A History of Stability and Change in Lebanon: Foreign Interventions and International Relations 9781350985063, 9781786732323

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Joseph Bayeh is an assistant professor at the University of Balamand, Lebanon. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Exeter.

‘Bayeh provides worthy insights about re-reading Middle East politics, with special reference to Lebanon, through an international relations lens with the added benefit of case study analysis, for the purpose of highlighting the relevance of specificity. In so doing, local geography, history and political dynamics are filtered lucidly through global and international meddling and interventionist policies which inevitably entangle Lebanon to the big-power game past and present. His book on stability and change in Lebanon is a “must read” for students of local political dynamics conditioned by international atmospherics.’ Larbi Sadiki, Professor of International Relations, Qatar University

A HISTORY OF STABILITY AND CHANGE IN LEBANON Foreign Interventions and International Relations

JOSEPH BAYEH

To my parents, Nicolas Bayeh and Nour Fayad, to whom I owe whatever success in this life . . .

Published in 2017 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2017 Joseph Bayeh The right of Joseph Bayeh to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. Library of Modern Middle East Studies 175 ISBN: 978 1 78453 097 6 eISBN: 978 1 78672 232 4 ePDF: 978 1 78673 232 3 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

CONTENTS

Introduction

1

1.

The European System and Pre-State Lebanon The European Connection and Change to Christian Emirate The Concert of Europe and Change to Kaymakamate Franco-British Polarisation and the Change to Mutesarrifate

18 18 35 57

2.

The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the First Republic World War I and Greater Lebanon World War II and Independence

76 76 91

3.

Bipolarity and Status-Quo Lebanon Containment and the 1958 Crisis De´tente and the 1975 War

109 110 131

4.

Unipolarity and the ‘Second Republic’ The ‘New World Order’ and the Syrian Mandate 11 September and the Restoration of Political Autonomy

160 161 183

Conclusion

198

Notes Bibliography Index

204 220 229

INTRODUCTION

‘It’s all the Italians’ fault.’ ‘It’s conceived in China and born in Lebanon.’ These two popular proverbs reflect the popular awareness, if not conviction, that changes in Lebanon are often determined by events outside its reach. Indeed, during its pre-state political incarnations (emirate, kaymakamate and mutessarifate), as well as during its modern republic system, most changes in Lebanon have arguably been linked to external factors in one way or another. Whether changes in its structure or stability, or the occasional occurrence of war, political developments in Lebanon have rarely been independent of conditions outside its realm. This popular belief has, however, never before been put to academic test. Although some literature mentions external (international and regional) determinants for change in Lebanon, no empirical study exists that incorporates a theoretical linkage between such external factors and changes in the country. In particular, there is a failure in the literature on political developments in Lebanon to determine conclusively the predominant effectors of change in the country – that is, whether domestic, regional or international dynamics are the main determinants of change in the structure and stability of Lebanon, and the linkages between those different dynamics and change.

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To fill this void in the extant literature, this book will study the long-term relationship between the international system and Lebanon. The book will investigate and establish the myriad links between changes on the international level and changes in the structure and stability of Lebanon, and, in so doing, will demonstrate that the country’s structures and stability are mainly determined by factors on the international level. In fact, it is assumed here that divided states positioned in volatile regions display a unique political dynamic. When such polities become the object of rivalry and contestation between major international powers, those states are more vulnerable to dynamics on the international level than to regional or domestic ones. This theoretical assumption enables better interpretation of systemic effects and their consequences on the structure and stability of Lebanon. Theorising allows us to derive meaningful patterns from the complex domain of international relations.1 Policy makers need theory to understand the huge amount of international information, in order to make practical policy choices.2 In the case of Lebanon, this task becomes an even more urgent priority for the purpose of policy making – foreign and domestic. It is almost certain, however, that the relevance of this work stretches beyond the confines of Lebanese politics and history. What applies in the case of Lebanon may serve academics and lay readers alike to understand similar cases around the world and, possibly, across history. Broadly speaking, the literature on Lebanon can be divided into three categories: historical works; discussion of change from a regional perspective; and systemic-oriented works, which usually try to link the dynamics of the international system to changes in Lebanon.3 The second of these literature categories, which attributes changes in the structure and stability of Lebanon to regional factors, can therefore be seen as the antithesis of the argument put forward by this book. That is not to downplay the importance of innate or regional dynamics in explaining change in structure and stability in Lebanon, but rather to demonstrate that, in many instances, systemic effects are the primary accountable source of that change.

INTRODUCTION

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Of course, no single level of analysis tells the complete story of change in Lebanon. A full understanding of any period of the country’s history necessarily requires recourse to determining variables on the local, regional, and international levels.4 In general, however, the major deficiency in all of the abovementioned literatures is that they study a specific issue or change that occurred in Lebanon. Thus, they are fragmented or short-term studies, most of whose authors adopted a micro-level analysis. Conversely, this book will investigate the relationship between the international system and changes in Lebanon over a long period from a macro level, which will cover all the relevant structural and stability changes in the modern history of the nation: the 1770 shift from Muslim to Christian emirates, the 1841 – 2 War, the 1842 kaymakamate system,5 the 1860 War, the 1860 mutesarrifate system,6 1920s Greater Lebanon, independence in 1943, the 1958 Crisis, the 1975 War, the ‘Second Republic’ (1990), the 2005 Syrian expulsion and the restoration of political autonomy. The significance of this macro analysis is its ability to enable comparisons over different time segments and to figure out patterns of systemic effects on changes in Lebanon or a pattern that describes the relationship between Lebanon and the international system. A divided state like Lebanon may be especially vulnerable to outside factors because of its smaller size and power relative to its neighbours or because of its location in a strategic region, which makes it tempting for greater systemic powers to interfere in its affairs. Other domestic factors also render a state more susceptible to outside intervention – mainly, a lack of consensus on national identity or the adoption of misguided policies that alienate a state from its surrounding environment, rendering it more vulnerable to external aggression. Most of the literature on Lebanon invests generously in an elaborate description and analysis of the country’s divided nature and the impact of this on Lebanon’s political developments – especially on the issue of instability and the occurrence of conflict.7 This book, however, accepts the divided nature of Lebanon as a major pillar of its domestic dynamics without delving into the details of that division. The focus here is on external dynamics and their effects.8

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The strong religious and sectarian bond within each group meant that loyalty to the sect was always a predominant fact of life in the country. In such a stringent milieu, the domestic pattern of interaction amongst Lebanese actors is usually a ‘zero-sum game’ – that is, every group looks at the others’ gains in the political system as a loss to its own. Hence, it is a valid suggestion that global tensions could only too easily lead to internal conflict under such conditions.9 In such weak and divided states, local wars are not usually over foreign policy, security or honour of the nation; they are about statehood, governance, and the role and status of nations and communities within states.10 It is misleading, however, to characterise wars in such countries as having essentially domestic origins and subsequently spilling over into regional and international arenas. On the contrary, the international facet of interethnic civil wars or of any internal war is predominant. Such a process entails two major dimensions: first, dynamics within the ‘international’ system more often than not contribute to the rise of internal revolutionary situations, thus internal political opposition is set into motion by autonomous states following distinct political interests in the global arena; and second, the international system largely shapes the outcomes of internal wars through some form of external involvement, through military intervention, external support on behalf of internal parties or mediation.11 While we explore the changes in both the structure and stability of Lebanon, it is specifically the latter aspect that requires clear understanding. Changes in stability denote the occurrence or prevention of local wars, and the relationship between the international system and local wars constitutes the domain of such enquiry. This relationship – the internationalisation process – thus constitutes the process by which the international system creates revolutionary situations within states and influences their outcomes.12 Therefore, it is imperative to unfold the causality between changes on the international (and regional) level and changes in the stability of Lebanon that usually lead to a subsequent change in its political structure.

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This book certainly adopts a systemic approach because it conceives causal variables mainly at the level of the international system.13 A study of systemic effects implies the presence of a systems theory: ‘a series of statements about relationships among independent and dependent variables, in which changes in one or more variables are accompanied, or followed by, changes in other variables or combinations of variables’.14 The dependent variables in this case are the structure and stability of Lebanon, linked through a causal relationship to independent variables on the systemic level. When the organisation of the units in the system affects their behaviour and their interactions, then a systemic approach should be adopted.15 Its components are structure at one level, and the interacting units at another level. The structure is the systems-level component, and systems theory aims at showing how these two levels operate and interact. This in turn requires a definition of structure excluding the attributes and the relations of units.16 One of the main mechanisms that help to maintain the international system is the balance of power – a situation in which no one power is in a predominant (military) position to enforce its will onto others. This usually involves a ‘general balance of power’ (at the systemic level) and a ‘local balance of power’ (sub-systemic/regional level), or ‘dominant balance’ and ‘subordinate balance’. For example US–Soviet balance of power comprised the dominant balance during the Cold War, and the dominant balance in the Middle East and other regions were subordinate to it – the dominant balance affects the subordinate much more than the other way round.17 Nevertheless, attempts to establish and preserve a balance of power have not always led to the preservation of peace; rather, they have often been a source of war. It must be remembered that the main function of a balance of power is not to preserve peace, but to preserve the system of states itself. A particular international order lasts as long as the balance is preserved.18 Thus, once we lose the balance the order changes – for example, from bipolarity to unipolarity. Although this book is more interested in the effects of systemic changes than the process of change itself, it is important to shed light on the notion of systemic change: in every system, a process of

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disequilibrium and adjustment is constantly taking place. In time, the change in the distribution of power amongst major states may change the system.19 Structure and polarisation are the two independent variables adopted in this research. Changes in one or both of these independent variables will trigger systemic dynamics that will affect the units of the system – in this case, Lebanon. The defining characteristic of any system is its structure. How states relate to each other (how they are positioned or arranged) is a crucial ingredient in any structural definition. Whereas the interaction of units is a unit attribute, their arrangement and positioning vis-a`-vis each other is a systemic attribute. Thus, a structural change arises only with a change in the arrangement of the units. Units behave differently when differently juxtaposed and combined, and their interactions produce different outcomes. Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system (multipolar, bipolar or unipolar).20 Structural constraint of the system will impose criteria that will reward certain behaviours and punish others. Thus, particular acceptable patterns of behaviour will emerge to fit any system’s structure. States may understand the structure that they are living in, with the constraints that it imposes on them and how it may reward some kinds of behaviour and penalise others. Major powers (states) define structures in the international system, and they decide and control the rules of engagement on the international arena for themselves as well as for others.21 Such structural changes can explain changes in state behaviour and changes in the outcomes resulting from their interactions.22 Definitions of structure, however, are independent of their alliances and conflicts. For example, a system in which three or more Great Powers have split to form two alliances remains a multipolar one, while a system in which two major powers dominate without any effective challenger has a bipolar structure.23 It is also important to differentiate between polarity, which is a function of structure, and polarisation – the latter being an independent variable for the purposes of this research.

INTRODUCTION

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Polarity helps us to understand the operation of the international system.24 Moreover, polarity is defined in terms of structure – that is, in terms of the number of Great Powers in the system. The system is bipolar if there are only two of them, multipolar if there are more.25 Polarisation, on the other hand, may or may not follow the pattern of polarity.26 Thus, it is a fallacy to provide polarity in behavioural terms and switch between polarity and polarisation.27 The relevant use of systemic polarisation in this research is to reflect a level of grave differences, and sometimes rivalry amongst major powers, on issues (related to Lebanon or the broader Middle East) to the extent that a certain dynamic is set in motion to constitute a distinct (contingent) systemic pattern of interaction over a particular issue and for a relatively limited time. On the other hand, polarity defines the structure of an international system and thus implies a general, systemic pattern of interaction alongside that structure. Moreover, the concept of systems and structures requires a precise demarcation of levels of analysis. Levels enable one to locate the sources of explanation, and the outcomes of which theories are composed.28 Although each level makes a contribution to the understanding or the explanation of politics among nations, each on its own fails to account for certain aspects of reality that ought to be considered.29 In addition to the international system, deciding the regional subsystem that makes up the environment of Lebanon – or indeed, of the wider Middle East – has to be a theory based and analytically practical process. The notion of ‘conflict’ – as a basis to establishing system membership – best serves this objective.30 Hence, the boundaries of the regional system surrounding Lebanon are chosen to comprise geographical Syria, Egypt and Turkey during the pre-state Lebanese system; and an extended subsystem to include the Arab world, Iran and Israel is chosen for the period since the creation of the Greater Lebanon system in 1920 – a setting containing all the dynamics of conflicts and interactions that have affected Lebanon throughout its history. There are several rules and conditions that describe system effects. In addition to the direct effects that states have on each other during

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their interactions, several types of interaction can be identified in a system (the international system in this research), which may also produce different, indirect effects – mediated, delayed or circular. System effects may be indirect, mediated or delayed because of the interconnections between the units of that system. These effects may be more important than the direct ones. A good understanding of the system enables states to fashion policies in accordance with such indirect effects. Thus, Egypt may have started the 1973 War in order to pull others in, either militarily or diplomatically. On the other hand, when it takes time for actors to adjust to what others have done, the short-term impact of behaviour will be quite different from what might result later. Causal relations will be difficult to detect under such delayed-effect conditions.31 Thus, the US decision not to intervene in the 1975 Lebanese conflict in the way in which it had during the 1958 instability may be partially related to a delayed effect of the ‘Vietnam syndrome’. Similarly, small amounts of variables may have a great impact in a system, and the law of diminishing returns may then come into play. In other instances, very little effect is felt until a significant mass is accumulated.32 For example, the European and Catholic patronage of the Lebanese Maronite community, which began during the Crusades, yielded regular benefits to the latter party, which gradually improved its position in the emirate system until the Maronites achieved a sizeable level of power, which tilted the balance in their favour. Eventually, a delayed systemic effect occurred and led to a change in the structure of the emirate when Christian rule began in 1770. Another kind of indirect system effect is represented by the mediated effect – a non-direct effect that has been modified in the environment of the political unit under study; that is, mediated within the regional sub-system that comprises the direct environment of the political unit/state. On such an occasion, there is an intermediary within the region – usually a regional power – which projects a modified or indirect systemic effect onto the unit. Such an intermediary usually has its own regional agenda – thus, the interplay between systemic dynamics and the intermediary’s agenda

INTRODUCTION

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would bring a mediated indirect effect to the unit, which can also have an unintended outcome. The best example of a systemic intermediary is a regional client state. Although as clients they are expected to conform to the general policies and interests of a major power, this is not always the case. Clients have the ability to manoeuvre and seek their own agendas in a region. In a system, major powers cannot always do as they see fit and smaller regional states can do more than the major powers would wish.33 Therefore, indirect-mediated effects are different from other effects of the intermediary’s autonomous interactions that have their roots exclusively on the regional level. Two main preconditions would provide the best context for the functioning of intermediaries in conveying systemic effects to Lebanon. The first occurs when there is systemic polarisation over the region or Lebanon, like the French– British rivalry over the Levant in the nineteenth century or the Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR during the 1975– 90 War. In these cases, a high level of distrust prevented direct intervention in favour of a regional role in tackling certain issues, and a proxy regional power becomes convenient under such circumstances. The second may occur when a regional power, due to systemic dynamics that have changed the regional environment, reacts automatically and asserts a regional agenda based on the opportunity provided on the international level. The major power(s) involved in such a situation may perceive no threat to their national interest, and might allow a free hand to a regional intermediary. The end results of both interactions on the unit under investigation are called indirect-mediated effects. The notion of a regional intermediary, although best exemplified through a ‘patron– client’ relationship, may well relate to any dominant regional power irrespective of the nature of its relations with systemic powers. Therefore, relations in a system are often not bilaterally determined, which means that the relationship between two states in a system is directly linked to their respective relations with other units.34 For example, the British decision to ally with the Ottoman Empire against Muhammad ‘Ali in Syria and Mount Lebanon was not

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related to a tradition of friendly bilateral relations between the two. It had to do mainly with the Russian threat to the balance of power on the European continent, not with any particular British interest in Turkey per se or because of any British animosity towards Muhammad ‘Ali. Turkey benefited from factors outside its realm and obtained outside support to preserve its empire. Indirect systemic effects produced through certain interactions may also be circular in nature. The strategies of actors in a system depend on the strategies of others. One actor’s policies can facilitate or obscure another’s in any given system. Actors and their environment affect each other. Initial behaviour and its outcomes can often inspire later behaviours by producing a powerful dynamic that can explain change over time, and that cannot be conceived in terms of causes and effects. Moreover, as actions accumulate to form the environment in which actors operate, the latter in turn change as the environment changes. This circular effect, produced by the system, may also lead actors to change themselves in the process.35 For instance, during the Cold War, the US supported Israel in the 1973 War against Egypt. The loss of Egypt was also considered a loss for the Soviets in the region, within Cold War politics, and the Soviets gave full support to Syria as an alternative client to Egypt. This changed the environment around Lebanon, allowing Syria to act as a systemic intermediary and pursue its regional agenda in the country. Thus, the subsequent 1975 War in Lebanon was mostly a product of this circular systemic effect, which had been triggered on the international level. The operation of systems stipulates that outcomes are not necessarily the result of intentions – many outcomes being quite unintended. Since actions in a system have unintended effects on the actor, others or the system in general, results may not arise out of intended desires and expectations and vice versa.36 The figure above represents a practical theoretical model that helps facilitate the process of linking changes in (or of) the international system to changes in Lebanon. The components of the model are the international system, the regional sub-system and Lebanon itself. The relations between independent and dependent

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INTRODUCTION

variables are graphically represented with the straight arrows from the international system to Lebanon (direct and delayed effects), and the arrows from the international system that are adjusted and refracted from the regional sub-system to Lebanon (indirectmediated effects). The dashed arrow running directly from the international system to the unit represents a delayed systemic effect – that is, one that builds up for a long time until change takes place suddenly. Therefore, very little effect is felt until a significant mass is accumulated and a major change in the unit occurs. The international system is the generally recognised international setting at the time of investigation that displays certain characteristics as a unique structure, a dominant pattern of interaction and a particular nature of its units. The major units, or ‘Great Powers’, are usually the determining factors for a system’s structure. The independent variables (a system’s structure and polarisation) are located at the systemic level.

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM Independent variables (STRUCTURE + POLARISATION)

REGIONAL SUB-SYSTEM (INTERMEDIARY)

LEBANON Dependent variables (STRUCTURE + STABILITY)

The Theoretical Model

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The sub-system, or the regional level of analysis, comprises a direct environment that surrounds the unit. It has the characteristics and general functions of a system, wherein some international systemic effects are diffused into the region, interact with the regional dynamics and subsequently send indirect or mediated systemic effects to the unit (in our case, Lebanon). These indirect systemic effects are usually projected through a regional intermediary – i.e. a dominant regional power – which has its own agenda within the sub-system. Thus, the intermediary (sometimes a proxy or client to major systemic powers) enforces systemic effects that infiltrate the region, become modified according to the dominant regional dynamics – and, especially, according to the intermediary’s own agenda – and, in turn, are refracted from the region to the unit. The final outcome is usually one of indirect or mediated systemic effects that should not be confused with ones emanating exclusively from the region – the latter (regional) effects are not the object of this framework. The sub-system, as does the international system, changes with time; therefore, the actors in the sub-system, including any systemic intermediaries, may also change, introducing different dynamics of interaction in each crosstime section.37 The unit/state – Lebanon – that functions as a smaller system itself also changes over time sections under this study. The changes on the unit level are represented through the dependent variables – that is, stability and structure in Lebanon. Changes in stability comprise the occurrence or termination of a local conflict, while changes in structure usually involve a change in the domestic distribution of power, the number and nature of domestic actors or an overall system transformation in the shape (i.e. territory) and nature of the unit/state as a whole. These changes would define the political entity of Lebanon throughout its history, with its different structures and internal dynamics. The model operates by identifying changes on the systemic level, tracking their effects and studying their impact on the unit/Lebanon. Within a certain defined international system, operating in a specific period of time under a unique structure and pattern of interaction, any change on the systemic level may have a direct and indirect effect

INTRODUCTION

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on the unit/Lebanon. For example, major changes in the systemic pattern of interaction (like polarisation) on issues related to the subsystemic region would trigger certain systemic dynamics, projecting direct and indirect effects onto Lebanon. In the same manner, a change in the whole system or within its structure – such as the emergence or decline of major systemic actors (Great Powers) – may trigger the same effects. The theoretical model above should enable us to answer the following questions: How did changes in the structure of the international system affect changes in the structure of Lebanon, and in what way? How did changes in the pattern of interactions of Great Powers, especially their foreign policies in the Middle East and Lebanon, affect the changes in the unit (Lebanon) and in what way? In particular, how did major powers’ polarisation over the Middle East and Lebanon affect the stability of the country? Is there a recurrent pattern that relates systemic effects to changes in the structure of Lebanon? Similarly, is there a recurrent pattern that relates systemic effects to changes in stability in Lebanon? Can we draw inferences that will help to forecast future developments in Lebanon that may be caused by systemic changes? Do systemic effects have primacy (over other causal variables) in explaining change in Lebanon? And, are there any generalisations that may formulate the relationship between the international system and Lebanon? The systemic approach of this study best fits the object of understanding the link between the international system and changes in Lebanon for several reasons. Part of the justification for this claim arises from the general theoretical rules of systems and interactions in world politics. For example, as Kenneth Waltz suggests, although states are legally equal and independent sovereign units, this does not mean they have the freedom to do whatever they want or to adopt a policy that they decide upon without taking into consideration the environment in which they exist. Sovereignty and dependency, Waltz says, are not mutually exclusive.38 Thus, understanding the environment and how it affects a state/unit requires a more systemic and macro-level investigation into the causes of any changes in the unit.

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Other justifications for the claim arise from the innate characteristics of the Middle East region and its countries – i.e. Lebanon’s sub-systemic environment. The general presence of authoritarian, non-democratic regimes renders those regimes highly dependent on the support of external (systemic) powers. Also, the fragmentation of the Middle East – especially its Arab states – and the failure of a pan-Arabist identity to unite nations of the same religion, colour, cultural background and language may have an important role in magnifying systemic effects on the region. The fact that different Arab states are keen to retain their independence from each other, and the fact that many of these states are small states located next to much bigger states (major regional actors), makes international intervention a welcomed phenomenon in the region in order to preserve some sort of a regional balance of power that will prevent any bigger Arab state or alliance from dominating the political scene in the Middle East. Direct external interventions are demanded by the smaller states of the region in times of distress. Examples can range from the US intervention in Lebanon in 1958 to the later Western intervention in the aftermath of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Moreover, the frequent resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, which threatens the existence of the present authoritarian (albeit not necessarily antiWestern) regimes, and the resultant, continuous quest to replace them with Iranian-style regimes or religious dictatorships may be another incentive behind international intervention in the region. The subsequent, avowedly anti-Western, regimes are perceived as jeopardising Western interests in the region. On the international level, the Middle East has always been a strategic region where major powers held high stakes and were frequently polarised over its management. At least since Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1798, the Middle East has been an object of rivalry amongst the Great Powers. The region’s geographical location had a strategic importance as the gateway between Europe and the Far East. Later, the discovery of oil by the British in Persia in 1908 added to its strategic importance, and, especially after World War II, the Middle East became the principal source of energy for

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industrialisation nations and an area of increasing importance for the global economy. The Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union transformed the region into an arena of fierce competition. More recently, Islamic fundamentalism and the war on terrorism reasserted the Middle East’s position on the foreign-policy agendas of the major powers. Although the involvement of major powers is not exclusive to the Middle East, their interventions there have always been distinguished by their intensity, frequency and profound impact on the region. In addition to the divided nature of Lebanon, which magnifies the impact on it of systemic effects, a systemic approach is also particularly crucial in order to understand change in Lebanon for other reasons. First, there is no one macro or long-term study or political analysis on Lebanon (other than purely historical literature) that covers its relationship with the international system since its appearance as a political entity (1590) until the present time; second, studies on Lebanon (especially on its stability) stress mainly domestic and regional factors in determining these changes, and thus marginalise the effects of international systemic dynamics on them. The current volume, however, aims at magnifying the systemic effects and their role in bringing change to Lebanon, and systems theory is utilised for determining the real weight that the international system has played in determining changes in the structure and stability of Lebanon. However, to avoid slipping into the realm of determinism, the investigation always takes into consideration domestic (unit), regional (sub-systemic) and other probable determinants of change, and weighs their significance with respect to the systemic effects under investigation. Finally, a systemic study also enables us to effect comparisons between cross sections of history over considerable time spans – and, hence, to discern a pattern of interaction between the international system and the unit/Lebanon. Such comparisons are sufficient to prove or disprove any key linkage between the international system and changes in Lebanon. This book adopts a comparative approach, in which systems theory is applied in cross-time comparisons over a long period of history

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from a macro-level perspective. Comparisons thereafter help to reveal patterns of systemic effects on stability and structure in Lebanon. Different cross-time comparisons along the time span covered in this analysis show certain parallel tendencies of systemic effects across the levels of analysis under investigation. These parallel events formulate the substance for the comparative apparatus, which helps to discern a pattern of systemic effects with respect to changes in stability and structure in Lebanon. The analysis acknowledges that the causes of change in the structure and stability of Lebanon frequently originate at the local, regional and international levels simultaneously. However, the general precedence of the last-named level in forming a pattern of systemic effects on changes in the country is what gives the research its complex, combinatorial nature. The comparisons in this book attempt to draw patterns of unit change in relation to systemic effects across distant cross-time sections. Several comparisons serve this objective – for example, comparing the changes in stability (and structure) in 1840 and 1860, which occurred within the constraints of the Concert of Europe’s structure and pattern of interaction. Later, a comparison between the changes in stability that occurred in 1958 and 1975 within the Cold War bipolar international system also shows a pattern of systemic effects on Lebanon that function in a parallel and consistent way across different time sections in history. Hence, a link is established between polarisation amongst major powers within the international system and the change in the dependent variable (stability) in Lebanon. In addition, comparing the roles played by regional intermediaries (regional powers) and the subsequent (mediated) systemic effects on Lebanon – that is, the different roles played by Turkey or Syria in conjunction with international systemic dynamics – will serve the purpose of explaining occasional changes to the structure of Lebanon. Other comparisons, also, involve the direct connection between changes in structure on the international level and changes in the structure of Lebanon itself – for example, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the change to Greater Lebanon, and the end of the Cold War and the change to the so-called Second Republic.

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The chapters that follow are arranged into two main parts. The first chapter studies systemic effects on pre-state Lebanon. It mainly covers the Concert of Europe system and international dynamics throughout the period, and their effect on the instabilities of 1840 and 1860 and on the changes in structure that occurred from emirate to kaymakamate, and from kaymakamate to mutessarifate respectively. The second part of the book investigates changes in Lebanon after the Ottoman era. Chapter 2 investigates the change to Greater Lebanon with the establishment of the French Mandate, and the effects of World War II on Lebanese independence. Chapter 3 studies the effect of bipolarity on stability in Lebanon – that is, the link between the containment policy of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the 1958 instability. The second part of this chapter investigates the effect of De´tente and the 1975 – 90 instability. Finally, Chapter 4 studies change in Lebanon within a unipolar system. The analysis in the first part relates the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the 1975– 90 instability through a settlement that changed the structure of the Lebanese system towards the ‘Second Republic’. The last section tackles the dynamics generated after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the war against terrorism – especially the recent US foreign policy towards the Middle East, which had yet another effect on the structure of Lebanon, ending Syrian hegemony and regaining full political autonomy.

CHAPTER 1 THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM AND PRE-STATE LEBANON

The European Connection and Change to Christian Emirate Background Long before the creation of the modern Lebanese republic in 1920, Lebanon had existed as a pre-state autonomous political entity. In more than three centuries of autonomous political existence, Lebanon had gone through various changes in its structure and stability that had led to three different political systems – the emirate, the kaymakamate and the mutesarrifate – before it acquired its present, modern state system. The Emirate Political System The first Lebanese political system came into existence as early as 1590 in the form of a princedom (emirate), which was headed by a Druze (Muslim) prince in a structure of alliance amongst a number of Druze and Christian feudal families. The territory of the emirate would stretch or shrink according to the strength of its prince. The history of Lebanon as a separate political entity began neither in 1920, with the creation of the modern state, nor in 1861, with the establishment of the autonomous Sanjak1 of Mount Lebanon (the Mutesarrifate). In fact, it is doubtful whether any other country in the Middle East apart from Egypt can claim such a long and

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uninterrupted history as an autonomous political entity. Certain unique features had already appeared as far back as the Mameluke period (1292– 1516), but a truly Lebanese entity, the Emirate (1590 – 1842), emerged only in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries during the reign of Fakhr al-Din II.2 By the early Ottoman period (1516 – 90), three recognizable elements in the structure of Lebanon already existed: the population, the system of lordship and the autonomy of local rulers. There was no hierarchy of lordly families at that stage, and although the spiritual leadership over the Maronites rested with the Maronite Patriarchate, temporal authority belonged to the Muslims. The emergence of a ruling institution, however, came soon after with the emergence of a princedom or emirate. The creation of the emirate was a process that took place from within, occasioned by the rise of one of the lordly families to supremacy over the others. The family in question was that of the Ma’ni led by Fakhr al-Din II from 1590 until 1633, who united the families under his leadership and had a standing army and some kind of regular administration. Although Fakhr al-Din did not establish the Lebanese state as we know it today, he created the political institution around which the nation would eventually crystallise. It was based on a secular principle that became part of the political tradition of Lebanon – that the ruler should transcend his communal loyalties and should protect the religious men and laity of faiths other than his own. The Ma’ni claim to authority held no religious sanction, which helped to rally adherents of all faiths around his princedom.3 Therefore, upon establishing their leadership over other Druze families, the Ma’nis’ religious tolerance enabled them to join the Maronites and Druze together in a close political association. This association served as the basis for the emirate for two-and-a-half centuries – first under the Ma’nis and later under their successors, the Shihabs. During this period (1590– 1842), Lebanon acquired its distinctive character as a separate political entity with a tradition of autonomy. It was these two factors that gave rise later to Lebanese claims for a state of their own.4

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The urge for autonomy stemmed from the particular nature of the Druze and Maronite communities. One Muslim heterodox, the other Christian Uniate, these sects had resisted any central government authority for centuries. This was what had first led them to seek refuge in the isolated and inaccessible Lebanese mountains. The emirate provided an acceptable, unifying political authority. Its autonomy had its limits, however. The Ottoman sultan was still recognised as the sovereign; each new emir had to be invested by the sultan and required to pay annual taxes to his treasury.5 The Ottomans realised that the tough Druze and Maronite mountaineers in Lebanon (mainly the mountainous areas of Lebanon: Bsharri, Batrun, Jubayl, Kisrwan and Shuf regions) were entitled to different treatment from the peoples of Syria (at that time, mainly the provinces of Aleppo and Damascus). The Turkish governor in Syria liaised between the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman Government in Istanbul) and the Lebanese feudal lords, who acted entirely independently in domestic affairs, passed on their fiefs to their descendents, exacted taxes and duties and didn’t owe any military service to the sultan. Prince Fakhr al-Din II ultimately aspired to create a greater Lebanon, sever all relations with the Porte and set the emirate on the road to progress. In addition to the Druze-area nucleus (Shuf, Gharb and Kisrwan) he received the sanjaks of Beirut and Sidon from the Porte; he seized Tripoli, Baalbak and Beqa’ from his neighbours to the north; and from his neighbours to the south he received the homage of Safad, Tiberias and Nazareth. In 1608, Fakhr al-Din signed a treaty with Ferdinand, the Medici grand duke of Tuscany, which included a secret article clearly directed against the Porte. Consequently, he was chased out of his lands by a Turkish army and had to flee to Florence, capital of his Italian ally; however, after five years in exile (1613–18), he returned to his hereditary domain. In 1624, the Porte recognised him as the lord of ‘Arabistan’, from Aleppo to the frontiers of Egypt.6 There was also a growth of French influence in the emirate due to the silk trade and that people’s special link with the Maronites, French contacts being mainly restricted to that group.7 Fakhr al-Din II’s sympathy with Christianity, however, turned the Porte against him and led to his execution in Istanbul in 1635. His

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ambition for an independent greater Lebanon would be the goal of another emir, Bashir al-Shihabi (1788 – 1840), whose family succeeded the Ma’ns in 1697.8 The region of Mount Lebanon had a distinct cultural history and political economy of its own. It may be argued that social organisation in Mount Lebanon between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries was exceptional within the Levant in being very similar to a European-type feudal system. In addition, the Maronites were almost unique amongst the non-Muslim religious minorities in the Middle East in their resistance to the dhimmi,9 a stance that ultimately ended in their refusal to join the millet council organised by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century.10 Such an attitude, derived as it was from their unique history as well as their collective perception, made them different from other religious minorities. This exclusiveness had historically forced the Maronites to settle in the mountains and develop their own semi-autonomous ‘political economy’.11 Thus, a clear account of the Maronites’ history is imperative to the understanding of systemic effects on Lebanon – the object of this research. To understand the historical nature of modern Lebanon, therefore, one must begin with the Maronites, because it was they who wanted to create an independent Lebanon in the first place.12 Although they originated as one of the Eastern churches, the Maronites started to establish contacts with Rome from 1215, thus eventually becoming followers of the Catholic papacy; however, they reserved their distinct cultural and organisational character. They have always stressed their uniqueness, perseverance and resistance to assimilation. The unique Maronite personality was reflected in an extensive school network as well as a relatively prosperous political economy of intensive agriculture and silk production. This economic base was instrumental in giving rise to the Ma’ni and Shihabi emirates, and in enabling the Maronites to maintain a high degree of autonomy under the Ottomans and later under the French.13 The early Maronites were Christians who lived in the countryside of Antioch within the jurisdiction of its patriarchate. After the conquest of Antioch by the Arabs in AD 636 and the rupture in communications between it and the other patriarchates, including

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that of Rome, the Maronite people elected a patriarch chosen from amongst the heads of their monasteries. For the first time, they had a religious authority of their own. Then, in the early eighth century, they regrouped in the mountains and valleys of Lebanon while the Islamic conquest advanced in the lowlands against the Byzantine Army. From the eighth to the fifteenth centuries, the Maronites lived in relative isolation, driven by the necessity for self-protection. In the sixteenth century, they opened themselves to the outside world and made contacts with their Muslim neighbours – the ‘Assaf princes. The ‘Assafs, who were Turkoman, had been placed in Ghazir in 1506 by the Ottoman authorities, to protect coastal areas after the departure of the Crusaders and to prevent the Maronites from contacting the Crusaders in Cyprus. They were Sunni Muslims who governed according to the prevailing non-religious feudal system rather than by Islamic Shari’a law. The ‘Assafs were content to collect taxes, and did not intervene in the affairs of the community. This situation suited the Maronites, and in 1516 resulted in the first known Lebanese Christian– Muslim cooperation. Freedom for Christians was ensured in exchange for lucrative revenue for the ‘Assafs. The Maronites benefited greatly from this situation, and began expanding southward to Kisrwan and the Maten districts. The Ottomans then replaced the ‘Assafs with Saifa princes (also Turkoman), who adopted Shari’a law. This led the Maronites to make a pact in 1584 with Fakhr al-Din II – governor of the Shouf and counterpart to the Saifa princes.14 The territories that made up the Lebanese Emirate, under both the Ma’ns and the Shihabs, did not have strictly fixed boundaries. Although its core consisted of the Maronite and Druze districts, the emirs usually controlled additional territories, either as tax collectors for the Ottoman Government or simply by their military strength. Sidon and Beirut, never strictly part of the emirate, were often under the rule of the Ma’n emirs, and served the latter as capitals. Tripoli for a time was under Ma’nid dominion. Beirut in the eighteenth century was frequently ruled by the Shihabs. Although the Beqa’ was formally a part of Damascus, its central region was almost continually under the control of the Lebanese emirs, who would frequently

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extend their influence also over the plain of ‘Akkar, to the north-east of Tripoli. In the northern Beqa’, the Shi’a of Baalbek region were also highly involved in the affairs of the Lebanese emirates, though they were never directly ruled by the Ma’ns or Shihabs. In the southern Beqa’, the region of Wadi al-Taim (at the base of Mount Hermon) was the home of the Shihab family, and subsequently became part of Lebanese territory when the Shihabs succeeded to the emirate. Therefore, pre-state Lebanon during Ottoman times – that is, the area that normally fell under the influence of Ma’n and Shihab rule – did not differ much from present-day Lebanon. An evolving form of political entity has continued without interruption from the early seventeenth century to the present time, establishing a separate and distinct Lebanese identity.15 The Divided Nature of Lebanon From its inception as a separate political entity, Lebanon carried physical, religious and ideological divisions that have been carried on throughout its history until our present time. The structure of the Lebanese system, no matter which form it has taken, has always carried the ethno-religious diversities that allowed it to be a perfect candidate for political instability. The factors for instability are therefore innate to the nature of the Lebanese entity; however, they have always surfaced whenever a regional or international situation occurred. Each community (Christian and Muslim) expressed its affiliation or stressed its position in the political structure by taking opposite sides on the issue or conflict at hand. Ironically, it was the Maronite – Druze association that both comprised a nucleus which enabled the creation of a distinct political entity and sowed the seeds for a chronic malaise in its structure – a division that would develop into a wider Christian – Muslim political schism throughout its history. This division – or ‘confessionalism’, as it was later to be called – is rooted in the general history of the region and the backgrounds of the groups that came to form Lebanon’s structure. Ironically, Lebanon is said to be indebted to such an arrangement for its existence and development into a pluralistic political entity:

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if it were not for confessionalism, Lebanon would not have existed. Lebanon’s confessionalism, as a sociological system, was a product of the Muslim Empire and of the Islamic Shari’a – or, rather, it was the product of a rigid implementation of them both ever since the establishment of the Abbasid Empire (AD 750–1259) up until the Tanzimat reforms of the Ottoman Empire of 1839. Accordingly, the Lebanese confessional system did not emerge from the Tanzimat, implemented in 1861–4, although it gained international recognition afterwards. Nor was it the result of the French Mandate and the creation of Greater Lebanon. The seeds of division in the Lebanese system, current or past, first surfaced in the sixteenth century. Two basic elements were involved: the Maronite Church and the Druze community represented by Fakhr al-Din II. They were joined during that period by other religious communities that found refuge in Lebanon. Gradually in this manner, the multi-religious, or multiconfessional, system became a de facto phenomenon.16 A major pillar of the divided nature of Lebanon is the strong religious and sectarian bond within each group. The loyalty to the sect was always a predominant fact of life. This form of loyalty was institutionalised when it became politically recognised under Ottoman rule. Although the Ottoman state recognised non-Sunni Muslim populations politically and legally as autonomous religious communities, they were seen as lesser-rank citizens. Citizens of the empire defined themselves in terms of their religions, not in terms of a particular set within those faiths. Religious leaders of each faith (Christian, Muslim and Jewish) sat in Istanbul, to represent their communities and to be held responsible for their behaviour at the same time. This system strengthened the sectarian-religious identity of the Ottoman subjects. These sectarian-religious bonds, which superseded any national feeling, defined loyalties in the first Lebanese Emirate, were sustained in all subsequent political structures and are still formally represented in Lebanon’s legal system and its political life. Thus, loyalty to the Lebanese nation remains fragile with respect to sect loyalties.17 Moreover, the various communities forming the Lebanese entity came from different backgrounds and were formed under different

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circumstances – thus, the religious communities of Lebanon grew as distinct groups, each with its special social character. The Shi’a, Druze and Maronites developed as rebel mountaineers, hardy and clannish, with a firm sense of particularism and a strong tendency towards independence. The Sunnite and Melchite populations were essentially townspeople, with none of the ruggedness and particularism of the mountaineers. Historically, the Sunnites and Melchites in Lebanon represent Muslim and Eastern Christian orthodoxy – unlike the Maronites, Shiites and Druze, who first established themselves in the country as dissenters and rebels against central authority. Consequently, while the Maronites, Shi’a and Druze remained isolated communities secluded in their mountain fastness, their Sunnite and Melchite countrymen, especially those of the coastal towns, maintained important connections with the world around them. Both the Sunnis and Orthodox Christians kept their ties with co-religionists elsewhere, especially in the neighbouring Syrian province of the empire.18 The Maronites, in particular, remain the most distinctive community in Lebanon since breaking away from Byzantium’s authority in the seventh century. Though they adopted the Arabic language, they have fiercely resisted, from their mountain bastion, both the Islamic religion that the Arab conquerors brought with them 1,300 years ago and affiliation with what is sometimes known as the ‘Arab Nation’.19 The division between the Druze and Maronites, or the more general Christian/Muslim division, would be a defining characteristic of all political systems in Lebanon. A succession of collisions would occur between the two communities over a varied range of political issues, especially after the rulers of Lebanon became Christians. The two sides of the divide would never again see the same things in the same way. Their conflicts would not be resolved into a consensus, and subsequent changes in the system (emirate; kaymakamate; mutessarifate; and, later, Greater Lebanon) would fall in one’s favour to the detriment of the other. The mutessarifate system (established 1861), amongst others, would be formed after two decades of intermittent warfare between, mainly, Maronites and

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Druze, without consulting the latter party. The new system would rather be imposed on both sides, like other settlements, ending instability and creating a new structure under international guarantees. Later, when Greater Lebanon was established in 1920 only the Maronites would be consulted while other communities would be taken for granted.20 The tendency of solving conflicts through enforcing stability in Lebanon through external intervention reflects the pattern of interaction amongst its constituent actors. The domestic pattern of interaction that defines relations between Lebanese actors across the Christian/Muslim divide is best characterised within a zerosum game: each group would consider a gain by the other as a loss to its own side. The International System: 1648–1814 When Fakhr al-Din II established the Lebanese Emirate in 1590, the international arena was predominantly European and religion was a defining characteristic of the major powers. From its inception, the emirate – with its domestic divide between two major religious communities, the Catholic Maronites and Muslim Druze – would prove volatile to, if not actually dependent on – the effects of major systemic powers’ interactions. In fact, it was the religious affiliation of Catholic Maronites in Lebanon with the major powers that gradually elevated the former’s position with respect to the Druze, and eventually led to the first change in the structure of the emirate. The international system in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was undergoing a drastic change. The medieval tendency towards universality – that is, a concept of world order that represented a combination of the traditions of the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church – was about to be replaced with a European balance-of-power system. In the Middle Ages, the power of the papacy and the universality of the Church was a defining characteristic of the European system of a Holy Roman Empire, made up of duchies, counties, cities and bishoprics all owing allegiance to the Roman emperor, and a number of kingdoms (France, Spain and Great Britain)

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that did not accept the authority of the Holy Roman Empire but remained part of the Universal Church.21 The weakening of the papacy under the impact of the Reformation ended any prospect of a hegemonic (Holy) European empire. The Reformation gave rebellious princes freedom of action on the religious and political levels. The concept of unity collapsed and the emerging states of Europe adopted raisons d’e´tat and the balance of power as their guiding principles. Raison d’e´tat asserted that the interests of states justified whatever means they employed to promote it. ‘The national interest’ thus replaced the medieval notion of a universal morality. The champion of this new approach was France, which was also one of the first nation states in Europe. It was Cardinal de Richelieu, first minister of Catholic France (1624–42), who first promoted the concept of raison d’e´tat in directing the affairs of his country. France’s secular policy was best exemplified in the treaties concluded with the Protestant Swedes and the Muslim Turks amongst other polities.22 With the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II (of Habsburg Austria) attempting to revive Catholic universality and establish imperial control over the princes of Europe, Richelieu feared a unified central Europe and prevented its occurrence. He saw the Habsburg attempt to re-establish the Catholic religion as a geopolitical threat to France’s security. He then drove his country into the Thirty Years’ War on the side of the Protestant princes under the pretext of raison d’e´tat, which enabled France, under Louis XIV, to become the dominant country in Europe and vastly extend its territory.23 A new European state system (1648–1814) was developed with the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War (1618– 48) and saw the end of the Napoleonic wars. This was a distinct international system, not only in the nature of its units and their general patterns of interaction before and after the Thirty Years’ War but also owing to the fact that the prevailing inter-dynastic politics retained their fundamental characteristics for almost one and a half centuries afterwards. During that period, the cultural context of Europe also contributed to the system. Although the continent was divided amongst a number of dynastic states and lesser entities, there

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was a sense of European cultural unity. The dominant idea of ‘Christendom’ referred to the religion that united the Europeans and set them apart from the Ottoman ‘heathen’ and the ‘barbarians’ inhabiting lands overseas. French was commonly spoken by members of the aristocracy throughout Europe; France – or, more precisely, the French Court – set the cultural standards for the continent in many ways. The modern concept of nationality was not yet fully developed. A cultural cosmopolitanism pervaded the continent, and even in politics identification was personal rather than national. Loyalties extended to a court, king, queen or lesser noble rather than to a nation. Therefore, Europe was culturally united, especially after the schism between Protestants and Catholics had been resolved through war in the 1630s and 1640s, but it was politically divided.24 The boundaries of this system were mainly religious. Europe was defined in terms of Christianity, and the principal relationships were between the princes of Christendom. Although these princes (or kings) had regular contact with the Ottoman Empire, membership of the system was strictly European. The myriad political units in Africa, Asia and elsewhere – kingdoms, sultanates, chiefdoms, free cities and the like – were not considered members of the European system. The rules that guided relationships between the European dynasties were rarely observed in relations with people generally considered to be ‘barbarians’, ‘heathen’ or other types of inferiors. The nature of the units in the system was also distinct. The old, medieval European order of free cities, church properties and private holdings, and local warlords became obsolete; instead, centralised political units, conceived in territorial terms and subject to no superior authority, took over.25 Power amongst the dynastic states was diffused. There were eight ‘powers’ and many lesser states for most of this period – thus, no single power dominated the system. The principle of the sovereign independence of the dynastic states and the importance of a balance of power as a mechanism for maintaining states’ independence were confirmed. One outcome of power diffusion amongst the eight powers, however, was constantly shifting alliances throughout the period, which led to substantial insecurity.26

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Foreign trade was commonly regarded as a zero-sum game: the gains of one power came at the expense of another. As a result, governments generally tried to create monopolies. This search for commercial exclusivity had a power-politics motive, and was guided by doctrines of mercantilism that were widely popular in eighteenth-century Europe. Under this doctrine, the State should be deeply involved in commercial activity, including foreign trade. The purpose was not only to promote economic wellbeing but also to amass the resources necessary to build and sustain military establishments.27 Therefore, the Treaty of Westphalia succeeded in creating a type of political order for Europe. Although it did not create peace, it established a number of ‘rules of the game’. These formally established the international system as one based on sovereign independence.28 Despite the frequency of war, the formal and informal rules of the system helped to sustain dynastic political orders, independence and sovereignty. Monarchs ruled by divine right and, hence, religious consideration was as important in moderating international politics as were the secular rules, treaties and customs of the time. Finally, the mechanism of the balance of power helped to preserve the independence of states and to sustain the principle of political sovereignty developed at Westphalia. Those who attempted continental hegemony were successfully thwarted by coalitions of dynasts who wanted to retain their autonomy and independence. Hence, for the period until the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, few of the essential characteristics of international politics changed fundamentally.29 The equilibrium of the Continent was mostly managed and reinforced by Great Britain, whose foreign policy was explicitly dedicated to maintaining the balance. Britain saw its interest in the preservation of the European balance and in preventing the domination of Europe by a single power; thus, it would throw its weight behind the weaker side in any conflict on the Continent. This policy of shifting coalitions under British leadership against French attempts to dominate eventually led to a European balance of power. This ‘balancer’ role played by Great Britain stemmed from geopolitical considerations. The survival of the island would be

