A New Creed: Fundamental Religious Beliefs in the Athenian Polis and Euripidean Drama 9783666251900, 3525251904, 9783525251904

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H Y P O M N E M A T A 91

VÔR

H Y P O M N E M A T A U N T E R S U C H U N G E N ZUR ANTIKE U N D ZU I H R E M N A C H L E B E N

Herausgegeben von Albrecht Dihle/Hartmut Erbse/Christian Habicht Hugh Lloyd-Jones/Günther Patzig/Bruno Snellf

HEFT 91

VANDENHOECK & RUPRECHT IN GÖTTINGEN

HARVEY YUNIS

A New Creed : Fundamental Religious Beliefs in the Athenian Polis and Euripidean Drama

VANDENHOECK & RUPRECHT IN GÖTTINGEN

CIP-Titelaufnahme

der Deutschen

Bibliothek

Yunis, Harvey: A new creed : fundamental religious beliefs in the Athenian polis and Euripidean drama / Harvey Yunis. Göttingen : Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1988 (Hypomnemata ; 91) Zugl.: Cambridge, Massachusetts, Univ., Diss. ISBN 3-525-25190-4 NE: GT

© Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen 1988 Printed in Germany. Ohne ausdrückliche Genehmigung des Verlages ist es nicht gestattet, das Buch oder Teile daraus auf foto- oder akustomechanischem Wege zu vervielfältigen. Druck: Hubert & Co., Göttingen

PARENTIBUS Ε Τ CONIUGI

Preface

Unless otherwise noted, the Oxford Classical Texts are used to quote and cite the plays of Euripides: J. Diggle, ed., vols. I (1984) and Π (1981), G. Murray, ed., vol. III 2nd ed. (1913). Full bibliographical information for works cited in the footnotes by author or editor and date of publication may be found in the bibliography at the end of the book.

Ancient works,

modem collections of ancient material, and standard works of reference are cited in the text by the common abbreviations. I would like to add a brief note about my use of certain words. I occasionally use the terms 'theology' and 'theological' to refer in an abbreviated manner to the content of beliefs about the gods. Plato used the term θεολογία in this way. I mean to exclude any connotations these words may have from their occurrence in Christian, scholastic, or modern contexts. Secondly, although the words 'morality' and 'moral' do not have Greek equivalents (nor, for that matter, does the word 'religion'), they can be used, as I occasionally use them here, to refer to a set of problems and questions that are recognizably Greek. These are problems and questions not about right and wrong, but about how best to live, given the world as it is. Thus, moral questions may come down to deciding what the world is really like, and this, in turn, will depend greatly on what one believes the gods are really like. Finally, I am pleased to be able to acknowledge the many debts I have incurred in the course of realizing this project. This book began its life as a doctoral dissertation at Harvard University. While writing the dissertation I was supported by fellowships from the Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation and

8

Preface

the Department of Education of the United States.

Rice University

generously provided a subsidy towards the cost of publication. But for the aid of several friends and teachers this book would never have seen the light of day. I am grateful to Professor Jeffrey Rusten for providing invaluable advice in addition to discerning criticism; to Professor Zeph Stewart for holding me to an uncompromising standard of clarity and precision; and to Jefferds Huyck, Danielle Arnold, John Gibert, and Professor Martha Nussbaum for their criticism of earlier drafts. It was my great good fortune to have been put in contact with Professor Albrecht Dihle who welcomed the manuscript for Hypomnemata considerable improvements.

and

suggested

Dr. Gudrun Müller of Vandenhoeck &

Ruprecht was extremely helpful in preparing the manuscript for publication. I owe the greatest debt to Professor Albert Henrichs. I am confident that it will prove worthwhile to have written this book if there is apparent in it some measure of his true and lively understanding of Greek life and literature.

Contents Preface

7

Introduction

11 Part One: Athens

1. Athenian Polis Religion

19

2. Plato, Laws 10: Fundamental Religious Beliefs and the Construction of the Pious Attitude

29

3. The Three Fundamental Beliefs of Athenian Polis Religion

38

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

The premises of the model of fundamental beliefs The first belief: the gods exist The second belief: the gods pay attention to the affairs of men The absolute justice of Plato's cosmic divinities vs. Athenian belief.... The third belief: reciprocity between men and gods

4. Nonconformity: 4.1 4.2 4.3

Socrates and Anaxagoras

Socrates Anaxagoras Summary of part one

38 42 43 45 50

59 62 66 72

Part Two: Euripides 5. Introduction to the Problem in Euripides: Three Examples

75

5.1

Bacchae 216-220: the first belief

77

5.2 5.3 5.4

Trojan Women 1060-1080: the second belief Andromache 1161-1165: the third belief Appendix to chapter five: fragments and sententiae

81 88 93

6. Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

100

6.1 6.2 6.3

Background: exchange of χάρις, divine φ ι λ ί α Hippolytus and Artemis Ion and Apollo

101 Ill 121

10 7.

Contents A N e w Creed: Heracles 7.1 7.2 7.3

7.4

Amphitruo: 1-513 The chorus of Theban elders: 514-814 Heracles: 815-1428

140 146 149

7.3.1 The problem: 815-1302 7.3.2 The crux: 1303-1346 7.3.3 The denouement 1347-1428

150 155 166

Epilogue

169

Bibliography Index

139

locorum

172 antiquorum

181

Introduction

It is no straightforward task to relate the work of an ancient poet to the society in which his work was composed and published. It is especially difficult in the case of tragic drama, where the subject matter normally pertains not to the contemporary society but to a mythical past. Yet the social and intellectual environment of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries is so exciting, so full of experiment and achievement and disappointment and reversal, that we feel compelled to investigate the relations between the various remnants of that society, even where the evidence, by its nature, does not readily lend itself to such investigation. As a composer of religious drama, Euripides was controversial in his own day, and remains no less so today. He wrote at a time when religious belief was scrutinized to a degree unprecendented in Greece and rarely equalled anywhere since. There is the well-known accusation of the woman in Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazusae

(450-451) that through his tragedies

Euripides persuaded men that gods do not exist. In classical Athens such an accusation was dire. Yet the woman is unsubtle in her failure to distinguish which aspects of religious belief are challenged in the work of Euripides; this deficiency is to be made up here. I have aimed to provide an answer, however provisional, to the following question:

how does Euripides

reflect, modify, and even challenge those beliefs about the gods which can be considered fundamental to the religion practiced by the Athenians? The reader will of course judge for him or herself the value of my inquiry. Such merit and novelty as it may have depends largely on the procedure I have devised for dealing with the intractability of the evidence at my disposal.

12

Introduction

There is no formal, external evidence bearing on the problem, such as direct discussions of this question or reliable statements about public reaction to this or that aspect of Euripides' work.

The import of

Aristophanes' hostile but intimate portrait of Euripides is ultimately as inscrutable as that of the ridiculous Socrates of the Clouds. It cannot be denied that sophistic rhetoric and pre-Socratic, scientific doctrines appear regularly in Euripides' work, and that these novelties are seamlessly, if noticeably, woven into the fabric of the dramas. Yet the mere quotation of passages reflecting these enlightened trends is not sufficient to motivate the inquiry at hand; it cannot be taken for granted how any particular passage pertained to contemporary religion. Nor is an appreciation of Euripides as an innovator or critic of traditional mythology strictly relevant, for the relation between myth and the beliefs of practiced religion is tenuous. Euripides has appeared to some of his readers to be as loyal to religious tradition, if not so conservative in expression, as Aeschylus and Sophocles are usually thought to be.1 However, I endeavor to compare Euripides not to his fellow tragedians, but to his fellow citizens. Here, of course, is where the evidence turns intractable: how can such a comparison, in the sphere of religious beliefs, be carried out legitimately? To proceed in the face of the problem, I have attempted to construct a model of fundamental religious beliefs which both accurately reflects the religion of the Athenians and usefully serves as a guide to problems of beliefs about the gods in Euripides.2 The model of fundamental beliefs is built up on the basis of inferences drawn from the evidence of religion in Athens. The inferential procedure is not a liability, for the primary evidence is abundant and the inferences to be drawn are never more than one step removed from that evidence. In Part One I have attempted to derive ideas from things; however, the evidence for each of the inferences I have drawn is always presented in the immediate 1

E. g. Lloyd-Jones (1983) 151-155, 175. Further remarks explaining precisely what I mean by fundamental beliefs, and the standing I claim for them, are to be found below in the first section of chapter three, pp. 38-41. 2

Introduction

13

vicinity of the inference. The reader is asked to consider for himself the aptness of the inference in each instance. Furthermore, consideration of fundamental religious beliefs was not unknown among intellectuals of the classical period. Essentially, the schema of religious doctrine set forth and defended by Plato in the Laws constitutes the same type of model of religious belief which I aim to construct for classical Athens. Plato's procedure and assertions must be taken seriously in any investigation of religious belief in the classical polis. However, Plato was not writing about Athens, did not aim to be merely descriptive, and therefore must be used with the utmost caution. Hence, there are two sorts of evidence to be used for two distinct but related purposes: first, the evidence of contemporary Athenian religion, for which I have mainly utilized, but not restricted myself to, sources stemming from Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries; second, the evidence taken from formal discussion of religious beliefs by Plato and, to a lesser extent, other thinkers roughly contemporary with Euripides. Although these two types of evidence are sometimes discussed next to each other, I have been careful to avoid confusing them. In the study of Euripides in Part Two there is no question of discovering the religious beliefs held by the playwright himself, for I know of no legitimate means of using the plays for that end. There is no attempt to uncover a programmatic critique of established religious practice or of the predominant religious mentality. There is no discussion of a chronological development in the treatment of religious problems in Euripides' work. I am far from asserting that religious issues pose the most important problem to be considered in Euripides. Nor is Euripides an absolute innovator in presenting characters and situations which might challenge fundamental religious beliefs; problems of understanding the ways of gods according to mortal lights play a role in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, as well as in much of earlier Greek poetry. Athenians in the late fifth century would have encountered the novel ideas of scientists and sophists, if only at several removes in Old Comedy. In any case, every Athenian would have

14

Introduction

had to live with some degree of incongruity between his religious beliefs and the world around him. Not every perjurer got his deserts, at least so far as one could see. The Athenians lived quite efficiently with incongruities of this sort, as have all societies whose religious beliefs were not extremely pessimistic. Furthermore, it is likely that some sort of license was implicitly afforded the tragedian to present what might elsewhere be considered scandalous or even impious. (Compare the license in Old Comedy to ridicule the gods.) Spectators will have gone to tragic performances aware of the possibility of being shocked or disturbed. The tragic stage was a safe place for presenting deeply challenging scenes and ideas without causing serious social distress or havoc. Imagine a traditionally pious citizen who was in the audience for the production of Euripides' Heracles. He may have been stunned by the appearance of Iris and Lyssa, moved by the report of Heracles' mad slaughter, then disturbed by Heracles' reasoning as he recovers his will to live. Yet because it had all occurred in the theater, under the auspices of the polis and the god Dionysus, he encountered no danger of failing to maintain his own beliefs and pious routine. For many reasons, therefore, the fundamental beliefs of the religion of the Athenian polis do not constitute a barometer allowing us to measure how much Euripides shocked his audience. But they do provide a standard of reference (παράδειγμα) to examine how Euripides incorporated and elaborated the functional premises of the religious life of Athenian citizens. The problems of religious belief presented in Euripides' dramas were problems of common concern to the citizens of the polis. The accusation from the Thesmophoriazusae mentioned above implies that what went on in the mythical society of tragedy, for all of its differences from contemporary Athenian society, mattered for the religious beliefs of individual Athenians. We cannot know if Athenians identified with tragic heroes such as Hippolytus or Heracles, but they must, we should assume, have appreciated the dilemmas of these heroes and tried to understand the reasoning of these heroes in the midst of their dilemmas in a manner which held significance

Introduction

15

for their own lives. This edifying feature of tragedy, probably part of the traditional and conventional experience of participating in the dramatic festival, enabled tragedy to fulfill its civic function. Because no Athenian could stand in relation to the gods as do Hippolytus and Heracles, I do not claim that the beliefs of an Athenian and the tragic hero should be considered equivalent; I do claim that what the Athenian saw the tragic hero believing about the gods was pertinent to what he himself believed about the gods. This book is divided into two parts, and the reader may wish to consult either part independently of the other. But the examination of religious belief in Athens and Euripides stems from and ultimately refers to a single, complex phenomenon of Athenian society: the conventionally pious citizen who sat in Euripides' audience would have had to ponder passages, characters, and situations that reflected and may have challenged the beliefs about the gods which were fundamental to his participation in the religion of the polis, fundamental to his priorities as a citizen of the polis. The present study thus aims to contribute towards understanding Euripides as a thinker who used the means of his chosen genre to reflect upon an important problem of his age.

PART

ONE

Α Τ Η Ε Ν S

We must not look for consistency in men's religious actions, any more than in their secular conduct: deeds do not fit: irreverence,

norms of belief and facts of practice,

words and

nor do men mean all that they say, in reverence

or

least of all men as nimble of wit and tongue as were many of

the Greeks. Religion is not all or nothing, certainly not among them.

Arthur Darby Nock, 'Religious Attitudes of the Ancient Greeks'

CHAPTER

ONE

Athenian Polis Religion

So long as there were independent poleis in Greece, religion was no less a concern of the polis, imposed no weaker or less extensive a set of obligations on the citizens, than civil order and civil defense.1 Although the polis had no official state religion in a modem sense, as, for example, Islam is the official religion of Saudi Arabia, there was nevertheless much religious activity which the polis through its official institutions supervised, subsidized, managed, promoted, defended or simply tolerated.2 One can immediately point to the following types of religious activity as falling securely under the head of what may conveniently be called polis religion: religious festivals, both those of the entire polis and its political subdivisions of phratry, tribe, and deme, and those celebrated by a clientele determined by non-political criteria, but sanctioned if not actually managed by the polis; 3 public sacrifices and dedications; the building and 1

Cf. Arist. Pol. 6.8, where religious institutions are reckoned among the ά ν α γ κ α ΐ α ι έπιμέλειαι of the polis (esp. 1322b 18-37; cf. 1328b2-23). 2 There are of course many discussions of the role of religion in the polis of the classical period. I cite those I consider the best: Fustel de Coulanges (1890) 131-269; Busolt-Swoboda (1920) 1.514-527, 2.1168-1176; Gernet and Boulanger (1932) 300-314; Solmsen (1942) 3-14; Nilsson (1951) 17-48; Ehrenberg (1960) 74-77; Burkert (1985) 216-275; Osborne (1985) 178-182,187. A historical view of the development of religion in the polis is given by Nilsson (1949) 242-262, Nilsson (1967) 708-714. If no one account is entirely satisfactory, these accounts taken together demonstrate a variety of approaches. Yet even taken together they do not exhaust the evidence. 3 In the latter group would fall the Brauronia and Eleusinian Mysteries, the political aspects of which, on the ideological level, are analyzed by Osborne (1985) 154-178.

20

Athenian Polis Religion

maintenance of cult statues, temples, and precincts; the appointment and control of priesthoods, religious officials of various titles, and religious embassies; the prosecution and punishment of impiety; the use of oaths and curses in the course of the normal and extraordinary business of the polis and citizens. But no account of the details of religious ritual and activity, however exhaustive, will alone reveal the inherence of religion in the polis.4 In the rest of this chapter I shall present those facts which best reveal how the political community of classical Athens was essentially a religious community.5 At Athens, the polis as the basic religious unit (Kultusgemeinde) was manifest on the Acropolis in the temples and cult of Athena as Polias or Poliouchos

and in the Prytaneum at the common hearth of the polis. 6

Political subdivisions were also religious units, with each tribe and deme having its own hearth, cult, and festivals.7 But the polis as religious unit was evident in many smaller, mundane forms of religious activity. Consider the following items. Typical is the locution used to express the standing of the polis in public sacrifices to various deities or public

With regard to the bureaucratic ties of these festivals to the polis, the Brauronia was supervised by a board of ten ίεροποιοί ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 54.7), and for the more complex question of the bureaucratic ties of the polis to the Eleusinian Mysteries, see Clinton (1980), Rhodes (1981) 636-637 (on [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 57.1). 4 Cf. Nilsson (1967) 713: 'Staat und Religion waren [by the end of the archaic period] mehr als jemals eines und dasselbe.' 5 To simplify matters I restrict my attention to Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries, both for this chapter and the rest of the investigation. This restriction is also necessary in order to maintain the efficacy of the contrast with Euripides, whose original audience was essentially Athenian. However, the description of polis religion would substantially hold for all other Greek poleis of the classical period, and, to a lesser but still significant degree, for all pre-modern communities. 6 On the Athena cult, Herington (1955); on the common hearth, Gernet (1968b). 7 Thus Cleisthenes sacralized his new political divisions of the citizenry ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 21.6). On the religious activities of the tribes, see Kearns (1985) 192-198; on the religious activities of the demes, especially their sacred calendars, see Whitehead (1986) 176-222. The effect of Cleisthenes' reforms in the religious sphere was to implant in the citizen body a new structure of cult observances alongside the older corporations of phratries and their subdivisions; see Kearns (1985). Cleisthenes adopted from the old system the principle of the unity of citizenship and religion; cf. Dem. 60.27-31, Arist. EN 1160al8-25. On the role of religion to define groups within the polis, see Burkert (1985) 254-260.

Athenian Polis Religion

21

sacrifices in general - ΰπέρ της πόλεως. 8 The polis of course either paid for these sacrifices (ιερά δημοτελή) or acknowledged the act of public service in an individual's λειτουργία. 9

Before each meeting of the

Assembly, a herald would utter on behalf of the polis a prayer in the form of a curse on enemies of the democracy.10 On one occasion Demosthenes tried to impute impiety to his adversary Midias by whom he had been struck while acting as choregos. He displays two obscure oracles, addressed to the entire polis, which in passing and in regard to wholly other circumstances enjoin the wearing of crowns. Demosthenes' argument turns on the contention that while wearing the crown as choregos he was acting as religious representative of the polis.11 The jury was meant to believe that the entire polis suffered religious outrage at the hands of Midias. In Xenophon's report of the attempt by Cleocritus in 403 to reconcile the warring Athenian factions, the primary appeal is to the common religious rites of the polis (HG 2.4.20). Oaths sworn by representatives of the polis in the religious ceremonies implementing peace agreements implied the conception of the entire polis simultaneously as a religious and political unit: the entire polis was bound religiously and politically by the oath the Assembly authorized the representative to take. The polis as a unit could incur impurity by suffering a source of pollution in its midst. Such was the 8 Antiph. 6.45, Dem. 21.114: prayers as well as sacrifices upon entrance to the Boule; [Dem.] 59.73: sacrifices at the ιερός γάμος during the Anthesteria; [Dem.] 59.92: sacrifices in general; PI. Lg. 828b: sacrifices in general; IG II 2 47.27 (= LS S 11.5): sacrifices to Asclepius; IG II 2 403.17-19 (= LSCG 35): sacrifices to Athena Nike; IG II 2 410.5-6, 13-16: sacrifices to Dionysus and the Other Gods. In the latter three instances, all from the fourth century, δήμος is used instead of π ό λ ι ς . There are numerous examples from inscriptions of the third century. 9 With pure cynicism [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.9 reports that the public sacrifices of the polis were arranged merely to feast the demos. In fact, honor for the gods and pleasure for the worshippers were harmonious concomitants in classical Greek religion: PI. Lg. 653c9-d5, Arist. EN 1160a22-25. Cf. Mikalson (1982), esp. 216 n. 15. For a list of festival liturgies in classical Athens, see Davies (1967). 10 Dem. 19.70: ΰπέρ υμών ώ άνδρες 'Αθηναίοι. See Rhodes (1972) 37 for sources of the prayer and a reconstruction. 11 Dem. 21.51-55, esp. 55: κατά τάς μαντείας ταύτας (Fontenrose [1978] #Η28) ΰπέρ ΰμών έστεφανώμεθα. All priests and priestesses uttered their prayers ΰπέρ υμών [sc. τών Α θ η ν α ί ω ν ] , Aeschin. 3.18. For ΰ μ ε ΐ ς = ή πόλις, cf. Dem. 18.88: ύμεΐς, άνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, τόδ' ύμείς οταν λέγω, την πόλιν λέγω.

22

Athenian Polis Religion

claim of the Spartan embassy just before the Peloponnesian War demanding the Athenians drive out the 'curse of the goddess' (Th. 1.126). Such was claimed to be the danger presented by the impious Andocides, by an adulteress, by a male prostitute, and by a homicide.12 Supreme authority in religious matters rested in the polis itself, or more directly, in the same institutions through which it governed itself otherwise. That is, decisions on religious matters were indistinguishable institutionally from matters of politics, economics, or anything else affecting the entire community. 1 3

Divine property was maintained and defended by the

institutions of the polis:14 the crime of temple-robbing (ιεροσυλία) had its own procedure, different from unspecified forms of impiety, but Xenophon records a statute in which temple-robbing is treated jointly with treason (HG 1.7.22). It is uncertain whether the two crimes were treated together because some similarity was perceived in the nature of the crimes or merely because, being of similar magnitude, they warranted the same punishment. In either case, in addition to the gods, the polis, as guardian of divine property, is an injured party. Plato calls temple-robbing ανόσια εργα και πολιτοφθόρα (Lg. 854c7), and, though he does not treat temple-robbing and treason in the same law, he enjoins the same procedure for both and treats them consecutively (Lg. 856bl-857a2). But the polis' arrogation of the right to appropriate divine property is a sign of its supreme religious authority. It is unclear whether there was in effect any distinction between the money of the gods and that of the Athenians. The divine treasuries had 12 Andocides: [Lys.] 6.53; adulteress: [Dem.] 59.85-87; male prostitute: Aeschin. 1.19-21; homicide: Antiph. 2.1.10-11, 3.1.2, 4.3.7. The pollution of an entire polis appears as a theme in tragedy, most famously in Soph. OT (cf. 22-29, 95-101, etc.). Likewise the polis as a unit will reap benefit or harm from the blessing or curse of chthonian gods or heroes, e.g. Aesch. Eum., Soph. OC, Eur. Heracl. Cf. Hes. Op. 240, and especially Aesch. Sept. 602-608, where the just man in a polis is said to share the divine retribution aimed at his impious fellow citizens. Aeschylus makes this situation analogous to the shipwreck case, where the impious aboard ship involve the whole company, including the pious, in ruin. For the shipwreck case, cf. Antiph. 5.81-83, [Lys.] 6.19-20, And. 1.137-139. On the question of pollution of the polis, see Parker (1983) 257-280. 13 See Ostwald (1986) 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 , 1 4 5 - 1 4 8 , 1 6 1 - 1 6 9 . 14 For an act of extraordinary management, cf. the decrees of Kallias: IG I 3 52.

Athenian Polis Religion

23

their own sources of income, recognized and preserved by the polis, but the money was there for the Athenians to use. Reporting on Athenian financial assets at the beginning of the war, Pericles makes no distinction between the money of the polis and the property of the gods. Even the gold in the chryselephantine Athena was in extremis available (Th. 2.13.3-5). Some accounts on stone show that the polis for some time took 'loans' from the divine treasuries (IG I 3 369).

Usually the accounts merely record

payments. In 407/6 the Athenians, desperate, resorted to melting golden statues of Nike.15 The Assembly had the power to establish the norms of piety with regard to the calendar of sacrifices offered on behalf of the polis. The piety of Nicomachus, a secretary in the revision of the law code begun in 410, was challenged by his accuser in the course of a more general attack. Though a disturbance in the so-called traditional sacrifices seems to be at issue, the accuser nevertheless accepts unspecified decrees of the Assembly, among other things, as authoritative in the establishment of the calendar (Lys. 30.17-19).16 The polis also retained the power to allow or exclude foreign forms of worship. The authority of Josephus is not sufficient to accept his assertion literally that there was a law (νόμος) in Athens against the introduction of a foreign god (Ap. 2.267). However, his assertion about Ninos' crime of initiating people in the rites of foreign gods is supported by the parallel case of Phryne. The latter, also tried for impiety, was accused among other things of introducing a new god. 17 However, there is good evidence that cults new to Attica customarily sought official authorization. If a foreign cult was to be successful in Athens with anything greater than a meager, shifting clientele, it would have to have a cult shrine, and some 15

Schol. ad Ar. Ra. 720 = Hellanicus FGrH 323a F 26, Philochorus FGrH 328 F 141; see Ferguson (1932) 85-95. In the fourth century sacred vessels were always considered a possible fund of emergency money (Dem. 22.48, Din. 1.69). 16 The sacrifices listed on the κύρβεις (Lys. 30.17, 20) must refer to a sacred calendar stemming from Solon's law code (Plu. Sol. 25.2); cf. Stroud (1979) 8-10. 17 See the summation of the prosecutor Euthias, Baiter-Sauppe Oratores Attici (1850) 2.319-320. This information is also recorded and discussed with the fragments of Hyperides' speech in defense of Phryne, Hyp. fr. 58 Sauppe.

24

Athenian Polis Religion

land, even if a tiny plot, would be needed for that purpose. Foreigners needed a special grant to gain the right of εγκτησις γης καί οικίας. 1 8 Thus, so far as a foreign god would own land and a shrine, the admission of foreign cults was in the hands of the Assembly. Preserved documents on stone contain references to this grant for the cults of the Thracian goddess Bendis, the Egyptian goddess Isis, and the Aphrodite of Kition on Cyprus. 19 Cases of impiety were of concern to the entire polis. Thus they were handled in the legal system like other matters of public concern, as a γραφή. The king archon received the indictments for cases of impiety and referred them to trial.20 This duty of the king archon, along with his other administrative religious duties and duties in ritual, is probably a vestige of the days when a real king held religious, political, and military authority conjointly. 21 However, the exceptions to the use of the γραφή ασεβείας procedure show just as clearly the conception of the polis as a unit and as authoritative. The procedure for serious crimes against the polis, such as treason ( π ρ ο δ ο σ ί α ) , was ε ι σ α γ γ ε λ ί α . 2 2

This was the procedure

envisaged in Diopeithes' decree against those who rejected religion (Plu. Per. 32.2). This procedure was in fact the one used against Alcibiades in 415 for profaning the Mysteries (And. 1.14; Plu. Ale. 22.4). The court's verdict in γραφαί or είσαγγελίαι (or the Assembly's, if it entertained an 18

Busolt-Swoboda (1920) 1.302 n. 1, Pêcirka (1966) for ancient sources. 19 IG I P 1283.4-6 (=LSCG 46), of the first half of the third century, refers to the original grant to Bendis. This cult had been established in Athens by 429/8 at the latest (IG 13 383.143; cf. IG l3 136 [=LSS 6]). IG Il2 337 (=LSCG 34) records the decree, proposed by the pious, conservative Lycurgus in 333/2, making the grant to Kitionian Aphrodite; at lines 42-45 of this decree, the grant to Isis is cited as precedent. For the fourth-century Athenian cult of the Libyan Ammon, see Classen (1959) 354. 20 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 57.2; Hyp. Eux. 6; cf. Pl. Euthphr. 2al-6. 21 Administrative duties: [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 57.1-2; IG I 3 84.6-8 (= LSCG 14). Ritual duties: see Rhodes (1981) 639 on what may be included in τάς πατρίους θυσίας διοικεί ούτος πάσας ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 57.1); for the ιερός γάμος of the king archon's wife, see [Dem.] 59.73-78, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 3.5. For the devolution and separation of authority, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 3.2-3. 22 On the procedure for εισαγγελία, see Harrison (1971) 50-59. Ostwald (1986) 528-536 argues that impiety was normally treated by εισαγγελία until the reforms of 403/2, and was treated by γραφή only after the reforms.

Athenian Polis Religion

25

εισαγγελία) was final. For all the strength of tradition, in effect impiety was what the court or Assembly decided it was; that this is true is clear from the fate of Socrates.23 The natural impulse of the demos was to stand by traditional piety. For example, an appeal for the defense of ancestral deities was conventional in a commander's speech to his men before battle (Th. 7.69.2; cf. Aesch. Pers. 402-404, Sept. 14-15). The mutilation of the Hermae and the revelation of the parody of the Mysteries in 415 provoked, whether or not intended by the perpetrators, huge popular outrage.24 Speakers in law courts found it expedient in general to impugn their opponent's piety before the jury. This ploy is too frequent (especially in Demosthenes and Aeschines, directed at each other) to need citation, but two examples are worthy of special note. First, in defending a case of παρανόμων, Lysias raised in court the issue of the reputation for impiety of his adversary, Cinesias (fr. V Gernet, cf. Ar. Ra. 366 and schol. ad loc.). Lysias also mentions Cinesias' connection to a social club of dubious taste, the κακοδαιμονισταί. Cinesias' physical ailments at the time of the prosecution made it convenient for Lysias to draw 23 The project of Rudhardt (1960) to discover the various clauses of an extended and specific law of impiety is fundamentally misconceived. As with other laws in the Athenian legal system, even in the somewhat more sophisticated period of the fourth century, whatever the precise terms of the law of impiety were, the interpretation of the law was basically open-ended. Cf. Ruschenbusch (1957), esp. 266-267 (Gesetzeslücken), for, among other examples, the simple, vague terms of the law of hybris (Dem. 21.47). Cf. also Plato's law of impiety in the Laws (907dff.). For the lack of precedent in Attic law, see Ruschenbusch (1957) 265. 24 Th. 6.27.3; the outrage was felt first of all as an omen for the Sicilian expedition. Powell (1979) shows the impact of religious belief on all facets of the Sicilian expedition. He concludes (31): 'The great Sicilian venture had been influenced throughout by religious considerations. Sent after divination had made the Athenians hope to capture Sicily, it lost probably its most talented commander when Alcibiades was recalled to face trial on a religious charge. Nikias, who in the event had most influence on the course of the campaign in Sicily, was saved from potentially ruinous involvement in the Hermai scandal by his religious reputation, and may have owed his original appointment as commander to a widespread belief that he and his schemes were divinely favoured. The failure of the expeditionary force to escape in 413 from the Great Harbour was due to divination. And the low morale of Athenian troops, which contributed to the final catastrophe, was largely a result of religious fears.' With regard to the failure of the expeditionary force to escape, the majority of the Athenian troops, though in dire straits, agreed with Nicias in taking the lunar eclipse as an omen requiring a delay in their retreat (Th. 7.50.4). There is no reason to believe the Sicilian expedition was exceptional with regard to religion.

26

Athenian Polis Religion

a lesson of divine retribution for his opponent's impious inclinations. Lysias' purpose is not merely character assassination. By prosecuting a case of παρανόμων, Cinesias enjoys the status of defender of the laws of the polis. 25 Lysias points out to the jury the incongruity of impiety and defense of the laws, calling Cinesias άσεβέστατον απάντων

καί

παρανομώτατον ανθρώπων. Second, Lycurgus turned his prosecution of Leocrates on the charge of treason into a virtual case of impiety. By forsaking his country, Lycurgus argues, Leocrates forsook the gods of the polis and essentially turned their temples and precincts over to destruction (cf. esp. Lyc. 2, 8, 17, 25, 26, 129, 147). Furthermore, by forsaking his country Leocrates has, contends Lycurgus, broken the terms of his ephebic oath, thus committing perjury and impiety against the gods (Lyc. 76; cf. Dem. 19.70-71, Din. 1.47). In 330 Lycurgus gave the strongest statement ever made in Athenian literature of the identification of gods and polis. The-one piece of evidence attesting to a break in the otherwise consistent religious attitudes of the demos is an exception which proves the rule. In his account of the plague Thucydides claims that 'no fear of gods nor law of men restrained people, for seeing everyone dying equally they judged that being pious or not made no difference' (2.53.4).26 Thucydides' statement about this effect of the plague takes for granted that this was a departure from normal practice, when piety would not have been so readily dispensed with. 27 This outstanding edifice of communal religion and politics, built up over the course of centuries, did not, could not, crumble at the advent of some 25

For this status, cf. the claim attributed to Theocrines and other sycophants who prosecute cases of paranomon ([Dem.] 58.34): the prosecutor claims 'that he guards against those who propose illegal measures and that when graphai paranomon should be abolished, the democracy is undone'. Cf. Dem. 24.154, Aeschin. 3.191. 26 This statement is offered as an explanation of the ανομία in the city which the plague precipitated (2.53.1). The lapse in piety probably refers primarily to the corruption of pious funeral practices (2.52.2-4). In addition to the futility of all ανθρωπεία τέχνη, Thucydides notes the useless appeals to the gods (2.47.4). 27 Mikalson (1984) shows that Thucydides' comments concerning the effects of the plague on religion probably apply to no more than a few desperate weeks. Most religious activities continued as normal during the five-year grip of the disease on Athens. Afterwards religious activity was fully renewed.

Athenian Polis Religion

27

foreign sophists who were not attached to the religious convictions of Athenian citizens, not even though the sophists were active in Athens at about the same time as the Peloponnesian war, as the plague, and as a series of calamities seems to have struck Greece in general (cf. Th. 1.23.1-3). Not only did Athens herself, her democratic institutions, and her imperial ambitions survive the war, but so did her traditional religion. The cults and festivals were maintained throughout the war, at least so far as wartime conditions allowed.28 After the war the religion of fourth-century Athens is indistinguishable from that of the fifth century. J. D. Mikalson has amply demonstrated the continued vigor in the fourth century of values associated with traditional religion.29 The stand of the demos is clear throughout the war and afterward; it never wavered, but for the brief, stressful period of the plague, from devotion to its gods. The purpose of this brief survey has been to demonstrate the centrality, importance, and persistence of the religious institutions in classical Athens. The polis defined the field of behavior for religion (as it did for most forms of human activity in the classical period) that was sufficiently broad to encompass nearly every significant variety, yet was clearly recognized as the normal extent to which an individual's religious actions mattered. The polis was as much a religious unit as it was a unit for political, military, and economic activity. The religious institutions to which the citizen bore allegiance were ultimately regulated by the polis; the dissolution of a citizen's allegiance to these religious institutions was ultimately a dissolution of his allegiance to his polis. This allegiance, maintained by the Athenians throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, necessarily entailed on the part of individual Athenians certain beliefs about the gods. But what are the beliefs 28 For example, while the Spartans held the fort at Decelea, the Athenians made the annual procession to Eleusis by sea (Xen. H G 1.4.20). Some provision, no longer preserved, was made by the polis for the cult of Bendis in wartime, IG I 3 136.6 [=LSS 6]. The Athenians did interrupt the celebration of the Mysteries in 335 when they received the shocking news that Alexander had destroyed Thebes (Air. An. 1.10.2). 29 Mikalson (1983), esp. 110-118. However, Mikalson's assertion (p.106) of 'a remarkable homogeneity and consensus of religious beliefs' is largely a function of his limited choice of sources.

28

Athenian Polis Religion

which constitute the theological core of this allegiance? Eventually, we shall examine the Athenian evidence for these, but first we may consider the framework of religious doctrine proposed by Plato for the polis of the Laws. Plato serves not as a reporter of Athenian religious attitudes, but as an expert political scientist who was familiar with the problem of religion in the polis and whose approach we can, to some degree, imitate in dealing with Athens.

CHAPTER TWO

Plato, Laws 10: Fundamental Religious Beliefs and the Construction of the Pious Attitude

The account of the polis and its institutions in Plato's Laws constitutes the primary source for understanding the political and moral consequences of ancient Greek beliefs about the gods. The polis of the Laws is founded upon and pervaded by a somewhat purified, but generally traditional form of the public religion which would be found in any polis of the classical period. 1 The Athenian in the Laws is keenly sensitive to the nature and degree of the beliefs about the gods which the citizens of a polis must have in order to maintain the vigor or even viability of the institutions of the polis. Nowhere else in ancient Greek literature is this topic treated with anything approaching the detail and explicitness of the Laws. The Laws offers not an historical account of religious belief in poleis of the classical period, but a political model in which religious beliefs are an essential factor. The polis of the Laws is not an ideal polis like that set forth in the Republic.

The Athenian in the Laws explicitly rejects for his present

purposes that ideal; though the latter is the best conceivable polis, it is 1 Some of the differences between religion in Plato's polis and religion in Athens are discussed below, pp. 45-50.

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unrealizable - είτε που θεοί ή παίδες θεών αυτήν οίκοΰσι (Lg. 739d67). 2 The polis of the Laws is settled upon as second best (Lg. 739a-e). The polis of the Republic was meant to answer the purely philosophical need of portraying an ideal notion of justice (Rep. 368c-369a).

The

discussion of the Laws serves the practical need of devising laws which a newly founded polis might adopt (Lg. 702cd). In the Republic

Plato

studiously avoided both the making of laws (Rep. 425b-426b, 427a) and the role of religion (Rep. 427bc). The discussion in the Laws proceeds on the assumption that favorable circumstances can be attained (e.g. Lg. 735a7-736c4), but there is no question that the citizens are men as they are with their acquired habits and prejudices (Lg. 707e-708d, cf. 732e3733a4). Hence the grim necessity of laws and penalties in the face of human nature (Lg. 853b4-854a3, cf. 859b6-864c8). The polis of the Laws is based upon and aspires to the real world, and it takes religion seriously. Hence the fitness of taking the religion of the polis of the Laws as an analytical model for understanding the religion of Athens.3 It is not possible in this space to describe in detail the manifestations of religion in the polis of the Laws.4 A few general indications of the extent of the role of religion must suffice. The citizen body as a whole and in all its various subdivisions celebrates frequent and regular religious convocations 2 There is no doubt he is referring to the Republic through its distinction of carrying the principle of κ ο ι ν ά τ ά φίλων to the unique extent of women, children, and all property (Lg. 739c). For comprehensive arguments that the polis of the Republic was not put forward as a practical possibility, and that the polis of the Laws was intended to be realized in practice, see Guthrie (1962-1981) 4.483-486,5.332-335. 3 Reverdin (1945) 4: 'Mais que la religion de la cité des Lois soit celle d'Athènes repensée, interpretée, enrichie, voilà qui justifie l'espoir de trouver dans ce dialogue de précieux renseignements non seulement sur la pensée religieuse de son auteur, mais également sur la religion grecque en général.' Burkert (1985) 333: 'The Laws presents a state in which the realities of the Greek polis come much more to the foreground than in the earlier, Utopian project of the Republic. Though only second best in the eyes of the philosopher, the state of the Laws is filled to the brim with the manifold reality of what actually existed; it is the most comprehensive literary account of the Greek polis we have, including its religion.' Ibid. 335: 'An idealized Athens is shining through the alleged Cretan city of the Laws' 4 The details of the religion of this polis are summarized by Burkert (1985) 332-337 and studied more extensively by Reverdin (1945) and Morrow (1960) 399-499. My citations of the text for this subject are only a sampling; more could easily be added.

Plato, Laws 10

31

of various kinds (738d, 77 Id, 799ab, 828bc, 829b). Religious rituals are incorporated into the ordinary and extraordinary operations of all political, legal, economic, educational, and familial institutions. 5 Zeus is the patron god of the polis (πολιούχος); he and Athena are partners in the polis (κοινωνοί πολιτείας, 921c). There is an acropolis dedicated to Hestia (i.e. a hearth for the entire polis), Zeus, and Athena (745b). Delphi is the recognized authority for all religious questions (738bc, 759c). The twelve Olympian gods are the patron gods of the twelve tribes of the polis (745d). Hephaestus, Athena, and Ares are patron deities of craftsman guilds (920de). There are priesthoods of various kinds (759a-760a), and even manteis (828b, 871c). In addition to the temples and precincts of the major panhellenic gods, there are innumerable shrines of local divinities throughout the land (740a, 761c, 848d). Every household has its own sacred hearth (740b). The entire citizen body is divided into religious choruses (664cd). The sacred calendar contains a festival of some kind for every day of the year (828b). Rites include not only the Olympian or heavenly gods, but also chthonian gods, daemones, heroes, and familial ancestors (717ab, 740bc, 799a, 80le, 828c). The power of religion is also utilized to fulfill social needs.

It

encourages the unanimity of the citizen body through shared rites and frequent, dignified concourse (708c2-4, 738dl-e2, 771c7-e7). Religion enhances the acceptance, stability, or immutability of desired social policies. By lending its sanction to particular institutions, the authority of the gods ensures a reverence for tradition and abhorence of change. For example, to prevent decay or innovation in music and dance, the established standards are consecrated (καθιερόω) in a sacred calendar. Resistance encounters prosecution for impiety (798e4-799b8, cf. 816cl-d2). The Athenian also uses consecration to enforce a novel and absolute ban on homosexuality. This is the chief expedient to effect a severe reversal of existing values. 5 Political: 738d, 745d, 771bc, 842e, 941a, 945e-947a; legal: 767c, 856a, 865cd, 871c, 916c, 936e; economic: 778cd, 844e, 849a, 914ab; educational: 766b, 794ab, 796c; familial: 873d, 958d (funerals); 774b-d, 775a (marriage); 784a, 785a (children); 856de, 881d (other).

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Essentially the universally accepted divine sanction against incest is extended to include homosexuality (837e9-838el). Thus the gods of this polis are made constantly present, constantly alive to all the citizens. The religion is meant to be energetic and central to the lives of the citizens (716d6-e2): τφ μεν άγαθω θύειν καί προσομιλείν άεί τοις θεοις εύχαΐς καί άναθήμασιν καί συμπάση θεραπεία θεών κάλλιστον και άριστον καί άνυσιμώτατον προς τον εύδαίμονα βίον καί δή καί διαφερόντως πρέπον, τφ δε κακφ τούτων τάναντία πέφυκεν. 6 Having carefully constructed a constitution in which the functioning of all aspects of life in the polis depends so heavily on the allegiance of the citizens to their gods and cult, Plato devoted much effort to ensuring the persistence of that allegiance. By guaranteeing the rectitude of the beliefs about the gods among the citizens, Plato ensured both the efficacy of the institutions of the polis and the cohesion of the polis as a whole. In Plato's hands, theology becomes a department of political science. But this is only a reflection of the situation which had always prevailed for Greek poleis. The protection of religion in the polis of the Laws falls naturally under the law of impiety (ασέβεια), which is expressed at first in very broad terms: οσα δε λόγω καί οσα εργφ περί θεούς υβρίζει τις λέγων ή πράττων (885b2-3). This is rather unexciting and represents no advance over the understanding of impiety in Athenian law or elsewhere. The innovation devised by Plato for protecting against impiety is part of a larger innovation in his legislation in general. Just when he actually began the legislation for the new Cretan colony, the Athenian initiated a practice which he claimed was unique (718b5-723d4).7 Before all the laws, or at least all 6

In the first address to all the citizens (715e7-718a6,726al-734e2), which is taken as the preamble to the entire body of the laws (734e3-4, cf. 723b3-5), the Athenian begins by stating and justifying the principle of the priority of θεών τιμή (715e7-717b4). 7 The claim of uniqueness is at 722b4-c4. In Stobaeus two preambles can be found which are ascribed to the ancient lawgivers Zaleucus of Locri Epizephyrii (4.2.19) and

Plato, Laws 10

33

the important laws (723cl-d4), he will subjoin a preamble (προοίμιον). Taken over from the practice of putting preludes before the body of a musical composition (722c2-723b2), the preambles to the laws are designed to add persuasion to the compulsion carried in the penal part of the law. 8 The preamble renders the citizen more docile towards the end which the lawgiver has in view:

ϊ ν α γαρ ευμενώς, καί δια την εύμένειαν

εΰμαθεστερον, την έπίταξιν, ο δη έστιν ό νόμος, δέξηται ω τον νόμον ό νομοθέτης λέγει (723a4-6). 9 The preamble is meant to be a persuasive statement that will induce the citizen to comply with the terms of the law on his own, without regard to the sanction included in the law. Purely rational arguments demonstrating that what the law enjoins is best may be a part of the preamble.10 However, the appeal in the preamble can be to anything which is most likely to affect the citizen as agent. The preamble to the first version of the marriage law is an appeal based on the natural human desire for immortality to be achieved through procreation (721b6-d6). The preambles to the laws of murder and orphan care use popular tales recounting post mortem penalties for the breach of proper behavior (870d4-871al, 926e9-927dl). n Essentially the preamble aims at Charandas of Catane (4.2.24). These are interesting because they embody Platonic principles, especially in establishing firm belief in just, attentive gods, but they are certainly post-Platonic inventions. Diod. Sic. (12.20) reports the essence of the preamble ascribed to Zaleucus. Cicero (Leg. 2.14-16) knew both these preambles and innocently claimed that Plato was the imitator. It might be felt, however, that Solon's poems upon the occasion of his legislation formed something of a precedent. Furthermore, Plato refers to legal preambles in regard to his involvement with a revision of the laws of Syracuse (Ep. 3.316a). 8 πειθοί καί βία, 722b6; το πείθειν τε αμα και άπειλείν, 721el-2; τυραννικόν έπίταγμα ... τοΰτ' είναι νόμος ακρατος, το δέ ... πειστικόν, 722e7-723a4. Cf. Görgemanns (1960) 30-71. 9 For the purpose of the preambles in general, cf. 718c8-d7, 719e7-720a2, 721d7-e3, 722b4-c2, 722e7-723b2. At 720a2-e5 the Athenian uses an analogy from medicine. Freeborn physicians treat their free patients by explaining to the patient why he must do what is prescribed. Slave physicians merely offer prescription to their slave patients. The practice among the free is clearly more efficient and preferable. 10 E.g. the preambles to the second version of the marriage law (772e7-773e4) and to the law of injuries (874e8-875d5). The largest rational argument of the entire work forms part of the preamble to the law of impiety (discussed immediately below). 11 Cf. the vehement exhortation in the preamble to the law against temple-robbing, 854a5-c5.

