A History of Russo-Japanese Relations: Over Two Centuries of Cooperation and Competition 9004400850, 9789004400856

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A History of Russo-Japanese Relations

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Brill’s Japanese Studies Library Edited by Joshua Mostow (Managing Editor) Caroline Rose Kate Wildman Nakai

VOLUME 66

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bjsl

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A History of Russo-Japanese Relations Over Two Centuries of Cooperation and Competition Edited by

Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Streltsov, D. V. (Dmitrii Viktorovich), editor. | Shimotomai,  Nobuo, 1948– editor. Title: A history of Russo-Japanese relations : over two centuries of  cooperation and competition / edited by Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2019] | Series: Brill’s Japanese  studies library, ISSN 0925-6512 ; Volume 66 | Includes bibliographical  references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2019011781 (print) | LCCN 2019017098 (ebook) |  ISBN 9789004400856 (E-book) | ISBN 9789004400009 (hardback : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Russia—Foreign relations—Japan. | Japan—Foreign  relations—Russia. | Soviet Union—Foreign relations—Japan. |  Japan—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. | Russia (Federation)—Foreign  relations—Japan. | Japan—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation) Classification: LCC DK68.7.J3 (ebook) | LCC DK68.7.J3 H57 2019 (print) |  DDC 327.47052—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019011781 Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 0925-6512 isbn 978-90-04-40000-9 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-40085-6 (e-book) Copyright 2019 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

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Contents Foreword ix Iokibe Makoto Foreword xiii Anatoliĭ V. Torkunov Preface xvii Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo Notes to Readers xx Notes on Contributors xxi

part 1 The Legacy of the 18th and 19th Centuries: from Hierarchical and Ethnocentric Foreign Relations to a Western Model of Equal International Relations 3 Ikuta Michiko Russo-Japanese Relations in the 18th and 19th Centuries: Exploration and Negotiation 18 Sergey V. Grishachev

part 2 The Diplomatic Dimension of the Russo-Japanese War: the Portsmouth Conference and Its Aftermath 45 Tosh Minohara Russia and Japan in the Late 19th to 20th Centuries: the Road to War and Peace 63 Igor V. Lukoyanov

part 3 Japanese-Russian Relations after the Treaty of Portsmouth: between Friendship and Suspicion 83 Kurosawa Fumitaka - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Russo-Japanese Relations from 1905 to 1916: from Enemies to Allies 101 Yuriĭ S. Pestushko and Yaroslav A. Shulatov

part 4 World War I, Revolution, and Intervention: from the Perspective of the Japanese Diaspora in Russia 121 Hara Teruyuki Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War and Japanese Troops in Russia’s Far East, 1918–1922 137 Sergey V. Grishachev and Vladimir G. Datsyshen

part 5 Japanese-Russian Relations in the 1920s: Struggles between Anti-Soviet and Pro-Soviet Forces 155 Tomita Takeshi Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1920s: from Hostility to Coexistence 179 Vladimir A. Grinyuk, Yaroslav A. Shulatov, and Anastasia S. Lozhkina

part 6 Japan’s Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931–1941: the Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact 201 Tobe Ryōchi Soviet-Japanese Relations after the Manchurian Incident, 1931–1939 218 Anastasia S. Lozhkina, Yaroslav A. Shulatov, and Kirill E. Cherevko

part 7 Wartime Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, 1941–1945 241 Hatano Sumio

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Soviet-Japanese Relations during World War II: the Origins of Territorial Dispute 259 Andrey I. Kravtsevich

part 8 The Reality of the Siberian Internment: Japanese Captives in the Soviet Union and Their Movements after Repatriation 305 Tomita Takeshi The “Маnchurian Blitzkrieg” of 1945 and Japanese Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union 334 Alekseĭ A. Кirichenko and Sergey V. Grishachev

part 9 From Peace to the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations: Soviet-Japanese Territorial Relations, 1951–1970 355 Kouno Yasuko and Shimotomai Nobuo Postwar Relations between the USSR and Japan from the Late 1940s to the 1950s 376 Sergey V. Chugrov

part 10 Soviet-Japanese Relations and the Principle of the “Indivisibility of Politics and Economics,” 1960–1985 403 Ozawa Haruko Soviet-Japanese Relations from 1960 to 1985: an Era of Ups and Downs 419 Viktor V. Kuz’minkov and Viktor N. Pavlyatenko