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jeopardised had all the resources of the Continent been controlled by a single power because Britain would possess far fewer resources and population and would have been at the mercy of a Continental empire. Therefore, France’s attempts at dominance in the name of raison d’e´tat would be restrained by the self-interest of other European states with the help of the balancer. France remained the strongest state, but it could not become dominant.30 This system would last as long as the European powers were willing to preserve it – in the event, until 1814. Although trade competition and wars continued to be a frequent feature of international interactions, the paramount pattern of interaction amongst the powers would be the drive to preserve the system based on a balance of power between them. Any bid for hegemony or the strengthening of one monarch’s power position vis-a`-vis other monarchs would be opposed by a counter-coalition, and Britain, especially, would play the leading role of a balancer in the system. Therefore, any contingent pattern of interaction would be subservient to the general cause of preserving the balance in the system. Moreover, the general European affiliation to Christianity and the particularly powerful position of France in the system would reflect positively on their co-religionists in the Lebanon. France, which was a pioneer in gaining commercial and political privileges in the Ottoman Empire, would extend its favours to the Maronite Catholics and strengthen their position in Lebanon. This link with France, amongst other European powers, would ultimately pave the way for the first change in the structure of Lebanon. Delayed Systemic Effect and Change to Christian Emirate A long-term and persistent connection between the Maronites and the Catholic West – accompanied by the latter’s cultural, economic and religious support to their fellow Christians – eventually tilted the balance of power in the emirate structure. The Maronites spread and flourished, and ultimately became the rulers of Lebanon. This first change occurred within the structure of the emirate, whereby the domestic balance of power shifted from the Druze to the Maronites and thus to a Christian-led emirate. Muslim Shihab rule in Lebanon

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transformed into Christian Shihab governance. This change, however, also signalled the beginning of the institutionalisation of the divided nature of Lebanon. In the eleventh century, the Maronites had sided with the Crusaders in their campaign and provided crucial assistance in the capture of Jerusalem. With the Crusaders as intermediaries, the Maronites had established ties with the papacy and, by the thirteenth century, they had submitted themselves – while maintaining much of their doctrinal peculiarities – to the authority of the Church of Rome. Shortly after the Ottoman Turks invaded Lebanon, the Caliph signed a ‘capitulation’ that granted to France the right to protect the Christians within his realm, confirming France as the dominant influence on Maronite culture. Beginning with Louis XIV, the French, as part of their mission civilisatrice would adopt more cultural and educational policies that helped to Westernise the Maronites at a time when their Muslim neighbours, under Ottoman rule, were heading towards Islamic extremism.31 The Maronite connection with the Crusaders was first recounted by William, bishop of Tyre, in the latter half of the twelfth century, when the greater part of Syria and Palestine was in the hands of the Crusaders. William of Tyre, in his history about the Crusaders in twelfth-century Syria, describes the Maronites as ‘Monothelites’ who were about 40,000 in number and who showed readiness to accept the teaching of the Church of Rome. Also, he recalled, they were tough people who rendered great service to ‘us concerning our many and significant interests with our enemies. For this reason, our people [the Latin Crusaders] were overwhelmed with joy when these Maronites returned to the true faith [the Roman Catholic faith].’32 Later, after the Crusaders left the Levant, religious and commercial ties continued to flourish with Italy and France. The Capitulation (a trade agreement) granted by Sulayman I to Francis I in 1534, brought significant advantages to both France and the Maronites. In 1569, the French flag could be seen in Lebanese ports establishing a base for French supremacy in the Levant. Since then, the French and Maronites have been drawn into a closer relationship with one another. Such active trade relations contributed to even more political

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links. In 1616, the first French consul was based in Sidon, and later, with growing importance, the seat of the council moved to Beirut.33 The Maronite affiliation with Catholicism would converge with Fakhr al-Din’s aspirations for power, and the two communities would form an alliance of convenience that would benefit both in the newly established emirate system. Fakhr al-Din was seeking autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, and he wanted to open his domain to the West. His alliance with the Maronites would serve that purpose, produce prosperity and establish established contacts with the West. The Maronites were able to strengthen relations between Prince Fakhr al-Din and Rome, Tuscany and France. During that period, the influence of the Maronites grew stronger. Under the political leadership of the el Khazen feudal family, which worked closely with Fakhr al-Din, the Maronites expanded in Lebanon and at the same time enhanced their contacts in Europe.34 By the time of the Ottoman occupation of Lebanon in 1516, the Maronites had become an organised and well-functioning community. Evidence of this Maronite expansion and their subsequent alliance with the Druze in a distinct political entity may be traced in two historical documents dating back to the sixteenth century, which were written by two separate emissaries sent by the Holy See. The first was presented to Pope Gregory XIII in 1579, and the second to Pope Clement VIII in 1596. In the first report (1579), the emissary described the significant exodus of the Maronites towards the southern region of Lebanon, which began after ‘the dispersion of the Shiites by the Mamluk in 1305 and was consolidated by the accession of the Ma’ans, especially Emir Qorqomaz in 1544 and his son Fakhr al-Din II Senior in 1584’. The report also mentions that as soon as Fakhr al-Din annexed the Gharb, Metn, Jurd and Shouf districts, the exodus of the Maronites intensified, encouraged by the Emir in order to reinforce his partisans. In his report, the emissary ‘implored’ the Pope to take the ‘Maronite Nation’ under his protection and patronage.35 The first papal emissary – Giovanni Battista Eliano – was actually on a mission to detect and rectify doctrinal ‘errors’ in the Maronite ritual books. The mission yielded two results: a Maronite school was

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established in Rome in 1584 for the religious education of Maronite students, and the printing of Maronite books was undertaken once doctrinal errors had been detected and rectified.36 Abbot Paul Naaman rightly suggests that the Maronites owed their survival throughout the Mamluk and Ottoman centuries to the support of their Western co-religionists. The Lebanese in general, and the Maronites in particular, enjoyed the care of the Apostolic See and the protection of Western Christian countries, which reduced the influence of the Ottoman Empire and elevated that of Prince Fakhr al-Din II. The latter, however, came to be perceived as a danger to the Ottoman Empire because of his Western friendships, notably with the popes of Rome, the princes of Tuscany and Venice, and the kings of France – friendships due partly to the Maronites. The exchange with Rome, and the West in general, of cultural and spiritual missions and of delegations served to elevate the Lebanese entity – especially through protection and educational services. Alumni of the Maronite College of Rome would play a major role in the advancement of Maronite status and the consolidation of ties between Lebanon and Rome. The Maronites’ aim in all of this was to escape their dhimmi status in the Islamic world, to establish autonomy inside their country and to enjoy free and reciprocal cooperation with their neighbours and allies, whether inside or outside Lebanon.37 A major reward of this European link was the establishment at the Maronite monastery of Qazhayya, in the district of Bsharri, of a printing press using Karshuni (Syriac alphabet) characters in the early seventeenth century – most likely by some Maronite graduate of Rome.38 It is worth noting that this was the first printing press in the region, and that printing would only be introduced to Egypt by Napoleon about 200 years later. Fakhr al-Din II’s success attracted attention in Europe. The Medici of Tuscany, who had plans to establish their own empire in Syria, became interested in the emir’s activities and encouraged him to rebel against his Ottoman suzerains. The emir, confident of Tuscan support, would indeed successfully challenge Ottoman authority, defeat the neighbouring pashas and extend his influence over most of Syria. When the Porte retaliated, however, the Tuscans failed to send

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their support, and Fakhr al-Din was defeated and taken prisoner by the Ottomans in 1633. He was then sent in chains to Istanbul, where he was put to death by strangling in 1635. His nephew, Mulhim, succeeded him in Lebanon, followed in 1657 by the latter’s son, Ahmad. In 1697, when the Ma’nid male line became extinct with Emir Ahmad’s death, the Shihab of Wadi al-Taym took over.39 In 1649, the Capitulation Agreement was renewed, and King Louis XIV reaffirmed France’s patronage of the Maronites in Lebanon. In addition to France’s guarantee to safeguard and protect the Maronites, French consuls in the country were ordered to assist any Maronite ‘who might wish to go over into Christian lands, either to study or for any other business, without taking or requiring of them any fee other than that which they may be able to give, treating them with all possible gentleness and charity’.40 By the late eighteenth century, the Druze’ power had been compromised due to internal rifts amongst them. Maronites, though, were becoming stronger and greater in numbers and influence. This shift in the sectarian balance led the Shihab emirs to embrace Christianity, and in 1770 the rule of the Christian Shihabs began. This conversion ended Druze rule in the country but the Druze remained a powerful force with which the Shihabs had to reckon, and peace between the Druze and the Christians in Lebanon held for many years.41 However, what turned mere sectarian imbalance into outright sectarian hatred was the deliberate weakening of Druze power within the structure of the emirate, especially from 1820 onwards. Bashir II – then a Maronite ruler – took measures that compromised the Druze leadership, and in 1825 he had their leader, Bashir Junbalat, imprisoned and strangled in Acre. Although this event established the unchallenged authority of the Emir it also weakened the Druze leadership, which had been the backbone of the Lebanese political system. The death of Bashir Junbalat signalled a turn for the worse between the two communities and introduced sectarianism into Lebanese politics, because the Druze concluded that this act constituted a Christian bid to destroy them.42 Although the Maronite population enjoyed a dramatic increase in numbers because of the increasing demand for peasants and Fakhr

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el-Din’s tolerant policies, which prompted an influx from the northern areas of Bsharri and Syria, it was the qualitative changes in the Maronite community that enabled the shift in the balance of power in the emirate. The advantages furnished by a preferential silk trade with a paternal France (via the Capitulation Agreement) and the increasingly educated elites with the assistance of Rome enabled a richer and more powerful Maronite community that caused the shift in the domestic balance of power vis-a`-vis the Druze. What started out as a Druze political entity thus transmuted into a Christian one. The effect of the long-term European connection was a structural change within the emirate system. The steady and gradual European support for the Maronites in Lebanon had the delayed effect of shifting the domestic balance of power in their favour, thus bringing a structural transformation towards a Christian emirate. A new era for Lebanon had begun.

The Concert of Europe and Change to Kaymakamate The first change of the Lebanese political entity from the emirate system to a kaymakamate system occurred in the aftermath of the 1841 instability. The European powers’ rivalry and their direct intervention in the Emirate affairs (international level), and the Ottoman aspiration to end Lebanese autonomy (sub-systemic level) led to both direct and mediated indirect systemic effects on Lebanon. The desire to preserve the European system and its balance of power, the polarisation between the European (systemic) powers over the Levant and their subsequent intervention to defeat Ibrahim Pasha in Syria all had the direct effect of weakening the position of the latter’s Lebanese ally, Bashir II, and thus triggering the 1841 instability and violence between the Maronites and Druze in Lebanon. The mediated indirect effects of this European intervention (systemic dynamics) were the change in the structure of Lebanon to that of a double kaymakamate and the loss of political autonomy in favour of stringent Ottoman control through a Turkish administrator. This latter consequence of European polarisation was made

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possible when the European powers assigned to Turkey the role of regional intermediary in Lebanon in order to bring an end to instability (a consequence of European rivalry in the first place). They thus indirectly allowed the Ottomans to incorporate their own agenda for the Levant by enforcing a settlement that brought an end to the emirate, with its Christian Lebanese emir. Consequently, Turkey would enforce a new political system for Lebanon, the Kaymakamate (1842– 58), and would gain more control over the ensuing structure, whereby executive powers would reside under Ottoman control – hence, the termination of an independent Shihabi reign and the impairment of Lebanon’s political autonomy. Background: The ‘Eastern Question’ and Systemic Polarisation over the Near East The ‘Eastern Question’ began with the decline in Ottoman strength vis-a`-vis Europe and the growing awareness by all parties concerned of this decline. This process is usually held to have commenced in 1774 at the earliest, and by the 1820s at the latest.43 Although earlier dates have also been suggested, this research adopts the view that 1798 was the date marking the beginning of the systemic dynamics known as the Eastern Question. In 1798, Napoleon landed in Egypt in a daring military strike intended to cut Britain off from India and perhaps establish a French Empire in the East. Lord Nelson and the British fleet halted his plans. He returned to France the next year, and, by 1801, the remaining troops of the French Expeditionary Force surrendered and were repatriated. This thwarted French attempt had nonetheless proved that Ottoman territories were vulnerable. The Ottomans had fought with Europe along shared borders in the Balkans and Central Asia; however, Napoleon had leapfrogged these customary battle lines, striking daringly against the Ottoman Arab heartland. Although the French failed and the British, who entered Egypt as allies of Turkey, eventually withdrew their forces by 1805, the incident marked the beginning of new systemic dynamics. European plans to conquer interior portions of the Ottoman Empire, rather than being satisfied with minor gains at the Eurasian edges, now became a possibility.

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Less than three decades after their loss in Egypt, the French began an occupation of Algeria (1830) that lasted 132 years. Nine years later (1839) the British took Aden. After 1798, two additional factors oriented the dynamics of the Eastern Question: Britain started to worry about its lifeline to India, and Napoleon’s interval gave the opportunity for Muhammad ‘Ali to seize power in Egypt. The last-named figure played a major role later in shaping the Eastern Question, as he brought the Ottoman Empire to the brink of destruction on two occasions.44 Therefore, the Eastern Question defined the patterns of interaction of systemic powers from the late eighteenth century until the fall of the Ottoman Empire – a pattern of systemic polarisation over whether to preserve the integrity and independence of the empire or not. Systemic effects became the main determinant of state structure in the Near East. In the eighteenth century, systemic effects resulting from this polarisation determined the emerging structure of the Balkan states, which gained independence from the Ottoman Empire; later, between 1914 and 1923, systemic effects completely reshaped the Near East and Lebanon on the basis of the principle of self-determination – a principle that fitted the interests and ambitions of systemic powers at that time.45 Napoleon’s incursion in the region was not the first European attempt to influence change in the Arab East. In the eighteenth century, a weakened Ottoman central administration and an awakened European interest in Ottoman affairs had encouraged rulers in Syria and Egypt to challenge the Porte. In 1768, Russia, which was then at war with Turkey for the third time in a century, found it useful to instigate trouble in Syria in order to divert Turkish attention from the battlefront – thus, Ottoman Syria became involved for the first time in a serious international conflict. The Russian intervention concerned neighbouring Palestine. Russia supported a local chieftain, Dahir al-‘Umar, master of the whole Galilee region and Acre since 1750, to rise against the Ottomans. Dahir al-‘Umar, a Bedouin whose father had been installed by the Shihabi Governor of Lebanon as sheikh over the Safad district, made his bid about 1737 by occupying the surrounding

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areas, and by 1750 had established his seat in ‘Akka. Dahir later entered into an alliance with ‘Ali Bey of Egypt. In 1770, ‘Ali Bey supported Dahir in his advance on Damascus, and the Ottoman Pasha of Damascus fled; in 1772, Dahir occupied Sidon at the foot of Mount Lebanon. In 1774, however, the Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynardja ended the war between Turkey and Russia, and the whole episode came to an end. The Ottomans regained control over the lost areas (Damascus, Sidon, and Acre), and Dahir was assassinated by one of his soldiers. It was the first time that a European power – Russia – had taken sides in a local issue to attain external ends.46 In 1775, Sidon was recaptured and given to Ahmad al-Jazzar, who later expanded his domain and made ‘Akka his base; later still, in 1780, he became governor of Damascus – a position that made him virtually the viceroy of Syria and the arbiter of Lebanon. The Emir of Lebanon at the time was Bashir II (ruled 1788–1840), who, on the occasion of Napoleon’s invasion, had failed to rush aid to the Pasha of ‘Akka; he had to withdraw to Cyprus on a British ship in order to avoid Jazzar’s revenge. Later in 1821, Bashir had to take refuge in Egypt after he re-attached Beqa’ to Lebanon and fell into dispute with the governors of Damascus and Tripoli. In Egypt, he cultivated a friendship with its viceroy, Muhammad ‘Ali, and thus, when Ibrahim (‘Ali’s son) invaded Syria, Bashir was a ready ally.47 At the end of the eighteenth century, systemic patterns of interaction undertook a shift when Habsburg Austria, which had been the major European opponent of the Ottoman Empire throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, shifted attention to an increasingly growing Russian threat from the east. Russia had grown in power in the Balkans by gaining a foothold on the strategically important Black Sea with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynardja in 1774, thus influencing the passage of vessels coming through the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Therefore, an interest in balancing Russian influence arose for fear that it might change the systemic balance of power. Austria, however, couldn’t oppose Russia outright for fear of a Russian alliance with Prussia. When Britain’s interest in the Eastern Question also became critical at the end of the eighteenth century, the British policy of preserving

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its trade with the Persian Gulf region and the need to secure a quick and safe passage to India through the Near East became a priority. Britain’s main interest until now, however, had been to preserve the systemic balance of power through its alliance with Prussia. Russia was not yet perceived as a threat to the international system.48 Therefore, when France, the traditional European ally of the Ottomans since the fifteenth century, opted by the end of the eighteenth century to abandon its policy of maintaining the Ottoman Empire, Britain had to step in. Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1798 was a threat to British interests in the region, especially to its Indian colony. The British joined ranks with the Russians and Ottomans, and defeated the French in their attempt to restore the balance. This alliance, however, soon collapsed.49 When war broke out between Russia and the Ottomans at the end of 1806, Britain had to re-examine its policies in the Near East and decided in favour of its alliance with Russia. Russia in central Europe would check any French advance, especially after the collapse of Austria following the Third Coalition war against Napoleon (1803– 6). However, after Russia made a separate peace with the French in 1807 at Tilsit, Britain opted in 1809 to make peace with the Ottomans – and when Napoleon invaded Russia in 1802, Britain restored its alliance with Russia.50 British policies throughout that period aimed at preserving the systemic balance of power. Systemic Pressure and the Ottoman Tanzimat By the end of the eighteenth century, the Porte was forced to undertake reforms after repeated defeats at the hands of Austrian and Russian armies that had resulted in the loss of the Crimea and the constant erosion of the Ottoman hegemony in the Balkans. These reforms, intended as a response to the European threats, were initially directed towards adopting European techniques in order to enhance Ottoman military capabilities. In line with the intended reforms, Sultan Mahmud II, who succeeded Salim III in 1808, started the reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire commonly known as the Tanzimat.51 These reforms were primarily aimed at centralisation, with the object of consolidating Ottoman authority over the

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empire’s territory. The policy of centralisation would direct Ottoman policy towards Lebanon from then onwards. The Circular Systemic Effect: French Support for Muhammad ‘Ali The rise of European political involvement in the region was one consequence of the Napoleonic struggle. It can be argued that an indirect systemic effect of the balance-of-power system of interaction resulted from the French and British polarisation over Egypt. The French defeat of the Mamluks and the British failure to restore either Mamluk or Ottoman rule opened the way for the ascendancy of Muhammad ‘Ali in Egypt.52 This, in turn, led to a change in the subsystemic environment that later affected developments in Lebanon. The British alliance with the Ottomans to defeat the French expedition in the region led to a circular effect, whereby France compensated for its lost position in the region through an alliance with another regional power. British action aimed at securing the Near Eastern route to its Indian Empire also ended the commercial advantages that France had enjoyed, and became a general British policy for most of the century – that is, to deny its French or Russian rivals domination over this route by helping to uphold Ottoman hegemony over the Eastern Mediterranean. In an attempt to adjust to the changing environment in the Arab East and to compensate for its diminished importance in Istanbul, France opted to support Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt, providing him with advice and cooperation in his reform efforts to the benefit of French commerce.53 Muhammad ‘Ali’s bid for regional dominance, which allowed him to threaten Istanbul itself in 1833, ran counter to the general systemic pattern of interaction of upholding the balance in Europe. This brought an end to his ambitions and yet another change to the regional environment, which had a drastic effect on Lebanon’s stability and structure. The Concert of Europe and Systemic Patterns of Interaction In 1815, the Congress of Vienna ended the Napoleonic Wars and established an international system that came to be known as the

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Concert of Europe. This arrangement was based on a notion of national interests, a balance between European powers and a deeper notion of solidarity, resting on common values and the wish to restore a lasting European order after the turmoil of the revolutionary wars. The Concert aimed at establishing a balance between the five major powers at the time (Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia). It also established a legal mechanism through international law, whereby the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna stipulated that the boundaries established in 1815 could not be altered without the consent of its eight signatories.54 The Concert system gave Europe the longest period of peace it had ever known up to that point. No conflict at all took place amongst the Great Powers for 40 years, and, after the Crimean War of 1854, no general war occurred for another 60. Although this international order, more than any other, was based on the balance of power, it was maintained with a minimum reliance on power. The equilibrium was so well designed that changing it required an immense effort, but also, and more importantly, there was a strong sense of shared values amongst the Continental countries. The equilibrium was physical and moral – that is, power and justice went together. The balance of power reduced the opportunity to use force and a shared sense of justice reduced the desire to do so.55 Although France was deprived of its conquests, it was granted its pre-revolutionary frontiers – a considerably larger territory than the one that Richelieu had ruled. The victors at Vienna found it safer for Europe if France was relatively satisfied rather than resentful and estranged. By 1818, France was admitted to the Congress system at periodic European congresses.56 The architect of this system, Prince von Metternich of Austria, felt the threat from the increasing currents of liberalism and nationalism that threatened the existence of his empire. Metternich then employed a web of moral restraint to avoid that threat. He persuaded the key countries to submit their disagreements to a sense of shared values. This relationship between the balance of power and a shared sense of values materialised in two documents: the Quadruple Alliance, consisting of Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia;

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and the Holy Alliance, consisting of the three ‘Eastern Courts’ – Prussia, Austria and Russia. Whereas the first arrangement was intended to thwart any aggressive French tendencies, the latter alliance was proposed by the Russian Tsar and aimed at preserving the domestic status quo in Europe as a religious obligation by the signatories. The Holy Alliance brought the conservative monarchs together in combating revolution, but it also obliged them to act only in concert.57 Metternich, who played a key role in managing the Concert system and in interpreting the requirements of the Holy Alliance, was driven by the concern of Austria’s volatile position surrounded by Prussia, Russia and Turkey. He believed that the nature of domestic institutions determined a state’s behaviour internationally; he thought democracy dangerous and unpredictable, and he identified peace with legitimate rule. He expected the crowned heads of ancient dynasties to preserve the Concert system. Metternich considered legitimacy the ‘cement that holds the international order together’.58 The Eastern Question was the major systemic dynamics that related the Concert of Europe to the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. The process triggered by a decline in the powers of the Ottoman Empire, and accompanied by nationalistic/separatist movements in some of its provinces, had to be checked with the aim of preserving a European balance and the Concert system. In the nineteenth century, the Eastern Question involved solving the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and its Christian subjects (primarily those in south-eastern Europe demanding autonomy or independence) without upsetting the balance of power in Europe – that is, solving the matter without allowing Russia to become the predominant power in the whole of Europe.59 Therefore, preserving the systemic balance of power had to take precedence over all other objectives or contingent policies of the Concert members. Muhammad ‘Ali and Changes in the Sub-Systemic Regional Environment The French invasion of Egypt led to the seizure of power by Muhammad ‘Ali (ruled 1805– 48), a Turk from Macedonia who had

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come to Egypt with the Ottoman forces sent against the French and who managed to become a governor of Egypt. Egypt expanded towards Syria but was forced to withdraw by a combined effort of the European powers, which did not wish to see an independent Egyptian state weakening that of the Ottomans. In return for withdrawal, he obtained in 1841 recognition of his family’s right to rule Egypt under Ottoman suzerainty. Egyptian rule continued, however, in Sudan, which for the first time constituted a single political unit.60 ‘Ali assisted the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II in the War of Greek Independence. However, the Greeks, helped by the Great Powers, succeeded in breaking away from the Ottoman Empire and achieving independence. In return for his services, Muhammad ‘Ali received only Crete from the Sultan. The Morea (governorship) of Greece, which had been promised to his son, Ibrahim, had been lost to the Ottomans, and Mahmud II was not willing to give other territories in compensation. Muhammad ‘Ali was insistent, and asked for Syria as a reward; when the Sultan refused his request, the Pasha decided to take the country by force, and sent his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to conquer Syria in the autumn of 1831.61 The Egyptian advance towards Syria had immediate consequences in Lebanon, where the friendship between Bashir II and Muhammad ‘Ali was already well known. Trouble broke out between the Druze and Maronites in the country even before Ibrahim Pasha arrived at Acre. Although the Druze had no special reason to fear Ibrahim’s advance, their attitude towards him was determined purely by their hostility to Bashir. Since it was expected that the Emir, sooner or later, would openly ally himself with Ibrahim, his Druze opponents decided to pose as champions of the Porte, which they expected to prevail in the end. The Maronites, however, looked upon the Egyptian conqueror as a friend, as did other Christians in Syria, because Ibrahim removed the traditional restrictions imposed on Christians and Jews, and placed these communities on an equal footing with the Muslims in all the towns that he occupied. Hence, he appeared as a liberator to all the Christians of Syria – and especially to those of Lebanon, who accepted him as the friend of their Emir.62

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When Ibrahim Pasha reached Konia in 1832, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire became a possibility as the road to Istanbul was open. This aroused Russia, Britain and France – the last-named of which had, up to this point, encouraged Muhammad ‘Ali in his ambitions. All of them had to act on behalf of the Sultan – thus, the Egyptian ambition had to be thwarted.63 The fall of the Ottoman Empire would have meant a change in the status quo; however, the Concert rules had to be enforced, and thus the preservation of the empire. Direct European intervention would consolidate Ottoman power for the time being. The issue, however, was not that simple. The British could not provide naval aid to Turkey, so Sultan Mahmud II asked Russia to send army and navy forces to defend Istanbul. France, which supported Muhammad ‘Ali as a counterweight to the British, was quite unwilling to see Turkey under the domination of Russia. Thus, it joined Britain in urging the Sultan to withdraw his request, but he did not. Russia aided Turkey and signed the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi with Istanbul on 8 July 1833, granting Russia the right to send military forces to the Turkish Straits whenever internal forces in Turkey demanded. Russia also obtained the right to send its warships through the straits, while a secret clause closed them to all other foreign powers.64 Russia followed a policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire, but the alliance improved Russia’s relative power and threatened the European balance of power. British objectives became focused on undoing the effects of Unkiar Skelessi, and on defending the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire against all threats. Britain became committed to removing Egypt from Syria, not because of any interest in the Near East but to preserve the status quo (balance) in Europe. The Ottoman Empire was considered important for the European balance of power.65 The Systemic Balance of Power and the Defeat of Muhammad ‘Ali With Unkiar Skelessi, Russia thought it had established a de facto protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. By the mid-1830s, relations between Russia and Turkey had normalised. After 1833, Russia

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upheld the status quo in the Near East because a fresh Ottoman defeat at the hands of Muhammad ‘Ali would establish a strong ‘Ali at the straits whilst, in the event of a Turkish victory, Mahmud II would become strong enough to assert his independence of Russian protection. In addition, Chancellor Metternich of Austria did not want to see a legitimate ruler once more challenged by his vassal, as ‘Ali was doing to the Sultan, fearing the possibilities of international friction caused by fresh struggles in the Levant. Therefore, Britain and Russia, although not the best of friends after Unkiar Skelessi, both wanted to preserve status quo. France was in favour of Egypt, but also upheld the status quo.66 Great Britain, in an effort to avoid a collision with Russia, tried to strengthen the Ottoman Empire in order to enable it to resist pressure either from Russia or from Egypt. Therefore, between 1835 and 1839, Britain made some unsuccessful efforts to strengthen the Ottoman armed forces.67 In 1838, when Muhammad ‘Ali declared his intention to seek full independence from the Sultan, Britain announced that it would take the side of the Porte. It was not ready to tolerate the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and ‘Ali’s control over the routes to India. Moreover, the British sought to avoid Ottoman dependence on Russian military power in order to prevent further Russian advances in Mesopotamia. Moreover, Metternich, ‘the legitimate’, would not tolerate defiance of legitimate authority – namely, Muhammad ‘Ali’s insubordination towards the Sultan. Eager to avoid the intensification of international friction, he successfully pressured France to subscribe to the Concert efforts of preserving the status quo in the East.68 European support for the Ottomans placed Egypt under a great deal of pressure. The Egyptians took the extreme measure of raising taxes and monopolising silk and other native products, and ordered disarmament of Mount Lebanon whilst imposing military conscription, which took Lebanese men to fight with the Egyptian Army. These measures caused instability and uprisings in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.69 In 1839, tempted by these uprisings, the Ottomans tried to regain Syria from ‘Ali by force. However, they were defeated,

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leaving the empire in a compromised position and likely to collapse. The European states then jointly stepped in to mediate between Turkey and Muhammad ‘Ali. The mediation efforts failed, however. France opposed the use of force against its ally, ‘Ali, because, despite the prospect of a potential Ottoman collapse, the French aspired to gain a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean through their Egyptian ally. Britain, however, found a great opportunity to achieve its objectives through binding Russia to act in concert with the other European powers. This would deprive Russia of the special position it had gained in the Ottoman Empire through Unkiar Skelessi.70 Upon Turkey’s second defeat and ‘Ali’s claim to Syria and Adana, which would have meant the collapse of the empire and a change in the status quo, the European powers intervened – and Britain and France ended their polarisation, and cooperated on this issue. The Great Powers had an ‘entente’ concerning the Near Eastern issue, and the British and French agreed on preserving the status quo through immediate action. Britain thus intervened militarily, and the Turco-Egyptian War was now declared to be an object of European interest.71 In short, although France and Great Britain were polarised over the Near East issue (France allied with ‘Ali vs a British alliance with Turkey), the general systemic pattern of interaction to preserve the balance of power system had to prevail over their contingent polarisation – that is, the preservation of the status quo in the Near East had, for the purpose of preserving the European balance of power, to override all other considerations. Hence, when ‘Ali announced his intentions to gain independence from the Porte, which would have left the empire weak and threatened with collapse, France had to concede to the British and general European stance and oppose ‘Ali, thus yielding to the general systemic pattern of interaction (or the rules of the system). The Franco-British polarisation over the Egyptian issue had its roots in the two powers’ opposing strategic interests in the region. Although France did not want ‘Ali to achieve full independence, it regarded the Pasha with his reliance on French officers and experts, as at least a potential client of France. French commercial interests in Egypt were

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important and increasing. Also, a strong Egypt under French influence would be a useful weapon against British predominance, which now seemed to threaten the eastern Mediterranean, and might also be helpful in assisting the growth of French power in North Africa generally. For all these reasons, there was strong reluctance by France to take an openly anti-Egyptian position.72 The British, however, wanted to evict ‘Ali from Syria but were not keen on driving him out of Egypt. Syria must be returned, otherwise Muhammad ‘Ali would always be in a position to invade Mesopotamia and thus control not merely the route to India via Suez and the Red Sea but also that running overland from northern Syria to the Persian Gulf. It would even be possible for the Egyptians to invade Mesopotamia from the south and west, and join up with the Russians advancing from the Caucasus. Moreover, as long as Syria remained in the hands of the Egyptians the sultan would be so weakened as to be unable to effectively maintain his position at the straits or his hold on Asia Minor. The gulf between French and British attitudes to Egypt was thus already wide, and was growing wider.73 Turkey would eventually gain its regional objectives through mediated systemic effects, and thus achieve its own agenda in the region (Arab East) because of European balance-of-power considerations – that is, systemic effects related to dynamics on the international level. Britain also achieved its principal aim in the Near East: the destruction of the threatening privileges that the Russians had won from the Ottoman Empire in 1833. Therefore, on 13 July 1841, the Straits Convention between the powers Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia guaranteed the closure of the straits to non-Turkish warships in time of peace. For the next decade, however, France rather than Russia would appear to London as the main threat to British influence in the Near East.74 In the meantime, signing the Straits Convention meant that France had rejoined the Concert of Europe and reverted to the traditional view that the Ottoman Empire was a necessary part of the European balance of power.75 British interests, however, did not lie in Syria, Lebanon or Egypt, or even in preserving the Ottoman Empire for its own sake, but rather in maintaining the status quo and balance of power in

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Europe – that is, preventing Russia from gaining an upper hand on the Continent. This systemic pattern of interaction (preserving the balance of power) led to the defeat of Muhammad ‘Ali, thus changing the regional environment of Lebanon, a development which compromised the emirate’s stability while reinforcing Ottoman authority. Thus, in line with the systemic pattern of interaction of preserving the European balance of power, a direct systemic effect resulting from the removal of ‘Ali from Lebanon was the end of his ally’s (Bashir II’s) reign and the ensuing instability (1840 – 2), while the indirect (mediated) effect was the subsequent fall of the emirate and the establishment of a new, weaker and more Ottomandominated control system. The 1840– 2 Instability and the End of the Emirate Systemic forces, the rivalry between France and Britain over how to manage the Eastern Question and the declining prominence of the Ottoman Empire played a decisive role in the changes that occurred after the fall of Bashir II and the subsequent instabilities of 1840–2 that led to a change in the Lebanese political structure and the country’s eventual loss of political autonomy. Although the powers agreed on preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in order not to risk Russian intervention in the region, the British and French disagreement on how to deal with Muhammad ‘Ali led Britain to seek direct intervention in Lebanon by backing the enemies of both ‘Ali and his ally, Emir Bashir II. Such a policy would later prove fatal for the stability and existence of the emirate. To preserve the status quo and to avoid any Russian intervention, the powers, including France, had to back the Porte in Istanbul. The European decision to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to check Muhammad ‘Ali’s expansion, accompanied by their direct intervention in the affairs of the Lebanese Emirate by supporting the rivals of Bashir II, prepared the way for a later change in the stability of the unit/Lebanon and a subsequent change in its structure.

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Although the causes of instability in Lebanon lay deep in the religious and social cleavages between its inhabitants – especially following ‘Ali’s policies in both Lebanon and Syria, which intensified the bitterness – it was ‘Ali’s withdrawal and the changing subsystemic environment, in addition to European intrigues, that provided sufficient cause for change. The Druze – Maronite conflict of 1840 developed as a result, in part, of Muhammad Ali’s forced withdrawal and, in part, of British and French polarisation (‘imperialistic rivalry’). ‘Ali, in line with his policy of reform and modernisation, and conforming to his diplomatic efforts to obtain the goodwill of the Christian powers of Europe, granted equality of status to the Christians in the Syrian pashaliks. In so doing, he antagonised all Muslims of the region. When the British attacked ‘Ali’s forces in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, the Muslims and Druze were determined to put the Christians in their place. The conflict was by no means a purely religious one, for it also had social and economic aspects; however, the instability had its international aspect mostly as a result of British and French rivalry in the Near East.76 Therefore, the change in Lebanon’s stability was, mainly, the direct consequence of Eastern Question dynamics at the international level. The breakdown of Ibrahim Pasha’s rule in Syria and Lebanon brought the downfall of Bashir II as emir of Lebanon. As the Egyptian troops left Lebanon, Bashir also left and went to Sidon, where he boarded a British ship which took him to exile in Malta. The end of Bashir II’s reign left a power vacuum; it was filled, within the Christian community, by the Maronite Church, which had already taken a convenient decision to back the resistance to Ibrahim Pasha – and, hence, to Emir Bashir. However, this power vacuum prevailing in 1840– 1, and the harsh feelings that had developed between the Maronite and Druze communities, were compounded by yet another factor. The returning Druze, who had lost their properties to confiscation and been sent into exile due to their opposition to the Egyptians, were outraged when they found that the Christians were now the owners of these lands. Both the Ottomans and the British had promised to restore confiscated Druze estates in appreciation of

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the latter’s role in opposing the Egyptians. In 1841, the disagreement between the two well-armed communities turned into a civil war and led to considerable bloodshed.77 Bashir II had been adopting policies that antagonised the Druze in Lebanon throughout his reign. Whilst consolidating his power over the emirate, he continued to break down the feudal structure of Mount Lebanon through a divide-and-rule policy, systematically destroying the power of the Druze feudal lords and thus destabilising the internal balance of Mount Lebanon society. This policy was a major domestic cause of the sectarian conflicts between the Maronites and the Druze that occurred between 1841 and 1860. When Bashir sided with the Egyptians in 1831, the Druze automatically took an opposite stance. During the Egyptian invasion of Syria under Muhammad ‘Ali’s son, Ibrahim Pasha, in 1831–2, the Druze considered Bashir II’s defection from the Ottoman to the Egyptian side as an opportunity to regain their lost power. Most of them joined the Ottoman troops in order to defend the Egyptian invasion. Thus, Ibrahim Pasha’s invasion of Syria only served to deepen sectarian sentiments. Ibrahim Pasha would later impose oppressive taxes and military conscription, and disarm the Druze of Mount Lebanon. In addition, when the Druze attempted to revolt against Egyptian rule between 1837 and 1838, they were defeated and crushed.78 Although Druze and Maronite relations deteriorated under Ibrahim Pasha’s rule, the instability of 1841–2 would not have occurred without favourable outside circumstances, not to mention direct incitement, from the systemic powers. Domestically, the strengthening of the political position of the Maronite Church during Egyptian rule along with the speedy decline of the predominantly Druze feudal system were also major causes of Christian – Druze antagonism. However, the British had been unsuccessfully attempting to incite the Lebanese against Ibrahim Pasha since 1835. They tried to convince Emir Bashir II to unite with the Druze in resisting the Egyptian occupation. Bashir remained loyal to Ibrahim until 1840, while the Druze of Lebanon, Wadi at-Taym and Hawran made common cause against him. After the European powers (Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria) landed

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on Lebanon’s coast in 1840 and Bashir II’s rule ended, the Ottomans, acting upon a British suggestion, appointed Emir Bashir Qasim Milhim Shihab (Bashir III) as ruler of Lebanon.79 France, which had just lost its Egyptian ally in the region, tilted towards the Maronites to maintain its influence, and supported Bashir al-Shihab III – also the Maronite Church’s candidate. French policies were held with the object of improving their position in the East, and obtaining a strategic advantage with respect to Britain by posing a threat to its hold on India. Therefore, by 1840, the Maronites were the major dynamic political force in Lebanon, and had recourse to France in support of their policy. When Bashir III became emir, he was a puppet in the hands of the Maronite clergy.80 When the returning Druze sheikhs demanded the restoration of their inherited fiefdoms, as well as former properties which were now in the hands of Christian merchants and peasants, Bashir III rejected their demands and even arrested some of them. The Maronite Church supported Bashir in his refusal to restore the prerogatives of these Druze chiefs. By 1840 –1, the Druze and Christians were conscious of the shift that had taken place in the balance of power between them. This internal rivalry, which divided Lebanon after the downfall of Bashir II and the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha to Egypt, was a good opportunity for external intervention. While the Ottomans (subsystemic intermediaries) seized the opportunity to apply a policy of centralisation, the Europeans (Great Britain, France and Russia) moved in to take advantage of the situation in order to try and reinforce their respective positions in the Near East.81 The British aimed at establishing a new Lebanese system that would be loyal to the Ottomans and restrict traditional French influence in Lebanon. Thus, their initial support for Bashir III came as part of an attempt to integrate Lebanon into the sphere of the Ottoman Government in Syria. To accomplish this objective, they suggested the weakening of the Druze sheikhs who were demanding the restoration of their ancient privileges. However, in the course of 1841, this British policy changed, especially when the Maronites started to seek advice and support exclusively from the French. While Britain’s efforts were dedicated to helping the Ottomans to restore

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their rule in Lebanon, the French attempted on the contrary, to preserve the autonomy of the Lebanese principality. The British, in an attempt to counterbalance the Maronite and French influence, moved to supporting the now-united Druze community and its sheikhs in their demand to restore their traditional privileges. When instability ultimately occurred in 1841, however, the two powers were forced to join ranks to end the conflict.82 This polarisation between France and Britain over the Lebanese issue eventually led to the 1841– 2 instability. French support of the Maronites and British efforts to re-establish Ottoman sovereignty over Lebanon soon led to a collision between the two communities in April 1841 – a crisis that lasted until 1842. Turkey’s Role as a Sub-Systemic Intermediary Turkey – a sub-systemic regional intermediary – would utilise the favourable international dynamics to achieve its own regional agenda. The Turks, appreciating the changing international environment that was polarising the European powers over the Levant, fomented instability in order to achieve their own agenda for the region (centralisation), and they successfully manipulated the domestic divide to trigger instability. The collapse of the system, they hoped, would justify their full annexation of Lebanon. After Egyptian forces had been evicted from Syria, the Ottomans were convinced that the only way to bring Lebanon under their direct control was to stir up strife between the Maronites and Druze, amongst whom the general alignment under Bashir, as under Fakhr al-Din, followed party rather than sectarian lines. Rivalries had been feudal and not religious until that time. Following their new policy of centralisation in the control of the provinces, the Turks played a divide-and-rule game – a strategy that was skilfully utilised to trigger the 1840– 2 instability, and that of 1858–60. The conflict between Druze and Maronites, which under Turkish stimulation began in 1841, would resurface again in 1845 and eventually culminate in the massacres of 1860.83 The policy of centralisation followed by the Ottomans after their reoccupation of Syria in 1840 stressed, amongst other things, the

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necessity of making the various provinces of the Ottoman Empire more dependent on Istanbul. The edict known as Hatt-i Sherif was only the first of a series of Ottoman reforms, known collectively as the Tanzimat (1839– 76), all of which emphasised the importance of political centralisation. Accordingly, when the Ottomans regained Syria in 1840 they were determined to increase the direct power of the central government in the region by reducing the prerogatives of the Syrian pashas. All vestiges of local autonomy were to be destroyed, particularly in the case of Lebanon; in fact, all the Turks had to do in Lebanon was to make use of systemic polarisation and take advantage of the policies of the European powers.84 The success of Turkey’s agenda of stirring up instability and thereby controlling Lebanon depended on the interactions of the European powers and their polarisation over the issue of the Levant. Turkey thus needed to trigger instability in Lebanon and prevent any chance of its independence in order to take control and achieve its policy of centralisation. To that end, the Ottomans, under the cover of their Tanzimat reforms, would commence a plan to destroy the country’s feudal system – the mainstay of Lebanon’s autonomy – thus causing this autonomy to collapse and bringing the country under their control. The first step towards centralisation was to institutionalise sectarian differences. Bashir III, following Turkey’s instruction, formed a provincial council of the major religious sects – officially in order to settle disputes and uphold the law. The Druze refused to cooperate, considering this council an encroachment on the traditional authority of their feudal lords, and, sure enough, the Ottoman administrative measures and inciting of classes and sects against each other eventually paid off. In 1841, the Druze, unable to remove Bashir peacefully, turned to insurrection, which soon led to a sectarian civil war and the massacre of Christians in mixedpopulation areas. The Maronites, realising that aid would not be forthcoming from the Ottomans, requested the European powers to intervene on their behalf. The Europeans were aware of Istanbul’s scheme for direct control of Lebanon and the final destruction of its autonomy. France, Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria–Hungary responded, and urged the Porte to end the mayhem.85

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A British detachment was sent to Dayr al-Qamar in an attempt to avert a massacre, but the Druze and Turks had agreed secretly to cooperate in attacking the Christians of the town. The Druze managed to attack and slaughter the Christians, a move that culminated in the capture of Bashir III by the Druze. Only then did the Turks decide to intervene, ostensibly to settle the issue, and sent a new governor – Umar Pasha – to Lebanon. While the powers sought the independence of Lebanon, Istanbul was still hoping to convince them that direct rule was the only solution to that country’s endemic strife. The Ottomans sought to end Lebanon’s self-rule and take advantage of the conflict-ridden situation to apply their own version of Tanzimat constitutionalism in Lebanon.86 Settlement and Change to the Double-Kaymakamate System (1842– 58) The Ottomans thus succeeded in triggering instability with the ultimate object of direct control over Lebanon; however, the attainment of their full agenda would prove impossible under the prevailing European policy. A new and weakened political system in Lebanon would be established, but total Ottoman control would be prevented. The European powers wanted to preserve the Ottoman Empire in order to safeguard the European balance of power and the international order, but a very strong and confident Turkey would reduce French and British influence in the region and thus was considered against their interests. The Ottomans, upon removing Bashir III from office, sent their troops, presumably to put an end to the troubles, and appointed a Turkish general, Umar Pasha as the new governor The latter was instructed to encourage the Christians to petition for direct Ottoman control on a permanent basis. The five European powers, however, opposed this Turkish attempt and frustrated the plan.87 The Porte, until this point, had still been counting on the support of Britain. The Ottomans were, however, to be disappointed. Instead of upholding the Turkish position of total control over Lebanon, the British openly condemned the attempt, and the proposal of the Porte to maintain direct Ottoman rule in Lebanon was completely rejected.

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The powers insisted on the establishment of a new political system for the country, which would suit its needs and be acceptable to the Porte and the powers.88 The Austrian Chancellor, Metternich, formulated a new political system (the double kaymakamate, or double governorate) for Lebanon, which represented a settlement to resolve the instability of 1841–2. The plan, which was approved by the European powers and the Ottomans, offered a compromise between the French, who wanted to restore the principality, and the Ottomans, who wanted direct rule. However, this new regime imposed on Lebanon was founded on a false presumption of the demography of the country – that is, that its northern district was inhabited entirely by Christians and the south wholly by Druze. In fact, Druze also lived in the northern district under Christian administration, whilst Christians outnumbered the Druze themselves in the nominally Druze southern district. There was only one part of the latter district, namely the Shuf, where the Druze had an obvious majority. The double-kaymakamate system would prove inefficient and unstable because of this demographic factor, and also because of the divergent expectations of the two communities. Both the Druze and the Christians hoped that the new regime would respond to their own particular aspirations.89 Metternich, ‘the legitimate’, in accordance with his policies on the European continent as the forerunner of the fight against nationalism and proponent of the idea of legitimate rule, acted against the Christian aspirations towards independence. Therefore, it was no coincidence that he should suggest the double-kaymakamate structure, which would dilute Lebanese autonomy in favour of a centralised, and more directly Ottoman, control over a province that he (Metternich) could only envisage as lying under the legitimate rule of the Ottoman sovereign. The Divided Nature of the Kaymakamate Structure The domestic divide in the new system would be a continuation of that in the emirate. The general pattern of interaction amongst the Christians and Druze continued to be a zero-sum game, and the new system was unsuccessful in creating better coexistence between them.

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In January, 1843, the new kaymakamate system replaced the emirate, which was now divided into two governorates, setting the stage for future sectarian strife. In the new system, the coastal plains and the Beqa’ Valley were placed under direct Turkish control. The Mountain was reorganised into a southern governorate under a Druze kaymakam (governor) and a northern governorate under a Maronite kaymakam. Both governors were placed under the general supervision of the Ottoman Pasha of Sidon, who was the governor of both Beirut and Sidon and the direct representative of the sultan. Moreover, when the kaymakams were appointed the Shihab family, normally the automatic choice for Lebanese government, was excluded from the post.90 The new system established confessional representation as a constitutional principle in Lebanon’s public life. Although, it represented a step towards bureaucratic governance, Lebanon’s new structure, which separated the country into two districts, was an ineffective solution to the country’s chronically divided nature.91 Overall, the double-kaymakamate structure presented serious difficulties. It had been instituted on the false assumption that the Beirut– Damascus road divided Mount Lebanon into two distinct parts: a northern part inhabited entirely by Christians, and a southern part inhabited entirely by Druze. In reality, as mentioned above, many Druze lived among the Christians in Matn, the southernmost district of the Christian kaymakamate, while the number of Christians living in the ‘Druze’ kaymakamate was more than double that of the Druze themselves.92 In addition, the new structure was undermined economically by the loss of the fertile plains. Turkish appointment and supervision of the governors also crippled the institution of hereditary feudal rule, diminishing the powers of the feudal lords – the major pillar of Lebanese autonomy. The Christian province in the north was further weakened by the exclusion of the important district of Jbeil – the ‘nerve centre’ of Maronite activity and the seat of the Maronite patriarch. Jbeil was attached to the Pachalik of Tripoli, and hence came under direct Ottoman rule.93 Therefore, the systemic patterns of interaction – European polarisation over Lebanon – that had led to direct intervention in

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emirate affairs enabled the Ottomans to pursue their agenda for centralisation, which, in turn, required the fomenting of instability in Lebanon in order to end its political autonomy. The resulting system, however, did not even fulfil Ottoman objectives, let alone Lebanese aspirations; rather, the kaymakamate system was a compromised settlement that would yet have catastrophic consequences. The desire to preserve the European balance of power and bolster the European intervention against the Egyptians in the region would have the direct effect of changing the sub-systemic environment of the Emirate of Lebanon, an outcome that ended the reign of a strong Bashir II and facilitated the appointment of a weaker ruler – Bashir III. Furthermore, European polarisation over Lebanon enabled the subsystemic intermediary’s (Turkey’s) policy towards centralisation, and had the indirect mediated effect of triggering instability (the 1841–42 War) and the subsequent change to the kaymakamate system and the relative loss of political autonomy under its new structure. Although the mediated effects resulted in a change in the system and loss of political autonomy in favour of the regional intermediary’s (Turkey’s) agenda, European interests limited the intermediary’s prerogative and hence enabled it to have limited control over Lebanon in the new system. The European settlement made sure that the new Lebanese system fell far short of total independence (autonomy), with the ultimate objective of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and forestalling any possibility of the latter’s collapse. However, the new system was also devised in such a way as to prevent total Ottoman control over the Levant, in order to accommodate the European foreign policies of intervention in the region.

