A New Model of Political Reasoning: China and Human Rights [1st ed. 2021] 981334802X, 9789813348028

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A New Model of Political Reasoning China and Human Rights

Kanzhen Li

A New Model of Political Reasoning

Kanzhen Li

A New Model of Political Reasoning China and Human Rights

Kanzhen Li China Foreign Affairs University Beijng, China

ISBN 978-981-33-4802-8    ISBN 978-981-33-4803-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4803-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover pattern © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgements

This book initially develops from my Ph.D. thesis. So I give the most thanks to the University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China, in which I completed my Bachelor, Master, and Ph.D. I thank many teachers there who are in the company of my years of youth (from 2004 to 2015). I want to give my special thanks to my Ph.D. supervisors Catherine Goetze and David Kiwuwa. They are the first readers of my thesis, giving approval as well as comments. I thank professors who attended my oral defense, who offered suggestions and decided a pass with a three-month revision. I also want to thank China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing, in which I do my postdoctoral research. The teachers there are friendly. I want to thank my professor Su Hao. The library and the cafe near the university are good places to read. Postdoctoral research provides me time and sources to think about and revise my thesis. I want to thank my family, which always gives encouragement to me. I cannot have time to finish the book without their supports. I also thank editors Jacob Dreyer and Srishti Gupta for their patience and assistance.

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Contents

1 Introduction  1 Part I The Motivation-Heuristic Complex  29 2 Approaching Political Reasoning 31 3 Two Tiers of Motivation-Heuristics 47 4 Two Tiers’ Interaction 79 5 Reasoning Outcome: Form and Type 91 Part II The Empirical Part  97 6 Empirical Connection: The China Case 99 7 China and Human Rights: Two Layers of Considerations113 8 Pre-1997: National Survival Strategy153

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9 Post-1997: Towards Balance Between National Survival and Meaningfulness179 10 Conclusion217 Bibliography229

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 5.1

Fig. 7.1

A Pyramid of political reasoning 33 Two tiers of motivation-heuristics 48 “Two Degrees” and Two Tiers’ relative power 80 “Two degrees” and types of political reasoning outcome (x: Degree of Self-Persuasion Moving from Low to High; y: Degree of Survival-Relativity Moving from Low to High; Types of Survival-Meaning Relation: A (balanced mix with lower self-persuasion and lower survival-relativity); C (balanced mix with higher self-persuasion and higher survival-relativity); D (survival-prioritized mix); B (Meaning-prioritized mix); and Somewhere between D and B around the intersection point of the axis (balanced mix) promoted by a decreased (increased) degree of survival-relativity plus an increased (decreased) degree of self-persuasion (somewhere between D and B, around the intersection point of the axis) 94 Number of International Human Rights Treaties that China had started to accept (sign, ratify, or access). (Sources: Concluded from the long table cited in Jing 2009 (pp. 170–173) and data about China and human rights treaties which can be searched in the homepage of the web (umn.edu) cited by Jing (p. 173): http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/ convention.asp?KO=12949&language=E&order=alpha)116

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List of Figures

Fig. 8.1

Fig. 9.1

Frequency of Criticisms of the West Concerning Human Rights. Source: Concluded from the observation of the proportion of articles that criticize the West among almost all People’s Daily articles about human rights from 1990 to 2012163 The proportion of People’s Daily articles mentioning particularity-­universality combination. (Source: Concluded from the observation of nearly all People’s Daily articles concerning human rights from1990 to 2012) 185

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The question that initially inspires this project is the complex nexus between strategic-driven and ideational-driven behaviors in political realms. If actors (individuals or other kinds) are driven by material impulses (as rationalism argue),1 why they seem to attach to values in some situations indeed? For example, Israel accepts the western culture initially for a better relationship with the U.S., but such acceptance persists after such security consideration weakens.2 If actors are driven by ideas (as constructivism argue),3 why they often return to strategic pay-offs at the expense of practicing or combating the norms/rules they favor or abhor? For example, countries that support absolute human rights hesitated to intervene to stop the disaster in Rwanda in the 1994 but acted quickly in the Kosovo case in late 1990s, with the latter involves strategic interests, but the former does not.4 Why the UK want to separate from the European Union, which previously seems to be a typical case of a regional entity bound by a collective identity5? Why the U.S. turns to protectionism at the expense of the spirit of economic/political freedom (both domestically and internationally) it always insists? Although the examples refer to different cases, one can feel that it is not a  Burchill et al. (2005), ch. 2–3, ch. 8.  Katzenstein (1996), ch. 11. 3  Burchill et al. (2005), ch. 8. 4  Brown (2005), 223–225. 5  For the idea of collective identity see Wendt (1992, 1999). 1 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 K. Li, A New Model of Political Reasoning, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4803-5_1

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stand-off question: strategies do not control completely and persistently, nor do the ideational considerations. The strategic and conceptual sides must co-exist and have dynamic relations so that actors’ behaviors continue and vary across time and space. If it is true, what are the internal mechanisms that shape such co-existence and dynamic relations for one to understand the nature and the diversity of political behaviors? The book (it’s theoretical backgrounds/contributions, it’s model and empirical illustration) fundamentally serves the above question. This book explores the internal mechanisms by building a political reasoning model of motivation-heuristic complex. Political reasoning is essential in understanding political outcomes. For example, only when one knows “how precisely actors are exposed to, receive, process, and then act upon the normative arguments” can one understand actors’ attitudes towards norms in “social environments”.6 Moreover, only when one know “the manner through which state learning transmits information about international change” can they predict how states will react to the dynamics of international relations.7 The motivation-heuristic complex explains how motivations (i.e., what A intrinsically wants) and heuristics (i.e., how A establishes understanding) combine to shape political reasoning. The political reasoning model of motivation-heuristic complex is basically constructed through the theoretical inspiration of, and contributions to, a synthesis of various theoretical tenets, which are: (1) Theories of Major International Relations (IR); (2) A psychological approach to politics e.g., psychological theories and developments and various literature in political psychology; and (3) literature on the ontology of political studies such as the material-idea relation.8 Basically speaking, the model proposes that the two tiers of motivation-­ heuristics continuously shape political reasoning, one being material/strategic and the other ideational. Meanwhile, the two levels interact due to their development laws, which shape the type of political reasoning outcome defined by the relative weight between the strategic and ideational considerations. The framework of political reasoning the project establishes is applied to explain the driving forces behind the Chinese policy elite’s attitude, in terms of ideas and policies, towards human rights since the end of the  Johnston (2001, 488).  Farkas (1998, 1). 8  Hay (2002). 6 7

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Cold War. Through such an application, the framework is both tested and illustrated and brings new insights into China and human rights. The empirical findings basically emphasize that: firstly, China’s human rights idea/policy is continuously driven by the Chinese policy elite’s mixed struggles for strategic and ideational goals; secondly, the two layers’ interaction shape the evolution of the Chinese policy elite’s political reasoning outcome type (the strategic-ideational relative weight) concerning human rights across two periods (one is the pre-1997 period and the other is the post-1997 period). The following section firstly explains the project’s theoretical background and contribution. It then illustrates how the theoretical model it builds brings new insights to the understanding of China’s human rights idea/policy compared to current literature in this field. Finally, an outline of following chapters allows a quick insight into how the theoretical frame is gradually built, what it is about, how it helps explain the case of China and human rights, and the conclusion.

1.1   Theoretical Basis and Contribution The explanation of the theoretical basis and contribution of the political reasoning model of motivation-heuristic complex is made in three sections. Firstly, it explains how the project’s attempts to build a motivation-­ heuristic complex participate in the rising research trend in political psychology, and how such a research focus might contribute to traditional major IR theories. Secondly, it stresses that the building of a motivation-­ heuristic complex is made through the synthesization of theories—mainly from psychology, IR theories, and literature in political psychology. It explains the reasons behind such a synthetic approach. It recognizes the emerging attempts at synthesizing psychology and IR theories that shape one newly fascinating development in IR and political studies. The project joins with such synthetic attempts in its own way. Thirdly, linked to the central aim of the book, it relates the project’s theoretical effort to addressing the classical question of material-idea relation in political studies. An explanation is made as to if and why there is a long-term stand-off tradition in major IR theories in consideration of the material-idea relation. Then, it articulates how the project’s framework of motivation-heuristic complex provides an experiment for the integration of material and ideational aspects.

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The Motivation-Heuristic Complex It is important to mention that both motivation and heuristics drive political reasoning. Motivations help shape the goals of social and political behaviors.9 As Maslow notes: “Man is a wanting animal… It is a characteristic of the human being throughout his whole life that he is practically always desiring something”.10 Butterfield argues that “wars would hardly be likely to occur if all men were Christian saints, competing with one another in nothing, perhaps, save self-renunciation”.11 Heuristics are a necessary part of political reasoning, and are important in accounting for political behavior. Actors’ conceptions of self and their external surroundings partly determine what they will do.12 According to some political/ social psychologists: “The process of ‘cognition’—the dynamics of the mind—produces the ‘beliefs’ and constructs (such as ‘images’ and ‘schemas’) that allow humans to make sense of their environment”.13 Accessing “the types of heuristics on which a person is likely to rely can help one understand what policy that individual might recommend in a given situation”.14 “Ideas should be accorded a crucial role in political explanation, since actors behave the way they do because they hold certain views about the social and political environment they inhabit”.15  otivation-Heuristic Complex, Political Psychology and IR M The motivation-heuristic complex’s relation to political psychology and IR is two-fold. Firstly, it allies with, and gains inspiration from, the reviving trend to combine motivations (and emotions) with cognition in political psychology, the so-called “cognitive-affective-motivational nexus”.16 Secondly, it fills two gaps in the traditional IR theories (ignoring its new developments in this part): (1) The stand-off between motivations and heuristics in theorizations of political reasoning in traditional IR theories; and (2) a general lack of ontological attention paid to the relation between motivation and heuristics in the development of traditional IR theories.  Burchill et al. (2005, 41); Maslow (1954, 24); Wendt (1999, 112–113).  Maslow (1954, 24). 11  Burchill et al. (2005, 41). 12  Farkas (1998); Wendt (1999). 13  Rosati and Miller (2010). 14  Farkas (1998, 39). 15  Hay (2002, 213). 16  Rosati and Miller (2010). 9

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The Motivation-Heuristic Complex and Political Psychology The intention to build a motivation-heuristic complex allies with as well as inspired by emerging attempts at combining motivation and cognition in political psychology.17 With the realization of the inappropriateness of a singular focus on cognitive dynamics which, alongside an ignorance of motivation, has led some political/social psychologists to emphasize the importance of adding motivation to the analysis of attitudes and behaviors.18 Katz, by making an earlier such attempt, theorizes how four kinds of motivations shape their corresponding types of attitudes: “At the psychological level the reasons for holding or for changing attitudes are found in the functions they perform for the individual, specifically the functions of adjustment, ego defense, value expression, and knowledge. The conditions necessary to arouse or modify an attitude vary according to the motivational basis of the attitude”.19 Fiske and Taylor point out that “as the cognitive miser viewpoint has matured, the importance of motivations and emotions has again become evident. Having developed considerable sophistication about people’s cognitive process, researchers are beginning to appreciate anew the interesting and important influences of motivation on cognition”.20 Thus, the model of motivation-heuristic complex that this project develops joins with this rising trend with its own approach. The Motivation-Heuristic Complex and IR Theories  Stand-Off Position A When examined through the lens of the motivation-heuristic relationship, major IR theories tend to focus on one, while downplaying the role of the other. While rationalism focuses on motivations and undervalues idea creation (heuristics), social constructivism attaches importance to idea creation and downplays the role of motivation.21 Rationalism (including neorealism and neoliberalism) gives motivation special importance.22 Firstly, rationalism considers the most important strategic needs of states (e.g., survival) as pre-existing and constant with  Rosati and Miller (2010).  Rosati and Miller (2010). 19  Katz (1960), the whole article and p. 163. 20  Rosati and Miller (2010). 21  Burchill et al. (2005, 192); Hay (2002, 195–196); Wendt (1992). 22  Burchill et al. (2005, 40–44, 188–193). 17 18

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little possibility of being influenced by social interactions.23 Secondly, state behaviors are fundamentally shaped by pre-existing strategic needs so that they use various means, ranging from balancing to institutional cooperation, to meet their strategic motives.24 Compared to this, the role of idea creation is undervalued.25 It is true that actors’ realizations of their goals and possible strategies might refer to understandings and interpretations.26 However, since actors can completely realize, and respond most efficiently to, the external dynamics according to their pre-existing material needs, the process of strategy selection is more likely a mechanical adaption during which idea creation can be ignored.27 According to Hay, “rationalism dispenses with the ‘problem’ of ideas in political analysis”, firstly by assuming that “actors have perfect or near-perfect information of the environment in which they find themselves, such that they know how to behave in such a way as to maximize their utility in any given context”, and secondly by emphasizing that material interests are given objectively in such a way that...actors will...come to perceive of those interests in an identical fashion”.28 Rationalist reasoning, according to Hindmoor, amounts to “obviously stylized sketches of actors’ beliefs and desires”.29 Social constructivism, as has been widely acknowledged, traditionally emphasizes the power of idea.30 Constructivists are interested in “how human beings collectively interpret and impose shared meanings on objects and actions, because in so doing, human beings collectively produce their own social realities”.31 Actors’ intentions and behaviors in political life are shaped by their understandings which are influenced by normative and interactional surroundings.32 But the determinant role of motivation is downplayed here. Firstly, and most fundamentally, constructivists emphasize the social-dependent  Burchill et al. (2005, 40–44, 189–193); Hay (2002, 196); Ruggie (1998, 855).  Burchill et al. (2005, 188–193, ch. 2–3); Keohane (1986, 273–275); Checkel (2001, 555–560); Nye (1988, 218); Ruggie (1998, 855). 25  Hay (2002, 196). 26  Hindmoor (2006, 214). 27  Burchill et al. (2005, 40–44, 189–193); Hay (2002, 8, 196); Hindmoor (2006, 183, 190, 214–218); Johnston (2001, 489); Nye (1988, 218); Ruggie (1998, 855). 28  Hay (2002, 196). 29  Hindmoor (2006, 217–218). 30  Burchill et al. (2005, ch. 8). 31  Sterling-Folker (2006, 116). 32  Baylis et al. (2008, 162–167); Guzzini (2000, 150–160). 23 24

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nature of motivation, which reduces the role of motivation to the role of idea construction.33 “Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations”.34 Thus, although in many conditions constructivists mention motivations (ranging from political to social ones), they emphasize the power of social construction in determining political outcomes, during which idea creation plays a key role.35 Wendt recognizes the state’s inherent needs (“objective interests”) for physical, material, and psychological well-being, but he stresses the determinant power of the understandings of the pathways (which he calls the “subjective interests”) towards these “objective interests” in shaping the nature of interstate relations.36 Johnston mentions that the desire for “status” and the consequent intention to increase “social rewards” against “social sanctions” encourage actors’ acceptance of new social norms; but, again, he stresses the power of social interaction and “a commong understanding” in determining the role of such desire.37 As Johnston emphasizes, “[social] rewards and sanctions cannot exist without the prior existence of a group and without a common understanding of the value or meaning that the group places on putative status markers. This much, at least, must be shared by the actor and the group”.38 Meanwhile, Risse recognizes the function of interests, but he renders pre-existing interests to social construction by focusing on the conditions in which actors are uncertain about their interests.39 Tannenwald also recognizes the instrumental usage of norms by political leaders for position and power (motivations), but stresses the importance of following the definition of a “civilized state” in determining policy.40 Some constructivists emphasize the role of emotion in determining the

33  Baylis et al. (2008, ch. 9); Burchill et al. (2005, ch. 8); Philpott (2001, 47–48); Wendt (1992, 1999). 34  Wendt (1992, 398). 35  Burchill et al. (2005, 198); Johnston (2001, 499–502); Katzenstein (1996, 20–21, 23, 24–25); Morgan (2000); Philpott (2001, 47); Wendt (1992, 398–399; 1994, 385; 1995, 7; 1999, 96, 112–136). 36  Wendt (1994, 385; 1999, 233–242). 37  Johnston (2001, 499–506). 38  Johnston (2001, 502). 39  Risse (2000, 6–7, 19), and the whole article. 40  Tannenwald (1999, 435, 437, 462).

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likelihood of new norm acceptance,41 but emotion cannot replace more basic desires. Secondly, contributing to the lack of the importance of motivation in constructivism, is the fact that constructivists’ articulation of motivation is incoherent.42 For one thing, Wendt stresses the importance of the motive of recognition by others in driving political behavior.43 By treating motivation for recognition as another motivation beside the motivation for survival put forward by Waltz, Wendt seems to treat motivation for recognition as pre-existing.44 Welch, as a further example, views motivation for justice as the driving force for war.45 These attempts to theorize motivation, however, contradict sharply with constructivism’s classical emphasis on the social-dependent nature of motivation. For the other, the content of “motivations” in constructivism is too loose. At times, constructivists allow a combination of material/strategic motives with ideational needs, with or without clarifying their relative importance.46 In most cases constructivists focus on ideational and psychological needs in their accounting for actors’ vulnerability to socialization, but the contents of these motivations are defined in various forms, such as desires for: justice, recognition, the maintenance of “stable role identities”, reputation, legitimacy, status, esteem, etc.47 The dilemma of a lack of explicitness in constructivist theorizations of motivation further demonstrates the lack of importance of motivation to constructivism. Such disjointedness hinders motivation from having legitimate importance in constructivism; and might also be a result of constructivist usage of the concept of motivation to support the power of social construction when it is needed, rather than treating motivation as a core theoretical theme. Thus, the motivation-heuristic complex this project tries to develop aims to reach a balance between motivation and idea creation, a balance  Finnemore (2003, 153–157); Johnston (2001, 496–497).  Wendt (1992, 398–399; 1994, 385; 1999, 96, 112–136). 43  Wendt (2003, 507–516). 44  Burchill et al. (2005, ch. 8) (section of Rationalist theory); Wendt (2003, 507–516). 45  Levy (1996). 46  Cronin (2001, 103, 105, 107–113); Katzenstein (1996, 202); Keck and Sikkink (1998, 16, 28–29); Philpott (2001, 47–49, 53); Reus-Smit (2004, 38); Wendt (2003, 517). 47  Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 2–8, 123); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896–901, 903–904); Johnston (2001, 499–502); Keck and Sikkink (1998, 16, 28–29); Kellman (1998); Levy (1996); Rae (2002, 2–10, 299–307); Reus-Smit (1997, 569–570); Wendt (1992, 411; 2003, 507–516). 41 42

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that is traditionally absent in the theorization of political reasoning in traditional IR theories.  he Question of Ontology T Taking a step further, this project emphasizes that traditional IR theories should pay more attention to the ontology of motivation-heuristic relations which are important in political (social)-psychological studies. The evolution of political/social psychology is considerably, although not completely, shaped by different scholarly positions in such an ontological debate.48 However, little importance is attached to such debate in IR theories which largely revolve around two ontological debates: agent-structure and material-idea.49 Thus, the ontological question of the relation between motivations and heuristics needs to be brought into IR theories from political/social psychology. Only by doing this can IR scholars find more ways to develop IR theories with a better balance between motivation and heuristics. Integrating Psychology and IR Theories There is an important emerging trend in political studies which is integrating psychology and IR theories. The trend is especially, and increasingly, clear in the realm of constructivism,50 but it is also seen in the realm of rationalism.51 Such a trend is both progressive and ineluctable since it meets both the advantage of theoretical synthesis and the fundamental importance (and also limitations) of human psychology for political studies. In its own way, this project joins the psycho-IR integration, not only because of its advantages, but also because of its importance for the motivation-­ heuristic balance that the motivation-heuristic complex requires. The latter has already been proved by the newly rationalist/constructivist works of literature that integrate with the psychological approach.

 McDermott (2004); Rosati and Miller (2010); Tetlock and Levi (1982).  Hay (2002); Hollis and Smith (1990); Marsh and Stoker (2002). 50  For example see Lebow (2008). 51  For example see Farkas (1998). 48 49

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Advantage of Theoretical Synthesis The advantage of the method of theoretical synthesis, either within or cross-disciplinary, is immense. Katzenstein and Okawara, for example, oppose “the privileging of parsimony that has become the hallmark of paradigmatic debates”, and emphasize that “[t]hey are made more intelligible by drawing selectively on different paradigms—that is, by analytical eclecticism, not parsimony”.52 Burchill and Linklater conclude that “[t]he influence of other disciplines and cognate fields is now pronounced in the subject, and many strands of international relations theory deny that the subject has a distinctive subject matter or can proceed without borrowing heavily from languages of inquiry in other fields of investigation”.53 Concluding a symposium on cross-disciplinary research in International Studies, James noted that: “History, psychology, technology studies, and neuroeconomics…reveal significant accomplishments and great potential for further application to international studies”.54 Both within-disciplinary and cross-disciplinary theoretical synthesis have emerged as developing research methods. Although the difficulties and limitations of synthesis have been realized, they continue to capture attention.55 Within the discipline of IR, attempts have been made to synthesize rationalism and social constructivism.56 Jackson, for example, collects scholarly debates on the communication and linkage between realism and constructivism.57 Zala combines realist and constructivist approaches to theorize polarity shaped not by relative material strength, but by “collective perception” of status in the international system.58 Across disciplines, attempts have been made to synthesize IR theories, such as rationalism and constructivism, and psychological approaches.59

 Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/2, 154).  Burchill et al. (2005, 11). 54  James (2011, 93) (quotation) and the whole article. 55  Baylis et al. (2008, 167); Burchill et al. (2005, 11); Checkel (2001, 581); Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/2). 56  Baylis et al. (2008, 167); Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/2). 57  Jackson (2004). 58  Zala (2017). 59  Farkas (1998); Shannon and Kowert (2012). 52 53

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Emerging Integration Between Psychology and IR Theories The importance of psychological approaches in political studies is well recognized,60 and from this the discipline of political psychology grows.61 “[P]olitical psychology provides a particularly humanistic slant on politics by asserting the importance of individual psychological processes to political outcomes”.62 However, it is undeniable that a psychological political approach (or political psychology) has limitations. Such limitations include, but are not restricted to: (1) The lack of an agreed model in replacing a “diverse set of claims”; and especially (2) The reliance on the individual level that weakens the approach to more collective and systematic political phenomenon.63 The importance of psychology, and its limitations, to political studies necessarily encourages investigation of attempts at a deeper level of integration between psychology and IR theories,64 and such attempts are prominent in new developments in both constructivism and rationalism. Constructivism There is recognition that the incorporation of psychological elements into constructivism could help supplement micro dynamics to a constructivist portrait of an ideational world.65 It is true that constructivists often use the concepts of psychological and social psychological approaches to build and support their arguments.66 Neverthless, traditional constructivism largely supports the power of idea in the social/political world (i.e., culture and norm) from a structural (or macro and “top”) angle.67 The integration between psychology and constructivism could make the constructivist explanation of IR more competent through allying both micro and structural levels.68 There is a new trend of integration between psychology and constructivism. Lebow’s pathbreaking book is marked by Hymans as signaling the  Shannon and Kowert (2012, 1–29).  McDermott (2004, ch. 1). 62  McDermott (2004, 3). 63  Shannon and Kowert (2012, 18–19). 64  Shannon and Kowert (2012). 65  Hymans (2010); Shannon and Kowert (2012, 7, 14–15). 66  Finnemore (2003, ch. 5); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 903–904); Johnston (2001); Levy (1996); Wendt (1992, 410–411). 67  Hymans (2010, 462); Shannon and Kowert (2012, 7, 14–15). 68  Hymans (2010, 462); Shannon and Kowert (2012, 7, 14–15). 60 61

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rise of “psychological constructivism”.69 Based on the Greek philosophy of human psychology, Lebow theorizes how the “mixing” and varying priority among primary human motives—appetite, reason, spirit, and additionally fear—drive humans to construct different kinds of orders and social/political worlds and shape different periods in European history from Ancient Greece to the modern era.70 Following Lebow’s work, Shannon and Kowert’s volume recognizes the complementarity between psychology and constructivism, and thus aims at exploring possibilities and ways of connections between the two.71 The volume includes various articles that represent rigorous and creative scholarly thinking for such end. For example, Kowert integrates the power of language (linguistic constructivism) and the power of passion (human emotion) in driving actors’ digestion of norms’ relatedness and attractiveness to them, shaping patterns of actors’ norm and moral compliance.72 For another example, Larson provides a social psychological approach to identity, explaining how groups (states) which desire higher status through “a positive identity” reform their previous identities which are not respected by other groups (states).73 Rationalism Hymans calls strongly for the incorporation of psychology in rationalist accounts of IR because Hymans recognizes the limitations of a rationalist account of political behavior for its general downplaying of human psychology that influences “rational calculating” of states formed by humans.74 This resonates with Jervis’ (one of the leading scholars in realism) arguing for the importance of connecting to “human psychology”.75 The attempts to integrate psychology and rationalism continue to emerge and develop. The Poliheuristic Theory, proposed by Mintz and applied and developed by other scholars, synthesizes psychological/cognitive dynamics (i.e., personality, values, cognitive thinking) and rational  Hymans (2010, 461).  Lebow (2008); Hymans (2010). 71  Shannon and Kowert (2012). 72  See Introduction, and Ch. 1 by Kowert in Shannon and Kowert (2012), especially pp. 22, 30–53. 73  See Introduction, and Ch. 2 by Larson in Shannon and Kowert (2012), especially pp. 22, 57–75. 74  Hymans (2010, 462), and the whole article. 75  Farkas (1998, 32). 69 70

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calculation for state interest by considering decision making as a two-stage process, where the first stage involves comprehensive cognitive thinking that selects possible policy choices based on domestic political considerations, and the second stage chooses from those first stage selections based on state rational interest maximization.76 Another attempt to integrate psychology and rationalism is made by Farkas. He integrates the two camps through evolutionary theory. He explores how individual members of the ruling groups, with different ideas and characteristics (psychological dynamics), are positionally/institutionally selected within the ruling group according to their past successes in maximizing state interest (evolutionary selection process), and which lead long-term to the state’s collective rational adaption to international dynamics (rationalist end).77 Mercer, by exploring various links between psychological processes and rationality, upholds a more interdependent attitude towards the two camps in explaining rational political attitude/behavior.78 As he concludes: “Rejecting the belief that psychology explains only mistakes should help rationalists overcome their fear of ‘going mental’ and thus encourage them to pay attention to the psychological assumptions that often drive their explanations”.79 The Project’s Approach to Integration This project integrates psychology and IR theories by synthesizing the logics and assumptions of psychological theories (especially Maslow’s theory of human motivation and Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance), various literature in current political psychology, and IR theories (especially constructivism, rationalism, and Marxism). To do this, firstly joins the new trend of integration between psychology and IR theories that aims at combining micro human dynamics and macro political processes.80 Secondly, with the aim of building a motivation-­ heuristic complex, it also recognizes that the complex it tries to build must have its basis in human nature on the one hand, and the adaptivity to both normatively and strategically political phenomenon on the other. The newly rationalist/constructivist works of literature that incorporate  James and Zhang (2005, 31–36).  Farkas (1998). 78  Mercer (2005). 79  Mercer (2005, 99). 80  Shannon and Kowert (2012); Hymans (2010). 76 77

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psychology (mentioned above) actually exemplify successful cases of motivation-­heuristic integration in the systematic political analysis. These works themselves have not focused on such a point (motivation-heuristic integration), but they show progress in developing major IR theories in such a direction. Inspired from these works, this project synthesizes psychological approaches with various IR theories and rich research/findings in current political-psychological literature, in the building of the motivation-­heuristic complex model. Material-Idea Nexus The current project of the motivation-heuristic complex is also tries to address enduring competition between materialism and idealism in political and IR studies. This reminds the central question raised at the very beginning of this book: exploring the internal mechanism that shapes the co-existent and dynamic relationship between strategic and ideational considerations. One can find a long-standing ontological and epistemological extremism in social science studies between materialism/positivism which insists on a scientific observation of the world independent of human knowledge, and idealism/interpretetivism which insists on the world’s dependence on human ideas that makes scientific observation impossible.81 The epistemological and ontological debates in IR studies have long suffered from a stand-off of extremes between two pairs of theorists: firstly, those who try to treat social science similarly to natural science (positivism) and those who insist on social life as different from natural science (intepretivism); and secondly, between those who consider material forces (materialism) as the major driving force behind political behaviour and those who consider ideational factors as most important (idealism).82 Positivism views the objective and constant laws governing the world as independent of human knowledge and considers the method of natural science as the key to a better understanding of social life.83 Such an epistemological stance is closely related to the ontological position which insists on the importance  Marsh and Stoker (2002, 17–32); Hay (2002, 33–37, 45–45, 81–83, 206).  Hay (2002, 206); Marsh and Stoker (2002, 20, 22–24, 132, 153–136, 149–150); Hollis and Smith (1990, 29–66, 71–90); Burchill et  al. (2005, 1–2, 8, 21–22, 203–204, 207–208, 212); Checkel (2001, 565–566); Lapid (1989, 239–243, 248–249). 83  Marsh and Stoker (2002, 20, 22–24); Hollis and Smith (1990, 29–66, 50); Burchill et al. (2005, 1–2, 22); Checkel (2001, 565–566). 81 82

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of material forces in driving social behavior.84 Opposing positivism and materialism is interpretivism and idealism.85 Different from positivism, interpretivism sees the importance of human knowledge and understanding in shaping the world as a social product and denies finding constant and objective laws as important and possible when studying the social world.86 Interpretivism is closely related to the ontological position of idealism which insists on the importance of ideas as shaping the outcome.87 Realism (not the “realism” in IR theories mentioned above) is another strand of epistemology which tries to overcome the stand-off extreme mentioned above by combining objective laws and social construction.88 Reflected in theory, the Gramscian theory of cultural hegemony contributes to such attempts by incorporating the role of ideational factors in the power struggle.89 However, the insufficient role given to concept construction hinders this stream’s efficiency in overcoming the epistemological and ontological extremes in international studies.90 It may be argued that the disequilibrium in addressing motivation-­ heuristic importance in traditional IR theories contributes to the above epistemological and ontological extremism. By focusing on the pre-­ existing and material nature of motivations while downplaying concept construction, rationalism emphasizes the need for finding constant, objective and naturally given laws, and the material forces in driving political behavior.91 By considering concept construction while paying less attention to pre-existing motivations, traditional social constructivism can easily overestimate the role of interpretation and knowledge as part of social construction in shaping the evolution of human history.92  Hay (2002, 206).  Marsh and Stoker (2002, 17–32); Hay (2002, 33–37, 45–45, 81–83, 206). 86  Hollis and Smith (1990, 71–90); Marsh and Stoker (2002, 26–28, 132–150); Burchill et al. (2005, 2, 22, 203–204, 207–208, 212); Lapid (1989, 239–243). 87  Hay (2002, 206). 88  Marsh and Stoker (2002, 20, 30–32); Bieler and Morton (2008). 89  Bates (1975, 351); Simon (1982, 29, 43, 67, 69–70, 72); Gramsci (1971, 641); Marsh and Stoker (2002, 20, 30–32). 90  Simon (1982, 29); Gramsci (1971, 641, 663); Landy and Bove (1994, 29); Bieler and Morton (2006, 83, 93–94); Marsh and Stoker (2002, 31–32); Burchill et al. (2005, 196). 91  Keohane (1986, 175–176); Burchill et  al. (2005, 1–2, 22, 113–115, 126–128, 192, 198, 206–207); Wendt (1999, 333–335); Marsh and Stoker (2002, 20–24, 31–32); Hay (2002, 206); Hollis and Smith (1990, 29–66, 50); Checkel (2001, 565–566). 92  Philpott (2001, 47); Wendt (1992, 398–399; 1994, 385; 1999, 96, 112–136, 333–335); Burchill et al. (2005, 2, 22, 203–204, 206–208, 212); Zehfuss (2002, 7–8); Hay (2002, 84 85

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The model built by its project, as previously concluded, provides two layers (one material and one ideational) of motivations and their corresponding heuristic mechanisms, and the two layers’ interactional combination, based on logics and assumptions from (political) psychology and IR theories. Thus, such a model portrays how such a two-layered-­ interactional structure of political reasoning filters and reacts to both material and ideational forces, leading to both regularities and variations in the combination as well as integration of material and ideational dynamics.

1.2   Empirical Illustration: China and Human Rights China’s attitude towards human rights clearly provides a fascinating empirical case for the project’s theoretical model. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, China’s relation with the issue of human rights has important implications for its relations with international society.93 According to Kent, “China’s compliance or non-compliance with the norms of the human rights regime constitutes the most rigorous test of the international citizenship, for human rights present an immediate challenge to the principle of state sovereignty. Unlike the international political economic regime, it is a moral regime...to the ideals of a politically conscious stratum of its [China’s] domestic population”.94 Secondly, the human rights issue for China involves a complex nexus of domestic and foreign dynamics that necessarily contain intertwining interactions among various strategic and normative factors. Thus, this is the case that may best illustrate the project’s model as it centers on two layers of motivation-heuristics and their interactions. The human rights issue itself is an interesting topic that already attracts tense strategic-ideational debate: realists and neoliberals see the function of an international human rights norm as being driven by power politics and economic benefits; normative explanations which see states’ attitudes towards the human rights norm as being shaped by their

206); Hollis and Smith (1990, 71–90); Marsh and Stoker (2002, 26–28, 132, 135–136, 149–150); Lapid (1989, 239–243); Wendt (1992, 398–399; 1994, 385; 1999, 96, 112–136). 93  Gill and Huang (2009a, b); Kent (1999, 1–2). 94  Kent (1999, 2).

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degree of internalization of such a norm.95 Similarly, the human rights issue connects to China’s strategic and normative issues, i.e., types of the political regime and economic pay-offs.96 However, an essential step towards an empirical angle is reading the current literature that focuses on China and human rights to understand if and how the project’s empirical understanding can learn from and contribute to the existing researches on such an issue. Current Literature This section firstly makes a timely overview of current literature which helps to explain China’s human rights attitudes and policies. It reveals the major evolution of idea trends and allows important questions to be raised. The purpose is to relate the inspiration for the project to the evolution of the literature in the area.  imely Overview of Literature T In 1994, Nathan demonstrated how China interprets Western human rights pressure in a strategic way and manipulates the human rights issue for strategic pursuit of its national interests.97 In 1997, Nathan again stressed China’s strategic consideration behind its human rights policy; concession or violation depends on the relatedness to its national interest including sovereignty and “national pride”.98 In 1999, two scholarly works explained China’s human rights attitudes and policy in terms of strategic consideration based on domestic and international dimensions. Kent explains expansion and limitations in China’s compliance with the international human rights regime in terms of China’s strategic adoption of international norms according to its domestic needs (domestic political regime needs, degree of domestic social stability, and domestic social demands), its international interests (dependence on international markets that necessarily results in interdependence), and international bargaining power (China’s national power and position to resist and even reshape the international socialization attempts in terms of China’s

 Wan (2001, 12).  Wan (2001, 9–10). 97  Nathan (1994). 98  Nathan (1997, 149–150). 95 96

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human rights journey).99 Sullivan explains how China tactically manipulated human rights ideas from late 1989 to the mid-1990s by emphasizing the discourse of “development”, based on China’s historical and national condition, in order to firstly emphasize sovereignty over political/civil rights and secondly to counter external pressure.100 In 2001, Wan explained China’s human rights policy in terms of China’s strategic position and power-struggle under Western pressure.101 He attributes China’s compliance to its defense of its national interest when threatened by external pressure, and explains China’s counterbalance against Western pressure by providing economic benefits, propaganda, and an alliance of developing states in the United Nations.102 In 2004, scholars discussed factors driving China’s human rights policy in terms of their relation to external pressure, historical origins, and domestic interest groups’ choices backed by normative support. Li and Drury argue that sanctions decreased China’s compliance (because of leading groups’ determination to protect the authority of the regime, domestic stability, and state sovereignty, China’s determination to prevent public compromise) and engagement policy encourages compliance (because engagement gives China security, international position/reputation, and closer ties with the U.S.).103 Kent attributes China’s limits in human rights internalization to historical causes resulting in China’s long-­ term exclusion from the international system, an exclusion that directly leads to China’s quick adaptation to the global market economy with a downplaying of other values.104 Cardenas tries to combine rationalist (strategic), constructivist (normative), and domestic explanations.105 He argues that China’s deviation from international human rights standards is a result of the leading role of “pro-violation constituencies” (the political regime and the related interest groups that emphasize stability and economic development) in controlling national security issues, which is backed by China’s normative structure that surrenders individual freedom

 Kent (1999).  Sullivan in Ness (2003, 121–123). 101  Wan (2001, 2–3), and the whole book. 102  Wan (2001, 2–3), and the whole book. 103  Li and Drury (2004). 104  Kent (2004). 105  Cardenas (2004). 99

100

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to the collective national security, sovereignty, and economic development.106 In 2006, Potter’s work (expanded into a book in 2014) explains China’s limitations in human rights compliance and implementation in terms of: firstly “selective adaption” to international norms according to its domestic norms and interests; and secondly “institutional capacity” relating to the contradiction between purposes of central government and that of local institutions and private agencies.107 Angle (2008) interprets China’s human rights attitudes from a new direction, the positive connection between Chinese Confucius tradition and human rights norms.108 Angle generally takes a positive attitude towards the compatibility and connection between the idea of Confucius-­ harmony that ties personal goodness to the goodness of others (collective wellbeing) and the Western-oriented human rights idea, both in terms of pragmatic benefits such connection brings (promoting domestic stability, especially relating to incoming gaps), and especially in terms of such connection’s moral advantage that attracts the author.109 In 2009, two scholarly works explain China’s human rights policy in terms of normative and identity factors. Jing applies Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm dynamics theory and argues that international material and non-material socialization efforts, driven firstly by concern over international legitimacy, promote China’s gradual trend towards internalization of human rights norms which decreases China’s overwhelming emphasis on state sovereignty.110 Chen emphasizes China’s increasing cooperation with the international regime, and attributes such evolution to the continuous development of China’s new national identity as a “modern socialist state”.111 For him, this new identity has been constructed by Chinese leaders since the late 1970s based on their continuous reconsideration of the domestic and international situation, the reconsideration that promotes the hope of improving interaction with both international institutions and the West.112

 Cardenas (2004).  Potter (2006); Kent (2015). 108  Angle (2008). 109  Angle (2008). 110  Jing (2009). 111  Chen (2009). 112  Chen (2009). 106 107

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Then, Weatherley argues in 2014 that Chinese leaders, from the late Qing to the post-Mao eras, continue to treat the issue of human rights and democracy using a pattern which aims to promote China’s national strength in the face of old and new imperialism.113  iterature Evolution: Trends and Issues L There are four trends and related questions which can be observed, and which provide inspiration, from the evolution and major content of the literature on China’s human rights attitude/policy. Firstly, an emphasis on purely domestic and international strategic considerations is especially noted in the 1990s and very early 2000s (see the literature dated 1994, 1997, 1999, and 2001 mentioned above114), but gradually expands to the incorporation of normative/ideational explanations (see literature dated 2004, 2008, and 2009 mentioned above115). This trend of expansion from a strategic-oriented explanation to the recognition of ideational aspects raises the first set of important questions: What is the relation between strategic and ideational factors in driving China’s human rights attitude/policy? If there are only strategic factors, why do later scholarly works find ideational factors? If there are only ideational factors, why are strategic factors emphasized by some scholars? If both strategic and ideational factors work, why and how do they combine? If their relative importance evolves overtime, considering the emergence of later scholarly works that raise ideational factors, is there a possibility of a growing relative importance of ideational factors whether strategic factors dominate or not? And if so, why and how does this happen? Secondly, current scholarly works show an interesting pattern in China’s treatment of international human rights ideas, i.e., not to ignore them, but to “reconstruct” them in relation to China’s own strategic consideration and/or normative/institutional characteristics. For example, China historically utilizes human rights ideas to serve a national rise in power.116 It selectively emphasizes discourses generated from international human rights ideas (the emphasis on survival and development) to suit its domestic stability and interest, domestic institutional/normative features, and to

 Gewirtz (2015).  Nathan (1994, 1997); Kent (1999). 115  Cardenas (2004); Angle (2008); Jing (2009); Chen (2009). 116  Gewirtz (2015). 113 114

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balance against external criticism.117 It later combines Confucius’s ideas of harmony and Western human rights traditions, both for domestic stability and realizing an ideational advantage.118 Such scholarly trend raises the next important question: What is the reason behind China’s constructive treatment of human rights ideas in relation to its domestic/international strategic and normative factors? The prominence of such a question seems to resonate with words in Finnemore and Sikkink’s work that “international norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structure and domestic norms, which can produce important variations in compliance and interpretation of these norms”.119 It also resonates with Acharya’s argument on the pattern of socialization, i.e., how international standards are incorporated by states depends on their domestic norms and dynamics.120 But what factors fundamentally shape the roots and patterns of China’s reconstruction of international human rights ideas as the filtering result of a domestic strain (as mentioned above)? Is it determined by, as Constructivists emphasize, the power of  ideas themselves (sourced both from international and domestic realms) and the interaction of these ideas themselves?121 Is it determined by the exploitation of social standards and institutions for state strategic ends emphasized by rationalist explanation; or the making and spreading of ideas for domestic and international strategic considerations highlighted by rationalism and Gramscianism?122 Or is it caused by all the above aspects? Thirdly, the current literature sees repeated mention of the influence of U.S.-led external pressure on China’s human rights attitude/policy. On the one hand, there is recognition that U.S.-led external pressure only leads to China’s seemingly tactical concession and cooperation for reducing the harm of such pressure on its national interest, but intrinsic toughness, discontent, and distrust results from such pressure because of the strategic side in Sino-U.S. relations and China’s unwillingness to show

 Sullivan in Ness (2003, 121–123); Potter (2006).  Angle (2008). 119  Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 893). 120  Acharya (2004). 121  Burchill et al. (2005, ch. 8); Wendt (1999); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). 122  Burchill et al. (2005, 188–192, ch. 2–3, ch. 5); Baylis et al. (2008, 149–153, ch. 7); Bieler and Morton (2008); Gramsci (1971). 117 118

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compromise publicly.123 On the other hand, scholars observe China’s more cooperative attitude since the softening of U.S.-led external economic pressure in the mid-1990s, suggesting that greater engagement with the external environment can leverage its human rights attitude for international reputation and security.124 This raises the third important question: if, and if so how, external pressure really influences China’s attitude/policy towards human rights attitude/policy? Fourthly, Chen emphasizes that China’s changing attitude towards international human rights norms is not due to its passive reaction to the external strategic/normative environment, but is a result of China’s own continuous reconstruction of national identity based on domestic and international considerations.125 This then raises the fourth important issue: what are the driving forces behind China’s own consideration that leads to its evolving human rights attitude/policy? Returning to the first trend and related questions mentioned above, the following questions are raised: Does China’s evolving human rights attitudes and policies relate to strategic and ideational sources, if so, how? What are the contents of strategic and ideational considerations? Where do they come from? A New Understanding of China and Human Rights All the above scholarly trends and important issues are interrelated in mapping China’s human rights attitude/policy, i.e., the contents and roots of strategic and ideational considerations that possibly influence China’s human rights ideas and policy; the relation between strategic and ideational factors; China’s reconstruction of international human rights ideas; and the precise role external pressure plays. The current literature inspires one to pay attention to these issues and, in analysis, their combination might be conducive to a comprehensive understanding of the making and evolution of China’s human rights attitude/policy. By applying the motivation-heuristic framework of political reasoning, the empirical illustration contributes to a new understanding of China and human rights. Basically speaking, the two layered motivation-heuristics forms the fundamental micro driving forces that continuously activate 123  Sullivan in Ness (2003, 121–123); Wan (2001); Li and Drury (2004); Drury and Li (2006). 124  Li and Drury (2004); Drury and Li (2006). 125  Chen (2009).

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Chinese policy group’s continuous strategic and ideational enthusiasm and their basic realization patterns in relation to external stimulates. The interaction between the two layers, during which the external environment contributes pressure, shape the condition of strategic-ideational relative importance and the evolution of such condition over time. The periodical reasoning outcome of the two layers’ interactional combination directly shapes the content, nature, and evolution of China’s human rights ideas and policy.

1.3   Chapter Outline This section alerts the reader to the structure of the chapters. Firstly, theoretical aspects are articulated in four chapters. Chapter 2 answers two introductory questions relating to the building of a motivation-heuristic complex. It explains how to give motivation and heuristics independent powers so that the function of motivation does not remove the function of ideational construction (as rationalism often does), and the function of ideational construction does not equate motivation with “interests” vulnerable to social construction (as constructivism often does).126 More importantly, it explores how this project approaches political reasoning as it concerns variations in actor types and interactions. It questions if and how one can manage actor types and interactions in the theoretical and empirical articulation of political reasoning. Chapter 3 articulates the continuous function of two levels of motivation-heuristics, one is material/ strategic and the other is ideational. Then it describes in detail what the two levels represent by explaining the contents of the motivations and heuristics that drive the material/strategic and ideational considerations. Chapter 4 reveals how the two tiers of motivation-heuristics interact. It basically answers two questions. Firstly and most importantly, what are the two teirs’ laws of development that shape their influence in the reasoning? And secondly, what factors influence the ideational tier’s development? Chapter 5 explains the form and the type of political reasoning outcome. The form reflects the continuous combination of the two levels of motivation-­heuristics. The type reveals the relative weight of strategic and ideational sides shaped by the two tiers’ interaction mentioned in Chap. 4. The empirical part is articulated over four chapters. Chap. 6 answers a set of questions concerning the connection of the conceptual model to  Burchill et al. (2005, 40–45, ch. 8).

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empirical studies, which  is followed by a discussion of the China case. Chapter 7 explores if and how China’s attitude towards human rights are simultaneously influenced by the two-tiers of motivation-heuristics, as proposed by the conceptual model. The form of the Chinese policy elite’s reasoning outcome concerning human rights in pre-1997 and post-1997 periods will be explained as supportive evidence. Chapters 8 and 9 explore how China’s human rights idea/policy during two different time periods are influenced by evolving types (strategic-ideational relative weight) of reasoning outcome shaped by different conditions of two tiers’ interaction. Chapter 10 (Conclusion) summarizes the conceptional model and empirical findings, and also contributes simple understandings, based on the conception model, of China’s human rights idea/policy and international relations since the COVID-19 pandemic.

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PART I

The Motivation-Heuristic Complex

CHAPTER 2

Approaching Political Reasoning

In its approach to political reasoning, this chapter aims to answer two sets of questions. Firstly, those questions concern the method of balancing motivation and heuristic, the original aim of this project. Constructivists argue that understandings, which are strongly influenced by ideas/norms embodied in social surroundings, define and redefine actors’ interests.1 While constructivists may not be 100 percent right in this, they encourage us to consider an important issue. That is, if it is true, and actually it is, that interests are often influenced by idea construction, how can one secure the position of motivations in the theorization of political reasoning? How can a balance between motivation and heuristic be realized? Secondly, the question of political reasoning regarding multi-level actors, interactions, and expressions is raised. The levels at which analysis takes place is a constant and vital issue: different actors are positioned at different levels according to their nature and size (e.g., individuals, social and political groups/organizations).2 Various types of actors at different levels have different reasoning (motivation and heuristic) processes and they are connected by social mechanisms and processes. Thus, when looking closely at the political world, a puzzle emerges: how can some laws of political reasoning be generalized from the existence of multilevel actors and interactional processes?

1 2

 Burchill et al. (2005, 194–201).  Hay (2002, ch.3); Hollis and Smith (1990, ch.1); McDermott (2004).