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part 11 The Rise to Power of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Policy of “Expanding Equilibrium” 443 Shimotomai Nobuo Perestroika and Russian-Japanese Relations, 1985–1991 459 Konstantin O. Sarkisov

part 12 From the Tokyo Declaration to the Irkutsk Statement, 1991 to 2001 483 Tōgō Kazuhiko Russian Policy toward Japan, 1992–2001: from Over-optimism to Realism in Developing Relations 499 Alexander N. Panov

part 13 Japanese-Russian Relations in the 21st Century, 2001–2015 521 Kawaraji Hidetake Russia and Japan at the Beginning of the 21st Century: an Era of Untapped Potential 535 Oleg I. Kazakov, Valeriĭ O. Kistanov, and Dmitry V. Streltsov

part 14 The “Northern Territories” Problem: a Continuing Legacy of the San Francisco System 557 Kimie Hara The Territorial Issue in Russian-Japanese Relations: an Overview 577 Dmitry V. Streltsov List of Names 607 Index 615 - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

Foreword Iokibe Makoto I visited Moscow in December 2011, and during this trip Anatoliĭ V. Torkunov, rector of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), told me about the published results of a joint historical research project between Russia and Poland that had adopted a “parallel history” approach. I was particularly intrigued to learn of this because several scholarly groups in Japan had also attempted to conduct such parallel history studies with their colleagues in China and Korea, with varying degrees of success. Parallel histories do not seek to reach agreement on a common history, rather they aim to present different perspectives on various aspects of history. Although this might appear a relatively easy task in that experts are simply asked to offer scholarly opinions, in actual fact it is quite challenging. Scholars on both sides develop a certain historical perspective based, in part, on a sense of strong pride in the history of their own country. It requires a high level of intellectual maturity to be able to listen to and understand another viewpoint. This is especially true when seen against the backdrop of recent events such as invasions and occupations, and when calls for justice might overshadow the need for intellectual open-mindedness. While patriotism is important, the challenge of a parallel history such as the present study is to balance this patriotism with a respect for each other’s country. An analogy might be drawn to Akutagawa Ryūnosuke’s 1922 short story Yabu no naka (In a Grove), which was later made into the film Rashomon by the famed Japanese director Kurosawa Akira. In the tale, three men discuss a murder in a mountain forest, but interestingly, they all have completely divergent views. The expression “Might makes right” might well be overstating the case; in essence, when there is no intellectual basis for the acceptance of diversity in a multicultural world and there is a tendency toward narrow-minded nationalism, the likelihood of conflict is inevitable. But the opportunity to examine history from the standpoint of another country and its historians is not only enjoyable but also gives rise to parallel history studies as demonstrated in this publication. Another aspect that all historians must share is a respect for well-grounded facts and rationale. While any country possesses its own values and its own narratives about its own history, in any joint historical research there must be a mutual, deferential respect for empirical evidence in order to avoid descending into a war of words that can surround national histories. Initially, I contemplated whether such lofty aims would be possible when embarking