Franco-British Polarisation and the Change to Mutesarrifate The fall of Bashir II and the subsequent kaymakamate structure left an atmosphere of resentment in system that was unstable at its very inception. Persistent Franco-British polarisation over the Levant, added to a Turkish scheme towards centralisation, eventually had the direct effect of turning social dissatisfaction into a full-scale war (1858– 60), which ended the kaymakamate system. Concert dynamics

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and the general systemic pattern of interaction, however, had the subsequent indirect mediated effect of enforcing a settlement that changed the Lebanese system and established a new political structure for the country – the Mutesarrifate of Mount Lebanon, or Petite Liban. Background: Domestic and Regional Levels Whenever the occasion occurred, the Ottomans made sure to sow the seeds of instability in the kaymakamate system with the ultimate objective of gaining total control over Lebanon and the elimination of its political autonomy. Turkey prepared the ground for an all-out explosion in Lebanon in order to prove the nation’s non-viability and the necessity of total Turkish control over it. The Concert would, indeed, ultimately seek a Turkish role in Lebanon, but not to the full satisfaction of the Ottoman agenda. As seen, above, the double-kaymakamate (double-governorate) system was inefficient and unstable because of the demographic factor and because of the opposing expectations of the two communities involved – the Druze and Christians. The new system failed to satisfy either community’s particular aspirations.94 In 1845, sectarian clashes between the Maronites and Druze erupted again and brought forth a formal protest from the Concert of Europe demanding Ottoman intervention. The Porte dispatched to Lebanon Foreign Minister Shakib Effendi, who published the ‘organic law’ for Lebanon that carried his name: the Tanzimat (regulations) of Shakib Effendi, in which he tried to follow the Ottoman Tanzimat announced in 1839 for the Hatt-I Sherif of Gulhane. The new regulations maintained the double-kaymmakamate system; each governorate was given a council (majlis) composed of a deputy kaymakam, a judge, and an advisor for each community: Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Sunni, Shi’a and Greek Catholic. However, the council, like the kaymakam himself, was under the control of the governor of Sidon.95 The Ottomans, who had contributed to the tensions by their favouritism towards the Druze, found these clashes a good opportunity for forcible intervention in the rather autonomous system set up

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in 1842. In accordance with the Ottoman agenda for total hegemony, the new Reglement preserved autonomy in form, but in the 15 years that followed, the powers of the Maronite and Druze communities were significantly reduced while those of the Sublime Porte were respectively enlarged. Turkey would take the necessary measures to force the inhabitants of the Mountain to return ‘within the bounds of obedience’.96 The regulations of 1845 achieved several Ottoman objectives: first, it undermined the influence of feudal lords by making membership of each council elective rather than hereditary and by assigning the decisions on criminal and civil cases to professional judges (feudal lords had previously been both administrators and judges in their respective districts); second, it placed ultimate authority and control of each majlis in the hands of the Turkish governor of Sidon. The councils were placed under the close supervision of the kaymakams, who were in turn watched and controlled by the pasha of Sidon. However, since decisions by each council had to be unanimous, sectarian divisions often left them deadlocked. The pasha then intervened to settle matters his way. Also, since new members had to be approved by the pasha, he was able to impose men whom he could control, and later incite them against the kaymakam if desired. This was possible because the kaymakam was appointed by the Ottomans from amongst their (the Lebanese) nobility while the members of the councils represented the peasantry, especially those recommended by the Maronite bishops, who sought the leadership of their community.97 The Tanzimat of Shakib Effendi, however, maintained the system of municipal representation in villages – through elected wakils (representatives) in the mixed areas whilst leaving the areas with homogeneous populations unchanged under the direct control of the hereditary feudal lords, who retained certain feudal privileges. These evidently intentional discrepancies between the local governments of the different areas were bound, as was surely planned, to aggravate the class struggle.98 However, maintaining the status quo in Lebanon was important to European stability; therefore, Turkish attempts to change it ran

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counter to the prevalent systemic dynamics in 1841 and 1845. The powers’ ability to manoeuvre and balance each others’ influence in the Levant was crucial to the European balance, so they took it upon themselves to ensure the preservation of Lebanon’s semi-autonomous structure. The International Dynamics: Systemic Pattern of Interaction The general pattern of interaction, of preserving the European balance to ensure the survival of the Concert system, did not exclude a lesser contingent pattern of European polarisation over the issue of influence and gains in Ottoman territories – and this was especially so in the case of Lebanon. During the country’s kaymakamate era, the prevalent pattern of interaction on the systemic level was a competition (polarisation) between the Concert of Europe powers – especially France, Britain and Russia – for influence in Lebanon. France, which enjoyed the oldest relationship of the three with the Levant, strove to maintain its influence through both its commerce and its culture; Russia, especially after the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji of 1774,99 made it its business to protect the Greek Orthodox populations in the sultan’s European holdings and in the eastern provinces; Britain was France’s main rival in the Levant, but in order to preserve the European balance of power it found it imperative to preserve the territorial integrity of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. If the empire disintegrated and an unfriendly power took over in the Arab lands, it would pose direct threats to British rule in India. The fear of such a possibility led Britain to champion the cause of the Druze in Lebanon in order to counterbalance French influence and offer its own legitimate excuse to intervene whenever there was trouble in the Levant.100 Thus, France maintained its traditional support for the Maronite Church, backing the latter’s demand for the restoration of a Christian Shihab emirate in the entire Mountain and French consuls working to that end, while Britain chose to counterbalance this by supporting opposing ideas and people (the Druze). Other consuls continually changed their positions according to their governments’ current relationships with France and Great Britain.101

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From the 1840s until the end of the nineteenth century, the mutual fears and ambitions of France, Britain, Austria–Hungary, Russia and Prussia obliged them to act in accord when crises erupted in Turkey’s eastern provinces. They united in the name of the Concert of Europe, but each watched the others closely lest one should break ranks and gain a strategic piece of Ottoman territory. Their first act as a united Concert with regard to Lebanon came in 1842, when they adopted the kaymakamate system. In 1845, the Concert also intervened to prevent direct Ottoman rule when the Pasha of Sidon arrested the Maronite and Druze kaymakams and disarmed the Christian population of the mountains under the pretext of ending sectarian clashes. The five powers sent identical notes objecting to the former action and further demanding that the Porte carry out its earlier promises to make sure that the Druze paid indemnity to the Maronites for the losses they had suffered during the war of 1841.102 Britain agreed to this latter provision, in contrast to its role as the protector of the Druze, because it felt that intervention (for the sake of balancing other European powers) would be more difficult if the Ottomans succeeded in turning Lebanon into an outright Turkish governorate. More significant was the fact that the identical memoranda to the Sultan explicitly proclaimed the five powers’ right to protect the Christians of the Ottoman Empire through collective intervention and international control.103 The five powers made sure that the right to protect and intervene on behalf of Christians covered all Concert members in order to prevent France, or any other member, from achieving territorial gains in the region, and hence to lessen any threat to the European balance of power. The European powers were concerned about the situation of the Sultan’s Christian subjects. They intervened collectively more than once to ensure that his responsibilities towards these non-Muslims were carried out. One aspect contrary to the rules of the Concert of Europe, however, was the persistent struggle of the various powers to acquire dominant influence. In 1853, these led to the Crimean War, in which the Ottomans received help from Britain and France against Russia; however, this conflict ended in a reassertion of the ‘Concert of Europe’. The Treaty of Paris in 1856 included a further statement by

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the Sultan reaffirming his guarantees to his subjects. In a sense, the relationship between ruler and ruled was thereby placed under the official notice of Europe. From this time onwards, the Sultan was treated formally as a member of the community of European monarchs. Russia, however, had its reservations and wanted to see broad self-government for the Christian provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. No single power, however, wished actively to encourage the break-up of the empire, with its consequences for the peace of Europe; memories of the Napoleonic wars were still very much alive.104 Thus, the contingent polarisations amongst systemic powers over relative gains in the Ottoman Empire had eventually to be suppressed in favour of the general systemic pattern of interaction of maintaining the balance of power, with the ultimate objective of maintaining the European Concert system itself. In the 1850s, two developments outside the region had a direct impact on Lebanon. After the Crimean War of 1854–6, in which Russia failed once again to take Constantinople/Istanbul because of the determined opposition of the other four powers, Russia was also deprived of its right of protection over the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Turkey was obliged to adopt a new reform law – the Hatti Hamayoun – confirming and extending the civil rights and the spiritual and temporal privileges that had been promised in its reform bill of 1839 but, in fact, had not been entirely granted. According to this law, the Ottoman Empire would abandon its traditional Islamic form of government, which endorsed the inferiority of non-Muslims, and would have become a secular state with secular and rational laws. The law was intended by the Ottomans as a defensive measure to prevent constant outside interference in their empire. The European powers, in contrast, took it as a further justification for their collective intervention and announced their right to see that the promised reforms were carried out. The instabilities of 1860 gave them another pretext for major intervention.105 In 1852, the Turks decided to order conscription of the Druze. The French had been trying to obtain relief for the Lebanese Christians from their Druze overlords, who had been ignoring the authority of

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the kaymamakam. On the other hand, the Druze had turned to rebellion against the Turks and to British help as a counterweight to French support for the Maronites. The rebellion of 1852 therefore took on an important additional dimension: overt rivalry between the European powers (polarisation). The Ottomans were unable to crush the rebels in Wadi al-Taym, and, by the end of 1852, under British influence, withdrew their previous demands on the Druze sheikhs and allowed their return to the Mountain. Later, Britain collaborated with the Druze in the formation of a special Druze detachment to fight in the Crimean War. Though never sent, the establishment of this military unit indicated an acceptance by both the Druze and the Ottomans of a new relationship – one which would prove lethal in 1860.106 Anglo-French Polarisation in the Levant According to Caesar Farah, the European polarisation over ‘Syria’ during most of the nineteenth century, in what became known as the ‘Syrian Question’, had a major influence on the politics of the region. The ‘abused prote´ge´ system’ in Lebanon best represents the dynamics of such polarisation. The successful intrusion of British influence in both ‘Syria’ and Istanbul, coupled with Britain’s rising religious and commercial influence, provoked counter-resistance from the French, who had long considered ‘Syria’ their private realm.107 Maintaining the accord amongst Concert members in the Levant proved difficult. A contingent polarisation defined European – especially French and British – policies in the region, which defied the general systemic pattern of interaction of preserving the balance of power and the Concert system. To neutralise their rivalries over Ottoman possessions, the European powers agreed to place the Sultan and his empire under their ‘collective tutelage’ and to bind each other to respect the territorial integrity of their ‘would-be-victim’. However, the assumption underlying this collective approach – evolving since 1826, formal since 1840 and systematic since 1856 – to regulate European relations with the Ottoman Empire did not hold true where Lebanon was concerned. There, representatives of the major

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European rivals could hardly restrain their conduct, and certainly were not able to prevent instability.108 Ottoman Policy towards Centralisation The Ottoman plot to trigger instability in Lebanon eventually came to light. Successive Ottoman policies targeting the Druze community enabled a Christian prosperity in the Mountain, which shifted the balance of power and added to Druze grievances. The regulations of Shakib Effendi and the aforementioned Ottoman policies reflected that polity’s main endeavour to increase the direct power of its central government. Although the kaymakamate system preserved some elements of autonomy for Mount Lebanon it actually allowed the Ottomans to introduce modifications in the governing system that increased their authority, making the two kaymakams employees of the Ottoman governor of Sidon. The Ottomans further sowed resentment between Christians and Druze through a scheme in 1852 for the general conscription of Muslim males, which led to the flight of young Druze males to Hawran or to the Anti-Lebanon Mountains on the border with Syria. In 1858, the Porte also issued the hatt-I humayun (Imperial Rescript), which promised further equality measures for non-Muslims. In addition to these Ottoman policies in Lebanon, the country’s silk industry in the 1850s brought prosperity to the Christians, who owned most of the spinning mills in the Druze district, while the Druze peasants continued to farm. In 1860, when conflict erupted, communal solidarity and devotion to a common cause amongst the Druze was at its height.109 The 1858 – 60 Instability In the spring of 1858, northern governorate Christian peasants started a revolt against their Christian feudal lords, asking for democratic reforms – that is, their own elected representatives, like those of the peasants in the villages of the mixed southern governorate. Bashir Ahmed Abi-l-lama’, the Christian kaymakam, supported this revolt. In the southern district of Chouf, encouraged by the northern success and their clergy, the peasants revolted against

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their Druze feudal lords. The Druze united behind their lords, and, as a result, massacres took place over three months in 1860. The Christian peasants had become restless in the northern governorate for several reasons. First, they felt that they were entitled to better treatment as a class, especially after they had participated in the common effort to overthrow Egyptian rule. At the same time, their ambitious clergy kept urging them to rise up against the nobility, while the Sublime Porte also followed a policy of setting the two classes against each other. In 1858, the Christian peasants in Kesrouan in northern Lebanon rebelled against their Christian overlords, setting up a peasant government within the district the following year. The Kesrouan peasants had been incensed by the fact that the peasants in other mixed villages enjoyed the protection of their elected representatives (the village wakils) against the abuses of the feudal lords, whilst they were denied such representatives – and they now demanded the right to elect their own representatives and to appoint ma’murs (functionaries) to represent the interest of their feudal lords. The peasants also wanted to abolish their obligations to the Khazen feudal lords (who owned most of the land), and to own the land that they themselves cultivated.110 The British backed the Khazen feudal lords while the French and Ottomans backed Emir Bechir Ahmad Abi-l-Lama’ – the Christian kaymakam – who supported the peasants alongside the Maronite clergy. When the revolt broke out, the Turkish authorities in Beirut did not attempt to suppress it.111 Although British pressure on Turkey forced the Porte to send a special commission to investigate the situation and to consider ways to restore order, this mission was ‘wilfully’ made to fail. The Ottomans’ objective was to show that no government but their own could succeed in Lebanon, and the more Lebanon plunged into disorder and confusion, the nearer they hoped they were to its attainment.112 In 1860, the Maronite peasants in the southern district of the Chouf also rose against their Druze feudal overlords, to protest the multiple dues they had to pay to them and lay claim to the latter’s feudal holdings. This class struggle turned into a religious war when the Druze population joined forces with their feudal chiefs because

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they saw in the uprising a direct threat to the existence of their own people. The three-month conflict involved not only the Maronite and Druze but also other sects. However, regardless of the lines of division, the massacre provided the Porte with the long-awaited and irrefutable proof that the Lebanese were incapable of governing themselves.113 Moreover, it was evident that the Druze had conspired with local Ottoman officials not to interfere with Druze attacks and even to assist these where possible.114 The Druze accused the Christians of starting the hostilities with the support of the French, who were attempting to enlarge their influence in Lebanon, while the Christians accused the Druze sheikhs and the Ottomans of encouraging the massacres.115 The 1860 instability provided the ideal pretext for Napoleon III to appease clerical extremists at home and, at the same time, to advance his ambitions in the East. The massacres, however, proved embarrassing to the British policy in Syria in general. When European Catholic opinion, particularly in France, was outraged and when the French Emperor used the aroused public sentiment to propose a military expedition to save fellow Christians in Lebanon, the British Government found itself in a predicament. To oppose Napoleon’s declared motives would set them against enraged European public opinion, but to endorse his expedition would run the risk of his emerging with a territorial gain. The British gave in and supported French intervention within defined limits, particularly since Prussia and Austria also endorsed Napoleon’s expedition and even offered to send troops to make it a collective effort. Russia also supported Napoleon, since a precedent would be established for it to intervene militarily in future disputes with the sultan’s government over Balkan issues.116 Unable to finance a land expedition in addition to its commitment to a naval force already present in ‘Syrian’ waters, Britain also conceded to French unilateral intervention to impose stability in Lebanon. Once there, however, all European powers soon suspected that France had undertaken the expedition not so much to quell instability, which had already ceased, but to pave the way for the eventual occupation of the country.117

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It is evident that the instability of 1860 was not the direct product of the Ottoman agenda of imposing its Tanzimat policy on Lebanon. Instability had not, as Ussama Makdisi proposes, ‘emerged out of, and provided, a subaltern understanding of the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire’.118 The Tanzimat legislation, which started in 1839 and continued until 1856 after the Crimean War, did not trigger domestic dynamics for conflict. The reforms directed the Ottoman agenda for Lebanon with the object of centralisation, thus Turkey took the necessary steps to prevent any possibility of Lebanese independence and to reduce whatever existing political autonomy the latter enjoyed. To this end, the Ottomans supported the Druze (as did the British) against French support for the Maronites, who were seeking a return to a Christian-ruled emirate system. The British support for Ottoman sovereignty in general, and for the Druze in Lebanon in particular, reflected Franco-British polarisation over the Levant, which transformed a long-standing domestic divide into an all-out war between Christians and Muslims in 1860. The argument that the Maronite Church’s exploitation of the Tanzimat as a pretext to demand a ‘resurrection of a traditional Christian Emirate’ and the Druze’s understanding of the Tanzimat ‘to mean a full restoration of their right to rule’ were the main causes of the 1860 instability119 cannot withstand a critical analysis of the events. In fact, the Maronite plea for the return of the Christian emirate was independent of the Tanzimat reforms, and had not ceased since the enforced settlement that had established the kaymakamate system in 1842. Moreover, the Druze abomination of the Christians continued to be the norm throughout the kaymakamate period and, irrespective of the Tanzimat and Druze aggression, had to be suppressed in 1840– 2 and 1845 by Turkey. Turkey’s efforts to keep the Druze at bay and the strict constraints and measures to increase the direct power of the central government, including an Ottoman scheme for general conscription for Muslim males, even led the Druze in 1850 to start a common uprising against the Ottomans in Hawran, Wadi al-Taym and Mount Lebanon, and to arrange with the British to come under their protection.120

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It was also Turkey that ‘lifted the lid’ on the Druze’s wrath, and enabled the instability of 1860. However, it is crucial to realise that the domestic pattern of interaction of a zero-sum game between the Christians and Muslims did not change. The domestic dynamics did not alter before or after the Tanzimat – thus, they cannot be considered the main source of the change in stability that occurred in 1860. The innate nature of the divided Lebanese structure enabled systemic effects to gain the upper hand in setting ‘in motion a process of local political development’ whereby the domestic divisions – the ‘social raw material’ – were not the product of British or French policies, or of the Ottoman countermeasures, but rather a raw material that already existed irrespective of the systemic dynamics. There were enough political and social attributes to create a potential for conflict – a potential that was exploited by both Ottomans and Europeans.121 The structure of Lebanon, therefore, assisted and magnified systemic effects, which in turn made change (instability) inevitable. Moreover, the regional agenda towards Ottoman centralisation and European reluctance to intervene in the region also had not changed, at least since 1839 – and it certainly did not start with the 1856 reforms. The Ottoman agenda remained the same: it merely maintained fertile ground for instability in the Levant, awaiting the right opportunity for change. It was Franco-British polarisation over the Levant, and those parties’ opposing stances over Lebanese affairs, that provided this opportunity – a total war that would allow the Ottomans full hegemony over Lebanon. Therefore, although the necessary causes of the 1858–60 instability were domestic (sectarian and social tensions that had been developing for a long time in the country), and regional (Turkish policies in this direction, with the ultimate objective of centralisation; the pro-Druze activity of Khurshid Pasha (the governor of the vilayets Beirut and Sidon, who made no effort to stop the massacres in Mount Lebanon); and the general atmosphere of religious fanaticism provided the catalyst), systemic factors and European polarisation over the Levant – especially between Britain and France – created the sufficient causes that led to the 1860 instability.

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However, when instability in Mount Lebanon reached the point at which it became counter-productive to the interests of the major powers concerned, a settlement was imposed with guarantees to make it work. The outcome was the Lebanese Mutesarrifate.122 The 1860 instability threatened Lebanese relative autonomy and the ability of the European powers to interfere in the region in the event of a total Ottoman consolidation of authority in Lebanon. Direct Ottoman control and the successful centralisation of the empire would weaken European leverage over the Sultan and the ability of France and Britain to preserve their interests in the region – Lebanon and a safe passage to India, respectively. A European consensus to end instability and a French military deployment in the Levant for that purpose invited yet other considerations. A stable Lebanon became a crucial objective for all the Concert powers – especially Britain. A French presence in the Levant threatened British interests in India and the European balance of power; thus, it contradicted the systemic pattern of interaction of maintaining the Concert of Europe system. The Lebanese issue had to be delegated to a sub-systemic intermediary (Turkey) in order to impose a settlement under international guarantees. Any unilateral gain by a European power would threaten the Concert system – a matter that superseded all other considerations. Turkey’s Role as a Sub-systemic Intermediary The rules governing the Concert of Europe system were therefore to lay yet another mediated indirect effect on Lebanon. Britain, so wary of French attempts to gain influence in the Levant, which would threaten the balance of the European system, took all measures to prevent such an outcome. The European community in Beirut was shocked by the masses of fugitives produced by the 1860 conflict, and started to organise a programme of relief work. The European consuls in Beirut protested to Khurshid Pasha regarding his inexplicable reticence. They urged the pasha to intervene and stop the conflict. He agreed to restrain the Druze on condition that the Maronites refrain from sending any assistance to their countrymen in the Druze district. The Lebanese

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Christians, with European encouragement, agreed to these Ottoman conditions, but the massacres went on until all Christian towns in the southern kaymakamate had fallen under Druze control. Turkish soldiers continued their direct and indirect support of the Druze assailants throughout all stages of the upheaval.123 Turkey was, in fact, following a premeditated agenda in Lebanon. Destroying any chance of Lebanese independence was crucial for the attainment of its aim of centralisation. Instability in Lebanon was thought to help convince the powers to accept that outcome. Upon their direct intervention in the Levant to re-establish order, the European powers made sure to organise their efforts within the Concert rules. The powers signed a protocol declaring that during their intervention and presence in the region none of them would seek to achieve territorial gains, exclusive influence or special commercial privileges there. Moreover, it was clear to the European powers that the 1860 instability was ‘caused by the wicked and wilful collusion of the Sultan’s authorities’.124 Yet this was not enough to ensure French restraint. Ottoman Turkey was not only assured of the integrity and sovereignty of its empire; to the disappointment of Christians, it was also bestowed with the role of re-establishing peace in the Levant. Threatened by the French role in the Levant, the British had overwhelming objections to a prolonged occupation, and it was recommended that the pacification of the country should be left entirely to the Turkish authorities.125 A sub-systemic intermediary was therefore required to establish stability, especially since Britain was suspicious of any long-term presence of French forces in the Levant – hence, Britain and other Europeans powers pushed for a quick settlement to the dispute and allocated the job of enforcing it to the Ottomans. The Ottomans, who had their own agenda to centralise authority and weaken Lebanese independence, grabbed this opportunity and acted as enforcers of the newly established mutessarifate system, which deprived Lebanon of integral areas of territory and placed it under the direct control of a Turkish governor. This arrangement further reduced Lebanon’s autonomy and increased Ottoman hegemony, although the system’s

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relative autonomy was internationally guaranteed. The mutessarifate system was agreeable to European interests in the region and to the Concert rules, especially after Turkey was admitted as a member of the European system. Settlement and Change to the Mutesarrifate System: An Indirect-mediated Systemic Effect The Ottomans now had a golden opportunity to achieve their agenda. Turkey had played a major role in plotting the 1860 instability with its attempt to crush any tendency for independence amongst its Christians (following their co-religionists in Europe) in accordance with its policy of centralisation. Handed the role of systemic intermediary to enforce a settlement and bring an end to the instability, Turkey would establish peace, dominate Lebanon, reorganise and weaken its structure, and confiscate its political autonomy. Short of total integration, the Ottoman agenda for Lebanon had been almost entirely achieved. Although Turkey did not have a free hand in completely eliminating the Lebanese political entity, Lebanon was now far from the relative independence that it had enjoyed under the emirate system. A weakened Lebanese system now had a non-Lebanese ruler, severed from vital areas that had been part of the traditional emirate structure, and, unlike previously, had become dependent on international guarantees for its survival.126 Under the mutesarrifate system, a new constitution was given to Lebanon and the last iqta’ (feudal-power) prerogatives were officially abolished. The new administration system was hierarchical, from the local base of elected village officials to the Administrative Council of twelve, presided over by a Christian Ottoman governor appointed for five years by the Porte with the approval of the European powers.127 In the new system, the two governorates were reunited into a single governorate (mutesarrifate) that was put under the collective guardianship of the European powers and the Sultan. The mutesarrifate was, however, much smaller than the Ma’an or Shihab emirate system had been. In the east, Hermel and the town of Zahle and its surroundings were excluded; the eastern watershed of the Orantes and Litani rivers was also taken away from the autonomous

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province and placed within the vilayet of Damascus as the sanjaks of Baalbek, the Beqa’, Rachaya, and Hasbaya. Lebanon’s eastern frontier now followed the crest of the Lebanon Mountains chain. Thus, in the east, the mutesarrifate was deprived of an area populated by large Christian communities and including crucial fertile regions such as the Beqa’ and Marjayoun valleys. To the west, Beirut, up to a radius of a few miles, was also excluded and placed under Ottoman authority. The same treatment was applied to Sidon in the south and to all of southern Lebanon. In the north, the city of Tripoli as well as the districts of Tripoli and Akkar, which were both inhabited by large Christian communities, were similarly put under direct Turkish control. Only the western ranges of Lebanon, known collectively as Mount Lebanon, were left to the mutesarrifate after all these territorial amputations. The new system was almost exclusively inhabited by a Christian and Druze population, and those Christians were mostly Maronites.128 Although the Christians could not achieve their goals (independence) through armed conflict, this was mostly compensated for by the strong international ties of the Maronite Church. The new mutesarrifate system could have been much worse for the Maronites, considering their repeated military failures. Their position was further strengthened by the convergence of the Ottoman reform movement with British and French interests with regard to Lebanese autonomy.129 Thus, ironically, systemic dynamics converged with the intermediary’s agenda and preserved a Christian-dominated political entity even after the military failure of that community against the Druze. Maronite Domination and Druze Subordination: The Ongoing Division Lebanon’s divided nature was carried over into the structure of this new system. The new government of Mount Lebanon comprised a system of Maronite dominance with international support, built on an enforced stability and a settlement that disregarded the wishes of the Druze community. By the end of 1860, the Druze, who had started out as victorious in the war, were ultimately defeated. The fragile political system of

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the kaymakamate would prove to be the last political framework through which the Druze were able to play an important role in Lebanon’s politics. Based on sectarian representation, the mutesarrifate deprived the Druze of their leading role in the politics of the Mountain and reduced them to the same level as communities that had never exercised such a role in the history of Lebanon.130 To ensure justice and equality within the mutesarrifate system, confessional representation was introduced at all levels of government – village, district and central. But the new structure also sharpened existing differences amongst the various sects and made religion, rather than common social and economic interests, the main criterion for governance. Also, the system, which had been introduced to protect the Maronites, was actually grossly unfair to that sect because of this sectarian representation. Although the Maronites were allocated four seats out of twelve on the central majlis and four out of seven district kaymakam posts, they remained underrepresented as the majority community.131 On the other hand, the Druze did not openly share the nationalist enthusiasm of the Maronites. After 1861, they were resigned to their status as a minority and tried to make the best advantage of their position by close cooperation with the mutesarrifate government. Maronite-style nationalism, with its strong religious tone, was, in fact, unappealing to them. After all, Christian nationalists thought of Lebanon as a Christian refuge. Additionally, the Druze remained suspicious of such sentiments because they associated Christian nationalism with French expansionist ambitions.132 Although relatively pacified, the basic divide in Lebanon’s system persisted, and a zero-sum-game pattern between its Christian and Muslim actors remained the norm. European polarisation over the Levant and a highly unstable kaymakamate system, which had been manipulated by a fragile Ottoman Empire seeking centralisation, had had the direct effect of causing the 1858 –60 instability. A further mediated indirect effect now occurred with the Ottoman enforcement of a settlement and the change to the new system – the Mutesarrifate of Mount Lebanon. This new Lebanese system would survive under international guarantees as long as the European

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Concert system operated – and, sure enough, it came to an end with the demise of the latter. To the dismay of the Lebanese Christians, the rules of the Concert system would have the indirect effect of consolidating Ottoman influence and changing the structure of Lebanon, leading to yet another loss of political autonomy – a long-time objective of the Ottomans. In sum, the Emirate of Lebanon was established around a divided nucleus between the Druze and the Maronites. Both communities were joined with other Christian and Muslim sects only to broaden the divide to a more general Christian– Muslim one. Whilst the Maronites were affiliated to Western Catholicism, the Druze remained loyal to the Ottomans. This long-term connection between the Lebanese Christians and the West eventually helped to shift the domestic balance of power in the emirate structure and turn it towards Christian rule. The Eastern Question and the European powers’ polarisation over the region (particularly Lebanon), in addition to the latter’s policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire as a safeguard to maintaining the European balance of power system, had changed the regional environment around Lebanon (signalled by the loss of an ally – Egypt) and had the grave indirect-mediated effect of weakening Lebanon, triggering instability, and the subsequent change to a kaymakamate system. Further European polarisation over Lebanon however, had had the direct effect of igniting further instability, necessitating a mediated-indirect effect (through Ottoman enforcement of a settlement) leading to a change in the structure of Lebanon and the birth of the mutessarifate system. The Ottoman Empire, a sub-systemic intermediary, had adopted a defence mechanism against European incursion (the Tanzimat), and on the occasion of both civil wars – 1841– 2 and 1860 – it had attempted to fulfil its regional agenda of centralisation, ensuring that Lebanon lost any potential for independence or autonomy. The regional intermediary’s agenda, however, contradicted European interests in the region, and the latter helped to maintain a relative autonomy with both systems – kaymakamate and mutassarifate –

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although these were both much less independent than the original emirate system had been. With the establishment of the mutessarifate system, Turkey had been fully admitted as a member of the international Concert system, and the stability and structure of Lebanon would be maintained as long as the systemic dynamics endured. The next change in Lebanon would only occur with the fall of the systemic balance of power and the Concert of Europe system after World War I. New structure and dynamics on the international level would result in yet another shift towards a new structure in Lebanon.

CHAPTER 2 THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE FIRST REPUBLIC

World War I and Greater Lebanon The emergence of new nation states in the international system and the eventual breakdown of the balance of power amongst the European empires led to World War I. That conflict also signalled the fall of the Concert of Europe system and the emergence of a new international system whose units were mainly nation states as opposed to empires. This new arrangement had its own rules, which differed from those of the Concert system: the general systemic pattern of interaction became justice and self-determination, which took precedence over the traditional power-balancing mechanism. The demise of traditional systemic powers (Austria –Hungary, Prussia and the Ottoman Empire) within the Concert system was also accompanied by the rise of the United States of America – a major power in the new structure, which would have a decisive impact on systemic effects from that point onwards. The changing structure on the international level had a direct effect on the structure in Lebanon. Under the patronage of France, which replaced Turkey in the Levant, a larger Christian-led political system – Greater Lebanon – replaced the mutessarifate system. Later, after World War II, the declining position of France in the

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international system and the prevalence of decolonisation as a systemic pattern of interaction would have another direct effect on Greater Lebanon – that is, its full independence and political autonomy. After World War I, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, amongst others, brought a change in the structure of the international system. This systemic change was accompanied by direct French and British control over the previously Ottoman parts of the Arab East, including Lebanon. These changes on the systemic level brought direct effects on the structure of Lebanon. A modern state system was to replace the, now defunct, mutessarifate system; Greater Lebanon, or the first Lebanese Republic, emerged. Background Many factors ended the viability of the Concert of Europe system. New states emerged in the Balkans, took sides with Russia or Austria– Hungary and became part of the growing rivalry between these two Great Powers. The emergence of new, lesser powers was not necessarily incompatible with a balance-of-power system provided that they did not alter the balance amongst the Great Powers by coalescing predominantly around one of them. Moreover, the principle of nationality that brought about those new states was incompatible with the Concert order – especially with the Ottoman Empire and Austria– Hungary. After 1900, the Ottoman Empire had lost all its European holdings and became unable to check Russian expansion to the south into the Balkans. The structural changes in the balance of power that occurred between the late 1870s and 1914 as a result of the nation state creation process was sufficient to endanger the Concert system regardless of changing ideologies, growing militarism and the polarisation of Europe into two hostile alliances. In the post-WWI system, there were 15 European nonGreat Power states as opposed to the five Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire during the Concert system.1 The international system that appeared after World War I was championed by a newly rising power, the US, and its president, Woodrow Wilson, set the rules for the new system in his 14 points.

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On 9 January 1918, President Wilson delivered his famous ‘Fourteen Points’ speech to the US Congress; it stated principles for a comprehensive reconstruction of the international system and of the foreign-policy practices of its members. In addition to the generally shared concern for an institutional reform, Wilson considered that the guarantee of peace did not lie in the modification of international institutions or drawing up constitutions for a League of Nations. A fundamental transformation of attitudes towards international relations was required. Policies were to be based on right and justice, and the measures for correct behaviour would be derived from morality and world public opinion, not from a balance of power.2 The new system envisaged by Wilson also had essential rules like self-determination, non-acceptance of special interests and the acceptance of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the principles of international law. Specific policies resulted from these political principles, such as freedom of the seas; open diplomacy; basing territorial settlements or adjustments on the consent of those who are affected – that is, that no nation has the right to hand peoples from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property; and, most importantly, the formation of the League of Nations.3 The principle of self-determination was also linked to the problem of colonialism in the postwar world. Although the ‘Trusteeship’ solution4 did not resolve the issue, because the Trusteeship Council’s mandate was limited and the Americans did not press the allies to decolonise, it represented a step forward in the sense that both Britain and France had to admit that the long-term purpose of colonialism was to foster the capacity for ultimate self-government and to advance the welfare of the colonial peoples. The British and the French, however, were both committed to maintaining or re-establishing their colonial positions; even during the San Francisco conferences, which established the post-WWII international order, ‘the French fought their way back’ into Syria and Lebanon, much to the frustrated astonishment of the independent Arab countries.5

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The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate The mutessarifate system was abolished with the outbreak of World War I. The Ottomans proclaimed martial law in Mount Lebanon in October 1914 and, after the resignation of Ohannes Pasha, the governor of the mutessarifate, in June 1915, they abrogated the protocols and the imperial decrees that governed the privilege status of Mount Lebanon.6 The Turks were later driven out of Syria and Lebanon by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under the command of General Allenby, who headed the Allied military campaign of 1917–18 against Turkey in the Near East. The Arabs, the British, the French and the Italians were under his command and the bulk of his forces were British, Anglo-Indian, and Australians and New Zealanders. The French had a small cavalry contingent with the expeditionary force in Palestine, and they were aware of their weak position because of the military predominance of the British in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Palestine and the Levant.7 The French position in the Near East, and especially in the Arab world, was very weak militarily and politically. Their small contingent with the Arab forces was composed of colonial troops from North Africa. The French detachment in Palestine and Syria assigned to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was so small that few people realised that France had any troops in the Levant. The political position of the French was also not strong. France, as a Catholic country, had always supported the Catholic Maronites in Lebanon but amongst the other Christians, particularly the Orthodox community, the French had comparatively few supporters. The Druze in Lebanon and Syria had long been pro-British and anti-French in general. Also, among Sunnite Muslims there was a strong anti-French feeling, which had been amplified by the propaganda of the Arab nationalists and by Muslim religious leaders who feared the French as supporters and protectors of the Arab Christians.8 The opposition of the Arabs of Syria and Lebanon to a French mandate was considered by the French to be the result of British and US influence and activities. Moreover, the fact that the Hashemite Emir Faisal and his forces had, in their Arab revolt against the

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Ottomans, been financed and equipped by the British added to these suspicions.9 Therefore, in 1918, and on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon were under the control of British military commanders. France had to make strenuous efforts to win the support of the British in opposing any changes that the US might propose with regard to the Sykes– Picot Agreement. This was a secret wartime treaty between France and Britain to divide the Arab territories between themselves after the war. The British had also issued the Balfour Declaration, promising a Jewish state on the Arab lands in Palestine. By the Sikes– Picot Agreement, Britain had made certain of exclusive control of Mosul oil when the Mosul area was included in the zone of French influence. However, during the war, France had come to realise the importance of petroleum with respect to national security and was determined to secure a share in the Mosul oil reserves.10 The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the removal of other European powers from the Near East scene left Britain and France to determine the fate of the Near East – Britain now being the militarily dominant power in the region. However, the policy of the European powers with respect to the Near East had to take the new systemic factors into consideration. The rise of the US as a major systemic power advocating a policy of national selfdetermination had to be observed. Multinational empires were out of fashion and the new trend was the recognition of the general principle of nationality and of the rights of nations to selfdetermination as soon as they were considered qualified to undertake that task. Therefore, the general systemic pattern of interaction immediately after World War I would be a tendency towards the emergence of small states approximating as closely as possible to nations in scope, mainly to avoid annexation. Consequently, new practices were devised to accommodate the Great Powers’ interests, and these took the form of ‘spheres of interest’; treaty arrangements with independent states; and, mostly, mandates – a procedure that reconciled the Great Powers’ interests and local, national aspirations of smaller states.11

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New states were formed in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but they differed greatly from those formed in central and eastern Europe. In Europe, where nationalist thinking was already a well-established tradition, the sense of separate nationality amongst the former subject peoples of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires was already in existence, and in most cases such clear and well-defined expectations were to be observed in the formation of the new states. This was not the case with the Arab subjects of the Ottoman Empire, where national consciousness, if it ever existed, was vague and confused by traditional loyalties of other kinds, which were often in conflict with one another. The Allies thought that they could ignore such confused and weak national sentiments amongst the Arabs of their newly mandated territories as they started to reorganise them into states, redrawing the political map of the Arab world according to their own best interests.12 The creation of small national states provided the opportunity for the European powers to continue their influence in the Near East because these states were weak and needed the protection and assistance of the Great Powers. Therefore, the decision to dismember the Ottoman Empire included the separating out of Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Arabia and Kurdistan. The boundaries or the status of the new countries was not yet decided. Lebanon’s fate, however, had been already settled in the Sykes –Picot Agreement between France and Britain, in which they agreed on the allocation of their newly gained territories.13 Lebanon, like Syria, would fall under a French mandate. The US, which had become an international power by this time, entered as a new player in Near Eastern affairs. The European imperial powers, especially France and Britain, did not have a free hand in deciding the fate of the ‘lost’ Arab Ottoman territories. President Wilson insisted on the right to self-determination – a major tenet of his idealistic new world order – and was determined to see that this right should be applied to the Ottoman Near East. Wilson, therefore, refused to recognise Anglo-French wartime commitments, and insisted that the International Commission on

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Mandates in Turkey should be sent to the Near East to determine the wishes of the various peoples there with regard to their future political status and choice of mandate. When the French tried to obstruct the sending of the international commission, President Wilson sent its American section, which came to be known as the ‘King-Crane’ Commission, to the Near East.14 The commission’s investigations revealed the actual wishes of the main religious and cultural groups in the area, and it sent back its report in the summer of 1919. The King-Crane Commission gave the Arabs, through the Syrian Congress, the chance to attack the AngloFrench policy of dividing the Arab lands that the nationalists called Syria, to protest against the Balfour Declaration and Jewish immigration, and to reject a French mandate. Most of the Lebanese, on the other hand, did not wish to be included in a Muslim Syria. Almost all the Maronites, and some of the other Christian groups, wanted a French mandate.15 By the time the commission reached Paris, President Wilson had returned to the US, which was rapidly becoming isolationist. The ideal of making the world ‘safe for democracy’ did not have a strong appeal in the US in 1919. After the US thus rapidly vanished from the international stage, it became important for Britain and France to come to an understanding with respect to the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.16 Their respective positions had improved after the US withdrawal from Near Eastern affairs, and France was in a better bargaining position than the British. On 15 September 1919, the French and British signed a military convention by which French military authorities dominated Syria and Lebanon. General Henri J. E. Gouraud was appointed French high commissioner in Syria and Lebanon, and arrived in Beirut in November to assume the task of commander-in-chief of the French military forces.17 After the US had withdrawn from international affairs, Great Britain was no longer in a position to oppose the French. The Syrians tried to resist them but failed, and in April at San Remo the Allies definitively allocated the mandate of Syria and Lebanon to France after the British and French reached agreements on issues related to

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the Mosul oil reserves, pipelines across the Syrian deserts, and the location of refineries and oil ports.18 The formation of an independent Lebanese state had become a possibility by the end of World War I. With the emerging international system, which enhanced European power in the region, and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the eternal aspiration of the Lebanese Christians for an independent Lebanon on the emirate territories appeared attainable. When the Allies gathered in Paris at the peace conference in 1919 to divide the territories of the defeated Ottoman Empire, a Lebanese delegation led by the Maronite Patriarch Elias Hoyek went to the French capital with a proposal for an interim solution for governing Lebanon. The proposal tackled a number of issues: autonomy, the restoration of Lebanon’s natural and historical borders and the mandate of France. In Beirut on 1 September 1920, General Gouraud officially proclaimed Greater Lebanon as proposed by the Lebanese delegation. With the establishment of the Republic of Greater Lebanon and the adoption of the first constitution in 1926, the dream of the Maronites came true. This was considered the greatest accomplishment of the Maronite Church.19 Systemic Effects and the Change to Greater Lebanon Domestic dynamics for independence had therefore already been brewing in Lebanon. It only became possible, however, with the right systemic changes. The necessary causes for an independent Lebanon were already present, but the (sufficient) dynamics that would enable change towards the new structure only occurred with changes on the systemic level and the new international paradigm of self-determination. Lebanon under the mutesarrifate system had already witnessed the emergence of certain social and political ideas that would be of fundamental importance in the subsequent history of the country. These ideas, varied in nature and often in conflict, represented attempts by Lebanese intellectuals to understand the special nature of their country and its peculiar relationship to the surrounding Near Eastern world. Christian intellectuals, in particular, tried to

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determine some principle of Muslim– Christian cooperation that would secure the safety and dignity of the Lebanese Christians in predominantly Muslim surroundings. To such Christians, the European idea of nationalism, with its secular connotations, seemed to provide a useful clue, but the adaptation of this idea to the special circumstances of Lebanon did not prove an easy task.20 By 1861, when the Lebanese Mutesarrifate was established, the idea of nationalism was already gaining wide currency in the Ottoman Empire. It had first been revealed four decades earlier in the European provinces, when the Serbs and Greeks had revolted against Turkish rule and begun their struggle for independence. Other Balkan peoples later followed their example, and in every case, as Greeks and other Balkan Christians revolted against a Turkish domination which was essentially Muslim, their nationalism, as Christians, already bore a religious character. In reaction, there developed amongst the Muslims of the Empire (Turks, Arabs and others) an intense desire to maintain the political dominance of Islam – if necessary, by violent means. The Ottoman Empire did not always approve of such fanaticism, however. Between 1839 and 1876, during the Tanzimat period, some efforts were indeed made to calm the disaffection of the Sultan’s non-Muslim subjects and associate them more closely with the Ottoman state. Reformers at the time tried hard to secure a general loyalty to the empire by promoting the idea of a secular Ottoman nationalism, which would transcend religious loyalties and embrace Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans alike. In practice, however, Ottomanism did not prove a success. Muslim fanatics found its secularism revolting, and refused to accept non-Muslims as their political associates. As for Christians, they seriously doubted the motives behind the Ottomanist reforms and tended to regard Ottomanism as a mere device to strengthen the predominance of Islam.21 Indeed, to the Christians of the empire Islamism and Ottomanism appeared equally threatening. While the former doctrine openly aimed at maintaining their disadvantaged status, the latter threatened to deprive them of valuable privileges that they had always enjoyed as protected minorities. Ottomanism, moreover, sought to intensify

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centralisation; consequently, remote Christian provinces, which had traditionally enjoyed a considerable measure of self-rule, were now menaced with the unwelcome prospect of direct Turkish government. True, the Ottomanist reformers promised to compensate for any loss of traditional privilege or local autonomy by allowing the minorities a fuller share in the general management of the empire. The Christians, however, were not reassured; they realised that no real equality between Christians and Muslims was possible, whatever promises were made, in a predominantly Muslim Empire. While they remained in the empire, the Christian nationalities in the Balkans, Armenia and Syria insisted on retaining their old privileges along with any new ones that they might secure. In the long run, they generally looked forward to the acquisition of a larger measure of autonomy as a first step towards complete independence.22 In fact, separatism acquired increasing momentum amongst Ottoman Christians in the nineteenth century; the various groups differed, however, in their ability to pursue their aims. In the Balkan countries, the Serbians, Bulgarians and Romanians formed, as did the Greeks, distinct Christian national groups identifiable by language. Proximity to Europe and the ready availability of outside help made it comparatively easy for these nationalities, one after the other, to revolt and achieve their independence. The Armenians, like the Balkan Christians, also had the advantage of being a distinct group with a language and separate church organisation of their own; their two homelands of Cilicia and Greater Armenia, however, were both in Asia Minor, surrounded by Muslim territory and geographically out of contact with Europe. Armenian nationalism, consequently, could not challenge Turkish rule with impunity, and when, in 1915, they attempted a revolt it was crushed with the utmost severity.23 Like the Armenians, the Arab-speaking Christians of Syria belonged to the Asiatic part of the Ottoman Empire and lacked the Balkan advantage of proximity to Europe. Moreover, by contrast with both the Balkan Christians and the Armenians, they had neither a country nor a national language that was exclusively their own. Hence, they could only be distinguished from the Arabspeaking Muslims of Syria by their religion, and were in no position

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to claim a separate independence. Although in the Mutesarrifate of Lebanon, the majority of the population were Christians, mostly Maronites, the Druze had an equal claim to Lebanon as a national homeland. Therefore, any Christian attempts to establish an autonomous Lebanon that took no account of Druze aspirations were destined to fail.24 The Lebanese Christians already had previous experience in this respect – the unstable kaymakamate system and the massacres of 1860. When, after 1840, the Maronites sought to assert their supremacy in the country, Druze reactions were set in motion that culminated in the massacres of 1860. In the purely Maronite districts of the north, many Maronites continued, even after 1860, to think of Lebanon mainly as a Christian homeland, and they were sometimes encouraged to do so by Roman Catholic missionaries. In the mixed districts of the south, however, such an attitude was not possible. In the latter areas, even the most devoted Christian nationalist realised that survival involved compromise. As a possible solution to the problem of establishing a viable Lebanese state, some of them called for an extension of the existing frontiers; however, the more perceptive probably realised that even this solution would be ineffective in the long run without close Christian – Muslim cooperation. The coastal towns and the Beqa’, so important to Lebanon, were predominantly Muslim in population, and their incorporation in a Greater Lebanon was bound to make the country much less of a Christian homeland.25 Moreover, calls for a Greater Lebanon political system may be traced back to the pre-WWI period: M. Jouplain (known by his pseudonym of ‘Bulus Nujaym’) wrote as far back as 1908 calling for the expansion of the mutesarrifya to include Beqa’, Bsharri, Marj’iyun, al-Hula, and Akkar. Also, the Jesuit priest Henry Lammens in 1902 called for a Greater Lebanon. Therefore, the internal dynamics of a nationalist Lebanism concept calling for a Greater Lebanon was present well before the French Mandate and the fall of the Ottoman Empire.26 Domestic dynamics, however, were not enough to cause a change in the structure of Lebanon or establish the historically

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Christian-aspired political entity. Only favourable conditions on the international level would enable a shift to the new Greater Lebanon system. Historical links between the Maronites and Catholic Europe would once again prove rewarding when France took over the region from Ottoman control. Relations between the Maronites and Roman Catholic Europe, especially with the Vatican and France, were crucial to the attainment and strengthening of the new Lebanese entity. The relationship between the Maronites and France dated back to the Crusades, and became even stronger as French interests in the Levant increased. In the nineteenth century, French involvement in Mount Lebanon became economic, cultural and political until France’s direct military intervention in the Maronite–Druze war of 1860. The French were also involved in establishing an autonomous region in Mount Lebanon (the mutesarrifate) and its administration, until the outbreak of World War I. However, it should be borne in mind that France did not actually create the political entity of Lebanon: Mount Lebanon had had a ‘semi-autonomous’ status within the Ottoman Empire for centuries before France’s involvement. The Emirate of Mount Lebanon had been formed in the late sixteenth century, and lasted until the middle of the nineteenth.27 In their own mandated territories, which they called ‘the Levant’, the French were willing to attend to reasoned and concrete demands by parties who knew what they wanted, but had no patience with the claims and objections of those who did not. In Mount Lebanon and the adjacent parts of the old Vilayet of Beirut, the Maronite Christians – France’s traditional allies in the region – were one party whose demands the French were willing to listen to. Of all the Arabs, excluding particular individuals or politically experienced princely dynasties, the Maronites appeared to the French to be the only people who knew precisely what they wanted. They clearly demanded the establishment of a ‘Greater Lebanon’ under their paramount control – separate, distinct and independent from the rest of the territory known as Syria.28 Since the turn of the twentieth century, the Maronites had been demanding the extension of the small territory under the

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mutessarifate system to what they argued were its natural and historical boundaries – the land that had traditionally been under emirate control. This would therefore include the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre and their respective hinterlands, which belonged to the Vilayet of Beirut, as well as the fertile valley of the Beqa’ (including the four kazas, or administrative districts, of Baalbek, the Bekaa, Rashayya and Hasbayya), which belonged to the Vilayet of Damascus at that time. The Maronites argued that this ‘Greater Lebanon’ had always had a special social and historical character, different from that of its surroundings, which made it necessary and indeed imperative for France to help establish it as an independent state.29 Following the establishment of Greater Lebanon, the French turned to deal with the rest of their mandated territory in the Levant. In Syria, unlike Lebanon, no single group indicated precisely what they wanted, which left the French to their own devices. First, they established four Syrian states (Aleppo, Damascus, the state of the Alawites and the state of the Jebel Druze). In response to strong nationalist demands, the states of Aleppo and Damascus were subsequently merged to form the state of Syria, later reconstituted as the Syrian Republic, to which the Jebel Druze and Alouite regions were ultimately annexed. Meanwhile, on 23 May 1926, the State of Greater Lebanon received a constitution that transformed it into the Lebanese Republic. Both republics, Lebanon and Syria, came into being under the French Mandate, sharing the same currency and customs services but flying different flags and run by separate, native administrations under one French high commissioner residing in Beirut. Later, each of the two countries acquired its own national anthem. But this arrangement failed to solve the question of nationality. To the Maronites, and many other Christians in Lebanon, the Lebanese were Lebanese and the Syrians were Syrians. Unfortunately, the Muslims in Lebanon and the Syrians did not share this view.30 Furthermore, the nationalists in Syria were also unsatisfied: they had, for a brief period, had their own Arab kingdom (under Sherif Housein) with its capital in historic Damascus, once the seat of the

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great Umayyad caliphs and the capital of the first Arab empire. For these nationalists, the French had destroyed their kingdom and established different political entities on its territory, including Lebanon. The Maronites, they argued, were perhaps entitled to retain the sort of autonomy they had enjoyed since the 1860s in the Ottoman Sanjak of Mount Lebanon, although they had no real reason to feel any different from other Syrians or Arabs. On the other hand, the Maronites had no right to obtain for their Greater Lebanon ‘Syrian territory’ that had formerly belonged to the vilayets of Beirut or Damascus, and which had ‘never formed part of their claimed historical homeland’.31 Arab nationalists thus refused to acknowledge the French-created Lebanese Republic as a nation state separate and distinct from Syria. Moreover, the Syrian Republic itself was not acceptable as the final and binding accomplishment of the aspirations of its people. The Syrians, after all were Arabs, and their territory, which historically had always included Palestine and Transjordan along with Lebanon, was not a national territory on its own but part of a greater Arab homeland. The ancient heartlands of that homeland were Syria, Iraq and Arabia, but since the birth of Islam it had come to include Egypt and the countries of North Africa all the way to the Atlantic. The British, the Arabs claimed, had promised them national independence on their historical homelands, but they had failed to honour their promises. Instead, they had partitioned this Arab territory along with the French, and made commitments to hand over a particularly precious part of it, namely Palestine, to the Jews.32 The French had established a state in Syria but had failed to create a special nationality to accompany it. In Lebanon, almost the same situation occurred, whereby the concept of a natural and historical Lebanese nationality was meaningful to some people in the country but not to others. By aspiring not only to have a separate country but also a separate Lebanese nationality, against the wishes of their neighbours and without the consent of the people who were forced to become their compatriots, the Maronites and their overwhelmingly Christian supporters in Lebanon had defied the Arab consensus – and especially, the Syrian-Arab consensus – and they had to pay the price.