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2.1   How to Define Motivation? This project secures the influence of heuristics by explaining how it influence reasoning. Confusion might emerge from the “motivation” part and this section explains this point. Developed from both psychology, rationalism and constructivism, the motivations that hold sufficient pre-existing nature are emphasized, which include: (1) Original motivations; and (2) stable constructed motivations.3 Original Motivations Original motivations are inspirations that are deeply shaped by actors’ nature, they remain most “constant” and are immune to social construction.4 For example, the motivations which originate in human nature lead to the similarities among people, although they may hold “superficial” variations due to different social backgrounds.5 “[I]t is the common experience of anthropologists”, Maslow notes, “that people, even in different societies, are much more alike than we would think from our first contact with them, and that as we know them better we seem to find more and more of this commonness. We then recognize the most startling differences to be superficial rather than basic, e.g., differences in style of hairdress, clothes, tastes in food, etc. Our classification of basic needs is in part an attempt to account for this unity behind the apparent diversity from culture to culture”.6 Stable Constructed Motivations Constructed motivations are originally the “means” used by political actors to reach their original motivations.7 These “means” are inherently vulnerable to influence from social constructions.8 The original human need for self-esteem can encourage people to become, for example, a good farmer in one society and a good business man in another.9 “[S]tates’  Burchill et al. (2005, 189–193); Maslow (1954); Wendt (1992, 1999).  Burchill et al. (2005, ch.2, 192); Maslow (1954). 5  Maslow (1954, 54–55). 6  Maslow (1954, 54). 7  Maslow (1954, 21–22, 26, 232); Wendt (1999, 233–241). 8  Maslow (1954, 21–23, 54–55); Wendt (1992, 1999). 9  Maslow (1954, 22). 3 4

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desire for security” can drive them to “status quo” in some situations but to “hegemon” in other situations.10 Some constructed motivations have gained considerable stability over a long period of time, the so called stable constructed motivations.11 However, it is arguable that the stability of these constructed motivations over time and space is largely, if not completely, driven by their close connections to original motivations.12 Other constructed “motivations” have weaker connections with original motivations and it is more difficult for them to have pre-existing nature, because they are volatile and more vulnerable to influences from social interactions and perceptions.13 These constructed “motivations” are removed from the theorization of motivations here.

2.2   How to Manage Multi-level Actors? Regrading multi-level actors, interactions, and expressions, this project tries to produce a pyramid of political reasoning (see Fig. 2.1) that indicates two core logics. These two logics carry the possibility of theorizing

An Actor as an Whole

and Commoness of Its Deputy (Leading group) Political Reasoning: The Universal Structure

Foundation: Basic Human Nature

Fig. 2.1  A Pyramid of political reasoning  Brown (2005, 44–45).  Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2003); Maslow (1954, 21–26, 54–55, ch.3–4). 12  Maslow (1954). 13  Maslow (1954); Wendt (1992, 1999). 10 11

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and studying reasoning with less interruption from actor variations and interactional processes. Firstly, it generalizes the universal law in political reasoning based firstly on human nature and its relation with political actors/behaviors, and secondly on current political literature, the laws that are fundamental to all kinds of political actors in whichever way they express such laws in different situations. Such logic resonates with Maslow’s understanding of human behavior/characteristics variations across societies by stressing the universal basic needs behind these variations.14 This project argues that the basic structure of a universal law of reasoning (including motivation and heuristic) exists in the political realm and may be found by starting from human nature and expanding to political actors with assistance from current political studies. Secondly, at the theoretical level, it treats any political actor as a whole in theorizing and applying a universal frame of reasoning. The “whole” of any transpersonal entity (i.e., state) may be explored by capturing the commonness of its deputy (i.e., the leading group). The following sections describe each of the three layers of the pyramid of political reasoning. The Foundation: Basic Human Nature The Foundation Basic human nature is the foundation of the dynamics of political reasoning. The being and reasoning (motivation and heuristic) of all kinds of political actors (individuals or various transpersonal actors) are closely linked with the law of human nature. Although individualism has its limitations in political analysis, human reasoning is the most original starting point for agents’ reasoning at different levels, although it is filtered by social channels which connect these different levels.15 Such fundamentality of human reasoning allows greater applicability to agents’ reasoning across various levels since the former provides roots for universality of the latter.16 Political reasoning (whoever the actors are) is direct and indirect, and individual and collective expression of basic human nature in the political arena.17 Lasswell (“considered the father of American  Maslow (1954).  Maslow (1954, 21–26); Farkas (1998, 2, 13–14); McDermott (2004, ch.9); Burchill et al. (2005, 113–115, 120–129); Rosati and Miller (2010); Hay (2002, ch.3); Hollis and Smith (1990, ch.1). 16  Maslow (1954, 21–26, 54–55); Farkas (1998, 7–10, 37–39); Checkel (2001, 561); Burchill et al. (2005, 113–115, 120–128); Rosati and Miller (2010). 17  Lebow (2008); McDermott (2004). 14 15

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Political Psychology”) “applied psychodynamic concepts to political behavior by arguing that people projected their unresolved or unrecognized psychic conflicts onto the external political world”.18 For example, on the individual level, George and George attribute US former President Wilson’s tough insistence on a “moralistic, rigid, and uncompromising political style” to his father’s severe influence on his childhood, which was based on a restrictive division between morality and immorality.19 For an example on a more macro level, Lebow emphasizes the original human spiritual motive (i.e., desire or honor) to explain mass political phenomena in societies across European history.20 From Humans to Political Actors In terms of the fundamental process from human nature to political phenomenon, the basic point here is that basic human nature drives the formation and expression of political beings (both individuals and transpersonal entities).21 It may be recalled that Maslow’s psychological findings show that humans’ senior and rich activities are ways of realizing their basic needs.22 Personality (including emotional, cognitional, value, and motivational channels) hugely influence political attitudes and behaviors of both individual leaders and citizens.23 Political psychological approaches to groupness argue that the formation of groups of every type, from social groups to states, is driven by human nature.24 Cottam et al. (political psychologists) argue that humans choose to become a member of a group because groupness can meet their needs: e.g., goal maximization through group cooperation, and positive feelings brought by community membership.25 Referring to the formation of the state, Lebow’s work indicates that the psychological desire for “standing” and “status” contribute to the emergence and development of the state in seventeenth and eighteenth Century Europe, because the state enables monarchic rulers to expand territory and win over provincial nobles through authority/power centralization and material collections for wars.26 Mack attributes the formation of the nation-state to people’s desire  McDermott (2004, 4).  Cottam et al. (2004, 17). 20  Lebow (2008). 21  Cottam et al. (2004, 63, 66–68); McDermott (2004, 4). 22  Maslow (1954). 23  Cottam et al. (2004, ch.2, ch.6). 24  Cottam et al. (2004, 63, 66–68). 25  Cottam et al. (2004, 66–68). 26  Lebow (2008, 263, 298–304). 18 19

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for belonging: “The nation and its tangible components represent one such form of group association by which individuals may fulfill this desire for involvement, affiliation, and inclusion”.27 Partisanship and its “bipolar” representation in public in Western countries is closely related to human’s conceptual and emotional reliance on groupness, and the consequent ingroup-outgroup division and competition.28 Leading to classes, the formation of, and dynamic relations among, classes as communities in both the domestic and the international arena, according to the traditional and neo-Marxist school, is driven by the struggle between two camps of people within the production system—the exploiter and the exploited— for maximizing their survival and material benefits.29 Approaching a Universal Structure of Political Reasoning Based on a selective/categorized approach to basic human nature, by exploring links with political phenomenon, and with the assistance of current IR and political literature, this project finds it possible, and aims to demonstrate that it is so, to establish a universal structure of political reasoning applicable to all kinds of political actors (be they individuals or various transpersonal actors). Two important points require explanation as they relate to such a goal. Relatedness To Political Phenomena Firstly, considering the many psychological approaches to our views of human nature, one must select and/or categorize them according to their extent of relatedness to political phenomena. Only by finding the “roots” of political behaviors in this way is it possible to find a way towards a universal structure. Classical realism emphasizes the aspects of fear, desire for glory, and power in human nature as fundamental to states’ continuous tendencies to conflict in an anarchical international environment.30 Social Identity Theory, an important strand in the field of Political Psychology, focuses on the tendencies in human nature to express self-understanding, belonging, and self-esteem through groupness, and to relate such tendencies to the divisive and often negative attitudes and relations between in-groups and out-groups in the political arena.31  Davis (1999, 28–29).  Greene (1999). 29  Baylis et al. (2008, ch.8); Burchill et al. (2005, 113–128); Maslow (1954, 21–22). 30  Cottam et al. (2004, 257–258); Hymans (2010, 464); Burchill et al. (2005, 32–33). 31  Cottam et al. (2004, 45–47); Shannon and Kowert (2012, 8, 11–12). 27 28

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Universal Structure and Its Concrete Expressions Secondly, and more importantly, here attention is paid to the differences as well as to the connections between universal structure and its concrete expressions. Resonating with Maslow’s logic that different human actions in different conditions (i.e., societies) may be driven by the same human need,32 it recognizes the varying/similar concrete expressions of a universal structure of political reasoning. It does so within and across types of actors and situations, and considers these varying/similar concrete expressions not as challenges, but as reflections of the universal structure by specific actors in specific conditions. The concrete expression and universal structure are different, but are also closely connected in nature. The Realist concept of fear-driven struggle for power (universal structure) could be applied to various state cases (concrete expressions), ranging from the war between Athens and Sparta in Ancient Europe, to the First World War triggered by European leaders’ eagerness to win the background competition resulting from wide-spread, fast-moving technological developments.33 The Constructivist core concept of actors being constructed by ideas in societies (universal structure), is expanded by scholars of this camp to different realms with various case supports (concrete expressions), according to sources of ideational factors that shape state identity/interest and inter-­ state  relations, i.e., the culture embedded in international society, or domestic norms, or the evolution of knowledge and ideas themselves.34 The Marxist concept of class struggle in the production system (universal structure) is gradually developed by Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars to explain various related phenomena (concrete expressions).35 This includes: the earlier version that emphasizes a capitalist-exploitation-driven formation of state in Europe and expansion of its outward influence; the later version which focuses on a “world-system” explanation of systematic hierarchy among states, one that serves exploitation of the core states within the periphery states; and the most current version which explores the process of exploitation through institutionalization, aided by the spread of orders and ideas that sustain capitalist domination both in the domestic and in the international arena.36 In the field of Political Psychology, scholars  Maslow (1954, 54).  Cottam et al. (2004, 257–258); Hymans (2010, 464). 34  Burchill et al. (2005, 194–201); Wendt (1992). 35  Burchill et al. (2005, ch.5); Baylis et al. (2008, ch.8). 36  Burchill et al. (2005, ch.5); Baylis et al. (2008, ch.8). 32 33

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have built several frameworks (various approaches to universality structure) to describe personal characteristics, e.g., by measuring personality, motives, cognitive styles, and coordination between aims and beliefs, and to explain different political styles among political leaders (concrete expressions) by using these frameworks.37 Social identity theory, which emphasizes divisive and competitive inter-group attitudes/relations driven by individuals’ attachment to belonging and self-esteem through groupness (universal structure), is used to explain various related social and international relations.38 An example could be seen in the negative perception that immigrants create cultural threats and social problems in some European countries; and in U.S.-Mexico relations where the U.S. punished Mexico for Americans’ drug use because the drugs were imported from Mexico, which in turn triggered Mexico’s nationalist anger in reaction.39 Actors as Wholes and the Commonness of Their Deputies This project focuses theoretically on the referent object of political reasoning as both actors as wholes and the commonness of their deputies, i.e., leading groups, with the latter especially preferred as useful in empirical study. The theoretical building, however, refers to the referent object as “actor”. Actually, there is usually a coincidence between actors as wholes and the commonness of their deputies. Actors as Wholes This project considers its theoretical referent object generally as actors as wholes and has strong reasons for doing so. It is true that internal dynamics within the “wholes” cannot be ignored. More debatable are transpersonal entities. Attitude/behavior are a result of both inner and external dynamics and the interaction between the two.40 For political psychologists, “conflict” within one group is common when contradiction of aims within group members often trigger their competition for “influence” and “resources”, and consequently the phenomena of “coalitions”.41 Domestic decision-making-related organizations

 Cottam et al. (2004, ch.2, ch.5).  Shannon and Kowert (2012, 11–12); Cottam et al. (2004, 45–48, 155–180, 191–192, 213–215). 39  Shannon and Kowert (2012, 11–12); Cottam et al. (2004, 45–48, 155–180, 191–192, 213–215). 40  Cottam et al. (2004, 14). 41  Cottam et al. (2004, 89–92). 37 38

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and the bureaucratic dynamics brought by competition for positions and influence within government members recalls the over-simplification of focusing on the state as a whole in foreign policy analysis.42 Characteristics of domestic norms, and the related domestic political/societal inclinations and interactions, often trigger different patterns of states’ responses to international issues and dynamics.43 Intrastate wars and violence triggered by conflict between/among ethnic groups often pose challenges to the cohesion of the state.44 Tracing back further, the original expansion of sovereign states is explained by some scholars as social groups (who are inspired by new advanced ideas) place pressure on domestic elites (who focus on pragmatic positional considerations), providing an example of the local sources of origin and evolution of the modern state itself.45 However, the reason for taking political actors, especially the transpersonal ones, as wholes is still immense for three reasons. Firstly, human’s strong attachment of their needs and emotions through groupness provides the foundation of the unity of any transpersonal entity, more prominent when faced with external interactions.46 According to social identity theorists, such as Turner and others, human’s strong attachment of “selfcategorization” through groupness leads to “a process of depersonalization” that prioritizes group membership over individual-level dynamics.47 Such human nature-driven unifying as a transpersonal entity would be especially strong when involved in external interactions: individuals’ attachment to groupness largely shape social/political interactions in the form of group division (e.g., people love their own group identity but doubt identities of the others) especially when the groups threat each other.48 The human-nature-driven binding of transpersonal entities, especially in the face of inter-entity interactions might explain why scholars from two important strands of IR theories, Neorealism and “systematic constructivism” (of which Wendt is the representor), emphasize a type of transpersonal entity (here the state) as a whole in explaining how its interest and behavior evolves according to the interaction with the external world,

 Brown (2005, 71–73); Cottam et al. (2004, 83).  Katzenstein’s idea in Ramseyer (1998); Burchill et al. (2005, 200). 44  Cottam et al. (2004, 170–180). 45  Philpott (2001). 46  Cottam et al. (2004, 66–68). 47  Smith (2008, 58). 48  Cottam et al. (2004, 45–48, 66); Shannon and Kowert (2012, 11). 42 43

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either in terms of material insecurity in the international system (neorealism) or of cultural stabilization of the interactive mode in international society (Wendt).49 Secondly, according to political psychological studies, formal transpersonal entities usually have “structure[s]” that are stable, widely accepted by their internal members, define the distribution of status, roles (standards of behavior according to position), norms (standards of action for all members), and ensure members’ loyalty to the entity.50 To such extent, the internal and external dynamics may be better considered as sources that help shape the entity’s attitude, behavior, and internal  channels, if possible, rather than being the reason for separating the entity into parts. Constructivists, who focus on the role of domestic norms in shaping states’ domestic and foreign policies,51 provide a basic proof of the channels (here the norm)52 from within in order to shape a transpersonal entity’s (here the state) attitude and behavior as a whole. The aggregation of the internal-external sources which, through the inner channels, produce state attitudes/behaviors as a whole, with degrees of channel evolution, is better illustrated by studies on norm diffusion. Finnemore and Sikkink explain how norms widely spread in the international society gradually come to be accepted and internalized through state leaders’ evolution of the internal norm channel because they have concerns about legitimacy and reputation (here this may also involve the internal channel of social positions), changing state behavior.53 Acharya emphasizes how the degree of Asian states’ compliance with regional institutional norms is shaped by the degree of fitness those norms have with Asian states’ domestic norms (digestion through the internal norm channel).54 Thirdly, the challenges and confusion over the wholeness of a transpersonal entity as the unit of analysis may be moderated by the change in types of entities as the focus. Here this refers to two aspects. The first refers to the appropriateness of space-time selection when examining historical and regionally political phenomena involving strong disruption of certain types of transpersonal entity by sub-entities. This can often lead to  Farkas (1998, 9–10); Wendt (1992, 1999); Burchill et al. (2005, 199–200).  Cottam et al. (2004, 65–66). 51  Burchill et al. (2005, 200). 52  Cottam et al. (2004, 65–66). 53  Cottam et al. (2004, 65–66); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). 54  Acharya (2004); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). 49 50

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type or structural transformation of the transpersonal entity. Typical examples may be seen in the formation and spread of modern sovereign states on the one hand, and the acceleration of intra-state conflicts since the end of the Cold War on the other. The former involves the gradual transformation from a monarchy (one type of transpersonal entity) into a modern sovereign state (another type of transpersonal entity).55 During such transformation different types of sub-entities are treated as wholes, i.e., the elite groups, the nobles, and the social groups that were inspired by the idea of sovereignty, and their interactions should be the focus, rather than those of the monarchies and feudal systems.56 The latter case of change, seen above, involves the societal prioritization of ethnic belonging over loyalty to a state whose structure is socially unsatisfactory and immature as a result of colonialism.57 Here transformation requires great structural change and means that ethnic groups, as sub-entities, and their interactions, rather than the state, should be the focus of analysis beside the state.58 This second aspect relates to approaches to case explanation. Focusing on transpersonal entities as wholes does not mean inflexibility, rather the definitions of those “entities” can vary the focus depending on the purpose of analysis. For example, one can focus on sub-entities as wholes and their interactions within a kind of larger transpersonal entity as a perspective-­related contribution to the explanation for political attitudes/behavior of such a larger transpersonal entity, if needed. Deputies as Leading Groups and their Commonness The universal law of political reasoning of transpersonal entities is often reflected practically in the commonness of their deputies, i.e., leading groups, which should be given substantial attention, especially in empirical studies. The Leading group plays an important role in defining goals and policy schedules that help realize the intrinsic nature and requirements of the transpersonal entity it leads and to which it is deputized. Referring to the state, governments provide people with material insurance and maintain domestic order and stability through economic, political, and military systems.59 State elites, according to Rae, play important roles in constructing and maintaining state identity as an independent and homogenous unit  Philpott (2001); Lebow (2008, ch.6).  Philpott (2001); Lebow (2008, ch.6). 57  Cottam et al. (2004, 170–172). 58  Cottam et al. (2004, 170–172). 59  Cottam et al. (2004, 193). 55 56

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when attempting to balance domestic and international dynamics.60 Farkas chooses the policy elite as the focus in his theorization of state learning because he recognizes that it is policy elites who reason and choose policies on behalf of the state, in turn leading to the state’s “rational” adaptation to the international dynamics.61 Johnston also emphasizes the importance of “individuals” and “small groups” in studies of state socialization in international relations.62 As an example, Sulfaro and Crislip analyzed the nature of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War by studying public opinion.63 Their idea that the government’s tendency towards constraint and consideration of the public opinion64 demonstrates the fundamental role of the state’s leading group in dealing with domestic intentions in consideration of foreign affairs. Leaders are also important for other kinds of transpersonal entities. For example, they activate and bind nationalist groups in their independent nationalist movements; a typical case may be that seen in Serbian nationalist’s independent movement away from the Yugoslavia Federation, during which time both leading political and intellectual figures played a central role.65 While recognizing the core importance of leading groups, their commonness should be emphasized in reflection of the universal law of political reasoning of transpersonal entities. Considering that the leading group of any formal transpersonal entity is not a single composition, the variation and interaction within the leading group cannot be ignored. The leading group is often comprised of important individual leaders, other members of the ruling group, and advisors who may have indirect influence in the ruling process.66 The multiple components of the ruling group necessarily involve differences in goals and ideas, and the consequent dynamics of coalition-based divisions and even power competition.67 Taking the state as a typical example, scholars recognize state policy elite as including important leaders, people who have important political and social positions, and those indirectly linked to advisors from policy research

 Rae (2002, 2–10, 50, 299–307).  Farkas (1998, 2, 13–14). 62  Johnston (2001, 507). 63  Sulfaro and Crislip (1997). 64  Sulfaro and Crislip (1997). 65  Cottam et al. (2004, 200–202). 66  Farkas (1998, 14); Cottam et al. (2004, 78–80). 67  Cottam et al. (2004, 83, 89–92). 60 61

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institutions who provide expertise, information, and analysis of related issues for the important members of the ruling group.68 Thus, scholarly research which investigates state decision-making through the lens of the policy group pay particular attention to its within-processes. Research on bureaucratic politics, with Alison as representor, focuses on how the protection of, and struggle for, political positions within the policy group influence foreign policy-making.69 The poliheuristic theory, with Mintz as the most important representor, emphasizes how the struggle for domestic support within policy groups shapes the choice boundary in state foreign policy decision-making.70 A further example is that of Farkas’ study which focuses on the processes that digest individual differences within state policy groups in the formation of long-term “state learning” and adaption to international dynamics.71 Variation within the leading group, however, cannot conceal the trend towards the commonness of the policy group, and the importance of such commonness. Firstly, the variation within the leading group accompanies the channels towards periodical/longer agreements that form the commonness of the leading group. Current political psychological studies actually provide insights into several such channels; four of those channels may be concluded as examples from current research, as follows: (1) The power of individual leaders in taming ingroup disagreements (from Hermann’s decision-making theory); (2) The ingroup organism (from Janis’ theory on groupthink) that encourages its members to tend toward uniformity, i.e., psychological or real punishments for insisting on a different opinion; (3) Compromises and consensus building among competing members (from research on bureaucratic politics); and, (4) Communication or discussion processes which are followed by a final agreement that adheres to either most members’ opinions, i.e., to the most “right” opinion, or to an earlier discussion result (from Stasser, Kerr, and Davis’ decision-­making model and Bales and Strodtbeck’s theory on the decision-­ making process).72 Thus, one can observe that the tendency towards a commonness that best represents the shared choices of the leading group  Farkas (1998, 14); Suzuki (2011, 273); Cottam et al. (2004, 78–80).  Brown (2005, 72–73); Cottam et al. (2004, 83). 70  James and Zhang (2005, 31–36). 71  Farkas (1998). 72  Cottam et al. (2004, 78–83). 68 69

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is an important and inevitable trend in decision-making. The style of in-­ group interactions in the Kennedy-led U.S. government in the early 1960s allowed for different opinions during discussion and solution finding processes; in the Nixon-led government in the early 1970s differences with Nixon’s decision-making processes were discouraged.73 But the different interaction styles within the above two administrations do not hinder them from making final official decisions. Secondly, it is often the commonness or the shared agreements (even the periodical ones) of the leading group, rather than the variation and interaction process, that makes sense in the study of the intrinsic nature of political reasoning of transpersonal entities that the leading groups deputize, especially in the relatively long-term. Diversity within the leading elite will often aggregate into commonness in the face of internal and external dynamics which confront the transpersonal entity for which they deputize. Research on bureaucratic politics reveals that the individual and factional competition for position within the leading group will very often give place to “intergroup conflict”.74 Considering the state, the leading elite’s first round of policy option selection aimed at securing the domestic support which poliheuristic theory proposes, actually meets the transpersonal entity’s (here the state) intrinsic demand for stable internal structure that ensures status and role attribution, norms, and cohesion.75 Also, the dynamics within the state’s leading elite usually evolve according to the national rational choices facing external constraints that relate to the national interest.76 According to poliheuristic theory, the leading group selects from the options that cannot threaten their domestic support, while at the same time they realize national goals.77 Farkas’ theory of state learning explains how the institutionally positional selection among leading group members’ with different ideas, according to the efficiency in maximizing state interest, result in the state’s rational reaction to the international environment.78

 Cottam et al. (2004, 66, 78–83).  Cottam et al. (2004, 83). 75  Cottam et al. (2004, 65–66); James and Zhang (2005, 31–36). 76  James and Zhang (2005, 31–36). 77  James and Zhang (2005, 31–36). 78  Farkas (1998). 73 74

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Bibliography Acharya, Amitav. 2004. How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? International Organization 58 (2): 239–275. Baylis, John, et al., eds. 2008. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. Brown, Chris. 2005. Understanding International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Burchill, Scott, et al. 2005. Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Checkel, Jeffrey. 2001. Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. International Organization 55 (3): 553–588. Cottam, Martha, et  al. 2004. Introduction to Political Psychology. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Davis, Thomas. 1999. Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity. Political Psychology 20 (1): 25–47. Farkas, Andrew. 1998. State Learning and International Change. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52 (4): 887–917. Greene, Steven. 1999. Understanding Party Identification: A Social Identity Approach. Political Psychology 20 (2): 393–403. Hay, Collin. 2002. Political Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. 1990. Explaining and Understanding International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. Hymans, Jacques. 2010. The Arrival of Psychological Constructivism. International Theory 2 (3): 461–467. James, P., and E.  Zhang. 2005. Chinese Choices: A Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises, 1950-1996. Foreign Policy Analysis 1: 31–54. Johnston, Alasdair Iain. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 487–515. Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. A Cultural Theory of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maslow, Abraham. 1954. Motivation and Personality, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. (Reprinted version). McDermott, Rose. 2004. Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Philpott, Daniel. 2001. Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rae, Heather. 2002. State Identities and the Homogenization of Peoples. Port Chester, NY: Cambridge University Press.

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Ramseyer, Mark. 1998. The Journal of Asian Studies. Association for Asian Studies 57 (3): 883–885. Rosati, Jerel A. and Colleen E. Miller. 2010. Political Psychology, Cognition, and Foreign Policy Analysis. In Denemark, Robert A. ed. The International Studies Encyclopedia. Blackwell Reference Online, http://www.isacompendium.com/ subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781444336597_chunk_g978144433659716_ss1-­10. Shannon, Vaoughn, and Paul A. Kowert, eds. 2012. Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: And Ideational Alliance. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Smith, Allison. 2008. The Implicit Motives of Terrorist Groups: How the Needs for Affiliation and Power Translate into Death and Destruction. Political Psychology 29 (1): 55–75. Sulfaro, Valerie A., and Mark N. Crislip. 1997. How Americans Perceive Foreign Policy Threats: A Magnitude Scaling Analysis. Political Psycholgy 18 (1): 103–126. Suzuki, Shogo. 2011. Why Does China Participate in Intrusive Peacekeeping? Understanding Paternalist Chinese Discourses on Development and Intervention. International Peacekeeping 18 (3): 271–285. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It. International Organization 46 (2): 391–425. ———. 1994. Collective Identity Formation and the International State. American Political Science Review 88 (2): 384–396. ———. 1995. Constructing International Politics. International Security 20 (1): 71–81. ———. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2003. Why a World State Is Inevitable. European Journal of International Relations 9 (4): 491–542.

CHAPTER 3

Two Tiers of Motivation-Heuristics

This chapter introduces the first part of the universal structure of political reasoning. The basic argument (see Fig. 3.1)1 is that there are two tiers of motivation-heuristics which function simultaneously to shape political reasoning: firstly, the material/strategic tier that includes the desire for survival that includes internal functionality and external safety, and the corresponding heuristic of strategic design; and secondly the ideational tier that includes the desire for self-persuasion through meaningfulness, and the corresponding with the heuristic of rightness building through a coherent system of ideational elements.

3.1   Two Levels and Connections Two Levels In line with, and supported by, literature in psychology and IR theories, it needs to be emphasized, firstly, that political motivations basically have two levels—one material/strategic and the other ideational. 1  This arguement developes from a synthetic inspiration from IR theories, psychology, literatures in political psychology and other political studies. Typical examples of these literatures see Maslow (1954); Festinger (2001); Rosati and Miller (2010); Waltz (2001, 2010); Cottam et al. (2004, 65–66, 76–77); Burchill et al. (2005, 189–193); Wendt (1999); and Johnston (2001).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 K. Li, A New Model of Political Reasoning, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4803-5_3

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Motivations

Heuristics

Pursuing Rightness Self-Persuasion Through Meaningfulness

Building a Coherent System of Ideational Elements

Survival Internal Functionality and External Safety

Design Strategies for Survival

Fig. 3.1  Two tiers of motivation-heuristics

Maslow’s treatment of human motivations supports such categorization.2 He discusses fundamental human motivations and considers them multi-leveled3: “Let us emphasize that it is unusual,” he notes, “not usual, that an act or a conscious wish have but one motivation”.4 According to Maslow’s theory, these multilevel motivations can be divided into two categories: one is material/strategic (such as physiological needs and the achievement of safety by sustaining protection from order and structure), and the other is cognitive and psychological (such as the need for belonging, esteem, cognitive impulse, etc.).5 The categorization of motivations into two kinds of strategic and ideational ones is also popular in IR literature. Although the motivation in social constructivism lacks a coherent and prominent pre-existing nature, it can also be divided into the material/strategic (e.g., national survival) and the cognitive/psychological (e.g., recognition, corporate identity).6 For example, Wendt realizes that a state has an interest in collective self-­esteem  Maslow (1954, 21–23, ch. 4).  Maslow (1954, 21–23, ch. 4). 4  Maslow (1954, 23). 5  Maslow (1954, 21–23, 35–37, 39–43, 43–50). 6  Maslow (1954, 21–22); Burchill et al. (2005, 198); Philpott (2001, 47); Wendt (1992, 398–399, 402–403; 1994, 385; 1999, 96, 112–136, 231–237, 241–242); Risse (2000, 6–7, 19); Tannenwald (1999, 435, 437, 462); Wendt (2003, 507, 510–511, 514–516); Levy (1996). 2 3

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for the maintenance of the state’s corporate identity.7 The rationalists’ recognition of the limited role of non-material interest (e.g., self-esteem, belonging to the group) along with its emphasis on material/strategic preexisting motivation (e.g., individual and national survival, national material power), again adds to the argument that motivations have one material/ strategic level and another cognitive/psychological level.8 Connection Pattern Material/strategic motives correspond to the material/strategic heuristic mechanism and the ideational aspiration corresponds to the ideational heuristic mechanism. Such a pattern of connection is supported by political psychologists who predict that motivation types choose corresponding cognitive mechanisms.9 As Fiske and Taylor note: “the emerging view of the social perceiver, then, might best be termed the motivated tactician, a fully engaged thinker who has multiple cognitive strategies available and chooses among them based on goals, motives, and needs”.10 IR theories also hint at such a connection pattern. According to rationalism and the theory of cultural hegemony, what follows the state/class material/strategic interests is the heuristic mechanism of material/strategic benefit-cost calculation.11 Constructivism’s attribution of the power of socialization partly to psychological motives (such as legitimacy or reputation) hints that the heuristic of persuasiveness seeking is closely linked to ideational motivation.12  Wendt (1999, 233–235, 241–242).  Axelrod (1997, 14–16, 47, 55–62); Jervis (1982, 360–368); Ruggie (1998, 855); Snidal (1985, 38–40); Burchill et al. (2005, 41–42, 64–66, 190–192); Waltz (2001, 160; 2010, 91–92); Art and Jervis (2009, 131, 182); Brown (2005, 44–45); Mearsheimer (2003, 2–5, 21, 55, 56, 60–61, 138); Layne (1994, 10–11); Maslow (1954, 21–22, 35–37, 39–42); Keohane (1986, 14, 107, 175–176, 183, 276, 291); Hay (2002, 8); Hindmoor (2006, 2); Baylis et  al. (2008, 131–132); Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 4); Wendt (1992, 1994, 1999, 2003). 9  Rosati and Miller (2010). 10  Fiske and Taylor (1991, 13); also cited in Rosati and Miller (2010). 11  Checkel (2001, 556); Schelling (1980, 4, 60, 86, 95); Hindmoor (2006, 11, 66, 276, 291); Hechter and Kanazawa (1997, 194); Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 4); Burchill et al. (2005, 192); Hay (2002, 8, 18); Baylis et  al. (2008, 127–128, 150–151); Simon (1982, 24–34, 67–92, 378); Jones (2006, 48). 12  Levy (1996); Wendt (2003, 507, 510–511, 514–516); Rae (2002, 2–10, 299–307); Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 2–8, 123); Reus-Smit (1997, 569–570); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896–901, 903–904); Johnston (2001, 499–502); Kellman (1998); Keck and Sikkink (1998, 16, 29–29); Maslow (1954, 21–23, 41–50). 7 8

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3.2   Survival and Strategies Desire for Survival Political actors (of whatever type) have survival demands that include both internal functionality and external safety, and the necessary structural and material support for internal and external security. This assumption is developed from literature in psychology (Maslow’s theory),13 political psychology (i.e., those theorize groupness)14 and IR (neoliberalism and especially neorealism).15 So, emphasizing “survival” is inspired from, and in line with, neorealism’s (for the representor see Waltz’s theory) emphasis on state’s need for survival,16 but the articulation of survival here is not the same as that in neorealism because: (1) the demand for “survival” is applied to all kinds of individual and transpersonal entities; and (2) besides external safety which realism focuses on, the “survival” here also emphasizes internal functionality of actors, especially transpersonal entities (including states). Human Nature The starting point of survival-related demands is human nature. Maslow emphasizes humans’ physiological needs (i.e., the need for food) and safety needs (the order and income chances provided by the external environment).17 For physiological needs he mentions: “Undoubtedly these physiological needs are the most prepotent of all needs. What this means specifically is that in the human being who is missing everything in life in an extreme fashion, it is most likely that the major motivation would be the physiological needs rather than any others”.18 For safety needs he mentions: “From these and similar observations, we may generalize and say that the average child and, less obviously, the average adult in our society generally prefers a safe, orderly, predictable, lawful, organized world, which he can count on and in which unexpected, unmanageable, chaotic, or other dangerous things do not happen, and in which, in any case, he has

 Maslow (1954).  Cottam et al. (2004, 65–77). 15  Waltz (2010); Mearsheimer (2003); Burchill et al. (2005, ch. 2–3). 16  Brown (2005, 41–45); Waltz (2010). 17  Maslow (1954, 35–43). 18  Maslow (1954, 36–37). 13 14

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powerful parents or protectors who shield him from harm”.19 As he continues, “[W[e can perceive the expressions of safety needs … for instance, the common preference for a job with tenure and protection, the desire for a savings account, and for insurance of various kinds (medical, dental, unemployment, disability, old age)”.20 Humans’ survival needs are also mentioned by IR theorists, such as Marx who emphasizes that human beings’ need for survival and their basic material needs drive them to participate in the production system by selling their labor.21 Rationalists, for example Waltz, also recognize humans’ need for survival.22 Political Actors Indeed, the human need for survival, and its dependence on the external, drives the formation and robustness of political entities.23 Individual political actors’ desire for survival needs little explanation since they are humans. Let us talk about the process from humans to transpersonal entities. The relation between humans’ survival needs and the formation of transpersonal entities are emphasized by Cottam et  al.: “Groups can be functional, in that they can fulfill many of our survival needs, including feeding, defense, nurturance, and reproduction…Many of these needs were stronger during earlier periods in history, but we still rely on groups to fulfill many of these functions today”.24 “For example”, they continue, “we rely heavily on our military forces to defend our country. We depend on farmers to provide some of our food. And, to the extent that we have a need to defend our country, for example, we might decide to join one of our country’s armed forces”.25 Appertaining to the survival hopes of its members, as well as its own logic,26 transpersonal entities have survival demands that include both internal functionality and external security,27 as well as the necessary structural and material support. Structural support for internal functionality  Maslow (1954, 41).  Maslow (1954, 41). 21  Burchill et al. (2005, 113–115). 22  Wendt (2003, 510–512); Waltz (2001, 2010); Maslow (1954, 35–37, 39–42). 23  Cottam et al. (2004, 66–67). 24  Cottam et al. (2004, 66–67). 25  Cottam et al. (2004, 67). 26  For the difference between individuals and groups see Cottam et al. (2004, 63). 27  The internal need for functionality is inspired from Cottam et al. (2004, 65–66, 76–77); and the need for external security is inspired from neo-realist Waltz (2010). 19 20

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and external security includes two aspects. Firstly, the former often refers to institutional and stable policy channels that ensure order as well as productivity for group existence and goals, i.e., the channels that define members’ social positions, roles, and standards of behaviors with which they need to conform.28 Secondly, structural support for external security often means the setting and defense of boundaries.29 Internal functionality and external safety also need material support, including wealth and defense capabilities, that are collected and developed from both internal and external sources.30 The above-mentioned survival-related demands control all kinds of transpersonal entities reflected in different ways (concrete expressions). Take family life as an example. On the one hand, the family has a house with a secure boundary that structurally protects family members from external threats; it has implicit distribution of positions31 (i.e., who makes important decisions and protects family members), and division of roles32 (i.e., some members earn money to feed family members, and some members do housework and take care of the children). These are the distributions that provide structural support for internal functionality. On the other hand, the family needs material support for its internal function and maintenance, collected both from family members’ incomes from society and internal financial management. Now, expand this concept to larger political entities. Firstly, internal functionality and prevention from external threats need internal structural insurance for both stability and entity productivity, as well as structural insurance for entity boundaries.33 Internal structural insurance often refers to sustainable political, economic, and coercive systems.34 These systems allocate authority and status, which is popular in every larger entity—ranging from church-based authority in societies in Medieval Europe, to the 28  For group channels see Cottam et  al. (2004, 65–66, 76–77). Also see Burchill et  al. (2005, 113–115); Maslow (1954, 35–43). 29  Waltz (2010, 95–96); Krasner (1995/1996, 121–122, 150–151; 2001a, 230, 239, 241–243, 245, 248); Wendt (1999, 232). 30  Developed from Burchill et  al. (2005, 40–44, 62); Art and Jervis (2009, 182); Mearsheimer (2003, 56, 60–61); and Brown (2005, 65–67). 31  Cottam et al. (2004, 65–66, 76–77). 32  Cottam et al. (2004, 65–66, 76–77). 33  Cottam et  al. (2004, 65–77, 193); Waltz (2010, 95–96); Krasner (1995/1996, 121–122, 150–151; 2001a, 230, 239, 241–243, 245, 248); Wendt (1999, 232). 34  Cottam et al. (2004, 193).

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hierarchical division of positions in modern states according to both social dominance theory and Marxist theory of the state (i.e., the state representing the interest and domination of the capitalist class over the working class).35 These systems also allocate roles among members that require their contributions (i.e., job opportunities) that also brings them wellbeing (i.e., incomes).36 The systems also ensure, in the modern state for example, “mechanisms” (i.e., wellbeing, rules, and coercive means) that bind the population’s cooperation and conformity to a stable order within the entity.37 Secondly, structural support for external safety requires the setting and protection of boundaries.38 Examples can be seen in the “walls of the city” in Greece, territories linked to church power, and more restrictive and legitimate recognition of the power of territory in the modern state system.39 For modern states, the boundaries that ensure their autonomy in coping with internal and external problems are well emphasized by IR Theorists.40 Thirdly, material support for internal functionality is arranged from internal economic growth on the one hand, and external sources through exchange (i.e., trade), and competition, on the other.41 Exchange, in the form of trade for example, brings wealth to states.42 Extracting materials from external sources may also involve “competition over scarce resources” that often promote conflict among entities.43 For example, Western expansion to other parts of the world during the colonial period afforded them material resources that partly assisted their state building.44 For another example, states in the practical world sometimes involve themselves in a combination of trade and competition.45 As Carr notes: “[T]he only way

 Cottam et al. (2004, 65); Brown (2005, 64, 68); Burchill et al. (2005, ch. 5).  Cottam et al. (2004, 65); Brown (2005, 67). 37  Cottam et al. (2004, 65–66, 193); Brown (2005, 67). 38  Waltz (2010, 95–96); Krasner (1995/1996, 121–122, 150–151; 2001a, 230, 239, 241–243, 245, 248); Wendt (1999, 232). 39  Brown (2005, 63–66). 40  Waltz (2010, 95–96); Mearsheimer (2003); Krasner (1995/1996, 121–122, 150–151; 2001a, b). 41  Burchill et al. (2005, 58–66); Brown (2005, 64–66); Cottam et al. (2004, 154–155). 42  Burchill et al. (2005, 58–66). 43  Cottam et al. (2004, 154–155). 44  Brown (2005, 64–65). 45  Burchill et al. (2005, 58–66); Cottam et al. (2004, 154–155). 35 36

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for a nation to expand its markets and therefore its wealth was to capture them from some other nation, if necessary by waging a trade war”.46 Fourthly, material support for external safety requires sufficient military defense capabilities and the relevant economic support accumulated from internal sources.47 Taking modern states as an example, its development, according to Tilly, is essentially driven by the demand for efficiencies in collecting internal economic resources through taxes for wars aimed at territory.48 Thus, one can easily conclude that the material support for internal functionality and external safety combined as large political entities’ requirements for wealth as well as military capabilities.49 “Because any state may at any time use force”, Waltz (neorealism) notes, “all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness”.50 Meanwhile, economic benefits are also important for states because it relates to “economic development through trade and foreign investment” and provides economic foundations for military capability building. and Neorealism, and especially neoliberalism, also recognize the importance of economic benefits.51 Design Strategies The heuristic mechanism corresponding with the survival motivation is searching for and designing strategies that could realize survival-related demands (internal functionality and external safety, and the corresponding structural and material support), according to different internal and external contextual situations.52  Burchill et al. (2005, 62).  Brown (2005, 66–67); Art and Jervis (2009, 182); Mearsheimer (2003, 56, 60–61). 48  Brown (2005, 65–66). 49  Brown (2005, 44–45); Mearsheimer (2003, 2–5, 21, 55, 56, 60–61, 138); Keohane (1986, 11, 14, 44–45, 66, 107, 175–176, 183, 276, 291); Ruggie (1998, 855); Snidal (1985, 38–40); Burchill et al. (2005, 41–43, 64–66, 180–192); Waltz (2001, 160; 2010, 91–92); Art and Jervis (2009, 131, 182); Layne (1994, 10–11); Maslow (1954, 21–23, 35–37, 39–42); Hay (2002, 8); Hindmoor (2006, 2); Baylis et  al. (2008, 131–132); Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 4); Wendt (2003, 510–512); Waltz (2001, 2010); Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2003). 50  Waltz (2001, 160). 51  Art and Jervis (2009, 182); Burchill et al. (2005, 62, 65–66); Mearsheimer (2003). 52  Based mainly on logics in rationalism and prospect theory, see Hay (2002, 8, 17–19, 103); Burchill et al. (2005, ch. 2, 189–192); Nye (1988, 218); Monroe (2001, 153); and McDermott (2004, 57–72). 46 47

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The basic logic of such strategic heuristic is fundamentally based on rational choice theory and political psychological theory (i.e., prospect theory) and their theorization of human’s utility cognition, both directed at strategically pursuing gains while limiting losses according to different situations.53 Rational choice theory has explained that individuals always try to select strategies based on conscious calculation of their (dis)advantages in existing situations, framed in the form of pay-off matrix, in order to maximize their pre-determined goals.54 The preferred strategies might be in various forms, including untrusted competition (i.e., prisoner’s dilemma), tit-for-tat strategy (cooperate with or retaliate to the last move), cooperation for long-term utility, and even more institutionalized patterns of cooperation through regimes.55 “[I]t can be,” Hindmoor notes, “that rational choice theorists employ an instrumental concept of rationality in which actions are judged as being rational to the extent that they constitute the best way of achieving some given goal”.56 Political psychological approaches to human judgements and decisions emphasize that individuals choose among options based on their assessment of current and future “trade-offs” between gains and losses.57 Different from the rational choice model that emphasizes strategic satisfaction of final benefits, prospect theory emphasizes strategic choices influenced by the safeguarding of current ownings.58 Humans tend to protect benefits that they already have through loss aversion, but they also tend to take risks when they have already lost in order to make future gains.59 As McDermott notes: “[P]eople tend to be risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses…people value what they possess to a greater degree than they value an equally attractive alternative”.60 Strategies which result from the tendency to protect current benefits and to pursue future gains under current losses can refer to both status quo and conflict-­promoted strategies.61 53  Hay (2002, 8, 17–19, 103); Burchill et  al. (2005, 192); Nye (1988, 218); Monroe (2001, 153); McDermott (2004, 57–72). 54  Levy (1997, 88); Snidal (1985, 48–49); Schelling (1980, 4, 60, 86, 95). 55  Axelrod (1981, 306–314, 317; 1997, 14–16); Snidal (1985, 48–49); Coddington (1967, 39); Hopkins (1965, 498–499); Mansbridge (1995). 56  Hindmoor (2006, 2). 57  McDermott (2004, 57–69). 58  McDermott (2004, 69–75). 59  McDermott (2004, 69–75); Cottam et al. (2004, 271–272). 60  Cottam et al. (2004, 271). 61  Cottam et al. (2004, 271–272); McDermott (2004, 69–75).

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Despite differences, both rational choice theory and prospect theory emphasize humans’ strategic heuristics for strategy mapping and selection under different situations, fundamentally promoting gains while limiting losses.62 The strategic heuristics are common for different actors in the political realm under different internal and external contextual constraints (concrete expressions). It is true that the internal and external contextual constraints are often combined, but for analytical conveniences the example here emphasizes the division between the two and then their combination. Firstly, Gramscian theory provides a typical example of strategic choices for internal functionality under internal contexts. It emphasizes the development and reformation of strategic systems that bind the whole society under capitalist domination over working classes, through control of production, coercion, and the attraction of consent and cooperation from all social groups by considering their interests.63 This resonates with social dominance theory that emphasizes mechanisms (strategies) used to set and maintain hierarchies in societies (internal functionality) according to race, gender, and class, etc.64 Secondly, neorealism and (neo)liberalism theorize typical examples of how political entities make strategic choices for survival-related demands according to external contextual constraints.65 Influenced hugely by the idea of utility maximization in rational choice theory, these IR theories provide rich evidence of the entities’ (here the states) strategic adaptation to the external constraint, although the detail of the cognitive process of such adaption is undertheorized.66 External situations are important for a state’s strategic calculation.67 For example, Waltz is typical in emphasizing this point when he argues that states which act according to signals from the structure will be rewarded, while states that fail to do so will be punished by the international system and will suffer as a consequence.68 Waltz 62  Hay (2002, 8, 17–19, 103); Burchill et  al. (2005, 192); Nye (1988, 218); Monroe (2001, 153); McDermott (2004, 57–72). 63  Gramsci (1971); Simon (1982, ch. 2–4); Baylis et al. (2008, ch. 8). 64  Cottam et al. (2004, 157). 65  Brown (2005, 41–48); Burchill et al. (2005, 188–193). 66  Walt (1992, 360); Layne (1994, 10–11); Feaver and Hellman (2000, 166–167); Brown (2005, 46); Snidal (1985, 25, 36–37). 67  Brown (2005, 41–48); Waltz (2010). 68  Walt (1992, 360); Grieco (1988, 488); Brown (2005, 43).

