A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949 [First ed.]

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A Military History of Modern China 1924-1949

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1956

A MILITARY HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA

1924-1949

Copyright © 1956 by Princeton University Press London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press L.C. CARD: 56-8386

F. F. Liu was formerly an officer in the Chinese National.isl forces in both staff and combat assignments. He was wounded twice during World War II, and decorated "for conspicuous gal­ lantry in action." He came to the United States and received his

doctorate at Princeton University. His military experience and

his training as a scholar have given him an unusual background for the writing of this book. He has used German, French, Rus­ sian, and Japanese sources, as well as Chinese and English. Professionally, Dr. Liu has continued his work in engineering and science. L'ntil recently he has been engaged full-time as an electronics and rocket instrumentation specialist at the Forrestal

Research Center in Princeton and is now a senior research scientist

with a leading aviation company in California, doing important research in advanced measurements and high-speed aerodynamics.

The title-page design was drawn by the author, The flag is the military banner of Whampoa Academy; the soldier's ballad on the left reflects the realization that learning and wisdom are ultimately more powerful than swords and fighting courage.

Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

TO MY 'PARENTS IN MEMORIAM

PREFACE MANY statesmen and scholars have shown a keen interest in the overwhelming changes and tragic upheavals which have torn China asunder in recent years. In search for a key to the causes and signifi­ cance of these turbulent decades, they have turned to the military history of modern China, which unfortunately is still inadequately re­ corded and often poorly analyzed. This book has been written in an attempt to offer a clearer statement of the chief events and their true significance. Six years were spent in research and four in the preparation of the present study. Once the work had started, a man trained primarily as an engineering scientist found the labor of writing it both enormous and challenging, and it did not leave the author's hands until Mr. Leonard R. N. Ashley had collaborated with him for two years, reorganizing and rewriting many parts of the book. I am most indebt­ ed to him for his scholarly suggestions and improvements. Many eminent scholars and scientists have lent assistance and encouragement either directly or indirectly. Sir Hugh Taylor, Dean K. H. Condit, and Professors C. D. Perkins and Luigi Crocco, all of Princeton Uni­ versity, did much to make it possible for the author to continue his writing concurrently with research in the instrumentation field of aero­ nautical electronics. To Professors George A. Graham, Harold H. Sprout, Jacob Viner, A. T. Mason, William Ebenstein, H. L. Childs, and Edward S. Corwin my debt is great. Professor W.W. Lockwood and my classmate at Princeton, Colonel A. J. Goodpaster, were the first to suggest the necessity for the study and to inspire its in­ ception. A number of others have read the manuscript in its entirety or in part and have contributed invaluable suggestions and construc­ tive counsel. Among these must be mentioned Field Marshal General Alexander von Falkenhausen; Mr. Herbert S. Bailey, Jr., Director of the Princeton University Press; and, particularly, Miss Miriam Brokaw, also of that organization; Dr. Hu Shih, the eminent Chinese scholar; Dr. George R. Loehr; and my friend, Professor K. W. So. To my neighbors Monsieur and Madame Henry G. F. Jacqz and to Mr. Shih-kang Tung, Librarian of the Gest Oriental Library at Princeton, I am indebted for much kind assistance. Mrs. Zoe L. Belth and Mrs. Mary Riker have typed parts of the manuscript. Catherine [ vii }

PREFACE

R. Johnson compiled the index. Dr. James Thorpe, Assistant Dean of the Graduate School at Princeton, was instrumental in obtaining a generous grant from Princeton University to help with the final revision of the manuscript and the preparation of the index. My wife Lily rendered unfailing assistance in typing, proofreading, and many aspects of the preparation. To her goes the credit of encourag­ ing me through a long-drawn-out battle of research and writing over the years until the book was completed. Finally, to Princeton University's scholarly atmosphere, to its stimulus and great tradition, the author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness. F.F.L. Princeton, New Jersey June r955

[ Vlll ]

CONTENTS PREFACE CHAPTER 1. PARTNERS IN REVOLUTION: SOVIET MILITARY POLICY AND ADVISERS IN CHINA

2.

CHAPTER I. II. III. IV. V.

THE ASCENDANCE OF WHAMPOA AND CHIANG KAI·SHEK The Foundation of the Military Academy. Its Policies Early \Vhampoa Victories. Chiang's Leadership Assured Cheng-chi-pu: Political Administration of the Army Galen and the Establishment of Soviet Dominance Chiang Kai-shek Rises to Power

8 8 15 17 19 2l

3·

CHAPTER

LAUNCHING THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION: REASONS AND RESULTS I. A Difficult Problem: The Expansion of the National Revolutionary Army II. The Bold Solution: Preparations for the Northern Expedition III. Cross Purposes: Chiang and the Northern Campaign-and the Communists

25 25 27 30

4.

THE SOVIET MASTER PLAN FAILS. THE KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST SPLIT \Vuhan: The Communist Military Attempt The Communist Political Attempt Chiang Kai-shek Fights Back The Commanders and the Commissars-The Kuomintang-Communist Split

CHAPTER

I. II. III. IV.

3

CHAPTER

5.

CHAPTER

6.

43

THE CONSOLIDATION OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S POWER A CRITICAL SUMMARY OF THE PERIOD 1924-1928

[ ix J

53

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

7.

THE BEGINNINGS OF GERMAN INFLUENCE: REORGANIZATION

I. The Need for Reorganization II. The Short and Important Career of Max Bauer III. The Background of the Reorganization: German Models. Japanese Models. Chinese Models IV. The Nature of the Reorganization CHAPTER

I. II. III. IV. V.

8.

60 60 61

TOWARD MILITARIZATION WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The Immediate Problem of Troop Disbandment Unification of the New Army under Chiang German Advisers Kriebel and Wetzell The Creation of a Military Council Chiang Controls the Military Council: Militarization

CHAPTER

9.

THE MOLDING OF "BASIC" MILITARY POWER

I. The importance of the Central Military Academy II. The Basic and Specialized Educational Programs III. General Staff Training: The Spirit of the General Staff College. Regular and Senior Command Courses. Advanced Study Abroad. An Evaluation of the Chinese System

85

CHAPTER 10. GERMAN MILITARY AND INDUS­ TRIAL INFLUENCE: VON SEECKT AND VON FALKENHAUSEN

I. Mutual Cooperation: The Sino-German Relationship Defined IL Von Seeckt's First Chinese Mission: The

Denkschrift fuer Marschall Chiang Kai-shek

III. Von Seeckt's Second Chinese Mission: His Aims and His Success IV. Cooperation in High Gear: von Falkcnhausen CHAPTER 11. 1937, THE TIME FOR WAR I. K'ang Chang Tao-Ti: A Fight to the Last

IL China's Strategy III. Preparation and the Lack of It IV. The Nationalist Army: Forth to Battle

CHAPTER 12. THE STATE IN ARMS: WARTIME ORGANIZATION

[ X

J

91

103

103 104 109

IIO

IIS

CONTENTS

I. The Theory: Concentration of Power for Total War II. The Growth and Problems of the Military Council III. The Supreme National Defense Conference and Supreme Defense Council IV. The Government within the Government: The Generalissimo's Personal Staff V. The Chinese Field Organization

CHAPTER 13. THE PEOPLE IN ARMS: MAN­ POWER MOBILIZATION The Prohlems

I. II. III. IV. V. VI.

Conscription Malnutrition and Disease Illiteracy Ssu Shou: Do or Die! Leadership Commanders

115

I 16

I I8 122 126 131 131

138

141

143 145 150

CHAPTER 14. THE MOBILIZATION OF INDUSTRY I. Native Potentialities IL Foreign Imports III. Management and Mismanagement

CHAPTER 15. GERMAN AND SOVIET FACTORS

I. The Dependability of the German Advisers II. The Craftiness of the Kremlin: The Sino­ Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Sino-Soviet Trade. The Soviet Military Men in China III. The Deterioration of Sino-Soviet Relations

CHAPTER 16. VINEGAR AND HONEY: THE STILWELL AND WEDEMEYER MISSIONS IN CHINA

153 153 156 159 162 162 166 170

174

l

Part One: Stilwel 's Failure

I. II. III. IV.

Early Missions to China "A Small-Fry Colonel" Returns as a General Problems for "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell Is Recalled l

Part Two: Stilwel 's Success

I. The Plan for Burma: Chinese Troops, American-Trained IL Ramgarh: The Program in India III. An Evaluation of Ramgarh's Success IV. Kunming and Kweilin: The Program in China

[ xi

J

174 176 178 181

CONTENTS V. The Pincer Movement: The Recovery of Burma Part Three: Wedemeyer's Success

CHAPTER

17. THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR,

1937-1945

First Phase: From Wanping to the Fall of Hankow Second Phase: The Chinese Reds Play Their Own Game Third Phase: I. Enter the American Ally II. The First Burma Campaign III. Victory in Burma and Its Aftermath IV. Operation /chi-go: The Japanese Offensive V. The Conclusion of the War Summary CHAPTER 18. FROM VICTORY TO DEFEAT I. The Japanese Surrender and Its Aftermath II. Reorganization toward Chaos III. The Failure of the Marshall Plan for China CHAPTER

19 1 19 1 197 197 20 2 208 2 1o 2 14 2 19 221 222 226 226 230 238

19. THE COMMUNIST TRIUMPH

ON THE MAINLAND The Seeds of Defeat The Widening Gulf The Communist Strategy The Loss of Manchuria: The Beginning of the End V. The Decisive Huai-Hai Campaign: The Fall of Hsuchow VI. The Crossing of the Yangtze. The Exile to Formosa

I. II. III. IV.

24 3 24 3 247 24 9 255 260 264

EPILOGUE: PORTAL TO THE FUTURE I. The Past Reviewed II. The Future Suggested

27 1 27 l 280

BIBLIOGRAPHY

287

INDEX

305 The map on page 28 was drawn by R. S. Snedeker, the charts by the author.

[XII}

A MILITARY HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA

1924-1949

1 · PARTNERS IN REVOLUTION. SOVIET MILITARY POLICY AND ADVISERS IN CHINA THE spirit of revolution was abroad in China in the 192o's. The war­ lords who controlled the government at Peking had suppressed the country and laid her open to the rapacious colonialism of Britain and Japan. The youth of China, stirred by the news of the October Revo­ lution in Russia, were ready to rise in revolt. Largely disappointed in the powers of the West, they turned to the example of the Russian Soviet for inspiration. In the midst of China's unrest there came to leadership a figure to whom the educated class gave substantial support: Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese republic. But, without an effective army, Dr. Sun found himself ill-equipped to battle in the arena of Chinese politics with the warlords who backed their desires and demands with guns. As far back as I 9 r 3, when the feuding warlords of the north had balked at Sun's constitutional proposals, he had been forced to recognize the salient role of military force in Chinese politics. He noted then that ". . . [now] the Parliament engages merely in tongue-lashing and the constitutional law itself has no power to curb their influence; the tuchun [military governors during the rule of warlords] mostly belong to the private faction of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Unless we appeal to the force of arms there is no way to settle the present national crisis.m But to create and equip an army was no easy task for Dr. Sun and his Kuomintang. The mission of the revolution seemed doomed to delay or destruction in the hands of undependable forces subject to the whims of the warlords of South China. Soviet Russia, however, saw both China's plight and her potentialities. Lenin, an astute ob­ server of China's revolution, perceived the importance of China to Russia's plan. In the tenth anniversary issue of Pravda, he wrote: "China and India are seething. These two nations have a population of more than seven hundred millions. Add to them their Asian neigh­ bors who are in like condition and they comprise over half the popu1 "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's manifesto to the nation on yueh-fa in 1913," Chung-shan ch'uan-shu (The Complete Works of Dr. Sun Yat-sen), r, Ch. 4.

[ 3 ]

SOV I ET P O L I CY AND A D V I SER S

lation of the earth.m Lenin went on to mention the growing revolu­ tionary movements of China and India and their key roles in com­ munism's international plan. Lenin added action to words. To China he sent some of the Soviet's best diplomats, shrewd men like G. Maring, Adolf Joffe, L. M. Karakhan. Some of the best minds in the Politiburo and the Comin­ tern planned for the Chinese revolution. Stalin and Trotsky kept their fingers on the pulse of events in China. Some of the most brilliant minds of the Red Army studied the Chinese military picture. Trotsky, Sklyansky, Yegorov, Bluecher, Bubnov, and others kept themselves constantly informed on developments in the Far East. A policy of Soviet-Chinese friendship was formed in an attempt to foster a spirit of cooperation and a concept of common purpose. Meanwhile the British were still posting notices on the gates to the park in Shanghai which read : "Chinese and dogs not admitted." The Kremlin's policy paid off. In the vigorous communist activities of Berlin and Paris such men as Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, and Chu Teh took an active part. On the campuses of Shanghai and Peking, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, Mao Tse-tung, and others established the Chinese Communist Party. In Moscow the Sun Yat-sen and Eastern Universities were founded to train the revolutionary core. At the Eastern University, in a lecture to a group of Chinese students, Stalin said: "Formerly, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, revolu­ tions began when the people rose, largely unarmed or poorly armed, to encounter the army of the old regime, trying to demoralize it or at least draw part of it over to their side. . . . In China matters have gone differently. . . . In China an armed revolutionary force is fight­ ing against an armed counter-revolutionary force. Herein lies one of the special features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revo­ lution. Here is the special importance of the Revolutionary Army of China.m Even the Kremlin's timing of its proffer of friendship and help was perfect. Lenin's representative contacted Dr. Sun Yat-sen at the lowest point of the latter's career, after he had been betrayed and forced out of Canton by the army of a treacherous warlord, Ch'en Ch'iung-ming. For sixty days Dr. Sun and his naval force fought Chen from the Pearl River base at Whampoa. A loyal officer joined 2 "Lenin on China," Pravda, Tenth A nniversary Issue, 1 9 2 2. 3 Stalin, J. V., Sochinenya (Moscow, 1 94 6 ) , VI I I , p. 363.

[ 4

J

SOV I ET P O L I CY AND A D V I S E R S

Sun and stayed at his side while he spL;it his days o n a gunboat : Chiang Kai-shek, whose faithfulness and ability endeared him to the elder statesman ; he became one of Sun's trusted military advisers. Another man came to offer Sun assistance-Lenin's personal repre­ sentative, Maring. At Sun's request a Soviet military representative went to Shanghai to confer with Chiang Kai-shek, whom Sun had delegated to work out a scheme of Canton-Moscow military coopera­ tion. In October 1 9 23 Chiang headed for Moscow, bearing despatches from Sun Yat-sen to Lenin. That mission started the hitherto-unknown officer on his meteoric rise. ·while Sun waited for the results of his embassy to Moscow he conferred with Mikhail Borodin on the possibilities of an entente with Soviet Russia that, without subjecting the Chinese to excessive ideological affiliation with the Kremlin, might provide needed sup­ port for the Kuomintang. Borodin was able to extend promises of support that would be to China's military and political advantage. Meanwhile, in Moscow, Lenin was seriously ill. Chiang was re­ ceived by Trotsky and Stalin and turned over to Sklyansky, then Trotsky's right-hand man in the Commissariat. Arrangements were made for assistance to the Kuomintang and material aid was assured by the Kremlin . The first step was taken with the sending of a small mission of selected military advisers to Canton. Chiang was conducted on extensive tours of various Soviet military establishments, includ­ ing naval and air bases, in order to acquaint him with the activities of the Red armed forces. In December 1 923, passing through Vladi­ vostok on his way back to China, Chiang met the famous Russian commander Vasily K. Bluecher, who, as General Galen (his nom de guerre) , was later to be the Kuomintang's chief military consultant. Bluecher was one of the Soviet's most celebrated commanders, exceptionally gifted in organizing and training troops. After the Oc­ tober Revolution he whipped a conglomerate mass of raw recruits into a crack army and led them to victory after victory over the White Russian forces. Bluecher combined the forcefulness of a successful field commander with the shrewdness of a diplomat and the suavity of an experienced public speaker ; he was to prove a distinct gain to the conference tables of the Kuomintang. At about the same time another famous Red Army commander, Mar­ shal A. I. Yegorov, was sent to Peking as the Kremlin's military attache. His function was to supervise and coordinate all the Soviet's military [ 5 }

S O V I E T P O L I CY A N D A D V I S E R S

activities i n China. Soviet Russia's interest in Chinese affairs at this period may be judged by the caliber of the men she placed in key positions there. Bluecher's importance has already been noted. Yegorov was later to become chief of the Red Army's general staff and to com­ mand important battle fronts in Russia's civil wars. Both Bluecher and Yegorov were among the first five marshals of the Red Army created by Russia in 1933. The others were Tuchehavsky, Voroshilov, and Budyenny. To assist Bluecher, a skillful military administrator, General Victor Rogacheff, was appointed chief of staff to the Soviet military mission in China, a mission of which Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, who later gained fame as a Red Army commander in World War 11, was re­ ported to have been a member. The size of the mission has been variously reported. During 1925, it was estimated that about a thou­ sand military and political personnel represented the Soviet in China. In that year a nucleus of twenty-four key military advisers was sta­ tioned in Canton to assist the Kuomintang. No other foreign organization can be credited with as much in­ fluence in the rise of the Nationalist Army in China as General Galen's ( Bluecher's) military mission. Aside from its obvious political func­ tions, the task of this mission was formally stated as follows : " r . To organize and instruct a National Revolutionary Army in the South of China for national liberation from the yoke of imperial­ ism and for the unification into one independent democratic republic. "2. To give every assistance to the government [at Canton] by working in the army and among the population in order to promote its democratic principles. "3. To make popular the doctrine of Communism and of Sovietism and to work toward bringing about complete rapprochement and [mutual] support between China and the U.S.S.R. and to create in the Army, in the labor organizations, and in the peasantry the desire for a further revolutionary movement.'" The first move of the Soviet political and military missions under Borodin and Galen was to effect reorganization in the Kuomintang. According to Dallin, Borodin's first task was reorganization rather than revolution. Galen's work, however, was concentrated in assisting • The Metropolitan Police Headquarters of Peking, Official Document, Soviet Plot in China ( Peking, 192 7 ) , p. 5 6. "Document Supplement," Chinese Social and Polit­ ical Science Review, XI ( 192 7), p. 1 3 1 .

[ 6 }

S O V I E T P O L I CY A N D ADV I S E R S

the Kuomintang to create a basic military force for revolutionary purposes.• In January 1924 the First National Congress of the Kuomintang accepted Chiang Kai-shek's proposal of reorganizing the army, re­ solving on immediate reorganization, presumably along Russian lines. As the first step it decided upon the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy. The influence of Chiang Kai-shek loomed large in the reorganization, for, as a rising military figure and the leading Chinese expert on Soviet systems, he was the figure in whom the in­ fluences of the Kuomintang and the Soviet combined. Chiang found support on all sides : as the trusted friend of the ailing party leader, Sun Yat-sen; as the closest tie with the Soviet advisers; as the re­ spected model of all the young military men of China. He enjoyed the growing allegiance of the young graduates of the Paoting Military Academy and the Shikan Gakko, the Japanese military school, and eventually the loyalty of the cadets and graduates of the Whampoa Academy, which he himself had helped to found. Chiang's role was succinctly stated in a report to Moscow from the Soviet military repre­ sentative in China dated May r r , r 92 5 : "The first step in the reor­ ganization of the army was the creation of the Kuomintang military school as chief of which General Chiang Kai-shek, a faithful friend of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was appointed. His task was to supply the army with junior officers of political understanding. . . . " 6 The Kuomintang instituted other changes in addition to its estab­ lishment of a training-ground for new officers. It created a political and military council along the lines of the Russian model (Revoyen Soviet) , the supreme military authority set up by Trotsky after September 1918. But the chief move in the Kuomintang's extensive reorganizational program, the chief work of Chiang, and the chief evidence of Soviet influence, was the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy. • Dallin, D. J., The Rise of Russia in A sia (New Haven : Yale University Pre,s, 1949 ) , p. 2 12 . 6 "Report of Soviet Military Attache a t Peking, M a y 1 1, 192 5," quoted in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents Illustrating the Hostile A ctivities of the Soviet Government and the Third International against Great Britain (London, 192 7 ) , pp. 20-3 1. Kawakami, K. K., Japan in China ( London : John Murray, 1938), p. 8.

[ 7 }

2 · THE ASCENDANCE OF WHAM POA AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK I . T H E F O U N DATI O N O F TH E M ILITARY A CADE M Y : ITS POLICI E S .

II.

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WHAM POA

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LEADERS H I P ASSURED. I I I . CHENG-CHI-P U : POLITICAL ADM I N I STRATION O F THE ARM Y . IV. GAL E N A N D T H E ESTABLISH M E N T O F SOVI ET DO M I NA N C E . V. C H I A N G KAI· SHEK RISES TO POWER. � -N G

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