A Maritime History of India [1 ed.]

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A MARITIME HISTORY OF INDIA COMMANDER K. SRIDHARAN Indian Navy

PUBLICATIONS DIVISION MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING

Digital version of August1965 (Sravana 1887) print edition

PUBLISHED BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, PUBLICATIONS DIVISION, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, SOOCHNA BHAWAN, CGO COMPLEX, LODHI ROAD, NEW DELHI3.

FOREWORD I am happy that an officer of the Indian Navy has written this book on the maritime history of India. The book contains a useful historical survey and brings out the importance of seafaring and sea power and its influence on our history. Though not so widely known, India has a rich maritime heritage. Since the dawn of history our people participated in international sea-borne commerce and our products and our culture spread to many countries. The advent of the Europeans in the Indian Ocean thwarted our peaceful maritime enterprise and opened our coastal regions for trade and commerce and eventual foreign domination. With the attainment of Independence, Indian shipping has progressed at a rapid pace. The Indian Navy, which is charged with the duty of guarding the country’s shores and protecting our shipping in times of war, has also considerably expanded. Indian shipping has a vital role to play in increasing our trade and commerce and the Indian Navy must also develop and strengthen into an effective force side by side with our expanded sea lanes. The book focuses attention on the importance of our maritime requirements and I hope all those who are interested in our maritime development would find it a useful guide. New Delhi Y.B.CHAVAN Minister of Defence

PREFACE This treatise is an attempt to bring out in one volume the various facets of Indian maritime history from time immemorial to the present day. A couple of books written by very eminent historians have been published, embracing much of the historical development of maritime activity up to the British period. But here I have endeavoured to bring out the history, including the post-Independence period, of the developments of which we should justifiably be proud, and the study of which makes a person learn the lessons of history and appreciate better the need for the country’s defence by maritime forces. My book is written primarily for those who are not historians by profession; that is the reason which prompted me to include in the Introduction some idea of the sources a historian resorts to and the difficult task he is set in piecing together the disjointed facts that emerge from them. I should like to make it clear here that the views expressed in this book are entirely my own and are not those of Naval Headquarters or the Government of India. As the book has been written while I am still in active service, the task has been beset with difficulties, primarily owing to my service preoccupation. I had, therefore, to rely on material mostly from previously published works of authority; and I had only limited opportunity to refer to original sources. The book, therefore, contains many references. I have included a map of ancient India showing the places mentioned in the book, particularly those historical names which are not well known today. I am greatly indebted to Shri Y. B. Chavan, Minister of Defence, for having written the Foreword to this book, and I deem it a high honour bestowed upon me. I am grateful to the Government of India for not only permitting me to publish this book, but also for having undertaken to publish it. I am thankful to the Chief of the Naval Staff for permission to publish some of the Service photographs.

I am most grateful for the very valuable suggestions so freely given by Captain D. R. Mehta, Indian Navy. My thanks are due to Chief Petty Officer Christy, Messrs Subramaniam, Tirath Singh, Ram Swarup and Rajagopal of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, for having helped me in the preparation of the manuscript.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The book quotes several eminent authors of authoritative works and contains authentic, statements and some photographs. These are given below in the order of their appearance in the book. I should like to place on record here my indebtedness to these authors, their executors, publishers and other authorities for their very kind permission given to me to quote or reproduce from their works. India and the Indian K. M. George Allen and Unwin Ocean Panikkar Ltd., London The Vedic Period—History A. D. Pusalker Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, and Culture of the Indian Bombay People Ancient India R. C. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi Majumdar The Indus Valley R. E. Mortimer Cambridge University Civilisation Wheeler Press, London A History of Indian Radha Kumud Kitab Mahal Private Ltd., Shipping Mookerji Allahabad Rulers of the Indian Ocean G. A. Ballard Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., London Age of the Nandas and K. A. i Motilal Banarsidass, Mauryas Nilakanta Delhi Sastri Glimpses of Ancient India Radha Kumud Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mookerji Bombay War in Ancient India V. R. R. Dik- Macmillan & Co. Ltd., shitar London The Pageant of India’s Gertrude David Mckay Company History,Vol. I(Copyright Emerson Sen Inc., U.S.A. 1948, reissued 1964)

An Advanced History of India

R. C. Macmillan &Co. Ltd. Majumdar, London H.C. Raychaudhuri, K. Datta A Comprehensive History Henry Blackie& Son, London of India, Vol. I (photograph Beveridge of Vasco da Gama & the Zamorin) The Cambridge History of Cambridge University the British Empire, Vol. IV Press, London A History of India J. C. Powell- Thomas Nelson & Sons Price Ltd., London Naval Defence of India K. B. Vaidya Thacker & Co. Ltd., (photograph of Admiral Bombay Kanhoji Angre) History of the French in G. B. W. H. Allen & Company, India Malleson London The Navy in India H. W. Ernest Benn Ltd., London Richmond The Wonder That Was A. L. Basham Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd. India United Kingdom The Bombay Dockyard R. A. Wadia Godrej Memorial Press, and the Wadia Master Bombay Builders (photograph of Jamsetjee Bomanjee) Our Shipping Asoka Mehta Padma Publications Ltd., Bombay Indian Shipping through Sumati Morarji The Scindia Steam the Ages Navigation Co. Ltd., Bombay Statement of Ships built at Hindustan Shipyard Ltd., Visakhapatnam New Delhi Photograph of Tanker Jayanti Shipping Co. Ltd., VIKRAM JAYANTI New Delhi

Jayanti Fleet at a Glance India’s Position in World Trade and Shipping

Jayanti Shipping Co. Ltd., New Delhi Indian Shipping Journal of the Indian National Steamship Owners Association, Bombay Cdr. K. Sridharan

CONTENTS Foreword Preface INTRODUCTION I EARLY PERIOD (UP TO 300 A.D.) 1 Prehistoric and Vedic Periods (up to 500 B.C.) 2 Age of the Nandas and Mauryas (500 to 200 B.C.) 3 The Andhra-Kushan Period (200 B.C. to 300 A.D.) II THE HINDU PERIOD (UP TO 1400 A.D.) 1 North Indian Hindu Dynasties (300 A.D. to 1200 A.D.) 2 South Indian Hindu Dynasties (up to 1400 A.D.) III THE MUSLIM PERIOD (1000 TO 1700 A.D.) 1 The Influence of the Seafaring Arabs 2 Later Muslim Era IV THE ADVENT OF THE EUROPEANS (15TH To 18TH CENTURY) The Portuguese in India (1498 A.D.)

1 The Advent of the Dutch (1603 A.D.) 2 The Coming of the British (1609 A.D.) 3 The Maratha Navy (1647 to 1756 A.D.) 4 The French Challenge (1600 to 1748 A.D.) V THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN NAVY (1613 TO 1964) 1 The Indian Marine (1613 to 1685) 2 The Bombay Marine and the Indian Navy (1686 to 1876) 3 Her Majesty’s Indian Marine and the Royal Indian Marine (1877 to 1933) 4 The Royal Indian Navy (1934 to 1947) 5 The Indian Navy (1947 to 1964) VI SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING (UP TO 1964) 1

Shipbuilding

2 Shipping VII CONCLUSION A Note on the Illustrations Index

INTRODUCTION The strategic geographical position of the Indian subcontinent in the Orient is obvious. Being in the centre of southern Asia, India overlooks through the expanse of seas around her Arabia and Africa on the west, and Burma, Thailand and Indonesia on the east. The geographical configuration of the Indian Ocean itself lends it prominence in the southern hemisphere. It washes the major part of the east coast of Africa on one side and the Indonesian Archipelagos and Australia on the other. It stretches as far south as the Antarctic, while it forms a confluence with the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal in the north. Then we have the Arabian Sea itself dividing peninsular India and Arabia, on which lies the oceanic route which is nearly 3,000 years old. Then there is the Bay of Bengal washing the shores of Burma and Malaya, which played its important part in the colonization of the East Asian countries. Thus nature has placed India in a favourable situation. The mere geographical situation of India in relation to the Indian Ocean and the oceanic expanse aroundher should help to develop international commerce as well as foreign relations. Sardar K. M. Panikkar observes that “it is an obvious fact to any student of history that India’s security lies on the Indian Ocean.”1 Looking back into the pages of history, it is clear that the Indian Ocean played a very prominent part in the subjugation of India by the Western powers. Aden and Malacca form the western and eastern entrances to the Indian Ocean, and when these approaches came under the domain of an alien power, this virtually gave it control over India. A critical analysis of Indian history brings out the fact that with the loss of the command of the sea India lost her independence. Supremacy of the invading foreigners in the East was, of course, based on the sea power they enjoyed in the West.

There is an impression that India was not a seafaring nation during the early period. A study of the country’s maritime history, on the other hand, clearly exposes this erroneous impression. In fact, the Hindus held supremacy over the Indian Ocean from very early times up to the 13th century. The ingress of any alien sea power apparently did not have any effect on the history of India till that period. The Hindus took to sea for commercial rather than political ends. Even with the advent of the Arabs on the Indian scene there was no perceptible effect upon India’s political status. This was because the Arabs came primarily as commercial navigators and their policy was not one of subjection of the country, though they had a few settlements on the Malabar coast. Thus the period up to about 16th century witnessed peaceful sea-borne commerce, religious expansion, cultural intercourse and international comity. Thenceforward, India’s maritime history is a record-of a succession of endeavours by foreign nations to establish control of the Indian Ocean, resulting in directly influencing India’s destiny. The control of the sea by a foreign power undoubtedly changed India’s economic structure. India’s trade was at all times predominantly maritime. When these sea routes came to be controlled by the European powers, the economy of India began to lie largely at the mercy of alien merchants. The primary causes that led to the entrenchment of alien powers in the Indiansoil were two : first, the neglect of sea power and undue reliance on land armies for defence, and, secondly, the mutual animosity and utter lack of co-operation among the Indian rulers of the period. The Portuguese were the first of the European nations to appreciate the importance of sea power; they flouted the age-old concept of the freedom of the high seas and claimed the monopoly of using the Indian seas to their own advantage. Their eclipse after a century of maritime enterprise was again due to their loss of sea power. The entry of the British and their eventual rise to power can be attributed primarily to their supremacy in the Indian Ocean which they maintained most zealously till they withdrew from the scene. The only serious threat to the British supremacy in the Indian Ocean

came from the Japanese when they challenged the British might during World War II in that troubled year, 1941. With the attainment of Independence, there has been a perceptible and steady expansion, not only of the Indian Navy but also of the Indian Mercantile Marine, as far as the resources of the country permit. It will be found that references to various sources have been made in this book. To give the reader a general idea of the nature of the works or materials referred to, their authenticity and the period to which they relate, the succeeding paragraphs on sources should serve as a guide. Generally speaking, there has been a dearth of reliable sources for tracing the development of maritime history with any categorical certainty, as is indeed the case with Indian history itself during the very early period. One is on firmer ground during the later periods of history when reliable archaeological and literary data become available. The sources of evidence fall under three broad headings : literature, art and archaeology. Literature The term literature connotes all written works which are in Sanskrit, Pali, Persian, Tamil, Marathi, Bengali and other Indian languages as well as the writings of foreign travellers and historians. The main Sanskrit works useful as sources for maritime history are : (a) The Vedas, of which the Rig Veda is the most important. The Vedic Period is put down by historians between a long range of years, from 2,000 to 600 B.C., which embraces the life of the Aryan civilization. The Rig Veda contains the Samhitas, the Brāhmanas, the change Āranyakas and the Upanisads. Among these certain Brāhmanas and Upanisads have been cited in the book. There seems to be general agreement among leading historians that there is no question of doubting the Vedic texts, particularly the Rg Veda; but there is difference of opinion regarding the Purānas. (b) The Purānas embody old historical traditions, and rudimentary facts of history can be found in them. The two epics, the

Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata, also contain historical events and traditions. They give us an insight into the two major events in history that took place years ago. As to the reliability of the evidence of the Purānas and the epics, it is ably summed up by A. D. Pusalker thus : “No student of Indian history should ignore the legendary element in the Purānas and epics. We cannot accept traditions as genuine historical facts so long or so far as they are not corroborated by contemporary texts or other reasonable evidence. Until then we can treat them only as traditional history.”1 (c) Manusmriti, the code of law framed by Manu, provides for shipping laws. Although this work has not been dated accurately, it is reckoned by historians to have been composed somewhere between 200 B.C. and 200 a.d. (d) Arthasāstra is a remarkable work which throws light on the system of administration during the period of Chandragupta Maurya (4th century B.C.), and contains useful information on sea-bornetrade and commerce, as well as some aspects of military science and international law. (e) Yukti Kalpataru is a compilation attributed to Bhoja Narapati and it deals with a variety of subjects, among which is given a description of ships; and it narrates the technique and know-how of their construction. The work borrows freely from an author called Bhoja, presumably Raja Bhoja of Dhara, a renowned polymath of the post-Gupta era. In Pali literature we have references to oceanic enterprise, for example the Mahāvamsa. Among Indian literatures, the references more useful to us are those in Tamil as the part of the country where it is spoken, being peninsular in character, had extensive sea-borne activity. Tamil works such as Pattinappālai, Silappadikāram and Manimekhalai make abundant references to the maritime activities of south Indians. Pattinappālai is one of the Sangam poems and it was written by Kadiyalur Rudran Kannan in the 2nd century a.d. and contains an elaborate description of the activities at the then famous port of Kaveripattinam at the mouth of the river Kaveri. Silappadikāram is a Tamil epic written by Ilangovadigal, brother of Cheran Senguttuvan; there is some difference of opinion as to its

date, but it was written certainly not earlier than 2nd century a.d., perhaps not later than 5th century a.d. Manimekhalai is its sequel written about the same period; from it certain useful conclusions can be drawn about the traditional life of the people of the time. So far the main Indian literary sources have been given. We shall turn to the invaluable source which has come down to us—the works of foreign travellers and historians. Periplus of the Erythraean Sea {Periplus Maris Erythræi) is an account left behind by an unknown Greek author who visited India in the 1st century A.D. The account, probably written about 60 A.D., is a mine of information. The Natural History written by Pliny (77 A.D.) and the Geography by Ptolemy (140 A.D.) contain useful information for the study of this period. Then we have the contributions by a succession of foreign writers, such as Megasthenes, Strabo, Fa-Hien the Chinese monk (415 A.D.), Hiuen Tsang (7th century A.D.), I-tsing (7th century A.D.), Marco Polo (13th century A.D.),.Nicolo Conti (15th century A.D.), Abdur Razzak (1442 A.D.) and Varthema, who have all left abundant records of contemporary events in India. Sculptures and paintings form an important direct source of evidence. To give an example : the paintings found in the Ajanta Caves reveal the life of the people of the time. The frescos there depict sea-going vessels conveying goods overseas. Archaeological evidence can be divided into Archaeological three categories, epigraphic, monumental and numismatic. From a scientific study of the archaeological finds many facts Archaeology have come to light which trace the history of India. Among the archaeological excavations, the astounding discovery of the Indus Valley Civilization at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa leads us direct to the history of the people dating back to about 2,700 years before Christ. The other source from which useful historical information may be gleaned is the monumental inscriptions and the inscriptions on plates. While making a grant of land, the kings of the early days used to inscribe their genealogy and eulogize their own achievements; and these have been happily preserved and are found most useful for the reconstruction of history.

We have the coins of the different periods of Indian history, and the legends on them yield several clues. The discovery of foreign coins also affords evidence of intimate international intercourse.

I

EARLY PERIOD 1—Prehistoric and Vedic Periods From the beginnings of his existence, man, we know, was slowly induced to venture afloat in search of food in the shape of fish. The earliest traces of human existence in India are reckoned by historians to date back to some 5,00,000 years ago, which was at the end of the First Interglacial Period and the beginning of the Second Ice Age. During this period and the Palaeolithic Age, among the implements used by man, one finds, virtually in most parts of habitable India, the use of tools made of coral, which is an indication that he ventured out to sea at least as far as the low water-line, if not deeper, in search of coral reefs. There is no doubt that fish, in addition to fruits and animal flesh, was one of his items of diet. It is, however, debatable if man 6f this Age partook of sea fish or freshwater fish. Nevertheless, the fact remains that he was tempted to go afloat in search of fish. Talking of the oldest living specimens of the Dravidians in the Prehistoric Age, R. C. Majumdar states that “they developed not only city life but also international trade,” and that “they knew most of the metals and plants, made pottery, boats and ships.”1 A study of anthropography and racial migration has revealed that the Negritos, the original immigrants from Africa to India, made a settlement on the Andamans, having crossed the sea from India in their small dug-outs. This was indeed an achievement for palaeolithic man when one considers that it entailed the traversing of some 700 miles of sea. We are on firmer The Indus Valley Civilization (3,000 b.c.—2,000 B.C.) ground when we come to the Indus Prehistoric Age (upto to 3,000 B.C.)

Valley Civilization, nearly 3,000 years before Christ The excavations at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa have revealed enough evidence to support the view that during this period there was an appreciable amount of maritime activity. An analysis of the Harappa skeletal finds shows personal ornaments such as shell bangles and mother of pearl shells which were found on the dead. Among the objects included in the burials was a large mussel-shell which was evidently used as a ladle. These objects would not have been found if the Harappan had not been a venturesome seafarer. In fact, the evidence of the extensive use of shell ornaments is obvious; most probably these shells were from the sea coast of India, perhaps the Persian Gulf. The food habits of the people of the Indus Valley Civilization indicate that they ate considerable quantities of fish, fresh-water fish as well as fish from the sea, as also shell-fish. There is clear evidence of this in the litter heaps found near the houses and streets of the cities unearthed. Some seals found in the region also have fish representations on them. The facts given so far prove only inshore seafaring. The assumption that they not only went on coastal voyages but were equally adventurous on the high seas has some basis. Among several seals that were discovered in the excavations at Harappa, there was one portraying an anchor. The fact that the Harappans had used an anchor is clear indication that the vessels in use were deep-water craft, perhaps sea-going. The other important piece of evidence that the Harappans had probably large-sized vessels capable of being used at sea is a naval dock recently unearthed at Lothal, in Gujarat. The yard’s dimensions are 710 feet long and about 120 feet broad. The measurements suggest that it might have been used either as a dock for large-sized sea-going vessels or as a boat pen for a number of smaller craft. There is overwhelming evidence that commercial contacts existed between the inhabitants of the Indus Valley and the peoples of countries abroad, such as Sumer, Egypt and Crete, not to mention others in Central Asia and Persia. Two questions arise from this : in the first place, could the trade relations have existed only through the plying of foreign ships to India ?; and, secondly, could the

commercial enterprise have been solely through traffic overland ? The answer to the first question is simple : it is true that ships of Crete, Egypt and Sumer were known to have been in operation and must have visited India, but it is equally true that similarly constructed ships were in existence in India as well. It will be hazardous to guess which of these nations first built ships of the kind that has been represented in the Harappa seal and the potsherd paintings of Mohenjo-Daro; but it is germane to our purpose to know that the Indus Valley Civilization did possess such ships. The ship portrayed in the seal and paintings exhibits a predominantly raised bow and stern which shows a marked similarity to the representations found in the early pottery of Egypt, the Minoan seals and the cylinders of Sumer. As regards the second question, however, it is difficult to make a definite statement; it is not easy to say if all, or part, or none, of the merchandise went by sea. Some tentative conclusions can be, however, drawn from the size and the shape of the craft in use. The ship is shown as having a mast and yard, and another has a cabin at midship with a man at the helm. Therefore, there is some indication that they were sea-going, particularly the latter type. The question is best answered in the words of Sir Mortimer Wheeler who sums up thus : “These may be river-craft, but there is no reason to suppose that similar small ships were less venturesome than the Arab dhows of to-day, and coastal traffic up the Persian Gulf would give a context of a near-coastal Harappan site such as Sutkagen-dor, 300 miles west of Karachi.”1 Dr Mackay, however, thinks that the Indus Valley was in touch with Sumer and Elam via the sea also. In the opinion of Dr Sayce, commercial oceanic enterprise between India and Babylon must have existed as early as 3,000 B.C.2 Before we pass on to the Vedic Age, we may conclude that it is not baseless to infer that the prehistoric people of India ventured out to sea, and that regarding the Indus Valley Civilization there is evidence to indicate that maritime activity did exist to some extent. The Indus Valley, according to Vedic Age (2000 B.C to 500 B.C) most historians, was inhabited by a race of the Mediterranean type of people who came to be known as the Dravidians Historians think

that there was an ingress into India of a race of people known as the Aryans about 2,000 B.C. We shall now examine the impact of the Aryan civilization and analyse their maritime activity during the period known to history as the Vedic Age. Vedic literature is replete with references to boats, ships and sea voyages. The Rg Veda refers to Varuna, the Lord of the Sea, and credits him with the knowledge of the ocean routes which were used by ships.1 It is, indeed, appropriate that the Indian Navy of today should have adopted the motto, “O Lord Varuna, be tranquil.” The Rg Veda mentions merchants plying ships to foreign countries in quest of more wealth.2 The Brihat Samhita, an encyclopaedic work, states that the very existence and health of sailors are influenced by the moon. There is another reference to ships going to sea for gainful ends.3 The Rig Veda also states that the merchants knew no bounds, not even the oceans, and that they went everywhere in search of wealth.4 There is also a passage which refers to a ship which was well rigged in which Varuna and Vasishta sailed to the mid-ocean and describes the ship, rolling and pitching.5 There is yet another passage which gives a graphic account of a naval expedition undertaken by one Bhujyu, the son of King Tugra. The ship is stated to have been fitted with hundred oars. In the event Bhujyu was shipwrecked by a gale and was picked up by Asvins in their boat6 We find a prayer in the Rg Veda, “O Lord, take us in a ship across the oceans for our well-being.”7 “The Eastern and Western Oceans” are also referred to in the Rig Veda, which are evidently the. Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.8 Apart from these references, the Rig Veda contains a description of a vessel, known as plava, which was claimed to be hardy and storm-proof and which is said to have had “Wings” on its sides.9 The “Wings” were most probably an archaic version of the modern stabilizers. The Amarakosa contains various items of naval terminology, such as nau bandhana (anchorage or mooring),naukarana (helm or steering), and naukaranādhāra (helmsman).1 The Atharva Veda Samhita describes the boats of the time as riding well the waves and as being of faultless construction, sturdy and spacious.

The Purdnas refer to Arjuna of the Haihaya tribe as Sahas-rabdhu or the “thousand armed,” from which we may infer that what is meant was perhaps his fleet of a thousand ships. The Bhrigus, who formed a tribe contemporaneous with the Haihayas, are claimed to have been sea-farers of repute who had maritime intercourse with the Western world. The Atris, another contemporary clan credited with the knowledge of shipbuilding, are said to have built Sahasrabāhu’s fleet of thousand ships, or perhaps a ship with thousand oars. The Mārkandeya Purāna refers to seagoing vessels and the Varāha Purāna speaks of people sailing out to sea for getting pearls and oysters. In the epics, too, we have numerous passages which allude to the knowledge of countries overseas. In the Rāmāyaņa, one finds ślokas which mention several countries abroad, taken to be references to places such as China, Java and Sumatra, as the likely places for the concealment of Sita.2 In the same canto there are some indications of the preparation of a naval encounter, which remotely suggests that there was some knowledge of naval engagements. Also, in the Mahābhārata, Drōna Parva, there are some references to mariners and to passages on the ocean, and in Sānti Parva the Navy is described as one of the divisions (angas) of the military force.3 From Sabhā Parva we learn that Sahadeva effectively crossed the seas to subjugate the outlying islands inhabited by tribes of mixed origin.4 The Baudhāyana Dharmśāstra mentions “samudra samya-nam” which means “oceanic voyage.” Despite these references in the Rg Veda, the Purānas, the epics and the śāstras, some foreign historians hold the view that there is no certain proof of oceanic navigation during the Rig Vedic period. Their argument is that terms like masts, sails, rudder and anchor, which are associated with oceanic navigation, are lacking in the Rig Veda; and that the mouth of the Indus, so convenient oceanic enterprise, was not made use of. On the other hand, there are other European scholars like Max Miiller, Zimmer and Lassen who claim that the ocean was known to the Rig Vedic people. Although there is difference of opinion, there seems to be overwhelming evidence in Vedic literature to conclude that to the Rig

Vedic people “the sea was undoubtedly known and there was probably some amount of sea-borne trade.”1 There is also evidence from sources other than the Vedas to show that maritime trade existed at least from the 6th century B.C., if not earlier. From the Bible it has been deduced by able historian, that about the 10th century B.C. merchandise from the ports of south India found their way to the territory of King Solomon. The excavations at Ur dating back to early times reveal Indian teak and cedar. The Bāveru and Suppāraka Jātakas, though perhaps written about 400 B.C., refer to an earlier period, 5th/6th century B.C., and they speak of oceanic navigation generally, and, in particular, to the shipping of peacocks by Indians to Babylon. Articles such as rice and satin cloth found their way to distant lands, as far back as the 10th century B.C., if not earlier. A study of etymology in respect of the word “satin” indicates that this traffic was by sea and not by the overland route via Persia. The Persians are known to change the letter “S” in Sanskrit into “H” We note that the word for “satin” is “sadain” in Hebrew and “sinthon” in Greek for the Sanskrit “sindhu,” which has reached the countries concerned without the verbal change normally undergone in Persia. Such derivative words in Greek, Hebrew, Latin and Spanish cati be traced for other articles of import from India, e.g., peacock, or “togai” in Tamil/Malayalam, is “tukim” in Hebrew and “tofos” in Greek. Also rice, or “arisi” in Tamil, is “arros” in Spanish, “oruza” in Greek and “oryza” in Latin. There are two incidents in the history of about this time which also prove the westward navigation of the Hindus. The first is the mention of some Hindus who reached Germany, seeking shelter from bad weather during the voyage. The other is the reference made to an Indian by name Subhanu (Sophon Indos) in the Greek inscription discovered between Berenice on the Red Sea coast and Edfu on the banks of the Nile. There is a reference in the Jātakas to the ingenious way by which navigators knew the direction of the coast by observing the movements of birds. There is thus both direct and indirect evidence to show that oceanic enterprise existed during this period. From the knowledge of

the type of ships of the time and other evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that sea voyages followed the coasts of Persia, Arabia and the shores of the Red Sea, but it is unlikely that a direct sea route to the African continent was established during this period.

2—Age of the Nandas and Mauryas From about the 5th century B.C., the Nandas enjoyed supremacy, and they were succeeded by the glorious Mauryas. It was in this age that India witnessed the invasion of Alexander, as also the gradual development of Hellenistic influence in the country. We shall now examine the maritime activity of this period. Greek and Roman literary records of Alexander’s campaign and contemporary events give abundant information of maritime intercourse and oceanic enterprise during the days of the Nanda and Mauryan empires. From Greek accounts it is evident that during Alexander’s invasion India was well acquainted with nautical affairs and with shipbuilding commensurate with the age. In the history of Alexander’s Indian campaign, we learn that he built a harbour at Patala where the Indus splits into two large branches. The Indus basin was geographically different from what we know it as today. Alexander wished to explore the western approach of the river Indus leading to the sea but his attempt was beset with difficulties owing to the characteristic bore tides in that area. It was mainly due to the assistance given by some local pilots that he managed to navigate and reach the sea. Alexander, during the preparation of his march back, came to know from Indians that there was a fairly straight sea route to Mesopotamia. Admiral Nearchus was given orders by Alexander to sail from the mouth of the Indus to the Euphrates. The Admiral acquired a flotilla of river boats, some of which were 30-oared, built in the Punjab by a tribe known as Ksatri (Xathroi), to make a sea voyage of nearly 1,500 miles. The fleet set sail along the, coast of the Persian Gulf and, despite gales and rough sea, reached Ormuz, which is a testimony to the hardy structure of the Indian-built boats of

those days. We quote Ballard’s commendation : “From a maritime standpoint its (the sea voyage of Nearchus) special interest lies in the proof that even twenty-three centuries before our time the seamen of the East were already quite familiar with the navigation of the Indian Ocean between India and Persia, and aware that at the proper season of the year a west-bound coasting voyage between these countries was safe and feasible even for river craft.”1 From the Greek classics we learn that commercial traffic between the Seleucid Empire and India was borne partly by the sea route via Gerrha on the west coast of Persian Gulf. From an Aramaic inscription of the 4th century B.C. one gleans the valuable information that a coasting trade route to Seleuceia through the Persian Gulf and thence via the Tigris existed during this period. This sea route had grown so convenient that the Mauryan epoch witnessed a great influx of a host of foreigners— traders, artisans, travellers and envoys. So large was this influx that we learn from Kautilya’s Artkaśāstra that a separate department had to be formed to look after their affairs and provide for their well-being. The Arthaśāstra throws light on the elaborate administrative system that existed during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya. It mentions, among other things, the establishment of a “War Office” consisting of a board of 30 officers, which was subdivided into six divisions, each comprising five members. One of the divisions mentioned is the “Admiralty.” We notice that the “Admiralty” was given the pride of place—it is the first division to be mentioned— which shows the importance given to it in Chandragupta’s administration. Under the department of the “Admiralty”, came a naval officer, nāvādhyaksa, whom Megas-thenes calls the “Superintendent of Ships.” The Arthasśāstra also codifies certain regulations to be followed in naval and mercantile marine affairs. It gave extreme powers to the Government for the destruction of craft which disobeyed the Port Laws or were scheduled to sail to enemy territory. The “Department of Navigation” was made responsible for the maintenance under Harbour Masters of harbours and harbour craft. Owners were given the facility to refit and repair their ships. Foreign ships that called at Maurya an harbours had to pay port dues at specified rates.

Kautilya differentiates between the river routes, coastal traffic routes and oceanic routes, and discusses their relative importance and advantages. Under loans for commercial ventures, the Arthaśāsira lays down 20 per cent as the rate of interest to be levied on seafaring merchants. There is definite indication in the Arthśāstra that not only did the Mauryans have a mercantile fleet but also seagoing naval vessels,: for the “Department of Navigation” was charged also with the protection of passengers and merchandise against the marauding pirates at large. We also learn from the same work that a “Superintendent of Ocean Mines” existed; this proves the interest that the Mauryas took in the exploration of ocean-beds in general, and pearl-fishery in particular; Government boats were lent on hire for the purpose. During the Mauryan Age the State employed on payment Indian artisans such as shipbuilders, armament manufacturers and even sailors, who were considered a privileged class and who enjoyed certain concessions in the matter of paying taxes to the State. This is borne out by Megasthenes and the works of Arrian and Diodorus. Strabo observes that shipbuilding was a monopoly of the Mauryan State. Pliny mentions that some of the ships weighed 75 tons. There seems to have been a variety of boats and craft to suit their needs. There were boats made of timber, of bamboo, baskets covered by skin, inflated leather bags, etc. The big vessels of wooden structure put to sea, and the other varieties were used for crossing the rivers and for transporting men and material through internal waterways. It is evident that Mauryan India had all the materials necessary for the construction of hardy seagoing, seaworthy vessels. We learn from Strabo that a Mauryan sailor, who had drifted in his boat to the Red Sea coast, offered his services to pilot interested Egyptians to India. Travelling was encouraged, and paid passengers could use Government vessels. Both private and Government vessels plied the oceans and rivers. There was an abundance of overseas trade, and the comity of nations prevailed. There were good diplomatic relations between the Mauryan Empire and the House of Seleucus. We know that foreign ambassadors such as Megasthenes and Deimachos were sent to the Court of the Mauryan Emperors. During the feign of Ptolemy

Philadelphus of Egypt, an embassy was sent to the Mauryan Court. There was exchange of diplomatic relations with these foreign countries, and Indians went abroad as ambassadors of their country. The story of the glory of the Mauryan Age will be incomplete without a mention of the famous reign of Asoka, who sent out missionaries to spread the message of Buddhism. There is evidence of Asoka’s son Mahendra and daughter Sanghamitra having sailed from Tamralipti to Ceylon, a southern coasting voyage off the entire east coast of India, with the intention of converting the Ceylonese to Buddhism. The edicts of Asoka and other records bear testimony to the travels of his missionaries to far-off lands in Western Asia, Egypt and Eastern Europe. The inscriptions of Asoka mention the names of foreign rulers whose lands were sought by Buddhist preachers to propagate their religion. Admittedly some of these missionaries went via the land route; nevertheless, Aśoka evidently continued to maintain a fleet which assisted in the wide religious and diplomatic relations which the emperor so efficiently established. The historian Mr V. A. Smith is of the opinion that Aśoka should have had a seagoing fleet in view of his dealings with Ceylon as well as with other countries overseas.1 Bodhisattvāvadāna Kalpalatā of Ksemendra alludes to maritime trade during Aśoka’s reign.2 In 256 B.C., Asoka was engaged in a war with the Kalingas, a reputed maritime power of the time. Aśoka ultimately conquered their kingdom, from which fact we may perhaps deduce that he had also a navy. The first authentic proof of Indian influence in the Mediterranean region is revealed by the excavation at Memphis, dating back to 200 B.C., where an Indian figurine of an Aryan woman has been unearthed. This discovery leads us to conclude that Indian culture had spread to countries overseas as far back as 200 B.C., if not earlier. It is thus evident that the age of the Nandas and the Mauryas witnessed an epoch of an extensive maritime activity that brought other nations closer to India, and spread our trade and with it our culture and religious beliefs in countries overseas. The wise policy of international comity and friendship established in the Mauryan Age laid the foundations for the building up of a lasting Indian trade with

overseas countries in the later ages. Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri concludes, “It is not unreasonable to suppose that these favourable conditions were attended with phenomenal development of industry as well as inland and foreign trades of the empire under Maurya rule.”1

3—The Andhra-Kushan Period The Satavahana dynasty (the Andhras) were reigning supreme in the south about the 2nd century B.C., while the north was dominated by the Kushans who came to prominence about the 1st century a.d. During this period Roman influence on India was at its peak. There is ample evidence to show intimate commercial intercourse between the Andhra Kingdom and the Roman Empire. There was such a great demand for Indian items of luxury that the gold coins of the Roman Empire, paid for the goods, poured into the country in remarkable quantities. This is proved by the Roman coins found in abundance more in the south than in the north. That the Andhras maintained a fleet is proved by incontrovertible numismatic evidence. The coins minted during the reigns of Pulumayi and Yagnasri show, on the obverse, representations of sailing ships with two masts. These coins were found in abundance in Tondamandalam, which appears to have belonged to the Satavahana empire. The people of these parts were known as “Tiraiyar” which literally means “sea-people.” It is believed that some of these coins were minted to proclaim some naval victory of the Andhras. It was during this period that coasting voyages from the West Coast of India towards the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea coasts underwent a phenomenal change. The discovery of the monsoon winds, attributed to Hippalus in 45 a.d., shortened these long and tedious coastal routes and brought in a nearer oceanic route which took advantage of the seasonal winds. The discovery attributed to Hippalus has recently been questioned by certain scholars who base their argument on a story related by Strabo. According to this version

an Indian sailor stranded on the shores of the Arabian Sea reached Alexandria and revealed the sea route to India. Based on this information, Eudoxus of Cyzicus was ordered by Euergetus II to set out to India, in which the former succeeded; he then returned to his country and repeated the journey. Prof. Nilakanta Sastri says, “It has been recently suggested on good grounds that the discovery of the monsoon attributed to Hippalus in the literary records was made by Eudoxus himself who probably derived his information from the stranded Indian merchant and undertook his first expedition with his help.”1 Be that as it may, the famous discovery effected a revolutionary change in oceanic sailing. The monsoons, now so well known to sailors, recur at regular intervals. The “trade winds,” as they have come to be known, blow for a period of six months from one quarter, and for the next six months from the opposite quarter. It was found that they occurred from four quarters : the southwest, north-east, south-east and the north-west, and that the winds were restricted between certain degrees of latitudes. It thus helped the sailors to proceed with their satis spread in the favourable direction of the wind and return home six months later, with the contrary wind. The only drawback the sailors faced was that the monsoons brought in their wake squally weather; the ocean voyages were, therefore, hazardous adventures. With this discovery, the multi-oared galleys gave place to ships with sail. Gradually bigger and bigger ships with more and more square-rigged sails came to be built. Even to this day we see the Indian sail boats and the dhows, the Arab counterparts, gracefully sailing the seas laden with cargo, utilizing the trade winds. Thus the discovery of the trade winds opened new vistas in ocean navigation, and the volume of maritime commerce grew during this period; even 165 years prior to this, it is well to note, Indian colonization of islands beyond, such as Socotra, the Sanskrit name of which was Sukhadara, had taken place. In the Kushan period there was extensive contact with foreign countries in general, and the Hellenistic world in particular. There was thus a marked Greek influence. It was so preponderant that we find Kanishka using the Greek alphabet in some of his inscriptions

and Vasudeva, the last of the Kushans, using only the Greek alphabet for his writings. Thus there were cultural and economic ties. A mine of information during this period is contained in the remarkable work, Periplus of the Erythrcean Sea. The work left by an unknown Greek writer gives the author’s personal views of his visit to India in the 1st century a.d., and it contains valuable material in regard to trade and the maritime activity of the country. At the commencement of the account it describes the mouth of the Indus as being shallow and difficult for safe navigation. We learn that at the mouth of the Indus was Barbari-cum, a seaport. From here the account traces the ports of Saurashtra, and across the Gulf of Cambay, the famous port ot Broach. From the last-mentioned port, the Periplus describes the land as the “beginning of the Kingdom of Nambanus and all India,” which is interpreted as that of the Andhra Empire. The Periplus also mentions the difficulties of navigation up to Broach and how there were arrangements for piloting vessels into the port. Government pilot-vessels met foreign ships at the mouth of the river Narmada and led them to moorings in established basins. The work lists a series of ports studded all along the coast. During the period covered by the work there were numerous ports which were centres of trade, and sea-borne commerce between India and the outside world had by then developed by leaps and bounds. The main articles of export were precious stones, spices, pearls, perfumes, etc. With this increase in trade activity, political relations also came to be established, particularly so between India and the Roman Empire, and Indians lived in Alexandria in large numbers. An analysis of Roman coins in India shows that the commercial contacts evidently began from the period of Augustus and continued to flourish till 217 a.d. to the days of Caracalla. The decline of this trade can be attributed partly to the decline of the Andhras resulting in the disruption of a politically unified south India, as well as the extinction of the Kushan Empire. The eclipse of this trade was also due to the fact that the Sassanian power in Persia, to some degree, interrupted the Roman-Indian commercial sea lanes. The Sassanids monopolized the sea route via the Persian Gulf, usurped the trade,

of the Arabs and reached out to the Indian Ocean and beyond as far as China. Nevertheless, it was the interest that the Mauryas and the Andhras took in maritime activity that paved the way to Indian colonization of the Indonesian Archipelago and other surrounding islands in the succeeding era.