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on this joint Russo-Japanese historical research project. I grew increasingly confident of the success of this collaborative endeavor when I discussed the issue of Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) in Siberia post-WW II with my Russian colleagues. There have been a number of incidents in the past that have caused the Japanese people to distrust Russia, such as the Soviet Union’s breeching of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, the entry into war against Japan, or the continued attacks against Japan even after its surrender on August 15, 1945, that resulted in the seizure of considerable territory. But the incident that the Japanese people found unforgivable was the capture and forced relocation of 600,000 Japanese living in Manchuria and elsewhere to the Soviet Union where they were made to work under inhumane conditions, with tens of thousands dying as a result. In the essays by Japanese scholars, I anticipated a stinging indictment of the actions by the Soviet Union and conversely a defense of past events in the contributions by Russian scholars. Yet quite the opposite was true. Tomita Takeshi’s essay on Russo-Japanese relations in the 1920s in Part 5 did not circumvent criticism, instead it presented a balanced and measured view based on facts. Aleksei A. Kirichenko and Sergey V. Grishachev’s piece on Japanese POWs in Part 8 did not apologize for the actions of the Soviet Union; in fact, it was even more critical, succinctly interpreting the events using factual information. I came to see the Russian authors as independent scholars in their own right, individuals filled with reason and conscience, and not swayed by the points of views of their respective governments. If the issue of POWs in Siberia was the greatest problem for the Japanese, for the Russians the largest disappointment vis-à-vis Japan in historical terms was the latter’s intervention in Siberia during the Russian Civil War. Yuriĭ S. Pestushko and Yaroslav A. Shulatov in Part 3 clearly demonstrate in their essay on Russo-Japanese relations from 1905 to 1916 that following the RussoJapanese War of 1904–1905 Japan and Russia deepened their cooperative relations through a series of agreements in 1907, 1911, and 1916, to the point that they appear to approach the status of allies. This situation was similar to the situation after the Pacific War between Japan and the United States, in which the two former enemies came to understand each other better and developed a strong friendship and a cooperative relationship. Japan and Russia followed this same trajectory after the Russo-Japanese War, which made Japan’s intervention against the Bolshevik’s revolutionary forces all the more bitter. Japan’s occupation of large swathes of Siberia later became one reason for Joseph Stalin’s entry into war against Japan near the conclusion of World War II and a rationale used by the Soviet Union for the attempted occupation of Hokkaido once the war ended.

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Events of such magnitude were handled in the essays by Japanese scholars, which described the Japanese “Siberian Expedition” as an “unjustifiable war.” When Japan and the United States jointly decided to send in their forces, it was meant to be a “limited dispatch.” However, as Tomita Takeshi points out in his aforementioned essay, “Japan sent the largest military contingent (70,000 troops), which was a violation of the agreement between the partners of the joint military expedition (United States, United Kingdom, and France).” Just as the Russian contributors criticized their own country’s handling of the issue of Siberian Japanese POWs, Japanese contributors criticized the manner in which their government decided to dispatch its forces. The empirically based discussions presented by Tomita and Aleksei A. Kirichenko are far from heated, conflictive exchanges that might cause offense: both the Japanese and Russian sides readily offered self-criticism and reflection. How did the Russian contributors pass judgment on Japan’s past actions regarding the Siberian Expedition? The essay by Sergey V. Grishachev and Vladimir G. Datsyshen in Part 4 discusses the influence the Russian Revolution on the Siberian Far East, drawing upon known facts and how this impacted the Japanese military in the period from 1918 to 1922. They summarize Japan’s decisions by stating that “Japan’s move was not anti-Russian, but simply the result of its inability to understand accurately the direction of the development and realities of Russian national society.” From a Japanese perspective, this is truly a generous appraisal. I would like to refrain from introducing all of the myriad issues in this volume, which are covered in wide-ranging discussions about bilateral images and perspectives between Japan and Russia. Many chapters rely on the use of primary documents, and a number can be seen as cutting edge in terms of their research and analysis. It is a ground-breaking parallel history of RussoJapanese relations, and although the focus is on the 20th century the essays offer a comprehensive treatment of Russo-Japanese history beginning in the 18th century and continuing until modern times. Bilateral relations were not fully developed or institutionalized in the 19th century, for example, and a number of individuals from this era stand out, men including Adam Laksman, Evfimiĭ V. Putyatin, and Takadaya Kahei, who were trusted and respected in each other’s countries despite their nations not previously having had close interaction. But this period was not all rosy. Contrasting national views were manifest in certain gruesome incidents that would lead to mutual distrust. And this was a harbinger of events in the 20th century. The two countries nonetheless overcame these problems to sign the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875 regarding Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. I can only wonder if bilateral relations in the 21st century might not proceed in the