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the psychological state of the citizen, for it is a means to directed action. In the first try at a preamble the Athenian states the law, then adds διανοηθέντα ώς ..., with the persuasive statement following (721b7). The participle in the accusative agrees with the subject of the clause containing the law, the citizen himself. He will do what the law enjoins if he bears in mind such and such. If the citizen believes the preamble, he will fulfill the terms of the law because of what he believes. The law and its sanction become otiose (cf. 822e4-823a6). Only if the preamble is rejected is the law really necessary (cf. 854c6-dl, 870e4-871al). By supplying the beliefs which suffice to bring about the action envisaged in the law, Plato has attempted to bridge the gap between belief and action. Plato's innovation for protecting against impiety lies in the preamble to the law of impiety. He first states the preamble succinctly thus (885b4-9): θεούς ηγούμενος είναι κατά νόμους ούδείς πώποτε ούτε έργον άσεβες ήργάσατο εκών ούτε λόγον άφήκεν άνομον, άλλα εν δή τι των τριών πάσχων, ή τούτο, οπερ είπον, ούχ ηγούμενος, ή το δεύτερον δντας ού φροντίζειν άνθρώπων, ή τρίτον

εύπαραμυθήτους

παραγόμενους.

είναι θ υ σ ί α ι ς τε καί

εύχαις

12

The three beliefs, therefore, which Plato posits as fundamental to the religion of the polis of the Laws are: 1) that the gods 'prescribed by law'13 exist, 2) that they take thought for men, and 3) that they cannot be appeased contrary to justice by sacrifices and prayers.14 The claim that no one who 12 This is introduced as the παραμύθιον to accompany the law (885b3), though it is later referred to as a προοίμιον (887a3, cl, 907d4). For the interchangeability of the two terms, cf. 720al, 773e5, 854a6, 880a6-8, 923c2-3. The three beliefs are set out in a similar negative form again at 888cl-7 and in positive form at 907b5-6. At Rep. 365d366b, the denial of any one of these three beliefs is said to provide the successful unjust man with encouragement. 13 An even stronger translation for κατά νόμους would be justified; cf. 890a6-7, b67. At 891e2 and 904a9-bl the gods are said to be κατά νόμον. 14 The qualification that the gods cannot be appeased 'contrary to justice' is added to the third belief at 885d3, 907b6. This qualification is crucial, and where it does not appear explicitly, it must be assumed.

Plato, Laws 10

35

believes these three assertions 'has ever voluntarily committed an impious act or uttered a lawless word' reveals the importance of this law and its preamble. On them depends not only the polis religion but also civil order (890a5-9). This preamble is so important that it can be considered the best preamble to all the laws (887b5-c2). For the most important thing for living well or not is thinking correctly about the gods (888b3-4). 15 The bulk of Book 10 is made up of an expansion of the succinct form of the preamble cited above. Plato has set out the three beliefs which are necessary and sufficient to ensure a pious, and therefore obedient, citizenry. But the three beliefs are not necessarily self-evident. Plato is aware that each belief is subject to denial by some class of men. The expansion of the preamble, a long, difficult but necessary task (886e6-887c4), consists of the attempt to deal with each religious belief separately and to persuade each class of dissidents that they are gravely mistaken.

The dissidents

themselves, speaking through the Athenian, ask for convincing evidence (τεκμήρια ικανά, 885d2-3, cf. 907b7) that each of the beliefs about the gods is true (885c5-e6). The dissidents are open to persuasion. They are in control of their faculties, but have erred mentally (άμαθία τις μ ά λ α χαλεπή, 886b7). Thus Plato is ruling out of consideration impiety due to incontinence (886a8-b2). What one believes is the sole issue. This is consistent with Plato's aim of establishing the expedient psychological basis for pious action. Before assessing the relation of Plato's three beliefs to the religion of Athens, it is worth reviewing the dissidents Plato envisages and the arguments he deploys against them. The first class of dissidents, who do not believe that the gods exist, are called οί νέοι καί σοφοί (886d2-3, cf. 888e8). They have an argument against the existence of the gods which asserts the priority of τύχη and φύσις over τέχνη (889a4-el). This argument goes on to assert that gods 15 The verb διανοεομαι is used for this preamble too to express the state of mind of the agent (888b4, 890a7), as was remarked above for 721b7. In the first succinct statement of the three beliefs quoted above, the verb ήγέομαι described the agent's state of mind. I see no significance in the use of one or another word for this purpose; the significant point is that Plato is constantly concerned with joining beliefs and action.

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are the product of τίνες νόμοι and are different in different places as νόμοι are different (889e3-890a2). The argument ends by asserting the Calliclean doctrine that might makes right (890a2-9). The rejection of the first fundamental belief obviously removes the divine sanction for morality: if gods do not exist, there can be no divine protection of the recognized standards of ethical behavior.

The response of the Athenian to this

argument, the proof that there are gods, is a long, complicated philosophical argument showing the ultimate priority of τέχνη and ψυχή (891b8-896c4) and the existence of a good soul or god directing the orderly movement of the heavenly bodies (896c5-899b9). It is impossible to say who if anyone in particular really proposed the argument put into the mouth of the atheistic dissident. Plato clearly envisions the radical atheism as stemming from a philosopher or scientist like Anaxagoras.16 But the scientific atheism is combined with the cynical atheism of the Sisyphus fragment and the amoralism of a Callicles. The combination of views is almost novel,17 and cannot be assigned to any one historical figure. The second class of dissidents, those who do not believe that the gods pay attention to men, do not derive their belief from a scientific position.18 In this case the theological error arises from the apparent prosperity of the wicked (899d8-900b3). This dissident believes that gods exist (899d7-8), yet is loth to hold the gods directly responsible for the prosperity of the wicked (900a6-7). The only escape from this inconcinnity (άλογία, 900a8) is the conclusion that the gods scorn and neglect human affairs (900bl-3). Here the apparent lack of a divine sanction for morality leads to 16 Cf. 886d4-e2, where the 'modern scientists' claim that the sun, moon, stars, and earth are not divine, but are earth and stones. Also, Anaxagoras is certainly alluded to later among those unnamed thinkers who are said to have incurred charges of άθεότης (967b4-dl). On the question of the identity of the radical atheists and the source of their argument, see Mahieu (1964). 17 Almost, because the conflation of atheism and amoralism in the Socrates of the Clouds offers something of a precedent. 18 However, Plato does claim that the impersonal forces of the atheistic scientists also eliminate the possibility of divine attention for men (886d8-el, 967a 1-5). This seems to leave open the possibility of calling the impersonal forces gods, but they would not be the gods 'prescribed by law', just because they are impersonal.

Plato, Laws 10

37

a rejection of the second fundamental belief. 19 The response to this form of dissent is twofold. In a second philosophical argument which follows directly from the previous one (900b6-cl), Plato shows that the gods care for small matters (i.e. human affairs) no less than for large (i.e. the cosmos, 900c9-903a3). The essence of this argument derives from the assertions of the first argument that 'the best soul takes care of the entire cosmos' (897c78) and that the '[cosmic] souls are good with respect to the whole of virtue' (899b5-6). The attention of the gods to human affairs follows from the perfect virtue of the gods in managing the entire cosmos. But, since in this case he is not speaking to scientists, the Athenian feels the need of 'some kind of fascinating tale' (έπφδοί μΰθοί τίνες, 903bl-2) to add to the philosophical argument. He makes a long speech directed personally to members of the second class of dissidents (903b4-905c7). This is not quite a myth like those at the end of the Gorgias and in Rep. 10, but it vividly stresses the fact that sinners do pay for their crimes, even if the penalty comes after death. The apparent prosperity of the wicked is a chimera; the divine sanction for morality is real. The third class of dissidents believes that the gods exist, that they pay attention to men, but that they can be seduced contrary to justice by the bribery (δώρα, 905d4) of sacrifices and prayers. Thus the divine sanction for morality is fatally weakened with Plato's third form of dissent. The Athenian offers no philosophical argument to combat this position. The address to this group of dissidents is in the same emotional, exhortative style as the 'fascinating tale' just mentioned (905d8-907a9, esp. 905e5906c6). The dissident is made to feel the absurdity of believing that the gods are worse guardians than dogs and shepherds. Plato's three beliefs are clearly designed to lead the citizens to act in the way he considered most desirable. The beliefs in question were just those which would most directly strengthen or enfeeble the religious actions of individual citizens. The fitness of applying or adapting these three beliefs to Athenian polis religion will be considered next. 19

This reasoning about the gods was ascribed to Thrasymachus, DK 85 Β 8.

CHAPTER

THREE

The Three Fundamental Beliefs of Athenian Polis Religion

3.1 The premises of the model of fundamental

beliefs

The three beliefs about the gods set forth by Plato were not intended to be the sum of all the religious beliefs his citizens might entertain. They were, rather, the beliefs which the citizens were obliged to maintain. In this sense they were like a creed. In addition to the impiety law requiring these beliefs, there was created a nocturnal council (νυκτερινός σύλλογος) charged with the task of defending just these three beliefs (909a, 961aff.). In the Athenian polis, religion persisted and functioned with neither a creed nor a specific group authoritative in religious matters and charged with preserving the faith.1 Some aspects of Athenian religion tended to diminish 1

The authority of certain groups, e.g. the priestly family of the Eumolpidae, would extend only over the cult which they supervised. At [Lys.] 6. 10 the Eumolpidae are mentioned because Andocides is a sinner against the Mysteries. When the Eumolpidae and Kerykes opposed the return of their enemy Alcibiades in 411, their wishes were disregarded (Th. 8.53.2). Dem. 22.27 is inconclusive; an offense against the Mysteries must be in Demosthenes' mind. The authority of the exalted priestly γένη was surely quite limited since they, along with appointed priests, were subject to the normal audit for public service (Aeschin. 3.18). Official religious interpreters (έξηγηταί) in fourth-

The premises of the model of fundamental beliefs

39

the possibility of real conflict over attitudes to the gods. Great variety of interpretation in one's belief about the gods must have been possible. To maintain a pious standing in the community one had essentially to acknowledge and perform the requisite ritual acts, which would include oaths and prayers, and display in general an overt concern for the gods. One would not have had to profess any beliefs about the gods at all to maintain a pious standing. Mere outward conformity to relatively loose standards of behavior and speech would suffice. Yet the very persistence and centrality of the religious institutions and cults of the polis in the lives of the citizens demands the presumption that the worshippers did have some beliefs about the gods and that the worship they performed made sense, that it was right and proper, with respect to the beliefs they held. One can infer from the religious institutions of the polis certain beliefs about the gods which at a minimum the worshipper must necessarily have held, if he were to believe that the ritual and accompanying prayers, to say nothing of his ethical conduct, had any

religious

significance. These are the beliefs about the gods which I am calling fundamental.

By 'necessarily' I mean necessarily with regard to the

worshipper's psychological motivation; i.e. if the worshipper believed in the religious significance of his religious actions and met even a minimal set of criteria for rationality, he would have to believe certain things about the gods, if only tacitly. 2 By 'religious significance' I am restricting my claims to those worshippers who were believers, those who believed that religion had something to do with the gods. Yet it is impossible to discover now what the number of such believers was in classical Athens. Hence, the fundamental beliefs are not intended to serve as a purely historical record of religious belief.

century Athens gave expert interpretation of ritual matters. I exclude from consideration such marginal groups as Pythagoreans and so-called Orphies. On the question of religious authority, see Garland (1984). 2 In the Laws Plato introduced his legal preambles to satisfy precisely this psychological necessity.

40

The Three Fundamental Beliefs

In order to identify fundamental religious beliefs in the absence of any direct record of such beliefs I have considered the following problem. The common religious institutions that dictated the forms of behavior enacted by individual Athenians in their dealings with the gods functioned only by virtue of a persistent allegiance of the individual Athenians to those institutions. What, then, is the minimal core of belief about the gods that would be necessary to maintain that allegiance, while admitting the necessary degree of variation among individuals? The same problem can be stated in other words. The religious beliefs held by an individual were not primarily a matter of public record nor a matter of public concern, although the individual's religious behavior was certainly both visible to the public and of public concern. Beliefs influence behavior; some beliefs determine behavior. If one could discover those beliefs about the gods that would be essential, if not necessarily sufficient in themselves, to produce the religious behavior we can in fact observe, then one would have identified a core of religious belief that could legitimately be called fundamental to religion in Athens. It is an historical fact that allegiance on the part of the Athenian citizens to their religious institutions persisted undiminished through the classical period. The fundamental beliefs are intended to serve as an historically valid, analytical model to account for this allegiance.3 The problem is both abstract and concrete. The allegiance to religious institutions and the religious behavior enacted as a result of that allegiance were concrete; to identify a core of belief that was necessary for such allegiance and behavior involves abstraction. Abstraction is required, and is in fact desirable, for another reason. The springs of action for individual Athenians were so numerous and varied, the sources of an individual's sense of allegiance so unintelligible, that it would be impossible to account 3 I have found just the following two statements which signal consideration of the idea of fundamental beliefs in Athens. Gernet et Boulanger (1932) 351: 'La négation formelle des dieux ... atteint le minimum de croyances nécessaires au culte civique lui-même.' Reverdin (1945) 213: 'Athènes prétendait empêcher ses citoyens et les métèques ou étrangers qui jouissaient de son hospitalité de professer sur les dieux des idées contraires à celles sur lesquelles reposaient les fondements religieux de l'État.' For a discussion of the usefulness of models in ancient history, see Finley (1985) 60-66.

The premises of the model of fundamental beliefs

41

for all of these influences, especially in view of the limits of the evidence. I have not attempted to ransack the sources that might reflect popular religious belief in order to compile a roster of beliefs which could be attributed to the average Athenian; such a method would itself involve abstraction and would not in any case answer the present need.4 For example, one will find very few assertions in such sources that the gods exist, simply because that was taken for granted by all. Hence, a crucial test for the fundamental beliefs I aim to identify is a negative one: could the religious behavior we can ascribe to individual Athenians have been performed in good faith if the individual consciously rejected a particular belief? Only if the answer is 'no' will such a belief be considered fundamental. For example, an individual could not worship the gods in good faith unless he believed that the gods exist. Thus, the method is reductive; I aim to reduce the stock of religious beliefs to a functional minimum. On the basis of evidence independent from Plato we can assert that Plato's first two beliefs in the Laws were fundamental to the functioning of religion in the Athenian polis. These are the beliefs that: 1) the gods exist, and 2) the gods pay attention to the affairs of men. It is not of course mere coincidence that the first two Platonic beliefs maintain their explanatory power for religion in Athens; these beliefs are integral to religious action in any form or place. Yet it is demonstrable that the third element of belief in Plato's scheme is not historically valid for classical Athens. A third fundamental belief, different from Plato's third belief, will follow in due course.5

4 E. g. Dover (1974) 246-268, Mikalson (1983). 5 In spite of the recognized importance of religion in the polis of the Laws, there has been little discussion of the relationship of the beliefs (as opposed to cults and institutions) of the religion of Plato's polis to the beliefs of Athenian polis religion. Dodds (1951) 207-235 discussed Plato's attempt to reform the decayed body of belief which he referred to as the Inherited Conglomerate (borrowing the term from Gilbert Murray).

42

The Three Fundamental Beliefs

3.2 The first belief: the gods exist

Είσίν οί θεοί. The necessity of the first belief is obvious. The genuine worshipper would have had to believe in the existence of the gods to whom his ritual was directed. 6 This fact was not lost on the Athenians. One can point to two passages in Aristophanes where the following reasoning is implicit·, if the gods do not exist, then religious actions are ineffective or pointless. This reasoning would hardly be automatic in an environment where it was unfamiliar. Yet in both passages the idea that the gods do not exist is brought up casually and without special preparation. The audience is expected to reason as above on its own in order to get the joke. At Knights 30 - 34 the slave Nicias suggests to his companion slave Demosthenes that they seek aid at an altar of some god. Demosthenes doubts the effectiveness of such a strategy and asks Nicias in a tone of mild surprise if he really believes the gods exist. For only on the premise that Nicias did believe in their existence, we must understand, would he have made that suggestion. (The joke arises from Nicias' certainty that the gods exist from the fact that he is θεοΐσιν έχθρός.) In the Thesmophoriazusae

one woman has complained of the effects of

Euripides' shabby portrayal of women (383-432). A second woman, who barely supports her family as a poor garland weaver, adds another complaint (443-456). In his tragedies Euripides has persuaded the men that the gods do not exist (450-451). The punch line follows immediately: her business has suffered tremendously (452), and so Euripides must be punished (453-454).

For the poor garland weaver the primary

consideration is business; the audience must understand that men who do

6

Cf. the vivid description of the attitude of genuine worshippers in Plato's first tirade against the atheists in Laws 10 (887c7-e7), especially how έν σπουδή τη μεγίστη ... ώς öti μάλιστα ουσιν θεοίς εύχαΐς προσδιαλεγομένους [sc. τους έσπουδακότας] καί ίκετείαις (887d7-e2). A similar point made by Aristotle in reference to dead ancestors would hold good for the gods (fr. 39 R.).

The gods pay attention to the affairs of men

43

not believe that the gods exist are not likely to bother with religious ritual, in this particular case, festivals or other rites where garlands are a necessity. 7

3.3 The second belief: men

the gods pay attention to the affairs of

Των α ν θ ρ ώ π ω ν φ ρ ο ν τ ί ζ ο υ σ ν ot θ ε ο ί . 8 T h e rationale of the s e c o n d belief is equally c o n s p i c u o u s :

g o d s w h o exist but take no notice of sacrifices

fulfilled or o f oaths forsworn, let alone of murders committed, are as g o o d in e f f e c t as no g o d s at all. 9 T w o areas of ritual in particular manifest the operation o f the s e c o n d fundamental belief. That the g o d s pay attention to the affairs o f m e n can be seen in the practice o f swearing oaths, a practice w h i c h w a s p e r v a s i v e both in the l i v e s o f individuals and in the o f f i c i a l b u s i n e s s o f the p o l i s . 1 0 e f f e c t , as w i t n e s s e s .

11

T h e g o d s named in the oath are s u m m o n e d , in Thus w h o e v e r took or received an oath in earnest

must have believed that the gods paid attention to the transaction. 1 2 W e can never really k n o w the extent to w h i c h the divine c o n s e q u e n c e s of perjury 7 At Nu. 423-426 Strepsiades also rejects traditional worship upon rejecting the traditional gods. But in this case the ground has been long prepared. 8 For the Greek, cf. Xen. Mem. 1.4.11, PI. Lg. 885b8, 888c5-6; with έπιμελεΐσθαι, cf. Xen. Smp. 4.46, 48, Mem. 1.4.14, 17, 18, PI. Lg. 907b5-6. 9 I.e. for the polis religion, which needed gods who noticed and responded to sacrifices, oaths, etc. I exempt from consideration here fourth-century philosophers who redefined the sort of attention, if any, paid by the gods to human affairs. 10 Cf. Lyc. 79: τό συνέχον την δημοκρατίαν δρκος εστί κτλ. Specifically e.g. archons: [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.5; jurors: Dem. 24.149-151; council members: see Rhodes (1972) 194; ephebes: Tod 2.204, Lyc. 76; private affairs of individuals: And. 1.126, Lys. 12.9-10, 32.13. Cf. the oath against tyrants taken by all Athenians in the decree of Demophantus of 410 (ap. And. 1.96-98), which eighty years later Lycurgus claimed still bound the Athenians (Lyc. 127); either the oath was repeated by each new generation or Lycurgus was claiming that the original oath held for later generations too. On oaths in general, see Plescia (1970). 11 E.g. μάρτυρες: Th. 2.71.4 (cf. 2.74.2-3), [Dem.] 48.11; ϊστορες: Tod 2.204.16 (the ephebic oath). 12 Oaths were often taken in places, such as in temples or at sacrificial altars, where the presence of the gods might be more forcibly felt by the jurant ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.5, Aeschin. 2.87, Din. 3.2, And. 1.97-98, 126, Is. 2.31, 12.9, [Dem.] 40.11). Plato even has Protagoras claim that he concludes negotiations with his students over fees by eliciting from them an oath in a temple (Prt. 328b5-c2)!

44

The Three Fundamental Beliefs

were slighted in classical Athens, though it was never acceptable to admit or encourage perjury in public. Even the perjurious policy of Lysander, who supposedly advised 'cheating children with dice, men with oaths' (Plu. Lys. 8.5), or Menon the Thessalian (Xen. An. 2.6.21-22, 25), depended on the widespread acceptance of oaths to be effective. The practice of divination, especially the consultation of oracles, also implies the presence of the second fundamental belief. Only on the premise that the god hears the question and delivers an appropriate response would the consultation of oracles make sense. The consultation of Delphi by individuals for personal reasons is well known.13 However, the polis as a whole consulted oracles for guidance in its affairs. On a crucial occasion, policy before Xerxes' invasion was ostensibly debated around the meaning of a Delphic oracle (Hdt. 7.140-143). But the oracles of Delphi and Dodona commonly furnished guidance for the proper regulation of technical matters in the polis religion, concerning such things as sacrifices, dedications, divine property, cult procedure, and the introduction of foreign cults. 14 The people of Athens clearly believed that the gods listened when they asked for advice.15 Any doubts about the seriousness of the appeal to oracles would have to be dispelled by the expensive, elaborate procedure, designed to ensure the integrity of the enquiry, which is part of a decree of 352/1 about the disposition of some sacred land in Eleusis (IG II2 204.2354 [=LSCG 32]). The elaborate procedure is justified 'in order that things concerning the two goddesses be as pious as possible and in the future no 13 E.g. Croesus, Hdt. 1.53-55; Chaerephon, PI. Ap. 21a; Xenophon, Xen. An. 3.1.57; cf. the requests of Creusa and Xuthus in Eur. Ion 302-306, 333-346,420-424. Cf. the catalogue of Delphic oracles in Fontenrose (1978) for this and other topics in oracular responses. 14 Sacrifices: Dem. 21.52, [Dem.] 43.66, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 54.6; dedications: Dem. 21.53, Hyp. Eux. 24-25, SEG 21.519 (mid 4th c„ a decree of the deme Acharnae), IG Il2 4969 (mid 4th c.); divine property: IG I 3 78.4-5 (=LSCG 5, late 5th c.), IG iP- 204 0=LSCG 32, 352/1); cult procedure: IG I 3 7.10-12 (=LSCG 15, mid 5th c.), IG I 3 137 (=LSS 8, late 5th c.); foreign cults: IG I 3 136.31 (=LSS 6.17, late 5th c.), IG Il2 1283.4-6 (=LSCG 46, 3rd c.; these lines refer to the original consultation of Dodona in the fifth century). 15 On θεοί έπήκοοι, see Versnel (1981) 26-37. Cf. Aesch. Eum. 297, and line 16 of the hymn to Demetrius Poliorcetes (Duris F Gr H 76 F 13 = Athen. 6.253e): [ ά λ λ ο ι θεοί] ούκ εχουσιν ωτα.

Plato's cosmic divinities vs. Athenian belief

45

impiety occur concerning the sacred precinct (όργάς) and the other sanctuaries in Athens' (lines 51-54).

3.4 The absolute justice of Plato's cosmic divinities vs. Athenian belief Plato's third fundamental belief, that the gods cannot be swayed by sacrifices and prayers contrary to justice, does not suit the religion of Athens for two reasons. These two reasons comprise the crucial differences between the religion of Athens and that of the polis of the Laws. First, we must distinguish between the philosophical understanding of the cosmic gods of Plato's polis and the gods of popular belief who sustain the religious institutions of the polis. In the argument against the scientific atheists Plato proved that the heavenly bodies which move themselves with perfect motion are in fact souls, or gods (Lg. 898d9-899b9). The subtleties of Plato's proof that gods exist (especially the vexed passage on the forms of motion, 893b6-894bl) 16 and the enlightened form of astronomy advocated by Plato (821a2-822c9) entail specialized knowledge. They make up an essential part of the education and knowledge of the lawguardians, thus distinguishing this group from the not-so-well-informed masses (966cl-d3). The citizens are, however, to learn enough about the gods of heaven (i.e. heavenly bodies) to enable them to avoid blasphemy and maintain piety in ritual (821c6-d4).17 But the important thing for the mass of citizens is not their knowledge, but their conformity to the laws (966c4-6). How is the piety of the mundane forms of worship related to and awakened by cosmic soul gods which only a philosopher-scientist could truly apprehend?

16

For an exposition of this passage, see Skemp (1942) 96-107. 17 This minimum of astronomical knowledge necessary for the average citizen and of relatively easy comprehension consists in understanding that the stars move not randomly but in regular orbits (821el-822c5).

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The Three Fundamental Beliefs

Plato's argument for the existence of the cosmic gods was offered in response solely to atheistic scientists. The Athenian also mentions ancient metrical and prose theogonies as a source of ignorance (886bl0-d2), but these accounts are dismissed from further consideration, for their antiquity renders them immune to criticism. 18 However, what Plato must have ultimately found objectionable in them, aside from the tales of father vs. son (886c6-7), was that they posited a πρώτη φύσις at the very beginning of things. The gods come afterwards (886c2-4). This error of making physis prior to the gods is shared with the scientific materialists, and would be refuted in the same argument which is aimed at them. No other source of disbelief in the existence of the gods is considered. Plato evidently felt there was no other cause of absolute atheism worthy of refutation; that is, there was no intellectual position which led anyone to disbelieve in the existence of the gods other than some form of scientific materialism. Plato's other two forms of dissent, the beliefs that the gods do not pay attention to men and that the gods can be seduced with bribes, have causes to which an average citizen might fall victim. To these two classes of dissidents Plato addressed exhortations, not philosophical arguments. There is also a significant disjunction in the terms used to speak of divinity in the philosophical part and the exhortative part of the preamble to the law of impiety. In the philosophical part the key term is ψυχή. This is what is shown to enjoy the ultimate priority of existence. Only at the very end of the argument is the soul which moves the heavenly bodies finally called θεός, and even here it is only a matter of adding a fitting appellation (899a9, cf. 899b3-9). In the exhortation to the second class of dissidents, the Athenian speaks of the chief god as ò πεττευτής (903d6)19 and ημών ò βασιλεύς (904a6). Gods in the plural are spoken of in the exhortations as 18 The older theogonies of Hesiod and Pherecydes could hardly have been absent from Crete, as 886bl0-l 1 would imply. So Plato must be thinking of more recent theogonies, perhaps versions of the 'Eudemian' Orphic theogony, composed, according to West, in late fifth-century Athens and known to Plato (West [1983] 116-119, 174-175). Circulating under the name of Orpheus these theogonies would naturally be called παλαιοί λόγοι (886c2, 6). 19 A leitmotiv throughout the work; cf. 644d7-9, 803c4-8, 804b3-4.

Plato's cosmic divinities vs. Athenian belief

47

άρχοντες (903b7, 905e2, 905e5ff.) and φύλακες (906d9ff.). These are the gods of the established religion, the gods 'prescribed by law', the gods of the polis, the gods known to the citizenry in mundane ritual and called Zeus, Athena, etc. Thus in Plato's polis there is no real correspondence between the cosmic gods and the gods of the established religion. 20 Plato has not even made the attempt to establish, for his own divinities, the sort of identity of polis and religion which resulted from the historical development of the polis. For all their vulnerability to scientifically based attacks, when the traditional gods were acknowledged, they provided a powerful base of communal feeling. They had personalities. If they were not objects of love, they were objects of loyalty. They provided the citizen with a personal object in worship. Plato's cosmic gods certainly cannot provide this, although it must be admitted that the religion of Plato's polis preserves from traditional polis religion as much of the traditional forms, feelings, and experiences as is consonant with the standard of morality demanded by Plato. The second problem for us in the formulation of Plato's third fundamental belief is the patent belief among Athenians that the gods did respond to sacrifices and prayers without strict regard for justice.

To

combat the basest manifestations of a belief in the venality of the gods Plato introduced what can count as his single true innovation from traditional polis religion. The law of impiety, when it is finally stated (Lg. 907d7909d2), does not contain a definition of what is to count as impiety, nor a list of categories or examples of infractions of religious law. Evidently 'hybris with regard to the gods in word or deed' (885b2-3, cf. 907d7-el) is specific enough. In addition to procedure, the law is concerned with setting penalties for impiety, which are determined strictly with regard to the 20 Solmsen (1942) 161-174, well aware of the difficulty of this problem, offered an instructive, but ultimately inadequate response. He claimed that 'Law' (his capital), as common attribute of the cosmos and the state, supplied the 'organic connection' (p. 163). But the concept of "Law' that Solmsen develops is every bit as esoteric as the scientific understanding of the cosmos. Dodds (1951) 220-221 recognized that Plato's cosmic gods were irreconcilable with traditional religion.

48

The Three Fundamental Beliefs

cause. 2 1

There are six possible causes.

For each of Plato's three

fundamental beliefs, there are two types of disbeliever (making six causes); viz. those who fail to believe but because of good character commit no further serious injustice, and those who fail to believe and through weak character cause much harm (908a7-d7).

The latter may themselves

disbelieve any one of the three fundamental beliefs (909a8-bl), but the harm they cause springs from their exploitation of the belief among the citizenry that the gods can be appeased (909b2-6), that is, a lapse of Plato's third fundamental belief. Plato was aware how the weakness of human nature rendered individuals liable to certain types of religious activity which are primarily based on a belief in the venality of the gods (909e5-910b3). To combat the 'illegal trade in religion' (909d6) Plato adds a rider to the law of impiety, the one passage where he specifies a type of behavior, as opposed to thought, as impious. This rider eliminates the right to own shrines in private dwellings and enjoins the obligation that all worship be done at public shrines with the presence and aid of the official priests and priestesses (909d7-e2,910b8-d4). The purpose of the rider is to eliminate the religious activity which was primarily motivated by the rejection of his third fundamental belief. 22 The type of worship Plato has in mind includes private dedications, curse tablets, rites of communication with the dead, various initiation rites of Greek or foreign origin, the use of charms, incantations, etc. 23 The invariable aim was to influence the deity for some personal or private end which was not conceived, it goes without saying, with regard to justice. This type of religious activity, often bordering on 21

For the structure of this law, see Wyller (1957). Wyller omits consideration of the important rider which immediately follows the law proper. 22 In spite of the strong wording of this rider, it cannot be taken to be applicable to the officially sanctioned family cults and hearths which each of the 5040 households is to have. Family cults and hearths are part of the polis religion; the household makes up the smallest unit of the political structure (cf. 740a). Plato makes it clear that the rider to the impiety law refers only to the intemperate practitioners of false religion, those of bad character (909d3-7). Cf. Gernet (1951) cxcv. 23 Cf. Lg. 909b2-5, 933d7-e4, Rep. 364b5-365a3; Corp. Hipp. Morb. Sacr. 1.10-46 Grensemann.

Plato's cosmic divinities vs. Athenian belief

49

superstition and magic, was commonly practised in Athens. Though some of these practices were less respectable than others, they were by no means restricted to the lower class of Athenians.24 Furthermore, a strict interpretation of Plato's third belief, that the gods cannot be seduced contrary to justice by sacrifice and prayer, would not only eliminate the practitioners of private religion, but might seem to endanger the public cults of the polis. The religious officials in the superior polis of the Laws might hope to avoid tainting their polis with a mercenary interest in making public sacrifices, but this could hardly have obtained in Athens. It must be doubted whether many public sacrifices and dedications in Athens were offered with anything nobler than a conscious notion of fulfilling self-interest.25 The situation in Athens was simply not so neat as Plato would have it in his polis. It is inaccurate to obliterate distinctions among the various conceptions of the gods implicit in the various forms of worship in Athens. The private worship banned in Plato's polis was indeed generally tolerated in Athens. At least once, however, the Athenians executed a practitioner of that craft. 26 Demosthenes' report of Aeschines' involvement with this sort of private religion was obviously intended to move the jury against Aeschines (Dem. 18.259-260). Furthermore, a noble conception of the gods, whether on the Parthenon frieze, in a lofty sentiment uttered by a tragic actor on the platform provided by the polis for the festival of Dionysus, or in an orator's appeal in the polis' court to the divine vigilance of justice (e.g. Dem. 23.74), represents an undeniable part of the religion of the Athenian polis. Where the Athenian polis religion contained these contradictory elements quite practically, Plato saw decay. In an excursus analyzing the greatness 24 Cf. Nilsson (1967) 795-804, Burkert (1982) 4-12. 25 A rhetorical commonplace of fourth-century Athens attributed the prosperity of earlier generations to their ευσέβεια: Lys. 30.18, Isoc. 7.29-30, Dem. 3.26. 26 The same Ninos who was cited above (Josephus Ap. 2.267) for introducing foreign gods, Dem. 19.281 and schol. ad loc. This case seems to have achieved some notoriety (cf. Dem. 39.2, [Dem.] 40.9), and may have been unique in the extreme punishment; however, the mantis Theoris may have been executed on a similar charge (Philochorus FGrH 328 F 60, [Dem.] 25.79-80, Plu. Dem. 14.6). Private worship could be seen as a form of new rites (cf. Lg. 909e3-5).

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The Three Fundamental Beliefs

and decline of Athens (Lg. 698aff.), Plato attributed the excellence of the days of Marathon and Salamis to the fact that τρόπον τινά εκών [sc. ò δήμος] έδούλευε τοις νόμοις (700a4-5). A decline in this 'voluntary slavery' (which began with a disregard of the laws of music) led to the final state of decay: [τους Αθηναίους] τψ τέλει όρκων καί πίστεων καί το παράπαν θεών μή φροντίζειν (701cl-2, cf. 762el-7). This statement of a religious breakdown among Athenians is belied by the evidence of Athenian religion itself. 27 But the absolute, attentive justice of the gods posited by Plato and a stern, unyielding belief in that justice were clearly beyond the norms of thought in the religion of Athens (cf. Lg. 885d4-el). Plato's demand that all citizens believe in the unremitting justice of the gods is thus an unrealistically severe standard to apply to Athens. The gods for Plato were always just, never changing; hence men always had to approach them and expect their reaction according to the same, unchanging just order. In Athens the conception of the gods was to some degree shifting and variable from person to person, even with the same person from occasion to occasion.

3.5 The third belief: reciprocity between men and gods The first two fundamental beliefs are not alone sufficient to provide a secure psychological basis for worshippers to maintain their allegiance to the religious institutions of Athens. What is needed is a third belief which gives the Athenian worshipper reason to expect the gods to react to his prayers, sacrifices, dedications, etc.; yet this belief must not be so morally and 27 The atheistic 'modem scientists' of Laws 10 are not contemporary with Plato (νυν, 886e4), but merely more recent than the αρχαίοι (886dl) and παλαιότατοι (886c2). Nor should we believe they are πάμπολλοι (886e4), because Clinias, who says this, does not know the first thing about them. We must finally dispense with such romantic views of a crise de foi engulfing Athens, whether placed at the end of the fifth century or in the fourth, as that expressed by Sandvoss (1968) 317: 'Eine unsichtbare, unheimliche Krankheit, viel schlimmer als einst die Pest, hatte die erste Polis der Griechen in einen armseligen, hoffnungslosen Zustand versetzt.' Such views are still popular in handbooks; cf. e.g. Muir (1985).

Reciprocity between men and gods

51

intellectually demanding as Plato's third belief. Hence, we assert that, as the third and final belief fundamental to the functioning of religion in Athens, Athenian worshippers believed that 3) between men and gods there exists a relationship which, however unequal, is reciprocal. 28 This belief, perhaps the most important, is also the most difficult to delimit. It has been consciously phrased to allow a wide margin of interpretation, or rather, to accommodate the requisite degree of religious variety in Athens. At bottom, however, as will be demonstrated below, religious activity of all sorts in Athens presumed divine reciprocation. The third fundamental belief of the Laws amounts to a specific and rather stringent form of the open-ended reciprocity which is asserted to hold for Athens. The following example from the use of oaths in procedural law illustrates the contrast between the harsh, clear-cut standard demanded by Plato in the Laws and the belief in a basic if untidy working relationship with the gods which prevailed in Athenian polis religion. When Plato considered the role of oaths in the legal system of the polis of the Laws, he first mentioned that long ago Rhadamanthys could dispense with juries and decide cases purely with a challenge of oaths. Since all men at that time believed strongly (έναργώς) in the gods, 29 no one would dare peijure himself (Lg. 948b3-c2). But the widespread disbelief among people of his day (νΰν δέ, 948c2) in one or another of his three beliefs has rendered the method of Rhadamanthys obsolete (948c2-dl). The denial of any one of these beliefs would remove the fear of divine sanction for perjury. Plato was appalled that in a city where there are so many lawsuits (Athens, of course) nearly half the citizens would have to be perjurers, and all these peijurers would be circulating freely (948d8-e4). Plato's solution was to drop the challenge of oaths wherever one could conceivably profit 28

A Greek version of this belief can conveniently be formulated on the basis of a parenthetical remark in another, unrelated context in Plato (cf. Smp. 188b): περί θεούς τε καί ανθρώπους προς αλλήλους κοινωνία τίς έστι. The three beliefs naturally form a hierarchy: the second belief implies the first, and the third implies the second and first. 29 For most of them were children of the gods. Plato has resurrected an argument he had Socrates use against Meletus (Ap. 27b3-28al).

52

The Three Fundamental Beliefs

from perjury (948d3-8, 948e4-949b6).30 It seems strange that Plato says 'since the opinions among men about the gods have changed, so must the laws change' (948dl-3). Plato must have had Athens on his mind when writing this passage, for in his polis men were to believe his three beliefs, and thus the conditions for an effective sanction for peijury were to be met. The legal system in fourth-century Athens incorporated oath-taking by having both plaintiff and defendant enter preliminary oaths (άντωμοσίαι) prior to trial in the άνάκρισις. 31 This meant that for every trial there had to be at least one perjurer. The Athenians could hardly be unaware of this dangerous proliferation of perjury. One party to a lawsuit might warn the jury against believing the opponent's oath because of a record of impiety or peijury, for the challenge of oaths itself would be unfair if one party was willing to perjure himself ([Dem.] 49.65-67, Dem. 54.38-40, Is. 9.19). Yet the institution throve. It was publicly asserted that the gods attended to the terms of the oath and would punish peijurers in some significant way ([Dem.] 11.2, And. 1.126, Isoc. 18.3). Some went so far as to assert the omniscience of the gods in order to support the efficacy of oaths (Dem. 19.239-240 [cf. 71], Lyc. 79, 146, cf. Xen. An. 2.5.7). Furthermore, the procedure for preliminary oaths for homicide trials on the Areopagus (specified as διωμοσίαι) was extraordinary - ούδε τον τυχόντα τιν' ορκον τούτον (Dem. 23.68). The accuser stands over the entrails of a pig, a ram, and a bull, which have been slaughtered in accordance with minute regulations by the proper functionaries, and utters explicit imprecations on himself and his household (Dem. 23.67-68). The awe which arises from this elaborate procedure could not ensure the absolute efficacy of the oath, yet it went some way towards maintaining its usefulness. 32 30 This actually eliminates only the use of preliminary oaths in the άνάκρισις and possibly the evidentiary oaths in a challenge (πρόκλησις). The innumerable other uses of oaths in the polis are unaffected. Cf. Gernet (1951) cxliv-cxlv. 3 1 Harrison (1971) 99-100. 32 The sycophant Stephanus was accused of perjuring himself in this particular oath, [Dem.] 59.10. Demosthenes indulges in the detailed description of this oath procedure in order to impress on the jury the seriousness of the loss should the decree of his opponent

Reciprocity between men and gods

53

The belief that the gods react to men on the basis of some form of a reciprocal relationship does not at all exclude the irrational element from the divine, or make the gods easily intelligible or entirely predictable. It rather excludes the possibility that the gods are utterly irrational, unintelligible, or unpredictable. The relationship of reciprocity may be uneven, unequal, or uncertain, but for the worshipper it must fundamentally exist.

The

formulation of the third belief constitutes a minimum level of intelligibility of the world which any religion must offer its adherents if the religion is to persist. 33 Some basis, rule, or pattern, however tenuous, for maintaining continuity in the relationship with the gods was necessary for polis life to continue. The polis religion comprised a way of life which included continuity and regularity. The force of ancestral custom (πάτριοι νόμοι, τα πάτρια, τα νομιζόμενα) in cult required the belief that the gods and their worshippers maintained an enduring, orderly relationship.

In

accordance with ancestral custom (κατά τα πάτρια) was the accepted way of executing religious duties.34 When the Athenians from Attica came into the city in 431, they were upset at having to dispense with their ancestral religious practices (Th. 2.16.2: Ιερά πάτρια). Departure from ancestral custom in offering sacrifices caused the Eumolpid priest Archias to be convicted on the charge of impiety ([Dem.] 59.116-117: θύοντα παρά τα πάτρια).

Apollodorus could claim that Stephanus and Neaera were

άσεβεις for their disruption of ancestral custom in the rites of the kingarchon's wife ([Dem.] 59.73:

τα πάτρια τα προς τους θεούς).

Apollodorus enhances the seriousness of his charge with an excursus on the antiquity and solemnity of ancestral customs ([Dem.] 59.72-79; cf. Lys. 30.17-21).

Aristocrates be judged legal. The lamentable result would permit this awesome oath to be circumvented. 33 Cf. Gould (1985) 1-5. 34 IG I 3 7.8 (= LSCG 15, mid 5th c.), IG I 3 78.4, 11, 34 (=LSCG 5, late 5th c.), 1G 112 780 (mid 3rd c.), Isoc. 7.29-30, Dem. 21.51, 54. Thucydides obscured the religious aspects of the πάτριος νόμος of the funeral for the polis' war-dead; cf. Pl. Menex. 249b, Dem. 60.36, Jacoby (1944) 60.

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The Three Fundamental Beliefs

The most basic form of reciprocity is the do ut des basis of humandivine interaction which is particularly evident in the three primary acts of Greek worship: sacrifice, prayer, and the votive offering. 35 The polis as a whole enjoyed a reciprocal relationship with its gods, a large version of the do ut des form of reciprocity. If this relationship may have been imperiled at times (as during the plague at Athens), it nevertheless persisted so long as the polis maintained its traditional cults and religious institutions.36 This relationship of the polis with its gods is strikingly represented in Aeschylus' Septem.

Normally called πολισσοΰχοι (69, 185, 271) or πολιούχοι

(109, 312, 822), the gods of the polis are also called πολιται (253) and appealed to as φιλοπόλεις (176).37 Eteocles claims that news of the danger to the polis is of common concern to the gods because of the reciprocal relationship (76-77):

ξυνά δ ' έλπίζω λέγειν, / πόλις γαρ ευ

πράσσουσα δαίμονας τίει. The great prayers of the despondent chorus are based on the care of the gods for the polis whose cult has been so constant (esp. 174-180, 304-320). If in ancient Athens the Athenians believed the gods, like citizens, had any obligation, let alone loyalty, to the polis in proportion to the degree of consistency and care in executing and preserving the gods' cult, then the third fundamental belief had to be present. It is worth noting that the sense of reciprocity in those 'private' forms of worship banned by Plato is very strong, though the reciprocity is of a purely mercenary kind. Yet the notion of reciprocity among Athenian worshippers could rise beyond a mercantile sense based on the external forms of pious ritual. For example, the understanding of ευσέβεια could be redefined to stress the worshipper's inner motivation rather than outward display, but this sentiment was surely restricted to the more enlightened 35 On the relationship of exchange in prayer, see Ausfeld (1903) 525-531, in votive offerings, see van Straten (1981) esp. 65-77, and below pp. 102-106. The exceptions prove the rule. Gods without a cult are those with whom men can enjoy no reciprocity: the deified θ ά ν α τ ο ς (Aesch. F 161 Radt) and 'Ανάγκη (Eur. Ale. 973-975). 36 Cf. Solmsen (1942) 3-14, Mikalson (1983) 18. 37 Cf. the elaborate summons of the native Athenian gods in Din. 1.64, and, with less elaboration, Dem. 18.141.

Reciprocity between men and gods

55

few. 38 More relevant is the belief in a divine sanction for moral laws, for this is made possible, though not inevitably required, by the degree of expectation or predictability involved in any relationship of reciprocity. In fact, without any one of the three Athenian fundamental beliefs, the divine sanction collapses: neither utterly capricious gods, nor inattentive gods, any more than no gods, can present a credible, likely threat of punishment for transgressing moral laws. 39 There is little evidence to demonstrate the widespread, popular acceptance of a comprehensive divine sanction for morality in the classical period; thus we are not arguing here from such a divine sanction to the fundamental beliefs. Yet the idea of a divine sanction did have some currency, despite both the frequently amoral gods of myth and the harsh facts of real life. 40 The complex Aeschylean version of the justice of Zeus may have been too obscure for many to grasp. But much of the force of the atheistic fragment from the Sisyphus play is lost, if people did not fear the sanction the gods gave to ν ό μ ο ι . 4 1

According to

Thucydides, Nicias in Sicily in 413 could announce his expectation of divine favor in return for his fulfillment of pious ritual and moral righteousness

(Th. 7.77.2-3). 42 The speaker of [Lys.] 6 demanded that

people not see Andocides, the doer of εργα ανόσια, go unpunished, lest their beliefs about the gods be dangerously eroded (literally, lest they become άθεωτέρους, 32). So far, then, as a belief in a divine sanction for

58 Xen. Mem. 1.3.3, An. 5.7.32, Ages. 11.2; [Pl.] Ale. 2.148d-150b; Isoc. 2.20; Theopompus FGrH 115 F 344; Theophr. de Pietate, esp. frr. 7-10 Pötscher. 39 Plato's insistence in the Laws on strict justice as the only form of reciprocity covers the gap between his own unfailing, inescapable divine moral sanction and the weaker, amorphous, yet not inconsiderable sanction observed elsewhere among Athenians. 40 On the conflict with the amoral gods of myth, see Burkert (1985) 246-250. It is worth recalling that myth and religion are separate, incongruent entities; cf. the words of the pious moralist Solon (fr. 29 West): πολλά ψεύδονται αοιδοί (the position of Theseus, HF 1315, αοιδών είπερ οΰ ψευδείς λόγοι, is discussed below, p. 159). On the conflict with the facts of life, see Dover (1974) 259-261. The Delphic oracle actively encouraged the notion of a divine sanction for moral laws; cf. Parke and Wormell (1956) 1.378-392. 41 TrGF 1.43 F 19, esp. lines 37-40. Cf. Isocrates' praise for the piety of the Egyptians, who have a strong belief in divine moral sanctions (Isoc. 11.24-27). 42 Cf. the Melians, Th. 5.104, and Isoc. 15.281-282.

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The Three Fundamental Beliefs

morality was accepted, even if its scope was limited, 43 the three fundamental beliefs were essential. Two texts from Athens explicitly corroborate the scheme of three beliefs presented here. First, in the view of the fragment from the Sisyphus play (TrGF

1.43 F 19) the gods were invented by a clever man to control the

criminal behavior of mankind. The divine moral sanction is the sole concern; religious ritual is ignored. The three fundamental beliefs, and only these beliefs, are incorporated to comprise the necessary and sufficient store of belief to produce the sanction: the gods exist (17,42); they pay attention to human affairs (18-24); they can be expected to react, causing fear of transgression (13-14, 37). However, divine reciprocation is even here presented as broader than mere punishment: the gods were located in heaven to encourage the notion that divine reciprocation can bring both good and evil (27-36). Second, in three lines of the Athenian hymn to the deified Demetrius Poliorcetes certain unnamed gods who have failed Athens are referred to. The respects in which these gods have failed the Athenians are mentioned and these correspond, inversely, to the three fundamental beliefs (Duris FGrH 76 F 13.15-17 = Athen. 253e): άλλον μεν ή μακράν γαρ άπέχουσιν θεοί,

15

ή ούκ εχουσιν ώτα, ή ούκ είσίν, ή οΰ προσέχουσιν ήμιν ούδε εν. Either these other gods do not exist (ούκ είσίν), or they do not pay attention (ούκ εχουσιν ώτα, ού προσέχουσιν), or they are aloof (μακράν άπέχουσιν), which I take to be equivalent to a lack of response to human initiative.44 43

E.g. to the moral laws protecting suppliants, strangers, and parents, and to furnishing a guarantee of oaths. Eur. fr. 644 N. expresses a thought similar to that expressed in [Lys.] 6.32. 44 In the absence of any explicit indication of the date, scholars generally accept 291/0 (defended by Bergk PLG 3.674). But the hymn fits best in 307, when Demetrius first arrived in Athens as 'liberator'; he was then recognized as a god (with Antigonus as σωτήρες θεοί, Plu. Demetr. 10.4-6; cf. Diod. Sic. 20.46.2) and showered with excessive adulation (Plu. Demetr. 11.1, 12.1-3, 13). Immediately preceding the hymn itself,

Reciprocity between men and gods

57

The fundamental beliefs through which the religion of the polis could function were necessarily shared by all genuine worshippers, as opposed to beliefs which, whatever their prescriptive connotations, were not strictly speaking necessary for the genuine worshipper to hold. The fundamental beliefs are the minimum set of beliefs if the religious acts of the polis and the individual citizens were to have religious meaning; these beliefs were the minimum needed to support the religion of the polis in general. It is always possible in any given group to find an individual for whom the above beliefs would not hold. 45 It would also have been possible for a heterodox thinker to conceal his heterodox thoughts and conform to the community outwardly in order to maintain his social position.

But the three

fundamental beliefs should be accepted in order to account for the religious behavior of the mass of Athenians, even though we have scant direct record of the beliefs of the masses. The educated elite in Athens no doubt presents a more complicated picture. However, Sophocles, Nicias, and Xenophon represent types of religious men among the educated elite. 46 The polis was a joint venture of all of its citizens, and the religious institutions of the polis, apart from which the polis was unthinkable, would persist only so long as the mass of citizens, the demos, believed in them. 47 In fact, the persistence of the polis religion is inconceivable without the bulk of the community Athenaeus quotes an account by Demochares in which the point about 'the other gods' is paraphrased (FGrH 75 F 2 = Athen. 253c-d): oí δ' ά λ λ ο ι [θεοί] καθεύδουσιν ή άποδημοΰσιν ή ούκ είσίν. This statement is equivalent to the rejection of (in order) the second belief, the third belief, the first belief. Even granting a role to motives of political expediency in the production of the hymn, it remains significant that the scepticism, honest or feigned, is expressed in terms which imply the rejection of the three beliefs. 45 E.g. Aristodemus the dwarf, who, believing that gods exist but have no concern for men, does not worship them (Xen. Mem. 1.4). Corp. Hipp. Morb. Sacr. 1.30 Grensemann distinguishes between disbelief in the existence of the gods and disbelief in the power of the gods. 46 Nilsson (1967) 784-785 on Nicias, 787-791 on Xenophon. As a frequent holder of prestigious public offices (TrGF 4.T 18-27), Sophocles must have been pious in a conventional way (cf. vita Sophoclis 12). It would be anachronistic to view Sophocles' involvement with the cult of Asclepius (TrGF 4.T 67-73) as unconventional. 47 Cf. the Greek expression for citizenship: της πολιτείας μετέχειν; Dodds (1951) 191: 'religion was a collective responsibility'. For this reason alone, Athenian polis religion is not comparable to the institutionalized state churches of modern nations, such as those of England and Sweden.

58

The Three Fundamental Beliefs

acquiescing, wittingly or not, in these beliefs. Without these beliefs the polis religion could endure only by means of a universal agreement to conduct an ongoing farce. There was no other group to sustain the institutions in the face of mass abnegation.

CHAPTER

FOUR

Nonconformity: Socrates and Anaxagoras

In the section of his defense where Socrates discusses the origin of the slanders of long standing against him, he mentions three stock charges which are hurled at all who engage in philosophy (PI. Ap. 23d). The three items are all matters of teaching: teaching about celestial and subterranean phenomena, teaching [people] to reject gods, and teaching how to make the weaker argument the stronger (23d5-7). 1 Earlier Socrates had said that people commonly believe that those who investigate celestial and subterranean phenomena and who make the weaker argument the stronger also reject the gods (18b4-c3). We infer from Socrates' statements that some men - they could be called σοφοί, σοφισταί or φιλόσοφοι - were perceived to promulgate doctrines which in some unclear way were judged inimical to traditional attitudes towards the gods and that a rather imprecise level of resentment was commonly aroused in Athenian society against these men. Yet the inference from Socrates' statements about the stock charges against philosophers is so vague that it offers little help in answering 1 Syntactically they depend on the participle διδάσκων, 23d3. The dichotomy in the charge between 'celestial and subterranean' reflects the traditional division of Olympian and chthonian gods, as e.g. Aesch. Ag. 89, PI. Lg. 717ab, 828c. The meaning of θεούς μή νομίζειν will be discussed below.

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Nonconformity

important questions, such as what doctrines would arouse resentment, on the part of whom, and why. Because of the paucity of evidence we shall be hard pressed to improve a great deal on the vague, but safe inference from Socrates' discussion of stock charges. We may begin with the observation that reliable expressions of unqualified atheism, i.e. a straightforward belief that the gods do not exist, are very rare throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.2 Even the hypercritical Plato assailed only esoteric scientists in Laws 10 for disbelieving in the existence of the gods. Religious dissent among the populace was a problem for Plato only with his second and third beliefs, both of which admit the existence of the gods. Nor does it appear that the mere promulgation of an atheistic belief was ever a matter of public concern in Athens during this period. Protagoras, strictly speaking an agnostic, not an atheist (DK 80 Β 4), seems to have been genuinely esteemed, not of course because of the agnosticism, but in spite of it.3 He recognized (as did Plato) that, however he personally viewed the gods, the social organization of the polis required a functioning religion.4 Thus, Protagoras must have behaved in public in conformity with this recognition, and not flouted public religion on the basis of agnosticism. The impiety of Diagoras of Melos, who in later centuries became notorious for atheism, did not rest on a publicly or privately expressed 2

Aside from discussion in Plato, there are only Prodicus {P. Here. 1428 fr. 19; see Henrichs [1975], [1976a]) and two passages from drama, Eur. fr. 286 N. (Bellerophontes) and the Sisyphus fragment (TrGF 1.43 F 19). For evaluating the testimony of ancient atheism, cf. the admonitory remarks of Winiarczyk (1981) xi-xiii. 3 For Protagorean doctrine in the myth in Plato's dialogue, see Müller (1967). There are two other pieces of good fourth-century evidence attesting to Protagoras' excellent popular standing in Athens. First, Protagoras was entrusted with the sensitive task of framing laws for the new colony at Thurii (Heraclides Ponticus fr. 150 Wehrli = Diog. Laert. 9.50). In this task Protagoras was associated with the respectable Athenian diviner Lampón (discussed below). Second, as noted by Dover (1975) 34, Socrates' retort to the notorious anti-sophist Anytus that Protagoras enjoyed an excellent reputation would make no sense if it were not true (PI. Meno 91b-92a). This evidence far outweighs the report in satiric verses of the third-century philosopher Timon of Phlius (ap. Sext. Emp. Math. 9.56 = DK 80 A 12) that the Athenians wanted to burn Protagoras' books because of the agnosticism; see Dover (1975) 34-37. 4 Cf. Pl. Prt. 324d-325a, where Protagoras acknowledges piety, along with justice and self-restraint, as a part of the essential civic virtue.

Nonconformity

61

belief that the gods do not exist, but was purely a matter of transgression against cult.5 Diagoras certainly achieved among Athenians a reputation for impiety during his lifetime. Aristophanes could bank on this reputation in 423 with his reference to 'Socrates the Melian' (Nu. 830). In 400/399 the speaker of [Lys.] 6, prosecuting Andocides for impiety, uses Diagoras as a standard of impiety which has been surpassed by Andocides (§ 17). In early 414, in Ar. Av., mention is made of a decree which put a price of one talent on Diagoras' head (1072-1074). The scholia to Ar. Av. 1073 record part of the decree verbatim, and claim that the reason for the decree was that Diagoras had belittled the Eleusinian Mysteries and turned people away from them.

The account in the scholia to Ar. Av. 1073 renders the

reference to Diagoras in [Lys.] 6 perfectly intelligible.

Diagoras is

mentioned there because, in addition to Andocides, he too was guilty of impiety against the Mysteries; his impiety was committed λόγφ, that is, by some kind of verbal abuse of the rites or propaganda against participating in them. There is no way to date the decree mentioned in Ar. Av. 1072-1074. It was probably recent, and would make good sense as part of the reaction to the revelation in 415 of the parody of the Mysteries by native Athenians. We cannot know if Diagoras' reputation in 423 was for impiety against the Mysteries or for some other sort of impiety. This essentially is all we know about Diagoras' impiety.

His notoriety certainly outlived him among

scholars and writers, and was distorted into a reputation for atheism. 6 Diagoras figures in the present inquiry no more than Andocides. Both committed acts of impiety, but neither, so far as we know, thought anything novel about the gods.

5 See Winiarczyk (1979) and (1980). This account supplants the previous standard accounts by Jacoby (1959) and Woodbury (1965). All the ancient testimony is collected in Winiarczyk (1981). 6 Burkert (1985) 467 n. 35 claims that Epicurus fr. 27.2 Arrighetti2 somehow vitiates Winiarczyk's case. But all this fragment shows is that Diagoras' reputation had been enlarged to the point of atheism by the end of the fourth century. This growth in reputation would have been considerably helped by truly atheistic writings circulated at some time during the fourth century conveniently under the name of the famous impious poet (see Winiarczyk [1980] 68).

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Nonconformity

We need not discuss in detail all the late and poor evidence which speaks of impiety trials of scientists or sophists, since Dover has shown decisively that the only certain impiety trial of an intellectual for his attitudes towards the gods is that of Socrates.7 But Dover was concerned to show only that intellectuals in Athens were not silenced by the legal institutions of the polis. There remains the question of a conflict over religious attitudes, even if the conflict never entered the courts. In the only two cases in which we can hope to flesh out the vagueness of our inference from Socrates' report of the stock charges, the cases of Socrates and Anaxagoras, the tripartite schema of fundamental religious beliefs will provide a better background than mere popular aversion to atheism. For in both cases the important religious issue was the relation of religious beliefs to the effective functioning of religious worship. It was the latter which was of chief moment in the polis.

4.1 Socrates There is no question of entering here into the problem of just what was Socrates' real attitude towards the gods. The concern of the present inquiry is to determine that attitude towards the gods which Socrates' accusers ascribed to him and which they felt the jury would find condemnable on a public charge of impiety. We confine our attention to the part of the charge and defense which has to do with this matter. 7 Dover (1975) demolishes the case for impiety trials of Aspasia, Anaxagoras, and Protagoras, and for the near miss of Diogenes of Apollonia, and confirms the general rejection of impiety trials of Euripides and Prodicus. This supplants the previous standard account by Derenne (1930). The speculations of Willink (1983) 28 that Prodicus was unwelcome in Athens from 410/9 and may even have left Athens under the threat of prosecution for impiety are supported by no evidence; there is none. Thus it is disingenuous of Willink to make the following claim (ibid.): 'that he [sc. Prodicus] was accused of "corrupting the young" [his emphasis, i.e. as opposed to conviction and execution on that charge; cf. Suda s.v. Πρόδικος] is entirely consonant with the evidence.' The circumstances in which Aristotle left Athens in 323/2 are not relevant for this inquiry (Dover [1975] 53-54).

Socrates

63

The official affidavit of Meletus runs in part: αδικεί Σωκράτης ους μεν ή πόλις νομίζει θεούς ού νομίζων, ετερα δέ καινά δαιμόνια είσηγού μένος. 8 Meletus has adopted into the indictment the stock charge θεούς μή νομίζειν. The qualification in the first clause, ους η πόλις ν ο μ ί ζ ε ι , and the entire second clause, where Socrates is accused of 'introducing new divine things', refers to the prohibition of worship in new or foreign cults without authorization of the polis (discussed above, pp. 2324). Meletus must have intended the jury to believe that Socrates had offended against the prerogative of the polis to control religious practices within its domain. That Socrates' uncanny inner voice had become known as his δαιμόνιον gave Meletus the pretext for charging Socrates with a breach of a universally recognized standard of piety. 9 Thus the context framed by Meletus for the offense θεούς μή νομίζειν is the religious sphere given recognizable unity by the polis, what we have called above Athenian polis religion. 10 There has been something of a sterile debate whether θεούς νομίζειν means 'to believe that gods exist' or 'to worship gods'. 11

The fuller

expression θεούς νομίζειν είναι clearly means 'to believe that gods exist' or 'to believe in gods'. If είναι is to be understood with the simple θεούς νομίζειν, the short expression would obviously have the same meaning as the full explicit expression. The contention that the simple θεούς νομίζειν means 'to believe that gods exist' depends on the proposition that είναι is 8 Preserved by Favorinus ap. Diog. Laert. 2.40; other sources for the charge are Xen. Mem. 1.1.1-2, Ap. 10; PI. Ap. 24b8-cl, 26b2-6, Euthphr. 3bl-3. 9 Xen. Ap. 12, Mem. 1.1.2; PI. Euthphr. 3b5-9, Ap. 31c8-d2. The passage from Plato's Apology also attests to the wide publicity of the δαιμόνιον. Meletus indulged in an equivocation of singular and plural. 10 This inference is strengthened by the fact that Xenophon, defending Socrates against this part of the charge, insists on the common cults of the polis as the context for Socrates' worship: θύων ... έπί των κοινών της πόλεως βωμών (Mem. 1.1.2); θύοντα ... έν ταΐς κοιναΐς έορταΐς καί έπί τών δημοσίων βωμών (Αρ. 11). Similarly, the polis religion formed the background for the proposal attributed to Demosthenes (in 324, concerning the deification of Alexander; Din. 1.94): γράφων και άπαγορεύων μηδένα νομίζειν άλλον θεόν ή τους παραδεδομένους. 11 Brickhouse and Smith (1985) 459-460 offer much bibliography on this debate, but unaccountably omit consideration of Fahr (1969), who demonstrated, if nothing else, that a debate between these alternatives is indeed futile.

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Nonconformity

always to be understood.12 But this proposition makes nonsense of Lys. 12.9: οϋτε θεούς οΰτ' ανθρώπους νομίζει. 1 3 That είναι is sometimes to be understood with θεούς νομίζειν 1 4 lends no support to the argument that it is always to be so understood. Since θεούς νομίζειν is apparently an older expression than θεούς νομίζειν είναι, it is unlikely that the former came into usage as an abridged form of the latter.15 One must decide in each case whether or not the είναι is to be supplied. There is no prima facie reason for understanding είναι in the terms of Meletus' indictment; the indictment makes perfect sense logically and as a criminal charge without the είναι.

In none of the several incidental

paraphrases of the indictment in Xenophon and Plato (cited above, n. 8) is είναι to be found. 16 Furthermore, Plato's Socrates explicitly adds είναι to the locution of the indictment in a facetious attempt to clarify Meletus' meaning (Ap. 26c2). It is not surprising that Meletus eagerly assents to this addition (26c7, 26e3-5). He may well have thought it true that Socrates did not believe in gods at all without reconciling this thought with the part of the indictment about introducing new divine things. Of course Plato may have put these words in Meletus' mouth in order to have Socrates expose an 12 This proposition was originally asserted by Tate (1936), (1937). However, ήγενσθαι θεούς normally means ήγείσθαι θεούς είναι: cf. Ar. Eq. 32; Eur. Hec. 800, El. 583, Ba. 1326; Pl. Ap. 27d, Lg. 899cd, 948bc. Cf. Fahr (1969) 162. 13 Even making allowance for the polar form of expression, it must make sense. Furthermore, the solemn context, in which Lysias desires to stress both Peison's readiness to commit to perjury and his inhumane behavior, requires both objects to maintain independent value. 14 As is clearly the case in PI. Lg. 885c7, 899c2,908c4,909bl (the evidence for Tate [1936]), as well as PI. Ap. 26c7, 35d5-6. 15 See the chronological chart in Fahr (1969) 166. θεούς νομίζειν (without additional predicate) first appears in Aesch. Pers. 497-498, then in Hdt. 4.59.1, and frequently thereafter. The earliest appearance of θεούς νομίζειν είναι (without additional predicate) for which there is a certain terminus ante quem is in the Sisyphus fragment (TrGF 1.43 F 19.42, before the death of either Euripides [407/6] or Critias [403]; Eur. fr. 1131 N. is spurious). However, θεούς νομίζειν είναι occurs in Corp. Hipp. Morb. Sacr. 1.30 Grensemann, approximately contemporaneous with the Sisyphus fragment. Otherwise this expression appears only once in Xenophon (Mem. 1.1.5) and several times in Plato (Αρ., Lg.). 16 On the one occasion where Xenophon actually says that Socrates believed that gods exist, the point is that Socrates' use of his daimonion is no different from traditional means of divination (Mem. 1.1.5).

Socrates

65

unclarified ambiguity in the indictment. In any case, the addition of είναι is not trivial. First, it is essential for Socrates' eventual point, that his belief in the existence of δαιμόνια necessarily implies a belief in the existence of δαίμονες (27c 1-2). This argument could not have been made without the use of είναι. Second, at the same time that Meletus assents to the addition of the είναι, he also chooses to disregard the important qualification in the indictment οΰς ή πόλις νομίζει (26c 1-7). Only a departure from the terms of the indictment enables Socrates to focus on disbelief in the existence of gods. If the είναι is not to be understood, it does not follow that θεούς νομίζειν means simply 'to worship gods'. It is clear that this cannot be the meaning of Lys. 12.9 (quoted above, p. 64). Xenophon's defense of Socrates against the part of the indictment under scrutiny here rested solely on a report of Socrates' conspicuous participation in traditional polis religion. From this participation Xenophon would have one make the inference, certain and obvious for him, that Socrates has not committed the offense named in the indictment (Xen. Ap. 11, Mem. 1.1.2; cf. Αρ. 24, Mem. 1.2.64). Thus θεούς νομίζειν must be something distinct from worshipping gods, but must be a necessary concomitant of worshipping gods. The best gloss on νομίζειν is one offered by Dover: 'νομίζειν (== νόμος) means "accept (or treat, practise) as normal".' 17 The simple expression θεούς νομίζειν can be translated as 'to accept gods in the normal way'; 18 the negative form of the expression means 'to reject the

17 Dover (1968) 203 (on Ar. Nu. 847). This is the meaning in Eur. Supp. 731-732: νυν τήνδ' άελπτον ήμεραν ίδοΰσ' έγώ / θεούς νομίζω. The chorus leader is not saying (pace Collard [1975] 296 [ad loc.]) that, having seen her enemies vanquished, she is persuaded that the gods exist; the existence of the gods was never in question. The affirmation Ί accept the gods in the normal way' comes in response to the chorus' previous doubt whether the gods would treat them fairly (608-616). (The chorus leader is certainly not saying that she worships the gods.) Thus, this passage is to be distinguished from those passages where the triumph of justice is taken as proof of the existence of the gods; the latter are discussed below, p. 95. 18

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normal way of accepting the gods'. 19 Θεούς νομίζειν is the normal attitude towards the gods and, as such, it forms the common basis of religious participation in the polis. The manifestation of this attitude consisted in normal religious behavior. In Meletus' indictment the relative clause ους ή πόλις νομίζει further specifies the norm as normal by the standard of polis religion. The intellectual component of this normal attitude must comprise the three fundamental beliefs, for all three are needed to ensure worship normal for the polis religion - wide as that 'normal' is. The normal attitude certainly assumes that the gods in question exist (the first fundamental belief); it naturally implies (based on the second and third beliefs) worship of them, 20 and also fear of them. 21 One need not know precisely and in detail what makes up this normal attitude in order to speak about it, claim it for oneself, or deny it to another, as Socrates' treatment of Meletus in Plato shows. However, Plato's Socrates claims that Meletus' religious charge is an absurd charge to make if Meletus intends to uphold it by contending that Socrates does not believe that gods exist at all (27e528al). Meletus is confused, it turns out, about the meaning of the stock charge, adopted into the indictment, of θεούς μή νομίζειν. We can recognize this as an appropriately Socratic defense.

4.2 Anaxagoras Concerning the supposed trial of Anaxagoras, Dover is right to dismiss the entire group of inconsistent details reported by four Hellenistic sources and 19

Lys. 12.9 means 'he [Peison] accepts neither gods nor men in the normal way'; i.e., concerning the first membrum, Peison's beliefs about the gods fell short of the minimum which would result in pious behavior, in this case, upholding an oath. 20 In addition to Xenophon's defense of Socrates, this is the point of [Lys.] 6.51: ους [sc. θεούς] ημείς νομίζομεν καί θεραπεύοντες καί άγνεύοντες θύομεν καί προσευχόμεθα. 21 This is the divine moral sanction discussed above, as e.g. in [Lys.] 6.19: έπεδείξατο δέ [sc. Ανδοκίδης] καν τοις "Ελλησιν δτι θεούς ού νομίζει· οΰ γαρ ώς δεδιώς τα πεποιημένα, άλλ' ώς θαρρών, ναυκληρία έπιθέμενος την θάλατταν επλει.

Anaxagoras

67

quoted in Diog. Laert. 2.12-14. All of these four sources agree on one thing, that there was a trial, a fact stressed by Diogenes but omitted by Dover, who concentrates exclusively on their differences. 22 The origin of the idea of a trial of Anaxagoras is probably the fourth-century historian Ephorus, who merely says (FGrH 70 F 196 [αρ. Diod. Sic. 12.39.2]): Ά ν α ξ α γ ό ρ α ν τον σοφιστήν, δ ι δ ά σ κ α λ ο ν οντά Περκλέους, ώς άσεβοΰντα εις τους θεούς έσυκοφάντουν [sc. oí έχθροί του Περικλέους]. In the fourth century συκοφαντέω may well mean 'criticize' (LSJ s.v. 1.2); but here, the context, in which Ephorus had just mentioned formal legal proceedings against Pheidias, indicates that Ephorus means 'falsely accuse at law'. But the use of the imperfect is interesting. All it need mean (taking the imperfect as conative) is that the enemies of Pericles tried or intended to prosecute Anaxagoras on the grounds of impiety towards the gods. No other meaning of the imperfect fits well. Clearly it cannot mean that Anaxagoras was subjected to a number of trials. The context in Ephorus gives no indication of an actual trial, so there is no sense to a durative meaning of the imperfect. 23 All we should infer is that Anaxagoras was threatened with legal action on the charge of impiety. We ought to accept this inference as true for the following reasons: 1) in spite of Ephorus' quotation of Old Comedy later in his account to support his view of Pericles, there is no hint that Ephorus has drawn his claim about Anaxagoras from comedy; 24 2) if Ephorus had himself invented the claim about Anaxagoras, or had knowingly taken over someone else's invention, he would hardly have described the attack of Pericles' enemies as 22 Dover (1975) 29-32. The Hellenistic sources are: Sotion fr. 3 Wehrli; Satyrus FHG 3.163, fr. 14; Hermippus of Smyrna fr. 30 Wehrli; Hieronymus of Rhodes fr. 41 Wehrli. 23 The next sentence in Ephorus' account describes the intentions, not the successes of Pericles' enemies: συνέπλεκον δ* έν ταΐς κατηγορίαις καί διαβολαΐς τον Περικλέα, δια τον φθόνον σπεύδοντες διαβαλείν την τάνδρός ύπεροχήν τε καί δόξαν. 24 This point is conceded by Dover (1975) 29-30.

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συκοφαντία. For the general context is an anti-Periclean account of the causes of the war. Of course Ephorus could have made an innocent error, but we have no earlier or better evidence to ascertain this. The evidence from Plutarch, the other source for Anaxagoras' flirtation with Athenian justice, confirms our inference from Ephorus. In two passages in Plutarch where Anaxagoras is mentioned incidentally, the idea of a trial is raised (Nie. 23.4; Mor. 169e). Yet in the passage where the topic is treated in greatest, though still meager, detail, Plutarch never asserts that Anaxagoras stood trial (Per. 32.2, 5). 25 The decree of Diopeithes, which Plutarch says was intended to cast suspicion on Pericles through Anaxagoras, is a very murky matter (Per. 32.2, the sole source): καί ψήφισμα Διοπείθης εγραψεν είσαγγέλλεσθαι τους τα θεια μή νομίζοντας ή λόγους περί των μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας. Plutarch gives no date for the decree. There is no indication that the decree was ever passed in the Council or Assembly. All Plutarch says is that Diopeithes drafted or proposed (εγραψεν) the decree. 26

Plutarch's

wording, as Dover remarked, is unlikely to retain the wording of the original: 'τα μετάρσια [in Plutarch] are what Athenians in Diopeithes' time, and Attic writers for long after, called τα μετέωρα'. 27 This throws considerable doubt on the credibility of Plutarch or his source. 25 The Ephorus tradition is probably taken into account and acknowledged in πλείστους μάρτυρας (Per. 31.2). 26 Amidst the maze of argument presented by Mansfeld (1980), he offers no evidence for his assertion (p. 33): 'The Assembly accepted this proposal.' This point, taken for granted (as so often in the literature), vitiates his elaborate case for a trial of Anaxagoras. He has also failed to take Dover (1975) into account. The use of the word ψήφισμα does not imply that the Assembly had passed the proposal: at Aeschin. 2.64, 68 the word is used for the draft of a decree. 27 Dover (1975) 39. But Dover goes slightly too far in his skepticism. He also finds fault with the wording of the decree in that it would be too broad and would include such pious members of the religious establishment as 'mathematicians who calculated programmes of intercalation, not to mention seers who interpreted heavenly signs' (Dover [1975] 39-40). Socrates' first two stock charges against philosophers (PI. Ap. 23d), which closely resemble the terms of Plutarch's report of the decree, show that the field of reference for the terms of the decree could have been unambiguously apparent.

Anaxagoras

69

Thus we cannot take Diopeithes' decree as an expression of the intent of the Athenian people, or as an official statement of publicly proscribed religious doctrine. Even if Diopeithes himself initiated legal proceedings against Anaxagoras on a charge of impiety (whether by γραφή or εισαγγελία), he may have drafted his decree to test the waters for such a case, or to seek an expression of support from the Assembly before proceeding to the courts. The possibilities are infinite. But the connection of Diopeithes with Anaxagoras reported by Plutarch is best explained not as fortuitous,28 but as the result of conflict between the two men, traces of the setting of which can perhaps be detected elsewhere. Plutarch relates without attribution an anecdote in which Anaxagoras and the diviner Lampón publicly opposed one another on the meaning of a single-horned ram {Per. 6.2-4); if there is no kernel of truth in the patently fictitious elaboration, the story may have been invented to explain a conflict between the two. Lampón was a prominent member of the religious establishment in Athens, a position which he initially achieved perhaps because of his timely prophecy of the end of the political rivalry of Pericles and Thucydides.29 Lampón was sent to Thurii by Pericles as a founder and chief mantis for the new city.30 He was among those taking the oaths for the peace and then alliance with Sparta in 421 (Th. 5.19.2, 5.24.1). He added a rider to an undated decree concerning contributions to the Eleusinian cult in which he seems to speak with some authority about a religious question, viz. the building of altars in the sacred precinct of Pelargikon.31 An honorarium of the right to eat in the Prytaneum was granted him, at least during war-time.32 Thus Lampón was a man of some 28 So Dover (1975) 40. 2 9 Lampón was called ό έξηγητής (Eupolis, fr. 319 Kassel-Austin) and θύτης καί χρησμολόγος καί μάντις (schol. ad Ar. Av. 521). In good divining style Lampón did not say which of the two would gain power, only that power would fall on one to the exclusion of the other! 3 Schol. ad Ar. Nu. 332; Plu. Mor. 812d; Diod. Sic. 12.10.3. Was Pericles returning a favor to Lampón for the latter's political forecasting? If so, the ostracism of Thucydides would have to be dated before the foundation of the colony. Both events are thought to have occurred in the late 440s, but neither has a precise date. 31 IG I 3 78 (=LSCG 5); rider, 47ff; Pelargikon, 54ff. 32 Schol. ad Ar. Pax 1084; cf. Ar. Av. 521 and schol. ad loc.

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standing. His exalted position within the polis depended on the continued vigor of the traditional religion and its institutions. Diopeithes had nothing like the prestige of Lampón, but he may well have been a political and religious associate of his. 33 Like Lampón, in addition to being a χρησμολόγος, Diopeithes was a ρήτωρ, that is, spoke in the Assembly. He seems to have been rather rabid in his delivery. 34 Diopeithes will have spoken out on behalf of traditional religion and the interests of those who were active in religious institutions.

His

'enthusiastic' manner, perhaps, was aimed at that section of the Athenian demos which would have responded to such an appeal. It is not difficult to see why Lampón or Diopeithes, as well as other members of the religious establishment at Athens, would oppose Anaxagoras, especially given the latter's connections to real political power, viz. Pericles. Whatever may have been the political motivations in an attempt to attack Anaxagoras through the courts, the fact that the attempt was based on a religious charge means that the attackers felt that Anaxagoras was susceptible of condemnation on this charge by an Athenian jury. In spite of the frequent claim in the sources, such as they are, that Pericles was the object of an attack on Anaxagoras, I am inclined to doubt this.35 Anaxagoras was the true object of the attack, but the reason he was worthy of attack was his tie to the powerful politician. Those who would have feared Anaxagoras' religious attitudes will have feared them the more because they found an audience with the leader of the demos and therefore potentially with the demos itself. Political power, then, would have been an issue, though not as the sources represent it. Members and sympathizers of 33 The two are named together for their divining at Ar. Av. 988. Diopeithes is also called Νικίου εταίρος (schol. ad Ar. Eq. 1085). This man could hardly be the same as the diviner who tried to affect the succession of the Spartan king after the death of Agis (Xen. HG 3.3.3; Plu. Ages. 3.4-9). Might not 'Diopeithes' have been a common name for gentlemen of this profession? 34 Called by Telecleides ό ρήτωρ ύπομανιώδης (fr. 6 Kock = schol. ad Ar. Av. 988). Cf. Ar. Ve. 380 and schol. ad loc. 35 Connor (1963) 115-116 shows there is no good evidence for assigning oligarchical sympathies to Diopeithes. Lampón was clearly a partisan of Pericles; cf. Schachermeyr (1968) 27-30.

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71

the religious establishment will have acted in many ways to defend their position from the influence of foreign sophists. Much wealth and prestige was at stake, 36 and also, at least in the minds of the truly pious, the good will of the gods. It should go without saying that we do not know what precisely in the philosophy of Anaxagoras was found objectionable by the religious establishment, or at least what his opponents would have claimed to be objectionable before a court or the Assembly. It is no more likely to be the single point about the sun being a stone 37 than an entire astronomy or meteorology (e.g. DK 59 A 42) which made the gods redundant. Plutarch's surmise about the basic cause of Anaxagoras' unpopularity would seem particularly apt if it could be taken with reference to Athenian diviners; no subject is specified (Nie. 23.4): ού γαρ ήνείχοντο τους φυσικούς καί μετεωρολέσχας τότε καλουμένους

ώς

εις

αιτίας

άλογους

καί

δυνάμεις

άπρονοήτους καί κατηναγκασμένα πάθη δ ι α τ ρ ί β ο ν τ α ς το θείον. 3 8 Though Anaxagoras may never have had to appear in court, and we know of no charge against him that he specifically denied the existence of the gods of the polis, his philosophy could have seemed to the pious to deny the possibility of any reciprocity between men and gods (e.g. in his refusal to acknowledge an omen in the single-horned ram). Thus Anaxagoras could have appeared especially threatening to diviners, whose religious activity 36 In view of the attitude of the garland weaver in Ar. Thes. 450-456 (discussed above, pp. 42f.), we may be permitted to suspect the same mercenary motive on the part of the diviners who opposed Anaxagoras. 37 PI. Ap. 26d shows that this is the kind of alarming doctrine which could be easily vulgarized. Sotion (fr. 3 Wehrli ap. Diog. Laert. 2.12) and others (e.g. Josephus Ap. 2.265; Olympiodorus in Mete, ad 339b2 [= DK 59 A 19]) make garbled and worthless claims to the effect that the doctrine about the sun was the cause of legal problems for Anaxagoras. In Eur. Or. 982-985 Tantalus' stone is probably not (pace scholia ad loc.) the Anaxagorean sun, but some other Anaxagorean heavenly body; see Scodel (1984). 38 It is possible that Plutarch is here relying on or interpreting Plato; cf. Lg. 886d8e l , 967al-5, and Plutarch's next paragraph, Nie. 23.5.

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was a crucial link in the traditional channel of communication between gods and men.

4.3 Summary of part one In Part One it has been shown that the polis was essentially a religious community and was the supreme unit of religious worship. The religious worship of the polis and its subdivisions was, in turn, a chief means of denoting the citizens and defining the group. We have seen the range of religious activity and thought characteristic of life in the Athenian polis and revealed the three fundamental beliefs which can account for that activity and thought. The fact that there existed no creed or authoritative religious body explains the lack of explicitly formulated religious doctrine, but the role of fundamental beliefs in the religion of the political model of the Laws confirms the validity of the model of fundamental beliefs in a modern analysis of the real polis of Athens. The citizenry, or some sections of it, correctly appreciated, however vaguely, that some doctrines could present a threat to polis religion. There existed a great freedom of belief about the gods in Athens, considerably greater than there would be in the polis of the Laws. Yet even in Athens, as the cases of Socrates and Anaxagoras show, the exercise of that freedom would encounter opposition at the point where traditional forms of worship, i.e. the religious institutions and cults of the polis, were endangered. These institutions and cults depended for their continued existence on the continued implicit or explicit assent of the individual citizens to the three fundamental beliefs. There is no question that the citizens by and large maintained their beliefs; however, as Plato's defense of polis religion implies, the three beliefs were a live issue for intellectuals.

PART

TWO

E U R I Ρ I D E S

To people accustomed to reason about the forms in which their religious feeling has incorporated itself, it is difficult to enter into that simple, untaught state of mind in which the form and the feeling have never been severed by an act of reflection. George Eliot, Silas Marner

CHAPTER

FIVE

Introduction to the Problem in Euripides: Three Examples

From the investigation of religious beliefs in the Athenian polis carried out in Part One, we have gained a reliable outline of the theology implicit in Athenian polis religion. Yet this outline, abstracted from the pressures and particularities of life, lacks the animation of true religion. We turn now to Euripides not merely to examine the status of the fundamental beliefs in a contemporary, fictive source, but to observe how this source represents particular human beings maintaining, modifying, and discarding the beliefs in particular circumstances. In the life of the polis, religious forms - the external, manifest side of religion - enjoyed a clear primacy over unchanneled, interior religious beliefs; only those circumstances in which personal beliefs jarred with accepted forms would pose problems of directly sensible consequences for the religious institutions of the polis. (This inference was borne out in the examination of the cases of Socrates and Anaxagoras.) Hence, we seek those instances in Euripides where a character experiences a relatively clear breach between his religious beliefs and the religious forms he observes or enacts, where the terms and occasion of the religious forms brought into question can be placed with tolerable assurance in the proper milieu of

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Greek religion, and where the antecedents to the conflict are at hand. Such circumstances arise in the work of Euripides with far greater frequency than in any other source from classical Athens; the playwright's skill is deployed to portray these circumstances, if not realistically, at least compellingly. The fundamental beliefs become touchstones of the varied reactions of the characters to the events of the dramas; the characters struggle with these beliefs and with the implications these beliefs have for their lives. Before plunging into Euripides, it is necessary to register a qualification. Composing dramas out of the stock of legends about ancient men and gods, a tragedian could hardly omit the gods altogether, or let his human characters express persistent, obstinate doubt about the existence of the divine characters. The mere existence of gods was a given in the world of tragedy. Hence, it practically follows from the constraints of the genre that the first fundamental belief, that the gods exist, does not become subject to doubt through the trials undergone by Euripides' human characters. The problems of religious belief which do arise in the plays concern generally the third and second beliefs: the human characters give much thought to the nature of the reciprocation of the gods with whom they are wont to deal, and upon occasion the human characters come to doubt whether the gods pay any attention to human affairs at all. As a religious thinker, Euripides was concerned with understanding the relations between gods and men; this concern translates, in our terminology, into a concern with the second and third fundamental beliefs. A parallel concern, into which this inquiry enters only indirectly, comprises the nature of the gods. There is no need to assume that the constraints of composing mythical tragedies would have been felt by Euripides as a serious problem; we may safely assume that Euripides was not worried by the question of the very existence of the gods.1 In at least one play, however, Euripides contrived to place the first

1

Cf. the best general study of Euripides as a religious thinker, Festugière (1950). Of course we cannot tell how Euripides actually felt, but there is little evidence to lead one to suppose that radical atheism was a serious alternative for anyone in Euripides' day (cf. pp. 60-61 above).

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belief at the center of dramatic concern. 2 This provides us with our first example.

5.1 Bacchae 216-220: the first belief ΠΕΝΘΕΥΣ κλύω δε νεοχμά τήνδ' άνά πτόλιν κακά, γυναίκας ή μ ΐ ν δώματ' έκλελοιπέναι πλασταισι βακχείαισιν, έν δέ δασκίοις ορεσι θοάζειν, τον νεωστι δαίμονα Διόνυσον, όστις έστί, τιμώσας χοροΐς.

220

Pentheus resists the god Dionysus and his maenadic rites, and then pays severely. In this respect his story is typical of the group of Dionysiac resistance myths. 3 Pentheus is fittingly described as a θεομάχος (Βa. 45; cf. 325, 635-636). But the Euripidean version of resistance to Dionysus is unique among these myths for a detail in the psychology of the resister. In most of the sources for the resistance myths, there is no indication why the resister resists the god or his maenadic rites. In Ovid the Minyads resist maenadism out of loyalty to sober Athena (Met. 4.37-39); this is similar to the resistance of Hippolytus to Aphrodite and her rites out of loyalty to Artemis. Like the other resisters, Pentheus is impetuous and ultimately impious. But only Pentheus resists Dionysus and his cult because he does not believe 'that Dionysus is a god' (cf. 242, quoted below) or, in other 2

Probably also the Bellerophontes; cf. the discussion of fr. 286 N. below, pp. 96-98. Because of the dispute over authorship the atheistic fragment from the Sisyphus is not discussed under Euripides; it was discussed above, p. 56. 3 This group includes the myths of Lycurgus (Horn. II. 6.130-140; Soph. Ant. 955965; [Apollod.] Β ibi. 3.5.1), the daughters of Proetus ([Apollod.] Bibl. 2.2.2, 3.5.2), the daughters of Minyas (Plu. Mor. 299e-f; Ael. VH 3.42; Ant. Lib. 10; Ovid Met. 4.1-41, 389-415), Butes (Diod. Sic. 5.50.2-5), Perseus (Paus. 2.20.4, 2.22.1), and Orpheus ([Eratosth.] Cat. 24 = Aesch. fr.83a Mette, Bassarae). Theoc. 26, about Pentheus and the maenads, is strongly influenced by Euripides. For a discussion of these resistance myths, see Guthrie (1950) 165-173, Otto (1965) 74-78.

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Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

words, that the god Dionysus exists.4 Pentheus is certainly not a radical atheist. He piously accepts and worships Zeus and the other gods who, from the play's point in time, are traditional in Thebes.5 Dionysus was previously unknown in Thebes; hence, Pentheus' initial rejection of this god is not irrational. Nevertheless, with respect to Dionysus alone, both when he first hears of the new god and after he has had the opportunity to become wiser, Pentheus denies the first fundamental belief. Not only is Pentheus' denial of the existence of the god novel in the context of Dionysiac resistance myths, it is also crucial for the structure, and even logic, of the play. Pentheus resists the maenadic rites because he considers them a fraud; he considers the rites to be fraudulent because he simply believes that the god, the supposed author of the rites, does not exist. This is the reasoning presented by Pentheus in his first lines of the play (216-220, quoted at the head of this section). The phrase τον νεωστί δαίμονα (219) is sarcastic; the phrase όστις έστί (220),6 offered as the justification for considering the rites fraudulent (πλασταίσι βακχείαισιν, 218), implies that whatever the newcomer is, he is not divine. So Cadmus understands Pentheus (333): κει μή γαρ εστίν ό θεός ούτος, ώς σύ φής (cf. 517). Later in the same monologue, still speaking his mind openly in the belief that he is alone, Pentheus reiterates his rejection of the proposition that Dionysus is a god (242-247): έκεννος [sc. ò ξένος] εΐναί φησι Διόνυσον θεόν, έκεινος έν μηρφ ποτ' έρράφθαι Διός, δς έκπυροΰται λαμπάσιν κεραυνίαις συν μητρί, Δίους οτι γάμους έψεύσατο.

245

ταΰτ' οΰχί δεινής αγχόνης εστ' αξια, 4 The sailors of Horn. Hymn 7 merely mistake the god for a man; no one in the hymn professes anything about the existence of Dionysus. Nor do the maenadic rites play a role in the hymn. Insistence on the god's human appearance seems implicit in Aesch. F 5962 Radt. 5 This is implied in 45-46, 247. Kopff (1982) transposed 199-203 to follow 247, and 325-327 to follow 344, apparently to reinforce this aspect of Pentheus' character. 6 For the diction of this phrase, cf. below p. 154, n. 25.

Bacchae 216-220

79

ύβρεις ΰβρίζειν, όστις εστίν ò ξένος; To reason as he does, Pentheus presumes what was urged in Part One as the connection between the first fundamental belief and accepted religious institutions: one must believe that the god exists in order to accept, in good faith, the authenticity of the god's cult. The same presumption lay behind Dionysus' claim in the prologue that he would prove to men his existence as a god in order to receive the cult he deserves (45-48; cf. 20-22, 39-42). It does not, of course, follow from his denial of the god's existence that Pentheus must grow angry with the god's devotees, suspect the maenads of licentiousness, and become obsessed with maenadism; these develop out of Pentheus' peculiar character.

But disbelief in the god's existence is a

necessary condition for Pentheus to acquire and maintain his perilous convictions; his resistance to the maenadic rites, and the play's tragic progress, would immediately collapse if Pentheus did in fact come to believe the god existed. Accordingly, the play is constructed so that, for a considerable stretch up to the plot leading into the final debacle (roughly 215-788), the subject of the stranger's divinity or the god's existence is repeatedly raised, giving Pentheus every opportunity to avert the disaster. When Pentheus remains unconvinced in the face of sufficient proofs, Dionysus remarks to his adversary (787): πείθη μεν ούδέν. Like the impious dissidents whom Plato hypothesized in Laws 10 (discussed above, p. 35), Pentheus does not err through incontinent passion or emotion; he is impious essentially, if not solely, because of an error of conscious belief. The proofs which are presented to Pentheus and ignored by him are of two kinds. First, Teiresias responds to Pentheus as if completing a loosely structured agon.

The seer attempts to instruct Pentheus by presenting

formal, sophisticated arguments proving the god's existence (272-327). 7 7 For the contemporary intellectual background to Teiresias' speech, cf. esp. Deichgräber (1935) 332-337, Henrichs (1975) 110, η. 64, and Roth (1984); further bibliography at Roth (1984) 59, η. 1. Teiresias' endeavor is not dissimilar to the attempt of the Athenian in Laws 10 to instruct the first class of dissidents through rational arguments.

80

Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

Cadmus adds a brief plea (330-342): if Pentheus does not believe the god exists, he ought, for the sake of safety and the family's greater honor, to feign belief. Thus, in the scene beginning with Pentheus' appearance on stage, the proposition that the god Dionysus exists has been rejected by Pentheus, affirmed and argued for by Teiresias, urged by Cadmus, and finally rejected again by Pentheus (343-346), in each case with the utmost explicitness. Following the failure of Teiresias' attempt at rational persuasion, Pentheus encounters a series of miracles (θαύματα) which increasingly compels belief in the god. The miracles constitute the second type of 'proof that the god Dionysus exists. There is the miracle of the maenads who spontaneously shed their bonds (443-448); the palace miracles consisting of the earthquake, the hallucinations of Pentheus, the blaze of Semele's fire, and the collapse of the palace (585-637); and the climactic series of supernatural events attending the maenads: the wearing of snakes (698, 767-768, cf. 102-104); the suckling of wild animals (699-702); the spontaneous production of water, wine, milk, and honey (704-711, cf. 142); the sympathy of nature (726-727); the σπαραγμοί of calves, heifers, and bulls (734-747); the invasion of villages and theft of children (748757); the halo of fire (757-758); and the rout of armed male defenders (758764). Earlier, the miracles had elicited some suggestive remarks from the servant and the Lydian stranger (449, 648-651); the messenger, addressing himself to Pentheus, explicitly infers from the miracles the presence of the god (712-713; cf. 764,769-772): ώστ\ εί παρήσθα, τόνδε θεόν τον νυν ψέγεις εύχανσιν αν μετήλθες είσιδών τάδε. 8 Pentheus remains unaffected. 8

On the role of miracles in ancient religion, cf. Nock (1933a) 83-91 and the following comment, Nock (1933b) 185 [= (1972) 327]: The result of a miracle is πίστις, that is to say, those present or some of them take up an attitude of submissive reliance in the new δΰναμις and its representatives.' This comment aptly describes the effect of the miracles on the messenger and the intended effect on Pentheus.

81

Trojan Women 1060-1080

All attempts to convince Pentheus that the god exists are then abandoned. Talk of the first fundamental belief, so prominent in the first half of the play, is suppressed in the second half as the dramatic action intensifies. Near the end of the play, however, Cadmus returns to the subject by drawing a moral (1325-1326): εί δ' εστίν όστις δαιμόνων ύπερφρονει

1325

ές τοΰδ' άθρήσας θάνατον ήγείσθω θεούς. One must supply είναι: 'let him believe that gods exist.'9 Pentheus himself now constitutes a third proof: he has been made an example so that others will not fail to believe that the god Dionysus exists.

5.2 Trojan Women 1060-1080:

the second belief

ΧΟΡΟΣ οϋτω δή τον έν Ίλίω

1060

ναόν και θυόεντα βωμόν προύδωκας Άχαιοις, ώ Ζεΰ, καί πελανών φλόγα σμύρνας αιθέριας τε καπνόν καί Πέργαμον ίεράν

1065

Ίδαιά τ' Ίδαια κισσοφόρα νάπη /

/

t

χιόνι καταρυτα ποταμια τέρμονά τε πρωτόβολον εφ, τάν καταλαμπομέναν ζαθέαν θεράπναν;

1070

φροΰδαί σοι θυσίαι χορών τ' εύφημοι κέλαδοι κατ' ορφναν τε παννυχίδες θεών, 9 Dodds (1960) 234 (ad loc.) glosses ήγείσθω θεούς as νομιζέτω θεούς. However, these two are not precise equivalents; see above, p. 64, n. 12 and p. 65, n. 18.

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Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

χρυσέων τε ξοάνων τύποι Φρυγών τε ζάθεοι σελά-

1075

ναι συνδώδεκα πλήθει. μέλει μέλει μοι, τάδ' εΐ φρονείς, άναξ, οΰράνιον εδρανον έπιβεβώς αιθέρα τε πόλεος όλομένας, αν πυρός αίθομένα κατέλυσεν ορμά.

1080

The gods have abandoned the Trojans: this is a theme running through the play. In the prologue Poseidon drew attention to the end of religion in Troy (15-16):

έρημα δ' άλση καί θεών ανάκτορα / φόνω καταρρει.

Troy's loyal friend of long standing (4-7), Poseidon withdrew from the polis only at the bitter end, for the cult he enjoyed is dead along with everything else (25-27): λείπω το κλεινόν "Ιλιον βωμούς τ' έμούς·

25

έρημία γαρ πόλιν οταν λάβη κακή, νοσεί τα των θεών ούδέ τιμάσθαι θέλει. Given the absolute destruction of the polis, the ruin of religion is inevitable; the citizens are killed or dispersed, so there is literally no one left to tend the cult of the gods. 10 In the second stasimon the chorus recalled two famous Trojans who had been taken as lovers by gods, Ganymede the beloved of Zeus (821-847), and Tithonus the beloved of Eos (848-859). Because of these love affairs between gods and representatives of Troy, the Trojans expected a boon for the polis (843-845, 857). Of course that boon never arrived. Hence, the Trojan women proclaimed that these love affairs were pointless, μάταν αρ' (821), and that divine affection for Troy is gone, τα θεών φίλτρα φρούδα Τροία (858-859). 10 The claim that gods desert a ruined polis is asserted at Aesch. Sept. 217-218 and implied at Sept. 304-320. In 480 the Athenians interpreted Athena's apparent departure from the acropolis as a sign that the polis would be destroyed (Hdt. 8.41.3). In 335, just before Alexander razed Thebes, some Theban diviners were reported to have claimed that the gods had deserted the polis (Diod. Sic. 17.10.5).

Trojan Women 1060-1080

83

In the present passage (1060-1080, the opening of the third stasimon), the Trojan women contemplate Zeus' abandonment of Troy in relation to the cult of Zeus in Troy.

In the normal scheme of belief it would be

incongruous to suppose that the god who enjoyed so magnificent a cult would abandon those who provided the cult; such a presumption underlies the sense of outrage expressed by the chorus in the first part of this passage, 1060-1070. They are not disappointed that the god did not reciprocate their loyal worship to the extent they might have desired; rather, they are shocked at Zeus' repudiation of their worship altogether: οΰτω δή ... προύδωκας ... ω Ζεΰ; 1 1 This is unlike the case of Poseidon, who left the polis only after his cult had died. For Zeus to discard his cult in Troy so abruptly makes a mockery of the belief in divine reciprocation. That Zeus has renounced the cult is, in the circumstances, undeniable; the chorus are compelled to admit that their belief in divine reciprocity (the third fundamental belief) was misplaced. The chorus accentuate the collapse of religious belief by designating the religious cult, and not merely the polis, as the thing betrayed by Zeus. The women recount the various features of Zeus' cult in Troy (1060-1076): his temple, sacrificial altar, burnt offerings, incense, holy citadel, sacred precinct on Mt. Ida, sacrifices, choral celebrations, night festivals, gilded cult statues, and 'twelve holy moons'. 12 These items nearly exhaust the 11 For the use of προδίδωμι to signify the breakdown of reciprocity between men and gods, cf. Apollo's statement of his obligation to protect his suppliant in the Eumenides·, he is zealous in maintaining the reciprocity and uses προδίδωμι to describe what he must avoid doing (Aesch. Eum. 232-234): εγώ δ' άρήξω xòv ίκέτην τε ρύσομαι· δεινή γαρ έν βροτοΐσι κάν θεοίς πέλει τοΰ προστροπαίου μήνις, εί προδώ σφ' εκών. And cf. the discussion of Ion 438, below p. 131. 12 The precise reference of ζάθεοι σελάναι συνδώδεκα (1075-1076) is uncertain. The chorus may be referring to moon-shaped cakes burnt at sacrifice; this explanation is offered in the scholia ad loc. and such moon-shaped cakes are known elsewhere (Eur. fr. 350 N., the lexicographical tradition s.v. σ ε λ ή ν α ι ; cf. Stengel [1910] 223-225). However, the reference may well be to rites dedicated to Zeus recurring on the same date of each month (i.e. as, for example, the seventh day of each month was sacred to Apollo; see Hes. Op. 770-771 and West's note ad loc.), to rites regulated according to some phase of the moon, or merely to the sacred calendar in general. Whereas the items listed in

84

Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

normal constituents of the cult that a polis devotes to a god it holds dear. The chorus' specific cultic references evince a familiarity with the defunct cult and an intimate attachment to the god who now appears traitorous. In the last four lines of the passage (1077-1080), the chorus take their theological speculation a step further. The women are not only disturbed by the consequences of the fact that Zeus failed to reciprocate their worship, but they are bothered (μέλει μέλει μοι, 1077) by the apparent irrationality of Zeus' behavior - what can explain so unexpected a turn? The proposition they consider as the solution to their dilemma amounts to a doubt of the second fundamental belief. I translate 1077-1080 as follows: 'It matters to me, lord, whether you are cognizant of these things (i.e. the catalogue of cultic details in 1060-1076), as you are perched on your throne in the heavenly aether when the polis has been destroyed, the polis which the blazing rush of fire dissolved.' 1 3 The chorus have pictured Zeus spatially distant, far off in the uppermost regions of the sky, and therefore mentally aloof. With this picture in mind they question whether the god is aware of

1060-1070 are specifically dedicated to Zeus, the items listed in 1071-1076 are appropriate to a range of deities (cf. θεών, 1073), though Zeus would obviously be included. 13 The text of this passage (quoted above, p. 82) is not in doubt, nor does the interpretation seem to me difficult. However, because a recent editor (Lee [1976] 250) offers an interpretation that seems to me wrong, and a recent, popular translator (Vellacott) offers a version I find needlessly obscure, I shall explain how I take the passage. I have inserted a comma into the Greek text of 1077 following μοι in order to clarify my interpretation; Diggle prints no comma there. I take τάδ' as accusative object of φρονείς, not the most common usage of φρονέω, but noted by LSJ s.v. Ill with citations from Homer. If φρονείς were taken in the frequent intransitive sense of the verb ('you are sensible' or 'wise'), I could elicit no cogent meaning for the passage. Furthermore, if τάδ' were the nominative subject of μέλει, looking forward to the rest of the sentence, the asyndeton with the preceding sentence would be intolerable; with τάδ' looking backward to 1060-1076 the asyndeton is merely formal, αιθέρα is connected by τε to εδρανον; both are objects of έπιβεβώς and form a hendiadys, as translated above. Lee takes αιθέρα as an object of φρονείς (along with τάδ'), meaning 'conflagration', referring to the firing of the polis. Lee's citation of LSJ s.v. αίθήρ 1.3 is not apt; however, at least regarding the meaning of αιθέρα, he is supported by a note recorded in the scholia ad 1079 (repeated in the lexicographical tradition) and attributed to Didymus. I believe that Didymus erred, having been misled by πυρός αίθομένα in the next line. If Didymus were correct, then Euripides would be incomprehensibly redundant. Another note in the scholia here interprets as I do. Lee is wrong to assert that taking αιθέρα as object of έπιβεβώς forces the genitive πόλεος to be dependent on τ ά δ ' , which would indeed be difficult; πόλεος όλομένας is genitive absolute.

Trojan Women 1060-1080

85

earthly affairs, specifically, the cult offered him by the Trojans and the destruction of the Trojan polis. Such an hypothesis, entailing a denial of the second fundamental belief, would have the merit of explaining the god's failure to reciprocate their worship - Zeus never knew he was being worshipped and he never knew the polis was being destroyed.14 There are numerous passages in Euripides where Zeus and aether are associated; so the connection between the two proposed by the chorus should not surprise. The particular concept of Zeus inhabiting the aether is also not unique to the present passage.15 However, the Zeus envisioned by the chorus - a god both physically and mentally remote - ought to be seen in contrast to the image of Zeus presented by Hecuba in her strange prayer earlier in the play (884-888).

Beginning with the scholia ad

loc.

interpretation of Hecuba's prayer has traditionally seen an allusion to preSocratic, scientific speculation. 16

However, it has been shown that

Euripides concocted a rather subtle mixture of scientific allusion and traditional religious language in Hecuba's prayer. 17

Hecuba sees in

14 The gods were envisioned as spatially remote in line 15 of the hymn to Demetrius Poliorcetes (quoted above, p. 56). In Ar. Av. 726-734, it is implied by the birds who have assumed divine duties that Zeus, having run away to sit haughtily in the clouds, was distant and did not maintain reciprocity with his human worshippers. The chorus of the Bacchae, on the other hand, assert that even if the gods inhabit the aether, far from men, they none the less attend to human affairs (Ba. 392-394). 15 Cf. Eur. fr. 487 N., von Arnim (1913) 18, line 11. This concept appears already in Homer (//. 2.412, etc.) and Hesiod (Op. 18). For a discussion and a list of citations of the various means that Euripides employed to associate Zeus and aether, see Matthiessen (1969) 700-701; Matthiessen omits Tr. 1079. 16 Such an allusion is undeniably present, though we ought not to assume a precise reference was intended; that Hecuba sounds scientific is enough. I follow Diels' view that the element of άήρ raised to divinity by Diogenes of Apollonia forms the background. (In the first edition of Fragmente der Vorsokratiker [1903], Diels placed Tr. 884-888 in the ' C section of Diogenes of Apollonia, 'Imitation'.) Diogenes asserted that άήρ was the support of the earth (DK 64 A 16a); in this he perhaps followed Anaximenes (DK 13 A 6, A 7.4, A 20), and perhaps agreed with Anaxagoras (DK 59 A 42.3). Diogenes certainly spoke of άήρ as divine (DK 64 Β 5 [θεός], A 8 [Zeus]). However, given the fragmentary state of our knowledge of the pre-Socratics, we ought not to insist on an allusion to one particular doctrine or thinker. Matthiessen (1969) 700 saw Tr. 884ff. as an association of αίθήρ with Zeus. But Matthiessen gains no support for his assertion by citing three Euripidean fragments where αίθήρ is explicitly mentioned as the support of the earth (frr. 919, 941, 944 N.); in only one of these fragments is Zeus associated with this αίθήρ (fr. 941)! 17 Scodel (1980) 94-95.

Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

86

Menelaus' intention to punish Helen a sign of just deserts; however novel certain elements of Hecuba's diction may be, she pictures Zeus involved in human affairs as the traditional agent of human justice (887-888): πάντα γαρ ... /... κατά δίκην τα θνήτ' άγεις. After Hecuba's prayer and before the third stasimon the indecisive agon between Helen and Hecuba occurs; the chorus are perhaps not so encouraged as to believe that Menelaus' resolve will endure. 18 In any case, the degree of involvement in human affairs attributed to Zeus in Hecuba's prayer is alien to the absent Zeus proposed by the chorus in the third stasimon, for the Zeus pictured by the chorus takes no part in human affairs. Hecuba had invoked Zeus as γης όχημα κάπί γης εχων εδραν (884); this Zeus has his abode on earth. The Zeus of the chorus inhabits a heavenly abode in the aether (1078-1079): ούράνιον εδρανον έπιβεβώς αιθέρα τε. The contrast is clear: earth and heaven, near and far, involved and aloof (and, perhaps, αήρ and αίθήρ). Near the end of the play, following the lament for Astyanax that crowns her suffering, Hecuba disavows in three brief utterances her faith in the gods: 1) 1240-1242: οΰκ ήν άρ' εν θεοΐσι 19 πλην ούμοί πόνοι

1240

Τροία τε πόλεων εκκριτον μισουμένη, μάτην δ' έβουθυτοΰμεν. 2) 1280-1281:

ίώ θεοί· καί τί τους θεούς καλώ;

1280

καί πρίν γαρ ούκ ηκουσαν ανακαλούμενοι.

18

Later in the ode they curse Menelaus (1100-1117) and envision Helen still enjoying luxury (1107-1109). Diggle obelized οΰκ to θεοίσι. I have removed the obeli because the text seems to me sound; I accept the scholiast's explanation: sc. ούδέν.

87

Trojan Women 1060-1080

3) 1288-1290: Κρόνιε, πρύτανι Φρύγιε, γενέτα t πάτερ α ν ά ξ ι α της Δαρδανίου t γονάς, τ ά δ ' οία πάσχομεν δέδορκας;

1290

In the first two of these passages, Hecuba rejects the third fundamental belief by relinquishing the traditional means of communication with the gods. The claim that 'we sacrificed in vain' (1242) tersely repeats the sentiment of the chorus in the third stasimon (1060-1070): the gods failed to reciprocate the cult that was devoted to them. The lapse in belief is provoked in Hecuba, as it was in the chorus, by a failure of religious action to attain its expected end. In the circumstances, belief gives way. In the second passage Hecuba stops herself in the midst of an appeal to the gods, for, given their lack of response, such an appeal now seems to her useless (1280). Hecuba's conviction that divine reciprocation is not forthcoming has, logically, led her to forgo the prayer she might have uttered; she has reached the point where she declines to worship the gods. In 1281, by suggesting that the gods did not even hear the appeals made to them, Hecuba doubts the belief that the gods pay attention to human affairs. This doubt of the second fundamental belief is repeated in the third passage (1288-1290): a pathetic address to Trojan Zeus is followed by the query whether this god even sees the suffering of the Trojans. 20 The chorus and Hecuba selected the same two items as the crucial matters of which the gods seemed to be oblivious:

the Trojans' religious efforts ( τ ά δ ' , 1077,

referring to the entire cult; sacrifice, 1242, and prayer, 1281) and the injuries done them (ruined polis, 1079-1080; their suffering, 1290). If the gods pay no attention to these two matters, they may be said to pay no attention to human affairs at all. 20 To this the chorus respond (1291): δέδορκεν. At this point, at least, they are not prepared to extend their doubt as far as Hecuba. Early in the play, following the Cassandra scene, Hecuba had expressed her disappointment in the gods rather mildly (469471).

Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

88

5.3 Andromache

1161-1165:

the third

belief

ΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ τοιαΰθ' ό τοις αλλοισι θεσπίζων αν α ξ, ò των δικαίων πάσιν άνθρώποις κριτής, δίκας δίδοντα παιδ' εδρασ' Άχιλλέως. έμνημόνευσε δ', ώσπερ άνθρωπος κακός, παλαιά νείκη · πώς αν ούν εϊη σοφός;

1165

In the Trojan Women the human characters claimed that the gods failed entirely to reciprocate their cult; Hecuba and the chorus eventually supposed that the gods were unaware of their plight. Thus, the third and then the second fundamental beliefs were rejected. In the passages to be examined from the Andromache there is no doubt that the god in question, Apollo, pays attention to mortal affairs; he pays, if anything, too much attention. The problem which arises for the human characters concerns the nature of the reciprocity between men and the god of the oracle in Delphi. Apollo's response to human initiative so outrages the messenger (and the chorus, for whom he can be presumed to speak) that he rejects Apollo's claim to the worship he receives in Delphi. Reciprocity between mortal and god breaks down because the mortals discover that the supposed reciprocity is a farce. At some time before the action of the play Neoptolemus had gone to Delphi and demanded compensation from Apollo for having caused the death of his father Achilles (52-53). Neoptolemus had more recently left his home in Phthia to return to Delphi to make amends for this blasphemy (δίκας δίδοντα, 1163; cf. 51-52, 1004, 1107). Andromache describes Neoptolemus' original demand on the god as μανία (52); at Delphi just before the murder is executed, Neoptolemus describes his prior action as α μ α ρ τ ί α (1106).

There is thus no question that Neoptolemus has

committed a grievous sacrilege and endangered himself (cf. 1194-1196). His second trip to the shrine is of course a recognition of the danger he has incurred; he has taken the trip in an effort to remove that danger (55). The

Andromache 1161-1165

89

messenger, well aware of Neoptolemus' original offense, is appalled by the events in Delphi not because he expects unwonted generosity from the god, but because of the manner in which retribution was exacted. The careful description of the circumstances of Apollo's retribution allows us the audience to understand, if not share, the messenger's dismay.21 First of all, Apollo has joined himself to a most unworthy ally. Orestes tells Hermione of the ambush he has prepared for Neoptolemus at Delphi (995-1008). The chorus overhear and are disturbed, but their thoughts in the immediately following fourth stasimon (1009-1046) do not directly pertain to the murder plot. They sing of Troy's fate and the scandalous behavior in the house of the Atreidae, even though, as women of Phthia, they are not directly concerned with these events. Nor are they moved by pity for the misfortune of others. The thread which connects these two themes and their present predicament is the attitude of Apollo. The most disturbing feature of Orestes' narration of his plot was his confident implication of Apollo as a confederate (1005-1006): ά λ λ ' εκ τ' έκείνου διαβολαΐς τε ταις έμαΐς / κακώς όλεΐται. Orestes portrays the demise of Neoptolemus as the single result of the vengeance of the two aggrieved parties, himself and the god (cf. esp. 1001-1004, 1006-1008).

Orestes,

who had vauntingly referred to himself as ό μηιροφόντης (999), is so vicious that the chorus are troubled by the hint of an alliance between the scoundrel and the god. In the lines about Troy (1009-1027) the chorus consider essentially the same question that is asked from a different perspective and for different reasons by the Trojan women in Tr. 1060-1080. The Phthian women ask 2 1 An initial hint of Euripides' intentions may be gathered from a relatively minor aspect of the dramatic information put at our disposal. Apollo's role in the death of Achilles would have been familiar from the Epic Cycle (cf. / / . 21.277, 22.359). Our attention is drawn to the Cycle by means of this allusion, but Euripides has none the less softened the ruthless Neoptolemus of the Cycle by suppressing in this play the murder of Priam ( / / . Parv. fr. XVI Allen) and the casting of Astyanax from the Trojan citadel ( / / . Parv. fr. XIX Allen). In the Andromache Neoptolemus is an offender attempting restitution, but he is not a brute. However, Burnett (1971) 152 may be right to see the description of the embattled Neoptolemus (1135ff.) as an allusion to the outrageous Neoptolemus of Troy.

90

Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

Apollo, who was historically bound to Troy (1009), and Poseidon, the other famous Trojan ally, how they could have forsaken their polis (10131018): τίνος οΰνεκα . . . τάλαιναν τάλαιναν μεθείτε Τροίαν; In their consideration of the lapse of divine reciprocity, the chorus even ponder the unlikely, but unavoidable fact that the Trojans' cult is now desolate (1025-1027): ούδ' ετι πυρ έπιβώμιον έν Τροί-

1025

α θεοίσιν λέλαμπεν καπνω θυώδπ. By considering Troy in this light the chorus imply the following query: could Apollo betray us too, could he make a mock of the cult bestowed on him by Greeks at Delphi? Next, singing of the murder of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra and her murder by Orestes (1028-1036), the chorus emphasize the role of Apollo's oracle in Orestes' act of matricide (1031-1032): θεοΰ θεοΰ νιν κέλευσμ' επεστράφη μαντόσυνον. In one breath they stress the incongruity of the matricide and the holy, innermost part of Apollo's shrine (1034-1035): άδυτων άποβάς, εκταν', ών ματρός φονεύς. This horrified mention of matricide contrasts with Orestes' boast mentioned above (999). Immediately after the ode the coryphaeus warns Peleus that the murder is planned to occur άγνοίς έν ίεροίς Λοξίου (1065), even though Orestes had not mentioned the shrine itself; the chorus clearly read correctly between the lines of Orestes' announcement to Hermione. Their premonitions will be borne out by the facts. At the end of their train of thought about Troy and the Atreidae, the chorus sing (1036): ω δαΐμον, ω Φοίβε, πώς πείθομαι; The scholiast ad loc. refers this question solely to the oracle given by Apollo to Orestes, the κέλευσμα (1031) enjoining matricide. This is too narrow

Andromache 1161-1165

91

an interpretation. The lack of an expressed object properly leaves open the interpretation of what it is the chorus have difficulty believing. Secondly, the chorus reach an emotional peak that has been building since the beginning of the ode; at this point (1036), clear and precise expression falters. 22 Hence, the chorus are hesitant to believe any of the indications of Apollo's perfidy that have just been mentioned: the betrayal of Troy, the complicity in matricide, and the apparent complicity with the lying, matricidal scoundrel in the ambush of Neoptolemus. The chorus are unable to accommodate these actions of Apollo within their normal expectations of Apollo's behavior towards men; they pause at the prospect and do not know what to think. The mere pause implies that the reverence which they pay the god is conditioned by the expectation of a certain standard in the god's reciprocation.

This standard is later made explicit in the messenger's

reproach of the god. Secondly, in the execution of the murder the god shows himself Orestes' ally in fact and thereby contributes to the desecration of the rites and purity of his own sanctuary. It is an ancient version of murder in the cathedral in which the god, aiding the assailants, corrupts the pious standards of his worship in Delphi in the mean pursuit of revenge. When Neoptolemus was attacked by ambush, he was within Apollo's sacred precinct, in the very act of sacrificing and uttering a prayer prior to approaching the oracle (1111-1119); he claims to be on a mission of piety (1125). The first stage of the fight takes place around the altar (11181138). At the point when a mysterious voice from the adyton intervenes (1147-1148): πριν δή τις άδυτων έκ μέσων έφθέγξατο δεινόν τι καί φρικώδες, ώρσε δέ στρατόν, Neoptolemus had succeeded in routing his mortal opponents (1139-1146). So far as the mortal conspirators were concerned, Orestes' plot had failed; 22 Garzya (1963) 97 says of ω δαίμον that 'l'esclamazione indica stupore e dolore', and compares Ale. 384, Hel. 455, Hipp. 871.

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the intervention from the adyton

was the decisive stroke against

Neoptolemus. At the end of the battle the corpse lay beside the altar and was then cast from the shrine (1156-1157). There can be no doubt that the unnamed, terrible voice, which came from the innermost shrine and which was the crucial factor in the murder, belonged to the god; the hint is obvious.23 The messenger, in the passage quoted at the head of this section (1161-1165), clearly holds the god responsible.

The compunctions

expressed earlier by the chorus are confirmed. Having completed his narration of the events in Delphi, the messenger utters the reproach quoted above (1161-1165). In the first three lines the messenger presents the two points of an irreconcilable opposition: the god's treatment of Neoptolemus ( τ ο ι α ΰ θ ' , 1161) and the standard according to which the god in Delphi is supposed to act towards men, viz. as the gods' spokesman to men (τοις άλλο u n θεσπίζων, 1161) and as the arbiter of justice for men (των δικαίων πάσιν άνθρώποις κριτής, 1162). The opposition is heightened by the reference to Neoptolemus' attempt to satisfy justice (δίκας δίδοντα, 1163). In the last two lines of his speech the messenger offers what he considers an appropriate model to describe Apollo's response to Neoptolemus (1164-1165). The god did not act wisely (σοφός, 1165), i.e. like a divine spokesman or an arbiter of justice, whom, we ought to infer, the messenger would gladly revere as a god. Apollo's actions were determined by the ineffaceable memory of Neoptolemus' original offense; hence the god responded to the man's approach like a vicious human being (άνθρωπος κακός, 1164). We ought to infer that this is not the sort of being whom the messenger would willingly worship and look upon as a god.24

23 For the use of τις to refer to a god's voice, cf. Ba. 1078-1079, IT 1385-1386, Soph. OC 1623. 24 For the moral connotations of σοφός in this context, see Stevens (1971) 235 ad loc. For the frequent insistence by Euripidean characters that gods be wise in moral matters, see below p. 144, n. 10. Cf. Boulter (1966) for an interpretation of the Andromache based on competing notions of wisdom (σοφία) which correspond to 'opposing concepts of morality' (p. 53).

93

Fragments and sententiae

It is not appropriate to dismiss the irreconcilable opposition presented by the messenger by remarking that he holds Apollo to a higher standard of behavior than might be deduced from the record of this and other gods in the stock of Greek myths, i.e. that he has a mistaken idea of what to expect from Apollo. It may be recognized as the god's prerogative whether he responds favorably or otherwise to the repentant sinner, but Euripides has taken pains to delineate the conflict between human beliefs about the god and the abasement of the god's status and shrine in Delphi. To respond on the basis of extra-dramatic considerations would artificially dissolve what is presented in the play as a real dilemma. In fact, the messenger's reproach forms the definitive moment of the dramatic conflict of the entire play; there follows immediately a kommos in which Neoptolemus is lamented and then the denouement with the appearance of Thetis. The murder of Neoptolemus is referred to for the last time by Thetis; she commands Peleus to bury the corpse 'near the Pythian altar as a reproach to the Delphians, so that the tomb publicize his violent murder at the hands of Orestes' (1240-1242). In harmony with the atmosphere of reconciliation at the play's end, Thetis omits any mention of Apollo by name; the location of the tomb is a sufficient reminder of the god's delinquency.25

5.4 Appendix to chapter five: fragments

and

sententiae

The interpretations of Euripides undertaken in Part Two concern the most important problems of religious belief in Euripides. These cases, in which a character's beliefs are part of the dramatic development of the play, are 25

Cf. Erbse (1966) 296-297. Burnett (1971) 152 remarks: '[Neoptolemus'] punishment thus comes upon him with didactic appropriateness and is plainly labelled as the justice not of man but of god.' First, I see no one in the play who draws any lesson from the fate of Neoptolemus. Second, I do not see Neoptolemus' punishment labeled, plainly or otherwise, as the justice of man or of god; if the boasts of Orestes (1003-1008) are being referred to, he is hardly a spokesman for justice. The messenger seems to me plainly to deny the justice of Neoptolemus' punishment (1162) and to liken the punishment to the revenge of a man, and a "bad man' at that (1164).

Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

94

interesting because here the fundamental beliefs are tested and examined in the face of events. The beliefs come alive, so to speak. Thus, it would not serve the present inquiry merely to catalogue all the instances in the preserved work of Euripides where one or another of the beliefs is mentioned in passing, or simply affirmed or doubted without further consideration. Among the considerable fragments of Euripides there are several which clearly or probably refer to the fundamental beliefs. But without the ability to discern context, one cannot tell how a character means what he says, how his words are related to circumstance, and how the belief in question affects action, if at all. 26 Many such fragments were excerpted and reported by later writers precisely because they tersely expressed a striking sententia. Likewise, certain utterances from the complete plays form pithy sentential, but however remarkable these passages may appear in isolation, they are often irrelevant to the drama as a whole. Because such passages, whether from the fragments or complete plays, do not provide material for our inquiry, I have largely ignored them. For the sake of illustrating this sort of sententious reference to the fundamental beliefs, I append a selection of six such passages. There is, however, a modest gain to be derived from a glance at this selection. Because of their terse expression, these passages demonstrate beyond doubt that Euripides recognized each of the beliefs as a distinctive and discernible element of religious belief. Needless to say, the poet shows no sign of ranking the beliefs in a hierarchy as I have done. 1) fr. 991 N., not assigned to any play: άλλ' εστι, κει τις έγγελα ( τώμω ) λόγω, Ζευς καί θεοί βρότεια λεύσσοντες πάθη. 26 Dodds (1929) made free use of fragments as evidence for assessing the nature of Euripidean irrationalism, even though he had initially (p. 98) insisted on context as an essential clue for determining the legitimate use of any particular passage.

95

Fragments and sententiae

The speaker affirms for himself the first and second beliefs, while acknowledging that others may entertain doubts. We can say nothing more. 2) fr. 577 N., from the Oenomaus: έγώ μεν εύτ' αν τους κακούς ορώ βροτών πίπτοντας, είναι φημί δαιμόνων γένος. The speaker affirms that seeing the downfall of the wicked encourages him to believe in the existence of the gods. The simple theodicy wherein the fall of the wicked proves the existence of the gods was hardly a novelty.27 But the speaker of the present lines may well have continued with a δέ clause in which he acknowledged his occasional doubt of the first belief when faced with the prosperity of the wicked.28 3) Hec. 488-496, Talthybius speaking: ώ Ζεΰ, τί λέξω; πότερα σ' ανθρώπους όρδν ή δόξαν άλλως τήνδε κεκτήσθαι μάτην [ψευδή, δοκοΰντας δαιμόνων είναι γένος],

490

τύχην δέ πάντα τάν βροτοις έπισκοπεΐν; οΰχ ήδ' άνασσα των πολυχρύσων Φρυγών, ούχ ηδε Πριάμου του μέγ' ολβίου δάμαρ; καί νυν πόλις μεν πάσ' άνέστηκεν δορί, αύτη δέ δούλη γραΰς άπαις έπί χθονί

495

κείται, κόνει φύρουσα δύστηνον κάρα. Talthybius utters these lines as he comes upon Hecuba in her degraded state. By doubting whether Zeus observes human affairs, Talthybius 27 Od. 24.351-352, Eur. El. 583-584, Ba. 1325-1326, Ar. Th. 668-674, and the proverb recorded by Diogenianus 6.88. At Aesch. Ag. 1578-1582, Aegisthus infers the second fundamental belief from the downfall of the unjust. On Eur. Supp. 731-732 see above p. 65, n. 18. 28 Variations on this theme were used to explain how Diagoras of Melos abandoned his belief in the gods; cf. Τ 9AB, 11, 26 Winiarczyk.

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Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

effectively doubts the second belief. The doubt clearly arises from the extreme and scarcely believable reversal in Hecuba's status. Yet that reversal is undeniable. Talthybius is a minor character in the drama and his exclamation doubting Zeus' attention to human affairs has no further significance; it is meant to emphasize the horror of Hecuba's degradation. 4) fr. 974 N., not assigned to any play: των αγαν γαρ οίπτεται θεός, τα μικρά δ' εις τύχην άφείς έα. The speaker of this fragment would essentially agree with Talthybius in doubting the second belief, if by τα μικρά he means τα έν βροτοΐς. If we could assume that is what is meant, this fragment would have even greater interest. For it would then anticipate the terms of the response of the Athenian in Laws 10 to those who denied the second belief (Lg. 900c-903a; cf. p. 37 above). The Athenian proved that the gods do attend to human affairs by showing that the gods attend to small matters no less than large (ώς έπιμελεΐς σμικρών είσιν θεοί ούχ ήττον, μάλλον δε, ή των μεγέθει διαφερόντων, 900c9-dl). 29 Of course, we have no grounds for assuming anything in particular at all. 5) fr. 286 N., from the Bellerophontes: φησίν τις είναι δήτ' έν ούρανφ θεούς; ούκ είσίν, ούκ εϊσ', εϊ τις ανθρώπων θέλει μή τω παλαίω μώρος ών χρήσθαι λόγφ. σκέψασθε δ' αυτοί, μή έπί τοις έμοίς λόγοις γνώμην εχοντες. φήμ' εγώ τυραννίδα

5

κτείνειν τε πλείστους κτημάτων τ' άποστερειν 29 The Platonic sound of this fragment may have been noticed by Plutarch, who introduces it by glossing θεός as ό του κόσμου βασιλεύς (Mor. 81 Id), a clear echo of Plato's notion of divinity in the Timaeus and the Laws.

Fragments and sententiae

97

ορκους τε παραβαίνοντας έκπορθειν πόλεις· και ταΰτα δρώντες μάλλον είσ' εύδαίμονες των εύσεβούντων ήσυχη καθ' ήμέραν. πόλεις τε μικράς οίδα τιμώσας θεούς,

10

αϊ μειζόνων κλύουσι δυσσεβεστέρων λόγχης άριθμφ πλείονος κρατούμεναι. 3 0 The speaker flatly denies that the gods exist; the proof is nearly the reverse of the theodicy used elsewhere to affirm their existence. Here the speaker does not merely point out the prosperity of the wicked or unjust; rather, he uses terms which amount to a denial of the third belief, the principle of reciprocity. The speaker plays on the expectation that, according to the common notion of reciprocity between men and gods, the pious should be better off than the impious. His examples show the reverse: it is the impious, the murderous, thieving tyrant and the peijurers (5-7), who are better off than the pious (8-9); and the latter, for all their worship of the gods (10), are subjected to the impious (11). Since these examples are irrefutable, the belief in divine reciprocity is shown to be unwarranted. From this position the speaker would have his auditors boldly reject the gods altogether. This inference requires tacit premises to the effect that gods, if they existed, would pay attention to men and would reciprocate piety with favor and impiety with disfavor. 31 Thus this one long fragment explicity denies the first and third fundamental beliefs, and implicitly denies the second. It is certainly the most interesting Euripidean fragment with regard to the fundamental beliefs. (1 omit the atheistic fragment from the Sisyphus, discussed above, p. 56, because of the dispute over authorship.) The Bellerophontes

must have contained an extended treatment of radical

30 I omit the last three lines, which make no sense as handed down. 31 With the picture of disrupted reciprocity in this fragment, it is worth comparing TrGF Adesp. F 1 b (g) (= Soph. fr. 103 N.). In the latter fragment, after a similar picture of disrupted reciprocity between men and gods, the speaker does not reject the gods altogether, but merely demands that a reasonable reciprocity be established. Scholars have claimed to see the influence of Euripides in this fragment (however, in response to Leo, Plaut. Forscht 118, n. 1, see Wilamowitz, Kl. Sehr. 4.291, n. 1). Eur. fr. 286 Ν. has not previously been cited as evidence of this influence.

Introduction to the Problem in Euripides

98

atheism (cf. also fr. 292 N.); the action of the play must have clearly refuted the atheism and shown that the gods exist. In our deprived circumstances we can say little more. 6) El. 737-746, the end of the second stasimon: λέγεται ( τάδε ), τάν δε πίστιν σμικράν παρ' εμοιγ' εχει, στρέψαι θερμάν άέλιον χρυσωπόν εδραν άλλαξαν-

740

τα δυστυχία βροτείω θνατάς ενεκεν δίκας. φοβεροί δε βροτοισι μΰθοι κέρδος προς θεών θεραπείαν. ων ού μνασθεισα πόσιν

745

κτείνεις, κλεινών συγγενέτειρ' αδελφών. The sentenîia proper is contained in lines 743-744: fearful stories encourage men to worship the gods. The earlier part of the ode concerns the episode of the golden lamb which, as the symbol of legitimate rule, became an object of contention between Atreus and Thyestes (699-726). Thyestes stole the totem. Zeus revealed the crime by reversing the direction of the motion of the heavenly bodies and reversing the climates of the regions of the earth (727-736). The τάδε printed as a supplement in line 737 refers to the reaction of Zeus. What the chorus are reluctant to believe (πίστιν σμικράν, 737-738) is not that Zeus reversed the path of the sun, but that he did it 'for the sake of a suit between mortals' (742).32 The chorus essentially doubt that Zeus pays such close attention, and reacts in so cosmic a manner, to a petty crime among mortals; for the tale implies just such attention and reaction. This is tantamount to doubting, at least for these circumstances, the second and 32

Wilamowitz (1921) 560. Rosivach (1978) fails to appreciate this point.

Fragments and sententiae

99

third fundamental beliefs. But the chorus immediately acknowledge the effect of such tales upon the religious observance and moral behavior of mankind. The belief in divine attention and divine reciprocity entailed by this story promotes both the cult that mortals offer the gods ( θ ε ώ ν θ ε ρ α π ε ί α ν , 744) and restraint from such behavior as would provoke divine punishment. 33 Clytemnestra's criminal slaughter of Agamemnon is an example, as was Thyestes' theft of the golden lamb, of just such behavior.

33 A s noted by Denniston (1939) 142, the fragment from the Sisyphus play also discussed the religious beliefs necessary to promote the belief in a divine sanction for morality (see p. 56 above). The present passage from the Electro adds that religious cult also depends on these beliefs.

CHAPTER SIX

Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus

and Ion

In the religion of the polis, worshippers naturally believed in some sort of reciprocity between themselves and the gods. The nature of this reciprocity and its reliability varied considerably according to the particular religious act in question; this matter was discussed in chapter three. In this chapter we shall examine in two plays of Euripides one distinctive type of reciprocity, viz. that which entails an allegiance between particular human beings and particular gods, a reciprocity which is strengthened on both sides by affection, loyalty, or special obligation. A relationship of this sort can frequently be identified in literary sources when the men or gods are designated as φίλοι of the other. In such cases the general nexus of ties and obligations which φιλία implies can be presumed to be present. But the designation φιλία does not cover all cases of special allegiance between divine and human parties, nor does it in itself explain the nature, extent, and operation of the allegiance between divine and mortal. Hippolytus and Ion each believes that he enjoys a special, preferential relationship with a particular god; on the basis of this belief they expect preferential treatment from the gods in question. In the course of the drama the characters are forced to test, and perhaps even discard, their belief in divine reciprocity.

Exchange of χάρις, divine φιλία

101

In the Hippolytus and the Ion we shall focus on the depiction and evolution of this religious belief; we do not present interpretations of these plays in their entirety. Before examining how Euripides treats problems involving beliefs of this sort, we shall describe the distinctive features of this religious attitude as it emerges from non-Euripidean sources.

6.1 Background:

exchange ο / χ ά ρ ι ς , divine φ ι λ ί α

An initial indication of the personal element in reciprocity with the gods may be gleaned from a short section of the conversation between Euthyphro and Socrates in Plato's dialogue. Near the end of the dialogue, Euthyphro makes his final attempt to define sacredness (το δσιον, Pl. Euthphr. 14b25): έάν μεν κεχαρισμένα τις έπίστηται τοις θεοίς λέγειν τε καί πράττειν ευχόμενος τε καί θύων, ταΰτ' εστι τα οσια, καί σώζει τα τοιαύτα τους τε ιδίους ο'ικους καί τα κοινά των πόλεων· τα δ' έναντία των κεχαρισμένων άσεβη, α δή καί ανατρέπει ίίπαντα καί άπόλλυσιν. The sense of reciprocity between men and gods is clear: human beings give the gods in prayer and sacrifice what is pleasing to them; in return the gods give men security in domestic and civil affairs. After several further questions and responses Socrates offers the following restatement of Euthyphro's definition (14e6-7): έμπορικη αρα τις αν εϊη, ώ Εύθύφρων, τέχνη ή όσιότης θεοίς καί άνθρώποις παρ' αλλήλων. Socrates' restatement also captures, if even more strongly, reciprocity between men and gods by defining sacredness as the art of commerce between men and gods. However, Socrates' version is tendentious, in spite

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Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

of Euthyphro's assent to the intervening premises, because Socrates has omitted a crucial element in the reciprocity posited by his interlocutor, viz. χάρις. As the first word in Euthyphro's definition, κεχαρισμένα was given prominence; so Socrates gives the prominent first position to his contrasting concept - εμπορική. Despite all the forms of worship of which Socrates' version is an accurate description, by omitting the intangible element of χάρις Socrates has omitted something typical and familiar in Greek religion. Like commercial exchange, exchange incorporating χάρις is a traditional and well-recognized basis for transactions between any two parties. 1 But χ ά ρ ι ς places the transaction outside the realm of mere business; it entails a measure of personal esteem which cannot be measured or delivered purely by means of an objective medium such as money. The deficiency in Socrates' version seems to me to be implied in Euthyphro's grudging assent to Socrates' restatement (14e8): εμπορική, ει οΰτως ηδιόν σοι όνομάζειν. This deficiency is glaring in the light of information gathered from messages to the gods inscribed on votive offerings, one of the principal modes of exchange between men and gods. In its most general aspect the act of setting up a votive offering is a tangible expression, and therefore a public record, of the dedicator's belief in some form of reciprocity between himself and a particular god. If the offering has been dedicated by a group, such as an entire polis, a deme, or a religious club, the offering is likewise a testimony of the reciprocal relation between the group and the god. There is an enormous quantity of evidence relating to the extent, variety, occasions, and purposes of votive offerings in Greek religion, most of it beyond the scope of this inquiry.2 For present purposes, it is most important to grasp that votive offerings, no matter how customary or perfunctory, were not the equivalent of payment by human beings for services rendered by gods on the basis of a quid pro quo commerce. In a study of the Hellenistic portion of the dedicatory epigrams 1 Cf. Soph. Ai. 522; Eur. Hel. 1234; Th. 2.40.4, 3.63.4; Lys. 12.60, 28.17, 31.24; Xen. Ages. 2.29. 2 For collections and analysis of this evidence, see Rouse (1902), Raubitschek (1949), Lazzarini (1976), van Straten (1981), Burkert (1985) 68-70,92-95.

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103

of the sixth book of the Palatine Anthology, Festugière showed that, in the Hellenistic period at least, 'cette réciprocité de dons entre l'homme et la divinité n'a pas le côté sordide d'un contrat'. Festugière selected the locution άνθ' ων as typical of the 'réciprocité d'amitié' which is often expressed by a variety of other means. 3 In fact inscriptions on votive offerings from both archaic Greece and classical Athens display the same tendency to elevate the relationship of dedicator and god beyond mere commercial contract to a preferential reciprocity based on mutual esteem. The offering is not presented as payment to the deity but as an ornament for the deity. The dedicated object was so typically described as an ά γ α λ μ α , that this word became a synonym for α ν ά θ η μ α (and then eventually came to mean 'statue').4 However, at least through the fourth century ά γ α λ μ α maintained its sense of 'ornament', if only in a subordinate way, even when used to refer to dedications;5 for example, from fifth-century Athens, [Anac.] AP 6.144.1-2 [= Hansen 312]: Στροίβου παΐ, τόδ' άγαλμα, Λεώκρατες, εύτ' άνέθηκας Έρμη, καλλικόμους ούκ ελαθες Χάριτας. The dedication is also frequently described as a gift for the god, δώρον; for example, from fifth-century Athens, Hansen 268.1-2: [,..]όδορός μ' άνέθεκ' Άφροδίτει δόρον άπαρχέν, πότνια, τον αγαθόν, τόι σύ δός άφθονίαν.

3 Festugière (1976) 413-414. Cf. Rouse (1902) 350: 'The essence of a votive offering is freewill'; the deity is conceived of as 'likely to be pleased with a gift'. Cf. the title of van Straten's article on votive offerings (van Straten [1981]): 'Gifts for the gods'. 4 For the semantic development, see Chantraine, Diet. Étym. 6-7, s.v. ά γ ά λ λ ο μ α ι . The use of ά γ α λ μ α in votive inscriptions is too frequent to bear citation. For its use in archaic votive inscriptions, see Lazzarini (1976) 95-98; in fifth-century Athenian votive inscriptions, see Raubitschek (1949) 430. To cite inscriptions from the collections of Raubitschek (1949), Peek (1955), and Hansen (1983), I use the editor's name and the inscription number. Wherever possible, I cite from Hansen's edition, because it is the most comprehensive and convenient. 5 See Wilamowitz (1895) 3.16-17 (ad IIF 49), Gemet (1968a) 97-99; and cf. the pun in PI. Lg. 930e7-931a2.

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In a manner very similar to the 'réciprocité de dons' described by Festugière and quoted above, the dedicator presented this offering as a gift, but expected a gift in return: σύ δός. 6 The most striking illustration of this religious attitude comes from a series of inscriptions in which the offering is portrayed as sustaining mutual esteem between dedicator and god. The notion of exchange or reciprocation is usually expressed by some locution using άντί as preverb or preposition (as Festugière's άνθ' ών), or some equivalent locution, such as άμοιβή. Some word expressing the notion of χάρις is applied to the action or disposition of either the donor or the recipient or both. The earliest certain example, providing a clear illustration, comes from seventh-century Thebes (Hansen 326): Μαντικλός μ' άνέθεκε ρεκαβόλοι άργυροτόξσοι τάς δεκάτας· τύ δέ, Φοίβε, δίδοι χαρίρετταν άμοιβ[άν]. 7 The diction of votive inscriptions from classical Athens expresses this sort of reciprocity with great plasticity. The following three examples are all from fifth-century Athens.8

6 For δώρον (gift for the god) as a conventional element in archaic votive formulae, see Lazzarini (1976) 102-103; cf. Hansen 327, 387. For other fifth-century examples of δώρον, cf. Raubitschek 332, [Anac.] AP 6.139 (for the date of the latter, see Page [1981] 140). For examples from fourth-century Athens, cf. IG II 2 4373, 4548, 4596, 4602, 4888, [Anac.] AP 6.346 (for the latter, cf. Page [1981] 136-137). Finley (1954) interpreted the institution of reciprocal gift-giving in Homeric society as essentially similar to the gifts given to gods; cf. II. 9.155: οϊ κέ έ δωτίνησι θεόν ώς τιμήσουσι; Finley (1954) 61-65, 100-103, 132-133, 148. For the practice of exchanging gifts as a formal aspect of friendship in the classical period, see Herman (1987), esp. 80,107. 7 The end of the second hexameter is formulaic, as in the prayer which Athena, disguised as Mentor, offers to Poseidon, Od. 3.58. For this motif in archaic votive formulae, see Lazzarini (1976) 131-136. For other archaic examples of similar locutions, cf. Hansen 321a, 336, 358, 359, 360, 371,400, 426. 8 Also from fifth-century Athens: Hansen 205, 231, 234, 258, 260, 279a, IG I 2 576. With Hansen 225 compare [Anac.] AP 6.137. [Anac.] AP 6.142 is, according to Page (1981) 142, from the fifth century, but not from Athens. From fourth-century Athens: IG II 2 4334,4556, [Anac.] AP 6.346 (on the provenance of the last mentioned, see Page [1981] 136-137). Cf. Pherecrates fr. 18A Edmonds: ώ Ζεΰ, καλώς γ' άνταποδίδως μοι την χάριν; and Peek 1491.3, a fourth-century Athenian epitaph: ει δέ τις εύσεβίας παρά Φερσεφόνει χάρις εστίν.

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105

[Anac.] AP 6.138 [= Hansen 313]: πρίν μεν Καλλιτέλης ίδρύσατο, τόνδε δ' έκείνου εγγονοί έστήσανθ', οίς χάριν άντιδίδου. Hansen 227: Φαρθένε, έν άκροπόλει Τελεσίνος αγαλμ' άνέθεκεν Κέτιος hôi χαίροσα διδοίες άλο άναθεναι. Hansen 275: ΓΙότνι', άπαρχέν τένδε Μένανδρο[ς — u u

]

εύχολέν τελέσας σοι χάριν άντ[ιδιδός] Αΐγιλιευς Ινυιός Δεμειρίο hò[v u u ] σόιζε, Διός θύγατερ, τόνδε χάρ[ιν θεμένε]. 9 The meaning of χάρις in this series of inscriptions is rather hard to specify precisely. Xenophon's Cyrus clearly uses the word χ ά ρ ι ς to express gratitude in a prayer which accompanies an offering of χαριστήρια to the gods (Cyr. 8.7.3). But χάρις cannot mean 'thanks' in the votive offerings cited above because the χάρις exists on both sides; and the dedicator wants more than thanks in return from his god. These votive offerings, therefore, are not thank-offerings. 'Favor' perhaps comes closest, because favor can be mutual; 10 but the inscriptions imply an enduring relationship of favor between the two parties, not a single exchange of acts of kindness. The inscriptions frequently, though not invariably, employ the present tense in moods outside the indicative, thus expressing the continuative aspect. 11 9

The supplement of the first pentameter is assured, and universally accepted, because of the end of the pentameter of [Anac.] AP 6.138 above, and Hansen 258: χ ] ά ρ ι ν άντιδίδο, likewise the end of a pentameter (cf. Hansen 231, 279a, 321a). Supplements for the second hexameter and pentameter are uncertain and disputed. I have printed Hansen's text in the second pentameter; another possibility worth considering is Kaibel's τόνδε χαρ[ιζομένε] (cf. Peek 1723 for this locution). 10 Cf. Chaniraine, Diet. Éíym. 1247, s.v. χάρις: '"faveur" accordée ou rendue'. 11 From the inscriptions quoted above: δίδοι (Hansen 326), άντιδίδου ([Anac.] AP 6.138), χαίροσα διδοίες (Hansen 227), άντ[ιδιδός] (Hansen 275.2), and possibly σόιζε

106

Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

Hence, χάρις in these inscriptions means favor in the sense of 'partial esteem' or 'preference'. The dedicator is attempting to sustain a privileged relationship with the deity, a relationship in which each party bestows on the other extraordinary esteem.12 The relationship manifests itself through pleasing material gifts on the one side and invaluable favor on the other; these cement an allegiance of each party towards the other.13 There is, of course, no question of equality between the parties. In a context outside votive offerings, reciprocity between mortal and divine based on an exchange of χάρις is stressed simultaneously with the normal inferiority of mortal to divine. An early Hippocratic writer invokes what he takes to be a standard popular belief, according to which the gods are thought to bestow favor upon men in return for the worship they receive with favor from men. The doctor wants to argue the absurdity of believing that a particular disease has a divine cause. He observes that the rich have greater means than the poor to honor the gods with sacrifice (θύειν) and dedications (άνατιθέναι άναθήματα); on that ground the rich ought to enjoy in return greater divine favor. Hence, if this disease were more divine (θειότερον) than others, it would fall more upon the poor than the rich (which is the exact opposite of the facts), ει δή τιμώμενοι χαίρουσιν οί θεοί καί θαυμαζόμενοι ΰπ' ανθρώπων καί άντί τούτων χάριτας ... χαρ[ιζομένε] (Hansen 275.4). With regard to the supplements for Hansen 275, see note 9. Similar instances are to be found in the inscriptions cited but not quoted above. 12 Cf. Burkert (1985) 189: 'Men live by the hope of reciprocal favour, charts.' Versnel (1981) 47-49 also rules out 'thanks' as the meaning of χάρις in votive offerings. However, his suggestion (following O. Loew, XARIS [Diss. Marburg 1908]) that χάρις means 'res laetificans, das Erfreuende' hardly advances our understanding. For the meaning of χ ά ρ ι ς in Homer, see Latacz (1966) 78-98. At II. 23.647-650, the reciprocal giftgiving of Homeric society is combined with divine χάρις in the sense which it has in the votive inscriptions. 13 In the first stasimon of the Trojan Women the chorus lament the Wooden Horse which the Trojans had presented as a dedication to the Trojan Athena Polias (511-567). The destruction that ensued made a farce of the expected reciprocation of favor. For the diction of votive offerings, cf. 535-536: καί Δαρδανίας άταν θεά δώσων, χάριν άζυγος άμβροτοπώλου. (Δαρδανίας αταν refers to the Horse, θεά is the slight but necessary emendation of Musurus printed by Diggle [mss.: θέα].) The concept of the failed votive offering presented in this ode owes much to a similar, but less dramatic scene of offering and refusal in//. 6.286-311.

Exchange of χάρις, divine φιλία

107

ά π ο δ ι δ ό α σ ι ν (Corp. Hipp. Aër. 22.9 Diller). 14 The doctor does not discard the popular belief about divine worship and favor; he does discard the popular belief that this disease has something to do with the gods. The affective element in divine reciprocity does not fail to surface where one would most expect it in Plato, the Symposium. When Eryximachus has the floor, he colorlessly speaks in passing of 'all sacrifices and occasions for divination' as ή περί θεούς τε καί ανθρώπους προς αλλήλους κοινωνία (188b6-cl). He then goes on to call this 'mutual association of men and gods', when it is properly managed, φιλίαι θεών και ανθρώπων (188dl, cf. d9). Eryximachus is not indulging in a bold metaphor for the sake of his praise of Love; rather, the natural fitness of the transition to the more emotive description, φιλία, serves as the basis for this part of his encomium of orderly Love. Relationships of φ ι λ ί α between men and gods are a hallmark of Homeric poetry. 15 Kinship with Zeus constitutes the most basic form of this relationship. Achilles, for example, is termed διογενής (II. 1.489, 21.17), addressed as Δι'ι φίλε (//. 1.74), and recognized as the object of the φιλία of Zeus (II. 9.117) and of the gods in general (II. 20.122-123, Od. 24.92).16 Agamemnon stands in a relationship of φιλία to Zeus because of his political status as king, a status which Zeus has a special care to promote. 17 φιλία between an individual and the gods can result from 14 I have printed the text attributed in Diller's apparatus to Koraes: he emended nonsense in the manuscripts (οΰ ιιμωμένοισιν ήδη εΐ) to read εϊ δη τιμ. Diller adopts in his text (Corpus Medicorum Graecorwri) the further conjecture of Pohlenz, who proposed reading τιμώμενοι δη ει κτλ. in the light of Eur. Hipp. 8 (discussed below, p. 114). The result of Pohlenz's conjecture is to make the doctor and Aphrodite in the Hippolytus sound very much alike. 15 For the evolution of the concept of θ ε ο φ ι λ ί α from Homer on, see Dirlmeier (1935). For the use of φιλέω in the diction of prayers from Homer on, see Keyßner (1932) 68-70. At no time before the Christian era does φιλία between men and gods signify love. 16 Zeus is Achilles' great-grandfather through Aeacus and Peleus. φιλία with Zeus through kinship is expressed also for Sarpedon (II. 16.433,450, 460, 568) and Heracles (II. 18.118). The convenience of epithets was more important than genealogy: Patroclus, who has no discernible blood tie to Zeus, often has the epithet διογενής (II. 1.337; 11.823; 16.49,126,707) and is once addressed as Διι φίλε (//. 11.611). 17 II. 2.196-197; cf. II. 2.100-109, 205-206; 9.98-99; Hes. Th. 96.

108

Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

consistently pious devotion to cult. In the following quotation, the 'gifts' which Hector never omitted must be votive offerings (//. 24.66-70, Zeus is speaking): ά λ λ α καί "Εκτωρ φίλτατος εσκε θεοισι βροχών οϊ έν Ί λ ί φ είσίν· ώς γαρ εμοιγ', έπεί οΰ τι φίλων ήμάρτανε δώρων, ού γάρ μοί ποτε βωμός έδεύετο δαιτός έίσης, λοιβής τε κνίσης τε. 18 Zeus maintains his allegiance to his loyal adherent.

70 Hector was

conscientious in his tendance of pious ritual; in return his divine φίλοι bestow even after his death the favor of an exceptional dispensation, the injunction against Achilles' mutilation of his corpse. 19 So too Apollo's priest Chryses is termed a φίλος of the god (//. 1.381). When Chryses sought Apollo's aid, he based his appeal on his previous attention to the god's cult (1.37-42; cf. esp. 39: εν ποτέ τοι Υαρίεντ' έπί νηόν ερεψα). 20 Examples from Homer could easily be multiplied. The language of φιλία is also used to describe the reciprocal allegiance between the community of an entire polis and a particular god.

In

Aeschylus' Ewnenides the Athenians and Athena enjoy such a relationship: the Athenians are παρθένου φίλας φίλοι (999). The offer to the Erinyes to exercise their powers benificently in return for loyal cult is tendered by Athena out of concern for the citizens (927-928): τάδ' εγώ προφρόνως τοισδε πολίταις / πράσσω (cf. 968-970). 21 The ancient goddesses are 18

Cf. 24.422-428, 749-750. In the nominative following the feminine caesura Hector regularly has the epithet Διι φίλος: II. 6.318,8.493,10.49,13.674. 19 The pathetic mixture of attachment and detachment which Homer's gods feel for mortals is clearly displayed in the scene in which Zeus grieves for Hector's fate (22.166185). The only other mortal for whom Zeus grieves is his φίλος by blood, Sarpedon (16.431-461,644-651). Sarpedon is rewarded with the supernatural removal of his corpse from the battlefield because of his special relationship with Zeus (16.454-457,666-683). Zeus expresses some reluctance over the fate of Troy as a whole because of their pious tendance of cult (4.43-49). 20 Cf. the favor Hephaestus renders his priest Dares (II. 5.9-24). 21 The thought is much like that of a private dedication of the early fifth century from the acropolis (Raubitschek 64):

Exchange of χάρις, divine φιλία

109

invited to acquire the Athenians as φίλοι (901) and join in the special relationship (868-869): εύ δρώσαν, εύ πάσχουσαν, εύ τιμωμένην χώρας μετασχειν τήσδε θεοφιλέστατης. Reciprocation between the two parties is spelled out. But the reciprocity is not devoid of the affection (φιλία) that makes the relation distinctive and secure; by their piety the Athenians have won for themselves the special status of φιλία προς τους θεούς. 2 2 It is much rarer but certainly not unexampled, for human beings to address a god as φίλος. When such an address occurs, there is present the feeling of unusual intimacy between the mortal and the god; e.g. Hipponax fr. 32.1-3 West: Έρμη, φίλ' Έρμη, Μαιαδεΰ, Κυλλήνιε, έπεύχομαί τοι, κάρτα γαρ κακώς ριγώ καί β α μ β α λ ύ ζ ω . 2 3 Homer remains unsurpassed at dramatizing from the divine perspective the tenuousness of the tie between men and gods (e.g. //. 21.462-467); yet his human characters hardly delve into the problem. When Hector realizes that he has been deceived by the gods and must face Achilles alone, he is stoic (//. 22.294-305). Herodotus takes the first steps towards portraying what becomes a prominent motif in Euripides, the psychological state of the worshipper who is troubled by insufficient favor from the god to whom he [ — u u ]νες καί παίδες Ά[θ]εν[α]ίαι τόδ' αγ[αλμα] [ανθεσα]ν. Ιιε δ' αύτ[οΐ]ς π[ρό]φρονα θυμό[ν εχοι]. 22 Cf. the appeal of the chorus of Aesch. Sept. to Ares to succor the polis αν ποτ' εύφιλήταν εθου (107). 23 Cf. Thgn. 373 (Zeus), Pl. Phdr. 279b8 (Pan), Men. Sam. 444 (Apollo), Gow and Page (1965) 2.208 (on Callimachus Hell. Ep. 55.4 [Zeus]); instances from Eur. Hipp. are discussed below. Burkert (1985) 274 misrepresents the statement in [Arist.] MM 1208b30-31 that 'it would be strange if someone were to say that he φιλείν Zeus'. Indeed here and elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus equal friendship between man and god is ruled out, but Aristotle does admit an unequal φιλία; cf. EE 1238bl8-28, EN 1179a2230, and Verdenius (1960) 60, 67 note 29.

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Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

has been devoted. Croesus had been especially lavish in the dedications (αναθήματα) he had made to Apollo in Delphi (Hdt. 1.50, 51, 54). From this munificence he gained the reputation of being θεοσεβής (1.86.2). While on the pyre on which Cyrus had placed him, Croesus invoked Apollo's aid with a reminder of the favor he formerly enjoyed through his lavish dedications: ε ϊ τ ί οι κεχαρισμένον έξ αύτοΰ έδωρήθη (1.87.1). After the pyre was miraculously quenched, Cyrus was convinced that Croesus was θεοφιλής (1.87.2). Croesus, however, was still troubled by what he felt was the discrepancy between his gifts to Apollo and the god's deceitful oracle (1.90.2-3). With bitter irony he sends his bonds to Delphi as a dedication (τιθέναι) of first-fruits (άκροθίνια) and asks the god bluntly ει άχαρίστοισι νόμος είναι τοίσι Έλληνικοίσι θεοίσι (1.90.4; cf. Bacchyl. 3.38, 58-62). The oracle explained that Apollo had of course been as loyal to Croesus as was possible (1.91). Croesus is in the end satisfied with the god's response: ò δε άκουσας συνέγνω έωυτοΰ είναι την άμαρτάδα καί οΰ του θεοΰ (1.91.6). One further aspect of friendship with the gods is worth observing before considering Euripides. In Xenophon's Symposium a certain Hermogenes claims that the gods are his great φίλοι; he stresses his constant, but conventional piety as the reason he has won such friends. In his response Socrates acknowledges the role of pious cult (θεραπεία) in winning such friends, but adds that the gods must be pleased with his character: τοιούτος

ών φίλους αυτούς εχεις, καί οί θεοί, ώς

καλοκαγαθία ηδονται (4.46-49).

εοικε,

Hermogenes' nobility is itself a

source of pleasure to the gods, in addition to the conventionally pious acts which spring from his noble disposition. A hint of the role of personal character in establishing mutual allegiance with a particular god appears as early as Homer. Odysseus clearly enjoys a special relationship with Athena and profits from the rewards of that relationship; Nestor extols the φιλία of Odysseus and Athena as the greatest between any god and any mortal (Od. 3.218-222). At one point Athena explains her attachment to this mortal as the result of a peculiar affinity in character, their common craftiness (Od.

Hippolytus and Artemis

111

13.291-302, 330-332). In the fifth century there is some scattered evidence of an appreciation of the role of the worshipper's moral character in winning the friendship of the gods. According to Plato's paraphrase, Simonides makes this point briefly in the poem on moral character: έπί πλείστον δε καί αριστοί είσιν οΰς αν οί θεοί φιλώσιν (Prt. 345c3 [= Simonides 37.19-20 Page]). 24 Some of the sources for Plutarch's excursus on this subject (Numa 4) may well go back to the fifth century; e.g. a Pythian oracle to Lycurgus recorded by Herodotus calls him Ζηνί φίλος καί πάσιν 'Ολύμπια δώματ' εχουσι (1.65.3). Clearly Lycurgus' moral character won him this distinction.25

6.2 Hippolytus and Artemis As portrayed by Euripides, Hippolytus and Artemis enjoy an extraordinary bond of mutual esteem. The reciprocity between this mortal and this deity approximates in many details the schema of allegiance between men and gods described just above. The drama, however, affords the opportunity of observing the vicissitudes of this reciprocity, to say nothing of the power lent by the poetry to the depiction of an intimacy between mortal and divine. 2 6

The allegiance of Hippolytus and Artemis to each other

withstands the force of events; however, there is a limit to what even this particularly strong allegiance can accomplish. The human partner is finally reduced to passivity. Following a choral song in honor of his goddess, Hippolytus worships her before her statue. In this one act the relationship between the man and Cf. Soph. Ai. 132-133, Eur. fr. 852 N. Isocrates records a story in which Aeacus succeeded on behalf of the Greeks in gaining a favorable intervention of the gods because of both his kinship with Zeus and his piety (δια της συγγενείας καί της εύσεβείας); within the latter Isocrates subsumes both pious ritual observance and pious character (Isoc. 9.14). 26 Festugière (1954) 1-18 was moved by the power of Euripides' portrayal of Hippolytus' devotion to Artemis, and took it as one model of personal devotion in what he called 'popular piety'. Cf. also Festugière (1969) 35-39: L'intimité avec une personne divine'. 24

25

112

Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

the goddess is firmly characterized. The ceremony entails the dedication of a garland (73-83), followed by a prelude to the prayer (84-86) and the prayer itself (87): σοί τόνδε πλεκτόν στέφανον έξ ακήρατου λειμώνος, ω δέσποινα, κοσμήσας φέρω, ενθ' οΰτε ποιμήν άξιοι φέρβειν βοτά

75

οΰτ' ήλθέ πω σίδηρος, άλλ' άκήρατον μέλισσα λειμών' ήρινή διέρχεται, Αιδώς δε ποταμίαισι κηπεύει δρόσοις, οσοις διδακτόν μηδέν άλλ' έν τη φύσει το σωφρονειν εϊληχεν ές τα πάντ' άεί,

80

τούτοις δρέπεσθαι, τοις κακοισι δ' οΰ θέμις, άλλ', ώ φίλη δέσποινα, χρυσέας κόμης άνάδημα δέξαι χειρός εύσεβοΰς άπο. μόνφ γάρ έστι τοΰτ' έμοί γέρας βροτών· σοι καί ξύνειμι και λόγοις άμείβομαι,

85

κλύων μεν αΰδής, ό'μμα δ' ούχ ορών το σόν. τέλος δε κάμψαιμ' ώσπερ ήρξάμην βίου. In making the dedication Hippolytus speaks to the goddess directly: σοί (the first word), and vocatives (74, 82).27 This is the typical manner of divine address in dedicatory epigrams. adornment for the goddess (74):

He offers the garland as an

κοσμήσας φέρω.

Although the

ornamental aspect of the dedicated object is usually subsumed in the formulaic αγαλμα, the dedicators may also use the word κοσμέω in describing their dedication: τόνδε σοι, ώ μεγάλη σεμνή Πάνδημε Άφρ[οδίτη, κοσ]μοΰμεν δώροις είκόσιν ήμετέραις. 28 27 For the use of the vocative δ έ σ π ο ι ν α in prayers in tragic diction, see Henrichs (1976b) 262-264. 28 IG II 2 4596, from fourth-century Athens; ironically, in light of our subject, to Aphrodite Pandemos. (The supplements are assured on the grounds of sense, meter, and

113

Hippolytus and Artemis

The value of the garland derives from its utter purity (73-77). It was bought, so to speak, with Hippolytus' morally pure character ( t o σωφρονεΐν), which gave him the right to enter the sacred meadow and cull the flowers (78-81). At the moment of donation Hippolytus stresses the piety of the human source of the gift (χειρός εύσεβοΰς άπο, 82-83); the gift and donor are not really divisible. At the moment of donation he also uses the rare form of address which connotes a distinctive friendship with the goddess: he calls her φίλη (82; cf. 1092). As a prelude to the request in the prayer, Hippolytus mentions the unique privilege which the goddess bestows on him in return for his devotion (84; cf. 19): he enjoys her physical presence and conversation (85-86; cf. 17-18). In the prayer which closes the dedication he asks only for an indefinite continuation of the status quo (87), and that is, in concrete terms, both the preferential treatment he receives as a favor from the goddess and his morally pure state which renders him worthy of her favor. In our discussion of the Hippolytus we are essentially concerned with the ties of allegiance between Hippolytus and Artemis. But the peculiarity of this relationship is enhanced by its juxtaposition with the mutual scorn of Hippolytus and Aphrodite.

At the very beginning of the play, after

announcing her identity, Aphrodite establishes a single principle for understanding relations between mortals and gods (7-8, quoted and discussed below). She then illustrates this principle (9) by referring to Hippolytus and his relations with the two goddesses.

Hippolytus is

devoted to Artemis (15-16); in return he enjoys the extraordinary favor of her presence in the hunt (17-19).

Hippolytus scorns Aphrodite to an

extraordinary degree (10-14); for this he is to be severely punished by her (21-23). The one situation is the reverse image of the other. 29 space on the stones.) In the inscription the dedicants adorn something (presumably an altar, βωμόν) by offering gifts; Hippolytus has made his offering into an adornment (taking κοσμήσας as coincident aorist) for the goddess. I take the intentions of the real and fictional dedicants to be the same. 29 The contrast is continued in the next scene, where Hippolytus' earnest worship of his favorite goddess (73-87) is followed by his refusal to offer even token worship to Aphrodite (88-120).

114

Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

The principle guiding both situations is none other than a reciprocation distinguished by the presence or absence of χάρις. Aphrodite first presents her disposition as a goddess towards men in terms of a reciprocity of strict requital (5-6): τους μεν σέβοντας τάμα πρεσβεύω κράτη,

5

σφάλλω δ' οσοι φρονοΰσιν εις ημάς μέγα. In the first place, of course, the goddess responds to the presence or absence of worship from men. But the harsh balance of this reciprocation is explained by a general rule governing divine response to men; the gods enjoy χάρις when men pay them honor (7-8): ενεστι γαρ δη κάν θεών γένει τόδε· τιμώμενοι χαίρουσιν ανθρώπων ϋπο. 30 The principle is in itself neither singular nor unexpected. What is striking is the implicit comparison of gods to men. Aphrodite claims that her principle explaining divine behavior holds for gods as well as (καί) for men.31 This implicit comparison is made explicit in the exchange between Hippolytus and the aged servant. The servant is trying to convince Hippolytus, gently, that he is offending Aphrodite by haughtily ignoring her, and that this is dangerous (88-107). They begin a discussion of what is normal conduct (νόμος) among men (91): Θε. οισθ' ούν βροτοΐσιν δς καθέστηκεν νόμος; The servant suggests that forwardness in engaging others elicits a favorable response; Hippolytus assents, and adds that the small effort involved yields significant gain (95-96): 30 Cf. the similar locution in Corp. Hipp. Aër. 22.9 Diller, quoted above, pp. 106107 and note 14. 31 Cf. Barrett (1964) 156, ad loc.

115

Hippolytus and Artemis

Θε. έν δ ' εύπροσηγόροισίν έστί τις χάρις;

95

Ιπ. πλείστη γε, καί κέρδος γε συν μόχθφ βραχεί. The gain (κέρδος) consists in the benefactions which emanate from the other party's favorable disposition. This would be a fair description of Hippolytus' relationship with Artemis, as well as what is lacking from his relationship with Aphrodite. So the servant clearly intends; the model of amicable reciprocity is an appropriate description of dealings with the gods as well as with men (97): Θε. ή κάν θεοίσι ταύτόν ελπίζεις τόδε; Here the point of comparison is explicit; the και έν θεοισι (97) refers back to the νόμος among men (in line 91). Hippolytus again agrees with the servant, adding the necessary and obvious qualification that men and gods normally (νόμοισι) act alike (98): Ιπ. εϊπερ γε θνητοί θεών νόμοισι χρώμεθα. For a mortal to offer a gift to a god in the hope that the god will find it pleasing and furthermore be inclined to reciprocate the favor, the mortal must attribute to the god attitudes and inclinations which are typically human. In this basic sense, when a mortal cultivates a special relationship with a god, a relationship approximating human φιλία, he expects that the god will respond in a human way; the god is envisaged to be much like a human being. 32 The same holds in the case, such as that of Hippolytus, where the mortal expects the god to be pleased not merely with his gifts, but equally or more so with himself as a person. For all the difference between mortal and divine, when the mortal seeks to have a god as his φίλος, the gulf between the two must diminish. None of this implies that Hippolytus 32 This is psychological anthropomorphism. Cf. Rudhardt (1958) 81: 'La religion suppose que des sentiments analogues [sc. aux passions qui naissent parmi les hommes] déterminent sa conduite [i.e. du dieu] envers les mortels. De tels sentiments se font jour dans les relations cultuelles, qu' ils expliquent partiellement.' Cf. also Keyßner (1932) 133-134.

116

Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Jon

is unaware of the impassable gulf between himself and his goddess. Such an implication would be incompatible with the pious stance of the dedication scene (cf. esp. 86: όμμα δ' ούχ όρων το σόν). Nevertheless, as will become apparent in the sequel, the intimate, unparalleled concourse with the goddess in which his piety finds fulfillment is hardly a stable medium for association with the divine. Under the force of the events which lead to the final meeting with Artemis, Hippolytus' belief in divine reciprocation is strained to the breaking-point. In four passages in which he addresses Zeus we can observe his religious attitude evolve from confidence to despair. The first time he addresses Zeus, in conversation with the nurse, the tone is light. Hippolytus suggests that Zeus should have arranged for men to acquire offspring without women; men could buy offspring from the gods by depositing money in temples (616-624). To express the notion of exchange he uses the unremarkable verb άντιτίθημι (620). But instead of honoring the gods through worship and gifts and reaping χάρις in return, men would be commercial partners with the gods. 33 The partnership proposed by Hippolytus would be based on an equal exchange, for the offspring to be collected would be equal in value to the money deposited (622-623): εκαστον.

34

παίδων πρίασθαι σπέρμα του τιμήματος, / της άξιας What Hippolytus imagines is in fact a crude parody of the

institution of votive offerings. Far from appearing in a troublesome light, pious reciprocity with the gods is at this point so certain for Hippolytus that he can confidently share a joke with Zeus at the expense of women. He speaks as if to one who would share his exasperation at the nurse and the 33 Hippolytus thus anticipates Socrates' proposition in the Euthyphro that sacredness is the art of commerce between men and gods - unless Euripides borrowed the idea from Socrates himself. In the Euthyphro Socrates did not mean his suggestion to be taken seriously, but neither is Hippolytus serious here. It may be worth recalling that the Hippolytus contains the passage which is likely to be a response to the real Socrates, viz. Phaedra's description of action based on incontinence (377-387; see Irwin [1983]). 34 The Greek means: 'You buy children at whatever price they may be valued at (του τιμήματος is genitive of price), each child at its own value'. For the text (adopted by Diggle) and interpretation, see Stinton (1977) 141-142.

Hippolytus and Artemis

rest of her sex.

117

After the disaster becomes evident Hippolytus' tone

changes. In his second address to Zeus Hippolytus swears a solemn oath before his father that he was innocent of the crime Phaedra had accused him of (1025-1031). Theseus, convinced of his son's impious disregard of the gods (948-951, 959-961), is unwilling to accept such an oath from a ready perjurer (1036-1040, 1055-1059; cf. 1321-1324).

Up to this point

Hippolytus had scrupulously observed the oath of silence imposed by the nurse (656-658, 1033), despite his initial threat not to (611-612). Now, however, blaming the gods for allowing him to be destroyed even though he is pious towards them, Hippolytus is truly tempted to speak (10601061): ώ θεοί, τί δήτα τοΰμόν οΰ λύω στόμα,

1060

όστις γ' ΰφ' υμών, ους σέβω, διόλλυμαι; But, in view of his father's disposition, he understands how pointless it would be to break the oath (1062-1063): οΰ δήτα· πάντως οΰ πίθοιμ' αν οϋς με δει, μάτην δ ' άν ορκους συγχέαιμ' ους ώμοσα. Hippolytus' faith in divine reciprocity is clearly shaken, for the gods do not reciprocate his piety as they should (1061). But, by preserving the pious standard he has consistently maintained, he does not turn away from the gods himself. In the third passage, Hippolytus utters a brief prayer to Zeus just before he sets out into exile from Troezen (1190-1193). He has evidently accepted his degraded status (1181-1184) and for himself prays only that Zeus preserve his life (1191), a rather meager return for his true merits. However, he adds the wish that, whether he himself lives or dies, his father may be apprised of the truth (1192-1193).

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Finally, when he is carried back on the scene in the agony of death, but before he recognizes Artemis' presence, he reaches his low point of despair (1363-1369): Ζεΰ Ζεΰ, τάδ' όρας; δδ' ό σεμνός έγώ καν θεοσέπτωρ, δδ' ò σωφροσύνη πάντας ύπερσχών,

1365

προΰπτον ές "Αιδην στείχω, κατ' ακρας όλέσας βίοτον, μόχθους δ' άλλως της εύσεβίας εις ανθρώπους έπόνησα. The extreme injustice of his situation leads Hippolytus to question not only the fairness of divine reciprocity (as he did in 1061), but even whether Zeus is paying any attention to him at all: Ζεΰ Ζεΰ, τάδ' όρας; This is his position of extreme despair; in the terms used in this inquiry, he now questions the second fundamental belief. 35 Hippolytus enumerates the factors which the gods should take notice of and should reciprocate favorably: his piety towards the gods (1364), the moral virtue which won him the favor of Artemis (σωφροσύνη, 1365), and his observance of the pious rules governing conduct towards men (1369). 36 His death is now imminent (1366-1367), which means that Zeus did not respond even to his last, modest prayer (1191). Because the gods have not taken notice and not reciprocated in kind, his pious labors have been in vain (άλλως, 1367). The statement that piety accomplishes nothing (άλλως) is the ultimate negation of religion. 37 While he speaks these lines, Artemis, his loyal 35 Theseus had described Hippolytus' supposed crime as an outrage against το σεμνόν Ζηνός όμμα (886), thereby affirming, on mistaken grounds, the second belief. 36 The last category must include his observance of the oath of silence elicited by the nurse, as noted by Barrett (1964) 404, ad loc. 37 The chorus know that Hippolytus is innocent. In the third stasimon (1102-1150) they too ponder his fate in relation to their expectations from the gods, but without the bitterness which arises from personal trauma. I briefly mention the respects in which the words of the chorus are pertinent to our theme; the reader is referred to the interpretation of Barrett (1964) 370-377. 1) The care of the gods for men normally brings assurance; its apparent absence is disturbing (1102-1110). 2) The chorus wish for the gods to

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goddess, is present on the scene and has already begun the process of altering the situation, to some degree, back in his favor. Artemis does not come on the scene at the play's end merely to balance Aphrodite's appearance at the beginning. She could of course have stayed away. Using the traditional terms of φ ι λ ί α , she reaffirms the intimate relationship that was presented from the mortal's perspective at the beginning of the play: Artemis acknowledges that she is Hippolytus' greatest friend among the gods (φιλτάτη θεών, 1394), recalling the claim to her friendship which he made in the dedication scene (82) and as he departed Troezen (1092); she also acknowledges that he is her greatest friend among mortals (πάντων φίλτατον βροτών, 1333; προσφιλής, 1398). Her purpose in coming is to provide recompense to the dying mortal who has been devoted to her (1298-1301): ά λ λ ' ές τόδ' ηλθον, παιδός έκδείξαι φρένα του σου δικαίαν, ώς ΰπ' εύκλείας θάνη, καί σης γυναικός οίστρον ή τρόπον τινά

1300

γενναιότητα. Artemis has come in order to vindicate Hippolytus' reputation. Telling the story of Phaedra's destructive passion (1301-1312) as a means to accomplish that goal, she carefully insists on Hippolytus' piety (1309; cf. 1390). Furthermore, she announces two concrete actions that she will undertake in order to repay Hippolytus for his piety and devotion to her. First (1416-1422), she will avenge his death (τιμωρήσομαι, 1422) by slaying one who is a favorite (φίλτατος, 1421) of Aphrodite. This act of vengeance is a response to Hippolytus' wish that he himself could curse his enemy goddess (1415). Artemis explicitly characterizes this action as respond favorably to their prayers for a good life (1111-1119). 3) The fate of Hippolytus is unexpected in view of his piety, and therefore unsettling (1120-1125). 4) In their pity for Hippolytus' misfortune (1142-1145) the chorus are moved to protest (1145-1146): φευ, μανίω θεοίσιν. The chorus end the ode in uncertainty; they ask the Χάριτες why they send into exile the one whom they describe as ούδέν άτας αίτιον (1148-1150). In spite of their misgivings in the circumstances, the chorus are not prepared to decisively reject the principle of divine reciprocity.

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recompense for his piety (1419):

σης εύσεβείας κάγαθής φρενός

χάριν. Secondly (1423-1430), she will institute an eternal cult to honor his memory, the ceremony in which unmarried girls offer their shorn locks to him. This is explicitly characterized as a gift in recompense; Artemis uses the locution which is by now familiar: άντί τώνδε των κακών (1423), δώσω (1425). 'These evils' are the result of the constant, pious devotion to Artemis which involved scorn of Aphrodite; therefore, they are, like the garland offered in the dedication scene, tangible signs of that devotion. His suffering constitutes a dedication to Artemis; in return she bestows on him the favor of vindication, vengeance, and memorial cult. Thus Artemis has answered Hippolytus' bewildered cry at the nadir of his faith in the gods. Her very presence, an affirmation of the unique privilege he claimed in the dedication scene (84-86), revives him, momentarily (1391-1393). Her concrete acts of reciprocation closely respond to the terms of his previous oath and prayer to Zeus. Just as he prayed (1192-1193), she vindicates him before his father, even though he is to die. In his oath of innocence to Zeus (1025-1031) Hippolytus added the imprecation that, if the oath were false, he should die άκλεης ανώνυμος (1028). With the memorial cult in his honor, she assures his fame (14291430): κοΰκ ανώνυμος πεσών / ερως ò Φαίδρας ές σε σιγηθήσεται. Artemis also acknowledges that she feels some pain on Hippolytus' behalf (1339); and she piously enunciates a divine attitude which recalls Aphrodite's principle at the beginning of the play (1339-1340): τους γαρ ευσεβείς θεοί / θνήσκοντας ού χαίρουσι (cf. 5-8). But the gulf between divine and mortal, over which Hippolytus and Artemis formed their strong allegiance, reasserts itself; the goddess feels bad about the death of this pious mortal, but can do nothing. She enunciates another principle of divine conduct, which we hear of now for the first time, which has no counterpart among the norms of human conduct, and which is laid to Zeus (1328-1334): normal practice (νόμος) among the gods prohibits them from interfering with the designs of another god, and they must stand aloof άλλ' άφιστάμεσθ' άεί (1330). Hippolytus has reached the limit of the

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121

favor he can expect from his goddess. In two further minor, but telling respects Artemis obeys different rules of conduct from men:

it is not

allowed her (ού θέμις) to shed tears at the sight of the ruin of her mortal φ ί λ ο ς (1396); and it is not allowed her (ού θέμις) to be present in the atmosphere of death (1437-1439). With his last words to the departing goddess Hippolytus acknowledges both the extraordinary strength and the inevitable limit of their mutual allegiance (1440-1441): χ α ί ρ ο υ σ α και σ ύ στείχε, π α ρ θ έ ν ' ό λ β ι α -

1440

μ α κ ρ ά ν δέ λείπεις ρ α δ ί ω ς ό μ ι λ ί α ν . With one word - ρ α δ ί ω ς - placed to deliver a striking rhetorical contrast with μ α κ ρ ά ν όμιλίαν, Hippolytus completes the record of his relationship with Artemis. 3 8

6.3 Ion and Apollo In the Ion an allegiance between mortal and god is depicted which, although taking somewhat different forms from that of Hippolytus and Artemis, is no less secure and no less imposing for the behavior and outlook of the mortal. After enduring what had seemed like a total renunciation of the gods' concern for him, Hippolytus soberly accommodated himself to the limited reciprocation Artemis could offer.

Hippolytus was never inclined to

question what Artemis was; that was and remained crystal clear. Ion differs from Hippolytus in that he tends to reflect upon his relationship with 38 On ραδίως Barrett (1964) 414, ad loc., comments: 'No word of rebuke in this: only his yearning for her and a resigned acceptance of his mortal lot. But the poet means something more: it is his comment, not Hipp.'s, on the inadequacy to mortal man of the puritan's ideal.' I agree that there is no rebuke in this word. However, I do not see it as yearning for her and resigned acceptance. The poet means nothing more here than Hippolytus himself does: the goddess is free from the painful consequences of her actions. But for Hippolytus to acknowledge the fragility of the bond from the goddess' perspective, which is what ραδίως amounts to, is an extraordinary gain of insight. Cf. Reinhardt (1960) 234-235.

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Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

Apollo, and to use his powers of reason to understand that relationship. Ion gradually becomes confused about the moral disposition of the god on whom he has always depended for both livelihood and purpose in life. He senses that the trust upon which his extraordinary allegiance to Apollo is founded has been betrayed. Yet amid the growing uncertainty Ion remains steadfastly loyal. In the penultimate scene, as Ion finally learns the truth about his origins that had hitherto been denied him, he expresses his consternation to Creusa thus (1537-1538): ò θεός αληθής ή μάτην μαντεύεται; έμοΰ ταράσσει, μήτερ, είκότως φρένα. To understand the cause of Ion's consternation, and in particular why it is είκότως, is the aim of our discussion of the Ion. In comparison to what is known about functionaries, both slave and free, in temple bureaucracies of the period, some of Ion's duties in Delphi are appropriate to his status as temple-slave, other duties, of high responsibility, seem inappropriate to that status. 39 No single term of the numerous official and semi-official titles in the nomenclature of Greek religious bureaucracy suffices to cover the range of activities performed by Ion. 4 0 However, if only by sheer force of personality, Ion combines the 39

Börner (1961) 44-49 compares Ion's duties to contemporary slave service in Delphi and concludes that Ion is a poetic transfiguration (Verklärung) which corresponds to nothing in reality. In asserting that the particular combination of details embodied in Ion has no parallel in reality, Börner is surely correct But this conclusion hardly prevents us from treating the aggregate of actions and beliefs which make up Ion as a coherent unity which would have struck a true chord in contemporary observers. 40 Jordan (1979) 23-28 describes the generic office which he calls 'precinct governor'; officials of various titles come into this category (e.g. ίεροποιός, ναοφύλαξ, ταμίας, νεωκόρος, etc.). Ion seems to fit this category in many respects; but such officials, of ultimate responsibility for the sanctity and safety of the precinct, would hardly be slaves. Börner (1961) 46 n. 1 argues convincingly against the suitability of classifying Ion as νεωκόρος, as many have done. (The term appears nowhere in the play.) In the service of a broad literary analysis, Hamilton (1985) 56-58 has confused the issue by calling Ion a priest, which Ion on any account is not. In the descriptive division made by Aristotle between priests (ιερείς) and the various other religious functionaries (έπιμεληταί), Ion would decidedly fall with the 'others' (Pol. 6.1322b 18-29). Stengel (1920) 31-78 ('Kultusbeamte') remains the best survey of offices and duties in temple and cult administration.

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123

various recognizable details of temple service in a unified spirit of devotion to Apollo. What emerges from the picture of his temple service is not an amalgam, realistic or otherwise, of religious tasks, but a single, dedicated worshipper of the god. From Hermes we learn that Ion has been appointed by the Delphians as keeper of the god's treasure, a position of immense importance for this wealthy establishment (54-55): χρυσοφύλακα του θεοΰ / ταμίαν τε πάντων πιστόν. In his initial encounters with the Athenian visitors we learn that Ion acts as official agent for foreign visitors in their dealings with the oracle up to the point of their entry into the temple; there are two terms used to describe this office: πρόξενος (335) and προφήτης (413-416).41 Ion wears distinctive vestments which designate him as dedicated to the god's service (326-327). The attempt by Xuthus to lay hands on this sacred apparel provokes from Ion a threat of murder (522-524). Yet Ion is also concerned with the janitorial duties of the temple-precinct which, mean in themselves, are sanctified and thus elevated by the place and purpose. At the beginning of his monody, after welcoming the new day and his fellow servants of Apollo (82-101), Ion enumerates the tasks which are specifically his: sweeping the premises, sprinkling pure water, shooing away the birds (102-108). In the following lyric passage each of these tasks is enacted: sweeping (112-124), sprinkling (146-149), shooing (154-181). The temple complex is Ion's home (δώμα, 315), and the temple sacrifices and the offerings of worshippers furnish his livelihood (323): βωμοί μ' εφερβον ούπιών τ' άεί ξένος (cf. 52). Ion serves the god in the temple and is in turn supported by the god and the temple business. There is, then, a certain economic reciprocity between Ion and the god to which Ion gives clear, repeated expression (110-111):

τους θρέψαντας Φοίβου ναούς

θεραπεύω (cf. 137-140, 183). Economic ties of reciprocation are enlivened and deepened by affection, devotion, and, finally, a sense of justice. The affection and devotion are vividly evident in Ion's monody. The chorus have not yet entered, so Ion is 41

Cf. 219-233,640, and 129: προ δόμων. On προφήτης, see n. 51, below p. 128.

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Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

alone on the scene. Viewing Ion in a private moment, we the audience become privy to his innermost thoughts and feelings about his relationship with Apollo; we learn more about this temple slave than merely what he does. Just as grand and mean tasks are undertaken together, so mean station is juxtaposed with, and sublimated to, grand feelings about service to the god. Ion describes his tasks as μόχθοι and πόνοι (102-103, 128, 131, 134135, 144, 181) and seems to demean his activity with the lowly term λ α τ ρ ε ύ ω (124, 129, 152). But Ion is supremely contented with his situation, for καλόν γε τον πόνον (128; cf. 131, 134); and he prays that his λατρεία to Apollo never cease (151-153; cf. 134-135,181-183). 42 Ion is a slave (δούλος), a slave of Apollo (182, 309, 327). Elsewhere in the play Ion shows great solicitude over the possibility that he was in fact born a slave (556, 1382-1383, 1477); he is loth to bear an inferior station and yield slavishly to other men (635-637). Nevertheless, since he is a slave to no man, but to a god, he bears this slavery with pride (131-133): κλεινός δ ' ò πόνος μοι θεοίσιν δούλαν χέρ' εχειν, ού θνατοις ά λ λ ' άθανάτοις. In conversation with Creusa (310-311), the question is raised whether his present slavish status is the result of some polis having placed him in Delphi as a dedication (ανάθημα) to the god, which would have no ignoble connotation, or of someone having sold him commonly, which would indeed be ignoble. Ion does not know, of course; but it does not seem to matter to him, for it is the fact that the god is his master, the very connection with the god, which ennobles him. Ion is also an orphan with no known connections outside the temple (109); in his solitude his intense and intimate feelings of loyalty to the god lead him to claim metaphorically 42 Jon's attitude is prefigured in Hermes' characterization of himself as δ α ι μ ό ν ω ν λ ά τ ρ ι ν (4). Pieket (1981) 163-166 portrayed λ α τ ρ ε ί α as a typical element in Greek religious mentality. However, except for the Ion, all of Pleket's sources are from the Hellenistic period or later; thus Euripides may have been injecting a novel element in his portrayal of Ion's attitude. However, Socrates also uses the notion of noble servitude to Apollo; cf. Pl. Αρ. 23b4-cl, Phd. 85bl-7. With Ion 128-133, compare an inscribed honorific epigram of about 300 B.C. from the Athenian acropolis, in which a priestess of Athena claims πόνον ούκ ά κ λ ε ά τόνδε έλάτρευσα θεά (IG II 2 3464, cited also by Pieket [1981]).

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125

the distinctive relation of kinship with the god: he reveals that he looks upon Apollo like a father (136, 139). The irony is thick, but effective. Ion punctuates the monody with a brief, repeated prayer to Apollo (125127= 141-143): ώ Παιάν ώ Παιάν,

125

εύαίων εύαίων ε'ιης, ώ Λατοΰς παΐ. The repetition of these verses gives them the character of a refrain, which seems to have been a typical feature of paean hymns in Delphi and probably of paeans generally. 43 Compound adjectives having εύ- as a first element are typical of hymnic diction. 44 The somewhat rare εύαίων may have been particularly associated with the diction of paean hymns. The word occurs in the invocation of the paean to 'Ύπνος in Soph. Phil. 829 and in the refrain of the fourth-century Delphic paean to Dionysus by Philodamus of Scarpheia (Powell [1925] 165-171, lines 11-13 etc.): ie Παιάν, ϊθι σωτήρ, εΰφρων τάνδε πόλιν φύλασσ' εύαίωνι συν δλβω. 4 5 In spite of his reverent tone throughout the monody, Ion is not enacting a form of worship; the reciprocal allegiance between the young man and his god is spelled out deliberately in the picture of normal daily life. Yet the formal elements of traditional paean diction used by Ion are borrowed from 43 For Delphic paeans, cf. the refrain of the paean to Pythian Apollo by Aristonoos (Powell [1925] 162-164) and Fairbanks (1900) 25-27, 30 for other evidence. For paean refrains elsewhere the evidence is collected in Fairbanks (1900) 3 4 - 3 9 , 4 8 - 4 9 . ϊή π α ι ά ν may originally have been a responsive war-shout; so Deubner (1919) 385-387. For the connection of Apollo and Paean, see Burkert (1985) 145. For the use of religious refrains in a literary context, see Fraenkel on Aesch. Ag. 121. 44 See Keyßner (1932) 165-166. 45 The scholiast of Soph. Phil. 829 glosses ε ύ α ί ω ν as ε υ μ ε ν ή ς , καλώς ά γ ω ν ή μ ί ν xòv α ι ώ ν α . This must be the meaning of ε ύ α ί ω ν in the ¡on (as commentators note), as well as in Philodamus.

126

Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

a context which was originally, or at least primarily, choral and part of sacred ritual. The concise allusion to paean refrains in a relatively mundane context allows Ion to convey with simplicity and directness the emotion underlying his allegiance to the god. Pious service, slavery, and filiation are all involved in Ion's situation with regard to Apollo. Early on Hermes speaks of Ion's σεμνόν βίον (56); Ion describes himself as οσιος άπ' εύνας (150). These qualities recall the solemnity and chastity which were the products of Hippolytus' extreme piety (cf. σεμνός, Hipp. 1064, 1364; chastity, Hipp. 1003). However, Ion's character and the nature of his allegiance to Apollo are drawn by Euripides along lines that exceed the traditional bounds of pious service (θεραπεία). For Ion, piety towards Apollo is inextricably bound up with an extreme moral sensibility; for Ion, piety ends in justice. Because of this extension of normal piety, Ion's allegiance to Apollo will be severely tested by abnormal demands on the god; the dimension of moral sensibility added to the normal expectations of pious worship is the essential factor in the bewilderment Ion experiences later in the play. On the unexceptionable authority of the god, Xuthus has claimed Ion as his son; but when the father orders the son to Athens, Ion protests vigorously (585-647). The prospect of entering the hubbub of political life in Athens makes Ion want to stay where he is, anonymous in Apollo's service. As the last and most important in the list of good things (αγαθά, 633) which he reckons in favor of his life in Delphi, Ion claims that while living at the temple he has found a station in which he can be just in relation to the god (642-644): δ δ' εύκτόν άνθρώποισι, καν ακουσιν η, δίκαιον είναί μ' ό νόμος ή φύσις θ' αμα παρείχε τω θεω. The language here is strong, δίκαιον είναι, the predicate, is put in an emphatic position. In contrast to the usual antithesis of νόμος and φύσις,

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here the two work together to produce a single, salutary effect. 4 6 The νόμος in question refers to all the duties of his temple service; his pious routine is one element in his attainment of justice. Although he is ignorant of his natural origins, by claiming that his own φύσις contributes to his just status, Ion is asserting that he is not just solely by virtue of Apollo's influence, but himself contributes an independent element in the just equation. 47 The force of the dative τω θεώ is important; it is not an indirect object after the verb, but a limiting dative of advantage or dative of relation with the predicate δίκαιον είναι. 4 8 Ion's situation does not enable him to be simply just in itself, but to be specifically just for the sake of the god, or more loosely, just by virtue of his relation to the god. The qualification καν ακουσιν rj is also important. The good Ion attains by being just in relation to the god is not an incidental good which he alone esteems, but, as he sees it, a fundamental good for men, whether they consciously desire it or not. According to the argument of the passage, this fundamental good would be unattainable in Athens; produced only in conjunction with the god, it constitutes the most valuable feature of the reciprocity between Ion and the god. In the rest of our discussion of the Ion we shall examine how Ion's relationship with Apollo as sketched above stands the test of circumstances. The first challenge arises from the first encounter with Creusa. Creusa enters decrying the unjust behavior of the gods (252-254). Shocked by Creusa's story that Apollo raped her 'friend', Ion cannot at first believe that the story is true (339, 341). In the course of the conversation Ion's sense of justice leads him to agree with Creusa that the god acted unjustly if he secretly saved the child and raised it apart from the grieving 46 See Heinimann (1945) 167-169. It is only in the sphere of the sacred that νόμος and φύσις can coincide. Cf. Eur. Ba. 894-8%, and esp. Xen. Oec. 7.16, where a husband entreats his wife to do α τε οί θεοί εφυσάν σε δύνασθαι καί ό νόμος συν επαινεί. It will be recalled that Hippolytus credited φύσις as the essential element in winning Artemis' favor, but disparaged the role of what is διδακτόν (Hipp. 79-81). 47 Wilamowitz (1926) 12 said of ¡on 643: 'Die apollinische σωφροσύνη ist ihm zur Natur geworden.' But, as is evident from his next sentence, Wilamowitz was influenced by Hippolytus. Ion and Hippolytus should be differentiated here. 48 Kühner-Gerth 1.414-415. Burnett (1970) 71 translates: 'that I may serve the god'.

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Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

mother, the injustice would lie in the fact that the god abandoned the woman and left her wretched even if he had saved the child (355). 49 (This of course is the true situation.)

Thus Ion shows he is not reluctant to

acknowledge injustice wherever it may appear to him. But Ion discovers an obstacle for Creusa's plan to ask the oracle about the child (363, 365): 'how will the god reveal in an oracle what he wishes to keep hidden?' Creusa intends to ask the oracle whether the child is alive (345-346). Such a question assumes that Apollo, having impregnated the woman, did indeed abandon her, even if the child was saved; for the god to answer the question at all would be, according to Ion (in 355), an admission of injustice on his part.50 Thus it would be impertinent to put such a question to the god and none of the prophetic sponsors would permit it (369). 51 It is a question of appearances (370-372): έν τοις γαρ αύτοΰ δώμασιν κακός φανείς

370

Φοίβος δικαίως τον θεμιστευοντά σοι δράσειεν άν τι πημ'. Ion is not saying that the god would justly punish a prophetic sponsor who permitted the oracle to reveal a true, but embarrassing response; that would, in any case, be unlikely for Ion, with his highly developed sense of justice, to assert. Ion is saying that Apollo would justly punish a prophetic sponsor 49

This is the meaning of 357-358-355, the order which Diggle prints. Diggle placed 355-356 after 358, and in 355 accepted Page's νυν for the manuscript's viv, with great improvement in sense. With the traditional text it is utterly unclear what injustice Ion is speaking of: in 355 the present tense αδικεί could not refer to the child who is supposed dead up to and including 354, but the viv, object of αδικεί, could refer to no one but the child; see Diggle (1974) 16-19. 50 It is a question of the type 'when did you stop beating your wife?'. In Fontenrose's catalogue of Delphic oracles (Fontenrose [1978]) I have found no question of this type. 51 The procedure envisioned here for consulting the oracle involves the use of a male προφήτης to sponsor the enquirer's request before the Pythia who sits on the tripod (9192). This job is described here and below (413-416) as assigned to a προφήτης, which I have translated as 'prophetic sponsor'. In 371 τον θεμιστευοντά refers to the same person, the όστις προφητεύσει of 369. There was an official at Delphi called προφήτης (Hdt. 8.36.2; cf. 7.111.2), but the nature of his duty is unclear. Fontenrose (1978) 212224 presents the best account of the difficult evidence concerning the procedure of consultation at Delphi. He succeeds with some difficulty in reconciling the evidence from the Ion with the other evidence in which the Pythia speaks directly to the enquirer.

129

Ion and Apollo

who engaged to put the embarrassing question to the oracle and therefore presumed that Apollo had been κ α κ ό ς .

The oracle functions on the

premise that Apollo is not κακός; it could hardly function otherwise. Ion insists that the beneficial reciprocity enacted in pious worship is not a matter of extorting concessions from reluctant gods (373, 378-379), but of gratefully receiving the gods' freely given presents (380): α δ ' άν διδώσ' έκόντες, ώφελούμεθα. What if Creusa's story were true? Ion does not give the story any credence, but he is clearly bothered by the problem such a story theoretically poses for the allegiance he bears towards Apollo based on his highly developed moral sensibility.

He delivers a lengthy and

serious

admonishment of Apollo in which he exhorts the god not to fall below the high standards of conduct to which his divine status obliges him (436-451). First it is necessary to gauge the tone of the admonishment.

The

passage begins (436-440): νουθετητέος δε μοι Φοίβος, τί πάσχει· παρθένους βία γαμών προδίδωσι; π α ΐ δ α ς έκτεκνοΰμενος λάθρα θνήσκοντας άμελει; μή σύ γ ' · ά λ λ \ έπεί κρατείς, άρετάς δίωκε.

440

Instead of the interrogation marks in 438 and 439, earlier editors often printed a comma or raised dot in 438 and a period after αμελεί in 439. 52 Is Ion asserting, as these editors would apparently have it, that Apollo has definitely betrayed the girl and forgotten the child? And for this outrage he is merely to be admonished? We would expect the ardent Ion to condemn the god outright, to say nothing of the shock he would express. 53 Thus, if 52 E.g. Kirchhoff (1868), Herwerden (1875), Nauck (1887), Paley (1889), Verrall (1890), Wecklein (1912), Wilamowitz (1926). Murray (1904), Biehl (1979), and Diggle (1981) print interrogation marks. 53 Owen (1939) 102 (ad 436) maintained a view that was typical in his generation: 'The pious young votary of Phoebus becomes the mouthpiece of Euripidean views, hardly appropriate to his character or office.' I take Ion to mean what he says; cf. my comments on HF 1340-1346, below p. 158, note 33.

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130

we read this passage as an uncharacteristic, complacent admission that Apollo has abandoned the mortals, it makes no sense to acknowedge any dramatic significance in the credence Ion gives Creusa's story. The admonishment passage makes more sense as a 'friendly chiding'.54 Here Ion is shaken, but loyal; real doubt of Apollo's virtue does not touch Ion until the penultimate scene. The first consideration is that Ion speaks in virtual privacy; Xuthus left the scene after 424, Creusa after 428. The chorus, present of course in the orchestra, seem to ignore the temple-slave; they register no reaction to his words during or after his speech. Thus, as during his solitary monody earlier, Ion can feel emboldened to utter out loud the personal, private reflections which he would hesitate to say in public.55 So his reflections here do not run the risk of embarrassing the god and undermining his cult. Secondly, Ion feels no personal involvement with this woman and her problems (433-434). In fact he was mystified by Creusa and her strange story (429-430): τί ποτε λόγοισιν ή ξένη προς τον θεον κρυπτοίσιν αίεί λοιδοροΰσ' αίνίσσεται;

430

He is unlikely to give credence to a story he does not fully understand, heard from a woman he does not know. When he utters the admonishment, he is on his way to complete his ritual cleansing of the sanctuary, thus demonstrating his continued adherence to the obligations of divine service even as he ponders the source of those obligations (434-436).

The

admonishment is an afterthought (νουθετητέος M. 436), an appendix, as it were, to his pious service. τί πάσχει (437) is obviously a question, one Ion in his privacy is asking of himself: 54

'what is going on with Apollo?' If the next two

Paley's translation of νουθετηιέος. The comment of Burnett (1970) 55, 'the boy is playful in his reproach', misses the earnestness of Ion's reproach. The tone is much like Theognis 373: Ζεΰ φίλε, θαυμάζω σε. Theognis then goes on to reprove Zeus for morally inadequate government of human affairs. 55 Ion later displays his sensibility of public embarrassment when he explicitly secludes the chorus to speak with Creusa in confidence (1520-1522).

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sentences (437-439) were taken as statements, the plural objects would indicate that Ion is making the unacceptable assertion that Apollo has made a habit of betrayal. Rather, these two short sentences, in asyndeton with each other and with the preceding τί πάσχει, continue the thought of τί πάσχει. They are questions (as in the text printed above) Ion is asking himself: 'is this (Creusa's story) the sort of thing Apollo does?' With the imperative of 439 (μή σύ γ':

'don't you, Apollo, of all people [γ'], do that sort of

thing'), Ion does not imply that Apollo has betrayed the woman and forgotten the child. Rather, since it is not inconceivable for Apollo to commit rape (there are such stories about other gods too, 446), it is worth reminding the god what the consequences of such behavior would be. It is for this reason that Creusa's story rankles in him. The divine sin which Ion contemplates is not mere rape. Nowhere in the play is Apollo faulted just for having seduced a mortal woman; sex between gods and mortals was of course not unusual in the legendary world to which Ion belongs. As he had suggested earlier (355), what Ion could not abide was the thought that the god had abandoned the mortals with whom he had established connections. Creusa herself had complained not of the rape, but merely of the fact that Apollo abandoned her (384-389); in her monody later in the play (859-922), Creusa weeps for herself and the child who have been abandoned. Using the emotive word προδίδωμι (438), Ion envisions Apollo repudiating his obligations to the woman. This repudiation amounts to a failure to maintain reciprocity. 56 Ion extends the horror by envisioning a god who ceased even to care (αμελεί, 439) about the child as it lay dying. If this were true, the second principle, that gods pay attention to mortals, would have been violated. 57 Thus, if Creusa's story were true, Ion's pious, just allegiance to

Cf. the discussion of προδίδωμι in Tr. 1062, above p. 83, and cf. HF 343. In her monody Creusa calls Xuthus and Apollo λέκτρων προδότας άχαρίστους (879-880). 57 In Laws 10 Plato used the words άμελέω, αμελής, and αμέλεια to describe the view of those who reject the second fundamental belief: the gods neglect human affairs (900b3,901d2,902a8,902cl, 903a8,904e5, 908e4, 909bl); cf. also Eur. Hel. 45-46, fr. 208 Ν. 56

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Apollo would break down entirely. Then comes the admonishment itself (439-440):

έπεί κρατείς, άρετάς δίωκε. 58 It is a 'friendly chiding1

because it is offered in private to the god with whom Ion enjoys intimate terms. The examination of divine immorality which follows is essentially an expansion of the admonishment, for the dire consequences constitute a warning to Apollo (440-451): καί γαρ όστις αν βροτών

440

κακός πεφύκη, ζημιοΰσιν οί θεοί. πώς ούν δίκαιον τους νόμους υμάς βροτοίς γράψαντας αυτούς άνομίαν όφλισκάνειν; εί δ' (ού γαρ εσται, τφ λόγφ δε χρήσομαι) δίκας βιαίων δώσετ' άνθρώποις γάμων

445

σύ καί Ποσειδών Ζευς θ' δς ούρανοΰ κρατεί, ναούς τίνοντες άδικίας κενώσετε, τας ήδονάς γαρ της προμηθίας πέρα σπεύδοντες άδικεΐτ'. ούκέτ' άνθρώπους κακούς λέγειν δίκαιον, εί τα τών θεών καλά

450

μιμούμεθ', άλλα τούς διδάσκοντας τάδε. The passage has bite, not least for the witty conceit of 444-447: the crimes of the gods are so abundant that they would exhaust even the huge funds of their temple treasuries in paying them off. But the passage is ultimately serious. By faulting the gods for a lapse of forethought (προμηθία, 448), Ion repeats his contention that the injustice at stake was a failure of the god to attend to his obligations towards mortals.59 The supposition of human and divine equality in vice and restitution leads to the conclusion that the gods are κακοί (449-451). In that case, human vice could seek exculpation 58 This is Ion's rejoinder to Creusa's accusation of the gods in similar terms (253254): ποι δίκην άνοίσομεν, εί τών κρατούντων άδικίαις όλσύμεθα; 59 Burnett (1970) 56 stresses προμηθία as 'the quality which above all Ion asks of his god'.

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by claiming divine viciousness as a model.60 What is left to distinguish the gods? Empty temples, to elaborate the conceit, are dead temples. The god's wealth is the manifest sign of flourishing worship, for the god's wealth is accrued through the donations of mortals: no votive offerings, no sacrifices, no worshipping people. As warden of Apollo's considerable wealth Ion is sensitive to what the wealth represents. Ion takes care that the dedications (αναθήματα) be kept free of blot (177); later in the play the messenger describes at length the magnificence of the dedications which Ion borrowed from Apollo's store (1141-1166). The distinctive superiority which earns the gods their full treasuries, their cult, and such devoted service as Ion's, must be, in Ion's view, superior moral excellence. It was for the sake of avoiding even the possibility that Apollo could appear κακός that Ion repudiated Creusa's attempt to put her question to the oracle (369-380). There is no mitigating the disaster for Ion's religious beliefs and pious way of life if Creusa were telling the truth. On four further occasions Ion demonstrates his continued allegiance to his god in the face of trying circumstances. First, Ion submits to the distasteful necessity of acknowledging Xuthus as his father, the man he had just been threatening with murder (522-527). Trust in the god's authority is the decisive factor (557): τω θεω γοΰν ούκ άπιστείν εικός. Second, Ion narrowly escapes the death plotted for him by Creusa because at the crucial moment he was attentive to pious procedure. 61 Before Ion was to drink from the poisoned cup, someone interrupted the libation ceremony with a profane utterance (1187-1189). Ion discarded the poisoned cup and began anew, true to his pious training (1190): ώς έν ίερώ μάντεσίν τ' έσθλοίς τραφείς; this led directly to the discovery of the plot (1190-1216).

Ion's connection to Apollo is emphasized on this

occasion by the splendor of the god's furnishings (1141-1166), by the 60 This argument was considered several times by Euripides; see the discussion of HF 1314-1321, below p. 157 and note 32. 61 Noted by Wilamowitz (1926) 12.

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Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

rather august epithets used by the messenger to refer to Ion: ò μαντευτός γόνος (1209) and especially ό πυθόχρηστος Λοξίου νεανίας (1218), and by one of the charges on which the Delphians condemn Creusa: trying to kill τον Ιερόν (1224). Third, Ion refrains from seizing the impious fugitive Creusa who has occupied Apollo's altar. Ion is truly tempted to violate the asylum, and expresses his dismay at the conflict between the demands of piety and the demands of justice (1312-1319). As in the monologue following the initial encounter with Creusa (436-451), here too Ion questions the disposition of the gods who legislate pious behavior for men (cf. esp. 442-443 with 13121313). In this instance Ion analyzes the apparent divine corruption into a failure of the gods' character (ού καλώς, 1312) and a failure of the gods' intelligence (ούδ' άπό γνώμης σοφής, 1313).62 Although he deliberately evaluates the reasons which would tend to impair his obligation to fulfill the demands of piety, his sense of that obligation holds firm. So, as formerly, having expressed reservations, he heeds the demands of piety and does the pious thing. 63 Fourth, when Ion's birth tokens are finally placed in his hands, he is first inclined to dedicate them unopened to his god (1380-1384). His decision to open them arises from a more subtle understanding of Apollo's will (1385-1386): του θεοΰ προθυμία / πολεμώ, τα μητρός σύμβολ' ος σέσωκέ μοι; There remains to consider the final crisis in which Ion reaches the state of consternation mentioned above as the aim of this discussion. When Ion first hears from Creusa that he is the offspring of Apollo, he is inclined to look upon this news with joy, if he can believe it to be true (1485, 1488). Upon reflection, however, he must reconcile Creusa's account of his origins with his faith in the truthfulness of Apollo's oracle;

62

Cf. the discussion of the gods' moral ignorance, below p. 144, note 10. The φευ before 1312 indicates that Ion realizes there is no way he can bring himself to violate the altar; he ceases to struggle with himself. For the deletion of 1275-1278, see Diggle (1974) 28-30. 63

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135

for he is under the impression that the oracle named Xuthus as his natural father (1532-153 3). 64 Ion is disposed to believe Creusa because of her authoritative display of knowledge of the birth tokens and because of her solemn oath by her native goddess, Athena (1529-1531). Ion is of course predisposed to believe Apollo's oracle. This is the immediate cause of the consternation (1537-1538): ò θεός αληθής ή μάτην μαντεύεται; έμοΰ ταράσσει, μήτερ, είκότως φρένα. 65 But the problem has deeper causes. Ion had repeatedly exposed his qualms about the soundness of his pious allegiance to Apollo and the strength of that allegiance had repeatedly been tested. So far, though the god has been silent, Ion has been true. If Creusa is indeed telling the truth not only does that mean that Apollo lied, but Ion would now have to confront in reality the circumstances which he himself hypothesized to be ultimately destructive to the reciprocity between himself and the god: the god would be κακός,

64

I am loth to spend time on the fruitless debate whether we can possibly, by the utmost exercise of ingenuity, exonerate Apollo from the charge of having lied in the oracle to Xuthus. Gauger (1977) 78-89 seems to me decisive against such ingenuities as Owen (1939) xix-xx and Biehl (1979) viii-xiii; further bibliography on this question at Gauger (1977) 80 n.l. I add two further considerations. First, since we are given no verbatim report of the oracle, inferences based on Hermes' disclosure (69-73) and Xuthus' report (530-537) are guesses at best To know what the oracle actually said cannot, by definition, be a matter of dramatic relevance. Secondly, Hermes unambiguously says that Apollo intended to conceal from the mortals the truth of his liaison with Creusa (72-73). At the end of the play Athena reaffirms Apollo's original intention to conceal (1566), though it was open for her to exculpate the god by referring to a hidden meaning in the oracle. I conclude that Apollo has told, at a minimum, a white lie. For Apollo to lie even to this degree suffices to render Ion's predicament serious and not frivolous, founded on a real act of deceit by the god and not caused by a misunderstanding of silly, rash Xuthus. We must not forget that Ion's stern moral sensibility holds Apollo to a severe standard. 65 If the subject of ταράσσει is not ό θεός, as suggested by Wilamowitz (1926) 158 ad loc., then it must be the entire preceding clause, i.e. 'the uncertainty whether the god speaks truly or falsely'. Cf. Badham (1853) 131 ad loc.: 'nominativus ante ταράσσει non est θεός, sed α π ο ρ ί α quae ex tota oratione intelligitur.' The suggestion of Biehl (1979) 80 ad loc. 'se. το πράγμα' is no help at all if he means anything more general than the content of 1537; specifying the πράγμα is the very point at issue. I am aware of no one who comments on είκότως.

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Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and Ion

Ion's noble devotion and pious service to the god would have been unworthily bestowed, and the greatest prize of his reciprocity with the god, a sense of just association, would vanish altogether. The ties of allegiance between the mortal and the god would not merely be spoiled but mockingly debased. On the other hand, Ion would realize the exalted status of formal φιλία with the god whom he has served, admired, and looked upon as father.

For these reasons it is reasonable (είκότως) for Ion to feel

bewildered. Even at this crisis Ion maintains his poise: he does not consign himself to despair, nor does he accept meekly (ώδε φαύλως, 1546) Creusa's improvised solutions to the dilemma (1534-1536, 1539-1545); he determines to enter the sanctuary and ask the god who his father is (15471548).66 With Athena's intervention (1549) the course of Ion's problematic reciprocity with Apollo is not resolved, but literally stopped in its tracks. The goddess prevents Ion from walking into the sanctuary.67 Athena indicates that Apollo was reluctant to face Ion and Creusa lest recriminations abound (1557-1558): δς [sc. Apollo] ές μεν όψιν σφφν μολειν ούκ ήξίου, μή των πάροιθε μέμψις ές μέσον μόλη, but there is nothing to indicate who would issue the recriminations, let alone whose recriminations would be justified. 68 We would seek in vain to 66

Owen (1939) 176-177 (ad 1546) wonders what Ion can gain from his question: 'The question "Are you telling the truth?" will be satisfactorily answered by the greatest liar.' This misses the point. Ion is not going to ask the proverbial liar if he is telling the truth; rather, he intends to confront the god and demand the truth. Because he never gets to put the demand, we cannot know if he would have been satisfied with the response. His satisfaction with Athena's explanation is discussed below. 67 Cf. Burnett (1971) 110: Ά final stalemate blocks the resolution of Apollo's piece.' 68 Critics formerly compared line 367 and concluded that recriminations against Apollo would be justified. Burnett (1962) 94 then claimed that Apollo shows consideration for the mortals by saving them 'from possible words of direct blasphemy'; from this claim we are invited to conclude that the blasphemous words would be unjust recriminations. Neither interpretation is clearly supported in the text; the question is deliberately left εξω του δράματος. Biehl (1979) 81 ad loc. says: 'verba, quibus Minerva utitur, dicta sunt non ut in ore deae, sed quasi a mortalibus: quid enim absurdius

Ion and Apollo

137

justify Apollo or condemn him. 69 Ion just reached the point where despair based on a bankrupt reciprocity with Apollo was imminent. Before there occurs either a cataclysm or a dramatic resuscitation, however hedged (as in the

Hippolytus),

Ion's relationship with Apollo spends itself and now he

passes into the reassuring hands of Athena to take up his destined post as ruler of Athens. Following Athena's explanations of the past and predictions of Ionian and Athenian glory (1560-1605), Ion warmly embraces his new patron goddess (1606-1608, 1617, 1618); but he makes one brief comment in reference to the defunct relationship with Apollo (1608): και πριν τοΰτο δ ' [i.e. the fact that Apollo is his father] οΰκ απιστον ήν. Although he had briefly expressed the hope that Creusa had truthfully reported that the god was his father (1485, 1488), at no previous point did Ion express or even imply conviction. The dramatic surge of the penultimate scene is based on the fact that Ion lacks this conviction and the consternation that moves him to enter the sanctuary entails the lack of such conviction. Thus critics have attempted to emend 1608 in order to have Ion refer to the doubt about divine paternity which he previously held but has now abandoned. 70 The text is best left as it was handed down; this one response is enigmatic, but no more so than the rest of the play's ending. Euripides could easily afford to sacrifice strict dramatic consistency for the sake of a unanimously harmonious ending; he could bank on the fact that the audience at least had been convinced of the divine paternity all along. Creusa joins Ion in

atque tragoediae minus aptum erat quam putare deum Delphicum a mortal ibus adduci posse, ut cuiuslibet vituperationem timeat?' This seems to me to beg the question. 69 So Erbse (1975), after soberly weighing the evidence for both views. Burnett (1971) 128-129 expresses severe reservations about the god who was uniformly vindicated in Burnett (1962). Wassermann (1940) makes the subtlest case for viewing the play as a defense of Apollo's providence. 70 See Diggle's apparatus for suggestions along these lines. Diggle maintains the traditional text, correctly in my view.

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Reciprocal Allegiance between Men and Gods in Hippolytus and ion

accepting Athena's explanations and the new turn of events with marvelous equanimity (1610-1613; cf. her former attitude, 425-428, 859-922). The new patron goddess approves their compliant attitude (1614) and for good measure throws in a self-serving platitude (1615): χρόνια μεν τα των θεών πως, ές τέλος δ' ούκ ασθενή. The foundation of the Ionian race in general and the Athenian empire in particular is secured. The play ends.

CHAPTER

A New Creed:

SEVEN

Heracles

The third belief fundamental to the polis religion of Athens held that there exists some form of reciprocity, however unequal, between men and gods. Running through the Heracles and integrated into its action is a debate about the nature of this reciprocity and whether it exists in any form at all. Many of the situations and arguments through which the fundamental beliefs were examined elsewhere in Euripides re-appear in this play.

At each

development of the plot the characters express their beliefs about the gods in relation to the dramatic events. The formal dramatic problem in which the play culminates - whether or not Heracles should commit suicide - is raised, debated, and resolved in terms of Heracles' evolving belief about divine reciprocity. In the last speech of the deliberations at the end of the play (1340-1393), justifying his decision to forgo suicide, Heracles utters a new creed about the gods. This leads directly into the calm winding-down and close of the play. There is, however, more than theology at stake. The abiding problem of the Heracles, as it seems to me, is to understand how Heracles chooses life in the midst of the overwhelming horror and despair which encompass him. The friendship of Theseus is of course essential for Heracles' rebirth as a man.1 However, the real source of the calm at the end of the play is 1

By ordering events such that the madness follows the labors, Euripides has enabled Theseus to arrive on the scene as Heracles' φίλος and in his debt (cf. 1235-1236). Three

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140

Heracles himself. He deliberates, he decides, he puts the past behind himself. Heracles' new creed is not merely the final statement of religious belief in a play which has had many such statements; it is the factor which enables the play to attain its unlikely end. In this sense Heracles' statement of religious belief is the telos of the play. Every position on reciprocity with the gods enunciated in the course of the play, constituting the stages in the running debate, will receive attention in the following chapter; the final position, as the consummation of the playwright's design, will naturally receive special scrutiny.

7.1 Amphitruo:

1-513

In this first part of the play, up to the appearance of Heracles, Amphitruo and Megara find themselves in a world in which all their expectations (έλπίδες) have collapsed. From a position of good fame and security as family of the ruler of Thebes, the son of Zeus, they become exposed to the ultimate danger at the hands of a usurper. Furthermore, they are utterly passive victims, having done nothing which directly or indirectly contributed to their fall. From the outset Megara views their situation as hopeless; she has already surrendered all her previous expectations. But during this part of the play Amphitruo undergoes a change in the way he views the world, from maintaining that his expectations have some real basis for attaining fulfillment to acknowledging that his expectations were vain. It is not just his particular expectations which Amphitruo discards, rather the basis which could render any expectation at all meaningful. The change in perspective is a change in his beliefs about the gods. Believing at first that Zeus will reliably act in a particular way, so as to give him a ground for expectation, he ends up rejecting that belief, having found that Zeus is unreliable. Amphitruo feels betrayed. Essentially, then, Amphitruo sources attest a version of the story in which the madness preceded the labors: Diod. Sic. 4.10.6-11.2; Nicolaus of Damascus, FGrH 90 F 13; [Apollod.] Bibl. 2.4.12.

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141

comes to reject the third fundamental belief, for in this most crucial circumstance Zeus has not maintained the reciprocity which Amphitruo had counted on before. Amphitruo, Megara, and the children of Heracles have occupied an altar of Zeus σωτήρ (48; cf. 522) as their last refuge against the murderous aim of Lycus. They are utterly desperate, have no means of salvation, and are completely without allies (51-56, 430). 2 Megara views the situation so despondently that she counsels abandoning their asylum and surrendering themselves to the inevitable (70-71, cf. 278-311). Amphitruo is unwilling to surrender, steadfastly clinging to hope, however remote: φιλώ τάς ελπίδας (91, cf. 95-106, esp. 105-106). Their only hope, symbolized by their presence at Zeus' altar, lies in Zeus himself. But the remoteness of this hope is already evident in Amphitruo's response to Lycus' plan of murdering the children (206-216): not the children, but Lycus, would die, if only the designs of Zeus were just (211-212). 3 Lycus does not respect the sanctity of the altar and prepares to burn them out (238-246). Megara, eager to maintain dignity in death (284-286), questions Amphitruo about his hope (σκέψαι δέ την σην έλπίδα, 295): does he really believe that Heracles will return from the dead (296-297)? Whereas he had entertained this hope previously (95-97), now Amphitruo has no response. He finally admits that salvation is impossible (318, cf. 502). A deal is struck with Lycus wherein they voluntarily leave the altar in exchange for certain dignities in the manner of death (319-335). As they leave the altar, their fate seems sealed. It is at this point that Amphitruo addresses his great reproach to Zeus (339-347): ώ Ζεΰ, μάτην άρ' όμόγαμόν σ ' έκτησάμην, μάτην δε παιδός κοινεών' έκλήζομεν·

340

2 Their lack of φίλοι at this point is stressed later in the play: 551, 558-561. The friendship of the chorus (266-267) is of no avail. 3 215-216, stated more confidently, is an assertion of divine retribution after the crime.

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A New Creed: Heracles

σύ δ' ήσθ' αρ' ήσσον ή 'δόκεις είναι φίλος. αρετή σε νικώ θνητός ών θεόν μέγαν • παιδας γαρ ού προύδωκα τους Ηρακλέους. σύ δ' ές μεν εύνας κρύφιος ήπίστω μολείν, τάλλότρια λέκτρα δόντος ούδενός λαβών,

345

σώζειν δε τούς σούς ούκ έπίστασαι φίλους. άμαθης τις ει θεός η δίκαιος ούκ εφυς. Given his situation, a desperate suppliant at Zeus' altar, Amphitruo might be expected to beseech Zeus with a request for salvation in a pious prayer. However, he inverts the traditional elements of prayer diction in the service of reproach rather than praise.4 He invokes the god (339) and addresses him with the second singular pronoun (341, 344). The relationship of φιλία would normally justify the prayer request; here the uselessness of the relationship justifies the reproach (339-340). He employs an epithet, scornfully (θεόν μέγαν, 342). Amphitruo measures Zeus by a moral standard rather than by prodigious deeds; though he uses the ambiguous word άρετη, his meaning is clear (342-343). Instead of an enumeration of εργα or άρεταί the deed recounted is a crime (344-345).5 Instead of the expected appeal for salvation Amphitruo emphasizes Zeus' failure to save the family (346). This failure stands in implicit contrast with the epithet Zeus bears at this altar, viz. σωτήρ (cf. 48). Having employed and inverted typical prayer diction, Amphitruo omits the precaticr, the entire passage constitutes a reiectio. Amphitruo has become convinced that no help from Zeus will be forthcoming in the little time remaining, just as so far none has come. Leaving the altar is itself a sign of his having renounced all expectation based on his relationship with Zeus. Although the lack of divine intervention in favor of the family of Heracles is the fact which has 4

The traditional elements in the diction of prayers and hymns are discussed by Keyßner (1932). For additional discussion of invocation, justification, and appeal, see Ausfeld (1903); of the 'Du-Stil, see Norden (1913) 143-163; of justification, see Bremer (1981) 196. 5 Cf. the pious enumeration of άρεταί in the eulogy of Heracles which follows immediately (348-441), esp. 357-358.

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143

determined Amphitruo's belief, there are two other factors which form the essential background for that belief, viz. the familial relationship of Zeus to Amphitruo and Heracles, and the moral obligation of one φίλος to another. In the first line of the play Amphitruo introduced himself by calling attention to his reputation (τίς... ούκ οίδεν) of sharing marriage to Alcmene with Zeus.

As Amphitruo's partner in marriage to Alcmene and in

fatherhood of Heracles, Zeus is a φίλος of the family. Amphitruo clearly believes that Zeus' relationship to the family of Heracles obliges the god, according to traditional custom, to help his φίλοι. Earlier Amphitruo had said their 'difficult straits' (δυσπραξία) was 'the truest test of φίλοι' (5759). 6

The relationship of reciprocity which exists between the pious

worshipper and the gods is strengthened in this case by the bond of φιλία. 7 The failure of reciprocation is consequently all the more disconcerting. At the point of leaving the altar Amphitruo reasons as follows. Although Zeus is certainly a φίλος of the family, he has done nothing for them in their troubles (339-340). Since this is not how one would expect a true φίλος to act, Zeus has shown himself a deficient φίλος, one whose actions do not match his nominal status (341). The ά ρ ε τ ή in which Amphitruo claims to be superior to Zeus consists in the fulfillment of the obligations of φιλία (342). For Amphitruo, although he has accomplished nothing, at least knows his duty and has done his best to carry it out; by implication Zeus has betrayed the children of Heracles (343). 8 Zeus does not even recognize that the obligation to help his φίλοι exists (346). 9 Then there follows what is merely a coda. Given his beliefs that Zeus is a φίλος, that the bond of φ ι λ ί α requires Zeus to save Heracles' family, that Zeus 6 Cf. 275-276, 585-586. 7 The distinctive reciprocity implied by φιλία between men and gods was discussed above, pp. 107-111. 8 Amphitruo's constant concern in the crisis is not for himself but for the children: 44-47, 133, 206-207, 316-325, 499-500; cf. 1113. For the use of προδίδωμι to signal repudiation of reciprocity with men, cf. above, pp. 83, 131. 9 344-345 add a bitter twist. Zeus' coupling with Alcmene had been done secretly (κρύφιος) and without Amphitruo's permission (δόντος ούδενός). This will have been excusable in the case of the god, especially in light of the benefits it was bound to bring. Now, when the ultimate benefit fails, it is merely a tawdry case of adultery.

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A New Creed: Heracles

does not lack the physical power to help, for he is a 'great god' (342), and that help has definitely failed, Amphitruo is compelled to believe that Zeus is either ignorant or unjust (347). Zeus is ignorant if he does not understand the moral obligation which the bond of φ ι λ ί α requires, unjust if he knowingly disregards that obligation. 10 Line 346 is really the important conclusion, for the failure of the god to recognize his obligation is sufficient to disrupt any expectation of divine response.

Amphitruo shows no

preference whether the failure is due to ignorance or innate injustice; either case would explain Zeus' failure to honor the moral obligation which for Amphitruo is at the heart of the reciprocity between him and the god. The fact that Amphitruo has renounced belief in divine reciprocation is emphasized again later, when the family is dressed for death. After making a final, desperate prayer to Zeus (498-500), Amphitruo admits the futility of an appeal to Zeus; there is simply no response (501): καίτοι κέκλησαι πολλάκις·

μάτην πονώ. 1 1

The bleakness of human life which

Amphitruo then depicts (503-512) is a natural consequence of the absence of an attentive, responsive divinity in the world. Human expectations 10 Bond (1981) 145 correctly stresses that the dilemma posed in 347 requires 'a strong intellectual element' in ά μ α θ η ς ; however, Bond missed the point of the note of Wilamowitz (1895) 3.79-80 ad loc. Nowhere does Wilamowitz take άμαθης as 'insensitive', 'lacking in moral feeling' (as Bond asserts), a meaning Bond claims is present in Eur. El. 294, a passage not cited by Wilamowitz. Wilamowitz stressed that the ignorance in question is not plain stupidity, as Bond would have it, but moral ignorance (the inability to know right from wrong, as we might say): 'Die Betonung der άμαθία ist für die Werdezeit der auf Erkenntnis gebauten άρετή charakteristisch.' (To his citation of Pl. Smp. 204a, Wilamowitz could well have added Pl. Lg. 688e-689e.) This sense of άμαθής does not obfuscate Amphitruo's point that Zeus has omitted a moral obligation, and does maintain a clear dilemma in 347 (as it does the similar dilemma of Th. 6.39.2): either Zeus lacks sense in moral matters [however intelligent he may be in other respects], or [if he is understanding of morality but chooses to ignore his moral obligation] he is unjust. It would be a weak point for Amphitruo to accuse the 'great god' (342) who schemed to commit adultery (344-345) of being just plain stupid; the accusation is sharper if άμαθής means that however intelligent Zeus may be, he lacks sense in the one area where it really matters (viz. obligations to φίλοι). On several occasions Euripidean characters judge the intelligence or ignorance of a particular god with strict regard to moral considerations: Andr. 1165 (cf. above, p. 92), Ion 1313 (cf. above, p. 134), IT 380-386, Tr. 971-974, 981-982, IA 394a-395, 1189-1190, El. 969-973, 1246, Or. 417, Ph. 86, fr. 645 N. The key terms are άμαθής, ασύνετος, and σοφός. 11 μάτην recalls the repeated μάτην of 339-340. Cf. Tr. 1280-1281, where Hecuba interrupts herself after beginning a prayer; she has given up hope of a response (discussed above, pp. 86f.).

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145

(έλπίδας, 506), of course, are groundless (506-507). The traditionally valued products of human activity, wealth and reputation, are insecure (511512). There is only τύχη (509-510). 12 The reasoning is straightforward and, given the premises, unassailable. Other attitudes besides that of Amphitruo were displayed in this first part of the play. έξέπεσον

Megara too had resigned expectation (η πολύ γε δόξης ε υ έ λ π ι δ ο ς , 460) and acknowledged the play of τ ύ χ η

(μεταβαλοΰσα δ ' ή τύχη, 480). But she is referring only to specific cases, the expectation of the children's glorious future and her own suddenly altered fate. Unlike Amphitruo's determined rational inquiry into the nature of Zeus' behavior, Megara, at the beginning of her first speech, proclaims the inscrutability of the gods (62). Amphitruo, in contrast, feels he understands the gods too well. There is the further consideration that one of the premises which led Amphitruo to his harsh disillusionment is not universally accepted in this first part of the play. Is Zeus really the father of Heracles? 13 If not, Zeus would not be bound by φιλία to Heracles' family and not so firmly bound to act in the way Amphitruo expected. Zeus might be pitiless, but he need not be either άμαθης or άδικος. Though the family of Heracles would be Euripides' extremely flexible use of τύχη has been amply demonstrated by Busch (1937). There is no universal meaning; one must decide the meaning in each case. Here, where Amphitruo has renounced belief in the reciprocation of Zeus, the meaning of τύχη must be akin to its meaning in Eur. fr. 154 Austin: ώ θνητά παραφρονήματ' ανθρώπων, μάτην οι' φασιν είναι την τύχην ά λ λ ' οϋ θεούς· ώς οΰδεν ϊστε κει λέγειν δοκεΐτέ τι. εΐ μεν γαρ ή τύχη 'στιν ούδέν δει θεών, εί δ' οί θεοί σθένουσιν ούδέν ή τύχη. Cf. Eur. Hec. 488-491, Cyc. 606-607, fr. 901 Ν. 13 Euripides could be exploiting an instability in the tradition about Heracles' parentage, an instability which might be reflected in Hdt. 2.43-44, 6.53. I find it more likely that Euripides is exploiting a weakness inherent in the traditional story of Zeus' visit to Alcmene on the same night as Amphitruo returned. This would have figured in Euripides' Alcmene ; it is comically exploited in Plautus' Amphitruo. Soph. Tr. presents a strong, uniform view of Zeus as the father (19, 139-140, 826, 1088, 1106, 1168, 1185, 1268-1269). Wilamowitz (1895) 2.111-113 discusses Euripidean innovations in the myth, but not the question of paternity. Euripides also allowed some doubt for Helen's traditional descent from Zeus (Ilei. 17-21, 259; ¡A 793-800), which Gorgias could just as well have followed as preceded (cf. DK 82 Β 11.3).

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no better off, at least the reciprocity of the gods would not be proved as illusory as Amphitruo contended. Lycus called the claim of Heracles' divine parentage an 'empty boast' (148-149). He used this dismissal of the tie to Zeus as one reason for discounting Amphitruo's initial hope for salvation (èXjriôa, 144). In response Amphitruo said that it was up to Zeus to defend his portion (μέρος) of Heracles' lineage (170-171), meaning that an intervention to save the family would amount to a confirmation of divine paternity. The chorus too do not share Amphitruo's conviction about Heracles' divine descent.

The first stasimon, immediately following

Amphitruo's reproach of Zeus, is an extended eulogy of the apparently dead hero. Convinced that Heracles is dead and the family doomed (425-435), the chorus go so far as to call the fate of the children 'god-forsaken, unjust' (αθεον αδικον, 433-434). This comes at the end of the song, after the twelve labors have been described. But when they consider the lineage of their subject at the beginning of the song, they are uncertain whether Zeus or Amphitruo is the father (353-354). The chorus seem to want to absolve Zeus of direct responsibility, for otherwise this expression of doubt would be gratuitous.14

7.2 The chorus of Theban elders:

514-814

When Heracles, re-united with his family, retires into the palace, the chorus move rather hesitantly towards taking up their song in honor of the returned hero. They are old of course (637-641), but the confusion into which they were thrown by events in the first part of the play lingers. They chide the gods for failing to invent a useful device which human intelligence can conceive of: a second youth enjoyed by the virtuous would serve as a clear distinction between good and evil men. As things are there is no such clear 14 To express their doubt Euripides conveniently has the chorus use the traditional hymnic form of address ε'ίιε ... είτε ... (353-354; see Norden [1913] 144-147) in this lament (αί'λινον, 348) which is also a hymn (355).

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The chorus of Theban elders

distinction, wealth being amassed by good and evil indiscriminately (655672). This confusion between good and evil, now clarified by the return of Heracles, was essentially the source of Amphitruo's unsettling rejection of divine reciprocation. In the return of Heracles and his consequent slaughter of Lycus the chorus see the hand of the gods. Immediately following the slaughter, in the third stasimon, the spontaneous choral celebration of the fall of the impious man (760-761) becomes a spontaneous statement of the theodicy of which the chorus have only just now become thoroughly convinced.

Thus not only does the mood change from dread to

exhilaration, but the new facts prompt a revision of beliefs about the gods. The chorus now confidently assert that men meet with a response from the gods according to their justice and piety (772-773): θεοί θεοί των άδικων μέλουσι καί των όσίων έπάειν.

The affirmation of this

particular form of the third pious belief (which, incidentally, would have won the approval of Plato) is the essence of the chorus' theodicy. The chorus assert their belief in explicit contrast to a view reported by them a few lines earlier (757-759): τίς ò θεούς ανομία χραίνων, θνατός ών, άφρονα λόγο ν Ι ο ύ ρ α ν ί ω ν μ α κ ά ρ ω ν | κ α τ ε β α λ ' 1 5 ως αρ' ού σθένουσιν θεοί; The identity of the τίς is obviously meant to be obscure. 16 By denying that 1 5 The cruces are for purely metrical reasons. In κατέβαλ' Dodds (1960) 95 (adBa. 202) suspected an allusion to a work of Protagoras entitled κ α τ α β ά λ λ ο ν τ ε ς (sc. λόγοι?). But the only thing preserved from this work is the homo mensura sentence (DK 80 Β 1). For the meaning of καταβάλλω here, see Bond (1981) 262. 16 Cf. the unknown, impious τις who denies the second fundamental belief, Aesch. Ag. 369-372: ούκ εφα τις θεούς βροτών άξιοΰσθαι μέλειν οσοις άθικτων χάρις πατοΐθ'. ό δ' ούκ ευσεβής. Wilamowitz (1895) 3.170 took 757-759 as 'Hohn gegen Lykos, der δειμάτων εξωθεν war, 723, und die Heiligkeit des Altars und Herdes nicht respektierte'. One might add that these lines are sung while the moans of the dying Lycus are heard from offstage. Bond (1981) 262, recalling 346, prefers to see Amphitruo in these lines. But the use of τίς hardly demands that we choose one or the other. Neither Lycus nor Amphitruo can be far from our thoughts as the chorus sing their theodicy. The

A New Creed: Heracles

148

the gods have power this person rejects all forms of the third fundamental belief. For if the gods are without power, any divine response to human affairs would be impotent and null. Reciprocity between men and gods could not be realized at all, including, of course, the divine sanction for human morality. Thus a natural consequence of the belief of the τίς would be lawlessness (ανομία).

Such lawlessness and the impious religious

belief which supports it are immediately undermined by the chorus with their theodicy.17 In terms of the progress of the drama, the theodicy of the chorus is an implicit revision of Amphitruo's belief about the gods. For the divine reaction sought by Amphitruo, the absence of which led him to abandon his belief in reciprocity with the gods, has finally come about.

In a reiteration

of their theodicy, the chorus specifically state that they arrived at this conviction just because of Heracles' victory over Lycus (809-814). Furthermore, the divine intervention, which in the agon with Lycus Amphitruo had implied would confirm Heracles' divine parentage (170171), is now accepted by the chorus as such confirmation. They have overcome their previous doubt (353-354) and are now thoroughly convinced that Heracles is the son of Zeus (Διός ό παις, 696; cf. 798-804). In essence Amphitruo's broken belief about Zeus is repaired:

the

view attributed to this τίς, a new, fourth element in addition to the views expressed or implied by Amphitruo, Lycus, and the pious chorus, is somewhat stronger than Amphitruo's. The latter only ruled out a reciprocity based on the special obligation of φιλία, not other, less exalted forms of reciprocity. 17 The phrase ό θεούς ανομία χραίνων literally translates as 'the one who defiles the gods with lawlessness', which most simply means 'the one who defiles the gods with [his own] lawlessness'. The very utterance of the following doctrine of lawless consequence is itself a lawless act. Bond (1981) 263 claims that, in light of the following λόγος, this phrase should be construed as 'the one who defiles the gods by [attributing] lawlessness [to them]'. This interpretation has, Bond claims, 'more point' than the one offered above. However, the λόγος of the τίς attributes powerlessness, not lawlessness, to the gods. Neither of Bond's parallels is apt {Hipp. 951, Ion 442-443); both of those passages contain words which explicitly attribute the quality in question to the gods, precisely what is lacking here. There is nothing in this passage to incline the audience to make the considerable supplement Bond would require. Finally, Bond's interpretation weakens the point of the chorus responding with a strong assertion of the divine sanction for human morality. The chorus are less concerned with pure theology than with the ill effect of dangerous beliefs about the gods.

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149

relationship of φιλία is avowed and the return of Heracles has fulfilled Zeus' obligations as φίλος. The god is neither ignorant nor unjust, but recognizes and fulfills what he owes his human φίλοι. It is worth adding that, just as the departure from Zeus' altar and Amphitruo's exasperation at the futility of prayer (501) signified the renunciation of pious belief, so with the repair of pious belief the chorus return to ritual forms. Seeing the gods at work, the chorus naturally express themselves in religious choral performance. At some point in the second stasimon the chorus-members put on crowns, symbol of their consecrated status (673-677). They sing paeans before Heracles' palace just as the Delians sing the paean before Apollo's temple (687-694). The celebratory third stasimon is practically a communal festival of Thebes (763764): χοροί χοροί καί θ α λ ί α ι μέλουσι Θήβας ιερόν κατ' άστυ. Local divinities are summoned to join in (781-797). In the repetitive diction (763, 765-766, 772) Bond has detected a traditional element of ritual triumph songs. 18 The rift between men and gods is apparently healed.

7.3 Heracles:

815-1428

In the aftermath of the mad slaughter of his wife and children, Heracles is first intent on suicide, then, after argument with Theseus, changes his mind and decides to live with Theseus in Athens. This is the basic dramatic interest of this part of the play: what will Heracles do? But Euripides carefully has the character give his reasons, first for suicide, then for the change of mind. What Heracles believes about the gods is a crucial part of his reasoning in each case; for the gods, Hera in particular, were responsible for the madness which put Heracles in his dilemma. There are two stages to Heracles' thoughts about the gods corresponding to his intentions first to die, then to live.

Although the decision to live is

something of an abrupt reversal, his beliefs about the gods do not undergo a 18 Bond (1981) 265-266.

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A New Creed: Heracles

radical shift; rather he progressively clarifies what he believes about the gods. There is no need to insist on unresolvable contradictions between the various statements of belief, nor, of course, on a bland inconsequentiality to which all the utterances can be reduced. 19 There is all the complexity of a real person grappling with a real problem. His decision to forgo suicide is made when he has clarified matters to his satisfaction, a satisfaction which gives strength to decision.

7.3.1 The problem:

815-1302

As the echoes of the triumphant theodicy of the chorus die down, Iris makes her terrible appearance accompanied by madness personified, Lyssa (815ff.). In Iris' first speech, after explaining the mission on which Hera has sent her, she justifies Hera's cruel purpose with a statement which amounts to another theodicy. The tenor of this theodicy, however, is vastly different from the immediately preceding one (840-842): γνφ [sc. Ηρακλής] μεν τον "Ηρας οιός έστ' αύτω χόλος,

840

μάθη δε τον έμόν· ή θεοί μεν οΰδαμοΰ, τα θνητά δ' εσται μεγάλα, μή δόντος [sc. Ηρακλέους] δίκην. Iris' last three words jar harshly against the facts presented so far in the play: there is no crime which Heracles has committed; Heracles has done nothing to merit punishment. In fact he has been portrayed throughout as a man of unblemished virtue: he is the hero of the labors (the great first stasimon, 348-441); he has restored just government to Thebes (565-573); 19 Schlesier (1985) sees Heracles making two different, incompatible types of criticism of the gods: 1) mythical or moral criticism which stems from divine anthropomorphism (1263-1265, 1303-1310, 1393); 2) criticism of anthropomorphism itself (1341-1346). She concludes that Heracles is not a character of 'univocité', but is 'une figure déterminée de façon polyvalente' (p. 40). Halleran (1986) regards a contradiction between 1340-1346 and 1392-1393 as explicable on the grounds of dramatic irony. On the other hand, Burnett (1971) 174-177 discounts the outburst against Hera (1303-1310) because it is uttered in Heracles' 'most faithless point of despair' (p. 176), and reduces the creed of 1341-1346 to an innocuous obiter dictum (p. 174).

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151

he is the father and husband who has returned to save his family (cf. 622636). We have heard that Heracles had participated on the side of the gods in the fight against the Giants (177-180; cf. 1190-1192). Heracles' piety has been especially prominent in contrast to the thoroughly impious Lycus. There is nothing in Heracles' return which is reminiscent, e.g., of the ominous return of Agamemnon. His first act on his return was to pay his respects to the household deities (606-609). At the moment the madness struck him he was in the act of offering a sacrifice of purification at the altar of Zeus (922-924, cf. 1144-1145).

The perversity of Iris' theodicy is

heightened by the striking portrayal of Λύσσα σωφρονοΰσα. 2 0 Lyssa protests against the plan of Hera and Iris. She takes no pleasure in attacking men who are φίλοι (846), and she mentions that Heracles is 'notable among the gods', for he 'alone restored the honors of the gods which were dying because of impious men' (849-853). In short, there is nothing in the play to account for Heracles' madness and suffering other than the anger of Hera. To call Heracles' fate 'deserved punishment' (δίκη) is perverse.21 More so even than his return from Hades and victory over Lycus, Heracles' mad slaughter reveals that he is the son of Zeus. For the only imaginable cause of this event is the anger of Hera, jealous of Zeus' son by 20 Wilamowitz' term, following Une 857 (Wilamowitz [1895] 2.124). 21 Cf. Stinton (1975) 251: 'This is the one Greek tragedy in which divine φθόνος is totally divorced from δίισ).' Critics have long sought an antecedent cause for Heracles' madness which would mitigate the abruptness of the madness in the play. Most turn to some version of the idea that it is the very greatness of Heracles which requires a fall. Wilamowitz (1895) 2.128-129 saw in Heracles the embodiment of 'das dorische Mannesideal' (viz. purely physical άρετή). Thus he contains within himself the seeds of his own destruction: 'sein Verbrechen kommt aus derselben Wurzel seines Wesens wie seine Heldengrösse.' This approach was taken over and modified by Verrall ([1905] 141142: Heracles is 'curst from his birth with a taint in his blood, a recurrent and progressive malady of the brain.'), Dodds ([1929] 99-100: The 'victory of irrational impulse over reason in a noble but unstable human being ... [Heracles'] insanity is clearly marked as belonging to the manic-depressive type."), and Murray (Oxford text, app. crit. ad 575: iam delirans Hercules). Knox (1972) 278 pointed out that Hera's anger could hardly be aroused at the grandeur Heracles achieved through the labors (as asserted by Burnett [1971] 177-179); the enmity began at Heracles' birth (1263-1268; cf. 20-21). Other attempts to discover in Heracles some sin, error, or fault to account for the madness are cited by Stinton (1975) 250, nn. 2, 3. An antecedent for the madness other than Hera's anger is precisely what is absent from the drama. Hera's anger needs no accounting for: it is a datum of the myth retained by the poet.

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another woman. Iris speaks of the anger of Hera directed at 'the son of Zeus and Alcmene' (825-832, 840). Theseus, learning of what Heracles has done, immediately infers the agency of Hera (1189, cf. 1240). The chorus, who have heard the speech of Iris, echo this verdict as the only possible explanation (1311-1312). There is no question that Hera has struck, but the motive of her anger, jealousy, is explicitly raised only once in the play (1308-1310, discussed below).

Zeus too bears some

responsibility for the attack, for in some sense he allowed Hera to attack his son. So Iris implies, by claiming that Zeus did not allow Hera to attack up to now (827-829). Zeus is blamed by the chorus (886-887, 1087-1088) and Amphitruo (1127). And the gods in general are held responsible (919, 1135, 1180). Thus the problem which was faced by Amphitruo in the first part of the play, when he came to doubt the reciprocation of Zeus, and which was seemingly resolved in the second part of the play, is raised anew with greater urgency: what will Heracles believe about the gods who, having wrecked his life, seem to have destroyed any basis for a reciprocal relationship with him? From the time that Heracles regains consciousness and is made fully aware of events (1146), he is intent on suicide. This impulse arises at first as the natural heroic response to the great δύσκλεια he has incurred (1152). He is ashamed of the evil deeds he has committed (1160). But the advent of Theseus, who strenuously opposes the suicide, forces Heracles to defend his decision at length. Theseus claims that suicide is not worthy of the great Heracles, but would suit a lesser man (1248, 1250). If Heracles were to kill himself, it would be an act of ignorance (άμαθία, 1254), i.e. a failure on the part of Heracles to understand what, according to Theseus, his arete requires.22 The explanation Heracles offers in response contains the exposition of the first stage in the evolution of his beliefs about the gods. Heracles no longer speaks of disgrace and shame. He speaks rather

22 On the nature of Heracles' arete, see Chalk (1962). The response of Adkins (1966) 209-219 is inadequate; see Stinton (1975) 251-252.

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153

of the futility of his life (άβίωτον, 1257), of which the gods Zeus and Hera are the sole cause. The theme of the victory of the divine over the mortal, first raised by Iris (841-842), is developed in Heracles' first long speech to Theseus (12551310). Just before the speech Theseus had mentioned Heracles' status of benefactor of mankind as a reason to refrain from suicide (1252). It has been frequently stressed in the play that the primary effect of the labors was to benefit mankind (20, 401-402, 696-700, 851-852). But, as Heracles will go on to show, he can find no consolation or renewed purpose in continued service to men. Though willing to acknowledge the heroic labors (1269-1278), he responds that men can render him no aid because Hera prevails ( ά λ λ ' "Ηρα κρατεί, 1253). His recent misfortune has made Heracles an outcast from Thebes; he can join in none of the sacred and profane associations which are the constituents of polis life (1279-1284). In fact, there is no polis at all which could conceivably admit him a place (1286). Greater than the issue of pollution, which could be resolved by ritual means (cf. 1324), is the clarity of Hera's hand, which has marked him out to bear a conspicuous stigma. People will recognize him and scorn him as 'that son of Zeus, who once killed his wife and children' (1287-1290). 23 Thus, he concludes, there is no reason for him to live: he can reap no gain having a useless and profane existence (1301-1302). More than merely the burden of living with the knowledge of having killed his own family is at stake. In the battle of the goddess Hera with the mortal Heracles the goddess has won - ά λ λ ' "Ηρα κρατεί. By striking him with madness, by implanting the stigma of accursedness, Hera has asserted her superiority, which Heracles has now acknowledged. The suicide, moreover, though a noble act which might recover some measure of dignity, would nevertheless demonstrate the effectiveness of the stigma which makes his life among men futile.

Thus, for Heracles to commit suicide would be a sign of

acquiescence in the first part of Iris' theodicy: ή θεοί μεν ούδαμοΰ, τα 23 Heracles magnifies his plight by a hyberbole which extends his exclusion to the natural world and compares his future status to that of the infamous Ixion (1294-1298).

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A New Creed: Heracles

θνητά δ' εσται μεγάλα. The injustice of this situation then dawns upon him suddenly. The protest against Hera's injustice, fully developed only at the end of the speech (1303-1310), is adumbrated early on. In the opening argument to show the futility of his life Heracles claims that he has essentially been doomed from birth (1258-1268). As a skilled rhetorician Heracles makes the same point from two alternative suppositions: one may suppose that he is the son of Amphitruo (1258-1262) or of Zeus (1263-1268), the result is the same.24 Why raise the question of his birth yet again? Events, and the goddess Iris herself, have finally confirmed his divine parentage beyond doubt. There is more here than rhetorical plenitude; Heracles raises the question in order to show his disgust with his real father Zeus (1263-1265): Ζευς δ', όστις ό Ζευς, πολέμιόν μ' έγείνατο "Ηρα (συ μέντοι μηδέν άχθεσθης, γέρον· πατέρα γαρ άντί Ζηνός ήγοΰμαι σ' έγώ)

1265

The phrase όστις ò Ζευς recalls a traditional element in the diction of prayers, but here, not in the context of a prayer, the meaning is disparaging. Far from the attitude of a pious worshipper before the ineffability of the divine, Heracles decries the kind of god Zeus must be who 'begat him as Hera's enemy' (1263-1264). 25 Heracles then takes the further step of disowning Zeus as his father. Addressing Amphitruo he says Ί consider

24

The rhetorical style of the entire speech is marked by the locutions ά μ ι λ λ η θ ώ λόγοις (1255) and αναπτύξω (1256) in the prooemium (1255-1257), the ordering of arguments (πρώτον μεν, 1258; έπεί δε, 1269), and the explicit conclusion (δήτα in interrogation, 1301). The end of the speech abandons rhetorical style; it is pure emotion (1303-1310). 25 Bond (1981) 383: 'δστις 6 Ζευς is meant to shock.' Heracles' words are perilously close to the blasphemy of Pentheus (Ba. 219-220): τον νεωστί δαίμονα / Διόνυσον, δστις έστί (discussed above, p. 78). For the traditional diction in prayers, see Fraenkel ad Aesch. Ag. 160, Norden (1913) 144-147. Eur. Or. 418 is also disparaging, but, coming so early in the play, not as charged as this instance. Eur. Tr. 885, coming in a prayer, is subtler in its mixture of connotations (cf. p. 85 above). The tone of Eur. fr. 480 N. is impossible to gauge.

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you in place of Zeus (αντί Ζηνός) as my father' (1264-1265). 26 This renunciation is an ineffectual gesture; the painful reality of his divine parentage lying at the root of his dilemma is unchangeable. Though he protests against the way Zeus has acted as father, much as Amphitruo protested earlier (339-347), the protest remains enmeshed in Heracles' mood and argument of futility.

7.3.2 The crux: 1303-1346 At the end of the first long speech comes the emotional protest against the goddess responsible for destroying all meaning in his life (1303-1310). In the first four and a half lines Heracles remonstrates once more against Hera's 'victory' (1303-1307): χορευέτω δη Ζηνός ή κλεινή δάμαρ 1"κρόουσ' 'Ολυμπίου Ζηνός άρβύλη πόδα")". επραξε γαρ βούλησιν ήν έβούλετο

1305

άνδρ' Ε λ λ ά δ ο ς τον πρώτον αΰτοίσιν βάθροις άνω κάτω στρέψασα. The next three and a half lines represent a crucial advance in Heracles' thinking; they open the perspective from which Heracles is led to reject Hera's stigma, the futility of his life, and, therefore, suicide (1307-1310): τοιαύτη θεφ τίς άν προσεύχοιθ'; ή γυναικός οΰνεκα λέκτρων φθονούσα Ζηνί τους εύεργέτας Ε λ λ ά δ ο ς άπώλεσ' ουδέν οντάς αιτίους.

1310

26 Admetus expresses disgust with his real father in similar terms (Ale. 641): και μ' ού νομίζω παΐδα σον πεφυκέναι. For a contrast with Zeus' behavior towards his son, cf. Amphitruo's loyal words to Heracles just after he awakes (1113): ώ τέκνον · ει γαρ καί κακώς πράσσων έμός.

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Though the reason for Hera's anger at Heracles is obvious, and was perhaps too obvious to need mention before, Heracles makes her motive explicit now for the first time in the play. It provokes from him a cry of his complete innocence of wrongdoing (ούδεν όντας αιτίους, 1310) which we noticed above was so prominent a part of his portrayal throughout the play.27 He realizes that the suffering he has encountered at the hands of the goddess has no relation to his own actions. Although he was not present to hear Iris utter her perverse theodicy, Heracles now becomes aware of and rejects the import of that theodicy. 28 This amounts to a recognition by Heracles that the basis of reciprocity between himself and the goddess is perverse. The full consequence of this enlarged perspective is yet to be drawn, but even here Heracles doubts the possibility of maintaining towards Hera the most fundamental expression of reciprocity with the gods: religious cult. His question 'to such a goddess who would pray?' implies a belief that any meaningful reciprocity with the goddess is impossible.29 To pray to this goddess is a waste of time, because a response from her would bear no conceivable relation to the worshipper and his prayer.30 The repudiation of ritual reciprocity with Hera in the emotional outburst is an anticipation of his following calm, reasoned statement (1340ff.): it will turn 27

When the chorus of the Hippolytus could not reconcile their belief in divine care for men with the unjust fate of Hippolytus, they describe him as ούδέν ατας αίτιον (1149); cf. above pp. 118f., note 37. 28 ούδέν όντας αιτίους is something of a rejoinder to μή δόντος δίκην (842). 29 Although only Hera is specifically mentioned here, Heracles has surely abandoned belief in a meaningful reciprocity with Zeus too: disowning Zeus as his father was a complaint against Zeus' gratuitous complicity in Hera's enmity. The bitter όστις ό Ζευς (1263) sounds like the exasperation of one who is unable to explain what defies explanation. Heracles' inability to say who or what Zeus is stems from Zeus' not being what Zeus, as father and god, should be, viz. a good father and a just god. Thus όστις ό Ζευς is itself an unarticulated anticipation of τοιαύτη θεώ. As if to shore up the basis for Heracles' outrage at Zeus, Euripides placed Heracles piously sacrificing at Zeus' altar when the madness struck (922-924, 1144-1145). In the enormity of this incongruity Jäkel (1972) 61 saw 'die Entwertung des alten Rituals durch die Götter selbst'; cf. the murder of Neoptolemus while he was sacrificing at Apollo's altar, discussed above, pp. 91f.. Cf. also Amphitruo's bitter reproach of Zeus, 1127. 30 It will be recalled that when Amphitruo acknowledged the utter collapse of the reciprocity between himself and Zeus, he first abused prayer diction to utter a reproach of Zeus (339-347), then resigned himself to the uselessness of prayer (501); cf. p. 147 above.

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out that τοιαύτη θεός, to whom it makes no sense to address prayer, is not, with reference to Heracles' beliefs about the gods, όρθώς θεός. Following Heracles' outburst against Hera, Theseus offers yet another argument against suicide (1314-1321).31 The core of the argument is the following: if the gods are content to live with their mistakes (ήνέσχοντό θ' ήμαρτηκότες, 1319), why should not Heracles, a mere mortal, do likewise?32 Theseus mentions adultery and violent overthrow as examples of regrettable divine behavior (1316-1318). His language is beguiling. The regrettable actions performed by the gods were voluntary; Theseus would have described them more accurately as crime (άδικειν), rather than as mere error (άμαρτάνειν, 1319). Censuring Heracles' overly strong feeling of remorse, Theseus speaks of such actions neutrally as τύχαι (1314, 1321), mere 'events', the origins of which are left ill defined. This way of looking at things will affect Heracles' change of mind. The rest of Theseus' speech is concerned with an offer of residence and future honors in Athens (13221339). Heracles then makes his second long speech to Theseus (1340-1393) in which he announces his new decision to forgo suicide and accept Theseus' offer (1347-1357). But the announcement is prefaced by a short response to Theseus' argument from divine exempla.

This is perhaps the most

famous bit of Euripidean 'criticism of the gods' (1340-1346): οϊμοι- πάρεργα { — ) τάδ' εστ' έμών κακών·

1340

έγώ δέ τους θεούς ούτε λέκτρ' α μή θέμις στέργειν νομίζω δεσμά τ' έξάπτειν χεροιν οϋτ' ήξίωσα πώποτ' ούτε πείσομαι ούδ' άλλον άλλου δεσπότην πεφυκέναι. 31 The lacuna at the beginning of Theseus' speech probably contains no more than one or two lines of formal introduction for his following points; see Drexler (1943) 333 n. 21, Bond ( 1 9 8 1 ) 392-393. In any case, no information is lacking to render Heracles' response less than completely intelligible. 32 Similar arguments are deployed by the Nurse at Hipp. 451-459 and Helen at Tr. 9 4 8 - 9 5 0 . That this was a stock argument appears from Ar. Nu. 1079-1082. Cf. the discussion of Ion 440-451, above pp. 132f.

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δειται γαρ ò θεός, ε'ίπερ εστ' όρθώς θεός, ούδενός· αοιδών οϊδε δύστηνοι λόγοι.

1345

33

In these lines Heracles expresses himself tersely. The full meaning of this passage must be unpacked bit by bit until the whole stands with integrity. Although the internal cohesion of the diction and rhetoric is complete, this is not an argument whose steps unfold consecutively. Heracles reveals a religious attitude whose jarring unorthodoxy stems from an imaginative idiosyncrasy worthy of Plato rather than from a simplistic denial of the 'facts' of traditional myth. Essentially, without denying the existence and activity of the traditional gods Heracles considers the sort of divine activity mentioned by Theseus from the perspective which he seemed to stumble upon in his angry outburst at Hera (1303-1310). This consideration leads directly to Heracles' change of mind. Although Heracles will choose the course advocated by Theseus, abstention from suicide, he does not do so because he is persuaded by the argument Theseus drew from the examples of divine criminal behavior. If Theseus were to influence his friend with that argument, Heracles would have to accept the examples as facts; for the argument from divine precedent 33 To compile a bibliography of the interpretation of this passage would be a Herculean task. The problem most frequently seized upon is whether or not these lines are fundamentally incompatible with the rest of the drama; i.e. is Heracles really denying the story he himself is involved in, denying that the gods have done what in the play they obviously have done? Those who argue that the passage is not incompatible have sought in various ways, of varying plausibility, to limit the scope of what Heracles denies in these lines, so that, at the very least, the events of the play can be saved; so e.g. Grube (1941) 56-59; Burnett (1971) 174-175; Stinton (1976) esp. 83; Bond (1981) 399-400; Knox (1985) 322. Those in the opposite camp, convinced that no expedient for compatibility is plausible, see an extra-dramatic intrusion of the view of the playwright (though just what that view is, is subject to much debate); the best spokesman for the latter approach is Brown (1978). However, I take it to be fundamentally wrong to see the playwright intruding and editorializing on the action, here as anywhere else in his dramas. In the absence of any overt sign of the playwright's persona, such as occurs in the parabaseis of Aristophanic comedy, we had better interpret the passage strictly within its dramatic context. Criteria used to select the playwright's own views (e.g. Decharme [1906] 20-21, Dodds [1929] 98) are inevitably subjective and applied unsystematically. My aim is the same here as elsewhere: this and all other utterances and actions of Heracles are the evidence for establishing his attitude towards the fundamental beliefs about the gods.

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depends on the reality of that precedent. Thus Theseus began with an appeal to the accounts of poets as the authority for his divine exempla (1315).

The unenthusiastic manner in which Theseus cites the poets

(αοιδών εϊπερ ού ψευδείς λόγοι, 1315) may well appear to us as a sign of Theseus' distrust of this authority.34 But Heracles never questions the reliability of the poets' accounts. He begins by stating that these examples (τάδ') are irrelevant (πάρεργα) to his situation (1340). 35 At the end of this passage (οϊδε [1346] picks up τάδ' [1340]), by characterizing these examples as αοιδών δύστηνοι λόγοι (1346) he need not imply that these λόγοι are false in the sense that they are complete fiction. The 'wretched stories' of adultery and criminal violence among the traditional gods may well be true in the sense that his story is true, and wretched.36 Heracles is just not concerned (as Theseus clearly was) with the lesson to be drawn from the fact that the traditional gods have committed crimes and tolerate their criminal past; in this sense Theseus' examples are irrelevant to his situation, be they true or false. Heracles' language, tentatively in 13411344, clearly in 1345-1346, shows that he is concerned with what would properly be called a philosophical understanding of divinity. 34

This

This appearance would be supported if Theseus' locution is meant to remind us of the proverb attributed to Solon (fr. 29 West): π ο λ λ ά ψεύδονται αοιδοί. Theseus has been portrayed throughout as an enlightened man. In addition to the boldness of offering residence and honors in Athens to the accursed man, he is impatient with Heracles' scruples about pollution (1231-1234, 1398-1400). This Theseus is not unlike the Theseus of the Suppliant Women. Schmid-Stithlin (1940) 1.3.430-447 viewed the Heracles, like the Suppliant Women, as an encomium of Theseus and Athens. An important factor for this view is Athena's sudden, unexplained intervention to prevent the mad Heracles from committing patricide (1002-1006). There is no question that τ ά δ ' refers to Theseus' examples; cf. Halleran (1986) 175. 36 Later, though reconciled to life, Heracles reiterates the wretchedness of his existence (1375,1385,1393,1403). Nearly all critics read 1346 as a direct retort to Theseus' words in 1315, hence as a claim that the poets' stories are false. But no one has explained in what sense wretched tales of poets are false tales. Mere allusion to Solon's remark (quoted in note 34 above) does not explain this. Below I indicate that Heracles would object to the designation of the traditional gods in the poets' tales as gods. In my interpretation of 1346 essentially I am stressing δύστηνοι, the word which Heracles uses and Theseus does not, as the predicate, not αοιδών (for the predicate in this position, cf. Soph. El. 741). Stinton (1976) 83-84 tentatively suggested that Heracles is disapproving of these tales, rather than rejecting them as false.

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understanding renders Theseus' mythohistorical examples irrelevant and provides him with the reason to refrain from suicide.37 Heracles denies that he believes that τους θεούς commit the sort of actions mentioned by Theseus (1341-1344).

But he is not therefore

denying that the beings known as Zeus, Hera, etc. have committted adultery and criminal violence. That would be absurd for Heracles of all people to deny; in 1307-1310 Heracles has just declared his strong belief about Zeus' adultery and Hera's grossly immoral reaction. Two elements in Heracles' diction, subtle but unmistakable, show that in 1341-1344 Heracles is not responding directly to Theseus' statement about divine activity. Heracles has another point entirely. We would infer this in any case from Heracles' initial claim about the irrelevancy of Theseus' divine examples. Theseus had specifically referred to the Olympian gods as the perpetrators of the misdeeds (1318-1319), and by using the aorist indicative (1317, 1318) had implied particular, if unspecified instances.38 Heracles speaks otherwise in 37 If it sounds as if I am making Heracles into a philosopher, that is appropriate; for Heracles is here speaking the language of late fifth-century philosophical discourse (cf. notes 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49 below). Wilamowitz (1895) 3.271 was the first to recognize the importance of the philosophical background. In the course of criticizing those (e.g. Verrall [1905]) who lay, in his opinion, too heavy emphasis on these lines, Bond (1981) 399 explains that 'Heracles is not an academic philosopher who has thought out the implications of everything he says.' Of course Heracles is not a philosopher. But he speaks here like a philosopher (as Bond himself notes several times) and gives every indication of thinking like one. His train of thought shows that Euripides has portrayed him as one who has thought out the implications of his words; cf. έσκεψάμην (1347) and the careful response to Theseus' charge of ά μ α θ ί α (1254-1257). Using the word έφρόντισα Phaedra too pauses at a dramatic moment to consider a philosophical problem {Hipp. 376; cf. 388); cf. also Hecuba at Hec. 592-603. With the plea of interpreting 1341-1346 'firmly in their context as a direct and detailed answer to the argument of Theseus (1314-1321)' Bond simplistically reduces the scope of this passage and shies away from the essential interpretive problem of the play. Although Verrall's approach is to be eschewed, we must not treat this passage as the reflections of either a polemical or a deluded man. To assuage the unease of those who are reluctant to concede dramatic interest to reflections about the nature of god, it may help to recall other instances where we readily admit that such reflection can stir the imagination and emotions: e.g. the temptation of Jesus (Matt. 4.1-11, Luke 4.1-13) or, more aptly, the arguments of Job. See Pfeiffer (1941) 692-707 for a discussion of the theological deliberations in Job, including their dramatic interest. One must not shy away when philosophy surfaces in Euripidean drama; it is integrated into the drama, and is not a sideshow or display. 3 ° Theseus cannot be using the gnomic aorist, for, having cited the poets as his source, he is treating his examples as facts derived from a historical narrative.

Heracles: the crux

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his reply. By using present infinitives (1342, 1344) 39 and leaving his subject, so far at least, unspecified (1341), he does not deny particular criminal acts by particular gods (e.g. Zeus overthrowing his father and committing adultery), but asserts a universal statement about a general subject (e.g. gods do not commit crimes). The question arises: if τους θεούς does not refer to Zeus, Hera, and the other Olympian gods, to whom or what does it refer? Heracles completes and clarifies his meaning in the next sentence (13451346); here is the delayed but expected specification of the previous subject τους θεούς. The γάρ (1345) shows that the sentence beginning with δείται is explanatory of what precedes it. 40

The subject ò θεός is

obviously a generic term, what we would call simply 'god' or 'the divine', for there is no reference to any particular god. 41 Heracles then invokes a means of discrimination which was standard equipment in the arsenal of intellectuals of Euripides' day - what was known as ό ρ θ ό τ η ς ονομάτων. 42 The distinction between the correct and incorrect uses of a 39 δεσπότην πεφυκέναι = δεσπότην είναι φύσει or δεσπόζειν; cf. Kühner-Gerth 1.42, Goodwin Moods and Tenses § 49.a. 40 In fact, the γάρ may be taken strictly with reference to the individual phrase τους θεούς; cf. Denniston, Greek Particles 65-66. 41 There is no question of monotheism. For the generic use of the article, cf. KühnerGerth 1.589, Smyth Greek Grammar §§ 1122-1123. The words άλλον άλλου (1344) refer to no particular gods, hence cannot supply a particular reference for ό θεός. ό θεός is used in the generic sense elsewhere by Euripides (HF 1243, discussed below; Hel. 711; Ph. 414), Gorgias (DK 82 Β 11.6), Plato (e.g. Ale. 1.133c and frequently throughout the discussion of the politically permissible τύποι περί θεολογίας [379a5] at the end of Rep. 2 [379a-383cj; this usage must be distinguished from Plato's use of ό θεός to refer to a single, supreme god), and Epicurus (ap. Diog. Laert. 10.123, ad Menoeceum). The same notion could be expressed by το θείον, e.g. Eur. M 394a, Xen. Mem. 1.4.18, and in the Sisyphus fragment (TrGF 1.43 F 19.16): the clever social innovator το θείον είσηγησατο, i.e. introduced 'the notion of divinity' or 'the idea of the divine'. For the use of ό θεός to express the generic concept of deity from Homer to Plato, cf. François (1957); for the use of the generic concept of divinity in Herodotus, expressed by either θεός or θείον, see Pötscher (1958). And cf. Festugière (1969) 34-35: '[Les Grecs] traduisent aussi bien la même réalité par ό θεός que par τό θείον: le vrai problem est de savoir quels sont nos rapports avec ce Divin.' 42 όρθότης ονομάτων and the closely related topic of όρθοέπεια were matters of crucial importance in the discourse of late fifth-century philosophy. The subject entails the relation of language to reality (hence an aspect of the νόμος/φύσις debate), and particularly the fitness of language to portray reality accurately. This subject was certainly treated by Protagoras (PI. Phdr. 267c, Crai. 391c), Prodicus (Pl. Crat. 384b, cf.

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name corresponds to the true and false instances of a thing. With the qualifying phrase εί'περ κτλ. (1345) Heracles is introducing the distinction between, on the one hand, that which truly belongs to this class, which truly is god, and to which the term 'god' ought properly (όρθώς) to be applied and, on the other hand, that which does not strictly belong to the class 'god' as he has marked it out, which in this strict sense is not god, but which sometimes, with less than perfect propriety, might be called 'god'.43 This distinction, drawn out at length for the sake of explicitness, is elementary and easily conveyed by the few words in Euripides' text. The phrase τους θεούς in 1341, therefore, as the explanandum, does not refer to the traditional or Olympian gods, but is used to refer genetically to that distinctive, 'proper' class of gods for which a definition is offered in 1345-1346. 44 This reading best explains the generalizing diction of 13411344, accounts for the following explanation employing philosophical terminology, and most importantly maintains the demands of the dramatic situation (i.e. the acknowledgment by Heracles and all other characters that Zeus and Hera are to blame). In 1341-1346 Heracles is not denying the DK 84 A 13-19), and Antisthenes (fr. 160 Giannantoni, cf. the first two titles in Diog. Laert. 6.17), and most likely by Democritus (see Barnes [19791 164-168), and Antiphon (for this interpretation of DK 87 Β 1, see Morrison [1963]). Plato's Cratylus is entirely devoted to όρθότης ονομάτων. Socrates' concern with the definition of moral terms is basically a part of this problem. The subject appealed not only to specialists; it could form the topic of sympotic conversation (Xen. Mem. 3.14.2). For a general account of the philosophical problems involved, see Guthrie (1962-1981) 3.204-219. 43 For the predicative sense of θεός, cf. Wilamowitz (1931-1932) 1.17-19. 44 The plural article may of course convey a generic force too; cf. the citations of Kiihner-Gerth and Smyth in note 41, and François (1957). οί θεοί was used generically by Theseus at 1232. Cf. also Xen. Smp. 4.47 (cited by Kiihner-Gerth loc. cit.): κ α ι "Ελληνες καί βάρβαροι τους θεούς ηγούνται πάντα είδέναι. The context, in which the speaker wants to establish a universal belief, shows that this does not mean 'both Greeks and barbarians consider that their gods know everything', but does mean 'both Greeks and barbarians consider that gods [in general] know everything'. Nor is the use of the singular and plural generic in close proximity peculiar; cf. the striking utterance of Heracles a few lines earlier (1243): αΰθαδες ό θεός, προς δέ τους θεούς έγώ. (This line, offered as a justification for suicide, shows that a concern with the nature of divinity guided Heracles' deliberation from the beginning.) Cf. also the juncture of το θείον and οί θεοί, Gorg. DK 82 Β l i a . 17. For the historical development of the plural θεοί and the singulars θεός and θείον to express 'divinity', see Else (1949). Desch (1986) 20-21 recognized that Heracles does not deny the activity of the traditional gods, but does claim that they are 'keine Götter in vollsten Sinn'.

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existence or activity of the traditional gods Zeus and Hera; he is certainly not denying their capacity for mischief. He is denying that they meet the criteria for inclusion in his somewhat restricted, distinctive class of gods. Heracles does not say in this passage anything further about how he views the status of the traditional gods; that will come a few lines later with specific reference to Hera. To sum up, I would expound 1340-1346 as follows: 'These examples of yours, Theseus, are irrelevant to my problems. For gods [in the sense which I shall specify in a moment] do not, as I view the matter, indulge in illicit love affairs and use handcuffs, nor have I ever viewed it otherwise nor will I, and the same holds for the notion that one is the master of another. My view depends on the strict sense which I am distinguishing [and in this case insisting on] as the truly proper sense of the term god: in this strict sense god is the sort of being that lacks nothing. The examples [of the behavior of so-called gods] which you drew from the poets are tales of wretchedness.' 45 It must be confessed that Heracles does not say enough about his notion of divinity for us to understand thoroughly the positive doctrine he is propounding. The meaning of δείται ούδενός is finally an enigma. In the present state of the evidence the relationship of Heracles' creed to Xenophanes is unlikely to be clarified. 46 Whatever the ultimate origin of 45 That is, from Heracles' perspective the poets will have committed the common impropriety of naming those responsible for the wretchedness 'gods'. 46 Commentators inevitably refer to Xenophanes DK 21 A 32, the relevant part of which runs in full: α π ο φ α ί ν ε τ α ι δέ καί περί θεών ώς ο υ δ ε μ ι ά ς η γ ε μ ο ν ί α ς έν αύτοίς ο ΰ σ η ς · οΰ γαρ οσιον δ ε σ π ό ζ ε σ θ α ί τ ι ν α των θεών· έπιδείσθαί τε μηδενός αύτών μ η δ έ ν α μηδ 1 όλως- ά κ ο ΰ ε ι ν δε καί ό ρ ά ν κ α θ ό λ ο υ καί μη κ α τ ά μέρος. Since the middle sentence ού γαρ ... μηδ' δλως is strongly reminiscent of 1344-1346, it is readily concluded that Euripides is paraphrasing Xenophanes. (That Euripides elsewhere [fr. 282 N.] paraphrases Xenophanes [B 2], as noted by the source, Athen. 1 0 . 4 1 3 c 4 1 4 c , is irrelevant.) The report of Xenophanes comes from [Plu.] Stromateis, a relatively late and frequently unreliable source (cf. Diels, Dox. Gr. 156-158). Xenophanes may have said something along these lines, but there is no warrant for Bond's printing the [Plu.] report with the key words in bold face, with not a word about the source, as if this report showed a nearly verbatim borrowing by Euripides (Bond [1981] 400). The problem lies in establishing a common ultimate source for [Plu.] (assuming its reliability) and Euripides. It seems to me that [Plu.]'s report of Xenophanes on the gods presents a conflation of at least two originally independent accounts in Xenophanes, the

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A New Creed: Heracles

Euripides' words in 1341-1346, his specific purpose in terms of the drama must provide the chief consideration in our interpretation. It would be a mistake to infer that Heracles is positing a deity whose absolute selfsufficiency puts it out of contact with mankind. 47

Heracles indeed

Σ ί λ λ ο ι and the scientific, didactic poem. The first part of [Plu.]'s report, up to δεσπόζεσθαί τ ι ν α των θεών, clearly stems from the attack on the presentation of the gods in Homer and Hesiod, and thus comes from the Σίλλοι (cf. Xenophanes Β 11,12). However, the last sentence in [Plu.j's report, άκούειν δέ ..., seems to be a paraphrase of Β 24, which certainly came from the didactic poem (cf. Diog. Laert. 9.19). That leaves the middle sentence, έπιδείσθαί τε ... The adversative δέ which follows would indicate that έ π ι δ ε ί σ θ α ί τε ... is to be taken with what follows, hence is concerned with the perfection of perception by the gods, and comes from the didactic poem. In that case it would have little to do with Heracles' creed, for Heracles is clearly not concerned with divine perception. On the other hand, the subject of the infinitive έπιδείσθαί is αύτών μηδένα, just about the same as the subject of the preceding clause; the τε also suggests no break in thought. The conflation, whether by [Plu.] or one of his predecessors, seems to have occurred precisely in the clause which is the crucial comparandum for 1345-1346. If Euripides was paraphrasing Xenophanes, he probably had the Σίλλοι in front of him (so Reinhardt [1916] 94). Not only did that poem probably have a wider circulation, but such a hypothesis would also explain the apparent reminiscence of Xenophanes Β 11,12 in the other divine activities ruled out by Heracles (1341-1342, especially adultery) and Heracles' immediate reference to αοιδοί. If this is indeed the case, we have still learned little of significance for the Heracles. For we must stress the different purposes of the two authors, especially the tragic situation in which Heracles delivers his creed. The opinion of Reinhardt (1960) 233 is worth repeating: 'Bei dem alten Rhapsoden war die Rechnung klar: die Rüge der homerischen Götter dient dem Preis seines allmächtigen Geistgottes. Der euripideische Herakles dagegen sagt das [1345-1346], zu sich kommend vor den Leichen seiner Kinder. Kam sein Wahnsinn von keinem Gott, wo kam er her? Kam er von einem Gott, war das ein Gott? ... Was bei Xenophanes Kritik an den homerischen Göttern war, erweitert sich zur Frage nach der Gottheit überhaupt' In addition to [Plu.]'s report of Xenophanes, Wilamowitz (1895) 3.271 cites a fragment of Antiphon (DK 87 Β 10) in order to show Euripides' debt to the philosophical tradition. But the crucial problem is that the subject, of whom it is said ούδενός δείται, is not preserved. It remains likely that Euripides is in some way elaborating an idea from the philosophical tradition, be it from the sources mentioned, the Eleatics (cf. DK 28 Β 8.5-6, 22-25, 33), Diogenes of Apollonia (cf. DK 64 Β 5), or elsewhere. 47 As Wilamowitz (1895) 3.271 inferred: 'der Gott des Euripides und der Philosophie, welche er wiedergibt, ist άπειρος [from the Antiphon fragment], also unpersönlich, und kann zu keiner Menschenseele in ein persönliches Verhältnis treten'. He claimed that the divinity of 1345-1346 would be no more responsive to prayer than the Hera condemned by Heracles in 1307-1310. This is presumably the point of Greenwood (1953) 63: T h e principle δείται ό θεός ούδενός flatly contradicts the whole Olympian religious system, its theory and practice alike' (quoted and endorsed by Bond [1981] 399). This is jumping the gun; one must first specify what sort of self-sufficiency is in question. Even Xenophanes (whether or not we accept the reliability of A 32, as Wilamowitz did) envisaged deity as the recipient of cult and prayers and as a living, responsive force in the life of his noble symposiasts (DK 21 Β 1; cf. Β 24, 25); cf. Jaeger (1947) 44. The gods of the polis of Plato's Laws embody a perfect notion of divinity, yet support the innumerable cults of the polis.

Heracles: the crux

165

repudiated reciprocity with the traditional gods; but he did so because of his insistence on the justice which he felt reciprocity with gods should entail. It is therefore unlikely that Heracles is now abandoning the idea of just reciprocity for his refined notion of deity. He himself will be obliged to reciprocate the cult he is to receive from the Athenians after his death (13311333). We must recognize that the perfection implied by the state of 'lacking nothing' is proposed by Heracles as the answer to morally deficient gods. Distinctions based on όρθότης

ο ν ο μ ά τ ω ν have been utilized

previously in the play to criticize moral deficiency.

Amphitruo had

introduced the distinction between true (όρθώς) and merely nominal, but unreliable (ού σαφείς) φ ί λ ο ι in the prologue: φίλων δέ τους μεν οΰ σαφείς ορώ φίλους, οι δ' ό'ντες όρθώς αδύνατοι π ρ ο σ ω φ ε λ ε ι ν (5556). 48 Amphitruo then employed this distinction in his reproach of Zeus; the god was measured by Amphitruo's standard of φ ι λ ί α and did not, it appeared then, measure up.

Amphitruo had 'called' Zeus a partner

(κοινεών' έκλήζομεν, 340), but Zeus' actions did not fulfill what the name signified, at least to Amphitruo. Hence Zeus' true status was less than his nominal status of φίλος (341); this constituted Zeus' deficiency in moral virtue (αρετή, 342). Even the portrayal of a Lyssa who only reluctantly lives up to her name, a Λύσσα σωφρονοΰσα (cf. 857), implies the problematic relationship of name and reality to which Heracles turns in 1340-1346. Lyssa used her sophrosyne

to level a moral rebuke to Iris

(845-854, esp. 854). By referring to Hera earlier as τοιαύτη θεός and denying on moral grounds her fitness as the recipient of prayer (13071310), Heracles explicitly put Hera's divine status in doubt and implicitly put the proper use of the predicate 'god' in doubt. This is only a short step from the distinction made in 1345-1346. It was moral indignation which 48 The same distinction regarding φ ί λ ο ι , based upon the ο ν ο μ α / ε ρ γ ο ν antithesis, is drawn at Or. 454-455 (cf. Hipp. 925-927). For other indications of Euripides' familiarity with distinctions based upon όρθότης ονομάτων, cf. Ale. 636, An. 376-377, IT 610, ΙΑ 559-560. Aeschylus several times employed a somewhat cruder form of this distinction: Sept. 405, 829, Supp. 315, Ag. 6 8 1 - 7 0 1 .