II

THE HINDU PERIOD I—North Indian Hindu Dynasties In this section we shall deal with the reign of the Imperial Guptas, followed by that of Harshavardhana and the Gurjara Pratiharas who are well known in history for their naval exploits. Other Hindu kingdoms of the north such as the Chandels and the Chauhans are relatively unimportant from our point of view until we come to the Palas of Bengal when we notice a revival of maritime activity. It was under the Guptas and Harsha that we see the partial colonization of Burma and Malacca. We get some information of Indian maritime enterprise from Fa-Hien and Hiuen Tsang, the Chinese travellers who visited the country during this period. We also learn from the Allahabad Pillar inscription composed by Harisena, the “warrior poet” of Samud-ragupta, and from some famous works of Kalidasa much about the reign of the Guptas. Samudragupta, during the course of his empire building, set out on a big military expedition towards the south annexing, as he progressed, territories along the east coast of India and penetrated down to the Kingdom of the Pallavas. In addition to conquering the mainland along the coast, he is known to have subjugated the adjoining islands. In the opinion of R. C. Majumdar, “The march along the coast suggests a joint operation by the navy.” He adds that “although there is no definite proof of this, we know that many islands in the Indian Ocean were either conquered by the great Gupta monarch, or submitted to him out of fear, thus clearly indicating his possession of a powerful navy.”1 The Allahabad praśasti alludes to the Gupta emperor’s conquest of several islands. Samudragupta is also known to have had contacts outside India. Historians have gathered from Chinese sources that during Samudragupta’s reign, Meghavarna, the King of Ceylon, sent to his

court an embassy which sought permission to construct a Buddhist monastery at Bodh Gaya : it has been established that the “Mahabodhi Vihara” was erected by the Ceylonese. Chandragupta II, also known as Vikramaditya, followed in the footsteps of his father Samudragupta, by more annexations of territory and the consolidation of the vast Gupta empire, which extended from the Himalayas to the Narmada, and laterally from Bengal to northern Gujarat and Kathiawar. He achieved this by the subjugation of petty chiefs in the east, and by a crushing blow liquidating the last of the Saka Satraps, Rudrasimha, in the west. Thus, in his reign several ports in the east and the west wore opened, as it were, to allow a free flow of commercial traffic from inland emporia. The ports of Dwarka, Porbandar, Verawal, Ghogha and Cambay were soon full of goods from manufacturing centres of the interior in the north, which in turn greatly revived maritime trade with European and African countries. These ports were made available for the export of goods in Indian and foreign bottoms. A significant change in the flow of traffic overland also came about, in that petty principalities en route from the north to the sea coast could not impose local taxes on these goods as hitherto, owing to their allegiance to Vikramaditya. The European trade which so far had been mostly a monopoly of south India began to be shared gradually by north India. The increase in overseas trade can be easily deduced from the tremendous inflow of foreign gold and the remarkable number of trade guilds that were in existence. At Vaisali, no fewer than 274 specimens of seals have been discovered by Bloch, all of which contained the inscription “Sresthi-Sartthavaha-Kulika-Nigama,” meaning “the Corporation of bankers, traders (and) merchants.” Most of these seals seem to have been used to authenticate con tracts drawn up by the corporation. Fa-Hien, who visited India in 399 a.d., has given an eyewitness account of Gupta India. With the expansion of overseas commerce the Gupta period witnessed an era of general prosperity, economic progress, cultural extension, artistic attainment and architectural advancement. The Gupta ascendancy was maintained and the

prosperity of the era continued till the end of the reign of Skandagupta. Kalidasa’s Raghuvamsa, a contemporary Sanskrit work of fame of Vikramaditya’s reign, is replete with references to ships and boats. The work describes the conquest of Bengal as having been accomplished under the protection of a fleet.1 Remarkable progress in astronomy was achieved during this period. Aryabhata and Varahamihira are known in history as great astronomers. The celestial bodies began to be accurately mapped and the art of oceanic navigation by rough and ready computation of position from known stars was introduced. It is of interest to note that the plotting of the starry sky had been accomplished even before the discovery of the magnetic compass. The “Matsya Yantra,” the crude fore-runner of the modern magnetic compass, was discovered by the Hindus shortly after. Ballard, in this connection, pays this great tribute to Oriental seamen : “Ages before the races of Europe had emerged from the primitive barbarism in their cloudy climate, where the study of the stars is always comparatively difficult, the Orientals knew quite enough about these permanent finger-posts of nature to use them with confidence for crossing the sea.”2 Coming down to the period of Harshavardhana, we are told that he had very cordial diplomatic relations with China. Hiuen Tsang visited the country during this period and Harsha reciprocated by sending an envoy to China. Then came another mission headed by Wang-hiuen-tse. Thus, there was close and intimate overseas contact between these two countries. Harsha is also known to have maintained a fleet. With the fall of Harsha, however, we notice the decadence of the imperial unity of India which caused a set-back in the unified commercial enterprise and affluent trade which existed in the Gupta-Harsha era. Inscriptions during the period of Jivitagupta II credit him with the possession of a fleet of war boats which formed part of his army. According to Hiuen Tsang, during this period the King of Assam maintained a fleet of 3,000 sail. About 600 a.d., the Saka Kings of Gujarat, who foresaw the impending decline of their kingdoms, started to look for refuge outside India and made preparations to colonize Java. A formidable

fleet set sail from the shores of Gujarat and reached the west coast of Java. The fleet brought a host of colonials from the Gur-jara territory. This was the first wave of colonists from the Westb Coast of India to have settled in Java and contributed in a large measure to the spreading of Indian art and culture. About the 8th century a.d., we find some interesting anecdotes which bring out some naval exploits off Sind and Kathiawar coasts. The Arabs belonging to the empire of the Caliph used to raid India not only by land but also by sea. We hear that in 712 a.d. some Muslim refugees were being evacuated from Ceylon to Iraq by sea and that the ship was waylaid by Indian pirates operating off the coast of Sind. To avenge this act, Hajaj, the Governor of Iraq, prevailed on the Caliph to send a sea-borne expedition which was mounted from Oman. The raid was directed towards Debal, a seaport of Sind, but it was crushed by the efficient forces of Dahar, the King of Sind. This was perhaps the first sea-borne operation in history that was launched against India by an alien power. In 756 a.d. when the Saindhava Chief, Pushyadeva of Jayadratha dynasty, was ruling a State in Kathiawar under the Pratihara Empire, there was a sea-borne invasion of Sind by the Arabs. They were repulsed by the Saindhava Navy. In 776 a.d. yet another naval onslaught was launched by the Arabs but only to be defeated once and for all by the Saindhava fleet; the Arabs thereafter never dared to attack India by sea. The Saindhavas were reputed for their naval supremacy in the peninsular seas and bore the title aparasamudrādhipati, i.e. “Masters of the Western Sea.” A Saindhava inscription bears testimony to these naval actions. R. C. Majumdar sums up the record of their naval supremacy thus : “The credit of saving India from Arab invasion by sea justly belongs to the Saindhavas, who are chiefly remarkable as being one of the few powers in ancient India with a distinguished record of naval exploits.”1 Until the end of the Imperial Gupta rule, Bengal remained a vassal State, but subsequently the Palas came to play a notable part in maritime affairs. The Jātakas have recorded the voyages of merchants sailing from Campa on the Ganga to Suvarnabhumi, taken by historians to denote in general, Burma, the Malay Peninsula

and the Indonesian Archipelago. This is corroborated by the statement in the Periplus of the Erythrcean Sea, where the author has alluded to such voyages from Bengal. Kalidasa refers to the monarchs of Bengal possessing oceangoing vessels. There is evidence of shipbuilding activity in 531 a.d. during the reign of Dharmaditya; this can be inferred from a copperplate grant referring to the term, nāvatakṣeni. Tam-ralipti in Bengal was an important overseas trading port and many voyages started from there. During the period of Dharmapala (770-815 a.d.) we find in his Khalimpur copper-plate grant, reference to officials such as Naukādhyaksa, Tarika and Saulkika, which designations have been respectively interpreted as “Inspector of Fleet,” “Overseer of ferries, tolls and forests” and “Customs Officer.” Evidently intimate contacts existed between the Sailendras, who were the Hindu rulers of Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago, and the Palas of Bengal. Evidence of religious and cultural contacts between these two Kingdoms is not difficult to find. Devapala of the Pala dynasty, in the first half of the 9th century a.d., gave permission to the Sailendras to build a Buddhist monastery at Nalanda, which is borne out by the copper-plate grant of this period. Architectural likeness between the famous stupa at Borobudur in Java and the monastery at Paharpur in Bengal also point to this fact. R. K. Mookerji says, “At Kedah (in Malaya) has been found an inscription mentioning a great Captain of Navigation (mahānāvika), Buddha Gupta, who hailed from Rangamati of Murshidabad District in West Bengal.”1 Thus we see that quite a fair amount of interest in maritime affairs was taken by the Imperial Guptas and their Hindu successors of the north. It is, however, to be noted that their dominant aim was to grapple with the incessant external aggression overland, such as they had from the Huns and the Arabs. They also had innumerable internal dissensions creating domestic problems which they invariably settled by land battles. These reasons precluded their making adequate progress in maritime activity.

2—South Indian Hindu Dynasties We have seen that from time immemorial south India had played a preponderant part in maritime affairs. As far back as 1000 B.C., we know that contacts existed between south India and other countries overseas, such as Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine. Sylvain Levi has adduced evidence to show that sea routes to the East from south Indian ports were common knowledge many centuries before Christ. All along the peninsular coast innumerable ports of ancient origin had sprung up and become centres of overseas trade. That the Dravidian civilization in the first century B.C. maintained very close maritime trade relations with the Roman Empire is quite evident. The Arikamedu excavations, near Pondicherry on the east coast, not only point to this fact but also reveal that the civilization which existed was cosmopolitan in character with marked Roman influence. The existence of a flourishing trade is corroborated by Pliny who estimates Indian income to be to the tune of £,70,000 per annum. The Aryans from the north drifted south Farther India between 600 B.C and 400 B.C., and by about the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D. they had extended their influence even beyond the shores of India and reached distant lands such as the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago. Communication with the outside world was predominantly across the seas. Even before this period, trade connections were in existence with countries overseas. The Jātaka stories are full of accounts of merchant ships bound for Suvarnabhumi (gold land) in search of wealth and, of trading voyages undertaken by adventurous seafarers. How difficult and perilous sea voyage could have been in those days can be judged from a Chinese source, in the statement of Kang Tai that a journey from India to Suvarnabhumi and back took three to four years. During the period of the Satavahana dynasty the fables contained in the Kathāsaritsāgara and other such sources relate instances of ships sailing to Kataha or Kataha-dwipa, which is the Kedah of today

in Malaya. The stories refer to journeys by merchants to Karpuradwipa (Camphor Island), and Suvaraa (Sumatra). Ptolemy has made a reference to Chryse Chora (Golden Land). Thus, there was quite an intimate knowledge of these islands of the Far East; and flourishing trade relations existed. By the first and second centuries a.d sea voyages that took Indians abroad for commerce and trade, naturally led to political activities and subsequent colonization of the Far East. The Malay Peninsula occupied a vantage position in the maritime trade. It is, therefore, natural that this part of Farther India should have attracted Indian merchants in the first instance; beyond, Funan (Kambuja), a portion of Indo-China, witnessed Hindu colonization in the first century a.d. R. C. Majumdar states, “There is no doubt that the Malay Peninsula served as the main gate of the Indian colonial expansion in the Far East. Takkola, modern Takua Pa, was the first landing stage of the Indian traders and colonists. From this some followed an all-sea route along the coast, but many passed through the narrow Isthmus of Kra directly to the opposite coast round the Bay of Bandon, and then proceeded further East, by land or sea, to Siam, Cambodia, and Annam."1 We shall now proceed to study more of this process of settlement which emanated predominantly from peninsular India. We have seen in the last chapter the maritime the Pallavas supremacy of the Andhras. After the decline of the Satavahana dynasty, the command of the sea passed to the Pallavas whose influence over the Hindu colonial kingdoms of Farther India was indeed remarkable. The spread of the Sanskrit language to the Hindu colonies in the Far East is attributed to the efforts of the Pallavas. The inscriptions, as well as the architecture, found in Kambuja (Cambodia) and Java are Pallava in character. The religious cult of Saivism permeated Kambuja through Pallava influence. Colonial enterprise across the Bay of Bengal is quite noticeable, and the cultural, religious and linguistic affiliations lead us to the inescapable conclusion that the colonization in all probability emanated from the early Pallava regions of south India. The Kasakudi plates refer to the successful naval expedition which was launched against Ceylon by Simhavishnu, the Pallava

king, ruling roughly between the years 575 a.d. to 600 a.d. The later Pallava monarchs found themselves drawn into the confused politics of Ceylon. Narasimhavarman I, during his reign from 630 a.d. to 668 a.d., was approached by Manavarma of Ceylon for help in regaining the latter’s power in the island. The former readily agreed because Manavarma was his ally in defeating Pulakesin II, an early Chalukya king. After the first abortive naval expedition in consort with Manavarma, Narasimhavarman successfully launched a second one and Manavarma occupied the island. The Kasakudi plates eulogize this naval expedition and call it a more laudable conquest than even of Rama’s.1 He was a great Pallava king and he had the foresight to build a naval base at Mamallapuram, some thirty miles south of Madras. Nagapattinam, farther south on the east coast, also served as a Pallava naval base. It could be inferred from the Vayalur Pillar inscription that Narasimhavarman II, during his reign from 680 a.d. to 720 a.d., conquered the Laccadive Islands. During his reign there was a flourishing maritime trade, and he also sent an embassy to China. Nandivarman III, an able Pallava, who ruled for 22 years from about 840 a.d., is known to have maintained a powerful naval force. He evidently had close overseas contact, for there is an inscription at Takua Pa in Pallava characters where a temple was named after him. It appears that Nripatunga, a Pallava of late 9th century a.d., helped the Pandyan king, Sri Mara, to invade Ceylon; this proves the naval supremacy of the Pallavas even so late. Before we leave the Pallava period and pass on to the other dynasties of the south, it may be noted that the Pallavas generally showed remarkable awareness of maritime affairs in spite of their preoccupation with contemporary south Indian kingdoms, with some of which they had to contend on land. Another interesting point to note is that despite these incessant wars maritime trade went on unabated and that commercial prosperity continued. The traditional antagonists of the Pallavas were the Chaluyas Chalukyas who rose to power during the 6th century a.d. Mangalesa, son of Pulakesin I, who ruled between a.d. 597 and 608, is credited with having captured the

island of Revati by mounting a naval expedition, according to the Nilgunda plates of Vikramaditya VI. Pulakesin II was by far the most famous Chalukya in the annals of history. During his reign from about 609 a.d. to 642 A.D. he built up a formidable navy and his kingdom was considered a great maritime power. The activities of the Chalukya naval power were in the main belligerent rather than pacific. With the help of his navy, Pulakesin II besieged the island of Puri, the present Elephanta Island near Bombay. The Aihole inscription bears testimony to this naval action in which over a hundred vessels of his fleet are stated to have taken part. By defeating the Mauryas of Konkan and by subjugating Malwa and Gujarat, he built up a formidable empire with a long sea-board which facilitated his oceanic enterprise. The strong navy so well established by Pulakesin II was evidently maintained even after his death, for we notice that Vinayaditya emulated his grandfather’s naval aggressiveness and subjugated Ceylon. This is borne out from the Kendur plate’s eulogy by Vinayaditya’s grandson, Kirtivarman II. It will be appropriate to examine here the glorious Kalingas part played by the Kalingas in the shaping of the maritime history of India. Indeed, they were responsible for having initiated the adventurous spirit of colonizing Java. It is known that Kalinga seafarers made a bold oceanic voyage and managed to land at Java as early as 75 a.d. Having landed, they settled in the island, built up their colonies and developed regular trade with the mainland of India. This marked the beginning of an era of Hindu civilization in this area of the Far East. There are not only the legendary chronicles of the “Klings” (Kalingas) having colonized Java; there is also inscriptional and architectural evidence in those regions. Some historians have tried to prove that the initial colonization of Java emanated from Gujarat. They base their argument on a legend which lends support to the tale in the chronicles of Java that a prince, Aji Saka, is believed to have gone to the island from India in 75 a.d. Radha Kumud Mookerji observes : “This story was perhaps invented only to show the connection of the ancient royal dynasty of Java with the Saka kings of northern India.”1 We have already

discussed the further colonization of Java by the Saka Kings of Gujarat in 600 A.D. There is no doubt that from as far back as 75 A.D., if not earlier, the Hindus began to make a descent on the Indonesian Archipelago and eventually left the imprint of Hindu civilization, Indian art and architecture, Hindu and Buddhist religious customs and manners. The island of Bali, situated east of Java, which place the author visited twice, shows that even to this day there exist visible signs of old Hindu culture and civilization. In Java we find that the Buddhist religion has exerted profound influence. In the Borobudur temple in Java one finds various fine sculptured representations of Indian ships in relief. One such sculpture portrays the perilous voyage of the Prince of Gujarat to the shores of Java. Radha Kumud Mookerji, after extensive research in this subject, remarks : “There are other ships which appear to be sailing tempest-tossed on the ocean, fully trying the pluck and dexterity of the oarsmen, sailors, and pilots, who, however, in their movements and looks impress us with the idea that they are quite equal to the occasion.”1 As mentioned earlier, the “Klings” continued to maintain their contact with the motherland. The Chilka lake in modern Orissa served as excellent anchorage in the days of the Kalingas, and from Palura on the Kalinga coast many a ship set sail to the cast. Kalidasa makes frequent references to the Kalinga porta at which vessels with shiploads of spices were anchored. The poet also alludes to the Kalinga capital being situated on the seashore and describes Hemangada, a Kalinga king, as the “Lord of Mahendragiri and Mahodadhi,” the latter of which connotes the “Great Sea.” The Kalingas were not only known to have exerted influence in the Far East; they also maintained overseas contacts nearer home with Ceylon. It is believed that Hemamala, a Kalinga princess, fled from Dantapura, carrying to Ceylon for safety the “tooth relic” of the Buddha. It is also known that some ruling Kalinga families emigrated to Ceylon for refuge as their kingdom was under Yavana rule. Until the arrival of the Cholas on the scene of south Indian maritime history and the Sri Vijaya Kings in Farther India, the Kalingas played an important maritime role and left the vestiges of

their civilization and oceanic enterprise fully imprinted on the annals of history. The spread of Hindu kingdoms in the Far East Sri Vijaya Kings wag gaining ground with little opposition from the sons of the soil. The earliest kingdom of the Hindus to be founded in Sumatra was that of Sri Vijaya. From the humble beginnings of the dynasty about the 4th century a.d., it expanded into a great naval and important commercial power by the end of the 7th century a.d. By a series of island-hopping the Sri Vijaya Empire extended its sway from Sumatra to Western Java and peninsular Malaya. By achieving the control of the Malacca Strait it attained supremacy of the Indian Ocean in the east, until the rise of the Sailendras in Farther India, a great naval power of the time which came to dispute Sri Vijaya’s command of the sea. With their powerful navy, the Sri Vijaya Kings saw to it that the seas were free from piracy and that trade was flourishing between India and their Empire. They had very close ties with the Indian kingdoms on the east coast, notably with the Kalinga monarchs. With Malacca firmly in their hands they had effective control over all shipping in the area, and the sea trade with China became more or less their monopoly. Though the Sri Vijaya Empire was a power based outside India, their names, customs, institutions, commercial corporations, etc., were all similar to those of south India, thus proving beyond doubt their Indian origin. The Sailendra dynasty wrested power from the Sailend as Kingdom of Sri Vijaya and established themselves in Java by 782 a.d. By the end of the 8th century a.d., Sumatra, Java and the Malay Peninsula came under the sway of the Sailendras and this brought about the unification of the Hindu Kingdoms in Suvarnadvipa. They also tried to annex Champa. The Java fleet now and again stormed the “Hinduized” kingdom of Annam in Indo-China. These exploits, though not fruitful to the Sailendras, show how powerful their navy was. Masudi, an Arab writer, remarks in 943 a.d., on the extent of the Sailendra Empire : “Even the most rapid vessels could not complete in two years a tour round the isles.” The Sailendras, within a century or so of their arrival

on the scene of Indonesian history, emerged as one of the most outstanding naval powers in the East. The only other power which dared to question the naval supremacy of the Sailendras was the Chola whose exploits cover a period of nearly 100 years. The Sailendras, having secured most of the islands in the Indian Ocean except Ceylon, wanted to annex it. Chandrabhanu, the Sailendra monarch, made two attempts in 1236 a.d. and 1256 a.d. at invading the island, which ultimately proved a costly venture. Sardar K. M. Panikkar observes : “The great expeditions of Chandrabhanu, involving a combined action of many thousand soldiers and hundreds of ships across the Bay of Bengal, constitute the last chapter in Hindu oceanic supremacy.”1 We shall now pass on to the three Chera, Chola and Pandya peninsular maritime kingdoms—Chera, Chola and Pandya. The great interest taken by them in maritime affairs to a degree unsurpassed by the contemporaneous kingdoms of the north is but natural if one considers the peninsular character of the south. A maritime power that rose to pre-eminence were the Cholas Cholas who had established their kingdom in the south several centuries before Christ. They began with a modest kingdom bounded by the Coromandel coast in the east, the rivers South Pennar in the north and Vellar in the south, and the Coorg borders in the west. Although the Pallavas to a certain extent confined the Cholas within their traditional boundaries, Chola aggressiveness backed by a formidable army and navy broke the bounds. Chola power expanded not only on land but also over the seas. The famous seaport Kaveripattinam was the hub of their oceanic activity. Puhar, as it was also known, was at the mouth of the river Kaveri. We have a description of the port, which later became also the Chola capital, in the Periplus of the Erythræan Sea which refers to it as Kamara, and it is given in Ptolemy’s Geography as Khaberis mouth. The citadel was built on the banks of the river by the constructive genius of Karikala Chola and it served not only as a base but also as a great commercial seaport. In those days the river approaches were sufficiently deep to permit ships of large draughts

to enter and tie up close to the harbour. There were such facilities as stevedoring, customs clearance, storehousing, money exchanges and the like; the import and export trade was brisk and the prosperous city was bustling with commercial activity. Pattinappaālai, one of the Tamil Sangam poems, gives us an elaborate description of the port, as well as its imports and exports, which fact is corroborated by the Periplus, as also by the other Tamil work Silappadikāram. Here is an extract : “Horses were brought from distant lands beyond the seas, pepper was brought in ships, gold and precious stones came from the northern mountains, sandal and akir came from the eastern seas; as also were the produce of the regions watered by the Ganges, all that is grown on the banks of the Kaveri, articles of food from Ilam (Ceylon) and the manufactures of Kala-kam, etc.”1 With such activity in the port which brought in many foreigners as traders, sailors and middlemen, a separate section of the town, state the same Tamil works, was set aside for their occupation. As briefly mentioned earlier, the Cholas had introduced a system of customs clearance in their ports. Pattinappālai and Silappadikāram refer to the administrative facility that was in force in those days in this respect. The goods were received, appraised and cleared under the seal of the tiger insignia of the Chola king. If there was any unavoidable delay in the appraisal, the goods were stored in the dockyard securely in the warehouses of the Government.1 The other port facility afforded to navigation by night was the provision of a row of lighthouses. Silappadikāram mentions the practice of the earlier Cholas of placing clay oil lamps atop palmyra trees at their ports; later on they built lighthouses in brick and mortar. With the backing of such administrative facilities, the Cholas not only carried on a thriving maritime trade but were also able to maintain an armada of ships and assert their supremacy on the high seas by the end of the ninth century a.d. The relations of the Cholas with The Cholas versusthe Sinhalese the Ceylon kings were, in the main, hostile. The maritime power of the Sinhalese was strained to the utmost in grappling with the incessant naval attacks by the formidable Chola fleet. From the days of

Karikala Chola, about 150 a.d., when he was credited with having successfully invaded Ceylon, till the decline of the Chola age, some parts or the whole of the island came under the Cholas at different stages, with the pendulum of power swinging between the Sinhalese and Cholas. Parantaka I, the Chola King ruling between a.d. 907 and 953, who subjugated the Pandyas and the Sinhalese, assumed the title, “Conqueror of Madura and Ceylon,” after waging a series of successful wars. His successor continued his predecessor’s policy of aggrandizement and set out a naval expedition in 959 a.d. against Ceylon. The wars with Ceylon went on unabated till the 13th century a.d., save for a brief spell during the reign of Kulo-ttunga Chola. Rajaraja the Great, son of Parantaka II, who ruled between 985 and 1014 a.d., became the paramount monarch of south India by conquering territories with his army and naval forces. The fleet of the Cheras was destroyed by his navy off Kandalur on the West Coast. He not only conquered Quilon, Orissa and other contiguous territories, but also annexed the Laccadive and Maldive group of islands. This is borne out by the Tanjore inscriptions at the end of which a statement credits him with having acquired “the twelve thousand ancient islands of the sea.” His fleet attacked Ceylon and occupied the northern half of the island, as eulogized in the Tiruvalangadu plates. During the reign of Rajaraja not The cholas versus the Sailendras only were friendly relations maintained between the Buddhist monarchy of the Sailendras and the Hindu kingdom of Cholas, but also commercial comity. The religious tolerance of the Cholas is borne out by the fact that die Sailendra king Chudamani Varman was permitted by Rajaraja in 1005 a.d. to build a Buddhist vihara on Chola soil at Nagapattinam. In the event, the vihara was completed by Chudamani Varman’s son, Sri Mara Vijayatunga Varman, and all this is clear from Chola inscriptions. It is, however, unfortunate that such good relations did not last long. Rajendra Chola, also known as Gangaikonda Chola, son of Rajaraja the Great, who reigned for 30 glorious years from 1014 a.d., witnessed an outbreak of hostilities with the Sailendras which

continued for another 50 years after his death. To start with, he successfully attacked Ceylon and annexed the whole island. He also annexed the Kalinga territory and conquered the whole of the eastern coast up to the mouth of the Ganges. He mounted a naval expedition on the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands and occupied it, which group served him as an advanced naval base. Rajendra Chola had the virtual control of the eastern coast of India, which was studded with naval ports and a variety of ships. The overwhelming logistic support that he commanded gave him the initiative to wrench Kedah, a strategic entrepot, the focal point of commerce between the West and the Far East. Emboldened by a series of naval successes, Rajendra’s formidable armada set sail from the Chola shores and went in to attack the Sailendras’ vast empire. After successfully engaging the opposing navy, the Chola King captured Kedah, the stronghold of the Sailendras, and gained a foothold in Malaya where he established his power. In the process of establishing his power, the Chola king conquered ten or eleven vassal states of the Sailendras scattered all over Lower Burma, the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago. Thus Rajendra’s victories brought him vast tracts of the eastern coastal regions of Sumatra, and the central and southern parts of the Malay Peninsula by the close of 1025 a.d. Rajendra’s conquests overseas are related in glowing terms in Chola inscriptions. After the demise of Rajendra, his Chola successors found it extremely difficult to maintain their suzerainty over the numerous islands, fairly spread out, lying far from the mainland. With their lines of communication so stretched, the latter period witnessed a series of struggles between the Sailendra kings on the one hand trying to reassert their independence, and the Chola kings, on the other, exerting their might, in vain, to subdue the country. Rajadhiraja, son of Rajendra Chola, had the difficult task of consolidating the vast empire left by his father in which he largely succeeded by keeping under check the revolts of the kings of Ceylon and other States. Virarajendra, one of the successors of Rajendra Chola, who ruled between 1063 a.d. and 1069 a.d. is reported to have reconquered Kadara and forced the local chief into the position of a vassal. The

hundred years war came to a close in 1090 a.d. and the prolonged hostilities with the Cholas ended indecisively. At long last amity prevailed and in 1090 a.d., Kulottunga Chola I received an embassy from the Sailendra king of Kadara and ordered the discontinuance of the rendering of homage by the latter. During his reign Ceylon succeeded in asserting its independence. The Sailendras also were worn out by the wars against the Cholas, and owing to Chandrabhanu’s ignominious defeat already alluded to, the decline of the empire set in during the 15th century. The other State which achieved prominence in the Cheras early maritime history of India was that of the Cheras who had direct commercial relations with the peoples of the West. Even ages before the discovery of the trade winds in 45 a.d., the Cheras are known to have had not only commercial relations but also religious intercourse with the Western world, as is evidenced by the origin of the Christian church in Malabar and the emergence of the Syrian Christians in Kerala. The excavations at Ur dating back to the 6th-7th century B.C., referred to in Chapter I, revealed Indian teak and cedar which are believed to have come from the forests of Kerala. K. M. Panikkar observes : “With Egypt, the relations of the West Coast of India were very intimate from the earliest times. The late Flinders Petrie discovered the portraits of Indian men and women at Memphis.”1 The excavations at Memphis relate to about 200 B.C., which proves the early contacts that the Cheras had with the Graeco-Roman world. Ancient Tamil works refer to the famous port of Muziris, the Cranganore of today, on the West Coast at the mouth of the river Periyar in the Chera country which came into prominence as an important port of call which the “Yavanas” (the Greeks) visited in their ships for trade. The Periplus calls it Muziris, and Ptolemy highlights this place as a port of commercial importance. Radha Kumud Mookerjee observes : “These Greek traders sailed from Egypt in the month of July and arrived at Muziris in forty days. They stayed on the Malabar coast for about three months and commenced their return voyage from Muziris in December or January.”2 The well-known mud-banks on the Malabar coast afforded

a protected sea area which served as good anchorage for ships visiting these ports. The finds of Roman coins at Cannanore on the West Coast prove the extent of trade, and the period of this commerce seems to have been the Julius-Claudius era. The trade consisted primarily of the export of Malabar pepper and spices. Pepper formed such an important culinary item in the Western world that, according to Gibbon, Alaric was prepared to spare Rome in 408 a.d. with a ransom to be paid in pepper. In fact, the Malabar pepper trade, carried both in Indian and foreign bottoms, became so common that the tonnages of ships came to be rated in accordance with the number of baskets of pepper that they were capable of carrying. The discovery of the trade winds in 45 a.d. improved the periodicity of ships calling at the West Coast ports. The Malabar seamen, as well as the Western seafarers, avoided the long coastal route off the Persian and Arabian shores and voyaged direct between Bab-el-Mandeb and the Chera ports. The Chera country, cut off from the mainland of the south by the mountains of the Western Ghats, came to be associated with seafaring, and its sons turned out to be excellent sailors. They withstood their long voyages on frugal victuals, but sustained themselves with that useful fruit coco-nut, grown abundantly in Malabar, which is a good panacea for the sailor’s disease, scurvy, its milk also being an excellent substitute for fresh water.

1. Seal of an anchor, Harappa

2. Painting of a boat on a potsherd, Mohenjo-Daro

3. Naval dock discovered at Lothal, Gujarat

4, A boat scene, Bharhut

5. “Miracle Panel” of Stupa I, Sanchi

6. Coin showing a ship of the Andhra period

7. Sculptured relief from the Stupa, Borobudur (Java)

8. Old port of Cannanore as drawn by an artist

The Cheras maintained a navy even during the days of King Senguttuvan when he is credited with having defeated the “Yavanas” at sea and conquered Kadambu near Goa by means of a naval expedition; but the later Cheras were eclipsed by the Cholas with their formidable fleet. The Cheras were at this period more concerned with the advancement of pacific maritime commerce than with belligerence. Nevertheless, it should not be imagined that they were backward in displaying their valour on the high seas. As already mentioned, they fought a memorable war at sea off Kandalur (near Trivandrum of today) against the Cholas, and we shall see in later history how the Malabar fleet during the days of the Zamorins of Calicut and the Rajas of Cochin rose to maritime supremacy.

Before we pass on to the Pandyas, we may conclude that there is ample evidence to prove the oceanic enterprise and overseas commercial interest displayed by the Cheras from the beginnings of south Indian history. The Cheras continued their trade with the West notwithstanding any wars that they might have been engaged in with the other contemporary south Indian kingdoms. The Pandyas were a dynasty with a rich The Pandyas: heritage which enabled them over the years to develop international understanding and maritime commerce. Even as far back as 20 B.C. we know of a Pandyan king who entered into an alliance with Augustus Caesar. The extent of intercourse can be judged from the facts related in Silappadikāram, which states that Roman soldiers were in the service of the Pandyan king named Chezhiyan. The work refers to “Yavana” ships which frequently called at the Pandyan port, Nirkunram. The same port is referred to in the Periplus as Nelkynda. The Pandya influence evidently had also spread in the Far East, as is evident from the remarkable resemblance in the names of certain clans in Sumatra. Nearer home, with Ceylon they had intimate relations, as can be gleaned from early history. It is said that a Pandyan bride was given in marriage to Prince Vijaya in Ceylon and that the whole bridal party was transported in a ship carrying over 800 passengers. This incidentally gives us an idea of the size of ships in use in those days. The Pandyas from early days were embroiled in the politics of Ceylon and the Sinhalese were familiar with Pandyan affairs, and this brought them into conflict with each other. The Pandya king Srimara Srivallabha, son of Varaguna I, reigning during the years a.d. 815 to 862, undertook a naval expedition against Ceylon which was then under Sena 1 and forced the latter to sue for peace. Again, in the latter part of Pandyan history it is said that Jatavarman Sundara Pandya I launched a seaborne attack on Ceylon and returned home with a large booty of pearls and elephants. We also hear of Kulasekhara Pandya sending a successful naval expedition in a bid to capture the tooth relic of Buddha. It is clear that the Pandyas had a strong navy which enabled them to undertake seaborne expeditions of this kind. One of our historians, V. R. R.

Dikshitar remarks : “When there was dispute between Parakrama Pandya and Kulasekhara regarding the succession to the Pandyan throne, the Ceylonese ruler sent, on request from the former, a naval brigade under Lankapura Dandanayaka, who after defeating Kulasekhara erected a pillar of victory. Incidents like these show that the kings of the south as well as the rulers of Ceylon had each a well-equipped fleet.”1 Pandyan relations with the Ceylonese during Vira Pandya’s reign were such that he went to their succour and defeated the Sailendra king, Chandrabhanu, who had launched a naval assault on Ceylon. The Pandyan inscription of 1264 a.d. chronicles the event, and Sardar K. M. Panikkar observes : “After his (Chandrabhanu’s) defeat and death in the battle with Vira Pandya, the Sri Vijaya (Sailendra) Kingdom ceases to be a naval power.”2 About 1310 a.d., the Pandyas were ruling over a territory running along the Coromandel coast in the east and from Quilon to Cape Comorin on the West Coast; and with Ceylon under their sway, the Gulf of Mannar virtually became Pandyan territorial waters, the beds of which were exploited by them for pearlfishery. The Pandyan pearl became such an attraction in the West that there was a great demand for the jewel. In addition to pearl-fishery, the Pandyas held a monopoly in beryls, which are precious stones of various colours, and which were also greatly fancied by the ladies of the West Thus, with such natural wealth as Pandyan pearls and beryls, and Malabar pepper, there was a great boom in the export trade of the CheraPandya era. ’The demand of pearls and pepper was steady, and while the Tamil fought valiant, bitter wars among themselves or with their Pallava or Sinhalese neighbours, Tamil merchants quietly continued to trade with one another and with distant countries of West and East, including the innumerable islands of the Indian Ocean, and even of the vast Pacific.”1 The Pandyan kingdom which was at the apex of its glory in the 13th century was the dominant power in the south, and it enjoyed a flourishing international maritime trade; but the kingdom suffered considerably throughout its history owing to constant conflicts either with the Chalukyas, the Pallavas, the Cholas or the Sinhalese. In addition, the civil war between Vira Pandya and Sundara Pandya, and the raids of Malik Kafur contributed to the decline of the

Pandyan kingdom till it was finally engulfed by the Vijayanagar Empire. Vijayanagar, which came into existence The Vijayanagar Empire about 1336 a.d., rose to power under Harihara II, who reigned over Mysore, Kanara and the whole of southern India.Subsequently, under Deva Raya I, it emerged as a vast empire bringing under its sway even outlying islands. We learn from Abdur Razzaq, a Persian who visited the country in 1442 a.d., that the Empire had under its control as many as 300 ports. Among these, he stresses the importance of Calicut as a great port and gives credit to the rulers for the efficient port organization set up for the furtherance of international trade. The Vijayanagar Emperor, Deva Raya II, not only assumed the lofty title, “Lord of the Eastern, Western and Southern Oceans,” but also conferred on Lakkanna, his trusted lieutenant, the title “Lord of the Southern Sea” and set him the important task of supervising overseas commercial undertakings. The subjects of Vijayanagar were great carriers of trade between India and the Far Eastern countries. Their economy was primarily geared to overseas trade which comprised articles of export like diamonds, rice, cloth, sugar and spices; the items of import were, in the main, horses, copper and mercury. The flourishing trade brought to the empire peoples from all over the world—Burmese, Chinese, Indonesians, Thais, Arabs, Persians, Abyssinians and Portuguese. Shipbuilding was a flourishing industry under the Vijayanagar Empire. Ships were built not only in India but also in the Maldive Islands. “Epigraphic evidence proves that the rulers of Vijayanagar maintained fleets and the people there were acquainted with the art of shipbuilding before the advent of the Portuguese.”1 The fact that the Vijayanagar Empepors had a navy can be deduced from the various naval expeditions they led against Pegu, Tenasserim and Ceylon. Even the Portuguese have borne testimony to the Vijayanagar fleet. It is known that there was an officer called Navayāda Prabhu who had the control of the fleets based at Bhatkal and Mangalore. Vijayanagar rose in the wake of the disintegrating Bahmani Kingdom, and the south saw an era of Hindu revival of maritime

commerce, but the incessant wars with the Deccan sultanates, the inability of the Vijayanagar Emperors to maintain the political unity of their empire, the lack of sustained overseas commercial effort backed by a powerful navy, and the advent of the Portuguese on the scene, who in 1510 a.d. took Goa, one of the best Vijayanagar ports, led to the decline and final eclipse of the great empire. Nature had given the Vijayanagar Empire ample opportunities for the expansion of its commerce. Looking at it in retrospect one may say that the south Indian Hindu Empire had nearly reached a formative stage in the establishment of a Greater India but fell just short of it owing to lack of sustained effort and frequent rivalries. This failure led primarily to the downfall of the Viiayanagar Empire and their consequent inability-to establish a stable Hindu empire in south India. We have seen how the Hindu The Eclipse of the Hindu Kingdoms Kingdoms had taken a preponderant share in the shaping of the maritime history of the nation. Their cultural and religious expansion into Malaya, Burma, Indonesia and Thailand, and their extensive trade reaching as far as China and Japan in the East, and Africa and the Mediterranean countries in the West, are achievements of no mean effort, and these have left their imprint on the historical palimpsest of the nation. “The Indian colonies which began to grow up all along the periphery of the motherland were essentially cultural and religious, rather than political or racial. They owed allegiance to no Indian emperor, were obedient to no Indian imperial policy.”1 Until the advent of the Arabs in the second century a.d., the Indian merchants held an unchallenged monopoly of overseas commerce over the whole of the Asian waters. The traders and merchants formed such an integral part of the Indian society that regular guilds or corporations such as the Manigramam merchants and the Nanadesis, which may be compared to the present day Chambers of Commerce, were in operation. The trading fleets enjoyed a fairly safer passage than the overland caravans and were not subject to so much looting, although it could not be said that the seas were completely free from piracy. It

is known that Alexandrian ships had soldiers on board as escorts for any eventuality. Pliny remarks that the Indian waters were infested with pirates and that ships were therefore armed with archers. Indians were also armed with such escorts ever since foreign trade emerged as an important factor of commercial enterprise. In the beginning the merchantmen took on board a company of archers well trained to shoot with bows and arrows, to ward off pirates’ attacks. Subsequently, Indian ships were fitted with deadlier weapons of war including unique contraptions; later on, they were mounted with guns and cannon. Coming to later times, Marco Polo observes of the manner in which the 13th century corsairs operated and the tactics they employed : “There go forth every year more than a hundred corsair vessels on cruise. These pirates take with them their wives and children and stay out the whole summer. Their method is to join in fleets of 20 or 30 of these pirate vessels together and then they form what they call a sea cordon, that is, they drop off till there is an interval of 5 or 6 miles between ship and ship, so that they cover something like a hundred miles of sea, and no merchant ship can escape them. For when any one corsair sights a vessel a signal is made by fire or smoke and then the whole of them make for this and seize the merchants and plunder them. After they have plundered them, they led them go.” These and other reasons led prudent States in India to maintain a strong navy to be able to keep the seas free from piracy and to promote international trade, as indeed it is one of the roles of the navy of any country to keep the sea-lanes clear for use by its merchant shipping. Unfortunately, India’s glorious maritime achievements were not sustained, and the reasons for the decline in their activity are various. By the close of the Hindu peribd, the country developed an attitude of arrogant complacency and rested on its laurels. It did not keep abreast of the Western advances in military science. The Hindu caste system undermined the general advance and, in particular, overseas commerce : this activity was thought to be unworthy and was left to the Vaisya class only; and religious custom ordained that sea voyages, if undertaken by the Brahmin class, were sinful and required them to undergo a ceremony of “purification.” Moreover,

there was an utter lack of unity among the later Hindu rulers, which exposed them to external exploitation; they were also caught in the Arab aggression overland, in the preoccupation with which pacific maritime advancement suffered. The concept of naval power, which could have aided their land battles fought in areas contiguous to the sea, never dawned on them. They devoted their attention merely to containing the enemy’s aggression overland, and resigned themselves to the acceptance of the Arab seafarers as middlemen for carrying on their overseas trade. Thus the glorious Hindu supremacy of the seas came to an end.