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same way, and if the challenge of the territorial issue will continue to prevent the development of better relations. No matter how important territorial issues might be, it is not the only driving force in the relationship between the two countries. It is my sincerest hope that the present publication will provide us all with the wisdom to avoid the unfortunate cycles of the past and to better comprehend the points of contention while at the same time allowing us to appreciate the richly diverse aspects of this bilateral relationship. This project is the result of a close collaboration of eminent scholars and experts, including the Russian and Japanese diplomats, Tōgō Kazuhiko and Alexander N. Panov, who have been deeply engaged in promoting bilateral relations. They provided valuable information, not generally known in the public domain, to the joint research group regarding recent bilateral negotiations. They also expressed their enthusiasm and dedication to the promotion of Russian-Japanese bilateral relations—they inspired our joint research project and their efforts are greatly respected. Many people assisted in the realization of this project but Shimotomai Nobuo and Dmitry V. Streltsov must be singled out for bringing this publication to fruition, and I am truly grateful for their efforts.

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Foreword Anatoliĭ V. Torkunov Geographically, Russia and Japan are neighbors, and international experience has shown us that countries sharing borders have a greater chance in establishing friendships and becoming full-fledged partners. If a region suffers from ideological, territorial, religious, ethnic, and other conflicts, however, the reality of geographical proximity might conversely serve as an extra catalyst for mutual alienation, mistrust, and at times even open hostility. Relations between neighboring countries could also be negatively burdened with past issues. These might refer to issues regarding mutual offense and unilateral, occasionally tendentious, assessments of certain historical events. This would include the assessments of particular historical events, including those by officials, as well as various “cartographic” and “historiographical” wars when authorities, guided by their own understanding of national interests, sanctioned the use of certain types of historical maps, evidence, and documents, and in the process silenced those who did not conform to the official point of view. Recent experience has demonstrated that such “skeletons in the closet” can poison the atmosphere of international relations and lead to serious diplomatic conflict. The search for solutions to such problems, based on compromise and reciprocal concession, can prove extremely difficult and often impossible as the problems surrounding bilateral relations between neighboring countries are emotionally charged and permit no half measures. The cumulative burden of a negative historical experience forces political leaders dependent on public moods to adhere to maximalist opinions and to remain inflexible. Ultimately, this hampers resolution. Russia and Japan are no exception. As the present publication demonstrates, our countries have shared diplomatic ties for more than two centuries, and the first contacts between the Russians and Japanese date back over three hundred years. Our complicated bilateral history has witnessed numerous conflicts that have led to reciprocal distrust and on occasion conflict. For much of the 20th century—an especially ambiguous period in the history of Russian-Japanese relations—our two countries were rivals, competitors, and intermittently military opponents. Since initial contact, however, the people of Russia and Japan have generally treated one another with mutual respect and expressed an interest in each other’s culture. For example, the Japanese were taken by and appreciated Russian classical literature, music, and painting. In Russia, Japanese mass culture has recently become so popular that this has led

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to the emergence of a Japanese culture “boom.” At the same time, unreliable information and periodically a lack of knowledge—or a total absence of it— relating to the history of bilateral ties has resulted in the general public of both countries forming misguided judgments and prejudices. For us in the 21st century, the history of the 20th century, the principal focus of the present study, is not a distant memory. Not only do we remember recent historical events but quite often overlay them with a subjective, and at times. emotional assessment. Historical offenses not only block an objective outlook on our past but also hamper the building of genuine good-neighbor relations. Working from and beyond these assumptions, this volume draws together Russian and Japanese historians in an effort to present research on the history of relations between the two countries. It aims to introduce Russian, Japanese, and international audiences to visions and interpretations of historical events and arguments, even if these visions appear at times diametrically opposed. It was decided that the most logical structure for this research was one that followed the notion of a “parallel history.” The same historical stages and events were dealt with from parallel angles—that is, from two opposing sides to reveal both distinctions as well as common ground in their interpretation. We believed that differences in opinions on history can only be understood through a parallel representation and comparison of the views of both countries. A similar approach has already proven instructive and useful in the work of Russian and European scholars. The research presented in this publication was the result of three years of diligent work. In 2011, a group of Japanese historians visited Moscow and held an informal meeting with their Russian colleagues. This gathering sowed the seeds for a joint research project on the history of bilateral relations between Russia and Japan. In June 2012, Russian historians formed the Russian-Japanese Commission on Complex Problems of Russian-Japanese Relations to discuss the difficult issues in Russian-Japanese relations; this group comprised some twenty Japanologists and experts in the history of international relations. Scholars representing Russian academic and educational centers in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Khabarovsk, and Krasnoyarsk, together with a number of Russian colleagues at Japanese universities, joined the Russian participants of the commission. These included individuals from Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO); Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU); the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS); the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences; the Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and the Far Eastern State University of Humanities. Moreover, young researchers and established experts—the disciples of the Soviet