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This price was to be particularly heavy because the Maronites had actively sought the help of the French to achieve their ends – and even more so, because they had deliberately shown no sensitivity to Arab frustrations around them.33 Compounding these troubles awaiting the newly formed political structure was a major change in the numerical proportions of the Lebanese population. According to the 1932 census, the proportion of Christian communities, taken together, had fallen from 80 per cent (in the mutesarrifate) to 54 per cent. That of the Maronites alone – the ‘hard core’ of the new entity – had reduced from 58 per cent to 29 per cent. The Muslims (Sunnis and Shi’a together) now accounted for 48 per cent of the total.34 Maronite success in establishing the Lebanese Republic would thus be accompanied by a greater burden. The newly added Muslim populations would exacerbate the domestic divide and pose grave challenges to the stability and survival of the system – a cost that the Maronites appeared willing to pay for the reincorporation of the historical emirate territories. It was therefore only with the new structural change in the international system (the fall of the Ottoman Empire) and French control over Syria and Lebanon that the idea of a Greater Lebanon became possible. It is certain that direct systemic effects played the primary role in allowing this new Lebanese structure to materialise, rather than other domestic (internal discourse) dynamics – although the latter factors were essential to the formation of the new system. Without French support for Maronite demands to restore the traditional emirate territories in a new political system, Lebanon would most probably have ended up as part of a wider Arab state post-WWI. In 1920, the French supported Christian demands for Greater Lebanon and prevented Sheriff Housein of Hijaz and his son, Faisal, from annexing Lebanon to their Arab kingdom. Full independence and political autonomy, however, would have to await another event on the international level – namely, World War II – which would shift the balance of power in the structure of the international system and directly reflect on Lebanon’s structure.

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World War II and Independence World War II and the German occupation of France weakened the latter’s position amongst the Great Powers on the international level, and compromised its status and influence in the Levant. Subsequently, a general process of decolonisation and British pressure on France led to the eventual termination of the French Mandate in Lebanon (and Syria), and the attainment of full independence and political autonomy with French withdrawal in 1946. Background During World War II, Lebanon remained under French control, However, the rise of British influence in the Levant – especially when Lebanon was transferred to Free French authority in June/July 1941 – triggered new dynamics for change in Lebanon, which would ultimately lead to independence in December 1946. On the domestic level, the Maronite– Sunni agreement, especially efforts by the Khoury (Maronite President) and Sulh (Sunni Prime Minister) since the 1930s to seek independence, was an important factor. However, Western powers, and especially Franco-British rivalry in the Levant, played the major role in Lebanon’s achieving independence at this early stage.35 The occupation of France by the Germans in June 1940 and the collaboration of the Vichy regime with the Nazis, on the one hand, and the emergence of a Free French movement led by Charles de Gaulle, on the other, had a direct effect on the future of the mandated territories. In the Levant, the French authorities sided with the Vichy (pro-Axis) Government and thus declared that they would abide by the French armistice, granting Germany access to Syrian air bases. Consequently, Britain reacted by invading Syria and Lebanon in June 1941. The Levant had become strategically important for British interests in the Middle East. The Suez Canal and Egypt, which were within one hour’s flight of Lebanese and Syrian airfields, would be jeopardised if Germany gained control of the Levant. The British invasion of Syria and Lebanon on 8 June 1941 was assisted, however, by a contingent of de Gaulle’s Free

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French troops. An armistice agreement was signed in Acre on 14 July, establishing British supremacy in the previous French Mandate, both militarily and financially, with respect to the Free French.36 Britain’s policy in the region was guided by its war effort. On the eve of invasion, Great Britain pledged to ensure the independence and freedom of Lebanon and Syria and to end the French Mandate. This pledge started a Franco-British rivalry in the Levant, but Britain now held the upper hand in the region. Major General Sir Edward Spears, Winston Churchill’s personal envoy and minister to the Levant, was to carry out British policies in this respect. Following Britain’s recognition of Lebanon’s and Syria’s independence, Spears was appointed as the first British minister to the republics of Lebanon and Syria on February 1942. His French counterpart was General Georges Catroux who was appointed by de Gaulle as commander of the French troops in the Levant.37 Britain’s minister, Spears, was careful in implementing the British policy. He would take all the necessary steps to eliminate French influence and to make total independence inevitable in Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, almost immediately after the Allied occupation of the Levant in the summer of 1941 and the ending of Vichy rule over the French mandated areas in the Levant, a sharp and bitter dispute was triggered between the Free French and the British. Although the region was formally placed under total Free French control, they were not allowed a free hand in the area. The Free French high commissioner, Catroux, was pressured by the British into issuing a statement proclaiming France’s commitment to the independence of the states in the region.38 Britain, through Spears, supported anti-French and pro-Arab Lebanese politicians in the coming parliamentary and presidential elections of 1943. First, Spears made sure that a parliamentary election took place, and then he supported the anti-French candidates to win. The anti-French and pro-Arab ‘constitutionalist bloc’ of Beshara al-Khoury and Riyad al-Sulh dominated the Chamber. Khoury and Sulh subsequently, with direct British support, became

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president and prime minister respectively. Khoury had defeated the French candidate, Emile Edde, who had earlier won the presidency under unchallenged French influence during the previous 1936 elections.39 Britain’s influence was thus instrumental in bringing about the 1943 parliamentary and presidential elections, and in helping the Lebanese to resist French attempts to reassert control that year.40 Britain’s pan-Arab policy, part of its war strategy during World War II, would also lead Spears to support Muslim demands in Lebanon for a more equitable position in the parliament after an unfair distribution of the seats in June 1943. Spears intervened, and imposed a greater percentage of parliamentary seats for the Muslims than had originally been allocated. He decided on a ratio of six Christians to five Muslims in parliament, which remained unchanged until 1989 when the distribution was equalised and the legislature enlarged. Moreover, Spears’ policy is said to have helped bring Muslim participation to a political system that the latter had, until that point, boycotted.41 In accordance with British policy to end the French Mandate, Spears’ next step was to broker a Christian– Muslim agreement (the National Pact) for the distribution of parliamentary seats in order to facilitate the August 1943 elections. The National Pact, between Maronite and Sunni elites, represented by Beshara al-Khoury and Riyad al-Sulh, was an unwritten agreement to reconcile the differing Christian and Muslim conceptions of Lebanon and to build a basis for coexistence in an independent Lebanon. According to this agreement, the Muslims would recognise the existence of an independent Lebanon and the Christians would give up any alliance with France and would accept the association of Lebanon with the other Arab states.42 The conditions of World War II were ideal for Britain to achieve its policies in the region, especially with respect to its traditional rival, France – that is, to curtail French influence in the Levant. Britain would follow a successful and persistent policy in Lebanon that would eventually change the political scene and end the French presence in the region.

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British and French Policies in the Levant The immediate British interest in the Middle East was to ensure a peaceful and stable region within the overall war effort at that time. This objective required placating any possible tensions emanating from Arab nationalist movements, and thus satisfying their aspirations as far as possible. In 1939, this policy resulted in the publication of the ‘White Book’, which restricted Jewish immigration into British Mandate Palestine and limited land sales there by Arabs to the Jews. In the Levant, on the other hand, this policy would mean promoting Syrian and Lebanese claims for independence while maintaining good relations with the Free French for the object of successful war efforts in Europe. This latter objective required acknowledging France’s standing in the Levant. Thus, in July 1941, de Gaulle and Oliver Lyttelton, Britain’s minister of state in the Middle East, reached a Franco-British agreement whereby Britain accepted French rule in Lebanon and Syria, and in return the responsibility of law and order would be left to the British forces on the spot. Britain, however, agreed to coordinate its military activities in the Levant with the French.43 However, this agreement between the British and Free France did not ease the severe rivalry over who actually control led Syria and Lebanon. On the Free French side, de Gaulle was eager to preserve France’s possessions in the Levant at any cost; on the British side, the military men and the civilian administrators in the Middle East considered the situation in terms of an ongoing rivalry between France and Britain that had existed during and immediately after World War I. They perceived the French presence in the Levant as a threat to British interests, and thus sought to abolish any French influence in the region.44 This dispute between France and Britain was a result of fundamental disagreement in the two powers’ visions for the future of the Levant. France was determined to maintain its imperial standing, while Britain favoured a Lebanese and Syrian move towards independence with closer ties to Britain.45 Naturally, Britain would support every effort that would strain French relations in the region and lead to its eviction from Lebanon and Syria.

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Since the beginning of 1942, the conflict between France and Britain had revolved around the main issue of whether or not to revive the Lebanese and Syrian constitutions and enable parliamentary elections to take place. The British considered that progress towards independence would be impossible without elections. Thus, when the Syrian National Bloc launched a campaign for holding elections in Syria, Spears adopted their cause thinking it would strengthen Britain’s position and weaken France’s in the Levant. The French, fearing exactly this outcome, were against the issue, and blamed the British for instigating the move. This British policy, however, converged with a general public demand for the restoration of constitutional life and parliamentary elections in Lebanon and Syria. The Maronite Church also supported elections and demanded full independence out of its conviction that France’s present weakness made it an insignificant power in shaping the Lebanon’s fate, and, further, that it had become an obstacle to Lebanese independence. The roots of such a conviction went back to the 1930s, but international conditions in the early 1940s revived them and gave them increased momentum.46 At the time, however, Britain didn’t put any direct pressure on France in pursuit of this objective. The issue had to be delayed because Britain was more engaged with events elsewhere during World War II – especially the Battle of El-Alamein. The situation in the Levant was therefore to remain unchanged between 1941, the year that Allied forces moved in, and 1943.47 Domestic Dynamics and the Link between Lebanism and Arabism With the creation of the new Arab state system by the late 1920s and early 1930s, a fresh pattern of interaction in the units of the region started to appear. Political elites began to compete for powerful positions in each country. The new rulers and career politicians throughout the region, who had actually worked for the strengthening of the system as their interests dictated, now made a point of denying its binding legality, and seized every possible chance to denounce it as an imperialist partition of the single Arab

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homeland. Palestine and Lebanon were the exceptions to this pattern, albeit each in its own way. In Palestine, Arabs who aspired to leadership could only make themselves appealing by complying with popular nationalist pressure, because of the Jewish threat. This forced them to obstruct repeated attempts by the British Mandate authorities to provide the country with a political government – because in any such government, the Jews, with the international influence that they wielded, were bound to be greatly overrepresented. Thus, the politically ambitious amongst the Palestinian Arabs had to compete for the leadership of the nationalist opposition, rather than for power and position in an actual ruling establishment. In Lebanon, however, while the Christian political establishment (dominated by the Maronites) was fully determined to make a success of the State, there was a Muslim opposition which was equally determined to make of it a failure. In Lebanon, the Christian ruling establishment, secure with the backing of France, spoke its mind freely and acted accordingly, while the opposition, with the moral backing of the prevailing nationalist sentiment in Syria and other Arab countries, did the same.48 It was not only the country’s Christian political establishment but also the French who wanted to make the political system in Lebanon a success. France was fully aware of the country’s domestic divide and realised that unless the Christians managed to ‘sell’ the idea of Lebanon to their Muslim compatriots, Lebanon as a state could not gain the required minimum of legitimacy it needed, politically, to be truly viable.49 Although the Maronites had wanted Lebanon, politically, for themselves, when the country finally received its constitution and became a parliamentary republic the French made sure that a Greek Orthodox Christian, rather than a Maronite, became its first president, with a Sunnite Muslim as speaker of its parliament. The Maronites, however, managed to secure for themselves all other key positions in the government and the administration – and, eventually, the presidency of the republic as well. What made this possible, in the initial stages, was the effective boycott of the State by all but a small group of the Sunnite Muslims, the only community in the country who could have stopped the Maronites from achieving a

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virtual monopoly of power at the time. Gradually, however, the French saw to it that the usefulness of this Muslim boycott was eroded, and impressed on the Maronite leadership the vital necessity of giving the Muslims a large enough stake in the country to encourage them to help maintain the State.50 Domestic structural problems, however, would impede such integration. In Lebanon, the Christians on the whole had an advantage over their fellow Muslims. They were socially more developed, and this put them in a position for a long time to provide the country with most of its required infrastructure. It also enabled them to provide an elegant social apparatus, which masked the fragile and flawed structure of the State and the social tension that lay underneath it, mainly due to the clearly uneven development of the different Lebanese communities and regions.51 Therefore, in order for Lebanon to be a success it needed a political accord and a more evenly distributed social development amongst the various communities that had come to form its population, and in the various regions that it had come to comprise. However, this was difficult for two main reasons. First, the Maronites in Lebanon were determined to maintain their own paramount control of the State, and were essentially unwilling to permit an equal share in the country’s political affairs between Christians and Muslims. Their argument was that the Muslims were naturally disposed towards the strong influence of their co-religionists in other Arab countries and could therefore not be trusted with the more sensitive political and administrative matters in Lebanon, such as situations involving national security and top-level decision making. The second reason was the dominant nationalist mood in the Arab world, especially in Syria, which was against Lebanon achieving political success. Inside Lebanon, the Muslim sector of the population could easily be swayed by external Arab nationalist influence, and could be used by other Arab countries as political leverage to keep the Lebanese state permanently unstable. Lebanon had been protected against just such destabilising Arab interventions in its affairs throughout the duration of the French Mandate. The actual problems of the country, however, were to be revealed as soon as the mandate came to an end,

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leaving an independent Lebanon at the mercy of external and internal forces acting in the name of Arab nationalism – an issue with which the Lebanese state, in the long run, was unable to come to reasonable terms.52 It seems that Lebanon’s political autonomy and independence would always be a curse to its stability, opening the way for external actors to influence the domestic stage through the country’s Christian – Muslim division. Stability in Lebanon was better preserved when its political autonomy was conditional on the patronage of an external great power. In both the mutessarifate and the French Mandate periods, Lebanon had enjoyed the safety of being insulated from its surrounding Muslim environment. Thus, from the beginning of the Greater Lebanon political system, a force called ‘Arabism’, acting from both outside and inside the country, stood face to face with another, exclusively parochial, social force known as ‘Lebanism’ – and these two forces collided on every fundamental issue, hindering the normal development of the State and keeping its political legitimacy and ultimate viability continuously in question. Each force, on the internal level would claim to represent a principle and ideal involving a particular concept of nationality.53 Systemic effects would not only serve the change towards a Greater Lebanon system but would also invite a new pattern of interaction, with new ‘players’ to be added to a now more complicated domestic divide. The religious division between Christians and Muslims was supplemented with new dynamics that transcended the state level, to the regional sub-systemic level: Arabism – a form of nationality and identity that would contribute to the domestic sources of conflict in the Lebanese structure. According to Kamal Salibi, it is no coincidence that the Christians adopted Lebanism and the Muslims Arabism. After Greater Lebanon was established, the Sunnites took the Shi’a politically for granted in the name of Arabism, while tending, in general, to leave them out of their inner councils. The Druze were also taken politically for granted by the Sunnites in the name of Arabism, both in Lebanon and Syria. In Lebanon, the Druze would concede to the idea of Arabism because

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it served a useful purpose for them. Although they did not oppose the creation of Greater Lebanon, their mistrust of Maronite intensions led the Druze to use Arabism as political leverage against the Maronites. In Salibi’s words, it was ‘a war of nerves which they [the Druze] seemed determined to pursue against their old Maronite foes’.54 In addition to the Druze and Shi’a, there were also the nonMaronite Christians of Greater Lebanon, amongst whom the Greek Orthodox formed the largest group. Although the Christian Orthodox also feared the implications of Arabism as a new guise for political Islam, at the time they generally felt more bitter about the Maronite political dominance in the country, and therefore treated the concept of Lebanism advanced by the Maronites with considerable reserve. The Greek Orthodox, moreover, were far from restricted only to Lebanon: there were more of them in Syria alone than the members of all the Christian communities of Lebanon put together. To the Greek Orthodox, therefore, the concept of panSyrianism was more meaningful than that of Arabism. When one member of their community, Antun Saadeh, gave influential political expression to this concept for the first time in the 1930s, pitting it against both Lebanism and Arabism, the Syrian Nationalist Party (Parti Populaire Syrien, or PPS), which he had founded, succeeded in attracting many followers amongst his co-religionists. His idea of secular pan-Syrianism also proved attractive to many Druze, Shi’a and some Christians other than the Greek Orthodox (including some Maronites who were disaffected by both Lebanism and Arabism), as well as to many Sunnite Muslims who set a high value on secularism, and who felt that they had far more in common with their fellow Syrians, of whatever religion or denomination, than with fellow Sunnite or Muslim Arabs elsewhere. Therefore, another idea of nationalism had emerged, which had enough recognition to make it valid. This new nationalism within Lebanon, however, soon became a cover for something else – Greek Orthodox particularism. Furthermore, those newly founded non-Lebanese nationalisms would eventually be incorporated into conflicts across the religious divide.55 A major pillar of Lebanism as the idea of a national identity separate from the wider Arab world was the ethno-historical

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assumption that Lebanon had been the birthplace of ancient Phoenicia, and that therefore the Lebanese were descendants of Phoenician ancestors. To the Christians, who had propagated the theory in the first place, a Lebanese nationalism based on Phoenician ancestry would serve their historical policy of independence and particularism perfectly well; to Muslims in Lebanon, however, any presumption that excluded them from their wider Arabic and Islamic affiliation was controversial and unacceptable, irrespective of its historical accuracy. The sustainability of the newly founded Greater Lebanon would require a minimum of common ground between the two communities on this essential issue of identity. The Muslims who had boycotted the new Lebanese system started to feel the benefits of participation – especially when it became clear that, under the prevailing international dynamics, an independent Lebanese state was irreversible. Lebanese Muslims thus needed a legitimate cover to justify their consent to the new system, and they would find it in another creative theory adopted by one of their own community leaders – Taqi al-Din al-Sulh – which also enabled the National Pact between the two communities. Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, a prominent Sunni Muslim, would propagate a theory that reflected the change in the Muslim urban elite as to their relations with Lebanon. Sulh wrote a critique of the theory of Charles Corm – the ‘forefather’ of Lebanese Phoenician identity. In his critique, Sulh recognised Lebanon as an independent national community, but, unlike Corm, he perceived the Lebanese identity as part of the larger Arab world, thus ‘Arabizing the Phoenicians’. In so doing, Sulh utilised a theory that had been prevalent amongst Arab geographers and ethnographers since the 1920s. This theory claimed that the entire population of the ancient Near East originated from the Arabian Peninsula, which made them all – Canaanites, Adomites, Amorites, Arameans, and so forth – Arabs. Thereafter, by the 1940s, it became conventional wisdom amongst Muslim Lebanese to state that the Phoenicians were actually Arabs. Ultimately, this enabled some Lebanese Arab nationalists to accept the Phoenicians into the Lebanese national narrative so long as they were recognised as an integral part of the Arab civilisation. Sunni

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elites, who in 1920 had fought fiercely against the formation of Greater Lebanon as an independent state, were gradually reconciled to its existence. The al-Sulhs, one of the country’s principal families, led this change whereby they actually agreed that Lebanon deserved to be an independent national community, although part of the Arab world.56 According to Asher Kaufman, the process of creating a non-Arab, age-old identity of Lebanon ended in failure. Emile Edde, Corm’s best friend, who also spoke only French, became the country’s president in 1936. However, the ideal of Corm and his friends regarding Lebanese national identity failed politically when Edde was removed from office in 1941 and when later, in 1943, the National Pact – the historic agreement between the Maronites and the Sunnis – defined Lebanon as a country with an ‘Arab Face’. Furthermore, in 1944, Lebanon became one of the founding members of the Arab League. Yet the Lebanese nationalism of Corm did not die.57 Lebanon became fully integrated into the Arab Muslim world. In 1989, the drafters of the Ta’if Accord, which ended the 15-year Lebanese war (1975– 90), took the trouble to reiterate several times that Lebanon was an Arab state tied in bonds of brotherhood and solidarity to its Arab neighbours. This obsession in the accord with the Arab-ness of Lebanon may actually attest to the fact that, for a good number of Lebanese, the identity of their nation is still not quite clear.58 Independence and Full Political Autonomy With the balance of power changing in its favour, Britain encouraged the Lebanese of different political and religious affiliations to seek independence from the French Mandate. Britain took several steps to enable Lebanon’s independence, in order to terminate France’s influence in the Levant. After acknowledging unilaterally Lebanon’s and Syria’s independence, it ensured the return of constitutional life through parliamentary elections in which it successfully supported pro-independence deputies and an anti-French presidential candidate, and brokered a Christian– Muslim alliance with the object of independence.

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After El-Alamein, the British refocused on regional matters and resumed their plan to hold elections in the Levant. The French didn’t resist this time, and they reinstated the constitution on 29 January 1943. The French decision came in an attempt to show flexibility over the constitution issue and elections, in return for British consent to France’s demands: the concluding of treaties with the newly elected governments that would ensure France’s future position in the Levant. The elections of 1943 brought a majority of deputies who wanted to end French influence in Lebanon, and consequently led to the election of Behara Khuri to the presidency and the appointment of Riyad al-Sulh as prime minister (both anti-French candidates) – a clear victory for those seeking independence from France. This result united Christians and Muslims in the country and later led to the unwritten National Pact between the two religious communities, which was to be crucial in achieving independence and guaranteeing Lebanon’s future existence.59 The election of November 1943 was a direct effect of the rivalry between France and Britain over the control of the Levant; thus, it was considered just a ‘phase in the dispute’ – a phase, however, that proved a turning point in the process of eliminating France’s influence from the region. The French also considered it a severe blow to their position in Lebanon. In this election (1943), contrary to those that had taken place in the 1920s and 1930s under the same mandate system, France had grown weaker and lost its ability to influence the electoral lists, while British influence was clearly visible (Spears was able to openly support anti-French candidates). This brought FrancoBritish relations, already tense since 1941, to the verge of collapse.60 Once in power, Khuri and Sulh resolved the issue of the ‘division of spoils’ and the form of power sharing in what became known as the National Pact on 19 September 1943 – ‘an unwritten agreement that [was] supposed to move Lebanon forward from a Greater Lebanon under Maronite hegemony to a Lebanon of all the communities enabling a share to all’.61 By 1943, most of the Sunni notables of Tripoli and the north were now prepared to accept the new State – especially as they had, in reality, been let down by the Syrian National Bloc, which, in moving

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against the French in 1937, had asked for Lebanon ‘to be treated like Syria’ in the event of independence. From the 1940s onwards, these notables would increasingly benefit from the expanding Lebanese market. Many of them, and many Greek Orthodox Christians, became advocates of the ideas and political parties of Arab nationalism. Others, however, remained attached to a concept of a ‘natural Syria’, as for example in the case of the Syrian National Social Party, and would call for a unified Fertile Crescent (broadly speaking, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan – with the addition of Cyprus as its ‘star’).62 Therefore, in 1943, the two main communities achieved a national pact that was essentially an unwritten agreement in which Christians renounced dependence upon the West in return for Muslim renunciation of union with Syria or any other Arab state. The National Pact preserved confessionalism (the 1860s system) as the basic constitutional system principle, and reaffirmed Maronite claims to the presidency, command of the army and other top positions. Parliamentary seats were allotted in a ratio of six to five in favour of the Christians, as were the bulk of civil and military posts. But the Maronites passed the office of prime minister to the Sunnis and the speakership of the parliament to the Shi’a. Moreover, the National Pact was designed to reassure Lebanon’s Christians that they would not be engulfed by Lebanese Islam. In 1945, the Muslims were appeased when the country asserted its Arab ‘identity’ by joining the Arab League – the organisation’s only member state led by Christians.63 When the Free French realised that their influence had been greatly compromised following these elections, and that it was no longer in their power to prevent Lebanon (and Syria) from achieving independence, they modified their original objective of preserving their imperial status in the Levant to a more practical one. France now sought to make independence contingent on the acquiescence of Lebanon and Syria to signing treaties that would allow France to retain its influence under a different pretext. But, on 8 November 1943, the Lebanese Parliament amended the constitution and erased any reference to the French Mandate, as well as eliminating all

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articles that established the mandate as the source of political power and jurisdiction in Lebanon. The French accused the British of encouraging the amendment issue.64 French reaction was harsh, and a full-blown crisis ensued in the country. The French high commissioner for the Levant, Jean Helleu, suspended the constitution, jailed senior Lebanese officials, annulled the constitutional amendments, dismissed the President and Cabinet, dissolved the Chamber and appointed the pro-French Emile Edde as president. Spears retaliated, and organised a united Lebanese opposition front against the French. Within days, a general strike occurred and demonstrations took place that left a number of casualties.65 France had tried to regain control after the blow it had received with the 1943 elections – and, especially, after the new parliament had amended the constitution, challenging its mandate authority over Lebanon. However, under the pretext of maintaining stability, the US and Britain intervened and put an end to any French retaliation. The US, now a major player in the region, stepped in and expressed its reservations over the French measures in Lebanon. Washington even threatened to take steps against the Free French in Lebanon in response to recent incidents in Beirut – which included all-out demonstrations, and the French authorities’ shooting of demonstrators and imprisonment of anti-French Lebanese politicians and members of government. It was the British, however, who eventually settled the issue in accordance with their long-standing policy – in line with their overall war strategy – of supporting Lebanon’s and Syria’s independence, based on the assumption that such support would assure stability and peace in the Levant and gain the cooperation of the people there. Britain couldn’t ignore the potential danger of the ongoing events to the stability of the Levant and the Middle East in general, but it also had to weigh their impact on future Anglo-French relations. Thus, upon orders from the War Cabinet, Richard Casey, Churchill’s minister-resident for the Middle East, came to Beirut on 19 November and handed over an ultimatum demanding the removal of Helleu from his position in the Levant and the release of the Lebanese leaders, or else the British would proclaim

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martial law throughout the country. France yielded to all demands, and Helleu was dismissed.66 As World War II was about to end, it was thought that the Levant would no longer be of strategic importance to Britain or the US, and that neither would continue to take an active interest in the region. There would thus be nothing to prevent France from ‘making a comeback’. President Khuri had a ‘Grand design’ to secure Lebanon’s independence, maintain good relations with the US and Britain, and his dominant position – as well as integrating Lebanon into the newly emerging Arab system – so it was crucial to loosen the French grip. Indeed, after the resolution of the November crisis the French declared their willingness to negotiate the transfer of the ‘common interests’ (certain government sectors) in the hope of easing the way to the signing of a treaty of friendship.67 When Khuri rejected the idea, the French made the evacuation of their armed forces from Lebanon conditional on the conclusion of the treaty. In September 1944, General Beynet, the new commanderin-chief of the French forces in the Levant and French high commissioner there, formally presented Khuri with France’s request for a treaty. Khuri rejected the request. The French treaty proposal was, in fact, backed by Britain. The British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, had instructed Spears to encourage Lebanon and Syria to sign treaties with France as the only way to attain full independence and subsequently to maintain and protect it.68 However, the involvement of the US in the Lebanese issue and its adoption of the British view would be decisive in the matter. The European powers were exhausted by the war effort and the US had become, arguably, the largest systemic power, driven by the principles of self-determination and anti-colonialism. The US had become a vigorous defender of Lebanese independence, and was strongly opposed to any treaty obligations towards France or to any other way of maintaining France’s special position in the Levant. On 19 September 1944, the US recognised Lebanon as a fully independent state after it had turned down a French appeal to delay doing so until both Lebanon and Syria had recognised France’s special status there. The American recognition

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came only a short while after the original French demand for the treaties had been submitted in Beirut and Damascus. The US consul in Beirut, together with Spears, had played an important role in encouraging the Lebanese Government to resist French demands, and contributed a great deal to the emergence of an anti-French policy in Washington.69 In addition to being a pro-Western country, Lebanon’s strategic position placed it on the list of US national interests in the region. This came to the fore in planning the Saudi Mediterranean oil pipeline (Tapline) and in the debate about the placement of its western terminal. Comparing seven possible outlets, the US Petroleum Attache´ proposed choosing Tripoli, but noted that to make this choice the US must ensure that Syria and Lebanon became wholly independent, with no foreign troops within their territory, and that no foreign country had a preferred political or economic position or treaty with them. The report was drafted at a time when British and French troops were still stationed in Lebanon. However, it did not take long for the attache´’s conditions to be fulfilled.70 The Soviet Union also began to show an interest in the region’s affairs. On 19 July 1944, the USSR recognised the independence of Lebanon and, on 20 October 1944, the first Soviet minister presented his papers to President Khuri. Both the US and the USSR were active in ensuring that Lebanon and Syria were invited to the founding conference of the United Nations at San Francisco in March 1945. France had opposed that move, while Britain quietly supported it.71 Lebanon’s independence and political autonomy was certainly the product of circumstances on the international level. In May 1945, de Gaulle sent new French forces to Lebanon to reinforce the ones already in the Levant. This was a final, desperate attempt by France to preserve its position in the region. De Gaulle attempted to put direct pressure on Lebanon and Syria to force the signing of the treaty. This triggered immediate demonstrations in Beirut. The French submitted to Beirut and Damascus what amounted to an ultimatum, demanding the signing of treaties along the lines of those drafted in 1936. These treaties were to ensure special status for France in the Levant, with bases for the French

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Army and Navy on Levantine territory. But, in response, such severe riots broke out in Syria that the French lost effective control of Damascus and other Syrian cities – to the extent that they bombed and shelled Damascus, killing 800 people. President Khuri in Lebanon asked for help from the British minister, and requested British diplomatic intervention.72 On 31 May 1945, the British intervened, as they had in the 1943 crisis. The Commander-in-chief of British forces in the Middle East was instructed to order French troops back to their bases, and to use all the means at his disposal to restore order and stability throughout the Levant. France resented this intervention, but was forced to concede to British demands. France’s standing in the region received a severe blow with the way things had ended, which made the evacuation of French forces from Lebanon just a matter of time. The French made a final attempt to salvage something of their traditional status by reaching an agreement with Britain on 13 December 1945 calling for negotiations between them and the Levant states on the exact arrangements that were to govern their withdrawal without setting a date for that withdrawal. However, the Levant states rejected the agreement and sought help from the United Nations. On 4 February 1946, Syria and Lebanon submitted a joint complaint to the UN Security Council, protesting against the failure to set a date for the evacuation of foreign troops from their two countries.73 The UN Security Council formally discussed the issue in midFebruary 1946. The US submitted a compromise proposal calling for the speedy withdrawal of foreign forces, but left the date to be set by further negotiations. Although the USSR vetoed this draft resolution because it had not been consulted in preparing it, Britain and France announced that they would observe its clauses just as if it had been formally adopted. Final talks were held in Paris on March 1946 between the Lebanese Government and France and led to the final withdrawal on 31 December 1946, which marked the end of France’s historical role in the Levant.74 Independent Lebanon still carried the country’s essentially divided nature. The divide, however, was further complicated by new issues of nationality and identity – essential, defining characteristics of a

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modern nation state. Moreover, the division was re-institutionalised through the new arrangement that replaced the mutessarifate – namely, the National Pact. While its original purpose was to enable Lebanese independence and the end of the French Mandate, the National Pact actually reasserted the nature of a divided political unit with a zero-sum-game equation amongst its confessional players. The agreement extended the confessional arrangement defined by Article 95 of the constitution of 1926, which stipulated the proportional distribution of government employment amongst the confessional communities. The National Pact allocated the presidency to a Maronite Christian, the prime ministership to a Sunnite Muslim and the speakership of parliament to a Shi’i Muslim, with parliamentary seats divided according to the six to five ratio agreed upon in August. The pact’s arrangement actually reinforced the sectarian principle as a pillar of the new Lebanese system. Although the agreement devised a formula for political cooperation amongst Lebanon’s various confessions, it was not a means of integration, nor was it intended to promote a sense of national identity. In real terms, the National Pact represented an acknowledgment of Lebanon’s pluralistic and divided structure.75 The process of decolonisation gave pan-Arabism a boost, and, although the Lebanese Government was by now independent and enjoying a fresh political autonomy, Muslim actors in the Lebanese system had gained more space for manoeuvre. Thus, the system was set on the path of instability once more, as Christians retained their pro-Western allegiance whilst their surrounding region was heading toward an anti-Western era of Arabism. In sum, although there were important domestic factors, especially Christian –Muslim consensus, in favour of an independent Greater Lebanon, its realisation would not have materialised without the right systemic dynamics. World War II and the German invasion of France compromised the latter’s status considerably on the international and regional level. By contrast, the substantial British presence in the Levant and the arrival on the scene of the US, with its own agenda and policies, had the direct effect of realising full Lebanese independence.

CHAPTER 3 BIPOLARITY AND STATUS-QUO LEBANON

After World War II, the balance of power on the international level had changed drastically. The traditional European powers, especially France and Britain, had suffered heavily during the war, and their declining role and stature soon paved the way for a new international structure dominated by two superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union. This new bipolar structure would define the international system, which would be governed by a general systemic pattern of interaction – that is, ‘Cold War’ dynamics and a US policy of Containment, until the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. This bipolar international system would also be the main determinant of the changes in structure and stability in Lebanon on two separate occasions: first, when the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was designed to contain any Soviet expansion in the Middle East, compromised Lebanon’s stability but concurrent systemic effects emanating from this containment policy also prevented the occurrence of war in the ensuing 1958 Crisis; second, when a contingent systemic pattern of De´tente between the contending superpowers enabled a descent into instability in Lebanon, triggering the 1975 – 90 War. This latter conflict lasted until the end of the Cold War itself, due to the bipolar structure of the international system and its general systemic pattern of

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interaction (Cold War dynamics and Containment), which balanced domestic forces and disabled all settlement attempts in favour of any of the parties to the conflict in Lebanon. On both occasions, however, the systemic effects of a bipolar international system would also prevent any change to the structure of Lebanon. Changes to the status quo would only occur with the end of the Cold War and superpower polarisation over the Middle East, which also ended superpower balancing in the region and enabled a settlement to the 1975 – 90 War – a resolution that subsequently altered the structure of Lebanon. On both occasions, the 1958 Crisis and 1975 – 90 War, domestic and regional dynamics played a significant role with respect to events in Lebanon. It was, however, the dynamics on the systemic level that really facilitated or prevented the occurrence of war. Therefore, this research acknowledges and refers to domestic and regional determinants for change that are consistent with the general theoretical framework. Additionally, in the case of the 1975 – 90 War, reference is made to the main determinants in the structure of Lebanon – that is, its Maronite and Sunni actors – whereas, on the regional level, the focus is on Syria’s agenda for Lebanon and the region. Lebanon at the time was not a priority on Israel’s agenda; the Jewish state was more concerned with the more important conflict with Syria and its ongoing peace process with Egypt. The Israeli actor on the regional level and the Shi’i actor on the domestic level would play a more significant role in the later stages of the 1975 – 90 War, and are not considered determining factors for the triggering of the war – the object of this research.

Containment and the 1958 Crisis The Cold War dynamics in a bipolar international system was best reflected in the US policy of containment of Soviet expansionism worldwide. The Eisenhower Doctrine, amongst others, was a US foreign policy designed to prevent possible Soviet advancement in the Middle East by pledging protection to pro-Western regimes – a

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manifestation of superpower polarisation over the region. The Doctrine – a contingent pattern of interaction, which reflected superpower polarisation over the Middle East – ran in parallel to the general systemic pattern of interaction of Containment that prevailed throughout the Cold War in a bipolar international structure. Consequently, events in Lebanon, which was already polarised over its domestic Christian– Muslim divide into a pro-Western and proSoviet camp, took a turn for the worse in 1958. Domestic dynamics, represented by, mostly, Muslim actors seeking unity with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s United Arab Republic, and regional dynamics, through Nasser’s attempt to annex Lebanon, pushed the latter towards instability and to a forceful change in structure. Within a Cold War environment, however, systemic effects triggered by the Eisenhower Doctrine prevented both the occurrence of war and a forceful change of structure in Lebanon during the 1958 Crisis. Direct US military intervention would ensure the preservation of the status quo in Lebanon. Background: The Bipolar International System and a Middle East Region Significant changes to the structure and dynamics of the international system and to the regional sub-system comprising the environment of Lebanon occurred in the aftermath of World War II. On the international level, the traditional multipolar nature of the system, which had been defined by the interplay of various actors (mainly European) setting the rules of the game (balances of power, systemic dynamics and general patterns of interaction) was replaced with a duality of two dominant superpowers (the US and USSR), which defined the structure of what became a bipolar international system – especially with the rapid decline of British and French status postWWII. The environment surrounding Lebanon was also changing, and a more complex sub-systemic Middle East region materialised with the creation of new state actors in the, now defunct, Ottoman Arab provinces. The alliance between the two superpowers during World War II soon turned into suspicion and distrust. The US became worried

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about Soviet expansionism, and was determined to prevent another situation similar to the Nazi experience that would threaten peace and lead to another world war. Mutual suspicion between the superpowers soon triggered Cold War dynamics that would define the general systemic pattern of interaction for the next 40 years. Superpower polarisation over almost every issue and region in the world would define the systemic pattern of interaction throughout the Cold War. In response, the US followed a containment policy to deal with the Soviet threat – a policy that is widely believed to have eventually led to the latter’s demise. When North Korea invaded the South on 25 June 1950, the US decided to enter the conflict in defence of the latter party in order to prevent its fall into communist control. This foreign policy militarised the general US Containment policy, which was already under way in Europe, and extended it to Asia – a prelude to the catastrophic US intervention in Vietnam 15 years later. The American decision to intervene was based on the perceived equivalence of communist and Nazi aggression. South Korea was not to be left prey to communism in the way that Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland had been handed over to Hitler at the Munich conference of September 1938 – an event that was generally considered to represent democracies’ appeasement of dictatorship, which ultimately led to World War II. The US and its Western allies were convinced that appeasement of aggression only encourage more aggression; thus, it was very important that early and effective force be used to stop it. Also, Containment established the principle that once a defence commitment is made it must be honoured at all costs, since failure to do so will encourage further aggression by undermining the credibility of all commitments.1 This attitude would also explain US interventions in external conflicts during the Cold War – especially, in the current case, its intervention during the 1958 Crisis in Lebanon to honour its commitments under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The shift to Containment started in 1946 with diplomat George Kennan’s ‘long telegram’ warning the US State Department of Soviet expansion in Europe and the necessity to contain it. The outbreak of the Korean War five years after the end of World War II, however,

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would firmly change the US perception of Stalin’s Russia from a wartime ally to an expansionist opponent that had to be contained, by force if necessary. Thus, Containment was a US foreign policy based on perceived strategic threats to US security and values, and aimed at preventing the expansion of Soviet power and influence beyond those areas dominated by Soviet forces during World War II. Although the actual application of this strategy varied widely during the Cold War, its central tenet remained unchanged – that is, that the failure to resist Soviet expansionism would encourage more of it and increase the threat of another world war.2 By 1950, The Truman Administration was very alarmed by the Soviet Union’s behaviour in Europe, especially the attempted blockade of Berlin and the forcible installation of a communist regime in Prague in 1948. Soon afterwards came the communist victory in China and the unexpectedly early Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb. In response, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 declared a Cold War against Soviet expansionism and was the first of several presidential doctrines. It was followed by those of Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter and Reagan – all aimed at devising US policies to use force to prevent the spread of communism.3 In the post-WWII bipolar international system, the Cold War would dominate systemic dynamics – that is, systemic polarisation and containment-related policies would define the systemic pattern of interaction throughout the Cold War. Similarly, the direct environment for Lebanon or the sub-systemic region underwent drastic changes after World War II. Lebanon’s subsystemic environment expanded to encompass a larger geographical area and to become more state-centric as a result of post-colonialism and self-determination. This new Middle East system would constitute the direct environment for the Lebanese Republic until our present time. Whereas the environment surrounding pre-state Lebanon encompassed, mainly, the Levant, Egypt and Turkey, the new subsystem expanded to include all the newly independent states of the Middle East: Egypt; Iran; and, after 1948, Israel. This new regional sub-system had its distinct structure with dominant regional actors, and its own dynamics of conflict and balance-of-power mechanism.

