I. B. Tauris, 1998, p. 68-111. Cf. White, George E., "The Alevi Turks of Asia Minor", Contemporary 1913, p. 698.

Review, no. 104,

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distinct from that of the Sunnis, was the result of "mendacious Armenian propaganda" during the Hamidian era.1 The later Kemalist Hasan Re§id Tankut, who in 1914 was a young official in the province of Sivas, looking back pointed to the influence of the Christian missions and described the mission schools in Mamuretiilaziz as "nothing else but stations set up in order to convey propaganda filled with hope [of change] to the Dersim".2 By contrast, the Kurdish Alevi writer Mehmed Nuri Dersimi, who went to highschool in Mamuretiilaziz before World War I, underlined the positive, modernizing and enlightening impact of these same institutions.3 The clash of different models of identity, reform and modernity is particularly obvious in the case of the international reform plan for the Eastern Provinces, a masterpiece of pluralist balancing, but a thorn in the CUP's side as it attempted to impose unrestricted sovereignty over Asia Minor. This plan was endorsed by the regime under international pressure on 8 February 1914. In applying the reforms, the aforementioned Hasan Re§id Tankut claimed that the Alevis would have voted side by side with the Armenians in the planned elections. That could have led to a comprehensive political reorganization of the Eastern Provinces. The Alevis and Armenians, hitherto isolated or clearly in the minority, would immediately have influenced not only the economic and cultural, but also the political life in those regions decisively. After the Balkan wars (1912/13) the CUP, which had established its dictatorial regime at the beginning of 1913, engaged in a comprehensive set of ethnically based policies aimed at the "national" homogenization of Asia Minor. These can be interpreted as a certain continuation of Abdulhamid's before-mentioned religious policies. They bore, however, the modernist imprint of secular ethno-nationalistic thinking. They began with the TurcoBulgarian population transfer (November 1913), continued with the disguised and illegal expulsion of Ottoman citizens of the Greek Orthodox faith from

* Nur, Riza, Hayat ve Hatiratim, vol. 3: Riza Nur-Ataturk Kavgasi, Istanbul: l§aret, 1992, p. 112. 2 Tankut, Hasan R., "Zazalar Hakkmda Sosyolojik Tetkiler", in: M. Bayrak, Agik-Gizli/ResmiGayriresmi Kiirdoloji Belgeleri, Ankara: Ozge, 1994, p. 409-490, here p. 472. Dersimi, Mehmed Nuri, Kurdistan Tarihinde Dersim, Aleppo, 1952, p. 45. Cf. my article '"Garib ellerde ve bi-kestim': l'exil chez Nuri Dersimi (1892-1973)", in this volume. 4 Tankut, Hasan R., "Dogu ve Gilneydogu Bolgesi Uzerine Etno-Politik Bir Inceleme", in: M. Bayrak, Agik-Gizli/ Resmi-Gayriresmi Kiirdoloji Belgeleri, Ankara: Ozge, 1994, p. 218-232, here p. 219. Cf. Davison, Roderic H., Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923. The impact of the West, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990, p. 196.

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the Aegean coast (beginning of 1914)1 and emerged as a vast set of measures of social and ethnic "technology" during World War I. Its main aims were the expulsion of the Greek, Armenian and, in part, the Assyrian Christians, the settlement of Muslim refugees from the Balkan and the Caucasus in their place, the general settlement of the nomads, and the dispersing of Kurds and Arabs throughout Anatolia. The Alevis as such were not concerned then. Contrary to the Christians, the non-Turkish Muslims - Kurds, Arabs and others - were seen as groups that could be assimilated, if necessary by coercion, to the Turkish nation under construction. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 officially recognized the "ethnic cleansing" that had gone on during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) for the sake of undisputed Turkish rule in Asia Minor. In March 1916 some Dersim Alevi tribes gathered together, occupied and then destroyed the towns of Nazimiye, Mazgirt, Pertek and £arsancak and marched towards Mamurettilaziz. The army however, succeeded in crushing this Kurdish Alevi revolt with a large contingent of troops which included many Shafi'i Kurds. In Harput the missionaries heard officials say they did not want one single (Alevi) Kurd left in the region; they wanted to deport them like the Armenians. Indeed a caravan appeared later in Harput with about 2,000 men, women and children from the former rebellious tribes, who were treated just as badly as the Armenians a year before - with the single exception that the men were not taken away separately and killed. The column, however, returned the following morning. The explanation, as was ascertained at the time, was that the tribes of Dersim, in a rare display of unity, had told the governor they would burn Harput to the ground if the deportees were not ordered to return immediately. 3 Further research would show how far this deportation was not only a punitive measure but already part of systematic ethnically-based policies that continued against the Kurdish Alevis after the revolt of Ko§kiri (1921) and especially in the 1930s. In order to make up for their lack of ethnological and sociological information about Asia Minor, which they claimed as the Turkish national homeland, the CUP had appointed some officials during World War I to travel Celal (Bayar), the chief of the CUP branch in Smyrna and later Prime Minister of the Republic, played an important role there. Cf. Sensekerci, Erkan, Türk devriminde Celal Bayar, 1918-1960, Istanbul: Alfa, 2000, p. 35-37; Bayar, Celal, Ben de yazdim, vol. 5, Istanbul, 196567, p. 1573. Cf. also Naimark, Norman M., Fires of hatred: ethnic cleansing in twentiethcentury Europe, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 43; Ladas, Stephen P., The exchange of minorities. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York: Macmillan, 1932 d. 1823. 2 Cf. Dündar, Fuat, Ittihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanlari Iskan Politikasi (1913-18), Istanbul: Iletigim, 2001. Cf. Riggs, Henry H., Days of Tragedy in Armenia. Personal Experiences 1917, Michigan: Gomidas Institute, 1997, p. 184.

in Harpoot,

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into the interior of Anatolia and conduct investigations.1 Esat Uras was given the task of collecting information about the Armenians. Baha Sait Bey was instructed to research Alevism-Bektashism. According to Sait, his mission was prompted by a population statistic, seized in the Anatolia College, which Protestant missionaries had compiled; it listed the Alevis as a former Christian grouping. This startled the CUP. The party elite deemed it necessary to counter such "separatist ideas" with arguments which Sait was instructed to develop and disseminate.2 The political scope of the investigation was to represent the Alevis as real "Old Turks". The CUP's discovery and enhancement of the Alevis did not serve to foster religious pluralism in Anatolia or the adoption of Alevism as a national religion. It was concerned with assimilating Alevism into an ethnonational body of thought. We, Sunnis and Alevis, are all Turks from the race of Oguz, Baha Sait is essentially saying. 3 Most of the Alevis in the Eastern Provinces felt threatened by this Young Turkish viewpoint: "istemeyiz mogollan", "we don't want the Mongols", cried out Ali§er, a militant Kurdish Alevi, assimilating Oguz and Mongols. 4 Moreover, the Alevis were disconcerted in the face of the enhanced status that the Muslim community (ummet) received as an exclusive warwaging community, mobilized by jihad (the §eyhiilislam had declared jihad on 14 November 1914). The Balaban tribe in the Erzincan region, however, is an example of how Zaza-speaking Alevis could partly be used by the CUP for its own purposes. Recently published correspondence between the Balaban chieftain Gul Agha and local representatives of the CUP, when compared with eyewitness accounts, makes it probable that some Balaban tribesmen were also engaged for massacres the CUP's secret organization Te§kilat-i Mahsusa 5 organized against the Armenians in 1915. Most Eastern Alevis, however,

* Cf. Diindar, Fuat, "ittihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Aragtirmalari", in: Toplumsal Tarih, July 2001, p. 43-50. 2 The palace interpreted this action as Kizilbag propaganda, though and prevented publication of the results in the Turk Yurdu (published only in 1926, see Baha, "Alevi", fn. 10). The Turk Yurdu was the organ of the pan-Turkish club "Turkish Hearth" (Turk Ocagi) that was closely connected to the CUP (in the eyes of devout Muslims it propounded ungodly beliefs). Cf. Birdogan, Nejat, ittihat-Terakki'nin Alevilik Bektagilik Ara^ttrmasi (Baha Sait Bey), Istanbul: Berfin, 1994, p. 11. 3 Baha Sait, "Alevi", p. 105-06. 4 Turkist ideology of race denied such origins, because the Mongols as a yellow race were not highly thought of. Aliger's poem is cited in Dersimi, Dersim, p. 155. ^ Ozgiil, Vatan, "Ittihat Terakki ve Balaban Agireti. Bazi Belgerler Igiginda Ittihatgilarin Agiret faligmalari", Toplumsal Tarih, December 2001, p. 38-42. Cf. Dersimi, Dersim, p. 68, and Lepsius, Johannes, Deutschland undArmenien 1914-1918, Potsdam, 1919, p. 86 and 94.

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succeeded in fleeing military service, refusing the Bektagi head Cemaleddin £elebi's call for Alevi participation in the army. 1 The terrible event of the extermination of the Armenians in 1915/16 was linked to the specific phenomenon of right-wing modernism in a Turkey on the threshold between old and new. For most of the Eastern Alevis the experience was traumatic. Identifying themselves with the Armenians, they lived for many years in fear of suffering the same fate, even if, materially, they also profited from the eviction of their neighbours. This is true, for instance, for the province of Erzincan, to where Zaza-speaking Alevis from Dersim had already begun migrating to in the nineteenth century and where they lived side by side with the indigenous Christians, for the most part peacefully. The latter had better fields, a developed infrastructure, and more advanced know-how in agriculture, trade and commerce. Their eviction during World War I, however, gave the Alevis an opportunity to improve their position. These facts help to explain the relative support Eastern Alevis there early on gave Mustafa Kemal, seeing that his movement was able to guarantee the status quo. Many Alevis, on the other hand, had strong reasons to mistrust Kemal Pasha's reorganisation of the CUP power network. They became the first "interior enemies" to openly oppose him in the revolt of Kogkiri-Dcrsim.2 At the end of 1919 Ali§er, the chief promotor of the Kurdish Alevi autonomy movement of Ko^kiri-Dersim, declared himself an inspector of the Caliph's army - a very surprising step for an Alevi, but understandable as a show of loyalty towards the liberal government in Istanbul - and, in this capacity, he called upon the tribes to resist Mustafa Kemal's unitary national movement. President Wilson's principle of self-determination was an important element of his Kurdist rhetoric. Around the same time, Mustafa Kemal made a pilgrimage to Hacibekta§ in order to win over the the chief of the Western Alevis, Ahmed Cemaleddin Celebi Efendi, who had already cooperated with Enver and Talat during World War I. He succeeded and, after the establishment of the Ankara government, made Cemaleddin the second vice-president of the Parliament in Ankara for a short time.3 A year later, in October 1921, the Kogkiri rebellion and the bloody suppression of it became a hotly debated topic in the National Assembly. In the end, the National Assembly adopted a plan drawn up by a commission for 1 Ba§bakanhk Osraanli Ar§ivi, DH.§FR 54-A/354; Dersimi, Dersim, p. 94-98, 115, 118, 280, 291. 2 On this point Baki Oz and other Kemalist Alevi authors are wrong (cf. Oz, Kurtulu§ Sava$i'nda Alevi-Bekta§iler, Istanbul: Yenigiin Haber Ajansi, 1997, p. 98).

Cf. Akin, Ridvan, TBMM Devleti (1920-1923). Idare, Istanbul: iletigim, 2001, p. 67.

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an autonomous administration of Turkish Kurdistan with a Kurdish regional parliament and Kurdish schools.1 But after its triumph in Lausanne in 1923, the regime abandoned the National Assembly's decision. Modern Kurdish claims for self-determination and the Eastern Alevis' anti-centralist, anti-CUP and anti-Sunni stance were closely linked in this first and meaningful clash with the Kemalist movement in Ko§kiri-Dersim.2 According to Riza Nur, then a highly placed Turkish diplomat, the agents of the rebellion couched their propaganda to the Alevis in the following terms: "We are Shiites in revolt against the Sunnis. Join us!" Several Turkishspeaking Alevis did in fact join the rebels. The Turkish nationalist and member of the National Assembly Halis Turgut Bey tried, with doubtful success, to convince the Turkish-speaking Alevis of the region that they were Turks and should support the Turkish Nationalists.3 But the term "Turk" in regional usage was very closely related to Sunni, i.e. to the state-supporting dominant class (the millet-i hakime).

Eastern Alevis in the Early Republic The aforementioned Erzincan Alevis were not equipped to pursue agriculture on the same high level as had done their Christian predecessors. Field surveys show traces of terraced fields, irrigation systems, roads and even mills where there are now only pastures.4 When speaking about their skilful predecessors, the village people (who preserve vivid but very partial memories) show an apparent inferiority complex. 5 Compared with the previous century, the economic and cultural life of the Eastern Anatolian towns and villages in fact regressed in the decades after World War I. Reality fell far short of the Young Turks' and Kemalists' rhetoric of civilization. Even in remote provincial towns the region had known some features of a Belle

1

See Olson, Robert, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism Texas Press, 1991, p. 39-41 and 166-168.

1880-1925, Austin: University of

2

For a deeper analysis see "Les Kurdes alévis et la question identitaire: le soulèvement du Koçkiri-Dersim (1919-21)", in this volume. 3 Nur, Hayat, p. 112. 4

I rely on some unpublished research concerning the cantons (ilçe) of Piiliimiir (province of Tunceli) and Çaglayan (province of Erzincan). 5

As early as in the 1930s it was a commonplace in the provinces to say that since the destruction of the Christian communities and the slaughter of the Armenians the towns had deteriorated, as early travelers' reports prove (see Ziircher, Erik-Jan, "TwoYoung Ottomanists Discover Kemalist Turkey: The Travel Diaries of Robert Anhegger and Andreas Tietze", Turkology Update Leiden Project Working Papers Archive, Department of Turkish Studies, Leiden University, http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/tcimo/tulp/Research/diaries.htm, 7 March 2007).

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Epoque 1 and notably the educational renaissance of the Eastern Anatolian Christians in the late Ottoman period; after World War I, the region remained depressed. The single-party regime established and maintained its power in these Eastern Provinces with large military expenditure. From the 1950s on, emigration became the only way out of an isolated and damaged world. Even far outside the province of Dersim/Tunceli, the Eastern Alevi villages offered no perspective of a better life. Subsistence farming prevailed to a large extent. The old commercial networks were destroyed. Eastern Anatolia had virtually no village schools until the 1960s; with few exceptions people remained illiterate. In rare cases, village schools were established in the 1920s or 1930s. The Turkish-speaking Mezirme for example (today's Ballikaya) in the canton of Hekimhan (province of Malatya) had for centuries been an important center of Eastern Alevism from where dedes made their annual tours throughout central Anatolia and into northern Syria. It had a tekke called Karadirek that was completely independent of the Bekta§iye. In 1926 a village school was established there as well as a gendarmerie station. One of the first actions of the appointed teacher and employee of the Republic was to destroy the tekke,2 Outside Dersim (renamed Tunceli in 1935) and especially in Western Anatolia, however, a fresh republican idealism motivated many Alevis during the single-party government (1923-45). The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 excited sympathy for the new regime. So, too, did the suppression of Sheykh Said's revolt in 1925, even among many Kurdish Alevis, because they interpreted this rebellion as a fanatical Sunni movement. The Kurdish Alevis who lived in Bingol, Mug and Varto, notably the Hormek and Lolan tribes, had a long history of conflict with their Kurdish Sunni neighbours. When their traditional enemies took part in Shaikh Said's rebellion (1924/25), they opposed the Kurds and threw their lot in with the Kemalist government.3 Outside Dersim the Alevis tolerated the banning of the tekkes in 1926 without resistance. The region of Dersim, renamed Tunceli in 1935, was the heart of Eastern Alevism and a well-known center for Alevis from Asia Minor to Syria. In the progressivist view of the Kemalist elite however, Dersim was an anti-modernist, obscurantist, feudalist and reactionary region, or, to quote one For this term in the late Ottoman context see in general Georgeon, François, Abdiilhamid II: le sultan calife (1876-1909), Paris: Fayard, 2003, and in particular my article "Alevilik as song and dialogue: The village sage Melûli Baba (1892-1989)", in this volume.

2

I rely on my (unpublished) research concerning this region, especially on information acquired by a retired teacher from there. Cf. Firat, Mehmet Çerif, Dogu llleri ve Varto Tarihi, Ankara: Türk Kültiiriinü Arastirma Enstitiisii, 1983 (1952), p. 161-198.

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high official, a "boil" that had to be lanced for the salvation of the country.1 This "operation" took the shape of the military campaign against Dersim in 1937/38. The campaign's emblematic figure was Turkey's first woman pilot Sabiha Gokgen, Atatiirk's adopted child, who bombed the Dersim villages. Despite the propaganda around the Dersim campaign in the 1930s, that it marked the progress of civilization, in the actors' deeper mentality old images and concepts of the enemy were reshaped in secular Social Darwinist terms. Around 1935, a secret report of the (military) Gendarmerie Command formulated the "Dersim problem" as follows in ethno-religious terms: "The worst aspect of Alevism, and one that deserves analysis, is the deep abyss separating [Alevis] from Turkdom. This abyss is the Kizilbag religion. The Kizilba§ do not like the Sunni Muslims, they bear them a grudge, they are their arch enemies. They call the Sunnis 'Rumi'. The Kizilbag believe that divine power is embodied in [human] carriers, and that their imams have been tortured to death at the hands of the Sunnis. Therefore they bear the Sunnis enmity. This has gone so far that for the Kizilba§, 'Turk' and 'Sunni' are the same, as are the names of Kurd and Kizilba§ [in Dersim]."2 Young Turks and Kemalists saw religion to a large extent as a given element of ethnic identity. Thus the state's conflict with the Dersim Alevis could only be solved by "radically exterminating the problem of Dersim through a general cleansing operation" by the army, as Prime Minister Celal Bayar said on 29 June 1938 in the National Assembly.3 In late summer 1938, leading men of Zaza-speaking Alevi villages around Dersim who had absolutely nothing to do with the revolt were arrested because of their relationship with Dersim tribes and killed by the military gendarmerie. The same fate befell Dersimis who did not participate in the struggle. Many survivors were deported to different places in Western Anatolia. The council of ministers decided the depopulation of different regions of Dersim (those of the Kalan, Demenan, Ko§ and §am tribes, between Cemiggezek and Erzincan) and the deportation of 5000-7000 people of Dersim on 6 August 1938.4 The council declared those zones forbidden

^ Hamdi Bey, Inspector of the Civil Services, 1926, cited in: Bcgikçi, Ismail, Turiceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi, Ankara: Yurt, 1992, p. 50-51. Jandarma Umum Kumandanligi, Dersim, [Gizli ve zata mahsustur]. Ankara: T.C. Dahiliye Vekaleti Jandarma Umum Kumandanligi, n.d. [c. 1935], p. 38-39, cited in van Bruinessen, Martin, '"Aslini inkar eden haramzadedir!' Le débat sur l'identité ethnique des Alévis kurdes", Etudes Kurdes, no. 3, Paris: Harmattan, October 2001, p. 7-40, here p. 20. 3 Akgill, Suat, Yakin Tarihimizde Dersim lsyanlarì ve Gerçekler, Istanbul: Bogaziçi Yayinlari, 1992, p. 155. 4 This is the officiai number, cf. Akgiil, Dersim, p. 155-156.

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level 3 zones, the highest level according to the Law of Resettlement (iskan Kanunu) of 1934. Level 2 zones were where people had to be deported to other regions in order to assimilate them into Turkdom. In level 1 one zones the number of Turks should be increased. Forced deportation of Dersimis had already been organized after the campaign in 1937. Robert Anhegger and Andreas Tietze, two scholars from Vienna who were then traveling in Western Anatolia (Eastern Anatolia was hermetically closed to outsiders), saw deported Kurds "loaded and unloaded like cattle by the officials" at the train station of Afyon-Karahisar in September 1937. In the ruins of a mosque in Aydin, they again saw Kurds of Tunceli. Uncared-for and completely destitute, they were "simply removed there and dispersed all over the country. They are dumped anywhere, without a roof over their head or employment. They do not know a single word of Turkish".1 Significantly, the little flock of Armenians in some provincial towns such as Kayseri proved to be the most helpful neighbors to this destitute people.2

Conclusion and outlook It is not surprising that many Alevis viewed the decline of Sunni power in the nineteenth century with satisfaction. They felt themselves confirmed in their centuries-old hopes. With astonishing ease and somewhat naively, many Kizilbag tribes and villages turned from the mid-19 th century on to the American missionaries, regarding them as long-awaited teachers. Western modernity, as represented by these men and women, the first to penetrate the countryside from the outside, fascinated them not so much in technical terms - as it did the Ottoman restorers and reformers - but for the free, self-confident disposition it reflected, and, surely, for the welfare it represented. The close ties of Ottoman and Young Turkish reformers with the endeavor to reestablish the undisputed rule of the Empire and its millet-i hakime, by centralization within the country and by arming to ward off external threats, made Alevis deeply suspicious, even if they gladly welcomed all liberal proclamations. But these proclamations were never lastingly implemented in the regions where Alevis lived.

^ Cited in Ziircher, "Travel Diaries " (see fn. 33). Author's interview in Izmir, September 2003, with people removed from Dersim to Kayseri in 1937/38.

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The state reformers early saw the dangers of what American missionaries - too smugly - called Islam's "internal breach" and "deadly wound" (the deep division within Islam from the beginning). 1 They made important efforts to overcome it. In this perspective we can interpret the Kemalists' abolition of the caliphate and their repression of Sunni Islam in the public sphere as a last radical attempt to heal the old breach. But the exclusive ethno-nationalism which served as an ideological ersatz for religion particularly alienated the Kurdish Alevis. The constructive dynamics of the Republic generally did not play any part in the Eastern Provinces, where the state of emergency, with a few interruptions, continued in force throughout the 20 th century. Despite the Kemalists' construction of their nation's prehistoric ethnic origins (the so-called Turkish History Thesis), Islam proved to be necessary, in the long term, as a crucial element of national, millt, identity. The quasiofficial "Turko-Islamic synthesis" of the 1970s-1980s confirms this fact. With the creation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 1924, Sunni Islam was integrated into the state from the beginning. Moreover, Sunni Muslim Turks determined the contents of the unitary "national culture" promoted by the Republic and retained control over public resources to a great extent. Radically Turkist 2 until 1945, the definition of this culture slowly shifted towards a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the dominant ideology in the last quarter of the 20 th century. In the second half of the 20 th century, the most profound social change in Alevi history since the 16 th century took place: the virtual end of the traditional rural Alevi organization that had secretly continued functioning during the single-party regime. This end coincided with the establishment of an urban Alevi diaspora, resulting from the massive migration of rural people, especially Eastern Alevis, to the urban centers in Turkey and Europe. Parallel to this process, a widespread leftist protest generation emerged in the 1970s. All this led finally to a spectacular public renaissance of Alevi identity in the urban context during the 1990s. But while teaching of religion, de facto Sunni Islam, has been declared obligatory in the schools since 1980 and Sunni structures, including the construction of mosques, have been massively sponsored by the state, the Alevis, as ever before, have seen themselves excluded from officially recognized culture in public institutions, public space and textbooks. Integrating the Alevis, particularly the Eastern Alevis, into a truly pluralistic society is thus still an important challenge which today's Turkey faces.

' White, George E., "The Shia Turks", Transactions of the Victoria Institute, vol. 40, London, 1908, p. 225-239, here p. 225-226. 2 "Turkism" being synonymous with Turkish ethno-nationalism.

6. DR MEHMED RE§ID (1873-1919): A POLITICAL DOCTOR

He was hard-working, tenacious, and a zealous patriot.* He was devoted to serving the "Ottoman nation", which he had come to view, since 1913, as being exclusively Muslim, and primarily Turkish. Dr Mehmed Re§id was among the founders of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). But unlike co-founder Dr Abdullah Cevdet, or other émigrés from Russia, Dr Ali Hiiseyinzade and Yusuf Akçura, he did not excel intellectually. Neither was he a member of the hard core of the committee that had been forming since 1906. Rather idealistic, and fancying himself to be incorruptible, he lacked the pragmatic sense of power of colleagues such as Dr Nazim and Bahaeddin §akir, or of his future boss, Talat Bey. All the more, he can be seen as a typical representative of the Unionist generation with a middle-class background and Western style education, while at the same time, a distrustful, proud and rigorous nationalist. It was a small elite, made up of a few dozens of people, which, led by a handful of figureheads, profoundly affected the fate of Turkey between 1908 and 1938. Dr Re§id was particularly implicated in the expulsion of Christians and the extermination of Armenians and Assyrians in 1914-16. My biographical study of Refid Bey offers to take an intimate look at a politicised generation along the course of a human life, and to highlight an individual. It is my intention to retrace the itinerary of Dr Re§id, to shed light on his intellectual and political socialization at the Military School of Medicine, on the role of his exile, on his career in the Unionist state, and on some fragments of his family life. I will only present an outline. A more indepth study would have to take account of a larger body of documents, including the correspondence of Re§id Bey as functionary, the judicial papers of Constantinople, as well as all of the items in the possession of his family. Moreover, two out of four of the diaries he had kept disappeared in 1960, according to Mithat §iikrii Bleda, his old party comrade.1

First published in Kieser, Hans-Lukas, and Schaller, Dominik J. (eds.), Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah! The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah, Zurich: Chronos, 2002, pp. 245-280. - More information on Dr Regid in Diyarbekir in 1915 can now be found in David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors. Muslim-Christian relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I, Piscataway N.J.: Giorgias, 2006. Bleda, Mithat §ükrü, Imparatorlugun Qökü$ü, Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979, p. 63.

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Contrary to a view widespread within academic circles in modern-day Turkey, 1 1 do not consider Dr Re§id as exceptional or extreme, but as quite ordinary and "typical" - as far as individuals can be seen so - of the Unionist elite during the Great War. Midhat §ukrii, then CUP Secretary General, very significantly says that many members of the party thoroughly shared the opinions of the vali of Diarbekir, but that after the cease-fire of 1918 they changed their language. 2 1 will emphasize the importance of the European and the very specific Ottoman Fin de siècle in Re§id's intellectual biography, but also argue that his decisive political radicalisation took place after 1909 and especially during the Balkan Wars in 1912/13. Finally I will reflect on the larger historical context of political doctors socialized at the turn of the 20th century. Dr Re§id is a terrifying figure, but there is also something tragic about him. A victim of the dynamics, fears and ideals that he shared with the members of his party, he, unlike many others, did not have the time to rewrite his past after having firmly established himself under the new regime. The writings he left behind therefore retain, in all their subjectivity, a rare authenticity. 3 Indeed he met an untypical end. Unlike the vast majority of Unionists, he was unable to manage his personal transition from the war regime under Talat and En ver to the national movement under Mustafa Kemal. Neither did he manage to flee abroad, as did the great party leaders. A few days after the armistice he was arrested by the Ottoman authorities, who accused him of being responsible for the massacre of the Armenians and the murder of two kaymakams who, in 1915, had opposed his policies in the province of

During the Orientalistentag in Bamberg in March 2001, for example, Turkish participants at the panel "Das politische Vokabular in der Türkei (19./20. Jahrhundert)" claimed Regid Bey to have been an extreme and exceptional representative of the Unionist current. 2 Güngör, Salähattin, "Bir Canli Tarih Konuguyor", Resimli Tarih, 5 July 1953, p. 2445. 3 I am using the edition by Nejdet Bilgi: Mehmed Regid [§ahingiray], Hayatt ve Hätiralari, ed. by N. Bilgi, Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1997. I will refer to it as "Bilgi 1997", but will cite the texts of Mehmed Reg id by their titles, e.g. "Regid, Balikesir Notlari", giving the page numbers according to Bilgi's edition, which comprises the following texts of Regid: 1) Ta^kqla Hattralari, pp. 57-64. 2) Balikesir Notlari, pp. 65-76. 3) Mülähazät: Ermeni Meselesi ve Diyarbekir Hatiralan, pp. 77-114. 4) GiinlUk: Tevkiften Intihara kadar, pp. 115-154. 5) Vasiyetnäme, pp. 157-58. 6) Hal Tercümesi: Kendi El Yazisi ile Biyografisi, pp. 163-65. 7) Arzt: 1911 Yilina Ait Bir Arzi, pp. 173-77. The edition Dr. Re$id Bey'in Hatiralari: 'Siirgiinden intihara', by A. Mehmetefendioglu, Istanbul: Arba, 1993, contrary to Bilgi's edition, only gives the censured version of Mülähazät and Günlük as they were published in 1919 in the newspapers Alemdar and Memleket. In addition, I will use the following text: Cevri (Mehmed Re§id Bey), inkiläb Nigin ve Nasil Oldu, Misir: Matbaa-i Ictihad, 1909. There is a new edition also by Bilgi (Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1994). I will cite it as Cevri, inkiläb. Most probably Cevri is a Pseudonyme for Mehmed Re§id (see N. Bilgi's arguments in the introduction: Cevri, inkiläb, pp. 11-23), even if before 1908 Mehmed Regid had used the CUP nickname "(Jerkes Lämi" od "Läli" (see Hanioglu, §iikrü, The Young Turks in Opposition, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 286-89, n. 410, n. 478, n. 487, and p. 356, n. 86).

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Diarbekir. He realized that he would be executed and therefore took his own life in February 1919, after having previously made an attempt to escape.

Curriculum vitae Let us first sum up the life of Mehmed Re§id §ahingiray, sometimes called (Jerkez Mehmed because of his origins.1 Born in the Russianadministered Caucasus on 8 February 1873, he would always carry a family name. Like so many other Muslims and Circassians, his family fled from Russian domination, and emigrated in 1874 to the empire of the Sultan. It installed itself in Istanbul, where the young Mehmed was brought up and educated. During his studies at the Military School of Medicine, the Mekteb-i Tibbiyye-i Askeriyye, Mehmed Re§id joined Ibrahim Temo, Ishak Stikuti, Abdullah Cevdet and Hikmet Emin to found a conspiratorial club, the Mhad-i Osmani Cemiyeti, which afterwards took on the name of ittihad ve Terakki, or Union and Progress. In 1894, Dr Re§id became assistant to the German professor During Pasha at the hospital of Haydarpasha. When the Hamidian police learned of his membership of the secret organisation, he was arrested and exiled to Libya (in 1897). For ten years, he stayed in Tripoli as a doctor in state service. There, in 1317 (1901/02), he married Mazlume Hamm, daughter of Adjutant Major (kolagasi) Ziya Bey, who was also an exile. When the Young Turks seized power in 1908, this provided Regid with a career opportunity: first, he served in the army, where he was soon promoted to kolagasi (in 1894, he had already obtained the rank of captain, but had been demoted in 1897). At the end of 1908, he tried to establish himself politically in the capital. It is during this time that he very probably wrote a booklet on the genesis of the Young Turk revolution.2 In 1909, he changed over to civil administration: he first became kaymakam of Istankoy (Archipelago), then mutasarrif of Hums (Tripoli), Lazistan (Trebizond) and Karesi (Balikesir). At the beginning of 1914, he was appointed secretary general of the §ark Vilayetleri Mufetti^-i Umumiligi, the general inspectorate created in order to implement the international reform plan in the Eastern Provinces. This plan was later revoked by the regime at the outbreak of World War One.

^ Not to be confused with ferkes Re§id, £erkes Edhem's brother (cf. Gorgulii, ismet, On Yillik Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922. Balkan - Birinci Diinya ve istiklal Harbi, Ankara : TTK, 1993, p. 43,44, 202). 2

Cevri 1979, cf. footnote 7.

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Vali of Diarbekir from the beginning of March 1915, Mehmed Re§id developed a particular zeal in the liquidation of Christian communities. From 26 March 1916 to 27 March 1917, Mehmed Re§id served as vali of Ankara, where, according to his daughter Nimet Burak, he desperately tried to combat wide-spread corruption within the army procurement service. In any case, he was removed from his post due to his involvement in these affairs.1 He returned to Istanbul with his family, where he got involved in the importing of perfumes. He was arrested on 5 November 1918, six days after the Moudros armistice. Aided by friends, he escaped, but the police managed to retrace him. It was then, on 6 February 1919, that he shot himself in the head. The Turkish parliament (Turk Biiyiik Millet Meclisi) in Ankara, founded on the 24 April 1920, assigned his family a pension for "services to the fatherland" rendered by the deceased (hidemât-i vataniye).2

Intellectual and political socialization at the Military School of Medicine Mehmed Re§id was part of a social stratum of Muslim immigrants from the Caucasus who had decisively influenced the Turkish national movement since the end of the 19th century. Deeply traumatised, this stratum had cultivated an exclusive Turkish-Muslim solidarity at an early date. It is within the circles of Turkish speaking Muslims from Russia that Turkism was born.3 Whereas the broad and influential movement of the Turkish Foyers, founded in 1911, had a clear ethno-national Turkist moulding, the Committee of Union and Progress, founded 22 years earlier, was nationalist in a Ottoman Muslim sense. Significantly, both movements originated at the Military School of Medicine, Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Askeriye, in Constantinople.4 At the end of the century, the Military School of Medicine was the meeting point of three elements fundamental to the Turkish national movement of the following decades: Western science, elitist political conspiracy and military institution. To quote a former Tibbiyeli (student of this school) from the end of the century, who very well conveys the 1

Cf. Talat Pasha's telegram of 22 March 1917 (BOA DH.KMS D. 44/1, n° 7), cited in Bilgi 1997, pp. 30-31. 2

3

Bleda 1979, p. 61.

Cf. Georgeon, François, Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), Paris: Ed. ADPF, 1980. 4 Cf. Sarinay, Yusuf, Tiirk Milliyetçiliginin Tarihî Geli§imi ve Turk Ocaklari 1912-1931, Istanbul: Ôtuken, 1994, pp. 121-127.

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atmosphere and attitude among the students: "The teachers and students were dominated by a deeply rooted 'Tibbiyeli spirit'. The school had been founded as an altogether Western institution. For a long time, medicine was taught there in French. This school was the first window of the Ottoman Empire open to the Western world. Those who studied there turned towards the West. The Tibbiyeli knew the difference between the East and the West, and bitterly resented the pain of being backward. For this reason, it was a hotbed of patriotism, of love of freedom, and of efforts to deliver us from oriental sloth and to raise us as quickly as possible to the high level of civilisation peculiar to other countries. The Tibbiyeli always assumed a rebellious attitude toward the despotic and reactionary administration of the last Sultans of the Ottoman Empire."1 In the 1870s Turkish became the teaching language of the Military School of Medicine as it had been the case in the Civil School of Medicine since its creation in 1867. The former now attracted more and more Muslim students from middle class or modest origins for whom teaching in French had been an obstacle. For those who were accepted, the free school offered upwards social mobility, promotion in the army and a secure state position. NonMuslims, who had had their fixed contingents at the Military School of Medicine, preferred the new Civil School. Complaints in the school archives show that they felt more and more uneasy in the former institution because their fellow students discriminated against them. 2 In the 1880s the Military School of Medicine became a center of mostly Muslim elite formation. The rising Muslim elite of the 1880s had been marked by the Turco-Russian "War of 1293", which had been catastrophic for the Ottoman Empire. This experience, the deep belief in positivist progress and a despairing pride encouraged the students to transgress old bonds of loyalty and solidarity. They felt resentment against their unsuccessful rulers as well as against nonMuslims. They also envied e.g. the Bulgarians for their political success in 1878, which had given them the chance to build up a modern nation-state. Several former Bulgarian students of the Military School of Medicine, who had served the Ottoman state, were now in high positions in the young Bulgaria. The Military School of Medicine constituted a formative environment, on a social, mental as well as an ideological level. The question: "How can this empire be saved?" haunted the young students, who could rightly believe themselves to be the predestined elite. The dramatic political, economic and military developments within the Ottoman Empire during the second half of 1

Saglam, Tevfik, Nasil Okudum, Istanbul: Atlas & Nehir lleti§im, 1991 (1959), pp. 74-75. I would like to thank Prof. Nuran Yildirim for this information.

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the 1870s served to underline the feeling that great events were lying ahead, and that, in order to save the fatherland, new directions and radical solutions were necessary. The desire to comprehend the forces underlying the new international order was great. The students wanted to understand the "strong" West. They read, learned, and discussed, most often within small circles. These were isolated in several ways: locked up in military boarding school, practically reduced to Turkish speaking Muslims sharing the same apocalyptic views ("end of the Muslim Empire"), and cut off from their fathers' generation, which they rejected due to being linked to the hated system of Abdulhamid. More even than because of his "despotism", the latter - who, all things considered, treated with much clemency these young rebels displying tyrannicidal yearnings- was despised for being incapable of applying modern recipes in order to restore imperial power. "The classrooms and the rooms of the final-year students were all centers of learning [meclis-i irfân]. There, one read, wrote, treated and discussed everything", writes Mehmed Re§id.1 Abdullah Cevdet was among those who consumed the most books. In 1888/89 (during his first year at the School), after having read Force et Matière by Ludwig Büchner, he completely broke with the religious spirituality he had cultivated up to then. Maybe this rupture is not as surprising if one considers the suggestiveness, the wide influence and the renown of Büchner, which would have enabled the students to identify with him. This "modern" author, himself a doctor, whose life the "reactionary" authorities had made difficult, had once been involved in the German revolution of 1848. Generally, an indirect, selective and filtered reception of European currents of thought took place. Not only was everything read in French (such as Kraft und Stoff by the German Büchner), but reception most often passed through intermediaries. Except for a couple of language professors, the teachers were Ottomans, most of whom had studied in Europe, mainly in Paris. Newspapers made up another important source of inspiration, reading forbidden papers in secret forming a daily ritual. 2 The fact that the French language constituted the medium for intellectual socialization favoured the reception of French thinkers, and when after 1895 many students decided to go into exile, they chose French speaking cities and universities. On 21 May 1889, according to Cevrî (Mehmed Re§id), five students from the Military School of Medicine - Arabkirli Abdullah Cevdet,

' Cevrî, inkilâb, p. 50.

2

Cf. Ibrahim Temo, Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin kurucusu ve 111 no'lu Ibrahim Temo'nun ittihad ve Terakki Amlari, Istanbul: Arba yay., 1987 (1939), pp. 12-13; Nur, Riza, Hayat ve Hatiratim. Riza Nur-Atatürk Kavgasi, 3 volumes, Istanbul: i§aret, 1992 (1967-68), vol. 1, p. 116.

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Kafkasyali Mehmed Re§id, Ohrili Ibrahim Edhem (Temo), Diyarbakirli Ishak Siikuti and Konyah Hikmet Emin - formed the conspiratorial core that would a few years later assume the name of ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Committee for Union and Progress (CUP).1 They were all convinced that "the dear fatherland was heading for disaster ". This was their starting point, and no other point would become equally important. Mehmed Re§id wondered how a large secret society could be erected that might win the battle "against the great despotic Satan", Abdulhamid. Ibrahim Temo reassured him by pointing to the example of the Greek committee Etniki Heteria.2 The conspiracy was sealed by handshake. In 1893, a large majority of the Askeri Tibbiyeli were to be members of the CUP, each with numbers and codenames to ensure secrecy. They called one another "brother", hardest.3 The pride of believing themselves to be the chosen intelligentsia charged by the nation with a mission, left an imprint on the entire Tibbiyeli generation of the end of the century.4 In a booklet written in 1909, Cevri informs us of open student propaganda activities in response to the great anti-Armenian pogroms of 1894-96: "After the painful event which the massacre of the Armenians (1310-1312) 5 was, we decided on a new strategy, which on the one hand consisted of attracting the attention of Europe, and on the other, of informing the people of the crimes committed by the despotic government. This greatly frightened the government, for in spite of strict police surveillance, we distributed pamphlets in public places and put up many declarations for example on the walls of police stations and the palace, or in mosques, schools, boats and trams." What was the content of these leaflets? Cevri sums it up: "All peoples bearing the title of 'Ottoman' are brothers. The massacre of the Armenians in Istanbul [August 1896] is a shame to Ottomans, but without a doubt, it is not the Turks, but the Hamidian government and its executioners who are to blame. Europe, demanding reforms in Turkey, is making use of this motif, and wants to declare Turks barbarians, and incapable of reforms. In order for the Yildiz [the sultan's palace] not to fall into this trap, one must strive to unite the different Ottoman peoples, and to topple the despotic government. In short, if we do not wish our destruction, let us unite all Ottoman peoples, and let us strive for freedom and to reinstate the law."6 Cevri, inkilab, pp. 48-51. Cf. Tunaya, Tank Zafer, Turkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, vol. 3: Ittihat ve Terakki, bir Qagin, bir Ku§agin, bir Partinin Tarihi, Istanbul: Ilcti§im, 1998 (1989), p. 27. 2

3

Temo 1987, pp. 13-15.

Cf. Cevri, Inkilab, p. 50, and Kuran, Ahmed Bedevi, Inkilap Tarihimiz Istanbul: Kanak, 2000 (first edition Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1945), p. 440. 4

5

ve Jon

Ttirkler

Nur 1967, vol. 1, pp. 115 et 124. According to the Mali calendar (massacre of Sassoun 1894-pogrome of Istanbul 1896). Cevri, inkilab, pp. 52-53.

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The "rescue of the fatherland" which would require the fall of the government, perceived to be weak, was always to be the first priority of the CUP and went hand-in-hand with defence against a European threat both real and imagined. Likewise, freedom, law, and (at times) Ottoman unity beyond Islam, were central, if relatively weakly developed, themes of the political leaflets. Another leaflet of the same year (1896) written by the founders of the CUP used a language less favourable to the Armenians, reproaching their defiance of "our state" through "insolent activities".1 Moreover, the personal trauma of persecution by the Hamidian government2 to a certain degree wiped out the major crime of the massacres of 1894-96 in the memory of the Unionists; nonetheless, this crime was still very prominent in the booklet published in 1909 by the CUP's founder.3 In 1897, soon after his arrest, the young Dr Re§id confirmed the central theme of the "war for the nation" in his notes. He explained himself to soldiers returning from the Greco-Turkish War of the same year, for whom he uses the honorific term gazi: '"Like you, we have waged war for the fatherland. You have waged war against those who have attacked our fatherland from outside, and you have won. We have declared war on those who harass the fatherland from within, and we are sure that we will win. We call to account those who ruin our country, exploit our villages, and cause our enemies to insult our religion and our nation. [...] The Ottoman element is shrinking. Ottoman land is disappearing piece by piece. Of this, we are witnesses, and we know who the culprits are. In order to make all this evil disappear, in order to rescue our working village dwellers and feed them well, we have declared war on these libertines, these tyrants, these enemies of the fatherland [...].' Speaking these words, I experienced a nervous shudder \ra§e-i asabiye He]. I understood that these words that sprang from my mouth mixed with tears were making a strong impression on our guardians." 4 As sincere as the patriotic commitment of the young Mehmed Re§id may have been, it carried in itself a powerful vision of evil. This young "idealist" did not understand to what extent the hope of saving the fatherland in fact connected him to his number one enemy, the "despot", whom he wanted to kill.5 Once the latter was to be dethroned, the logic of his Ittihadist beliefs would crave other "enemies of the nation". The Christian minorities were to serve this function. * Temo 1987, p. 42. See also points 1 and 2 of the regulations of the CUP in its first years: Tunaya, Tarik Zafer, Turkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, vol. 1: Ikinci Me§rutiyet Donemi, 1908-18, Istanbul: tlcti§im, 1998-99, p. 70. 3 4

Cevri, inkilab, p. 37. Cevri, Inkilab, pp. 42-43 and 52. Re§id, Ta§h§la Hattralari, pp. 57-63, here 60-61.

Probably at the end of 1896, Mehmed Re§id sent a letter to Ishak Siikuti of the CUP-center in Geneva asking to hire some "bloodthirsty anarchists" and send them to assassinate the sultan. Hanioglu 1995, p. 105.

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The right-wing heritage of the European and Ottoman Fin de Siècle The mental world of the Unionists bore the imprint of the right, whose identity was defined by a strong Feindbild (image of the enemy), paired with ethnic, racial and cultural references. In fact, what is striking in the analysis of Unionist thinking, is a marked preference for authors directly or indirectly connected with the right, that is to say, the extreme right in Europe.1 No important connection can be found to either the thoughts or the organisations of the left, which are however very present among the Armenians and Bulgarian Ottomans. From the start, the attitude towards non-Muslim Ottomans was very ambiguous.2 During the years preceding 1908, the Askert Tibbiyeli as well as the Unionist officers both admired the courage and the organisation of the Armenian and Bulgarian revolutionaries. But the fact that the Hntchak militants questioned the state in 1896 dismayed the Unionist conspirators, even though they themselves wanted to overturn the system. They were intrigued by the refusal of the Armenians to consider Russia a hereditary enemy.3 All things considered, they were part of the millet-i hakime (which can be translated as "Herrenvolk", or "master people"):4 the basis of their identity, which had become the unfortunate, helpless and despaired Ottoman nation (biçare millet-i Osmaniye). Mehmed Re§id would use these terms in abundance, but would always exclude non-Muslims from the community so designated. For the young Unionists the whole political situation was a matter of deeply offended "national honor", $eref-i milliye. It is no coincidence that they called the CUP a "national movement", hareket-i milliye.5 They had a poweroriented view from the center, with special focus on the Balkan. They were not able to see the helpless situation of e. g. many rural Armenians in the eastern provinces since the 1870s. The increasing and exclusive solidarity with

Ludwig Büchner for example was not an extreme rightist, nor antisocialist or antisemitic. But his materialist and Darwinist texts lend themselves perfectly to a right-wing reading (this and his approval the capitalism as an illustration for the survival of the fittest caused Friedrich Engels and all the dialectical materialists to criticize him harshly). Cf. notably his Am Sterbelager des Jahrhunderts. Blicke eines freien Denkers aus der Zeit in die Zeit, Giessen: Emil Roth, 1898, and his Darwinismus und Sozialismus oder Der Kampfund das Dasein und die moderne Gesellschaft, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1906.

2

Cf. Temo 1987, p. 17, and Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, Türk Inkiläbi Tarihi, vol. 2, part 4,. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991, pp. 115-19. 3 Cf. Temo 1987, p. 42; "Ermeni", in: §üräy-i Ummet, Istanbul, 13. 8. 1904, cited in: Bayur 1991, vol. 2, part 4, p. 111. Cf. Hanioglu, §ükrü, Preparation for a Revolution. The Young Turks, 1902-1908, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 300. Cevri, inkilab, pp. 29 and 41.

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Muslims was understandable in the context of the non-Muslim elites of Constantinople. Notably the Greek-Orthodox {Rum) neo-phanariots successfully managed multiple affiliations. They had profited most of the changes since the Ottoman Reforms (Tanzimat) and were still holding important offices during the reign of Abdulhamid II. The anti-Rum hate of the radical Unionists since 1912 had its roots in the perception of the Hamidian system. If during the first fifteen years or so, the CUP was still relatively open, the hard core of the committee, including the two Askert Tibbiyeli, Bahaeddin §akir and Nazim, as well as Talat Bey, would exhibit a pronounced anti-Christian and Turkist tendency from as early as 1906. According to §iikrii Hanioglu, it used a language suited to winning over the non-Muslim opposition for tactical reasons. The political language employed within the conspiratorial group, however, differed from it substantially.1 Ludwig Büchner, Ernst Haeckel, Carl Vogt, Emile Boutmy and Gustave Le Bon were among the influential figures most adored by the Unionist generation. The part of French positivism that was connected to the revanchist right exerted a very particular influence. This selective reception focused on the progressive, but anti-democratic (contempt of the "masses"), anti-egalitarian, and anti-humanist elements ("races" of different value). It left aside the idea, as dear to the father of French positivism, Auguste Comte, as to the materialist Ludwig Büchner, of a "church of humanity".2 With regard to the attitude towards religion, it is useful to return to Büchner, one of the "icons" (Hanioglu) of the Unionist intellectuals.3 It is to his ideas that Abdullah Cevdet converted in 1889. Büchner, himself a doctor, was a materialist, a Darwinist and a racist. To him, reality equaled "nature": that which is described by the natural sciences. Consequently, the laboratory became the "edifice of wisdom", the hikmethane, as the Tibbiyeli regularly called it.4 Man was nature's product, determined by the laws of nature, by race, and by the law of "survival of the fittest". God was nothing other than impersonal nature as conceived by the leading sciences of the end of the century (biology, chemistry, physics), or rather, as a certain perception of the natural sciences pictured it.

Hikmet Bayur already cited a letter party is a party purely Turk[/ia/w bir against Islam and Turkdom [islamlik 115. 2 Cf. Bozarslan, Hamit, Les courants doctorat en Histoire, s. la dir. de F. Hanioglu 2001. 3 Hanioglu 2001, p. 313. 4

Saglam 1991, p. 85.

by Bahaeddin §akir and Nazim of 1906 saying that "our Turk cemiyeti | that will never admit opinions of people ve Turkluk]." Bayur 1991 (see fn. 28), vol. 2, part 4, p. de pensée dans l'Empire ottoman. 1908-1918, Thèse de Furet, EHESS, Paris, 1992; Hanioglu 1995 (see fn. 5);

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"It was a student's pleasure which delighted me no end, that we would mock the administration, the sultan, people in high positions and other grave matters, and that we would make fun of religion", wrote one Tibbiyeli. Religion and devotion to the Hamidian system went hand-in-hand. Religious education, which was mandatory in school, culminated in the phrase: "Be a soldier under Abdulhamid Han / He must be obeyed by order of the Koran." Every evening, in accordance with military discipline, the Tibbiyeli fell into rank to shout "Long live the sultan". But they preferred to say nothing, or to transform the phrase into a curse, and so by contrast devised slogans exalting the fatherland, the nation, freedom and science.1 "Virtue" and "discipline" were some of the notions charged with a very positive meaning. Primarily, this meant the disciplined solidarity (tesanud) of a conspiratorial group that did not hesitate strictly to apply excommunication (afaroz) to those who did not share the same rebellious and missionary patriotism.2 Secondly, and importantly, they implied a scientific, methodical and disciplined attitude. Several Tibbiyeli, with Mehmed Re§id among them, saw this practiced notably among the German professors that they would later serve as assistants. Less liked, but no less formative were the discipline, the distrust and the daily control exerted by the military establishment in which the Tibbiyeli spent their youth. Mehmed Re§id was later to be shaped by experiences and scraps of ideas drawn from his student environment: conspiracy, elitism, generational rupture, loss of traditional beliefs, Ottoman-Muslim (or Turkish-Muslim) solidarity, and the hate of everything that appeared to him to run contrary to OttomanMuslim power. Being a Circassian immigrant partly reinforced these elements, notably the hate of non-Muslims, and the distrust of local notables who did not always behave exactly according to central politics or party principles. Although it would not fit in his self-image, he was to become intransigent. Apologetic as it is, the only passage in which Mehmed Regid refers, in 1919, to his personal life as a student, provides us with interesting leads as to the nature of his "virtue": "At school, in exile and as a functionary I always desired law and justice; I respected the rights of my friends and peers; I was calm and considerate in my duties; at secondary school, at high school, and at the School of Medicine I always had the friendship and confidence of all my companions; I never took part in certain villainous behavior, and abstained

1 Nur 1967, pp. 123-134 et p. 252, citation p. 127, distich cited in Georgeon 1980, p. 14. Cf. Saglam 1991, pp. 77-79. 2 Tefvif Saglam tells how a student was practically killed by the measures of excommunication applied against him (Saglam 1991, p. 75). Cf. Nur 1967, vol. 1, pp. 115-116.

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from any sort of rudeness, such as the impertinence and boastfulness that was widespread among students. My friends and fellow students can testify to this if necessary." Subsequently, the text tells us of the political attitude particular to the author: "At the age of twenty [1893], I was a member of the Union of Islam Committee [ittihad-i islam Cemiyeti], and at this age, I wrote a memorandum that aimed at Muslim unity in a way which probably had not even occurred to the office of the Cheikiilislam: to grant all peoples and particularly Arabistan considerable freedoms, maybe even, given time, and gradually, administrative autonomy. It is easily proven that I have always defended this opinion within the circles of Union and Progress, among my friends, and wherever I served as a functionary." 1 This "federalist generosity", though, would be limited to the Muslims, the "ruling nation" (millet-i hdkime).2 Mehmed Re§id did not possess the intellectual agility of his comrade Abdullah Cevdet. Moreover, he did not free himself as completely from his faith. 3 Despite a very probable religious crisis, he would stay, just as Yusuf Akgura, 4 profoundly attached to Sunni Islam, both as an identity and as a culture, but also, unlike Ak§ura, to the idea of Islamic Unity (if his affirmation above is to be believed). Like almost the entire generation of Unionists, he would view Islam in terms of ethnicity, not just as a verbal, theological confession. That said, Regid Bey incorporated the "new ideas" of Europe into his thinking, in as much as they suited him. It is in this manner that he would later consider the country's problems as diseases in the body of the nation, and would apply to them, as he would say, the remedies of a bacteriologist or a surgeon. All the more as "Europe's political doctors", as he early on came to believe, "had sentenced the 'ill man' [the Ottoman Empire] to a speedy death". 5 Detachment from the confessed faith (linked to the break between generations) went hand-in-hand with a deep attachment to an "irrational" identity hiding behind the magic word "national" (milli). The imagined national community was thought to descend from an obscure prehistory and ethnicity, while retaining the idea of Muslim solidarity. The result was a partly racial and partly religious aversion to non-Turks and non-Muslims. This hypostasis of a community through the term of "nation" is a

2

Resid, Hattralari, pp. 79-80. "Millet-i hakime" is a recurring key term in the language of Regid Bey.

Cf. for example in a text of 1911 "herkesin zulm ve istibadla titredigi ve Cenab-i Hakk'i birakip Kizil Sultan'a ibadet eyledigi", Regid, Am, p. 176. Cf. too Cevri, inhlab, pp. 37-38. 4

Georgeon 1980, pp. 14 and 17-18. Cevri, Inkilab, p. 28.

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phenomenon of prime importance, common to all ideologies of the right. It explains the character and the radical nature of the Unionist movement. Incapable of maintaining a dialogue between generations, the Unionists lost or shattered their traditional theocratic world and grafted an ideological discourse made up of scientific scraps, religious fragments, revolutionary ideas and political opportunism onto the theocratic system - but maintained the will to imperial power. The Unionists affirmed the constitution, a sign of modernity, but scorned democracy. While atheism was cultivated on the inside, the fight for Islam was preached to the (despised) "masses". They exalted "freedom" without believing in freedoms. 1 They pretended to be enlightened, in contrast to the Hamidian generation, while clinging to new myths. Unlike Bahaeddin §akir and Nazim, Mehmed Re§id was initially not among the most radical exhibiting clear anti-Christian tendencies. At least until 1909, he seems to have preserved the spirit of openness which the founding group of the CUP had once possessed at least in part. The German professor Ernst von During (1858-1944) probably exerted a moderating influence. This dermatologist, working at the hospital of Haydarpasha with the young Dr Mehmed as his assistant from 1894 to 1897, was not a member of the positivist elite of the turn of the century, that believed it could solve society's problems by directly applying recipes drawn from the natural sciences. While conducting a research project - the professor and his assistant were inquiring into syphilis in the provinces - he did not shut his eyes to social realities. He proposed reforms and good education, without giving in to the temptations of social engineering.2 However, Regid Bey, like many Unionists of the first hour, had no political sympathies whatsoever for a Germany whose interference in Turkey he feared, and which had, "as the blood of our Armenian compatriots was flowing in streams", basely courted the sultan.3

Cf. my "Die Sprache politisierter Ärzte im ausgehenden osmanischen Reich", in: Kieser, Hans-Lukas (ed.), The political language in Turkey (19th-20th cc.), Istanbul: Isis, 2002 pp. 7190. Concerning islamist discourse used in Unionist tracts cf. Hanioglu 1995, pp. 115-116. 2 The direct transfer of scientific and technical concepts upon society gave an inhuman face to the tendances of social hygienics of that time and grew worse under totalitarian systems. Back in Germany, Ernst von During however had other preoccupations and was engaged in social education with humanist principles. Cf. Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie, München: K. G. Saur, 1995, p. 639. During, Ernst von, Legons cliniques sur la syphilis, Brüssel and Paris, 1898; idem, Die Bordellfrage, Referat, Leipzig: Metzger & Wittig, 1905; idem, Grundlagen und Grundsätze der Heilpädagogik. Vorlesungen für Lehrer, Erzieher und Studierende aller Fakultäten, Erlenbach-Zürich: Rotapfel-Verlag, 1925; idem, Jugendliche Prostituierte. Eine grundsätzliche Frage, Frankfurt a. M.: Kern, 1928; idem, Sexualpädagogik, Erlenbach-Zürich: Rotapfel-Verlag, 1930. 3 Cevrf, Inkiläb, p. 42^43.

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For his assistant, who had suffered arrest, degradation and exile in 1897, Ernst von During wrote an excellent doctor's certificate in French that underlined his professional and human qualities.1 In the interest of a balanced and multi-dimensional portrayal, it will be useful to keep in mind this letter, which is probably more than just a recommendation made out of kindness. We must fathom the transition from the "intelligent and upright" young man of the 1890s to one of the people mainly responsible of the mass killings in 1915.

Functionary of the Young Turk government Apart from what we have already said in the curriculum vitae, we know hardly anything more about Re§id Bey's exile in Tripoli. He seems to have had a happy time there, devoted to his family, to his job at the hospital, to discussions with his friends and to some endeavours in education. In 1900 he prompted the exiles to open a library in which lectures were given to the inhabitants on basic subjects.2 In August 1908, Mehmed Re§id returned from Tripoli to Constantinople with his other exiled friends. In December, he was promoted to adjutant major, and worked as a military doctor for a couple of months. "In order better to serve my country, I found it necessary to change my profession." On 20 August 1909, he resigned from military service.3 In the capital, the old exile became involved in politics. It seems surprising to see him temporarily associate himself with the movement of Prince Sabahaddin, which was constituted as a liberal party, Firka-i Ahrar, in September 1908.4 Why did Re§id Bey want to join them? We lack sufficient information to provide a clear and straightforward answer. Certainly, like the other surviving founders of the CUP, Mehmed Bey was no longer at the center "Le docteur Rechid Efendi, actuellement à Tripoli de Barbarie, a été pendant presque trois années mon adjoint, dans le service de dermatologie et syphiligraphie de l'hôpital Haidar Pacha et pendant mon voyage fait sur ordre du gouvernement Impérial dans le vilayet de Castamouni pour étudier la question de syphilis dans ce vilayet.- J'estime le docteur Mehmed Rechid Efendi comme homme et comme médecin. Il est devenu mon ami par son intelligence, par la droiture de son caractère et par le zèle déployé dans le service. Comme médecin il a acquis de bonnes connaissances; comme spécialiste en dermatologie et de syphiligraphie il a acquis des connaissances qui le rendent apte à diriger avec plein succès un grand service - C'est pour moi un plaisir et une satisfaction de lui écrire ce certificat parce que je peux le faire de meilleure conscience. Je lui souhaite l'occasion d'appliquer ses connaissances et de se distinguer comme médecin.- Constantinople, 16/28 octobre 1897. Prof. Dr. med. E. von Düring. Professeur à l'Ecole Impériale de médecine. Médecin et chef du service de dermatologie et de syphiligraphie à l'hôpital de Haidar Pacha." See the facsimile in Mehmetefendioglu 1993, p. 116. 2

3

Hanioglu 1995, p. 207. Rcsid, Hal Terciimesi, p. 164.

^ Tunaya 1998, vol. 1, p. 175.

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of the party he had founded, What appealed to him in Sabahaddin's group was no doubt the emphasis laid on private initiative, for he was skeptical of the state as it presented itself at the time, with Hamidian functionaries still in place. 1 Besides, he was not against decentralization, as we have seen, on condition that it would take place under the roof of Muslim unity. But the prince's consideration for minorities could hardly have pleased him. Even so, Dr Re§id was not yet the radicalized anti-Christian that he would become by the outbreak of the Great War. The text he wrote at the end of 1908 or at the beginning of 1909 on the genesis of the Young Turk revolution provides us with significant evidence of this. Within it, he vividly complains of the massacre of the Armenians, whom he without hesitation calls compatriots. 2 This would no longer be the case in his later writings. In the tense atmosphere prevailing in the capital after the attempted coup d'état of April 1909 (31 Mart Vakasi), those with political ambitions had to tread carefully. As a matter of fact, in the same year, Dr Regid found himself no longer associated with Sabahaddin. Looking back, Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, a friend and disciple of the prince, wrote: "One despotism had just crumbled [that of Abdulhamid in 1908], but a new one had been founded in its place [that of the CUP in 1909]. Recognizing that the Committee for Union and Progress was unwilling to compromise, a few figures from Teçebbiisiï §ahsi [Sabahaddin's Party of Private Initiative] [...] came to terms with Union and Progress by accepting the positions offered to them. [...] Dr Regid was among those who changed sides."3 On 9 October 1909 Mehmed Re§id was installed as kaymakam of Istankôy in the Archipelago. In February 1910 he was promoted to mutasarrif of Hums in the province of Tripoli, only to be removed in June 1911, accused by the provincial authorities of having failed to remain impartial in the administrative affairs of the sancak. With the Unionists in place, however, the Osmanli ittiliad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Hums Livâ Heyet-i Merkeziyesi thanked him in a letter of 19/20 June for his valuable services to the nation, the fatherland and the party.4 A memorandum on the state of Tripoli, probably addressed to the vali, sheds some light on the reasons behind the transfer. It is revealing of the character and the attitudes of the mutasarrif, who was then 38 years old Cf. Re§id's memorandum of 14 October 1904 to the Hamidian authorities, in which he criticizes the insufficiency and irresponsibility of the Ottoman administration at Tripolis. Bilgi 1997, p. 17.

2 3

•

Cevrf, Inkilab, p. 42.

Kuran, Ahmed Bedevi, Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Jon Turkler, Istanbul: Kaynak, 2000 (1945), p. 328. Cf. Bilgi 1997, pp. 18-19.

4

Bilgi 1997, pp. 20-21.

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(1320/1911). In it, Dr Re§id complains of the grave insufficiency of medical care and preventative measures for civilian travelers in the kaza of Misrat. He gives advice, and warns of the possibility of dire consequences for the entire province. This conduct, rather audacious for a kaymakam, as justified as it might have been, was framed by a militant patriotic discourse, very instructive of the self-image cultivated by the new functionary: " My life bears witness to the fact that your servant does not waste his time on speeches, but instead devotes himself to action and to effort [efal ve mesai]. I am proud of having been, at the age of 17, among the founders of Union and Progress [...]. Since this time, my life has served to bewail the misfortune of my nation and my country, and to exact revenge on those responsible for this misfortune." 1 He gives an example of his zeal "for the defence of the rights of his country [memleketin hukukunu miidafaa]" in retelling an event that occurred during the month preceding the revolution of 1908, when the parliament of the city of Tripoli presided by Hasan Pasha wished to "give one of the most respectable landed properties to the Italians out of friendship for Nejad Bey, son of the vali ". Mehmed Regid regarded this action as a crime against the fatherland: "In order to excite religious fervour [gayret-i diniye\ and national zeal [hamiyet-i milliye] I was not ashamed to execrate [telin etmek] the entire despotic government, including Abdulhamid." In a note above the line, he explains: "In crying out publicly that all those who perpetrated such a crime Abdulhamid, the vali, the city council - were traitors, I took neither my situation nor my future into account, nor even my own life, and proved that life would be without value to me if the fatherland were lost."2 This patriotic confession was coupled with the conviction of having rendered excellent services as governor of Hums. He emphasizes the order and discipline acquired thanks to his kaymakamlik. Toward the end of the text, he declares: "Consequently, it is clear that I shall continue, as I have always done, to pursue with all my strength the duty which I consider as sacred as my honour."3 One hardly doubts the good faith of the author of this memorandum, who proudly presents himself as founder of the CUP, fervent patriot and man of action. Even so, his intransigence is a little disconcerting. With the missionary fervour of a Jacobean, he declares himself prepared to sacrifice everything for the highest value known to him: the fatherland. Reserving no special treatment for either local notables or higher authorities, he wants to vent his anger on all those responsible in his eyes for the sufferings of "my

' Re§id, Arzi, pp. 175-176 2 Regid, Arzi, p. 176. 3 "namusum derecesinde mukaddes bildigim vazifemi", Re§id, Arzi, p. 177.

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nation". Already at the outbreak of the War of Tripoli (September 1911— October 1912), we are dealing with a Re§id as a functionary prepared to go very far for "his own". After a brief intermezzo as mutasarrif of Kozan, already on the 25 July 1911, Re§id Bey was appointed mutasarrif of Lazistan (Rize), a post from which he was removed on 10 September 1912 for his belligerent behavior. Siileyman Nazif, at the time employed in the vilayet of Trebizond, in a retrospective article described the mutasarrif of Lazistan as a legalist (kanunperest) whose incorruptible character inspired personal respect, and promoted discipline within the administration.1 Administrative inquiries followed that would, on 7 November 1912 return to Mehmed Re§id the right to continue in his office. It is not until after the establishment of a Unionist dictatorship (23 January 1913) that we see Mehmed Re§id once again solidly installed in a position. On 7 June 1913 he was very briefly reinstalled in Lazistan, and then, on the 8 July 1913, appointed mutasarrif of Karesi (province of Bahkesir), where he remained until 23 July 1914.2

Establishing anti-Rum and anti-Armenian views At Karesi, for the first time, the patriotic fervour of Dr Re§id was expressed through large-scale anti-Christian actions. He was one of the protagonists of the policy of illegal expulsion of Greeks from the Aegean coast, a violent policy hardly concealed from diplomatic circles, and executed by party and government organs. The Unionists saw it as retaliation for the evil which, according to them, the Muslims under Greek domination had been suffering since the Balkan Wars.3 The person of the mutasarrif of Karesi united party and government affiliation. His hasty deployment to the region seems to have served appropriate plans. Foremost, he devoted his office to the expulsion of the Rumlar (Greek-Orthodox Ottomans) and to the resettlement of the Bulgarians from the cities and villages of his government.

1 "Doktor Refid", Hadisat, 8 §ubat 1919, entirely transliterated in Bilgi 1997, pp. 167-171, here pp. 168-169.

Bilgi 1997, p. 21. While the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria in November 1913 concluded the first intergovernemental treaty for population transfer in modern history, the talks with Greece did not happen. Therefore the Unionists implemented secret politics of expulsion by spreading panic in the Rum villages from the beginning of 1914. Cf. BOA DH.KMS 17/29, cited in Bilgi 1997, p. 22; Naimark, Norman M., Fires of hatred: ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 43. §en§ekerci, Erkan, Turk devriminde Celal Bayar, 1918-1960, Istanbul: Alfa, 2000, pp. 35-41. Cf. infra.

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Anti-Christian Unionist attitudes, already present in nucleo, had become radicalized during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. A year before the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War One, the Unionists had formed a highly destructive view of the Anatolian Christians: They represented "a mortal worry",1 a "tumour" requiring operation. "Union and Progress had taken a final decision. The sources of trouble ['boils of discord', giban ba§lan] had to be eliminated, the Rumlar had to be liquidated \tasfiye etmek] by political and economic measures. At the very outset, the Rumlar who were economically powerful needed to be broken and destroyed", wrote the nationalist author Nurdogan Tagalan in 1970. Celal (Bayar) Bey, head of the Smyrna cell of Union and Progress in 1914, confirms in his memoirs that the CUP and the ministry of war, run by Enver since the 3 January 1914, were, parallel to the regular activities of the government, working towards the liquidation of "concentrations of non-Muslims" in the Aegean region; and he details the methods of intimidation used in order to "encourage" them to emigrate. Especially after the international reactivation of the reform issue for the Eastern Provinces in 1913, the Unionists established negative views of the Armenians similar to those of the Rumlar. The Balikesir Notlari of Mehmed Re§id contain a blend of social frustration and nationalistic aversion. During an excursion between 29 July and 7 August 1913, he recorded the then current state of affairs, and projected a "better" future without Rumlar, writing on paper bearing the letterhead "Secretariat of the mutasarriflik of Karesi". 4 The dream of a modern administration and infrastructure went hand-in-hand with the establishment of unrestricted Turkish-Muslim domination, politically, economically and demographically. Thus, it is through very "nationally" tinted glasses (with religious and racial connotations) that the mutasarrif perceived the situation. What resulted, was a polarised image: on the one hand, the Rumlar, socially envied and viewed all the less favourably as they were prospering in many places; and on the other hand, the good Muslims and their (sic) state, which must be strengthened at all cost, because they were subject to exploitation and Christian intrigues. Mehmed Re§id mentally anticipated the order which six

2

Bayar, Celal,

Ben de yazdim,

vol. 5, Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1965-67, p. 1573.

Tasalan, Nurdogan, Ege'de Kurtulu§ Sava.si baislarken, Istanbul: Milliyet, 1970, p. 65, cited in Ak5am, Taner, insan Haklari ve Ermeni Sorunu. tttihad ve Terakki'den Kurtulus Sava§i'na, Ankara: Imge, 1999, p. 179. 3

Bayar 1965-67, p. 1573.

4

Cf. Bilgi 1997, p. 46.

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months later Enver Pasha would give the Special Organisation in the Aegean region: "separate the loyal ones [Muslims] from the traitors [Christians]".1 In Summer 1913, Mehmed Re§id was thus a high Unionist functionary who, in his private notes, no longer considered the Rumlar as compatriots, vatanda§lar, but as inner enemies against which the severest measures needed to be taken, including expulsion. His journey seems to have been the preparation for this. In Karesi, his rigorousness fuelled dispositions bearing the imprint of social and national hate as well as social engineering: social, economic, ethnic and demographic "technologies" inspired by "scientific" concepts. 2 The goal was the instalment of modern "national" structures, visible through good roads, tramways and beautiful public buildings. One had to shatter the regional reality as it then existed. The towns and villages needed to be re-planned in order to strengthen the Muslim element and concentrate economic prosperity into its hands. Functionaries were needed who were more nationalist, and a police force which was better equipped. Let us take a closer look at the Balikesir Notlan. On the first day in Ivrindi, he notes: "The [local] Rumlar have stayed perfectly Rum, made rich thanks to the Balya [mining] Company".3 The following day in Edremit, he accused the kaymakam of being "too closely and disagreeably connected with the metropolitan". With regard to the villages, he writes: "In this region, the villagers [Muslims] do relatively well. But they cannot duly profit from their produce, or better said, from their hard work [sa'yilerinden]. The monopolists and oppressors [Rum] do not permit them to open their eyes." Here once again, the social cleavage which the author denounces is also seen in terms of ethnic opposition. Continuing, he writes: "In Edremit, a national and a commercial sentiment have awakened. A rivalry directed against the Christians has arisen." 4 What also disturbs the modernity projected by Re§id, is the nomad phenomenon. "Here [in the region of Ilica] there are Wallachs, coming from Teselya as nomads. [...] By the fact that they are mobile and nomadic, they constitute a risk to security. Some of them work as sawyers. They must all be expelled."5 Ayvalik appealed to Dr Re§id, hut it was "unfortunately a Greek [Yunan] city. The city is extremely prosperous, very ordered, the houses are very pretty. But the inhabitants are generally Rum. The writings in the shops * Meeting of 23 February 1914 at the War Ministry, cf. Kutay, Cemal, "Tiirkiye Nereye Gidiyor ?", Sohbetler, Eyliil 1969, no. 10, p. 69, cited in Akfam 1999, p. 178. 2 Cf. Diindar, Fuat, "Ittihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Ara§tirmalan", in Toplumsal Tarih, July 2001, pp. 43-50. 3 Re§id, Balikesir Notlan, p. 65. Regid, Balikesir Notion, p. 66. Regid, Balikesir Notion, p. 68.

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are Greek [Rumca]; even the street names are Greek. The government has not been paying enough attention here." 1 To counter the weight of the RumlarlGreeks, he suggested as an urgent measure to "attach a few Muslim villages to the kaza and to establish active and prosperous [Muslim] traders and farmers on the territory of the kasaba. He considered it "necessary that in Ayvalik, the police officers were not indigenous non-Muslims, but that they still knew the [Greek] language." What he found particularly "detestable" was the fact that the town hall building was the property of the metropolitan. On Yunda, an exclusively Rum island near Ayvalik, the mutasarnf deemed it "reasonable to introduce suitable immigrants [muhacir] there. Establishing a business-oriented and prosperous colony of Muslims who know the olive trade, will help in keeping an eye on the Rumlar [Rumluk]."2 At the next halt in his journey, in Burhaniye, "a kasaba of 1700 houses, of which around 700 are Rum houses", he once again complained of the fact that "unfortunately", the Rumlar were in control of commerce.3 A visit to the Balya Company confirmed him in his ethnically and socially anti-Rum views. "The top management is made up of a few strangers, generally Rumlar and in particular, Greeks [Yunanli], the lower employees are Laz, Kurds and Turks." In order better to control the firm, he deemed it appropriate to "dismiss the secretary general of the firm, Prodromos, the chief engineer Kokitos and the head worker."4 The anti-Christian discourse, fed by social envy, became even more radical with regard to the Armenians. In a text from the end of 1918 (which retrospectively refers to his experiences in Diarbekir), Dr Re§id portrays the Armenians as leeches of the Muslim element [islam unsurunun kanim emmekdedirler]. According to him, as secretaries and bookkeepers to sheikhs, aghas and Kurdish beys, they have subjected the latter "to the slavery of their economy". As to the acts of violence committed by the tribes, in his eyes the first victims were the Muslim villagers, while the Armenians remain unscathed due to "the toadyism and base flattery peculiar to them".5 We see here the same set of arguments as can be found in the anti-Semitism of the time. Additionally, we find the spectre of biologism: In their "prosperous and fortunate" villages, the Armenians increase their population. Contrary to official Unionist statistics careful to show a decreasing number of Armenians, Dr Regid insisted on there being a rising Armenian population (tezayud-i * Re§id, Bahkesir 2 Resid, Balikesir 3 Regid, Bahkesir 4 Regid, Bahkesir

Notlan, p. 69. Notlan, p. 70. Notlan, p. 71. Notlan, p. 75.

^ Re§id, Miilahazat, p. 98.

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niifus), and used this as an argument against claims that they were being persecuted.1 Within all the right-wing movements of the era, similar prejudices can be found, blending together "the enemy" of race, class and religion.2 Even the Jewish author and Turkish nationalist, Moiz Kohen (Tekinalp), spread political and economic stereotypes. "Due to privileges too easily given, and also due to their own initiative", he writes, the Christians of Asia Minor were "always more prosperous, increasingly driving out the true masters [sic] of the land". According to him, the Armenians have "enriched themselves thanks to their good relations with the English". With regard to the sacred goal of a national economy, millt iktisad, he ascertains with satisfaction, and without the slightest remorse that the widespread boycott movement carried out simultaneously with the secret expulsions in the first half of 1914 has "ruined hundreds of Greek and Armenian tradesmen." 3 By the way, when Dr Johannes Lepsius on 5 October 1915 in a lecture to German journalists complained that the destruction of the Armenians had a disastrous impact on the Ottoman economy, with negative effects on Germany, he was replied to by Kaliski, a social democrat (!), that the Jews or donmes (Muslim Jews) would easily replace them. 4 It would be worth developing and differentiating this painful Jewish-(Oriental-)Christian aspect which probably still plays a considerable role e. g. in the recent trouble over the genocide issue between Armenia and Israel. 5 Unlike the preceding times, Mehmed Re§id does not seem to have ended his time in office in Karesi after falling out with local notables or regional authorities. Though he did pride himself on having removed the Rumlar without giving rise to protest. 6 Intimidated, those concerned had apparently said nothing in front of the mutasarrif. It was to the perfect satisfaction of the central government that he appears to have fulfilled his task of organising the deportations and grappling with infrastructural modernisation. In any case, he found himself promoted to the rank of vali in ' Re§id, Miïlâhazât, pp. 97 and 99. 2 Cf. among others Nur 1967, vol. 2, p. 264; Nedjat (= Sadri Celai Bey), Le droit du Turc, Genève: H. Koch, 1919, p. 7 - 8 ; Kara-Schemsi (= Rechid Safvet Atabinen), Les Turcs et le Panhellénisme, Genève: P. Richter, 1918, p. 15; idem, Le prolétariat Turc au Congrès socialiste International de Berne, Bern, 1919, p. 14. 3 Alp, Tekin, Turkismus und Pantiirkismus, Weimar: Verlag Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915, pp. 3 9 40 and 62. Cf. also Hanioglu, §iikru, "Jews in the Young Turk Movement to the 1908 Revolution", in: Levy, Avigdor, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, Princeton (N. J.): Darwin Press, 1994, p. 520. 4 Ernst Jàckh-Papers (Yale University Library), Group 461, Box 2, Folder 52. Thanks to Dominik Schaller, Zurich, for this reference. 5

Cf. Haaretz, English Edition, 17.2.2002; Turkish Daily News, 26.2.2002.

6

Bilgi 1997, p. 22.

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July 1914, while at the same time his close party comrade, the minister of the interior, Talat Pasha, proposed a particularly delicate post to him. In a letter of 19 July 1914, he insisted on offering him the charge of "secretary general of the inspectorate of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir and Mamuretiilaziz", while commending his devotion, his capabilities and his efficiency.1 The international reform plan for the six Eastern Provinces, signed by the Porte under diplomatic pressure - also from Germany - on 8 February 1914, made provisions for two powerful inspectors from neutral countries. They were to control the process of reform, designed to stabilise the fragile coexistence of ethnic groups, enable the participation of all groups in regional politics, and establish a functioning rule of law. But this plan ran counter to the Unionist project of centralising "nationalisation" at the expense of the regions and the Christians. Indeed, it was rigorously denounced by the CUP as a first step toward Armenian autonomy, that would finally lead to Russian annexation. It was therefore necessary to hinder the "imposed" inspectorate as much as possible. The person most suitable for this task was Dr Regid. But he would not take up his new office. The First World War offered an exceptional opportunity to get rid of the embarrassing question of reforms, raised on a diplomatic platform ever since the Congress of Berlin (1878).2 On 13 August 1914, three days before his superior, Inspector General Hoff, would be called back from Van, and without a replacement being appointed, Regid Bey was named vali of Diarbekir.3 But this man of action immediately saw himself placed into other postings closer to the front: From the 10 September he was vali of Basra, which fell on 20 November.4 From 24 November 1914 until 25 December he was vice vali of Baghdad, probably to keep an eye on the vali, Süleyman Nazif, a critic of the Unionists.5 "At which point I found the mutasarrif of Lazistan to have changed!... Instead of the old poised character and calm, there 1

2

Letter partly cited in Bilgi 1997, p. 22.

"Fortunately World War One broke out thus preventing the implementation of that harmful [reform] project", a member of the Turkish Historical Society later wrote, who was an employee of the Ministry of the Interior in 1914: Tankut, Hasan Re§it, "Dogu ve Giineydogu Bölgesi Üzerine Etno-Politik Bir Inceleme ", in M. Bayrak, Agik-Gizli/ Resmi-Gayriresmi Kiirdoloji Belgeleri, pp. 218-232, Ankara: Özge, 1994 (1961), here p. 219. CT. Djemal, Ahmed, Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes, München, 1922, pp. 337-354, and Talät, (A. Kabacali, ed.), Talät Pasa'nin Hätiralari, Istanbul, 1994 (1946), pp. 58-71. 3 Bilgi 1997, p. 23, cf. Kieser, Hans-Lukas, Der verpasste Friede. Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei 1839-1938, Zürich: Chronos, 2000, p. 444. ^ Erickson, Edward, J., Ordered to die, A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, Westport (Connecticut): Greenwood, 2001, P- 67. 5

Süleyman Nazif, son of Said Pasha of Diarbekir, resigned from his post in Bagdat in December 1915 and dedicated himself to journalism and literature (U?man, Abdullah, "Süleyman Nazif', Osmanlilar Ansiklopedisi, Istanbul: Yapi Kredi, 1999).

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was an appalling arrogance and anger", writes the Vali Siileyman Bey.1 From 10 January to 25 February 1915, Dr Re§id was vali of Mossul. Finally, he replaced Governor Hamid (Kapanci) Bey, whose valilik in Diarbekir from 17 September 1914 to 25 March 1915 was distinguished by a relatively tolerant policy toward the Armenians, contrary to the wishes of the CUP.2 Re§id Bey's judgement of Hamid Bey was harsh: "My predecessor dud not govern. Totally indifferent, and giving himself to pleasure and amusement, he threw the affairs of the government into great chaos, and reduced the state's hold to zero."3 By contrast, Dr Re§id considered himself a servant perfectly devoted to a state which he desired to be Jacobean and of Turkish-Muslim "ethnicity". He governed the province of Diarbekir until 2 March 1916.