III

THE MUSLIM PERIOD 1—The Influence of the Seafaring Arabs The Arabs were known as seafarers even before the birth of Islam, but they seem to have redoubled their efforts at oceanic commerce after the advent of Islam. The small beginnings they had made in the early period came to stay and their oceanic commerce with India became revitalized with the emergence of Caliph Omar who established trading posts at Basra, Shatt-al-Arab and Socotra. By about the 8th century a.d. they began to come to India by sea in great numbers principally as traders, and they had no serious ideas of conquest. As Strabo observes : “The Arabs are not very warlike even on land, but rather traders and merchants, and not at all warlike on the sea.” Nevertheless, there were a few naval exploits by the Arabs on the shores of Sind and Kathiawar in the 8th century a.d.; and we saw earlier how the Saindhava fleet gave a final blow to such attempts. Thenceforward the Arabs assumed the role of pacific carriers of trade between the East and the West. Arab merchants established trading colonies along the east coast of Africa and extended their trade into the Far East and reached as far as China. There were also Arab settlements in south India, chiefly in Malabar on the West Coast and sparsely in Kaveripattmam on the east coast. During the Sri Vijaya-Chola age, the Arabs reached their zenith of maritime commerce, and by the end of the Hindu period they held a complete monopoly in overseas trade. The take-over of trade from south Indian merchants by the Arab middlemen apparently came about at the end of the Chola power. So long as the Cholas wielded their naval power, the Arabs do not appear to have ventured to interfere. But the decline of the Chola power had created a vacuum

in overseas commerce and the Arabs stepped in. With the passing of the overseas trade to the Arabs there was little or no direct interest taken by Indians in overseas commerce and they were content to trade with the Arab intermediaries and agents who sailed with their wares between the East and the West.

2—Later Muslim Era Unlike the seafaring Arabs who had no serious designs to conquer India and whose oceanic adventures were clearly not the result of a sustained national policy, the descent on India by the Arabs overland had far-reaching consequences. From the seafaring Arabs who had frequented India for centuries, the Caliphs came to know of the riches of India, which knowledge culminated in the attack overland led by Kasim and the fall of Debal, the river port on the Indus. With the Arab conquest of Sind, the valuable ports on this coast fell into their hands. Turning to the other area of descent into India by Mahmud of Ghazni, in the 11th century, we hear that on his 17th expedition a river battle took place near Multan. Ghazni’s fleet, consisting of about 1,500 boats fitted with sharp spikes all round, took archers on board and met the Indian armada of 4,000 boats manned by the Jats in which the latter were defeated, mainly owing to the damage the spikes had caused to the approaching boats. During the Medieval period, there are several accounts of the participation of river craft in such battles, but only during the Moghul period do we find mention of the Imperial Moghul Navy, the activity of which was marked in the Bay of Bengal. After consolidation of the Moghul power, Akbar seems to have organized an Imperial Navy with the establishment of an office called Meer Bahri which could be interpreted as the Admiralty or Navy Headquarters. The organization was, in the main, similar to that which had existed during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya; indeed, those who know the organization of the present Naval Headquarters in India can even draw some striking parallels. The functions of

Akbar’s Naval Headquarters were divided under four sections : “Material,” “Personnel,” “Internal Waterways” and “ustoms.” The “Material” section had under its charge the construction of ships and craft, and their efficient maintenance. Ships and river craft of different tonnages were constructed to suit their role in accordance with the requirements of the service. “There were those built for the transportation of elephants, and those of such construction as to be employed in sieges, while others were meant for the conveyance of merchandise. There were also ships which served for convenient habitations. The Emperor had also pleasure boats built with convenient apartments, and others on which there were floating markets and flower gardens.”1 The “Personnel” section was responsible for the recruitment and training of pilots, sailors and other technical personnel for the manning of ships and craft in the service. From Ain-i-Akbari by Abul Fazl and other contemporary works it is known that the personnel was categorized : “Nakhoda”—captain of the ship, “Maullim”—the navigator, “Tundeil”—the chief Buffer, “Sir-heng”—yard-master, “Bhandaree”—storehousemen, “Punjaree” —Crow’s nest look-out, “Keranee”—ship’s writer, “Sukangeer”— helmsman and “Kherwah”— Ordinary Seaman. The third section was purely devoted to work connected with internal waterways. There was a system of river-watching, and all waterways were kept under watch. Several rules existed for the correct use of navigable rivers. The Customs section was responsible for the appraisal, levy, and collection of customs revenue. Apart from a small charge on the import and export of goods, they also levied a cess on ships or craft newly constructed and imposed river tolls. The attention of the Moghul Navy was directed primarily towards the Bengal region which was being subjected to attacks from the Muggs, the Arakanese and the Portuguese. To repulse such attacks, the Imperial Flotilla was operating from Dacca as its base. This operation of the Moghuls turned out to be a costly venture financially and by way of the heavy defeats that they suffered at the hands of the Portuguese in particular. Radha Kumud Mookerji observes : “We have mention of a naval establishment consisting, at the time it was

established by Akbar, of 3,000 vessels or boats, but it was afterwards reduced to 768 armed cruisers or boats, besides the number of vessels required to be furnished by the Zemindars in return for the lands they held as jageer.”2 Akbar used his navy either to put down piracy or to subjugate rebellious Chieftains, such as Mirza Jani Beg of Thatta and Daud of Patna. His viceroy, Raja Man Singh, used the fleet to defeat Kedara Raya, the Lord of Sripura. He sent under Manda Raya a fleet of 100 vessels but was defeated by Kedara Raya. A second naval expedition set out in 1604 a.d. which finally defeated Kedara Raya. Akbar’s conquest of Gujarat by land battles brought to him the flourishing ports of the Gujarat peninsula which gave him vast commercial gains. R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri and K. Datta observe : “Besides placing its resources at the disposal of the Empire, it secured for it free access to the sea and brought it in contact with the Portuguese, which in some ways influenced the history of India. But the Moghuls made no attempt to build up any sea power and their short-sightedness in this direction helped the intrusion of the European traders.”1 The incessant attacks by the Muggs and the Portuguese wore down the Dacca-based Moghul Navy and its maintenance was becoming inefficient. The naval engagement in 1662 a.d. against the Assamese imposed heavy losses on the Moghul Fleet. Radha Kumud Mookerji gives a detailed account of this action;2 it need not be repeated here, but suffice it to say that this had a great effect on the Dacca Fleet. There was, however, a remarkable revival within two years when Shaista Khan became the Viceroy of Bengal; the fleet was rebuilt and equipped with nearly 300 ships and base facilities were also provided at Samgramgara situated at the confluence of the Brahmaputra and the Ganges, and at Dhapa. The island of Sandvipa also served as an advanced base. The rebuilt and re-equipped Navy launched a successful attack on the Arakan coast, acting in concert with the Moghul Army. In the days of Aurangzeb, Masulipatam was a good commercial port and maritime commerce was flourishing. Similarly, Surat was a good trading centre, though the shipping off this coast was

constantly falling a prey to corsairs and Aurangzeb’s ships were not in a position to put down piracy. Despite an organized navy, the Moghuls did not clearly appreciate the importance of sea power. Their power was primarily based on land armies and they evidently placed an undue reliance on the large standing armies for the defence of their vast empire. The Moghul Navy based at Dacca was by no means a high-seasfleet, but was a fleet of large boats. Had the Moghuls appreciated the value of sea power, they would have established island bases around India far from the mainland, which could have enabled them to operate on the high seas in defence of their shipping. The Moghul’s lack of aspiration and foresight regarding mastery of the sea after consolidating their empire on land resulted in the neglect of sea power; this is a lesson of history. Their continental outlook paved the way for the ingress of the European powers, which resulted in directly influencing India’s destiny.

IV

THE ADVENT OF THE EUROPEANS 1-The Portuguese in India We saw in the last chapter how the Arabs held a complete monopoly in the overseas trade between the East and the West. The Arabs exploited their exclusive position in trade, which exasperated the West. In 1453, the Ottoman Turks, who were by then in possession of Constantinople, throttled also the overland trade route. Thus the important spice trade with the East could only be carried on by the West through a hostile intermediary, the Arabs. The trade, indispensable as it was, became a factor in the search for an independent all-sea route to India. The first European nation to make an effort to find a sea route to India was Portugal. Under the patronage of Prince Henry several attempts were made towards this end but it took more than his lifetime for the Portuguese to explore the long coast of Africa. It was on July 8, 1497, that Vasco da Gama set sail on the historic voyage on board SAN GABRIEL which brought him up to the Cape; having rounded it, he reached Calicut on May 11, 1498, from Milindi where he had obtained the services of an Indian pilot, who guided the ship across the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. It was, indeed, a glorious event for the Portuguese achievement, fulfilling their ambition. Apart from the Portuguese opportunity to break the Arab monopoly, it ushered in the epoch of the advent of the other European nations. The Indians, however, did not fully appreciate the implications of the discovery of this route. With their characteristic continental outlook and pacific seafaring there was an attitude of complacency on their part, and the real threat from the sea was not appreciated until it was too late to rectify. The Indians merely looked upon the advent as yet another carrier of trade appearing on the scene, but unfortunately events were to prove otherwise.

The coming to India of the Portuguese ships brought in a revolutionary change in that they were the first men-of-war in the Indian seas to have mounted cannon. This show of arms had quite a demoralizing effect on Indians. Though Indians had used the seas for transporting military forces and though sometimes ships were armed with archers and naphtha-throwers, they had never seen anything like this and the Portuguese had gained the initial material surprise. To understand the full political The Political Stateof India implications of the visit of Vasco da Gama and the events that followed, it is necessary to describe the situation in India at the time. At the close of the 15th century, politically India was in a turmoil and the country was divided into several States. There was hardly any political solidarity. There were the Hindu and Muslim religious differences, and a number of principalities and kingdoms. These, though belonging to the same religion, had serious differences of opinion; petty rivalries were rampant and jealousy was rife. Of these the Moghul Empire in the north, the Deccan Sultanates, the Vijayanagar Empire and the King of Calicut, the Zamorin, were the major rulers in India. We have seen earlier how Calicut became the centre of the pepper trade. The Zamorin of Calicut pursued a policy of encouraging trade with foreign countries. In fact, it was this uniform policy that was followed by the successive Zamorins, which was more responsible for the affluence of the port of Calicut than its advantageous natural location. It was to such a port that Vasco da Gama came with his four ships and submitted his request to the Zamorin for permission to trade. Needless to say, the request was readily granted. Although the reception given to The Zamorin of Calicut Vasco da Gama by the Zamorin was cordial, to the Arabs in the city this meant an interruption of their long-established trade connections. They remonstrated, in vain, with the Zamorin on the new alliance and made bold to suggest that they would leave Calicut for good, thus bringing about the commercial starvation of the port. Despite

Arab protests the Zamorin continued to afford the Portuguese all the normal facilities given to foreign traders, but when Vasco da Gama was asked to pay the usual customs levy he was infuriated and left for Portugal. On his way he called at Cannanore where the Kolathiri Raja gave the Portuguese a rousing reception. The Raja was anxious to befriend the Portuguese through whom he hoped to achieve prosperity in the same manner as the Zamorin had acquired wealth by trading with the Arabs. The Zamorin took note of the hostile attitude of Vasco da Gama. So far the Zamorin’s dealings with the Arabs had been pacific and straightforward. He, therefore, did not require more than a small naval force powerful enough to deal with inshore corsairs. The Zamorin, in the circumstances, did not fully realize the graver danger of the coining of the Portuguese and was unprepared for the events that followed. The next expedition to reach Calicut from Portugal consisted of thirteen ships fully armed under the command of Cabral. On arrival he paid his compliments to the Zamorin who permitted him to set up a trading establishment. Soon there was friction between the Arabs and the Portuguese, and in a mood of arrogance and tactless behaviour Cabral seized an Arab vessel lying in the port of Calicut. The Arabs stormed the Portuguese establishment in retaliation. Cabral appealed to the Zamorin for compensation but failed to get any. Unprovoked by the Zamorin and on such a pretext Cabral withdrew his ships and bombarded the citadel for two days before putting into Cochin. The Calicut cannon replied, but feebly. At Cochin, Cabral was received with enthusiasm by the local Raja, who had been traditionally antagonistic to the Zamorin. He afforded all facilities to the Portuguese to establish a trading settlement. Meanwhile, the Zamorin made hurried preparations to avenge Cabral’s barbaric act and fitted out a fleet of some. 80 ships which sailed to meet the enemy off Cochin. Despite the help promised by the Raja of Cochin, Cabral’s ships slipped out of the harbour under cover of darkness unnoticed by the Calicut fleet which was lying in wait outside the port.

Having given the slip to the Zamorin’s fleet, Cabral called at Cannanore, where again he was given a warm reception by the Kolathiri Raja, who had always questioned the Zamorin’s authority. While there, Cabral made an alliance with the Raja and finally returned to Portugal. His return to Portugal did not mark the end; on the contrary, it was but the beginning, and there followed on the Indian seas, for over a century, a war of reprisal. Cabral was followed by Jao da Nova in command of four ships in 1501 a.d., and he attacked and looted a Calicut merchantman anchored outside the harbour. His fleet took the role of surface raiders, preying on lone Calicut ships plying off the West Coast. The Zamorin, therefore, sent an armada of 180 vessels to locate and destroy the enemy. When the fleets met off Cannanore, the Portuguese fired their cannon to frighten off the Calicut fleet, but they were still closing the enemy. Unfortunately the Zamorin’s fleet was not equipped as a high-seas fleet and could not give chase and the enemy succeeded in getting away. The Portuguese, however, were determined to claim the supremacy of the Indian seas. They persisted in their effort and sent armada after armada. The next expedition to be despatched was a formidable one consisting of 20 ships which were heavily armed and properly equipped under the command of no other than Vasco da Gama himself. The shrewd commander that he was, he gained the goodwill of the authorities on the east coast of Africa on his way to the Indian waters and thus safeguarded his line of communication to Lisbon. Even on his way to India, he started pillaging harmless merchant ships that came his way, a clear act of piracy flouting the concept of the freedom of the high seas. The policy of the Portuguese was evidently to usurp the Indian trade by a show of strength and by unfair means, as they had no hopes of capturing the age-old trade by peaceful competitive commercial enterprise. On reaching the Indian waters da Gama established bases at Cochin and Cannanore with the full assent of the Rajas of the respective ports. From these bases the Portuguese ships started their operations consisting of raids on unescorted merchant ships plying off the West Coast. By this show of strength they managed to coerce the king of Bhatkal, a vassal State of the Vijayanagar Empire,

into accepting Portuguese supremacy of the contiguous seas. The Portuguese pronounced their dictum that Indian or Arab ships should not ply without their express permission; and these were forbidden to enter Calicut. Thus a systematic blockade was instituted and Calicut was subjected to commercial starvation. These unprecedented events led the Zamorin of Calicut to reinforce and re-equip his fleet. Two flotillas were fitted out in 1503 A.D. The first flotilla consisted of comparatively heavy ships, about a hundred in number, mostly sambuks, under the command of Ambar, and the second flotilla was placed under Admiral Kasim. A comparison of the Calicut and Portuguese naval forces should be of interest. The Calicut fleet had superiority in numbers and, being light in construction, had an edge over the Portuguese ships in speed. The Portuguese caravels, on the other hand, had a definite advantage in fire power. Each caravel’s armament consisted of four heavy cannon, six falconets, of which two were stern guns, ten guns on the quarter-deck on swivel mountings and a twin gun mounted on the poop. The Zamorin’s fleet sailed out to meet the threat of the Portuguese fleet. Ambar’s and Kasim’s flotillas were not acting as one force. The caravels first sighted and engaged with their heavy guns Ambar’s ships separately, scored a direct hit on the Flagship and sank three other vessels, which obliged Ambar to disengage temporarily. Having initially dealt with Ambar’s flotilla, the Portuguese turned their attention to the other flotilla. The caravels’ guns, now trained on Kasim’s ships, inflicted heavy damage. In the meantime, Ambar’s flotilla recovered from the initial bombardment, regrouped its vessels and joined the battle. Eventually the fast-moving Calicut ships outmanoeuvred the Portuguese fleet, which could not direct its fire against the Calicut fleet. In the event, Vasco da Gama had to disengage and sail away to Europe. Although this battle at sea off Cochin took place way back in 1503, a few lessons may be learned from it. As already brought out, the Calicut Navy not only lacked fire-power but failed to concentrate their forces until it was too late. When the battle swung in favour of the Calicut Admiral, he failed to give chase and let the Portuguese ships get away; this was primarily because the Calicut fleet, not

being a high-seas fleet, was unsuited to such a task. “Though the honours of the battle off Cochin lay with the Calicut Navy,” observes K. M. Panikkar, “the failure of Kasim to destroy the Portuguese fleet and his inability to chase da Gama nullified the fruits of his victory.”1 It became apparent to the Portuguese that the Calicut fleet was not a high-seas fleet and that at best it was able to fight only in coastal waters. It came to be known that the Zamorin’s fleet was unsuited to operate in areas far removed from its base. This weakness came to the fore during the battle off Cochin and the Portuguese were quick to spot it and exploit the fact later on.

9. View of old port of Calicut as seen by an artist

10. Vasco da Gama presenting his credentials to the Zamorin of Calicut

11 A Portuguese warship in terracotta, Naldanga

12, A Portuguese boat in terracotta, Naldanga

13. Fort St George—an artist’s impression

14. The PITT exchanging broadsides with the ST LOUIS

15. Engagement between the WARREN HASTINGS and the PIEMONTAISE (the beginning)

16. After the action

The extraordinary feature of the Portuguese effort lay in the resolute manner in which the fleet in the East was continually replaced or reinforced. Before Calicut could revive from the ravages of the battle off Cochin, two squadrons under the Albuquerque brothers were on their way. Meanwhile, the traditional feud between Calicut and Cochin, aggravated by the Portuguese intervention, precipitated a war between the two Rajas. During this campaign a large fleet of the Zamorin took part in support of the land operations directed against the territories of the Raja of Cochin. The Calicut fleet employed as many as 280 ships, with a complement of about 4,000 men, and the armaments mounted were no fewer than 380 guns of various calibre. The Albuquerques’ squadrons had by then taken position off the shores of Cochin, and to a great measure reduced the effectiveness of the naval gun support that was being given by the Calicut fleet to its advancing army. In January, 1504, a truce was concluded between the Portuguese and the Zamorin, but no sooner had the Albuquerques’ squadrons left for Portugal, than the Zamorin attacked Cochin employing his army and navy. Although

the Albuquerques’ squadrons had gone, Cochin base itself was defended by Duarte Pacheco, with shore artillery and a few Portuguese vessels that had been left behind. The Calicut-Cochin war dragged on for about five months, during which period it is of interest to note the ingenious methods adopted by the Calicut fleet in combating the enemy. The Zamorin’s lightly constructed ships were being destroyed by artillery fire, from gun emplacements along the shores of Cochin. Even a near miss by the Portuguese cannon used to dismember the frail bulkheads of the Calicut ships due to the shock waves created. As a protective measure the sides of the Calicut ships were covered by a sort of fender all-round, made up of bags filled with pressure-resisting material, such as cotton. Another original innovation was in regard to their harbour defence. To prevent Portuguese ships from entering the port, padaos, a kind of small paddle boats, anchored apart, were tied to one another by iron cables to form a cordon, which proved a hazard for safe navigation. They also used fire balls on floating hulks. Several incendiary towers were constructed on the deck of the hulks, set alight and sent down stream where the Portuguese ships were anchored, in the hope of destroying them by fire. Pacheco’s defence against this sort of contrivance was to create a cordon of anchored dumb barges with high masts. Lisbon, hearing of the difficult Portuguese position in India, promptly despatched, on April 22, 1504, a large fleet consisting of more than half a dozen ships under the command of Lopo Soares to reinforce the Cochin forces. Hardly had he arrived on the scene when he evolved a clever operational plan : the Zamorin expected an attack on Calicut; knowing that this port would be defended well, Soares scored an element of surprise by launching a blitz attack on Cranganore, the other naval port of the Zamorin. A squadron of the Calicut fleet was stationed at this port, and Mammali, the Squadron Commander, was completely taken by surprise, and the whole squadron was destroyed. When the merchantmen lying in the port were thus bereft of their escorts, Soares pillaged most of them without encountering much resistance. This incident shook the confidence of the Zamorin. Moreover, he had lost quite a few of his ships in his war against Cochin, as now at

Cranganore in the surprise attack. His fleet having been thus cut down, and realizing that his ships were no match for the fire-power of the Portuguese, he decided to look for an ally outside India. He found the Sultan of Egypt, an old associate, more than eager to join hands in the common cause of meeting the Portuguese threat. It will be remembered that the all-sea route from Europe to India bypassed the Egyptian ports and since then Egypt’s commercial prosperity had been on the decline. The Sultan, therefore, promptly despatched, in 1507, a sizable naval force, fully equipped with weapons matching those of the Portuguese and under an able Admiral, Mir Hussain. Mir Hussain had a well-conceived plan. He set himself the task of reaching Diu which he could use as his base. The plan was for the Calicut fleet to rendezvous the Egyptian fleet at a predetermined position; the combined force was to attack the Portuguese squadrons. Admiral Hussain had no difficulty in reaching Diu, though he was somewhat delayed on passage. The Calicut fleet, which had since gained some knowledge in armaments, joined Mir Hussain’s fleet as previously planned, with heavier guns mounted on board ships. The Indo-Egyptian fleet sailed south and came upon the Portuguese fleet at Chaul. They exchanged fire; the gun duel went on for nearly two days but the battle ended without a decision. “An enemy who was equal in equipment and superior in seamanship had arrived on the Indian waters.”1 The Portuguese, however, redoubled their efforts, formed a fleet of 19 ships, and attacked Dabul in November, 1508. The Portuguese fleet lingered on until the arrival of a favourable tide to go in to attack the Indo-Egyptian fleet at Diu. On February 3, 1509, the battle was joined when the entrance to the harbour, which was being defended by the ships of the Sultan of Cambay, was fired at by the Portuguese. After firing several salvoes for a prolonged period, the Portuguese advanced rapidly with the aid of a stiff stern wind and closed their adversaries. The combined fleets of Calicut and Egypt fought a valiant battle and stemmed the advance of the Portuguese. During the progress of the battle, the Governor of the Sultan defected to the Portuguese side and this act of treachery had an important part to play in the course of the battle. The Governor cut off the shore logistic support to the Indo-Egyptian fleet, and the

engagement finally petered out indecisively; and Mir Hussain returned to Egypt with his fleet. K. M. Panikkar ably sums up the effect of the two sea battles that took place in 1503 and 1509 : “Thus without a decisive battle, the supremacy of the sea passed to the Portuguese. Judged from results, the battle of Cochin in 1503, and the engagement off Diu in 1509 are the two most significant events in Indian history. The first action showed to the Portuguese the weakness of the Indian navies and afforded them the opportunity for building up a naval empire. The second left them free to pursue an oceanic policy they desired and laid the firm foundations of the European mastery of the Eastern seas which continued for over 400 years.”2 Despite, these two oppressive battles, the Calicut fleet not only managed to survive but continued to dispute the naval supremacy of the Portuguese for some 80 years, if not on the high seas, at any rate, on the territorial waters. Albuquerque, the Portuguese Governor in Cochin, appreciated the strategic unsoundness of his naval power in being based at Cochin, situated as it was in close proximity to hostile Calicut. Therefore, he planned, in consultation with Marshal Cutinho, to lay siege to the citadel of Calicut. On January 3, 1510, a formidable fleet launched a determined attack on the port, softened the beaches by heavy bombardment and landed the troops. The day selected was one when the Zamorin’s army was preoccupied in an inland sector away from the port. Although initially there was negligible resistance, the local citizens rose to the challenge and retaliated, inflicting heavy casualties. The Portuguese retreated in haste and just managed to evacuate in their ships to Cochin. This incident brought home to the Portuguese even more forcibly the dire necessity to find a base for their operations at a safer distance from Calicut. They selected Goa as the most suitable port for the furtherance of their ambitious designs. After an initial setback, Albuquerque annexed Goa from the Vijayanagar Empire, in 1510. He then proceeded to fortify the port, and made it the seat of the Portuguese Colonial Government, the vestiges of which remained till December 19, 1961. The Zamorin’s ability in the constant attempt at disputing Portuguese naval power in the Indian waters during eight long

decades is primarily attributed to the efforts of the hereditary Admirals, the Marakkars. Mohammed Kunjali Marakkar, the first Admiral of Calicut, a Moplah by birth, was himself an experienced and valiant navigator. Kunjali I enlisted a band of brave, sturdy seamen, and constructed a formidable base at Ponnani, half way between Cochin and Calicut. He had able deputies in Kutti Ali and Pachi Marakkar. The Calicut Admirals realized that their ships were no match for the Portuguese ships, which were fitted with heavy guns. They also appreciated that the caravels took room for manoeuvre and required a high wind velocity to assist in their fast movement. Kutti Ali therefore went in for smaller craft (“war padaos”), which could be rowed through lagoons and narrow waters, and did not present themselves as large targets to the Portuguese guns. He had several of these craft deployed at strategic points such as at entrances to rivers, and had others hidden away near narrow channels. He placed on vantage hill features look-outs to give early warning of the approaching enemy. His “war padaos” then converged on the Portuguese ships, set fire to their sails and rendered them ineffective. But this only contributed to the harassment of Portuguese shipping, but did not lead to the attainment of sea power in the Indian Ocean, for which purpose a balanced fleet of larger ships with heavier guns was needed. Nevertheless, in these harassing raids the Marakkars showed remarkable prowess. K. M. Panikkar’s tribute reads : “In initiative, courage, navigational skill and persistence, they bear comparison with the great figures of naval warfare.”1 By 1525, however, the Portuguese had established a fortress at Calicut. Out of the innumerable skirmishes at sea a few engagements stand out. The Portuguese squadron, under the command of Lope Vaz da Sampayo, came upon Kutti Ali’s fleet off Cannanore and a long-drawn and indecisive engagement followed. Kutti Ali’s fleet, however, managed to approach Calicut and bombard the Portuguese citadel. On February 26, 1525, the Portuguese under Henry Menezes struck at the newly developed base at Ponnani, and a few ships berthed in the roadstead caught fire. Kutti Ali in retaliation stormed the port of Cochin, set fire to the Portuguese ships and managed to get away unhindered. During the Zamorin’s

siege of Calicut in the same year, Kutti Ali’s ships blockaded the port and to a large extent interrupted the Portuguese logistic support arriving from Cochin and Goa. While menacing the Portuguese, Kutti Ali strove to avoid a direct engagement with the caravels. In 1528, however, a powerful Portuguese armada forced him to give battle off Barkur in which the Zamorin’s fleet suffered severe reverses and Kutti Ali was taken prisoner. Yet the Marakkar depredations continued unabated under Kunjali II. He had succeeded in his operations to such an extent that communication by sea between the two Portuguese ports of Goa and Cochin was virtually severed and adversely affected their trade. Nevertheless, the Portuguese intervention in the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean dried up the Arab-Zamorin axis of sea trade and pacific overseas commerce was now confined to the east coast of India and beyond. In this shift of commerce, Colombo assumed increasing importance. The Portuguese came upon the island of Ceylon by chance when Don Lorenzo drifted into Colombo after a heavy squall, and they were quick to seize the opportunity to make a settlement there. The Calicut and Arab ships, which were regularly calling at this port, were subjected to the traditional Portuguese treatment. This brought Kunjali’s fleet out to Negapatam in the east coast and to the Ceylonese waters, and it got embroiled in a civil war in the island. After a prolonged stay in the region, the bulk of Kunjali’s fleet was destroyed off Vidulai near Rameswaram and Kunjali himself is reported to have been killed on shore at Puttalam in Ceylon. The Zamorin was by now convinced of the futility of such illconceived operations and realized that, as a last resort, he should invoke the assistance of a comparable naval power from outside India to evict the Portuguese finally. He, therefore, parleyed with Turkey and secured a Turkish fleet of 70 ships, commanded by Sulaiman Pasha, which arrived in 1538. The fleet arrived off Diu and bombarded the city. Pasha and his men were much interested in plunder, irrespective of the nationality of the victim. He was more a source of difficulties to the Indians than of any help to them. On November 2, 1538, a powerful fleet of the Portuguese appeared off

Diu, and Pasha stealthily sailed away during the night without giving battle. The Turkish-Malabar alliance thus came to an ignominious end. The Portuguese, therefore, exploited the weak situation of the Zamorin and a naval truce prevailed for a while. But soon hostilities broke out. Between the years 1538 and 1558 a number of skirmishes took place, none of them decisive. In 1558 two significant events took place. Luiz de Mello engaged Kunjali’s ships off Cannanore and inflicted heavy damage on the Zamorin’s fleet, which withdrew to Calicut. Thereupon de Mello’s ships systematically blockaded the port of Calicut. Had he not been recalled to Portugal, Calicut would have been reduced to utter commercial starvation. In the absence of de Mello, Kunjali III renewed his depredations. In 1553, as usual, the Portuguese replaced their fleet with a good number of galleons (ships of about 600 tons) and some sloops. There were several harassing engagements of no important consequence for about a decade. But in 1564, Kunjali’s ships made a determined attack on the ships berthed in Cannanore harbour and damaged them severely. To crush the Zamorin’s naval power, three squadrons were organized under the over-all command of Concalo Marmanaque. The squadrons were deployed suitably along the West Coast and were allotted specific sectors of operation. One of the squadrons under Dom Paulo de Lina operating off Bhatkal was attacked by Kunjali, who gained a resounding victory. The other notable sea action which brought laurels to Kunjali III was in 1569. A formidable fleet consisting of 36 ships set sail from Goa under the command of Dom Martino de Miranda in search of Kunjali’s forces. When the forces met, Kunjali tried to avoid a direct engagement. However, when Miranda’s forces were placed in an unfavourable position Kunjali took advantage of the situation, inflicted heavy damage and caused the Portuguese ships to retire. Encouraged by his success, Kunjali added a few more victories to his credit in the coastal waters off Diu. Until the death of Kunjali III in 1595, the Portuguese suffered incessant reverses in the coastal waters. In memory of this gallant admiral who fought for nearly four decades and achieved so much for the cause of his country, the Indian Navy

of today has commissioned an establishment at Bombay known as I.N.S. KUNJALI. Kunjali’s resistance to the Portuguese was confined to the coastal waters, but did not seriously threaten their supremacy in the Indian Ocean. Albuquerque had rightly appreciated the concept of sea power. He had the foresight to realize the strategic importance of Socotra Island which dominated the entrance to the Red Sea. He, therefore, annexed the island, fortified it and established an advanced naval base there. Then he turned his attention to Ormuz, situated in a position capable of commanding the sea approaches to the Persian Gulf. With little difficulty he claimed Portugal’s suzerainty over Ormuz and erected a formidable fort dominating the Ormuz Straits. With the east coast of Africa already under Portuguese influence, their dominance over western Indian Ocean was complete. Albuquerque recognized the important geographical location of Malacca, which formed, as it were, the eastern entrance into the Indian Ocean. His successful occupation of Malacca in 1513 gave Portugal the crowning glory of heralding an era of complete supremacy in the Indian Ocean. This enviable position of the Portuguese lasted so long as their sea power in the Atlantic remained supreme. While the Portuguese were reaping Portuguese Decline immense benefits from the exclusive Eastern commerce, Europe witnessed an era of religious upheaval. Protestants were against the Papal grant of trade monopoly to the Portuguese in the East. The defeat of the Spanish Armada at the hands of the British swung the pendulum of power in the West and paved the way for the entry into India of the other maritime nations of Europe. The Dutch and the English were now in no mood to pay the exorbitant prices demanded by the Portuguese for Indian goods, and were preparing themselves for carrying on direct trade with India. These were not the only reasons that led to the downfall of the Portuguese in India : other factors contributed to their decline. To start with, they failed to maintain their aim : the achievement of sea power in the Indian Ocean. When Brazil was discovered, the Portuguese were distracted from the Indian scene and were lured by

the lucrative lands of the South American continent. The Portuguese, therefore, could not give undivided attention to the Indian Ocean and they had difficulty in deploying their forces in two widely separated theatres of operations. The amalgamation of Portugal with her more powerful neighbour, Spain, made the Portuguese toe the Spanish line, which was not necessarily in furtherance of Portuguese ambitions. Although in 1640 she regained her independence, it was too late : the Dutch and the British were entrenched in India by then. Other factors for their eclipse were poor administration, inability to eradicate corruption and nepotism, and the selfishness and lethargy which permeated the rank and file of the Government machinery. It was during such a chaotic stage in Portuguese power that the Dutch entered the Indian scene.