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academic school—also participated in the work of the commission such that it became representative of the entire Russian academic community. The Japanese authors included respected historians and political scientists at home and abroad: Prefectural University of Kumamoto, Hōsei University; Kyoto University; Osaka University; Kobe University; Seikei University; Tokyo Woman’s Christian University; Hokkaido Information University, Ebetsu; International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken) Kyoto; University of Tsukuba; Kyoto Institute of Technology; Yamanashi Gakuin University; Niigata University of International and Information Researches; and University of Waterloo in Canada. Over the course of the project historians from the two countries met formally (in Morioka, Awaji, and Moscow) and informally (once in Moscow) from 2011 to 2013. These meetings provided opportunities to exchange opinions and to outline the general contextual requirements for this volume, including research methodology, as scholarly approaches in Japan and Russia are very different. The activity of the commission garnered attention far beyond Russia for several reasons. This was due, in the first instance, to the commission’s special international and political context, especially in light of the recent rise of Russian-Japanese relations and the dynamic development in the interaction between the two countries. The expansion and deepening of Russian-Japanese cooperation created conditions for the formation of an atmosphere of interdependence and trust, thereby promoting the work of the commission. Second, it was also important to note that this project emerged as a form of international dialogue in a “Track Two” format, complementing and developing achievements of previous formal meetings between the leaders of our countries. Historians from the two countries have demonstrated the ability to collaborate as a team and to find a common language even concerning those difficult and delicate issues about which no mutual understanding has previously been reached at the official level. Third, joint commissions for research into the thorny historical issues of bilateral relations already enjoyed widespread international academic practice by the time the Russian-Japanese commission of historians was created. Japan, for example, had formed commissions of historians with its Chinese and South Korean colleagues while Russian experts carried out successful joint research projects with Polish, German, Estonian, and Latvian historians to enrich the academic community with thousands of previously unstudied documents. They also issued publications in a number of languages and carried out a series of research forums. Therefore, when planning this research project, we took into consideration the past positive experience of similar research groups. But this project also had a certain advantage: our two countries were not held hostage

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to past historical issues like those that generate complex political problems for Japan vis-à-vis relations with its Asian neighbors. Despite the complicated and diverse issues in the history of Russian-Japanese relations, they do not create insuperable problems for political dialogue between the two countries. The outcome of this project is a collection of essays organized into fourteen chronological sections that offers consolidated academic research on the history of Russian-Japanese contacts and relations from the 18th century to the present day. The authors are noted Russian and Japanese experts whose contributions present a range of interpretations of this rich history, drawing upon the ideas and views shaped by each country’s own historiography. It is hoped that this publication will not only offer new academic insights into the field but will also assist in mapping out the course of future relations that, in turn, will nurture a deeper understanding between our two nations.