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Barry Buzan and Ole Waever rightly delineate the boundaries of this Middle East sub-system, which was composed largely of postcolonial, modern states. Although the new structure of the region still included strong elements of clan, tribe and religion, a pattern of ‘security interdependence’ covering a region stretching from Morocco to Iran, including all the Arab states plus Israel and Iran, would define the dynamics of a Middle Eastern regional pattern of interaction. It would, however, exclude Cyprus, Sudan and the Horn of Africa, while Afghanistan and Turkey would separate the Middle East from South Asia and Europe respectively. Although it had once governed most of this region, Turkey may be excluded from regional membership – especially after the 1920s when, with its adoption of Atatu¨rk’s Westernised path, it distanced itself from its Ottoman imperial past.4 The region developed its distinct structure with dominant actors that determined its regional balance-of-power mechanism, and generated the dynamics and patterns of interaction that would also constitute the regional factors for change within its member states – especially Lebanon. Therefore, regional dynamics emanating from rivalries between the Hashemite and Saudi monarchies, between Iraq and Egypt or from the emergence of anti-Western Arab nationalism and socialist revolutionary regimes in the region would all constitute regional determinants for change in the structure and stability of Lebanon – the dependent variables for the purposes of this analysis. This sub-system and its distinct regional dynamics became more distinct after the wave of decolonisation between 1945 and 1948, which produced a large number of independent states. However, Buzan and Waever correctly suggest that most conflict dynamics that defined the regional pattern of interaction had their roots in the interwar years. The aforementioned rivalries between the Hashemite and Saudi monarchies, between Iraq and Egypt for leadership of the Arabs, and the conflict between Palestinians and Zionist immigrants all commenced during the 1930s – as did territorial disputes (Lebanon versus Syria) and the emergence of Arab nationalism. Such dynamics, Buzan and Waever argue, were sufficient to constitute an ‘Arab state system’, but until the end of World War II, British and

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French military and political presence dominated the region and overshadowed all other factors. Moreover, the independence of Israel shifted the earlier conflict between Palestinians and Zionist immigrants to the state level, and started the first of many Arab – Israeli wars.5 Although some Middle Eastern dynamics can be explained in terms of ethnic and religious factors (Arab – Iranian or Muslim– Christian/Jewish), the creation of Arab nationalism may have been the cause of even more inter-Arab rivalry and conflict than cooperation and accord. Buzan and Waever suggest that the region also contains strong inter-Arab and inter-Islamic agendas. Inter-Arab rivalries involve competition for leadership of the Arab world and interpretations of Arabism, as well as more traditional types of rivalry over territory, water and ideology. Moreover, Islamists are often the domestic opposition in Arab states, and Islamic states (e.g. Iran) are easily seen as a threat by many of their neighbours. Therefore, Middle Eastern dynamics are mainly driven by territorial disputes, ideological competitions, power and status rivalries, and ethnic and cultural divisions.6 Therefore, after World War II, a bipolar international system and Cold War dynamics would interplay with the sub-systemic dynamics of the Middle East region to determine changes in the stability and structure of Lebanon – and it would do so on two separate occasions: during 1958 and 1975. Cold War vs Middle East Regional Dynamics Following World War II, the main ideological currents and interArab rivalries that dominated the Middle East region and determined its dynamics usually took a pro-Western or anti-Western (usually pro-Soviet) direction. Although the ideology of pan-Arabism was a major factor in determining the dynamics of the Middle East region throughout the Cold War, it was highly entangled in Cold War dynamics on the systemic level and, in particular, linked to a pro-Soviet, socialist path. Middle East dynamics was especially characterised by an Egyptian– Iraqi struggle for regional hegemony that also reflected the Cold War dynamics and East – West

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polarisation – an issue that would define the regional pattern of interaction for more than 20 years. As Malcom Kerr suggests, the idea of pan-Arabism had, since World War II, been closely linked with two other leading concepts: anti-colonialism and revolutionary socialism. Hostility to Western influence accompanied the ideology of pan-Arabism as an expression of Arab rejection of British and US intervention in inter-Arab affairs. This linkage, Kerr suggests, reflected Arab awareness of Western involvement in the region: first Britain and France, then Britain and the US. From 1955 to 1958, the Soviet Union would also be active in supporting the Syrian and Egyptian governments and then the Iraqi revolution, as a counter to the support given to other pro-Western regimes by Britain and the US.7 After World War II, Iraq and Egypt began a geopolitical competition for the hegemony of the Arab world, and Syria became the centre of their contest. Once the French Mandate was terminated, each country was particularly keen to incorporate Syria on its side – and the competition only intensified after the Egyptian revolution of 1952. Iraqi leaders frequently sought Syrian – Iraqi unification under the Hashemite crown, or, failing that, at least a close alliance. Iraqi efforts were related partly to sentiment and dynastic ambition dating from World War I and partly to promoting Iraqi leadership in the region. However, these attempts were opposed by the Egyptian Government of the day and Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi regime, however, was in a keen alliance with Britain, while a series of Egyptian governments sought to bring their treaty with Britain8 to an end. A major objective of British policy in the Middle East post-WWII was to maintain a strong and friendly Iraq – thus, the interests of Iraq and Britain converged over the issue of Syria. Like the Egyptian resistance to Iraqi efforts, the French also, until 1956, resisted British influence in the region. France resented the commercial, cultural and political influence that the British had retained after the collapse of their (France’s) mandate in Syria and Lebanon, and they did not forgive the British for their role in bringing an end to that mandate. From 1955 onwards, however, the ‘game’ was also joined by the US and the Soviet Union.9

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After the overthrow of the pro-Western regime of King Farouk in 1952, the main concern of Nasser’s Egypt throughout the 1950s was to terminate British occupation of the Suez Canal zone and to fight any attempt to improve British influence in Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon by opposing Western proposals such as the 1955 Baghdad Pact. Consequently, Karen Rasler rightly suggests that the Egyptian dictator, under the pretext of pan-Arabism, used his influence in other Arab countries to keep out any Western influence. Nasser was also able to mobilise pan-Arab sentiment in his battles against regional rivals, or through providing regional politicians with a cause to use against their own governments. Therefore, the main determinants of Nasser’s domestic and foreign policies were challenging the West, pan-Arabism and ‘neutralism’ in the Cold War10 – the last-named being a widely disbelieved stance, as it was clear to most observers that his socialist regime tilted towards the Soviet bloc. However, Iraq remained the main challenger to Egypt’s bid for regional hegemony until July 1958 when the Free Officers’ Coup removed King Faisal II from power. Iraq, in concert with Britain, sought control over the Fertile Crescent area (Lebanon, Syria and Jordan) and Palestinian interests. Moreover, Egypt and Iraq were polarised over their respective conceptions of the strategic order in the region. When Nasser obtained Britain’s agreement to evacuate the Suez Canal in 1954 and saw this as the beginning of the end of Britain’s role in the area, the Iraqis countered immediately by joining the Baghdad Pact in 1955 – an arrangement that could maintain Britain’s strategic position in Iraq and which would extend to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon and provide some counterweight to Egypt’s regional influence. The pact ignited another round of fierce Egyptian–Iraqi competition for influence in the lesser states between them – that is, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. However, the US and USSR soon afterwards also became involved in the contest.11 What had begun as regional dynamics for hegemony became tightly aligned to systemic dynamics of superpower polarisation over the region. In newly independent Syria, however, a dislike of the British and French influence prevailed. Any link with Iraq was perceived as

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linking Syria to Western imperialism and further forestalling Arab unity. Thus, Syria followed a strictly anti-Western path from independence onwards. This path, Kerr suggests, was also determined by other domestic and international factors. The chronic involvement of the Syrian army in politics (three consecutive coups: in 1949, 1952 and 1954) played a major role in that direction. Other factors originated on the systemic level – that is, the series of attempts by the US and Britain to bolster their strategic interests in the region during the 1950s. The failure of those efforts only heightened anti-Western sentiments in Syria. Both a Middle East Defence Organisation in 1951 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955 failed to attract Syria’s endorsement. It was hoped that the Syrian coup of 1954, which removed the pro-Egyptian dictatorship of Brigadier Adib Shishakli, would draw Syria into the Baghdad Pact, but, given the strength of neutralist and anti-Hashemite sentiment in Syria, such efforts proved unsuccessful. Moreover, a combination of Egyptian, Saudi and Soviet efforts managed to keep Syria away from the ‘denounced’ pact, and, before 1955 was out, Syria had signed a military alliance with Egypt and purchased arms from the Soviets.12 The Iraqi camp ultimately lost its bid for regional domination because it had adopted pro-Western foreign policies that stood in contrast to the Arab-nationalist ideals propagated by the Nasser camp. Iraqi regional policy took its last blow with the British loss in the Suez crisis in 1956 and the subsequent union of Egypt and Syria (as the United Arab Republic) in February 1958. It collapsed completely with the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy a few months later. But the 1957– 8 Egyptian– Iraqi rivalry was now firmly knotted to the Cold War dynamics, and played a major role in the 1958 instability in Lebanon. Systemic polarisation between the US and the Soviet Union also polarised the Arab governments into two camps: first, a pro-Iraqi camp against Nasserism, which they considered would pave the way for communist penetration and eventually Soviet domination; and second, an Egyptian camp, which recognised no such Soviet threat and saw the various Western defence plans for the area (Baghdad Pact, 1955 and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957) as an attempt to drag them into a Cold War in which they had

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no interest. More importantly, this second camp perceived such defence plans as a form of collective imperialism designed to subjugate the Arabs to the West under the pretext of Soviet threats.13 Therefore, by the mid-1950s, the Syrian and Egyptian stances in the Cold War between the two superpowers was already clear. AntiWestern dictatorships with close ties and military cooperation with the Soviet Union provided ample indications for Western powers, especially the US, in formulating the latter’s Middle East policies. Systemic Polarisation and Stability in Lebanon: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the 1958 Crisis After World War II, the US, which had become a superpower on the systemic level, also became an effective broker in Middle East politics in general and Lebanon in particular. With the outbreak of the Cold War and the adoption of Containment to deter the Soviet threat, the interests of the US (and its Western allies) in the region were mainly centred around oil and security arrangements – thus Lebanon, amongst other pro-Western countries, gradually gained importance in the US agenda for the region. The newly independent Lebanon was struggling to preserve its structure and political autonomy in an environment in which competition for regional hegemony between Egypt and Iraq rendered the sovereignty of lesser divided states like Lebanon highly vulnerable. While post-independence Lebanese governments were walking the tightrope of neutrality between the superpowers and maintaining the necessary regional alliances, a greater threat loomed from the systemic dynamics of superpower polarisation over the region – and especially the Eisenhower Doctrine, which threatened stability and put Lebanon on the verge of war in 1958. Although Britain retained its position in the Middle East after World War II and, alongside the US, replaced French influence in the region, by the end of the 1940s the US became the predominant Western power in the region. According to Eyal Zisser, US interests in the region were focused on the Gulf oil fields and their access routes. Thus, internal instability and Soviet incursion were Washington’s main worries. In Lebanon, however, the US interest materialised soon

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after the end of World War II. The expectation that Lebanon might turn into a strategic stronghold for the US arose from the recognition of its geopolitical position, as well as from the conviction that the country was firmly pro-Western in its inclinations. This belief led to the American plan to allow the Saudi Mediterranean oil pipeline to pass through Lebanon. Later, the outbreak of the Cold War added to the force of such an argument. Although the US understood that Lebanon was not the key to the Middle East, and that countries such as Syria and Egypt were more significant, Zisser rightly suggests that Washington still considered it worthwhile to foster close relations with Beirut. This policy was mainly driven by the country’s pro-Western orientation (especially amongst its Christian actors) and its public awareness of the need for Western protection.14 Lebanon’s importance for the US agenda may be reflected through three initiatives during the late 1940s: first, the conclusion of the petroleum Tapline agreement, which was signed on 10 August 1946; second, achieving Lebanon’s economic assistance under Point Four of the Truman Doctrine of 12 March 1947 (Point Four spoke of help to such recipient countries as would use it to fight off communism; the relevant agreement was signed on 4 December 1951); and third, a failed attempt during 1946 to conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce – Lebanon was reluctant to commit itself so strongly to the US.15 During the 1950s, a divided Lebanon was trying to preserve its sovereignty whilst escaping entanglement in conflicting systemic and regional dynamics. Decision makers in the country had to balance Lebanon’s commitment to Western policies in the region against the threatening ideology of Arab nationalism – a policy dictated by the opposing affiliations across the domestic Christian– Muslim division. Accordingly, Zisser indicates that, from the end of 1950, Western policies in the Middle East aimed at a plan to establish a regional defence command in which the Middle Eastern countries – including Lebanon – would take part alongside the Western powers. The aim was to coordinate the defence of the region against possible Soviet aggression – an idea initiated by the British but soon jointly

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promoted by the US. Thus, on 25 May 1950, Britain, France and the US issued the ‘Tripartite Declaration’, which laid down principles for upholding the security and territorial integrity of Middle Eastern states. Lebanon welcomed the declaration; however, when the proposal for forming a Middle East Command for that purpose was submitted by the Western powers in October 1951, Lebanon’s leaders refrained from any such commitment. Although tacitly they would agree to it, they feared a hostile reaction – especially from the Sunni community.16 Similarly, George Nasr rightly suggests that Lebanon under President Khoury acted according to the logic of a newly independent, small state. Khoury’s main objective was to preserve Lebanon’s newly obtained independence, and for that the country needed to preserve the status quo in the Middle East. In the 1940s and the early 1950s, the challenge to that status quo came from the Hashemite monarchies of Iraq and Jordan. Iraq was seeking the realisation of the Fertile Crescent Project (Iraq and geographical Syria), and Jordan the realisation of the Greater Syria Project (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine) – both of which involved Lebanon and Syria. Lebanon, therefore, aligned itself with the opponents of the Hashemites – Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt – whenever it was threatened with these Hashemite projects. Concurrently, Lebanon cooperated with the three major Western powers – Britain, France and the US. However, the 1951 Middle East Command (MEAC) proposal, which was rejected by Egypt and was a matter of disagreement amongst the Arab states, was also critical to the stability of Lebanon. Conflicting views amongst the Arab states on alignment (Syria was uncertain; Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were in favour, but they would not enter without Egypt’s concurrence), as well as the conflict between the Western powers and Egypt, had their impact on the internal situation in Lebanon. The country’s Sunnis were influenced by Egypt, and thus against alignment. Lebanon took the safest course by refraining from making a decision. A few months later, the Egyptian coup d’e´tat, on 23 July 1952, brought all discussions about the alignment to a standstill.17 President Camille Chamoun, who succeeded Khoury on 23 September 1952, had to face yet another challenge – the Baghdad

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Pact. With the Cold War now dominating all aspects of Middle East politics, the region was polarised between Iraq, which became a member of the pro-Western Baghdad Pact of 1955, and Egypt – now a revolutionary socialist state – which pursued a policy of undeclared war on Western interests in the Middle East. Egypt adopted a revolutionary brand of Arab nationalism, purchased arms from the Soviet bloc in the autumn of 1955 to counter Iraqi–Western armaments and had started an agenda for regional hegemony. Egypt, therefore, became the main challenger to the status quo and Lebanon tilted towards the Baghdad Pact, as it opposed Egypt’s bid for Arab leadership.18 Lebanon did not, however, join the Baghdad Pact or its counterpart – the Tripartite Alliance – which was led by Egypt and included Saudi Arabia and Syria. Lebanon had to accommodate its Muslim sentiments towards Arab nationalism; take into account Christian reservations about an alliance with an anti-Western Syria and Egypt, and disapproval of their close collaboration with the Soviet Union; and, most important, a Christian fear of Arab nationalism. But Lebanese neutrality was not enough for Egypt and its allies (Syria and Saudi Arabia), who went on exerting pressure on the country to force it into their alliance. The Suez War in 1956 would also increase the pressure on Lebanon, with Muslim demands to sever diplomatic and economic relations with Britain and France, who were at war with Egypt. Lebanon, nevertheless, maintained friendly diplomatic relations with Britain, France and the US throughout 1955 and 1956, until the end of the war in which the US opposed French and British aggression and which ultimately substantially reduced the power position of the two nations in the region. Although the US would abandon plans for military alliances with Arab states like the MEAC (1951) and the Baghdad Pact of 1955, it continued to view the region as its exclusive sphere of influence. This latter assumption, however, was the basis for yet another episode in Cold War politics – the Eisenhower Doctrine.19 The Eisenhower Doctrine was another manifestation of US and Soviet polarisation over the Middle East in a bipolar international system: it constituted the US policy of containing Soviet

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expansionism in the Middle East at the height of the Cold War. This pattern of superpower polarisation over the Middle East resembled that of Franco-British polarisation over the Levant in the previous century and, likewise, would produce decisive systemic effects on the structure and stability of Lebanon. The fierce Cold War pattern of interaction and the US policy of Containment would prove vital to the preservation of the stability and structure of the Lebanese political system. The systemic dynamics (Eisenhower Doctrine) would ultimately surpass any regional (Egypt) or domestic (Lebanese Muslim) dynamics towards a change in the status quo (Lebanese stability and structure). According to Henry Kissinger, the US’s attempts to distance itself from Europe, especially after the 1956 Suez War, forced it to carry the burden of protecting pro-Western regimes in every region of the world, including the Middle East. Thus, on 5 January 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower formulated what came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine – a threefold Middle East programme of economic aid, military assistance and protection against communist aggression – a policy that would later enable US intervention in Lebanon during the 1958 Crisis.20 Thus, as Carl Brown rightly suggests, after the 1955 Czech– Egyptian arms deal, in which Egypt bought $250 million worth of Soviet weapons through Czechoslovakia, Washington feared that Nasserism would facilitate Soviet penetration of the Arab world. The 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine came at a time when France and Britain were discredited in the Arab world after the 1956 Suez War. It was viewed in the region as an American attempt to keep the Arabs away from Nasser. Although most Arab states avoided such an unpopular public position, the Lebanese Government of President Chamoun allied with the US policy and antagonised Arab nationalists, who started a battle for the control of Lebanon in order to drag it back towards their notion of an Arab consensus.21 Chamoun, however, was not alone in sensing the need to balance the Egyptian threat; Jordan and Saudi Arabia had also openly allied themselves with the US, and condemned Cairo and Damascus for allegedly opening the door to the spread of communism in the area.

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In return, the US extended its financial and military support – but not without unintended serious repercussions for such states. This alliance with the West, as Kerr correctly suggests, also contributed to the armed insurrection in Lebanon in May 1958 and the military coup that liquidated the Iraqi monarchy two months later. Syria became firmly knitted to the communist camp alongside Egypt, and would seal its ideological orientation by its union with Egypt in February 1958. The Iraqi revolution of July 1958 would also end Britain’s position in that country, and the subsequent landing of American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan respectively, to prevent a chain reaction that might overthrow the regimes in those countries, was the last major Western effort to play a decisive role in inter-Arab affairs during the Cold War.22 Lebanon’s subscription to the Western alliance was not undertaken in vain or as an act of defiance in the face of Arab consensus; rather, it was a last attempt by Chamoun to safeguard the stability and structure of the country’s system from Syrian –Egyptian aggression under the guise of Arab nationalism. Therefore, as Nasr rightly suggests, President Chamoun immediately subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine, abandoning the traditional policy of neutrality because of the perceived threat to Lebanese independence from Syria and Egypt. During 1955 and 1956, Chamoun had followed a policy of appeasement towards states, by keeping Lebanon non-aligned and by extending full support to Egypt during the Suez Crisis. Both Syria and Egypt, however, refused to come to terms with the Lebanese Government. The threat of exporting revolutionary Arab nationalism into Lebanon in order to accomplish Nasser’s agenda for leadership in the region was potent.23 In the same manner, Rasler suggests that President Chamoun had violated an important condition of the 1943 National Pact – maintaining a neutral Lebanon – only to safeguard the system. A wave of pan-Arab and Nasserist ideologies had bombarded Lebanese Muslims, whose allegiance shifted towards Egypt and Syria. With an insecure Christian community and the threat posed by Nasser to the survival of Lebanon itself, Chamoun’s only hope was to align Lebanon with the US.24

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Therefore, polarisation over the Eisenhower Doctrine immediately percolated down to the domestic divide in Lebanon. Muslims were driven by the fever of Arab nationalism; Christians by their devotion to Lebanese nationalism, and keenness to preserve the independence of their country. The unity of the country was about to be severely tested. Lebanon became polarised into two camps: an anti-Western, proNasser side amongst Lebanese Muslims (primarily Sunnis); and, basically, a pro-Western, anti-Nasser and anti-Syrian side amongst its Christians. Egypt and Syria viewed Lebanon as an enemy and a threat to their own future security. Consequently, they led an intense attack on the Lebanese Government in the press and radio, and supported its removal.25 However, Sunni anxiety about a proWestern policy in general, and the Eisenhower Doctrine in particular, coupled with an unreserved allegiance to Nasser and a tendency to unite with neighbouring Syria, would only serve to strengthen Christian support for President Chamoun. Under the circumstances, prominent Christian leaders who were not previously on especially good terms with the President rallied to his support, while most of the Sunni elites backed the ambitions of their communities against the President.26 Lebanon was now firmly positioned on the Western side in the Cold War competition. It was understood at that time that if and when aggression by ‘international communism’ took place, Syria would be the source for communist, as well as Soviet, influence, which was on the increase in that state. Therefore, the subscription of Lebanon to the Eisenhower Doctrine was directed not only against the Soviet Union but also against its allies in the Arab world: Syria and Egypt.27 Systemic polarisation between the two superpowers thus infiltrated the domestic division in Lebanon and compounded its rival Christian and Muslim allegiances, heightening the threat of collision. Nasr correctly observes that Lebanese nationalism and Arab nationalism determined, to a great extent, the attitude of Lebanese citizens towards the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Lebanese nationalists feared the unionist tendencies of the Syrian and Egyptian regimes and

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disapproved of Soviet influence in those countries. Alignment with the US meant to them additional security against the dangers emanating from these sources, and a means of preserving close ties with the West. Therefore, Lebanese nationalists, generally Christians, placed their national interest to the fore when they welcomed economic and technical assistance from the US through the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Arab nationalists, on the other hand, evaluated the doctrine primarily on the Arab level. Thinking of the ‘Arab Nation’ as a homeland, these nationalists, mostly Muslims, were against Western– Arab collaboration. Lebanese Muslims would abide by the position of Syria and Egypt, at whose hands the Arab nationalists expected the realisation of Arab unity. The anti-Western policy of Syria and Egypt, therefore, played the main role in instigating the Arab nationalists against the Eisenhower Doctrine. Arab nationalists – realising that the doctrine was directed against a change in the status quo by force, and that it was designed to drive a wedge between the Arabs and the Soviet Union – sought to discredit the US. This overwhelming sectarian allegiance of each group (Lebanese nationalists and Arab nationalists) gradually turned the rift in Lebanese society into a confessional conflict.28 On the regional level, Syria and Egypt soon embarked on an organised campaign to change the status quo by force in Lebanon, by triggering instability in order to overthrow the regime. Radio and press media from Cairo and Damascus instigated this opposition to the government, and focused their attacks on President Chamoun. In addition to press and radio campaigns, Egypt and Syria were sending arms and sabotage experts to the Lebanese opposition. The situation was aggravated by the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) on 1 February 1958. The majority of Lebanese Muslims, driven by Arab nationalism, gave up all loyalty to the Lebanese state and now demanded unity with the UAR. Lebanese nationalists, on the other hand, warned that unity with the UAR would not be tolerated, and that independence would be defended at all costs.29 It was the perfect time for Nasser to try to achieve his regional agenda and overthrow the regime in Lebanon. To his disappointment, however, events would soon prove that the dominant international

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dynamics ran against any forceful change in the status quo of Lebanon. Nasser’s agenda for change would clash with a higher and more powerful Western agenda to preserve pro-Western Lebanon. By the spring of 1958, the US was becoming sceptical of the validity of dividing the Arab world along ideological lines through the Eisenhower Doctrine, and was tempted to take a more conciliatory attitude toward the Nasserite movement. However, Salim Yaqub suggests that in the spring and summer of that year, the US gave Chamoun full support against any Nasserite attempts to change the status quo in Lebanon and dispatched, upon his request, thousands of marines to Lebanon. Chamoun was one of the few Arab leaders to embrace the Eisenhower Doctrine, and in so doing had symbolised the US commitment to freedom and independence, and it was crucial for the US that he avoided public failure. Permitting the obvious defeat or collapse of one of its chief Arab defenders was out of the question, because the US’s prestige could thereby suffer severe damage not only in the Middle East but throughout the world. Thus, the US would have to provide all possible support to prevent Chamoun’s political demise.30 Domestically, though, Lebanese Muslims and pro-Nasser leftist politicians were openly supported by Egypt and Syria, after the establishment of the UAR, in their attempt to overthrow the Chamoun regime. Ironically, it was under the pretext of a domestic issue – the presidential succession – that the crisis erupted and internationalised Lebanon’s internal divisions in 1958. By mid-May of that year, autonomous rebel zones had appeared throughout the country, including in Beirut. Muslim anti-establishment groups had already received small amounts of arms and equipment from Syria over the previous two years, but when the crisis erupted the US and Britain reported a dramatic increase in those illegal transfers – and they were being supplemented by the infiltration of armed UAR nationals. Such infiltration was part of Nasser’s policy, and he also used the UAR Embassy in Beirut to channel money and arms to the rebels. Moreover, hostile propaganda was directed against Chamoun’s regime through the broadcasts of Radio Cairo’s ‘Voice of the Arabs’.31 There was no doubt that Syria and Nasser’s Egypt were fomenting the 1958 crisis in an attempt to change the status quo in the country

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and overthrow the Christian pro-Western regime, as a preface to annexing Lebanon into their UAR. Lebanon was an obstacle to Nasser’s bid for hegemony in the Middle East. However, any regional dynamics leading to the collapse of a pro-Western Arab regime would stand in direct contrast to the US policy of containment in general and its Middle East version – the Eisenhower Doctrine – in particular. Lebanon, which had endorsed the doctrine and was a member of the Western alliance, was entitled to, and would request, the support of the West against the Nasserite threat. American Intervention and Preservation of the Status Quo The 1958 Crisis threatened Western interests not only in Lebanon but also across the wider Middle East region. Losing a foothold with the collapse of a pro-Western regime was considered a gain to the Soviet camp – an unacceptable eventuality in the context of Cold War politics. Thus, the crisis in Lebanon took on an international dimension whereby the systemic effects of fierce Containment would ensure the failure of Nasser’s endeavours in Lebanon, preventing the shift of the crisis into all-out war and preserving the integrity of the political system by maintaining its structure. Within the wider region, if the Lebanese rebels were to succeed, supported as they were by the UAR, Nasser’s prestige and influence in the Arab World would have been considerably enhanced. This would seem to imply that, conversely, the Western powers ought to rein in their power position and influence in the Middle East somewhat in order to accommodate Nasser. The Egyptian President was, after all, no communist – and, in fact, unity between Syria and Egypt could be regarded as a check on communist influence in the former country; however, there was no question that Nasser’s close collaboration with the Soviet Union implied that his success would amount to the promotion of Soviet prestige in the area.32 The US knew that its intervention in Lebanon could enhance antiWestern sentiment in the Arab world, resulting in the overthrow of pro-Western governments, the closing of the Suez Canal, the sabotaging of pipelines in Syria, and probably a major oil crisis for the West. However, refusing to honour President Chamoun’s request

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for intervention would be even worse, since it would show the world that the US was not prepared to come to the defence of its allies, with catastrophic implications for the Western position in the Cold War.33 Military intervention to preserve the status quo in Lebanon would at least maintain the confidence of non-Arab Middle Eastern countries like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Failure to act, on the other hand, would damage US credibility with the Soviets and encourage the latter’s expansionism. Losing the Middle East by inaction was widely considered worse than the ‘loss’ of China because of the strategic position and resources of the former.34 Furthermore, the Lebanese crisis did not satisfy the assumptions and commitments formalised in the Eisenhower Doctrine. It was not a case of ‘armed aggression’ by a country ‘controlled by international communism’; therefore, the US had to rely mainly on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in order to justify any military intervention. However, in reality, its intervention in Lebanon had everything to do with the Eisenhower Doctrine. Lebanon’s subscription to the doctrine in early 1957 alienated the country’s Muslims and contributed to the 1958 instability. Nonetheless, it earned the country the gratitude of the US and the support necessary to suppress the instability and preserve the Lebanese system. Thus, the doctrine bore the main responsibility for aggravating the Lebanese crisis to the point where intervention by the US seemed necessary, even though it failed to provide sufficient legal justification for that intervention.35 On 14 July, the Iraqi monarchy was toppled and Iraq declared a republic. This event boosted the morale of the Lebanese rebels and increased the prospect of a ‘domino effect’, which would collapse the Lebanese regime. President Chamoun immediately sent an official request for US troops, and the next day, 15 July, the first American Marine detachment landed south of Beirut. Meanwhile, a British detachment of paratroopers was sent to support the Jordanian regime, which was also threatened by Nasser’s agenda.36 The US intervention reinforced stability in the country and ended any prospect of success for the Egyptian agenda in Lebanon. Western intervention preserved the status quo in Lebanon by ensuring a regular

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presidential election and a continuation of the political system. Nasser’s plan for hegemony was checked by Western intervention, and attempts to annex Lebanon to the UAR proved futile. The uprising in Lebanon against President Chamoun’s government that began in May, and then the Iraqi revolution of 14 July that put an end to the monarchy, brought pan-Arab expectations to their height. For a moment, it seemed as if pan-Arab objectives were at hand – then the expectations turned sour. The American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan respectively, allowed Chamoun to see out his term in office and to achieve a peaceful succession of power, which would secure the continuation of Lebanese independence and the survival of King Hussein’s regime in Jordan. The greatest disappointment came in Iraq. The new regime there soon descended into a power struggle, and by the end of the year the relationship between Iraq and the UAR was even worse than it had been under the Hashemite regime. Nasser considered the Iraqi prime minister, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, a traitor to Arab nationalism and a stooge for international communism. The low point in Baghdad–Cairo relations was reached in March 1959, when an uprising in the city of Mosul, led by Arab nationalist officers and supported by the UAR, was bloodily suppressed. The following autumn, there was an unsuccessful attempt on Qasim’s life, attributed to agents of the UAR.37 The events of 1958 provided further testimony of Lebanon’s chronic domestic divide, and of a phenomenon that has recurred throughout the country’s history – that is, the automatic alignment of both Christians and Muslims with opposing external powers or ideologies in an effort to preserve or enhance their leverage in the political system. This domestic pattern of interaction of a zero-sum game between Lebanese actors continues to be the norm, and any polarisation on the international level tends to boil down to a confrontation across the domestic divide and a subsequent occurrence of instability in Lebanon. Hence, as Milton Viorst suggests, although the 1958 instability was terminated relatively quickly it left the Lebanese Christians sceptical about their Muslims compatriots’ commitment to the Lebanese state, and wary about how the latter would react to the next Arab demagogue who came along.38

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It is not clear whether the 1958 instability was a direct systemic effect of the Eisenhower Doctrine or not; however, it is certainly obvious that one direct systemic effect of that policy was the restoration of stability and the preservation of the political system in Lebanon against domestic and regional efforts to enforce a change to its structure. The domestic (Muslim) and regional (Syrian–Egyptian) agenda to change the status quo in Lebanon was overwhelming, and to a certain extent it succeeded in provoking instability in Lebanon. However, these regional dynamics stood in clear contrast to more compelling systemic dynamics – containment through the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Cold War systemic dynamics would supersede any regional sub-systemic dynamics, and eventually instability was suppressed and any forceful change in the status quo prevented. The Lebanese political system thus survived the domestic and regional agenda for change through direct systemic intervention by the US.

De´tente and the 1975 War The Vietnam War left a great impact on the containment policy pursued by the West. Cold War dynamics continued to govern most aspects of international politics, but military intervention as an object of containment policy took a more cautious turn. Post-Vietnam War US presidents concluded that the best way to avoid another such debacle was simply to stay out of Third World conflicts – especially civil wars. A symptom of this new direction was the Nixon Doctrine, which reaffirmed US defence commitments worldwide but which made it clear that the US would never again ‘Americanise’ a ground war on an ally’s behalf. The US would continue to provide military assistance, but allies would be expected to supply the manpower for their own defence.39 Background: System Dynamics and De´tente De´tente did not represent a major shift in the systemic pattern of interaction (Cold War dynamics), rather it was a contingent policy designed to ease tensions between East and West. The US and its

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Western allies sought de´tente with the Soviet Union in order to enable cooperation on critical issues, especially in Europe, and as a means of restraining communist expansionism and aggression. A short interval of de´tente took place during the Cold War when the two competing superpowers saw it as in their interest to regulate their relationship. However, this increased cooperation, especially in arms control, did not change the general pattern of interaction in the Cold War system. The US –Soviet relationship remained fundamentally a competitive one, and polarisation over most issues remained the rule. Although De´tente was doing well in Europe, US–Soviet polarisation over Third World issues interacted with ongoing competition in the arms race to undermine the process.40 The Nixon Administration removed the US from the Vietnam War, and refocused the nation’s attention on broader international issues through a process of what it called ‘structure of peace’. The triangular relationship between the US, the USSR and China helped in accomplishing a series of breakthroughs: the end of the Vietnam War; an agreement that guaranteed access to divided Berlin; a dramatic reduction of Soviet influence in the Middle East, and the beginning of the Arab– Israeli peace process; and the European Security Conference (completed during the Ford Administration).41 The first attempts at de´tente were initiated by France. Between 1961 and 1969, de Gaulle broke the West’s united front against Moscow by pulling France out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and by pursuing his own policy of De´tente with the Kremlin. He tried to undo the spheres-of-influence arrangement, which made western Europe the ‘backyard’ of the US and placed eastern Europe under Russian tutelage, and proclaimed a policy of ‘de´tente, entente and cooperation’ with eastern Europe. De Gaulle wanted West Germany to follow in France’s footsteps, but he failed in this regard. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 put an end to de Gaulle’s initiative.42 In 1969, Willy Brandt was elected Chancellor of West Germany and decided to adopt the policy of Ostpolitik – rapprochement with the communist world – with the object of eventual German reunification. President Richard Nixon’s administration – fearing

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the loss of Germany from the Western alliance and NATO, and the restraints of the European Economic Community – decided to support Brandt’s initiative rather than obstructing it. Supporting Ostpolitik gave the US the leverage to end the 20-year-old crisis over Berlin. Nixon firmly linked Ostpolitik and access to Berlin (then an enclave deep inside Soviet-controlled territory), and both these issues to overall Soviet restraint. In 1971, a new four-power agreement was reached guaranteeing the freedom of West Berlin and Western access to the city. Consequently, the dispute with the Soviet Union over Berlin was resolved and other friendship treaties were achieved between West Germany and Poland, West and East Germany, and West Germany and the Soviet Union.43 On the Soviet side, these treaties provided a big incentive for restrained conduct, at least while they were being negotiated and ratified. De´tente successfully linked the whole range of issues between East and West all around the world. If the Soviets were to reap the benefits of the relaxation of tensions, they, too, would be obliged to contribute to De´tente.44 In the Middle East, the US used the de´tente policy as a safety net while it reduced the Soviet Union’s political influence. The Soviet Union had become the principal arms supplier to Syria and Egypt during the 1960s, and an organisational and technical supporter of radical Arab groups. The USSR also championed the Arab position and radical Arab views in international forums. Under such circumstances, any diplomatic progress on the Arab–Israeli front would be attributed to Soviet support, while stalemate incurred the risk of repeated crises. The deadlock could only be broken if all the parties were obliged to face the fundamental geopolitical reality of the Middle East: that Israel was too strong (or could be made too strong) to be defeated even by all of its neighbours combined, and that the US would counter any Soviet intervention there. The US therefore tried to pressure the Soviets to restrain their allies in the region.45 On the opposite side, the Soviet leaders tried to persuade Washington to support diplomatic outcomes that would strengthen the Soviet position in the Arab world. But as long as the Soviet Union kept supplying the radical Middle Eastern states with the bulk of their

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arms and their diplomatic support, the US had no interest in cooperating with Moscow. In the view of Nixon and his advisers, the best strategy was to demonstrate that the Soviet Union’s capacity to foment crises was not matched by its ability to resolve them. Arab moderation would be encouraged by rewarding responsible Arab leaders with American support when their complaints were legitimate. The Soviet Union would then either participate or be moved to the periphery of Middle East politics. The US followed two complementary paths in order to achieve this goal: it blocked any Arab action that resulted from Soviet military support or involved a Soviet military threat, and it also took charge of the peace process between the Arab states and Israel when the situation reached a deadlock and some key Arab leaders dissociated themselves from the Soviet Union and turned to the US after the 1973 Arab–Israeli War.46 In 1973, Egypt and Syria went to war against Israel, and when the conflict had ended Israel had crossed the Suez Canal to a point some 20 miles from Cairo and occupied Syrian territory to the very outskirts of Damascus. Egypt, under President Anwar Sadat, turned from Moscow to Washington for assistance in a step-by-step process towards peace. Even Syrian President, Hafez Assad – considered the more radical of the two leaders, and the one more closely tied to the Soviet Union – sought American mediation on the Golan Heights issue. In 1974, there were interim agreements with Egypt and Syria that began a process of Israeli withdrawal in return for Arab security guarantees. In 1975, Israel and Egypt concluded a second disengagement agreement. In 1979, Egypt and Israel signed a formal peace agreement under the auspices of US President Jimmy Carter.47 The Berlin negotiations contributed to Soviet restraint in the Middle East until well into 1973. Later, the European Security Conference helped to moderate Soviet reactions during the various diplomatic shuttles that moved the Soviet Union to the fringes of Middle East diplomacy. De´tente not only calmed the international situation, it also created restraints that contributed to what was considered a Soviet geopolitical retreat.48 The objective of the US was to get beyond Vietnam without suffering geopolitical losses, and to establish a policy towards the

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communists that was geared to the relevant battlefields. Nixon saw De´tente as a tactic in a long-term geopolitical struggle. Ironically, by 1973, Nixon’s policy had pacified East– West relations to such a degree that it became safe to challenge it at home. There was a call to return to the original premise of containment and to follow a more rigid line, awaiting the transformation of the Soviet system. Nixon, however, believed that De´tente served US interests because a period without expansion would weaken communism.49 In the summer of 1970, Nixon started negotiations with the Soviet Union that provided the framework for an agreement on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) two years later. The negotiations led to two agreements: the Anti-Ballistic-Missile defence system (ABM Treaty) in 1972; and a five-year interim agreement that obliged both sides to freeze their strategic offensivemissile forces, whether land- or sea-based, at agreed levels.50 In 1971, the Nixon Administration decided to add the European Security Conference to its list of incentives for encouraging Soviet moderation. The US insisted on the satisfactory conclusion of the Berlin negotiations and the initiation of negotiations on mutual force reductions in Europe. When these were concluded, the Conference emerged through the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. The most significant provision of the Helsinki Agreement turned out to be the so-called Basket III on human rights (Basket I and II dealt with politics and economy). Reforms were achieved in eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia and Poland) using these provisions, both domestically and internationally, in order to undermine not only Soviet domination but also the communist regimes in individual Eastern bloc countries. The European Security Conference thus helped to moderate Soviet conduct in Europe, and it later accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Empire.51 According to William Keylor, both US President Richard Nixon and USSR General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev were determined to reduce East– West tensions, but neither was capable of controlling their Middle Eastern clients. For instance, when President Sadat failed to secure from the Soviet Union the offensive weapons that would have assured Egyptian military superiority over Israel, he

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abruptly turned against his patron, the USSR. On 18 July 1972, shortly after the Nixon – Brezhnev summit talks in Moscow appeared to confirm the Kremlin’s commitment to East–West De´tente at the expense of its clients in peripheral regions such as the Middle East, the Egyptian leader angrily ordered most of the Soviet advisors and technicians out of his country (though he permitted the Russians to retain access to Egyptian naval facilities). In early October 1973, on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, Egypt, in concert with Syria, launched a well-coordinated surprise attack against Israel. During the conflict, the two superpowers, though reluctant to become involved in another Middle Eastern struggle that might unravel the fragile fabric of de´tente fashioned by Nixon and Brezhnev, did not want to be defeated by proxy. They therefore supplied military equipment to their respective clients while vainly seeking to arrange a ceasefire through the United Nations. During the conflict, the Kremlin declared its intention to deploy its forces in the region (a zone of strategic and economic importance to the US); in response, the US ordered a worldwide nuclear alert of US forces and the Soviet Union followed suit. For a moment, it appeared that Moscow’s desire to exploit the Arab–Israeli conflict in order to retain a foothold in the Middle East, and Washington’s determination to prevent such a radical shift in the global balance of power, had offset both superpowers’ commitment to the Nixon–Brezhnev policy of De´tente.52 The escalation of this fourth Arab–Israeli war into a global confrontation between the US and USSR was, presumably, avoided by a compromise resolution passed by the UN Security Council on 22 October 1973, which authorised the interposition of a UN emergency force between the combatants in order to supervise a ceasefire. In December of that year, the Israelis and Arabs, under intense pressure from both superpowers, conducted their first direct negotiations in Geneva – a prelude to US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s famous ‘shuttle’ diplomacy, conducted between Cairo and Tel Aviv for two further years. In September 1975, the two sides finally concluded an agreement that provided for partial Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in order to create a buffer zone policed by US and UN observers to detect ceasefire violations. Though the USSR did not recognise this

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American-sponsored interim agreement, it refrained from interfering with the peace process in the Middle East. Thus, the superpower De´tente appeared to have survived its first serious test, while the prospects of stability in the Middle East seemed, by the middle of the 1970s, to be more promising than ever before.53 De´tente reached its high point in 1973, and then degenerated over increasing polarisation and instabilities in the Third World. During the 1970s, the US frequently accused the Soviet Union of taking advantage of De´tente to increase its influence in the Third World. For the Soviet Union, De´tente was problematic on the domestic level because radical elements became critical of the Soviet leadership and accused it of favouring better relations with the US over supporting progressive movements in the Third World. In the October 1973 Middle East War, the policy became highly strained when both superpowers took actions that seemed incompatible with the spirit of De´tente and the commitment to relax tensions and forego attempts to gain unilateral advantage. It was clear that such a regional conflict carried the risk of drawing the superpowers into direct confrontation.54 Although Sadat had expelled the Soviet advisers in 1972, once the war started in October 1973, the Soviets supported Egypt and Syria by engaging in a massive re-supply effort. The US, on the other hand, countered the Soviet efforts by airlifting tons of weapons to Israel. After hostilities ended, the Americans focused on excluding the Soviets from the peace settlement, and Sadat soon leaned to the Western side. The loss of Egypt, the most powerful regional Arab state, was a serious blow to the Soviets in a region of great strategic importance.55 The 1973 war was not the only incident that strained US–Soviet relations during the contingent policy of De´tente. The general Cold War dynamics was still prevalent outside the European continent. In the 1970s, a series of confrontations between the two superpowers spread throughout the Third World. From South East Asia to Africa to the Middle East, proxy wars were fought between Soviet- and USbacked parties in local conflicts, spreading instability throughout these Third World countries. On the international level, a continued

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arms race and mutual mistrust persisted as each superpower thought the other side was taking advantage of De´tente to increase its powers and win the Cold War.56 Eventually, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 provoked an abrupt return to Containment. The US considered the invasion a step towards controlling Pakistan, Iran, and eventually the oil-rich Gulf region. Later, Carter declared, through what became known as the Carter Doctrine, that any attempt by the Soviets to control the Persian Gulf would be a threat to US vital interests – and, hence, would be opposed by all means possible.57 Circular Effect and Change in the Regional Environment The US assistance to Israel during the 1973 War, the loss of Egypt, and the later Egyptian change of sides towards the West were all considered regional gains to the US in Cold War politics. In addition, the decline of the status of Egypt after 1973 shifted the balance of power between the two superpowers and weakened Soviet influence in the Middle East. Consequently, in an attempt to adapt to this change in the regional environment, the Soviet Union sought an alternative ally and threw its support behind Syria. Syria became the main Soviet ally in the region and the champion of Arab–Israeli confrontation. This ‘circular systemic effect’58 would transform Lebanon into a buffer state59 – a small independent state lying between two larger, usually rival, states – between Syria and Israel. Lebanon became locked in a buffer-system arrangement due to this circular effect, which would also have great consequences for its stability. With full Soviet support and a new-found US passivity towards Lebanon, Syria embarked on a regional agenda to dominate Lebanon in order to improve its position vis-a`-vis Israel – a policy that necessitated fomenting instability in Lebanon as a means to control the country. The buffer (Lebanon) is simply smaller than its two neighbours – the smaller and larger parties in a buffer system signify relative capabilities. Realising its inferior position vis-a`-vis both its rival neighbours, Lebanon tried to avoid conflict by following a policy of ‘deutilisation’ – the deliberate effort to remain weak – in an attempt to preserve its neutral position in the regional conflict. Therefore,

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Lebanon tried to discourage its rival neighbours from interfering in Lebanese neutrality by rendering the state weak so as to make any move against it a blatant act of aggression.60 Although it could be argued that Lebanon (as a buffer) played a secondary role in the conflict between Syria and Israel, this did not prevent Syria from treating Lebanon as such; the Syrian invasion of Lebanon was strongly motivated by the long-sought Syrian objective to incorporate Lebanon into ‘greater Syria’. The logic of a buffer system, however, has its own rules. None of its rival neighbours could dominate Lebanon. Thus, when Syria invaded Lebanon militarily in 1976, Israel followed suit by claiming for itself its own zone of influence south of the Litani River. The Syrians chose to intervene in Lebanon when they recognised that the logic of the buffer system prevailed, and they tried to soften the Israeli reaction by coordinating their moves with Israel’s ally, the US. Although Lebanon got caught in a buffer system, a unilateral takeover by Syria or Israel could not take place – thus, in 1978, Israel, in turn, occupied the southern part of Lebanon in an attempt to prevent total Syrian control of the whole country, and warned against any Syrian presence south of the Litani.61 Lebanon incorporated neutrality into its unwritten National Pact of 1943, which established a norm of non-affiliation with France or the Christian West and a limited association with the neighbouring Arabs. Relations with Syria, however, were a persistent dilemma, and only when Syria was weak did Lebanon’s neutrality seem secure. With the exception of the 1958 instability after Syria’s merger with Egypt, Lebanon enjoyed two decades of strong neutrality and was able to avoid being drawn into the 1967 and 1973 Arab– Israeli wars mainly because of Syria’s weakness. A series of ten successful coups in the latter country between 1949 and 1970 kept Syria’s aspiration of dominating Lebanon at bay.62 With Egypt’s waning influence and Soviet backing, however, this was Syria’s opportunity to make its bid for regional hegemony – and especially to try to achieve its dream of a Greater Syria. This sudden ascendancy in its regional position as an intermediary for Soviet policies in the Middle East enabled Syria simultaneously to follow its agenda for Lebanon and the Soviet agenda for the region. Therefore, it

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is safe to assume that the 1975 War in Lebanon was mainly the outcome of the aforementioned circular systemic effect. The Palestinian Factor Lebanon had been fertile ground for conflict long before 1975 and the commencement of the Syrian agenda for hegemony. Domestic and regional factors had combined to strain the country’s domestic divide. The Palestinian factor, in particular, was a necessary catalyst to that conflict; in fact, Palestinian militants actually started the 1975 War with the blessing of Lebanese Muslims and leftist elements and the active support of Syria. The necessary conditions for the conflict were already present, and the changing international and regional environment provided sufficient factors to give way to instability in 1975. Although many domestic factors, like the hegemony of conservative, sectarian elites or the liberal economic system privileging the service sector,63 may have added to the already strained domestic divide between Lebanese Christians and Muslims, it was the regional factors represented by the Palestinian and Syrian activities that rendered the division extreme on the eve of the 1975 War. In general, there were demands for a shift away from the provisions of the National Pact of 1943 and for a redistribution of the domestic balance of power, in order to curtail the powers of the Christian president and enhance those of the Muslim prime minister, in addition to demands for equal distribution of Parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims and greater political participation for the latter group. Lebanese Muslims and leftists allied themselves with the Palestinians in order to attain those demands and improve their status vis-a`-vis the Christians – and even tried to transform the political system as a whole.64 After the devastating 1967 defeat of the Arabs by Israel in the Six Day War, the political arm of the Palestinians – the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – transformed itself into a more independent and militant nationalist movement, and decided to initiate its own armed struggle. Egypt and Syria, whatever their proPalestinian rhetoric, would permit no independent PLO activities

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across their borders. Jordan was successful in controlling its borders with Israel. Lebanon was therefore the only remaining Arab territory from which to launch raids into Israel. Arab states imposed a settlement in Lebanon that provided the PLO with the status of a ‘state within a state’. Under pressure from the Arab League, and particularly from Nasser, Lebanon was forced to sign the Cairo Accord of 1969, which ceded to the PLO authority over the refugee camps and the power to build a military base within striking distance of the Israeli border. In the following year, the PLO challenged King Hussein of Jordan, who prevailed and defeated them in the ‘Black September’ assault of 1970. This cracked down on the Palestinian militants, who were thrown out of Jordan and subsequently infiltrated Lebanon in order to join other PLO forces already there. They rearmed and established for themselves a state within a state in south Lebanon and the Beirut suburbs, while their raids into Israel increasingly exposed Lebanon to Israeli retaliation. This aggravated Lebanon’s polarisation between Christians and Muslims.65 The PLO, under the leadership of the Fatah movement and in conjunction with the Syrian authorities, was rapidly establishing clandestine Palestinian commando bases in South Lebanon, and developing special lines of supply to connect them with Syria. These bases were already being used for operations against Israel by 1968. The Christian Lebanese, and some conservative Muslims who did not want to see their country turned into another Jordan, were gravely concerned by the growth of the commandos.66 The activities of the Palestinian commando militias were considered a serious threat to national security and stability in Lebanon, and exposed the country to the danger of Israeli retaliation and possible Israeli occupation of parts of South Lebanon. At the domestic level, the leftist groups and the Muslim Lebanese gave their backing to the commandos in the hope that they would serve as an instrument for the promotion of Muslim power in the country at the expense of traditionally established Christian prerogatives. In 1968, therefore, the Lebanese community was already severely divided between a Muslim pro-Palestinian and a Christian anti-commando grouping.67

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A Palestinian proto-state – ‘Fatahland’ – evolved in the south of Lebanon and became a battleground between Israel and the Palestinians. The Lebanese state, burdened with domestic and regional pressures, was unable to act as a sovereign state, and in 1973 it would sign yet another accord with the Palestinians – the Malkart Agreement – that confirmed the Cairo Accord.68 Between 1967 and 1973, the Palestinians launched hundreds of attacks on Israel, which were met with Israeli retaliation. The Lebanese Army deserted the southern part of Lebanon, and the area became a battleground for Israel and the Palestinians. By the early 1970s, these Palestinian operations had become the focal point around which Lebanese ‘rejectionists’ – mostly Muslims and leftists – had congregated. The Palestinians’ position in the south became pre-eminent following the active part that they played in the Lebanese war during 1975–6. They helped the National Movement to occupy almost all of Lebanon. The Palestinians became the true masters of the area stretching between Tyre-Nabatiyya and Beirut, and had a strong base in Sidon. The Palestinian mini-state was firmly established in the area between the Litani River and Beirut after 1978, when Israel invaded Lebanon in the ‘Litani Operation’ with the object of removing all Palestinian bases from the south. United Nations forces (UNIFIL) were deployed in the area following the subsequent Israeli withdrawal.69 Although the Palestinian factor exacerbated the domestic divisions in Lebanon, it is doubtful that it would have been sufficient to trigger the 1975 War had it been the sole dynamics for change at the time. On the contrary, a Palestinian role would have strained the domestic arena between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon but would not have had any decisive effect on the country’s stability had it not been endowed with sufficient systemic dynamics for change. The Syrian Agenda and Instability in Lebanon The Palestinian factor provided both an opportunity and a challenge to the Syrian agenda in Lebanon and the region. Syria initially supported the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon alongside its Lebanese allies in triggering the war in 1975 as a prelude to its

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aspired hegemony, but, soon afterwards, Syria would have to check those same allies lest they jeopardise its regional agenda. Syria was already an established client to the Soviet Union when the Lebanese war started in 1975. This conflict, in a pro-Western state in the Middle East, was clearly inseparable from Cold War dynamics. Throughout the 1970s, Syria had built up its military forces with Soviet aid – all the more so after Sadat turned from Moscow to Washington.70 Moreover Syria’s allies in Lebanon enjoyed the same Soviet patronage. The Palestinian–leftist coalition and Syriansponsored Palestine Liberation Army battalions along with Al Saiqa (Palestinian guerrilla) forces operating in Lebanon enjoyed Soviet support.71 Since Hafez Assad consolidated his power in Syria in the early 1970s, he had regarded Lebanon as central to his nation’s sphere of influence – and Lebanon was most important for Syria’s regional ambitions. In addition to its geographical proximity and close historical ties, Lebanon’s role as the major base for PLO operations raised the stakes for Syria, whose reputation as champion of the Palestinian cause was integral to its claim to Arab leadership. Syria (Syria’s agenda) endorsed moderate reform of the Lebanese political system along with preservation of the status of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon, but extreme elements in Lebanon’s anti-establishment coalition (Syria’s allies) wanted a secularised and leftist-orientated Lebanese regime, whose Arabism would be asserted in staunch support of the Palestinian resistance. This stance would challenge Syria’s position of regional leadership, taking the foreign-policy initiative out of Syrian hands and possibly leading to war with Israel at an unfavourable moment.72 Although Syria might have hoped to achieve its goals in Lebanon through its Lebanese and Palestinian allies, it soon realised that it lacked sufficient leverage over them and that direct intervention in Lebanon (which came in June 1976) was imperative to achieve compliance and the wider Syrian agenda in the region.73 Syria had an interest in maintaining a continuous, low-intensity conflict with Israel because the oppressive Syrian Alawite regime needed to perpetuate such a conflict in the name of Arab nationalism in order to acquire legitimacy and stay in power. It needed an

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ideological cause to fight, and found it in the Arab –Israeli conflict. By maintaining this low-level combat with Israel, through its proxies and primarily via Lebanon, the Syrian regime was able to claim that it was the only Arab country that was fighting Israel.74 After the Arab– Israeli war of 1973, in which Israel occupied the Golan Heights in Syria, the US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, mediated a settlement that resulted in the signing of the Golan Heights Agreement on 31 May 1974, at which Syria pledged that guerrilla operations would not be permitted against Israel across the Golan Heights. Assad’s legitimacy, however, was based on confronting Israel, and this could no longer be done across the Syrian– Israeli border. Therefore, when chance permitted, Assad took the opportunity to intervene in Lebanon – already the scene of PLO operations – to use its territories to ‘confront’ Israel as he was unable to do anywhere else.75 Syria did not, however, wish to take its chances in a direct confrontation with Israel; if not restrained, its Palestinian and Lebanese clients would have dragged it in that direction. When the war started, Syria immediately dispatched units of the Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army and Palestinian guerrilla group Al Saiqa (‘Lightning’) to Lebanon in order to ‘prevent the perceived Christian efforts to partition the country’. Their intervention tilted the balance significantly in favour of the Muslim–Palestinian forces and allowed the Syrians to work out a ‘national covenant’ designed to regulate and modify the Lebanese political system76 – the first attempt in a series of failed Syrian efforts to change the status quo in Lebanon and establish its control over that country’s system. It is widely acknowledged that, in June 1976, the Syrian regime shifted its support in the Lebanese war from the Palestinian and leftist–Muslim side to the Christian side in a tactical step intended to regain the balance of power within the country and to prevent any one party from dominating it. This time, the Syrian regime decided on direct intervention and sent its army to invade Lebanon and restore the military balance that had been turning against the Christians after the PLO forces achieved substantial gains on the ground. Soon afterwards, on 20 July 1976, Assad gave his famous speech in which he declared that ‘Syria and Lebanon are one people in two states’.

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This Syrian incursion into Lebanon came amidst heightened tensions between Arab states. Assad had been irritated by the signing of the Sinai II Agreement between Israel and Egypt on 4 September 1975, since he felt that he had been betrayed and deserted by the Egyptian President. Syria feared that Egypt had taken itself out of the confrontation with Israel, leaving Syria to face the Israelis alone.77 Moderate Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, opposed these Syrian attempts to make political gains in Lebanon in order to offset the perceived setback of Sinai II. Saudi Arabia was wary of Syria taking advantage of Lebanon’s crisis to form a northern front, which would consolidate its military strength and would give the Syrians a voice at least as influential as that of Egypt in Arab military affairs.78 The Saudis were also worried that the resultant fighting could lead to a general Arab–Israeli war, so they favoured joint Arab action to solve the Lebanese situation rather than unilateral action by individual Arab states. Therefore, in early October 1976 Kuwait, with Saudi blessing, called for an Arab League meeting to discuss Lebanon. The ‘Arabisation’ of the Lebanese war, as the Arab League initiative was widely viewed, was opposed by Hafez Assad, many Palestinians and some Lebanese. The Syrians refused to attend the conference.79 Assad was an accomplished strategist, and he knew that the key to the successful attainment of his agenda lay in playing his cards well with the two superpowers competing over the Middle East. Systemic dynamics not only positioned Syria in the forefront of regional politics, but the softening of Containment in favour of De´tente – and the US initiative for peace in the Middle East – provided an ideal moment for Syria to make its move. Assad was in the right position at the right time. De´tente Ramifications and Lebanon’s Stability When the Lebanese war started in 1975, a contingent policy of de´tente was prevalent on the international level and the possibility for direct confrontation between the two rival superpowers had been kept at bay. The conflict therefore ranked as unimportant in the US agenda for the Middle East. The US was pursuing a more vital policy in the region – an initiative for Arab –Israeli peace – and preferred to

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hand over the issue of Lebanon to a sub-systemic intermediary (Syria) while insulating itself from direct involvement. The Soviet Union, however, saw in the Lebanese war an opportunity to compensate for lost ground in the region, especially after the defection of its main ally, Egypt, to the Western side. Therefore, Syria, which was already a Soviet client by 1975, would simultaneously serve as a sub-systemic intermediary for US policies in the region. Syria’s role in Lebanon would be endorsed and encouraged by the US, as it would be perceived as vital to regional security and an Arab– Israeli peace. On the eve of the 1975 War, Lebanon was not considered a strategic asset in the region and the US was not ready to intervene directly in a Third World conflict during a period of de´tente, as it had been in the 1958 War. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the resulting oil crisis, the US had shifted its focus of attention from the Levant, which until then had been the scene of Cold War confrontations and Arab–Israeli wars, to the Gulf, where the US had massive oil interests that had been threatened by the oil embargo. Issues in the Levant, and especially Lebanon, became of minor importance and increased in significance only when the situation there affected the flow of oil from the Gulf. The US military and economic alliance with Saudi Arabia and Iran surpassed the superpower’s relations with all other Middle Eastern countries except Israel. Lebanon was no longer considered a political asset to the US stance in the region. Moreover, the emergence of De´tente between the two superpowers in the early 1970s enabled US policy makers to define the instability of Lebanon in 1975 as a domestic or regional problem.80 According to Kail Ellis, when the war broke out in 1975, Kissinger was preoccupied with the negotiations for a second Arab – Israeli disengagement agreement. Kissinger’s main concern was to prevent the conflict in Lebanon from escalating into a general Middle East war. However, although the US had a traditional policy of supporting the Christians in Lebanon, this time – given the collapse of Vietnam, and the US-Adminstration’s decision to stop supporting anti-Soviet forces in the 1975 Angolan conflict – direct military support was out of question. The US thus confined itself to the

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nominal position of opposing any foreign intervention in the Lebanese conflict while trying to maintain a balance between the various forces. Kissinger feared that Lebanon would become dominated by the PLO and other radical groups and their Lebanese allies, making the country a permanent guerrilla base against Israel. This view, according to Ellis, directed the US policy of opposing any PLO participation in the Arab–Israeli peace process. Moreover, although Kissinger opposed Syrian hegemony in Lebanon he saw a role for Syria in balancing radical Muslim groups, as long as this did not provoke a Syrian–Israeli confrontation over Lebanon. When Israel was convinced its national interest coincided with Syria’s objectives, Syria intervened in Lebanon in June 1976 to end the first phase of the Lebanese war.81 The US mistakenly considered Syria part of a solution to the conflict, and was blinded to the fact that it was actually a major and direct cause of instability in Lebanon. However, the US would later capitulate to Syria’s self-imposed role as a regional intermediary in Lebanon and, naturally, so did the Soviets. Although the US voiced nominal opposition to Syria’s intervention and later invasion of Lebanon, it soon changed to a positive welcoming of the Syrian role, which Kissinger, the US secretary of state, and the State Department both described as ‘constructive’. It was thought that Syrian involvement would curb the PLO’s influence and divert them from the Golan Heights and the separate peace being prepared with Egypt. The US, moreover, brokered an informal agreement between Syria and Israel that became known as the ‘Red Line’ understanding; this enabled Syrian troops to invade Lebanon, beginning on 1 June 1976. The understanding stipulated that Israel would allow Syrian entry into Lebanon on certain conditions: first, Syrian troops would not be deployed south of a ‘red line’ drawn west from the Litani River; second, the number and equipment of Syrian troops was to be strictly limited; third, Syria was not allowed to deploy any air force or antiaircraft missiles; and finally, the use of Syrian naval forces was limited. A general understanding between the Syrians and the US was that the former would control the Palestinian–leftists and restore order to the country. The US would also formalise the Syrian role in Lebanon by giving it an Arab cover. The US arranged – through its ally, Saudi

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Arabia – an October meeting between presidents Assad and Sadat in Riyadh, at which Assad agreed to drop his opposition to Sadat’s concessions to Israel in exchange for Sadat’s dropping his opposition to Syria’s role in Lebanon. The agreement culminated in an official Arab League mandate to Syrian forces in Lebanon.82 The US arrangement with Syria also sounded good to Israeli policy makers. Syria was kept at a safe distance from Israeli borders, and it was in Israel’s interest to keep a huge number (25,000 soldiers at the time) of Syrian elite forces mired in Lebanese internal divisions and clashes, and away from the Golan Heights. To achieve this objective, Israel actively supported the Christian forces in the south and, through a political and military alliance with the anti-Syrian Maronite leaders, in the rest of Lebanon.83 Moreover, the US would actively endorse an exclusive Syrian role in Lebanon while rejecting any other involvement. During the Lebanese presidential race in 1976, the US special envoy to Lebanon, Dean Brown, made it clear to Raymond Edde – a presidential candidate – that the US supported the Syrian military prerogative in Lebanon, and that what had happened in 1958 would not be repeated in 1976 – that is, the US would not intervene militarily to end the conflict. Moreover, he assured Edde that the US would veto any UN resolution for that purpose in case the Lebanese sought the help of the UN (to send multinational forces); thus, the US would not allow any party other than Syria to act as intermediary and enforce its vision for a settlement.84 Unlike the US, which felt at ease with its position in the Middle East – especially after the defection of Egypt – the Soviet Union continued its active support to radical groups and allies in the region in an effort to achieve relative gains vis-a`-vis the US. While the US operated in the spirit of de´tente on Middle Eastern issues, the Soviet Union was still pursuing strict Cold War policies. Naturally, any perceived leftist gains in the region were welcome news to the USSR, and, accordingly, Syria’s agenda in Lebanon fell into such a category. From the very beginning of the war, Moscow had been concerned for the fate of the Palestinians. It downplayed the Palestinian role in the Lebanese conflict and portrayed the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) as a vital element in the Arab struggle against

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Israel, whose weakening would harm the overall Arab cause. Consequently, support for the Palestinians emerged as a policy dictated by and complementary with the Arab national interest. The Soviet Union was interested in preserving the PLO’s position in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world, for its significant role in obstructing a possible rapprochement between Syria and the US (of a kind that Egypt had reached) and as a reminder that Israel had usurped the Arab territories with the support of the Americans. Soon after the onset of the war, Moscow also bestowed its open support on the leftist and Muslim cause in Lebanon.85 After the 4 September 1975 disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt, the US seemed to have enhanced its position in the region as the only power capable of delivering what the USSR had been promising for eight years – forcing Israel to relinquish at least part of the occupied territories – and thus the Soviet position was significantly weakened both in terms of the zero-sum game in a bipolar system and in terms of their regional polarisation. It was feared that Cairo’s acceptance of a US-sponsored accord would start a chain reaction with other Arab states, mainly Syria and Jordan, following suit. Moscow had to support the more radical Arab groups in order to avoid losing ground in the Middle East. Thus, Syria was designated to serve as the linchpin of Soviet Middle East strategy. Syria’s goal to establish a Syrian-led north-eastern Arab alliance was supported by Moscow with the hope that it would effectively counterbalance the emerging Cairo – Riyadh axis, and eventually lead to the abortion of the US peace initiative.86 Moreover, a definite leftist victory in Lebanon and the establishment of a progressive regime in this traditionally pro-Western country could have effectively undermined the recent American successes, whilst permitting the creation of a territorial belt of Soviet influence extending from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. Lebanon was considered a subordinate issue to wider regional Soviet pursuits – particularly the dual goals of enhancing Soviet relations with the Arab confrontational states and striving to become an equal partner in the settlement process, which was the paramount regional determinant of Soviet policy towards the Lebanese war.87

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The opportunity for a Syrian agenda in Lebanon ripened mainly because of a contingent pattern of interaction on the systemic level – De´tente – however, there were limitations to Syria’s prerogatives. Whilst instability was not preserved under De´tente, the structure of Lebanon had to be maintained because no one party was able to make substantial gains and break the balance under the general and paramount Cold War pattern of interaction. The status quo would not change as long as a Cold War pattern dominated a bipolar international system. The Americans and Soviets had opposite interests in Lebanon; the Soviets would encourage a Syrian attack on the Christian nationalists because it would lead to the installation of a leftist regime dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military support and, hence, a Soviet gain in Lebanon that would compensate for its losses in Egypt. For the US, on the other hand, the policy of containment would prevent any Soviet gains in the region and thus would prevent a total Christian defeat, which would have enabled a leftist regime in Lebanon.88 Therefore, as Buzan and Waever argued, it is wrong to assume that the 1975 civil war in Lebanon and the failure of De´tente to affect or prevent its occurrence may lie in the fact that it had nothing to do with Cold War dynamics, and that it was caused by regional dynamics that ensured that the former could not have affected its occurrence.89 In fact, it was the De´tente dynamics themselves that provided the ideal circumstances for instability in Lebanon. Similarly, the argument raised by Farid el Khazen that the eventual breakdown in Lebanon’s stability and the 1975 War was embedded in the 1967 defeat and the subsequent military role of the Palestinians in Lebanon,90 or in an independent Syrian agenda for change, does not provide an adequate explanation for the triggering of the 1975–90 War. The main determinant for change in the stability of Lebanon did not lie in domestic or regional (Palestinian or Syrian) dynamics, rather it was dynamics on the international level – De´tente policy – that were conducive to instability and the 1975 War. Syria was able to pursue its regional agenda, and undermine Lebanon’s stability for that purpose, in the midst of contingent

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De´tente dynamics that neutralised US direct opposition and did not prevent keen Soviet support to its regional ally. Total Syrian control over Lebanon, and settlement of the conflict in its favour, would, however, prove impossible under the prevalent Cold War dynamics. The balance in the Middle East in general, and in Lebanon in particular, had to be maintained and no party was allowed to prevail. Contingent De´tente dynamics and the circular systemic effect may have led to the 1975 War, but general systemic Cold War dynamics had to prevail over any other factor in a bipolar international system. Conducive contingent systemic dynamics triggered the war, and a prevalent general containment policy throughout the Cold War in a bipolar system ensured its continuation. Thus, the Lebanese war was firmly entangled in wider Cold War politics, and the internal balance had to be preserved while a forceful change in structure proved impossible. Settlement Failure (1975– 89) and the Preservation of the Status Quo Many attempts to settle the conflict were made between 1975 and 1989. Whether they sought genuine reconciliation among the various warring factions or promoted plans to end the conflict in favour of one of the parties involved, all attempts ended in utter failure. The status quo would be maintained, and a change in Lebanese structure would prove impossible under Cold War dynamics. Settlement would only be attainable with the conclusion of the Cold War and the end of polarisation between the two superpowers over the Middle East. The main attempts to end the conflict were: the National Dialogue Committee (1975), the Constitutional Document (1976), the Arab Summit Conference at Riyadh and Cairo (1976), The Geneva – Lausanne Conference (1983, 1984) and the Damascus Tripartite Agreement (1985).91 The National Dialogue Committee (25 September–24 November 1975) was the first Syrian-sponsored attempt to resolve the conflict. It was composed of 20 members, equally divided between Christians and Muslims. However, the committee, of mostly traditional

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sectarian leaders, lacked a clearly defined mission, mandate or agenda, and its members had totally different expectations.92 Actors in the conflict were aligned primarily into two camps – the Muslim Lebanese National Movement (LNM), in alliance with the PLO, and the Christian Lebanese Front (LF). They were divided over the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon and the need for political reforms. The Christians blocked any attempt at reform under Palestinian military pressure. They accused the PLO of tilting the balance of power between the religious communities in Lebanon in favour of the Muslims, and demanded that the PLO’s power be curbed and its presence limited to certain regions of Lebanon.93 The Constitutional Document (14 February 1976) was a reform programme worked out between Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh and Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam. The 17-point programme that became known as the Constitutional Document was based on a compromise that would set the tone for all succeeding discussions of constitutional change in Lebanon.94 It strengthened the powers of the Sunni Muslim prime minister, weakened that of the Maronite Christian president, reallocated power in parliament by equalising the number of Christian and Muslim deputies (i.e. it proposed replacing the 6:5 ratio, which favoured the Christians, with an equal 5:5 ratio) and called for Palestinians to abide by the agreements between the Lebanese state and the PLO.95 Christians would, therefore, relinquish some of their powers in return for Muslim consent to maintain the confessional system and not to demand a share of political power proportionate to their demographic majority. Although never incorporated into law, the Constitutional Document established the direction and constraints for a future agreement. However, the document was refuted by the LNM – the most powerful movement inside Lebanon at the time – and the attempt came to nothing.96 The Riyadh–Cairo Arab Summit Conference (October 1976) was yet another attempt at settlement in the aftermath of Syria’s direct military intervention in June 1976. A summit meeting attended by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and the PLO was convened in Riyadh to consider the Lebanese conflict and the crisis in Syrian–Palestinian relations. Decisions taken by the Riyadh Summit

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were endorsed by a full Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo. The two meetings established a sizeable Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to assist the Lebanese Government in reasserting its authority. A committee composed of representatives from Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was formed to supervise the application of the 1969 Cairo Accord between Lebanon and the PLO. This Arab initiative for settlement would also fail, as the Syrians shifted their support from the Christian to the Muslim/PLO side in Lebanon. Israel’s March 1978 invasion and its creation of a ‘security zone’ in South Lebanon ended all hopes for implementation of the Riyadh Summit’s resolutions.97 The Geneva–Lausanne Conference (31 October–4 November 1983 and 12–20 March 1984) was an attempt based on a Saudi–Syrian initiative after the signing of the Lebanese–Israeli 17 May Agreement in 1983. The Agreement, which was supported by the US, was rejected by the Lebanese Muslims and strongly opposed by several Arab countries, especially Syria. President Gemayel accepted the initiative and headed a Committee for National Reconciliation with nine other prominent political figures to discuss issues concerning Lebanon’s identity, Israel’s occupation, comprehensive reform measures and the role of the military.98 By 1983, Syria had become the dominant power in Lebanon with 30,000 troops in Lebanese territories, and the Palestinians in Lebanon were no longer the issue in negotiations. Syria and its allies were mainly concerned with abrogating the Lebanese–Israeli treaty. The Geneva part of the negotiations was a result of an escalation of hostilities by the Syrian-supported factions of the Druze and non-PLO Palestinian forces, who attacked the areas under Christian control. The Geneva Conference, however, simply resulted in recommendations to abrogate the 17 May Agreement and to end the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territories. The second rounds of talks, in Lausanne four and a half months later, were the result of an escalation of hostilities by proSyrian militias (Shi’a and Druze) against the Lebanese Army. Syria orchestrated this fighting and provided financial, logistic and military assistance to its allies. The result was further disintegration of the national army and the abrogation of the Lebanese–Israeli agreement.99 The Damascus Tripartite Agreement (28 December 1985) represented yet another Syrian attempt to settle the conflict in its

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favour. Syria summoned the leaders of the three major militias, Elie Hobeiqa (Leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces), Nabih Berri (Leader of the Shi’i Amal, or ‘Hope’, movement), and Walid Jumblat (the Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party – PSP), who met in Damascus to negotiate a settlement plan. The resulting tripartite agreement departed radically from former peace plans in several areas, especially in its call for the abolition of the sectarian system and for the definition of a special relationship with Syria. Distinctive relations with Syria materialised later on after the Taif settlement in a series of bilateral agreements that tied Lebanon to the Syrian regime on all levels (security, military, foreign affairs etc). This was supposed to keep the Lebanese committed to Arab causes and refrain from adopting prowestern policies. In practice, it established total Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. The agreement was short-lived; two weeks after its signing, Samir Geagea (then chief of staff of the Lebanese Forces) led a rebellion that removed Hobeiqa from the leadership of the Lebanese Forces, and annulled the accord. However, the plan’s two new elements (phased abolition of sectarianism and special relations with Syria) became key issues that any future settlements would have to address.100 Syria’s agenda for Lebanon was evident in all its sponsored attempts at settlement. The compromises on the domestic distribution of power that would weaken the Christian position in the system, the issues related to Arabism and special relations with Syria would all eventually lead to the weakening of the Lebanese system and the strengthening of Syria’s hegemony. These advantages, and more, would eventually be attained in the Ta’if settlement, which would put an end to the war. The agenda sought by Syria’s sponsored settlements during a bipolar international system would be achieved later in more favourable international circumstances. The US also made its bid to end the war, through a peacekeeping intervention in 1982. With the Cold War still raging, however, and a ‘soft’ approach to settlement, with the minimum deployment of armed force, the attempt eventually crumbled, with catastrophic losses to US diplomatic and military prestige. The US, under the Reagan Administration, sent a US Marine Corps ‘peacekeeping’ force into Lebanon. Although the intervention

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had humanitarian intentions, the US military was drawn directly into the conflict, provoking deadly retaliation by those opposed to the American presence.101 The immediate but implicit aim of US intervention was to restrain an ally – Israel – after its invasion of Lebanon. The Israelis misled the Reagan Administration into believing that the invasion would be limited to southern Lebanon – i.e. that it was designed to create a defensive buffer zone – whereas, in fact, Israeli defence minister Ariel Sharon’s agenda was to destroy all PLO forces in Lebanon and establish a Christian, pro-Israeli government in Beirut. The general long-term US aims in Lebanon were to secure the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces and to establish a strong central government in Beirut. In Lebanon, however, as in Vietnam, translating general political goals into specific and attainable military objectives proved impossible.102 The initial US intervention did secure a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the beleaguered PLO forces from West Beirut, where they had been surrounded and pounded by Israeli aircraft and artillery. But US intervention in the wake of Israel’s occupation of West Beirut and complicity in the massacres of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps was weakened from the start by the administration’s inability to define clear political objectives attainable by military means. In fact, it was suggested that ‘the US decision to reenter Lebanon was less a considered policy decision than an impulse to “do something” to demonstrate US concern and assuage American guilt over what had taken place in the refugee camps despite US promises that Palestinians would be safe after the PLO departure’.103 The US’s ultimate goal of a peaceful Lebanon free of all foreign forces presumed the willingness of the Israelis and the Syrians to withdraw. In fact, the Syrians refused to leave and the Israelis conditioned their withdrawal on Syria’s. The initially welcomed US Marine Corps presence would soon turn into an inviting target for Iranian and Syrian-sponsored terrorists. The US’s support for Lebanon against both its domestic militia enemies and Syria led to the bombing of the US Embassy on 18 April 1983, and later to a deadly attack on 23 October on marine headquarters.104 Soon afterwards, the marines withdrew from Lebanon and the US refrained

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from further involvement in the Lebanese war, awaiting the right conditions for a successful settlement. A settlement that would bring an end to the Lebanese war would, however, only materialise after the end of the Cold War and superpower polarisation over the region. On 22 October 1989, the Lebanese Parliament adopted the Document of National Understanding, better known as the Ta’if Accord – the settlement that would eventually bring an end to the war. All previous peacemaking efforts had failed. During the Cold War, the conflict had been aggravated through competition between the two superpowers for influence in the Middle East. Regionally, some Arab governments – as well as Israel – had exploited the opportunities offered by Lebanon’s political divisions. External powers had sponsored Lebanese groups in order to promote their own interests.105 Therefore, any attempt at settlement under Cold War dynamics would have failed because a balance had to be maintained and no one party to the conflict was allowed to triumph. As long as the superpowers were polarised over the Middle East, the conflict in Lebanon, which reflected that polarisation, persisted. With the end of polarisation, however, a settlement became feasible. Crisis vs 1975– 90 War During the instabilities of 1958 and 1975 – 90, domestic factors, amongst others, played an important role in producing fertile ground for the conflict. Both wars were accompanied by demands for major political reform in the Lebanese regime in order to repair basic distortions. Lebanese Muslims, especially the Shi’a and Druze, demanded representation in parliament according to their proportion within the population. Muslims also demanded that more political posts be opened to the Muslim communities, and that the position of prime minister be strengthened.106 Domestic factors, however, would not have been sufficient on their own to trigger either of these two conflicts. The domestic dynamics leading towards instability could always have been checked by the government if outside intervention had been neutralised. Moreover, domestic dissatisfaction across the Christian–Muslim divide has

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been a permanent feature of Lebanese politics in view of the zerosum-game pattern of interaction amongst its minorities. Karen Rasler suggests that international political dynamics combined with internal factors to produce different outcomes in 1958 and 1975. Whereas, the 1958 Lebanese War was quickly terminated and a negotiated settlement between the major internal parties resulted in an outcome that preserved the existing political system, the 1975 War was not as successfully concluded. It produced a political system breakdown and resulted in a change in the structure in Lebanon, with the Ta’if Accord. A comparative analysis of the two conflicts will reveal that the regional sub-systemic environment played a significant role in bringing about both of them.107 Both conflicts were stirred by regional and international politics. In particular, the divisions within Lebanon were exploited by the foreign-policy objectives of Egypt in the 1950s and Syria in the 1970s. Albeit at different times, both presidents Nasser and Assad were involved in powerful bids for regional Arab hegemony and their relationships with various Lebanese groups were forged in the interests of protecting or advancing their Middle East positions.108 However, the regional agendas of both Egypt and Syria were dependent on the intensity of Cold War dynamics and the superpowers’ polarisation over the Middle East. According to Rasler, international pressures were greatly responsible for the 1958 and 1975 wars but the internal and external factors were largely concurrent. In other words, it is too difficult to suggest that the causal factors of these two civil wars were situated primarily in Lebanon’s domestic institutional arrangements or the configuration of international competition. A more accurate picture is that the intermingling of complex internal and external dynamics produced Lebanon’s revolutionary situation in 1958 and 1975. However, the conditions of the war in 1958 were much more conductive to settlement than the war environment of 1975 – 6.109 Rasler’s notion of external pressure as a predominant cause of instability is rather confused and inaccurate; the Middle East region constitutes the main system in her analysis and she fails to critically differentiate between the regional and systemic dynamics and how each affected

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stability in Lebanon. Both external factors are treated collectively as a cause of change in Lebanon, and she fails to specify whether the regional or systemic was the main determinant of instability. Similarly, Samir Khalaf acknowledges that the Cold War had transformed the Middle East into a proxy battlefield for superpower rivalry, causing the 1958 Crisis,110 but he, too, fails to specify the distinction between regional and systemic effects on change in Lebanon and their relative significance. The Egyptian bid to change the status quo in Lebanon challenged the systemic pattern of polarisation over the Middle East under a strict containment policy adopted by the US; thus, it was eventually countered and aborted through direct US intervention. A settlement was reached and the status quo preserved. In 1975, a relaxed policy of de´tente and US efforts for peace between Israel and Egypt marginalised Lebanon’s importance. Therefore, the Syrian agenda for Lebanon was not opposed as long as it did not threaten De´tente or the US peace initiative. Settling the conflict in Syria’s favour, however, was impossible under the general Cold War conditions, and a breakthrough would only be reached with the end of the polarisation over the region. Although the US intervened in Lebanon amidst the Cold War atmosphere of 1958, it failed to do so in the De´tente atmosphere of 1975. When the US did intervene again, in 1982, it was amidst renewed Cold War tensions after the collapse of the contingent De´tente dynamics. In sum, while the Cold War had a disintegrating effect on the Lebanese polity, triggering instability on both occasions, it also accorded Lebanon at least a minimum of strategic value for the US in the international arena.111 Therefore, it is safe to assume that when systemic polarity coincided with systemic polarisation, Lebanon acquired a magnified and strategic value in the rivalry between the superpowers, which helped in the preservation of its political system. Comparing the two wars, of 1958 and 1975–90, proves the primacy of systemic effects on the changes in the stability and structure of Lebanon. In the first instance, the regional agenda leading to instability and a change of status quo in Lebanon were

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thwarted by an unfavourable, strict and ‘militarised’ Containment dynamics on the systemic level and fierce polarisation with respect to the Middle East region. In the second instance, however, De´tente and the primacy of a US peace initiative in the region were favourable for a regional agenda that fomented instability in Lebanon and sought a change in its status quo. Although systemic dynamics occasionally contributed towards the events leading to the occurrence of instability in Lebanon, they have always been the primary factors behind enforcing stability and ending violence whenever it occurred. In general, the conditions of a bipolar international system helped to preserve the structure of Lebanon, and any attempt at forceful change in the status quo during the Cold War was prevented. Although systemic polarisation (US vs USSR) over the Middle East paved the way for instability in Lebanon, a bipolar systemic structure and a general pattern of interaction (Containment) allowed no change in its political system. The Eisenhower Doctrine – stemming from the Cold War dynamics and the Containment pattern of interaction, and aimed at preserving pro-Western or status quo regimes in the Middle East – not only prevented the occurrence of war in Lebanon but also hindered a regional and domestic attempt to change its structure in 1958. In contrast, a later contingent pattern of interaction (De´tente), which rendered US intervention in Third World conflicts of a Cold War nature unfavourable, failed to preserve stability in Lebanon and triggered the 1975–90 War. However, a forceful change in Lebanon’s structure was impossible throughout the war – that is, as long as the Cold War persisted. Superpower polarisation over the Middle East would balance the contending powers within Lebanon and disable any attempt at settlement. The end of US–Soviet polarisation over the Middle East by the end of the 1980s signalled another phase of systemic effects on the structure and stability of Lebanon – a successful settlement to the 1975–90 War would be reached (the Ta’if Accord) and would be enforced through a regional intermediary (Syria), leading to a change in the structure of Lebanon and a transfer into what some commentators regard as a ‘Second Republic’ political system.

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The end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union marked a major change in the structure of the international system. A new international system commenced, with an, arguably, unipolar structure, which had a new set of rules and a general pattern of interaction defined by the dominance of the only remaining superpower – the US – on the international level. The change in the systemic pattern of interaction with the end of Cold War polarisation over the Middle East, amongst other regions, had an indirect mediated effect on Lebanon, terminating the 1975 – 90 War through a regional intermediary, Syria, which imposed a political settlement that led to yet another change to Lebanon’s political structure – this time leading towards a ‘Second Republic’ system. The new system in Lebanon was, however, saddled with a total loss of political autonomy and a de facto Syrian mandate for almost 15 years. After the terrorist attacks against the US on 11 September 2001, however, new dynamics on the international system ensued, and a contingent systemic pattern of interaction was reflected in a ‘war on terrorism’, which modified the US policy towards the Middle East. Syria, amongst others, was targeted as part of this new US policy which had a direct effect on Lebanon’s structure through evicting Syria’s forces from the country and restoring its political autonomy in 2005.

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The ‘New World Order’ and the Syrian Mandate The end of the Cold War and the bipolar system also brought to an end the last vestiges of superpower polarisation over the Middle East and enabled a successful settlement (the Ta’if Accord in 1989) in Lebanon, which was sponsored by the US and its regional ally, Saudi Arabia. The US, however, assigned to a regional intermediary – Syria – the enforcement of the settlement – a process which led to a significant loss of Lebanon’s political autonomy in favour of substantial Syrian hegemony. Therefore, the end of systemic polarisation (Cold War) and the emergence of a unipolar ‘new world order’ had the indirect mediated systemic effect of a de facto Syrian mandate in Lebanon between 1990 and 2005. The termination of Soviet – US confrontation on the international level also brought to an end the US policy of containment of the USSR, and thus concluded an era of polarisation between the two superpowers over almost all international issues – a pattern of interaction that had characterised the Cold War for almost 40 years. Thus – for the Middle East in general, and Lebanon in particular – the end of polarisation over the region terminated the need for the US to balance another superpower in the region (the Soviet Union) and eventually brought an end to local wars related to the Cold War era – including, naturally enough, an end to Lebanon’s conflict. The collapse of the Soviet Union also marked a major change in the structure of the international system, with the disappearance of a major systemic actor. Consequently, a new world order materialised around the sole remaining superpower – the US – rendering it a unipolar structure with a new set of rules and patterns of interaction. The commencement of such a unipolar system on the international level was accompanied by an end to the 1975–90 instability in Lebanon; a change to a new political structure (so-called Second Republic); and a de facto Syrian mandate over Lebanon’s new system, with the tacit blessing of the US. Background The process that led to the end of the Cold War and the eventual disappearance of the Soviet Union from the international system

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started in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev, the new general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted a fresh path of reforms in order to deal with the severe economic and military problems of his nation. Gorbachev followed a policy of simultaneous economic and political reforms – a new political openness, or glasnost, and economic restructuring, or perestroika – in an attempt to ensure the survival of the Soviet Union. The first signs of improved Soviet– US relations in accordance with this Soviet overture occurred when the stalled arms-control negotiations were also resumed in 1985. On 8 December 1987, the two superpowers signed a historic agreement that eliminated all intermediate-range nuclear forces (ground-based missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometres) from Europe.1 By 1989, the Kremlin had also changed its attitude toward its client states in eastern Europe. They were now considered economic burdens on the USSR, and they had also lost their strategic value as satellite states in light of the successful arms-control negotiations with the West. Consequently, when the communist regimes were ousted from power in the Eastern bloc countries during 1989, the Kremlin acquiesced. Between 1989 and 1990, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany – the DDR) denounced communism and broke free from Soviet constraints. Later, in November 1990, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and the Soviet-led trading system – Comecon – was abolished in January 1991.2 The collapse of the Soviet Union reversed the US attitude towards Russia in a matter of months – from hostility to friendship. With the dissolution of the eastern European satellites, almost all Russian acquisitions since the time of Peter the Great had been lost. The pace and enormity of the Soviet collapse was a unique historical event – the disintegration of a systemic power without even losing a war: a collapse that started during President Ronald Reagan’s second term (1985) and was completed during George H. W. Bush’s presidency.3 Reagan’s first term had marked the formal end of De´tente, when the US abandoned the policy aimed at the relaxation of tensions and took a more aggressive stance in confronting Soviet geopolitical offensives.

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Reagan had introduced a rearmament programme designed to end any Soviet quest for strategic superiority, whilst simultaneously utilising the issue of human rights as an ideological instrument to undermine the Soviet system.4 All the gains obtained by the Soviets in the 1970s were reversed after the end of the Cold War. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was ended in 1990; Cuban troops withdrew from Angola by 1991; the communist-backed government in Ethiopia collapsed in 1993; and, in 1990, the Sandinista communist party in Nicaragua consented to free elections. The most important development, however, was the Soviet Army withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Mikhail Gorbachev was later toppled from power, in 1991, and Boris Yeltsin (president of the Russian Republic – one of the 15 republics of the Soviet Union at that time), supported by the Soviet Army, took over and declared the Communist Party illegal, putting an end to the Soviet empire.5 In the Middle East, Soviet policy had been altered by Gorbachev’s reforms since 1985. Gorbachev assumed a new policy called the ‘new thinking’, in which the Kremlin abandoned the quest for an ‘antiimperialist’ Middle East alliance – an aim that had dominated Soviet priorities in the previous decades. The ‘new thinking’ was originally adopted to deal with the issue of Afghanistan, but was applied later to the Middle East.6 In addition to a reassessment of Soviet Middle East policy in general, the ‘new thinking’ modified Soviet interactions with the US and the international community as well. Its main objectives involved the extrication of the USSR from the ‘swamp’ of Afghanistan with the least possible damage; abandoning the ‘anti-imperialist bloc’ policy, in favour of establishing friendly relations with states of any political nature; and an active role in the settlement of regional conflicts, including a principal role in the Arab– Israeli peace process and the attempted resolution of the 1990 Gulf crisis. The new policy also involved a curtailment of Soviet support to radical states. Thus, arms supplies to Syria and Libya were reduced in the second half of the 1980s and Gorbachev made it clear to Assad that the Soviet Union did not intend to help Syria attain military parity with Israel.7

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Therefore, the Soviet Union moved away from confrontation with the US in the Middle East (and other regions) and was cooperating with the US to bring a peaceful resolution to local conflicts. The ‘new thinking’, which marked the end of the Cold War, served the Kremlin as the basis of a comprehensive global and regional approach. Thus, in the 1990 Gulf crisis, upon Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Soviet Union aligned itself with the US as a principal protector of a ‘new world order’8 – an order which was proclaimed by President Bush in classically Wilsonian terms with a stress on the theme of ‘enlarging democracy’. In this new structure, however, the US was the only remaining superpower with the capacity to intervene in any part of the world.9 This New World Order, setting new rules for the international system, was clearly reflected in the 1990 Gulf War. The US, which acted as the custodian of the World Order, went to war against Iraq to end its occupation of Kuwait; Iraq’s aggression was considered ‘a rebellion against the World Order’.10 As the only remaining superpower, the US had the privilege of adopting aggressive foreign policies in order to further its agendas in the region and elsewhere. During the George H. W. Bush Administration, a prevalent ‘Weinberger Doctrine’ (named after former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger) set the rules of engagement on the international arena. This doctrine, which served as a guide to US military interventions abroad, warned that failed coercive diplomacy would certainly lead to an ever-widening war, which in turn meant loss of control over one’s foreign policy. Therefore, during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990 – 1, General Colin Powell – the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff – adopted the Weinberger Doctrine, which required the application of overwhelming force as a means of defeating Iraq quickly and with a minimum cost in US casualties.11 Thus, the US sought all possible support from international and regional allies for the object of concluding a quick and easy victory. On the diplomatic front, this doctrine suggested to American envoys that heavy unilateral pressure and coercive diplomacy could bring significant political results and avoid or manage systemic effects.

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The positive reaction of the main Arab states, especially Egypt and Syria, to this doctrine was crucial for the success of US policy. Both nations had traditionally tended to compete with Baghdad for leadership, and they would want to influence any new emerging regional order that might materialise in the wake of Iraq’s defeat. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the possibility of a move into Saudi Arabia – thus altering the strategic balance in the region – threatened what the US considered its vital interests. This potent Iraqi threat could only be thwarted by the US and its allies, since Saudi Arabia could not defend itself against either Iraq or Iran and had therefore to depend on external help.12 An ‘Arab response’, as suggested by King Hussein of Jordan, was summarily rejected by a US viewing the world in other terms. In this post-Cold War system, the US also re-initiated its efforts for a peace settlement in the Middle East. Wars of a Cold War nature in the region had to be put off first. Thus, in 1989, a formal settlement was reached in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, which rearranged the constitutional powers in Lebanon – but stability was yet to be achieved. A regional intermediary, Syria, was given the task of ending the war and reinforcing stability in the country. Syrian involvement in Lebanon, however, had another repercussion. Syria had its own long-standing agenda for Lebanon, and the chance was ripe to achieve it. Thus, systemic changes indirectly affected the Lebanese system by giving Syria the chance to attain its long-awaited gains in Lebanon and establish total hegemony. The new international system thus brought simultaneous changes to the Lebanese system – a change in the country’s constitution in favour of its Muslim actors, and a de facto Syrian mandate in Lebanon leading to a total loss of the latter’s political autonomy. The Ta’if Settlement and the End of the 1975 War According to Birthe Hansen, the restoration of Lebanon’s stability and the termination of the 1975– 90 war represented a departure from the Cold War polarisation and the bipolar conflict pattern in the region. Whilst all previous attempts to settle the conflict had been a total failure, in 1989 the Ta’if Accord had been agreed on; however,

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it would only be implemented through Syrian enforcement one year later. All previous attempts to end Lebanon’s war during Cold War dynamics had failed, mainly because of external interference in Lebanon’s politics by the Middle Eastern regional powers, who had played a cliental role for the two systemic superpowers and thereby preserved the balance between the Lebanese fighting parties and provided them with the means to continue hostilities. However, after 1989, Lebanon’s war was placed into another context outside the previous superpowers’ confrontation. This attempt to put an end to the war was successful, and thereby broke with the systemic bipolar patterns as well as the previously bipolarised issue of control within Lebanon. Syria had the opportunity to impose a solution as the Middle East region had been freed from superpower balancing. Therefore, the main determinant of change for the internal Lebanese balance of power (Second Republic), and the accompanying Syrian domination were the changes on the systemic level, with the redistribution of systemic and sub-systemic regional strength in favour of the US.13 As we have seen, by the end of the 1980s the weakening position of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War enabled an international solution to Lebanon’s war. Accordingly, an agreement – the ‘national accord charter’ – was signed at a meeting of the Lebanese assembly at Ta’if in Saudi Arabia, the US’s traditional Arab ally. The Ta’if Accord signalled the strengthening of the US camp vis-a`-vis the Soviet Union in the region. Thus, a successful ceasefire in Lebanon was declared in 1989.14 The Ta’if settlement contained a reorganisation of power within Lebanon’s political structure, including a reduction of the Maronite president’s power and a strengthening of the Sunni-led government – that is, a change in the country’s executive powers. Muslim representation was strengthened, which implied a major change to the sectarian system towards equal representation of Muslims and Christians in the Lebanese parliament in contrast to the previous Christian advantages in the system. This arrangement also meant a strengthening of the Shi’a in the system. With Ta’if, the Syrian presence was officially recognised – but with the requirement

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for a planned Syrian retreat to the Beqa’. Syrian needs were also recognised, through a formal assertion of the Arab orientation of the new Lebanese system and its strong affiliation to Syria. The Ta’if Accord was the first sign of the loosening of Cold War patterns in Lebanon, but attempts to restore the Lebanese state did not succeed immediately; General Michael Aoun and his Christian army refused to disarm, and launched an attack against Lebanese forces in the Christian areas of the country, where the fighting went on even after Ta’if.15 The enforcement of the Ta’if Accord had thus to be postponed until the right moment. The convergence of regional and systemic dynamics in 1990 was the perfect occasion to settle Lebanon’s issues – the US would put off a local war as a precursor to a wider regional policy towards an Arab– Israeli peace, and Syria would finally achieve its agenda in Lebanon. After Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the US became convinced that to achieve stability in the Middle East, the Lebanese war had to be ended. Lebanon’s instability was seen as a barrier to the resolution of the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, which had been further aggravated by the rise of the Palestinian Intifada.16 The second Gulf War was also the perfect occasion for Syria to make its move; thus, it shifted its cliental alliance from the, now defunct, Soviet to the US side. Syria gained favour with the Americans and was entrusted with the task of enforcing stability in Lebanon, thus enabling it to conclude the (1975– 90) Lebanese war to its advantage.17 The US followed a policy of appeasement towards Syria, by allowing it to gain the upper hand in Lebanon’s new structure based on the ultimately false assumption of future Syrian cooperation on the Arab– Israeli issue. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Lebanon was still partitioned and in a state of war. However, this bipolar pattern of domestic divide was broken in the autumn of 1990 when Syrian forces were ultimately allowed to defeat Aoun in October of that year. After that, the pro-Syrian Lebanese Government disarmed all combatants except Hezbollah and the South Lebanese Army (SLA), and the war came to an end. The Ta’if settlement was successfully enforced in Lebanon

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unlike other attempts during bipolarity, when many ceasefires were declared and peace plans devised but none of them lasted or restored stability. Moreover, this (October 1990) was the first time that Syria, the former Soviet proxy, had been given a free hand to launch strikes and gain total control over Lebanon. It was, Hansen deduces, an action approved by the US and unopposed by Israel. Thereafter, Syria was allowed to establish its hegemony in Second Republic Lebanon by keeping more than 30,000 troops there for more than ten years after the end of the war. In addition, Lebanon’s foreign policy was directed from Damascus, and the reconstruction of the Lebanese state was strongly influenced by the Syrian presence.18 According to Tom Najem, the Ta’if Accord, like other settlements that had ended instabilities (local wars) throughout Lebanon’s history, had to be forced onto the country. Ta’if became possible only with the occurrence of favourable changes on the systemic level, and was not the outcome of an innate domestic consensus. In fact, the Ta’if Accord was not significantly different from two previous peace plans, the 1976 Constitutional Document and the 1985 Tripartite Agreement. The Ta’if Accord mainly established Christian–Muslim parity in Lebanon’s political system, which remained a confessional one, whilst preserving the laissez-faire nature of Lebanese economy. Moreover, the fact that it had few supporters amongst Lebanese leaders and the continuation of the fighting for another year after Ta’if provides further proof that the conflict ended only as a result of external dynamics. Thus, as Najem correctly concludes, the Ta’if Accord was an imposed settlement. After the Cold War, the international community – led by the US, and through its regional ally Saudi Arabia – supported and sponsored the process. Syria’s position in Lebanon was sustained, and opposition to its role was forbidden. When Michael Aoun opposed the agreement it was ultimately applied by force, on 13 October 1990. The Syrian Air Force, with a ‘green light’ from the US, successfully ousted the Christian general and ended the war.19 Ta’if not only ended the conflict but also paved the way for a new and unique era in Lebanon’s history – that of a de facto Syrian mandate over the country.

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Syria Re-commissioned as a Regional Intermediary The changing systemic structure and the fall of the USSR did not end Syria’s role as a regional intermediary for systemic effects on Lebanon, however. The realities of the new international system and the policies of the only remaining superpower enabled Syria to reprise that role one more time. This indirect mediated systemic effect led to a loss of political autonomy in Lebanon, whereby a complete Syrian hegemony over the Lebanese system would be the defining characteristics of the Second Republic. As mentioned above, the Ta’if agreement became possible largely because of the relaxation of tensions at both the international and regional levels. According to Hani Fares, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the US ceased to view the Lebanese conflict in the context of its own confrontation with the Soviet Union. The US became subsequently more willing to accept a Syrian role in Lebanon, while less supportive of Israeli interventionist policies. Accordingly, the Arab League revived its ‘Arabisation’ peace initiative and paved the way for favourable regional dynamics conducive to the US-sought settlement in Lebanon – hence, creating a regional platform in concurrence with the prevailing systemic dynamics.20 The changing systemic dynamics with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 led the US to seek Syrian support and participation in the Gulf coalition. Syria, however, was a client of the Soviet Union and a major contributor to the Lebanese conflict. The circumstances were perfect, therefore, for Syria to secure an ongoing role in Lebanon. Not only was the country willing to participate in the US-led coalition but its president, Hafez Assad, also agreed to face-to-face talks with the Israelis and to join a US-dominated peace process without a central role for the Soviet Union or the United Nations. The US, in return, would allow a Syrian de facto mandate over Lebanon. The US thus decided in favour of Syria, and, although strongly denied in public, it gave a tacit green light for a Syrian move against Aoun in October 1990.21 Syria had nursed a long-sought agenda in Lebanon, ever since the Greater Lebanon Republic had been formed. Syria had been present

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in Lebanon since 1976, and throughout the civil war it had expanded its position there. The Syrian intervention in October 1990, however, produced a qualitative change in that presence. After General Aoun’s army had been crushed, Syria backed the Lebanese Army in disarming and pacifying the vast majority of the country’s militias. Thus, Syria was allowed to intervene and bring an end to the civil war in the context of the Gulf Conflict of 1990–1. The US had reevaluated Syria’s role after its participation in the Desert Storm operation, and saw it as being able to play a constructive role in settling the Arab– Israeli conflict, which outcome presupposed an end to the Lebanese civil war. The US therefore allowed Syria to end the hostilities. This US approval of Syria’s role was decisive because it prevented the ‘Syrian solution’ causing a clash with Israel, and that policy was only possible because the Soviet Union had retreated from competition in the area. Moreover, the Syrian solution was made easier by the fact that the PLO had lost its backing from Saudi Arabia and the other rich Gulf states, and Iraq was now unable to support the Palestinians. Thus, none of the Palestinian factions was in a position or had the capability to play a major role in the Lebanese conflict any longer. This development changed the Lebanese domestic balance and eased the way for Syrian intervention.22 Therefore, Syria’s subsequent control over Lebanon was a consequence of its participation in the desert operation against Iraq. Syria had been quick to respond and enlist in US efforts to gather support for the Coalition and the build-up of Operation Desert Shield, and the US gave Syria a free hand in Lebanon as a reward for this contribution. For the US, there were advantages to a Syrian solution: a Middle Eastern conflict would be terminated in the midst of a much larger unfolding problem, Lebanon would no longer provide a reason for Israel and Syria to clash over its control, and Lebanon could be part of the peace process when some internal order had been established. The US also hoped that Syria’s incentive to advance friendly relations with Iran would be reduced, and that Lebanon might get a chance to reconstruct. The Syrian solution in Lebanon was accompanied by a simultaneous US commitment to work for a settlement of the Palestine problem and the Arab–Israeli

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conflict, in order to counter the linkage made by Saddam Hussein between Kuwait and the Palestinians. (The US resisted Saddam’s suggestion that the ‘Palestinian Question’, as well as Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, should be on the agenda of their talks in late 1990 and early 1991.) Thus, Hansen proposes, the US efforts to achieve a successful settlement necessitated the incorporation of Syria as part of the process. Syria’s successful domination of Lebanon was no longer considered a Soviet gain and, in Hansen’s words, ‘the linkage [between] the Lebanese civil war and the bipolar zero-sum game in its proxy form had been broken’.23 Hansen correctly argues that the new US–Syria relationship reflected a unipolar pattern of interaction whereby Syria flocked to the US and the US, in its turn, reassessed the Middle Eastern states and now found Syria’s role useful. Syria’s agenda in Lebanon concurred with the new US policy in the region. The US wanted to put an end to minor conflicts – including the Lebanese civil war, which was also a proxy struggle. Therefore, US approval was necessary as well as sufficient for Syria’s role, and acceptable to Israel.24 It may be argued that Syria was ‘re-commissioned’ to its role in Lebanon after Ta’if. There is plenty of evidence to prove, as shown in Chapter 3, that Syria’s role as a sub-systemic regional intermediary with respect to Lebanon originated in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab defeat and Egypt’s rapprochement with Israel. Syria subsequently became the Soviets’ main ally in the region, and, at the same time, after Lebanon’s war started and Syria’s direct intervention occurred in 1976, the US regarded Syria as the best intermediary to keep the balance in Lebanon and utilise the country as a buffer zone between the Arabs and Israel. At a later stage, especially by 1989, Syria was also regarded by the US as a practical regional intermediary to serve a wider Middle East peace process. Thus, the US Administration had acknowledged Syria’s crucial role as a regional intermediary to systemic effects in Lebanon even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. First, upon the outbreak of the Lebanese war (1975–90) the American Ambassador in Lebanon informed Raymond Edde, the Lebanese presidential candidate at that time, that a prospective

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president should be willing to acknowledge a Syrian role in Lebanon. The ambassador made it clear that it was his administration’s policy not to interfere in the Lebanese war, and he went even further in affirming US intentions to veto any Lebanese attempts at seeking the United Nations Security Council’s help to enforce stability in the country. The 1958 US military intervention would not be repeated, the ambassador stressed; neither would the US allow any other country to step in for that purpose.25 A second instance, according to Elie Salem, came after the US withdrawal from Lebanon following its 1982–84 involvement in a peacekeeping attempt after the 1982 Israeli invasion. When the US failed to achieve its objectives in Lebanon, it withdrew militarily and diplomatically, preferring, for domestic US reasons, not to be visibly involved with the Lebanese conflict. The US avoided any involvement in Lebanese affairs between 1984 and 1987; however, by spring 1987, Washington moved cautiously towards Damascus in an effort to cooperate on Lebanon and regional problems. Reagan had shifted his interest in Lebanon and concentrated on internal affairs, and Lebanon was no longer on the US list of priorities; however, the US Administration was anxious to move the peace process forward. Syria’s position in the region acquired importance because it proved to be a major actor who triumphed on the Lebanese scene, and Washington saw it as the key to the Middle East peace process. The Reagan Administration wanted a success in the Middle East, which could take the form of an international peace conference on the region, before the US elections in 1988. The US Administration, moreover, was not at ease with the growing influence of Iranian-backed Hezbollah, and its policy was to pull Syria away from Iran; this could be attained, it was thought, through a dialogue with Syria.26 The US conviction of Syria’s importance to the Middle East peace process was probably asserted from that time onwards. Hence, even after its withdrawal from Lebanon, the US Administration maintained its view of Syria as a useful policeman in the country; Syria’s role was to exercise military restraint and to deliver the foreign hostages held by the Shi’i Hezbollah group. The US in return endorsed Syrian primacy in

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Lebanon and supported Lebanese presidential candidates with programmes acceptable to Damascus.27 The mediated systemic effects that led to the Syrian solution in reenforcing stability and the new political settlement of Ta’if not only changed the political structure within Lebanon but ultimately led to a loss of political autonomy, in the same way that the mutesarrifate settlement of 1860 had brought peace and a loss of Lebanon’s political autonomy to a previous, Turkish, ruler. The ‘Second Republic’ In the so-called Second Republic (also known as the ‘Ta’if Republic’), Lebanon acquired a new constitution, which changed the domestic balance of power to the disadvantage of the country’s Christian actors. It also stressed the Arab identity of the state and its special ties to neighbouring Syria – a qualitative change in Lebanon’s political system, which led to Syria’s total hegemony while preserving the domestic pattern of a zero-sum interaction amongst local actors. After 1990, Syria became the ultimate arbiter of the Lebanese political system. Both the Syrian Army and the Syrian secret police had, by that time, penetrated nearly all facets of Lebanese society, making any form of opposition to either Syria or the Syriansponsored political order in the country extremely difficult. Since then, very few political decisions were made in Lebanon without Damascus first being consulted.28 Syria proved methodical in knitting together a series of arrangements that tied the Second Republic to its own command; on 22 May 1991, a ‘Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination’ institutionalised this new era of Syrian dominance. The treaty stipulated a Higher Council between the two countries, which would oversee an institutional structure of four permanent interstate committees: for prime ministerial ‘coordination’, foreign affairs, economic and social policy, and defence and security. In August 1991, a ‘Defence and Security Pact’ was also imposed on Lebanon for the object of linking the Lebanese Army, intelligence services, security agencies and Interior Ministry to the Syrian apparatus. In this context, Lebanon committed itself to exchange

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information on security and policy issues, whether national or international, and to exchange officers and military instructors under the pretext of military coordination. In 1994, Syria imposed another treaty on Lebanon, which involved the sharing of the Orantes River and the creation of ‘common cultural institutions’. According to that treaty, Lebanon was allocated 22 per cent of the Orantes’ flow, which included all water withdrawals from Lebanese wells in the vicinity of the river or associated springs as part of the Lebanese share. Meanwhile, a labour accord ensured the status of over 1 million Syrian workers in Lebanon, who were also utilised for the object of Syrian hegemony in the country – making Lebanon’s disentanglement from Syria all but impossible.29 According to Joseph Maila, the Ta’if Accord was rooted in a wellestablished ‘tradition’ that renders Lebanon more of a contractual, consociational democracy than one based on a constitution. According to this tradition, Lebanon’s formal, legal framework is always subordinate to a pragmatic, consensual approach to mitigating conflict within the country, and to managing national and communal strain. Maila suggests that 15 years of war did not alter this equation or this particular political culture – an outcome that is, perhaps, the war’s major lesson. There was no victor in the Lebanese war; if there had been, it would have ended Lebanon’s communal contract because the victorious party would have claimed dominance over the others by virtue of its military and political superiority.30 Such consistency in the local domestic dynamics before and after the 1975– 90 War is yet further proof that changes to the stability and structure in Lebanon do not derive from predominantly innate causes. Lebanon’s wars rather, commence and are terminated as a function of international dynamics. Settlement scenarios are usually the product of systemic effects on Lebanon – hence, they fail to alter the domestic political dynamics or contribute to a radical and permanent solution to Lebanon’s recurring instabilities. In the same manner, Hani Faris gives a parallel view when he agrees that Ta’if cannot be the final blueprint for a future Lebanon and suggests that the country still needs new political institutions and processes that

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promote social cohesion and protect the citizen rather than the country’s sectarian interests.31 Maila, moreover, suggests that the most important change to the structure of postwar Lebanon was the reform at the executive level, whose powers, previously held by the president, have been transferred to a council of ministers that meets as a collegial body. It was this change, to Article 17 of the constitution, which prompted some to comment that Lebanon had now entered its Second Republic. Its president no longer controlled the government. His role was more a representative of political and moral authority than of a figure who becomes involved in political activities and the day-to-day management of political affairs. In practice, however, communal balancing was always taken into account and the abolition of sectarianism was still impossible. Although the Ta’if Accord’s implementation effectively restored stability and ended the violence in Lebanon, the agreement failed to ensure Lebanon’s independence. Maila concludes that ‘Lebanon’s peace was achieved at the price of its independence’.32 This view, however, has long been held by many observers. Edward Hnein, the main proponent of such a view, suggests that every time Lebanon’s independence (political autonomy) is strengthened, its structure (integrity, stability) is weakened, and vice versa. Hnein accounts for three such relevant eras in Lebanon’s history: the Emirate of Fakhr al-Din II, under which Lebanon was protected by three treaties (Vatican, Spain, Tuscany-Italy) and an agreement with Malta; the Mutesarrifate Protocol of 1861, which made the seven powers33 protectors of Lebanese Christians (adding to the advantages gleaned from the silk trade); and the Mandate, under which French direct protection preserved stability. According to Hnein, during the emirate Lebanese borders reached Tadmor in Syria and trade with Europe thrived, but independence and political autonomy relied on the support of the Vatican, Spain and Tuscany. During the mutessarifate, Lebanese independence and political autonomy depended on the guarantees of the appropriate powers. Under the French Mandate, political autonomy and independence were mandated to France, which ensured the status quo and prevented

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the occurrence of war or changes in Lebanon’s structure. On all three occasions, Lebanese stability was preserved by relinquishing its political autonomy to external actors. On the other hand, during the 1840– 60 kaymakamate system; the 1814 – 18 direct Turkish rule; and during the De´tente period, when the political autonomy of the Lebanese system was not guaranteed by external actors, Lebanon suffered instabilities, hunger and the outbreak of war respectively.34 Kaymakamate vs ‘Second Republic’ The systemic structural change of 1989, that altered the stability and structure of Lebanon through a mediated effect (Syria’s role), resembles the earlier mediated effect that occurred with the change in structure from emirate to kaymakamate in 1842. At that historical juncture, the Ottomans, who had been awaiting their chance, took advantage of European demands for a direct intervention in Lebanon. This was desired in order to bring an end to the chaos in the country and to reinforce the stability that had been lost, as a direct result of European rivalries and interventionist policies themselves – especially the expulsion of Emir Bashir II two years previously. The Ottomans took action, enforced stability and ended the reign of Bashir III – and, thus, the emirate system itself. Turkey then established a new structure (the kaymakamate), which would thereafter compromise the political autonomy of the Lebanese entity by shifting all executive power into the hands of a Turkish pasha – hence, ensuring a centralised governance of Lebanon and terminating its special status as an autonomous entity within the Ottoman Empire. Such were the indirect mediated effects of European rivalries and their policies in the region. After 1989, Syria, which had been awaiting a similar opportunity to take full control over Lebanon, used the systemic and regional opportunities available, especially after the second Gulf War, to present itself as a factor for stability in Lebanon – a mission that was duly handed to the country by the US. Syria went in and imposed a Second Republic system with a new ‘Ta’if’ constitution that significantly reduced the executive powers of a Christian president in favour of a Muslim prime minister. Such a structural change, along

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with Syrian control over all the Lebanese territories after 1990, gave Syria a free hand in all matters of the State and led to a total loss of political autonomy in Lebanon. Thus, systemic structural change led to an indirect mediated effect – that is, the realisation of a long-held Syrian dream of dominating the Lebanese scene after imposing a solution of its own choice for the Lebanese conflict – something that neither the Israelis nor the Syrians could impose during the years of the Lebanese conflict that took place in a bipolar world characterised by a raging Cold War. Therefore, similar systemic dynamics 150 years apart led to similar systemic effects on Lebanon. On both occasions, changes in the international system yielded systemic effects, which enforced stability and changed the political structure of the country – an indirect mediated effect, which, on both occasions, compromised its political autonomy. The Continuing Domestic Divide The Ta’if Accord, like previous settlements in Lebanon, was a mere practical political settlement sponsored by the international community to end a war and establish stability, and it had ultimately to be imposed through the aid of a regional intermediary (Syria) in the same way that the 1840 (kaymakamate) and 1860 (mutesarrifate) political settlements had had to be imposed through the then regional intermediary (Turkey). It is thus certain that Ta’if, like the previous settlements, was not based on genuine foundations of domestic reconciliation. Hence, the domestic divide still survives. A change in the structure of the international system that ended the polarisation of the Cold War brought a change in stability to Lebanon – or, in other words, a return to ‘ground zero’ with respect to the pattern of interaction in Lebanon. In short, it stopped the shooting but did not change the political dynamics within the country. Ta’if was not the offspring of domestic reconciliation; it was the product of an indirect mediated systemic effect on Lebanon. Therefore the Second Republic – the offspring of this systemic change – and the lost political autonomy in favour of a Syrian de

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facto mandate in Lebanon after 1990, would be subject to change whenever a new systemic dynamics, especially polarisation, re-emerged on the international systemic level, because the domestic pattern of interaction and the divided nature of Lebanon did not change. Post-Ta’if, Lebanon is still vulnerable to systemic effects. The only change came in the balance of political power within the country, whereby the Christian president lost most of his executive powers in favour of the Sunni prime minister and the Cabinet, and in a general loss of Lebanon’s political autonomy to Syria. Thus, the ongoing divide in the Second Republic, as in the country’s previous political systems, still feeds on the same pattern of interaction of a zero-sum game in which a gain for one actor represents a loss for another. After 1990, for instance, the powers of the Muslim (especially Shi’a) actors in Lebanon were enhanced while Syria’s enemies in Lebanon, especially the Christians, were marginalised and excluded from the political scene. In a zero-sum calculation of winners and losers in the aftermath of Lebanon’s Second Republic, it is evident that the Christians (especially the Maronites) have lost their prerogatives within the system. Meir Zamir correctly advances the argument that since 1990 the Maronites have been demoted to a marginal status in Lebanon – a country that is rapidly assuming an Arab-Muslim character. The Maronites, Zamir suggests, are nonetheless coming to terms with the fact that, like other Christian populations in the Arab countries, their future is as a minority in a ‘Muslim state’. The Second Republic, which rose after the Ta’if Accord, is a reflection of their marginal status – a position which stands out in sharp contrast to their political, social, economic and cultural dominance before 1975. The Maronites, who were the founders of the Lebanese state, historically held the role of guardians of its independence, sovereignty and Christian character. They demanded and acquired for themselves a prominent position in its political and administrative systems and in the armed forces – initially with French assistance, during the mandate, and later, after independence, when they used the National Pact of 1943 to retain and even enhance their privileged status. They not only controlled the presidency but also secured the position of

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commander-in-chief of the army and head of the judicial system. In fact, their share in the administration was much greater than their proportion in the general population, and they took advantage of their dominance and access to state institutions to increase their power and wealth. The Maronites determined Lebanon’s national identity, which distinguished it from Syria and the rest of the Arab world. Zamir even argues that the demise of the Maronites was not merely the result of the miscalculations of their leaders during the war; it was, in fact, rooted in the dominant position that they had assumed since independence.35 Therefore, it was inevitable that the mediated systemic effects that brought changes to the domestic balances within the country would impact negatively on the Christian position in the Second Republic system. After all, any adverse change in the position of a dominant actor in a zero-sum game would be to his adversaries’ advantage. According to Zamir, the Maronites did not play their cards well prior to the 1975 War. After independence, Lebanon was controlled by a Christian minority that faced increasing numbers of restless Muslims. The Maronites, he suggested, wrongly claimed Lebanon almost exclusively to themselves instead of attempting to strengthen the Muslims’ attachment to the nation by granting them an equal share in running the State. The National Pact between the Maronite Beshara al-Khoury and the Sunni Riyad al-Sulh was a compromise between Christian and Muslim politicians over the division of political power in the independent Lebanese state, based on proportional, sectarian representation and on Lebanon’s being a part of the Arab world while maintaining its uniqueness. At the time, the pact was viewed as a pragmatic solution and it enabled Lebanon to gain independence from France, win the recognition of the Arab states and become a founding member of the Arab League. But it was vague in regard to Lebanon’s national identity, and it laid the ground for an inefficient and corrupt political system. Michel Chiha, its chief ideologist, predicted that the Muslims were willing to accept it for a transitional period only. Aware of the destructiveness of sectarian divisions, he saw the pact and its provisions for sectarian representation as an intermediate stage in

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securing a balance between the sects before all the different elements were integrated into one Lebanese nation. His views, however, were not shared by a majority of the Maronites, who not only insisted on maintaining the status quo indefinitely but also exploited their privileged positions in the political system to strengthen their hold over the State.36 After independence, the Maronites had disregarded the stated objectives of the National Pact – that is, the creation of a pluralistic and tolerant Lebanese society with no sectarian or religious discrimination. Although Zamir acknowledges the argument that in an unstable and divided Middle East this was a utopian and unattainable goal, he nonetheless blames the Maronites, who, during the French Mandate, had rejected attempts to strengthen the Christian majority by reducing Lebanon’s territory or by adopting a decentralised system in which each region would maintain a large degree of autonomy. In fact, efforts to create a pluralistic and just society under a parliamentary democracy were never really given a chance. The Maronites were determined to retain their hegemony at any cost, whether because of fears rooted in their past or because of greedy and ambitious politicians who saw their own interests as synonymous with those of their community and of Lebanon as a whole.37 The zero-sum rule amongst Lebanon’s actors was overwhelming, and superseded any written or unwritten agreement. According to Paul Sayah, many Christians in the Second Republic felt that post-Ta’if governments gave political precedence to Muslims. In the 1992 elections, the majority of the Lebanese (87 per cent) did not vote. The Christians called for a boycott of the elections because they felt that their candidates were disadvantaged by ‘a selective method [. . .] employed with the aim of influencing election results in favour of some politicians or communities over others’. Later, in the 1996 elections, Christians were once again discriminated against. This was confirmed by the constitutional council, which judged the electoral law, as applied, to be unconstitutional. The Christians, particularly the Maronites, felt that they were being alienated from public life, with administrative

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posts being allocated on the basis of political allegiance to the government (led, at that time, by Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri). This perception generated a feeling of injustice, lack of trust in the government and lack of confidence in the future. Moreover, Lebanon’s demographic balance has also shifted since Ta’if. Increased emigration rates for Christians and the granting of nationality to Muslim immigrants have resulted in a Muslim majority. This imbalance will become more profound if the 400,000 Palestinian refugees in the country, 90 per cent of whom are Muslims, become Lebanese citizens. Christian bitterness has also been provoked by the fact that some recently naturalised Muslim families were registered to vote in the Maronite villages of Matn and Kesrowan, where they had neither homes nor properties, at the same time that displaced Christians have been unable to return to their homes.38 Moreover, when the Christian Party of the Lebanese forces was dissolved and its leader imprisoned because of his alleged role in the bombing of a church (a charge of which he was acquitted), some government officials acknowledged that his prosecution was politically motivated. At the same time, other leaders who participated in the war were given ministerial posts in the government. Also, Christians who lived in the former Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon felt abandoned by the government, and lived in constant fear and under great pressure to emigrate. However, despite their fears that Lebanon was losing an important part of its national character, Sayah suggests that the majority of Christians upheld their allegiance to the country and felt that they must face their difficulties with hope and determination.39 Thus, the Second Republic did not alter the divided nature of Lebanon, which remained volatile to external factors and unable to control domestic political developments in an independent manner. As Carl Brown puts it, Little Lebanon can only employ the diplomacy of the weak. It can only regain some margin of manoeuvre by making pluralist domestic politics sufficiently attractive to all Lebanese that they can in united fashion balance off the outside power.

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Lebanese once did that in 1943. It did not manage after 1989– 1990 to achieve an updated national pact that just might have moved toward getting both Israeli and Syrian armies out of Lebanon. The immediate prospect is that Lebanon will remain virtually a client state of Syria.40 In a similar manner, Elizabeth Picard acknowledges that the suspension of hostilities (end of instability) ‘was made possible only by the 1991 Gulf War, the opening of negotiations between Israel and the Arabs, and above all by the exhaustion of the Lebanese people’;41 however, she fails to put these regional and domestic factors in their proper context. Picard falls short of realising that the systemic effect of a major change on the international system – the fall of the Soviet Union – was the predominant factor behind all those regional and domestic phenomena that facilitated the subsequent end of instability in Lebanon. She does, however, recognise that the end of war did not change the domestic patterns of interaction or the divisions within the unit, which remained unchanged under the Second Republic. She suggests that ‘the decade following the end of instability revealed the resilience of social structures, the resistance of collective habits of thought, and the historic depth of divisions capable of stirring unrest’.42 This ongoing, divided nature of Lebanon certainly proves the argument that the end of the Lebanese war was a factor of ‘systemic effects’ rather than a product of regional or domestic dynamics – Lebanon still carries its innate seeds of instability in the Second Republic. Therefore, the end of the Cold War led to the indirect mediated systemic effect that caused a structural change in Lebanon towards a Second Republic system; however, the country’s chronic domestic divide could not be bridged after the imposed settlement of Ta’if, and Lebanese independence had to be compromised under a de facto Syrian mandate (until 2005). With a stalemate on the regional level, especially in the stalled Syrian – Israeli peace process, change in Lebanon would only occur with changing international dynamics – that is, with the new US agenda for the region after 11 September 2001.

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11 September and the Restoration of Political Autonomy The terrorist attacks against the US on 11 September 2001 not only started new dynamics on the international level but also had repercussions on political developments in Lebanon. The US, the sole remaining superpower, changed its foreign policy in the Middle East. Syria, amongst others, became the target for change, which consequently led to its expulsion from Lebanon. Therefore, the systemic dynamics triggered by 11 September had the direct effect of ending the de facto Syrian mandate and the eventual restoration of political autonomy in Lebanon – a positive change to the structure of the Second Republic. Background 11 September triggered new dynamics and created a new contingent pattern of interaction in the international system. This time, however, the change in the pattern of interaction was not between major powers (state actors) in the system. The source of such dynamics was an action by a non-state actor of insignificant power (in the traditional terms of power politics). 11 September caused a systemic polarisation between the US and its Western allies on one side and Islamic fundamentalism on the other. Consequently, this new pattern triggered dynamics of zero-tolerance policy towards Islamic and non-status-quo regimes. Although the polarisation was over the broader issue of terrorism, amongst others, it was, however, focused on the Middle East region in particular. These new systemic dynamics were, nonetheless, strictly a polarisation issue. It did not bring any change to the unipolar systemic structure or the general systemic pattern of interaction emanating from such unipolarity – the US is still the only systemic superpower and its unrivalled capabilities lends its foreign policies the ample power to produce daunting systemic effects. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have caused a contingent change in US policy and behaviour – that is, a short-term one.43 The new dynamics is thus a polarisation within the existing constraints of a post-Cold War unipolar system. Terrorism did not

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change the defining characteristic of the post-Cold War system – that is, the unipolarity of the system. Instead, the effect of 11 September, according to Kenneth Waltz, has been to increase US power and extend its military presence in the world. US unilateralism in a unipolar world will continue to be the general pattern, and the temporary anti-terrorist coalition will not lead to a multilateral systemic pattern of interaction.44 Barry Buzan, on the other hand, introduces his own concept of ‘polarity’. In an attempt to explain the polarisation between Islam and the West through (albeit mistakenly) incorporating the concept of identity as a defining characteristic of polarity. He combines polarity and identity in an attempt to understand the structure and character of world politics since the end of the Cold War, and of post11 September world politics. According to Buzan, although there was no agreement on whether the post-Cold War world was multipolar or unipolar, by the late 1990s – and particularly after 11 September 2001 – the idea that world politics was unipolar became prevalent. Buzan adds to the materialistic notion of polarity (based on the distribution of capability) the concept of identity – a constructivist concept that assumes that who actors think they are, and how they construct their identities in relation to each other, shapes behaviour independently from the distribution of capabilities. Therefore, Buzan studies polarity within a social context based on the assumption of a society of states that has its own rules, norms and institutions.45 In a similar manner, Benjamin R. Barber tries to explain this polarisation as a collision between ‘aggressive economic and cultural globalisation’ (symbolised by the US) and the ‘forces of disintegral tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism’ (symbolised by Islamic jihad). In his ‘Jihad vs McWorld’, Barber suggests that this new systemic polarisation between the forces of globalisation and those of Islamic fundamentalism is a confrontation of secularist materialism and the attempt to homogenise values vs those who are keen to preserve their cultural and religious distinctiveness.46 Long before 11 September 2001, however, Samuel Huntington had professed that cultural differences would be the dominant source

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for the next pattern of conflict in a post-Cold War World. A ‘clash’ would occur between the West and Islamic, amongst other civilisations over cultural identification – that is, language, history, religion, customs, institutions and the subjective self-identification of people.47 The myth that the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union had brought the ‘End of History’,48 and the uncontested triumph of liberal capitalism and democracy over all other doctrines, has been debunked. This systemic polarisation between the West, led by the US, and the Islamic and radical, mostly Arab, countries eventually led to unexpected effects on the political system in Lebanon – namely, the restoration of political autonomy. In its new policy of war on terrorism, the US also decided to crack down on anti-Western and nonconformist regimes in the Middle East. In the process, Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Syria and Iran, amongst others, became the targets for change. Dictatorships and radical regimes were considered a good breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism, and the US, with its Western allies, now demanded democratic reforms and compliance with international law in such countries. In the process, Syria was expelled from Lebanon, ending 15 years of a military occupation that also dominated all aspects of political life in the country. The War on Terrorism 11 September 2001 has reordered US priorities and brought the Middle East into the forefront of its political agenda. During his election campaign in January 2000, George W. Bush became the first US president to publicly announce his support for an independent and viable Palestinian state. He committed the US to the promotion of democracy in the Middle East; renounced the US’ long-standing commitment to stability through the support of authoritarian regimes; and, in September 2002, he adopted a policy of pre-emptive war that provided the cover for invading Iraq (2003) and directly challenging key tenets of international law regarding justifications for intervention. During November 2003, in Washington and during his state visit to London, the US President made it clear that

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US foreign policy on the question of democracy in the Middle East had changed, and he renounced the traditional Western preference for stability over democracy in the area. Frequent reference to the ‘freedom deficit’ in the Middle East had occurred in US political debates since 11 September 2001. Economic failure and political oppression was now considered a major source of ideologies that spread hatred and violence.49 This US Administration’s goal to spread democracy to the Middle East was based on a firm conviction that democracy will bring ‘hope and progress’, which will replace ‘hatred and terror’. Military power alone does not assure the US’s long-term security; therefore, a lasting peace and democratic advances in the region were seen as the best policy to ‘drain the fever swamps in which terrorism breeds’. Democratic Middle Eastern governments, it was thought, will not shelter terrorist camps.50 Therefore a main tenet to the new US policy after 11 September 2001 was the aim of spreading democracy and ensuring a lasting peace in the Middle East region as a means to fight Islamic terrorism. The US would take all necessary steps to achieve that purpose – imposing compliance from nonconformist Arab regimes became a priority. Syria’s Defiance and Regional Isolation Although Syria had supported the US-led coalition in Operation Desert Storm (1990) in order to evict Saddam Hussein from Iraq in the first Gulf War, it was not very cooperative on these new US policies in the region. The country persisted in supporting ‘terrorist’ organisations (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah) in the region, and opposed the US war on Iraq in 2003, allowing guerrilla fighters to infiltrate through Syrian borders into Iraq. Syria’s non-compliance with US policy had serious consequences, amongst which was its forced eviction from Lebanon. Syria had adopted militant and pan-Arab positions, especially with respect to the Palestinian Intifada and the question of the Israeli – Arab conflict, and, to a greater extent, on issues related to the war with Iraq since 2003. For example, as mentioned above,

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it allowed Arab (mainly Syrian) fighters to cross Syrian borders into Iraq.51 After the attacks of 11 September 2001 triggered new dynamics on the international and regional level, the US formulated a new policy for the international system and the Middle East regional subsystem, which introduced a new era in Syrian – US relations. The US, firmly resolved to attack its enemies, soon demanded that Syria change its course and join forces with the international community in order to fight terrorism. Damascus provided some nominal assistance in this respect, but it ignored the presence in Syria and Lebanon of Osama Bin Laden-supporting activists and of other Islamic activities involved in terrorism. Syria, in fact, continued on a course of action that stood in total contradiction to Washington’s policies. It tried to obstruct US regional interests – namely, the promotion of the Arab – Israeli peace process, the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the isolation of Iran and the elimination of the military dimension of Hezbollah’s activities in Lebanon. On the contrary, Syria put more effort in promoting its relations with other members of the ‘Axis of Evil’, as President George W. Bush defined North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah.52 Furthermore, an even more serious matter was under consideration. Syria’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capacity came under the spotlight – especially after Libya’s decision to give up such capabilities. Syria has based its national security doctrine on WMD since the early 1990s. WMD were the ideal way to close the technological gap between Syria and Israel, especially between their air forces. Since the early 1990s, Syria had achieved certain advances in this direction through close cooperation with North Korea and Iran. Allying itself with both countries, Syria had adopted the same patterns of behaviour as Iran and North Korea. At least since mid1990s, Syria has boasted a chemical-weapons capability beyond that of any other regional country except Iran, and it is assumed to have been trying to develop biological weapons, including anthrax and cholera bacteria. Therefore, since 11 September 2001 – and especially since the 2003 war on Iraq – US policy towards Syria has no longer been determined, as it was in the past, by the Israeli–

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Syrian conflict but rather within the new conception that US national-security interests require action against any regime involved in terrorism and developing non-conventional weapons. Syria certainly fits these categories, thus resulting in the mounting pressure put on it by the US and the European Union.53 President Bashar Assad of Syria suddenly found himself trapped in an ‘international storm’ that threatened the survival of his regime. Not only did Syria manage to make an enemy out of France and the US, whose interests now converged on the Middle East, but it also lost favour in the Arab world. Syria’s Alawite rulers, unlike other Arab Sunni rulers, had never been perceived by Arab public opinion as the defenders of the Arabs. Their esoteric Alawite faith may be one of the reasons behind this estrangement, but, more importantly, they were seen as having waged their own wars against the Palestinians and cut down to size Beirut’s pan-Arabists in pursuit of Syrian hegemony. Moreover, those Arab regimes on good terms with the US would not intercede on Syria’s behalf. Egypt itself was under US pressure to undergo democratic reforms, and Saudi Arabia became especially angered with the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri, who held Saudi citizenship. Syria was truly isolated.54 Syria’s Expulsion and the Restoration of Political Autonomy The war on terrorism and a concurrent systemic consensus (between the US and other major powers) over the issues of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and democratic reforms in the Middle East materialised in a heightened importance for the Lebanese issue – and, thus, support for US-led international efforts to bring change in Lebanon, to end the Syrian hegemony and to restore Lebanese political autonomy as an essential component of US policies in the region. Far from an exclusive Lebanese concern, however, the US antiSyrian policy in an effort to enforce an end to Syrian occupation was driven, mainly, by Syria’s support for terrorist organisations such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, and by the ongoing Syrian active opposition to US policies in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular.

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In October 2003, the US Administration dramatically shifted its policy towards Syria by explicitly supporting Israel’s first air strike on Syrian soil in three decades, and by renouncing its longstanding objection to congressional sanctions on Damascus. Both decisions came in reaction to Syria’s failure to comply with US policies in the region. Syria had not ended its sponsorship of terrorist groups opposed to the Middle East peace process, and continued to support insurgents fighting US forces in Iraq. The Americans also claimed that terrorist attacks (on Israel) were being directed by terrorist groups based in Syria. Moreover, Syria had not stopped facilitating the infiltration of anti-US militants into Iraq. The US policy shift towards Syria was manifested in 6 October 2003, when President George W. Bush explicitly supported an Israeli raid against an Islamic Jihad camp outside Damascus. Soon afterwards, on 15 October, the US House of Representatives approved the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSA) – a bill that threatened Syria with diplomatic and economic sanctions unless it ended its support for terrorist organisations, the development of WMD and the occupation of neighbouring Lebanon.55 On 11 May 2004, the George W. Bush Administration issued an executive order imposing a range of new economic sanctions on Syria. These sanctions, although limited in scope, marked a definitive departure in US policy towards Syria – from constructive engagement to deterrence. The US decided to end its policy of appeasement towards Damascus, which had been going on for almost three decades and had strengthened after 1990. Damascus had enjoyed tacit US recognition of its lucrative control over Lebanon and freedom to illegally import Iraqi oil at cut-rate prices, earning the regime over $1 billion annually – all of which had formed incentives for Syrian cooperation on regional issues like the Arab–Israeli peace process.56 The European Union, in conjunction with US policies, decided to put on halt Syria’s association agreement with the EU. Britain, Germany and the Netherlands withdrew their support for the text, insisting that it must now contain a Syrian pledge not to develop

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WMD. Even France was unwilling to support Syria any longer. French President Jacques Chirac was outraged by Syria’s refusal to support the economic recovery policies of his close friend, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, following the November 2002 Paris II donor conference for Lebanon. The French and the Americans were calling publicly for an immediate Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.57 However, the mounting international pressure and dissatisfaction with Syria’s policies was not enough to convince Assad’s regime to change direction. On the contrary, Syria continued its defiance of the international will, actively pursuing policies against the dominant systemic pattern of interaction. These aberrant policies encouraged swift retaliation from the international community, and led to its unexpectedly rapid eviction from Lebanon. In August 2004, Assad summoned al-Hariri to Damascus and ordered him to have the Lebanese Government and Parliament change the country’s constitution to extend the tenure of Emile Lahoud, Syria’s appointed president in Lebanon. Al-Hariri bowed to the command, but resigned soon after. The international community, especially the US and France, opposed this step and appealed for a normal election. Syria, however, still defiant, went on with its plan and extended another three years to Lahoud. This move gave a critical momentum to Lebanese opposition sentiments throughout late 2004. Druze leader Walid Jumblat condemned the Syrian and Lebanese regimes, while al-Hariri, the leader of the country’s Sunni Muslim community, coordinated opposition actively from behind the scenes. Both non-Christian leaders had been key Syrian allies in the 1990s, and their prospective alliance with the traditionally antiSyrian Christians was alarming to Assad’s regime. Syria’s response came in the form of death threats through senior Lebanese regime representatives and other kinds of intimidation of the country’s opposition. On 1 October 2004, Jumblat’s colleague, Marwan Hamade, who had resigned from the government in protest at Lahoud’s extension, was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt. Syria’s real troubles, however, were now not on the domestic level but rather on the international level.58

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On 2 September 2004, the UN Security Council, upon a French and US request, adopted Resolution 1559 (UNSCR 1559), which stipulated the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanese soil and an end to foreign interference in Lebanese presidential elections – that is, in the words of Secretary General Kofi Annan, ‘the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the government of Lebanon [. . .]’. The resolution called for the secretary general to report within 30 days on whether the parties concerned – that is, mainly Syria – had met the requirements of UNSCR 1559. On Friday, 1 October, Annan issued his report, which concluded that Syria had not. Syrian troops, the exact number of which were known only to Damascus but which were estimated at 14,000, were still deployed inside Lebanon despite some recent ‘redeployments’. The recent three-year extension to President Emile Lahoud’s term in office, necessitating constitutional amendments, was criticised, with Annan implying direct intervention by the Government of Syria. Lebanese and Syrian officials downplayed the Secretary General’s report. The US also made a connection between the issuance of Annan’s report and the Hamade bombing.59 In reality, Syria was now fully exposed and in no position to resist international pressure lest it face an even worse security council resolution. Syria’s withdrawal was now a matter of time, but a domestic incident would play a catalyst for its abrupt and hasty withdrawal. Al-Hariri’s assassination on 14 February 2005 triggered a popular movement against Syria’s long-term hegemony over Lebanese politics. The former Prime Minister was perceived to be tacitly joining the ranks of an embryonic Druze– Maronite opposition force. His assassination paved the way for the Sunnis to openly join the ranks of the Druze and Christians in a popular upheaval (the ‘Cedar Revolution’) against Syrian occupation. The movement demanded Syrian withdrawal, the removal of Lebanese intelligence chiefs, the appointment of a neutral government with the task of preparing parliamentary elections for May 2005 and an international investigation into al-Hariri’s death.60

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On the other hand, Hezbollah successfully orchestrated a huge pro-Syrian rally in downtown Beirut. Both popular movements agreed to pursue an international investigation into al-Hariri’s assassination and the withdrawal of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, but Hezbollah argued that the Ta’if Accord of 1989, and not UNSCR 1559, remained the basis for any potential, constructive national debate in Lebanon. In other words, the party firmly opposed any anti-Syrian rhetoric and urged the opposition to strengthen Lebanese– Syrian ties by protecting Hezbollah military ‘resistance’ against Israel. Therefore, it was clear that the traditional sectarian divide that characterises Lebanese politics was still present, with the Shi’i Muslim sect clearly throwing its weight behind Syria while the other alliance (Christian– Druze – Sunni) demanded the country’s withdrawal.61 Hezbollah’s massive support for Syria was, however, no longer enough to maintain its presence in Lebanon. With local, regional and international accusations about Syria’s involvement in al-Hariri’s assassination, and mounting international pressure to identify the culprits, Syria’s exodus came sooner than expected; in summer 2005, the Syrian presence in Lebanon ended after almost 30 years of occupation. The Christians of Lebanon had always asserted their call for a sovereign Lebanon outside Syrian control and dominion – an ongoing demand since the end of the civil war, which led to Syrian hegemony in the country and the undermining of the Christian executive powers in the system. The Muslims of Lebanon, however, have been keen on refusing to define Syrian hegemony as occupation or interference in Lebanese affairs since the balance of political power in the country tilted in their favour after the end of the civil war. However, even with the Sunni – Druze –Christian alliance against Syria’s presence after al-Hariri’s assassination, Syria still had the support of the country’s Shi’i sect – the most dominant, both numerically and militarily. Therefore, it is wrong to assume that Syria’s exit was triggered by domestic dynamics. The process of its expulsion started with the shift in US attitudes towards Syria – especially after the 2003 war on Iraq.

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Stability Intact Historically, systemic polarisation has led to instability in Lebanon (during the time of the Eastern Question and the Cold War). On this occasion, however, events did not follow their traditional path, and the country’s stability is still intact. The new international dynamics caused by 11 September 2001, and the changing pattern of interaction on the international level as represented in a Western– Islamic confrontation, could not affect the stability of the Lebanese system because of the absence of another major systemic power in the conflict. Although the post-2001 war on terrorism was considered by many to be a war against Islam, and Lebanese Christians were naturally inclined to support that war, stability in Lebanon was preserved. It may be argued that this new systemic polarisation did not materialise over the religious divide in Lebanon because of the lack of a balancing power on the systemic level. Unlike during the Franco-British polarisation (at the time of the Eastern Question) or during the US – Soviet Cold War over the Middle East, the war on terrorism took place in a unipolar system in which all major powers took sides with the only remaining superpower. There was no polarisation between two or more major powers over the Middle East or Lebanon, and hence no attempt to balance or oppose Western influence in the region. Although the Shi’a in Lebanon, especially Hezbollah, and their Syrian and Iranian patrons lost ground in the aftermath of recent political developments in Lebanon and the Middle East, there was no change in the stability of Lebanon. In the absence of favourable circumstances on the international level and a counter-US policy by another major power, regional and domestic dynamics were insufficient to bring about a change in stability and trigger a local war. Continuing Domestic Divide: Ta’if vs UNSCR 1559 Neither Syrian withdrawal following the Cedar Revolution nor the subsequent elections in Lebanon changed the domestic pattern of interaction amongst the Lebanese players. The domestic divide remains evident in the country’s political process, in which Christians

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and Muslims still dissociate on fundamental matters pertaining to power sharing and the nature and identity of Lebanon. Behind the short-term alliance in the aftermath of Rafiq alHariri’s assassination, however, lay different objectives for every religious group. While Hezbollah’s reaction against a Syrian withdrawal should be understood in the light of safeguarding its powers and the benefits accumulated from the preservation of the status quo (Syrian hegemony), the other Muslim groups only agreed with the Christians on the issue of complete Syrian withdrawal. Beyond that, positions on the role and the future of Hezbollah in any potential new Lebanese structure diverge radically. Druze and Sunni leaders continually insist that they are abiding by the 1989 Ta’if Accord, while the Christian opposition in general favours UNSCR 1559. This divergence on the basis for future political developments in Lebanon is another reflection of the absence of a common national identity (Arabic vs Lebanese) across the divide.62 Ta’if enhanced the Muslims’ position in the power structure of Lebanon by eradicating the dominant legislative position enjoyed by the Christian Maronite sect before the 1975 War. It reduced the prerogative of the president by transferring authority to the Council of Ministers as a collegial body. Accordingly, the powers of the prime minister and other government ministers were increased substantially. Ta’if was also decisive in determining the Arab identity of Lebanon. Moreover, the Syrian hegemony and its role in supporting Hezbollah whilst suppressing the Christians and manipulating elections after 1990 played an additional role in tilting the domestic balance towards the Muslim side. UNSCR 1559, however, focused on the importance of free and fair elections without outside interference, withdrawal of all foreign (i.e. Syrian) forces and disarmament of all militias (Hezbollah). Therefore, it was clearly understandable why the Christians in Lebanon advocated UNSCR 1559 while the Muslims, including the Druze and Sunnis, argued for the implementation of the Ta’if agreement. In the course of subsequent events, the domestic divide could not be adequately represented as one between through those who were anti-Syrian and those who were anti. It was, rather, better reflected in the more significant identity

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problem that was still shaking the very foundations of Lebanese society. Moreover, it was clear that the various sects in Lebanon were still dependent on regional and international players (Syria, the US and France) or developments (the UNSCR 1559) in order to advance their own political agendas in the country.63 UNSCR 1559 was regarded as a Western plan to bring change in the structure of Lebanon – a change that would undermine the privileged position of the Muslims in general, and the Shi’a in particular, in the system. This eventuality, accompanied by the disarmament of Hezbollah, would not only change the existing distribution of power towards better Christian representation but also carried the danger of diluting Lebanon’s recently asserted Arab identity in favour of a more authentic Lebanese identity by neutralising the country’s role in the Arab– Israeli conflict. In May – June 2005, Lebanon witnessed the first parliamentary elections after the withdrawal of Syrian troops in compliance with UNSCR 1559. Not surprisingly, the electoral law that governed the 2005 elections was the same as that adopted in the 2000 elections and it differed little from those governing the two previous elections, in 1992 and 1996 – all of which had been dictated by Syria during its occupation and designed to influence the outcome of elections by targeting political groups, mainly Christians.64 Although this election brought a large number of previously targeted or banned groups into parliament, the political process was still heavily hampered by politicians and parties that had close ties with Syria and embraced agendas going beyond Lebanon – notably, Hezbollah. Therefore, the election did not bring a significant change to the political process in Lebanon because the Syrian-backed ‘old guard’ – with its multiple regional agendas, ranging from Iran to the Arab– Israeli conflict – retained significant influence. The elections restructured political alliances but did not usher in a new era of change.65 On the contrary, the elections were held along traditional sectarian lines. The Sunnis and Druze, who were demanding Syria’s withdrawal, made an alliance with the pro-Syrian Shi’a (and a few

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Christians) in order to dominate the election results. This was solid proof of the continuation of a zero-sum political game between the Lebanese factions. Consequently, the newly formed government, which represented the election victors, deliberately neglected to mention UNSCR 1559 in its programme. This decision represented a commitment to the wider Arab and Islamic causes – especially with the presence of Hezbollah representatives in both parliament and Cabinet, and the ongoing support of their Syrian and Iranian patrons.66 However, the ongoing domestic divide and the zero-sum-game pattern of interaction between the Lebanese actors was never the main decisive factor on the changes in the structure or stability of Lebanon. In the case of Syria’s withdrawal, as in previous events, it was mostly systemic dynamics that brought the change. As former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice puts it, ‘the first thing that we’ve done is to, together with France, mobilise international opinion so that the Syrians had to get out of Lebanon [. . .] the next step is to make certain that the Syrians respect Lebanese sovereignty, and so we’ll work on that step’.67 The US, after 11 September 2001, like the European powers during the Concert system, became the guarantor of Lebanon’s independence and political autonomy. Therefore, 11 September 2001 caused systemic polarisation between the US and its allies on one side and Islamic terrorism on the other. This contingent pattern of interaction, which was reflected in the war on terrorism had direct effects on the structure of Lebanon. Within the new systemic dynamics, Syria was targeted by the US for its opposition to the war on terrorism, especially for its continuing support for fundamentalist organisations and lack of cooperation in the US war on Iraq in 2003. Consequently, the US led an international campaign terminating the de facto Syrian mandate in Lebanon, which meant the expulsion of Syrian forces in 2005 after 15 years of occupation and, thus, the restoration of Lebanon’s political autonomy. Finally, a comparison between the two changes in Lebanon under a unipolar international system – the end of the 1975–90 War, which established a de facto Syrian mandate, and the end of Syrian

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occupation in 2005, which restored Lebanon’s political autonomy – reveals that both occurred under the influence of systemic effects. In the first change, the US became the only superpower and followed a Middle East policy aimed at ending local wars as a prelude for a wider Arab– Israeli peace settlement. Thus, the US decided to impose a settlement on Lebanon through a regional intermediary – Syria – which had proved useful to US policies at the time. Hence, Syria ended the war and achieved its long-sought agenda of controlling Lebanon. The second change in Lebanon occurred when the same superpower followed new policies in the Middle East dictated by its war on terrorism. But Syria this time was uncooperative and adopted a path that would oppose overwhelming systemic dynamics (the war on terrorism); thus, it was punished and expelled from Lebanon. It was therefore the US that established a Syrian mandate in Lebanon (1990–2005), and it was also the US that ended that mandate and enabled the restoration of Lebanon’s political autonomy. Both changes to Lebanon’s structure were mainly caused by dynamics on the international level, rather than on the domestic or regional levels.