166

A New Creed: Heracles

led Heracles to take this critical attitude and it is a moral failure which Heracles fastened upon Zeus and Hera. What Heracles envisions for deity may therefore be a state of moral perfection: not gods who do nothing, but gods who do no wrong. As Plato did in the theological section of the Laws, so here Heracles may be demanding gods who live up to a morally exacting standard of reciprocation, rather than abandoning the idea of reciprocation altogether.49

7.3.3 The denouement: 1347-1428 We are now in a position to view the dramatic repercussions of Heracles' creed. Above all, it should be obvious that Heracles is not eager to make a pedantic point about words based on a vulgar use of όρθότης ονομάτων. His concern with the proper reference of the word θεός is a concern with the real nature of the gods. From the perspective he has gained he reinterprets, in fact clarifies, the situation he finds himself in, just as Amphitruo had done earlier. Heracles has returned to Amphitruo's position of rejecting the third fundamental belief, but does so in broader, more pervasive terms. Amphitruo found that Zeus failed to maintain the specific reciprocity which he personally enjoyed with the god; he was then ready to go to his death resigned and freed from illusion. Heracles, having already declared his feeling that he cannot look upon Hera as the sort of goddess with whom a reciprocal relation is possible, has now made the more extensive claim that such behavior as hers is not consonant with the status, as he conceives it, of being a god. By implication he withholds from Hera his acknowledgment of her as a god. 50 This perspective consequently 49

Festugière (1969) 26-28 proposed that Heracles is demanding a god who is good, a god without φθόνος; this was a revolutionary concept made explicit by Plato (cf. Phdr. 247a7, Tim. 29el-3). Hera was accused by Heracles of being motivated purely by φθόνος (1309; cf. Stinton's comment cited above, p. 151 note 21). The locus classicus for the Greek view of jealous gods is Hdt. 1.32.1, Solon to Croesus: το θείον παν φθονερόν τε καί ταραχώδες. 50 Cf. 1307-1310, discussed above. This is reminiscent of the line from the Bellerophontes, probably spoken by Bellerophon himself (Eur. fr. 292.7 Ν.): εί θεοί τι

Heracles: the denouement

167

enables him to reject the stigma from the gods, the religious connotations of his wretched past, which, necessitating his exclusion from human society, would have rendered his life futile. There is no doubt that this interpretation credits Heracles with a notion of divinity which in context is very idiosyncratic. But this idiosyncrasy is emphasized in the text with the έγώ δέ (1341) and the three verbs of personal belief (νομίζω, πείσομαι, 1342-1343).

ήξίωσα,

51

When Heracles announces his decision to forgo suicide and accept Theseus' offer of residence in Athens (1347-1357), he no longer views himself as he had earlier, viz. as a man against, and defeated by, the gods. Now he views himself as a man who has suffered nothing more supernatural than misfortune, however great; there is no mention of the gods. 5 2 Suicide could leave him branded a coward (1347-1348), 5 3 for a man who does not withstand misfortunes (ταις συμφοραΐς, 1349) is like a soldier who does not endure the slings of a mortal opponent (ανδρός ... β έ λ ο ς , 1350).

Whereas he had previously thought of his last 'labor'

(1279) as qualitatively different from the previous twelve, for it issued in the obscene stigma of unnaturalness (1269-1298), now he accepts the mad slaughter as qualitatively the same as the previous labors, if more severe

δρώσιν αϊσχρόν, ούκ είσΐν θεοί. The predicate is θεοί: if gods do something base, they are not gods. The existence of the beings who commit the base action is not questioned, rather their nature. 51 Euripides is elsewhere bold enough to allow a character to introduce an idiosyncratic notion of divinity in order to clarify a moral perspective; e.g. Tr. 884-888 (where Menelaus notices the peculiarity of this notion of divinity, 889) and Ba. 272-297. In both of these instances the idiosyncratic notions of divinity also derive from ideas current in intellectual speculation. 52 Cf. Nestle (1901) 102: 'Herakles ... glaubt nicht an den religiösen Grund seiner Geistesumnachtung, er betrachtet sie als ein natürliches Unglück und erträgt es daher, weiterzuleben'. 53 These lines have been cited as sufficient explanation for Heracles' change of mind; i.e. he is merely concerned with avoiding the appearance of cowardice. E.g. Bond (1981) 401, having already dismissed any larger issues: 'Heracles' change of mind is rapidly indicated and given one single motivation, fear of the charge of cowardice.' That he is concerned with avoiding this appearance is obvious. But why the sudden concern? Theseus had suggested this point way back at 1248, 1250. An explanation is needed to account for Heracles' entire ratiocination, which at this point makes the avoidance of appearing cowardly paramount.

168

A New Creed: Heracles

(1353-1356). He no longer acknowledges that he has been marked out by the goddess, just that he is unfortunate: τη τύχη δουλευτέον, he says (1357), not τω (or τη) θεφ. 5 4 He is even determined to retain the murder weapons, which will remind him of what he has done with them (13771382). They, if anything, would bear the most direct stain of pollution, would most directly summon the force of Hera's stigma. But they are also reminders of his heroic stature in Greece (1383) and are essential to defend the life he intends now to preserve (1384). Heracles ends his speech with the following words (1392-1393): πάντες έξολώλαμεν "Ηρας μια πληγέντες άθλιοι τύχη. There is no contradiction here, or even conflict, with anything Heracles has said before. Heracles repeats his conviction that Hera, who certainly exists, has acted and destroyed him and, what he proclaimed before, that he is pure victim. 55 But he stops short of allowing Hera's behavior, which has left him in a wretched state, to be glorified as a demonstration of the superiority, let alone the justice, of the divine (as Hera and Iris would have it). Hera's behavior is, so to speak, no more rational, no less prone to moral obscenity, hence no more dignified, than τύχη. 56 Having denied to Hera the status of god in his distinctive sense, he refuses to observe the validity of the stigma which she has imposed. He will live on in sorrow, but without granting that a god, in his sense, has marked him out.

Hera has failed in her

vengeful purpose; her victory has been snatched away. Far from prevailing (cf. 1253), the goddess is now, in the terms of Iris' theodicy, ούδαμοΰ, a

5 4 Cf. Teiresias to Pentheus, insisting on the need to recognize Dionysus as a god (Ba. 366): τω βακχίω γαρ τω Διός δουλευτέον. 5 5 The responsibility of the gods for Heracles' madness was discussed above. The passages in which the gods are explicitly held responsible are: 827-829, 886-887, 919, 1087-1088, 1127, 1135,1180. Halleran (1986) 178 claimed that Heracles in 1392-1393 'belies' his words in 1340-1346. 5 6 "Ηρας μια τύχη (1393) is straightforward enough for '[... destroyed] by a single stroke from Hera'. Euripides uses the word τύχη here to refer to an act with a distinct agent (by appending a defining genitive and adjective), whereas he has used it repeatedly in the play with a distinctive notion of the indeterminacy of events; cf. 509, 1314, 1321, 1357, 1396 and p. 145, n. 12 above. With Hera's intervention reduced to the level of τύχη, Drexler (1943) 326-335 interpreted τύχη as 'das Grundproblem des Dramas'.

Epilogue

'loser'. 57

169

Suppressing a final hesitation over the incriminating blood,

Heracles breaks out of his utter isolation (cf. 1337) to renew his φιλία with Theseus (1394-1401). He leaves Thebes 'for the sake of custom' (1322), but can now in good conscience enjoy among the Athenians the 'benefit' (1335) which he previously felt no human society could give him (1253, 1281-1290). It was the awareness of shattered reciprocity with immoral gods which led him to this resolve.

7.4

Epilogue

Euripides' Heracles has been fruitfully compared to Sophocles' Ajax with respect to their responses in a situation where suicide may be warranted. 58 Both suffered fits of madness imposed by goddesses during which they turned their anger onto improper objects. Both considered whether suicide was the proper response. Indeed, we are likely to think of Ajax when Heracles, having realized what he has done, at first feels terrific shame and wishes for suicide (1146-1162, cf. Ai. 364-367, 393-400, 473-480). We may perhaps notice a retort to the attitude of Ajax when Theseus tries to dissuade Heracles by claiming that suicide is the proper response of 'an average man', not worthy of the great Heracles (1248-1254).

The

respective decisions of the two protagonists have been taken as fundamentally contrasting attitudes towards life: the one, in which it is cowardice to live; the other, in which it is courageous to live and cowardice to die. 59 However, among the various differences between the cases of the two protagonists there is one (not mentioned by de Romilly) which endangers the balance of the contrast. Ajax was driven mad by a just if severe goddess 57 For the colloquial sense of 'losing in competition' of ο ύ δ α μ ο ΰ (841), see Renehan (1985) 167-168. 58 de Romilly (1980); less subtly Pohlenz (1954) 301-302, Barlow (1981). 59 de Romilly (1980) 7: 'Le contraste est si net qu' il suggère l'existence d' une polémique délibérée.' Compare Ai. 479-480 with HF 1227-1228.

170

A New Creed: Heracles

in order to deflect a criminal impulse. Furthermore, Ajax had a record of impiety which added to the divine anger against him. 60 There is a certain fitness in the madness, suffering, and suicide of Ajax, in which the gods maintain a harsh but clear reciprocity. Heracles, on the other hand, is portrayed as the paragon of piety and harbored no criminal inclinations. His decision to refrain from suicide was based, as we have seen, on a realization that the gods had treated him unfairly. Thus the contrast in attitudes toward suicide results at least as much from a contrast in the dramatic situations in which the suicide is contemplated, as from fundamentally contrasting attitudes towards life and death. There is, however, a Sophoclean figure with whom Heracles can be seen to stand in significant contrast: the Oedipus of the OT. For here there is a certain parallelism in situation which renders their contrasting attitudes, not towards suicide but towards the gods, meaningful.

Both have

accomplished heroic deeds and are portrayed as basically upright individuals. Both perpetrated unwittingly and in all innocence horrible crimes against their families at the instigation of the gods. When the truth becomes known, both must decide what reaction is proper. Oedipus acknowledges that he is accursed (ironically according to the terms of his own curse of the killer of Laius, 1291); by the act of selfmutilation he inflicts on himself a permanent sign of accursedness. Because of his accursed state, a result of the gods' unexplained hatred of him, Oedipus demands his exile from the polis, naming both sacred and profane places (1340-1346, 1378-1383, 1518-1519). His daughters, inheriting his stigma, will also be excluded from the sacred and profane companies of the polis (1489-1491). He declares that he must be cast out from society, utterly isolated (1436-1437,1449-1451). In all these respects Oedipus has much in common with Heracles while the latter was still intent on suicide. Likewise, the invariable attitude of Oedipus is fundamentally opposed to that which Heracles, under the 60

The boasts of being able to succeed in battle without the aid of the gods (758-777).

Epilogue

171

beneficial influence of Theseus, settles upon after deliberation.61 Oedipus is aware no less than Heracles that the responsibility for the crimes belongs solely to a god (Apollo, 1329-1330); he considers himself abandoned by the gods (άθεος μέν είμ', 1360). But by accepting, even demanding his own accursedness, and inflicting on himself permanent, external signs of that condition (blindness and exile), Oedipus does not rebel against the outrageousness of the behavior of the gods. For Oedipus the possibility of taking a critical attitude towards the gods never arises. What a contrast with Heracles, who recognizes how perversely the gods repaid his piety, and then renounces the forms and significance of the relationship between himself and immoral gods.

61 Knox (1966) does not deal with Heracles' change of mind, but he shows how vastly Sophocles and Aeschylus differ from Euripides in their abstention from portraying 'second thoughts', a basic element in Euripidean drama. Heracles' willingness to deliberate and change his decision is another indication of the same spirit which enables him to reject reciprocity with the gods.

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Index locorum antiquorum Italic numerals refer to the pages and notes of this book. Detailed discussions of a passage are printed in boldface. An asterisk (*) marks those works whose attribution to the author in question is spurious. AELIAN VH 3.42: 77 n. 3 AESCTflNES 1.19-21: 22 n. 12 2.64, 68: 68 n. 26; 87: 43 n. 12 3.18: 21 n. 11, 38 n. 1; 191: 26 n. 25 AESCHYLUS Ag. 89: 59 n. 1; 369-372: 147 n. 16; 681-701: 165 n. 48; 1 5 7 8 1582: 95 n. 2 7 Eum. 22 n. 12; 232-234: 83 n. 11; 297: 44 n. 15; 8 6 8 - 8 6 9 , 9 0 1 , 927-928, 968-970, 999: 108-109 Pers. 402-404: 25; 497-498: 64 n. 15 Sept. 14-15: 25; 69, 76-77: 54; 107: 109 n. 22; 109, 174-180, 176, 185: 54; 217-218: 82 n. 10; 253, 271: 54; 304-320: 54, 82 n. 10; 312: 54; 405: 165 n. 48; 822: 54; 829: 165 n. 48; 602-608: 22 n. 12 Supp. 315: 165 n. 48 F r a g m e n t s (Mette) 83a: 77 n. 3; (Radt) F 59-62: 78 η. 4; 161: 54 η. 35 ANAXAGORAS (DK 59) A 19: 71 η. 37; 42: 71,85 η. 16 ANAXIMENES (DK 13) A 6, 7, 20: 85 η. 16 ANDOaDES 1.14: 24; 96-98: 43 η. 10, η. 12; 126: 43 η. 10, η. 12, 52; 1 3 7 139: 22 η. 12 ANTHOLOGIA PALATINA 6.137: 104 η. 8; 138: 105 & η. 9, η. 11; 139: 104 η. 6; 142: 104 η. 8; 144: 103; 346: 104 η. 6

.ANTIPHON ORATOR 2.1.10-11: 22 η. 12 3.1.2: 22 η. 12 4.3.7: 22 η. 12 5.81-83: 22 η. 12 6.45: 21 η. 8 ANTIPHON SOPHISTES (DK 87) Β 1: 162 η. 42; 10: 164 η. 46 ANTISTHENES fr. 160 Giannantoni: 162 η. 42 ANTONINUS LIBERAUS 10: 77 η. 3 APOLLODORUS *Bibl. 2.2.2: 77 η. 3; 2.4.12: 140 η. 1; 3.5.1-2: 77 η. 3 ARISTOPHANES A v . 521: 69 η. 32; 726-734: 85 η. 14; 988: 70 η. 33; 1072-1074:

61 Eq. Nu.

30-34: 42,64 η. 12 12, 36 η. 17; 423-426: 43 η. 7; 830: 61; 1079-1082: 157 η. 32 Ra. 366: 25 Th. 443-456: 42, 71 η. 36; 4 5 0 451: 11; 668-674: 95 η. 27 Ve. 380: 70 η. 34 ARISTOTLE *Ath. Pol. 3.2-3, 3.5: 24 η. 21; 21.6: 20 η. 7; 54.6: 44 η. 14; 54.7: 20 η. 3; 55.5: 43 η. 10, η. 12; 57.1: 20 η. 3, 24 η. 21; 57.1-2: 24 η. 21 EE 1238bl8-28: 109 η. 23 ΕΝ 1160al8-25: 20 η. 7; 1160a22-25: 21 η. 9; 1 1 7 9 a 2 2 30: 109 η. 23 *ΜΜ 1208b30-31: 109 η. 23

182

Index locorum antiquorum

ARISTOTLE (coni.)

Pol. 1322bl8-37: 19 η. 1, 122 η. 40; 1328b2-23: 19 η. 1 fr. 39 Rose: 42 η. 6 ARRIAN

An. 1.10.2: 27 η. 28 BACCHYIJDES

3.38, 58-62 (Snell-Maehler): 110 CALLEMACHUS

Hell. Ep. (Gow & Page) 55.4: 109 n. 23 aCERO Leg. 2.14-16: 33 n. 7 CORPUS HIPPOCRATICUM

Aër. (Diller) 22.9: 106-107 Morb. Sacr. (Grensemann) 1.10-46: 48 n. 23; 1.30: 57 n. 45, 64 n. 15 DEMOCHARES (FGrH 75) F 2: 56 η. 44 DEMOSTHENES

3.26: 49 η. 25 * 11.2: 52 18.88: 21 η. 11; 141: 54 η. 37; 259-260: 49 19.70: 21 η. 10; 70-71: 26, 52; 239-240: 52; 281: 49 η. 26 21.47: 25 η. 23; 51-55: 21 η. 11, 44 η. 14, 53 η. 34; 114: 21 η. 8 22.27: 38 η. 1; 48: 23 η. 15 23.67-68: 52; 74: 49 24.149-151: 43 η. 10; 154: 26 η. 25 »25.79-80: 49 η. 26 39.2: 49 η. 26 »40.9: 49 η. 26; 11: 43 η. 12 »43.66: 44 η. 14 »48.11: 43 η. 11 »49.65-67: 52 54.38^0: 52 »58.34: 26 η. 25 »59.10: 52 η. 32; 73: 21 η. 8; 7379: 24 η. 21, 53; 85-87: 22 η. 12; 92: 21 η. 8; 116-117: 53 60.27-31: 20 η. 7; 36: 53 η. 34 DIAGORAS OF MELOS

Τ 9ΑΒ, 11, 26 Winiarczyk: 95 η. 28 DINARCHUS

1.47: 26; 64: 54 η. 37; 69: 23 η. 15; 94: 63 η. 10 3.2: 43 η. 12

DIODORUS SICULUS

4.10.6-11.2: 140 η. 1 ; 5.50.2-5: 77 η. 3; 12.10.3: 69 η. 30; 12.20: 33 η. 7; 17.10.5: 82 η. 10; 20.46.2: 56 η. 44 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA (DK 64)

A 8, 16a: 85 η. 16 Β 5: 85 η. 16,164 η. 46 DIOGENES LAERTIUS

2.12-14: 67; 2.40: 63 η. 8; 6.17: 162 η. 42; 9.19: 164 η. 46 DIOGENIANUS

6.88: 95 η. 27 DURIS (FGrH 76) F 13: 44 η. 15, 56, 85 η. 14 EPHORUS (FGrH 70) F 196: 67-68 EPICURUS

αρ. Diog. Laert. 10.123: 161 η. 41 fr. 27.2 Arrighetti2; 61 η. 6 EUPOliS

fr. 319 Kassel-Austin: 69 η. 29 EURIPIDES

Ale. 384: 91 η. 22; 636: 165 η. 48; 641: 155 η. 26; 973-975: 54 η. 35 Alcmene 145 η. 13 Andr. 51-55: 88; 376-377: 165 η. 48; 995-1008: 89; 1003-1008: 93 η. 25; 1004: 88; 1009-1036: 89-91; 1065: 90; 1106-1107: 88; 1111-1157: 91-92; 11611165: 88-93,92; 1165: 144 η. 10; 1194-1196: 88; 1240-1242: 93 Βα. 20-22,39-42: 79; 45: 77; 4546: 78 η. 5; 45-48: 79; 199-203: 78 η. 5; 216-220: 77-81; 219220: 154 η. 25; 242-247: 77, 78-79; 247: 78 η. 5; 272-327: 79,167 η. 51; 325: 77; 325-327: 78 η. 5; 330-342: 80; 333: 78; 343-346: 80; 366: 768 η. 54; 392-394: 85 η. 14; 4 4 3 - 4 4 8 , 449: 80; 517: 78; 585-637: 80; 635-636: 77; 648-651, 698-764, 712-713,769-772: 80; 787: 79; 894-896: J27 η. 46; 1078-1079: 92 η. 25; 1325-1326: 87, 95 η. 27; 1326: 64 η. 12 Cyc. 606-607: 145 η. 12

Index locorum antiquorum EURIPIDES (cont.)

El.

294: 144 n. 10; 583-584: 64 n. 12, 95 n. 27; 699-736: 98; 737-746: 98-99; 969-973, 1246: 144 n. 10 Hec. 488-496: 95-96, 145 n. 12; 592-603: 160 n. 37; 800: 64 n. 12 Hel. 17-21: 145 n. 13; 45-46: 131 n. 57; 259: 145 n. 13; 455: 91 n. 22; 711: 161 n. 41; 1234: 102 n. 1 Heracl. 22 n. 12 HF 1: 143; 20-21: 151 n. 21, 755; 44-47: 143 n. 8; 48: 141, 142; 51-56: 141; 55-56: 165; 57-59: 143; 62: 145; 70-71,91, 95-97, 95-106: 141; 133: 143 n. 8; 144, 148-149: 146; 170-171: 146, 148; 177-180: 151; 206207: 143 n. 8; 206-216: 141 & n. 3; 238-246: 141; 266-267: 141 n. 2; 275-276: 143 n. 6; 278-311, 284-286, 295-297: 141 ; 316-325: 143 n. 8; 318, 319335: 141; 339-347: 141-144, 155, 156 n. 30; 340-342: 165; 346: 147 n. 16; 348-441: 142 n. 5, 150; 353-354: 146 & n. 14, 148; 357-358: 742 n. 5; 4 0 1 402: 153; 425-435: 146; 430: ¡41; 433-434: 146; 460, 480: 145; 498-512: 144-145; 499-500: 143 n. 8; 501: 149; 502: 141; 509: 168 n. 56; 522: 747; 551, 558-561: 747 n. 2; 565-573: 750; 575: 757 n. 21; 585-586: 143 n. 6; 606-609, 622-636: 757; 637-641: 746; 655-672: 747; 673-677, 687-694: 7 4 9 ; 696: 74«; 696-700: 753; 723: 747 n. 16; 757-759: 147-148; 760-761: 747; 763-766, 772: 749; 772-773: 747; 781-797: 749; 798-804, 809-814: 7 4 « ; 825-832: 752; 827-829: 752, 76« n. 55; 840: 752; 840-842: 750, 753, 756 n. 2«, 76« ά η. 57; 845-854: 765; 846, 849-853: 757; 851-852: 753; 857: 757 ά η. 20, 165; 886-887, 919: 152,

183

168 η. 55; 922-924: 151,156 η. 29; 1002-1006: 159 η. 34; 10871088: 152, 168 η. 55; 1113: 743 λ. 8, 155 η. 26; 1127: 752, 756 λ. 29, 765 Λ. 55; 1135: 752, 76« η. 55; 1144-1145: 151,156 η. 29; 1146: 7 5 2 , 1 1 4 6 - 1 1 6 2 : 169; 1152, 1160: 152; 1180: 752, 168 η. 55; 1189: 7 5 2 ; 1190-1192: 757; 1227-1228: 769 η. 59; 1231-1234: 759 η. 34; 1232: 762 η. 44; 1235-1236: 739 η. 7,1240: 752,1243: 161 η. 41,162 η. 44; 1248: 752, 767 η. 53; 1248-1254: 169; 1250: 752, 767 η. 53; 1252-1253: 753, 76«, 769; 1254: 752; 1254-1257: 760 η. 37; 1255-1302: 153-155; 1263: 154 η. 25, 156 η. 29; 1263-1265: 750 η. 79, 754; 1263-1268: 757 η. 27; 12691298, 1279: 767; 1279-1290: 753; 1281-1290: 169; 12941298: 753 η. 23; 1301-1302: 753; 1303-1310: 750 η. 19, 155-157, 158; 1307-1310: 752, 760, 764 η. 47, 165, 166 η. 49, η. 50; 1311-1312: 752; 1314: 168 η. 56; 1314-1321: 757, 760 η. 37; 1315: 759 & η. 36; 13171319: 160; 1321: 168 η. 56; 1322: 169; 1322-1339: 7 5 7 ; 1324: 753; 1331-1333: 7 6 5 ; 1335, 1337: 769; 1340-1346: 150 η. 19, 157-166,

168 η. 55;

1340-1393: 739; 1341-1343: 167; 1347: 160 η. 37; 13471357: 757, 167-168; 1357: 168 η. 56; 1375: 159 η. 36; m i 1384: 76«; 1385: 759 η. 36; 1392-1393: 750 η. 79, 159 η. 36, 168; 1394-1401: 169; 1396: 168 η. 56; 1398-1400: 759 η. 34; 1403: 759 η. 36 Hipp. 5-8: 774, 720; 7-23, 17-19, 19: 773; 73-87: 112-113; 7981: 727 η. 46; 82: 773, 779; 8486: 720; 86: 776; 88-107: 774; 88-120: 773 η. 29; 91-98: 774775; 376, 388: 760 η. 37; 451459: 157 η. 32; 611-612: 777;

184

Index locorum antiquorum

EURIPIDES (cont.) 616-624: 116-117; 622-623: 116 & n. 34; 656-658: 117; 871: 91 n. 22; 886: 118 n. 35; 925-927: 165 n. 48; 948-951: 117; 951: 148 n. 17; 959-961: 7 7 7 , 1 0 0 3 : 126; 1025-1031: 777,120; 1028: 120; 1033, 1036-1040, 10551059, 1060-1063: 117; 1064: 126; 1092: 113,119; 1102-1150: 118-119 n. 37; 1149: 156 n. 27; 1181-1184: 117; 1190-1193: 777,120; 1298-1301, 1301-1312: 119; 1321-1324: 117; 13281334: 120; 1333: 119; 13391340: 120; 1363-1369: 118-119; 1364: 126; 1390: 119; 13911393: 120; 1394: 119; 1396: 121; 1398: 119; 1 4 1 5 - 1 4 3 0 : 119-120; 1437-1439: 121; 14401441: 121 & n. 38 Ion 4: 724 n. 42; 52, 54-55: 123; 56: 126; 69-73: 135 n. 64; 82101: 123; 91-92: 128 n. 51; 102-103: 124; 102-108: 123; 109: 124; 110-111, 112-124: 123; 124: 124; 125-127: 125126; 128: 124; 128-133: 124 n. 42; 129: 123 n. 41, 124; 131, 131-133, 134, 134-135: 7 2 4 ; 136: 125; 137-140: 123; 139: 125; 144: 124; 146-149: 123; 150: 126; 151-153, 152: 124; 154-181: 123; 177: 133; 181, 181-183, 182: 124; 183: 123; 219-233: 123 n. 41; 252-254: 127, 132 n. 58; 302-306: 44 n. 13; 309, 310-311: 124; 3 1 5 , 323, 326-327: 123; 327: 124; 333-346: 44 n. 13; 335: 7 2 5 ; 339, 341: 127; 345-346: 128; 354-358: 128 n. 49; 355: 128, 131; 363, 365: 725, 367: 136 n. 68; 369-380: 128-129,133; 384389: 757; 413-416: 123,128 η. 57/420-424: 44 η. 13; 425-428: 138; 429-430, 433-436: 130; 436-440: 129-132; 4 4 0 - 4 5 1 : 132-133; 442-443: 148 η. 17; 446: 131; 522-524: 123; 522527: 133; 530-537: 135 η. 64;

556: 124; 557: 133; 585-647, 633: 126; 635-637: 124; 640: 123 η. 41; 642-644: 126-127; 859-922: 131, 138; 8 7 9 - 8 8 0 : 131 η. 56; 1141-1166: 133; 1187-1224: 133-134; 1275-1278: 134 η. 63; 1312-1319: 134; 1313: 144 η. 10; 1 3 8 0 - 1 3 8 6 : 134; 1382-1383, 1477: 124; 1485, 1488: 134, 137; 15201522: 130 η. 55; 1 5 2 9 - 1 5 3 3 : 135; 1534-1536: 136; 15371538: 722,135-136; 1539-1549, 1557-1558: 136; 1560-1605: 137; 1566: 135 η. 64; 16061608, 1610-1613: 137-138; 1614-1615:138; 1617-1618: 137 ΙΑ 394a-395: 144 η. 10, 161 η. 41; 559-560: 165 η. 48; 7 9 3 800: 745«. 75; 1189-1190: 144 η. 10 IT 380-386: 744 η. 10; 610: 165 η. 48; 1385-1386: 92 η. 23 Or. 417: 744 η. 10; 418: 154 η. 25; 454-455: 165 η. 48; 9 8 2 985: 77 η. 37 Ph. 86: 744 η. 10; 414: 161 η. 41 Supp. 159 η. 34; 731-732: 65 η. 18 Tr. 4-7, 15-16, 25-27: 82 ; 469471: 87 η. 20; 535-536: 106 η. 13; 821-859: 82; 884-888: 8586, 167 η. 51; 885: 754 η. 25; 948-950: 757 η. 32; 9 7 1 - 9 7 4 , 981-982: 744 η. 10; 1060-1076: 83-84; 1060-1080: 81-87; 10751076: 83 η. 12; 1077-1080: 84 & η. 13; 1078-1079: 86; 11001117: 86 η. 18; 1 2 4 0 - 1 2 4 2 , 1280-1281, 1288-1290: 86-87; 1291: 87 η. 20 Fragments (Austin) 154: 745 η. 12; (Nauck) 208: 757 η. 57; 282: 163 η. 46; 286: 60 η. 2, 96-98; 292: 98, 166 η. 50; 350:55 η. 12; 480: 154 η. 25; 487: 85 η. 15; 577: 95; 644: 56 η. 43; 645: 744 η. 10; 852: 777 η. 24; 901: 745 η. 12; 919, 941, 944: 85 η. 16; 974: 96; 991: 94-95; *1131: 64 η. 15; (von Arnim) 18: 85 η. 15

Index locorum antìquorum

GORGIAS (DK 82) Β 11: 745 η. 13, 161 η. 41; I l a : 162 η. 44 HANSEN, CARMINA EPIGRAPHICA GRAECA 205,225: 104 η. 8; 221: 105; 231: 104 η. 8, 105 η. 9; 234: 104 η. 8; 258: 104 η. 8, 105 η. 9; 260: 104 η. 8; 268: 103; 275: 105; 279a: 104 η. 8, 105 η. 9; 3 1 2 : 103; 313: 105 & η. 9; 3 2 1 a : 104 η. 7, 105 η. 9; 326: 7 0 4 ; 327: 104 η. 6; 336, 358-360, 371: 104 η. 7; 387: 104 η. 6; 400, 426: 104 η. 7 HELLANICUS (FGrH 323a) F 26: 23 η. 15 HERACUDES PONTICUS fr. 150 Wehrli: 60 η. 3 HERMIPPUS OF SMYRNA fr. 30 Wehrli: 67 η. 22 HERODOTUS I.32.1: 766 η. 49; 50-51: 110; 5355: 44 η. 13; 54: 110; 6 5 . 3 : 111 ; 86-87,90-91: H O 2.43-44: 145 η. 13 4.59.1: 64 η. 15 6.53: 145 η. 13 7.111.2: 128 η. 51; 140-143: 44 8.36.2: 128 η. 51; 41.3: 82 η. 10 HESIOD Th. 96 \107n.l7 Op. 18: 85 η. 15; 240: 22 η. 12; 770-771: 83 η. 12 HIERONYMUS OF RHODES fr. 41 Wehrli: 67 η. 22 mPPONAX fr. 32 West: 109 HOMER Hymn 7: 78 η. 4 II. 1.37-42: 108; 1.74: 107; 1.337: 107 η. 16; 1.381: 108; 1.489: 107; 2.100-109, 196-197, 205-206: 107 η. 17; 2.412: 85 η. 15; 4.43-49: 108 η. 19; 5.924: 108 η. 20; 6.130-140: 77 η. 3; 6.286-311: 706 η. 13; 6.318, 8.493: 708 η. 18; 9.98-99: 107 η. 77/ 9.117: 107; 9.155: 104 η. 6 , 1 0 . 4 9 : 108 η. 18; 1 1 . 6 1 1 , 823: 707 η. 16; 13.674: 108 η.

185

18; 16.49, 126: 7 0 7 η. 16; 16.431-461: 708 η. 19; 16.433, 450, 460, 568: 707 η. 16; 16.644-651, 666-683: 108 η. 19; 16.707, 18.118: 107 η. 16; 20.122-123,21.17: 107; 21.277: 89 η. 27; 21.462-467: 7 09; 22.166-185: 708 η. 19; 22.294305: 709; 22.359: 89 η. 21; 23.647-650: 706 η. 12; 24.6670: 708; 24.422-428, 749-750: 708 η. 18 II. Parv. frr. XVI, XIX Allen: 89 η. 21 Od. 3.58: 104 η. 7; 3 . 2 1 8 - 2 2 2 , 13.291-302, 330-332: 770-777; 24.92: 707; 24.351-352: 95 η. 27 HYPERIDES Eux. 6: 24 η. 20; 24-25: 44 η. 14 fr. 58 Sauppe: 23 η. 17 INSCRIPTIONS GRAECAE 1 2 576: 104 η. 8 1 3 7: 44 η. 14, 53 η. 34; 52: 22 η. 74; 78: 44 η. 14, 53 η. 34, 69 η. 31; 84.6-8: 24 η. 21; 136: 24 η. 19, 27 η. 28, 44 η. 14; 137: 44 η. 14; 369: 23; 383.143: 24 η. 19 I I 2 47.27: 27 η. 8; 204: 44 & η. 14; 337: 24 η. 19; 4 0 3 . 1 7 - 1 9 , 410: 27 η. 8; 780: 5 5 η. 34; 1283.4-6: 24 η. 79, 44 η. 14; 3464: 724 η. 42; 4334: 704 η. 8; 4373, 4548: 104 η. 6; 4556: 704 η. 8; 4596: 704 η. 6, 112; 4602, 4888: 704 η. 6; 4969: 4 4 η. 74 ISAEUS 2.31: 43 η. 12 9.19: 52 12.9: 43 η. 12 IS OCRATES 2.20: 55 η. 38 7.29-30: 49 η. 25, 53 η. 34 9.14: 777 Λ. 25 11.24-27: 55 λ. 47 15.281-282: 55 η. 42 18.3: 52 JOSEPHUS Λ/>. 2.265 : 77 η. 37; 2.267: 2 5 , 49 η. 26

186

Index locorum antiquorum

LYCURGUS 2, 8, 17, 25, 26: 26; 76: 26, 43 n. 10; 79: 43 n. 10; 52; 127: 43 n. 10; 129: 26; 146: 5 2 ; 147: 26 LYSIAS *6.10: 5 5 « . 7 , 1 7 : 61; 19-20: 22 n. 72, 6 6 n. 21; 32: 55, 5 6 n. 43; 51: 66 n. 20; 53: 22 n. 12 12.9: 64, 65, 66 n. 79; 9-10: n. 10; 60: 702 n. 1 28.17: 102 n. 1 30.17-21: 25 & n. 16, 53; 18: 49 n. 25 31.24: 702 n. 1 32.13: 43 n. 10 fr. V Gernet: 25-26 MENANDER Sam. 444: 109 η. 23 NICOLAUS OF DAMASCUS (FGrH 90) F 13: 140 η. 1 OVID Met. 4.1-41, 389-415: 77 & n. 3 PARMENIDES (DK 28) Β 8: 164 η. 46 PAUSANIAS 2.20.4,22.1: 77 η. 3 PEEK, GRIECHISCHE VERSINSCHRIFTEN 1491: 104 η. 8; 1723: 705 η. 9 PHERECRATES fr. 18Α Edmonds: 104 η. 8 PHILOCHORUS (FGrH 328) F 60: 49 n. 26; 141: 25 n. 15 PHILODAMUS OF SCARPHEIA Powell (Coll. Alex.) 11-13: 725 PLATO Ale. 1.133c: 767 n. 41 *Alc. 2.148d-150b: 55 n. 38 Ap. 18b4-c3: 59; 21a: 44 n. 13; 23b4-cl: 124 n. 42; 23d: 59 & n. 1,68 n. 27; 24b8-cl, 26b: 6 5 n. 8; 26c: 64 & n. 14, 65; 26d: 77 n. 37; 26e: 64; 2 7 b 3 - 2 8 a l : 57 n. 29; 27c: 65; 27d: 64 n. 12; 27e5-28al: 66; 31c8-d2: 65 n. 9; 35d5-6: 64 n. 14 Crat. 384b, 391c: 161 n. 42 Ep. 3.316a: 33 n. 7 Euthphr. 116 n. 33; 2a: 24 n. 20; 3b: 65 n. 8, n. 9; 14b-e: 7 0 7 -

102

Lg.

644d: 46 n. 19; 653cd: 27 n. 9; 664cd: 57; 688e-689e: 144 n. 10; 698a-701c: 5 0 ; 702cd, 707e708d: 50; 708c2-4: 57; 715e7717b4, 715e7-718a6: 52 n. 6; 716de: 52; 717ab: 31,59 n.l; 718b5-723d4: 5 2 - 5 4 ; 7 1 8 c d , 719e-720a: 55 n. 9; 720al: 5 4 n. 12; 720a2-e5: 55 n. 9; 721b6d6: 5 5 ; 721b7: 5 4 ; 7 2 1 d 7 - e 3 : 55 n. 9; 7 2 1 e l - 2 : 55 λ. S ; 722b4-c4: 52 n. 7, 55 n. 9 ; 722b6: 55 n. 8 ; 7 2 2 c 2 - 7 2 3 b 2 : 55; 722e7-723a4: 55 n. 8; 722e7723b2: 55 n. 9; 723a: 55; 723b: 52 n. 6; 723cd: 5 5 ; 726a-734e: 52 n. 6 ; 732e3-733a4: 5 0 ; 734e: 52 n. 6 ; 735a7-736c4: 50; 738bc: 57; 738d: 57, 57 n. 5; 738dl-e2: 57; 739a-e: 5 0 ; 739c: 50 n. 2 ; 739d: 5 0 ; 740a-c: 31,48 n. 22; 745b: 5 7 ; 745d: 57 ά n. 5; 759a-760a, 761c: 57; 762e: 5 0 ; 766b, 767c, 771bc: 57 λ. 5 ; 771c-e: 57; 772e7-773e4: 55 n. 70; 773e5: 54 n. 72; 7 7 4 b - d , 775a, 778cd, 784a, 785a, 794ab, 796c: 57 n. 5; 798e-799b, 801e: 57; 803c, 804b: 4 6 n. 79; 816cd: 5 7 ; 821a-822c: 45 ά n. 17; 822e4-823a6: 54; 828b: 27 n. 8, 57; 828c: 57, 59 n. 7; 829b: 5 7 ; 837e9-838el: 5 2 ; 842e, 844e: 57 n. 5 ; 848d: 5 7 ; 849a: 57 n. 5; 853b4-854a3: 50; 854a5-c5: 55 n. 11; 854a6: 54 n. 12; 854cd: 22, 5 4 ; 856a: 57 n. 5; 856bl-857a2: 22; 856de: 57 n. 5 ; 859b6-864c8: 50; 865cd: 57 n. 5; 870d-871a: 55, 5 4 ; 8 7 1 c : 57 ά n. 5; 873d: 57 n. 5 ; 874e8875d5: 55 n. 10; 880a: 54 n. 12; 88ld: 57 n. 5; 885b: 52, 54 ά n. 12, 43 n. 8, 47; 885c5-e6: 5 5 ; 885c7: 64 n. 14; 885d: 54 n. 14, 35,50; 886ab: 55;886b-d: 46 & n. 18; 886d: 55; 886de: 5 6 n. 16, n. 18, 50 n. 27, 71 n. 38; 886e887c: 55; 887a3, 8 8 7 c l : 54 n. 12; 887c7-e7: 42 n. 6; 888b: 5 5 ά Λ. 75; 888c: 54 n. 72, 45 n.

Index locorum antiquorum PLATO (cont.) 8; 888e, 889a4-el: 35; 889e890a: 35-36; 890a: 34 n. 13, 35 & n. 15; 890b6: 34 n. 13; 891b8-896c4: 36; 891e: 34 n. 13; 893b6-894bl: 45; 896c5899b9: 36; 897c: 37; 8 9 8 d 899b: 45-46; 899b: 37; 899c2: 64 n. 14; 899cd: 64 n. 12; 899d900b: 36; 900b3: 131 n. 57; 900b6-903a: 37,96; 900cd: 96; 90Id: 131 n. 57; 902a, 902c, 903a: 131 n. 57; 903b-905c7: 37; 903b7: 47; 903d, 904a6: 46; 904a9-bl: 34 n. 13; 904e: 131 n. 57; 905d4-907a9: 37; 905e, 906d9ff.: 47; 907b: 34n.l2,n. 14, 35, 43 n. 8; 907d ff.: 25 n. 23; 907d4: 34 n. 12; 9 0 7 d 7 910d4: 47-49; 908c: 64 n. 14; 908e: 131 n. 57; 909a: 38; 909b 1: 64 n. 14, 131 n. 57; 909e: 49 n. 26; 914ab, 916c: 31 n. 5; 920de, 921c: 31; 923c: 34 n. 12; 926e-927d: 33; 930e-931a: 103 n. 5; 933de: 48 n. 23; 936e, 941a, 945e-947a: 31 n. 5; 948b949b: 51-52; 948bc: 64 n. 12; 958d: 31 n. 5; 961a ff.: 38; 966cd: 45; 967a: 36 n. 18, 71 n. 38; 967b4-dl: 36 n. 16 Menex. 249b: 53 n. 34 Meno 91b-92a: 60 n. 3 Phd. 85b 1-7: 124 n. 42 Phdr. 247a7: 166 n. 49; 267c: 161 n. 42; 279b8: 109 n. 23 Prt. 324d-325a: 60 n. 4; 328b5-c2: 43 n. 12 Rep. 364b5-365a3: 48 n. 23; 365d366b: 34 n. 12; 368c-369a: 30; 379a-383c: 161 n. 41; 4 2 5 b 426b, 427a-c: 30 Smp. 188b-d: 51 n. 28,107; 204a: 144 n. 10 Tim. 29el-3: 166 n. 49 PLAUTUS Amph. 145 n. 13 PLUTARCH Ages. 3.4-9: 70 n. 33 Ale. 22.4: 24 Dem. 14.6: 49 η. 26

187

Demetr. 10-13: 56 η. 44 Lys. 8.5: 44 Mor. 169e: 68; 299ef: 77 η. 3; 81 Id: 96 η. 29; 812d: 69 η. 30 Nie. 23.4: 68, 71; 23.5: 71 η. 38 Νurna 4: 111 Per. 6.2-4: 69; 31.2: 68 η. 25; 32.2: 24, 68-69; 32.5: 68 Sol. 25.2: 23 η. 16 PRODICUS (DK 84) A 13-19: 162 η. 42 P. Here. 1428 fr. 19: 60 η. 2 PROTAGORAS (DK 80) Β 1: 147 η. 15; 4: 60 RAUBmSCHEK, DEDICATIONS 64: 709 η. 21; 332: 104 η. 6 SATYRUS fr. 14 (FHG): 67 η. 22 SCHOLIA Aristophanes: ad Av. 521: 69 η. 29, η. 32; ad Av. 1073: 61; ad Eq. 1085: 70 η. 33; ad Nu. 332: 69 η. 30; ad Pax 1084: 69 η. 32; ad Ra. 366: 25; ad Ve. 380: 70 n. 34 Demosthenes: ad 19.281: 49n.26 Euripides: ad Tr. 1079: 84 n. 13 Sophocles: ad Ph. 829: 125 η. 45 SIMONIDES 37.19-20 Page: 111 SOLON fr. 29 West: 55 η. 40,159 η. 34 SOPHOCLES Ai. 132-133: 111 η. 24; 364-367, 393-400,473-480: 169; 479-480: 169 η. 59; 522: 102 η. 1; 758777: 170 η. 60 Ant. 955-965: 77 η. 3 ΕΙ. 741: 159 η. 36 OC 22 η. 12; 1623: 92 η. 23 ΟΤ 22 η. 12; 1291: 170; 13291330: 171; 1340-1346: 170; 1360: 171; 1378-1383, 14361437, 1449-1451, 1489-1491, 1518-1519: 170 Ph. 829: 125 Tr. 19, 139-140, 826, 1088, 1106, 1168,1185,1268-1269: 145 η. 13

sonoN

fr. 3 Wehrli: 67 η. 22, 71 η. 37

188

Index locorum antiquorum

STOBAEUS 4.2.19, 24: 32 n. 7 SUDA Πρόδικος: 62 η. 7; σελήναι: 83 η. 12 SUPPLEMENTUM EPIGRAPHICUM GRAECUM 21.519: 44 η. 14 TELECUDES fr. 6 Kock: 70 η. 34 THEOCRITUS 26: 77 η. 3 THEOGNIS 373: 109 η. 23,130 η. 54 THEOPHRASTUS Piet. frr. 7-10 Pötscher: 55 η. 38 THEOPOMPUS (FGrH 115) F 344: 55 n. 38 THRASYMACHUS (DK 85) Β 8: 37 η. 19 THUCYDIDES 1.23.1-3: 27; 126: 22 2.13.3-5: 23; 16.2: 53; 40.4: 102 η. 1; 47.4-53.1: 26 η. 26; 53.4: 26; 71.4, 74.2-3: 43 η. 11 3.63.4: 102 η. 1 5.19.2, 24.1: 69; 104: 55 η. 42 6.27.3: 25 η. 24; 39.2: 144 η. 10 7.50.4: 25 η. 24; 69.2: 25; Π.2-3: 55 8.53.2: 58 n. 1 TIMON OF PHLIUS DK 80 A 12: 60 η. 3

TOD, GHI 2.204: 43 η. 10, η. 11 TRAGICORUM GRAECORUM FRAGMENTA 1.43 F 19: 55, 56, 60 η. 2, 64 η. 15, 99 η. 33,161 η. 41 2. (Adesp.) F 1 b (g): 97 η. 31 4.T 18-27, 67-73: 5 7 η. 46 XENOPHANES (DK 21) A 32: 163-164 η. 46, η. 47 Β 1: 164 η. 47; 2, 11, 12: 163-164 η. 46; 24: 164 η. 46, η. 47; 25: 164 η. 47 ΧΕΝΟΡΗΟΝ Ages. 2.29: 102 η. 1; 11.2: 55 η. 38 An. 2.5.7: 52; 2.6.21-22, 25: 44; 3.1.5-7: 44 η. 13; 5.7.32: 55 η. 38 Αρ. 10: 63 η. 8; 11: 63 η. 10,65; 12: 63 η. 9; 24: 65 *Ath. Pol. 2.9: 21 η. 9 Cyr. 8.7.3: 105 HG 1.4.20: 27 η. 28; 1.7.22: 2 2 ; 2.4.20: 27; 3.3.3: 7 0 / 1 . 5 5 Mem. 1.1.1-2: 65 η. 8, η. 9, η. 10, 65; 1.1.5: 64 η. 15, η. 16 ; 1.2.64: 65; 1.3.3: 55 η. 38; 1.4: 43 η. 8, 57 η. 45, 161 η. 41; 3.14.2: 162 η. 42 Oec. 7.16: 127 η. 46 Smp. 4.46-49: 43 η. 8, 110; 4.47: 162 η. 44

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