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Preface Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo This publication, the fruit of an ambitious collaborative effort between Russian and Japanese historians, presents a parallel view on the complex and sensitive problems surrounding the history of Russo-Japanese bilateral relations. Such a joint project between historians and political scientists from the two countries did not emerge in a vacuum, as outlined in the forewords by Iokibe Makoto and Anatoliĭ V. Torkunov in this volume. During the post-Stalin period, Soviet and Japanese historians and economists had an opportunity to meet and exchange opinions despite the ideological disagreements between our two countries. Political scientists joined this academic exchange in the perestroika era of the 1980s and 1990s, and a number of platforms were created for dialogue between Japanese and Soviet, then Russian, scholars. The Gorbachev Foundation kindly supported these academic exchanges after the breakdown of the former Soviet Union in 1991. The end of the Soviet era enabled a number of Russian historians and others working in the humanities field to continue their academic careers at Japanese universities. For example, Hōsei University’s recruitment of Konstanin O. Sarkisov, one of the contributors to this volume, opened up new channels for academic exchange between Russian and Japanese specialists. And Russia witnessed something of a renaissance in Japan under the aegis of Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, a founding father of the perestroika policy. In the 21st century, academic exchange was given a fresh impetus with the election of Vladimir Putin as Russia’s president. A Japanese-Russian public forum was established to address the preparations of a bilateral peace treaty on the “Track Two” principles, which helped to avoid the narrow limits of official positions. Russia was enthusiastic about the promotion of public contacts with Japan, and the former Russian ambassador to Japan, Alexander N. Panov, and other Russian community leaders did much to develop the public dialogue. Although perhaps not obvious at first glance, a shift in Russian-Japanese contacts surfaced following the disastrous events of the Tōhoku Earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the meltdown at the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant in eastern Japan on March 11, 2011. Iokibe Makoto, a long-time advocate of Japanese-Russian relations, headed the governmental staff dealing with the aftermath of this catastrophe. Russia was one of the countries to assist Japan in the clean-up, and against the backdrop of a new situation between Russia and

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Japan, Shimotomai Nobuo and Iokibe Makoto met with Professor Torkunov, the rector of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). At that meeting, Professor Torkunov remarked on the successful example of the non-governmental Russian-Polish commission of historians working on a “parallel history” project between the two nations. He suggested the launch of a similar venture regarding Russo-Japanese history. Six months following that conversation a delegation of ten Japanese scholars visited Russia; the group was led by Professor Iokibe, even though at this time he was fully immersed in coordinating the Fukushima reconstruction. The Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS) hosted a frank exchange of opinions with fourteen Russian Japanologists, including Alexander N. Panov, Dmitry V. Streltsov and Sergey V. Chugrov, on the possible approach of a joint study relating to the over two centuries of history of Russian-Japanese relations. This marked the beginning of this RussianJapanese “parallel history” project, which kicked off a year later in October 2012 at the first official meeting of historians in the Japanese city of Morioka. In 2015, the results of a three-year mutual research project were published in Russian as Rossiĭsko-yaponskie otnosheniya v formate parallel′noĭ istorii (Russian-Japanese Relations in the Format of a Parallel History) and in Japanese as Nichiro kankei shi. Parareru hisutorī no chōsen (The History of Japanese-Russian Relations. Challenges of a Parallel History) by the MGIMO Press and the University of Tokyo Press. The present study demonstrates that Russian-Japanese relations followed a general trajectory in their historical development. The successful outcome of our joint work rests upon on earlier achievements in both Russia and Japan in the field of history and other affiliated areas of scholarship. One reoccurring problem within the lengthy history of Soviet (Russian)Japanese relations—dating back to even before the 1855 demarcation between Etorofu (Iturup) and Urup—is territorial. The lack of success in resolving this problem through diplomatic efforts signals the complexity of the issue and the difficulty in resolving it. This publication attempts to address this issue from the perspective of modern scholarship and knowledge, and in the process to dispel the many existing stereotypes such as the long-standing belief that the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was preventable. A History of Russo-Japanese Relations: Over Two Centuries of Cooperation and Competition is only the beginning of an ongoing journey. New horizons were opened up in the history of Russian-Japanese relations by the efforts of many courageous Russian historians, sociologists, and political scientists who began their research in the perestroika years, among them Alekseĭ A. Kirichenko and his study of Japanese prisoners of war. And conversely, the achievements in the area of Japanese history have augmented the work of Russian historians. As