Vali in Diarbekir It was a functionary and party member who had been particularly frustrated by the first months of the war, and cumulatively radicalized4 in his thoughts and actions since 1909, who became governor of Diarbekir in 1915. The valilik of Dr Re§id really deserves a separate study. What follows can be no more than provisional remarks that leave important questions open. According to his own words, the vali Re§id Bey "removed" 120'000 Armenians from his province,5 of which the majority were massacred, or died from exhaustion. This figure is nearly double the official Ottoman number of Armenians in the province of Diarbekir. 1

"Doktor Re§id", Hadisat, 8 §ubat 1919, cited in Bilgi 1997, p. 169.

Cf. £ankaya, Ali, Mülkiye ve Mülkiyeler, Ankara: Mars Matbaasi, 1968-1969, vol. 3, p. 956; Beysanoglu, §evket, Diyarbakir Tarihi, vol. 2, Ankara: Irmak Matbaasi, 1998, p. 788; Bilgi 1997, pp. 25 et 78. 3 Rc§id, Mülähazäl, p. 102. Cf. the concept of the "cumulative radicalisation" (Hans Mommsen) concerning the destruction of the European Jews. Focussing on historical developments and situational elements, this concept refutes the "intentionalist" thesis of an extermination planned long before, without calling into question the fact of genocide. See Mommsen, Hans, "Der Nationalsozialismus. Kumulative Radikalisierung und Selbstzerstörung des Regimes", in Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon, vol. 16, Mannheim, 1976, pp. 785-790. In a telegram of 5 Eylül 1331 (18 September 1915) from Diarbekir to the Ministry of the Interior, see Armenians in Ottoman Documents (1915-1920), Ankara: The Turkish Prime Ministry General Directorate of the State Archives, 1995, p. 105. In Memleket, 29 Nisan 1919, is cited, according to Bilgi 1997, p. 28, a similar telegram of 15 Eylül 1331 (28 September 1915). Cf. McCarthy, Justin, Muslims and minorities: the population of Ottoman Anatolia and the end of (he Empire, New York University Press, 1983, pp. 69-70. The official Ottoman number is 73'226, McCarthy gives a recitified number of 89'131. Cf. Cuinet, Vital, La Turquie d'Asie, vol. 2, Paris, 1892, p. 412. It is unclear if the vali included in his number the Armenian deportees from Bitlis, partly passing through Diarbekir, or if he simply inflated the number in order to show his "success".

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What did happened there in the eyes of outside observers, political friends of the Ottoman Empire? On 31 July 1915, the German ambassador in Constantinople informed the Chancellor of the Reich Bethmann Hollweg in Berlin of the murder of the Christians, saying (translated from German): "Since the beginning of this month, the vali of Diarbekir, Regid Bey, has begun the systematic extermination of the Christian population in his district, without distinguishing between race or creed."1 Why did the vali act in this way? A few months later, he explained himself during a conversation in Constantinople with Midhat §ükrü (Bleda), secretary general of Union and Progress at the time. These were extremely telling words come down to us thanks to this secretary. They expressed open social envy, an obsession with a general conspiracy, and the Social-Darwinist idea, namely, that it was necessary to kill collectively in order collectively to survive. "We will liquidate them before they eliminate us." This is the vision of a politically poisoned Armenian people, extending to a dehumanising image of Armenian "microbes" within the "organism of the fatherland". To eliminate them was the duty with which the vali Dr Regid saw himself to be charged. Explicitly, he abandoned the medical code of ethics where the salvation of Turkishness was concerned. It is worth citing the whole passage:2 "Being a doctor did not make me forget my nationality [milliyet]. Regid is a doctor. But he came into this world a Turk. If you had had the opportunity as I have had in Diarbekir, to ascertain from close range what ideas the Armenians were secretly letting themselves be poisoned with, what prosperity they were living in, what terrible feelings of enmity they maintained toward the state [memleket], then you would bear me no reproaches now. The Armenians in the Eastern Provinces had been so goaded against us that, had they stayed where they were, they would not have left a single Turk or Muslim alive. I have studied the personal files of many. While searching their houses, enough ammunition was found to blow up a whole army. They had a fantastic organisation at their disposal. Shortly we would have needed candles to look for the Turks in Anatolia, had we retained this organisation with branches throughout our entire country [memleket]. Therefore: Either they us, or we them. In this situation, I thought to myself: 'Hey, Dr Regid! There are two alternatives: Either the Armenians will liquidate ^ 31. Juli 1915, Der Botschafter in außerordentlicher Mission in Konstantinopel (HohenloheLangenburg) an den Reichskanzler (Bethmann Hollweg), Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes: DE/PA-AA/R14086 (cf. Lepsius, Johannes (ed.), Deutschland und Armenien 1914 1918: Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke, Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919, document 126). Wolfgang Gust has edited these documents: Revidierte Ausgabe der von Johannes Lepsius unter dem. Titel 'Deutschland und Armenien 1914-1918' herausgegebenen Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke, Version 2.10, s. 1., 1999. Cf. http://www.armenocide.de. 2

Güngör 1953, pp. 2444^45.

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the Turks [temizliyecekler], or the Turks will liquidate them!...' Faced with the necessity of having to choose, I did not hesitate for long. My Turkishness triumphed over my identity as a doctor. Before they do away with us, we will get rid of them, I said to myself. [...] But I did not accomplish this deed either to satisfy my personal pride or to enrich myself. I had seen that the fatherland [vatan] was about to be lost, therefore, I proceeded eyes closed and without consideration, convinced that I was acting for the welfare of the nation [millet]. If my own [national] history were to call me to account for this, my conduct - nothing doing. The history of other peoples may write about me what it will, it does not trouble me in the least. [...] The Armenian bandits were a load of harmful microbes [mikroplar] that had afflicted the body [bünye| of the fatherland [vatan]. Was it not the duty of the doctor to kill the microbes?" When Regid Bey arrived in Diarbekir at the end of March 1915, he was confronted with a situation difficult in several regards. The state had little authority, the security forces were weak, the population was agitated and anxious, while the large number of deserters, Muslims and non-Muslims, made internal security problems more acute. The Muslims feared an invasion by the Russians, who had been victorious since the terrible Ottoman defeat at Sankami§, while on the western front, the British were preparing the invasion of Gallipoli. What was feared by some, was a hope to others. The Christians had suffered the most from frequently brutal requisitions since general mobilisation in August 1914.1 The memory of the great massacres of the end of the century was still fresh. To many Armenians and especially the young people, a good number of whom were deserters, the abolition of the reform plan for the Eastern Provinces and the voluntary entry into the War on the side of Germany, with a war of aggression against Russia, had destroyed any acceptable prospect of life under the regime currently in place, whose downfall they were hoping for. Sometimes, they audaciously expressed their views in the streets or in the cafés. They were aware of the disarming of the Armenian soldiers, separated into work battalions since February and exposed to massacre. Aggravating the situation in the provinces was the fact that, ever since the centralising reforms of the Tanzimat, the tribes, mostly Kurdish but also Nestorian, were disoriented, and all the more rebellious as the institution of the state no longer functioned properly in their region. Well before he arrived in Diarbekir, Regid Bey had already strengthened his general conviction, namely, that the misfortune of the Ottoman Empire and nation was largely the fault of the Christians within the country. To him,

1

Cf. Kieser 2000, pp. 335-336.

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the victims were the "helpless Ottoman nation", from which he excluded the Ottoman Christians. Since 1913, he considered the latter in effect as enemies in a mortal struggle that would decide between the death or survival of "his nation". He was determined directly to confront the "traitorous nation" (melun Ermeni milleti). There can be no doubt as to the support of his superior, Talat, and of the CUP. It was in March, shortly before the arrival of Re§id Bey in Diarbekir, during reunions in the capital, that Bahaeddin §akir was given the task of grappling with the "inner enemy", meaning the Armenian community. This comrade and colleague of Re§id Bey was the head of the Te§kilat-i Mahsusa in the Eastern Provinces.1 Mehmed Resid found himself completely confirmed in his apocalyptic views when he arrived in Diarbekir. He learned of the great number of Armenian deserters (he does not mention the very numerous Muslim deserters). He was appalled by the fact that they moved freely even in the city. They were impertinent in his eyes, and he thought he heard them say, in the hope of a rapid Russian breakthrough: "Up to now, you have been the ruling nation [millet-i hakime], but now it is for us to dominate, and for you to be subjected."2 He saw them, or rather, in line with CUP propaganda, believed to see them as well armed, organised and conspiring to stage a general rebellion. In equal manner, an important number of Muslims in the city were also seized by the spectre of a Christian conspiracy. It is these that he ably succeeded in submitting to his will and organising, before delivering a fatal blow to the Christian minority. But as much as (or more than?) fear, it was booty that compelled them to line up behind the new vali. If Suleyman Nazif is to be believed, many Muslims first of all feared him and hated him for his brutality. According to him, it was exclusively the lower masses, together with the militia and policemen brought in from outside, who participated in pillaging and murdering the Armenians. "I have learned with satisfaction that in Diarbekir, not a single notable {e§raf\ has been involved in the matters of deportation and massacre", writes Suleyman Nazif.3 But this is not entirely true. Several notables closely collaborated with the vali.4 Dr Resid had brought with him a loyal troop of around 30 men, mainly Circassians. It was a striking force, very probably linked to the Te§kilat-i Mahsusa.5 They were joined by the policemen already there. Furthermore, 1

2

Cf. Ak^am 1999, pp. 254-255. Re§id,

Miilahazat,

"Doktor Resid'', 4

p. 102. For the recurring use of "ciiret" (audacity, impertinence), see e.g.

Hadisat, 8 §ubat

1919, in Bilgi 1997, pp. 167-171, here p. 171.

Cf. Beysanoglu 1992, pp. 793-794.

Regid, Mulahaz&t, p. 89. Cf. Nesimi, Abidin, pp. 39-40 (cf. citation infra).

Yittarm iginden, Istanbul: Gozlem yayinlari,

1977,

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they organised a militia under the command of the Diyarbakirli Cemilpa§azade Mustafa. 1 Strengthened by this support, he succeeded in searching all the Armenian houses in the city, arrested hundreds of deserters, and confiscated a large quantity of arms. 2 In perfect keeping with what had been organised in the cities of other provinces, the vali of Diarbekir demanded the immediate surrender of the deserters and their arms, and, in order to intimidate and paralyse the Armenians, had the heads of the community arrested and tortured. A witness by the name of Floyd Smith, a doctor with the ABCFM 3 in Diarbekir since 1913, describes the searches and arrests as follows: "The police in searching houses took anything they wished. Books and papers were sure to bring condemnation to a household. Violation of women was a common accompaniment of police research. Finally the prisons were full and Typhus began. - It had been present throughout the winter in the city." 4 While using the same elements, Floyd Smith paints a wholly different picture of the months before the liquidation of the Armenian community. Right until the first weeks of the valilik of Regid, Dr Smith enjoyed intact relations with the government. Afterwards, the vali refused any meeting with the "colleague". Because of his work, Dr Smith was perfectly aware of what was happening in the Christian quarter. He confirms the government's precarious position in view of the general problem of desertion before the arrival of Mehmed Re§id: "During the winter many Armenians had evaded military service by means of the roofs. (One who knows Diarbekir realises that it is possible for an expert to go at all over the city and not descend unto the street.) A far larger force of police than was at hand would have been necessary to apprehend these men. They finally became so confident of their ability to avoid capture that they played cards etc. almost under the Vali's nose (this was the first vali [Hamid Bey] we had during our stay). He at last became incensed and gave the Gregorian Bishop to understand that unless these men surrendered, drastic measures would be undertaken. On the strength of this the Bishop and the Dragoman of the vilayet went upon the roofs and lectured the men, telling

1

Regid, Mulahazat, pp. 103 et 107, cf. Bilgi 1997, p. 26. Re§id, Mulahazat, pp. 104-5.

American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission, the strongest and best established missionary organization in Asia Minor during the last Ottoman decades. Dr. Smith mentions several Christian notables having been tortured and finally killed. Many died from typhus. He could not get access to the suffering people. "Metassian, the representative of the Standard Oil, was taken down in prison. [...] They refused me admittance [in the prison] rather prudely asking what business I had there. One of the guards said: 'Let him die like a dog.' He died that same afternoon." Letter to James Barton, Vevey (Switzerland), 18 September 1915, pp. 3 ^ , Archives of the ABCFM, Houghton Library, Boston, ABC 16.9.7 (reel 716: 436).

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them that they were bringing ruin upon themselves and the whole Christian quarter. As a result quite a number surrendered. This occurred the last of February." Floyd Smith makes it clear to what extent the situation worsened with the arrival of the new governor: "The vali was superseded early1 in March. By getting a large force of police and gendarmes the new vali [Regid Bey] succeeded in apprehending the larger part of these men. He soon started the imprisonment of prominent Armenians using as justification the false statement that they were sheltering deserters. [...] Then a search for arms was made and several bombs unearthed, some rifles and ammunition found. Evidently there was a revolutionary committee and some ideas in some heads of doing things, but I am sure that the large majority of Christians were opposed to any such proceedings. Most people had weapons in their houses in remembrance of the event of twenty years ago, but I feel positive that there was no idea of a general uprising. About the first of April a proclamation was posted demanding arms. Men were imprisoned right and left and tortured to make them confess the presence and place of concealment's of arms. Some went mad under the torture."2 Confessions of some sort were extracted under the torture. An Armenian close to the American mission (ABCFM) was made to sign an absurd document saying that the ABCFM was preparing an insurrection in Diarbekir and that its "agent", Dr Smith, was an Armenian.3 Lack of English certainly made the vali's distrust more acute. But these "absurdities" and gross exaggerations followed a clear logic: they served to legitimise the antiChristian measures. 4 The prisoners who did not die under torture were massacred at the end of May, when the full-scale liquidation of the Christians commenced. Expelled, Dr Smith was also made to leave before the final drama started. The government confiscated the property of the ABCFM within the city.5 The rapid and voluntary deterioration of intact relations between local functionaries and the ABCFM, an organisation rooted in the vilayet of Diarbekir for three generations,6 is a strong sign of the "new spirit" which the * Officially on 25 March only. 2

Letter to James Barton, Vevey (Switzerland), 18 September 1915, pp. 2-3, ABC 16.9.7 (reel 716: 434-436). 3 Re§id Bey had persons from the entourage of Dr. Smith tortured and one of them sign that "1. I (Dr Smith) am an Armenian, 2. I (Dr Smith) was Maynard's agent to incite insurrection in Diarbekir as at Van." Smith's letter to Barton, Vevey, 25 August 1915, ABC 16.9.7 (reel 716: 419). 4 Cf. some gruesome confessions told by Rcgid himself (Regid, Mulahazat, p. 106). 5

Smith's letter to Barton, Rowley (Iowa), 20 Septembre 1917, ABC 16.9.7 (reel 716: 472).

Cf. Dr Smith's (Diarbekir) and Dr Thorn's (who had lived for 40 years at Mardin) letters to Barton from 1914 to March 1915, ABC 16.9.7 (reels 716 et 717).

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emissaries of the CUP brought with them to the Eastern Provinces in the Spring of 1915. In many places, by the way, party affiliation and governmental office were not so strongly united in the same person as in the case of the vali of Diarbekir. The vali now had the community, stripped of their leaders, "deported". Thousands of people followed a handful of policemen sheepishly. Still a great number of them were massacred outside the walls. Then, the vali turned to the other towns and villages of his province. Often, as in Djezire, this meant the complete massacre of the entire Christian population, without the effort of organising deportations. Two kaymakam, Nesimi Bey of Lice and Sabit Bey of Be§iri, opposed the policy of the vali, but they were trapped and assassinated. There can be no doubt as to the ultimate responsibility of the vali, even if, under the threat of the tribunal, the latter vividly defended himself in his Miil&hazat against the accusation of having organised the assassinations.1 What he writes is highly significant. His incredible version of these two murders and his conceited tone, moreover, cast a dark shadow onto the intellectual honesty of the author of this long text, the majority of which concerns the Armenians. To expect honesty is probably asking too much if one considers Mulahazat to be a purely apologetic text, without any claim to truth, as subjective as it might be. In my opinion, however, there is a claim to truth, at least partly. The weeding out of Christian communities went on until Autumn. On 28 September 1915, the vali sent a telegram to the minister of the interior, stating that he had removed 120'000 Armenians from his province.2 On 19 of October 1915, a friend sent Re§id Bey his congratulations for the kurban bayrami by telegraph from Mardin, saying: "I kiss your hands, you who have gained us the six [eastern] provinces and who have opened to us access to Turkestan and to the Caucasus."3 He somewhat exaggerates the salutary vision of the vali's deeds, a vision also cultivated by Dr Re§id himself. This telegram is also a clue to the strong Panturanist views of some friends of the vali. As to the actual "dispatchment" ( s e v k i y a t ) of the Christians of the province of Diarbekir, let us hear the German diplomatic service, which mentions vali Re§id several times. Firstly, Walter Holstein, the vice consul in Mossul, told the embassy what was happening in the neighbouring province. On 10 June 1915, he informed the embassy in Constantinople of the general massacres of Armenian men, women and children then in progress in the

Reçid, Mulâhazât, pp. 79-91. Abidin Nesimî Bey, son of Hiiseyin Nesimî Bey (the liberal kaymakam of Lice, murdered in 1915), wrote in his memoirs: "He [Re§id Bey] invited him to Diarbekir and had him killed by ordering a band of Tcherkess Harun, part of the Special Organization, to lay an ambush." Nesimi, Abidin, Yillann içinden, Istanbul: Gôzlem yayinlari, 1977, pp. 39-40. Cited in Aktar, Ayhan, "Osmanli Meclisi Ermeni meselesini lartiçiyor. KasvraArahk 1918", Gorus, Istanbul: TÙSÎAD, August 2001, pp. 42-54, here p. 52. Ottoman Documents, p. 105. 3

Cited in Bilgi 1997, p. 29.

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province of Diarbekir, whose governor he explicitly mentioned. The news of other massacres, irrespective of age and sex, would be confirmed in subsequent dispatches. On 10 June, Holstein wrote (translated here from German): "614 Armenian men, women and children banished from Diarbekir have all been slaughtered on the journey here by raft; Keleks arrived here empty yesterday; for a few days now, corpses and human members have been floating by in the river. Further transports of Armenian 'emigrants' [Aussiedler] are on the way here, with the same fate awaiting them. I have expressed my deepest revulsion toward these crimes to the local government; the local vali expresses his regret, noting that the vali of Diarbekir alone bears responsibility. [...] The massacre of the Armenians in the vilayet of Diarbekir is becoming increasingly known here and is creating growing unrest among the local population, which can easily give rise to unforeseen consequences in face of the incomprehensible irresponsibility and weakness of the local government. In the districts of Mardin and Amadia, conditions have developed into a true persecution of Christians."1 In July, the German diplomatic service began attending to the matter of vali Re§id on a higher level. On 12 July 1915, the ambassador in Constantinople, Wangenheim, gave the following note in French to the minister of the interior, Talat: "The German Embassy has just learned the following from a reliable source: The vali of Diarbekir, Re§id Bey, has recently organised regular massacres among the Christian population in his district, without distinguishing between Armenians, and Christians belonging to other denominations, and without worrying about whether they were guilty or innocent. [...] Under the orders of Regid Bey, policemen from Diarbekir went to Mardin and there arrested the Armenian bishop together with a large number of Armenians and other Christians, 700 people in total; all of them were driven to a place outside the city during the night and slaughtered like sheep. The total number of the victims of these massacres is estimated at 2000 souls. If the Imperial Government does not take measures against Re§id Bey, it must be feared that the lower classes of the Muslim population from the surrounding vilayets might themselves rise up to indulge in a general massacre of all Christian inhabitants."2 This intervention by the embassy seems to have been the consequence of a dispatch by Holstein of 10 July, which had demanded the immediate

1 10. Juni 1915, Walter Holstein, deutscher Vizekonsul in Mossul an die Botschaft in Konstantinopel, DE/PA-AA/BoKon/169 (cf. Lepsius 1919, doc. 78 and 80). 2

12. Juli 1915, Die deutsche Botschaft in Konstantinopel (Wangenheim) an das türkische Innenministerium, DE/PA-AA/BoKon/169, (cf. Lepsius 1919, doc. 112). Note of Johannes Mordtmann, Generalkonsul in Konstantinopel: "am 12/7 persönlich an Talaat bej übergeben." Cf. also the dispatch already cited to the Reichskanzler on 31.7.1915.

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removal of the vali of Diarbekir.1 But Talat supremely passed over the German "meddling". It is true that on the same day (12 July), he conveyed the German note, partly word for word, to his subordinate comrade, and urged him not to apply the anti-Armenian measures to the other Christians. The only thing to unsettle the minister of the interior when confronted with the German reaction, was the bad publicity, and the fact that Re§id was applying to the Assyrians the same "disciplinary measures [tedabir-i inzibatiye] intended for the Armenians" (as Talat calls them in the encrypted telegram). In this respect the boss harshly criticized his subordinate in a second telegram of 20 July 1915, urging him to stop the indiscriminate anti-Christian measures that were "very detrimental to the country".2 The ally's diplomats could not, or would not, understand that, basically, the vali of Diarbekir had been acting by mutual agreement with his superior from the outset. By the time of the illegal expulsion of the Rumlar during the first half of 1914, the latter had already successfully concealed a policy that he would not acknowledge in front of the foreign diplomats. On 14 August 1915, Holstein unsuccessfully reiterated his demand for the removal of Re§id Bey, and called "the atrocities officially committed in the province of Diarbekir" historically unique.3 "Der frühere Mutessariff von Mardin, zur Zeit hier, mitteilt mir folgendes: Der Vali von Diarbekir, Reschid Bey, wüte unter der Christenheit seines Vilajets wie ein toller Bluthund; er hat vor kurzem auch in Mardin siebenhundert Christen (meistens Armenier) darunter armenischen Bischof in einer Nacht durch aus Diarbekir speziell entsandte Gendarmerie sammeln und in der Nähe der Stadt wie Hammel abschlachten lassen. Reschid Bey fährt fort in seiner Blutarbeit unter Unschuldigen deren Zahl wie der Mutessariff mich versicherte, heute zweitausend übersteigt. [...] Reschid Bey sollte sofort abberufen werden womit dokumentiert würde dass die Regierung seine Schandtaten nicht billigt und wodurch allgemeine Erregung hier beschwichtigt werden könnte." 10. Juli 1915, Walter Holstein, deutscher Vizekonsul in Mossul an die Botschaft in Konstantinopel, DE/PA-AA/BoKon/169 (cf. Lepsius 1919, doc. 110). 2 BOA DH.§FR, no. 54/406, 12 July 1915, transliterated in Ottoman Documents (see fn. 89), p. 75. Cf. Ak?am's deliberations (1999, pp. 25-26). DH. §FR no. 54-A /248,20 July 1915; I thank Taner Akcam who gave me a copy of this telegram. 3 "Jedermann weiß daß der Vali von Diarbekir beispielsweise die Seele der in seinem Vilajet vorgekommenen entsetzlichen Verbrechen an der Christenheit ist; jedermann annimmt mit Recht daß wir die Greueltaten auch kennen und man fragt sich weshalb wir gestatten daß ein notorischer Massenmörder unbestraft und weiterhin Vali bleibe. [...] Erst wenn wir die Pforte gezwungen haben die in Diarbekir Mardin Seert etc. in Beamtenstellungen sitzenden Verbrecher rücksichtslos zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen, und zwar schleunigst, erst dann fallen die Verdächtigungen gegen uns fort. Ich [...] bin erstaunt über die Naivität der Pforte daß sie glaubt die Tatsachen der Verbrechen türkischer Beamten durch krasse Lügen aus der Welt schaffen zu können. [...] Die Welt hat Greueltaten wie sie erweislich von Amtswegen im Vilajet Diarbekir begangen worden sind und werden noch nicht erlebt!" 14. August 1915, Walter Holstein, deutscher Vizekonsul in Mossul an die Botschaft in Konstantinopel, DE/PAAA/BoKon/170 (cf. Lepsius 1919, doc. 139). In an earlier dispatch, Holstein refers to the murder of the kaymakam of Midyat (cf. Re§id Mülähazät, p. 85), and estimates a very low percentage of survivors among the deportees: "Der hiesige Vali - gestern hierher zurückgekehrt - mitteilt mir: 1) Auf Befehl des Vali von Diarbekir wurde kürzlich Kaimakam von Midiat (Muselmann) ermordet da er sich geweigert hatte Christen seines Bezirks massakrieren zu lassen. 2) Von den aus Vilajet Diarbekir hierher Verbannten sind nur Frauen und Kinder, und von den letzteren auch nur etwa 1/3 der ursprünglichen Anzahl, hier angekommen; alle Männer wurden unterwegs ermordet, von den Frauen wurden die jungen unter den muselmanischen Kurden verteilt." 16. Juli 1915, Walter Holstein, deutscher Vizekonsul in Mossul an die Botschaft in Konstantinopel, DE/PA-AA/BoKon/169 (cf. Lepsius 1919, doc. 115).

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The persecutions continued until the month of September. A telegram from the embassy to the foreign ministry of 10 September 1915 confirmed the general fact of the central government's two policies, one official, one concealed, as well as the direct implication of the regular army in the massacre of the Armenians. In particular, the telegram highlighted two characteristics of the extermination under Governor Re§id: In this case, it affected all Christians, not just the Armenians, and it included men, women and children. Compared to other governors who usually had the men massacred on the spot, and the women and children deported to the concentration camps in Syria, the vali of Diarbekir carried out a maximum programme and, unlike other provinces, did not seem to distinguish between Suriyani and Armenians.1

Willing executioner of the CUP: an embarrassing memory The contemporary judgement of the valilik of Dr Re§id was unanimous and universal outside of the CUP, whether in German diplomatic circles, in Ottoman circles, or among the informed foreigners. "He has exterminated thousands of human beings through massacres [katliam ile imha]", says the writer and former functionary, Stileyman Nazif, himself descending from a family of notables from Diarbekir.2 "Systematic extermination of Christians" is the term used on several occasions by German diplomats to describe the actions of the vali of Diarbekir in 1915. I said at the beginning that contrary to the view widespread within academic circles in Turkey I do not consider Dr Regid as exceptional, but as typical of the Unionist elite during the Great War. I also referred to Secretary General Midhat §iikrii who, after having summarised his conversation with Mehmed Re§id, very significantly adds that many members of the party thoroughly shared the opinions of the vali of Diarbekir, but that after the "Der Konsulatsverweser Holstein telegraphiert unter dem 9. d.M. aus Mossul, daß nach den von anderer Seite bestätigten Angaben türkischer Truppen, die auf dem Marsche von Djezire nach Bagdad durch Mossul kamen, etwa eine Woche vorher Banden von Kurden, die zu diesem Zwecke von Fetki (sie, Feyzi) bej, Deputierten von Diarbekir angeworben waren, unter Duldung der Ortsbehörden und Teilnahme des Militärs die gesamte christliche Einwohnerschaft der Stadt Djezire (Vilajet Diarbekir) niedergemetzelt haben. Die Bevölkerung von Djezire wurde i.J. 1891 auf etwa 10000 Seelen geschätzt, von denen die Hälfte Mohammedaner (darunter über 2000 Kurden); die andere Hälfte setzte sich zusammen aus 4750 Armeniern (2500 Gregorianern, 1250 Katholiken, 1000 Protestanten), 250 katholischen Chaldäern und 100 syrischen Jakobiten. Dieser Vorfall sowie die bereits gemeldeten Vorfälle in Trapezunt und Angora stehen in offenem Widerspruch mit den kürzlich vom Ministerium des Innern erlassenen Weisungen, die hoffen ließen, daß die Armenierverfolgungen und die damit im Zusammenhange stehenden Ausschreitungen nunmehr aufhören würden." Der Botschafter in außerordentlicher Mission in Konstantinopel (Hohenlohe-Langenburg) an das Auswärtige Amt, Pera, den 11. September 1915, DE/PA-AA/BoKon/170 (cf. Lepsius 1919, see fn. 91, doc. 167). "Doktor Regid", Hadisat, 8 §ubat 1919, cited in Bilgi 1997, p. 168.

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cease-fire, they changed their language.1 The fact that certain other Unionists might at times not have liked him much is normal, considering the distrust and the widespread intrigues within these circles before the reign of Mustafa Kemal. Perhaps what the family had experienced in the Caucasus and the fact that they were Circassian contributed to the doctor's emotional and ideological hardening. But again, ultimately this is nothing extraordinary, given the large number of muhacir or descendants of muhacir within the CUP. I therefore suggest that Re§id Bey was an "ordinary" Unionist and well integrated into the Unionist power structure during the years 1913-16, eager to serve the fatherland in accordance with the will of the party. Despite his pride and his difficult character, he was respected, or at least seen as very useful by the Ittihadist center. The latter was at the time dominated by his superior and (party) "brother", Talat Bey, as well as by his "brothers" and colleagues from the School of Medicine, Nazim and Bahaeddin §akir. His rapid promotion, and his appointment to important posts confirm my view. He was sent to particularly difficult places, beginning with the Aegean region in 1913, where at the end of the same year, a secret policy of expelling Christians was established for the first time. Important offices in the Eastern Provinces followed, where since the Spring of 1915, a policy completely to remove the Armenians was applied. In autumn 1916, this enormous goal had been more or less achieved. After the "success" of the anti-Armenian policy, the regime had gained a prime interest in cooling things down, so as not to compromise its future on the international scene. In my opinion, it is at this point that Dr Regid began to inconvenience those in power, partly because his misdeeds were far from having passed unnoticed by the foreign powers. They had even led to vivid protests by the German ally. The name of the vali of Diarbekir had become a symbol for the premeditated murder of Christians. In addition, Re§id Bey, as vali of Ankara (between 26 March 1916 and 27 March 1917), turned against the system then in place, which was full of corruption and war profiteers. His intransigence and straightforwardness began seriously to upset the regime once they were no longer directed toward the Christians. Unlike more Machiavellian figures such as Talat, or his two colleagues mentioned before, the patriot Regid Bey probably wholeheartedly believed in the dehumanised view of the Armenians as "exploiters", "bloodsuckers", "tumours" and "microbes".2 This is a 1

2

Gungor 1953, p. 2445.

This dehumanized vision of the "interior foes" coexists (almost) perfectly with the tenderness of the family father Re§id Bey. In fact, he is mostly absent, taken by his service for the state (hidemmat-i devlet) that is for him more important than anything else. But his last words to the family are undeniably tactful and touching. Re§id, "Son Soziim", Tasvir-i Efkar, 10 February 1919 (Bilgi 1997, pp. 155-56).

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language used by a number of Unionists at the time. He believed the elimination of a people, seen as dangerous to the national "body", to be just and necessary. Confronted by corruption among functionaries and servicemen in the vilayet of Ankara, on the other hand, he could not remain inactive without abandoning his belief in a new Turkey, purified not only of "traitorous" minorities, but also of ancient evils and vices. Accordingly, he acted, collided head-on with the regime, and was dismissed. I do not completely believe the stories telling of Dr Read's enrichment while in office. 1 His efforts to make a living through trade in 1917-18, and his family's poverty after 1919 suggest the contrary.2 Above all, it was Re§id Bey's known and irrefutable implication in the murder of the Armenians that made this figure embarrassing to the Unionist politicians, who, faced with defeat, wished to save their heads, and also, their national project. To wide political circles, it was thus tempting to point at certain Ittihadists, and to portray notably the vali of Diarbekir as a radical who had acted on his own authority and not that of the center.3 Rightly, Siileyman Nazif at the beginning of 1919 asked: "Beyond Diarbekir, there is a whole other group of men like Re§id. What will they do?" 4 Mehmed Re§id was hardly wrong in feeling himself to be the scapegoat for an entire large group, when after his arrest, he wrote in his diary that he alone was held responsible.5 Once the Turkish national movement had won its battle and had established itself internationally, it was no longer so necessary to distance oneself from it. Nevertheless, this crops up again in the interview by a journalist from Resimli Tarih with Mithat §iikrii Bleda, during which, in an account of his conversation with Re§id Bey, the latter portrays himself as being above all suspicion in regard to the anti-Armenian policy of the CUP. By taking the impoverished family of Dr Re§id into its care after his suicide - even though in itself an irreproachable act by the Great National Assembly of Ankara - the republic at the same time explicitly appropriated the political figure of Re§id Bey. This second act, without necessarily being connected to the first, bore grave consequences. In it, there lay a symbolic assumption of responsibility by an entire Ittihadist generation, founder of the Turkish nation-state. In its eyes, Dr Re§id once again became the loyal and 1

a . Siileyman Nazif, "Doktor Re§id". Hadisat, 8 §ubat 1919 (Bilgi 1997, p. 170).

2

C f . B i l g i 1997, p. 41. 3 Cf. e.g. the propagandist publications by Re§id Safvet (Atabinen), an Itthihadist agent in Switzerland 1918-1919. Cf. Kologlu, Orhan, Aydmlanmizin Bunalim Yih 1918. Zaferi Nihai'den Tam Teslimiyete, Istanbul: Boyut, 2000, pp. 158-64. 4

Cf. Siileyman Nazif, "Doktor Re§id", Hadisat, 8 §ubat 1919, (Bilgi 1997, p. 171). Regid, Gtinluk, pp. 119 and 135.

6

Giingor 1953, pp. 2444-4-5.

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deserving servant of the state, according to the image he himself cultivates in his notes. A few lines written by Mithat §iikrii Bleda on Re§id Bey in his memoirs are very significant in this regard. Contrary to the interview in Resimli Tarih, the secretary general of Union and Progress from 1916-18 speaks clearly here. In no way does he question the behaviour of the vali of Diarbekir. On the contrary, as so many others, like a good positivist and Darwinist, §iikru Bleda portrays Dr Re§id as an infallible man of science who, rightly and for the supreme salvation of the Turkish nation, had been resolved to "annihilate the illness and the ill", meaning the Armenians, perceived as mentally ill. In these words by §ukru Bleda, Social Darwinism, hygienic discourse, a cult of raison d'état, and political resentments blend together. 1 It is worth citing the whole passage: "Vali Dr Mehmed Re§id Bey was a doctor who, amid the most difficult of conditions, did not shy away from bearing the responsibility for the heavy duties he had been charged with. [...] Regarding the question of how the fatherland [memleket] could be liberated from its pains, after he diagnosed the disease in question and took all responsibility onto himself, and, as doctor and statesman, showed the courage as well as the maturity to accomplish the task he had been accorded. This is the kind of personality we are confronted with in Vali Dr Mehmed Re§id Bey. This was during the most critical period of Turkey's political life, in the years 1908-1918. Vali Dr Mehmed Re§id Bey was then serving in the civilian administration. He diagnosed the mental illness [ruhî hastaliklar] of the minorities. For they supported England, Russia and France, who for centuries had desired to partition Turkey, and were finally also of help to the United States, in that they referred to the principles of President Wilson. In conjunction with the diagnosis, Vali Dr Mehmed Re§id Bey also pointed out the last possible cure during the final period: Either to destroy the illness and the ill, or to see the entire Turkish people and its country perish at the hands of maniacs [deliler], Vali Dr Mehmed Re§id Bey was a scientist. His outlook and his behaviour could not be wrong, and were not. Vali Dr Mehmed Re§id Bey's behaviour was sanctioned by the National Assembly of Turkey by according his children an annuity in return for his services to the fatherland, and also recognised by Atatiirk. [...] But precisely 'this' Vali Dr Mehmed Re§id Bey was arrested by Damat Ferit Pasha's government [5 November 1918] and handed over to the war tribunal! For the government of Damat Ferit Pasha, and the Liberty and Agreement Party connected to it, wished to punish the members of the Union and Progress Party, who had fought for the constitution, and their governments.

1

Bleda 1979, pp. 61-62.

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The real intention behind this was to exterminate the spirit of the constitutional period begun in 1908. [...] They needed culprits to blame for past events. [...]. Of the Turkish government officials, Mr. Kemal, kaymakam of Bogazlayan, Nusret, the mutasarrif of Yozgat, and Dr Mehmed Regid, the vali of Diarbekir were affected. They were taken prisoner and courtmartialled. Among them, Messrs. Kemal and Nusret were sentenced to death and executed. Vali Dr Mehmed Regid Bey fled during the course of the inquiry, and afterwards committed suicide [6 February 1919], As if they were the culprits of a whole era, while on the other hand, those who had always caused trouble in Turkey and launched insurrections, innocent: In such an atmosphere, the "war tribunal of Nemrut Mustafa" declared its verdict. In doing so, it made an historic error. This verdict did not punish Messrs. Kemal, Nusret or Vali Dr Mehmed Re§id. The government and the tribunal punished themselves and the Turkish nation."

A nation in despair and its political doctors (conclusion) Dr Re§id, a talented and upright young doctor and Ottoman patriot in the 1890s, had 20 years later become a radical who committed crimes against humanity. This article may help better to understand the genesis of his radical Ottoman Muslim nationalism1 against a background of traumatic collective experiences, injured honour and an organicist vision of an "ill" society. Mehmed Regid was part of a narrow new elite, socialized in the Fin de siècle, which notably improved its social standing thanks to the free Military School of Medicine in the Ottoman capital. Lacking a convincing, viable project for the salvation of the country, i. e. the modernization of the Ottoman Near East, this elite early on drifted off into a right-wing current. It identified with the "despaired Ottoman nation" (biçare millet-i Ostnaniye), defined more and more exclusively as Muslim and thus becoming synonymous with the traditional "master nation" (millet-i hâkime). Contrary to the traditional understanding, this millet-i hâkime no longer was defined in terms of theology, but of culture and ethnicity. For the young educated elite, the despair was first of all a political one: the decline of power and loss of territory. The misery of the Muslim refugees from the Balkan and the

For this notion cf. Zürcher, Erik Jan, "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908-1838", in: K. Karpat (ed.), Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey, Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 150-79.

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Caucasus plays a less important role in Mehmed Regid's thinking than one could expect.1 The term "right-wing" expresses the attachment to an "irrational" identity hiding behind the magic word "national" (millî). While retaining the idea of Muslim solidarity and a (partly) shared history, the imagined national community was thought to descend from an obscure prehistory and ethnicity. A partly racial and partly religious aversion to non-Muslims and finally to non-Turks originated from this. These strong right-wing brackets are visible early on in the affinities of important Unionists with the revanchist French as well as the militarist German right and the exclusion or marginalization of "cosmopolitan" figures. 2 At times the rightists perfectly managed to integrate national and imperial ambitions. That was particularly the case during the Unionist single-party regime during World War One. The Unionist right-wing "national project" originating in the Fin de siècle was the struggle for power of the new Ottoman-Muslim elites. Endowed with Western-style education and believing in positivism they opted for rightwing, not for liberal and federalist or for left-wing modernization. They ethnicised the conception of millet-i hâkime in order to make it fit in with the modern concept of nation-state. "Nature", in a scientific perception, and state, in an authoritarian understanding, took the place of God and theological precepts. The Western as well as the Ottoman right believed there to be a "given", "natural" difference. This explains why it was not possible for nonMuslims to become full members of the Young Turk movement and to throw their lot in with the Kemalists. To a lesser extent, this is also true for the Jews in Unionist and Kemalist Turkey. After 1913, the Unionists seriously began to adopt the modern concept of nation-state to the territory they realistically saw as defendable, according to what they regarded as "Realpolitik". From that point of view an anti-Christian homogenization of Asia Minor by means of social engineering was called for. Realized since January 1914, this project was to constitute a masterpiece of extreme rightist modernization in the first half of the 20th century. Contrary to the right-wing currents in an increasingly secular Western Europe since the Fin de siècle, socio-ethnic exclusion in Ottoman society had not to be argued by a pseudo-scientific racial discourse. It was fully operative on the base of on-going religious distinction. Therefore, on the ground mostly an Islamist That is different in later works of other nationalist authors, cf. e.g. Kara-Schemsi, L'extermination des Turcs, Geneve, 1919. 2 Cf. Hanioglu 1994, pp. 520-23. It is interesting to see how the historical Jewish experience in Europe, including the contemporary Dreyfus Affair, served as anti-Western propaganda rather than examples for questioning own positions towards the gavur. As far as they publicly adopted an anti-Western stance, Jews in the CUP were seen as true patriots.

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discourse was used for legitimizing the liquidation of the Armenian communities. This Islamism partly is also present in Dr Regid's Mulahaz&t. This booklet relatively seldom recurs to biologist metaphors. After the loss of the Arab provinces the millet-i hakime turned out to be far from the religious ummet, and with the victorious Anatolian wars (1919-23), Islamist rhetoric towards the Kurds was no longer necessary. Now the Young Turks changed their Ottoman nationalism to a Turkish ethnonationalism that had already been well trained in the Turkish Foyers under the spiritual leader Ziya Gokalp. How can we explain the evolution and radicalization of Dr Regid's thoughts and actions? An important underlying factor of vali Regid's final stance was the power- and state-oriented socialization among the students of the Military School of Medicine. In that milieu power, politics, fatherland and nation clearly and explicitly stood above medical ethics, just as Dr Regid himself said. Dr Regid's operative radicalization took place after 1911, with the establishment of anti-Christian views and politics. When in March 1915 he arrived in Diarbekir he was radicalized enough to do what he did between March and September. Contextual radicalization then was secondary. The material presented in this article gives the impression that he arrived with the determination once and for all to get rid of the Christians in his province. He just needed specific orders from the center. With regard to the Assyrians he even had to be stopped in his murderous zeal by his boss Talat Bey. In all probability, Mehmed Regid really believed he was in an apocalyptic situation, a deadly battle between Muslims and Christians, between Turkish power and the effrontery of the traditionally subordinate gavur. In any case, this is the basic tenor of Miilahazat, his apologetic text of the end of 1918.1 Unlike other protagonists of the Armenian genocide, he appears to have felt panic, and to have made real errors of judgement. He was obsessed by the idea that the Ottoman nation would be annihilated by inner and exterior foes. 2 He set political decline against genocide. Contrary to the propagandists of his party, he does not seem to have done this deliberately. His apocalyptic vision does not look like having been a pure instrument of propaganda, cold-bloodedly staged in order once and for all to put an end to the Armenian question and, afterwards, justify it. But whatever the case may be, he did precisely the latter. For the salvation of the country, he declared himself obliged to destroy an entire community, which he imagined to be "incurable". Weltanschauung combined with delusion played an important role in Dr Regid's action. This is corroborated by the aforementioned fact that, contrary ' Regid, Müláhazát, pp. 77-113. 2

Cf. e.g. Regid, Müláhazat, p. 109.

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to the "disciplinary measures" of the ministry of the interior, expressed in the telegrams of 12 and 20 July 1915, he had undertaken a large-scale destruction of Armenians and Assyrians, and not limited to the former, as he should have done. The fact that the Unionist-Kemalist generation, which had founded the nation-state, counted Dr Re§id amongst its heroes instead of accepting the "universal" verdict, betrays of a more general setting of the course of history. This has cast dark shadows onto the historical conscience of several Turkish generations. One ought not to demonise Dr Re§id in a simplistic manner, but to analyse his personality, career and actions. Facts should be faced as to what point this "upright patriot", and with him Union and Progress, the great organisation of the Turkish national movement, had arrived at through a successive radicalisation in difficult circumstances. While this painful examination was lacking, the expression of a critical memory with reference to universal values and human right issues was for decades confined to a few marginal voices.1

Cf. also Akçam, Taner, "Another History on Sèvres and Lausanne", in Kieser/Schaller, Armenian Genocide and Shoah, p. 281-299, and my article "La Guerre mondiale vue par la diaspora turque en Suisse (1918-1923)", in: Farschid, Olaf/ Kropp, Manfred/ Dähne, Stephan (eds.), The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, Beiruter Texte und Studien 99, Würzburg: Ergon, 2006, p. 231-246.

7. BEATRICE ROHNER (1876-1947) AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

Let me begin with a photo.* We see here a garden with trees, in the foreground on the left a smiling, bareheaded youngish woman, sitting on a chair and holding a little boy. On the right, behind a small round table, a slightly older bearded man who wears a uniform with decorations and a fez or kalpak, an Ottoman headgear; has a little girl on his knees. This seems to be the idyllic picture of a well-to-do couple with two children in the park of their villa. 1

We are however in the year 1916 in Aleppo, capital of an Ottoman province where the second phase of the Armenians' genocide, their death by starvation in large camps and the violent suppression of these camps was taking place. 2 The man in the photo is Jemal Pasha (1872-1922), one of the Unpublished paper, first intitled "Networking, Spirituality, Memory: The Female Missionary Béatrice Rohner during the Armenian Genocide", presented at the symposium "Rescue practices facing genocidal situations. Comparative perspectives", Paris, Sciences Po, December 11th to 13th 2006. 1 The photo is from a private collection in the USA, origin unknown. Many thanks to Missak Keleshian who sent it to me. 2 Cf. Kevorkian, Raymond H., L'extermination des déportés arméniens ottomans dans les camps de concentration de Syrie et de Mésopotamie (1915-1916): la deuxième phase du génocide, Paris: Centre d'Histoire Arménienne Contemporaine, 1998 (= Revue d'Histoire Arménienne Contemporaine, vol. II).

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triumvirate heading the Young Turk regime in 1913-18, Minister of Naval Affairs and Commander of the Fourth Army in Syria. The woman is Beatrice Rohner (1876-1947), 1 a Swiss lady who had grown up in Basel, been a teacher in Paris and Istanbul and then, in 1900, settled in Marash (today Kahramanmarash) where she worked for the German Protestant Hulfsbund fur christliches Liebeswerk im Orient (Aid Association for Christian Charity in the East). From December 1915 to April 1917 she stayed in Aleppo and led the humanitarian efforts to help the Armenians. Enjoying Jemal's protection, she cared for about 1000 Armenian orphans (two of them are in our photo). She managed moreover to undertake rescue actions in the camps illegally, spending large sums of money that she received from American, Swiss and German philanthropic circles. Hilmar Kaiser has published on those rescue efforts in Aleppo and has the merit of having recalled the names of Beatrice Rohner and Hovhannes Eskijian, the pioneer of that "humanitarian resistance to genocide", to a scholarly public.2 This article follows a biographical perspective and goes beyond the context of 1915/16. It outlines Rohner's life, including her experience in Aleppo. It draws particular attention to the impact of those efforts upon her life, on her attempts to come to terms with her experience, and the role of her pietistic spirituality in rescue work and beyond. It leaves open the question if there is generally something like a "spirituality of rescue", but emphasizes that this is the case with Beatrice Rohner. To a large extent her thinking, behaviour and relations were conditioned by a spiritual life. Her spiritual biography is accessible through her writings, which we must contextualize within time, space and personal networks.3 I "A beautiful sunny childhood" and a commitment in Marash Like her compatriot Jakob Ktinzler (1871-1949), the non-Armenian rescuer later best known to Armenians,4 Rohner grew up as a half-orphan. Born in Basel on 24 April 1876, her father died when she was three years old, and her sister Anni one year old. It seems that her mother, Maria Magdalena

1 An old lady in Stuttgart, Else Rauscher, who had known Beatrice Rohner personally, confirms this identification. I thank her for her information. 2 Kaiser, Hilmar, At the crossroads of Der Zor. Death, survival, and humanitarian resistance, Princeton N.J.: Taderon, 2001. 3 Sincere thanks to Hannelore Graf, Mutterhausarchiv der Evangelischen Diakonissenanstalt Stuttgart (MEDS), to Bruno Blaser, Christlicher Hilfsbund e.V., and to Daniel Kress, Staatsarchiv des Kantons Basel-Stadt. 4 "The non-Armenian mentioned most frequently in our interviews was Papa Kuenzler, a Swiss missionary", write Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller in their book Survivors. An oral history of the Armenian Genocide, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999 (1993), p. 130. Rohner is not mentioned in this book. On Kilnzler see the introduction to Kiinzler, Jakob, Im Landes des Blutes und der Tränen. Erlebnisse in Mesopotamien während des Weltkriegs (1914-18), Zürich: Chronos, 2004.

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Rohner-Thoma provided for the family after the death of her husband, a shopkeeper, while little Beatrice stayed with her grandmother. In her house she "lived a beautiful sunny childhood", as she wrote around 1901. After four years of primary school, she spent six years at a high school for girls and then two years at a teacher training college. For five years she worked as a private teacher mostly in Paris, then joined the Hulfsbund fur christlich.es Liebeswerk im Orient, a relief organization founded in Frankfurt in 1896. Pastor Otto Stockmayer, a leader of the Pietistic Revival (Gemeinschaftsbewegung) of the late 19th century had invited her to do so. 1 The Htilfsbund had a more pietistic character than the more liberal Deutsche Orient-Mission of Dr. Johannes Lepsius, but both originated in the common relief movement of 1896 after the anti-Armenian massacres of 1895.2 This photo of Rohner was taken around 1898.3

Hand-written Curriculum of Beatrice Rohner, c. 1901, in the archives of the Christliche Hilfsbund, Bad Homburg (ACH), and Ged.enksch.rift für Schwester Beatrice Rohner, Wiistenrot: Kurt Reith Verlag, 1947, p. 5; Civilstand L 1 1876 Nr. 475, Staatsarchiv des Kantons BaselStadt. 2 On the particular context of the humanitarian protest and relief movement in Switzerland after 1896 see Kieser, Hans-Lukas (ed.), Die armenische Frage und die Schweiz / La question arménienne et la Suisse (1896-1923), Zürich: Chronos, 1999. 3 ACH.

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Beatrice Rohner taught in the Hiilfsbund orphanage school in Bebek, Istanbul, in 1899. In fall 1900 she moved to Marash in Central Anatolia where she was a housemother and teacher in the Hiilfsbund orphanage "BethUllah" or "Bethel". She took the lead in her purely female family: Her mother followed her in 1908, her sister in 1913. Full of praise for her, an Armenian author who had lived in Marash writes that her "work was not merely to adopt children into her heart and superintend an orphanage. [...] In the midst of her important and exacting responsibilities in the orphanage, she found time and created opportunities to conduct revival meetings [...]. Beatrice Rohner's testimony was one much to be coveted and emulated. She was a woman of gentleness and humility, full of compassion and tender solicitude toward the needy and weak, and generous with things entrusted to her care."1 Thus, on the eve of the First World War, Rohner lived in her "own Jerusalem" in Ottoman Marash, surrounded by her students and together with her family from Basel. On a photo from Marash, taken around 1911, we see her in the middle row on the right, sitting beside Schuchardt, the Hiilfsbund director, her mother and her sister.2 On April, 6th, 1915 Karl Blank, Rohner's colleague in Marash, reported to the Hiilfsbund director Friedrich Schuchardt how difficult the time had been since the general mobilization in August 1914, and that, since March 1915, massacres had been imminent, partly because of the upheavels in Zeytun, near Marash. Therefore Beatrice Rohner went to Aleppo and called the German Consul Rossler, who then made a trip to Marash.3 But the lowprofile intervention of lesser diplomats was not to stop the general antiArmenian policy. The people of Zeytun was deported first to Konya, then, by order of the minister of the Interior Talat on April 24th, to Deir ez-Zor.4 The Armenians from the villages around Marash were also sent to the desert, and in mid-August the Armenians from the town of Marash itself.5 Rohner was one of the informants of Andreas Vischer of the Swiss Relief Committee in Basel, a doctor on furlough from the joint Germano-Swiss hospital in Urfa

1 Bilezikian, Vartan, Apraham Hoja of Aintab, Winona Lake: Light and Life Press, 1951, pp. 98-99. Many thanks to Mehmet Ali Dogan who sent me copies of these pages. 2 ACH. 3 Blank's letter enclosed in Schuchardt to German Foreign Office (GFO), 20 August 1915. Cf. German Ambassador Wangenheim to GFO, 27 March 1915; long report of Rossler to GFO, 12 April 1915; documents of the GFO, edited by Wolfgang Gust, on www.armenocide.de. 4 The Turkish Republic Prime Ministry General Directorate of the State Archives, Directorate of Ottoman Archives (ed.), Armenians in Ottoman documents (1915-1920), Ankara 1995, p. 26. 5 Rossler to Embassy, Istanbul, 16 August 1916.

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that their common friend Jakob Künzler managed during the War.1 One of her reports was also included in Brice's and Toynbee's famous collection of documents.2

II Aleppo 1915-17 Protestant missionary networks sought ways to help the hundreds of thousands of survivors of the deportations who were suffering in the camps around Aleppo. On October, 11th, Schuchardt openly asked the German Foreign Office for a travel permit in order to "visit our stations in the centre of Asia Minor and, together with our brothers and sister of the mission, to find a way of bringing practical and spiritual help to the Armenians in the socalled concentration camps in the region of Aleppo and Urfa." 3 The German Embassy opposed this idea, saying it would be understood politically and because "resources would be wasted without us gaining anything". 4 Nevertheless Schuchardt obtained a travel permit, but only as far as Constantinople. German diplomacy understood that German help for starving Armenians was important for publicity in the West, but should not be revealed to the Turks.5 Schuchardt visited William Peet, the informal chief of the Protestant American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions (ABCFM) in Ottoman Turkey and, on November 12th, the US Ambassador Henry Morgenthau.6 The right person for Aleppo, though, was not Director Schuchardt, but Rohner. She was fluent in Turkish, French, German, English and Armenian (and Arabic?) and, as a woman and a citizen of a neutral country, enjoyed a low profile. She too had obtained a travel permit and come to Istanbul. There was also a friend of her, the old ABCFM doctor Fred Shepard from Ainteb (today Gaziantep, some 60 km southeast of Marash). They all met and discussed plans for rescue in November. "During the negotiations in Constantinople an old friend, a doctor of the American mission [Shepard], visited me. He had seen much of the deportation, but his efforts to do 1 Article "An die Armenierfreunde" in the Basler Nachrichten of 16 August 1915 (also among the diplomatic documents on www.armenocide.de, because German consul Wunderlich had sent the article to the Reichskanzler on 22 September 1915). 2 Bryce, James, und Toynbee, Arnold (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Documents Presented to Viscount of Falloden by Viscount Bryce London, 1916; uncensored Edition: Princeton (N.J.): Gomidas Institute, 2000, p. 470. O

r

Enclosed in GFO to Ambassador Wangenheim, 15 October 1915 (www.armenocide.de). Wangenheim, 21 October, and Neurath, 5 days later. 5 Metternich, German Embassy, to Reichskanzler Bethmann Hollweg, 17 February 1916. Cf. Kaiser, Crossroads, 1p. 35. r ° Schuchardt to GFO on 12 November 1915; Kaiser, Crossroads, p. 34.

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something for the deportees had failed. The Americans possessed important sums of money from the USA, but the real area of deportation - Aleppo and its surroundings - where thousands fell victim to hunger and illness daily, was completely closed to them because of the Turkish military authorities' ban. During the discussion my friend suddenly said: 'You are Swiss and belong to a German missionary society. Could you not enter that area? Be assured that we would give you all the money we have.' This was a ray of hope! I understood God wanted to do something! Aleppo closed, infected, that centre of need and misery, should be opened!" From then on, the "call to Aleppo stood urgently and imperatively before my soul", Rohner wrote in 1934, when for the first time she was able to look back and compose a retrospective account of 1915/16. 1 Once back in Marash, this "call" prevented her from staying and celebrating Christmas there, as she intended to do, but impelled her to travel quickly to Aleppo together with her "mission sister" Paula Schafer. During the journey the two investigated the situation in several camps. 2 In a letter of December 29th to Schuchardt from Aleppo, Rohner writes that on this day she had obtained Jemal Pasha's permission by telegraph to run the big Armenian orphanage in Aleppo. Shortly before, she had met Jemal and Abdulhalik Mustafa [Renda], the governor (vali) of Aleppo, a hardliner who had replaced the generally respected, moderate, Jelal Bey. Jemal insisted that he did not accept her traveling outside Aleppo. "I think we must do as much as we can in this matter, albeit collaboration with the officials may be unpleasant", Rohner concluded.3 Rohner enjoyed freedom of movement in the town, hired employees, among them Armenian fugitives who thus acquired protection, and organized care for the orphans. She made Sisag Manughian, a pastor she knew from Marash who was living in hiding in Aleppo, a co-worker, saving him and his family from death. Another permanent collaborator was Anna Jensen from Mamuretiilaziz, like Rohner a member of the Hiilfsbund.4 Harassed by officials, Rohner had to change the orphanage buildings three times within a few days, but nonetheless the government gave some food for the orphans. "Though [...] the vali was not at all sympathetic to us, he was obliged to allow us the absolute necessities. [...] We depended on our enemies, and nonetheless lived from what the heavenly Father gave us", she commented, looking back on the difficult start of the orphanage where she finally cared 1 "Pfade in grossen Wassern", Sonnenaufgang 36 (1934), pp. 14-15, 21, 30-31, 38-39, 45-46, 54-56, here p. 21. ^ 3 reports enclosed in Schuchardt to GFO, 26 January 1916. 3 Enclosed in Schuchardt to GFO, 14 February 1916. 4 "Pfade", p. 45.

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with her team for ca. 1000 Armenians. 1 Early on she knew that her children were threatened, and that the government intended to take them into government orphanages and to assimilate them to Muslim Turks, changing their identity.2 "I was confronted with my new duty. It far exceeded my physical and mental forces. But I knew one thing. There comes a gift from the God who has called, a gift that perfectly fits the duty." 3 The orphanage was only a part of Rohner's work. Already in January we see her fully engaged in organizing help for the camps outside Aleppo. 4 The official work in Aleppo "gave the opportunity to do relief work in all silence" in the camps, as she wrote to Andreas Vischer. 5 Freedom of action in the town, the backing of the German consul Walter Rossler and the American consul Jesse Jackson (in them "I found two men who had their hearts in the right place"), 6 an international network of friends in Aleppo (among them the Swiss merchants Emil Zollinger and Conrad Schiiepp) and in Europe, much money from the ABCFM or from the Near East Relief which was just beginning, and, above all, an underground network of courageous, intelligent young men, mostly Armenians, who smuggled letters and money to the camps: all this made possible this perilous commitment that helped thousands of people to survive for a time, and some of them also to escape final destruction. Rohner cooperated with the Armenian Protestant pastor, Hovhannes Eskidjian, who since summer 1915 had built up a large network of help for the deportees without any confessional restrictions. According to John Minassian, who worked for Eskidjian and later for Rohner, she once succeeded in stopping a dangerous investigation directed against Eskidjian. But this pillar of humanitarian and consciously Christian resistance died of typhus on March 25th 1916, leaving a further 250 orphans to the care of Rohner's team. She used spiritual humor in the difficult moment when inspectors came. "She invited the officials in and showed them the children in their classrooms, saying 'Come in and see my garden of flowers'. Their skeleton-like bodies,

1 "Pfade", p. 39. Cf. Letters of Rohner of 13 February and of 3 May 1916 in Sonnenaufgang (1916), pp. 61 and 78-79.

18

Cf. her letter to Peet on 17 January 1916, enclosed in Peet to German Embassy, 10 February 3

"Pfade", p. 31. Rohner's letter to Peet of 17 January 1915, enclosed in Peet to German Embassy, 10 February 1916.

4

5

Copies of this document (an answer to a questionnaire of the Swiss Relief Committee) and of a letter of Rossler to Vischer were enclosed in Metternich, Geman Embassy, to the Reichskanzler, 28 April 1916. 6

"Pfade", p. 38.

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sheeted in their shabby clothes, were living proof of hunger nearing the starvation point", Minassian writes.1 Men from Marash, travelers, businessmen and other courageous young men connected Rohner with the camps. A young trader from Izmir, who had first been a teacher in the orphanage, voluntarily began to act as a messenger to the deportees outside Aleppo; 2 in May 1916 he worked together with a young Armenian from Marash called Garabed in Deir ez-Zor.3 Under Ali Fuad, the governor (mutasarrif) of that district, whom Rohner appreciated, 4 many Armenians had managed to begin a modest new life in the town. In the camp on the left side of the Euphrates, however, the situation was horrible. Fuad was replaced in July 1916 by the Circassian Salih Zeki who massacred the remnants of the Armenians sent to Deir ez-Zor in groups of a few thousands. 5 "Those in Deir ez-Zor and its surroundings, about 80'000, who had scarcely enjoyed a little rest, were gathered into camps in order to be brought in groups to the other side of the Euphrates. Again a hopeless wandering took place, and then, far from the eyes of any European, gangs of irregulars were waiting on orders from their government, and made a bloody end to them all", Rohner summarized what wounded fugitives of that massacres had reported her.6 The messengers normally came to Rohner after nightfall, after the daily work in the orphanage. "[One of them] told us about the different camps. [...] The fellahs [peasants] would always give us some grain or bread for money. We quickly took our cashbox [...] and while the messenger rested for a few hours, we sewed into his clothes as many of pieces of gold as could be put in. During this time I read the mail that he had brought with him. What mail! Letters, sheets of papers from friends to whom we felt close [...]. What enormous amounts of need and wretchedness these letters contained! Quickly I had to answer a few lines, to tell them that God had not forgotten them, that his love was the same even if all that could be shaken was shaken. After a few hours, long before daybreak, our friend had to set off, [...] our hearts with him. How we longed for a message that he had come through."7 The translated Minassian, John, Many hills yet to climb, Santa Barbara (California): Jim Cook, 1986, pp. 104 and 121 (quotation). Cf. Shnorhokian, M.H., A pioneer during the Armenian Genocide: Rev. Hovhannes Eskijian, 1989. Many thanks to Nancy Eskijian, the granddaughter of Hovhannes Eskijian, who sent me this unpublished paper that incorporates first-hand accounts. ^ See Rohner's detailed report on relief between 1 January and 1 June 1916, enclosed in Rössler to Reichskanzler, 17 June 1916. 3 Letter of Rohner, 3 May 1916, in Sonnenuntergang 18 (1916), pp. 78-79. Rohner's biographical hommage to Garabed in Rohner, Beatrice, Die Stunde ist gekommen. Märtyrerbilder aus der Jetztzeit, Frankfurt a. M., Verlag Orient, n.d. (c. 1920), pp. 7-14. 4 Rohner, Stunde, p. 30. 5 Kevorkian, Extermination, pp. 37^14. 6 Rohner, Stunde, pp. 13-14. 7 "Pfade", pp. 54-55.

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texts of a few of these shattering letters to Rohner from Deir ez-Zor and elsewhere have been preserved in the German diplomatic archives,1 other parts in later quotations by Rohner, 2 but none of Rohner's letters of consolation. About another messenger Rohner wrote: "In this way he managed to bring help many times until the henchmen seized him at last and he sealed his service with his life. 'No man has greater love than to give his life for his friends' [John 15,13]."3

Ill Sad good-bye to Aleppo Rohner's network of rescue worked relatively well from January to September 1916, albeit the help reached only a small fraction of the hundreds of thousands of Armenians in northern Syria. Not only the material help was important, but also the communication, the show of sympathy and the empowerment. In a letter from Rossler to the Reichskanzler BethmannHollweg in September 20th 1916, we read that the "distribution of American back-up funds by Sister Beatrice Rohner through Armenian intermediaries has faced obstacles in the Euphrates area", because one of her messengers had been seized by the authorities and under torture revealed information about the relief organization. In order not to endanger the whole work, Rohner withdrew provisionally and concentrated her effort upon the orphanage. She kept informing consul Rossler and others about what she knew.4 "The greatest difficulties arise from the double fact that I am scarcely tolerated in my work for the orphans [in Aleppo], while officially the relief work [in the camps] is not allowed at all. It must be done secretly and where it becomes public, it is forbidden and suppressed. This time the Armenians will not expect any help from outside", Rohner wrote on 24 November 1916 to Emanuel Riggenbach, a representative of the Relief Committee in Basel. "Until now the officials could not get rid of little me, because they themselves gave me the work [for the orphans], but they do everything to put me off." Very discrete publicity in Europe, in order to collect funds, and a low profile on the ground were preconditions for - relatively - successful relief work. She exhorted her correspondent not to publish letters with her name and that, if ever possible, Riggenbach should write the "poor" [Arme] not "Armenians" 1

Enclosed in Rossler, Aleppo, to Reichskanzler Bethmann Hollweg, 29 July 1916. Rohner, Stunde, several quotations. 3 "Pfade", p. 55. 4 Rossler to Reichskanzler, 20 September and 5 November 1916; Rohner's statistics about the origin and fate of the parents of 720 orphans enclosed in Radowitz, German Embassy, to Reichskanzler, 4 October 1916. 2

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[Armenier].1 "Little would be gained for the remnants of the Armenian people if I report everywhere, but for the emergency itself I could no longer do anything." In the same letter she writes that it had been possible to open workplaces for thousands of Armenian women in Aleppo where they spun and sew for the military but were safe. Colonel Kemal Bey, responsible for this work, was cooperative.2 When Rohner withdrew provisionally from the distribution of help in the camps in September, the murderous suppression of the camps had already begun as we had mentioned with regard to Deir ez-Zor. Furthermore it was not rashness, but the harsh politics of Turkification that finally caused Rohner to lose the most intimate part of her commitment, the orphans. "In Aleppo the government has taken 70 boys from the orphanages directed by Sister Beatrice Rohner to bring them to a government orphanage in the Lebanon where they shall be raised up together with children of Muslim refugees from Eastern Anatolia. Similar transfers of this kind to government orphanages are planned", Rossler reported on February 14th 1917 to the Reichskanzler. Some of Rohner's orphans had gone to a government orphanage in Aintoura, Lebanon, that Jemal entrusted to Halide Edip, a well known writer and Turkish patriot, who, however, had not condoned the CUP policy of extermination. 3 We see her on a photo at the left of Jemal Pasha at the entrance of Aintoura, a Lazarist College requisitioned by the authorities.4 On March 16th Rossler confirmed that Rohner's work had been completely wound up, adding that she had been asked by the American consul to reorganize relief in Aleppo what she did for about 20'000 people in need in the town, still including 1'200 children. Shortly after, on March 17th, she broke down and withdrew for good, entrusting her "work to a commission of Armenians supervised by Zollinger". 5 Rohner was exhausted and had been deeply affected since her orphans had been taken away. Karl Meyer, the chronicler of the Swiss relief to the Armenians, who himself had worked among Armenian refugees in the Lebanon, writes that Rohner "suffered a nervous breakdown on March 17th. Jakob Kiinzler was called from Urfa, came to Aleppo and accompanied her to Constantinople from where she returned 1 Rohner to Riggenbach, 24 November 1916, enclosed in Rossler to Reichskanzler, 25 November 1916. Rossler to Reichskanzler, 16 March 1917. 3 Cf. Atay, Falih Rifki, Zeytindag, Istanbul: Bate§, 1981 (1938), pp. 63-65. 4 Photo from Kerr, Stanley E., The Lions ofMarash personal experiences with American Near East relief, 1919-1922, Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1973. Thanks to Missak Kelechian for sending me a scan. Cf. Parseghian, Nora, "The French College in Aintoura, Lebanon or Jemal Pasha's orphanage where Armenian children were to be turkified", Aztag, English supplement, www.aztagdaily.com/EnglishSupplement/FEA_02012006_0001.htm (4 May 2006). 2

5

Rossler to German Embassy, 14 and 17 May 1917.

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later to Germany." 1 Probably Kiinzler accompanied her to Marash, not to Istanbul, for a first period of rest. 2 Towards the end of 1917 she traveled to Germany via Istanbul after she had obtained the Ottoman travel permit on October 5th. 3 On 28 August 1918 Schuchardt reported to Rossler that Rohner was his, or the Hiilfsbund's, guest in Frankfurt, and that her departure again for Aleppo was planned only for fall 1919.4 According to Minassian, Rohner was back in Aleppo already in March 1919 when she "invited me to visit the grave of Reverend Eskijian, to commemorate the third anniversary of his death. 'Only a few will come to remember the great man who died withour fear', she said, 'because he did all he could to serve his people.'" 5 It took however many years before Rohner recovered. Meyer says that she lived for a while on the Hasliberg in the Swiss mountains where, in autumn 1926, Hewig Bull from Aleppo, her former coworker in Marash, visited her and told her that all her orphans were still alive.6 According to Meyer and to Rohner herself, this brought her depression to an end. She worked as a "free missionary" to Germans in Wurtemberg and in 1928/29 made a trip to Marash, Aintab and Syria. In 1932 she began to run a Christian guesthouse in Wustenroth, near Stuttgart. Again she had a team and young people around her, held prayers and explained the Bible. In addition she wrote or translated books of spirituality. Albeit in a non-political pietistic language, she made crystal clear that one must not join the Nazis. 7 She died in her house in Wustenroth on 9 February 1947. This photo was taken in her last years. 8

1 Meyer, Karl, Armenien und die Schweiz, Bern: Blaukreuz-Verlag, 1974, p. 249. ^ Rohner to German Embassy, 14 May 1917. 3 "Marag'da Mtiessese-i Muavene Reisesi Isvi9re tebeasindan Beatrice Rohner'in hem§ire olarak yaptigi giizcl hizmetlere binaen Almanya'ya seyahatine imisaade olundugu" (19/S/1336, Ottoman State Archives, Istanbul, DH.EUM.5.§b 50:15). Many thanks to Nazan Maksudyan for sending me this document. 4 Deportation der Armenier Dezember 1914 bis August 1918. Schriftverkehr von Hilfsbundmitarbeitern mit offiziellen Stellen in Deutschland, ACH. 5 Minassian, Many hills, p. 199. 6 In Lebanon Büll had met Pastor Sisag Manughian, Rohner's right hand in Aleppo in 1916; he told her that he had investigated the destiny of Rohner's former orphans (Meyer, Armenien, p. 267). Rohner confirms this and adds that all her children finally escaped from Turkish rule ("Pfade", p. 14). 7

She and her team had a difficult time when a part of her house was occupied by N.S. nurses. She could "spiritually win over" only one of them; Abschrift eines Rundbriefes von Beatrice Rohner vom Jahr 1945, MEDS. Cf. "Vita für Beatrice Rohner" in Rohner, Beatrice, Jünger Jesu aus der Kirche der Armen. Abraham Levonian, Wüstenrot: Kurt Reith Verlag, p. 30 (p. 27 on her trip to Marash); Rohner, Beatrice, Worte fir Wanderer zur Herrlichkeit. Gedanken über den Hebräerbrief, Giessen and Basel: Brunnen-Verlag, 1938; she translated from English Carmichael, Amy, Die goldene Schnur. Das Werden einer Gemeinschaft, Giessen und Basel: Brunnen-Verlag, 1934. 8

From the first page of

Gedenkschrift.

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IV Coining to terms Shortly after the Nazis came to power at the beginning of 1933, Rohner began to write the memoir from which we have already quoted some passages. "Again and again I was asked in this time [after 1917] to write [on my experience in Aleppo]; but I had too heavy a heart. Again and again there appeared before my soul the conclusion of my service in Aleppo, when with a short dry order the Turkish government took the nearly 1000 children from me to settle them in their own homes and institutions. I fell ill and had to return to Europe [...]. The last thing that I saw of them was that special train which carried them off, and thus the curtain of darkness was drawn on them, on me, on all I had lived through in Syria. In that situation what could I write?"1 Nevertheless she made a first attempt when, around 1920, she published a booklet entitled The hour has come: portraits of present-day martyrs.1 On 32 pages Rohner paid homage and a last farewell to eight Armenian friends from Marash, lost in 1915/16. It is a text of painful 1

"Pfade", p. 14. Rohner, Beatrice, Die Stunde ist gekommen. Märtyrerbilder aus der Jetztzeit, Frankfurt a. M.: Verlag Orient, n.d. (c. 1920). 1

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memory and mourning, mobilizing all the spiritual resources Rohner had, to give meaning to the lives and deaths of these dear human beings. Minas, a young man and gifted singer from Bunduk (a mountain village that had been destroyed in 1895 and lost nearly all its men), Rohner had taught to read on the eve of the First World War. He then became an informal pastor in the village. In 1915 Rohner saw him passing through Marash, with the whole village. She could save one of his girls. "Now he can sing [his song] before the throne of the lamb. The little village of Bunduk is desolate and deserted [...]. Will there ever be a new beginning?" 1 The longest homage is that to Garabed, entitled "A devoted messenger" whom we have already mentioned in relation to Deir ez-Zor. Garabed, a silversmith in the town, had been seized by the spiritual revival Rohner worked for, and had himself become active in it. In 1915, he survived the deportation, went from his camp to Aleppo, which was forbidden on pain of death in order to get help to relatives, and became finally one of Rohner's messengers to Deir ez-Zor. "He felt it was now time not only to speak about, but to live God's love [...]." At least three times he came and went. "Everywhere he had found compatriots from Marash [...], he gave them a little help which eked out their life for a while, and comforted them in their courage and faith, like greetings from eternal love." He was then lost track of. "[...] Garabed had become an old man, his full black hair turned very grey [...]. But he had a deep earnestness, a saintly determination, and peace that is not of this earth." In Deir ez-Zor there was daily prayer in inter-confessional assemblies. The informal group of Christossa-Siroz [Lovers of Christ], mostly Gregorian Armenians (Armenian Orthodox), who had had their center in Anteb, played a leading part. "Each evening they met [...] and during the day they went as messengers of his [God's] love into the huts of misery and to all the desperate people around them. [...] According to a letter which another messenger brought me they planned to penetrate further into the desert in order to bring consolation and help to the Christians scattered there." 2 It was too late; the murderous elimination of the remnants was beginning. Another chapter is on Haig, a shoemaker from Zeytun near Marash, and at the same time a free evangelist on his own account. As a "political suspect", he was arrested early on in spring 1915, brought to the prison in Marash and executed in public in one of Marash's squares. 3 The only chapter Rohner devoted to one of her cherished orphans is the short one on Setrag,

^ 2 3

7. Pp. 11-14. Pp. 16-17.

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whose deported mother married a Muslim in Aleppo; she had to convert, but her little son refused to do so and was brought to the orphanage. That Rohner refused to think that lost life was lost for good becomes clearest in her chapter on Araxia, an exceptionally gifted girl, one of those who had emancipated themselves from tradition, including early marriage, through their education in missionary or other institutions in late Ottoman times. Back from two years in England she joined the Christossa-Siroz and settled down in Anteb before the War. She too had to leave in 1915. "I cannot say what grief struck me when I learnt about this. Araxia on the road!" After several months of silence, Araxia was found in Deir ez-Zor. Thanks to Rohner's messengers, they could correspond. "I have no words to describe the misery to you [...]. We live God's presence in our midst as never before; the prayers are fervent and all separations have disappeared", Araxia wrote. Rohner received a last message from her just when she was being taken away for the final massacre. "The life from which we expected so much was shattered so early. Was it for nothing?"1 Rohner's memoir of 1933/34 differs from that of 1920, as it is a complete narrative. After 17 years, Rohner was capable of articulating the whole story. More than in 1920, she argued that despite everything the God of love had not been completely absent. Even if there is no explicit link, it is difficult not to think that her readiness to write was also a reaction to the Nazis' coming to power. There is no doubt that she wanted to empower her readers against the "demons" she herself had faced in the First World War. "Yes, our house [in Aleppo] would perhaps have become an oasis in the desert, but never let us forget that the Pharaoh of Turkish hatred and the will to destruction [Vernichtungswillen] was after us and wanted at all costs to prevent a little people escaping his power." 2 Rohner also wanted to show that a feeble being like herself was able to organize efficient humanitarian resistance. "How much we were disliked in Aleppo! Our simple presence was a permanent thorn in the flesh of those who were determined to destroy the remnants of the Armenian people. Every opportunity to scatter these children, the hope of the future, again, to ban me from Aleppo, to hunt my co-workers into the desert, would have been warmly welcomed. But something hindered the enemies, something paralyzed all the spies and stooges who were with us every day, something held back the Turkish authorities from destroying everything with a single order, although we were completely exposed to them." Rohner gives several examples of critical situations, concluding: "What held the enemies back? They, at least, 1 2

Pp. 28-32. "Pfade", p. 38.

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did not know it themselves, but we knew it and knew it every day again, when in prayer together we spoke of our utter helplessness and our impossible situation to the Lord [...J." 1

Conclusion Pietists were often mocked as unrealistic sanctimonious people. It was nevertheless Beatrice Rohner, member of a pietistic organization, who organized the most important rescue effort during the second phase of the Armenian Genocide. Unlike some German "missionary brothers", she never had illusions about the perpetrators' will to exterminate. She used her potential, her connections, her symbolic capital and the sympathy Jemal felt for her to organize efficient relief. Backed by the Near East Relief, by German and American diplomacy (weak where the Armenians were concerned), by international philanthropic circles and Swiss connections, she built up an efficient network of trusting friends, mostly people who shared her faith in Jesus, whom she knew already from Marash. She used them in the orphanages and for the most difficult task of illegal intervention in the camps. Despite the pietists' well-known loyalty to Authority, she did not refrain from illegal humanitarian action. A strong spiritual life existed in her team, in her mind and during difficult moments - including her long depression after 1917. She was aware early on that she would probably lose the children, but when she did so, it was too much for her. Spirituality was not the superstructure but a vital motor in this rescuer's case. Rohner carried back her experience to Germany where she built up a little center of spiritual resistance to Nazi power in Wustenroth. Her late Ottoman experiences remained omnipresent in her books and talks. Another transfer of analogous experiences was that from Rohner's friend Jakob Kiinzler to his compatriot of Walzenhausen, Carl Lutz, the Swiss Consul in Budapest, who helped to save tens of thousands of Jews in 1944 by issuing illegal visas. 2 Like Franz Werfel, but without any literary ambition, in 1933/34 Beatrice Rohner clearly articulated her encounter with massive evil in history in 1915-17, in order to be ready to face evil at the present, that is, under the Nazis. Faithful to her own spiritual biography, she did so however with elaborate references to the Gospel. She paid particular attention to the Letter to the Hebrews, addressed to a little group of early Jewish Christians whom she explicitly compared with the Armenians.3

1

3

"Pfade", p. 54 Cf. Künzler, Im Lande, p. 128. Cf. "Pfade", p. 14-15, and Worte fir Wanderer, p. 111.

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8. AN ETHNO-NATIONALIST REVOLUTIONARY AND THEORIST OF KEMALISM: DR MAHMUT ESAT BOZKURT (1892-1943)

Mahmut Esat Bozkurt is the Minister of Justice who, in 1926, introduced the Swiss Civil Code in Turkey.* In his preface of the same year to the new Law (a preface which also figures in recent editions) we read these words: "The Turkish nation [...] must at all costs conform to the requirements of modern civilization. For a nation which has decided to live this is essential."1 These words briefly caracterize the political thinking of a man whom I propose to call an ethno-nationalist rightist revolutionary. By this I understand a man believing in modern progress, in a nation defined ethnically, and in the necessity of using violence to achieve modernity. In this short biographical study I want to shed light on three stages of Bozkurt's life: first his childhood in Izmir and education in Switzerland; second his official positions in Ankara in the early years of the Republic; and third his political thinking in the 1930s. The concluding part of this chapter is a reflection on what I consider Bozkurt's deep ambivalence. This can be seen in, on the one hand, the dead-end of his ethno-national Turkist credo, partly fed by hatred, which is closely tied to his revolutionary project; and, on the other hand, the open window of his longing for new horizons, a longing that, in the last analysis, I judge able to force open the prison of his radical Turkism.

Student years and membership of the Foyer turc Mahmut Esat was born into a family of landowners in the little town of Ku§adasi, south of Izmir. His father was first president of the municipality of Ku§adasx, then member of the Council of the Ottoman province of Izmir. Mahmut attended primary school at Kugadasi and secondary school at Izmir.

* First published as a book chapter in Kieser, Hans-Lukas (ed.), Turkey beyond nationalism. Towards post-national identities? London: I. B. Tauris, 2006, p. 20-27. ' Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat, "Esbabi mucibe läyihasi", in: Yargitay igtihadi birle$tirme kararlari ve Isvigre Federal Mahkemesi kararlari ile notlu Medeni Kanun, Borglar Kanunu tatbikat kanunu ve ilgili kanunlar-tüzükler yönetmelikler, Istanbul: Fakiilteler Matbaasi, 1984 (first ed. 1926), p. XXIX, XXX and XXXII.