2—The Advent of the Dutch The first of the European powers to break the trade monopoly of the Portuguese in the East were the Dutch. Even during the zenith of the Portuguese commercial power, the Netherlanders had voyaged to India as individual traders and as sailors in the employ of the Portuguese. Thus the Dutch had the opportunity to acquire some knowledge of the East. The Dutch appreciated the fact that the Portuguese were rather weak in the Malay Archipelago, particularly as the Sunda Straits were not being guarded. This being the “Spice Land,” and it also being vulnerable, the Dutch struck here first. Cornelis de Houtman set sail from Texel Island on April 2, 1595, rounded the Cape and made for Java. The aim of the Amsterdam merchants was clear at the time. They had initially no special interest in India; the “Spice Islands” were their main attraction. To achieve solidarity in Eastern commerce, the Dutch formed on March 20, 1602, a monopolist body of rich merchants, which came to be known as “The United Company.” “Not only was the Company given the exclusive right to trade in all countries between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan, but within that area it was empowered to carry on war, to

conclude treaties, to take possession of territory, and to erect fortresses.”1 Thus a powerful body with the backing of its country’s Government became the instrument for the implementation of Dutch policy of a positive commercial expansion. With the formation of the United The Dutch and the Portiguese Company, the Dutch policy of establishing sea power in the East and evicting the Portuguese crystallized. With this end in view the Dutch sent powerful fleets to attack the Portuguese and repeated the venture regularly every year. The Dutch annexed Amboina in 1605, overran Jakarta in 1619, seized Malacca in 1641, and occupied Colombo in 1654. Thus the periphery of Portuguese power in the East was crumbling and their long-established commercial empire was facing imminent doom. The Dutch were primarily concerned with the spice trade in the Indies; the motives that led them to India were clearly of secondary consideration. “The Dutch traders were not slow to discover that the system of paying in money for the pepper and spices had grave disadvantages. At the same time they saw that there was an active commercial movement in existence, with Bantam, and especially Achin, as its intermediary centres, by which the population of the Archipelago exchanged their own products for cotton goods from Gujarat and from the Coromandel coast. The idea naturally arose of controlling that movement, eliminating the Arab and Indian middlemen, and paying for the spices with imported cotton goods.”2 This prompted the Dutch to send even during their early voyages Admiral Van der Haghen to the Indian waters to explore the possibilities of founding Dutch settlements. In 1603 at Calicut, the Admiral negotiated a trade treaty with the Zamorin, which gave the latter hopes of expelling the Portuguese from his territory. Van der Haghen then detached from his fleet, one of his naval units, DELFT, to Masulipatam on the east coast. Without much opposition the Dutch made a settlement in the port, and within a few years they expanded southward on the Coromandel coast and established factories at Nizampatam, Devanampatnam, Tiruppapuliyur and Pulicat. The last named port was bombarded by the Portuguese, the Dutch suffering severe losses. In view of the proximity of the

Portuguese settlement at St Thomas, the Dutch fortified Pulicat and staved off further attacks. The declining Portuguese naval power could not dislodge the Dutch from their settlements in the East. By 1613 the Dutch Commercial Directorate of the Coromandel Coast was so well established that it was upgraded to the status of a Government, with its seat at Pulicat; later, in 1689, it was transferred to Negapatam which port the Portuguese had lost to the Dutch in 1659. Thus the Dutch systematically eliminated the Portuguese bases and strategic points situated along the outer cordon of the Indian subcontinent and thus secured a foothold on the east coast of India. Having entrenched themselves on the Coromandel coast, they expanded northward and founded settlements at Balasore, Chinsura, Kasimbazar and Patna. They then turned their attention to the West Coast and founded a factory at Sural. With Colombo as their base of operations and having received reinforcement of a sizable fleet from home, the Dutch blockaded Goa periodically. In 1661 a large Dutch fleet under the command of Van Goens raided Quilon and occupied it. The fleet then went north and, in 1662, after bitter fighting, took Cranganore, Van Goens planned the capture of Quilon and Cranganore as a preliminary step, this being but the spring-board for his bigger offensive for the elimination of the Portuguese stronghold at Cochin. In 1662, the island of Vypin fell to the Dutch, and in November that year Van Goens’s fleet bombarded Cochin which was finally occupied. This marked the elimination of Portuguese naval power in the Indian Ocean and their decline to the role of a weak occupant of the minor establishments at Goa, Daman and Diu. Within a century of their advent, the Dutch had established maritime supremacy and were the leading European nation in maritime commerce in the 17th century. It was clearly by their command of the sea and their adequate appreciation of the value of sea power that the Dutch rose to this position in India. The Dutch massacre of the British at The Dutch and the British Amboina in 1623 obliterated them from the Indies. This forced the British to turn to India. In a sense this may be said to have laid the corner-stone for the foundation of the British Empire in India. The British, who had

established a trading centre at Surat in 1612, came into conflict with the Dutch. The English endeavoured, in vain, to drive a wedge between the new Dutch settlement at Surat and the Moghul Emperor Jahangir, whose goodwill was essential for the establishment of trading centres in India. While the British were quietly pursuing their commercial enterprise at Surat, the Dutch had wrenched the monopoly of overseas trade emanating from the West Coast of India and had reached a position of confidence in the Indian Ocean. “So conscious were they of their naval supremacy that in 1652 the outbreak of war with both England and Portugal was welcomed at Batavia as likely to turn to the Company’s advantage.”1 In the wake of the Anglo-Dutch wars, the primary cause of which was the rivalry in eastern overseas commerce, the Dutch interrupted the sea communication of the English between Surat and Bombay, the new British acquisition. The Dutch claimed some British merchant ships as prize in this area, as also in the Bay of Bengal. In the first AngloDutch War the British scored a decisive victory in European waters, which forced the Dutch to sue for peace. The effect was reflected on the Indian scene too. Thus the two nations, for a time, pursued their commercial interests without conflict. The second and the third wars began to tell upon Dutch supremacy in the Atlantic and in the Indian Ocean. The increasing British maritime The Decline of the Dutch supremacy in the Indian Ocean was primarily responsible for the fall of the Dutch power in India. The United Company of the Dutch had many defects in their commercial system. “Great as it had been as an empire-builder, able as it still was as a merchant, it failed as a colonial ruler.”2 The Company was fully committed in the Indies, and the administrative system was not properly decentralized for the efficient handling of affairs in India. The Company’s monopolistic adherence excluded the enterprising individual Netherlanders from participating in the ever-increasing overseas trade and, to a large measure, thwarted the economic advancement of the Indies. By 1823 the British obliterated all traces of Dutch power in India and all that remain today are a few buildings at Chinsura and Nega-patam.

3—The Coming of the British Although the appearance of the Portuguese in Indian waters demonstrated to the other maritime nations of the West the fruitfulness of the venture, a Papal bull forbade other Catholic powers to encroach on the monopoly enjoyed by Portugal. The advent of Protestantism largely nullified the Papal grant. The Dutch who had succeeded in breaking the Portuguese monopoly demanded exorbitant prices for pepper and other Indian goods in Western markets. This kindled the English spirit of defiance, which made them follow quickly in the wake of the Dutch ships. The enterprising entrepreneurs of England formed the East India Company in 1599, and obtained next year a Royal Charter from Queen Elizabeth. A fleet of four ships under the command of Captain James Lancaster sailed on the maiden voyage to the East and reached Sumatra. In this area the ships operated as privateers and returned to England. The Company’s ships made two such voyages to the Indies before their arrival in India. It was only on their third voyage that an attempt was made to open up trade with India, when William Hawkins presented himself in 1609 at the court of Jahangir for the favour of obtaining a fireman for trading rights. Owing to the strong protests made by the Portuguese at Surat, Jahangir was unable to grant a fireman. Hawkins was met by another British fleet under Sir Henry Middleton. Infuriated by Jahangir’s refusal, the latter sailed to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb in the Red Sea and by force bartered English goods for those carried by the Surat vessels passing the Straits. In addition, he extorted a large ransom before they were set free. J. C. Powell-Price remarks : “What could not be obtained by diplomacy was now gained by a display of what sea power meant.”1 Indeed, this had a salutary effect from the point of view of the British, for no sooner did this take place than the entrepot of Surat was made available to them. The East India Company, realizing the Portuguese Opposition obstructionist policy of the Portuguese, fitted out their ships as armed merchantmen and despatched a squadron under the command of Captain Thomas

Best, which reached Surat in 1612. Captain Best had no difficulty in obtaining the fireman, but soon encountered a squadron of Portuguese galleons outside the harbour. The British ships were better armed than the Portuguese ones, but the latter had superior sailing qualities. There were intermittent gun duels between the two squadrons for nearly a month, but the English emerged as the victors. After successfully warding off the Portuguese, the English set up their trading centres at Surat, Ahmedabad and Cambay. The year 1613 marks the beginning of an era of British progress in their chequered career in the establishment of their Empire in India. This year also witnessed the birth of the Indian Marine. So far, the Honourable East India Company’s Marine consisted of, at best, armed merchantmen manned by sailor-cum-traders, which were found to be adequate protection for merchandise carried in their own bottoms. But with the establishment of trade settlements on the West Coast, the progress in overseas commerce and the vulnerability of British shipping to attack by belligerent raiders, the defence commitments increased. This led to the formation of the Indian Marine, the exploits of which we shall record later on. The English continued to have difficulties with the Portuguese. The Viceroy of Goa was determined to disrupt British overseas trade by any means. In 1614 a British squadron consisting of four ships under the command of Captain Nicholas Downton arrived at Surat and put into the comparatively sheltered waters of Swally Hole. In January, 1615, the Portuguese Viceroy bore down on these ships, personally commanding a powerful fleet consisting of over forty sail, mounting large calibre guns, some even 42-pounders. The Portuguese ships with large draughts could not enter Swally, and had to be content with sending boarding parties after a bombardment. The English, however, succeeded in beating back the boarding parties and at the same time replying with their guns. The Portuguese ships retreated after their unsuccessful attack. Subsequently, in March, 1615, the ships of the Viceroy met the British ships off Swally, but the Portuguese did not make bold to attack despite a preponderance of armour, and HOPE, one of Downton’s ships, sailed away to England unmolested with merchandise from an Indian port for the first time. The Moghul Navy

did not participate in any of these actions. The Moghul Empire, vast as it was, great as it was on land, was utterly powerless at sea. Realizing their-weakness, the Moghuls are believed to have entreated Downton to prolong his stay to give them protection against Portuguese attacks at sea. Within six months of Downton’s departure, Captain Keeling brought Sir Thomas Roe in his ship. The arrival in India of King James’s Ambassador in the person of Sir Thomas Roe brought about Royal cognizance of the East India Company’s trade and paid dividends in their affairs, in India. In the beginning of the 17th Fight for Trade Supremacy century, the Eastern waters were dominated by the Portuguese and the English in India, and the Dutch in the Indies. About this period the Fight for Trade Supermacy three European naval powers in the East were by and large, balanced forces. Therefore, other than harassing raids on one another’s domains, a decisive battle with enduring results could not be achieved by any one power by itself. In 1619, consequent upon the political developments in the West, an alliance was evolved between the English and the Dutch against the Portuguese in India. The understanding was that each side should provide ten ships for defending their shipping and safeguarding their common interests. The combined fleets commenced their operations in 1621. Between the years 1622 and 1623, they successfully blockaded Goa and severed sea communication between Portuguese India and Lisbon. Encouraged by the results of the Anglo-Dutch alliance, the British ventured to open up trade with Persia. This created an unhealthy competition with the Surat-based Indian shipping and interfered with the Portuguese preserve of the Persian Gulf trade. There was the inevitable clash with the Portuguese off the Persian Gulf region, but with the Persian monarch’s interest in ousting the Portuguese, the British succeeded in laying siege to Ormuz and capturing it eventually. The fall of Ormuz jn 1622 marked the destruction of one of the pillars of Portuguese overseas commerce in the East. Paradoxically, as we see it in retrospect, the British and the Dutch, in league to evict a common foe, now waged war between

themselves in the Indian Ocean in 1652, as the result of the commencement of hostilities between the home countries. The Dutch virtually excluded British sea-borne commerce from the Persian Gulf and the West Coast; the overwhelming victories of the English in the Atlantic could by no means compensate for the heavy losses suffered in the Eastern waters. About this time the estranged relations between the English and the Portuguese were waning; they drew closer together, alienating the Dutch. It was more an alliance of convenience than one born of genuine friendship. The conflict between the Dutch and the Acquisition of Ports Portuguese gave the British a golden opportunity to consolidate their position in India by the acquisition of strategic ports along the peninsular coast. As early as 1611, the British had succeeded in establishing their factory at Masulipatam on the east coast. But incessant interference from the Dutch led the British to look for a more suitable location than Masulipatam. In 1639, Francis Day succeeded in getting the lease of Madras from the Raja of Chandragiri and fortified the sea port known as Fort St George. The British then expanded northwards and founded settlements in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. By 1690, they established a settlement at Calcutta and fortified the port. The factory was named after William of Orange and became the Fort William that we see today. All the settlements on the Coromandel coast were initially administered from Fort St George. In 1668, the East India Company obtained Bombay by a stroke of good fortune on a nominal rent from Charles II who had secured the island through his marriage to Catherine of Braganza. This was a godsend, as Surat was not a suitable base for the Company’s operations. Bombay, indeed, prospered, and in 1687 became the main British entrepot on the West Coast. Moghul-Maratha wars prompted the British to fortify the island lor reasons of security. The acquisition of these ports was necessary for the establishment of British maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The Royal Navy, powerful as it was in the Atlantic, operating hundreds of miles away from home bases, required these ports for logistic support; in addition, the ports catered for British commercial

needs. Thus grew the concept of a British Empire in the East based on paramount sea power. The policy of the East India Company, also underwent a radical change during this period. The Company’s Charter was modified by King Charles II in 1661. “Power was given to the Company to seize and send home interlopers; to wage war and conclude peace with non-Christian princes and to appoint governors, who in conjunction with their councils, were to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction at the various settlements.”1 The English first came as pacific traders but found it necessary to indulge in warlike activities, to annex territories, conclude treaties, establish settlements on Indian soil and rule over their enclaves to ensure commercial gain. This gradual transformation seems to have taken place partly due to the selfish reasons of the English, but primarily to political instability in India. As R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri and K. Datta observe : “The long warfare between the imperial forces, the Marathas and the other Deccan States, the Maratha raids on Surat in 1664 and 1670, the weak government of the Moghul viceroys in Bengal which became exposed to grave internal as well as external dangers, the disturbances caused by the Malabar pirates and the consequent necessity of defence made the change inevitable.”2 While the British were grappling with their European adversaries in the Indian Ocean, there was a noteworthy awakening in Indian maritime affairs, revived by two local powers, the Sidis of Indian and the Marathas. These two naval powers had caused the British to suffer for over a century immense loss in maritime trade until 1757 when Commodore James put an end to the last of the powers by the capture of Swarnadrug, the main Maratha naval base.

17. The Maratha Admiral Kanhoji Angre

18. Maratha grabs and gallivats attacking an English ship

19. A group of Naval Officers of the Marine Survey (1922-23)

20. Vice-Admiral H. Fitzherbert

21. R.I.N, ship off the Levant Coast

22. H.M.I.S. DELHI

23. Jawaharlal Nehru inspecting a “Division” on board H.M.I.S. DELHI

4—The Maratha Navy After the eclipse of the Zamorin’s fleet under Kunjali, the first of the local powers on the West Coast to dispute British naval supremacy in the coastal waters were the Sidis. While the Moghul naval interests were centred at Cambay, at the mouth of the Gulf of Cambay, the Sidis’ sea-borne commerce was based at the port of Janjira, some 50 miles south of Bombay. With the decline of the Deccan Sultanates, the Sidis rose to prominence; and the credit of developing a fleet based at Janjira goes to Malik Ambar. They also operated from Surat for the protection of Haj pilgrims travelling by sea. The Moghuls at Cambay under Aurangzeb and the Sidis at Janjira under the Bijapur Sultans made common cause and challenged any naval vessel in the coastal waters. The Sidis, however, were completely committed to settling their disputes with the Marathas. They set out from Surat and Janjira, and pillaged the Maratha country regularly. Shivaji, the founder of the Maratha Birth of the Maratha Navy Kingdom, was in 1646 fighting, on land, the power of the Bijapur Sultanate, established at Poena. The Maratha leader soon appreciated that his thrust on land towards the east could not be sustained unless he opened a second front on the North Konkan sector. Unable to subjugate the Janjira fort by an attack through land frontiers, Shivaji came to the conclusion that there was but one solution to obtain control of sea-borne commerce—the formation of a naval force. Accordingly, between the years 1659 and 1664, Shivaji embarked on a programme of fitting out a Maratha fleet; a series of bases on the Konkan coast sprang up to support it. The shipbuilding programme, the recruitment of sailors and the commissioning of the Maratha navy were undertaken with determination. As many as 500 vessels were constructed and the command of two fleets was vested in Admirals Mainaik Bhandari and Daulet Khan. The emergence of the Maratha The Sidis versus the Marathas navy in the initial stages did not present a serious threat either to the Sidis or to the British. The Sidis, under the patronage of Aurangzeb, The sidis of janjira

succeeded in operating freely in the coastal waters from Gujarat to Goa. Although there were stray skirmishes between Shivaji’s squadrons and the Janjira fleet, the Maratha navy was rendered ineffective by the Sidis who had complete control of the off-shore waters of the Konkan coast. The infant Maratha navy soon overcame its teething troubles and began to operate off the Konkan coast with increasing success. Shivaji’s administrative genius was largely responsible for evolving sound regulations for the efficient operation of the naval service. He took care to establish a proper organization for the logistic support of his fleet. Naval and armament stores were supplied to the fleet in accordance with an established scale. Personnel in the Service were recruited on contract and a free scale of rations was in existence. The Captains of ships were vested with varying degrees of financial powers in accordance with the rank and type of command held. In the year 1679 the English permitted the Sidi fleet to take refuge in Bombay harbour, which appeared to Shivaji as an alliance of convenience to overcome the Maratha fleet. The English had not forgotten Shivaji’s daring attack on Surat in 1664. Shivaji promptly despatched his fleet to annex the island of Khanderi situated to the south of the entrance to Bombay harbour. The Anglo-Sidi fleet endeavoured to evict the Marathas from the island. Despite prolonged fighting at sea off Bombay, the English could not dislodge Shivaji’s forces from the continued occupation of the island. The English, the Portuguese and the Moghuls were made to realize that Shivaji was not only powerful ashore but was making a determined bid to command the sea as well. With the sound foundations laid by Rise of Maratha Naval Power Shivaji, the Maratha fleet throve even after his death in 1680. It was in 1683 that the Maratha fleet under Admiral Sidhoji Gujar achieved a resounding victory in capturing two useful bases, Swamadmg ajid Vijayadrug, on the Konkan coast. Besides, Kolaba was wrested from the Sidis and turned into a strong naval base. Khanderi and Underi, strategically overlooking Bombay, were fortified and several other anchorages were improved.

In spite of a temporary set-back in the progress of the Maratha navy on account of the political struggle for the throne of Shivaji, and the death of Admiral Sidhoji Gujar in 1698, the fleet managed to survive primarily because of the untiring efforts of the famous Admiral Kanhoji Angre. Admiral Sidhoji Gujar was succeeded by Admiral Kanhoji Angre Kanhoji Angre, an admiral of outstanding ability, whose fleet disputed British naval power along the West Coast of India. Kanhoji had the hereditary background of a family of seafarers. His father, Tukaji, had distinguished himself in Shivaji’s fleet. Kanhoji rose from a humble position in the fleet as a boy to that of a deputy to Admiral Rajaram. On his taking over in 1699, Kanhoji sought the help of Balaji, the first Peshwa of the Marathas, and succeeded in getting governmental support to his naval policy of establishing mastery of the Konkan seas. Before embarking on any major operations at sea, he established his base at Vijayadrug in Ratnagiri, a natural harbour but a shallow port. The harbour suited him perfectly; whereas his small ships could enter and take shelter therein, his European adversaries with ships drawing deep draughts could not give chase up the shallow river. The entrance to the harbour was, in addition, protected by an overlooking fortress manned by crack troops. Kanhoji also developed his dockyard which was capable of building vessels, mounting guns and victualling the fleet. Backed by such massive logistic support his fleet was fast growing in strength. At this time his armada was made up of ten grabs, each of which mounted sixteen to thirty guns, and fifty gallivats with guns ranging from four to ten each, depending on their tonnage. Some of the grabs were as big as 400 tons and the gallivats of 120 tons. Hardly had Angre established his base when he had to face opposing naval forces. The Moghul fleet was disappearing from the sea, the Sidi naval power was petering out, the Portuguese naval supremacy in the East was on the wane and the Dutch naval forces were hardly concerned with naval affairs on the West Coast. The, main contenders were, therefore, the British, and for an effective opposition there had to be a combination of these forces. In 1699, the year of Kanhoji’s taking over the command, a tripartite coalition

consisting of the Sidis, the Moghuls and the Portuguese strove in a combined effort to put an end to the Maratha naval power. In the naval action that ensued, Kanhoji emerged victorious and annexed Sagargad. He also exacted revenue from many principalities along the Konkan coast. By the beginning of the 18th century Admiral Kanhoji Angre was in possession of the entire coast from Savantwadi to Bombay. There was hardly a creek, cove, harbour or estuary where he had not established fortifications—a citadel or fortress and navigational facilities. His mastery of the coastal waters emboldened him to levy a tax termed chauth on all shipping that voyaged within the Maratha territorial waters, and he introduced a system of passes. This bold step triggered the British guns, as it ran counter to the contemporary English procedure of permits. In 1717, Kanhoji seized the British ship SUCCESS. The British Governor, Mr Boone, retaliated with a strong naval force which went in to attack Vijayadrug, Kanhoji’s main naval base. The base was impregnable. The heavy ships of the British could not enter the harbour, nor could their smaller craft penetrate the boom at the entrance. The attack was repulsed by Kanhoji’s forces and Boone’s attempt ended ignominiously. In 1718, a second attempt was made, but this time on Kenery (Khanderi) which was then in Kanhoji’s possession. A squadron of British ships softened the beaches by bombardment and landed their men in a bid to capture it; they suffered severe losses and had to retreat. The British suffered further reverses when in 1720 another British vessel CHARLOTTE was seized by Kanhoji and taken as prize into Vijayadrug. Humiliated by these defeats, the English joined hands with the Portuguese, and in 1722 sent a combined expedition under Commodore Mathews against the island of Kolaba. Here, too, the European forces suffered heavy losses. “After this victory against the combined forces,” comments K. M. Panikktar, “Kanhoji’s power on the Konkan coast was unchallenged.”1 The other European naval power with which Kanhoji had not yet come into conflict was the Dutch. Angre had occasion to seize two Netherlands merchantmen, which lowered the prestige of the Dutch in the East. To regain it, a formidable Dutch fleet raided Vijayadrug in

1724, but this ended as ignominiously as the earlier European attacks on the fortress. By 1727 Kanhoji Angre’s naval supremacy in the coastal waters was at its peak. Coastal shipping was always convoyed; still, the English continued to lose ships owing to the vigilant operations of Kanhoji. Angre’s ships were dependent on the land and sea breezes which blow on the Konkan coast alternately in twenty-four hours. The land breeze seaward drops beyond the range of about forty miles, which was, therefore, a limiting factor for his sailing vessels. “His fleet consisted of grabs and gallivats, vessels peculiar to the Malabar coast. The grabs have rarely more than two masts, although some have three; those of three are about 300 tons but the others are not more than 150. They are built to draw very little water, being very broad in proportion to length, narrowing, however, from the middle to the end, where instead of bows, they have prows, projecting like those of a Mediterranean galley and covered with a strong deck level with the main deck of the vessel from which, however, it is separated by a bulkhead which terminates the forecastle. As this construction subjects the grab to pitch violently when sailing a head sea, the deck of the prow is not enclosed with sides as the rest of the vessel is, but remains bare, so that the water which dashes upon it may pass off without interruption. On the main deck under the forecastle are mounted two pieces of cannon of nine or twelve pounders, which point forwards through the portholes cut in the bulkhead and fire over the prow; the cannon of the broadside are from six to nine pounders. The gallivats are large row-boats built like the grab but of smaller dimensions, the largest rarely exceeding 70 tons; they have two masts, of which the mizen is very slight; the main mast bears only one sail, which is triangular and very large, the peak of it when hoisted being much higher than the’ mast itself. In general the gallivats are covered with spar deck, made of lightness of split bamboos, and these carry only ‘petteraroes’ which are fixed on swivels in the gunnel of the vessel; but those of the largest size have a fixed deck on which they mount six or eight pieces of cannon from two to four pounders. They have forty or fifty stout oars, and may be rowed four miles an hour. Eight or ten grabs, and forty or fifty gallivats, crowded with men, generally composed Angria’s principal

fleet destined to attack ships of force or burthen. The vessel no sooner came in sight of the port or bay where the fleet was lying than they slipped their cables and put out to sea. If the wind blew, their construction enabled them to sail almost as fast as the wind; if it was calm, the gallivats rowed towards the grabs. When within cannon shot of the chase, they generally assembled in her stern and the grabs attacked her at a distance with their prow-guns, firing first only at the masts and taking aim where the three masts of the vessel just opened all together to their view, by which means this shot would probably strike one or other of the three. As soon as the chase was dismasted they came nearer and battered her on all sides until she struck; and if the defence was obstinate, they sent a number of gallivats, with two or three hundred men in each who boarded, sword in hand, from all quarters in the same instant.”1 Intrepid commander as he was, impregnable fortress bases though he had, a formidable fleet though he commanded, yet Kanhoji failed to achieve the command of the sea. His ships were fast and capable of manoeuvring in restricted waters. His daring men brought off many victories at sea. At the peak of his glory he had a good opportunity to wrest the command of the sea from the British, but he failed to achieve this primarily because of a wrong concept of sea power. His naval forces were restricted to activities along the coast, but in heavy weather on the high seas they could not give chase to British ships far removed from the coast. The Maratha fleet was tied to the coast and had no advance bases away from the mainland to support it for any possible operations at a distance from its home bases. In other words Angle’s naval forces lacked freedom of manoeuvre and defence in depth. Some inconsiderate foreign historians have described Angre as a pirate of the Konkan coast. To say the least, it is an unfair and prejudiced assessment. His behaviour must be judged from contemporary practice and not from the present day concept of freedom of the high seas and the right of innocent passage for merchant ships plying within the limits of alien territorial sea. Captain James Lancaster’s privateering expedition to the Indies, referred to earlier, could also be described as an act of piracy. Angre was as much a pirate to the English as Sir Francis Drake was to the

Spaniards and as Admiral Kheyer-eddin Barbarossa was to the Tunisians. It is all a matter of opinion, as viewed from different perspectives. At any rate, Kanhoji Angre’s daring and brilliant services to his country have since been recognized by independent India : in memory of the Admiral a premier naval establishment in Bombay has been commissioned as I.N.S. ANGRE. There is some doubt regarding the date of Kanhoji’s death It has been variously put down by historians between the years 1728 and 1731. With the passing away of the gallant admiral, there arose several family feuds between his sons. In the wake of such domestic politics, the Sidis, the English and the Portuguese enjoyed a little respite from the incessant threat of the Maratha naval power. The English also tried to exploit the internal differences of this notable naval family of the Marathas. In the event, two sons of Kanhoji, Sakhoji and Sambhaji, divided the naval control of the territories between them. Sakhoji took control of Kolaba and Sambhaji that of Swarnadrug. This division of control of the territory was, to an extent, responsible for the diminution of the naval power of the Angres. In 1730, Sakhoji’s squadron of four grabs and fifteen gallivats bore down on two British vessels BOMBAY and BENGAL off the shores of Kolaba, and sank them. In 1732 the Maratha fleet attacked a British ship of the line, OCKHAM. The Maratha depredations thus proceeded unabated. In 1733 Sakhoji died, but his brother Sambhaji carried on the warfare with mounting crescendo. In 1738 Commodore Bagwell with his squadron of four ships sought Sambhaji’s fleet for a decisive action, but had to retreat after suffering some losses. The loss of English shipping grew larger continuously; the DERBY, RESTORATION and several others were lost in quick succession. Continual success in inflicting heavy damage on the British gave an opportunity to Sambhaji to propose to the English from a position of superiority that he would condescend to issue passes and thus give immunity to British shipping for a consideration of twenty lakh rupees a year. Needless to say, the offer was summarily rejected, although the British were suffering losses amounting to a figure much higher than the one quoted. Meanwhile, the English were making friendly overtures to Manaji, another brother of Sambhaji, who was in command of Kolaba, with a

view to creating a rift in the Maratha family. The British succeeded in the attempt, and within a year the British openly helped Manaji to repulse Sambhaji’s fleet which had come in to attack Kolaba. In the years that followed there were a few inconclusive battles at sea. Commodore James’s squadron in 1748 and Commodore Lisle’s fleet in the following year had encounters with the Maratha fleet under Tulaji who had succeeded Sambhaji. Tulaji was, however, successful in taking a sizable toll of British shipping. The English were alarmed at the losses and made a determined effort to eliminate the Maratha naval power. Plans were made in 1755 to seize Vijayadrug, after a preliminary reconnaissance of the impregnable Maratha base. It was a matter of good fortune for the British that a formidable squadron under Admiral Watson was available in Bombay harbour. It is a matter of regret that the sad story of family feuds persisted and that the Peshwas allied themselves with the British for the reduction of Vijayadrug. The broad plan was that a strong army under Lieutenant-Colonel Clive and the Peshwa land forces should make their thrusts on land, simultaneously aided by Admiral Watson’s naval gun fire support. In the event, after an obstinate resistance the strong base finally fell into the hands of the British on April 7, 1756. This marked the end of the glorious Maratha naval power. After the eclipse of this power, there was no local naval power whatsoever to challenge British naval supremacy in the East. However, a new naval power, the French, who were in a position to dispute the British command of the sea, had already entered the Eastern waters, and we shall presently see the contest on the Indian seas between these two that ensued, in which Indians largely played the part of lone spectators.

5—The French Challenge While the British were preoccupied on the West Coast with the suppression of the Maratha naval power, there appeared on the east coast yet another foreign power in the shape of the French. Among the four important maritime powers of the West who ventured to establish overseas commerce in the East, the French were the last

to enter the Orient. They had, however, made occasional visits to the Malabar coast from 1527, but it was not until the beginning of the 17th century that they began organized commercial voyages to the East. It was through the enthusiasm of Colbert, the creator of the French Nayy, that France was made to note the immense benefits that accrued to the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English in Eastern commerce. The French India Company was formed in 1664, but the ships of the line under Caron did not reach the Indian waters until December 24, 1667, when they touched Cochin. From there Caron went on to Surat where he established the first French factory. Within two years of the arrival of the French in India, they had founded a settlement at Masulipatam on the east coast by obtaining a fireman from the Sultan of Golkonda. By 1688 they had also established a trading centre at Chandranagore and a few other smaller settlements on the east coast. The French, after settling The French versus the Dutch down on the east coast, turned their attention to Ceylon which had attractive commercial ports; but the Dutch, who were firmly established in the island, ejected the French from there by The French the efforts of the Dutch Admiral Van Goens. In 1672, the French Admiral De la Haye succeeded in taking St Thome on the east coast from the possession of the Dutch. Thus, the French, soon after their arrival in the Indian waters, had inflamed the Dutch and were courting trouble. In 1674, the Dutch persuaded the Sultan of Golkonda to evict the French from St Thome. While the Sultan was at this task, attacking the French with his army on land, St Thome was successfully blockaded by the Dutch who forced the French to capitulate. Driven out of St Thome and having all but lost Masulipatam, the French were at sea and had to look for a suitable port. Francis Martin, an enterprising Frenchman, found Pondicherry answering his requirements, and settled a French colony there. Though Pondicherry is by no means a port but only an open roadstead, it suited the French as enemy warships could not enter it and surprise them. “Its situation, sheltered for nine months in the year from the monsoon, the inconsiderable surf, and the fact of there being a little river falling into the sea

navigable for flat-bottomed boats, rendered it superior as a settlement to any other place on the Coromandel coast.”1 Between the years 1674 and 1693, the settlement throve admirably and managed to survive Shivaji’s wars in the Camatic. In 1693, the French and the Dutch were at war in the West. The Dutch in India were waiting all along for an opportunity to eliminate the rival company of traders from the Coromandel coast. The Dutch, therefore, pounced on the French at Pondi-cherry in August that year. A formidable Dutch fleet of nineteen sail, mounting a total of sixteen guns and six mortars, rendezvoused off Pondicherry. Francis Martin put up a stiff resistance despite meagre resources, and had no option but to capitulate. During the temporary occupation of Pondicherry the Dutch improved upon its fortifications. When hostilities between the two countries in Europe ended in 1697, Pondicherry was restored to the French who re-established themselves, backed by the presence of a squadron of ships anchored at the roadstead. In 1701, the seat of the French Government in India was established at Pondicherry and the settlement at Surat was closed down. The loss of Surat made the French look for another suitable trading post on the West Coast. In 1725, a squadron of French ships under the command of Commodore M. de Pardaillan set sail from Pondicherry to the shores of the Malabar coast in search of a possible opening for a settlement at a place not in the possession of any of the foreign powers. Between Cannanore and Calicut, they found a small coastal town, and seized it. It was the ingenuity of the famous Captain Bertrand Francis Mahe La Bourdonnais that made the capture of this place possible. Even small craft could not penetrate the shallow creek, and the town was protected by a rising hill from the shores of the beach. La Bourdonnais constructed, on the spot, rafts capable of navigating the creek and landed with his troops, while the ships’ guns softened the beaches. In recognition of La Bourdonnais’s brilliant effort, Commodore de Pardaillan christened the town “Mahe” after the Captain’s name. Not only did the French thus obtain a footing on the West Coast, but they also expanded their settlements on the east coast, and acquired Karikal.

In 1744 the War of the Austrian Succession broke out between England and France, and the hostilities were reflected with equal animosity in the Eastern theatre. During this period Dupleix was at the helm of the French Company’s affairs in India. The French at Pondicherry had, in the recent past, suffered from the inroads of Shivaji, and their defences were at a low ebb. French naval power in the Indian Ocean was based at Mauritius, under La Bourdonnais, the Governor of the island. On the eve of the declaration of the War of Austrian Succession, France strove to get the English to preserve a state of neutrality in the Indian theatre. With such wishful thinking on the part of the French authorities, a major part of La Bourdonnais’s naval force was withdrawn from Mauritius to the West. “He (La Bourdonnais) knew the full significance of that order; he felt that it was to give up, for the coming war at all events, all hope for French preponderance in India; he felt that it would leave him a powerless spectator of the triumphs of the English—disarmed and defenceless, perhaps even a prey to their attacks.”1 He obeyed orders under protest; in retrospect we may say that his fears came true despite his efforts in the eleventh hour to rectify the French mistake. While this was the French position in the East, the British Admiralty, aware of a possible conflict, had already deployed a squadron of four ships in the Indian waters, ready to prey on French shipping, should an opportunity present itself. This force was later reinforced by a few more units. When Dupleix received intelligence of the British plans, he immediately appealed to La Bourdomiais for assistance. “This action of the French Governor (Dupleix) was not so much with a view to secure the command of the sea or the destruction of the British fleet, but to give him support in his designs.”2 Dupleix, the competent soldier that he, was, and versatile in statecraft, was yet oblivious of the advantages of maritime strength. La Bourdonnais, for his part, fully appreciated the necessity of sea power to maintain the colonial French Government in the East. The Governor of Mauritius, therefore, disregarded the passive directive from Paris, and busied himself with gathering an improvised fleet by commandeering the merchantmen in the port and fitting The AngloFrench Wars

them out with guns and armament and stores as best as he could with the meagre resources available to him. He managed to gather a fleet of nine ships and arrived off Mahe by June, 1746. Of his fleet, only one was a true man-of-war, the ACHILLE. Meanwhile, the British squadron under Commodore Barnet started operating off the Malacca Straits, the focal point of Eastern trade routes, where it achieved several sinkings of French shipping. By the middle of 1746, the British squadron reached the Coromandel coast, as Commodore Barnet had received intelligence of the impending arrival of a French fleet in that area. Soon after his arrival Commodore Barnet died and the command of the British squadron was taken over by Commodore Peyton, an irresolute commander. On July 6 of that year, the two forces ran into each other off Negapatam. A comparison of the French and British naval forces should be of interest here. The following statement shows the strength of the two forces, the figures within brackets indicating the number of guns mounted :

Merchantmen converted -do-do-do-do-do-

Admiral La Commodore Peyton’s Bourdonnais’s British Squadron French Fleet The ACHILLE (70)—The MEDWAY (60)— Flagship Flagship The BOURBON (38) The PRESTON (50) The PHŒNIX (34) The NEPTUNE (30) The INSULAIRE (26)

The HARWICH (50) The WINCHESTER (50) The MEDWAY’S PRIZE(40) D’The LIVELY (20)

The DUC ORLEANS(20) Three other Vessels (24 each)

At first sight it would appear that the French had superiority in number of units. It would also seem that the French had an edge

over the British in armament, gun for gun. A closer scrutiny, however, reveals that the calibres of the British guns were all twenty-four pounders, whereas the French ones consisted mainly of eight and twelve pounders, except those of ACHILLE which had the heavier armament matching the British. It should also be remembered that, though superior in numbers, the majority of the French fleet was made up of hurriedly converted merchantmen, whereas the British squadron was a proper naval force equipped for a fighting role. Some French historians claim that La Bourdonnais had the better calibre of men; on the other hand, some English writers state that the British crews of Peyton’s force were in good fighting fettle. By and large, it could be said that there was, more or less, parity between the two forces, with perhaps just an edge of superiority with the British. When the forces manoeuvred, the British ships obtained a favourable position in relation to the prevailing wind and engaged the opponents with their long-range guns safely away from the reach of the bulk of the French trajectories. The ACHILLE alone could reply with any effect. Before the ACHILLE’s guns could be brought to bear on the English ships, three of La Bourdonnais’s ships, carrying smaller armament were hit and rendered out of action. Peyton’s ships now concentrated their fire on the French flagship. Fortunately for the French, dusk fell and the action was called off by both sides. At dawn on July 7, the two forces found themselves in a position where the tactical advantage rested with the British. The casualties from the previous day’s action on the French side were more considerable than the British’s, in ships and men. Commodore Peyton failed to drive home the advantage he had gained when he decided to break off the overnight engagement. The British squadron sailed away from the area, Commodore Peyton thereby disregarding a valuable principle of war—maintenance of the aim. La Bourdonnais had two courses open to him : one was to give chase to the fleeing enemy and destroy him, the other to attack Madras, the British main base on the east coast, the sea approaches to which had been left undefended by the British squadron. He could not make a snap appreciation of the situation as he was not aware of the intentions of Peyton’s force. Were the British ships to go back to Madras after

repairing their slender damages, La Bourdonnais’s position would become vulnerable and an attack on Madras would then be rendered untenable. Some of his own ships having been disabled, La Bourdonnais decided to put into Pondicherry and consult Dupleix. The whereabouts of the British squadron being still unknown to the French, Dupleix, too, was in a quandary. After protracted consultations when diverse opinions were expressed as to the next course of action to be taken, La Bourdonnais set sail on September 12, 1746, to attack Madras and within nine days he secured the capitulation of the port. After this French success, there cropped up a series of grave differences of opinion between La Bourdonnais and Dupleix regarding the treatment of Madras. This resulted in mutual recrimination and unnecessary loss of ground and of French prestige. While La Bourdonnais believed that Madras would be untenable without the command of the sea, Dupleix insisted that Madras should not be released for ransom but retained. In the event, La Bourdonnais left Madras to its fate in October, but only after the first onset of the monsoon had taken its toll of some of his ships. With the disappearance of La Bourdonnais’s ships and with the English fleet reinforced, the command of the sea was re-established by the British. Dupleix’s plans for controlling his territorial gains by a land army proved fatal, and the tables were turned on him when Pondicherry was subjected to a systematic blockade by the British. Dupleix learnt the bitter lesson of the importance of sea power in the Indian Ocean the hard way. The battles waged in the Eastern theatre amongst foreign nations were primarily the result of domestic politics in their home countries, and once peace was concluded in Europe, the status quo ite was restored on the Indian subcontinent. Thus, with the signing of a peace treaty between England and France at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, the possessions in India reverted to the respective countries. That, however, did not mark the end of the French challenge at sea, nor was peace maintained in Europe and India. Even before the Seven Years’ War broke out, the uneasy peace between the English and the French was broken by various clashes in India.

In 1757, the French made a second attempt at crippling the British ships in the East, being determined to oust the English from India. In accordance with a grandiose French plan, a sizable expedition consisting of over two thousand troops, convoyed by a large escort force, set sail from France on May 2, 1757. The over-all command of the expedition was entrusted to Lally, an intrepid commander. The escorting fleet was under d’Ache, an irresolute and nervous commander. It was due to d’Ache’s weakness that the convoy took almost a whole year to reach the Indian waters. He was unprepared to expose his ships to the alleged hazards at the Cape during the period of equinox. He wasted considerable precious time by steering miles out of his course on such flimsy pretexts. Finally the fleet that appeared north of Pondicherry on April 28, 1758, consisted of the following ships : LE ZODIAQUE (74 guns), DUC DE BOURGOGNE (60), BIEN A1ME (58), VENGEUR (54), SAINT LOUIS (50), DUC D’ ORLEANS (50), CONDE (44), MORAS (44), and SYLPHIDE (36). In the meantime, a squadron of British ships under Commodore Stevens sailed from England, almost three months after d’Achc had left France, and reached Madras by the direct route nearly five weeks ahead of the French fleet. The British squadron thus reinforced the fleet under Admiral Pocock which was already operating in the Bay of Bengal. The reinforced fleet consisted of the following ships, the number of guns mounted being shown in brackets: CUMBERLAND (66), YARMOUTH (64), ELIZABETH (64), WEYMOUTH (60), TIGER (60), NEWCASTLE (50), SALISBERY (50), and PROTECTOR (44). This fleet left Madras on April 17, 1758, and set an intercepting course southward. The British fleet had seven ships of Fleet Action off Negapatam the Royal Navy and one from the Bombay Marine. The men of this fleet were fully “worked up.” The French crews, on the other hand, were in a state of exhaustion after a tiring voyage, and they lacked sufficient training. The units of the French fleet, with the exception of LE ZODIAQUE, were carrying troops to capacity. These factors, to some degree, diminished the fighting efficiency of the French fleet. When the two fleets met, d’Ache’s ships were in a close line-ahead formation but for two stragglers. Admiral Pocock immediately

manoeuvred his fleet into line-ahead and closed the enemy. Soon both fleets fired their broadsides and the two flagships were engaging each other. The firing by the English was accurate and caused heavy casualties to the French personnel on the overcrowded ships. Five ships of the French fleet were put out of action. Although the accuracy of the French fire was poor, it had scored some chance hits which destroyed a few masts, sails and superstructure of the enemy ships. The action, which lasted for about two hours, was called off as both sides had suffered significant damage. The French fleet sailed to Pondicherry and the British returned to Madras. The British loss was 31 killed and 116 wounded, and the French one was heavy: 251 killed and 602 wounded. The casualties among the Senior Officers were Commodore Stevens and Captain Martin of the CUMBERLAND, and the French Admiral and his flag-captain. The French ship BIEN AIME ran aground during action. Soon after Lally reached Pondicherry, he organized an assault by land on Fort St David and captured it in a blitzkrieg action. He then wanted to launch a joint attack on Madras with his land and naval forces. d’Ache did not agree to Lally’s plans. His contention was that the proper role of his force was to prey on enemy shipping in the Indian Ocean. Some historians attribute d’Ache’s refusal to cooperate in the siege of Madras to his fear of encountering the British fleet in the process. Although Lally was vested with wide administrative and executive powers over French affairs in India, the command of the French fleet was solely in the hands of d’Ache. Irrespective of whether the opinion on military operations of Lally or d’Ache was correct, a dual control, with the absence of a supreme commander for the French in India, stands out as one of the major defects in their administration. Misunderstandings between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais, both of whom had ill-defined spheres of authority, had similarly affected French advancement in India. d’Ache’s naval force put to sea on July 28, 1758, on a mission of his own choosing, the cherished hope of raiding enemy merchant ships. He entertained high hopes when, on August 1, he originally sighted off Tranquebar some English sails looming large on the horizon; but as he drew nearer he found to his dismay that they were

none other than Admiral Pocock’s fleet. “After a severe engagement of about two hours, in which he lost many men (over 500) and was himself wounded, he had been completely worsted, and had saved himself only by the superior sailing qualities of his ships.”1 He then returned to the French base and maintained “a fleet in being” at Pondicherry roads for a period of one month. Thereafter, he sailed away from India on September 2, 1758, which left the British the unchallenged masters of the Indian seas until his reappearance a year later. During his absence for a whole year from India, d’Ache had spent his energies refitting his battered ships at Mauritius. "Without a naval base nearer than Mauritius, it was impossible for the French commander to keep his fleet at sea, and he had at a crucial time in the land campaign to withdraw to his base to recondition his ships.”1 This was not so with the British; they had suitable bases in their possession such as Bombay and Madras which could attend to periodic refits and urgent repairs. A year’s absence of the French ships from the Indian waters, therefore, could not be helped. Anyway, when the French fleet reappeared at Fort St David on September 10, 1759, it was reinforced, rearmed and refitted, and consisted of the following ships :

Admiral Pocock’s fleet, likewise reinforced, consisting of the following ships, bore upon d’Ache’s fleet the very day of its arrival :

A furious engagement ensued at about 2 p.m. that day which lasted for over two hours and even at the end of which it was indecisive. “By that time,” observes Col. G. B. Malleson, “several of the ships on both sides were greatly crippled, and some of those of the French leaving the line for the purpose of refitting; the officer who commanded LE ZODIAQUE, her captain having been killed, put his helm up to follow them. d’Ache running to reverse the order was struck in the thigh by a grape-shot and fell senseless. There was no one left to correct the error, and the other ships of the squadron, following what they believed to be their Admiral’s order, hauled out of action, and made sail to join their consorts, the English being too crippled to follow them.”1 Soon after this action, d’Ache decided to leave the Indian waters for good, in spite of entreaties from Lally to stay on to reap the benefits of having crippled the British fleet. The decision of d’Ache marked the doom of the French power in India. By now the British naval force was reinforced by a squadron under Rear-Admiral Cornish who came to relieve Pocock. As the British fleet had no hostile naval force to deal with, Cornish was called upon to cooperate with the land forces in capturing various French posts. After the fall of Wandiwash in 1760, the French settlements fell like nine pins, including Pondicherry which was taken in 1761 by the British. The joint action by sea and land forces of the British was very well co-ordinated and executed. “The principal cause which had contributed to this complete victory was certainly the relentless pressure of sea power. Although the French fleet was never

destroyed, yet the cumulative effect of the three actions which were fought established an irresistible superiority.”2 The truce between the French and the English during the period 1763 to 1778 restored the original colonies to the respective powers. But by 1778, the English had become firmly established on Indian soil, deriving their strength from sea power in the Indian Ocean. “Consequently, unless Britain permanently lost her command of the seas, there was no possibility of her Empire in India being seriously in danger.”3 When the War of American Independence broke out, the French were once again at war with the English and endeavoured to regain their losses in India. On February 13, 1782, a powerful French fleet of 12 ships under the command of Suffren, an admirable commander, arrived off Madras. Four days after his arrival, an indecisive engagement took place between the French fleet and the English flotilla of 9 ships under Sir Edward Hughes. After a brief action the French fleet put into Porto Novo, and the English flotilla proceeded to Trincomalee. The adversaries met again off Trincomalee on April 11, where a severe battle ensued resulting in heavy losses on both sides, though the action was indecisive. The British loss was 137 killed and 430 wounded, the casualties in the Flagship alone amounting to 59 killed and 96 wounded. Again in the same year, on July 5, another action at sea took place off Negapatam. The English nearly won this battle but a sudden change in the prevailing wind direction helped Suffren to make a quick getaway. Both fleets, battered in the three sea battles that were waged in such quick succession, took time off to refit and re-equip. Suffren, despite lack of facilities, managed to bring his ships to a state of sea-worthiness sooner than his adversary. On August 31, Suffren succeeded in capturing Trincomalee. On September 2, the British arrived off Trincomalee, but it was too late to save the port. At dawn next day the French fleet had sailed. The British Admiral sought after Suffren’s fleet and intercepted it. A threehour battle ensued and would have continued further but for nightfall. Although the British casualties in the encounter were 51 killed including two Captains and 283 wounded, the English are said to have scored a gain in this battle.

The next decisive bout at sea came on June 20, 1783, when Suffren’s naval force, in defiance to Bussy’s orders, left Trincomalee and met Hughes’s fleet off Cuddalore. The French fleet consisted of fifteen ships carrying a total of 1018 guns, whereas the British naval force was made up of eighteen ships mounting 1202 guns in all. The British obviously had a preponderance in numbers as well as in armament. “The practical outcome was that, boldly attacking a materially superior force, the French in two hours of hard close fighting inflicted losses on the British greater than they suffered themselves,” says Admiral Sir H. W. Richmond.1 The main reason given for the British failure has been insufficiency of guns’ crew, caused by scorbutic casualties. There is no gainsaying the fact that Suffren’s challenge to British naval supremacy was indeed effective in so far as it went. He could not further exploit his success as peace was concluded between the two countries in Europe. The reasons that may be given for the French failure to establish naval supremacy in the East are broadly five. In the first place, they had not given serious thought to the paramount necessity of controlling the seas if they were to sustain their colonies in the East. Secondly, even when they were in a position to assert their might in the Indian Ocean, they did so in a half-hearted manner, their efforts being in spurts and not sustained. Thirdly, the division of command of the naval and land forces led to serious break-downs in ventures demanding unified action. Fourthly, the lack of adequate base facilities compelled their naval forces to desert the Indian seas and return to Mauritius for refitting and rearming. Finally, with the extinction of the French fleet at Trafalgar in 1805, the naval power of the British became paramount not only in Europe but also in the East. With the end of the French challenge in British Supremacy the Indian Ocean, the British reigned supreme without any interruption for well over a century in these waters until 1941 when British Supremacy they had to face a serious threat from the Japanese. The reason is not far to seek for their emerging victorious in India, after a long struggle with her European adversaries as well as some Indian naval powers from time to time. Although they first entered the Indian

Ocean primarily for trade, the British realized that for sound trading in a country lacking political balance, as India was at the time, it was necessary to have their interests safeguarded by armed forces, and to have their enclaves provided with adequate security. The establishment of such autonomous settlements led to the necessity of their being maintained, financed and directed from England, thousands of miles across the ocean. Soon it became a two-way channel, with England receiving material benefits from the Company’s earnings and supplying the enclaves in turn naval and land forces and war-making wherewithal to sustain their expanding colonies. The entire trade between their home country and the colonies in India, it should be remembered, was carried by sea, which during this period was infested not only by corsairs but enemy raiders of varying nationalities fluctuating in step with the march of history. It was of prime importance to the British—indeed to any maritime country which depends on sea-borne trade—to ensure the protection of their shipping. The emergence of British naval power in the East went hand in hand with the development of their bases in the subcontinent. Their progress in India grew with their annexation of the peripheral bases around the Indian seas. Most of these outlying bases were acquired by the British by using India as their support area for the operations. As early as 1622, Ormuz, dominating the entrance to the Persian Gulf, was taken by the British, acting in consort with Persian monarchs. With the acquisition of Malacca in 1759 and Singapore in 1824, the British took control of the Straits of Malacca, the focal point of shipping routes and the eastern gateway to the Indian Ocean. With Trincomalee taken from the Dutch in 1781 and Mauritius annexed in 1810 from the French, the British were extending their zone of control. In course of time, every important island-base in the west Indian Ocean was in their possession—Laccadives, Maldives, Seychelles and Chagos. Aden fell in 1839 to a naval expedition mounted from Bombay. “With her unchallenged supremacy in the Mediterranean, and with the acquisition of authority over Egypt and the annexation of Cyprus, the Mediterranean route to India became a private subway for Britain, with controls at different stages—

Gibraltar, Malta, Port Said and Aden. The Red Sea became an exclusively British sea lane, bolted and barred at both entrances, Aden assumed the importance it possessed during the times of Egyptian and Arabian navigation in the Indian Ocean, and it may be well said that the Suez Canal became, as events developed, the strongest link in the chain which bound India to Britain.”1

V

THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN NAVY 1 The Indian Marine During the early years of the advent of the British in the East, the Indian seas were infested by corsairs and privateers of numerous belligerent nations, as well as those of India. It was customary for the maritime nations involved in sea-borne trade to take the precaution of arming their merchant ships against depredations at sea. The British East India Company commissioned armed trading vessels, capable of fighting at sea, in addition to being carriers of merchandise. The earliest such vessels to arrive at Sur at on September 5, 1612, consisted of the DRAGON and HOSEANDER, the squadron being under the command of Captain Thomas Best. Soon after the arrival of Captain Best’s ships in India, they faced incessant attacks from Portuguese ships. The East India Company realized that the opposition of the belligerents in India was stubborn and that the simple precaution of arming their merchantmen, manned by sailorcum-traders on board, would not meet the situation adequately. They also appreciated the fact that when their armed merchant ships were away from the Indian shores on their mission of delivering goods in England, the port settlements were without seaward defence. These reasons led to the formation of the Indian Marine in 1613. The practice of using the East India Company’s Marine, consisting of armed merchantmen, for shipping, however, continued. This year should be noted as the historic one marking the beginning of the Navy in India. It should be of interest to mention that the first regular regiment of the British Army in India was raised only in 1660, 47 years after the establishment of the Navy in India.1 A humble beginning was made in 1613 when the nucleus of a naval force consisting of grabs and gallivats1 was commissioned by

the Company. The service, which came to be popularly known as the “grab service,” attracted enough British officers from the armed merchant vessels. These ships were manned by Hindu fishermen of the Konkan coast who were the first Indians to be employed as sailors by the Company. The initial role of the Indian Marine was equally modest: it was to protect the Company’s shipping in the Gulf of Cambay, in the navigable estuary-of the Tapti discharging at Surat, and in the river approaches of the Narmada at Broach. Soon after its formation, the Indian Marine was called upon to act in consort with Downton’s British squadron against the Portuguese attacks, as narrated earlier. In these actions the Marine acquitted itself creditably. By 1615 the services of the Indian Marine were considered indispensable; the Marine was reinforced, attaining a total strength of ten grabs and gallivats. In 1622 the Indian Marine was pressed into service to mount an expedition on Ormuz in the Persian Gulf in the possession of the Portuguese. The naval expedition, consisting of the LONDON, JONAS, WHALE, DOLPHIN, LION and four pinnaces2, set sail on December 23, 1621, and arrived off Ormuz on January 19, 1622. The squadron, acting in consort with the Persian army, stormed Ormuz. After protracted fighting with the Portuguese, Ormuz, which controlled the trade routes between the Persian Gulf and India, fell into British hands. In this operation the Officers and men of the Marine earned well-deserved praise for their gallant action and devotion to duty. The morale of the Marine was very high. The Marine steadily expanded; in 1635 four indigenously-built pinnaces were, added to the squadron. Its administration was improved, and it became a disciplined service. The Commander of the Marine was vested with disciplinary powers and was legally empowered to request for a court martial. The first court to assemble in India was the one held on board CHARLES at Surat to try one Gregory Lellington who was accused of murder. On the rise of the Maratha naval power in 1664, the Marine was constantly engaged in fighting Shivaji’s fleet. Paradoxically, their first engagement was against the Maratha land forces. When, on January 5, 1664, Shivaji made a surprise attack on Surat, the grabs and gallivats of the Marine took their stations on the river Tapti and

opened up at the horsemen attacking the factory. They put up such a barrage that the factory was saved. With Shivaji’s fleet active on the Konkan coast and the Malabar corsairs still in operation on the West Coast, it became increasingly necessary for the Indian Marine to be reinforced to cope with the escorting of convoys in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. In 1669 orders were placed for the construction of two pinnaces and two brigantines at the Bombay dockyard. The operations by the Sidi fleet in Bombay area and the increasing activity of the Marathas around Bombay drew much of the attention of the Indian Marine to this region in 1679. In the same year, the financial position of the Company having deteriorated owing to excessive expenses in maintaining the armed forces, the Marine was retrenched considerably. This was a retrograde step from the point of view of the British as this was the crucial time when the Maratha fleet was in the ascendant, and Shivaji had occupied Khanderi. A few engagements ensued between the Marine and the Maratha fleet off Khanderi, in most of which Shivaji’s forces emerged victorious. While the Indian Marine was grappling with Shivaji’s fleet, a small group of military officers under the misguided leadership of Captain Richard Keigwin, commander of the Bombay garrison, revolted in 1683 against the Surat administration. The rebellion was gathering momentum and would have resulted in an ugly mutiny but for the timely intervention of Sir Thomas Grantham, acting under authority from the King of England. The Marine was in no way involved in this episode, except that some of the ships lying in Bombay harbour were seized by Keigwin. With the increasing facilities at Bombay and the advantage of an excellent sheltered harbour there, Surat was losing its importance; and, in 1686, the seat of the British Colonial Government was transferred to Bombay. With this change, the Indian Marine came to be based at Bombay. 2—The Bombay Marine and the Indian Navy The Bombay Marine (1686-1829)

With the transfer of the base of the Indian Marine to Bombay in 1686, the force was redesignated the Bombay Marine. It continued its operations on the West Coast, convoying British shipping; in the process it had a prolonged struggle with the Maratha Navy. A litde over a decade after being commissioned as the Bombay Marine, the force had to face stiff opposition at sea against Kanhoji’s fleet. The main function of the Bombay Marine during its existence was to protect Bombay from the naval threat by the Sidis and the Marathas. The Bombay Marine was, therefore, manned even at the peril of withdrawing seamen from the trading ships of the Company. For nearly fifty years the struggle with the Maratha fleet continued. There is no doubt that without the backing of the Royal Navy’s heavy ships, the Bombay Marine could not have wiped the Maratha fleet off the West Coast. By 1716 the Bombay Marine had come to be of great use to the East India Company. The Fleet was by then sizable. It had a 32-gun ship, four grab-ships, each mounting 20 to 28 guns, and twenty grabs and gallivats with guns ranging from 5 to 12 each. The whole force was under the command of Commodore Mathews, who was designated the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Marine. Two years before the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession, the apparent lull in hostilities led the British to reduce imprudently the Bombay Marine to a very small size; the RESTORATION and NEPTUNE’S PRIZE were the only two major ships, apart from a few grabs and gallivats. They realized their grave error early when they found that the ever-increasing merchant fleet was inadequately protected. Consequent on the threat of war with France, the Bombay Marine was enlarged in the eleventh hour, and the expanded force now consisted of three 28-gun ships, one 20-gun ship and about 14 grabs and gallivats. During the long series of Anglo-French wars, the ships of the Bombay Marine took an active part in the operations at sea, side by side with the Royal Navy ships. Mention has been made earlier of the REVENGE and the PROTECTOR which participated under Pocock’s fleet in the struggle against the French naval forces. The natural

outcome of the participation of the Bombay Marine in these wars was the steady progress of the Service. When Connodore James assumed the office of the Commanderin-Chief of the Bombay Marine in 1751, the composition of his flotilla was as follows : PROTECTOR (Flagship)—44 gun “capital cruiser,” BOMBAY—32 gun “frigate,” GUARDIAN— 28 gun “frigate,” REVENGE—28 gun “frigate,” DRAKE—14 gun “grab,” PRINCE AUGUSTUS—14 gun “grab,” RESOURCE —14 gun “grab,” SUCCESS—14 gun “ketch,” DEFENCE—14 gun “ketch,” SWALLOW —14 gun “ketch,” TRIUMPH, VIPER —Bomb ketch, and over a dozen gallivats. These ships were officered only by Europeans but the complement of the crew was mixed and contained in some ships up to threefourths of locally recruited sailors. Thus the Marine was getting into a well-organized service primarily for defending the Company’s trade interests at sea. “So long as there was peace with European powers it undertook the whole burden of defence from the Persian Gulf to China. When war with European powers occurred, it dealt with the lesser navies of the Country Powers, either singly or in conjunction with the Royal Squadron.”1 A series of improvements in the Service was introduced in 1761. Till that year the personnel in the Marine Service was free to wear any kind of clothing, but now a regular uniform was prescribed, which reform was conducive to discipline. The Bombay Marine, from its humble beginnings, gradually grew into a disciplined service and reached the stature of a small Navy, although its designation remained the same. No doubt the presence of their “big brother,” the Royal Navy, overshadowed the activities of the Bombay Marine and stole the thunder of the Marine’s glory to a great extent. As Admiral Sir H. W. Richmond observes : “The fact that no spectacular battles were fought at sea by that force must not blind our eyes to the importance of the work of this detached flotilla; for though in normal times, when no European Naval forces were in the Eastern seas, it was a navy in itself, with its own capital ships and lesser classes, in this war it was, strategically, a flotilla.”2 The Bombay Marine was called upon to undertake a seaborne assault on Hyder Ali’s ports on the Malabar coast, which ended in a

complete success. “It was due to the existence of that force that operations against Hyder in Mysore were possible, that the Royal squadron with its very scanty forces did not have to make detachments to defend trade on the Malabar coast, in the Persian Gulf and in the Malacca Straits, where the Company’s convoys were wholly protected by the armed ship of the Company itself and the Royal squadron was not called on, to any appreciable degree, to support the operations in Bassein and Salsette.”1 The Marine was utilized in the capture of Trincomalee from the Dutch, in annexing Perim in 1799, and, during the Napoleonic wars, in the sea-borne assault on Java and Sumatra. In these operations the Bombay Marine exhibited supreme devotion to duty and earned commendations for their action. In 1798 the Marine regulations underwent thorough revision. Till then the officers had been allowed to take part in trading ventures. This undesirable practice in a disciplined Service was put an end to, and the pay and pensions of the officers were revised to compensate for the loss in income. A Marine Board was constituted which comprised a Superintendent (Civil Servant), a Master-Attendant (Seniormost Marine Officer) and the Commodore at Bombay. A directive was issued to the Marine which stipulated the following broad duties required of it : defence of shipping, suppression of piracy, convoying of merchantmen, carrying of troops, execution of marine survey in Eastern waters, piloting in Bombay harbour, and other general duties of men-of-war. We shall now examine the Marine’s contribution towards the charting of the oceans and the sea approaches to harbours. Despite its preoccupation with operational duties, it found it possible to initiate a surveying expedition as early as 1772, not only for the survey of Indian ports but also for some of the ports outside India. The survey was headed by Lieutenant Robinson and a team of officers consisting of Lt. Porter and Midshipmen Blair and Mascall. The team set out to make a coastal survey of “Mekran, Scind, Kattiawar,” a portion of Persia and some of the coastal areas around Muscat in Arabia. It is gratifying to note that their survey was accurate in certain areas, though their instruments were not of any high standard. These surveys were of immense value to the navigators of that period. From

such humble beginnings in 1772, the Marine Survey of India has progressed in the two centuries since; it is still conducted by the Indian Navy through a separate branch of the Service under the Chief Hydrographer. As regards suppression of piracy, the Bombay Marine was engaged throughout its career in tracking and destroying corsairs, not only in the Indian seas but beyond in the Persian Gulf. The Marine dogged the Joasmi pirates and finally annihilated them by 1830. The last of the operations undertaken by the Bombay Marine, before it was re-designated, was that of the Burma Campaign. In 1824, war broke out between the British Government in India and the King of Burma; in the conflict the Bombay Marine was inextricably involved in the close support of the land battle. A squadron of the Bombay Marine sailed up the river Bassein. Throughout the prolonged operations this squadron co-operated with the British army in the capture of Tenasserim, Arakan, Cheduba and Ramree. Only when the Burmese King sued for peace in 1826 did the units of the Bombay Marine return to their normal operations in India. During the course of hostilities with Burma, a programme of shipbuilding was initiated, which however came to fruition only at the end of that war. Four sloops were launched in succession from 1824 to 1826. A few more of lesser class of ships were added by 1828 and the Bombay Marine’s strength in that year stood as follows :

and eight small craft .

From 1827 to 1830, the Service witnessed some desirable changes in its organization. By 1827 representations were received in London for improving the conditions of service, pay and pensions, and the status of the Bombay Marine. The first step taken that year to ameliorate the conditions in force was to confer on the officers of the Bombay Marine a status equivalent to that of the officers in the Royal Navy of corresponding rank, with the proviso that the Royal Navy Officers would have precedence over the Marine Officers. The other prudent measure introduced was that of command and control; neither Service was vested with any powers of command over the other, unless agreed to between the respective Government. So far the units of the Bombay Marine had been only “Red Ensign” ships. On June 12, 1827, the King of England was pleased to grant the ships of the Marine the privilege of wearing the Union Jack and the pennant of St George’s Cross. In the same year it was also decided to appoint a Service officer, Captain Charles Malcolm, R. N., as Superintendent of the Bombay Marine, an appointment hitherto held by a civil servant. Another extraordinary change took place in 1829 in regard to the discipline of the Bombay Marine. Though there was a system of instituting a Court of Inquiry, the naval court could not pronounce judgement and mete out any punishments, which were the prerogatives of the Government. To improve upon this system, martial law, already applicable to the British Army in India, was introduced into the Bombay Marine. To overcome the legal implications, a curious formula was devised by giving the naval officers army commissions, in addition to the naval commissions held by them, and by naming the Service “Marine Corps.” The curious name “Marine The Indian Navy (1830-1863) Corps” was to last only a year, for in 1830 in acknowledgement of its remarkable services at sea for over two centuries, the force was called the Indian Navy The Indian Navy. The Indian Navy was ushered into an era of change from sail to steam. On March 20, 1830, the first steamship, HUGH LINDSAY, built in the Bombay Docks, powered by a twin 80 horse-power engine, steamed out of Bombay harbour under the command of Commander J. Wilson, one of the

enterprising officers of the Indian Navy, and reached Suez, a distance of 3,000 miles, after refuelling at Aden. This was a precursory voyage which led, in later times, to the regular use of the Suez route for communication with Britain. With the advent of steam, ships powered by engines began to appear from England at regular intervals to strengthen the Indian Navy. In 1836 came ATLANTA, a 600-ton sloop with steam engines of 210 horsepower, mounting four large guns. This was followed next year by another similar type, BERENICE, mounting four 8-inch guns. In 1838, one more steamship arrived, the SEMIRAMIS, which was a hundred tons heavier than the previous types and had as much more horsepower to propel her. As a result, the Indian Navy underwent certain changes in its organization to suit the metamorphosis from sail to steam; marine engineers entered the Service in 1839. During this period of transition, both sailing- and steamships were in service in the Indian Navy. The steamships were often called upon in operations at sea to tow the conventional sailing ships to favourable positions in relation to the direction of the prevailing wind. The first major expedition of the Indian Navy was the assault on Aden in 1839. The capture of this strategically important port was accomplished by a comparatively small force consisting of two Royal Navy ships, VOLAGE and CRUISER, and two Indian Navy ships, MAHI and COOTE, and a detachment of troops. Despite stubborn resistance by the Arabs, Aden fell. A Red Sea squadron of the Indian Navy was then formed and despatched to Aden for the protection of that region. Soon after Aden was taken, war broke out with China in 1840. Several ships of the Indian Navy found their way to that area while executing the operations of the war. Of the ships that took part, some were the new steamships—the ATLANTA, AUCKLAND, ARIADNE, AKBAR, MEMNON, MEDUSA, QUEEN and SESOSTRIS. In 1843, the operations off Sind at the mouth of the Indus required the active participation of the Indian Navy ships. The Indian Navy had a number of commitments at that time, but the size of the fleet did not have the personnel required to undertake the tasks. The Red Sea squadron continued to be based at Aden, a detachment was operating at the Indus estuary, and a regular

steamer service operating between Bombay and Suez had to be kept up; the Persian Gulf area, also under the Navy’s zone of control, necessitated the stationing of a squadron in that region, and finally they were called upon to assist in the Chinese war. These being their operational commitments in 1840-43, the size of the fleet was 11 steam frigates, 3 sloops, 4 brigantines, 6 schooners and 2 cutters, with a total officer complement of 66, excluding midshipmen. Despite the shortage of ships and personnel, the Indian Navy seems to have risen to the occasion. Sir Robert Oliver was at the helm of Indian naval affairs during this period. He took pains to educate his officers in service subjects and to infuse interest into young officers to undertake the study of steam propulsion. The scientific advancement in this field was great; the rapid change from sail to steam, bringing in its wake a host of problems unfamiliar to deck officers, would not have been overcome but for Sir Robert’s drive. It was through his efforts that a Gunnery School was established at Butcher Island, Bombay, in 1845, and a high standard of efficiency was reached in gunnery, which was to pay dividends in the ensuing Burma War. Under Sir Robert’s stewardship the Indian Navy witnessed an augmentation of the force in 1847. The officer strength was increased from 66 to 92, excluding midshipmen. The appointment of the Superintendent was upgraded and was to be tenable by a Commodore (First Class). On April 4, 1848, Sir Robert Oliver was designated Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy, in recognition of his services. In January, 1849, by an Act of the Supreme Legislative Council, the Governor-General and the Governors of the Provinces of Madras and Bombay were endowed with powers in respect of courts martial. By virtue of this Act they could empower Captains and Commanders to hold courts. During the period 1848 to 1849, the Indian Navy added to its laurels in the part it played in the siege of Multan, an operation entirely undertaken by a naval force, the Indus Flotilla. The result was a complete success. At the outbreak of the Second Burma War in 1852, six steamships of the Indian Navy, FEROOZ, SESOSTRIS, MOO-ZUFFER, BERENICE, ZENOBIA and MEDUSA, along with some Royal Navy

ships, were despatched for service. There is no doubt that the excellent standard of training that they had received stood them in good stead; and the Indian Navy was in no small way responsible for the British gains at Rangoon, Martaban and Bassein. A few years later, in 1856, when hostilities against the Persians commenced, the Indian Navy, without the assistance of the Royal Navy, went into action. In all, 9 ships of the Indian Navy, 23 transports and 6 steamers from private steamship companies with troops on board, formed the expeditionary force. It is needless to recount the success of the action. There was spontaneous awakening of national feeling in 1857 culminating in the Great Rising of 1857. The Indian Navy was in no way connected with this event. However, an Indian Naval Brigade, consisting of 78 officers and 1,740 men, was formed in 1857-58, for service ashore in support of the British Army. Guns and ammunition were landed from ships at Calcutta. The Indian. Naval Brigade fought in Bihar, in what is now known as Uttar Pradesh, in Dacca and Assam, and showed prowess on land as well. Curiously enough, the only occasion when the highest gallantry award, the Victoria Cross, was bestowed on Indian Naval personnel, was for bravery shown on land! Following these historical developments, the responsibility for the governance of India was assumed by the Crown and the East India Company’s rule ended. As a consequence, the Indian Navy was abolished on April 30, 1863, and the defence of the Indian seas thenceforward devolved on the Admiralty. While the The Bombay and Bengal Marines (1863-1876) Indian Navy was being abolished, it was simultaneously decided to resuscitate the old organization of the Marine for the performance of local navalservice in a non-combatant role. The strength of the Marine was fixed at eleven vessels, of which four were placed in reserve. The following ships formed the Marine : COROMANDEL, DALHOUSTE, PRINCE ARTHUR, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIAN, ARRACAN, SESOSTRIS, TUBAL CAIN, WALTER MORRICE, FEROOZ and ZENOBIA.

24. President Dr Rajendra Prasad presenting Colours to the Indian Navy, May 27, 1951

25. Jawaharlal Nehru with Admirai Sir Mark Pizey

26. “Sealand” aircraft flying in formation

27. “Sealand” touching down

28. Two ships of the Indian Navy fuelling at sea

The ships of the Marine were deployed on the west and east coasts and designated the Bombay and Bengal Marines. For fourteen years the Marine carried out non-operational duties, such as the laying of submarine and telegraph cables from Bombay to Suez and from Karachi to Basra, operating as troop-carriers and hydrographic survey. The useful work of the hydrographic survey was carried on uninterrupted from the days of its inception but for a brief period from 1942 till the cessation of World War II when it was not pursued owing to the exigencies of war. In 1871, two vessels, MAGDALA and ABYSSINIA, were commissioned for coast defence, and they formed the nucleus of an Indian Defence Force. In the same year, the Marine took part in the Abyssinian Campaigns primarily as troop-carriers.

3—Her Majesty’s Indian Marine and the Royal Indian Marine

The year 1877 witnessed Her Majesty’s Marine (1877-1891) yet another change in the history of the Navy in India. Admiral Bythesea of the Royal Navy was responsible for reorganizing the service Her Majesty’s Indian which was re-named in that year Indian Marine. The naval force was divided into the Eastern and the Western Divisions, which were based at Calcutta and Bombay and operated in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, respectively. The dockyard facilities at the two bases were improved. The duties of H. M.’s Indian Marine at that time were : transport of troops, Government stores and equipment; maintenance of “Station Ships,” at Aden, in the Andamans, in Burma and in the Persian Gulf for policing, lighting and other allied purposes; operation of gunboats on the rivers Irrawady and Euphrates; the construction, repair and maintenance of Government craft and launches, and the prosecution of hydrographic survey. During the period under survey came the Egyptian Campaigns of 1882 and 1885, the Third Burmese War of 1885 and the Chin-Lushai expedition in Burma in 1889. In these campaigns H. M’s Indian Marine was employed extensively, though in the restricted trooping role. The Marine was augmented by the addition of seven torpedo boats in 1889 and two torpedo gunboats, the ASSAYE and PLASSEY, in 1892. The expanded squadron was placed under the command of an officer of the rank of captain of the Royal Navy. Although officered by Europeans, part of the crew of the squadron was drawn from local sailors. Despite the fact that a The Royal Indian Marine (1892-1933) modest role of noncombatant duties was assigned to H. M.’s Indian Marine, the zealous enthusiasm shown and the efficient performance of these duties did not go unnoticed. In recognition of the loyal services rendered in the various campaigns of the previous decade, Queen Victoria conferred on the Service the well-earned title, “The Royal Indian Marine,” in 1892. The first major operation in which the Royal Indian Marine took part was the Suakin Expedition in East Africa in 1896. Then came the

Boer War, the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the Somaliland Expedition in 1902-04. In all these campaigns the Royal Indian Marine acquitted itself with distinction, performing its duties with remarkable ability. The Marine, in concert with the Royal Navy, was engaged from 1904 to 1914 in the suppression of gun-running in the Persian Gulf. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the composition and disposition of the ships of the Royal Indian Marine stood as follows : Troopships :

Others :

Survey Ships :

River Steamers :

Without much delay, the Marine was prepared for the emergency and deployed for war. The HARDINGE, NORTHBROOK and DALHOUSIE were soon fitted with armament, converted into auxiliary cruisers, commissioned as His Majesty’s ships, manned both by the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Marine crew, and despatched to join the East Indies Squadron. The DALHOUSIE stationed at Aden was given the role of an “Examination Vessel,” and as a “Base Guard Ship” at Basra. The PALINURUS, refitted at Bombay, operated as the “Examination Vessel,” at that port. The INVESTIGATOR was given the duties of patrolling. During the war years the Service expanded considerably, several ships were built or requisitioned, and the strength of officers rose to

500 and that of sailors to 13,000. The ships were allowed to fly the “Blue Ensign” and the Marine played its part in every expeditionary force throughout the hostilities, rising to the occasion, despite five decades of non-combatant service. After the Armistice was signed in 1918, the Royal Indian Marine reverted to its peacetime role. Meanwhile; Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe, visiting India, was invited by the Government to examine the affairs of the Royal Indian Marine with a view to drawing up a scheme for its reorganization. He made a series of valuable recommendations; most of them had financial implications and, unfortunately, those could not be given effect to, owing to paucity of funds. The only recommendation which bore fruit was the appointment of Rear-Admiral Mawby, Royal Navy, as Director of the Royal Indian Marine. In 1923 the three troopers were sold and the station ships were down-graded to lighthouse tenders, which action was a direct result of the recommendations of the Inchcape Commission. Mawby protested vehemently against this retrograde step and resigned on this issue. Yet the Government were helpless without the requisite finances in the wake of the post-war depression. Nevertheless, in 1925, the remonstrance of Mawby led to a committee composed of General Lord Rawlinson, Commander-inChief,India,Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and Captain Sir Edward Head-lam, Director of the Royal Indian Marine, to probe into this thorny issue. The Rawlinson Committee submitted a report on the reorganization of the Royal Indian Marine and made the following recommendations : the Royal Indian Marine should be constituted as a combatant force; the naval force should be redesignated as the Royal Indian Navy; the initial strength of the force should consist of four sloops, two patrol craft, four trawlers, two survey ships and a depot ship; and the Service should be placed under the over-all command of an officer of the rank of Rear-Admiral on the active list of the Royal Navy. As a result of these recommendations, the “White Ensign” was hoisted on all Royal Indian Marine ships on November 11, 1928, and the reorganization was initiated. Before we pass on to the next phase of development of the Navy in India, it should be of interest to

mention here that the Royal Indian Marine had on its cadre about 15 Indians, who had risen from the “lower deck” to the rank of WarrantOfficers.