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editors we hope that the efforts of the numerous eminent scholars contributing to this volume will draw the attention of general and specialist readers in Russia, Japan, and around the world. A project of this size posed enormous challenges, and we would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to the many authors who generously gave their time in contributing to the present publication, which we hope will become a valuable research tool for anyone is interested in Russo-Japanese relations, in particular, and more generally to international relations in Asia. We must acknowledge with great appreciation the indefatigable efforts of our Englishlanguage editor Amy Reigle Newland and the assistance of Johan-Christian Newland in redrafting select maps. We would also like to express our extreme gratitude to Patricia Radder, Irene Jager, and the staff at Brill Publishers who were instrumental in overseeing all aspects in the production of the book. Finally, we would like to single out the International Chodiev Foundation and its chairman and founder, Dr. Patokh Chodiev, who provided the financial support for the publication of this English version.

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Notes to Readers A book of such complexity involves numerous editorial, bibliographical, and linguistic challenges. Japanese names, terms, and sources have been romanized using the modified Hepburn system while the romanization of Russian (Cyrillic script) has been simplified and generally only acknowledges the use of the accent “ė” and “ĭ.” Every effort has nonetheless been made to provide consistency with regard to Russian-language terms, names, and bibliographical sources. Chinese terms and names are romanized using the Pinyin system unless accepted practice renders them in the older Wades-Giles system. Japanese place names that have been anglicized appear in that form (e.g., Hokkaido, not Hokkaidō; Tokyo, not Tōkyō) unless cited in an originallanguage source. Japanese names are presented in traditional order with surname preceding first name, unless an individual has principally been active outside Japan. Russian names appear in full form (first, patronymic, last) in the bibliographies after each essay and in the list of individuals at the back of the book (birth and death dates are also included there). Exceptions in the romanization of Russian names include those of individuals whose names have become familiar in an anglicized form, for example, Catherine (not Ekaterina) I, Nicholas (not Nikolaĭ), Nikita Khruschchev (not Nikita Хrushchev) or Joseph Stalin (not Iosif Stalin [Russian] or Ioseb St’alini [Georgian]). The full names of the Russian contributors to this publication are included in the “Notes on Contributors”; select authors use an anglicized or variant form in the romanization of their names (e.g., Alexander not Aleksandr) in accordance with their own professional history. Until October 1917 Russia employed the Julian calendar while other regions, such as Europe and North America, used the Gregorian calendar. The Julian calendar was twelve days behind the Gregorian calendar in the 19th century and thirteen days in the 20th century. Both dates are generally included for events pre-dating October 1917, with the Julian date preceding the Gregorian date, as for example, in the signing of the Treaty of St. Petersburg on April 25 (May 7), 1875. Bibliographical citations of Russian archival sources retain the original Russian forms, therefore: f. (Фонд, fond): section or archive number; ed. hr. (Единица хранения, edinitsa khraneniya): storage unit; pol. (Полка, polka): shelf; op. (Опись, opis’): file number (also pap. [Папка, papka]); d. (Дело, delo): folder; por. (Порция, portsiya): section of an inventory; ch. (Часть, chast’): part; l. (Лист, listis): sheet or page (recto); and ob. (Оборот листа, oborot lista): sheet or page (verso).

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Notes on Contributors

Project Leaders

Iokibe Makoto is a political and diplomatic historian. He was assistant professor at Hiroshima University from 1969, and since 1981 has been a professor at Kobe University. Professor Iokibe has been the chair of the Japan Political Science Association (JPSA, 1998), chair of the reconstruction following the Tōhoku Earthquake of 2011, chair of directors at the Prefectural University of Kumamoto (2012), and since 2018 the chair of directors at Hyōgo Prefectural University. From 2007 to 2012 he was the rector of the Defense Academy. He has also been a visiting professor at Harvard University. His publications include The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan (2013, editor) and Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration (2008, co-editor). Anatoly (Anatoliĭ) Vasil′evich Torkunov is an expert in international relations, the recent history of Korea, and the history of diplomacy. From 1971 to 1972 and 1983 to 1986, he served at Soviet embassies in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States; he holds the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. In 1992, he became rector of MGIMO University, after serving as the dean of the School of International Relations and vice rector for external relations. He is the author and co-author of numerous scholarly works, including nine monographs, and is a member and section head of the Academic Council at the Security Council of Russia, president of the Russian International Studies Association (RISA), chairman of the board of directors of Russian Channel One, and chairman of the Moscow Region Civic Chamber.