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hints that states know that if they do not act according to the structural constraints they will be punished, although there is lack of explanation on how such “knowing” occurs.69 Following such logic, states then choose different strategies according to different external constraints and/or opportunities.70 For one thing, under the zero-sum anarchical international system, states pursue and act according to relative material strength (both economic and military); on the one hand, they try to accumulate advanced material strength in comparison with others, on the other hand, they act according to the distribution of relative national material capabilities in the international system.71 These actions then often lead to competitive actions which include blackmail, band-wagoning, balancing, balancing threats, buck-passing, security dilemmas, and even war.72 Cooperation is possible (for defensive realism and neoclassical realism) based on the self-interest of states, especially the great powers.73 However, (for neorealism) cooperation is generally limited because of states’ distrust of each other and their concern for relative gains.74 For the other, when the situation of increasing interdependence is prominent, states (as liberals and neoliberals emphasize) prefer a softer strategy of institutionalized cooperation for mutual (rather than relative) material benefits.75 Increased and complex interdependence across different arenas and actors since the acceleration of globalization, and the ability of institutions to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty through the provision of information,

 Walt (1992, 360); Layne (1994, 10–11); Feaver and Hellman (2000, 166–167).  Burchill et al. (2005, 189–193). 71  Baylis et al. (2008, 127–131); Taliaferro (2000–2001, 128); Feaver and Hellman (2000, 174); Krasner (1991, 337–338, 343, 369, 363–364; 1992, 50). 72  Mearsheimer (2003, 138–139); Schweller and Priess (1997, 2, 9); Waltz (2000, 27, 36, 38); Walt (1985, 4–6; 1992, 322–323, 360); Elman (2004, 564); Snyder (2002, 155–156, 162); Schweller (1994, 74–75, 89–106). 73  Mearsheimer (1994–1995, 7, 13; 1995, 82, 91); Taliaferro (2000–2001, 138); Waltz (2000, 26–27); Jervis (1985, 64–68, 73–76, 78–79; 1998, 986–987; 1999, 52); Schweller and Priess (1997, 9–10); Krasner (1981; 1982, 499, 501–505; 1995/1996, 115–117, 121–123, 150–151; 2001a, 239, 241–243, 245, 248; 2001b, 22). 74  Layne (1994, 10–11); Mearsheimer (1994–1995, 12); Walt (1998, 35); Taliaferro (2000–2001, 138); Jervis (1999, 52); Schweller and Priess (1997, 9–10); Grieco (1988). 75  Baylis et al. (2008, 129–137); Burchill et al. (2005, ch. 3); Walt (1998, 39–40); Keohane and Martin (1995: 43); Keohane (1982, 334; 1998, 83, 91); Schweller and Priess (1997, 3); Katzenstein et al. (1998, 662). 69 70

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leads to the fact that cooperation based on reciprocity, rather than on other strategies, can realize greater national benefits for states.76 Thirdly, explanations of nationalism actually provide an example of realizing survival-related demands in a combination of both internal and external dynamics. The arousal and encouragement of people within the nation to participate (binding internal cohesion by fighting against external threats),77 for the goal of the recovery of national inferiority and to deter external threats (external safety), not only provides evidence for a social identity explanation of ingroup and outgroup prejudice and competition, but also illustrates the strategies under the combination of internal and external dynamics for survival-related demands.78 Taking Germany after the first World War as an extreme, rare, as well as tragic, example, the internal economic and political crisis and the territorial loss Germany suffered after the first World War encouraged extreme strategies to reunify the German people under national goals of territorial recovery and expansion.79

3.3   Self-Persuasion and Rightness Desire for Self-Persuasion Through Meaningfulness Political actors also want to persuade themselves through satisfactory meaningfulness of being and doing things, which goes beyond survival-­ related demands. Human Nature Seeking meaningfulness for self-persuasion has its foundation in human nature. Besides physiological needs, Maslow theorizes five other types of human needs,80 they include: (1) philosophizing the surroundings for

76  Schweller and Priess (1997, 3); Walt (1998, 39–40); Katzenstein et  al. (1998, 662); Jervis (1999, 51); Keohane and Martin (1995, 43, 46); Keohane (1982, 325–326, 334, 354; 1998, 83, 91); Nye (1990a, 157–159, 160–164, 166–168, 170; 1990b, 178–183; 2002, 237, 239, 241, 243; 2004, 256, 266); Keohane and Nye (1985, 166–168); Axelrod and Keohane (1985, 228, 244–246, 250–253). 77  Cottam et al. (2004, 66). 78  Cottam et al. (2004, ch. 8). 79  Cottam et al. (2004, 212–213). 80  Maslow (1954, ch. 4).

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safety81; (2) belonging needs, i.e., “hunger for … a place in his [individual’s] group or family”, illustrated through, for example, commitment to groupness which means “one’s territory, of one’s clan, of one’s own ‘kind’, one’s class, one’s gang, one’s familiar working colleague”, or personal and international groups and communities82; (3) the need for esteem which means high evaluation and respect of the self and which drives people to search for self-confidence, freedom, reputation, recognition, glory, dignity and so on83; (4) “self-actualization” needs that mean “what a man can be, he must be. He must be true to his own nature”, which varies across individuals (i.e., becoming family keepers, musicians, painters, etc.)84; and (5) the need to gain knowledge and understanding (related to self-­ actualization).85 All these types of human needs which Maslow proposed, pertain to humans’ desire for meaningfulness, whether such meaningfulness focuses on philosophizing, a sense of belonging, self-respect, or self-actualization. Literature in (psychological) political studies provides further theoretical and empirical support to the meaningfulness-related needs. For example, humans often want to theorize the self and their external surroundings for certainty and self-confidence.86 Maslow recognizes humans’ safety-­ oriented attempts (non-material side) to theorization, arguing that the second strand of the basic human need for safety is “preference for familiar rather than unfamiliar things”.87 For him important examples for such attemps include the construction of “world philosophy” which “organizes the universe and the men in it into some sort of satisfactorily coherent, meaningful whole”.88 Some political psychologists recognize the human need for “ontological security” that basically means to require continuous and stable conceptions about the self, the other, and the self-other relations that enable individuals to defeat uncertainty.89 For Laing, ontological security is needed for “‘a continuous person’ that enjoys stable and whole existence in reality, as opposed to anxiety and loss of meaning that  Maslow (1954, 41–42).  Maslow (1954, 41–44). 83  Maslow (1954, 21–23, 41–46). 84  Maslow (1954, 46). 85  Maslow (1954, 41–42, 46–50). 86  Maslow (1954, 41–42, ch. 4); Chernobrov (2016); Kinnvall (2004). 87  Maslow (1954, 41–42). 88  Maslow (1954, 41–42). 89  Chernobrov (2016, 582–583), and the whole article; Kinnvall (2004). 81 82

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could threaten everyday experiences and self’s integrity”.90 For Giddens ontological security is used to reduce “existential anxiety” through “the belief that the story (the discourse) being told is a good one, one that rests on solid ground” and “a security of being, a sense of confidence and trust that the world is what it appears to be”.91 Ontological security brings reliable and stable meaning that “brackets out questions about ourselves, others and the object-world which have to be taken for granted in order to keep on with everyday activity”.92 Another example is that of operational code theory (a political psychological approach) which emphasizes the role of political leaders’ philosophical beliefs about the functioning pattern of the world in shaping their choice of options for national goals.93 Such reliance on beliefs necessarily relates to the requirement for theorization for safety and certainty.94 But, it may also relate to understanding-oriented human needs based on Maslow’s theory and political psychological research.95 Maslow emphasizes that the need for getting and systemizing knowledge is driven by the original human impulse to know and understand, and is also related to the human need for self-actualization.96 Such understanding-driven needs also resonate with political psychological research. As Cottam et  al. notes: “[P]eople need to understand the world around them, and particularly the people in that world. Perceivers need to explain and predict the behavior of others. In order to do this, they need to process incoming information from their environments and to evaluate it”.97 A further example is indicated by Teske whose findings from interviews with a number of political activists show that political activists are encouraged by the pursuit of self-meaningfulness in relation to others through political activism; Teske emphasizes this as the “construction of self-­ identity”.98 Their political activities are driven by “concerns for what kind of person one is and what kind of life one is living, on the qualitative moral concerns that political actors have and the desires they have that certain  A conclusion of Laing’s theory in Chernobrov (2016, 583).  A conclusion and explanation of Giddens’ theory in Kinnvall (2004, 746). 92  Giddens’ idea and words, cited in Chernovrov (2016, 583). 93  Cottam et al. (2004, 31–32). 94  Maslow (1954, 41–42, ch. 4); Chernobrov (2016); Kinnvall (2004). 95  Maslow (1954, 41–50); Cottam et al. (2004, 38). 96  Maslow (1954, 41–50). 97  Cottam et al. (2004, 38). 98  Teske (1997). 90 91

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qualities (bravery, honesty, commitment, and so on) be instantiated in their actions and lives”.99 “Through participating in what Richard Flacks calls ‘making history’…”, Teske continues to note, “and shaping the rules and institutions of collective life, political activists’ lives take on a certain meaning in larger social, historical, and political contexts which they otherwise would not have”.100 This resonates with Maslow’s typical articulation of self-actualization—the search for actualization of the self’s own goal that he/she naturally has as a person.101 Political Actors Individual political actors undoubtly require meaningfulness (as indicated above).102 Since individuals attach value to groupness,103 i.e., they attach themselves to a collective meaning system to satisfy their own ontological security and self-confidence,104 transpersonal entities intrinsically need meaningfulness for self-persuasion. For transpersonal entities, such intrinsic motivation is reflected differently when types and situations differ (concrete expressions). Firstly, Social psychologists emphasize groups’ (be they nations, racial groups, or other) desires for “distinct” and “positive” features/performances (i.e., identity which is an important part of ontological narrative105) in comparison with other groups.106 The resultant competition and negative attitudes among groups derived from their difference can be attributed to groups’ defenses of the stability of their own features against challenges from the out-­ group.107 Chernobrov, for example, articulates how actors attach and maintain “positive” self-identity (part of ontological narratives108) by discriminating against the identities of others, a typical example is Western societies’ discrimination against Oriental culture.109

 Teske (1997, 74, 77, 85) (quotation).  Teske (1997, 85). 101  Maslow (1954, 46). 102  Teske (1997). 103  Cottam et al. (2004, 45–46). 104  Chernobrov (2016, 584). 105  Chernobrov (2016, 584). 106  Cottam et al. (2004, 45–47, 154–156, 192–196). 107  Chernobrov (2016, 584). 108  Chernobrov (2016, 584). 109  Chernobrov (2016, 587). 99

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Secondly, concerning state-level examples, the long-term practice of certain types of inter-state interactions often lead to states’ preferences for, and reliance on, such routinized interaction patterns because this affords them a stable ontology of self and the self-other relation.110 For some scholars “Cold War politics” is a good case example of states’ preferences for routinized interaction.111 In this situation, states habitually identify and align themselves bipolarly, with competition between the practices of two camps.112 This resonates with Wendt’s articulation that different types of interactional cultures (providing agents with ontological security113) derived from continuous state practices, shape states’ identification of the self and others, which in turn stabilizes certain interactional culture, or transforms it from one to another (i.e., between anarchical and more collective ones).114 IR theorists also explain state actions in terms of other meaningfulness-­ related factors—such as belonging and esteem.115 Concerning belonging, social constructivists argue that states’ compliance with international standards is partly driven by their desire to belong to international society and that they do so by conforming to its common rules.116 Rationalists, such as Axelrod, recognize that as institutionalized cooperation is sustained, the state may have psychological needs for such institutions, i.e., the psychological feeling of being part of the group, which encourages adherence to institutional norms for a certain period of time after which strategic benefits of doing so are absent.117 Leading to esteem, constructivists often attribute states’ norm-compliance behaviors to the esteem-related factors (reputation, legitimacy, social status/influence) that influence states and their leading groups, and groups in general.118 Because states “want others

 Chernobrov (2016, 583–584).  Chernobrov (2016, 583–584). 112  Chernobrov (2016, 583–584). 113  Wendt (1999, 187). 114  Wendt (1999). 115  Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896–904); Wendt (2003); Levy (1996); Rae (2002: 2–10, 299–307); Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 2–8, 123); Reus-Smit (1997, 569–570); Johnston (2001, 499–502); Kellman (1998); Keck and Sikkink (1998, 16, 29–40). 116  Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 902–903). 117  Axelrod (1997, 55–63, 57–59, 62). 118  Wendt (2003); Levy (1996); Rae (2002, 2–10, 299–307); Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 2–8, 123); Reus-Smit (1997, 569–570); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896–904); Johnston (2001, 499–502); Kellman (1998); Keck and Sikkink (1998, 16, 29–40). 110 111

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to think well of them”, they follow the institutional rules that many other states follow in order to gain international reputation and to prove that their domestic regime is not worse than that of others.119 Even powerful states attach importance to “legitimacy” and “the values of the broader international community”, influencing and constraining their behaviors.120 Building Rightness Corresponding with the desire of self-persuasion through meaningfulness construction is the heuristic attempt to build rightness. Based on a synthetic inspiration from various literature in IR theories, cognitive theories, political psychology, and political studies, it is argued here that121: ­rightness is made through a coherent system of ideational elements which refer to both values (culture, norm-related factors, self-conception) and facts (derived from experience and observation), assisted by channels which move towards coherency construction, such as a stand-off position and different types of synthesis. Pursuing a Coherent Ideational System The rightness building that political actors pursue is directed at two simultaneous characteristics.  he First Characteristic T The first characteristic is allying with ideational elements which refer to both values and facts.122 Such a psychological-cognitive trend is already hinted at by Risse, who considers reasoning for truth as inclusive of two simultaneous judgment aspects: “(1) whether their assumptions about the world and about cause-and-effect relationships in the world are correct (the realm of theoretical discourses); or (2) whether norms of appropriate behaviour can be justified, and which norms apply under given

 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 902–904).  Baylis et al. (2008, 165). 121  The argument develops from a synthetic inspiration from Baylis et  al. 2008, ch. 9; Wendt (1992, 1999); Johnston (2001); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Risse (2000); Festinger (2001); Chernobrov 2016, 584; Craig et al. (2002); Schaefer and Simon (2017, 959–961) (about Berry’s theory); Mowle (2003). 122  Risse (2000, 6–7). 119 120

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circumstances (the realm of practical discourses)”.123 The former refers to the quality of views (values) and the latter refers to the relation with reality (facts). The alliance with values in pursuit of rightness is frequently emphasized in the core assumption of constructivism: internal/external sources of values play a central role in shaping political processes and outcomes, because it is directed at appropriateness seeking, i.e., searching for and following what is considered to be the appropriate and right views, goals, and behaviors.124 Through internal imagination and communication, actors’ understandings of what is good forms and changes via cognitive dynamics.125 Values include various types that are already studied by scholars (both in constructivism, other political studies, and political psychology) to explain political behavior. Firstly, in terms of culture, although he defines it as including norms, rules, etc., according to Wendt it means having shared ideas about the world and self-other relations held by transpersonal entities (groups, societies, and states) that homogenize the thinking and activity patterns of their members, both in social and political realms.126 Secondly, value also includes norm-related elements (norms, rules, ethics, etc.). Socially embedded norm-related ideational factors influence actors’ understanding and reasoning of standards of appropriate behavior.127 Social constructivism basically portrays the influence of norm-­ related ideational elements in two strands.128 The first strand refers to norms that have been deeply internalized and are taken for granted.129 Actors’ (including states) cognitive horizons and their consequent definition of acceptable organization and behavior, are shaped by shared understanding and norms.130 People comply with these taken-for-granted norms because they think it is the right and good thing to do, or because it is  Risse (2000, 6–7).  Farkas (1998, 3–5); Baylis et  al. (2008, ch. 9); Wendt (1992, 396–398, 404–407; 1994, 385–386, 390; 1999); Reus-Smit (2004, 23, 25, 27); Risse (2000, 3–7). 125  Checkel (2001, 553–554, 560–564, 579–581); Johnston (2001, 492–493, 496–499); Finnemore (2003, 152–153). 126  Wendt (1999, 141, 159–162, 249–250). 127  Baylis et al. (2008, ch. 9). 128  Reus-Smit (2004, 23, 25, 27). 129  Johnston (2001, 492–493); Reus-Smit (1997, 564, 568–569); Sterling-Folker (2001); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). 130  Cronin (2001, 103–105, 107–113); Porch (2000, 162–164); Kellman (1998); ReusSmit (1997, 564, 568–569); Sterling-Folker (2001); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). 123 124

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consistent with their identity.131 The second strand refers to detailed processes of deliberation from which one judges the persuasiveness of certain arguments and ideas.132 This strand relates to situations during which norms and actions are contested and people try to ascertain which norms and actions are better, or how a reasoned consensus can be found to resolve contestation.133 Actors often identify and prove the persuasiveness of certain ideas and actions by judging the quality and quantity of existing rules and norms that back them.134 As Kratochwil notes: “Human action in general is ‘rule-governed’ … Thus, not only must an actor refer to rules and norms when he/she wants to make a choice, but the observers, as well, must understand the normative structure underlying the action in order to interpret and appraise choices”.135 Thirdly, value also refers to self-conception. For one thing, the self-­ conception could emerge from learning the attitudes/actions of others in social interactions.136 “On the ‘we are what we do’ theory of social interaction”, Wendt argues, “in other words, by acting as if it had a new identity and teaching the other what it must do to help sustain that identity, each actor erodes his previous identity and learns to see himself in the mirror of the other, changing his conception of who he is”.137 For the other, self-­ conception can emerge, according to Shih, from the “role”.138 As he emphasizes, “[A]n essential part of our knowledge of the world is the role we believe we are playing in that world. Our behavior confirms that our roles can be enacted”.139 Following such a logic, the explanation of state behavior or foreign policy, according to Shih, must be understood through the lens of role definition or “national self-image” that the state has in the international environment.140

 Johnston (2001, 495); Risse (2000, 3–5); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).  Risse (2000, 3–5); Reus-Smit (1997, 564, 568–569); 2004, 23, 25, 27); Zehfuss (2002, 16–19); Kratochwil (1989, 11–12, 37–40, 179, 217–218, 223, 228); Johnston (2001, 496–499). 133  Risse (2000, 3–7). 134  Johnston (2001, 496–499); Risse (2000, 3–5); Reus-Smit (1997, 564, 568–569; 2004, 23, 25, 27); Zehfuss (2002, 16–19); Kratochwil (1989, 11–40, 179–228). 135  Kratochwil (1989, 11). 136  Wendt (1999). 137  Wendt (1999, 346). 138  Shih (1988). 139  Shih (1988, 601). 140  Shih (1988, 602). 131 132

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Fourthly, world views are also important in shaping values. Beliefs and a stable understanding of the outside world and its causal relations influence actors’ (both individuals and transpersonal entities) interpretations of, and reactions to, the external dynamics.141 The individual-level importance of world views has been emphasized by political psychological studies of political leaders (leader studies and operation code, etc.), about how their beliefs about human nature and social/political realities influence their decisions.142 The general importance of world views is illustrated, for example, through the other-image that political psychologists believe as originated in people’s need to categorize realities for sustainable information processing.143 As Cottem et  al. notes: “[C]ognitive systems … are organized in order to enable people to move through their worlds without thinking too much and yet manage their environments effectively … Knowledge about the environment that people live in is organized, simplified, and used to make sense of complex social and physical realities”.144 “The human mind”, Allport argues, “must think with the aid of categories. … Once formed, categories are the basis for normal judgement”.145 The alliance with facts is also an integral part of rightness. Actors assess practical situations and ideas by judging if they follow the facts, and through their casual relations actors can observe and reason what is more neutral, and also changeable, than value-related elements, the so called “truth”.146 Such alliance with “truth” can be extracted from constructivist assumptions, whereby actors emphasize the factual truth that enables better and correct understanding of the world, cause-and-affect relationships, and the applicability of referred ideas in a given situation.147 Research from political psychology also provides evidence of fact seeking. According to attribution theory, people evaluate reasons behind others’ behaviors according to what they consider as “scientific” logic.148 According to the theory of “availability heuristic”, “people predict the likelihood of  Mowle (2003, 562–563).  Cottam et al. (2004, 26, 31–32); Mowle (2003, 563). 143  Mowle (2003, 562); Cottam et al. (2004, 41–45). 144  Cottam et al. (2004, 41–42). 145  Cottam et al. (2004, 42). 146  Reus-Smit (2004, 23, 25, 27, 228; 1997: 564, 568–569); Risse (2000, 3–7, 33); Johnston (2001, 495–502). 147  Reus-Smit (1997, 564–569; 2004, 23–27, 228); Risse (2000, 3–7, 33); Johnston (2001, 496–499). 148  Cottam et al. (2004, 39). 141 142

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something, based on the ease with which they can think of instances or examples of it”.149 According to the core assumption of “analogical reasoning”, past factual elements (whether much earlier or more recent ones) will always have their influence on current political reasoning.150 For example, with reference to the “Munich analogy”, the historical facts that appeasement finally encouraged aggression and violence was the dominant logic of justification behind U.S. military intervention in Vietnam in 1965 and in Kuwait in 1991.151  he Second Characteristic T The second characteristic is the attempt at the coherency of the meaningfulness system.152 Actors’ experiences and knowledge usually involve both coherent and contradictory opinions and “facts”.153 In the United States, for example, sees the continuing internal debate between those who ally with an US identity and those who ally along ethnic lines.154 Political psychological research indicates how the intensified propaganda of two competitive types of information in support of two parties in the U.S. national election period increases its citizens’ experiences with idea contradiction and ambivalence.155 Scholarly research indicates that Israel continuously has two conflicting national identities derived from earlier and later national (inner) experiences; one is the identification of self-weakness and the other is the identification of self-strength.156 Managing diverse opinions is more easy in our daily lives through various and flexible psychological/cognitive methods.157 For example, when people who like smoking know that smoking is unhealthy, they could persuade themselves by arguing that “the danger from smoking is negligible compared to the danger he runs driving a car”.158 People can also ignore

 A conclusion of such theory in Cottam et al. (2004, 39).  Cottam et al. (2004, 270–271). 151  Cottam et al. (2004, 270–271). 152  Developed from Festinger (2001); and Cottam et al. (2004, 39–41). 153  Festinger (2001); Craig et al. (2002); Rudolph (2005); Huckfeldt and Sprague (2000). 154  Merelman et al. (1998). 155  Keele and Wolak (2008). 156  Gamson and Herzog (1999). 157  Festinger (2001). 158  Festinger (2001, 21–22). 149 150

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diverse ideas by considering them as irrelevant; or can even attach to different values according to different situations. Nevertheless, pursuing persuasive meaningfulness for more “serious” and “greater” issues and questions, especially in important social/political realms, requires that the elements (either similar or different ones) relevant to such meaning can be organized into a coherent system with minimized confusion.159 That is why the theories about cognitive consistency are referred to here. Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance states that humans’ internal need for cognitive consistency continuously drives them to maintain that consistency and thereby reduce cognitive dissonance.160 “The existence of dissonance”, Festinger notes, “…will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance … and try to avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance”.161 According to Heider, humans want to maintain their views about their self as well as their surroundings in a balanced system, parts of which co-exist and function with “harmonious” and coherent frames.162 Hard-working students are less likely to join in parties before exams because they do not want to do anything contradictory to their self-­ definition as hard-working students.163 Furthermore, according to political psychologists, issues connected with elements biased towards coherency entail easier and more stable attitudes/choices, while issues connected with conflicting elements entail ambivalence that hinders the efficiency and stability of choice/attitude.164 “When a choice involves only one value, or multiple values that can be easily prioritized, they find that response variance is relatively low. When a choice involves a conflict between two values that are irreconcilable, however, they find that response variance is comparatively high”.165 Approaching a Coherent Meaningfulness System Facing the coherent, and especially contradictory, relations between or among ideas concerning certain issue(s) or question(s), the pursuit of a coherent meaningfulness system fundamentally include two types. Firstly, a disconnection, or

 Festinger (2001); Cottam et al. (2004, 39–41).  Maslow (1954, 21–23); Festinger (2001, 1–3). 161  Festinger (2001, 3). 162  Cottam et al. (2004, 40). 163  Cottam et al. (2004, 40). 164  Craig et al. (2002); Rudolph (2005); Huckfeldt and Sprague (2000). 165  Rudolph (2005, 909). 159 160

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stand-­off, which means support for one type of element/s and opposition to other type/s.166 Secondly, a connection which includes two sub-forms: (1) biased synthesis, i.e., an ideational synthesis during which certain type(s) of elements are positionally higher than others; (2) balanced synthesis, i.e., an ideational synthesis during which different types of elements are incorporated within a balanced weight.167 Variations exist between the two sub-­forms according to the degree of equality between/among significant elements. The more (less) the significant types of elements are given equal weight, the more (less) the heuristic process moves closer to a balanced synthesis. The accurate psychological/cognitive impulses and methods towards the above mentioned two types (and the sub-forms) are out of the scope of this project. Different actors may have various ways, and only some of them could be found in the explanations below. The first type is disconnection through a stand-off position, described as: allying with one kind(s) of ideational element(s) while opposing the other kind(s).168 Cognitive theorists already suggest such pathways through which actors can maintain a coherency of ideas out of the challenge presented by new knowledge e.g., insisting on maintaining previous opinions and/or changing opinions according to the new information obtained.169 Some political psychology scholars refer to such a stand-off position as the “extreme” position, although they mainly focus on its role in moderating or preventing ambivalence and idea contradiction.170 In terms of the abortion issue, Huckfeldt, Sprague and Graig et al. find that voters who take “an extreme attitude” find it more easy to make a choice with little ambivalence.171 The stand-off position is often reflected in political psychological research on acculturation strategies adopted by immigrants to deal with the relation between their original and new identity cultures.172 According to Berry, immigrants may finally choose between their previous identities and the identity of the new society to which they

 Festinger (2001); Schaefer and Simon (2017, 959–960).  The assumption is developed based on the inspiration from psychological and political psychological literature, for examples see Festinger (2001); and Schaefer and Simon (2017, 959–960) (about Berry’s theory). 168  Schaefer and Simon (2017, 959–960). 169  Festinger (2001); Finnemore (2003, 157–159). 170  Craig et al. (2002, 298–299); Huckfeldt and Sprague (2000, 65, 73). 171  Huckfeldt and Sprague (2000, 73); Craig et al. (2002, 298). 172  Schaefer and Simon (2017, 959–960). 166 167

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immigrate, i.e., they may either insist on maintaining their previous identity or ally with the new one.173 The second type is the connection of ideational elements that results in a synthetic system.174 The function of such a channel has been observed in various political studies. Concerning the phenomena that individuals from different genders also ally with other categorizations (i.e., class and nationality), there is rising political psychological research which deals with such multiple identities’ cross categorization by proposing a combinational logic relating to a co-existence of aspects from these multiple identities combined in a new identity form.175 Political psychological research on immigrants’ identity also suggests that immigrants may combine their previous identities and the identity of the new society into which they migrate.176 In IR studies, Rae hints at a blending of ideas in the construction of national identity by proposing that “elites were influenced by and drew upon the cultural resources available to them in their attempts to construct corporate state identities”.177 As seen earlier, this synthetic type further divides into two sub-forms, which are now elaborated. The first of these is biased synthesis, a synthesis of different types of ideational elements with weight placed more heavily on certain kinds(s) than on others.178 One example of such cognitive form is found in political psychological studies which refer to the making of a so-called “hierarchical” system with unequal positions among different types of ideational elements in social/political life.179 As Sammut notes in research on identity construction among immigrants, “Hierarchical identification … refers to the situation that individuals identify with more than one group but privilege one of these groups as the primary reference point of their identification”.180 Another example is seen in the phenomena of “selective” binding which emphasizes one’s previous/inner ideational elements over the later/external elements, indicated by political psychological and IR research.181 According to Vertzberger, the psychological  Hopkins (2011, 252).  Schaefer and Simon (2017, 959–961). 175  Gerson (2001, 181–182). 176  Hopkins (2011, 252). 177  Rae (2002, 2–3, 299–307) (for quotation see p. 307). 178  Schaefer and Simon (2017, 961). 179  Schaefer and Simon (2017, 961). 180  Schaefer and Simon (2017, 959–961) (for quotation see p. 961). 181  Cottam et al. (2004, 40–41); Potter (2006). 173 174

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prevention of idea contradiction encourages actors towards “selective exposure to information, as people search for information supporting their decision and avoid information that would be critical of it”.182 This “selective” bias often leads to, in the IR realm for example, the “selective” binding of domestic and international norms, with the former having absolute weight of emphasis.183 In understanding states’ policies towards international norms, Potter emphasizes practice of “selective adaptation” in which domestic actors allow “complementarity” between domestic and international institutions by choosing parts of the latter that “resonate with” the former.184 Balanced Synthesis is the second sub-form, it is a synthesis that gives relatively equal weight to both sides or each side (in the existence of more than two).185 Barry’s approach to acculturation realizes that, “Individuals who want to live in both worlds, keeping their ethnocultural identification and heritage, but also participating fully in the larger society, are following an ‘integration strategy.’”186 Hopkins’ approach is based on Dovidio et al.’s theory on harmonizing inter-group relations within one society by contributing-to-team spirit, which coordinates these groups’ differences (as different team members) within a commonality (team task).187 Based on such logic, Hopkins further develops a relevant micro approach, with empirical support from Muslims in Britain, to the “dual identities” faced by immigrants, i.e., the contribution of the major identity of the society into which they immigrate, in the pattern that is in line with the distinction of the immigrant groups (“to contribute to Britain as Muslims”).188 There are also many related cases in IR recognized directly or indirectly. Gamson and Herzog discuss Israel’s national identity projection through its relation with the U.S.189 For them the lack of discussion about the strategic role of the U.S. in Israel since the end of the Cold War reveals Israel’s attempts to maintain an unquestioned U.S. role to safeguard the balance between Israel’s dual identification of self-weakness and of self-strength,

 A conclusion of Vertzberger in Cottam et al. (2004, 40–41).  Potter (2006). 184  Potter (2006, 389–397). 185  Schaefer and Simon (2017, 959–960). 186  A conclusion of Barry’s approach in Schaefer and Simon (2017, 959–960). 187  Hopkins (2011, 253–256). 188  Hopkins (2011, 267), and the whole article. 189  Gamson and Herzog (1999). 182 183

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two conflicting identifications already incorporated in a balanced way in its national culture.190 Ruggie explains how Western theorists develop philosophical concepts (such as the notion that “civil society” functions to safeguard “individual property”), to solve the “legitimation crisis” between “individuation” (relating to “private property rights”), and “political community”, contributing to the ideas that uphold modern states (e.g., sovereignty).191 Ruggie’s logic actually indicates the balanced synthesis between two contradictory concepts, individual rights and community rights, under ideas related to the development of the modern sovereign state. Kahler, as another example, indicates how a “normative consensus” that manage normative conflicts (“among the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, peace preservation, and human rights”) in humanitarian intervention is attempted by the introduction of the norm of “Responsibility to Protect” (“RtoP”) (RtoP is the norm that legitimizes external intervention when the state fails to conduct citizen protection, which is one part of the meaning of sovereignty).192 Kahler also hints at a more balanced synthesised structure—the integration between sovereignty and human rights through the veins of “RtoP”.

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Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization 42 (3): 485–507. Hay, Collin. 2002. Political Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Hechter, Michael, and Satoshi Kanazawa. 1997. Sociological Rational Choice Theory. Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1): 191–214. Hindmoor, Andrew. 2006. Rational Choice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hopkins, Raymond. 1965. Game Theory and Generalization in Ethics. The Review of Politics 27 (4): 491–500. Hopkins, Nick. 2011. Dual Identities and Their Recognition: Minority Group Members’ Perspectives. Political Psychology 32 (2): 251–270. Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 2000. Consequences of Inconsistency: The Accessibility and Stability of Abortion Attitudes. Political Psychology 21 (1): 57–79. Jervis, Robert. 1982. Security Regimes. International Organization 36 (2): 357–378. ———. 1985. From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation. World Politics 38 (1): 58–79. ———. 1998. Realism in the Study of World Politics. International Organization 52 (4): 984–985. ———. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate. International Security 24 (1): 42–63. Johnston, Alasdair Iain. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 487–515. Jones, Steve. 2006. Antonio Gramsci. London: Routledge, 2006, Reprinted in 2007. Kahler, Miles. 2011. Legitimacy, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Institutions. Politics Philosophy & Economics 10 (1): 20–45. Katzenstein, Peter, et al. 1998. International Organization and the Study of World Politics. International Organization 52 (4): 645–685. Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. New York: Cornell University Press. Keele, Luke, and Jennifer Wolak. 2008. Contextual Sources of Ambivalence. Political Psychology 29 (5): 653–673. Kellman, Barry. 1998. The Chemical Weapons Taboo by Richard Price. Review Article. The American Journal of International Law 92 (1): 160–163. Keohane, Robert. 1982. The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization 36 (2): 325–355. ———., ed. 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press. ———. 1998. International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? Foreign Policy 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge, pp. 82-194. Keohane, Robert, and Lisa Martin. 1995. The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security 20 (1): 39–51. Keohane, Robert, and Joseph Nye. 1985. Two Cheers of Multilateralism. Foreign Policy 60: 148–167.

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Kinnvall, Catarina. 2004. Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security. Political Psychology 25 (5): 741–767. Krasner, Stephen. 1981. Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why. International Studies Quarterly 25 (1): 119–148. ———. 1982. Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables. International Organization 36 (2): 497–510. ———. 1991. Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. World Politics 43 (3): 336–366. ———. 1992. Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy: A Response to Gilbert. Political Theory 20 (1): 38–52. Krasner, Stephen. 1995/1996. Compromising Westphalia. International Security 20 (3): 115-151. Krasner, Stephen. 2001a. Abiding Sovereignty. International Political Science Review 22 (3): 229–251. ———. 2001b. Sovereignty. Foreign Policy 122: 20–29. Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1989. Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Layne, Christopher. 1994. Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace. International Security 19 (2): 5–49. Levy, Jack. 1996. Political Psychology. International Society of Political Psychology 17 (4): 827–830. ———. 1997. Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations. International Studies Quarterly 41 (1): 87–112. Mansbridge, Jane. 1995. Rational Choice Gains by Losing. Political Psychology 16 (1): 137–155. Maslow, Abraham. 1954. Motivation and Personality, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. (Reprinted version). McDermott, Rose. 2004. Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mearsheimer, John. 1994–1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19 (3): 5–49. Mearsheimer, John. 1995. A Realist Reply. International Security 20 (1): 82–93. ———. 2003 [2001]. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. Merelman, Richard, et al. 1998. Unity and Diversity in American Political Culture: An Exploratory Study of the National Conversation on American Pluralism and Identity. Political Psychology 19 (4): 781–807. Monroe, Kristen Renwick. 2001. Paradigm Shift: From Rational Choice to Perspective. International Political Science Review 22 (2): 151–172. Mowle, Thomas. 2003. Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict. Political Psychology 24 (3): 561–592.

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CHAPTER 4

Two Tiers’ Interaction

The two tiers of motivation-heuristics interact with each other. Two aspects are explained here. Firstly, the most fundamental to the interaction is the “two degrees”—the degree of survival-relativity and the degree of self-persuasion—that determine the two tiers’ relative influencing power against each other (see Fig.  4.1).1 Secondly, during this process, actor’s capacity of rebuilding rightness (relating to to the degree of rightness building) from contradictory ideas is influenced by factors such as the level of survival felt and way of treatment by the external others if they bring the contradictory idea.2

4.1   Degree of Survival-Relativity The degree of survival-relativity positively correlates to the degree of survival-­strategic consideration’s influence on the power of self-persuasion through meaning-rightness.3 This is because the condition of survival determines actors’ psychological energy paid to the survival issue and the 1  Developed based on the synthetic inspiration from Maslow 1954; Broadbent 1957; Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292; Sibley and Osborne 2016; Wendt 1999, 2003; and Katzenstein 1996. 2  Developed based on the synthetic inspiration from Festinger 2001; Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292; Schaefer and Simon 2017, 960–962 (About Berry’s theory); Hopkins 2011. 3  Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7; and Broadbent 1957.

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Disproportional to Degree of Survival-Relativity The Relative Power of Persuasion Tier (contrary to that of Survival Tier) Proportional to Degree of Self-Persuasion

Fig. 4.1  “Two Degrees” and Two Tiers’ relative power

corresponding psychological downplaying of the ideational aspect.4 When the degree of survival-relativity is higher (lower), the survival tier’s restriction on the persuasion tier’s space becomes more (less) tense.5 This contributes to the relatively more (less) constrained weight of meaning pursuing and as well as more (less) constrained function of rightness building.6 The degree of survival-relativity is shaped simultaneously by two factors. The first factor is the degree of general survival satisfaction that is disproportional to the degree of survival-relativity.7 The second factor is the degree of focused issue’s, based on rational and objective judgments, connectedness to survival (the survival sensitivity) that is proportional to the degree of survival-relativity. Both of the two factors should be considered if one wants to clarify the degree of survival-relativity. For example, when facing an issue that is intrinsically highly sensitive for survival (e.g., job opportunities), the increased general survival satisfaction (e.g., having enough money) will still decrease the survival-relativity overall. When facing an issue that is less sensitive for survival  (e.g., landscaping), the survival-relativity will still increase if the general survival satisfaction is low  (e.g., when one lacks money so that paying money for landscaping means a shortage of money for food).  Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7; Broadbent 1957.  Maslow 1954, ch.4, 52–54, 97–99; Wendt 1999, 231–242; Bieler and Morton 2008; Broadbent 1957. 6  Maslow 1954, ch.4, 52–54, 97–99; Wendt 1999, 231–242; Bieler and Morton 2008; Broadbent 1957. 7  Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7. 4 5

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The idea that the condition of survival determines the space for the persuasion level developes based on Maslow’s theory of human motivations with their relation.8 Maslow orders basic human needs into hierarchies, ranging physiological needs, need for safety, need for love and belonging, and desire for self-actualization from low to high.9 He assumes that lower needs (relating more to material ones) are stronger and that more satisfaction of lower-level needs can enable better development of higher needs (relating more to ideational ones).10 He notes: “five sets of needs are some how in such terms as the following: if one need is satisfied, than another emerges … if prepotent need A is satisfied only 10 percent, then need B may not be visible at all. However, as this need A becomes satisfied 25 percent, need B may emerge 5 percent, as need A becomes satisfied 75 percent, need B may emerge 50 percent, and so on”.11 “Higher needs,” Maslow notes, “requires better outside conditions to make them possible. Better environmental conditions (familial, economic, political, educational, etc.) are all more necessary to allow people to love each other than merely to keep them from killing each other. Very good conditions are needed to make self-actualization possible”.12 Since the material/strategic motive relates to physiological needs and the material aspect of safety (protection), and the persuasion motive here relates to the ideational aspect of safety (world view for familiarity) and cognitive need and self-­actualization, it is arguable that better (worse) condition of survival promotes more (or less) space for meaning pursuing and rightness building.13 Such a position resonates with other psychologists who point out that humans can only concentrate on a limited number of objects for every piece of time.14 For example, Broadbent hints that humans’ increased (or less) attention to specific information necessarily leads to decreased (or increased) attention to other information.15 Because humans’ concentration is limited, the occupation of certain types of motivation-heuristic in reasoning space inevitably divides the space for other types of motivation-­heuristic.16 Thus, better (or worse) condition of survival that promotes less (more) attention  Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7.  Maslow 1954, ch.4, ch.7. 10  Maslow 1954, ch.4, 52–54, 97–99. 11  Maslow 1954, 53–54. 12  Maslow 1954, 99. 13  Maslow 1954, ch.4, 41–46, 52–54, 97–99. 14  Broadbent 1957. 15  Broadbent 1957. 16  Broadbent 1957. 8 9

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to survival determines actors’ more (less) attention to pursuing meaningfulness and rightness.17 Survival’s shaping of ideational direction resulted from threat to survival is illustrated both by Motivated Social Cognition Theory and Terror Management Theory, although disagreements between them remain.18 Motivated Social Cognition Theory points out the relation between the condition of survival and cognition, arguing that the fear of death and uncertainty encourage actors to insist on conservative ideas.19 According to Castano et  al.’s conclusion of this strand of theory, “[C]onservatism seems to go hand in hand with fear of death”, and “when reminded of death, individuals display behaviors that have a conservative flavor”.20 Similar and different from Motivated Social Cognition Theory, the Terror Management theory argues that the fear and anxiety caused by death encourage people to insist on their previous worldview, either conservatism or liberalism.21 As Castano et al. concludes, “[r]eminding people of the inevitability of their own death makes them … more likely to cling to their cultural worldviews” and “one’s cultural worldview serves as a buffer against the anxiety of death”.22 Despite their differences, both theories indicate how attention to survival (fear of death means the desire for survival) shapes ideational functionality. The further supporting theory is postmaterialism, which shows a positive relationship between the degree of economic income of society and the degree of attention to non-material issues such as ideas.23 According to Ciuk et al.’s conclusion of such theory: “Unprecedented economic gains and physical security in postindustrial societies … provide opportunities for citizens residing in these societies to address broader quality-of-life issues such as social and political equality, environmental and racial justice, and the free expression of ideas”.24 Relevant research on U.S. citizens indicates that rich people are more concerned with and more likely to follow the ideology.25  Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99; Broadbent 1957.  Castano et al. 2011, 601–605. 19  Castano et al. 2011, 601–603. 20  Castano et al. 2011, 602. 21  Castano et al. 2011, 603–604. 22  Castano et al. 2011, 603. 23  Ciuk et al. 2018, 871–872. 24  Ciuk et al. 2018, 871. 25  Ciuk et al. 2018, 872. 17 18

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4.2   Degree of Self-Persuasion The degree of self-persuasion positively correlates to the degree of the persuasion tier’s influence on the survival tier’s activeness.26 The looseness of self-persuasion often decreased the strength of the persuasion level itself and encourages more space for the function and development of survival motive-heuristic.27 Increased maturation of self-persuasion increases the weight of the persuasion level itself and decreases the space for the function and development of survival motivation-heuristic.28 Strong beliefs always have the power to moderate exclusive attention to survival and strategy, but weaker beliefs encourage more attention to strategic pay-offs. The degree of self-Persuasion is determined by the degree of significant confusion or contradiction in the meaninfulness system.29 For example, political psychologists define ambivalence as the condition in which there is “an internalized conflict between two important but seemingly irreconcilable values”.30 One can observe the degree of coherency or contradiction in two ways: (1) the condition of actors’ exposure to coherent/ contradictory ideational environments (if the ideational environments they contact form coherency or contradiction); and more essentially (2) actors’ own feelings (how they feel about the relation among ideational elements they get in touch with).31 The correlation between the degree of self-persuasion and the space for survival/strategic consideration is supported by researches from (political) psychological and IR studies.

26  Festinger 2001; Broadbent 1957; Katzenstein 1996, 56, 202; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999, 231–242; Bieler and Morton 2008, 105–109, 116; Simon 1982, 24–31, 43–80, 92–113, 378; Bieler and Morton 2006, 93–94, 83, 169; Ruggie 1983, 273–279. 27  Festinger 2001; Broadbent 1957; Katzenstein 1996, 56, 202; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999, 231–242; Bieler and Morton 2008, 105–109, 116; Simon 1982, 24–31, 43–80, 92–113, 378; Bieler and Morton 2006, 93–94, 83, 169; Ruggie 1983, 273–279. 28  Festinger 2001; Broadbent 1957; Maslow 1954; Katzenstein 1996, 56, 202; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999, 231–242; Bieler and Morton 2008, 105–109, 116; Simon 1982, 24–31, 43–80, 92–113, 378; Bieler and Morton 2006, 93–94, 83, 169; Ruggie 1983, 273–279. 29  Festinger 2001; Rudolph 2005, 905, 909; Schaefer and Simon 2017. 30  Rudolph 2005, 905. 31  Developed from Festinger 2001; Johnston 2001, 492; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore 2003; Smith et  al. 2004, 630 and the whole article; and Schaefer and Simon 2017, 960 and the whole article.

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Following the logic of the theory of human attention limitation, the looseness (strength) of self-persuasion necessarily entails less (more) attention to meaningfulness pursuing and rightness building and consequently more (less) concentration on material/strategic level.32 Literature in IR studies hints (although indirectly) that an incoherent ideational system promotes intervention from material/strategic considerations. A social constructivist research discusses situations in which competing domestic subcultures encourage politicians to pay more attention to domestic political struggles.33 The concept of common sense in the Gramscian theory of cultural hegemony shows how people’s fragmentary thinking can aid class domination and contribute to the importance of material basis in determining ideational structure in human history.34 In contrast, social constructivism and political psychological literature indicate that a mature meaning system can weaken rational and egoist pursuit of survival-strategy in politics. Wendt explains how the maturation of collective and cooperative culture based on social practice expands actors’ (reminding that Wendt emphasizes the actor as the state) emphasis of self-interest to the interests of others.35 In such culture “actors identify with it, have made it, the generalized other, part of their understanding of self”, and “make the welfare of the group an end in itself”.36 Social learning theory and social identity theory emphasize the relation between normative beliefs and inter-group prejudice/conflict, explaining how strong beliefs in favour of in-group norms developed from actors’ childhood (by following the attitudes of people with close ties with them) and self-­ understanding attachment lead to competitive and divisive attitude to the out-group.37 In line with Huntington, Ross attributes ethnic conflicts to the cultural factor: the differences in worldviews (understanding of self and others) leads to threat perception and communication gap that makes ethnic conflict persistent.38

 Broadbent 1957.  Katzenstein 1996, 56, 202. 34  Bieler and Morton 2008, 105–109, 116; Simon 1982, 24–31, 43–80, 92–113, 378; Bieler and Morton 2006, 93–94, 83–169; Burchill et al. 2005, 113–128; Katzenstein 1996, 56, 202; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. 35  Wendt 1999, 337; Burchill et al. 2005, 199. 36  Wendt 1999, 337–339. 37  Cottam et al. 2004, 45–48, 155–156. 38  Ross 1997. 32 33

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Factors that Influence Pattern of Rightness Building During the reasoning period involving new but contradictory ideas, actors’ cognitive evolution pattern is influenced by two factors that contribute to the degree of rebuilding rightness for self-persuasion. It is true that other factors might also work, such as “the cognitive-processing abilities of individuals in a group”.39 But the below two factors might be the most common ones that transcend individual and cultural variations.  Easy to understand, more (less) incorporation/openness mentioned below correlates to more (less) synthesis transformed from stand-off reliance on previous opinion (for details of rightness building patterns/channels see Chap. 3). Degree of Survival-Relativity The first factor belongs to survival-­relativity: the better (worse) condition of survival promotes more (less) psychological enthusiasm for active ideational processes, promoting (discouraging) cognitive systems that provide space for new and different ideas.40 As previously argued, increased (decreased) survival satisfaction leads to more (less) attention to non-survival consideration.41 The increased (decreased) energy paid to ideational processes necessarily promotes (discourages) the trend towards cognitive openness/incorporation/sophistication.42 Such an assumption is in line with and supported by a considerable number of political psychological researches. Although some researches argue that actors are more willing to consider and process new different information, Haas and Cunningham disagree with such argument.43 According to them, the threat and uncertainty (relating to survival) that people feel can hugely influence on patterns of people’s management of contradictory ideas.44 Threat and uncertainty lead to intolerant and closed attitude towards newly contradictory ideas.45 “[P]erceived threat leads to greater intolerance”.46 “People may sometimes choose to undermine feelings of uncertainty”, Haas and Cunningham emphasizes, “by adopting a closed-minded, defensive stance … to avoid the uncertainty-evoking information and/or actively work to undermine the source of the  Johnston 2001, 497.  Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7; Broadbent 1957; and Haas and Cunningham, 291–292. 41  Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7; and Broadbent 1957. 42  Inspired from Rudolph and Poop 2007. 43  Haas and Cunningham 2014, 292. 44  Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292. 45  Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292. 46  Haas and Cunningham 2014, 292. 39 40

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i­nformation … uncertainty has been shown to lead to increased confidence in and dedication to one’s prior attitudes, values, moral beliefs, and social identity”.47 According to Rokeach, “anxiety stemming from external threat is the underlying cause of dogmatism and, therefore, intolerance”.48 An empirical indication shows how the threat from “the Roma minority” that “Serbian adolescents” feel during the struggle for economic resources and values leads to a high degree of intolerant attitude towards Roma instead of ethnically cultural integration.49 Treatment by the External The second factor is about treatment by the external that brings different idea (s): more (less) tolerant/favorable treatment by the outer promotes more (less) openness to the new idea from the external context.50 An intolerant (tolerant) external environment that brings the different ideas will hinder (promote) actors’ real openness to the new ideational elements by (a) encouraging (discouraging) actors to moderate the real ideational contradiction by attributing to the external pressure instead of changing their previous opinion; (b) promoting (discouraging) actors’ negative attitude towards the external environment so that a defensive (open) cognition appears.51 Firstly, Festinger articulates the influence of the external’s attitude on actors’ cognitive patterns in moderating cognitive contradiction.52 Festinger generally proposes that increase (or moderation) in the strength of reward or punishment will increase (decrease) the possibility that people reduce the dissonance between their real attitude and their forced compliance by stressing the reward or punishment rather than by changing internal attitudes.53 According to Festinger, under the condition of accepting a new idea caused by a strongly coercive external environment, actors can easily reach cognitive consonance by referring to external pressure.54 However, such cognitive dissonance reduction by referring to external pressure hinders the process of dealing with conflicting ideational  Haas and Cunningham 2014, 292.  A conclusion of Rokeach’s idea in Feldman and Stenner 1997, 742. 49  Ljujic et al. 2012. 50  Developed from Festinger 2001, ch.4–5; Fleischmann and Phalet 2016, 448, 450, 461; Hopkins 2011; Schaefer and Simon 2017; Howarth and Andreouli 2016; Smith et al. 2004; and Ozyurt 2013. 51  Developed from Festinger 2001, ch.4–5; Fleischmann and Phalet 2016, 448, 450, 461; Hopkins 2011; Schaefer and Simon 2017; Howarth and Andreouli 2016; Smith et al. 2004; and Ozyurt 2013. 52  Festinger 2001, ch.4–5. 53  Festinger 2001, ch.4–5. 54  Festinger 2001, ch.1, ch.4–5, pp. 21–23, 84–97, 126. 47 48

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elements themselves.55 Since actors can quickly turn to the reference to external pressure, they do not think carefully about ideational relations.56 In contrast, when external pressure for compliance moderates, it is challenging to reduce cognitive contradiction by referring to the external pressure, forcing actors to focus energy on dealing with norms themselves, increasing the possibility of attitude change.57 “One would expect that”, Festinger notes, “since the pressure to reduce dissonance depends upon the magnitude of dissonance that exists, a change of private opinion would follow public compliance more frequently when the punishment or reward is relatively weak than when it is too strong”.58 “If forced compliance has been elicited”, Festinger continues to note, “the number of consonant relations may be increased by magnifying the importance of the reward obtained or of the punishment avoided”.59 So, Festinger notes that “[t]oo great a reward or punishment will result in only little dissonance” and “one would not expect private change to follow as often”.60 Secondly, political psychological researches on the identity management of immigrants and minor groups show that these kinds of actors’ willingness in incorporating new ideas from the external correlate to their feeling of the external’s attitude: inclusive (exclusive) attitude from the external promote positive (negative) emotion that encourages actors to incorporate (refuse) a new idea from the external.61 As Berry argues, “larger society’s preferences limit the freedom of ethnocultural groups. The feasibility of the integration strategy, for example, requires that the larger society accepts cultural diversity and is open to the needs of ethnocultural groups”.62 For Berry, the inclusive external environment encourages more incorporative cognitive trends in dealing with contradictory new identities from such external context, ranging from integration of new contextual identity with the previous identity to the ultimate 55  Festinger 2001, ch.1, ch.4–5, pp. 21–23, 84–85, 94–97, 126; Rae 2002; Ruggie 1983, 273–279; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein 1996, 56, 202. 56  Festinger 2001, ch.1, ch.4–5, pp. 21–23, 84–85, 94–97, 126; Ruggie 1983, 273–279; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein 1996, 56, 202. 57  Festinger 2001, ch.1, ch.4–5, pp. 94–97. 58  Festinger 2001, 95. 59  Festinger 2001, 96. 60  Festinger 2001, 91, 95. 61  Fleischmann and Phalet 2016, 448, 450, 461; Hopkins 2011; Schaefer and Simon 2017; Howarth and Andreouli 2016; Smith et al. 2004; and Ozyurt 2013. 62  A conclusion of Berry’s theory in Schaefer and Simon 2017, 961.