4—The Royal Indian Navy Although in 1928, consequent on the Rawlinson Committee’s recommendations, the Indian Navy (Discipline) Bill was introduced in the Central Legislative Assembly, it was defeated by a single vote. It was not until 1934 that the Bill was adopted on its reintroduction; and it received the assent of the Governor-General on September 8, that year. With the enactment of the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act of 1934, the Royal Indian Navy was formally inaugurated at a historic ceremony at Bombay on October 2, 1934. “After the destruction of the Maratha naval power in 1751,” observes Sardar K. M. Panikkar, “Indians were sailing the seas for the first time in warships— small and insignificant units, no doubt, but symbolic of the resuscitation of the old forces which had for at least two millennia held the mastery of the Indian seas.”1 From its inception in 1934 till the eve of the Second World War, the Royal Indian Navy underwent little or no expansion owing to the financial depression of the thirties. With the threat of an impending war against Germany, a Commission was set up under Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield to review urgently the defence organization in India. The report of the Chatfield Commission, among other things, made the following recommendations : the Royal Indian Navy should assume greater responsibilities for the defence of Indian seas, in collaboration with the East Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy; His Majesty’s Government should discontinue the annual levy of Rs 15 lakhs payable by India for her naval defence; the Royal Indian Navy should be strengthened by the immediate addition of four modern Bittern class sloops and four Mastiff class trawlers; the introduction of a system of Reserves to augment the regular entry of personnel, and the opening of naval depots and training establishments.

The recommendations were accepted in toto; as a result, the expansion of the Royal Indian Navy during the years of World War II was phenomenal. From 1937, Rear-Admiral Fitzherbert (later Admiral Sir Herbert Fitzherbert), who was the head of the Royal Indian Navy, had the tremendous task of reorganizing and expanding the Service. Just before the outbreak of the war, the scheme to establish Reserves was put into effect. Officers for the Executive, Engineering and Accountant Branches were taken in initially on the Reserve strength. At the commencement of the war, the Royal Indian Naval Reserve (RINR) was formed with officers drawn from the Merchant Navy, and the Royal Indian Navy Volunteer Reserve (RINVR) was also instituted with suitable volunteers from all walks of life. As regards the sailor complement, “Hostilities Only” ratings, “Special Service” and “Boy Entry” sailors were recruited at a fast rate. A programme for the rapid construction of ships was put into effect. Fast seagoing motor boats for coastal patrols, corvettes for escort duties, trawlers for minesweeping, depot ships, auxiliary vessels, small craft for harbour defence and a host of yard craft had to be built, acquired and requisitioned. The first vessel of the series to be launched in India’s yards, at Garden Reach, Calcutta, was a Basset Class trawler, H.M.I.S. TRAVANCORE, in July, 1941. By next year five ships, AMRITSAR, BARODA, HYDERABAD, LAHORE and PUNJAB, were commissioned for minesweeping and patrol duties. In 1943, the first Bangor class minesweeper built in India, the DECCAN, was put into service. Concurrently several launches, tugs and other small craft were constructed. Meanwhile, the sloops, H.M.I.S. SUTLEJ, JUMNA, NARBADA, GODAVARI, KISTNA and CAUVERY, were commissioned in the United Kingdom and sailed to India. It is of interest to know that most of these ships are in service to this day, NARBADA and GODAVARI having been transferred to Pakistan. The table below shows the magnitude of the expansion during the war years :

The expansion called for good organization, efficient administration, proper arrangement for training of personnel, development of base and dockyard facilities and the tackling of allied logistic problems. In addition to Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi which had served as bases before the War, new bases were developed, notably at Visakhapatnam, Cochin and Madras. The former looked after equipping merchant ships defensively against mines, underwater, surface and air attacks, while the inspection organization functioned at Visakhapatnam, Cochin and Madras. The proper training of personnel was an important problem. As the pace of recruitment was rapid, training facilities were inadequate, instructional establishments were insufficient, instructors were hard to find and most trainees had no experience at sea. It was indeed creditable on the part of the organization to have weathered these serious shortcomings and to have produced trained personnel of excellent calibre who proved their mettle in war. H.M.I.S. DALHOUSIE at Bombay was, at the outbreak of World War II, the training establishment for boys, but in 1940 a large establishment, H.M.I.S. BAHADUR, had to be commissioned at Karachi to cater for the increased intake. In 1942, one more establishment came into being, H.M.I.S. DILAWAR, where boys were recruited at the age of 14 and were prepared for BAHADUR. Basic training for officers was imparted in H.M.I.S. FEROZE, an establishment at Bombay. Their initial training at sea had to be given

in operational ships as no other ship was available for the purpose. Schools sprang up for specialist training, such as H.M.I.S. HIMALAYA (Gunnery School), H.M.I.S. CHAMAK (Radar School), both at Karachi; H.M.I.S. TALWAR (Signal School), H.M.I.S. MACHLIMAR (Anti-submarine School) at Bombay; H.M.I.S. SHIVAJI (Naval Engineering) at Lonavla; H.M.I.S. AKBAR at Thana (Bombay); and H.M.I.S. CHEETAH at Trombay (Bombay). In addition to local tasks, such as patrolling, contraband control, securing of intelligence and seaward defence, the Royal Indian Navy took part in a number of operations of war, largely in the role of trade protection. Convoying became its principal role. In 1940, five sloops of the Royal Indian Navy were placed under the Commander-inChief, East Indies, for operations in the Red Sea, in the Gulf of Aden and in the Persian Gulf. During the African Campaign, the ships African Campaign of the Royal Indian Navy played an important part in the operations, contributing in a large measure to the downfall of the Italian Empire in East Africa. In the initial stages of the campaign, when the Allies were suffering some reverses, the troopships H.M.I.S. NETRAVATI and PARVATI operated in difficult conditions along with the Royal Navy in the evacuation of British Somaliland. As the campaign progressed in 1941, during the advance of the Allied forces in the Sudan, the Royal Indian Navy played a vital role in its first joint action with the Army. H.M.I.S. CLIVE bombarded the beaches of the Sudan and Eritrea. H.M.I.S. HINDUSTAN and INDUS gave close support, while H.M.I.S. PARVATI and RATNAGIRI were landing troops at Massawa in Eritrea. In a similar action Berbera in British Somaliland was reoccupied. H.M.I.S. LAWRENCE, LILAVATI, Persian Gulf Operations INVESTIGATOR and tug DINA took part in this theatre of war in a joint operation with the Allied armies which led to the capture of Abadan, Bandar Shahpur and Khorramshahr. Two Indian naval officers earned the Distinguished Service Cross for their acts of bravery in these operations. A few sailors were also awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. These operations and the

Eritrean Campaign together minimized the major threat to Indian shipping nearer home waters. Among the casualties and losses, mention must be made of H.M.I.S. PATHAN which was lost in June, 1940, and of H.M.I.S. PARVATI which struck a mine in April, 1941. H.M.I.S. JUMNA and SUTLEJ were Atlantic Campaign attached to the Royal Navy in the Atlantic for escort of shipping; here they gained valuable experience in convoying, and later played an important part in operations connected with the British withdrawal from Malaya. Perhaps one of the most Operations in the Indian Ocean notable performances of the Royal Indian Navy during this war was the audacious action displayed by H.M.I.S. BENGAL, a newly-built mine sweeper, on its maiden voyage escorting a Dutch tanker from Australia to India. BENGAL’S main armament was a sole 12-pounder gun, while the tanker was fitted with a solitary 4-inch gun. On November 11, 1942, they came up against two Japanese surface raiders of about 8,000 to 10,000 tons each, carrying 6-inch guns and torpedoes. Immediately on sighting the raiders, BENGAL ordered the tanker to keep clear and closed the enemy. In the engagement that followed, BENGAL scored a direct hit on one of the raiders, sinking it. Meanwhile, the other raider engaged the tanker, which replied with determination. Having dealt with the first raider, BENGAL now turned its attention to the other. Without giving battle, the second raider turned away to pick up the survivors of its consort. This gallant action by H.M.I.S. BENGAL against heavy odds showed dedication to duty and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Service. Its Commanding Officer was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, and a number of officers and sailors were granted other awards. On Japan’s entry into the war, Royal Burma Campaign Indian Navy ships were engaged in several operations in South-East Asia. In the early days of the campaign, H.M.I.S. INDUS was sunk in Akyab harbour by a Japanese air raid. During 1943-44, the Coastal Forces of the Royal Indian Navy did admirable work in co-operating with the Allied forces

on the Arakan coast. In the spring of 1945, the Royal Indian Navy took an active part in the eight amphibious operations which enabled the 15th Indian Corps to advance down the Arakan coast from the frontiers to Rangoon. The personnel of the R.I.N. Landing Craft Wing distinguished themselves in the landings on the beaches of Akyab, Myeton, Kyakpyu, Kangan, Ruywa and Letpan. They contributed, in no small measure, not only to the initial landings but also to the subsequent build-up of forces. The Indian sloops, NARBADA, JUMNA, KISTNA and CAUVERY, gave naval gunfire support in the Allied coastal advance in the Arakan. A flotilla of nine fleet minesweepers cleared the approaches to the Rangoon river estuary before the arrival of the assault forces whose escorts included SUTLEJ and CAUVERY. In 1943, H.M.I.S. NARBADA while on escort duty succeeded in sinking a Japanese submarine off Visakhapatnam. The Royal Indian Navy thus acquitted itself most creditably in many theatres of operations during World War II; some actions were, no doubt, not so spectacular as others; nevertheless, there is no gainsaying the fact that its devotion to duty, efficiency in operations and the maintenance of its aim contributed in no small measure to the achievement of victory. British supremacy in the Indian Ocean prevailed since 1783 despite the fact that on two notable occasions, during the First and Second World Wars, their sea power was disputed. The German raiders, EMDEN, WOLF and KöNIGSBERG, in World War I, strove to disrupt British sea communication in the Indian Ocean. The very presence of these raiders forced the British to deploy several warships in this theatre of war, although Allied shipping losses were negligible. The challenge in World War II was, however, much more serious. With the entry of the Japanese fleet into the Indian Ocean and the Axis surface-raiders and submarines already operating in the Eastern waters, the formidable threat could not have been neutralized but for British assertion of sea power, largely with the aid of American naval strength. All these achievements called for an efficient administrative machinery in India and good staff work. At the outbreak of the war, Naval Headquarters were functioning at Bombay, and the Service was administered by the Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian

Navy (FOCRIN), assisted by not more than a dozen Staff Officers. The rapid expansion of the Service, the increasing operational commitments and the need for close cooperation with the other two Services as well as with the Government in a total war such as this, led to the transfer of Naval Headquarters to New Delhi during March, 1941. The Headquarters continued to function with FOCRIN as the head of (the organization but under the Commander-in-Chief, India, who was the Supreme Commander of all the three Services., Mention must be made here of the Women’s Royal Indian Naval Service formed in 1943. The WRINS, as they were popularly known, were primarily employed in the Communication Branch of the Service. The WRINS, found soon to be a useful addition, expanded rapidly and by the end of the war there were as many as 275 officers and 813 ratings. The Service was disbanded by 1947. At the end of the war, The Post-War Royal Indian Navy H.M.I.S. NARBADA arrived at Port Blair on September 26,1945, with the Naval Force Commander for the reoccupation of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands The official surrender of the Japanese forces in these islands was made to Captain Blair, R.I.N.R., after whose grandfather the port had been named. With the cessation of hostilities, the 37th Minesweeping Flotilla of the Royal Indian Navy undertook the hazardous task of clearing the mines laid by enemy and Allied naval forces off Singapore, the Andaman and Nicobar islands, and in the Malacca Straits. H.M.I, ships also assisted the British Pacific Fleet in the “policing” operations off Japan. Soon after the cessation of hostilities, an R.I.N. Mutiny unprecedented event happened in the Royal Indian Navy. On February 18, 1946, ratings at H.M.I.S. TALWAR, the Signal School at Bombay, staged a mutiny which soon spread to a majority of the ships and establishments of the Service. Having seized the Castle Barracks at Bombay, the mutineers threatened to commit acts of violence. At Karachi, H.M.I.S. HINDUSTAN was forcibly taken over by the ratings who were threatening to bombard the town. By timely political intervention and Governmental persuasion the mutiny was stopped short of ugly

violence. A high-powered Enquiry Commission was appointed by the Government to probe into the circumstances leading to the mutiny. The report and the findings submitted by the Commission are naturally confidential, but the basic reasons that led to the grave incident are now common knowledge. After the war, there was largescale demobilization and there was a certain amount of uncertainty in the minds of both officers and men about their future. The country itself was going through the historical political agitation for independence.

5—The Indian Navy After the mutiny in February, 1946, the Royal Indian Navy was faced by an entirely different and tremendous problem, resulting from the political decision of partitioning the country into two independent States, India and Pakistan. While negotiations for independence were in progress, the officers and men, mobilized for World War II, were being released from the Service, a selected number of war entrants being retained on a permanent basis. Thus, steps were under way to stabilize the Service, when in the wake of these preparations the partition of the country came about on August 15, 1947. This event had far-reaching consequences. The Royal Indian Navy, which had gained extensive experience in World War II, had to be split in the approximate proportion of two-thirds of the undivided fleet and associated assets to India and one-third to Pakistan. The following were the major units of the fleet that independent India was left with : 4 Anti-aircraft Frigates, 2 Anti-submarine Frigates, 1 Corvette, 12 Fleet Minesweepers, and 1 Survey Ship. The shore establishments, on the other hand, could not obviously be divided in any fixed proportion. The establishments which were situated in each of the two independent States were retained by the respective countries. As a result, H.M.I.S. HIMALAYA, the Gunnery School, H.M.I.S. CHAMAK, the Radar School, H.M.I.S. DILAWAR and BAHADUR, the Boys’ Training Establishments, all located at Karachi, went to Pakistan. This posed some serious problems of

training the officers and sailors of the Indian Navy, but they were admirably overcome in later years by the untiring efforts of the late Commodore H.M. St. L. Nott, Chief of Staff at Naval Headquarters. It was most unfortunate that he was killed in an air crash in the mountains of Corsica on March 28, 1948, before he could live to see the tremendous advancement of his plans for the development of the Indian Navy. In addition to the loss of training establishments, there resulted a sudden exodus of Muslim naval officers and men who had opted to serve Pakistan. The recruitment in the past had been such that at the time of Partition a number of sailors, particularly in the senior ranks, were Punjabi Mussulmans. Consequently, the Indian Navy was suddenly denuded of senior gunnery, engine-room and communication personnel. The position regarding officers was no better. The policy of recruitment of officers in the Navy had been such that for every Indian Naval officer there had been two British serving in the Indian Navy. Partition and the concomitant political change necessitated the retirement of all British officers in the Royal Indian Navy except those who volunteered to serve for a specified period under special terms. Such of the British officers as opted to retire were given handsome gratuities as compensation for premature retirement. These factors, at the dawn of Independence, caused a serious depletion of personnel in the Indian Navy. The Indian Navy was now solely responsible for maritime defence and could not, owing to the political change, let this task be performed by the Royal Navy. This fact called for the developing of naval bases, the improving of repair facilities, the augmenting of naval personnel to man new ships, the instituting of new training establishments and, above all, the enlarging of the fleet to become a balanced force capable of adequately meeting, in concert with the other two Services, any possible threat to the security of the country. Thus, a lot of leeway had to be made up in order to keep the flag of independent India flying on the Indian seas. The pre-Independence Government had already planned to add a cruiser to the Royal Indian Navy. This plan was vigorously pursued by the Indian Government, and the United Kingdom gave its unstinted support in this respect. The first cruiser, H.M.S. ACHILLES, of the

LEANDER class, which had seen action off the River Plate against the German Pocket Battleship, GRAFSPEE, was purchased. It was commissioned as H.M.I.S. DELHI and reached Indian waters by 1948. This was followed in 1950 by the acquisition from the United Kingdom of three “R” class destroyers, which were renamed RAJPUT, RANJIT and RANA, and formed the 11th Destroyer Squadron. It was at this stage that India become a Republic on January 26, 1950. Consequent on this constitutional change, the prefix “Royal” was dropped and the Service came to be called the “Indian Navy.” The “White Ensign” was replaced by the “Indian Naval White Ensign,” the Asoka Sarnath lion capitol took the place of the Crown, and the lotus leaf became the “surround” in naval badges, in which the design of the “surmount” was altered. May 27, 1951, was another historic day when the President of India presented the President’s Colours to the Indian Navy. It was indeed a proud and memorable event for the Indian Navy. The expansion of the Indian Navy progressed according to a wellconceived plan. In 1951 the fleet had a further addition of three Hunt class destroyers, originally obtained on loan from the Royal Navy to facilitate sea-training but later purchased. These ships, GODAVARI, GANGA and GOMATI, eventually formed the 22nd Destroyer Squadron on May 5, 1954. With the increase in the units of the fleet, the need arose of having a fleet tanker capable of replenishing the ships at sea, obviating the necessity for the fleet to return to harbour for constant refuelling. A fleet tanker capable of carrying 3,000 tons of furnace fuel oil, in addition to 3,500 tons of dead weight, was purchased from Italy and commissioned as I.N.S. SHAKTI on January 20, 1954. To meet any possible threat from mines that may be laid along our coasts and approaches to harbours by an enemy in a war, it was considered necessary to possess coastal minesweepers. Accordingly, in August, 1956, four coastal minesweepers, I.N.S. KARWAR, KAKINADA, CANNANORE and CUDDALORE, were commissioned and formed the 149th Minesweeping Squadron. These ships were specially built for the Indian Navy, the latest developments in minesweeping techniques being incorporated in them. In addition to

these, two inshore minesweepers, I.N.S. BAS-SEIN and BIMLIPATAM, were acquired. A store cum repair ship, I.N.S. DHARINI, was also commissioned. Several Seaward Defence Boats and Seaward Patrol Craft were also built. A new chapter was opened in the progress of the Indian Navy when H.M.S. NIGERIA, a cruiser of the FIJI class, completely modernized and re-equipped and commissioned as I.N.S. MYSORE, joined the fleet on December 29, 1957. Rear-Admiral (later ViceAdmiral) R. D. Katari, the first Indian officer appointed as the Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet, transferred his flag at sea from I.N.S. DELHI to I.N.S. MYSORE. The MYSORE, one of the most modern ships of its type afloat in 1957, mounts nine six-inch guns on three turrets, and has an enclosed bridge, with very modern radar and electronic equipment. During the years 1958 to 1960, the Government embarked on a programme of acquiring newly constructed anti-aircraft/ antisubmarine frigates of Types 14, 41 and 12. They were commissioned as TRISHUL and TALWAR (15th Frigate Squadron); BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA (16th Frigate Squadron), and KUTHAR, KIRPAN and KHUKRI (14th Frigate Squadron). All these ships were specially constructed for the Indian Navy and were purchased from the United Kingdom. As early as 1957, the first aircraft carrier of the Indian Navy was in the process of being acquired from the United Kingdom, but it took more than three years to modernize completely the HERCULES and provide it with all the necessary equipment. It is fitted with an angled deck, steam catapult and the mirror landing-device. Commissioned as I.N.S. VIKRANT on March 4, 1961, embarking Seahawk fighters and Alize aircraft, the ship arrived at Bombay on November 3, 1961. This marks the successful completion of the current phase of expansion of the fleet to the stature of a balanced naval force. Soon after its arrival, Rear-Admiral (now Vice-Admiral) B. S. Soman, the then Flag Officer Commanding the Indian Fleet, transferred his flag to VIKRANT. The expansion of the Navy does not end here. The acquisition of a submarine arm has not been forgotten; as the Defence Minister

stated in his budget speech in Parliament in March, 1964, “We are trying to secure a submarine for our training purposes.” Indeed, all this progress would not have been possible but for the determined expansion of training facilities since Partition. The dearth of training establishments and the inadequacy of trained instructors presented serious problems in the early years of Independence. Technical training facilities continued to be extended by the United Kingdom until various schools were set up in the country. A Boys’ Training Establishment was set up at Visakhapatnam, and schools with the most modern equipment for specialist training sprang up in Cochin. The new schools which were built on Venduruthy Island were for gunnery, navigation and direction, torpedo and anti-submarine, signal communication, basic and divisional, and tactical training. The last named school is equipped with the “Action Speed Tactical Teacher,” an electronic device to simulate tactical situations at sea. While such advancement in training facilities was taking place, many officers and senior sailors were sent abroad for courses of study to be able to return to India as instructors. During the formative years of the Service, some officers from the Royal Navy were engaged on loan service to help accelerate the Navy’s progress in technical fields. There is now not a single Royal Navy Officer on loan service. A naval air station, I.N.S. GARUDA, was established at Cochin in May, 1953, with aircraft forming a “Fleet Requirements Unit” to facilitate ships in anti-aircraft and other allied training; the establishment also provided a nucleus organization for naval aviation. The Electrical School at Jamnagar which was opened on April 27, 1955, the Engineering School and the Naval Engineering College, both at Lonavla, cater for the training of officers and sailors of these branches. Since Independence remarkable progress has been made, and today the Indian Navy is not only self-sufficient in training requirements but also extends its facilities to friendly countries. In the sphere of training of Staff Officers also, there has been considerable progress. From 1950 a Naval Wing at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, has been in existence. In the National Defence College, which was inaugurated on April 27, 1960, on the lines of the Imperial Defence College, senior naval officers, along with the other

two Services and civilian counterparts, undergo higher Staff training. The present Commandant of the National Defence College is ViceAdmiral A. K. Chatterji, who is the first naval officer to hold this position. The logistic support for an expanding fleet was also improved side by side. A scheme for a planned expansion of the Bombay Dockyard was put into effect; naval and armament store depots were constructed in various parts of the country; victualling store yards were established; port facilities were improved; and yard craft and other auxiliary vessels were brought into service. The necessity of continuous survey of sea approaches to harbours and neighbouring sea areas to facilitate mariners has not been lost sight of since Independence. The Hydrographic Branch of the Service is as old as the Navy itself. Within two years of Partition, I.N.S. ROHILKHAND and two Seaward Defence Motor Launches were converted for surveying duties. In July, 1951, in order to cater for increased commitments in marine survey, the KHUKRI was refitted and recommissioned as I.N.S. INVESTIGATOR, thus retaining a name associated with the history of marine survey in India. Apart from surveys executed purely for the requirements of the Service, several others were made according to the civil needs of the country, regulated by the National Harbour Board. Surveys of Kandla port and its approaches, Bhatkal, Malpe, Mangalore and other minor ports were undertaken. In August, 1954, the designation of the Marine Survey of India was changed to that of Hydrographic Branch of the Navy. I.N.S. JUMNA and SUTLEJ were also converted into survey ships and a new survey vessel DARSHAK was constructed at Visakhapatnam, to make it possible for the Service to undertake surveys of several other areas. The Service has established a Hydrographic Drawing Office, a production centre for charts, a chart depot and a Hydrographic School. After Independence the organization of command of the Indian Navy underwent some changes as and when circumstances warranted a revision. At the time of Partition, Rear-Admiral J. T. S. Hall was the head of the Service with the title, “Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian Navy” (FOCRIN). He was succeeded on August 15, 1948, by Vice-Admiral Edward Parry (later Admiral Sir

Edward Parry), who was designated “Commander-in-Chief, Royal Indian Navy” (CINCRIN). This title later became “Commander-inChief, Indian Navy” (CINCIN). On India’s becoming a Republic, the supreme command of the Defence Forces was vested in the President; consequently, the designation, "Commander-in-Chief, Indian Navy,” was replaced by the title, “The Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS). The CNS continues to function at New Delhi. Until April, 1958, the Service was commanded by officers of the Royal Navy taken on loan. Admiral Sir Edward Parry was relieved in October, 1951, by Vice-Admiral Mark Pizey (later Admiral Sir Mark Pizey). He was followed by Vice-Admiral Stephen Carlill (later Vice-Admiral Sir Stephen Carlill), in July, 1955. The first Indian Chief of the Naval Staff to take over the command of the Service (on April 22, 1958) was Vice-Admiral R. D. Katari.

29. Vice-Admiral B. S. Soman

30. Vice-Admiral A. K. Chatterji

31. I.N.S. VANT at Malta

32. An “Alize” touching down On June 5, 1962, Vice-Admiral B. S. Soman took over as the Chief of the Naval Staff. Vice-Admiral Soman has had over 30 years of service in the Navy during which period he has held all the important commands, both ashore and afloat. Command afloat was also vested in Royal Navy officers on loan until October 2, 1956, and their designations underwent a series of changes in conformity with the development of the fleet: “Commodore, Indian Naval Squadron” (COMINS) changed to “RearAdmiral, Commanding Indian Naval Squadron” (RACINS), then to “Flag Officer (Flotilla) Indian Fleet” (FOFIF), and finally to “Flag Officer Commanding, Indian Fleet” (FOCIF). The shore command came to be divided to conform to geographical areas : Commodorein-Charge, Bombay, later designated Flag Officer, Bombay; Commodore Superintendent, Training Establishments, Cochin, later designated Commodore-in-Charge, Cochin, and Naval Officer-inCharge, Visakhapatnam, subsequently upgraded to Commodore, East Coast. These administrative authorities of shore commands also exercise command of the contiguous sea area with clearly defined spheres of authority.

Mention must be made of the inauguration of the Naval Wing of the National Cadet Corps in August, 1952, as a result of the passing of the National Cadet Corps Act of 1948. The object of this Corps is to instil into the youth of the country a nautical awareness to develop esprit de corps and create an avenue for intake into the Service. The entire scheme is purely voluntary, without any liability for active service. The Indian Navy saw its first action since Independence during the Goa liberation. I.N.S. DELHI was entrusted with the, task of operating off Diu in support of the land operations in that area. I.N.S. BETWA, BEAS and CAUVERY were to prevent any Portuguese warships from obtaining entry into, or exit from, Marmagao. I.N.S. MYSORE and TRISHUL were assigned the task of taking over the island of Anjadiva. The whole naval operation was under the over-all command of Rear-Admiral (now Vice-Admiral) B. S. Soman, the then Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet. I.N.S. DELHI was called upon to render ineffective certain army installations at Diu, which task she performed most effectively. At Marmagao, the only Portuguese warship in harbour was the ALBUQUERQUE which was putting up an effective anti-aircraft fire at our Air Force planes and planning to attack our ships. To neutralize ALBUQUERQUE, I.N.S. BETWA tried to seize the ship, but while in the act of doing so, ALBUQUERQUE foundered and ran aground. In Anjadiva, however, there was some stiff resistance to our men landing from MYSORE and TRISHUL. A white flag was put up initially by the Portuguese signifying surrender, but when the naval landing parties advanced they were shot at. As a result, seven sailors lost their lives in the liberation of the island. Thus ended the naval episode of Goa operations, which contributed to the removal of the last vestiges of Portuguese colonial rule from Indian soil. From a purely military point of view, it was a unique experience for the naval forces to have had to operate by using the minimum force and that, too, when it was found absolutely necessary. It also brought home the extent of co-operation that has to be achieved in a coordinated operation such as this. Marmagao has since been added to the list of major ports in India and a Naval Officer-in-Charge of the rank of Commodore has been

appointed. Several of our naval ships now frequently visit this port. The second naval air station, I.N.S. HANSA, temporarily located at Coimbatore, was transferred to Dabolim in Goa on June 18, 1964; this was a significant day in the history of India’s naval aviation. Mention must be made of the decision that has recently been taken by the Government to transfer from the Army to the Navy the responsibility of the coastal defence of the country. Tn accordance with this decision, in July, 1964, the first unit of the Army Coast Battery at Bombay was taken over by the Navy. Vice-Admiral B. S. Soman, the Chief of the Naval Staff, observed on this occasion that “a new chapter begins in the history of the seaward defence of our country.”

VI

SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 1 Shipbuilding From the time that man ventured out to sea in search of food in the form of fish, there has been evidence in India of human ingenuity in discovering methods to keep him afloat. Logs of wood and rafts formed the basic contrivances which were floated on rivers in the initial stages, nature’s currents providing the propulsion, and the destinations being left to chance. Later, he discovered how to propel in the still waters of lakes by the use of a long pole thrust against the beds at the bottom, which method we still see in certain parts of the country where the waters are not deep. Then came the paddles for propulsion. The first known oceanic voyage is that of the Negritos of the Palaeolithic Age who crossed the sea from the mainland of India to the Andaman Islands in small dug-outs made by hollowing out the trunks of trees, and propelled by paddles. Admittedly, the Negritos may not have aimed at reaching the Andamans, as they were probably unaware of its existence, but reached there by chance. Nevertheless, the fact remains that they propelled themselves on the surface of the sea for over 700 miles in a contrivance which they had discovered during the Old Stone Age. Then we come to the period of the Indus Valley Civilization, about 3,000 years before Christ, when we find evidence from Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa excavations where representations of vessels show that they were certainly river-craft and, some, most probably, sea-going. The representation on a potsherd painting shows a mast, yard and a helm, and it is logical to conclude that by that time India knew the use of sail and steering oars. During the Vedic Age, although we know that ocean-going vessels did exist, unfortunately there is but meagre material describing, in any detail, the boats and ships of the time. Some passages in the Rg Veda show that there were multi-oared

vessels of sturdy construction which rode the sea well and were broad beamed with strong steering-oars: We have seen that the Atris of the Aryan State were well versed in the art of constructing vessels. Pali literature throws some light on the size of vessels built during the pre-Mauryan era. Rajavallia, a Pali work, mentions vessels that could accommodate as many as 700 passengers. The Sankha Jātaka refers to a vessel with three masts, 800 cubits (1,300 ft) long, 600 cubits (1,000 ft) wide and 20 fathoms deep. This gives us an idea of the enormous size of the ships that were built in India in those days. Coming down to the age of the Nandas and the Mauryas, we know from Strabo that shipbuilding throve as an Imperial undertaking. We saw earlier that the Ksatri tribe in the Punjab built a flotilla of river craft, some of which were 30-oared, for the use of Admiral Nearchus. Pliny mentions some ships of this era which were of 75 tons. He brings out incidentally the peculiar design of Indian ships and the use of anchor, while discussing the seas between Ceylon and India. He observes that between Ceylon and India the sea in certain areas was shallow, but in others too deep for anchors to reach the bottom. To enable ships to turn in such a restricted channel, the ships were constructed with high prows at either ends. The shipbuilding industry of the Mauryan age had all the material and wherewithal necessary for the construction of hardy seagoing, seaworthy vessels. From Yukti Kalpataru of medieval times, a fund of information can be gathered about shipbuilding in general, and about the various classes of ships, and the material used in particular, during the Gupta and post-Gupta eras. The ships, according to this work, were classified under two broad types—the ordinary type (samanya) and the special type (visesha). The ordinary type plied on inland waterways, rivers and lakes. The ordinary type of craft was again distinguished under ten different names in accordance with its dimensions and draught: Kshudra, Madhyama, Bhima, Chapala, Patala, Bhaya, Dirgha, Patraputa, Garbhara and Manthara. The special type was meant for seagoing and was sub-divided into two varieties— Dirgha, after its length and Unnata, after its height. The Dirgha and Unnata classes of ships were further broken down to ten and five sub-classes, respectively. The Dirgha sub-classes were named Dirghika, Tarani, Lola, Gatvara, Gamini, Tari, Janghala,

Plavim, Dharini and Vegini. The nomenclature of Unnata sub-classes were : Urddhava, Anurddhava, Suvarnamukhi, Garbhini and Manthara. In addition to the classification of ships by length and height, three types of ships were categorized according to their role, and their names were indicative of the provision of cabin accommodation and its location on board. These types were : Sarvamandira, Madhyamandira and Agramandira. The Sarva-mandira was so called as it had apartments all round and was utilized to carry gold and jewellery, royal chargers and the women of the harem, and was primarily a passenger liner as we know it today. The Madhyamandira had midship cabins which afforded maximum comfort at sea and was therefore used for pleasure cruises by royalty. The Agramandira had cabins forward and was fitted out for battles at sea. The regulations for painting the ship’s sides were laid down in accordance with the number of masts it carried. A single-masted vessel was to be blue, a twin-masted, yellow, a triple-masted, red, and a four-masted, white. The bows of ships were decorated with representations of various animals such as tiger and lion, as also birds and serpents. The Yukti Kalpataru also gives an elaborate description of the wood to be used in the construction of ships and propounds the merits and demerits of different kinds of wood. In the use of metals in ship construction the work recommends gold, silver and copper, or an alloy of two or more of these elements, but forbids the utilization of iron, particularly for joining up the ship’s sides and bottom. “The iron will inevitably expose them to the influence of magnetic rocks in the sea, or bring them within a magnetic field and so lead them to risks. Hence the planks of bottoms are to be fitted together or mortised by means of substances other than iron.”1 In this connection A. L. Basham interprets the significance of the use of iron in Indian ship construction thus : “Normally the timbers of ancient Indian ships were not nailed or riveted, but lashed together; this was done to avoid the imaginary danger of magnetic rocks, for the technique of nailing a ship’s timbers was certainly known in India in the medieval period. In fact sewn or lashed timbers were more resilient than nailed ones, and

could stand better the fierce storms of the monsoon period and the many coral reefs of the Indian Ocean.”1 From a study of the numismatic evidence pertaining to the Andhra period one can glean some information about the characteristics of the vessels of the time. Three coins with ship representations have been described by Alexander Rea. “The obverse of the first shows a ship resembling the Indian dhoni, with bow to the right. The vessel is pointed in vertical section at each end. On the point of the stem is a round ball. The rudder, in the shape of a post with spoon on end, projects below. The deck is straight, and on it are two round objects from which rise two masts, each with a cross-tree at the top. Traces of rigging can be faintly seen.”2 It was during this period that the seasonal winds were discovered which led to the replacement of multi-oared galleys by ships with sails, heralding a new age in navigation. The Ajanta paintings also depict Indian vessels. There is, for instance, a sailing vessel of the 6th century a.d. painted in Cave II, Ajanta. The mural shows the vessel tossing on a swell of the sea. It has three high sails, supported by three masts at its stern. There is a lug-sail that runs obliquely to the triple mast. Two oars are seen well forward near the uprising stem. A seaman is shown as seated at the bows. The vessels of the early medieval period are found depicted in the sculptures of the Buddhist temple at Borobudur in Java. These look like the catamarans in use by south Indian fishermen even today. The largest vessel shows fifteen sailors aboard and gives the impression of being unduly long with a top-heavy superstructure. It depicts a mast with curved multi-ribs, fitted with steadying outriggers for safe sea-keeping and steered by large oars, but not by rudders which were not in vogue at the time. During the few centuries that followed there was rapid progress in shipbuilding in India. A cross-section of the views of contemporary visitors to India who wrote about shipbuilding from the first to the sixteenth centuries and of the opinions of other authorities on this interesting subject is well worth considering here. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, mentions two types of ships—the “Sangara” and “Colandiophonta.” The “Sangaras” described by him were “coastals”

as we understand them today, and the “Colandiophontas” were the large sea-going transports. The Maldives, which were under Indian occupation, also built ships made of the timber available in plenty on the island. Among the early Arab writers of the ninth and tenth centuries, Sulaiman has commended the Maldivites for the production of excellent ships and the high-class craftsmanship of the islanders. John of Montecorvino has given his impressions of the ships built during the Hindu period. He is of opinion that these ships were grotesque and not strong. Caulking and iron were not used in them. The planks were put together and tied by means of ropes made of husk. When these ships put to sea, often the rope fastening gave way and had to be constantly re-tied. The rudder was also not strong enough to withstand the swell of the sea. The position of the rudder was such that it interfered with the tacking operation. These ships, according to him, were single-masted and the sails were of matting, or of poor-quality cloth. On the other hand, J. Hornell, an authority on shipbuilding, has observed that the ships of the Hindu period were sailing vessels with two masts, that the stem and stern were high and slanting downwards and were steered by two small paddles. While the remarks of Montecorvino might perhaps hold good for an earlier period, the observations of Marco Polo regarding ships of the later medieval period are highly complimentary. ” According to him [Marco Polo], the ships that are employed in navigation are built of firtimber; they are all double-planked, that is, they have a course of sheathing boards laid over the planking in every part. These are caulked with oakum both within and without, and are fastened with iron nails. The bottoms are smeared over with a preparation of quicklime and hemp, pounded together and mixed with oil procured from a certain tree, which makes a kind of unguent that ‘retains its viscous properties more firmly and is a better material than pitch’.... He saw ships of so large a size as to require a crew of 300 men, and other ships that were manned by crews of 200 and 150 men. . . . These ships were moved with oars or sweeps, and each oar required four men to work it.”1 They carried on board as many as ten smaller craft which were used for anchor work and other ancillary duties. “The larger vessel had usually a single deck, and below, the deck space

was divided into sixty small cabins, fewer or more according to the size of the vessel. ... It was provided with a good helm, with four masts, and as many sails. Some ships of the larger class had, besides the cabins, as many as thirteen bulk-heads. . . . The object of these was to guard against accidents which might make the vessel spring a leak.”1 After Marco Polo, who came to India in the 13th century, we have an account by an Italian traveller Nicolo Conti who visited India early in the 15th century. He had observed that Indian-built ships were larger in size than the ones built by the Italians. They were of approximately 60,000 cubic feet in capacity. They were so large that they required as many as five sails, supported by five masts, to propel them. The bottom was made up of three layers of planks to enable the ships to resist the cyclonic weather encountered during the monsoons. Ships were built in large numbers in several south Indian yards, notably at Calicut and Cochin on the Malabar coast and at Kaveripattinam, Masulipatam and Calcutta on the east coast. We find that there were two types of ships built during this period : the “Monoxylon” and the “Colandiophonta.” The “Monoxylon”, as the name implies, was cut out of a single log, and in order to accommodate about 100 to 150 persons it was raised with planks athwart in tiers. The “Monoxyla” were used for coastal traffic and these were referred to in the Periplus of the Erythræan Sea as “Sangara.” The “Colandiophontas,” however, were ocean-going ships and were proportionately large and sturdy, being of more than 1,000 tons. They are believed to have undertaken voyages to Malacca and China. There is accord in the descriptions of these types of vessels given by Marco Polo, Nicolo Conti and Varthema. Dr Vincent has remarked that India built large-sized vessels, from about 200 B.C. to the close of the 16th century. The Moors are known to have built keeled ships, according to Barbosa, of a thousand and a thousand and two hundred “bahares” weight(224 tons approximately). With the, coming of the Portuguese, the building of warships in India underwent a notable change, when guns were mounted on board. This practice was first adopted by the Zamorin of Calicut, emulating the Portuguese ships. Varthema had seen Calicut ships of

300 or 400 butts. Despite their practice of not utilizing oakum for joining planks, he was surprised that the way timbers were put together did not admit of any seepage of water. The sails of the Calicut ships, he observed, were made of cotton and the anchors of marble. In later times C. R. Low describes the “Batil,” a vessel of the Malabar coast, in his book, History of the Indian Navy.1 They were two-masted sailing vessels which were 50 to 60 feet long, 16 to 18 feet broad and 8 to 10 feet high. The distinguishing feature of these vessels, which were otherwise akin to Europe-built craft, was the decorated, wooden-carved, stern. They were constructed with Malabar teak and contained a single deck. The joinings were effected with bolts and nails. Though their outer appearance looked unfinished, they are stated to have been versatile boats which rode the sea well. These ships are reported to have had a striking resemblance to the ship in which Vasco da Gama came to India. It cannot, however, be said with certainty that the Indians copied the Portuguese design. Maritime countries which came into contact with one another used to adopt the best features of one another’s construction techniques and methods to mutual advantage. In the 17th century the Indian shipbuilding industry received an impetus under the Marathas. The Maratha naval power developed Vijayadrug as their shipbuilding yard which produced grabs, gallivats and smaller craft. The evolution of shipbuilding from the earliest times to the advent of the British has been one of progress, from rafts and river-craft to multi-oared galleys, culminating in large seagoing, sailing vessels. The materials and wherewithal for ship construction were obtained from purely indigenous sources; artisans were, in the main, Indians, though some foreign technicians of Greek origin and Portuguese gunsmiths were pressed into service from time to time. When the British set foot on Indian soil, the shipbuilding industry in India was already in a flourishing state. Several shipyards around the periphery of the Indian coast had sprung up not only under Indian control, but also under Portuguese patronage, such as those at Goa, Daman and Bassein. The vessels built at Bhavnagar known as “Baghalahs” were plying the Indian seas when the British arrived.

The “Baghalahs” were one of the oldest designs that traversed the Gujarat coast. The over-all dimensions were 74 feet by 25 feet— those of a rather broad-sized vessel. They “were of approximately 150 tons and their holds were as deep as 11½- feet. The stern was almost perpendicular to the sea level. The design is said to have been conservatively retained since the days of Alexander’s invasion, with the exception that they were later mounted with two guns at the stern which was well rounded. The construction was entirely of wood except for the joining which were of nail, and the deck was covered with matting. In view of the apparently insecure method of construction, it is a wonder that these vessels withstood rough seas. An Indian-built “Baghalah,” DERIA DOWLUT, is known to have lasted for 87 years, from 1750 to 1837. When the British established their factory at Surat in 1612, the port had already had experience in building ships for the Moghul Navy and for the Sidis. With the advent of the British, however, the facilities for ship construction and undertaking refits were expanded. The earliest reference to repairs undertaken by the Surat yards on a British ship is in 1626 when the PRIMROSE was careened. Several others were refitted subsequently, and later some new constructions, notably brigantines, were undertaken. But the Surat yards were not developed to any great extent by the British, primarily owing to two reasons : in the first place, the port was not ideally suited for ship construction, not being particularly fitted to turn out the larger types of ships; secondly, the location of Surat made it vulnerable to attacks and lacked security. No wonder then that the British ordered for two pinnaces to be built at Daman and two more at Bassein in 1635, when they had a truce with the Portuguese. The British appreciated the importance of establishing a dock at Bombay in view of the natural advantages that the place offered : from 1669, the British were seriously considering the use of the natural bay at Bombay for constructing a dock, and this came to fruition during 1693-94. The heritage of the shipbuilding industry during the early British regime in India is synonymous, so to say, with the famous family of Wadias, the Master Shipbuilders of Bombay. Lowjee Nusserwanjee Wadia, the first Master Builder, was sent to Bombay from Surat by the British to execute ship construction, but this task could not progress

owing to paucity of teak wood. Later, efforts were made by the British to supply Lowjee Nusserwanjee with sufficient quantities of teak wood and he proceeded with his excellent art of turning out cruisers for the Marine and other auxiliary craft for use by the Bombay yard. It is believed that it was on his advice that the present site of the dockyard was chosen by the British. By 1735 the entire shipbuilding equipment was transferred to Bombay from Surat and during the years 1750-54 a dry dock was constructed at Bombay under the British regime. In the succeeding years wet docks and the second and third dry docks were also completed. During the 18th and 19th centuries, under the supervision of a long line of Wadia Master Builders, as many as 352 vessels, big and small—ships of the line, warships and yard craft—were constructed by Indian workers.1 In the Calcutta docks over 35 vessels were built during the years 1781 to 1800, aggregating to a total tonnage of 17,020. Besides building ships for the British, typical Indian vessels, such as the pinnace, bangle, brig and dhoni continued to be constructed. The longevity of ships of teak, constructed in India, and their seaworthiness compared with the vessels of oak built in the West, began to be appreciated by the Europeans. Abraham Parsons in 1775 testified that Bombay-built ships compared most favourably with those constructed in Europe in elegance and strength. In fact, he went so far as to say that the wood used in Indian ships was more durable than that obtainable in Europe at the time. The life of Indian ships, according to him, was as much as fifty to sixty years.2 Lord Wellesley was a staunch supporter of the policy of constructing ships in India for the use of the British and was of the firm opinion that Indian-built vessels were far less expensive than British ones. A furore was created among the entrepreneurs in England when Indian merchandise arrived in London in Indian bottoms. The London shipbuilders had grave misgivings that their monopoly would be in jeopardy. Such vested interests, therefore, tried to discourage the Indian shipbuilding industry on various pretexts. Despite the vested interests in Europe which raised the “teak-oak” controversy, the overriding advantages of teak-built ships won the day until the advent of ironclad ships.

The Industrial Revolution ushered in the change in ship construction from wood to iron and sail to steam. This revolutionary change which took place in the second quarter of the 19th century, and the lack of industrialization in India in contrast to the rapid British progress in this field, were some of the causes that led to the extinction of the shipbuilding industry in India, with the last of the illustrious Wadia Master Builders, Jamsetjee Dhunjibhoy, fading into oblivion. It cannot, however, be said that these were the only reasons for the decline of this industry, for the change in the technique of naval construction seems to have been adapted in India with a sense of urgency. In 1830, the first steamship, HUGH LINDSAY, was built in the Bombay Dockyard and, within a decade, the first iron-ship, PLANET, also was constructed in Bombay and launched. The quality of Indian workmanship, be it a sailing ship with wooden hull or a steamship with iron hull, was of the highest. C. R. Low has testified that Bombay-built ships, in comparison with English-made ones held by the Company, were in good condition when the erstwhile Indian Navy was wound up.1 It was at this juncture that the governance of India was assumed by the Crown, terminating the East India Company’s rule and abolishing the erstwhile Indian Navy. Asoka Mehta observes : “That spelled the end of Indian shipbuilding, which, if it had received adequate encouragement from the Government, would have, beyond doubt, adjusted itself to changed conditions created by the supplanting of sail by steam and wood by iron.”2 He sums up : “In 1786, John Fitch produced a vessel whose steampower moved twelve strong oars, six on one side of the boat and six on the other. Robert Fulton perfected the steam-propelled ship in 1807-1814. Further improvements and inventions followed in quick succession : 1836, screw-propeller, 1840, iron hull, 1880, steel hull,1895, diesel engine, 1900, turbine or rotary engine, 1903, electric motor vessel. Every invention added to the difficulties of shipbuilding and shipping of industrially backward India—held back by the selfish policy of an alien Government.”1 The industry lay dormant from then on until after World War I. On January 12, 1922, Shri P. S. Sivaswamy Iyer moved a resolution in the Legislative Assembly seeking to revive the shipbuilding industry in India. After a prolonged debate on the floor of the House, the

Government appointed on January 3, 1923, the Indian Mercantile Marine Committee and asked it to examine the question. Captain Sir E. J. Headlam, the Director of Royal Indian Marine, also the Chairman of the Marine Committee, made the recommendation that shipbuilding in India should be started with government subsidy. Notwithstanding the recommendation, the Government of the time did not deem fit to revive the industry, as this evidently came in conflict with vested British shipbuilding interests. Between the two World Wars, therefore, there was hardly any progress worth recording except for the bold venture of the Scindia Company to establish a shipbuilding yard in the country. As early as 1937 the Scindias negotiated with the Government for permission for a site for building a yard at Calcutta. The Scindias were correct in their opinion that Calcutta, with its improved harbour and dock facilities, with iron, steel and coal available nearby, and with skilled workmen easily to be found in the area, would be ideally suited for their purpose. The Calcutta Port Commissioners were not keen on giving the site; and the Government in 1940 offered a site at Vizagapatam, now Visakhapatnam, which was accepted by the Company despite the attendant disadvantages and with the primary object of initiating a shipbuilding industry in India that could truly become a national undertaking. Despite the advice of Admiral Fitzherbert, the Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian Navy, for the imperative need for developing the shipbuilding industry in India, the Government was lukewarm in its efforts. From the moment the Scindias plunged into this venture, the industry faced innumerable difficulties regarding the procurement of the necessary equipment. The infant industry overcame its teething troubles, and on June 21, 1941, Dr Rajendra Prasad, President of the Indian National Congress at the time, laid the foundation-stone which marked the revival of the shipbuilding industry after a century of inactivity. The yard went into operation and produced some coastal craft for the Royal Indian Navy. It also laid keels for four merchant ships, but in the wake of its development came the Japanese bombing raid of Visakhapatnam in 1942. This unfortunately retarded progress in the construction programme. In other parts of the country also, notably at Bombay and Calcutta, several ships for the Royal

Indian Navy, mostly Basset Trawlers and smaller craft for the Coastal Forces, were constructed during the war years. The work in the Visakhapatnam yard was recommenced as soon as conditions permitted, and by 1946 its construction was completed at a total cost of Rs 5 crores. The shipyard had by then two slipways with a capacity for building ships of 550 feet in length and 15,000 tons dead weight. In 1946, the keel was laid for the first modern Indian steamship of 8,000 tons dead weight for the Scindias. It was a memorable day in the annals of shipbuilding in India, when on March 14, 1948, SS JALAUSHA was launched by the late Prime Minister of India. JALAUSHA, meaning the “dawn of the waters” appropriately signifies the reawakening of this important industry in India. The second ship, JALAPRABHA, was launched on November 24, 1948, by the late Sardar Patel, Deputy Prime Minister, who said on the occasion : “Our shipping industry is still in its infancy. The geographical position makes it inevitable for India to have a shipping industry up to its requirements and to have a strong Navy to guard its long coast line. We are spending crores of rupees on shipping freight for the import of our essential requirements. We are severely handicapped in the transport of these commodities at the right time or in the right quantity because of our dependence on foreign shipping. In an emergency, we are at the mercy of other countries. Just as civil aviation is the foundation of air power, mercantile marine constitutes the backbone of the Navy. Without the backing of a mercantile shipping, a Navy of reasonable dimensions is impossible.” The infant industry, requiring vast capital investment, managed to launch, against financial odds, eight more ships from November, 1948, to February, 1952, a commendable progress. The industry had, however, to face foreign competition. Long-established yards with the backing of industrially advanced States could build ships cheaper than India. The Scindias on the one hand was not getting enough orders, and on the other it was not in a position to undertake the construction of ships at an economical rate. To compete with world markets it was found necessary to expand the yard, adding additional slipways and ancillary facilities for large-scale production. It was, naturally, not possible for a private company to invest large sums of money for the purpose. The Scindias represented to the Government

the grave financial condition of the company. In order that the industry should survive in the national interest, the Government placed orders in 1949 for the building of some ships under subsidy which bridged the difference in cost of construction in India and the cost of similar vessels if built in the United Kingdom. Such am interim arrangement also was unsatisfactory and the concern continued to operate in peril. These reasons necessitated the Scindias’ handing over the management of the yard to the Government of India on March 1, 1952, after pioneering effort for over a decade.

*Note.—The

name “RAJKUMAR” was changed to “JAG MITRA” after delivery to the owners. (Information by courtesy of Hindustan Shipyard Ltd., New Delhi) The Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. was formed with two-thirds of the paid-up capital with the Government and the balance in the hands of the Scindias, whose knowledge and experience in the industry was thereby retained. The Government, on taking over, negotiated with a French firm, the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de La Loire, for technical collaboration in the improvement of the yard and for the training of personnel. In 1957 an officer from the Indian Navy was appointed as the Managing Director of the Shipyard. The target of launchings of 1,00,000 gross tons was reached by the Hindustan Shipyard on July 5, 1958, when JALAVEERA, being the twenty-third ship, was completed. The progress can be gauged from the statement of ships built at Visakhapatnam (pp. 132-133). The value of ships built has been on the increase. The figures given below speak for themselves :

The yard’s capacity is 40,000 gross registered tonnage per annum, and for its expansion a sum of Rs 244 lakhs was provided in the Third Five Year Plan. With a view to augmenting the facilities for refit and repair of ships of the Merchant Navies and of the Indian Navy, the Government acquired on May 14, 1960, the Mazagon Docks at Bombay. On this occasion, Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister at the time, stated that “. . . it will help India towards self-sufficiency in the manufacture and repair of ships.” For similar reasons the Garden Reach Workshops at Calcutta was also acquired. The Seaward Defence Boat I.N.S. AJAY built at the Workshops was commissioned in 1960. To increase the shipbuilding capacity of the country, a second shipyard is to be established at Cochin.

Since Independence tremendous strides have been taken in the sphere of shipbuilding, and it is hoped that in future the industry will grow steadily, backed by the industrialization of the country now being achieved by planned progress, and that the country will regain lost ground in this field.

2—Shipping Shipping is a primary factor in the economy of a nation. This was realized even during the Hindu period, and the sea-borne commerce of the Hindus continued to flourish from the days of the Mauryas up to the advent of the Arabs. During the Sri Vijaya-Chola era, the Arabs reached their zenith in maritime commerce, and by the end of the Hindu period they held the monopoly of overseas trade. The Arabs assumed the role of intermediaries of trade between the East and the West until the advent of the Europeans. Talking of the decline of Indian shipping, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru said : “Now, unfortunately, like other things in which we fell, we fell back in shipping and almost you might say that that itself was a final indication of our decadence. And I am not for a moment laying stress on what foreign conquest did to India—of course it did—but I think we had fallen before that foreign conquest came, as a country inevitably does if it becomes static, becomes weak and loses its creative energy.”1 The European domination of India for over four centuries completely thwarted national overseas trading. The political control of India by the British was followed by an economic policy that slowly but surely exterminated Indian overseas trading. From 1800 to 1813, a series of discriminatory orders were promulgated in India which imposed a higher rate of import duty on goods carried by non-British ships. In fact the rates were double those levied on goods carried in British bottoms. The French and the Dutch succeeded, as a result of wars, in obtaining favourable terms, which resulted in Indian ships alone being adversely affected by these heavy duties. By 1862, the British India Steam Navigation Company forged ahead and spread their lines of sea communication both in the East

and towards the West, devouring on the way all Indian competition. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the shortening of the steaming distance by nearly 4,000 miles, the Company flourished. In addition to overseas trade, by 1880 the Company took over India’s coastal trade and obtained thus the virtual monopoly of shipping in the East. The only other British company that was in operation at the time was the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, and in 1916 an amalgamation of these two companies was effected bringing under one administration a fleet of 20,00,000 tons—a colossal tonnage which could render ineffective any Indian shipping company. It is no wonder then that during the years 1890 to 1919, none of the Indian shipping companies could survive. About 1890, Jamshedji N. Tata commissioned the Tata Line to operate between Bombay, China and Japan in the interests of the yarn trade. The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company at once reduced their freight rates from Rs 17 to the ridiculous figure of Rs 1½ per ton. The result was inevitable : the Tata Line was forced to close down--after which event the rates were restored to Rs 17. Another instance of “rate war” between a British and an Indian company is worth recording. The Swadeshi Steam Navigation Company, started by Shri V. O. Chidambaram Pillai in 1906, competed with the British India Steam Navigation Company; but it was forced into liquidation, and Chidambaram Pillai was sent to jail on political grounds. Shri C. Rajagopalachari comments on the debacle that the Swadeshi Company “crashed on the rocks of politics, not on the rocks of business.“Several other Indian companies were floated but forced to wither away by such unfair means. Asoka Mehta observes : “Destruction of a hundred shipping companies involving a capital loss of over ten crores of rupees was the price paid by us.”1 Despite these throttling practices of the British vested interests, the resurgent Indian aspirations for political and economic freedom prevailed. On March 27, 1919, Narottam Morarji, a far-sighted entrepreneur, started the Scindia Steam Navigation Company Ltd., which alone managed to survive, ail the crippling efforts of the British shipping interests. SS LOYALTY, the first ship of the Company, sailed

to the United Kingdom on April 5, 1919, flying the Scindia flag for the first time. Like any other Indian company of this time, it also suffered from British undercutting. LOYALTY was lying idle in the port of London for six months, pending its survey by Lloyds. Undaunted, the Company went in for six “Frank” ships to augment their line, but it took almost one year to have them registered. By this time the postwar boom in shipping had slumped. The Company survived, not because it did not lose financially, but because it could withstand tremendous losses which were partly minimized by trading activities. By the tenacity and patriotism of the proprietors, the Company managed to survive, and in 1923 they eventually succeeded in reaching a ten-year agreement at the British Shipping Conference— an agreement by no means favourable but which had to be accepted for saving the Company. The agreement forced the Company to withdraw from overseas operations and relegated it to coastal shipping, restricting its tonnage to 75,000. About this time there was a general awakening of national interest in mercantile affairs. During the years 1922 to 1928, Indian members of the Legislative Assembly moved several resolutions for the promotion of Indian Mercantile Marine, for the prevention of “rate wars”, for reserving coastal trade to Indian vessels and for commissioning a Training Ship in India. Only the last resolution bore fruit when the Indian Mercantile Marine Training Ship DUFFERIN was commissioned in 1927. By 1930, the Indian shipping interests came together to form an association which came to be known as the Indian National Steamship Owners’ Association, so that they could present for mutual benefit a united front in their dealings with the Government and the British shipping interests. Between themselves the members of the Association owned 84,000 tons of shipping; and Shri Walchand Hirachand became their spokesman. This Association has grown very much, and it aims at developing national shipping and safeguarding the national shipping interests. The Association celebrated its Silver Jubilee on January 2, 1959, under the presidentship of Smt. Sumati Morarjee. In 1933, when the ten-year agreement of the Scindias was about to lapse, a bitter “rate war” began; the freights slumped to the

financial detriment of the shipping industry. Eventually a tripartite agreement was reached between the Asiatic and the Scindia Companies and the British shipping magnates, which led to the commencement of the first Scindia passenger service between Rangoon and the Coromandel coast, as well as to their tonnage expansion to 1,00,000 gross. At the commencement of World War II in 1939, the Indian Companies were concentrating on coastal shipping and the total tonnage was to the tune of 1,50,000 gross, which dwindled to 75,000 tons at the end of hostilities owing to loss in sinkings during the war. The Indian shipping interests expressed their misgivings as to the possibility of getting adequate Government compensation and were apprehensive of the extinction of the Indian Mercantile Marine which had been built up against great odds. Happily the events that followed the war gave no cause for alarm. In 1944, the Government appointed a Reconstruction Policy Committee on shipping with Sir Aziz-ul-Haque, the then Commerce Member, as Chairman. The Government also enunciated their basic views in the statement: “For a country of its size, the length of its coastline and its strategic position athwart one of the world’s main sea routes, India possesses a distressingly small number of deep-sea ships which at the outbreak of war stood at no more than 30 with a total of less than 1,50,000 tons gross. India’s weakness in this respect has long been recognized and the Government of India are pledged to a policy of assisting in the development of an Indian Mercantile Marine. So far, however, the action taken to implement this undertaking has been limited to the establishment of the DUFFERIN for the training of executive officers, the provision of special facilities for the training of marine engineers and to using Government’s good offices to promote a settlement between the Indian and British companies operating on the coast with regard to the division of the available trade between them. “The vulnerability of India’s position has been revealed by the stress of wartime conditions, but by no circumstances more glaringly than by her inability to find adequate shipping from her own resources to provide for the transport of the food supplies required by her. The rectification of this state of affairs should be one of the immediate

post-war objectives, not only for commercial reasons but also because the development of the Royal Indian Navy necessarily implies the concurrent development of the merchant navy. “The acquisition of an adequate share in the world’s carrying trade should be the aim of our post-war shipping policy, and to this end steps should be taken to secure for Indian shipping : an increased share of the coastal trade including trade with Ceylon and Burma (the present share is estimated at between 20-30 per cent); a substantial share in the near trades, e.g., Persian Gulf, East Africa, Malaya and Dutch East Indies; a fair share in the Eastern trades, especially those trades of which Japanese shipping will have been dispossessed; a fair share also in the trade between India on the one hand, and the United Kingdom, the Continent of Europe and North America on the other; and, in order to give maximum relief to the railways, a number of steps have been taken to ensure the fullest utilization of country craft and to prevent wasteful competition between country craft and steamers. As India may have to look to all forms of transport to sustain her economy in the post-war era the continued development of country craft will have to be considered. Co-ordination of steamer and country craft services is an essential part of this development subject to due regard being paid to the different needs served by steamers and country craft.” In the succeeding year the Policy Committee appointed a subcommittee, with Dr C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar as Chairman, which made the following recommendations, after prolonged deliberations, in March, 1947 : India should aim at a target of two million gross tons of shipping; coastal trade should be entirely reserved for Indian shipping; 75 per cent of adjacent trade should be handled by Indian ships—to countries such as Burma and Ceylon, 50 per cent of India’s distant trades and 30 per cent of trades carried in Axis vessels in the Orient should be eventually taken over by Indian ships; Indian shipping, dealing in overseas trade, should be given fiscal aid; and, a Shipping Board should be formed to formulate local and international shipping policy. With the attainment of Independence, a new era in the history of Indian shipping was ushered in, and remarkable progress has been achieved. The national Government accepted the recommendations

of the Reconstruction Policy Sub-Committee of aiming at the target of two million tons—the Indian tonnage at the time stood at 1,92,000 gross. Independence was heralded by the immediate establishment of regular overseas Indian shipping services to the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States. In the years that followed there was intense activity in several fields towards the rapid advancement of Indian shipping. New shipping companies were floated, the development of major and minor ports was taken in hand, and a Director-General of Shipping was appointed to assist the Government and the shipping interests in handling the numerous and complex problems of this vital industry. The Control of Shipping Act was codified, providing for a system of licensing for coastal shipping. Government schemes for the grant of liberal loans to Indian shipping companies on easy terms to expand their fleet were evolved. A Shipping Development Fund was instituted by the Government. Another important measure taken was the passing of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act of 1958, as a result of which the National Shipping, Board, the highest advisory body, was formed. The Act consolidated all the previous laws and included some new ones on shipping. Before the end of 1948, the shipping tonnage registered an increase of 33 per cent over the pre-Independence figures. Since then there has been a steady increase in tonnage : the tremendous progress can be readily appreciated from the table on the opposite page. To give an impetus to shipping in overseas trade, the Government sponsored in 1950 the Eastern Shipping Corporation, This marked the first experiment in modern India when the public sector participated in shipping activity; the move was followed, owing to its success, by the establishment of the Western Shipping Corporation in 1956. In 1961 both these Corporations were merged with a total tonnage of 1,38,593 Gross Registered Ton (GRT). At the commencement of the First Five Year Plan in 1951, the aggregate tonnage reached was 3,90,707 GRT. The Planning Commission devoted attention to the planned development of this industry of national importance and fixed a target of 6,00,000 GRT to be attained by the end of the first five years. It is gratifying that, despite numerous difficulties, this target was achieved by the industry

with an outlay of Rs 44 crores, of which 50 per cent was contributed by the Government and the other half by the private sector. The next goal that was set for the Second Five Year Plan period was the 9,00,000 GRT mark. With the acquisition of the tanker ADI JAYANTI on August 24, 1961, Indian shipping crossed this target.

ADI JAYANTI of 3,000 DWT was the first oil tanker under Indian Registry. It was also the first acquisition of the Jayanti Shipping Company. This Company, though a new-comer in the field, has taken tremendous strides in the growth of Indian shipping. From its acquisition of ADI JAYANTI in 1961, till the recent commissioning of another super-tanker VIKRAM JAYANTI in 1964, the Company has acquired a fleet of 21 ships, totalling about 4,50,000 DWT, an impressive figure for such a short period. The Company has one more unique distinction in possessing on June 22, 1964, the largest vessel on Indian Registry, namely, VIKRAM JAYANTI, which has a capacity of carrying 52,000 tons of oil when fully loaded and requires a 36-feet draught. The vessel has been built at an approximate cost of Rs 325 lakhs. The Company’s achievement can be seen from the statement of acquisition of ships given opposite. A substantial increase has been achieved in the shipping tonnage during the period of the first two Five The Five Year Plans Year Plans, as can be seen from the table given below :

By the end of the Second Five Year Plan the targets set for overseas and coastal shipping were 4.9 and 4.1 lakhs GRT respectively. But the actual achievement in overseas tonnage has exceeded the target, while in coastal shipping there has been a shortfall JAYANTI FLEET AT A GLANCE (as on 1st July, 1964) DEAD WEIGHT TONNAGE

(Information by kind courtesy of M/s. Jayanti Shipping Co., Ltd.) For the expansion of shipping a sum of Rs 18-7 crores was spent during the First Plan, and about Rs 52-7 crores during the Second Plan. One of the main features of the Second Plan period was the establishment of the Shipping Development Fund. . In the Third Plan Rs 55 crores have been provided for shipping. This is in addition to a sum of Rs 4 crores which is to be provided from the Shipping Development Fund. The private sector is expected to’ contribute Rs 7 crores. The following table shows the coastal and overseas shipping during the Third Plan period :

A major part of the above, i.e. 1,00,000 GRT coastal and 9,30,600 GRT overseas tonnage is towards the replacement of old ships. All this expansion has been achieved after crossing innumerable hurdles, one of which was the inadequacy of trained personnel to man and maintain these ships. The problem was accentuated by the loss of a number of trained personnel in World War II and by some personnel going over to serve Pakistan after Partition. The DUFFERIN, established in 1927, took on more entrants and included the training of marine engineers in the first instance. The Merchant Navy Officers’ Training Committee was appointed in 1947; on its recommendation, a Marine Engineering College was started at Calcutta the following year. A Nautical and Engineering College was also established at Bombay. From then on, pre-sea training was imparted on the DUFFERIN, and post-sea technical instruction to Merchant Navy Officers for the Certificate of Competency was undertaken at Bombay. The training of merchant seamen was undertaken at Calcutta in 1950 by the BHADRA. This was later augmented by the MEKHALA at Visakhapatnam in 1951 and NAVLAKSHI in Sau-rashtra in 1955.

Since the Partition till 1962, over 17,000 seamen have been trained and the Government is reported to have incurred Rs 2½ crores in the training of officers and men for the Merchant Service. Thus they weathered the shortage of personnel and continued with the planned expansion of shipping. The table given on page 141 shows the figures for Indian shipping acquired during the ten year period from 1951 to 1961. It will be seen from the table that the acquisition of tankers has not progressed very much. Including the recent acquisition, the VIK-RAM JAYANTI, which is a super-tanker of 54,350 tons, India possesses only five tankers with an aggregate GRT of 98,588. This figure is, by any standard, grossly inadequate. Oil is the life blood of a country. Most industries depend upon oil in one form or another. It is an important strategic commodity. A large percentage of crude oil is imported, and it is, therefore, important for India to possess a larger fleet of tankers. The expansion of Indian shipping (see chart opposite) though impressive, is insufficient considering the volume of India’s distant and adjacent trade that is carried in foreign bottoms. In 1964, 86 per cent of India’s foreign trade was carried by sea. The volume of shipping cleared in 1964 is estimated to be in the region of 4,26,00,000 tons of general cargo and 90,00,000 tons of oil. Of this huge volume of traffic a mere 12 per cent is carried in Indian bottoms, while the bulk of our trade is cleared by foreign ships. This is not only a tremendous strain on our finances but also an unnecessary drain on our foreign exchange. Moreover, in case of war with any nation, the non-belligerent shipping interests may not be prepared to clear our trade, placing their ships in peril; our war economy will then be in jeopardy. According to the statistics available for 1962, India ranks sixteenth among the trading nations in the world. India’s position in world trade and shipping is shown in the table on pp. 146-147. It will be seen that the proportion between India’s contribution to world trade and the corresponding percentage to world fleet strikes one readily as most inadequate, when compared to other maritime nations above her in the table. Not only does our overseas shipping need to be augmented but coastal shipping also requires to be developed. The problems here

are slightly different: in this field there is no competition from foreign shipping as coastal shipping is reserved for ships of Indian

*These

percentages are worked out on the basis of half of the total of the exports and imports of each country to world total given at the top which represents half of the total of the exports and imports of all the countries. † Half the total of the exports and imports of all countries except Cuba, China (mainland), the U.S.S.R., Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany (Bast), Hungary, Poland and Rumania. The latest year for which the figures are available for these countries except Cuba for which no figures are available is 1960 when the average of their total exports and imports amounted to $15,400 million.

(a) Including 12 million g.r.t. in the Reserve Fleet, (b) Converted from Rupee figures for year ended March 31, 1963, according to Indian Government source and including figures for the erstwhile Portuguese possessions in India, (c) This figure, as given by the Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, is slightly higher, presumably because the Lloyd’s Register figures include noncommercial vessels also, (d) Estimated. (e) For 1961. Source : I.M.F. for trade figures, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping for Tonnage. Reproduced from INDIAN SHIPPING, September, 1963. By kind courtesy of the Editor, INDIAN SHIPPING, the journal of the Indian National Steamship Owners’ Association, Bombay. Register. In 1959, the Minister of Shipping had observed : “It is obvious that for a country like India with a vast coastline, an adequate and efficient coastal fleet is a national necessity from the economic as well as strategic points of view. In that context, it becomes our duty to ensure that economic employment is secured for the coastal fleet.” The shipping interests, however, hold that there is no equitable distribution of home cargo between road transport, railways and coastal shipping. They also point out that the present freight rates and the inadequacy of cargo lead to uneconomic operation of coastal shipping and, therefore, do not foster development in this sphere. The Rail-Sea Co-ordination Committee endeavours to iron out these imbalances; and so long as the three modes of transport do not enter into unhealthy competition but are viewed as being complementary in the shared role of economic distribution of goods, there should be no impediments in the progress of coastal shipping. A history of shipping will be incomplete without some mention of the part played by, the formidable fleet of sailing vessels. They are estimated to be over 3,000 in number; they operate in coastal waters and have the advantage of being able to navigate through creeks and coves which steamers cannot enter owing to their big draughts. The operating costs of the sailing vessels being negligible, they contribute in their humble way to strengthening the internal transport system without much expense. Some large-sized sailing vessels also venture

on the high seas to places as far off as Persia, Arabia and East Africa, continuing the tradition of seafaring of old. The sea has been the main medium over which transportation of goods and personnel was effected in the past; it is bound to remain so, at any rate in the foreseeable future, being the only economical means so far known to man. Merchant shipping for India, indeed for any maritime country, is of paramount importance in its economy. Our late Prime Minister remarked : “Mercantile Marines represent power of a different type; not power of armed might but the power of the country’s growing wealth and prosperity.”1 The Merchant Navy has an important role to perform in peace, more so in times of war. Vice-Admiral R. D. Katari, the former Chief of the Naval Staff, observed : "Sea power does not mean a fighting navy alone. It means possession of a fleet of merchant ships of all types so that India’s maritime trade could be carried on by her own ships without dependence on others; a number of ports with repair and docking facilities all round the 2,500 mile coast; a good shipbuilding industry with industrial backing to make all types of machinery to equip the ships made in India, and a navy, sufficiently powerful, to protect our shores in times of peace and war. . . . The primary duty of the navy is the protection of the country’s maritime trade. There is no doubt that India is going to expand her sea-borne trade. There must be a naval power to give adequate protection to the ships.”1

33. Jamsetjee Bomanjee

34. EARL BALCARRAS built at Bombay, 1815

35. V. O. Chidambaram Pillai

36. Narottam Morarji

37. Walchamd Hirachand

38. Smt Sumatiben Morarjee

39. S.S. LOYALTY

40. Super Oil Tanker VIKRAM JAYANTI

VII

CONCLUSION A study of India’s maritime history from the earliest times to the present day shows that she was a nation of seafarers, and as Smt. Sumati Morarjee put it : “Our maritime history is not a matter of chance or of casual growth; it is a heritage, but it is a heritage that must be guarded jealously and studied carefully in all its phases.”1 The strategic geographical position of the Indian subcontinent, with expanses of sea around it, naturally led to seafaring even from the days of the Indus Valley Civilization, dating back to 3,000 B.C. The Hindus, since the days, of the Mauryas, the Andhras, the Pallavas, the Chalukyas, the Kalingas, the Palas, the Cholas, the Cheras and the Pandyas displayed remarkable interest in maritime intercourse. Of these Hindu kingdoms, it was the Cholas who exhibited outstanding ability in naval matters. During the epoch of the Sri Vijaya Kings and the Sailendras, religious and cultural expansion and maritime commerce with Southeast Asia reached their zenith. It was but natural that the south Indian dynasties should have shown more interest in maritime affairs than their north Indian brethren who were preoccupied with incessant external aggression overland. It is unfortunate that the Hindu kingdoms, after having taken a preponderant share in the shaping of the maritime history of the nation, should have resigned themselves to entrusting their overseas trading to the hands of the Arabs. The decadence of the Hindu kingdoms had set in, not only because of disunity among themselves —which in itself was an important factor—but more so owing to their neglect of sea power and the consequent economic stagnation. The seafaring Arabs entered the eastern seas for purely commercial reasons and not with, any designs of conquest, nor was their entry the outcome of any imperial policy. They carried on peaceful trade and plied the seas unmolested, side by side with Indian vessels.

During the medieval period, India’s meagre participation in maritime affairs, despite an organized Moghul Navy, was an important factor leading to India’s decline. The Moghul’s lack of aspiration and foresight to rule the sea, after the consolidation of their Empire, and their undue reliance on land armies for defence and neglect of sea power, are two lessons of history. It was with the advent of the Portuguese that peace and tranquillity on the Indian seas changed to war and hostility. It was with the entry of the Europeans that maritime history became a record of a succession of endeavours to establish control of the Indian Ocean, resulting in directly influencing India’s destiny. The ultimate control of the Indian Ocean by an alien power had a formidable impact on the shaping of India’s history. Shri Jawahar-lal Nehru observed : “By and large, I think it is said that even in the past and remote ages, it was the seafaring nations that prospered, prospered both from the point of view of power and from the point of view of wealth, because of trade and commerce. I do not say that land-locked nations have not been very powerful; they have been certainly powerful, for periods at a time, but, on the whole, the importance of sea power has been a dominant feature of history.”1 Among the contemporaneous powers, it was the Portuguese to some extent, and the British more than anyone else, who appreciated the importance of sea power. Although the Zamorin of Calicut, and later the Marathas, ventured to dispute the sea power of the foreign powers, the Indian concept of naval defence was limited to coastal waters. The absence of an Indian high seas fleet of comparable size, and the lack of island bases outside India, gave them no defence in depth. Such outside bases would have enabled them to retaliate ably, with their navies preying heavily on enemy shipping. Instead, the indigenous navy of this period was tied to the coast with a relatively short tether, thus rendering it ineffective in disputing the command of the Indian Ocean, which is a lesson to be learnt from history. The concept of relating the strength of the navy merely to the length of India’s coastline is the outcome of a continental outlook, which seems even today to be the mistaken premise of some protagonists.