Volume Editors and Authors

Shimotomai Nobuo was professor at the Faculty of Law and Politics, Hōsei University, Tokyo, from 1988 to 2019 and has recently become an invited professor at Kanagawa University. He is a specialist in Russian history and the politics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He has been an honorary research (Nitobe) fellow at the Russian Research Centre, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom (1983–1985), a visiting scholar at Harvard University Russian

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Research Center (1992–1994) and the Wilson Center, Washington, DC (1993), as well as a guest editorial writer for the Asahi shinbun (1999–2002). Professor Shimotomai was the president of the Japanese Association of International Relations and a member of the Japan-Russia Eminent Persons’ Council (2004– 2006), and chairperson of the 10th World Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES) in Makuhari, Japan (2015). His recent publications include Kami to kakumei (God and Revolution, 2017), Sovieto renpōshi (A History of the Soviet Union, 2017), Rosia to Soren (Russia and the Soviet Union, 2013), Mosukuwa to Kin Nissei: Sobieto renpōshi (Moscow and Kim Il-sung: History of the Soviet Federation, 2007), and Ajia reisenshi (A History of the Asian Cold War, 2004; Korean ed. 2017). Dmitry (Dmitriĭ) Viktorovich Streltsov is head of the Afro-Asian Department at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) and a leading research fellow at the Center of Japanese Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS) in Moscow. Since 2008, Professor Streltsov has headed the Russian Association of Japanologists (Assotsiatsiya yaponovedov). The author of numerous academic works, including the books Vneshnepoliticheskie prioritety Yaponii v Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskom regione (The Foreign Policy Priorities of Japan in the Asia-Pacific, 2015), he is also the chief editor of Ezhegodnik Yaponiya (Yearbook Japan) and of the e-journal Yaponskie issledovaniya (Japanese Studies in Russia). His research interests include the domestic and international politics of contemporary Japan, postwar Japanese history, Japanese energy and social policy, Russo-Japanese relations, economic integration in East Asia, and Russian diplomatic and security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Authors Kirill Evgen’evich Cherevko is a leading researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences (IRH RAS), in Moscow. Under the guidance of the scholar Nikolaĭ Iosifovich Konrad (1891–1970) he made one of the first attempts to study and translate the 8th-century Japanese chronicle, Kojiki, into Russian. Professor Cherevko’s publications include Zarozhdenie russko-yaponskikh otnosheniĭ Zarozhdenie XVII–XIX veka- (The Emergence of Russo-Japanese Relations in the 17th–19th Centuries, 1999) and “Kodziki” (“Zapis′ o deyaniyakh drevnosti”): VIII v. i stanovlenie yaponskogo ėtnosa, ego yazyka i pis′mennosti (“Kojiki.” [Record of Ancient Matters]: the 8th Century and the Formation of the - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Japanese Ethnic Group, Its Language and Literature, 2003). He has been engaged in extensive research into the history of Russian-Japanese and SovietJapanese relations, in particular, the issues of territorial demarcation, and the ethno-genesis of the Japanese nation. Sergey (Sergeĭ) Vladislavovich Chugrov has been Professor of Sociology at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, since 2002 and from 2007 the chief editor of the journal Polis. Political Studies. He worked as a columnist at the daily newspaper Izvestiya (1977–1987) and from 1988 has been affiliated with the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. His publications include Yaponiya v poiskakh novnoĭ identichnosti (Japan in Search of a New Identity, 2010); “American World Order: The End of the ‘End of History’?,” Japanese Journal of Political Science (September 2015); and “Foreign Policy in Statu Nascendi,” in Japanese and Russian Politics. Polar Opposites or Something in Common? (2015). