A Philosophical Critique of Thought [1st ed.] 9789811583988, 9789811583995

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Zhengyu Sun

A Philosophical Critique of Thought

A Philosophical Critique of Thought

Zhengyu Sun

A Philosophical Critique of Thought

123

Zhengyu Sun Jilin University Changchun, China Translated by Mei Yang Jilin University Changchun, China

Jianming Dong Institute of Philosophy Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Beijing, China

Sponsored by: National Achievements Library of Philosophy and Social Sciences (15KZX001); Research Scheme of Scholars in Philosophy and Social Sciences of Jilin University (2012FRMJ01); Academic Translation Project of Philosophy and Social Sciences of Jilin University (2017ZZ048). ISBN 978-981-15-8398-8 ISBN 978-981-15-8399-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8399-5

(eBook)

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

An Introduction by Tom Rockmore

Since this is a long, detailed book, it will perhaps suffice to provide no more than a short introduction. Who is Prof. Sun Zhengyu and what does he think? The answer to the first question is that Sun is a distinguished contemporary Chinese student of philosophy and the social sciences. The answer to the second question is that he holds an original Marxist view that plays a distinctive role within the broad series of views that currently constitute Chinese Marxism. Sun Zhengyu (b. 1946) is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Social Sciences at Jilin University and the Director of Center for Fundamentals of Philosophy, which is one of the Key Centers of Humanities and Social Sciences under the Ministry of Education; member of the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth CPPCC National Committee; member of the Advisory Committee of the National Philosophy and Social Sciences Experts; member of Social Sciences Commission of the Ministry of Education; and served as Director of the Education Committee of philosophy of the Ministry of Education, Chairman of the philosophy society of Jilin Province, and Director of the academic committee of Jilin University. Representative works: On Philosophy, Critique of Premises of Theory Thinking, Research on Marxist Fundamentals (2 Volumes), Times in Thoughts, A Lofty Position, Philosophical Essays of Sun Zhengyu (9 Volumes), Research on Marxist Dialectics, Monographic Studies on Contemporary Chinese Marxist Philosophy, Our Spiritual Home, and A Philosophical Critique of Thought, History of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy since Reform and Opening (1978–2009). He has published more than 300 papers in journals and newspapers, including Social Sciences in China and Philosophical Researches and 28 papers were reprinted by Xinhua Digest. He was awarded the title of “National Advanced Worker,” the first award of “National Famous Teacher,” the first nomination award of “National Teaching Model,” Chinese National Book Award, China Outstanding Publication Award, and “Lifetime Achievement Award” of Jilin University (Livon). Sun Zhengyu’s academic and teaching achievements are successively reported by CCTV, People’s v

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Daily, Guangming Daily, China Education Newspaper, China Social Science Today, China University Education Newspaper, Philosophical Trends, and other press and media. After these sparse comments on who Prof. Sun is, I come to a series of only slightly more developed comments on his philosophical commitments. Contemporary China arose and continues to build on the great Chinese revolution. China is officially Marxist and contemporary Chinese thought centers on working out the distinctive series of interrelated views that compose Chinese Marxism. Marxism arose in the middle of the nineteenth century in the views of Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels influenced each other in the process of working out a series of views intended to bring about the transition from capitalism to communism. This view is set out in a number of texts they wrote individually as well as together, supposedly beginning with The German Ideology, a work whose origins are not clear, and perhaps most influentially in “The Communist Manifesto.” Marx and Engels both clearly claim to hold the same view that arose through their interactions over more than 40 years. The view in question came increasingly to be called Marxism, in virtue of Engels’ celebration of what are often Marx’s views or his reading of Marx’s views. Marxism differs in different times and places. Marx notoriously said on more than one occasion that he was not a Marxist. This claim suggests that there are differences, even significant differences between Marx and Engels’ views. In itself, this is not surprising since different writers routinely differ in working out even the most closely associated views. Marxism favors a kind of historical contextualism. According to Hegel, theories arise within and depend on their surrounding context. Marxism, as Karl Korsch points out, is a product of and clearly dependent on its historical circumstances.1 For contingent historical reasons, what is called Marxism today is largely, even mainly due to the influence of Engels in the continuing reception of Marx’s theories as well as his own contribution in working out and applying them. Each of us is a child of a historical moment. Marxism routinely stresses a unified view of the views of Marx and Engels mainly for political reasons that it will be helpful to distinguish. For present purposes, it will be useful to distinguish briefly between Marx’s views, Engels’ views, the publication of Marx’s writings, Lenin’s reception of them and later, post-Leninist Marxism. This fivefold distinction calls attention to the particular circumstances in which Marxism emerged. Marx wrote voluminously but, unlike Engels, only rarely published any of his writings. There are many different views of Marxism that depend for their meaning on the proverbial eye of the beholder. Though he did not often complete his texts, either because as Engels said Marx was more gifted, or for whatever other reason, Marx’s views are mainly known today under the routinely cited but obscure heading of Marxism. Marx’s views became known in his lifetime through two main ways. On the one hand, there is Engels’ unceasing effort to deflect attention from his own views in favor of calling attention to Marx’s ideas. 1

See [1].

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On the other hand, there is the fact that when Lenin came to power he steadfastly promoted Marx’s known views that included Capital I but not such crucial texts that, though Marx had in the meantime died, were still not published, such as the Paris Manuscripts and the Grundrisse, and so on. For these reasons, in the short period, when Lenin was in power before his early death Marxism that was in power after the October Revolution mainly arose in following Engels’ understanding of Marx’s views, for instance, in Ludwig Feuerbach and Classical German Philosophy, as well as his own contributions to it. The Leninist interpretation of Marxism resulted in a turning toward Engels not only as Marx’s literary executor, surely a crucial role when so many of Marx’s texts did not appear during his lifetime, in any case as the main interpreter of Marxism. The turn toward Engels that arose during Lenin’s period at the political helm was discussed and criticized but never later revoked. Post-Leninist Marxism includes two main strands that are already clear in the struggle in the Soviet Union in the 1920s between the mechanists associated with Akselrod and the dialecticians who were clustered around Deborin. The mechanists, who included a number of natural scientists, relied on a causal interpretation of cognition in refuting a dialectical approach. The dialecticians distanced themselves from a causal interpretation of cognition in distantly following Hegel. Needless to say, like so many other Marxist disputes, the struggle between the Deborinists and the mechanists ended with the brief and hollow victory of the dialecticians. This victory was brief because it was proclaimed in 1929 and then quickly reversed in 1931 when Yudin and Mitin accused the dialecticians of idealism after which both sides were condemned. The struggle between the mechanists and the dialecticians was, however, significant in at least two ways. One way was the influence it had on the rise of Chinese Marxism well before the victory of the Chinese Revolution. The other was the relation of Chinese Marxism to the Leninist variety of Marxism. In a famous reference in Capital, Marx suggested that he was a Hegelian, not an anti-Hegelian, and by implication, since Hegel was a philosopher, his own theory was, as he indicated in the “Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach,” an effort to rely on philosophy in a new, in principle more fruitful way to change the world. Though, as noted, Marx and Engels, perhaps for political reasons, consistently claim to have the same view, in Capital Marx clearly claims to be a Hegelian, hence a philosopher. The situation is different for Engels, an anti-Hegelian, who never claims to be a philosopher and who was active in the middle of the nineteenth century during the post-Hegelian turn away from classical idealism that is away from pre-scientific philosophy and toward post-philosophical science. Engels, who was influenced by the turn from philosophy to science, has obvious positivist leanings. Like Comte, the creator of positivism, Engels inclines toward a reliance on science to solve social problems. A consistent commitment to science instead of philosophy runs throughout Engels’ writings like a red thread throughout Engels’ writings, including his early interest in Schelling’s research on natural science, and his very late interest in Darwinism. This turn away from philosophy to science as the way to solve the problems of philosophy is pellucid in the infamous suggestion

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later pilloried by Lukács, otherwise all too often confined to the then current view of Marxist political orthodoxy, that the thing in itself that he depicts as the central problem of philosophy can easily be disposed of through praxis and industry.2 Following Engels, the suggestion that the problems of philosophy can be solved or resolved through Marxism understood as science is a frequent Marxist theme. Engels, who left the Gymnasium without graduating to work in the family business, never studied philosophy formally. Though masked his grasp of the tradition through his graceful writing style, he was never more than distantly aware of even the main philosophical views. Sun, who is a Marxist in the Engelsian vein, differs from most other Marxists in the wide and confident breadth of his grasp, not only of Marxism, but also, which is unusual in Marxism, to a wide swath of the Western philosophical tradition. In comparison, Marx’s grasp of the Western philosophical tradition, especially German idealism, is strong. Marx took a Ph.D. in philosophy only 10 years after Hegel passed from the scene, when the latter was still an important presence in the philosophical debate. He forged his first philosophical arms in seeking, as Heidegger would say, to dialog with the German idealist thinker on his own level. Yet Engels and most other Marxists, with the obvious exception of Lukács, often do not know nearly enough about Hegel from whom they routinely turn away without attempting to come to grips with Hegel whom they mainly tend to ignore. Hegel consistently sees the problems of philosophy as yielding to nothing other than philosophy. Hegel thinks Western philosophy begins in Parmenides’ view of the identity of thought (or thinking) and being. In both the Encyclopedia Logic as well as in the Science of Logic, Hegel takes a typical philosophical route in contending that philosophy turns as he obscurely reports in sybilline language the Idea. “The Idea is what is true in and for itself, the absolute unity of Concept and objectivity.”3 Sun, who takes a post-philosophical turn, suggests that the problem of the unity of thought and being is finally solved not by Hegel but, following Engels, by Marxism. “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being.”4 Sun is a Marxist, albeit of an unusual kind. In generalizing, one can say that most Marxists, including Chinese students of Marx and Marxism begin from an only rarely articulated assumption. They assume without proof that though Marx begins his intellectual journey in responding to Hegel, Marxists do not need to know more than the most minimal things about it since the former overcomes the latter. One consequence is that few Marxists, including Chinese Marxists, have more than a minimal grasp of Hegel, whose view they summarily reject, but with which they are not well acquainted. This practice results in significant distortion, such as Marxist claims to overcome Hegel based on an approach to Hegel through Marx. Thus, Zhang Shi-ying, clearly one of the few very best Chinese Hegel scholars, has no 2

See [2]. See [3]. 4 Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, in Marx-Engels Collected Writings, vol. 26, part 2: “Materialism”. 3

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hesitation in reading Hegel through Marxism.5 Sun, on the contrary, differs from most Marxists in his very good grasp of and respect for the main figures, concerns, and theories in the Western tradition. In Sun’s formulation, Western philosophy and Marxism do not run independently of one another but intersect in relation to the crucial theme of the relation of thought and being. Marxists, who have in mind distinctions relative to capitalism, routinely draw attention to a basic distinction between so-called bourgeois and proletarian thought. The problem is the Marxist form of the ancient philosophical theme of the relation between thought and being that runs throughout the entire Western tradition. This problem occurs for the first time in Parmenides, who claims that thought and being are the same in creating the initially recognizable form of what later became Western philosophy. Orthodox Marxism, with exceptions, adopts and builds on Engels’ reactions to Marx’s views. We have already seen that Lukács was critical of Engels when he wrote History and Class Consciousness, where he defended an unorthodox form of Marxism. In that book, the Hungarian Marxist seeks to solve what he depicts as the central problem of philosophy through so-called proletarian thought. Sun, who is comparatively more orthodox, follows Engels’ view that “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being.”6 Engels’ statement of what he regards as the central problem of philosophy is neutral. He characterizes it as concerning the relation of thought and being but does not describe that relation. It remains, then, unclear if Sun, who refers often to Engels’ view of the philosophy as turning on the relation of thought and being, is concerned with the relation of thought and being in general, their supposed identity to which Parmenides appeals, the a priori construction on which Kant in his Copernican revolution rests his case, or some form of the Hegelian construction of their identity. Now Kant claims in the so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy, a term he never uses to refer to his own position but that has become routine in the debate, that we do not and cannot grasp a mind-independent object. He anticipates and clearly denies Engels’ view that the problem of knowledge, especially the orthodox Marxist form of the view featured in the anti-Kantian reflection theory of knowledge, or the view that cognition is finally only possible through grasping the world as it is, in a word through materialism. Engels is a materialist. His materialism is obvious in his commitment to the empiricist claim that cognition is based on a direct apprehension of the world as it is. Materialism takes many forms beginning in ancient philosophy in the philosophers of nature Marx discusses in his dissertation and continuing right up to the present. The supposed advantage of materialism lies in the suggestion that it goes beyond mere representations or other ideas to grasp the world. This view is problematic since, as Hegel points out, the suggestion that we grasp “matter” does 5

See [4]. Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy??

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not demonstrate the Marxist materialist claim to know something concrete. It rather indicates that we know something abstract, since, as Hegel points out, “matter is itself already something abstract which cannot be perceived as such.”7 Sun, following Engels, subscribes on behalf of Marxism to a form of the view that, for instance, Kant rejects. It is the considerable achievement of Sun’s book that, though firmly in the Marxist camp, he brings together his detailed reading of Marxism as well as Western philosophy in all its many forms in working out his position. It is now up to the readers of Sun’s treatise to make up their own mind as to whose view to follow in reading this book! Tom Rockmore Peking University Beijing, China

References 1. Korsch, K. (1970). Marxism and philosophy (trans: Halliday, F.). London: NLB. 2. Lukács, G. (1971). History and class consciousness (trans: Livingstone, R.) (pp. 131–133). Cambridge: MIT Press. 3. Hegel, G. W. F. (1991). The Encyclopedia logic (trans: Geraets, T. F., Suchting, W. A. & Harris, H. S.) (p. 286). Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, §213. 4. Wang, R. (2014). Zhang Shi-Ying and chinese appreciation of hegelian philosophy. In Asia Network Exchange, 22(1), 90–96.

See Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, §38, p. 79.

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Contents

1 A Critique of the Basic Beliefs Underlying Thought . . . . . . . . 1 The Abstract Identity of Thought and Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Representational Thought: The Intuitive Reflection of Abstract Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Formal Thought: The Abstract Identity of Formal Reasoning . 3 The Logical Identity of Thought and Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Reflective Thinking and the Identity of Thought and Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Identity of Logical Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Identity of Conceptual Development . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The Identity of Logic and History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Historical Identity of Thought and Being . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Thought and Being Are Subject to the Same Laws . . . . 4.2 The Contradictory Relation of Theory and Practice . . . . 4.3 The Contradictory Relation of Ideal and Reality . . . . . . 4.4 Cultural Reflections on the Contradictory Relation of Thought and Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A Critique of the Basic Logic Underlying Thought . . . . . . . 1 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Formal Logic . . . . 1.1 The Dual Meaning of Formal Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The Two Types of Premise of Formal Logic . . . . . . . 1.3 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Formal Logic by Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Intensional Logic . . 2.1 Analysis of Intensional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Intensional Logic of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Intensional Logic of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Practical Logic . . . 3.1 Contradiction Analysis of Practical Categories . . . . . 3.2 The Internal Contradictions and the Logic of Practice References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3 A Critique of the Basic Modes Underlying Thought . . . . . . . . . . 1 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Commonsense . . . . . . . . 1.1 Commonsense as Worldview, Mode of Thought, and Value Norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Limitations and Transcendence of Commonsense . . . . . . . 1.3 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Commonsense and the Common-Sensicalization (Philosophization) of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Diachronic Relation Between Philosophy and Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Synchronic Relation Between Philosophy and Religion . . . 2.3 Philosophical Reflection on Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 A Critique on the Premises Underlying Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Aesthetic World of Art and the Philosophical Inquiry of Beauty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Philosophical and Artistic Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Philosophical Implications of Art and the Artistic Purpose of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The Sensitive Nerve and Essence of the Spirit of the Age . 4 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Two Basic Modes of Theoretical Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Reflective Relation of Philosophy to Science . . . . . . . 4.3 Philosophical Reflection on Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Reflections on Scientism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 A Three-Level Critique of the Premises Underlying Conceptual Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4 A Critique of the Basic Concepts Underlying Thought . 1 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Being . . . . . . . 1.1 Being and Pure Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Being and Existents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Being and Dasein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Being and Noumenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Is “Noumenon” Being or Nothing? . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Does “Noumenon” Refer to Origin or Essence? . 1.7 Noumenology and the Noumenological Pursuit . .

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2 A Critique of the Premises Underlying the World . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The World and Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Material and Spiritual Worlds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The World ‘In Itself’ and the Cultural World . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Real and Ideal Worlds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Ontology, Noumenology, and World Outlook and the Question of the Relation Between Thought and Being . . . 3 A Critique of the Premises Underlying History . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 History and Man’s Mode of Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Historical Premises and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 History and the ‘Cultural Reservoir’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Conceptual Analysis of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Truth and the Objectivity of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Expanding on the Question of the Objectivity of Thought 5 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Value and Value Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Value Direction and Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Value and Truth Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A Critique of the Premises Underlying the Philosophical Ideas of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Basic Question of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Critique of the Premises Underlying Philosophy . . . . 1.2 The Theoretical Space of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Philosophical Themes Throughout the Ages . . . . . . . . . . 2 Philosophy and the History of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Historical Ideology and Ideological History . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Philosophical Modes for Comprehending Reality . . . 2.3 Philosophy’s Theoretical Innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Philosophy and Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Metaphysical Disposition of Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Metaphysics as the History of Conceptual Critique . . . . . 3.3 Post-metaphysics in the Metaphysical Pursuit of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Philosophy and Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Conceptual Analysis of Noumenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Ontology’s Three Intensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Ontology’s Self-critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 The Characterization of Noumenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Philosophy and Dialectics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Dialectics’ Mode of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Critical Essence of Dialectics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5.3 Dialectics, Epistemology and Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 The Dialectics of Practical Wisdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 The Intellectual Quintessence of the Age and the Living Soul of Civilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 The Epochality and Humanity of Philosophy . . . . . . . . 6.2 Apprehension and Reflection of Philosophical Evolution 6.3 Viewing the Paradigm Shift of Philosophy from the Standpoint of Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Three Basic Categories and Research Paradigms . . . . . . 6.5 Shaping and Guiding the New Spirit of the Age . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

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What manner of civilization should modern humans forge? On what developmental path should a nation embark? What lifestyle should each individual choose? These are the most fundamental issues of our time. Profoundly implicit in the choices outlined above is a deeper question: What are the criteria of choice? An examination of these criteria is a reflection on the premises constituting9 thought, or a critique of the premises underlying thought. Using a ‘critique of the premises underlying thought’ as the basic idea and hermeneutic principle in philosophy10 will open a wider theoretical space for contemporary philosophy so as to avoid the predicament of being ‘pseudo-scientific’ or ‘pseudo-artistic.’ It will also present contemporary philosophy with a realistic path of development for the task of reflecting on the criteria of choice. This book, A Philosophical Critique of Thought, is mainly concerned with elaborating an account of the unique theoretical essence and activities of philosophy. It seeks to formulate concrete philosophical arguments for a critique of the basic beliefs, logic, modes, concepts, and philosophical ideas which constitute thought, with the aim of demonstrating the vigorous self-critique and inexhaustible theoretical space found in philosophical development. This book will provide a new principle of interpretation for understanding philosophy, and, in turn, will use this principle to develop a critique of the premises underlying thought, thereby furthering the contemporary development of philosophy.

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We would like to thank Editage (https://www.editage.cn) for English language editing of this book. We would like to thank Dr. Eleanor Ryan-Saha’s proofreading of the manuscript. 9 ‘Constituting,’ synonymous with ‘forming,’ is employed here as a translation that is faithful to the author’s original term. 10 ‘Philosophy’ in this work is not understood in the morphological sense, and therefore is not conceived with recourse to categories such as Chinese Philosophy, European Philosophy and the Philosophy of India. Rather, philosophy is taken to mean the basic rules of things. As such philosophy is fundamentally different from other disciplines, such as literature and science. Based on Hegel’s discussion of the relation between thought and being, the author further proposes that philosophy is a critique of the premises underlying the identity of thought and being.

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This book encompasses a critique of the premises underlying thought, which mainly includes the basic beliefs, logic, modes, concepts, and philosophical ideas constituting thought. Such a critique should comprise five aspects: first, the basic beliefs constituting thought propose a critique of the identity of thought and being; second, the basic logic constituting thought refers to a critique of the formal, intensional, and practical logic of thought; third, the basic modes constituting thought denote a critique of the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world, including commonsense, religion, art, and science; fourth, the basic concepts constituting thought entail a critique centering on being, the world, history, truth, value, and other basic concepts; and finally, the philosophical ideas constituting thought indicate a critique of philosophy itself. A critique aligned on these five aspects will provide a general philosophical overview of the premise critique of thought. A Critique of the Basic Beliefs Underlying Thought The assertion that “our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws”11 is the basic belief constituting thought. Therefore, a critique of these ‘basic beliefs’ is a direct critique of the “unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought,”12 as well as a critique of the basic question of philosophy itself—the question of the relation between thought and being. A critique of the underlying premises of the basic modes, ideas, and logic of thought constructed by philosophy itself implicitly contains the critique of the basic beliefs of the thought so constructed. This implies that the question of the relation of thought and being is the cardinal and fundamental question of philosophy itself. Therefore, a critique of the underlying premises of thought should first involve a critique of the basic beliefs that constitute thought, in other words, a critique of the identity of thought and being. In understanding the relation between thought and being, it is necessary to critically reflect on two basic ideas: first, on abstract identity, and second, on the abstract opposition of thought and being. These two ideas are polar opposites, but are also connected. The abstract opposition of thought and being is implicit in the abstract identity of thought and being. Its concrete manifestations are as follows: On a sensory level, the abstract identity of image and object implicitly contains the abstract opposition between the image that arises in different subjects and the object. On a rational level, the abstract identity of representation and thought implicitly contains the abstract opposition between representations in different subjects and thought. On the level of value, the abstract identity of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ implicitly contains the abstract opposition of value judgments in different subjects. On the level of laws, the abstract identity of thought and being implicitly contains the abstract opposition between the laws of thought and being. Abstract identity and opposition are the opposing ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’ of thought. A critique starting 11

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. (1987). Collected Works, Volume 25: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. (Clemens Dutt Trans.). New York: International Publishers, p. 544. 12 Ibid.

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from the thesis and progressing to the antithesis is then a critique that begins from the abstract identity of thought and being and progresses to a critique centering on the abstract opposition of thought and being. It is precisely a critique of the abstract identity and opposition of thought and being that has shaped the historical progression from the logical to the historical identity of thought and being, thus continually deepening the critique of the basic beliefs that constitute thought. A Critique of the Basic Logic Underlying Thought Fundamentally speaking, the question of the relation between thought and being is a question of the relation between the laws of thought and the laws of being; in other words, it seeks to determine whether thought and being ‘are subject to the same laws.’ Therefore, a philosophical critique of the premises underlying thought not only points toward a critique focused on the basic beliefs of the identity of thought and being, but also toward a critique of the basic logic constituting thought, i.e. the laws of thought. This concretely manifests itself as a critique of the premises of the extensional, as well as the intensional logic and the practical basis of thought. To be specific, in the thought activities of humans, concepts are not merely the ‘cells’ that constitute these activities. Rather, as Lenin put it, they are the ‘ladder’ and ‘scaffolding’ of understanding. The basic logic that constitutes thought includes the extensional or formal logic, which is constructed by the extension of concepts; the intensional logic or dialectic, constructed by the intension of concepts; and the practical or life logic, constructed by the practical basis of concepts. Hence, a critique focused on the basic logic that constitutes thought should mainly consist of a critique of formal, dialectical, and practical logic. A Critique of the Basic Modes Underlying Thought The thought activities of humans are not only subject to the laws of thought, but also comprise our thoughts about the world constructed through the various modes on the basis of which we comprehend the world. Common sense, religion, art, science, and philosophy mediate the real relations with the world that are formed based on the practical activities of humans. In other words, they are the basic methods by which humans ‘grasp’ the world. All human thoughts are constructed through the various modes by which humans comprehend the world. Therefore, a philosophical critique of the underlying premises of thought should necessarily include a critique of the basic modes that constitute thought. The basic modes by which we comprehend the world immediately provide us with a variety of rich worldviews, for they are themselves the different modes by which we comprehend the world. These basic modes not only provide humans with a variety of worldviews, but can also determine our ways of thinking and the values and norms of our thoughts and behaviors. Therefore, as the fundamental ways of comprehending the world, the three-fold intensions of worldview, mode of thinking and value norms constitute the object of the reflective and philosophical thinking. Regarding the implications for the premise critique of thought, it is especially important that a philosophical critique of the underlying premises of the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world involves a critique of the premises

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of this conceptual framework and its three levels: commonsense, science, and philosophy. In the critique of this three-level conceptual framework, new ladders and scaffolding will be constructed concerning the history of human civilization, and, further, the historical transformation of the human worldview, modes of thought, and value norms will be realized. A Critique of the Basic Concepts Underlying Thought The premises constituting thought not only encompass the basic beliefs, logic, and modes constituting thought, but are also more universally presented as the basic concepts that constitute thought. They include the basic concepts of being, the world, history, truth, and value, that humans require to construct thought. The critique of the basic concepts that constitute thought will reveal the openness and breadth of the ideological space uncovered by a philosophical critique of the underlying premises of thought. Within the theoretical space of the critique of thought, the premises of thought with their immediate fecundity and historicity are precisely the basic concepts that constitute thought. However, the critique of the basic concepts constituting thought in this book has three constraints. The first is selectivity, which signifies a constraint on the critique of the specific basic concepts constituting thought; the second is historicity, which denotes a constraint on the critique of the basic concepts achieved in our time; and the third is ‘opinionated-ness’, which refers to a constraint on the critique of the basic concepts that the author comprehends in our time. Collectively, these demonstrate that the critique of the premises underlying thought is an ongoing philosophical activity that is still in progress, rather than an established philosophical theory. A Critique of the Philosophical Ideas Underlying Thought Hidden within the thoughts of each age are the basic ideas that compose them, and which resonate deeply as the philosophical ideas of the age. Therefore, a philosophical critique of the underlying premises of thought is not merely a critique of the basic beliefs, logic, modes, and concepts constituting thought; rather, it also points toward a critique of its deeper philosophical ideas. A critique of the philosophical ideas that constitute thought points directly to a premise, or a critique of philosophy itself. This mainly encompasses reflections on several key questions such as the basic questions of philosophy, metaphysics, the history of philosophy, and the spirit of the time (Zeitgeist). This means that the critique of the basic philosophical ideas that constitute thought should include an examination of the premises of basic beliefs about life, an exploration of the basis of empirical knowledge, a reflection on the scale of historical progress, and an inquiry into the criteria for evaluating truth, goodness, and beauty. This will enable the transformation of our worldviews, modes of thought, value concepts, aesthetic tastes, and our entire way of life, thus shaping and guiding a new Zeitgeist. A critique of the underlying premises of philosophy is a critique of the bases and principles constituting thought itself. Hence, it necessarily points toward the core ideas that regulate human thoughts and behaviors, i.e., a critique of our worldviews.

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That is the most direct and appropriate entry point into the theoretical essence of philosophy, and therefore into the development of a critique of the premises of philosophy. The crux of this book is to propose a principle of interpretation for the comprehension of philosophy, that is, in positing philosophy as a critique of the underlying premises of thought. This will reveal the special theoretical essence and unique social functions of philosophy, while also demonstrating the vigorous, infinite theoretical space inherent in the self-critique of philosophical development. The critique of the underlying premises of thought has been divided here into five categories, which have been endowed with new connotations to provide relevant scaffolds for our discussion: worldview, ontology, reflective thinking, representation, and critique. The conceptual framework constructed through the interdependence of these categories forms the totality of the interpretative principle and the narrative logic of this book. In concrete terms, ‘worldview’ refers to the thoughts concerning the entire world formed by individuals, that is, not from a perspective external to the world, but through the eyes of individuals in their lives and on their paths. ‘Ontology’ does not refer to the ‘noumena’ that constitute the world, but to the basis, criteria, and standards of human thought and behavior; hence, it is the soul of worldview theory. ‘Reflective thinking’ does not refer to the general meaning of repeated deliberation, but instead reveals the ontology composed of the various premises of thought and behavior; hence, it is the mode of thought for analytical thinking or thought-analysis in philosophy. ‘Representation’ does not refer to statements of empirical facts, or the expression of emotions and will, but rather to the manifestation of the Zeitgeist and the living soul of civilization; hence, it reflects a mode of existence of philosophy in which the theories of being, truth, and value are consistent. A critique is neither a vain refutation, nor a speculative introspection, but rather a reflection on the history of human civilization through conceptual critique and terminological revolution; hence, it is the mode of operation by which a philosophical inquiry into the constitution of thought is accomplished. The ontological reflection and representation performed through critique encompasses the perspective of individuals in their lives and on their paths—their worldviews. It should be emphasized that the critique of thought presented in this book is a form of reflective thinking that regards thought itself as the object of thought. However, defining ‘reflective thinking’ in philosophical terms as a critique of the underlying premises of thought does not refer to the general meaning of ‘thinking about thinking’; rather, it means to regard the bases constituting thought as the object of critique. Since reflective thinking in philosophy has been defined as a critique of the underlying premises of thought, philosophy should not simply be differentiated from the different modes by which humans comprehend the world in terms of its theoretical essence, research object, and social functions. Rather, it should fundamentally transform the philosophical meaning of worldview, ontology, and the other basic concepts. Ontology in philosophy is not the origin, essence, or primal nature that underlies all things; nor is it the idea or logic that determines them; it is the basis, criteria, and standards that govern human thoughts and behaviors. Ontology, which is determined by histories and epochs, also has infinite and ultimate directivity.

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Hence, it is neither absolutely absolute, nor absolutely relative, but is relatively absolute: the relativity of historical significance and absoluteness of epochal significance. A worldview with ontological concepts at its heart is not a naturally occurring and unconstrained non-human perspective, but rather the perspective of humans in their lives and on their chosen paths. In this sense, a critique of the underlying premises of thought is a critical reflection on such a perspective—a critique of the underlying premises of a worldview. The critique of the underlying premises of thought presented in this book stems directly from the interpretation of a thesis propounded by Engels, which is as follows: “The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and hence, too, that in the final analysis they cannot contradict each other in their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.”13 In all human activities beyond philosophy, the entirety of thought about the world is constructed based on the commitment to this premise, whereas the mission of philosophy is to reflect on this premise and critically examine the entirety of thoughts about the world. Marx uses this ‘revolutionary and critical’ dialectic to present a dual critique of abstract reason and existence, and, further, a ‘ruthless criticism of everything existing.’ Therefore, Marxist philosophy has truly become “the intellectual quintessence of its time” and “the living soul of culture.”14 In this sense, Marxist philosophy is a model for a critique of the underlying premises of thought, and also a theoretical source for deepening our critique thereof; and, in what follows, this book will present a specific in-depth elaboration of the critique of thought by Marxist philosophy. The critique of the underlying premises of thought presented by this book is a philosophical activity that is still in progress, and not a completed philosophical theory. As such, it endeavours to accomplish three tasks: first, to demonstrate why philosophical activity is a critique of thought; second, to elucidate the theoretical space found in the philosophical critique of the underlying premises of thought; and, finally, to conduct a selective, case-by-case critique of the basic beliefs that constitutes thought. Specifically, the primary question that will be explored and discussed in this book is, ‘why is philosophical activity a critique of the premises of thought?’, or conversely, ‘why is the critique of the premises of thought a truly philosophical activity?’ The reason for exploring and discussing this primary question is rather simple: The ways of understanding philosophy have differed dramatically throughout history. Understanding philosophy as the critique of thought requires systematic and in-depth elaboration and discussion. I hope to persuasively and insightfully discuss a possible mode of activity in philosophy, thereby clearing a fascinating and exploratory theoretical space for contemporary philosophical activity. This is my greatest expectation for this work, and also my greatest comfort in life.

13

Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 544. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. (1975). Collected Works, Volume 1: Marx: The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung (Clemens Dutt Trans.). London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 195.

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Chapter 1

A Critique of the Basic Beliefs Underlying Thought

The premises underlying thought principally include the basic beliefs, modes, logic, concepts, and philosophical ideas that constitute thought. A critique of the underlying premises of the basic beliefs that constitute thought is our primary task in critiquing the premises underlying thought. Basic beliefs bolster our confidence that “our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws.”1 They are the “unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought”;2 and it is precisely by holding these basic beliefs that humans are able to dynamically understand and transform the world, and to strive to convert reality into their ideal world. Nevertheless, the manner by which to view these basic beliefs and unconscious and unconditional premises is a fundamental problem that humans have always faced in their cognitive and practical activities; it is implicit in the basic modes, logic, concepts, and philosophical ideas that constitute thought, and is the unconscious and unconditional premise found at the deepest level of thought. Therefore, a critique of the underlying premises of thought should first involve a critique of the basic beliefs constituting thought, that is, a critique of the identity of thought and being. In the history of philosophy, the basic beliefs constituting thought, i.e., the identity of thought and being, can be summarized as the intermingling between diachronic and synchronic identities in the forms of the abstract, logical, and historical identities of thought and being. Therefore, I will perform a critique of the underlying premises of the basic beliefs constituting thought based on these three forms.

1 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 544.

2 Ibid.

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 Z. Sun, A Philosophical Critique of Thought, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8399-5_1

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1 A Critique of the Basic Beliefs Underlying Thought

1 The Abstract Identity of Thought and Being The most universal and naive unconscious premise that humans hold concerning their basic beliefs is the unconscious assumption of a direct connection between thought and being, i.e., the assumption of the abstract identity of thought and being. Therefore, a critique of the basic beliefs constituting thought should first involve a critique of the abstract identity of thought and being. The abstract identity of thought and being is the non-reflective view of the relation between thought and being, which directly commits us to the identity of thought and being. This concretely manifests as two basic modes of thought: representational thought, which considers an object in an objective or intuitive mode of thought, and constitutes the so-called intuitive reflection theory; and formal thought, which considers the relation of thought and existence in a pure form that is detached from content, and which constitutes so-called formal reasoning. I will critique the premises underlying these two abstract identities in turn.

1.1 Representational Thought: The Intuitive Reflection of Abstract Identity Concerning the identity of thought and being, the most universal and frequent manner by which humans raise questions is by asking ‘is it or is it not?’ That is to say, if I am certain of the existence of an object in my mind, that is, the existence of a specific object, and if this object does exist in reality and is indeed the specific object, then we can confirm the identity of thought and being. The identity of ‘is’ and ‘it is,’ like the identity of ‘image’ and ‘object’ on a sensory level, are the “sensecertainty”3 described by Hegel. Therefore, we will base our critique of the identity of thought and being on intuitive reflection s on Hegel’s reflective thoughts regarding sense-certainty. The first chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a reflection on sensecertainty. In the very beginning, he raises the following question in a direct and straightforward manner: “The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or what simply is. Our approach to the object must also be immediate or receptive; we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to comprehend it.”4 This statement has two levels of meaning: Firstly, our knowledge is concerned with knowledge of immediate or existing objects. Secondly, we adopt an immediate or receptive stance regarding the object and knowledge of the object without allowing conceptual

3 Hegel

[2], p. 58. Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 58.

4 Hegel,

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comprehension into our apprehension. Hegel posited that this knowledge, which is there at the start or is immediately formed by our object, is sense-certainty. Hegel uses the word ‘appear’ twice to summarize our understanding of sensecertainty. First, he writes that “sense-certainty immediately appears as the richest kind of knowledge, indeed a knowledge of infinite wealth”5 ; then, “sense-certainty appears to be the truest knowledge; for it has not as yet omitted anything from the object, but has the object before it in its perfect entirety.”6 However, precisely because it ‘appears to be’ and is not ‘certain,’ Hegel changes course, pointing out that, “in the event, this very certainty proves itself to be the most abstract and poorest truth.”7 Therefore, why is sense-certainty, which ‘appears to be’ the richest and truest, actually the most abstract and poorest truth? According to Hegel, “All that it says about what it knows is just that it is; and its truth contains nothing but the sheer being of the thing [Sache].”8 On the other hand, “consciousness, for its part, is in this certainty only as a pure ‘I’.”9 Therefore, “I am in it only as a pure ‘This’, and the object similarly only as a pure ‘This’.”10 The above indicates that the identity of thought and being in sense-certainty is merely the identity of the two ‘Thises,’ which is also the identity of the pure ‘This’ as ‘I’ and the other ‘This’ as object.11 In this regard, Hegel makes the profound point that the identity of the pure ‘Thises’ excludes the richest and truest content in two aspects: First, “I am certain of this particular thing, not because I, qua consciousness, in knowing it have developed myself or thought about it in various ways.”12 Thus, this particular ‘I’ in sense-certainty is not the richest and truest, but the most abstract and poorest. Second, “I, qua consciousness, in knowing it have developed myself or thought about it in various ways; and also not because the thing of which I am certain, in virtue of a host of distinct qualities, would be in its own self a rich complex of connections, or related in various ways to other things.”13 Thus, this particular ‘thing’ in sense-certainty is, similarly, not the richest and truest, but the most abstract and poorest, precisely because the ‘I’ and ‘the thing’—and thought and being in sense-certainty—are the most abstract and poorest. Therefore, the truth in sense-certainty, composed of this pure immediacy, can only ‘appear to be’ the richest and truest, while, in essence, it is the most abstract and poorest. Profoundly thinking and experiencing the contradictions of rich and poor and concrete and abstract in sense-certainty is instructive for our cognition of the essence of representational thought and intuitive reflection theory, and useful for the dialectical thinking of the analysis of contradictory negation at the beginning of our philosophical thought. 5 Hegel,

Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 58.

6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., 12 Ibid., 13 Ibid.

p. 59. p. 58.

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It is worth pondering the fact that Hegel’s analysis of sense-certainty is not only limited to its essence of being the most abstract and poorest; it also reveals the inherent contradictions of sense-certainty, and serves as a solid starting point for his entire contradictory analysis with regard to cognition. Hegel states that sense-certainty splits the two “Thises, one ‘This’ as ‘I,’ and the other ‘This’ as object. When we reflect on this difference, we find that neither one nor the other is only immediately present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time mediated: I have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly, is in sense-certainty through something else, viz. through the ‘I’.”14 Sense-certainty is established based on the relation between the ‘I’ and the ‘thing’. Thus, the thing cannot be comprehended apart from the I, while the I cannot be comprehended separately from the thing. Therefore, Hegel proposes that “To this end, we have not to reflect on [the object] and ponder what it might be in truth, but only to consider the way in which it is present in sense-certainty.”15 In this way, Hegel transforms the discussion from thinking simply about existence outside of the consciousness to reflective-thinking about existence inside of the consciousness. Furthermore, he highlights the inherent contradictions of cognition, thereby approaching human cognition from the contradictory relation between thought and being, instead of intuitively from the relation between object and image. In so doing, Hegel reveals the essence of representational thought: “That habit should be called material thinking, a contingent consciousness that is absorbed only in material stuff, and therefore finds it hard work to lift the [thinking] self clear of such matter, and to be with itself alone.”16 It is precisely by revealing the most abstract and poorest aspects of the richest and truest sense-certainty that Hegel uncovers the inherent contradictions of cognition and knowledge, thereby also exposing the abstract identity of thought and being found in the essence of representational thought. This implies that, at the start of his philosophical thinking, Hegel had already formed a theoretical self-consciousness with consistent views of dialectic, epistemology, and logic, thence also providing future generations with a dialectical epistemology concerned with the analysis of contradictory negation. This suggests that Lenin’s statement that “Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism,”17 is not only been asserted by Hegel in his Science of Logic, but is also discussed in his Phenomenology of Spirit when the inherent contradictions of sense-certainty are presented at the beginning of his discourse. Hegel’s critique of representational thought, in philosophical terms, is directed at the old materialist way of thinking. Representational thought is not merely the simple way people think, but the entire mode of thought in materialist thinking. In other words, it is precisely the mode of thought in the old materialism, which theoretically represents people’s simple ways of thinking. As stated by Marx, “The chief 14 Hegel,

Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 59.

15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 17 Lenin

p. 35. [3], p. 360.

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defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.”18 Here, ‘conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation’ refers to the intuitive reflection theory of the old materialism, which has representational thought as its essence. Marx’s emphasis that it is not conceived ‘as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively’ indicates his practical reflection on representational thought and intuitive reflection theory, which has representational thought as its essence. Marx adopts a mode of thought with a practical viewpoint in his criticism of the old materialism, profoundly demonstrating the true line of inheritance, not to mention the revolutionary relationship, between Marxism and classical German philosophy. Regarding the intuitive reflection theory of old materialism, Engels points to the unconscious and unconditional premise of theoretical thought when he writes, “Eighteenth century materialism, owing to its essentially metaphysical character, investigated this premise only as regards content. It restricted itself to the proof that the content of all thought and knowledge must derive from sensuous experience, and revived the principle: nihil est in intellectu, quod nom prius fuerit in sensu [nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense].”19 Engels’s argument clearly reveals the limitations of the old materialism in addressing the question concerning the relation of thought and being: that is, in only approaching the relation of thought and being in terms of content and not form, and only recognizing that content originates from sensuous experience. By failing to approach the unconscious and unconditional premise underlying theoretical thought from the contradictory negation of content and form, it does not critically reflect the premise from the relation of thought and being. Therefore, the intuitive reflection theory of thought can only provide the abstract identity of thought and being conceived by representational thought. This demonstrates that in both the critique of old materialism and the inherited critique of classical German philosophy, Marx and Engels are extremely consistent.

2 Formal Thought: The Abstract Identity of Formal Reasoning In his reflections on representational thought, Hegel also reflects critically on another thought, namely formal reasoning. He clearly indicates that its essence is the “freedom from all content, and a sense of vanity toward it.”20 This is the abstract identity of thought and being, which results from the ‘pure’ mode of thought due to the ‘detachment from content.’

18 Marx

and Engels [4], p. 3. and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, pp. 544–545. 20 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 35. 19 Marx

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In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel’s criticisms of formal reasoning are mentioned under the ‘Demands of the Study of Philosophy,’ and unfold in comparison with philosophical thought, i.e., speculative thought. Hence, they have specific purposes and connotations. Hegel makes the point that: Philosophy is frequently taken to be a purely formal kind of knowledge, void of content, and the insight is sadly lacking that, whatever truth there may be in the content of any discipline or science, it can only deserve the name if such truth has been engendered by philosophy. Let the other sciences try to argue as much as they like without philosophy—without it they can have in them neither life, Spirit, nor truth.21

In other words, Hegel’s criticism of formal reasoning is formulated in response to the view that philosophy is held to be “a purely formal kind of knowledge, void of content.”22 His aim was for others to understand the ‘demands of the study of philosophy,’ and to alter “formalistic thinking that argues back and forth in thoughts that have no actuality.”23 Using his criticisms of formal thought as a foothold, Hegel suggests in Science of Logic that “this thinking study of things may serve, in a general way, as a description of philosophy…a mode in which thinking becomes knowledge, and knowledge through notions.”24 Such reflective thinking in philosophy deals with thoughts as thoughts, and strives to bring thoughts into consciousness. Precisely due to this highest aim of philosophical thinking, Hegel refutes the abstract identity of thought and being in formal reasoning, and proposes the concrete identity of thought and being, thus establishing the identity of thought and being as a law. What are the real laws of thought? This is the starting point of Hegel’s critique of formal reasoning. On the basis of the distinction between abstract and concrete identity, Hegel points out that the maxim of identity in formal logic merely points to the laws of abstract reason, and not the true laws of thought. He states that the maxim of identity is expressed as: “Everything is identical with itself, or ‘A = A’.” However, “the propositional form itself contradicts it: for a proposition always promises a distinction between subject and predicate; while the present one does not fulfill what its form requires.”25 Unlike abstract identity, concrete identity encompasses differences and possesses inherent negation. Hegel held that the identity of thought and being includes the intrinsic, existent difference in thought and being. The logic behind this thought process, which is based on the intrinsic differences in the identity of thought and being, is the renunciation in the self-negation of a notion. In this way, Hegel’s criticism of formal reasoning points specifically to the premises of theoretical thought, i.e., the identity of thought and being. Hegel’s critique of formal reasoning is not only directed at its detachment from content, but is simultaneously a critique of the underlying premises of formal logic as ‘known judgment.’ This is the transition point from formal logic to intensional logic, 21 Ibid.,

p. 41. Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 41. 23 Ibid., p. 35. 24 Hegel [5], pp. 103–104. 25 Ibid., p. 267. 22 Hegel,

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and in understanding the distinction between the essence of formal and dialectical logic. Hegel states that, “The notion…is certainly a form, but an infinite and creative form which includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the fullness of all content.”26 He posits that the concepts or notions that constitute judgment do not have a solid or rigid existence, but represent a self-initiated development process. This is because any notion can be simultaneously affirmed and refuted, and all exist as links and mediations. The self-negation of a notion is both a negation of its nullity (such that it receives a fuller affirmation), and of its validity (such that it is then re-affirmed on a higher level of logic). Therefore, as a known judgment, formal reasoning has various premises that are not notions of abstract identity, but are notions that are constantly produced through self-negation. In Hegel’s Science of Logic, the self-development of notions manifests itself as the progression from being the mutual transition of notions in the immediacy of thought (theory of Being), to the mutual reflection of notions in the mediation of thought (theory of Essence), and then to the unification of the immediacy and mediation of thought in a concrete notion (theory of Notion). Hegel uses a mystical form of idealism to provide the general logic of thought activities—the logic of conceptual development. According to this, all premises of known judgment encompass negative understanding in its affirmative understanding, thereby transcending the abstract identity of thought and being, and forming the concrete identity thereof. A critique of the abstract identity of thought and being in Marxist philosophy also points toward the law of identity in formal reasoning. Engels states: The law of identity in the old metaphysical sense is the fundamental law of the old outlook: a = a. Each thing is equal to itself. Everything was permanent, the solar system, stars, organisms. This law has been refuted by natural science bit by bit in each separate case, but theoretically it still prevails…Abstract identity, like all metaphysical categories, suffices for everyday use… For natural science in its comprehensive role, however, even in each single branch, abstract identity is totally inadequate….27

Clearly, Engels’s criticism of the law of identity is also a critique of the fundamental law of the old outlook; in other words, it is a demand for worldview theory to transcend abstract identity and to form a dialectical worldview theory. Lenin also points out that, “In the old logic, there is no transition, [nor] development (of concept and thought), there is not [an] ‘inner necessary connection’ of all the parts, and ‘transition’ of some parts into others.”28 Based on this criticism, Lenin wholeheartedly approves of Hegel’s demand for a unified logic of content and form, and proposes that, “Logic is the science [,] not of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development ‘of all material, natural, and spiritual things’, i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the History of knowledge of the world.”29 26 Hegel,

Hegel’s Logic, p. 324. and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 496. 28 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 97. 29 Ibid., pp. 92–93. 27 Marx

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It is especially noteworthy that in comparison Lenin more clearly sublimates the critique of the old logic to a critical reflection on the relation of thought and being, and to a critical reflection on the premises of theoretical thought. Lenin asks, “If everything develops, does not that apply also to the most general concepts and categories of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialectics of concepts and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance.”30 Here, Lenin connects the dialectics of the theory of the worldview with the basic question of philosophy, i.e., the premises of theoretical thought. There is no transition and development in the old logic, and dialectic is concerned with the development of logic. It is about a unified logic of thought and being, which is also a dialectic of concepts and of cognition with objective significance. For this reason, dialectic, epistemology, and logic are, as identified by Lenin, the same thing—a worldview theory regarding the question of the relation of thought and being, based on the critique of the underlying premises of theoretical thought. Dialectical theory is the science concerned with the unification and development of thought and being. It does not regard the premises that are the known judgments of formal logic as solid, but as developing. All concepts, categories, and propositions are merely “stages of cognizing the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognising and mastering it.”31 All such stages and knots in the web implicitly contain the contradictions between thought and being, and possess inherent self-negation. Hence, they constitute the logic of development of human cognition. It should also be noted that in Engels’s and Lenin’s critiques of the abstract identity of thought and being, they place particular emphasis on the critical reflection of dialectic on the relation between the universal and particular, and between the general and specific. Engels states, “The fact that identity contains difference within itself is expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose is red, where, either in the subject or in the predicate, there is something that is not covered by the predicate or the subject.”32 Lenin puts it this way: To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal…the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a “nucleus” (“cell”) the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general.33

Through the critique of the abstract identity of thought and being in formal reasoning, we will deepen our understanding of the epistemology of contradictions, and the concrete identity of thought and being. 30 Ibid.,

p. 254. Lenin: Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 93. 32 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 495. 33 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, pp. 359–360. 31 Lenin,

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3 The Logical Identity of Thought and Being The abstract identity and abstract opposition of thought and being are two opposing poles that are also connected. That is to say, the abstract opposition of thought and being is implicit in the abstract identity of thought and being. On a sensory level, the abstract identity of image and object implicitly contains the abstract opposition between the image of different subjects and the object. On a rational level, the abstract identity of representation and thought implicitly contains the abstract opposition between the representation of different subjects and thought. On the level of value, the abstract identity of is and ought implicitly contains the abstract opposition of value judgments of different subjects. On the level of laws, the abstract identity of thought and being implicitly contains the abstract opposition between the laws of thought and of being. Abstract identity and opposition are thus the opposing thesis and antithesis of thought. Hegel and Marx each constructed a synthesis regarding the relation of thought and being to address this question: Hegel constructed the logical identity of thought and being, which is the dialectic of idealism; while Marx constructed the historical identity of thought and being, which is his materialist dialectic and an illustration of historical materialism.

3.1 Reflective Thinking and the Identity of Thought and Being Reflective thinking is ‘thinking about thinking,’ which means regarding thought itself as the object of thinking. This is Hegel’s fundamental explanation of his own reflections on speculative philosophy, the basis of which Hegel believed originates from a principle of modern philosophy—namely, that thought is not natural. This principle refers to the self-consciousness of thought concerning its non-identity with being, and the self-awareness that it does not naturally and directly follow being. It is precisely this self-consciousness of the contradiction between thought and being that highlights the cardinal and fundamental question of philosophy itself—the question of the relation of thought and being. This arises when thought regards the relation of thought and being as a question, which indicates that it is only in the reflection of thought on itself that philosophy is made aware of the question of the relation of thought and being. This implies awareness, or self-consciousness, that thinking about this question is not general but reflective thinking. Reflective thinking exposes the secret of philosophy; it does not consist of thoughts about the world (being), but is a critique (examination) of thought about the world (being). Thought is the object of reflective thinking as well as of philosophy. With thought as its object, philosophy involves examining whether thought coincides with being. However, this type of philosophical examination is not an investigation of whether a particular concrete thought coincides with being, but of the basis for the

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consistency of thought and being. This is Hegel’s version: a reflection on the question of the relation between thought and being in order to provide a basis for its identity. In Hegel’s view, reflecting on this question to provide a basis for the identity of thought and being is the foundation for the objectivity of all thought. For this reason, he defined philosophy as the science of truth. In terms of its relationship with other sciences, philosophy is undoubtedly a science of science. However, Hegel explicitly regarded philosophy as the science of truth; this is not the science above all sciences criticized by later generations, but rather a science that lays the foundation for all sciences. This science of truth is not above science, but beneath it—providing a foundation on which to construct science. In this sense Hegel was not refuting, but instead was furthering Kant’s philosophy, proceeding from the understanding that the work of philosophy is to lay the foundation for science, and to constantly tend to this foundation. Regarding philosophy as the exercise of tending to the foundation of science, or as a reflection on thought, relates it directly with the ideological state of the times (that is, the scientific spirit of the times). According to Engels’s summary, from the latter half of the fifteenth century to the early nineteenth century, modern natural science in Europe can, on the whole, be divided into two major stages: first, the science of collecting materials, which then developed into the science of classifying materials. During this process, mathematics was widely applied in all fields of natural science, experimental methods were generally established, and theoretical thought became increasingly important. Thus, the question about the relation of thought and being became ever more prominent, prompting such questions as, ‘Is there an identity of thought and being?’; ‘Does Thought possess objectivity?’; and ‘How can we ensure the truth of thought?’ The crux of the matter is a question that goes back at least to Kant: Are the laws of thought merely the laws by which thought comprehends being, or are thought and being subject to the same laws? If it is the former, then how can we ensure the objectivity of natural science? In concrete terms, what is the basis of mathematical axioms? What is the basis for experimental methods to distinguish the general from the particular? What is the basis for the universal laws that are comprehended by theoretical thought? How can thought ensure the leap from phenomena to essence, from particulars to universals, from contingency to inevitability? Such musings indicate that the question of the relation of thought and being is not an experiential but a transcendental (law) question. The relation between the laws of thought and of being is the true question regarding their relation, as it is the true question for the unconscious and unconditional premise of theoretical thought. Responding to the question of the relation of thought and being in terms of laws implies that it cannot be limited to representational thought and formal reasoning, but has to involve speculative thought. This is Hegel’s fundamental view of philosophical thought, because representational thought only approaches the relation of thought and being from phenomena, not from laws. Hence, Hegel argues that representational thought is not appropriate for philosophical thought. On the other hand, formal reasoning only adopts a formal approach toward the laws of thought and being. Hence it is unable to explain the laws of thought and being through their content.

3 The Logical Identity of Thought and Being

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Hegel then claims that formal reasoning is also unable to construct a philosophy that is the science of truth. This is only possible by eliminating representational thought and formal reasoning from rational philosophical thought, and Hegel explicitly identifies rational philosophical thought as speculative thought—reflective thinking that regards thought as the object of thinking. Therefore, we can see that Hegel’s reflective thinking is not ‘thinking about thinking’ in the usual sense, but an investigation by thought of its own objectivity, which is also an investigation of whether thought and being are subject to the same laws. Hegel called this the question of ‘the identity of thought and being.’ Hegel’s understanding of this question is profound and wise, although his response to it is far-fetched and mystical. In order to prove the identity of thought and being, i.e., the identity of the laws of thought and being, he could not take the path of empiricism (experience cannot prove laws), or transcendental idealism (Kant had already refuted the identity of thought and being in a transcendental sense). Hence, Hegel could only use his own speculative thought to open a new path, which became the path of logical priority: It is only when the laws of thought and being freely possess identity in logic that they can achieve identity in itself in self-movement and self-cognition. Evidently, Hegel’s conclusion about the identity of thought and being had already been prefigured in his premise. This is certainly far-fetched and mystical. It is precisely this mysticism that distinguishes the idealist nature of Hegel’s philosophy. At the same time, it is the unity in itself of the laws of thought and being in the self-movement and self-cognition of thought which then constitutes Hegel’s trifold consistency in ontology, epistemology, and dialectics. Therefore, understanding, elaborating, and evaluating Hegel’s identity of thought and being is directly related to the critique of the basic beliefs that constitute thought.

3.2 The Identity of Logical Priority The identity of thought and being, to Hegel, is the self-movement and self-cognition of the ‘absolute idea,’ which has been the focus of much criticism regarding its idealistic essence and absorption of dialectical thought. This criticism, however, has neglected the concept’s significance in the history of philosophy: It systematically summarizes the entire previous history of philosophy and raises it to the highest peak, and the metaphysics reflected in contemporary philosophy originates from this point. Re-exploring the thought intensions of the ‘absolute idea’ and its true meaning will enable us to gain a deeper understanding of Hegel’s identity of thought and being. What is the absolute idea? In brief, it can be summarized as the freedom of the whole; the unity of principle; the priority of logic; inherent negativity; conceptual systematization; and historical thought. Hegel raises traditional philosophy to its peak predominantly in these six areas, and its core idea is the identity of thought and being. Hegel first treats the pursuit of the freedom of the whole in thought by traditional philosophy as reflective activities in human thought.

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When confronted with a complex and changing world, human thought strives to grasp its inherent unity at the most profound level. It then uses this unity to explain all phenomena in the world, and tries to relate all knowledge to these phenomena. This is the freedom of the whole pursued by thought to comprehend and explain the world. This pursuit of thought is presented in the form of theory, thereby constructing the various forms of past and present philosophy. In Europe, the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle was the first to explicitly define philosophy as that which has the freedom of the whole as its goal. He stated that metaphysics (philosophy) is a study of “being as being,” and “seeking the first principles and the highest causes.”34 These first principles will enable a unified explanation for all things in human experience, or can be explained as the various concrete manifestations of a particular universal essence, thereby enabling thought to comprehend and explain the freedom of the whole of the world. Hegel agrees completely with the goal of philosophy as defined by Aristotle. However, he believes that after Aristotle elevated different phenomena into concepts, the concepts decomposed into a series of specific concepts that are external to each other, thus no longer fulfilling the goal of philosophy. Although later philosophy attempted to use the concept of an ‘entity’ to unify particular concepts, these philosophies were not aware that the pursuit of thought must regard human thought itself as the object, and hence also did not reach the freedom of the whole of thought. Hegel’s philosophy of the identity of thought and being was proposed in response to this. Hegel believed based solely on the subjectivity of thought, that thought can be regarded as a type of universal spiritual activity, and that it contains within itself the freedom of the whole. However, this freedom is only the self-connection of abstract ideas, and thus can only be an indeterminate, deceptive freedom. As for the objectivity of thought, it must contain the different determinations of things in its content. However, if thought can only conceive of things according to its own nature (and not the nature of things), then it can only achieve a subjective imagination of freedom. Therefore, Hegel argued that the ‘highest task’ of philosophy is to confirm the consistency of the nature of thought and things, thereby realizing the ‘reconciliation’ of reason and reality. To accomplish this task, thought itself must be regarded as the object, thus verifying the identity of thought and being through the self-cognition of thought. The self-cognition of thought is possible because of the distinction between man and nature: “Nature does not bring its nous [reason] into consciousness: it is man who first makes himself double so to speak so as to be a universal for a universal.”35 Man does not just regard the external world as an object, self-consciously taking the definition of things as the definition of thought, thereby bringing the hidden reason of nature into consciousness. Rather, the definition of thought itself is also regarded as an object, thus reflecting on the consistency of the determinations of thought and thing.

34 Aristotle 35 Hegel,

[6], p. 61. Hegel’s Logic, p. 24.

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The self-cognition of thought is not general spiritual activity. Hegel proposes that spirit as feeling and intuition regards sensuous things as its object; spirit as imagination regards images as its object; the spirit as will regards purpose as its object. Spirit, which opposes or merely differs from these specific forms of being and its object, demands that its highest internality—thought—become its object. This, as described by Hegel, is the reflective activity of human thought, i.e., human thought that regards itself as the object of thought. In this reflective activity of human thought, all spiritual activity—encompassing feeling and intuition, imagination and will, as well as the object of these spiritual activities endowed with infinite richness—is unified in the nature of human thought, and is explained in the unity of thought. Therefore, Hegel believes that philosophy, which has the freedom of the whole of thought as its goal, is unable to restrict itself to the study of external things (this only allows the self-consciousness of the concrete definition of things as the concrete determinations of thought), or to be satisfied by the investigation of spiritual activities (this only allows the development of the concrete form of spiritual activities). Instead, the focus should be on the self-cognition of thought. In this way, Hegel promotes the pursuit of the freedom of all thought in traditional metaphysics as the reflective activity of human thought. Hegel then imputes the pursuit of the unity of principles in traditional philosophy as the logic of the movement of human thought. The purpose of the self-reflection of thought is to comprehend the unity of principles that thought itself uses to comprehend all of reality (all spiritual activities and their objects). This unity of principles is able to absorb different knowledge into a theoretical form, thus grasping and preserving their essence, and abandoning their externalities. This method can then be used to extract the elements of logic within them, and to allow the abstract foundations of these elements to enrich the content of truth. Therefore, “the whole extent of what is known must appear as one organization of the Notion; that in this way the manifold reality may be related to that Idea as the universal, and thereby determined.”36 It can be seen that, as the absolute idea of the unity of principles, its substance is the logic of the movement of human thought. Hegel posits the object of philosophy as the absolute idea, i.e., the logic of the movement of human thought, which originates in his reflections on the philosophy of his era—that of establishing scientific systems—and is shaped by his critique and conclusions on historical philosophy. Philosophers before Hegel divided philosophy into three parts: ontology (which studies the origins of the world), epistemology (which explores human cognition), and logic (which examines the form of thought). Hegel attempted to use the absolute idea as the principle of unity in an effort to merge ontology, epistemology, and logic into a unified philosophical theory, in which an ontology without an epistemological foundation would be as ineffective as an epistemology not constituted by thought itself. The unity achieved in Hegel’s philosophy is not, as is commonly held, merely that the absolute idea has meaning in ontology,

36 Hegel

[7], pp. 229–230.

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epistemology, and logic. Instead, it presents the same principle to which thought and being are subjected using the logic of the movement of human thought. Hegel’s effort has a deeper basis. Past philosophers have either ascribed the question of the relation of thought and being to the unity of conscious content and sensuous objects, i.e., the unity of spirit as feeling and intuition with its object described by Hegel (e.g. eighteenth-century French materialism), or set the laws of thought and being in opposition in order to refute the claim that the laws of thought possess objective logical meaning (e.g. Kant’s transcendental philosophy). Nevertheless, they have never unified thought and being on the level of laws. Using the logic of the movement of human thought to demonstrate that thought and being are subject to the same laws, we can theoretically express the freedom of the whole of thought to comprehend and explain the world. This is the substantial content for the absolute idea as the unity of principles. It explicitly advances all of philosophy, especially the major basic question of modern philosophy—the relation of thought and being—to the question of unifying two series of laws, i.e., the laws of thought and being. On this basis, Hegel posits the ontological commitment of traditional philosophy as the logical priority of the identity of thought and being. The pursuit of the freedom of the whole of thought in traditional metaphysics usually takes specific ontological commitments as its premise: from Thales’ ‘water’ and Pythagoras’ ‘number,’ to Democritus’ ‘atom’ and Plato’s ‘idea’; from Descartes’ ‘Cogito’ and Spinoza’s ‘entity,’ to Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself’ and Fichte’s ‘self.’ Nonetheless, these ontological commitments first divided thought from being, and then used a specific form (relation) to unify them (or to refute their identity). In contrast, Hegel believes that thought and being must have a unity in-themselves before they can have unity for-itself . In other words, the ontological commitment of metaphysics must contain the identity of thought and being. This is the logical priority described by Hegel. The logical priority of the identity of thought and being refers to the fact that it should first exist in-itself intrinsically in human thought and objective things. Regardless of whether human thought is self-conscious about the nature of itself and of things, their natures exist and are unified. Therefore, logical priority is not the soul that has transcended the world or wanders outside the world, but is being in-itself that is relative to being for-itself. Precisely because the absolute idea can only be brought to consciousness in the reflective thinking of human thought, before thought becomes self-conscious of its nature, the absolute idea, which is being in-itself , can only be a priority in logic, i.e., deduction. This is Hegel’s ontological commitment. It is extremely profound. As long as logical priority is given a materialist interpretation, its true meaning will become evident. Engels writes, “The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and hence, too, that in the final analysis they cannot contradict each other in their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.”37 Evidently, Engels

37 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Vol, 25, p. 544.

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also regarded the unity in-itself of thought and being as a premise of human cognition and theoretical thought, while also emphasizing the unconditionality of the premises. In Hegel’s view, whether or not to affirm the logical priority of the absolute idea (that is, the unconditional premises of theoretical thought) is crucial to philosophical theory. Kant rejected the identity of thought and being because he regarded thought as just ‘our’ thought, and found an irreconcilable gap between ‘things in themselves.’ Affirming the identity of thought and being implies that we must acknowledge that thought refers not only to our thought but also to the thought of the thing itself. Hegel stressed that the logical priority of the absolute idea aims to explain, first, the ability of thought and being to realize that unity for-itself in the process of human thought originates from the fact that they are unified in themselves; second, how achieving unity for-itself in human thought works to sublimate the unity in-itself to unity for-itself , and to transform potential things into real things; and, third, that the task of philosophy is to enable humans to become conscious of the nature of thought, and to achieve the unity for-itself and in-itself of thought and being based on the path constructed by thought. Therefore, the logical priority of the absolute idea, or the identity in-itself of thought and being, does not imply that thought contains the concrete content of being a priori, but that thought and being are essentially subject to the same laws. In philosophy’s reflection on thought, the identity in-itself of thought and being is transformed into identity for-itself , thus expressing the logic of the movement of human thought in a theoretical form. It is precisely by using the logical priority of the identity of thought and being that Hegel once again sublimates the dialectics of traditional philosophy to the method by which thought constitutes itself. Why does the absolute idea necessarily transform being in-itself to being foritself , and ultimately become being in-and-for-itself ? Hegel answers this explicitly: The absolute idea possesses inherent negativity; thus it is the absolute method for the self-development of the absolute idea. The absolute method is not an addition that is external to the absolute idea, but the determinateness possessed by the absolute idea itself, i.e., the method by which thought constitutes itself. As the first category of Science of Logic, ‘pure being’ is an ‘immediacy that is prior to all certainty,’ and hence is also ‘pure thought.’ It is the identity of thought and being that is in-itself or potential, i.e., logically prior. Thus, “it must be being and nothing else.”38 However, as this logically prior being has no concrete determinateness, it is also absolute nothing. The logically-prior absolute idea is both being and nothing; it opposes itself, and hence, has inherent negativity. This negativity presents itself as a dual negation in the process of the selfconstruction of thought: On the one hand, thought continually negates its own nothingness, gradually enriching its own determinateness; this is the process of the selfconstruction of thought. On the other hand, thought continually reflects, criticizes, and negates the determinateness it receives, reconstructing its own determinateness

38 Hegel

[8], p. 223.

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on an even deeper level; this is also a process of self-reflection of thought. The movement of this dual negation of thought both manifests itself as the constant enrichment of the determinations of thought and achieves the continuous transformation of thought on a logical level, which enables the logic of the movement of human thought to manifest itself as a dialectical unity between the constructive and reflective, and the progressive and transcendent. According to Hegel’s description of the process, in the movement of self-negation, the absolute idea receives the determinateness of infinite richness from being-in-itself ; the infinite richness of determinateness allows the absolute idea to develop from the abstract to the concrete; the process of development is the self-return of the absolute idea on a higher level, thereby constituting a circle for the upward spiralling progression of thought; and, lastly, the largest circle constituted in this development process is the progression of the absolute idea from being-in-self to being-for-itself , finally reaching being-in-and-for-itself . In this way, Hegel conceives the freedom of the whole of thought as the process of human thought constituting itself, and the pursuit of the freedom of the whole of thought in traditional philosophy as the dialectical and critical reflective activities of thought constituting itself. Hegel, who uses the dialectic of thought constituting itself as the content, then objectifies the contents of traditional philosophy as the organic organization of concepts. The self-development of the absolute idea is a necessary process through which to achieve the unification of the freedom of the whole of thought at its various moments. The philosophical system that demonstrates this process cannot be a ‘loosely connected whole,’ but rather must ‘appear as an organic organization of concepts.’ Hegel argues that, in the course of traditional philosophy, each philosophy was a specific expression of the absolute idea, hence each was a philosophical whole. However, these philosophies only expressed the particular determinateness of the absolute idea; hence, in order to overcome the limitations of their determinateness, the absolute idea will expand itself to a richer philosophical whole. Thus, each moment of the absolute idea does not have an isolated, contingent existence, but is an inevitable existence with universal connections and transformations, so that the system becomes a conceptual system that develops from the abstract to the concrete. This conceptual system expresses the logic of the movement of human thought, and, hence, it is the object of the self-cognition of thought. By studying the movement of concepts, philosophy can come to know the nature of human thought and the world constructed by humans using concepts, thereby realizing the reconciliation between self-conscious reason and reason that exists within the thing. For this reason, Hegel focused his philosophical study on the art of using concepts, striving to employ concepts that are “hewn, treated, flexible, mobile, relative, mutually connected, united in opposites”39 to express the logic of the movement of human thought.

39 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works, Vol.38, p. 146.

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In Hegel’s view, the logical process of the formation of a concept and the historical process of cognition are consistent. Therefore, he transformed the history of traditional philosophy into the concrete content of the circular movement of concepts. In Hegel’s view, the history of philosophy is the history of the development of philosophical thought, and the philosophical system is the philosophical thought of historical development. The substantial contents of both express the absolute idea, i.e., the logic of the movement of human thought. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the history of philosophy presents each particular determinateness or element in the development of the absolute idea, whereas the philosophical system presents the logic of the movement of thought purely from the nature of thought. The latter takes the various stages of determinateness of the absolute idea accumulated in the history of philosophy and elevates them to particular moments in the circular movement of the concept. Hegel’s understanding shows the two-way relationship between the history of philosophy and philosophical theory: On the one hand, the history of philosophy is the historical unfolding of the absolute idea, and its substantial content is the logic of the movement of human thought; thus, history is subject to logic. On the other hand, philosophical theory is the external and contingent logical unfolding that is free from history, and each moment has the determinateness of history; hence, logic is also subject to history. Where does this leave us? Hegel formulated his theory of philosophy by summarizing the history of thought and its achievements (as can be seen in the interconnections between Lectures on the History of Philosophy and Science of Logic). However, he also posits the logical priority of the absolute idea as history being subject to logic. Hegel’s expression of the dialectics of the movement of human thought in an idealistic form conceives a process by which humans construct thought according to the nature of their thoughts, and in which the results of thoughts constituting themselves promote the unity of opposites in the self-development of thought. The absolute idea, which is the logic of the movement of human thought in its self-constitution and self-critique, manifests its unity with the objective world as successively progressive conceptual systems. It then regards these conceptual systems as objects of critical reflection, thus self-consciously realizing the freedom of the whole of thought and the necessary unity of each sub-division. This is the identity of thought and being, as constituted by Hegel, using conceptual development; it is also Hegel’s logic of conceptual dialectics.

3.3 The Identity of Conceptual Development The biggest obstacle in our understanding of Hegel’s conceptual dialectic is the departure from the Zeitgeist presented by Hegel’s philosophy: our description of it as a mysterious or incomprehensible thing. Therefore, it is necessary for us to understand and explicate Hegel’s philosophical thinking based on his era.

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Hegel once stated that philosophy is always the times grasped in thought. This fundamental argument follows, and indeed should be taken as the starting point of Hegel’s philosophy. From the Zeitgeist presented in Hegel’s philosophy, we can identify three aspects of unity. The first is its immediacy; as the Zeitgeist of the Age of Ideologies in the nineteenth century, Hegel’s philosophy is focused on presenting the form of conceptual self-movement, i.e., the dialectic of conceptual movement, to reveal the logic of the movement of human thought. The aim was to provide the logical foundation for different scientific systems in nineteenth century science, which Engels describes as involving the classification of material. It is the first in the history of philosophy to use a form of theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements to reveal the logic of the movement of human thought. This is the true content and meaning of Hegel’s conceptual dialectic. The second aspect is its mediacy; as a German theory of the French Revolution, Hegel’s philosophy uses a mode of conceptual self-movement to exhibit the free movement of human reason, thereby presenting philosophical arguments for the freedom of human reason. This can be regarded as real life motivating Hegel’s philosophy to pursue ‘political concerns.’ The third aspect is its deeper selfconsciousness; as the culmination of the goal of all classical German philosophy to ‘uplift the people,’ Hegel’s philosophy uses conceptual self-movement to realize the dialectical synthesis of individual and universal reason; this is also a way of integrating individual reason to uplift universal reason. Therefore, in Hegel’s view, the self-movement and self-cognition of his conceptual dialectics is the ‘uplifted’ selfcognition and self-realization of man. These can be regarded as the deeper humanistic concerns of Hegel’s dialectic. Altogether, the Age of Ideologies, the German theory of the French Revolution, and the aim of ‘uplifting the people’ constitute the dialectical theoretical system of conceptual development, with its rich intension and mystical form, in Hegel’s philosophy. The Middle Ages was known as the Age of Faith, the Renaissance as the Age of Adventure, the seventeenth century the Age of Reason, the eighteenth century the Age of Enlightenment, and the nineteenth century the Age of Ideologies. This summary provides an insight into our re-understanding and re-explanation of the relationship between Hegel’s conceptual dialectic and zeitgeist, especially of that between Hegel’s conceptual dialectic and the scientific absorption of the nineteenth century. Since the Age of Adventure (the Renaissance), as described by Engels, was “a time which called for giants and produced giants,”40 it marks the point when the scientific spirit of truth-seeking was rekindled in modern times. During the Age of Reason, seventeenth-century Europe witnessed the rise of modern experimental science, and the gradual expansion and deepening of scientific reason. The Age of Enlightenment in eighteenth century Europe was the time when advocating the power of reason became increasingly prevalent. The Age of Ideologies in nineteenth century Europe was when, as Engels put it, the science of ‘collecting materials’ became the science of ‘classifying materials’; it was also the age when the systems for the conceptual 40 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 319.

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development of the different sciences were established. Indeed, Hegel’s conceptual dialectic originated from a theoretical self-consciousness of his own age, that of the establishment of scientific systems. Engels points out that the development of modern science historically followed a course from the science of collecting to that of classifying materials until the nineteenth century: “Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner interconnection has become absolutely imperative. It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another.”41 As the culmination of classical German philosophy, Hegel adapted the logic of conceptual development to the needs of the logical foundation required for each science to create the dialectics of conceptual development. Through this, he reveals the logic of the movement of human thought, and epitomizes the zeitgeist of this Age of Ideologies. Lenin once remarked that Hegel’s logic is concerned with the logic of the unity between the content and form of thought; it is the logic of the self-constitution of thought. Furthermore, under the heading of ‘what constitutes dialectics,’ Lenin reaches the following conclusion about the substantial content of dialectics based on his exploration of the true meaning of Hegel’s conceptual dialectics: “The mutual dependence of notions, the mutual dependence of all notions without exception; the transitions of notions from one into another, the transitions of all notions without exception; the relativity of opposition between notions, the identity of opposites between notions: Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all others.”42 This indicates that Hegel’s conceptual dialectics not only manifests the Zeitgeist of the Age of Ideologies in a theoretical way, but also sublimates dialectical theory from a spontaneous to a self-conscious theoretical condition. Regarding the history of dialectic, the most prominent and important contribution of Hegel’s philosophy is its fundamental transformation of dialectic from a spontaneous to a self-conscious theoretical condition, and its presentation of dialectic as the logic of the movement of human thought that possesses a unified ontology, epistemology, and logic. Hegel’s awareness of this theoretical task originates from his self-consciousness of the philosophy of the Age of Ideologies, which also shaped the conclusions of his critique of the history of philosophy. Historically, as previously mentioned, philosophers before Hegel divided philosophy into three parts: ontology (which studies the origins of the world), epistemology (which explores human cognition), and logic (which examines the form of thought). Hegel attempted to use the logic of the movement of human thought as the principle of unity, in order to merge ontology, epistemology, and logic into a dialectical system of conceptual development. In this system of conceptual dialectic, any ontology without an epistemological foundation would be ineffective, as would any epistemology without the logical foundation of self-constituting thought. The unity of ontology, epistemology, 41 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 338. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 197.

42 Lenin,

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and logic achieved in Hegel’s philosophy presents the same principles as well as laws to which thought and being are subject using the logic of the movement of thought, i.e., the dialectics of conceptual development. Past philosophers have either treated the question of the relation of thought and being as that of the unity of conscious content and sensuous objects, i.e., the unity of spirit as feeling and intuition with its object as described by Hegel (e.g. eighteenth century French materialism), or set the laws of thought and being in opposition in order to refute the claim that the laws of Thought possess objective logical meaning (e.g. Kant’s transcendental philosophy). Nevertheless, they never achieved the identity of thought and being on the level of laws. In Hegel’s view, the true mission of philosophy is to achieve the unity of “the freedom of the whole” and “the necessity of the several sub-divisions”,43 which is also to use the necessity for logic to achieve the freedom of the whole of thought. By using the logic of the movement of human thought to demonstrate that thought and being are subject to the same laws, we can theoretically express the freedom of the whole of thought to comprehend and explain the world. This is the substantial content of Hegel’s absolute idea as the unity of principles. It explicitly elevates all of philosophy, especially the great basic question of modern philosophy—the relation of thought and being—to the question of the unification of two series of laws, i.e. those laws to which thought and being are subject. Hegel’s conceptual dialectic, as the logic of the movement of human thought, is the ‘intensional logic’ for the development of the content of thought, and a presentation of the method of this logic. Therefore, to Hegel, the content and method of thought are in unity. However, historically, philosophers have often attempted to seek methodologies from other sciences. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff, and others have looked to mathematics to find a method for the establishment of philosophical systems. Hegel believes that they took the wrong path because philosophy is precisely the study of the self-evident premises of mathematics. Hegel posited that philosophy should have its own method and the method is the consciousness of the form of self-movement in its own content, i.e., the method of the self-construction of thought. Hegel’s definition of method is based on the view that “philosophy is the objective science of truth, it is science of necessity.”44 Method, as the logic of the necessity of truth, is the expansion of the necessity of each sub-division in seeking the truth of the freedom of the whole; it is also the process of the self-movement, self-expansion, and self-development of thought. Self-cognition that departs from the absolute idea does not contain this absolute method in the course of self-cognition; similarly, logical expansion that departs from this absolute method will not contain the absolute idea to realize self-cognition. Therefore, Hegel unified his ontology and dialectic: The ontology of logic is the dialectic of conceptual self-development; the dialectic of conceptual development is the ontology of logic. Hegel’s ontology, epistemology, and logic employ dialectic as the content to achieve unity. Based on this, Hegel’s philosophy is the unity of content and form, system and method, ontology 43 Hegel 44 Hegel

[9], p. 10. [10], p. 12.

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and logic. We can use one word to fully express the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy: Dialectic. In general explanations, dialectic, epistemology, and logic are interpreted as the unity of three aspects, three parts, or three levels, without understanding the true meaning of Hegel’s dialectic. Lenin compares Hegel’s understanding to pre-Hegelian philosophy thusly: “In the old logic there is no transition, [no] development (of concept and thought), there is not an ‘inner necessary connection’ of all the parts and ‘transition’ of some parts into others.”45 In contrast, “What Hegel demands is a Logic, the forms of which would be forms with content, forms of living, real content, inseparably connected with the content.”46 Therefore, Lenin placed great emphasis on Hegel’s view that “It is along this path of self-construction alone that Philosophy can become objective, demonstrative science,” and proposed that “the ‘path of self-construction’ = the path (this is the crux, in my opinion) of real cognition, of the process of cognizing, of movement from ignorance to knowledge.”47 What is the basis for the self-movement, self-development, and self-construction of concepts? It lies in the concepts’ inherent negativity. Hegel very much admired Spinoza’s views on ‘self-caused entities’ and ‘determination is negation,’ and regarded them as the soul of the ‘absolute method,’ i.e., the dialectic of conceptual self-development, which permeates the entire construction and reflection of the ontology of logic. Based on this, Hegel’s dialectic is seen to be a dialectic of conceptual self-negation. This is the most significant theoretical endowment that Hegel’s dialectic bequeaths us. In Hegel’s philosophy, this inherent negativity manifests as dual negativity in the process of the self-construction of thought: On the one hand, thought continually negates its own nothingness, gradually obtaining more concrete and richer determinateness; this is the process of the self-construction of thought. On the other hand, thought continually reflects, criticizes, and negates the determinateness it receives, reconstructing its own determinateness on an even deeper level; this is the process of the self-reflection of thought. The movement of this dual negation of thought manifests itself both as the constant enrichment of the determinations of thought, resulting in the constant enrichment of content, and as the constantly deepening efforts of thought, resulting in a continuous transition on a logical level. The enrichment of thought determinations and the transition of logical levels in the movement of thought are the dialectical unity between the constructive and reflective, determinate and critical, and progressive and transcendent in the movement of human thought. In our usual understanding, the negativity of thought is only the negation of ‘wrong’ thoughts, which serves to transform wrong thoughts to right. The profundity of Hegel’s dialectics concerning the logic of the movement of human thought is that he does not merely apprehend and describe the inherent negativity of thought as the negation of ‘nothingness,’ that is, he does not merely regard the inherent negativity of thought as the enrichment and construction of thought determinateness. In fact, 45 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 97. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 92. 47 Ibid., p. 88. 46 Lenin,

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he apprehends and describes the inherent negativity of thought as the negation of determinateness, i.e., regarding the inherent negativity of thought as a critique and reflection on determinateness, thus apprehending and describing the negativity of thought as the process of self-transcendence on a logical level. This is precisely because the process of the self-construction of thought is the dialectical unity of the constructive and reflective, the determinate and the critical. Hence, the absolute idea as ontology does not have a specific, solid, and rigid existence, but rather is a continually deepening and developing process. The unity of ontology and dialectic, or the fact that ontology is a dialectic, is where the true meaning of Hegel’s ontology of logic is to be found. It inspires people to apprehend dialectic from the perspective of ontological critique, and to apprehend the self-critique and self-development of ontology from the perspective of the inherent negativity of dialectic.

3.4 The Identity of Logic and History Engels once asserted that the theoretical strength of Hegel’s philosophy lies in its ‘immense sense of history.’ Based on the systematic summary of and profound reflections on the history of human thought, including Hegel’s philosophy, Engels explained that ‘dialectical philosophy’ is a form of “theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.”48 In the Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin raised a theoretical question of great significance: Why was “the idea of universal movement and change” conjectured by Hegel in the Science of Logic “before its application to life and society”?49 In other words, why was the dialectical theory of self-consciousness not first assimilated from the fields of life and nature, of society and history? Instead, how was it that Hegel, who studied the movement of conceptual logic, first apprehended and described the world as a process? This question is certainly thought-provoking. In his discourse on Hegel’s philosophy, Engels repeatedly emphasized that Hegel’s dialectics summarized the development of all philosophy in an impressive way. It was the result of 2500 years of philosophical development and each of Hegel’s categories represents a stage in the history of philosophy. Similarly, Lenin also stressed that Hegel’s dialectic is an overview of the history of thought. In his philosophy, Hegel connected the self-development of his concepts and categories with the entire history of philosophy. This clearly indicates that Hegel was able to create the first dialectical theory of self-consciousness based on the history of human cognition because the theory itself is built on this history; it is produced by summarising the history of human cognition. Basically, Hegel’s conceptual dialectic is the dialectical theory of self-consciousness; it is, as Engels wrote, the “theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.”50 48 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 491. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 141. 50 Marx and Engels [11], p. 491. 49 Lenin,

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Hegel’s dialectical theory hints at a philosophical question of great significance: As the world confronted by human thought has infinitely rich determinateness, how should humans use their thought to comprehend and explain the ‘freedom of the whole’ of thought and being? This question contains the two major contradictions that traditional philosophy is unable to resolve: First, the grand purpose of philosophy contradicts the historical results of empirical science, that is, the cognitive results obtained in the historical development of empirical science contradict ‘Ultimate Being,’ ‘Ultimate Explanation,’ and ‘Ultimate Value’; and, second, the supremacy and non- supremacy of human thought are contradictory, for, as stated by Engels, the non-supremacy of thought in its individual realization and in reality at any particular moment contradicts the sovereignty of thought in its disposition, vocation, and ultimate goal. It is worth pondering that Hegel’s conceptual dialectics was created precisely as a way of resolving these two major contradictions. Hegel’s method seeks to achieve unity between “the freedom of the whole” and “the necessity of the several sub-divisions”51 through the dialectic of conceptual self-movement and self-cognition. Thus, it is only by understanding the immense theoretical challenge faced by Hegelian philosophy and the unique method by which Hegel resolved it that we can fully comprehend Hegel’s dialectic. Hegel believed that traditional philosophy was trapped by these two contradictions because they belong to two wrong modes of thought—representational thought and formal reasoning. The habit of picture-thinking…should be called material thinking, a contingent consciousness that is absorbed only in material stuff, and therefore finds it hard work to lift the [thinking] self clear of such matter, and to be with itself alone. At the opposite extreme, argumentation is freedom from all content, and a sense of vanity toward it.52

That is, representational thought is trapped in the necessity of each sub-division and thus unable to realize the freedom of the whole. Conversely, formal reasoning is freedom of the whole that has departed from its roots, i.e., the necessity of each subdivision. Ultimately, both are unable to resolve the theoretical difficulty identified by Hegel. Hegel posited that the mode of thought on a philosophical level must immerse itself in content, allowing self-movement based on its nature, and must then survey this movement. This is speculative thought, which differs from representational thought and formal reasoning. Hegel’s profoundly wise philosophical approach shifts the perspective of philosophy from the intuitive objectivity principle of representational thought, and the empty subjectivity principle of formal reasoning, toward the subjectivity principle of speculative thought. The content of speculative thought is the absolute idea, i.e., the logic of the movement of human thought. By immersing freedom in content and allowing the self-movement of content based on its nature, the pursuit of the freedom of the whole by philosophy can be shifted from a focus on the external world in itself and the abstract inner world, to a process of thought movements 51 Hegel

[9], p. 10. Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 35.

52 Hegel,

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that both ‘logicizes’ the external and concretizes the inner world. Surveying this movement, human thought comes to regard itself as the object of thinking, demonstrating reflection on a philosophical level. This indicates that the reflective thinking in philosophy stressed by Hegel is inseparable from the ontological dialectic that he constructed, i.e., the logic of the movement of human thought. In these reflective activities, the absolute idea is both the subject and object. As the subject, it is not the thinker but the thoughts of the thinker. As the object, it is not the external world in-itself or abstract spiritual activity, but the process of the self-construction of thought. It is at this point that Hegel institutes two major changes in a departure from traditional philosophy: First, the subject is transformed from individual to human thought, and the universality of human thought is used to overcome the limitations of individual thought; and, second, the object is transformed from the external world in-itself and abstract spiritual activity into the logical process for the comprehension of spiritual activity by human thought for-itself and all its objects. The logic of the movement of human thought is used to replace the externality of the objective world and the abstraction (subjectivity) of spiritual activities. Thus, in its reflective functions, human thought is able to achieve the unity between the freedom of the whole and the necessity of each sub-division demanded by Hegel. Hegel’s conceptual dialectic is then the product of the self-conscious resolution of an immense theoretical obstacle in traditional philosophy. The way in which Hegel resolves this problem and the results he obtains present a major contribution but also a fundamental theoretical flaw. Hegel’s theoretical contribution lies in his use of conceptual dialectic to present the logic of the movement of human thought. The theoretical flaw is that he uses the self-movement of ‘impersonal reason’ to present the logic of this movement. The unity of this theoretical contribution and theoretical flaw in Hegel’s philosophy constitutes Hegel’s idealistic conceptual dialectic. The start and end of Hegel’s philosophy is to realize the unity of the freedom of the whole and the necessity of each sub-division. Thus, he profoundly exposes the non-philosophical nature of representational thought and formal reasoning, and uses speculative thought to achieve major transformations in subject and object. That is, he transforms the subject from the ‘thinker’ to ‘thoughts of the thinker,’ and the object from the external world in-itself and abstract spiritual activity to the conceptual activities of the self-construction of thought. In these dual transformations, Hegel abstracts the subject of reality as universal thought, all things as logical categories, and all forms of movement as the logical activity of categories. This is then, as criticized by Marx, the self-movement of impersonal reason, indicating that Hegel’s speculative thought is a thoroughly idealistic mode of thought. However, it is also, as described by Lenin, ‘intelligent idealism,’ i.e., the idealism of dialectic. It uses the dialectic of conceptual development to present the logic of the movement of human thought; hence, it “is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism.”53 Thus, Hegel’s speculative thought nurtures within it Marx’s dialectical theory and the whole of contemporary philosophy.

53 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 274.

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Marx presents an incisive discussion concerning the idealistic nature of Hegel’s conceptual dialectic, proposing that, in the final abstraction, everything presents itself as a logical category. Furthermore: “Just by means of abstraction we have transformed everything into a logical category, so one has only to make an abstraction of every characteristic distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition—purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement.”54 Hence, Marx suggests that the so-called ‘absolute method’ is merely “the abstraction of movement,” or “movement in abstract condition.”55 In this “movement of pure reason…Just as from the dialectical movement of the simple categories is born the group, so from the dialectical movement of the groups is born the series, and from the dialectical movement of the series is born the entire system.”56 This is the idealistic substance of Hegel’s conceptual dialectic. Hegel uses the concept to mediate objective subjectification and subjective objectification, while also producing and externalizing the concept to achieve the identity of thought and being, subjective and objective, and truth and goodness: thereby transforming conceptual development into the self-confrontation and self-movement of impersonal reason, and, further, mystifying the real dialectical relation of man with the world. This leads Marx to declare that, “for Hegel, all that has happened and is still happening is only just what is happening in his own mind. Thus, the philosophy of history is nothing but the history of philosophy, of his own philosophy.”57 Marx goes further: “He thinks he is constructing the world by the movement of thought, whereas he is merely reconstructing systematically and classifying by the absolute method of thoughts which are in the minds of all.”58 According to Marx, this requires that we sublate the conceptual dialectic mystified by Hegel’s philosophy into an internal moment of practical dialectics, thus not using the dialectical movement of concepts to explain the practical activities of humans, but rather using the practical activities of humans to explain the dialectical development of concepts. Marx’s ‘practical shift’ is based on the internal contradictions of practical human activities and their historical development, laying a solid practical foundation for conceptual dialectic, while also providing conceptual dialectic with an example of ‘logic’ in Capital (Das Kapital), and thereby constructing a practical dialectical theory with a rational condition. This indicates that Hegel’s philosophy is a mediating moment in the transition from traditional to contemporary philosophy. It nurtures modern philosophy, unconsciously pointing it toward a path out of the maze of traditional metaphysics.

54 Marx 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.

[12], p. 47.

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4 The Historical Identity of Thought and Being Traditional materialist and idealist philosophies ponder the question of the relation of nature and spirit from two opposing poles. Hence, their approach to the question of the abstract opposition between natural and spiritual ontology is stagnant, and they still use a reductionist mode of thought to expound the unity of the two. Old materialism regards nature as the origin of spirit. Hence, it strives to reduce spirit to nature, and to use nature to explain the spiritual activities of humans, thus using the measure of matter as the basis for all human behavior. This is the natural ontology of old materialism. Idealism, on the other hand, regards spirit as the origin of nature. Hence, it attempts to reduce nature to spirit, and to use the spiritual activities of humans to explain nature, thus using the measure of spirit as the basis of all human behavior. This is the spiritual ontology of idealism. As old materialism views nature as its ontology, it apprehends the relation of humans to the world from a passive standpoint, which eliminates human agency. Therefore, it persists in holding a naive, in-itself objectivity principle. As idealism regards the spirit as its ontology, it can only apprehend the relation of humans to the world from an active standpoint, and develops human agency in an abstract manner. Hence, it persists in holding a naive, for-itself subjectivity principle. The old materialism and idealism not only insist on the abstract opposition of natural and spiritual ontology in ontological questions, but also lead to the incompatibility between the principles of objectivity and subjectivity in modes of thought. They extend the abstract opposition in this ontological question and the incompatibility of the mode of thought to all philosophical questions, thus leading to the one-sided exaggeration of philosophical theories on both extremes. In Theses on Feuerbach, Marx’s critique of the whole of the old philosophy incisively exposes the fundamental flaw in this opposing philosophy. He points out the internal contradiction that cannot be resolved using the existing mode of thought, and introduces a practical and historical mode of thought to answer and resolve the path of all philosophical questions. This is the ‘intensional logic of history,’ which has the ‘historical identity of thought and being’ as its content.

4.1 Thought and Being Are Subject to the Same Laws Fundamentally, the identity of thought and being is a question of whether the laws of thought and being are subject to the same laws. From the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, classical German philosophy was not only aware that the question of the relation of thought and being is a fundamental question. It also attempted to overcome the abstract opposition of natural and spiritual ontologies in the question of origins, to sublate the incompatibility between the objectivity and subjectivity principles in the mode of thought, and to employ a new mode of thought to clear new philosophical paths.

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Kant was fully conscious of the fact that nature apart from man is only an ‘Is that Is Not’ and a ‘Nothing that Is.’ Hence, he defined nature separately from man as the ‘thing-in-itself .’ Further, he insisted that human cognition of the world must have its own basis, or sensuous forms to provide the concepts of time and space, and intellectual categories to provide the form of judgment. Sensuous forms and intellectual categories cause the world to produce phenomena in man, which constitute the world comprehended by man, while the thing-in-itself forms the negative boundary that limits the possibility of human cognition. In this way, Kant commits to the existence of two ‘noumena’: natural ontology and spiritual ontology. In the sphere of cognition, instead of claiming that Kant dissolved the opposition of natural and spiritual noumena, we should say that he proved that this opposition cannot be overcome. The true meaning of Kant’s philosophy lies in his demonstration that, not only are the opposing noumena (natural and spiritual) indispensable, they are not mutually reducible either. Human cognition can only be established on the unity of the two polar opposites, the result of which changes the world in-itself into the world foritself , i.e., the human world. The human world is the sphere of practical reason. In this domain, human behaviors are subject to the ‘absolute order,’ which is selfdiscipline, the self-restraint of humans; thus, it is the sphere of freedom. Essentially, Kant viewed practical reason as the basis of all human behavior and established a new starting point for philosophy. This new starting point has substantive meaning for the development of selfconscious dialectical theory. It demands the recognition of the separateness of the interactions between nature and spirit, object and subject, from the mental activities of the subject, thereby elucidating the dialectical transformation between them. Fichte’s ‘self’ is thinking activity with agency, which manifests itself as the construction of the ‘non-self.’ Hegel extended the meaning of practical reason to the sphere of cognition, thus achieving the unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic in dialectical theory. Hegel believes that to eliminate the abstract opposition between natural and spiritual noumena, and to overcome the incompatibility between principles of objectivity and subjectivity, we must resort to the mediating moments that unify them—the conceptual world. Concept is the generation of the subjective world for-itself from the objective world in-itself , that is, the transformation of the external world into thought determinations. At the same time, a concept is also the generation of the objective world in-itself from the subjective world for-itself , that is, the construction of the objective world in thought using conceptual conditions. Nature in-itself and spirit for-itself , pure objectivity and pure subjectivity, are unified in the conceptual world that is in-and-for-itself. Concept, which mediates the mutual generation of nature and spirit, is the reconciliation of the measure of matter and the measure of man; it is also the unity of regularity and purposiveness. It is first subjective purposiveness with objective meaning, i.e., the demand of goodness rooted in truth. This demand of goodness is the unity of nature and spirit, objective and subjective thought. It uses the externalization and objectification of a concept, i.e., the real external activity, to generate the world demanded by man. Lenin stated that the concepts in Hegel’s Science of Logic contain “the germs

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of historical materialism.”59 This germ, inherent in Hegel’s practical apprehension of concepts, possesses the ability of mediation that regards practical activities as the unity of nature and spirit, objective and subjective. Through such mediation, we can explain Hegel’s brilliant conjecture of the world’s generation of man. It is this conjecture that makes Hegel’s philosophy ‘intelligent’ in conceiving an idealist theory of dialectic, which constitutes the mediating moment from traditional to contemporary philosophy. It unconsciously reveals a path for the mediation of ontology in contemporary philosophy. Clearing this path is the philosophical revolution of contemporary philosophy. Marx and Engels obstinately affirmed the preferred status of nature to man and his spirit. In fact, they used the affirmation of this status as the criterion to divide materialist and idealist philosophy. Indeed, they also held that: (1) If either nature or spirit is used in an ontological sense to differentiate between materialism and idealism, then it cannot be used in other senses; (2) Nature that is abstract, isolated, and separate from man is also Nothingness to man; the proof of the preferred status of nature must come from empirical science and practical human activities; (3) Practical human activities, including scientific ones, use themselves as mediators to sublate the abstract opposition of nature and spirit, thereby achieving concrete identity in the development of human history; (4) For this reason, the old materialism and old idealism departed from the practical activities and historical development of humans to resolve the question of the relation of nature and spirit. The abstract opposition of the two in ontological terms has been exaggerated, extended, and expanded into the incompatibility of overall philosophical theory. This has resulted in limitations that they cannot overcome by themselves (old materialism cannot accommodate agency; old idealism can only develop agency in an abstract manner); (5) The result is the abstract opposition and incompatibility between natural and spiritual ontology, the principles of objectivity and subjectivity, thus constituting the ‘either-or’ mode of thought in metaphysics; (6) Therefore, it is necessary to rescue and improve classical German philosophy, especially Hegel’s theory of conceptual dialectics, and to establish a new philosophy based on the re-apprehension of practice. Up until Marx, Hegel merely regarded the concept as the mediating moment between objective subjectification and subjective objectification. By using the generation and externalization of the concept itself to achieve the identity of thought and being, subjective and objective, and truth and goodness, implies that conceptual development has become the self-confrontation and self-movement of impersonal reason, thereby mystifying the real dialectical relation of man and world. Thus, we must sublate the conceptual dialectic mystified by Hegel’s philosophy into internal sub-divisions of practical dialectic, which means not using the dialectical movement of concepts to explain the practical activities of humans, but instead using the practical activities of humans to explain the dialectical development of concepts. Conceptual determinations, as the internal sub-divisions of practice, are both the crystallization of the regular cognition of the practical subject for the practical object, as well as the manifestation of the purposive demands of the practical subject for 59 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 189.

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the practical object. Hence, it is the unity of regularity and purposiveness; and it is precisely in this unity that the measures of matter and of man can be merged in order for man to construct a picture of the objective world for himself. Only then can a new object—which is created in ideas, that is, the demands for the world to satisfy itself, and the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty in man—be sublimated in human thought. The so-called externalization and objectification of the concept, in reality, can only regard practice as a real external activity, and transform the new object (conceptual determinations) of ideas into a new object (the product of labor that satisfies the subject’s needs) in reality. Therefore, Marx not only uses practical categories to sublate the abstract opposition between natural and spiritual ontology, and objectivity and subjectivity principles; he also views practical activities as the basis for the unity of the opposition of man and the world, in taking a practical standpoint in order to resolve any philosophical questions.