CONCLUSION

‘From this small country, we travel the World, we challenge the World, people and countries, and we build wherever we want a Lebanon.’ Said Akel Portraying Lebanese adventurers, with their instinctive passion to travel like their Phoenician ancestors, seems to mirror a historical, uninterrupted contact between Lebanon and distant nations around the world. This book has given a brief glimpse of such interaction, which has left its mark on Lebanon’s history and polity. Tracking systemic effects on Lebanon throughout its recent history, we can definitely observe a pattern of change that relates Lebanon to international systemic changes. Whenever a major change in the structure of the international system has occurred (the decline or rise of a major systemic power, usually linked to Lebanon), a subsequent change in the structure of Lebanon has generally accompanied it. Structural changes in Lebanon, and sometimes a transformation of the whole system, have occurred with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of France’s influence; the subsequent decline of France’s status after World War II, which was accompanied by the rise of the US internationally and as a power broker in the region; and the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union.

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Change in its systemic structure after World War I led to a change in the structure of Lebanon towards a Greater Lebanon system; World War II and the decline of France’s position led to independence; the Cold War triggered instability; and the post-Soviet system led to a Syrian mandate over Lebanon and the loss of political autonomy. The post 11 September polarisation, however, between Islam and the West – especially the US – triggered a new foreign policy by the sole remaining superpower, and thus a contingent systemic pattern of interaction – the war on terrorism – which led to the termination of the Syrian mandate and the restoration of Lebanese autonomy. On the other hand, whenever the systemic pattern of interaction shifted towards polarisation between major powers over the Middle East or Lebanon, a tendency towards instability in Lebanon has prevailed and local war occurred – usually carrying the possibility of a subsequent change in the structure of the country. European polarisation over the Ottoman Empire (the Eastern Question) and the Levant, in particular through Franco-British intervention in the Lebanese Emirate’s affairs, led to direct and indirect systemic effects that initiated instability and subsequently changed the structure of Lebanon to the double-kaymakamate and the mutessarifate systems, in 1841 and 1861 respectively. Also, the twin superpowers’ polarisation during the Cold War triggered instability twice in Lebanon (in 1958 and 1975– 90) – the latter war only concluding with the end of polarisation over the region. Sometimes, systemic dynamics and regional dynamics push in the same direction; in such a case, no matter what kind of change occurs to the independent variables (structure and polarisation), the resulting effects on the dependent variable will be the same. The Syrian role as a systemic intermediary to end the war in 1990, and to re-establish stability and enforce a US-sponsored settlement in Lebanon, as a result of systemic change with the fall of the USSR resembles the Ottoman interventions in 1840 and 1860 to establish stability and enforce a European settlement in the country. Syria and Ottoman Turkey were utilised as systemic intermediaries to preserve stability in Lebanon, although both had their own agendas for the country and both had played a major role in causing the instability in

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the first place. On both occasions, however, systemic powers found it in their interest to utilise a regional intermediary to play the role of a stabiliser in Lebanon – it was in the interest of the systemic powers not to intervene directly for that purpose. In general, therefore, polarisation is directly related to instability in Lebanon. Although the country carries some innate seeds of instability due to its social mosaic and divided structure, and although regional factors for instability are usually present, the functioning of the international system reveals a certain pattern of systemic effects on Lebanon – effects that tend to play the decisive role in determining change in the structure and stability of the country. Sometimes systemic effects may not explain the occurrence of political instability in Lebanon – as in the case of the 1975 War. However, in that case, they proved to be the dominant factor in putting an end to it: .

.

In 1840 and 1861, a direct French intervention was enough to end the upheavals in Lebanon. These conflicts were primarily caused by systemic effects due to polarisation between France, Great Britain and Russia on the international level and their subsequent interventions in the Ottoman Empire’s affairs. Local divisions and regional dynamics helped to foment instability, especially due to Turkey’s attempt to centralise power away from its provinces and thus quash any aspiration for political autonomy in Lebanon, but their role was secondary. In 1958, the Eisenhower Doctrine for containment in the Middle East during the Cold War (systemic polarisation) played a certain role in triggering the 1958 instability, but it had the direct effect of preventing a war and preserving the political structure. Stability was immediately restored by direct US intervention through the deployment of the US marines to support the Lebanese Government. The systemic pattern of interaction in the form of Containment was unfavourable to the domestic (Muslim) or regional (Nasser) bid to change the status quo in Lebanon. US intervention curbed Nasser’s influence and prevented the

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occurrence of war in Lebanon. The regional dynamics, which were exemplified by Soviet support for radical regimes in the Middle East (especially Egypt) and the latter’s bid for regional hegemony, was promoting instability and a change in the status quo (structure) of Lebanon. The regional dynamics were flowing against the prevailing systemic dynamics – containment against change in the status quo of pro-Western Lebanon – and was thus checked by the US (systemic power), reversing its effect and preserving stability and structure in Lebanon. In 1990, the concluding of the 1975 War came with an end to the bipolar system, which also ended systemic polarisation – that is, the end of the Cold War and superpower polarisation over the Middle East. The end of polarisation as the dominant systemic pattern of interaction enabled the US to initiate a peace process and end the Lebanese war in the absence of any Soviet-supported obstructions.

Thus, even when instability in Lebanon had regional sub-systemic or domestic causes, the possibility of a local war has mostly been a function of systemic dynamics. On the other hand, prevention or termination of instability (war) in Lebanon and the imposition of a settlement has always been the result of systemic effects. Those settlements usually led to a change in the structure of Lebanon. The point can be made, however, that the first structural change in Lebanon did not instigate any instability – and neither did it come as a result of a settlement to stop instability, as in the case of later structural changes. That change (Druze to Maronite rule) occurred before the beginning of systemic polarisation over the Eastern Question and European rivalry over the fate of the Ottoman Empire and influence in the Levant. This may be considered as further proof of the importance of systemic effects on Lebanon. Although the change to a Maronite-led emirate was the result of delayed systemic effects – the change in the domestic balance of power in favour of the Maronites because of their traditional European connections and support – instability or ethnic war did not occur because systemic powers were not yet polarised over the Middle East region. Although

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this first structural change had its main causes on the systemic level (a systemic pattern of interaction of supporting co-religionist Catholics in the East), it also proves that instability did not occur in the absence of systemic polarisation over Lebanon. A shift in the domestic balance of power and the end of Druze-Muslim rule was not enough to trigger instability or ethnic war in Lebanon. Therefore, a general pattern can be observed when studying systemic effects on the changes in Lebanon: mainly, that change in the structure and stability of the country are mostly caused by changes and dynamics on the international level and not by factors on the regional or domestic level. Thus, the pattern describing systemic effects on Lebanon is that although domestic and regional effects are necessary to cause change in the country’s structure and stability, it is the international systemic effects that constitute the sufficient cause of change in Lebanon. Changes in structure and stability in Lebanon would not have occurred if it were not for changes in the international dynamics – that is, systemic effects always played the dominant role in the changes that occurred in Lebanon. Finally, it is worth mentioning that in an ongoing unitary political system and with a chronic domestic divide between Muslims and Christians, the domestic pattern of interaction will always be a predominantly zero-sum game – a pattern that has marked Lebanon throughout its history. Thus, as long as the surrounding regional environment of Lebanon (the Middle East) is considered a strategic geographical area, changes in Lebanon will be primarily determined by systemic interactions.1 During the Ottoman Era, and especially after the change to a Christian emirate, the Druze found it difficult to separate themselves from the Ottomans or take an opposing stance to that of Ottoman dominance lest they end up on the same side as the Christians with respect to Lebanese politics. Later, on the issue of Muhammad ‘Ali, they automatically took an opposite stance against ‘Ali’s expansion in the Levant and fought against him for no other reason than that of their domestic considerations. Their sole concern was that, ‘Ali, France’s ally, victorious in the Levant against

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the Ottomans, would inflate the Maronites’ power and influence in Lebanon. In the twentieth century, the Muslim community in the country found it very difficult to acquiesce to an independent Lebanon under a Greater Lebanon system, and when the latter became an irreversible fact they found it difficult to distinguish between a Lebanese nationalism and a wider affiliation to Arab nationalism and Arab causes. This duality of allegiance also served their domestic considerations of power balancing with the Christians, and led to their frequent adherence to Arab causes at the expense of their loyalty to their own country. Muslims in Lebanon acquiesced to unity with Nasser’s United Arab Republic (UAR); Palestinian incursions into Lebanon, and the latter’s activities against Israel; and, after 1975, Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon – all to the detriment of Lebanon’s sovereignty.

NOTES

Introduction 1. James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), p. 2. 2. Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff (eds), Two Worlds of International Relations (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 3. 3. Historical works on Lebanon, although comprehensive in their details (authors such as Kamal Salibi, Eyal Zisser, Kais Firro and Meir Zamir), usually undermine the dynamics on the international system. They are more interested in the domestic level of analysis, whereby local individual or societal trends are considered to be the major source of change in any political entity. In the second category some of the literature is systemic in nature but it considers the region to be the bigger picture/system that explains change in Lebanon. A good example is The Breakdown of The State in Lebanon 1967– 1976 by Farid el Khazen, who analyses a mixture of domestic and regional factors – mainly, the Palestinian factor – that led to the Lebanese civil war. The third category is systemic-oriented and links international dynamics to changes in Lebanon, but it either presents a deficient theoretical linkage, thus offering a ‘fuzzy’ representation of systemic effects on Lebanon, or it fails to point out the real cause of change by giving equal weight to the domestic, regional and international dynamics. Literatures of this sort include Unipolarity and the Middle East by Birthe Hansen, The Internationalization of Communal Strife by Manus Midlarsky, The Politics of Intervention in Ottoman Lebanon 1830– 1861 by Caesar Farah, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon by Samir Khalaf, and Lebanon, Improbable Nation: a Study of Political Developments by Leila Meo. 4. L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 101.

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5. The political system that succeeded the emirate; refer to Chapter 1, The International Dynamics: Systemic Pattern of Interaction. 6. The political system that succeeded the double kaymakamate; refer to Chapter 2, World War I and Greater Lebanon; Background; The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate. 7. Most of the literature on Lebanon focuses extensively, if not exclusively, on its divided nature. Some representative samples are: Halim Barakat, Lebanon in Strife: Student Prelude to Civil War; Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon; David Gordon, Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation; Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic; Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation; and Samir Khalaf, Lebanon’s Predicament and Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict. 8. Lebanon, with its fragmented political culture, has been frequently portrayed as an ‘improbable’, ‘precarious’, ‘fragmented’, ‘dismembered’ or ‘torn’ society – a divided state ravaged by ethnic, religious and communal schisms; a small, plural, fragmented political culture trapped in turbulent regional and global rivalries. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, p. 2. 9. Paul E. Salem, ‘Superpowers and Small States: An Overview of AmericanLebanese Relations’, Beirut Review, 5 (Spring 1992), p. 75. 10. Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 19– 20. 11. Using the cases in Lebanon in 1958 and 1975, Karen Rasler insists that external forces create the conditions for internal wars. Both civil wars, she suggests, were inspired by regional and international politics. Rasler, however, fails to detect whether the predominant source of instability in Lebanon originated on the regional or international level, and to investigate the link between both dynamics and change in Lebanon – issues which form the main objective of this book. Karen A. Rasler, ‘International Influence on the Origins and Outcomes of International War: a Comparative Analysis of the 1958 and 1975–6 Lebanese Civil War’, in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), The Internationalization of Communal Strife (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 107. 12. The internationalisation process is generally understood to refer to the involvement of external parties in local conflicts for the purpose of influencing their outcomes – a definition misunderstood by some as the shift of a purely domestic struggle to one involving other states and regimes. It is misleading to treat the international system mainly as a neutral actor and, thus, neglect to consider the contribution of systemic effects to creating the conditions for internal war. Internal conflicts, whether ethnically based or not, are a product of a complex relationship between domestic conditions and the competitive arena of international relations. Every internal war is a conflict both between and within political systems or a conflict that is both external and internal. Brown, Old Rules, Dangerous Game, p. 94; and Rasler, ‘International Influence’, p. 115. 13. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979), p. 19.

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14. James E. Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff Jr., ed., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1997) 101– 2. 15. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 39. 16. Ibid., pp. 39 – 40. 17. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995), pp. 97– 9. 18. Ibid., pp. 102– 3, 107. 19. Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Political Analysis, 6th edn (New York: New York University Press, 1992), p. 43. 20. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 79– 80, 81. 21. Ibid., pp. 88 – 96. 22. Ibid., p. 97. 23. Ibid., pp. 98 – 9. 24. Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 2 – 3. 25. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 113. 26. Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers, p. 4. 27. Jervis, System Effects, p. 112. 28. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 70. 29. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework, p. 7. 30. F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations’, International Studies Review 1(1) (Spring 1999), pp. 13 – 15. 31. Jervis, System Effects, pp. 29– 32. 32. Ibid., pp. 34 – 5. 33. Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch, Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 10 – 18. 34. Jervis, System Effects, pp. 32– 3. 35. Ibid., pp. 40, 44, 48, 52, 58– 9. 36. Ibid., p. 70. 37. This term denotes a mixture of time-series analysis and cross-section analysis – both investigative methods used in statistics and systems theory. 38. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 96.

Chapter 1 The European System and Pre-State Lebanon 1. A transliteration of the Turkish term for district or administrative division during Ottoman times. 2. Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 4 – 5.

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3. Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981), pp. 126– 7. 4. Zamir, The Formation, p. 5. 5. Ibid. 6. Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs From the Earliest Times to the Present, 10th edn (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1970), pp. 729 – 30. 7. Hourani, The Emergence, p. 129. 8. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 731. 9. Dhimmi refers to the status of non-Muslims in Muslim societies, whereby they are treated as subordinates who are placed under the protection of Muslims in return for a per capita tax. 10. The millet system was established by the Ottomans to enable different religious groups to live according to their own personal laws while their religious leaders maintained liaison with the Porte. 11. Nazih Ayoubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), p. 115. 12. Kamal Salibi, ‘The Historical Perspective’, in Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills (eds), Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I.B.Tauris, 1988), p. 7. 13. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 115. 14. Abbot Paul Naaman, ‘Church and Politics in the Maronite Experience 1516 – 1943’. Available at http://www.maronite-institute.org/MARI/JMS/january98/ Church_and_Politics.htm (accessed 23 November 2016). 15. Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: The Trinity Press, 1968), p. xiii. 16. Naaman, ‘Church and Politics’. 17. Bassem Khalifah, The Rise and Fall of Christian Lebanon (Toronto: York Press Ltd, 1997), pp. 2 – 3. 18. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. xxiv – xxv. 19. Milton Viorst, Sandcastles: The Arabs In Search of the Modern World (London: Jonathan Cape, 1994), pp. 163– 4. 20. Salibi, ‘The Historical Perspective’, p. 11. 21. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1994), pp. 56 – 7. 22. Ibid., pp. 58, 61. 23. Ibid., pp. 59, 65 – 6. 24. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework, pp. 35– 6. 25. Ibid., pp. 36 – 7. 26. Ibid., pp. 37 – 8. 27. Ibid., pp. 38 – 9. 28. Ibid., p. 41. 29. Ibid., p. 42. 30. Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 69– 74. 31. Viorst, Sandcastles, p. 164.

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32. Matti Moosa, The Maronites in History (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 217–18. 33. A. J. Abraham, Lebanon at Mid-Century: Maronite Druze Relations in Lebanon 1840– 1860 – A Prelude to Arab Nationalism (Washington, DC: University Press of America Inc., 1981), pp. 69– 70. 34. Naaman, ‘Church and Politics’. 35. Abbot Paul Naaman, ‘Maronite Society at the End of the XVI Century’. Available at www.maronite-institute.org/MARI/JMS/july99/Maronite_Society. htm (accessed 23 November June 2016). 36. Moosa, The Maronites in History, p. 255. 37. Naaman, ‘Maronite Society’. 38. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 127. 39. Ibid., p. 4. 40. J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record 1535– 1956, Vol. 1, 1534– 1914 (Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire: Archive Editions, 1987), p. 24. 41. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 11– 14. 42. Leila Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1994), pp. 18– 19. 43. Brown, Old Rules, Dangerous Game, p. 25. 44. Ibid., pp. 25 – 6. 45. M. E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East 1792– 1923 (London: Longman Group Ltd, 1987), p. 45. 46. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 15– 16. 47. Hitti, History of the Arabs, pp. 731– 3. 48. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, p. 47– 9. 49. Ibid., pp. 50 – 1. 50. Ibid., pp. 52 – 6. 51. John P. Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861– 1914 (London: Ithaca Press, 1977), p. 11. 52. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, p. 57. 53. Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, p. 12. 54. Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘Was There a European Order in the Twentieth Century? From The Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War’, Contemporary European History, Volume 9, Issue 3 (November 2000), pp. 329–30. 55. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 79. 56. Ibid., pp. 81 – 2. 57. Ibid., pp. 82 – 3. 58. Ibid., pp. 84 – 5. 59. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, p. 59. 60. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1991), p. 273. 61. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 28. 62. Ibid.

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63. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 733. 64. William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 68– 9. 65. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, pp. 70– 1. 66. M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774– 1923 (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 90. 67. Ibid., p. 92. 68. Ceasar Farah, The Politics of Intervention in Ottoman Lebanon 1830– 1861 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2000), p. 30. 69. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 734. 70. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, p. 71. 71. Anderson, The Eastern Question, p. 96. 72. Ibid., p. 97. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid., pp. 106 – 7. 75. Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, p. 14. 76. Yale, The Near East, pp. 72– 3. 77. Engin Deniz Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Empire 1861– 1920 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), pp. 26– 7. 78. Kais M. Firro, A History of the Druze (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), pp. 54 – 78. 79. Ibid., pp. 80 – 1. 80. Abraham, Lebanon at Mid-Century, p. 70. 81. Firro, History of the Druze, pp. 82– 3. 82. Ibid., pp. 83 – 5. 83. Hitti, History of the Arabs, pp. 734– 5. 84. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 44– 5. 85. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, pp. 18– 20. 86. Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 29– 31. 87. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, p. 20. 88. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 60. 89. Firro, History of the Druze, pp. 96– 7. 90. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, p. 21. 91. Akarli, The Long Peace, p. 27. 92. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 63. 93. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, p. 22. 94. Firro, History of the Druze, p. 97. 95. Ibid., pp. 101 – 2. 96. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in The Near and Middle East, pp. 132 – 5. 97. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, pp. 23– 4. 98. Ibid., p. 24. 99. A peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire following the defeat of the latter in the Russo– Turkish war of 1768– 74. It signalled the defeat of

210

100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118.

119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126.

127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132.

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the Ottomans in their war against Russia, and gave Russia the right to protect Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Ibid., pp. 25 – 7. Akarli, The Long Peace, pp. 28–9. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, p. 27. Ibid., pp. 27 – 8. Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 275. Meo, Lebanon Improbable Nation, p. 28. Winslow, War and Politics, p. 35. Farah, The Politics of Intervention, p. 702. The use of ‘Syria’ instead of ‘Lebanon’ or ‘Levant’ may be related to the author’s ideological considerations. Ibid., p. 705. Firro, History of the Druze, pp. 108– 16. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, p. 29. Ibid., p. 30. Charles Churchill, The Druze and the Maronites Under Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860 (London: Spottiswoode and Co., 1862), p. 45. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, p. 31. Winslow, War and Politics, p. 37. Firro, History of the Druze, p. 120. Farah, The Politics of Intervention, p. 76. Ibid., p. 76. Ussama Makdisi, ‘Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon’, Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 42, No. 1 (January, 2000), p. 182. Ibid., p. 196. Firro, History of the Druze, pp. 108– 10. Salibi ‘The Historical Perspective’, p. 5. Ibid., p. 6. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 92– 105. Churchill, The Druze and The Maronites, pp. 221– 2. Ibid., p. 251. On June 1861, the Reglament Organique (organic statute) established the Mutesarrifate of Lebanon as an autonomous Ottoman province under the guarantee of the European Powers. Iliya F. Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711– 1845 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 276. Meo, Lebanon Improbable Nation, pp. 33– 4. Harik, Politics and Change, p. 276. Firro, History of the Druze, p. 125. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, p. 37. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 118– 19.

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The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the First Republic

1. Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648– 1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 170 – 1. 2. Ibid., p. 177. 3. Ibid., pp. 184 – 5. 4. A system introduced by the United Nations to guarantee that particular ‘Trust’ territories were administered so as to serve the interests of their inhabitants and to maintain peace and security. 5. Ibid., p. 270. 6. Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (London: I.B.Tauris, 2000), p. 4. 7. Yale, The Near East, pp. 328–9. 8. Ibid., pp. 330 – 1. 9. Ibid., p. 332. 10. Ibid., p. 334. 11. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, pp. 301– 2. 12. Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 20. 13. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, p. 304. 14. Yale, The Near East, p. 335. 15. Ibid., p. 336. 16. Ibid., p. 337. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid., p. 338. 19. Naaman, ‘Church and Politics’. 20. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 115. 21. Ibid., pp. 151 – 2. 22. Ibid., p. 152. 23. Ibid., pp. 152 – 3. 24. Ibid., p. 153. 25. Ibid. 26. Kais M. Firro, Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the Mandate (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p. 17. 27. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, pp. 1 – 2. 28. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p. 25. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., pp. 26 – 7. 31. Ibid., p. 28. 32. Ibid., pp. 28 – 9. 33. Ibid., pp. 29 – 30, 32. 34. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, p. 5.

212

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35. Ibid., p. 26. 36. Caroline Attie, Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), pp. 18–19. 37. Ibid., pp. 19 – 20. 38. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, p. 26. 39. Attie, Struggle in the Levant, pp. 20– 1. 40. Ibid., p. 22. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., p. 26. 43. Aviel Roshwald, Estranged Bedfellows: Britain and France in the Middle East During the Second World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 81–2. 44. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, pp. 28– 9. 45. Ibid., p. 30. 46. Ibid., pp. 32 – 4. 47. Ibid., p. 36. 48. Salibi, House of Many Mansions, pp. 33– 4. 49. Ibid., p. 34. 50. Ibid., p. 35. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid., pp. 36 – 7. 53. Ibid., p. 37. 54. Ibid., pp. 51 – 2. 55. Ibid., pp. 54 – 5. 56. Asher Kaufman, ‘“Tell us our History”: Charles Corm, Mount Lebanon and Lebanese Nationalism’, Middle Eastern Studies 4(3) (May 2004), p. 19. 57. Ibid., p. 21. 58. Ibid., p. 22. 59. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, pp. 37– 8, 41. 60. Ibid., pp. 41, 43. 61. Ibid., pp. 56 – 7. 62. Ayoubi, Overstating the Arab State, p. 116. 63. Viorst, Sandcastles, p. 165. 64. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, pp. 69– 72. 65. Ibid., pp. 76 – 7. 66. Ibid., pp. 79 – 82. 67. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, pp. 85– 6, 88. 68. Ibid., pp. 88 – 9. 69. Roshwald, Estranged Bedfellows, pp. 154; 156– 7, 175 – 6. 70. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, p. 209. 71. Ibid, p. 92. 72. Ibid., pp. 93 – 4. 73. Roshwald, Estranged Bedfellows, p. 212. 74. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, pp. 96– 7. 75. Attie, Struggle in the Levant, pp. 26– 7.

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213

Chapter 3 Bipolarity and Status-Quo Lebanon 1. Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), pp. 2 – 4, 17. 2. Ibid., pp. 34 – 5. 3. Ibid., pp. 34 – 5, 36. 4. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 187. 5. Ibid., p. 188. 6. Ibid., pp. 190, 194. 7. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958– 1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 1 – 2. 8. The Anglo –Iraqi Treaty of 1948 negotiated British withdrawal from Iraq in return for close military cooperation and British control over Iraqi foreign policy. Arab nationalists in Iraq refused it, and it was repudiated after the Free Officers’ Coup in 1958. 9. Ibid., pp. 2 –3. 10. Rasler, ‘International Influence’, p. 109. 11. Ibid., p. 110. 12. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 4 – 6. 13. Rasler, ‘International Influence’, p. 110. 14. Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, pp. 206– 9. 15. Ibid., p. 210. 16. Ibid., pp. 211, 213. 17. George F. Nasr, ‘The Policy of Lebanon in the Web of Inter-Arab Cold War Politics’, PhD dissertation, University of Alberta, 1969, pp. 410 – 17. 18. Ibid., pp. 418 – 20. 19. Ibid., pp. 421 – 6. 20. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 549. 21. L. Carl Brown (ed.), Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004), p. 283. 22. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 6 – 7. 23. Nasr, ‘The Policy of Lebanon’, p. 294. 24. Rasler, ‘International Influence’, p. 110. 25. Ibid., pp. 110 – 11. 26. Nasr, ‘The Policy of Lebanon’, p. 311. 27. Ibid., pp. 317 – 18. 28. Ibid., pp. 304 – 5. 29. Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), p. 389; Nasr, ‘The Policy of Lebanon’, pp. 321– 2. 30. Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and The Middle East (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 205 – 6.

214 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66.

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Ibid., pp. 206– 11. Nasr, ‘The Policy of Lebanon’, p. 353. Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, p. 212. Ibid., p. 224. Ibid., p. 236. Nasr, ‘The Policy of Lebanon’, pp. 371– 2. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 22– 3. Viorst, Sandcastles, p. 171. Record, Making War, Thinking History, pp. 25– 6. David S. Painter, The Cold War: An International History (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 76. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 734. Ibid., pp. 734– 5. Ibid., pp. 734– 6. Ibid., p. 737. Ibid., p. 737. Ibid., p. 738. Ibid., p. 739. Ibid., p. 740. Ibid., pp. 745– 6. Ibid., pp. 748– 9. Ibid., pp. 758– 60. William Keylor, The Twentieth Century World, An International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 345. Ibid., p. 346. Painter, The Cold War, pp. 78– 9. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., pp. 80 – 94. Record, Making War, Thinking History, p. 80. Jervis, System Effects, pp. 58– 9. Michael Greenfield Partem, ‘The Buffer System in International Relations’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 1(27-1) (March 1983), p. 4. Ibid., pp. 8 –9. Ibid., pp. 10 – 13. Ibid., pp. 20 – 1. Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the War in Lebanon (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. viii. Hussein Sirriyeh, ‘Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict’, Adelphi Papers 243 (Autumn 1989), pp. 12– 16. Viorst, Sandcastles, pp. 172– 3. See also, Brown, Diplomacy in The Middle East, pp. 283 – 4. Kamal Salibi, Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958– 1976 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), pp. 34– 5.

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215

67. Ibid., p. 35. 68. N. Kliot, ‘The Territorial Disintegration of a state: the case of Lebanon’, University of Durham, Occasional Papers Series 30 (1986), p. 12. 69. Ibid., p. 24. 70. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, p. 395. 71. Salem, ‘Superpowers and Small States’, p. 59. 72. Naomi Weimberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 4 – 5, 10. 73. Ibid., p. 12. 74. Marius Deeb, Syria’s Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 3. 75. Ibid., p. 6. 76. Adeeb I. Dawisha, ‘Syria in Lebanon. Assad’s Vietnam?’ Foreign Policy 33 (Winter 1978 –1979), p. 141. 77. Edward Haley and Lewis Snider (eds), Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1979), p. 122. 78. Ibid., p. 123. 79. Ibid., p. 124. 80. Salem, ‘Superpowers and Small States’, pp. 58– 9. 81. Kail C. Ellis, ‘US Policy Toward Lebanon’, in Kail Ellis (ed.), Lebanon’s Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century (Ganisville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002), pp. 93– 4. 82. Salem, ‘Superpowers and Small States’, pp. 60– 1. 83. Adeeb Dawisha, ‘Assad’s Vietnam?’, p. 145. 84. Nicola Nasif, Raymond Edde Jumhuriyat al-Damir (Beirut: Annahar Publishers, 2002), pp. 409 – 17. Edde recorded the whole conversation on two tapes, giving one to Dean Brown and keeping the other. 85. Ilana Kass, ‘The Lebanon Civil War 1975 – 76: A Case of Crisis Mismanagement’, Jerusalem Papers On Peace Problems, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1979, pp. 9 – 13. 86. Ibid., p. 14. 87. Ibid., pp. 15, 20. 88. Dawisha, ‘Assad’s Vietnam?’, p. 148. 89. Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, p. 201. 90. Farid el Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967– 1976 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 4. 91. Hani A. Faris, ‘The Failure of Peacemaking in Lebanon, 1975– 1989’, in Deirdre Collings (ed.), Peace For Lebanon?: From War to Reconstruction ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1994), p. 21. 92. Ibid., p. 22. 93. Mary-Jane Deeb and Marius K. Deeb, ‘Regional Conflicts and Regional Solutions: Lebanon’, The ANNALS AAPSS 518 (November 1991), pp. 83 – 5. 94. Faris, ‘The Failure of Peacemaking’, pp. 22–3.

216 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111.

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Deeb and Deeb, ‘Regional Conflicts and Regional Solutions’, pp. 85 – 6. Faris, ‘The Failure of Peacemaking’, p. 23. Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., pp. 24 – 5. Deeb and Deeb, ‘Regional Conflicts and Regional Solutions’, pp. 86 – 7. Faris, ‘The Failure of Peacemaking’, p. 26. Record, Making War, Thinking History, p. 81. Ibid., pp. 81 – 2. Ibid., p. 83. Record, Making War, Thinking History, pp. 83– 4. Faris, ‘The Failure of Peacemaking’, pp. 26–7. Kliot, ‘Territorial Disintegration’, p. 12. Rasler, ‘International Influence’, p. 94. Ibid., p. 107. Ibid., p. 108. Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, p. 6. Salem, ‘Superpowers and Small States’, p. 75.

Chapter 4 Unipolarity and the ‘Second Republic’ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, pp. 451– 2. Ibid., p. 454. Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 762– 4. Ibid., p. 772. Ibid., pp. 773, 785. Alan R. Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 166. Ibid., pp. 170– 1. Ibid., pp. 172– 4, 178. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 805. Elie Salem, ‘A New World Order: Settlement Scenarios in the Arab East’, Beirut Review Vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 4. Record, Making War, Thinking History, pp. 29– 30. Salem, ‘New World Order’, pp. 5, 10. Birthe Hansen, Unipolarity and The Middle East (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), p. 139. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 145. Ellis, ‘US Policy Towards Lebanon’, p. 98. Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in The Middle East, From Interstate war to New Security, 2nd edn (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 6. Hansen, Unipolarity and The Middle East, p. 145.

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19. Tom Najem, ‘The Collapse and Reconstruction of Lebanon’, Durham Middle East Paper 59 (1988), pp. 21– 2. 20. Faris, ‘The Failure of Peacemaking’, pp. 27–8. 21. Salem, ‘Superpowers and Small States’, pp. 73– 5. 22. Hansen, Unipolarity and The Middle East, p. 145. 23. Ibid., p. 147. 24. Ibid. 25. Nasif, Raymond Edde, pp. 412– 19. 26. Elie Salem, Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon: The Troubled Years 1982– 88 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1995), pp. 242– 3. 27. Ellis, ‘U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon’, p. 98. 28. Najem, ‘Collapse and Reconstruction’, pp. 24– 5. 29. William Harris, Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton, NJ: Marcus Wiener Publishers, 1996), pp. 292–4. 30. Joseph Maila, ‘The Ta’if Accord: An Evaluation’, in Collings, Peace for Lebanon?, pp. 31–2. 31. Faris, ‘The Failure of Peacemaking’, p. 28. 32. Maila, ‘The Ta’if Accord’, pp. 38– 41. 33. The Reglament Organique – organic statute – or the protocol that established the mutessarifate on 9 June 1861 constituted Lebanon as an autonomous Ottoman province under the guarantee of six signatory Powers – France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Britain and the Ottoman Empire. In 1867, Italy adhered to the statute as a seventh guarantor. 34. Edward Hnein, ’Ala Doroub Lubnan (Jounieh, Lebanon: Al-Kaslik Publications, 1979), pp. 88–9. 35. Meir Zamir, ‘From Hegemony to Marginalization, the Maronites of Lebanon’, in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds), Minorities and The State in the Arab World (London: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1999), pp. 111 – 12. 36. Ibid., pp. 113 – 14. 37. Ibid, pp. 118 – 19. 38. Paul Nabil Sayah, ‘Muslim-Christian relations in Lebanon: A Christian Perspective’, in Kail C. Ellis (ed), Lebanon’s Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century (Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002), p. 127. 39. Ibid., pp. 127 – 8. 40. Brown, Diplomacy in The Middle East, p. 284. 41. Picard, A Shattered Country, p. x. 42. Ibid. 43. Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Continuity of International Politics’, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds), Worlds in Collision: Terror and The Future of Global Order (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 349. 44. Ibid., pp. 350 – 1, 353. 45. Barry Buzan, The United States and The Great Powers, pp. 2 – 3.

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46. Benjamin R. Barber, ‘Democracy and Terror in the Era of Jihad vs. McWorld’, in Booth and Dunne, Worlds in Collision Terror, pp. 245 – 6. 47. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 72(3) (Summer 1993), pp. 22, 24. 48. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books Inc., 1992). 49. Augustus Richard Norton, ‘Making War, Making Peace: The Middle East Entangles America’, Current History, 103(669) (January 2004), pp. 6–7. 50. Joshua Muravchik, ‘Bringing Democracy to the Arab World’, Current History, 103(669) (January 2004), p. 8. 51. Eyal Zisser, ‘Syria and the War in Iraq’, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) 7(2) (June 2003), p. 44. 52. Ibid., pp. 44 – 5. 53. Eyal Zisser, ‘Syria and the Question of WMD’, MERIA 8(3) (September 2004), pp. 1– 2. 54. Fouad Ajami, ‘The Autumn of the Autocrats’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 3 (May –June 2005), pp. 21, 30. 55. Ziad K. Abdelnour, ‘The US– Syrian Crisis: Why Diplomacy Failed’, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (MEIB) 5(10) (October 2003). Available at www. meforum.org/meib/articles/0310_s1.htm (accessed 30 November 2016). 56. Gary C. Gambill, ‘American Sanctions on Syria: A Diplomatic Masterstroke?’, MEIB 6(5) (May 2004). Available at www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0405_ s1.htm (accessed 30 November 2016). 57. Ibid. 58. William Harris, ‘An Anschluss brought down by errors and hubris’, Daily Star Lebanon, 22 March 2005. 59. Daily Star Lebanon, 4 October 2004. 60. Karim Knio, ‘Lebanon: Cedar Revolution or Neo-Sectarian Partition?’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (July 2005), p. 225. 61. Ibid., p. 226. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid., pp. 228– 9, 230. 64. Farid el Khazen, ‘Continuity and Change’, 8 August 2005. Available at www. lebanonwire.com/0805/05080801BL.asp (accessed 14 December 2016). 65. Ibid. 66. Nizar Abdel-Kader, ‘“Impossible” Options’, 6 August 2005. Available at http://world.mediamonitors.net/layout/set/print/content/view/full/17468 (accessed 14 December 2016). 67. From a Washington Post interview conducted with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 31 July 2005. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/AR2005072901435.html (accessed 30 November 2016).

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Conclusion 1. A similar conclusion was given by George F. Nasr in his study on Lebanon during the Cold War, in which he anticipated that ‘the Christian-Moslem controversy continues to exist and will continue to exist as long as the majority of the Christians are Lebanese nationalists and the majority of the Muslims are Arab nationalists. The government, therefore, in conducting its foreign policy should be primarily concerned about keeping Christian-Moslem controversy within manageable size.’ Nasr, ‘The Policy of Lebanon’, p. 432.

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INDEX

Abdel Nasser, Gamal, 111 Abi-l-lama, Bashir Ahmad, 72, 73 ABM Treaty (Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty), 135 Al Saiqa, 143, 144 Alawite(s), 143, 188 state of the, 88 Aleppo (state of), 20, 88 Algeria, the French occupation, 37 ‘Ali, Muhammad, see Muhammad ‘Ali Allenby, General Edmund Hynman, 79 Amal (Hope Movement), 154 Annan, Kofi, 191 Antioch, 21 Aoun, Michael army crushed, 170 and his Christian army, 167 opposed the Ta’if agreement, 168 Syrian move against, 169 Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), 153 Arab League, 101, 103, 141, 145, 148, 169 initiative, 145 Lebanon’s national identity, 179 Arab Summit Conference, 151, 152, 153

Arab world, 7, 79, 81, 97, 99 – 101, 115–16, 123, 125, 127, 128, 133, 149, 179, 188 Arabism, 98– 9, 108, 115, 143, 154 pan-Arabism, 108, 115 – 17 Arabistan, 20 Assad, Hafez, 134, 143, 145, 169 Austria (Habsburg Austria and Austrian), 27, 38, 39, 41, 42 Austrian Chancellor, 55 Austria – Hungary, 53, 61, 77 Austria’s volatile position, 42 Baghdad Pact, 117, 118, 122 balance of power, 5, 10, 14 balance-of-power system (mechanism), 26–30, 40–2, 44, 46–7 European balance of power, 29, 44, 46– 8, 54, 57, 61, 74 Balfour Declaration, 80, 82 Balkans, 36, 38, 39, 77, 85 Barber, Benjamin R., 184 Bashir III (ruler of Lebanon), 51, 53, 54, 57, 176 Berri, Nabih, 154 Beynet, Etienne, 105 Bin Laden, Osama, 187 bipolarity, 5, 17, 168

230

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CHANGE IN LEBANON

Black September, 141 Brandt, Willy (Chancellor of West Germany), 132 Brezhnev, Leonid, 135 Brown, Carl, 123, 181 Brown, Dean, 148 Bush, George H. W., 162, 164 Bush, George W., 185, 187, 189 Buzan, Berry, 114, 115, 150, 184 Byzantine Army, 22

de Gaulle, Charles, 91, 92, 94, 106, 132 de Richelieu, Cardinal, 27 Defence and Security Pact, 173 delayed effect(s), 8, 11, 35 dependent variable(s), 5, 11, 14, 199 Desert Storm (Operation), 170, 186 Dhimmi, 21, 33 direct effect(s), 8, 35, 57, 73, 74, 76, 77, 91, 102, 108, 160, 183, 200

Cairo Accord, 141, 142, 153 Capitulation Agreement, 31, 34, 35 Carter, Jimmy (US President), 134 Casey, Richard, 104 Catroux, George, 92 Chamoun, Camille, 121 Chiha, Michel, 179 Chirac, Jacques, 190 Christendom, 28 Churchill, Winston, 92 circular effect, 10, 40, 138 Cold War, 5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 109, 111, 113, 115 – 20, 122– 5, 129, 138, 143, 146, 154, 158, 159– 61, 163 – 5, 167 – 9, 177, 182, 184, 185, 193, 198 – 201 dynamics, 109 – 13, 115, 118, 123, 125, 131, 132, 137, 143, 150, 151, 156, 157, 159, 166 politics, 10, 122, 128, 138, 148 post-Cold War, 165, 183– 5 Concert of Europe, the, 16, 17, 35, 41, 42, 47, 58, 60, 61, 69, 75–7 Congress of Vienna, the, 40, 41 Constitutional Document, 151, 152, 168 containment policy, 17, 109, 112, 131, 151, 158 general Containment policy, 151 US Containment policy, 112 Corm, Charles, 100 Crimean War, 41, 61, 62, 63, 67 Crusades, 8, 87 Crusaders, 22, 31

Eastern Courts, 42 Eastern Question, 36, 37, 38, 42, 48, 49, 74, 193, 199, 201 Edde, Emille, 93, 101, 104 Edde, Raymond, 148, 172 Eden, Anthony, 105 Eisenhower Doctrine, 17, 109–12, 117, 119, 120, 122–9, 131, 159, 200 El-Alamein (Battle), 95, 102 Eliano, Giovanni Batista, 32 Ellis, Kail, 147 European connection, 35 European Security Conference, 132, 134, 135 Faisal II (King of Iraq), 117 Faisal, Hashemite Emir, 79, 90 Fakhr al-Din II, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 32– 4, 52, 175 Farah, Caesar, 63 Faris, Hani, 175 Farouk (king of Egypt), 117 Fatah (movement, ‘Fatahland’), 141, 142 Ferdinand (the Medici grand duke of Tuscany), 20 Fertile Crescent, 103, 117, 121 Francis I (king of France), 31 Frangieh, Suleiman, 152 French Mandate, 17, 24, 79, 81, 82, 86, 88, 91 – 3, 98, 101, 103, 108, 116, 175, 180

INDEX Geagea, Samir, 154 Geneva – Lausanne Conference, 137, 152, 153 Glasnost, 162 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 162, 163 Gouraud, General Henry J. E., 82, 83 Great Powers, 6, 7, 11, 13, 41, 43, 46, 47, 77, 80, 81, 91 Greater Syria, 121, 139 Hansen, Birthe, 165, 168, 171 Hariri, Rafiq, 181, 188, 190 hatt-I humayun, 64 Hatt-I Sherif of Gulhane, 58 Helleu, Jean, 104, 105 Helsinki Treaty, 135 Hezbollah, 167, 172, 185, 187, 188, 194 – 6 Hitler, Adolph, 112 Hnein, Edward, 175 Hobeiqa, Elie, 154 Holy Alliance, 42 Holy Roman Empire, 26, 27 Housein, Sherif, 88 Hoyek, Elias, Maronite Patriarch, 83 Huntington, Samuel, 184 Hussein (king of Jordan) 141, 165 Hussein, Saddam, 171, 186, 187 independent variables, 5, 6, 11, 199 indirect effect(s), 8, 12, 13, 35, 69, 73, 74 international order, 5, 41, 42, 54, 78 internationalisation process, 4 Iqta’, 71 Islamic fundamentalism, 14, 15, 183 – 5 Jazzar, Ahmad, 38 Jouplain, M., 86 Jumblat, Walid, 154, 190 Junbalat, Bashir, 34

231

Kaufman, Asher, 101 kaymakamate (system), 57, 58, 60, 61, 64, 67, 70, 73, 74, 86, 176, 177, 199 Kazas, 88 Kennan, George, 112 Kerr, Malcom, 116, 118, 124 Keylor, William, 135 Khaddam, Abdel Halim, 152 Khalaf, Samir, 158 Khazen (feudal lords), 32, 65 Khazen, Farid, 150 Khurshid Pasha, 68, 69 Khury, Beshara, 92, 93, 179 King-Crane Commission, 82 Kissinger, Henry, 123, 144, 146, 147 Korean War, 112 Kuchuk Kaynardja Treaty, 38 Lammens, Henry, 86 League of Nations, 78 Lebanese Front, 152 Lebanese National Movement, 152 Lebanism, 86, 95, 98, 99 Litani Operation, 142 Louis XIV (king of Francee), 27, 31, 34 Lyttelton, Oliver, 94 Ma’ni(s), 19 and Ma’nid, 22, 34 Mahmud II, Sultan, 39, 43 – 5 Maila, Joseph, 174, 175 Makdisi, Ussama, 67 Malkart Agreement, 142 Mamluk(s), 32, 33, 40 Maronite Patriarchate, 19 mediated effect(s), 8, 9, 48, 57, 58, 74, 160, 176, 177 Medici (grand duke of Tuscany), 20, 33 Middle East Command (MEAC), 121, 122 Muhammad ‘Ali, 9, 10, 37, 38, 40, 42– 8

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OF STABILITY AND

multipolar (system), 6, 7, 111, 184 mutessarifate (system), 1, 17, 25, 26, 70, 71, 74 – 9, 88, 98, 108, 175, 199 Naaman, Paul, Abbot, 33 Najem, Tom, 168 Napoleon (expedition), 33, 36 Napoleonic Wars, 27, 40, 62 Russia, invasion of 39 Nasserism, 118, 123 Nasserist, 124 Nasr, George, 121, 124, 125 National Dialogue Committee, 151 National Movement, 142 National Pact, the, 93, 100–3, 108, 124, 139, 140, 178–80 National Reconciliation Committee, 153 National Understanding, Document of, 156 NATO, 132, 133 Nelson, Lord, 36 New World Order, 81, 161, 164 Nixon, Richard (US President), 132– 6 Administration, 135 Nixon Doctrine, 113, 131 Nujaym, Bulus, 86 Ohannes Pasha, 79 Operation Desert Shield, 170 Operation Desert Storm, 186 organic law, 58 Ostpolitik, 132, 133 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 140, 141, 143, 144, 147, 152, 153, 155, 170 Palestinian Resistance Movement, 148 pan-Arab, 93, 117, 124, 130, 186 pan-Arabism, 108, 115– 17 pan-Arabist, 14 Paris Peace Conference, 80 Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS), 99

CHANGE IN LEBANON

perestroika, 162 Persian Gulf (region) crisis of 1990, 164 Picard, Elizabeth, 182 polarity, 6, 7, 158, 184 Powell, Colin, 164 Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), 154 Qasim, ‘Abd al-Karim, 51, 130 Qorqomaz, emir of Lebanon, 32 Quadruple Alliance, the, 41 Rasler, Karen, 117, 124, 157 Reagan, Ronald, 113, 154, 155, 163, 172 Reformation, the, 27 regional subsystem, 7, 187 Reglement of Shakib Efendi, 58, 59, 64 Rice, Condoleezza, 196 Saadeh, Antun, 99 Sadat, Anwar (Egyptian President), 134, 135, 137, 143, 148 Saifa, princes, 22 Salem, Elie, 172 Salibi, Kamal, 98 Salim III (Ottoman Sultan), 39 SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty), 135 San Francisco conferences, 78, 106 San Remo (conference), 82 Sanjak (of Mount Lebanon), 18, 89 Sayah, Paul, 180 Second Republic, Lebanon, 3, 16, 17, 159–61, 166, 168, 169, 173, 175–83 Shari’a law, 22, 24 Sharon, Ariel, 155 Shihabi, Bashir II, 21, 34, 35, 38, 43, 48– 51, 57, 176 Sinai II Agreement, 145 Six Day War, 140 Solh, Taqi al-Din, 100 South Lebanese Army (SLA), 167

INDEX Soviet Union, 15, 17, 106, 109, 116, 118, 119, 122, 125, 126, 128, 132 – 8, 143, 146, 148– 50, 160 – 4, 166, 169 – 71, 182, 185, 198 expansion, 109, 112 influence in the middle east, 132, 138 threat, 112, 118, 119 Spears, Sir Edward, 92, 93, 95, 102, 104, 105, 106 sub-systemic intermediary, 52, 69, 70, 74, 146 Sulayman I (Ottoman Sultan), 31 Sulh, Riyad, 91, 92, 93, 100, 102, 179 Sykes – Picot Agreement, 80, 81 Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSA), 189 Syrian National Bloc, 95, 102 systems theory, 5, 15 Ta’if Settlement, 101, 154, 156, 157, 159, 161, 165 – 9, 173– 5, 177 – 80, 192, 194 Tanzimat, the, 24, 39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 74, 84 exploitation of, 67, 68 Tapline (agreement), 120 Third World conflicts, 131, 159 Treaty of Westphalia, 27, 29 Tripartite Agreement, 121, 122, 143, 154, 168 Truman Doctrine, 113, 120 Trusteeship Council, 78 UAR see United Arab Republic Al-‘Umar, Dahir, 37 Umar Pasha (Ottoman governor of Lebanon), 54 UNIFIL see United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

233

unipolar (system), 6, 17, 160, 161, 171, 183, 184, 193, 196 unipolarity, 6, 183, 184 United Arab Republic (UAR), 126, 127, 128, 130, 203 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 142 Unkiar Skelessi, treaty, 44 – 6 UNSCR 1559 (UN Security Council resolution 1559), 191, 192, 194–6 Vichy Regime, 91, 92 Vietnam Syndrome, 8 Vietnam War, 131, 132 Viorst, Milton, 130 Von Metternich (prince of Austria), 41, 42, 45, 55 Waever, Ole, 114 Waltz, Kenneth, 13, 184 War of Greek Independence, 43 Warsaw Pact, 162 weapons of mass destruction, 187, 188 Weinberger Doctrine, 164 White Book, 94 William, bishop of Tyre, 31 Wilson, Woodrow, 77, 78, 81, 82 World War I, 75– 7, 79, 80, 83, 87, 94, 116, 119 World War II, 14, 17, 76, 90, 91, 93, 95, 105, 108, 109, 111 – 16, 119, 120, 198, 199 Yaqub, Salim, 127 Yeltsin, Boris, 163 Yom Kippor (War), 136, 146 Zamir, Meir, 178, 179, 180 zero-sum game, 4, 29, 55, 68, 73, 108, 130, 149, 171, 178, 179, 196, 202 Zisser, Eyal, 119