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adoption of the new identity in cases.63 Exclusion and prejudice from the external, in contrast, often promote disengagement with the new identity.64 According to Fleischmann and Phalet, misrecognition and discrimination by the society and the consequently negative feeling towards the external encourage the minority group’s distance from the dominant society and a defense of their distinct cultural heritage.65 According to research by Dovidio et al. and Holtz et al., immigrant and minority groups who experience “low status” and “rejection” from the significant society they live are more likely to insist on their original cultural identities.66 The insistence on the original Islamic heritage of Turkish immigrants in German, as research shows, is considerably due to their feeling of exclusion from German society.67 Based on Dovidio et al.’s research, Hopkins indicates that a feeling of recognition by the larger society can encourage immigrants to build identity integration through the construction of a contributive identity, i.e., the aboriginal culture contributes to the larger-society-culture.68

Bibliography Bieler, Andreas, and Adam David Morton, eds. 2006. Images of Grasci: Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations. London: Routledge. ———. 2008. The Deficit of Discourse in IPE: Turning Base Metal into Gold? International Studies Quarterly 52 (1): 103–128. Broadbent, Donald. 1957. A Mechanical Model of Human Attention and Immediate Memory. Psychological Review 64: 205–215. Burchill, Scott, et al. 2005. Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Castano, Emanuele, et  al. 2011. Ideology, Fear of Death, and Death Anxiety. Political Psychology 32 (4): 601–621. Ciuk, David, et al. 2018. Values Voters: The Conditional Effect of Income on the Relationship Between Core Values and Political Attitudes and Behavior. Political Psychology 39 (4): 869–888.

 Smith et al. 2004, 630; Schaefer and Simon 2017, 960.  Smith et al. 2004, 630; Schaefer and Simon 2017, 960. 65  Fleischmann and Phalet 2016, 448, 450, 461. 66  Schaefer and Simon 2017, 961. 67  Schaefer and Simon 2017. 68  Hopkins 2011. 63 64

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Cottam, Martha, et  al. 2004. Introduction to Political Psychology. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Feldman, Stanley, and Karen Stenner. 1997. Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism. Political Psychology 18 (4): 741–770. Festinger, Leon. 2001 [1957, 1962, 1982]. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: University Press. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52 (4): 887–917. Finnemore, Martha. 2003. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Fleischmann, Fenella, and Karen Phalet. 2016. Identity Conflict or Compatibility: A Comparison of Muslim Minorities in Five European Cities. Political Psychology 37 (4): 447–463. Haas, Ingrid Johnsen, and William A.  Cunningham. 2014. The Uncertainty Paradox: Perceived Threat Moderates the Effect of Uncertainty on Political Tolerance. Political Psychology 35 (2): 291–302. Hopkins, Nick. 2011. Dual Identities and Their Recognition: Minority Group Members’ Perspectives. Political Psychology 32 (2): 251–270. Howarth, Caroline, and Eleni Andreouli. 2016. “Nobody Wants to Be an Outsider”: From Diversity Management to Diversity Engagement. Political Psychology 37 (3): 327–340. Johnston, Alasdair Iain. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 487–515. Katzenstein, Peter, ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security. New  York: Columbia University Press. Ljujic, Vanja, et al. 2012. Romaphobia Among Serbian Adolescents: The Role of National In-group Attitudes and Perceived Threatpops. Political Psychology 33 (6): 911–924. Maslow, Abraham. 1954. Motivation and Personality, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. (Reprinted version). Ozyurt, Saba. 2013. Negotiating Multiple Identities, Constructing Western-­ Muslim Selves in the Netherlands and the United Statespops. Political Psychology 34 (2): 239–263. Rae, Heather. 2002. State Identities and the Homogenization of Peoples. Port Chester, NY: Cambridge University Press. Ross, Marc Howard. 1997. The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political Psychology and Ethnic Conflict. Political Psychology 18 (2): 299–326. Rudolph, Thomas. 2005. Group Attachment and the Reduction of Value-Driven Ambivalence. Political Psychology 26 (6): 905–928. Rudolph, Thomas, and Elizabeth Poop. 2007. An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence. Political Psychology 28 (5): 563–585.

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Ruggie, John G. 1983. Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis. World Politics 35 (2): 261–285. Schaefer, Christoph Daniel, and Bernd Simon. 2017. Opportunities for Immigrants’ Acculturation and Identification Varieties. Political Psycholgy 38 (6): 959–975. Simon, Roger. 1982. Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction. London: GBR: ElecBook. Sibley, Chris G., and Danny Osborne. 2016. Ideology and Post-Colonial Society. Political Psychology 37 (1): 115–161. Smith, Allison, et al. 2004. Close Encounters with the Midwest: Forming Identity in a Bicultural Context. Political Psychology 25 (4): 611–641. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2003. Why a World State Is Inevitable. European Journal of International Relations 9 (4): 491–542.

CHAPTER 5

Reasoning Outcome: Form and Type

The Two tiers’ combination and interaction finally aggregate into reasoning outcome. The reasoning outcome has two characteristics. The first characteristic directly shows the two tiers’ endless combination: the outcome is formed as a system of the strategic-ideational cluster (s).1 The second characteristic relates to the two tiers’ interaction: the aggregated condition (and its evolution) of “two degrees” (mentioned in the last chapter) shapes the type (and its evolution) of reasoning outcome in terms of the relative importance between survival strategy and meaningfulness.

5.1   Form: Strategy-Idea Cluster/s The continuous combination of the two tiers determines that the form of the reasoning outcome, indirectly or directly observable, represents a cluster or clusters of strategic-ideational cluster (s) in which certain strategic element (s) connect to corresponding ideational element (s) in each cluster, with such connection being directly (when the two sides of elements are obvious) or indirectly observable (when one side is cyptic); and the cluster or clusters are then organized in a system under a concluding theme.2 1  Developed based on synthetic inspiration from Reus-Smit (2004, ch. 11, especially p. 38); Contessi (2010); Cottam et al. (2004, 31–32); and Simon (1982, 70). 2  Reus-Smit (ed.) (2004, ch.11, especially p. 38); Contessi (2010); Cottam et al. (2004, 31–32); and Simon (1982, 70).

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The aggregated cluster (s) system shapes the basic structure of political behavior, oral and written representations—i.e., political judgments, policy statements, etc. Political studies have hinted at the strategic-ideational co-existence and connection as micro-political phenomena.3 Political psychological approach about Operational Code maps several important “philosophical beliefs” and “instrumental beliefs” about “basic philosophical and instrumental questions” that shape leaders’ decision making.4 However, two kinds of beliefs in the Operational Code approach are theorized and empirically analyzed in a co-existent but not connected way. There are works which show the connection between strategic and ideational elements, although with a bias either towards strategic or ideational side. Kratochwil emphasizes that the influence of rules and norms often reflect in actors’ reference to these rules and norms in their reasoning and arguing.5 Reus-Smit explains how actors often pursue strategic interests through the frame of the law by “casting claims in the language of law”, which help them gain “social opinion” and avoid cost from others’ deviation.6 Combining rationalism and constructivism, Contessi explores how states pursue strategic aims in the UN by selectively emphasizing the norms according to their strategic interests.7 Taking a step further, one can imagine that strategic-ideational connection presents in the cluster.8 Simple outcome involves fewer clusters while more complex outcome involves a more massive number of clusters. States’ statements concerning intervention in the UN can provide a relatively simple outcome: the paragraph that emphasizes the importance of consent from the host country contains the connection between the sovereignty norm and the strategic concern for national security.9 Develops from the logic of the Gramscian school, one can further argue that the clusters (when there is more than one cluster) are usually organized systematically, under “central principle”.10

 Contessi (2010).  Cottam et al. (2004, 31–32). 5  Zehfuss (2002, 16–19). 6  Reus-Smit (2004, ch. 11, especially p. 38). 7  Contessi (2010). 8  Contessi (2010). 9  Contessi (2010). 10  Simon (1982, 70). 3 4

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5.2   Type: Strategy-Meaning Relative Weight The more crucial characteristic of reasoning outcome is its type—the relative power between the survival-strategic and meaningfulness-rightness considerations. Such relative power, and its variation, is shaped by the conditions, and the evolving conditions of “two degrees” across periods and situations. Since the two tiers’ mutual influence works through the “two degrees”—the degree of survival-relativity and the degree of self-­persuasion (as previously argued),11 the relative power of each tier in the final reasoning outcome is shaped by the conditions of the “two degrees” during the reasoning process. The relative power of meaningfulness-rightness consideration is disproportional to the degree of survival-relativity and proportional to the degree of self-persuasion; the relative strength of survival-strategy  consideration is proportional to the degree of survival-­ relativity and disproportional to the degree of self-persuasion.12 One can conclude several typical types of nature shaped by different aggregated conditions of the “two degrees” (see Fig. 5.1). Firstly, a higher degree of survival-relativity plus a lower degree of self-persuasion encourages survival-prioritized (prominence of the  survival-strategy consideration) mix (D in Fig. 5.1). Secondly, a lower degree of survival-relativity plus a higher degree of self-persuasion encourages meaning-­prioritized (prominence of the meaningfulness-rightness consideration) mix (B in Fig. 5.1). Thirdly, balanced mix (a relatively balance between survival-strategy and meaningfulness-rightness considerations) could be promoted in three conditions: a lower degree of survival-relativity plus a lower degree of self-persuasion (A in Fig. 5.1), a higher degree of survival-­relativity plus a higher degree of self-persuasion (C in Fig. 5.1), and a decreased (increased) degree of survival-relativity plus an increased (decreased) degree of self-persuasion (somewhere between D and B around the intersection point of the axis). The survival-meaningfulness relation can vary due to different aggregated conditions of “two degrees” in different situations and periods. So, the consequent reasoning outcome type can move across and within the sections in Fig. 5.1. For example, the type in one case/period might be in section D (survival-prioritized mix) but in section B (meaningfulness-­ prioritized mix) in another case/time. For another example, within  Maslow (1954, ch. 4, 52–54, 97–99); Broadbent (1957); Wendt (1999, 2003).  Maslow (1954, ch. 4, 52–54, 97–99); Broadbent 1957; Wendt (1999, 2003).

11 12

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High

D

C

High x

Low

A

B y Low

Fig. 5.1  “Two degrees” and types of political reasoning outcome (x: Degree of Self-Persuasion Moving from Low to High; y: Degree of Survival-Relativity Moving from Low to High; Types of Survival-Meaning Relation: A (balanced mix with lower self-persuasion and lower survival-relativity); C (balanced mix with higher self-persuasion and higher survival-relativity); D (survival-prioritized mix); B (Meaning-prioritized mix); and Somewhere between D and B around the intersection point of the axis (balanced mix) promoted by a decreased (increased) degree of survival-relativity plus an increased (decreased) degree of self-persuasion (somewhere between D and B, around the intersection point of the axis)

section D (survival-prioritized mix), a change in the aggregation of “two degrees” can lead to a lessened degree of survival-prioritization, and even to a balanced mix located in somewhere between D and B.

Bibliography Broadbent, Donald. 1957. A Mechanical Model of Human Attention and Immediate Memory. Psychological Review 64: 205–215. Contessi, Nicola P. 2010. Multilateralis, Intervention and Norm Contestation: China’s Stance on Darfur in the UN Security Council. Security Dialogue 41 (3): 323–344.

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Cottam, Martha, et  al. 2004. Introduction to Political Psychology. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Maslow, Abraham. 1954. Motivation and Personality, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. (Reprinted version). Reus-Smit, Christian., ed. 2004. The Politics of International Law. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Simon, Roger. 1982. Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction. London: GBR: ElecBook. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2003. Why a World State Is Inevitable. European Journal of International Relations 9 (4): 491–542. Zehfuss, Maja. 2002. Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PART II

The Empirical Part

CHAPTER 6

Empirical Connection: The China Case

The methodology of model application/testing follows the logic that the variable relations proposed in the model reflect in the empirical data.1 Based on such logic, there are several points about approaching data and data-model connections. Empirical methods concerning the China case will follow general explanations.

6.1   Referent Object As mentioned in the theoretical part, the model applies its assumptions about reasoning to any actor as a whole and focuses on the commonness of the deputy (or leading groups) when it refers to a transpersonal entity as a whole. The China Case: Commonness of Chinese Policy Group This project focuses on the commoness of the Chinese policy elite in the study of China (a transpersonal entity, a state) as a whole. Indeed, China’s policy group reason on behalf of China2 and can best reflect what China wants and how it adapts to the human rights norm.

1 2

 Evera 1997, ch.1–2.  Farkas 1998.

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Scholars who study China’s foreign policy often focus on China’s policy group’s reasoning and behavior.3 Kuhn examines “how China’s leaders think” by mapping the chain of motives that drive their domestic and foreign policies.4 Chen focuses on how China’s leaders recreate China’s identity based on their analysis of the internal/external conditions, and how such recreation shapes China’s evolving policy towards the international human rights regime.5 Furthermore, Potter explores how “China’s official interpretive communities” deal with the norm of human rights based on “the legal culture norms of China’s party/state”, shaping China’s human rights policy.6 The interaction process within the policy elite is not the focus of this project. If considered the Chinese policy elite as a whole, what is focused here is the information that one can generalize about their shared reasoning concerning the relation between China and human rights. Such shared concerns represent the agreements within the Chinese policy elite which consistently shape the Chinese human rights policy. The China Case: Components of Chinese Policy Elite Understanding the Chinese Policy elite’s components can help one know from whom the commonness should be captured. Of whom does China’s policy group comprise? According to Farkas, the state policy group includes those who “have formal positions that give them responsibility for setting foreign policy or if they consult regularly (on matters of foreign policy) with those who do”.7 Thus, for Farkas, the state policy includes those who have essential “official positions within the government”, “adviser”, prominent experts, etc.8 According to Liu and Zhang, three tiers are essential for understanding China’s foreign policy.9 The first two tiers—the central government/core leaders and governmental agencies dealing with foreign affairs (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs)— have close relations due to the latter’s role in representing the former’s

 Kuhn 2010.  Kuhn 2010. 5  Chen 2009. 6  Potter 2006, 395, and the whole article. 7  Farkas 1998, 14. 8  Farkas 1998, 14. 9  Liu and Haibin 2014, 405–406. 3 4

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decision.10 Liu and Zhang also recognize the role of scholarly opinions from prestigious research institutions that directly or indirectly made up the think tank group.11 Following the logic of Farkas, Liu, and Zhang, China’s policy group includes (1) most importantly, the official group—central government and its core leaders, and related agencies; and (2) Think tank group compromising important scholars from essential institutions.12 There are two reasons for considering scholars. Firstly, these scholars indirectly participate in the decision-making process by providing core officials with expertized knowledge and advice, through institutional and personal channels that help gather their pieces of advice to be presentable to officials.13 It is noted that, “[a]nalysts with policy expertise, national reputations or personal connections with policy makers can exercise policy influence … Some policy makers actively solicit analysis that addresses current policy issues or supports their views”.14 Secondly, although it is difficult to know if and how these scholars’ advice is considered in the decision making since the detailed internal process information is difficult to assess, it is clear that their works often re-emphasize and explain the policy. Such explanations are often helpful in the exploration of the reason behind China’s policy decision.

6.2   How to Get Reasoning Data Accessing reasoning data refers to aspects: resources and analysis methods. Resources: The China Case Generally speaking, it is crucial to collect resources that could reflect individuals’ reasoning (e.g. personal diaries, notes, and oral expressions) and the shared reasoning of entities’ deputies (e.g. official documents, public speeches). Concerning the China case, the project analyzes discourses in three kinds of contexts, all of which reflect the shared policy logic. The first kind  Liu and Haibin 2014, 405–406.  Liu and Haibin 2014, 405–406. 12  Farkas 1998, 13–14; Glaser and Saunders 2002; Shambaugh 2002; Liu and Haibin 2014, 405–406. 13  Glaser and Saunders 2002; Shambaugh 2002. 14  Suzuki 2011, 273. 10 11

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is China’s official documents concerning human rights (e.g., Chinese leaders’ ideas and speeches, human rights white papers, and other relevant Chinese official statements), which directly represent the Chinese policy group’s shared concern over human rights.15 Secondly, significant newspapers, i.e. the People’s Daily, will also be used to clarify the Chinese policy group’s joint reasoning. As China’s principal official newspaper, the People’s Daily is essential because, as claimed by Kuhn, it represents “the Party’s mouthpiece”.16 Scholars who study China’s human rights policies, for example, cannot ignore what China’s major official newspapers say.17 As Kent notes: “Articles published in …official newspapers like Renmin ribao (‘People’s Daily’) gave official sanction to human rights policy positions”.18 The third kind is selected works in the journals published by China’s prestigious think tank institutions (e.g., China Foreign Affairs University, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, etc.),19 and also representative expertized works introducing China’s human rights t­heory/policy.20 Incorporating important scholarly works is due to the role Chinese think tank scholars play in contributing to and articulating China’s policy.21 Analysis Method: The China Case Discourse analysis is important here. Political psychologists often use such a method to explore actors’ psychology and cognition.22 Constructivists also recognize the importance of discourse analysis because it can help assess the process of identity construction.23 Two kinds of discourse analysis methods are used to grasp reasoning characteristics. The first one is “lexicometric measurement” that measures the frequency of relevant words in official and scholarly texts, to capture the policy group’s emphasis and the emphasis’ evolution.24 The second follows the method used by Suzuki, Carlson, and Liu, namely, reading,  Liu and Haibin 2014, 405–406; and Chiu 1989.  Kuhn 2010, 107. 17  Kent 1999, ch.5. 18  Kent 1999, 155. 19  Glaser and Saunders 2002. 20  Chiu 1989. 21  Farkas 1998, 13–14; Glaser and Saunders 2002; Shambaugh 2002. 22  McDermott 2004, 31–34. 23  Sterling-Folker 2006, 119. 24  Bonnafous and Temmar 2013, 81–86, ch.V. 15 16

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understanding, and concluding the meaning of argument/s in texts and translating them into table form when necessary.25 For example, Chinese scholars such as Liu evaluates the evolution of Chinese human rights ideas by concluding the meaning of relevant articles in table form.26 Both of the two discourse analysis approaches aim to extract the content and evolution of China’s policy group’s reasoning process and outcome.

6.3   How to Clarify Reasoning Outcome Type Clarifying the type of political reasoning outcomes (strategic-ideational relative weight) is a difficult part of the data exploration. The fundamental clarification criterion is the goal/aim of the focused actor. The investigation of such a goal/aim could be assisted by macro and micro evidence. Fundamental Clarification Criterion: The Goal Both strategic and ideational forces drive any behaviors. For example, both competitive pattern and cooperative patterns of behavior are results of survival-related and meaningfulness-related processing of social information. For example, competition in international relations (i.e., “security dilemma” and balance of power) could be driven both by national security consideration,27 and the beliefs generated from interactions.28 Cooperation in international relations is due to the consideration of predictable reciprocity-­based “rational” strategic calculations,29 as well as to ideational factors—i.e., the collective identity that concerns others besides self-interests.30 The core question is the relative weight of strategic and ideational sides that drive them. One can not clearly clarify the relative power between the strategic side and the ideational side behind behaviors in many situations. The fundamental clarification is the goal/aim that an actor wants more. Any information from social interaction must work through the

 Carlson 2004, 10–11, 15–23; Suzuki 2011; 刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018.  刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018. 27  Burchill et al. 2005, ch2, 37–38; and Brown 2005, 40–43. 28  Wendt 1992, 1999. 29  Axelrod 1981; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; and Brown 2005, 45–46; Burchill et  al. 2005, 192. 30  For example see collective identity in Wendt 1992, 1999. 25 26

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pre-­existing motivations without which interest for interacting with related information disappears. So, for example, it is true that various rationalist behavior such as competition and cooperation have normative backgrounds (according to constructivist explanation), since actors think that the world is just like this because the others do so, or the social environments tell the actors that they should change strategies/interests.31 However, the rationalist behaviors (either competitive or cooperation) are fundamentally more strategic oriented as long as the “thing” actors want more is survival/material. The social/normative backgrounds conduct only additional influence, and such effect usually works longer when they can serve the more decisive goal, which is survival. Object and Content of Concern Another two points need explanation for the “goal”. Firstly, rational/material calculations for more comprehensive objects often pertain to more ideational aspirations (besides the strategic considerations). This is because concern for wider scope of objects usually needs more bravery for pursuing some innocent goals (i.e., love, humanitarian caring). For example, group leaders who are indeed concerned for the material well-being of a larger number of group members usually need more attachment to morality than those who concern smaller number of members’ material well-being. And the group leaders’ truly concern for the material well-being of members of other groups needs more ideational aspirations than the respect for their own groups’ material well-being since such expansion of material caring needs to transcend self-­ other division of interests at the group level. Secondly, more concern for non-material well-being necessarily involves more ideational attachment than concern for only material well-being, whatever the scope of the object of concern is. However, the wider the object scope is, the better. This is quite understandable. A person pursues what he/she thinks is important and will give these things to the “others” he/she concerns. So, truly norms/morality/ethics are moral since they concern various material and ideational well-being of the entire human being, despite their debates on how to realize such an end. For example, the innocent norm of human rights (whose contents are continuously evolving) and the ideal of Marxism (whose contents are also evolving along with social practices) shows universal caring about humanity. The difference is only the approach to such an end. While the former realizes

 Wendt 1992, 1999, 2003.

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an ideal world by respecting humans’ freedom and choice, the latter realizes a perfect world for humans’ well-being by removing practical problems in human societies since the labor division. Macro Evidence: The China Case Macro clarification is useful to identify the goal, which refers to the measurement of the degree of coincidence between actors’ behavior and strategic/ideational situations that actors face.32 After such a comparison, one can have a first-glance generalization of the survival-meaning relation contained in reasoning outcome. For example, to what extent do behaviors follow the strategic pay-offs in situations and to what extent do actions deviate from such pay-offs; if there is a deviation from strategic maximization, then one can convince the function of ideational aspects. Such comparison logic is widespread in political studies. For example, neorealists such as Mearsheimer and constructivists often use the comparison between behavior and macro strategic or normative environment to convince the influence of strategic or normative influence on states.33 Concerning the China case, one can explore the condition of coincidence between China’s behavior/policy and the strategic/ideational conditions it faces. Micro Evidence: The China Case Two Tiers’ Intervention Pattern Before going to micro evidence, one should explain how the two tiers conduct its influence on each other in micro way. The two tiers always intervene in each other through selecting/organizing the other’s elements according to the consideration of the tier conducting influence.34 The survival tier intervenes in the persuasion tier through selecting/organizing the persuasion tier’s ideational elements according to survival-strategic consideration.35 For Ikenberry and Kupchan, hegemonic states’ dominance in the international arena  Mearsheimer 2003; Johnston 2001, 492.  Mearsheimer 2003; Johnston 2001, 492. 34  Developed from Mearsheimer 2003; and Johnston 2001, 492; Simon 1982, 69–70; Burchill et al. 2005, ch.8; and Wendt 1999, 233–242. 35  Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Ikenberry 2001; Simon 1982, 69–70; and Sibley and Osborne 2016. 32 33

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throughout history is considerably built and secured by sustainably “attracting” other states to accept the ideas and the relevant institutional orders consistent with the hegemonic interests.36 Such logic of strategic manipulation of ideas is articulated in a more micro way by cultural hegemony theory. According to the theory of cultural hegemony, dominant classes establish and sustain their domination by educating the subordinate groups with systems of ideologies in favor of the dominant class.37 The usual method for ideological manipulation is to combine the existing ideological elements that have been accepted by other social classes, in order to win the support of other major social groups.38 Political psychological literature also illustrates the micro process of idea manipulation. According to the social dominance theory, the “social hierarchy” (the hierarchical positions of different groups in a society) is built and stabilized considerably by the higher-status groups’ construction of ideologies that support the “social hierarchy”.39 Sibley and Osborne illustrate such ideological manipulation by exploring how the dominant Whites in New Zealand construct ideologies to perpetuate the disadvantaged social position of the Maori, by reframing history and recognizing Maori culture’s contribution to the national identity of New Zealand.40 Similarly, persuasion tier’s intervention of the survival tier functions through the selection/organization of strategic elements according to meaning-rightness inspiration.41 For constructivism, norms and cultures set appropriate behavior standards that shape actors’ actions, including their strategies.42 States’ socialization into the international normative context that links weaponry with sovereignty and modernity leads to the spread of weapons in the state system.43 Meanwhile, although strategic consideration takes a role, the decreased usage of weaponry since 1945 is considerably related to the new international standard that defines

 Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Ikenberry 2001.  Baylis et al. 2008, 146–150; Burchill et al. 2005, 113–128; Jones 2006, 43, 48; Cox 1987; Gramsci 1971, 637–638; Simon 1982, 29, 69–72, 99; Bieler and Morton 2008. 38  Baylis et al. 2008, 146–150; Burchill et al. 2005, 113–128; Jones 2006, 43–48; Cox 1987; Gramsci 1971, 637–638; Simon 1982, 29, 69–72, 99. 39  Cottam et al. 2004, 157; Sibley and Osborne 2016, 115–120. 40  Sibley and Osborne 2016. 41  Developed from Burchill et al. 2005, ch.8; Wendt 1999, 233–242; and Katzenstein 1996. 42  Katzenstein 1996, and especially pp. 463–469; Burchill et al. 2005, ch.8. 43  Katzenstein 1996, ch.3. 36 37

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non-­ use of weaponry as “legitimate” and “civilized” state behavior.44 Furthermore, Kier illustrates how France’s two competing military cultures in France promote continuing domestic debate that hinders French foreign policy decision making before the second World War.45 Wendt explains how different beliefs about strategies developed from social practices shape different types of the international system that includes anarchy (maximization of self-interest at the expense of the interests of others) and an emerging cooperative one (egoism decreases for collective interests).46 Discourse Reflection The two tiers intervene in each other through selecting/organizing the other’s elements according to the consideration of the tier conducting influence.47 Moreover, the strategic-ideational connections form reasoning outcomes in the cluster (s) system.48 So, each cluster already contains the mutual intervention between the connected strategic and ideational elements. Thus, to explore the relative weight of each tier in the reasoning outcome fundamentally means to explore if and how the majority number of significant clusters that form the reasoning outcome is dominated by intervention from survival consideration, from persuasion consideration, or a survival-persuasion balance. So, one can explore micro evidence of what actors want more in three ways: (1) most essentially, by exploring major clusters in reasoning outcome form one by one, to see if the connection (between strategic and ideational element) logic contained in each cluster is biased to the survival side, persuasion side, or the balanced both; (2) by generalizing the primary contents in the reasoning outcome contexts, to see if the contents are biased to the survival side, persuasion side, or the balanced both; and (3) to find direct discourse evidence, if there are, that show the strategic-­ ideational relative weight. The above three ways will be applied to the China case. This project explores the strategic-ideational connection logics in clusters that form the documents/works presenting the Chinese policy elite’s shared reasoning concerning human rights. Meanwhile, other discourse evidence that directly shows the strategic-ideational relative weight will also be highlighted.  Tannenwald 1999.  Katzenstein 1996, ch.6. 46  Wendt 1992, 1999. 47  Simon 1982, 69–70; Sibley and Osborne 2016; Burchill et al. 2005, ch8; Wendt 1999, 233–242; Katzenstein 1996. 48  Contessi 2010. 44 45

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6.4   “Two Degrees” and the Reasoning Outcome Type The correlation between “two degrees” and the type of resoning outcome, which is the most challenging part of data exploration, could also be made through macro and micro pieces of evidence. Firstly, the macro evidence refers to the close correlation between the condition/evolution of the “two degrees” and the condition/evolution of the type of political reasoning.49 Secondly, micro evidence refers to the discourse reflections that directly/indirectly show the connectedness between “two degrees” and strategic-ideational relative weight in the actor’s considerations. Concerning the China case, one can observe if the type of the Chinese policy elite’s reasoning outcome correlates to the “two degrees” as the conceptional model proposes and if there are discourse reflections that directly indicate such correlations.

6.5   Period Division and the Periodical Main Key Periodical Division: The China Case Empirical cases often include either a shorter or longer period. The more extended period can usually be divided into more than one period during which the behaviors have both continuities and transformations. Such cross periods comparison is conductive to illustrate how the mix and interaction of the two tiers shape persistency and change in political reasoning outcomes (in terms of both form and type) and consequent behaviors. Concerning the China case, as later will be explored, if and how can one clarify the periodical divisions in China’s human rights policy’s evolution since the end of the Cold War? If there is a periodical division, what are continuities and changes across periods? And why? Periodical Main Key: The China Case The focused period (either as a singular one or among divided periods) in the exploration of reasoning outcome and its related variables can be either short or long. A short period can be relatively easy. Referring to a

 Checkel 1998; Finnemore 2003; Johnston 2001, 492.

49

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more extended period, one can capture the characteristics of major variables (e.g., “two degrees”, form and type of reasoning outcome) by generalizing the average level of the periodical trend. One can clarify some determinant signals at the beginning of the period. One can also make a year-by-year analysis, which helps one to observe a conclusive trend. This applies to the China case.

Bibliography Axelrod, Robert. 1981. The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoist. The American Political Science Review 75 (2): 306–318. Axelrod, Robert, and Robert Keohane. 1985. Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. World Politics 38 (1): 226–254. Baylis, John, et al., eds. 2008. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. Bieler, Andreas, and Adam David Morton. 2008. The Deficit of Discourse in IPE: Turning Base Metal into Gold? International Studies Quarterly 52 (1): 103–128. Bonnafous, Simone, and Malika Temmar, eds. 2013. Discourse Analysis & Human and Social Sciences. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers. Brown, Chris. 2005. Understanding International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Burchill, Scott, et al. 2005. Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Carlson, Allen. 2004. Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China’s Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention. Pacific Affairs 77 (1): 9–27. Checkel, Jeffrey. 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. Review Article. World Politics 50: 324–348. Chen, Dingding. 2009. China’s Participation in the International Human Rights Regime: A State Identity Perspective. Chinese Journal of International Politics 2 (3): 399–419. Chiu, Hungdah. 1989. Chinese Attitude Toward International Law of Human Rights in the Post-Mao Era. Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Number 5-1989 (94), School of Law University of Maryland. Contessi, Nicola P. 2010. Multilateralis, Intervention and Norm Contestation: China’s Stance on Darfur in the UN Security Council. Security Dialogue 41 (3): 323–344. Cottam, Martha, et  al. 2004. Introduction to Political Psychology. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

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Cox, Robert. 1987. Production, State and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University. Evera, Van Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Farkas, Andrew. 1998. State Learning and International Change. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Finnemore, Martha. 2003. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Glaser, Bonnie, and Phillip Saunders. 2002. Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence. The China Quarterly 171: 597–616. Gramsci, Antonio. 1971 [1978]. Selections From the Prison Notebooks, Ed and Trans. Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New  York: International Publishers. Ikenberry, John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuliding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ikenberry, John, and Charles Kupchan. 1990. Socialization and Hegemonic Power. International Organization 44 (3): 283–315. Johnston, Alasdair Iain. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 487–515. Jones, Steve. 2006. Antonio Gramsci. London: Routledge, 2006, Reprinted in 2007. Katzenstein, Peter, ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security. New  York: Columbia University Press. Kent, Ann. 1999. China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 2010. How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China’s Reform and What This Means for the Future. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd. Liu, Tiewa, and Zhang Haibin. 2014. Debates in China About the Responsibility to Protect as a Developing International Norm: A General Assessment. Conflict, Security & Development 14 (4): 403–427. McDermott, Rose. 2004. Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mearsheimer, John. 2003 [2001]. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. Potter, Pitman. 2006. Selective Adaptation and Institutional Capacity: Perspective on Human Rights in China. International Journal 61 (2): 389–407. Shambaugh, David. 2002. China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structures and Process. The China Quarterly 171: 575–596. Simon, Roger. 1982. Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction. London: GBR: ElecBook.

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Sibley, Chris G., and Danny Osborne. 2016. Ideology and Post-Colonial Society. Political Psychology 37 (1): 115–161. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer., ed. 2006. Making Sense of International Relations Theory. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Suzuki, Shogo. 2011. Why Does China Participate in Intrusive Peacekeeping? Understanding Paternalist Chinese Discourses on Development and Intervention. International Peacekeeping 18 (3): 271–285. Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-use. International Organization 53 (3): 433–468. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It. International Organization 46 (2): 391–425. ———. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2003. Why a World State Is Inevitable. European Journal of International Relations 9 (4): 491–542.

Speeches, Articles

and

Books in Chinese

刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 改革开放与我国人权观的变迁, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2018年04期

CHAPTER 7

China and Human Rights: Two Layers of Considerations

This chapter explains if and how the two tiers of motivation-heuristics simultaneously shape China’s consideration of the human rights issue. Firstly, it observes a watershed year that divides the evolution of China’s human rights policy into two periods since the end of the Cold War: the pre-1997 period and the post-1997 period. It then raises questions about what factors determine the continuity as well as transformation across the two periods. Secondly, it argues that two kinds of considerations continuously drive the Chinese policy elite’s concern about human rights. The first kind of consideration is the desire and strategies for China’s survival relating to domestic functionality and external safety. The second consideration is the pursuit of a meaningfulness system concerning human rights by exploring the ideational relations about it. Thirdly, it grasps the form of the Chinese policy elite’s reasoning outcome concerning human rights. It finds that the form is a system of strategic-­ideational clusters. Such a cluster/s system shows the outcome-­ reflection of the two layers of considerations’ continuous mix. Meanwhile, it also partly contributes to China’s human rights policy’s evolution across the two periods.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 K. Li, A New Model of Political Reasoning, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4803-5_7

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7.1   Periodical Division The project’s emphasis is the post-Cold War era because the end of the Cold war signals the real expansive “power” of the human rights regime that “spread” its influences across the world.1 As Brown notes: “During the Cold War, human rights were often treated as a strategic bargaining tool, to be used to gain concessions from or to embarrass the states of the East. After 1989, the political barriers to the universal spread of the notion of human rights came down, plus advances in technology enabled NGOs concerned with the promotion of human rights to exert more influence than ever before”.2 The period division is made based on current scholarly snapshots of events that capture the ongoing evolution pattern of China’s domestic and foreign policy concerning the human rights issue. The focus here is to generalize the overall evolution trend across periods, with particular emphasis on grasping the watersheds that show periodical divisions. Arguably, the post-Cold War Chinese human rights policy has evolved in a two-periods pattern.3 The first period is the pre-1997 one (from 1990 to 1997), and the other is the post-1997 one (from 1997 to 2019), and the year 1997 is the watershed in the post-Cold War era.4 A general observation from China’s policy behavior concerning human rights indicates that since 1990 there has been a trend toward China’s increasing concentration on the human rights issue, especially since the watershed of 1997, after which such process has continuously accelerated. The Pre-1997 Period The period from 1990 to 1997 see a gradual change in Chinese human rights policy behavior. The domestically considerable change happened. The first-time publication by the State Council, the Human Rights White Paper in 1991, shows the “signal of the Communist Party of China and  Brown (2005, 208).  Brown (2005, 208). 3  Kent (1999, 15, 247–248, chap.1); Chen (2009, 400–404). 4  Partially in line with Chen (2009) and Jing (2009). The watershed of 1997 here is different from Chen (2009) who considers the watershed since 1989 as 1994. Jing’s (Jing 2009, 165–168) work does not clearly defines the time periods, but one can observe a huge transformation since 1997 from the empirical evidences that cited from Allen Carlson in page 165. Also see Kent (1999, ch.2, 247–248), and the whole book. 1 2

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government’s fundamental transformation in human rights idea and practice”.5 This period also shows the introduction of a series of laws—i.e., in administrative, judicial, labor, education, and other social areas, to protect citizens, workers, women and children, and minority nationality.6 Human rights studies and educations are also promoted and supported.7 China’s participation in the international human rights regime increased in this period.8 China became a new member of two international human rights conventions in the early 1990s.9 At this time, China cooperated with “investigation” from western countries such as Australia, France, and Canada, and also sent scholars to the West for study and communication concerning human rights.10 The Post-1997 Period The period from 1997 to 2019 see accelerated change in Chinese human rights policy behavior. Domestically, China incorporated human rights protection into its constitutional law in 2004, which is understood to represent China’s increasing acceptance of the international human rights regime.11 Observers note that “China’s human rights record is expected to improve over time as it continues to reform and open up. The constitutional amendment made in March 2004 to respect and protect human rights…is a step forward in this direction. It represents a strong indication that the government pays increasing attention to the issue of human rights”.12 The post-1997 period sees accelerated expansion in China’s participation in the international human rights regime.13 The number of international human rights treaties (including covenants and protocols) that China signed and ratified jumped sharply from 19  in 1996 to 21  in 1997 and increased by the total number of eight from 1997 to 2002 (see Fig. 7.1).14 For example, China signed and ratified the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights in 1997 and 2001, and signed the  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 34).  Kent (1999, 201, 204–215); 1995 human rights white paper. 7  1995 human rights white paper. 8  Chen (2009, 400–404); Jing (2009, 164–165). 9  Jing (2009, 170–173). 10  Chen (2009, 402–403); Kent (1999, 160). 11  Jing (2009, 168). 12  Chan (2005, 195). 13  Chen (2009, 400–404); Jing (2009, 165–168). 14  Jing (2009, 170–173). 5 6

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91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

19

19

90

30 26 27 25 23 22 22 21 20 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 15 10 5 0

Fig. 7.1  Number of International Human Rights Treaties that China had started to accept (sign, ratify, or access). (Sources: Concluded from the long table cited in Jing 2009 (pp. 170–173) and data about China and human rights treaties which can be searched in the homepage of the web (umn.edu) cited by Jing (p. 173): http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=12949&language=E&or der=alpha)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998.15 Because of the importance of these two covenants, China’s membership marked significant progress in its relationship with the international human rights regime.16 As Chiu argues, China’s “acceptance of existing multilateral human rights conventions is an indication of its official attitude toward the international law of human rights”.17 Other events provide additional indication of China’s more positive attitude towards the international human rights regime: China promises long-term cooperation with the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights by signing related documents in 1998, invited several senior officials of UN human rights organizations to China, and registered an accelerated number of NGOs that help translate public opinions to the central government.18 The Watershed: 1997 The watershed as the year of 1997 defined above is mostly consistent with the scholarly observation of the evolution pattern in China’s policy towards international institutions and global affairs,19 further convincing the  Chen (2009, 195–197).  Kent (1999, 195); Chen (2009, 404). 17  Chiu (1989, 18–19). 18  Chan (2005, 188–189); Kent (1999, 78, 195–198); Chen (2009, 404); Morton (2005, 521–522, 526–527). 19  Wang (2007). 15 16

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appropriateness of the watershed in the human rights term. Wang observed a general trend of increasing appearance of the discourse of “linking up with the international track” in three crucial Chinese newspapers (such as People’s Daily, the Beijing Evening News) and valuable scholarly Journal articles ranging from the earliest 1980s to the latest 2006, with the application areas ranging from economic to cultural/political/legal realms and other realms later.20 From Wang’s tables indicating the discourse appearance, one can observe a watershed signal as being located around the late 1990s: (1) Wang’s Figure about the evolution of appearance of such cooperative discourse in the People’s Daily from 1987 to 2003 shows the emergence of such discourse in 1993, which rises until 1996 and then slightly decreased after that, with discourse appearance increased sharply in the years close to 1999, which is very possibly the year of 1997;21 (2) The cooperative discourse emerges in the Beijing Evening News in 1998 and shows a general trend of increase in the discourse appearance after that;22 and (3) Significant scholarly journal articles with such discourse appear in 1994, and the number grows slightly after 1994 but rises sharply after 1998.23 The policy in Xi’s era further shows an acceleratingly active cooperation and participation in international affairs: “there are several indications that the new leadership, under President Xi Jinping, has decided that it would like to become more active and ‘do more’ in the international realm”.24 So, two trends in China’s policy could be concluded: (1) the overall direction of increasing attention to the human rights issue; and (2) the accelerating of such an increase since the year 1997. The question is, what factors that shape the continuities and transformations across the two periods?

7.2   Two Layers of Considerations Two kinds of considerations continuously drive the Chinese policy elite’s concern about human rights. In the China case, the kinds of consideration are the concrete expression of the continuous mix of two tiers of  Wang (2007, 1–11).  See figure 1 in Wang (2007, 5). 22  See figure 2 and analysis in Wang (2007, 5). 23  See figure 3 and analysis in Wang (2007, 6). 24  Foot (2014, 1085). 20 21

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motivation-­heuristics. The first kind of consideration is the desire and strategies for China’s survival that means: (a) good social relations necessary for China’s internal functionality, including domestic stability, rich-poor gap management, and the adaptation to social-stratum evolution; (b) national security through resisting external intervention; and (c) as well as national material development in support of national security and sustaining virtuous domestic relations.25 Historical experiences function, but more as factors that work through China’s pre-existing survival concern so that China adapts directions for the survival goal. Here it disagrees with the constructivists’ full attribution of China’s behaviors to identity-­ building/rebuilding from past experiences of realist power politics.26 The second consideration is the pursuit of meaningfulness system concerning human rights, by exploring the question of ideational relations about human rights: firstly, the relation between Western tradition that emphasizes absolute/natural individual freedom and Chinese political/cultural beliefs that doubt such absolute individualism; and secondly, the relation between sovereignty and human rights.27 National Survival-Strategic Consideration  irtuous Social Relations V Chinese policy group’s concern for China’s internal functionality leads to the attention to virtuous social relations that require, for example, domestic stability and adaptation for social dynamics.28 Concern for Domestic Stability Domestic stability is necessary for China’s internal functionality. It is considered by Chinese leaders as the foundation for China’s domestic project of development and reform.29 Such concern also relates to historical experience and the rich-poor gap.30

25  Kuhn (2010, 3–4, 13–16, 98, 121; ch.8–10); Nee and Sonja (2012); Tubilewicz (2006, ch.3); Fravel (1996, 1115–1116); Brown (2005, 66–67); Art and Jervis (2009, 182); Mearsheimer (2003, 56, 60–61); and Mao’s idea documented in: http://www.humanrights. cn/html/wxzl/1/. 26  Wang (2000, 487–488); Hempson-Jones (2005, 706–707, 720). 27  Maslow (1954, 46); Festinger (2001); and Teske (1997); Chen (2009, 417); Baylis et al. (2008, ch.29); 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012). 28  Kuhn (2010, 13–16, 98–121, ch.8–10). 29  Kuhn (2010, 98, 121). 30  Chan (2005); Kuhn (2010, 15, 121).

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There is a full recognition of China’s particular attention to domestic stability influenced by memory.31 US former President Clinton’s speech in 1998 shows such recognition: “the Chinese…understand better than I the price of paid over time at various moments in history for disruption and upheaval in China, so there is an understanding to have stability in the country”.32 Kuhn mentions China’s attention to the chaos during the Cultural Revolution, which reminds China’s politicians and intellectuals of the importance of stability for national goals of well-being and development.33 China’s policy group also pays attention to the possible influence of the rich-poor gap on domestic stability.34 Indeed, the gradually enlarging number of “middle class” and “upper class” in China35 and the generally improving incomes of rural populations36 shows a long-term improvement of material conditions in China. However, at the same time, the incoming gap is still existing. As Xia notes: “…because China has a very large population and its economic development is very unbalanced, it will continue to focus its attention on internal issues”.37 Unlike Xia’s analysis of the practical situation, Kuhn notes human psychology’s role in “coloring” the social gap. Although Kuhn notices the “better off in absolute terms” in Chinese peoples’ living conditions in rural areas, he emphasizes humans’ intention to “judge their circumstances not in comparison to what they had in the past but in comparison to what others have in the present”.38 Kuhn thus worries about the potential influence of such a feeling of inequality on China’s domestic social stability.39 Adaptation to Social Dynamics also attracts the Chinese policy elite, especially China’s social stratum proportions.40 The rise of the new social stratum in China accompanies China’s gradual reform in ownership and development of the market economy.41 As Shambaugh notes, an essential  For example see Kuhn (2010, 13–14).  Chan (2005, 182). 33  Kuhn (2010, 13–14). 34  Kuhn (2010, 15, 121), Xia (2001, 18). 35  Shambaugh (2016, 58). 36  Kuhn (2010, 15). 37  Xia (2001, 18). 38  Kuhn (2010, 15). 39  Kuhn (2010, 15). 40  Tubilewicz (2006, ch.3); Kuhn (2010, 13–16, ch.8–10). 41  Nee and Sonja (2012); Tubilewicz (2006, ch.3); Kuhn (2010, 13–16, ch.8–10). 31 32

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phenomenon emerging in China is the growing population beyond the term traditionally defined as “proletariats”: “Between 1978 and 2006 the percentage of the workforce engaged in agriculture dropped from 67.4 percent to 40.3 percent, while those engaged in private business (private entrepreneurs, private business owners and their employers) grew from 2.2 percent to 20.9 percent”, “‘upper class’ …now accounts for 6 percent of population”, and the “the growth of the middle class…in China, which reportedly now accounts for approximately 28 percent of the population (combining upper-and lower-middle-class households)”.42 The need to consider the new rising stratum is immense for China’s internal functional efficiency, e.g., in terms of economy.43 Chinese leaders recognize the importance of the new social stratum (i.e., entrepreneurs) for China’s economic development.44 As Li explains, in the 1990s, the Chinese government gives more freedom to “local enterprise” and “individual labor” so that these inspired people can be getting rich first during fair competition.45 According to Fan, the market economy and its corresponding legal channels (citizens’ legal equality) encourage individuals to search for independent economic interests during fair competition.46 National Security Following the intrinsic nature of any transpersonal entity, especially the state, the Chinese policy elite attach great importance to resisting external threats to China.47 Such concern relates to historical experience and practical situations.48 There is full recognition of how China’s experience of “humiliation” strengthens China’s resistance to external intervention.49 As Li and Dury note: “China’s history with foreign occupation…created a culture that is particularly cautious and sensitive to issues involving foreign goverments”.50 Hempson-Jones has a similar point of view, arguing that China’s past  Shambaugh (2016, 58).  Kuhn (2010, 13, 15–16). 44  Kuhn (2010, 13, 15–16). 45  李步云 [Li Buyun] (1994, 42). 46  范继增 [Fan Jizeng] (2011, 33–34). 47  Waltz (2010, 95–96); Krasner (2001a, 239, 241–243, 245, 248); Krasner (1995/1996, 121–122, 150–151); Fravel (1996, 1109, 1115–1116). 48  Wang (2000, 86 and its footnotes); Brown (2005, 213–217, 223–225). 49  Wang (2000, 486 and its footnotes). 50  Li and Drury (2004, 384). 42 43

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experience shapes its “self-perception as a victim of the West during the ‘century of shame’ that is most often used…to explain the PRC’s…realist outlook and absolutist position on sovereignty [referring to non-­ interference]”.51 The past bitter experience contributes to China’s “guarding against suspected attempts by the other major powers to divide, conquer and exploit China”.52 Besides experience, China’s emphasis on non-intervention also relates to the practical situations: the domestic subjects that China faces (i.e., Taiwan question, ethnic tensions, and social processes during reforms) on the one hand, and its continuous suspicion towards some Western countries (mainly U.S.) on the other hand.53 The U.S.-led western countries’ strategic concern and the consequent “pick and choose” pattern considering the international institutions (including that relating to the human rights issue) is acknowledged even by Western scholars.54 For example, Brown notices the broad criticism of the U.S. and some other Western countries for their strategic management of the relationship with the international regime, including the international human rights regime.55 Concerning China, U.S. lacks interest in Chinese human rights before the 1980s very possibly because of needing China in the balance against the Soviet Union but paid more attention to such issue when the U.S did not need China in such balance since the 1980s, although other factors may also work, i.e., the increasing interaction between China and foreign organizations.56 That is perhaps why both China (and other countries such as Russia), in line with realist theorists, doubt the U.S.’ (and other great powers’) intention to use the human rights course as an excuse to intervene countries’ internal affairs for self-interests and power expansion.57  ational Material Development N Concern for national material development, both economic and military strength, is unavoidable for China.58 According to neorealism, material  Hempson-Jones (2005, 706–707).  Hempson-Jones (2005, 705–706). 53  Rawnsley (2006); Choedon (2005, 54–55); Yin (2007, 26–29, 57–61); Fravel (1996, 1109, 1118–1119); Kuhn (2010); Carlson (2004, 11, 16). 54  Brown (2005, 213–217, 223–225). 55  Brown (2005, 213–217, 223–225). 56  Wan (1997, 238–239). 57  Brown (2005, 226–227). 58  Brown (2005, 66–67); Art and Jervis (2009, 182); Mearsheimer (2003, 56, 60–61). 51 52

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strength is necessary for national security through holding capabilities of combating possible foreign threats.59 The overall national material improvement also provides long-term material backing for a pleasant and efficient domestic social environment by, for example, moderating the social stress caused by poverty and the gap between different social groups.60 That is perhaps why Kuhn notes that “ecnomic improvements— higher standard of living, financial success, luxuries of life—are goals in every country”.61 According to Xia, economic development is China’s persistently important task.62 The persistent concern for material development already shapes China’s strategy towards things coming from the West since late Qing, which is defined by Weatherley as incorporating the things useful but giving up the things harmful aimed at increasing China’s national strength.63 When facing technologies and ideas from the West, as Weatherley observes, “there is a debate in China…close tied…to the question of how to make China strong”.64 China’s concern for national material development further relates to China’s experience of foreign invasion and the global spread of the market economy.65 For one thing, the memory of the interaction with the international system—historical suffering from foreign aggression and others, drives China’s continuous material power building.66 According to Kuhn, China’s experience of foreign oppression promotes China’s determination to rise.67 As Kuhn notes: “[T]he Chinese want to show the world that they are in every way a modern nation and in every sense a great power…material wealth…military strength…these are what they must and will achieve”.68 For the other, the world-wide evolution of the economic model necessarily influences China’s road towards the national material building. Such influence is partially recognized by Kent. Kent notes that the real close interaction between China and the international system  Waltz (2001, 160).  Mao’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; Kuhn (2010, 13, 15–16). 61  Kuhn (2010, 3–4). 62  Xia (2001, 18). 63  Gewirtz (2015, 548–549). 64  Concluded and quoted in Gewirtz (2015, 548–549). 65  Kuhn (2010, 3–4); Kent (2004, 539). 66  Kuhn (2010, 3–5); Hempson-Jones (2005, 705–706); Wang (2000, 487–488). 67  Kuhn (2010, 3–5). 68  Kuhn (2010, 3–4). 59 60

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began when the system is dominated by the globalized process of market-­ oriented economy, so that “China embraced the market eagerly and swiftly”.69 The policy of reform and opening up since the former President Deng embarked China’s new period of incorporating the market economy in the socialist construction, which brings new domestic issues (such as ownership reforms) and a new relationship with the international society (such as the growing attention to economic opportunities under market principle).70 The connection with the market economy through reform and opening up shows that China is “catching up, and is grasping the strategic opportunity granted it by history”.71 Strategic Logic Arguably, China’s human rights idea and policy relates to a strategic struggle for the above-mentioned national survival considerations.72 This is a reflection of the proposed strategic mapping for survival according to different situations.73 For example, Wan explains how China’s concern for economic development, stability, and managing pressure from the West shape Chinese human rights policy.74 The remaining issue, which will be explored later in this chapter, is just the detail about how exactly the Chinese policy elite’s strategic struggle for China’s survival contribute to the condition and evolution of China’s human rights idea and policy. Meaningfulness-Rightness Consideration China also pursues meaningfulness during its management of the human rights issue. Every country needs meaningfulness, including China. For example, Chen, in agreeing with Foot, notes China’s desire for “searching for a durable identity” that “provides certainty amid a rapidly changing world”.75 “Without this durable sense of self”, Foot argues, “it is difficult

 Kent (2004, 524, 539).  Chen (2009); Kuhn (2010). 71  McCormick and Ping (2011, 209). 72  Wan (2001). 73  Hay (2002, 8, 17–19, 103); Burchill et al. (2005, ch.2, 189, 192); Nye (1988, 218); and Monroe (2001, 153); McDermott (2004, 57–72). 74  Wan (2001, 2–3, 29–30). 75  Chen (2009, 417). 69 70

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for the state in question or its major interlocutors to anticipate future policy stances, thus increasing uncertainty in an already uncertain world”.76 Indeed, China searches for an ideational backing that could help it rebuild confidence, belief, and behavior guidelines.77 But it is a difficult task, since China faces two ideational forces. On the one hand, there is a strong sense of “reviving” traditional Chinese values, which is shaped, according to Kuhn’s analysis, by the combination of a proud of China’s ancient civilization and regret of China’s experience of foreign oppression.78 According to the former President Mao’s words: “The period during which the Chinese people are considered uncivilized is passed, we will rise in the world as a nation with high-level culture”.79 President Xi emphasizes that “China’s development, at least in part, is driven by patriotism and pride”; and that the “pride that Chinese people take in our glorious ancient civilization” and Chinese people’s experience of “national weakness, oppression and humiliation” combine to shape the cause of the “self-motivation to build our country”.80 On the other hand, according to Su, China is continuously facing the process and consequence of the Western-driven globalization of “liberal trade” and relevant political/ social values since the Industrial Revolution.81 So, modern China continuously faces the challenge of colliding between China’s more previously taken as the right thing (ancient Chinese civilization plus traditional culture, and later the belief in the Marxism), and the spread of westernization that largely dominates the value system of China’s external social environment.82 While some of the latter are gradually incorporated for China’s better national construction,83 the management of the two different systems is “fundamental” but a difficult task indeed.84 Such difficulty could be seen, for example, in Chinese leaders’ significant attempts in the incorporation of market economy under the essential

 Chen (2009, 417).  Kuhn (2010, 4, ch.10); Jonathan Spence’s idea and Link’s idea in Link (2015). 78  Kuhn (2010, 4); McCormick and Ping (2011). 79  A translation of Mao’s words documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 80  Cited and quoted in Kuhn (2010, 4). 81  Su Hao’s article in McCormick and Ping (2011, 204–207). 82  Link (2015); Kuhn (2010, ch.10). 83  Gewirtz (2015, 548–549); Kent (2004, 539). 84  Link (2015). 76 77

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institutional spirit of Marxist/socialist philosophy.85 Thus, it is not surprising that some Western scholars who study China find China’s continuous “search” for “self” in the modern era and the way towards “defining example of how things should be”.86  uman Rights: Question of Ideational Relation H The idea of human rights is originated in Europe (tracing back to the Medieval period) tradition and expanded globally after several significant waves of struggle against human disasters (i.e., great wars, slave trade, severe racial discrimination such genocide, etc.).87 The norm of human rights becomes an international regime after the UN’s introduction of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948; and gradually expands through a series of international and regional treaties, increasing numbers of states signed these treaties, UN human rights branches, NGOs, and bilateral platforms which “investigate” and promote state compliance.88 The expansion of the international human rights regime becomes clear since the 1960s and especially after the end of the Cold War.89 The universal spirit of human rights embedded in the UN-centered international human regime is “[t]he idea of a human right implies a kind of universal human identity that transcends the national, ethnic and religious identities…see individuals as having those rights simply by virtue of their humanity, and quite regardless of the community or nation of which they are members”.90 The essential importance of such regime channel is its normative codification of the universal respect of the things that “we share” as “most fundamental to our common humanity” and its providing of space for members of the international society to think and cooperate for agreements and realization of “commonness”.91 Under such primary spiritual channels, the international human rights regime’s norms (represented as treaties) are continuously evolving.92  Kuhn (2010, ch.8–11).  Jonathan Spence’s idea and Link’s idea in Link (2015). 87  Baylis et al. (2008, 508). 88  Baylis et  al. (2008, ch. 29); Brown (2005, 208–209); Jing (2009, 161–164); Kent (1999, 9–13). 89  Baylis et al. (2008, chap. 29); Brown (2005, 208–209); Jing (2009, 161–164); Kent (1999, 9–13). 90  Brown (2005, 208, 211). 91  Ness (2003, 17). 92  Ness (2003, 17). 85 86

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The treaty-based international human rights norm’s primary contents include three generations, with essential relevant treaties completed from 1948 to 1993 (with the majority codified in the period from 1948 to early 1980s).93 The first generation concentrates on individual political/civil rights, which is shaped by “the traditional western concept of human rights”:94 i.e., “freedom of speech and assembly” and, according to the words in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration, “the right to take part in the government of his (sic) country, directly or through freely chosen representatives”.95 The second and third generations gradually expand the concentration to economic/social/cultural rights and collective rights: i.e., “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family…and to the continuous improvement of living conditions (Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 11.1)”; “economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality (Article 22)” (the article here belongs to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); The right of self-­ determination considering that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-­ determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development (Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 1.1)”; “the right to development” that promotes the development of “the newly independent countries”.96 Concerning human rights, some of its conceptual elements attract China (thanks to the affluent and evolving contents of the human rights norm) but some challenge China’s ideational standing. The Chinese policy elite’s concerns are to build a persuasive human rights understanding by managing both attractive and challenging elements. Below explains the parts that China feels challengeable. While the attractive feature will be accepted (as later will be shown), it is the challenging part that drives China’s own path to the rightness building concerning human rights. The promotion of the international human rights norm is for a long time dominated mainly by the Western-style and concerns, with which non-Western countries necessarily feel uncomfortable, including China.97  Baylis et al. (2008, 508–509).  Chiu (1989, 12–13). 95  Concluded and quoted by Brown in Baylis et al. (2008, 508–509). 96  Brown’s article in Baylis et al. (2008, 508–509, 515–516); Chiu (1989, 12–13). 97  Baylis et al. (2008, ch. 29). 93 94

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The contradiction centers on two points: one is towards the Western legacy that concerning absolute individual rights against everything, and the other is the involving expansion of such absolute individual rights against state sovereignty.98 Relation of Political/Cultural Beliefs From the very beginning, Chinese political and cultural beliefs doubt one aspect of international human rights norm—the Western tradition that backs absolute and naturally given individual freedom.99 Marxism Marxists do not refuse “human rights” as an innocent idea but doubt it as being used as the discourse tool of class exploitation under the labor division.100 The Western tradition emphasizes individuals’ naturally given freedom against governments (political and civil rights) for protection of self’s property and freedom of market/political/social choices with ignorance of the collectivity.101 The Western emphasis of naturally individual rights against limits from social collectivity is for Marxism the tool for capitalist exploration at the expense of the interests of the social community and its large population.102 For one thing, Marxism intrinsically doubts egoist pursuit of capitalist accumulation that necessarily resulted in small groups’ (the capitalist class in the traditional Marxist definition) exploitation of a large number of other groups (the working class in the traditional Marxist definition) in the human society under the division of labour.103 According to the Chinese reading of Marxist literature, the concept of “freedom” is the excuse of capitalists’ free maximization of their economic interests in the marketplace through the legal/political codification of “freedom” so that the proletariats are disadvantaged forever.104 Marx, indeed, “pointed to the way in which the liberal position stresses property rights to the advantage of the rich and powerful”.105 For the other, according to the Chinese reading of Marx’s work, the realization of one’s actual improvements depends on the community, the “real” community without class exploitation.106 The “communitarian thinkers”  Baylis et al. (2008, ch.29); 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012).  Baylis et al. (2008, ch.29); 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012). 100  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012). 101  Baylis et al. (2008, 510–512). 102  Baylis et al. (2008, 511–512, ch.8); 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 第二章 [ch.2]). 103  Burchill et al. (2005, 112–120); 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 73–92). 104  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 87–88). 105  Brown’s conclusion of Marx’s words in Baylis et al. (2008, 511–512). 106  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 89–90). 98 99

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such as Hegel also emphasizes the importance of belonging to the social community for individual realization.107 Following Marxism, China fundamentally believes that the only way to humans’ goodness and progress is to emancipate from capitalist exploitation through the proletariat building of a communist collectivity in which most people earn equal to how much they give in and what they need so that they enjoying fairness and dignity.108 So, China permanently doubts the Western protection of “human rights” through Western democracy that serves a small number of capitalists’ exploitation of a more substantial number of working people.109 The Chinese government led by the CCP (the Chinese Communist Party) follows, according to the former President Mao, the principle of people’s democratic dictatorship: a proletariat-built institution that operates democracy under dictatorship towards those agasint socialist constructions, and that protect the social order and most people’s interests and freedom through socialist disciplines that constrain absolute egoist behavior.110 Socialist democracy (people’s democratic dictatorship) serves most people’s rights, which is more advanced than Western democracy that serves a small number’s will.111 Traditional Values There is also a contradiction between the Western tradition of human rights concepts and elements in traditional Chinese values heritage from traditional Chinese civilization and culture.112 As previously mentioned, the Western tradition of human rights—represented by the “Liberal Account of Rights”, intends to see humans as having naturally determined rights against everything as long as such “rights” could be satisfied.113 In contrast, traditional Chinese values attach great importance to “morality” from society and the “universe”.114 Such “morality” embedded in family relation (imagining, for example, the father’s duty and the son’s  Baylis et al. (2008, 511–512).  Baylis et al. (2008, 513–514, ch.29); Brown (2005, 207–208, chap.11); Kent (1999, 18–40, 159); Chiu (1989, 3–4); Potter (2006, 389–397); Chen (2009, 400–401, 417); Kahler (2011); Rae (2002, 301–304); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 893); 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012); 李君如 [Li Junru] (2014a). 109  Mao and Deng’s words documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 110  Mao’s words documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 111  Mao and Deng’s words documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 112  Li and Drury (2004, 384). 113  Baylis et al. (2008, 510–512). 114  Li and Drury (2004, 384); Chan (2005, 179). 107 108

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respects of the father), “personal relationships”, ethics, the concern for the order and goodness of the larger group/s that persons belong to (“collectivism”), and “harmony between people and the universe”.115 All of these reflect traditional Chinese values’ attention to individuals’ conforming to moral standards concerning the larger being, which largely decreases the attractiveness of the western concept of “rights”.116 Traditional Chinese value is not alone. Many Asian countries disagree with the typical Western emphasis of “rights” because such emphasis ignores broader relations such as family and society.117 Some Western thinkers such as Bentham have a similar point of view: “the function of government was to promote the general good…and the idea that individuals might have the right to undermine this seemed to him madness, especially since no one could tell him where these rights came from; the whole idea was ‘nonsense upon stilts’”.118 Sovereignty and Human Rights Besides political/cultural beliefs, China also feels the conflict between human rights protection and the principle of state sovereignty.119 China, like many other members in the international society, faces the debates between two conflicting normative forces: one is the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention codified in the UN Charter; and the other is the normative stance expanded since the end of the Cold War (with the practices of “humanitarian intervention”) that measures the legitimization of state sovereignty with the degree of human rights satisfaction and allows the international society to intervene when it finds that some states do not meet the “criterion” for human rights protection.120 China has long supported the principle of sovereignty and non-­ intervention.121 Such a position has both legal and practical basis. The UN Charter stresses that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 115  Link (2015); Kent (2002, 347); Li and Drury (2004, 384); Chan (2005, 179); 李步云 [Li Buyun] (1994, 41–42). 116  Li and Drury (2004, 384); Chan (2005, 179); Baylis et al. (2008, 511). 117  Baylis et al. (2008, 518, ch.29). 118  A conclusion of Jeremy Bentham’s idea in Baylis et al. (2008, 511–512). 119  Baylis et al. (2008, 513–514, ch.29); Brown (2005, 207–208, chap.11); Kent (1999, 18–40, 159); Chiu (1989, 3–4); Potter (2006, 389–397); Chen (2009, 400–401, 417); Kahler (2011); Rae (2002, 301–304); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 893). 120  Baylis et al. (2008, ch.29); Nathan (1994, 628–629); Brown (2005, 222). 121  Chan (2005, 59–60).

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within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”.122 The principle of sovereignty embedded in Westphalia, established in 1648, is an important (although not the only) foundation of the modern state system, which codified the sovereign legitimacy against violence and disorder in a large scale (reminding that the Westphalia system has emerged after a large-scale war in Europe) through establishing domestic political/military authority over a defined territory, so that it is, according to Classical philosophers such as Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, the necessary legal insurance of both domestic and international order.123 However, it is also the fact that the expansion of the international human rights practices gradually challenges the principle of sovereignty through emphasizing states’ acceptance of foreign observations and interventions when the international society is “unsatisfactory” with a state’s domestic human rights condition.124 The rise of the international human rights protection that permits intervention, especially its later form of “humanitarian intervention”, shapes a “complex and contested” debate in the international society about the “relationship between human rights and sovereignty”.125 China is naturally influenced by such normative debate, which is, according to Chen, plays a vital role in China’s deliberation of the human rights issue.126 Not surprisingly, Wang attributes China’s hesitation towards the international institution to the contradiction in the international normative system itself: “If only China learns and internalizes this set of ‘good’ norms, it would act as a cooperative member of the global community. But in reality, the international normative structure is not made up of only one set of cooperative principles. There are multiple norms systems that may or may not be consistent with one another”.127 However, a challenge always exists with chances for progress. Managing the relation between China’s characteristics and elements from international standards is difficult. However, such a task also means a chance for rebuilding meaningfulness in new historical conditions, for example, concerning human rights. As Chan notes: “Yet the more China is engaged, the more it is exposed to the influence of different worldviews and ideologies. Through comparison, China (for Chinese elites who deal with  Nathan (1994, 628).  Krasner (2001b, 21). 124  Nathan (1994, 628–629). 125  Nathan (1994, 628–629); Brown (2005, 222); Baylis et al. (2008, ch.29). 126  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 29). 127  Wang (2000, 487). 122 123

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external affairs, to be more exact) leans to be aware of the different choices of actions and their consequences”.128 As the following chapters will show, China is gradually making its creative and innovative road.

7.3   Two Considerations: Form of Reasoning Outcome The strategic consideration and ideational consideration are mixed as a cluster (s) system in reasoning outcomes concerning human rights. From such a cluster/s system, one can have an overall image of how strategic and ideational elements combine to shape China’s human rights idea and partially view why China’s human rights policy evolves across the two periods. There are three essential points in China’s human rights idea/policy— with the core theme as “China’s own human rights approach”129—that evolve across the two periods. The three points are: (1) the attitude towards the international human regime; (2) the position on state d ­ ivision; and (3) the human rights content. The following explains the illustration of the three points. It also describes how the strategic-ideational assemblies follow the illustrations of the three points and explain how these contribute to the evolution of China’s human rights policy across the two periods. The Pre-1997 Form The concluding theme is “China’s own human rights approach”.130 As the preface section in the 1991 human rights white paper declares: “The Chinese people form their human rights ideas, based on their history and national condition, and based on a long period of practices and experiences”.131  luster 1: International Human Rights Regime C Illustration The primary argument on the question of attitude towards the international human rights regime in this period could be concluded as a positive and cooperative attitude towards that regime.132 The 1991 white  Chan (2005, 59).  Liu (2014). 130  Liu (2014). 131  1991 human rights white paper. 132  1991 human rights white paper. 128 129

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paper declares: “China recognizes and respects the UN Charter’s principle and spirit of protecting and promoting human rights, appreciates and supports the UN’s efforts in universally promoting human rights and freedom, and actively participates in UN activities in human rights arenas”.133 The white paper published in 1995 also emphasizes China’s supports and respect for the UN spirit of human rights protection and the relevant treaties.134 Strategic Elements The official cooperative attitude towards the international human rights norm relates to China’s intention to encourage an external environment in which China could benefit through positive international reputation and strategic relations with other countries.135 For one thing, “Keeping a low profile [韬光养晦]”, which was the core spirit of China’s foreign policy since the early 1990s, means to be cautious and cooperative in exchange for “a favorable international environment for development”.136 It is becoming increasingly important to construct strategic relations with other countries (Western countries and “developing nations”) that could improve China’s national interests.137 According to Nathan, the need for better relation with other countries necessarily requires China to consider the human rights issue which “‘linked’ to other issues”.138 For the other, the need for better inter-state relations encourages China to build a positive international image.139 Scott recognizes China’s consistent projection of its “international image” for national interests, which concentrates, until the mid-1990s, on several styles: such as “keeping a low profile” so that China can “carry out long-term Economic Modernization”, and the later “make some contributions”.140 According to Chan, China’s increasing human-rights-related official and public efforts (i.e., the establishment of research institutions such as the China Society for Human Rights Studies) indicates China’s struggle for a positive international reputation.141

 1991 human rights white paper.  1995 human rights white paper. 135  Chen (2009, 409). 136  Yin (2007, 27). 137  Chen (2009, 409); Wan (2001, 2–3). 138  Nathan (1994, 622, 627). 139  Chen (2009, 409). 140  Scott (2010, 73–74). 141  Chan (2005, 181). 133 134

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Ideational Elements The supports of and cooperation with the international human rights regime in this period also relates to China’s recognition of the legitimacy and moral basis of human rights protection codified in the UN system.142 According to Wan’s observation, “China was more willing to accommodate international human rights institutions than bilateral human rights diplomacy because China respected the legitimacy of these institutions”.143 As former Premier Li stated in 1992: “We believe that the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all mankind should be respected everywhere….China agrees that questions concerning human rights should be the subject of normal international discussion”.144 A People’s Daily article recording a meeting on human rights in 1994 notes that human rights improvements “are the common goal of people worldwide”.145  luster 2: State Division C Illustration The Argument that dominated this period concerning state division is the tough emphasis of sovereignty and the stress of national diversity.146 The particular emphasis of sovereignty is observable in official documents.147 The 1991 White Paper emphasizes that “China always recognize that the issue of human rights is fundamentally a state’s domestic affairs”, and that “China strongly opposes any country to use the issue of human rights to spread its value, ideology, political criteria, and development model, so that many developing countries can protect their sovereignty and dignity”.148 In the 1995 white paper, China again insists on its determination to protect sovereignty.149 China also emphasizes the need to respect diversity across states in human rights protection.150 According to the 1991 white paper, “China insists on strengthening international cooperation in the human rights arena based on mutual understanding and seeking common ground while reserving differences. Any country’s human rights protection approach  Wan (2001, 7).  Wan (2001, 7). 144  Li Peng’s words in Nathan (1994, 641). 145  People’s Daily 1994/12/24. 146  1991 human rights white paper. 147  1991 and 1995 human rights white papers. 148  1991 human rights white paper. 149  1995 human rights white paper. 150  1991 and 1995 human rights white papers. 142 143

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cannot be separated from that country’s history and economic, political, and cultural condition, and need to be realized and protected by the sovereign state through the domestic legal system”.151 The 1995 white paper also emphasizes the differences across states in human rights understanding and practices due to their different national backgrounds and conditions.152 Strategic Elements The strategic elements that form the preference of tough/clear state division relate to the protection of domestic stability and national development, with the two tracks interrelate with each other since stability is the basis of development.153 The stability-related concern relates to China’s dominant perception that Western countries (mainly the U.S.) use human rights for intervention, being aimed at disrupting China’s domestic institution and integration with allying domestic supporters of western democracy.154 Former President Deng already emphasized China’s determination to resist the danger of domestic instability caused by Western instigation, realized the danger of combining some domestic individuals/groups with the slogan of Western human rights and democracy, and China’s determination to insist on the People’s Democratic Dictatorship.155 Respecting different national conditions is also recognized by China as essential for national economic development that relies on domestic stability and the prevention of negative consequences of adopting western-­ democracy.156 For the former President Deng, “economic development should be China’s priority and that stability is absolutely essential for realizing this goal”.157 Chinese scholars also realize the importance of seeking a human rights model based on the national condition after noting the negative economic/social consequences in many other countries due to Western democracy’s adoption.158

 1991 human rights white paper.  1995 human rights white paper. 153  Ness (2003, 128–130); Wan (2001, 23–24); 万霞 [Wan Xia] (1996, 59–60); 庞森 [Pang Sen] (1997, 38); Deng’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 154  Ness (2003, 128–130); 万霞 [Wan Xia] (1996, 59–60). 155  Deng’s idea: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 156  Wan (2001, 23–24); 庞森 [Pang Sen] (1997, 38). 157  Deng’s idea concluded in Wan (2001, 23). 158  庞森 [Pang Sen] (1997, 38). 151 152

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Ideational Elements The ideational elements concerning state division is also noticed. China realizes the importance of Sovereignty as an international norm and insurance of domestic human rights.159 For one thing, the 1991 white paper emphasizes the normative basis of the importance of sovereignty and non-intervention in human rights protection, by referring to contents in the UN treaties—i.e., contents about the insistence on sovereignty and non-intervention, and contents about the resistance of misusing the human rights issue for inter-state harmony.160 So, both Chinese official documents and scholars emphasize the human rights issue as a state’s domestic affairs that legitimately resist external intervention.161 External interference is illegitimate without the consent from the human rights treaty member states except in certain conditions that belong to largescale human rights violations such as invasion, racial genocide, etc.162 For the other, China considers sovereignty as essential for a state’s domestic human rights protection.163 By referring to historical facts such as the two World Wars, Chinese scholars recognize that the state can only protect its people’s lives and rights when every state respect each other’s sovereignty so that invasion disappears.164 As former President Deng emphasizes, “collective rights take precedence over individual rights and that sovereignty is far more important than individual rights”.165 Respecting national differences is also considered by China as connecting to an ethical understanding of reality.166 China’s official and scholarly works recognize the absence of a universally applicable model of human rights protection in the state system due to national differences in terms of their conditions, backgrounds, developmental stages, and human rights

159  1991 human rights white paper; 李林海 [Li Linhai] (1992, 48); 李步云和王修经 [Li Buyun and Wang Xiujing] (1995, 21). 160  1991 human rights white paper. 161  1991 human rights white paper; 刘文宗 [Liu Wenzong] (1990, 24–25); 李步云和王修 经 [Li Buyun and Wang Xiujing] (1995, 21); 万霞 [Wan Xia] (1996, 58). 162  刘文宗 [Liu Wenzong] (1990, 24–25); 李步云和王修经 [Li Buyun and Wang Xiujing] (1995, 21); 万霞 [Wan Xia] (1996, 58). 163  李林海 [Li Linhai] (1992, 48); 李步云和王修经 [Li Buyun and Wang Xiujing] (1995, 21). 164  李林海 [Li Linhai] (1992, 48); 李步云和王修经 [Li Buyun and Wang Xiujing] (1995, 21). 165  A conclusion of Deng’s idea in Wan (2001, 23). 166  1991 human rights white paper.

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understandings.167 Chinese scholars also relate the reality of national differences to the development of collective rights in the UN treaties: “…due to the social/cultural/economic diversity, there is a reservation about the content of individual rights in international treaties. Even the countries that can hold the treaty duties have such reservations…The UN recognizes such limitation, and gradually removes its attention from individual rights to collective rights…individual rights could not be realized unless the collective rights being realized”.168  luster 3: Human Rights Content C Illustration China, in this period, emphasizes the priority of the right to subsistence and development.169 While explaining the progress in other aspects of human rights (political and civil, labor, women, and children, religious, etc.), the 1991 and 1995 human rights white papers emphasize the priority of the right to subsistence and development, which are secured by the policy of putting the economic construction as the core position.170 Thus, the Chinese policy elite recognizes all types of human rights, but organizes them in a hierarchical order where the most necessary and urgent rights (subsistence and development) are “the precondition for” other rights.171 As Wan concludes: “The general human rights White Papers treat people’s rights to subsistence and development as taking precedence over civil and political rights in China’s current situation. Economic rights are therefore given priority in all these documents”.172 “All…documents [Chinee human rights white papers]”, Wan observes, “treat political and civil rights in China as an afterthought to economic rights”.173 Strategic Elements Insisting on the priority of the right to subsistence and development grows from an emphasis on material development for China’s domestic social functionality and national material

 1991 human rights white paper; 万霞 [Wan Xia] (1996, 59).  万霞 [Wan Xia] (1996, 58). 169  1991 and 1995 human rights white papers; Kent (1999, 156); Potter (2006, 393–394). 170  1991 and 1995 human rights white papers. 171  Kent (1999, 39, 156–169, 182–183); Potter (2006, 392–396); 1991 human rights white paper. 172  Wan (2001, 18). 173  Wan (2001, 19). 167 168

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accumulation.174 China’s current condition—i.e. the lack of economic development, a large population with a shortage of natural resources, determines that economic development is necessary for the national strength and material accumulation for domestic needs (i.e., stability, material requirements and attribution).175 As Liu explains: “China is still a developing country with limitations in economic and cultural development. China is now struggling to develop a socialist market economy…such a road can…ensure national prosperity as well as social stability…”.176 The 1991 white paper notes the remaining limitations in national economic development, people’s living conditions, and capacity to respond to an accidental crisis, thus emphasizing the importance of concentrating on economic development based on stability for the Chinese people’s right to subsistence.177 As 1995 white paper emphasizes: “China is a developing country with 12 hundreds of million population and lower per capita resources, and with long-term experience of external invasion, plundering, and oppression. So, enjoying the right to subsistence and development historically becomes the most urgent request of Chinese people”.178 Ideational Elements China’s insistence on the right to subsistence and development is supported by a normative basis and such right’s factual importance for other rights.179 For one thing, based on the UN treaty contents that recognize individuals’ rights for physical security and living as well as the importance of collective rights, the 1991 white paper emphasizes the importance of national independence and development for domestic populations’ subsistence and living condition and argues that such emphasis is essential viewing towards the practices of foreign invasion and unjust economic order that previously and continuously harm many less-developed countries.180 For the other, concerning reality in human rights protection, former President Deng emphasizes that “improvement of economic welfare is a foremost human right and also the prerequisite

174  1991 and 1995 human rights white papers; Kuhn (2010, 13, 15–16); 刘海年 [Liu Hainian] (1994, 46). 175  1991 and 1995 human rights white papers; Kuhn (2010, 13, 15–16); 刘海年 [Liu Hainian] (1994, 46). 176  刘海年 [Liu Hainian] (1994, 46). 177  1991 human rights white paper. 178  1995 human rights white paper. 179  1991 human rights white paper; Wan (2001, 23). 180  1991 human rights white paper.

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for other rights”.181 It is recognized that human rights are impossible with a lack of national development: people will lose their fundamental rights when their nation continuously suffers from unjust international economic order.182 People can not enjoy other kinds of rights without support from their nation’s economic development.183 The Post-1997 Form The concluding theme is also “China’s own human rights approach”.184 The 2014 white paper emphasizes that: “It has been proved that only by adhering to the socialist path with Chinese characteristics can China’s human rights undertaking achieve better development”.185  luster 1: International Human Rights Regime C Illustration One can observe that China has an increasingly active attitude towards the international human rights regime, compared to the pre-1997 period. The white papers from 1999 to 2005 emphasize China’s respect for “the universal principle of the human rights” and China’s supportive/ cooperative attitude towards international human rights activities.186 The white papers from 2010 to 2015 take steps further, promising China’s constructive role in the international human rights career, for promoting human rights in ways that are “just” and “non-selective”.187 The white papers from 2016 to 2018 emphasize China’s willingness to contribute to the international human rights career in terms of development, legalization, judiciary, communication, and cooperation.188 Strategic Elements The strategic logic behind China’s expanded cooperation and activeness in terms of human rights is the struggle for China’s material benefits in accelerated interdependence through protecting foreign interest ties and “soft power” building.189  A conclusion of Deng’s idea in Wan (2001, 23).  白桂梅 [Bai Guimei] (1991, 6). 183  Ness (2003, 133–134). 184  Liu (2014). 185  Human rights white paper 2014. 186  1999, 2001, 2004 and 2005 human rights white papers. 187  Human rights white papers 2010, 2013, 2014 and 2015. 188  Human rights white papers 2016, 2017 and 2018. 189  Wang (2000, 490); Kent (2002, 345–348); Cho (2013, 547–548); 邱昌情 [Qiu Changqing] (2008, 63–64). 181 182

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Accelerated interdependence brings a closer connection between China’s material interests and external conditions—i.e., peace/stability and friendly relations, the connection that promotes China’s increasing concern for global affairs.190 Kent notes that China’s cooperative behavior cannot be separated from its attachment to the external environment that brings benefits (e.g., investments and trade) to China’s national economy.191 According to Wang, China’s increasing attention to international cooperation relates to the increasing connection between China’s national interests and other states’ interests in an accelerated “economic globalization”.192 In the speech in the UN, former President Hu emphasizes several points, including the construction of international mechanisms for “common security”—for world peace and “common prosperity”—through “mutually beneficial cooperation” under more fairly and stable international trade and finance.193 Protecting foreign interest ties during interdependence necessarily needs a positive international image or “soft power”.194 Both Cho and Kent emphasize that the strategic concern for “global status” promotes China’s active involvement in the international institutional platform.195 Foot emphasizes that China’s deep involvement in the UN is for “global status” building through attracting “like-minded allies” and preventing other countries’ negative views towards China.196 In his speech in a meeting of the China Society for Human Rights in 2009, Luo emphasizes the importance of the struggle for a positive result for China in “the international human rights propaganda struggle” through active participation in international communication and institutional activities.197 In his article published 2018, Qiu mentions the increasing importance of the human rights discourse in international society for a state’s reputation, and thus stresses the importance for China to participate in the international

190  Wang (2000, 490); Kent (2002, 345–348); Chen (2009, 409); Kuhn (2010, 126); Xia (2001, 18–19); Chan (2005, 181). 191  Kent (2002, 345, 347–348). 192  Wang (2000, 490). 193  Hu’s speech in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 194  Chen (2009, 409); Kuhn (2010, 126); Xia (2001, 18–19); Chan (2005, 181); Wang (2000, 490); Kent (2002, 345–348); Cho (2013, 547–548). 195  Cho (2013, 547–548); Kent (2002, 347). 196  Foot (2014, 1092). 197  罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] (2014a).

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communicative/institutional mechanisms to improve China’s “real discourse capability”.198 Ideational Elements China’s accelerated active attitude towards the international human rights regime is also driven by China’s long-lasting but also increasing identification with the UN normative system.199 China respects the UN’s legitimacy and role, an identification that continues from the inter-war period until the present.200 According to Kaufman, China’s identification with the UN emerges in China’s early interaction with the UN during the interwar period, during which China searched in the UN for the international society’s respect of Chinese civilization and equal and just treatment of China.201 Foot recognizes China’s continuous appreciation of the UN for its authority, efforts, and representativeness of truly “collective actions” in managing issues in international society202 China feels even closer than before to the UN system because China resonates with UN’s evolving normative promotions that fit China’s opinion and give China a sense of dignity: these normative promotions include, for examples, the respect of “legal equality” and “sovereign equality” of states, and the recognition of diverse expressions of countries under the UN spirit, and the encouragement of “differentiated responsibilities” which recognizes more responsibilities for some states with more capabilities.203 As Fan notes: “The United Nations is the core fore of international human rights protection…China is a significant political power that has the duty to comply with the treaties made by the UN and which have come into force”.204  luster 2: State Division C Illustration A more objective approach to national division is indicated in this period. For one thing, the emphasis of sovereignty continuous but is expressed in more objective way. A decreased frequency of direct emphasis on state sovereignty could be seen in white papers from 1999 to 2018.205  邱昌情 [Qiu Changqing] (2008, 63–64).  Wan (2001, 7); Foot (2014, 1088–1092). 200  Wan (2001, 7); Foot (2014, 1088); Kaufman (2014). 201  Kaufman (2014). 202  Foot (2014, 1088). 203  Foot (2014, 1088–1092). 204  范继增 [Fan Jizeng] (2011, 36). 205  See human rights white papers 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2018. 198 199

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Some scholars observe China’s insistence on state sovereignty in a less “hard-line” way.206 Sovereignty is absolutely essential for China and any other states. But the style of expression in the post-1997 period is different from that in the pre-1997 period: the former’s tone is more objective than the latter’s tone. For the other, both sovereignty and national diversity are contained in the emphasis of dialogue and cooperation based on equality and mutual respect.207 The 1999 white paper emphasizes that: “For many years, China had communicated and cooperated with many countries in the world concerning the issue of human rights”.208 The 2014 white paper (similar to the 2013 and 2015 white papers) encourages “mutual understanding through dialogues and communication on human rights”.209 Strategic Elements The more objective state division approach relates to the simultaneous consideration of both national independence and interdependence-­related cooperation.210 On the one hand, China concerns for national independence through insisting on non-intervention continues.211 According to Luo’s speech in an international conference in 2009: “If one state’s sovereignty is lost, that country’s politics, economy, and culture will be manipulated by colonialism and hegemonism”.212 On the other hand, the increasingly close connection between China’s development and a peaceful, friendly, and prosperous external environment determines that China pays great attention to international cooperation.213 The above mentioned two considerations combine to shape China’s objective approach towards the question of state division. The encouragement of mutual respect and communication “based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” in terms of human rights satisfies the security-­ development dual aims: it promotes cooperative interaction among states with different conditions/opinions while also reminds the importance of

 Jing (2009, 165–166); Hempson-Jones (2005, 712).  Human rights white papers 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2010 208  Human rights white paper 1999. 209  2013, 2014, 2015 human rights white papers. 210  Lynch (2007, 704–706); Xia (2001, 18–19); Wang (2000, 490); Hempson-Jones (2005, 703–704, 712). 211  罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] (2014c). 212  罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] (2014c). 213  Xia (2001, 18–19); Wang (2000, 490). 206 207

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non-interference in a more cooperation-favoring way.214 According to former President Jiang’s speech in the UN meeting in 2000, “the dialogue and cooperation in terms of human rights must be conducted based on the respect of state sovereignty…”.215 According to former President Hu’s speech in a UN meeting in 2005: “We should respect every country’s right to choose their social institution and development, mutually learn without intentional repelling, learn from others’ strong points and close the gap…promotes every countries’ development based on their national conditions…pursue joint development [among states] based on seeking commonness with the existence of differences…”.216 According to Liao’s articulation concerning the Human Destiny Community [President Xi’s emphasis]: “Although the respect of state sovereignty is mostly pivotal and cannot be vague, the common interest, value, and responsibility contained in the Human Destiny Community objectively require a dynamic understanding of the detailed meaning of sovereignty with keeping up with the times…considering the human right-sovereignty relation, the parsimonious emphasis of either side is practically harmful”.217 Ideational Elements China’s approach to state division also closely relates to its ideational concern for norms and human rights protection.218 Sovereignty and non-interference contained in China’s approach (mentioned above) is considered necessary in terms of both norms and human rights protection.219 For one thing, China primarily considers the state and its sovereignty as the essential components of international law, which determines the lack of legitimacy of domestic affairs interference in terms of human rights.220 Walzer (a Western liberal scholar) emphasizes the normative/moral basis of sovereignty and non-intervention even in terms of the human rights issue: “[S]tates have a moral right to autonomy, which  Hempson-Jones (2005, 703–704, 712); Xia (2001, 18–19).  A translation of Jiang’s speech in the UN documented in: http://www.humanrights. cn/html/wxzl/1/. 216  A translation of Hu’s speech in the UN documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/ html/wxzl/1/. 217  廖凡 [Liao Fan] (2018, 55). 218  Lynch (2007, 704–705); 李云龙 [Li Yunlong] (2007, 31); Chan (2005, 183); Jiang’s speech in the UN documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 219  Chan (2005, 183); Jiang’s speech in the UN documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 220  Chan (2005, 183). 214 215

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derives, via a social contract, from the rights of the individual citizens of a state. State rights to territorial integrity and political sovereignty can therefore be defended morally in the same way as the individual’s rights to life and liberty”.221 For the other, China considers sovereignty and non-­ interfere as necessary insurance of human rights.222 In his article published in 2007, Li emphasizes the importance of “dividing the human rights relating to sovereignty from human rights relating to the international realm” because “a state’s human rights progress fundamentally relies on the efforts of that country’s government and people, and on that country’s progress in the social, democratic, and legal system”.223 The promotion of dialogues based on equality and mutual respect comes from the respect of practical diversity and the goodness for human rights career.224 For one thing, Chinese leaders and scholars respect the fact of “plurality” and diversity, which makes dialogue necessary.225 According to former President Hu’s speech in the UN in 2005: “Diversity exists so that civilizations learn from each other and commonly progress…one should protect civilizational diversity with the spirit of equality and openness, promote democratic international relations, and try to build a harmonious world in which all civilizations co-exist”.226 For the other, respecting national differences is considered as necessary for progress in human rights worldwide.227 In his article published in 2007, Li defines dialogue as “an efficient approach to international human rights progress”: “Human rights reflect the human’s desire for freedom and equality and are an affirmation of human value and dignity…However, every state and culture have a unique value system and value realization approach. Peoples have different opinions considering the specific contents, priority order, and detailed ways of human rights realization. Because of such  A conclusion and quotation of Michael Walzer’s idea in Brown (2005, 226–227).   Jiang’s speech in the UN documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 223  李云龙 [Li Yunlong] (2007, 31). 224  Human rights white papers 2001, 2005 and 2010; Lynch (2007, 704–705); 李云龙 [Li Yunlong] (2007, 31); Jiang’s speech in the UN documented in: http://www.humanrights. cn/html/wxzl/1/. 225  Lynch (2007, 704–705); Jiang’s speech in the UN documented in: http://www. humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 226  A translation of Hu’s speech in the UN documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/ html/wxzl/1/. 227  李云龙 [Li Yunlong] (2007, 31). 221

222

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differences, we need international human rights protection and all states to struggle to promote international human rights progress. Human rights dialogue is a primary method for transcending differences towards the standard view”.228  luster 3: Human Rights Content C Illustration In this period, China gives attention to comprehensive rights besides the emphasis of the right to subsistence and development.229 The white papers from 1997 to 2001, besides the focus on the right to subsistence and development, also emphasize developing comprehensive rights (economic, social, cultural, and political) and the construction of democracy and legalization.230 Besides the material basis of human rights (subsistence and development), the 2016 and 2018 white papers emphasize the importance of the coordination among all kinds of rights and the “[i]nstitutional guarantee of human rights under the rule of law”.231 Strategic Elements Two strategic elements contribute the attention to comprehensive rights based on the priority of the right to subsistence and development (mentioned above) in this period: (1) National material accumulation through emphasizing subsistence and development in general, as well as incorporating the more luxurious stratum to the commercial project; and (2) The insurance of China’s social functionality through moderation of the rich-poor gap.232 The promotion of economic growth needs both the core position of subsistence and development and the contribution from rising luxurious stratum that could be encouraged by more rights and freedom.233 For one thing, the need for national material accumulation determines that the priority of the right to survival and material development through the emphasis of economic development under stability always continues.234 Jing and Wei emphasize the importance of subsistence for a nation and its people, and the urgency to develop China’s production power through “removing any ideational, actional, rule and institutional limits that hinder  李云龙 [Li Yunlong] (2007, 31).  2000 human rights white paper. 230  1997, 2000 and 2001 human rights white papers. 231  2016 and 2018 human rights white papers. 232  Kuhn (2010, 13, 15–16, 124, ch.10); Shambaugh (2016, 58); Xia (2001, 18); Ness (2003, 130–131, 133); 朱穆之 [Zhu Muzhi] (2002, 4). 233  Kuhn (2010, 124, ch.10); Shambaugh (2016, 58); Xia (2001, 18); Ness (2003, 130–131, 133); 魏联合 [Wei Lianhe] (2004, 48–49). 234  Xia (2001, 18); Ness (2003, 130–131, 133). 228 229

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the development”.235 For the other, this period sees substantially increasing importance of the private business sectors and the enlarging number of more prosperous people who serve these sectors (i.e., the so-called “middle class” and “upper class”), which encourages China to pay more attention to these social parts’ demands—i.e., more rights and freedom.236 The policy, expressed theoretically in former President Jiang’s “Three Represents” for example, recognizes the rights of people from the private sectors to enter the Party membership and incorporates them to the “advanced productive forces” along with the working class in the contribution to the socialist construction for the final stage of community.237 The policy aims to give more encouragement and freedom to the rising “new social strata” (i.e., entrepreneurs, “self-employed”) so that they can contribute more to the development of China’s economy.238 In the discussion of the relation between former President Jiang’s “Three Representatives” and human rights, Zhu notes the relation between institutional/legal evolution and promotion of economic development in evolving social relations: “There are not only workers and scientific managers in public ownership enterprises, but also technicians in private enterprises, managers and technicians in the foreign-owned business, individual households, private entrepreneurs, professionals……Developing advanced production power cannot only be considered relating to economic rights but also relates closely to people’s all-around human rights”.239 The concern for comprehensive rights also relates to the moderation of the rich-poor gap for domestic functionality.240 The rich-poor gap is recognized as unfavorable because it brings social pressure (i.e., social instability).241 Kuhn demonstrates the link between the need to manage social relations and the progress in China’s democratization model, which ensures enlarged decision and selection participation.242 The result is attempting to build mechanisms that can promote social fairness.243  景凤启 [Jing Fengqi] (2003, 21–22); 魏联合 [Wei Lianhe] (2004, 49).  Kuhn (2010, 124, ch.10); Shambaugh (2016, 58); 魏联合 [Wei Lianhe] (2004, 48–49). 237  Kuhn (2010, 110, 115, ch.10). 238  Kuhn (2010, 76, 109–110). 239  朱穆之 [Zhu Muzhi] (2002, 4). 240  Kuhn (2010, 13, 15–16). 241  Kuhn (2010, 13, 15–16). 242  Kuhn (2010, 13, 15–16). 243  Hu’s idea documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; 李君如 [Li Junru] (2014b). 235 236

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According to former President Hu’s speech, the construction of the harmonious society aided by democratic legalization, justice, fairness contributes to the coordination of social contradictions and the construction of good social orders.244 Ideational Elements The human rights content in this period is also shaped by Chinese recognition that all rights have a normative basis and are essential for domestic human rights improvement.245 All kinds of rights have a normative basis in the evolving international human rights regime.246 China’s concern is applying these rights according to China’s national condition and Chinese peoples’ needs.247 As the 2000 white paper notes: “China is an oriental developing country with a long history, a large population, and a relative shortage of resources and wealth. In such a country, human rights promotion… can only start from China’s national condition and explore the road with China’s characteristics”.248 Thus, while the Western model prioritizes individual political/civil rights, China respects all human rights and follows “the principle of interdependent and inalienability of all human rights” besides the emphasis on rights to subsistence and development.249 The construction of comprehensive rights based on the focus on rights to subsistence and development is, more importantly, resulted from the Chinese policy elite’s attempts at domestic human rights progress.250 Continuous focus on rights to subsistence and development through economic development provides necessary and sustainable material foundations for rights and social development in China with a large population but lack of resources.251 Comprehensive rights are recognized as integral to human rights development in China.252 According to Wei’s explanation, former President Jiang’s attention to rights of the newly rising social stratum relates not only to the new stratum’s contribution to the national economy but also to the following of the socialist principle of protecting the majority’s rights in China’s new social condition (that the rising  Hu’s idea documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/.  Human rights white papers 2000 and 2018; Baylis et al. (2008, ch.29). 246  Baylis et al. (2008, ch.29). 247  Human rights white papers 2000 and 2018. 248  2000 human rights white paper. 249  2018 human rights white paper; Baylis et al. (2008, ch.29). 250  2000 and 2018 huamn rights white papers. 251  景凤启 [Jing Fengqi] (2003, 21–22); 魏联合 [Wei Lianhe] (2004, 49); 付国荣 [Fu Guorong] (2004, 55); 李君如 [Li Junru] (2014b); 罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] (2014b). 252  付国荣 [Fu Guorong] (2004, 56). 244 245

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number of new strata join China’s majority).253 In a discussion of the relationship between human rights and scientific development (former President Hu’s emphasis), Fu notes: “…the construction and conduction of comprehensive human rights mean the comprehensive and coordinated principles in guiding the Chinese human rights development, the appropriate management of various rights relations, and the relation between rights and duty, promoting the comprehensive, coordinative, and healthy development of Chinese human rights”.254 In the speech in an international conference in 2014, Cui emphasizes that the Chinese Dream (President Xi’s theory) aims to realize the dream of China and its people and to promote China’s human rights progress through “uniting individual and collective rights, comprehensively promoting all kinds of human rights, and protecting civilians’ various fundamental rights”.255 Explain China’s Human Rights Policy So, the three clusters in China’s reasoning outcome concerning human rights evolve (including both continuities and changes) across the two periods. The attitude towards the international human rights regime indicates a cooperative attitude towards the international human rights regime (in pre-1997 period) and then emphasizes a more expansive participative and constructive role in the regime and international human rights career (in post-1997 period).256 Concerning state division, China stresses toughly sovereignty and national diversity (in the pre-1997 period) and then has a still but more object illustration of emphasis on sovereignty plus the encouragement of dialogue/cooperation based on equality/mutual respect (in the post-1997 period).257 Leading to the human rights content, China initially emphasizes the priority of the right to subsistence and development— e.g. putting economic construction as the core position (pre-1997 period), and then pays increasing attention to comprehansive rights (coordination among economic, social/cultural, and political/civil rights) besides the emphasis of the right to subsistence and development (post-1997 period).258  魏联合 [Wei Lianhe] (2004, 48–49).  付国荣 [Fu Guorong] (2004, 56). 255  崔玉英 [Cui Yuying] (2014). 256  1991, 1999, 2010, 2013, 2014 and 2015 human rights white papers. 257  1991, 2001, 2004 and 2005 human rights white papers; Jing (2009, 165–166); Hempson-Jones (2005, 712). 258  1991, 1995, 2001 and 2018 human rights white papers; Potter (2006, 393–394). 253 254

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The strategic and ideational elements contained in each cluster across the two periods have been explained in detail above. The contents and evolution of the three clusters (and their strategic-ideational elements) contribute to China’s continuously increasing attention to the human rights issue (both domestically and internationally) and the expanded cooperative and active attitude since the watershed year 1997.

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Monroe, Kristen Renwick. 2001. Paradigm Shift: From Rational Choice to Perspective. International Political Science Review 22 (2): 151–172. Morton, Katherine. 2005. The Emergence of NGOs in China and Their Transnational Linkages: Implications for Domestic Reform. Australian Journal of International Affairs 59 (4): 519–532. Nathan, Andrew. 1994. Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy. China Quarterly 39: 622–643. Nee, Victor, and Opper Sonja. 2012. Capitalism from Below: Markets and Institutional Change in China. Harvard: The President and Fellows of Harvard College. Ness, Peter Van, ed. 2003. Debating human rights: critical essays from the United States and Asia. Taylor & Francis e-Library. Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada: Routledge. Nye, Joseph. 1988. Neorealism and Neoliberalism. World politics 40 (2): 235–251. Potter, Pitman. 2006. Selective Adaptation and Institutional Capacity: Perspective on Human Rights in China. International Journal 61 (2): 389–407. Rae, Heather. 2002. State Identities and the Homogenization of Peoples. Port Chester, NY: Cambridge University Press. Rawnsley, Gary. 2006. May You Live in Interesting Times: China, Japan and Peacekeeping. In R. E. Utley (ed), Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention. Ashgate Publishing Group. Scott, David. 2010. China and the “Responsibilities” of a “Responsible” Power— The Uncertainties of Appropriate Power Rise Language. Journal Asia-Pacific Review 17 (1): 72–96. Shambaugh, David. 2016. China’s Future. UK and USA: Polity Press. Teske, Nathan. 1997. Beyond Altruism: Identity-Construction as Moral Motive in Political Explanation. Political Psychology 18 (1): 71–91. Tubilewicz, Czeslaw, ed. 2006. Critical Issues in Contemporary China. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Waltz, Kenneth. 2001. Men, the State, and War. New  York: Columbia University Press. ———. 2010. Theory of International Politics. California: Waveland Pr Inc. Wan, Ming. 1997. Human Rights and Sino-US Relations: Policies and Changing Realities. The Pacific Review 10 (2): 237–255. ———. 2001. Human Rights and Chinese Foreign Relations. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Wang, Hongying. 2000. Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization. Asian Survey 40 (3): 475–491. ———. 2007. “Linking up with the International Track”: What’s in a Slogan? The International Quarterly 189: 1–23. Xia, Liping. 2001. China: A Responsible Power. Journal of Contemporary China 10 (26): 17–25.

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Yin, He. 2007. China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations. Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy.

Speeches, Articles

and

Books

in

Chinese

白桂梅 [Bai Guimei] 1991 论新一代人权, 法学研究 CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW, 1991 年05期 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012, 中国特色社会主义人权理论研究, 北 京:中国检察出版社 崔玉英 [Cui Yuying] 2014, 加强国际合作 共促世界人权事业发展--在第十二届 中德人权研讨会开幕式上的致辞 (来源:人权杂志) http://www.humanrights. cn/html/wxzl/6/. 范继增 [Fan Jizeng] 2011, 中国人权理论演变的社会动因初探, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2011年03期 付国荣 [Fu Guorong] 2004, 以科学发展观促进人权事业健康发展, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2004年05期 景凤启 [Jing Fengqi] 2003, 试论党的三代领导核心对马克思主义人权观的继 承、发展和创新, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2003年03期 李步云 [Li Buyun] 1994, 人权的两个理论问题, 中国法学CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 1994年03期 李步云和王修经 [Li Buyun and Wang Xiujing] 1995,人权国际保护与国家主权, 法学研究 CASS JOURNAL OF LAW 1995年04期 李君如 [Li Junru] 2014a, 中国的文化变革与人权事业的进步 (来源:人权杂志) http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/. ——— 2014b, 中国梦, 中国的人权梦 (来源:人权杂志) http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/. 李林海 [Li Linhai] 1992, 主权原则与人权的国际保护, 外交学院学报 JOURNAL OF F.A.C., 1992年01期 李云龙 [Li Yunlong] 2007, 人权对话与人权合作:构建和谐世界的必要途径, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2007年01期 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 全球治理背景下的人类命运共同体的阐释与构建, 中国法 学 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE, 2018年05期 刘文宗 [Liu Wenzong] 1990, 论人权与不干涉他国内政, 外交学院学报 FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW, 1990年02期 刘海年 [Liu Hainian] 1994, 不同文化背景的人权观念, 中国法学 CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 1994年06期 罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2014a, 加强人权建设, 积极服务于我国人权事业发展和国 际人权交流合作—中国人权研究会会长罗豪才在中国人权研究会第三届全国 理事会上的讲话(摘编)(2009年8月25日) http://www.humanrights.cn/ html/wxzl/6/ ——— 2014b, 中国以民生为重的人权建设, (来源:人权杂志) http://www. humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/

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——— 2014c, 人权保障的“中国模式”—中国人权研究会会长罗豪才在比利时布 鲁塞尔自由大学座谈会上发表演讲(摘编)(2009年9月21日) http://www. humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/ 庞森 [Pang Sen] 1997, 发展权问题初探, 国际问题研究 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 1997年01期 邱昌情 [Qiu Changqing] 2008, 中国在国际人权领域话语权:现实困境与应对策 略, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2008年03期 万霞 [Wan Xia] 1996, 论人权的国际保护, 外交学院学报 JOURNAL OF F.A.C.,1996年04期 魏联合 [Wei Lianhe] 2004, “三个代表”重要思想对中国人权观的发展与创新, 人 权HUAMN RIGHTS, 2004年04期 朱穆之 [Zhu Muzhi] 2002, “三个代表”思想与人权, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2002年02期

CHAPTER 8

Pre-1997: National Survival Strategy

This chapter illustrates if and how the two tiers’ interaction (the “two degrees”) shape the type of the Chinese policy elite’s reasoning outcome, and contributes to China’s policy behavior in this period. Arguably, China’s human rights idea/policy in this period, behaviorally expressed in increasing attention to the human rights issue, is fundamentally driven by prominence of national survival strategy as a result of a higher survival-­ relativity and moderate level of self-persuasion.

8.1   Higher Degree of Survival-Relativity China faces a higher degree of survival relativity when considering the human rights issue, which is shaped by (1) The higher degree of Survival’s sensitivity towards the human rights issue resulted from the issue’s close connection with China’s foreign economic/political relations;1 (2) The lower degree of China’s general survival satisfaction as a result of the undergoing challenge of searching ways of development, lower level of national security determined by the growing trend of containment from the external on China’s rise, and China’s relatively moderate level of national power competence.2  Nathan (1994, 635); Ness (2003, 127–128).  Yin (2007, 26–29); Jing (2009, 160–161); Chow and Li (2002, 250); Gill and Huang (2009a, b). 1 2

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Survival Sensitivity: Higher In this period, Western criticism, sanctions, and isolation following the Tiananmen accident created an environment in which China’s way of dealing with the human rights issue strongly relates to its foreign economic/ political relations and national security/development.3 There is a dual crisis for China, which must be managed with caution. On the one hand, the U.S.-led Western sanctions and isolation against China necessarily cause China’s economic and political cost if China does not make a policy change.4 On the other hand, too many changes for reducing the external pressure might disrupt China’s own political and economic function pattern, an issue relating to both domestic stability and development.5 Overall, the ties between the human rights issue and China’s survival are especially close in this period. General Survival Satisfaction: Lower China, in the pre-1997 period, experiences a relatively lower level of general survival satisfaction. Development Puzzle China, in the significant part of the 1990s, is busy with solving its development puzzle.6 The “socialist market economy” approach is a result of former President Deng’s unsatisfying with China’s low pace of reform and an uneasy intra-Party debate in the early 1990s.7 After that was a domestic economic problem in early 1990s and years-long financial reform led by former Premier Zhu until close to the end of the 1990s.8 By 1997, former President Jiang started his journey of major ownership reform.9 Jing observes China’s domestic concern over its development puzzle after former President Deng’s Southern Tour in 1992.10 “For most of the time, at least by the mid-1990s,” Jing argues, “China’s foreign policy was reactive instead of proactive. The main focus of the Chinese government was its domestic politics. Deng Xiaoping’s Southern  Nathan (1994, 635); Ness (2003, 127–128).  Nathan (1994, 635). 5  Ness (2003, 127–128). 6  Jing (2009, 160–161). 7  Kuhn (2010, ch.8, 75–85). 8  Kuhn (2010, ch.8, 75–85, 87–92). 9  Kuhn (2010, ch9: 95–99). 10  Jing (2009, 160–161). 3 4

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Tour in 1992 is a case in point to show that China was still trying to decide its domestic development path.”11 National Security also faces challenges. The containment pressure from the US-led alliances on China is unusually high in most parts of the 1990s, followed strategic vacuum left by the end of the Cold War.12 Not to mention China’s realization of international fear of its development since the mid-1990s.13 The ongoing feeling of uneasy external environment continuously represents in official discourses. China’s Government Work Reports in most of the 1990s shows China’s feeling of an uneasy international environment.14 The Report in 1990 stressed that “the threat to world peace still exist” and “power politics conducted by some countries become increasingly obvious”.15 Concerning China’s relation with western countries, it stresses that “… there are difficulties and tortuousness in varying degrees. The reason is that some western countries impose sanctions on our countries, impose pressure in many aspects, and intervene in China’s internal affairs”.16 The Report in 1992 emphasizes that “… new and old contradictions combine; the world is not in peace and tranquility … The existence of hegemony and power politics is the primary cause of unrest in the international environment”.17 The Report in 1993 states that: “In an extended period, the new World War is possibly prevented. However, varying unstable elements increase … Hegemony and power politics still exist … The world is not in peace and tranquility”.18 The Report in 1996, besides the recognition of the existence of contradictions and hegemony and power politics, specifically points out that: “Sino-US relation has experienced severe difficulties; this is entirely due to US’ inadvisable anti-China policy. After efforts made by both sides, although the relation improves, still goes up and down”.19 Continuously, the Report in 1997 still mentions that

 Jing (2009, 160–161).  Yin (2007, 26–27, 29). 13  Gill and Huang (2009a, 12–13); Gill and Huang (2009b, 12–13). 14  Carlson (2004); An observation of China’s Government Work Reports from 1990 to 1997, for the titles see bibliography. 15  1990 Government Work Report. 16  1990 Government Work Report. 17  1992 Government Work Report. 18  1993 Government Work Report. 19  1996 Government Work Report. 11 12

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“hegemony and power politics still seriously threat world peace, stability and development”.20 National Material Strength deserves more effort despite considerable progress that has happened. It is reported that China’s GDP increases from 1020.9 million (yuan) in 1990 to 2145.4 million (yuan) in 1997, not a very sharp growth.21 At the same time, as Zhang notes, China recognizes the rising contradictory trends after the end of the Cold War—the US expanding hegemony and the multipolarity.22 Such contradictory trends, coupled with expanding economic globalization, makes China feel the urgency to struggle more for competitiveness in the international market. 23

8.2   Moderate Degree of Self-Persuasion In this period, the Chinese policy group manages the contradiction concerning the issue of human rights by emphasizing particularism: stressing China’s distinctive characteristics through a focus of class and state division.24 Such a cognitive solution brings a higher degree of biased synthetic system—incorporating the discourse of human rights but framing it with particular emphasis on China’s own belief.25 The emphasis of particularity and the consequent particular biased synthetic approach is contributed by China’s unsatisfactory survival condition and intense external pressure, both of which generate a reliance on China’s original ideational position and limit the incorporation of newly outcoming ones.26 The highly-biased synthetic approach shows progress in China’s management of human rights issues for meaningfulness building. However, it is arguable that the degree of self-persuasion is moderate since China is  1997 Government Work Report.  Chow and Li (2002, 250). 22  张历历 [Zhang Lili] (2015, 250–251). 23  张历历 [Zhang Lili] (2015, 250–251). 24  People’s Daily 1990/9/17, 1990/8/13, 1991/11/9, 1992/1/27, 1997/5/30 and 1998/2/7; Kent (1999, ch5). 25  For such framing see for example 李步云 [Li Buyun] (1992, 2–8); and Feron (2015, 92). Also see Potter (2006); and Acharya (2004). 26  Nathan (1994, 636); Festinger (2001, ch.4–5); Maslow (1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7); Broadbent (1957); Haas and Cunningham (2014, 291–292); Schaefer and Simon (2017). 20 21

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still undergoing a process to build internal-external ideational connections concerning human rights, especially viewing towards China’s ongoing and accelerating integration to the world’s standards. Rightness Building Pattern: Particularism and Highly Biased Synthesis  he Emphasis of Particularity T In this period concerning human rights is directly reflected in People’s Daily articles that indicate a specific focus on the “particularity of human rights”.27 The particularity of human rights is mainly articulated through the emphasis of class characteristics and state boundaries/differences, in dealing with the human rights issue.28 The People’s Daily articles in the early 1990s show an emphasis on class division and variations across states, all relating to particularity.29 Class Division based on Marxist doctrine is highly emphasized in this period. Deng’s idea of “Practice is the only way of testing truth” (“实践是 检验真理的唯一标准”), which encourage Chinese scholars to think about the discourse of human rights outside the capitalist tenets.30 Since 1990 Chinese scholars emphasize the fundamental division between the Marxist/socialist and capitalist/western human rights ideas.31 The necessary conclusion is the appreciation of Marxist recognition of class characteristics of “human rights”: rights are for the dominant class, and there is rights struggle between conflict classes; Western emphasis of abstract and universal rights aims to sustain capitalist exploitation; Marxism/socialism is advanced in realizing rights for most people by removing class exploitation.32

27  Kent (1999, 19–27, 147–159, ch.5 (for quotation see p.  154)); People’s Daily 1990/9/17. 28  Festinger (2001, 21–23); Johnston (2001, 495–502); Kratochwil (1989); Rae (2002, 2–10, 299–307); Kent (1999); People’s Daily 1990/9/17, 1990/8/13, 1991/11/9, 1992/1/27, 1997/5/30 and 1998/2/7. 29  People’s Daily 1990/9/17, 1990/8/13, 1991/11/9 and 1992/1/27; Kent (1999, 147–159, 182). 30  范继增 [Fan Jizeng] (2011, 32). 31  People’s Daily 1990/8/13; 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 28–29). 32  People’s Daily 1990/8/13 and 1992/1/27; 杨晓青 [Yang Xiaoqing] (1991, 46); 李林 等 [Li Lin, et al.] (1991, 15–17); 张文显 [Zhang Wenxian] (1991).

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Concluded from a human rights meeting in 1991, Yang notes that class characteristics influence human rights’ contents in every society.33 The fundamental differences among human rights in different societies lie in if the rights content serves small groups or most people.34 A scholarly article in 1991 recording a human rights meeting emphasizes the class character of human rights in class society.35 It points out that western human rights are privileged rights that serve the dominant capitalist class at the expense of wide-spread rights.36 A People’s Daily article in 1990 recording a meeting on human rights notes Chinese experts’ appreciation of Marxist human rights ideas, which realizes the fact of class division based on material/ social development in the evolution of human history and insists on the importance of reaching communism for the rights of most people through removing exploitation.37 A People’s Daily article in 1992 recording a meeting on human rights notes Chinese experts’ view: “The Marxist human rights idea links human rights with human emancipation. It is different from capitalist human rights ideas, which are narrow and serve the interests of a small number of people”.38 A People’s Daily article on 9th November 1991 recording a meeting on human rights organized by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC notes Chinese experts’ opinion that “it is only socialism and communism that can lead to real human rights for most people”.39 State Division emphasized by China in human rights protection is reflected in: (1) The emphasis of the state role in human rights protection based on their own social/economic/political conditions; (2) the importance of sovereignty.40 Chinese scholars strongly agree that in the current state system, human rights protection is mainly conducted through the state—its legal and domestic policies.41 During this process, human rights protection could have different forms across states due to their own historical/cultural/  杨晓青 [Yang Xiaoqing] (1991, 46).  杨晓青 [Yang Xiaoqing] (1991, 46). 35  李林 等 [Li Lin, et al.] (1991, 16). 36  李林 等 [Li Lin, et al.] (1991, 16). 37  People’s Daily 1990/9/17. 38  People’s Daily 1992/1/27. 39  People’s Daily 1991/11/9. 40  Kent (1999, 19–27, 152–159, 182); People’s Daily 1990/9/17; 李林 等 [Li Lin et al.] (1991, 16). 41  李林 等 [Li Lin et al.] (1991, 16). 33 34

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institutional characteristics and stages of development.42 Zhu emphasizes the appropriateness and importance of a “specific model” in human rights protection based on every state’s condition and value.43 Similarly, Li and Wang emphasize the existence of “specific criteria” of human rights necessarily to be considered according to variation among states in terms of the national condition, including historical/religion/cultural background, institutional type, economic situation, etc.44 State sovereignty and resistance to external interference are also emphasized. There are some Chinese scholars who realize the evolving nature of state sovereignty.45 However, according to Carlson’s observation, it is a fact that the majority of Chinese scholars favor the conservative insistence on traditional state sovereignty.46 Thus although Carlson observes change, he still realizes the “cautious acceptance” in China’s attitude towards intervention by the mid-1990s.47  ighly Biased Synthesis H The emphasis on particularity results in a higher degree of biased synthesis—incorporating human rights discourse with particular emphasis on China’s distinctiveness.48 Synthesis happens. Firstly and most fundamentally, incorporation of the discourse of human rights itself reflects a synthesis. Secondly, there is scholarly recognition of the existence of universal and common criteria of rights defined as common interests and morality shared by humans.49 As we see, Li articulates for the unification of commonness and distinctiveness in human rights.50 However, the incorporation of human rights discourse operates through a prominent emphasis of particularity, and the projection of the human rights approach consequently gives prominent emphasis on China’s  刘海年 [Liu Hainian] (1994, 43).  朱晓青 [Zhu Xiaoqing] (1994, 31). 44  李步云 [Li Buyun] (1994, 39–40); 李步云和王修经 [Li Buyun and Wang Xiujing] (1995, 20). 45  Carlson (2004, 19). 46  Carlson (2004, 18). 47  Carlson (2004, 17). 48  李步云 [Li Buyun] (1992, 2–8); Feron (2015, 92); Potter (2006); Acharya (2004); Schaefer and Simon (2017). 49  李步云和王修经 [Li Buyun and Wang Xiujing] (1995, 20). 50  李步云 [Li Buyun] (1992, 2–8). 42 43

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distinctiveness.51 Let us refer to two examples. Firstly, the consideration of social-embeddedness, the duty, collectivism, and human emancipation from exploitation in the articulation of human rights theory reflect China’s characteristics in the construction of the human rights discourse based on Marxist and socialist philosophy.52 Secondly, there is another evidence that postpones the prominence of the particularity in this period: the scholarly recognition of human rights’ commonness is often followed by an emphasis on the variation across classes and states, and many scholars consider the latter with a denying of the former.53 Yang, when concluding a human rights meeting, notes that “… human rights do not have commonness, but only has the characteristics of classes”.54 The Role of Less Survival Satisfaction and Higher External Pressure China’s preference for particularity is shaped by unsatisfactory survival conditions and the condition of attitude from the external.55 Survival Condition As mentioned above, China’s general survival condition is not so satisfactory in this period. The lower degree of survival satisfaction necessarily encourages a preference of conservative ideational position—the reliance on one’s traditional ideas to increase a sense of certainty and save cognitive energy.56 External Pressure This period, following the Tiananmen Accident, generally sees immense international pressure on China’s human rights issue.57 Firstly, as Nathan observes, “China suffered repeated humiliations in UN bodies concerned with human rights”.58 China faced criticism from other

51  李步云 [Li Buyun] (1992, 2–8); Feron (2015, 92); Potter (2006); Acharya (2004); Schaefer and Simon (2017). 52  李步云 [1992], 2–8; Feron (2015, 92). 53  People’s Daily 1992/1/27 and 1992/10/18; 杨晓青 [Yang Xiaoqing] (1991, 46); 刘 海年 [Liu Hainian] (1994, 43); 朱晓青 [Zhu Xiaoqing] (1994, 31). 54  杨晓青 [Yang Xiaoqing] (1991, 46). 55  Nathan (1994, 636); Festinger (2001, ch.4–5); Maslow (1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7); Broadbent (1957); Haas and Cunningham (2014, 291–292); Schaefer and Simon (2017). 56  Maslow (1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7); Broadbent (1957); Haas and Cunningham (2014, 291–292). 57  Kent (1999); Jing (2009, 164); Nathan (1994, 635–636). 58  Nathan (1994, 636).

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countries within the UN Commissions and Sub-Commissions on human rights.59 Members of these Commissions challenged China year on year with various attempts to make resolutions.60 Secondly, China also faced with economic sanctions by Western countries, and with the US’s action of connecting China’s human rights with trade (MFN).61 As Wan notes, “Congress, the media, the public, human rights NGOs … exerted tremendous pressure on the White House to take strong action against the Chinese government … The dominant issue in 1990–94 was the linkage between China’s human rights record and its MFN status with the United States. There was pressure from the Congress and the public to use MFN as a weapon to force China to improve its human rights record”.62 As Nathan notes: “The human rights issue did only modest damage to China’s interests until 1989 … Many countries imposed sanctions, including diplomatic cold shoulders of one kind or another, cancellation of cultural exchanges, freezes on bilateral aid and loans, voting for temporary suspension of World Bank and Asian Development Bank loans, and interruption of World Bank and Asian Development Bank loans, and interruption of military sales and links”.63 To sum up, the non-material pressure added with material pressure from the west and international society throughout the essential part of the 1990s.64 “Arguably”, as Wachman observes, “the period immediately after 1989 was the worst that the PRC has experienced in pressure from abroad”.65 The higher external pressure generates two kinds of influences, both of which encourage China’s unique focus of its previous ideational stance in managing the human rights issue.66 Firstly, pressure hints a negative attitude from the external that, according to acculturation theory, encourages China to insist on a previous ideational orientation so that they feel a psychological balance.67 The resistance to psychological negation from the West has already been expressed by former President Mao, whose idea is  Kent (1999, 49–73); Wachman (2001, 266–268); Jing (2009, 164–165).  Kent (1999, 49–73); Wachman (2001, 266–268); Jing (2009, 164–165). 61  Jing (2009, 164); Kent (1999, 49–73, 248); Chen (2009, 402–403); Wachman (2001, 272). 62  Wan (1997, 239–240). 63  Nathan (1994, 635). 64  Yin (2007, 26–30, 49); Jing (2009, 164). 65  Wachman (2001, 268). 66  Festinger (2001, ch.4–5); Schaefer and Simon (2017). 67  For acculturation theory see Schaefer and Simon (2017). 59 60

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influential in representing China’s political psychology: “We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all other countries based on the principle of equality. However, imperialism, which has long been hostile to Chinese people, cannot quickly treat us with an equal attitude. We will not give imperialist countries legitimate positions in China if they do not change their hostile attitude”.68 Former President Deng’s words reflect a similar understanding: “The countries who conduct power politics has no right to talk about human rights, they had damaged the human rights of so many people in China! … they think that they have absolute power and can impose sanctions on countries and people who do not follow them … why they interfere with China’s domestic affairs? Who gives them such power? Chinese people will never accept any action against the principles of international relations, and will not bend to pressure”.69 Chinese scholars in the early 1990s stressed that Western sanctions show Western countries’ intention to use the issue of “human rights” to change China’s socialist characteristics.70 Scholars such as Wachman, Sullivan, Wan, and Li & Drury recognize China’s psychologically defensive tendency in the face of external pressure.71 They find that external pressure encourages China’s sense of losing national dignity, stimulates its unwillingness “to yield to foreign rights pressure”, promotes its nationalism, and generates China’s tactic reaction to the international pressure instead of internalizing the international human rights regime.72 Secondly, according to Festinger, higher external pressure allows actors to sustain their previous idea despite behavior change because the contradiction between the previous attitude and the new behavior can decrease when actors refer to high external pressure that imposes the new idea.73 Following such logic, for China, the alliance with previous belief was reinforced with less feeling of contradiction even with participation in the international human rights regime.74 Such psychological/cognitive intention has discourse reflections. China’s Government Work Plan in 1994

68  A translation of Mao’s words documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 69  景凤启 [Jing Fengqi] (2003, 21). 70  People’s Daily 1990/9/17 and 1992/1/27. 71  Wachman (2001); Ness (2003, 129–130); Wan (2001, 2–3, 6–7); Li and Drury (2004). 72  Wachman (2001); Ness (2003, 129–130); Wan (2001, 2–3, 6–7); Li and Drury (2004). 73  Festinger (2001, ch.1, ch.4–5). 74  Festinger (2001, ch.1, ch.4–5).

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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00

Fig. 8.1  Frequency of Criticisms of the West Concerning Human Rights. Source: Concluded from the observation of the proportion of articles that criticize the West among almost all People’s Daily articles about human rights from 1990 to 2012

correctly points against the Human Rights anti-China Proposal.75 The analysis of almost all People’s Daily articles concerning human rights from 1990 to 2012 tells a concentration of high frequency of criticism of the west in the period before 2000 (See Fig. 8.1). Degree of Self-Persuasion: Moderate Chinese policy elite realizes a moderate degree of self-persuasion in this period. China’s gradual development of its human rights idea shows a significant step toward the successful management of ideational relations concerning human rights. However, it is arguable that China is still undergoing a significant process of finding a more persuasive system that can enable better internal-external ideational engagements.76 This is especially the case because China’s interaction with international society (including the international human regime) will continue and expand, the trend that goes through the 1990s and accelerates in the period after that.77 The unresolved contradiction between the China’s stance and the international standards (especially the parts from Western traditions) is noted by Western scholars, with some degree of exaggeration or prejudice, but hinting at the debate and confusion that needs further management. Brown reviews the international human rights career as being mapped by a struggle between the Western human rights understanding and the rise  1994 Government Work Report.  Festinger (2001), the whole book and p.182. 77  Baylis et  al. (2008, 321–323); Festinger (2001); Katzestein (1996, 56); Chiu (1989, 13–18); Staehle (2006), the whole article and p.43; Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Kent (1999); Welsh (2004); Jing (2009 161); Kahler (2011). 75 76

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of “Asian values” (stressing social collectivities against too much individualism), the struggle that even reminders Huntington’s famous assumption of “Clash of Civilizations”.78 Potter theorizes that the state socializes to the international standard in a way that combines the internal and international standards (the mechanism of “complementarity” as Potter called).79 The degree of such combination during socialization depends on the degree of compatibility between domestic and international institutions.80 In analyzing China’s policy towards human rights, Potter emphasizes China’s selection of elements of the international standard according to its concerns and emphasizes the intrinsic contradiction and incompatibility between China’s domestic norm and the international human rights standard.81 I agree with Potter, and in line with Acharya, for the widespread political phenomena of combining domestic and international standards during states’ socialization to international norms.82 And Potter’s emphasis on China’s “selection” behavior hints at a lack of domestic-­international engagement in China’s solution in this period. But Potter misreads the reason behind China’s choice. The lack of domestic-international engagement is not because of incompatibility between China’s domestic norm and the international standards as Potter argues. Instead, it is because China is still undergoing a process to build connections between the two. It is a process that needs time for countries that face new outcoming norms, especially so for China that faces an intense external pressure which, as previously argued, slows down such process. Indeed, in the pre-1997 period, China is undergoing a significant period of cognitive adaptation and information collection for connections among diverse norms/facts relating to human rights, with the progress made but the task not finished. According to Zhong’s notes of a human rights meeting in the early 1990s, Chinese scholars participating in the meeting recognize several vital questions on human rights that need exploration: i.e., the definition of human rights, the possibility of the existence of common criteria for human rights, the relation between human rights and sovereignty, and the relation between individual and collective

 Baylis et al. (2008, 518).  Potter (2006). 80  Potter (2006). 81  Potter (2006, 393–396). 82  Acharya (2004). 78 79

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rights.83 “In order to engage in discussion or debate over human rights with the West”, as Wan notes, “the Chinese government has allowed translation and publication in China of virtually all important human rights documents and treaties … has given more leeway to more open-­ minded and independent scholars to discuss rights issues”.84 According to Liu’s reflection, most of the 1990s is the learning period for Chinese human rights theory building through searching China’s sources for human rights and exploring Western human rights ideas.85 This learning process is driven by official-encouraged human rights studies and participation in international human rights meetings.86

8.3   Type of Reasoning Outcome: National Survival Strategy Is Prioritized The type of reasoning outcome concerning human rights could be defined as survival-prioritized one—the particular prominence of national survival strategy during its combination with the meaningfulness-rightness consideration. Pieces of evidence of such survival-strategy prioritization include two parts. The first part of the evidence is the connection logics of clusters concerning state division and human rights content, both of which show a bias towards national survival strategy in the strategic-ideational connections. The second part of the evidence is indicated in other representative discourses in Chinese official and scholarly documents/works and foreign observers’ analysis. Connection Logics of Clusters As previously mentioned, the relative intervention of the two tiers (through selection and organization of the elements from each other87) could be explored, in a micro way, by analyzing the cluster connection logics (in the reasoning outcome form) to see if there is a bias towards survival-strategy, meaningfulness-rightness, or both. It finds that clusters about state  People’s Daily 1992/1/27.  Wan (2001, 22). 85  刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] (2018, 13, 18). 86  刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] (2018, 13, 18). 87  Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990); Ikenberry (2001); Simon (1982, 69–70); Sibley and Osborne (2016); Burchill et al. (2005, ch.8); Wendt (1999, 233–242); Katzenstein (1996). 83 84

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division and human rights content show a clear preference for national survival-­ strategic consideration. Concerning state division, the tough emphasis of sovereignty indicates China’s special cautiousness towards the possible threats to the national boundary and domestic stability hidden in the international human rights practices/politics.88 Concerning human rights content, prioritizing the right to subsistence and development shows the concentration on accumulating material fundation for China’s national development and domestic functionality.89  ough Emphasis of Sovereignty: Noticing Threats to National T and Domestic Security The connection between boundary and safety is very close. The story of sovereignty’s emergence and expansion closely relates to boundary setting for safety.90 Its emergence closely relates to the survival of territorial communities on which its members’ survival depends.91 Sovereignty stabilizes territorial controls that were previously easily changed in medieval Europe and promote a more efficient collection of material resources for internal governance over citizens and war against external threats.92 Citizens find their belonging to sovereignty states more conducive to survival, since governments provide them jobs, order, and freedom from external threats.93 The rise and spread of sovereignty states for such a pragmatic aim happened earlier in Europe and then adopted by other parts of the world which experience colonialism and the great wars caused by the territorial expansion of some sovereignty states.94 Sovereignty is increasingly recognized as essential for states considerably due to the absence of any other “higher ruling body” that could “look after” them.95 According to

88  Carlson (2004, 10–11, 15–16); Wan (2001, 3); Ness (2003, 128); Deng’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 89  1991 human rights white paper; Kuhn (2010, 76, 78, 117). 90  Cottam et  al. (2004, 66–67); Krasner (2001, 20); Biersteker and Weber (1996, the whole book and pp. 84–86). 91  Cottam et al. (2004, 66–67); Krasner (2001, 20); and Biersteker and Weber (1996, the whole book, and pp. 84–86, ch.4). 92  Biersteker and Weber (1996, the whole book, and pp. 81–87); Krasner (2001, 20–21); Wendt (1992, 412); Lebow (2008, 299, ch.6). 93  Cottam et al. (2004, 66–67, 193). 94  Biersteker and Weber (1996, ch.4). 95  Brown (2005, 41–42); Burchill et al. (2005, 34–35); Mearsheimer (2003, 30).

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Krasner, the persistence of sovereignty fundamentally relates to the question of the state.96 As previously mentioned, a significant characteristic in China’s articulation of the point of state division in this period is the tough emphasis of sovereignty. Besides the attachment to normative concerns about the principle of sovereignty (as mentioned in ch.7), the tough emphasis of sovereignty indicates China’s higher defense against possible threats to the national boundary and domestic stability hidden in the international human rights practices/politics.97 Threats from Foreign Intervention In this period, China’s concern about possible threats from foreign intervention is extraordinarily deep, influencing its position on the relationship between sovereignty and human rights.98 Firstly, for China, sovereignty is especially crucial since it feels possible threats from foreign inteference in the realm of human rights.99 Former President Deng’s words directly show such consideration: “National sovereignty and security must be in the first place, and we are more explicit about this point than before. Some Western countries talk about human rights and the legitimacy and appropriateness of socialist institutions. They want to harm our state right”.100 The 1991 white paper indicates a similar worry: “… some great western powers insist on the Cold-War logic, make the human right issue politicalized and ideological so that they use the issue as the way in the international arena to pressure developing countries, to impose hegemonism and power politics, and make the political antagonism in the area of human rights increasingly obvious”.101 The white paper then points to the political intention behind the Western countries’ pressure on China in terms of human rights, as the intention to “interfere with China’s domestic affairs, destroy China’s stability, contain China’s development, and change China’s development road and social institution”.102 Chinese scholars also recognize the connection between human rights and the need to protect national sovereignty/independence  Krasner (2001, 20).  Carlson (2004, 10–11, 15–16); Wan (2001, 3); Ness (2003, 128); Deng’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 98  1991 human rights white paper; Carlson (2004, 10–11, 15–16); Wan (2001, 3). 99  1991 human rights white paper. 100  A translation of Deng’s words in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 101  1991 human rights white paper. 102  1991 human rights white paper. 96 97

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against hegemonism and imperialism in the new historical stage during which new political powers are emerging, and traditional western intervention remains with cloth of human rights.103 Thus, for China, international intervention with the aim of human rights is, in most conditions, “a breach of the right of self-determination, motivated by a desire to impose Western standards on other states …”.104 China’s worry is understandable. “[W]hile human rights has become an important theme in international relations”, Wan notes, “power remains a central factor shaping the conduct of human rights diplomacy … As a result, human rights pressure appears to target nations like China just as old-fashioned power politics … In Beijing this induces a perceived need to defend national interests …”.105 Krasner also notes the persistence of power politics behind the spread of international institutions, including the international human right regime: “In a few instances states have voluntarily embraced international supervision, but generally the weak have acceded to the preferences of the strong …”.106 Secondly, the cautiousness towards foreign intervention is further contributed by its historical experience of foreign invasion that is reminded by the external treatment in terms of human rights in this period.107 Li and Drury notice: “China’s history with foreign occupation … has created a culture that is particularly cautious and sensitive to issues involving foreign governments … Western demands for human rights reforms refresh Chinese memories of foreign intervention and promote its xenophobia”.108 Carlson also observes a strong correlation between China’s strong resistance against intervention in the early 1990s and China’s memory of western domination in history stimulated by international sanctions against China’s human rights record.109 According to former President Deng’s interpretation of the international sanctions against China in early 1990s: “I am a Chinese, and I am familiar with the history of aggression against China. When I heard that the seven Western countries, at their summit meeting, had decided to impose sanctions on China, my immediate

 刘文宗 [Liu Wenzong] (1990, 24); 李林海 [Li Linhai] (1992, 50).  Brown (2005, 225). 105  Wan (2001, 3). 106  Krasner (2001, 22). 107  Li and Drury (2004, 384). 108  Li and Drury (2004, 384). 109  Carlson (2004, 10–11, 15–16). 103 104

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association was to 1900, when the allied forces of the eight powers invaded China”.110 A Chinese scholar emphasized in 1990: “Since the 1840 Opium War, our country has repeatedly invaded, enslaved, and pressured by imperialism. We will never forget this history, and will not let those ‘kind’ gentlemen make us their vassal again”.111 Threats to Domestic Stability The strict emphasis of non-interference is also due to China’s caution towards the possible threats of international human rights practices/politics to China’s domestic stability.112 According to former President Deng’s memory of the Tiananmen Incident in July 1990: “When those so-called fighters for democracy get some power, they will fight with each other. If they fight, there will be internal war, in which ‘human rights’ is impossible”.113 According to former President Jiang’s conclusion based on the experience in the Incident: “… facts have also proved that if a country with an over 1.2 billion population does not enjoy social and political stability, it cannot possibly have the situation of reform and opening up that we are having today”.114 The Chinese policy group recognizes that the Western human rights model might, and the West intends to disrupt China’s regime type (the People’s Democratic Dictatorship), which is the basis of China’s stability as a socialist country.115 As former President Deng emphasizes in an internal meeting with several other senior officials, the stability is prioritized, relying on the insistence of socialism through People’s Democratic Dictatorship that can continuously ensure the proletariat’s position against “the invasion from capitalism”.116 Deng continues that: “If you use capitalist human rights and democracy to promote turmoil, I will firmly resist …”.117 According to Zhu, the real motive behind the U.S.’s pressure on China in terms of human rights is the Westernization and disintegration of China, rather  Quoted in Carlson (2004, 15).  刘文宗 [Liu Wenzong] (1990, 27). 112  Wan (2001, 23–24, 29–30); Kuhn (2010, 13, 16); Ness (2003, 127–130). 113  A translation of Deng’s words documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 114  Cited and quoted in Wan (2001, 24). 115  Ness (2003, 128); Deng’s words documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 116  A translation of Deng’s idea documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 117  A translation of Deng’s words documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 110 111

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than the innocent promotion of human rights.118 Concluding China’s concern, research shows that: “To ensure stability, the party needs to be resolute in dealing with challenges … that undermine stability. Western democracy is unsuitable for China”.119  he Right to Subsistence and Development: The Material Concern T The bias toward national survival-strategic consideration is also reflected in China’s articulation of human rights content in this period. Besides the normative basis of the right to subsistence and development (mentioned in ch.7), the concern over Chinese people’s living conditions indicates Chinese leaders’ sense of responsibility.120 In an interview conducted by a foreign reporter, former President Jiang argues that the questions that made him sleep late are questions of “how to provide enough food and clothing to the 1.2 billion Chinese people. How can we improve their lives”; and he mentions that “I am always thinking how to finally achieve the objective of common prosperity. This is always the most important task for us. Although I once studied higher mathematics, I still find it quite difficult to solve this equation”.121 This is in line with the method of clarification of meaningfulness mentioned earlier: concern for the material well-being of the larger scope of objects show more ideational aspiration. However, the meaningfulness accompanies with a stronger national survival strategy consideration because the emphasis on the right to subsistence and development in this period strongly correlates to the struggle for material basis for national development and domestic functionality. Such consideration is necessary in this period for China’s survival, especially considering the fact that China’s level of material development is relatively lower during this period. Former President Deng thus incorporates the concentration of material accumulation into the innovative development of Chinese socialist theory (the aspect of “socialist market economy”), arguing that the most important thing is the improvement of “socialist productivity” and “the living standard of people”.122 The type of economic model is not the primary criterion for clarifying socialism or capitalism because the market economy can exist in both socialist and capitalist countries.123 Former President Jiang takes a similar opinion, believing that good  Ness (2003, 128).  Wan (2001, 23). 120  Kuhn (2010, 19–21, ch.3). 121  Kuhn (2010, 21). 122  Kuhn (2010, 78, 117). 123  Kuhn (2010, 78, 117). 118 119

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things will happen if priority is given to more economic freedom than political reform.124 The content of human rights in this period clearly reflects the national goal. The 1991 white paper emphasizes people’s and national subsistence and development through material safeguarding—i.e., the prevention of being harmed by external invasion and primarily improving people’s living conditions by economic development.125 As a Chinese scholar emphasizes, “insisting on economic development is the core of the right to develop”, and that “one must clarify the relationship between economic and social development and political development. If a country and its people want to realize the right to develop, they must build a strong economic and social basis …”.126 Some foreign scholars, such as Feron, defines one characteristic of the Chinese human rights approach as “materialism”, which refers to its preference of economic/social rights over political/civil rights.127 Feron’s definition is too narrow and unsustainable, as shown in the next chapter concerning the post-1997 period. However, it captures China’s concentration on national  material accumulation in designing human rights ideas in this period. Other Micro Evidence The prominence of national survival-strategic consideration in the reasoning outcome concerning human rights could also be observed in other discourses in official/scholarly works. These discourses show the domination of survival-related concerns in China’s making of human rights approach— national security, material development, and domestic stability, etc.128 Discourses in People’s Daily articles and Chinese scholars’ work indicate a strong linkage between China’s human rights theory construction and the importance of resisting western interference and assisting China’s national development.129 In People’s Daily articles in this period, the insistence on the Marxist (class) character of human rights, for example, is often related to the need to fight against threats from capitalist and western countries.130 According to a Chinese scholar’s conclusion of China’s  Kuhn (2010, 76).  1991 human rights white paper. 126  庞森 [Pang Sen] (1997, 38). 127  Feron (2015, 93–96). 128  Nathan (1994, 628); Ness (2003, 126). 129  People’s Daily 1990/9/17 and 1992/1/27; 王林霞 [Wang Linxia] (2009, 27). 130  People’s Daily 1990/9/17. 124 125

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human rights idea construction during the early 1990s: “Due to the need for international political struggle, China raises the flag of human rights during the early 90s of the Twentieth Century. However, China does not entirely follow the Western human rights idea and theory, and not copy the Western human rights model, instead … points out the human rights ideas with Chinese characteristics and lists the priority order in human rights development according to China’s national condition. Doing this is to prevent Western intervention and, more importantly, suit the need for domestic construction and development …”.131 Similarly, as a Chinese scholar mentioned in 1991: “The development of international law of human rights helps the Third World countries make use of the issue of human rights to oppose hegemonism and colonialism, to preserve sovereignty and independence and to promote the development and prosperity of national economy”.132 Foreign observers note (although with exaggerations due to the lack of understanding of China and other reasons) the strategic side of China’s human rights idea and policy in this period. Nathan considers China’s human rights idea/policy making as part of a widespread worldwide political phenomenon—managing “ideas and values to build support at home and to recruit sympathizers among publics and policy-makers abroad”.133 For Nathan, “human rights was a useful, if minor, tool of Chinese diplomacy … struggled to reinvigorate old alliances, find new sympathizers and divide critics”.134 This resonates with Sullivan’s understanding of the nature of China’s human rights idea/policymaking as a strategic “struggle over human rights within a country” and “weapon to promote broad foreign policy objectives”.135 The conclusion made by foreign observers seems to have a color of exaggeration and negative emotion, probably because of a lack of understanding of China or/and because China’s strategic maximization is sensitive news for other countries, especially those with conflicting interests. However, like every other state, China needs strategies to protect and strengthen itself, which will be appreciated by realists who see the world as anarchic without a transnational keeper of security and justice.136  王林霞 [Wang Linxia] (2009, 27).  Nathan (1994, 628). 133  Nathan (1994, 622). 134  Nathan (1994, 622). 135  Ness (2003, 124–129). 136  Brown (2005, 41–43); Burchill et al. (2005, ch.2). 131 132

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8.4   “Two Degrees” and Reasoning Outcome Type The empirical data prove the essential assumption about the relation between “two degrees” and the type of reasoning outcome—higher degree of survival-relativity plus moderate degree of self-persuasion promote prominence of survival-strategic consideration compared to meaningfulness-rightness consideration in the reasoning outcome (located in section D of Fig. 5.1, in Chap. 5).137 The Macro Reflection Such empirical indication could be observed through the macro connections in the empirical sections above show. After finding the unsatisfactory survival-related conditions that China faces in general as well as concerning the human rights issue and a moderate degree of resolving the question of ideational relation brought by the discourse of human rights, it finds that the type of reasoning outcome is a national survival-prioritized one in the combination of strategic and meaningfulness considerations. Micro Reflections Besides the macro reflection, one can also find micro reflections for the relation between “two degrees” and the reasoning outcome type. On the one hand, the contribution of China’s lack of survival-related satisfaction to its concentration of material demands is hinted at for example, by Chan’s understanding of Chinese human rights policy: “Because of different stages of development … different countries have different understandings of what exactly constitutes human rights and what emphasis should be stressed. Of all the constituent elements of human rights, the most important ones to the Chinese are the rights to survive and the satisfaction of basic human needs such as food and shelter, followed by education”.138 Chinese citizens also share such logic. Concluded from the findings of a 1995 survey of opinions of peoples living in Beijing, Wan finds that there are “worry among ordinary citizens about any political change that promises greater freedom but may also undermine stability. Chinese are generally cautious toward political and economic change”.139  Maslow (1954, ch.4, 52–54, 97–99); Broadbent (1957); Wendt (1999 and 2003).  Chan (2005, 180 (quotation)); Maslow (1954). 139  Wan (2001, 27–28). 137 138

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On the other hand, the remaining ideational contradiction concerning human rights also contributes to China’s concentration on material-­ strategic goals. Finding micro reflection is difficult, but not impossible. The origin is already reflected in the early 1990s (and earlier). The challenge from the western discourse of human rights leads to the emphasis of division between “capitalist” and “socialist” understandings of human rights in China.140 The theoretical debate in the 1970s centers between those who argue that human rights are the discourse of western capitalism so that the discourse of human rights should be denied in socialist countries, and those who argue for Marxist/socialist human rights theories different from and more advancing than, western capitalists.141 The resolution to such debate is the latter camp, reflecting in former President Deng’s emphasis in the 1980s that socialist and capitalist human rights are different, and that while the former serves the rights of most people, the latter serve rights of a small group in the expense of the rights of the significant others.142 Based on such a starting point, the period since the 1990s sees the rising theorization of human rights based on Marxism’s philosophy.143 The hardline division between the socialist-capitalist position concerning human rights gradually developed since the 1970s concerning the human rights issue; it hints at  a remained contradiction faced by China about the universal normative topic despite the theoretical progress made.144 Former President Deng, during his meeting with the Egyptian President in 1990, points out that: “Now China is undergoing reform, openness, and concentrating efforts on development and removing poverty. Nevertheless, the U.S. mentions the question of human rights, what is the reason? Impossible to understand. We can see that the human rights issue is an excuse”.145 Ignoring the U.S.’s real intention, the concentration on material goals may also be a partial result of the unresolved question of ideational relations concerning human rights, which promotes more attention to things beyond such a question. Managing self-other ideational difference during the integration to the international society is a difficult  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 14–25).  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 14–26). 142  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 25–26). 143  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 36–38). 144  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 14–26). 145  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] (2012, 26). 140 141

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task requiring time, with such difficulty increasing sharply at the start of this period due to the high external pressure that strengthens China’s defense of its distinctiveness.146 So, the concentration on national material goals is understandable as well as a rational choice.

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Speeches, Articles and Books in Chinese 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012, 中国特色社会主义人权理论研究, 北 京:中国检察出版社 范继增 [Fan Jizeng] 2011, 中国人权理论演变的社会动因初探, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2011年03期 景凤启 [Jing Fengqi] 2003, 试论党的三代领导核心对马克思主义人权观的继 承、发展和创新, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2003年03期 李步云 [Li Buyun] 1992, 社会主义人权的基本理论与实践, 法学研究CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW, 1992年04期 李步云 [Li Buyun] 1994, 人权的两个理论问题, 中国法学CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 1994年03期 李步云和王修经 [Li Buyun and Wang Xiujing] 1995,人权国际保护与国家主权, 法学研究 CASS JOURNAL OF LAW 1995年04期 李林 等 [Li Lin, et al.] 1991, 以马克思主义为指导深入研究人权理论——人权理 论研讨会综述 法学研究CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW, 1991年05期 李林海 [Li Linhai] 1992, 主权原则与人权的国际保护, 外交学院学报 JOURNAL OF F.A.C., 1992年01期 刘文宗 [Liu Wenzong] 1990, 论人权与不干涉他国内政, 外交学院学报 FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW, 1990年02期 刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 改革开放与我国人权观的变迁, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2018年04期 刘海年 [Liu Hainian] 1994, 不同文化背景的人权观念, 中国法学 CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 1994年06期 庞森 [Pang Sen] 1997, 发展权问题初探, 国际问题研究 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 1997年01期 王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009, 浅谈中国人权发展的独特模式及其经验意义, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2009年01期 杨晓青 [Yang Xiaoqing] 1991, 人权理论研究座谈会综述, 中国法学 CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 1991年04期 张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 当代中国外交简史, 上海人民出版社 张文显 [Zhang Wenxian] 1991, 论人权的主体与主体的人权, 中国法学CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 1991年05期 朱晓青 [Zhu Xiaoqing] 1994, 论人权的共同标准--兼与万鄂湘同志商榷, 中国法 学CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 1994年06期

CHAPTER 9

Post-1997: Towards Balance Between National Survival and Meaningfulness

This chapter explores if and how the “two degrees” shape the type of Chinese policy elite’s reasoning outcome in this period, and how this relates to China’s policy behavior in the post-1997 period. It finds a movements towards a balance between national survival and meaningfulness expression/practicing due to the two tiers’ new interactional condition. And such change in the reasoning outcome type fundamentally correlates to the expansion of China’s attention to human rights both in domestic and international realms in the post-1997 period.

9.1   Decreased Degree of Survival-Relativity The degree of survival relativity decreases in this period. Firstly, there is reduced national survival’s sensitivity towards the human rights issue following the weakened international pressure on China.1 Secondly, there is a higher level of national survival satisfaction due to China’s development approach, more national security brought by increasing favorable international environment, and China’s expanding national power.2

1 2

 Nathan 1997, 135; Nathan 1994, 635; Ness 2003, 127–128.  Yin 2007, 45–47; Jing 2009, 160–161; Kuhn 2010, ch.9, ch.10.

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Survival Sensitivity: Decreased U.S.-led pressure on China decreases substantially, signaled by the removal of the connection between the human rights issue and China’s trading status.3 This decreases the strong correlation between China’s management of human rights and its foreign economic/political relations, compared to the early part of the 1990s.4 General Survival Satisfaction: Higher China, in the post-1997 period, enjoys an increased level of general survival satisfaction. Development Model China, in this stage, has been increasingly successful in managing its development approach.5 China’s stable presentation in the Asian financial crisis towards the end of the 20th Century demonstrates China’s achievements in its financial reform.6 Former President Jiang’s plan of ownership reform (stimulate and legitimize the private ownership) was announced in 1997 in the Central Party School and was later incorporated officially in Jiang’s “Three Represents” in the early new Century.7 Jiang’s work has been thought of making a significant contribution to a major puzzle that China faced since 1989: the integration between socialism and the market economy.8 Moreover, there are continuous efforts of economic restructuring in former President Hu’s period and under President Xi’s leadership by changing focus from “Domestic Fixed Asset Investment” plus “Low-End Consumer Exports” to “Domestic Consumer Spending” plus “Innovation, Services”, building a new engine for the sustainability and adaptiveness of China’s economy.9 National Security China faces a more favorable external security environment since 1997, especially regarding other issues’ sharing of U.S. strategic attention, the rising multipolar trend in the international system, and China’s mostly healthy relations with other countries.10  Nathan 1997, 135; Wan 1997, 248–249.  Nathan 1994, 635; Ness 2003, 127–128. 5  Jing 2009, 160–161; Kuhn 2010, ch.9, ch.10. 6  Kuhn 2010, ch.8, 87–92. 7  Kuhn 2010, ch.9, ch.10, 95–99, 102–107. 8  Kuhn 2010, 117–118. 9  Shambaugh 2016, 27–30. 10  Yin 2007, 26–29, 45–46; 张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 317–320; Shambaugh 2016, 138–166. 3 4

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Towards and since the new century, many other issues (such as terrorism and war in countries like Iran and Iraq) eventually occupied the strategic vacuum left by the Soviet Union’s demise, at least for the US.11 As Yin observes: “Following the September 11 2001 attack on U.S. soil, China managed to secure what can perhaps be described as a more favourable international environment”.12 The United States, since the mid-­1990s, gradually change its China policy from containment (i.e., imposing sanction on China concerning the human rights issue) to the encouragement of China’s development and expanding role in the international affairs, which is for the U.S. conducive to its national interests.13 Moreover, as one Chinese scholar observes, there are trends of decreasing US hegemony and increasing economic multipolarity in the 21st Century: “During the early period of 21the Century, there has been a trend towards significant transformation in the international order: states demand redistribution of power and rulemaking, trying to maximize their national interests through multilateral mechanisms. New dynamics emerge in inter-state relations and alliances. The unipolar role of the United States decreases”.14 Discourses in China’s Government Work Reports since 1998 reflect its feeling of such an increasingly relaxed international environment.15 The discourses that emphasize instability with threats from hegemony, power politics, and Sino-US tension before 1998 are increasingly replaced by the recognition of a more favorable international environment.16 The Government Report in 1998, for the first time since 1990, argues that “peace and development are still the two major themes of the world today”.17 It also notes that the Sino-US relationship “enters new stage of development”.18 The Report in 2002, besides stressing the world subject of “peace and development”, also realizes, for the first time since 1990, that “the international environment that our country faces is the one in which the chances are more than challenges”.19 The description of  Yin 2007, 26–29, 45–46.  Yin 2007, 45. 13  张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 265, 267. 14  张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 317–320 (for the quotation see p. 320). 15  Yin 2007, 45–46; China’s Government Work Reports in 1998, 2002 and 2003. 16  A comparison between Government Work Reports in 1990, 1996 with Reports in 1998, 2002 and 2003. 17  Government Work Report in 1998. 18  Government Work Report in 1998. 19  Government Work Report in 2002. 11 12

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China’s external environment as “chances are surpassing challenges” also appears in the Report in 2003.20 The emphasis on the world subject as “peace and development” appears in the Reports in 2003, 2004, and 2005.21 Finally, China’s relations with other countries does not pose fundamental threats: the combination of competition and cooperation dominates the Sino-US relation; the good general relation between China and Russia and Europe; the long-term cultivated relation between China and developing countries; and the strong economic ties between China and its neighboring Asian countries mainly decrease the negative impact brought by these countries fear of China’s rise plus China’s “geographic position” of being surrounded by these countries.22 National Material Strength China’s national material power increase substantially both in terms of economy and military. A continuously successful development approach necessarily brings sustainable economic growth.23 “The 1999 Far Eastern Economic Review survey of the Chinese elite”, as Wan observes, “revealed a high degree of satisfaction with China’s economic development among the Chinese elite, with more than half of the respondents agreeing that China is already a developed nation”.24 China’s economy grows widely since 2001, with the most years experiencing a growth rate of more than 7%.25 China’s per capita surpassed that of the U.S. in 2006, replaced Japan as the most significant Asian economic entity in 2010, and became one of two leading economic entities in the world in that year.26 Many observers indeed conclude a gradual slowing down of the growth pace.27 However, these observers’ common conclusion is China’s continuing economic growth, although at different paces with up and down.28 China remains the average GDP growth between 8 to 10 percent.29 Even the most pessimist foreign prediction of China’s future growth by 2020 (3 percent) is still an  Government Work Report in 2003.  Government Work Reports in 2003, 2004 and 2005. 22  Shambaugh 2016, 138–166. 23  Kuhn 2010, ch.9, ch.10; Jing 2009, 160–161; Yin 2007, 44; Shambaugh 2016, 27–30. 24  Cited and concluded in Wan 2001, 30. 25  张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 320–322, 383. 26  张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 320. 27  Shambaugh 2016, 11, 22, 27–28. 28  Shambaugh 2016, 32. 29  Shambaugh 2016, 30–32. 20 21

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outstanding performance that other countries want to achieve.30 Not to mention China’s effort for economic re-structuring (as mentioned above) for a more efficient economic function, which might lead to a short-term slowdown of GDP growth but more healthy economic development in the long run.31 The expansion of China’s military strength is also noticeable. Growing economic support and technological innovation bring rapid improvement in capabilities in every aspect of China’s military.32 According to an official document in Australia in 2009: “China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin. Its military modernisation will be increasingly characterized by the development of power projection capabilities. A major power of China’s stature can be expected to develop a globally significant military capability befitting its size”.33 Generally speaking, there is a clear recognition of China’s expanding national strength. As Chan notices: “Signs of economic vigor and military modernization in recent decades, when combined with China’s extant territorial and demographic base, have seemingly raised its status among the ranks of great powers”.34 As Princeton Project Report notes in 2006: “China is on track to rapidly regain its historic great power status”.35 As Su argues in his article published in 2011: “China is playing a more and more important role on the world stage. Along with its rising, China has become a major power of global influence whose hard power has been regarded as an important factor affecting regional and even global affairs”.36

9.2   Increased Degree of Self-Persuasion In this period, the Chinese policy group manages ideational relations concerning human rights through emphasizing particularity-university combination.37 Such a cognitive solution brings a more incorporative synthetic system—the dominant position of China’s own belief but with more

 Shambaugh 2016, 30–32.  Shambaugh 2016, 22, 27–28. 32  Shambaugh 2016, 167–168. 33  McCormick and Ping 2011, 189. 34  Chan 2005b, 687. 35  McCormick and Ping 2011, 209. 36  McCormick and Ping 2011, 209. 37  刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 18. 30 31

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incorporation of values from the external, in pursuit of the universal goal of human rights protection.38 The emphasis of particularity-universality combination and the consequent more incorporative approach is contributed by the satisfactory survival and external attitude (mentioned above), both of which generate a more flexible and open psychological/cognitive trend regarding ideational relations concerning human rights.39 The increased incorporative approach enables China’s better integration of its previous ideational characteristics in the universal human rights protection project, and it is a confidence that the Chinese policy group has felt.40 Particularity-Universality Unity and More Incorporative Synthesis Particularity-Universality Unity The emphasis of “the combination of the universal human rights principle with China’s national conditions” becomes gradually more prominent from 1997.41 A slight change occurs in 1997, during which a People’s Daily article summarizing a human rights conference quotes former Premier Li’s use of conciliatory language: “search the common ground of world human rights ideas, protect human rights ideas of developing countries”.42 Since then, there are increasing numbers of People’s Daily articles that directly mention the notion, using the same or similar words, of “the combination of the universal human rights principle with China’s national conditions”.43 The analysis of nearly all People’s Daily articles from 1990 to 2012 concerning human rights demonstrates a similar trend: the proportion of articles mentioning the coordination of particularity and

38  For such framing see for examples Xi’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights. cn/html/wxzl/1/; 孙强 [Sun Qiang] 2013, 52–56; and 刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018. 39  Festinger 2001, ch.4–5; Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7; Broadbent 1957; Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292; Schaefer and Simon 2017. 40  罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2014b; 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 43. 41  Kent 1999, 19–27, 152–154, 189; People’s Daily 1997/5/30 and 1998/12/11; 2015 human rights white paper. 42  People’s Daily 1997/5/30. 43  People’s Daily 1998/12/11, 2004/3/2, 2007/5/12, and 2008/12/3; 2015 human rights white paper.

0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00

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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

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Fig. 9.1  The proportion of People’s Daily articles mentioning particularity-­ universality combination. (Source: Concluded from the observation of nearly all People’s Daily articles concerning human rights from1990 to 2012)

universality of human rights increased substantially since the watershed of 1998–2004 compared to the previous period (see Fig. 9.1). Former President Jiang’s letter to the UN (for congratulating the 50th anniversary of the Declaration) emphasizes the importance of combining the universality with China’s particularity in human rights protection.44 President Xi emphasizes (in the congratulation letter to the human rights forum in Beijing in 2015) that “China insists on combining the universal principle of human rights and China’s condition”, and that “China insists on strengthening communication and mutual learning among different cultures, promoting inter-state human rights communication and cooperation, and promoting better development in human rights careers in every state”.45 According to the 2018 white paper: “China calls for inclusiveness, exchanges, and mutual learning between cultures and between countries to advance human rights together. International human rights issues should be resolved through consultation. Building a global human rights governance system needs the participation of all countries, and progress in human rights benefits all peoples in the world”.46 The combinational trend is also evident in detailed scholarly works. Sha observes that the Chinese human rights ideas are made through “concluding and developing from past experiences especially traditional Chinse

 刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 18.   A translation of Xi’s words documented in: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 46  2018 human rights white paper. 44 45

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culture, and openly incorporating the results of human civilizations”.47 Wang concludes the Chinese human rights theory as being developed from: “critical learning, reform, and incorporating western human rights idea and theory, going along with international human rights development direction, and combining with the national condition and the advancement of Chinese traditional culture”; from supplementing China’s human rights practices with “learning from human rights construction experiences of other states with an open attitude”.48 Liu doubts the past ignorance of university and over-emphasis of class-oriented angels, and explains that: “The present practical question needed to be resolved is how to promote national human rights construction through accepting and conducting international human rights duty and balancing human rights’ universal and particular principles based on the preconditional background of international human rights standards”.49  ore Incorporative Synthetic Approach M The emphasis of particularity-universality combination indicates a more incorporative synthetic approach concerning human rights. Domination of Previous Position China’s previous characteristic is still dominant, expressed in the insistence on Marxist/socialist philosophy— i.e., the prevention of capitalist exploitation through socialist institution’s protection of large population’s rights, the combination of the individual rights and collective interests, etc.50 Incorporation Increases However, at the same time, more incorporation of the external ideas appears in this period as the combination of the universality (the standard criteria respecting by every state) and particularity (the different parts of the human rights protection model based on national backgrounds).51 Arguably, the idea of relating particularity to the universality of human rights is emphasized by the Chinese policy group regarding the philosophy of Marxism, which is considered a key to better philosophizing the world.52 More importantly, the reasoning of Chinese traditional culture/philosophy in relation to Western values in terms of  沙奇光 [Sha Qiguang] 2003, 41.  王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009, 28. 49  刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 18. 50  孙强 [Sun Qiang] 2013, 52–56. 51  Based on the reading of 孙强 [Sun Qiang] 2013, 53. 52  People’s Daily 1992/1/27. 47 48

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human rights promotes a deeper understanding of the two systems’ differences and connections on such an issue.53 The below traces such process from cultural comparison to connection, which contributes to the increased incorporative approach concerning human rights. The starting point of cognitive progress is the tracing of traditional culture/philosophy in terms of human rights.54 Tian illustrates the cultural basis of Chinese human rights understanding that influences China’s domestic and foreign policy logics: the importance of he (“和为贵”) in Confucianism and its consequent emphasis of unity between the interests/rights of the self and the interests/rights of others contribute to China’s human rights spirit reflected in both domestic realm—i.e., multi-­ party cooperation and harmonious relations among various religions; such cultural basis also influence China’s foreign policy—i.e., encouraging international dialogue and cooperation.55 Chen analyses the contribution of traditional Chinese culture to the idea of human rights, especially appreciating the traditional idea—i.e., the importance of people and harmonious social relations through balancing oneself’s rights and the duty for society/nation—in explaining Chinese human rights idea.56 Su recognizes the value of Chinese philosophy—especially the idea of “Unity of Heaven and Humanity”—in contributing to the idea of human rights by the ­balance between the self-oriented rights and existence/rights of others (including nature).57 Sha explains two crucial elements in traditional Chinese culture that relate to human rights: benevolence that promotes the love for people, and unity/mutual promotion between the duty for the others and personal development.58 Based on such an explanation, Sha further emphasizes the contribution of Chinese culture to the development of human rights ideas: “political benevolence”, and the interdependent harmony/unity among individuals, the state, and the natural world.59 Chinese culture/philosophy is then compared with Western values in terms of human rights.60 According to Meng, the western understanding of rights as naturally given is based on the western culture of  蒙培元 [Meng Peiyuan] 2002, 12–13; and 黄爱教 [Huang Aijiao] 2018.  田丹 [Tian Dan] 2002, 20. 55  田丹 [Tian Dan] 2002, 20. 56  陈志尚 [Chen Zhishang] 2002, 19. 57  McCormick and Ping 2011, 207–210. 58  沙奇光 [Sha Qiguang] 2003, 40. 59  沙奇光 [Sha Qiguang] 2003, 41. 60  蒙培元 [Meng Peiyuan] 2002, 12–13. 53 54

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“human-­centrism” that believe that humans dominate and control the natural world; in contrast, traditional Chinese culture (including Confucianism and Taoism) attach importance to humans, but emphasize that such the basis of such importance is a harmony/unity with the nature that is “the real source of humans”.61 Cultural comparison promotes the exploration of ways to cultural connection.62 Huang makes a historical and detailed analysis of the dynamic cultural relations already contained in the original UN’s human rights norm.63 It also points out the role of Chinese culture in bridging the ideational conflict in the norm.64 Huang traced the two elements contained in the making of the Universal Declaring of Human Rights that form the dynamic interaction of universal as well as contradictory forces in the Declaration: (1) the universal value—respecting human rights; and (2) the different values of western rationalism vs. the Confucius spirit of conscience, with the former is postponed by western drafters of the Declaration and the latter promoted by the Chinese drafter Zhang Pengchun with a connection to the importance of economic and social justice.65 More importantly, Huang believes in Confucianism’s capability in moderating the negative result brought by the value contradiction by strengthening the conscious emphasis of “spirit” that moderates the absolute individualism against collectivism under rationalism and brings more practical “realization of individual rights in detailed normal relations”.66 Hua also illustrates Zhang’s contribution to the making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.67 Hua explains how Zhang made efforts at bridging the West-East connection in the universal human rights projection by suggesting the incorporation of Confucius spirit of “conscience”/benevolence in the Declaration so that the caring about others and society could balance the Western concern of rationally absolute individualism.68 Based on the analysis of Chinese-Western difference, Meng recognizes that these two systems “form a supplementary relation in terms of the human culture and

 蒙培元 [Meng Peiyuan] 2002, 12–13.  蒙培元 [Meng Peiyuan] 2002, 12–13. 63  黄爱教 [Huang Aijiao] 2018. 64  黄爱教 [Huang Aijiao] 2018. 65  黄爱教 [Huang Aijiao] 2018, 50–55. 66  黄爱教 [Huang Aijiao] 2018, 51, 58–60. 67  化国宇 [Hua Guoyu] 2015. 68  化国宇 [Hua Guoyu] 2015. 61 62

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plays their historical roles”.69 According to Meng, there is the importance of “building the room for their joint development” through “mutual respect, mutual understanding, dialogue through equal basis, and encouragement of shared view”.70 The management of Western-Eastern difference and the role that the Chinese philosophy could play in such process is explained by Fan, who argues for building the connection between Eastern and Western cultures through Eastern philosophy—i.e., “unity” from traditional Chinese philosophy can transcend the dualism and contradictions in both the philosophical (i.e., the dualism in Western philosophy) and social relations (i.e., the relation among people and the relation between people and the state).71 Cui encourages a new perspective beyond the “absolute cognition concerning the human rights signified by a stand-­ off between ‘Asian Value’ and ‘Western Value’”.72 The Role of Better Survival Satisfaction and Less External Pressure Chinese policy group’s more incorporative cognitive trend is considerably shaped by two factors—China’s more satisfactory condition of survival and a better attitude from external on this subject.73 Survival Condition More national survival satisfaction encourages more psychological/cognitive energy and openness in the management of ideational relations.74 Lynch’s words support such a proposition concerning China in this period: “Material power can fuel ideational power. Rapid economic growth seems to have emboldened the Chinese elites to ‘think outside the box’ concerning China’s political future”.75 External Pressure It is true that external pressure still remains in this period, with a typical example reflects in the U.S’s official reports criticizing China’s human rights condition.76 However, a consistently decreased  蒙培元 [Meng Peiyuan] 2002, 13.  蒙培元 [Meng Peiyuan] 2002, 13. 71  范继增 [Fan Jizeng] 2011, the whole article and p.35. 72  崔之元 [Cui Zhiyuan] 2009, 40, 42. 73  Festinger 2001, ch.4–5; Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7; Broadbent 1957; Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292; Schaefer and Simon 2017. 74  Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7; Broadbent 1957; Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292. 75  Lynch 2007, 718. 76  People’s Daily 2002/3/9. 69 70

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pressure is a clear and necessary trend in this period.77 The primary reason is simple: cooperating with and engaging a rising (in every aspect) China brings more benefits than the pressure on China to comply with the Western criterion that might disrupt China’s stability and development.78 The US removed the connection between MFN and China’s human rights in May 1994.79 Following the US decision to remove the link between China’s human rights condition and China’s trading status, there is a gradual movement from the pressure to “comprehensive engagement” of China and Sino-US “strategic dialogue”.80 A resolution is adopted in the UN sub-Commission in 1997, upholding China’s preference for “constructive dialogue”.81 EU countries and the US formally relinquished the opportunities to make resolutions about China’s position in the UN Commission and Sub-Commission in 1998.82 As a People’s Daily article noted in 1998, many western countries want to “replace confrontation with constructive communication” concerning China’s human rights position.83 “Since the mid-1990s”, Wan concludes, “human rights in China has settled in as a mere diplomatic issue with the United States … the U.S. government now sees human rights as only one of a whole series of issues with China. Western Europe, Japan, and other advanced nations have now largely replaced pressure tactics with symbolic, toothless rights dialogues”.84 Lessened external pressure generates two kinds of influences, which weakens China’s particular focus on its previous ideational stance in managing the human rights issue.85 Firstly, decreased pressure tells a more positive attitude from the external that, according to acculturation theory, encourages China’s more inclusive attitude towards the external ideational sources.86 If high external pressure and the power politics embedded in it in the early 1990s stimulated China’s nationalism and a dignity-driven resistance to comply with the external pressure, this period shows China’s  Wan 1997, 248–249.  Xia 2001, 22; Nathan 1997, 141–142; Wan 1997, 8, 248–249. 79  Chen 2009, 403; Kent 1999, 71–73. 80  Nathan 1997, 135; Wan 1997, 248–249. 81  Kent 1999, 74–83, 244–250, ch.2 (for quotation see p. 79). 82  Kent 1999, 78–80. 83  People’s Daily 1998/10/22. 84  Wan 2001, 8. 85  Festinger 2001, ch.4–5; Schaefer and Simon 2017. 86  Schaefer and Simon 2017. 77 78

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more neutral and even inclusive thinking concerning Sino-Western values about human rights.87 Li explains China’s dual historical experiences with the Western idea of human rights (“historical dialectics” called by Li) that contribute to Chinese emphasis of both collective and individual rights: the past attraction by the Western human rights idea on the one hand, and being harmed later by the Western imperialism on the other hand.88 According to Fan, “…the confrontation and dialogue in terms of the human rights issue between the two nations [China and the U.S.] bring scholarly deliberations about human rights theory”.89 Both Wang and He, in their explanation of former President Hu and President Xi’s theories, note the willingness to respect the enlarging part of commonness and hold inclusive views about cultural differences.90 Secondly, according to Festinger’s idea, decreased external pressure removes the possibility of moderating the contradiction between unchanged opinion and changed (compliance) behavior, encouraging real attitude transformation.91 Following such logic, for China, decreased external pressure necessarily accompanied with lessened reference to external pressure, that pushes more ideational change along with expanding cooperation with the international human rights regime.92 The analysis of nearly all People’s Daily articles concerning human rights from 1990 to 2012 reflects such psychological/cognitive intentiona because the proportion of articles that criticize the West reduced mainly since the period of 1998–2004 (see Fig. 8.1 in Chap. 8). Degree of Self-Persuasion: Increased Particularity-universality combination marks fundamental progress in self-­ persuasion. Such a combination is closer to the advanced integrative approach to self-other difference theorized by Dovidio et al.: the integration between the self and the group through emphasizing the contribution of self’s distinctiveness to the group’s common goal, removing the

 王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009, 29; and 李君如 [Li Junru] 2014a.  李君如 [Li Junru] 2014a. 89  范继增 [Fan Jizeng] 2011, 36. 90  王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009, 29; 何志鹏 [He Zhipeng] 2017, 4. 91  Festinger 2001, ch.1, ch.4–5. 92  Festinger 2001, ch.1, ch.4–5. 87 88

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confrontation between the self-identity and the external identity.93 Thus, Potter, who emphasizes (as mentioned before) China’s selection of human rights norm according to China’s concerns and the intrinsic incompatibility between Chinese and international human rights institution (which is  actually the institution’s  side of Western tradition in Potter’s articulation),94 not only underestimates the potential connection between Chinese system and the international standard but also underestimates China’s capability in finding and developing such connection. The compatibility between Chinese domestic norms and the international standards developed by the concept of particularity-universality combination actually shape what Potter theorized as the ideal solution to different normative standards—the “complementarity” or the coherent co-function of different systems.95 More self-persuasiveness is reflected in China’s expanding research activeness concerning human rights, regarding that the expansion of Chinese publications concerning human rights indicates the progress in the Chinese human rights theory studies.96 Liu counts the yearly number of human rights articles from a Chinese academic website from 1991 to 2003: showing that after a rise of the article number in 1991 (27) and 1992 (32), the number fell after that and remains to be relatively lower in 1993 (14), 1994 (17) and 1995 (17), but rising hugely and generally continuing to rise in 1997 (25), 1998 (29), 1999 (36), 2000 (30), 2001 (45), 2002 (45) and 2003 (52).97 More self-persuasiveness is also reflected in China’s growing expression of the Chinese human rights approach’s strong correlation and contribution to the international human rights standards and activities, in terms of its cultural and experience-related enlightenment.98 In terms of cultural aspect, Su emphasizes that “…people need to notice the concept of Unity of Heaven and Humanity, which is influential in both Confucianism and Daoism. People’s understanding of their place and relationship to Heaven … and Earth … the core elements and cultural genes that are

 Hopkins 2011, the whole article and pp. 253–256, 267.  Potter 2006. 95  Potter 2006, 391–392. 96  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012, 38. 97  刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 14. 98  黄爱教 [Huang Aijiao] 2018, 59; and 王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009, 29. 93 94

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appropriate for human ethical values”.99 Appreciating President Xi’s emphasis on “strengthening cultural confidence and value confidence” as “the most long-lasting and profound power”, Huang notes China’s realization of its cultural contribution to the international human rights career.100 In terms of experience, Chen notes that “…it [China] not only wins the strong social foundation of the realization of development rights but also shows China’s historical success of the protection of development rights. This is China’s contribution to the universal theory of development rights”.101 Wang notes the contribution of China’s experience to the international human rights career: China’s practice of “transcending the Western human rights model while at the same time creatively exploring the domestic human rights approach” relates to a more widely applicable logic (for almost every state) that helps coordinate the goal of domestic “human rights development” and “the following of fundamental international human rights principles”.102 More fundamentally, the increased self-persuasion further expresses in the increasing recognition of the capability of the Chinese approach in managing ideational relations concerning human rights. According to Liao, the idea of Community of Human Destiny (President Xi’s idea) “has close internal relation with East and Western traditional cultures and the Marxist idea of community, and thus has the potential as ‘common solution’ to the East-Western disagreements”.103 Liao then explains the ideational connections: the connection between the idea of Community of Human Destiny and the Western philosophical strand of “cosmopolitanism”, which put nations and individuals under a world-wide community; the connection between the idea of Community of Human Destiny and Marx’s proposal of a community of individuals free from class division and exploitation.104 According to even foreign scholars such as Angle, the Confucian respect of harmony—individuals’ ties with the goodness of others and broader community—is also understandable for “non-­ Confucian thinkers” because “a simultaneous commitment to human rights and to harmony is coherent and desirable”.105  McCormick and Ping 2011, 210.  黄爱教 [Huang Aijiao] 2018, 59 (the quotation is a translation of Xi’s words cited in the article). 101  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2017, 20. 102  王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009, 29. 103  廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 43. 104  廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 43–45. 105  Angle 2008, 2–3, 4–6. 99

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9.3   Reasoning Outcome Type: Towards a Balance Between National Survival and Meaningfulness The type of reasoning outcome concerning human rights in this period could be defined as moving towards a balance between national survival strategy and meaningfulness expression/practicing. Pieces of evidence of such nature include three parts. Firstly, data shows importance but also an observable deviation from national survival-strategic maximization. The second part of the evidence is indicated in the connection logics of clusters concerning state division and human rights content. The third part of the evidence is indicated in other representative discourses in Chinese official/ scholarly documents/works and foreign observers’ analyses. These discourses show China’s increasingly practicing and expressing meaningfulness concerning human rights (both domestically and internationally) besides strategic considerations. Importance of Plus Deviation from National Survival-Strategic Maximization The importance of national survival-strategy continues in this period, which is necessary for China as a state. For example, the emphasis of harmonious society from 2003 to 2008 closely relates to the aim at “constructing a peaceful, stable, friendly, equal, and reciprocity international environment, and objective and friendly propaganda context”.106 According to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang’ statement in 2013, “President Xi has stressed that while firmly committed to peaceful development, we definitely must not forsake our legitimate interests or compromise our core national interests”, and that “[n]o country should expect us to swallow the bitter fruit that undermines our sovereignty, security and development interests”.107 In the articulation of China’s foreign policy goal, Zhang explains President Xi’s determination to protect China’s “core national interests” while at the same time insist on “the road to a peaceful rise” and regionally shared prosperity since “the relation between China and the world becomes increasingly important; currently, China’s destiny is increasingly intertwined with the world’s future and destiny. China’s development depends on the world, and the world also needs China”.108  张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 322.  Foot 2014, 1087. 108  张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 383, 385. 106 107

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The above discourses hint a resonation with the proposition that China’s active and cooperative attitude towards international institutions, including the international human rights regime, is considerably shaped by China’s concern for accelerated interdependence and the consequent importance of foreign interest ties and “soft power” building.109 As foreign observers argue, China’s active attitude towards the international multilateral mechanism is a strategic attempt at building its international image against threats to its rise (i.e., the spread of “China Threat Theory” in the international society) and increasing China’s regional/global influence conducive to its national material development in the global competition.110 Deviation From National Survival-Strategic Maximization Two aspects of phenomena, however, indicate deviations from national strategic maximization. Firstly, China in the post-1997 period enjoys rapidly expanding economic influence and better strategic relations with other states,111 all indicating a softened correlation between China’s accelerated cooperation in terms of human rights and external strategic constrain mentioned above (i.e., interdependence leads to China’s focus on foreign interest ties and “soft power” building112). Concerning China’s economic influence, Shambaugh notes that “China will continue to have a major impact globally. China currently accounts for 16.4 percent of global GDP; it contributes about 35 percent of global growth; and it accounts for about 11 percent of global trade. China’s economic footprint is now truly global, with its business investing and operating all over the world … If the Chinese economy catches a cold … the virus spreads internationally”.113 In the work published in 2001, Xia concludes China’s strategic relations with other states: “In recent years, China has made great progress in establishing partnerships with other countries. It has established a strategic partnership of coordination with Russia, a comprehensive partnership with France and Britain, and friendly, cooperative partnership working for

109  Wang 2000, 490; Kent 2002, 345–348; Cho 2013, 547–548; 邱昌情 [Qiu Chanqing] 2008, 63–64. 110  Scott 2010, 73–74; Cho 2013, 547–548. 111  Shambaugh 2016, 23; Xia 2001, 22–23. 112  Wang 2000, 490; Kent 2002, 345–348; Cho 2013, 547–548; 邱昌情 [Qiu Changqing] 2008, 63–64. 113  Shambaugh 2016, 22–23.

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peace and development with Japan. The leaders of China and the United States have declared that both countries will devote themselves to establishing a constructive strategic partnership moving into the twenty-first century. At the same time, China has also established partnerships with many Third World countries, including neighboring countries”.114 Secondly, the high degree of domestically positive emotion also shows a lessened connection between China’s evolving human rights content and the domestic strategic constrain (moderation of possible social stress caused by inequality115). In work published in 2001, Wan already notices the Chinese population’s positive attitude towards their economic, social and political environment, viewing towards Chinese citizens’ “general satisfaction … with their rising living standards, the country’s rising status on the world stage, and their wish to see a powerful and prosperous China”, and their belief in the capability of the CCP leadership in safeguarding China’s “political stability and economic success”.116 Concluding a research among Chinese citizens conducted in 1997, Wan notes that “Chinese adults rate their quality of life as 29 percent better than it was five years ago and expect quality of life to improve by a further 32 percent over the next five years”.117 After interviewing Chinese people in 2008, the Pew Global Attitudes Project reports that: “The Chinese people express extraordinary levels of satisfaction with the way things are going in their country and with their nation’s economy. With more than eight-in-­ ten having a positive view of both, China ranks number one among 24 countries on both measures in the 2008 survey … Most Chinese citizens polled rate many aspects of their own lives favourably, including their family life, their incomes and their jobs”.118 The result of professional research in Shambaugh’s work published in 2016 also shows Chinese citizens’ satisfaction with their living environment.119 Indeed, Chinese citizens’ persistent positive attitude cannot be separated from the Chinese government’s continuous efforts in both economic and social terms.120

 Xia 2001, 22–23.  Kuhn 2010, 13, 15–16. 116  Wan 2001, 9, 30. 117  Wan 2001, 30. 118  Kuhn 2010, 24–25. 119  Shambaugh 2016, 61–62. 120  Shambaugh 2016, 61–62. 114 115

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It is true that comprehensive human rights encourage rising luxurious stratum in economic construction by giving them more rights/freedom as well as ease social pressure from rich-gap by an enlarged decision and selection participation.121 However, encouraging a wealthy stratum does not require such an expansive change in human rights content design. People in business are concerned with profit opportunities more than others. More importantly, it is the fact that economic growth is long-term insurance of peoples’ living conditions which shapes the fundamental color of Chinese citizens’ attitudes in general, and that is why some academics consider “economic performance” as the most crucial factor in safeguarding China’s domestic stability.122 If economic growth itself is most fundamental to ensure domestic social virtuousness,123 then why Chinese human rights contents expand as it does in the post-1997 period? The two points of deviation mentioned above hint at an increased function of something different from national survival-strategy. Cluster Connection Logics The increased power of meaningfulness is reflected, in a micro way, in the strategic-ideational connection logics in clusters (in the form of reasoning outcome) concerning state division and human rights content. Concerning state division, China’s more objective attitude relates to lessened security-­ related worrying of intervention hidden in the international human rights practices, and an increased normative/factual reasoning.124 Concerning human rights content, the increased attention to comprehensive rights itself indicates increased expression of ideational and moral concern that intrinsically embedded in China’s institutional/political guidelines.125

121  1991 and 1995 human rights white papers; Kuhn 2010, 13, 15–16, 124, ch.10; Shambaugh 2016, 58; Xia 2001, 18; Ness 2003, 130–131, 133; 魏联合 [Wei Lianhe] 2004, 48–49; 刘海年 [Liu Hainian] 1994, 46. 122  Wan 2001, 8–9. 123  Wan 2001, 8–9. 124  Liu and Haibin 2014, 404; Brown 2005, 222, 226–227; Wan 2001, 3; Ness 2003, 128; Deng’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; 周忠海 and 谢海 霞 [Zhou Zhonghai and Xie Haixia] 2001, the whole article and pp.165–168; 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 52–56; Risse 2000; Johnston 2001. 125  Kuhn 2010, 19–22; 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012.

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 ore Objective Emphasis of Sovereignty: Less Attention to National M Security Threat Plus More Normative Reasoning While China’s tough emphasis on sovereignty in the pre-1997 period relates to China’s concentration on threats from foreign intervention in the international human rights politics,126 the still but more objective emphasis on sovereignty in the post-1997 period closely relates to decreasing national survival anxiety about intervention partly contributed by the evolving international norms concerning human rights-sovereignty relation, plus an increased ethical/normative reasoning.127 Firstly, the practices of humanitarian intervention—which claims the absolute legitimacy of international intervention in conditions of domestic human rights violation, leads to worrying about the interference of domestic affairs from power politics in the international society.128 The ­emergence of the international norm of “responsibility to protect” in 2001, however, shows more rational coordination between sovereignty and human rights protection through emphasizing “responsibility”: the consideration of the sovereign state as holding primary responsibility to protect its citizens (“sovereignty as responsibility”) and the consideration of the international intervention as being allowed only in the conditions when the state cannot realize the responsibility of protecting its citizens (“a new wording from the ‘right to intervene’ to the ‘responsibility to protect’”).129 Such normative development necessarily ease states’ (including China) security crises brought by the potential power-driven foreign intervention embedded in the previous international human rights protection practices.130 Secondly, besides the decreased connection to the national survival crisis is the increasing connection to ideational reasoning in terms of human rights-sovereignty relations.131 Besides the ideational reasoning of sovereignty (the importance of sovereignty as the norm and for domestic human rights protection),132 this period also sees the emergence of  1991 human rights white paper; Carlson 2004, 10–11, 15–16; Wan 2001, 3.  Brown 2005, 222, 226–227; Liu and Haibin 2014, 404; 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 52–56. 128  Brown 2005, 222, 226–227. 129  Liu and Haibin 2014, 404. 130  Brown 2005, 222, 226–227. 131  Chan 2005a, 183; 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 52–56; Jiang’s speech in the UN: http:// www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 132  Chan 2005a, 183; Jiang’s speech in the UN: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/ wxzl/1/. 126 127

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multi-­aspect reasoning on sovereignty-human rights relations based on norms and facts.133 In their article published in 2001, Zhou and Xie articulate more dialectic relation between human rights protection and sovereignty, based on the UN’s normative proposition of the state as the primary conductor of domestic human rights protection as well as the state’s duty in complying with human rights protection (i.e., through domestic legal system’s drawing close to the international-treaty-based standards, and participation in the international prevention of large-scale human rights violations).134 After studying Chinese attitude towards the idea of “responsibility to protect”, Liu and Zhang observe an “increasing openness of Chinese society to this topic” and “that the most common position from academics and officials is one that positively receives the R2P concept and agrees that, under specific situations, international society can intervene in prudent and appropriate ways. We can basically define their attitude as ‘neutral’”.135 Liao refers to the new idea of “Responsibility to Protect” in the UN and emphasizes a cautious and dynamic understanding of the relation between human rights and sovereignty, indicating a more balanced weight to the two sides.136 Liao resists the position that “human rights is higher than sovereignty” and believes in the state as the primary conductor of domestic human rights protection and the prevention of intervention through the cloth of human rights protection.137 Meanwhile, Liao also realizes that a parsimony emphasis on state sovereignty should be more flexible because of the increasing influence of international law on domestic law and the state’s duty to its own and the international goodness under the realm of the Human Destiny Community.138  omprehensive Human Rights: Increased Expression C of Ideational Concern Expanding the human rights content in this period indicates increased expression of ideational concern intrinsically embedded in China’s 133  周忠海 and 谢海霞 [Zhou Zhonghai and Xie Haixia] 2001, the whole article and pp.165–168; Risse 2000; Johnston 2001. 134  周忠海 and 谢海霞 [Zhou Zhonghai and Xie Haixia] 2001, the whole article and pp.165–168. 135  Liu and Haibin 2014, the whole article and p. 410. 136  廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 52–56. 137  廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 52–56. 138  廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 52–56.

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institutional/political guidelines.139 According to the method of clarifying meaningfulness, the concern for non-material as well as material wellbeing of wider objects needs more ideational aspiration. As Kuhn notes, Chinese leaders are continuously driven by a sense of responsibility in building a sound economic, political, and social system.140 Echoing with the priority order in human rights protection that China has predicted (mentioned in the last chapter), the period of concentrating on material rights through economic development will be necessarily followed by more attention to Chinese people’s non-material needs, which the Chinese government see and want to take care of.141 Former President Jiang, besides concentrating on stimulating China’s economic growth (“material civilization” as Jiang stresses) by allying the new social groups in private economic sectors, also emphasizes on the construction of “spiritual civilization” and “political civilization” through developing “morality, ethics, philosophy, literature … religion”, “morality, civil behaviour, highminded personal traits, progressive social attitudes, shared beliefs, and the arts” and “governmental, social and legal systems which would bring about decency, consistency, and ultimately some kind of democratic society”.142 Former President Hu, besides concentrating on durable economic development based on stability, pays increasing attention to constructing a relatively just society which could provide a better political and social environment for people: more balanced attribution of wealth among different regions and groups, the reduction of pollution during the industrial development, more chances for expression voices from “middle class”, and political reform; and all these various tasks for economic, political and social goodness are taken into consideration in the development of “A Harmonious Society” and “Scientific Perspective on Development”.143 As Hu emphasizes: “the people have growing cultural deeds and have become more independent, selective, changeable and diverse in thinking, setting higher requirements for the development of an advanced socialist culture”.144 “We must”, Hu stresses,

 Kuhn 2010, 19–22;陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012.  Kuhn 2010, 19–22. 141  Kent 1999, 156–169, 182–183, ch.5; Wan 2001, 19; 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2017, 17–21. 142  Kuhn 2010, 117–118. 143  Kuhn 2010, 28–30, 123–126. 144  Cited and quoted in Kuhn 2010, 125. 139 140

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“strive for harmonious development”.145 President Xi also stresses the importance of achieving “all-round development” besides economic development, giving equal importance to the management of issues such as the urban-rural gap, “bureaucratism”, and corruption.146 Chen explains the expansion of the meaning of development beyond the material side in Xi’s policy: the meaning of development as representing human dignity and needs, the historical steps towards the gradual resolve of every problem relating to equitable and sustainable development in China for its people’s enjoying of comprehensive human rights including economic/social/cultural/political ones.147 Chen explains: “within a state, the development of different social groups and regions refers to balance and coordination of interests”, and “[o]ne cannot only emphasize interests with ignorance of justice, which is the vulgarized understanding of development with a parsimonious emphasis on development’s material and economic side. The right to development attach importance to not only interests but also justice. The right to development directly relates to justice, and the realization of development is the promotion and insurance of justice. So, the right to development enriches the meaning of justice, there is no justice without development, and justice develops along with the development in economic, political, cultural, and social realms”.148 Other Discourse Reflections Other discourses also reflect China’s increased willingness (besides the concern over national survival-strategy) to express and practice its meaningfulness concerning human rights in domestic and international realms. One can feel an increasing power of ideational/spiritual forces (i.e., genuinely humanitarian caring) because these discourse show the Chinese policy group’s concern for the material and non-material well-being of both Chinese people and people in other countries. For example, as a Chinese scholar argues in an interview conducted by Chen in 2004: “Now our country has put ‘respect and safeguard human rights’ at the top of our agenda since the 15th Party Congress, it is necessary for us to be an active member of the international human rights community. We need to abide  Cited and quoted in Kuhn 2010, 126.  Cited and quoted in Kuhn 2010, 23–24; Cite in Shambaugh 2016, 8–9. 147  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2017, 17–21. 148  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2017, 22. 145 146

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by international standards … we should continue to promote human rights, both internationally and domestically”.149 Kuhn’s note of idea from a Chinese elite member shows China’s desire for constructing a better China for Chinese people and even a better world: “We used to think that if we could build our economy and lift our people’s standard of living, we would have fulfilled out responsibility. Today we realize while economic achievements are necessary they are not sufficient. Our responsibility goes further: we must provide our people with opportunities to develop culturally and spiritually, to participate in the political process in accord with China’s maturing democracy, and to enjoy life in diverse ways befitting such a huge and variegated country. We are also responsible to work actively with other nations to construct a peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious world”.150 Chen articulates the interests-justice synthesis in the meaning of the right to development emphasized by President Xi: the balanced and equal enjoyments of development in both domestic and international realms, and China’s emphasis of great powers’ responsibilities in promoting the orders (both in domestic and international realms) for justice and joint development in the Human Destiny Community.151 Domestic Realm The guideline of the CCP-led Chinese government is to struggle for the socialist ideal of a good society for most people, which determines the government’s intrinsic attention to peoples’ goodness; it resonates with the significant spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.152 Former President Mao’s emphasis on “People’s Democratic Dictatorship” and former Presidents Deng and Jiang’s emphasis on socialist protection of most peoples’ rights, all indicates CCP’s concern about humans’ goodness.153 Former President Hu and President Xi emphasize the importance of caring about people’s needs.154 Former President Hu emphasizes taking the people’s needs and goodness as a fundamental priority.155 President Xi already argues in 2006 that “people, not material, are what we focus  Chen 2009, 414.  Kuhn 2010, 19–22, 25 (quotation). 151  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2017, 3, 22, 27. 152  陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012. 153   Mao’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012, 25–32. 154  Lynch 2007, 710; Kuhn 2010, 24. 155  Lynch 2007, 710. 149 150

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on”.156 According to a Chinese scholar, the spirit of “serving the people” is universally attractive, transcending the traditional Chinese-Western debate in the human rights protection model, and be fundamental criteria that measure the degree of any state’s realization of human rights.157 Indeed, there could be little worry about “rights” progress when the government continuously concentrates on doing things for people. When explaining China’s attitudes towards human rights since the two crucial events in 1997 (the entrance of two important international human rights treaties) and 2003 (the emphasis of the principle of “People First” by former President Hu) to the present, Liu notes in his article published in 2018, that: “The entrance of our country into the international human rights treaties means that the human rights criterion is no longer the only domestic criteria. The legalization of human rights makes the international and domestic criteria converge, and this means that the culture of rights will become the primary culture in China”.158 The 2018 whiter paper emphasizes “the determination and ultimate goal of the CPC and the Chinese government to respect and protect human rights”.159 Thus, Chinese policy elite practises what it believes as right concerning domestic human rights protection: absorbing the international standards and other countries’ experiences through China’s domestic conditions and channels.160 For one thing, the failed cases of other countries tell China that taking political/civil rights (through Western democracy) first harms economic development in developing countries, hindering long-­ term human rights progress.161 China believes that “successful long-term development of a nation’s economy” and “people’s living standards” are the basis for the realization of “every type of human rights and basic freedoms”.162 For the other, China, in this period, also concerns about developing comprehensive rights contained in the universal standards in ways that suit China’s national condition and channels.163 Former President  Cited and quoted in Kuhn 2010, 24.  Lynch 2007, 708. 158  刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 18–22 (for quotation see p.22). 159  2018 human rights white paper. 160  Human rights white papers 1997, 2000, 2013 and 2018; Acharya 2004. 161  Ness 2003, 131, 133. 162  Ness 2003, 134. 163  Hu’s idea (在法国国民议会的演讲, 2004 年1月27日) documented in http://www. humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; 2018 huamn rights white paper; Baylis and Smith 2008, ch.29; Acharya 2004. 156 157

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Hu already recognizes that the essential nature of protecting political/civil rights does not lie in the type of institution but the degree of national institution’s realization of people’s needs in political/civil terms in a specific state.164 He realizes the Chinese government’s determination to protect political/civil rights through China’s way— “socialist democracy”— as long as the Western political model will cause negative consequences in China.165 According to Xia: “Establishing democracy and rule of law in China has been an important part of China’s constitution. In most villages in China, farmers have the right to elect their leaders. In coastal areas, tests have been conducted in some selected towns where people have the right to elect the leaders of towns. At the same time, the National People’s Congress and local people’s Congress at different levels in China have gone far beyond acting as rubber stamp and have been playing important roles in making laws and supervising officials. Although China still has lot of things to do in achieving democracy and rule of law, it will continue to go in that direction step by step. Ultimately, China will become a democratic country ruled by law with Chinese characteristics”.166 There is also increasing attention to and debates on how to incorporate international standards into the national legal system based on China’s national condition.167 In the article published in 1999, Mo and Song note that: “…for human rights protection, we should make every effort to translate the universal human rights protection to domestic human rights protection”.168 Luo, in the speech at an international conference in 2009, argues that “China always insists on respect the universal human rights principle as well as China’s national condition” and that “based on the widely-­ recognized international legal principles such as respecting state sovereignty and national conditions, China actively conducts legal, judicial, and administrative measures to carry out international legal duties”.169 164  Hu’s idea (在法国国民议会的演讲, 2004 年1月27日) documented in http://www. humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; A translation of Hu’s idea(在纪念全国人民代表大会成立 50周年大会上的讲话)documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; Lynch 2007, 710. 165  Hu’s idea (在法国国民议会的演讲, 2004 年1月27日) documented in http://www. humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; Hu’s idea(在纪念全国人民代表大会成立50周年大会上的 讲话)documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; Lynch 2007, 710. 166  Xia 2001, 21. 167  莫纪宏 and 宋雅芳 [Mo Jihong and Song Yafang] 1999. 168  莫纪宏 and 宋雅芳 [Mo Jihong and Song Yafang] 1999, 66. 169  罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2014c.

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China’s practicing of its human rights approach in the domestic realm encourages research to conclude China’s increasing internalization of the international human rights norm. Applying Finnemore and Sikkink’s constructivist approach, Jing realizes the progress of such internalization by noticing two crucial events: the establishment of human rights research institute in 1997 in Beijing University and the providing of human rights courses in Tsinghua University; and the inclusion of human rights protection into China’s constitution in 2004, which is considered by Jing as “one step toward the ultimate internalization of the norm of human rights in China in the form of law”.170 Although such a definition of “internalization” misses the story of how China has struggled to build what seems the right way from the self-other difference, this kind of research at least convinces an (increased) ideational aspect of China’s human rights idea/policy in the domestic realm. International Realm The active pattern of China’s human rights foreign policy closely relates to China’s expressing and practicing of the meaningfulness it gradually established concerning human rights in the international stage. Zhang already recognizes China’s “political and moral attentions” to global governance during this time.171 Chinese scholars also increasingly call for China to contribute its experience and opinions to global governance and its increasingly important role in the international stage.172 China practices and expresses its meaningfulness concerning human rights internationally, in the UN for example, because China believes that its opinion can contribute to the “global public goods”.173 The meaningfulness concerning human rights that China tries to express and practice includes two aspects: (1) The importance of respecting national conditions and characteristics; (2) the contribution of China’s particularity-universality combinational approach to the international human rights career.174 Meanwhile, other researches and discourses show China’s intention to contribute, in its own way, to the international human rights career.  Jing 2009, the whole article and p.168 (and its footnotes).  张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 322, 324. 172  Foot 2014, 1085, 1086–1087. 173  Foot 2014, 1085. 174  2018 human rights white paper; 王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009; 朱穆之 [Zhu Muzhi] 2002, 5; Jiang’s speech in the UN: http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 170 171

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Respecting National Conditions Concerning the first aspect, Zhu articulates the relationship between “Three Represents” and international human rights protection, that the promotion of advanced cultures is related to the international stage because every nation’s distinctive cultures should be respected and humans’ comprehensive freedom/development will be realized through advanced cultures and moralities based on enough production power.175 Former President Jiang’s speech in the UN in 2000 emphasizes the realization of international pursuit of human rights based on respecting every country’s sovereignty and specific condition: “Every country must follow the international human rights treaties based on domestic situation and law so that the domestic peoples’ human rights and fundamental freedom can be promoted and protected”.176 Relating to the Human Destiny Community, He emphasizes the importance of the mutual respect of differences in preventing power politics and cultural arrogance from hindering international human rights dialogue/ cooperation: “…one should cooperate and coordinate based on mutual respect so that an inclusive human rights idea and order could be formed rather than considering the willingness of some countries … The Human Destiny Community encourages the promotion of human rights protection based on inclusiveness, mutual understanding, and reciprocity”.177 As Zhao notes, “the liberal tide of thought is in reality just Westcentrism, regarding Western values as the only reasonable and universal values”.178 In the article published in 2007, Li recognizes that “the international human rights dialogue should prevent unnecessary political intervention and realize human rights promotion through professional communication”, because international human rights dialogue is the method of managing the interest relation and ideational differences in a way that is conducive to international peace, seeking mutual understanding and commonness from differences, and the construction of a harmonious world.179 Foreign scholars resonate with China’s position. Many researchers from Western and non-Western countries realize that appropriate international institutionalization should develop from communication and consensus  朱穆之 [Zhu Muzhi] 2002, 5.  A translation of Jiang’s speech in the UN documented in: http://www.humanrights. cn/html/wxzl/1/. 177  何志鹏 [He Zhipeng] 2017, 4. 178  Lynch 2007, 705. 179  李云龙 [Li Yunlong] 2007, 32. 175 176

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among differences for a universal goal rather than from a universalization of a specific country’s model.180 For example, Muzaffar stresses the importance of developing international human rights practices that give expanding space for non-Western cultures/ideas.181 Muzaffar is deeply critical of the Western model of human rights due to Western countries’ historical and modern colonization and power politics that indicate a fundamental ignorance of human dignity in other cultural systems.182 Criticizing “Western hegemonic universalism”, Aziz calls for “a truly global universalism encompassing the various World traditions” because, as Friedman argues, “all cultures contain democratic elements, and that each nation must institutionalize democracy in its own way”.183 After tracing the Medieval European practices of the natural rights ideal through “a political bargain and contract” that is “restricted in time and space”, Brown doubts the appropriateness of the overreliance on a naturally-given universally applicable model in terms of human rights protection.184 “Returning to the history of rights”, Brown argues, “it is here that the distinction between rights grounded in natural law and rights grounded in a contract become crucial … it is only if rights are grounded in some account of human flourishing and reason that they are genuinely universal in scope. But is this position, as its adherents insist, free of cultural bias, a set of ideas that all rational beings must accept? It seems not … It seems that either the standards derived from natural law, or some similar doctrine … are not in fact universally desired”.185 The Contribution of China’s Combinational Approach China’s contribution does not stop here. This refers to the second aspect of meaningfulness that China tries to express and practice in the international stage: China’s particularity-universality combinational approach contributes to the international human rights career.186 According to Foot, a more applicable international institutional mechanism in various areas, including human rights, can only be gradually developed through “universality as pluralism” that replaces the “western normative consensus” with truly

 For these essays see Ness 2003.  Muzaffar’s idea in Ness 2003, ch.1. 182  Muzaffar’s idea in Ness 2003, ch.1. 183  Aziz’s idea in Ness 2003, 32; Friedman’s idea in Ness 2003, 56. 184  Baylis et al. 2008, 510–511, 517. 185  Baylis et al. 2008, 517. 186  2018 human rights white paper; 王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009. 180 181

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“global representation of pluralist policy positions or values”.187 The particularity-­ universality combinational mechanism that China emphasizes in this period is an advanced approach to realize “global representation of pluralist policy positions or values” mentioned by Foot.188 China attempts to share its own experience of combination in the international human rights realm.189 Former President Hu’s idea of a harmonious society and a harmonious world expresses more concentration on “foreign policy for people” and the concern for humans through the establishment of international order in which all countries’ people could enjoy justice and equitable development.190 The contribution of the idea of Human Destiny Community (President Xi’s theory) to the international human rights career lies in the logic that in order to satisfy and coordinate different human needs in different conditions and periods, the “principle and method of organic and overall trade-offs” and the priority orders among different but interdependent kinds of human rights could be helpful for the developing human rights protection in different societies with different conditions.191 According to Liao’s articulation of the Human Destiny Community, China attaches importance to the construction of “common value”, which encourages the common view based on an inclusive and respective attitude towards diversity across nations/civilizations.192 China, as a “responsible great power”, also attaches importance to international responsibilities not only for Chinese (in China and abroad) but also world’s common interests/development through encouraging a comprehensive understanding of human rights contents, a dialectic understanding of human rights-sovereignty relation based on the recognition of sovereignty as the fundamental governing principle of international relation and the state as the primary conductors of domestic human rights protection, and a better contribution to the design of international institutions.193 He argues that: “…the idea of Human Destiny Community considerably indicates the vital position of the right to development of the state and its people,

 Foot 2014, 1091–1092.  Foot 2014, 1091–1092. 189  2018 human rights white paper; 王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009. 190  张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 322, 326–329. 191  何志鹏 [He Zhipeng] 2017, 5–6. 192  廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 52–53, 56–57. 193  廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 52–53, 56–57. 187 188

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represents the more comprehensive understanding of the right to development, and promotes the combination of the development rights and institution; these aim at establishing a better international political and economic order”.194 According to Liao: “One can explain the Human Destiny Community’s meaning from three aspects—interest community, value community, and responsibility community; and one should consider both idealism and realism in global governance while at the same time following the fundamental pursuit of global legalization”.195 Other Researches and Discourses Other researches and discourses give a direct or indirect indication of China’s increased meaningfulness consideration in its human rights foreign policy. Although focusing on “responsibility”, they (some of whom have some misunderstandings) contribute to the indication of China’s increased meaningfulness-related concern. Suzuki notices China’s paternalist motive of “teaching” other states with what China thinks as useful.196 Such a psychological/cultural motive is shaped by two factors—the pride for civilizational advancement and practical success, and the sense of being a rising developing country in the world influenced by the West for a long time.197 Suzuki’s analysis is right in the sense that China wants to share what it thinks as “good” to others, but is inappropriate to equate such sharing to “paternalism”, a word with a sense of arrogance. Xia’s analysis is more objective than Suzuki in capturing the fact. Tracing back to China’s historical/cultural legacy of preferring peace, friendship, and justice, Xia argues that China’s responsible behavior in the international realm is not hypocritic because China concerns others’ interests besides self-interests, a sign of real responsibility.198 “China is a country with 5000 years of civilization and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese thinkers advocated ‘associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good neighbors’, which shows that throughout history the Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for relations of friendship with the people of other countries”.199 The idea of “responsible power” is first pointed out by former Premier Zhu towards the end of the 20th Century and may further be  何志鹏 [He Zhipeng] 2017, 2–3.  廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 43. 196  Suzuki 2011. 197  Suzuki 2011. 198  Xia 2001, 17, 19, and the whole article. 199  Xia 2001, 19. 194 195

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strengthened by the western (mainly US) encouragement of China’s such role.200 “Responsible power”, in words of former Premier Zhu, entails China as “a responsible economic player but also a political one in upholding justice and peace”.201 China’s Government Work Report in 2007 defines “constructing a harmonious world” as being “based on political equality and democracy, economic mutual benefits and cooperation, through friendly cooperation among states, commonly facing the globally traditional and non-traditional security challenges and achieving the world’s persistent peace and prosperity”.202 Government Work Report in 2011 mentions “conducting obligatory international responsibility and duty” in the connection with multilaterialism.203 As President Xi emphasizes during his meeting with a senior UN official in 2013: “As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has heavy responsibilities to assume and has the capability to assume them”.204

9.4   “Two Degrees” and Reasoning Outcome Type The empirical data articulated by this chapter provides another periodical case for the most crucial assumption about the two-tiers’ interactional combination proposed in the conceptional model: decreased degree of survival-relativity plus increased degree of self-persuasion promote a balance between meaningfulness-rightness consideration and survival-­ strategic consideration in reasoning outcome (located in somewhere between section D and B of Fig. 5.1 in Chap. 5).205 The Macro Connection Such empirical indication could be observed through the macro connection the empirical sections above show. After finding the improved survival-­ related conditions that China faces in general as well as concerning the human rights issue, and the increased degree of resolving the question of ideational relation brought by the discourse of human rights, it finds the  Staehle 2006, 69–70; Yin 2007, 46–47; Richardson 2011, 287–288.  Richardson 2011, 288. 202  Government Work Report 2007. 203  Government Work Report 2011. 204  Cited and quoted in Foot 2014, 1087. 205  Maslow 1954, ch.4, 52–54, 97–99; Broadbent 1957; Wendt 1999, 2003. 200

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nature of reasoning outcome as being moving towards a balance between national survival consideration and meaningfulness consideration. Micro Reflections Besides the macro reflection, one can also find micro reflections for the relation between “two degrees” and the reasoning outcome type. On the one hand, China’s increased survival-related satisfaction contributes to its increasing attention to the ideational aspirations concerning human rights in the post-1997 period.206 Research shows the widespread phenomenon that economic satisfaction encourages the better performance of comprehensive human rights in societies.207 Peerenboom’s research of Asian countries shows the positive correlation between the level of material insurance and the level of human rights performance in general, which is, according to Feron’s analysis, not only due to the government’s financial ability in implementing various kinds of rights but also to the fact that citizens’ willingness in civilized behavior positively correlates to the degree of material condition they enjoy: “…materially content citizens may be less prone to crime, violence and political or religious extremism … a rich country with rich citizens is in a much better position to face the human rights challenge”.208 There is recognition of the correlation between China’s increasing advantages in the domestic/international realm and its increased willingness to be more active in the international stage.209 As Yin notes: “China’s growing confidence based on its achievements in both domestic and international fields … indicate the belief among the Chinese leadership that China can be selectively active and do something worthwhile … Such a belief is reflected in China’s growing concerns for the peace and security of the world”.210 As Lynch observes: “The tone of their [Chinese policy group’s] writings suggests that the massive increase in Chinese power of recent years invigorates them intellectually and motivates them to question the inevitability of what they regard as Western political-cultural domination … internal source of identity can be heavily influenced by a state’s

 Maslow 1954.  Feron 2015, 102. 208  Feron 2015, 102. 209  Yin 2007, 47. 210  Yin 2007, 47. 206 207

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changing levels of material power”.211 As Xia notes, “[i]f China thinks that the international security environment is stable and it is not facing serious military threats, it will pursue its policy of reform (including political reform) and opening and its independent foreign policy of peace. As a result, China will integrate itself deeply into the international community and world institutions”.212 According to Ruan’s explaination in 2012: “Today, China has become a leading actor on the international stage thanks to the fast growth of its strength … China must have the courage to speak out and contribute its ideas to the word even though its means China will face more difficult and complicated options”.213 On the other hand, increased self-persuasiveness concerning human rights shapes the increased power of meaningfulness expression and practising. The success of a particularity-universality combination in managing the ideational relation concerning human rights gives China more “ideational power” in domestic and foreign human rights policymaking.214 According to Luo, the integration between Chinese traditional culture and the human rights issue help construct a truly Chinese human rights approach, which is “rooted and developed in Chinese soil” and “deeply into people’s heart” so that “we are more confident and have strength in domestic human rights protection as well as in international communication and cooperation, learning from others, and developing ourselves during communication and interaction”.215 Luo also emphasizes that “our success in the human rights arena gives us confidence and strength that our human rights road and success testable. We should go out more, make our voice, play a more significant role, participate more deeply in the international human rights career, and participate in the construction of international human rights ideas and rules”.216 This resonates to some extent with Lynch’s observation of China’s increasing willingness to play a role in the evolution of international political norms (i.e., “the constitutive norm of democracy”) after the strengthening of “their [the Chinese group’s] civilizational self-confidence”.217  Lynch 2007, 718.  Xia 2001, 24. 213  Foot 2014, 1086–1087. 214  2018 human rights white paper; Lynch 2007, 718; 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 43; 罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2014b. 215  罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2014b. 216  罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2015. 217  Lynch 2007, 718. 211 212

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Bibliography Acharya, Amitav. 2004. How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? International Organization 58 (2): 239–275. Angle, Stephen. 2008. Human rights and harmony. Wesleyan University, From the Selected Works of Stephen Angle,http://works.bepress.com/stephen-­c-­angle/2/ Baylis, John, et al., eds. 2008. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. Broadbent, Donald. 1957. A Mechanical Model of Human Attention and Immediate Memory. Psychological Review 64: 205–215. Brown, Chris. 2005. Understanding International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Carlson, Allen. 2004. Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China’s Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention. Pacific Affairs 77 (1): 9–27. Chan, Gerald. 2005a. China’s Compliance in Global Affairs, Volume 4: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, Human Rights. USA: World Scientific Publishing Company, Incorporated. Chan, Steve. 2005b. Is There a Power Transition Between the U.S. And China? The Different Faces of National Power. Asian Survey 45 (5): 687–701. Chen, Dingding. 2009. China’s Participation in the International Human Rights Regime: A State Identity Perspective. Chinese Journal of International Politics 2 (3): 399–419. Cho, II Hyun. 2013. Dual Identity and Issue Localization: East Asia in Global Governance. Global Governance 19: 545–565. Feron, Henri. 2015. The Chinese Model of Human Rights. Chinese Legal Science 2015 5: 1. Festinger, Leon. 2001 [1957, 1962, 1982]. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: University Press. Foot, Rosemary. 2014. ‘Doing some things’ in the Xi Jinping Era: The United Nations as China’s Venue of Choice. International Affairs 90 (5): 1085–1100. Haas, Ingrid Johnsen, and William A.  Cunningham. 2014. The Uncertainty Paradox: Perceived Threat Moderates the Effect of Uncertainty on Political Tolerance. Political Psychology 35 (2): 291–302. Hopkins, Nick. 2011. Dual Identities and Their Recognition: Minority Group Members’ Perspectives. Political Psychology 32 (2): 251–270. Jing, Chen. 2009. Explaining the Change in China’s Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping: A Norm Change Perspective. Journal of Contemporary China 18 (58): 157–173. Johnston, Alasdair Iain. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 487–515.

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Kent, Ann. 1999. China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. ———. 2002. China’s International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations. Global Governance 8: 343–364. Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 2010. How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China’s Reform and What This Means for the Future. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd. Liu, Tiewa, and Zhang Haibin. 2014. Debates in China About the Responsibility to Protect as a Developing International Norm: A General Assessment. Conflict, Security & Development 14 (4): 403–427. Lynch, Daniel. 2007. Envisioning China’s Political Future: Elite Responses to Democracy as a Global Constitutive Norm. International Studies Quarterly 51 (3): 701–722. Maslow, Abraham. 1954. Motivation and Personality, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. (Reprinted version). McCormick, Brett, and Johanthan H.  Ping, eds. 2011. Chinese Engagements: Regional Issues with Global Implications. Robina: Bond University Press. Nathan, Andrew. 1994. Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy. China Quarterly 39: 622–643. ———. 1997. China: Getting Human Rights Right. The Washington Quarterly 20 (2): 135–151. Ness, Peter Van, ed. 2003. Debating human rights: critical essays from the United States and Asia. Taylor & Francis e-Library. Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada: Routledge. Potter, Pitman. 2006. Selective Adaptation and Institutional Capacity: Perspective on Human Rights in China. International Journal 61 (2): 389–407. Richardson, Courtne. 2011. A Responsible Power? China and the UN Peacekeeping Regime. International Peacekeeping 18 (3): 286–297. Risse, Thomas. 2000. “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics. International Organization 54 (1): 1–39. Schaefer, Christoph Daniel, and Bernd Simon. 2017. Opportunities for Immigrants’ Acculturation and Identification Varieties. Political Psycholgy 38 (6): 959–975. Scott, David. 2010. China and the “Responsibilities” of a “Responsible” Power— The Uncertainties of Appropriate Power Rise Language. Journal Asia-Pacific Review 17 (1): 72–96. Shambaugh, David. 2016. China’s Future. UK and USA: Polity Press. Smith, Allison. 2008. The Implicit Motives of Terrorist Groups: How the Needs for Affiliation and Power Translate into Death and Destruction. Political Psychology 29 (1): 55–75. Staehle, Stefan. 2006. China’s Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Regime. Thesis submitted to the George Washington University.

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Suzuki, Shogo. 2011. Why Does China Participate in Intrusive Peacekeeping? Understanding Paternalist Chinese Discourses on Development and Intervention. International Peacekeeping 18 (3): 271–285. Wan, Ming. 1997. Human Rights and Sino-US Relations: Policies and Changing Realities. The Pacific Review 10 (2): 237–255. ———. 2001. Human Rights and Chinese Foreign Relations. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Wang, Hongying. 2000. Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization. Asian Survey 40 (3): 475–491. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2003. Why a World State Is Inevitable. European Journal of International Relations 9 (4): 491–542. Xia, Liping. 2001. China: A Responsible Power. Journal of Contemporary China 10 (26): 17–25. Yin, He. 2007. China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations. Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy.

China’s Government Work Reports Government Work Report. 2007. http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-­03/16/content_1260216.htm ———. 2011. http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825233.htm

Speeches, Articles and Books

in

Chinese

陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012, 中国特色社会主义人权理论研究, 北 京:中国检察出版社 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2017, 中国发展权话语体系的基本内涵, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2017年01期 陈志尚 [Chen Zhishang] 2002, 儒家传统与中国人权, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2002年06期 崔之元 [Cui Zhiyuan] 2009, 摆脱“亚洲价值”与“西方价值”的绝对化思维方式-对人权问题的思考, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2009年02期 范继增 [Fan Jizeng] 2011, 中国人权理论演变的社会动因初探, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2011年03期 何志鹏 [He Zhipeng] 2017, 人类命运共同体理念对人权理论的贡献, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2017年05期 化国宇 [Hua Guoyu] 2015, 国际人权事业的中国贡献:张彭春与《世界人权宣 言》中国政法大学出版社 黄爱教 [Huang Aijiao] 2018, 《世界人权宣言》与儒家“精神”, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2018年05期

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李君如 [Li Junru] 2014a, 中国的文化变革与人权事业的进步 (来源:人权杂志) http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/. 李云龙 [Li Yunlong] 2007, 人权对话与人权合作:构建和谐世界的必要途径, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2007年01期 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 全球治理背景下的人类命运共同体的阐释与构建, 中国法 学 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE, 2018年05期 刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 改革开放与我国人权观的变迁, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2018年04期 刘海年 [Liu Hainian] 1994, 不同文化背景的人权观念, 中国法学 CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 1994年06期 罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2014b, 中国以民生为重的人权建设, (来源:人权杂志) http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/ ——— 2014c, 人权保障的“中国模式”—中国人权研究会会长罗豪才在比利时布 鲁塞尔自由大学座谈会上发表演讲(摘编)(2009年9月21日) http://www. humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/ 罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2015, 利用本土机制推动人权建设—在“迈向跨文化人权对 话”国际学术研讨会开幕式上的致辞 (2014年9月22日) http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/ 蒙培元 [Meng Peiyuan] 2002, 从中西传统人权观念看人与自然的关系, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2002年05期 莫纪宏 & 宋雅芳 [Mo Jihong & Song Yafang] 1999, 论国际人权公约与国内宪法 的关系, 中国法学CFHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 1999年03期 邱昌情 [Qiu Changqing] 2008, 中国在国际人权领域话语权:现实困境与应对策 略, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2008年03期 沙奇光 [Sha Qiguang] 2003, 中国的传统文化与中国的人权理念, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2003年04期 孙强 [Sun Qiang] 2013, 改革开放以来马克思主义人权理论中国化的理论创新, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2013年03期 田丹 [Tian Dan] 2002, “和为贵”传统思想与中国人权, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2002年06期 王林霞 [Wang Linxia] 2009, 浅谈中国人权发展的独特模式及其经验意义, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2009年01期 魏联合 [Wei Lianhe] 2004, “三个代表”重要思想对中国人权观的发展与创新, 人 权HUAMN RIGHTS, 2004年04期 张历历 [Zhang Lili] 2015, 当代中国外交简史, 上海人民出版社 周忠海 & 谢海霞 [Zhou Zhonghai & Xie Haixia] 2001, 论国际法上的人权保护, 中国法学 CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 2001年01期 朱穆之 [Zhu Muzhi] 2002, “三个代表”思想与人权, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2002年02期

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

Returning to the question raised at the beginning of the book: what is the internal mechanism that can help one understand the complex and inconsistent expressions of strategic and ideational sides in political behaviors? The book answers such a question through a model of the motivation-­ heuristic complex and illustrates the model by the case of China and human rights. Following the model’s logic, the conclusion also read the Chinese human rights approach and international relations since the COVID-19 pandemic.

10.1   The Model: Motivation-Heuristic Complex The model is a two-layered motivation-heuristic complex, with the two tiers combine and interact towards an aggregated outcome. Such a political reasoning model explains why one can sometimes see both strategic and ideational sides in actors’ behavior, and why the ideational side is evident in some situations but seems to be not working in other conditions. One should bear in mind that two points are important: 1). the project holds a neutral attitude towards both survival-strategy and meaningfulness-­rightness since they are necessary parts of being, and the project’s emphasis is to capture  the law governing the two sides’ combination and interaction; 2). the “law” of political reasoning that this project proposes, although mentioned as a “universal” sometimes, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 K. Li, A New Model of Political Reasoning, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4803-5_10

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is just a  conception/generalization  (among many) that needs further investigating/testing.  Two tiers consistently function together. They are: (1) the material/ strategic tier as the desire for survival—including internal functionality and external safety, corresponding with the heuristic of strategic designing for the aim of survival; (2) the ideational tier as the desire for self-­persuasion through meaningfulness, corresponding with the heuristic mechanism of rightness building through a coherent system of ideational elements.1 The two tiers not only continuously combine but also interact with each other. The basic law of interaction is the “two degrees” that determine two tiers’ influence on each other: firstly, the degree of survival-­ relativity (the issue’s connection with survival & the level of general survival satisfaction) positively correlates to the degree of survival tier’s influence; and secondly, the degree of rightness building (i.e., level of coherency correlating to believing in specific meaningfulness) positively correlates to the degree of self-persuasion tier’s influence.2 During the self-persuasion construction process, the actor’s capacity to rebuild rightness from contradictory ideas relates to the level of survival satisfaction and the relation with the external that brings the contradictory idea.3 The final political reasoning outcome has two characteristics: the former link to the mix of the two tiers, and the second links to the two tiers’ interaction. Firstly, the combination of the two levels and their mutual selection of each other’s elements determines that the form of the final reasoning outcome presents as the strategic-ideational cluster (s) system: every strategic element/s connects to specific ideational element/s in each cluster in the cluster/s system, directly or indirectly observable.4 Secondly, and more importantly, the reasoning outcome’s type (the relative weight between survival-strategy and meaningfulness-rightness) is shaped by the “two degrees” mentioned above, which could evolve across case and time depending on the condition of the “two degrees”.

1  Maslow 1954; Festinger 2001; Waltz 2001, 2010; Cottam et al. 2004, 65–66, 76–77; Burchill et al. 2005, 189–193; Wendt 1999; and Johnston 2001. 2  Maslow 1954; Festinger 2001; Broadbent 1957; Wendt 1999, 2003. 3  Maslow 1954; Festinger 2001; Haas and Cunningham 2014, 960–962 (About Berry’s theory); Hopkins 2011; Sibley and Osborne 2016. 4  Contessi 2010; Cottam et al. 2004, 31–32; Baylis et al. 2008, 146–150; Gramsci 1971; Simon 1982, 29, 69–72, 99; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Wendt 1999; Katzenstein 1996; and Mearsheimer 2003.

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10.2   The Empiric: China and Human Rights Regarding the importance of China for the word, and the complex involvement of strategic and ideational factors in China’s consideration of the human rights issue, the case of China and human rights is an interesting and representative case for the model’s testing and illustration. After behavior observation and discourse analysis that read the Chinese policy elite’s shared reasoning, the empirical part argues that the evolution of China’s human rights idea/policy across two periods (the pre-1997 period and the post-1997 period) is driven by the combination and interaction of the two layers of motivation-heuristics and the corresponding reasoning outcomes. Two Considerations Chinese policy elite is continuously driven by two kinds of considerations that influence China’s attitude towards human rights. The first kind of consideration is the desire and strategies for China’s survival which means domestic benign relations, national security and national material development.5 The second consideration is the self-­persuasion-­driven pursuit of meaningfulness concerning human rights by exploring ideational relations concerning human rights, most importantly, the relation between the Western tradition and Chinese political/cultural beliefs concerning human rights, and between human rights and sovereignty.6 The two considerations’ simultaneous function is further reflected in the forms of China’s political reasoning outcomes in the pre-1997 period and the post-1997 period. Three essential points are significant in forming China’s human rights idea: about the international human rights regime, about state division, and about human rights content. Each point contains a connection between strategic and ideational elements (based on analysis). The illustrations about each point and the corresponding strategic-­ideational elements evolve across the two periods, contributing to China’s increasing attention to the human rights issue since 1990, especially since 1997. Pre-1997 Period Going deeper, China’s human rights idea/policy in the pre-1997 period behaviorally expressed in increasing attention to the human rights issue is shaped by prominence of national survival strategy (the type of reasoning outcome) resulted from the higher degree of survival-­relativity and the moderate degree of self-persuasion. 5  Kuhn 2010, 3–4, 13–16, 98, 121; ch.8–10; Nee and Sonja 2012; Tubilewicz 2006, ch.3; Fravel 1996, 1115–1116; Brown 2005, 66–67; Art and Jervis 2009, 182; Mearsheimer 2003, 56, 60–61; Mao’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 6  Maslow 1954, 46; Festinger 2001; and Teske 1997; Chen 2009, 417; Baylis et al. 2008, ch.29; 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012.

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On the one hand, China faces a higher degree of survival relativity when considering the human rights issue. The human rights issue’s close connection with China’s foreign economic/political relations means a higher degree of survival’s sensitivity towards the human rights issue.7 China’s general survival satisfaction is also lower because of the challenges of searching for ways of development, lower level of national security due to containment from the external, and China’s relatively moderate level of national power competence.8 On the other hand, the Chinese policy group manages the contradiction caused by the human rights issue by emphasizing particularism— which stresses China’s distinctiveness through class and state division.9 The emphasis of particularity is contributed by China’s survival dissatisfaction and intense external pressure from the international society, both of which generate reliance on previous ideas and limit the incorporation of new ones.10 Such a cognitive solution brings a higher degree of a biased synthetic system—incorporating the discourse of human rights but framing it with a particular emphasis on China’s own belief.11 The highly-­ biased synthetic approach shows progress in China’s management of the human rights issue in meaningfulness building. However, it is arguable that the degree of self-persuasion is still moderate since China is still undergoing a significant process towards resolving question of ideational relations concerning human rights, especially viewing toward China’s ongoing and accelerating integration to the world and its standards. Consequently, the type of reasoning outcome concerning human rights is survival-prioritized one—that is, the prominence of national survival strategy during its combination with the meaningfulness-rightness consideration. Evidence of such nature includes two parts. The first part of the evidence is the connection logics of clusters (in the form of reasoning outcome) concerning state division and human rights content. Concerning state division, the tough emphasis of sovereignty is largely driven by the prevention of threats to the national boundary and domestic stability, which strongly relate to China’s attention to historical experience and the  Nathan 1994, 635; Ness 2003, 127–128.  Yin 2007, 26–29; Jing 2009, 160–161; Chow and Li 2002, 250; Gill and Huang 2009a, b. 9   People’s Daily 1990/9/17, 1990/8/13, 1991/11/9, 1992/1/27, 1997/5/30, 1998/2/7; Kent 1999, ch.5; Festinger 2001. 10  Nathan 1994, 636; Festinger 2001, ch.4–5; Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7; Broadbent 1957; Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292; Schaefer and Simon 2017. 11  李步云 [Li Buyun] 1992, 2–8; Feron 2015, 92; Potter 2006; Acharya 2004. 7 8

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future threats hidden in the Western human rights foreign policy.12 Concerning human rights content, the prioritization of the right to subsistence and development largely reflect the concentration on developing material basis for national strength and domestic functionality.13 The second part of the evidence present in other discourses, in Chinese official/ scholarly documents and works as well as foreign observers’ analysis. Post-1997 Period China’s human rights idea/policy in the post-1997 period behaviorally reflected in accelerated attention to the human rights issue is driven by a movement towards a balance between national survival strategy and meaningfulness expression/practicing concerning human rights. On the one hand, the degree of survival relativity decreases during this period. National survival’s sensitivity towards the human rights issue decreases following the weakened international pressure on China.14 China also enjoys a higher level of survival satisfaction due to China’s progress in its development approach, more national security brought by increasing favorable international environment, and China’s expanding national power.15 On the other hand, in this period, the Chinese policy group manages ideational relations concerning human rights through emphasizing particularity-­ university combination, based on reflective thinking of Marxist philosophy and especially the relation between Chinese and Western philosophies/cultures in terms of human rights.16 The preference of particularity-universality combination is contributed by China’s satisfactory survival condition and more positive external attitude, both of which generate a more flexible and open psychological/cognitive trend regarding ideational relations brought by the issue of human rights.17 Such a cognitive solution brings a more incorporative synthetic system— the dominant position of China’s original belief but with more incorporation (than the previous period) of values from other countries, in pursuit 12  Carlson 2004, 10–11, 15–16; Wan 2001, 3; Ness 2003, 128; Deng’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. 13  1991 human rights white paper; Kuhn 2010, 76, 78, 117. 14  Nathan 1997, 135; Nathan 1994, 635; Ness 2003, 127–128. 15  Yin 2007, 45–47; Jing 2009, 160–161; Kuhn 2010, ch.9, ch.10. 16  刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 18; People’s Daily 1992/1/27; 蒙培元 [Meng Peiyuan] 2002, 12–13; Festinger 2001. 17  Festinger 2001, ch.4–5; Maslow 1954, 52–54, 97–99, ch.4, ch.7; Broadbent 1957; Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292; Schaefer and Simon 2017.

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of the universal goal of human rights protection.18 The increased incorporative approach brings fundamental progress in the self-persuasion during China’s integration with the universal human rights project, a confidence that the Chinese policy group has felt.19 Consequently, the type of reasoning outcome concerning human rights in this period gradually moves to a balance between national survival strategy and meaningfulness expression/practicing. Evidence of such nature includes two parts. The first part of the evidence reflects in the connection logic of clusters concerning state division and human rights content. Concerning state division, China’s more objective attitude relates to lessened security-related worrying of intervention hidden in the international human rights practices, and an increased normative/factual reasoning.20 Concerning human rights content, the increased attention to comprehensive rights itself indicates increased expression of ideational concern that intrinsically embedded in China’s institutional/political guidelines, through adopting the universal human rights standards in Chinese way.21 The second part of the evidence is also indicated in other representative discourses in both Chinese official/scholarly documents/works and analysis of foreign observers. These discourses indicate firstly the importance of, but also a deviation from, national strategic maximization. Secondly, these discourses show China’s increased willingness to practice and express its meaningfulness concerning human rights in domestic and international realms, for material as well as non-material well-being of both Chinese people and people in other countries.

10.3   Chinese Human Rights Approach Since the Pandemic China’s human rights approach since the COVID-19 pandemic is generally a continuation of the post-1997 period analyzed in the book, and with some further developments. Emphasizing the core spirit of 18   Xi’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; 孙强 [Sun Qiang] 2013, 52–56; 刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018. 19  罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2014b; 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 43. 20  Liu and Haibin 2014, 404; Brown 2005, 222, 226–227; Wan 2001, 3; Ness 2003, 128; Deng’s idea documented in http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/; 周忠海 and 谢海 霞 [Zhou Zhonghai and Xie Haixia] 2001, the whole article and pp.165–168; 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 52–56; Risse 2000; Johnston 2001. 21  2018 human rights white paper; Kuhn 2010, 19–22; 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012.

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“people-­centrism”, the Chinese government led by President Xi emphasizes the priority of people’s lives/healthy and prosperous living conditions, besides which more coordinated development of comprehensive rights are stressed to meet people’s diverse demands.22 The nature is largely in line with the post-1997 one: a relative balance between national strategy and meaningfulness expression/practicing. The pandemic threatens Chinese people’s lives and China’s domestic economy, and thus China’s national survival, which China must deal with in urgency by emphasizing unti-pandemic struggle and economic improvements.23 Meanwhile, the power of meaningfulness expression/practicing behind China’s human rights policy in this period is very strong. This is not only because that China is successful in controlling the domestic pandemic in the prevention of national survival condition from getting worse, but also because the Chinese policy group wants to express and practice the meaningfulness of the Chinese human rights approach, which they strongly believe in.24 The idea of “people-centrism” is considered as having a deep connection and compatibility with the system of rights-centrism.25 Meanwhile, there is a strong belief in the value of the Chinese human rights model for China and the world. “The new human rights idea of people-centrism insists on the value of putting people first. People are the creators of history, putting people in the first priority is the highest level of respecting and protecting human rights, and is also the core of the CCP’s human rights idea”.26 “The idea of constructing the Common Community of Human Destiny reflects China’s great-power responsibility in facing humans’ common challenges and creating a beautiful future for humans. In terms of international human rights progress, the idea of the Common Community of Human Destiny aims to promote equality, security, sharing, and happiness for every person. So, it has a universal value for human society’s development”.27

 鲁广锦 [Lu Guangjin] 2020.  Cottam et al. 2004, 65–66, 76–77; Maslow 1954. 24  Maslow 1954; Wendt 1999, 2003. 25  何志鹏 [He Zhipeng] 2020. 26  鲁广锦 [Lu Guangjin] 2020. 27  鲁广锦 [Lu Guangjin] 2020. 22 23

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10.4   Some Suggestions for IR Since the Pandemic The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic leads to massive uncertainty in international relations: peoples’ worries, economic loss, domestic social pressure and deterioration in inter-state relations, etc. A crisis is understandable but could be managed through two aspects. Firstly, the breakthrough point is the improvement of survival conditions to draw states out of too much concentration on competition and balance of power that encourages mutual distrust and disagreement.28 That is perhaps why, for example, many commentators call for (1) The urgent development of globally connective channels for cooperation in terms of pandemic containing,29 so that  the resultant improvement of public health and consequent economic recover could decrease domestic social pressure  which  strengthens state leaders’ long-lasting (i.e., the U.S. government) intention to transform domestic conflict to the external;30 (2) The Sino-­U.S. military communication mechanism’s urgent improvements for the prevention of mutual misreading of each other’s intentions and actions;31 and (3) The building of channels for international economic cooperation (in which China’s “One Belt One Road” project is considered as contributive) and domestic rich-poor gap moderation.32 Secondly, the strengthening of what Wendt imagined as truly collective identity is vital to transcend, to some extent, at least, the egoist struggle for power.33 In this aspect, China’s suggestions (i.e., the idea of Community of Human Destiny) for the building of a sense of community with multilateralism and “global governance institutional channels” that promote mutual understanding and cooperation for joint development and justice based on equality and mutual respect, is contributive.34 The pandemic brings challenges but also a chance for building a more adaptive international order.35 If it is the case, the above mentioned two aspects might be necessary participants in such a process.

28  Maslow 1954, ch.4, 52–54, 97–99; Burchill et al. 2005, ch.2; Broadbent 1957; Haas and Cunningham 2014, 291–292. 29  Tang 2020. 30  陈琪 and 薛静[Chen Qi and Xue Jing] 2020. 31  Lyu 2020. 32  白云怡 and 谢文婷 [Bai Yunyi and Xie Wenting] 2020. 33  Wendt 1999, 2003. 34  Human rights white papers 2010 and 2018; 廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018; 吕晶华 [Lv Jinghua] 2019; 王毅 [Wang Yi] 2020 35  白云怡 and 谢文婷 [Bai Yunyi and Xie Wenting] 2020.

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Speeches, Articles

and

Books

in

Chinese

白云怡 & 谢文婷 [Bai Yunyi & Xie Wenting] 2020, 哈佛大学荣休教授、”中国 通”傅高义:美国独大的”单极”时代正在结束, (来源:环球时报) 2020-07-20 https://world.huanqiu.com/article/3z7qeHm81zG 陈琪 & 薛静[Chen Qi and Xue Jing] 2020, 如何认识当前的中美外交舆论斗 争?清华卡内基全球政策中心(2020/5/25) https://carnegietsinghua.org/ 2020/05/25/zh-­pub-­82310. 陈佑武 [Chen Youwu] 2012, 中国特色社会主义人权理论研究, 北 京:中国检察出版社 何志鹏 [He Zhipeng] 2020, “以人民为中心”:人权理论的中国化解码, 李步云 [Li Buyun] 1992, 社会主义人权的基本理论与实践, 法学研究CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW, 1992年04期

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廖凡 [Liao Fan] 2018, 全球治理背景下的人类命运共同体的阐释与构建, 中国法 学 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE, 2018年05期 刘志强 [Liu Zhiqiang] 2018, 改革开放与我国人权观的变迁, 人权HUMAN RIGHTS, 2018年04期 鲁广锦 [Lu Guangjin] 2020, 全面建成小康社会的人权意义, (来源:光明日报) http://www.humanrights.cn/html/2020/2_0728/52771.html. 罗豪才 [Luo Haocai] 2014b, 中国以民生为重的人权建设, (来源:人权杂志) http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/ 吕晶华 [Lv Jinghua] 2019, 中国在全球治理方面的三个经验, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2019/10/10/zh-­pub-­79942 蒙培元 [Meng Peiyuan] 2002, 从中西传统人权观念看人与自然的关系, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2002年05期 孙强 [Sun Qiang] 2013, 改革开放以来马克思主义人权理论中国化的理论创新, 人权 HUMAN RIGHTS, 2013年03期 王毅 [Wang Yi] 2020, 坚定捍卫多边主义, 推动构建人类命运共同体—王毅国务 委员兼外长在联合国经社理事会”新冠肺炎疫情后的多边主义:在成立75周年 之际, 我们需要什么样的联合国”高级别会议的发言(2020-07-17) https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1798590.shtml. 周忠海 & 谢海霞 [Zhou Zhonghai & Xie Haixia] 2001, 论国际法上的人权保护, 中国法学 CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE, 2001年01期

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Important Websites http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/1/. http://www.humanrights.cn/html/wxzl/6/. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1798590.shtml.

People’s Daily Articles 1990/8/13 马克思主义人权理论研讨会述要 1990/9/17 坚持马克思主义人权观; 反对资产阶级人权观—高校人权问题研讨 会综述 1991/11/9 中宣部理论局召开的理论讨论会强调 用马克思主义观点看待人 权问题 1992/1/27坚持以马克思主义为指导 把人权理论研究引向深入—人权理论研讨 会综述 1994/12/24中国人权研究会理事会暨人权理论研讨会在京举行 1997/5/30中国人权发展基金会首届理事会指出 生存与发展是人权之本 李鹏 为大会题词 乔石朱镕基分别打电话祝贺 1998/2/7首都专家学者评美国人权报告 反对利用人权干涉中国内政 1998/10/22对话代替对抗---国际人权领域交流的大趋势 1998/12/11《世界人权宣言》发表50周年纪念会在京举行 江泽民致信祝贺 2002/3/9中国人权研究会举行座谈会 专家学者用大量事实批驳美国人权报告 2004/3/2唐家璇在中国人权研究会第二届全国理事会第二次会议上说 改进人 权保护是中国21世纪发展的重要任务 2008/12/3中国改革开放与人权发展30年学术研讨会召开

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