By the beginning of the 19th century, the British were a first-rate sea power in the world. Their unquestioned control of the Indian Ocean led to their uninterrupted rule in India, except on two occasions in the 20th century during the First and Second World Wars, when the German and the Japanese fleets disputed the sea power of the British in the Indian Ocean. A study of India’s history proves that it was the failure to maintain the command of the Indian seas that weakened her position and eventually brought about her incapacity to defend herself against foreign aggression. The shipbuilding industry in India had shown, through the ages, remarkable progress so long as sailing ships with wooden hull were in vogue. The obstacles to the growth of this industry, when the change took place from sail to steam and wood to iron, were not only political and commercial but also the lack of industrialization of India as opposed to rapid British advancement in this field. In the postIndependence period, the industry has been forging ahead in its planned expansion backed by the progressive industrialization of the country. Shipping is vital for our economy, and, ton for ton and mile for mile, conveyance of goods over the sea is by far the cheapest mode of transport known to man. An expanded merchant fleet is as important to carry our trade and commerce as it is to have a strong balanced naval force to protect our shipping and maintain the command of the sea. Since Partition, our naval forces have also undergone planned expansion and modernization, and we have advanced from “corvettes to a carrier.” In the words of Vice-Admiral R. D. Katari : “A study of the history of India brings out one very important lesson, namely, the influence of sea power on national history. So long as we had the command of the seas around us we played an effective part in the world affairs, but once we lost it we lost our independence. Now that we have become a free nation, it is the duty of every Indian to see that we don’t forget this lesson for which we paid so dearly.”1

A NOTE ON THE ILLUSTRATIONS (Unless otherwise stated, the photographs up to No. 13 are reproduced by courtesy of the Archaeological Survey of India.) 1. There is enough evidence to show that as early as 3,000 B.C. the people of the Harappa culture ventured out to sea. Among several seals discovered in the excavations at Harappa, one portrays an anchor, as shown in the photograph. That the Harappan used an anchor is a clear indication that deep-water craft, perhaps seagoing, were in existence even in that early period. (reproduced from EXCAVATIONS SWARUP VATS)

AT

HARAPPA, Volume II, by MADHO

2. The people of the Indus Valley Civilization, even in the dim past, knew the art of navigation and built their own boats. The photograph of a painting portraying a boat on a potsherd discovered at MohenjoDaro dates back to 3,000 B.C. The boat has a high prow and stern, a single mast and what appears to be a rudder. The boat resembles markedly similar representations found in the early pottery of Egypt, and the Minoan seals and the cylinders of Sumer. This suggests mutual contact among these countries. 3. Harappa culture in 3,000 B.C. was so advanced that the Harappan knew the art of boat-building and boat maintenance. This is proved by the very recent important discovery at Lothal, in the Ahmedabad District of Gujarat, where an entire naval dock has been unearthed. It is about 710 feet long and 120 feet wide. From its size it appears to have been used either as a dock for large-sized seagoing vessels or as a boat-pen for a number of smaller vessels. 4. About the 2nd century B.C. the Hindus showed remarkable awareness of maritime affairs. Their interest in overseas commerce took them to far-off lands to spread trade as also their culture. The

photograph shows a boat scene at Bharhut, as archaeological evidence of the notable nautical activity of the 2nd century B.C. 5. The photograph shows the sculpture of the “Miracle Panel” of Stupa I at the East Gate, front South Pillar at Sanchi. The boat sculptured shows an upturned stern and a low bow. It carries a passenger and two persons at oars, one of whom appears to be a woman. 6. The Satavahana or Satakarni dynasty (the Andhras) maintained a regular fleet of ships. There is numismatic evidence of this fact. They had intimate relations with the Roman Empire and had a flourishing overseas trade. The photograph shows a representation of a sailing ship with two masts on the obverse of a coin minted by King Satakarni in about 200 a.d. The fish and the conch shell are symbolic of the sea. 7. As far back as 75 a.d., if not earlier, the Hindus visited the Indonesian Archipelago. They eventually left there the imprint of Hindu civilization, Indian art and architecture, Hindu and Buddhist religious customs and manners. The photograph shows a sculptured relief from the famous Buddhist Stupa at Borobudur in Java, Indonesia. It portrays an Indian ship that sailed the seas more than a thousand years ago. There is a striking architectural likeness between the Stupa at Borobudur and the monastery at Paharpur in Bengal, thus proving the close contacts between the Sailendras who were the Hindu rulers of the Archipelago and the Palas of Bengal. (by courtesy of the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) 8. The port of Cannanore on the West Coast played an important part in the commercial life of the Cheras. The finds of Roman coins at Cannanore prove the vast extent of the trade that existed during the Julian-Claudian era. This old port drawn by an artist portrays in the foreground an off-shore island and typical boats. (picture and the one below reproduced from INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, by K. M. PANIKKAR, by courtesy of M/s. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London)

9. The port of Calicut was the centre of the pepper trade from very early days. Pepper was an important culinary item in the West and the commodity was carried both in Indian and foreign bottoms. In fact, the tonnage of ships was rated according to the number of baskets of Calicut pepper that they were capable of carrying. The Zamorins of Calicut pursued a policy of encouraging overseas trade; as a result Calicut became a flourishing entrepot of the East. The picture portrays a view of the old port as seen by an artist. 10. On July 8, 1497, Vasco da Gama set sail on his maiden voyage on board SAN GABRIEL which brought him up to the Cape of Good Hope. Having rounded it, he reached Calicut on May 11, 1498, from Milindi where he had obtained the services of an Indian pilot who guided the ship across the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. The picture shows the historic occasion when Vasco da Gama presented his credentials and submitted his request to the Zamorin of Calicut for permission to trade. (picture reproduced from A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF INDIA, Vol I, by HENRY BEVERIDGE, by courtesy of M/s. Blackie and Son Ltd.) 11. & 12. The Portuguese were the first among the European nations to appreciate the importance of sea power, but they flouted the age-old concept of freedom of the high seas and claimed the monopoly of using the Indian seas to their own advantage. From about the 16th century the peaceful Indian sea-borne commerce was destroyed by the Portuguese. The two pictures show a Portuguese warship and a boat in terracotta found in a brick temple at Naldanga in Jessore District (East Pakistan). The warship has multi-decks and the portholes can be clearly seen. The ship is manned by the Portuguese with headdress. The paddle boat has four passengers and is manned by two oarsmen. (by courtesy of the Archaeological Survey of India and the Asutosh Museum, Calcutta) 13. The British consolidated (their position in India by the acquisition of strategic ports along the peninsular coast. In 1611, the British had

a factory at Masulipatam on the east coast, but the incessant interference from the Dutch led the British to look for a more suitable location. In 1639, Francis Day succeeded in getting the lease of Madras from the ruler of Chandragiri and fortified the seaport which has come to be known as Fort St George. The photograph portrays the artist’s impression of the Fort. (picture reproduced from India and the Indian Ocean, by K. M. Panikkar, by courtesy of M/s. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London) 14. The French challenged the supremacy of the British in the Indian Ocean from the days of the War of the Austrian Succession to the Battle of Trafalgar. The picture shows the British ship PITT exchanging broadsides with the French ship ST LOUIS on September 29, 1758, off Fort St David. In this encounter the 50-gun ship ST LOUIS scored a direct hit on PITT which started shipping water and sailed away, breaking the engagement. (pictures Nos. 14, 15 and 16 by courtesy of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich) 15. & 16. The Anglo-French battle for supremacy of the Indian Ocean continued spasmodically for over 60 years. Here the two pictures show the commencement and the close of a four-hour engagement between the British India-man, WARREN HASTINGS, and the French frigate, LA PIEMONTAISE, on June 21, 1806. The Indiaman was inferior in fire power with only, eight broadside guns, whereas the French frigate had 23. In the action that ensued, the WARREN HASTINGS lost badly and was seized by the French. 17. After the eclipse of the Zamorin’s fleet under Kunjali, the local power that disputed British naval supremacy in the coastal waters was Shivaji’s fleet under Kanhoji Angre, an Admiral of outstanding ability. Kanhoji came of a family of seafarers. His daring and brilliant services to the nation have been recognized by India after Independence. In memory of the Admiral a premier naval establishment at Bombay has been commissioned as I.N.S. ANGRE.

(photograph from Naval Defence of India, by K. B. Vaidya, by courtesy of M/s. Thacker and Co. Ltd.) 18. By the beginning of 17th century Admiral Kanhoji Angre was in possession of the entire Konkan coast from Savantwadi to Bombay. He had mastery of the coastal waters and operated the Maratha fleet in that region to levy a tax called chauth. When British ships defied payment, he attacked them with his grabs and gallivats, The grabs mounted 16 to 30 guns each and some of them were nearly 400 tons. The gallivats which were smaller, some 120 tons, mounted 4 to 10 guns each. The photograph shows some grabs and gallivats of the Maratha fleet making a co-ordinated attack on a British ship. (reproduced from India and the Indian Ocean, by K. M. Panikkar, by courtesy of M/s. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London) 19. The Hydrographic Branch of the Indian Navy is as old as the Navy itself. As early as 1772, the Bombay Marine initiated a surveying expedition. The charting of the seas which began in 1772 has progressed almost uninterruptedly to this day. The photograph— the oldest in the possession of the Indian Navy—shows a group of Naval Officers of the Marine Survey on board a surveying ship during the survey season 1922-23. 20. From its inception in 1934 till the beginning of World War II, the Royal Indian Navy underwent little or no expansion owing to the financial depression of the thirties.With the report of the Chatfield Commission, Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert Fitzherbert was appointed the head of the Royal Indian Navy in 1936. After taking over, he had the tremendous task of reorganizing and expanding the Service during a very crucial period. (photographs Nos. 20-28, by courtesy of the Armed Forces Information Office, Ministry of Defence)

21. During World War II, apart from local tasks such as patrolling, contraband control and seaward defence, the Royal Indian Navy participated in the African and Atlantic campaigns and in operations in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Photograph shows a ship of the Royal Indian Navy off the Levant coast. 22. On attaining Independence, India purchased the first cruiser, formerly H. M. S. ACHILLES of the AJAX class, which had seen action off the River Plate against the German Pocket Battleship GRAFSPEE. Completely refitted and modernized, the ship was commissioned as H. M. I. S. DELHI and reached Indian waters in 1948. 23. The first cruiser H. M. I. S. DELHI was acquired by India in 1948. Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India, visited the ship soon after its arrival at Bombay. The picture shows him inspecting a “Division” on board the ship. 24. About a year after India becoming a Republic the President of India bestowed upon the Indian Navy a great honour by presenting the President’s Colours. The historic occasion took place on May 27, 1951, at Bombay, the Indian Navy’s premier naval base. The photograph shows the ceremonial presentation of Colours at the Brabourne Stadium. 25. Shri Jawaharlal Nehru showed keen interest in the Indian Navy. After his historic visit to Indonesia on board I.N.S. DELHI in 1950, he re-visited the fleet in October, 1954. He took passage on board the then Flagship I.N.S. DELHI from Cochin to Bombay and witnessed the fleet exercises at sea. The photograph shows Shri Nehru with Admiral Sir Mark Pizey, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, on the bridge of I.N.S. DELHI. 26. & 27. A naval air station, IN.S. GARUDA, was established at Cochin in May, 1953. This establishment was commissioned to provide ships with anti-aircraft and other allied training. It also provided a nucleus organization for aviation. The first photograph

shows “Sealand” aircraft flying in formation, and the second a “Sealand” touching down in Ernakulam Channel, Cochin. 28. When ships operate at sea for prolonged periods it becomes necessary to refuel them without their having to return to base. The refuelling is done either by a Fleet Tanker or by a larger ship having reserve fuel. The refuelling is executed when both the supplying and receiving ships are under way to avoid being “sitting ducks” to an “enemy.” Here two ships of the Indian Navy are seen taking part in the exercise of fuelling at sea. 29. Vice-Admiral B. S. Soman has more than 30 years of service in the Navy. During the war he served in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and took part in the capture of the Italian submarine GALLILIO off Aden. He saw some service also with the North Atlantic Convoy Escorts. He held every important command both ashore and afloat, and reached the top of the Service as Chief of the Naval Staff on June 5, 1962. As a member of the Inter-Services Pay Committee in 1947, he was the spokesman of the Navy and was subsequently assigned the delicate task involving the partition of the Navy as a member of the Armed Forces Reconstruction Committee. (photographs Nos. 29 and 30 by Armed Forces Information Office, Ministry of Defence) 30. Vice-Admiral A. K. Chatterji, Commandant of the National Defence College, has the distinction of being the first naval officer to be appointed to this post on January 10, 1964, and is next in seniority to the present Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral B. S. Soman. He joined the service in 1933, qualified as an antisubmarine specialist and took part in anti-submarine operations during World War II. After the war he held various important appointments, including those of Commodore-in-Charge, Bombay, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and tht Flag Officer Commanding, Indian Fleet.

31. & 32. The first Aircraft Carrier of the Indian Navy was commissioned as I.N.S. VIKRANT on March 4, 1961, in the United Kingdom and arrived in India on November 3 that year. The Carrier, which served as H.M.S. HERCULES, has beep completely modernized. It is fitted with angled deck, steam catapult and the mirror landing device. Here is a photograph of VIKRANT at Malta on its maiden voyage to India. The second photograph shows an Alize touching down. (by courtesy of Naval Headquarters) 33. The heritage of the shipbuilding industry during early British regime in India was synonymous with the famous family of Wadias, the Master Shipbuilders of Bombay. The photograph shows a portrait of Jamsctjce Bomanjee, the third Master Builder (1756-1821), who collaborated with Framjee Maneckjee (1750-1804). (photograph reproduced from The Bombay Dockyard and the Wadia Master Builders, by R. A. Wadia-—by courtesy of Shri R. A. Wadia) 34. Shipbuilding in India reached its acme of efficiency by the end of the 18th century. The lasting nature of ships of teak constructed in India and their seaworthiness in comparison with those of the vessels of oak built in the West were appreciated by the Europeans. The photograph shows the EARL BALCARRAS, 1488 tons, built at Bombay in 1815, a typical East Indiaman which proved superior in sailing qualities to contemporary ships. (photograph by courtesy of the Parker Gallery, London) 35. The European domination of India for over four centuries completely thwarted national overseas trading. The political control of India by the British also meant an economic policy that put an end to Indian overseas trading. In 1906, by the pioneering efforts of Shri V. O. Chidambaram Pillai, shown in the photograph, the Swadeshi Steam Navigation Company was started, which competed with the British India Steam Navigation Company. By unfair “rate-wars,” the Indian company was forced into liquidation.

36. Despite the throttling practices of the British vested interests, the resurgent Indian aspirations for political and economic freedom prevailed. On March 27, 1919, Narottam Morarji, a far-sighted entrepreneur, started the Scindia Steam Navigation Company Ltd., which alone managed to survive the crippling efforts made by the British shipping interests. (photographs Nos. 36-39 by courtesy of M/s. The Scindia Steam Navigation Company Ltd.) 37. By 1930, the Indian shipping interests formed the Indian National Steamship Owners’ Association, so that they might cooperate for mutual benefit and present a united front in their dealings with the Government. Between themselves, the members of the Association owned 84,000 tons of shipping, and Walchand Hirachand, one of the pioneers in this field, shown in the photograph, became their spokesman. 38. Smt. Sumatiben Morarjee is closely associated with the shipping industry. In appreciation of her services to the maritime industry she was elected President of the Indian National Steamship Owners’ Association for three consecutive years—probably the only woman to be a president in the shipping world. 39. S. S. LOYALTY, the first ship of the Scindia Steam Navigation Company that journeyed to the United Kingdom on April 5, 1919. Like any other Indian company of this time, this Company also suffered from British undercutting. The LOYALTY was lying idle in the port of London for six months pending its survey by Lloyds. The Company survived because its losses were minimized by other trading activities. The 5 th of April thus marks the National Maritime Day, and this day was celebrated for the first time in 1964. 40. Oil is the life-blood of a country. Most industries depend upon oil in one form or another. A large percentage of crude oil is imported; it

is, therefore, important for India to possess a large fleet of tankers. Photograph shows the 54,350-ton Super Oil Tanker, VIKRAM JAYANTI, of the Jayanti Shipping Company Ltd. Commissioned on June 22, 1964, the tanker has the distinction of being the largest vessel on Indian Registry so far. (photograph by courtesy of Jayanti Shipping Company Ltd.)

INDEX Abdur Razzaq, 39 Abyssinian Campaigns, 101 ACHILLE, 79 to 81 Aden, 89, 98 An Advanced History of India, 40, 46, 68 African Campaign, 107 Age of the Nandas and Mauryas, 17, 18 Aihole inscription, 28 Ain-i-Akbari, 45 Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of, 82 Aiyar, Dr C. P. Ramaswamy, 139 Ajanta paintings, 123 Aji Saka, 29 Akbar, the Navy in his time, 44 to 46 AKBAR, 98, 107 Albuquerque, 53, 55, 56, 59 ALBUQUERQUE, 118 Alexander, 13, 14 Alexandria, 18, 20 Allahabad Pillar inscription, 21 Amarakosa, 10 Ambar, 51, 52 Ancient India, 7, 21, 24, 27 Andhras, 27 ANGRE, I.N.S., 75 Annam, 27, 31 Arabia, 13 Arabian Sea, 10 Arabs, 24, 25, 41,42, 150 Arikamedu excavations, 26 Arjuna (of the Haihaya tribe), 11 Arrian, 15

Arthasāstra, 14,15 Aryabhata, 23 Aryans, 9, 10, 26 Asoka, 16 Assam, King of, 23 Asvins, 10 Atharva Veda Samhita, 11 Atris, 11, 120 Augustus, 20 Aurangzeb, 46 Aziz-ul-Haque, Sir, 138 Babylon, 12 “Baghalah,” 127 BAHADUR, H.M.I.S., 107, 112 Bali, 29 Bandon, Bay of, 27 Barbaricum, 19 Barnet, Commodore, 80 Basra, 43 BASSEIN, I.N.S., 114 Baudhāyana Dharmaśāstra, 11 Baveru Jātaka, 12 BEAS, I.N.S., 114, 118 Bengal, 22, 24 Bengal, Buy of, 10, 27 BENGAL, H.M.I.S., 108, 109 Bengal Marine, 101 Berenice, 13 Best, Capt. Thomas, 90 BETWA, I.N.S., 114, 118 Bhatkal,40,51 Bhavnagar, 127 Bhujyu, 10 Bible, 12 BIMLIPATAM, I.N.S., 114 Bloch,22

Bodh Gaya, 22 Bodhisattvāvadāna Kalpalatā, 16 Boer War, 102 Bombay, 67, 127, 128 BOMBAY (Br. vessel), 75 Bombay Marine, 93 to 96, 101; see also Indian Navy Borobudur, 25, 29, 123 Boxer Rebellion, 102 BRAHMAPUTRA, I.N.S., 114 Brihat Samhita, 10 British, the, 63 ff British India Steam Navigation Company, 136 A MARITIME HISTORY OF INDIA British Shipping Conference, 137 Broach, 19 Buddha Gupta, 25 Buddhism, 16 Burma, 21 Burma Campaign, 96, 109 Burmese Wars, 100, 101 Butcher Island, 99 Coastal shipping—see under Shipping Cochin, 50, 51, 56, 106 “Colandiophonta,” 123, 125 Colbert, 77 Cornish, Admiral, 86 Cranganore, 36, 54, 62 Crete, 8 CUDDALORE, I.N.S., 114 Cyzicus, 18 Cabrai, 50 Calicut, 39, 48 to 51, 55, 56 Caliph Omar, 43 Cambay, 22 Cambay, Gulf of, 19 Cambodia, 27

The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, 61, 63, 68, 86 Campa, 24 Cannanore, 49 to 51 CANNANORE, T.N.S., 114 Caracalla, 20 Carlill, Vice-Admiral Sir Stephen, 117 Caron, 77 CAUVERY, 106, 109, 118 Ceylon, 16,27 to 30,33,57,58 Chalukyas, 28 CHAMAK, H.M.I.S., 107, 112 Chandels, 21 Chandrabhanu, 31,35, 38 Chandragupta II (Vikramaditya), 22 Chandragupta Maurya, 14, 44 CHARLOTTE (Br. vessel), 72 Chatfield Commission, 105 Chatterji, A. K., Vice-Admiral, 116, 159 Chauhans, 21 Chaul, 54 Chauth, 72 Cheras, 34 to 37 Chezhiyan, 37 Chilka lake, 30 Chia-Lushai expedition, 101 China, 23, 31 Cholas, 30 to 35, 150 Chryse Chora (Golden Land), 26 Chudamani Varman, 34 Dabolim, 119 Dabul, 55 d’Ache, 82 to 86 Dahar, 24 DALHOUSIE, 100, 102, 103, 107 Dantapura, 30 DARSHAK, 116

Day, Francis, 67 Debal, 24,44 Deimachos, 16 DELHI, 113, 114, 118 DERBY, 75 Devapala, 25 DHARINI, I.N.S., 114 Dharmaditya, 25 Dharmapala, 25 Dicdorus, 15 Diu, 54, 55,118 Don Lorenzo, 57 Downton, Capt. Nicholas, 65, 66 Dravidian Civilization, 26 Dravidians, 7, 9 Duarte Pacheco, 53 DUFFER1N, 137,138,144 Dupleix, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84 Dutch, 60 to 64 Dwarka, 22 East India Company, 64, 90, 129 Eastern Shipping Corporation, 140 Fdfu, 13 Edicts of Asoka, 16 Egypt, 8, 9, 26 Egypt, Sultan of, 54 Egyptian Campaigns, 101 Elam, 9 Eudoxus, 18 Euergetus II, 18 Euphrates, 14 Fa-Hien, 21, 22 Far East, 26,27, 30; Hindu Kingdoms in, 30, 31 Fitzherbert, Admiral Sir Herbert, 105, 130

Fleet, British, 64, 72, 79 to 86; Calicut, 50 to 52; Dacca, 46; French, 85 to 87; Ghazni’s, 44; Harsha’s, 23; Kanhoji’s, 73, 74, 93; Malabar, 37; Moghul, 46; Portuguese, 50 to 60; Shivaji’s, 92; Zamorin’s, 50, 51, See also Naval exploits Fort St David, 84, 85 Fort St George, 67 Fort William, 67 French, 76 ff Funan, 27 Ganga, 24 Gangaikonda Chola, 34 Gerrha, 14 Ghogha, 22 Glimpses of Ancient India, 25 Goa, 56,118 GODAVARI, 106, 113 GOMATI, 113, Grabs and Gallivats, 73, 74, 91, 92 Great Rising (1857), the, 100 Gujarat, 22, 23, 29 Gunnery School, 99 Guptas, 21, 121 Gurjara Pratiharas, 21 Haihayas, 11 Hajaj, 24 Hall, Rear-Admiral J.T.S., 117 Harappa, 7 to 9, 120 Harisena, 21 Harsha (Harshavardhana), 21, 23 Hawkins, William, 64 Headlam, Capt. Sir E.J., 130 Hemamala, 30 Hemangada, 30 Her Majesty’s Indian Marine, 101, 102 Hiuen Tsang, 21,23

Himalayas, 22 HINDUSTAN, 108 Hindustan Shipyard, 134 Hippalus, 18 History and Culture of the Indian People, “The Vedic Period,” 12 A History of India, 65 A History of Indian Shipping, 29, 30, 36, 45, 122 to 125 History of the French in India, 86 History of the Indian Navy, 90, 126, 129 Hornell.,J 124 Hughes, Sir Edward, 87 Huns, 25 Hyder Ali, 95 Hydrographic Branch, 116 Inchcape Commission, 103 India and the Indian Ocean, 31, 36, 38, 52, 55, 57, 72, 85, 86, 104 Indian Marine, formation and expansion, 65,90 to 92; redesignated Bombay Marine, 93; see also Bombay Marine Indian Mercantile Marine, 137, 138 Indian Mercantile Marine Committee, 130 Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 140 Indian National Steamship Owners Association, 137, 138 Indian Naval Brigade, 100 Indian Navy, 97; change from sail to steam, 98; first major expedition, 98 to 100; abolished, 100; marine service revived, 100; Her Majesty’s Indian Marine formed, and name changed into Royal Indian Marine, 101, 102; activities, 101 to 104; Inchcape Commission, 103; Raw-linson Committee, 104; name changed into Royal Indian Navy,104; expansion after Independence, 112, 113; work during Goa operation, 118; see also Royal Indian Navy Indian Navy motto, 10 Indian Ocean, 14, 21, 109, 110, 151 Indian Shipping through the Ages, 150 Indonesian Archipelago, 20, 24 to 26, 29 Indus (River), 12, 13, 19 Indus Civilization, 9

Indus Flotilla, 99 Indus Valley Civilization, 7 to 9, 120, 150 Industrial Revolution, 129 INVESTIGATOR, 102, 103, 116 Iraq, 24 Iyer, P. S. Sivasvvamy, 130 Jahangir, 63, 64 JALAPRABHA, 131 JALAUSHA, 131 Jamsetjee Dhunjibhoy, 129 Janjira, 68, 69 Jātakas, 13, 24, 26 Jatavarman Sundara Pandya I, 38 Java, 23, 24, 27, 29 Jayanti Shipping Company, 142, 143 Jivitagupta II, 23 JUMNA, 106, 108, 109, 116 Kadara, 35 Kalidasa, 21,24, 30 Kalingas, 16, 29, 30 Kambuja, 27 Kandalur, 34, 37 Kang Tai, 26 Kanhoji Angre, 70 to 75 Kanishka, 19 Karikal, 78 Karpura-dwipa (Camphor Island), 26 Kasakudi plates, 27, 28 Kasim, Admiral. 44. 51. 52 Katari, Vice-Admiral R. D., 117,148, 152 Kathāsaritsāgara, 26 Kathiawar, 22,24 Kautilya, 14,15 Kaveri, 32 .Kaveripattinam, 32

Kedah, 25,26, 34 Kedara Raya, 46 Keigwin, Capt. Richard, 92 Kendur plate, 29 Khalimpur, 25 KHUKRI, 114, 116 KIRPAN, 114 Kirtivarman II, 29 KISTNA, 106, 109 Kolathiri Raja, 49, 50 Kra, 27 Ksatri tribe, 14, 121 Kulasekhara, 38 Kulottunga Chola, 33 Kunjali I, 56 Kunjali II, 57 Kunjali III, 58, 59 KUNJALI, I.N.S., 59 Kushans, 17 KUTHAR, 114 Kutti Ali, 56, 57 La Bourdonnais, 78 to 82, 84 Lakkanna, 39 Lally, 82, 84, 86 Lankapura Dandanayaka, 38 Lassen, 12 Levi, Sylvain, 26 Lope Vazda Sampayo, 57 Lopo Soares, 54 Lothal, 8 LOYALTY, SS., 137 Luiz de Mello, 58 Madras, 67, 81, 82, 85, 87, 106 Mahābhārata, 11 “Mahabodhi Vihara,” 22

Mahavamsa, 28 Mahe, 78, 79 Mahendra, 16 Mahmud of Ghazni, 44 Malabar, 36, 37 Malacca, 21, 31 Malay Peninsula, 25 to 27 Malcolm, Capt. Charles, 97 Malik Kafur, 39 Malwa, 29 Mamallapuram, 28 Mammali, 54 Manaji, 75 Munavarma, 27, 28 Mangalesa, 28 Mangalore, 40 Maratha Navy, 69 to 76 Marathas, 126, 151 Marco Polo, 41, 124, 125 “Marine Corps,” 97 Marine Survey of India, 96 Mārkandeya Purāna, 11 Marmagao, 118 Martin, Francis, 77 Masudi, 31 Masulipatam, 67, 77 Mathews, Commodore, 93 “Matsya Yantra,” 23 Mauritius, 79, 88, 89 Mauryas, 13 to 15,121 Mawby, Rear-Admiral, 103 Max Müller, 12 Megasthenes, 15, 16 Meghavarna, 21 Memphis, 17, 36 Menezes, Henry, 57 Menon,V.K. Krishna, 135

Merchant Navy, 148, 149 Mesopotamia, 26 Mir Hussain, 54, 55 Mirza Jani Beg, 45 Moghul Navy, 44 to 47,127,151 Mohenjo-Daro, 7, 9, 120 “Monoxylon,” 125 Montecorvino, John of, 124 Mookerji, Radha Kumud, 29, 30 Muziris, 36 MYSORE, I.N.S., 114, 118 Nagapattinam (Negapatam), 28, 34, 87; see also Negapatam Nalanda, 25 Nandas, 13, 121 Narasimhavarman I, 27 Narasimhavarman II, 28 Narmada, 19, 22 Narottam Morarji, 137 National Shipping Board, 140 Naval exploits, in Gupta period, 21, 22; by Arabs, 24, 43; in Pallava period, 27, 28; in Chola period, 34; by Pandyas,38; in Akbar’s time, 46; by Portuguese, 51 to 55, 57; between Raja of Cochin and Zamorin of Calicut, 53; Dutch-Portuguese conflicts, 61-62; AngloDutch conflicts, 63-64, 67; Anglo-Portuguese conflicts, 65-66; Dutch-French conflicts, 78;Anglo-French Wars, 78-88 The Navy in India, 87, 94, 95 Nearchus, Admiral, 14 Negapatam, 58, 62, 80, 87 Negritos, 7 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 131, 135, 148, 151 Nicolo Conti, 125 Nile, 13 Nilgunda plates, 28 Nirkunram, 37 Nott, H. M. St. L., Commodore, 112 Nripatunga, 28

OCKHAM, 75 Oliver, Sir Robert, 99 Oman, 24 Origin and Growth of Religion among the Babylonians, 9 Orme, 74,90 Ormuz, 14, 67, 89, 91 Our Shipping, 129, 137 The Pageant of India’s History, 39, 41 Paharpur, 25 Palas, 21,24, 25 Palestine, 26 Pallavas, 21, 27, 28, 32 Pandyan pearl, 38, 39 Panikkar, K. M., 31 parakrama Pandya, 38 parantaka I, 33 parantaka II, 33 Parry, Admiral Sir Edward, 117 Parsons, Abraham, 128 Patala, 13 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 131 Pattinappālai, 5, 32, 33 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 136 Periplus of the Erythrcean Sea, 19, 24, 32, 36,123 Persia, 12 to 14 Persian Gulf, 14, 18 Peyton, Commodore, 80, 81 Pillai, V.O. Chidambaram, 136 Pizey, Admiral Sir Mark, 117 Planning Commission, 142 Plava, 10 Pliny, 15,41,121 Pocock, Admiral, 83, 84 Pondicherry. 77, 78, 82, 86 Ponnani, 56

Porbandar, 22 Porto Novo, 87 Ports, ancient, 19, 22, 26, 30, 32, 36, 39. For individual ports, see under each name Portuguese, 45, 46, 48 ff, 125, 126, 151 Prasad, Dr Rajendra, 130 Ptolemy Philadelphus, 16 Puhar, 32 Pulakesin II, 27 to 29 Pulicat, 62 Pulumayi, 17 Purānas, 11 Puri island, 28 Pushyadeva, 24 Quilon, 62 Raghuvamsa, 22, 23 Raja Man Singh, 46 Rajadhiraja, 35 Rajagopalachari, C, 136 Rajaraja, 33, 34 Rajavallia, 121 Rajendra Chola, 34, 35 Rāmāyaņa, 11 RANA, 113 Rangamati, 25 “Rate War,” 136 to 138 Ratnagiri, 71 Rawlinson Committee, 104 Red Sea, 13, 18 RESTORATION, 75 Revati island, 28 RgVeda,10 to l2,120 Royal Indian Marine, see Indian Navy Royal Indian Navy, inception, 104; Chatfield Commission, 105; reorganization, 105 to 107; functions, 107; operations in which it

took part, 107 to 110; mutiny by ratings, 111; partition, 111, 112. See also Indian Navy Royal Navy, 93, 94, 97, 102 Rudrasimha, 22 Rulers of the Indian Ocean, 14, 23 Sagargad, 71 Sailendras, 25, 31, 34 Sailing vessels, 148 Saindhavas, 24 Saivism, 27 Saka Kings, 23 Sakhoji, 75 Sambhaji, 75, 76 Samgramgara, 46 Samudragupta, 21, 22 SAN GABRIEL, 48 Sandvipa, 46 “Sangara,” 123, 125 Sanghamitra, 16 Sankha Jātaka, 121 Satavahana dynasty, 17, 26, 27 Saurashtra, 19 Savantwadi, 72 Scindia Steam Navigation Company, 137 Scindias, 130, 131, 134, 138 Seleuceia, 14 Seleucid Empire, 14 Senguttuvan, King, 37 Shaista Khan, 46 SHAKTI, I.N.S., 113 Shipbuilding, 11, 13,15, 25, 40, 96; history, 120ff; wood and metals used in, 122, 124, 126 to 129; during British period, 126 to 128 Shipping, importance of, 135; difficulties of Indian Companies, 136 to 138; Reconstruction Policy Committee, 138 to 140; progress after Independence, 140 to 142; under Five Year Plans, 142, 144, 145;

India’s position in world trade and shipping, 146, 147; difficulties of coastal shipping, 148; sailing vessels, 148 Shipping Act, 140 Shipping Development Fund, 140, 144 Ships, classification of, 121, 122; shape and size of, 124, 125; painting of, 122; types of, 125; earliest evidence of, 7 to 10f numismatic evidence, 123; Ajanta paintings, 123 Shivaji, 69,70 Siam, 27 Sidhoji Gujar, Admiral, 70, 71 Sidis of Janjira, 68 to 70,127 Silappadikāram, 32, 33, 37 Simhavishnu, 27 Sind, 24 Skandagupta, 22 Socotra, 19, 43 Solomon, 12 Somaliland Expedition, 102 Soman, Vice-Admiral B.S., 115,117 to 119 South India, 25 Spanish Armada, 59 Sri Mara Vijayatunga Varman, 34 Sri Vijaya Kings, 30, 31 Srimara Srivallabha, 38 St. Thome, 77 Steamship, 98 Stevens, Commodore, 83 Strabo, 15,16,18,43,121 Suakin Expedition, 102 Subhanu, 12 SUCCESS, 72 Suez Canal, 89, 136 Suffren, 87, 88 Sumati Morarjee, Smt., 138, 150 Sumatra, 30, 31 Sumer, 8, 9 Suppāraka Jātaka, 12

Surat, 63,78,127 SUTLEJ, 106, 108, 109, 116 Suvarna (Sumatra), 26 Suvarnabhumi, 24 Suvarnadvipa, 31 Swadeshi Steam Navigation Company, 136 Swally Hole, 65,66 Swarnadrug, 68, 70, 75 Takkola, 27 Takua Pa, 27,28 TALWAR, 107, 111, 114 Tamralipti, 16, 25 Tanjore inscriptions, 34 Tata, Jamshedji N., 136 Tata Line, 136 “Teak-Oak” controversy, 129 Tigris, 14 Tiruvalangadu plates, 34 Tondamandalam, 18 Trade winds, 18, 19,36 Travels in Asia and Africa, 128 Trincomalee, 87, 89, 95 TRISHUL, 114, 118 Tugra, King, 10 Tulaji, 76 Ur, 12, 35 Vaisali, 22 Van Goens, 62 Varaguna I, 38 Varāha Purāna, 11 Varahamihira, 23 Varthema, 126 Varuna, 10 Vasco da Gama, 48 to 51, 126

Vasishta, 10 Vasudeva, 19 Vayalur Pillar inscription, 28 Vellar, 32 Verawal, 22 Vijayadrug, 70 to 72, 76, 126 Vijayanagar, 39, 40 Vikramaditya, 22 VIKRANT, I.N.S., 114, 115 Vinayaditya, 29 Vira Pandya, 38 Virarajendra, 35 Visakhapatnam, 106, 130, 131; ships built at, 132, 133 Wadia, Lowjee Nusservvanjee, 128 Walchand Hirachand, 138 Wandiwash, 86 Wang-hiuen-tse, 23 War in Ancient India, 38 Watson, Admiral, 76 Wellesley, Lord, 128 Western Shipping Corporation, 140 Women’s Royal Indian Naval Service (WRINS), 110 The Wonder That Was India, 123 Yagnasri, 17 “Yavanas” (the Greeks), 36, 37 Yukti Kalpataru, 121, 122 Zamorin of Calicut, 49 to 58, 126, 151 Zimmer, 12

INTRODUCTION 1India

and the Indian Ocean, Ch. VIII, p. 93 1History and Culture of the Indian People, “The Vedic Period,” p. 311

Chapter 1 1Ancient

India, p. 16 1Indus Civilisation (The Cambridge History of India) 2Hibbert Lectures for 1887 on the Origin and Growth of Religion among the Babylonians 1Rg Veda, 1.25.1. Also in Taittiriya Upani, vad, Durga Silk tam 2ibid., I.48.3 3ibid I.56.2 4ibid. I.56.2 5ibid., VII.88.3 and 4 6ibid.,I.116.3 7ibid., I.97.8 8ibid., X.136.5 9ibid. I.24.35 and 36 1Varahamihira, Brihat Samhita, Chs. V and VII 2Rāmāyana, 40.25 3Mahābhārata, Ch. 59, 41 4ibid 31 1History and Culture of the Indian People, “The Vedic Period,” p. 461 1Rulers of the Indian Ocean, G. A. Ballard, p. 9 1Edicts of Asoka, p. viii 2Ch. 73 1Age of the Nandas and Mauryas, p. 261 1Age of the Nandas and Maury as, p. 273 Chapter-2

1Ancient

India, pp. 242-243 1Raghuvamsa, IV, 36 2Rulers of the Indian Ocean, p. 2 1Ancint India, p. 320 1Glimpses of Ancient India, p. 95 1Ancient India, p. 509 1See also Mahavamsa, Ch. 47 1A History of Indian Shipping, p. 105 1A History of Indian Shipping, p. 32 1India and the Indian Ocean, p. 35 1Pattinappālai 1 Pattinappālai, 134-6, and Silappadikāralll, Canto VI. 11.1.20 1 India and the Indian Ocean, p. 24 2A History of Indian Shipping, p. 86 1 War in Ancient India, p. 293 2india and the Indian Ocean, p 35 1The Pageant of India’s History, Gertrude Emerson Sen, p. 201 1An Advanced History of India, R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychavdhuri and K. Datta, p. 375 1The Pageant of India’s History, Gertrude Emerson Sen, p. 321

Chapter-3 1A

History of Indian Shipping, Radha Kumud Mookerji, pp. 147-148 ibid. p. 150 2ibid/ p. 150 1An Advanced History of India, p. 452 2A History of Indian Shipping, p. 162

Chapter-4 1India

and the Indian Ocean, p. 41 and the Indian Ocean, K. M, Panikkar, p. 43 2ibid., p. 42 1India and the Indian Ocean, p. 45 1The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, p. 31 1India

2ibid.,

Vol. IV, pp. 32-33 1The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, p. 56 2ibid., Vol. IV, P. 57 1A History of India, p. 409 1The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, pp. 95-96 2 An Advanced History of India p. 638 1India and the Indian Ocean, 61 1Orme’s description, quoted in Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. I, Part II, p. 89 1History of the French in India, Col. G. B. Malleson, pp. 33, 34 1 History of the French in India, Col. G. B. Malleson, p. 118 2India and the Indian Ocean, K. M. Panikkar, p. 66 1History of the French in India, Col. G. B. Malleson 1India and the Indian Ocean, K. M. Panikkar, p. 67 1History of the French in India, p. 555 2The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, p. 164 3India and the Indian Ocean, K. M. Panikkar, p. 67 1The Navy in India, p. 370 1 India and the Indian Ocean, K. M. Panikkar, p. 72

Chapter-5 1History

of the Indian Navy, C. R. Low, Vol. I, p. 16 description of these ships is quoted earlier. 2Pinnaces, propelled by oars, were two (or three) masted schoonerrigged vessels mounting small guns. 1The Navy in India, p. 383 2op. cit., pp. 380, 381 1The Navy in India, H. W. Richmond, p. 380 1 India and the Indian Ocean, p. 79 1Orme’s

Chapter-6 1A

History of Indian Shipping, Radha Kumud Mookerji, p. 14 Wonder That Was India, p. 226 2A History of Indian Shipping, Radha Kumud Mookerji, p. 35 1The

1A

History of Indian Shipping, Radha Kumud Mookerji, p. 137 1History of Indian Shipping, Radha Kumud Mookerji, p. 138 1Vol. I, p. 169 1For details see Appendix “B” to The Bombay Dockyard and the Wadia Master Builders, R. A. Wadia. 2Travels in Asia and Africa 1History of the Indian Navy, Vol. II, pp. 135, 136 2Our Shipping, p. 12 1Our Shipping, p. 17 1 Opening address to the National Shipping Board 1Our Shipping, p. 21 1At the inauguration of the National Shipping Board in April, 1959 1Address at I.N.S. SHIVAJI, Lonavla, 1959

Chapter-7 1Indian

Shipping through the Ages address to the National Shipping Board 1Join the Navy 1Opening