4.2 The Contradictory Relation of Theory and Practice Concerning the question of the relation of thought and being, its true meaning is in whether thought possesses objectivity, i.e., whether thought has truth. To this, Marx remarks, “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth—i.e., the reality and power, the “this-sidedness” of his thinking” in practice.60 In reality, the question of the relation of thought and being is a question of the relation of theory and practice. Theory is often apprehended and expressed from the simplified perspective of explaining the world in terms of different knowledge systems. However, it has not been apprehended and expressed from the view of changing the world in terms of determining the conceptual system of human thought and behavior. Therefore, adopting a practical standpoint to re-apprehend and elaborate the question of the relation of thought and being requires a re-exploration of the dialectical relation of theory and its practice. Any true theory will need a triad of basic intensions: First, it uses the form of a logical system of concepts to provide us with a historical, developing picture of the world, thus determining our self-apprehension and mutual apprehension of the world. Second, it uses the form of a logical and conceptual framework of thought to provide us with a historically developing mode of thought, thereby determining how we should comprehend, describe, and apprehend the world. Third, it uses the universality, regularity, and ideality of theory to provide us with historically developing values, which determine our thoughts and behaviors. The triadic intensions of theory indicate that a theory is not only explanatory, but is also normative; a theory is not merely practical, but trans-practical.

60 Engels,

Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, p. 82.

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First, theory provides us with a historically developing picture of the world, thus determining our apprehension and transformation of the world. Modern science and philosophy tell us that observations are theory-laden, theory-immersed, ‘contaminated’ by theory, and that ‘there are no neutral observations.’ The world we ‘see’ has undergone the mediation of theory, and is not a reflection of the tabula rasa of our brains. It is a world with historical content that is ingrained with theories, and not a world in-itself that is unrelated to the historical development of theory. The key point here is that humans have a historical and cultural existence, and are not a-historical or a-cultural. Humans, as real (and not abstract) beings, not only possess inherited acquisitions in a biological sense, but also acquire inheritance in a sociological sense; that is, individuals are possessed by history and culture, and hence, become historical, cultural beings. It is precisely history and culture that provide us with a changing and developing picture of the world, which determines our apprehension of the world. Imagine life without the Copernican heliocentric theory: Would we be able to construct the scientific worldview of the ‘Earth revolving around the Sun’ based on our empirical observations? Without Einstein’s theory of relativity, would we be able to construct ideas of the motion of matter and space-time relationships in modern physics based on our own empirical observations? More simply, without medical theory, what would we see in an X-ray film or electrocardiogram? We often emphasize that all must proceed from reality and that we are seeking the truth from facts. However, we frequently start from negative, passive, and intuitive theories of reflection (that are similar theory-laden observations), which simplifies and vulgarizes these fundamental demands into careful looking and close listening. We rarely reflect on the determination of theories in observations, and even set theory against observation. The dialectical relations between theory and observation, theory and reality, and theory and practice occupy a prominent and important place in any reflection on theory. Second, theory provides us with a scientific mode of thought, thereby determining our logic and methods of thought. ‘Theory-laden observation’ does not only refer to the fact that observations are constrained by theory, such as the knowledge system, but also that observations are determined by theory, such as the mode of thought. It determines how the observing and practicing subject thinks and observes the object, and how it performs practical activities. Lenin depicts this as, “Dialectic as living, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing), with an infinite number of shades of every approach and approximation to reality (with a philosophical system growing into a whole out of each shade).”61 Humans rely on these cognitive components with the number of sides eternally increasing to historically expand and deepen their cognition of the world, thereby historically changing and renewing their picture of the world. The increasing components of cognition originate from the development of scientific theories. The advancement of scientific theory is mainly presented in terms of the increasing number of scientific disciplines, the development of each discipline, interpenetration

61 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works, Vol., 38, p. 360.

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between disciplines, epoch-making scientific discoveries and their subsequent scientific revolution, and the theoretical characterization by philosophy of the scientific spirit of its time. Through the mutual interaction and resulting synthesis within each aspect of advancement in scientific theory, we achieve the historical evolution of the mode of human thought. The cognitive system used by contemporary humans to comprehend the world is based on an infinitely expanding and deepening organic whole that is composed of manifold interconnected and interacting cognitive components organized in a specific hierarchical structure. Without the cognitive system and mode of thought provided by contemporary scientific theories, we would not be able to construct a picture of the scientific world in its current condition. Without this picture of the scientific world, how would we then form a worldview of science that determines human thoughts and behaviors? Third, theory provides us with the value norms, the connotations of our time, thereby shaping and guiding our values and value pursuits. Each age and society will inevitably face mutually-contradicting conflicts of values. These values manifest themselves as conflicts between social value norms and value orientations toward ‘what it is we ultimately want,’ and the personal value and value identity of ‘what it is I want.’ This also manifests as conflicts between mutually contradictory value norms and value orientations within this particular society, and between mutually contradictory value orientations and the identities of individuals. On the surface, personal value orientations and identities are extremely subjective, arbitrary, and random. On a deeper layer, personal value orientation is always oriented toward that of a particular society, while the personal value identity always identifies with the value norms of a particular society. Therefore, within the value contradictions of reality, social value orientations and norms occupy a leading and dominant status. What people think about and do not think about, how they think and do not think, what they do and do not do; how they do and do not do: these, on a fundamental level, are determined by the value orientations and norms of a society. The fact that the value orientations and norms of a society have an orienting and normative effect is due to the theoretical nature of these orientations and norms. They use a ‘value paradigm’ to give systematic value-coordinates to the lives of people, to establish the positive and negative dimensions of these coordinates, and to propose criteria for value evaluation and its hermeneutic principle. Therefore, they have an orienting and normative effect on aspects such as personal value judgment, selection, and ideals. In the value coordinates provided by Marxist theory, the positive dimension is the liberation of humanity and the holistic development of each individual; the negative dimension is, as described by Marx, the “self-estrangement” of various “holy and unholy forms.”62 Therefore, the value goals and orientations of Marxist theory are not only the liberation of humanity from the dependency of people on people, but also from the dependency of people on things. The various scientific, humanist, and postmodern trends of thought that characterize contemporary times have all exerted value orientations and norms. In overall terms, the value orientations of these doctrines not only dissolved the self-estrangement of various non-sacred images described 62 Marx

[13], p. 176.

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by Marx, but also dissolved the measure of value for value coordinates. This has resulted in the value orientation of relativity and nihilism, and an existential anxiety that pervades all of society. These theoretical and social trends of relativism and nihilism cannot be ignored in contemporary society. The theoretical thought trends, including the ‘suspension of non-judgmental opposition,’ ‘closure of all value channels,’ starting from the ‘zero degree of emotion,’63 and the social thought trends, including the mocking of ideals, contempt for morality, rejection of tradition, avoidance of the lofty, disregard for rules, and ‘anything goes’ attitude, echo each other. Altogether, this has led to confusion and fatigue among the people, caused by a loss of faith, metaphysical loss, and crises of meaning. Thus, the theoretical reconstruction of a value paradigm is urgently needed. The triadic intension of theory indicates that theory not only has an explanatory function, but also has normative, critical, and guiding functions in practice. Therefore, we need to re-examine the dialectical relation of theory and practice from the basic intensions of theory and its functions. Concerning the relation of theory and practice, we frequently emphasize the dependency of theory on practice, but have often overlooked the transcendence of theory over practice. Hence, while strengthening practical consciousness, we have also weakened theoretical consciousness. Theory originating from practice is not merely the generalization and summary of practical experiences. More importantly, it is the critical reflection, normative correction, and idealistic guidance of practical activities, experiences, and results. This is the transcendence of theory over practice. As Gadamer states, “In the end, all practice suggests what points beyond it.”64 This assertion has far-reaching and profound implications, and is worth considering. In the process of human history, practical activities are the pursuit of our own purposes. The developmental process of human history is also the self-transcendence of practical activities. That is, it is the historical negation of existing practical methods, experiences, and results, and the historical creation of new practical methods, practical experience, and practical results. In the historical trajectory of the self-transcendence of practice, theory should first comprise the new world picture,65 modes of thought, values, and purposive demands of practical activities, thus constituting the inherent negativity of practical activities. This inherent negativity is the idealistic manual of theory for practice. Therefore, Gadamer also states that, “The praise of theory becomes a rebuttal of the opposed word ‘practice’.”66 Theory as the word opposing practice does not merely refer to the conceptuality of theory and materiality of practice, but also the idealism of theory and realism of practice. Humans have real existence, but are constantly dissatisfied with the reality of their existence and demanding the transformation of their reality into a more

63 Meaning

an unbiased attitude. [14], p. 36. 65 ‘World picture,’ or ‘picture of the world’ means different people see different things in the world. This term is distinguished from ‘worldview,’ referring to personal values. 66 Gadamer, Praise of Theory: Speeches and Essays, p. 17. 64 Gadamer

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idealized existence. Theory uses its own ideal world picture and purposiveness to demand and transcend practice, thus promoting the self-transcendence of practice. The transcendence of theory over practice also involves using its distance from reality to reflect critically on and to normatively correct practical activities. All human practical activities possess antinomic characteristics, and thus present positive and negative dual effects. Whether it is a global problem faced by contemporary humans, or the independence of people based on the dependency on things caused by a market economy, all manifest the duality of practical activities. Therefore, practice requires a refutation of theory, meaning a critical theoretical reflection on practical activities to promote the self-transcendence thereof. Theory’s ability to refute practice and promote its self-transcendence is due to its triadic features: First, theory has upward compatibility, i.e., theory is the accumulation and crystallization of the history of human cognition; hence, it is able to use theoretical thought, which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements, to reflect on the practical activities of reality. Second, theory is inclusive of the age, i.e., it is the age within the thought; hence, it is able to use its comprehension of the universality, essence, and regularity of the age to reflect critically on practical activities and to normatively correct practical activities. Third, theory has conceptual systematicity, i.e., it is the logical system of concepts; hence, it is able to holistically observe practical activities within the mutual determination and comprehension of concepts, and to guide practical activities toward self-transcendence. More importantly, the transcendence of theory over practice lies in its ability to comprehend the laws of practice. Therefore, as described by Marx, it can serve to shorten and alleviate the pains of the practical process. Practice always uses one-sided form to achieve its development, that is, it always pays a particular price for its own development. Thus, during the practical process, especially during the process of social revolution, such pains are inevitable. Theory not only guides people regarding ‘what to do,’ it also helps determine ‘what not to do.’ People generally observe reality based on a particular theory or idea, which they then use to determine the problem they want to solve, and the path and method to resolve this problem. Marx asserts, “It is not enough that thought strive to actualise itself; actuality must itself strive toward thought.”67 The value of theory lies in its ability to use its regular knowledge of practical activities to alleviate such pains, thereby promoting the self-transcendence of practice. In summary, the historical identity of thought and being is the identity of theory derived from practice; the identity of practice is sublimated to theory; the identity is the refutation of practice by theory, as well as the determination of practice by theory. It is precisely this dialectical movement of theory and practice that constitutes the historical identity of thought and being. Deeply reflecting on the dialectical relation of theory and practice is an important step in promoting practical development and theoretical innovation in contemporary times.

67 Marx

[15], p. 138.

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4.3 The Contradictory Relation of Ideal and Reality Humans are both realistic and idealistic beings. However, we often approach the categories of the ideal and reality in a very simplistic manner, as though reality were an appearance that we could observe in the present, while the ideal is what we would like reality to become in the future. In actuality, reality is the mode of human existence, and the ideal is the mode of human activity. We need to approach the relation of ideal and reality from the mode of existence. It is only through the in-depth understanding of the relation of the ideal and reality that we can realistically apprehend the relation of thought and being. The world is nature, and its being is natural. However, humans, who are formed from nature, need to know and change nature in order to transform it into human existence with the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. This is the transcendence of humans over the world. Human life is also nature. It lives naturally, and dies naturally; both life and death are natural. However, humans want to know the meaning and value of life, to transform it into a meaningful and valuable life; this is the transcendence of humans over life. It is precisely in this dual meaning that humans want to create their own ideal world, and to create their own ideal life. Therefore, humans are idealistic beings. Humans are transcendent, creative, idealistic beings. This is not a vague or abstract proposition or judgment. It has rich intensions, and directly manifests itself as the transcendence of practical human activities. The transcendence of practical activities connotes the transcendence of spiritual human activities. The transcendence of practical and spiritual activities concretely manifests itself as the transcendence of cultural activities. This constitutes the transcendence of the human realm of life. During the process of transcendence in our realm of life, this process manifests itself as transcendence in the pursuit of value. Hence, human ideals, or the relations between ideal and reality encompass the transcendence of practical, spiritual, and cultural activities; of the realm of life, and the pursuit of value, which constitutes the relation of thought with being, and humans with the world. First, we will analyze the practical activities of transcendence, which comprise the mode of human existence and manifest the unique relation of humans with the world. This is the negative unified relation between thought and being, and humans and the world. This unified relation creates a duality of the world itself, of humans themselves, and of the history of human development. The essence of the relation of thought and being is the negative unified relation of humans with the world. Animals are a type of surviving life activity, while humans are a living type. If we approach this from the relation of humans and the world, the difference between surviving and living lies in the fact that the survival activities of animals are purely instinctual and natural. Hence, this manifests a direct, affirmative relationship between animals and the world; in other words, animals can achieve unity with the world through their natural activities. Conversely, the living activities of humans are precisely those that transcend and transform nature. They change the natural world into that which is desired by humans, seeking to transform ideal into reality. These

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activities, which change reality into the ideal desired by humans, are the negation of the existing state of the world. The unity of humans with the world is achieved in the negative activities of humans toward the world. Is it possible to apprehend the negative unity of humans and the world? This is the key to apprehending the fundamental question on the relation of thought and being, and of humans and the world. Humans, in their own activities, have ‘dualized’ the world: On the one hand, the world is eternally a natural world in-itself ; on the other, it has also become, as described by Marx, humanized nature, a human world. The world is ‘dualized’ through human activities. Similarly, in their activities, humans are also ‘dualized’: While humans are eternally natural beings in-itself , they are also supernatural beings for-itself. Thus, in their activities, humans already have the duality of the natural and supernatural, in-itself and for-itself ; they follow their own purpose to perform their activities, which is the creation of their own history, while the activities of historical creation by humans also constitute the laws of historical development, which is also the dualism of history. We often use the concept of practice, believing that practice comprises the conscious, purposive, objective material activities undertaken by people to change and explore the objective world. However, how should we apprehend practice? It is the mode of human existence. Humans are a process of practical activities; therefore, our apprehension of humans, and of the relation between humans and the world is, fundamentally, an apprehension of practical activities. What are practical activities? They are those activities that negate the existing world. Animals use their instincts to achieve unity with nature, and this is an affirmative activity. However, the practical activities of humans involve the process of a negative unity with the world. Thus, we apprehend that humans are beings beyond themselves. Why is this the case? It is because humans have a practical mode of existence. Practice is the activity of negating the existing state of the world, which results in the negative unity of humans and the world. Given our understanding of the negative unified relation of humans and the world, we can now thoroughly apprehend the dialectic, and the dialectical relations of thought and being, subject and object, ideal and reality, and humans and the world. Dialectic originates from the negative relation of humans with the world. Without this negative relation, how can there be any dialectic? Hence, as posed by Marx, what constitutes dialectic? It is the affirmative apprehension of things that also contains its negative apprehension. Only this can be called dialectic. Why, in our affirmative apprehension of things, is it necessary to hold its negative apprehension? This is because humans have a practical mode of existence. Thus, the relation of humans to the world is a unified relation of negativity. Our lives in this world are entirely the result and product of our negation of the existing world. Practical activity is, ultimately, an idealistic activity. It is the process by which reality is obtained for the purposive demands and the objective picture of the world68 constructed by humans. This process destroys the reality of the world in itself, 68 See

‘world picture’ above.

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and transforms the purposive demands of humans into reality, thereby achieving the unity of humans and the world in a relation of negativity. This is the dialectical relation of the ideal and reality. It is the most important point, as it constitutes the fundamental difference between humans and animals. What is the existence of humans? Humans are negative beings, or humans are idealistic beings. All the practical activities of humans are merely geared toward realising their purposive demands. To realize the purposive demands of humans is to negate the reality of the world: this encompasses the entirety of human behavior. It is only by understanding this point that we can truly understand the relation of thought and being, and of humans and the world. Humans do not look at the world from outside it. The cognizing of things occurs due to the purposive demand vis-à-vis the thing, or else we would not cognize the thing. Human cognitive activities already possess the negativity of their own practice. Hence, human cognition exists as the internal division of practical activities. In our practical activities, we ‘dualize’ the world in which we exist. The world of our lives is most definitely and eternally a natural world. However, through practical activities, humans will cause this natural world to become, as described by Marx, a humanized nature, or, again as described by Marx, a human world. The relation between humans and the world is constructed by human practical activities. Practical activity is a process of negating the real world. It negates the existence of this reality, and the human picture of the world is objectively given to the natural world. Thus, the world itself is ‘dualized,’ and the relationship of humans and the world is a negatively unified relation. In this negative unified relation, the world itself is first ‘dualized.’ This is the ‘dualization’ of the ‘world in-itself ’ and the ‘world picture.’ This is also the historical identity of thought and being. If the world is only apprehended as a natural world, then we cannot apprehend the true and real relation of humans and the world. Neither will we apprehend the real, true relation of thought and being. When practical activities ‘dualize’ the world we are in, they cause us to possess duality. Human duality is multi-faceted. We can say that humans are natural beings, and are also social beings. Humans are material as well as spiritual beings. However, most profoundly, humans are real and ideal beings. Humans are beings existing with the unity of opposites in reality and ideally; hence they are beings beyond themselves. By seriously apprehending our own existence, we can understand the nature of human existence. Humans represent the true dialectical existence. Every single human has a dialectical existence. This is because you are never you: You always exist in negativity. You are at the same time you and not you, a positivity and negativity. This is the true unity of opposites. You changed from the ‘you’ of yesterday to the ‘you’ of today, and you will necessarily become another ‘you’ tomorrow. This is the negation of negation, and the duality of humans. Humans are real beings, but are also idealistic, transcendent, and creative beings. This is the deepest level of human duality. It is only by apprehending this duality, especially the duality of ideal and reality, that we can understand the relation of thought and being, and of humans and the world. The process of duality in humans constitutes the dualism of history. As real beings, humans are forever the result of history. The conditions given to us by history constitute the real existence of each individual, such that we are forever the result and

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product of history. At the same time, we are forever accepting history in the midst of its changing, thus we are always the premise of history. As the premise of history, we provide history with a succession of results, while the result of history also constitutes our premise for creating history, thereby constructing the continual existence of history. As historical existence implies that humans are real and ideal, thus humans are both the result and the premise of history. Humans are both subject to the laws of history and create their own history. Human history is a process of development and in the process of historical development, thought and being constitute the identity of history. The negative identity of thought and being is not abstract. Most directly, it manifests as the transcendence of human spiritual activities. First, it is the transcendence of representation over an empirical object. Human representation is not merely a reflection of that object, but also the creation of an object that is not there, i.e., imagined. The imagination further transcends the representational existence of the empirical object. Humans are not merely able to imagine an object, they can also construct thoughts concerning the object. This is the transcendence of thought over representation. Furthermore, human intellect transcends given knowledge, and human wisdom transcends the logic determined by formal logic. Thus, humans construct, in their own spiritual activities, a series of transcendences, which is also the negative identity of thought and being. Altogether this amounts to representation that transcends objects, imagination that transcends image, thought that transcends representation, intellect that transcends knowledge, and wisdom that transcends logic. These are all concrete manifestations of the idealism, transcendence, and creativity of human spiritual activities. After we see a stunning sunrise or a starry night, we will often say that the beautiful scenery ‘appeared in our mind.’ After hearing a passionate percussion piece or a heart-wrenching orchestral symphony, we will also often say that the music is still ‘lingering in our mind.’ We can recite all the dynasties of China ‘in our minds,’ vividly listing the ancient history. We are able to perform mental arithmetic, transforming everything into numbers. We can even construct deities, ghosts, and monsters ‘in our minds.’ This, as Marx described, is the faculty of being able to realistically imagine a particular thing without imagining a real thing, which is also the transcendence of thought over being. I appreciate one line in Lenovo’s advertising, ‘If humans lose association, what would the world become?’ Without imagination and association, the world of humans would not exist. However, it is worth contemplating that if humans did not have thought, then the world of humans would not exist. The human ability for rational thought transforms objective into conceptual being. When I say ‘table,’ do I move the table into my brain? When I say ‘fire,’ do I move the burning fire into my mind? When I say ‘red,’ do I dye my brain red? Certainly not. This is because I use concepts to grasp this empirical world. Not only can humans comprehend the representation of the object, they can create representations related to an object that previously did not exist, letting loose their imagination. Not only can humans imagine images that do not exist in this world, they can also construct universal, essential, necessary, and

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general concepts related to the object, thereby constructing a world of conceptual systems for themselves. What then is science? Science is the use of various logical conceptual systems. Humans are able to use scientific methods to comprehend this empirical world, and to construct a world picture of science. Cassirer asserts in An Essay on Man that, “Science is the last step in man’s mental development and it may be regarded as the highest and most characteristic attainment of human culture.”69 Furthermore, “There is no second power in our modern world which may be compared to that of scientific thought. It is held to be the summit and consummation of all our human activities, the last chapter in the history of mankind and the most important subject of a philosophy of man.”70 Above all, “To science we may apply the words spoken by Archimedes, ‘Give me a place to stand and I will move the universe.’ In a changing universe scientific thought fixes the points of rest, the unmovable poles.”71 Therefore, it is the development of science that historically has promoted the identity of thought and being. Indeed, we find that any familiar conceptual framework of science always starts from the most refined initial concept and conditions. Then, it deduces a series of theorems, laws, formulas, and equations using rigorous logical means, in order to form a universal and predictable conclusion. This provides thought with a sound logic for understanding, describing, characterizing, and explaining the world. We are most familiar with Euclidean geometry, whose initial concepts include just: point, line, plane, above…, between…, and superimpose. Its entire theory is based on ten axioms and ten postulates, and a meticulous geometrical system is deduced through rigorous deductive methods. It is unsurprising that later scientists have often immersed themselves in the logical beauty of Euclid’s Elements, and have used it as a model for systems of scientific logic. When discussing people’s criticisms of Capital, Marx said that it does not matter if this work has this or that flaw, as a ‘complete work of art,’ it is something to be proud of. Indeed, all who have read Capital cannot help but be deeply impressed by the immensity of the work from abstract to concrete logic. Who can claim that this logic did not impact their thoughts and evoke a strong sense of logical beauty? Lenin said that, with Capital, Marx left behind a logic for mankind. This great work clearly presents the triadic consistency in dialectic, epistemology, and logic, which demonstrates the dialectical identity of thought and being. The three greatest philosophers of ancient Greece—Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—individually explored the concepts, judgment, and reasoning used by humans to comprehend the world when discussing the formation of humans’ theoretical thinking abilities. Furthermore, Aristotle formed a systematic logic of deductive reasoning, constructing the basic paradigm for the logic of the movement of human thought. Comparatively, what has classical German philosophy given us? Since Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel have constructed a logic of the movement of human thought through their reflections on traditional formal logic, especially the Law of 69 Cassirer 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid.

[16], p. 207.

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Identity, ‘A is A’. This is the logic of conceptual intensional movement. Hegel’s Science of Logic presents the dialectical logic of the movement of human thought with the mutual unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic. Marx inherited the theoretical heritage of classical German philosophy and his critical mind transformed the intensional logic of thought into the intensional logic of history, symbolised by Capital, positing that it is also the transformation of the logical identity of thought and being into the historical identity of thought and being.

4.4 Cultural Reflections on the Contradictory Relation of Thought and Being Among the various schools of modern and contemporary Western philosophy formed after the crusade against Hegel’s philosophy, despite the differences in interests and standpoints, the theoretical starting points and developmental trends have not departed from the path of ontological mediation introduced by Hegel’s philosophy. In particular, when faced with increasing challenges in modern science (where philosophy has been and is being expelled from its traditional territories), and the new thirst for philosophy in modern social life (in its search for new supports for modern life and new ideas about the world), these schools of philosophy have attempted to identify a mediating division to eliminate the abstract opposition of nature and spirit, objective and subjective. They have tried to use this mediating division as a principle of unity to reflect on the question of the relation of thought and being. One of the prominent characteristics of contemporary Western philosophy is the high value placed on the study of language. There is a belief that, although the world is beyond consciousness (since its being is not dependent on human consciousness), it is graspable within human language (since humans can only express the world through language). Indeed, language is the negative boundary (the world beyond language is the ‘nothing’ that ‘is’) as well as the positive boundary (the world comes into being in language) of human existence. It is precisely language that embodies the deep contradictions between nature and spirit, objective and subjective, truth and goodness; thus, it has accumulated the historical results of human thought and all of human culture. Therefore, modern philosophers have attempted to use language analysis to dissolve traditional philosophy or reconstruct philosophical theory. However, the mainstream schools of contemporary Western philosophy have vastly different understandings of language itself. Scientific philosophy believes that only science represents the highest performance and attainment of human nature. Only scientific theory (scientific language) can constitute the immovable poles that support the understanding of truth in human activities. Therefore, logical positivism attempts to use the theories and methods of natural science to transform philosophy, and attributes philosophy to the logic of science.72 Since Popper’s critical rationalism, including Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ historicism, the focus of scientific philosophy has 72 White

[17].

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returned to the question of the growth of scientific knowledge. They believe that philosophy, like epistemology and methodology, has as its main mission the study of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the modes of thought. In studying the growth of knowledge, the best standpoint is to study the growth of scientific knowledge. In studying the evolution of the modes of human thought, it is best to study the transformation of scientific theory (scientific questions, paradigms, and research programs). Thus, they attributed scientific philosophy to the logic of scientific development. Wartofsky believes that the true purpose of scientific philosophy is not to construct a logical or historical model of scientific theory, nor is it to provide the epistemology or methodology of scientific research. Its purpose is to reflect critically on the conceptual foundations of scientific thought, and to provide a deeper philosophical explanation for the conceptual framework of scientific theory. To this end, scientific philosophy must transcend the understanding of science of itself, and reach an understanding of scientific understanding, i.e., a humanistic understanding of science. The unity of humanity should be comprehensible in the interactions and mutual conversations among the conceptual frameworks of common sense, science, and philosophy. A humanistic understanding of the summit of humanity—science— should be achieved in the unity of humanity. Thus, philosophy can act as a bridge for communication between the natural and humanistic sciences. This is the ‘most beautiful meaning’ of philosophy, as mentioned by Wartofsky.73 How, then, should we apprehend scientific understanding from a humanistic perspective? How should we comprehend the humanistic unity of the natural and the human sciences? Cassirer’s cultural philosophy (symbolic philosophy) offers a somewhat instructive attempt. Cassirer proposes that “…if there is any definition of the nature or ‘essence’ of man, this definition can only be understood as a functional one, not a substantial one.”74 Therefore, in the understanding of human, it is necessary to replace the unity of results with the unity of activities and the unity of products with the unity of creation processes. “Man’s outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark, is not his metaphysical or physical nature—but his work. It is this work, it is the system of human activities, which defines and determines the circle of ‘humanity’. Language, myth, religion, art, science, history are the constituents, the various sectors of this circle. A ‘philosophy of man’ would therefore be a philosophy which would give us insight into the fundamental structure of each of these human activities, and which at the same time would enable us to understand them as an organic whole.”75 Thus, Cassirer expands the scientific ontology emphasized in scientific philosophy to take in the cultural ontology of human activities. His cultural philosophy intends to demonstrate that although humans and animals live in the same physical world, the world of human life is completely different from the natural world of animals. It is only in the creation of cultural activities that humans become truly human; as a whole, human culture represents the historical course of continuous self-liberation. 73 Wartofsky 74 Cassirer, 75 Ibid.

[18]. An Essay on Man, pp. 67–68.

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In this way, Cassirer not only regards culture as mediating the unity of man and the world, he further understands the human world as a cultural world. If Cassirer’s philosophical study has provided a ‘cultural world’ that transcends the natural physical world, then existentialism since Heidegger, and especially Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, have provided philosophical study with a world of meaning. Heidegger notes that philosophy has constantly been exploring “the question about the meaning of being,” especially since modern philosophy, and that it has become the epistemology and methodology of the meaning of being. However, we already stand in an understanding of being, the “what is to be ascertained, the meaning of being, will require its own conceptualization.”76 Gadamer replies: Man as a historical being is not the occupation of history and culture by man, but the occupation of man by history and culture. It is not the individual that chooses a particular method of understanding, but the comprehension that constitutes his mode of being. Comprehension is not primarily the activities of the subjective consciousness of the individual, but the mode by which history and culture enter individual consciousness. Comprehension, as the occupation of the individual by history and culture and the possibility of personal unfolding, is realized as the “fusion” of “historical horizons” and “subjective horizons.”77 This is the ‘world of meaning.’ Scientific philosophy sublates the abstract opposition of nature and spirit as the unity of thought and reality in the scientific world; cultural philosophy expands humanity in the scientific world to encompass the circle of humanity, thus constructing a cultural world that sublates the abstract opposition of man and nature. Philosophical hermeneutics thus departs from the occupation of individuals by history and culture in order to propose a world of meaning, with understanding as the mode of human existence. Thus, we can see that the development and progress of contemporary philosophy has gradually deepened, concretely revealing that man exists in three space-time worlds: man as a natural being, surviving in the natural world with other beings; man as a social being that has transcended nature, living in a self-created social world; and man as society, made up of cultural beings, who are occupied by history and culture but also able to display new possibilities in their historical activities, thus living in a world of meaning based on historical and personal integration. This suggests that humans do not use their own natural being, but the social being created in their historical activities, to mediate the construction of a unity of opposites in the world. The fundamental feature of contemporary philosophy lies in using the human social being as a mediator to sublate the abstract opposition between nature and spirit, objective and subjective, thus regarding the social being itself as the ontology pursued by philosophy. The old materialism and old idealism, which were formed based on the abstract relation of opposition between two opposing poles, have been replaced by contemporary philosophy, which seeks to integrate, transition, and transform the two poles. This replacement is, to date, the most profound evolution of philosophy. It has changed the way philosophy questions and pursues, thereby transforming the awareness, values, 76 Heidegger 77 Gadamer

[19], pp. 5. [20], p. xxxi.

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and aesthetic orientations of humanity. That is, it has changed the modes of human thought on a deeper level, and altered our understanding of the question of the relation of thought and being. Within the opposing modes of thought, traditional philosophy has always striven to reach an absolute, certain, and ultimate understanding of truth, that is, knowledge based on the principles governing the universe. Therefore, the ontology that philosophy has pursued is a particular essence that transcends or is higher than man. Ontology was taken as a self-existing entity unrelated to human conditions (such as history, science, culture, language, interest, needs, and material production). The questions it asks itself are ‘what is absolutely true?’; ‘what is supremely good?’; and ‘what is the highest beauty?’. In traditional philosophy, it was only when philosophy revealed this absolute truth, this supreme good, and this highest beauty that humans were able to acquire complete and accurate scientific knowledge about the world, and to conduct real and effective practical activities and an ethical social life. This, on the dimension of knowledge, is the persistent pursuit of absolute truth; on the dimension of value, it is an obsession with supreme good; on the aesthetic dimension, it is indulgence in the illusion of the highest beauty. From a fundamental mode of thought, it split the world into having an either/or dualism, an abstract opposition of true and false, good and evil, beauty and ugliness. This is the anti-history (anti-reality) mode of thought in metaphysics. Ontologically mediated contemporary philosophy stands in the position of historicism in rejecting the pursuit of absolute certainty. Marx points out that dialectic “in its rational form…includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence.”78 Human cognition, which is formed in the process of historic development and characterized by its time, is a type of historical progress, but also a historical limitation; thus it nurtures within it new historical possibilities. In terms of historical progress, human understanding of truth, goodness, and beauty in their own age is the highest comprehension of the unity of man and world achieved in a particular epoch; it marks the highest ‘unmovable pole’ for all activities of that age, and hence is absolute. As for its historical limitation, people’s understanding of truth, goodness, and beauty in their own age is also historically specific. As the highest immovable pole for all human activities, it presents the one-sidedness that humans as historical beings are unable to escape, hence it is relative. Regarding its historical possibilities, people’s understanding of truth, goodness, and beauty in their own age precisely represents the ‘ladders’ and ‘scaffolds’ constructed in the progress of development, and hence, provides real possibilities for continuous advancement. Truth, goodness, and beauty will forever be self-sublated as mediators. Their values are neither absolutely absolute nor absolutely relative, but relatively absolute—absolute in their own age, relative in the course of history.

78 Marx

[21], p. 15.

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In this regard, contemporary Western philosophy has shown great consistency. Popper and other philosophers who stress the humanistic aspects of science, i.e., science as the manifestation of humanity, may possibly be mistaken. Popper stated that knowledge, and especially our scientific knowledge, progresses through the history of unjustified conjectures, attempted refutations, and proposal of more mature solutions.79 Scientific theory is the object of historical critique, and all of its results exist as mediations. Similarly, the fundamental aim of philosophical hermeneutics is to stimulate reflection and to challenge the certainty of assumptions in predetermined directions. Gadamer held that comprehension is a mode of being, and that it is first and foremost a historical limitation on man. Hence, an intrinsic bias is an inevitable and legitimate aspect of human existence. When humans unfold new historical possibilities in understanding, they will be realized as the dialectical development of self-sublation. Traditional philosophy approaches the question of the relation of nature and spirit from two opposing poles. In essence, it sets up the abstract opposition of natural and spiritual attributes, thus seeking the ontology of existence between the two poles. In contrast, contemporary philosophy approaches the relation of nature and spirit through mediation. Essentially, it uses the historical activities of man as the mediator to achieve the concrete unity of sensuous being and spiritual activities, and approaches the question of the relation of thought and being from the historical activities of man. The dialectical mode of thought provided by contemporary philosophy reminds us that, on the dimension of knowledge, it is not the persistent pursuit of absolute truth, but an exploration of the relative truths of the time and comprehension of truth as a process; on the dimension of value, it is not the obsession with supreme goodness, but an exploration of the relative goodness of the time, and comprehension of the measure of value as a process; on the aesthetic dimension, it is not indulgence in the illusion of the highest beauty, but an exploration of the relative beauty of the time, and comprehension of aesthetic activities as a process. Modern dialectical theory, which proceeds from the historical activities of man, adopts the standpoint of mediation to approach all existing things. This is the essence of its evolution and critique. It takes the exploration of the identity of thought and being, and changes it from the pursuit of ultimate truth, goodness, and beauty of traditional philosophy to a relativistic comprehension of the standards of the times. Humans are specific links in the chains of the material world, and constitute being in-itself or natural being. The subject, which understands and changes the world, is also being for-itself or self-conscious being. Therefore, humans, as the unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, become being-in-and-for-itself ; that is, they exist as subjects endowed with agency that have achieved self-cognition and selftransformation in the material world. As being in-itself or natural beings, humans are unified with the material world, and the material world is the basis for their survival and development, an ontology. As being for-itself or self-conscious being, humans use their historical activities to achieve unity between the measures of matter and

79 Popper

[22], p. vii.

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man, objective laws and subjective purpose. This is the historical identity of thought and being. Adopting three different perspectives—being-in-itself and being-for-itself, resulting in being-in-and-for-itself —to examine the relation of thought and being, and of man and the world, gives us three different philosophical theories: the old materialism (from the perspective of being-in-itself ), the old idealism (from the perspective of being-for-itself ) and contemporary philosophy (from the perspective of being-in-and-for-itself ). The old materialism and the old idealism comprehend the relation of man and the world from the two opposing poles of in-itself and foritself , they become trapped in the mode of either/or metaphysics, forming abstract oppositions and incompatible philosophical theories. In the process of sublating the polar opposition in traditional philosophy, the perspective of contemporary philosophy increasingly came to focus on the mediating moment that bridges the two poles. This allows practical, scientific, cultural, and hermeneutic philosophy, among others, to become the manifold forms of contemporary philosophy. Penetrating the deeper unity of the multiple forms of contemporary philosophy will reveal that they essentially regard humans as social beings, or one of the features, parts, aspects, or moments, of ontology. It can be said that the generation and development of the whole of contemporary philosophy was based on the great philosophical revolution brought about by Marx’s practical dialectical theory through its substantive content and fundamental direction, regardless of whether the other schools are conscious of or acknowledge this point. Therefore, Marx is the true founder of contemporary philosophy. Using the historical activities of man as the mediator—and of man and the world— to explore the relation of thought and being is the shared feature of the whole of contemporary philosophy. However, the historical activities of man are used in a variety of mediating divisions to constitute the unity of opposites in the relation of man and the world. Using areas such as language, science, art, religion, and ethics as the mediating moments will allow us to construct a particular principle of unity to explain the unity of man and the world. However, the different schools of modern Western philosophy tend to grasp hold of one particular moment and introduce onesided exaggerations, which leads to a modern idealist philosophy. Marx’s dialectic of the intensional logic of history not only sublates the unity of opposites in the various relations between man and the world to the internal moment of practical human activities; it reveals that the most basic practical human activities—those of material production—occupy a fundamental position in the relation of thought and being, man and the world. Marx uses the activities of material production as the foundation to explain the history of science, culture, art, religion, and language, indicating that they will interact to constitute the possibility of the progressive, limited, and developing nature of historical beings. Thus, he has laid down real foundations for responding to the question of the relation of thought and being. The vast disparity between Marxist philosophy and the various schools of modern Western philosophy is not coincidental. Philosophers questioning ontology were first influenced by philosophers questioning the subject. Modern Western scientific philosophy, in its essence, regards scientists as subjects cognizing and changing the

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world. Hence, it uses the scientific activities of science and its results as ontology. Modern Western cultural philosophy, in its essence, more commonly regards humanistic scholars as its subject. Hence, it uses general cultural activities as its ontology. Marxist philosophy regards socialized humans or the socialization of humans as its subject; hence, it uses all practical human activities based on the activities of material production and their historical results as its ontology. The subject and ontology in Marx’s understanding essentially uses the form of sublation to accommodate the subject and ontology of modern Western philosophy. Therefore, we should approach the relation of Marxist and modern Western philosophy from two angles: On the one hand, truthfully viewing the results of modern Western philosophy as the question of Marxist practical philosophy should prove meaningful through self-consciously transforming and sublimating the results as the concrete content of practical philosophy. On the other hand, self-consciously persisting on the philosophical path cleared by Marx requires using practical dialectical theory to criticize the erroneous tendencies of modern Western philosophy caused by bias, resulting in the exaggeration of practical activities at a particular moment. To achieve the unity of these two approaches, our basic premise is to comprehend the question of the relation of thought and being from a practical and historical standpoint.

References 1. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1987). Collected works, Volume 25: Engels: Dialectics of nature (trans: Clemens, D.). New York: International Publishers, p. 544. 2. Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). Phenomenologyof Spirit (trans: Miller, A. V.). New York: Oxford University Press, p. 58. 3. Lenin, V. L. (1976). Lenin collected works: Volume 38, Philosophical notebooks (trans: Clemence, D.). Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 360. 4. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1975). Collected works, Volume 5: Theses on Feuerbach (trans: Lough, W.). London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 3. 5. Hegel, C. W. F. (1873). Hegel’s logic: Part one of the encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences (trans: Wallace, W.). Pacifica: Marxists Internet Achieve, pp. 103–104. 6. Aristotle. (2012). Metaphysics (trans: Ross, W. D.). Central Compilation & Translation Press, p. 61. 7. Hegel, G. W. F. (1995). Lectures on the history of philosophy: Plato and the platonists, Volume 2 (trans: Haldane, E. S., & Simson, F. H.). Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 229–230. 8. Hegel, G. W. F. (1873). Hegel’s logic: Part one of the encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences (trans: Wallace, W.). Pacifica: Marxists Internet Archive, p. 223. 9. Hegel, G. W. F. (2001). Encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences part one. Blackmask Online, p. 10. 10. Hegel, G. W. F. (1995). Lectures on the history of philosophy: Greek philosophy to plato, Volume 1 (trans: Haldane, E. S.). Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, p. 12. 11. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1987). Collected works, Volume 25: Engels: Dialectics of nature (trans: Dutt, C.). New York: International Publishers, p. 491. 12. Marx, K. (1955). Poverty of philosophy (trans: The Institute of Marxism-Leninism). Progress Publishers, p. 47.

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13. Marx, K. (2010). Marx and Engels collected works. Lawrence & Wishart, 3, 176. 14. Gadamer, H. -G. (1998). Praise of theory: Speeches and essays (trans: Dawson, C.). New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 36. 15. Marx, K. (1970). Critique of Hegel’s ‘philosophy of right’ (trans: O’Malley, J., & Jolin, A.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 138. 16. Cassirer, E. (1972). An essay on man: An introduction to a philosophy of human culture (p. 207). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 17. White, M. (1955). The age of analysis. Signet. 18. Wartofsky, M. (1968). Conceptual foundations of scientific thought (p. 1). Chapter: Macmillan Company. 19. Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and time (trans: Stambaugh, J.). State University of New York Press, p. 5. 20. Gadamer, H. -G. (2006). Truth and method, second edition (trans: Weinsheimer, J., & Marshall, D. G.), Continuum Publishing Group. Introduction, p. xxiv; Foreword to Second Edition, p. xxxi. 21. Marx, K. (1887). Capital, Volume 1 (trans: Moore, S., & Aveling, E.). Afterword to Second Edition, p. 15. 22. Popper, K. (1962). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Basic Books, p. vii.

Chapter 2

A Critique of the Basic Logic Underlying Thought

Fundamentally, the question of the relation between thought and being is a question of the relation between the laws of thought and the laws of being; in other words, it concerns the question of whether thought and being ‘are subject to the same laws.’ Therefore, a philosophical critique of the premises underlying thought not only points toward a critique focused on the identity of thought and being, but also toward a critique of the basic logic constituting thought, i.e. the laws of thought.

1 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Formal Logic In the thought activities of humans, concepts are not merely the ‘cells’ that constitute these activities. Rather, as Lenin put it, they are the ‘ladder’ and ‘scaffolding’ of understanding. Therefore, the operation of concepts is not merely the ‘synchronic’ logic of thought movements, but also the ‘diachronic’ logic of thought movements. The basic logic that constitutes thought includes the extensional or formal logic, which is constructed by the extension of concepts; the intensional logic or dialectic, which is constructed by the intension of concepts; and the practical or life logic, constructed by the practical basis of concepts. Hence, a critique focused on the basic logic that constitutes thought should mainly consist of a critique of formal, dialectical, and practical logic. Here we will first conduct a critique of the premises underlying formal logic, i.e. extensional logic.

1.1 The Dual Meaning of Formal Logic Formal logic has a dual meaning: in the first sense it refers to the logical structure of thought used by people in their thought activities in real life, and the thought laws and rules it follows; this is formal logic in-itself . In the second sense it refers to the science © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 Z. Sun, A Philosophical Critique of Thought, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8399-5_2

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of the logical structure of thought, and of its laws and rules, commonly known as normal logic; this is formal logic for-itself . By differentiating between logic in-itself and for-itself , we are establishing the basis for the critique of the premises underlying formal logic. In concrete terms, the critique of the premises underlying formal logic involves using the critical reflection on formal logic for-itself as a mediation to reveal the internal contradictions that are implicit in formal logic in-itself . In the process of revealing such a critique, we are expressing at the outset the internal contradictions in the ‘question of the identity of thought and being’ that are implicit in the premise of theoretical thought. During thought activities in real life, man is always unconsciously committed to the dual identity of thought and being: the unconscious commitment to the identity of ‘thought determination’ and ‘being determination’ with regard to content, and the unconscious commitment to the identity of ‘the logic of thought’ and ‘the logic of being’ with regard to form; in both cases, there is a commitment to the fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and hence too that in the final analysis their results cannot contradict each other, but must coincide with regard to the identity of content or form. It is precisely people’s dual commitment to the identity of thought and being for both content and form in their thought-activities that constitutes ‘the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.’ As the ‘the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought,’ the thought-laws and thought-rules that man follows in his thought activities in real life exist in-themselves in his thought activities. As for man’s formal logic in-itself , it is not necessary to learn logic for-itself . This is precisely what Lenin notes when reading Hegel’s The Science of Logic, that Hegel makes “a shrewd statement about logic: it is a ‘prejudice’ that it ‘teaches how to think’ (just as physiology ‘teaches…to digest’?).”1 This clearly indicates that thinking which ‘conforms to logic’ is the nature of thought; logic that conforms to the nature of thought cannot be taught; and hence, logic does not teach us how to think. We all know that humans do not need to learn about physiology or digestion in order to chew, swallow, absorb, and excrete spontaneously. Conversely, if anyone uses physiology or digestion to consciously eat a meal, it will be regarded as a ridiculous joke. This analogy vividly illustrates the fact that just as physiology does not teach us to digest, logic does not teach us to think. Therefore, this analogy shows profoundly that formal logic in-itself is ‘the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought,’ whereas formal logic for-itself is man’s self-consciousness of the nature of thought, thus causing him to think consciously according to logic. To critique the premises underlying formal logic in-itself is to reveal the unconscious premise of man’s thought activities in real life, which then causes man to be selfconscious of this unconscious premise. This ‘self-conscious’ logic is the formal logic of general logic. Therefore, a critique of the premises underlying formal logic initself must resort to formal logic for-itself , i.e. what is commonly referred to as the critique of the premises underlying general logic. 1 Lenin

[1, p. 87].

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Man thinks by relying on the nature of thought, that is, he thinks by relying on ‘the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.’ However, man cannot spontaneously master the movement of the laws of thought, and hence needs to consciously investigate the laws of the movement of thought. Using the metaphor that physiology does not teach us to digest, we may observe that man uses the nature of physiology to digest, but does not spontaneously master the laws of movement in digestion. To master the laws of movement in digestion, he must learn and investigate physiology; to master the laws of movement in thought, he must learn and investigate logic. The essence of physiology or logic that does not teach us to digest or think lies in the act of empowering man to be self-conscious about digestion and thought. Therefore, it is only through the critique of the premises underlying the science of the laws and rules of thought, i.e. logic, that we can achieve a critique of ‘the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought,’ and a critique of the premises underlying the basic logic—formal logic—constituting thought.

1.2 The Two Types of Premise of Formal Logic As a formal science, formal logic is a science that is temporarily detached from content and specializes in the study of the formal structure of thought. This indicates that formal logic is concerned with the logic of concept ‘extension,’ and not with the logic of concept ‘intension.’ As the extensional logic of concepts, within the domain of formal logic, there are two types of premise that are not discussed: the first is whether the ‘known judgment of reasoning’ is true; the second is how formal logic itself can be possible. Therefore, a critique of the premises underlying formal logic is mainly a critique of these two types of premise. A premise, in formal logic, is defined as a ‘known judgment of reasoning.’ For instance, consider the categorical syllogism: All metals conduct electricity; iron is a metal; therefore, iron conducts electricity. The two categorical judgments— ‘All metals conduct electricity’ and ‘Iron is a metal’—are known judgments that constitute the major and minor premises of this categorical syllogism. Such premises, which are known judgments, are not discussed in formal logic. In the process of formal reasoning, we are seeking to deduce a conclusion based on premises that are known judgments. What we are concerned with is whether the reasoning process conforms to the rules of thought, and not whether the premises that are known judgments of thought are true. By questioning the premises that are ‘known judgments,’ and critically inquiring whether the premises are reasonable, we will be exceeding the domain of formal logic. For this reason, logicians have always expressed doubts over Leibniz’s ‘principle of sufficient reason’ in his Monadology. They believe that this type of requirement points to the premises of reasoning, which should not and cannot possibly be solved within the realm of logic. Formal logic rejects the questioning of premises, i.e. known judgments, in reasoning, which is also the rejection of critical thinking toward thought content and concept intension. In other words, formal logic is premised on the commitment

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or establishment that the premises of reasoning are known, true, and certain. Even if formal logic does not make this type of commitment, it still adopts an attitude of setting aside or ignoring the truth of premises. These two attitudes are equivalent: They are both based on the premise of not considering the premises of reasoning. The rejection of formal logic regarding the questioning of the premises for reasoning conforms to the determinateness of formal logic itself. In terms of formal logic for-itself , it has already declared that it is detached from content, and specializes in studying the formal structure of thought, and its laws and rules. If it is not detached from content, and does not extract the formal structure of thought for specialized study, then it is unable to investigate the laws and rules of the form of thought. As with mathematics, in order to study the quantitative and spatial relations between objects, it needs to adopt an attitude of setting aside concrete objects. In terms of formal logic in-itself , although thought processes in real life cannot be detached from content, we still pre-set or set aside the underlying premises. In the example of a categorical syllogism above, we only need to deduce the conclusion that ‘Iron conducts electricity’ based on the two premises ‘All metals conduct electricity’ and ‘Iron is a metal.’ As to whether all metals conduct electricity, or whether iron is a metal, such questions are not considered in the process of formal reasoning. The investigation of ‘whether all metals conduct electricity’ or ‘whether iron is a metal’ then becomes another reasoning process. For example, to argue that ‘all metals conduct electricity,’ the following categorical syllogism can be formed in the thought process: All materials with a large quantity of freely-moving charged particles are electrically-conductive materials; all metals have a large quantity of freely-moving charged particles; therefore, all metals can conduct electricity. However, this process of formal reasoning is based on the commitment to the fact that ‘All materials with a large quantity of freely-moving charged particles are electrically-conductive materials.’ In other words, all questions considered in the domain of formal logic are based on the commitment to the underlying premises. With this in mind, we can raise the following question: In the historical development of humans, the various underlying premises of all known judgments (i.e. the varied knowledge constituting the content of thought) are not fixed and unchanging but are historically situated and therefore subject to change. Thus, how is the renewal of such known judgments or the change in the premises of reasoning realized? This is the first type of premise not discussed in formal logic. Regarding the question of the relation of thought and being, philosophy precisely seeks to study how the unity of thought and being is realized in the development of the concepts constituting thought. Therefore, formal logic does not discuss the premises that are known judgments; that is to say, the first type of premise that formal logic does not discuss is precisely the critique by philosophy of premises underlyingthe formal logic constituting thought. This indicates that in philosophy’s critique of formal logic, its starting point is to reflect on the question of the relation of thought and being, and not to negate the laws and rules of thought movements revealed by formal logic. Upon further consideration, we will also discover another type of question: formal logic neither discusses the premises that are ‘known judgments,’ nor does it discuss the premises of how formal logic itself can be established. In other words, formal

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logic does not discuss why it is able to extract the formal structure of thought and provide the laws and rules of thought. This is the second type of premise not discussed in formal logic. Regarding the question of the relation of thought and being or the critique of the premises underlying theoretical thought, the question of how formal logic itself can be established more directly constitutes philosophy’s critique of the premises underlying the formal logic constituting thought. In terms of formal logic in-itself , if someone violates the laws and rules of formal logic in his thought process, he will not be able to accurately express his thoughts. As is commonly said, if thought activities do not conform to formal logic, then the communication and exchange of thought cannot be realized. Therefore, when violating formal logic, man must correct his own conceptual expression or reasoning process, in order to follow the laws and rules of formal logic. However, in the thought processes of formal logic, man also does not reflect on the mode of linguistic expression for the accurate exchange of ideas, and the laws and rules of thought implicit within such modes of linguistic expression. That is, during man’s thought processes in real life, the following question is not raised: why is it necessary for us to follow certain set laws and rules in thought activities? Formal logic for-itself , i.e. formal logic as a science, asks itself such questions, and gives its own answers. However, the question raised by formal logic is: what is the basis for each concrete law and each concrete rule? Accordingly, the answer given by formal logic is to concretely argue the basis for each law and each rule. For example, formal logic raises the question of why the middle term of a categorical syllogism must be distributed at least once in the premises, and it demonstrates this based on the relation of the middle term with the major and minor terms. In other words, as a science, formal logic studies the concrete rules in the reasoning process and does not question the premises regarding how the laws and rules of formal logic can be established. The problem is that formal logic not only has premises; its premise is the premise that it is committed to. This is ‘the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought’—that thought and being follow the same laws. Formal logic is premised on the commitment to the presence of a certain heterogeneous isomorphism between the operation of thought and the object of thought. Formal logic is premised on this fundamental premise that it is committed to, and uses it to study the formal structure of thought and its laws and rules of operation. Without this commitment, how can man confidently apply formal logic in thinking and arguing about the complex connections of its object? In view of this, there are two types of premise that are not discussed within the domain of formal logic: the first type is the content of thought, i.e. the premise of known judgments, and the second type is the form of thought, i.e. the premise of formal logic itself. Thus, critical reflection on these two premise types, which are not discussed in formal logic, is philosophical reflection on the formal logic constituting thought.

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1.3 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Formal Logic by Philosophy As there are two premise types that are not discussed within the domain of formal logic, philosophy’s reflection on formal logic is also manifested as a dual concern: the first concern is with the ‘known judgments’ that constitute the contents of thought, to critically examine the rationality of these ‘known judgments’; that is, to regard the ‘known’ premises set by formal logic as the object of critique. The second concern is with the laws and rules of thought operations that constitute the form of thought, to critically examine the premise of theoretical thought; that is, to regard the selfevident premises of formal logic as the object of critique. Through critical reflection about the ‘known judgments’ that are the content of thought, and the ‘laws and rules’ of thought operations, philosophy can achieve a ‘critique of the premises underlying theoretical thought’ that uses formal logic as a mediator. A critique of the premises underlying formal logic by philosophy is directly manifested as a reflection on the basic laws of formal logic. Formal logic has three basic laws: the law of identity; the law of non-contradiction; and the law of excluded middle. Formal logic does not discuss the premises that are the content of thought, and does not reflect on the premises of its own existence, but only requires that the process of thought operations conform to the self-consistent laws and rules of formal logic. Therefore, there are no contradictions within formal logic; it excludes contradictions. In its essence, the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle in formal logic requires certainty of thought (whatever is, is; whatever is not, is not; it cannot be and not be at the same time). In this sense, formal logic only requires that the thought operations of man follow one law—A is A, i.e. the law of identity. The other two basic laws of formal logic—that A and not A cannot be true at the same time, i.e. the law of non-contradiction; and that either A or not A must be true, i.e. the law of excluded middle—are merely the logical extension and supplementation of the law of identity. For this reason, philosophy expresses a special concern toward the law of identity in formal logic, and is focused on the critique of the premises underlying it. The premise for the law of identity is twofold: anything in reality is the same as itself; anything in thought can be thought of as being the same as itself. That is, formal logic is committed to the fact that every individual thing has identity, and also that every single thing has an identity with the corresponding thought unit. The dual premise of the law of identity also constitutes the dual conditions of human thought: it is both the condition for which things can be thought about, and also the condition to guarantee the certainty and synonymy of the topics, propositions, and concepts in thought operations. The problem is that the thought condition determined by the law of identity in formal logic is only the condition for representational thought and commonsense thought, but not the condition for theoretical thought—scientific thought and philosophical thought (to be precise, not the sufficient condition for theoretical thought).

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Representational thought is a type of thought where the concept is dependent on and subordinate to representations: “That habit [of representational thought] should be called material thinking, a contingent consciousness that is absorbed only in material stuff, and therefore finds it hard work to lift the [thinking] self clear of such matter, and to be with itself alone.”2 In representational thought, the concept corresponds to the representation, while representation corresponds to a certain object. The triangular relationships of concept-representation-object expressed in the triangle of meaning (e.g. the concept of cow, the representation of cow, and the existence of cow) are precisely the mutually corresponding, certain relations between object and image mediated by concepts, which are formed in man’s representational thought. In such relations of representational thought, thought is attributed with dual certainty: the certainty of the object and the certainty of the concept. Therefore, the law of identity in formal logic constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for representational thought. Commonsense thinking is empirical thinking that satisfies the needs of daily life. Common sense is always firmly dependent on experience, and experience is always connected to individual things, phenomena, and experiences. Within the scope of empirical common sense, man can only think using a type of binary logic: whatever is, is; whatever is not, is not; it cannot be both ‘is’ and ‘is not.’ A is A; not A is not A; it cannot be said that ‘it is both A and not A.’ Therefore, the law of identity in formal logic is also a necessary and sufficient condition of common-sense thinking. The problem is that once human thought ventures out into the wide world of research (as stated by Engels), where it uses scientific thought and philosophical thought to conduct theoretical thinking, representational thought and commonsense thought will embark upon many wonderful adventures. Philosophy’s concern with the premise for the law of identity (as well as the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle) in formal logic is a type of concern that surpasses the theoretical thinking of representational thought and commonsense thought toward the premise of theoretical thought. In other words, it concerns the two premise types that are not discussed in formal logic. Firstly, we will discuss philosophy’s concern regarding the ‘known judgments’ that form the content of thought, which is also its concern regarding concept intension or knowledge content. In formal logic, as a premise that is a ‘known judgment’, its concrete content is infinitely rich, and its knowledge content can be divided into three basic levels: commonsense that is known judgment, science that is known judgment, and philosophy that is known judgment. Philosophy’s concern for the premise of formal logic is directly manifested as a critique of the premises underlying the commonsense, science, and philosophy of the premise of reasoning. This type of critique, in essence, is the self-critique of concepts. In the reasoning process of formal logic, the premises that are ‘known judgments’ are established and given; hence, they are unique and certain. Regarding the certainty of premises, the conclusion of certainty also needs to be deduced logically. Thus, thought processes need to and should be able to exclude contradictions. Conversely, 2 Hegel

[2].

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if the premises that are known judgments are contradictory and uncertain, then they are unable to act as premises of reasoning in formal logic; this is because they do not satisfy the requirement that thought processes must exclude contradictions. Such mutually contradictory and uncertain premises need to be transformed into a type of premise that has a richer and deeper content, while also possessing non-contradiction and certainty. Only then can they act as premises that are known judgments in the reasoning of formal logic. Thus, in the reasoning of formal logic, the premise itself is still non-contradictory, and hence, it still requires that the process of thought operations be non-contradictory. Philosophy’s concern with the premise of reasoning in formal logic is also a critical reflection on the non-contradiction and certainty of such premises. The question raised by philosophy is: are the ‘known judgments’ that are premises certain and non-contradictory? Can the commonsense, science, and philosophy that are the content of knowledge be recognized non-critically? Evidently, philosophy has a dual concern about the premise of formal logic. It is a type of concern that points toward the premise of formal logic, but which surpasses the domain of formal logic. It is also concerned with thinking critically on the philosophical level about the premise of theoretical thought. Therefore, we need to emphasize that philosophy is a critique of the premises underlying formal logic, and a critical reflection on the premise of theoretical thought; but not to negate logic as a formal science. Logic, as a formal science, has its own unique theoretical nature and social function. As an independent scientific discipline, it does not need to raise the question of the premise of theoretical thought within its own domain. As for applying logic to itself using the premise of theoretical thought as its premise, it also provides a theoretical space for critical reflection on logic by philosophy. Understanding the difference between these two enables us to conduct a critique of the premises underlying the formal logic constituting thought. From the perspective of substantive content, philosophy’s concern for the premise of formal logic arose from classical German philosophy between the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. This type of substantive content is the critique of the premises underlying formal logic by dialectics. The founder of classical German philosophy, Kant, criticized formal logic in the sense of being opposed to the transcendental logic, and proposed that formal logic severs the connection between the content and form of cognition, which also eliminates the true contradiction in cognition: the contradiction between the content and form of cognition. Kant himself started from the contradiction between the content and form of cognition, and critically reflected on the premise of theoretical thought: the logic with which thought grasps being. The personification of classical German philosophy, Hegel, started from a unified view of ontology, epistemology, and dialectic, and proposed that logic is not the theory of the external form of thought, but the science of the laws for human thought movements. In the progression of human thought movements, form is form with content; it is form that is inseparably linked with content. This type of logic required by Hegel is the logic of conceptual development, i.e. conceptual dialectic. It is precisely in the self-conscious form of conceptual dialectic created by Hegel that the critique of the premises underlying formal logic by dialectic truly began.

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In the evolution of classical German philosophy, by distinguishing between abstract identity and concrete identity, Hegel proposed that the law of identity in formal logic is only a law of abstract reasoning, and not a true law of thought. He states that the maxim of identity is expressed as ‘Everything is identical with itself,’ or ‘A = A.’ However, “the propositional form itself contradicts it: for a proposition always promises a distinction between subject and predicate,” whereas the proposition ‘A = A’ “does not fulfil what its form requires.”3 Hegel believed that the identity of thought and being also contains the intrinsic, existent difference between thought and being. The movement of the logic of thought based on this identity, which contains the intrinsic difference between thought and being, is a renunciation in the self-negation of a concept. Thus, Hegel’s starting point in the critique of formal logic directs the sword point of his critique toward the identity of thought and being, which is the premise of theoretical thought. On the basis of critically inheriting the dialectic of Hegel, Engels pointed out, profoundly enough, that: The law of identity in the old metaphysical sense is the fundamental law of the old outlook: a = a. Each thing is equal to itself. Everything was permanent, the solar system, stars, organisms. This law has been refuted by natural science bit by bit in each separate case, but theoretically it still prevails…Abstract identity, like all metaphysical categories, suffices for everyday use… For natural science in its comprehensive role, however, even in each single branch, abstract identity is totally inadequate….4

Engels’s critique of the law of identity in formal logic is a critique of the fundamental law of the old outlook; that is, it is a demand for worldview theory to transcend abstract identity, and form a dialectical worldview theory. Lenin greatly admired Hegel’s demand for a unified logic of content and form, and proposed that, Logic is the science [,] not of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development ‘of all material, natural, and spiritual things’, i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the History of knowledge of the world.5

It is especially noteworthy that Lenin more clearly sublimates the critique of the old logic to a critical reflection on theoretical thought. Lenin proposed that, If everything develops, does not that apply also to the most general concepts and categories of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialectics of concepts and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance.6

Here, Lenin profoundly connects the dialectics of worldview theory with the basic question of philosophy, i.e., the premises of theoretical thought. As a theory concerned with the unification and development of thought and being, dialectical 3 Hegel

[3]. and Engels [4]. 5 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, pp. 92–93. 6 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 254. 4 Marx

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theory does not regard the premises that are ‘known judgments’ as solid things, but as things that are still developing. All concepts, categories, and propositions are merely “stages of distinguishing, i.e. of cognising the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognising and mastering it.”7 All such ‘stages’ and ‘focal points in the web’ implicitly contain the contradictions between thought and being, and possess inherent self-negation. Hence, they constitute the logic of development of human cognition. The above analysis indicates that, regardless of whether it is Hegel, Engels, or Lenin, their critiques of formal logic are all philosophical critiques of formal logic. They are all reflections on ‘the question of the relation of thought and being,’ and all seek to answer the question of the development of human cognition. It is this type of reflection and critique that surpasses the domain of formal logic and constitutes dialectics in the philosophical sense. Second, we will discuss philosophy’s concern about how formal logic is possible. The identity of thought and being is the premise of theoretical thought, and it directly includes questions on two basic levels: on its surface, it is the question of whether the essence and laws of being are expressed in the concepts, categories, and propositions that are the determinateness of thought, and the various theoretical systems composed of their logical connections. On a deeper level, it is the question of whether the laws of so-called being-movements can be described by thought-movements composed of the forms, categories, laws, and rules of thought that are the logic of thought movements; that is, the question of how do logical figures of thought possess objectivity. The philosophies previous to Marxism, which depart from the practical activity of man and its historical development, could not answer this question correctly. Engels said that, Eighteenth century materialism…restricted itself to the proof that the content of all thought and knowledge must derive from sensuous experience”8 and does not investigate the relation of thought and being in regard to form. In other words, old materialism has yet to question the objectivity of logical figures. As opposed to old materialism, idealism considers the question of the relation of thought and being from the perspective of form; what they refer to as being is only the being of consciousness. Thus they also attribute to it logical figures such as the logic of the self-movement of thought. In his critique of modern philosophy, Kant opposed the logic of thought movement with the logic of the movement of being, and proposed that the logic by which thought grasps being only has meaning in subjective logic, but not in objective logic. Hegel was against Kant’s opposing the logic of thought with the logic of being, and proposed that the two are identical in-themselves. He then used this type of identity in-itself as a premise to unfold the self-movement of thought, but did not address the question of why thought and being are identical in-themselves. Therefore, Engels states that “what is here to be proved [by Hegel] is already tacitly contained in the presupposition.”9 Evidently, the entirety of philosophical thinking of the old philosophy about the question of the relation of thought and being only considers the relations of thought 7 Ibid.,

p. 93. and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 25, pp. 544–545. 9 Engels [5, p. 22]. 8 Marx

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with being or being with thought. Therefore, when thinking about logical figures, it still does not depart from the relation between thought and being. This type of thinking can only result in the direct assertion that logical figures are about being, or categorically denying that logical figures express the logic of being. The problem lies in the fact that the most essential and closest foundation of thought is not thought itself, and not being that is mutually opposed to thought, but the practical activity of humans themselves that constitutes the relation of thought and being. Marx states that “the forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire history of the world down to the present,” and that. Each of his human relations to the world – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving – in short, all the organs of his individual being, like those organs which are directly social in their form, are in their objective orientation or in their orientation to the object, the appropriation of the human reality.Their orientation to the object is the manifestation of the human reality…10

Similar to the forming of the five senses, the relation of thought and being divorced from the practical activity of man is unable to exist as a relation in real life. Hence, by considering the question of the relation of thought and being without the practical activity of man, we can only regard the relation between the two as a sensuous, intuitive relation (old materialism), or the relation of self-cognition by thought (idealism). These two modes of thinking both discard the foundation of logical figures in real life. The foundation of logical figures in real life is also the practical activity of man. Man and the practice of human history is the point of intersection between thought and being. In his discourse on the categories of logic and the practice of man, Lenin clearly raises the question of logical figures from the viewpoint of practical theory. He states that, The practical activity of man had to lead his consciousness to the repetition of the various logical figures thousands of millions of times in order that these figures could obtain the significance of axioms.11

Also that, Man’s practice, repeating itself a thousand million times, becomes consolidated in man’s consciousness by figures of logic. Precisely (and only) on account of this thousand-millionfold repetition, these figures have the stability of a prejudice, an axiomatic character.12

Lenin’s discourse has rich connotations and significant implications. Lenin raised the issue of the origin of logical figures, for which he explicitly states that logical figures originate from human practical activity. Human practical activity is also a type of logic, which is manifested as the logic of sensuous activity and the logic of external operation. The logic of practical operation is restricted by external being, and also by conscious activity. At the same time, it alters external being, and also changes 10 Marx

and Engels [6]. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 190. 12 Ibid., p. 216. 11 Lenin,

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conscious activity. Thus, such practical activity repeated a thousand million times, which is restricted by thought and being, while also altering thought and being, will form its own logic. Moreover, practice will lead consciousness to the repetition of the various logical figures thousands of millions of times, which then transforms the logic of practice and external operation into the logic of consciousness and thought operations. When discussing the origin of logical figures, it is necessary for us to introduce Piaget’s genetic epistemology. In the 1980s, a number of scholars in China began paying attention to the genetic epistemology of this Swiss psychologist and philosopher. The most basic axiom of this theory is the use of four basic categories—schema, assimilation, accommodation, and equilibration—to explain the basic formation and developmental process of children’s (and adults’) cognitive structure. Piaget states that the schema is the structure of actions; assimilation and accommodation are the two functions by which individuals adapt to their environment; and equilibration is the balance between these two functions. Piaget believed that infants have an instinctual hereditary schema (e.g. the movement structure of suckling). In the subsequent process of environmental adaptation, the individual might include the object into the subject’s schema (assimilation), or adjust the existing schema or create a new schema (accommodation) such that the two functions, assimilation and accommodation might reach another higher level of equilibrium, thereby realizing the development of cognitive structure. The pros and cons of Piaget’s genetic epistemology will not be discussed here. I would only like to point out that in Piaget’s schema, transition theory, which was based on extensive observation and experimentation, demonstrates, to a certain extent or from a certain perspective, the internalization process of the logic of external operations toward the logic of thought operations. Lenin’s thesis that man’s practice, repeating itself a thousand million times, becomes consolidated in man’s consciousness by figures of logic explains the true origin of logical figures in the broadest and deepest sense. Lenin’s discourse on the relation of practice and logical figures not only answers the question regarding the origin of logical figures, but also further explains why these logical figures have the stability of a prejudice, or an axiomatic character. Lenin believed that logical figures are not produced by themselves, or formed suddenly, but are the product of a thousand million acts of practice. Therefore, the stability of a prejudice, or an axiomatic character of logical figures, must and can only be explained by man’s practice repeated a thousand million times. Practical activity is oriented toward the objective world; it is restricted and determined by the objective, while also attaining self-adjustment and self-realization through the continuous alteration of the objective world. The logic of practical activity that has undergone a thousand million acts of adjustment and realization, together with the logic of the movement in-itself of the objective world, will constitute what Lenin referred to as converging and diverging lines: circles which touch one another. This refers to the alteration of the objective world according to the logic of the objective world. Man’s practical activity also leads his consciousness to the repetition of the various logical figures thousands of millions of times, such that these logical figures will be consolidated in the logical form of thought rules, modes, and operations. In turn, the logic of

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thought operation, which originates from man’s practical activity, will become the logic that regulates, controls and determines man’s practical activity. In this way, logical figures will attain the stability of a prejudice, or an axiomatic character. Lenin’s discourse addresses the premise for how formal logic is possible from a practical viewpoint, while also providing the real-life foundation for claiming that thought and being are subject to the same laws from a practical perspective. Thus, it answers the question of the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought from a practical viewpoint. Therefore, Lenin’s discourse on the practical foundation of logic in the Philosophical Notebooks is not only a critique of the premises underlying the basic logic constituting thought, but is also a critique of the premises underlying the basic belief constituting thought. An in-depth study of the philosophical thinking in Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks will help to deepen our understanding of the question of the relation between thought and being.

2 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Intensional Logic Formal logic, which is concerned with extensional logic, is an independent formal science. A critique of the premises underlying extensional logic is the premise critique by philosophy of formal logic as a science. In contrast, dialectical logic, which is concerned with intensional logic, is not logic in its general sense, but is philosophy as dialectic. The critique of the premises underlying intensional logic is not the critique of the premises underlying logic as a science, but the critique of the premises underlying philosophy itself. In this sense, a critique of the premises underlying intensional logic is not only a critique of the premises underlying the basic logic constituting thought, but also a critique of the premises underlying the dialectical theory of philosophy itself.

2.1 Analysis of Intensional Logic Concepts and categories are the summary, accumulation, and sublimation of human civilization. They both constitute the true content of human theoretical thought, and also form the ‘ladder’ and ‘scaffolding’ of human cognition. Therefore, the critique of the premises underlying thought by philosophy must resort directly to the critique of the premises underlying concepts and categories, that is, to the critique of the premises underlying the intensional logic of conceptual and categorical development. Concepts have intension and extension. Hence, man’s thought activities not only need to follow formal logic, which is extensional logic, but also dialectical logic, which is intensional logic. However, logical circles generally do not agree with referring to dialectical logic as logic, and only rarely mention the term “intensional

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logic.” Even philosophical circles are unfamiliar and suspicious of the term “intensional logic.” Therefore, a critique of the premises underlying intensional logic must first start with a clarification of what intensional logic is. The majority of logicians and philosophers are of the opinion that dialectical logic fundamentally cannot be established. Logicians believe that dialectical logic is either chaotic, or is unorthodox and non-standard deviant logic. If it is the former, then when it advocates naked contradictions, it should be abandoned. If it is the latter, then it has a place in the logical family, but its concepts cannot be mutually defined in standard logic. The basis of this assertion lies in the fact that, “To accept contradictions is absurd. If even contradictions are accepted, then what other absurdities can we not accept?”13 Similarly, by denying contradictions, philosophers of science often use the exclusion of contradictions to reject dialectics or dialectical logic. Popper’s What is Dialectic? and Bunge’s A Critical Examination of Dialectics are masterpieces in modern philosophy refuting dialectic. For both logicians and philosophers of science, their doubts over dialectical logic are mainly focused on the following aspects: first, what is a dialectical contradiction? Can contradictions exist objectively? What is the relation between dialectical contradictions and logical contradictions? Second, is the relation between dialectical logic and formal logic akin to the relation between higher mathematics and elementary mathematics? Can we regard dialectical logic as having a deeper explanatory power for formal logic? Third, can logical laws be divided into dynamic and stationary laws? Can we regard dialectical logic as having conquered the limitation of formal logic in its emphasis on the stationary? To address these issues, we must first discuss our understanding of dialectical contradictions. Combining dialectic and contradiction gives us dialectical contradiction, which is a premise for understanding dialectical logic. Dialectical contradiction is a two-fold form of determination: the dialectical is contradictory; only the contradictory needs dialectic. That is to say, without contradictions, there is no need for dialectic; without dialectic, we are unable to grasp or comprehend contradiction. Dialectical logic has as its premise the contradictions that require dialectic, and has as its content dialectics that is contradictory. Dialectical logic is concerned with the logic of the dialectic of the contradictory movements of thought. In human thought movements, to grasp and comprehend anything, involves two indispensable aspects synchronically: first, it is the identity affirming the thing itself; whatever is, is; whatever is not, is not; A is A; A is not not-A. This is the intellectual grasp and the understanding of things, from which is constituted the formal logic that thought-movements follow. Second, “it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state.”14 Things are comprehended as the process of self-negation, such that A is A, and A is also not-A. This is the grasp and comprehension of things by dialectic, from which is formed the dialectical logic that thought-movements follow.

13 Zhang 14 Marx

[7]. and Engels [8, p. 20].

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This analysis reveals the following: first, it affirms that dialectical logic is not based on the negation of formal logic, but on the affirmation of formal logic. Second, it affirms that formal logic does not regard itself as the only logic of thought movements, but that dialectical logic should be explained in the critique of the premises underlying formal logic. Third, it explains that dialectical logic does not regard itself as a socalled higher logic, but that the critique of the premises underlying dialectical logic should unfold in such an exposition. When expounding dialectical logic, Engels made the following comparison: Dialectical logic, in contrast to the old, merely formal logic, is not, like the latter, content with enumerating the forms of motion of thought, i.e., the various forms of judgment and conclusion, and placing them side by side without any connection. On the contrary, it derives these forms out of another, it makes one subordinate to another instead of putting them on an equal level, it develops the higher forms out of the lower.15

Therefore, we must carefully consider Engels’s discourse as a basis for the in-depth exposition of dialectical logic.

2.2 Intensional Logic of Thought Dialectical logic is the intensional logic of concepts and thought; it is logic concerned with the development of concepts and thought. Dialectical logic aims to solve a fundamental issue: the world confronted by human thought has infinitely rich determinateness; how should humans use their thoughts to comprehend and explain the freedom of the whole of the world? This constitutes two major contradictions that cannot be resolved by traditional philosophy: the first is the contradiction between the ambitious goals of philosophy and the historical achievements of empirical science. The second is the contradiction between the supremacy and non-supremacy of human thought. The personification of classical German philosophy, Hegel was aware of these two major contradictions. In his mind, intensional logic is formed as a unique means to resolve these two major contradictions. He believed traditional philosophy is unable to lift itself clear of these two major contradictions because they belong to two wrong modes of thought—representational thought and formal thought. That habit [of representational thought] should be called material thinking, a contingent consciousness that is absorbed only in material stuff, and therefore finds it hard work to lift the [thinking] self clear of such matter, and to be with itself alone. At the opposite extreme, argumentation [or formal reasoning] is freedom from all content, and a sense of vanity toward it.16

Representational thought “is absorbed in material stuff”17 because, as a mode of thought, it uses external things as a scale of thought; hence, it is a negative principle 15 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 25, pp. 503–504. Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 35.

16 Hegel, 17 Ibid.

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of objectivity. The objective world is a whole with mutual connections between each link; it is a whole in-itself but it is not free. Although representational thought can continuously transform the determinateness of the external world into the determinateness of thought, it is fundamentally unable to achieve the freedom of the whole of thought. Therefore, representational thought is not a mode of thought on the philosophical level. Formal thought transcends content and has a sense of vanity toward it. As a mode of thought, it uses abstract spiritual activity to realize the self-connection of thought; hence, it is an empty principle of subjectivity. As a type of activity, spirit is free in-itself , but is divorced from the inevitability of links. Therefore, although formal thought can attain satisfaction in spirit that cannot be attained in reality, it is fundamentally unable to achieve true freedom. Formal thought is also not the mode of thought required by philosophy. Regarding this, Hegel proposed that the mode of thought on the philosophical level must be a mode of thought that freely immerses itself in content, allowing the self-movement of content according to its nature, and then observes such movements. This is speculative thought, which is unlike representational thought and formal thought. It shifts the perspective of philosophy from the intuitive objectivity principle of representational thought and the empty subjectivity principle of formal reasoning, to the subjectivity principle of speculative thought. Speculative thought reflects upon the logic of human thought-movements. By immersing freedom in content, and allowing the self-movement of content according to its nature, we can shift the pursuit of the freedom of the whole by philosophy from a focus on the external world in itself and the abstract inner world, to a process of thought movement that both ‘logicizes’ the external world and ‘concretizes’ the inner world. By surveying this movement, human thought will instead regard itself as the object of thinking, i.e. as reflective activity on a philosophical level. In these reflective activities, Hegel introduces two major transformations to the pursuit of traditional philosophy. Firstly, individual thought is replaced by human thought as the subject; thus, the universality of human thought is used to overcome the limitations of individual thought. Secondly, the external world and spiritual world in-itself are replaced by the logical progression by which human thought grasps spiritual activity and all its objects for-itself as the object; thus, the externality of the objective world and the abstraction (subjectivity) of spiritual activity are replaced by the logic of human thought movements. In these two major transformations, Hegel abstracts the subject of reality into universal thought, all things into logical categories, and all forms of movements into the logical movement of categories. This is then the self-movement of impersonal reason, as criticized by Marx. In such self-movement of impersonal reason, thought that is the subject of thought is not the external world in-self , or the abstract spiritual world, but a peculiar world of man that is formed by humans grasping all spiritual activities and its objects according to the nature of their thought—the conceptual world. In this way, Hegel transforms the pursuit of unity of the external world or the unity of the spiritual world into the unification of the external world and the spiritual world, i.e. the study of the conceptual world. The conceptual world is the generation of human thought by the external world, and hence it is the subjectification of the objective world. The conceptual world

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is also the generation of the external world by the spiritual world, and hence, it is the objectification of the subjective world. The conceptual world is the product of the subjectification of the objective world, and the objectification of the subjective world. It is not only a tool for grasping the object by constituting thought in the form of ideas, but also constitutes the cultural world of humans in a multitude of forms. In contemporary philosophy, the compelling ‘World 3 proposed by Karl Popper, and the mythology, religion, language, art, history, and science described by Ernst Cassirer in An Essay on Man, are in some sense extensions and elaborations of Hegel’s conceptual world. Such extensions and elaborations are profound reminders to modern philosophers that although man and animals live in the same physical world (nature), the world of man is completely unlike that of animals. Man can only be man in its truest sense if he can grasp all conceptual systems created by humans, and can attain the freedom of the whole of thought in the application and creation of concepts. There are two modes by which man learns concepts: the first is by learning the concept itself, i.e. grasping all types of knowledge related to the object, and applying these concepts to grasp the world and guide his own actions. The second is to study the concept as the object, in order to examine the nature of human thought; explore the logic of thought in grasping spiritual activity and its objects; uncover the narrowness and one-sidedness of different conceptual systems, and the transience of history; create the permeation and synthesis between conceptual systems; and promote the expansion and deepening of conceptual systems. This will allow us to achieve the transformation of human thought movements from the old logic to the new logic, and the transition of human thought modes from the old mode to the new mode. Hegel refers to such examination of concept itself as thinking about thinking and cognizing about cognition, which constitutes the intensional logic of conceptual movement. Hegel defined philosophy as the self-reflection of thought. In essence, it connects the mode by which philosophy grasps the world with other modes by which humans grasp the world, while also distinguishing between them. Humans use various modes to grasp the world, such as mythology, religion, common sense, art, and science; thereby forming conceptual systems of different levels for each domain in the world. By attaining external actuality, these conceptual systems will constitute the material culture of humans. By forming man’s thought modes, values, aesthetic consciousness, etc. through agglomeration and accumulation, these conceptual systems will constitute the psychological culture of humans. By forming various types of symbol systems through objectification, these conceptual systems will constitute the theoretical culture of humans. This will then constitute a world that belongs to man— the cultural world. Hegel’s statement regarding the generation of a world through the objectification of concepts is, in essence, referring to the generation of human concepts by the world, i.e. the generation of a true world of man—the cultural world. In Hegel’s view, the spirit of the cultural world is the concept; hence, the substantive content of man’s self-cognition can only be the self-cognition of concept. The self-cognition of concept is premised on the existence of conceptual systems. Hence, philosophy must use the conclusions drawn from the history of philosophy to realize the self-cognition of concept. Moreover, since philosophy regards the concept

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itself as the object, it studies the methods by which humans grasp the world and their achievements, and not the objects grasped by these methods. Therefore, the mission of philosophy is not to study the external or inner world in order to form and develop concepts (this is the task of the separate sciences, which includes mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences, and noetic sciences), but to study the developing conceptual systems in order to uncover the logic of human thought movements. The function of philosophy is not to provide humans with various concrete methods and forms of knowledge (this is the task of the sciences), but to reflect critically on the various conceptual systems, thereby inspiring humans to observe and comprehend the world from new perspectives, in order to obtain new meaning from the world. In this regard, the American contemporary philosopher, Wartofsky, drew the following conclusion: philosophy is “the formulation and analysis of concepts,” “an enterprise of the systematic study of the concepts and conceptual frameworks of sciences,” “an enterprise in understanding the scientific understanding,” and the enterprise of realizing “some humanistic understanding of the sciences.”18 Hegel replaced the external world and spiritual world with the conceptual world as the object of philosophy. This had a profound impact on the creation and development of modern philosophy. First, it led modern philosophy to connect the philosophical mode by which humans grasped the world with other modes, while also distinguishing between them, thereby comprehensively directing the philosophical perspective toward a world that belonged to humans—the cultural world of man and its spirit, i.e. the conceptual world. Fields of contemporary philosophy study such as philosophical culturology, scientific anthropology, and philosophical semiotics were developed by following this path. Secondly, it led contemporary philosophy to integrate the individual aspects, levels, and forms of conceptual systems in the cultural world of man for its study, thereby forming a principle of unity to explain this world. This can be found in the essence of the logical model of scientific structure and the historical model of scientific development provided by contemporary phenomenology , hermeneutics, analytic philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. Third, it led contemporary philosophy to form different philosophical modes by which humans grasped the world in its reflection on areas such as science, art, language, history, ethics, law, and religion. Fourth, it led contemporary philosophy to re-examine philosophy itself in its reflection on the world of man, thus forming various modern and ever-deepening meta-philosophical theories. This is Hegel’s intensional logic of thought, i.e. the path unconsciously indicated by conceptual dialectics for contemporary philosophy. In Hegel’s view, the logic of human thought movement is the expression of the nature of human thought, and also the same law system that thought and being are subjected to, which is self-consciously perceived by human thought. Therefore, by reflecting on the logic of human thought movements, philosophy is not merely the attainment of a philosophical explanation of the unity of the world, but more importantly enables man to be self-conscious of the nature of his thought. Thus, man is able to observe and comprehend the world according to the nature of thought, in 18 Wartofsky

[9].

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order to understand and determine his actions. In the unified progression of history and logic, thought continuously transforms the concept into purposeful needs, which constitutes for itself an objective picture that is constantly renewed. This need for the Good is a matter of, “by means of sublating the determinations of the external world, giving itself reality in the form of external actuality.”19 This prompted subsequent philosophers to comprehend the world of man from the perspective of humans, to comprehend the human individual from the perspective of humans, and to comprehend the unity of man and the world from the process of human activity. Thus, encapsulated within it was a great revolution in the history of philosophy. It was the theoretically pioneering contribution of Marxist philosophy and the whole of contemporary philosophy.

2.3 Intensional Logic of History In the history of philosophy, there are two types of basic intensional logic: the intensional logic of Hegel’s conceptual dialectics, and that of Marx’s historical dialectical development. The former is intensional logic using the concept itself as its content, whereas the latter uses history as its intension. The intensional logic of history is the logic of the development of man himself, that is, the logic of the history of human civilization. Marxist philosophy, with Capital as its main symbol, is the uncovering and unfolding of the intensional logic of history. What is the essential distinction between the new outlook of Marxist philosophy and the old philosophy? To address this question, Marx and Engels give a clear response in German Ideology: In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here it is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven. That is to say, not of setting out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-processes demonstrating the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process.20

This tells us explicitly that the fundamental difference between the new outlook of Marxism and all of past philosophy is that the new outlook of Marxist philosophy regards real, active men as its starting point, whereas past philosophy sets out from men as…imagined. The highest achievement of the latter is Hegel’s intensional logic of thought, whereas the former has created the intensional logic of history, which is the science of real men and of their historical development. Therefore, since their starting point is real, active men and not men as imagined, Marx and Engels further point out that: Where speculation ends, where real life starts, there consequently begins real, positive science, the expounding of practical activity, of the practical process of development of 19 Hegel 20 Marx

[10]. and Engels [6].

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2 A Critique of the Basic Logic Underlying Thought men. Empty phrases about consciousness end, and real knowledge has to take their place. When the reality is described, a self-sufficient philosophy loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results, abstractions which are derived from the observation of the historical development of men. These abstractions in themselves, divorced from real history, have no value whatsoever.21

This tells us more explicitly that, unlike self-sufficient philosophy, the substantive content of Marxist philosophy is the summing-up of the most general results: abstractions which are derived from the observation of the historical development of men, that is, the theory of historical laws. For this reason, in his later work, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, Engels reached the following conclusion about Marxist philosophy: it is “the science of real men and of their historical development.”22 Engels’s assertion is not a general assertion, but a fundamental assertion concerning Marxist philosophy. In Engels’s Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx, he clearly stated that Marx made two major discoveries in his lifetime: first, he discovered the law of the development of human history; second, he discovered the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production, and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created. These two major discoveries were the great achievements of Marx’s lifetime of study, which coalesced in Capital. Therefore, how we regard the relation between Marx’s two major discoveries and Engels’s science of real men and of their historical development, especially the relation between Marx’s capital and the science of real men and of their historical development, then becomes a fundamental question in our comprehension of Marxist philosophy. Concerning the capital studied in Capital, Marx stated explicitly that, Capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social character.23

As for why we need to regard capital as an object, Marx said, Under all forms of society there is a certain industry which predominates over all the rest and whose condition therefore determines the rank and influence of all the rest. It is the universal light with which all the other colours are tinged and are modified through its peculiarity. It is a special ether which determines the specific gravity of everything that appears in it.24

“Capital is the all dominating economic power of bourgeois society. It must form the starting point as well as the end.”25 Capital is the universal light that determines modern relations of production and all the resulting social relations of man; it is the special ether, and the all dominating economic power. Hence, it determines real men 21 Ibid.,

p. 37. [5, p. 41]. 23 Marx and Engels [11]. 24 Marx [12]. 25 Ibid., p. 303. 22 Engels

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and their real history. Therefore, it is necessary for us to regard capital as an object to construct a science of real men and of their historical development. Marx claims that by distinguishing the relations between persons from the relations between things, we can uncover the logic of real men and of their historical development from the logic of capital. From this, we can obtain two mutually determining conclusions: Marxism’s science of real men and of their historical development is intensively and systematically embodied in Capital. The law of the development of human history and the special law of motion governing the bourgeois society that is uncovered in Capital intensively and systematically presents the science of real men and of the historical development of Marxism. Therefore, we are unable to truly comprehend and master Capital if we depart from the science of real men and of their historical development of Marxism; conversely, we are unable to truly comprehend and master the science of real men and of their historical development of Marxism if we depart from Capital. As the science of real men and of their historical development, Capital is the ‘outlook’ of changing the world, and the ‘outlook’ of changing the world in Marxism is captured intensively in Capital. First, the science of real men and of their historical development fundamentally alters the starting point of philosophy: it does not set out from abstract men but from real men. Therefore, how we should comprehend and expound abstract men and real men then becomes a fundamental question in the mutual interpretation of Marxist philosophy and Capital. What are abstract men and real men? Marx proposed in the Theses on Feuerbach that “human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.”26 Then, where is the essence of man identified by Marx, i.e. the ensemble of all social relations, reflected? It is reflected in the relations between persons found in the relations between things of commodity, money, and capital revealed in Capital. Without these economic categories or the social relations of man embodied in these economic categories, man will be abstract man and not real man. The intensional logic of history is the logic of real men and of their historical development that is composed of the series of categories reflecting the relations between persons. Regarding real men, Engels pointed out in his Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx that this reality lies in the fact that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, hence the production of the immediate material means forms the foundation of real men and of their historical development. By reflecting upon and grasping the economic categories of this foundation, we will be able to grasp the most basic and most important philosophical category of real men. As Marx explains in the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy that: Population is an abstraction, if we leave out e.g. the classes of which it consists. These classes, again, are but an empty word, unless we know what are the elements on which they are based, such as wage-labor, capital, etc. These imply, in their turn, exchange, division of labor, prices, etc. Capital, e.g. does not mean anything without wage-labor, value, money, price, etc. If we start out, therefore, with population, we do so with a chaotic conception of the whole, and by closer analysis we will gradually arrive at simpler ideas; thus we shall proceed from the imaginary concrete to less and less complex abstractions, until we get the 26 Engels,

Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, p. 87.

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2 A Critique of the Basic Logic Underlying Thought simplest conception. This once attained, we might start on our return journey until we would finally come back to population, but this time not as a chaotic notion of an integral whole, but as a rich aggregate of many conceptions and relations.27

Marx’s discourse shows that studying man by proceeding from man himself only allows us to set out from abstract man to form an understanding of abstract man. It is only by setting out from the various determinations of man—the most important of which are economic categories—that we can form a concrete understanding of man; it is only by showing the concrete constituted by economic categories that we can uncover the essence of man, i.e. the ensemble of all social relations. The economic category that constitutes the starting point of Capital is the commodity, and the essence of the commodity uncovered in Capital lies in the duality of the commodity. “A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another.”28 “The utility of a thing makes it a use value… A commodity… is therefore, so far as it is a material thing, a use value, something useful.”29 The use values of commodities are the material depositories of exchange value, whereas “exchange value…presents itself as a quantitative relation, as the proportion in which values in use of one sort are exchanged for those of another sort.”30 This then leads to the following contradiction between the use value and exchange value of commodities: “As use values, commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as exchange value they are merely different quantities.”31 As a product of labor for exchange and selling, what is the basis for the duality of the use value and exchange value of commodity? What is the basis for the differences in the quality of its use value and the quantity of its exchange value? This, as uncovered in Capital, is the pivot on which a clear comprehension of political economy turns, i.e. the twofold nature of labor. It is this ‘pivot’ that constitutes the starting point of Capital for unveiling the secrets of ‘real men and of their historical development.’ Marx proposed that: If then we leave out of consideration the use value of commodities, they have only one common property left, that of being products of labor.[…] Along with the useful qualities of the products themselves, we put out of sight both the useful character of the various kinds of labor embodied in them, and the concrete forms of that labor; there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labor, human labor in the abstract.32

In Marx’s analysis of the commodity, the real history of humans—labor—reveals its own duality in the duality of the commodity, namely, concrete labor that creates the use value of commodities and abstract labor for which commodity is the product 27 Marx,

A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, pp. 292–293. and Engels [8, p. 45]. 29 Ibid., p. 46. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., p. 48. 32 Marx and Engels, Volume 35, p. 48. 28 Marx

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of labor. This duality of labor uncovered in Capital provides a real, rather than an abstract, starting point for understanding real men—the duality of man’s own naturality and sociality. Man’s own duality constitutes the starting point for the intensional logic of history. Man, first and foremost, exists in nature. As a natural being, man requires satisfaction from nature, and such natural satisfaction is realized by man’s own objectified activity—labor. The use value of a commodity lies in the conceit that a commodity is a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort another. The concrete labor of man is the use of different concrete forms to create various things to satisfy the wants of man, that is, to change external nature into a purposeful existence. Therefore, the use value of commodity and the concrete labor of man are manifested in real history as the objective beings of man. This implies that the naturality of man manifested in commodity is no longer the naturality that is abstract and unrelated to history, but the naturality of use value created by labor. The crucial theoretical significance forming an understanding of man’s existence via the duality of commodity and of labor lies in the fact that when we examine the antithesis of nature and history in old philosophy, created because the relation of man to nature is excluded from history, under the candlelight of Capital, we will expose the nonreality of its understanding of being (including man and nature). At the same time, the historicality of man’s naturality, i.e. the true foundation of real men and of their historical development was also determined in the analysis of commodity in Capital. This is Marx’s profound philosophical intension of economic categories. Man’s natural historicality or man’s historical naturality implies that man is both a natural being and a social being. This is the duality of man’s being and it is profoundly manifested in the duality of commodity and its implicit duality of labor. In terms of their exchange value, commodities only tell us that “human labor-power has been expended in their production, that human labor is embodied in them.”33 “When looked at as crystals of this social substance, common to them all, they are—Values.”34 The general value form, which represents all products of labor as mere congelations of undifferentiated human labor, shows by its very structure that it is the social résumé of the world of commodities. That form consequently makes it indisputably evident that in the world of commodities the character possessed by all labor of being humanlabor constitutes its specific social character.35

The social nature of labor implies that like the naturality of man, the sociality of man is not an abstract being, but is first manifested within the exchange value of commodity and its implicit abstract labor of man. The exchange of commodities, in essence, is the exchange of labor. The exchange of labor, in turn, constitutes the foundation for all social relations. From this, we can see that in relation to Marx’s famous assertion in Theses on Feuerbach—“human essence is no abstraction inherent 33 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 35, p. 48.

34 Ibid. 35 Ibid.,

p. 78.

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in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations”36 — this assertion can precisely and can only obtain true intension of thought from the pivot on which a clear comprehension of political economy turns, i.e. the duality of labor, as expounded in Capital. The theory of the duality of labor in Capital has laid the foundation for unveiling the secrets of real men and of their historical development, and has established a theoretical basis for the intensional logic of history. Marx’s real foundation for resolving the secrets of real men and of their historical development is labor. The direct object of Marx’s resolution of the secrets of labor is not labor, but the commodities created by labor. The duality of labor is revealed by expounding the duality of commodity; the duality of human existence can be highlighted through the duality of labor, thereby revealing the relations between persons that are hidden within the relations between things. This illustrates how profound and sophisticated Marx’s philosophical thinking was: the sensuous concrete is only a chaotic conception of the whole, and by setting out from the sensuous concrete, we are unable to grasp the rational concrete in reality. Conversely, it is only by setting out from the rational abstract, i.e. the simplest conception, that we are able to achieve the rational concrete, i.e. a rich aggregate of many conceptions and relations. Therefore, it is only by analyzing the concrete economic categories to understand all of history that we can truly uncover the relations between persons hidden in the relations between things, thereby unveiling the secrets of real men and of their historical development. This shows Marx’s theoretical self-consciousness of the unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic, while also demonstrating the unity of historical materialism and dialectics in Capital. Thus, it profoundly embodies the philosophical intensions of economic categories in Capital. In this regard, an important figure in Western Marxism, Kosik, once stated that: If economic categories are ‘forms of being’ or ‘existential determinants’ of the social subject, then their analysis and dialectical systematization uncovers social being. It is spiritually reproduced in the dialectical unfolding of economic categories. This shows once again why economic categories in Capital cannot be systematized in the progression of factual historicity or of formal logic, and why dialectical unfolding is the only possible logical construction of social being.37

This only possible logical construction is the intensional logic of history. In terms of the triadic consistency in ontology, epistemology, and logic, Capital directly presents a theoretical system composed of a series of economic categories; if we leave out these economic categories and their logical relations, then the theoretical system of Capital will no longer exist. The economic categories and their logical system that constitute Capital are also the product of Marx’s use of the determinations of thought to grasp the determinations of reality; if we leave out the epistemological self-consciousness of thought toward reality, then it will not be possible to truly understand and grasp the economic categories and the logical system of Capital. The determinations of reality, which are grasped by Capital using the determinations of 36 Engels, 37 Kosík

Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, p. 87. [13].

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thought, are the relations between persons that are hidden in the relations between things of commodity, money, capital, rent, and profit. Its “economic categories are only the theoretical expressions, the abstractions of the social relations of production.”38 By departing from the real life-processes of men, it will not be possible to truly understand commodity, money, capital, rent, profit, and all other economic categories and their logical relations. This is the unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic, and also the unity of history and logic that was realized in Capital. It is in such a unity that Marx’s analysis of economic categories transformed the abstract man in the old philosophy into real man in the ensemble of all social relations. This implies that the economic categories that constitute Capital are, in essence, the science of real men and of their historical development, that is, the intensional logic of history in Marxism. Second, the science of real men and of their historical development not only fundamentally changes the starting point of philosophical study by setting out from real men; it also transforms the basic content of philosophical study: it is not abstract men and abstract being, but real men and real history. Real history that is constituted by real men is the true object of Marxist philosophy. The law of history formed by the practical activity of real men is the true question of Marxist philosophy. The creation of the science of real men and of their historical development is the fundamental task of Marxist philosophy. Where, therefore, where can we find the law of the development of human history? It can be found in Capital. Concerning history, Marx pointed out that, Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.39 History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which uses the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity.40

In the historical development of real men, man is both the regular premise of history, and the regular result of history. It is only because man is the regular result of history that he can be the regular premise of history. The dialectical movement of man as the premise and result of history will then constitute the law of the development of human history concerning men making their own history. Marx and Engels explicitly stated that, This conception of history thus relies on expounding the real process of production—starting from the material production of life itself—and comprehending the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production, i.e. civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all history; describing it in its action as the state, and also explaining how all

38 Marx

and Engels [14]. and Engels [14]. 40 Marx and Engels [6]. 39 Marx

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2 A Critique of the Basic Logic Underlying Thought the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, morality, etc., etc., arise from it, and tracing the process of their formation from that basis.41

Therefore, Marx and Engels further pointed out that, It has not, like the idealist view of history, to look for a category in every period, but remains constantly on the real ground of history; it does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice.42

As for the relation between economic categories and historical process, Marx stated that, It may be said that the more simple category can serve as an expression of the predominant relations of an undeveloped whole or of the subordinate relations of a more developed whole, [relations] which had historically existed before the whole developed in the direction expressed in the more concrete category. In so far, the laws of abstract reasoning which ascends from the most simple to the complex, correspond to the actual process of history.43 Thus, although the simple category may have existed historically before the more concrete one, it can attain its complete internal and external development only in complex forms of society, while the more concrete category has reached its full development in a less advanced form of society.44

On which basis Marx proposed that: The bourgeois society is the most highly developed and most highly differentiated historical organization of production. The categories which serve as the expression of its conditions and the comprehension of its own organization enable it at the same time to gain an insight into the organization and the conditions of production which had prevailed under all past forms of society.45

Marx’s exposition of the relations between economic categories, and the relations between economic categories and historical process, has significant implications for grasping the law of history: Man’s reflections on the forms of social life, and consequently, also, his scientific analysis of those forms, take a course directly opposite to that of their actual historical development. He begins, post festum, with the results of the process of development ready to hand before him.46

In Capital, Marx regards the anatomy of the human being as the key to the anatomy of the ape, thus simpler categories can be mastered by analyzing more concrete categories, and insight can be gained into an undeveloped whole by examining a more developed whole. Therefore, the Capital does not merely reveal the law of the development of capitalism, but also reveals a complex form of society, i.e. a capitalist 41 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 5, p. 53. pp. 53–54. 43 Marx. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 296. 44 Ibid., p. 297. 45 Ibid., p. 300. 46 Marx and Engels [8, p. 86]. 42 Ibid.,

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form of society, thereby revealing all forms of social life, i.e. the process of history, which also reveals the law of the development of human history. Real men are formed in the process of labor, and real history unfolds in the history of labor. All the social relations of man are formed and developed through the historical process of exchanging the products of labor—commodity. The mode of realizing the value of commodities and its historical development has significant implications in comprehending man’s being and its historical development. The duality of the use value and exchange value of commodity implies that as: Human action with a view to the production of use value, labor is the appropriation of natural substances to human requirements; it is the necessary condition for effecting exchange of matter between man and Nature; it is the everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase.47

This indicates that concrete labor that creates use value is a nature-imposed condition of ‘every’ social form. As opposed to the nature of concrete labor, which creates use value, abstract labor that creates exchange value is the foundation for creating various ‘different’ social forms. Therefore, by revealing the mode by which the exchange of abstract labor can be realized and its historical transformation, we can reveal the mode of human existence and the changes in its historical form, as well as the law of development of human history. Capital’s revelation of the mode of exchange and its history constitutes the important content for the science of real men and of their historical development in Marxist philosophy. Regarding the intrinsic association between the mode of exchange and real men and their historical development, Marx pointed out that. The absolute mutual dependence of individuals, who are indifferent to one another, constitutes their social connection. This social connection is expressed in exchange value, in which alone his own activity or his product becomes an activity or product for the individual himself. He must produce a general product—exchange value, or exchange value isolated by itself, individualized: money. On the other hand,the power that each individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth exists in him as the owner of exchange values, of money. He carries his social power, as also his connection with society, in his pocket.48

This implies that “the activity, whatever its individual form of manifestation, and the product of the activity, whatever its particular nature, is exchange value, i.e. something general in which all individuality, all particularity, is negated and extinguished.”49 This indicates that the secret of money lies in the fact that it is not a general commodity, but a special commodity, i.e. a special commodity that acts in a fixed manner as a general equivalent. Thus, the social reality of the commodity is that “Since all commodities are merely particular equivalents of money, the latter being their universal equivalent,”50 money becomes “the power that each individual 47 Marx 48 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 35, p. 194. and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 94.

49 Ibid. 50 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 35, p. 100.

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exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth exists in him as the owner of exchange values, of money.”51 This profoundly indicates that the universal connections of men are alienated in the universal exchange as the relations between things, thus forming the mode of human existence identified by Marx, which is personal independence based on upon dependence mediated by things. This then is real men in real history. By studying and analyzing the historical nature of the form of value, Marx reached the famous conclusion on the historical form of human existence, as follows: Relationships of personal dependence are the first forms of society, in which human productivity develops only to a limited extent and at isolated points. Personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things is the second great form, and only in it is a system of general social exchange of matter, a system of universal relations, universal requirements and universal capacities, formed. Free individuality, based on the universal development of the individuals and the subordination of their communal, social productivity, which is their social possession [Vermögen], is the third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third.52

From this, we can see that Marx’s proposed human existence is definitely not the existence of abstract men as described in self-sufficient philosophy, but the existence of real men and of their historical development. Marx’s conclusion about the historical form of man is based on the analysis of the process of the realization of the value of the commodity, which is the elemental form of the most highly developed and most highly differentiated historical organization of production, i.e. capitalist society, that is, an analysis of how the social relationship of persons is transformed into a social attitude of things regarding money. Therefore, Marx’s conclusion about the historical form of human existence not only descriptively summarizes the history of human existence, but also reflectively uncovers the secret of real human existence: the manifestation of the social relations of humans as the social relations of things, which has led human existence to become personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things. This is the existence of real men in real history, i.e. the existence of man in modern society. Concerning personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things, Marx not only reaches the above conclusion, but also presents the following philosophical exposition regarding this conclusion: “The individuals are now ruled by abstractions whereas previously they were dependent on one another… Yet the abstraction or idea is nothing but the theoretical expression of those material relationships which dominate the individuals.”53 In this sense, Marx pointed out that as history crystallized in thought, the abstract philosophical ideas of Hegel’s philosophy are not mysterious and fantastical thoughts that transcend their context, but use the most abstract form to express the most real state of being—individuals are now ruled by abstractions, i.e. personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things. It is worth noting that when philosophy cites Marx’s conclusion on 51 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 94. and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 95. 53 Ibid., p. 101. 52 Marx

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the historical form of human existence and its explanation, it is often based on the ‘Chapter on Money’ from the manuscripts of Capital, which seems to be unrelated to philosophy. This indicates that without Marx’s Capital in which reality is described, without the critique of political economy in Capital, it is not possible for us to gain a true understanding of Marx’s philosophical critique, and the Marxist outlook that stems from such a critique. In Marx’s view, the unity of history and logic is not Hegel’s intensional logic of thought composed by impersonal reason, but the intensional logic of history using real men and their historical development as its content. Based on this, we can further understand why Marx and Engels emphasized that their philosophy is only a summing-up of the most general results, abstractions which are derived from the observation of the historical development of men, that is, the science of real men and of their historical development.

3 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Practical Logic Practice is the mode of human existence. The formal logic and the intensional logic used by humans to grasp the world are both based on their practical activities. To conduct a critique of the premises underlying the basic logic constituting thought, we must first conduct a critique of the premises underlying practical logic.

3.1 Contradiction Analysis of Practical Categories The category, practice, is a concentrated manifestation of man’s special relationship with the world—the negative unified relationship of man with the world, that is, a relationship wherein man objectifies his own purposeful demands to bring them into reality. It is precisely this negative unified relationship of man with the world that constitutes the practical logic of human thought. Fundamentally speaking, the practicality of human existence is the root of all contradictions in human existence. Therefore, cognition of the contradiction of human existence must rely on an understanding of the practicality of human existence. A theoretical reflection on the contradiction of human existence must be sublimated into a reflection on the practicality of human existence. Thus, a critique of the premises underlying the question of the relation of thought and being must be deepened into a critique of the premises underlying practical logic. Man is the most peculiar existence in the world: man created man himself, and created the world of man; man will forever create himself, and will forever create the world of man; man is forever an incomplete being, and the world of man is forever an incomplete being. The creativity, incompleteness, and infinite openness of humans are the practicality of human existence. Practice “is all social, objective, material activities performed by humans to actively transform the world for their own survival and development… The basic features of practice are its objective reality,

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conscious agency, and social historicality.”54 Implicit within the practical activities of humans are all the contradictory relations between humans and the world. Implicit within the practical logic of man are all the questions on the relation of thought and being. Practical activity is, first, the practical activity of material production. It causes humans to become the subject in the cognition and transformation of the world, and causes the world to become the object of human cognition and transformation. This implies that practice is the relation between subject and object, as well as the foundation for the relation between subject and object. Moreover, the practical activity of man causes nature in-itself to become man’s nature and humanized nature; in other words, it turns the natural world into a human world. The world is ‘dualized’ by practice into the world in-itself (the natural world) and the world for-itself (the human world). Practical activity brings about or causes the ‘dualization’ of the world into world in-itself and the world for-itself . It also causes the ‘dualization’ of humans into the unity of opposites of naturality and sociality, i.e. the unity of opposites of man in-himself and for-himself . The natural status of man or man in-himself indicates the primitivite status of nature for man; whereas the social status of man or man for-himself indicates the transcendence of man over nature. Therefore, the practical activity of man implicitly contains the contradictions between the natural status and social status of man, and between man in-himself and for-himself . This then constitutes the contradiction between the primitive status of nature for man and the transcendence of man over nature in philosophical reflections. Practical activity is the objective material activity of humans in their conscious, purposeful, and active transformation of the world. Therefore, human history, which is composed of the practical activity of humans, also presents significant forms of duality: on the one hand, history is the process of purposeful activity by people; it is the people’s creation of their own history. On the other hand, history is a process of lawful development, and people are unable to change the laws of historical development. Therefore, the practical activity of humans implicitly contains antinomy between the creativity of man and the regularity of history; it implicitly contains the hotly-debated antinomy between the environmental determination of humans and the human determination of the environment. These historical antinomies precisely constitute the theoretical premise of philosophical reflection. The duality of the world, of man, and of history constituted by the practical activity of humans stems from the polarity of practical activity itself. The polarity of human practical activity is mainly manifested in four ways. First is the naturality and supernaturality of the practical subject. Practical activity is the use of man’s own sensuous nature (physical organization) to transform a sensuous object (the material world) through a sensuous mediation (material tool). Without the natural, sensuous being of the practical subject, there can be no sensuous practical activity.

54 Li

et al. [15].

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But man is not simply a natural being; he is a human natural being, endowed that is with reason. Instead of accepting nature as it comes to him, as an animal does, he tries to adapt himself to nature and at the same time to adapt nature to himself in order to satisfy his needs. It is this twofold adaptation, this constant action and reaction of the environment on man and of man on his environment that determines the nature of human activity.55

If there is nature without super-nature, man can only adapt himself to nature as an animal does; conversely, if there is supernatural level without a natural level, the supernatural nature of man can only have mysterious and abstract features. Therefore, as a practical subject, the naturality of man should possess a supernatural level (forhimself ), while the supernaturality of man should possess a natural level (in-himself ). Only the reflections of dialectical philosophy can transcend intellectual thought that divides natural and the supernatural, in order to achieve a dialectical understanding of man in-and-for-himself. Second is the purposefulness and lawfulness of practical activity. The practical activity of man is purposeful, conscious activity. It is activity performed by man to realize his own purpose and demands. As a practical subject, man creates a picture of the world that he himself demands. Then man uses his own practical activity to transform the world into his ideal world. However, at the same time, as the objective, material activity of man, practice must also confront the objective world, and shift according to the objective world. Therefore, on the one hand, the practical subject wants to change the world based on his desires, purpose, and demands; on the other hand, the purposeful demands of the practical subject must also accumulate an understanding of the laws of the world, such that these purposeful demands can be realized. This constitutes the contradiction between the purposefulness and lawfulness of practical activity. Similarly, a rational understanding of this contradiction can only be obtained in the reflections of dialectical philosophy. Third is the standard of man and the standard of the object of practical activity. The peculiarity of human practical activity lies in the fact that humans base their life activities on two standards. The purposefulness of practical activity, in essence, is to make demands from the objective world based on the standard of man. In contrast, the lawfulness of practical activity is to regulate the purpose and activity of man based on the standard of the object. Therefore, on a deeper level, the contradiction between the purposefulness and lawfulness of practical activity is also the contradiction between the standard of man and the standard of the object. Regarding this deeper contradiction, Marx once stated that, An animal forms objects only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.56

In other words, an animal only has one standard, i.e. the standard of the species it belongs to, whereas man has two standards, i.e. the standard of every species 55 Cornu 56 Marx

16). and Engels [6].

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and the inherent standard of man. The practical activity of man uses the standard of man to change the world, and also uses every standard of the object to regulate his own thoughts and actions. It is precisely in this unity of opposites of these two standards that practical activity manifests as the unity of opposites of purposefulness and lawfulness. Fourth is the objective subjectification and the subjective objectification of practical activity. Practical activity is a process of dualization: on the one hand, the practical subject makes demands of the object of practice using the standard of man, and achieves the real existence of his own purposeful demands; this is the so-called subjective objectification (the object becomes the object as demanded by the subject). On the other hand, the practical subject also uses the standard of the object to regulate his own thoughts and actions, thus performing practical activities according to objective laws; this is the so-called objective subjectification (the subject becomes the subject in the course of mastering objective laws). It is within this unity of opposites between objective subjectification and subjective objectification that man achieves the unity of opposites between the transformation of the world and the transformation of himself. In the practical activity of humans, this process of objective subjectification and subjective objectification is continuously expanding and deepening. Therefore, we can claim that, Practice is the activity of eliminating the one-sidedness of subjectivity and objectivity, and achieving the unity of the subject and object; it is also the activity of developing the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity, leading to a new contradiction between the subject and object. In summary, practical activity not only implicitly contains all the secrets of human social life; it also implicitly contains all the secrets of man’s object world. It is the root of all real contradictions faced by humans; it is also the source and treasure trove that can provide humans with the strength and method to resolve all contradictions.57

As a mode of being of man, practice not only implicitly contains numerous contradictions, including those between the natural status and the supernatural status of the practical subject, the purposefulness and lawfulness of practical activity, the standard of man and the standard of the object of the practical process, and the subject objectification and object subjectification of the practical result; it also implicitly contains the contradictions of practical activity between its actuality and universality, actuality and ideality, and actuality and infinity. These contradictions more profoundly constitute a practical logic of human thought.

3.2 The Internal Contradictions and the Logic of Practice The logic of practice originates from its internal contradictions, and also from ‘logicizing’ its internal contradictions. Therefore, reflecting on the logic of practice involves a concrete exploration of the internal contradictions of practice. 57 Gao

[17].

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First, we will analyze the contradictory relation between the reality and the universality of practical activity. Philosophical reflection is the theoretical thinking of the relation of thought and being as a question; whereas the relation of thought and being and all the questions it implicitly contains originates from the practical activity of humans. The most essential and closest foundation of thought is not thought itself, or being, which is in mutual opposition to thought, but the practical activity of humans that constitutes the relation of thought and being. Human thought activity, which is based in practice, includes both the activity of constitutive thinking to realize the concrete unity of thought and being, and also the activity of reflective thinking that regards the thinking of the concrete unity of thought and being as the object of re-thinking. Fundamentally speaking, such activities of reflective thinking are determined by the contradiction between the actuality and transcendence (universality, ideality, and infinity) of practical activity. Therefore, a concrete analysis of the contradictions between the actuality and transcendence of practical activity is needed in order to grasp the real-life foundation of philosophical reflection. The common explanation of practice usually over-emphasizes its actuality, and neglects the analysis of its universality. In his interpretation of the relation of practice and theory, Lenin once proposed the following conclusion: “Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality.”58 Practice has the quality of immediate actuality, i.e. the quality of viewing the subjective in the objective, and theory does not possess such a quality; hence, practice is higher than theory. However, this does not negate the fact that practice has the quality of universality. In fact, it is the opposite. The quality of the universality of practice is the foundation for the universality of theory. When searching for the real-life foundation of philosophical reflection, we will find that the contradictory relation between the immediate actuality and universality of practice itself will, in terms of the mode of human survival, determine the philosophical dimension of human thinking—reflection. Human thought, and the theories based on human thought activities, possess the quality of universality which is shared by men in grasping and explaining the world. On a deeper level, the quality of the universality of thought is the universality of the logic of thought. Concerning the logic of thought, Lenin once explicitly proposed, as we saw earlier in this chapter, the question on logical figures from the perspective of practical theory. Lenin stated that: “The practical activity of man had to lead his consciousness to the repetition of the various logical figures thousands of millions of times in order that these figures could obtain the significance of axioms.”59 He also stated that, “Man’s practice, repeating itself a thousand million times, becomes consolidated in man’s consciousness by figures of logic. Precisely (and only) on account of this thousand-million-fold repetition, these figures have the stability of a prejudice, an axiomatic character.”60 58 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works, Volume 38, p. 213. p. 190. 60 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works, Volume 38, p. 216. 59 Ibid.,

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The logic of thought comes from the practical activity of humans. This implies that the practical activity of humans itself is a type of logic which possesses universality. The logic of practice is directly manifested as the logic of sensuous activity and of external operations. The logic of sensuous activity of practice is restricted by both external being and conscious activity; it alters both external being and conscious activity. In this type of practical activity repeated a thousand million times, where there is dual restriction (external and intrinsic restriction) and bidirectional transformation (external and intrinsic transformation), practice will form its own logic of sensuous activity. It will also lead man’s consciousness (thought) to the repetition of the various logical figures thousands of millions of times, such that the logic of sensuous activity of practice will be transformed into the logic of operation of consciousness (thought). Thus, the logic of thought will obtain the significance of axioms. The logic of thought uses thought laws, rules, methods and operations, and logical operations to abstract and express the universality, necessity, and lawfulness of things. Conversely, the logic of thought also uses universality, necessity, and lawfulness to regulate, control, and determine the practical activity of humans, thereby causing universal, necessary, and lawful cognition to obtain immediate actuality. This should show us that the contradiction between the universality and actuality of practical activity constitutes the contradiction of human existence: with regard to reality at any particular moment and individual realization of practical activity, practice is always the process of obtaining actuality by concrete thinking. As for the totality and process of practical activity, practice is also the process of obtaining actuality by all human thinking. Therefore, the practical activity of humans must realize the concrete unity of thought and being, and of the subjective and objective, i.e. constitutive thinking, in order that such thinking will obtain concrete actuality. The practical activity of humans must also reflect on the concrete unity of thought and being, and of the subjective and objective, i.e. reflective thinking, in order for thinking to transition to a new level of logic, and to perform new practical activities on this new level. This indicates that practical activity itself contains the contradiction of universality and actuality, and determines the reflective dimension of human thinking. This question warrants our deep contemplation. Second, we will analyze the contradictory relationship between the actuality and ideality of practical activity. Actuality and ideality is another contradiction implicit in practical activity. Lenin wrote that: “Man’s practice = the demand (1) also of external actuality (2).”61 Concerning the demands of man’s practice, Lenin explained that“…the world does not satisfy man and man decides to change it by his activity.”62 As for the changes to the world through man’s practice, Lenin pointed out more profoundly that: “The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself, changes external actuality, abolishes its determinateness (= alters some sides or

61 Ibid.,

p. 213. Lenin Collected Works, Volume 38, p. 213.

62 Lenin,

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other, qualities, of it), and thus removes from it the features of Semblance, externality and nullity, and makes it as being in and for itself (= objectively true).”63 The demand or purpose of human practice is non-actual, conceptual existence, i.e. ideal being that serves as the driving force and direction of practical activity. The external actuality of man’s practice changes such ideal demands or purpose into real, objective existence. This indicates that the essence of practice lies in the fact that real men are always dissatisfied with their own reality, and will always want to change their reality into the ideal reality. Man’s practical activity, which involves turning the ideal into reality, is premised on the fact that man has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself and decides to change it by his activity. This implies that the premise of practical activity already encompasses the profound contradiction between ideality (an objective picture of the world that man has constructed, and the decision to turn this picture into reality) and reality (the objective picture of the world itself, i.e. the world that has yet to be changed by man’s decision). The practical process of man is such a process of dualization; that is, on the one hand, it changes the actuality of the world (the objective picture of the world itself) into non-actuality (the alteration of some sides or other, qualities of the world); on the other hand, it changes man’s ideality (an objective picture of the world that man has constructed) into actuality with objective existence (makes the world as being in and for itself [=objectively true]). In this way, practical activity will change the actuality of the world in-itself into nonactuality, and the ideality of man for-itself into true actuality, thereby transforming the world into reality in-and-for-itself —according to the objective being created by man’s ideal. The contradiction between the ideality and actuality of practical activity causes man and the world to form a unique negatively-unified relationship, i.e. man uses ideal demands to negate the Being of the world in reality, thus causing the world to become the reality demanded by man, thereby realizing the unity of man and the world within such a reality. The contradiction between the ideality and actuality of practical activity constitutes the real-life foundation for the self-reflection of thought: what is the relation between man and the world? How should man regard ideal and reality? Does reality determine the ideal, or does the ideal shape reality? In human thought activities, how are ‘is’ (reality) and ‘ought’ (ideal) unified? What is the ‘logical scaffolding’ of human thought? Finally, we analyze the contradictory relation between the actuality and infinity of practical activity. Another contradiction in practical activity is the relation between actuality and infinity. The reality at any particular moment and the individual realization of human practical activity are finite, whereas human practical activity itself is an infinite process of historical development. Practical activity is the point of intersection between thought and being, the subjective and objective, the standard of man and the standard of the object, purposefulness and lawfulness, the natural world and human world, man in-himself and man for-himself , the creation of history by man 63 Ibid.,

p. 218.

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and the law of historical development, and all other contradictions between man and the world. It is not a solid, stationary, isolated point, but the process of historical development of all the contradictions aggregated on this point of intersection. According to Hegel, infinity is the process of finite development. The developmental process of practice shows the infinite directionality and infinite process of practice. The practical activity of humans occurs because “the world does not satisfy man and man decides to change it by his activity.”64 It is the activity of changing the world into one that man wants, that is, the activity of transforming the ideal into reality. The ideality that is implicitly contained in human practical activity is a type of infinite directionality. Therefore, human thought that is based on human practice is always manifested as the pursuit of the infinite: pursuit of the Ultimate Being as the unity of the world; pursuit of the Ultimate Explanation as the unity of knowledge, and pursuit of the Ultimate Value as the unity of meaning. The practical logic of the negative unity of man with the world determines the infinite directionality of human thought, and hence determines the Ultimate Concern of philosophy. By setting out from the mode of being of human practice, and by setting out more directly from the contradiction between the actuality and infinity of practice, we will know that philosophy pursues the Ultimate Being, which is the unity of the world. This is the inescapable, ultimate direction of human practice and human thought as the activities of objectification. This ultimate directionality prompts humans to search tirelessly for the secrets of the world, and to continuously renew man’s picture of the world and mode of thought. Philosophy pursues the Ultimate Explanation, which is the unity of knowledge. This is the ultimate directionality constituted by the reflective thinking of human thought about the Ultimate Being. The concern about the Ultimate Explanation is then the concern about the question concerning the relation of thought and being, which is the concern about whether the laws of thought and being can be mutually unified, and also about the rationality of man. Such a concern prompts man to constantly reflect on the question of the relation of thought and being, thus leading to the historical development of the philosophical dimension regarding the reflection about human thought. Philosophy pursues the Ultimate Value, which is the unity of meaning. This is the ultimate directionality constituted by the self-examination of human thought of its own being. The concern about the Ultimate Value is the concern about the mutual relations between man and the world, man and society, and man and himself. Such a concern prompts man to constantly reflect on all of his thoughts and actions, as well as to search for standards and scales by which to evaluate and determine his own thoughts and actions. As can be seen above, the question of the relation of thought and being, which is the fundamental question of philosophy, takes as its substantive content the contradictions between the actuality and universality, actuality and ideality, and actuality and infinity of human practical activity. From the past to the present, philosophy has pursued the unity of the world (Ultimate Being), the unity of knowledge (Ultimate Explanation), and the unity of meaning (Ultimate Value). These are not unrelated to

64 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works, Volume 38, p. 213.

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man’s practical activity, nor are they mysterious and fantastical thoughts that transcend man’s historical activity. This pursuit is rooted in the mode of being of human practice. Practice has infinite directionality, and philosophy has attempted to verify the unity of the world (Ultimate Being), appropriate the unity of knowledge (Ultimate Explanation), and determine the unity of meaning (Ultimate Value), in order to establish the existence of humans themselves within the world. Therefore, based on the contradictory and the practical relations between philosophy and human existence, we should draw the basic conclusion as follows: for a subject that transforms and cognizes the world, philosophy is an indispensable and irreplaceable basic mode by which humans grasp the world. Moreover, the existence and development of philosophy is deeply rooted within the mode of being of man himself—practice. The logic of practice should become the real foundation of reflective philosophy and its basic question.

References 1. Lenin, V. I. (1976). Lenin collected works: Volume 38, philosophical notebooks (Clemence Dutt, Trans.) (p. 87). Moscow: Progress Publishers. 2. Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). The phenomenology of spirit. (A.V. Miller Trans.) (p. 35). New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Hegel, G. W. F. (1873). Hegel’s logic: Part one of the encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences (W. Wallace, Trans.) (p. 267). Pacifica: Marxists Internet Achieve. 4 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1987). Marx & Engels collected works, Volume 25: Engels: Dialectics of Nature (Clemens Dutt Trans.) (p. 496). New York: International Publishers. 5. Engels, F. (1941). Ludwig Feuerbach and the outcome of classical german philosophy (Clemens Dutt Trans.). New York: International Publishers. 6. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1975). Marx & Engels collected works, Volume 3: Marx: Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844 (M. Milligan & D. J. Struik Trans.) (p. 277). New York: International Publishers. 7. Zhang, Jian-Jun et al. (2013). On the dialogue between analytical philosophy and dialectical philosophy. Jianghan Tribune, 9:74–82. 8. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1996). Marx & Engels collected works, Volume 35: Marx: Capital, Volume I (S. Moore & E. Aveling Trans.). London: Lawrence & Wishart. 9. Wartofsky, M. W. (1968). Conceptual foundations of scientific thought (pp. 5, 11, 18). London, UK: The Macmillan Company. 10. Hegel, G. W. F. (2010). The science of logic (G. di Giovanni Trans.) (p. 730). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 11. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1998). Marx & Engels collected works, Volume 37: Marx: Capital, Volume III (S. Moore & E. Aveling Trans.) (p. 801). London: Lawrence & Wishart. 12. Marx, K. (1904). A contribution to the critique of political economy (N. I. Stone Trans.) (p. 302). Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 13. Kosík, K. (1976). Dialectics of the concrete: A study on problems of man and world (K. Kovanda & J. Schimdt Trans.) (pp. 112–113). Dordrecht, Holland and Boston, USA: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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14. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1975). Marx & Engels collected works, Volume 5: The German ideology (W. Lough Trans.) (p. 36). London: Lawrence & Wishart. 15. Li, Xiu-Lin et al. (Eds.). (1990). Principles of dialectical materialism and historical materialism (p. 231). China Renmin University Press. 16. Cornu, A. (1957). The origins of marxian thought. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. 17. Gao, Qing-Hai. (1988). On the significance of the practical viewpoint as a mode of thought. Social Science Front, 1988(1), 63–71.

Chapter 3

A Critique of the Basic Modes Underlying Thought

All human thought concerning the world which formed through practical activities is not the cognitive result of human comprehension of the laws of being and of the world but the one constituted by the basic modes comprehending the world as well. Without an understanding of the basic modes through which humans comprehend the world, it is not possible to construct a true relation between thought and being and, therefore, an accurate understanding of the human world. Therefore, a critique of the premises underlying thought must not only consider the basic beliefs and logic underlying thought, but also the modes underlying thought. Humans’ thought activities are not only subject to laws of thought, but are also constructed through the various basic modes by which they comprehend the world, or the modes by which humans transform the world in-itself into the human world. During its lengthy formation and evolution, humankind formed a unique relation with the world that includes not only ‘natural’ relations, or those experienced with human senses, but also unique ‘human’ relations that are mediated by their own modes, including commonsense, religion, art, science, and philosophy. In other words, these are the basic tools humans use to comprehend the world around them and any philosophical critique of the underlying premises of thought should necessarily involve these factors. The immediacy of these basic modes provides us with a variety of rich worldviews, or different ways people see the world. In addition, each mode—commonsense, religion, art, science, and philosophy—lends human thoughts and behaviors their own modes and value norms. Therefore, any philosophical reflection on these basic modes by which humans comprehend the world must consider the following: worldview, mode of thought, and value norms.

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1 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Commonsense Commonsense is the most fundamental and universal mode through which humans comprehend the world. It is the foundation on which all other modes (including philosophy) are formed and developed. For this reason, humans often use commonsense to understand and explain other modes, going so far as to regard philosophy, for example, as an extension and deformation of commonsense. As a result, humans do not use philosophy to transform commonsense, thereby elevating human thought, but instead use commonsense to transform philosophy— limiting philosophy so that it adheres to human experience. However, such an assumption results in a common and serious misunderstanding of philosophy. Therefore, a philosophical critique of the basic modes underlying thought must examine a philosophical critique of commonsense. Commonsense is characterized by its empirical nature: it originates from experience, adheres to experience, and is adapted to experience. It is itself unable to transcend experience: the worldview of commonsense is one that is mediated and constructed through the universality and commonality of human experience. Commonsense as a mode of thought, therefore, is black-and-white thinking based on the certainty of experience. Commonsense as a value norm includes the shared beliefs formed from the common experience governing human thought and behavior. While commonsense is crucial for the survival and development of humankind, its empirical nature must also make it the object of critical philosophical reflection.

1.1 Commonsense as Worldview, Mode of Thought, and Value Norm Commonsense refers to knowledge that is universal and ordinary yet persistent and generally useful. It includes knowledge that is universally accepted by every healthy and normal individual, and it is the product of generations of human experience and represents humankind’s adaptation to its natural, social, and cultural environments. In some ways, human commonsense can be compared to animals’ camouflage; it is a crucial means of human survival. All humans, whatever their life experiences, share some basic knowledge and experiences. Within the framework of commonsense, humans can achieve mutual understanding of their empirical world, communicate their thoughts and feelings, coordinate their behavioral patterns, and internally self-identify. In other words, commonsense is the most universal basic mode through which humans comprehend the world, their selves, and their relationships. Commonsense is defined by its empirical nature: commonsense always adheres to empirical representations, meaning that this worldview is mediated by the universality of human experiences. Within human’s common experiences, in other words, there exists a common worldview characterized by intuitiveness, non-criticalness, etc.

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A commonsense worldview is intuitive in that it is formed through experience by the experiential subject. Humans use commonsense to observe, describe, and explain the world, thereby forming a worldview that encompasses the commonality of experience. It is precisely because of this shared perspective that commonsense can speak to and explain an empirical subject’s direct experiences. In other words, it can be used intuitively. To the experiential subject, this intuitive worldview is two-fold: the experiential subject has access to the world containing a universal and common experience and the experiential subject also uses this universal and common experience as a mediator to intuitively perceive the existence of the world. In other words, experience both mediates the subject’s worldview and the image of the world in the subject’s thought. Therefore, experience is the commonality between the constitutive mediator and substantive content of the commonsense worldview. Within the unity of commonsense and empirical intuition, the experiential subject achieves both self-understanding of the empirical world and mutual understanding among experiential subjects, thereby constituting humankind’s commonsense worldview. The commonsense worldview is also characterized by significant non-criticalness, or solidity. This is because a worldview constructed through commonsense can never escape dependence on the commonality of experience; it is unable to transcend and construct a scientific worldview. In other words, commonsense is premised on the givenness and immediacy of experience, which manifests as continuity and noncriticalness. The commonsense worldview is also mediated by the historical inheritance of common experience, and thereby achieves continuity across generations. This makes it a rigid and solid worldview permanently based on common experience. To an experiential individual, the experiential worldview is grounded in shared commonsense. Due to dependence on empirical representation, the concepts are always circling everchanging representations and are merely a label for expressive experience. Therefore, the commonsense worldview is always a chaotic whole. More importantly, since commonsense adheres to empirical representation, transcending experience is challenging. Hence, both commonsense itself and the empirical worldview constructed through commonsense are non-critical and non-reflective. The commonsense worldview is inseparable from the mode of thought that is formed in and applicable to people’s daily lives. In their daily lives, humans often think of questions and answers in terms of a dichotomy: is it or is it not; yes or no; true or false; correct or wrong; beautiful or ugly; good or evil; etc. If we analyze these modes of questioning and answering, it becomes apparent that these modes implicitly contain a formula of thought: either P or Q. This formula is one of black and white, polarized, and mutually incompatible factors. And this is how commonsense plays out in daily life. Humans’ daily lives are based in common experience, which serves as a mediator to connect and unify them with the world. In this relationship, humans are experiential subjects who intuitively comprehend the world; the world is an empirical object presented to the cognitive subject (i.e., humans) in a given mode. In this ‘intuitivegiven’ subject-object relation, there is a certain stable, one-to-one, black-and-white empirical relation between the subject’s experience and the object of the experience.

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This suggests that polar opposites and black-and-white thinking are fundamental characteristics of the commonsense mode of thought. Humans’ common experience is certain; hence, the experiential subject’s thought must maintain a black-and-white certainty. Therefore, in the commonsense mode, white is white, black is black, man is man, woman is woman, the sun is the sun, the moon is the moon, the beneficial is beneficial, the harmful is harmful, the beautiful is beautiful, the ugly is ugly. Everything is clear-cut. Such binary understanding is also essential to the metaphysical mode of thought. Metaphysics as a mode of thought, refers to a philosophical theory which holds a negative view of contradictions. A metaphysical mode of thought ‘thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antithesis.’ Marx and Engels discuss the essence, characteristics, and origin of the metaphysical mode of thought in depth. Engels specifically elaborates on the relation between this mode of thought and commonsense, pointing out that the metaphysical ‘formula of thought’ is “‘yea, yea; nay, nay’; for whatsoever is more than these cometh evil.”1 Why, then, do humans often think in absolutely irreconcilable antithesis? Why does this metaphysical mode of thought occupy a solid position in humans’ thought activities? Engels has a clear response to this troubling question: “At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound commonsense.”2 Daily life, including daily living, work, interactions, and entertainment, is the most fundamental and universal component of human life. Within daily activities, the simple inferences of commonsense are able to satisfy formal logical reasoning. General commonsense, expressed through technical maxims and moral aphorisms, satisfies the requirements of daily activities and regulate interpersonal relationships in daily interactions. Meanwhile, a fuzzy understanding of natural commonsense can satisfy the need for humans to adapt to natural laws without providing precise explanations of natural phenomena in daily activities. Cautionary, aphoristic, political commonsense allows humans to conduct mutually accepted political commentary, thus fulfilling their need to be concerned with world events and express their sentiments in daily activities. The above types of commonsense fulfill the needs of daily life and are formed from common experience accumulated across generations. However, these are only applicable to daily life: once we venture beyond, commonsense and its mode of thought will encounter, as Engels describes, very wonderful adventures. Therefore, it becomes at times necessary to transcend these limitations in order to move beyond the commonsense and/or metaphysical modes of thought. In order to do so, we must expand, deepen, and transform the domain of human activities. We should also note that commonsense both describes and explains the world and restricts and normalizes human thoughts and behaviors. In other words, commonsense is the unity of worldview, mode of thought, and value norm. It serves as both the basis and boundary for people’s daily thoughts and behaviors and plays a dual normalizing role in determining and negating human thoughts and behaviors. 1 Marx 2 Ibid.

and Engels [1].

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Commonsense is common and ordinary knowledge, yet it is also universal and persistent. Accordingly, its normalizing role is also the universal and persistent: it is precisely in the value norm of commonsense that humans can achieve the broadest mutual understanding, acceptance, adjustment, and motivation in terms of their values. Therefore, commonsense as a value norm is a solid foundation for daily life and indeed all of human existence. It manifests as values which maintain humankind’s existence at the most practical level and in daily life. It relies on unique metaphorical forms (e.g., proverbs, maxims, aphorisms, etc.) to expand its scope of applicability and use value. In this way, commonsense as value norm achieves its continuation through cultural traditions and folk psychology, through which it becomes seen as universal value norms for nations or all of humankind. Commonsense as a value norm, similar to commonsense as worldview or mode of thought, is also the product of the universality of experience. The criteria and boundary of human thoughts and behaviors all depend on the universality of experience. All human thoughts and behaviors are directly constrained by commonsense both as a worldview and mode of thought. All thoughts and behaviors that transcend universal experience are paradoxes and challenges to commonsense as a value norm and regarded as absurd or nonsense. Empirical value ideas determine the three major characteristics of commonsense as a value norm: its narrowness (i.e., its inability to transcend common experience), its conservativeness (i.e., its tendency toward established value norms), and its polarity (i.e., its tendency to lead to polar and antithetical value judgments). Fundamentally speaking, commonsense as a value norm involves making value judgments based on commonsense as a mode of thought. This results in making qualitative judgments out of habit rather than performing quantitative analysis. Such judgments always evaluates experience in isolation rather than systematically examining an object’s manifold relations. It focuses on present gains and losses rather than fundamental future interests and arrives at judgments in polarized opposition, rather than seeking a mediating tension between two dichotomies. Under the constraints of the polarized, antithetical commonsense mode of thought, commonsense value judgments are also characterized by polarity. The analysis above indicates that the empirical nature of commonsense determines the empirical, representational, limited, and non-critical nature of a commonsense worldview, mode of thought, and value norm. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how to transcend the premises of commonsense in order to overcome these shortcomings.

1.2 Limitations and Transcendence of Commonsense Commonsense originates from experience but is unable to transcend it. In contrast, although philosophy’s ultimate origin and applications are human experience, one of its essential characteristics is its ability to transcend experience. The experientiality of commonsense and transcendence of philosophy means that, on the deepest level,

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philosophy is not an extension or deformation of commonsense, but rather a transcendence of the latter. In this sense, philosophy is formed and developed through critical reflection on commonsense. For example, primitive people understood the world in a fantastic manner: they conceived natural phenomena according to human experiences and human experiences according to events of the universe. As a result, various delusional causes were thought to explain human experiences. In other words, theoretical thought and its basic modes (i.e., science and philosophy) were not yet formed. As time went on, people began using systematic conceptual frameworks to describe and explain the empirical world. These did not merely express given and intuitive empirical facts, but rather explained facts based on concepts such as essence, generality, laws, and necessity. This universally necessary knowledge concerned objects that transcend experience and that explain empirical objects. Hence, while it originates from experience, it also transcends it. Both philosophy and science are characterized by such transcendence, and both are considered basic modes of human theoretical thought. The transcendence of philosophy, in particular, is fully expressed in its research objects and methods: it seeks to generalize and explain not only certain things, but the entire world, through human thought. Philosophy is thus formed through the pursuit for a unified explanation of the world. Ancient philosophy gradually turned from the pursuit of logical causal relations between a phenomenon and the essence of the world to a consideration of the unity of the world as transcending experience and as the ontology comprehended by thought. This is the essence of traditional metaphysical philosophy and describes the transcendent characteristic of philosophy as a whole. Philosophy’s transcendent nature is even more profoundly manifested in its basic question, or the relation between thought and being. In commonsense thinking, thought is empirical content and being is empirical object: the relation between the two is certain and corresponding, thus there is no question, or no purpose for philosophy. Conversely, philosophical thinking not only investigates the relation between thought and being, but even considers this its foundational question. Thus, it creates a question regarding the commonsense relationship between thought, or empirical content, and being, or empirical object. This question allows philosophy to transcend empirical commonsense. Such transcendent philosophical reflection allows for examination of the following questions: What is the relation between the object and content of experience? How does the object of experience become the content of experience? What is the relation between the phenomenon and essence of the empirical object? How does human cognition comprehend the phenomenon and essence of the empirical object? What is the relation of human senses and reason to the phenomenon and essence of the empirical object? Is the phenomenon comprehended by human senses real, or is the essence comprehended by human reason real? The dependence of commonsense on experience is due to the representational nature of commonsense thinking, whereas the transcendence of philosophy is expressed in the conceptual nature of philosophical thinking. If philosophy is regarded as the extension and deformation

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of commonsense, it becomes merely commonsense embellished with certain philosophical terms. As a result, the basic question of philosophy will lose its philosophical intension, thus transforming transcendent philosophy into empirical commonsense. Both commonsense and philosophy require concepts to explain the world. However, the nature and function of concepts in commonsense is vastly different to those in philosophy. In commonsense thinking, concepts are centered around representations; they are moved by and are in service to representations. In philosophical thinking, the relation between concepts and representations is reversed: representations are centered around concepts and are moved by and are in service to the latter. Commonsense concepts are the unity of intension and extension and of common experience and empirical object, and the dependence of common experience on empirical object. In this sense, commonsense concepts merely distinguish between the names of representations. For example, ‘sun,’ ‘moon,’ and ‘stars’ are concepts used to describe objects of experience. If the empirical representation of the ‘sun’ is lost, then the other concepts become purely names. Lenin explains this by citing Hegel to explain the relation between representation and thought: “The object in its existence without thought and Notion is an image or a name: it is what it is in the determinations of thought and Notion….”3 In commonsense thinking, where concept revolves around representation, humans can form a naive materialism, which affirms that empirical objects are independent from human consciousness, and dialectics, which affirms the flow (motion) of an empirical object and relations among empirical objects. However, such naive materialism and dialectics are neither capable of refuting philosophical idealism nor truly achieve dialectical thinking. This is due to the existence of an intractable paradox in human cognitive activities: if all human cognition originates from experience, then it becomes necessary to ask whether there are things beyond experience that do not exist independently of experience, but which can only inform experience. Experience is silent on this matter, because it is unable to answer questions that have transcended beyond experience. To phrase this question more simply: since we know about the existence of the external world through our own cognition, then if we assert that the external world exists independently prior to our cognition we must acknowledge there is a type of cognition prior to our cognition. In other words, we are caught in the dogmatism of transcendentalism. Nevertheless, if we are satisfied with the claim that the existence of the external world can only be known through cognition, we will instead be caught in subjective idealism where “Esse is percipi [To be is to be perceived].”4 This indicates that naive materialism based in commonsense thinking resides in representational thinking, where concepts revolve around representations; it cannot truly refute idealism and hence is also unable to thoroughly adhere to philosophical materialism. To adhere to materialism on a philosophical level, it is necessary to transcend representational thinking on the level of thought.

3 Lenin 4 Zhu

[2]. [3].

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Similarly, naive dialectics based on commonsense representational thinking is also unable to truly achieve dialectical thinking. In such thinking, humans can acknowledge the movement and connection of things on the level of feeling and perception and can refute and deny the metaphysics of movement and connection of things on a sensuous and perceptive level. However, commonsense representational thinking does not allow for comprehension of the essence of this movement and connection. On the contrary, humans always misinterpret or deny said movement and connection on the level of essence. For example, the ancient Greek philosopher Zeno described the arrow paradox, a typical metaphysical proposition in refutation conducted on a sensuous and perceptive level. Is it not typical metaphysics—denying the movement of things—to claim that an arrow in flight is motionless? However, Hegel, the master of dialectics, points out that Zeno never considered denying movement ‘sensuous certainty’; the question is merely on the ‘truth of movement.’ In other words, seeing is believing. Zeno, like others, acknowledges that the flying arrow is in motion; however, he is dissatisfied with acknowledging this movement on a sensuous and perceptive level. Instead, he desires to pursue the truth of movement: how one should express the essence of movement in a conceptual manner. This can be called philosophical thinking that has transcended commonsense. Lenin made the following comment regarding this issue: “The question is not whether there is movement, but how to express it in the logic of concepts.”5 The question of whether there is movement can be resolved within experience; hence, it is a commonsense question rather than a philosophical one. However, the question of how to express movement in the logic of concepts transcends experience; it is a philosophical question rather than a commonsense one. In order to understand this more deeply, we can analyze another one of Zeno’s propositions: the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. Zeno proposed that if the tortoise is allowed a head start, Achilles, a Greek hero who excelled at running, will never overtake the tortoise. It may seem absurd to claim that a hero who can run like the wind is unable to overtake a slow-crawling tortoise. However, let us consider this proposition on a conceptual level: before Achilles overtakes the tortoise, he must first reach the tortoise’s starting point. However, by this point, the tortoise has already crawled a certain distance, and Achilles will also have to run that distance. Since the distance between Achilles and the tortoise can be divided into an infinite number of segments, Achilles will come closer and closer to the tortoise but never overtake it. Undoubtedly, the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise cannot possibly exist in one’s real experience—Achilles will most certainly overtake the tortoise—hence, it is indeed absurd. However, the logic of this proposition is unassailable, thus revealing the contradiction between representational and rational thinking and between empirical commonsense and philosophical reflection. In other words, philosophy reflects on empirical commonsense on a conceptual level that transcends experience rather than duplicating and arguing with empirical commonsense on the level of representational thinking.

5 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 254.

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Commonsense is always oriented towards finite experience and uses finite representational thinking to deal with the infinite that cannot be achieved by experience; thus, it is unable to achieve the infinitude of transcendence. Conversely, the transcendence of philosophical reason is always oriented towards infinite existence that transcends experience and uses the infiniteness of transcendence to address finite experience, thereby unifying the finite and the infinite to form the philosophical wisdom of dialectics. In human’s finite experience, we are unable to verify the limitlessness of time or space; however, in the unfolding of experience across the generations we may also perceive this limitlessness. Therefore, in commonsense experience, humans constantly aggregate and pursue the finite with the infinite or, on the other hand, ridicule and deride the finite with the infinite. In terms of the former, within commonsense humans always regard infinity as the infinite superimposition of the finite. That is, the infinite expansion of experience is proof of infinity. In response to this, Hegel states that viewing infinity as the aggregate of the finite and as tolerating the finite is to regard infinity as opposed to the finite, an understanding he calls “bad infinity.” 6 As for the latter argument, commonsense refracts the unattainability of the infinite as a certain pessimistic or nihilistic understanding of society, history, and life. In terms of empirical commonsense, the limitlessness of time and space does indeed stand in stark contrast to the indescribable transience and minuteness of finite life. Even sayings such as ‘a fleeting second’ or ‘a drop in the ocean’ are insufficient to express the transience and minuteness of finite life. Thus, viewing human life through the finiteness of empirical commonsense makes one feel as though life is incredibly fleeting and insignificant, as described in the following quotes from Chinese poems: “Where, before me, are the ages that have gone? And where, behind me, are the coming generations?” 7 and “Like mayflies between heaven and earth, like a single grain in the vast dark sea.”8 Regardless of whether we use the finite to pursue the infinite or the infinite to ridicule the finite, empirical commonsense is unable to achieve a dialectical understanding of the finite and infinite that transcends experience. Therefore, myth and religion, both derived from empirical commonsense, always imagine the infinite as ‘another world’ in contrast to ‘this world.’ They place the finiteness of human’s existence in relationship to our infinite existence in ‘past lives’ and ‘the afterlife.’ In other words, if human cognition is limited to empirical commonsense without being complemented by transcendent philosophy, myth or religion will fill the void of ‘infinitude.’ Throughout human history, popular and mystic culture often complement and support each other. At most fundamental level, this is due to complementary understandings of the finite and the infinite. To transcend commonsense understandings is to enter theoretical understandings of dialectical contradiction between the finite and the infinite.

6 Hegel

[4]. [5]. 8 Hegel [6]. 7 Chen

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Philosophical thinking (especially the dialectical philosophy of thinkers like Hegel and Marx) involves the unity of opposites (i.e., the finite and infinite) through an infinitude of processes, thereby transcending the representational thinking of commonsense and changing the commonsense worldview, mode of thought and value norms. Thus, comprehension of unity between the finite and the infinite through philosophical dialectical thinking not only affects people’s outlook on nature, the world, or the universe, but also on society, history, and humankind—shaping how we observe and experience our lives. Humans created humans, and humans created the human world; humans will forever create themselves, and humans will forever create the human world. Humans are forever unending, and the human world is forever unending. This is the infinitude of human and of the human world. Creation is both eternal and infinite. Thus, humans achieve eternity and infinitude through their own creative activities. This is the infinite outlook offered by the dialectical wisdom of philosophy. The empirical, representational, and finite nature of commonsense determines its non-criticalness; commonsense does not have the ability to be self-critical, selfreflective, or self-transcendent. In contrast, the transcendent, conceptual, and infinite nature of philosophy determines its criticalness; philosophy has the ability to be self-critical, self-reflective, and self-transcendent. Commonsense, which is dependent on experience, is a description rather than a reflection of empirical facts; it uses concepts to describe empirical facts rather than reflect on the concepts that describe empirical facts. It is a scattered, extrinsic, and ambiguous expression of common experience, rather than a systematic, intrinsic, and clear statement of particular knowledge. Hence, commonsense does not possess selfcriticalness. Critical knowledge must exist in a stable form that provides the contents of thought with a clearly defined and systematic conceptual framework. Evidently, such a systematic conceptual framework is not commonsense but rather transcendent theories. Only theories of thought constructed through conceptual frameworks are equipped with self-criticalness, self-reflection, and self-transcendence. Among the multitude of basic modes by which humans comprehend the world, science and philosophy are two endowed with criticality. They are produced through a critique of commonsense. Throughout the historical development of philosophy, commonsense has been an important object of critique that has given rise to the formation and development of philosophical thinking. Philosophy is continuously ‘verifying’ commonsense by asking the following questions: What do the various types of commonsense express? In what manner does commonsense construct its own content of thought? What, ultimately, does commonsense explain and believe? How is the commonsense worldview formed, and how does it change? What precisely is the commonsense mode of thought? What is the commonsense value norm? How does human thought transcend commonsense to form scientific thought? What is the relation between science and commonsense? What is the relation between commonsense and the other modes by which humans comprehend the world, myth, religion, art, ethics, etc.? What role does this play in the development of mankind?

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In the relation between philosophy and commonsense, the latter is always the object of the former’s critique and reflection. Therefore, philosophy is not merely another form of commonsense, rather it is thought concerning commonsense; philosophy is not the philosophical expression of the commonsense worldview, mode of thought, and value norms, but critical reflection on the above.

1.3 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Commonsense and the Common-Sensicalization (Philosophization) of Philosophy To understand philosophy through a comparison with commonsense is not to negate the commonsense nature of philosophy, but instead to overcome the tendency of commonsense to oversimplify its examination of philosophy and of the relation between thought and being. The focus of our discourse here is that the philosophicalization of commonsense and the common-sensicalization of philosophy are not the same thing. The common-sensicalization of philosophy means to revolutionize or to change commonsense with a philosophical method, just as science does in a scientific way. More specifically, it involves using philosophical or scientific worldviews, modes of thought and value norms to transform and renew the commonsense worldview, mode of thought and value norm, enabling philosophy and science to become universally accepted common. This can be referred to as the ‘common-sensicalization of noncommonsense;’ it is the substantive content and epochal mark of human civilization. During modernization, improvements in human existence routinized non-daily life, affecting the most fundamental content and modes. This included the scientification of daily experiences, the culturalization of daily pastimes, the socialization of daily interactions, the legalization of daily behaviors, and the urbanization of rural life. On a deeper level, the routinization of non-daily life changed and reconstructed human’s worldview, mode of thought and value norms. Thus, modernization resulted in the common-sensicalization of non-commonsense, including art, science, and philosophy, affecting humans’ lifestyle, aesthetic tastes, and ultimate concerns. This phenomenon played a critical role in modernizing both human and society and in the comprehensive development of human. As science and philosophy are the transcendence of commonsense, rather than its extension or deformation, and due to the transcendent, conceptual, infinite, and critical nature of philosophical thinking, humans find it very difficult to truly understand philosophy and the relation between philosophy and commonsense on a philosophical level. Humans live within empirical commonsense; they are limited to the scope of daily activities, which does not involve the world of research and which lacks philosophical reflection, a necessary practice. Hence, they often approach the common-sensicalization of philosophy from the wrong angle. That is, they do not use philosophy to transform commonsense, but instead use commonsense to transform

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philosophy, thus shifting from the ‘common-sensicalization of philosophy’ to the ‘philosophicalization of commonsense.’ This latter phenomenon refers to the use of empirical commonsense to examine, understand, explain, and apply philosophy, thus transforming philosophy into commonsense embellished with certain philosophical terms. In order to understand how this happens, we must first understand a related phenomenon, the ‘scientification of commonsense.’ In the common-sensicalization of science, the most prominent issue is that science is viewed merely as knowledge or skills: it can be summarized, therefore, as the popularization of scientific knowledge or skills. This ignores the substantive content of the common-sensicalization of science, which is to use a scientific worldview, mode of thought and value norm to transform and renew the commonsense worldview, mode of thought and value norm. When science is viewed using commonsense as a mode of thought, this may enable us to gain some scientific knowledge or skills, but we do not transform our mode of thought, which makes it difficult to form a scientific outlook. The fundamental definition of philosophy becomes even more complicated when you consider that it involves not only the transcendence of commonsense but also that of science. It is precisely due to the difficulty in understanding philosophy that people are susceptible to using commonsense to understand it, leading to the philosophicalization of commonsense. This can be seen in two examples. First, people often view philosophy from the standpoint of ‘sound commonsense’ (i.e., naive realism) rather than as a unique, reflective dimension of human thinking. Hence, they regard philosophy as a particular type of given knowledge (e.g., knowledge with the greatest universality). Consequently, philosophy loses its transcendent quality, reflective attitude, critical spirit, and creative awareness, and, as a result, its unique, indispensable, and irreplaceable social function. Second, people often regard philosophy as including certain ready-made principles or conclusions: they treat philosophy with a dogmatic attitude and apply it through labelling. Consequently, they do not transform their worldview, mode of thought, and value norms, but instead merely label their commonsense worldview, mode of thought, and value norm using philosophical terms. The fundamental difference between the ‘philosophicalization of commonsense’ and the ‘common-sensicalization of philosophy’ lies in whether philosophy serves as an extension and deformation of commonsense or as its critique and transcendence. Here, critique and transcendence refer to changes in nature and function and extension or deformation negate those changes. In addition, transcendence reflects philosophical changes to the commonsense worldview, mode of thought, and value norm, resulting in a philosophical worldview, mode of thought, and value norm. Conversely, extension or deformation reflects a commonsense examination of philosophy, which results, as described previously, in a transformation of philosophy into commonsense embellished with philosophical terms. In other words, such extension or deformation of philosophy will necessarily lead to the ‘philosophicalization of commonsense,’ while examining the relation between philosophy and commonsense from the perspective of critique and transcendence leads to the ‘common-sensicalization of philosophy.’

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Philosophy adopts a mode of thought that transcends commonsense to construct its worldview and value norm, thereby providing humans with a philosophical outlook on the world and their values. It enables us to reflect critically on the commonsense mode of thought, worldview, and value norm through a historical philosophical mode of thought, worldview, and value norm while also allowing philosophy to become the universally accepted ideology and code of conduct. Such a common-sensicalization process is manifested in three areas: in the philosophical worldview, mode of thought, and value norm. The common-sensicalization of the philosophical worldview (To understand the world in a philosophical way) does not involve a solidified worldview distinct from that of commonsense, but instead regards commonsense and scientific worldviews as the objects of critical reflection. This reveals the various premises underlying these worldviews, inspires a historical and dialectical attitude toward these worldviews, and enables the pursuit of new self-critical and self-transcendent worldviews in turn. Therefore, the common-sensicalization of philosophy enables the conscious and universal adoption of a reflective attitude, critical spirit, and creative awareness toward commonsense and scientific worldviews, thereby enabling the commonsensicalization of the scientific worldview to remain in a state of constant historical transformation. The common-sensicalization of the philosophical mode of thought is, on the one hand, the conscious and universal adoption of philosophy’s reflective attitude, critical spirit, and creative awareness and, on the other hand, the sublimation of changes in human’s mode of thought caused by scientific discoveries and the development of self-consciousness, thus prompting humans to cognize the world using a modern mode of thought. Contemporary philosophy, which is based on contemporary science, has profoundly transformed the mode of thought of intuitive reflection, as represented by naive realism; that of linear causality, as represented by mechanical determinism; and that of substantive reductionism, as represented by abstract object theory. Not only has this promoted the common-sensicalization of the modern scientific mode of thought on a philosophical level, but also the common-sensicalization of the modern philosophical mode of thought. The common-sensicalization of the philosophical value norm also does not involve the direct proposal of value judgments, but instead regards commonsense and scientific value judgments as the objects of reflection, thereby critically revealing the various premises implicit within them. This process critically reveals the basis, standards, and scales of these value judgments, thereby inspiring us to view our own values with a critical spirit and open attitude. A prominent characteristic of the philosophical value attitude is its adoption of the oughtness of the ideal and use of the large scale of history to observe and reflect on commonsense and scientific values, thereby maintaining the necessary tension between the ideal and reality, and between history’s large and small scales. In other words, this approach provides us with the historical and dialectical wisdom needed to examine questions of value. During modernization, this philosophical outlook on values has striven to pursue dialectical unity between the scientific and humanistic spirits, between scientific and value rationality, and between utilitarianism and idealism. It has guided us in the

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conscious transcendence of absolutist or relativistic value attitudes and has continually elevated the sphere of life. Thus, the common-sensicalization of the philosophical value norm is the universal and conscious adoption of dialectical value attitudes. The critique of the premises underlying commonsense demonstrates that commonsense is both an important object of philosophical reflection and an important foundation that prevents philosophical reflection from falling into illusions detached from life. Our emphasis should be on philosophy’s transformation of commonsense and the resulting ‘common-sensicalization of philosophy.’ To do so requires an explicit definition of philosophy rather than a negation of commonsense’s values and their significance to philosophy. Philosophy originates from but transcends commonsense, reflects upon but is transformed into commonsense—this is the benign cycle between commonsense and philosophy. To achieve such a philosophical consciousness requires a serious critique of the premises underlying commonsense. Only then can we genuinely achieve theoretical consciousness of philosophical thinking.

2 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Religion Philosophy is concerned with the great wisdom and intelligence in the relationship between human and the world, i.e., world outlook. Among the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world, there is yet another that serves a similar role: religion. Throughout the history of human civilization, the relation between philosophy and religion has been an intimate one with both diachronic (i.e., vertical) and synchronic (i.e., horizontal) aspects. An example of the former is philosophy’s common departure from religion, while an example of the latter is the fact that both philosophy and religion are two types of world outlooks concerned with the relationship between human and the world. It is precisely in these two types of relations that the intimate connections between philosophy and religion manifest. It is a necessary condition of a critique on the premises underlying religion.

2.1 The Diachronic Relation Between Philosophy and Religion In Engels’s famous work, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, he proposes the following well-known thesis: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being.” 9 In other words, philosophy regards the relation of thought and being as its ‘great basic question.’ After proposing this thesis, Engels immediately goes on to explain the philosophical intent of this question based on its formation and evolution, revealing the vertical relation between philosophy and religion: 9 Engels

[7].

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From the very early times when men, still completely ignorant of the structure of their own bodies, under the stimulus of dream apparitions came to believe that their thinking and sensation were not activities of their bodies, but of a distinct soul which inhabits the body and leaves it at death—from this time, men have been driven to reflect about the relation between this soul and the outside world. If in death it took leave of the body and lived on, there was no occasion to invent yet another distinct death for it. Thus, arose the idea of its immortality which at the stage of development appeared not at all as a consolation but as a fate against which it was no use fighting, and often enough, as among the Greeks, as a positive misfortune. Not religious desire for consolation, but the quandary arising from the common universal ignorance of what to do with this soul (once its existence had been accepted) after the death of the body—led in a general way to the tedious notion of personal immortality. In an exactly similar manner the first gods arose through the personification of natural forces. And these gods in the further development of religions assumed more and more an extra-mundane form, until finally by a process of abstraction, I might almost say of distillation, occurring naturally in the course of man’s intellectual development, out of the many more or less limited and mutually limiting gods there arose in the minds of men the idea of the one exclusive god of the monotheistic religions.10

Thus the question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature— the paramount question of the whole of philosophy—has, no less than all religion, its roots in the narrow-minded and ignorant notions of savagery.11 A prominent characteristic of primitive thinking lies in its belief about the wholeness of consciousness, or the state of consciousness where thinking and feeling are undivided that results in the indivisibility of object and subject. This indivisibility of thinking and feeling and of subject and object results in humans comprehending the world as fantastic, which in turn leads to the dual fantasy of human and the world, specifically either viewing human behaviors as based in cosmological events or explaining cosmological events based on human behavior. This, then, creates an interpenetrating, mystical, inductive relation between human and the world. Primitive people’s nature worship and animistic religions stem from this mystical interpenetration and formation of a fantastic world. For example, in such a worldview favorable or devastating weather conditions may be gifts or punishments from the gods; cosmological (natural) events are personified into expressions of emotion or will. As Engels states, “The first gods arose through the personification of natural forces. And these gods in the further development of religions assumed more and more an extra-mundane form, until finally… occurring naturally in the course of man’s intellectual development, out of the many more or less limited and mutually limiting gods there arose in the minds of men the idea of the one exclusive god of the monotheistic religions.”12 From this we can see that although religion as a cultural phenomenon has supernatural properties, it stems from human’s dependence on and comprehension of the natural world. As Engels states, “All religion, however, is nothing but the fantastic

10 Engels

[8]. p. 21. 12 Engels [8]. 11 Ibid,

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reflection in men’s mind of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces.”13 The English term religion stems from the Latin words relegate and religio. The former means ‘to bind’ and refers to the bond between human and god, while the latter means ‘reverence’ and refers to humans’ reverence of god. In Chinese, the word religion (宗教) has two characters. The first, 宗, originally meant reverence for the ancestral gods and may also refer to respect for the ancestral temple. It is composed of宀 and 示: 示 means that the heavens will reveal the signs of fortune and misfortune to man. The second character, 教, originally meant “that which is given from above and respected below” or “the saints preach the teachings of the gods, which are obeyed by mortals.” 14 Thus, we can see their connection with the gods. Philosophy born of religion is a type of cultural phenomenon and a manifestation of human’s dependence and comprehension of the natural world. As Engels says, “Thus the question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature—the paramount question of the whole of philosophy—has, no less than all religion, its roots in the narrow-minded and ignorant notions of savagery.”15 However, philosophy born of religion not only regards “the question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature”16 as its great basic question, but also mainly adopts the mode of theoretical thought to explore this question. This, then, reveals the intimate relation of philosophy with another basic mode by which humans comprehend the world: science. It is precisely this relation that causes philosophy to become increasingly distinct from religion through its own historical evolution, thereby becoming a special cultural form by which humans comprehend the world. Human theoretical thought originates from the transcendence of fantastic mythical thinking and is shaped by the transcendence of empirical commonsense thinking. It is precisely the dual transcendence of the mythical and commonsense modes of thought that have philosophy and science the basic modes of human theoretical thought. For a long period of time, science was embedded within the matrix of philosophy in an undifferentiated form, such that people often view philosophy in the sense of science and vice versa. The first step in the formation of human theoretical thought was the formation of logical thinking. The progression of human cognition from the fantastic and commonsense modes of thought to the theoretical is a shift from fantastic or empirical comprehension of cognitive objects to a logical comprehension that transcends experience. The logicalization of thought, or the adherence of thought to logic, is the primary prerequisite of theoretical thought and originates from the need to explain the world. Science and philosophy, then, stemmed from this theoretical explanation of the world, first manifesting in the same form of physical speculation. 13 Marx

and Engels [9]. [10]. 15 Engels [8, p. 21]. 16 Ibid. 14 He

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This attempt to generalize the natural world using uniform explanatory principles gradually caused people to believe that the world is understandable and can be explained by science. In the scientific and philosophical modes of thought, reason is believed to obtain theoretical modes of thought and to produce cultural forms. This is one of the vertical differences between religious and philosophical modes, and suggests that another basic mode, science, is extremely important. In understanding philosophy, our starting point cannot be a specific isolated binary relation (i.e., philosophy and religion or philosophy and science) but must be found in the complex relations among philosophy and the various other basic modes by which humans comprehend the world. Among these, the three-way relation between philosophy, science, and religion is especially important to understand philosophy.

2.2 Synchronic Relation Between Philosophy and Religion Philosophy and religion are two cultural phenomena used to understand and explain world outlooks in the relation between human and the world. Both are manifestations of the two-way adaptive relation in human’s dependence on and comprehension of the natural world, but both are different modes of manifestation. As human relies on the natural world for survival, it is dependent on the natural world; at the same time, this dependence is achieved through comprehension of the natural world. This two-way relationship constitutes the basic content of both philosophy and religion. The essential characteristic of religion is the belief in a god. When humans feel they are unable to comprehend or depend on the alien forces of the natural world, they turn toward belief in and dependence on the supernatural religious world. As Marx states, “Religion is, in fact, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet gained himself or has lost himself again.”17 Unlike religion, philosophy, which is based in theoretical thought, has strived to understand the above relationship in an increasingly rational manner. In particular, Marxist philosophy begins from the standpoint of ‘real men and their historical development’ in order to develop a practical materialist world outlook. In order to understand philosophy and religion, it is crucial to note that both include cultural values pertaining to the ‘meaning-world’ created by human and human’s pursuit of the meaning of life. Human cannot bear to think of its existence as fleeting in the vast universe, nor can humans bear the thought of their insignificant and silent death. The senseless extinguishing of life is unacceptable and unbearable. Hence, life activities obtained the significance of cosmological events in the mythical meaning-world, and the extinguishing of life took on the meaning of rebirth or the transfer of the soul. Religion enabled human’s existence to acquire a sacred meaning through the development of a god. Religion’s understanding of the sacred unifies all kinds of forces into one omnipotent force, all kinds of intelligence into one omniscient intelligence, all kinds of emotions into one unparalleled emotion, and all 17 Marx

[11].

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kinds of values into one perfect value. In this way, the sacred in religion becomes the source of all power, the basis of all intelligence, the criterion of all emotions, and the measure of all values. Thus, humans obtain the fundamental meaning of life from this alienated sacred form. This is what Marx described as “human self-alienation in its sacred form.”18 Human created religion in order to obtain the sacred meaning of existence. However, the sacred meaning of religion is precisely the expression of human’s paradoxical existence: the meaning of life originates from the sacred, which implies that human’s own essential force has been alienated into religion, hence it reflects the self-consciousness and self-esteem of a human that has either not yet gained itself or has lost itself. Eliminating religion’s sacred meaning implies that life itself is not sacred, which causes life to lose the ultimate basis, criterion, and measure of its selfnormalization and self-judgement. If religion’s sacred meaning exists, then human life is endowed with sacred meaning; if it does not exist, then humans are fleeting beings in the universe whose death is permanent and without rebirth. The awareness of the existence of the sacred causes people to perceive all their thoughts and actions as under the scrutiny of an omniscient force, thus causing life to become unbearably heavy. Conversely, the awareness of the extinguishing of the sacred form causes them to perceive that all their thoughts and actions are merely their own thoughts and actions; thus, causing life to become unbearably light. This is the inescapable contradiction of religion. In order to transcend this contradiction it is necessary to transcend the uniform religious understanding concerning the meaning of life and to seek out the rich and varied meaning-world constructed by various cultural forms. Synchronically, the human meaning-world is manifested as the diverse modes by which humans comprehend the world, cultural forms, and the unity of such diversity. This colorful meaning-world is composed of smaller mythological, religious, commonsense, aesthetic, ethical, scientific, and philosophical worlds. Together, these many variations on a common theme constitute a unified meaning-world. As a basic mode by which humans comprehend the world, the unique role of philosophy lies in its illumination of meaning. The meaning-world is created through all the modes by which humans comprehend the world. However, the crystallization of such creative activities is like sunlight passing through a prism that is decomposed into its individual colors, or the individual modes. The paramount life-value of philosophy lies in its ability to focus the meaning created by the various modes into the enlightenment of human’s life-world. The cultural philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, describes this by saying: We are engrossed in a study of the particular phenomena in their richness and variety; we enjoy the polychromy and the polyphony of man’s nature. But a philosophical analysis sets itself a different task. Its starting point and its working hypothesis are embodied in the conviction that the varied and seemingly dispersed rays may be gathered together and brought into a common focus.19

Specifically, it means that: 18 Ibid.,

p. 132. [12].

19 Cassirer

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A “philosophy of man” would therefore be a philosophy which would give us insight into the fundamental structure of each of these human activities, and which at the same time would enable us to understand them as an organic whole. Language, art, myth, religion are no isolated, random creations. They are held together by a common bond.20

Cassirer further points out that: In the boundless multiplicity and variety of mythical images, of religious dogmas, of linguistic forms, of works of art, philosophic thought reveals the unity of a general function by which all these creations are held together. Myth, religion, art, language, even science, are now looked upon as so many variations on a common theme—and it is the task of philosophy to make this theme audible and understandable.21

As Marx calls it, “every true philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its time” and “the living soul of culture.”22

2.3 Philosophical Reflection on Religion The diachronic and synchronic relations between philosophy and religion indicate both complex connections and significant differences between the two. An analysis of these connections and differences will help us to clarify the relationship and to better understand philosophy itself. The intimate connection between philosophy and religion first manifests in the fact that philosophy is born from and has its roots in religion. Thus, an exploration of philosophy necessarily entails tracing its religious roots. Second, both are ideologies that indirectly and abstractly represent the needs of economic foundation. Third, in terms of the historical evolution of philosophy and religion, philosophy is not only born from religion but was once in service to and incorporated within religion; hence, it has always been significantly influenced by religion. Most importantly, both are world outlooks that seek to explain the relation between human and the world. Our overall deliberation of the universe, history, and life has always relied either upon religion or philosophy; in fact, our outlook on the world, history, life, and values is often formed in the conflict between the two. The main difference between philosophy and religion is that, in its direct manifestation, philosophy is merely the superstructure of ideas (i.e., a type of ideology), whereas religion is not merely the superstructure of ideas but a superstructure of institutions. The latter not only includes constitutive elements such as dogmas, canons, and rituals, but also organizations, religious institutions with restrictive powers and authoritative full-time religious leaders. Second, philosophy and religion employ different modes to fulfill their roles as world outlooks. Philosophy, with its reliance on theoretical thought, mainly expresses understanding on the relationship between 20 Cassirer

[13]. [14]. 22 Marx and Engels [15]. 21 Cassirer

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humans and the world through abstract thinking. Religion, on the other hand, relies not only on abstract theories but also on various intuitive representations and artistic reproductions. Third, religion uses ‘vulgar logic’ to penetrate and influence all levels of society, whereas philosophy’s theoretical thought requires conscious study; hence, its influence is always constrained by people’s cultural environments. Finally, the greatest difference between philosophy and religion is that the essence of religion is the belief in a god, whereas the essence of philosophy is its critical rational thinking. As a result, religion resorts to blind faith and emotional fanaticism in order to achieve dependence on a god. Since philosophy is based in critical rational thinking, it relies on the real relation between human and the world. Modern Western philosophy formed a critical spirit of philosophy wherein ‘reason comes before belief, and the self comes before God.’ In Marxist philosophy, philosophical thought is focused even more clearly on people and their historical development. In the 1840s, Marx proposed that: The struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against that world of which religion is the spiritual aroma…. It is the task of history, therefore, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is above all the task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask human self-alienation in its secular forms, once its sacred form has been unmasked. Thus, the critique of heaven is transformed into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, the critique of theology into the critique of politics.23

Therefore, in Marx’s view, the critique of religion is the prerequisite of every critique. From the perspective of human culture, although the religious world is imaginary, the devotional faith of religious believers is a genuine psychological state. Xia Zhentao states: Although the dependence of humans on the religious world that is manifested through their faith in that world does not bring about the real content found in their dependence on the natural world, it is still a roundabout manner by which they depend and comprehend the natural world, hence it indirectly reflects their pursuit of an ideal realm where truth, goodness and beauty are unified…. From the perspective of the relation between man and nature, although religion has supernatural traits, it is also a type of processing manifested from man’s fantastical imagination of nature. This type of processing is evidently a type of deification but, in reality, it is humanization that has been sublimated. If man himself is an independent being that is not reliant on nature, and hence does not have any relation with nature, religion would not exist. However, in this case, man himself has become god. As a form of consciousness, religion is closely related to man’s psychological sense of dependence, while this sense of dependence first originated from man’s dependence on nature. Thus, religion also reflects the unity of the essence of man and nature in a false form.24

23 Marx 24 Xia

[16]. [17].

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For this reason, complicated and contradictory relations remain between philosophy and religion. An in-depth deliberation of these relationships is necessary to achieving a true understanding of philosophy.25

3 A Critique on the Premises Underlying Art Human pursues meaning and cannot bear to live a meaningless life. Human created religion in order to acquire the sacred meaning of existence. However, in religion, human alienates its own essence to the existence of god, consequently causing it to lose the meaning of existence in religion. This is the paradox of the religious meaningworld. The ability of humans to transcend this paradox is due to the variety of basic modes available through which to comprehend the world, providing humans with multiple cultural meaning-worlds. Philosophy, as the mode through which human existence becomes illuminated, has complex and intimate connections with the other modes and the multiple cultural meaning-worlds they create. The relation between philosophy and art is especially worthy of exploration.

3.1 The Aesthetic World of Art and the Philosophical Inquiry of Beauty There are many different viewpoints concerning the origin and essence of art. For example, imitationalism sees art as the imitation of nature, imaginationism claims art is the product of human imagination, manifestationism argues that art is the sensuous manifestation of ideas, expressionism believes art is the objectified existence of emotions, symbolism claims art is the venting of frustrations, existentialism sees art as humans’ poetic way of life, and reflectionism claims that art reflects life through the shaping of sensuous forms. Regardless of the understanding, however, art always presents humans with an aesthetic world, one that expresses the depth of human emotions and deepens their feelings and experiences. In the artistic world, emotions and experiences acquire self-sufficiency. Art systematizes the individual’s emotions and harmonizes their experiences, adjusting and sublimating them. Art also objectifies and clarifies human emotions, thus expressing true imagination. In the artistic world human life acquires the meaning and value of beauty, and it is precisely this questioning of beauty that constitutes the intimate connection between philosophy and art.

25 With regards to the understanding of this relationship, it is worth considering the arguments Feng

You-Lan on national spirit, who asserts that a nation is either religious or philosophical. The Chinese nation is not religious, but philosophical. Thus, philosophy is the foundation of the Chinese nation. This thought is worthy of deep consideration.

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What is beauty? This is a philosophical line of inquiry that regards beauty as its subject. Philosophers from ancient to modern times have questioned this, with a focus on artistic beauty. For example, Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece; the classical German philosophers Kant and Hegel; Marxist philosophers such as Marx, Engels, Lafargue, and Lukács; contemporary Western philosophers such as Heidegger and Gadamer; and postmodernists such as Derrida, Foucault, and Rorty all show great philosophical concern toward beauty. Similarly, in Chinese philosophy, philosophers from the pre-Qin to the modern era have shown an artistic temperament or explored the question of beauty, always seeking the unity of truth, beauty, and goodness in the integration of heaven and man, of emotion and scene, and of knowledge and practice. These thinkers disagreed on the definition of beauty. For example, Plato proposed that beauty is the imitation of the ‘idea of beauty.’ Kant suggested that beauty is a symbol of morality. Hegel described beauty as the manifestation of ideas. Schopenhauer claimed that beauty is the subjectification of the will. Freud proposed that beauty is the sublimation of sexual satisfaction. Croce claimed that beauty is the success of intuition, and Chernyshevsky stated that beauty is life. No matter the conclusion, however, these arguments show that the essence, existence, discovery, and creation of beauty constitute the philosophical inquiry of the aesthetic world. The artistic world is the world of beauty. Art directly and vividly embodies Marx’s observation that man forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. Art affirms the complexity, richness, and creativity of the human mind and the rich, colorful, contradictory relation between human and the world. Fundamentally speaking, philosophical inquiry into the aesthetic world of art is questioning a human mode of existence and the mutual relation between human and the world. As one of the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world, art and the relation between human and the world it embodies can be regarded as objects of philosophical reflection. Artistic beauty is not only the crystallization of human creativity; it is itself a manifestation of life activities. The aesthetician Susanne Langer explains beauty by saying, “The more you study artistic composition, the more lucidly you see its likeness to the composition of life itself.”26 She goes on to clarify that “the composition of life itself” ranges “from the elementary biological patterns to the great structures of human feeling and personality that are the import of our crowning works of art…. It is by virtue of this likeness that a picture, a song, a poem is more than a thing—that it seems to be a living form, created, not mechanically contrived, for the expression of a meaning that seems inherent in the work itself: our own sentient being, Reality.”27 Similarly, modern Chinese aesthetician Zong Bai-Hua believes that the “rhythms, melodies, and harmonies” of art “are inseparable from the expression of life. They are not lifeless, mechanical voids, but have rich content and concrete images that are expressive and profoundly meaningful.”28 The foundation of artistic beauty lies in the fact that art itself is a living form. Art brings us into the realm of beauty, because it expresses life full of creative vitality. 26 Langer

[18].

27 Ibid. 28 Zong

[19].

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For example, the shrimps depicted by Chinese painter Qi Bai-Shi are not actually playing in rivers and lakes, nor are the horses drawn by Xu Bei-Hong running in the fields, but we can feel the vitality and creativity of life in these images and experience the intense beauty of life created by art. Art can only possess beauty when it displays life’s joys and sorrows, longing and pursuit, vitality and creativity. It is only by experiencing life’s vastness and depth, etherealness and fullness that the appreciation of art brings us into the artistic world, where art can nourish and engulf life and inspire the creation of a life of beauty. Therefore, it is necessary for philosophy to regard art as a living form that reveals the secrets of human in its creations, thereby elucidating the relation between human and the world; only then can art be regarded as an object of philosophical reflection.

3.2 The Philosophical and Artistic Modes Art is the formal manifestation of life’s creative activities, whereas philosophy is inquiry into human and the interrelations between human and the world contained within the aesthetic world. Philosophy is the theoretical mode by which humans comprehend the world, whereas art is the aesthetic mode. As the manifestation of mankind’s creative abilities, philosophy uses a theoretical mode to create a conceptual world, while art uses an aesthetic mode to create a formal world. As cited from Claude Bernard, “Art is I; science is we.”29 What science expresses are objective laws that do not shift with human will; the cognition of its truth must gain consensus; hence, the ‘we.’ Conversely, art expresses an individual’s intense aesthetic experience, hence the ‘I.’ Science and philosophy are therefore distinct from art in critical ways. Art is a special mode by which humans comprehend the world through the use of artistic forms. Theory must rely on reason to persuade others through logical argumentation, whereas art must use emotions to move others through artistic forms. Artistic forms inspire a sense of beauty through aesthetic meaning, hence they must possess an artistic quality, or demonstrate the typicality, ideality, and universality of artistic beauty. Theory, meanwhile, expresses the laws of movement using a logical framework of concepts; it must elucidate the universality, necessity, and regularity of things through logical argumentation. However, theory as ‘we’ and art as ‘I’ are not irreconcilably separated. In reality, these two modes by which humans comprehend the world are the unity of opposites. In theoretical activities, while theory speaks in the voice of ‘we,’ the theoretician is an individual ‘I,’ striving to pursue a consistent and objective common ‘we’ voice. Conversely, in artistic activities ‘I’ is the diegetic sound, while ‘we’ is the non-diegetic sound: art speaks in the voice of ‘I’ but artistic manifestations contain the common emotion and will of ‘we.’ This implies that theory, which expresses ‘we,’ is inseparable from the discovery of ‘I’ and that art, which expresses ‘I,’ is inseparable from the manifestation of ‘we.’ 29 Bernard

[20].

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All the modes by which humans comprehend the world are intentional, and each must be realized through an individual ‘I.’ Therefore, the relation between ‘I’ and ‘we’ and between ‘theory’ and ‘art’ is dialectical. It is of especial importance to note that philosophy is not merely distinct from art, but also from science. Therefore, the theoretical mode of philosophy displays a more complex relation between ‘I’ and ‘we’: it more directly manifests the unity of ‘I’ and ‘we.’ In other words, all true philosophy explores the questions of human based on epochal content, national form, and individual style. Philosophy is created through philosophers’ thinking minds. It embodies the individual’s unique experience and understanding of the world, history, life, and the self. A selfless philosophy does not exist, and as the explorations of philosophers concern the humanistic questions of human and the world, nor does a philosophy that departs from ‘we.’ Philosophy’s unity of ‘I’ and ‘we’ is not merely the unity of ‘I’ the philosopher and ‘we’ the theoretical content, but more importantly unity between is and ought; regularity and purposiveness; and truth, goodness, and beauty. A philosophy whose objective is the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty is not simply in pursuit of these ideals, thereby distinguishing it from scientific, ethical, and artistic modes of comprehending the world. Philosophy is the characterization of human self-consciousness in each era, based on philosophers’ individual self-consciousness. Contemporary Western scholars distinguish between science and art based on the basic function of language. They propose that science relies on the informative function of language to describe and explain the empirical world, whereas art uses the expressive function of language to present human emotion and will. In other words, science informs us of empirical facts and hence can certainly achieve the consensus of ‘we,’ whereas art expresses individual emotion and will and hence is closely related to an individual’s perceptions and experiences. However, some scholars have taken issue with philosophy on this point: if philosophy is intended to fulfill the informative function of language, it should then state empirical facts. However, if it is instead intended to fulfill the expressive function of language, then it should present man’s emotion or will. If it neither informs us of facts or expresses emotions, then philosophy in the traditional sense should be abolished and transformed into science or quasi-literary art. Such doubts over philosophy help us consider more deeply its definition, and allow us to conduct a comparative study of the various modes by which humans comprehend the world.

3.3 Philosophical Implications of Art and the Artistic Purpose of Philosophy People often praise a thought-provoking novel or heart-wrenching poem as being rich in philosophy, while an ingenious artist or inventive writer is commonly praised as having a philosophical mind. It is as though we are saying that philosophy is a

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profound connotation of art and the artist’s erudition. Some have said that writers and artists must discover philosophy and express literature. Art is not simply a reflection of the world, but a reflection of the world through the eyes of the artist. The reality reflected in literary creations is not the natural state of the real world, but a spiritualized reality. In art sensuous things are spiritualized, while spiritual things are manifested through sensualization. In literary creations, the realization of the spirit and the spiritualization of reality are constantly intermingling, making the artist’s spiritual state indivisible from the artwork’s ideological state. Some Chinese scholars suggest that “a profound background in philosophy and world literature serves as a deep foundation for literature. The presence of deep metaphysical philosophical thinking and lofty humanistic spiritual background is the hallmark that sets apart a ‘master’ from everyone else. Without this background and foundation, literature will forever glide above the ground, and never truly take flight.”30 As the ancients said, ‘The stone which hides a jade brightens the mountain; the water which contains a pearl beautifies the river.’ Philosophy, in other words, is the underlying foundation that brightens and beautifies art. To understand the interrelation between philosophy and art, it is important to note that philosophy, which seeks truth, goodness, and beauty, must create the artistic purpose of the aesthetic meaning-world. The realm of beauty is the realm of freedom, which is pursued by all humankind. Human life is shaped according to the laws of beauty, inspiring us to view the relation between philosophy and art as the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. Many philosophers have explored this relationship. In Esthétique et Philosophie [Aesthetics and Philosophy], for example, French aesthetician Mikel Dufrenne discusses Kant and Hegel’s understanding of the relation of truth, goodness, and beauty. Dufrenne believes that Kant regarded beauty as a symbol of goodness: Beauty does not inform us of what goodness is because absolute goodness can only be realized and cannot be imagined. However, beauty can hint to us. In fact, beauty says to us specifically that we can realize goodness. This is because the inherent harmlessness of aesthetic pleasure is the hallmark of our moral mission. Aesthetic emotion expresses and prepares moral emotion.31

As for Hegel’s views on truth, goodness, and beauty, Dufrenne claims, “In Hegel’s thinking, there is no longer the idea of beauty. He believes that beauty is the idea itself. It is a reified idea…. [It is] truth itself in sensuous form.” Therefore, he continues, “The truth that philosophy must work hard to obtain is almost directly provided in aesthetic experience: ideas are presented in their sensuous forms.”32 Dufrenne’s interpretation of Kant and Hegel’s thinking interprets the philosophical meaning of beauty. In modern times ‘poeticized philosophy’ has become a focus of philosophical concern. Regardless of the different understandings of this term, one point remains undisputed: philosophy, characterized by idealism, expresses the poetic yearning 30 Yu

[21].

31 Dufrenne 32 Dufrenne

[22]. [22].

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of human for a perfect society. Li Da-Zhao writes, “Philosophers, in general, are concerned with ideal things.”33 Philosophy is the search for wisdom in creating the meaning of life and social ideals. It shapes and guides the spirit of the age using its own poetic experience and yearning toward society and life. As the greatest creation of the deepest levels of the human mind, philosophy is not logic or transcendent mysteries. It must provide humans with the ideals of life and enable the world to achieve the ideals of human. The concern for human progress, meditations on human destiny, the envisioning of the human future, and the pursuit of human ideals are the intrinsic artistic purposes of philosophy, all of which serve to transform the world into a beautiful place.

3.4 The Sensitive Nerve and Essence of the Spirit of the Age Discussions on philosophy frequently quote a famous line by Marx: “every true philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its time.”34 When thinking about art and literature, people tend to feel profoundly that art and literature are the sensitive nerve of the age. Characterizing this “quintessence of its time”35 can further define the close relation between philosophy and art. True philosophy to be the “the intellectual quintessence” of the time is due to the fact that true philosophical theories are crystallizations of humankind’s selfconsciousness regarding the interrelation between human and the world. They are infused with unique explanatory principles and conceptual frameworks to elucidate this relationship, along with a description of value ideas, aesthetic consciousness, and ultimate concern. The spirit of the times is both the enlightenment that gathers into focus the meaning of the living world, which has epochal intension and is created by the various modes by which humans comprehend the world, and also the theoretical sublimation of individual self-consciousness toward the universal and tendentious meaning of the age. Philosophy expresses the spirit of each age in a focused, profound, and intense manner, thus enabling it to become the “the intellectual quintessence” of the time. The spirit of each age is the crystallization of the meaning-world using the various basic modes by which humans comprehend the world. Within the meaning-world of each age, art and literature have always been the sensitive nerve. Therefore, philosophy that seeks truth, goodness, and beauty is always intricately connected to science and art. In The Origins of Marxian Thought, Cornu calls German classical philosophers Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel “German romantic philosophers,” asserting that “German romantic idealist philosophy” started from the great German poet, Goethe. He writes, “This new organic and vitalist world view of Goethe’s opened the road for romanticism’s efforts to realize the dynamic unity of spirit and matter, of man and 33 Li

[23]. and Engels [15]. 35 Ibid. 34 Marx

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the world, by reducing essential reality to spirit.”36 The modern Chinese philosopher He Lin also discussed the relationship between Hegel and Goethe and Schiller: German literature and philosophy are mutually complementary. They are embodiments of the same spirit of the age through different modes. The German writers of that time used the scenes and ideals depicted by the language of imagery thinking, whereas the philosophers used the logical language of abstract thinking to conduct systematic argumentation. Therefore, understanding German literature alone without German philosophy will entrap us in immediacy, leading to the lack of theoretical thoroughness. Conversely, understanding German philosophy alone without German literature will blind us to the poetic, image-filled, passionate, and moving concrete content of German literature that is reflected in abstract German philosophical theory.37

The famous contemporary novelist, Milan Kundera, once stated: Thus the spirit of an age cannot be judged exclusively by its ideas, its theoretical concepts, without considering its art, and particularly the novel. The nineteenth century invented the locomotive, and Hegel was convinced he had grasped the very spirit of universal history. But Flaubert discovered stupidity. I daresay that is the greatest discovery of a century so proud of its scientific thought.38

Regarding the role of philosophy and art in manifesting the spirit of the age, Engels and Lenin’s arguments are even more profound. They raise Balzac and Tolstoy, respectively, as examples of literature and art’s crucial role. In his letters concerning the realism of literature, Engels writes: Balzac… in La Comédie humaine gives us a most wonderfully realistic history of French ‘Society’, especially of le monde parisien [Paris high society]… That Balzac thus was compelled to go against his own class sympathies and political prejudices, that he saw the necessity of the downfall of his favorite nobles, and described them as people deserving no better fate; and that he saw the real men of the future where, for the time being they alone were to be found.” 39

Similarly, in his commentary on Leo Tolstoy, Lenin states, “Belonging, as he did, primarily to the era of 1861–1904, Tolstoy in his works—both as an artist and as a thinker and preacher—embodied in amazingly bold relief the specific historical features of the entire first Russian revolution, its strength and its weakness.”40 He continues on to say, “Tolstoy is great as the spokesman of the ideas and sentiments that emerged among the millions of Russian peasants at the time the bourgeois revolution was approaching in Russia.”41 The arguments of Engels and Lenin profoundly reveal the ‘spirit of the age’ embodied by art and literature, thus elucidating the true philosophical meaning of art and literature. Humans use all the modes by which they comprehend the world to create a world that, to them, embodies the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. Therefore, any 36 Auguste

[24]. [25]. 38 Milan [26]. 39 Marx and Engels [27]. 40 Lenin [28]. 41 Lenin [29]. 37 He

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philosophical critique of the premises underlying art should be based on the creative activities of humankind, thereby enabling us to achieve an understanding on the unique mode of art and its distinct value.

4 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Science Among the various modes by which humans comprehend the world, the relation between philosophy and science is the closest and most complex. In a certain sense, understanding philosophy is to understand the relation between philosophy and science. Therefore, critique of the premises underlying the various modes by which humans comprehend the world should focus particularly on exploring the philosophical critique of the premises underlying science.

4.1 Two Basic Modes of Theoretical Thought So far, we have determined that science and philosophy are not the extension or deformation, of commonsense, but rather the transcendence of commonsense. Such transcendence is mainly embodied in the empirical, representational, finite, and noncritical nature of commonsense as opposed to the transcendent, conceptual, infinite, and critical nature of science and philosophy. Commonsense, which depends on experience, relies on representational thinking to comprehend the world. Conversely, in transcendent science and philosophy, representations revolve around concepts and are created in a conceptual manner (the worldview required by human); hence, such modes comprehend the world through theoretical thought and conceptual thinking rather than representational thinking. A fundamental difference between science and philosophy and commonsense is that the former are two basic modes of theoretical thought while commonsense is representational and depends on experience. The term theory is constantly bandied about; however, its definition remains unclear. Various dictionaries define the term as ‘the systematic conclusion of knowledge regarding nature and society based on the generalization of human practices,’ or ‘a system of concepts and principles; a systematic rational understanding,’ etc. However, such definitions are solely focused on theory as the systematic nature of knowledge, which makes it difficult to express science and philosophy as theory and to truly separate science and philosophy from commonsense. Science and philosophy as theory possess three major basic intensions. First, both are knowledge systems composed of a series of concepts, paradigms, and principles. These knowledge systems provide humans with corresponding worldviews and the principles or axioms needed to understand these worldviews. Second, these knowledge systems implicitly contain the modes of thought needed to construct these systems and their corresponding worldviews. Third, as knowledge systems and modes of thought, science and philosophy normalize human thought and behavior,

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i.e., human value evaluation and choice. Together these three intensions represent the unity of the philosophical and scientific knowledge system, mode of thought, and value norm. It is because science and philosophy possess these three major basic intensions that they are able to normalize human thoughts and behaviors on a theoretical level. Any relatively mature scientific conceptual framework will take as its point of departure the most refined initial concepts and conditions, followed by the deduction of a series of theorems, laws, formulas, and equations based on rigorous logical means, to form universal and predictive conclusions, thereby providing thought with a powerful logic in understanding, describing, characterizing, and explaining the world. Science uses different conceptual frameworks to systematically construct the scientific worldview and achieves mutual self-understanding of scientific concepts through these frameworks. It is also through these conceptual scientific frameworks that we perceive the beauty of the logical power by which humans comprehend the world, of the unity by which thought comprehends being, and of the theoretical innovation in the self-negation and development of scientific concepts. Similarly, philosophy as theory also uses logical expansion to construct its own unique logical power and beauty. As Marx writes, “Theory is capable of seizing the masses once it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem once it becomes radical.”42 Science and philosophy as theory both possess explanatory, normalizing, critical, and idealizing functions. However, it is worth focusing our deliberations on the fact that science and philosophy are two basic modes of human theoretical thought. This has two layers of meaning. First, as modes of theoretical thought, they are highly correlated and possess complex similarities. Second, as two different modes of theoretical thought, they manifest as two mutually antagonistic and complementary dimensions. From a diachronist perspective, human theoretical thought, both scientific and philosophical, originated from the transcendence of fantastic mythical thinking and was formed through the transcendence of empirical commonsense thinking. For a long period of time, science remained embedded in its undifferentiated form within the matrix of philosophy. Even today, science and philosophy are frequently ambiguous in their intensions and extensions. The logicalization of thought, or rather the adherence of thought to logic, is the primary prerequisite of theoretical thought, i.e., conceptual thinking. As the two basic modes of theoretical thought, scientific and philosophical thinking both apply the logic of concepts to the comprehension, description, and explanation of the world and attempt to explain the world in order to provide certain principles or axioms. It is due to this that scientific and philosophical thinking both encounter the predicaments of ‘class-concepts’ (i.e., contradictions between sense and reason, experience and transcendence), ‘rules of thinking’ (i.e., contradictions between intuition and logic, intensional and extensional logic), and ‘conceptual definitions’ (i.e., contradictions between absolutism and relativism of meaning, human and character of

42 Marx

[16, p. 137].

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times), etc. It is precisely these predicaments that drive the continuous transcendence of scientific and philosophical thinking over empirical commonsense thinking, thus enabling human theoretical thought to achieve historical progress. Therefore, from a diachronic perspective, philosophy and science are highly correlated and have intimate similarities. The historical development of philosophy is often described as follows: ancient philosophy is an all-encompassing ‘summary of knowledge,’ modern philosophy is an attempt to surpass science with a ‘science of science,’ and contemporary philosophy is represented by Marxist philosophy, scientism, and humanism, each of which has a different relation to science. Such generalizations on the overall process of philosophical development express the different relations of philosophy to science both in different historical ages and within the same age. Although ancient philosophy may be considered an all-encompassing ‘summary of knowledge,’ ancient philosophers constantly sought to distinguishing philosophy from non-philosophical knowledge. They viewed philosophy as the ‘love of wisdom’ and the knowledge of other disciplines as ‘wisdom,’ thus revealing the characteristics of philosophy. In Aristotle’s classification of knowledge, he defines philosophy as “seeking the first disciplines and the highest cause,”43 which clearly identifies philosophy as the basic principle underlying all knowledge. The maturation of philosophy and science is also the differentiation between philosophy and science. When philosophy was seen as the ‘summary of knowledge,’ it necessarily regarded the whole world as its object, meaning that science remained within its embrace. It was then impossible for philosophy to propose and explore its own basic question regarding the relation between thought and being. Upon the maturation of science and its gradual independence from philosophy, philosophy was eventually expelled from its ‘hereditary territory,’ which only then enabled it to regard human knowledge, including the cognitive results of science, as the object of its re-thinking and re-cognizing. Philosophy was then able to clearly propose and explore its own basic question and to attempt to provide a theoretical basis for all human cognition, including scientific cognition, thus becoming seen as the ‘science of science.’ With the rapid development of modern science and widespread application of its techniques, which have profoundly transformed the interrelation between man and the world, a modern pluralistic understanding of the interrelation between philosophy and science has emerged. From the perspective of synchronicity, science and philosophy as theory both possess the three intensions of knowledge systems, modes of thought, and value norms; the three features of upward compatibility, epochal conformity, and logical expansion; and the four basic explanatory, normalizing, critical, and idealizing functions. These common features indicate the high degree of correlation between the two modes. How, then, do we distinguish between science and philosophy in terms of synchronicity? In general, the following three methods are used: to distinguish between their objects, to separate their functions, and to delineate their domains. 43 Aristotle

[30].

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The first, to distinguish between the objects of the two modes, refers to the claim that science has as its object different fields, areas, levels, or problems, whereas philosophy regards the whole world as its object. The first method, then, is a mode of thought based on the differentiation between objects’ particularity and universality. The second method, to separate between the two modes’ functions, refers to the claim that science provides particular laws for different fields or areas, whereas philosophy provides universal laws for the whole world. This is based on the differentiation between functions’ particularity and universality. Finally, the third method, or delineation between domains, is the attempt to seek out a domain for philosophy that cannot be explored by science or to discover philosophical questions that cannot be solved by science. This is based on the defense of philosophy’s right to survive in the modern age. The first two methods, distinguishing between science and philosophy’s objects and separating their functions, are the most universal modes by which to think about the interrelations between the two. The most important questions to examine through this lens are: (1) Does philosophy possess knowledge with the greatest universality and applicability? (2) Is the relation between philosophy and science one of universality and particularity? (3) Is the direction of philosophical development the ‘scientification’ of philosophy? And (4) Can we depart from the binary relation between philosophy and science and understand their relation from a broader perspective, thus renewing our understanding of philosophy?

4.2 The Reflective Relation of Philosophy to Science Philosophy and science’s fundamental difference lies in their separate and intensive manifestation of two basic dimensions of human theoretical thought: science manifests a high degree of unity between thought and being, whereas philosophy manifests reflection on the relation between thought and being. Therefore, the relation of philosophy to science is, fundamentally speaking, not one of universality to particularity nor of specific particularity to another particularity, but rather a reflective relation mediated by the question of the relation between thought and being. Science is a human activity, the application of theoretical thought to exploring the mysteries of nature, society, and the spirit, thus gaining an understanding of the world’s regularity in order to transform the world and benefit humankind. The essence of scientific activities is to achieve comprehension of the world’s regularity and to realize the unity of thought and being on the level of laws. Science is a focused representation of the progress in human reasoning. It provides humans with a worldview that unites thought and being on the level of laws. Science not only uses a variety of consistent and orderly symbolic systems and conceptual frameworks to understand and explain the empirical world, but is itself manifested as the formation and determination, expansion and deepening, renewal and revolution of the scientific mode of thought and conceptual systems. The web of scientific

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concepts and paradigms woven during scientific development constitutes an increasingly profound worldview and increasingly solid scaffolding for human cognition of the world. This indicates that scientific concepts and paradigms have achieved a high degree of unity between thought and being. Not only has the rapid development of modern science profoundly transformed our worldview and mode of thought, it has also transformed our value norms and way of life. Science occupies an extremely crucial position in modern humans’ social life and plays an immense role unrivalled by any other cultural form. Nevertheless, no matter how advanced science becomes or how important its position in social life and historical development, as the scientific mode by which humans comprehend the world it is always striving to achieve unity between thought and being. However, it never reflects on the relation between them, unlike philosophy. Science, as a human activity, uses theoretical thought to abstract, generalize, describe, and explain the laws of movement for the object of thought (being). In other words, it achieves unity of thought and being on the level of theoretical thought. This is the fundamental question that scientific activities and scientific theories seek to resolve, rather than questions of the relation between thought and being, such as: Can thought express being?, How can we test the objectivity of thought? How does the movement of concepts reflect the moving of things? How is the thinking and feeling of the subject of thought unified during the reflection of being? How does scientific development transform man’s mode of thought? In other words, scientific activities and theories regard the unity of thought and being as “the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought”44 in order to explore and express the laws of nature, society, and thought (i.e., being as the object of thought activities). Unlike scientific activities, philosophical activities involve regarding the relation between thought and being as a question for reflection. In such philosophical reflection, scientific activities and their theoretical results become the object. This is the reflective relation of philosophy to science. It should be noted that if the subject of scientific activities—the scientist—reflects upon the question of the relation between thought and being, they would then have transcended the research activities of science and entered into the reflective activities of philosophy. Not only do such transcendent activities occur frequently during scientific activities, they are also extremely important. In their scientific research, scientists are constantly required to transcend empirical thinking, thereby transcending given scientific theories and arriving at new discoveries or theories. However, the difference between science and philosophy implies that when scientists consider the question of the relation between thought and being as the object of their scientific activities, they have transcended science and entered into philosophical reflection. The cognitive activities of science and reflective activities of philosophy are the two different basic modes of human theoretical thought and two different basic dimensions of human thinking. They exist as a unity of opposites in human thought.

44 Marx

and Engels [31].

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The relation between philosophy and science is not one of universality and particularity. Therefore, it is not possible to differentiate between philosophy and science by distinguishing their objects, separating their functions, or delineating their domains. Nor is it possible to generalize and summarize scientific achievements simply by means of elevation, introduction, and renewal. It is also not possible to regard philosophy as science with the greatest universality and applicability. Philosophy is not the extension and deformation of science, but reflection on science and its transcendence. The intrinsic connection between philosophy and science lies in the unity between thought and being and reflecting on the relation between thought and being. It is characterized by mutual differences and connections rather than the relation between the universality and particularity of research objects. The contradictory movements of nature, society, and thought can be expressed using mathematical models. Theories that have received widespread concern in the philosophical world, including system theory, cybernetics, information theory, synergetics, catastrophe theory, dissipative structure theory, self-organization theory, etc., all regard the whole world as their object in a certain sense. In contrast, natural dialectics, cognitive dialectics, dialectics of thinking, historical dialectics, and aesthetics, not to mention mathematical philosophy, astronomical philosophy, economic philosophy, management philosophy, etc. regard particular domains as their objects. Why, therefore, are fields in the former group considered science and in the latter considered philosophy? The answer is that the questions proposed and explored by the former fields of study concern the laws of movement, that is, realizing the unity of thought and being in their research achievements on the level of laws, rather than examining the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought. In contrast, the latter fields of study specifically reflect on the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought rather than concretely studying the laws of movement of various beings. This indicates that there is a logical gap between philosophy and science. The logic of science is the logic of realizing the unity of thought and being, while the logic of philosophy is the logic of reflecting on the relation between thought and being. The logic of philosophy allows the logic of science to become the object of philosophical reflection. Thus, the logical communication between philosophy and science can be achieved through philosophical reflection.

4.3 Philosophical Reflection on Science Fundamentally speaking, scientific activities involve describing the laws of being using the laws of thought, or realizing unity between thought and being on the level of laws. The progress of human scientific activities is found within thought’s use of rich cognitive components, modes, links, and mediation to expand and deepen comprehension of the laws of being. Therefore, all scientific activities have as their foundational and fundamental question the relation between thought and being. More specifically, scientific activities manifest questions on the relation between thought

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and being as questions of subject and object, observation and theory, logic and intuition, truth and value, understanding and explanation, etc. Philosophical reflection on science is primarily a reflection on the fundamental question of scientific activities, which regards as its substantive content the question on the relation between thought and being. Scientific activities use the laws of thought to comprehend and describe the laws of being, thus forming universally necessary knowledge regarding the empirical object. The question then becomes, what is the relation between the laws of thought and the laws of being? Do they follow different laws? How do the laws of thought comprehend the laws of being? Are the laws of being described by thought the actual laws of being? Such questions regarding the laws of thought and being have previously been explored in great depth by the founder of German classical philosophy, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Hegel. In addition, the founders of Marxist philosophy, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, each arrived at profound generalizations and conclusions on this topic as well. It is therefore necessary to conduct specific discussions on their philosophical reflections. The various contradictions in such reflection on scientific activities results in an extremely complex contradictory relation between thought and being. This provides better insight into the rich theoretical content and meaning in philosophy’s reflection of science and provides a deeper understanding of science, thus allowing us to conduct scientific research activities in a creative manner. The most direct form of philosophical reflection on science is that on scientific achievements. In such reflection, philosophy continuously reveals the rich contradictory relation between thought and being, uncovers the laws to which thought and being are subjected, and elucidates the philosophical meaning of cognitive components contained within scientific achievements. Such philosophical reflection is not a general process of regarding scientific achievements as the objects of re-cognition and re-thinking. Instead, during scientific research, the subject constantly regards established scientific achievements as the objects of re-cognition and re-thinking in order to expose contradictions between existing scientific achievements and new empirical facts intrinsic to scientific achievements themselves, thereby driving the development of science. Philosophical reflection on scientific results proposes questions concerning scientific achievements on a philosophical level, including: What research methods, conceptual frameworks, explanatory principles, and value ideas are contained within scientific achievements? From what perspective do these achievements promote the philosophical understanding of the relation between thought and being and between human and the world? How do these achievements transform humans’ worldview, mode of thought, and value ideas? What is the spirit of the age that they express? What is the spirit of the age that philosophy is required to shape and guide? How should philosophy reconstruct its own system of categories based on this scientific spirit of the age to realize its self-development? Such philosophical reflection not only implies philosophy’s transcendence of science, i.e., by transforming scientific achievements into philosophical theories; it

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also implies the self-transcendence of philosophy, i.e., the transformation of philosophy with the development of science. Engels writes, “With each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science it [materialism] has to change its form; and after history was also subjected to materialistic treatment, here also a new avenue of development has opened.”45 Therefore, it is necessary to understand philosophical reflection on scientific research achievements as resulting in both the transcendence of science and the self-transcendence of philosophy. The philosophical generalization of scientific achievements does not involve seeking out new and applicable categories and principles, but instead searching for the scientific spirit of the age and elucidating changes in mode of thought or renewal of value ideas necessitated by this scientific spirit. This requires philosophical transcendence and reflection to possess a deep sense of history and keen insight, as well as an understanding of the contemporary scientific spirit within a broader context and based in more basic principles than science. This allows such reflection to go beyond scientific achievements in generalizing the new spirit of the age, thereby promoting the development of science and shaping and guiding the age’s spirit. Scientific activities describe the laws of being based on the laws of thought; they realize the unity of thought and being on the level of laws. Thus, the history of scientific development is the history of the expansion and deepening of the unity between thought and being on the level of laws. This indicates that the history of scientific development is the most concentrated and profound manifestation of the development of human cognition. Reflection on the logic of scientific development is thus reflection on the history of human cognition. Therefore, it is important to note that philosophical reflection on science is reflection on the logic of scientific development. American philosopher Marx W. Wartofsky agrees that the growth of scientific knowledge should be the main object of epistemology but stresses that we should understand the activities of scientific cognition based on ordinary human cognitive activities, explore current cognitive methods of science based on previous scientific cognitive methods, and base fundamental concepts of science on ordinary human concepts. In other words, we should regard epistemology as the common laws of human activities in communication of the connection between scientific and other types of cognition. He systematically demonstrates the unity of opposites between the continuity and intermittence of scientific activities and other human activities based on the origin of scientific thinking and conceptual foundations of its methods. Wartofsky claims that science represents the greatest human achievement. In the history of human development, science has undergone a long and arduous formation as a unique mode of cognition. It originates from common human understanding and ordinary modes of cognition; he argues, saying, “At the very base of science is the impress of its historical continuity with common experience, with common ways of understanding, and with common ways of talking and thinking, for science did not spring into being full grown.”46 In other words, human progress has moved 45 Engels

[8, p. 26]. [32].

46 Wartofsky

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from explaining observed facts using certain delusional causes to generalizing the whole domain of natural phenomena using unified explanatory principles. We have gone from conceptual commonsense frameworks that generalize common experience to the conceptual scientific frameworks that show clarity, falsifiability, and logical explanatory power, and from rational reflection on empirical facts to critique of the various rules and principles governing practice. That is to say, human historical development unifies the continuity and intermittence of scientific activities and other human activities. Therefore, in order for us to gain a fuller understanding of science, we must first understand it as a special human industry. Reflection on the logic of scientific development not only helps us to understand the laws of scientific development and the whole of human cognitive activities, it also indirectly helps us to understand the logic of philosophical development. American philosopher Morton White states: Once it becomes clear that there are no sharp lines of demarcation between the disciplines and that no one of them can claim a fundamental position in the scheme of knowing, and once it becomes clear that there are forms of human experience which are just as important as knowing, the way is open to a philosophical study of man in the broadest sense. 47

Regarding the recent gulf between philosophy and science and the tendency of contemporary Western philosophers to think of philosophy as a tightly compartmentalized subject, White humorously proposed that once we reconcile philosophy with science and the various compartments of philosophy, “Science would no longer be the bugbear or the underling of philosophy but a less than constant companion. The philosopher would profit through knowledge of other disciplines, to say nothing of profiting through absorbing other experiences.”48 In the same vein, he continued: The grand philosophers would surrender the notion that they can know one big thing without knowing or feeling lots of little things, and the minute philosophers would make an effort to know big things.” The philosophical “hedgehogs” (i.e. the humanist philosophers of continental Europe” and the philosophical “foxes” (i.e. the analytical philosophers of England and America) will achieve a certain “reconciliation.”49

It should be said that such a vision of philosophy, inspired by reflection on the logic of scientific development, is encouraging. The spirit of each age is manifested, to different extents, in the scientific spirit of that age. This is especially the case in the contemporary era due to the development of empirical science and its increasing role in social life. As the essence of the spirit of the age, philosophy constantly embodies the scientific spirit using the modes of philosophy. Therefore, the philosophical reflection of science is manifested intensively as the reflection of the scientific spirit of the age. Science is an activity that embodies the greatest achievements of human intellect. In this sense, the scientific spirit is the agglomeration and sublimation of the human spirit in scientific activities. It is manifested intensively as truth-seeking, fact-seeking, 47 White

[33].

48 Ibid. 49 Morton

[33].

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and creative output. Across historical eras, the scientific spirit has adopted different contents and forms. The book series of “The Mentor Philosophers,” published in America in the 1950s, summarizes the characteristics of each century since the European Middle Ages, clearly presenting different spirits of the age and their scientific spirits. It refers to the European Middle Ages as ‘the Age of Belief,’ or the time when philosophy and science were the ‘handmaidens’ of religion. The Renaissance, meanwhile, is referred to as ‘the Age of Adventure,’—the era Engels describes as “the times which called for giants and produced giants” and during which the truthseeking spirit of science was reignited. The 17th century, which witnessed the rise of modern experimental science and the deepening of scientific reason, is referred to as ‘the Age of Reason,’ while the 18th century is called ‘the Age of Enlightenment’ due to the growing advocacy of the power of reason. The 19th century, meanwhile, is named ‘the Age of Ideology,’—the era Engels describes as shifting from a science that ‘accumulates materials’ to one that ‘classifies materials’ and which saw the establishment of a system of conceptual development for each scientific discipline. Finally, the 20th century is referred to as ‘the Age of Analysis’ in light of its rapid scientific development and self-reflection within the context of a highly differentiated and highly integrated modern scientific system. The German philosopher Ernst Cassirer reflected on the Western scientific spirit and modern spirit of the age, asserting that ‘reason’ is the core concept marking the modern spirit; however, its definition has undergone a profound change over the last few centuries. He claims that in the 17th century, reason was the “realm of the eternal verities”; it attempts to start from “a highest, intuitively grasped certainty” and thus extend the whole chain of possible knowledge through rigorous inference. “The eighteenth century abandons this kind of deduction and proof,” he continues. “It constructs its ideal according to the model and pattern of contemporary natural science.” It does not view reason as the “treasury” of knowledge, principles and truth, but rather “the original intellectual force which guides the discovery and determination of truth.”50 Cassirer’s argument shows that Western philosophy, whether the spirit of ‘adventure’ during the Renaissance, the spirit of ‘reason’ in the 17th century, or the spirit of ‘enlightenment’ in the 18th century, has intensively expressed and shaped a scientific spirit of the age centered on reason. Such a scientific spirit advocates human’s rational authority, establishes human’s subjective position, and fulfills the role of human’s subjective actions. As modern philosophers have revived the exploratory spirit of ancient Greek philosophy through rational thinking, this too is a renaissance of the ancient Greek spirit. Engels points out that the development of modern science has shifted from one that ‘accumulates materials’ to one that ‘classifies materials’ such that by the 19th century, he argues: Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner interconnection has become absolutely imperative. It

50 Cassirer

[34].

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is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another.51

It is precisely due to this that the 19th century can be referred to as ‘the Age of Ideology.’ Hegel later applied this concept to develop a dialectics that profoundly elucidated the logic of the movement of human thought, thus intensively manifesting the spirit of the ‘age of ideology.’ In response to naming the scientific spirit of modern times as the spirit of reason, it is often generalized based on a pluralistic understanding. Some have called the 20th century the ‘Age of Analysis’ (e.g., Morton White), while others have referred to it as the ‘Age of Complexity’ (e.g., Alvin Toffler) or the ‘Age of Relativism’ (e.g., Luther J. Brinkley). Reflecting on the scientific spirit of the contemporary age is an important premise for contemporary philosophy in order to express and shape the spirit of the age. The most significant feature of contemporary scientific development is its exponential growth. The number of scientific and technological achievements over the past 60 years is more than those of the last 2,000 years. During this exponential growth, scientific differentiation and integration occurred simultaneously. The integrity of research, the multidisciplinary nature of research objects, the multi-object nature of disciplines, and the informatization of scientific research have become epistemological characteristics of contemporary scientific research. In response to this: The mode of thought formed by the development of science and technology is characterized by the shift from the absolute to the relative; from uniformity to ambiguity; from precision to fuzziness; from causality to contingency; from certainty to uncertainty; from reversibility to irreversibility; from analytical methods to systematic methods; from localization theory to field theory; from the separation of time and space to the unity of time and space.52

The epistemological characteristics of contemporary science and corresponding changes in mode of thought imply that there has been a major transformation in the contemporary scientific spirit, which also implies that the spirit of the age has undergone a similar change. However, although the contemporary scientific spirit contains the ordinary spirit of truth-seeking, fact-seeking, criticality, and creativity, it is more obvious that it possesses a tolerant spirit, as seen in the shift from the absolute to the relative and from uniformity to ambiguity (i.e., a true spirit of avid critique and creativity) and a historical consciousness, as seen in the shift from precision to fuzziness, from certainty to uncertainty, and from analytical methods to systematic methods (i.e., viewing the world from the standpoint of human’s practical activities and their historical development). Therefore, we should regard the relation between the essence of the spirit of the age (philosophy) and the scientific spirit of the age (science) from a reflective standpoint.

51 Marx

and Engels [35]. Knowledge of Modern Science and Technology (Song Jian Ed.). Science Press and Central Party School Press, 1994, p. 48.

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4.4 Reflections on Scientism The most prominent question of the contemporary age is the prevailing trend of scientism in philosophy. Scientism refers to a theoretical ideology that has prevailed in philosophy since the mid-19th century. The development of science and the widespread application of its techniques caused certain natural scientists and philosophers to believe that 1) science is great and philosophy is minute, 2) it is only by ignoring or even abusing traditional philosophy that we can be freed from its bonds, and 3) the only way for new philosophy to overcome these dilemmas is to become empirical science or a by-product of empirical science. These theorists attempted to transform philosophy using the theories and methods of empirical science and to lower philosophy from a ‘science of science’ to a ‘philosophy of science,’ i.e., to be subordinate to science. Thus, scientism rejects philosophy in the traditional sense and transforms it into the vassal of science. German philosopher Hans Reichenbach is a representative thinker of scientism. Concerning philosophy and its relation to science, he writes: The essence of knowledge is generalization…Generalization, therefore, is the origin of science…. The multitude of observed facts could not satisfy the desire to know; the quest for knowledge transcended observation and demanded generality… Where scientific explanation failed because the knowledge of the time was insufficient to provide the right generalization, imagination took its place and supplied a kind of explanation which appealed to the urge for generality by satisfying it with naive parallelisms… The search for generality was appeased by the pseudo explanation. It is from this ground that philosophy sprang.53

Based on this explanation of the interrelation between philosophy and science, Reichenbach arrives at the following conclusion: The new philosophy originated as a by-product of scientific research…. [Mathematicians, physicists, biologists or psychologists’] philosophy resulted from the attempts to find solutions to problems encountered in scientific research… logical analysis demands a concentration… which aims at clarification rather than discovery.54

Thus, the thinkers of scientism regard the philosophy of science as the logical analysis of science, thereby rendering philosophy merely a by-product of science. More than a century earlier, on the cusp of the rise of scientism in philosophy and science, Engels observed that “natural scientists believe that they free themselves from philosophy by ignoring or abusing it.”55 However, the actual situation was: They are no less in bondage to philosophy, but unfortunately in most cases to the worst philosophy, and those who abuse philosophy most are slaves to precisely the worst vulgarized relics of the worst philosophies…. Natural scientists may adopt whatever attitudes they please, they are still under the domination of philosophy. It is only a question whether they want to be dominated by a bad, fashionable philosophy or by a form of theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.56 53 Reichenbach

[36]. [37]. 55 Marx and Engels [38]. 56 Ibid., p. 490–491. 54 Reichenbach

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However, against the backdrop of contemporary rapid scientific development, people often use science to understand philosophy, attempting to change philosophy into a specific form of science. Over the course of centuries, people have tried to weaken science’s scientific nature or strengthen philosophy’s scientific nature in order to defend philosophy’s right to survive and development. Because of this, the relation between philosophy and science is gradually becoming the most important question in the self-understanding of philosophy. Science has both broad and specific meanings. In a narrow sense, it refers to the theories formed through empirical (or experimental) research and verified through experience (or experiments). In a broad sense, the terms may refer to thoughts, theses, and theories that are correct and truth ful. When reflecting on scientism in philosophy, it is necessary to reexamine these definitions. The narrow view regards science as the sole criterion to inspect philosophy, believing that abstract and speculative philosophy has yet to achieve the standards of science. Hence, it attempts to transform philosophy using the theories and methods of empirical science. The result is the confounding or even castrating of philosophy’s unique properties and functions as a special mode by which humans comprehend the world, and thus a loss of its independent meaning. Contemporary Western philosophy has become increasingly aware of this issue. Through logical positivism, many schools of contemporary Western philosophy have sought to mitigate their relations with metaphysics. Contemporary Western philosophy and its current modern schools of thought are moving away from scientism and contemporary Chinese philosophy should be careful not to repeat the same mistakes. As for the broad view, science should not be regarded as the sole criteria through which to view philosophy. Although both the two modes of theoretical thought— science and philosophy—possess the same three intensions (i.e., knowledge system, mode of thought, and value norm), these intensions have different roles and manifestations in science and philosophy. In its most direct sense, science is simply a truth-seeking activity (the pursuit, discovery, and upholding of truth). In an indirect sense, scientific activities shape the scientific mode of thought and normalize human thinking and behavior using the scientific worldview and mode of thought. Unlike science, philosophical theories are themselves the unity of fact, value, and aesthetic judgement, or of ontology, truth theory, and value theory. Its aim is not only to seek truth, but also to seek goodness and beauty as well as the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. In this sense, philosophical theories are also the unity of assertoric judgement (i.e., how it is), apodictic judgement (i.e., how it will be), and ought judgement (i.e., how it ought to be). Philosophical theories both express specific knowledge and embody human’s specific intentions and pursuit of the ideal. Philosophical theories are human’s understanding of the relation between it and the world on an epochal level as well as the conscious guide for the promotion of this relation; they reflect and express the spirit of the age while also shaping and guiding it. If philosophy is viewed only through the broad sense of science, it becomes merely a truth-seeking activity; such an understanding distorts its aim to unify truth, goodness, and beauty, causing philosophy to lose its social function in shaping and guiding the spirit of the age.

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To classify philosophy as science is to negate the independent existence of philosophy. Naturally, we can use the concepts of scientific and not scientific to distinguish between different philosophies, which is how we use the concepts of good and evil to distinguish between different philosophies. Philosophy pursues the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. Hence, a broad concept of science (i.e., correct and truthful) can distinguish between philosophies with different properties but cannot regard science as the criterion of philosophy. Philosophy and science also differ in that philosophy not only has a two-way relation to science, but also has multi-way relations to the various basic modes by which humans comprehend the world. The objects of philosophical reflection include science, art, religion, ethics, language, history, and other cultural phenomena. Philosophy understands science based on its interrelations with the various modes by which humans comprehend the world and reviews science based on its overall relation with human culture. Hence, philosophy can reflect critically on science and promote its development. The deepest difference between science and philosophy lies in the fact that science regards the unity of thought and being as the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought, thus achieving the unity of thought and being in reality and providing human with scientific results to know and transform the world. In contrast, philosophy regards the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought as its fundamental object of reflection, thus driving the development of science and the whole of human civilization based on such reflection.

4.5 A Three-Level Critique of the Premises Underlying Conceptual Frameworks The most important aspect of the philosophical critique of the premises underlying the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world is the critique of the following three conceptual frameworks: commonsense, science, and philosophy. Human is the subject in the cognition and transformation of the world. Concepts occupy an especially important position in the relation between human and the world; they are both the form of human thought and the achievement of human cognition. They constitute the subject’s comprehension of an object’s determinateness through the unity of intension and extension. Therefore, in the real relation between human and the world, human as the subject must use concepts to comprehend, describe, explain, and reflect on themselves, the world and relation between the two, as well as to understand, explain, normalize, and reflect on their own thoughts and behaviors. They must use concepts to construct a regular picture of the world and the ideal and purposeful requirements for the world. Concept is the mode by which human builds the empirical world in its thinking and the means of social inheritance by which it passes down this world across generations. Concept is the reservoir of human history and culture, as well as the scaffolding for the development of human civilization.

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Humans have inherited many types of conceptual systems throughout history, which have directly and deeply constrained and normalized our historical creative activities and understanding of the world, the mutual understanding between people, and individual self-understanding. In this sense, the history of human civilization is also the history of the formation, evolution, transformation, and development of concepts. Therefore, philosophical critique of the premises underlying the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world is intensively manifested as the critique of the premises underlying the conceptual modes by which humans comprehend the world. The conceptual systems by which humans comprehend the world are complicated and derived from historical development. However, they can be divided into three basic levels: commonsense, scientific, and philosophical conceptual frameworks. These conceptual frameworks refer to the mode by which humans construct the empirical world and organize concepts in their thinking. Any concept used by humans to comprehend and explain the world cannot possibly constitute an isolated determination of the world in thought, nor can it independently enable thought to gain an understanding of the world. All concepts must have intensions and extensions, evolution and development and all must (and can only) be gained and realized in a given conceptual framework. In other words, concepts must be “related to each other, and to a network of concepts by means of which these are in turn understood, to form what we may call a conceptual framework or structure.”57 Therefore, on a deeper level, the way in which humans describe and explain the world, and how they explain and normalize themselves, is always determined by the different properties of the conceptual frameworks they possess and apply, as well as the different standards attained by these frameworks. It must be clarified that the properties and standards of conceptual frameworks have different meanings. Properties refer to the special properties possessed by the different levels of conceptual frameworks. Based on this, conceptual frameworks can be divided into three basic levels: the commonsense, scientific, and philosophical. The concepts at each level have different properties. For example, humans often use the concept of matter, but it has different properties at each of these three levels. Within the commonsense conceptual framework, matter refers to all concrete things; within the conceptual framework of science, matter refers to the elements that constitute the world, and within the philosophical conceptual framework it refers to objective reality that does not depend on human consciousness but is comprehended by human thought. Similarly, truth, goodness, beauty, falsehood, evil, ugliness, etc. all have different properties within each conceptual frameworks. In common sense, truth and falsehood refer to the ‘is’ or ‘is not’ of empirical objects; in science, these terms also refer, more importantly, to the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ of thought concerning empirical objects; and in philosophy, they refer not only to the existence of empirical objects or whether a specific thought concerning the empirical object is established, but more importantly whether there exists the unity of thought and being, i.e., whether thought has objectivity. In addition, philosophy connects truth, goodness, and beauty; thus, the philosophical understanding is always a certain unity of the outlooks of truth, 57 Wartofsky

[32].

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values, and history. This implies that although the concept of ‘truth’ is used frequently, the concept itself has different properties within different conceptual frameworks. Unlike the properties of conceptual frameworks, which can be divided into three levels, the standard of conceptual frameworks refers to a framework’s degree of development. As common experience, commonsense has different standards in the history of human civilization. As science, the achievements of research have different standards in the history of human civilization. As philosophy, reflection also has different standards in the history of human civilization. It is only by differentiating among the different properties of conceptual frameworks that we can distinguish between the commonsense, scientific, and philosophical modes by which humans comprehend the world in a general sense. This profoundly demonstrates the diversity of the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world, as well as the significant implication of philosophical reflection on these modes.

References 1. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1987). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 25: Engels: AntiDühring (Emile Burns Trans.). New York: International Publishers, p. 22. 2. Lenin, V. I. (1976). Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, Philosophical Notebooks (Clemence Dutt, Trans.), Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 224. 3. Zhu, De-Sheng. (1997). On the Identity of Thought and Being. Philosophical Research, Volume 3. Cf. George Berkeley (2002). A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (David R. Wilkins Ed). London: Jacob Tonson, p. 13. 4. Hegel, G. W. F. (2010). The Science of Logic (George di Giovanni Trans.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 109. 5. Chen, Zi-Ang. (1929). On a Gate-Tower at Yu-Chou. In The Jade Mountain: A Chinese Anthology (Witter Bynner Trans.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 15. 6. Hegel, R. E. (1998). The Sights and Sounds of Red Cliffs: On Reading Su Shi. Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews, 20, 11–30. 7. Engels, F. (1941). Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (Clemens Dutt Trans.). New York: International Publishers, p. 20. 8. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, p. 20. 9. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1987). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 25: Engels: AntiDühring (Emile Burns Trans.). New York: International Publishers, p. 300. 10. He, Guang-Hu. (1991). A diversified view of god (pp. 1–2). Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Publishing House. 11. Marx, K. (1970). Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ (Joseph O’Malley and Annette Jolin, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 131. 12. Cassirer, E. (1972). An essay on man: An introduction to a philosophy of human culture (p. 278). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 13. Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture, p. 68. 14. Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture, p. 71. 15. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1975). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 1: Marx: The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung (Clemens Dutt Trans.). London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 195. 16. Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 131–132. 17. Xia, Zhen-Tao. (1999). Nature and culture. Social Sciences in China, 5, 98–99. 18. Langer, S. K. (1957). Problems of art: Ten philosophical lectures (p. 58). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

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19. Zong, Bai-Hua. (1981). A Walk in Aesthetics. Shanghai People’s Publishing House, p. 15. 20. Bernard, C. (1957). An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine. Dover Publications, p. 17. 21. Yu, Ping. (1999). Literature, do people still love you? Xinhua Digest, 9, 194. 22. Dufrenne, M. (1976). Esthétique et Philosophie. Paris: Klincsieck. 23. Li, Da-Zhao. (1984). Collected Works of Li Dazhao. People’s Publishing House, p. 345. 24. Cornu, A. (1957). The origins of marxian thought (p. 12). Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas. 25. He, Lin. (1978). The Age of Hegel. In Collection of Research on Foreign History of Philosophy, Volume 1. Shanghai People’s Publishing House, p. 57. 26. Milan, K. (1985). The Jerusalem Address. Acceptance speech on receipt of the Jerusalem Prize for Literature. Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 27. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2001). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 48: Engels: Letters— 1888. London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 167–168. 28. Lenin, V. I. (1977). Lenin Collected Works: Volume 16 (Clemence Dutt, Trans.). Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 324. 29. Lenin, V. I. (1977). Lenin Collected Works: Volume 15 (Andrew Rothstein and Bernard Isaacs, Trans.). Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 206. 30. Aristotle. (2012). Metaphysics. (W. D. Ross, Trans.), Central Compilation & Translation Press, p. 61. 31. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1987). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 25: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. (Clemens Dutt Trans.). New York: International Publishers, p. 544. 32. Wartofsky, M. W. (1968). Conceptual foundations of scientific thought (p. 4). London, UK: The Macmillan Company. 33. White, M. (1955). The Age of Analysis (p. 241). New York: The New American Library. 34. Cassirer, E. (1951). The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. (Fritz Koelln and James Pettegrove Trans.) New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p. 6, 7, 13. 35. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1987). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 25: Engels: Dialectics of Nature (Clemens Dutt Trans.). New York: International Publishers, p. 338. 36. Reichenbach, H. (1968). The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 5, 8. 37. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, p. 123. 38. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1987). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 25: Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Notes and Fragments (Clemens Dutt Trans.). New York: International Publishers, p. 490.

Chapter 4

A Critique of the Basic Concepts Underlying Thought

The premises constituting thought not only include the basic beliefs, logic, and modes which underlie thought, but also more universal conceptual manifestations such as being, the world, history, life, truth, and values. These are concepts which humans use to construct thought. A critique of these basic concepts will broaden the philosophical critique of the premises underlying thought.

1 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Being If we are committed to the assertion that the most basic question of philosophy is that regarding the relation between thought and being, then it is necessary to first define thought and being. This definition both affects our understanding of the above question and vice versa: our understanding of the relation between thought and being directly determines how we define both thought and being.

1.1 Being and Pure Being Being is a concept fraught with contradictions. Its extension is the broadest—everything is, but its intension is the thinnest—everything is nothing. Hegel describes this as “the original featurelessness which precedes all definite character and is the very first of all.”1 However, by “original featurelessness” Hegel refers not to being itself, but to thought: in the beginning of The Science of Logic, Hegel uses the word “pure” three times to explain “the original featurelessness”: pure being, pure nothing, and pure thought. Therefore, to understand the relation between thought and being in a 1 Hegel

[1, p. 223].

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philosophical sense, we must first reflect upon the relation between ‘pure thought’ and ‘pure being’. Being, or ‘everything is,’ can also be understood as a completely indeterminate pure being. Likewise, if being is understood as ‘everything is nothing,’ then it is a completely indeterminate ‘pure nothing.’ Together, the two understandings of being form ‘pure thought,’ Hegel’s ‘featurelessness’ that precedes all definite character. Therefore, thought and being are identified in-itself : pure being is pure thought, or, the ‘identity of thought and being.’ In the beginning of The Science of Logic, Hegel frames the relation between thought and being as the relation between pure thought and pure being. This is not an idealist illusion but the theoretical consciousness of philosophical thought regarding the relation between thought and being. This theoretical consciousness is also Hegel’s so-called “original featurelessness,” which both reveals the beginning of human history and individual cognition and the beginning of the mobility of thought, thereby positing the philosophical foundations of the relation between thought and being as “a featurelessness that precedes all definite character.”2 As ‘the original featurelessness,’ pure being is pure nothing and pure nothing is pure being. Here, there is an immediate non-distinct identity between thought and being, which is and is not. To distinguish between being and thought, which is and is not, implies that being itself has distinctions and is non-identical. Therefore, when discussing pure being, there is a fundamental contradiction regarding the relation between thought and being: the two ought to be distinct but in actuality are not. Hegel reflects this contradiction when he suggests the “two basic requirements [of dialectics]: (1) ‘The necessity of connection’ and (2) ‘the immanent emergence of distinctions.’”3 According to Hegel, ‘pure being’ represents identity within the differences between pure thought, pure being, and pure nothing. Therefore, it must constantly negate itself, thus forming a self-constructing path. In Hegel’s view, the immanent emergence of distinctions between thought and being is not merely a logical inference, but based on historical evidence. Arguing that “what is the first in science had of necessity to show itself to be the first historically,”4 he believed that the beginning of the history of human and individual cognition was also the beginning of the “great basic question of all philosophy,”5 i.e., the relation of thought and being. This can also be represented as the dialectics of ontology or the ontology of dialectics. According to Hegel, pure being embodies the evolution of human thought from nothing to being (i.e., animal consciousness to human thought). During this evolutionary process, human thought germinates, moving from its original potential state. At first, its contents and forms are impoverished but at the same time contain the seed for all contradictory human cognitive movements. Therefore, regarding pure being as the baseline is to regard the germination of human thought

2 Ibid. 3 Lenin

[2, p. 97]. [3, p. 65]. 5 Engels [4, p. 20]. 4 Hegel

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as the baseline. Such a view reveals the contradictory nature of human thought and constitutes the human basis for understanding the relation between thought and being. As the baseline of individual cognition, pure being embodies an individual’s innate capacity for thought, before they carry out any concrete cognitive activities. In this state, the individual’s capacity for thought is an inborn physiological-psychological function; a latent cognitive capacity. Its contents and forms are extremely rudimentary, but this innate capacity for thought constitutes the foundation for subsequent rich and varied thought activities. Therefore, regarding pure being as the baseline of cognition is to regard the individual’s innate capacity for thought as the baseline. Such a view demonstrates the contradictory nature of individual thought and constitutes an individual basis for understanding the relation between thought and being. The immediate identity and potential difference between thought and being— is and is not—inherent in pure being is precisely the logical presentation of the germinating state of human thought and the potential state of individual thought. In this state, humans have already developed a capacity for thought distinct from that of animals, and individuals have already inherited an innate capacity for thought; hence, they are ‘being’. However, the capacity for human thought in this process of formation has yet to attain complete independence, while the capacity for individual thought has yet to be realized through concrete cognitive activities, hence they are ‘nothing.’ In other words, both ‘being’ and ‘nothing,’ ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are essential characteristics of the germinating or potential state of human and individual thought that the philosophical category of pure being intends to embody. Pure being thus contains the seed for all contradictions in the dialectics of the potential relation between thought and being. Therefore, The Science of Logic, which regards pure being as its baseline not only reveals the human and individual basis for the relation between thought and being, but also its dialectical essence.

1.2 Being and Existents Describing pure being as being without determinateness or distinction, Hegel points out, “But if when we wish to view the whole world we can only say that everything is, and nothing more, we are neglecting all speciality and, instead of plenitude, we have absolute emptiness.”6 In contrast to pure being, “all specialty,” in other words, is being with determinateness, that is, being that is distinct from others. This is what Hegel calls ‘existents.’ Hegel’s distinction between pure being (i.e., indeterminate being) and existents (i.e., determinate being) reflect the dual relation between thought and being. First, the relation between thought and pure being is the dialectics of the potential relation between thought and being. Second, the relation between thought and existents is

6 Hegel

[1, p. 226].

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the dialectics of the actual relation between thought and being. Understanding the relation between thought and being must involve this dual relation. Pure being is the highest abstraction of all determinate beings, i.e. existents. In pure being, all this determinateness of existents evaporates. To comprehend that all existents start from pure being both indicates the fundamental mobility of thought (i.e., all determinate existents are constructed in thought) and the fundamental reality of thought (i.e., thought reflects existents and the logic of their movements through concepts and their logical movements). Marx offers his own materialist explanation for this understanding by saying, “that everything, in the final abstraction [. . .] presents itself as a logical category. [. . . ] Just as by dint of abstraction we have transformed everything into a logical category, so one has only to make an abstraction of every characteristic distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition—purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement.”7 Therefore, “If one finds in logical categories the substance of all things, one imagines one has found in the logical formula of movement the absolute method, which not only explains all things, but also implies the movement of things.”8 Hegel, meanwhile, inverted this relationship and guided the logical movement of categories toward mysticism. Nevertheless, Hegel’s revelation on the relation between thought and being can serve as inspiration for renewed understanding of how thought comprehends and presents the mobility of being. According to Hegel, all determinate beings (i.e., existents) are not beings in themselves but beings for themselves. That is, they have been endowed with intention (determinateness) by thought, i.e., the existence of concepts and categories. Therefore, the relation of thought to being is directly manifested in the relation of thought to concepts and the relation of the movement of thought to the movement of concepts. In Lenin’s annotations of Hegel in his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin comments on Hegel’s statement that “to understand [motion] means to express its essence in the form of the Notion,” proposing the following thesis: “The question is not whether there is movement, but how to express it in the logic of concepts.”9 Lenin cites Hegel here by saying, “What makes the difficulty is always thought alone, since it keeps apart the moments of an object which in their separation are really united.”10 Likewise, Lenin suggests that dialectics can be understood as “the identity of opposites between notions.”11 Here, Lenin not only understands being and the concept of being in relation to thought, but also unifies dialectics and ontology through these concepts. For both Hegel and Lenin, ‘ontology’ is the dialectics of the relation between thought and being, or the ‘tripartite unity’ of dialectics, epistemology, and logic.

7 Marx

[5]. Marx and Engels Collected Works, Vol., 6, p. 164. 9 Lenin [2, pp. 254–256]. 10 Ibid., p. 257. 11 Ibid., p. 197. 8 Marx,

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1.3 Being and Dasein The existence of both existents as the content of thought and pure being as pure thought implies that there is a special category of being conscious of being—in other words, a being with self-consciousness that directs its questions toward being. Heidegger describes this as “Dasein” (a German word for being-there, or existence). Heidegger suggests that if we intend to explore being, we must first ask ourselves, In which being is the meaning of being to be found; from which being is the disclosure of being to get its start? Is the starting point arbitrary, or does a certain being have priority in the elaboration of the question of being? Which is this exemplary being and in what sense does it have priority?12 In response to this question, Heidegger answers: Regarding, understanding and grasping, choosing, and gaining access to, are constitutive attitudes of inquiry and are thus themselves modes of being of a particular being, of the being we inquirers ourselves in each case are. Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being—one who questions—transparent in its being. . . . This being which we ourselves in each case are and which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its being we formulate terminologically as Dasein.13

Heidegger thus reveals that Dasein, which occupies a higher position in his ontology, is a being conscious of its own being; in other words, man. Dasein is not the existence of a particular individual but the existence of a genus: in his discourse on ‘I,’ Hegel states, “Thought conceived as a subject (agent) is a thinker, and the subject existing as a thinker is simply denoted by the term ‘I.’”14 Concerning ‘I’ as subject, Hegel further proposes that “for everyone else is an ‘I’ or ‘Ego,’ and when I call myself ‘I,’ though I indubitably mean the single person myself, I express a thorough universal.”15 In other words, as an independent, individual being, ‘I’ is myself; as a constituent of a class, ‘I’ is ‘we’: ‘I’ is the unity of the individual and the universal, which normally stand as opposites. The existence of ‘we’ differentiates being itself into ‘subject’ and ‘object.’ The relation between the two is predicated on Dasein, in which man is the subject and subject is logically prioritized over object. In this regard, Marx and Engels point out, “Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not ‘relate’ itself to anything, it does not ‘relate’ itself at all. For the animal its relation to others does not exist as a relation.”16 In other words, for a relationship to exist and for thought and being to exist as a question of relation, there must be an ‘I’ and a subject-object relation constructed through self-consciousness. This subject-object relation is the relation of Dasein to being or the relation of our thought to being. This implies that the relation between subject and object is also the relation between thought and being. 12 Heidegger

[6]. Being and Time, pp. 5–6. 14 Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 126. 15 Ibid., p. 136. 16 Marx and Engels. Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 5: The German Ideology, p. 44. 13 Heidegger,

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The relation of the subject to the object is premised on the logical priority of the subject. In the subject-object relation, therefore, thought has logical priority over being. Being as the object of thought is being comprehended by thought; encompassing both necessitates encompassing determinate existents and indeterminate pure being. The comprehension of thought for the determinateness of existent being is a never-ending process, while the comprehension of thought for the indeterminateness of pure being implies the infinite possibilities of the unity of thought and being, mobility possessed by thought itself. Thought’s comprehension of being through its own mobility is the intrinsic basis for achieving the unity of thought and being, subject and object. When thought comprehends being as determinate, it must resort to the historical process of creating and modifying concepts and categories, or the determinateness of being comprehended by thought. Concepts and categories serve as the summary, accumulation, and sublimation of human civilization in human thought, what Lenin calls the ‘rungs’ and ‘scaffolding’ of cognition. Using these rungs and scaffolding, human thought continually expands and deepens its cognition of the determinateness of being, thereby achieving the concrete and historical identity of thought and being. Hegel refers to this self-consciously realizing the freedom of the whole of thought and the necessary unity of each moment. This is the identity of thought and being, as constituted by Hegel, using conceptual development; it is also Hegel’s logic of conceptual dialectics. It presents the shift from thought and being in itself to for itself and then to the unity of in and for itself based on its rationality. An understanding of the concepts of being, existent, and Dasein leads to the following conclusion: ‘ontology’ in a philosophical sense is not merely a theory concerning pure being or existents but is instead the dual relation of thought to being premised on the logical priority of Dasein. It reflects both the mobility of thought, as expressed by the relation of thought to pure being, and the reality of thought, as expressed by the relation of thought to existents. Together, these two relations reflect the relation between subject and object, and, in essence, the relation between thought and being. This indicates that ontology is not a theory of being separate from thought but rather addresses the question of the relation between thought and being by regarding being as the object of reflection. In other words, ontology is a dialectics containing the question of the relation between thought and being and, in essence, ontology and dialectics are the same thing.

1.4 Being and Noumenon In the relation between thought and being, the mobility of thought lies not only in its continuous construction of determinate existents, but also in its constant questioning concerning the grounds for existents’ existence. This questioning reveals a special intension of ontology: noumenology.

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There are two views of noumenology worth exploring. The first equates ontology with noumenology while the second contrasts ontology with noumenology. Although these two views appear in stark opposition, they include common implicit premises.

1.5 Is “Noumenon” Being or Nothing? Willard Van Orman Quine, an important contemporary philosopher, highlights the importance and arduousness of these discussions. In his essay On What There Is, he points out that the ontological problem must distinguish between an “ontological statement” and “ontological commitment”; the former concerns the question of “what there is,” whereas the latter concerns the question of “what we say there is.”17 This distinction not only reflects the common position of contemporary Western philosophy that ‘ontology without epistemology is useless,’ but also highlights the relation between thought and being as related to the subject-object relation. Thus, it is a modern philosophical reflection on ontology. Nevertheless, further reflection on Quine’s distinction leads to the following question: when describing “what there is” and “what we say there is”, to what does what refer to—determinate existent or indeterminate pure being? If the former, then in what sense is Quine’s thought an ontology? If the latter, then in what sense is it a “what”? Undoubtedly, Quine’s “what” only refers to determinate existent and not indeterminate pure being: to Quine, being as ontology is not being as constituted by philosophical reflection but being as used in everyday language. Quine conflates common sense being with that in philosophy, thereby also conflating “what” as existents with “noumenon” as the ground (for existence). Quine’s ontological commitment of “what we say there is” does not refer to the commitment of noumenon as the ground but is merely an epistemological reflection on what there is. Being as noumenon does not refer to currently existing existents but to the question of how existents can exist. In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger poses this profound question: “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?”18 According to Heidegger, there are three levels of “nothing”: The first encompasses ‘what is now present at hand,’ ‘what has previously been,’ and ‘what will be in the future’; the second asks ‘from what ground do beings come?’, ‘On what ground do beings stand?’, and ‘To what ground do beings go?’; the third concerns ‘one being [who] always keeps coming to the fore in this questioning: the human beings who pose this question.’19

In other words, Heidegger’s understanding of nothing refers to the questioning of the ground on which beings exist by the “human beings who pose this question.” To Heidegger, noumenon is not being, but nothing; it is not the being of beings (i.e., 17 Willard Van Orman Quine. “On What There Is.” In From a Logical Point of View: 9 LogicoPhilosophical Essays. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 1–19. 18 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 1. 19 Ibid., pp. 2–4.

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existents), but the ground on which beings exist as beings. Heidegger confirms that ontology is the philosophical theory of nothing, or that which concerns “how it is possible.” The key question then lies in why human beings question noumenon as nothing. Humans exist in reality, and their objects of cognition exist with determinateness. Thus, the real relation between man and the world can only be the relation between Dasein and existents rather than that between pure thought and pure being. In this sense, the question of the relation between thought and being is also the question of how to unify thought and being, or how to constitute thought rather than how it is possible to reflect on thought. Humans achieve the unity of thought and being through the mobility of thought. Therefore, the questioning of being by thought is not only thought’s questioning of the determinateness of existents, but also thought’s questioning of how existents exist. This, then, constitutes an ontology with a special intension, a noumenology that questions the ground of being. In other words, the question of the relation between thought and being not only includes the ontology of being, but also the noumenology of how being exists.

1.6 Does “Noumenon” Refer to Origin or Essence? There are two basic philosophical approaches to the search for noumenon. The first regards noumenon as origin, seeking the primordial source and matrix from which all things originate and to which all things return, thus explaining the unity of all things. The other regards noumenon as the essence of logical relations, thereby seeking the essence of phenomena. The former attempts to explain all existents through a particular existent, that is, all particulars through a special being. This implies that the diversity of quantity can be explained through the identification of quality, thus necessitating the second concept, or noumenon as essence. This latter approach, or noumenon as essence, includes three fundamental premises. First, the essence of thought requires separating being itself from the phenomenon of being. In other words, empirical observations of phenomena are not being itself, but rather being itself is transcendent and hidden behind empirical phenomena. Second, subject and object are opposed, thus regarding noumenon as essence that transcends or exceeds human beings and as entities is unrelated to historical human states. Such an approach attempts to eliminate all subjectivity and return being to its true form. Finally, the goal of this approach is to separate the absolute from the relative, thus striving to adopt as its starting point ‘a highest, intuitively grasped certainty’ (i.e., the most universal principle or theory governing the universe) in order to achieve the most thorough, unifying explanation of all human experience, thereby providing humans with an ultimate ‘eternal verity.’ The three premises above demonstrate that the philosophical meaning of noumenology does not lie in the fact that it views noumenon as origin or essence but instead in how it separates essence from phenomenon, thereby pursuing the

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origin or essence, splitting the subjective from the objective, and opposing the relative to the absolute. Its substance lies in philosophy’s need to reveal absolute truth, supreme goodness, and ultimate beauty. When philosophers turned from the pursuit of noumenon toward human cognition, the theoretical kernel of philosophical research underwent a transformation, determining that ontology without epistemology is useless,. Instead, modern philosophy regards reflection on human cognition as its theoretical kernel. The metaphysical mode of thought that pursues pure objectivity and seeks the absolute opposition of subjectivity and objectivity has been abandoned in favor of a dialectical theory that seeks to unify thought and being, the subjective and objective. As a result, independent noumenological philosophy and its representative metaphysical mode of thought have been negated by classical German philosophy’s dialectical mode of thought. As far as it is concerned, in Hegelian logic, the self-construction of thought is a dual negation. On the one hand, thought is constantly negating its nothingness in order to gain richer determinateness; this is the process by which thought constructs itself. On the other hand, thought is constantly negating its determinateness in order to reconstruct its determinateness on a deeper level; this is the process by which thought reflects on itself. Within this process of dual negation, thought achieves constant enrichment and hierarchical leaps in its intensions. This is Hegel’s dialectics of ontology or ontology of dialectics; it unifies construction and reflection, determinateness and criticalness, progression and leaps. It is worth pondering the fact that Hegel’s dialectics of ontology or ontology of dialectics concerns not merely the determinateness of thought but also negates the determinateness of thought; in other words, Hegelian noumenology is an ontology of thinking about thinking that prepares the ground for the determination of thought. Marx, meanwhile, differs from Hegel in his views regarding the contradictory movements of thought’s self-negation and the ontological pursuit of human thought in practice. Engels, likewise, clearly specifies that human thought based in human practice is the “dialectical unity” of the “sovereign” and the “non-sovereign”: “It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition, its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual realization and in reality at any particular moment.”20 He argues that the ontological pursuit of philosophy is rooted in the ‘disposition, vocation, possibilities and historical ultimate goal’ of human thought, that is, the supremacy of human thought. Marxist philosophy believes that the practical activities of human society and human cognitive activities based in practice are a continuously unfolding historical process. In this historical process, all human cognitive results, including philosophical ontological pursuits, will always have a relative nature. At the same time, human practice and cognition will never remain on the same plane but will constantly move towards freedom of the whole. Therefore, Marxist philosophy refutes the illusion that traditional ontology dominates absolute truth but does not reject ontological pursuit based on the disposition of human practice and thought.

20 Marx

and Engels, Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 25: Engels: Anti-Dühring, p. 80.

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1.7 Noumenology and the Noumenological Pursuit Human thought that is based in human practice constantly strives to create a space in which it is possible on the deepest level or most radical sense, thus establishing a secure place of settlement for human life. Therefore, noumenology is not a theory of noumenon but rather the intentional pursuit of noumenon that attempts to trace the source of the ultimate concerns regarding the relations between man and the world. The rationality of the noumenological pursuit lies in the fact that humans always postulate a goal which is based in reality but which also transcends reality, thus negating real existence and transforming reality into ideal reality. The true meaning of the noumenological pursuit lies in the fact that it inspires humans to forever maintain a necessary tension between ideality and reality, ultimate directionality and historical certainty, while also constantly disrupting this subtle balance and allowing humans to maintain a vibrant sense of truth, goodness, and beauty in their activities, thus opening a space for self-critique and self-transcendence.21 Noumenology based on the sovereignty of human thought is critical and dialectical, and the pursuit of noumenon is contradictory: noumenology points toward a basic principle resulting in the intrinsic unification of man and human thought with the world, and strives to provide human existence and development with scaffolding using this basic principle. However, the development of human history constantly challenges this explanation and undermines the authority and effectiveness of the ‘scaffolding’ it provides. Noumenology regards the noumenon, or basic principle, as the basic criteria by which it explains and evaluates all things, thus creating an explanatory cycle from which it cannot escape. Philosophers seek to expose their opponents’ internal contradictions, thus enabling cyclical leaps of noumenological explanation to a higher level and reflecting the self-contradiction of philosophical noumenology. How one treats such internal contradictions is the distinguishing marker between traditional and modern philosophy: traditional philosophy strives to gain an absolute and ultimate noumenon, viewing the world as black and white and eternally unchanging with an abstract opposition between true and false, good and evil, beautiful and ugly. This historically transcendent and rigid noumenological mode has dominated human thought for thousands of years. However, contemporary philosophers have rebelled against such a ‘metaphysical horror,’ moving from polarity to mediation in its mode of thought, from system to questions in its research path, and from hierarchical to sequential in its basic theories. In other words, it seeks to understand the philosophical pursuit of noumenon and the noumenological pursuit of philosophy starting from human historical development. For example, Marxist philosophy starts with real men and their historical development, which represents a true revolution in noumenology. Noumenon formed during human historical development and used to explain and evaluate all things and to govern thoughts and behaviors is a type of historical progression and limitation pregnant with new possibilities. In terms of its progression, the noumenon to which 21 Sun

[7].

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humans are committed in their own age reflects their highest understanding regarding the unity of man and the world; it becomes the criterion to normalize and evaluate all human thoughts and behaviors in that age (i.e., the highest scaffolding), and it is absolute. In terms of its limitations, meanwhile, the noumenon to which humans are committed is also the product of a specific historical era; as the highest scaffolding for all human activities in that age, it manifests the one-sidedness from which humans, as historical beings, cannot escape, and it is relative. Finally, in terms of its historical possibility, the noumenon to which humans are committed in their own age serves as the rungs and scaffolding constructed during the process of human advancement and provides a real possibility for the continuation of human development. In other words, noumenon, as the basis and criteria to normalize human thoughts and behaviors, is forever self-sublating; noumenology, or noumenological pursuit, is the dialectics of noumenological critique. The analysis above indicates that noumenology is not knowledge concerning existents but instead the questioning of being, including the existence of existents, being of being, and how it is possible. Such questioning is based on the sovereignty of human thought, which is also the questioning of human thought’s disposition, mission, possibilities, and ultimate historical goal. The intentional questioning and pursuit of noumenon attempts to trace the source; it is humans’ never-ending attempt to determine the basis, criteria, and measure for their own thoughts and behaviors. In other words, a noumenology that regards the question of the relation between thought and being as its substantive content both uses the sovereignty of thought to pursue and construct the highest scaffolding that normalizes all human thoughts and behaviors and reflects on and critiques the scaffolding it constructs. This unity of opposites between the pursuit of and reflection on the “highest scaffolding” is the dialectics of noumenological critique, which is also the dialectics of the question of the relation between thought and being.

2 A Critique of the Premises Underlying the World To understand the basic concepts by which humans comprehend the world, it is necessary to first define what is meant by “the world.” Likewise, if philosophy is understood as a theoretical and systematized world outlook, then it is necessary to define what is meant by “world outlook.”

2.1 The World and Being Philosophical research often does not distinguish between ontology, noumenology, and world outlook, defining the latter as one or both of the two former. Further clarifying the relation between the three terms and differentiating between ontology and

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noumenology is crucial for a deeper understanding of the relation between thought and being and philosophy’s theoretical nature and unique social function. The world is not equivalent to being: being is indeterminate pure thought, whereas the world is an existent endowed with determinateness through thought. It may then be further classified into different worlds using a specific determinateness as the criterion. Because the world is determinate being, it has particular intensions. The move from being to the world implies being’s conversion from pure being to being that is comprehended, endowed with determinateness, and demarcated with boundaries through thought. This bounded world is then divided into different worlds.

2.2 The Material and Spiritual Worlds Being may be distinguished into material and spiritual being. However, when making a similar demarcation of the world into matter and spirit, we must reflect upon two important questions: the determinateness of matter and the determinateness of spirit. According to common sense concepts, matter refers to various things that can be seen and touched: matter in this sense is also being. Therefore, common sense often conflates matter, being, and the world. In the natural sciences, however, matter refers to objects’ basic morphology, constituent elements, and hierarchical structure. In this sense, matter is still an empirical object, but one composed through the mediation of various experimental methods: it is a constrained understanding of being and the world and hence is clearly distinct from common sense definitions. Finally, in philosophy matter refers to the abstraction of all existents beyond the spirit. Lenin describes this understanding of matter by saying, “Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality,” and hence the unique property of matter is its “objective reality.”22 In other words, common sense, natural science, and philosophy all use matter to describe a basic concept by which humans comprehend the world and constitute thought; however, matter has different kinds of determinateness depending on the definition. The philosophical perspective of matter can only be established in its relation to “spirit.” In this sense, the relation of spirit and matter is a basic demarcation of the world through thought as it reflects on being, or the division of the world into conscious being (spirit) and being outside of consciousness (matter). Such a demarcation lays a materialist foundation for understanding the relation between thought and being. When understood relative to matter, spirit commonly refers to consciousness, or the function and attribute of a special matter (i.e., the human brain) and the reflection of matter in the human brain. Spirit as consciousness is the existence of concepts; “the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and

22 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 14, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p. 130.

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translated into forms of thought.”23 Here, the ideal includes both concepts’ form and content. In terms of the former, spirit encompasses sensations and perceptions, representations and abstractions, induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, association and imagination, intuition and logic, etc. Spirit as social consciousness, meanwhile, includes myths, religion, art, science, philosophy, etc. The contents of these different concepts, in turn, constitute the meaningful cultural world that contains man’s mythological, religious, artistic, scientific, and philosophical worlds. Rather than being divided into spirit and matter, the cultural world forms a human world distinct from the world in itself . This requires that we not only reflect upon the question of the relation between thought and being from the perspective of the spiritual and material worlds, but also from the perspective of the human world, cultural world, and meaning-world.

2.3 The World ‘In Itself’ and the Cultural World In this demarcation, the world is broken into the world in itself and the world of culture. It is necessary, therefore, to understand the basic mode by which humans comprehend the world, transforming it from the former to the latter. Doing so, viewing the world as the basic mode by which humans comprehend the world, allows for a deeper understanding of how world outlook affects the relation between thought and being and how it is related to ontology and noumenology. The world in itself is the world that exists naturally, and it is in a constant state of motion and change. The term implies that the world in itself exists beyond man and does not shift according to man’s will and that it can be viewed outside of man’s relation to the world. When viewing the world through the lens of man’s relation to it, the world becomes man’s “object-world” or “worldview.” Worldview is a view of the world presented to human; it is comprehended through human modes and formed through human historical development. While this view is of the world itself, i.e., the world in itself , it can only be formed through mediation from the various modes by which man comprehends the world. Therefore, man’s worldview has a dual intension: it is both a view of the world itself rather than an illusory view and it is not the world in itself , rather a view of the world that human has formed through its own methods. As discussed in the previous section, this implies that the human worldview is inseparable from the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world. It is only by clarifying these basic modes that we can come to know their worldview. The basic modes by which humans comprehend the world provide humans with a rich and varied worldview through common sense, religion, art, ethics, science, and/or philosophy. A common sense worldview, for example, originates from and is applicable to human experience. The worldview of religion, meanwhile, posits a 23 Marx and Engels, Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 35: Marx: Capital, Volume I (Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling Trans.), p. 19.

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heavenly world or otherworld separate from the “real” world. An artistic worldview prioritizes the poetic, aesthetic, and symbolic. A scientific worldview is described by consistent and orderly symbolic systems and conceptual frameworks. Finally, a philosophical worldview seeks to use ontology, noumenology, and world outlook to reflect on the relation between thought and being. Furthermore, on the basic modes by which humans understand the world, in his book Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Karl Popper divides the world into three “sub-worlds”: “First, the world of physical objects or of physical states; secondly, the world of states of consciousness, or of mental states, or perhaps of behavioral dispositions to act; and thirdly, the world of objective contents of thought, especially of scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of art.”24 Expanding on this third world, Popper differentiates between “subjective knowledge” and “objective spirit,” describing the third world as containing “objective knowledge.” To accomplish this, Popper first distinguishes between two types of knowledge: subjective and objective. He suggests that so-called “subjective knowledge” is composed of “dispositions” to act a certain way, believe in certain things, and say certain things; hence, it encompasses the thought processes of the second world and the related brain processes of the first world. Objective knowledge, meanwhile, is composed of logical theories, conjectures, and guesses. This distinction leads to his three worlds: “the physical world, ‘World 1’, the world of our conscious experience, ‘World 2’, and the world of the logical contents of books, libraries, computer memories, and suchlike, ‘World 3.’”25 In order to satisfy the preconditions for the existence of World 3, Popper criticizes the common sense theory of knowledge by saying, “The common sense theory of knowledge is unaware of World 3, and it thus ignores the existence of knowledge in the objective sense.”26 “Objective knowledge” in the study of the philosophy of culture owes much to Popper’s commitments and their critique in academia. Using subjective knowledge as a comparison, Popper also explains the difference between his theory of objective knowledge and Hegel’s “objective spirit.” He suggests that the most important differences between Hegel’s objective and absolute spirit and his own third world include the following points: (1) According to Hegel, though the Objective Spirit (comprising artistic creation) and Absolute Spirit (comprising philosophy) both consist of human productions, man is not creative . . . As against this I assert that the individual creative element, the relation of give-and-take between a man and his work, is of the greatest importance. In Hegel this degenerates into the doctrine that the great man is something like a medium in which the Spirit of the Epoch expresses itself.” [. . .] (2) My schema works through error-elimination, and on the scientific level through conscious criticism under the regulative idea of the search for truth.” [. . .] (3) My third world has no similarity whatever to human consciousness, and though its first inmates are products of human consciousness, they are totally different from conscious ideas or from thoughts in the subjective sense.27 24 Popper,

Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, p. 106. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, pp. 73–74. 26 Ibid., p. 74. 27 Ibid., pp. 125–126. 25 Popper,

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Popper emphasizes three points: First, man creates the third world. Second, man’s rational critique is the mechanism for World 3’s self-development. Finally, the third world has an objective, rather than subjective, existence. These differences not only help us understand objective knowledge but also directly evoke philosophical concern toward the basic content of objective knowledge: science. Science occupies an especially important position in man’s cultural world: it not only constitutes a worldview that contains the intensions of our age, but also a mode of thought and values ideas. Together, the scientific worldview, mode of thought, and values exist as objective knowledge, thus constituting real culture which can be criticized. A critique of the premises underlying science is a critique of the premises underlying the worldview, mode of thought, and values of each age, which is also a critique of the premises underlying the culture of that age. It is worth noting that the philosophy of culture often neglects, or even rejects, the philosophical reflection of science, especially of natural science. “Scientism,” in particular, is frequently susceptible to overlooking philosophical concern toward science as culture. This, in turn, results in a divide between the philosophy of culture and the philosophy of science, thus opposing “scientific culture” with “humanistic culture.” Marx Wartofsky, a philosopher of science, explains the philosophy of science as the humanistic understanding of science; thus, he argues, it is an important part of the philosophy of culture, and a critique of the premises underlying culture should include a critique of the premises underlying science.28 Therefore, objective knowledge, i.e., science, the basic content of Popper’s third world, has an indispensable significance in the critique of the premises underlying culture. It should also be noted that Popper’s third world encompasses not only scientific thought but also poetic thought and works of art.29 This posits the existence of two types of culture: scientific and humanistic. Therefore, within the purview of the third world, a critique of the premises underlying culture should naturally include a critique of the premises underlying scientific culture, humanistic culture, and their interrelations. In terms of science, German physicist Max Planck states: Science is a self-contained unity: it is divided into various branches, but this division has no natural foundation and is due simply to the limitations of the human mind which compel us to adopt a division of labor. Actually there is a continuous chain from physics and chemistry to biology and anthropology and thence to the social and intellectual sciences.30

Popper’s evolutionary approach highlights only the exploration of scientific thought, especially of natural science, and overlooks the elucidation of humanistic culture. Nevertheless, the existence of these two types of cultures inspires a deeper understanding of the relation between thought and being and a deeper critique of the premises underlying culture. The philosophical meaning of World 3 as objective knowledge lies first in the fact that it highlights the historicity of the question of the relation between thought and 28 Sun

[8].

29 Popper, 30 Planck

Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, p. 106. [9].

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being. In other words, it reifies the abstract question of the relation between thought and being as one mediated by objective knowledge. This relation not only involves the relation between thought and being in the scientific world, which takes scientific thought as its content, but in the cultural world, which takes historical culture as its content. The relation between thought and being within the purview of culture, therefore, not only deepens reflection on the relation between thought and being, but also initiates philosophical reflection on culture in terms of the question of the relation between thought and being. Second, the philosophical meaning of the third world as objective knowledge also lies in the fact that it provides an extremely important critique of the premises underlying culture. Wartofsky makes the following comparison between common sense and science: “Common sense is by its very nature acritical . . . it is the emergence of this criticism [that is] crucial in the transition from common sense to science.”31 Common sense is acritical because it does not possess the conditions of criticizability. Critique requires the capacity for experience to be regarded as the object of reflection. Only an organized and systematic body of knowledge explicitly expressed in a single language can become the object of critical and explicit reflection. According to Wartofsky, “The most important difference between science and common sense lies in the explicitness and the refutability of scientific proposition and in the aim of science to be consciously and deliberately critical as a matter of course.”32 In other words, the cultural critique of World 3 is not merely a cultural reflection on science but on various cultural activities. Wartofsky states that there is a danger in relying solely on scientific methods to build the world of human experience: “The continuity of science with common sense, of scientific activity with fundamental human activities, of scientific understanding with the common understanding is broken.”33 If we view Popper’s World 3 in terms of Wartofsky’s humanistic understanding of science, thereby understanding culture in terms of the relation between scientific and humanistic culture, the horizons of the philosophy of culture expand, thus advancing the critique of the premises underlying culture. Humans achieve their relation with the world through the mediation of basic modes. These modes not only provide them with a rich and varied world, but also enable them to live within worlds with different meanings. If we view the relation between man and the world from this perspective, this undermines Marx’s critique of ‘world outlook’ as the fundamental viewpoint concerning the whole world, or assertion that that world outlook is ‘conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation.’ Instead, man constructs his worldview through his own basic modes, or his own vision during his lifetime. It is worth pondering the fact that each person’s constructed worldview includes the determinateness of thought in regard to being (i.e. a “real” worldview) and the

31 Wartofsky

[10]. p. 66–67. 33 Ibid., p. 24. 32 Ibid.,

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negation of thought in regard to being (i.e. an “ideal” worldview). Therefore, a philosophical world outlook is both the ontology of “how it exists” and the noumenology of “how it is possible.” Thus, world outlook contains the dual intensions of ontology and noumenology.

2.4 Real and Ideal Worlds The demarcation between the real and ideal worlds highlights the negative unity of man with the world and the sovereignty of human thought based on practice, thereby underscoring the ontological meaning of world outlook. Human practical activities create a differentiation between the world in itself and the world for itself , the natural world and the human world. This differentiation does not split the world into two completely different existences; that is, it does not split the world into (1) some other world and (2) the human world, as we encounter in religious modes of comprehension. Instead, human’s practical activities cause the natural world to have a dual nature. More specifically, if man is the subject of practice and the world is the object, then both are eternally natural existences in terms of origin. However, the subject-object relation between the two also implies that both human and the world are the result and product of man’s own practical activities; hence, both belong to the human world that humans have created themselves. Not only does human practice create this dualization of the real world, but it also creates a “threefold world” of human life: humans are natural beings, surviving with other organisms in the natural world; they are social beings, existing beyond nature and living within the cultural world they have created; and they are sociocultural beings, dominated by history and culture but also showing new possibilities in their own historical activities, thus living in a meaning world that merges history and individuals. This meaning world is created by humans to realize their self-development. Therefore, man’s world outlook does not concern the world in itself but rather the meaning world; this outlook views the world from the standpoint of practice, as reflected in Marx’s theory of practice. Practice is human’s purposive, conscious activity; it transforms individual purpose and demand into reality. As the subject of activity, man composes his own worldview and changes the world according to his ideals through practical activities. As man’s mode of existence, practice implicitly contains various contradictions, including subjects’ natural and supernatural nature, the purposiveness and regularity of practical activities, the practical measure of man and things, and the objectification of the subject and the subjectification of the object. It also contains contradictions between the reality and universality, reality and ideality, and reality and infinity of practical activities. Lenin states, “Man’s practice = the demand (1) also of external actuality (2).”34 He continues on to explain the demand of practice by saying, “The world does

34 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, Philosophical Notebooks, p. 213.

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not satisfy man and man decides to change it by his activity.”35 In other words, the demand or purpose of practice is an unreal, conceptual existence, an ideal existence that directs practical activities. Therefore, the essence of practice lies in the fact that humans are always dissatisfied with their own reality and constantly strive to change reality into ideal reality. The practical process is a dualized one: on the one hand it changes the reality of the world into unreality, while on the other hand it changes human ideality into reality through objective existence. The contradiction between the ideality and reality of practical activities causes a unique negative unity between humanity and the world: man performs a real negation of the current state of the world through ideal demand, causing the world to become the demanded reality and thus achieving unity between man and the world. The individual realization of reality due to practical activity is limited at any particular moment, whereas human practical activity itself is an unlimited process of historical unfolding. The unlimited directionality and process of practice is revealed in its unfolding. Human practical activity is the act of changing the world according to human desires. Hence, human thought based in human practice always manifests as the pursuit of the unlimited: the pursuit of the ultimate being to bring about unity of the world, the pursuit of the ultimate explanation to bring about unity of knowledge, the pursuit of the ultimate value to bring about unity of meaning, etc. Based on the mode of existence of human practice and, more directly, the contradiction between the reality and infinity of practice, it is evident that philosophy pursues the ultimate being to bring about unity of the world. This is the ultimate directionality from which human practice and thought, both objectified activities, cannot escape. It is this that motivates humans to tirelessly seek answers to the mysteries of the world and to continuously renew their worldview and mode of thought. Philosophy can also be said to pursue the ultimate explanation to bring about unity of knowledge. This is the ultimate directionality of human thought in its reflective thinking regarding the ultimate being. It drives humans to labor arduously in scientific research and continuously transforms the rungs and scaffolding on which human cognition of the world is based. Finally, philosophy pursues the ultimate value to bring about unity of meaning. This is the ultimate directionality of human thought in its reflection on human’s existence. It provokes humans to ruminate over the relation between man and the world, continuously questioning their hypotheses and challenging their premises, thus laying down the highest scaffolding for their thoughts and behaviors. Practice possesses unlimited directionality, while philosophy attempts to secure a place of settlement for human life in the world through the confirmation of the unity of the world (ultimate being), the possession of the unity of knowledge (ultimate knowledge), and the determination of the unity of meaning (ultimate value). This can be summarized as world outlook as ontology, or ontology as world outlook.

35 Ibid.

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2.5 Ontology, Noumenology, and World Outlook and the Question of the Relation Between Thought and Being Together, ontology, noumenology, and world outlook are the philosophical theory constructed from the reflection of human thought on the question of the relation between thought and being. To clarify the relations among the three requires both exploring their respective relation to the question of the relation between thought and being, and deep reflection on the premises of each. Ontology is premised on the particularity of man’s being: in other words, it is the reflection of man’s thought about being. Therefore, ontology is not a question of being separate from thought, but rather is a question of the relation between thought and being as constituted in the reflection of thought. This suggests three things about ontology. First, ontology is the reflection of thought with being as its object; hence, consciousness that departs from reflection is unable to construct a philosophical ontology. Second, ontology’s basic question is that of the relation between thought and being; departing from this basic question implies that a philosophical ontology cannot be constructed. Third, an ontology that regards the question of the relation between thought and being as its basic question reflects the contradictory relation between thought and being; hence, departing from dialectical thinking implies that a philosophical ontology cannot be constructed. In his Science of Logic, Hegel presents the dialectics of ontology as the dialectical movement of thought and being from in itself to for itself and thence to in and for itself . This is further presented as the dialectical development from ‘being’ to ‘essence’ and thence to ‘notion’, thereby constituting a ‘tripartite consistency’ among ontology, epistemology, and logic. In Capital, meanwhile, Marx regards being as existence within real history, thus revealing the relations between men within the relations between things and the real social relations among people within the logical relations among economic categories. Marx’s ontology, therefore, transforms Hegel’s ontology concerning the intensional logic of thought into one concerning the intensional logic of history, thus transforming the traditional philosophical ontological question of how the world is possible into one of how is liberation possible. Marx’s ontology not only conforms to the Hegelian dialectics of the tripartite consistency among ontology, epistemology, and logic, but also a similar Marxist tripartite dialectics among the theories of being, truth, and value and of a ruthless criticism of all that exists. Marx’s critical and revolutionary dialectics, therefore, is an ontology concerning real history that addresses the possibility of liberation. Ontology, meanwhile, is premised not only in the mobility of thought but also in its sovereignty; not only in the constant affirmation of thought to itself but also its constant negation of itself. Thought’s affirmation of itself is the acquisition of richer determinateness in its movements, while its negation consists of its ever-deepening pursuit of the possibilities of being. The pursuit of being’s possibilities is the ground for the pursuit of determinateness and of the premise underlying the self-construction of thought. The premise underlying the self-construction of thought, meanwhile, is

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neither indeterminate pure being nor determinate existents, but rather being hidden within thought that constrains and normalizes all human thoughts and behaviors; such being is the invisible hand of thought. This being within thought that is both “is” and “is not” is the being of noumenon: the being that normalizes all human thoughts and behaviors and that is the basis, criteria, and measure of all human thoughts and behaviors and which underlies thought. Noumenology is not an ontology of the determinations of thought, but rather an ontology that reflects on the determinations of thought. It is not an ontology of affirmation, in other words, but one of negation. It is not an ontology of reality, but one of ideality. To understand noumenology, or this ontology of negation, ideality, and criticality, it is necessary to understand that reflection on noumenology is not the same as reflection in the general sense, but rather refers to reflection on the premises underlying thought. In addition, reflection on noumenology is not general “thinking about thinking,” but is rather thinking about thinking on the critique of the premises underlying thought. This is also the dialectics of noumenological critique. Finally, world outlook is premised on humanity’s constructed objective picture of the world. We cannot conceive of world outlook only as object or as contemplation but instead must understand it subjectively, as based on the relation between thought and being and as the product of the dialectical movements between the two. We also cannot conceive of world outlook based solely on its reality but instead based on its possibility. The world does not exist merely as existents that can be comprehended by thought, but also as non-being in the purposive demand of thought. This is the unity of opposites between the reality and possibility of thought, but even more so, it is the unity of opposites between the reality and possibility of the practical basis for thought. Practice is the negative unity of man to the world, which implies that man is not merely a real being but also an ideal being, a being that transforms the ideal into reality and reality into the ideal. Therefore, world outlook is not merely an ontology that reflects on being, but also a noumenology that reflects on the premises of thought. It is man’s vision over his lifetime and in Dasein’s life it is the transformation the ideal into reality. Thus, the great basic question of world outlook as human vision is that regarding the relation between thought and being. Its substantive theoretical nature and content is the unity of ontology and noumenology, and its fundamental social function is in guiding people to participate in the comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things while also recognizing the negation of that state, thus opening up a space for the human pursuit of the ideal. The above analysis describes the tripartite consistency among ontology, noumenology, and world outlook that regards the question of the relation between thought and being as its basic question. Philosophy involves historical thinking and thinking about history, which in turn requires us to view philosophy with a historical and progressive vision, continuously endowing philosophical ideas with new intensions of the age. Exploring ontology, noumenology, and world outlook allows us to see that the history of philosophy is the history of reflection on the question of the relation between thought and being and of shaping and guiding a new spirit of the age. It is also the history of transforming and reconstructing the human worldview, mode

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of thought, values, and ultimate concerns. It is only by renewing our understanding of ontology, noumenology, and world outlook, with a focus on this question, that we are able to continuously deepen our understanding of philosophy as the essence of the spirit of the age and the living soul of civilization.

3 A Critique of the Premises Underlying History If man is a historical being and history is a basic concept underlying thought, then it is necessary to develop a precise definition for history. Does history possess objectivity? What is the relation between human historical activities and the laws of historical development? Is historicism the same as relativism? How we understand the answers to these questions directly affects our understanding of the relations between humanity and the world and between thought and being.

3.1 History and Man’s Mode of Existence Man is a transcendent, creative, and ideal being who transforms the real world into an ideal reality through the individual creative process. This is the negative unity of humanity and the world and of the ideal and reality. It is through the act of obtaining this negative unity that man constitutes his own concrete and real historical and cultural existence. The difference between humans and animals lies in their different life activities. The life activities of the latter focus on survival, whereas those of the former center around ‘living.’ We often regard survival and living as activities that maintain life. However, it is only by viewing both as activities that continue life and inherit culture that we can understand human history and culture and, by extension, the question of the relation between thought and being. First, it is necessary to understand how animals continue their species through survival activities. Marx states that animals have one ‘measure’: that of the species to which they belong. In other words, animals must adapt instinctively according to their species, thereby achieving natural reproduction and instinctively passing life from generation to generation. This sort of life activity can also be understood as ‘replicative.’ Human life activities, meanwhile, are a result of unity between the ‘scale of all things’ and man’s ‘intrinsic and inherent measure,’ or the unity between regularity and purposiveness. Thus, man’s life activities do not merely modify the environment, but also human himself. In this dual process, the continuation of human life transcends the replication of individual lifeforms, thereby bringing about human history. Human history is achieved through the duality of human inheritance: the unity of acquired inheritance (i.e., natural inheritance) and hereditary acquisition (i.e., cultural inheritance). Man is a historical being, hence he is also a cultural being.

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Human life activities, therefore, not only change their living environments; they ‘humanize’ nature, transforming the world to which human belongs into a human one, and ‘culturalize’ human himself, transforming the human world into a cultural one. As described by Dobzhansky in his famous work, Genetics and the Origin of Species, culture is a mode of human inheritance: The adaptation to the environment is achieved in animals and plants by changing their genotypes; man alone responds to the challenges of the environment chiefly through discovery, invention, and the forms of behavior which constitute culture. Now, cultural evolution is a process which is vastly more rapid and more efficient than biological evolution. [. . .] The capacity to acquire and to transmit cultural traits became selectively very important in the human species.36

In other words, humans achieve historical development through the inheritance and evolution of culture. Language occupies an extremely important position in human cultural inheritance. Biologists claim that there are striking similarities between genetic code and language structure. For example, both include symbols that must be placed within a particular system to gain specific meaning; the isolated units themselves have no value. As with language symbols, genetic code always has a hierarchical structure, and the identity of units within a single level can only be confirmed once combined and elevated to higher-level units. And, as with language phonemes, chromosomal DNA bases comprise various distinguishing features. Some structural linguists believe these striking similarities are by no means accidental, but instead due to the fact that our human ancestors transmitted two basic types of information systems to their offspring: the biological genetic code, transmitted by cellular chromosomes, and language abilities transmitted through neuro- and socio-psychological mechanisms.37 Human cultural inheritance, therefore, indicates this duality between natural and social relations in the human production of life and the historicity of human existence.

3.2 Historical Premises and Results In this section we will discuss the topic of premises underlying history in light of the following question: Does social being determine social consciousness or does social consciousness determine social being? To answer this question it is necessary to resolve the contradiction underlying human practical activities. If humans make their own history, then social consciousness determines social being, fundamentally negating the regularity of historical development. However, if history operates in accordance with its own laws, then social being determines social consciousness, which in turn negates the claim that humans make their own history. This is the 36 Dobzhansky 37 Chen

[12].

[11].

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antinomy of historical outlook, and how philosophers address this antinomy results in radically different historical outlooks. It is precisely in this duality, or antinomy, between human historical activities and historical objectivity, that historical conceptions of materialism become trapped. For example, eighteenth-century French materialists examine this question through the relation between man and the environment. On the one hand, they believe that man and human ideas are products of the environment, hence proposing that to alter either it is first necessary to alter the environment. However, they also believe that modifying the environment depends on the wisdom of geniuses, and that to propose such modification we must first create genius characters and thoughts. This resulted in a split society consisting of two groups: great geniuses able to alter the environment through their thoughts, and everyone else whose selves and ideas are affected by environmental changes. Such an outlook is more historical idealism than natural materialism. Marx and Engels critique such views in The German Ideology, in which they argue against Feuerbach: “As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he considers history he is not a materialist. With him materialism and history diverge completely.”38 Instead, Marx seeks to avoid becoming entrapped in the above antinomy or skewing toward historical idealism, instead using a dialectical mode of thought to offer a historical materialist alternative understanding of human social history. He proposes that, based on the real existence of human beings and their historical development: The existence of the human race is the result of an earlier process which organic life passed through. Man comes into existence only when a certain point is reached. But once man has emerged, he becomes the permanent pre-condition of human history, likewise its permanent product and result, and he is pre-condition only as his own product and result.39

In this quote, Marx addresses the antinomy of the historical outlook that heretofore troubled philosophers, and profoundly elucidates the dialectical relation of man as the pre-condition and result of history. According to Marx, humanity, “the permanent pre-condition of human history,” is always “the result of an earlier process.” In other words, human historical activities are always determined by previously existing historical conditions not created by any given individual but by the previous generation. Therefore, human historical activities are not carried out according to human whims, but are the results of historical activities manifesting as the laws of historical development and do not shift according to human will. Humans receive the real conditions and forces for creating history and then alter themselves and their living environment accordingly, thereby achieving social historical progress and creating new historical conditions for the next generation. Therefore, humans do create their own history, and history is the human process of pursuing its aims. Real humans are both the pre-condition and the result of history: as the result of history, they create new historical pre-conditions, 38 Marx 39 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 5, p. 41. [13].

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while as the pre-conditions of history, they create new historical results. This dialectical movement is the dialectics of man and history, or the laws of history constructed by human historical activities. Marx expands on this approach by saying, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”40 In other words, history is both the human pursuit of its aims and an objective process formed by human activity that does not shift according to human will. If we depart from such dialectical thinking, it is not possible to develop nor understand a theory of historical materialism. The main deficiency of textbooks’ historical outlook, according to Marx, is that they view the relation between man and the world ‘only in the form of the object or of contemplation’ without revealing the antinomy described above, thereby failing to elucidate the dialectical thinking of historical materialism from the standpoint of practice. The Marxist historical outlook views the starting point of history as sensuous human activity and human as participants in history. Thus, it forms a historical materialism that regards history as its explanatory principle, the fact that life determines consciousness as its core idea, the intensional logic of history as its basic content, the liberation of humankind as its value demand, and the transformation of the world as its theoretical direction. Within this framework, the concept of history is far more than just an activity or process, but rather also includes concepts of civilization and development. In Hegel’s “intensional logic of thought,” history and logic are mutually consistent and laws are transformed into the mysterious force of logical priority; history, therefore, is understood as the self-realization of logic. However, Marx’s “intensional logic of history” regards history as human activity by which it pursues it aims; the objectivity of historical laws, therefore, lies in the objectivity of human historical activities, and historical laws manifest as the advancement of human civilization achieved by human activity. The two historical outlooks differ in whether humans and their historical development constitute historical laws or whether history is governed by pre-existing and mysterious laws. It is only by viewing Marx’s materialism and dialectics from the standpoint of practice that we can gain a profound understanding of Marx’s historical outlook and how his ideas differ from Hegel’s. First, Marx’s discourse inspires a deeper understanding of how human exists. Humans, as specific links in the chain of the material world, are beings in itself , or natural beings. The emergence of humans is the result of natural evolution; hence, the material world is the premise for human existence. It is precisely because of this that Marx believes “the existence of the human race is the result of an earlier process which organic life passed through. Man comes into existence only when a certain point is reached.”41 Nevertheless, humans are also the subjects in the cognition and transformation of the world and are thereby also beings for itself , or conscious beings. Humans achieve 40 Marx 41 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 11, p. 103. and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 32, p. 492.

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existence and development through their cognition and transformation of the world. It is precisely because of this that Marx also proposes, “But once man has emerged, he becomes the permanent pre-condition of human history, likewise its permanent product and result, and he is pre-condition only as his own product and result.”42 Thus, history is the true pre-condition for human existence and development. The thesis and antithesis above indicate that we need to understand human existence from the perspective of a synthesis between the two: as beings in itself or natural beings, humans are unified with the material world. The material world is the basis and premise for human survival and development, and humans are forever natural beings. As beings for itself or conscious beings, meanwhile, human existence can only be a process of self-creation. Human history is the basis and premise for human survival and development, and humans are forever supernatural beings. As beings in and for itself , or natural and conscious beings, humans achieve the unity of the natural and the supernatural, the measure of things and the measure of man, regularity and purposiveness through their historical activities, thereby constituting human history and achieving their own development. Second, Marx’s discourse inspires a deeper understanding on the nature of the process of history. As described earlier, man, as “the permanent pre-condition of human history,” is always “its permanent product and result.” Hence, human historical activities are always determined by previously existing historical conditions not created by any individual but by the previous generation. In this regard, historical conditions are then the pre-conditions for man’s creation of history, and each generation exists as both the product and result of history. Therefore, human historical activities are not carried out according to individual whims, and the results manifest as the laws of historical development and do not shift according to human will. Thus, historical development becomes the premise for human development. Understanding historical conditions as the pre-condition for human creation of history combines understandings of both matter and spirit. For example, Marx and Engels state: Each stage [of history] contains a material result, a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation to nature and of individuals to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and circumstances, which on the one hand is indeed modified by the new generation, but on the other also prescribes for it is conditions of life and gives it a definite development a special character.43

At the same time, these historical conditions also include a variety of cultural conditions. Human language, for example, is the reservoir of historical culture, while historical cultural accumulation appropriates individuals. For humans to use language, therefore, is to be appropriated by historical culture. Historical changes in language determine human understanding of the world, hence also embodying human historical changes and normalizing human historical development. In summary, according to Marx, human, “the permanent product and result” of history, also receives the real conditions for creating history, by which humans alter 42 Ibid. 43 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 5, p. 54.

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themselves and their living environment, thereby achieving historical progress and creating new historical conditions for the next generation. Therefore, humans both create their own history and are the pre-condition for their own history. History is the active process of pursuing human aims and the special mode by which man achieves self-development.

3.3 History and the ‘Cultural Reservoir’ Human history and culture are inextricably linked to human language. Marx writes, “Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for me.”44 Language, as ‘real consciousness,’ not only transforms an individual’s current consciousness into speech that can be communicated and exchanged, it also ‘stores’ the product of human consciousness activities across the generations in a ‘reservoir’ of historical culture. In his discourse on language, philosopher of culture Ernst Cassirer proposes: The decisive feature [of language] is not its physical but its logical character. Physically the word may be declared to be impotent, but logically it is elevated to a higher, indeed to the highest rank. The Logos becomes the principle of the universe and the first principle of human knowledge. [. . .] In this human world the faculty of speech occupies a central place. We must, therefore, understand what speech means in order to understand the “meaning” of the universe.45

The power of language lies in its role as a mediator between man and the world and in its ability to transform the world into a human one. Although the world exists beyond and does not depend on human consciousness, it does exist within human language: humans can only describe the world using language. Language is thus both the negative boundary of human existence—that is, to humankind the world beyond language is an existing non-being or existing nothing—and the positive boundary of human existence—through language, the world transforms from an existing non-being into true existence. It is precisely because human language contains the achievements of human cognition and the crystallization of human culture that it is the reservoir of human historical culture. To depart from language is to depart from human historical culture, transforming the real and true relation of man to the world into an illusory and abstract relation. Thus, a critique of the premises underlying the relation between thought and being and the concept of history must include a critique of the premises underlying language. Language preserves the cultural accumulation of history, which in turn appropriates individuals. To use language is to understand historical culture, history, 44 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 5, p. 44. [14].

45 Cassirer

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and human processes. The historical changes of language determine man’s preunderstanding, thus embodying human historical changes and normalizing human historical development. If human is subordinate to history, then it is also subordinate to language. It is only by being subordinate to language that man achieves mutual and self-understanding. In this regard, philosophical hermeneutics presents a novel perspective: man created language but is also subordinate to language. Man did not create a tool, therefore, but his own mode of existence.46 From this perspective, man does not use language, but rather language underlies the existence of man. To say that language is the reservoir of historical culture that appropriates individuals across the generations implies that historical culture is understood, explained, and renewed through language. This, in turn, suggests that language uncovers a tension between history and reality and between historical and individual perspectives: the unity of opposites between historical culture’s appropriation of individuals and individuals’ explanation of historical culture. It is precisely the unity of history and individuals in such tension that constitutes each individual’s unique “meaning-world.” Man’s ideas are internal, but language is expressible. Hence, ideas must be confirmed as thought in the form of language; language is the house of thought. In addition, ideas must achieve comprehension, understanding, and description through language; hence, language is also the house of the world. Ideas can exist only within consciousness, whereas language extinguishes the dual opposition of ideas and being, thus becoming the house of the unity between thought and the world. More importantly, ideas achieve historical social inheritance in the form of language, thereby accumulating in human culture. Therefore, we can also say that language is the reservoir of historical culture. As such, the forms of language are rich and varied, manifesting as everyday language, artistic language, scientific language, etc., enabling a diversity of languages to present the richness of the human world. Thus, human consciousness uses language as a medium to illuminate the human world. As the reservoir of historical culture, human words do not exist in isolation. Ferdinand de Saussure, a master of modern linguistics, thinks it is very meaningful to compare the function of language with a game of chess: First, a state of a set of chessmen corresponds closely to a state of language. The respective value of the pieces depends on their position on the chessboard just as each linguistic term derives its value from its opposition to all other terms. [. . .] In the second place, the system is always momentary; it varies from one position to the next. [. . .] Finally, to pass from one state of equilibrium to the next, or from one synchrony to the next, [changes in isolated elements can have] a repercussion on the whole system.47

In other words, language has a systematic and historical existence. It systematically presents the richness of and reveals developmental changes in human consciousness and civilization. In his Course in General Linguistics, Saussure presents an in-depth analysis on the relation between language and speech, proposing that: 46 Yin 47 de

[15]. Saussure [16].

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Speech has both an individual and a social side, and we cannot conceive of one without the other. Besides: Speech always implies both an established system and an evolution; at every moment it is an existing institution and a product of the past. [. . .] In separating language from speaking we are at the same time separating: (1) what is social from what is individual; and (2) what is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental.48

Analyzing language and speech through this lens suggests that language expresses a social existence external to individuals; it exists as an institution that constrains human existence and as rules of human existence. In this sense, it is language that appropriates individuals, and individuals are the products of the past. Speech, meanwhile, expresses an individual’s practice of language and has a historical existence; it exists as the unity of man’s physical, biological, and psychological activity and is a personal activity. In this sense, it is individuals who appropriate language, and speech is the reality of language. It is precisely this dualized process of language appropriating individuals and individuals appropriating language that allows human consciousness to transcend its internal, polar, uniform, and non-historical nature, thus gaining diverse manifestations, obtaining the reality of historical culture, and achieving the progress and development of human civilization. An important feature of language is that it has the dual attributes of logic and humanity. In modern philosophy’s linguistic turn, so-called analytic philosophy highlights the logical characteristics of language, whereas “humanistic philosophy” emphasizes its humanistic characteristics. The former highlights language’s uniformity of semantics, certainty of concepts, and verifiability of meaning, while the latter emphasizes the ambiguity of semantics, the uncertainty of concepts, and the proliferation of meaning. Both highlight language’s characteristics from two extremes while also revealing a multifaceted tension of language. It is precisely this tension that enables language to express the abundant variety of human consciousness and to build a long-lasting historical culture with rich intensions. In order to deepen philosophical understandings of the historical cultural significance of language, it is necessary to discuss the linguistic turn in contemporary Western philosophy. First, the reason contemporary Western philosophers attach great importance to the philosophical study of language is because they have come to a basic understanding: although the world exists independently from human consciousness, it also exists within human language. Hence, as described above, language is both the negative and positive boundary of human existence. It is only in language that we find the profound contradictions between nature and spirit, objective and subjective, thought and being, truth and goodness, etc. as well as an accumulation of all historical achievements of human thought and culture. This linguistic turn indicates a regressive advancement in philosophy’s selfcognition. Ancient philosophy, for example, departs from reflection on human consciousness to directly seek the unity of all things from the object of cognition. However, it can only achieve naïve realism or savage idealism, i.e., to attribute the unity of all things to Democritus’ atoms or Plato’s Ideas. Modern philosophy, meanwhile, steps back from the direct assertions of ancient philosophy regarding the 48 Ibid.,

pp. 8, 14.

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unity of all things in order to reflect upon the epistemology of human consciousness, thereby seeking the unity of thought and being in binary opposition, i.e., pursuing the objectivity of thought. Therefore, modern philosophy proposes the basic question of philosophy—that of the relation between thought and being—in a regressive manner, an epistemological turn in philosophy. Contemporary philosophy, in its turn, steps back even further, removing itself from the epistemological reflection of modern philosophy in order to analyze human language, thus seeking human self-understanding in the diverse unity of human culture. It therefore highlights the various mediating links within the unity of thought and being in a regressive manner; deepening our understanding of human existence and interrelation with the world through the critique of language. Second, contemporary Western philosophers’ emphasis on the philosophical study of language is due to their attempt to use reflection on language to “cure” traditional philosophy. At the turn of the twentieth century, many famous Western philosophers, such as Russell, Wittgenstein, Schlick, and Carnap, explicitly argued that philosophical questions are, fundamentally speaking, linguistic questions. According to these thinkers, philosophy does not provide knowledge or theory but only analyzes and clarifies people’s meaning. Instead, they seek to answer the following questions: What is philosophy? What are the mistakes of traditional philosophy? What is the basis for the linguistic turn of modern philosophy? Such modern philosophers believe the Socratic method set an example for all true later philosophy in investigating the meaning of language. They also believe that speculative philosophers both past and present have forged many unsolvable philosophical questions, the reason for which lies in their incorrect use of language. Due to the development of modern logic, we are now able to accurately comprehend the essence and structure of language, which enables us to clarify the metaphysical conundrums produced through this incorrect usage.49 Third, contemporary Western philosophers place great emphasis on the philosophical study of language: not only do they view philosophy’s linguistic turn as the “scientification” of philosophy, but they also see it from the perspective of cultural critique and humanistic studies. Contemporary philosophical hermeneutics claims that humans use language to understand the world and to express that understanding. Conversely, language is also the expression of man’s mode and degree of understanding. Therefore, the analysis of language is not merely the analysis of the world as understood by man, but first and foremost the analysis of man’s understanding of the world. The latter analysis is the understanding of understanding, and it is precisely on such cognition that philosophical hermeneutics has decided its task: before discussing how man understands the world and himself, it is necessary to first investigate understanding itself and the conditions for the possibility of understanding. Finally, contemporary Western philosophers pay great attention to the philosophical study of language because in comparison to ideas, language has a broader and

49 Xu

[17].

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deeper value for philosophical reflection. The epistemological turn of modern philosophy involves reflecting on the question of the relation between thought and being based on ideas; in this sense, the epistemological turn can also be called the idealist turn. Unlike in modern philosophy, the linguistic turn of contemporary philosophy involves examining the relation between thought and being based on language; hence language is the focus and starting point of contemporary philosophy. This latter approach allows for broader and deeper philosophical reflection: ideas must be confirmed as thought in the form of language and thus language is the house of thought. Since ideas must achieve comprehension, understanding, and description through language, language is also the house of the world. Therefore, ideas and being are on opposite poles, but this opposition is extinguished by language, which mediates the unity of the two. Thus, language is the house of the unity between thought and the world, and ideas can only achieve social inheritance through language, which accumulates into culture. Therefore, language is the reservoir of historical culture. Ideas can only realize subjects’ exchange of thought through language, hence language can be said to be the mediator of communicative practice. The forms of language are rich and varied and include everyday language, artistic language, scientific language, etc. Together, these diverse forms enable ideas to express the richness of the world. As the objective vector of ideas, language constitutes thought’s object, thus enabling ideas to realize self-critique. Ideas are psychological processes, and their supernatural (social) nature is manifested through natural processes; language not only realizes this supernatural nature through symbolic means, it also exists as objective knowledge, thus constituting the foundation of logical analysis. Ideas themselves are unable to realize their social inheritance and hence cannot achieve independent development. As the reservoir of historical culture, language’s evolution and development possesses an independence that does not shift according to man’s subjective will, thus constituting an important premise for human social development. The shift from modern philosophy’s epistemological turn to contemporary philosophy’s linguistic turn is not merely due to logic. Fundamentally speaking, this turn is a theoretical characterization of the transformation in man’s mode of existence from being expressed in terms of ideas to being expressed in terms of language. First, ideas embody individual rational comprehension of the world in the heroic age, whereas language embodies social rational comprehension of the world in the decline of the heroic age. The use of public language to characterize man’s mode of existence implies the universalization of social rationality, which has replaced the monopoly and domination of rationality by certain heroic figures characterized by ideas. Second, ideas embody an elite society where individuals’ private ethics are responsible for maintaining society, whereas language embodies a civil society where social ethics are responsible for maintaining society. The use of historical and public language to characterize man’s mode of existence implies the universalization of social ethics, which has replaced the role models of private ethics fulfilled by certain heroic figures characterized by ideas.

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Third, ideas embody an elite culture of individual aesthetic pleasure, whereas language embodies a societal popular culture of aesthetic sharing. Man’s mode of existence, as characterized by language, is the universalization and diversification of intersubjectivity, which has replaced the cultural monopoly of certain elite cultures characterized by ideas. Fourth, ideas embody the private exchanges of a closed society, whereas language embodies the global exchanges of an open society. Man’s mode of existence as characterized by language entails open, extensive exchanges and communication between subjects, which has replaced the narrow space of communication as characterized by ideas. Fifth, ideas embody the limited nature of education in a subject’s appropriation of culture, whereas language embodies the popular nature of education in culture’s appropriation of the subject. Man’s mode of existence as characterized by language is the appropriation of man by the reservoir of historical culture; the premise for such appropriation is the popularization of education. This replaces the limited nature of education as characterized by ideas and its appropriation of the subject. Sixth, ideas embody the pursuit of objectivity of thought, where the object gives meaning, whereas language embodies the pursuit of the richness of the human world, where the subject creates meaning. Finally, ideas embody the expansion of mankind’s practical will in his conquest of nature, whereas language embodies the reflection of the practical will on the harmony between man and nature. The turn from ideas to language reveals the major difference between modern and contemporary philosophy: in idealism, the object gives meaning to the subject, hence the fundamental question of modern idealism is the pursuit of the objectivity of thought. In the linguistic turn, however, meaning cannot be separated from the subject’s creative activities; hence contemporary philosophy focuses on man’s mode of existence and the rich relation it creates between man and the world. The prominence of idealism in modern philosophy is due to its advocacy of the mobility of man’s rationality, which reveals mankind’s desire and power to conquer nature. In contrast, man’s mode of existence as characterized by language is a reflection of the relation between man and the world, and examining human practice through critical reflection on language drives the formation of a new human world outlook. Contemporary philosophy’s linguistic turn reveals the contradictory nature of human existence. This is extremely significant for understanding the historicity of human existence: the contradiction between the social nature of language and the individual nature of speech allows the contradictions between society and individuals, tradition and reality, and commonality and individuality to gain concrete content. Language expresses a social existence external to individuals; it exists as an institution that constrains human existence and as the rules of existence. In this sense, language appropriates individuals, and individuals are the result of history. Speech, meanwhile, is an individual’s practice of language and has a historical existence; it exists as the unity of man’s physical, biological, and psychological activity and as a personal activity. In this sense, individuals appropriate language, and speech is the reality of language.

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The synchronicity of language and the diachronicity of speech, the structural nature of language and the event-based nature of speech; the formality of language and the substantivity of speech; the systematic nature of language and the procedural nature of speech; the regularity of language and the factuality of speech; the uniformity of language and the diversity of speech; the internality of language and the externality of speech; the autonomy of language and the restrictiveness of speech; the potentiality of language and the reality of speech; the static nature of language and the dynamic nature of speech; and other relations between the two provide rich theoretical content for profound reflection on man’s mode of existence. People generally regard language as a tool for interaction rather than as a mode of man’s existence. The linguistic turn, however, places the relations between language and historical culture, language and man’s mode of thought and action, and language and the diversity and unity of human culture at the forefront.

4 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Truth The basis for human behavior is the unity of regularity and purposiveness, which is also the unity of truth and value. Truth is the basic concept normalizing human thoughts and behaviors. Thus, a critique of the premises underlying truth is also a critique of the premises underlying this basic concept.

4.1 Conceptual Analysis of Truth “Is this true?” is a common question; however, people have different understandings of what truth means. Thus, analyzing different understandings of truth can serve as a premise for critical reflection. In the most direct sense, the question “Is this true?” asks whether something exists. True in this context means “is” or “exists,” whereas the negation of true means “is not” or “does not exist.” The philosophical pursuit of being, therefore, refers directly to the pursuit of the true. On a deeper level, “Is this true?” asks not only about existence but also questions the determinateness of existents. In other words, the existence of the object at hand is not the issue, but rather whether it has a certain determinateness. Any particular thing (i.e., existent) has a certain type or types of determinateness. Existents with that determinateness are true whereas existents without that determinateness are false. For example, if someone says a thing before us is a table, and we ask “Is this true?”, then we are questioning whether this thing has the determinateness of tables. In other words, the meaning of true may also be established in the relation between real and false, a different understanding than whether something is or exists. Regardless of which of the above definitions of truth is used, the question at hand always concerns an object. The third meaning of “Is this true?”, however, concerns not

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an object but rather the representation of an object, that is, whether an object has been reproduced in the representation and thought of a cognitive subject in a manner that conforms to the object itself. This is a question that explicitly concerns the subject’s cognition, i.e., the so-called epistemological question. The object of cognition exists externally to the subject; hence, to the cognitive subject, the existence of the object possesses objectivity. However, it is only when the object of cognition becomes the subject’s image, that is, when the external object becomes an internal image, that the subject is able to know about the object. In this process of cognition, the subject may reproduce the object correctly or incorrectly. The question of truth in this epistemological framework is whether the image conforms to the object. Thus, “true” refers to correct cognition. Fourth, “Is this true?” may question not only the relation between object and image, but also that between representation (as image) and thought. This type of questioning has an even deeper philosophical and epistemological significance. Man, as cognitive subject, has both the sensuous function of representing the object and the rational function of thinking about the object. Hence, man’s cognitive activities are carried out within the contradictions of the sensuous and the rational, of representation and thought. The representation of the object composed by man’s sensuous function can only be the representation of the object’s sensuous existence (i.e., phenomenon), whereas thought concerning the object composed by man’s rational function is thinking on the object’s inherent determination (i.e., essence). Man is unable to think about the phenomenon of an object through reason, while human senses are unable to represent the essence of an object. The question then becomes whether it is the essence, as represented by reasonable thinking, or the phenomenon, as represented by the sense, that is true. To pose this question within the contradictions between senses and reason, representation and thought is to question whether sensuous experience or rational thought is true. Here lies the fourth meaning of truth: in the relations between the sensuous and rational, representation and thought, and experience and transcendence. It is this level of truth that has led to the long-standing conflict between philosophical empiricism and rationalism. The dialectical understanding of truth at this level implies that it must be subordinate to the understanding of man’s mode of existence, i.e., practice. Finally, “Is this true?” may question not only whether cognitive results are “true” or “false,” but also include the cognitive subject’s evaluation of the cognitive object. In other words, the question is not ontological or epistemological, but rather aesthetical or relating to values. Hegel, for example, writes: Thus we speak of a true friend; by which we mean a friend whose manner of conduct accords with the notion of friendship. In the same way we speak of a true work of Art. Untrue in this sense means the same as bad, or self-discordant. In this sense a bad state is an untrue state; and evil and untruth may be said to consist in the contradiction subsisting between the function or notion and the existence of the object. Of such a bad object we may form a correct representation, but the import of such representation is inherently false.50

50 Hegel,

Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 139.

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An object may have a real existence and a correctly constructed image in human representation and thought. Nevertheless, we may still ask: “Is this true?” In such questioning, “true” does not refer to whether the object exists or is correct, but rather to our evaluation of the object and its image: only the good or beautiful is true, whereas the bad or ugly is false. Such questioning of value theory transcends the ontological and epistemological questioning of truth. To summarize the five meanings of truth, we can make three generalizations regarding the question “Is it true?” The first is that it is a question of “is or is not,” i.e., of ontology or noumenology. Second, it is a question of “correct or wrong,” i.e., of epistemology or logic. Third, it is a question of “good or bad,” i.e., of value theory or ethics. The above multi-layered definitions show that truth is a polysemic and complex concept. In philosophy, truth is naturally most concerned with the question of correct or wrong, or whether human cognition (i.e., representation and thought) correctly comprehends an object’s existence (i.e., phenomenon and essence). Therefore, the question of truth is generally viewed from the perspective of epistemology or logic. However, in order to fully understand the polysemic nature of truth, it is necessary to connect the definitions of is or is not, correct or wrong, and good or bad, thus understanding truth as the unity of ontology, epistemology, and value theory, which is also to understand truth in the overall relation between man and the world and between thought and being. Modern philosophy has already explored the question of truth, as described by Zou Hua-Zheng: From the beginning, modern philosophy has had a degree of consciousness that is far higher than that of ancient and medieval philosophy: Everything that is said to be man’s daily life is, in essence, also everything that is manifested to man, which are all based on man’s senses and presented through his consciousness. The object of cognition must be consciousness from the beginning. Man cannot be separated from consciousness and have his own object of cognition.51

Philosophical reflection on human cognition discovered a profound paradox: if human cognition can only originate from experience, then are there things beyond experience that do not depend on or exist independently from experience, and which can only inform experience? Experience cannot help but be silent on this matter. Because we can only know about the existence of the external world through our own cognition, then if we assert that the external world exists independently of cognition we must acknowledge a type of cognition prior to human cognition. This is also referred to as the “dogmatism of transcendentalism.” However, if we acknowledge that the existence of the external world can only be known through cognition, then we are also acknowledging Berkeley’s subjective idealism, or esse is percipi [to be is to be perceived].52 This paradox not only abandons ontology separate from epistemology, 51 Zou 52 Zhu

[18]. [19].

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thus confirming that ontology without epistemology is useless, but also reveals the profound contradictions in human truth-seeking consciousness, thereby requiring us to modify our simplified understanding of truth.

4.2 Truth and the Objectivity of Thought “True” and “truth” are intimately linked, but there are also important differences between the two concepts. There is a major tendency to conflate the two, and when such ordinary understanding manifests in philosophy the result is the conflation and/or separation of ontological questions and epistemological ones. What is true is first an ontological problem, i.e., the question of being and nonbeing, what is and is not. However, it is also an epistemological question, i.e., whether the image of an object is correct or wrong. The two are intimately linked: on the one hand, “Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious being,”53 but without the corresponding being there can be no corresponding consciousness. On the other hand, being within consciousness can only be conscious being; being that is not conscious can only be “non-being.” Since the question of “true” combines what is or is not, correct or wrong, good or bad, and other questions of ontology, epistemology, and value theory, it must be considered within the context of the overall relation between man and the world, thought and being. Marx and Engels, meanwhile, explain “truth” as the “correct reflection of objective things and their laws. Opposite of ‘fallacy’. The difference between truth and fallacy is whether objective reality is reflected correctly.”54 This definition illustrates the fact that the question of truth does not concern the object of cognition itself, but rather the relation between human cognition (i.e., representation and thought) and the object of cognition. That is, the question of truth is not an ontological question but an epistemological one. This can be contrasted with “true,” which is primarily an ontological question that confirms whether an object exists. Further analysis of truth reveals that Marx and Engel’s definition hides a vital question: is truth the correct conception of “objective things and their laws” or the correct conception of the laws themselves? The former implies that truth is both the correct conception of objective things and of the laws of things. Human cognition comprehends objects through sensuous and rational functions, thereby forming representations—which concern an object’s phenomenal form—and thought—which concerns an object’s inherent essence. The latter implies that truth can be broken into truth of representation—which concerns an object’s phenomenal form—and truth of thought—which concerns an object’s inherent essence. This is a vulgarized understanding of truth. Instead, a better understanding of truth is as cognition concerning universal necessity. Truth is cognition able to reach theoretical explanations for a certain type (or 53 Marx 54 Cihai

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 5, p. 36. [20].

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types) of complicated phenomena. Thus, it can be defined as the correct conception concerning the regularity of things. In other words, truth can only refer to cognition concerning the commonality, essence, necessity, and laws of things, but not the phenomenal form of things. Engels once responded with biting sarcasm to the careless use of truth by saying that if we regard statements such as “Paris is in France,” “a man who gets no food dies of hunger,” and so on as eternal truths, then we are merely deriving pleasure from using “mighty words for very simple things.”55 Truth, in other words, is cognition concerning universal necessity. Hence, the question of truth is one of objectivity of thought. In essence, it is the question of unifying thought and being, human cognition and the objective world on the level of laws. Engels proposes the following: In what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality? In philosophical language this question is called the question of the ‘identity of thinking and being’, and the overwhelming majority of philosophers given an affirmative answer to this question.56

This suggests that “the question of the identity of thought and being,” i.e., the question of the objectivity of thought, can be summarized as containing three basic levels: (1) the question of the relation between man’s representational consciousness and empirical objects, (2) the question of the relation between the determinations of thought and the essence of an object, and (3) the question of the relation between man’s representational consciousness and the determinations of thought. The first addresses the objectivity of representation and whether representation, as man’s sensuous image, imitates empirical objects’ phenomenal form; this is also a question of whether man’s representation conforms to an object’s phenomenon. It forms an important premise for addressing the objectivity of thought, but does not question the objectivity of thought itself. In other words, in order to address the objectivity of thought, we must first determine the objectivity of representation. The question of the objectivity of thought includes two levels. On its surface, it questions whether the determinations of thought (i.e., an object’s concepts, categories, and propositions and the various theoretical systems resulting from their logical connections) express empirical objects’ commonality, essence, necessity, and laws. On a deeper level, it asks whether the logic of the operation of thought (i.e., the movement of thought composed by the forms, categories, rules, and modes of thought) can describe the laws of the movement of being, which is also the question of the unity of thought and being on the level of laws. This implies that the question of truth is both an epistemological question (i.e., whether and how the determinations of thought are unified with the essence of an object) and a logical one (i.e., whether and how the logic of thought is unified with the logic of things). Since the question of truth is primarily the question of the objectivity of thought, it is extremely important. As truth realizes the unity of thought and being on the level of laws, Hegel, Marx, Engels, and Lenin all emphasize how to comprehend 55 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 81. Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, p. 21.

56 Engels,

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and describe the movement of things’ laws using the logical movement of concepts. Since truth realizes the unity of thought and being on the level of laws, we cannot examine truth using intuition but must depend on human practical activities. Philosophical inquiry into the objectivity of thought has undergone a long, tortuous, and complicated process of development resulting in major profound theoretical questions and accumulating lessons to inspire in-depth exploration by future generations. Avoiding these major theoretical questions and simply asserting the objectivity of thought leads to theories which lack the requisite thoroughness and persuasiveness. Ignoring historical philosophical experiences and lessons and directly arguing for the objectivity of thought results in the loss of the rich and profound theoretical content found in philosophy’s truth outlook. Therefore we must critically reflect upon truth through the lenses of both history and theory.

4.3 Expanding on the Question of the Objectivity of Thought The question of the objectivity of thought is premised on man’s consciousness of the division between representation and thought. In the history of philosophy, concern over this question stemmed from confusion over the pursuit of noumenon: more specifically, from confusion between experience and transcendence and representation and thought concerning noumenon. The concrete manifestation of such confusion is the question of the relation between being and non-being, noumenon and phenomenon of all things through man’s representation (i.e., experience) and thought (i.e., concepts). Human’s cognitive relation with the world on the one hand involves man as the cognitive subject in reality who comprehends the world for itself through the unity of opposites of sense and reason, representation and thought and, on the other hand, involves the world as an objective existence independent of man’s consciousness that exists in itself through the unity of opposites of phenomenon and essence, contingency and necessity. Nevertheless, when people seek the primordial source and noumenon of all things through reflection on human consciousness that comprehends the world and the world comprehended by human consciousness, they are amazed by the self-division between the two. This self-division is illustrated by the fact that the world presented by man’s representation (i.e., experience) is always individual, fluid, contingent, complex, and phenomenal, whereas the world presented in man’s thought (i.e. rational cognition) is universal, invariant, necessary, regular, and essential. Things presented to man’s representation are sensuous being, whereas those presented to man’s thought are nonbeing (thought cannot comprehend the sensuous being of things); things presented to man’s thought are essential being, whereas those presented to man’s representation are also non-being (representation cannot comprehend the inherent essence of things); empirical objects only exist in empirical representation, whereas transcendent essence only exists in transcendent thought. This leads to the philosophical consciousness of the self-division in man’s consciousness—division between the

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representational world and the conceptual one. Objectifying this results in the philosophical consciousness of the world’s self-division between sensuous being and the world’s inherent essence. In ancient Greek philosophy, this divided consciousness and its objectification are expressed as the division between phenomenon and noumenon, i.e., in the division between Plato’s “world of shadows” and “world of ideas.” The noumenological problem of pursuing the origin of all things becomes expressed in the self-division between representation and thought: is the existence of the sensuous world presented to man’s representational consciousness real, or is the existence of the essential world presented to man’s determinations of thought real? Becoming conscious of the self-division between representation and thought and gaining concrete theoretical philosophical content highlights the following questions: (1) Can human know being that cannot be seen? Can the logic of human thought operations describe the laws of the movement of being? (2) How does man come to know being that cannot be seen? Is this achieved through representation; through the induction, analysis, abstraction, and generalization of representation; or through rational intuition that transcends representation? (3) Is the unseen being known to human the essence of the thing in-itself (i.e., the universe determines the laws of reason) or determinations endowed by thought on being (i.e., reason determines the laws of the universe)? The answers to these questions constitute philosophical debates on theoretical content and demonstrate the complexity inherent in the question of truth. The fundamental question of modern Western philosophy, which is based on modern experimental science, is whether and how thought expresses the questions on the essence and laws of the object of thought, i.e. the question of the objectivity of thought. As Hegel states, modern Western philosophy does not concern “pure thought” nor the “thinking of the objects in their truth,” but rather “[the thinking of] the thinking and understanding of the objects.”57 When thought regards its own understanding of an object as its object, then such thought is no longer naïve, but instead what Hegel calls “the knowing of knowing, and the thinking of thinking,” i.e., reflection. Through such reflection, modern philosophy is becoming more explicitly conscious of the fact that all object determinateness in human thought is due to determinations of an object in human thought. To know whether these determinations have objectivity requires examining not only the contents of thought concerning the object but also the movements of thought that form the contents of thought. Thus, in investigating this question modern philosophers are not simply considering the relation between thought and representation. Instead, consider it as the core of their concrete proposal and study of the natural world and human consciousness; conscious content and conscious forms; sensuous cognition and rational cognition; object consciousness and self-consciousness; extensional logic and intensional logic; intellectual thinking and dialectical thinking; induction and deduction; analysis and synthesis; representation and abstraction; and other rich theoretical contents. Pre-classical German philosophy uses either empiricism or idealism to frame the question of the objectivity of thought as the epistemological analysis of sensation 57 Hegel,

Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Modern Philosophy, Volume 3, pp. 159–160.

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(i.e., materialist philosopher Locke and idealist philosophers Berkeley and Hume) or the transcendental intuition of reason (i.e., materialist philosopher Spinoza and idealist philosophers Descartes and Leibniz). The common characteristic between these thinkers is that they begin with either the content or form of thought in their deliberations on representation and thought and their relations with an object. Modern materialist philosophy claims that the objectivity of thought lies in the fact that thought originates from representation, representation is an object’s image, and hence thinking formed by thought’s induction, analysis, abstraction, and generalization of representation is an object’s determinateness of thought. This mode of thought is a vivid epistemological example of materialism, described by Lenin as that which ‘starts from things to sensation and thought,’ and confirms the principle of reflection theory in materialist epistemology. However, this mode of thought also solely bases the question of the objectivity of thought on the empirical origin of thought contents, without exploring the question in regard to the form of thought movements. This begs the following question: if thought images are not merely images of objects but rather images that can only be formed through a subject’s thought activities and if such image’s objectivity requires the objectivity of both the origin of thought and of a subject’s thought activities, then do a subject’s thought activities possess objectivity? Furthermore, since a subject’s thought activities use the forms of thought to analyze and abstract representations, then do the forms of thought possess objectivity? Engels writes, “Eighteenth century materialism [. . .] restricted itself to the proof that the content of all thought and knowledge must derive from sensuous experience” and does not consider the objectivity of thought in regard to form.58 In other words, modern materialist philosophy has not truly resolved the question of the objectivity of thought in terms of thought’s relation to being. Modern idealist philosophy, meanwhile, believes that thought’s objectivity lies in the fact that the object of thought is the content of thought (being of the conscious world), and thought forms its determinations through self-cognition, which is also the determinations of the object of thought. This mode of thought forms an epistemological idealist line of thinking, described by Lenin as that which ‘starts from sensation and thought to things.’ This approach vividly highlights the epistemological examination of thinking itself. This leads, however, to the following questions: if the objects of thought are limited to beings of the conscious world, then where do such beings come from? What is the relation between beings of the conscious world and beings beyond consciousness? If we do not resolve this question, then how can we confirm the objectivity of thought? Modern idealist philosophy regards beings beyond consciousness as a meaningless epistemological question, and hence excludes it from the question of the objectivity of thought. Therefore, this approach can only develop mobility of thought in abstraction and cannot truly resolve the question of the objectivity of thought. The analysis above indicates that both modern materialist and idealist philosophy have different approaches to the relation between thought and being, and that these approach affect their understanding of the objectivity of thought. In modern 58 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 25, pp. 544–545.

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materialist philosophy, the question of the relation between thought and being is the question of the relation between the contents of thought and the objects of thought, while the basis for thought is not considered. In modern idealist philosophy, the question is about the relation between the activities of thought and the contents of thought, and all being must be conscious. The founder of classical German philosophy, Immanuel Kant, believes that modern materialist philosophy asserts the objectivity of thought without reflecting on the form of cognition, whereas modern idealist philosophy asserts the objectivity of thought while avoiding beings beyond consciousness. Therefore, both are dogmatic explanations and inadequate to fully understanding the question at hand. Kant occupies an especially prominent position in the philosophical exploration of the objectivity of thought. He transforms the traditional mode of questioning in pre-classical German philosophy: rather than directly questioning the objectivity of thought, he instead questions how human knowing is possible. This reveals the two basic iconic features of classical German philosophy in its examination of the objectivity of thought: first, it turns the focus of the question on the relation between thought and being to the question of the laws by which thought comprehends being and second, it concentrates on the profound reflection of human spiritual activities. In response to modern materialism and idealism’s focus on the content and form of cognition, respectively, as the starting place for examining the objectivity of thought, Kant begins with the contradiction between the two. He argues that a thing-in-itself that lies beyond consciousness is the true face of the world, yet it cannot constitute the content of man’s cognition without first changing into a being of man’s conscious world. Cognitive content, as conscious being, is man’s cognition of the world, but such cognition can only be a product of man’s comprehension of the world and not the thing-in-itself , or the true face of the world. If humans want to know the latter, they must transcend cognitive content, i.e., conscious being. However, by doing so the thing-in-itself is unable to constitute the object of human cognition. Therefore, Kant claims that when humans attempt to comprehend the thing-in-itself through reason, they must fall into the antinomy of reason. How, then, can we understand and evaluate human cognition of the world? Kant believes that the basis lies in human a priori (prior to experience) possession of sensuous forms, which provide the concepts of time and space, and intellectual categories, which provide the forms of judgment. These enable a thing-in-itself to produce phenomena; this is the world comprehended by man. However, a thingin-itself can only limit human cognition as a negative boundary; man’s cognition can only reach the phenomenal world but never the thing-in-itself . This is otherwise known as Kantian agnosticism. In Kant’s understanding, a thing-in-itself is the objective premise and negative boundary of cognition and a priori logic is cognition’s subjective basis and positive boundary. This opposition between cognition’s objective premise and subjective basis and positive and negative boundaries affirms the possibility of the continuous expansion of human cognition (i.e., ongoing human constitution of the world comprehended by man) while also categorically negating the possibility of humans knowing a thing-in-itself (i.e., humans can only construct the world comprehended by man).

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Therefore, in Kantian philosophy the affirmation of human cognition is also the negation of human cognition: the basis for human cognition of the world (a priori logic) is also the boundary of human cognition of the world (phenomenal world). The deeper implication of this is that the logic by which human thought comprehends being is also that by which thought comprehends being; it only has the significance of subjective logic and not of objective logic and can only constitute the world as comprehended by man but cannot express the true face of the world. Kant’s question of how knowing is possible and his conclusion that reason determines the laws of the universe constitute the philosophical consciousness of the division between subjective and objective logic and between the laws of thought and those of being. Addressing the question of the objectivity of thought using such philosophical consciousness as the theoretical premise must involve examining the logic by which thought comprehends being through the unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic and demonstrating the objectivity possessed by such logic. Hegelian and Marxist philosophy both have critiques of Kant’s theory. Hegel, for example, argues that the logic by which thought comprehends being is the same logic to which both thought and being are subject; hence the former has both the significance of subjective logic and of objective logic. Such an argument reflects Hegel’s ontological commitment to the identity of thought and being. To Hegel, thought and being must first have identity in itself before they can have identity for itself . The former implies that regardless of whether human thought is conscious about its disposition or that of things, such dispositions exist and are unified. This type of identity can only be made conscious through the reflective activity of human thought; hence, before thought becomes conscious of this identity, the inference of thought can only be a type of logical priority. Hegel begins with identity in itself , or the logical priority of thought and being, the aim of which is to explain that: (1) thought and being are able to achieve identify for itself in the course of human thought, because they have unity in itself ; (2) unity for itself achieved by human thought is the sublimation of unity in itself into unity for itself , transforming potential unity into real unity and suggesting that the unity of thought and being is also a dialectical process; and (3) the task of philosophy is to enable humans to become conscious of this disposition of thought, thus achieving the unity in and for itself of thought and being according to thought’s self-constructing path. Hegel’s identity in itself , or the logical priority of thought and being, does not imply that thought has priority in encompassing its concrete content, but that thought and being are subject to the same laws. This philosophical reflection on thought expresses the logic of the movement of human thought in theoretical form. Hegel assumes a ontological commitment to identity in itself , or the logical priority of thought and being, in his discourse on the objectivity of thought. As Engels notes, “What is here to be proved is already tacitly contained in the presupposition.”59 This implies that Hegel is criticizing Kant and explaining the objectivity of thought in a completely idealistic manner. However, Hegel’s idealist explanation

59 Engels,

Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, p. 22.

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contains what Lenin describes as a ‘brilliant guess,’ as can be seen by providing a materialistic explanation for the identity in itself of thought and being. In his discussion on the relation between thought and being, Engels proposes that: The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and hence, too, that in the final analysis they cannot contradict each other in their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.60

In other words, the relation between dialectical materialism and the objectivity of thought must consider that thought and being are subject to the same laws as “the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.” The fundamental difference between dialectical idealism and dialectical materialism is that the former views such ontological commitment as the starting point of thought’s deduction of being, whereas the latter views it as the starting point of the world’s material unity and the objectivity of thought and bases this argument on human practical activities and the historical development of scientific cognition. In his dialectical idealistic explanation of the objectivity of thought, Hegel uses the self-movement of concepts to demonstrate the dialectical development of human cognition. This has direct and significant implications for a dialectical materialistic explanation of the objectivity of thought. For example, is it necessary to connect the exploration of the objectivity of thought with the logical movement of concepts? Lenin suggests, “If everything develops, does not that apply also to the most general concepts and categories of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialectics of concepts and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance.”61 He also stresses that “the question is not whether there is movement, but how to express it in the logic of concepts.”62 Therefore, a dialectical materialistic explanation for the objectivity of thought must address the objective meaning of concepts’ logical movements. Second, how should we understand the objective meaning of concepts and their logical movement? Lenin believes that Hegel’s conceptual dialectics already implicitly contains two major insights. First: The formation of (abstract) notions and operations with them already includes idea, conviction, consciousness of the law-governed character of the objective connection of the world. To distinguish causality from this connection is stupid. To deny the objectivity of notions, the objectivity of the universal in the individual and in the particular, is impossible. Consequently, Hegel is much more profound than Kant, and others, in tracing the reflection of the movement of the objective world in the movement of notions. . . . Here is where one should look for the true meaning, significance and role of Hegel’s Logic.63

And, in addition: “The concept (cognition) reveals the essence (the law of causality, identity, difference, etc.) in Being (in immediate phenomena)—such is actually the 60 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 544. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, Philosophical Notebooks, p. 254.

61 Lenin, 62 Ibid. 63 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, Philosophical Notebooks, pp. 178–179.

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general course of all human cognition (of all science). [. . .] Insofar Hegel’s dialectic is a generalization of the history of thought.”64 Lenin goes on to say, “The history of thought from the standpoint of the development and application of the general concepts and categories of Logic—That’s what is needed!”65 This implies that when discussing the objectivity of thought, we must connect the objective meaning of concepts and their logical movements with the conceptual reflection of laws and the unity of conceptual development with the history of thought. Third, how should we verify the objectivity of thought possessed by concepts and their logical movement? Lenin writes: Theoretical cognition ought to give the object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory movement, an in and for itself. But the human notion “definitively” catches this objective truth of cognition, seizes and masters it, only when the notion becomes “beingfor-itself” in time sense of practice. That is, the practice of man and of mankind is the test, the criterion of the objectivity of cognition. Is that Hegel’s idea?66

Lenin also states that “Hegel comes to the ‘Idea’ as the coincidence of the Notion and the object, as truth, through the practical, purposive activity of man. A very close approach to the view that man by his practice proves the objective correctness of his ideas, concepts, knowledge, science.”67 Hegel’s dialectical thinking is an important theoretical source for Marxist philosophy. In his dialectical materialistic understanding of the objectivity of thought, a key theoretical starting point is his proposed series of major theoretical questions—questions upon which Marx, Engels, and Lenin expand in their critical study of Hegelian philosophy.

5 A Critique of the Premises Underlying Value There are two basic concepts to express what is positive and negative in human thought: truth, which expresses what is correct or wrong, and value, which expresses what is good or bad. The complexity of these questions lies in the fact that regularity and purposiveness are inseparable in human thought; what is correct or wrong cannot be separated from what is good or bad. According to Hegel, a true state is a good one. Therefore, it is only within the unity of truth and value that we can profoundly comprehend both concepts individually.

64 Ibid.,

p. 316. p. 177. 66 Ibid., p. 211. 67 Ibid., p. 191. 65 Ibid.,

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5.1 Value and Value Outlook The question of what is good or ought to be (i.e., value) has a normative role in human thought and behavior, because it implicitly contains the approved value measure or criteria that form specific moral ideas and ethical norms. Therefore, philosophical questioning of what is good and what ought to be takes value categories as its starting point and highlights the importance of value theory. Value theory has become of increasing concern in contemporary philosophy. In the 1980s, Chinese scholars described value theory as the “ontological study of value,” the “epistemological study of value,” and the “dialectical study of value and truth,” specifically discussing the “basis of value,” “essence of value,” “characteristics of value,” “types of value,” “consciousness of value,” “essence of evaluation,” “criteria of evaluation,” “social evaluation,” and “value and truth.” This study has deepened in recent years, and Chinese scholarship on the topic has involved heated and protracted debates centered on question such as “What is value?”, “Where is value?”, “What is the basis of value judgment?”, “What is the relation between value judgment and factual judgment?”, etc. Pondering these questions deepens philosophical questioning on value itself. Regarding the question of the essence of value (i.e., What is value?), there are various understandings and explanations. In general, the academic community defines the term based on the logical relation between subject and object. More specifically, value can be defined from three angles: (1) based on the functions or attributes of an object itself (i.e., emphasizing the objectivity of value), (2) based on the subject and subjective need (i.e., emphasizing the subjectivity of value), and (3) based on the relation between subject and object (i.e., emphasizing the relationality of value). Although some scholars argue from the former two positions, most emphasize that value is established in the unity of subject and object. The resulting basic formulations of value can be summarized as follows: (1) value refers to “the applicability, approach or consistency of the existence and effects of the object and their changes with subjective need and its development”68 and (2) value is “a specific relation between the subject and the object, that is, a benefit relation where the object satisfies subjective need with its attributes and subjective need is satisfied by the object.”69 Such explanatory models of value both highlight that it is based on the relation between subject and object and emphasize that its essence lies in an object’s utility for the subject, thereby highlighting the subject-object utility relation. In recent years, some scholars have also proposed explanatory models based on social norm values (i.e., the value relation between individual subjects and social subjects), humanitarian values (i.e., man’s inherent value as a subjective being), and others that differ from such utility value. The theoretical understanding of value’s essence implicitly contains the question of value’s existence (i.e., where is value?); if we are certain value is an object’s utility 68 Li

[21].

69 Ibid.

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to the subject, then it is logical to conclude that value is an attribute of the object and not of the subject. However, such a conclusion does not conform to the definition of value as a subject-object relation. Hence, many scholars stress that value is not an entity but rather a relation. That is, value only exists in the relation between subject and object, outside of which the attributes of the object itself have no value. This understanding of value leads to a deeper theoretical question: If value is the satisfaction of subjective need by an object’s attribute or function, then the existence of any value must be logically premised on the subject’s evaluation of this satisfaction. In other words, beyond the subject’s evaluation, it is not possible to make value judgments about whether an object’s attribute or function has satisfied subjective need. Evaluation, therefore, then becomes a key question in value theory. Based on the subject’s evaluation we can propose a series of methods for understanding evaluation theory, including the background psychological system of the evaluation subject, the psychological application process of evaluation, the psychological operation mechanism of evaluation, the social application of evaluation, and the rationality of evaluation. Viewing value judgment as the result of evaluative activities implies that it varies from another type of basic judgment: factual judgment. The relation between value and factual judgment and that between good and true, a relation implicitly contained within these two judgments, constitutes even deeper theoretical questions in value theory. Feng Pin proposes that the particularity of value judgment lies in the fact that: Value judgment necessarily contains two major types of information. The first is information concerning the value object itself and its relations with other relevant objects; the second is information concerning the needs of the value subject. Both are indispensable for value judgments. In contrast, factual judgments only contain the first type of information, that is, information concerning what the object itself is and its relations with other relevant objects. The formation of factual judgments includes the emotions, pursuits and value aspirations of the judger, but the content of the judgment itself does not include information on the needs of the subject making these judgments. [. . .] Value judgments reveal the relation between the subject’s needs and the object’s properties and functions; factual judgments reveal the properties and features of the object itself. These two are not equivalent. Value judgments correspond to the value relation between the subject and object, that is, the relation between the object and subjective need, and whether the object satisfies subjective need; whereas factual judgments correspond to the relations among the elements of the object and among objects. [. . .] The essential difference between value judgments and factual judgments is that there is an additional factor in value judgments that determines their essence: man’s need. This is the essence of value judgments.70

However, there are also intimate connections between value and factual judgments, and both are indispensable in human social life.

70 Feng

[22].

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5.2 Value Direction and Orientation Value outlook is not purely theoretical. In any value system, there exist two basic and mutually contradictory aspects: that of societal and individual value ideals, and of norms and direction. In other words, the contradiction between the societal question of “What do we want?” and the individual question of “What do I want?” Each individual in a society has unique and ever-changing value goals and orientations characterized by extreme subjectivity and arbitrariness. It is as though individuals carry out their value choices based solely on their benefits, desires, needs, interests, and emotions. Nevertheless, individuals’ varied and ever-changing value choices demonstrate that their value goals are always determined by society’s value ideals, that individual value orientations are always oriented toward societal value direction, and that individual value identities are always identified with societal value norms. Therefore, within a society’s value system, its value ideals, norms, and direction play a decisive role in individuals’ value orientations. This is evident in the social content, nature, and form of individuals’ value orientations. First, the contents of individuals’ value orientations always encompass questions with social content, such as social justice, legal norms, political systems, and the meaning of life; they are by no means purely personal issues devoid of social content. Second, the nature of individuals’ value orientation always encompasses questions of a social nature, such as truth, goodness, and beauty versus falsehood, evil and ugliness; ideality and reality; the macroscopic and microscopic measures of history; collective and individual interests; long- and short-term interests, etc.; they are by no means purely personal issues unrelated to society. Third, the forms of individuals’ value orientation are always manifested through social forms, such as science, art, ethics, religion, etc.; they are by no means purely personal manifestations without social forms. Furthermore, real life tells us that the overall tendency of individuals’ value orientations is always determined by the basic value direction of a society. The dilemma is that individuals’ value orientations always stem from upheavals in a society’s value coordinates; to solve these contradictions, it is first necessary to solve the contradictions in society’s value direction. The value direction of society requires a reasonable mechanism for social reward and punishment, or “hard constraints” that embody the value norms of society. At the same time, the realization of a society’s value direction must depend on individuals’ value identity, i.e., the conscience of the behavioral subject. Xiao Xue-Hui describes conscience as: The special ability of individuals to understand and comprehend the various relationships in which they are placed, and the various ethical issues they must deal with; it is also the ability of individuals for self-monitoring, self-examination and self-comprehension. This is an internal stabilization mechanism that was discovered relatively early by mankind which affects all activities of behavioral subjects. In the social life of humans, conscience covertly, but persistently and universally plays a role in the way that humans handle their relationships with themselves, with others, with society and with the external environment. . . . Conscience reifies the guidance and promotion of individuals, and the guarding of their spiritual world.

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The ethical behaviors that humans show at the level of conscience are the result of true self-confrontation and the manifestation of self-loyalty. At this level, individuals develop their higher-level attributes through the practice of morality, thereby embodying the dignity of mankind.71

The process of social transformation is inevitably accompanied by the reconstruction of value norms, which in turn leads to the upheaval and confusion of universal value ideas. In philosophically questioning “goodness,” we must be dialectical in our treatment of ideality and reality, morality and interests, unity and choice, etc. while also maintaining the necessary tension between idealism and utilitarianism, moral expectations and moral obligations, unified norms and diverse choices, and so on.

5.3 Value and Truth Outlook The relation between factual and value judgments and between truth and value prompts us to reconsider the relation between man and the world. This relation is not an animal-like affirmative unity but a negative unity held by man; human practical activities are both regular activities based on the measure of things and purposive ones based on the measure of man. Regularity and purposiveness mutually determine human practical activities, and they are unified in opposition. From a practical standpoint, man’s pursuit of truth is not merely the correct reflection of objective things and their laws, but must necessarily also encompass man’s purposive pursuits. Gao Qing-Hai explains that practice is based on man’s negative unity with the world, which reveals truth and thereby breaks through the traditionally narrow vision of the theory of truth. The relation between fact and value, therefore, is the relation between regularity and purposiveness or between correct or wrong and good or bad. This has always been a divisive and controversial topic in philosophy, which often splits into the question of truth concerning correct or wrong and the question of value concerning good or bad. This what Gao refers to as the “traditionally narrow vision of the theory of truth,” and it is precisely in response to this that he pose the following question: “In the relentless pursuit of truth by humans, what is it that they are pursuing? What is it that they want to pursue?”72 This questioning directs the understanding of truth toward the questioning of man’s relation to the world. Why do humans want to pursue truth? Gao states: When we usually speak of pursuing the truth, speaking the truth, telling the truth and “fighting for the truth with our lives”, we are by no means referring to adapting or conforming ourselves to the external objective and objects; instead, our connotations have clearly exceeded beyond the truth of scientific cognition. A truth that needs and deserves to be fought for or even sacrificing our lives for is a sacred and important goal. It must necessarily embody the ideals and pursuits of human beings, and is entrusted with their great expectations for the future. 71 Xiao 72 Gao

[23]. [24].

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This type of truth can only be the realization of man’s creative disposition, and not merely a return to the existing determinations of things.73

Based on the above quote, Gao suggests it is necessary to renew our understanding of truth using theoretical philosophical characteristics: Philosophy originated from life, and hence should express life, understanding life, explain life, criticize life, and guide life. The theory of truth in philosophy is a specialized theory that teaches people to distinguish truth from falsehood and to pursue truth. It ought to have a broad horizon and a transcendent frame of mind, holistically expressing the truth-seeking activities in life. Not only must it explain factual, instrumental and theoretical truth activities, but also obligatory, purposive and practical truth pursuits, and the interrelations between the two. It must not, and should not, limit its own vision to a specific question of truth.74

Gao argues that to understand truth in the philosophical sense is to understand truth based on man’s mode of existence, i.e., from man’s negative unity with the world. In his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin states, “The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself . . . the world does not satisfy man and man decides to change it by his activity.”75 It is precisely based on this quote that Gao proposes, “A practical disposition implies that man is a self-creating being”76 and that “in man’s own creative activities, he objectifies his essence as an external being by means of projecting his disposition, while also humanizing the object, thus changing natural things into ‘being-for-self.’”77 Based on this understanding, Gao addresses falsehood as relative to truth: The fact that man needs to seek out truth implies that he is able to create falsehood, and that he is constantly creating falsehood. Since man is frequently tempted and deceived by falsehoods, such that there is often falsehood in truth and truth in falsehood, rendering the two inseparable, it is therefore necessary for man to pursue truth and distinguish truth from falsehoods.78

He continues on to say: It is often the case that there is falsehood in truth and truth in falsehood, such that falsehood can become truth and truth can become falsehood. As the saying goes, when what is true is taken to be false, then the false is true; when what is false is taken to be true, then the true is also false. If this is not the case, then man will lose his creative ability, and will no longer be man.79

Gao also states:

73 Ibid.,

p. 100. p. 101. 75 Lenin [2, pp. 213, 217]. 76 Gao Qing-Hai. Gao Qing-Hai’s Philosophical Papers, Volume II, p. 101. 77 Ibid., pp. 101–102. 78 Ibid., p. 102. 79 Ibid., p. 104. 74 Ibid.,

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In accordance with this understanding, man’s pursuit of truth is not simply a type of cognitive activity, but an actual creative activity. The truth pursued by man does not merely adapt to nature and conform to the objective, but is a creative goal that focuses on man’s ideals and pursuits. Thus, we have no choice but to adjust and modify the concept and theoretical framework of truth that was formed based on the simple conception of truth.80

Gao propose that by viewing truth from the practical standpoint of man’s negative unity with the world: The unity manifested in the truth pursued by man will not simply be the unity originally possessed by the object that tends toward objectivity, but should be a new, higher unity built by human means between man and the objective, man and the object, and man and the world. Such truth necessarily embodies the unity of truth, goodness and beauty in man’s ideals and pursuit.81

This is Gao’s outlook about truth based on man’s negative unity with the world, which is also his philosophical truth and value outlook based on the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. Philosophy, which pursues truth, goodness and beauty, is not merely an ontology concerning what is or is not, truth theory concerning correct or wrong, nor value theory concerning good or bad. Instead, it is a reflection on existence and the pursuit of truth starting from specific value demands. Therefore, any true philosophy will involve the unity of ontology, truth theory, and value theory. Their division causes us to regard philosophy as the science or art of expression rather than as “the essence of the spirit of the age” or “the living soul of civilization.” This type of thinking can guide us in advancing our critique of the premises underlying the basic beliefs, logic, modes, and concepts constituting thought in order to better critique the premises underlying the philosophical understanding of thought.

References 1. Hegel, G. W. F. (1873). Hegel’s logic: Part one of the encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences (W. Wallace, Trans.) (p. 223). Pacifica: Marxists Internet Archive. 2. Lenin, V. I. (1976). Lenin collected works: Volume 38, philosophical notebooks (C. Dutt, Trans.). Moscow: Progress Publishers. 3. Hegel, G. W. F. (2010). The science of logic (G. di Giovanni, Ed., Trans.) (p. 65). New York: Cambridge University Press. 4. Engels, F. (1941). Ludwig Feuerbach and the outcome of classical German philosophy (C. Dutt, Trans.) (p. 20). New York: International Publishers. 5. Marx, K. (2010). Marx and Engels collected works. Lawrence & Wishart (Vol. 6, pp. 163–164). 6. Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and time (J. Stambaugh, Trans.) (p. 5). New York: State University of New York Press. 7. Sun, Zheng-Yu. (1991). Ultimate being, ultimate explanation and ultimate value: A noumenology of the ultimate concern. Social Science Front, 4, 1–7.

80 Ibid. 81 Gao

[24].

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8. Sun, Zheng-Yu. (1990). A humanistic understanding of science: A commentary on Wartofsky’s philosophy of science. Social Sciences in China, 4, 29–43. 9. Planck, M. (1936). The philosophy of physics (W. H. Johnston, Trans.) (pp. 87–88). New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 10. Wartofsky, M. W. (1968). Conceptual foundations of scientific thought (p. 65). London, UK: The Macmillan Company. 11. Dobzhansky, T. (1951). Genetics and the origin of species (p. 308). New York: Columbia University Press. 12. Chen, Yuan-Ming. (1984). Linguistics and modern science (p. 113). Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House. 13. Marx, K. (1971). Theories of surplus value (J. Cohen & S. W. Ryazanskaya, Trans.) (p. 491). Moscow: Progress Publishers. 14. Cassirer, E. (1992). An essay on man: An introduction to a philosophy of human culture (p. 111). New Haven and London: Yale University Press (first published 1944). 15. Yin, Ding. (1988). The fate of understanding (p. 268). Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company. 16. de Saussure, F. (2011). Course in general linguistics (pp. 88–89). New York: Columbia University Press. 17. Xu, You-Yu. (1991). Comment on ‘the linguistic turn in philosophy’. Philosophical Research, 7, 42–49. 18. Zou, Hua-Zheng. (1987). A study on an essay concerning human understanding (p. 51). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 19. Zhu, De-Sheng. (1997). On the identity of thought and being. Philosophical Research, 3, 7–15. 20. Cihai. (1980). Shanghai: Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House. 21. Li, Xiu-Lin. (Ed.). (1990). Principles of dialectical materialism and historical materialism (3rd Ed., p. 293). Beijing: China Renmin University Press. 22. Feng, Ping. (1995). The theory of evaluation (p. 254). Beijing: Oriental Publishing House. 23. Xiao, Xue-Hui. (1995). Conditions for the virtuous operation of new ethical culture. Jianghai Academic Journal, 2, 89–95. 24. Gao, Qing-Hai. (1997). Gao Qing-Hai’s philosophical papers (Vol. II, p. 98). Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House.

Chapter 5

A Critique of the Premises Underlying the Philosophical Ideas of Thought

Basic concepts of an age manifest on a deeper level as philosophical ideas. Therefore, a critique of those philosophical ideas, which underlie the basic concepts of an age, is also a critique of those basic concepts.

1 The Basic Question of Philosophy The most basic question of philosophy is its theoretical nature. Concerning the question of the relation between thought and being, Engels proposes two theses: first, it is the great basic question of modern philosophy, and second, the relation of thought and being is the “unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.”1 On the surface, these two theses seem contradictory. If the relation between thought and being is the “unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought,” this implies that the relation between thought and being is not actually a question. How then, can it be the “great basic question” of philosophy? Conversely, if the relation between thought and being is the “great basic question,” why assert that it is also the “unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought?”

1.1 The Critique of the Premises Underlying Philosophy Whether the relation between thought and being is the “unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought” and should be regarded as a question (i.e., whether thought and being are subject to the same laws) should, in principle, distinguish human thought activities into two basic dimensions. First is the constitution of thought (where an individual achieves the unity of thought and being in his/her own 1 Marx

and Engels [17, p. 544].

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cognitive activities). Second is the reflection of thought (where thought “thinks about itself,” using itself as a medium). All human thought activities, with the exception of philosophy, regard the idea that thought and being are subject to the same laws as an “unconscious and unconditional premise” in order to constitute thoughts concerning the world. In contrast, philosophy regards these constituted thoughts as the objects of its critique, reflecting on them to question the premises underlying thought. The premises underlying thought are the basis and principle by which thought constitutes itself, and the logical fulcrum upon which thought constitutes itself. Thus, they possess both implicitness and logical coercion. The former trait refers to the fact that the premises of thought act as thought’s invisible hand and behind-the-scenes manipulator during its self-construction. Thought’s logical coercion refers to the fact that the premises of thought are hidden within its activities and normalize the mode and content of all human thoughts and behaviors. The philosophical critique of the premises underlying thought involves revealing its implicit premises, deconstructing their logical coercion, and reconstructing the basis and principles by which thought constitutes itself, thereby changing human modes of thought, value ideas, aesthetic consciousness, ultimate concerns, and, ultimately, practical activities. This indicates that philosophical reflection is not the scrutiny and rectification of the contents of thought generally, but rather a reflection on thought’s implicit premises. This implies that the philosophical dimension of human thought is critical. Immanuel Kant, the founder of classical German philosophy, views the purpose of philosophy as “cleaning up the foundation;” he uses philosophy to reveal inherent contradictions in human reason. Georg Hegel, meanwhile, defines philosophy as “thinking becoming conscious of its nature,” and philosophical thinking as “speculative thinking” based on the distinction between representational thinking and formal argumentation. In other words, when thought regards itself as its object, it achieves consciousness concerning its own nature. Phenomenologist Edmund Husserl proposes that cognition is unfathomable, and its possibility self-evident in the so-called “natural attitude of thought,” whereas in philosophical thinking, the possibility of cognition is the basic question. All of these philosophers turn their critiques on the premises by which human thought constitutes itself. In this sense, Kant’s theory of a priori knowledge, Hegel’s dialectics, and Husserl’s phenomenology are all critiques of the premises underlying the question of the relation between thought and being. Philosophical reflection (or thought regarding itself as the object of thinking), implies that philosophy’s basic question and premise critique are mutually determined. It is only in the critique of its premises that the unconscious and unconditional premise of theoretical thought—the relation between thought and being—can be regarded as the basic question. The relation between thought and being determines the essence of philosophy to be the critique of the premises underlying theoretical thought. Thus, both thought and being determine philosophy’s theoretical nature, its theoretical space, and its social significance in all human activities.

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1.2 The Theoretical Space of Philosophy The premises upon which thought constitutes itself include its basic modes, concepts, logic, and beliefs. Therefore, the philosophical critique of the premises underlying the question of the relation between thought and being involves the following: (1) a critique of the premises underlying the basic modes of thought (i.e., common sense, religion, art, science, and philosophy itself); (2) a critique of the premises underlying the basic concepts of thought (i.e., world, natural, historical, life, value, rational, justice, and freedom outlooks); (3) a critique of the premises underlying the basic logic of thought (i.e., extensional and intensional logic); and (4) a critique of the premises underlying the basic beliefs of thought (i.e., the identity of thought and being). The critique of the premises underlying the basic modes is the most immediate philosophical critique. All human thought is composed of various basic modes by which humans comprehend the world: common sense, religion, art, science, and philosophy. Therefore, philosophical critique of the premises underlying thought is first and foremost the critique of these modes. Common sense is the product of human experience across generations and allows humans the most extensive understanding of their empirical world, the most universal communication of thoughts and feelings, the most direct coordination of behavioral patterns, and the most convenient selfidentification of their internal world. Therefore, common sense is the most universal premise normalizing human thoughts and behaviors and constitutes the immediate object of the philosophical premise critique. The essential characteristic of religion, meanwhile, is the belief in god. The sacred form unifies all kinds of forces into an omnipotent one, all kinds of intelligence into an omniscient one, all kinds of emotions into an unparalleled one, and all kinds of values into the perfect one. In this way, the sacred form becomes the source of all power, the basis of all intelligence, the criterion of all emotions, and the measure of all values. Humanity can only obtain the fundamental meaning of life from an alienated sacred form. Therefore, the philosophical critique of the premises underlying religion is the critique of its inverted world outlook. Art expresses the complexity, richness, and creativity of the human mind; the rich and colorful contradictory relation between humanity and the world; and man’s shaping of himself and the human world according to the laws of beauty. Philosophy regards artistic activity and its products as objects of reflection, thus uncovering humanity’s secrets contained within artistic creations; demonstrating the meaning and value of life expressed in art; and elucidating the rich relation between humanity and the world as manifested through art, thus achieving a deeper understanding of the world and life. The philosophical critique of the premises underlying science is a reflection on the relation between thought and being in scientific activities, and questions of world outlook, epistemology, and methodology, thereby reflecting upon the scientific spirit of the age and science’s social function. The philosophical critique of philosophy exposes its premises’ inner contradictions, revealing their narrow-mindedness, one-sidedness, and transience, and demonstrating philosophy’s historical progression, limitations, and possibilities. This enables humans to view

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all thought and behavior with a critical eye, and adopt new modes of thought and value systems to reflect upon their historical and real existence, thereby shaping and guiding a new spirit of the age. The above critiques form the principal content of philosophy. The thought of each age implicitly contains its underlying basic beliefs, which become manifest as philosophical ideas. The dialectics between man and nature that seeks heaven, earth, and man; man and society that explores You, ‘I’ and ‘They; man and self that reflects on knowledge, emotions, and will; and man and life that pursues truth, goodness, and beauty are condensed into the philosophical categories of theoretical thought. Being and non-being; noumenon and phenomenon; subject and object; sensuousness and reason; experience and transcendence; thought and being; freedom and necessity in Western philosophy; heaven and earth; internal and external; noumenon and function; the Way and the vessel (i.e. that which is above and with physical form); reason and desire; man and self; righteousness and benefit; benevolence and wisdom; and cognition and practice in Chinese philosophy are crystallized in deeper understandings of the question of the relation between thought and being. Through critical reflection on truth, laws, science, culture, history, language, reason, values, and justice, modern philosophy has conducted an ever-deepening critique of the premises underlying the basic concepts of thought. This has resulted in disciplinespecific philosophy, including the philosophy of science, logic, culture, language, value, politics, law, economics, technology, engineering, management, education, and so on. The critique of the premises underlying the basic concepts of thought involves investigating the premises underlying the beliefs of life; exploring the basis of empirical common sense; reflecting on the measure of historical progress; and questioning the criteria for the evaluation of truth, goodness, and beauty, thereby transforming human worldview, mode of thought, value ideas, aesthetic taste, and way of life. The critique of the premises underlying the basic logic is a critique of the premises underlying the laws and rules by which thought constitutes itself, which concretely manifests itself as the critique of the premises underlying extensional and intensional logic. Formal logic (i.e., extensional logic), has two premises: first, the possibility of thought’s contents (i.e. the “known judgments” of conceptual intensions); second, the possibility of forms of thought (i.e. the “rules of thought”) of formal logic. The philosophical critique of the premises underlying extensional logic regards the selfevident premises of formal logic as the object of its critique, and its aim is to seek out a logical foundation for the identity of thought and being. Dialectical logic, as intensional logic, regards the historical development of conceptual intensions as its object of reflection, thereby revealing the logic by which thought constitutes itself. Hegel’s dialectics demonstrates the dual negativity of thought in constituting itself. Specifically, thought negates its nihility to form its determinateness, and negates its determinateness in order to reconstruct it on a deeper level. This dual negativity of thought shows the harmony of thought and being realized in the dialectical unity between constructiveness and reflectiveness; determinateness and negativity; and progression of human thought. The dialectics of Marx, Engels, and Lenin rely on the most essential and immediate basis of thought—practice—as their core category

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and explanatory principle, in order to uncover how the logic of thought can have “the stability of a prejudice, an axiomatic character.”2 The critique of the premises underlying the basic beliefs of thought is a direct critique of the unconscious and unconditional premise of theoretical thought. In other words, human practical, cognitive, evaluative, and aesthetic activities implicitly contain an unconscious and unconditional premise—a commitment to the harmony of thought and being. This is thought’s basic belief in constituting itself, and the basic question of how thought is possible. The philosophical critique of the premises underlying the basic beliefs of thought is also a critique of the premises underlying the basic question of philosophy, or the relation between thought and being. The critique of the premises underlying the basic mode, concepts, and logic by which thought constitutes itself is also a critique of the premises underlying the basic beliefs by which thought constitutes itself, which in turn enables the relation between thought and being to become the great basic question of philosophy. On the other hand, the critique of the premises underlying these basic beliefs manifests as the critique of the premises underlying the basic modes, concepts, and logic by which thought constitutes itself, thereby providing a broad theoretical space for the critique of the premises underlying philosophy.

1.3 Philosophical Themes Throughout the Ages The philosophical critique of the premises underlying thought regards the thought of each historical age as its object. In each age, philosophy has its own epochal intensions, and hence its own philosophical themes. The basic question of philosophy receives epochal intensions through the contemporary historical theme, and this theme deepens the basic question of philosophy through its epochal intensions. Marx comments in the introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’: It is the task of history, therefore, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is above all the task of philosophy, which is in service of history, to unmask human self-alienation in its secular forms, once its sacred form has been unmasked. Thus, the critique of heaven is transformed into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, the critique of theology into the critique of politics.3

Here, Marx provides an important reflection on the historical evolution of philosophy, and the comprehension of its contemporary themes: pre-modern philosophy was essentially the process of shaping the “sacred form,” modern philosophy deconstructs the sacred form and replaces it with “secular forms,” and contemporary philosophy is the process of deconstructing secular forms through the deconstruction of the sacred form. 2 Lenin 3 Marx

[9, p. 216]. [18, p. 132].

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If we connect philosophy’s shaping of the sacred form, deconstruction of the sacred form, and deconstruction of secular forms with Marx’s relationships of personal dependence, personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things, and free development of all conditioned upon the free development of each, we gain a deeper understanding for contemporary philosophical themes. In historical relationships of personal dependence, the contemporary philosophical theme is the establishment of the sacred form, or the theoretical form of human selfconsciousness. In the time of personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things, man’s personal dependence shifted to a dependence on things; hence, the theme was the deconstruction of man’s self-alienation in the sacred form, and the establishment of secular forms. Finally, contemporary reflection focuses on the value of individual universal development; philosophy has progressed from the deconstruction of the sacred form to the deconstruction of secular forms. The evolutionary process of philosophy, therefore, is the theoretical characterization of human historical progress, from personal dependence, to a dependence on things, to a shifting dependence on things. In its theoretical characterization of human historical transformation, philosophy, as the theoretical form of human self-consciousness, has always constituted its own historical development through the pursuit of truth, i.e., a critique of the premises underlying thought. Thus, in the course of establishing the sacred form, deconstructing the sacred form, and deconstructing secular forms, philosophy realizes a major transformation from the epistemological to the practical and linguistic. The philosophical intension of this transformation is a shift from dogmatism concerning the question of the relation between thought and being, towards epistemological reflection and practical understanding of this basic question. It is also the process of unifying history with logic, whereby the historical transformation of philosophical themes is used to deepen this basic question. Philosophy’s basic question determines its theoretical nature: philosophy is the critique of the premises underlying thought, and its historical theme in a given area represents the epochal intensions of thought upon which it reflects. In other words, philosophy’s premise critique is of the premises underlying epochal thought. Substituting philosophy’s historical theme with its basic question eliminates its unique nature and special functions. On the other hand, replacing its basic question with its historical theme causes it to become abstract. Thus, theoretical consciousness of the basic question is necessary to determine the historical theme, and theoretical consciousness of the historical theme is necessary to reflect upon the basic question—thus enabling us to conduct a philosophical critique of the premises underlying thought while unifying the two. Only then can philosophy truly become the intellectual quintessence of its time, and the living soul of culture.

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2 Philosophy and the History of Philosophy The philosophical ideas underlying thought are both formed in and transformed by history. Philosophy and its history represent the unity of historical ideology and ideological history. In this sense, philosophy is the history of philosophy. However, this proposition is controversial in the academic community. Therefore, analyzing this statement is also a critique of the premises underlying the philosophical ideas of thought. In the history of philosophy, philosophical propositions of value do not originate from nothing, but are distinctively relevant. Similarly, refutations of philosophical propositions are not baseless complaints, but passionate articulations. The relevance of criticizing the belief that philosophy is the history of philosophy is obvious: philosophical research should confront reality in order to achieve the formation of epochal and creative thought (rather than hiding in an ivory tower). Nevertheless, is this proposition relevant, or positively significant? What are its connotations? More specifically, can we depart from the history of philosophy and specialize in the study of philosophy, remaining oriented in reality while achieving theoretical innovations?

2.1 Historical Ideology and Ideological History There are two meanings to the statement that philosophy is the history of philosophy. First, philosophy is historical ideology; second, the history of philosophy is ideological history. Therefore, to understand the meaning of the statement, we must explore the connection between history and thought in philosophical activities. Philosophy is a theoretical form of human self-consciousness formed by philosophers’ thinking minds. Thus, all philosophical theories are inseparable from the ages in which philosophers live, the cultural traditions they have inherited, their personal characteristics, and the human problems over which they ponder. All philosophers are telling a personal story in the name of humanity, and a human story in their own names. Personal understanding and speculation are synchronous with human ideology and civilization, and with contemporary historical characteristics and trends. In this regard, all philosophy is an exploration of human problems based on epochal content, national form, and individual style; hence, it is always historical rather than super-historical. If philosophy is historical ideology, then so must be the history of philosophy, which is composed of philosophy throughout the ages. This ideological history is that of the battle of ideological heroes, changes in noble minds, and the transformation of the spirit of the age. It presents historical ideology as the history of philosophy and serves as the rungs and scaffolding of philosophical development by presenting the questions of historical ideologies and the theoretical form of human

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self-consciousness they offer to future generations. Philosophers of every age and specialty must rely on this scaffolding; those who depart will not move forward, no matter how brilliant their genius. In his discourse on Hegelian philosophy, Engels repeatedly stresses that Hegel’s dialectics summarizes the entire development of philosophy in the “most splendid fashion,” and is the result of two and a half thousand years of philosophical development. Each of Hegel’s categories represents a stage in the history of philosophy. Engels states, “Theoretical thinking is an innate quality only as regards natural capacity. This natural capacity must be developed, improved, and for its improvement there is as yet no other means than the study of previous philosophy.”4 He warns, the “lack of acquaintance with the history of philosophy” has meant that “propositions which were advanced in philosophy centuries ago, which are often enough completely dead philosophically, are frequently put forward … as brand-new wisdom and even become fashionable for a while.”5 He goes on to target “bad, fashionable philosophy” and points out: The official Hegelian school had assimilated only the most simple devices of the master’s dialectics and applied them to everything and anything, often with ridiculous incompetence. Hegel’s whole legacy was, so far as they were concerned, limited to a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright, and to a list of words and phrases whose only purpose was to turn up at the right moment, when ideas and positive knowledge were lacking.6

Engels thus suggests that so-called dialectical philosophy is “a form of theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.”7 The history of philosophy is ideological history, hence any type of philosophy in the history of philosophy is not a particular philosopher’s monologue, but rather a diachronic and synchronic dialogue among philosophers. Indeed, such a philosophical monologue does not exist, while philosophical dialogue centers around understanding various types of historical ideology. If any discussion of a philosophical question is not premised on the history of philosophy, it will depart from the history of thought and its achievements, and hence limit specific historical ideologies “to a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright.”8 It may even result in putting forward “propositions which are often enough completely dead philosophically … as brand-new wisdom and even become fashionable for a while.”9 Therefore, when studying any philosophical question, it is vital to regard the various historical ideologies (i.e., philosophy) of any ideological history (i.e., history of philosophy) as the context. 4 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 338. p. 339. 6 Marx and Engels [19, p. 472]. 7 Marx and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 491. 8 Marx and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 16, p. 472. 9 Marx and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 339. 5 Ibid.,

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Although humans utilize a variety of philosophical terms in our own thought activities, these terms are completely different from those used in professional philosophical research. In research, philosophical terms are the accumulation of the entire history of philosophy; the concept of ideological history, therefore, is the scaffolding of the study of philosophy. To amateur philosophers, terms are isolated from their ideological history, and hence cannot serve as such scaffolding. For example, the term “philosophy” has no set definition in academic research but rather represents diverse understandings and explanations throughout the ages. This has necessitated thinking of the term in vertical and horizontal ways, making philosophy an object of critical reflection. In contrast, among amateur philosophers, “philosophy” has a given definition; hence, they can only consider it based on such a conclusion. This is often illustrated in amateur philosophical papers: their arguments are original, but their justifications are textbook, and their arguments are positioned as monologues that cannot be questioned. This surprising similarity originates from the fact that these amateur philosophers do not understand the history of philosophy and lack the scaffolding necessary to philosophical research. The severity of this problem is limited to not only amateur philosophers but also certain professional researchers who adopt this method. Therefore, it is especially important to understand philosophy and the history of philosophy as historical ideology and ideological history, respectively, and to regard the history of philosophy as the scaffolding of philosophical research. This is the clearest and most direct argument for the utility of the statement “philosophy is the history of philosophy.”

2.2 The Philosophical Modes for Comprehending Reality The confrontation of reality through theoretical means is premised on the appropriation of theory. In philosophy, so-called theory does not refer to certain tenets and ready-made conclusions, but rather to ideological history (i.e., history of philosophy) composed of historical ideology (i.e., philosophy). If we depart from this ideological history, we lose any philosophy that confronts reality. Modern scientists and philosophers have reached a basic consensus: observation is infiltrated and burdened by theory. There is no neutral observation. Our understanding and explanation of reality is likewise consciously or unconsciously burdened by theory. Therefore, the question becomes what kind of theory infiltrates our observation of reality. Is it that which “rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements”10 or is it that which is outdated, narrow-minded, or isolated? In terms of philosophy, is it a historical ideology formed using ideological history, or is it a non-historical ideology apart from ideological history? Human observation and comprehension of reality are achieved through two basic modes: experience and theory. Theory’s observation and comprehension is not only

10 Marx

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mediated by experience, but also by theory itself. Hence, the theoretical comprehension of reality always maintains a certain distance from reality. It is precisely due to this distance that theory can transcend the representational thinking and formal argumentation criticized by Hegel. In other words, it is only by transcending the complexity of perception, fluidity of representation, narrow-mindedness of emotions, and subjectivity of intention that we can fully reflect, profoundly examine, rationally confront, idealistically guide, and sensibly reflect on reality. Only then can we achieve philosophy as “its time apprehended in thoughts”11 and enable it to become “the intellectual quintessence of its time.”12 When criticizing the current state of philosophical research, it is crucial to criticize its departure from reality. However, the means by which we confront reality (i.e., through empirical or philosophical methods) is a question often overlooked. Much of the current philosophical research that claims to study reality actually proposes, considers, and answers questions on a non-philosophical level (that is, on an empirical level). Such “acritical positivism” lacks the scaffolding of philosophical research, as well as genuine theoretical thought and laborious theoretical exploration, treating reality as merely the amassing of facts. Such research cannot arrive at the necessary theoretical comprehension of reality. Marx and Engels point out in The German Ideology that in our time, history has become “the history of the world.” In The Communist Manifesto, they state more explicitly that in our time, “national onesidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible.” Therefore, the “problem of China” is not merely China’s problem but the global issues faced by contemporary China and how it solves these issues. This broader perspective fosters an understanding of the immense theoretical power of Marx’s “historical ideology.” Marx believes one should distinguish a historical age not based on what it produces, but rather on its mode of production. He proposes that the essence of the market economy is that it exists as “personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things.”13 He also states that the task of modern philosophy is “to unmask human self-alienation”14 in its sacred form, while contemporary philosophy’s task is “to unmask human self-alienation in its secular forms.”15 Marx understands the relation of theory and reality as follows: “It is not enough that thought strives to actualize itself; actuality must itself strive toward thought.”16 Therefore, Marx’s historical ideology serves as an indispensable theoretical mediator in the observation and comprehension of reality; scientific development; the transformation of economic development; the complex relation between theory and reality; China’s economic, political, cultural, and theoretical construction; and China’s technological, institutional, cultural, and theoretical innovations. Conversely, 11 Hegel

[20, p. 19]. and Engels [21, p. 195]. 13 Marx and Engels. Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 95. 14 Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 132. 15 Ibid. 16 Marx and Engels [22, p. 183]. 12 Marx

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if we depart from such historical ideology and its mediating role, how then do we observe and comprehend reality? Contemporary Chinese philosophy, which confronts the world, modernization, and the future, must do so through philosophical means, thereby reflecting and expressing China’s reality as it shapes and guides China’s future.

2.3 Philosophy’s Theoretical Innovations Theoretical innovations are based on two basic premises: the acquisition of theoretical resources, and the discovery of theoretical difficulties. These two premises are mutually complementary: it is only by acquiring theoretical resources that we are able to discover their corresponding theoretical difficulties, and it is only by discovering theoretical difficulties that we can activate their corresponding theoretical resources. It is precisely in this dual interaction that we are able to achieve true theoretical innovation. The challenge of philosophical innovation lies primarily in the fact that philosophy must comprehend the human problems of its time through theoretical modes. Every age of human life is full of intricate contradictions between man and nature; man and society; and man and self; and among individuals, groups, strata, classes, nations, and countries. In addition, questions of social institutions; political ideals; ethics and morality; value ideas; social psychology; and social currents imply that philosophy must always mediate between the sacred and the secular; rationality and irrationality; standards and choice; necessity and freedom; ideality and reality; and macroscopic and microscopic historical scales. Such philosophical thinking concerns human survival and development and should not base its findings on the experience or speculation of individuals, nor on the amassing of data. It is only by applying Engel’s “theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements”17 (i.e., ideological history), which contains the accumulation of human civilization, that we can reach full comprehension of human problems at a philosophical level. This enables philosophy to become “its time apprehended in thoughts.”18 Philosophical innovation that is not grounded in ideological history is unable to endure the questioning of ideological history and the criticism of human problems. Another challenge lies in the fact that philosophical comprehension of contemporary human problems is not merely determined by external difficulties between theory and experience, but also by the internal difficulties among theories. Engels writes, “In the history of society … the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without an intended aim.”19 These various opposing 17 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 491. [20, p. 19]. 19 Engels [4, p. 48]. 18 Hegel

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purposes and aims filter through philosophers’ minds, thus becoming different types of philosophy: the theoretical forms of human self-consciousness, and the conflicting theories humans use to observe and comprehend reality. Without the in-depth study and critical reflection of these conflicting theories, historical ideology is the only possible theory; this burdens observation and lacks the critical power of theoretical innovation. For example, in contemporary philosophical discussion of justice, scholars cannot avoid the works of philosophers such as Rawls, Nozick, and Hayek; nor can they bypass philosophical trends such as neoliberalism, neo-leftism, and neoconservatism. However, they must also confront the ghosts of Plato and Aristotle; Hobbes and Locke; and Kant and Hegel. If a Chinese philosopher is examining this question, these Western ghosts are joined by scholars such as Confucius, Mencius, Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi, Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming, Kang Youwei, and Liang Qichao. As American scholar Luther Brinkley proposed in his book Conflict of Ideals: “If one is to satisfy his quest for values to which he could commit himself, he must have some understanding of the alternative ideals competing for his adherence.”20 If we depart from these theoretical resources and their critical reflection, it will not be possible to profoundly explore questions or achieve philosophical innovation. Philosophical innovation is further challenged due to genuine theoretical difficulties in theoretical resources, which require new theories to resolve. Philosophy develops through the continual discovery and resolution of these difficulties. However, if the history of philosophy is not ideological history grounded in philosophical development and the discovery of true theoretical difficulties, then socalled philosophical innovation cannot exist. The discovery of theoretical difficulties requires both the accumulation of literature over the long term and the persistent accumulation of thought, which enables the use of theoretical resources and the understanding of theoretical difficulties. For example, Marx, Engels, and Lenin all respond to Hegel’s dialectic by revealing its real theoretical difficulties, thereby creating and advancing the dialectical theory of Marxism. Marx believes that Hegel’s dialectic, “the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner,” is “mystic”—because Hege l regards the process of thinking as not only “the demiurgos of the real world” but also in its rational form as “a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors.”21 Engels, meanwhile, proposes that Hegel’s dialectic “once and for all dealt the deathblow to the finality of all products of human thought and action”22 and “produced an extremely tame political conclusion,” because Hegel “had a bit of the philistine’s queue dangling behind.” In other words, classical German philosophy, as the German theory of the French Revolution, only produced a “revolution in nightcaps.”23 Finally, Lenin starts from the theoretical perspective that “dialectics is living, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing)” and reveals the epistemological roots of idealist philosophy, including that of Hegel: “philosophical idealism is a one-sided, 20 Brinkley

[23, p. vii]. and Engels [24, pp. 19–20]. 22 Engels [4, p. 11]. 23 Engels [4, p. 11]. 21 Marx

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exaggerated, “überschwengliches” (Dietzgen) development (inflation, distention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosized.”24 It is precisely due to the real acquisition of theoretical resources from Hegel’s dialectics, the true discovery of theoretical difficulties in his theory, and the conscious confrontation of reality, that the revolutionary and critical dialectics of Marxism, with its rational form, was created. To summarize, the true significance of the proposition “philosophy is the history of philosophy” is not to describe philosophy as the history of philosophy, or to limit the scope of philosophical research to that of the history of philosophy. Instead, this statement emphasizes that philosophy and the history of philosophy are historical ideology and ideological history, respectively. This neither prioritizes the history of philosophy nor dilutes reality and the future with history, but instead conceives of philosophy as historical ideology. In other words, philosophy does not consist of dull tenets, ready-made conclusions, or ultimate truths in lists of figures, amassing of texts, or descriptions of a battlefield. Instead, the openness and innovation of philosophical thinking should involve the continuous innovation of ideological history, based on the theoretical consciousness of historical ideology. It is only by understanding this that we can achieve the aims of those who critique this proposition: to confront reality and the future through philosophical means. This requires the profound deliberation of those engaged in philosophical research.

3 Philosophy and Metaphysics Metaphysics is often regarded as the science of things after or beyond physics. In modern times, philosophers trend toward the so-called “post-metaphysics,” or the idea that the critique of the premises underlying philosophical thought is first and foremost the critique of the premises underlying metaphysics.

3.1 The Metaphysical Disposition of Man Philosophy is one of the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world. It cannot substitute for other modes, nor can it be substituted by other modes. Therefore, the understanding of philosophy is also the understanding of how philosophy comprehends the world. This book argues that the unique value of the philosophical mode—distinct from religion, art, or science—is its representation of humanity’s theoretical consciousness; serving as a metaphysics that characterizes humanity’s metaphysical disposition and captures human self-consciousness in a theoretical form.

24 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, pp. 360–361.

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Philosophical metaphysics originates from humans’ practical mode of existence, i.e., life activity. Human life activity is not the innate survival activity of animals. Instead, man “makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness,”25 according to Marx and Engels. Lenin expands on this by saying, “The world does not satisfy man and man decides to change it by his activity. […] The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself, changes external actuality, abolishes its determinateness (= alters some sides or other, qualities, of it) … and makes it as being in and for itself (= objectively true).”26 In other words, human practical activity changes the reality of the world into non-reality, and human ideality into true reality. This is the negative unity of humanity and the world. In human practical activity and historical development, humanity is forever attempting to achieve purposiveness through individual objective activities. Man is forever creating himself and his world, hence humanity and the world it has created are forever unfinished. Humanity, therefore, has the most bizarre existence in the world—ideal, transcendent, and creative, existing in negative unity with the world, and changing reality into ideality. To negate reality and pursue ideality is humans’ metaphysical disposition, and can thus be described as philosophical metaphysics, or the theoretical characterization of the ideal, transcendent, and creative human self-consciousness concerning their own existence. Practice is the “most essential and immediate basis”27 of human thought. The contradiction between ideality and reality in practical activity determines the contradiction between the sovereignty and non-sovereignty of thought. Marx and Engels write, “Human thought is just as much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge is just as much unlimited as limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition, its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual realization and in reality at any particular moment.”28 Human thought, based in human practice, craves to comprehend and explain the world on the most profound level and to affirm humans’ position and value in the world. This is the ultimate concern of human thought, which is directed toward ultimate being, explanation, and value.29 As one of the basic modes by which humans comprehend the world, the metaphysical pursuit of philosophy is the theoretical characterization of “its disposition, its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal”30 of human thought, which is based in practice. Therefore, philosophical metaphysics will always be an intentional pursuit of tracing one’s origins, and an idealistic pursuit of self-transcendence. It will always involve “meta-thinking,” i.e., a reflection upon reality through ideality, and the living soul of culture that shapes and guides the spirit of the age.

25 Marx

and Engels [25, p. 276]. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 213, 217–218. 27 Marx and Engels [17, p. 511]. 28 Marx and Engels [26, p. 80]. 29 Sun [27, pp. 231–235]. 30 Marx and Engels [17, p. 80]. 26 Lenin,

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To negate reality and pursue ideality are humans’ real-life processes. The historical development of human civilization has always been filled with battles of ideals; societal turmoil and transformation; and historical regression and advancement. From this is fashioned the perplexing and colorful history of civilization, which depicts humans’ self-creation and self-development, but also exhibits a negation of reality and a pursuit of ideality. Together, the theoretical characterization of human development; the pursuit of mysteries in the world, history, and human life; reflection upon the basis, criteria, and measure by which thought constitutes itself; and the quest to satisfy the unquenchable thirst for political ideals, social justice, moral foundation, and value demands constitute human philosophical metaphysical adventures, which are also the events of human civilization in theoretical form. There has always been a contradiction between ideality and reality within practical human activity, just as there has always been a contradiction between sovereignty and non-sovereignty within practical human thought. This has led to the existence of two basic contradictions in philosophical metaphysics. First, as the theoretical characterization of the sovereignty of human thought, philosophical metaphysics strives to provide an eternal place of settlement for human life in the form of absolute truth. However, human history and changes in human thought are constantly negating the authority and effectiveness of any such absolute truth. Second, philosophy regards absolute truth as the basis, criterion, and measure by which to judge and explain everything. However, its own development is achieved through self-critique, which enables philosophy to break free from the cycle of self-explanation and become transformed. Considering these contradictions, philosophical metaphysics can be categorized into three basic theoretical forms. First, that which makes matters possible without knowing they are impossible (otherwise known as traditional metaphysics). This approach regards philosophy as the incarnation of absolute truth. Today, it has become known as a “metaphysical horror”31 and is often criticized. Second, that which does not make matters possible upon knowing they are impossible (otherwise known as the rejection of metaphysics). In this framework, philosophy is replaced by science, and reflects the trend of scientism, which many have criticized. Third, that which makes matters possible even when knowing they are impossible. This approach sees philosophy as a metaphysical pursuit involving the theoretical characterization of man’s metaphysical disposition; it is known as a revival of metaphysics, and scholars today both advocate for and reject the approach. Within the history of philosophy, philosophical metaphysics is the revolution of modern philosophy against traditional philosophy, or the revolutionary transformation of metaphysics from making matters possible without knowing they are impossible to making matters possible even when knowing they are impossible. In such a way, traditional metaphysics is transformed from a super-historical absolute into a relative absolute: “the intellectual quintessence of its time” and “the living soul of culture.”32 31 Kolakowski 32 Marx

[28]. and Engels [21, p. 195].

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The three theoretical forms described above characterize human civilization through theoretical means, thereby forming human self-consciousness in theoretical form (i.e., philosophy). Marx generalizes human existence using three historical forms: “personal dependence”; “personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things” and “free individuality, based on the universal development of the individuals”.33 Based on man’s mode of existence in the natural economy, we can establish the sacred form that characterizes personal dependence and normalizes all human thoughts and behaviors through the embodiment of absolute truth: this is traditional metaphysics. Humanity’s mode of existence in the market economy reveals its self-alienation from the sacred form, and is characterized by personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things, which uses unlimited reason to normalize all human thoughts and behaviors (this is rational metaphysics, as shown in modern Western philosophy). Finally, humanity’s mode of existence as based on future or ideal universal development shows its self-alienation from secular forms, and is characterized by the desire and pursuit of individual free and universal development, and the use of limited reason to reflect on all human thoughts and behaviors (this is post-metaphysics).

3.2 Metaphysics as the History of Conceptual Critique Metaphysics, as human self-consciousness in theoretical form, is not a world outlook in the ordinary sense, in that it regards the whole world as its object, nor the science of science in that it predominates over science, but rather a reflection on human civilization. In other words, in metaphysics, thought regards itself as its object (i.e., meta-thinking). Concepts, as the accumulation and cultural reservoir of the history of human civilization, serve as a scaffolding for human civilization. Thus, critical reflection on concepts is the theoretical characterization of man’s metaphysical disposition (i.e., the negation of reality and pursuit of ideality). It is the quest to answer human problems using epochal intensions, which is also a reflection on human civilization. Such metaphysical pursuits contain a critical reflection on concepts (thought) and exist as the critical history of concepts from the perspective of their theoretical interest, modes of thought, social functions, and historical evolution. Thus, the ability to view the history of conceptual critique as a metaphysical pursuit of philosophy imposes a fundamental restriction on our understanding of metaphysics. Metaphysics’ theoretical interest is to seek out a principle of unity that transcends concrete physics. Aristotle proposes that metaphysics is “seeking the first principles and the highest causes.”34 Hegel expands on this: “In this way the manifold reality may be related to that Idea as the universal, and thereby be determined.”35 33 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 95. [1, p. 1]. 35 Hegel [29, pp. 229–230]. 34 Aristotle

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Wartofsky summarizes the history of metaphysics by saying, “The driving force of metaphysical thought, both in its classical and modern forms, has been the attempt to get things whole, to present a unified picture or framework within which the wide diversity of things in our experience could be explained on the basis of some universal principles, or as manifestations of some universal stuff or process.”36 In philosophical metaphysics, how we view metaphysics’ principle of unity (whether the search is to make matters possible without knowing they are impossible, or to make matters possible even when knowing they are impossible) leads to a divide between traditional metaphysics and post-metaphysics, as described in the previous section. Traditional metaphysics views itself as the embodiment of the principle of unity it points to, whereas post-metaphysics regards traditional metaphysics as the object of its critique, thus transforming the former into a metaphysical pursuit that seeks to make matters possible even when knowing they are impossible. In addition, any metaphysics that seeks a principle of unity is a reflection and critique of speculative thinking, transcending representational thinking and formal argumentation. In this regard, Hegel proposes that so-called representational thinking “should be called material thinking, a contingent consciousness that is absorbed only in material stuff, and therefore finds it hard work to lift the [thinking] self clear of such matter, and to be with itself alone.” In addition, he describes so-called formal thinking as “freedom from all content, and a sense of vanity towards it” and speculative thinking as that which strives to “sink this freedom [of thought] in the content, letting it move spontaneously of its own nature, by the self as its own self, and then to contemplate this movement”37 in order to achieve the unity of the freedom of the whole, and the necessity of aspects. Such “speculative thinking” uses critical reflection on concepts to present the logic of movements in human thought, thus showing the logic of events in human civilization. Wartofsky proposes: The history of metaphysics is a history of the criticism of concepts of such a universal or general sort, and of the attempt to formulate systems of such concepts. … We might summarize this by defining metaphysics as ‘that enterprise in the formulation and analysis of concepts which undertakes a critical and systematic inquiry into the principles of Being, and the origin and structure of what there is’.38

Therefore, the ability to view metaphysical pursuits from the perspective of the history of conceptual critique, rather than as the simple pursuit of a unifying principle, imposes a fundamental restriction on our understanding and explanation of metaphysics. If we view post-metaphysics this way, then it is not the metaphysical negation of the conceptual critique, but instead the profound theoretical consciousness of this conceptual critique; it consciously regards reason, truth, progress, laws, and other basic concepts (thoughts) that form the foundation of human thought and civilization as objects of critical reflection. 36 Wartofsky

[15, p. 10]. [6, pp. 35–36]. 38 Wartofsky [15, p. 11]. 37 Hegel

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In terms of social functions, metaphysics that contains critical reflection uses a particular unity principle that transcends both experiential common sense and empirical science to normalize all human thoughts and behaviors. Rorty writes: Since the ancient Greeks, Western thinkers have been seeking a set of unified ideas…this set of ideas can be used to prove or criticize individual behaviors and lives as well as social customs and institutions, while also providing a framework for personal moral thinking and socio-political thinking. […] It was the area of culture where one touched bottom … and thus to discover the significance of one’s life.39

Specifically, the social functions of traditional metaphysics are as follows. First, to use metaphysical thinking that seeks the theory of all things in order to advance the development of theoretical thought, science, and technology; to promote human reflection on the meaning of individual lives; and to provide such reflection with an unquenchable thirst. Second, to confirm various sacred or secular forms by means of universal reason in order to provide a firm grounding for societal value norms. Third, to characterize personal dependence in the natural economy, and dependence mediated by things in the market economy, utilizing the theory of all things and universal reason. Traditional metaphysics is both scientific and philosophical. It is scientific in that it concerns the theory of all things and proclaims itself to be true science, or the science of science. It is philosophical in its pursuit of a principle of unity based on man’s metaphysical disposition in order to achieve a place of settlement for human life, and it exists as human self-consciousness in theoretical form. Therefore, the ability to view metaphysical pursuits from the perspective of value ideals, not merely from specific theories of knowledge, imposes a fundamental restriction not only on the position and attitude of human understanding but also on how we understand post-metaphysics. For example, if we view post-metaphysics from the perspective of historical conceptual critique, then it is not the negation of value demands undertaken by metaphysics, but instead the profound theoretical consciousness of metaphysics’ value demands: it consciously reflects on value, freedom, justice, development, and other basic concepts that form the foundation of human thought and civilization. The metaphysical pursuits characterized by personal dependence, personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things, and the free development of all are conditioned upon the free development of each. They correspond to the establishment of the sacred form, the deconstruction of the sacred form, and the deconstruction of secular forms. This shift from traditional metaphysics to post-metaphysics reflects the transformation from ancient, to modern, to contemporary philosophy. Therefore, the ability to understand and comprehend metaphysical pursuits from the perspective of theoretical human self-consciousness (i.e., the theoretical characterization of the 39 Rorty

[13, p. 4]. This quote was taken from the Preface to the Chinese edition of the book “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature”.

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historical transformation of man’s form of existence) imposes a fundamental restriction on our understanding of the historical course of metaphysics, and the extent to which we comprehend the deeper cultural intentions of metaphysical pursuits. In the history of Western philosophy, Platonism and Hegelianism have occupied dominant positions in traditional metaphysics. The earliest manifestation of the metaphysics of objectivism is Plato’s world of ideas. This manifests in the Middle Ages as the metaphysics of monotheism (i.e., the metaphysics of objectivism expressed in the alienated form of man’s essence [God]). Since Descartes and Bacon, traditional metaphysics has manifested as anti-dogmatism (i.e., the metaphysics of epistemological reflection, or metaphysics with subjective characteristics). Hegelian philosophy, meanwhile, is metaphysics that both logicizes and historicizes objectivism (unifying history and logic, and encompassing conceptual dialectics). This metaphysics in dialectical form embodies the fundamental characteristics and functions of metaphysics as the history of conceptual critique. Therefore, Hegel’s thought represents the highest form of traditional metaphysics, one which unifies ontology, epistemology, and logic—a dialectical metaphysics that takes conceptual critique as its content. It opposes a simple, subjective freedom of the whole, and instead requires the unity of the two. This is the metaphysics of the unity of subject and object, or the identity of thought and being. Human self-consciousness in theoretical form as characterized by philosophy is never just an extroverted view towards the theory of all things, but also an introverted view towards humanity’s spiritual world. Cassirer states: The initial steps toward man’s intellectual and cultural life may be described as acts which involve a sort of mental adjustment to the immediate environment. But as human culture progresses we very soon meet with an opposite tendency of human life. From the earliest glimmering of human consciousness we find an introvert view of life accompanying and complementing this extrovert view. The farther we trace the development of human culture from these beginnings the more this introvert view seems to come to the fore.40

In ancient Greek philosophy, the notion that “man is the measure of things” implicitly contains a contradiction between human rationality and irrationality. The metaphysical pursuit of philosophy has always been entangled with the contradiction between physicalism and psychologism. Materialism, as naturalism, has always expressed concern for man as a physical being, whereas idealism, which regards the spirit as noumenon, has never departed from its concern for psychology as a spiritual phenomenon. Hegel’s metaphysics concerns the identity of thought and being, and returns all of man’s spiritual activities—emotion, will, and representation—to thought: hence it is the metaphysics of impersonal reason’s self-movement. To rebel against Hegel is to rebel against the self-movement of impersonal reason, and return the subject—man—to the richness and diversity of the spirit. Any metaphysics is then a metaphysics of psychologism. In fact, both the metaphysics of physicalism as the history of conceptual critique, and psychologism as the history of spiritual analysis, will inevitably take on cultural perspectives—and thus inescapably represent their 40 Cassirer

[3, p. 17].

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own time. In modern philosophy, the metaphysical reflection on conceptual intension, dating back to Descartes, formed the Hegelian philosophy of the intensional logic of thought, and inspired Marx’s philosophy of the intensional logic of history. In the history of conceptual critique, the conceptual critique of metaphysics has a dual meaning. On the one hand, it is the critique of the premises underlying the basic concepts of thought, such as truth, goodness, and beauty, which normalize human thoughts and behaviors. On the other hand, it is the critique of the premises underlying the harmony of thought and being (i.e., the objectivity of thought) implicitly contained within these basic concepts. Metaphysics directly points to the former, whereas the latter is the great basic question of philosophy—the relation between thought and being—and is revealed by metaphysics in its critique of these basic concepts. Therefore, the history of the conceptual critique of metaphysics is both the history of the critique for the basic concepts underlying thought, and the history of the unfolding of philosophy’s basic question. To deepen the critique of the premises underlying the basic belief of thought through the critique of the basic concepts constituting thought, and to critique the premises underlying basic epochal concepts constituting thought through the critique of the premises underlying the basic belief of thought, requires the use of metaphysics as the history of conceptual critique.

3.3 Post-metaphysics in the Metaphysical Pursuit of Philosophy The most revolutionary turn in the metaphysical pursuit of philosophy is the shift from traditional metaphysics, which attempts to make matters possible without knowing they are impossible, to post-metaphysics, which attempts to make matters possible even when knowing they are impossible. Post-metaphysics is not the assertion of a principle of unity of thought and being, but rather the critique of the premises underlying the basic concepts constituting thought (the objectivity or truth of thought, the necessity or regularity of history, the monism or absoluteness of value, the uniformity or unidirectionality of development, and the hierarchical or foundational nature of culture). Thus, it enables philosophy to consciously become the critical activity of making matters possible even when knowing they are impossible. In addition, post-metaphysics does not regard the two basic modes of theoretical thought—philosophy and science—as the embodiment of reason or the benchmark for all culture. Instead, it takes the opposite path, critiquing philosophy and science to achieve a subversive critique of the premises underlying reason itself, resulting in a revolutionary transformation from unlimited to limited reason. Post-metaphysics is the use of limited reason’s theoretical consciousness to carry out in-depth critiques of the premises underlying the basic concepts of thought in order to critique the premises underlying them—the identity of thought and being. Therefore, post-metaphysics is contemporary philosophy in the metaphysical pursuit, rather than non-metaphysics at the end of philosophy.

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Hegelian philosophy is the culmination of all traditional metaphysics. Thus, the critique of Hegelian philosophy is the starting point for all contemporary philosophy. At the beginning of The Age of Analysis: Twentieth Century Philosophers, American philosopher Morton White reflects on Hegel’s importance by saying, “It is a remarkable tribute to an enormously muddled but brilliant German professor of the nineteenth century that almost every important philosophical movement of the twentieth century begins with an attack on his views.”41 Likewise, the English philosopher Ayer uses the extremely provocative phrase “The Revolt from Hegel”42 in his Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. In The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, German philosopher Hans Reichenbach criticizes metaphysics that originate from man’s unfortunate nature. Thus, the rejection of metaphysics not only became the most fashionable keyword of twenty-first century philosophy, but also constituted the predominant philosophical idea. The real significance of the rejection of metaphysics is that it exposes the arrogance of reason, or the philosophical nature of traditional metaphysics, by attempting to make matters possible without knowing they are impossible. In other words, it exposes the tendency of traditional metaphysics to regard philosophy as the embodiment of unlimited reason. This is manifested in three critiques of the premises underlying Hegelian philosophy. First is the Marxist critique. In response to the fantasy of traditional philosophy and its use of speculative means to comprehend the freedom of the world, Engels proposes, “If we deduce world schematism not from our minds, but only through our minds from the real world, if we deduce principles of being from what is, we need no philosophy for this purpose, but positive knowledge of the world and of what happens in it; and what this yields is also not philosophy, but positive science.”43 He continues, “The Hegelian system was the last and most consummate form of philosophy, in so far as the latter is represented as a special science superior to every other. All philosophy collapsed with this system.”44 Thus, Engels proposes that Marxist philosophy, as contemporary materialism, “is no longer philosophy at all, but simply a world outlook.”45 With regard to this world outlook, Marx himself makes a brilliant statement: “All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.”46 Second is the scientific critique. In his systematic exposition of the opposing principles between scientific and speculative philosophy, Reichenbach proposes that “it is an unfortunate matter of fact that human beings are inclined to give answers even when they do not have the means to find correct answers.”47 Thus, he continues:

41 White

[16, p. 13]. [30]. 43 Marx and Engels [31, p. 35]. 44 Marx and Engels [32, p. 594]. 45 Marx and Engels [33, p. 129]. 46 Marx and Engels [34, p. 5]. 47 Reichenbach [12, p. 8]. 42 Ayer

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Where scientific explanation failed because the knowledge of the time was insufficient to provide the right generalization, imagination took its place and supplied a kind of explanation which appealed to the urge for generality by satisfying it with naïve parallelisms. … The search for generality was appeased by the pseudo explanation.48

Based on the above, Reichenbach suggests that metaphysics “sought to acquire a knowledge of generalities, of the most general principles that govern the universe.”49 Carnap expands on this, stating explicitly: I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in themselves, the Absolute, and such like. … Such propositions are not verifiable … and precisely by this procedure they deprive them of any sense.50

Based on the above, Carnap concludes that metaphysics “gives the illusion of knowledge without actually giving any knowledge. This is the reason why we reject it.”51 In other words, scientism not only rejects traditional metaphysics’ basic ideas and mode of thought, but also its aims and historical achievements. This is precisely why it has turned from traditional metaphysics, which seeks to make matters possible without knowing they are impossible, to the end of metaphysics, which does not seek to make matters possible upon knowing they are impossible. Third is the humanistic critique of Hegelian philosophy. In modern Western humanistic thought, Hegel’s impersonal reason is considered cold, alienating the richness of human emotion, will, imagination, experience, and individuality in favor of non-human or super-human thought. Such cold reason is hostile toward personal existence. Humanists believe that Hegel’s use of reason to describe thought and being, and his presentation of the logic of historical necessity, is not only fictional and contrary to human survival, but also negates the value of personal survival. In humanistic thought, the critique of traditional philosophy depends on life experiences, including human emotions, will, imagination, personality, and the subconscious, as well as the humanities and how they affect human survival and the human lifeworld. These theories highlight the contradictions between man in-himself and for-himself , rationality and irrationality, consciousness and sub-consciousness, life and death, individuals and society, the meaning and value of human life, and so on, thereby transforming the search of traditional metaphysics for absolute truth into a concern for human existence. Modern Western philosophy generally understands metaphysics as a universal, super-scientific, and unverifiable “pseudo-explanation” of the world. Thus, it not only rejects traditional metaphysics’ purely speculative mode of investigation, but also its aims and historical achievements. Both major trends of thought in modern Western philosophy deny the certainty of reason and strive to undermine the belief in the rationality of human existence. Thus, in comparison to traditional metaphysics, 48 Ibid.,

p. 8. p. 303. 50 White [16, pp. 212–214]. 51 Ibid., pp. 212–214, 220. 49 Ibid.,

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which seeks to comprehend and explain global freedom through thought, modern Western philosophy shows a deep suspicion of human reason. It has shifted from passionate enthusiasm for the future of mankind to fear; from the ambitious pursuit of truth, goodness, and beauty to a listless lament. This has become the theoretical refraction of modern social life. It is a sensitive reaction to modern humanity’s crisis of culture and to the current era’s global problems. This idea displays some duality. On the one hand, the critique of traditional metaphysics has inspired profound and thorough reflection on human reason and its objective activities. On the other hand, the critique poses a serious challenge to the rationality of human existence and the progressiveness of historical processes. The essential characteristic of post-metaphysics lies in its focused revelation of the inherent contradictions in metaphysics’ universal reason. First, it exposes the “metaphysical horror” caused by the depravity of rationalism shown in philosophers from Plato to Hegel (i.e., the ravages of essentialism caused by humans’ deviation from universal reason). Second, it rejects the hierarchical pursuit of metaphysics, and underscores the sequential arrangement of ontological meaning, thereby ending the identity philosophy that can stifle practical choice and cultural diversity through universal reason. Third, through the process of disintegrating subjective metaphysics, it highlights the real significance of intersubjectivity, communication theory, negotiation, dialogue, and organic solidarity in human historical activities. Fourth, through the process of negating identity philosophy, it attempts to construct new philosophical ideas, premised on non-identity, that transcend absolutism and relativism, thereby enabling necessary tension to become a basic idea of contemporary philosophy. Such post-metaphysical thoughts are of crucial theoretical and practical significance to the in-depth examination of truth, objective concepts, and philosophical ideas that are the “ruthless criticism of all that exists”52 throughout all of social life, thereby continuously deepening the “unmasking of human self-alienation in its secular forms.”53 Post-metaphysics regards the critique of metaphysics as its theoretical focus. It is a fundamentally critical activity that takes philosophy itself—human selfconsciousness in theoretical form—as its object. The substance of such activity is the transformation of human self-consciousness regarding existence. The basic mode upon which it depends is dialogue among various cultural forms involving the conceptual critique of metaphysics. The most important dialogues are those between philosophy and other cultural forms; among various philosophical theories or ideologies; and between philosophy and real history or lifeworld. All pertain to the critique of the premises underlying concepts (thought). This includes critique of the premises underlying philosophy through religion, art, and science; philosophy through culture, economics, and politics; philosophy through freedom, justice, and equality; and philosophy through despotism, democracy, and negotiation. It is precisely by this modern conceptual critique that post-metaphysics has undertaken “to unmask human

52 Marx 53 Marx

and Engels [35, p. 142]. [18, p. 132].

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self-alienation in its secular forms,”54 thus transforming it into a matter of thinking with concepts as the object, and making matters possible even when knowing they are impossible. Therefore, in the metaphysical pursuit, post-metaphysics is concerned with contemporary human self-consciousness in theoretical form, rather than the end of philosophy, which renounces that characterization.

4 Philosophy and Ontology Different philosophical understandings of metaphysics manifest as different understandings of ontology. How we understand the latter not only restricts our understanding of the former, but also profoundly normalizes contemporary metaphysical pursuits.

4.1 The Conceptual Analysis of Noumenon Noumenon and ontology are the most extensive and ambiguous categories used in philosophical theories. When reading the great works of philosophy, people often discover that within different philosophical frameworks noumenon has special theoretical intensions and historical determinateness, while the number of concepts concerning noumenon signifies many different philosophical frameworks. Therefore, defining philosophy is the same as defining noumenon. The conceptual analysis of noumenon and ontology is of utmost importance to philosophical self-understanding. Before exploring noumenon and ontology as philosophical concepts, we must first briefly analyze the conventional definition of origin, as Ontology is often a search for the origin of things Origin is the opposite of end. All things have their origin and end; all matters have a start and finish. It is the source or foundation of things; people trace the origin of their thoughts and action while opposing “doing things in the reverse order” or “seeking the end before the origin.” We can thus infer that 本 (origin) has the following meanings: (1) important or central (e.g., 本 部 [headquarters], 本题 [subject under discussion], etc.); (2) self or with regards to the self (e.g., 本人 [myself], 本国 [my country], 本乡本土 [my hometown], etc.); (3) originally or initially (e.g., 本意 [original intention], 本质 [essence], etc.) These everyday meanings demonstrate that regardless of how many different meanings people apply to 本体 (noumenon), it is always imbued with the sense of searching for the most fundamental things, always defined in relation to the end, and always searching for the ultimate grounds of our own thoughts and actions. The 1980 edition of Cihai defines ontology as “the aspect of philosophy studying the question concerning the origin or nature of the world” and stresses that this

54 Ibid.

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concept is “still popular among bourgeois philosophical circles.”55 Such an explanation not only negates the modern philosophical meaning of ontology but also renounces its rich theoretical intensions and misinterprets it as a singular question concerning the origin or nature of the world. It is necessary to transcend such simplistic understandings. The 1996 Encyclopedia of Marxist Philosophy describes ontology as the unity of history and logic, which helps us to understand the term’s theoretical intensions and their historical evolution. Ontology is the philosophical study of general being, or being itself, and was developed in ancient Greek philosophy. German philosopher Rudolph Goclenius was the first to use the term ontology to refer to ontology, in 1613. German philosopher Christian Wolff fully fleshed out ontological thought in the eighteenth century, defining it as the philosophical study of general being and the nature of the world, claiming that it does not rely on experience or natural science, but instead on the logical analysis of concepts. Ontology thus became a study of transcendent existence, removed from concrete existence. Eighteenth-century French materialism based its critique of ontology on contemporary natural science, while classical German philosophy, especially Hegelian philosophy, put forward the unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic in the form of idealism. Dialectical materialism sometimes used the term ontology to express the spirit’s material origin when discussing the relation between matter and spirit. Modern Western philosophy holds different attitudes concerning ontology: scientism rejects metaphysics and believes ontology, as the study of general being, is a meaningless pseudo-question, whereas humanism studies the existence of man as its ontology. Contemporary American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine proposes an “ontological commitment” and claims that ontology is merely the philosopher’s “commitment” to “what there is.”56 This leads to the following questions. First, given that ontology is the philosophical study concerning general being or being itself, what is the relation between noumenon and being? Second, given that ontology is the study of transcendent existence removed from concrete existence, what is the relation between concrete being and transcendent being? And third, if Marxist philosophy applies the term ontology to express the material origin of the spirit, what is the Marxist explanation of ontology? To answer the first question, being is the broadest concept with the thinnest intension (without content). Hegel describes being as “the original featurelessness [of the indeterminate] which precedes all definite character and is the very first of all.”57 “If when we wish to view the whole world we can only say that everything is, and nothing more, we are neglecting all specialty and, instead of plenitude, we have absolute emptiness.”58 For Hegel, being is the “very poorest and most abstract” concept. All things in the world (including matter and spirit) do not merely exist but are beings with specific determinateness (with specific content and form). Hegel writes, 55 Cihai.

Shanghai: Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 1980, p. 1246. Orman Quine [14, p. 1, 12]. 57 Hegel [5, p. 223]. 58 Ibid., p. 226. 56 Van

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“we cannot determine unless there is both one and another.”59 “A concrete thing is always very different from the abstract category as such. And in the case of being, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for being is the utterly abstract.”60 Since everything is being with determinateness, Hegel calls determinate being specific and special being. If we say that abstract or pure being is being, then all things with determinateness are existents. Only determinate existents exist; pure being without any cannot exist. Nevertheless, human thought is not only the various determinateness of abstract things; it also conceives of things as various determinate existents, removes the various determinateness of things, and searches for the being of all existents. Thus, the reflective search for being is philosophical ontology, and the being sought after by philosophy is the so-called noumenon. Noumenon, as abstract being is not a real existence but a directionality of human thought. Marxism claims that the real foundation of philosophical reflection is humanity’s social life. If that is the case, the noumenon sought after by philosophy must be explained from this perspective. It is only by starting from human social life that we can give a reasonable explanation of noumenon and ontology in philosophy. The creation and development of noumenon and ontology is connected to mankind’s unique means of survival. Humans are the practical-cognitive subjects of changing the world, hence the direction and value of all their activities, both practical and cognitive, lies in changing the world to satisfy their needs and embody the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty from their perspective. Thus, practical historical activity is the essential foundation for all philosophical reflection. Mankind’s practical activity encompasses not only reality, but also ideality; not only finiteness, but also infinite directionality. Theoretical thought based on humanity’s practical disposition desires to comprehend the world and affirm man’s position in it on the most profound level. This desire points to the ultimate; its theoretical characterization constitutes philosophical ontology. Noumenon is thus a desire for the ultimate, while ontology is an origin-tracing, intentional pursuit; an endless directionality of theoretical thought; and an ultimate concern that points to the infinite. Both are profound manifestations of the contradictions between reality and ideality; finiteness and infiniteness; certainty and transcendence; and historical determinateness and the ultimate directionality of human existence. In this sense, philosophical ontology, which concerns being or noumenon, is the theory characterizing the contradictory nature of human existence. The second question, what is the relation between concrete being and transcendent being, concerns the relation between noumenon and transcendent being. Noumenon is transcendent being, not empirical being. Any experiential being is determinate being, i.e., existents, and can become the object of scientific research. In contrast, noumenon is the abstract product of pure thought; hence, it is being that transcends experience. To understand this question is to understand the fundamental question

59 Ibid.,

p. 223. Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 230.

60 Hegel,

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of both ontology and philosophy. Conversely, it is precisely because of the difficulty of this question that people often misunderstand both concepts. Man, as real being, desires to pursue transcendent being; human cognition of the world always lies within the contradiction between sensuousness and reason. Gao Qing-Hai writes: We believe that the thing observed by our senses is not being itself, but that the supersensory object that is hidden behind it and upon which it is based, is the true being, that is the so-called “noumenon.” The relation between empirical being and noumenon being is a deterministic deductive relation: all empirical phenomena originate from the determinations of noumenon, hence the former can only be understood and explained through the former. Conversely, noumenon is not determined by empirical phenomena, but is itself an absolute being in-itself with ultimate cause. The separation and opposition of the fact of being and the noumenon of being is the basic premise for ontological thought. Thus, so-called ontological philosophy can also be said to be a theoretical mode of cognition that conceives of the object from an absolute reality that transcends the object. “Ontology,” as the explanatory principle of the object, completely belongs to man. It describes a mode by which man understands and comprehends the object world from his point of view. Abandoning the visible, existing world and pursuing an invisible, noumenon world is a characteristic that is possessed only by man. Man is a being that is not satisfied with his current existence and is constantly pursuing a future, ideal existence. This is commonly known as man’s “metaphysical” nature. Thus, ontology uses this search for real being above and beyond the object to express man’s metaphysical pursuit.61

From this, we can see that ontological philosophy, which considers being or noumenon as its starting point, has three fundamental premises of thought. First, it separates being itself from the phenomenon of being, setting them in opposition. It believes that any phenomenon observed empirically is not being itself; but being itself is transcendent, hidden behind empirical phenomena. Second, it opposes the subjective with the objective: the subject with the object. It regards noumenon as an essence beyond mankind: a self-existing entity unrelated to mankind’s historical state. Thus, it strives to eliminate all subjectivity in order to return to the true face of being. Third, it aims to separate the absolute from the relative in an attempt to start from the highest intuitively grasped certainty (i.e., the universal principle that governs the universe), thus achieving an explanation for the diversity of human experience, and providing humankind with an ultimate truth. These premises indicate that the philosophical mode with ontology as its explanatory principle is produced due to the splitting of essence and phenomenon, the separation of the subjective and objective, and the opposition of the relative and the absolute. Its substance is its requirement for philosophy to reveal the absolute truth. The third question, what is a Marxist philosophical explanation of ontology, concerns the relation of Marxist philosophy to ontology. Ontology drives the philosophical pursuit of eternal truth and ultimate cause, as well as the desire to express the noumenon of the world to their pinnacle (while also leading ontological philosophy towards self-negation). If phenomenon is removed from being, how can we know being itself? As the object of man’s cognition, is being able to reject the subjectivity 61 Gao

[36, pp. 141–142].

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of cognition? Can humanity’s cognition of its own being have the nature of absolute, supreme, and ultimate truth? When philosophers turn from the investigation of noumenon to reflection on human cognition, the theoretical kernel of philosophical research undergoes a transformation. Indeed, modern epistemological philosophy argues that ontology without epistemology is useless. Due to this development, ontological philosophy, which regards the search for being itself as its theoretical kernel, was replaced by epistemological philosophy, which regards reflection on human cognition as its theoretical kernel. The metaphysical mode of thought, which aims to pursue pure objectivity, setting subjectivity in absolute opposition, was abandoned for dialectical theory, which seeks the unification of thought and being, subjective and objective. Ontological philosophy that exists independently, and its representative mode of thought, metaphysics, have been negated by classical German philosophy in favor of dialectics. This implies that ontological philosophy as a mode of theoretical thought is merely a product of human thought at a specific historical stage; hence, there are no grounds for regarding it as an explanatory principle for the contemporary philosophical mode. Marxism claims that social practical activities and practice-based cognitive activities are continuously unfolding processes. Thus, all human cognition, including philosophical ontology, will always be relative. However, human practice and cognition will never remain static; they will always advance towards the freedom of the whole. Therefore, Marxist philosophy refutes the illusion of absolute truth appropriated by traditional ontology but does not reject the ontological pursuit that stems from the practical nature of mankind. Contemporary understanding of philosophical ontology suggests that ontology as an origin-tracing, intentional pursuit reflecting ultimate concern for humanity, the world, and their interrelation, does not have a precise origin. Its true meaning is not whether it can achieve the ultimate being, explanation, and value to which it points, Instead, the rationality of the ontological pursuit lies in the fact that humans always postulate a rational goal based in reality yet transcending reality, thus negating their real existence and transforming true reality into a more ideal version. The true meaning of ontological pursuit is that it inspires humans to forever maintain the necessary tension between ideality and reality; and ultimate directionality and historical certainty, while also breaking their subtle balance. This allows humans to maintain a vibrant sense of truth, goodness, and beauty in all their activities—while opening up a space for self-critique and self-transcendence.

4.2 Ontology’s Three Intensions Ontology is an origin-tracing, intentional pursuit; an endless directionality of theoretical thought; and an ultimate concern that points to infinity. Hence, the being or noumenon it seeks is not only indeterminate pure being, but also being that explains all determinate existents and normalizes all human thoughts and actions. Therefore, philosophical ontology has three basic intensions: pursuit of ultimate being as the

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unity of the world (ontology or ontology in a narrow sense); reflection on the ultimate explanation as the unity of knowledge (theory of knowledge or epistemology); and recognition of ultimate value as the unity of meaning (theory of value or theory of meaning). First, the investigation of ultimate being as the unity of the world. The general view is to define ontology as ontology—i.e., as a theory concerning being. However, we must consider that within the history of philosophy, the being to which ontology points is not the existence of various concrete things or empirical objects, but rather the existence of totality, or being itself. The subject of thought that comprehends being is an abstraction of unity—or the unity of abstraction. A subject of thought seeks this unity of abstraction and uses it as the grounds for the creation, evolution, and return of all existents. Therefore, in a subject of thought’s comprehension of the world, this being becomes the ultimate being. Aristotle proposes that philosophical exploration begins with amazement over nature. When confronted with manifold and ever-changing nature, human thought will attempt to seek out a being “that of which all things that are consist, the first from which they come to be, the last into which they are resolved” and will treat this being as the ultimate cause of being. Such thought represents the infancy of philosophical thinking. This ultimate being points to the diverse unity of the empirical world: a sensuous being from which all things come’ to which all things return. However, this type of thinking implicitly contains self-negation and self-transcendence. The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus considers fire to be the origin of all things and proposes the universe is an ever-living fire. He does not merely regard a specific determinate being (i.e., fire) as the primordial source, a matrix from which all things come and to which all things return, but regards the necessity of the process (Logos) as an unchanging noumenon of the changing world. To Heraclitus, as the origin of all things and unity of the world, fire is both a real, sensuous being and a symbolic Logos. This inspires philosophers to follow another way of thinking—the logical comprehension of Logos—to seek the unity of the world, i.e., ultimate being. This philosophical way of thinking explores the logical relation between phenomenon and essence in the objective world, and regards noumenon, or ultimate being, as a rational being that transcends experience and is comprehended by thought (i.e., a universal being). Plato believes that all phenomena in reality are always imperfect, as they are the existence of particularity (or the particularity of existence). All knowledge obtained through empirical objects will thus lose the unity of explanation. Therefore, there should exist a world of ideas that is higher than physical things to reveal the meaning of the physical world. Thus, Plato’s search for ultimate being indicates the second basic intension of ontology. Second, investigation of the ultimate explanation as the unity of knowledge. When identifying the origin of the world or ultimate being, philosophers cannot regard the origin or noumenon merely as an abstract concept, but must justify it logically. To make noumenon concrete is to explain it. The concept of noumenon

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points to the world’s ultimate being, hence it provides an ultimate explanation for the world. It is worth noting that ontology as the ultimate explanation is mediated through epistemology. In other words, in its immediate theoretical form, it does not manifest as ontology concerning the unity of the world, but as epistemology concerning the unity of knowledge. While summarizing ancient Greek philosophy, Aristotle proposes that philosophical ontology is “seeking the first principles and the highest causes.”62 These first principles unify the explanations for the diversity of human experience, explaining them as concrete manifestations of a universal essence, thereby achieving the freedom of the whole in thought’s comprehension of the world. Hegel agrees with Aristotle. However, he also believes that upon elevating various phenomena into concepts, Aristotle and subsequent philosophers decompose those concepts into a series of specific concepts external to one another, rather than providing a principle of unity. He also argues that the principle of unity, as the ultimate explanation, can only be formed through reflection on all human knowledge and the history of human cognition, not through the cognition of various empirical objects. He proposes, “in this way the manifold reality may be related to that Idea as the universal, and thereby be determined”63 and that philosophy must be conceived as “a knowing of knowing”.64 and “thinking of thinking,”65 i.e., “reflection,” thus enabling its principle of unity to gain a logical determination. To Hegel, the principle of unity pursued by ontology provides the ultimate explanation for the world, not because it offers an intellectual explanation of the world, but because it can sublate all knowledge and the entire history of knowing into the logic by which thought comprehends being (i.e., the logic of human thought). As this logic serves to enrich any truthful content, it is the unifying basis for the production and explanation of all human knowledge. This understanding is a profound summary of traditional ontology. Specifically, Hegel uses the philosophical form of the unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic to achieve unity of the ultimate being, and the ultimate explanation to which ontology points. Third, the investigation of ultimate value as the unity of meaning. Ontology pursues ultimate being as the unity of the world, and ultimate explanation as the unity of knowledge. This is not a delusion, but an attempt to lay down a foundation for human settlement in the world through affirmation of the ultimate being and appropriation of the ultimate explanation (i.e., the highest scaffolding of human existence). Mankind’s concern for ultimate being and ultimate explanation stems from its concern for its own ultimate value. 62 Aristotle

[1, p. 1]. [29, pp. 229–230]. 64 Hegel [37, p. 410]. Please note that “a knowing of knowing” is from a different English translation of The Phenomenology of Spirit. This is because the A.V. Miller translation used so far is not as similar to the Chinese translation (“a knowing of…knowledge”). 65 Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 123. 63 Hegel

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“Nature is the law of man,” “Man is the measure of all things,” “God is the supreme judge,” “Reason is the law-giver of the universe,” “Science is the pivot about which the universe turns,” “For man the root is man himself”—these fundamental philosophical propositions express the spirit of particular ages, and are historical examples of ontology’s understanding of humans’ settlement. Thus, they constitute the measure by which humanity judges, explains, and normalizes its thoughts and actions (i.e., ultimate value as the unity of meaning). Since Socrates, Western philosophers have attempted to lead humans away from particularities to universal principles, questioning how humans measure the truth, goodness, and beauty of their own words and actions. This Socratic questioning is man’s pursuit of ultimate value: it permeates the whole of traditional Western philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle to Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach. Since the ancient Greeks, Western thinkers have been seeking a set of unified ideas, which can be used to prove or criticize individual behaviors and lives as well as social customs and institutions. Contemporary American philosopher Richard Rorty points out: Philosophy as a discipline thus sees itself as the attempt to underwrite or debunk claims to knowledge made by science, morality, art, or religion. … Philosophy can be foundational in respect to the rest of culture because culture is the assemblage of claims to knowledge, and philosophy adjudicates such claims. […] It was the area of culture where one touched bottom … and thus discover the significance of one’s life.66

The search for the meaning of life is also the search for the ultimate value, with universal applicability or restraint. This ultimate value is also the highest standard by which all human thoughts and behaviors are measured; hence, all smaller human goals are merely means by which to reach the ultimate value. Ultimate value thus constitutes ontology’s most passionate concern. Some Chinese scholars have followed the path laid down by eighteenth century German idealist philosopher Christian Wolff and others, simplifying ontology into a theory concerning the origin of the world, without examining its three intensions concerning ultimate being, ultimate explanation, and ultimate value. They assert that there is no ontology in traditional Chinese philosophy in its true sense. For example, Zhang Dong-Sun reaches this conclusion based on the fact that there is no copula (“be”) in Chinese. In fact, traditional Chinese philosophy, which “to investigate the relation between Heaven and man, to understand the changes of past and present,”67 “judges the beauty of heaven and earth and analyzes the reason of all things,” and “ordains conscience for heaven and earth and secures life and fortune for the people,”68 is the expression of concern for ultimate being, ultimate explanation, and ultimate value. Is this not broad and profound ontological pursuit in the classical Chinese style? The quintessence of tradition is advocated by modern neo-Confucianism; the “endless treasure of one’s own home” is sought after by the “paramount courage of solitary exploration.” Is this not also ontological pursuit in the Chinese style? 66 Rorty

[13 p. 3, 4]. [38, p. 1113]. 68 Guo [39, p. 254]. 67 Zhang

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Feng You-Lan states that “Confucianism in China does not focus on pursuing knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but is primarily seeking the ideal life. The ideal life is the mainstream idea of Chinese philosophy, and is also the spirit of Confucian philosophy.”69 Likewise, Guo Qi-Yong proposes: Twentieth-century Western philosophy, be it phenomenology, existentialism, semiotics, or philosophical anthropology, hermeneutics, Western Marxism and so on, is fundamentally to resolve the spiritual confusion, metaphysical loss and life crisis of modern humans, as well as the alienation between man and God, man and man, man and his emotions and self-consciousness. The philosophy of Xiong, Feng, Jin, and He70 serves as the doctrine of traditional ontology concerning the place of man among heaven, earth, men, and the self, and the obligations, responsibilities, value, and ultimate meaning of life. It also provides a reinterpretation, where the beneficial components of the world outlook, cosmological outlook, life outlook, and value outlook of traditional Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism are reconstructed and introduced abroad. This is a contribution of global significance, and a valuable attempt to place Chinese philosophy on the world stage.71

Therefore, by renewing our understanding of ontology and the history of Chinese and Western philosophy as seeking ultimate value, we can deepen both our understanding of ontology and our cognition of the history of philosophy.

4.3 Ontology’s Self-critique Since ontology points to ultimate being, explanation, and value, it is an ultimate concern. In particular, since the ontological pursuit of traditional philosophy often transforms ontology into an unchanging being, people frequently view it as a lifeless and rigid philosophical theory from which inherent negativity has been eliminated. However, this is a misunderstanding: the ultimate being, explanation, and value pursued by ontology is the eternal goal to which theoretical thought points, and the object of its open reflection and self-critique. Hence ontology has the inherent basis of self-negation. As the eternal goal to which theoretical thought points, ontology expresses on a philosophical level the certainty, necessity, simplicity, and unity pursued by human thought and all its constructed science. Chemistry seeks basic elements, physics elementary particles, and biology hereditary genetics—is this not a concern of ultimate being? Are not natural sciences, social sciences, noetic sciences, and mathematics all seeking first principles, thus belying concern for the ultimate explanation? As for the immediate directionality of the sciences, do they not attempt to reach a unifying ultimate explanation for their own objects of study based on a specific ultimate being? Who can refute this pursuit for the ultimate being and ultimate explanation? 69 Feng

[40, p. 497]. This refers to Xiong Shi-Li, Feng You-Lan, Jin Yue-Lin, and He Lin. 71 Guo [41, p. 62]. 70 Note:

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Engels states that human thought is the dialectical unity of the sovereign and the non-sovereign: “It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition, its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual realization and in reality at any particular moment.”72 The ontological pursuit of philosophy, therefore, stems from the “disposition, vocation, possibilities, and historical ultimate goal” of human thought. Likewise, contemporary American philosopher Wartofsky points out: The driving force of metaphysical thought, both in its classical and modern forms, has been the attempt to get things whole, to present a unified picture or framework within which the wide diversity of things in our experience could be explained on the basis of some universal principles, or as manifestations of some universal stuff or process.73

Wartofsky also says that this metaphysical desire of ontology cannot be denied, because for humans, “there is a sense of system and a demand for clarity and for the unity of our thought which go to the roots of our thinking activity, and may very well go even deeper, deriving from the kind of organisms we are and the kind of world we have to survive in.”74 In this sense, the ontological pursuit of philosophy is not only inevitable, but also irrefutable. As the object of open reflection and self-critique by theoretical thought, the necessity, simplicity, and unity sought after by ontology, as well as the ultimate being, explanation, and value to which it is committed, implicitly contain inherent negativity, which manifests as the historical process of self-sublation. Since philosophy is “its time apprehended in thoughts,”75 the noumenon to which it is committed can only be the product of its own time. However, philosophical ontology demands supreme authority and ultimate certainty, viewing its noumenon as an unquestionable and immutable absolute. Therefore, philosophical ontology contains two basic contradictions. First, it points to the ultimate appropriation and explanation of a basic principle for the intrinsic unification of humanity and thought, and strives to provide human existence and development with a firm grounding. However, human development constantly challenges this ultimate explanation, undermining its authority and effectiveness, thereby causing a contradiction between philosophical ontology and human development. Second, philosophical ontology regards the basic principle to which it is committed as the measure by which it evaluates all things, thus creating an explanatory cycle from which it cannot escape. Philosophers constantly expose the internal contradictions of their opponents’ ontology in critiques of one another, thus enabling cyclical leaps to a higher level of ontological explanation. This is philosophical ontology’s self-contradiction. Philosophers have always adopted the viewpoint of the spirit of the age, and continually uncovered various premises implicitly contained within its ontological commitment, 72 Marx

and Engels [26, p. 80]. [15, p. 10]. 74 Ibid., p. 9. 75 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 19. 73 Wartofsky

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thereby demonstrating the narrow-mindedness, one-sidedness, and transience of their ultimate being, explanation, and value. This in turn drives mankind to continuously reflect upon its place of settlement, treating all of its thoughts and actions through conscious critical awareness, adopting new modes of theoretical thought and new systems of value ideas to observe human history and reality, as well as undertaking higher-level ontological pursuits. It is precisely this mutual promotion between ultimate concern and self-critique of ontology that constitutes the contradictory unity of the ontological pursuit in philosophy. The master of dialectics, Hegel, has a profound understanding of the contradictory nature of the ontological pursuit. He states: It certainly happens that a new philosophy makes its appearance, which maintains the others to be valueless; and indeed each on in turn comes forth at first with the pretext that by its means all previous philosophies not only are refuted, but what in them is wanting is supplied, and now at length the right one is discovered. But following upon what has gone before, it would rather seem that other words of Scriptures are just as applicable to such a philosophy—the words which the Apostle Peter spoke to Ananias, ‘Behold the feet of them that shall carry thee out are at the door.’ Behold the philosophy by which thine own will be refuted and displaced shall not tarry long as it has not tarried before.76

This discussion indicates that philosophy and its ontological pursuit are both inescapably historical. Nevertheless, even Hegel, with his clear understanding of the self-negation of philosophy, follows the same path as his predecessors, and transforms the self-critical ontological pursuit into acritical ontological belief. Within his framework of idealist philosophy based on the unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic, he attempts to accomplish “the task that … can only be accomplished by the entire human race in its progressive development” and the result, as described by Engels, is “an end of all philosophy in the hitherto accepted sense of the word.”77 Why does traditional philosophy always transform self-critical ontology into acritical ontological belief? Does the end of traditional philosophy also imply the end of ontological pursuit? Does modern and contemporary philosophy need to (and is it able to) reconstruct the ontology of its own time? What is the modern significance of the ultimate being, explanation, and value to which ontology points? These are the major topics of ontological research in the modern era. Contemporary American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine believes, the problem of ontology “can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: ‘What is there?’”78 However, he also reminds us that when discussing ontology, we must pay attention to the distinction between two different questions: what is actually there, and what we say is there. The former concerns ontological statements, while the latter addresses ontological commitment in language. This distinction expresses modern understandings of the ontological question and touches on the crux of ontology in traditional philosophy. Although traditional philosophers are concerned with “what we say there is”—i.e., the ultimate being, explanation, and value in language—they 76 Hegel,

Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume 1, p. 17. [4, p. 15]. 78 Van Orman Quine [14, p. 1]. 77 Engels

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constantly regard the question of “what we say there is” as the question of “what there actually is,” which regards their commitment as an unquestionable and immutable absolute. This is why traditional philosophers transform self-critical ontology into acritical ontological belief. Once we become conscious of the fact that ontology is a commitment, we ask the following questions: What is the ontological commitment? What is the basis and significance of this commitment? In the early 1950s, German philosopher Hans Reichenbach proposed that “speculative philosophy sought to acquire a knowledge of generalities, of the most general principles that govern the universe.”79 He goes on to state more specifically: Speculative philosophy wanted absolute certainty. If it was impossible to foretell individual occurrences, at least the general laws controlling all occurrences were regarded as accessible to knowledge; these laws were to be derived by the power of reason. Reason, the lawgiver of the universe, revealed to the human mind the intrinsic nature of all things—a thesis of this kind was at the basis of all forms of speculative systems.80

Reichenbach’s view represents that of modern Western analytical philosophy and the philosophy of science. Both regard ontology’s substantive content as the ultimate explanation of the world’s absolute certainty and regard the origin of ontological pursuit as the false exaggeration of the power of human reason, viewing reason as the lawgiver of the universe. The modern Western trend of scientism takes as its starting point the refutation of the commitment to the sovereignty of reason, thereby refuting the intentional ontological pursuit, the rejection of metaphysics. Unlike scientism, humanism, as represented by existentialism, regards the whole of traditional philosophy as essentialism, which exists in opposition to existentialism, and rejects the pursuit of ontology for the ultimate being and explanation. It also focuses the intentional ontological pursuit on the reflection of man’s own existence and concentrates on constructing a modern Dasein ontology. German philosopher Martin Heidegger believes that to explore ontology concerned with being we must first ask ourselves, “In which being is the meaning of being to be found; from which being is the disclosure of being to get its start? Is the starting point arbitrary, or does a certain being have priority in the elaboration of the question of being? Which is this exemplary being and in what sense does it have priority?”81 In response to this question, Heidegger replies: Regarding, understanding and grasping, choosing, and gaining access to, are constitutive attitudes of inquiry and are thus themselves modes of being of a particular being, of the being we inquirers ourselves in each case are. Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being—one who question—transparent in its being. … This being which we ourselves in each case are and which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its being we formulate terminologically as Da-sein.82

79 Reichenbach

[12, pp. 303–304]. pp. 303–304. 81 Heidegger [7, p. 5]. 82 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 5–6. 80 Ibid.,

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Heidegger’s question and answer indicate that his concept of the Dasein has priority in ontology and is being conscious of its own being, which is also the being of man. He regards the study of being as that of Dasein, which is also to regard the ontology of traditional philosophy as ontology concerned with human existence. French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre further distinguishes all being into being in itself and being for itself ; highlighting the particularity of being for itself —the priority of being to essence—and placing the investigation of being for itself —the structure of human existence—at the heart of philosophy. Dissecting contemporary Western understandings of ontology shows that although various schools hold different, even opposite, attitudes toward ontology (either criticizing or defending, refuting or reconstructing), all conceive of the goal of ontology as the ultimate explanation of absolute certainty, and regard its roots as the commitment to the sovereignty of reason. In this sense, the whole of contemporary Western philosophy—whether scientism or humanism—is anti-ontologist: it rejects the absolutism and rationalism of traditional ontology, and advocates for relativism and irrationalism. The difference between scientism and humanism is that scientism starts from an objection to absolutism and rationalism, viewing the ontological pursuit as a meaningless pseudo-problem, whereas humanism starts from a focus on man himself, eliminating the pursuit of ontology for the unity of the world (ultimate being) and knowledge (ultimate explanation), instead regarding ontology as concern for the state of human existence. It should be acknowledged that there is no shortage of analysis and critique of traditional ontology in contemporary Western philosophy, nor is there a lack of insight into the modern reconstruction of ontology. Nevertheless, the relativism and irrationalism advocated by contemporary Western philosophy indicate a shift from passionate enthusiasm for the future of mankind to apprehension, from the universedevouring illusion of human reason to deep concern over human reason. Disillusion, rejection, frustration, and anxiety have replaced oneness, unity, harmony, and totality. Many contemporary Western philosophers believe that life must be considered based on the next concrete problem to solve, rather than the ultimate value to which humanity must dedicate itself—thus they have generalized the current age as the “age of relativism.”83 This rejection and loss of the ontological pursuit is a shift from the one-sided exaggeration of the sovereignty of human thought (by traditional philosophy) to the one-sided exaggeration of the non-sovereignty of human thought. It is the theoretical refraction of the cultural and spiritual crisis in modern capitalist society. When we say that ultimate being, explanation, and value are the three intensions of ontology, rather than its three historical forms, we imply that they are not mutually exclusive and sequential, but instead premised on one another—always coexisting. More specifically, the pursuit of ultimate being as the unity of the world is the inescapable ultimate directionality of human practice and thought as objective activities; this ultimate directionality drives humankind to relentlessly search for the world’s mysteries, and continually renew its worldview. The pursuit of ultimate 83 Brinkley

[23, p. 11].

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explanation as the unity of knowledge is the ultimate directionality constituted by the reflective thinking of human thought on ultimate being. The concern for ultimate explanation is the concern for whether the laws of thought can be unified with the laws of being (which is also the concern of human reason). This concern drives humankind to endlessly reflect upon the relation between thought and being, thus guiding mankind to conduct philosophical thinking on an even deeper level. The pursuit of ultimate value as the unity of meaning is the ultimate directionality constituted by the reflection of human thought on man’s own existence; the concern for ultimate value is the concern for man and the world, man and man, man and the self. This concern drives humankind to continuously reflect upon its thoughts and actions, thus seeking criteria by which to evaluate and normalize itself. It is thus evident that no matter the issue—whether concern for the unity of the world and knowledge or for the unity of meaning—to humans, the subjects of practice and cognition, the question is not whether they ought to be concerned but how they should be concerned. Pursuing noumenon is thus not only a prominent characteristic of philosophical thinking, but also an important social function of philosophy.

4.4 The Characterization of Noumenon Philosophical questioning is not a general investigation into philosophy’s object of study, theoretical content, systemic structure, or social function, but rather an examination of its grounds and mode of existence. Why does philosophy exist? How does philosophy exist? The pursuit of noumenon is grounds for the existence of philosophy, whereas the reflection and characterization of noumenon is its mode of existence. Thus, the train of thought provided in the General Theory of Philosophy84 — concerning the questioning and understanding of philosophy can be generalized as the “reflection and characterization of noumenon.” (1) The Pursuit of Noumenon Why does philosophy exist? This is the simplest yet the most critical question of philosophy, and not only points to the basis for its existence, but also makes this basis dependent on the existence of humankind. Philosophy is the basic mode by which humans comprehend the world. Among the basic modes by which mankind creates its own lifeworld and achieves selfdevelopment, what is the unique value of philosophy? Such questioning is the humanistic basis for the existence of philosophy and causes the questioning of why philosophy exists to be dependent on the questioning of what kind of being is man. Man’s being is his life activity. Man’s life activity is not limited to the survival activity of animals, but seeks unique living, or practical activity, which makes his life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness. The direction and value of 84 Sun

China.

[42]. This is the most influential textbook-style philosophical monograph in contemporary

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this practical activity lie in changing the world to satisfy the needs of humankind, and to embody the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty from a human perspective. Historical practical activity is the essential foundation of human thought. Human thought based on mankind’s practical disposition always desires to comprehend the world on the most profound level, and affirm man’s position and value. This is what Engels calls the demand for the sovereignty of thought according to “its disposition, its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal.”85 The desire for the sovereignty of human thought not only originates from but also realizes the practical disposition of human existence. Man’s practical activity involves the objectification of purpose and the transformation of ideality into reality. On the one hand, it transforms the reality of the world into non-reality. On the other hand, it transforms man’s ideality (what Lenin calls the objective picture of the world) that man constructs for himself into true reality. This practical activity is an unlimited historical process, and the ideality it implicitly contains is an unlimited directionality. Therefore, human thought, which is based in human practice, desires to comprehend and explain the world on the most profound level, and to affirm man’s position and value in the world. This is the philosophical pursuit of human thought—the pursuit of noumenon. The philosophical pursuit of noumenon is an origin-tracing, intentional one; an endless directionality of theoretical thought, and an ultimate concern that points to the infinite. Ontology has three basic intensions: the pursuit of ultimate being as the unity of the world, ultimate explanation as the unity of knowledge, and ultimate value as the unity of meaning. In a philosophical sense, the three intensions of ontology are not separate from one another, nor are they juxtaposed. To assume otherwise leads to three philosophical standpoints. First, isolating ontological pursuit as the search for ultimate being leads to the empiricalization of the noumenon, causing it to become ontology of substance theory (i.e., one that regards the noumenon as a primordial source, matrix or atom, and genetic being of substance). Second, isolating ontological pursuit as the search for an ultimate explanation leads to the “scientification” of the noumenon, causing it to become ontology of epistemology (i.e., one that regards the noumenon as universal reason or principle). Third, isolating ontological pursuit as the search for ultimate value leads to the aestheticization of the noumenon, causing it to become poetic ontology (i.e., one that regards the noumenon as the expression of a subjective will). The common consequence of these three philosophical standpoints is the fragmentation of ontology, truth theory, and value theory. The philosophical pursuit of ultimate being, explanation, and value is not concerned with the definitions of truth, goodness, and beauty, but rather explores truth, goodness, and beauty as its subjects. This embodies the real significance of philosophical ontology as the basis by which to evaluate truth, goodness, and beauty in human thoughts and actions. Noumenon in the philosophical sense is not a substantive ultimate being, nor is it an intellectual ultimate explanation, nor subjective ultimate value; instead, it pursues the basis for all human thoughts and actions 85 Marx

and Engels [31, p. 80].

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through the search for ultimate being, explanation, and value. This enables philosophical ontology to play a unique role in the various modes by which humans comprehend the world (i.e., religion, morality, art, science, common sense, etc.) and in all human-created knowledge systems (i.e., mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences, human sciences, thinking sciences, etc.). By regarding the noumenon as the ultimate measure, philosophical ontology can reflect critically on the various premises of all human activities and knowledge, thus providing a grounding for human existence. A question worth pondering is whether the pursuit of noumenon is a contradiction. Since philosophy is its time apprehended in thoughts, the noumenon to which it is committed can only be the product of its own time. However, philosophical ontology constantly demands supreme authority and ultimate certainty. It therefore contains two contradictions. First, it points to the ultimate appropriation and explanation of a basic principle for the intrinsic unification of man and his thought with the world and strives to ground the existence and development of human beings in this principle. However, the development of human history constantly challenges this ultimate explanation and undermines its authority and effectiveness, causing a contradiction between philosophical ontology and human historical development. Second, philosophical ontology regards the noumenon as the basis by which it evaluates all things, which is also the basis for itself, thus creating an explanatory cycle from which it cannot escape. Therefore, philosophers are able to expose the internal contradictions of their opponents’ ontology, thus enabling cyclical leaps of ontological explanation to a higher level. This is another self-contradiction. These internal contradictions have led to a distinction between traditional and modern philosophy. The former, whether materialist or idealist, strives to obtain an absolute, ultimate noumenon. The questions it poses to itself include: What is absolute truth? What is supreme goodness? What is ultimate beauty? It views the world as black and white; eternally unchanging, existing in abstract opposition and divided between true and false, good and evil, beautiful and ugly. This is a nonhistorical and rigid ontological mode of thought that has dominated human beings for thousands of years. In contrast, modern philosophy has transformed from polarity to mediation, and thus attempts to understand the philosophical pursuit of noumenon, starting from human development. Marxist philosophy views philosophy from the starting point of real men and their historical development (i.e., from a practical mode of thought). It thus represents a true revolution: it sees the notion of noumenon formed during human historical development as able to evaluate all things, and to normalize thoughts and actions as both historical progressions and historical limitations. Thus, it is pregnant with new historical possibilities. The noumenon to which humans are committed in their own age reflects the highest understanding humans achieved in their time regarding the unity of man and the world. Therefore, it is absolute. In terms of its historical limitation, the noumenon to which humans are committed in their own age is also the product of a specific historical era; it manifests a one-sidedness from which humans, as historical beings, cannot escape. Therefore, it is relative. The noumenon to which humans are committed in their own age serves as scaffolding constructed during the

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process of human advancement, thus it provides a real possibility for the continuation of human development. Therefore, noumenon as a mediation is forever self-sublating. Ontological pursuit based on a practical mode of thought is a dialectical theory that can provide humankind with dialectical wisdom. (2) Reflection on Noumenon What we think about is inseparable from how we think about it. Therefore, how we explain noumenon depends on our understanding of how philosophy exists. To explain philosophy’s mode of existence, people have often used the concept of reflection to express its particularity. However, just as people have different understandings concerning noumenon, they also have different understandings of reflection, which in turn affects their understandings of noumenon. Reflection, therefore, is a term worthy of further exploration. Reflection, in its most direct sense, is to turn around and regard thought as the object of thinking, what Hegel calls “the thinking of thinking.”86 Hegel realizes that this reflection can be challenging: while proposing the reflective mode of philosophical activity, he also consciously examines and compares three different modes of thought: representational thinking, formal thinking, and tries to explore the meaning of “reflection” through the exam of these three modes. Representational thinking, he says, “should be called material thinking, a contingent consciousness that is absorbed only in material stuff, and therefore finds it hard work to lift the self clear of such matter, and to be with itself alone.” Meanwhile, he defines formal thinking as “freedom from all content, and a vanity that stands above all content” and speculative thinking as the attempt to “sink the freedom [of thought] in the content, letting it move spontaneously of its own nature, by the self as its own self, and then to contemplate this movement.” Likewise, there are three modes of understanding noumenon, although they do not correspond simply to Hegel’s three modes of thought. To view noumenon as empirical rather than transcendent being is to mistake the object of experience for the object of reflection, and representational thinking for reflective thinking. This misunderstanding implies that we do not conceive of reflection as thought regarding itself as the object of thinking, but instead see reflection as thinking about a specific empirical object. As a result, existents (empirical objects) are confounded with being as a philosophical object, and mirroring (empirical thinking) is confounded with reflection. It is undoubtedly the case that humans form representations of empirical objects through mirroring, and this is the materialistic basis for the epistemology of dialectical materialism. However, noumenon is not existent but rather transcendent: the criterion that normalizes human thoughts and actions. It is implicitly contained within all human thought. Hence, it is only when thought regards itself as the object of thinking that we can reflect upon the noumenon. Therefore, understanding philosophical reflection and the noumenon it pursues requires understanding the distinction between common sense and philosophy. Common sense is defined by its empirical, representational, and finite nature. Dependent on experience, common sense is a description of, rather than a reflection 86 Hegel,

Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences Part One. p. 13.

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on, empirical facts; it uses concepts to describe empirical facts rather than reflecting on the concepts themselves. Philosophy based on the pursuit of noumenon is therefore not the extension or deformation of common sense, but rather transcends it. It regards common sense as the object of reflection, thereby revealing the criterion normalizing human thoughts and behaviors implicitly contained within common sense ideas, i.e. the noumenon. Philosophical research’s epistemological standpoint is to view the noumenon as universal thought (knowledge) concerning empirical objects and the reflection of philosophy as the summary of particular thoughts (knowledge) into the most universal thought (knowledge); this demonstrates the scientism trend in philosophical research. This epistemological standpoint does not question philosophy based on human grounds for its existence, but rather defines it based on the dual relation between philosophy and science—and interprets it using hierarchical relations of knowledge classification. This, in turn, interprets the relation between philosophy and science as one between the universal and the particular, or the deep and superficial levels, thereby regarding the noumenon as an unchanging universal principle. In this mode of explanation, philosophy is merely the extension of science; it is science with the greatest generality, yet does not transcend science. It cannot be a basic mode by which humans comprehend the world distinct from science. Instead, philosophy should reflect on science. Science regards all world domains and human activities as its objects; based upon these it constructs various thoughts concerning the world. Philosophy, meanwhile, regards all science’s thoughts as its object and undertakes reflection on these thoughts. This reflective relation implicitly contains a three-way relationship between the world, science, and philosophy; not simply a two-way relationship between philosophy and science, or philosophy and the world. It is precisely in this sense that only when philosophy is expelled from its hereditary territory and becomes “homeless” can it truly dominate the world by regarding all scientific thoughts concerning the world as the object of its reflection— and thereby seeking noumenon. The distinction between thought and reflection implies that there are two distinct basic dimensions of human thought. The first is the constitution of thought, where thought achieves unity of thought and being through the mediation of human cognitive activities. The second is reflection on thought, where thought regards the relation of thought and being as a question upon which to reflect. In the former, the goal is to achieve the unity of thought and being, not to regard it as a question. Conversely, in the latter the task of thought is not to achieve the unity of thought and being, but to investigate said relationship. Engels states explicitly that the question of the relation between thought and being is the basic question of philosophy and proposes that thought and being are subject to the same laws, forming “the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.”87 Therefore, philosophical reflection seeks this unconscious and unconditional premise implicitly contained in theoretical thought.

87 Marx

and Engels [33, p. 544].

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The premise of thought is not its general content but the basis and principle upon which thought constitutes itself: thought’s invisible hand and manipulator behind the scenes. It possesses both logical coercion governing thought as well as invisible, untouchable implicitness. As the basis and principle upon which thought constitutes itself, the premise of thought is the noumenon which normalizes human thought and behavior. Philosophical reflection has an object thought itself, thus uncovering the underlying premises and discovering the noumenon. This noumenon restricts, normalizes, and guides all human activities in a profound manner. However, it is also the premises of thought—the measure normalizing human thoughts and actions—and is implicitly contained within all human activity. Therefore, the philosophical mode of actively seeking the noumenon is critical reflection. The transcendence of representational and formal thinking; the epistemological standpoint and the trend of scientism; and the questioning of assumptions and premises are all theoretical modes of critical reflection in philosophy. Thus, the critique of the premises underlying theoretical thought is also the reflection of the noumenon pursued by philosophy. (3) Characterization of the Noumenon If philosophy pursues noumenon by means of reflection, then how does it present this noumenon? Noumenon, as the premise underlying thought, possesses significant generality: First, every thought will have various empirical, intuitive, aesthetic, and logical premises. Second, every thought must move according to the logic of its motion. In the sense of normalizing human thoughts and actions, the selfdeveloping intensional logic by which thought must abide has a prominent philosophical significance. Third, the constitution of any thought is always the product of one (or more) basic modes by which humans comprehend the world (i.e., religion, art, ethics, science, philosophy, etc.). Fourth, all human thought implicitly contains an unconscious and unconditional premise (i.e., the identity of thought and being). These premises constitute the object of philosophical reflection, and philosophy forms the noumenon through this reflection. The noumenon is not the knowledge of these premises, but rather the philosophical ideas contained within them. Hegel explains this using the relationship between God and the Temple, proposing that “a cultivated people without metaphysics” is “like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a holy of holies.”88 As God is the sacred light that makes the Temple the Temple, philosophy is the sacred light that makes humanity’s palace of culture and spiritual home. In other words, philosophy, like the sun that shines on the earth, illuminates human life. Without philosophy, human life would be cast into the shade. Therefore, Hegel believes, “man should honor himself and consider himself worthy of the highest things,”89 or of the universal idea governing human life, i.e., the noumenon. People often find it difficult to understand how the noumenon serves as an enlightenment. Under the banner of rejecting metaphysics, scientism criticizes the whole of 88 Hegel 89 Hegel

[43, p. 8]. [44, p. 36].

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traditional philosophy, with Hegelian philosophy as the main object of its crusade. It calls the noumenon into question, especially the mode by which philosophy seeks and presents it. Logical empiricist Hans Reichenbach proposes that the whole of traditional philosophy originates from mankind’s unfortunate nature, saying that “human beings are inclined to give answers even when they do not have the means to find correct answers.”90 Therefore, philosophy merely “supplied a kind of explanation which appealed to the urge for generality by satisfying it with naïve parallelisms … the search for generality was appeased by the pseudo explanation.”91 Moreover, Rudolf Carnap, a key figure in logical empiricism, distinguishes between the two functions of language—representation and expression—to make a similar philosophical critique. Carnap challenges the philosophical mode of existence in the clearest and sharpest manner.92 Thus, the response to such philosophical critique should be the best means by which to elucidate the unique philosophical mode of existence. Carnap proposes that the representative function of language constitutes propositions about empirical facts: hence, it is served by science. Meanwhile, language’s expressive function constitutes various opinions about human emotions, and is best served by art. By analyzing the functions of language and their relation to science and art, Carnap sharply poses the following question to metaphysics, i.e., philosophy: If philosophy as metaphysics neither serves the representative function of language, representing the empirical world like science, nor serves the expressive function of language, expressing emotions or will like art, then is it not merely the arrogance of reason and abuse of language? Does this not mean we should and must reject such metaphysics? If we commit to Carnap’s two functions of language and their relation to science and art, we are unable to deny his rejection of metaphysics. Interestingly, in responding to Carnap’s criticisms, contemporary philosophy often either bows to the self-defense of the representative function of language or to the self-commitment of the expressive function of language, and therefore pursues either the “scientification” or “literary-ization” of philosophy. Carnap’s question compels us to ask whether philosophy must serve the representative function of language, thus leading to its “scientification,” or the expressive function of language, thus leading to its “literary-ization.” This suggests, in turn, a deeper question: does philosophy rely neither on representation nor expression, but instead on its own special mode to achieve self-realization? I suggest that philosophy, what Marx calls the “intellectual quintessence of its time” and the “living soul of culture,”93 does not represent the status of the times or empirical human facts, nor does it express an individual’s emotions concerning the status of the times, but instead characterizes the intellectual quintessence of its time, and the living soul of culture. This is not another function of language opposed to representation and expression,

90 Reichenbach

[12, p. 8].

91 Ibid. 92 White 93 Marx

[16, pp. 212–214]. and Engels [48, p. 195].

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but a unique mode by which philosophy pursues and presents the noumenon. Philosophy is constantly representing or expressing something; however, its conclusions are neither the statement of empirical facts nor the transmission of emotion and will, but the characterization of the noumenon pursued through both representation and expression. The philosophical characterization of noumenon is primarily realized through philosophical questions, the mode of questioning, and the search for questions. Philosophical characterization first involves the asking of questions: asking about the unity of all things implies humankind is attempting to affirm itself as the highest scaffolding of the meaning of life and that humanity has yet to achieve reflection on the meaning of life based on the relation of thought to being. Asking about the unity of meaning implies humankind is searching for the meaning of life through the cognition of reflection and viewing it based on “super-history” (i.e., abstract concepts). Philosophical characterization also involves transforming the mode of questioning. Traditional philosophy poses questions based on the search for an ultimate being regarded as the foundation for the meaning of life. This implies the desire for unity of meaning—and that humankind has yet to achieve a historical understanding of its own existence. Modern and contemporary philosophy ask questions based on the diversity of human activity, the plurality of human culture, and the selectivity of human history in an attempt to pursue and reflect on the meaning of life based on the unity of foundation in human activity, the unity of function in human culture, and the unity of trends in human history. This implies that humankind is striving to understand its existence through historical and dialectical means and encountering new questions of meaning in the face of the retreat of nature and the world of symbols. I believe that philosophy is always the characterization of humanity’s search for its place of settlement, or highest scaffolding, which is also the search for the sublime within human spiritual life. This search is the theoretical characterization of historical transformation in humankind’s mode of existence and significance. In overall terms, philosophy has evolved from the sacred form, to deconstruction of the sacred form, to deconstruction of secular forms. This can be expressed as humankind’s selfalienation from the sacred form, to the deconstruction of humankind’s self-alienation from the sacred form, to the deconstruction of mankind’s self-alienation from secular forms—or from humanity’s dependent existence to independent existence and to the association of free men. Reflective philosophical activity pursues noumenon through reflection on the underlying premises, whereas philosophical characterization requires comprehension of the intellectual quintessence of our times and the living soul of culture through a variety of philosophical propositions. Thus, human philosophical activity is constituted by reflection and characterization of the noumenon.

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5 Philosophy and Dialectics A philosophy of reflection is not the representation of empirical facts about the world, but rather the unmasking of internal contradictions between man and the world: subject and object, sense and reason, ideality and reality, truth and value, and freedom and necessity. Therefore, dialectics is not only a method of philosophical reflection but also its content. Hence, understanding dialectics based on the unity of content and method forms an important aspect of the critique of the premises underlying the philosophical ideas of thought.

5.1 Dialectics’ Mode of Thought Philosophers commonly reference adherence to dialectics and the rejection of metaphysics; however, the definitions of these terms remain vague. How do we adhere to dialectics and how do we reject metaphysics? While the dictionary may provide some answers, we must also ask: why it is that when people are adhering to dialectics, they are also often ridiculing dialectics as “magic tricks?” In addition, why is it that when people are rejecting metaphysics, they are also often accusing themselves of being trapped in metaphysics? Dialectics and metaphysics are two basic categories in philosophical theory and are often applied to human life. In his review of Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in 1859, Engels addresses dialectics and metaphysics when discussing how to study economics: The official Hegelian school had assimilated only the most simple devices of the master’s dialectics and applied them to everything and anything, often with ridiculous incompetence. Hegel’s whole legacy was, so far as they were concerned, limited to a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright, and to a list of words and phrases whose only purpose was to turn up at the right moment, when ideas and positive knowledge were lacking.94

When faced with such mechanical application of the word dialectics, how can we not call it speaking in clichés or saying empty words? How can we blame people for ridiculing dialectics as a magic trick? Engels’s discourse is acerbic but also pertinent. It causes us to ask whether we are acting like the official Hegelian school Engels criticizes, regarding dialectics as “a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright”95 or turning it into “a list of words and phrases whose only purpose was to turn up at the right moment, when ideas and positive knowledge were lacking.”96 When we simplify certain questions without exception, stressing their action and reaction or limiting 94 Marx

and Engels [46, p. 472].

95 Ibid. 96 Ibid.,

p. 472.

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our discussion of various figures and their theories into contributions and limitations, will we remember the “official Hegelian school?” Will we warn ourselves against turning dialectics into magic tricks? Engel’s discourse provides the profound realization of why people have ridiculed dialectics: dialectics has become dialectical words without contents of thought. Therefore, in academic theory, the first question we must ask is whether dialectics is a method free from the contents of thought and universally applicable. We habitually conceive of dialectics as the most fundamental and important method that can be used to explain any question. However, such a conception neglects the fundamental requirement of dialectics: the concrete analysis of concrete issues. This results in the opposite of what dialectics should accomplish, magic tricks free from the contents of thought. Engels’s criticism aims at the fact that Hegel’s school “had assimilated only the most simple devices of the master’s dialectics.”97 But it remains unclear what “the master’s dialectics” is referring to: Hegel’s own dialectics? These are described in Hegel’s volume The Science of Logic, suggesting that how we conceive of Hegel’s logic is how we conceive of his dialectics. In the Conspectus of Hegel’s Book The Science of Logic, Lenin makes three important statements regarding Hegel’s logic: First, “the categories of thought are not an auxiliary tool of man, but an expression of laws both of nature and of man.”98 Second, in response to those who regard logic as external forms, Lenin proposes, “What Hegel demands is a Logic, the forms of which would be forms with content, forms of living, real content, inseparably connected with the content.”99 Third, based on the understanding above, Lenin argues that “logic is the science not of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development ‘of all material, natural and spiritual things’, i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the History of knowledge of the world.”100 This logic, which is the unity of content and form, is Hegel’s dialectics. Hegel’s dialectics concerning the unity of content and form is not formed by chance. From Aristotle to Bacon, many have explored and proposed the deductive and inductive logic concerned in the motion of thought. These two logics, known as formal logic, require us to temporarily set aside the concrete contents of thought, and specialize in the study of the structure of thought and the laws and rules of its motion. This logic can also be known as extensional logic, i.e., concerning the extensional relations of concepts. In contrast, since Descartes, the ever-deepening modern Western philosophical reflection on human thought has gradually formed a logic that regards conceptual content of thought and its development as its object (i.e., intensional logic). As the pinnacle of all traditional Western philosophy, especially in modern times, Hegel’s The Science of Logic is precisely about the dialectics concerning the intensional logic of concepts, that is, dialectics concerning the logic 97 Ibid. 98 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 91. p. 92. 100 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 92, 93. 99 Ibid.,

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of the motion of human thought. This dialectics, which regards the contents of thought as its object, is not pure form external to content, nor is it a method that sets aside the contents of thought. Instead, Hegel’s dialectics is one concerning the motion of thought and the development of concepts (what Hegel calls “the dialectics of truth.” People’s greatest misunderstanding of dialectics is that they split the content and form of thought, the intensions and extensions of concepts, and the theory and method of philosophy, thus changing dialectics from the theory of world outlook and doctrine of truth into a method free from the contents of thought, conceptual intensions, and empirical knowledge. It is as though dialectics is a tool that can be used on different objects as needed and then put away for later use. In order to understand the unity between dialectics’ content and form, theory and method, we must first renew our understanding of everyday concepts, words, and categories. Lenin describes Hegel’s dialectics as follows: “The categories of thought are not an auxiliary tool of man, but an expression of laws both of nature and of man. … Categories are stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognizing the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognizing and mastering it.”101 Hence, categories constitute the scaffolding of human cognition. In other words, these terms are not merely the accumulation or crystallization of human cognition and the reservoir of civilization, but this reservoir provides humanity with the focal points of its self-development. If removed from this reservoir of civilization and reflection on it, dialectics becomes a mere template; words and phrases for magic tricks. The above suggests that people turn dialectics into “magic tricks” because, as Engels states, “ideas and positive knowledge were lacking.” By “thinking,” Engels refers not merely to various contents of thought, but specifically to thinking within the history of thinking. After criticizing the “official Hegelian school,” Engels gives the following explanation of “the master’s dialectics”: “What distinguishes Hegel’s mode of thinking from that of all other philosophers was the exceptional historical sense underlying it”; “especially since Hegel—unlike his pupils—did not rely on ignorance, but was one of the most erudite thinkers of all time.”102 . Thus, Engels arrives at a basic assertion concerning dialectical philosophy, describing it as a form of “theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.”103 In other words, whether one can comprehend and apply dialectics depends, fundamentally speaking, or whether one understands the history of thought and its achievements and can comprehend humankind’s history of thought. In this regard, Engels further proposes that theoretical thought is an innate capacity that must be developed and trained and involve learning about past philosophies. This point is worthy of deep deliberation. Dialectics and metaphysics exist in relation to each other, and their misunderstandings are inseparable. It can even be said that simplified and vulgar misunderstandings of the latter will lead to simplified and vulgar misunderstandings of the

101 Ibid.,

p. 91, 93. and Engels [46, p. 474]. 103 Marx and Engels [33, p. 491]. 102 Marx

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former. Therefore, we should start from Engel’s discourse on metaphysics in order to reflect on our understanding of the two concepts. Marx summarizes the essence of dialectics by saying: [Dialectics] includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.104

In contrast, Engels generalizes metaphysics’ mode of thinking as “thinking in absolutely irreconcilable antithesis.”105 Engels also describes metaphysics’ formula of thinking as “‘yea, yea; nay, nay’; for whatsoever is more than these cometh evil.”106 Based on the above discourse, some papers and textbooks have made the following inference: Dialectics claims that “A is also not-A” and “being is also not-being,” whereas metaphysics believes that “A is A” and “A cannot be not-A.” This simplistic inference not only muddies Marx and Engel’s discourse and blurs the true relation between dialectics and metaphysics but has also led to the misinterpretation of both concepts. Must dialectics preserve certainty of thought? If the answer is yes, then how can it also affirm that A is not-A and being is not-being? Who can claim that the sun is also the moon, day is also night, true is also false, or beauty is also ugliness? This indicates that we cannot conceive of dialectics without concrete contents of thought. If we regard dialectics as a pure method, free from the contents of thought, then it will become a magic trick that negates the certainty of thought, an unfathomable thing that is the object of ridicule. How, then, should we view the formula of thinking, i.e., “yea, yea; nay, nay” in metaphysics? As long as we start from practice and not abstract principles, we must acknowledge that it is precisely the mode of thought of everyday life: the sun is the sun, the moon is the moon, day is day, night is night, true is true, false is false, beauty is beauty, ugliness is ugliness, and so forth. Every individual must abide by this certainty of thought in order to exchange ideas and communicate their emotions to others. If this is the case, however, then why must we “adhere to dialectics” and “reject metaphysics?” Engels gives a sincere and profound answer in response to this question by explaining the rationality behind metaphysics’ mode of thought: “At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense.”107 So-called common sense knowledge is universal and ordinary, yet generally and persistently useful. It is the common human experience that originates from, adheres to, and applies to experience. Daily human life is based on and abides by this common experience. Within common sense, humans achieve mutual 104 Marx 105 Marx

and Engels [47, p. 20]. and Engels [31, p. 22].

106 Ibid. 107 Marx

and Engels [31, p. 22].

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identification of their world view; mutual communication of their thoughts and feelings; and mutual coordination of their behavioral patterns. Therefore, common sense has obvious survival value to human existence. However, it also demands that we abide by a metaphysical mode of thought. In the relation between man and the world mediated by common sense, man is the empirical subject. Man comprehends the world through intuition, and the world as the established empirical object is presented in a given manner. In this intuition–given subject-object relation, man and the world are stable and certain beings; hence, the relation between them is a one-to-one correspondence. A is A and cannot be not-A, being is being and cannot be not-being. The empirical subject thus preserves the certainty of “yea, yea; nay, nay.” If this is the case, then why should we reject the metaphysical mode of thought? Engels states, “Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures into the wide world of research.”108 Here, he clearly distinguishes between “the homely realm of his own four walls” and “the wide world of research” in order to hint at the rationality and limitations of the metaphysical mode of thought. He continues: And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.109

Therefore, as long as we are not merely living but thinking, or rather reflecting, on living (i.e., “venturing into the wide world of research”), we will find that the metaphysical mode of thought leads to “very wonderful adventures.” The question then becomes whether black-and-white judgments can be made between yes and no, good and bad, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, honor and disgrace—or between I and we, part and whole, short-term and long-term, ideality and reality. When answering questions of who is brighter, the sun in the sky or the moon in the water; which is larger, the large tree on the mountain top or the small tree at the foot of the mountain; who is more important, the beloved in one’s heart or the world beyond one’s heart, we can never make metaphysical assertions of “yea, yea; nay, nay.” Instead, we resort to statements of love, emotion, confusion, and complication, applying dialectical wisdom to maintain the necessary tension and achieve a subtle balance. Therefore, dialectics has its roots in human life. Dialectics that stems from human life is not merely indispensable to reflection on life, but also has a special significance in what Engels calls the “wide world of research,” i.e., scientific research and philosophical reflection. It would be difficult to conduct scientific research and philosophical reflection in modern times without dialectics. Since the early nineteenth century, human research in the natural sciences has developed from a classifying science concerned with finished things into one 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid.,

pp. 22–23.

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concerned with processes, i.e., “the origin and development of these things” and the “interconnection which binds all these natural processes into one great whole.” Based on this, Engels proposes: The results obtained by modern natural science force themselves upon everyone who is occupied with theoretical matters with the same irresistibility with which the natural scientist today is willy-nilly driven to general theoretical conclusions. And here a certain compensation occurs. If theoreticians are semi-initiates in the sphere of natural science, then natural scientists today are actually just as much so in the sphere of theory, in the sphere of what hitherto was called philosophy.110 Engels continues: Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative. It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.111

Therefore, Engels stresses, “A nation that wants to climb to the pinnacles of science cannot possibly manage without theoretical thought.”112 But what kind of “theoretical thought” is necessary? Engels states: It is precisely dialectics that constitutes the most important form of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, the evolutionary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and transitions from one field of investigation to another.113 He goes on to state: Natural scientists themselves feel how much they are dominated by this incoherence and confusion, and that the so-called philosophy now current offers them absolutely no way out. And here there really is no other way out, no possibility of achieving clarity, than by a return, in one form or another, form metaphysical to dialectical thinking.114

Engels believes that philosophy must transform into a dialectical philosophy that “rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements”115 in order to become viable and modern. He writes, “Natural scientists allow philosophy to prolong an illusory existence by making shift with the dregs of old metaphysics. Only when natural and historical science has become imbued with dialectics will all the philosophical rubbish—other than the pure theory of thought—be superfluous, disappearing in positive science.”116 Engels’s warning is deeply pertinent. We must understand the antithesis between dialectics and metaphysics, as well as the significance of dialectical thinking and 110 Marx

and Engels [33, p. 338].

111 Ibid. 112 Marx

and Engels [33, p. 340]. p. 339. 114 Ibid., pp. 340–341. 115 Ibid., p. 491. 116 Ibid. 113 Ibid.,

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philosophy based on the development of modern science and philosophy, in order to comprehend the significance of dialectical philosophy as dialectical thinking in the current age. The most fundamental problem in understanding dialectics and metaphysics generally lies in our explanation of the distinction between the two in terms of empirical common sense. This involves explaining dialectics as the belief “that everything in the world is developing and changing, and that the cause for the development of things lies with its internal contradictions” while explaining metaphysics as a view of “the world from an isolated, static and one-sided standpoint, and regarding all things as isolated from one another and eternally immutable. If there are changes, these are limited to an increase or decrease in quantity or a change in place, and the substantive change of things is not acknowledged; in fact, [metaphysics] insists that the cause of all changes lies with a motive force that is external to things.” This common explanation of dialectics, metaphysics, and their interrelation does not elevate human thought from the level of common sense to philosophy, but instead lowers the theoretical questions from the philosophical level to that of empirical common sense. Thus, it deludes people into remaining at the level of empirical common sense in their understanding. Whether we transcend this empirical understanding is the primary question in the adherence to and development of Marxist dialectical theory in contemporary times. To answer this question, we must first discuss our understanding of metaphysics. The most direct question here is whether people can “view all things as isolated from one another and eternally immutable”117 in terms of sensuous certainty or representation, and whether they can “acknowledge the substantive change of things.” In other words, whether people turn a blind eye and adopt an attitude of self-deception regarding the connections among things, and the changes in things themselves. When we see horses galloping across the fields or eagles soaring in the blue sky, who can deny that the horses and the fields, the eagle and the sky are connected? Who can deny the galloping of the horses or the soaring of the eagle, i.e., their movement and change? Is not denying these connections and changes a bald-faced lie? Similarly, who can deny the substantive change of organisms from life to death or of knowledge from nothing to being? If this is undeniable, how can we deny the connections, changes, and development of metaphysics? We can also ask this question from the opposite angle. That is, even if we acknowledge the connection between the horses and the fields, the eagle and the sky; the fact that the horses are galloping and the eagle is soaring; and the change in quality of the horses and eagle from life to death, are we adopting a dialectical standpoint to the world? As though responding to the question raised above, Lenin makes two crucial statements when analyzing the famous philosophical proposition of Zeno’s arrow.118 He first cites Hegel, proposing, “It did not occur to Zeno to deny movement as ‘sensuous certainty’, it was merely a question of the truth of movement.” 117 Ai

[48].

118 According

to Zeno, the flying arrow exists at a certain position at every instant, so the flying arrow does not move.

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He goes on to explain how we should understand the truth of movement by saying, “The question is not whether there is movement, but how to express it in the logic of concepts.”119 These two statements are extremely enlightening. Normally, dialectics and metaphysics can only be distinguished based on whether we acknowledge movement, change, connection, and development. However, Lenin points out that since no one denies movement, “the question is not whether there is movement.” Thus, Lenin uplifts a common sense question at the empirical level to a philosophical one at the transcendent level, and explores how to express [movement] “in the logic of concepts.” Using human perception, no one can deny the connections among things, nor their movement and development. However, a question remains regarding the definition of movement. In terms of phenomenon, movement means that an object is in one place at a particular moment then in another place at another moment. However, this explanation only describes the result of movement, not movement itself. It does not show the possibility of movement, but instead depicts movement as the sum of states of rest. Therefore, when confirming or depicting movement in terms of empirical facts, the proposition of Zeno’s arrow is mistaken. Zeno’s mistake lies in his attempt to understand the truth of movement based on its essence and by using concepts, not in his use of the dialectics of concepts to comprehend the result of movement—most definitely not because he denies movement as sensuous certainty, i.e., as regarded at the empirical level. Dialectics uses the logic of concepts to express movement. Engels points out that this movement is a contradiction: it is the unity of continuity and intermittence, the existence of things at a certain point and not at every moment, and the existence of things as themselves and not as themselves at any given moment. It is precisely these contradictions that lead to difficulties “expressing [movement] in the logic of concepts”120 and that thus constitute the antithesis between dialectics and metaphysics. We can acknowledge movement as a sensuous certainty, but it is difficult to express movement in the logic of concepts in our thoughts. This is because “what makes the difficulty is always thought alone, since it keeps apart the moments of an object which in their separation are really united.”121 Moreover, “we cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movement, without interrupting continuity, without simplifying, coarsening, dismembering, strangling that which is living. The representation of movement by means of thought always makes coarse, kills—and not only by means of thought, but also by sense-perception, and not only of movement, but every concept.”122 Therefore, humans comprehend and explain the connection, movement, and development of things using dialectics on the conceptual level. We can say that doing this on the empirical level is also dialectics, but it is a naïve dialectics, unable to 119 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 254. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 254. 121 Ibid., p. 257. 122 Ibid., pp. 257–258. 120 Lenin,

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resolve the contradictions between the truth of movement and other questions of the relation between thought and being. It thus often becomes trapped in the metaphysical mode of thought, i.e., “yea, yea; nay, nay” in its comprehension. For example, we acknowledge that horses are galloping in the fields, and the eagle is soaring in the blue sky. However, when we attempt to explain the movements using concepts, the answers we give are always whether or not the horses are galloping or the eagle is soaring, instead of answers that include “in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state,”123 i.e., expressing this movement as the unity of movement and static. Therefore, a dialectical understanding must transcend the commonsense mode of thought on the empirical level and gain the philosophical mode of thought on the conceptual level. This requires an understanding of the antithesis of dialectics and metaphysics from the perspective of the relationship between thought and being, what Engels calls the “great basic question of all philosophy.”124 The metaphysical mode of thought does not deny connection and change or contradiction and development. However, it does deny any contradictory relation between thought and being. The metaphysical formula of thinking is “thinking in absolutely irreconcilable antithesis”125 : it views thought and being as existing in immediate and unchanging unity. In man’s experience, thought reflects being itself, including both the connection and change of being, and its contradiction and development. If people notice any contradiction between thought and being in their experience, they view it as an immediate disunity or a distortion of being. For example, if we affirm the galloping of the horses and the soaring of the eagle, it is considered an accurate reflection of being, whereas the opposite would be distorted. The relation between thought and being must be seen as immediate unity or immediate disunity. Therefore, the experiential contradiction between thought and being is still constituted by the metaphysical mode of thought. The dialectical mode of thought starts from the question of the relation between thought and being in order to continually deepen the contradiction between thought and being that is implicitly contained within human cognition: its concepts and categories, the use of the logic of concepts to express the essence of movement, and its contradictions and development. In modern theories of social development, development is constantly shaped through reflection, and understandings have progressed from simple economic growth, to coordinated economic and societal development, to universally accepted sustainable development. Engels describes the logic of concepts, meanwhile, as “theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.”126 To advance our understanding of development, therefore, requires philosophical reflection on its historical evolution as a conceptual intension.

123 Marx

and Engels [47, p. 20]. [4, p. 20]. 125 Marx and Engels [31, p. 22]. 126 Marx and Engels [33, p. 491]. 124 Engels

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This understanding of dialectics, metaphysics, and their interrelation is not mystic but actual, not abstract but real. The key here is reflection on the terms concept and name. Confounding the two demonstrates an empirical-level understanding of dialectics and leads to a distorted understanding of its epistemological roots. Within empirical consciousness, concept is merely a name for a specific object, and names have a certain and stable correspondence to the objects they indicate. Therefore, concepts as names are neither contradictory, nor do they develop over time. Be it man, thing, law, or truth, the objects to which these terms refer, and the understanding of these objects, are static; thus, the concepts themselves are also certain, unchanging, non-contradictory, and non-developing. It is precisely this empirical consciousness that constitutes the metaphysical mode of thought. To transcend this mode, we must first transcend empirical consciousness and construct a dialectical mode of thought that includes a contradictory and developing understanding of concept. For example, let us take the concept of man. Man is a historical and cultural being with specific historical and cultural intensions: a contradictory and developing being. In empirical consciousness, man is a static concept and non-contradictory; even if people acknowledge man as a contradictory being, it is still difficult to gain awareness of the internal contradictions in the concept. However, our understanding of man is continually deepened through the revelation of these internal contradictions. For example, Feuerbach conceives of man as a sensuous being, whereas Marx conceives of man as “sensuous activity” and “the ensemble of social relations.”127 This deepening of conceptual understanding, in turn, deepens the understanding of the object to which the concept refers. Man is no longer an established and unchanging being but one that is contradictory and developing. This is a dialectical understanding. The same is true for the understanding of thing. If we regard concepts as merely the names of objects, then the objects to which they refer are established and unchanging. It is only by deepening cognition on the internal contradictions of concepts in scientific research that we can deepen the dialectical understanding of thing. Albert Einstein says, “Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality,”128 while Heisenberg argues, “The history of physics is not simply a string of experimental findings and observations, or the sequence of mathematical descriptions that follow it. It is also a history of concepts.”129 The history of human science is that of formation and confirmation, expansion and deepening, and the renewal and revolution of scientific concepts. The web of concepts woven by science constitutes mankind’s “stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognizing the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognizing and mastering it.”130 Let us imagine a person who does not know physics. Aside from regarding the concept of thing as a name, how else can he regard the concept? Since he does not possess knowledge of physics, how can he discover the contradiction between concept and object? Aside from regarding thing as “yea, yea; nay, nay,” how can he achieve a dialectical understanding? 127 Engels

[4, p. 87]. [49, p. 81]. 129 Reference Materials for Modern Physics, Vol. 3, Beijing: Science Press, p. 9. 130 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 93. 128 Einstein

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The same holds true for the common concepts of law and truth. We often say that law is invisible and intangible, but it can also be known and used: how can both of these things be true? This suggests a contradiction between sensuousness and reason, the individual and the general, phenomenon and essence, necessity and contingency, and so on. We can only know law within the dialectical understanding of its internal contradictions. Similarly, in people’s empirical consciousnesses, truth is a coincidence of concept and object. More specifically, it indicates that the concept to which one refers is also the object that it should refer to, or the correct reflection of the objective object. However, dialectical understanding of the concept of truth elicits deeper layers of contradictions: In the immediate sense, the question of truth is the question of whether an object to which a concept refers exists, i.e., if it is or is not. If we delve deeper, we find that the question of truth is not merely a response to this question but also to the question of whether a concept expresses the essence of an object. This can be further divided into questions concerning the truth of representation and the truth of thought (i.e., whether the representation is a correct reflection of the object’s phenomenon and whether thought is a correct reflection of the object’s essence). Therefore, truth is not merely a matter of is or is not, correct or wrong, but also of good and bad. Hegel describes this as follows: Thus we speak of a true friend; by which we mean a friend whose manner of conduct accords with the notion of friendship. In the same way we speak of a true work of Art. Untrue in this sense means the same as bad, or self-discordant. In this sense, a bad state is an untrue state; and evil and untruth may be said to consist in the contradiction subsisting between the function or notion and the existence of the object. Of such a bad object we may form a correct representation, but the import of such representation is inherently false.131

Hegel’s discussion complicates a seemingly simple question, as is appropriate in true dialectical thinking. If we view questions of truth on a philosophical level, we are in fact required to understand it based on the unity of ontology, epistemology, and value theory. This can only be done within a dialectical outlook. This suggests that dialectics further complicates its object of study in its undertaking of the concrete analysis of concrete issues. It analyzes complicated internal contradictions in the object of study itself, thereby eliciting things’ self-development through these complicated contradictions. This requires us to analyze the contradictions between concepts and experience, as well as the internal contradictions within concepts elicited through these external contradictions. In addition, the internal contradictions of concepts deepens our understanding of these internal contradictions, while the development of concepts deepens our understanding of this development. Thus, dialectics is most certainly not “a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright”132 nor “a list of words and phrases” used to cover up ignorance, but the concrete analysis of concrete issues that expresses the contradiction, movement, and development of things using concepts. It is precisely in this sense that Lenin defines dialectics as the “mutual dependence of notions,” “mutual dependence of all notions without exception,” “transitions of notions from one into 131 Hegel, 132 Marx

Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 139. and Engels [19, p. 472].

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another,” “transitions of all notions from one into another without exception,” “the relativity of opposition between notions,” and “the identity of opposites between notions.”133 Dialectics is the art of operating concepts and can only be mastered through meticulous study. Dialectics is, in Engels’s words, a form of “theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements”134 and is based on the real relation between man and the world. This relation, as well as the relation between thought and being, are a negative unity. It is precisely this negative unity that constitutes the rich contradictory relation between man and the world, while the historical development of human self-consciousness concerning the contradictory relation between man and the world constitutes dialectics. According to Marx, man’s relation with the world involves man’s transformation of the world based on “the standard of every species” and man’s “inherent standard,”135 thus transforming the world into one that meets his expectations and can satisfy his needs. Therefore, in the relation between man and the world, thought and being, humanity both negates the current state of the world (being) through its own cognitive activities, and constructs a demanded reality while also negating it through its own practical activities, thus turning the purposive demand and ideal picture into real existence. This negative unity between man and the world, thought and being constitutes dialectics, which views everything with a critical attitude. Marx states that dialectics “lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”136 This therefore requires us to understand Marx’s theory of practice concerning the relation between humanity and the world.

5.2 The Critical Essence of Dialectics As Marx famously says, dialectics “is critical and revolutionary.”137 However, we must reflect deeply upon the theoretical intensions of this statement and their true significance. In understanding dialectics from the perspective of post-metaphysics, three theoretical premises are unavoidable: the confluence of Hegel’s dialectics and metaphysics; Marx’s dialectic ending of metaphysics; and the clarification of Hegel’s and Marx’s dialectics from the perspective of post-metaphysics. (1) Hegel’s Critique of Abstract Reason Hegel attempts to reconstruct metaphysics with dialectics to achieve a confluence between the two. This philosophical mission, the transformation of metaphysics into dialectics and the constitution of metaphysics with dialectics, is achieved through 133 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 197. and Engels [33, p. 491]. 135 Marx and Engels [50, p. 277]. 136 Marx and Engels [47, p. 20]. 137 Ibid. 134 Marx

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the logic of concepts. Said concepts are the subject of Hegel’s philosophy, which is also the confluence of dialectics and metaphysics. Hegel’s work represents the completion of metaphysics rather than the end of philosophy: it opens up a new philosophical path for a dialectics that transcends metaphysics. Concerning his own philosophy, Hegel proposes: In general, in my philosophical endeavors, what I have worked towards and continue to work towards is the scientific knowledge of the truth.138 … It may be held the highest and final aim of philosophic science to bring about, through the ascertainment of this harmony [i.e. the harmony of thought and experience], a reconciliation of the self-conscious reason with the reason which is in the world—in other words, with actuality.139

Based on this philosophy concerning the truth of the identity of thought and being, Hegel proposes, “This thinking study of things may serve, in a general way, as a description of philosophy.”140 The reason why philosophy is able to undertake its mission, in other words, lies in the fact that “philosophy, on the other hand, is a peculiar mode of thinking—a mode in which thinking becomes knowledge, and knowledge through notions.”141 Concepts are the determinateness of thought, and the determinateness of thought is the determination of things. Therefore, concepts are the determinations of things through thought. This is the identity of thought and being through notions. Transcending an intellectual understanding of concepts and achieving the identity of thought and being through concepts is what Hegel calls the philosophical mode of thought, and what he uses to transform metaphysics. The fundamental characteristic of metaphysics as philosophy is its determination of sensation (things) using thought (notions), identifying philosophy’s first principles and highest causes in concepts. These serve as a unifying explanation for the wide variety of things encountered in human experience and can be explained as concrete manifestations of a universal essence, thus allowing thought to achieve freedom of the whole in its explanation of the world. Hegel agrees with this philosophical goal, but he believes that previous philosophy either elevates various phenomena as concepts while decomposing concepts into external particularities, or uses an “entitative” concept to unify various particular concepts without being conscious of the fact that the pursuit of first principles must regard thought itself as its object (and hence failing to achieve the freedom of the whole). Hegel’s transformation of metaphysics with dialectics is accomplished through the critique of the abstract reason that constitutes old metaphysics. He achieves a metaphysics where thought determines sensation through the dialectical movement of concepts and unifies the freedom of the whole with the necessity of aspects, thereby constructing metaphysics as a dialectics of ontology, epistemology, and logic. This confluence involves presenting philosophy’s first principles and highest causes 138 Hegel

[51, p. 8]. Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 108. 140 Ibid., p. 103. 141 Ibid., p. 104. 139 Hegel,

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based on the contradictory movement of concepts themselves, from abstract unity to concrete unity. Thus, the transformation of metaphysics into dialectics is the highest realm metaphysics can achieve; hence, it represents the completion of metaphysics. Hegel’s conceptual dialectics has two starting points: the identity of thought and being (i.e., concepts as the determinateness of the identity of thought and being) and the immanent emergence of distinctions between thought and being (i.e., concepts as the identity of thought and being achieved through their own dialectical movements). Therefore, Hegel’s dialectics is the progressive sublimation of concepts from abstract to concrete unity. Hegel’s constitution of metaphysics with dialectics therefore represents the unity of the identity of thought and being with concrete generality, achieved by concepts as the subject and entity, the unity of the freedom of the whole with the necessity of aspects, and the unity of individual reason with universal reason. Whether the identity of thought and being achieved by concepts is abstract or concrete, it can only be a generality, not an individuality. Therefore, the sublimation of concepts from abstract to concrete identity is also the movement of concepts from abstract generality (thought as names) to concrete generality (thought as concepts). This is the unification of the identity of thought and being with concrete generality. In addition, concepts’ movement from abstract to concrete generality is a dual process of negation. On the one hand, thought negates its own abstraction, moving from being in itself to being for itself and thus gaining increasingly concrete determinateness. On the other hand, thought also continuously negates its own one-sided determinateness, serving as its own thesis and antithesis, and reconstructing its determinateness as synthesis on a new logical level. This is the contradictory movement of concepts’ affirmation and negation, progression and leaps, and represents the unity of the freedom of the whole and the necessity of aspects. Finally, the movement of concepts from abstract to concrete generality is a process of individual reason recognizing universal reason and of dialectical integration between individual and universal reason. It is also a process of universal reason’s assimilation into individual reason and of individual reason becoming conscious of universal reason, thereby unifying the two. Hegel’s conceptual dialectics is thus the movement of the unity between the identity of thought and being with concrete generality, between the freedom of the whole and the necessity of aspects, and between individual reason and universal reason, all of which are achieved with concepts as the subject and the entity. In the history of philosophy, Hegel’s conceptual dialectics constitutes a dual logic regarding “how it is possible”: both “how cognition is possible” and “how freedom is possible.” With regards to the former, Hegel regards the logical priority of the identity of thought and being and the immanent emergence of distinctions between thought and being as dual premises, attributing the possibility of cognition to concepts’ dialectical movement and presenting the unity of thought and being as the movement of concepts from abstract to concrete identity. As for the latter, Hegel regards the freedom of the whole and the necessity of aspects as dual premises in order to attribute freedom’s possibility to the dialectical movement of concepts; that is, the movement of concepts from abstract generality (freedom of the whole in itself ) to concrete

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generality (the necessity of aspects). This is the movement of freedom from being in itself to being for itself to being in and for itself . This dual logic is achieved in the movement of the recognition of individual reason for universal reason; this process is both a cognitive process from abstract to concrete identity, and a freedom process from abstract to concrete generality. In Hegel’s philosophy, the cognitive and freedom processes underlying the recognition of individual reason for universal reason are of crucial significance. In Hegel’s view, metaphysics is transformed into dialectics because philosophy as truth must ensure that “the thoughtful mind enters deeply into their content, and learns and strengthens itself in their midst”142 and that “the task of leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge […] the individual whose substance is the more advanced Spirit runs through this past […] must also pass through the formative stages of universal Spirit.”143 In this regard, Cornu states, “This reconciliation by sorrow and effort, without which there is no profound life, and of which the figure of Christ is a symbol, constitutes the root idea of Hegel’s system.”144 The assimilation of individual for universal reason is the true meaning behind Hegel’s transformation of metaphysics with dialectics. Hegel’s confluence of dialectics and metaphysics is both the negation of traditional metaphysics and its completion. As the negation of traditional metaphysics, the metaphysical tradition of thought determining sensation reveals the internal contradiction of concepts—the subject and entity of thought determining sensation—thus compelling the confluence of metaphysics with dialectics. As the completion of traditional metaphysics, the metaphysical tradition of thought determining sensation confirms the position of concepts (universal reason) as the sole subject and entity while also turning dialectics into conceptual metaphysics. Hegel’s conceptual dialectics and metaphysics constitute Hegel’s “own time apprehended in thoughts.”145 Hegel is conscious of the dilemma of modernity due to the natural economy’s substitution for the market economy, and the loss of ethical totality characterized by the despair in universal reason. He believes that “to renounce the knowledge of truth and this despair in reason was glorified by our time as the supreme triumph of the spirit.”146 Therefore, he strives to use concrete and universal rational dialectics to transform metaphysics constituted by abstract reason, thus forming the scientific knowledge of truth through the confluence of dialectics and metaphysics. In terms of its deeper social roots, Hegel characterizes the internal contradictions of the capitalist society in which he lived: On the one hand, the bourgeoisie cannot survive without a continual revolution in social relations, thus negating the internal requirements of the capitalist mode of production. On the other hand, in bourgeois society, the principle of commodity exchange underlies the fundamental

142 Hegel

[51, p. 9]. [6, p. 16]. 144 Cornu [2, p. 22]. 145 Hegel [20, p. 19]. 146 Hegel [52]. 143 Hegel

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mode of all social life, and concept becomes the conscious form normalizing all domains of life. Marx states that Hegel’s philosophy expresses the most real state of human existence in the most abstract form. This is the state of human existence ruled by abstraction: a “personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things.”147 Hegel’s dialectics is thus a theoretical characterization of man’s social existence constituted by the logic of capital. This implies that capital, the abstract being which rules man’s social life, is the secret to Hegel’s confluence of dialectics with metaphysics. (2) Marx’s Critique of “Abstract Being” While in the philosophical sense Hegel achieves the confluence of dialectics and metaphysics, in the historical sense, he uses this confluence to theoretically characterize the capitalist mode of existence. This is Marx’s understanding of Hegel’s philosophy, and the starting point of his critique of Hegel. Marx constitutes his own dialectics that regards man’s historical activities as its content and abstract being—capital—as its object of critique, thereby achieving a dual end: it ends both super-historical metaphysics and the myth of non-historical capitalism. Marx profoundly reveals the relationship between Hegel’s philosophy and reality, arguing that the first element in the Hegel’s system is “metaphysically disguised nature separated from man,” the second is “metaphysically disguised spirit separated from man,” and the third is “the metaphysically disguised unity of both, real man and the real human species.”148 Marx believes that the metaphysical disguise of nature, spirit, and the human species is not due to Hegel’s preference for speculation (unlike other modern philosophers) but because individuals are ruled by abstractions. Therefore, Marx’s critique of Hegel is based on Hegel’s belief in the abstract being underlying speculative metaphysics. Being is the starting point of all philosophical thinking: how philosophers understand being, and on what being their thinking is focused, is what distinguishes different philosophies from one another. To all metaphysicians, including Hegel, true being is that which represents the first principles and highest causes; their focus is on being that constitutes the identity of thought and being. Therefore, philosophical metaphysics is the identity philosophy that pursues first principles and highest causes, and the metaphysical disguise is to hide the nature of all being by means of thought determining sensation as the self-movement of thoughts, determinations, or concepts. This can only be a super-historical, non-historical being. Thus, it is by starting from the critique of Hegel’s philosophy that Marx develops a critique of metaphysics. Historian R. G. Collingwood writes that “history [was] perhaps the only thing in which Marx was much interested.”149 This implies that Marx discovered a true being that transcends Hegel’s dialectical metaphysics and hence ends all metaphysics. 147 Marx

and Engels. Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 95. and Engels [53, p. 139]. 149 Collingwood [54, p. 124]. 148 Marx

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Marx and Engels state, “‘History’ is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.”150 To Marx and Engels, history is “the being of men,” “their actual lifeprocess”151 ; “the nature that preceded human history,” to man, “is nature which today no longer exists anywhere.”152 This indicates that history is the being with which Marx is concerned, and man’s mode of existence. The fundamental difference between humans and animals is that humans are historical beings. Since “the first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals,”153 Marx’s “setting out from real, active men”154 refers to “real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life.”155 Marx writes: The existence of the human race is the result of an earlier process which organic life passed through. Man comes into existence only when a certain point is reached. But once man has emerged, he becomes the permanent pre-condition of human history, likewise its permanent product and result, and he is pre-condition only as his own product and result.156

Man himself, as the precondition and result of history, constructs his own history through activity, and his own being through history. History separated from man leads to the abstraction of man’s being and of man’s real relation with the world. The being of individuals is their real-life processes, while the root of their real life is the production of material life conditions, i.e., labor. Labor is therefore humanity’s being. Marx’s ontology of real life based on labor injects being into negative dialectics, as illustrated by the question of whether the origin of distinctions’ immanent emergence is in concepts or in concepts’ internal negativity. To Hegel, the former originates from the identity of thought and being while the latter originates from individual consciousness of individual and universal reason. Therefore, Hegel attempts to use the self-movement of concepts to achieve unity between the two. He argues that concepts are sublimated from the abstract identity of thought and being into the concrete identity of thought and being. They then achieve integration of individual and universal reason through their own movement. Unlike Hegel, Marx’s negative dialectics is based on the negative unity of humanity with the world, i.e., human practical activity. Marx uses mankind’s labor as the starting point for his dialectics of being. In Capital, Marx starts from the economic cell form of bourgeois society—“the commodity form of the product of labor, or the value form of the commodity”157 —and gradually reveals contradictions between the use and exchange value of commodities and between concrete and 150 Marx

and Engels [53, p. 93]. and Engels [55, p. 36]. 152 Ibid., p. 40. 153 Ibid., p. 31. 154 Ibid., p. 36. 155 Ibid., p. 31. 156 Marx [11, p. 491]. 157 Marx and Engels [24, p. 8]. 151 Marx

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abstract labor that constitute these values. Based on this, he then focuses his analysis of the contradictions of bourgeois society on those between “living” and “dead” labor (capital), thereby uncovering the being of bourgeois society where all concrete being is ruled and governed by abstract being, i.e., capital. It is precisely this fact that forms the foundation for Hegel’s metaphysical disguise of nature, spirit, and humanity. Therefore, Marx’s dialectics is more than just the critique of a dialectics of abstract reason, but also of a dialectics of abstract being (capital); it thus turns the independence and individuality of capital into that of man. In contemporary philosophy, the post-metaphysical critique of metaphysics is primarily the critique of concepts where thought determines sensuousness. Therefore, what Theodor W. Adorno calls “making sure of the nonconceptual in the concepts”158 is the fundamental starting point. Within this post-metaphysical perspective, Marx’s dialectics, which criticizes abstract being, is “insight into the constitutive character of the nonconceptual in the concept.”159 First, it perceives reality through thought and reveals thought through reality. The fundamental proposition of Marx’s historical materialism is that “it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness”160 ; this transforms Hegel’s critique of abstract reason into the critique of abstract being. Secondly, Marx’s economic critique reveals the relations between persons concealed by the relations among things. Through critique of the British classical economist Ricardo, who “transforms men into hats,” and the classical German philosopher Hegel, who “transforms hats into ideas,”161 Marx critiques abstract being as dead labor (capital). Third, Marx’s critique of utopian socialism reveals the alienation of labor in the alienation of man and exposes the latter through the former, thus transforming the irrational critique of reality into the critique of irrational reality. This critique is truly an insight into “the nonconceptual in the concept,” that is, into the contradictions between reality and thought; living labor and dead labor; and the critique of reality and the critique of thought (words), thereby causing dialectics to move from the negation of thought to the negation of reality. The post-metaphysical critique of the identity of concepts implicitly contains the critique of the system of identity philosophy, that is, it criticizes the great narrative of the ideological system constituted by identity. Marx has profound insights into systems, stating, “My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite.”162 He describes the Hegelian system by saying, “Just as by dint of abstract ion we have transformed everything into a logical category, so one has only to make an abstraction of every characteristic distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition—purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement.”163 Furthermore, Marx reveals the roots of the 158 Adorno

[56, p. 12].

159 Ibid. 160 Marx

and Engels [55, p. 37]. and Engels [57, p. 161]. 162 Marx and Engels [47, p. 19]. 163 Marx and Engels [57, pp. 163–164]. 161 Marx

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system’s (logic’s) imposition on history: “For Hegel, all that has happened and is still happening is only just what is happening in his own mind. Thus the philosophy of history is nothing but the history of philosophy, of his own philosophy.”164 This implies that Marx criticizes the metaphysics of systems rather than the ideological system of concepts. To Marx, whether thought constitutes systems is not merely an epistemological question, but also a methodological one: how thought comprehends reality. In terms of the former, Marx proposes two paths by which thought constitutes itself: “By the former method the complete conception passes into an abstract definition; by the latter, the abstract definitions lead to the reproduction of the concrete subject on the course of reasoning.”165 In terms of the latter, Marx proposes, “The anatomy of the human being is the key to the anatomy of the ape. But the intimations of a higher animal in lower ones can be understood only if the animal of the higher order is already known.”166 From this, Marx arrives at an important conclusion: “It would thus be impractical and wrong to arrange the economic categories in the order in which they were the determining factors in the course of history. Their order of sequence is rather determined by the relation which they bear to one another in modern bourgeois society.”167 In addition, “Capital is the all dominating economic power of bourgeois society. It must form the starting point as well as the end and be developed before land-ownership.”168 It is because Marx regards the “all dominating economic power of bourgeois society” (capital) as his object of critique that he is able to reveal humanity’s “personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things” and how “individuals are now ruled by abstraction.”169 This constitutes Marx’s revolutionary dialectics and “ruthless criticism of all that exists.”170 If separated from this consciousness of how thought constitutes systems, then how does Marx achieve his critique of abstract being? Similarly, how then does post-metaphysics achieve its critique of identity philosophy? Breaking through the dialectics of systems is not to oppose thought constituting systems, but to reject the metaphysics of systems. Based on his critique of capital as abstract being, Marx proposes, “It is above all the task of philosophy, which is in service of history, to unmask human self-alienation in its secular forms, once its sacred form has been unmasked.”171 To unmask human self-alienation in the sacred and secular forms is not merely the end of metaphysics where thought determines sensations, but also the end of the personified history of metaphysics—the end of the heroic age. Men make their own history, which requires both the retreat of the heroic age and the rise of the heroic spirit. The 164 Ibid.,

p. 165. [10, p. 293]. 166 Ibid., p. 300. 167 Ibid., p. 304. 168 Ibid., p. 303. 169 Marx and Engels. Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 95. 170 Marx and Engels [35, p. 142]. 171 Marx [18, p. 132]. 165 Marx

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heroes of the heroic age are Hegel’s universal reason and its personification, whereas the heroes of the heroic spirit are real individuals who make their own history. To replace the heroic age with the heroic spirit is to replace the personification of universal reason with real individuals, and to transform individuals into reality— independent and universally developed individuals. This is the dialectics of history revealed in Marx’s laws of history and composed from human historical activities that implicitly contain man’s reason, purpose, ideals, and pursuit. This is an antimetaphysical metaphysical pursuit, which implicitly contains the dialectics of the metaphysical pursuit concerning man’s being. (3) Post-metaphysics and Dialectics Dialectics is the critique of the abstract. In Hegel’s sense, this results in the consciousness of universal reason through the critique of abstract reason. This is a dialectics of the intensional logic underlying thought, and of the self-critique and selftranscendence of thought. It constitutes conceptual metaphysics, i.e., the confluence of dialectics and metaphysics. In Marx’s sense, however, abstract reason originates from the abstraction of abstract being; hence, his dialectics goes beyond a critique of abstract reason to achieve the critique of thought and practice through the dual critique of abstract reason and abstract being (capital). This dialectic involves ruthless criticism of all that exists; hence, it is the ending of metaphysics by dialectics. Based on the above, it remains unclear what the “abstract” criticized by post-metaphysics is. What is the historical fate of Hegel’s and Marx’s dialectics in such a critique? In what sense does such a critique constitute the dialectical theory of the contemporary era? The abstract criticized by post-metaphysics generally refers to identity philosophy. Metaphysics as philosophy is a paradigm wherein the identity of thought and being is achieved through the determination of sensation by thought; whereas postmetaphysics is a perspective that rejects the determination of sensation by thought and substitutes identity with non-identity. In Post-Metaphysical Thinking, Jürgen Habermas explains why identity philosophy has come under the attack of postmetaphysics: “Metaphysical thought has been problematized by historical developments that have come to it from outside and have in the final analysis been socially conditioned.”172 Habermas then divides “socially conditioned” factors into four groups: (1) “totalizing thinking that aims at the one and the whole was rendered dubious by a new type of procedural rationality,” (2) “the new experiences of time and contingency within an ever more complex modern society” resulting in “a detranscendentalization of inherited basic concepts was thereby set in motion,” (3) “criticism of the reification and functionalization of forms of life and interaction, as well as of the objectivistic self-understanding of science and technology … promoted criticism of the foundations of a philosophy that forces everything into subject-object relations,” and 4) “the

172 Habermas

[17, p. 33].

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classical precedence of theory over practice could no longer hold up against mutual dependencies that were emerging ever more clearly.”173 Concerning the origin of metaphysics, Isaiah Berlin proposes in Liberty that: The notion that one can discover large patterns or regularities in the procession of historical events … has affected not merely ways of observing and describing the activities and characters of human beings, but moral and political and religious attitudes towards them. … In describing human behavior it has always been artificial and over-austere to omit questions of the character, purposes and motives of individuals.174

This is what he refers to as the existence of “personal and impersonal theories of history.”175 Berlin believes that “this kind of impersonal interpretation of historical change … traces the ultimate responsibility for what happens to the acts or behaviors of impersonal or ‘trans-personal’ or ‘super-personal’ entities or ‘forces’ whose evolution is identified with human history.”176 Therefore, his critique of metaphysics is the critique of the notion that “history obeys laws, whether natural or super-natural.”177 This implies that the abstract criticized by post-metaphysics is, fundamentally speaking, law (especially the laws of history). In this post-metaphysical perspective, dialectics faces a twofold challenge: the question of the logic concerning thought and history. Post-metaphysics must first challenge the logic of truth—laws—and the objectivity of thought, a challenge directed both at Hegel and Marx. Second, it must challenge the logic of the truth and the objectivity of history. Similarly, this challenge is directed not only at Hegel but also at Marx. Metaphysics as identity philosophy is, in essence, the foundation of truth in human thought, i.e., the objectivity of laws. Hegel endeavors to construct metaphysics as the dialectics involving the unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic to accomplish the confluence of dialectics and metaphysics, thereby achieving the transition of truth from abstract to concrete generality, the unity of truth’s freedom of the whole, and the necessity of aspects in the dialectical movement of concepts. Hegel’s conceptual dialectics, as the completion of metaphysics, lays the foundation for the notion of truth. Hence, it will always have an independent significance in current and future philosophical development. Evaluating its contemporary significance, however, involves four questions: (1) the evaluation of the history of metaphysics, (2) the evaluation of Hegel’s dialectics as the logic of movement in human thought, (3) the evaluation of Hegel’s dialectics as modern logic, and (4) the evaluation of the true meaning of Hegel’s dialectics in Marx’s dialectics. The evaluation of Hegel’s dialectics involves an evaluation of the history of metaphysics. According to philosopher of science Wartofsky: The driving force of metaphysical thought, both in its classical and modern forms, has been the attempt to get things whole, to present a unified picture or framework within which the 173 Ibid.,

pp. 33–34. [58, p. 96].

174 Berlin 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid., 177 Ibid.,

p. 98. p. 96–98, 104.

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wide diversity of things in our experience could be explained on the basis of some universal principles, or as manifestations of some universal stuff or process.178 Wartofsky continues, saying that the origin of this metaphysical thought lies in the fact that: The impetus to philosophical analysis in the interests of conceptual clarity and systematic coherence is too deeply ingrained…There is a sense of system and a demand for clarity and for the unity of our thought which go to the roots of our thinking activity, and may very well go even deeper, deriving from the kind of organisms we are and the kind of world we have to survive in.179

Metaphysics’ ontological origin implies that humankind’s metaphysical urge is unavoidable. It is humanity’s fate and the theoretical characterization of mankind’s mode of existence in pursuing and achieving ideality. At the same time, we must realize not only the metaphysical commitment to identity, but also that: The history of metaphysics is a history of the criticism of concepts of such a universal or general sort, and of the attempt to formulate systems of such concepts. … We might summarize this by defining metaphysics as ‘that enterprise in the formulation and analysis of concepts which undertakes a critical and systematic inquiry into the principles of Being, and the origin and structure of what there is.180

If we reexamine Hegel’s confluence of dialectics and metaphysics from this perspective, we rediscover the true meaning of Hegel’s philosophy. Specifically, in a materialist sense Hegel’s logical priorities become clear, as does his critical and systematic inquiry into the identity of thought and being, as identified by Engels: “The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and hence, too, that in the final analysis they cannot contradict each other in their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.”181 Whether we are committed to this premise of theoretical thought and its critical and systematic inquiry depends on our commitment to Hegel and Marx’s discovery of laws and whether post-metaphysics avoids sinking into the mire of relativism, making it impossible to form any real consensus based on the denial of the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought. The second question about the evaluation of Hegel’s dialectics is the logic of the movement of human thought in Hegel’s dialectics. As the spirit of the nineteenth century “Age of Ideology,” Hegel’s theoretical consciousness of philosophical thinking is the logic of the movement of human thought. This constitutes Hegel’s conceptual dialectics, i.e., the intensional logic of thought (or the logic of truth for Hegel). Truth, i.e., the objectivity of thought, is the theme of modern Western philosophy. The basic question is whether the concepts determined by thought contain the question of the identity between thought and being. By committing to the logical priority of the identity between thought and being, Hegel is devoted to exploring the 178 Wartofsky

[15]. p. 9. 180 Ibid., p. 11. 181 Marx and Engels [17]. 179 Ibid.,

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dialectical movement of concept from abstract to concrete identity. The result is a conceptual dialectics from the abstract to the concrete, which is also the tripartite unity of ontology, epistemology, and logic. This conceptual dialectics demonstrates the intensional logic of the movement of human thought in four aspects: (1) it is the logic underlying humanity’s movement of thought from the abstract to the concrete as a species, (2) it is the logic underlying the humanity’s movement of thought from the abstract to the concrete as individuals, (3) it is the logic for the self-construction and development of science, and (4) it is the logic of the self-realization of the unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought, the identity of thought and being. It provides humankind’s consciousness of the nature of thought with intensional logic. Although Hegel uses the imposition of logic on history to present that underlying the movement of human thought, he also provides the self-construction of all science with an intensional logic of concepts involving the unity of ontology, epistemology, and dialectics. Marx’s Capital is what Lenin calls “Logic (with a capital letter),”182 which profoundly embodies the logic of conceptual dialectics. Marx states that he consciously “coquetted” with Hegel’s dialectics,183 while Lenin writes, “It is impossible completely to understand Marx’s Capital … without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel’s Logic.”184 Hegel’s dialectics is a valuable philosophical heritage concerning the movement of human thought. Whether we are committed to its logic affects our commitment to Hegel’s intensional logic of conceptual movement in The Science of Logic (or to the intensional logic of human history presented in Marx’s Capital, as well as whether post-metaphysics can avoid relativism). The third question is that of the relation between individual and universal reason in Hegel’s dialectics’ reflection on modernity. As theoretical consciousness of the dilemma of modernity, the true aim of Hegel’s dialectics is to reconstruct the totality of ethics through universal reason, thereby reconciling humanity with its own world. To Hegel, concept is an ethical entity, while conceptual dialectics is the self-realization of ethical concepts. Based on its critique of abstract reason, Hegel’s dialectics not only encompasses the identification of the individual with universal reason, but also the struggle among individual reason. Intersubjectivity, meanwhile, constitutes the real content of the identification of the individual with universal reason. Although Hegel uses the imposition of individual reason by universal reason to constitute the freedom of the whole, it is also necessary to achieve reconciliation between the two, and between man and his world. This does not merely involve Hegel’s theoretical consciousness of the dilemma of modernity, but is also a serious question facing contemporary humans: how is universal ethics possible? The fourth question concerns the true meaning of Hegel’s dialectics in relation to Marx’s dialectics. Marx’s completion of metaphysics involves using critical and revolutionary dialectics that lets nothing impose upon it, based on the critique of 182 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 317. and Engels [50, p. 19]. 184 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 180. 183 Marx

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the “theoretical expression of those material relationships which dominate individuals,”185 that is, capital. This is the dual critique of metaphysics and its reality. Hence, Marx’s dialectics ends metaphysics as eternal truth and the myth concerning the nonhistoricity of capitalism. However, does this imply that Marx’s dialectics also ends the commitment of human thought for the logic of the objectivity of truth? Does it imply that Marx’s dialectics has negated the rationality of the existence of capitalism and the necessity of its self-sublation? Does Marx’s dialectics reject the great narrative concerning truth or the exploration concerning human liberation based on the laws of history? In his speech at Marx’s graveside, Engels said Marx made two major discoveries: “the law of development of human history” and “the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production, and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created.”186 This indicates that Marx’s work is to discover “the laws of history,” whereas his dialectics concerns the laws of history. To Marx, dialectics is not the negation of laws, but is laws themselves, i.e., the intensional logic of history and the unity of ontology, epistemology, and dialectics with history as its content. It is precisely this dialectic that constitutes “Logic with a capital letter.” In confirming that Marx’s dialectics is the intensional logic of history, challenging the logic of truth (i.e., laws) and the objectivity of post-metaphysics is then not merely a challenge to Hegel’s dialectics as the intensional logic of thought, but also to Marx’s dialectics as the intensional logic of history. This challenge requires us to seek out the great narrative of truth (laws) objectivity in greater depth, and to construct the dialectical theory of our time on this basis. Marx and Engels believe that history consists of human activity toward humanity’s aims. Therefore, the laws of history are not external to human activity but rather the two are the same. Departure from historical activity leads to the externalization, abstraction, and sanctification of the laws of history, causing them to become a mysterious force controlling human historical activity. The fundamental distinction between Marx and Hegel’s dialectics is whether it is real activity that constitutes laws, or preexisting laws that govern activity. Hegel’s dialectics, in confluence with metaphysics, involves the transformation of laws into the mysterious force of logical priority; and the deduction of history as the self-realization of logic. Marx’s dialectics, the end of metaphysics, not only “unmasks human self-alienation in its sacred form”187 but also in its secular forms. It reveals human self-alienation in capital and unifies human historical activity with historical laws. The key to understanding the relation of post-metaphysics to dialectics, therefore, is to understand the laws of history based on human historical activity. The objectivity of historical laws lies with that of human historical activity, or practice. If we depart from the latter, then the former becomes a mysterious force controlling human historical activity. Hegel’s dialectics describes the objectivity of laws as the self-movement of “impersonal reason”; hence, this dialectic is not the 185 Marx

and Engels [59, p. 101]. [60]. 187 Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 132. 186 Engels

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end of metaphysics but rather its completion. Marx’s dialectics argues that the laws of history concern “real men and … their historical development”188 ; hence, this dialectic is no longer in confluence with metaphysics but rather is its end. From this, we can draw two conclusions. First, departing from human historical activity and viewing the laws of history as a ready-made formula, i.e., as abstract generality, not only deviates from Marx’s dialectics but also regresses to the metaphysics of abstract identity criticized by Hegel. Second, to deny that human historical activity constitutes historical laws, thereby denying the objectivity of laws, is not merely a challenge to Hegel’s dialectics, but also to Marx’s. Philosophy is a specific time apprehended in thoughts, and any epochal philosophy is produced from the theoretical consciousness concerning contemporary human problems. The epochal human problems of modern society, which regards the logic of capital as its substantive content, is what Marx refers to as human self-alienation in its secular forms—rationalism and its reality, or politics, law, and country. Human self-alienation in its secular forms leads to the fragmentation of man’s real world, and division between humanity and nature; humanity and society; humanity and others; and humanity and the self. Today’s philosophical theory is constituted by the self-consciousness of this division. Post-metaphysics is therefore based on contemporary social conflicts, and reveals human self-alienation, especially through social stereotyping, thereby presenting a new perspective to dialectics’ “ruthless criticism of all that exists.”189 Post-metaphysics adopts the extreme mode of denying the objectivity of truth– laws–objective concepts in order to intensively manifest metaphysics’ internal contradictions of universal reason. It exposes the “metaphysical horror”190 caused by the depravity of rationalism from Plato to Hegel and the ravages of essentialism caused by humanity’s deviation from universal reason. It rejects the hierarchical pursuit of metaphysics and underscores the sequential arrangement of ontological meaning, thereby ending identity philosophy, which stifles practical choice and cultural diversity through universal reason. In disintegrating subjective metaphysics, it also highlights the significance of intersubjectivity, communication theory, negotiation, dialogue, and organic solidarity in human historical activities. Finally, in negating identity philosophy, it attempts to construct new philosophical ideas premised upon non-identity and to transcend absolutism and relativism, thereby including necessary tension as a basic ideal in contemporary philosophy. This postmetaphysical perspective is of crucial theoretical and practical significance to the in-depth examination of truth–laws–objective concepts and to the permeation of dialectics. At the same time, we cannot adopt an acritical view of post-metaphysics’ critique, since it adopts the extreme view of denying truth–laws–objectivity, thus trapping itself within relativism. Any possible dialogue cannot but be premised on a commitment to truth–laws–objectivity, and any possible thought or practice cannot but be 188 Engels,

Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, p. 41. and Engels [61, p. 142]. 190 Kolakowski [28]. 189 Marx

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premised on a commitment to the metaphysical nature of human ideality and transcendence. Dialectics’ rational nature lies in the fact that it ends the illusion of metaphysics concerning eternal verities while also initiating the ontological pursuit in metaphysics’ self-critique. This is the contemporary revival of metaphysics, or ontology. Sun Zheng-Yu writes: Philosophical ontology is an origin-tracing, intentional pursuit, an endless directionality of theoretical thought, and an ultimate concern that points to the infinite. The life value of philosophical ontological pursuit lies with the fact that humans always postulate an ideal goal that is based on reality, but which also transcends reality, thus negating their real existence and transforming reality into one that is more ideal. The true meaning of philosophical ontological pursuit lies with the fact that it guides humans to forever maintain a necessary tension between ideality and reality, ultimate directionality and historical certainty; while also constantly breaking this subtle balance, allowing humans to always maintain a vibrant sense of truth, goodness and beauty in all their activities, thus forever opening up a space for selfcritique and self-transcendence. In this sense, philosophy is ontology, and the self-critique of ontology is also the critique of the premises underlying thought.191

This self-critique of ontology, or the critique of the premises underlying thought, is the “ruthless criticism of all that exists.”192 Marx writes, “It is not enough that thought strive to actualize itself; actuality must itself strive toward thought.”193 Contemporary dialectical theory not only critiques the metaphysical passion and impulse, ideal and pursuit, but is also the critique of metaphysics itself. Dialectical critique is the twofold critique of reality and ideality. The acritical view will lead to the “depravity of rationalism,” “ravages of essentialism,” and “metaphysical horror.” The acritical abandonment of the metaphysical commitment to and pursuit of laws, truth, and objectivity will lead to existential anguish without the standard for choice and the unbearable lightness of life. Modern society is not a break in the history of human civilization; hence, post-metaphysics cannot possibly be a break in the history of human thought. Dialectics requires us to maintain a necessary tension in the dilemma of modernity and achieve a subtle balance.

5.3 Dialectics, Epistemology and Logic In the developmental history of dialectics and of Marxism, Lenin’s thought is of unique significance, especially that expounded in his Philosophical Notebooks, which is formed through interactions between Hegel’s The Science of Logic and Marx’s Capital. Lenin refers to Capital as his starting point for his exploration in the Science 191 Sun

[62, pp. 688–689]. and Engels [35, p.142]. 193 Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 138. 192 Marx

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of Logic’s true meaning. However, he also uses a Hegelian and Marxist theoretical consciousness to reinterpret Capital. It is precisely these interactions that have shaped the dialectical thought in Philosophical Notebooks, which consist of a tripartite unity among materialist logic, dialectics, and epistemology. Whether this renews our understanding of dialectics depends both on our understanding of dialectics and of the philosophical mode by which humans comprehend the world. (1) Dialectics and Logic In the Plan of Hegel’s Dialectics (Logic), Lenin says, “In Capital, Marx applied to a single science logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge of materialism [three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing] which has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further.”194 However, it remains unclear why Lenin describes dialectics as logic. In the Conspectus of Hegel’s Book The Science of Logic, Lenin writes, “A shrewd statement about logic: it is a ‘prejudice’ that it ‘teaches how to think’ (just as physiology ‘teaches…to digest’??).”195 People generally view logic as a discipline that “teaches how to think”; however, just as physiology does not “teach to digest,” logic also does not “teach how to think.” Hence, what is this logic discussed in Hegel’s The Science of Logic? It is precisely in his rethinking of the term that Lenin puts forward a series of crucial thoughts regarding why it is necessary to understand dialectics in terms of logic. Lenin writes in the preface to the first edition of The Science of Logic that “logical science, which is the true content of genuine metaphysics or pure speculative philosophy” and “philosophy cannot borrow its method from a subordinate science, such as mathematics. … It is along this path of self-construction alone that Philosophy can become objective, demonstrative science.”196 In the preface to the second edition, he adds, “What Hegel demands is a Logic, the forms of which would be forms with content, forms of living, real content, inseparably connected with the content.”197 He concludes by saying, “Logic is the science not of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development ‘of all material, natural, and spiritual things’, i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the History of knowledge of the world.”198 Lenin’s comments have strong theoretical pertinence and profound ideological intensions. In 1859, when commenting on Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Engels points out: The official Hegelian school had assimilated only the most simple devices of the master’s dialectics and applied them to everything and anything, often with ridiculous incompetence. Hegel’s whole legacy was, so far as they were concerned, limited to “a mere template, by 194 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 317. p. 87. 196 Ibid., p. 87, 88. 197 Ibid., p. 92. 198 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, pp. 92–93. 195 Ibid.,

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means of which any subject could be shaped aright,”199 and to a list of words and phrases whose only purpose was to turn up at the right moment, when ideas and positive knowledge were lacking.200

Engels’s discourse provides profound insight into why dialectics has been regarded as “a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright”201 and turned into “a list of words and phrases whose only purpose was to turn up at the right moment, when ideas and positive knowledge were lacking”202 : dialectics was considered a pure mode of thinking removed from the contents of thought and regarded as a means for use.203 It is precisely in this context that Lenin reinterprets logic in The Science of Logic, confirming that Hegelian logic involves the unity of content and form, and placing special emphasis on the fact that “logic is the science not of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development ‘of all material, natural and spiritual things.’”204 It is the science of logic in this sense, which is concerned with the harmony of thought and being and which constitutes dialectics, that represents the science of development. Hegel believes that philosophy is “the scientific knowledge of the truth”205 ; hence, its fundamental content and vocation lie in achieving the harmony of thought and being. However, this is often misunderstood; people either regard concepts determined by thought as empty names removed from the world and life, or they regard the world and life as complex representations removed from concepts, thereby negating the “harmony of thought and being”206 in the sense of truth. More specifically, the greatest misunderstanding of dialectics is nothing more than the separation between the content and form of thought; the intensions and extensions of concept; and the theory and method of philosophy. Dialectics as the theory of world outlook becomes a mere template; words and phrases without the contents of thought, conceptual intensions, or empirical knowledge. This fundamental misunderstanding highlights the core concept of dialectics: the understanding of development. Lenin points out: With the “principle of development” in the twentieth century (indeed, at the end of the nineteenth century also) “all are agreed.” Yes, but this superficial, not thought out, accidental, philistine “agreement” is an agreement of such a kind as stifles and vulgarizes the truth.207 Lenin further points out that, the real problem in understanding the concept of development is:

199 Marx

and Engels [19, p. 472].

200 Ibid. 201 Ibid. 202 Marx

and Engels [46, p. 472].

203 Ibid. 204 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, pp. 92–93. [51, p. 8]. 206 Hegel [5, p. 108]. 207 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 253. 205 Hegel

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If everything develops, then everything passes from one into another, for development as is well known is not a simple, universal and eternal growth, enlargement (respective diminution), etc.—If that is so, then, in the first place, evolution has to be understood more exactly, as the arising and passing away of everything, as mutual transitions. And, in the second place, if everything develops, does not that apply also to the most general concepts and categories of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialectics of concepts and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance.208 Lenin also stresses that this is “regarding the question of dialectics and its objective significance.”209

The dialectics of concepts and cognition have objective significance, and the question of development “applies also to the most general concepts and categories of thought” because the concepts and categories determined by thought are neither forms of thought nor abstract generality. A real understanding of the logic of development must involve the concepts and categories that constitute logic. On the basis of affirming Hegelian logic, involving the unity of content and form and claiming that “logic is the science not of external forms of thought,” Lenin proposes, “Objectivism: the categories of thought are not an auxiliary tool of man, but an expression of laws both of nature and of man.”210 In addition, he describes categories by saying, “Man is confronted with a web of natural phenomena. Instinctive man, the savage, does not distinguish himself from nature. Conscious man does distinguish, categories are stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognizing the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognizing and mastering it.”211 Such logical categories are “not merely an abstract universal, but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular,” and the logic that unfolds from them is “not abstract, dead and immobile, but concrete.”212 It is precisely based on such an understanding that Lenin writes after citing Hegel’s discourse: “This is characteristic! The spirit and essence of dialectics!”213 These statements by Lenin are not accidental articulations, but are made based on the comparison between old logic and The Science of Logic: “In the old logic, there is no transition, development (of concept and thought), there is not ‘an inner necessary connection’ of all the parts and ‘transition’ of some parts into others.”214 In The Science of Logic, “Hegel puts forward two basic requirements: (1) ‘The necessity of connection’ and (2) ‘the immanent emergence of distinctions.’”215 Lenin believes these embody “the dialectical = ‘comprehending the antithesis in its unity…’”216 Therefore, Lenin proposes: 208 Ibid.,

pp. 253–254. p. 253. 210 Ibid., p. 91. 211 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 93. 212 Ibid, p. 100. 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid., p. 97. 215 Ibid. 216 Ibid., p. 98. 209 Ibid.,

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Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical—under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another—why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another. 217

Lenin’s statements concerning dialectics imply that in order to comprehend the antithesis in its unity, we must first comprehend the dialectics of concepts and cognition that have objective significance. Moreover, in order to gain a deeper understanding that dialectics is logic, we must first renew our understanding of the real expression of logic: concepts. It is especially noteworthy that Philosophical Notebooks stresses the reinterpretation of concepts in the unity of dialectics and logic. Lenin points out: Hegel analyzes concepts that usually appear to be dead and shows that there is movement in them. Finite? That means moving to an end! Something?—means not that which is Other. Being in general?—means such indeterminateness that Being = not-Being. All-sided, universal flexibility of concepts, a flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites—that is the essence of the matter. This flexibility, applied subjectively = eclecticism and sophistry. Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world.218 Lenin further proposes: The formation of (abstract) notions and operations with them already includes idea, conviction, consciousness of the law-governed character of the objective connection of the world. … To deny the objectivity of notions, the objectivity of the universal in the individual and in the particular, is impossible. Consequently, Hegel is much more profound than Kant, and others, in tracing the reflection of the movement of the objective world in the movement of notions.219 Lenin uses commodity as described in Capital as an example, stating: Just as the simple form of value, the individual act of exchange of one given commodity for another, already includes in an undeveloped form all the main contradictions of capitalism— so the simplest generalization, the first and simplest formation of notions (judgments, syllogisms, etc.) already denotes man’s ever deeper cognition of the objective connection of the world. Here is where one should look for the true meaning, significance and role of Hegel’s Logic.220 He continues: Logical concepts are subjective so long as they remain ‘abstract’, in their abstract form, but at the same time they express also the Things-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract, both phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source.221

Lenin then cites The Science of Logic: “The object in its existence without thought and Notion is an image or a name: it is what it is in the determinations of thought and 217 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 109. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 110. 219 Ibid., p. 178. 220 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, pp. 178–179. 221 Ibid., p. 208. 218 Lenin,

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Notion,” and adds, “That is correct! Image and thought, the development of both, nothing else.”222 Based on the above understanding of concepts, Lenin describes dialectics as: “mutual dependence of notions,” “mutual dependence of all notions without exception,” “transitions of notions from one into another,” “transitions of all notions from one into another without exception,” “the relativity of opposition between notions,” and “the identity of opposites between notions.223 This explanation reveals the unity of logic and dialectics and the significant philosophical implications of this unity. After reading this excerpt from Hegel: “To understand [motion] means to express its essence in the form of the Notion,” Lenin commented, “Correct!” and made the following statement: “The question is not whether there is movement, but how to express it in the logic of concepts.”224 Affirming the empirical fact of motion is still merely the reflection of naïve realism, which “describes the result of motion, but not motion itself. … It does not show, it does not contain in itself the possibility of motion. … It depicts motion as a sum, as a concatenation of states of rest,” whereas dialectical contradiction is “shifted, screened, covered over.”225 Therefore, it is only by uncovering the contradictory nature of motion that we can comprehend the antithesis in its unity and constitute dialectics as theoretical thought. Hegel reveals, “What makes the difficulty is always thought alone, since it keeps apart the moments of an object which in their separation are really united.”226 To this end, Lenin proposes: We cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movement, without interrupting continuity, without simplifying, coarsening, dismembering, strangling that which is living. The representation of movement by means of thought always makes coarse, kills—and not only by means of thought, but also by sense-perception, and not only of movement, but every concept.227

It is because thought and concept are always “simplifying, coarsening, dismembering, strangling that which is living” that one may realize the dialectics of the harmony of thought and being implies achieving the “all-sided, universal flexibility of concepts, a flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites”228 and that these concepts “must be hewn, treated, flexible, mobile, relative, mutually connected, united in opposites.”229 It is through this renewed understanding of concepts in the sense of the unity between dialectics and logic that Lenin quotes Engels as saying dialectics is the “art of operating with [concepts].”230 Based on the understanding that dialectics must be logic and that the logic of things (dialectics of being) must be described using the logical movement of thought 222 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 224. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 197. 224 Ibid., pp. 254–256. 225 Ibid., p. 257. 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid., pp. 257–258. 228 Ibid., p. 110. 229 Ibid., p. 146. 230 Ibid., p. 251. 223 ”Lenin,

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(dialectics of concepts) to achieve the harmony of thought and being, Lenin not only confirms “a dialectics of concepts and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance”231 but also makes a surprising comment: “Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism.”232 He explains this by saying, “Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent; metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of stupid.”233 This suggests that in order to develop a Marxist “intelligent materialism,” we must first have a profound understanding of the “dialectics of concepts” provided by Hegel’s intelligent idealism, i.e., dialectical idealism. We must transcend what Marx criticizes as materialism that conceives of “things, reality, sensuousness … only in the form of the object, or of contemplation”234 and what Lenin criticizes as “metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid,” i.e., “stupid materialism.”235 This transcendence requires a renewed understanding of dialectics as the science of logic. Based on the developmental history of Marxist philosophy, Lenin’s belief that dialectics is logic reflects Engel’s argument concerning the harmony of thought and being. Engels writes: The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and hence, too, that in the final analysis they cannot contradict each other in their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought. Eighteenth-century materialism, owing to its essentially metaphysical character, investigated this premise only as regards content. It restricted itself to the proof that the content of all thought and knowledge must derive from sensuous experience, and revived the principle: nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu [nothing is in the mind that has not been in the senses]. It was modern idealistic, but at the same time dialectical philosophy, and especially Hegel, which for the first time investigated it also as regards form.236

Old materialism investigated the harmony of thought and being only with regard to content, which resulted in its essentially metaphysical character. Hegelian philosophy, which investigates the harmony of thought and being, also considers form. As a result, it forms a dialectical philosophy regarding dialectics and logic, and an intelligent idealism based on the mystical mode of idealism. Lenin stresses that Capital achieves the tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge of materialism. This confirms that Marx has “taken everything valuable in Hegel” and “developed it further,”237 thereby achieving the leap from intelligent idealism to intelligent materialism. (2) Dialectics and Epistemology 231 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 254. p. 254, 274. 233 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 274. 234 Marx and Engels [34, p. 3]. 235 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 274. 236 Marx and Engels [33, pp. 544–545]. 237 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 317. 232 Ibid.,

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Lenin’s statement that “logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge of materialism” are “one and the same thing” undeniably encompasses the judgment that “dialectics is logic.”238 In addition, in an essay titled “On the Question of Dialectics,” Lenin proposes that: “Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism.”239 The academic community has different understandings of this statement. One view regards it as “applying dialectics to the Bildertheorie [theory of reflection], to the process and development of knowledge.”240 However, this explanation not only greatly diminishes the deep ideological intension in dialectics as epistemology but also regards Lenin’s dialectical thought (especially that expounded in Philosophical Notebooks) as an unavoidable theoretical misconception of the dialectics of the theory of knowledge. This is highlighted in the fact that contemporary dialectical research has reached near consensus concerning the classification of dialectics into the following groups: the dialectics of ontology, epistemology, and the theory of practice. Some scholars use Lenin’s statement that “dialectics is the theory of knowledge” to assert that his dialectics is the dialectics of the theory of knowledge. This implies that it is only by reinterpreting Philosophical Notebooks, which examine the relationship between The Science of Logic and Capital, that we can understand the true meaning of Lenin’s statement. In Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin regards dialectics “as the sum-total of examples … and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world).”241 Lenin stresses that “dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the ‘aspect’ of the matter (it is not ‘an aspect’ but the essence of the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention.”242 Lenin’s discussion emphasizes three points. First, dialectics is Marx’s and Hegel’s theory of knowledge. Here, Lenin not only aligns Hegel and Marx to stress that dialectics is the theory of knowledge, but also places special emphasis on this claim with regards to the consistency of The Science of Logic and Capital. Second, the proposition that dialectics is the theory of knowledge “is not ‘an aspect’ but the essence of the matter.”243 Here, Lenin targets other theoretical models; the “essence of the matter” refers to the fact that dialectics should not be “taken as the sum-total of examples” but must be understood “as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world).”244 In other words, dialectics should be based on the great basic question of philosophy, i.e., that of the relation between thought and being. Third, to stress the difficulty of understanding “the essence of the matter” Lenin proposes that even the famous Marxist theorist “Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention [to] the essence of the matter.”245 238 Ibid. 239 Ibid.,

p. 360. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 360. 241 Ibid., p. 357. 242 Ibid., p. 360. 243 Ibid. 244 Ibid., p. 357. 245 Ibid., p. 360. 240 Lenin,

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The entirety of Philosophical Notebooks understands dialectics as logic, and conceives of dialectics as the comprehension of being’s movement by the logic of thought in order to comprehensively demonstrate that dialectics is Hegel’s and Marx’s theory of knowledge. This includes arguments concerning the dialectical nature of human cognition; the dialectical movement of cognition; the relation between dialectics and the history of cognition; the practical basis of cognition and logic; the epistemological roots of idealism, etc. Lenin thus not only elaborates on “the essence of the mater,” i.e., that dialectics is Hegel’s and Marx’s theory of knowledge, but also profoundly reveals that logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge in Capital are the same. In Philosophical Notebooks, the two statements “Dialectics is the theory of knowledge” and “Dialectics is logic” are not mutually independent; they are in fact the same judgment of “the essence of the matter” from two different perspectives. In “looking for the true meaning, significance and role of Hegel’s Logic,” Lenin proposes that “the formation of (abstract) notions and operations with them already includes idea, conviction, consciousness of the law-governed character of the objective connection of the world.”246 Based on a materialist standpoint, Lenin therefore further puts forward his point that “logic is the science of cognition. It is the theory of knowledge. Knowledge is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws, etc. (thought, science = “the logical Idea”) embrace conditionally, approximately, the universal law-governed character of eternally moving and developing nature.”247 Based on this fact, “man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as a whole, in its completeness, its “immediate totality”, he can only eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc.”248 It is because Lenin interprets The Science of Logic, which concerns the science of cognition, from a materialist standpoint that he writes: “Very profound and clever! The laws of logic are the reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.”249 Lenin then expands on this tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge as “the essence of the matter”—the question of the relation between thought and being. “Dialectics is the theory of knowledge” stems from the dialectical nature of human cognition. Lenin proposes, “To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognized): the individual is the universal.”250 He continues, “Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a ‘nucleus’ (‘cell’) the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in 246 Lenin, 247 Ibid.,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, pp. 178–179. p. 182.

248 Ibid. 249 Ibid., 250 Ibid.,

p. 183. p. 359.

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general.”251 Here, Lenin not only argues for dialectics as the theory of knowledge, but also for a dialectics of concepts and cognition with objective significance based on the dialectical nature of human cognition. The unity of the two propositions— “dialectics is logic” and “dialectics is the theory of knowledge”—further suggests that logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge are the same. To say that “dialectics is the theory of knowledge” also implies that human cognition follows a dialectical development. In Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin makes a series of profound statements in this regard: “The coincidence of thought with the object is a process,”252 “Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. The reflection of nature in man’s thought must be understood not ‘lifelessly’, not ‘abstractly’, not devoid of movement, not without contradictions, but in the eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution,”253 “the endless process of the deepening of man’s knowledge of the thing, of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to essence and from less profound to more profound essence,”254 and “human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life.”255 Based on this understanding of the dialectical development of human cognition, in “On the Question of Dialectics” Lenin explains: Dialectics as living, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing), with an infinite number of shades of every approach and approximation to reality (with a philosophical system growing into a whole out of each shade)—here we have an immeasurably rich content as compared with “metaphysical” materialism, the fundamental misfortune of which is its inability to apply dialectics to the theory of reflection, to the process and development of knowledge.256

This statement indicates the necessity of understanding the statement that “dialectics is the theory of knowledge” based on the dialectical development of cognition, and demonstrates that Lenin targets “the fundamental misfortune of metaphysical materialism” in proposing applying “dialectics to the theory of reflection, to the process and development of knowledge.” If the above proposition is simply understood as applying dialectics to the theory of reflection, we cannot understand either its profound connotations or how logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge can be the same. To say that dialectics is the theory of knowledge also implies that all philosophical theory, doctrine, and thought are intimately related to specific aspects of human cognition. Lenin proposes:

251 Ibid.,

pp. 359–360. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 194. 253 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 194, 195. 254 Ibid., p. 221. 255 Ibid., p. 251. 256 Ibid., p. 360. 252 Lenin,

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Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated development (inflation, distention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosized. Idealism is clerical obscurantism. True. But philosophical idealism is (“more correctly” and “in addition”) a road to clerical obscurantism through one of the shades of the infinitely complex knowledge (dialectical) of man.257 Lenin further expounds: Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification, subjectivity and subjective blindness— voilà the epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscurantism (= philosophical idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless; it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge.258

To understand the history of philosophy based on the statement that dialectics is the theory of knowledge is to understand the epistemological roots of the emergence and long-term existence of philosophical idealism. To say that dialectics is the theory of knowledge implies that dialectical philosophy is a form of theoretical thought that rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements. After reading The Science of Logic, Lenin concludes that whether it is the dialectical nature and development of human cognition or the epistemological roots of the conflict among philosophical theories and schools, understanding the unity of logic, dialectics, and epistemology must involve connecting dialectics with all of philosophical history. In the Conspectus of Hegel’s The Science of Logic, Lenin writes, “Obviously, Hegel takes his self-development of concepts, of categories, in connection with the entire history of philosophy. This gives still a new aspect to the whole Logic.”259 In Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin asks the following question: Why was “the idea of universal movement and change (1813 Logic) conjectured before its application to life and society”?260 Lenin believes that The Science of Logic guesses this idea of universal movement and change because Hegel traces “the dialectical in the history of philosophy”261 and because “Hegel’s dialectic is a generalization of the history of thought.”262 Thus, Lenin arrives at an important conclusion: “Continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the dialectical elaboration of the history of human thought, science and technique.”263 Based on this, he proposes, “the history of 257 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 361. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 361. 259 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 114. 260 Ibid., p. 141. 261 Ibid., p. 247. 262 Ibid., p. 316. 263 Ibid., p. 147. 258 Lenin,

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philosophy, the history of the separate sciences, the history of the mental development of the child, the history of the mental development of animals, the history of language, psychology, physiology of the sense organs … these are the fields of knowledge from which the theory of knowledge and dialectics should be built.”264 This helps explain why Engels regards dialectical philosophy as “a form of theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.”265 It is especially noteworthy that the most important argument for Lenin’s assertion that dialectics is Hegel’s and Marx’s theory of knowledge is that logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge are the same from the standpoint of practice. Lenin here refers to materialism, but it is neither old materialism, nor materialism in the general sense—but specifically Marxist modern materialism. In the Conspectus of Hegel’s The Science of Logic, “The Doctrine of the Concept,” Lenin writes “cognition of the object” beside a passage reading, “The knowledge of truth is placed in the cognition of the object ‘as object without the addition of any subjective reflection.’”266 In other words, Lenin interprets and elucidates Hegel’s thoughts from the standpoint of materialism, using this framework to make a series of comments concerning materialistic dialectics. He proposes that “the laws of the external world, of nature … are the bases of man’s purposive activity… In his practical activity, man is confronted with the objective world, is dependent on it, and determines his activity by it”267 and that “men’s ends are engendered by the objective world and presuppose it.”268 He also stresses that “Man’s consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it”Lenin, 269 and that “the world does not satisfy man and man decides to change it by his activity.”270 He then proposes, “The essence: The ‘good’ is a ‘demand of external actuality’, i.e., by the ‘good’ is understood man’s practice= the demand (1) also of external actuality (2).”271 Here, Lenin reveals the ontological roots of the claim that logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge are one and the same: the dialectical relation of the purposive demand of human practical activity with external actuality. Lenin also explains the basis of logic, proposing that “man’s practice, repeating itself a thousand million times, becomes consolidated in man’s consciousness by figures of logic. Precisely (and only) on account of this thousand-million-fold repetition, these figures have the stability of a prejudice, an axiomatic character.”272 This reveals why logic has objective significance based on human practical activity. Under the heading “Hegel on practice and the objectivity of cognition,” Lenin writes, “The

264 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 351. and Engels [33, p. 491]. 266 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 185. 267 Lenin [9, pp. 187–188]. 268 Ibid., p. 189. 269 Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 212. 270 Ibid., p. 213. 271 Ibid. 272 Ibid., p. 216. 265 Marx

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practice of man and of mankind is the test, the criterion of the objectivity of cognition. Is this Hegel’s idea? It is necessary to return to this.”273 He continues, “In Hegel practice serves as a link in the analysis of the process of cognition, and indeed as the transition to objective (‘absolute’, according to Hegel) truth. Marx, consequently, clearly sides with Hegel in introducing the criterion of practice into the theory of knowledge: see the Theses on Feuerbach.”274 Such thoughts elucidate Marx’s practical standpoint on the tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge of materialism; thereby enabling us to understand more deeply how Marx’s materialism has “taken everything valuable in Hegel” and “developed it further.”275 They imply that if we depart from Lenin’s practical understanding of the relation between thought and being, regarding Lenin’s key thoughts as merely applying dialectics to the theory of reflection, or regarding them as the dialectics of epistemology, then we will be departing from Lenin’s beliefs. (3) “One and the Same Thing” in Capital To Lenin, there is no greater theoretical question than the definition of Marxism, and no greater theoretical conundrum than the fact that no Marxists (including Plekhanov) truly understand Marxism. Lenin’s theory that logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge are one and the same, as described by his analysis of the relation between The Science of Logic and Capital, is a response to these questions. Lenin believes that dialectics is not only a decisive feature of Marxist philosophy, but the living soul of Marxism. However, after Engels’s death, Marx’s dialectics encountered two serious distortions: regarding development as a fashionable banner for a vulgar theory of evolution and relegating dialectics from a Hegelian conscious form (i.e., the idealistic tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge) to a naïve and spontaneous thing (i.e., the sum-total of examples). Lenin points out the source of such distortions by saying, “It is impossible completely to understand Marx’s Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel’s Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!”276 To understand Marx, one must first understand Marx’s Capital; to understand Capital, one must have first studied Hegel’s The Science of Logic. To do so requires an understanding that logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge in Capital are the same thing. Lenin studied Hegel’s The Science of Logic as a conscious Marxist; hence, he tries “to read Hegel materialistically”277 and considers The Science of Logic with reference to Capital. He determines: If Marx did not leave behind him a “Logic” (with a capital letter), he did leave the logic of Capital, and this ought to be utilized to the full in this question. In Capital, Marx applied to 273 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 211.

274 Ibid. 275 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 317. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 180. 277 Ibid. 104. 276 Lenin,

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a single science logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge of materialism [three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing] which has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further.278

To say that logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge are the same has profound, concrete ideological intensions. First, Capital presents a theoretical system composed of a series of economic categories; this theoretical system would not exist without these economic categories and their logical relations. In this sense, Capital contains logic concerning the movement of capital. Second, the economic categories and their logical relations are the product of Marx’s comprehension of the determinations of reality through the determinations of thought; it would not be possible to comprehend the logical system of Capital without this epistemological consciousness of thought. In this sense, Capital also contains the theory of knowledge concerning the movement of capital. Third, the determinations of reality comprehended by the determinations of thought are relations between persons concealed by relations among things: commodities, currencies, capital, ground-rent, and profit. These “economic categories are only the theoretical expressions, the abstractions of the social relations of production”279 ; if we depart from human’s life-process then we will be unable to understand these economic categories or their logical relations. In this sense, Capital is also the dialectics that embodies the “harmony of thought and being.”280 This indicates that Capital draws on Hegel’s theory regarding dialectics, epistemology, and logic as one and the same in order to study the logic of the movement of capital. Indeed, Capital goes one step further, premising Hegel’s theory on Marxist materialism. In the opening of Capital, Marx proposes, “The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ‘an immense accumulation of commodities’, its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity.”281 In Philosophical Notebooks, however, Lenin’s primary concern is the dialectical relation between the universal and the particular, as embodied in the unit of the commodity. In the conspectus of the introduction to Hegel’s The Science of Logic, Lenin writes the following boxed comment: “A beautiful formula: ‘Not merely an abstract universal, but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular, the individual, the single’ (all the wealth of the particular and single!)!! Très bien!”282 In his summary essay, “On the Question of Dialectics,” Lenin makes the following comment on Capital’s approach to commodities: In his Capital, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday relation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz. the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this “cell” of bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or the germs of all 278 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 317. and Engels [57, p. 165]. 280 Sun [63]. 281 Marx and Engels [47, p. 45]. 282 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 99. 279 Marx

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the contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the summation of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.283

Here, Lenin does not merely explain the dialectics of the universal and the particular embodied in Capital, he also expounds on the “method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general”: from the abstract to the concrete and the unity between history and logic. In Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin not only expounds on the various categories in Capital based on the dialectical relation between commodity’s universal and the particular, he also treats the logic of Capital based on the general course of cognition. In Plan of Hegel’s Dialectics (Logic), Lenin writes: The concept (cognition) reveals the essence (the law of causality, identity, difference, etc.) in Being (in immediate phenomena)—such is actually the general course of all human cognition (of all science) in general. Such is the course also of natural science and political economy and history. Insofar Hegel’s dialect is a generalization of the history of thought. To trace this more concretely and in greater detail in the history of the separate sciences seems an extraordinarily rewarding task. In logic, the history of thought must, by and large, coincide with the laws of thinking.284

In this regard, Lenin writes more specifically, “Commodity–money–capital,” “production of absolute surplus-value,” “production of relative surplus-value,” “the history of capitalism and the analysis of the concepts summing it up,”285 “the beginning—the most simple, ordinary, mass, immediate ‘Being’: the single commodity (‘Sein’ in political economy). The analysis of it as a social relation. A double analysis, deductive and inductive—logical and history (forms of value),” and “testing by facts or by practice respectively, is to be found here in each step of the analysis.”286 Lenin believes that Capital as logic means that “every science must be absorbed in logic, since each is an applied logic insofar as it consists in apprehending its object in forms of thought and of the Notion” (Hegel).287 Capital’s logic of the movement of capital is that which Marx comprehends using the logical movement of economic categories (commodity, currency, capital, etc.), which is also the determination of “real history” through the determinations of thought. In his conspectus of Hegel’s The Science of Logic, “The Doctrine of Essence,” Lenin presents an excerpt by Hegel: “Speculative thought consists only in this, that thought holds fast Contradiction and itself in Contradiction and not in that it allows itself to be dominated by it—as happens to imagination—or suffers its determinations to be resolved into others, or into Nothing.” He follows this with the comment, “This core had to be discovered, understood, rescued, laid bare, refined, which is precisely what Marx and Engels did.”288 283 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, pp. 358–359. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 316. 285 Ibid., pp. 316–318. 286 Ibid., p. 318. 287 Ibid., p. 201. 288 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 141. 284 Lenin,

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In Capital, Marx uses the concrete determinateness of contradiction to analyze the duality of commodity as use value and exchange value, which is followed by an analysis on the duality of labor that forms the duality of commodity, thereby constituting Marxist labor theory of value in the political economy and of surplus value upon which it is constructed. Lenin believes that Capital’s method of study and exposition shows that “Marx applied Hegel’s dialectics in its rational form to political economy.”289 The tripartite unity of dialectics, epistemology, and logic in Marx’s Capital is based upon that achieved through idealism in Hegel’s The Science of Logic, and modern materialism created by Marx and Engels. In reading The Science of Logic “with reference to Capital,” Lenin is especially concerned that Marx is “the movement forward from Hegel and Feuerbach further, from idealistic to materialistic dialectics”290 and stresses that Marx “has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further.”291 This implies that the most fundamental question to gaining an in-depth understanding of Capital’s tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge is the definition of “everything valuable” that Marx takes from Hegel—and how Marx further develops it. There are two main values of conceptual dialectics in Hegel’s The Science of Logic. First, the use of the necessity of connection and immanent emergence of distinctions to criticize concepts as abstract generality and demonstrate their concreteness. Second, the use of the self-sublation of determinations of thought in cognitive development to criticize concepts as dead or immobile, but instead demonstrate their negativity. Marx develops these two aspects by transforming Hegel’s concrete materialism into concreteness formed through reflection of being by thought, while also transforming Hegel’s negative materialism into a dialectics that is both critical and revolutionary. These transformations rely on the historical process of the negative unity between man and the world based on human practical activity. In the afterword to the second edition of Capital, Marx states: My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea”, he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea”. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.292 In addition, Marx argues: [A rational dialectics] includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.293 289 Ibid.,

p. 178. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 340. 291 Ibid., p. 317. 292 Marx and Engels [47, p. 19]. 293 Ibid., p. 20. 290 Lenin,

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Thus, Marx proposes two fundamental statements in Capital. First, the fundamental distinction between Hegel’s and Marx’s dialectics lies in whether ideas determine reality or reality determines ideas. Second, dialectics in its rational form not only affirms that reality determines ideas but is also critical and revolutionary. In Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin emphasizes, “I am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically” and states, “Hegel is materialism which has been stood on its head.”294 He thus proposes that Marx and Engels have “discovered, understood, rescued, laid bare, refined”295 Hegelian idealism. They have reclaimed “the universal, all-sided, vital connection of everything with everything and the reflection of this connection” and “embraced the world” through concepts that “must be hewn, treated, flexible, mobile, relative, mutually connected, united in opposites.”296 This, in turn, enables logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge to be one and the same. This dialectics in Capital, fundamentally speaking, transcends that which is merely a sum-total of examples or a naïve dialectics based on intuitive reflection theory, as Lenin concludes in his analysis of the relation between The Science of Logic and Capital. In Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin comments “remarkably correct and profound” next to the following excerpt from Hegel: It is now seen that the so-called explanation and proof of the concrete element which is brought into Propositions is partly tautology and partly a confusion of the true relationship; partly, too, it is seen that this confusion served to disguise the trick of Cognition, which takes up the data of experience one-sidedly (the only manner in which it could reach its simple definitions and formulas), and does away with refutation from experience by proposing and taking as valid experience not in its concrete totality but as example, and only in that direction which is serviceable for the hypotheses and the theory. Concrete experience being thus subordinated to the presupposed determinations, the foundation of the theory is obscured, and is exhibited only from that side which is in conformity with the theory.297

Lenin adds to this discussion, “cf. the political economy of the bourgeoisie.”298 In other words, the major theoretical deficiency of the political economy of the bourgeoisie is that its propositions are premised upon “taking up the data of experience one-sidedly.”299 Capital, however, transcends this political economy. The tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge it achieves does not, fundamentally speaking, “take up the data of experience one-sidedly”300 nor cause “concrete experience to be thus subordinated to the presupposed determinations.”301 Hence, it is neither the sum-total of examples concerning capitalism nor a mere template with which to interpret capitalism but “proposes and takes from the concrete totality of experience,” which is also the “combination of many objects with 294 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 104. p. 141. 296 Ibid., p. 146. 297 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, pp. 209–210. 298 Ibid., p. 210. 299 Ibid. 300 Ibid. 301 Ibid. 295 Ibid.,

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different destinations” and the “unity of diverse elements” achieved by the “rational concrete.”302 (4) Advancing Dialectical Research Based on the Theoretical Consciousness of the “Tripartite Unity” In discussing the relationship between The Science of Logic and Capital, Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks presents a comprehensive exploration of dialectical theory that not only answers major theoretical questions raised or left unanswered by his predecessors but also proposes a series of new questions. These include the following: Why is dialectics the basis of Hegel’s and Marx’s theory of knowledge? What does it mean to say that logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge are the same? Is it impossible to understand Marx’s Capital without thoroughly studying Hegel’s Logic”? What does it mean that Hegel’s The Science of Logic has the least idealism and the most materialism? Why is intelligent idealism closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism? What does it mean to say that Hegel’s The Science of Logic encompasses the “germs” of dialectical and historical materialism? What does it mean to say that Marx took “everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further”? Why is dialectics “the expression of the essence of motion in the logic of concepts”? What does it mean to say that science is an “applied logic”? How do we summarize the history of thought “from the standpoint of the development and application of the general concepts and categories of logic”? Why does dialectics, as a principle of development, have to be both concept and cognition with objective significance? How do we ensure that Marxist dialectics in its rational form can become humankind’s universal and conscious mode of thought? If we generalize the questions above, we see that Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks examines two aspects of a fundamental question: First, how to understand the true meaning of Hegel’s The Science of Logic and achieve a theoretical consciousness of philosophical thinking, and second, how to understand his belief that Marx has “taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further.”303 Both questions reflect the tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge. Lenin believes that “half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!”304 due to a lack of understanding of “the essence of the matter.”305 As demonstrated by current research in Marxist philosophy, both in China and abroad, there is no consensus on the “the essence of the matter.”306 This remains an urgent theoretical issue that requires further exploration in contemporary dialectical research. Since dialectics is not understood based on the tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge, it departs from philosophy’s great basic question: the relation between thought and being. It thus becomes merely abstract—or the sum-total of examples. 302 Marx

[10, p. 293]. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 317. 304 Ibid., p. 180. 305 Ibid., p. 360. 306 Ibid. 303 Lenin,

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In summarizing the history of philosophy, Engels makes the following general statement: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being.”307 However, explanations for the great basic question of philosophy often decompose the question of the relation between thought and being into a ontological one of which is the first (i.e., the origin) or an epistemological one of whether there is identity (i.e., whether thought can know being), thus turning dialectics into a question unrelated to that of the relation between thought and being. Such approaches regard dialectics as a universal object theory concerned with nature, society, and thought. This not only fragments the unity of world outlook, epistemology, and methodology, it also turns dialectics into what Lenin criticizes in Philosophical Notebooks as the “sum-total of examples.”308 A direct consequence of regarding dialectics in this way is that it becomes a mere template that can be applied to all cases. Instead, dialectics is “a form of theoretical thought that rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.”309 It has a deep foundation in the history of cognition and concrete contents of thought. To take dialectics as the sum-total of examples is to remove it from the history of thought and its achievements, i.e., from the deep foundation of the history of cognition and concrete contents of thought, and regard it as a method for use, which Engels criticizes as “a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright”310 and “a list of words and phrases whose only purpose was to turn up at the right moment, when ideas and positive knowledge were lacking.”311 Thus, there are two extremes misinterpretations of dialectics: regarding dialectics as the sum-total of examples implies that dialectics is a method for use above the sum-total of examples‘ while regarding dialectics as a method for use implies that dialectics will depend on the sum-total of examples from nature, society, and thought to explain the universality of the unity of opposites, transformation of quantity into quality, and negation of negation. These two extremes thus meet, and both have deep roots in dialectics’ departure from the question of the relation between thought and being or dialectics’ unity with epistemology and logic. In addition, when dialectics is not understood based on the tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge, then dialectical relations depart from the content and form of cognition, i.e., from the principles of reflection and mobility of cognition. This turns Marxist epistemology into the intuitive reflection theory of old materialism. Marx identifies the chief defect of all previous materialism as the fact that “things, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation,”312 while Engels sees it as the fact that “this premise,” i.e., “the harmony 307 Engels

[4, p. 20]. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 357. 309 Marx and Engels [17, p. 491]. 310 Marx and Engels [19, p. 472]. 311 Ibid. 312 Marx and Engels [61, p. 3]. 308 Lenin,

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of thought and being,” is investigated “only as regards content.”313 . In contrast to previous materialist theories, Marx argues that “in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by idealism,”314 while Engels states, “It was modern idealistic, but at the same time dialectical philosophy, and especially Hegel, which for the first time investigated it also as regards form,”315 i.e. the premise of the harmony of thought and being. Likewise, when reading Hegel’s The Science of Logic and Marx’s and Engel’s critique of all previous materialism’s shortcomings, Lenin refers to old materialism as “stupid materialism” and calls dialectical idealism “intelligent idealism.” He concludes that “intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism.”316 According to the arguments above, Marxist epistemology must be understood based on intelligent materialism. However, due to a lack of understanding regarding the intelligent idealism of the tripartite unity of dialectics, epistemology, and logic in Hegel’s The Science of Logic, many revert the Marxist intelligent materialism to “stupid materialism” and reduce the Marxist mobile reflection theory to the intuitive reflection theory of old materialism. This manifests both as the “inability to apply dialectics to the theory of reflection, to the process and development of knowledge”317 and as the misunderstanding that “dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general,”318 “that there is a dialectics of concepts and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance,”319 or that “the question is not whether there is movement, but how to express it in the logic of concepts.”320 Such approaches cannot subjectively conceive of things, reality, and sensuousness, and are thus fundamentally unable to understand active epistemology. At the same time, such approaches reduce Marx’s active reflection theory to the intuitive reflection theory of previous materialism, thus reducing Marxist dialectics to naïve dialectics. They regard dialectics as an abstract method, the sum-total of examples. This implies that the inability to achieve the tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge will not only lead to the meeting of the two extreme misunderstandings, but also to the dual reduction of Marxist epistemology to intuitive reflection theory, and Marxist dialectics to naïve dialectics. When dialectics is not understood using this tripartite unity, it departs from the principle of unity of the harmony of thought and being in its treatment of the principle of development, thereby vulgarizing the dialectics of the doctrine of development. Dialectics is the doctrine of development. Philosophical theories before Marxism consist of two types of one-sided doctrines of development. The first is old materialism, which describes change on the empirical and representational level but cannot 313 Marx

and Engels [33, p. 544]. and Engels [64, p. 3]. 315 Marx and Engels [17, p. 545]. 316 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 274. 317 Ibid., p. 360. 318 Ibid. 319 Ibid., p. 254. 320 Ibid. 314 Marx

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express the essence of motion in the logic of concepts (hence, it can only achieve naïve dialectics). The second is idealism, which explains the dialectical essence of thought and movement of concepts on the level of thoughts and concepts (hence, it can only achieve the dialectics of the self-movement and self-cognition of impersonal reason). This dialectic is both the conscious and mystical form of dialectics, but not the rational form seen in Capital. The roots of these one-sided doctrines of development are found in the fact that old materialism and idealism investigate the harmony of thought and being only in regard to content or form, respectively. Old materialism views the harmony of thought and being only in regard to content: it describes change on the empirical and representational level but is unable to comprehend development based on an objective dialectics of concept and cognition. Idealism views the harmony of thought and being only in regard to form: it reveals the dialectical nature of thought and the dialectical movement of concepts on the level of thought and concepts, but is unable to comprehend the reality of development. Before Marxism, philosophy could only be one of these two one-sided doctrines; neither acknowledged the real foundation of the harmony of thought and being—human practical activity and its historical development. Lenin proposes that the “nodal point [of thought and being] = the practice of mankind and of human history.”321 In other words, the most essential and immediate basis of human thought is human practical activity. It is only through rational understanding of practical categories as the basic categories of dialectics, and reflection on the relation between thought and being from the internal contradictions of man’s practical activity and its historical development, that we gain a rational explanation of the negative unity of thought with being (i.e., unity in development and development in unity of thought and being). In human practical activity, being exists both as real objects reflected by thought and as the object of the purposive demand of thought. As real objects reflected by thought, being normalizes thought’s activity and contents and is modified by thought into logical categories and their movements, thereby becoming concrete. As the object of the purposive demand of thought, being is the real object changed by thought and the non-real existence that thought negates (man constructs an objective picture of the world for himself and is convinced of his own reality and the non-reality of being). Human practical activity is a historical process of unfolding in which thought, being, and their interrelation are developing rather than already established. Marx and Engels describe thought by saying, “It is in the measure that man has learned to change nature that his intelligence has increased.”322 In terms of being, man’s “sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and that of the state of society; and indeed … the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations.”323 Since the historical development of human practical activity alters thought

321 Lenin

[9, p. 278]. and Engels [33, p. 511]. 323 Marx and Engels [55, p. 59]. 322 Marx

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and being, it also affects the relationship between them, causing it to become increasingly richer and deeper. Because of this, it is necessary to understand unity through development and development through unity. If, like old materialism and idealism, thought, being, and their interrelation are abstract, if the historicity of the subject of thought is removed, and the unity of thought and being is regarded as the harmony of representation and object, or if the mobility of thought is expressed abstractly, and the unity of thought and being is regarded as the self-cognition of the determinations of thought, then how can we respond to the doctrine of development found in dialectical theory? The principles of development and unity are real content developed from unity in development and development in unity of thought and being, which are based on human practical activity and its historical development. They have achieved reality by criticizing the theory of practice concerning the relation between thought and being. Therefore, dialectics in its rational form can be seen as “the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form”324 and can be reached through Marx’s practical philosophical path. If we depart from the question of the relation between thought and being, and from understanding the theory of practice of philosophy’s great basic question, then dialectics’ doctrine of development is necessarily vulgarized. Dialectics is often not understood based on the tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge. Therefore dialectics, epistemology, and logic are viewed as three different domains. This is not merely a misinterpretation, but actually negates the tripartite unity between them. This so-called tripartite unity is often expressed concretely as follows. Dialectics, as the doctrine of the universal laws of nature, society, and thought, encompasses epistemology and logic. Epistemology, as the doctrine of how to unify thought and being, is included within dialectics and encompasses logic. Logic, as the doctrine of thought itself, is directly included within epistemology, which in turn is included in dialectics. In this explanatory model, dialectics, epistemology, and logic are theories of domains at three different levels, with sequentially nested relationships. Such a model differs drastically from Lenin’s tripartite unity. In Lenin’s view, the essence of the matter is whether it is possible to understand all philosophical questions from the basic question as generalized by Engels: the question of the relation between thought and being. Therefore, the so-called tripartite unity of dialectics, epistemology, and logic is based on the fact that they are one and the same: together they represent the theory concerning philosophy’s basic question. This tripartite unity can be expressed as follows: The laws of motion of thought consciously reflecting being, as in Marxist philosophy, are the accumulation of science’s cognitive results from the reflection of the world, which were constructed in the process of human advancement. Hence, they are “the sum-total, the conclusion of the History of knowledge of the world.”325 Therefore, in terms of its objective content and universal meaning, Marxist philosophy contains universal laws

324 Lenin 325 Lenin,

[65, p. 24]. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 93.

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concerning the development of nature, society, and thought (i.e. materialist dialectics). It investigates the laws of motion of thought consciously reflecting being, which are based on the rich interactions between the subject and object of cognition and practice, as well as their historical development. Hence, it provides human historical activities with a cognitive foundation. Therefore, it is the theory that addresses the identity laws of thought and being, i.e., the epistemology of idealistic dialectics. The Marxists laws of motions of thought consciously reflecting being are the summary of thought’s history and achievements, and the method by which thought consciously approaches being. Therefore, Marxist philosophy is a crucial tool by which humans come to know and modify the world, that is, the logic or methodology of materialist dialectics. Because logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge are the same, there are no sequentially nested relations based on the size of the domains. Since dialectics is often not understood based on this tripartite unity, Capital’s dialectics is often regarded as a narrative mode from the abstract to the concrete, thus causing it to become experiential, empirical, and acritical. Lenin bases his reading of The Science of Logic on Marxism, leading him to realize the tripartite unity of logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge. However, scholars often simplify Capital’s dialectics as a method for use; hence, they apply the epistemology of intuitive reflection theory when viewing relations between Capital’s economic categories and their objects, thereby regarding Capital as an acritical positivism. This mode indicates a lack of understanding of the critical hereditary relation between Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic, and the fact that logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge are one and the same. In the preface to the first edition of Capital, Marx points out, “In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.”326 Hence, the basis for the use of abstraction to investigate political economy is because “economic categories are only the theoretical expressions, the abstractions of the social relations of production.”327 This “force of abstraction” is not abstract thinking, but what Lenin elucidates in Philosophical Notebooks as “a dialectics of concept and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance”328 and the “application to a single science logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge,”329 which are one and the same. As Marx points out in the introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, if we start our research from the so-called premise of reality, i.e. the population, then the object of research will only be “a chaotic conception of the whole;” hence, it is only by “proceeding from the imaginary concrete to less and less complex abstractions” that we will ultimately arrive at “a rich aggregate of many conceptions and relations.330 In other words, it is only by commencing our investigation with abstract man that we can understand abstract humanity itself; only by starting from the various determinations 326 Marx

and Engels [47, p. 8]. and Engels [57, p. 165]. 328 Lenin, Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 254. 329 Ibid., p. 317. 330 ”Marx [10, pp. 292–293]. 327 Marx

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of man that we can form a concrete understanding of humanity; and only by presenting the concrete constituted by economic categories that we can form a rational concrete to comprehend man’s being. In Capital, Marx’s direct object was not labor itself, but the commodity created by labor. Capital reveals the duality of labor through the duality of commodity, and the duality of man’s existence through the duality of labor, thus revealing the relations between persons in the relations among things. Capital starts from the simplest conception, i.e. commodity, and uses “a dialectics of concept and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance”331 to comprehend the actual history, thereby using the dialectical development of economic categories to present the rich aggregate of the motion of capital. When dialectics is misunderstood in this way, the theoretical consciousness of philosophical thinking cannot be reached. Lenin’s dialectics of the tripartite unity thus becomes epistemological dialectics in its modern Western philosophical form. As the basic question of philosophy, the relation between thought and being is neither one philosophical question among many, nor one aspect among various aspects of philosophical questions, but rather the essence of philosophy. It is a question that determines philosophy’s special theoretical properties and determines philosophy as a basic mode by which humans comprehend the world. Conversely, a question only becomes a philosophical one when it is asked based on the relation of thought to being and implicitly reveals that relation. Questions that depart from these grounds to investigate nature, society, or thought are empirical and scientific rather than philosophical. This implies that it is only by achieving theoretical consciousness of the question of the relation between thought and being that theoretical consciousness of philosophical thinking can be reached. This is why theoreticians, including Plekhanov, regard dialectics as the theory of knowledge as the heart of philosophy; reduce Marxist epistemology to intuitive reflection theory; regard the tripartite unity of dialectics, epistemology, and logic as three levels of nested relationships; and experientialize and empiricize Capital, which “has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further.” The misunderstanding of philosophy’s theoretical nature leads to the inability to achieve theoretical consciousness of philosophical thinking. Because the question of the relation between thought and being is not understood based on philosophy’s theoretical characteristics, but rather from its historical forms, this basic question is often regarded with one specific historical form: modern Western philosophy. Philosophical theories concerning the question of the relation between thought and being, and the tripartite unity of dialectics, epistemology, and logic, are often regarded as modern Western epistemological dialectics—such views see this dialectics as outdated. This indicates that how we understand Marx’s Capital and Lenin’s dialectical thought not only requires in-depth exploration of the dialectics in The Science of Logic, Capital, and Philosophical Notebooks, but also the reinterpretation of the question of the relation between thought and being as philosophy’s great basic question. It is only by premising our understanding on the theoretical consciousness of philosophical thinking that we can advance Marxist dialectical research. 331 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 254.

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5.4 The Dialectics of Practical Wisdom In contemporary Chinese philosophical research, a profound understanding of dialectics as the theory of knowledge is possible through the reinterpretation of Mao ZeDong’s On Practice and On Contradiction. Many scholars believe that On Practice is concerned with epistemology, while On Contradiction addresses dialectics—and that the two include different domains, contents, and issues. However, this misinterprets the relation between epistemology and dialectics—as well as that between On Practice and On Contradiction. Both volumes address the theory of contradiction concerning the theory of practice; and the theory of practice concerning the theory of contradiction. In terms of theoretical nature, both include the epistemology of the theory of practice. In terms of theoretical content, both are dialectics of the theory of practice. In terms of origin, both demonstrate that dialectics is the theory of knowledge. In terms of significance, both include world outlooks and methodologies that aim to turn knowledge into wisdom, and therefore guide practice. Hence, the dialectics of practical wisdom or the practical wisdom of dialectics can be found in Mao’s On Practice and On Contradiction. (1) Truth from Facts: The Theoretical Purpose of On Practice and On Contradiction Marxist philosophy is not hidden in the ivory tower. As Engels said in the “Speech at the Grave of Karl Marx,” Marx was before all else a revolutionary. Similarly, Engels, Lenin, and Mao Ze-Dong are all revolutionaries, but they are also theoreticians. Their theories are vividly pertinent to reality and originate from theoretical responses to major real-world questions. Hence, when studying and interpreting On Practice and On Contradiction, it is necessary to comprehend them based on their applicability to reality. On Practice and On Contradiction were written to oppose subjectivism expressed as empiricism and dogmatism, and to establish the Marxist ideological line of seeking truth from facts. Both establish a Marxist style of study that connects theory with practice and examines Marxism within the context of China’s reality. Both volumes lay a solid philosophical foundation for addressing the question of ideological line. Only by comprehending this theoretical purpose can we gain a profound understanding of On Practice and On Contradiction.332 The ideology question, fundamentally speaking, is one of how to know and modify the world; and analyze and address issues. As Mao concisely states, it is the question of “seeking truth from facts.”333 The question of how to unify subject and object, combine theory and practice, and seek truth from facts are the shared theoretical purposes of On Practice and On Contradiction. In On Practice, Mao states:

332 For all citations from On Practice and On Contradiction, please refer to: Mao [66] and Collected

Works of Mao Ze-Dong: Volume I. People’s Publishing House, 1991. 333 Mao [67, p. 21].

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Idealism and mechanical materialism, opportunism and adventurism are all characterized by the breach between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies.334

Likewise, in On Contradiction, Mao states, “Our present study of philosophy should therefore have the eradication of dogmatic thinking as its main objective.”335 If we truly understand materialist dialectics, he continues, “we shall be able to demolish dogmatic ideas which are contrary to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and detrimental to our revolutionary cause, and our comrades with practical experience will be able to organize their experience into principles and avoid repeating empiricist errors.”336 In order to accomplish this, we must first address two major philosophical questions. First, we must explain the contradictory movement of cognition from the standpoint of practice, thus consciously achieving the unity of the subjective and objective, and theory and practice, based on basic laws of cognitive activities. Second, we must explain the world outlook and methodology of cognitive contradictions from the standpoint of practice, thus consciously achieving unity of the subjective and objective, and theory and practice, based on the mode and capacity of thought. On Practice is focused on answering the former, while On Contradiction addresses the latter. Both describe how to combine the subjective and the objective, theory with practice, and oppose various questions of subjectivism. It is only by grasping this theoretical purpose that we can understand On Practice and On Contradiction are based on the unity of epistemology and dialectics. The classification of On Practice and On Contradiction as epistemology and dialectics, respectively, stems from textbooks on Marxist philosophy, which often teach epistemology from the perspective of the former and dialectics from the perspective of the latter. Such texts tend to divide the narrative on Marxist philosophy into four major blocks: materialism, dialectics, epistemology, and historical materialism. This is a practice that needs to be carefully studied and improved. The consequence of this divided narrative is that people often mischaracterize these two volumes, as though On Practice and On Contradiction are the epistemology and dialectics referred to in textbooks. The logic of this inverted causality has led to a separation in the two volume’s theoretical purposes, nature, and content. A more complete understanding requires a break from this narrative framework. (2) Epistemology: The Theoretical Nature of On Practice and On Contradiction In 1964, during a conversation on the basic philosophy of Japanese physicist Sakata Shoichi, Mao stated that “philosophy is the theory of cognition.”337 This statement does not concern a specific question but represents Mao’s fundamental viewpoint 334 Mao

[66, p. 307]. [66, p. 311]. 336 Ibid., p. 346. 337 Zhou [68]. 335 Mao

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concerning philosophy’s theoretical nature. This can be best seen through Mao’s most representative works: On Practice and On Contradiction. The subtitle of On Practice is “On the Relation between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing.”338 The book focuses on the relation between practice and knowledge, specifically elucidating knowledge’s practical basis and movement process; how to acquire and test truth; and how to unify the subjective and objective and the historical and concrete. However, can the epistemology of On Practice be generalized into the idea that philosophy is the theory of cognition? In discussing this issue, the first task is to answer whether On Contradiction contains the theory of cognition—and in what sense. If On Contradiction is concerned with dialectics, then how is it also epistemology? Meticulous study of the work shows that it touches on the dialectics of how to adopt the viewpoint of contradiction to observe and analyze questions (the dialectics of overcoming the apriorism of idealism and the intuitive reflection theory of old materialism; the dialectics of active reflection; and the dialectics that regards the theory of practice as its foundation and practical activity as its content). Mao states, “This dialectical world outlook teaches us primarily how to observe and analyze the movement of opposites in different things and, on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for resolving contradictions.”339 This is both the starting point of On Contradiction and its focus. its dialectics is to discuss dialectics in an epistemological sense and based on the theory of practice. On Contradiction analyzes the universality and particularity of contradiction. However, Mao does not descriptively narrate this, but instead asks epistemological questions. He states: As regards the sequence in the movement of man’s knowledge, there is always a gradual growth from the knowledge of individual and particular things to the knowledge of things in general. Only after man knows the particular essence of many different things can he proceed to generalization and know the common essence of things.340 He continues: When man attains the knowledge of this common essence, he uses it as a guide and proceeds to study various concrete things which have not yet been studied, or studied thoroughly, and to discover the particular essence of each; only thus is he able to supplement, enrich and develop his knowledge of their common essence and prevent such knowledge from withering or petrifying.341

Based on the above quotes, Mao makes the following generalization concerning the laws of human cognition: “These are the two processes of cognition: one, from the particular to the general, and the other, from the general to the particular. Thus cognition always moves in cycles and (so long as scientific method is strictly adhered to) each cycle advances human knowledge a step higher and so makes it more and 338 Mao

[66, p. 295]. [66, p. 315]. 340 Ibid., p. 320. 341 Ibid., p. 321. 339 Mao

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more profound.”342 This law of cognition based on the relation between the particular and the general, as elucidated in On Contradiction, embodies the law of human cognition summarized in On Practice: “Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level.”343 Concerning the particularity of contradiction, On Contradiction highlights two questions: the principal contradiction and the contradictory aspects of the principal. With regards to the former, Mao stresses that “in studying any complex process in which there are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to finding its principal contradiction. Once this principal contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily solved.”344 In this regard, Mao points out, “There are thousands of scholars and men of action who do not understand it, and the result is that, lost in a fog, they are unable to get to the heart of a problem and naturally cannot find a way to resolve its contradictions.”345 Mao does not describe the principal contradiction in the common dialectical sense, but instead reveals the practical significance of grasping it in terms of epistemology and methodology. In terms of the latter question, Mao points out that “the nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position”346 and emphasizes that “when the principal aspect which has gained predominance changes, the nature of a thing changes accordingly.”347 The discourse concerning the contradictory aspects of the principal is mainly based on changes to the nature of things: “the supersession of the old by the new is a general, eternal and inviolable law of the universe.”348 Based on this, Mao explains the historical inevitability of capitalism being replaced by socialism, and old China by New China, and the revolutionary forces of China changing from small to large; weak to strong. As with the discourse on the principal contradiction, Mao does not provide a general explanation but instead reveals the significance of the contradictory aspects of the principal (in terms of objective knowledge and major real-life problems). To analyze contradiction’s universality and particularity, On Contradiction focuses on “the identity and struggle of the aspects of a contradiction.”349 Mao’s analysis starts from Lenin: Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical—under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another—why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.350 342 Ibid. 343 Mao

[66, p. 308]. p. 332.

344 Ibid., 345 Ibid. 346 Ibid.,

p. 333.

347 Ibid. 348 Ibid. 349 Ibid., 350 Ibid.

p. 337.

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As when analyzing the universality and particularity of contradiction, Mao’s analysis of contradiction’s identity and struggle focuses on how two contradictory parties can exist in mutual dependence and transform into one another. He examines the question of why the human mind must grasp these two contradictory parties as “living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.” Mao proposes, “The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other.”351 Based on this conclusion, he presents concrete analyses of real questions, including: “by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled,” “the landlord class owning the land is transformed into a class that has lost its land, while the peasants who once lost their land are transformed into small holders who have acquired land,” “war is transformed into peace,” and “peace is transformed into war.”352 In his analysis of contradiction’s struggle, Mao examines the place of antagonism in contradiction, proposing that “contradiction and struggle are universal and absolute, but the methods of resolving contradictions, that is, the forms of struggle, differ according to the differences in the nature of the contradictions.”353 He then examines the view of “contradictions between correct and incorrect ideas in the Communist Party”354 as an example to illustrate that the methods of resolving contradictions “differ according to the differences in the nature of the contradictions.”355 From beginning to end, On Contradiction is concerned with how to know and study contradictions, and how to treat and resolve them, which is also the topic of dialectics within epistemology, and the demonstration of dialectics within the theory of practice. On Contradiction thus includes a dialectics of epistemology and dialectics of practical wisdom. Mao’s statement that “dialectics is the theory of cognition” encompasses the profound ideological intensions of understanding dialectics from this perspective. (3) Dialectics: The Theoretical Content of On Practice and On Contradiction If On Contradiction is a discourse of dialectics in terms of epistemology, then On Practice is a discourse of epistemology with dialectics as its content. In this way, the two volumes represent the unity between the theoretical nature of epistemology and the theoretical content of dialectics, or more simply, between dialectics and epistemology. On Practice is concerned with epistemology of the dialectical relation of cognition, the dialectical movement of cognition, and that which overcomes the metaphysical mode of thought and applies the dialectical mode of thought. It takes dialectics as its content, applies dialectical thinking to analyze questions, and thus can be regarded as practical wisdom. 351 Mao

[66, p. 338]. pp. 338–340. 353 Ibid., p. 344. 354 Ibid. 355 Ibid. 352 Ibid.,

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The starting point of On Practice is the dialectical relation between knowledge and practice, knowing and doing. On Practice specifically analyzes the dialectical relations between perceptual and rational knowledge; direct and indirect experience; relative and absolute truth; and theory and practice, thereby revealing the laws of the dialectical movement of knowledge. If we depart from these dialectical relations, we will not be able to understand On Practice. To elaborate on Marxism’s practical outlook, Mao raises the following question: “How does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve practice?”356 The entirety of On Practice is built around the dialectical relation between knowledge and practice and regards the development of knowledge (i.e. the dialectical movement of knowledge) as its basic content. On Practice analyzes the dialectical relation between perceptual and rational knowledge based in practice, as well as the dialectical movement of knowledge that regards this dialectical relation as its content. Mao points out that, in the process of human practice, “man at first sees only the phenomenal side, the separate aspects, the external relations of things”357 ; this is the perceptual stage of cognition. However, he continues, “The real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive step by step at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws and of the internal relations between one process and another”358 ; this is the rational stage of cognition. Therefore, Mao writes, “Perception only solves the problem of phenomena; theory alone can solve the problem of essence.”359 . In further discussion, Mao generalizes the dialectical relation between perceptual and rational knowledge as follows: rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge, and perceptual knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge. The development of perceptual into rational knowledge is the first leap in the dialectical movement of cognition. In this discourse, Mao proposes two important categories: direct experience and indirect experience. Mao writes that “a man’s knowledge consists only of two parts, that which comes from direct experience and that which comes from indirect experience.”360 He continues, “All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. But one cannot have direct experience of everything; as a matter of fact, most of our knowledge comes from indirect experience, for example, all knowledge from past times and foreign lands.”361 This indirect experience includes common sense, i.e., “common experience,” but is primarily referring to scientific, abstract knowledge; in which “objective reality has been scientifically reflected.”362 In On Practice, the relation between direct and indirect experience is not simply that between individual and common experience but encompasses the relation between experience and 356 Mao

[66, p. 297].

357 Ibid. 358 Ibid.,

p. 298. p. 299. 360 Ibid., p. 300. 361 Ibid. 362 Ibid. 359 Ibid.,

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knowledge; experience and theory; and experience and science. Understanding the relation between direct and indirect experience not only deepens our understanding of the dialectical relation between perceptual and rational knowledge, but also our understanding of On Practice’s fundamental question: What is the dialectical relation between knowledge and practice? Practice is the source and purpose of knowledge. Mao states: Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world. … The active function of knowledge manifests itself not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but—and this is more important—it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice.363

The leap from knowledge to practice is important not merely because the purpose of knowledge is practice, but also because practice alone can serve as the criterion for testing the truth and advancing the development of knowledge. Mao writes, “The history of human knowledge tells us that the truth of many theories is incomplete and that this incompleteness is remedied through the test of practice. Many theories are erroneous and it is through the test of practice that their errors are corrected.”364 On Practice’s assertion that practice alone is the criterion for testing truth elucidates the dialectical relation between knowledge and practice, based on the deepening of knowledge and the development of truth. Mao says, “Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the truth.”365 This illustrates that truth is concrete, historical, and a process of discovery. On Practice elucidates the dialectical relation between relative and absolute truth. Mao states: Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man’s knowledge of a particular process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth.366 He continues: The development of an objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing away in human knowledge. As man’s practice which changes objective reality in accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programs, advances further and further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper. The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so is man’s cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the course of practice.367 363 Mao

[66, p. 304]. p. 305. 365 Ibid., p. 308. 366 Ibid., p. 307. 367 Mao [66, pp. 307–308]. 364 Ibid.,

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(4) Dialectics is the Theory of Knowledge: The Theoretical Origin of On Practice and On Contradiction The unity between the theoretical nature of epistemology and the theoretical content of dialectics in On Practice and On Contradiction is in the same vein as the philosophical ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In particular, Mao develops Lenin’s philosophical idea concerning the tripartite unity of dialectics, epistemology, and logic. “Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism”368 : this is the most important statement in Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks. It not only expresses Lenin’s fundamental understanding of philosophy, especially of Marxist philosophy, it also demonstrates his fundamental understanding of Marx’s and Engels’s Marxist philosophy. Engels describes Theses on Feuerbach, written by Marx in the spring of 1845, as “invaluable as the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world outlook.”369 In it, Marx critiques the intuitive reflection theory of old materialism, and examines the question of whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking. He proposes that the solution to all philosophical questions can be found “in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice,”370 and concludes that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”371 Marxist philosophy, which aims to change the world, is an active reflection of the unity between materialism and dialectics and is centered on the practical viewpoint. In terms of its theoretical nature, Marxist philosophy is epistemology concerned with the relation between the subject and object. The fundamental understanding of Marx and Engels is profound and consistent. First, Marx criticizes old materialism for viewing the question of the relation between thought and being “only in the form of the object, or of contemplation”372 ; this is precisely what Engels identifies as viewing the relation of thought and being “only as regards content.” Both Marx and Engels attribute the chief defect of old materialism to intuitive reflection theory. Second, Marx criticizes idealism for only abstractly addressing the active side, which Engels identifies as idealism viewing the relation of thought and being “only as regards form.” Both Marx and Engels regard idealism as abstract activeness. Finally, Marx believes that old materialism and idealism share the same roots: both depart from “sensuous human activity”373 when viewing the relation between thought and being. This is precisely what Engels identifies as departing from “men as participants in history” when solving the question of the relation between thought and being. Both Marx and Engels regard the fundamental problem 368 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 360. [4, p. 8]. 370 Marx and Engels [69, p. 5]. 371 Ibid. 372 Ibid., p. 3. 373 Marx and Engels [70, p. 3]. 369 Engels

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of old materialism and idealism as not understanding the decisive role of practice in cognition. This analysis indicates that Marx’s and Engels’s critique of old materialism and idealism stems from an epistemology that regards the question of the relation between thought and being as the basic question. Engels not only generalizes this as the “great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy,”374 but also profoundly reveals the substance of this question. Specifically, he argues, “the fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws … is the unconscious and unconditional premise for our theoretical thought.”375 Elucidating the dialectical relation between our subjective thought and the objective world is the fundamental task of epistemology and philosophy. Dialectics is the fundamental content of epistemology, and dialectics is the theory of knowledge. Thus, we can see that Lenin’s statement, “Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism”376 directly expounds on Marx’s and Engels’s fundamental philosophy. For Lenin, this statement is not isolated. Instead, it is his conclusion drawn from studying the history of philosophy, especially from the theoretical explorations in Hegel’s The Science of Logic and Marx’s Capital. It is based on extensive research and embodied by his belief in the tripartite unity of dialectics, epistemology, and logic. On Practice and On Contradiction frequently cite Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but most frequently rely on Lenin’s Conspectus of Hegel’s Book, The Science of Logic, and On the Question of Dialectics. This implies that Mao created On Practice and On Contradiction based on careful study of Lenin’s works. Mao suggests that On Contradiction is intended to “extend and present” the philosophical ideas elucidated in Lenin’s On the Question of Dialectics, and profoundly embody the basic idea that dialectics is the theory of knowledge. Therefore, our understanding of the unity of epistemology and dialectics in On Practice and On Contradiction depends not only on our understanding of these two works themselves, but also our understanding of the interrelation between Marxist epistemology and dialectics. (5) The Dialectics of Practical Wisdom: The True Meaning of On Practice and On Contradiction The unity of dialectics and epistemology in On Practice and On Contradiction regards practice as its core viewpoint and fundamental aim. They contain both dialectics of practical wisdom and the practical wisdom of dialectics. Practical wisdom is wisdom embodied in practice. It is distinct from theoretical wisdom and life wisdom, yet also inseparable from the two. Theoretical wisdom mainly refers to metaphysical wisdom that transcends practice, while life wisdom refers to common sense wisdom based on experience. Practical wisdom integrates 374 Engels

[4, p. 20]. and Engels [17, p. 544]. 376 Lenin [9, p. 360]. 375 Marx

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metaphysical wisdom with life wisdom, while also elevating life wisdom into hardearned metaphysical wisdom. If we borrow Mao’s views on literature and art, we can say that practical wisdom has life as its source but is also on a higher plane than life wisdom. On Practice and On Contradiction contain practical wisdom with life as its source. The purpose of these two works is to oppose subjectivism manifested as dogmatism and empiricism. The books’ content thus uses the analysis of dogmatism and empiricism to elucidate the theory of practice, which is the unity of knowledge and practice, and the theory of contradiction, which is the unity of opposites. Both are infused with concrete analysis on life and practice, whether describing the basic role of practice in knowledge and the dialectical movement of practice-based knowledge or the contradictory viewpoints in knowledge. On Practice and On Contradiction, as practical wisdom, are on a higher plane than life wisdom. In other words, their contradiction analysis of knowledge not only sublimates a series of philosophical categories, but also endows these categories with unique philosophical intensions: Perceptual and rational knowledge; direct and indirect experience; relative and absolute truth; theory and practice; internal and external causes; generality and individuality; principal and secondary contradiction; and the principal and secondary aspect of a contradiction… In On Practice and On Contradiction, these basic categories are the vivid and lively intensions of practice, and the profound intensions of theory. Practical wisdom that has life as its source but is on a higher plane than life wisdom instills brilliant colors to the greyness of theory while also imbuing weight to the naivete of reality. Thus, reality enlivens theory, while theory enlightens reality. Mao’s unique contribution to dialectics is his realization of the dialectical mode of thought as practical wisdom. This has three major significances. First, in terms of world outlook, it elucidates a dialectical mode of thought and methodology, thus achieving unity of the two. Second, in terms of theory of practice, it summarizes dialectical wisdom that regards contradiction analysis as its core, thus enabling dialectics to become a real force in guiding action. Third, in terms of Sinicization, “contemporarization,” and popularization, it constructs a Marxist dialectical theory with Chinese characteristics, thereby enriching and developing Marxist dialectics with the long history of Chinese civilization (and innovative practices in Chinese experience).

6 The Intellectual Quintessence of the Age and the Living Soul of Civilization The social self-consciousness of philosophy as meaning is a theory constructed by philosophers that normalizes how we understand and affect the interrelation between humanity and the world. All true philosophy is the comprehension of humankind’s self-consciousness concerning this interrelation in its own age. It is imbued with

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unique explanatory principles and conceptual frameworks philosophers apply to explain the interrelation. All philosophies are imprinted by the value ideas, aesthetic consciousness, and ultimate concerns philosophers adopt to contemplate this relation. Therefore, every true philosophical theory is what Hegel describes as “its time apprehended in thoughts”377 and what Marx calls the “intellectual quintessence of its time.”378

6.1 The Epochality and Humanity of Philosophy There are many different explanations of the spirit of the age and its quintessence. Nevertheless, if we consider this issue based on the historical development of human life activity and the created life-world, it is clear that age refers to a stage of social development with a relative, qualitative difference in human life activity and the created life-world. The spirit of the age, meanwhile, represents the meaning of the lifeworld, and has specific historical intensions that mark different stages of social development. The intellectual quintessence of the age, finally, is the social selfconsciousness of the meaning of the age, and the theoretical comprehension of the epochal life-world’s meaning. In general, the spirit of any age exists as three basic modes: (1) the meaning of the life-world with epochal intensions, created using the various modes by which humans comprehend the world (this mainly includes the scientific, artistic, and ethical spirit, etc.).; (2) the individual self-consciousness of the universal meaning of the age, i.e., mainstream individual self-consciousness (such as universal social psychology, etc.); and (3) the social self-consciousness of the theoretical meaning of the age (i.e., philosophical theories). The philosophical spirit of each age is not merely the spirit of the age, but also its quintessence. The philosophical spirit is both the enlightenment that focuses the meaning of the life-world with its epochal intension created by the various modes by which humans comprehend the world, and the theoretical sublimation of the individual self-consciousness toward the universal meaning of the age. In other words, among the above three modes, philosophy, as the social self-consciousness of meaning, most profoundly manifests the spirit of each age. Hence, it is the intellectual quintessence of its time. Second, philosophy as the mode of thought for human reflection critically reflects on the spirit of the age based on social self-consciousness, creatively shaping and guiding it, and thus also serving as the living soul of culture. When interpreting philosophy, people often cite Marx’s statement that “every true philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its time”379 to highlight philosophy’s epochality, and to criticize super-epochal philosophical fantasies or delusions. In particular, they direct their criticisms toward Hegel’s philosophy as the culmination 377 Hegel 378 Marx 379 Ibid.

[20, p. 19]. and Engels [21, p. 195].

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of traditional philosophy and believe that its fundamental defect lies with its view of philosophy as super-historical and reflecting ultimate truth—thereby losing the basis for existing beyond its own time. This fundamentally negates the contemporariness of traditional philosophy. There is no doubt this criticism is valid. The problem lies with the fact that such criticisms must consider the following questions: First, we often stress that Marxism is universal truth; that Marxist philosophy reveals and provides humankind with universal laws of the development of nature, society, and thought; and that these laws do not change with the development of human history. Is Marxist philosophy, therefore, super-epochal and super-historical? Second, Marxist philosophy emerged half a century ago. Hence, when we argue for the contemporariness of Marxist philosophy today, are we also implicitly acknowledging its super-epochal nature? Third, if Marxist philosophy, which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, has super-epochal characteristics, then why does the traditional philosophy (including Hegelian philosophy) that came before it (as well as modern Western philosophy that emerged at the same time), not possess super-epochal characteristics? Finally, if traditional philosophy prior to Marx does not possess super-epochal characteristics, then why is ancient Greek philosophy from Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, or classical German philosophy from Kant and Hegel, still recognized by contemporary scholars—even to the extent that many contemporary philosophers have advocated a “return to Kant” or “return to Greece?” In my view, such dilemmas result from an absolute stress on philosophy’s epochality, or historicity. Such an approach causes us to deny philosophy’s humanity, or super-epochality. It should be noted that any philosopher’s statement has a specific background and special pertinence; hence, it will always highlight a specific aspect of one question. As Mao says, “Proper limits have to be exceeded in order to right a wrong, or else the wrong cannot be righted.”380 In the leading article of No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung, Marx asks, “ought philosophy to discuss religious matters also in newspaper articles.” He then directly targets German philosophy, which he says “has an urge for isolation, for systematic seclusion, for dispassionate self-examination,” especially in contrast with “the quick-witted and alive-to-events newspapers.” He proposes that “philosophy does not exist outside the world” and that “every true philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its time,”381 which strongly emphasizes its epochality. Marx directly states: The time must come when philosophy not only internally by its content, but also externally through its form, comes into contact and interaction with the real world of its day. Philosophy then ceases to be a particular system in relation to other particular systems, it becomes philosophy in general in relation to the world, it becomes the philosophy of the contemporary world.382

380 Mao

[71, p. 29]. and Engels. Collected Works, Volume 1: Marx: The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung, p. 195. 382 Ibid. 381 Marx

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Marx believes that such a philosophy is “the living soul of culture” and has become “worldly.”383 Marx thus emphasizes both philosophy’s epochality and humanity. Arguments concerning the contemporariness of Marxist philosophy often focus on the fact that we are currently living in an era shaped by Marxist philosophy; that is, we are contemporaneous with Marx. However, if we consider this argument more carefully, we find it lacking. First, the twentieth century was a time of great upheaval in human history, with unprecedented revolutions in civilization, mode of existence, and ideologies. Hence, calling it a new age in human history is not an exaggeration. Second, if the criteria for dividing ages is the substitution of the natural economy with a market economy, and traditional society with modern society (thereby implying that we are contemporaneous with Marx), then we cannot explain why modern Western philosophy is not also contemporaneous—especially classical German philosophy as represented by Kant and Hegel. Finally, if we divide the ages based merely on time, are contemporary Western philosophers more contemporaneous than Marx? Thus, the question once again returns to our understanding of Marxist philosophy’s contemporariness. In my view, we cannot depart from its epochality to view its humanity, nor vice versa. The humanity of philosophy implicitly contains its epochality, and the epochality of philosophy is the historical answer to the question of its humanity. Therefore, the contemporariness of Marxist philosophy lies with its deep-rooted, weighty, and profound humanity. Although it is just one of several basic modes by which humans comprehend the world, philosophy is distinct from myth, religion, art, ethics, and science. It regards human existence, and the relation between man and the created world, as the object of its reflection. Despite the differences in object and methods of study, the conflicts between different schools, and revisions in theoretical forms, philosophy throughout the ages has always been man’s reflection upon himself: man is the mystery of philosophy. This is the humanity of philosophical questions that constitutes the superepochal contemporariness of true philosophy. As human self-consciousness in theoretical form, all true philosophy theoretically characterizes man’s understanding of himself, and his self-consciousness concerning his relation with the world. Hence, all true philosophy should possess super-epochal humanity, or the contemporariness of humankind’s self-understanding. For example, the philosophical clash between materialism and idealism that pervades the entire history of philosophy characterizes humankind’s self-consciousness concerning its origin from (and transcendence of) nature. This philosophical clash possesses undeniable contemporariness, while any materialist or idealist philosophy also manifests contemporariness in the deliberation of man’s paradoxical existence. Within the history of philosophy, humanity never exists as an abstract question of man—quite the opposite: it is always presented as an epochal topic with particular intensions. Therefore, the contemporariness of philosophy based on the question of humanity is also determined by the theoretical consciousness of every philosophy in every age for the philosophical topics of its own age.

383 Ibid.

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In the introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right,’ Marx makes the following generalization concerning the history of philosophy: “It is above all the task of philosophy, which is in service of history, to unmask human self-alienation in its secular forms, once its sacred form has been unmasked. Thus, the critique of heaven is transformed into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, the critique of theology into the critique of politics.”384 This generalization reveals the three major processes all Western philosophy has undergone: the premodern “human self-alienation in the sacred form,” which is also the philosophy of forming and ascertaining the ontology of God; the modern unmasking of this “human self-alienation in the sacred form,” or the philosophy of the humanization of God involving God’s naturalization, materialization, and spiritualization; and the contemporary unmasking of “human self-alienation in its secular forms,” or the contemporary philosophy that regards the self-critique of human reason as its basic content and the critique of the earth, law, and politics as its main object. The establishment of the sacred form, unmasking of the sacred form, and unmasking of secular forms are completely different philosophical tasks that constitute entirely different philosophical theories, demonstrating philosophy’s inescapable epochality. Even Hegel is aware of such epochality, stating: It is just as foolish to imagine that any philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as that an individual can overleap his own time or leap over Rhodes. If his theory does indeed transcend his own time, if it builds itself a world as it ought to be, then it certainly has an existence, but only within his opinions—a pliant medium in which the imagination can construct anything it pleases.385

However, Hegel is equally aware of the self-negation of epochal philosophy, using the life cycle of a plant as an example. He writes that “the bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead.”386 The bud nurtures the blossom, while the blossom nurtures the fruit. The bursting forth of the blossom negates the bud, while the emergence of the fruit negates the blossom. However, “these forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.387 This process of negation is precisely the affirmation of previous existence in its new form and content. By viewing the history of philosophy in this manner, it becomes no longer a process of fruitless negation, but one of sublation and bearing fruit. In this sense, the history of philosophy is also the development of philosophy, and the history of answering humanity’s questions through epochal topics and content. 384 Marx

[18, p. 132]. [72, pp. 21–22]. 386 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 2. 387 Ibid. 385 Hegel

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Although the three philosophical tasks differ, they contain a common philosophical thought concerning humanity and the search for what grounds human existence. Any philosophical thought that encompasses true meaning cannot escape from the question of humanity: the relation of criterion and choice; subject and object; sensuousness and reason; individuality and generality; I and We; ideality and reality; thought and being; man and the world, etc. If we borrow from my previous generalization of traditional and modern philosophy, then traditional philosophy is essentially the theoretical characterization of man’s ravages of essentialism caused by the unbearable weight of the criterion for life without choice, whereas modern philosophy is the theoretical characterization of man’s existential anguish caused by the unbearable lightness of life with a weakened criterion for choice. Therefore, a philosophy with more profound epochal intensions will have greater super-epochal humanistic value or contemporariness. In my view, it is because Marx profoundly understands the humanity of philosophical questions and epochal topics of philosophy’s humanistic questions that his philosophy possesses such astute contemporariness. Unlike many modern Western philosophers who emptily criticize the popular logicism or depravity of reason of Hegelian philosophy, Marx adopts historical materialism to keenly point out the relation between this philosophy of impersonal reason and human survival since modern times and reveal Hegel’s super-epochal intensions. Marx proposes that Hegel’s impersonal reason expresses that the most realistic state of human survival is the most abstract form. He argues, “individuals are now ruled by abstractions whereas previously they were dependent on one another. … Yet the abstraction or idea is nothing but the theoretical expression of those material relationships which dominate the individuals.”388 This state of human survival ruled by abstractions is one of man’s independence in the market economy built on dependence mediated by things. Is this not the unity of humanity and epochality in Hegelian philosophy? Is not the fundamental limitation of Hegelian philosophy its expression of the epochality of human survival, yet its inability to propose a super-epochal philosophical theory? Does this not imply that if we depart from deep-seated humanity and fall into current epochality, we lose the contemporariness of philosophy? Unlike Hegelian philosophy, the vitality of Marxist philosophy does not merely lie with Marx’s profound revelation of mankind’s state of the times ruled by abstractions, but also in its description of material relationships that constitute this state of the times, i.e., the alienation of man’s independence and individuality into those of capital (things). Based on this, Marx proposes a super-epochal historical task: the liberation of man from the universal domination of things, and the transformation of capital’s independence and individuality into humanity’s. This epochal philosophy originates from and yet transcends the times in which Marx lives, liberating all humankind and realizing the free development of all. I believe that Marx’s metaphor of every true philosophy as “the intellectual quintessence of its time” and “the living soul of culture”389 offers us two important ideas. First, it perceptively demonstrates the indivisible unity of philosophy’s 388 Marx 389 Marx

and Engels [59, p. 101]. and Engels [45, p. 195].

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humanity and epochality: the more deeply-rooted a philosophy is in its epoch, the more profound its humanity, and the more likely it will become the intellectual quintessence of its time (and the greater its super-epochal contemporariness). Second, as the intellectual quintessence of its time and the living soul of culture, philosophy does not merely reflect the spirit of the age but must also shape it by possessing both epochality and super-epochality. Fundamentally speaking, does not the contemporariness of Marxist philosophy lie with its unity of epochality and super-epochality? If so, we should understand the contemporariness of Marxist philosophy based on the unity between the epochality and humanity of philosophy, and contemporariness of traditional philosophy. Individuals cannot directly ask philosophical questions of humanity; people often regard philosophical questions as common sense or scientific ones, which leads to their dilution. The contemporariness of traditional philosophy is dependent on philosophers’ use of independent philosophical thoughts to express genuine philosophical questions of humanity. Martin Heidegger discusses philosophical questions from two angles. First, he addresses why philosophical questions are the first in rank; that is, why they are always the broadest, deepest, and most ordinary questions.390 Second, he explains why philosophical questions are distinctive and “have no direct resonance in everydayness.”391 He proposes that “all essential questioning in philosophy necessarily remains untimely”392 and continues to say “this is because philosophy either projects far beyond its own time or else binds its time back to this timer’s earlier and inceptive past”.393 Hence, “not only does not allow itself to be made timely but, on the contrary, imposes its measures on the times.”394 Based on this, Heidegger proposes that “philosophy is essentially untimely”395 and “whenever a philosophy becomes fashion, either there is no actual philosophy or else philosophy is misinterpreted and, according to some intentions alien to it, misused for the needs of the day.”396 Thus, in Heidegger’s view, this untimely, super-temporal philosophy has “power in the rightful sense”397 and “can stand in the innermost harmony with the authentic happening in the history of a people … it can even be its prelude … what is untimely will have its own times.”398 Therefore, Heidegger proposes, “philosophy never makes things easier, but only more difficult.”399 He points out, “The burdening of historical Dasein, and thereby at bottom of Being itself, is rather the genuine sense of what philosophy

390 Heidegger 391 Ibid.,

p. 9.

392 Ibid. 393 Ibid.,

p. 9.

394 Ibid. 395 Ibid. 396 Ibid. 397 Ibid. 398 Ibid. 399 Ibid.,

p.12.

[8, p. 2].

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can achieve. Burdening gives back to things, to beings, their weight (Being).”400 He continues, “Burdening is one of the essential and fundamental conditions for the arising of everything great, among which we include above all else the fate of a historical people and its works.”401 Therefore, the conclusion at which Heidegger arrives is: “Philosophizing, we can now say, is extra-ordinary questioning about the extra-ordinary.”402 It should be noted that Heidegger’s discourse is not intended to be mystifying but is his genuine experience of philosophy. Philosophy, as human self-consciousness in theoretical form, is both the story of humankind told by philosophers in their own names, and philosophers’ personal stories told in the name of humankind. Philosophers’ personal rational speculations and life experiences fuse together with the whole of human civilization and thought within philosophical theories through “theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements”403 (Engels). These theories manifest as classic works that constitute the history and tradition of philosophy. The more original the philosophy, the more profoundly it can characterize human self-consciousness concerning its own existence, and the more it possesses super-epochal contemporariness. Since philosophy is human self-consciousness in theoretical form, philosophers’ self-consciousness concerning human existence, and their unique understanding of questions of humanity, not only encompass their personal speculations and experiences, but also reflect the rational speculation of life experiences of an entire people. This is what Feng You-Lan calls the “the more national, the more world.”404 In a paper written during the last moments of his life, titled “The future development of the Chinese people requires its own philosophical theory,” Professor Gao Qing-Hai proposes, “The life course, survival fate and living situation of the Chinese people are ingrained with our particularities; only we ourselves will have the deepest experience of our troubles and hopes, suffering and pursuit, obstacles and dreams. These are difficult for Westerners to comprehend.” He continues: Philosophy marks the height and depth that a people has achieved in its own selfconsciousness and embodies its level of mental development and maturity. … For a society and a nation to stand up … the key is to first stand up in its thoughts; a nation that cannot stand up in its thoughts … will not truly become a nation that decides its own fate. … [Therefore, we] should shift the main focus of philosophical research to the creation of contemporary Chinese philosophical theories that belong to China.405

Thus, to think about traditional philosophy based on the revival of the Chinese people is philosophical thinking with contemporary significance.

400 Ibid. 401 Ibid. 402 Heidegger

[8, p. 12, 14]. and Engels [17, p. 491]. 404 Feng [40, pp. 438–439]. 405 Gao [73]. 403 Marx

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6.2 Apprehension and Reflection of Philosophical Evolution To understand that philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its time requires reflection on its historical evolution. There are three perspectives to consider: the historical evolution of the basic question of philosophy; the historical change in mankind’s mode of existence; and the historical process of the philosophical pursuit of the sublime. First, regarding a reflection on philosophy based on the historical evolution of its basic question (that of the relation between thought and being, Engels proposes that “the great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being”406 and follows this with separate discussions on the question—in ancient times, the Middle Ages, and the modern era. Engels suggests that in early times, men have “been driven to reflect about the relation between this soul and the outside world,”407 . which gave rise to theories of immortality. Therefore, “the question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature—the paramount question of the whole of philosophy— has, not less than religion, its roots in the narrow-minded and ignorant notions of savagery.”408 . During the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, Engels says, the basic question of philosophy shifted to, “Did God create the world or has the world been in existence eternally?”409 Engels then shifts to discussing modern philosophy and its basic question, noting that during this period the question of the relation between thought and being “could for the first time be put forward in its whole acuteness, could achieve its full significance, only after European society had awakened from the long hibernation of the Christian Middle Ages.”410 It is generally believed that there are two major turns in the developmental history of Western philosophy: the epistemological turn from ancient to modern philosophy, and the practical or linguistic turn from modern to contemporary philosophy. Both have transformed understanding of the relation between thought and being. Contemporary philosopher of science Karl Popper once proposed what he called the three worlds theory. He called the physical, natural world “World 1,” the world of human spirit “World 2,” and the world composed of language and culture “World 3.” Such classifications help us explain the essential characteristics of ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophy. The first departs from the relation of World 2 with World 1, i.e., the relation of thought and being, and naively questions World 1 (being). Modern philosophy, meanwhile, also starts from the relation between World 2 and World 1 but uses this relation to explore the question of the relation between the two. Finally, contemporary philosophy uses World 3 to explore the relation between Worlds 1 and 2: it uses language and culture to explore the relation of thought and being. 406 Engels

[4].

407 Ibid. 408 Ibid., 409 Ibid. 410 Ibid.

p. 21.

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Ancient philosophy involves epistemological reflection removed from human consciousness and its interrelation with the world. Thus, it naively seeks unity of the world based on the object world itself and directly asserts the world itself without being conscious of the question of the relation of thought and being that is implicitly contained in this assertion. Therefore, ancient philosophy has yet to consciously ask the basic question of philosophy—and instead directly seeks the world itself. Modern philosophy, meanwhile, is known as the epistemological turn, because it starts from reflection on human consciousness and its interrelation with the world and seeks unity between the two in the relation between thought and being. In this epistemological reflection, the question of the relation between thought and being achieves full significance. From the late 18th to early nineteenth century, classical German philosophy further developed this epistemological turn. There was an increased focus on logical reflection about the relation between thought and being on the level of the laws of concepts’ dialectical movements. Therefore, modern philosophy consciously asks the basic question of philosophy, seeking unity between the laws of being and thought. Finally, contemporary philosophy is known as the practical or linguistic turn, because it transcends the binary opposition of the subjective and objective in the modern epistemological turn, instead starting from the foundation (practice) or cultural medium (language) of the unity between thought and being to answer the question of the relation between thought and being. Marx’s practical turn uses man’s mode of existence—practical activity and its historical development—as the basis for resolving the question of the relation between thought and being; humanity and the world. This linguistic turn in contemporary Western philosophy uses the reservoir of human history and culture—language—as its starting point. Therefore, contemporary philosophy uses human historical existence to answer the basic question of philosophy. It fundamentally differs from traditional philosophy (including ancient and modern philosophy) in that the latter adopts super-historical means to resolve philosophical questions, whereas the former adopts historical means to ask and answer philosophical questions. The historical transformation of these philosophical forms achieved developments in both the mode of questioning and its theoretical intensions. Ancient philosophy asks the question concerning the unity of all things, implying that humankind is attempting to ascertain the highest scaffolding for the meaning of human life through unified being, but has yet to reflect upon the meaning of human life based on the relation of thought with being. Such a philosophy characterizes the process of mankind moving from being in-itself to for-itself . Modern philosophy asks the question concerning the unity of consciousness, implying that humanity uses the cognition of reflection to seek the meaning of human life and super-historical (i.e., abstract) concepts to view the meaning of existence. Such a philosophy characterizes humanity’s self-consciousness as ruled by abstractions. Finally, contemporary philosophy examines the unity of practice and science, language, culture, etc., implying that humanity uses historical (i.e., real) concepts to view the meaning of existence, and indicating humanity’s conflict and crisis of meaning due to multiculturalism. Such

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a philosophy characterizes humanity’s self-consciousness as the mutual integration of theoretical and practical reason. The second philosophical perspective reflects on the historical forms of human existence. Philosophy is human self-consciousness in theoretical form; hence, the historical evolution of its theoretical forms is directly determined by historical changes in human self-consciousness concerning its own existence. In turn, historical changes in self-consciousness concerning its own existence are determined by the transformation of historical forms of human existence. Therefore, the history of philosophy is the history of human development in its theoretical form; the philosophy of every age is “its time apprehended in thoughts”411 and “the intellectual quintessence of its time.”412 Concerning the historical form of human existence, Marx adopts a macroscopic view of history and makes the following generalization: Relationships of personal dependence are the first forms of society, in which human productivity develops only to a limited extent and at isolated points. Personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things is the second great form, and only in it is a system of general social exchange of matter, a system of universal relations, universal requirements and universal capacities, formed. Free individuality, based on the universal development of the individuals and the subordination of their communal, social productivity, which is their social possession, is the third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third.413

In general, the three major historical forms of human existence are personally dependent relationships; personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things; and free individuality based on individuals’ universal development. In the first historical form—personally dependent relationships—individuals are attached to groups, do not have independence, and are “an appurtenance of a particular, limited aggregation of human beings.”414 In the second, individuals are freed from personally dependent relationships and gain independence, but only based upon dependence mediated by things. In other words, humans are dependent on and ruled by things; hence, relations among people are restricted by relations among things. It is only by transcending this relation that we achieve “free individuality, based on the universal development of the individuals and the subordination of their communal, social productivity, which is their social possession.”415 These historical forms of human existence reflect the historical determinateness of the mode of human existence. Such historical determinateness manifests as the natural economy, market economy, and product economy, which are based on highly-developed social productivity. The so-called natural economy reflects man’s mode of existence as personally dependent under circumstances of low productivity. Within a natural economy, “human productivity develops only to a limited extent 411 Hegel,

Philosophy of Right, p. 19. and Engels [21, p. 195]. 413 Marx and Engels [59, p. 95]. 414 Ibid., p. 17. 415 Ibid., p. 95. 412 Marx

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and at isolated points.”416 Individuals’ mutual dependence is caused by low levels of productivity; hence, the natural economy is characterized by the trinity of economic asceticism, cultural obscurantism, and political despotism. The former requires the two latter; thus, man’s mode of existence in the natural economy is, in essence, that of mutual dependence. According to Marx, the market economy, which transcends the natural economy, transforms man’s mode of existence from mutual dependence to personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things. He proposes that “only in [this mode of existence] is a system of general social exchange of matter, a system of universal relations, universal requirements and universal capacities, formed.”417 In comparison to the natural economy, the market economy can be generalized by the rejection of asceticism and demand for happiness in economic life; the rejection of obscurantism and the demand for rational freedom in cultural life; and the rejection of despotism and the demand for natural rights in political life. The theoretical expressions of these demands constitute the well-known philosophical propositions “I desire, therefore I exist” (the demand for happiness); “I think, therefore I am” (the demand for rational freedom); and “I was born a human” (the demand for natural rights). If we delve deeper into the market economy from the perspective of humanity’s mode of thought, value ideas, mode of behavior, and other modes of existence, then we can reach a more substantive generalization. Specifically, the market economy is characterized by the value attitude of utilitarianism; the mode of thought of instrumental reason; and the social system of democracy and the legal system. The market economy shapes all social life according to its own demands, thereby shaping a new mode of existence for humanity. Marx offers a simple and astute generalization of this phenomenon: “personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things.”418 This reveals the duality of the market economy and its adaptive mode of existence. On the one hand, compared to the natural economy, the market economy causes man’s mode of existence to transform from mutual dependence to personal independence. On the other hand, this independence can only be based upon dependence mediated by things. It is precisely due to this duality, and its adaptive mode of existence, that Marx affirms the vast historical progressiveness of the market economy (compared to the natural economy) and deeply exposed the market economy’s internal contradictions. He proposes a third state of human existence: “Free individuality, based on the universal development of the individuals and the subordination of their communal, social productivity, which is their possession.”419 The transition from the natural economy to the market economy involves the modernization of human society: the market economy is inseparable from modernization. Therefore, in order to understand the duality of the market economy, we must first apprehend modernization. Modernization is an unprecedented and rapidly 416 Ibid. 417 Ibid. 418 Marx 419 Ibid.

and Engels [59, p. 95].

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developing humanization of nature—the process of conquering nature using modern science and technology. It is also the unprecedented and rapid socialization of individuals—the process of realizing human social relations through the principle of equivalent exchange. Therefore, modernization highlights two sharp contradictions: that between rapid scientific development and increasingly serious global problems, and that between the modernization of man’s mode of survival and man’s materialization or alienation. The unparalleled humanization of nature achieved by modernization has created unprecedented material wealth. However, it has also led to global problems, including population expansion, environmental pollution, ecological imbalances, food shortages, energy crises, and the threat of nuclear war. The personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things achieved by the market economy upholds the subjectivity and independence of individuals, thus enhancing their subjective selfconsciousness, and forming conditions for their self-realization stripping “of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe” and downing everything “ in the icy water of egotistical calculation,”420 that is, forming a survival state involving humanity’s materialization of man). Professor Daniel Bell of Harvard University classifies the stages of social development into three groups: pre-modernization (agricultural society), modernization (industrial society), and post-modernization (information society). Pre-modern society is characterized by a social life that centers on the family. Interpersonal relations are direct and intimate; the organizational structure of society is simple; customs, morals, and habits have great power; behavioral patterns are fixed and uniform; and societal problems include economic industrialization and ideological enlightenment. In a modern society, all social development accompanies industrialization and mechanization, which includes removing the boundaries between social classes and increasing social mobility, the development of education, expansion of civil rights, development of social services, etc. At the same time, this society also involves complex social division of labor; frequent social mobility; superficial, indirect, and temporary interpersonal relations; unstable families; and persistent individual feelings of tension, depression, anxiety, and loneliness. Finally, in a postmodern society, the knowledge industry occupies a dominant position. Those who engage in brainwork form the base and leadership of society; information processing transcends national boundaries; the boundaries of both nations and families are further blurred; and the main problems are global (including population expansion, environmental pollution, ecological imbalances, and energy crises).421 Confronting this dual contradiction of modernization leads to a sharp philosophical contradiction between modernization and anti-modernization. Antimodernization manifests as developing countries’ criticism of developed nations’ materialism based on moral idealism, while modernization is reflected by developed

420 Marx 421 Bell

and Engels [74, p. 487]. [75].

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countries’ cultural conservatism. Representative works reflecting this sharp contradiction include The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism by Daniel Bell; OneDimensional Man by Herbert Marcuse; and Anti-Modernization Thought Trends in a Worldwide Perspective by Guy Alitto. In contrast, modern Western philosophy, which reflects modernization, regards the humanization of nature as the deconstruction of the “absolute” sought by philosophy. The pluralism of truth outlook, relativism of value outlook, and non-determinism of historical outlook together constitute the dominant explanatory principles of modern Western philosophy. This leads to sharp conflicts between meta-physics and infra-physics; scientism and humanism; idealism and pragmatism; moralism and utilitarianism; the ultimate concern; and the “deconstruction of philosophy.”422 The third philosophical perspective is to reflect on philosophy based on its search for the sublime. As the spiritual coordinates of human history, the sublime and the insignificant have always been polar opposites: the former symbolizes truth, goodness, and beauty, while the latter implies falsehood, evil, and ugliness. The pursuit of sublime ideals, the dedication to sublime causes, the perfecting of a sublime personality, and the approach to the realm of the sublime have always been regarded as having the greatest meaning and value in human life. Philosophy, as human selfconsciousness in theoretical form, regards advocation of the sublime and denigration of the insignificant as its goal. Whether traditional Chinese philosophy (from the Pre-Qin era to the Ming and Qing dynasties) or Western philosophy (from ancient Greece and Rome to modern Europe), all regard the sublime as the true meaning of philosophical reason. As “its time apprehended in thoughts,”423 traditional Chinese and Western philosophy have, in the process of constructing the spiritual coordinates of human life, both historically pursued the sublime and ahistorically alienated the sublime as a superhistorical being. The pursuit and alienation of the sublime constitute an internal contradiction within all traditional philosophy. This is the dialectics of the negation of negation in philosophy involving the pursuit and establishment of the sublime, alienation through the criticism and deconstruction of the sublime, and the reseeking and reestablishment of the sublime. In his discourse on the anti-religious historical task of philosophy, Marx makes the following generalization concerning the essence of religion: “Man makes religion; religion does not make man. Religion is, in fact, the self-consciousness and selfesteem of man who has either not yet gained himself or has lost himself again.”424 He believes “[Religion] is the fantastic realization of the human being because the human being has attained no true reality. Thus, the struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against that world of which religion is the spiritual aroma.”425 Therefore, Marx proposes:

422 Sun

[76, pp. 146–151]. [20, p. 19]. 424 Marx [18, p. 131]. 425 Ibid. 423 Hegel

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It is the task of history, therefore, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is above all the task of philosophy, which is in service of history, to unmask human self-alienation in its secular forms, once its sacred form has been unmasked. Thus, the critique of heaven is transformed into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, the critique of theology into the critique of politics.426

Here, Marx provides an important angle for understanding the historical evolution of philosophy: pre-modern philosophy, especially during the Middle Ages, focused on shaping the sacred form; modern philosophy is the process of deconstructing the sacred form and replacing it with various secular forms; and contemporary philosophy is the process of deconstructing various secular forms based on deconstructing the sacred form. By apprehending the history of philosophy based on the dual philosophical processes of pursuing the sublime and deconstructing the alienated sublime, we can deepen our understanding of the theoretical intensions of philosophical development. Traditional philosophy’s pursuit of the sublime is characterized by its underlying premise of absolute opposition between the sublime and the insignificant; its goal of establishing a sublime ultimate being; and its uses of its theoretical as the ultimate realization of the sublime’s self-renewal. These characteristics manifest as traditional philosophy’s mode of questioning: what is absolute truth, supreme goodness, and ultimate beauty? It is only when philosophy reveals this to humankind (which in turn humanity uses to judge and practice their lives) that humankind can be sublimated. Thus, traditional philosophy turns love and pursuit of the sublime into various unchanging philosophical ideas, while alienating the sublime’s historical intensions into rigid dogmas and idols that rule human thoughts and actions. This leads to traditional philosophy’s contradiction between pursuing and alienating the sublime. Traditional Chinese philosophy regards its task as “to ordain conscience for Heaven and Earth, to secure life and fortune for the people”427 and its content as “to investigate the relation between Heaven and man, to understand the changes of past and present”428 ; “to cultivate the self, manage the family, govern the state and bring peace to the world”; and “to be a sage in the inner sphere and a king in the outer sphere” in order to construct spiritual coordinates and establish a place of settlement for human life. The pursuit of the sublime in traditional Chinese philosophy is unceasing. Chinese philosophical texts state such axioms as “preserve the principles of Heaven, extinguish the desire of man429 ;” “the gentleman understands what is moral, the small man understands what is profitable;”430 and “the ruler guides the minister, the father guides the son.”431 Additionally, there are warnings against “the ruler taking the standards of the early kings as a model;” and “taking the right and

426 Ibid.,

p. 132. [39, p. 254]. 428 Zhang [38, p. 1113]. 429 Guo [39, p. 270]. 430 Ibid., p. 27. 431 Ibid., p. 144. 427 Guo

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wrong of Confucius as right and wrong;”432 and the “cardinal guides and constant virtues.” (Gangchang) These quotes not only demonstrate dichotomous and absolute modes of thought and values, but also the consequent alienation of the sublime. The sublime is alienated into the ruler who represents the country and the state; the sage who represents humanity and personality; Confucianism that represents the classics and the literary; and the cardinal guides and constant virtues that represent ethics and morality. This alienation of the sublime mainly manifests as the sanctification of sovereign power; the classics; the cardinal guides and constant virtues; or other ethical relations. In Western philosophy, however, it manifests as sanctification of noumenon, the universal, logic, or other cognitive relations. God as the alienated sublime—the highest norm and supreme judge of all human thoughts and actions—is merely sanctified noumenon—the universal, or logic. The alienation of the sublime is thus embodied by alienation in religion, i.e., the alienation of the sublime into God as the sacred form. Therefore, Marx proposes that “the critique of religion is the prerequisite of every critique” and “the struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against that world of which religion is the spiritual aroma.”433 Marx also notes that after human self-alienation in its sacred form is unmasked, modern philosophy turns to the unmasking of human self-alienation in its secular forms (i.e., human law, politics, etc.). If we connect the developmental process of philosophy from the shaping of the sacred form to the deconstruction of the sacred form (and thence to the deconstruction of secular forms with Marx’s developmental process, from personally dependent relationships, to personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things, to free individuality based upon the universal development of individuals), we gain a profound understanding of the self-consciousness of human existence achieved during its pursuit of the sublime. In the first stage, an individual’s pursuit of the sublime is also worship of the group; the worshipped group is then alienated into the super-human sacred form (from totem to God). Thus, as human self-consciousness in theoretical form, philosophy’s pursuit and alienation of the sublime manifests as worship of the sacred form based upon relationships of personal dependence. In the second stage, mutual dependence among humans becomes human dependence upon things. Hence, man’s worship of gods becomes worship of things, while the alienation of the sublime into the sacred form becomes the alienation of the sublime into secular forms. This philosophical evolution is the theoretical characterization of human historical progress from mutual dependence to dependence on things. However, in the twentieth century, amidst the process of deconstructing the secular forms, philosophical reason was burdened by spiritual fatigue caused by loss of the sublime. Hence, contemporary philosophy is now undertaking theoretical reflection on reestablishing the sublime in order to achieve self-development.

432 Zhang 433 Marx

[77, p. 703]. [18, p. 131].

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6.3 Viewing the Paradigm Shift of Philosophy from the Standpoint of Practice In contemporary philosophical research, the phrase paradigm shift (from philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn) is often used to mark the transformation of philosophy. In my view, if we use the standpoint of logic to signify the analytical movement of contemporary philosophy, then the standpoint of practice can indicate Marx’s philosophical revolution, as well as the Marxist philosophical research paradigm in contemporary China. The standpoint of practice refers to using the practical standpoint as a mode of thought to view all of philosophical history and questions the relations between theory and practice and ideality and reality. Such a paradigm is concretely embodied in the Marxist philosophy of contemporary China, as shown in philosophical textbooks, and the basic question. (1) Philosophical Textbooks Since Chinese economic reform, Chinese philosophical circles have increasingly recognized the generalization and exposition of Marxist philosophy based on practical materialism. This is based on both a short thesis by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, and from understandings of Marx’s philosophical revolution grounded in general philosophical textbooks. Such understandings are grounded in the question of whether viewing these texts from the standpoint of practice provides a rational explanation of Marxist philosophy. Overall, general textbooks tend to summarize Marxist philosophy as dialectical and historical materialism, and divide Marxist philosophy into four major components: materialism, dialectics, epistemology, and historical outlook. Therefore, viewing these textbooks from the standpoint of practice manifests in two ways: viewing these four components separately (from the standpoint of practice) or considering dialectical and historical materialism overall. I first summarize the examination of each of the four major components of these textbooks. The first component is materialism. Marxist philosophy is not old materialism, but instead creates a new materialism. It is substantive, therefore, whether old or new materialism is used to explain Marxist materialism in a given textbook. In Theses on Feuerbach, Marx notes, “The chief defect of all previous materialism (Feuerbach’s included) is that things, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.”434 Here, he reveals the chief defect of old materialism and profoundly elucidates the fundamental change of new materialism. Therefore, textbooks’ discussions of materialism reflect their explanatory principles. As for the cornerstone of materialism, i.e., matter, Lenin proposes that “a deduction which all of us make in everyday practice … is that outside us and independently of us, there exist objects, things, bodies and that our perceptions are images of the

434 Marx

and Engels [64, p. 3].

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external world.”435 It is precisely based on viewing matter from the standpoint of practice that Lenin defines matter within Marxist materialism: “Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”436 These discussions indicate that Marx and Lenin view the world and matter; the relation between humanity and the world, spirit and matter, subject and object; and the modification of old materialism by new materialism from the standpoint of practice. Marxist materialism is built upon the standpoint of practice. In sharp contrast, materialism in textbooks conceives of the world and matter “only in the form of the object or of contemplation” rather than as “sensuous human activity, practice … subjectively.”437 Thus, it confounds Marxist materialism with the fact that Marx transcends old materialism. In this regard, some scholars compare the materialism in textbooks with eighteenth century French materialism to demonstrate the former’s theoretical nature. This indicates that it is only by viewing the world from the standpoint of practice that we can truly understand and explain the new materialism of Marxism. The second component is dialectics. Whether materialism is viewed from the standpoint of practice directly determines whether dialectics can be viewed in this way. Since old materialism conceived of things, reality, and sensuousness only in the form of the object or of contemplation, it departs from not only human practical activity in its materialism but also human practical activity in its dialectics (dialectics as the movement of a thing in itself ). In contrast, Marx explains dialectics from man’s conception of the world, proposing that dialectics “includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up.”438 In Marx’s view, dialectics is first a question of world outlook and the methodology of man’s conception of things (and whether man is able to know and change the world through a dialectic world outlook and methodology). He further states that dialectics “regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”439 It is precisely by viewing dialectics from the standpoint of practice that dialectics can be both critical and revolutionary. In Engels’s discussion of the unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought, and his conclusion that “our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws,”440 he makes the following comparison between old materialism and dialectical philosophy: 435 Lenin

[78, pp. 103–10]. p. 130. 437 Marx and Engels [70, p. 3]. 438 Marx and Engels [47, p. 20]. 439 Marx and Engels [47, p. 20]. 440 Marx and Engels [17, p. 544]. 436 Ibid.,

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Eighteenth-century materialism, owing to its essentially metaphysical character, investigated this premise only as regards content. It restricted itself to the proof that the content of all thought and knowledge must derive from sensuous experience, and revived the principle: nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu [nothing is in the mind that has not been in the senses]. It was modern idealistic, but at the same time dialectical philosophy, and especially Hegel, which for the first time investigated it also as regards form.441

This implies that old materialism is unable to constitute a dialectics that transcends experience; it is only by subjectively conceiving of the relation between humanity and the world that we can constitute a dialectics in terms of world outlook and methodology. Regarding the developmental history of dialectics, especially Marxist dialectics, Lenin states: “Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism.”442 This statement regards dialectics “as the sum-total of examples … and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world)”443 ; it emphasizes that “dialectics is the theory of knowledge … it is not an ‘an aspect’ but the essence of the matter.”444 Lenin thus proposes that “the practice of man and of mankind is the test, the criterion of the objectivity of cognition.”445 This requires us to view dialectics from the standpoint of practice. In On Contradiction, Mao expands Lenin’s basic idea, stating, “This dialectical world outlook teaches us primarily how to observe and analyze the movement of opposites in different things and, on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for resolving contradictions.” This summarizes the dialectics of On Contradiction: analysis concerning the identity and struggle; universality and particularity; and principal and secondary aspects of contradiction are all dialectics viewed from the standpoint of practice. This practical summary of dialectics (that is, centered on contradiction analysis) constitutes Mao’s dialectics of practical wisdom. Thus, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao all develop practice-based dialectics of unity among world outlook, epistemology, and methodology; of analyzing and resolving contradictions; and of knowing and changing the world. The fundamental requirement of such dialectics is to “include in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state.”446 Its substantive content is to use the unity of opposites of dialectical thinking to comprehend, study, and resolve all questions. Its social function is to use critical and revolutionary dialectics to actively change the world. The chief defect of dialectics in textbooks is that they describe dialectics’ basic laws and categories “only in the form of the object, or of contemplation,”447 not from the standpoint of practice. Nor do these texts truly embody the living soul of dialectics concerning 441 Ibid.,

pp. 544–545. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 360. 443 Ibid., p. 357, 360. 444 Ibid., p. 360. 445 Ibid. 446 Marx and Engels [24, p. 20]. 447 Marx and Engels [70, p. 3]. 442 Lenin,

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the concrete analysis of concrete issues, thereby transforming dialectics into the sum-total of “principles + examples” or a ready-made conclusion removed from practice. The third component is epistemology. Why is the epistemology of old materialism considered intuitive reflection theory, while that of Marx’s new materialism considered active reflection theory? The answer is determined by whether the relation between man and the world is “conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation”448 or subjectively as practice. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels note, “Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not ‘relate’ itself to anything, it does not ‘relate’ itself at all. For the animal its relation to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all.”449 Thus, the cognitive relation constituted by man and the world has man as the subject (“I”). The idea that man is able to actively reflect the world is premised on the fact that man and his consciousness are products of society. It is only by starting from humanity’s social and historical nature that we can rationally explain Marxism’s active reflection theory. Whether man as the cognitive subject is viewed as a natural being or as a practical, social, historical, or cultural being is the fundamental question regarding whether the intuitive reflection theory of old materialism can transition to the active reflection theory of new materialism. Thus, any reflection on epistemology in textbooks also reflects the activeness of human cognition. Human cognitive activity, which is based in practice, is the activity of comprehending and creating objects through concepts (or realizing the unity between subject and object in concepts). Marx states, “The ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.”450 The fact that human cognition is able to achieve unity between subject and object requires not only the material basis of cognition (the cognitive functions of the human mind) but also the practical basis (the historically developing subject-object relation that constitutes reality) and mediating system of cognition (material and cultural medium). To reveal the contradiction between the subjective and the objective in cognitive activity (sensuousness and reason, intuition and logic, truth and value, etc.) is the real content of epistemology. To reveal the historical development of the relation between the subjective and the objective constituted by human practical activity, especially that of the mediating system of cognition, is the explanation of the active reflection theory. However, textbook epistemology does not start here. Instead, it overlooks the contradiction between the subjective and objective in cognitive activity, therefore finding it difficult to reveal the activeness of cognition from the standpoint of practice.

448 Ibid. 449 Marx 450 Marx

and Engels [55, p. 44]. and Engels [47, p. 19].

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Viewing epistemology from the standpoint of practice is to view it from humans’ social, historical, and cultural context: from real people and their historical development; from the contradiction between practical activity’s purposiveness and regularity; and from the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty demanded by human practical activity. Such an epistemology is not only one of the unity of dialectics, epistemology, and logic, but also one of the unity of ontology, truth theory, and value theory. Viewing epistemology from the standpoint of practice reveals the laws of motion of human cognition within the contradiction between is and is not; right and wrong; and good and bad. It is only by transcending the narrow-minded view of textbook epistemology that we can transition from intuitive reflection theory to active reflection theory. The fourth component is historical outlook. Does social being determine social consciousness, or vice versa? The answer lies in resolving the contradiction imposed by human practical activity. If humans make their own history, then social consciousness determines social being, which fundamentally negates the regularity of historical development. If, however, history operates in accordance with its own laws, then social being determines social consciousness, which in turn fundamentally negates the claim that men make their own history. This represents the antinomy of historical outlook: how it is understood results in radically different historical outlooks. Marxist historical materialism represents a rational understanding and treatment of this antinomy; therefore, I adopt this perspective to examine textbooks’ historical outlook. It is in the duality of social history that old materialism becomes trapped in this inescapable antinomy, and responds with materialism. Eighteenth-century French materialists examine this in the relation between man and the environment. On the one hand, they believe that man and his ideas are products of the environment, and in order to alter man and his ideas it is first necessary to alter the environment. On the other hand, they believe that modification of the environment depends on the wisdom of geniuses (therefore requiring genius characters and thoughts. Consequently, they divided society into two parts: great geniuses who alter the environment through their thoughts; and everyone else, who alter themselves and their ideas through environmental changes. Thus, they shift from the natural outlook of materialism to the historical outlook of idealism. As Marx and Engels state in criticizing Feuerbach, “As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he considers history he is not a materialist. With him materialism and history diverge completely.”451 In response to the entrapment of old materialism and its orientation towards historical idealism, Marx gives a historical materialist reply using the dialectical mode of thought. Based on human existence and historical development, he proposes: The existence of the human race is the result of an earlier process which organic life passed through. Man comes into existence only when a certain point is reached. But once man has emerged, he becomes the permanent pre-condition of human history, likewise its permanent product and result, and he is pre-condition only as his own product and result.452 451 Marx 452 Marx

and Engels [55, p. 41]. [11, p. 491].

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Here, Marx addresses the antinomy troubling philosophers and elucidates the dialectical relation of man as the pre-condition and result of history. Man, as the permanent pre-condition of human history, is always the result of an earlier process. Human historical activities are always determined by preexisting historical conditions (created by previous generations). Therefore, human historical activities are not carried out at the pleasure of individuals; the results of historical activities manifest as the laws of historical development that do not shift according to human will. Man receives real conditions and forces for creating history, by which he alters himself and his living environment, thereby achieving social progress and creating new historical conditions for the next generation. Therefore, humans create their own history, and history is humanity’s activity process of pursuing its own aims. Real people are both the precondition and result of history. As the result of history, they create new historical preconditions; while as the precondition, they create new historical results. This is the dialectics of man and his history. Marx summarizes by saying, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”453 This implies that history is both the activity of man pursuing his aims and an objective process formed in human activity (that does not shift according to man’s will). If we depart from such dialectical thinking, we cannot understand historical materialism. The chief defect of textbooks’ historical outlook, therefore, is that they do not reveal the antinomy of the historical outlook from the standpoint of practice, and thus fail to elucidate the dialectical thinking of historical materialism. (2) The Basic Question of Philosophy By viewing textbooks’ materialism, dialectics, epistemology, and historical outlook from the standpoint of practice, contemporary Chinese Marxists have reinterpreted Marxist philosophy under the banner of practical materialism, and reconstructed multiple versions of the Marxist narrative system. Regardless of whether these systems start with the relation between man and the world, or the relation between subject and object, all attempt to elucidate the relation between man and the world; subject and object; truth and value; and theory and practice from the standpoint of practice. The basic categories of the textbooks—matter, contradiction, reflection, social being, and laws—have been reinterpreted as new narrative categories— practice, subject, value, history, and choice—thereby forming a systematic practical materialist research paradigm. The first step is to determine the basic question of this paradigm. Is it still the relation between thought and being? If we deny that, how can it understand and interpret Marxist philosophy? If we affirm that the question of the relation between thought and being is its basic question, then how does it transcend textbooks and reinterpret Marxist philosophy? How we interpret and evaluate Engels’s generalization of the question of the relation between thought and being as the great basic question of 453 Marx

and Engels [79, p. 103].

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philosophy has substantive significance in Marxist philosophy. General philosophical textbooks often cite Engels, identifying the question of the relation between thought and being as the basic question of philosophy, without discussion. They then generalize this basic question as one of ontology: whether thought or being, spirit or matter is first; and the epistemological question of whether there is identity between thought and being; spirit and matter. In such a narrative, the explanation of philosophy’s basic question is unquestionable—it serves as a conclusion in Marxist philosophy, rather than a question of study. In general, there are two mutually opposing but complementary mindsets refuting the idea that the relation between thought and being is the great basic question of philosophy. The first path denies that philosophy has a basic question” while the second refutes that its basic question is that of the relation between thought and being. From a theoretical point of view, the fundamental issue is the special meaning of the question of the relation between thought and being (among all philosophical questions). Is it the principal question of philosophy, or a question that determines the theoretical nature of philosophy? Textbooks do not view this basic question based on philosophy’s theoretical nature. However, it is only in doing so that the question of the relation between thought and being can be called the basic question of philosophy. There are two arguments for considering the relation between thought and being as the great basic question of philosophy. The first regards the question as to the relation between spirit and matter; arguing that all phenomena can be divided into spiritual and material, and that philosophy, as the theory of world outlook, regards the relation between the two as its basic question. The second regards the question as the fundamental question of all human activity, and arguing that human cognitive activity achieves unity between thought and being in concepts, while human practical activity achieves unity between thought and being in actions (thus turning the question of the relation between thought and being into the great basic question of philosophy). However, these two arguments are insufficient and debatable. The first approach, to regard the relation between thought and being as the relation between spirit and matter, simplifies the question. Engels stresses that the question of the relation between thinking and being, as the “great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy,” was “put forward in its whole acuteness and could achieve its full significance” only in modern philosophy.454 Modern philosophy explores this question in relation to content and form, thus studying the relation between the objective world and the contents of consciousness, and between the content and form of consciousness; object consciousness and self-consciousness; extensional and intensional logic; intellectual and dialectical thought; and analytical and synthetic judgment. In particular, it reflects on the relation between the laws of thought and being on the level of laws, thereby enabling the question of the relation between thought and being to achieve its full significance. Attributing the basic question of philosophy to one of the relation between spirit and matter not only makes it hard to express the full significance of the question, but also makes it difficult to explain why this question is the basis of philosophy. 454 Engels

[4, pp. 20–21].

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The second argument, that the relation between thought and being is the basis of philosophy because it is fundamental to all human activity, is similarly lacking in persuasive power. The relation between thought and being implicitly contained within all human activity does not exist as a question, but as the unconscious and unconditional premise of theoretical thought. Although human cognitive activity is the unity of thought and being achieved in concepts, and human practical activity is the unity of thought and being achieved in actions, neither regard the relation between thought and being as a question. It is only in the reflective activity of philosophy that this unconscious and unconditional premise is viewed as the object of study. A crucial question is whether Marx regards the question of the relation between thought and being as the basic question of his philosophy. In Theses on Feuerbach, Marx proposes, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”455 This statement has often been interpreted as meaning that the question of the relation between thought and being is only the basic question regarding the interpretation of the world, not regarding how to change the world. This implies that using reflection to consciously understand philosophy and its basic question is fundamental to our understanding of the theoretical nature of philosophy. Marx, like Engels, starts from the question of the relation between thought and being in his clear criticism of old materialism and idealism. He argues that old materialism views the question of the relation between thought and being “only in the form of the object, or of contemplation,”456 thus regarding it as an intuitive relation of reflection. This is precisely what Engels identifies as old materialism, viewing the relation of thought with being only with regard to content. Second, Marx argues, idealism only sets forth abstractly the active side, thus regarding the relation of thought with being as the active outcome of thought. Similarly, Engels identifies this as idealism, viewing the relation of thought with being only with regard to form. Third, Marx points out that only “the active side was set forth abstractly”457 by idealism because it does not view the relation between thought and being as “sensuous human activity.”458 Engels identifies this as resolving the question of the relation between thought and being without considering humans as participants in history. Marx does not refute Engels’s generalization regarding the great basic question of philosophy. In fact, he answers the question based on what he calls “sensuous human activity”—what Engels calls “men as participants in history.” This implies that the question of the relation between thought and being is the fundamental question on world outlook (as Marx addresses in Theses on Feuerbach), while the modern materialist answer constitutes the Marxist world outlook. Theses on Feuerbach demonstrates that Marx focuses on criticism of the world outlooks of old materialism and idealism and describes the question of the relation between thought and being in order to present an in-depth exposition on modern materialism. 455 Marx 456 Ibid., 457 Ibid. 458 Ibid.

and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 5, p. 5. p. 3.

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The fundamental distinction between the modern materialism of Marxism and that of other philosophers is that the latter does not resolve the question of the relation between thought and being in human practice, but rather adopts contemplation or abstract active principles to answer this great basic question. Hence, their philosophy can only interpret the world and must be concerned with “all mysteries which lead theory to mysticism.”459 In contrast, the modern materialism of Marx and Engels starts from the fundamental idea that “all social life is essentially practical”460 and that “man must prove the truth … of his thinking in practice.”461 This indicates that Marxism, which seeks to change the world, does not change the basic question of philosophy. Instead, it fundamentally changes the mysteries that lead theory to mysticism, and adopts a practical, historical standpoint when answering the question of the relation between thought and being, thereby establishing modern materialism.

6.4 Three Basic Categories and Research Paradigms Every philosophical theory is a conceptual system composed of basic categories that not only reveal major differences between theories, but also provide distinct paradigms in its evolution. In contemporary China, understanding changes in paradigms through transitions in basic categories will facilitate in-depth comprehension of the history and logic of Marxist philosophical research. (1) Matter, Practice, and Philosophy Contemporary Chinese Marxist philosophical research can be divided into three basic stages: pre-1980s textbook philosophy; the philosophy after textbook reform in the 1980s; and post-textbook philosophy since the 1990s. The hallmark of these three stages is the sequential transition of three groups of basic categories centering around matter, practice, and philosophy. These three groups are: (1) matter, contradiction, reflection, social being, and law; (2) practice, subject, value, history, and choice; and (3) philosophy, reflection, critique, being, and dialogue. Matter, practice, and philosophy serve as the core categories, while law, choice, and dialogue, respectively, are the substantive basic ideas. Pre-1980s textbook philosophy has matter as its core category, and law as its substantive content. Its basic categories are matter, contradiction, reflection, social being, and law. This group of basic categories constitutes what has been termed dialectical and historical materialism. This textbook philosophy is composed of four parts. The first concerns materialism, with matter as its basic category; its main content involves discourse on the world’s material unity based on the derivativeness of consciousness from matter. The second concerns dialectics, with contradiction as its basic category; its main content involves discourse on the laws of motion of 459 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 5, p. 5.

460 Ibid. 461 Ibid.,

p. 3.

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matter based on the laws of unity of opposites, qualitative interchange, and negation of negation. The third part concerns epistemology, with reflection as its basic category; its main content involves discourse on the laws of motion of cognition based on the conceptual reflection of matter by consciousness. The fourth part concerns the materialist historical outlook, with social being as its basic category; its main content involves discourse on the laws of motion of history based on the mode of social movement as a special mode of material movement and its conceptual reflection. The basic ideas across these four parts are the laws that constitute the philosophy’s substantive content. They can be summarized as follows: the world is material; matter is in movement; the movement of matter obeys laws; and the laws of motion of matter can be known. The philosophy of textbook reform in the 1980s has practice as its core category and the reconstructed system as its substantive content. Its basic categories are practice, subject, value, history, and choice. This group of basic categories constitutes the Marxist philosophical system known as practical materialism. Based on its systemic composition, a prominent difference between this philosophy and the previous one is its diversity, as its basic theories are composed of diverse systems. Nevertheless, its basic theoretical content displays broad and profound consistencies. First, all theoretical content is developed based on practice and the practical relation between humanity and the world. Second, the practical mode of human existence is transitioned to the relation between subject and object, while the subject (i.e., human existence) is used as the starting point for a rich relationship between subject and object (including developing the contradictory relation of man as subject and object in terms of intersubjectivity, and making subject a basic category of practical materialism). Third, the value and aesthetic relations between subject and object are developed based on their practical and cognitive relations, while also integrated within the whole subject-object relation (the most important of which is the value relation, thereby making value a basic category of practical materialism). Fourth, its theoretical content involves subject-object relations based in practice, and its substantive content is the relation between humanity and the world that has purposive demand and objective activity (hence, real people and their historical development as its substantive content, making history a basic category of practical materialism). Fifth, the historical conception of the relation between man and the world highlights a series of previously overlooked philosophical categories, including historical activity and laws; preconditions and results; necessity and contingency; laws and trends; determinism and non-determinism; criterion and choice; and macroscopic and microscopic scale. The most important of these is the choice of subjectively active humanity in historical activity, which makes choice yet another basic category of practical materialism. Therefore, practical materialism is constituted by practice, subject, value, history, and choice. The profound intension expressed by practice is the negative unity of man with the world, which is humanity’s transformation of reality into ideal reality through purposive and objective practical activity. Post-textbook philosophy since the 1990s regards philosophy as its core category, and dialogue or communication as its main orientation. Main categories include

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philosophy, reflection, critique, being, and dialogue. It expresses a twofold theoretical demand. On the one hand, it strives to enable Marxist philosophy to speak Chinese through dialogue among Chinese, Western, and Marxist philosophy. On the other hand, it attempts to highlight the philosophical revolution of Marxist philosophy and its true spirit through such dialogues, thereby repositioning Marxist philosophy. This effort is significantly different from the 1980s philosophy of textbook reform in one respect: it attempts to reinterpret Marxist philosophy based on a pluralistic understanding of philosophy, whereas the latter aimed to reinterpret Marxist philosophy based only on Marxist philosophy. It is precisely due to this distinction in theoretical vision that the core category highlighted by the philosophy of textbook reform is practice, while that of post-textbook philosophy is philosophy. In this theoretical perspective, although its research content, method, and results show even greater diversity, its fundamental theoretical characteristics still exhibit broad and profound consistencies. First, the focus of its study is philosophy itself, seeking an understanding through in-depth reflection on philosophy’s theoretical characteristics, object of study, social function, and historical evolution. In particular, it reflects upon philosophy through comparison of the various basic modes by which humans comprehend the world (religion, art, science, and philosophy) and through comparison of various philosophical outlooks (such as the theory of universal law, epistemology, linguistic analysis, realm of life, existential meaning, social critique, cultural dialogue, and theory of practice) thereby reexamining Marxist philosophy as a world outlook. Second, it highlights the category of reflection based on philosophy, as well as intensively investigating the special mode of thought belonging to philosophy itself—the great basic question constituted by this philosophical mode of thinking and its historical evolution. Based on this, it explores the Marxist philosophical revolution in the history of philosophy. Third, it reconceives of philosophy’s critical nature through reflection on the mode of thought, especially the critical and revolutionary essence of dialectics as identified by Marx, and on the fact that dialectics is the “ruthless criticism of all that exists.”462 Based on this, it comprehends and interprets the critical theory of Western Marxism since Gramsci, Lukács, and Korsch, thereby making critique a basic category of posttextbook philosophy. Fourth, based on critical reflection on the fundamental issues of the contemporary era, it critiques the essential being of modern society (capital) thereby sublimating the question of being into that of real history. It views the relations among persons hidden within the relations among things, as identified by Marx, as the most fundamental being in philosophical investigation. Fifth, it analyzes the questioning of being by Chinese, Western, and Marxist philosophy based on the reflection and examination of being, and the mode of thought and value demand implicitly contained within such questioning. Based on this, it seeks dialogue among Chinese, Western, and Marxist philosophy; reconstructs a Marxist philosophy that speaks Chinese; and strives to make Marxism the conscious pursuit of the people. In overall terms, the basic rationale of post-textbook philosophy is as follows: to question philosophy from an open theoretical perspective, thereby achieving theoretical

462 Marx

and Engels [61, p. 142].

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consciousness of philosophical reflection; to highlight the critical nature of philosophy within this theoretical consciousness; to understand the reality of being through the critical activity of philosophy; and to enable dialogue among Chinese, Western, and Marxist philosophy through the investigation of being, thereby constructing a Marxist philosophy that speaks Chinese based on a broad vision facing the world, modernization and the future. (2) Matter-Law, Practice-Choice and Philosophy-Dialogue In logical structures and conceptual systems with a specific core category as their logical basis and basic categories as their main content, no single category or concept exists in isolation. Instead, each gains self-determination and mutual determination, self-comprehension and mutual comprehension, within their conceptual framework. This self-consistency and its explanatory principle enable philosophical theories underlying such frameworks to possess the significance of research paradigms. Conversely, a philosophical theory possesses the significance of a research paradigm if it constructs a specific conceptual framework based on its core and basic categories. Therefore, to ascertain and evaluate a research paradigm involves ascertaining and evaluating a conceptual framework based on a specific core category, exemplified by basic categories and their explanatory principles. The research paradigm of dialectical and historical materialism, which has matter as its core category and law as its substantive content, has as an explanatory principle the view that philosophy, which serves as the theory of world outlook, is the fundamental viewpoint concerning the whole world. Therefore, in textbooks’ narrative systems, the primary question philosophy seeks to answer should concern the essence of the world and its laws of motion. Textbook philosophy regards matter as its logical basis (in the systematic exposition of the fundamental viewpoint concerning the whole world). This implies that in understanding textbook philosophy as a research paradigm, the most fundamental question concerns the outlook of philosophy. The basic idea of textbook philosophy is that philosophy is defined based on the distinction between philosophy and science. There are some similarities: the real world is the object of study of both philosophy and other sciences. However, each specific science only studies “a specific domain, specific aspect or specific thing of the world and its process,”463 whereas philosophy regards “the whole world including nature, human society and human thought”464 as its object of study. The specific sciences, which regard a world particularity as their object of study, provide humankind with particular laws concerning the world; whereas philosophy, which regards the whole world as its object, provides humankind with universal laws concerning the whole. Philosophy is the science with the greatest universality. This is the fundamental explanatory principle of textbook philosophy as a research paradigm. Since textbooks explain philosophy as the knowledge of the fundamental viewpoint concerning the whole world, Marxist philosophy is positioned as the science with the greatest universality; hence, philosophy’s basic question becomes that of 463 Li

et al. [80, p. 2]. p. 3.

464 Ibid.,

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the essence and origin of the world, which in turn makes matter the core category of Marxist philosophy. This implies that to understand and evaluate textbook philosophy is to understand and evaluate what Engels identifies as the basic question of philosophy: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being.”465 In other words, philosophy does not form specific knowledge on thought and being by regarding them as objects of study, but studies the relation of thought and being as a question. This distinction is extremely important. Philosophical textbooks often regard philosophy in terms of universal laws. However, in Engels’s philosophical thinking, the fact that thought and being are subject to the same laws exists primarily as the unconscious and unconditional premise of theoretical thought; it is only in philosophical reflection that thought regards the relation of thought and being as a question to be considered (and only then does it propose the question in the philosophical sense). This implies that the fundamental distinction between science and philosophy lies not in their respective degrees of universality, but in the fact that science regards the unity of thought and being as its unconscious and unconditional premise of thoughts concerning the world, whereas philosophy regards this unconscious and unconditional premise as the object of its study, thus critically reflecting upon all human thought concerning the world. In brief, science is the constitution of thought, whereas philosophy is the reflection on thought. This implies that exploring the question of the relation between thought and being is premised upon reflective philosophical thinking. If we depart from the reflective activities of philosophy, then we regard philosophical questions as common sense or scientific questions. This is the fundamental defect of textbook philosophy as a research paradigm. The most fundamental hallmark of the Marxist philosophical revolution is that it asks and answers the question of the relation between thought and being starting from human practical activity and regards practice as the logical starting point for answering all philosophical questions. Textbook philosophy departs from human practical activity, instead regarding matter as its logical starting point and core category. Its fundamental problem is that it does not ask questions in terms of the relation between thought and being, or in terms of the practical turn achieved by Marxist philosophy. Instead, it raises questions based on the mode of thought of “the object, or of contemplation” and in naive realism. Therefore, textbook philosophy does not form what Engels calls “theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements”466 and hence is unable to embody the philosophical revolution achieved by Marxist philosophy—nor can it provide a rational research paradigm and narrative system for the Marxist philosophy of the new century. As for the practical materialism research paradigm in the 1980s, which has practice as its core category, its fundamental explanatory principle is to view philosophy as the theory concerning the relation between man and the world. It thus reconstructs the Marxist world outlook and gradually forms practical materialism, a crystallization 465 Engels 466 Marx

[4, p. 20]. and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 491.

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of the most important theoretical results from Chinese philosophical circles in the 1980s. Practical materialism emphasizes the understanding of the relation between man and the world, thought and being based on human practice, thereby shifting the world outlook of naive realism, which views the world using the mode of thought of “the object, or of contemplation.” In terms of epistemology, practical materialism emphasizes the understanding of the practical, cognitive, value, and aesthetic relation between subject and object, starting from the subject, highlighting the role of choice, reflection, and construction in the subject’s cognitive activities, and enabling active reflection theory. In terms of dialectics, practical materialism emphasizes uncovering the contradictions between man and the world; thought and being; subject and object; and subjective and objective starting from man’s mode of existence and development (i.e., practice). This not only highlights the mode of thought and critical essence of dialectics but also achieves unity of dialectics with the basic question of philosophy in concordance with Lenin’s statement that “dialectics is the theory of knowledge.”467 In terms of historical outlook, practical materialism emphasizes understanding the developmental laws of history based on human historical activity, changing the view that the laws of history exist beyond man’s historical activity; attempting to explain all philosophical questions based on the historical nature of human existence; and achieving the unity of world outlook, epistemology, value theory, and historical outlook based on practical outlook. The philosophical task of practical materialism starts with the reform of general philosophy textbooks and reconstructs its theoretical systems through the reconception of Marxist philosophy. System consciousness dominated the Chinese philosophical community in the 1980s: this led to discussion focused on questions of material and practical ontology; reflection and choice theory; dialectics and system theory; and historical and non-historical determinism. Such questions also happened to be the core questions of the four parts of textbook philosophy: world outlook, epistemology, dialectics, and historical outlook. Practical materialism, which was significant in defining and positioning Marxist philosophy, was also proposed as the explanatory principle. Nevertheless, this system consciousness reconstructing the Marxist philosophical system did not have realistic possibilities in the early stages of reform. The lack of systematic research on Marxist philosophical texts, and the absence of communication and exchange between Marxist, Chinese, and Western philosophy led to insufficient theoretical resources for the reconstruction of the Marxist philosophical system in China. When research went beyond the construction of the system and touched upon content, many unbridgeable differences emerged, which led to difficulties furthering the discussion. The most critical issue was the understanding of philosophy itself. Unlike practical materialism, which regards practice as its core category, posttextbook philosophy regards philosophy as its core category, and dialogue as its substantive content. Its logical starting point is the questioning of philosophy, while its fundamental explanatory principle is to view philosophy and the history of philosophy as historical ideology and ideological history. Thus, it views the entire history 467 Lenin,

Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 360.

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of philosophy from the perspective of ideological history, and views various philosophical theories based on historical ideology—thereby regarding dialogue among various philosophies as its research paradigm and exploring the Marxist philosophical revolution in its reflection on ideological history. The self-understanding of philosophy is not self-enclosed meditation, nor is it stubborn self-identification; instead, it takes broad philosophical vision as its background, and open philosophical consciousness as its basis for comparison and differentiation of different outlooks, especially in the contemporary era. The reflective activity of the 1990s, which regarded philosophy as its focal point, involved the comparative study of Marxist, Chinese, and Western philosophy; two major trends of thought (i.e., scientism and humanism); and two types of culture (i.e., Chinese and Western) in an attempt to lay a deep cultural foundation for philosophy based on comparative studies. This project constitutes the research paradigm of post-textbook philosophy and lays a solid foundation for a new century of Chinese Marxist philosophical research. It has led us away from simple, abstract, and empty philosophical debates caused by the dearth of theoretical resources and provided crucial theoretical preparations for philosophical development in the new century. In addition, it has normalized Marxist philosophical research in the new century, which is based on reflecting upon the textbook reform of the 1980s and the self-conception of philosophy in the 1990s (thus directing us toward the world and the future and creatively advancing Marxist philosophical research in the new century). (3) Advancing Marxist Philosophical Research Through Dialogue Among Research Paradigms The three research paradigms, exemplified by matter-law, practice-choice, and philosophy-dialogue, are not only connected through sequential transition, but also through upward compatibility. That is, their transition does not eliminate the questions of the previous paradigm; rather, preceding paradigms’ basic categories and theoretical content are reinterpreted. Therefore, adherence to and development of Marxist philosophy in the new century not only requires dialogue among Chinese, Western, and Marxist philosophy, but also the practical and full realization of dialogue among the three research paradigms in Marxist philosophy, with the core categories of matter, practice, and philosophy. The fundamental content of materialism and dialectics in Marxist philosophy (and the real force of Marxism concerning human liberation) are to ascertain the material unity of the world; comprehend the laws of motion of nature, society, and thought; and change the world by knowing its regularity. In his Speech at the Grave of Karl Marx, Engels states that Marx’s greatest contribution to humankind was that he “discovered the law of development of human history” and “the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production, and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created”; thus, “he was the first to make conscious of its [the modern proletariat’s] own position and its needs, conscious of the conditions of its emancipation.”468 Therefore, the research paradigm of textbook 468 Engels

[60].

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philosophy, which has matter as its core category and law as its substantive content, not only has a real basis but also expresses the age’s demands of philosophy. Reflection on textbook philosophy since the 1980s, and the research paradigm of practical materialism, has practice as its core category. This does not simply abandon the research paradigm of textbook philosophy, but rather adopts the mode of thought from a practical standpoint to reveal its deeper theoretical difficulties, reinterpreting the theoretical system’s basic categories (including matter, contradiction, reflection, social being, and law), in the sense of returning to Marx. The result was a Marxist practical materialism in contemporary China. The core category of textbook philosophy is matter, and its substantive content is law; the fundamental characteristic of both is their objectivity. Therefore, how to ascertain and demonstrate objectivity in the laws of motion of matter becomes the theoretical foundation of textbook philosophy. It is from this point that practical materialism examines textbook philosophy. Marx proposes in Theses on Feuerbach: The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.469

Here, Marx starts from the question of the relation between thought and being to clearly and concisely criticize old materialism and idealism. Old materialism views the question of the relation between thought and being “only in the form of the object, or of contemplation,” thereby regarding the relation of thought to being as an intuitive reflective relation. Idealism only sets forth abstractly the active side, hence attributing the relation of thought to being to the active outcome of thought. Marx notes that old materialism can only conceive of the relation between thought and being in the form of the object or of contemplation, while idealism can only set forth the active side (which abstractly stems from the departure from sensuous human activity when viewing the relation between thought and being). Based on this, Marx proposes, “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.”470 In this statement, Marx suggests the need to consider whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking (or the question of the relation between thought and being) from a practical standpoint. This implies that the objectivity of matter and law is not self-evident when conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but can be only be revealed in human practice. Therefore, the core category that constitutes the logical basis of the Marxist world outlook is not matter or law removed from practice, but practice that provides a real foundation for the objectivity of matter and law. This is the sublation of textbook 469 Marx 470 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 5, p. 3. and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 5, p. 3.

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philosophy by practical materialism, and the fundamental content and true meaning of practical materialism. Every philosophical theory appeals to the search for truth and the reflection on existence based on specific value demands, while also arguing for specific value demands based on the search for truth and reflection on existence. Therefore, no philosophical theory is a solitary or isolated ontology, truth theory, or value theory, but instead the unity of ontology, truth theory, and value theory. The value demands of a given philosophical theory determine its understanding of being and truth. The true starting point of Marxist philosophy is not that it interprets the world through universal laws, but that it changes the world for human liberation. Therefore, the practice of changing the world constitutes the core category of Marxist philosophy. Thus, Marxist philosophy adopts a mode of thought from a practical standpoint to reveal the negative unity of man with the world; the historical unity of thought and being achieved by the historical process of this negative unity; and the truth of laws achieved in the historical unity of thought and being, thereby laying the foundations of ontology and truth theory for the value demands of human liberation. This is the research paradigm of practical materialism involving the unity of ontology, truth theory, and value theory, as well as its reinterpretation of the basic categories of the textbook paradigm (i.e., matter, contradiction, reflection, social being, and law) within the conceptual framework constituted by basic categories of practice, subject, value, history, and choice. This implies that practical materialism does not abandon the research paradigm of textbook philosophy, but instead adopts a new logical basis—practice—to sublimate textbook philosophy’s interpretation of Marxist philosophy. There are two important contexts to practical materialism. First, the examination of and reflection on the research paradigm of textbook philosophy, and second, the response to and critique of Western philosophical ideology. In terms of the relation between theory and practice, practical materialism originated from two epochal issues: the innovative practices of Chinese socialism since the Chinese economic reform, and the global problems encountered since the advent of post-industrial civilization. Since philosophy is its own apprehended in thoughts, practical materialism must start from addressing the real problems of its time in its reinterpretation of Marxist philosophy. It is precisely in the dual concern of theory and reality that practical materialism must operate (where history has become world history) in order to achieve a Marxist philosophy that speaks Chinese and possesses national characteristics while being globally-minded. The research paradigm of post-textbook philosophy, which has philosophy as its core category and dialogue as its substantive content, is the sublation of practical materialism through such a theoretical consciousness. As human self-consciousness in theoretical form, philosophy forms the core of human culture; it embodies distinctive conceptions of human survival and development in different ages and populations, and an understanding of epochal human problems. Hence, it manifests as philosophical ideas with certain shared epochal intensions and certain differences. The theoretical consciousness of this complex relation between philosophy and reality enables contemporary philosophy to regard

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philosophy as a core category of reflection and dialogue among different forms as the basic idea of philosophical research. Marxist philosophical research in China since the 1990s has progressively engaged in dialogue with Chinese and Western philosophy, focusing on philosophical reflection, thus deepened its own understanding. This research has consciously undertaken the twofold historical task of practical materialism: the reinterpretation of Marxism starting from the real problems of our times; and addressing the problems of our times based on its reinterpretation. In 1843, in the introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right,’ Marx proposed: “It is above all the task of philosophy, which is in service of history, to unmask human self-alienation in its secular forms, once its sacred form has been unmasked.”471 What Marx refers to as history has led to human self-alienation in its secular forms, which constitutes the mode of existence of capital, where personal independence is based upon dependence mediated by things. The unmasking of human self-alienation in capital transforms its independence and individuality into that of humanity, thereby realizing human liberation and the universal development of the individuals. This is the fundamental demand and historical task of Marxist philosophy. It is precisely in profound reflection on history, and critical reflection on modernity, that Marxist philosophical research in China since the 1990s has deepened its understanding of modern materialism (which has history as its explanatory principle; the determination of consciousness by life as its core idea; the intensional logic of history as its basic content; human liberation as its value demand; changing the world as its theoretical direction; and a tendency towards defining Marxist philosophy based on historical materialism). Historical materialism, which has history as its explanatory principle, not only highlights history as a basic category of practical materialism; it also underscores the historical intensions within practice (practical materialism’s core category). Practice has mostly been interpreted as sensuous human activity, based on which the relation between man and the world has been understood as the negative unity of man with the world. However, in historical materialism, practice is the mode of existence underlying real people and their historical development, while history is not merely the process of sensuous human activity, but also the result of such activity (i.e., the civilization created by humanity as participants in history). As history and civilization are mutually explanatory, historical civilization or civilization history is the crystallization of human historical activity; the embodiment of the real relation between man and the world; the normalization of trends; and the future of human development. Practical materialism has thus transformed the world outlook of textbook philosophy concerning the fundamental viewpoint of the whole world into one concerning the relation between man and the world, thereby reinterpreting the Marxist world outlook based on the mode of thought from a practical standpoint. Building upon this, historical materialism regards history as its explanatory principle, and conceives of the world outlook concerning the relation between man and the world as that which regards civilization as its substantive content. Therefore, the epochal issues of historical materialism’s world outlook are as follows: What is the contemporary relation 471 Marx

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of man, who is based upon the contemporary practical activity of humankind, with the world? What is the worldview of contemporary man mediated by contemporary science? What is the mode of thought, value ideas, and aesthetic consciousness of contemporary man, which are based on his contemporary social life and mode of existence? How should we observe reality and answer the major questions of our time based on the law of development of human history and the special law of motion of bourgeois society discovered by Marx? How do we investigate the problem of China, summarize the Chinese experience, and create the Chinese model based on a socialism with Chinese characteristics? How do we achieve the Sinicization, “contemporarization,” and popularization of Marxist philosophy through a theoretical consciousness that speaks Chinese? In philosophical reflection on epochal questions, historical materialism has not only discovered the real foundation underlying philosophical dialogue, but has also achieved a connection between textbook philosophy and practical materialism, and an adherence to and development of Marxist philosophy.

6.5 Shaping and Guiding the New Spirit of the Age The philosophy that characterizes the spirit of the age is not merely its mirroring and expression; or its generalization and summary, but more importantly, its reflection and characterization; shaping and guidance. Engels states, “In every epoch, and therefore also in ours, theoretical thought is a historical product, which at different times assumes very different forms and, therewith, very different contents.”472 The primary characteristic of contemporary social life and thought can be described as the deconstruction of the dichotomous model. In traditional society, based upon the natural economy, the people’s economic, political, cultural, and spiritual life have all existed in a state of dichotomy; hence, all questions were considered using a dichotomous mode of thought. Traditional philosophy, as the reality in thought of traditional society, intensively embodies this dichotomous mode of existence and thought. It is always searching for absolute certainty within the absolute opposition between true and false; good and evil; and beauty and ugliness. Since traditional philosophy always objectifies this absolute certainty as a determinate being, and hence sanctifies it, this leads to what Marx describes as “human self-alienation in its sacred form.” The market economy, technological civilization, and popular culture of the contemporary era gradually eroded these sacred forms, while ever-deepening reflection on human self-alienation in its secular forms has transformed the mode of human survival from a dichotomy to a mediation (the plurality of models in contemporary world politics, economic globalization, and the coexistence of multicultural models in the contemporary world). This deconstruction of the dichotomous model enables the liberation of humankind from dichotomous modes of survival and thought, which represents a major advancement in human history. It signifies the essential difference between 472 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 338.

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modern and traditional societies and serves as a solid basis of social life in contemporary philosophy. Nevertheless, the deconstruction of the dichotomous model also eliminates absolute certainty, and measures of value and criteria for behavior that were postulated by traditional society. Therefore, the deconstruction of the dichotomous model requires contemporary philosophy to renew its pursuit of the criteria for human thoughts and behaviors, and reestablish a place of settlement for man through theoretical means. The profound transformation of contemporary social life constitutes the real foundation of life in contemporary philosophy and poses urgent theoretical questions. From the perspective of its most fundamental content and form, the transformation of man’s mode of existence in modern society can be summarized as the routinization of non-daily life. This manifests as the scientification of daily experiences; the culturalization of daily leisure; the socialization of daily interactions; the politicization of daily behaviors; and the urbanization of rural life, among others. On a deeper level, the routinization of non-daily life is the process of transforming and reconstructing man’s worldview, mode of thought, and value ideas. As Engels points out, once the commonsense mode of thought and its worldview enter the wide world of research in non-daily life, they encounter “wonderful adventures.”473 It is these adventures and the life-process of modern society that provide the foundation for life in contemporary philosophy. In modern social life, it is the rapid development of science and technology that prompts humans to enter the wide world of non-daily life, and to continuously undertake its routinization. Science provides humankind with ever-deepening conceptual and knowledge systems for describing and explaining the world, thus presenting a historical and epochal scientific worldview. The developmental history of science is the history of advancements in human theoretical thought. The formation and confirmation, expansion and deepening, transformation and renewal of scientific concepts not only provides humans with “focal points in the web, which assist in cognizing and mastering it,”474 but also gives them ever-deepening cognitive components and methods of thinking. Every epochal discovery in science profoundly transforms man’s mode of thought and worldview through brilliant theoretical results. Copernicus’ theory of the heliocentric model, Darwin’s theory of evolution, Einstein’s theory of relativity, Bohr’s quantum mechanics, Freud’s theory of the unconscious mind—these not only represent a major blow to the black-and-white commonsensical mode of thought, but also transform common sense thinking through the unstoppable force of the scientific mode of thought. In contemporary science, the intersection of different sciences, especially the rise of horizontal disciplines due to systematization, cybernetics, and information theory, have led to an even broader and more profound transformation of the human mode of thought—and the worldview it constitutes. Science “has trained the human mind in the understanding of logical 473 Marx

and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 22. Lenin Collected Works: Volume 38, p. 93.

474 Lenin,

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relationships which would have appeared incomprehensible to the educated man of earlier centuries.”475 This transformation provides philosophy with a contemporary scientific foundation. As the intellectual quintessence of its time, philosophy takes the above transformation and sublimates it into theoretical social self-consciousness. Contemporary philosophy says there is no neutral observation; that theory permeates and burdens observation; and that our explanation of the world is premised on the conceptual framework and mode of thought by which we comprehend it and its historical transformation. Contemporary philosophy based on science has profoundly altered the mode of thought of intuitive reflection theory, as represented by naive realism; the mode of thought of linear causality, as represented by mechanistic determinism; and the mode of thought of essential reductionism, as represented by the theory of abstract entity. This strongly promotes the commonsensicalization of both contemporary scientific and philosophical modes of thought. Not only has contemporary science altered our mode of thought and our worldview, it has also altered our value ideas. As the value norm of human thoughts and actions, common sense is the product of human adaptations to their natural, social, and general cultural environments, accumulated across generations. In the value ideas of common sense, the basis and criterion, scope and boundary of human thoughts and actions are based on the universality of experience. Man’s thoughts and actions are directly constrained and normalized by the commonsense worldview and mode of thought; any thought or behavior that transcends universal experience is seen as a paradox and a challenge to the value norm; thus regarded as absurd. The narrow-mindedness of common-sense value ideas are normalized by empirical value criteria. Common sense value judgments make qualitative statements rather than perform quantitative analysis, and evaluate a specific object of experience in isolation rather than systematically examining the manifold relations of the object. Truth and falsehood; yes and no; honor and shame; good and bad; good and evil; beauty and ugliness are all defined by common sense empirical criteria as existing in dichotomy. Simplicity and absoluteness are the prominent characteristics of common-sense value ideas. Unlike common sense, scientific value ideas are not empirical but theoretical. Science uses its systematic knowledge system and logical mode of thought to normalize all human thoughts and actions. The empirical spirit and analytical attitude form the basis for scientific value ideas. Science not only focuses on the universality of experience, but also on the rational thinking concerning the universality of experience. It not only emphasizes qualitative statements, but also the quantitative analyses of statements. Thus, science provides humans with a real foundation for transcending dichotomous value ideas. In the developmental process of science, its worldview and mode of thought have remained in a state of historical transformation, thereby continuously changing and renewing man’s understanding of himself, the world, and their relation (i.e., the human world outlook). The expansion of the contents of thought and action, and the renewal of their modes, will inevitably lead to changes in value 475 Reichenbach

[12, p. 120].

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criteria. Since value criteria form the basis for value ideas, judgments, and norms, these changes will inevitably lead to historical transformations of the entire value system. Therefore, scientific value ideas will transcend common sense. Since philosophy serves as social self-consciousness concerning the meaning of human existence, its value ideas are prominently characterized by reflection and critique. Philosophy does not directly propose and offer specific value judgments. Instead, it regards common sense and scientific value judgments as its objects of reflection, and critically reveals the premises they implicitly contain—thereby inspiring humans to adopt a critical spirit and open attitude when considering their own value ideas. In contemporary social life, philosophy regards the routinization of non-daily life as its basis in order to continuously sublimate the dialectical wisdom of human life through “actual life-processes involving the scientification of daily experiences, the culturalization of daily leisure, the socialization of daily interactions, the politicization of daily behaviors, and the urbanization of rural life. The philosophical value attitude involves adopting the oughtness of ideality and the macroscopic scale of history to observe and reflect upon the real value ideas offered by common sense and science, thus enabling humans to maintain a necessary tension between the sacred and the secular; ideality and reality; and the macroscopic and microscopic scale of history in order to achieve a subtle balance. Contemporary philosophy is increasingly using the ranking of values in order to pursue benefit and avoid harm by choosing the lesser of two evils. It strives to pursue the dialectical unity of the scientific and humanistic spirit, scientific and value rationality, and utilitarianism and idealism, thus guiding people toward consciously transcending absolutism or relativism. In contemporary social life, the “commonsensicalization” of philosophical ideas is the historical and dialectical value attitude, and the universal consciousness of the realm of human life. The most significant problem of contemporary China since economic reform is that of development, specifically its criteria and sequential arrangement. In China, an efficient people-oriented approach to scientific development is considered that which has scientific development as its theme, transforming the mode of economic development as its central tenet, and resolving the problem of people’s livelihood by maximizing public interest and satisfying the basic public needs of society. This is also how China behaves towards modernity within the context of economic globalization. It profoundly embodies the necessary tension and subtle balance between history’s macroscopic and microscopic scales. This is not merely strategic thinking with regards to promoting the comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development of society, but also embodies the fundamental goal of striving for human liberation and achieving the universal free development of every individual. This requires us to study and elucidate an outlook of scientific development with an even stronger sense of social responsibility, and a broader theoretical vision, in order to advance philosophical research through the theoretical exploration of major questions of reality. Since philosophy is human self-consciousness in theoretical form, the historical evolution of its theoretical forms is directly determined by historical changes in mankind’s self-consciousness concerning its own existence. In turn, these historical

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changes are determined by the transition in historical forms of human existence. Therefore, the history of philosophy is ultimately the history of human development: the philosophy of each age is ultimately its time apprehended in the thoughts and intellectual quintessence of its time. Therefore, we must expound on philosophy as the theory of world outlook from such a theoretical perspective. Man’s mode of existence, and the resulting questions of man’s survival and development, have become the focus of contemporary philosophy. Practical activity, as man’s mode of existence, and its historical development (the contradictory relations between man and nature; man and society; man and others; and man and the self) are based on man’s practical activity; while questions of science, language, culture, and development based on human practical activity make up the main content of contemporary philosophy. In the dialectical understanding of human practical activity on the contemporary level, not only must we pay attention to the contradictory relations contained within practical activity (between passiveness and activeness; purposiveness and objectivity; purposiveness and regularity; reality and universality, etc.), we must also pay special attention to contradictory relations based on practice (between man’s survival and living; the natural and the human world; the measure of things and of man; the precondition and result of history; man’s form of existence; and mankind’s historical development, etc.) Moreover, based on the new characteristics of human practical activity in the contemporary era, we must also strive to explore the contradictory relations within the practical activity of the modernization process (between positive and negative effects; humanization and materialization; scientific and technological progress and global problems; development and costs, etc.). The contemporary scientific dialectical understanding starts from the interrelations among the multiple modes by which humans comprehend the world in order to propose and explore the relation between science, religion, common sense, art, ethics, and philosophy. It also adopts the perspective of scientific activity and progress to concretely explore the contradictory relations between theory and observation; verification and falsification; logic and intuition; speculation and rebuttal; discovery and defense; understanding and explanation; paradigm and scientist groups; theoretical kernel and protective band; empirical questions and conceptual questions, etc.). Furthermore, based on reflection of science and its social function, this dialectical understanding deepens its exploration of major questions concerning the development of human survival, including that of science and culture; science and society; the natural sciences and humanities; the scientific and humanistic spirit; science and scientism, etc.). Due to the significant role of science and technology in modern social life, philosophical understanding of science has become extremely crucial in contemporary philosophy. With regard to contemporary dialectical theory, it is primarily the numerous internal and external contradictions uncovered by scientific development that have presented increasingly rich research topics for the development of dialectical theory. Among these, the question of the relation between science and nonscience, and the humanistic understanding of science, are key premises underlying the treatment of science, and the scientific spirit and the critique of scientism.

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The contemporary dialectical understanding of language regards the linguistic turn of modern Western philosophy as its object, in order to explore the philosophical understanding of language in Anglo-American analytic and European humanistic philosophy. It also uses modern linguistics to explore the contradictory relations between language and speech; signifier and signified; referent and meaning; phonetics and semantics; semantics and pragmatics; the logic and humanity of language; natural language and artificial language, etc. In the dialectical understanding of language and speech, contradictory relations are explorations between the synchronicity of language and the diachronicity of speech; the structural nature of language and the event-based nature of speech; the formality of language and the substantivity of speech; the systematic nature of language and the procedural nature of speech; the regularity of language and the factuality of speech; the internality of language and the reality of speech, etc.) Such explorations not only deepen our understanding of the contradictory relation between man’s sociality and individuality; and his ideality and reality, but also of the contradictory relation between language and culture; language and the world; and language and man. Since the philosophy of culture has increasingly been regarded as mainstream in philosophy, the contemporary dialectical understanding of culture has uncovered internal contradictions from multiple aspects, including culture’s humanity and epochality; humanity and nationality; diversity and unity; multiple intensions; multiple forms; multiple characteristics; transition and reconstruction; anomie and conflict and culture in itself ; conscious culture; popular and elite culture; Eastern and Western culture; cultural radicalism and conservatism, etc. These contradictory relations have become the crucial content of contemporary philosophical research. In the contemporary dialectical understanding of development, the contradiction between human survival and development is regarded as the focal point, while the criteria and choice of development are regarded as core categories that constitute the ever-deepening philosophical reflection on development. Man is a historical being, not a replicative existence. This implies that man has achieved self-transcendence— that man transcends what he is: a being with development as its mode of existence. Therefore, in the dialectical understanding of man’s mode of existence, it is important to have a dialectical understanding of development; this is the greatest question faced by contemporary humans, and the most hotly debated in the contemporary academic community. This debate deepens our dialectical understanding of development, based on the intersection of epochality and humanity, thus proposing and forming a series of philosophical categories with development as their focal point, including survival and development’s fact and value; value and cost; criteria and choice; macroscopic and microscopic scale; humanization and materialization, etc. In fact, contemporary Chinese scholars have chosen reflection on the market economy as their starting point to deepen dialectical understanding of development—and have provided contemporary philosophy with rich theoretical content. Contemporary dialectical understanding of the relation between humanity and the world highlights a series of overall contradictory relations, including rationalism and irrationalism; scientism and humanism; objectivism and relativism; determinism

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and non-determinism; essentialism and existentialism; structuralism and deconstructionism; foundationalism and anti-foundationalism, etc. These philosophical conflicts, based on overall relations, promote the understanding of world outlook’s historical intensions. That is, the world in a world outlook is not naturally occurring or unrelated to man, but the world in which humans live. The boundary is not endless or unrelated to man, but the boundary of humans in their path. The outlook is not the inhuman or super-human perspective of gods, but the perspective of man as a historical being. Therefore, as the theory of world outlook, philosophy is fundamentally concerned with the theory of man’s perspective in this life and on the path of life; it is historical ideology constituted by ideological history. A true philosophy should be the intellectual quintessence of its time, and the living soul of culture. Thus, the critique of the premises underlying world outlook has become the living soul of contemporary philosophy. Marx states, “It is not enough that thought strives to actualize itself; actuality must itself strive toward thought.”476 The most important thought toward which actuality must strive is Marxist philosophy, which has shaped and guided the spirit of the age. The theoretical innovation of contemporary Marxist philosophy presents a new world, and establishes new ideals based on new theoretical thought and philosophical ideas. It views reality through innovative thinking; reveals the manifold possibilities implicitly contained within reality; weighs the pros and cons of reality; and ranks its values, thereby constructing a new form for the development of human civilization. The critique of the premises underlying the philosophical ideas of thought is to imbue philosophical ideas with new epochal intensions, and to shape and guide the spirit of the age with new philosophical ideas.

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Index

A Absolute idea, 11, 13–17, 20, 22–24 Abstract, 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, 16, 23–30, 34, 37– 39, 41–44, 55, 62, 67–74, 77, 80, 97, 104, 111, 116, 124, 132, 138, 144, 154, 167, 170, 184, 203, 204, 207, 217, 222, 226, 227, 232, 234, 236, 238, 240–243, 245, 251, 252, 256, 261–263, 265, 267, 269, 270, 277, 279, 284, 286, 290, 305, 311, 317 Abstract identity, 2, 4–9, 55, 239, 247 abstract identity of thought and being, 2, 4–9, 239 Abstract reason, 6, 234, 235, 237, 240, 242, 245 Abstract to concrete, 38, 236, 237, 243, 245 Abstract unity, 236 Active reflection, 267, 274, 279, 300, 301, 310 Albert Einstein, 30, 232, 316 Analysis and synthesis, 141, 166 Analytical philosophy, 213 A priori, 15, 168, 169, 180 Aristotle, 12, 38, 106, 114, 190, 194, 207– 209, 224, 283

B Basic question of philosophy, The, 8, 55, 91, 129, 157, 179, 183, 198, 219, 255, 266, 271, 289, 290, 302–305, 309, 310 Being, 1–17, 20, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 33– 45, 47, 48, 50–52, 54–59, 64, 68– 83, 85, 90, 93, 95, 98–100, 104, 106, 108, 111, 113–119, 125, 126, 129– 150, 154–170, 172, 176, 179–184, © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 Z. Sun, A Philosophical Critique of Thought, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8399-5

192, 195, 197–200, 203–220, 222, 224, 226, 227, 229, 231–242, 244, 245, 250–256, 260–271, 275, 278– 280, 286–290, 294, 295, 300–315, 320, 321

C Carnap, 157, 200, 221 Cassirer, Ernst., 38, 40, 41, 63, 102, 103, 121, 154, 197 Change the world, 77, 78, 278, 279, 298, 299, 304, 305, 311 Characterization, 31, 108, 158, 184, 192– 194, 196, 202, 204, 215, 220, 222, 238, 244, 286, 296, 315 Collingwood, 238 Commonsense, 52–54, 85–98, 100, 102, 112, 120, 125–127, 231, 316, 317 Commonsense thinking, 90, 91, 100, 113, 114 Concept, 1, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 21, 22, 25, 27–29, 33, 35, 37, 38, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59–61, 63–65, 87, 90– 92, 94, 107, 111–113, 116, 119, 121, 122, 125–127, 129, 132, 134, 136, 139–141, 149, 152, 154, 156, 160, 162–165, 168, 170, 171, 177, 179, 181–183, 187, 194–196, 198, 201– 203, 205, 207, 208, 214, 218, 219, 222, 224–226, 230–245, 247, 250– 254, 256–259, 262–265, 267, 268, 270, 271, 290, 300, 303, 304, 308, 316 Conceptual framework, 29, 38, 40, 64, 90, 94, 110, 113, 115, 118, 125–127, 142, 282, 308, 313, 317 327

328 Conscious content, 14, 20, 166 Constitutes itself, 15, 180–183, 193, 220, 241 Constituting thought\constitution of thought, 1, 2, 19, 47, 49–51, 54, 59, 63, 75, 129, 177, 198 Construct, 10, 11, 17, 29–31, 37, 38, 40, 44, 67, 85, 87, 94, 97, 112, 113, 121, 125, 126, 129, 137, 139, 144, 147, 168, 180, 201, 216, 219, 232, 234, 239, 243, 246, 247, 268, 281, 285, 295, 308 Content and form, 5, 7, 19, 20, 48, 54, 55, 168, 203, 224, 225, 250, 251, 266, 303, 316 Cornu, 110, 237 Criterion and choice, 286, 306 Critique of political economy, 67, 68, 72, 75, 223, 249, 270

D Dependence mediated by things, 74, 184, 188, 194, 196, 238, 241, 286, 291– 293, 296, 314 Determination, 12, 13, 16, 21, 27–30, 33, 48, 60, 65, 68, 70, 76, 91, 115, 121, 126, 137, 146, 148, 161, 164, 166, 167, 176, 205, 208, 235, 238, 242, 252, 261–264, 269, 270, 308, 314 Dialectical, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 16, 18, 19, 21– 25, 27–30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 43– 45, 47, 55, 59–61, 65, 70, 71, 77, 91– 94, 97, 98, 101, 108, 131, 137, 138, 147, 148, 151, 152, 161, 166, 169– 172, 175, 182, 186, 190, 197, 203, 206, 211, 218, 222, 224, 225, 227– 233, 235, 236, 238, 242, 243, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 253–259, 261, 262, 265–269, 271, 274–278, 280, 281, 290, 297–299, 301–303, 305, 308, 318–320 Dialectical materialism, 170, 203, 218, 258 Dialectics, 4, 8, 9, 11, 15–25, 28, 30, 35, 38, 42, 44, 47, 54–56, 59, 60, 64, 65, 70, 91–93, 117, 122, 130–132, 134, 137, 139, 147, 148, 152, 170, 171, 180, 182, 186, 190, 191, 197, 206, 212, 223–276, 279–281, 294, 297–299, 301, 302, 305, 307, 310, 311 Dialectics of concept, 8, 55, 170, 230, 251, 252, 254, 257, 267, 268, 270, 271

Index Dialectics of practical wisdom, 272, 276, 280, 299 Duality of commodity, 69, 70, 263, 271 Duality of labor, 69, 70, 263, 271 Dufrenne, 109

E Empiricism, 11, 161, 166, 221, 228, 272, 281 Entity, 12, 14, 42, 173, 205, 236, 237, 245, 317 Epistemological turn, 157, 158, 289, 290 Epistemology, 4, 8, 11, 13, 14, 19–21, 27, 38–41, 54, 58, 70, 71, 119, 132, 135, 137, 147, 157, 162, 163, 167, 169, 181, 197, 203, 206–208, 212, 216, 218, 233, 235, 243, 245, 246, 249, 255, 258, 260, 261, 263, 266, 267, 269–276, 279, 280, 297, 299–302, 306, 307, 310 Essence, 3–5, 7, 10–13, 33, 34, 40, 42–45, 49, 52, 53, 56, 63, 64, 67–69, 71, 77, 81, 88, 90, 92, 104–106, 115, 120, 122, 123, 131, 132, 134, 136, 137, 146, 147, 149, 157, 161–166, 170, 172, 173, 176, 177, 180, 188, 197, 200, 202, 205, 207, 208, 214, 226, 230, 231, 233–235, 243, 251–253, 255–257, 259, 262, 263, 265, 268, 269, 271, 274, 277, 292, 294, 298, 299, 307–310 Essentialism, 201, 213, 247, 248, 286, 321 Ethics, 44, 64, 94, 125, 141, 158, 162, 174, 189, 220, 245, 284, 296, 319 Exchange value, 68, 69, 73, 74, 239, 263 Existentialism, 41, 105, 210, 213, 321 Experience, 5, 11, 12, 32, 53, 56, 86–95, 100, 105, 107–110, 112, 113, 119, 120, 124, 127, 136, 141, 142, 144, 161, 162, 165, 167, 168, 181, 182, 187, 189, 195, 200, 203–205, 207, 208, 211, 218, 226, 231, 233, 235, 242, 244, 254, 264, 273, 277, 280, 281, 288, 299, 315–318 Explain the world, 12, 14, 20, 87, 91, 100, 113, 126, 192, 216, 273 Explanatory cycle of ontology, 217 Extensional logic, 47, 49, 59, 113, 166, 182, 224

F Feng You-Lan, 105, 210, 288

Index For itself, 65, 134, 145, 147, 152, 153, 165, 169, 214, 217, 236, 237 Formal logic, 6, 8, 37, 38, 47–56, 59–61, 70, 75, 182, 224 Formal thought, 2, 5, 6, 61, 62 Form of consciousness, 104 Freedom, 5, 11–14, 16–18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 61–63, 109, 134, 137, 181, 182, 189, 195–197, 199, 201, 206, 208, 218, 223, 235–237, 243, 245, 292 Freedom of the whole, 16, 20

G Gadamer, 32, 41, 43, 106 Good, 42, 65, 87, 125, 138, 162, 163, 171– 173, 175, 177, 217, 227, 233, 259, 301, 315, 317

H Habermas, 242 Hegel, 2–25, 27, 28, 38, 39, 48, 54–56, 61– 65, 74, 75, 82, 91–94, 106, 109–111, 118, 122, 129–134, 137, 142, 147, 152, 161, 164, 166, 169–171, 180, 182, 183, 186, 188, 190, 191, 194, 195, 197, 199–201, 203, 204, 208, 209, 212, 218, 220, 223–225, 229, 233–256, 258–265, 267, 270, 271, 279, 280, 282–286, 299, 314 Heidegger, 41, 106, 133, 135, 213, 214, 287, 288 Heisenberg, 232 He Lin, 111, 210 Hermeneutics, 41, 43, 64, 155, 157, 210 Historical materialism, 9, 28, 70, 152, 240, 265, 273, 286, 297, 301, 302, 305, 308, 314, 315 Historical thinking, 148 History and logic, 65, 71, 75, 152, 197, 203, 262, 305 Human liberation, 246, 311, 313, 314, 318 Husserl, 180

I Idea, 1, 11–14, 22, 33, 72, 74, 99, 106, 109, 142, 152, 170, 171, 180, 191, 194, 199, 201, 208, 210, 220, 237, 252, 256, 258, 260, 263, 274, 279, 280, 286, 299, 300, 303, 305, 308, 314 Idealism, 7, 9, 11, 24, 26, 28, 32, 37, 41, 44, 56, 57, 91, 97, 109, 151, 156, 159,

329 162, 166, 168, 170, 175, 190, 197, 203, 254, 256, 258, 263–265, 267– 269, 273, 274, 279, 280, 284, 293, 294, 301, 304, 312, 318 Identity philosophy, 201, 238, 240–243, 247 Immanent emergence of distinctions, 130, 236, 251, 263 Impersonal reason, 24, 25, 28, 62, 75, 197, 200, 246, 268, 286 In and for itself, 81, 134, 147, 153, 169, 171, 192, 237 Independence of people\independence of individuals, 33 Individual reason, 18, 236, 237, 245 Individual self-consciousness, 108, 110, 282 Individuals’ mutual dependence, 292 Induction, 141, 166, 167 Inherent negativity, 11, 15, 21, 22, 32, 210, 211 In itself, 8, 11, 12, 23, 35, 62, 134, 141, 145, 147, 152, 153, 165, 169, 170, 214, 236, 237, 251, 253, 261, 298, 320 Intellectual quintessence of its time, The, 103, 110, 184, 188, 193, 221, 282, 283, 286, 287, 289, 291, 317, 319, 321 Intellectual thought, 77 Intensional logic, 6, 20, 26, 39, 44, 47, 59– 61, 63–65, 67, 69–71, 75, 147, 152, 166, 181, 182, 198, 220, 224, 242, 244–246, 303, 314 Intuitive reflection theory, 2, 3, 5, 264, 266, 267, 270, 271, 274, 279, 300, 301, 317 Isaiah Berlin, 243

K Kant, 10, 11, 14, 15, 20, 27, 38, 54, 56, 106, 109, 118, 168–170, 180, 190, 209, 252, 283, 284

L Lenin, 4, 7, 8, 16, 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 30, 38, 47, 48, 55–59, 79, 80, 82, 91, 92, 111, 132, 134, 140, 145, 164, 167, 170, 171, 176, 182, 190–192, 216, 224, 225, 229, 230, 232–234, 245, 248–272, 275, 279, 280, 297–299, 310, 316 Linguistic turn, 156–160, 289, 290 Logical positivism, 39

330 Logical priority, 11, 14, 15, 17, 134, 152, 169, 236, 244, 246 Logic of the movement of human thought, 13–21, 23, 24, 38, 39, 122, 169, 244 Love of wisdom, 114

M Mao Ze-Dong, 272 Materialism, 4, 5, 14, 20, 24, 26, 28, 41, 44, 56, 57, 91, 119, 151, 152, 167, 168, 197, 199, 203, 249, 254, 255, 257– 261, 263–269, 273, 274, 279, 280, 284, 293, 297–301, 304, 305, 311, 312, 314 Materialization, 285, 293, 319, 320 Measure of man, 27, 145, 153, 175 Measure of things, 153, 175, 197, 319 Mediation of noumenon, 28 Metaphysics, 11–14, 25, 44, 88, 92, 124, 135, 191–203, 206, 213, 220, 221, 223, 225, 226, 228–230, 232, 234– 238, 240–249 Mode of thought in metaphysics, 28, 42 Mode of thought of essential reductionism, 317 Mode of thought with a practical viewpoint, 5 M•White, 120, 122, 199

N Necessity, 19, 20, 23, 24, 80, 90, 107, 111, 121, 130, 163–165, 171, 182, 189, 195, 198, 200, 207, 210, 211, 223, 228, 233, 235–237, 243, 246, 251, 257, 263, 285, 306 Negative unity, 35, 82, 145, 146, 148, 149, 175–177, 192, 234, 239, 263, 268, 306, 313, 314 Noumenological mode of thought, 138 Noumenological pursuit, 138, 139 Noumenon, 134–139, 148, 165, 166, 182, 197, 202–207, 211, 215–222, 296

O Object, 2–5, 9, 11–14, 17, 20, 24, 27–30, 35, 37, 38, 43, 50–53, 57, 58, 62– 64, 66–68, 70, 71, 76–79, 81, 86, 87, 89–91, 94, 95, 97–100, 106, 107, 114–119, 122, 125, 126, 132–136, 140–142, 144, 145, 147, 148, 152, 156, 158–168, 171–173, 175–177,

Index 180–183, 187, 192, 194, 195, 197, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210, 211, 215, 218–221, 223–227, 230, 232, 233, 235, 238, 241, 242, 252– 254, 257, 259, 262, 264, 266, 268– 272, 279, 284–286, 290, 297–300, 302–304, 306–310, 312, 317, 318, 320 Objectification, 25, 27–29, 63, 78, 82, 145, 166, 216 Objective, 2, 8, 14, 17, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27– 29, 35, 37, 39, 41, 48, 55–58, 62, 63, 65, 69, 75–81, 107, 108, 126, 137, 140, 142–144, 146, 148, 152, 156, 158, 163–165, 168–171, 175– 177, 192, 201, 205–207, 214, 216, 233, 244, 247, 249, 251, 252, 254– 260, 265, 267–271, 273–275, 277– 280, 290, 298–300, 302, 303, 306, 310, 312 Objectivity of thought, 12, 116, 157, 159, 163–171, 198, 243, 244 Ontological commitment, 14, 135, 169, 170, 203, 211–213 Ontology\noumenology, 134, 135, 137, 139–142, 145, 147–149, 162 P Phenomenology, 2–6, 23, 61, 64, 180, 208, 210, 285 Philosophy of science\scientific philosophy, 39–41, 44, 64, 123, 143, 182, 199, 213 Plato, 14, 38, 106, 156, 166, 190, 197, 201, 207, 209, 247, 283 Platonism, 197 Positivism, 124, 188, 270 Practical logic, 47, 75, 76, 78, 82 Practical materialism, 297, 302, 306, 309, 310, 312–315 Practical reason, 27, 291 Practical turn, 290, 309 Practice, 5, 28–30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 57, 58, 72, 75–83, 95, 106, 112, 120, 137, 145, 146, 148, 152, 156, 158, 159, 161, 171, 175, 182, 192, 199, 206, 214– 216, 226, 234, 242, 243, 246, 247, 255, 259, 260, 262, 268–270, 272– 281, 290, 295, 297–302, 305–314, 319 Premise, 1, 2, 5–8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 20, 37, 45, 47–56, 59–61, 71, 75, 76, 81, 85, 89, 95, 97, 98, 105, 112, 116, 117,

Index 122, 125, 126, 129, 135, 136, 139, 143, 144, 146–150, 152–154, 158– 160, 164, 168–171, 177, 179–186, 189, 191, 198, 199, 201, 205, 211, 217, 219, 220, 222, 223, 234, 236, 239, 244, 245, 248, 254, 266, 267, 270, 280, 295, 298, 299, 304, 309, 318, 319, 321 Premises of thought, 1, 85, 148, 180, 205, 220 Principle of development, 250, 265, 267 Pure being, 15, 129–136, 140, 148, 204, 206 Purposiveness, 27, 29, 33, 108, 145, 149, 153, 160, 171, 175, 192, 301, 319 Q Question of the relation between thought and being, 10, 47, 59, 115, 116, 134, 136, 139, 141, 144, 147–149, 158, 168, 179–182, 184, 219, 231, 256, 266, 269, 271, 279, 280, 289, 290, 302–305, 309, 312 R Rational concrete, 70, 265, 271 Rationalism, 39, 161, 201, 214, 247, 248, 320 Reason, 8, 10, 12, 16, 18, 25, 28, 49, 52, 66, 77, 86, 90, 93, 101, 104, 105, 107, 113, 121, 122, 156, 157, 161, 165– 169, 180, 182, 194, 195, 197–201, 205, 209, 213–215, 221, 223, 233, 235, 242, 285, 286, 292, 294, 296, 300 Reflection, 2, 3, 5, 7–10, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 30, 32, 33, 37–39, 43, 48, 51, 52, 54–56, 64, 72, 75–77, 79, 81, 82, 85, 86, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 103, 106, 107, 109, 115–120, 123, 125, 127, 134, 135, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 146–148, 156–160, 162– 171, 175, 177, 180–184, 187, 190, 192–198, 201, 204, 206–208, 210, 211, 213, 215, 218–220, 222–225, 227, 231–233, 245, 252, 253, 255– 257, 259, 260, 263, 264, 266–271, 274, 279, 282, 284, 289, 290, 296, 300–302, 304–315, 317–320 Regularity, 27, 29, 33, 76, 107, 108, 115, 145, 149, 150, 153, 160, 164, 171, 175, 198, 243, 301, 311, 319, 320 Reichenbach, 123, 199, 200, 213, 221

331 Reject metaphysics, 223, 226 Representation, 9, 37, 53, 86, 87, 91, 112, 115, 141, 161–167, 188, 191, 197, 218, 221–223, 229, 230, 233, 250, 253, 269 Representational thought, 2–5, 10, 11, 23, 24, 52, 53, 61, 62 Rorty, 106, 196, 209 S Sacred form, 102, 104, 181, 183, 184, 188, 194, 196, 222, 241, 246, 285, 295, 296, 314, 315 Saussure, 155 Science, 4, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 17–23, 27, 28, 30, 31, 38–40, 42–45, 47–49, 51, 53– 55, 59–61, 63–67, 71, 73, 75, 85, 90, 94–97, 100, 101, 103, 107–127, 129– 131, 140, 141, 143, 144, 147, 166, 171, 174, 177, 181, 182, 191, 193, 194, 196, 198, 199, 201, 203, 209, 210, 213, 217, 219–221, 224, 227– 229, 232, 235, 242, 243, 245, 248– 252, 254–256, 258–265, 267, 270, 271, 278, 280, 284, 289, 290, 293, 297, 307–309, 315–319 Scientism, 114, 123, 124, 143, 193, 203, 213, 214, 219, 220, 294, 311, 319, 320 Secular form, 104, 183, 184, 188, 194, 196, 201, 202, 222, 241, 246, 247, 285, 295, 296, 314, 315 Self-alienation, 102, 104, 183, 184, 188, 194, 201, 202, 222, 241, 246, 247, 285, 295, 296, 314, 315 Self-consciousness, 4, 9, 13, 18, 19, 22, 48, 70, 97, 101, 102, 108, 110, 133, 166, 184–186, 190–192, 194, 196, 197, 201, 202, 210, 234, 247, 281, 282, 284, 288, 290, 291, 293, 294, 296, 303, 313, 317, 318 Self-critique of ontology, 212, 248 Self-reflection, 13, 16, 21, 63, 81, 94, 121 Sensibility, 188 Sensuous activity, 57, 80, 232, 312 Sociality, 69, 76, 320 Sovereignty, 23, 138, 139, 145, 147, 192, 193, 213, 214, 216 Speculative thought, 6, 10, 11, 23, 24, 62, 262 Spirit, 2–6, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20, 23, 26–28, 31, 39, 41, 43, 61–64, 96, 97, 99, 100, 104, 105, 109–111, 115, 118– 122, 124, 140–142, 148, 149, 153,

332 156, 177, 181, 182, 185, 192, 197, 203, 208–211, 237, 238, 240–242, 244, 251, 282, 285, 287, 289, 298, 303, 307, 315, 317–319, 321 Subject, 1, 6, 8–11, 14, 15, 17, 20, 24, 26– 30, 35, 37, 38, 43–45, 47, 48, 50, 55, 58, 59, 62, 70, 76–78, 83, 85, 87, 88, 99, 106, 116, 118, 120, 125, 133–136, 145, 152, 158, 159, 161, 165, 167, 169, 170, 172–174, 179, 180, 182, 186, 197, 202, 204, 205, 207, 215, 216, 223, 227, 233, 235–237, 241, 242, 244, 250, 254, 263, 266, 269, 270, 272, 279, 280, 286, 298, 300, 302, 305, 306, 309, 310, 313 Subjective, 1, 12, 14, 25, 27, 28, 31, 39, 41, 44, 48, 56, 63, 78–81, 91, 121, 137, 142, 143, 156, 158, 162, 168–170, 172, 173, 197, 201, 205, 206, 216, 244, 247, 252, 254, 256, 258, 259, 273, 274, 280, 290, 293, 298, 300, 310 Sublime, 222, 289, 294–296 Supernaturality, 76, 77 T Theoretical thought, 1, 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 15, 18, 22, 32, 33, 48, 49, 51–56, 59, 90, 100, 101, 103, 104, 112–117, 123– 125, 170, 179, 180, 182, 183, 186, 188, 189, 196, 198, 204, 206, 210– 212, 216, 219, 220, 225, 228, 231, 234, 244, 245, 248, 253, 254, 258, 259, 266, 280, 288, 298, 304, 309, 315, 316, 321 Thing-in-itself, 14, 27, 168 Thinking about history, 148 Transcendence, 32–34, 37, 76, 79, 89, 90, 93–96, 98, 100, 112–114, 117–119, 161, 165, 182, 204, 220, 248, 254, 284 Transcendental logic, 54 Transcendental philosophy, 14, 20

Index Transition, 6–8, 19, 21, 25, 41, 58, 63, 80, 144, 228, 233, 234, 243, 251, 253, 260, 292, 300, 301, 305, 311, 319, 320 Truth, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 18, 20, 25, 27–30, 34, 39, 42, 43, 50, 92, 104, 106–111, 118, 120–122, 124–127, 129, 137, 138, 142, 147, 156, 160–166, 171, 172, 174–177, 182–184, 191, 193– 195, 198, 200, 201, 204–206, 209, 216, 217, 223, 225, 229–233, 235, 237, 243, 244, 246–248, 250, 259, 260, 272, 274, 277–279, 281, 283, 285, 294, 295, 300–302, 305, 312, 313, 317

U Ultimate being, 23, 82, 83, 146, 192, 206– 217, 222, 295 Ultimate explanation, 23, 82, 83, 146, 207– 211, 213–217 Ultimate value, 23, 82, 83, 146, 207–210, 214–216 Universal law, 10, 115, 256, 269, 283, 307– 309, 313 Universal reason, 18, 196, 201, 216, 236, 237, 239, 242, 245, 247 Use value, 68, 69, 73, 89, 263

W Wartofsky, 40, 64, 119, 143, 144, 195, 211, 243, 244 World outlook, 98, 101, 103, 139, 141, 142, 144–149, 159, 181, 194, 199, 210, 225, 250, 266, 272, 274, 279, 281, 298, 299, 303, 304, 307–310, 312, 314, 317, 319, 321

Z Zeitgeist, 17–19