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Turgut Tiirkoglu, Mahmut's schoolfriend and later himself a Member of Parliament in Ankara, recalled the young Mahmut's tremendous hatred of all non-Turks. 1 This hatred may partly be explained by his family history. His grand-parents were muhacir (Muslim refugees) from the Peleponnese. His grand-father Haci Mahmut told the boy patriotic stories of painful losses; as Tiirkoglu writes, these awakened in the child his love for his nation and fatherland.2 In 1908, the sixteen-year-old Mahmut entered the University of Istanbul, where he obtained his Ottoman masters' degree in Law in 1912. Thanks to his well-to-do family, he had the means to finance what was then seen as the crowning achievement of an academic training: studying at a French-speaking university in Paris or in Switzerland. Mahmut decided to prepare his doctorate at the University of Fribourg, where he first had to acquire a Swiss master's degree in Law. The place where he mostly lived and had his flat was Lausanne. A few years earlier, in 1911, Turkish ethnonational clubs called Foyers turcs had been founded in Lausanne and Geneva. They were in the vanguard of the Turkist movement in Europa and had close ties with the Turkists in the Ottoman capital. In those years, this movement began to win over the majority of Turkish-speaking university students. It is not clear when exactly Mahmut Esat arrived in Switzerland. He was surely there during the First World War until 1919, and probably entered the country in 1913 or 1914, thus shortly after the international congress of Turkists in March 1913 in Petit-Lancy near Geneva. Important spokesmen of the Turkist movement attended this congress, among them Hamdullah Subhi, the long-standing president of the organization called Turk ocagi (ideologically identical with the Foyers turcs or Turk yurdu; Foyers turcs is used in this article as a generic term for both). The proceedings of this Geneva congress were published in 1913 in Istanbul.3 The Foyers turcs of the diaspora were the formative microcosm which Mahmut Esat entered on the eve of the First World War. He developed his ideas here before he began his political career in Ankara in 1920. This is also true of §iikrii Sara?oglu, Cemal Hiisnii Taray and many other men who occupied important positions in public life in the early Turkish Republic. 4 1 Ifitman, Tank Ziya, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Hayati ve Hatiralari, 1892-1943, Izmir: Giine§ Basim ve yayinevi, 1944, p. 9-10. 2 Igitman, p. 9 and 84. 3 Yurdcular Yasasi. Isviçre'de Cenevre §ehrine yakm Petit-Lancy Köyünde Pension Racine'de kurulan ikinci Yurdcular Dernegi'nin muzakerat ve mukerrerati, Istanbul: Yeni Turan Matbaasi, o. D. (1913). 4 For a detailed study of this diaspora see my book Vorkämpfer der "Neuen Türkei". Revolutionäre Bildungseliten am Genfersee (1868-1939), Zürich: Chronos, 2005, and Osmanische Diaspora in der Schweiz, thematic issue of Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte/ Revue Suisse d'Histoire, 51-3 (2002).

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Let me say a few words about this formative microcosm. The goal and "ideal" (mefkure) of the Foyer movement was to carry out a salutary social revolution in ethno-national terms. Such a revolution was considered the means to save a Turkish nation that would otherwise perish. The dream of national "rebirth" was associated with the Foyers' members' vision of their own nation as the greatest victim in history, particularly of Russian aggression, of European imperialism, and of disloyal non-Muslim citizens of the Ottoman Empire in collusion with Europe. The Foyers, however, emphasized the constructive project, not the complaint: the effort required to achieve Western civilization. Their members often condemned their own (Ottoman Muslim) failure; this sometimes went so far as self-humiliation. The 1913 congress and the publications and minutes of the Foyers stressed the particular urgency of educating Turkish men and women, if possible in Europe. 1 One text already postulated the legal equality of men and women and emancipation from Islam as a basis for ordering society. On the other hand Islam was very much in evidence as a major cultural ingredient for defining "Turkdom". By contrast, in the 1930s Kemal Atatiirk and the Turkish Historical Society he founded wanted to get rid of Islam once for all and base Turkdom exclusively on "scientific", anthropological, ethnographical, and paleological foundations. Pre-Ottoman history was, however, already very important for the historical construction of identity in the Foyer turc. 2 The depressing sight of the recent past was offset by a militant visionary belief in Turkdom. The new Turkish identity to be established was considered superior to all other identities. The ardent belief in it, and the project of a "New Turkey" closely tied to it, helped to surmount the difficult present in a declining Empire. During the 1913 congress, hatred, resentment and the call for revenge were all the more forcefully expressed since the Second Balkan War was going on at the time. 3 At the same congress of Geneva, the participants declared their pride in having created a new national consciousness, in calling themselves straightforwardly "Turks", and, after a great deal of effort, in having destroyed the attitude of understanding themselves as Osmanlici or members of an Ottoman nation, in the multi-ethnic sense of the term. 4 Another topic of discussion was what one speaker called the liberation of the economy from the grip of the non-Muslims, a matter of much concern for Mahmut Esat, who later (1922-1923) became Minister of Economy. Like most of his Foyer 1 2 3 4

Yurtgular Yurtgular Yurtgular Yurtgular

Yasasi, Yasasi, Yasasi, Yasasi,

p. 37,48-50. p. 64-65. p. 24. p. 29.

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"brothers", he saw the "class struggle" of the peasants and the workers as a struggle against what were called at the congress the Ottoman "Armenian profiteers", the Ottoman "Greek swindlers", and only in the third place the oppressive Turkish landlords. The "class enemy" was closely associated with the ethno-religious enemy. 1 The Foyer members talked about the urgency of saving Turkdom in Anatolia from the foreigners, among whom they included the non-Muslim Ottoman citizens! All participants at the Geneva congress were "convinced that only Anatolia could be the Turkish homeland and guarantee the political existence of Ottoman Turkdom", and they "promised to commit themselves whole-heartedly and dedicatedly in the forefront of the struggle aimed at making the Turks the masters of Anatolia."2 Though he studied in Fribourg, Mahmut Esat became a member and the president of the Foyer turc in Lausanne. He cooperated with his friend §ükrü Sara9oglu, then president of the Foyer turc in Geneva; much later §ükrü became Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey (1942-46). §ükrü, also a native of Izmir, was linked to the Izmir cell of the Young Turkish Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that was headed by Celal Bayar, later President of the Republic of Turkey (1950-1960). In contrast to the wellto-do Mahmut Esat, many members of the Foyers in Switzerland lived, like §iikrii, on a scholarship awarded by the Ottoman state. At the end of World War I, when Mahmut Esat was its president, the Foyer in Lausanne, helped by friends, began to take the leadership of the movement for the "defence of the Turks' rights" (Türk hukukunu miidafaa) in Anatolia, as we can read in the minutes of the Lausanne Foyer? Those months were very prolific in articulating visions of a "New Turkey". We do not find among Foyer members signs of crisis or despair like those felt among the Turkish Muslim intelligentsia in Istanbul. 4 Well-known topics reemerged in the discussion about the Turkish nation-state to be created in Asia Minor: the elimination of Christian influence inside and outside this territory once and for all, but the adoption of the example of the Ottoman Christians in education and economy. In religious matters, the Foyer members ascertained that the nationalists should "not hesitate to guarantee our national organization under a religious [Muslim] cover, if necessary", in order "not to alienate the people from Turkism". A long struggle was foreseen against the "religious conscience well rooted amongst us but which harms progress". 1

Yurtçular Yasasi, p. 61. Yurtçular Yasasi, p. 69-70. ^ Lozan Turk Yurdu Cemiyeti 'nin Muharrerat ve Zabt-i Sabik Defteri, Library of the Turkish Historical Association (TTK) in Ankara. 4 Cf. Kologlu, Orhan, Aydinlarimizin bunahm yih 1918. Zafer nihai'den tam teslimiyete, Istanbul: Boyut Kitablari, 2000. 2

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Polygamy, women's veiling, and arbitrary divorce by men were rejected. In those discussions Mahmut Esat stated that "in religious matters religion has to serve Turkdom, not vice versa".1 In the months after the end of the First World War, the nationalist Turkish diaspora in and around the Foyers in Lausanne and Geneva produced an important quantity of propaganda literature in defence of the Turkish nationalist position on the future of Asia Minor. This agitation took place in cooperation with professional journalists and diplomats from the capital close to the CUP, among them Ahmed Cevdet Oran, the owner of the journal ikdam, and Re§id Safvet Atabinen, a diplomat and close friend of Javid Bey and Talat Pasha, who later became secretary of the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference, a Member of Parliament in Ankara, and a founding member of the Turkish Historical Society. A main aim of the propaganda was to prove by demographic or other arguments the "Turkish race'"s prerogative to found a nation-state in the whole of Asia Minor. In the Lausanne-based English-language paper Turkey, Mahmut Esat and his friends §iikru Sara9oglu, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu and Harun Aligc protested against British prime minister Lloyd George for his use of the term "Muslim Greeks": "[...] we, who are Turks, from the points of view of blood, sentiment, conscience and all, and are wholeheartedly attached to our nation, we protest against the attributions of Mr. Lloyd George. There is no 'Mohammedan Greek' in our country. We are Turks not only by religion but mainly by race."2 In June 1919 Mahmut Esat and §ukrii Saragoglu traveled secretly from Switzerland to Anatolia to engage in the guerilla war against the Allies in the region of Izmir. Shortly before his departure Mahmut Esat had completed his doctorate at the University of Fribourg.3 After the inauguration of the Turkish National Assembly in Ankara in April 1920, Mustafa Kemal called the ambitious young jurist to Ankara. In 1922, at the age of 30, he was made Minister of Economy, and in 1924 he became Minister of Justice.

1 97th, 98th and 102th session (4 and 11 May, and 22 June 1919), minutes of the Lausanne Foyer Turc. 2 "About the 'Mohammedan Greeks'!", Turkey, no. 2, March 1921, p. 6. 3 It was published later: Essad, Mahmoud, Du régime des capitulations ottomanes: leur caractère juridique d'après l'histoire et les textes, Stamboul: S.A. de Papeterie et d'Imprimerie Fratelli Haim, 1928.

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A Minister in the young nation state Mahmut Esat returned to Asia Minor in 1919 as the bearer of a revolutionary national project. When, in 1922, he was proposed to head the Ministry of Justice he refused, saying that the situation did not yet permit the radical changes he had in mind. 1 His long article "The principles of the Turkish revolution" 2 of 1924 glorified the War of Independance as a "holy revolution" to establish the nation's full sovereignty and achieve its final full accession to the community of Western states under the rule of modern law. Through this the Turkish Revolution was giving all oppressed nations, particularly the Muslim ones, a good example, he argued. In a speech in 1930 he called the Turkish Revolution the greatest revolution in world history, and praised the Republican People's Party, the bearer of the Revolution, that "took the material and symbolic wealth [in Asia Minor] from the hands of the foreigners [non-Muslim Ottomans included] and gave it to the Turkish nation." Many elements of the history of the Turkish Revolution as taught in the universities after 1930 are already in place in Mahmut Esat's article of 1924, except for the veneration of Atatiirk. Mahmut Esat deplored the fact that the people was not yet truly sovereign, but he did not question the link between this fact and his own understanding of nation/people as the community of the Muslim Turks, i.e. the religious community formerly ruling in Ottoman times (millet-i hakime). He understood that neither the establishment of Turkish sovereignty over Asia Minor nor its Turkification made Turkey a modern democracy; he thus postulated a third revolutionary stage for establishing the people's sovereignty in the political system and the economy.3 Until his death Mahmut Esat remained marked by the knowledege that Turkey still had a long way to go to become a real democracy, as Switzerland was above all, in his eyes. When Mahmut Esat became Minister of the Economy in 1922, he said that he was close to the left wing of the CUP. 4 He showed a particular concern for the poorer classes and set up a system of loans for farmers. His first aim, however, was to fully Turkify the Republic's economy in accordance with the Foyer doctrine, i.e. to oust and dispossess the non-Muslims. This concern was clearly expressed during and after the First Congress of the

1 Uyar, Hakki, "Sol milliyetgi" bir Tiirk aydim Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1892-1943), Biike, 2000, p. 72. 2 The whole speech is reproduced in Uyar 2000, p. 206-212, here 207. 3 Article reproduced in Uyar 2000, p. 162-91. 4 Uvar 2000. D. 35.

Ankara:

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Economy in Izmir in February 1923, both by him and by the President and Gazi Mustafa Kemal. 1 In 1924 Mahmut Esat was appointed Minister of Justice, and two years later he introduced the Swiss Civil Code into Turkey. He again proved to be revolutionary in this office, this time directing his efforts not against nonMuslims but against the "religious reaction" (irtica) that he largely identified with the Kurds. The Kemalists had not accorded the Sunni Kurds the autonomy promised them for their collaboration during the War of Indépendance. This brought about the great uprising led by Sheikh Said in 1925, that was motivated partly by religion (the Caliphate had been abolished in 1924) and partly by Kurdish nationalism. Threatening the Kurds in particular, the Minister of Justice declared during a speech on the new Civil Code: "The Turkish Revolution has decided to acquire Western civilization without conditions or limits. This decision is based on such a strong will that all those who oppose it are condemned to be annihilated by iron and fire. [...] We do not proceed according to our mood or our desire, but according to the ideal of our nation." 2 Later, during the Kurdish uprising of 1930, this prominent Kemalist spoke of the war between two races, Kurds and Turks, and went so far as to say: "All, friends, enemies and the mountains shall know that the Turk is the master of this country. All those who are not pure Turks have only one right in the Turkish homeland: the right to be servants, the right to be slaves." 3 Mahmut Esat leads us again into the problematic core of the Kemalist Revolution of the interwar period: a revolutionary modernist project; an underlying ethnic, not civic, understanding of nation; and thus a profound tension between the universalistic ambition of the project (to be part of the universal community of civilized states under the rule of law) and the coercive, violent reality of its völkisch nationalism. Interestingly, the Minister of Justice took the ethnic and linguistic pluralism in Switzerland as a strong argument for the universal validity of its Civil Code, 4 but he did not take this pluralism, including political pluralism, seriously as the essential context for the very functioning of those laws.

1 Uyar 2000, p. 39 and 42; Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk'ün söylev ve Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Ankara, 1997, Vol. II, p. 129-132. 2

demecleri

Uyar 2000, p. 73. Son Posta, 20 September 1930. Cited in Halici, §aduman, Yeni Türkiye'de devletinin yapilanmasmda Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1892-1943), Ankara: Atatürk Aragtirma Merkezi, 2004, p. 348. For a similar statement of the Prime Minister at the time, Ismet Inönü, on the Turks' exclusive "ethnic and racial rights" in Asia Minor, see Milliyet, August 31, 1930. 4 Bozkurt, "Esbabi mucibe", p. XXX-XXXI. 3

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Nevertheless, did the Civil Code not prove to be a stable foundation stone of Republican Turkey, a firm pledge of Turkey's abolition of Sharia and Caliphate? Undoubtedly, the enthusiast nationalist Bozkurt gave lasting and constructive impulses to Republican Turkey. It is true that the Code he introduced became an incontestable pillar of the state and was more and more integrated and adapted to Turkish society. For several decades, however, a worrying gap existed between the laws and their observance (notably where legal marriage was concerned). There was another problem. The hurried adoption of the Civil Code had to do with a deal at the Lausanne Conference of 1923; only if Turkey introduced such a modern code, would the Western powers accord the Republic full sovereignty and not insist on supervising its tribunals after the abolition of the Capitulations (the legal privileges for foreigners in the Ottoman Empire). Thus the nationalist elite's primary desire for power and sovereignty also influenced the hasty legal revolution in 1926.

Theorizing Kemalism after 1930 Mahmud Esat was Minister of Justice until 1930. His disappearance from the political scene coincided with the closing-down of the extensive Foyer turc organization (Turk, ocagi), i.e. its fusion into the single-party organization of Mustafa Kemal's Republican People's Party in 1930-1931. The Foyers had been Mahmud Esat's intellectual home for nearly twenty years; back from Switzerland he had continued to frequent them. After the Foyers were closed down, intellectual, cultural, and political public life was more then ever controlled by the state and centered on its leader. Mustafa Kemal made great efforts in those years to promote the Turkish History thesis and the Sun Language theory, both highly Turko-centric visions of human history. In theses endeavours the former Minister of Justice was not involved. Mahmud Esat continued to be a Member of Parliament until his death; he was moreover appointed Professor of the History of the Turkish Revolution at Istanbul University, a new branch of study that the state began to promote after its university reform in 1933. Together with Moiz Kohen Tekinalp 1 he then became the most important theorist of Kemalism, an ideology he declared to be of universal validity. According to this logic, Atatiirk was the greatest revolutionary in the world. 2 It was the time of 1 Cf. his book Le Kemalisme, Paris: Felix Alcan, 1937. Tekinalp (sometimes Tekin Alp), a Turkish Jew who was nine years older than Bozkurt, was no less of a Turkist. He published not only in Turkish, but also in French; in contrast to Bozkurt he abstained from outspokenly racist pronouncements. 2 Uyar 2000, p. 101-102.

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nationalist superlatives in and outside Turkey. In the 1910s and 1920s, Tekinalp had also been close to the Foyers turcs. In 1932 Mahmut Esat for the first time used the term "Kemalism" (Kemalizm). 1 Besides, following the Surname Law of 1934, Mahmut Esat adopted the surname "Bozkurt", the name of the emblematic animal (grey wolf) symbolizing Turkdom for the Turkists. In his book Ataturk ihtilali Bozkurt defined revolution (ihtilal) as en event that produced a completely new situation by annihilating and replacing all that had been before. 2 The setting up of the new fully justified the destruction of the old and "bad"; seen in this light it legitimized all the violence exercised by Kemalism. For Bozkurt, Ataturk completely personified the Turkish Revolution and the Turkish nation. Thus if Ataturk reigned, the nation reigned, and there was perfect "authoritarian democracy", the chief taking his authority from the nation/people.3 In the same paragraph in his book, Bozkurt asserts that German National Socialism and Italian Fascism are nothing other than versions of Atatiirk's regime. For Bozkurt, National Socialism was the German liberation movement, analogous to that of the Turks after the First World War. Thanks to the Turks' success against the "imperialist" powers and the treaty they imposed at Paris-Sèvres, the Turkish experience, in Bozkurt's eyes, offered an ideal model of liberation for all nations oppressed by the West, particularly for those defeated in the First World War. He proudly cited Hitler's explicit affirmation of this position in a speech in the Reichstag. 4 In the 1930s, Bokurt's previous quasi-religious Foyer cult of Turkdom or Turkishness (Turkliik) fused with the cult, equally quasi-religious, of the leader-saviour Ataturk; Atatiirk's career was identified with the War of Salvation (Kurtulu§ Savasi) of 1919-1922 and the revolutionary construction of the nation state - in short, with the history of the Turkish Revolution as taught by Bozkurt.

Conclusion From his arrival in Switzerland, Mahmut Esat was committed to a national project that more and more took shape in the formative microcosm of the Foyers turcs. Asia Minor was to become the homeland of the Turkish nation - a nation understood as the community of Turkish-speaking Muslims 1 2 3 4

Uyar2000,p. 101. Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat, Ataturk ihtilali, Istanbul: Kaynak, 1995 (first edition 1940), p.164. Bozkurt, Ataturk, p. 107. Bozkurt, Ataturk, p. 287.

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sharing the same ideal of a strong, modern, and secular Turkish nation-state in Asia Minor. This was the goal he aimed to achieve, and this was the meaning of the term "revolution" often used in the Foyers. Esat was not much concerned to save a multinational empire, in contrast to the founders of the CUP and the "first generation" of Young Turks. Glorifying the Turkish ethno-nation above all, Bozkurt logically was not immune to racism and other forms of misanthropy. He frequently made enthusiastic and exaggerated statements like "all for the Turks"; "total Turkism"; "first the Turks, then humanity, and finally the others"; 1 and openly anti-Semitic - "For me a Turk has more value than all the Jews of this world, not to say the whole world". 2 The clear problem with Bozkurt's ethnonationalism - this is presumably true of all ideologies of this kind - was his unquestioning essentialist belief in a collective identity that he took to be a superior and absolute value. Behind this belief were the traumatic traces of the late Ottoman period, the millet-i hakime's hatred of the non-Turkish, nonMuslim "other", and the fear of the Turks' collapse as a political entity. In the eyes of most European readers at the beginning of the 21 s t century, Bozkurt's völkisch nationalism undoubtedly appears strange and negative. But even if often dominant, this was not the only pole of his worldview. His thinking had a schizophrenic aspect. He was incapable of conceiving of "New Turkey" other than in two contradictory, paradoxical ways. For he almost always sought to put Turkish society in a universal frame and to think and shape it according to universal terms that, by definition, cannot be ethnocentric. Thus the blatant nationalist he sometimes was could quite innocently also express his political views thus: "In a political perspective, revolution or progress mean making the people as sovereign as possible. For the Swiss it would be reactionary to adopt Turkish norms. For us on the other hand it is revolutionary to implement theirs." 3 Bozkurt's and many Kemalists' exaggerated nationalist thinking had a lasting negative impact on Turkey, because a really civic and pluralist, and thus democratic, conception of society could not develop out of it. But the other impact, which had some constructive long-term results, was the will to participate fully in modern "civilization" by accepting norms and values considered as universal. This is the legacy worth highlighting politically today in a Turkey on the road towards "post-nationalist" communitarian horizons.

1

I§itman, Tank Ziya, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt. Hayati ve hattralari 1892-1943, Izmir: Güneg, 1944, p. 63-64. "Masonluk meselesi, sabik Adliye Vekili Mahmut Esat Beyin Masonlara cevabi I", Anadolu, 18 October 1931, cited in Uyar, Bozkurt, p. 65. 'J D Bozkurt, Atatürk, p. 73. 2

9. «GARÎB ELLERDE VE BÎ-KESTÏM»: L'EXIL CHEZ NURI DERSIMI (1892-1973)*

Sous ce mot «En pays étranger, j'étais dépaysé et sans appui» 1 de l'intellectuel et militant kurde Mehmed Nuri Dersimi je propose quelques réflexions sur l'exil kurde dans la première moitié du 20e siècle. Exil, gurbet, est un terme répétitif des textes, tous en ottoman, que cet auteur a laissés. Je commencerai par demander ce qui était pour Dersimi la patrie et le patrimoine dont il se voyait éloigné durant la seconde moitié de sa vie (193773). Je mettrai en relief la genèse de sa gurbet. l'exil intérieur - une gurbet avant la gurbet - d'un Kurde dans une époque où le turquisme kémaliste atteignait son apogée. Je ferai le récit de sa fuite et de son insertion dans l'exilrefuge fragile. Je terminerai par quelques regards sur la nature du témoignage et de l'écriture par laquelle l'exilé (gurbetçi) mit en valeur sa situation. Ma source principale est Hatiratim, les mémoires de Mehmed Nuri Dersimi, son second livre paru treize ans après sa mort2. Je contextualise cette source principale à partir du premier livre de Dersimi, intitulé Le Dersim dans l'histoire du Kurdistan3, ainsi que de plusieurs recherches que j'ai effectuées auparavant 4 . Il y reste un problème: Les sources ne vont guère au delà des années 1950. Sans une exploration systématique de son entourage par le moyen de l'histoire orale, on saura peu sur la seconde moitié de la gurbet de Dersimi.5

*

Unpublished paper, read at the conférence "Ghurba/gurbet, variations autour de l'exil" on 17 November 2003 at the IISMM/EHESS, Paris. Dersimi, Mehmed Nuri, Hatiratim, Stockholm: Roja Nû, 1986, p. 200. Cette édition donne le texte en ottoman (transcrit en caractères latins) tandis que l'édition établie par Mehmet Bayrak l'adapte au turc actuel. Cette deuxième édition contient des notes de bas de page très instructives de la part de l'éditeur ainsi qu'une annexe composé de quelques texte et photos de Dersimi: Dersimi, Mehmed Nuri, Dersim ve Kürt Milli Miicadelesine Dair Hatiratim, sadele§tirerek, notlayarak ve resimleyerek Mehmet Bayrak, Ankara: Öz-Ge, 1992. Dorénavant Hatiratim 1986. L'édition de Bayrak sera citée Hatiratim 1992. Dersimi, Mehmet Nuri, Kurdistan Tarihinde Dersim, Aleppo, 1952. Notamment Kieser, Hans-Lukas, «Mehmet Nuri Dersimi, ein asylsuchender Kurde», in: idem (dir.), Kurdistan und Europa. Beiträge zur kurdischen Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts/ Regards sur l'histoire kurde (19-20e siècles), Zurich: Chronos, 1997, p. 187-216; idem, «Les Kurdes alévis et la question identitaire: le soulèvement du Koçkiri-Dersim (1919-21)», Les Annales de l'autre Islam n° 5 (1998), p. 279-316. Pour une interview avec la deuxième épouse de Dersimi, Fende, voir A. Dikili, «Ben burada Kiirtlerin içinde mezarimi yapayim...», Berxwedan, 15 janvier 1993.

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I Né dans la fin de siècle ottomane Nuri Dersimi est un membre tardif de cette élite ottomane de formation, issue d'une génération née dans la Fin de siècle, qui subit et fut auteur d'importantes ruptures durant son âge actif. Intellectuellement socialisée au tournant du siècle, dans une interaction idéologique étroite avec les courants européens contemporains, elle devint la génération fondatrice du nouvel ordre post-ottoman au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale. En tant que Kurde nationaliste Nuri Dersimi était le perdant du nouvel ordre au Proche-Orient. Il dut finalement quitter sa terre natale et passa de 1937 à 1973, donc pour presque la moitié de sa vie, dans la gurbet en Syrie. 1937 était la première année de la campagne du Dersim et donc le moment où le «Kurdistan» - la partie orientale d'Asie mineure peuplée majoritairement, à l'ère ottomane, de Kurdes et d'Arméniens - fut définitivement conquis par un Etat central qui s'y était attaqué depuis le début des réformes ottomanes (Tanzimat) dans les années 1830. Le nom désigne l'origine: Nuri Dersimi est né en 1892 à Hozat dans le Dersim en Anatolie orientale. Son père Milla Ibrahim est joueur de Saz, poète et instituteur tribal et villageois. Il instille à son fils aussi bien une philosophie alévie de la vie qu'une conscience nationaliste kurde. Dans ces contrées-là, cette conscience s'inspire beaucoup de l'exemple que donne le voisinage arménien: volonté donc d'un renouveau linguistique, littéraire et éducatif ainsi que des visions politiques qui donnent une place primordiale à la nation à construire. La première expérience scolaire du petit Mehmed Nuri est celle dans le village au nom bien arménien Sorpiyan, où enseigne son oncle Milla Hasan. 1 Nuri Dersimi goûte la gurbet, comme il écrit, lorqu'en 1911 il part à Istanbul pour y faire ses études de vétérinaire à la Mulkiye Baytar Mektebi. C'est bien une gurbet par la distance qui le sépare de sa terre natale et des siens. Mais en même temps c'est pour lui la plus belle période de sa vie comme il dit également, donc peu comparable à celle en Syrie dont il sera question plus tard. 2 Dans la capitale il y a un petit nombre d'étudiants du Dersim; il les connaît de l'école de son père. Il y existe pourtant un assez large réseau dersimi qui organise aussi des cent (réunions alévies à caractère social et religieux). Les cem resteront pour Nuri Dersimi des manifestations privilégiées de sociabilité, de ressourcement spirituel et de mobilisation idéologique.

' Hatiratiml986, p. 16. Hatiratiml986, p. 2 4 , 2 7

2

et 35.

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Dans les années après la «révolution jeune turque» de 1908, une atmosphère politiquement chargée règne parmi les étudiants et de la capitale et en province. La libéralisation relative permet des discussions ouvertes et la recherche collective de nouveaux horizons politiques. Nuri Dersimi fréquente aussi bien ses compatriotes du Dersim que les nouvelles associations kurdistes crées dans la capitale. Mais il est un des seuls Alévis parmi la grande majorité de Kurdes sunnites dans ces associations. Il n'est pas compris lorqu'il met le doigt sur le fossé important dans la société anatolienne orientale entre sunnites et alévis: On rejettera plus tard, en 1919, ses propos quand il parlera de l'urgence d'une réconciliation confessionnelle au profit de l'unité kurde 1 . Le nationalisme qui réunit idéologiquement ces kurdistes de la première heure, n'est pas à même de toucher au plus profond de la question identitaire. L'expérience de l'étrangeté lui est en effet familière depuis son plus petit âge: Lorsque Mehmed Nuri est orphelin suite à la mort précoce de sa mère; quand on le gifle à l'école de village; ou encore lorsque le père, qui veut un avenir radieux pour son fils, l'envoie dans un collège militaire à Mamuretiilaziz. «Mon père me manquait et je me croyais être dans la gurbet.»2 Le père n'a alors pas hésité à chercher une école mieux adaptée pour son fils. Quand le fils se trouve à Istanbul le père lui écrit une lettre dans laquelle il parle de «mon orphelin dans la gurbet», de «l'oiseau qui s'est envolé». 3 La tendresse familiale se mêle au soufisme alévi chez ce poète et joueur de saz qu'est Milla Ibrahim. L'expression de la gurbet chez Nuri Dersimi, si politique qu'elle soit plus tard, restera liée à l'expérience de l'orphelinat et à l'univers symbolique alévi. A l'instar de l'expérience enfantine, elle sera adoucie par l'amour d'amis proches et par l'expérience de solidarités: solidarité dersimie, solidarité alévie et solidarité simplement humaine.

II Être gurbetçi avant la gurbet La vraie gurbet longue et amère en Syrie commencera en 1937. Comment est-elle advenue? C'est encore une histoire individuelle qui reflète celle d'une région et d'un paysage humain alors particulièrement détruit, ceux de l'Anatolie orientale.

2

3

Hatiratim.1986, p. 99. Hatiratim) 986, p. 19. Hatiraum]986,

p. 27.

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Pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale, Nuri Dersimi travaille pour le centre vétérinaire militaire d'Erzincan. Ce poste à la frontière du Dersim lui permet une assez grande liberté de mouvement dont il profite pour militer pour la cause kurde et contre la participation des Kurdes alévis à la guerre. C'est alors aussi qu'il se marie avec Selvi, une jeune Kurde alévie du village de Çamgigi dans le district de Kangal, province de Sivas. Ce mariage se terminera brusquement 20 ans plus tard lors du départ de l'époux pour la Syrie. Le jeune militant commence à éveiller le soupçon de hauts officiers et du plénipotentiare du parti Union et Progrès à Erzincan en 1915/16, mais le problème s'arrange. Ce n'est qu'avec le soulèvement du Koçgiri-Dersim, en 1921, qui aspire à l'autonomie kurde et dont Nuri Dersimi est un des leaders, qu'il est et reste cerné et ciblé par les nationalistes turcs comme un adversaire de taille. Sans succès, Mustafa Kemal l'invite en septembre 1919 à participer comme député du Dersim au gouvernement d'Ankara. Dans les années à venir il y aura d'autres tentatives de récupérer, domestiquer ou faire taire cet acteur kurde, entre autre par l'attribution d'une belle ferme jadis arménienne dans le village de Holvenk près de Harput. Après la suppression du soulèvement du Koçgiri-Dersim, Nuri Dersimi vit clandestinement au Dersim, car le gouvernement l'exclut de l'amnestie finalement déclarée. Il est sous la protection de Seyid Riza, le plus puissant chef tribal de la région. Le régime l'amnistie quelques années plus tard, mais ce n'est qu'un sursis. Car il est surveillé de près et souvent dénoncé. La gendarmerie entreprend régulièrement des perquisitions dans sa ferme. Par conséquent le couple se trouve dans une tension permanente qui rend malade la femme. Le fait que le couple n'ait pas d'enfants est peut-être à voir en relation avec cette situation. La pression hyper-turquiste des années 30 se fait tout particulièrement sentir au Dersim qui est le coeur de l'habitat kurdo-alévi et contre lequel le régime prépare la campagne dite du Dersim. Elle sera déclenchée au printemps 1937 et se transformera en 1938 en une campagne d'anéantissement, destinée, avec les mots du Premier ministre Celai Bayar devant l'Assemblée nationale, à «éradiquer une fois pour toutes le problème»1 que pose le Dersim hétérodoxe et hétéro-ethnique à l'Etat.

1 Cité dans Akgul, Suat, Yakin Tarihimizde Dersim Îsyanlan ve Gerçekler, Istanbul: Bogaziçi Yayinlari, 1992, p. 124-25.

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III Le traumatisme de la campagne du Dersim La campagne du Dersim est la grande déchirure qui force beaucoup de Dersimis à vivre dans la gurbet. Pour la majorité il y aura après la campagne une déportation forcée dans l'ouest du pays, d'autres, dont Nuri Dersimi, s'enfuient à temps avant la tempête. Ce traumatisme de la campagne du Dersim, qui détruit le patrimoine et tue beaucoup d'amis et de parents, déterminera la gurbet du réfugié Mehmed Nuri. Dès le début les activités dans l'exil serviront à réparer et surmonter ce traumatisme initial. Peu avant la campagne, le docteur Mehmed Nuri a tenté de s'organiser un «demi-exil»: Il a rendu visite auprès du ministère de l'agriculture pour obtenir une propriété dans l'ouest au lieu de celle près d'Elazig. Cette tentative se termine par l'échec. A en conclure dans la rétrospective, la campagne du Dersim visait en effet à exterminer tout un groupe de leaders et de leurs familles, jugés antiturcs, et de prévenir une éventuelle réorganisation des Dersimis en diaspora. La rupture dans le cas de Nuri Dersimi est totale comme l'indique une lettre écrite au père de Selvi peu après la fuite. Je la cite dans la version donnée en 1993 à un journaliste par l'ancienne épouse de l'exilé: «Dorénavant je ne suis plus présent. Sachez-moi comme quelqu'un qui n'existe plus. Ma cause n'a pas réussi. Prends ta fille et ramène-la dans ta maison.»1 C'est ainsi que se termine, sans autre acte formel, le premier mariage de Dersimi. En préférant la fuite à la perte, le survivant se voit donner la mission de témoigner de ce qui arrive aux siens, c'est à dire ceux qui, comme lui, avaient cru à une autonomie kurde. Mais il s'agit aussi de membres de familles: En automne 1938, pour échapper aux persécuteurs, sa fille adoptive Fato, âgée de 14 ans, se précipite comme d'autres femmes et filles dans une gorge. Un frère est transporté de Diyarbékir, où il travaille comme scribe, dans le Dersim pour être fusillé avec les deux autres frères de Nuri Dersimi. Pour Hidir, Pertek et Ismail comme pour beaucoup d'autres, la consanguinité avec des oppositionnels semble être la seule raison de leur exécution. En septembre 1937 Nuri Dersimi quitte Elazig en train (pour son caractère trop peu turc pur le nom de Mamuretuaziz vient juste d'être changé en «Elazig», Dersim en «Tunceli»). Peu de personnes savent sa vraie destination: un asile en Europe. Suivi de près par la police civile, il arrive à Istanbul et loge à Sirkeci dans l'hôtel «Elazig» qui appartient à un Arménien nommé Ovadis, probablement un originaire de la même région que le réfugié. Il prend le train pour Edirne dans le but de descendre à une station grecque. Par hasard, 1

Giindem, 25 juin

1993.

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il apprend dans le train par l'ancien collègue vétérinaire Sabri que, suite au traité d'amitié entre Grèce et Turquie, il risquerait l'extradition. Il rentre à l'hôtel, y laisse son bagage pour détourner l'attention des agents secrets et se précipite de nouveau à la gare, cette fois-ci à Haydarpacha, pour prendre le train pour Adana. C'est ainsi, par une décision hâtive, que le mandat français en Syrie est devenu la destination finale de sa fuite. Par peur des persécuteurs, il envoie d'Adana un télégramme à Elazig disant qu'il reviendrait bientôt après un bref détour pour acheter du bétail à Mardine. 1 Le train express pour Mardine le mène alors sur territoire syrien. Le 11 septembre 1937, Nuri Dersimi traverse dans ce train la frontière turco-syrienne près d'Islahiye. De nouveau c'est l'amitié humaine, cette fois-ci de l'avocat syrien Kâmil Sinno, qui voyage après Adana dans le même compartiment que lui, qui sauve le fugitif inexpérimenté des pièges non seulement à la douane, mais encore sur le territoire mandataire. 2 Car la lune de miel entre Paris et la dictature kémaliste a pour conséquence que les requérants d'asile kurdes en Syrie sont renvoyés sans considération humanitaire. C'est une désillusion particulièrement amère pour un intellectuel qui croyait au support français pour les victimes kurdes. Ils sont nombreux dans les années 1930 à faire cette expérience.3

IV Refuge menacé La gurbet commence donc par une vie dans la clandestinité. L'amitié, des réseaux de solidarité ainsi que la foi en une mission tiennent debout l'exilé. Mission depuis le début de la gurbet: Le 14 septembre 1937 il fait envoyer d'Alep une lettre de deux pages à la Société des Nations à Genève qui y arrive le 19 septembre. Des lettres identiques qui dénoncent la campagne de destruction dans le Dersim et demandent l'intervention des autorités adressées, sont envoyées aux ministères de l'extérieur britannique, français et américain. Il n'y aura aucune suite, aucune réponse donnée au cri de détresse que sont ces lettres adressées à des instances que l'émissaire informel du Dersim croyait crédibles. Le témoignage du vétérinaire kurde, si ineffectif qu'il ait été sur le

2 3

Hatiratiml986, p. 186. Hatiratiml9S6, p. 187-88.

Cf. entre autre le récit de Noureddine Zaza de Maden (Diyerbékir) dans Genève: Labor et Fides, 1993 (1982), p. 59-63.

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plan de la diplomatie contribue pourtant à la mobilisation nationaliste de la jeunesse kurde en Syrie, dont beaucoup de familles sont réfugiées. 1 Des amis aident à ce que le réfugié menacé se forge une nouvelle identité. Les amis sont parfois des rencontres de pur hasard, comme Kamil Sinno, ou bien se trouvent grâce à une relation au Dersim, aux Alévis ou aux Kurdes. L'amitié est un thème central de cette gurbet et les textes de l'exilé expriment à plusieurs reprises sa profonde gratitude envers des personnes qui ont tout fait pour adoucir son sort. Tout d'abord le requérant d'asile croit pouvoir se faire passer, comme on le lui conseille, pour un Kurtdagli, un ressortissant donc de la région du même nom dans la province d'Alep où la majorité des gens ne parlaient pas l'arabe. Mais le réfugié doit se rendre sous la protection d'un chef de tribu, autrement il aurait risqué d'être appréhendé. Ces premiers mois de son exil il reste par conséquent dans la sphère d'influence du chef de tribu kurde alévi Koco Aga, originaire d'Elbistan, qui contrôle alors la région de Leçe près de Kirikhan à l'est d'Iskenderun. C'est aussi Koço Aga qui figure comme expéditeur de la deuxième lettre, datée du 20 novembre 1937 (deux jours près l'exécution de l'ami et leader Seyid Riza), que fait envoyer Nuri Dersimi d'Alexandrette à la SDN. La rédaction en français et l'envoi de ces lettres se fait dans une coopération avec l'ami Memduh Selim (un des fondateurs de la Ligue Nationale Kurde Khoybun), le leader et futur érudit kurde Kamuran Bedirhan et l'Arménien Agop Efendi qui est inspecteur de la puissance mandataire à Iskenderun. Nuri Dersimi passe alors pour un membre de la tribu Sinemilli de Koço Aga. Pour un certain temps il porte le pseudonyme Hiiseyin Mazlum, puis Bagriyanik Mémo. 2 Puis il obtient une carte de séjour et deux ans plus tard la citoyenneté syrienne. Mais la pression turque sur les autorités françaises, puis syriennes le tiendront toujours dans l'insécurité; une insécurité qui durera jusque dans les années 1950. Car ses contacts avec des membres du parti arménien Dachnak et ses efforts sur le plan diplomatique le rendent particulièrement suspect aux yeux des services turcs. Par le biais de l'ambassadeur turc en Syrie, le gouvernement fait pression sur les autorités syriennes, demandant l'extradition de cette personne gênante qui contribue à mobiliser la jeunesse kurde depuis son exil. On le dénonce, essaie de le faire assassiner, perquisitionne sa maison et l'accuse d'être communiste. 3 ^ Cf. Zaza 1993, p. 88-89. Pour une analyse des lettres envoyées à la SDN voir Kieser 1997, p. 188-90, facsimiles p. 211-16. Pour un bref regard sur les cercles intellectuels kurdes dans l'exil syrien voir Strohmeier, Martin, Crucial images in the présentation ofa Kurdish national identity: heroes andpatriots, traitorsandfoes, Leiden: Brill, 2003, p. 128-32.

3

Hatiraftm 1992, p. 265. Hatiratiml986,

p. 196,205-6 et 215; Hatirattm 1992, p. 266.

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En été 1938, donc moins d'un an après la séparation de Selvi, l'exilé se lie à Feride, une institutrice à Alep, elle-même ressortissante du Dersim; leurs noces ont lieu à Amman en juillet 1939. Hatiratim, mais aussi des lettres personnelles témoignent d'un grand attachement et d'une profonde reconnaissance de Nuri Dersimi pour sa seconde épouse qu'il considère aussi bien comme «compagne de vie que main droite» dans ses activités pour la cause kurde.1 Ce mariage reste également sans enfants. L'époux essaie de consoler Feride: «Ne considère pas comme nécessaire un fruit de vie condamné à vivre comme transfuge et esclave apatride.» Le couple adopte, paraît-il, une fille qui s'appelle Jale.2 L'ignorance de l'arabe, la langue officielle de Syrie, renforce pour le Kurde le sentiment de la gurbet. La pression turque lui rend impossible d'avoir un poste officiel en Syrie. Par chance, une ancienne connaissance d'Istanbul, Abdullah Ibn al Husain, depuis 1921 émir de Transjordanie, lui propose fin 1938 le poste de vétérinaire dans son palais. Mais une démarche turque termine cette belle position une fois que les deux premiers ans, fixés dans le contrat, se sont écoulés. Amère ironie de la gurbet: Un malentendu linguistique renforce la défaveur. Lorsque l'émir demande tout d'un coup au Dr. Dersimi de régler son cas avec le consul turc à Ammann, Dersimi plaide l'impossibilité d'une telle démarche en disant: «Bon, si vous ne m'acceptez plus, je n'irai pas en haut, mais en bas», ceci étant un proverbe kurde. Mais Abdullah le prend au pied de la lettre pensant avec colère que Nuri Dersimi veut se rendre chez son ennemi Ibn Saud, émir de l'Arabie Saoudite.. , 3

V Rendre un sens à la gurbet Le sentiment d'être en mission et la parole donnée à Seyid Riza de témoigner pour le Dersim, ont motivé et tenu debout dès son départ le fugitif Nuri Dersimi. Ceci malgré beaucoup d'échecs: Il n'arrive pas à sa destination prévue en Europe, il n'a aucun succès auprès de la diplomatie, la France lui refuse plus tard le visa pour se rendre auprès de son ami Kamuran Bedirhan à Paris, et il meurt sans avoir revu sa patrie. De plus, à part quelques articles4 il ne publie qu'un seul livre durant sa vie: une production plutôt maigre pour quelqu'un qui dévoue sa vie à l'acte de témoignage. Pourtant: Ce livre et ses ' Quelques lettres sont reproduites dans Hatiratim 1992, p. 263-67, citation p. 267. 2

Hatiratim 1992, p. 267.

3

Hatiratim 1986, p. 206. Cf. Anter, Musa, Hatiralanm, vol. 1, Istanbul: Yön, 1991, p. 102-03.

4

Dont l'introduction dans la publication de la lettre de Celadet Ali Bedirhan à Mustafa Kemal de 1933: Tiirkiye Reisicumhuru Gazi M. Kemal Pa§a Hazretlerine açik mektup, 1973.

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mémoires publiées après sa mort, constituent une source capitale pour l'histoire du Dersim dans la première moitié du vingtième siècle. Sans l'écriture de ce gurbetçi, le paysage humain du Dersim à cette époque serait privée de sa presque seule voix. «Né et élevé sur un pâturage ensoleillé de l'Orient où j'ai vécu, aimé et lutté pour mon droit et mon existence, moi le vagabond qui d'un coeur gros a dû s'enfuir à l'étranger [yad ellere].»1 Il s'agit du début d'une lettre parue dans le journal Dicle Kaynagi à Istanbul en 1952. Ce sont des mots émouvants, tirés presque au hasard de la production de l'exilé. Ils prouvent une écriture qui invite à la solidarisation, voire identification avec leur auteur. Voici la force du message de Mehmed Nuri Dersimi: savoir toucher ceux susceptibles de recevoir le témoignage d'un drame personnel et humain, drame qui exprime celui de tout un collectif. La trame personnelle, l'expérience d'une vie, forme le fil rouge vigoureux et convaincant de son écriture. Sans elles la documentation historiographique qu'offre le travail de l'auteur, pour importante qu'elle soit en tant que telle, apparaîtrait comme très incomplète, voire bricolée, ceci dû à la situation difficile de l'exil en Syrie, à l'absence d'archives et au manque d'environnement professionnel. Nuri Dersimi sait, et avec raison, cultiver un discours de la douleur, de l'échec et de la perte, un discours qui se place consciemment tout à l'opposé du discours triomphaliste des kémalistes après le Traité de Lausanne en 1923. «Je suis un homme touché par la catastrophe [ben felaketzede bir insanim].» 2 S'il cultive le discours de la catastrophe qui l'a traumatisé, on peut le croire: C'est ce dont témoigne sa vie. Il ne met pas en scène un discours ostentatoire de la victimisation qui sent de loin la propagande politique (a contrario de l'exemple du diplomate Re§id Atabinen, un habile propagateur de la cause turquiste en Suisse dans les années 1918/193). «Quand je lis dans Dicle Kaynagi les plaintes et les berceuses dans la douce langue de nos mères, je trouve l'occasion de pleurer à chaudes larmes.» Ceci une autre phrase dans sa lettre parue au journal Dicle Kaynagi en 1952 qui est suivie de la remarque amère: «Parmi les peuples de ce monde nous sommes ce peuple qui a même été privé de l'opportunité de pleurer sa souffrance dans sa propre langue.» Les larmes sont en effet très présentes dans l'écriture du gurbetçi. Ceci bien sûr en rapport avec ce dont il témoigne et qu'il éprouve existentiellement. Mais il y apparaît en plus une dimension de la pensée alévie, une tradition religieuse qui ne prend pas le succès politique 1 Hatiratim 1992, p. 268. 2 Hatiratim 1986, p. 201. 3 Nombreux pamphlets publiés sous le pseudonyme Kara-Schemsi, dont L'extermination des Turcs, Genève, 1919.

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apparent comme signe de valeur et de vérité, mais qui valorise - à l'instar de l'expérience à Kerbela de l'héritier, vu légitime, de l'histoire du salut, la famille d ' A l i ibn Abi Talib - l'échec, la perte et le statut de victimes. 1 L'échec est valorisé non pas en tant que tel, mais comme passage douloureux face à un exercice injuste du pouvoir. A l'effet de témoignage dans la perspective de la victime - effet valable à long terme - , s'ajoute un autre, plus immédiat et plus ambivalent: La mobilisisation militante de la jeunesse kurde, «l'espoir et l'avenir de ma race» 2 . C'est une tâche éducative qui arrive à se transformer, sous la plume amère de l'exilé, en appel à la vengeance. Le langage de cet appel est imprégné par une vision social-darwiniste du monde telle qu'elle était courante parmi les élites de formation, y compris les Jeunes Turcs, socialisées au début du XXe siècle. Cette pensée contredit en partie celle, alévie, dont nous venons de parler. Pour preuve quelques lignes tirées de la «Harangue à la jeunesse» qui se trouve à la fin du livre Le Dersim dans l'histoire du Kurdistan: «Oh jeunesse kurde, oh fils d'une nation chevaleresque qui dédaigne l'oppression qu'elle souffre depuis de siècles. [...] Chaque être qui veut vivre doit se battre. Chaque nation qui veut avoir sa place sur cette terre doit lutter. Voici le principe inchangeable de la Nature. La loi sans merci de l'existence dans le monde de la chimie, des plantes et des animaux est de combattre et de faire la guerre. Ce principe est encore plus inexorable pour le genre humain. [...] Nous sommes une nation qui ne veut pas mourir. Les Kurdes se sont décidés à vivre, et ils vivront. [...] Vengeance!»3 Une autre contradiction ou tension, encore plus frappante, dans la production de l'exilé est celle qui concerne la relation avec les Arméniens: D'une part Dersimi les désigne chaleureusement comme des frères et soeurs avec qui il a grandi sur sa terre natale, d'autre part, en tant que Kurde, il se sent très mal compris et injustement traité dans le discours de certains Arméniens. Les raisons principales de cette amertume semblent être l'exil, la faible publicité des Kurdes comparée à celle des Arméniens, la «concurrence» des diaspora arménienne et kurde (notamment pour ce qui concerne la production On retrouve ce genre d'articulation implicitement ou explicitement alévie p. ex. aussi dans un poème d'Agik Nesimî à la mémoire des trois jeunes révolutionnaires, dont deux alévis, exécutés le 6 mai 1972 en Turquie: «Pleure mon coeur, pleure sans arrêt/ (...) A chaque époque meurent de vrais hommes comme ceux-là/ (...) Chaque jour le 6 mai, chaque jour Kerbela/ Ah! La cruauté du tyran n'est pas encore terminé!» Cité dans Bayart, Jean-François, «La question Alevî dans la Turquie moderne», in: Carré, Olivier (dir.), L'islam et l'état dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1982, p. 118. 3

Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim, p. 337.

Kiirdistan Tarihinde Dersim, p. 336-38. Pour de brèves analyses de ce passage voir Bozarslan, Hamit, La question kurde. Etats et minorités au Moyen-Orient, Paris: Sciences Po, 1997, p. 104, et Kieser, Hans-Lukas, «Die Sprache politisierter Arzte (1889-1923)», in: idem, Aspects ofthe political language in Turkey (19th-20th centuries), Istanbul: Isis, p. 89-90.

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de mémoriaux écrits, en quoi les Arméniens devancent de loin les Kurdes) et, généralement, la déception sur l'échec de la fraternité arméno-kurde dans la première moitié du XXe siècle. L'amertume de Dersimi a probablement crû dans la seconde moitié de son exil. Un indice en est le fait que le ton parfois antiarménien ne se fasse encore guère sentir dans le livre publié en 1952. Un autre indice en est une remarque indignée sur le roman d'un Arménien, paru en 1961 seulement, qui lui paraît salir l'honneur des Kurdes. 1 Généralement l'exilé se révolte contre le peu de compréhension que rencontrent les Kurdes, en tant que victimes de l'histoire proche, de la part des Arméniens et de l'Occident. Malgré cela et malgré quelques grosses exagérations qu'il lance dans ce contexte, Dersimi continue de voir lié le destin de ces deux peuples, vus comme frères. 2 Dans son exil en Syrie, Dersimi a élevé une voix nette, parfois aigiie et perçante, et non sans faux sons, pour rappeller au monde la dimension non seulement antikurde, mais anti-humaine de la politique turquiste dans les provinces de l'Est. Il s'est cru porteur d'une double tâche: d'une part de témoigner des Kurdes, surtout du Dersim (une région kurde alévie dévastée par la campagne militaire de 1937/38); d'autre part d'en appeler à la jeunesse kurde pour la mobiliser et l'instruire d'un passé qu'il lui était défendu de connaître en Turquie contemporaine. Il n'était pas tout à fait «sans appui», mais la gurbet a marqué cette «vie de Kurde» de façon traumatique et définitive.

Il s'agit de Gardon, Victor (alias Gakavian, Wahram), Le Chevalier 1961. Voir Hatiratim 1986, p. 69. 2 Voir le chapitre «Ermeni meselesi» dans Hatiratim 1986, p. 38-70.

à l'Emeraude,

Paris,

10. ALEVILIK AS SONG AND DIALOGUE: THE VILLAGE SAGE MELULI BABA (1892-1989)

After the death of a beloved person the poet and village sage Hiiseyin Karaca gave himself the name Meluli, ie. 'sad'.* It is by this name, often supplemented by the Bektashi title 'Baba' that he gained high esteem in the region of Marash and beyond. This paper hopes to shed light on this fascinating man, who throughout his life held himself at some distance from the traditional rural Alevi system and its hereditary sacred figures, the dedes. I like to regard Meluli Baba as an exponent of a little-known provincial 'Enlightenment' in the late Ottoman period, a movement that appears in turn linked to the introduction of Oriental Christian educational institutions which, because of the proximity of the Alevis to non-Muslim cultures, had a particular impact upon them. 1 Meluli's solid education and particular spiritual socialisation in the fragile 'Belle Epoque' before World War One made him particularly resistant to the appeals of the highly ideologized periods that followed. In his rich poetry (§iir) as in his 'graceful dialogue' (muhabbet), there is a complete absence of nationalist language, be it Turkish or Kurdish (he was an Alevi Kurd speaking kurmanci). He remained aloof from the traditional Alevi hierarchies, when asked pleading for an open, secular society. He articulated life, the events of the day, or his examination of the grandson's Marxist visions by using the rich symbolic heritage of the Alevi-Bektashi tradition. Thus we can and must see him as a significant Alevi representative of the twentieth century, one who succeeded in questioning religious rituals and social constraints without denying that what Alevis call the dz, the essence of faith. Here, I would like initially to offer a little insight into the world in which Hiiseyin Karaca grew up, then place his particular career in this context, and finally discuss his poetry and muhabbet. This is a first study, and by no way exhaustive. It intends to draw the attention to a remarkable person and

* First published in Shankland, David (ed.), Anthropology, Archaeology and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia or the life and times ofF. W. Hasluck (1878-1920), Istanbul: Isis, 2004, vol. 1, p. 355-368. 1 1 would like to thank David Shankland for his helpful comments and assistance in polishing the final version of my text.

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indeed to the importance of conducting research into that what we may call 'Eastern (Anatolian) Alevism'. 1

Eastern Alevi life in late Ottoman times One may interpret the well-researched Alevi 'coming-out' during the 1990s — a religious re-articulation in a modern, socially dynamic, multicultural context — as the resumption of a process which the catastrophe of World War One had suppressed at its very commencement.2 The world of the eastern Alevis, one based on subsistence farming and constituted upon dede lineages, only definitively began to break up in the 1960s. Whilst an immensely complicated phenomenon, this change had to do certainly with new access in the east to public education, the introduction of the radio, and significant migration to the towns. In spite of this well-known social change in the modern era, my suggestion would be that the germ of the dissolution of the rural and tribal communities, and of the dede system, were already clearly present in the century before, that indeed when Hüseyin Karaca was born. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the strong educational renaissance of the Armenians and the presence of a growing educational and sanitary system built up by Occidental missionaries in provincial towns and in villages changed the whole region in a way that crossed any specific communitarian borders. Change came also through the Ottoman politics of centralisation, this however influenced mostly the administrative provincial centres where state schools and a few hospitals were founded. The new possibilities associated with these agencies of modernity resulted on the one hand in social and ethnic tensions and on the other in new perspectives for hitherto underprivileged groups, among them the Alevis. If under Sultan Abdulhamid II a strong censor and the presence of police informers hampered intellectual exchange even in smaller towns, the free movement of people, and the autonomous building up of schools in the Alevi villages during the years after 1908 opened the door for dynamic social and intellectual movements. Albeit perhaps at a low level in the social hierarchy, regional Alevis, particularly the masculine youth, were seized by these dynamics.3 * See my 'Die Aleviten im Wandel der Neuzeit' in Tamcke (2003). For detailed insights into Kurdish Alevism as an important part of Eastern Alevism and its sources see Bayrak (1997) and Gezik (2000). 2 A good overview over the first years of the Alevi revival is provided by Vorhoff (1995). 3 On the Alevis, the Western missionaries and the state in central and oriental Anatolia see Kieser (2001 and 2000; 69-81, 167-70, and 382-412).

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In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, in the period before Abdiilhamid II, Alevi villages and tribes had already tried to access modern education and protection via the American missionaries.1 Under the influence of these missionaries' puritanism — a mixture of individual spirituality and Enlightenment ideals — tribal chiefs and others questioned the dede system and compelled a revision of religious practices. Some changes, aimed at eliminating 'superstitious traditions', as reported in missionary documents, seem indeed have been initiated at that time. But the attempt to escape a world where they were tolerated perhaps, but certainly discriminated against economically, via outside help was considered by the authorities as a threat to the existing order and repressed accordingly. Nevertheless, the state itself was not in a position to respond to the Alevis' needs, even if Abdiilhamid took more seriously the 'Alevi question' than the Tanzimat reformers before him. Indeed, he did not win this community over for the state, as he surely would have liked, but in fact alienated it through a Sunnitising campaign, during the course of which he sent forth Hanefi preachers and teachers, built mosques in Alevi villages and supervised the inhabitants' religious life. Hiiseyin Karaca's experiences as child shed light on this period. Throughout Abdiilhamid's reign, some villagers, among them Meluli's parents, managed to migrate to places that gave hope for a better life. Overall though, any Alevi move to the towns was still very limited. A number of men went as seasonal workers to the urban centres and the capital. If families settled down in an urban milieu, it was — so far as I know with regard to the situation in central and eastern Anatolia — in or in the neighbourhood of Christian districts. Further, as the nomadic tribes began to settle, whole new settlements were made in the proximity of Christian villages, as we can clearly see in the province of Erzincan. The history of that interior migration, of consecutive resettlements, and forms of cohabitation remains to be written. It could be based on local oral traditions, administrative sources and the rich memorial literature in Armenian. It seems that a peaceful cooperation combined with a division of labour had prevailed before 1914: the newcomers being herdsmen with little knowledge of agriculture, construction and trade. With the help of Christians, not Sunnites, in the towns, a few Alevi families gained access to the commercial and educational possibilities of urban life from which they had mostly been excluded since the sixteenth century. Hiiseyin Karaca's father again is a good example of this. The almost complete destruction of the Christians in those regions caused therefore a deep rupture in the process of change that had begun in the mid-nineteenth century. Significantly, with a few exceptions, Eastern Alevis 1

See Karakaya-Stump (2004).

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were not the agents and instruments of that destruction. In the period after World War One until the end of the Turkish Republican single party rule after World War Two, they remained much isolated, reliant upon their own means of subsistence, without most of the interactions and new possibilities they had won in the late Ottoman period. They welcomed nevertheless the abolition of the Caliphate (1924) and the promise of a secular state, i.e. the raising of the centuries-old Sunni pressure. This made many of them, as far as they were not engaged in Kurdish resistance, loyal voters for Mustafa Kemal's Republican Party, and some Alevi Kurdish figures moved into Republican urban society through embracing its tenets. The state however did not, positively or negatively, penetrate the Eastern Alevis' rural world before the end of the 1950s. The state only intervened if there was some political activity or religious life with a supraregional context, such as in the case of the tekkes and brotherhoods. Certainly, before 1960, an average Alevi village had neither school, nor hospital, nor tribunal, even not gendarmes, if sufficiently distant from the Dersim (province of Tunceli).1 As in deep Ottoman times the villages in those regions managed themselves their problems on the ground. They did this again on the base of the traditional system led by dedes. The isolation however was relative and provisional. The desire for a better life in an open, modern world was present, the previous interactions and the heritage of the short, fragile Belle Epoque before 1914 not forgotten. Rooted in that world, a man like Meluli could build up his social and spiritual life in a quite selfdetermined and productive way, even if the circumstances of these decades of 'setback' were economically and socially difficult.

Meluli's path Hiiseyin Karaca (Erbil)2, later called Meluli, was born in 1892 and died in 1989. Besides gaining his life as a farmer and livestock dealer, he was an ozan, a poet and song-writer, and an a§ik, singer. He was of a kurmancispeaking Kurdish Alevi tribe, but not a dede family. Even if he was later 1 The history of Dersim, where then most important concentration of Kurdish Alevis were found, is still under-researched. A good paper on the situation in the 1930s is Bruinessen (1994). See also Akgiil (1992). For more information on Alevi practices and early Kurdist tendencies in Dersim see Kieser (1993, 1994). 2 Erbil is the name taken by Meluli baba in the 1930s after the introduction of the surname law by the Republican State. Unless particularly indicated, the information in this section is taken from Erbil and Ózpolat (1994; 2-34), as well as from documents and records given me by the family. For the contextualization of the material I rely also on my unpublished oral history researches of the years 2000-2002 concerning Puliimur (a sub-province of Tunceli), £aglayan (a sub-province of Erzincan), Elbistan, and Adiyaman.

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often called baba erenler or ermi§ dede, a 'developed' or 'holy' person, this was due to his wisdom and righteousness, not his descent from a dede lineage (soydan dede). His parents grew up in the village of Engizek (today's Ag11 ba§i) in the sub-district (bucak) Kurgulu of the district of Hekimhan in the province of Malatya. For economic reasons, but also because their desire to marry had been disputed, they left their natal village and settled finally down in the village of Kotiire in the strongly Armenian district of Yarpuz (today's Af§in), in today's province of Kahramanmara§. Hiiseyin Karaca was born and spent most time of his life in Kotiire. Ra§o, Hiiscyin's father, was a descendant of the branch called §u§tiiler of the kurmanci-speaking tribe of Cawra§ (or £ogra§), a tribe seemingly nomadic until the nineteenth century, and whose different segments were then looking for regular settlements in the region between Arapkir, Malatya, Giiriin, and Elbistan. From what we know of Ra§o on the one hand, and missionary documents on the other, I have gained the impression that the religious organisation of those tribes, whose members settled down in groups or individually, was loose. For them and even more for migrants like Ra§o there seems already to have existed the possibility to choose the dede according to one's own preferences, or to remain more or less outside the dede system, as did Hiiseyin Karaca from his later youth. Ra§o became prosperous, and an agha (great man) of his village. He was able to send his son Hiiseyin in about 1904 to the college of Yarpuz, a modern college with partly Western style education, made up and supported by the Armenian community, who numbered one thousand in the town alone. 1 Hiiseyin, a twelve years old boy, was admitted in the house of Ra§o's Armenian friend Penes. Before going to college, Hiiseyin had attended the classes of the village teacher, who taught Arabic, and was very probably appointed by the Hamidian state. Shortly before his death, Meluli wrote down in Ottoman script his experiences as a schoolboy in Kotiire and Yarpuz. For its important insights, it is worth citing the whole passage: 'The teacher of Arabic in the village was a man with a broad education. We attended his classes sitting down on the cushions brought from home. In those times, there was strong religious pressure from the Ottomans. At the beginning of Ramadan they sent an imam to each village and forced the whole population to fast. But the teacher of Arabic was a man who had grasped the non-sense of remaining uselessly hungry. For this reason he said that true fasting consisted in doing no evil to other people, and in not lying. During mealtimes he ate together with us, but put a watchman before the door to give a sign in case there came a stranger from outside. Some years later they moved 1

Kevorkian and Paboudjian (1992; 318).

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the teacher of Arabic, and my father gave me into an Armenian family in Afgin where I attended classes in the Armenian school. My first spiritual nourishment [tasavvuf gidami] I took from this family. The woman of the house possessed real faith. Her husband Penes was a superstitious man and a church-goer. The woman only went because she felt obliged, but without believing in it. There was also a daughter, a little older than me; both called me 'my friend' [dostum]. Not even my own mother took such great pains for me as she did. His wife said to me: 'Friend, do not look at Penes and the people around him. These are looking for God in the hereafter and think that by going to church and by praying they have made worship, bringing them once a reward by God. Had they not this hope and the fear of hell, they would even not turn to see the face of God. True worship however consists in loving men, and God is in man's heart.' She did never deal other with me than with her own child. In the Armenian school I learnt Arabic and Armenian, mathematics and literature, and I had the opportunity to enquire after other religions; but it was this woman who taught me true faith and true thinking. Shortly before the massacre of the Armenians in 1915, they were forced to move from here. The woman wept a lot. I have never known where they have gone, or what has become of them.' 1 This recollection by Meluli gives a vivid picture of his early religious experience and education in a multi-cultural Ottoman setting, but the lack of relevant research means that it is not possible to say whether his Armenian education, as son of a Kurdish Alevi agha, was exceptional. Meluli, at least, does not present it in that fashion. The close ties between Armenians and Kurdish aghas in things concerning trade, finances, correspondance, and construction are well known. The correlation beween Armenian poetry and the a§ik's or ozan's lyrics too is said to be well established.2 But the point here is not this, but Hiiseyin Karaca's broad, multicultural education and upbringing, made possible in what I have called the Belle Epoque of those years. It will also be important to understand what this meant for his self-articulation as a 'modern Alevi' but one grown up in late Ottoman times. As his autobiographical text clearly indicates, young Hiiseyin early had internalized scepticism with regard to traditions, be they religious or not. When he married on the eve of World War One, he refused the traditional ceremonies and festivities, arguing interestingly that marriage for him was a holy institution. Against all established customs (with exceptions however 1 A transliteration of this passage of the Ottoman manuscript is provided in Erbil and Ozpolat (1994; 7-8). The forced departure of Penes' family was probably part of the movements which affected the Armenian notables in Istanbul and most towns in Asia Minor at the end of April or in May 1915, several weeks before the general deportations. 2

Kreiser/Neumann (2003; 178).

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amongst the Armenians) the young couple used to walk hand in hand through the village. Bagdat remained Meluli's only wife for his entire life. She died in 1986, three years before his husband's decease. Hiiseyin Karaca did not feel confortable in his father's house because he did not share his values. Ra§o lived in polygamy with three wives. What his son decided to leave home, he did so with the observation that his father's income derived partly from his trade in the loot of the bandits in the nearby mountains. Thus his father's bread was haram, unlawful. Hiiseyin and Bagdat left Ra§o's house and made themselves a little place in a villager's stable, as was then usual for impoverished young couples. Thanks to his uncle Ali, Hiiseyin could begin to gain his living through trading in livestock, leading flocks until Erzurum and Aleppo. That same Ali had become a member of the Bektashi order through the mediation of Cheikh Mamo, a Bektashi in the village Mecitozii near Divrigi, who was reknowned for his sanctity (keramet). He had had his actual initiation by virtue of a man with the astonishing name Rahim Pasha, reputed as true and good dede. This dede was from Erzurum, worked for a while in the region of Yarpuz, and moved later to Sivas. Ali brought his nephew into contact in turn with this order. Dedes had often been guests in the house of Ra§o agha, and the whole of Kotiire depended on them. Hiiseyin Karaca's contacts with dedes visiting the region now multiplied, and he entered in public discussions with them, among them Kose Ahmet, the son of an uncle of Rahim Pasha. Kose Ahmet was regarded as a savant. He had been educated at a medrese (theological school). Even if animated, the discussions in the village's grand-looking houses (konak) — also fit to organize cem ceremonies — seem always to have taken place in a polite and dignified atmosphere. Hiiseyin Karaca used arguments present since the second half of the nineteenth century but due particularly to the progressive spirit taught in the new Armenian and in the missionary schools. He reproached the dedes for providing themselves with authority by presenting themselves as descendants of the prophet by means of forged documents. He accused them of receiving such documents from the Ottoman authorities by offering bribes, living at the expense of the people, exploiting their good intentions, and making them believe external rituals were the essence of religion. For this reason, he suggested, they were no different from hypocritical Sunnite hocas whom the Alevis despised. He went so far to call them ignoramuses incapable of teaching people the truth of religion: love of humanity and of justice.

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It may be that this particularly critical stance had also to do with the fact that Cemaleddin Çelebi Efendi, then the Bektashi head responsible for rural Alevis but unpopular in the Eastern provinces for his close collaboration with the Young Turks' dictatorial régime, had in 1909 obtained from Sultan Reshad a declaration that he was descended from Haci Bektag.1 It is interesting to note too that Bektashism was an attractive 'label' for the young man Hiiseyin Karaca to oppose himself to the dedes. To call himself a member of the Bektashi Tarikat which, in its urban setting, permitted those who were not entitled to do so by birth become babas by virtue of their training alone, was a way to distinguish himself from the traditional dedes: it was for him a sign of being 'progressive', not traditional, superstitious, or conniving with exploitation. When he was about twenty five years of age, in 1917, Hiiseyin Karaca entered formally into the Bektashi order. Normally he should have been by this time enroled in the army. But this does not seem to have been the case, indeed as it was not with most of the Kurdish Alevis who opposed Cemaleddin Çelebi's calls for Alevi participation in the army. 2 Where and when Huseyin's initiation as a Bektashi took place is not clear. He did not visit any tekke, and does not seem to have known any Bektashi master or pir. Though initiated, he seems subsequently to have adopted the label of a Bektashi for himself without being in any way organisationally tied to the order. He however had, as he said, some contacts with Bektashi teachers (mur§id) in or passing through the province, and he fostered the relationship with a circle of good friends, among them Ali. The discoursive elaboration and emphasis in Melûli's poetry stands clearly in the poetic tradition of Bektashism, albeit one that does not support the dede system. Let us take a verse from one of Melûli's few 'early poems' that strongly emphasizes this shared identity as being one who is on the correct path: 3 Hakka giden ruhaniz Hak yolunun kurbamyiz Hak bizde biz burhaniyiz Bilmeyenler cUhelâdir We are the spiritual ones marching to God We are the sacrificial God's path God lives in us, we are his proof Those who do not know this are ignoramuses.

1

Ku e iik (2002; 130). Kiifiik (2002; 131). 3 Erbil and Ozpolat (1994; 57). In Erbil and Ozpolat's chronology, this means before 1950. Most of Meluli baba's early poems have been lost. 2

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According to his nephew Hamdullah Erbil, Meluli understood himself as a Bektashi in the sense of the Bektashism before it was institutionalized corresponding to imperial Ottoman needs by Balim Sultan in the sixteenth century. 1 So far as I know he never made any visit during his life to Hacibektag near Kirgehir, where this centre is located.

Meluli, poetry and muhabbet From the 1920s on, Meluli's house in Kotiire became a sort of spiritual and cultural centre. Many people visited him, looking for counsel, consolation and companiable society. For them he recited his poems. This kind of communication was called sazh sozlii sohbet: 'conversation with words and saz (music)'. 2 Dedes and ozans propagated his poetry, some of which were also ultimately broadcast. One reason for the lost of his early poems is the fact that he gave their manuscripts to visitors. An important person in this interwar period was a woman named Go§e whose father had been a disciple of the aforementioned Cheikh Mamo, as was the case for her husband's father. Her husband Kiyno worked together with Ali and Hiiseyin Karaca. She heard from Karaca, met him and deeply loved him in a spiritual (ilahi) way. She and her husband decided to form together with Karaca and Bagdat a common household. Go§e was for twelve years, until her death, the cornerstone of this little community that formed a social and spiritual centre, open to many visitors from outside, but also important for the life of the village of Kotiire. When Go§e died, Hiiseyin Karaca gave himself the name of Meluli or 'sad'. There is no indication that the two couples had gone, during a cem ceremony, through a formal musahiblik, a religious partnership so central in the Alevi tradition. The common household came to an end with Go§e's death, but from the outside remained more or less the same. Meluli's grandson Hamdullah Erbil called the house of his grandfather, where he himself grew up in the 1950s and 60s, 'a true centre of culture': 'There always came friends, one read books, discussed, played the saz, recited poems and fostered muhabbet.'3 What was important — and what ties up with the main function of the Alevi cem — is that the guest and participant of the muhabbet should be listened,

1

Erbil and Ôzpolat (1994; 306-7). Erbil and Ôzpolat (1994; 24). The saz is a mandolin-like string instrument used by most minstrels. 3 Erbil and Ôzpolat (1994; 22).

2

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consolated, edified, and thus leave at the end with more peace in the heart. 1 Keramet in the specific sense of the miracle worked by power of sanctity had no or little place in Melüli's universe. In his poetry Melüli repeats, condenses and interweaves references to his faith. He does this often in a dialogue with himself that is typical for this kind of a§ik literature. Simultaneously, his poems have a devotional element, and reflect certain standard elements within the Alevi heritage. In this way, they express the individual sense and interpretation of Alevi culture and the faith of a community — both more locally in the sense of the Kotiire circle and more widely in historical or spatial terms. Thus, though there is much of his individual experience Melüli's rhymed poetry may be seen as the only thing in his life strictly dominated by formal criteria and traditional religious themes. Among these repeated religious elements are Ali; the perfect man (insan-i kámil)-, the worship of the perfect man (secde-i Ádem)\ the distinction between those who know the secde-i Ádem and those who do not; and men as a place wherein God dwells {beyt-i rahmari). In his poetry there is also a repetitive curse against Muaviye, Yezid and Mervan, seen as ruthless rulers of this world who bear the distinctive sign of those who are not aware of the secde-i Ádem. As a Bektashi Melüli is a 'free-thinker', but in the strict spiritual discipline of a man devoted to the secde-i Ádem. In one early poem Melüli writes: Secde-i Adem'e boyun egmedi Lanetledi onu ulumuz bizim He has not bowed to the secde-i Adem Therefore our wisdom has damned him.2 In a late poem of the 1980s we read: Melüliyim kiblem kámil insandir Kámil insan kalbi beyt-i rahmandir Secde etmeyenler §eksiz §eytandir Ona lanet eden erenlerdeniz I am Melüli, my kible [where I turn in worship] is the perfect man The heart of the perfect man is the house of God Those who do not bow before him are doubtless Satan We are the saints who damn himP

1 A few years ago I met in Bòrgenek near Adiyaman Dede Hayri D. who like Meluli keeps a daily open house, but exercises no traditional function as dede. Thus after his work in town and at the weekends he was a respected host and adviser in his village. 2 Erbil and Ózpolat (1994; 65). 3 Erbil and Ózpolat (1994; 174).

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As I understand his biography, Meluli never attended a cent after his adolescence. But there is much worship in his poetry. He sings, for example, extracts from the sacrifical song sung by the a§ik in the cem as the sheep stands before the congregation in the meydan, the peace-making space that is central to the Alevi worship in the cem} For Meluli this space is detached from the cem ritual, it is the space of the muhabbet and the virtual community defined by the 'we' in his poems. Kanli kinli bu meydanda bari§ir Karde§ olur hep beraber sevi§ir The bloody and the vindictive become reconciled on this place They become brothers, loving one another.^

He is one of those apks who conserved in his songs the o'z of Alevism — the peacemaking dialogue, the search for God in the man, the anti-orthodox piousness — throughout the twentieth century despite the dissolution of the rural world. In the same early poems we read: lnsaniz insana saygi bizdedir Muhabbet ehliyiz sevgi bizdedir Gergek vicdandaki duygu bizdedir Birakmaz insasi elimiz bizim We are humans, have respect We are muhabbet persons, have love We have the true sense of conscience Our hands do not neglect justice. 3

Meluli concentrates worship upon the insan-i kdmil. He leaves aside all religious rituals in favor of the word he communicates in his muhabbet or poems. This is the medium of his Alevi belief, and he goes so far to say: 'We are not empty words but give tongue to the Koran' ( L a f d e g i l dilli Kuramz).4 In this belief — which opposes the dogma of the Kuran as the pre-existing word of God — the creative word, the perfect man, and God are closely linked. Ali, interpreted in partly clear Christological terms, is the strongest symbol for this. It was 'the helper Ali' who inspired Muhammed to the Kuran.5 'There is no God except Ali, who is king' (La ilahe ilia Ali olan §ah), Meluli wrote in his last poem in 1989. He also said that Ali existed from the 1 For the 'sacrifice song' and the meydan, see Shankland (2003; 94-132). Erbil and Ozpolat (1994; 65). 3 Erbil and Ozpolat (1994; 65). 4 Erbil and Ozpolat (1994; 57). ^ indirdi kuram ol ayet ayet / Muhammed'de olan nusret Ali (Erbil and Ozpolat 1994; 194). 2

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beginning, before the creation of the world, and that, united to God, he then made the cosmos, the earth, and man. 1 This particular worship of Ali gives him pre-eminence over Muhammed as is also the case in the tale of the kirklar meclisi (the council of the forty) or the ascension (mirag) of Muhammed. It is a central, omnipresent tale in the Alevi tradition. In Meluli's words it reads as follows: Melulim Muhammed miraca vardi izzetle hurmetle igeri girdi Kaldirdi perdeyi Aliyi gordii Agikar oldu rahmammiz bizim I am Meluli: Muhammed made the ascension He entered in heaven with dignity and respect He raised the curtain and saw Ali Thus our God was made manifest. 2

Conclusion Let me make some concluding remarks by noting the close relationship between Meluli and his grandson Hamdullah Erbil (1952-1993). This relationship is probably the strongest illustration of Meluli's enlightened spirituality, its historical context and particular roots as outlined in this short paper. Meluli was never engaged ideologically, be it as Turkist, Kurdist or Kemalist. There was no picture of Atatiirk in his house, and no trace of him in his poems; nor was there any picture of Ali or Haci Bektag, or any other idol. If after the 1960s Meluli clearly showed solidarity with the socialist opposition, to which Hamdullah adhered, and wrote in his last years poems against the military coup, 3 this again was not in the idiom of then predominant Marxist-Leninist ideology, but in his own terms. The persecution of the leftish youth he called a re-edition of the era of Muaviye, Yezid and Kerbela. However he openly did not share many of this youth's presumptions. In a video recording for example we hear him ask rhetorically, how one wanted to be a revolutionary if he had not yet fully become a human being (a reference to kdmil insan). Meluli was opposed to the dialectical and biological materialism advocated by the 'revolutionaries' (devrimci). In a

1 2 3

Erbil and Ozpolat (1994; 385). Erbil and Ozpolat (1994; 209). Erbil and Ozpolat (1994; 176-79).

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poem dedicated to them he ironically rejects their conviction that the mankind descended from monkeys.1 Meluli showed his solidarity with his grandson by always remaining in contact with him and by visiting him regularly in prison in the 1970s and 1980s, despite his great age. Hamdullah Erbil, a leftish militant, had early been fascinated by his grandfather's world of thinking and faith. In prison, and particularly after the death of Meluli in 1989, he rediscovered the rich Alevi heritage of his grandfather and tried to reconcile it with his own experiences. He did this in a very personal and sincere way. Grandfather and grandson shared a sense of distance from those who ruled over them, but whereas the militants attacked them frontally, their actions based on a revolutionary ideology, Meluli's priority was the achievement of the individuals' secde-i Adem or orientation to the 'perfect man'. He thus admonished his grandson and his friends to concentrate on this first, and to change politics and society slowly from below and from within. In a fight against his leukemia Hamdullah Erbil succeeded in preparing the edition of poems from which we took all examples given above. He however died in 1993 before it could go to press; his elder sister Latife Ozpolat finished the job.

References Akgiil, S. 1992 Yakin tarihimizde Dersim isyanlari ve gergekler, Istanbul; Bogazi§i Yaymlari. Bayrak, M. (ed.) 1997 Alevilik ve Ktirtler (inceleme — Aragtirma Belgeler), Wuppertal; Ozge. Bruinessen, M. van, 1998 'Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the Chemical War against the Iraqi Kurds', in: Andreopoulos, G. Genocide — Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 141-70. Erbil, H., and Ozpolat, L. (1994) Meluli divani ve Aleviligin, tasavvufun, Bekta§iligin Tarihgesi, Ankara; Basak. Gezik, E. 2000 Dinsel, Etnik ve Politik Sorunlar Ankara; Kalan.

Baglaminda

Alevi

Ktirtler,

Karakaya-Stump, A., 2004 'The Emergence of the Kizilbag in the Western Thought: Missionary Accounts and their Aftermath', in: Shankland, David (ed.), Anthropology, Archaeology and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia or the life and times of F. W. Hasluck (1878-1920), Istanbul: Isis, 2004, vol. 1, p. 329-359. 1

Erbil and Ozpolat (1994; 126).

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Kévorkian, R., and Paboudjian, P. 1992 Les Arméniens dans l'Empire ottoman à la veille du génocide, Paris; ARHIS. Kieser, H. 1993 'Les Kurdes alévis face au nationalisme turc. L'alévité du Dersim et son rôle dans le premier soulèvement kurde contre Mustafa Kemal (Koçkiri 1919-1921)', Amsterdam; MERA Occasional Paper 18. Kieser, H. 1994 'L'Alévisme kurde', Peuples Méditerranéens Vols. 68-69; 57-76. Kieser, H. 2000 Der verpasste Friede. Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei, Zürich; Chronos. Kieser, H. 2001 'Muslim Heterodoxy and Protestant Utopia. The Interactions between Alevis and Missionaries in Ottoman Anatolia', in Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 41; 1, 89-111. Kieser, H. 2003 'Die Aleviten im Wandel der Neuzeit. Eine sozialgeschichtliche Skizze im Zeichen der longue durée', in Tamcke, M. (ed.) Orient am Scheideweg, Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac; 35-61. Kreiser, K., and Neumann, C. 2003 Kleine Geschichte der Türkei, Stuttgart; Reel am. Kiiçiik, H., 2002 The Role of the Bektashis in Turkey's national struggle, Leiden; Brill. Shankland, D, 2003 The Alevis in Turkey. The emergence of a secular Islamic tradition, London; Routledge Curzon. Vorhoff, K. 1995 Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identität in der Türkei der Gegenwart, Berlin; Klaus Schwarz.

11. DJIHAD, WELTORDNUNG, «GOLDENER APFEL». DIE OSMANISCHE REICHSIDEOLOGIE IM KONTEXT WESTÖSTLICHER GESCHICHTE

Imperialismus bedeutet das Streben einer Gruppe nach Machtausübung über andere, bei universalem Anspruch über die ganze «bewohnte Welt».*1 Zur Gewinnung und Sicherung der Macht spielt Krieg im militärischen, ökonomischen und ideologischen Sinn eine zentrale Rolle; dabei genügt militärischer Erfolg allein nicht, als «Beweis» der Richtigkeit des ideologischen Konzeptes ist er indes unerlässlich. Ein imperialistisches Symbol, Objekt des Begehrens und eschatologisches Motiv - finale Eroberung - par excellence ist der Goldene oder Rote Apfel (Kizil Elma), ein geläufiges Thema türkisch-osmanischer Literatur seit dem 15. Jahrhundert. Er drückt den Traum von Weltherrschaft, insbesondere das Begehren des expandierenden Osmanischen Reiches nach Herrschaft über die Lande der Christenheit aus, wie sie der goldene Globus in der Hand christlicher Kaiser und Könige - so des Justinian-Reiterstandbildes in Konstantinopel 2 - symbolisierte. Imperiale Herrschaft hat mit diesem Insignium ein kulturübergreifendes Symbol erhalten, wenn es als expansive Zielvorstellung und Zeichen des noch Unerreichten auch auf osmanischer Seite eine wechselnde Bedeutung besass: Im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit hintereinander mit Konstantinopel, Rom und Köln identifiziert, wurde der Rote Apfel von den osmanischen Pantürkisten des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts vom Westen auf den Osten, das *

First published in: Faber, Richard (ed.), Imperialismus Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005, p. 183-203.

in Geschichte

und

Gegenwart,

Ich beschränke in diesem Aufsatz den Begriff «Imperialismus» nicht auf die neuzeitliche europäische Expansion, die in der «Epoche des Imperialismus» vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg gipfelte, sondern verstehe ihn - ausgehend von der Fragestellung des vorliegenden Bandes (Faber, Richard (ed.), Imperialismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005) - als expansives, auf ein zu schaffendes Reich ausgerichtetes Denken und Handeln. Der Unterschied zwischen «imperial» und «imperialistisch» entspricht demjenigen zwischen «national» und «nationalistisch»: Der zweite Begriff betont jeweils die ideologische Verankerung. Für den engeren Begriffsgebrauch siehe z. B. Bayer, Erich, und Wende, Frank (Hg.), Wörterbuch zur Geschichte: Begriffe und Fachausdrücke, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1995, 225 f. 2 Vgl. Yérasimos, Stéphane, «De l'arbre à la pomme: la généalogie d'un thème apocalyptique», in Lellouch, Benjamin, und id. (Hg.), Les traditions apocalyptiques au tournant de la chute de Constantinople, Paris: Harmattan, 1999, S. 153-92, hier 165-84. Zum Motiv des KizilElma siehe auch Evliya Çelebi, Im Reiche des Goldenen Apfels: des türkischen Weltenbummlers Evliyâ Çelebi denkwürdige Reise in das Giaurenland und in die Stadt und Festung Wien anno 1665, übersetzt und erläutert von Richard F. Kreutel, vermehrte Neuauflage besorgt von Erich Prokosch und Karl Teply, Graz: Verlag Styria, 1987.

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heisst das zentralasiatische «Turan» übertragen. Der Rote Apfel bedeutete Herrschaft in ihrer expandierenden Bewegung, indem er meist ein noch unerreichtes Ziel symbolisierte, während das sunnitische Kalifat auf Basis der Scharia - die eigentliche Machtlegitimation osmanischer Universalgewalt seit Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts - eine unumstürzliche, göttlich legitimierte Ordnung darstellte. Der osmanische Imperialismus bestand, kurz gefasst, in der Verknüpfung von Kizil Elma, Djihad («Heiliger Krieg») und Scharia («Göttliches Recht»), Die Sehnsucht nach Einheit und Versöhnung der Menschheit war ein wichtiges Kennzeichen der frühen Neuzeit im 15./16 Jahrhundert, jenes Zeitalters, in dem erstmals die Erde in ihrer globalen Dimension konkret wahrgenommen und ihre Erschliessung begonnen wurde. Damals stieg das Osmanische Reich zu «Weltherrschaft» im klassischen mediterranen Sinn auf. Der Pax ottomanica vom Balkan bis nach Nordafrika lagen ebenso osmanische Waffenerfolge wie die allgemeine Sehnsucht nach einer übergreifenden Ordnung, die auch die Reichsideologie widerspiegelte, zugrunde. Der absolute Massstab dieser Ordnung war das in der muslimischen, christlichen und jüdischen Eschatologie angestrebte irdische Gottesreich, ihr säkulares Vorbild Alexander, Augustus oder auch - für die Sultane - Dschingis Khan. Die Bemühungen um ein Universalreich im 16. Jahrhundert - ob osmanisch, safavidisch, französisch oder spanisch-habsburgisch - blieben hinter der Utopie und dem sie bedingenden consensus universorum,1 zurück. Dennoch ist das eine nicht ohne das andere denkbar. Imperialismus braucht die Rechtfertigung durch universale Referenzen, das heisst die Einbindung in eine Heilsgeschichte der «Menschheit», die der Akkreditierung der Machtausübung dient. Eine Eschatologie, die dem Imperatoren feindlich oder gleichgültig gesinnt war, stellte ihn nicht nur in seiner machtpolitischen Staatsräson, sondern in seinem persönlichen Selbstverständnis in Frage. Mit der Eroberung Konstantinopels 1453 fassten die Osmanen die (arabisch-)islamische, die mongolische und die (ost-)römische Reichstradition unter einem Herrscher, dem Sultan Mehmed II. zusammen, der sich ökumenisch-universal als Erbe einer dreifachen translatio imperii verstand und kurzum - wenig orthodox - «Kalif (Stellvertreter) Gottes» bezeichnet wurde. 2

Den Begriff gebrauchte Augustus in einer Schlüsselpassage seiner Selbstdarstellung Res gestae = Monumentum Ancyranum, Kap. 35. Der Begriff «Kalif» bedeutet in der islamischen Tradition den Stellvertreter und Nachfolger des Propheten Muhammed; die Wendung «Kalif Gottes» oder «Stellvertreter des Herrn der Welten», die der Scheichülislam auf die osmanischen Sultane anwandte, geht darüber hinaus. Atsiz, Hüseyin N., Osmanli tarihine ait takvimler, Istanbul: Kûçûkaydin, 1961, S. 9, zitiert in: Imber, Colin, «Süleyman as Caliph of the Muslims: Ebû's-Su-ûd's formulation of Ottoman dynastic ideology», in: Veinstein, Gill (Hg.), Soliman le Magnifique et son temps, Paris: La Documentation Française, 1992, S. 179, vgl. 181.

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Anders als die Khanate baute seine Herrschaft auf einem auf Dauer konzipierten Hofstaat auf. In der Konfrontation mit den christlichen Machthabern Europas, inneren Heterodoxien und dem Schiitentum der Safaviden im Iran optierte die Weltmacht im 16. Jahrhundert für eine prononciert sunnitische Herrschaftsideologie, die das islamische Recht, die Scharia, als ideale Basis der Weltordnung und Reichslegitimation nahm. Bezeichnenderweise koexistierten in der Realität aber Scharia und Gewohnheitsrecht (örf). Mit der Ausbildung, Entwicklung und Auflösung der osmanischen Reichsideologie im Kontext europäisch-nahöstlicher Geschichte setzt sich mein Beitrag auseinander. Er stützt sich sowohl auf hofnahe Quellen als auch solche, die die Perspektive von Rivalen oder Opfern der Machtausübung formulieren. Ich gehe davon aus, dass Herrschaft immer an eine entsprechende Ideologieproduktion gebunden ist, wie auch Herrschaftskrisen, Legitimationsverluste und ideologische Defizite sich gegenseitig bedingen. Zur menschenfeindlichen Gefährlichkeit des Imperialismus im heilsgeschichtlichen Horizont gehört die Schwierigkeit der Akteure, sich mit der Vergänglichkeit des Reiches abzufinden, es als vorläufig zu konzipieren und sein Ende mit friedlichen Mitteln zu antizipieren. Dies gilt, wie im Aufsatz deutlich werden soll, auch für den islamischen osmanisch-türkischen Kontext anfangs des 20. Jahrhunderts.

I. Reich, Religion und Sozialordnung Das Osmanische Reich war die ausgedehnteste und dauerhafteste islamische Herrschaft der Geschichte. Wie die meisten Imperien der Weltgeschichte begann es im kleinen Rahmen, indem es sich in einer Randregion eines bisherigen Reiches eine Machtbasis aufzubauen begann. Es gelang den Osmanen, sich im religiös und politisch multipolaren, wechselhaften Kleinasien des 13.-15. Jahrhunderts sowie auf dem Balkan sukzessive gegenüber Byzanz, christlichen Fürsten und konkurrierenden türkischen Emiraten durchzusetzen; dies nicht allein auf Grund ihres militärischen Potentials oder der Motivation durch den beutereichen Djihad, sondern weil ihre Oberherrschaft auch manchen Christen - der überwiegenden Bevölkerungsmehrheit in Kleinasien und auf dem Balkan bis im 15. Jahrhundert - als das kleinere Übel erschien. Im 15./16. Jahrhundert wandelte sich die osmanische Herrschaft von einem Regionalfürstentum heterodox-islamischer Prägung zu einem Universalreich orthodox-sunnitischer Ausrichtung, das auch Nordafrika,

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Arabien und Syrien umfasste. Die Etablierung des Weltreiches lief Hand in Hand mit der Ausbildung einer bewahrenden, die bestehenden Verhältnisse und die Eroberungen legitimierenden Ideologie, die das Reich eng mit der sunnitisch-islamischen Kalifatstradition verwob. In einer Zeit, als Europa von konfessionellen Wirren gespalten war und schwach erschien, stellte sie eine Herrschaft islamischer Rechtgläubigkeit bis ans «Ende der Zeiten» in Aussicht. Da der grössere Teil der Eroberungen islamischen Herrschaftsbereich und nicht etwa nur solchen von «Ungläubigen» (Christen) 1 umfasste, liess sich Djihad als Rechtfertigung der Eroberungen und Motor weltweiter Expansion des där-ül-isläm (Haus des Islams) nur mit Modifikationen gebrauchen: indem die feindlichen muslimischen Herrscher als korrupt oder ketzerisch dargestellt wurden. Ab Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts machten die Hofhistoriker in der Retrospektive die osmanische Dynastie zu orthodoxen Champions des Djihads (gazt), womit sie die vorangegangenen wie auch die noch erhofften Eroberungen in ein präzises heilsgeschichtliches Bild einfügten, die nomadische Machttradition und das Motiv des Beutezuges hingegen zudeckten. «Mach die Feinde der [islamischen] Religion dem Staub gleich, zerstreue die Armeen der Ungläubigen. Mach mein Schwert zum Licht auf dem Pfad der Religion, mach es zum Führer der Djihad-Kämpfer», liess Sa'deddin, der Lehrer von Sultan Murad III. (1574-95), dessen Ahnen Osman (1280-1324) beten und formulierte damit den dynastischen Mythos. 2 Weder Mehmed, dem gefeierten Eroberer von Konstantinopel, noch seinen Nachfolgern gelang die ersehnte Invasion in Westeuropa; gleichwohl repräsentierten sie sich - in deutlicher Selbstüberschätzung - als «Gottes Schatten über alle Völker». Noch im 19. Jahrhundert glaubten viele Muslime in Kleinasien an diesen Allmachtsmythos des 16. Jahrhunderts, den sie mit der Vorstellung verbanden, die europäischen Könige empfingen ihre Krone vom Sultan.3 Als eine theologische «Hochkultur» unterschied sich die imperiale Legitimationswelt mit ihrer jahrhundertealten schriftlichen Rechtstradition stark von der gazf-Ideologie der früheren Phasen (13./14. Jahrhundert) in Kleinasien und auf dem Balkan, als muslimische Helden (gäzi) im Verein mit Zwar galten die Christen und Juden nach dem Koran als Angehörige gültiger Buchreligionen. Dennoch wurden die christlichen Feinde ausserhalb - ganz wie es der zeitgenössische abendländische Diskurs über die «Mohammedaner» tat - als Ungläubige (Kafir, g a v u r ) bezeichnet; sehr oft wurde dieser Begriff auch auf die Christen im eigenen Reich selbst angewandt, nicht jedoch von der Zentralverwaltung. 2 Zitiert in Imber, Colin, «The Ottoman dynastie myth», Turcica 19 (1987), S. 13. 3 Kieser, Hans-Lukas, Der verpasste Friede. Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei 1839-1938, Zürich: Chronos, 2000, S. 42. Zum Begriff «Schatten Gottes» siehe z. B. Fleischer, Cornell H., «The lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the imperial image in the reign of Süleyman», in: Veinstein, Gill (Hg.), Soliman le Magnifique et son temps, Paris: La Documentation Française, 1992, S. 159-77.

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volksnahen Derwischen nichtmuslimisches Gebiet erobert und kolonisiert hatten. Daraus bildeten sich oft ethnisch-religiöses Zusammenleben und synkretistische mündliche Traditionen heraus; auch wurden viele ländliche Christen nominell zu Muslimen. Der imperiale Sunnismus ab Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts jedoch kannte klar definierte religiöse Grenzen, die nur ausnahmsweise durch eine amtlich registrierte Bekehrung überschritten werden konnten. Davon ausgeschlossen waren die Muslime, die als Empfänger der letztgültigen Offenbarung die staatstragende Gemeinschaft ( u m m a h / ü m m e t ) bildeten und, gemäss Scharia, bei Todesstrafe nicht konvertieren durften. Durch diese ideologische Wende an der Schwelle zum Grossreich waren im imperialen Sozialsystem häretische Gruppen wie die Aleviten und Yeziden am meisten benachteiligt; andere, wie die Drusen oder heterodoxe Kurdenstämme wurden gleichwohl für die Erfordernisse der regionalen Machtsicherung vom Staat kooptiert. Anders als die Aleviten und Yeziden galten die Christen und Juden nach dem Koran als gläubige Angehörige von «Buchreligionen», die zum Preise einer Sondersteuer und jeglichen Machtverzichts als Schutzbefohlene zimmi zu respektieren waren. Jeder Imperialismus hat eine Innen- und Aussenfront, mithin innere und äussere Feinde, im Umgang mit welchen er sich als solcher - das heisst als Machtordnung, die der Ausbeutung bedarf - entlarvt. So sehr die Feinde das Hindernis einer «rationalen», interessenorientierten «Realpolitik» darstellten, wurden sie doch jeweils mittels einer religiösen Sprache definiert und karikiert. Der sich als sachlicher, quellennaher Historiker verstehende Celälzäde Mustafa, ein hoher Beamter unter Sultan Süyleyman I., stellte dessen europäischen Rivalen Karl V. so dar: «König des Landes Spanien, des Zentrums der Bösen und der gemeinen, verdammten Ungläubigen, ein Unreiner und Gottloser, Karl mit Namen, ein Verfluchter von ketzerischen Gesetzen, der das Haupt der Heere der Irregeleiteten und Führer der verderbten Scharen ist, [...] die dem Ritus des Messias (folgen).» 1 Die imperialistische Konsolidierung des Osmanischen Reiches im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert war mit der Schaffung klarer Fronten und expliziter Feindbilder auch nach Innen gekoppelt. Eine frühe, signifikante Episode war der Aufstand unter Scheich Bedreddin (hingerichtet 1416, ein Jahr übrigens nach Jan Hus).2 Mit der blutigen Repression dieser integrativen messianischen

Mustafa Ibn-Celal (Celalzade Mustafa, genannt Koca Nisanci), Geschichte Sultan Süleiman Kanunis von 1520 bis 1557: oder Tabakat ül-Memalik ve Derecat ül-Mesalik, hg. von Petra Kappert, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981, S. 37. 2 Babinger, Franz, «Scheich Bedr ed-Din, der Sohn des Richters von Simaw; ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Sektenwesens im altosmanischen Reich», Der Islam, 11 (1921), S. 1-106; Kissling, Hans J., «Das Menäqybnäme des Scheich Bedr ed-Dins, des Sohnes des Richters von Samavna», Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 100 (1950), S. 112-176.

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Bewegung, die sozial benachteiligte Muslime, Christen und Juden vereinte, setzte Mehmed I., der Grossvater Mehmed des Eroberers, seine imperiale Vision konsequent gegen spirituelles «heterodoxes» Charisma und das Postulat sozialer Gerechtigkeit durch. Wenige Jahre nach der verheerenden Niederlage gegen Tamerlan und einem bedrohlichen Interregnum an der Spitze des Staates bahnte Mehmed I. eine Entwicklung an, die knapp 150 Jahre später in der «Blüte» des Reiches unter Süleyman I. («dem Prächtigen») zur Konsequenz hatte, dass gewisse heterodoxe Kreise nicht auf Grund rebellischer Akte, sondern ihrer Gesinnung eliminiert wurden; das heisst, weil sich der Inhalt und die Praxis ihres Gottesdienstes nicht ins religiös definierte Sozialsystem einfügten und somit als Gefahr für den Staat galten. Bei den später als Aleviten bezeichneten - anatolischen Kizilba§, den Hauptopfern dieses Prozesses, ist es nicht möglich, eine klare Grenze zwischen religiöser Verfolgung und sogenannt rationaler Repression, welche die Sicherheit des Staates aus pragmatischen Gründen zu erfordern schien, zu setzen. Den Dokumenten der Zentralverwaltung aus jener Epoche nach zu schliessen, spielte für die Strafverfolgung nicht konkrete Rebellion, sondern der belegbare gegenläufige Glaube die zentrale Rolle. Verfluchung der umaiyadischen Kalife, Verletzung der sunnitischen Glaubenspflichten, verbotene Bücher und suspekte Kontakte nach Persien, so lauteten die hauptsächlichen Anklagepunkte gegen diese Häretiker, die oft aussergerichtlich exekutiert wurden; andere von ihnen wurden deportiert oder auf die Galeeren geschickt.1 Die angestrebte ideologische Einheit war labil; in der Krise des spätosmanischen Reiches im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert kamen die Widersprüche offen zu Tage (vgl. Kap. III). Nicht allein wegen der sozialen Marginalisierung der Heterodoxen, darunter am zahlreichsten die Aleviten, erwies sich die «orthodoxe Wende» im 16. Jahrhundert als zwiespältig, da widersprüchlich zur eigenen Geschichte. Auch die Elitetruppe, das militärische Kernstück des Reiches, das aus der Knabenlese rekrutierte Janitscharenkorps, entsprach keineswegs sunnitischen Vorgaben. Dem Emir (Fürsten) stand im Djihad zwar ein Fünftel der Kriegsgefangenen zu; aber die Zwangsaushebung und die Zwangsbekehrung von Knaben zum Zwecke des Kriegs- und Palastdienstes, die in der zweiten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts daraus entwickelt worden waren, widersprachen klar der Sünna - so vorzüglich sie sich auch zum Aufbau einer aus sozialen Bezügen losgelösten, einzig dem Imperator verpflichteten Elite eigneten. In ihrer Verbundenheit mit dem Refik, Ahmed, On altinci asirda Räfizilik ve Bektaqilik. On alttnci asirda Türkiye'de Räfizilik ve Bekta§ilige dair Hazinei Evrak vesikalarmi havidir, Istanbul, 1932; Imber, Colin H., «The persecution of the Ottoman Shi'ites according to the Mühimme defterleri. 1565-1585», Der Islam 56 (1979), S. 245-273. Vgl. Matuz, Josef, Das Osmanische Reich. Grundlinien seiner Geschichte, Darmstadt: Primus, 1996 (Erstausgabe 1996), S. 80.

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Sufismus des Bektaschi-Ordens, der seinerseits mit dem ländlichen Alevitentum enge Beziehungen pflegte, standen die Janitscharen in ihrer spirituell-ideologischen Verfassung ausserhalb des Sunnismus. 1 Immerhin reorganisierte sich der Orden im 16. Jahrhundert in Funktion der imperialen Bedürfnisse und stellte seine Gründungsikonen - geistesmächtige religiöse Grenzgänger - als Kämpfer für die Ausbreitung des Islams in Abstimmung mit dem Emir dar.2

II. Konkurrierende Reichsapokalyptik Rom, Ostrom, die Kalifenreiche, inklusive dem Osmanischen, und das Römische Reich Deutscher Nation wie auch seine Avatare beruhten gleichermassen auf dem virgilischen Reichsgedanken mit seiner heilsmässigen Verklärung imperialer Macht, verkörpert durch das imperiale Oberhaupt. 3 Durch die Einbindung in ein Heilsgeschehen und durch die Konfrontation mit einem göttlichen Gegenüber sprach die Reichsidee den Kaiser von Machtgier, Willkür und Selbstverherrlichung frei; sie pries ihn als Garanten von Friede, Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit, in Übereinstimmung mit dem «Universum». Damit kam sie auch jeglichem herrschaftsgefährdenden Millenarismus zuvor. Grundsätzliche Delegitimation im Innern des Reiches gab es dennoch in mannigfacher Weise und auf Grund alternativer heilsgeschichtlicher Bilder; so durch die frühen Christen im Römischen Reich, das oppositionelle Schiitentum in den Kalifatsreichen von den Umaiyaden bis zu den Osmanen und durch die modernistischen Jungtürken Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts. Epochale Umbrüche sowie Aufbau und Ende von Imperien sind in mancher Hinsicht synonyme Begriffe, die immer auch eine eschatologische Dimension enthalten. Dies gilt für das 1., das 16. wie auch für das beginnende 20. Jahrhundert.4 Herausragende Herrscher oder Gestalten der Hoffnung galten als Vorläufer oder Verkörperung des «wahren Reiches» auf 1 Z. B. ist in Bektagi-Liedern ganz unorthodox vom çarmiha gerilmi§ Isa, vom ans Kreuz genagelten Jesus die Rede, womit der «Skandal des Kreuzes» (Paulus) nicht mit dem Argument der Verwechslung beseitigt wurde (vgl. Sure 4,156). 2 Vgl. Mélikoff, Irène, Hadji Bektach: un mythe et ses avatars: genèse et évolution du soufisme populaire en Turquie, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998, sowie mein «Die Aleviten im Wandel der Neuzeit. Eine sozialgeschichtliche Skizze im Zeichen der longue durée», in: Tamcke, Martin (Hg.), Orient am Scheideweg, Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2003, S. 35-61, hier 37-41. Über die Janitscharen siehe z. B. Mantran, Robert (Hg.), Histoire de l'Empire ottoman, Paris: Fayard, 1989, S. 46,54 f., 130-32. 3 Für eine aktuelle Auseinandersetzung mit dem virgilischen Reichsgedanken in der Geschichte siehe Faber, Richard, Abendland. Ein politischer Kampßegriff, Berlin: Philo, 2002.

Für eine neue, eingehende Auseinandersetzung mit apokalyptischen Strömungen im Mittelmeerraum, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der osmanischen, an der Schwelle zur Neuzeit, siehe Fleischer, Cornell, A Mediterranean Apocalypse (im Druck).

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Erden. «Heilspolitik» und «Realpolitik» im imperialen Massstab sind daher keine Gegensätze, sondern die beiden Enden einer immer an ideologische Produktion gebundenen Machtausübung. Der französische Renaissance-Orientalist und Levante-Reisende Guillaume Postel war durch die Osmanen fasziniert und zugleich herausgefordert. Er bildete in seinem Werk die volle Spannweite des zeittypischen eschatologischen Denkens ab, das vom aggressiven Kreuzzugsaufruf an ein Europa, das sich - so seine Version - unter dem französischen König zu einigen hätte, bis zur Vision religiöser Aussöhnung mit den Türken reichte und das Ziel der «Wiederherstellung und Eintracht» (:restitution et concorde) der Welt verfolgte. Entgegengesetzte, aber im übrigen analoge Vorstellungen finden sich bei zeitgenössischen osmanischen Autoren. Seit dem 7. Jahrhundert konkurrierten apokalyptische Visionen, die auf der einen Seite die Eroberung der christlichen Welt, insbesondere Konstantinopels und Roms durch die Muslime, auf der anderen Seite den Triumph der Christenheit über den Islam in Aussicht stellten.1 Die eschatologischen Schemata im Islam sind den jüdischen und christlichen nahe verwandt, sie sind aber da wie dort nicht einheitlich. Zum Grundbestand gehört die Erwartung eines weltweiten endzeitlichen Chaos (fitna), das dem Reich des Mahdi der Endzeit/Messias vorausgeht. An dessen Ende stehen Weltuntergang (hyämet) und Weltgericht. Eine starke sunnitische Tradition erwartete den wiederkehrenden Jesus (ha) als König des glücklichen Endreiches, der in Damaskus vom Himmel herabsteigen und den deccäl (Antichristen) besiegen sollte. Zur allgemeinen religionsübergreifenden Endzeiterwartung im 15./16. Jahrhundert gehörte auch die Hoffnung auf einen starken Universalherrscher, der entweder als Wegbereiter des Messias galt oder aber mit ihm zu einer einzigen Erlösergestalt verschmolz. Auch osmanische Texte zeugen von der Erwartung der Wiederkunft Jesu. Ahväl-i kiyamet (Zustände der Endzeit), die Schrift eines Anonymus, malte dieses Friedensreich Jesu aus, das er auf vierzig Jahre begrenzte; seine einfache Sprache und die implizit gegenwartskritische Botschaft machen klar, dass es sich bei diesem Text vermutlich vom Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts nicht um Hofliteratur handelt.2 Explizit prodynastisch war hingegen die Schrift Conti' ül-meknunät von anfangs der 1530er Jahre, die von Mevlänä Isä, einem Abel, Armand, «Changements politiques et littérature eschatologique dans le monde musulman», Studia Islamica 2 (1954), S. 2 3 ^ 3 , hier S. 26-32; zu Postel siehe z. B. De orbis terrae concordia libri IV, Basel: Johannes Oporinus, 1543; Des histoires orientales et principalement des turkes ou turchikes et schitiques ou tartaresques et autres qui en sont descendues, oeuvre pour la tierce fois augmentée, Paris 1575. Flemming, Barbara, «Sâhib-kirân und Mahdî: Türkische Endzeiterwartungen im ersten Jahrzehnt der Regierung Süleymäns», in: Kara, György (Hg.), Between the Danube and the Caucasus, Budapest, 1987, S. 41-62, hier 44-49.

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Zeitgenossen Süleyman des I. stammt. Isä stellte die Kriegszüge der Osmanen als Werk von Glaubenskriegern auf dem Weg zur vollständigen Weltherrschaft dar; er beschrieb auch die ersten vier Feldzüge von Süleyman I. nach Europa sowie die Niederschlagung der Aufstände in Anatolien. Den osmanischen Misserfolg vor Wien (1529) interpretierte er als Rückschlag auf dem Weg zum schliesslichen Sieg über Karloz (Karl V.). Er sah das Heer des Islams Rom einnehmen und sich nach Frankreich ausdehnen. Das Reich des künftigen Mahdi beschrieb er ohne grundsätzlichen Bruch mit der Herrschaft Süleymans, sondern als dessen ideale, umfassende Verwirklichung: Der Mahdi werde zusammen mit seinen Wesiren Jesus, Elias und Hizir (einer legendären, wohl auf Elia zurückzuführenden Prophetengestalt) die Welt mit Frieden füllen; die religiöse Aufspaltung werde ein Ende nehmen; Steuermissbrauch werde aufhören; jeder werde genug zum Leben haben.1 Für die in Spanien verfolgten sephardischen Juden wurde das neue Osmanische Reich zum rettenden Refugium. Don Isaac Abravanel, ein Führer der vertriebenen Gemeinschaft, erwartete Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts die Bekehrung des Sultans zum Judaismus und das Anbrechen einer messianischen Ära. 2 Eliahu Capsali interpretierte in seiner hebräischen Chronik Seder Eliyahu Zuta (1523), die vom Osmanischen Reich handelt, die Rolle Mehmeds II., Selims I. und Süleymans I. als diejenige eines «ersten Messias», der die Rückkehr der Juden erlauben, Jerusalem wiederherstellen und den Weg für das eschatologische Reich bereiten würde. Die Erwartung der Rückkehr und restauratio der Juden sowie die instrumentale, gegenüber den katholischen Fürsten Europas destruktive Rolle der Osmanen in diesem heilsgeschichtlichen Prozess teilten rom- und staatskritische protestantische Kreise. 3 Eliahu Capsali stand keinem Hofchronisten nach in der Lobhudelei gegenüber den Herrschern. Er verklärte namentlich Selim I. («den Grausamen») als eschatologischen Alexander und Cyrus; auch beschrieb er zahlreiche seiner Brutalitäten, allerdings nur, um diese vollumfänglich zu rechtfertigen.4

2

Flemming, «Sähib-kirän und Mahdi», S. 51-62.

Tishby, Isaiah, «Acute apocalyptic messianism», in: Saperstein, Marc (Hg.), Essential Papers on Messianic Movements and Personalities in Jewish History, New York, 1992, S. 259-286; diesen bibliographischen Hinweise verdanke ich Prof. Cornell Fleischer, Chicago. Vgl' Netanyahu, Benzion, Don Isaac Abravanel statesman and philosopher, Philedalphia (Pa.): The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1968 (Erstausgabe 1953). Namentlich Finch, Henry, The World's Resurrection or the Calling of the Jewes. A Present to Judah and the Children of Israel that loyned with Him, and to Ioseph (that valiant tribe of Ephraim) and all the House ofisrael that loyned with Him, London: Edward Griffin for William Bladen, 1621. 4 Eliahu Capsali war der Grossneffe Moses Capsalis, des ersten israelitischen Grossrabbiners im osmanischen Konstantinopel. Berlin, Charles, «A sixteenth-century Hebrew chronicle of the Ottoman Empire: the Seder Eliyahu Zuta of Elijah Capsali and its Message», in: idem (Hg.), Studies in Jewish bibliography history and literature in honor of I. Edward Kiev, New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1971, S. 21^4.

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Süleyman I., der Sohn Selims, stand in seiner Aspiration auf Universalherrschaft in expliziter Konkurrenz zu Kaiser Karl V. und zu Schah Ismail, wenn dessen Prestige auch durch die militärische Niederlage 1514 bei Caldiran, im östlichen Kleinasien, gegen das Heer Sultan Selims I. stark gelitten hatte. Süleyman wie Ismail Hessen sich sahib-kiran, Universalherrscher des letzten Zeitalters nennen, ein Begriff, den osmanische Autoren auch Karl V. - als überhebliche Selbstbezeichnung - in den Mund legten.1 Überaus zahlreich waren auch auf europäischer Seite apokalyptische Reichsspekulationen. Der bereits erwähnte Guillaume Postel machte sich zum Apostel eines geeinten christlichen Europa unter einer französischen Universalmonarchie; noch grösser waren die entsprechenden Erwartungen an Karl V. 2 Während Posteis Aufrufe zum antitürkische Kreuzzug den französischen König wenig beeindruckten, dieser im Gegenteil den osmanischen Druck auf Österreich begrüsste, zeigten die heilsgeschichtlichen Projektionen des Isfahaner Religionsgelehrten und Historikers Fazlallah anfangs des 16. Jahrhunderts mehr Wirkung auf den Usbekenführer Muhammad Schaibäni Khan, den aufstrebenden Herrscher Transoxaniens und Nachkommen Dschingis Khans. An dessen Hof hatte Fazlallah Zuflucht gefunden. Er sah Muhammad als imperialen Erneuerer (müceddid) der islamischen Ökumene, doch starb dieser alsbald im Kampf gegen den Safavidenherrscher Ismail. 3 Der Religionsgelehrte übertrug nun seine Vision auf den erfolgreichen osmanischen Sultan Selim I. Im schroffen Gegensatz zu den eschatologischen Erwartungen an die herrschenden Fürsten, aber im selben Sinnhorizont von Real- und Heilsgeschichte, standen die immer auch sozial begründeten, oft übersteigerten Erwartungen an alternative Heilsgestalten; so der schon erwähnte Scheich Bedreddin sowie mehrere charismatische Rebellenführer im Osmanischen Reich der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts. Sie führten meist Gruppen an, die man in der Forschung wegen ihrer besonderen, bisweilen christusähnlichen Verehrung Alis und dessen Bevorzugung gegenüber seinem Schwiegervater Mohammed «alidisch» nennt. Die Führer galten ihrer Anhängerschaft als

Sahib-kiran: wörtlich Meister der (astrologisch-weltgeschichtlichen) Konjunktion. Flemming, «Sähib-kirän und Mahdi», S. 58 und 62. Siehe auch Fleischer, «The lawgiver as Messiah». Vgl. Haeusler, Martin, Das Ende der Geschichte in der mittelalterlichen Weltchronistik, Köln, 1980. 3 Fadlallah Ibn Ruzbihan-i Hungi, Transoxanien und Turkestan zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts: das «Mihman-nama-yi Buhara» des Fadlallah b. Ruzbihan Hungi: Übersetzung und Kommentar, vorgelegt von Ursula Ott, Freiburg/Br., 1974; Glassen, Erika, «Krisenbewusstsein und Heilserwartung in der islamischen Welt zu Beginn der Neuzeit», in U. Haarmann und P. Bachmann (Hg.), Die islamische Welt zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit. Festschrift für Hans Robert Roemer, Beirut, 1979, S. 175-78.

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Vorboten des endzeitlichen Mahdi (Messias) oder als Statthalter des verborgenen, nie gestorbenen Zwölften Imams, manchmals gar als diese selbst.1 Es gab im Abendland im 15./16. Jahrhundert vergleichbare militante millenaristische Bewegungen, so diejenige Thomas Müntzers oder die Jan Bockelsons von Leiden, des selbst ernannten endzeitlichen Königs von Münster. Als Zeichen seines Anspruchs auf universale weltliche und geistliche Herrschaft trug letzterer bezeichnenderweise einen Reichsapfel mit Kreuz und zwei Schwertern. 2 Eine gewisse Analogie bildete auch die verbreitete Hoffnung auf die Wiederkehr Friedrichs II. als Endzeitkaiser; auch hier kam es teilweise zu einer Verschmelzung von Endzeitkaiser und Messias im Hinblick auf das Millennium. 3 Die Konstruktion von Ursprungsmythen - das logische Pendant zur endzeitlichen Einbindung herrschaftlichen Anspruchs - war im osmanischen Kontext vergleichsweise bescheiden. A priori gab es keine dynastische Legitimität der Osmanen als Kalifen, da sie keinerlei direkte Verwandtschaft mit dem Propheten oder den Kuraisch, dem herrschenden Stamme Mekkas, geltend machen konnten. Zudem spielte dynastische Heiratspolitik am polygamen Hof im Vergleich zu Europa keine Rolle. Während zum Beispiel Guillaume Postel eine heilsgeschichtliche Erwählung der Franzosen, der anonyme Autor des Buches der hundert Kapitel von anfangs des 16. Jahrhunderts eine solche der Deutschen konstruierte - beide im Rückgriff auf vor-abrahamitische Gestalten der Bibel - , 4 konzentrierten sich die osmanischen Hofideologen im 16. Jahrhundert darauf, das osmanische Herrscherhaus von Anbeginn an als rechtgläubigen Vorkämpfer im Djihad darzustellen.5 Dies wie jenes waren Fiktionen.

Literaturhinweise: Sohrweide, Hanna, «Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert», Der Islam, 41 (1965), S. 9 5 223; Ocak, Ahmet Ya§ar, Osmanh lmparatorlugu'nda marjinal sûfilik: Kalendertier (XIV-XVI/. yüzyillar), Ankara: TTK, 1992, S. 121-37; id., «Idéologie officielle et réaction populaire: un aperçu général sur les mouvements et les courants socio-religieux à l'époque de Soliman le Magnifique», in: Veinstein, Soliman le Magnifique, S. 185-192; Glassen, Erika, «Schah Ismâ'îl ein Mahdî der anatolischen Turkmenen?», Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 121 (1971), S. 61-69. Siehe Heinrich Aldegrevers Stich «Johann von Leiden als König», abgebildet in Cohn, Norman, Das neue irdische Paradies: revolutionärer Millenarismus und mystischer Anarchismus im mittelalterlichen Europa, Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1988, S. 301. Cohn, Das neue irdische Paradies, S. 117-38. Vgl. auch Niccoli, Ottavia, Profeti e popolo nell'ltalia del Rinascimento, Roma: Laterza, 1987. 4 Weill, Georges, Vie et caractère de Guillaume Postel, traduite du latin et mise à jour par François Secret, Milan: Archè, 1987, S. 199-203; Haupt, Hermán, Ein oberrheinischer Revolutionär aus dem Zeitalter Maximilians I. Mitteilungen aus einer kirchlich-politischen Reformschrift des ersten Decenniums des 16. Jahrhunderts, Trier, 1893. Für frühe Versionen und die dieser Repräsentation inhärente Problematik siehe Fodor, Pál, In quest of the Golden Apple. Imperial Ideology, politics, and military administration in the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000, S. 47^-9.

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Die ethno-nationale Komponente trat im osmanischen Imperialismus zwar stärker zugunsten der religiösen in den Hintergrund als in Europa; erst gegen Ende des Reiches, im späten 19. Jahrhundert, begann sich dies grundsätzlich zu ändern. Dennoch beschäftigte der vorislamische Ursprung der Türken die osmanischen Chronisten. Sie fragten sich zum Beispiel, ob Japhet oder Sem der Stammvater der Oguzen (Turkvölker) sei und suchten genealogische Verbindungen zwischen den biblischen Propheten, Muhammed und den Osmanen herzustellen.1 Damit gaben sie auch eine Replik auf die arabischen Apokalypsen, die das Kommen der Türken lange Zeit mit demjenigen Gogs und Magogs (Yecüc ve Mecüc) - den eschatologischen Feindesscharen aus dem Norden, die der Koran wie die Bibel erwähnt identifiziert hatten. Sie bewiesen damit, wie wichtig ihnen die eigene, und sei sie noch so fiktive Einbindung in die menschheitliche Heilsgeschichte war.2 Zugleich wird dadurch die Brüchigkeit eines ideologischen Fundamentes deutlich, das weit mehr noch als die europäischen Potentaten auf Universalität angewiesen war, um die grosse reichsinterne Heterogenität zu überspannen.

III. Restauration, Reform, Revolution: der schwierige Abschied vom Reich (19./20. Jahrhundert) Anders als Europa und seine Aufbrüche stand das Osmanische Reich im 15./16. Jahrhundert weniger im Zeichen moderner Globalisierung als der jahrtausendealten Tradition imperialer mediterraner Welt (oikumene). Dank des osmanischen Sultan-Kalifen erschien das «Haus der Islams» Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts als weitgehend geeint, während das «christliche Europa» mit der offenkundigen Tatsache unvereinter religöser und politischer Gegensätze mitten in seinem Innern zu leben hatte. Die innere Zerrissenheit war in der longue durée und vor globalem Horizont eine Stärke, nicht wegen der damit verknüpften kolonialistischen Expansion, sondern weil sie zur säkularisierenden Neuformulierung universaler Kategorien, und damit von Religion, herausforderte. Dieser Prozess nahm in der Aufklärung Gestalt an und dauert mit manchen Rückschlägen und Fehlentwicklungen - darunter die laizistischen Millenarismen des 20. Jahrhunderts - bis heute an. Im osmanischen Raum hingegen zersplitterte das auf dem Islam ruhende Selbstbild viel später - im wesentlichen zur Zeit der jungtürkischen

Der Chronist A§ikpa§azâde (15. Jahrhundert) sowie der schon erwähnte Mevlânâ Isâ in seinen Câmi' iil-meknunât entschieden sich für Japhet als Stammvater; Flemming, «Sâhib-kirân und Mahdî», S.47 und 52. 2 Abel, «Changements politiques et littérature eschatologique», S. 42.

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Generation (spätes 19., frühes 20. Jahrhundert) - , dafür umso rascher, unvermittelter, schmerzhafter. Ein friedlicher Abschied vom Reich - zwecks Machtteilung oder einer geregelten Überführung in eine zeitgemässe Neuordnung - gelang den wenigsten Erben imperialer Macht; auch und besonders den Jungtürken nicht. Die osmanischen Reformer vor ihnen hatten im 19. Jahrhundert nicht vermocht, sich von dem auf Letztgültigkeit ausgerichteten Mythos des Reiches zu lösen, der die eigene Identität und eine privilegierte Position über Jahrhunderte getragen hatte. Reform bedeutete für sie Restauration gemäss dem sunnitischen Djihad- und Weltordnungsgedanken; die proklamierten liberalen Werte realisierten sie nicht oder nur partiell, je nach Region. Der Hofhistoriker Mehmed Essad stellte den Vater der Reform des 19. Jahrhunderts, Sultan Mahmud II. (1808-39), martialisch und nach dem Bild des sahib-kiran dar: «Mahmud ist ein furchterregender Alexander, das geringste Drohzeichen seines Gesichtes würde, wie eine Festungsmauer, die Anstrengungen von hunderttausend Gog[-Kriegern] aufhalten». 1 Der Autor interpretierte in seinem Buch von 1826 das im selben Jahr von Mahmud befohlene Massaker an den Janitscharen und das Verbot des Bektaschi-Ordens als «heilvollen Vorgang» (•vak'a-i hayriyye) für das Reich. Das Gedicht eines Hofdichters auf Mahmud pries ihn als «Herrn der Welt»: «Der Schöpfer setzte als den Herrn der Welt/ Den Völkern vor Sultan Mahmud den Chan / [...] Sein Kanon ist nur die Gerechtigkeit/ [...] Durch das Gesetz hat er die Welt geregelt/ [...] Er heile die Welt bis zum jüngsten Tag.» 2 Der Hofdichter verzichtete nicht auf die eschatologische Referenz und den Anspruch auf Weltordnung. Der Hofhistoriker gebrauchte, und sei es «rhetorisch», den Bezug auf Gog und Magog. Im Unterschied zum 16. Jahrhundert standen diese Bezüge und die ganze Reichsideologie im offenkundigen Widerspruch zu einer Realität, die von der Abspaltung und Unabhängigkeit Griechenlands 1821-30, der Niederlage im Krieg gegen Russland 1828 und dem drohenden Kollaps des Reiches in den 1830er Jahren wegen der ägyptischen Invasion in Syrien und Kleinasien geprägt war. Die «orientalische Krise» bildete forthin ein weltpolitisches Dauerthema und manifestierte sich als zunehmende Desorientiertheit der imperialen Eliten. In seiner endzeitlich beflügelten Expansionsphase im 15./16. Jahrhundert konnte Muhammad As'ad Safvat, Précis historique de la destruction du corps des janissaires par le sultan Mahmoud en 1826, traduit du turc [Schrift Üss-i Zafer, Istanbul 1826] par Armand Pierre Caussin de Perceval, Paris: Firmin Didot, 1833, S. 6. 2 Ausschnitt aus dem offiziellen Gedicht von Ahmed Sadik Ziver auf die Eröffnung der osmanisch-kaiserlichen Ärzteschule in Konstantinopel, 1839. Transkription mit deutscher Übersetzung von Hammer-Purgstall in Terzioglu, Arslan, «Galatasaray'daki Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Adliye-i §ahane'ye dair §imdiye kadar bilinmeyen almanca kaynaklar», Tarih ve Toplum, Nr. 100, April 1992, S. 216.

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das Reich mit manchen inneren Widersprüchen leben, da die universale Perspektive sie überwog und relativierte; im 19. Jahrhundert war dies nicht mehr der Fall. Mahmud II. beseitigte mit dem vak'a-i hayriyye nicht nur anstössige Truppen aus der Hauptstadt, sondern auch den aus dem 15./16. Jahrhundert stammendem ideologischen Widerspruch, der darin bestanden hatte, dass die für das Imperium zentrale Institution der Elitetruppen nicht der Linie der sunnitischen Reichsideologie entsprach. Zentralisierung und Vereinheitlichung - auch in ideologischer Hinsicht - waren denn auch die Schlüsselpostulate der Reform; die Binneneroberung und Direktregierung über das plurireligiöse Kurdistan war eine der ersten Folgerungen daraus. Mahmuds Politik wie auch dem ganzen Buch Mehmed Essads eignete eine restaurativ-sunnitische Ideologie, die ein idealisiertes Bild osmanischer Herrschaft im 16. Jahrhunderts zum Vorbild nahm. Die osmanische Reformpolitik des 19. Jahrhunderts setzte auf administrative Zentralisierung und den Import europäischen Know-hows in den Kernbereichen von Militär und Verwaltung; sie ging soweit, Französisch als die Sprache der Zivilisation und des Fortschritts in ihren Hochschulen als Unterrichtssprache sowie als Primärsprache des Aussenministeriums einzuführen. Aber sie tastete den osmanischen Reichsgedanken nicht an. Das ganze Set imperialer Restauration war daher nicht mit den liberalen Vorgaben vereinbar, die Grossbritannien im Namen Europas im Bereich der Menschenrechte, namentlich der religiösen Freiheit und der Gleichberechtigung aller Individuen und religiösen Gemeinschaften einforderte. Grossbritannien, der unentbehrliche strategische Seniorpartner aus dem Westen, liess sich seinen Beistand gegen den übermächtigen Druck Russlands und Ägyptens auf den Sultan mit der osmanischen Marktöffnung und strategischen Zugeständnissen entgelten. Die Abhängigkeit gegenüber dem Westen, die territorialen Verluste und die muslimischen Flüchtlingsströme ins schrumpfende Reich nahmen im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts in beängstigendem Ausmass zu. Apokalyptisches Denken religiöser wie sozialdarwinistischer Art breitete sich im Reich von Mazedonien bis in den Sudan aus; ersteres vor allem im Volk, letzteres bei jenen Reichseliten, die Hochschulbildung genossen hatten. Sultan Abdulhamid II. (1876-1909), in welchem der von Mahmud II. begonnene defensive Restaurationsversuch des Reiches gipfelte, bemühte sich in besonderem Mass um die religiöse und symbolische Dimension seiner Herrschaft: Er entsandte sunnitisch-hanefitische Missionare zu den Aleviten und Yeziden, liess in nominell muslimischen Dörfern Moscheen bauen, betonte seine weltweite Rolle als Kalif («Panislamismus») und suchte mit einem dichten Netz von Spionen dafür zu sorgen, dass über seine Person, sein Amt und sein Reich nichts Herabwürdigendes gesagt oder geschrieben wurde.

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Was der Sultan zwanghaft verhindern wollte, trat ein. Wegen der Massaker an den osmanischen Armeniern, der am stärksten nach Westen ausgerichteten Gemeinschaft, nannte ihn Europa den sultan rouge, während ihn die angehenden jungtürkischen Staatsdiener - viele von ihnen Studenten der militärischen Ärzteschule und der Hochschule für Verwaltung - als reaktionären Versager an der Spitze ihres Staates hassten. In der medikalisisierten Sprache der damaligen wissenschaftsgläubigen Jungeliten schrieb 1898 ein nach Genf geflohener Jungtürke (mit umgekehrten Vorzeichen als der Hofdichter 1839): «Le vrai pathogène n'est que l'ignoble personne du Sultan rouge. C'est elle qui, à l'instar des bascilles virgules de Koch empoisonne l'économie sociale ottomane et provoque ses spasmes, ses crampes, son anémie de plus en plus intense.»1 Die vielfach in Karikaturen dargestellte Phantasie der Jungtürken, das System Abdulhamids in die Luft zu jagen, entsprang dem Wunsch nach tabula rasa, der - ganz unislamischen - Sehnsucht nach Revolution grundstürzender Art. Die nach Aufbruch Trachtenden hatten keine deutliche Vorstellung von dem, was anstelle des Alten treten sollte. Ratlosigkeit, Weltschmerz und Frustration über die Lage der «desolaten muslimischen Nation» (biçâre milleti muhammediyye) beherrschten sie. Abgebaut werden sollte die verwirrende kosmopolitische Komplexität des Viel völkerreiches; einfach, «rein» und «natürlich» sollte die befrachtete osmanische «Kunstsprache» werden; auszumerzen waren Despotismus, Korruption, religiöse Reaktion, «fremde Einmischung» - kurz alles, was als Schwächung der Macht, Verhinderung des Fortschrittes und belastend für das Selbstwertgefühl erschien. All dies bedeutete indes noch keine Emanzipation vom historischen osmanischen Reichsgedanken. Die erste Generation der Jungtürken verstand sich als zugehörig zur «Reichsnation», ja als dessen berufener Retter. Unter dem Einfluss der Balkannationalismen und akademischer Vordenker aus Russland begannen sie allerdings ihren bisher religiös gefüllten Nationsbegriff (millet und ümmet) zunehmend ethnisch zu fassen. Eine Hauptschwierigkeit der anfangs des 20. Jahrhunderts von Sultan wie Opposition noch immer angestrebten renovatio imperii bestand darin, Macht, die im Namen des Islams ausgeübt worden war, gemäss dem modernen Prinzip der Gleichberechtigung auch an ehemalige politisch unmündige «Schutzbefohlene», nämlich die Nichtmuslime abgeben zu müssen. Diese Transformation ideell und sozial zu leisten war für das Osmanische Reich eine grosse Herausforderung - schwieriger als die Emanzipation der Juden für die aus der Aufklärung hervorgegangenen europäischen Staatssysteme. Zwar ging Die jungtürkische Oppositionszeitschrift Osmanli, Nr. 7, französischsprachige Ausgabe Genf, 5. Juni 1898, S. 1.

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es in der rechtsstaatlichen europäischen Sicht des 19. Jahrhunderts dabei um indiskutable liberale Rechte. Aber die Werte- und Rechtsgemeinschaft, die diese im Westen verfocht, war aus der kirchlichen Glaubensgemeinschaft erwachsen und hatte in einem langen Prozess christlich-humanistische Inhalte zeitgemäss umzusetzen beziehungsweise zu säkularisieren begonnen. Dabei begrenzte sie sich auf Nationalstaaten oder aber Reiche mit stark eingeschränktem Uni versalanspruch, und die religiösen Differenzen, die sie zu überbrücken hatten, beschränkten sich weitgehend auf konfessionelle Unterschiede und auf die kleine jüdische Minderheit. Doch selbst diese beschränkte Integration gelang aus der sozialgeschichtlichen Perspektive des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts nur ganz unvollkommen, wie die spätere systematische Judenverfolgung zeigte. Im Vergleich mit Europa war das Osmanische Reich viel heterogener: Es hatte Muslime, Christen und Juden zu integrieren. Mit dem Bild islamischer Weltordnung, der Scharia und der Voraussetzung, dass die Muslime die Basis des Staates (iis-ü saltanaf) bildeten, stand und fiel der traditionelle Reichsgedanke. Die vom Westen immer wieder geforderte tatsächliche Verwirklichung der religiösen Wahlfreiheit (auch für Muslime und nominale Muslime) hätte das Ende des Sozialsystems bedeutet. Die Religion als expliziter Eckpfeiler der Macht verlor erst in jenem Moment 1923 ihre Funktion, als die Jungtürken und jungtürkischen Kemalisten fast alle Nichtmuslime aus ihrem kleinasiatischem Machtgebiet nach strikt religiösadministrativen Kriterien - Kirchenzugehörigkeit - entfernt hatten. Es ist nur ein scheinbares Paradox, dass atheistische Modernisierer des 20. Jahrhunderts, und nicht der Sultan-Kalif während seiner jahrhundertelangen Herrschaft, die Türkei vollständig islamisierten. Die Abdrängung des imperialen Ordnungsgedankens durch einen aggressiven Islamismus und der langfristige Ersatz des islamischen Credos durch ein türkistisches bedeuteten allerdings, was viele Akteure erst im Nachhinein realisierten, das Ende des Reiches. Nach der «jungtürkischen Revolution» (1908) gegen Abdulhamid, hatte der Türkismus (und «Turanismus») im Sinne der nationalistischen Vordenker Yusuf Ak?ura und Ziya Gökalp die muslimischen Studenten, soweit sie sich als Türken identifizierten, zu begeistern begonnen. Diese junge Generation begrüsste am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs den Nationalismus überschwänglich als Rettung aus der Krise des Islams und der demütigenden Lage der «unerweckten türkischen Nation». Der Rückgriff auf das Türkentum war - wie bei allen ethnisch begründeten Nationalismen - die Zuflucht zu einer Essenz, die als prähistorisch und «natürlich» gegeben imaginiert wurde, sich mithin als kompatibel mit moderner biologistischer Weltanschauung

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präsentierte, aber zugleich einen Weg wies aus der sprachlichen und kulturellen Kompliziertheit der spätosmanischen Epoche. Der türkische Nationalismus sollte die sunnitische Elite des Herrschervolkes (millet-i hakime) im ausgehenden, sechshundertjährigen Universalreich des Sultan-Kalifen mit einem Zeitalter versöhnen, in welchem der Islam keine Zukunft zu haben schien. Ein tiefer Bruch mit der bisherigen Staatsideologie zu Gunsten «modernen», «fortschrittlichen», «wissenschaftlichen» Gedankengutes, nicht nur Know-hows, brach sich Bahn. Dennoch integrierte die weitgehend atheistische jungtürkische Generation - zu der auch die kemalistischen Gründergestalten inklusive Mustafa Kemal Atatürk zählten - ihre islamische Herkunft als einen Bestandteil türkischer Ethnizität, entleerte jedoch den Islam jeglicher Offenbarungsinhalte und moralischer Gültigkeit. Sie wertete ihn explizit ab, indem sie das vorislamische, heidnische Türkentum glorifizierte. Sie «machten Turan zu ihrem Mahdi», wie Gökalp prophetisch bejahend schrieb. 1 Die mythisch überhöhte nationale Erlösungsgeschichte und das Pantheon alter und neuer nationaler Helden sollten das religiöse Vakuum ausfüllen. Zur politischen Ideologie des Osmanischen Reiches taugte der Türkismus jedoch schlecht. Als Pantürkismus (oder Panturanismus) postulierte er die Vereinigung aller Turkvölker, mithin ein Grossreich auf ethnischer Basis, das sich vom Balkan bis Zentralasien erstrecken und nicht mit dem Osmanischen Reich zusammenfallen würde. Der Rote Apfel tauchte anfangs des 20. Jahrhunderts vorwiegend in diesem politisch oder aber kulturell gefassten panturanischen Sinn auf. Die jungtürkische Einparteiendiktatur unter Talat, Enver und Djemal trat 1914 indes ohne einheitliche Ideologie in den Ersten Weltkrieg ein. Je nach Bedürfnis griffen sie auf die eine oder andere Ideologie zurück: Der Pantürkismus motivierte den Russlandfeldzug Enver Paschas; türkischer Ethno-Nationalismus begründete die Genozid- und Vertreibungspolitik in Kleinasien; Osmanismus und Panislamismus bestimmten den politischen Ton gegenüber den Arabern, die dem Reich erhalten bleiben sollten. Die jungtürkischen Akteure der Kriegsjahre 1912-1918 (Balkankriege und Erster Weltkrieg zusammen genommen) begehrten, die Rolle von genialen hommes d'action in einer säkular-apokalyptischen Weltsituation zu spielen. Als verschworene Glieder eines elitären Geheimbundes (des jungtürkischen Comité Union et Progrès) verschrieben sie sich der «Rettung» von Reich und Nation; nach Massgabe dieses Ziels betrachteten sie sich als Herren über Leben und Tod von Millionen von Menschen. 1916, nach Abschluss der 1

«Kizil Elma», Türk Yurdu, 2. Jg., Nr. 11, 23. 1. 1913 (transkribierte Ausgabe Ankara: Tutibay, 1998, Bd. 2, S. 119).

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Hauptphase des Völkermords an den Armeniern, pilgerten Enver und Djemal Pascha per Zug demonstrativ gemeinsam nach Medina zum Grabe Mohammeds. Dies sollte eine positive Wirkung auf die arabischen Muslime haben, aber auch die eigene Moral stärken. Falih Rifki Atay, Djemals Ordonnanzoffizier und Privatsekretär, beschrieb später die Pilgerfahrt und kommentierte sie am Schluss so: «Heiliger Krieg, Osmanisches Reich, Gott und der Prophet: Alles vermischt sich miteinander. Ich möchte lachen. [...] Es ist kein Witz, wir betreiben islamischen Imperialismus. Ihr, deren Eingeweide von Krummdolchen aufgeschlitzt, deren Fleisch von der Wüstensonne geröstet wird! Ihr, die Brüder der in den eisigen Bergen bei Sarikami§ [im Russlandfeldzug] Erfrorenen, ihr alle seid ihr nicht die Opfer der Wahnvorstellung eines völlig leeren Kopfes [Enver]?»1

IV. Der republikanisch verstandene «Goldene Apfel» Die oben zitierten Worte des glühenden Kemalisten und Freundes von Atatürk Falih Rifki belegen den endgültigen Abschied vom osmanischen Imperialismus, den die Erben des Sultansreiches und Gründer der Republik Türkei vollzogen hatten. Mustafa Kemal Pascha selbst nannte es 1923 in einer Rede vor der türkischen Nationalversammlung in Ankara eine Schimäre, die muslimische Welt von einem einzigen Zentrum aus regieren zu wollen. Zur Abwehr panislamischer Reichsvorstellungen argumentierte er - ganz Kind seiner Zeit und Teil einer positivistischen Elite - mit Begriffen wie «wissenschaftliche Wahrheit», «historische Wahrheit», «Organismus» und «Naturgesetz». Es sei «unvernünftig» und «unwissenschaftlich», den «politischen Körper» des Staates auf gemeinislamischer anstatt türkischnationaler Basis konstituieren zu wollen.2 Andeutungsweise war der Abschied vom Reich schon 1913 in einem Gedicht Ziya Gökalps (1876-1924) - eines der wichtigsten geistigen Väter des Kemalismus - vorgezeichnet, in welchem der Goldene Apfel zu einem Dorf made in Switzerland und zum Symbol kulturellen Aufbruchs mutierte: «Bauen wir in der Schweiz ein türkisches Dorf, eine Stadt / auf; von dort soll ein neuer Strom / ein Bildungsfluss nach Turan sich ergiessen /[...] Kizilelma

1 Falih Rifki |Atay]. '/.eytindagi [Ölberg], Istanbul: Bateg, 1981 (Erstausgabe Istanbul 1932), S. 57 f. Es handelt sich um eine Retrospektive unter Verwendung zeitgenössischer Tagebuchnotizen.

2

Französische Ubersetzung auf Daktyloskript im Schweizerischen Bundesarchiv, J.II.19, 1969/27,4.

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sei der Name dieser Stadt / Mädchen und Knaben kamen und bewohnten sie / Sie wurden zum neuen Adam, zur neuen Eva.» 1 Die junge türkische Generation sollte in der Schweiz - die der spätosmanischen Jugend als Zitadelle europäischer Kultur ohne imperialistische Verdorbenheit galt - ein Dorf oder eine Stadt aufbauen und damit den Grundstein zu einer neuen Gesellschaft legen. In der kemalistischen Interpretation des Gedichtes ist diese die Republik Türkei mit Ankara als dem schliesslichen Kizil Elma. 2 Zwar hiess es in der folgenden Gedichtzeile mehrdeutig, dass sich der Strom eines Tages wenden und ins Weltmeer fliessen werde. Dass der Goldene Apfel - das Symbol machtpolitischer Begehrlichkeit, der einst die christlichen Metropolen bezeichnet hatte - zum idealtypischen Schweizerdorf wurde, bedeutete nichtsdestoweniger eine Revolution. Republikanisch gedeutet war der Apfel fortan kein imperialistisches Symbol mehr, sondern das nicht weniger ambitionierte Ziel, in der Bejahung der säkularen Werte des einstigen Feindes eine rechtsstaatlich funktionierende Gesellschaft «türkischer Nation» von unten nach oben zu verwirklichen. Nach der Vertreibung des Kalifen 1924 verwaltete die Republik den sunnitischen Ritus staatlich und machte den Islam im Übrigen mundtot. Seither ist das Sultanat-Kalifat, die stellvertretende Nachfolge des Propheten Mohammed, verwaist. Für manche Muslime bedeutet dies noch heute ein schmerzliches Zeichen für den lamentablen Zustand ihrer Glaubenssache. Viele jedoch sahen die Absetzung des Sultan-Kalifen als Befreiung, da sie ihn als «Fürsten dieser Welt», nicht Sachwalter Gottes wahrgenommen hatten. Mit dem Kalifat ging auch die gesellschaftliche Geltung der Scharia zu Ende, was namentlich die Aleviten, die der Scharia nie verbunden gewesen waren, begrüssten. Der Justizminister Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, bis 1919 Präsident des türkistischen Foyer turc in Lausanne, führte das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuches 1926 integral ein. Es löste die Scharia - einst Basis der Reichsideologie - vollständig ab und wurde zum Herzstück der «türkischen Revolution». Die Absage an die osmanische Vergangenheit und die Einführung neuer Vorbilder waren in den 1920er Jahren radikal, ausdrücklich revolutionär, aber leider oft im Banne eines extremen Türkismus. Auch erfolgten sie von oben

1 «Kizil Elma», Türk Yurdu, 2. Jg., Nr. 11, 23. 1. 1913 (transkribierte Ausgabe Ankara: Tutibav 1998, Bd. 2, S. 118 f.). 2 «Cette ville turque, créée de toutes pièces dans un coin de la Suisse libre et couverte d'un bout à l'autre d'universités, d'instituts, d'académies et de toutes sortes d'oeuvres culturelles et intellectuelles purement et proprement turques serait Kizil Elma, la terre promise du peuple turc. [...] Mais voilà qu'avant que ne s'écoule une douzaine d'années, Kizil Elma a vu effectivement le jour. Elle ne s'appelle pas Kizil Elma, mais Ankara. Elle n'est pas située dans un coin de la Suisse libre, mais au coeur de la Turquie libre.» Alp, Tekin, Le Kemalisme, Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1937, S. 24. Vgl. Yérasimos, «De l'arbre à la pomme», S. 190-92.

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nach unten, verbunden mit Zwang und Gewalt. Nichttürken und Nichtmuslime galten bestenfalls als Bürger zweiter Klasse; die systematische Enteignung der Christen fand ihre republikanische Fortsetzung beim kleinen Rest, der im Land verblieben war; der kurdische Osten der explizit «antiimperialistischen» Republik glich permanent einer besetzten «Binnenkolonie» (Ismail Be§ik§i). Ein beträchtlicher Teil der militärischen und bürokratischen Reichselite hatte sich im Übergang vom Reich zur Republik die eigenen Privilegien zu wahren gewusst. In mancher Hinsicht überlebten imperialistische Muster, auch heilsgeschichtlicher Art. Ein weit verbreitetes Stossgebet hatte in den letzten Jahren des Reiches so gelautet: «Möge Gott uns den Herrscher [sahibi] senden.» 1 Wir erinnern uns an den sahib-i kiran des 16. Jahrhunderts. Viele Muslime und Türken sahen nach 1919 in Mustafa Kemal den ersehnten Führer, einige bezeichneten ihn explizit als Mahdi; offiziell trug er nach den grossen Waffenerfolgen den Titel eines gazi, das heisst eines Helden im Djihad. Ab 1926 wurden landesweit erste Statuen von ihm aufgestellt. Die von Staates wegen aufgebaute kemalistische Säkularreligion transzendierte ihn als Identifikationsfigur des republikanischen Nationalismus. Sie richtete sich in erster Linie gegen den politischen Islam, setzte aber auch dem völkischen Türkismus Grenzen. Kritik an Mustafa Kemal Atatürk war (und ist) von Gesetzes wegen verboten. Kemals Landung in Trabzon (19. Mai 1919) wurde zur Stunde Null des republikanischen Gründungsmythos erhoben und galt somit als Beginn des Unabhängigkeits- beziehungsweise, wörtlich, «Erlösungskrieges» (kurtulu§ savap). Zentrales Heiligtum der Nation wurde das im Zweiten Weltkrieg in der neuen Hauptstadt Ankara gebaute monumentale Atatürk-Mausoleum. Im Gegensatz zu den wenig orthodoxen Janitscharen im Osmanischen Reich ernannte sich die Armee zur ideologischen Wächterin über die neue Religion und damit über die Republik. «Le Kemalisme n'a reconnu qu'un seul Dieu: le nationalisme», schrieb Moi'z Kohen Tekinalp 1937 zutreffend. 2 Die übersteigerten post-osmanisehen Entwicklungen in der Türkei lassen sich nur im Kontext der Ablösung vom imperialen Habitus verstehen, einer Ablösung, zu der bei aller nationalistischen Xenophobie das Bemühen um die eigene, bisher verpasste Einordnung in die globalisierte Welt gehörte als türkische Muslime wie zugleich Wahleuropäer. Gökalps republikanisch verstandener Apfel ist ein starkes Zeichen dafür.

* «Allah sahibi göndersin», zitiert in Kieser, Der verpasste Friede, S. 368. 2 Alp, Kemalisme, S. 24.

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Zum Schluss Die Idee imperialer Ordnung begründet die Ausübung von Macht mit der Notwendigkeit von Sicherheit und Ordnung in der «bewohnten Welt» zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit. Da «reine» Macht ohne genügende Legitimation rasch hinfällig ist, bedarf dauerhafte Herrschaft einer soliden Ideologie, die ihren göttlich verankerten menschheitlichen Nutzen überzeugend darlegt. So pries im Jahre 1519 eine Steuerordnung für die frisch eroberte Provinz Syrien den Sultan Selim I. («den Grausamen») als Verkörperung göttlicher Güte und Gerechtigkeit, Wohltäter der Menschheit und Kalifen des universal gültigen Rechtes. 1 Da es dem Imparator in der Realität an Kredibilität und am consensus universorum gebricht, bedarf er des Krieges, der Repression und der Ausbeutung, um sich zu etablieren und zu halten. Seine Herrschaft kultiviert die Differenz zwischen imperialer Rechtgläubigkeit und reichsgefährdender Gesinnung. Sie beschönigt ihre eigene Unterdrückungsgeschichte und setzt sich heilsgeschichtlich in Szene. Auch der römische Kaiser Nero (54-68), der dem Cäsarenwahn verfiel und neben anderen Missetaten die Christen Roms brutal verfolgte, wurde anfänglich als Ordner der Menschheit dargestellt, als bereitwillig, seinen Göttern Rechenschaft über sein Tun abzulegen. 2 Das Imperium Romanum ist zwar zum unüberbotenen Inbegriff eines Reiches geworden, das seine historische und ideengeschichtliche Langlebigkeit wohl der weitgehenden Integration des Christentums, das heisst jener Kraft, die es am grundsätzlichsten hinterfragt hatte, verdankte. Aber selbst eine ausgefeilte, Gegensätze in sich vereinende Ideologie konnte die Schwächen, Ungerechtigkeiten und Bluttaten seiner Machtausübung nicht zudecken, die sie weit vom idealen, eschatologischen Universalreich entfernten. Auch die islamischen Reiche handeln von Eroberung und Ausbeutung ebenso wie vom Versuch gerechter, gottesfürchtiger Verwaltung, dem Streben nach soliden universalen Fundamenten und dem Wunsch nach gesellschaftlicher Stabilität. Sie entwickelten sich im machtmässigen und ideologischen Schatten des christlichen Roms/Ostroms; ihre Akteure träumten über Jahrhunderte von der Eroberung von Byzanz und Rom, und damit von der ' Abou-el-Haj, Rifa'at Ali, «Aspects of the legitimation of Ottoman rule as reflected in the jjreambles to two early Liva Kanunnameler», Turcica 21-23 (1991), S, 371-83, hier 376 f. Der Philosoph Seneca legte Nero, seinem Schüler, zu Herrschaftsbeginn diese Worte in den Mund: «Ich den Völkern ein Richter über Leben und Tod; Los und Stellung eines jeden liegen in meiner Hand [...]; aus meinem Spruch erhalten Anlass zur Freude Völker und Städte [...] welche Völker völlig ausgerottet, welche verschleppt werden sollen [...] - es liegt in meiner Entscheidung. [...] Heute den unsterblichen Göttern, wenn sie Rechenschaft von mir fordern sollten, das Menschengeschlecht vorzuzählen, bin ich bereit.»Clementia I 2 (Seneca (Übersetzung Manfred Rosenbach, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989, Bd. 5, S. 4 f.).

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Vereinigung der Mittelmeerwelt unter islamischer Herrschaft. An der Schwelle zur Neuzeit verdichtete sich dieses mit eschatologischen Visionen verschmolzene Motiv im Symbol des Kiz.il Elma (Roter Apfel). In West und Ost erregte der Aufstieg des Osmanischen Reiches mit der dreifachen Machtfülle (aus zentralasiatischer, islamischer und byzantinischer Tradition), die der Sultan in sich vereinte, heilsgeschichtlichen Enthusiasmus oder aber Schrecken. Für die in Spanien verfolgten sephardischen Juden wurde das neue Reich zum rettenden Refugium und Anlass zu eschatologischen Spekulationen. Diese kongruierten insofern mit derjenigen des Kizil Elma, als sie den Untergang Roms, der einstigen Zerstörerin Jerusalems, postulierten. Während im 15. und in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts die osmanische Expansion von eschatologischen Erwartungen beflügelt war, bezweckte die Ausformulierung einer streng sunnitischen Reichsideologie und Hofhistoriographie ab Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts die Festigung und Wahrung einer Herrschaft, die ihre inneren Widersprüche im Gegensatz zu den europäischen Kolonialmächten nicht mehr mit glänzenden Eroberungen überdecken konnte. Dennoch war die osmanische Herrschaft so solide, dass sie mehrere Jahrhunderte überdauerte. Erst die zunehmende Interaktion mit den europäischen Grossmächten, die im Gegensatz zum Osmanischen Reich global agierten, erschütterte sie im 19. Jahrhundert irreversibel nach Innen und nach Aussen. Die Grundlagen der Herrschaft verloren ihre Glaubwürdigkeit bei den Eliten, woraus eine tiefe Ratlosigkeit resultierte. Der Abschied vom Reich erwies sich für die osmanischen Muslime umso schwieriger, als er das Ende des traditionellen islamischen Kalifats bedeutete, das die Osmanen seit dem 16. Jahrhundert innehatten. Als neues Ideal, wiederum durch den Kizil Elma versinnbildlicht, brach sich anfangs des 20. Jahrhunderts der Türkismus Bahn im Denken der muslimisch-türkischen Reichseliten. In der Version des Pantürkismus deutete das Ideal einen neuen, diesmal ostwärts gerichteten Imperialismus an, der jedoch illusorisch blieb. Die republikanische Deutung des Kizil Elma als keimhafte Bildungsstätte einer neuen Generation, ausgehend von der Schweiz, wies imperialistische und völkische Auswüchse des Türkismus zurück. Dennoch blieb der junge Nachfolgestaat des Osmanischen Reiches vor letzteren wie auch vor den Nachwirkungen imperialistischer Muster im Innern nicht verschont.

12. TURKEY'S ÉLITE DIASPORA IN SWITZERLAND (1860s-1920s)

We all know that World War I was a most momentous watershed in modern history in Europe as well as in the Near East.* The Swiss Confederation then appeared as a little island, asylum and ideal place for agitation in the midst of the global theatre. During the decades before, in and just after World War I, élite diasporas formed a small but most significant arena for what was to happen in the big empires of the Tsar and the Sultan. It was a microcosm strongly linked to macrocosms in transition. Mostly students, the diaspora members were absorbed by such heavy questions like the future of their big countries. Revolution, inkilâp, was their keyword. They believed in their mission as empire-saviours, nation-builders or internationalist revolutionaries. Elite diasporas represent an often underestimated factor in the modern remodeling of the East and Near East. The advantage of microcosms for us as historians lays in the fact that they can be studied more easily and closely than macrocosms. La petite Russie, the "little Russia", rue de Carouge in Geneva, is well known as a center of the Russian diaspora, famed for its revolutionary stance. Similar places could be found in Zurich and Bern. The Russian Revolution was made in Switzerland, as Alfred Senn stated in his book of 1971 (Senn, 1971 ; Mysyrowicz, 1975). Very few people are aware of the fact that in the Fin the siècle the same quarter around the rue de Carouge also housed several Young Turks and the room, rue de Carouge 7, where they weekly met. Interestingly enough, this was also the address of Kurdistan, the first Ottoman and Kurdish periodical which, after the terrible pogroms of 1895 and ongoing violence in the Eastern Provinces, appealed for Kurdish-Armenian friendship. Abdurrahman Bedirhan, the responsible of Kurdistan, peacefully shared the same working room with later Turkists and members of the Ankara parliament like Tunali Hilmi and Akil Muhtar. An Armenian typesetter made their publications possible.1 At the eve of WWI the situation was deeply changed. While the students from Russia, many of them Jews and women, still largely believed in First published in: Anastassiadou, Meropi (ed.), Elites urbaines et savoir scientifique dans la société ottomane (XIXe-XXe siècles), Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003, p. 349-382. Many thanks to Christoph Maier for the linguistic polishing of the text. 1 See the report of the Department of Police and Justice of Geneva, 10 April and 30 Mayl899, Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv [= BAr] E 21, 14248 und E 21, 14250 ; Hanioglu, 1995, 170.

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international socialism, the South Eastern diaspora was now strongly divided along ethno-national lines. Bulgarian, Armenian (Kieser, 1999), Greek, Serbian and Zionist 1 organisations already had existed at the turn of the century ; the new one in 1911 was the Turk Yurdu, or Turkish Foyer, followed a few months later by the Kurdish Hêvi (Ekrem Cernii Paga, 1992, 18-22 ; Kadri Cernii Pa§a, 1991, 34). Hêvi as well as the first Turk Yurdu were located in Lausanne, not in Geneva. The University of Lausanne, then a very young university in the liberal radical center of the Swiss Romandie, was attractive for prospective elites not only from the East, but particularly also from Italy, among them, by the way, the young Mussolini. As international as it was with regard to students and professors, it had not the same cosmopolitan feature and deep roots in Calvinist ethics as the city of Calvin and Rousseau. While Geneva was the undisputed center in Switzerland for political publication and agitation from the first Young Ottomans in the 1860s to the Young Turks before 1908, Lausanne in 1911 had the first Turkish Foyer in Europe that, until 1923, remained the most important one together with that in Geneva. This concentration in French- and not German-speaking Switzerland was of course a result of the franco-centrism of the Ottoman Reform age and the special place given to French as "language of progress". Contrary to the Ottoman Turks, big numbers of students from Russia, and some Ottoman or post-Ottoman Christians also frequented the universities of Zurich and Bern. Many Ottoman Christians however went to universities founded by missionaries in Istanbul or Beyrout. Thanks to Ahmed Bedevi Kuran (1956, 2000) and above all to Siikru Hanioglu (1981, 1995, 2001) we know a lot about the Young Turks in opposition, and their activities in Geneva. We however know much less about the Turkish Foyers in Switzerland and the role the Ottoman diaspora played during and after WWI for the future of the Ottoman Empire. Surely, neither the Young Turk nor the Kemalist revolution were directly prepared in Switzerland as it was the case for the Russian revolution. In this paper, I want to give an overview of Turkey's élite diaspora in Geneva and Lausanne. I will try to understand those coming, going and acting, point out the actors' networks and mindmaps, and focus upon the events in the shadow of later national myths. Analysing the little Helvetic arena will help us explaining the change from the Fin de siècle to the aftermath of WWI,

With Chaim Weizmann, lecturer at the University of Geneva (later president of the state of Israel) as their president, the Zionist Society in Geneva was particularly active at the turn of the century, staying in opposition to the revolutionary socialists. See Weizmann, 1951, 89-145.

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and the specific role Western-trained new elites played in it. It sheds light upon a decisive period of intellectual history and history of intellectuals.

The Young Ottoman and Young Turkish opposition in Geneva Prominent Young Ottomans like Ziya Pasha, Namik Kemal, Hiiseyin Vasfi Pasha and Ali Suavi temporarily found exile in Switzerland. Inkilâp (Revolution), Ulûm (Sciences) and Hurriyet (Freedom) —all meaningful titles— were among the first oppositional newspapers published in Geneva beginning in 1868 (Gôçmen, 1995, 65-66). According to the Federal Archives in Bern first diplomatic troubles began only a decade later when in 1880-81 the Freemason Ali Çevkatî published his lstikbal (Future) in Geneva.1 It is striking to what extent we find recurrent ideas in lstikbal which 20 years later became the main themes of the Young Turks : Abdulhamid is seen as enemy number one and despotic; the Ottoman nation and Muslim religion is going to be annihilated while the "nation" is sleeping; thus awakening and liberating action is needed. In secret, lstikbal was intensively read by the students of the Constantinopolitan Military School for Medecine, where in 1889 the Committee Union and Progress was founded. Young Ottoman and similar activities before 1890 were the work of individuals. Only after 1895 can we begin to speak about a politically active Ottoman diaspora open to group dynamics. Since the 1870s there were some Ottoman students in Zurich and Geneva, but a small number and mostly Ottoman Greeks (Rumlar), Armenians or Jews. In the list of students in Geneva in 1897 we find nine Turkish-speaking Muslim Ottomans, among them seven active Young Turks, namely Mustafa Ragip (Faculté des Sciences), Tunali Hilmi (Facultés des Lettres et des Sciences Sociales), Halil Muvaffak (Faculté de Droit), and Nuri Ahmed, Akil Muhtar, Ahmed Seraceddin und Abdullah Cevdet in the Faculté de Médecine. Beside these students, there were about twenty other active Young Turks then in the town, among them Ishak Siikûti, Midhat §iikrii Bleda and Mizanci Murad.2 The first diaspora in Geneva of the second half of the 1890s was a young, vulnerable and open one. It clearly won the sympathy of the Geneva public and the press. It enjoyed the important concrete support of some Swiss personalities. The locally well-known socialist member of the Geneva cantonal parliament Jean Albert Karlen, aged fifty, in a certain sense adopted 1

2

BAr E 21 13887.

See Liste des Autorités, Professeurs, University, and Gôçmen, 1995, 124.

Etudiants et Auditeurs, published each semester by the

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these young students. As an engraver he could help them in producing their papers. He also gave his name for the official press register. So from 1896 to 1900 we find Karlen officially responsible of Me§veret, Mizan, Beberuhi and Osmanli.1 Another important collaborator in those years was Dr Edmond Lardy. From 1889 to 1897 this young doctor from Neuchatel in Switzerland had been the surgeon in chief of the French Hospital in Istanbul. He was content with his career and life there, instead of "eating dry bread in Switzerland", as he wrote in a letter to his mother, but the "terrible crises", among them the antiArmenian pogrom in the capital of August 1896, deeply affected him. 2 After a medical commission in the Turco-Greek war he returned and opened a medical practice in Geneva in 1898. Alongside writing pro-Young Turkish articles for the Swiss press he devoted himself to the Osmanli by supervising its French edition and by translating articles from Turkish into French. 3 It is ironical to say that Miinir Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, who desperately worked for the containment of the Young Turkish activities in Switzerland, always had to bring his problems before Charles Edouard Lardy, the Swiss legate in Paris and brother of Edmond Lardy. 4 1 will not deal with diplomatic issues here but just say that Swiss authorities did not take the Young Turkish rhetorics of tyrannicide seriously. They tried to appease Miinir Pasha and Karatheodory Pasha (ambassador in Brussels), before they met with important joint pressure from Germany and Turkey in 1899. Edmond Lardy, a sympathizer of Ali Riza, had a quite idealistic liberal view of his Young Turkish fellows, which probably more or less corresponded to what he saw in his acquaintances in the town. But there already existed a splitting up into different groups, among them the important group of radical activists, using strong Islamist rhetorics led by Tunah Hilmi, Ishak Siikuti and Ahmed Nuri. The way Lardy described the Young Turks to the Swiss authorities, when he was interrogated after an incident with agents of the newly established Ottoman consul in Geneva, 5 shows that probably he did not fully know of the pamphlets the radicals published in Ottoman. Anyway, we see him clearly in the other camp, close to Mahmud Pasha and his sons, Johann Albert Karlen, born 1850, from Boltigen (Bern), graveur in Geneva. See the report of the Public Prosecutor, Bemerkungen über das bisherige Treiben der Jungtürken in Genf, 3 0 October 1899, BAr E 21 14249, vol. 1. See also the official press register of Geneva at the Chancellerie d'Etat. 2

BAr I. 139, 1974/77, Bd. 55. Cf. also his letter to his brother Charles Edouard Lardy of 25 February 1893. 3

4

BAr E 21 14249, vol. 1 ; Terrier, 2001 ; Kuran, 2000, 119.

See for example the dossier of Charles Edouard Lardy, Paris, of 11 April 1899, with several documents on blackmail by Young Turks, BAr E 2 1 , 1 4 2 4 8 . 5

Police interrogation of 3 October 1899, BAr E 2 1 , 1 4 2 4 8 .

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who arrived in Geneva in March 1900. He got in contact with them through Jacques Charlier, native of Geneva, who was a teacher of Sabahaddin and private secretary of Mahmud. 1 The Ottoman Muslim diaspora of the end of the 19th century was highly fragile and diverse. The young men leaving their country in a rush often had no clear perspective not even in the short term. Lacking a solidly installed network of friends or hemgeri, integration in the town and at the university was difficult. The academically successful Akil Muhtar, who finally became a lecturer at the university, was an exception. 2 Despite the superWesternization of Constantinopolitans, to take a meaningful word of §erif Mardin, they experienced several cultural shocks and confusions, when they first arrived, for example in the daily coexistence with the other sex, be that at the university or in lodgings without segregation. Especially the emancipated female students from Eastern Europe behaved very differently to what they knew. Ali Kemal (1985, 90-91) nicely described this in Omriim. Mustafa Refik and Tunali Hilmi were among the first to marry Swiss women, but Ottoman Armenians preceded them. 3 The Genevans and even the police saw these Turks as quiet and well behaved. Surely, they could not look into their minds and were not able to read what they published for the Ottoman public. In a report to the Federal Prosecutor in April 1899, the Genevan police described the Armenian committee as more militant and, due to the recent pogroms, more ready to take revenge. 4 The center of the revolutionary Armenians was chemin de la Roseraie, close to the rue de Carouge. But from the beginning there was a significant distance between the Armenian and the Ottoman Turkish diaspora. Mainly from the Caucasus and since the 1880s solidly established in the town and university of Geneva, where in 1887 they founded the Hntshak party, the Armenians were intimate with the Russian revolutionary theories and movements. Compared to the Young Turks they were professionals, also in the field of publication. Since 1891 they published their monthly Droshak in Geneva and an important number of Armenian books an booklets appeared

* See the report of the Department of Justice and Police, Geneva, of 31 March 1900, E 21 14250 ; Kuran, 2000, 87-88 ; Hanioglu, 1995, 143-48, and the notice of Ahmed Celâleddin Pagas quoted on p. 159. Cf. also a few letters of Edmond Lardy of the first half of 1900 (private archive). 2 See Programme des Cours de l'Université de Genève, published annually. 3

Report of Public Prosecutor, 7 April 1899, BAr E 2 1 , 14248 ; Türk Ansiklopedisi, Ankara : Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1982, 492-93 ; Osmanhlar Ansiklopedisi, Istanbul : YKY, 1999, vol. 1, 565. 4

10 April 1899, BAr E21 14248.

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there in late Ottoman times (A. Ter Minassian, 1999 ; T. Ter Minassian, 1999). Despite different attempts, cordial relationships did only exist on an individual basis, never collectively and politically. There were several reasons why the Armenian and Young Turkish oppositionals missed their chance of finding a trustful consensus between them in the small arena of the diaspora. One was mistrust and contempt from the Armenian side. But this was linked to what probably was the main reason : the lack of a clear, positive political program of the Young Turks and thus the impossibility of a solid agreement on principles. Defending himself against the accusation of non-cooperation, an Armenian stated in the Gazette de Lausanne of 31 May 1901 that there was no credible program of how to change the State in order to reach social justice and security, the two most vital points for the Armenians. He argued that the main motivation of the Young Turks was to deprive Abdulhamid of power, reconsolidate the State and ensure their own places in it. He was not so wrong. For the Armenians, but also for an important part of the Swiss and international public the touchstone was the position vis-à-vis the Armenian massacres in 1895-96. These large-scale pogroms were like thunderbolts from a distance in the long, feverish, but internally peaceful European Belle Epoque. They were the strongest and closest among other thunderbolts like the German massmurder of the Hereros or the Belgian massacres in Congo. People from different religious backgrounds, liberals, socialists and freemasons, participated in the protest movement of 1896. This contributed to the establishment of a broad international civil movement for human rights. It should not be forgotten that the core of those supporting these first broad protests did this in the name of human rights and that they were at the same time deeply critical of imperialism. Those in Switzerland who supported the Young Turkish opposition, even when the question of expulsions was raised, were the same who had participated at the forefront of the humanitarian mobilization for the Armenians in 1896. A good example is the pacifist Swiss deputy Albert Gobat, member of the liberal party, but sympathetic of socialist ideas. In September 1896, just after the pogroms in the capital, he had been in Istanbul and had written a bitter article for the Genevan newspaper Le Genevois, of 31 September 1896, against the international power system and the Ottoman State. On 19 June 1901 the same man pleaded in the National Assembly in Bern for secure asylum for the Young Turks in Switzerland and attacked the President of the Confederation for wanting to cooperate with the secret services of the Sultan. As general secretary of the international

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interparlamentarian Union for Peace, an important organization for the preparation of the Hague Conference in 1899, Gobat won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1902.1 Against this background, the statements of the Young Turks in exile on the Armenian topic were of enormous moral and political weight. If however we look carefully at their statements, we see a lot of ambivalence. While we can find shame and consternation even in some of their Ottoman texts, the topic itself did not much concern them. The most important statements were made up for the European public. One good example is the German supplement to the Osmanli in February 1900 that contains a long article on the massmurder. 2 But by putting all the blame on the sultan it completely lacks a social and political understanding of the pogroms. What mostly concerned the majority of these young elites was the future of Ottoman and Islamic power and their own places in it, not the dysfuntions at the bottom of their society. For them, the Diabolus ex machina was Abdulhamid. Again and again they imagined in texts and caricatures his violent removal that was supposed to make everything better. Caricatures and texts made in Geneva and elsewhere are obsessed by the idée fixe of a sultan devil, mentally ill and sexually pervert, responsible for the whole Ottoman despair. This restricted perception has to do with radicalization through the hermetic dynamics of the diaspora. The use of medical metaphors in describing the enemy number one would deserve special attention. An article of Osmanli in June 1898 for example calls the sultan a "pathogene, toxic and bacillus of the Ottoman social organism". The pre-occupation with the Empire's losing power and territory also is a recurrent theme of the caricatures. Despite ongoing activities after 1901 Geneva was then no more the decisive CUP-center in Europe. It is true that Abdullah Cevdet and Ethem RuhT continued until 1904, when Cevdet was expelled by a decision of the Federal Governement. 3 It was not this tireless thinker or his equals, but pragmatists like Dr. Bahaeddin §akir and Dr. Nazim who reorganized the CUP and, together with young officers like Enver and officials like Talat, took power in the Empire after 1908. Not Geneva, but Paris, Salonica and Constantinople were then the centers of activity.

' BAr E 21 14250; Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, internet edition, www.dhs.ch. Cf. Kieset, 1999 b, 144. 2 For the Federal Prosecutor's collection of Young Turkish journals produced in Geneva see BAr E 21 14249. 3 See BAr E 2001 (B), vol. 38 ; Hanioglu, 1982.

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The Turkish Foyers in French-speaking Switzerland The Young Turks in Geneva at the Fin de siècle had been young people on the search. Not all of course shared the same feeling of despair and need for political delivery. Some went to Europe for fun, out of curiosity and because it was à la mode to go there and to be more or less oppositional. Not a few, by the way, were in opposition in order to extort money or posts from the Palace. However, my general impression is that the Young Turks at the Fin de siècle were people on the search. Some twelve years later, the picture is different : They found! Even if not exactly what they had been looking for. If we take seriously this difference, I think we can better understand why Turkish nationalism until today is such a very strong feature. Those activists now in the diaspora were Turkists declaring that they knew what they were heading for : a social revolution in Turkist terms and Turan as last, quasi —secularly— religious reference of their idealism, meflcûrecilik (I use "Turkism" here as synonym of Turkish ethno-nationalism of which Panturkism or Panturanism is the maximalist and irredentist version). In the Turkish Foyers (Turk Yurdu) they proudly declared, as we can read in the protocoles 1 of the Lausanne Türk Yurdu and in their publications, to know who they were, where to go and what to do. Meanwhile, since the turn of the century, the number of Ottoman students had successively grown in Geneva as well as in Lausanne, to a lesser extent also in other Swiss universities. Despite their concern for politics and society, medecine, science and law always remained their prefered studies. This is an important fact. On the eve of Worl War I, there were in total about 300 university students from the Ottoman Empire (without Egypt), among them 31 state scholarship holders. Most of these latter were probably Muslims, but not of the whole number. I have checked the situation for 1915-16 in Lausanne. Judging by the names of the 77 students registered at the university as being from Turkey, 50 were Armenians or Greeks, six Jews and 21 Turkish speaking Muslims, 14 of them from Istanbul. 2 Compared to the 1890s, most of these Turks now lived in a closed circle and had relatively little interaction with other non-Muslim groups from the East and with Swiss people. They were tightly organized in the Türk Yurdu, founded in 1911. The Turkish Foyers in Europe were founded Lozan Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti'nin Muharrerat ve Zabt-i Sabik Defteri), archive of the Turkish Historical Society, Ankara (Y 653). I very much thank Dr. Munir Dedeoglu for providing me with many transcriptions from this manuscript. See Université de Genève, Liste des autorités, professeurs, étudiants et auditeurs, semestrially; Liste des étudiants de l'Université de Lausanne, by semester, and Kreiser, 1996, 34.

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synchronically and based on the same principles like the Turkish Foyers or Hearths (Turk Ocagi) in Istanbul and Asia Minor, without depending on them in terms of organisation (Sannay, 1994, 107-127). In this very formative club, the limits and rules were clear. The membership depended on a Turkish father. The Yurdcular Yasasi, established in Petit-Lancy near Geneva in March 1913, stated that exceptional membership was open to those, "whose feelings, opinions, ideas and wishes did not permit any doubt that they were Turks." 1 The rules of the Foyer members demanded a strict discipline concerning the regularity of meetings, participation in them, behaviour of the members and their contributions to the Foyer. Not only with regard to group discipline, but also to their aims, the Turkish Foyers differed from the Young Turks in the 1890s. As Dr Cevdet Nasuhoglu, then the president of the Foyer in Geneva, put it during the conference in Petit-Lancy in March 1913 : "It is our duty to ensure a prosperous future for the Turkish race, it is our duty to take revenge for the losses our nation suffered." 2 The objectives regarding the future of the Turks and not, as twenty years ago, of the Ottoman Empire, was to be reached by Turkist "social revolution" notably through education - igtimai inkilap is a key term of the Yurdcular. Another key element already present in the protocols of the Lausanne Turk Yurdu is secularization. Linked to the longing for a "new society" is the recurrent wish for female education. But the emotionally postulated and highly idealized new and revolutionary role of women was not put in concrete terms. Thus it did not so much mean individual emancipation than enabling women and mothers to be efficient transmitters of "national" culture and productive members of the imagined new "national society".3 Switzerland was seen as ideal country for education (tahsil beldesi), especially for women. The president of the Society for Education in Switzerland (isvigre'de Tahsil Cemiyeti) H. Vasif described, in an article for the journal Kadinlar Dunyasi, the qualified schools, the affordable prices and, last but not least, the good discipline in the boardinghouses that in his eyes made Switzerland an ideal place for girl students ((Jakir, 1994, 259). In the same journal girls of well-to-do parents were incited to study in Europe by dramatically saying : "Go to the Occident. There learn knowledge and sciences and bring it back with you. If you do not do so, our motherland will die, we ^ Yurdcular Yasasi, article 9, p. 5.

2

.

Yurdcular Yasasi. Isvigre'de Cenevre §ehrine yakin Petit-Lancy Koyiinde Pension Racine*de kurulan Ikinci Yurdcular Dernegi'nin muzakerat ve mukerrerati, Istanbul: Yeni Turan Matbaasi, no date [1914], p. 19. Cf. Cenevre'de tahsil, Istanbul: Meziyet-i iktisadiye matbaasi, 1328 [1912], p. 11. Thanks to Prof. Klaus Kreiser who sent me a copy.

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will die, Islam and Turkdom will die, all will die. It will be trodden under the feet of the Occident. It already is being trodden upon." (£akir, 1994,260). We find similar rhetorics and the same appeal in a brochure of the Geneva Tiirk Yurdu, intitled Cenevre'de Tahsil. They well express the mentality, wishes and fears of the new academic Turkish élite at the eve of World War I, after the beginning of the Balkan wars. Despite a few female members, the microcosm of the Yurdcular like that of the Young Turks was highly masculine. Yusuf Kemal [Tengirgek] attended the conference in Petit-Lancy and later wrote in his book Vat an hizmetinde : "We made different agreements, which enforced our sentiment of Turkishness, saying that we would not marry a non-Turkish girl [what difference to the 1890s!] and that, if necessary, we would kill those hampering our work for progress or hindering the Turkish girls in going to school." 1 On the same pages Tengir§ek rigthly wrote that the Balkan wars were the birth of Turkish nationalism among the students in Europe, due to regrettable frictions between Turkish and non-Turkish students. 89 members, among them six women (three of them described as holders of a state scholarship), are registered in the Lausanne Tiirk Yurdu'& book of members. For 28 the subject is mentioned. At the top of the list is chemistry (7 mentions), followed by engineering (4), then medecine and law (each 3). Nearly two thirds of the entries (18) concern natural and technical sciences (including aviation, electricity, agriculture and ceramics), only 10 entries concern "soft subjects" like social and political sciences, pedagogy, literature and arts.2 These proportions well reflect those of the whole Turkish university diaspora in Switzerland. Thus it is important to note that a community mostly educated in natural and technical sciences devoted itself mostly to social and political questions. The same, by the way, was the case in the Russian and Balkan diasporas. The Yurdcular in Lausanne organized dozens of conferences and discussions, the big majority of them dealing with historical and social topics like "national progress", "nationalism", "Turkism", "caliphate", "Russian Revolution", "prostitution", "marriage and divorce", and "organization of our duty". 3 On the whole, the nationalist diaspora after 1912 lived in closed and well organized circles, happy with itself. It seems to have had less contacts with Swiss people than the Young Turks at the turn of the century. However 1

Tengirgek, 1967, 124. Thanks to Prof. Klaus Kreiser, Bamberg, who sent me a copy.

See the list of members of the Foyer ture of Lausanne (Tiirk Yurtlan archives of the Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, Signatur : Y. 654.

Uye Kayit

Defteri),

3 See the list established according to the data in the protocol in §ahingoz, 1997, 49-52. The problem of this descriptive article are the unreliable quotations taken from the protocols.

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there were some interactions, especially linked to the efforts since 1918 to promote the Turkish cause before the Swiss and European public. At the end of 1918 for example they organized a conference on how Turkey could recover. A few Swiss people also were in attendance at the conference. Louis Rambert's son gave a talk.1 The Foyers distinguished themselves from the politically engaged generation in the 1890s by stating that the Turkish Foyers should not deal with politics, but precisely with igtimdi inkilap ("social revolution"). 2 It is true that before 1918 they rarely delt with daily politics. To a certain degree they were above all social centers for Turkish academics abroad. But after 1918 the Foyers most actively delt with politics, and of course from the beginning played an important role within a holistic political setting. If the Young Turkish diaspora in the 1890s gravitated around the Hamidian power center, in a very negative way, the largely autonomous Turkist élite diaspora of the 1910s gravitated around the CUP-power center, but repeatedly assured the party leaders of their full loyalty. Some important Foyer members were, however, directly linked to the CUP. §ukrii Saragoglu for example had worked for the CUP in Izmir, where Celai Bayar was its General Secretary. He must have known the CUPorganized terror against, and expulsion of, the Aegean Rumlar in spring 1914 (so openly described in Bayar's Ben de yazdim). Thanks to a scholarship from the vilayet —where CUP-member Rahmi Bey, Mithad §iikru's brother-inlaw, was governor— this young man from a poor family could come to study political sciences in Geneva in Mayl915 (£ankaya, 1968-69, IV, 1226-41 ; Bayar, 1965-67, V, 1568-82). The German secret service in Switzerland was right in stating that §ukrii, president of the Foyer ture in Geneva, "represents the interests of the Young Turkish government and the members of the Committee Union and Progress, without showing this openly." 3 There were important mental images and discursive features common to the Fin de sièce-generation and the 1910s-generation of the Swiss diaspora of Turkish-speaking Muslims. Both believed in their vocation as elitist saviours of a not yet awakened nation, be it the millet-i Osmaniye, de facto reduced to the Muslims, or the Tiirk milleti. Both believed that their nation was the greatest victim of contemporary history that not only suffered tremendous 1 Louis Rambert's son Maurice (1866-1941) had been at important posts in the Ottoman capital ; in 1916 he settled down in Geneva (see Biographisches Lexikon verstorbener Schweizer, vol. II, Zürich 1948, p. 159) ; "Lozan Türk Yurdunun 1918-1919 Mayis Tatil devresi zarfmda ayinladigi iglcrin Raporu", manuscript in the book of protocols.

3

Yurdcular Yasasi, p. 9, article 22.

11 May 1918, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (=PAAA) in Berlin, R 21280, 12728.

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losses of power and territory but was threatened by annihilation in the near future. Both cultivated a categorical feindbild and declared to take revenge on those whom they saw responsible for the losses. In the 1890s the traitor and inner enemy number one was Abdulhamid, in the 1910s the Rumlar and the Armenians gradually took over this mental position. Both generations shared a social-darwinist conception of a secular apocalypse presently taking place. For both nature —in the scientific, positivist sense of the 19th century— and its so-called iron laws represented an absolute reference for human society. In their political language organicist métaphores had an important place. For both, state, nation and religion were unseperable entities, thus giving a very unclear meaning to the recurrent rhetorics of annihilation. Primarily they meant loss of political power and territories, sometimes they also pointed to the misery and deaths of the Muslim refugees in the Caucasus and the Balkan. Even if for Young Turkish activists Islamist rhetorics had been very important, and they often appealed to the public in their pamphlets by saying "ey miisulmanlar", for them Islam was a Muslim ethnicity, not a religious confession to the Coranic revelation. Their socialisation and the strong group dynamics in the Military School of Medecine in Constantinople (Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Askeriye) for example had made them loose their traditional faith. It is not surprising that young Young Turks of Geneva, the former Askerî Tibbiyeli Tunali Hilmi and Akil Muhtar, were declared Turkists a dozen years later, thus filling their metaphysical gab with a secular creed. For the Turkish ethno-nationalists Islam remained highly important, but only as an "ethnic" element of their national identity. The change to an ethno-nationalist stance was groundbreaking. Nationalism took the place of religion. In Petit-Lancy in March 1913 Nasuhoglu explicitly called the movement of the Foyers, Yurdculuk —taken as synonym for Turkish nationalism— a "social and national religion" to which the racial brothers (soy kardegleri) converted (ihtida etmek)} But this did not at all mean, for example, that the Foyer members did without celebrating the Feast of the Sacrifice together. On the contrary, this helped them cultivate their distinguished Turkishness in non-Muslim surroundings. What today we see as dangerous ingredients of a strong and exclusive nationalism was a widespread phenomenon in the first half of the 20 th century. Anti-universalist nationalism linked with ethnic references and right-wing progressism was a strong paradigm for disoriented societies between Fin de siècle and World War II. It would be wrong to imagine the Foyer members as people of extremist behaviour. Good manners, discipline, solidarity and an elevated language prevailed in these clubs mostly composed of serious, hard' Yurdcular Yasasi,

pp. 18-19.

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working students. The little world of these "idealists" (mefkûreci), as they called themselves, was quite ideal in and around the Foyers. There was no unpleasant quarreling within, as far as I know. They were so tactful as to write a letter of condolence to Louis Rambert's son, when his father died. 1 The Yurdcular did not create diplomatic problems like the Young Turks. They did not use insulting language, at least not in the direct manner of the Young Turks in opposition. We only understand that something was also wrong with them if, on the one hand, we analyse their Weltanschauung from a humanist standpoint and, on the other hand, look at the microcosm's links with the macrocosm. In the early summer 1916, for example, when the destruction of the Armenians in Asia Minor was completed —a topic which the French-speaking Swiss press covered in detail thanks to their own direct channels—, they published a manifest, which appealed to the Tiirkler, declaring the general victimization of the Turks in the last decades and congratulating the governement on its successful war efforts.2

The Ottoman diaspora in Switzerland during WWI and its aftermath Switzerland was crawling with all sorts of people during WWI. An interesting, almost forgotten part were the "Orientals", as people from the Near East, Middle East and the Arab countries were called. Nearly 1100 Ottomans regularly resided in the cantons of Geneva and Vaud in 1917. The percentage of those who could be admitted as "Turks" to the Foyers was, however, not more than about 15 percent of this number. Only for Geneva do we have to add a high number of at least one thousand Ottomans living there provisionally, judging by the numbers of people staying in hotels (the corresponding list includes people from the Balkans, Greece and the Ottoman Empire; the number for 1914 is 2463). In 1918 the Ottomans regularly residing in Geneva numbered 816 people, this was nearly double the number of 1913 (439). 3 The increase in 1914 is due to the fact that many Ottomans living in Europe fled to neutral Switzerland. An additional reason for the increase, also during the war, is that this country constituted the most important platform in Europe not only for asylum, but also for information gathering and espionage. At that time the Germans, French, British and 1

2

Protocol of the 85th session, 25 Kanun-u Sani 1919. Partly published in the journal Turk Yurdu, 13 July 1916.

See the annual Rapports sur la gestion du Conseil d'Etat du Canton de Genève and "Liste des ressortissant ottomans résidants dans le Canton de Vaud", 15 August 1917, Archives Cantonales Vaudoises.

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Ottomans established very active secret service branches in Switzerland —their archives provide fascinating insights. It was a small but highly complex and dynamic arena not only of warmongers, spies and intrigants, but also of honest peace-searchers, pacifists and anti-nationalists. In his diaries Louis Rambert —another interesting personality between Turkey and Switzerland— gives us some insights into the Ottoman diaspora in 1915. At the turn of the century, Rambert had been in charge of the Ottoman Bank's branch in Constantinople. Afterwards he was appointed director of the Régie des Tabacs, a post he held until his death, 80 years old, in Constantinople in 1919 (David, 1994). For short times during the war he was back at his home in Montreux near Lausanne. He was surprised to meet many of his acquaintances from the Ottoman capital there in 1915. Many visited him, for example the Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, Izzet Holo Pasha, former secretary of Abdulhamid, and Cavid Bey, former minister of finance and active member of the CUP's central committee during the War. 1 Coming from Berlin to Geneva, Cavid told Rambert on 4 April 1915 that there was no panic in the capital despite the expected landing of the allies at Gallipoli and that the State was firmly governed by Talat. Other visitors in May, June and July, when the attack had begun, confirmed this. The protocols of the Lausanne Turk Yurdu corroberate the impression that for a very long time the Ottoman elites in the diaspora had full confidence in the military outcome of the conflict. They pushed the dark sides of the war aside. According to his conversation with Rambert, even Cavid, who had been against the Ottoman entry into the war, shared this confidence. According to his diary the old man replied to him that he still believed that the Ottoman decision was a capital mistake and that the Empire would have won a lot by staying neutral. The Ottoman diaspora in Switzerland during WWI was heterogenous, also among the Turkish-speaking Muslims. The main difference was between pro- and anti-Ittihadists, thus mainly between supporters and opponents of the Ottoman participation in the war. The main heads of the liberal opposition were all in Switzerland : Prince Sabahaddin, Ahmed Re§id Pasha, Liitfi Fikri Bey and Kemal Midhat Bey, a grandchild of Midhat Pasha. Completely different anti-Unionists like Siileyman Nazif and Dr Riza Nur, but also prominent Ittihadists like Cavid Bey and, after the war, Talat and Cemal Pasha were sporadically present. The liberal opposition worked for a separate peace, but without sufficient backing. Contrary to the ruling leaders in Turkey it saw war as a human and national catastrophe, not as a salutary event. 1

Diaiy of Louis Rambert, April-September 1915, Musée du Vieux Montreux, Switzerland.

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Agents of the war regime like Mehmed Ali Tevfik gave speeches and published books or articles in which they glorified the Turkish war effort. Tevfik Bey's book published in Bern especially emphasized the success of the economical nationalization equaling de-christianization (Mehmed Ali Tewfik, 1918). This employee of the foreign ministry figures on a group photo of the Geneva Türk Yurdu taken during the War, one proof more of the loose, but extensive interconnection of the diaspora Foyers and the Ittihadist state (Kuran, 1956, 679). He had also ties with the Türk Ocagi ("Turkish Hearth") in Istanbul (Landau, 1995, 33-34, 41, 44). The Egyptian nationalist leader in exile Mohammed Farid described him this way : "This young man is one of the extremist Turks. He is the chief editor of the Turkish newspaper Le Croissant [Hilal], which is put out by the CUP in Istanbul in French. He came to Austria and Germany [and Switzerland!] with an assignment to give speeches about the Turks' origin, conquests, and accomplishments, to glorify their history, to prove that the Germans must be united with them, and other things of that sort." (Muammad Farid, 1992,474. Trefzger, 1970). I suggest to understand what happened in those years in the Turkish diaspora in Switzerland as a generational consensus among the young or a nationalist truce, while in the older generation there remained sharp and fundamental disagreements. This consensus on a nationalist basis exclusively focussed on the future of the Turks and remained more or less silent on the thorny issue of war guilt and war crimes, so important to the liberal oppositionals. In my eyes Ahmed Bedevi is a good example of this consensus. Not-withstanding his admiration and devotion for Sabahaddin Bey, who was a categorical opponent of the Ittihadists and their war politics, he became a member of the Turkish Foyer, an organisation loyal to the war regime (Kuran, 2000). Thus in the small Helvetic arena the younger generation managed relations first with the Ittihadists but also with the opposition. Their generational consensus, tinged with youthful idealism, represented important symbolic capital. For the Ottoman legation it was as easier to have close ties with these young academics as many of them were also holders of a state scholarship. 1 It is true that just after WWI we can find some anti-Unionist rhetoric in the publications of the Türk Yurdu in Switzerland. But this was an alibi born out of their own confusion after the big defeat, as well as cosmetics for the Western public, and did not represent fundamental questions concerning their own recent past.

1

See informations in the Türk Yurtlari Üye Kayit Defteri. Cf. also PAAA, R 21281, p. 61.

308

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In addition to the Turkish Foyers, the younger generation was able to found new societies. During WWI it established a society called Isviçre Türk Gençleri Cemiyeti (Society for Turkish Young People in Switzerland). It comprised young academics, mostly Foyer members. At the University of Lausanne it opened a section of the students society Turquía. In 1919 mainly Foyer members also founded the Turk Menfaatlarim Koruma Cemiyeti (Society for the Protection of Turkish Interests) and in 1920 the Bureau Permanent du Congrès Turc de Lausanne. Its president was Haroun Alitché, a member of the Lausanne Turk Yurdu.1 When the armed "National Struggle", Millî Mücadele, began in Asia Minor in 1919, the owerwhelming Turkish —not Ottoman !— academic diaspora in Switzerland formed a quite compact, well organized and motivated bloc. Its strong ties with the Ittihadists, also after the armistice in October 1918, and the backing by the State —with a short interruption during the governement of Ferid Pasha, when Reshad Halis was legate in Bern— made it a powerful milieu for nationalist interaction in a decisive period for effective propaganda towards the West. This is true long before 15 May 1919, the date of the Greek invasion of Izmir, which contributed to the large nationalist consensus. Excluded from it were only some liberals who could not, or not fully, approve of the "national war". The messages which Prince Sabahaddin and Ahmed Regid [Rey] tried to give in 1918-19 —Regid Bey in his book published in Geneva in 1918— were truthful in their balancing between nationalism, anti-imperialism and universal values, but politically ineffective because they were too complex compared with the strong and coherent nationalist language.2 It is important to emphasize the role of some personalities, sent to Switzerland in 1918 or being already there, for the establishment of the nationalist consensus against the allies at the end of the war. We already mentioned Mehmed Ali Tevfik. Ahmed Cevdet [Oran], journalist and owner of the newspaper Ikdam, had settled in Lausanne several years ago, after his rupture with the CUP. But during the War he gradually became the regime's mouthpiece. On 6 May 1915 the Journal de Genève learnt that he published articles in Istanbul against the Swiss press, which he considered to be too critical of Ottoman politics. He appealed that the Swiss residents in Turkey should be expelled and Swiss goods boycotted. "Seemingly hostile to the CUP", but behind the scenes working for it, the Federal police's file on * Kuran, 2000, 441, 447 ; Archives cantonales vaudoises, Inspecteur Pousaz' report of 12 July 1922, S 112/88/5 : 320 and S 112/88/2 : 92. Ahmed Réchid, 1918 ; Sabahaddin's Vicdan-i Milltye Bir Hitap, reproduced in Ege, Nezahet Nurettin, Prens Sabahaddin. Hayah ve ìlmì MUdafaalari, Istanbul : Fakiilteler Matbaasi, 1977, 399-412.

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Ahmed Cevdet concluded. 1 According to a report of the Geneva police of 16 January 1919, he arrived in the town with the special mission of politically organizing the Turkish students there. For this he had the large sum of 100 000 Swiss francs at his disposal. 2 I am not sure if the Foyer members saw a lot of this money. In 1919 and 1920 they published six booklets in French, but partly financed the printing themselves by collecting money in the Turkish community. 3 In contrast to the state agents who always resided in luxury hotels, many Foyer members lived very modestly. The most important actor in those months between autumn 1918 and spring 1919 certainly was Kara Schemsi, alias Re§id Safvet [Atabinen], The report of 16 January mentions him as directly implicated in the propaganda spread among the students. We also find him often mentioned in the protocols of the Lausanne Ttirk Yurdu. In his months in Switzerland this relatively young diplomat, confidant of Talat since 1913 and collaborator of Cavid during World War I, published at least six books and booklets in fine French, three of them dealing with the Armenian question. It is true that in his first publication of automn 1918, entitled Les Turcs et la question d'Arménie, he condemns, I quote, the "crimes of our authorities", accuses "the radical Unionists" and their "terrorist agents" of massacres, and calls for an impartial investigation by members of neutral states. 4 But in the same book he also says that compared with the sufferings of the Turks since the 18th century and especially during the Balkan wars, I quote,"the massacres of the Armenians [...] are a joke" (Kara-Schemsi, 1919 a, 2). By attacking Henry Morgenthau and André Mandelstam in an antisemitic manner, he, the diplomat, lost his composure (Kara-Schemsi, 1919 d, 21-22). Moreover this Constantinopolitan bourgeois and damat (son-in-law) of the Ottoman Palace felt no scrupule presenting himself in Bern in February 1919 as representative of the Turks in Europe at the International Socialist Congress and, in March 1919, again in Bern, in the name of the Muslim world at the International Conference for the League of Nations (KaraSchemsi, 1919 b ; 1919 c). He had personally known Mustafa Kemal since 1915 and was appointed by him as general secretary of the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne conference in 1922. Later he became a deputy and member of the Turkish Historical Society. Re§id Safvet is a perfect example of a state employee and publicist who managed his place in the sun from Abdulhamid to

1

BAr E 21,10557, cf. also E 2001 (B), vol. 5a, A.43.8, and PAAA R 21281, p. 150.

2

B A r E 2 1 , 10557. 3 "Lozan Turk Yurdunun 1918-1919 Mayis tatil devresi zarfinda yayinladigi ijlerin raporu", manuscript in the book of protocols. 4

Kara-Schemsi (pseudonym for Re§id Safvet), 1918 a, 4, 8, 10-11.

310

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FOR

BELONGING

Mustafa Kemal. He succeeded in influencing the minds of almost the whole young intelligentsia in Switzerland at a decisive historical turning-point.1 In 1919 the activists once again and more than ever used the rhetorics of victimization and impending annihilation of the Turkish nation. In his book L'extermination des Turcs of January 1919 for example, Re§id Safvet dramatically declared that ten million Turks were on the way to being exterminated by the allies. 2 By saying this, he excluded all serious consideration of other suffering ; moreover, he called those accusing Turkey of having exterminated the Armenians criminal and racist. Barely proclaimed, he suppressed his own claim of an international inquiry of that crime. In Safved's L'extermination des Turcs, published in Geneva, we find a calculated confusion of historical categories, and an inflation of terms like extermination, annihilation, murder, crusade and exclusion —all in order to demonstrate the supreme victimisation of the Turks. Far from the Eastern provinces and free from religious connotations, the Turkist milieu in Switzerland did not need the Islamist rhetoric of saving the caliphate, used by the nationalist leaders in Anatolia in order to win over the Kurds. For antiRum and anti-Armenian purposes, it interestingly began to write about "Turco-Kurds" and a "Turco-Kurdish race" that demographically dominated Anatolia, its "cradle" (Kieser, forthcoming).

After-effects Contrary to the Muslim nationalism, ideologically used in Asia Minor between 1913 and 1921, the élite diaspora already believed in a secular Turkish nationalism that only after 1923 was to be implemented or, in a way, imported into Anatolia. The most significant act in this sense, the central piece of the "Turkish social revolution", was the adoption of the unchanged Swiss Civil Code in Turkey in 1926 by the minister of Justice Mahmut Esat Bey, the former president of the Lausanne Türk Yurdu. The coercive instead of convincing way in which he undertook its introduction in Turkey deserves attention. In 1925 he proclaimed : "It is the decision of the Turkish Revolution to appropriate the Western civilization without restrictions and compromize. [...] Those opposing against are condamned to be annihilated by

1 Cf. Çankaya, 1968-69, II, 1064-65 ; Giilersoy, Çelik, 1994, 4 - 9 . Thanks to Gottfried Hagen who gave me the references to this article.

2

Kara-Schemsi, 1919 a, 2. Cf. the prompt reaction of the Tribune de Genève, 30 January 1919, to Safvet's brochure : "La propagande jeune-turque en Suisse".

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iron and fire" (Uyar, 2000, 73). Moreover the fervor for secular civilization of the former Foyer president was tinged with racism, e.g. against the Kurds. 1 After the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish Foyer in Lausanne was closed down on 30 July 1923. It had fulfilled its political mission outside Turkey. The quasi-religious adoration of Turan and Turkdom as well as of the positive sciences, and its full approval of socialdarwinism had been questionable aspects of the Foyer movement. The experience of a democratically organized club and the eagerness for education, also of women, however can be seen as its most important and, on the whole, positive feature. Even if a little minority, the six female members of the Turkish Foyer in Lausanne represented an important progress compared with the purely masculine organizations of the Fin de siècle. Then it would have been unthinkable that a Muslim Turk woman gave a lecture before a group of men as was the case in the foyer. The Turkist desire for female education was indeed revolutionary in the Muslim context, 2 but had a strong ideological bias. Its scope was less individual emancipation than to enable women and mothers to be efficient transmitters of "national" culture and productive members of a modern nation. However it made professional careers of women possible for the first time. The most significant example of a brilliant female career in close dépendance of its masculine architects is Ayge Afetinan (1908-85), the adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, herself a Foyer member in Ankara. With some interruptions she received her high school and academic education in Lausanne and Geneva between 1925 and 1939. Member of the Turkish Historical Society and secretary of her adoptive father, she was the mouthpiece of the Turkish History Thesis, that was imposed on the academic life and text books in the authoritarian Republic in the 1930s. A first historical congress was convocated in July 1932 in order to establish an ethnonationalist historiography. In his opening speech Esat [Sagay], then the minister of education, emphasized the importance of history teaching for the "national culture". Afetinans's own doctoral thesis, elaborated under the auspices of the renowned anthropologist Eugène Pittard of the University of Geneva, originated from the spirit of a thesis declaring Asia-Minor as racially Turkish and the Turkdom as the cradle of civilisation (Afetinan, 1941; 1989, 6-23; Ersanli, 2001). Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1892-1943) is an impressive member of a generation born in the Fin de siècle whose desire of a new order got caught in 1 Cf. Milliyet 19 September 1919. Because of his racism we cannot consider him as a "leftish nationalist" (as Uyar Hakki recently has done).

Cf. Cenevre'de tahsil, p. 11.

312

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BELONGING

the whirl of a violent nationalist and etatist thinking. His ambiguity was that of the whole Foyer movement. Desiring to catch up with the nations renowned as civilized and politically strong, its representatives in the Swiss diaspora had selectively adopted elements of Western culture which they considered as "progressive", even though these elements stood in an unresolvable tension to the ethnonationalist credo. Lacking credibility the protagonists thus continuously resorted to coercion and violence in their political practice. It is not surprising that the Turkish Foyers (or Hearths, Ocaklar) in Anatolia merged into the Republican single party. Neither the Türk Yurdu, this club of academics in Europe, nor the Türk Ocagi, its big brother, had been able to form a fairly indépendant intelligentsia. Since their creation in 1911, especially since the establishment of the single-party regime of the CUP in 1913, they trailed behind the power by spreading nationalism and flattering the rulers. Their wish to create an autonomous intellectual and cultural organization, as stated in the Foyer regulations, was never developed seriously enough, its aims were too conform with the Turkist politics of the rulers. Without resistance they finally were taken up in 1931 by an increasingly totalitarian state (Georgeon, 1982,208-14. Adamr, 2001).

Conclusion In the protocols of the Türk Yurdu in Lausanne we read in June 1918 : "Brothers, from day to day nationalism exercises a stronger influence upon the Turkish world. While yesterday we answered to the question 'What is your nationality' by saying 'I am Muslim', today we do not hesitate to respond by proudly saying 'I am a Turk'." I would suggest that the Turkish Foyers of the Swiss diaspora served to train prospective elites in a modernist, secular Turkish nationalism that, a decade later, was to be adopted in Asia Minor. This seems to be specially true for important political figures of Republican Turkey like Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, president of the Lausanne Türk Yurdu, and Sükrü Saraçoglu, president of the Geneva Türk Yurdu during WWI. But it is equally true for the other Foyer members, among them a great majority that afterwards did not make splendid careers in politics, like for example the author Nurullah Ataç or the professor Siiheyb Derbil. Moiz Cohen Tekinalp was right in saying in 1915 that the Türk Yurdu movement in Europe had "no impact on the masses", but "made hundreds of Turkish students in Europe", the prospective élite, "convinced nationalists" (Alp, 1915, 31). The five years from 1918 to 1922 were the most feverish and productive time of the Turkish nationalist diaspora. Probably there had never been a better equipped and organised political diaspora in Switzerland than the Turkish one in those years. Tank Zafer Tunaya (1952, 377) rightly wrote that after the Mudros armistice the Turkish Foyers launched, I quote, "in the navel

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of Europe a movement for the defense of [national] claims [miidafaa-i hukuk]". What he did not say was that they were largely backed by the state apparatus, professional diplomats and writers of or near to the CUP. It was no accident that the great success of Turkish nationalism on the international diplomatic platform took place in Lausanne 1923. The basis for this had been layed in the dozen years before. What fifty years ago had begun with an Ottoman opposition in exile, crying out for help against despotism, ended in a Turkist honeymoon. Most Foyer members took important professional positions in the new State. An important feature of the new Ottoman elites since the Fin de siècle is that they were over-politicised, i.e. extremely focussed on power, politics, nation and state, and over-Europeanized in the sense that their thinking and acting extremely depended on a certain image of Europe : of European power, know how and Weltanschauung. On the whole they turned to a right-wing paradigm of modernization, by adopting so called "scientific truths" or "natural laws" to society, and by hypostasizing a community through the term of "nation". I suggest here that the diaspora substantially contributed to this development. According to Halide Edib, the "capital soon followed [!] the example" of the Turkish Foyers in Europe (Halide Edip, 1926, 321). Politically and culturally (over-)sensitized élite diasporas were powerful catalysts for modernist changes. Sometimes they radicalized political stances. Their masculine desire to be empire-saviours and nation-builders existed however in a multiple distance : far from their own country, far from the lower classes and far from the reality of the provinces, but greatly desiring to speak for them all. Dynamics in closed diaspora circles, surrounded by equally over-politicised and over-Europeanized students from Eastern Europe and Russia, anticipated processes which in the society on the ground would have taken much longer and which, perhaps, would have taken another direction.

314

A

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BELONGING

ANNEX STATISTICS : STUDENTS FROM OTTOMAN A N D REPUBLICAN TURKEY IN GENEVA A N D LAUSANNE, 1 8 9 2 - 1 9 3 8 Until 1918, all Ottomans, including Christians and Jews, except the Egyptians, were registered as Turks ("Turcs"), even if sometimes there existed confusions. ^ Contrary to those of the University of Geneva, the semestrial lists of students of the Université de Lausanne do not, in its comprehensive table, show the subject studied by each student. Only since 1909/10 the lists of the University of Geneva give in its table the number of female students, given in brackets in the table below. For the time before, only the name is an indicator of the sex. The name itself is also important in indicating the student's origin (Muslim, Christian, Jew, Greek, Armenian, Turk, Arab etc.). The auditeurs, students only attending lectures, are included in the number of students. Their number is also given in square brackets, for example "[8]". I take the figures of the beginning of the winter semesters. Year

Ge.+ Lausanne Geneva Laus. Total Total 4

2 6

1896

9 13

1898 1900 1902 1904 1906 1908 1910 1912

23 21 26 37 58 90 125 132

1892 1894

5 12 18 12 21 38 52 72 70

22 3

[1] [1] [2] [3] [9] [12] [16] [26]

3 (1) [l] 8[2]4 11 (1) [3] 3 14 [1] 16 [4] 20 |4| 38 [8J 53 (1) [5 (1)] 62 (5) [5 (3)]

Sciences

Lettres et Sciences soc.

-

-

1

[1]

2 [1] 1

-

3 3 2 6 6 5

-

[1] [2] [1] [4] [2] (1) [3 (3)]

-

2(1) 1

2

-

4 15 [1] 11 [1]

2

-

4 2 [1]

Droit Médecine

2 1 4 6 9 21 12 9

5 [1] 6 2 3 5 [1] 9 [3] 7 [4] 20 [2] (1) 37 (1) [1]

Edmond Bechara of the University of Lausanne for example figures in the summer semester 1892 as «Arménien», in the winter semester 1892/93 as «Turc» and in the following summer semester as «Ottoman» —evidently, he was an Ottoman Armenian. In the 1880s and 1890s several Ottoman Armenians of the University of Geneva figured as «Arméniens», not «Turcs» (or «Ottomans»). 9 Pantché Hadji-Mischef (Droit), Sadik Méhémet. In the summer semester 1892 there was only Sadik Méhémet at the Faculté de Droit, a Sciences: The Jew Moïse Schalit ; Lettres et Sciences soc. : Joseph Kakabadzé (auditeur, non-Muslim) ; Médecine : Lubitza Koucheva and Arthur Miglievich (non-Muslims). Summer semester 1895. Sciences : The Muslim Ahmed Schükri and the Jew Moïse Schalit ; Lettres et Sciences soc.: The Muslim Mehmed Ersched. 4 Sciences : Georges Coleff, Habile Boustani (auditeur); Droit : Paul-H. Funduklian ; Médecine : Ahmed Nouri, Akil Mouhktar, Moïse Schalit, Ahmed Seradjeddin, Hassan Arif (auditeur). Beside Moïse Schalit these students of medecine are Muslims and Young Turks.

TURKEY'S Year

1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938

Year

ÉLITE D I A S P O R A

Ge.+ Lausanne Geneva Laus. Total Total

IN

SWITZERLAND

315

Lettres et Droit Médecine Sciences soc. Sciences 12 39 [1] 15 (1) [5] 12 [3] 133 1 64 [13] 69 (3) [9] éc. et (2) sociales 25(4) 101 [24] 74 (9) [13 (3)] 23 (2) [4 (1); 7 [4 (1)] 10 [4 (1)] 9 n i 175 4 47 (10) [7 (4)] 13 (1) [3 102 55 [2] 14 (3) 6 (1) [3 10 (1) [1] (3)] (1)] 1 3 3 8(3) 35 17 [1] 3(1) 18 (4) 2 1 1 2 5 3 1 1 6(4) 3(2) 7 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 1 1 4 3 7 2 2 7 9 1 32 (2) 10(2) 5 42 3(1) 1 (1) [1] 1 4 1 6 32 26 (2) 13(2) 4 2 21 3 3(1) 6(1) 1 (1) 5(1) 14 24 (2) 2 37 13 (1) 3(1) 2 25 6 161 1 52 27(1) Total Sciences Lettres Droit Médecine Total et Science s soc. Geneva Ge.+ LauLaus. sanne Sciences

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316

A

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BELONGING

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ÉLITE

DIASPORA

IN

SWITZERLAND

317

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KIESER, Hans-Lukas (1997 b), «Schweiz des Fin de siècle und 'Armenien' : Patriotische Identifikation, Weltbürgertum und Protestantismus in der schweizerischen philarmenischen Bewegung», Armenische Frage, 133— 157.

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LANDAU, Jacob M. (1995), Pan-Turkism. From Irredentism to Cooperation, Bloomington, Indiana University Press. LANDAU, Jakob M. (1984), Tekinalp, Turkish Patriot 1883-1961, Leiden, Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten. LAUT, Jens Peter (2000), Das Türkische als Ursprache ? Sprachwissenschaftliche Theorien in der Zeit des erwachenden türkischen Nationalismus, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz. LEDANTEC, Félix (1906), La Lutte universelle, «être c'est lutter, vivre c'est vaincre», Paris, Flammarion. LEDANTEC, Félix (1912), L'égoïsme base de toute société, Paris, Flammarion. LEDANTEC, Félix (1914), Le lois naturelles. Réflexions d'un biologiste sur les sciences, Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan. LÜTFl FJKRÎ (1991), Lütfi Fikri Bey'in günlügü (The Diary of Lütfi Fikri Bey), Istanbul, Arma. MAIER, Hans (1995), Politische Religionen, Freiburg, Herder. MARDIN, §erif (1962), The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, Princeton University Press. MARDIN, §erif (1974), «Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century», Peter BENEDICT et al. (ed.), Turkey : Geographic and Social Perspectives, Leiden, 403-46.

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13. MACRO ET MICRO HISTOIRE AUTOUR DE LA CONFÉRENCE SUR LE PROCHE-ORIENT TENUE À LAUSANNE EN 1922-23

La signature du Traité de Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 dans le Palais de Rumine fut, selon la perspective adoptée, un jour de gloire ou de deuil, de triomphe ou d'humiliation.* Ses retombées se font toujours sentir dans la ville de Lausanne sous la forme de manifestations presque annuelles de la part de descendants des perdants. La Conférence de Lausanne devint l'influent paradigme pour la solution ethno-nationaliste d'une situation multireligieuse problématique. Elle dessine le nouvel ordre post-ottoman au Proche-Orient, affirmant les clauses du Traité de Sèvres (1920) qui stipulent la création d'un foyer national juif en Palestine, mais modifiant entièrement l'ordre prévu en Asie Mineure. Elle fixe le statut précaire des victimes du Proche-Orient, dépourvues de droits collectifs: Arméniens, Kurdes et Palestiniens dans un système d'Etat-Nations, en partie encore sous mandat.

Interpréter la Conférence de Lausanne Le récit "turquiste" de la Conférence se présente brillant: commandé par le héros Mustafa Kemal (Atatùrk), le jeune mouvement nationaliste, issu d'un Etat ottoman vaincu dans la Grande Guerre, défia dans une "guerre de libération" (1919-1922) les vainqueurs "impérialistes" et remporta dans le territoire réclamé la victoire contre les concurrents minoritaires "traîtres" grecs, arméniens et Kurdes alévis. Il posa ainsi les fondements pour l'homogénéité, la stabilité et le redressement nationaux. C'est à Lausanne qu'il fit approuver ces acquis par l'Occident. Cette optique fut immédiatement reprise par les ethno-nationalistes allemands qui admiraient la construction énergique de la "nouvelle Turquie pour les Turcs" (tel le slogan des turquistes) et la révision du Traité "dictatorial" de Sèvres (1920) qu'avait réussie l'ancien allié. La droite en Italie et en France partageait l'admiration, tandis que la jeune URSS, dans sa cause First published in: Mémoire vive. Pages d'histoire lausannoise, 2004, S. 42-48. - On Turkist diaspora in Switzerland and the Foyer Turc in Lausanne see now my book Vorkämpfer der «neuen Türkei». Revolutionäre Bildungseliten am Genfersee (1870-1939), Zürich: Chronos,

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anti-occidentale, était de connivence avec les kémalistes victorieux. Dès la Guerre froide au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la version kémaliste fit aussi partie du discours des diplomates et des orientalistes américains qui valorisaient ainsi le nouvel allié. Pour les perdants aussi bien que pour les humanitaires internationaux, l'ombre de la Conférence était écrasante. Le Traité acceptait tacitement les faits de guerre: le génocide des Arméniens ottomans, le massacre d'Assyriens ottomans, la déportation de Kurdes ottomans (1915—1916) et l'expulsion des Ottomans gréco-orthodoxes (1914 et 1919—1922), commise au profit de la turquification de l'Anatolie. Le nouveau gouvernement d'Ankara cachait à peine sa naissance au sein du parti jeune-turc, directement responsable des crimes perpétrés entre 1914—1918. Le Traité complétait les faits de guerre par un transfert de populations jusqu'alors inouï, celui de Grecs musulmans (356'000) et d'Ottomans anatoliens de confession orthodoxe (290'000, avec ceux déjà expulsés comptant environ 1,5 millions de personnes). Avec quatre générations de retard, on a tout récemment commencé à déplorer publiquement ce transfert, même en Turquie. Pour ce qui est des crimes antérieurs, le négationnisme et l'apologie parfois grotesques, mais tacitement autorisés par le Traité, prévalent toujours largement. La Conférence sur le Proche-Orient scella l'islamisation démographique de l'Asie Mineure par une élite nationaliste plus ou moins athée, mais qui avait su rassembler les masses sous la bannière de l'Islam. Peu après son triomphe à Lausanne elle changea de rhétorique, abolit en mars 1924 le Califat, rompit sa promesse de provinces kurdes autonomes et construisit la République de Turquie sur la base idéologique d'un turquisme séculier et unitariste. Tout en étant politiquement opposé à l'Europe occidentale, ce turquisme se hâtait après la Conférence d'effectuer une révolution sociale et culturelle à l'européenne en même temps qu'il tentait de justifier le passé proche par une mission civilisatrice réussie. Le coeur de la révolution sociale fut l'introduction du Code Civil suisse en 1926 qui abolit complètement la charia, un des piliers de l'Empire ottoman. Pour les partisans du Califat, la Conférence de Lausanne signifiait une grave défaite.

Le rôle de la diaspora turque en Suisse Derrière la Conférence et l'introduction du Code Civil il y a une histoire peu connue, mais importante, qui a comme actrice la diaspora turque à Lausanne et ailleurs en Suisse. A partir des années 1890, Genève et Lausanne sont devenus des lieux privilégiés d'exil et de formation supérieure pour les

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Ottomans musulmans. Ceux-ci arrivèrent d'ailleurs tardivement, comparés aux chrétiens ottomans ou ex-ottomans des Balkans et aux Arméniens déjà solidement installés à côté des étudiants russes, surtout à Genève. C'est l'exemple de diasporas cloisonnées, organisées autour de clubs ethnonationaux grec, serbe, bulgare, arménien, sioniste, albanais et égyptien qui alors sert de modèle à une diaspora turco-ottomane dépaysée et idéologiquement désorientée. En 1911, le Foyer Turc de Lausanne est fondé et se réunit 19 Avenue de Riant-Mont. Il est en contact étroit avec celui créé synchroniquement à Genève et forme le centre du mouvement turquiste en Europe. Cette micro histoire s'insère dans une macro histoire que marque la menace de l'Empire ottoman par l'impérialisme européen et par les nationalismes des non-musulmans au sein de l'Etat, jusqu'alors politiquement défavorisés. Plus concrètement, c'est en 1911 la guerre tripolitaine — l'invasion italienne en Lybie — qui divise l'Occident et l'Orient, musulmans et chrétiens jusque dans les milieux estudiantins à Lausanne, Genève et Paris. C'est en 1912 à Lausanne et en 1913 à Genève que sont convoqués les congrès européens des turquistes membres des Foyers. Les Foyers Turcs sont un facteur important pour la socialisation de toute une nouvelle jeune élite dans un turquisme qui se comprend alors comme un mouvement culturel, mais qui contribue en fait largement au mouvement nationaliste au sens politique. A l'instar des Foyers du Léman, un mouvement turquiste se crée à Constantinople, la capitale de l'Empire, et dans les villes provinciales. Ses filiales, également appelées Foyers, ses publications et les Foyers en Europe forment après la Première Guerre mondiale la colonne vertébrale du nationalisme turc. La fonction des Foyers en Suisse est l'agitation et la propagande en direction de l'Occident. En revanche, l'instrument du pouvoir des nationalistes est l'armée sous le général Mustafa Kemal, son soutien populaire les musulmans surtout sunnites, y compris kurdes, et sa représentation l'Assemblée nationale à Ankara qui réunit les notables musulmans du pays, la nouvelle élite issue des Foyers et des camarades du chef suprême. Un membre important de la nouvelle élite est le juriste Mahmud Esat Bozkurt, fils d'un notable d'Izmir et président du Foyer Turc à Lausanne pendant et après la Première Guerre mondiale. Il élabore dans ces années à l'Université de Fri bourg une thèse intitulée Du régime des capitulations ottomanes, publiée bien plus tard, en 1928, à Istanbul. Les capitulations, ces contrats qui donnent aux Européens protégés par les puissances un statut d'extra territorialité, sont les entraves majeures à la souveraineté intégrale de l'Etat. C'est à cette souveraineté et à la revitalisation de l'Etat qu'aspirent les

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nationalistes, eux-mêmes presque tous employés, officiers ou boursiers de l'Etat ottoman. En Suisse qui est hors du concert des puissances, ils croient trouver un terrain libre et neutre, sinon de la compréhension pour leur cause. L'absence d'impérialisme politique ainsi qu'une moralité jugée plus intacte que dans les métropoles européennes contribuent à l'image de la Suisse comme lieu de formation idéale, également pour les filles musulmanes. Mentionnons à titre d'exemple tardif la jeune fille Ayché Afet Inan dont le rêve est une éducation en Suisse. Lorsque Mustafa Kemal l'adopte en 1925 — elle est alors une institutrice âgée de 17 ans —, il réalise immédiatement son rêve et l'envoie, comme elle écrit, dans l'internat international de "Rochemont" à Lausanne (une institution qui n'existe plus aujourd'hui). Elle poursuivit ses études à Genève où elle obtint son doctorat en anthropologie. L'ambition des membres du Foyer Turc à Lausanne dans les années 1910 ne se limite pas à la revitalisation de l'Etat. Bien que proches des jeunesturcs au pouvoir tels qu'Enver et Talat pachas, ils s'en distancient en admettant la fin de l'Empire à moins que la nation turque réalise son "réveil" et garantisse son existence étatique. Les protocoles du Foyer, écrits à la main en ottoman dans un solide livre de notes comptant plus de 300 pages, aujourd'hui conservé à Ankara, témoignent d'une conviction turquiste quasi religieuse et du désir d'un réveil national mis en place par une révolution sociale dont le coeur est la formation à l'européenne et le refoulement de l'Islam de la vie publique. On reconnaît facilement la similitude avec le kémalisme ultérieur. Après la Première Guerre mondiale et pendant la lutte nationale, la Guerre de Libération, les discussions visionnaires autour d'une nouvelle Turquie s'intensifient en même temps que les Foyers de Lausanne et de Genève commencent une agitation politique qui prend de l'ampleur et constitue une importante préparation turque locale à la Conférence de Lausanne. Lorsque le navire jeune-turc commence à couler en été 1918, des professionnels de la propagande et de la diplomatie quittent Constantinople pour la Suisse et choisissent les Foyers Turcs comme terrain privilégié de leurs efforts mobilisateurs. Le plus prolifique parmi ces agents est Réchid Safvet Atabinen qui signe Kara-Schemsi. Dans la diaspora, se forme alors un large front nationaliste à vocation propagandiste. Face à ce dernier, les opposants libéraux ottomans, dont les chefs résident également au bord du Léman depuis l'établissement du régime dicatorial jeune-turc en 1913, n'arrivent pas à se mettre suffisamment en valeur. Aux yeux des nationalistes, ils se compromettent par leurs liens avec le gouvernement du sultan à Istanbul. L'événement clé qui mobilise les derniers indécis est l'invasion d'Izmir par l'armée grecque, appuyée par les

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Britanniques, en mai 1919. Pour Mahmut Esat et son camarade Chukru Saraçoglu, le président du Foyer Turc de Genève, c'est le signal pour le départ et l'appel aux armes. Un agent italien qui réside en Suisse romande organise leur voyage à Izmir, car la résistance kémaliste contre les Grecs correspond aux intérêts expansionnistes italiens. L'expérience du maquis est pourtant de courte durée: Mustafa Kemal convoque Esat et Chukru à Ankara où, âgés d'à peine trente ans, ils sont députés au nouveau Parlement avant de devenir peu après ministres. Grâce aux efforts conjoints de la diaspora turque, une quantité de publications dirigées contre les revendications européennes, grecques et arméniennes en Asie Mineure voient le jour en Suisse entre 1918 et 1922. L'imprimeur A. Bovard-Giddey à Lausanne profite entre autres du boom publiciste. Le scandale du meurtre des Arméniens en 1915-1916 par le régime jeune-turque trouve son écho dans plusieurs livres et tracts apologétiques, notamment de la plume de Kara-Schemsi qui, en comparant globalement la souffrance des Arméniens et celle des musulmans ottomans dans l'histoire moderne, relativise et ridiculise les massacres arméniens en les désignant du terme de "plaisanteries". Il instaure ainsi un discours turc indigne au sujet de ce qu'André Mandelstam, un juif russe et pionnier du droit international, résidant au Bosphore de 1898 à 1914, puis au bord du Léman, avait appelé "crime de lèse-humanité" dans un livre publié à Lausanne en 1917. A partir de mai 1919, le Bureau Permanent du Congrès Turc de Lausanne organise chaque année au foyer du Café du Théâtre un congrès turc qui s'occupe de la construction nationale de l'Asie Mineure. Harun Alitché, membre du Foyer Turc de Lausanne, est chef du Bureau Permanent, en même temps qu'il préside la Société académique inter-musulmane à Lausanne. En 1920 il fonde une Ligue académique ottomane et contribue à la fondation de l'Union islamique, toutes deux à Lausanne; l'Union s'engage pour l'indépendance des pays musulmans. Par là, les nationalistes turcs contrôlent en grande partie la diaspora musulmane arabe et égyptienne, voire indienne, créant ainsi des synergies anti-occidentales d'envergure dans leurs litiges avec l'Angleterre. On se réunit généralement au Restaurant de la Paix. En février 1921 le Bureau Permanent lance le journal Turkey, Monthly Organ of the Turkish Congress at Lausanne, imprimé chez Giesser & Held installé rue Caroline 5. Ce lancement a précisément lieu pendant la Conférence de Paix à Londres, préparatoire de celle à Lausanne et où le délégué turc demande déjà l'abrogation du Traité de Sèvres. Celui-ci correspond trop, il est vrai, aux aspirations impérialistes en attribuant certaines zones d'influence (passagères) en Asie Mineure à la France et même à l'Italie. Mais il est loin du démembrement annihilateur total de la Turquie que décrient les protestations

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fracassantes des nationalistes et qui est répété plus tard même dans des livres d'orientalistes occidentaux. Ce qui gène d'abord les turquistes c'est l'attribution d'Izmir à la Grèce et le droit à l'autodétermination prévu pour les Arméniens et les Kurdes, autochtones d'Asie Mineure tout comme les Grecs anatoliens, mais jusqu'alors soumis à la capitale ottomane. Le journal Turkey tente de justifier l'agenda nationaliste, révisionniste par rapport à Sèvres, aux yeux du public anglo-saxon et veut le convaincre de l'utilité stratégique d'une alliance. Pour cela il joue habilement sur la double menace anti-occidentale de l'Islam et du communisme. "Whether the Turks be bound to the Bolshevists or separateti from them depends upon the position to be taken by GreatBritain as regards the Turkish daims" [De la position qu'adoptera la GrandeBretagne à l'égard des prétentions turques dépendra le rapprochement ou la séparation des Turcs à l'égard des Bolchéviques], écrit-il.

Durant la Conférence Quand le 20 novembre 1922 le président de la Confédération Haab inaugure la Conférence, il souligne l'importance d'une paix qui puisse satisfaire également les perdants. Pour la délégation turque, seule face à celles d'Angleterre, de France, d'Italie, de Grèce, de Roumanie, du Japon et du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, le défi est grand. Néanmoins il ressemble quelque peu à un match à domicile: à côté du premier délégué Ismet Intìnti, une icône militaire, ami de Mustafa Kemal, se trouve le docteur Riza Nur, un turquiste acharné qui avait fait partie de la diaspora en Suisse romande avant d'être convoqué par Kemal au ministère de l'extérieur, puis à la tête du ministère de la santé du nouveau gouvernement d'Ankara. Le secrétaire général de la délégation n'est autre que Réchid Safvet alias Kara-Schemsi, intime des Foyers Turcs du Léman. Dans son discours, le 20 novembre, Ismet se déclare très satisfait du choix du lieu de la Conférence, car "l'histoire glorieuse" de la Suisse représente parfaitement "la valeur qu'une noble nation attache à son indépendance". La première partie des négociations qui traite des populations non turques et non musulmanes en Anatolie se termine fin janvier par l'abandon complet de l'idée d'un Foyer national arménien et d'une autonomie kurde ainsi que par la signature de la Convention sur l'échange des populations grecque et turques, déjà mentionné au début de l'article, appliquée partout en Asie Mineure sauf à Istanbul et partout en Grèce sauf en Thrace occidentale. C'est au docteur Riza Nur qu'Ismet pacha a confié les négociations dans les souscommissions où se joue le destin des diverses populations. Quand le 6 janvier

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les délégués britannique et italien se prononcent en faveur d'un foyer arménien, Nur provoque le scandale en interrompant furieusement la séance et en quittant la salle, selon les écrits de Joseph C. Grew, ambassadeur américain en Suisse et observateur à la Conférence. L'idéologie du docteur, un spécialiste en chirurgie, est radicale, comme le prouvent ses notes privées sur les négociations: "Il est d'intérêt vital et parfaitement juste de ne laisser vivre aucun humain d'une autre race, d'une autre langue et d'une autre religion dans notre patrie." Sur la même page, il ajoute que les non-Turcs et les nonmusulmans sont "un élément étranger, un fléau et des microbes". Que faire des Kurdes, pourtant musulmans? "Moyennant un programme d'assimilation suivi il faut les purifier de leurs langue et race distinctes." Significativement, ce n'est pas le destin des humains directement concernés, dont les centaines de milliers de réfugiés agonisant en hiver 1922— 1923, mais les questions économiques et stratégiques qui s'avèrent plus épineuses et conduisent à l'interruption de la Conférence du 4 février au 23 avril 1923. C'est au sujet de Mosul, une région riche en pétrole, de l'ouverture des détroits, d'intérêt géostratégique vital, ainsi que par rapport aux dettes ottomanes et aux investissements européens en Anatolie ottomane que la délégation turque est amenée à faire des concessions substantielles. Lord Curzon, bien que co-responsable de cette asymétrie de la poursuite des intérêts, est néanmoins un des seuls à être pleinement conscient de la dimension historique et paradigmatique d'un traitement des populations qui obéit à la logique de la "purification ethnique": Ce terme anachronique est parfaitement pertinent. Fin janvier Curzon qualifie devant les délégués le soidisant échange des populations qui complète les purifications précédentes "a thoroughly bad and vicious solution for which the world would pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come." [une solution totalement mauvaise et haineuse que le monde payerait lourdement dans les cent années à venir]. Le 13 décembre, il rétorque sarcastiquement à Ismet qui avait tenu un discours euphémisant sur la tolérance des Turcs et refuse catégoriquement toute responsabilité historique, si la communauté arménienne ottomane s'était tuée elle-même. L'expert du droit international André Mandelstam consterné, constate "la reconnaissance implicite [par la Conférence] d'un droit général pour tous les peuples d'affermir et de consolider leur existence par la destruction ou l'assimilation violente d'autres nations." La portée extrêmement ambivalente de la Conférence se lit également dans les réactions suisses. On n'est pas a priori critique à l'égard des revendications nationales turques face aux puissances. On est même flatté de \a politesse des porte-paroles et l'on salue les efforts de modernisations que le Bureau Permanent du Congrès Turc met au premier plan dans ses

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communiqués de presse. Le 25 mai 1921, le Droit du Peuple écrit: "Le troisième congrès annuel des Turcs a eu lieu, la semaine passée, à Lausanne. Il a décidé d'envoyer un télégramme à M. Schulthess, président de la Confédération helvétique, pour remercier le peuple suisse de sa généreuse hospitalité, de mener une lutte pour la laïcisation et la modernisation complète de la Turquie; pour compléter l'émancipation de la femme turque et relever son niveau social; pour l'adaptation complète des institutions modernes à l'Etat turc, et pour la décentralisation de l'administration en Turquie." La Suisse reste toutefois très sensible à tout ce qui concerne les minorités. L'identification aux Arméniens, peuple montagnard et chrétien, depuis les terribles pogromes des années 1895-1896 sous le sultan Abdulhamid, la présence d'une forte diaspora arménienne dès la fin du XIX e siècle et l'afflux de rescapés du Génocide de 1915-1916 renforcent cette sensibilité et donc le scepticisme à l'égard du Traité en 1923. Comparées à l'agitation turque appuyée par tout un appareil d'Etat, les activités des Arméniens, de plus en plus désespérés durant la Conférence, font figure de témoignage, mais n'ont pas la portée politique désirée. Les nationalistes arméniens, tout comme les Grecs, n'ont, contrairement aux kémalistes, pas su limiter à temps, c'est à dire lors des pourparlers de Paris en 1919-1920, leurs revendications territoriales. L'abandon total d'un foyer arménien anatolien promis par les Puissances occidentales à Lausanne n'incombe pourtant pas à ces acteurs faibles, admis seulement dans les souscommissions de la Conférence, mais aux grands acteurs. Une des voix helvétiques les plus vigoureuses qui perpétuent le message universel du destin particulier des victimes et apatrides arméniens est le pasteur vaudois Antony Krafft-Bonnard (1869—1945), le directeur des deux foyers d'orphelins arméniens à Begnins et à Genève que financent des philanthropes suisses. Il fustige les pièges d'une Realpolitik myope, en particulier le traitement des réfugiés apatrides par la Conférence. Devant les succès de l'ethno-nationalisme radical en Europe dans les années 1930, KrafftBonnard fait de plus en plus figure de solitaire prêchant dans le désert, mais son témoignage n'en est que d'autant plus important. De l'autre côté du spectre helvétique par rapport à la Conférence, on trouve le colonel vaudois Arthur Fonjallaz. En tant que président aussi bien de la Société des amis de la Turquie que de la Société Suisse d'Entreprises en Orient il joue un rôle actif dans les coulisses de la Conférence. Dans les salons du Lausanne-Palace où loge la délégation turque, il essaie d'initier des contrats suisses lucratifs avec les représentants du nouvel Etat-nation. Il sert également d'intermédiaire entre la délégation turque et le Conseil fédéral qui s'est abstenu de nouer lui-même des contacts. Le conseiller fédéral Schulthess charge un

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collaborateur de rendre visite, en compagnie de Fonjallaz, à Mustafa Chéref bey, l'ancien ministre du commerce, et à Ismet pacha à Lausanne le 29 juin 1923. Les deux délégués suisses croient que les représentants turcs sont favorables aux projets des entreprises suisses. Schulthess pourtant ne partage pas leur opinion et refuse la préparation rapide de traités d'établissement de commerce avant la fin de la Conférence. Le conseil fédéral répond par contre favorablement au désir du chef de la délégation turc de lui rendre visite à Berne. Le 26 juillet, deux jours après la signature du Traité, le service des avions va le chercher à Lausanne. Ismet pacha, Riza Nur et le colonel Tewfik bey sont accueillis à Berne par le Président de la Confédération Scheurer. En septembre 1923 une mission suisse présidée par Fonjallaz et qui se propose de nouer des rapports économiques durables part pour Ankara. C'est une mission privée, la Confédération n'étant officiellement représentée en Turquie qu'en 1926. En décembre 1923, un Syndicat d'entreprises en Orient S.A. qui réunit plus d'une douzaine des grands noms de l'industrie suisse se constitue dans les salons du Lausanne-Palace et place Fonjallaz à sa présidence. Tandis que certaines entreprises s'enracinent avec succès, Fonjallaz, le pionnier et grand admirateur de la "nouvelle Turquie" perd sa fortune dans ses aventures turques. Par la suite, il est apparu comme un des fascistes les plus profilés en Suisse, liant sa vénération d'Atatiirk à celle de Mussolini.

Epilogue L'existence du Foyer Turc de Lausanne s'achève le 30 juillet 1923, six jours après la Conférence. Son ancien président Mahmut Esat Bozkurt accède en 1924 au poste de ministre de la justice. En vertu de cette position, il introduit en 1926 le Code Civil suisse en Turquie. Cette révolution sociale se passe cependant dans un climat politique de plus en plus dictatorial, peu après la répression sanglante de la révolte kurde du chéikh Saïd, la suppression de journaux et l'incarcération du poète Nazim Hikmet. Le paradoxe du Traité de Lausanne est le paradoxe de la République de Turquie: le Traité a sanctionné une "technologie démographique" vertigineuse (purifications ethniques, transferts massifs de populations) et un régime nationaliste profondément antilibéral, mais qui s'avère stable envers l'extérieur. En plus, la République de Turquie affirme malgré tout des principes à même de la démocratiser tôt ou tard de l'intérieur. Lausanne n'est donc pas un Traité à réviser mais à surmonter: par l'émancipation véritable d'un ethno-nationalisme antihumaniste, par l'ouverture transfrontalière et par l'intégration européenne d'un Etat-nation qui, à l'instar du face-à-face à Lausanne, a longtemps persisté à se voir menacé de démembrement par ses propres citoyens hétéroculturels et par l'Europe.

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Sources: Le Traité de Lausanne, textes et cartes: Conférence de Lausanne sur les affaires du Proche-Orient. Actes signés à Lausanne le 30 janvier et le 24 juillet 1923, Paris 1923. Protocoles et versions préliminaires: Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: records of proceedings and draft terms of peace: presented to Parliament, London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923 (sur les Arméniens pp. 173 — 215 et 289—311, sur l'échange de populations pp. 303 — 337 et 4 0 6 - 4 2 6 ) . Aux Archives fédérales: Le discours de Haab, tenu le 20 novembre 1922: E 2001 (B) 4/20. Sur Fonjallaz et Berne en 1923: E 2200.11, 1, 22 Aux Archives cantonales vaudoises: Sur la conférence de Lausanne : S 112/93—99. Sur les agitations orientales locales à la veille de la Conférence : S 112/88/1—5. Sur Arthur Fonjallaz ATS: A. Fonjallaz

Bibliographie Diaspora ottomane en Suisse : Revue suisse d'histoire 52-3 (2002). Afetinan décrit sa vie dans Afetinan Ayse Atatürk'ten Mektuplar, Ankara, TTK, 1989. Sur Fonjallaz : Cantini Claude, Le colonel fasciste suisse, Arthur Fonjallaz, Lausanne, Pierre-Marcel Favre, 1983. Les notes sur la Conférence du docteur Nur, délégué turc, se trouvent dans Nur Riza, Hayat ve hatiratim. Riza Nur Inönii kavgasi. Lozan ve ötesi, Istanbul 1992. L'observation américaine de la Conférence: Grew Joseph, Turbulent Era. A diplomatie record of forty years 1904-1945, London, Hammond & Co., 1953, t. 1, pp. 475-585. Sur la perspective des partisans du Califat: Misiroglu Kadir, Lozan — zafer mi, hezimet mi?, Istanbul, Sebil, 1992. Histoire diplomatique: Yanoulopoulos Yanis, The Conference of Lausanne 1922— 1923, Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1974. Une voix philarménienne vaudoise: Krafft-Bonnard Antony, L'Arménie à la Conférence de Lausanne. Et quelques autobiographies d'orphelins arméniens réfugiés au Foyer arménien de Begnins, Vaud (Suisse), Alençon 1923. La problématique du transfert de populations: Stephen P. Ladas, The exchange of minorities. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York, Macmillan, 1932; Georg Streit, Der Lausanner Vertrag und der griechisch-türkische Bevölkerungsaustausch, Berlin, Stilke, 1929.

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Sur l'influence paradigmatique de la "solution" de Lausanne: Mandelstam André, La Société des Nations et les puissances devant le problème arménien, Paris, A. Pedone, 1926; Naimark Norman, Fires of hatred: ethnie cleansing in twentieth-century Europe, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001; Kieser Hans-Lukas et Schaller Dominik (éds.): Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah/ The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah, Zurich, Chronos, 2002, pp. 11-80. Sur l'aide suisse aux Arméniens et aux Kurdes: Künzler Jakob, Im Landes des Blutes und der Tränen, Zurich, Chronos, 1999 (1ère éd. 1921); Meyer Karl, Armenien und die Schweiz, Bern 1974, et Kieser Hans-Lukas (éd.), Die armenische Frage und die Schweiz/ La question arménienne et la Suisse (1896-1923), Zürich, Chronos, 1999.

14. MODERNISIERUNG UND GEWALT IN DER GRÜNDUNGSEPOCHE DES TÜRKISCHEN NATIONALSTAATS (1913-1938)

In der Zeit der Umbrüche vom osmanischen zum postosmanisehen Nahen Osten wurde der türkische Nationalstaat in Kleinasien gegründet.* 1913 setzte sich das jungtürkische Komitee Einheit und Fortschritt (CUP) diktatorisch an die Spitze des Osmanischen Reiches. Es verband im Ersten Weltkrieg gesellschaftliche Modernisierungsmassnahmen mit einer radikalen Politik ethnoreligiöser Homogenisierung Kleinasiens. Zwar schien die Weltkriegsniederlage einen völligen Bruch mit dem CUP zu bringen. Doch organisierten jungtürkische Kreise unter Führung des Generals Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) einen erfolgreichen Kampf sowohl gegen die Siegermächte und die von ihr abhängige liberale Regierung in Istanbul als auch gegen konkurrierende politische Projekte der Griechen, Armenier und Kurden in Anatolien. Es ergab sich 1913-1938 eine personelle und programmatische Kontinuität im Hinblick auf die administrative und militärische Elite der Türkei wie die Modernisierung und Homogenisierung Kleinasiens und die zu Grunde liegende Ideologie des Türkismus. Grundlegende Unterschiede zwischen imperialer jungtürkischer und republikanischer kemalistischer Politik betrafen außeranatolische Gebiete, die nach 1918 als definitiv verloren galten. Atatürk starb 1938 kurz nach Beendigung des blutigen „Zivilisierungsfeldzugs" gegen den Dersim, das letzte bis dahin noch faktisch teilautonome Kurdengebiet mitten in Anatolien. Die Modernisierung verfolgte das Ziel, eine souveräne, vereinheitlichte türkische Nation auf gleicher zivilisatorischer Augenhöhe wie die westlichen Staaten zu schaffen.

1. Überblick Die Republik Türkei ist im großen Kontext des Ersten Weltkriegs geschaffen worden und sie ist davon im ganzen 20. Jahrhundert geprägt geblieben. Die willige Teilnahme des CUP an der Selbstzerfleischung Europas 1914—18 öffnete Schleusen der Gewalt nicht nur nach Aussen, sondern insbesondere nach Innen. Inspiriert vom Zeitgeist des Sozialdarwinismus und eines exklusiven Ethnonationalismus, ergriff das CUP grundstürzende *

Published in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 3-2006, p. 156-167.

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Sozialrevolutionäre Massnahmen zugunsten des Aufbaus einer modernen türkisch-muslimischen Nation in Anatolien. Diese zielten auf die islamisierende Türkisierung sowohl der Bevölkerung als auch der Wirtschaft. Zielscheiben systematischer Ausgrenzung und Gewalt wurden die christlichen Mitbürger, allen voran die überdurchschnittlich gebildeten und ökonomisch agilen Armenier mit ihrem Siedlungsgebiet inmitten Anatoliens. Das CUP ging davon aus, dass die osmanischen Christen im Gegensatz zu den Muslimen nicht in die türkische Nation assimiliert werden könnten. Prinzipiell getragen wurde die Türkisierungspolitik von einer Bildungselite, die am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs eine „Bekehrung" zu völkischem türkischem Nationalismus durchgemacht hatte. Dieser inspirierte sich an den aufstrebenden Ethnonationalismen auf dem Balkan und in Osteuropa. Es ist nur auf dem Hintergrund der spätosmanischen Krise, die auch eine tiefe Orientierungskrise war, zu erklären, dass sich die staatstragende osmanisch-muslimische Elite innerhalb einer Generation vom islamisch kosmopolitischem Denken ab- und dem Nationalismus zuwandte. Ein wichtiger Auslöser dafür waren die traumatischen muslimischen Erfahrungen und territorialen Verluste in der europäischen Türkei, dem historischen Zentrum des Osmanischen Reichs, insbesondere während der Balkankriege 1912/13. Einige Gründerväter, darunter Atatürk selbst, verloren damals ihre Heimat. Allerdings hatte sich schon seit der Jahrhundertwende in führenden Kreisen der oppositionellen Jungtürken ein starkes exklusiv türkischmuslimisches Solidaritätsgefühl breit gemacht, das sich - was Anatolien betraf - mit der vom Sultan Abdulhamid II. geförderten muslimischen Einheit deckte. „Den Staat zu retten" - die politische Macht der „Herrschergruppe", der muslimischen millet-i häkime, zu wahren - lautete die zentrale Losung des CUP seit seiner konspirativen Gründung an der militärischen Ärzteschule in Istanbul im Jahre 1889. Es gelang den in osmanischen Militär- und Verwaltungsschulen zu Staatsdienern ausgebildeten Jungtürken in der Tat, ihre politische Macht in den neuen Nationalstaat hinüberzuretten. Ein schmerzlicher, dramatischer Prozess führte vom Konzept eines osmanischen Staats, der drei Kontinente umfasste, zum Konzept eines türkischen Nationalstaats in Anatolien. Erst nach der vollständigen Niederlage im Weltkrieg und dem Ende imperialer Illusionen war dessen definitive Aneignung möglich, und damit der klare Verzicht auf Pantürkismus, Panislamismus und Osmanismus, die in den Jahren zuvor noch zum ideologischen Repertoire des CUP gehört hatten.

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Die Nahostkonferenz von Lausanne 1922/23 bedeutete einen Triumph für türkisch nationalistische Akteure, die drei Jahre zuvor noch im politischen Abseits gestanden hatten. Sie segnete die Ergebnisse des militärischen Kampfes in Anatolien ab, wischte die unbereinigte Weltkriegsvergangenheit unter den diplomatischen Teppich und überließ die noch verbliebenen nichttürkischen Minderheiten in Anatolien weitgehend ihrem Schicksal. Die Konferenz war ein Abbild der Politik der Westmächte der Zwischenkriegszeit. Absorbiert von ihren eigenen Problemen und Interessen, stellten sie den Umgang mit Minderheiten dem Gutdünken des souveränen Nationalstaats und seiner ethnoreligiösen Mehrheit anheim. Zudem glaubten sie - darin lag das Novum der Konferenz - , mit zwangsmäßigen Bevölkerungstransfers von Millionen Menschen, wie demjenigen von Türken und Griechen, Probleme interethnischen Zusammenlebens künftig beseitigen zu können. Der Aufbau der Republik geschah in einer unruhigen, zerklüfteten europäischen Zwischenkriegszeit und mit der Fiktion, 1919 - der Beginn des Widerstandkampfes unter Mustafa Kemal - sei die Stunde Null der türkischen Nationalstaatswerdung. Licht und Schatten lagen beieinander: Reformen im Namen universaler zivilisatorischer Werte - aber oktroyiert von einer schmalen Elite. Ethnoreligiöser Nationalismus und tief verankerte Vorurteile gegen Nichtmuslime („gavur") machten es unmöglich, eine wirksame zivile Statsbürgerschaft zu etablieren. Im Osten hielt der Staat seine Herrschaft über die Kurden militärisch aufrecht, ohne seinen zivilisatorischen Anspruch einzulösen. Hier - am Haupschauplatz des Genozids an den Armeniern - waren menschliche Beziehungen, öffentliches Vertrauen und der sozioökonomische Motor der Gesellschaft am gründlichsten zerstört worden. Trotz all dem legten die republikanischen Gründerväter einige Grundlagen, die sich bewähren sollten, wie das neue Alphabet oder das neue Zivilrecht, das Kernstück der „türkischen Revolution". Türkische Geschichtsthese und Sprachtheorie hingegen, und mit ihr eine für die Gründerväter zentrale symbolische Produktion, erscheinen retrospektiv als Zeugnisse eines radikalen Nationalismus, der eine zerstörte interethnische Koexistenz in Kleinasien mit turkozentrisehen Phantasien kompensierte anstatt beschädigte Beziehungen und politische Kultur neu aufzubauen.

2. Türkismus als revolutionäre Modernisierungsideologie Die dominante Türkisierungspolitik Anatoliens von 1913-38 gehorchte auch einer militärischen und realpolitischen Logik; sie bleibt aber unverstanden ohne Einblick in den ideologischen Siegeszug des Türkismus am

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Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs. Türkistische Vereine sprossen ab 1911 in den osmanischen Metropolen und unter der türkischen Bildungsdiaspora in Europa empor; die langlebigsten und wichtigsten hießen „Türkisches Heim" (Türk Yurdu) und „Türkischer Herd" (Türk Ocagi), ihre wichtigste Zeitschrift ebenfalls Türk Yurdu. Sie verschrieben sich einem völkischen Nationalismus, pflegten ihr „nationales Ideal" in regelmässigen Zusammenkünften und übten Jahre vor der Republiksgründung und der Abschaffung des Kalifates einen säkularen Nationalismus ein.1 Die italienische Besetzung des osmanischen Tripolis (Libyen) in Nordafrika im Herbst 1911 führte zu einer Polarisierung zwischen Christentum und Islam, West und Ost, Türken und osmanischen Christen. Die friedliche jungtürkische Revolution hatte im Juli 1908 für kurze Zeit ein visionäres, utopisches Fenster hin zur Verständigung der Religionen und Kulturen verheißen. Die antiarmenischen Pogrome in Adana 1909, der Tripoliskrieg und die Balkankriege 1912/13 bewirkten jedoch rasch das Gegenteil. Der Traum von einer modernen, den Nahosten überspannenden demokratischen osmanischen Föderation verschwand Ende 1911 endgültig aus dem politischen Diskurs. Das utopische Ziel der Vielvölkerversöhnung wich der sozialdarwinistisch determinierten Zwangsvorstellung vom bevorstehenden Entscheidungskampf unversöhnlicher Nationalismen. In dieser weit- und reichspolitischen Lage wurden die türkistischen Klubs gegründet. Damit riefen die - nationalismusgeschichtlich gesprochen - spät gekommenen türkischsprachigen Muslime eine einflussreiche Organisation ins Leben, die sich als kulturelle National- und Modernisierungsbewegung verstand. Ihr Hauptziel lag nicht mehr darin, das Osmanische Reich wieder erstarken zu lassen, sondern mittels „sozialer Revolution" (so einer ihrer Schlüsselbegriffe) eine neue Gesellschaft auf der Basis des Türkentums aufzubauen - und damit die „türkische Nation zu retten". Zu diesem Zweck war sie willens, als fortschrittlich geltende wissenschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Prinzipien aus Europa zu übernehmen. Die pragmatische Formulierung politischer Ziele überließ sie dem CUP, das sie unterstützte und hinter sich wusste. Beim Eintritt in den Verein musste das künftige Mitglied schwören, sich für das Türkentum einzusetzen, dem Verein und den türkischen Häuptern gehorsam zu sein und nur unter Türken zu heiraten. Eine Broschüre der Genfer Türkisten, die 1912/13 für den Studienaufenthalt in Genf warb, schrieb: „Wir segnen Euch, Türkensöhne, falls euer Blut noch unvermischt ist. Kommt nach Europa!" 2 Ein Appell zur Mitgliedschaft vom Februar 1912 erklärte sich dramatisch als „Hilfeschrei des Türkentums, nämlich einer riesengrossen ' Vgl. Kieser, Vorkämpfer, Kap. 4. 2

Cenevre'de 1328, S. 7.

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Nationalität, die dem Abgrund entgegenpurzelt."1 An anderer Stelle hieß es: „Geht in den Westen. Erwerbt euch dort Wissen und Erkenntnis und bringt es mit euch heim. Sonst wird unser Heimatland sterben, wir werden sterben, Islam und Türkentum werden sterben, alles wird sterben. Es wird von den Füssen des Westens getreten werden - es wird nicht getreten werden: Es wird ja schon getreten." 2 Untergangsangst, Bildungseifer und ethnoreligiöse Solidarität mischen sich in diesen Zeilen. Vom 28. bis 31. März 1913 fand in Petit-Lancy bei Genf ein Kongress statt, der die Regeln und Zielsetzungen der türkistischen Bewegung artikulierte. Mitglieder und einflussreiche Repräsentanten der Bewegung wie Hamdullah Subhi (Tannöver) aus Istanbul waren zugegen. In der Eröffnungsrede hieß es von der „Religion des türkischen Patriotismus", die endlich geboren sei; von der „sozialen und nationalen Religion", die der Türkismus darstelle; und von der endlich erfolgten „Bekehrung zum Türkentum" (dabei wurde der Standardausdruck für die Bekehrung zum Islam, ihtida etmek, verwendet). Alle Kongressteilnehmer erklärten sich „überzeugt davon, dass nur Anatolien jenes Vaterland [anayurt] sein könne, das dem osmanischen Türkentum die politische Existenz garantiere." Dies war verknüpft mit der „Aneignung des Ziels, in Anatolien eine homogene und konzentrierte Einheit der osmanischen Türken zu schaffen." Ein gemeinsamer Schwur und die gebetshafte Wiederholung unterstrichen die Wichtigkeit des Anliegens: Alle „versprachen von ganzem Herzen und mit ihrer vollen Überzeugung an vorderster Front dafür einzustehen, dass die Türken die [alleinigen] Besitzer Anatoliens würden. Sie schworen feierlich, dass sie auf ihrem Weg hin zum grossen nationalen Anliegen aus Anatolien ihr Vaterland [anayurt] machen würden."3 Stärker als das Klagen über eine düstere Zukunft, das jungtürkische Artikulationen der Jahrhundertwende dominiert hatte, kultivierte der Türkismus das selbst zu verantwortende Projekt modernen nationalen Aufbaus. An allererster Stelle stand das Bildungsanliegen, das Männer und Frauen betraf. Daran schloss sich das Versprechen an, sich für die rechtliche Gleichstellung der Frau bei den Muslimen einzusetzen und gegen fortschrittsfeindliche Traditionen zu kämpfen. Dank Bildung in Europa sollten „aufgeklärte, revolutionäre Frauen auferzogen werden, die unsere Frauenwelt erhellen und mit [National-]Bewusstsein erfüllen können." 4 Einer der ausschließlich männlichen Kongressteilnehmer schrieb: „Wir machten verschiedene Versprechungen, die das Gefühl für unser Türkentum stärken 1

3 4

Türk Yurdu 22. 2. 1912, transkribierte Ausgabe Ankara: Tutibay, 1998, Bd. 1, S. 120. Cahr, Kadin, S. 260. Yurdcular Yasasi, S. 16, 19, 69 f. Yurdcular Yasasi, S. 37, 48-50.

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sollten. So verpflichteten wir uns, kein nichttürkisches Mädchen zu heiraten und, falls nötig, jene zu töten, die den Fortschritt, für den wir arbeiteten, behinderten und die türkischen Mädchen davon abhalten wollten, zur Schule zu gehen." 1 Schuld an den Missständen der Gegenwart wurde den osmanischen Nichttürken, den europäischen Mächten und dem reaktionären Islam zugewiesen; Licht ins Dunkel brachte hingegen die türkistische Frohbotschaft. Die Kongressteilnehmer beglückwünschten sich damit, ein neues nationales Bewusstsein geschaffen zu haben und sich endlich unumwunden „Türken" zu nennen, und nicht in erster Linie Osmanen oder Muslime. Sie erlegten sich die verbindliche missionarische Aufgabe auf, „in allen Bereichen des sozialen Lebens für die Verbreitung und Förderung des türkischen Nationalismus" zu sorgen. Dank ihrer Wende zum Türkismus würden auch sie sich endlich primär um ihr eigenes nationales Interesse kümmern, wie dies die Armenier schon lange täten. Lebhafte Diskussionen entzündeten sich um den Begriff „Türke" und damit um den Zugang zur Mitgliedschaft. Die einen wollten ihn rassisch verstehen, andere jedoch, darunter Hamdullah Subhi, als eine aus Mentalität, Lebensgefühl und Erziehung erwachsende Identität. Man einigte sich schließlich auf einen Kompromiss: Die Mitgliedschaft stand ausschließlich Türken offen, nämlich jenen, die entweder einen türkischen Vater hatten oder deren „Türkesein auf Grund ihrer Gefühle, Meinungen, Überzeugungen und Hoffnungen erwiesen war".2 Ein wichtiger Gesprächsgegenstand auf dem Kongress war die „Befreiung der Wirtschaft vom Joch der Fremden"; mit diesen waren die ausländischen und inländischen Nichtmuslime gemeint. Zugleich galten die osmanischen Christen explizit als nachzuahmendes Vorbild im Bereich Wirtschaft und Schulen. Der Kampf für die Besserstellung der Bauern wurde als Kampf gegen die „armenischen Profiteure", die „betrügerischen Rum" (griechisch-orthodoxe Osmanen) und, an dritter Stelle, türkische Unterdrücker propagiert. Im Folgenden ist indes nur noch die Rede von der Dringlichkeit, das anatolische Türkentum von den Fremden zu befreien, mit der bereits genannten schwerwiegenden Präzisierung, dass damit die „inländischen und ausländischen Fremden" gemeint seien. Klassenfeind und ethnoreligiöser Widersacher deckten sich somit. Ressentiments waren auf dem Kongress umso präsenter, als er mitten im Balkankrieg stattfand: Am 28. März 1913 war Edirne gefallen. „Wir werden das geliebte und heilige Edirne rächen", versprach

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Tengir§ek, Vatan, S. 124.

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Yurdcular Yasasi, S. 5, 29, 47.

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die Versammlung, nachdem sie die Sure für die Toten (Fatiha) gesprochen und ein Schweigen eingehalten hatte.1 Die Türkisten assoziierten das Thema der Minderheiten mit europäischer Einmischung und dem schwierigen, multikulturellen osmanischen Erbe, das sie durch einen konsequenten Nationalismus zu „überwinden" trachteten. Offene Verachtung des „wurzellosen" Kosmopolitismus, der die osmanischen Reformeliten im 19. Jahrhundert geprägt hatte, gehörte nun zum guten Ton. Entsprechend wurde auch das bisher als lingua Sacra geltende, stark vom Arabischen und Persischen durchwirkte osmanische Staatsidiom verworfen. Die Sprache sollte mittels „Säuberung", „Nationalisierung" und „Veredelung" „rein türkisch" (öz tiirkge) werden.2 Die Beanspruchung Anatoliens als türkische Heimat war zwar zentral, aber auch die Vorstellung einer ethnischen, sich bis nach Zentralasien und China erstreckenden, zumindest kulturellen „Großtürkei" spielte eine Rolle. Deren Helden waren die Grossherrscher Dschingis Khan und Tamerlan, ihre Weltmachtsträume symbolisierte der Rote Apfel (Kizil Elma).3 Im Zeichen des nationalen „Wiedererwachens" und der „Rückkehr zum Turanismus" wurden Feste und Gedenktage, die auf Helden und Mythen zurückgriffen, gefeiert;4 und 1913 wurde auf Veranlassung des CUP eine vom Kriegsministerium unterstützte paramilitärische türkistische Jugendorganisation mit dem Namen „Bund Türkischer Kraft" (Türk Gücü Cemiyeti) gegründet.5 Quasireligiöses Denken, welches „Natur" als Allgewalt und völkische Nation als höchste Verbindlichkeit setzten, prägte die Artikulation der Türkisten. Damit stellten sie sich in Gegensatz zu jenen Muslimen, die auf dem theologischen Credo ihrer Tradition beharrten. Der kurdische Scheich Said Nursi etwa sprach von „berauschten Pseudo-Patrioten", die sich „hinter dem Schleier des Türkentums versteckten", um „eine metaphorische, rassische, vergängliche und hasserfüllte Gemeinschaft" zu bilden.6 Der grundlegende Konflikt mit dem Islam als politischem Konkurrenten war vorgespurt.

1 Yurdcular Yasasi, S. 24, 61. 2 Laut, Ursprache, S. 18-23. 3 Zum Thema des Kizil Elma vgl. Kieser, Dschihad. 4 Alp, Türkismus, S. 18. 5 Balcioglu, Tegkilat-i Mahsusa, S. 183-193.

Zitiert nach Qelik, Huseyin, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and the ideal of Islamic unity, www.sozler.com (Mai 2002).

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3. Erste Türkisierungsetappe: Weltkrieg bis Konferenz von Lausanne (1914-23) Trotz der weltanschaulichen und gesellschaftspolitischen Kluft zwischen militanten Muslimen wie Said-i Kurdi (alias Said-Nursi) und den Türkisten ordneten sich beide am Vorabend des Weltkriegs in eine Front gegenüber Europa und dem „Christentum" ein. Die Balkankriege trugen zur Radikalisierung sowohl des Ethnonationalismus der Bildungseliten als auch des „osmanisch-muslimischen Nationalismus" bei. Mit letzterem ist jene Ideolologie gemeint, die sich seit Sultan Abdulhamid als Selbstverständnis der millet-i häkime (der sich zur Herrschaft berufen glaubenden Sunniten) auch in den Provinzen des Reichs und unter sunnitischen Kurden herausbildete.1 Beide Formen des Nationalismus erhielten eine explizit antichristliche Stoßrichtung. Für die Türkei waren die Balkankriege der Beginn einer zehn Jahre dauernden Kriegsperiode und für das CUP eine Gelegenheit, sich als Partei entschlossener Patrioten sowohl muslimischer als auch türkistischer Inspiration zu profilieren. Der weltanschauliche Hauptfeind des Türkismus und Pantürkismus war wie beim Panislamismus das russische Reich, der politische Hauptkonkurrent des osmanischen Staates seit dem 18. Jahrhundert. Die liberalen Gegner des osmanischen Kriegseintritts wiesen zu Recht auf die mystifizierte, vom CUP ideologisch ausgeschlachtete Russlandfeindschaft hin.2 Der riskante Krieg gegen das Zarenreich zur Befreiung und „Heimführung" der muslimischen Turkvölker war bei den Türkisten populär. So zum Beispiel bei Ziya Gökalp, einem Vordenker des türkischen Nationalismus und Mitglied des CUPZentralkomitees, der bei Weltkriegsbeginn zur Vernichtung Russlands aufrief.3 Die relativ hohe Zahl von Mitgliedern türkistischer Vereine - gut dreitausend - bedeutete, dass am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs ein Großteil der türkischmuslimischen Akademiker dem Türkismus anhing. Panislamismus, Osmanismus sowie Türkismus waren koexistierende Ideologien, die das jungtürkische Kriegsregime je nach Opportunität in den Vordergrund rückte. Gegenüber den Arabern, die dem Reich erhalten bleiben sollten, bestimmten Osmanismus und Panislamismus den politischen Ton. Für Kleinasien galt seit dem Ende der Balkankriege eine Agenda der Türkisierung, im Nordosten ab Sommer 1914 eine solche des pantürkischen und panislamischen Irredentismus. Die von Ende 1913 bis August 1914 maßgeblich von Enver aufgebaute „Spezialorganisation" (Te§kilat-i Mahsusa) * Vgl. Zürcher, Identity Politics. 2

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diente diesen beiden Zwecken.1 Enver genoss große Popularität in den Spalten der Zeitschrift Türk Yurdu, die er moralisch und materiell unterstützte; zugleich unterhielt er enge Kontakte mit muslimischen Führern, darunter Said Nursi, den er im Ersten Weltkrieg als Chef einer Kurdenmiliz an der Ostfront gegen Russen und Armenier einsetzte. Dieses Kriegserlebnis, das mit der russischen Gefangenschaft endete, wurde für den Kurdenscheich aber zu einem Wendepunkt: Vom Islamisten begann er sich zum Gründer einer bis heute bedeutenden „pietistischen" Bewegung (sog. Nurcu) zu entwickeln. Die CUP-Hardliner, allen voran Enver, glaubten an Krieg als Heilmittel zur Lösung politischer Probleme. In diesem Geist unterzeichneten sie das geheime Bündnis mit Deutschland am 2. August 1914 und traten im Herbst, wie im Bündnisvertrag versprochen, gegen Russland in den Krieg ein. Was Kleinasien betraf, ermöglichte ihnen der Krieg, mit dem Widerruf der Kapitulationen die volle Souveränität im Innern durchzusetzen und den internationalen Reformplan für die Ostprovinzen zu suspendieren, den sie am 8. Februar hatten zähneknirschend unterschreiben müssen. Dieser hätte der armenischen Landbevölkerung die im Vertrag von Berlin 1878 versprochene Sicherheit endlich gewährleisten, die regionale Verwaltung demokratisieren und somit die „armenische Frage" friedlich lösen sollen. Das CUP begann die Türkisierung Anatoliens, des künftigen „Heims der Türken", mit Vertreibungen von insgesamt rund 300.000 osmanischen Christen aus Ostthrazien im Herbst 1913 und von der Ägäisküste im ersten Halbjahr 1914. In den ersten Kriegsmonaten 1914 kam nach Angaben eines Führers des Te§kilat-i Mahsusa mehr als eine Million weiterer christlicher Vertreibungsopfer von der Ägäaisregion hinzu. 3 Envers katastrophal gescheiterter Russlandfeldzug, die Brutalisierung des Krieges an der Ostfront (gegen Russland und im Nordiran) und die Bedrohung der Haupstadt durch den alliierten Angriff bei den Dardanellen ließen das CUP Ende März/ Anfang April 1915 einen fatalen Entschluss fassen: die „armenische Frage" in Kleinasien physisch durch die Beseitigung der armenischen Gemeinschaft zu „lösen", wobei sie das Argument der nationalen Sicherheit anführten. Die Art und Weise der in den folgenden Monaten vom Innenministerium organisierten „Verschickungen" machte klar, dass es nicht um geordnete Umsiedlungen, sondern um die Vernichtung der Armenier und die Aneignung ihres Besitzes durch die muslimisch-türkische Nation ging.

' Kieser/Schaller, Armenian Genocide, S. 21-24. 2 Vahlde, Said Nursi, S. 123. 3 Mango, Atatürk, S. 122; Ak?am, Empire, S. 147.

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Der armenische Genozid stand im Dienste der Türkisierung Anatoliens und war Teil einer systematischen Politik ethnischer Umgestaltung, die bis 1938 andauerte. Sie erfolgte in zwei Grundschritten: Erstens wurde - vor allem 1913-23 - Anatolien gesellschaftlich islamisiert (die Christen vertrieben, Tausende von Waisenkindern islamisiert), zweitens wurden - vor allem 192338 - nichttürkische Muslime türkisiert. Die Armenier ganz Kleinasiens waren 1915 der zentralstaatlich gelenkten „Verschickung", der Massentötung und dem Tod durch Hunger, Krankheit und Erschöpfung preisgegeben. Viele Zehntausende syrische Christen in den Provinzen Van und Diyarbekir und im Nordiran, wo anfangs 1915 die osmanische Armee und Milizen einmarschierten, wurden Opfer von Massakern. Die syrischen Christen (Süryani) in den Städten Anatoliens hingegen waren nicht von der „Verschickung" betroffen. Beim russischen Vordringen 1916 wurden Hunderttausende von Kurden deportiert: Aufgesplittert und getrennt von ihren Führern sollten sie in Westanatolien „im Türkentume aufgehen". 1 Viele Zehntausende von ihnen starben wegen der schlechten Organisation an Auszehrung und Kälte, jedoch nicht durch Massaker. Auch Araber, Tscherkessen, Bosniaken und Albaner waren von der homogenisierenden Umsiedlungspolitik betroffen.2 Nach den ersten Vertreibungen von 1914 fand die umfassende Ausstoßung der Rum während des türkisch-griechischen Krieges 1919-23 statt und wurde mit dem „Bevölkerungsaustausch" von 1923 vollendet. Die Weltkriegsniederlage warf Ende 1918 die Jungtürken definitiv auf Anatolien zurück, wo sie sich schon frühzeitig auf eine Guerilla vorbereitet hatten. Anatolien in den Grenzen des „Nationalpakts" (Misak-i Milli) von 1919 entsprach in etwa der auf dem Türkistenkongress 1913 artikulierten Vorstellung vom nationaltürkischen Heimatland. Der alliierte Verzicht darauf, Kleinasien zu besetzen, ermöglichte 1919-22 einen offenen Kampf gegen die Ordnung der Siegermächte und der von ihr gestützten Istanbuler Regierung. Er richtete sich gegen konkurrierende nichttürkische Ansprüche auf Teile Anatoliens und wurde daher gegen die Armenier im Nordosten und in Kilikien, die kurdischen Aleviten in der Region Ko?giri-Dersim und die Griechen im Westen gefochten. Zahlreiche im Zusammenhang mit dem Armeniermord 1915/16 gesuchte Kriegsverbrecher fanden Unterschlupf in der Nationalbewegung mit Zentrum Ankara.3

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Künzler, Erlebnisse, S. 102. Dündar, Iskän Politikasi. Akgam, Armenien, S. 122-37.

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Die militärisch erfolgreiche türkische Nätionalbewegung erhielt in Lausanne - seit 1911 ein Zentrum von Türkisten - ihre diplomatische Weihe. Neben der militärischen Ikone Ismet (Inönü) Pascha, dem ersten Delegierten, standen zwei profilierte Türkisten, nämlich Dr. Riza Nur als zweiter Delegierter und Regid Safvet als Generalsekretär, an der Spitze der Delegation. Sie hatte Instruktionen erhalten, unter keinen Umständen die Errichtung einer armenischen Heimstätte mit Einschluss von Teilen Kleinasiens zuzulassen. Riza Nur leitete die Gespräche in den Subkommissionen, die sich mit den verschiedenen Volksgruppen befassten. Als am 6. Januar die britische Delegation eine sichere Heimstätte für die armenischen Flüchtlinge verlangte, verließ Nur wütend den Saal. In seinen privaten Notizen schrieb er vom „vitalen Interesse, keinen Menschen einer anderen Rasse, einer anderen Sprache und einer anderen Religion in unserem Vaterland leben zu lassen". Mit Bezug auf die Verhandlungen über kurdische, armenische und griechische Minderheiten in Kleinasien notierte er, dass „diese fremden Elemente eine Plage und Mikroben" seien und dass man die Kurden mittels „Assimilationsprogramm von der fremden Sprache und Rasse reinigen müsse". Nurs Auffassung und damit das türkistische Modell setzten sich im Prinzip durch: Aus der Konferenz ging die türkische Nationalbewegung rundum als Siegerin in der Auseinandersetzung um Kleinasien hervor und arrangierte sich vorteilhaft mit den Westmächten. Der Vertrag vom 24. Juli 1923 segnete das Resultat der jungtürkischen Vernichtungspolitik ab, ließ die armenische und kurdische Selbstbestimmung fallen und unterschrieb den bisher grössten Bevölkerungstransfer der Geschichte („Austausch" von 356.000 Muslimen aus Griechenland, gegen nahezu 1,5 Millionen orthodoxe Christen aus Kleinasien, die meisten de facto schon vertrieben).2 Lord Curzon kommentierte die Zwangsumsiedlungen so: „a thoroughly bad and vicious solution , for which the world would pay a penalty for a hundred years to come. [...] It was a solution enforced by the action of the Turkish government in expelling these people from Turkish territory."3 Der erfahrene Türkeikenner Andrew Ryan, Mitglied der britischen Delegation in Lausanne, machte sich keine Illusionen, was den Schutz der verbliebenen Nichtmuslime betraf: „Our greatest defeat, however, was our failure [...] to get any guarantees worthy of the name for the treatment of non-Moslem minorities."4

1

3 4

Nur, Hayat, Bd. 2, S. 260; vgl. Kieser, Vorkämpfer, Kap. 5.6. Naimark, Fires, S. 54. Zitiert in Ladas, Exchange, S. 341 f. Ryan, Last, S. 193.

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Zwar hatten die Delegierten der Westmächte in Lausanne für die Nichtmuslime Minderheitenklauseln durchgesetzt, aber diese waren ausserhalb der Metropolen nirgends durchsetzbar. Ein schwieriger Verhandlungsgegenstand hatte darin bestanden, dass die Alliierten als Gegenzug für die Aufhebung der Kapitulation die Anstellung ausländischer Experten an türkischen Gerichten verlangten. Schließlich einigte man sich darauf, dass die Türkei als Gegenleistung für die Aufhebung der Kapitulationen versprach, ihr Rechts- und Gerichtswesen nach europäischen Standards zu reformieren. Dieser Schritt erlaubte der Regierung in Ankara einen weiteren Schachzug: nach getaner Reform - der Einführung europäischer Gesetze Druck auf die nichtmuslimischen Gemeinschaften auszuüben, so dass diese „freiwillig" auf den völkerrechtlich garantierten Minderheitenschutz verzichteten.1

IV. Kulturrevolution und zweite Türkisierungsetappe Mustafa Kemal unternahm den Neuaufbau des Staates zusammen mit einer Equipe junger, ihm ergebener Türkisten, zu denen Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), der ehemalige Präsident des Türkistenklubs in Lausanne, gehörte. Als Wirtschaftsminister betrieb er ab 1922 die Weiterführung der 1914 begonnenen wirtschaftlichen Nationalisierung. Die Devise des von ihm initiierten Wirtschaftskongresses in Izmir (Februar/März 1923) hieß „die nichtmuslimen Wirtschaftsträger aus dem ökonomischen Leben zu eliminieren und an ihrer Stelle türkische Geschäftsleute aufzubauen".2 Mustafa Kemal äußerte sich im selben Jahr in Adana: ,Armenier haben kein Recht in diesem Land. Das Land gehört uns, es gehört den Türken. In der Geschichte war dieses Land türkisch, daher ist es türkisch und wird ewig türkisch bleiben. Das Land ist endlich seinen rechtmäßigen Besitzern zurückgegeben worden. Die Armenier und die anderen [Christen] haben kein Anrecht hier. Diese fruchtbaren Orte gehören den wirklichen Türken."3 1924 wurde Bozkurt Justizminister. In diesem Amt bewies er progressistische Visionen in rechtsmodernistischer Perspektive, das heisst er verband seine Projekte gesellschaftlicher Erneuerung mit radikalem Türkismus und bejahte für deren Umsetzung eine „stählerne Hand". 1925 stellte er die revolutionäre Art und Weise, wie ein neues Zivilgesetzbuch eingeführt werden sollte, mit antikurdischem Unterton so in Aussicht: „Es ist der Entschluss der 1

Hirsch, Gesetz, S. 229-32.

2

Uyar, Bozkurt, S. 35, 39,42.

3

Atatürk, Söylev, Vol. II, p. 130.

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Türkischen Revolution, die Zivilisation des Westens uneingeschränkt und bedingungslos sich anzueignen. [...] Diejenigen, die sich dagegen auflehnen wollen, sind dazu verurteilt, mit Eisen und Feuer vernichtet zu werden. [...] Wir schreiten nicht nach unserer Laune oder unseren Wünschen, sondern nach Maßgabe der Anliegen unserer Nation voran."1 Im selben Jahr erstickte die Republik den Kurdenaufstand unter Scheich Said als Rebellion „reaktionärer religiöser und feudaler Kräfte" - dies die Standardabstempelung allen kurdischen Widerstands bis 1937/38. Um die Kollaboration der Kurden zu gewinnen, hatten die Kemalisten vor 1922 die Befreiung des Sultankalifen vor fremden Mächten propagiert und eine kurdische Autonomie versprochen, das Versprechen aber nicht eingehalten. Kemal nahm den Kriegszustand 1925 zum Anlass, gegen jegliche Opposition im Lande mit Sondergerichten sowie gegen die Presse vorzugehen. Die antiliberale Politik, antikurdische Gewalt und systematische Negation kurdischer Identität waren einem Modernisierungsprojekt eingeschrieben, dessen Glaubensideal ein völkischer Türkismus war. Herzstück der „türkischen Revolution" war die Übernahme des Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches im Jahre 1926, das die Scharia - einen einstigen Pfeiler des Reichs - definitiv ausschaltete. Bozkurt präsentierte es einleitend als das „neueste, vollkommenste und volksnahste" Zivilrecht der Welt. Dieses sollte von nun an das „Ordnungsprinzip des nationalen gesellschaftlichen Lebens" bilden und dieses von Grund auf erneuern. „Die türkische Nation [...] muss, koste es, was es wolle, sich selbst den Erfordernissen der zeitgenössischen Zivilisation anpassen. Für eine Nation, die sich entschlossen hat zu leben, ist dies unumgänglich."2 Zu den Richtern, die mit der schwierigen Umsetzung des importierten Gesetzes beauftragt waren, sprach er: „Türkische Richter, ihr müsst die eifersüchtigen Wächter der türkischen Revolution sein, die Wächter der neuen Zivilisation, die von stählerner Hand gegründet worden ist. Ihr werdet nicht zulassen, dass die Vergangenheit erneut hochkommt und das Neue in Zweifel gezogen wird."3 Weitere Reformen nach westlichem Muster, die den Bruch mit der Vergangenheit vollzogen, waren 1926 die Kalenderreform; 1928 die Einführung der lateinischen Schrift und die Streichung des Islams als Staatsreligion aus der Verfassung; 1934 die Einführung der Familiennamen und des Frauenwahlrechts auf nationaler Ebene; und 1935 die Einführung des Sonntags als Ruhetag. Bozkurt war Mitglied der Türkistenvereinigung Türk Ocagi, die 1931 der kemalistischen Einheitspartei einverleibt wurde; das Türk Ocagi

' Zitiert nach Uyar, Bozkurt, S. 73. 2

Bozkurt, Esbabi, S. XXIX f. und XXXII.

3

Rede vom 1. 11. 1926, lptman 1944, S. 52.

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unterstützte aktiv mit seinen vielen Filialen die kemalistische Revolution, instruierte seine Mitglieder und leitete während der „Schriftrevolution" 1928 vielerorts Alphabetisierungskampagnen. Trotz des problematischen politischen und ideologischen Kontexts der „türkischen Revolution" haben sich viele Reformen als nachhaltig erwiesen jedoch nicht, wie die Gründerväter meinten, auch als Mittel gegen jene nahgeschichtlichen Beziehungstraumata, die sie zuzudecken trachteten. Nirgends waren diese Traumata noch so manifest wie in der Region Dersim zu Beginn der 1930er-Jahre: Zahlreiche Armenier hatten dort überlebt; das Bewusstsein armenisch-(alevitisch-)kurdischer Verbundenheit und einstiger alternativer Modernisierungsprojekte vor Ort (westlicher Missionen oder der armenischen Gemeinschaft) war dort wach; Multikulturalismus, Stammesleben und traditionelle alevitische Gemeinschaftsstrukturen, aber auch Banditentum wegen der Isolierung und Verarmung erinnerten an die spätosmanische Epoche. Der Dersim wurde daher von kemalistischen Reformern eine herauszuoperierende „Eiterbeule" genannt. Das Gesetz über die Niederlassung (Iskan Kanunu) von 1934 bezweckte explizit die demografische Türkisierung Ostanatoliens; es legalisierte Zwangsumsiedlungen unter Aufhebung der zivilen Rechte der Umzusiedelnden. 1935 wurde der Name Dersim türkisierend umbenannt zu Tunceli. 1937/38 fand ein militärischer Feldzug statt; mit 50'000 Mann, unterstützt von der Luftwaffe, sollte er „mit einer allgemeinen Säuberungsaktion dieses Problem [des Dersim] ein für allemal ausradieren", wie Ministerpräsident Celal Bayar im Juni 1938 vor der Nationalversammlung festhielt (als Chef der CUP-Filiale Izmir hatte sich Bayar schon im Frühjahr 1914 bei ethnischen Säuberungen gegen die Rum hervorgetan). Der gewaltsame Tod vieler Tausender Zivilisten, die partielle Deportation der Bevölkerung in Gebiete Westanatoliens und eine auf Jahre hinaus verwüstete und entleerte Region waren das Resultat dessen, was in der kemalistischen Presse vollmundig als Zivilisierungsmission angekündigt und von der internationalen Presse unkritisch so übernommen worden war.1

5. Modernisierung und Gewalt Die Innenpolitik im Hinblick auf Anatolien wurde 1913-38 durchgehend vom Anliegen der Türkisierung dominiert. Sie betraf im ersten Jahrzehnt vor allem die kleinasiatischen Christen, danach vor allem die Kurden. Türkisierung bezog sich auf Demografie, Ökonomie, Sprache und

1

Kieser, Friede, S. 408-12.

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Geschichtsschreibung. Sprachreinigung sollte ein puristisches Türkisch, die Änderung der Toponymie eine türkische Landschaft und eine turkozentrische Geschichtsschreibung ein urtürkisches Anatolien hervorbringen. Dass sie eng verknüpft mit Ethnonationalismus einhergingen, war das nachhaltige Problem der kemalistischen Modernisierungsmaßnahmen. In ideen- und mentalitätsgeschichtlicher Perspektive möchte ich zwei Beispiele herausheben für die abschließende Betrachtung kemalistischer Modernität und Gewalt. Das Eine ist das frühosmanische Motiv vom Goldenen Apfel (Kizil Elma), das machtpolitische Begehrlichkeit im Blick auf zu erobernde christliche Metropolen symbolisierte. Die kemalistische Interpretation eines Gedichts Gökalps mit dem Titel Kizil Elma deutete den Goldene Apfel radikal um zur aufzurichtenden Stätte einer Bildungsrevolution. Die Botschaft lautete, dass das verheißene Land, die „neue Türkei", nicht durch Eroberung, sondern nur durch Bildungsarbeit an sich selbst zu haben war. Einst Symbol eines die abendländische Welt gewaltsam erstürmenden Türkentums und Islams, wurde der Apfel zum Ideal einer modernen Gesellschaft, in der man sich die besten Werte des langjährigen okzidentalen Widersachers friedlich aneignete. Diese Deutung und ihr konstruktives Potenzial wurden zum Konsens breiter Atatürk-freundlicher Kreise im 20. Jahrhundert. Das andere, zeitgleiche, aber problematische Beispiel ist die türkische Geschichtsthese, die Atatürk in seinen letzten Lebensjahren stark am Herzen lag.2 Diese These - eine Verknüpfung frühgeschichtlicher Spekulationen mit politischen Bedürfnissen - erklärte das Türkentum zur Wiege menschlicher Zivilisation, die türkische Sprache zur Ursprache der Menschheit, Kleinasien als seit Urzeiten prototürkisch besiedelt und die Türken zu frühgeschichtlichen, kulturbringenden Besiedlern Europas und damit zu weißen, arischen ProtoEuropäern. Auf Betreiben des Staatschefs wurde die These anfangs der 1930erJahre etabliert und im schulischen und universitären Unterricht verbreitet. Die frühgeschichtliche Bemühung ging von der Prämisse aus, dass physischanthropologische, biologisch-völkische und ethnologische Merkmale letztgültige Bestimmungen nationaler Gemeinschaft, ja des Menschen schlechthin seien. Die Emphase über Ariertum, Erstbesiedlung und einstige Hochkultur spiegelte Holzwege damaliger europäischer Geschichte. Der Rekurs auf Frühgeschichte suchte eine maximale Distanz von der nahen Vergangenheit zu schaffen und den Bruch mit der kosmopolitischen osmanischen Identität und jeglichem islamischem Bezug zu besiegeln. Er sollte auch den politischen sunnitischen Islam als Konkurrenten bei der ^ Alp, Kemalisme, S. 24; Kieser, Vorkämpfer, Kap. 6.5. Kieser, Vorkämpfer, Kap. 6.6.

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Identitätsfindung ausschalten; denn dieser war die reale Basis gesellschaftlicher Mobilisierung in den Kriegsjahren 1912-22 gewesen. Die These von den proto-europäischen türkischen Kulturbringern festigte das Band mit Europa und kompensierte den einseitigen Zivilisationsimport der Gegenwart. Die These von der Präexistenz der Türken in Kleinasien schließlich drängte das Ärgernis auf die Seite, dass überall im Land Ruinen und in ausländischen Bibliotheken eine Vielzahl von Dokumenten Anderes in den Vordergrund stellten: die frühe anatolische Vergangenheit von Griechen, Armeniern, syrischen Christen etc., die im Jahrzehnt vor 1923 weitgehend vertrieben oder ausgerottet worden waren. In dieser wichtigen Hinsicht war Prähistorie, inklusive der Vereinnahmung der hethitischen und sumerischen Hochkulturen als proto-türkisch, eine Ausflucht davor, sich mit nahen Traumata, gescheiterten Beziehungen und womöglich ihrer Reparatur zu befassen. Die Kemalisten verdrängten dies - zumal sie sich innenpolitisch von gewaltsamen jungtürkischen Mustern nicht unmissverständlich losgesagt hatten. Geschichtsaufarbeitung in dieser, für die eigene politische Kultur höchst bedeutsamen Hinsicht schoben sie auf spätere Generationen.

Bibliografie Akçam, Taner, Armenien und der Völkermord: die Istanbuler Prozesse und die türkische Nationalbewegung, Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 2004 (Erstausgabe 1996). Akçam, Taner, From Empire to Republic. Turkish nationalism and the Armenian genocide, London: ZED Books, 2004. Alp, Tekin, Türkismus und Pantürkismus, Weimar: Verlag Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915. Alp, Tekin, Le Kemalisme, Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1937. Atatürk, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Ankara, 1997. Balcioglu, Mustafa, Te§kilat-i Mahsusa'dan Cumhuriyete, Ankara: Nobel, 2001. Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat, Esbabi mucibe lâyihasi, in: Yargitay içtihadi birlegtirme kararlari ve Isviçre Fédéral Mahkemesi kararlan ile notlu Medenî Kanun, Borçlar Kanunu tatbikat kanunu ve ilgili kanunlar-tüzükler yönetmelikler, Istanbul: Fakülteler Matbaasi, 1984 (Erstausgabe 1926), S. XXIX-XXXV. Çakir, Serpil, Osmanh kadm hareketi, Istanbul: Metis, 1994. Cenevre'de Tahsil, Istanbul: Mezîyet-i iktisâdiye matbaasi, 1328. Dündar, Fuat, Ittihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanlan iskân politikasi (1913-1918), Istanbul: Iletisim, 2001.

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Fünfzig Jahre Türkisches Zivilgesetzbuch, Sondernummer der Zeitschrift für schweizerisches Recht 95-3 (1976). Hirsch, Ernst E., Vom schweizerischen Gesetz zum türkischen Recht, Zeitschrift für schweizerisches Recht 95-3 (1976), S. 223^48. Igitman, Tank Ziya, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt. Hayati ve hatiralari 1892-1943, Izmir: Güneg, 1944. Kieser, Hans-Lukas, Vorkämpfer der „neuen Türkei". Revolutionäre Bildungseliten am Genfersee (1870-1939), Zürich: Chronos, 2005. Kieser, Hans-Lukas, Djihad, Weltordnung, „Goldener Apfel". Die osmanische Reichsideologie im Kontext west-östlicher Geschichte, in: Faber, Richard (Hg.),

Imperialismus

in

Geschichte

und

Gegenwart,

Würzburg:

Königshausen & Neumann, 2004, S, 183-203. Kieser, Hans-Lukas, und Schaller, Dominik (Hg.), Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah / The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah, Zürich: Chronos, 2002. Kieser, Hans-Lukas, Der verpasste Friede. Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei 1839-1938, Zürich: Chronos, 2000. Künzler, Jakob, Im Lande des Blutes und der Tränen, Erlebnisse in Mesopotamien während des Weltkriegs (1914-1918), Zürich: Chronos, 1999. Ladas, Stephen P., The exchange of minorities. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York: Macmillan, 1932. Landau, Jacob M., Pan-Turkism. From irredentism to cooperation, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. Laut, Jens Peter, Das Türkische als Ursprache? Sprachwissenschaftliche Theorien in der Zeit des erwachenden türkischen Nationalismus, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000. Mango, Andrew, Atatürk, London: John Murray, 2001. Naimark Norman, Fires of hatred: ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Nur, Riza, Hayat ve hatiratim, 3 Bde., Istanbul: i§aret, 1992 (Erstausgabe 196768). Réchid, Ahmed, Appel à la justice, Genève: Imprimerie du Journal de Genève, 1918. Ryan, Andrew, The last of the dragomans, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1951. Tengirjek, Yusuf Kemal, Vatan Hizmetinde, Istanbul: Bahar Matbaasi, 1967. Uyar, Hakki, „Sol milliyet^" bir Türk aydmi Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1892-1943), Ankara: Büke, 2000.

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Vahide, §ükran, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Istanbul: Sözler, 1992. Yurdcular Yasasi. Isvitjre'dc Cenevre jehrine yakin Petit-Lancy Köyünde Pension Racine'de kurulan Ikinci Yurdcular Dernegi'nin muzakerat ve mukerrerati, Istanbul: Yeni Turan Matbaasi, 1914. Zürcher, Erik Jan, Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908-1938, in: K. Karpat (Hg.), Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey, Leiden: Brill, 2000, S. 150-79.

15. DIE HERAUSBILDUNG DES NATIONALISTISCHEN GESCHICHTSDISKURSES IN DER TÜRKEI (SPÄTES 19.MITTE 20. JAHRHUNDERT)

Dieser Aufsatz konzentriert sich auf die Herausbildung der nationalistischen Meistererzählungen (master narratives) im jungen Nationalstaat Türkei, die eine geschichtspolitische Bedeutung entfalteten;* er dokumentiert somit nicht das historiographische Schaffen in seiner ganzen Bandbreite innerhalb des späten osmanischen Reiches und der frühen Republik: Den profilierten kommunistischen Historiker Hikmet Kivilcimh (1902-71) lässt er beispielsweise links liegen. In diesem bewusst gezielten Fokus spannt der Aufsatz den Bogen von der Geschichtsschreibung der Tanzimat (der osmanischen Reformära des 19. Jahrhunderts), die bereits keine traditionelle Hofhistoriographie mehr war, zur Schaffung des nationalstaatlichen kemalistischen Geschichtsdiskurses. Er skizziert die Akteure, die Etappen und den Kontext der Entwicklung hin zum türkistischen Paradigma in seiner republikanischen Version. Er bezieht dabei die professionelle Historiographie, staatliche Inititiativen wie auch jene historische Publizistik mit ein, die die Geschichtsbilder oft stärker prägte als die Männer - um solche handelte es sich fast ausschliesslich - von der Zunft. Ein weiterer wichtiger Aspekt sind die Folgen der von einer schmalen Elite in den spezifischen Umständen der Nationsbildung ausgearbeiteten Geschichtsinterpretation für das kollektive Gedächtnis der türkischen Gesellschaft im ganzen 20. Jahrhundert. Im staats- und verfassungspatriotischen Geist der kurzen Zeit nach der unblutigen jungtürkischen Revolution (Juli 1908) suchte sich die neu gegründete staatliche Osmanische Geschichtskommission (Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni) für ein gemeinsames, wissenschaftliches und säkulares Geschichtsverständnis einzusetzen. Doch die Konstruktion einer patriotischen Geschichte einer - ebenfalls erst zu schaffenden - modernen multiethnischen osmanischen Nation, ohne Islam und Dynastie als primäre Referenzen, blieb ein frommer Wunsch. Was sich in den folgenden Jahrzehnten Bahn brach, waren Geschichtsschreibungen neu gegründeter Nationalstaaten, darunter

*

Published in Krzoska, Markus, und Maner, Hans-Christian (ed.), Beruf und Berufimg. Geschichtswissenschaft und Nation in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, Münster. Lit, 2005, p. 59-98. - Für hilfreiche, kritische Gegenlesungen dieses Aufsatzes danke ich Astrid Meier, Zürich, und Johann Strauss, Strassburg.

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prägnant der Republik Türkei, die zwar wissenschaftliche Methodik selektiv einbezogen, das Wahrheitsethos jedoch dem Primat der Nation unterwarfen. Im Gegensatz zur gemeinsosmanischen (auch «osmanistisch» genannten) Option der obgenannten Kommission gründeten 1911 türkische Auslandstudenten in der französischen Schweiz wie auch türkische Akademiker in der Hauptstadt Istanbul ethno-nationalistische Foyers. Sie engagierten sich für das «Erwachen des Türkentums» - sie nannten dies die türkische «Sozialrevolution» - , formulierten eine entsprechende Geschichtsschau und postulierten die «Erlösung des anatolischen Türkentums von der Versklavung durch einheimische [nichtmuslimische] und ausländische Fremde». 1 Damit setzten sie sich schroff vom Osmanismus (dem gemeinosmanischen Patriotismus) und Kosmopolitismus ab. Diese Nationalisten betrachteten sich als Spätkömmlinge im Vergleich zu den Griechen, Serben, Bulgaren, Armeniern wie auch den Zionisten. Sie nahmen in ihrer Neuausrichtung immer wieder Bezug auf die jungen Nationalstaaten ihrer ehemaligen Untertanen auf dem Balkan, die - im Gegensatz etwa zur angelsächsischen Welt oder zur Schweiz - einem ethnischen, auf einem «Volkstum» und nicht primär auf einer Verfassung, Staatsphilosophie und geographischen Realitäten gründenden Nationalismus anhingen; daher nennen wir ihren Nationalismus «Ethnonationalismus». 2 Weltanschaulich und finanziell waren diese frühen Türkisten eng mit der 1889 gegründeten Partei für Einheit und Fortschritt {ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti=Comite Union et Progrès, CUP) verbunden, die sich der machtpolitischen «Rettung» der osmanischen Nation im engeren Sinn der Muslime, vor allem der türkischsprachigen, verschrieben hatte, ideologisch aber zwischen Türkismus, Islamismus und Osmanismus oszillierte. Auch profilierte Türkisten wie Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, Hamdullah Subhi und Fuat Köprülü hatten damals keine eindeutige politische Perspektive. Indem sie die türkische Nation jedoch als primären Wert und als «überlebensfähig» im sozialdarwinistischen Sinn vertraten, antizipierten sie

So z. B. am Türkistenkongress im März 1913: Yurdcular Yasasi. Isvi§re'de Cenevre §ehrine yakin Petit-Lancy Köyünde Pension Racine'de kurulan Jkinci Yurdcular Dernegi'nin muzakerat ve mukerrerati [Das Gesetz der Yurdcular. Verhandlungen und Beschlüsse des Zweiten Türkistenkongresses, der in der Pension Racine im Dorf Petit-Lancy bei Genf stattfand], Istanbul 1913, S. 61 (Zitat) und 65. Yurdcu, Plural Yurdcular, kann mit «Mitglied des Türk Yurdu» oder, allgemeiner, mit «Türkist» (türkischer Ethnonationalist) übersetzt werden. Zum Begriff «Ethnonationalismus» siehe Altermatt, Urs: Das Fanal von Sarajevo: Ethnonationalismus in Europa. Paderborn 1996. Gökalp, ein Vordenker des türkischen Ethnonationalismus, hatte noch 1909, vor seinem Umzug aus Diyarbekir nach Saloniki, die USA als Modell für den osmanischen Staat gepriesen und die spirituelle nationale Verbindung im Gegensatz zur Blutbande und angestammten Kultur herausgestrichen. Türklük ve Osmanlihk [Türkentum und Osmanentum], Zitiert nach Arai, Masami: Between State and nation. A new light on the journal Türk Yurdu. In: Turcica, 24 (1992), 277-95, hier 289.

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eine Zukunft auch ohne Reich. 1 Entsprechend definierte bereits 1913 ein wichtiges Grundlagenpapier Anatolien als «Mutterland» (anayurt) der türkischen Nation. 2 Erst die menschengemachte Katastrophe des Ersten Weltkriegs brachte aber den schliesslichen Durchbruch des Türkismus. Die anfangs 1913 eingerichtete CUP-Einparteiendiktatur unter Talat, Enver und Djemal trat im Herbst 1914 ohne einheitliche Ideologie, aber mit dem festen Willen, den Staat zu stärken, in den Ersten Weltkrieg ein. Je nach Bedürfnis griff sie auf die eine oder andere Ideologie zurück: Expansiver Pantürkismus motivierte den Russlandfeldzug Enver Paschas; türkischer Ethnonationalismus begründete die Vertreibungs- und Genozidpolitik in Kleinasien; Osmanismus und Panislamismus bestimmten den politischen Ton gegenüber den Arabern, die dem Reich erhalten bleiben sollten. Dieser letzte Faktor fiel jedoch 1918 mit dem militärischen Verlust Arabiens, Iraks und Syriens weg. Mit ihren gut dreitausend Mitgliedern umfassten die türkistischen Foyers (Türk Yurdu [türkisches Heim] und Türk Ocagi [türkischer Herd]) seit dem Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs den Grossteil der jungen türkischen Akademikerschaft. Aus ihrem Schoss entstammten jene Kräfte, die binnen zweier Jahrzehnte den türkisch-nationalen Geschichtsdiskurs in scharfer Distinktion von der - spät versuchten - gemeinosmanischen Geschichtssicht ausformulierten. Ab 1931 geschah dies im dirigistischen Rahmen der offiziösen Türkischen Geschichtsgesellschaft (Türk Tarih Kurumü), dem türkistischen Gegenstück zur osmanistischen Geschichtskommission. Das Tarih Kurumu betreibt bis heute umfangreiche Projekte und wacht dabei über die politischen Prämissen der türkischen Geschichtswissenschaft. Frühe Mitglieder des Türk Ocagi und Autoren der ihm angeschlossenen, 1911 gegründeten Zeitschrift Türk Yurdu wie Yusuf Akgura und Regid Saffet Atabinen wurden später sowohl Parlamentsabgeordnete der Republik Türkei als auch Mitglieder des Tarih Kurumu. Die Arbeit der Geschichtsgesellschaft gipfelte in den 1930er Jahren in der von Mustafa Kemal Atatürk persönlich geförderten Türkischen Geschichtsthese (Türk Tarih Tezi). Sie war verknüpft mit der Sonnensprachtheorie (Güne§-Dil Teorisi), die Türkisch zur Ursprache der Menschheit statuierte. Die Geschichtsthese glorifizierte das Türkentum als Wiege der menschlichen Zivilisation, identifizierte die Türken als Arier und versetzte mit der Gleichsetzung von Türken und Hethitern die türkische Besiedelung Kleinasiens um Jahrtausende zurück, womit sie dessen territorialen Besitz nach der Vertreibung und Ermordung der Armenier und So namentlich Ak^ura in: Ba'su ba'de'l-mevt [Auferstehung nach dem Tod] In: Türk Yurdu, 2/34 (1913); Neuausgabe (Ankara 1998) Bd. 2, 176 f. 2 Yurdcular Yasasi, S. 69 f.

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Griechen rechtfertigte. Die Expertin kemalistischer Historiographie Bü§ra Ersanli hat mit Recht betont, dass «die politische Mission jener Historiker immer den Vorrang vor dem wissenschaftlichen Engagement hatte». 1 Dies hat sich trotz einer quantitativ beeindruckenden Produktion auch in den folgenden Jahrzehnten nicht grundlegend geändert. Die breite Bevölkerung der Republik Türkei hatte wegen des weit verbreiteten Analphabetismus, des Wechsels vom arabischen zum lateinischen Alphabet (1928) und des illiberalen Erziehungs- und Mediensystems kaum Möglichkeiten zur intellektuellen Auseinandersetzung mit den Vorbedingungen ihrer Nationalgeschichtsschreibung, die Hand in Hand ging mit gewaltsamen politischen Veränderungsprozessen. Die grosse Mehrheit der muslimischen Bevölkerung im spätosmanisehen Reich war des Lesens und Schreibens nicht kundig; Historiographie und ihre Rezeption beschränkten sich auf eine schmale, meist an den weiterführenden Schulen der Hauptstadt sowie in Europa ausgebildetete Elite. Dies war bei den orientalischen Christen - Griechisch-Orthodoxe {Rum), Armenier und Assyrer - anders; ihr Bildungsgrad war dank der Bildungsrenaissance des 19. Jahrhunderts, mitbedingt durch westliche Missionsanstrengungen, sowohl bei Männern als auch Frauen bedeutend höher. Die im übrigen auch nationalistisch geprägte historiographische Produktion dieser 1914-23 aus Kleinasien weitgehend vertriebenen Gemeinschaften, kann hier nicht thematisiert werden. 2 Die Tatsache, dass sich keine, die religiösen Gemeinschaften übergreifende moderne gemeinosmanische Historiographie entwickeln konnte, zeugt jedoch von der grundlegenden Schwierigkeit der damaligen - wie heutigen Gesellschaftsgruppen des Nahen Ostens, gemeinsam in Vergangenheit und Zukunft zu blicken. 3

^ Ersanli, Bü§ra: Iktidar ve tarih. Türkiye'de «Resmi Tarih» Tezinin olugumu (1929-1937) [Macht und Geschichte. Die Entwicklung der «offiziellen Geschichts-»These in der Türkei ^1929-1937)]. Istanbul 1996 (1992), 13, vgl. 122. Es gibt kaum weiterführende Literatur, die angezeigt werden könnte (ein Defizit, das auch aus dem generellen Mangel an Forschung über die christlichen Gemeinschaften im neuzeitlichen, v. a. spät- und postosmanischen Orient herrührt). Immerhin sei auf Kevork Pamukciyans in der Publikation begriffenes mehrbändiges Werk Ermeni kaynaklanndan tarihe katkilar [Beiträge zur Geschichte aus armenischen Quellen] hingewiesen, Istanbul 2002. Ich danke Prof. Hacik Gazer in Halle für den Buchhinweis. 3 Eine breite Beschäftigung auf neuestem Stand mit osmanischer und türkischer Historiographie - obzwar fast ohne Berücksichtigung des in diesem Aufsatz über Nationalstaat und Historiographie zentral bewerteten türkisch-armenischen sowie alevitischen Aspektes - findet sich in: Adamr, Fikret, und Faroqhi, Suraiya (Hg.): The Ottomans and the Balkans. A discussion of historiography. Leiden 2002.

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I. «Reformhistoriographie» im Horizont des Kalifenreiches (19. Jahrhundert) Im Gegensatz zur osmanischen Hofhistoriographie zur Blütezeit des Reiches im 16. Jahrhundert stand diejenige des 19. Jahrhunderts vor dem grossen Problem, eine geschichtliche begründete imperiale Perspektive in der inneren Herrschaftskrise und äusseren Bedrängtheit durch die europäischen Mächte aufzuzeigen. Herrscherlob, Ratschläge für den Fürsten und retrospektive Legitimierung erfolgreicher Politik allein genügten nicht mehr. Die Illusion eines unwandelbaren Weltreiches mit gottgegebener Dynastie und letztgültiger islamischer (hanefitisch-sunnitischer) Orthodoxie liess sich nicht mehr ohne Weiteres aufrecht erhalten. Zwar waren damalige osmanische Historiker wie Mehmed Esad, Ahmed Cevdet Pascha oder Abdurrahman §eref in mancher Hinsicht nichts anderes als traditionelle Hofchronisten (vak'a-nüvis): Grundsätzliche Zweifel am Islam, am Reichsgedanken, an der Dynastie und der privilegierten Stellung der Muslime als Herrschervolk (millet-i häkime) lagen ihnen fern; sie schrieben Geschichte in der Perspektive des muslimischen Reiches und um zu seinem Weiterbestehen beizutragen. Anders als ihre Vorgänger mussten sie und die Jungosmanen nach ihnen sich jedoch mit der europäischen Überlegenheit, einschneidenden Reformen und der Einordnung in die europäische Weltordnung auseinandersetzen. Entsprechend beschäftigten sie sich auch intensiv mit der europäischen, vor allem französischen Historiographie und glaubten wie diese an die Geschichtschreibung als politische und patriotische Lehrmeisterin.1 Der Hofhistoriker Mehmed Esad stellte den Vater der Reform des 19. Jahrhunderts (Tanzimat), Sultan Mahmud II. (1808-39), martialisch und nach dem Bild des eschatologisehen Herrschers (sahib-laran) dar: so wie ihn im 16. Jahrhundert eine apokalyptische Strömung in Sultan Süleyman I. erblickt hatte. Er interpretierte das 1826 von Mahmud befohlene Massaker an den Janitscharen, den traditionsreichen Elitetruppen, und das Verbot des BektaschiOrdens, eines mit den Janitscharen wie auch den meisten heterodoxen Aleviten in Kleinasien und auf dem Balkan liierten Ordens, als «heilvollen Vorgang» (vak'a-i hayriyye) für das Reich. Dasselbe tat der Historiograph und Reformpolitiker Ahmed Djevdet Pascha (1823-95). 2 Mahmud II. beseitigte mit dem vak'a-i hayriyye nicht nur schwer disziplinierbare Truppen aus der

2

Vgl. Ersanli: Iktidar ve tarih, 50-59.

Neumann, Christoph K.: Das indirekte Argument. Ein Plädoyer für die «Tanzimat» vermittels der Historie. Die geschichtliche Bedeutung von Ahmed Cevdet Pagas Ta'rih. Münster 1994. Zum eschatologischen Motiv osmanischer Herrschaft vgl. meinen Artikel: Djihad, Weltordnung, «Goldener Apfel». Die osmanische Reichsideologie im Kontext west-östlicher Geschichte. In: Faber, Richard (Hg.): Imperialismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Im Druck.

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Hauptstadt, sondern auch den aus dem 15./16. Jahrhundert stammenden ideologischen Widerspruch, der darin bestanden hatte, dass die für das Imperium zentrale Institution der Elitetruppen nicht der Linie der sunnitischen Reichsideologie entsprach. Zentralisierung und Vereinheitlichung - letztlich auch in ideologischer Hinsicht - waren die Schlüsselpostulate der Reform; die Binneneroberung und Direktregierung über das plurireligiöse Kurdistan war eine der ersten Folgerungen daraus. Gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts wurde konsequenterweise die Sunnitisierung der heterodoxen, ländlichen Aleviten (damals kizilba§ genannt) wie auch der Yeziden, die seit jeher die Reichsidologie und die Scharia ablehnten, zu einem wichtigen Postulat der Palastpolitik. 1 Von der Hofdichtung wurde Mahmud II. als «Herr der Welt» gepriesen, als was ihn die Provinzbevölkerung, soweit sie sunnitisch war, auch durchaus noch betrachtete. 2 Im Unterschied zum 16. Jahrhundert standen der Anspruch auf Weltordnung und die ganze Reichsideologie im offenkundigen Widerspruch zu einer Realität, die von der Abspaltung und Unabhängigkeit Griechenlands 1821-30, der Niederlage im Krieg gegen Russland 1828 und dem drohenden Kollaps des Reiches in den 1830er Jahren wegen der ägyptischen Invasion in Syrien und Kleinasien geprägt war. Die «orientalische Krise» bildete forthin ein weltpolitisches Dauerthema und manifestierte sich als zunehmende Desorientiertheit der imperialen Eliten. In seiner Expansionsphase im 15./16. Jahrhundert konnte das Reich mit manchen inneren Widersprüchen leben, da die universale Perspektive sie überwog und relativierte; im 19. Jahrhundert war dies nicht mehr der Fall. Mahmuds Politik wie auch dem Buch Mehmed Esads eignete eine restaurativ-sunnitische Ideologie, die ein idealisiertes Bild osmanischer Herrschaft im 16. Jahrhundert zum Vorbild nahm. Die osmanische Reformpolitik des 19. Jahrhunderts setzte zwar auf administrative Zentralisierung und den Import europäischen Know-hows in den Kernbereichen von Militär und Verwaltung, tastete aber den Reichsgedanken nicht an. Die Ausgangslage für die historiographische Produktion von Jungosmanen oder (je nach Terminologie) frühen Jungtürken wie Ahmed Midhat, Ali Suavi, Ali §efkati, Namik Kemal und Mehmed Murad im letzten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts unterschied sich durch die Desillusionierung über

1 Vgl. Deringil, Selim: The well-protected domains: ideology and the legitimation of power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909. London 1998,68-92; 2 Gedicht von Ahmed Sadik Ziver auf die Eröffnung der osmanisch-kaiserlichen Arzteschule in Konstantinopel, 1839. Transkription mit deutscher Übersetzung von Hammer-Purgstall in Terzioglu, Arslan: Galatasaray'daki Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Adliye-i gahane'ye dair gimdiye kadar bilinmeyen almanca kaynaklar [Bis anhin unbekannte deutschsprachige Quellen über die Kaiserliche Ärzteschule in Galatasaray], Tarih ve Toplurn, Nr. 100, April 1992, S. 216. Zum Sultanbild in der Provinz vgl. Kieser, Hans-Lukas: Der verpasste Friede. Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei 1839-1938. Zürich 2000, 42.

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den Ausgang der Reformpolitik, die aussenpolitischen Misserfolge und - zum Teil - den Hass auf das autokratische System des Sultans Abdulhamid II. (1876-1909), in welchem der von Mahmud II. begonnene defensive Restaurationsversuch des Reiches gipfelte. Die frühen Jungtürken hegten das Bedürfnis nach patriotischer Besinnung auf die Glanzzeiten und Helden des Reiches; zugleich suchten sie vehement einer imperialen «Dekadenz» zu entgehen, die sie als «byzantinisch» deuteten. Die kosmopolitische neobyzantinische Ausrichtung, die etwa der freimaurerische Jungosmane Ali §efkati vertrat, blieb eine in der Folge fallen gelassene Minderheitenposition.1 Die Abgrenzung von der byzantinischen Geschichte und vom Kosmopolitismus generell sowie die Minimierung des Einflusses von Byzanz auf die Türken wurden zu zentralen Anliegen der türkistischen Geschichtsschreibung.2 Als übergreifende Konstanten reformerischer wie früher jungtürkischer Geschichtssicht blieben der determinierende Horizont des Kalifatsreiches und der islamischen Geschichte sowie die Zentriertheit auf den Staat, seine Geschicke und seine Organisation. Die Aufwertung des Türkentums bei Ali Suavi, Namik Kemal und Ahmed Midhat ordnete sich noch ganz in diesen Rahmen ein. Der romantisierende historiographische Kult um Helden wie Saladin, Mehmed den Eroberer und Selim I. tendierte indes bereits zu expliziter antichristlicher Polemik und türkisch-muslimischem Chauvinismus 3 - eine Tendenz, die sich im Kontext des Ersten Weltkriegs scharf akzentuieren sollte.

II. Die jungtürkische Krise und der Umgang mit Geschichte (Fin de siecle-Erster Weltkrieg) Die dramatische osmanische Niederlage im russsisch-türkischen Krieg 1877/78, der sich auf dem Balkan und in Ostanatolien abspielte, bildete den Auftakt der Regierung Abdulhamids II. Der russische Vormarsch löste Ströme muslimischer Flüchtlinge nach Istanbul aus und führte um ein Haar zu dessen Birinci, Ali: Ali §efkati. In: Osmanlilar Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul 1999, Bd. 1,237 f. Ursinus, Michael: «Nicht die Türken siegten über Byzanz, sondern Byzanz über die Türken.», Zur Vergangenheitsbewältigung im Osmanischen Reich am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs, Periplus 3 (1993), 47-68; ders.: From Süleyman Pasha to Mehmet Fuat Köprülü: Roman and' Byzantine History in late Ottoman Historiography. In: Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 12 ^1988), 305-14. So Namik Kemal: Evrak-i Perijan [Verstreute Dokumente], Istanbul H. 1288-1305 (18711888); zitiert in Kuran, Ercüman: Ottoman historiography of the Tanzimat period, in: Lewis, Bernard, und Holt, Peter (Hg.): Historians of the Middle East, London 1962, 422-29, hier 426 f. Zum jungosmanischen politischen Denken und Umgang mit der osmanischen Geschichte: Mardin, §erif: The genesis of Young Ottoman thought. A study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas. Princeton 1962.

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Fall. Die Niederlage prägte den defensiven, autokratischen Islamismus des Sultans, bildete aber auch den prägenden mentalen Hintergrund der jungtürkischen Generation. Zur «Endzeitstimmung» im osmanischen Fin de siècle und damit zur jungtürkischen Krise mit ihren einschneidenden Folgen trug zudem der Staatsbankrott (1875) bei, der zur Einrichtung der ausländischen Schuldenverwaltung führte (1881). Das Schreckbild der Fremdbestimmung, des Endes und Untergangs, den die Jungtürken in sozialdarwinistische Begriffe fassten, ging bei ihnen zusammen mit dem Wunsch nach tabula rasa und völligem Neuanfang. Es fehlten ihnen aber vorerst die politischen Ideen und die entsprechenden Geschichtsbilder zur Begründung einer «neuen Türkei» auf neuer Grundlage, das heisst jenseits von Islam und osmanischer Dynastie. Der Begriff «neue Türkei» wurde seit dem Fin de siècle zum Topos sowohl dieser Akteure als auch europäischer Beobachter. Um die Jahrhundertwende kreierten hauptsächlich aus dem russischen Zarenreich emigrierte türkischsprachige muslimische Akademiker wie Ahmed Agayef (alias Agaoglu), Ismail Gasprinski und Yusuf Akçura eindeutige ethnonationale Geschichtsbilder.1 Auf ihrer Identitätssuche jenseits zaristischer Reichsideologie Hessen sie sich von europäischen Pionieren der Turkologie wie dem deutsch-russischen Linguisten Wilhelm Radioff, dem Turkologen Arminius Vambéry aus Ungarn und dem französischen Publizisten Léon Cahun inspirieren. Diese hatten sich mit der türkischen Völkerfamilie in ethnischer Hinsicht befasst und, dem Zeitgeist entsprechend, ihre Darstellung mit einem wertenden Rassedenken und sozialdarwinistischen Vorstellungen verknüpft. Der Zentralasien-Reisende Radioff verband in den 1880er Jahren neue Begriffe mit alten Stereotypen, indem er zum Beispiel von den Turkmenen als den «noch unvermischten Vetretern des Türkenthums» sprach und dem «faulen, aber ehrlichen Türken» den «schlauen, gewandten Griechen» gegenüberstellte. 2 Bei all seiner Sympathie für den Gegenstand seiner Forschung und Betonung der «weltgeschichtlichen Bedeutung» der Türken in der Vergangenheit stellte Vambéry 1885 das türkische Volk in seinem Werk Das Türkenvolk in seinen ethnologischen und ethnographischen Beziehungen als «unfähig, seine nationale Existenz [staatlich] zu begründen», dar und stellte ihm ein «grausames Schicksal», nämlich die teilweise Für eine eingehende wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung mit Akçura und Agaoglu siehe Georgeon, François: Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935). Paris 1980; ders.: Ahmed Agaoglu, un intellectuel turc, In: Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée (ReMMM) 5 2 - 5 3 (1989), 186-97. Über Gasprinski (alias Gaspirali) siehe Cervonnaja, Svetlana M.: Das Vermächtnis Ismail Gasprinskijs im Kontext aktueller Probleme von Wissenschaft und Politik des postsowjetischen Raumes. In: Orient 44-2 (2002), 239-80. Radioff, Wilhelm: Aus Sibirien. Lose Blätter aus meinem Tagebuch. Leipzig 1893 (Erstausgabe 1884), 471-73.

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Vernichtung in Aussicht. 1 Solche Gedanken und die ethnonationale Konzeption insgesamt übten eine herausfordernde, gleichsam elektrisierende Wirkung auf die türkischsprachige osmanische Elite aus, wie dies die frühen Diskussionen der Türkisten belegen. Den nachhaltigsten direkten Einfluss auf die türkischsprachige Elite besass jedoch Cahun. Bereits 1873 hatte er auf einem Orientalistenkongress in Paris ebenso suggestiv wie - im Hinblick auf europäische Rassentheorien subversiv gefragt: «Les Turcs sont-ils arrivés de l'Isigh Gol dans le nord de l'Europe à une époque tellement ancienne à l'arrivée des Aryens, qu'ils puissent être considérés, par rapport à ceux-ci, comme autochtones?» Er wies auf sprachliche und rassische Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Etruskern und Türken hin, um zu schliessen: »Nous pouvons ainsi constater que les populations dites touraniennes qui ont d'abord débordé sur l'Europe étaient des Turcs; qu'il en est de même de celles qui ont débordé sur le nord de l'Asie orientale.»2 Cahuns auf französisch geschriebene, romantisierende vorosmanische Geschichte der Türken und Mongolen, gab der desorientierten türkischsprachigen Generation der Jahrhundertwende einen rettenden, nämlich vor-osmanischen Boden unter die Füsse. 3 Sein Buch war anschaulich geschrieben und machte dank vielen Quellenverweisen einen wissenschaftlichen Eindruck; vor allem aber war es auf Französisch verfasst, das die osmanische Bildungselite seit den Tanzimat als Kultursprache pflegte. Auch in methodologischer Hinsicht nahm bis Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts, wie wir noch sehen werden, die universitäre türkische FBstoriographie die französische zum Vorbild. Die frühen Türkisten aus dem Zarenreich, die sich dem E t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m u s als neuer Grundlage gesellschaftlichen Selbstverständnisses zuwandten, waren um die Jahrhundertwende eine kleine Minderheit innerhalb der akademischen Elite. Denn diese war insgesamt noch stark der Tradition des osmanisch-türkischen Kalifatsreiches verpflichtet und vom Gedanken umhergetrieben, wie ihr «grosser Staat» historisch verstanden und politisch gerettet werden könnte. Erst die Bewegung der türkistischen Foyers machte den Türkismus ein Jahrzehnt später zur geistigen Hauptströmung unter jungen Akademikern und einigen wenigen Akademikerinnen. Das allgemeine Aufkommen dieser Strömung war wiederum eng mit der Ereignisgeschichte gekoppelt, nämlich mit den Kriegen Vambéry, Hermann [Arminius]: Das Türkenvolk in seinen ethnologischen und ethnographischen Beziehungen, Leipzig 1885, 622. 2 Cahun, Léon: Habitat et migrations préhistoriques des races dites touraniennes. Congrès international des orientalistes. Compte rendu de la première session. 1. Bd. Paris 1874, 431-41, zitiert in: Copeaux, Etienne: Espaces et temps de la nation turque: analyse d'une historiographie nationaliste 1931-1993. Paris 1997, 36 f. 3 Cahun, Léon: Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie. Turcs et Mongols des origines à 1405. Paris 1896.

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in Libyen und auf dem Balkan (1911-13). Diese verlustreichen Kriege gegen die jungen, im Gegensatz zum Reich «aufstrebenden» Nationalstaaten ehemaliger christlicher Untertanen bestärkten die osmanisch-muslimische Bildungselite darin, nur ein ethnoreligiöser Nationalismus - der sich politisch Europa widersetzte, ihm kulturell-zivilisatorisch jedoch gänzlich nachstrebte habe politische Zukunft. Der gemeinsosmanische Enthusiasmus nach der unblutigen jungtürkischen Revolution im Juli 1908 hatte andere Perspektiven auch historiographischer Art eröffnet. Die 1909 gegründete staatliche Osmanische Geschichtskommission hielt im Frühjahr 1910 fest, wie nötig für die osmanische Nation ein geschichtliches Kompendium sei, das ihr im Gegensatz zu den westeuropäischen Nationen noch fehle. «Bei Nationen, die um ihre Vergangenheit nicht wissen, die über die Tugenden und Fehler ihrer Väter und Vorväter nicht informiert sind, die nicht vor dem Gericht ihres Gewissens das Urteil des Beifalls oder der Mißbilligung aussprechen [...], können sich die Zuneigung zu und Verbundenheit mit der lieben Heimat, dieser liebevollen Mutter, nicht vollständig manifestieren.» Mit diesen Worten beklagte die Kommission nicht nur das Fehlen eines säkularen patriotischen Geschichtsverständnisses, sondern auch den Mangel an emanzipatorischer Kritik in der bisherigen Hofhistoriographie. Im verfassungspatriotischen Geist jener kurzen Zeit nach der Revolution fuhr sie fort: «Als die Osmanen, die sich die Prinzipien des Konstitutionalismus zu eigen gemacht haben, den festen Willen äusserten, mit der Einheit der Ethnien, dem Ausgleich der Interessen und dem Bündeln der Hoffnungen, mit gleicher Kraft auf die gemeinsame Heimat zu bauen, zeigte sich die Notwendigkeit die nationale Geschichte zu lernen.»1 Aber nicht die Osmanische Geschichtskommission, sondern die Intellektuellen der türkistischen Foyers nahmen mit ihrer historiographischen Produktion jener Jahre vor dem Weltkrieg die entscheidenden Weichenstellungen für die Prägung der Geschichtsbilder in der Türkei des 20. Jahrhundert vor. Zwei zueinander in Spannung stehende Entwicklungen liefen Hand in Hand: die Konstruktion einer türkistischen Geschichtsschau, das heisst die Wende vom osmanisch-muslimischen zum ethnonationalen Paradigma, sowie die Verwissenschaftlichung, das heisst die Adoption zeitgenössischer europäischer Methodologie. Drei für diesen Paradigmenwechsel einflussreiche Persönlichkeiten, die auch für die frühe Republik wichtig blieben, waren Yusuf Akgura, Ahmed Agaoglu und Ziya 1 Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni: tfade-i meram [Absichtserklärung]. In: Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuasi [Zeitschrift der Osmanische Geschichtskommission] 1 (1 Nisan 1326), 1. Zitiert in Herzog, Christoph: Geschichte und Ideologie: Mehmed Murad und Celal Nuri über die historischen Ursachen des osmanischen Niedergangs. Berlin 1996, 203.

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Gökalp. Für die ethnonationale Geschichtsschau verbunden mit seriöser wissenschaftlicher Recherche setzte sich Fuat Köprülü ein. Für die Verknüpfung türkistischer Thesen mit anthropologischen Spekulationen stehen unter anderen Re§id Saffet Atabinen und Ay§e Afetinan (diese eng liiert mit Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). Alle genannten ausser Köprülü sowie Gökalp, der 1924 verstarb, wurden in den 1930er Jahren auch Mitglieder des deutungsmächtigen Tarih Kurumu. Der nationalistische Vordenker und Soziologe Ziya Gökalp unterschied 1922 in seinem Artikel «Ist Geschichte Wissenschaft oder Kunst?» zwischen objektiver, um soziologische Gesetzmässigkeiten bemühter Historiographie und nationaler Geschichte, die pädagogische Inhalte und Ziele habe, nämlich die Selbstfindung der Nation. 1 Er schloss mit den Worten: «Die objektive Geschichte ist das Gedächtnis der Menschheit, die nationale Geschichte hingegen das Bewusstsein der Nation.» 2 Die Spannung zwischen nationaler Selbstbestätigung und der Erforschung geschichtlicher Wahrheit, die der Selbstbestätigung auf Kosten anderer entgegensteht, ist der historiographischen Produktion in jedem Nationalstaat inhärent. Aus verschiedenen Gründen war sie in der Türkei des 20. Jahrhunderts stärker ausgeprägt und dauerhafter als anderswo. Denn sie bildete auch das schwierige und prägende Verhältnis zu Europa im Zeitalter des Imperialismus ab: Von Europa holten sich die jungtürkischen Eliten einerseits die intellektuellen Mittel zur nationalen und zivilisatorischen Selbstkonstruktion her (nichts belegt dies deutlicher als der Aufruf an die Jugend, sich mit einem Studium in Europa zur Rettung der Nation zu befähigen), von dessen erdrückender Übermacht suchten sie sich andererseits in ihrer türkischen und kulturell muslimischen Identität durch die Schaffung entsprechender Geschichtsbilder scharf abzugrenzen. Die Abgrenzung von europäischen Geschichtsbildern, die der Konstruktion einer modernen türkisch-muslimischen Identität hinderlich schienen, sei es weil sie kritisch oder aber mit Vorurteilen behaftet waren, bestimmten weitgehend die historiographischen Themen der Gründungsepoche des türkischen Nationalismus, das heisst des ersten Drittels des 20. Jahrhunderts. Die «zivilisatorische Leistung» der Türken in der Geschichte, die (minimisierte) Rolle von Byzanz, die ethnische Identität der Bewohner

Wie Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945, vgl. dessen Les cadres sociaux de la memoire, Paris 1925), der eine analoge Unterscheidung traf, stand Gökalp unter dem Einfluss des französischen Soziologen Emile Dürkheim. Gökalp, Ziya: Tarih ilim mi, yoksa sanat mi [Ist Geschichte Wissenschaft oder Kunst]? In: Küsük Mecmua [Kleine Zeitschrift] 1/11 (1338/1922), 15 f. Zitiert nach Strohmeier, Martin: Seldschukische Geschichte und türkische Geschichtswissenschaft: die Seldschuken im Urteil moderner türkischer Historiker. Berlin 1984, 70-73.

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Kleinasiens, das Postulat, Anatolien vom nichttürkischen «Fremden» zu «erlösen» wie auch zahlreiche Gegenstände der späten osmanischen und frühen nachosmanisehen Nahgeschichte - davon am ausgeprägtesten die «armenische Frage» - bildeten die Hauptthemen der nationalen Identitätskonstruktion; ein weiteres Themenfeld umfasste den «Untergang» des Osmanischen Reiches sowie - in der Distanznahme von der eigenen, als unentwirrbar problematisch betrachteten Geschichte - die entsprechend aufgewertete vorosmanische und vorislamische türkische Epoche: Fast alle diese Themen treten am grundlegenden Türkistenkongress vom März 1913 deutlich zu Tage. 1 Der Jargon des sozialen und mentalen Konstruktivismus taugt allein nicht zur B e s c h r e i b u n g des P h ä n o m e n s « T ü r k i s m u s » : 2 Zur ethnonationalistischen Wende im Geschichtsbild am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs gehörte die Entdeckung einer bisher ungekannten Dimension, die zum quasi religiösen Heureka-Erlebnis wurde. Daraus entsprang ein Kult um das Türkentum und eine völkische Tendenz, die die exklusive Teilhabe an einer sprachlich-kulturellen «Gemeinschaft der Gefühle» kultivierte und eine starke Aufwertung der heidnischen Vorzeit betrieb. Die türkistischen Foyers suchten mit missionarischem Eifer die noch «unerweckten» Rassegeschwister «mit dem Licht zu erleuchten, das die heilige Kanzel des türkischen Tempels bestrahlt». 3 Die Mitglieder des Foyer Türe in Lausanne, dem Zentrum der Foyer-Bewegung in Europa, verpflichteten sich, «die Richtigkeit ihrer Anliegen und Heiligkeit ihrer Ziele jenen Türken gegenüber, die noch nicht zur Bewegung gehörten, überall zu verteidigen». 4 Das Türkentum Zentralasiens, das mythische Turan und die ethnische, sich bis nach Zentralasien und China erstreckende Grosstürkei bestimmten die geschichtliche, spirituelle und politische Ausrichtung der türkistischen Bewegung. Ihre Helden waren die Grossherrscher Dschingis Khan und Tamerlan, die Rasse, die sie glorifizierten, hiess Oguz. Der Rote Apfel (Kizil Elmä) symbolisierte ihre kulturellen oder politischen Weltmachtsträume. Im Zeichen des nationalen «Wiedererwachens» und der «Rückkehr zum Turanismus» wurden Feste und Gedenktage, die auf Helden und Mythen zurückgriffen, inbrünstig gefeiert. So pilgerte man am Jahrestag der Eroberung von Konstantinopel zum Grabe Mehmeds II. («des Eroberers»), «um die

2

Yurdcular Yasasi.

Kritische und selbstkritische Reflexionen dazu beim armenisch-amerikanischen Historiker Suny: Suny, Ronald: Constructing primordialism: Old histories for new nations. In: The Journal of Modern Histrory 73 (2001), 862-96. 3 Protokollbuch des Foyer Ture in Lausanne, Eintrag vom 25. 5. 1918 (Türk Tarih Kurumu [Türkische Geschichtsgesellschaft in Ankara] Y 653). 4 Ebenda, Artikel 16: «Madde 16: Yurdcular davalarimn dogrulugunu ve yurdeuluk emellerimn kudsiyetini, yurdcu olmayan Türklere kar§i her tarafta müdafaa etmekte mükelleftirler.»

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Heiligkeit seines Geistes anzurufen, um sich für die harte Aufgabe der Zukunft Erhebung und Eingebung zu holen.»1 Von Ziya Gökalp stammt die auch von türkischen Auslandstudenten zitierte emphatische Strophe, die als quasi religiöse Ergänzung, nicht als Gegensatz zur eingangs erwähnten türkistischen Festlegung auf das Mutterland Anatolien zu lesen ist: «Das Heimatland [vatan] der Türken ist nicht die Türkei, ist nicht Turkestan, es ist ein ewiges Land: Turan!» Weniger bekannt sind die vorausgehenden Zeilen, deren Geschichtsmystizismus sich mit antiwestlichen Seitenhieben verbindet: «Die Eindrücke, die in meinem Blute kreisen, sind der Widerhall meiner Geschichte. Ich lese nicht die ruhmreichen Taten meiner Ahnen auf den toten vergilbten, verstaubten Blättern der Geschichte, sondern in meinen Adern, meinem Herzen. Mein Attila, mein Dschingis [Khan], diese heldenhaften Gestalten, die den stolzen Ruhm meiner Rasse bilden, erscheinen auf jenen verstaubten Blättern der Geschichte, diesem mit Übelwollen und Verleumdung durchsumpften Milieu, mit Schande und Schmach bedeckt, während sie in Wirklichkeit nicht geringer sind als Alexander und Cäsar. Mein Herz kennt noch besser Oguz Khan, eine für die Geschichte dunkle und ungeklärte Gestalt [mythischer Stammvater der Osmanen und Seldschuken].»2 Als Soziologe war sich Gökalp zwar klar geworden, dass das Konzept einer rassischen Nation im Sinne des Blutes und der Abstammung absurd war; dennoch passten manche seiner einprägsamen Formulierungen - wie die obige - ins Weltbild stärker rassistisch denkender Türkisten. Nach Gökalps Auffassung, die Mustafa Kemal massgeblich prägte, bestimmte die kindliche und jugendliche Sozialisierung über den Erwerb der Muttersprache, kollektiver Gefühle und der Religion die Zugehörigkeit zur Nation; daher mass er der nationalen Geschichtserziehung auch einen hohen identitätsbildenden Wert bei. In der politischen Praxis bedeutete die nationale Sozialisierung im Sinne Gökalps jedoch ein fast ebenso exklusives Zugehörigkeitsmerkmal wie Rasse im biologischen Sinn. 3

2

Alp, Tekin: Türkismus und Pantürkismus. Weimar 1915,18.

Auf deutsch zitiert in Werner, Ernst: Panturkismus und einige Tendenzen moderner türkischer Historiographie. In: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 13 (1965), 1342-54, hier 1345. Vgl. Yurdcular Yasasi. Istanbul o.D. (1914), 19. 3 Gökalp, Ziya: Millet nedir [Was ist eine Nation]? In: Kü9ük Mecmua 1923, zitiert nach der Übersetzung in: Berkes, Niyazi (Hg.): Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization. Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp. New York 1959, 134-38. Erik-Jan Zürcher diskutiert die politische Zweischneidigkeit des kemalistischen Nationsbegriffs in The core terminology of kemalism: mefküre, milli, muasir, medeni. In: Kieser, Hans-Lukas (Hg.): Aspects of the political language in Turkey (19th-20th cc.). Istanbul 2002, 105-116, hier 111 f.

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III. Die türkistische Neuausrichtung und die Zeitschrift Türk Yurdu In den gleichen Vorkriegsnummern des Türk Yurdu, in denen Ziya Gökalp und andere damalige panturanistische 1 Türkisten ihre lyrischen Seelenergüsse publizierten, erschienen soziologische und historische Artikel, manche davon übrigens ebenfalls aus der Feder des vielseitig begabten Soziologen Gökalp. Die von 1911 bis 1931 erscheinende Zeitschrift Türk Yurdu war in kultureller und geistesgeschichtlicher Hinsicht das mit Abstand einflussreichste Organ für die türkischsprachige Bildungselite; sie gibt einen ausgezeichneten Einblick in die Formulierung und Prägung neuer Geschichtsbilder auf dem Wege zur «neuen Türkei».2 Gegenüber Türk Yurdu wirkte die Zeitschrift der Kommission für osmanische Geschichte (Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuasi) trocken und gelehrt. In den entscheidenden Jahren vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg besass sie keine zündende Ideologie, die dem seelischen Bedürfnis nach einer starken ersatzreligiösen Identität im Zeitalter der Säkularisierung und Auflösung des Reichs entgegenkam. Das Bemühen der Kommission, die Idee multiethnischer nationaler Kohäsion gegenüber den Nationalismen und dem Islamismus geltend zu machen und eine osmanische Geschichte im osmanistischen Geist zu schreiben, fand kaum Widerhall. Auch lief die sachliche Beschäftigung mit der Geschichte eines durch Eroberung entstandenen Vielvölkerreiches Gefahr, die Legitimation des Reiches vor allem bei den Nichtmuslimen zu untergraben.3 Die geschichtlichen Beiträge im Türk Yurdu konzentrierten sich im Gegensatz dazu auf die Aufwertung vorosmanischer türkischer Geschichte. So Ahmed Agayef (alias Agaoglu) in seiner Vorlesung über die «Geschichte türkischer Zivilisation», die er an der Universität Istanbul hielt und 1913 im Türk Yurdu abdrucken liess.4 Agayefs Kernaussage lautetete, es könne «kein Zweifel bestehen, dass die Türken schon in vorislamischer Zeit zivilisiert gewesen seien». Agayefs intellektueller Kontrahent Süleyman Nazif Schriftsteller, 1914/15 Vali von Bagdad und prononcierter Kritiker des CUP

Panturanismus oder Pantürkismus ist die irredentistische Maximalvariante des türkischen Ethnonationalismus. Mit seinem Kult von Turan pflegte Gökalp vor allem die kulturelle, nicht die politische Dimension des Panturanismus; diese wiederum fand in Enver Pascha einen prominenten Vertreter. Allgemein über die Zeitschrift: Dumont, Paul: La revue Türk Yurdu et les Musulmans de l'Empire russe. In: Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, 15/3^4- (1974), 315-32; Arai. 3 4

Vgl. Herzog, 204.

Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi [Türkische Zivilisationsgeschichte]. In: Türk Yurdu, 2/40, 41,43 (1913); Neuausgabe (Ankara 1998) Bd. 2, 292-96, 303-8, 3 4 0 ^ 5 .

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auch hinsichtlich seiner Armenierpolitik 1 - bezeichnetet den TürkentumMythos jener, die den Islam und die osmanische Geschichte gering achteten und sich somit nicht um eine wirkliche Synthese von Ost und West bemühen würden, spöttisch als «Dschingis Khan-Krankheit»: «Wenn wir den Arabern und Persern alles zurückgaben, was wir von Ihnen haben, bliebe uns nichts anderes als eine langärmlige Jacke.» Es spricht für das Türk Yurdu als damals relativ offenes Forum, dass es diese Kontroversen wenigstens zum Teil abbildete.2 Obligate Verweise auf westliche Autoren (die, falls sie die eigene Sicht stützten, als unfehlbar galten) fehlen in kaum einem historiographischen Text. So wies zum Beispiel Agayef auf den schon von Ali Suavi entdeckten englisch-jüdischen Turkologen Arthur Lumley Davids hin, der 1832 vom «recht hohen Grad der Zivilisation» der Tartaren gesprochen hatte.3 In Agayefs Vorlesung von 1913 tauchen bereits deutliche Anklänge auf die berüchtigte Hethitertheorie Mustafa Kemal Atatürks der 1930er Jahre auf, die - als Teil der Türkischen Geschichtsthese - eine türkische Besiedlung Kleinasiens in vorhomerischer Zeit postulierte und damit akute politische Bedürfnisse nach historischer Legitimierung der Nahgeschichte zu befriedigen suchte.4 Nicht nur die Türken, auch die Juden sahen sich vom zeitgenössischen Europa kulturell und rassisch abgewertet. Es gibt daher nicht nur Einflüsse, sondern auch einige relevante Überschneidungslinien mit jüdischen Intellektuellen festzuhalten. Der aus Saloniki stammende Ideologe des Türkismus Moiz Kohen Tekinalp (1883-1961), wurde, obwohl letztlich ein Aussenseiter der Bewegung, in den 1930er Jahren der wichtigste Theoretiker des Kemalismus fürs Ausland; 5 in den 1920er Jahren hatte er sich beim Türk Ocagi für die durchgreifende Türkifizierung der Gesellschaft stark gemacht. 6 Die Namen Davids', Vambérys und Cahuns sind bereits gefallen: alle drei frühe Turkologen, die Grenzen europäischen Wissens überschritten, kulturelle Vorurteile hinterfragten und damit der türkischen Identitätskonstruktion und * So z. B. Nazif, Süleyman: Doktor Rc§id. In: Hadisat 8.2.1919 (ganzer Artikel transkribiert in Mehmed Re§id [§ahingiray]: Hayati ve Hâtiralari, hg. von Nejdet Bilgi, Izmir 1997, 167-71. Eine Zusammenfassung der Kontroverse findet sich in Tuncer, Hüseyin: Türk Yurdu üzerine bir inceleme. Ankara 1975, 403. Zitat nach Arai, 292. 3 Türk Yurdu, 2/40 (1913); Neuausgabe Bd. 2, 295 f. Vgl. Davids, Arthur Lumley: Grammaire turke: précédée d'un discours préliminaire sur la langue et la littérature des nations orientales avec un vocabulaire volumineux. Traduit de l'anglais par Madame Sarah Davids. London 1836 (englische Originalausgabe 1832). Türk Yurdu, 2/40 (1913); Neuausgabe Bd. 2, 304-7. Siehe auch Kap. V. Durch sein Werk Le Kémalisme. Paris 1937. Über Tekinalp siehe Landau, Jacob: Tekinalp, Turkish patriot: 1883-1961. Istanbul 1984. So durch seine Schrift Türklegtirme [Türkifizierung], Istanbul 1928; abgedruckt in: Bayrak, Mehmet (Hg.): Kürtler ve ulusal-demokratik mücadeleri [Die Kurden und ihre Kämpfe um Nation und Demokratie]. Ankara 1993, 324-74.

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Historiographie Impulse verliehen. Manchmal geschah dies auf fragwürdige Weise. Der aus Lemberg stammende Zionist Alfred Nossig (1864-1943) betätigte sich während des Ersten Weltkriegs als Propagandist des Türkismus in deutschen Diensten; seine Schriften wurden mehrfach aufgelegt. Kurz nach der Vernichtung der armenischen Gemeinschaft in Kleinasien suchte er im Herbst 1915 die jungtürkischen Führer in Istanbul auf, interviewte sie und stellte sie noch belobigender dar als Tekinalp in seinem damals ebenfalls auf Deutsch erscheinenden Werk über Pantürkismus.1 Nossig schrieb mit Tendenz zu kollektiver Selbstidentifikation - er suchte gleichzeitig das zionistische Anliegen beim Innenminister Talat voranzutreiben - und in säkular apokalyptischer Sichtweise: «Was sich in der Türkei vollzieht, wird für alle Zeiten eines der denkwürdigsten und lehrreichsten Schauspiele der Weltgeschichte bleiben. Es ist das Schauspiel eines Volkes und eines Staates, die, durch innere Zustände und äussere Umtriebe dicht an den Rand moralischer Zerrüttung, wirtschaftlichen Ruins und politischer Vernichtung gebracht, von vielen als rettungslos verloren betrachtet, sich aufraffen; die unter heilsamen Amputationen, aus dem unversiegten Kräftevorrat eines lebenden Organismus heraus sich verjüngen, ja, ihr politisch-nationales Dasein in modernem Sinne eigentlich erst beginnen.»2 Zionismus und türkischer Nationalismus teilten die zwiespältige Erfahrung mit Europa, die Absage an den Kosmopolitismus («Byzanz») und an die eigene religiöse Tradition sowie das negative Geschichtsbild asiatischer «Rückständigkeit» und osmanischer Misswirtschaft. Beide verbanden mit dieser Geschichtsschau ein konträres Zukunftsprojekt, das auf der Basis des «erweckten» eigenen ethnonationalen Kollektivs im postosmanisehen Raum europäische Zivilisation zum Erblühen bringen sollte. Die positiven eigenen nationalen Geschichtsmythen bezogen sich vor allem auf die alte vorislamische beziehungsweise vorchristliche Zeit. Im Gegensatz zu den Türkisten standen diese Mythen bei den Zionisten indes nicht im radikalen Gegensatz zur eigenen Offenbarungsreligion. Das für die türkistische Intelligentsia zentrale historiographische Bemühen, die eigene Geschichte als die einer Zivilisation auf zumindest gleicher Augenhöhe wie die europäische darzustellen, ging einher mit ihrem Bestreben, sich zivilisationsgeschichtlich in die «westliche Völkerfamilie»

2

Alp: Türkismus.

Nossig, Alfred: Die Neue Türkei und ihre Führer. Halle (Saale) 1916, 1. Nossig gehörte ab 1939 zum Judenrat in Warschau und wurde am 22. 2. 1943 von jüdischen Partisanen wegen seiner Kollaboration mit den Nationalsozialisten ermordet. Instruktiv, aber wenig erhellend für den türkischen Zusammenhang sind Kressel, Getzel: Nossig, Alfred. In: Encyclopaedia Judaica (digital), und Hart, Mitchell: Moses the Microbiologist: Judaism and social hygiene in the work of Alfred Nossig. Jewish Social Studies 2 (1995), 72-97.

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einzuordnen. Hamdullah Subhi, der Mitbegründer und langjährige Präsident des Türk Ocagi, schrieb 1924: «Das Türk Yurdu ist ein Organ für lebensfördernde Meinungen im Kampf gegen alle Reaktionäre, die die türkische Nation nach hinten ziehen wollen. Es wird weiterhin die kulturellen und wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeiten der Türk Ocaklari festhalten und für die kulturelle Einheit der türkischen Nation kämpfen. Das Türk Yurdu ist zugleich ein Propagandaorgan jener, die sich die westliche Zivilisation angeeignet haben, die alle Ansätze zur Rettung [der Nation] im Import jener Zivilisation erblicken und die die türkische Nation in die westliche Völkerfamilie einordnen wollen.» 1 Zwar passten sich die Türkisten dem allgemeinen Trend der sie umgebenden spätosmanischen nichtmuslimischen Jungeliten an, aber sie verliehen dem Nationalismus eine ganz spezielle Ausprägung, indem sie ihn als Rettung aus der Krise des Islams und der demütigenden Lage der «unerweckten türkischen Nation» überschwänglich begrüssten. Der türkische Nationalismus hatte in der Tat die Herkulesaufgabe zu lösen, die Elite des Herrschervolkes (millet-i häkime) im ausgehenden, sechshundertjährigen Universalreich des Kalifen mit einer Moderne zu versöhnen, in welcher der Islam keine Zukunft zu haben schien. Der Rückgriff auf das Türkentum war die Zuflucht zu einer Essenz, die als prähistorisch und «natürlich» gegeben imaginiert wurde; sie präsentierte sich als kompatibel mit moderner biologistischer Weltanschauung und wies zugleich einen Weg aus der sprachlichen und kulturellen Kompliziertheit der spätosmanischen Epoche. Methodische Skepsis und die Freiheit des Denkens, unabdingbare Ingredienzien einer am Wahrheitsethos orientierten Wissenschaft, blieben weitgehend auf der Strecke - wie bei allen zeitgenössischen Nationalismen dieser Art. Das neue Weltbild «rettete» vor der Komplexität, Osmane zu sein, und der wachsenden Schwierigkeit, Muslim zu bleiben in einer Welt schwindenden islamischen Prestiges. Selten hatte Geschichtsschreibung eine so performative Funktion wie für die türkistische Türkei bis zum Tode Atatürks (1911-38). Die an Turan und das Türkentum glaubende Generation entwarf neuartige Geschichtsbilder, die grossenteils in der jungen Republik offizialisiert wurden (siehe Kapitel V). Es erstaunt daher nicht, dass die Foyers, deren Sprachrohr die Zeitschrift Türk Yurdu bildete, 2 1931 anstandslos mit der Republikanischen Einheitspartei verschmolzen wurden und auch die Zeitschrift Türk Yurdu ihr Erscheinen einstellte. Die Wortführer des während zwanzig Jahren einflussreichsten türkischen Kulturclubs Hessen verlauten, dass die Einheitspartei unter dem 1

Türk Yurdu, 15/1 (1924); Neuausgabe Bd. 8, 13.

Seit Februar 1929 explizit auf der Titelseite: «[Türk Yurdu] propagiert die Meinungen der Türk Ocaklari.»

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grossen Führer Mustafa Kemal Pascha ihre geistigen und kulturellen Anliegen vollumfänglich vertrete.1

IV. Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und weitere dead-ends früher nationalistischer Historiographie Das Pendant jener Historiographie, die sich mythisch wie wissenschaftlich auf die frühe Zeit des Türkentums bezog, stellt die nahgeschichtliche polemische und apologetische Geschichtsschreibung dar. Beide dienten letztlich demselben Ziel, nämlich der ethnonationalen Selbstvergewisserung und der Rechtfertigung nach Aussen. Die Leugnung des Völkermordes an den kleinasiatischen Armeniern bildet die wohl massivste und dauerhafteste, zutiefst verinnerlichte Abdrängung authentischer Erinnerung durch eine nationalistische Historiographie im 20. Jahrhundert. Als tiefer Schatten dessen, was diese Geschichtsschreibung als die «aufgehende Sonne» der türkischen Nation verherrlichte, war die leugnende Abdrängung ein zentraler Aspekt der Nationsbildung. In den Jahren 1915-23, als das Verbrechen an den Armeniern noch frisch im Gedächtnis war und in der Diplomatie eine beträchtliche Rolle spielte, bestand die Strategie der staatlichen und nationalistischen Eliten vor allem in der Legitimierung und Relativierung des Geschehenen (die vollumfängliche Leugnung ist ein Phänomen der 1970er und 80er Jahre). Das türkisch-muslimische Leid im Ersten Weltkrieg, in den Balkankriegen und seit dem 19. Jahrhundert wurde als unvergleich grösser als das armenische dargestellt, die antiarmenischen Massnahmen von Regierung und Armee in ihrer Tragweite minimisiert. Die teilweise islamistisch gefärbte sozialdarwinistische Legitimierung bestand darin, die armenischen Christen sowohl als Widersacher als auch als Verräter im türkischen und muslimischen Daseinskampf darzustellen, den «Untergang des Schwächeren» als Naturgesetz auszugeben und zu argumentieren, die armenischen - wie zum Teil auch die griechisch-orthodoxen, assyrischen und bisweilen jüdischen - osmanischen Staatsbürger seien ein schädlicher, Wirtschafts- und Wehrkraft zersetzender Fremdkörper im Organismus der türkisch-muslimischen Nation gewesen.2 Da die Jungtürken des Kriegsregimes und ihre Ideologie international zwar scharf kritisiert, aber letztlich nicht geächtet wurden, sondern ihre kemalistischen

^ Vgl. Georgeon, François: Les Foyers Turcs à l'époque kémaliste (1923-1931). In: Turcica XIV (1982), 168-215, hier 208-14; Tuncer, 12. 2 Vgl. Kieser, Hans-Lukas, und Schaller, Dominik: Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah / The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah. Ziirich 2002, 34-38.

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Nachfolger - selbst meist ehemalige CUP-Mitglieder oder -Sympathisanten aus der Konferenz von Lausanne 1923 als Sieger hervorgingen, blieben die genannten Argumente bestehen und wurden von der nationalen Geschichtsschreibung perpetuiert. Nicht nur das: Die paradoxe Kombination von Rechtfertigung und Leugnung des Genozids wurde zu einem zentralen Bestandteil türkisch-nationalistischen Selbstverständnisses.1 Als wichtiger, in jenen Jahren in der Propaganda tätiger Diplomat und Historiker ist der bereits erwähnte Re§id Saffet [Atabinen] (1884-1965) hervorzuheben, ein Vertrauter der CUP-Parteigrossen Talat Pascha und Djavid Bey während des Weltkriegs. Dank seiner geschliffenen Französischkenntnisse und Umgangsformen machte sein Auftreten auch in Europa immer wieder Eindruck (vgl. Kapitel V). Er weilte vom Herbst 1918 bis Frühsommer 1919 in der Schweiz, wo sich auch sein Schwiegervater §ükrü Pascha und dessen Vater Riza Pascha aufhielten. 2 Re§id Saffet agitierte in der Westschweizer Diaspora, speziell in den Foyers turcs, veröffentlichte aber auch 1918/19 unter dem Pseudonym Kara Schemsi mindestens sechs Bücher und Broschüren auf französisch, drei davon direkt zum Thema «question arménienne». Seine und die übrigen von der damaligen türkischen Diaspora in Europa produzierten Schriften belegen die zentrale Rolle der Geschichtsdeutung und des Skandalon der Armeniervernichtung im Legitimierungskampf um die neue Nahostordnung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg.3 An den Beginn des ganzen «Dramas» setzte Re§id Saffet einen «von Russland unterstützten armenischen Verrat». 4 Seine Hauptargumente deckten sich mit denjenigen der jungtürkischen Weltkriegspropaganda: Für ihn - wie für Djemal und Talat Pascha, die zur gleichen Zeit in Deutschland ihre Memoiren niederschrieben - 5 stellte der Reformplan vom 8. Februar 1914, der in den Ostprovinzen des Osmanischen Reiches mehr Sicherheit, Demokratie

Auf diesen Sachverhalt hat von türkischer Seite erstmals der als politischer Flüchtling längere Zeit in Deutschland forschende Taner Akçam aufmerksam gemacht: Türk Ulusal Kimligi ve Ermeni Sorunu [Die türkische nationale Identität und die armenische Frage]. Istanbul 1992. Wie diese Namen und Titel deutlich machen, hatte sich der in Paris an der Ecole libre de sciences politiques ausgebildete Sohn eines Palastmusikers in die osmänische High society eingeheiratet. Vgl. Gülersoy, Çelik: Ölümün 29. Yilmda Regid Safvet Atabinen. In: Tarih ve Topium, Nr. 122 (Februar 1994), 4 - 9 . Siehe auch Kieser, Hans-Lukas: Orientalischer Schauplatz Schweiz (Fin de siècle-Zwischenkriegszeit). Zürich 2004 (in Vorbereitung). [Now jDublished: Vorkämpfer der «Neuen Türkei». Zürich 2005]. Vgl. meinen Artikel La «Grande Guerre» vue par la diaspora turque en Suisse (1918-1923). I now published: Farschid, Olaf/ Kropp, Manfred/ Dähne, Stephan (eds.), The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, Beiruter Texte und Studien 99, Würzburg: Ergon, 2006, p. 231-246]. 4 Kara-Schemsi: Les Turcs et la question d'Arménie. Genève, 1918, 9. Talât Paga: Talât Paga'nm hâtiralari [Die Erinnerungen von Talat Pascha]. Hg. von A. Kabacali. Istanbul 1994; Djemal, Ahmed (Pascha): Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes. München 1922,

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sowie internationale Kontrolle anstrebte, nichts anderes als eine europäische Verschwörung im Namen der Armenier dar, die auf eine russische Invasion und die Vernichtung der Muslime hinauslaufen sollte: In dieser Logik bedeutete der jungtürkische Kriegseintritt an der Seite Deutschlands die Verhinderung dieser V e r n i c h t u n g . 1 Regid Saffet betrieb zudem bereits eingehend eine Parallelisierung, die zum geschichtspolitischen Standardrepertoire wurde: Der Skandal sollte «neutralisiert» werden, indem die jungtürkische Vernichtungspolitik von 1915/16 in ganz Kleinasien Seite an Seite mit den blutigen Racheakten der armenischen Milizen bei ihrem Rückzug aus der Region Erzurum im Jahre 1918 gestellt wurde. Re§id Saffet war ein Meister der Viktimisierungsrhetorik. In seiner im Januar 1919 vollendeten und in Genf veröffentlichten Broschüre mit dem Titel Vextermination des Turcs erklärte er pathetisch, die Siegermächte seien daran, mit ihrer Politik zehn Millionen Türken auszurotten. In seiner Schrift findet sich eine kalkulierte Vermengung historischer Kategorien und eine Inflation von Begriffen wie «Ausrottung», «Vernichtung», «Mord» und «Kreuzzug» an, die bezweckten, die einzigartige Opferrolle der Türken in der modernen Geschichte herauszustellen. Verglichen mit dem Leiden der Türken seit Beginn der zaristischen Expansionspolitik im 18. Jahrhundert und ganz besonders während der Balkankriege 1912/13 seien die Armeniermassaker, welche die westliche Öffentlichkeit beschäftigten, «ein Scherz» ( d e s plaisanteries).2 Falls die Türken nicht in Wirklichkeit sehr tolerant wären, hätten sie zur Zeit ihrer Machtfülle im 16. Jahrhundert, spätestestens aber während der grossen antiarmenischen Pogrome von 1895/96 das ganze armenische Volk ausgerottet.3 Die Behandlung von Opferzahlen und demographischen Statistiken nimmt einen nicht geringen Raum ein in Regid Saffets Texten. Auch hier finden sich dieselben Sprünge über Epochen und Kategorien: Kriegsopfer und Flüchtlinge, Balkankriege und Erster Weltkrieg zusammen genommen, zählte er vier Millionen Türken, die er absurderweise explizit als die Opfer armenischen, griechischen, balkanchristlichen und maronitischen Verrates darstellte. Die armenischen Opfer reduzierte er auf 300'000 (das osmanische Parlament ging in jenen Monaten von 800'000 armenischen Deportation- und Massakertoten aus). 4

^ Kara-Schemsi: Turcs et Arméniens devant l'Histoire, o. O. 1919, 9-13. 2 Kara-Schemsi: L'extermination des Turcs. Genève 1919, 2. 3 Kara-Schemsi: Question d'Arménie, 5. 4 Kara-Schemsi: Extermination (wie Anm. 52), 1-2. Akçam, Taner: Insan Haklari ve Ermem Sorunu. Ittihad ve Terakki'den Kurtulus Savagi'na [Die Menschenrechte und die armenische Frage. Von Union et Progrès bis zum Befreiungskrieg], Ankara 1999, 301 und 536.

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Re§id Saffet negierte zwar keineswegs die «von unseren Autoritäten begangenen Verbrechen» am armenischen Volk, suchte die Verantwortlichkeit indes auf wenige «radikale Unionisten», deren «terroristische Agenten» und insbesondere - wie dies die osmanische Propaganda seit 1915 tat - auf Deutschland abzuwälzen. 1 Das Subjekt nationalistischer Historiographie bildet die Nation, bei Saffet die «wahren, heldenhaften Türken»: ein Volk unschuldiger Märtyrer und letztgültige politische wie auch moralische Referenz. Dank dieser diskursiven Konstruktion eines Volkes, das (angeblich) nichts mit den Kriegsverbrechen zu tun hatte, gab es für die türkisch-nationale Geschichtsschreibung auch keinen wesentlichen Grund, sich mit dem Mord an den eigenen armenischen Bürgern zu befassen - denn dieser hatte nichts mit einem selbst zu tun. «[...] wenn die Armenier unter jemand anderem als den terroristischen Agenten von Union et Progrès litten, dann konnten dies höchstens albanische Emigranten, Leute von Epirus, Thessaloniki oder andere frisch in Kleinasien angesiedelte Elemente gewesen sein.» 2 Im Umfeld der Pariser und Vorfeld der Lausanner Friedensverhandlungen gewannen Opfer- und Täterkategorien sowie demographische Statistiken eine weitreichende politische Bedeutung für den osmanischen Raum. Die Verlierermächten suchten sich nach Kriegsende als «victime conduite à l'holocauste» zu präsentieren, um mit der zeitgenössischen Genfer Presse zu sprechen: 3 Für kritische Geschichts- und Gewissenserforschung blieb kaum Raum. Die von massgeblichen Teilen der politischen Klasse betriebene Viktimisierungsrhetorik, die universale Referenzen systematisch entwertete, führte in der Türkei (wie auch Deutschland) zu einem nahgeschichtlichen Zerrbild mit gravierenden politischen und gesellschaftlichen Folgen. 4 Der Armeniermord stellte fortan bis heute das grösste Tabu des zunehmend unitär formulierten nationalen Geschichtsverständnisses dar. 5 Wer andeutete, die Armeniermorde seien inakzeptal oder gar ein Verbrechen gewesen, verging sich mit strafrechtlichen Konsequenzen am staatlich verordneten historischen

* Kara-Schemsi: Les Turcs et la question d'Arménie. Genève 1918, 4, 8, 10 f. 3 4

Kara-Schemsi: Question d'Arménie, 9-10. Tribune de Genève vom 15. 2. 1919.

Vgl. Akçam, Taner: Another history on Sèvres and Lausanne. In: Kieser und Schaller: Völkermord, 281-99, sowie meinen Artikel Grande Guerre, 281-99. Der für ein breites Publikum geschriebene Artikel «Soykirim» iddialarimn arkasmdaki gerçek [Die Wahrheit hinter den «Völkermords-Behauptungen] von Ilber Ortayli ist der jüngste Beleg dafür (Popüler Tarih Nr. 35, Juli 2003, S. 58-62). Der international respektable Universitätsprofessor und Experte spätosmanischer Geschichte wehrt zwar die kategorische Leugnung als unvernünftig ab, sorgt sich aber mit eigenartiger Logik um die nationale Ehre im Falle einer Genozid-Anerkennung («wir wären sonst alle die Kinder von Schlächtern»). Er beschuldigt diejenigen Wissenschafter, die von Genozid sprechen, sie würden den Holocaust relativieren, und geht offensichtlich und im Widerspruch zur UN-Genoziddefinition davon aus, der Holocaust sei der einzige Genozid der Geschichte gewesen.

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Selbstbild. 1935 schrieb das Programm der Einheitspartei: «Unsere Partei erachtet die gründliche Kenntnis der eigenen Geschichte bei unseren türkischen Landsleuten als ausserordentlich wichtig. Dieses Wissen ist ein heiliges Innerstes, das die Tüchtigkeit, Energie und das Selbstwertgefühl des Türken nährt und ihm gegen alle der nationalen Existenz schädlichen Strömungen eine unerschütterliche Festigkeit verleiht.»1 Die zur Rechtfertigung der antiarmenischen Politik verwendeten ebenso nationalistischen wie Sozialrevolutionären Argumentationsmuster behielten im historischen Diskurs nicht allein rechtsgerichteter Türkisten, sondern auch linkskemalistischer Kreise weit über die Zwischenkriegszeit hinaus ihre Gültigkeit. Beide glaubten zudem, die Armeniermorde als revolutionäre Gewalt in einem Klassenkampf zwischen muslimischem, hauptsächlich aus Bauern und Soldaten bestehendem «Proletariat» und ausbeuterischem christlichem (armenischem und griechisch-orthodoxem) Bürgertum explizit oder unterschwellig legitimieren zu können.2 Dessen Compradoren-Kapitalismus habe im Bunde mit ausländischen Mächten gestanden, wozu insbesondere auch die protestantischen amerikanischen Missionsschulen gezählt wurden, deren Habitus und Weltanschauung das bestehende spätosmanische System am tiefgreifendsten in Frage gestellt hatten.3

V. Die unitäre Republik und ihre Türkische Geschichtsthese Seit dem Vertrag von Lausanne 1923 kennt die «neue Türkei» ein im Gegensatz zu vorher zwar verringertes, aber fortan klar abgegrenztes Territorium, das die nationale Historiographie prägt. Das zentrale Thema der ethnischen Identität der Bewohner Kleinasiens wurde seit der politisch virulenten Epoche des Ersten Weltkrieges vor allem auf drei Ebenen angegangen: ethnographisch, frühhistorisch bis vorosmanisch und statistischdemographisch. In den 1930er Jahren bis zu Atatürks Tod 1938 setzte sich der

' Zitiert nach Ersanh: Iktidar ve tarih, 165. 2 So auch im Bestseller des auch unter der «demokratischen» Studentenschaft einflussreichen Linkskemalisten Dogan Avcioglu: Türkiye'nin Düzeni (Dün-Bugün-Yarin). Ankara 1968. Ebenso bei Feroz Ahmad, einem Schüler von Bernhard Lewis: Siehe z. B. sein The making of modern Turkey. London 1993, und Unionist relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914. In: Braude, Benjamin, und Lewis, Bernard: Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The functioning of a plural society, Bd. 1, New York 1982,401-34. 3 Zu den zur türkisch-nationalistischen Geschichtsschreibung gegenläufigen «historiographical legacies» dieser Mission siehe mein Some Remarks on Alevi Responses to the Missionaries in Eastern Anatolia (19th-20th cc.). In: Tejirian, Eleanor H., and Spector Simon, Reeva (Hg.): Altruism and Imperialism. Western Cultural and Religious Missions to the Middle East (19th20th cc.). New York 2002, 120-142, hier 139-^-2.

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Staat intensiv für jene anthropologische These ein, die eine in grossen Teilen auf die frühe Antike zurückzureichende (proto-)türkische Identität der anatolischen Bevölkerung behauptete. 1 Wir setzen uns in diesem Kapitel mit den spezifisch türkischrepublikanischen Geschichtsvorstellungen und ihren Akteuren auseinander. Zur Sprache kommen sollen die Historikerin Afetinan, Atatürks Adoptivtochter, und weitere Historiker, deren Produktion im Zeichen der sogenannten Türkischen Geschichtsthese stand, aber auch solche in professioneller Distanz dazu, sowie die Konstruktion des türkistischen Alevitenbildes, das die historiographische Neuausrichtung gut veranschaulicht.

Die nationalistische Vereinnahmung der Aleviten Die Aleviten, ein Viertel bis ein Drittel der Bevölkerung Kleinasiens, bildeten ein wichtiges ethnographisches Teilthema der historischen Identitätskonstruktion der späten Jungtürken und frühen Kemalisten. Sie hatten im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts erst das neugierige Interesse der westlichen Missionare, später auch der Anthropologen geweckt; von den sunnitisch «rechtgläubigen» osmanischen Eliten, die Reformer der Tanzimat wie Ahmed Cevdet Pascha eingeschlossen, waren die Aleviten mit Misstrauen und Verachtung behandelt worden. Im Gegensatz dazu wandten sich die Türkisten nach 1911 erwartungsvoll dieser grossen heterodoxen Gruppe des Islams zu, in der sie «echtes Türkentum» zu entdecken glaubten. Interessant war für sie erstens das bäuerliche, in mancher Hinsicht vorosmanische Türkisch, das die Mehrheit der Aleviten pflegte (es gab allerdings auch eine kurdischsprachige Minderheit sowie eine kleine armenische Alevitengruppe); zweitens eine ländliche Sozialorganisation, die sich als alttürkisch deuten liess und drittens einige religiöse Charakteristika, die sich mit dem zentralasiatischen Schamanismus der Türken vor ihrer Westwanderung in Beziehung bringen Hessen. «Wenn wir die Eigenart der türkischen Aleviten, kizilba§ und Bekta§i untersuchen», schrieb der türkistische Forscher Baha Sait 1926 in der Zeitschrift Türk Yurdu, «wäre es ganz falsch, sie nur auf Ali und die Imame zu reduzieren.» (Sait spielt damit auf die von den Aleviten gepflegte schiitische Version der islamischen Gründungsgeschichte und die herausragende, christusähnliche Stellung Alis, des Schwiegersohns von

Für eine eingehende, kritische Analyse der nationalistischen Geschichtsschreibung in der Republik Türkei siehe neben Ersanli: Iktidar ve Tarih ; Copeaux: Espaces et temps, und ders.: Une vision turque du monde à travers les cartes: de 1931 à nos jours. Paris 2000.

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Muhammed, im alevitischen Glauben an.) « Der offensichtlichste Zweck der alevitischen Gründerväter [im Spätmittelalter] war es, die Sprache, das Geschlecht und das Blut des Türken zu bewahren. Die kizilbag blieben ganz Türken. Ja, sie haben nicht einmal einen nichtalevitischen Türken geheiratet.» Der Autor ignorierte die nichttürkischen Aleviten und das Faktum zahlreicher alevitisch-armenischer Ehen. Der idealisierte turkmenische Alevit verkörperte aus türkistischer Sicht die nationale Tradition im Gegensatz zur kosmopolitischen und arabisch-islamischen. «Der seine Sitten und seine Nationalität liebende Türke konnte sich nicht für den Kosmopolitismus erwärmen. Das internationale Ideal des Arabers konnte sich nicht mit dem nationalen Ideal des Türken vereinigen und wird es in Ewigkeit nicht tun können. Daher sind die traditionellsten und reinsten Türken die Turkmenen und Yörüken.» Sait schloss apodiktisch mit Hinweis auf den mythischen Stammvater der türkischen Rasse: «Ritual und Regeln dieser [alevitischen] Gruppe entsprechen ganz und gar derjenigen der Oguz-Tradition und des Zeltes der schamanischen Türken.» Anstoss für Saits vom jungtürkischen Regime während des Ersten Weltkriegs finanzierte Untersuchung war die Empörung über den Mangel an türkischem Identitätsbewusstsein bei den Aleviten, die sich nicht daran störten, dass einige Missionare in ihnen ehemalige Christen vermutet hätten. Damals standen jedoch Kräfte im Umkreis des Sultan-Kalifen der Publikation eines Textes entgegen, der eine aus imperialer Sicht traditionell suspekte Gruppe in türkistischer Perspektive stark aufwertete; deshalb konnte er erst später erscheinen. 1 In seiner Redaktion von 1926 Hess er die türkische Einheit der Republik hochleben in der (illusorischen) Überzeugung, der alevitischsunnitische Konflikt sei «zu einem mit den Kalifen zusammen ins Grab befördeten Ammenmärchen» geworden; denn Aleviten und Sunniten seien «Bluts- und Seelenbrüder». In der Realität blieben die Aleviten jedoch von der Macht, den Ressourcen und der religiös-kulturellen Deutungshoheit auch des neuen Staates weitgehend ausgeschlossen (in den 1960er und 70er Jahren kam es daher zu blutigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den ungleichen Partnern). 2 Trotz ihrer ideologischen Geladenheit enthält Saits Untersuchung eine Fülle authentischer Beobachtungen und ist nicht umsonst Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, im Zuge der alevitischen Renaissance, die - wie die gleichzeitige

Baha Sait: Türkiye'de Alevi Zümreleri [Alevitische Gruppen in der Türkei]. In: Türk Yurdu, September 1926, Fortsetzungen im Oktober und November (Neuausgabe Bd. 11, 105-12, 16378, 201-8). 2 Vgl. Bozarslan, Hamit: Le phénomène milicien: une composante de la violence politique des années soixante-dix. In: Turcica, 31 (1999), 185-244, hier. 235-38; Laçiner, Omer: Der Konflikt zwischen Sunniten und Aleviten in der Türkei. In: Blaschke, lochen, und Bruinessen, Martin van: Islam und Politik in der Türkei. Berlin 1989, 233-254, hier 251-54.

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kurdische Renaissance - den ethno-nationalistischen Unitarismus widerlegte, neu aufgelegt worden.1 Einen ebenso ausgesprochen türkistischen Blick auf die Aleviten wie auch auf die Kurden finden wir bei Hasan Regit Tankut (1891-1980) vor, einem höheren Verwaltungsbeamten, der im Türk Ocagi aktiv war, 1931 Parlamentsabgeordneter wurde, die Türkische Sprachgesellschaft mit begründete und in den folgenden Jahren innerhalb und ausserhalb der Universität mit Enthusiasmus die Sonnensprachtheorie sowie die Türkische Geschichtsthese vertrat. 2 Anders als die übrigen historisch tätigen Kollegen, die oft aus Istanbul stammten, war Tankut im Bergdistrikt Elbistan der Provinz Mara§ geboren worden. Er blieb dieser Verbindung zum Inneren und Osten Anatoliens treu, machte viele Reisen und beschäftigte sich mit Aleviten und Kurden. Sein türkistischer Enthusiasmus hinderte ihn nicht daran, interessante Beobachtungen über das östliche Landesinnere zu machen, das die Republik bis zur Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts für Fremde verschlossen hielt. Diese Beobachtungen hielt er in Berichten fest, die entgegen der ursprünglichen Intention meist nicht veröffentlicht wurden, da sie dem allumfassenden Türkentum Anatoliens, das der Staat mittels der Geschichtsthese und der Sonnensprachtheorie der Bevölkerung einzuhämmern suchte, zu offen widersprachen. Im Gegensatz zu den meisten Politikern sah Tankut ein, dass weder das kurdische noch das alevitische Problem, das die Republik durch ihren kulturellen Unitarismus mit kreierte, gewaltsam lösbar waren.3

Professionelle Historiker am Scheidewege Die Tendenz, die Aleviten ohne die - aus heutiger Sicht und nach heutigem Forschungsstand - unerlässliche Berücksichtigung pluriethnischer und synkretistischer Gesichtspunkte als «echte Türken, welche die nationale

Birdogan, Nejat: Ittihat-Terakki'nin Alevilik Bektagilik Aragtirmasi (Baha Sait Bey) [Die Untersuchungen der Partei Einheit und Fortschritt über Alevismus und Bektaschismus (Baha Sait Bey)]. Istanbul 1994. 2 Siehe unter anderem Tankut, Hasan Regit: Tracé linguistique en direction de la préhistoire et l'explication de la théorie giines-dil (soleil-langue). Communication faite par le Prof. H. Resit Tankut. Istanbul 1937; ders.: Güneg-Dil Teorisi göre dil tetkikleri (Türk dil bilgisine giri§) [Der Sonnensprachtheorie entsprechende Sprachuntersuchungen (Einleitung in die türkische Sprachlehre]. Istanbul 1936. Vgl. auch Copeaux, Espaces et temps, 70. Tankuts Berichte sind jetzt veröffentlicht in: Bayrak, Mehmet (Hg.): Açik-gizli/resmigayriresmi kürdoloji belgeleri [Offene und geheime, offizielle und inoffizielle Dokumente der Kurdologie], Ankara 1994, 197-232; 409-90; Angaben zur Person 197-204. Zur Thematik siehe auch Besikçi, Ismail: Türk tarih tezi, günes-dil teorisi ve Kürt sorunu [Die Türkische Geschichtsthese, die Sonnensprachtheorie und die kurdische Frage]. Ankara 1991.

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Tradition am reinsten bewahrt haben»,» zu interpretieren, findet sich auch bei einem so verdienten professionellen Historiker wie Fuat Köpriilü (18901966), ebenfalls regelmässiger Autor im Türk Yurdu.1 Schon mit 23 wurde er Professor an der Universität Istanbul, später Abgeordneter in Ankara und schliesslich Aussenminister, aber bezeichnenderweise nie Mitglied der Türkischen Geschichtsgesellschaft (Tarih Kurumu). Wie die mehr oder minder professionellen nationalistischen Historiker seiner Generation interessierte er sich stark für die vorosmanische türkische Geschichte. 2 Mit grosser Gelehrsamkeit beschäftigte er sich aber auch mit der Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Religionsgeschichte Kleinasiens in frühosmanischer Zeit. 3 Im Gegensatz zu den «idealistischen» 4 Türkisten, zu denen in historiographischer Hinsicht auch Atatürk zählt, verzichtete er auf frühhistorische und anthropologische Spekulationen - zu wichtig waren ihm in der Regel Quellenbelege und ein methodisches Arbeiten, das der Annales-Schule nahe stand. Als Nationalist war Köprülü aber nicht bereit, die Konstruktion nationaler «Essenz» zu hinterfragen. Unterliess er es deshalb - trotz besseren Wissens - oder weil er in der autoritären Atmosphäre nicht den intellektuellen Mut aufbrachte, türkistischen Irrlehren der jungen Republik entgegenzutreten (siehe unten zur Türkischen Geschichtsthese)? Bei aller Gelehrsamkeit bewegte auch Köprülü sich im verengenden Korsett des Nationalismus, der das negierte, was ihm als Abwertung eigener «unvergleichbarer» Identität erschien. In seinem frühen Werk Türkiya Tarihi [Geschichte der Türkei] (1923), in dem der Geist des türkischen Unabhängigkeitskriegs weht, wehrte Köprülü die Vorstellung ab, die Türken irgendwie der «gelben Rasse» zuzurechnen und statuierte: «Die in der Weltgeschichte von den Türken vollbrachten Taten sind so erhaben, dass sie mit denjenigen keiner anderen Nation verglichen werden können.» 5 In weiteren Werken verband er die in mancher Hinsicht plausible Aufwertung der Türken in der mittelalterlichen Geschichte mit der pauschalen

Köprülü, Fuad: Bemerkungen zur Religionsgeschichte Kleinasiens. In: Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte 1 (1922), 203-22, hier 215. Über Köprülü siehe Berktay, Halil: Der Aufstieg und die gegenwärtige Krise der nationalistischen Geschichtsschreibung in der Türkei. In: Periplus: Jahrbuch für aussereuropäische Geschichte 1 (1991), 102-15, hier 108-14, und Ersanli: Iktidar ve Tarih, 130-37. 2 So sein frühes Werk: Türkiya Tarihi: Anadolu istilasina kadar Türkler [Geschichte der Türkei: die Türken bis zur Eroberung Anatoliens], Istanbul 1923. 3 Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat: Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad's Werk über die ersten Mystiker in der türkischen Literatur (Teilübersetzung des Werkes Türk edebiyatinda ilk mutasavviflar durch Theodor Menzel). Budapest und Leipzig 1927. Ders: Les origines de l'Empire ottoman. Paris 1935. Vgl. auch die englischen Neuausgaben: The Seljuks of Anatolia: their history and culture according to local Muslim sources. Übersetzt und hg. von Gary Leiser. Salt Lake City 1992; Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish invasion (prolegomena). Übersetzt, hg. und eingeführt von Gary Leiser. Salt Lake City 1993. So ihre Selbstbezeichnung mefküreci, neutürkisch ülkücü. Türkiya Tarihi, 4 und 6.

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Abwehr byzantinischen Einflusses auf die ösmanische Institutionen; diese seien dem seldschukisch-iranischen Erbe, letztlich aber wohl - wie auch Atatürk meinte - dem türkischen «Stammesgeist» entsprungen.1 Wie schon erwähnt stellte Byzanz ein zentrales Feindbild der türkischen Nationalisten dar (wie im übrigen auch der slawischen Nationalisten auf dem Balkan)2. Die Republik Türkei, die Kerngebiete des einstigen jahrtausendealten Byzanz einschloss, verzichtete daher auf die wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung mit diesem Erbe; anstelle der Byzantinistik führte sie hingegen Lehrstühle für Sumerisch, Hethitisch, Chinesisch und Ungarisch ein - Fachgebiete, die aus türkistischer Sicht geeignet waren, die Grösse und historische Tiefe türkischer Zivilisation zu belegen. Im Gegensatz zum institutionell wohl etablierten, national wie international angesehenen Köprülü hatte es der zehn Jahre ältere, populärer ausgerichtete Ahmed Refik Altinay (1880-1937) schwer im jungen Nationalstaat. 3 Auch er war ein professioneller Historiker aus Istanbul, ab 1909 Mitglied der Osmanischen Geschichtskommission. Durchaus patriotisch hatte er 1912 das Türk Ocagi mit begründet, gehörte aber zu dessen liberalem Flügel; türkistischer Enthusiasmus lag ihm fern. 1918, nach dem Debakel der CUP-Kriegspolitik, war er vorübergehend Mitglied der Liberalen Partei, die einen Kompromiss mit den Siegermächten und die offene Auseinandersetzung mit den jungtürkischen Kriegsverbrechen befürwortete. Als einer der ganz wenigen türkischen Intellektuellen veröffentlichte Ahmet Refik damals eine nicht primär apologetische Schrift über den Mord (kitäl) an den Armeniern, dessen Augenzeuge er 1915 in der Stadt Eski§ehir geworden war. 4 Nachdem Refik noch mehrere Jahre weitgehend unbehelligt an der Universität Istanbul hatte lehren dürfen, wurde ihm am Ersten Türkischen Geschichtskongress 1932 die undankbare Rolle zuteil, sich - im Stile eines Schauprozesses - öffentlich als historiographischen Versager kundzutun, der es Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat: Bizans müesseselerinin Osmanh müesseselerine te'siri hakkinda bazi mülahazalar [Einige Betrachtungen über den Einfluss byzantinischer Institutionen auf die osmanischen Institutionen]. Istanbul 1931; Berktay: Aufstieg, 114. Für eine historiographisch reflektierte Auseinandersetzung mit der Entstehung des Osmanischen Reiches auf neuestem Forschungsstand siehe Kafadar, Cemal: Between two worlds: the construction of the Ottoman State. Berkeley 1995; für eine heutige byzantinistische Sichtweise, die im Gegensatz zu Köprülü mannigfache byzantinisch-osmanische Kontinuitäten herausstellt: Matsche, Klaus-Peter: Research problems concerning the transition to Tourkokratia: the Byzantinist Standpoint. In: Adamr und Faroqhi: Historiography, 79-113. 2 Vgl. z. B. Mishkova, Diana: Die Konstruktion nationaler Identität in Bulgarien (1878-1912). In: Asien Afrika Lateinamerika 29 (2001), 73-90, hier 80-83. 3 Zur Person siehe Ozean, Abdülkadir: Ahmet Refik Alinay. In: Osmanhlar Ansiklopedisi 4[Enzyklopädie der Osmanen], Bd. 1, 240 f.; Ersanh: Iktidar ve Tarih, 153-57. Ahmet Refik [Altinay]: Iki komite, iki kital [Zwei Komitees, zwei Massaker]. Istanbul 1919 (Neuauflage Ankaral994). Fragwürdig an diesem zweiteiligen, im übrigen wertvollen Zeugnis ist die Parallelführung der staatlichen Vernichtungspolitik von 1915 und der Racheakte armenischer Milizen bei Erzurum im Jahre 1918.

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versäumt habe, am grossen Werk volkserziehender Nationalgeschichte mitzutun. 1 1933 verlor er seine Stelle im Zuge einer Welle von Entlassungen relativ liberaler Professoren (von denen viele durch Emigranten aus dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschland ersetzt wurden, bei denen der Staatsführer davon ausgehen konnte, dass sie sich nicht in die Politik des Gastlandes einmischen würden). Der ebenfalls aus Istanbul stammende Yusuf Hikmet Bayur (1891— 1980), Enkel eines Grosswesirs, war noch mehr als Köprülü ebenso sehr Politiker wie Historiker und reüssierte in der Republik in beiderlei Hinsicht. Schon 1922/23 war er als aussenpolitischer Berater Mitglied der türkischen Delegation bei der Konferenz in Lausanne gewesen. Dieses aussenpolitische Engagement sowie die spätere Mitgliedschaft im Tarih Kurumu - er war lange dessen Vizepräsident - teilte er mit Atabinen. Während Ahmet Refik 1933 seine Stelle verlor, wurde Bayur im selben Jahr als Parlamentsabgeordneter gewählt und mit der Lehre des im Rahmen der Universitätsreform an allen Hochschulen neu eingeführten Faches «Geschichte der türkische Revolution» (Türk inkiläbi tarihi) betraut. 1934 stieg der Atatürk treu ergebene Historiker zum Erziehungsminister auf. Er spezialisierte sich auf die republikanische Version der Nahgeschichte, deren Leitlinien der Staatschef 1927 in einer langen Rede vorgegeben hatte. Er stellte sie innerhalb dieses Rahmens im Vergleich etwa mit Regid Safvet Atabinen differenziert dar. Im Gegensatz zu diesem und zu Köprülü trat er als Historiker international aber kaum in Erscheinung. 2 Mit Köprülü verbanden Omer Lütfi Barkan (1903-79) der nicht hinterfragbare Nationalismus sowie die Strukturgeschichte der Annales, mit Refik Altinay das Interesse für die osmanischen Archive. Als Staatsstipendiat studierte er an der Universität Strassburg; 1933 wurde er Dozent am Institut für die Geschichte der türkischen Revolution in Istanbul, vier Jahre später erhielt er den Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsgeschichte an der Universität Istanbul. Ausgehend von umfangreichen Recherchen im osmanischen Staatsarchiv veröffentlichte er fortan wichtige Arbeiten mit zu Recht internationaler Ausstrahlung über demographische, agrarische, rechtliche und steuerliche Aspekte der osmanischen Geschichte. Als treues Kind des unterdessen etablierten kemalistisehen Staates hatte er einen weit staatszentrischeren Blick als seine beiden älteren Kollegen. Er trug nicht wenig zum

Ersanh, Bü§ra: «Turkish History Thesis» and its aftermath. A story of modus operandi. In: Asien Afrika Lateinamerika 29 (2001), 7 - 2 9 , hier 14 f. 2 Bayurs Hauptwerk ist: Türk inkiläbi tarihi [Geschichte der türkischen Revolution], Ankara 1991 (Erstausgabe 1940), 10 Teilbände. Meines Wissens wurde keines seiner Werke in eine europäische Sprache übersetzt. Zur Person vgl. Türk ansiklopedisi [Türkische Enzyklopädie]. Ankara 1946-1984, Bd. 4, 477 f.

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«Dokumentenfetischismus» (Berktay) der folgenden türkischen Historiographie bei, die - auch als Reaktion auf die Quellenarmut der Türkischen Geschichtsthese - die Akten in den staatlichen Archiven, die sich oft nur mit grosser paläographischer Mühe erschliessen Hessen und damit nur einem engen Kreis zugänglich waren, als quasi heilige Schrift lasen. Barkan war um die Aufwertung des osmanischen Staates bemüht, dessen Machtfülle und administrative Qualitäten er bewunderte, und wehrte sich dagegen, den Begriff «Feudalismus» auf ihn anzuwenden. 1 Der Etatismus in der Geschichtswissenschaft verstärkte die Identifikation mit dem osmanischen Staat namentlich auch in der sogenannten armenischen Frage. Das für die zweite Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts als Grundlage geltende apologetische Werk schuf Esat Uras, ein Mitglied des Türk Tarih Kurumu und ehemaliger Angestellter des dem Innenministerium unterstellten Polizeidirektoriums während des Ersten Weltkriegs. 2 Auch Yusuf Hikmet Bayur äusserte sich als Spezialist der Gegenwartsgeschichte sowie der Aussenpolitik mehrfach zu diesem Thema. Im Gegensatz zu späteren Leugnern hielt er an der vom Osmanischen Generalstab während des Ersten Weltkriegs geäusserten Zahl von 800'000 Armeniern fest, die durch die Massaker oder Strapazen der Deportation getötet wurden. Er rechtfertigte diese Vernichtung als Prävention einer armenische Autonomie und notwendige Voraussetzung für den zu kreierenden türkischen Nationalstaat. 3 Bayurs und allen weiteren Büchern etatistischer Provenienz ist die Absenz der Opferperspektive und somit einer humanistischen Herangehensweise eigen. Im Vergleich zu Personen wie Atabinen, Tankut, Baha Sait oder auch Afetinan, die von ausserhalb der universitären historischen Zunft kamen, obwohl sie zum Teil Mitglieder des Tarih Kurumu wurden und einen geschichtspolitisch wirksamen Diskurs mit begründeten, standen Bayur, Barkan und Köprülü aber den völkischen Tendenzen und türkistischen Spekulation reserviert gegenüber. 4 Dies gilt auch für den produktiven Historiker Osman Nuri Ergin (1883-1961), der sich namentlich mit einem M o n u m e n t a l w e r k über die Erziehungsgeschichte verdienstvoll gemacht hat: Auch er tat gleichwohl beim Werk der Nationalisierung insofern mit, als er für die Neubenennung von mehr 1

2

Berktay, 115-21.

Uras, Esat: The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question. Istanbul 1988; türkische Erstausgabe 19. Kaiser, Hilmar: Dall'impero alla repubblica: le continuità del negazionismo turco. In: Flores, Marcello (Hg.): Storia, verità, giustizia. I crimini del XX secolo. Milano 2001, 89-113, hier 108-12. 3 Bayur: Türk inkiläbi, Bd. 3, Teil 3, 22, und Teil 4 , 7 8 7 ; zitiert nach Ak9am: Insan haklari, 205, 301 und 311. 4 Vgl. eine gewisse Parallele mit Deutschland: Weber, Wolfgang: Völkische Tendenzen in der Geschichtswissenschaft. In: Puschner, Uwe (Hg.): Handbuch zur «Völkischen Bewegung» 1871-1918. München 1996, 834-58.

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als 5000 Strassennamen Istanbuls meist mit den Namen türkischer Helden verantwortlich zeichnete.1

Atatürk und Ay§e Afetinan: Historiographische Höhen- und Holzwege im Zeichen der Geschichtsthese Der Erste Türkische Geschichtskongress war Mustafa Kemal Paschas (1881-1938) Inititative entsprungen. Der erfolgreiche General empfand als Staatsmann zunehmend das Bedürfnis nach historischer Fundierung der türkischen Nationalstaatsgründung in Anatolien, die seine glänzenden Waffenerfolge ermöglicht hatten. In einem discours fleuve vor der Einheitspartei Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi [Republikanische Volkspartei] präsentierte er 1927 seine Version des türkischen Unabhängigkeitskrieges ( 1 9 1 9 - 2 3 ) . 2 Diese mutierte alsbald zur Gründungsgeschichte einer kemalistischen Säkularreligion, die an eigenen Universitätsinstituten gelehrt wurde, den Jahreskalender mit entsprechenden Feiertagen versah und den Führer im ganzen Lande mit Statuen und Bildern, mit dem Ehrentitel/Familiennamen «Atatürk» («Erzvater der Türken», 1934), der Omnipräsenz seiner Sprüche und nach seinem Tod mit einem tempelähnlichen Mausoleum in der neuen Haupstadt Ankara verherrlichte. Nachdem die türkistisch-republikanische Version zeitgenössischer Geschichte genügend etabliert schien, begann Mustafa Kemal sich Ende der 1920er Jahre mit Nachdruck darum zu bemühen, die «neue Türkei» wissenschaftlich aus der Anthropologie und Frühgeschichte zu begründen. Der Genfer Anthropologe und Universitätsrektor Eugène Pittard, der mit Atatürk direkt wie auch über seine Dissertandin Afetinan Freundschaft pflegte, fand dessen brennenden «souci scientifique» überaus bemerkenswert. 3 Um die türkistische Geschichtsschreibung zu institutionalisieren, wurde im April 1930 die Kommission für türkische Geschichte des Türkischen Herdes (Türk Ocagi Türk Tarih Heyeti) gegründet. Aus deren Mitgliedern - mit zwei Ausnahmen alle Abgeordnete der Nationalversammlung - setzte sich ein Jahr später, nach der Fusionierung des Türk Ocagi mit der kemalistischen Einheitspartei, die Gesellschaft zur Erforschung türkischer Geschichte (Türk

Karakoç, Man: Ergin, Osman Nun. In: Osmanlilar Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul 1999, Bd. 1,413 f . Vgl. Ergin, Osman Nuri: Istanbul Mektepleri ve Ilim, Terbiye ve San'at Müesseseleri Dolayisiyle Ttirkiye Maarif Tarihi [Türkische Bildungsgeschichte im Spiegel der Schulen und der Institutionen für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Kunst in Istanbul]. 5 Bde. Istanbul 1977. 2 Als deutsche Buchausgabe: Kemal, Mustafa: Die neue Türkei. 3 Bde. Leipzig 1928. Pittard, Eugène: Un chef d'Etat animateur de l'anthropologie et de la préhistoire: Kemal Atatürk. In: Revue anthropologique (de Paris) 49 (1939), 5-16, hier 14.

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Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti) zusammen, die kurz darauf den bis heute gültigen Namen Türk Tarih Kurumu annahm. Neun Mitglieder dieser Gruppe verfassten 1929/30 den Band Türk Tarihinin Anahatlari [Grundlinien der türkischen Geschichte]. Dieser befasste sich vorwiegend mit der vorislamischen Zeit und stellte - ohne Quellenbelege - die transkontinentale Verbreitung der türkischen Rasse, ihre aus rassischen Vorzügen hergeleiteten überragenden zivilisatorischen und politischen Leistungen sowie die türkischen Wurzeln der vorgriechischen Zivilisationen in Kleinasien heraus. Das Ganze präsentierte sich als radikal ethnozentrische Weltsicht und insbesondere als ein - türkistisch umgepolter - Gegenentwurf zur bisher dominierenden eurozentrisehen «Universalgeschichte», die den Türken wenig positiven Platz einräumte. Ihr spekulativer Charakter und ihre Widersprüchlichkeit waren offensichtlich (die von den Türkisten anerkannte Emigration aus der «Urheimat» Zentralasien und das historisch bestens belegte Eindringen der Türken ins hochmittelalterliche Kleinasien Hessen sich zum Beispiel schwerlich mit der behaupteten jahrtausendealten türkischen Präsenz in Anatolien in Einklang bringen). Die Entwicklung vom Osmanischen Reich zum Nationalstaat wurde nicht dargestellt; ausser dem moralisierenden Ton, der auf die republikanische Gegenwart zielte, fehlte jeglicher Gegenwartsbezug.1 Eine separate «Einleitung», die ganz auf die osmanische Geschichte verzichtete, fasste 1931 die Prämissen des Bandes zusammen, fügte die Übersetzung von Cahuns Rede aus dem Jahre 1873 (!) bei und wurde an die Schulen verteilt. 2 Damit war die bis heute nie widerrufene Türkische Geschichtsthese geboren, die Eingang in die weiteren Schulbücher fand und für Jahrzehnte den Unterricht prägte.3 Als Mustafa Kemal im Juli 1932 den Ersten Türkischen Geschichtskongress in Ankara einberief, verband er mit ihm das Ziel, die Geschichtsthese zu vertiefen, ihr einen offiziellen Charakter zu verleihen und für ihre Verbreitung zu sorgen.4 Linguistische Spekulationen spielten bei den frühhistorischen Diskussionen eine wichtige Rolle. Gleichsam als Zwillingsgesellschaft mit zum Teil identischen Mitgliedern wurde daher am 12. Juli 1932 die Türkische Sprachgesellschaft (Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti, später umbenannt in Türk Dil Kurumu) gegründet; sie entwickelte in den folgenden Jahren die «Sonnensprachtheorie» und wurde zur massgeblichen * Türk Tarihinin Anahatlari [Grundlinien der türkischen Geschichte]. Istanbul 1930; Angaben in diesem Abschnitt nach Ersanli: Iktidar ve Tarih, 87-98. 2 Türk Tarihinin Anahatlarina Medhal. Istanbul 1931. 3 Für eine Analyse dieser Schulbücher siehe Ersanh: Iktidar ve Tarih, 98-116. 4 Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongrenin zabitlari, konferanslar, münaka§alar [Der Erste Türkische Geschichtskongress, die Protokolle, Reden und Diskussionen des Kongresses]. Istanbul 1932. Für eine Analyse siehe Ersanli: Iktidar ve Tarih, 119-60.

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sprachregulierenden, um ein «reines Türkisch» (öz türkge) bemühten Institution des Nationalstaates. Während die Türkische Geschichtsthese Anatolien urtürkisch und aus dem Türkentum die Wiege aller Weltzivilisation machte, stellte die Sonnensprachtheorie Türkisch als Ursprache der Menschheit dar. 1 Geschichtsthese wie Sprachtheorie inspirierten sich stark aus Theorien der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts; namentlich auch des bisher noch nicht erwähnten Mustafa Celâleddin alias Constantin Borzecki. Dieser nach Istanbul emigrierte und zum Islam bekehrte Pole nutzte Forschungslücken für turkophile Spekulationen und argumentierte zum Teil mit sprachlichen Assonanzen: Ortsnamen wie «Turckheim» und «Troyes» schienen ihm der Beleg für die einstige Ausbreitung zivilisationsbringender Türken in Europa. 2 Anders als die Geschichtsthese blieb die Sprachtheorie, obzwar unwiderrufen, weitgehend nur ein vorübergehendes Irrlicht des jungen Nationalismus. Die junge Ay§e Afetinan (1908-85) war eine wichtige Protagonistin Muse, Medium und Sprachrohr wie auch initiative Akteurin und Missionarin - nationalistischer Geschichtsschreibung. Sie spielte am Ersten Geschichtskongress eine zentrale Rolle bei der Artikulation der These, 3 nahm 1935 den Vizevorsitz des Tarih Kurumu ein und avancierte 1950 zur Universitätsprofessorin in Ankara. Mustafa Kemal hatte sie 1925 als angehende Primarlehrerin in Izmir kennengelernt, adoptiert und, ihren Mädchentraum erfüllend, zur Ausbildung in ein Westschweizer Internat gesandt. 1927 führte sie ihre französischsprachige Ausbildung am katholischen Lycée Notre Dame de Sion in Istanbul fort. Passagen, die im dort verwendeten Geographiebuch bei ihr Anstoss erregten, entrüsteten auch ihren Adoptivvater: namentlich die Einteilung der Türken in die «mongolische beziehungsweise gelbe Rasse» und der abwertende Blick auf die zivilisatorischen Folgen der türkischen Eroberung Kleinasiens. 4 1929 wurde Afet Inan 5 Geschichts- und Heimatkundelehrerin an der Musikschule in Ankara, wo sie auch dem Türk Ocagi beitrat. Atatürk gab ihr den dezidierten Auftrag, über die Geschichte als * Vgl. Anm. 68 sowie Inan, Abdülkadir: Güne§-dil teorisi üzerine ders notlari: Türkoloji, II [Lektionsnotizen über die Sonnensprachtheorie: Turkologie, II]. Istanbul 1936. Für eine eingehende Auseinandersetzung mit türkisch-nationalistischer Sprachtheorie siehe Laut, Jens Peter: Das Türkische als Ursprache? Sprachwissenschaftliche Theorien in der Zeit des erwachenden türkischen Nationalismus. Wiesbaden 2000. 2 Djelaleddin, Mustafa: Les Turcs anciens et modernes, Paris 1870, zitiert nach Copeaux: Espaces et temps (wie Anm. 18), 35-37. 3 Sie hielt zwei Vorträge: Tarihten evel ve tarihin fecrinde (Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, 1 8 41) und Orta Kurun tarihine umumî bir baki§ [Ein allgemeiner Blick auf die Geschichte des Mittelalters] ( 4 0 5 - 4 4 ) . Ihr erster Vortrag wurde auch auf Deutsch publiziert: Vorgeschichtliche Zeit und Anbruch der geschichtlichen Zeit. Vortrag gehalten am 2. Juli 1932 am ersten Historikerkongress in Ankara. Istanbul 1935. 4 Afetinan, Ay§e: Atatürk'ten mektuplar [Briefe von Atatürk]. Ankara 1989 (1981), 9 f. «Afetinan» wurde erst 1934 - nach dem Erlass des Familiennamengesetzes - zu ihrem Nachnamen.

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«der eigentlichen Quelle nationaler Existenz» zu arbeiten und mit ihren Ergebnissen öffentlich aufzutreten. 1 So war sie im April 1930 aktiv dabei bei der Gründung der Kommission für türkische Geschichte des Türk Ocagi, aus der der Tarih Kurumu hervorging. Afet Inan empfand sich damals unter grossem Zeitdruck und hätte vorgezogen, «gar nichts zu sagen». 2 Nicht weniger als den anderen fehlten ihr die wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen für einen sorgfältigen Geschichtsdiskurs. Sie nahm daher 1935 mit Eifer die Gelegenheit wahr, die ihr der Staat mit einer Beamtung als Dozentin ermöglichte, sich in Genf zum Zweck der beruflichen Vorbereitung ein Lizentitat (1938) 3 und Doktorat (1939) zu erwerben. Ihre Dissertation L'Anatolie, le pays de la race turque4 bei Eugène Pittard entsprang einer gross angelegten, vom Staate organisierten anthropometrisehen Untersuchung; sie zielte darauf ab, zentrale Aspekte der Türkischen Geschichtsthese auf eine empirische Grundlage zu stellen und «auf definitive Weise die Geschichte dieses Fleckens auf der Erde zu schreiben». 5 Zu beweisen war Anatolien als jahrtausendealte Wiege einer türkischen Rasse; die Nachfahrenschaft der gegenwärtigen Bewohner von den neolithischen Bewohnern Anatoliens; deren nicht-mongolische Rassezugehörigkeit; die Einwanderung dieser zivilisatorisch überlegenen «brachykephalen» 6 Menschen nach Europa; und somit der türkische Ursprung europäischer Zivilisation. «Les Turcs [...], dans leur grande majorité, appartiennent à cette race blanche d'Europe, connue, dans la classification, sous le nom d'Homo Alpinus» (S. 162).7 Die Daten von 64'000 Individuen auf dem Territorium der Republik Türkei bewiesen keine der genannten politisch-anthropologischen Prämissen; was sie indes indiskutabel belegten, war die rassisch kaum fassbare anthropometri sehe Vielfalt. Der Doktorvater war sich dessen bewusst, suchte aber im Vorwort mit allgemeinen Komplimenten und auffällig suggestiver Rhetorik, die viel einschränkender Partikel bedurfte, seine Sympathie für die Arbeit zu bekunden; damit gab er den Prämissen eine akademische Weihe, ohne kritischen Einspruch geltend zu machen. Afetinan: Mektuplar, 11 f. Neben ihren Reden am Geschichtskongress veröffentlichte sie 1930 auch das Schulbuch Vatanda§ için medenî bilgiler [Staatsbürgerkunde]. Istanbul 1930. Afetinan: Mektuplar, 12. Ihre Lizentiatsarbeit veröffentlichte der Tarih Kurumu: Aperçu général sur l'Histoire économique de l'Empire Turc-Ottoman. Préface de M. le Prof. Antony Babel. Istanbul 1941. Afetinan, Ay§e: L'Anatolie, le pays de la race turque: recherches sur les caractères anthropologiques des populations de la Turquie, enquête sur 64.000 individus. Préface de Eugène Pittard. Genf 1941. Zur Organisation der Untersuchung siehe auch Pittard: Atattirk (wie Anm. 86), 12-14. Afetinan: L'Anatolie (wie Anm. 99), 3. «Kurzköpfig» im Gegensatz zu «dolichokephal», «langköpfig». Vgl. Tankut, Hasan Re§it: Le mot «alp» et le foyer de la race alpine. Istanbul 1938.

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Eugène Pittard (1867-1962) galt Atatürk als wissenschaftliche Autorität und war eine der wichtigsten Referenzen von dessen Geschichtsbemühung, partiell auch deren Inspirator. Der vierzehn Jahre ältere Professor geizte dem «chef suprême» gegenüber nicht mit Lob aller Art, vor allem für seine tatkräftige Unterstützung anthropologischer Forschung (der Genfer Anthropologe führte seit 1928 Feldforschungen in Anatolien durch). Er ging für einen citoyen de la République de Genève sehr weit in seiner Panegyrik auf die «neue Türkei» und ihren Führer; er meldete keinerlei Widerstand gegenüber der historiographischen oder politischen Unternehmung seines Freundes an.1 Dabei konnte er nicht übersehen haben, dass die Überhöhung des Türkentums durch den staatlichen Wissenschaftsbetrieb nicht nur einherging mit der Entwertung des christlichen Erbes im Land, sondern auch mit einer blutigen antikurdischen Repression. Pittards Rede vom Auftauchen brachykephaler Völkerschaften vor dem Beginn der Steinzeit, womöglich von Asien her kommend, sein Hinweis auf das Rätsel der etruskischen Herkunft, 2 seine explizite Ermunterung, entsprechende anthropologische Forschungen zu betreiben, waren suggestiv, ohne dass sie sich auf eine Schlussfolgerung festlegten. Was Pittard als Frage, Hypothese oder faszinierendes Gedankenspiel aufwarf, wurde von den neuen Machthabern, die nach prähistorischer Legitimierung ihres frisch aus Krieg, Gewalt und dem diplomatischen Triumph in Lausanne heraus geborenen Nationalstaates trachteten, als autoritative Aufforderung gelesen, das Türkentum jener brachykephalen Gruppen, namentlich der Etrusker, Sumerer und Hethiter, zu beweisen. Das Scheitern des empirischen Beweises wurde dadurch verschleiert, dass sich die Herkunftsfrage aus mehreren Gründen wissenschaftlich nicht schlüssig beantworten liess.

Re§id Sajfet Atabinen: türkistische Revision der Weltgeschichte Wie der Nationalismus als eine Erweckung auf das «Vergessen» der eigenen Nation, so reagierte die Geschichtsthese in den Augen der Protagonisten auf das bisherige Verborgensein nationaler Vergangenheit, für das sie die eigene Vergesslichkeit sowie fremdes Vergessen- und Verächtlichmachen verantwortlich machten. «Ganz zu Unrecht sind die Türken aus historischer Perspektive mit Schweigen übergangen oder als unbedeutend Siehe namentlich Pittard: Atatürk, und ders.: Le visage nouveau de la Turquie: à travers lAsie-Mineure. Paris 1931. 2 Pittard, Eugène: Les races et l'histoire. Paris 1924, 90, und ders.: Contribution à l'étude anthropologique des Turcs d'Asie mineure. In: Revue Turque d'Anthropologie Nr. 8, 1928 (zitiert in Copeaux: Temps et espaces, 53).

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dargestellt worden, [...] obwohl sie doch in Sprache, Wissenschaft und Kunst der Weltzivilisation von frühester Zeit an die grössten Dienste geleistet haben», rief Esat [Sagay] aus, der als Erziehungsminister den Ersten Geschichtskongress eröffnete. Bei Re§id Saffet Atabinen, den wir als Publizisten zur armenischtürkischen Nahgeschichte bereits kennen gelernt haben (Kap. IV) und der dem Ersten Geschichtskongress beiwohnte, zeigt sich das prononciert reaktive Element sowohl bei seiner nahgeschichtlichen als auch seiner «universalgeschichtlichen» publizistischen Arbeit. Er hatte bereits im April 1930 zusammen mit Afetinan, Yusuf Ak9ura, Regit Galip und einem Dutzend weiteren Personen Einsitz in die Geschichtskommission genommen. In den folgenden Jahrzehnten beehrte er sich, als Gründungsmitglied des Tarih Kurumu und Promotor von dessen Thesen aufzutreten. Gerne führte er unter seinem Namen auch den Hinweis darauf, dass er Generalsekretär der türkischen Delegation bei der Orientkonferenz in Lausanne 1922/23 gewesen war. Wie bei Afetinan und den übrigen der Geschichtsthese nahe stehenden Historiker zeichnet sich seine Arbeit durch den wählerischen Gebrauch von Sekundärquellen aus, deren zum Teil rein hypothetischen Aussagen über die frühen Türken als Grundsteine der eigenen Sicht genommen und mit Spekulationen ergänzt wurden. Mit zahlreichen türkisch- und französischsprachigen Werken, die sich der Revision der Weltgeschichte aus türkistischer Perspektive verschrieben, 1 machte er sich mehr als andere auch in Europa einen Namen. Wie eine Internetrecherche zeigt, ist ausser Köprülü kaum ein anderer Historiker seiner Generation mit seinen Werken in den Bibliotheken der westlichen Welt so gut vertreten wie er. Wie schon nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg verlieh er auch später wieder je nach aktuellem Anlass dem türkischen Nationalismus eine scharfe geschichtspolitische Stimme im Westen; 2 dabei profilierte er sich als «Kalter Krieger»: Russland blieb, ob zaristisch oder kommunistisch, sein primäres und pauschales aussenpolitisches Feindbild - ganz so, wie er dies schon als Mitglied der spätosmanischen jungtürkischen Elite formuliert hatte. Atabinen scheute sich nicht, europäische Kollegen, die seine Geschichtsrevision nicht mit vollzogen, offen zu kritisieren. Namentlich der Münchner Turkologe und Nahostwissenschafter Franz Babinger erregte mit seinem wenig schmeichelhaften Werk über Mehmed den Eroberer - einer Ikone der Nationalisten - seinen Groll. Die Kritik bezog sich weniger auf Unter anderem: Atabinen, Rechid Saffet: Les turcs occidentaux et la Méditerranée. Istanbul 1956,8; ders.: Revisions historiques. Istanbul 1958,36. So anlässlich der Auseinandersetzungen im Vorfeld der Unabhängigkeit Zyperns: Kara §emsi (alias Re§it Saffet Atabinen): Lettre ouverte à Lord Salisbury sur la question de Chypre. Istanbul 1957 (auch abgedruckt in Revisions, 143-64.

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tatsächliche Schwächen des Bandes, so die mangelnden Belege, als den gekränkten Identifikationsstolz: «Il faut délibérément vouloir tout ignorer de la corruption effrénée des moeurs et des intrigues byzantines, depuis la fondation même de l'Empire d'Orient, pour se permettre de diriger un feu croisé d'accusations aussi systématiques contre les Souverains turcs, dont les vertus ancestrales ne commencent à se corrompre que précisément après leurs relations suivies avec les Byzantins [...J.» 1 Atabinen griff auch nach architekturgeschichtlichen Argumenten. In einem 1938 in Paris aufgelegten Werk suchte er mit einigen kreuz und quer zusammengesuchten Belegen die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung türkischer Architektur aufzuzeigen. So hätten die Türken als erste nach den Sumerern das Konzept der Kuppel beherrscht und breit angewandt. Es ging ihm auch in dieser Schrift darum, die Türkische Geschichtsthese zu bestätigen, nämlich «den fundamental kreativen Charakter der türkischen Rasse auf dem Gebiet der Architektur und der Zivilisation im allgemeinen.» Nichts belege besser als die Architektur die rassische Distinktion «dieser gesunden, kraftvollen, beherrschenden [türkischen] Gesellschaft». 2 Die dominierende Stellung armenischer Baumeister unter den Seldschuken und Osmanen ignorierte er gänzlich. Problematisch am geschichtlichen Bemühen Atabinens und vieler seiner Kollegen war nicht das legitime Bestreben, die Türken aufzuwerten und jahrhundertalten negativen Klischees entgegenzutreten - einzelne ihrer Argument trafen durchaus zu - , sondern ihre Übertreibung in die entgegengesetzte Richtung, die bezeichnenderweise vielfach verknüpft war mit Verunglimpfungen gegenüber den orientalischen Christen, den Arabern, den Levantinern und den Missionaren. Atabinen war gleichsam besessen vom Bedürfnis, bis in die Namen und Sitten französischer und schweizerischer Dörfer hinein spekulative türkische beziehungsweise hunnische Ursprünge zu lesen. 3 Er hatte im übrigen keinerlei Mühe damit, auf Spuren christlicher Türken im Mittelalter hinzuweisen, wenn ihm dies dem Ansehen der Türken in der westlichen Welt dienlich schien. Es sind wohl die originell und innovativ anmutenden Aspekte seiner Arbeit, gewiss auch die glänzenden Beziehungen des perfekt französischsprachigen ehemaligen Diplomaten, die ihm trotz der methodologischen und inhaltlichen Zweifelhaftigkeit seines * Fatih Sultan Mehmed et son dernier historien occidental. In: Atabinen: Revisions, 101. Der Artikel nimmt Bezug auf Babinger, Franz: Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit: Weltenstürmer einer Zeitenwende. München 1953, bzw. dessen französische Übersetzung: Mahomet II le conquérant et son temps: 1432-1481. Paris 1954. Les caractéristiques de l'architecture turque. Paris 1938, 122 f. Über die Kuppel 81-89. Esquisse d'une histoire rationnelle d'Attila dans les Gaules. In: Atabinen: Revisions (wie Anm. 106), 9 - 3 6 , insb. 27-30, sowie Contribution à une histoire sincère d'Attila. In: Atabinen: Revisions, 39-73.

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Schaffens die Tore italienischer und französischer Universitäten für Gastvorträge öffneten. Selbst Lucien Febvre war (mangels Fachkenntnissen?) bereit, Atabinens abenteuerliche Konferenz an der Sorbonne am 19. Mai 1953 über «Les Turcs à Constantinople du Ve au XVe siècle» (im Rahmen des 500jährigen Jubiläums der Eroberung Konstantinopels) als einen Schritt «im Rahmen eines ganzen grossen Umgestaltungsprozesses der Geschichte», zu dem sich die Annales-Gründer programmatisch bekannten, zu begrüssen; über türkistische Verzerrungen wie auch Atabinens nie widerrufene, untolerierbare historiographische Polemik nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg ging er freundlichst hinweg.1

Schluss Die in ihrem Selbstverständnis in Frage gestellte jungtürkische muslimische Elite schuf vom Fin de siècle bis zum Beginn der Zwischenkriegszeit eine historiographische «Krisenliteratur»,2 die zwischen den Hauptreferenzen Islam, Reich, Türkentum und Europa oszillierte. Diese Elite nahm nicht mehr, wie noch die Historiographen der osmanischen Reformära (Tanzimat, 1839-1876), die dynastische Begründung des Reiches und die sunnitische Staatsideologie als gegebenes Fundament wahr. Sie bemängelte im Gegenteil die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der Hofhistoriographie und suchte wissenschaftlichen Grund für die eigene historische Selbstvergewisserung. Trotz unbestreitbarer methodologischer Fortschritte im Bemühen um Wissenschaftlichkeit geriet die türkische Geschichtsschreibung nach 1900 dem Zeitgeist entsprechend in den Bann nationalgeschichtlich verengter Deutungsraster, sozialdarwinistischer Denkmuster und prähistorischer Spekulationen. 3 Westliche Wissenschaft, Methodik und Technik wurden enthusiastisch bejaht, weit weniger jedoch der kritische Intellekt von Renaissance und Aufklärung, der sie ermöglichte.4 Wissenschaft, Religion und

Allocution du Grand Historien M. Lucien Febvre, de l'Institut, après la conférence de Rechid Saffet Atabinen. In: Atabinen: Turcs coccidentaux, 161-63. 2 Zum Begriff «Krisenliteratur» vgl. Herzog, 5. Für den Vergleich mit der von der Rassenideologie beeinflussten prähistorischen Anthropologie in Deutschland siehe Wiwjorra, Ingo: Die deutsche Vorgeschichtsforschung und ihr Verhältnis zu Nationalismus und Rassismus. In: Puschner, Uwe (Hg.)- Handbuch zur «Völkischen Bewegung» 1871-1918. München 1996, 186-207. Auch Yusuf Akçura, der in Paris seine Hochschulausbildung genossen hatte, kritisierte 1921 das «blinde, dogmatische Vertrauen bei uns auf jede Theorie, die vom Westen kommt», während «leider der wissenschaftliche Zweifel, die Grundbedingung, um zur Gewissheit gelangen zu können, fehlt. Zitiert in Georgeon: Origines, 55.

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Menschen sollten dem neuen Staat dienen: Die staatszentrische Gesellschaftauffassung des Reichs manifestierte sich in neuem Gewand. So es darum ging, sich seiner Vergangenheit zu rühmen und diese als Legitimierung gegenwärtiger Ansprüche zu gebrauchen - wie im zeitgenössischen Europa und bei den jungen Balkanstaaten gang und gäbe dann mit voller spekulativer Kraft und mit Rückgriff auf früheste Geschichte: Dieser Logik gehorchten die Geschichte treibenden republikanischen Türkisten in einer Epoche virulenter Ethnonationalismen. Die Staatszentriertheit der historiographischen Produktion ist eine Konstante in der osmanischen wie republikanischen Türkei. Die von der Hofhistoriographie ererbte Schranke, eine andere als die Staatsperspektive einzunehmen - zum Beispiel die Perspektive der nicht-muslimischen Opfer erwies sich für die Schaffung ungeschminkter Geschichtsbilder als ebenso hinderlich wie die neuen nationalistischen Prämissen. Zentrale Themen wie die kurdische Frage, der Völkermord an den Armeniern, die ethnoreligiöse Heterogeneität und die gesellschaftliche Realität auf dem Lande, insbesondere in den Ostprovinzen, blieben daher im 20. Jahrhundert weitgehend blinde Flecken und Tabus der türkischen Historiographie - zumindest was das universitäre Establishment angeht. Wissenschafter wie Ismail Be§ikgi oder Taner Ak§am, die sich pionierhaft den tabuisierten Themen zuwandten, wurden gesellschaftlich und akademisch hart ausgegrenzt. Die inhaltliche (Selbst-) Zensur setzte sich in erstaunlichem Mass bis in die 1990er Jahre auch bei einem Grossteil der institutionalisierten westlichen Produktion über die moderne Türkeigeschichte durch. 1 Erst Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts begann der Wissenschaftsbetrieb, einige türkische Historikerinnen und Historiker eingeschlossen, explizite «post-nationalistische» Geschichtsperspektiven zu entwickeln. In Europa zerbrachen kulturelle Selbstbilder, die auf religiösen Traditionen aufbauten, im Laufe eines Jahrhunderte dauernden, in der Renaissance beginnenden und sich in der Aufklärung beschleunigenden Prozesses. Die auf dem Islam ruhenden kulturellen Spiegel und Geschichtsbilder zersplitterten später - im wesentlichen zur Zeit der So auch beim für Jahrzehnte als Bibel der Turkologie und modernen Türkeigeschichte geltenden Buch von Bernard Lewis: The emergence of modern Turkey (London 1961, zahlreiche Neuauflagen und Übersetzungen): ein elitozentrisches Werk und als solches sehr brauchbar, das aber in keiner Weise die inneren Probleme - Migration, kurdische, armenische, alevitische Fragen - zu erhellen vermochte; dito Shaw, Stanford: History of the Ottoman empire and modern Turkey, Cambridge 1976-1978. Andere Arbeiten priesen mit dem expliziten Hinweis auf die atlantische Allianz die Stabilität des Bündnispartners und beschönigten seine nahe Vergangenheit (so Kinross, Patrick: Atatürk: the rebirth of a nation. London 2001, Erstauflage 1964, oder Thomas, Lewis V., und Frye, Richard N.: The United States and Turkey and Iran. Cambridge 1951) und setzten damit unter anderen Vorzeichen jene Tradition unkritischer Bewunderung der «neuen Türkei» und ihrer Macher fort, die in der Zwischenkriegszeit nicht nur in Deutschland Urstände gefeiert hatte.

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jungtürkischen Generation - , dafür umso rascher, unvermittelter und schmerzhafter. Davon betroffen waren jene künftig dominierenden Eliten, die eine vollständige westliche Erziehung genossen hatten, nicht jedoch das Volk, was zu einer bis heute andauernden Spaltung der Gesellschaft beitrug. Die rasante Aneignung des Türkismus am Vorabend des Weltkrieges brachte einen Perspektiven Wechsel, schob allerdings einen beträchtlichen Teil der Antworten auf die bohrenden Fragen nach kultureller Identität und langfristiger gesellschaftlicher Zukunft im nahöstlichen Fin de siècle auf spätere Generationen auf. Dennoch bildete die ethnonationale Konstruktion für die türkischsprachigen muslimischen Eliten die hilfreiche «Krücke», mittels derer sie sich von der bisher übermächtigen islamischen Geschichtsdeutung und Gesellschaftslegitimierung emanzipieren konnten. Der Türkismus erschloss kreativ neue historische Räume und neue Methoden. Die besondere Problematik bestand und besteht darin, dass seine zeitbedingten Fehlentwürfe und dead-ends nicht Episoden blieben, die alsbald in freier intra- und internationaler Interaktion von der Weiterentwicklung überholt und widerrufen werden konnten. 1 Für dieses Defizit verantwortlich ist einerseits das zur Säkularreligion erstarrte staatszentrierte nationalistische Konzept, andererseits ein west-östlicher Kontext, der freier interregionaler Entwicklung wenig, geostrategischer Anbindung dafür umso mehr Raum bot. Die Geschichtsthese der 1930er Jahre (Türk Tarih Tezi) war das Produkt eines radikalen Ethnonationalismus und verstärkte dessen negative Auswirkungen in Erziehung, Geistesleben und Politik. Ihre Träger vollzogen das sacrificium intellectus, die Opferung des kritischen Intellekts, angesichts der politischen Mission, der sie sich verschrieben hatten. Nach Innen wirkte die These bis ans Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts nach; international hatte sie kaum Ausstrahlung. Paradoxerweise waren es die Studien von Köprülü und Barkan zur - vom jungen Nationalismus abgewerteten - osmanischen Geschichte, die als einzige in der internationalen Wissenschaft Bedeutung erlangten. 2 Die Geschichtsthese kann und muss aber auch als ernst zu nehmendes Zeichen dafür gelesen werden, dass die bisherige europäische Universalgeschichte der «aussereuropäisehen», namentlich türkischen und islamischen Welt nicht gerecht geworden war (und übrigens noch immer nicht

Ein sprechendes Beispiel dafür ist die Publikation durch den Tarih Kurumu der türkischen Version der Doktorarbeit Afetinans, einer vom rassischen Ethnonationalismus zutiefst geprägten Schrift noch nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Türkiye halkinin antropolojik karakterleri ve Türkiye tarihi, Türk lrkinin vatani Anadolu, 64'000 ki§i üzerinde anket [Die anthropologischen Charakteristiken des türkischen Volkes und die türkische Geschichte, Anatolien als Heimat der türkischen Rasse, eine Untersuchung von 64'000 Personen]. Ankara 1947. 2 Vgl. Ersanli, Bü§ra: The Ottoman Empire in the historiography of the Kemalist era: A theory of fatal decline. In: Adamr und Faroqhi: Historiography, 115-154, hier 154.

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ist). Davon mag eine gewisse Sympathie der um die Histoire Mondiale in Abgrenzung von der «vieille histoire universelle» bemühten AnnalesRepräsentanten für die Arbeit der türkischen Kollegen herrühren, auch wenn es jenen im Gegensatz zu diesen in ihrer Arbeit darum ging, rassische, sprachliche und kulturelle Distinktionskonstrukte zu dekomponieren. Trotz der expliziten Selbstüberhöhung, die allzuoft zum Diskurs einer «Herrenrasse» geriet, war eine Haupttriebfeder für die Herausbildung des türkisch-nationalen Geschichtsdiskurses diejenige, nicht als «Barbar», wie das europäische Klischee oft besagte, von der Globalgeschichte ausgeschlossen, sondern als integraler Bestandteil der Menschheit anerkannt zu werden. Denn der tief greifende Verlust von Reich und islamischer Referenz hatte das brennende Bedürfnis nach grundlegender Neuorientierung, nach frühhistorischer Begründung, nämlich einem aristotelischen Punkt ausserhalb sowohl der traditionell mulimischen als auch der modernen, eurozentrisch besetzten Geschichte geweckt.

16. TÜRKISCHE NATIONALREVOLUTION, ANTHROPOLOGISCH GEKRÖNT: KEMAL ATATÜRK UND EUGÈNE PITTARD

Ewigen Dank schulde die Wissenschaft, insbesondere die Anthropologie und die Frühgeschichte, Kemal Atatürk, der in seinem Land mit leidenschaftlichem persönlichem Interesse international vorbildliche Forschungen initiiert habe, schrieb 1939 der Genfer Anthropologe Eugène Pittard.* 1 Pittard war seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg Eckpfeiler einer wichtigen Wissenschaftsbeziehung zwischen der Schweiz und der Türkei. Sie ermöglichte unter anderem anfangs der 1930er Jahre einen Beitrag zur Reform des türkischen Hochschulwesens und in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Anstellungen verfolgter Wissenschafter aus Deutschland. Pittards Hauptrolle war jedoch der Beistand bei der Geburt der "Türkischen Geschichtsthese", die den Glauben an eine türkische Frühbesiedlung Kleinasiens und eine weltzivilisatorische Rolle des Türkentums mit den Mitteln damaliger Anthropologie abstützte. Es handelte sich um den Versuch einer völkischen Letztbegründung der türkischen Nation, nachdem die Gründer der Republik Türkei sich vom Islam als Staatsreligion losgesagt hatten. Die Geschichtsthese der 1930er Jahre war die Krönung einer Nationalrevolution, die nach der Demografie Kleinasiens in den 1910er und dem Staat in den 1920er Jahren auch ein revolutioniertes historisches Selbstverständnis etablieren wollte. Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit der Interaktion Pittard-Atatürk und dem Gebrauch der Geschichtswissenschaft sowie der Anthropologie in der frühen postosmanischen Türkei. Er geht von der These aus, dass die Gründer der ethnonationalen Türkei im internationalen Vergleich einen besonders ausgeprägten historisch-anthropologischen Rechtfertigungsbedarf hatten, und zwar aus zwei zeitgeschichtlichen Gründen: Erstens weil sie sich markant vom Islam als politischer Referenz abwandten, und zweitens, weil sie Völkermord und Vertreibung von nichttürkischen Gruppen aus Anatolien implizit als "sinnvolles" Geschehen vor dem Hintergrund alter Geschichte darzustellen *

^ Published in Historische Anthropologie

1/2006, p. 105-118.

Puggne Pittard, Un chef d'Etat animateur de l'anthropologie et de la préhistoire: Kemal Atatürk, Revue anthropologique (de Paris) 49 (1939), 5 - 1 6 , hier 14 f. - Herzlichen Dank an Majan Garhnski vom Musée d'Ethnographie in Genf, der mir Zutritt zu Pittards Nachlass ermöglicht hat.

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bemüht waren. Vorgängig bedarf es einiger Worte zu Pittard und zum damals bedeutsamen Phänomen des Türkismus (verstanden als türkischer Ethnonationalismus).1

Eugène Pittard (1867-1962) Pittards Autorität in der Türkei und auf dem Balkan hing damit zusammen, dass er ein internationales wissenschaftliches Prestige mit dem Ruf eines aufgeschlossenen, philanthropischen und demokratischen Akteurs verband. Privatdozent seit 1908 und Inhaber des neuen Lehrstuhls für Anthropologie seit 1916, war Pittard zudem bei den zahlreichen "Orientalen" aus der osmanischen Welt, die in Genf studierten, beliebt als engagiert vortragender und persönlich hilfreicher Dozent. 2 Fasziniert von der prähistorischen Welt der Fossilien hatte Pittard schon als Gymnasiast Sammlungen angelegt und Kontakt zum damaligen Professor der Geologie und Zoologie Carl Vogt aufgenommen. Dieser Wahlschweizer und einstige Flüchtling der deutschen 1848er Revolution wurde zum Lehrer Pittards. Seine prägende Ausbildung zum Anthropologen, inklusive die Vermessung sowohl fossiler Knochen als auch der äusseren Masse gegenwärtiger Völkerschaften, erhielt Pittard an der Ecole d'Anthropologie in Paris. Die physische Anthropologie blieb bei ihm jedoch immer verbunden mit einem starken Interesse an Geschichte und Ethnologie. Von der Paläoanthropologie bis zur Ethnohistorie bot sich den damaligen anthropologischen Pionieren ein faszinierender Raum für neue welthistorische Bilder über die Frühgeschichte der menschlichen Zivilisation, ausgehend von Fossilien- und Grabungsfunden. Das anthropologische Forschen in grossen Kategorien von Zivilisationen und "Rassen" war für Pittard eine professionelle Leidenschaft. Quelle der Inspiration, nicht etwa von Angst und Befremdung, war ihm die Völkervielfalt, darunter Gruppen wie die so genannten Hottentoten oder Zigeuner. Letzteren widmete er zahlreiche Studien: Sie sind von (exotischer) Neugier, aber auch vom Respekt vor diesen Menschen getragen; herablassende, * Die Bausteine zu diesem Artikel finden sich in Hans-Lukas Kieser. Vorkämpfer der "neuen Türkei". Revolutionäre Bildungseliten am Genfersee (1870-1939), Zürich 2005, insb. Kap. 6.6. Für eine neue, kritische Darstellung damaliger türkischer Rassenanthropologie mit teilweisem Einbezug der Genfer Verbindung siehe Nazan Maksudvan. Türklügü ôlçmek. Bilimkurgusal antropöloji ve Türk milliyetçiliginin îrkçi çehresi 1925-1939, Istanbul 2005. Für die historiografische Einordnung siehe Etienne Copeaux. Espaces et temps de la nation turque: analyse d'une historiographie nationaliste 1931-1993, Paris: CNRS Editions, 1997, und HansLukas Kieser. Die Herausbildung des türkisch-nationalen Geschichtsdiskurses (spätes 19.-Mitte 20. Jahrhundert), in: Krzoska, Markus, und Maner, Hans-Christian (Hg.), Beruf und Berufung. Geschichtswissenschaft und Nation in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, Münster, 2005, 59-98. 2 "M. Pittard ta öteden beri Türk Talebenin 'Parrain'i dir." Hakimiyet-i Milliye 10. 12. 1928.

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gefühlskalte Beobachtung - wie bei anderen zeitgenössischen Schädelvermessern 1 - ist ihnen fremd. Nicht der Sozialdarwinismus, sondern ein traditioneller Humanismus, Deismus und ein wissenschaftlicher Habitus aus der Zeit noch vor Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts prägten Pittards Umgang mit Menschen. Das anthropologische Interesse unterschied er scharf von den politischen Rassekonstruktionen nationalistischer Intellektueller; 2 daher gebrauchte er in seinen Texten den Begriff "Rasse" meist nur in Anführungszeichen. Eines seiner Werke mit dem ominösen Titel Les races belligérantes etwa beschrieb den Ersten Weltkrieg eben doch nicht als Krieg der Rassen, sondern nahm ihn vielmehr zum Anlass, die eigene Gelehrsamkeit auszubreiten mit der Nebenbemerkung, die europäischen Nationen seien eine Mischung verschiedener "Rassen", nirgends deckungsgleich mit Nationalität. Von Gobineaus These der ungleichwertigen Ungleichheit der Menschenrassen 3 grenzte er sich oft ironisch ab. Aber nicht mehr: kein eindeutiger Widerspruch, kein Bekenntnis zur normativen Einheit des Menschengeschlechts. Wie Vogt verband Pittard Genfer Republikanismus mit kosmopolitischer Ausrichtung und humanitärem Engagement. Anders als Vogt war er aber kein scharfzüngiger politischer Beobachter. Er tat sich auch nie als bekennender Atheist hervor wie viele seiner naturwissenschaftlichen Kollegen. Einen gläubigen Katholiken in seinem Freundeskreis etwa bedrängte er nicht, sein evolutionistisches Weltbild zu teilen - dies geht aus einem Brief seiner überaus umfangreichen, noch kaum aufgearbeiteten weltweiten Korrespondenz hervor. 4 Anfangs des 20. Jahrhunderts trifft man ihn an der Seite seiner Verlobten Hélène Dufour bei Heilsarmee-Einsätzen in einem L o n d o n e r E l e n d s q u a r t i e r a n . 5 Anders als die meisten seiner Wissenschaftskollegen engagierte er sich während des Weltkriegs stark in der Flüchtlingshilfe; nach dem Weltkrieg war er vorübergehend Hochkommissar des Völkerbunds in Albanien, wo eine Hungersnot herrschte, und begründete dort auch das albanische Rote Kreuz.

Vgl. über Schlaginhaufen, den Kollegen Pittards in Zürich: Christoph Keller. Otto Schlaginhaufen: Der Schädelvermesser: Otto Schlaginhaufen - Anthropologe und Rassenhygieniker: eine biographische Reportage, Zürich 1995. 3

Eugène Pittard. Les races et l'histoire, Paris 1924, 57 f.

Comte Joseph Arthur Gobineau. Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines, 3 Bde., Paris 18531855. 4 Archiv des Musée d'Ethnographie (MEG) 359 R. 347, Brief von de Freire de Andrade vom 15. 5. 1962. Jane Botbol, Eugène Pittard, un savant du XIXème siècle: une étude de sa correspondance de 1897 à 1931, Mémoire de licence dactyl. Lettres Genève, Genf, 1996, 20 f.

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Was in den 1920er Jahren neu hinzukam in Pittards Gelehrtenleben, war eine leidenschaftliche Verbindung zur Türkei der Kemalisten und zu Kemal Atatürk persönlich. Sie machte ihn zum Akteur von etwas, wovon er sich bisher distanziert hatte: von Rassekonstruktionen im Dienste nationalistischer Politiker. Pittard reiste 1928 erstmals und in den 1930er Jahren mehrere Male in die Türkei. Seine Frau, die Schriftstellerin Noëlle Roger (geborene Hélène Dufour), begleitete ihn auf seinen Reisen. Sie bestärkte ihn im Enthusiasmus für Atatürk und die "Neue Türkei". 1

Türkismiis Regit Saffet Atabinen, ein Parlamentarier und Mitbegründer des Türkischen Geschichtsinstituts (Türk Tarih Kurumu), erinnerte 1958 in einem Brief an den 91jährigen Pittard dankbar an gemeinsame Veranstaltungen in Genf in den Jahren 1919/20. 2 Die türkische Studentenschaft in der Schweiz organisierte damals Vorträge über die Türken und den Islam, um für ihre nationale Sache in Kleinasien zu werben. Der gewiefte Diplomat Atabinen, der wenig später Generalsekretär der türkischen Delegation an der Lausanner Nahostkonferenz wurde, leitete die nationalistische Studentenschaft dabei an. Er rühmte in seinem Brief von 1958 Pittards grosse Verdienste um sein Land - Pittard wurde in den 30er Jahren auch Ehrenmitglied des Türk Tarih Kurumu - und präzisierte, dass er von ihm wertvolle Auskünfte über Attila erhalten habe. Diese habe er Mustafa Kemal weitergeleitet, wodurch der künftige Staatschef auf den Genfer Professoren aufmerksam geworden sei.3 Weshalb das Interesse gerade an Attila? Der im späten 19. Jahrhundert einsetzende türkische Nationalismus wertete den Hunnenführer Attila als heroischen Vorfahren auf. Er setzte sich damit in einen Gegensatz zur abendländischen Geschichtsschreibung, die Attila oft ausgesprochen negativ darstellte. Atabinen hielt 1934 in Budapest einen Vortrag über diesen, wie er dort sagte, gemeinsamen turanischen Vorfahren (er gebrauchte Turan als Bezeichnung für eine von Westchina bis Europa reichende "Rasse", aus der

^ Siehe ihre begeisterten Berichte: Noëlle Roger (=Hélène Pittard-Dufour), En Asie Mineure. La Turquie du Ghazi, Paris 1930; dies., Anadolou. La Turquie de Kémal Atatürk, extrait de la Revue des deux mondes 1. 12. 1938, Paris. 2 Vgl. Einladungskarte für eine gemeinsame Konferenz am 3. 7. 1919, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Genf (= BPU), Ms. fr. 6313. 3 BPU Pittard 2003/52. Pittard schreibt, seine Studien über Türken auf dem Balkan hätten Mustafa Kemal auf ihn aufmerksam gemacht, d.h. womöglich noch vor Re§id Saffets Hinweis. Solche Studien finden sich in Eugène Pittard. Les peuples des Balkans: Recherches anthropologiques dans la péninsule des Balkans spécialement dans la Dobrudja, Genf 1920. Siehe Pittard, Animateur, 12.

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auch die Türken hervorgegangen seien). In seinem Vortrag würdigte Atabinen Attilas Auftreten im 5. Jahrhundert als eine männliche eurasische Reaktion auf römische Korruption und christliche Unterwürfigkeit; der geniale, "nordischrassige" Herrscher Attila habe dabei Völker befreit, das "orientalisch verseuchte" Italien gereinigt, eine Transfusion turanischen Blutes ins griechisch-syrisch vergiftete Europa bewerkstelligt und somit die mittelalterliche Wiedergeburt Europas eingeleitet. 1 Die antichristlichen und antieuropäischen Ressentiments gingen einher mit der türkischen Sehnsucht, wenn oft auch politische Antipoden, so doch jedenfalls aktive Akteure "europäischer Zivilisation" zu sein und gewesen zu sein. Dies findet sich in solchen Geschichtsvorstellungen ebenso wieder wie in politischen Schriften der Jungtürken und Kemalisten. Im epischen Gedicht Kizilelma (Goldroter Apfel) hatte der Soziologe und Publizist Ziya Gökalp anfangs 1913 seine Vision einer türkischen Bildungsstätte bei Lausanne geschildert, die zur Keimzelle für den Aufbau der türkischen Nation werden sollte. In einem bemerkenswerten Akt deutete der viel gelesene Vordenker des Nationalismus Gökalp damit den Goldroten Apfel, das traditionelle türkische Symbol für die Eroberung der christlichen Welt, um als friedliche Aneignung geistigen Gutes aus Europa. 2 Dies bewahrte allerdings weder Gökalp noch das jungtürkische Regime davor, kurz danach, im Ersten Weltkrieg, imperialen Träumen im panislamischen und pantürkischen Sinn nachzujagen. Danach blieb indes der Goldrote Apfel nur für Splittergruppen weiterhin Symbol ausgreifender Eroberung. Gökalp schrieb in einem weiteren einflussreichen Gedicht: "Attila und Dschingis Khan, diese heldenhaften Gestalten / Die mit ihren Siegen meine Rasse verherrlichen / Erscheinen zwar auf verstaubten Blättern der Geschichte als beschmutzt und schmachvoll / Während Alexander und Cäsar ruhmreich hervortreten / [...] Ich aber lese, verstehe und verherrliche sie in meinen Pulsadern." 3 Gökalp wertete in diesen Zeilen das Türkentum auf, indem er Geschichtsidentifikationen jenseits von Rom, Athen und dem makedonischen Pella entwarf. Die kemalistische Geschichtsthese, von der die Rede sein wird, ging noch weiter: Sie positionierte sich auch jenseits von Mekka, Medina und Jerusalem. Beide beanspruchten, Geschichte jenseits geschriebener Dokumente zu erschliessen, nämlich so wie sie sich unmittelbar im eigenen "Blut" (Gökalp) oder aber in Fossilien kund tue. Resid Saffet Atabinen. Esquisse d'une histoire rationnelle d'Attila dans les Gaules, in: ders., Revisions historiques, Instanbul 1958, 9 - 3 6 , hier 23, und Contribution à une histoire sincère d'Attila, S. 39-73, hier 43 und 49 f. 2 Türk Yurdu 23. 1. 1913, in der transkribierten Neuausgabe Bd. 2, 118 (Ankara: Tutibay, 1998). Vgl. Kieser, Vorkämpfer, 123-125. 3 Türk Yurdu 17. 10. 1912, Neuausgabe Bd. 1,419.

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Jenseits des grossen Corpus schriftlicher Dokumente aus Antike und Mittelalter, die eine griechische, lateinische, armenische, arabische oder byzantinische Sicht der Dinge artikulierten, setzten die Kemalisten auf eine Anthropologie, die stein- und knochenhart die Grösse vorislamischer türkischer Vergangenheit zu belegen hatte. Pittard kam somit anfangs der Zwischenkriegszeit mit einer Elite in Kontakt, die mit dem politischen Projekt eines türkischen Nationalstaats in Kleinasien das Projekt einer gründlichen historischen Revision verfolgte. Mustafa Kemal machte es Ende der 1920er Jahre - das heisst nach den siegreichen Kriegen um Anatolien, dem Triumph an der Lausanner Konferenz 1922/23 und dem darauf folgenden raschen Staatsaufbau in Ankara - zum vorrangigen Anliegen, das militärisch und politisch Erreichte historisch abzusichern. Die offizielle Version der Nahgeschichte seit 1919 hatte er 1927 in einer langen Rede niedergelegt, die in drei Bänden erschien. Es handelt sich um einen Rechenschaftsbericht, in welchem der Ich-Erzähler die Nation verkörpert, das Jahr 1919 als die "Stunde null" der Nation und Mustafa Kemal als deren unanfechtbares Haupt erscheint.1 Ebenso wichtig wie die Etablierung seiner Version der nahen Vergangenheit war dem Staatsgründer die Bestätigung eines geschichtlichen Credos, das er von früh an mit sich trug. Es verband den Glauben an die Nation mit grandiosen Vorstellungen nationaler Vergangenheit. Man hörte Mustafa Kemal zum Beispiel in einer Rede vor muslimischen Geschäftsleuten im März 1923 in Adana sagen, die Armenier hätten "in diesem gesegneten Land keinerlei Recht. Das Land gehört euch, es gehört den Türken. Es war in der Geschichte türkisch, ist jetzt türkisch und wird ewig türkisch sein." Das ursprünglich türkische und turanische Territorium sei im Laufe der Jahrtausende von Ägyptern, Persern, Griechen, Römern, Arabern und Byzantinern besetzt worden. Die osmanischen Eroberungen hätten es dann den eigentlichen Besitzern, der einheimischen Bevölkerung turanischer "Rasse", wieder zurückgegeben; und der siegreiche Krieg gegen Armenier und Griechen in den Jahren 1919-22 habe dies definitiv besiegelt.2

Die Türkische Geschichtsthese Militärisch und diplomatisch war die Lage in Kleinasien seit 1923 tatsächlich klar; und bis 1930 sicherte das Regime Mustafa Kemals seine ^ In zeitgenössischer Übersetzung: Mustapha Kemal fAtatürkl. Die neue Türkei 1919-1927, 3 Bde., Leipzig 1928. 2 Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Deme?leri, Ankara 1997, Bd. II, 130.

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Herrschaft auch in den Kurdengebieten weitgehend ab. Aber die Anfechtbarkeit auf symbolischer Ebene blieb hoch: Überall fanden sich Spuren einer vortürkischer Besiedlung Kleinasiens, insbesondere von Vorfahren jener Griechen und Armenier, die von den Muslimen Kleinasiens unter Führung der türkischen Nationalisten militärisch besiegt und definitiv vertrieben worden waren. Diese traumatischen Ereignisse und mit ihnen die Erinnerung an ein plurales Kleinasien hafteten noch frisch im Gedächtnis der jungen Nation. Ein weiterer Punkt war wichtig: Trotz dieser Vertreibungen, und obwohl man "endlich unter sich" war, wie ein Artikel im Türk Yurdu, dem Organ des Foyer Turc, 1926 befriedigt und selbstgerecht festhielt, 1 wurde die nationalistische Elite sich der ethnoreligiösen Heterogenität bewusst, die trotz allem weiterhin die anatolische Gesellschaft prägte. Dies brachten unter anderem die Forschungen von Hasan Regit [Tankut] (1891-1980) zu Tage, einem Parlamentsmitglied, das auch im Foyer Turc aktiv war, und am FoyerKongress im April 1930 seine entsprechenden Befunde vorstellte. 2 Die Türkische Geschichtsthese reagiert auf die offenen, bohrenden Fragen der Zeit nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg mit einer wilden anthropologischen Spekulation: Sie erklärte das Türkentum zur Wiege der menschlichen Zivilisation, die türkische Sprache zur Ursprache der Menschheit, und Kleinasien als seit Urzeiten prototürkisch besiedelt (womit alle zeitgenössischen Bewohner K l e i n a s i e n s auf ein u m f a s s e n d e s frühgeschichtliches Türkentum zurückgeführt waren). Die These deklarierte zudem die Türken zu frühgeschichtlichen, kulturbringenden Besiedlern Europas, und damit zu weissen, arischen Proto-Europäern. Das Türkentum erschien somit als das pure Gegenteil vom finsteren Klischeebild eines asiatisch-islamischen Reitervolks oder barbarischen Usurpatoren. Damit war ein trotziger Widerspruch zur abendländischen Griechenbegeisterung und eine Minimalisierung der historischen Existenz nichttürkischer Völker in Kleinasien verknüpft. Die Umwertung der Werte mochte originell klingen auch für die Ohren einiger europäischer Anthropologen und Historiker auf der Suche nach Positionen jenseits des Eurozentrismus. 3 * Baha Sait. Türkiye'de Alevi Zümreleri, Türk Yurdu, September 1926 (Neuausgabe Bd. 11, 105). 2 Tankuts Berichte sind teilweise veröffentlicht in: Mehmet Bavrak. (Hg.), Açik-gizli/resmigaynresmi kürdoloji belgeleri, Ankara 1994, 197-232 und 409-90; Angaben zur Person 197204. Hasan Refit Tankut half 1931 die Türkische Sprachgesellschaft zu begründen und vertrat in den folgenden Jahren innerhalb und ausserhalb der Universität die Sonnensprachtheorie und die Türkische Geschichtsthese. Siehe unter anderem Hasan Regit Tankut. Tracé linguistique en direction de la préhistoire et l'explication de la théorie günes-dil (soleil-langue). Communication faite par le Prof. H. Resit Tankut, Istanbul 1937; ders.: Etude linguistique d'après la méthode panchronique de la théorie Güne§-Dil et du point de vue paléo-sociologique, Istanbul 1936. Vgl. auch Copeaux, Espaces, 70. 3 Bis hin zu den Annales-Begründern. Vgl. Kieser, Herausbildung, 94 f.

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Ein solches Geschichtsbild zusammen mit dem Credo vom kulturbringenden Türkentum wissenschaftlich zu artikulieren, beauftragte der Staatschef im Frühjahr 1930 türkische Intellektuelle aus dem Foyer Turc. Neben Atabinen nahm auch Atatürks 22jährige Adoptivtochter Afet Inan Einsitz in die Geschichtskommission, aus der wenig später das Geschichtsinstitut hervorging. Es diente von Beginn an der Ausarbeitung einer nationalen Historiografie, inklusive Frühgeschichte und Anthropologie. 1930/31 verfasste die Kommission in Rekordzeit Geschichtsbücher im neuen Geist und publizierte eine Rede Leon Cahuns, eines französischen HobbyTurkologen, aus dem Jahre 1873 auf Türkisch. Der Erste Geschichtskongress von 1932 in Ankara krönte diese grundlegende Phase und offizialisierte die Geschichtshese. Dissidente Stimmen wurden kaltgestellt. Im publizierten Kongressband fällt auf, wie häufig auf Pittard Bezug genommen wird. Dem Zweiten Geschichskongress 1937 in Istanbul verlieh dann der persönlich anwesende Pittard - damals Dekan der phil. II-Fakultät und bald Rektor der Universität Genf - eine internationale wissenschaftliche Weihe. Noch stärker als der Erste lief dieser Kongress ab als akklamierendes Zelebrieren undiskutierter Prämissen. Bei beiden Kongressen war Atatürk anwesend, und die Kongresspublikation, die vorne Atatürks Portraitfoto enthielt, war dem, so hiess es, "grössten Sohn der türkischen Geschichte" gewidmet. Ohne die Interaktion Pittard-Atatürk hätte es die Geschichtsthese so nicht geben können. Eugène Pittard war derjenige ausländische Wissenschaftler, dem Mustafa Kemal am nächsten stand. Davon zeugt sowohl die persönliche Freundschaft als auch die intensive Rezeption: Bei Pittards Vorträgen in den Jahren 1928-38 in Ankara war Atatürk meist unter den Zuhörern. Die zahlreichen Unterstreichungen und Randbemerkungen, darunter der Buchstabe "d" für "dikkat" - Achtung wichtig! - belegen, wie intensiv der Staatschef die Werke des Genfer Anthropologen seit Mitte der 1920er Jahre rezipierte, das heisst seit dem Erscheinen von Les races et l'histoire: Introduction ethnologique à l'histoire (1924). Zwar las er auch eingehend Anthropologen wie Alfred Cort Haddon, George Montandon und Gobineaus Werk Essai sur l'inégalité' des races humaines, das in seinem rassisch wertenden Urteil über die Türken gespalten war. 1 Am meisten sprach ihn jedoch Pittard an: Er schien ihm die Garantie zu sein für autoritative internationale Wissenschaft.

^ Graf Joseph Arthur Gobineau. Versuch über die Ungleichheit der Menschenracen, 4 Bde., Stuttgart 1898-1901 (französisches Original 1853-55), hier Bd. 1, 170-75.

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Pittard-Atatürk Der Beginn von Atatürks Bemühung um die Prähistorie koinzidierte mit Pittards Anatolien-Expedition und der persönlichen Bekanntschaft der beiden Männer im Sommer 1928.1 Pittard war einer der wenigen Ausländer, die im zweiten Jahrhundertviertel nach Ostanatolien reisen durfte und vielleicht der erste, der dies nach der blutigen Niederschlagung des kurdischen Aufstands von 1925 tat. Von dieser Realität ist in Eugène Pittards und Noëlle Rogers Reiseberichten allerdings nie die Rede. 2 Pittard war einerseits ganz von seiner Forschung, andererseits von der türkischen Revolution und der Person Atatürks eingenommen. Er berichtete eindrücklich von der revolutionären Begeisterung in den Provinzstädten anlässlich der damals eingeleiteten Umstellung vom arabischen aufs lateinische Alphabet. Er beobachtete ebenfalls, ohne kritischen Nebenton, den damals landesweit einsetzenden kemalistischen Bilderkult. 3 Die türkische Presse ging im Herbst 1928 ausführlich auf den Besuch der, wie es hiess, alten Freunde der Türkei ein und publizierte Pittards Entdeckungen. 4 Er selbst veröffentlichte seine Ergebnisse nach der Rückkehr in der europäischen Presse und in Fachzeitschriften. Es ging um zwei Dinge: erstens (auf Grund von Pittards Steinwerkzeugfunden bei Adiyaman in Südostanatolien) um die Entdeckung einer bisher verneinten paläolithischen Zivilisation in Kleinasien; 5 zweitens (auf Grund eigenhändiger Vermessung von 210 Soldaten in einem Militärlager bei Ankara) um die Hypothese, die anatolischen Türken entstammten einer "brachykephalen Rasse"; zudem lasse der sogenannte indice nasale auf eine grössere "rassische Homogenität" der Türken in Anatolien als der Türken auf dem Balkan schliessen. 6 "Brachykephalie" wurde damals generell mit indoeuropäisch, arisch und kulturbringend assoziiert. Pikanterweise hatte Pittard in Les races et l'histoire, das unter anderem von der Kategorisierung der Rassen in dolichound brachykephale (lang- und kurzschädlige) handelt, noch nicht die Türken, dafür die Armenier als brachykephal aufgeführt. 7

Eugène Pittard. Quelques souvenirs personnels sur Ataturk, Journal de Genève 14 11 1938

1.

2

Eugène Pittard, A Travers LAsie-Mineure. Le visage nouveau de la Turquie, Paris 1931; Roger, Turquie. Pittard, Animateur, 8; ders., Visage nouveau, 76 und 102-111. So Akcham 25. 9. 1928, La République 28. 10. 1928; beide Artikel BPU Ms. fr. 6313. EugèflÇ Pittard, Découverte de la divilisation paléolothique en Asie Mineure, Archives suisses d'Anthropologie générale 2-5 (1928-1929), 135-65. Eugène Pittard, Contribution à l'étude anthropologique des Turcs d A s i e Mineure, Türk Antropoloji Mecmuasi Nr. 8 (September 1929), 3-29, hier 3, 10 und 19. Pittard, Les races et l'histoire, 47.

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An beide Befunde schloss Pittard Vermutungen an, von denen er sagte, sie wären durch weitergehende Forschungen zu beweisen (in der türkischen Presse kursierten sie alsbald als autoritative Aussagen), und zwar: Anatolien sei mehrheitlich von Menschen derselben "Rasse" bewohnt 1 und sei ethnisch entschieden vom "bloc asiatique" abzutrennen und dem "bloc européen" zuzuordnen. 2 Die Haustierhaltung und viele unserer Kulturpflanzen, ja womöglich wir selbst als weisse Europäer stammten von dort, wo mit der Domestizierung der Tiere einst die grösste Sozialrevolution aller Zeiten staatgefunden habe. 3 Pittard suggerierte zugleich eine "türkischrassige" Kontinuität vom Mesolithikum, Neolithikum über Hethiter, Sumerer und selbst antike kleinasiatische Hellenen bis zur Gegenwart. Die kemalistische Erneuerung, hielt er fest, entspreche ganz der Wesensart, dem Genie, der in ihrer Kontinuität und zivilisatorischen Rolle herausgehobenen türkischen Rasse. 4 Suggestiv war auch Pittards Hinweis auf die rätselhafte Herkunft der Etrusker in Italien 5 - "türkisch" hiess die kategorische Antwort kemalistischer Historiker. In einer seiner Konferenzen in der Türkei sprach Pittard gemäss eigenen Notizen diese Worte: "Welches sind die rassischen Charakteristika der neolithischen Europäer? Sie sind von Asien gekommen. Sie haben den Homo Alpinus geschaffen. Sie sind unsere Vorfahren und Brüder. Also ist Anatolien Heiliges Land [Terre sacrée]". 6 Ideen von der turanischen Einwanderung in Europa beziehungsweise von den Türken als kulturbringenden Proto-Europäern gab es schon bei Cahun. 7 Aber Cahun war kein etablierter Wissenschafter von internationalem Ruf gewesen und die Zentralität Anatoliens für den türkischen Nationalismus war jüngeren Datums. Es war somit im besonderen Vertrauen auf seinen neuen Freund, den Genfer Anthropologen, dass Mustafa Kemal Ende der 1920er Jahre das Unternehmen "Türkische Geschichtsthese" in die Wege leitete mit dem Ziel, sein Nationsverständnis auf, wie er hoffte, sichere anthropologische Grundlage zu stellen. Neben der Gründung des Tarih Kurumu, den Publikationen und den Kongressen war ein wichtiger Bestandteil davon die von ihm befohlene * Vgl. Pittard, Visage nouveau, 24. 2

3

Illustré 22. 11. 1928, BPU Ms. fr. 6313.

Pittard, Visage nouveau, 12-15. Sehr deutlich auch Eugène Pittard. Les origines de l'humanité et les bases préhistoriques de la civilisation, Broschüre, Bern 1942, 9 f. 4 "Bu memleket çok jeyler vadediyor. Çiinkû bugünkü rönesans hareketi Türk îrkmin dehasma tetabuk eden bir saha bui m u§ tur." Hakimiyet-i Milliye 10. 12. 1928, BPU Ms. fr. 6313. 5

Pittard, Contribution, 29.

6

Handschriftliche Notizen, BPU Ms. fr. 6290/3.

7

Léon Cahun. Habitat et migrations préhistoriques des races dites touraniennes, in: Congrès international des orientalistes. Compte rendu de la première session, 1. Bd., Paris 1874, 431-41, zitiert in: Copeaux, Espaces et temps, 36 f. Vgl. auch Léon Cahun. Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie. Turcs et Mongols des origines à 1405, Paris 1896.

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physische Vermessung von 64'000 Menschen in Anatolien. Sie bildete die Datengrundlage für Afet Inans Dissertation mit dem sprechenden Titel L'Anatolie, le pays de la "race" turque und entlockte Pittard, Inans Doktorvater, euphorische Aussagen über Atatürk als grossen Freund der Anthropologie. Afet Inan beanspruchte mit Hinblick auf Kleinasien, "auf definitive Weise die Geschichte dieses Fleckens Erde zu schreiben". 1 Sie verband die brachykephale arische Selbstdefinition der "türkischen Rasse in Anatolien" mit der Selbstbestimmung als Homo Alpinus (über ihren Doktorvater hinaus besass dieser rassische Terminus im helvetischen Diskurs jener Jahre einen hohen Stellenwert). Afet Inan war Sprachrohr ihres Adoptivvaters, aber zugleich eine selbstbewusste, sendungsbewusste Galionsfigur der Geschichtsthese. Sie wurde später Geschichtsprofessorin in A n k a r a . 2 Ihre intellektuelle Biografie verweist darauf, wie eng die Emanzipation urbaner Türkinnen an einen radikalen Nationalismus geknüpft war. Bei den Vertretern und Vertreterinnen der Geschichtsthese gesellte sich zur Idee der proto-europäischen türkischen Hochkultur und Erstbesiedelung Kleinasiens die damit eng verknüpfte vom Türkischen als der Mutter aller Sprachen, die in die so genannte Sonnensprachtheorie mündete. 3 Die politische Anwendung lag unter anderem wiederum darin, Kleinasien als urtürkisches Territorium in Anspruch zu nehmen. Zudem wurden Ortsnamen, die offensichtlich anderen Sprachen entstammten, leicht verändert, um türkisch zu klingen - zum Beispiel Diyarbakir anstatt Diarbekir - , wenn sie nicht vollständig gewechselt wurden, wie Hatay ("Hethiterstätte") für Antakya. Der über 60jährige Pittard machte seine anthropologischen Interpretationen im Hinblick auf Türken und Kleinasien zwar durchaus aus Überzeugung und mit wissenschaftlichem Pathos. Aber ohne die eindringliche Nachfrage, ohne den ihn faszinierenden, ihn schmeichelnden Dialog mit der kemalistischen Elite wäre er wohl kaum so weit gegangen in seinen Aussagen, wie er es dann tat. Von einem Treffen mitt Atatürk im Sommer 1937 schrieb Pittard: "Als ich auf das Problem zu sprechen kam, das ihm am so sehr Herzen lag, nämlich den Ursprung der türkischen Rasse und Zivilisation seit prähistorischen Zeiten, mache ich ihm eine grosse Freude, als ich ihm ankündige, dass ohne Invasion aus Kleinasien in der Jungsteinzeit Afet Inan (=Ay§e Afetinan), L'Anatolie, le pays de la "race" turque: recherches sur les caractères anthropologiques des populations de la Turquie, enquête sur 64.000 individus, préface de Eugène Pittard, Genf 1941, 3. Autobiografisch und mit Briefen aus Genf zur Zeit ihres Doktorats: Avse Afetinan. Atatürk'ten mektuplar, Ankara 1989. Vgl. Jens Pgter Laut, Das Türkische als Ursprache? Sprachwissenschaftliche Theorien in der Zeit des erwachenden türkischen Nationalismus, Wiesbaden 2000.

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Europa wahrscheinlich nicht das Stadium der Steinzeit hätte überwinden können."1 Pittards Beitrag jener Jahre zur Geschichtsthese erscheint insgesamt als bedingt, wenn nicht ausgelöst, durch eine suggestive kommunikative Konstellation. Er liess sich einspannen in ein Unternehmen, das die Aufwertung der einen zu Ungunsten anderer "Rassen" bezweckte; er half mit, die Türken zu einer brachykephalen, also "kurzschädeligen" und "arischen Rasse" zu erklären, was die Kemalisten als Bewunderer europäischer Zivilisation unbedingt sein wollten. Sympathie für die Türkei und den Förderer der Anthropologie Atatürk, aber auch etwas Opportunismus und Geltungsstreben scheinen die Gründe dafür gewesen zu sein. Die tatsächliche, nämlich zeitgeschichtliche Bedeutung der Frühgeschichtsthese reflektierte er dabei nicht; Ansätze dazu überdeckte er durch einen Diskurs des Wohlwollens und der Faszination. Pittard pflegte mit zahlreichen Ministern und Funktionären persönlichen Kontakt, auch mit Ministerpräsident Ismet Inönü, und fädelte helvetische Beteiligungen im türkischen Erziehungssystem ein. 2 Am wichtigsten war zweifellos die Mission seines Kollegen, des Genfer Pädagogikprofessors Albert Malche. Mit weitgehenden Vollmachten ausgestattet, inspizierte dieser 1931-33 Hochschulen, Mittelschulen und Spitäler und schlug in seinem Bericht umfassende Neuerungen vor. 3 Die Umsetzung dieser Neuerungen gab dem Erziehungssystem wichtige Impulse und bot Gelegenheit, einige Dozenten der 1933 in Zürich gegründeten "Notgemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland" anzustellen. Zugleich fand eine Säuberung statt: Liberale türkische Professoren, die der Geschichtsthese kritisch gegenüberstanden, verloren ihre Stelle; Institute für Türkische Revolution und entsprechende Geschichtsbilder wurden eingerichtet, deren Kurse und Prüfungen jeder Studierende obligatorisch zu absolvieren hatte. Die Aufnahme von Akademikern, die aus Nazi-Deutschland flüchten mussten, war im Übrigen eine Ausnahme. Denn, logisch verknüpft mit der Geschichtsthese, begrenzte das Siedlungsgesetz von 1934 die Einwanderung auf Menschen türkischer Abstammung und Kultur. Im Sommer desselben Jahres fanden mit Wissen der Zentralregierung und unter Beteiligung der

^ Pittard, Souvenirs. 2 Drei Genfer Professoren und einige Genfer Lehrbeauftragte lehrten in den 30er Jahren an der Universität Istanbul (gemäss Pittard, "Souvenirs"). Seinen Kollegen André Naville, Privatdozent in Genf, schlug Pittard mit Erfolg für den Zoologielehrstuhl an der Universität Istanbul vor; vgl. den Briefwechsel im Mai 1935 mit Ministerpräsident Ismet Pascha und Erziehungsminister Cemal Hüsnü, MEG 350 R. 174. a

Vgl. Horst Widmann. Exil und Bildungshilfe: die deutschsprachige akademische Eimigration in die Türkei nach 1933, Bern 1973, 45-61; Mustafa Ergün. Atatürk devri Türk egitimi III, http://www.egitim.aku.edu.tr/ata3.htm, 12. 3. 2005.

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lokalen Zentren der Einheitspartei antijüdische Pogrome in Thrakien statt mit dem Ziel, die Juden aus jenem europäischen Zipfel der Türkei zu vertreiben.1

Die zeitgeschichtliche Bedingtheit kemalistischer Rassenanthropologie Die frühgeschichtliche Bemühung im letzten Lebensjahrzehnt Atatürks ging von der Prämisse aus, dass anthropologisch nachweisbare biologische Merkmale letztgültige Determinanten des Menschseins und der nationalen Gemeinschaft seien. Mit Ausnahme eines kanonisierten Abschnitts von 1919— 1927 blieb die Zeitgeschichte explizit von der Anstrengung um die Nationalgeschichte ausgespart. Und doch lagen die Motive der Geschichtsthese ganz im damaligen Zeitgeschehen. Der Rekurs auf die Frühgeschichte suchte eine maximale Distanz von der nahen Vergangenheit. Die wissenschaftlich anthropologisch "nachgewiesene" türkische Identität sollte den Bruch mit der kosmopolitischen osmanischen Identität und jeglichem islamischem Bezug besiegeln. Aus dem Untergang des Osmanischen Reichs, insbesondere dem Misslingen der jungtürkischen Revolution von 1908 (im Blick auf gesamtosmanische Erneuerung), aus den Balkankriegen 1912/13 und dem Ersten Weltkrieg schlössen die Kemalisten, dass die Türkei nur als eine anthropologisch fundierte Ethnonation überleben und zivilisatorisch zu den europäischen Staaten aufschliessen konnte. Die anthropologische These vom Türkentum sollte den sunnitischen Islam als bedrohlichen Konkurrenten ausschalten; denn dieser war die reale Basis gesellschaftlicher Mobilisierung in den Kriegsjahren 1913-22 gewesen und hatte im Osmanischen Reich den sunnitischen Herrschaftsanspruch legitimiert. Zweitens drängte die These von der Präexistenz der Türken in Kleinasien und von ihrer Zivilisationsbringenden Rolle in der Weltgeschichte das Ärgernis auf die Seite, dass überall im Land Ruinen und in den ausländischen Bibliotheken eine Vielzahl von Dokumenten etwas anderes in den Vordergrund stellten: die Jahrtausende alte anatolische Existenz ganz anderer Völker, griechischer, armenischer, assyrischer. Im Jahrzehnt vor 1923 waren sie weitgehend vertrieben oder ausgerottet worden. Die nationalistische Elite verstand dies als eine vielleicht bedauerliche, vor allem aber folgerichtige Antwort auf eigene Verluste - und damit waren muslimische Verluste gemeint - auf dem Balkan und im Kaukasus. Prähistorie, inklusive der Vereinnahmung der hethitischen und sumerischen Hochkulturen als prototürkisch, war in dieser * Vgl. Rifat N. Bali. Cumhuriyet yillarinda Türkiye Yahudileri. Bir Türklegtirme serüveni (1923-1945), Istanbul 1999. Nachtrag 2007: Vgl. auch Hatice Bavraktar. The anti-Jewish pogrom in Eastern Thrace in 1934: new evidence for the responsibility of the Turkish government, Patterns of Prejudice 40-2 (2006), 95-111.

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Hinsicht eine Ausflucht davor, sich mit gescheiterten Beziehungen und auch ihrer Bewältigung und Konfliktlösungen zu befassen. Sie liess im Gegenteil die türkische Alleinherrschaft über Anatolien und das "Verschwinden" der Anderen als historisch begründet, als geradezu natürlichen Prozess erscheinen. Damit war zugedeckt, dass eine jungtürkische Bevölkerungspolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg und deren Fortsetzung in den Kriegen um Anatolien, 1919-22, zur fast vollständigen Entchristianistierung Kleinasiens geführt und die demografische Grundlage geschaffen hatte, in Kleinasien einen türkischmuslimischen Nationalstaat auf ethnonationalistischer Grundlage zu gründen. Nichttürkische Muslime wurden im Gegensatz zu den Christen als dem "Türkentum" assimilierbar betrachtet. Die Geschichtsthese entsprang auch dem zum Teil durchaus berechtigten Bemühen, den Raum der Geschichte geografisch und chronologisch weit zu öffnen. Aber sie führte in eine Sackgasse: die Illusion eines archimedischen Punktes ganz ausserhalb, eines Alibis, eines Anderswo, weg von den Problemen der nahen, spätosmanischen Geschichte, die man als heillosen Strudel ungelöster Probleme erinnerte. Sie fasste nationale Identität ethnisch-rassisch und setzte das Türkentum über alles. Unbeabsichtigt führte sie das nationalistische Prahlen mit Hochkultur und Erstbesiedelung wichtige Argumente der Nationalismen in ganz Europa - zu einer absurden Überhöhung. Für diejenigen, die an die Geschichtsthese glaubten, schuf sie zwar vorübergehend Distanz zu den chronischen Fragen nach der Zukunft der osmanischen Welt, zu den Traumata der Kriege, zu den Vertreibungen, Massenmorden, zur eigenen abgrundtiefen Identitätskrise und zur kurz zuvor gehabten politischen Existenzangst. Aber auf die Dauer konnte sie die notwendige Wiederkehr dieser Themen nicht vermeiden. Nach dem erfolgreichen Auftritt der türkischen Nationalisten an der Friedenskonferenz von Lausanne 1922/23, hatte es sich der Führer der neuen Republik Mustafa Kemal zur leidenschaftlichen Pflicht gemacht, Kleinasien auch symbolisch als Terre sacrée und Terre promise dem Türkentum anzueignen. Wissenschaft, genauer gesagt Anthropologie und Frühgeschichte, dienten dazu, diesen letztlichen Anspruch zu begründen. Der damals international bekannte Genfer Anthropologe und Universitätsprofessor Eugène Pittard spielte dabei eine zentrale Rolle. Er war seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg der Eckpfeiler einer wichtigen Wissenschaftsbeziehung zwischen der Schweiz und der Türkei; er leistete mit seinen Kategorisierungen, Suggestionen und seinem Prestige Beistand bei der Geburt einer These, die den überhöhten Glauben ans Türkentum "welthistorisch" zu fundieren suchte. Es handelte sich um den Versuch einer völkischen Letztbegründung der türkischen Nation im Rahmen einer türkischen Revolution, die auch die eigene Geschichte als Basis des Selbstverständnisses revolutionierte.

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Das neue Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB) von 1926 und die Türkische Geschichtsthese der 1930er Jahre sind die beiden Kristallisationspunkte oder Säulen des türkischen nation building im 20. Jahrhundert. Das eine handelt von der Umwandlung von Staat und Gesellschaft, die andere von der Schaffung einer neuen Identität. Beide waren Willensakte einer Elite, die in beiden Hinsichten unbedingt zu Europa gehören wollte. Während das ZGB allmählich zum indiskutablen Bestandteil türkischer Rechtskultur wurde, der international anerkannt ist, blieb die türkische Geschichtsthese und die damit verknüpfte anthropologische Identitätsbemühung ein Kuriosum. Und doch war sie für Atatürks Weltbild zentral - nichts interessierte den Nationalstaatsgründer in seinen letzten Lebensjahren mehr als die Fragen, auf die diese These spekulativ antwortete. An ihr hing das symbolische Fundament seiner Staatsgründung. Aber nicht als stabile Säule nationaler Identität, sondern als Zeichen der Zeit Monument intellektueller Aporie des Ethnonationalismus - hat sie ihre Epoche überdauert. Pittard selbst sah seine eigene Aufgabe darin, zum Selbstbewusstsein von Menschen beizutragen, für die er Sympathie empfand; dies auch als Reaktion, wie er schrieb, auf weit verbreitete westliche Vorurteile gegenüber Muslimen und Türken. 1 Daher übernahm er in seinem Buch über die Neue Türkei von 1931 vorgefertigte Bilder über die Nahgeschichte, so die Legende vom armenischen Verrat im Ersten Weltkrieg oder das Abschieben türkischer Verantwortung für die Idee des Bevölkerungstransfers von 1922/23.2 Warum Hess der renommierte Gelehrte sich in ein zweifelhaftes geschichtspolitisches Unternehmen einspannen, das in zentraler Hinsicht - Verbindung von Nation und "Rasse" - seinen zuvor artikulierten Standpunkten widersprach? Es bedürfte einer intensiveren Beschäftigung mit Pittards Lebensgeschichte, um diese Frage aus biografischer Sicht präzise zu beantworten. Doch einige abschliessende Vermutungen können angestellt werden: Neben bereits genannten Faktoren wie akademische Eitelkeit, privilegierte persönliche Forschungsbedingungen, Förderung der Anthropologie in zuvor nie gekanntem ^ Ähnliches mag den katholischen Priester und damals bekannten Kulturanthropologen Wilhelm Koppers (1886-1961) zur Teilnahme am Zweiten Geschichtskongress bewogen haben. Er sagte in seinem Beitrag: "Die Soziologie der Urtürken und Urindogermanen zeigt so viele und wesentliche Übereinstimmungen, dass an der genetischen Zusammengehörigkeit beider wohl nicht gezweifelt werden kann." Die Lehre, die er zog, war allerdings, dass die Rolle des einen nicht gegen diejenige eines anderen Volkstums auszuspielen sei, es komme im Gegenteil auf ihr gutes Zusammenwirken an, wie er explizit im Hinblick auf die kriegerische Gegenwart sagte. Wilhelm Koppers. Urtürkentum und Urindogermantum im Lichte der völkerkundlichen Universalgeschichte, Separatdruck aus Belleten Nr. 20, Istanbul 1941, 523-25. Visage nouveau, 24. In Briefen an die türkische Botschaft erkundigte er sich, wie es zum schmerzhaften Zwangstransfer, den die Lausanner Konferenz festschrieb, gekommen war. Unkritisch verbreitete er die Version, dies sei der griechische Vorschlag gewesen, ohne zu erwähnen, dass die türkische Delegation auf zwanghaftem Transfer beharrt hatte. Vgl. die relativ differenzierte Antwort des Geschäftsträgers in Bern Mehmed Münir [Ertegün] in einem Privatbrief vom 22. 2. 1930, MEG 350R. 162.

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Ausmass, persönliche Beziehungen und Sympathie für Türken und Muslime (bzw. Empörung über europäische Vorurteile) gibt es weitere Aspekte zu bedenken. So gab es einen patriotisch helvetischen Faktor insofern, als Pittard als ein Gegner der Nationalsozialisten den naheliegenden Einfluss Deutschlands zumindest in Sachen Wissenschaftsbeziehung zu schwächen suchte. Er konnte dabei mit Erfolg darauf aufbauen, dass Teile der kemalistischen Elite in der Westschweiz studiert hatten (darunter Mahmut Bozkurt, der Justizminister, der das schweizerische ZGB einführte) und dass diese Elite die Schweiz als eine vom Imperialismus unverdorbene Zitadelle europäischer Zivilisation idealisierte. Umgekehrt lässt sich von einer generellen Türkenbegeisterung im Schweizer Bürgertum nicht sprechen, da die jahrzehntelange Solidarisierung mit den Armeniern bei Teilen des Bürgertums da zu tiefe Spuren hinterlassen hatte. Im Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit teilten allerdings zahlreiche Vertreterinnen und Vertreter akademischer und politischer Eliten - vor allem von Rechts, aber zum Teil auch von Links - die Begeisterung für den Kemalismus. 1 Vermutlich gaben letztlich Beziehungsfaktoren den Ausschlag gaben für das prominente Engagement des bejahrten Pittard. Dazu gehört insbesondere seine Freundschaft und Bewunderung für den türkischen Staatschef, wobei es schwierig abzuschätzen ist, wie sehr die AtatürkFaszination von Pittards Frau Noelle Roger dabei ins Gewicht fiel.

Trotz des Rassediskurses kann bei Pittard von einem antisemitischen Impuls nicht die Rede sein, da er sich früh explizit gegen den deutschen Antisemitismus wandte. Zudem haben jüdische Intellektuelle wie der Leon Cahun in Paris und Moi'z Kohen Tekinalp in Istanbul zentrale Beiträge zum Türkismus geleistet, letzterer mit beachtlicher Selbstverleugnung auch zum Kemalismus. Tekin Alp. Le Kemalisme, Paris, 1937.

17. DEPLORABLE, UNAVOIDABLE, FUNCTIONAL, SALUTARY: SOME REMARKS ON THE ÉLITES' ACCEPTANCE OF MASS VIOLENCE AROUND WORLD WAR I

Raphael Lemkin (1900-59), lawyer and historian, pioneer of the U.N. Convention against genocide, wrote in his autobiography: "In Turkey, more than 1'200'000 Armenians were put to death for no other reason than they were Christians. After the end of the war, some 150 Turkish war criminals were arrested [...] Then one day, I read in the newspapers that all Turkish war criminals were to be released. I was shocked. [...] Why is the killing of a million a lesser crime than the killing of a single individual? I didn't know all the answers, but I felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be adopted by the world."1 The shocking experience in October 1922 of the impunity and acceptance of the destruction of the Anatolian Armenians in World War I made the Jewish student Raphael Lemkin aware of the need for a new concept in international law. Why was ethno-religious mass violence more or less accepted at that time? The article at hand addresses this question. It studies the link between the acceptance of mass violence and the project of "New Turkey" in the wider context of WWI, all set against a backdrop of defeat and the ruin of old political orders. The article limits itself to texts of contemporary Turkish and German authors and does not deal with the question of the Allies' failure to secure justice for the victims. It emphasizes a more general current of ideas among the national intellectual élites, not the particular justifications and mentalities of the perpetrators of genocide. I argue that the convergence of Social Darwinism, ethno-national concepts, social revolution and total war led, along twisted roads, to the fragmentation and final transgression of *

Published as "Deplorable, unavoidable, functional, salutary: some remarks on the acceptance of mass violence by Turkish and German élites in the context of the Armenian Genocide", Bridges 12-1/2 (2005), p. 189-227. Totally Unofficial Man: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, n.d., n.p., New York, Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division, The Raphael Lemkin Papers, Boy 2; partly published in Totten, Samuel, and Jacobs, Steven Leonhard (eds.), Pioneers of Genocide Studies, New Brunswick: Transaction Pub., p. 365-99, here 371; on Raphael Lemkin and his studies on the anti-Armenian violence see Schaller, Dominik, "Der Völkermord an den Armeniern im Osmanischen Reich, 1915-1917, Ereignis, Historiographie und Vergleich", in id. et al. (eds.), Enteignet - Vertrieben - Ermordet. Beiträge zur Genozidforschung, Zürich: Chronos, 2004, p. 260-62.

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hitherto established ethical boundaries, i.e. to the acceptance of mass killing not only of soldiers or, in the extreme, enemy civilians, but of citizens in one's own country belonging to a different ethno-religious group. Even if deplorable, the mass killings of Armenians and Jews in WWI and WWII were considered by many authors as "functional", "unavoidable", and "salutary". Compared to what had happened, or might have happened to their own political body, in the actors' imagination, without "harsh measures", the sufferings of the others appeared irrelevant. As self-styled "heroes of realism" they imposed on themselves a particular harshness against others and (at least verbally) themselves. They rationalized their murderous exclusion by representing the other as en element incompatible with the order they heroically steered towards. This essay contextualizes patterns and shifts of thinking, but does not elaborate on the implementation of policies nor reconstruct the genesis and circulation of ideas. With the large-scale anti-Armenian pogroms in 1895-96 there began an important debate on mass killing in Europe to which the oppositional Young Turkish press partly responded. In Germany, from the beginning, nationalists tended to play down this mass violence by pointing to the supreme aim of a new, sovereign Turkey, ally of a strong German Reich. Two decades later, after the Treaty of Versailles, the rise of a new, nationalist, anti-Entente Turkey became a seminal topos in Germany until 1945. In the interwar-period German rightists successively accepted the mass violence perpetrated in Asia Minor against hetero-ethnical citizens during WWI. They believed it to be the unavoidable precondition of Turkey's successful remaking, depicted as paradigmatical. This paper makes further clear that the prevention of mass murder remains illusory when the responsible national élites belittle universal references and international instruments.

Preliminary reflections The discussion about how to deal with violence, about its legitimation - if at all - and its limits, is old, but of topical interest. Opinions depend on historical contexts. WWI was a watershed in so far as it not only turned the whole of Europe into a cemetery - after most European countries had enjoyed a century of relative peace - but also thoroughly destroyed political and moral credit. Universal references collapsed. Contrary to WWII, and to Turkey and Russia in WWI, this particular outbreak of violence took place mostly on the front between states, sometimes against civilians in the adversary's territory, but not yet against ethnic groups seen as interior enemies.

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Ideologies in the evolutionary or revolutionary struggle between classes, races and nations focussed upon enemies inside people's own society. They contributed to the transgression of the moral consensus of 19th century Europe, that the killing of unarmed civilians outside - a fortiori of those inside people's own protector state - was a particularly serious crime. The U.N. Convention on Genocide of 1948 outlawed the partial or total mass murder by the "Punishment of the Crime of Genocide", but limited this to cases where the victims were members of a "national, ethnical, racial or religious group". It is, however, not self-evident that the mass killing of members of another group, or of young armed men 1 is any better than genocide. War, military mass killing, and the genesis of genocide are linked. While the mass killing of soldiers followed the rules of war, the "total war" of the 20th century transgressed them, as the notion of "enemy" was expanded. The targeted groups inside or outside the state, soldiers or civilians, were seen and presented as a threat to the socio-political body the actors fought for. In humanistic terms, in this or the other way, humanity was violating itself. And by destroying the others, perpetrators diminished their own humanity.2 Differing from classical European wars, the genocides of WWI and WWII were linked to the creation of an exclusive new society. This is not necessarily modern. The biblical call for the total annihilation of the Midianite people in the founding period of Israel in "Canaan" (Numeri 31) is one of the oldest records on this matter.3 In the era of the World Wars, the hardliner among the Young Turks and the German National Socialists thought it legitimate to completely dispose of peoples. They did this from a perspective aiming at a new order, at the same time fearing complete ruin if they failed, and (falsely) seeing no alternative to their particular way. They thought they were pragmatical and functional, true "heroes of realism".4 One needed to be super-human, if necessary inhuman, if one wanted to be "realistic". Not only did the end justify the means, but the means - the exclusion and destruction of the other perceived as threat - were inherent to the engineering of the envisaged ethno-national order, which should be in accordance with the so-

The historian and diplómate George F. Kennan coined the expression "first great holocaust" for WWI, its victims being eight million young men. See Kennan, George F., The decline of Bismarck's European order: Franco-Russian relations, 1875-1890, Princeton (N.J.) 1979, p. 3. 2 Cf. Bauer, Yehuda, Rethinking the Holocaust, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001, p. 12-13. 3 "If that story is not a 'divine' justification for genocide, I don't know what it is", Bauer, Rethinking, p. 41. 4 The jurist and influential later National Socialist Werner Best coined in the 1920s the expression "Heroischer Realismus", see Herbert, Ulrich, Best: biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft: 1903-1989, Bonn: Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1996, p. 97.

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called "iron laws" of the modern age. Sacred "laws of life" or "natural laws", derived from Darwinism and combined with social technology, formed the ideological background of the actors. Their inherited value was the state, their proclaimed supreme value the nation. It is not possible to truly distance oneself from a crime without understanding its genesis and context. This demands a strictly historical perspective, not simplistic moralising. We remain far from being able to fathom what was done and how it could happen, if we do not take seriously the fears, beliefs and logic of the actors or perpetrators, and of the élite behind them. Pepetrators of genocide never act in a vacuum. This is why I would like to make some remarks on the élite's thinking as expressed in its language. The intellectual context of 1915 reveals a dense interconnection - often disguised - of "violent discourses". In this paper I try to concentrate on such relevant metaphorical constraints, logics and ideological presuppositions that I understand as preconditions that made genocide possible in the era of the World Wars.

Catastrophe, catharsis, and Turkey's rebirth Although some Germans of a liberal, leftish or religious persuasion criticised the war, many educated Germans, even if they did not actually approve of it, interpreted the catastrophe of WWI, at least in its first months, in a positive way. Franz Eckart, a strong patriot, Protestant, and director of the German carpet factory in Urfa, wrote in a letter of 5 March 1915 about the "purifying impact of the war". A few months later he was a broken man who had lost his Armenian staff, his credit in the town and his self-confidence. For enthusiasts or for uncritical observers, the World War or "world struggle" (Weltkampf) 1 appeared as an apocalyptic catyclysm leading to catharsis and national rebirth, be it in Turkey, Europe or elsewhere. Secular apocalypse and catharsis meant "purification", revelation of the "true forces" of Nature and History, and more prosaically, the venting of tensions, the occasion for revenge and international reordering. Even among those who understood the scandal of human destruction, some early on began to interpret the catastrophe in positive terms with regard to their own nation.2 For contemporary Turkists and some of their German friends, WWI had redemptory qualities.

E. g. Klinghardt, Karl, Tiirkün Yordu. Der Türken Heimatland, Eine Landesschilderung, Hamburg: L. Friedrichsen ] Co., 1925, p. 42.

geographisch-politische

Expelled from Ottoman Palestine, David Ben Gurion said in New York in September 1915: "The terrible catastrophe [WWI], the worst catastrophe of our [Jewish] history which has befallen us since the defeat of Bar Kochba, at last has revived the people. It is from the bosom of the storm that the appeal of the redeemer's corn has reached us." Charbit, Denis (ed.), Sionismes. Textes fondamentaux, Paris: Albin Michel, 1998, p. 180. If not indicated otherwise, the translations into English are by the author.

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"What happens in Turkey, will be for all times one of the most memorable and most instructive plays of world history. It is the drama of a people and a state that were considered by many as hopelessly lost because of interior problems and exterior intrigues. Despite being next to moral ruin, economical breakdown and political destruction they picked themselves up. By applying salutary amputations and by re-sourcing themselves from the inexhaustible power reservoir of a living organism, they became rejuvenated, in fact they then began their politico-national existence in the modern sense", Alfred Nossig (1864-1943), a well-known Galician Jewish author and Zionist, wrote in the first chapter, entitled "The rebirth of Turkey", of a book published in Halle, Germany, in 1916. "The Young Turks did not invent nationalism, the whole modern historical evolution goes in this direction", Nossig continued. "Nature will not change its laws in favor of the adversaries of Turkish nationalism." 2 Nossig knew Turkey from several journeys. 3 In preparing his book in the Autumn of 1915, he visited and interviewed the main leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in Istanbul, among them Dr. Bahaeddin §akir (as chief of the Special Organization in the East he was one of the main architects of the Armenian Genocide taking place in the preceding months). "You consider human beings only as servants of principles", Nossig said to him. "Nothing more and nothing less", §akir answered. "We who organized the change [in Turkey], will watch in the coming decades that the spirit of our principles will not change."4 Nossig praises this "doctor of the fatherland". 5 The character of his perception is the point to be discussed here. An influential publicist from Europe was during the Armenian Genocide using a highly positive language for the recent changes going on inside Turkey. He consciously spoke about "salutary amputations". Appealing to him as a co-religionist, he personally attempted to silence US Ambassador Henry Morgenthau concerning the

"Was sich in der Türkei vollzieht, wird für alle Zeiten eines der denkwürdigsten und lehrreichsten Schauspiele der Weltgeschichte bleiben. Es ist das Schauspiel eines Volkes und eines Staates, die, durch innere Zustände und äussere Umtriebe dicht an den Rand moralischer Zerrüttung, wirtschaftlichen Ruins und politischer Vernichtung gebracht, von vielen als rettungslos verloren betrachtet, sich aufraffen; die unter heilsamen Amputationen, aus dem unversiegten Kräftevorrat eines lebenden Organismus heraus sich verjüngen, ja, ihr politischnationales Dasein in modernem Sinne eigentlich erst beginnen." Nossig, Alfred, Die Neue Türkei und ihre Führer, Halle (Saale): Otto Hendel Verlag, 1916, p. 1. 2 Nossig, Türkei, p. 9-10. 3 Nossig, Türkei, p. 6. 4 Nossig, Türkei, p. 74. Nossig, Türkei, p. 71.

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Armenian massacres.1 Without the slightest scruples he associated with the main representatives of the regime. Imbued as he was with the euphemistic thinking of the dominant Turco-German circles of those days, he was unable or unwilling to read the present from the perspective of the victims. He cleverly disguised any allusion to the misery inside Anatolia related to war and the remaking of Turkey. Beside his panegyric to the leading men, he completely focussed on the constructive aspects of Turkey's "rebirth": reform of the army, administration, economy, education, religion and civil law.2 Nossig made intellectually acceptable, not to say exemplary, the conduct of the CUP leaders for German readers. In this important sense, he joined in the same discourse as ardent Turkist authors. Mehmed AH Tevfik for example, editor-in-chief of the journal Hilal (crescent), emphasized in conferences in Europe and in a book published in French in Berne (Switzerland) the benefits the war brought to Turkey's nation building, especially concerning economical "nationalisation", i.e. the transfer of economical power from the non-Muslim to the Turko-Muslim Ottoman citizens.3 We know the outstanding role the Armenian "deportation" played in this matter.4 For Mehmed Ali "the impact of the Balkan wars had fortunately influenced the national soul and made Turkey enter [...] a new and prosperous period of regeneration and reorganization."5 Henceforth "the people" (the élite!) understood that it must "make a superhuman effort and ward off the terrible danger threatening us, in order to escape the servitude and death awaiting us." * Morgenthau, Henry, Ambassador Morgenthau's story, New York: Doubleday, Page & Co, 1918, p. 378-79. 2 After WWI Nossig was working as a pacifist in Berlin for a political European Union (Europäischer Friedensbund) under the roof of the League of Nations. Cf. Holl, Karl, "Europapolitik im Vorfeld der Deutschen Regierungspolitik. Zur Tätigkeit proeuropäischer Organisationen in der Weimarer Republik", Historische Zeitschrift, 219 (1974), p. 33-94. In 1933 Nossig was expelled to Poland. After the Nazi occupation of Poland and the establishment of the Warsaw Ghetto, the chairman of the Warsaw Judenrat appointed him a member of the Judenrat. Accused of collaborating with the Nazis, Nossig was shot on 22 September 1943 by members of the Jewish Underground which he had called a "bandit organization". Cf. Almog, Shmuel, "Alfred Nossig: A Reappraisal", Studies in Zionism, 4 (1983), No. 7, p. 1-29. 3 Mehmed Ali Tewfik, La Turquie et Les Turcs: Trois conferences sur le passe et sur Vetat actuel dupeuple turc, Bern: Staempfli & Cie, 1918. On his person see Alp, Tekin (Moiz Kohen Tekinalp), Türkismus und Pantürkismus, Weimar: Verlag Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915. p. 17; Kuran, Ahmed Bedevi, inkilap Tarihimiz ve Jon Türkler, Istanbul: Kaynak, 2000 (first edition 1948), p. 449; Muhammad Farid, The memoirs and diaries of Muhammad Farid, an Egyptian nationalist leader (1868-1919), introduced, translated and annotated by Arthur Goldschmidt, San Francisco: Mellen University Research Press, 1992, p. 474 and 498; PAAA (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin) R 21281, p. 150. 4 Cf. Christian Gerlach's recent study: "Nationsbildung im Krieg: Wirtschaftliche Faktoren bei der Vernichtung der Armenier und beim Mord an den ungarischen Juden", in H.-L. Kieser and D. J. Schaller, Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah. The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah, Zürich: Chronos, 2002, p. 347-422. Tewfik, La Turquie, p. 74.

ACCEPTANCE

OF

MASS

VIOLENCE

417

The "Turkish people" had one great aim, "to feel secure at home" and "to be the sole master on the national territory".1 A majority of the Turkists before WWI already considered Anatolia the holy land and fatherland of the Turkish nation, as they had stated during the international conference of Turkists in Petit-Lancy near Geneva in March 1913.2 This credo coexisted with panTurkist and Islamist or Ottomanist imperial dreams. The German geostrategist and professor of Turkology Ernst Jackh ("Turken-Jackh") put concisely the Turkist rationale for the War: "Turkey wants to be Turkish - this is the Turkish war aim."3 A CUP circular of 6 November 1914 put it frankly: "Our participation in the war does not only aim at the prevention of a threatening danger [from Russia], no, we pursue a much closer goal: the realization of our national ideal."4 As stated in the same circular, the territorially maximalist "national ideal" was this: "The national ideal of our people and our land compels us to annihilate the Muscovite foe for the sake of us having a natural imperial frontier that includes and unifies all our national comrades."5 The national ideal was a "sacred ideal" and had a redemptory dimension, as had the war. Those Turks who were not yet nationalist Turkists and thus lived in "spiritual confusion" needed to be "redeemed" and "illuminated by the light which shines on the sacred pulpit of the Turkish temple", as we can read in the protocols of the Turkist club in Lausanne, where Mehmed Ali agitated at times during WWI. 6 By participating in the Great War, Mehmed Ali continued in his aforementioned book, the nation showed a "truly superhuman effort" and "superhuman heroism" in favour of its "eternal progress." 7 "For four years", he concluded in summer 1918, "truly Turkish" businesses have been founded, an "army of jurists" has worked, Turkist authors have written and teachers taught - all in order to realize the "sacred ideal" of Turkey's remaking.8 In his book, destruction was completely disguised by construction, i.e. the national project (limited, in his case, to Asia Minor).

2

Tewfik, La Turquie, p. 90.

Yurdcular Yasasi. Isvigre'de Cenevre $ehrine yakin Petit-Lancy Köyünde Pension Racine'de kurulan ikinci Yurdcular Dernegi'nin muzakerat ve mukerrerati, Istanbul: Yeni Turan Matbaasi, no date [1913], p. 19 3 Jäckh, Ernst, Das grössere Mitteleuropa, Weimar: Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag, 1916, p. 12. 4 Alp, Türkismus, p. 53. Ibidem. Lozan Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti'nin Muharrerat ve Zabt-i Sabik Defleri, Türk Tarih Kurumu (Y 653), 25 May 1918. 7 Tewfik, La Turquie, p. 60-61 and 81-82. Tewfik, La Turquie, p. 63.

418

A QUEST

FOR

BELONGING

In seminal texts of this nature - and they were followed by a great number of similar ones in Germany in the inter-war period (see below) - the victims were not, or were only marginally or subliminally, mentioned. For the Turkist and later Kemalist Moiz Kohen [Tekin Alp/ Tekinalp], "the Turks have understood that, in order to live and survive, they must become again themselves, they must turkicize and nationalize themselves", as he wrote in a book published in 1915 in Weimar.1 Tekin Alp was not an outspoken racist, but was imbued by the idea of national regeneration. Even contemporary Germany - the great model for successful national unification before 1918 took its coherence from cultural nationalism, not the principle of race, Alp argued. 2 As soldiers and peasants, the Turks were for centuries that "Volkselement [racial element] that was neglected and forgotten in its own land", he continued.3 In contrast, "due to privileges too easily given, and also due to their own initiative, the Christian peoples of Turkey progressed more and more, increasingly driving out the true masters [sic] of the land." The Armenians had "enriched themselves thanks to their good relations with the English".4 With regard to the sacred goal of a national economy, millt iktisad, Tekin Alp ascertained with satisfaction that the widespread boycott movement carried out simultaneously with the secret expulsions in the first half of 1914 had "ruined hundreds of Greek and Armenian tradesmen."5 Tekin Alp and especially Nossig managed multiple stands and identities. Looking at Nossig's biography, had he not have been so trusting in authority and believing in power, we could imagine him as a pacifist activist like Armin T. Wegener. But in the historical situation of 1915 he made an opposite choice6 like Tekin Alp. Alfred Nossig, Mehmed Ali Tevfik and Tekin Alp were well acquainted with journalists, leaders and academics not only in Constantinople, but also in Paris and Switzerland. They knew a lot of what went on in Anatolia from May to September 1915. The same is true for other important voices then between Germany and Turkey like those of Ernst Jackh, Friedrich Naumann, Paul Rohrbach or the orientalist, diplomate and geopolitical theorist Max von

^ Alp, Tiirkismus, p. 16. 2 Alp argued, by refering to the song "Deutschland, Deutschland iiber allés". Alp, Tiirkismus, p. 6 8 - 6 9 and 72-73. 3 Alp, Tiirkismus, p. 60-61.

4 Alp, Tiirkismus, 5

p. 61-62.

Alp, Tiirkismus, p. 39-40.

In his case, this then had also to do with a specific political agenda he pursued: Together with the Ottoman deputy Emmanuel Carasso he established in those weeks, with the government's permission, the Union Israélite-Ottomane to facilitate the colonization of Palestine. Cf. Almog, "Reappraisal", p. 16.

ACCEPTANCE

OF M A S S

VIOLENCE

419

Oppenheim. 1 But their stand was deeply elito- and Germano-centric, their political language under the spell of geostrategics, (Darwinist) "realpolitik", enthusiastic nationalism, and culturalist imperialism. The deaths in Anatolia and elsewhere remained at a theoretical distance for their views, they were definitely not relevant compared to the overriding aims in terms of war alliance, final victory and the envisaged "superior order" of "greater Mitteleuropa [Central Europe]". In this geostrategic and culturalist conception Constantinople was the "oriental center of our Mitteleuropa". (What a gap between this short-cut integration of Turkey into Europe and the current civil and democratic efforts for Turkey's adhesion to the EU!) In contrast, Dr. Johannes Lepsius, himself initially a warmonger close to the élites in the German capital, had "converted" 3 in spring 1915, overwhelmed by the testimonies he received from the ground. In August 1915 Lepsius tried to appeal to the same people in Constantinople Nossig interviewed some weeks later, in order to stop their policy of extermination, but was coldly answered that it was time to finish once for all with the Armenians. 4 Paul Rohrbach, in contact with Lepsius, then realized that "morally this cost[s] the Turco-German alliance its neck", whereas Oppenheim persisted in justifying the "unavoidable cruelties" directed against a whole people, seen as enemy of the Turco-German strategy.6 Bruno Eckart, one of Lepsius' experienced correspondents in the Eastern provinces (the brother of the above-mentioned Franz Eckart), had from June 1915 known the consequences of the CUP policies in Urfa, where he lived together with his brother's family. What he found most revolting was not the mass killings alone, but the justificative language the leaders used on the Cf. Schmuhl, Hans-Walter, "Friedrich Naumann und die 'armenische Frage'. Die deutsche Öffentlichkeit und die Verfolgung der Armenier vor 1915", in Kieser and Schaller, Genocide, p. 503-16, and Schaller, Dominik, "Die Rezeption des Völkermordes an den Armeniern in Deutschland, 1915-1945", in Kieser and id., Genocide, p. 524-30. - Andre N. Mandelstam is not wrong calling these and others globally "Pangermanists", even if there were differences between (e. g.) Naumann's and Jäckh's "ethical imperialism" and the crude Machtpolitik of the right-wing (/,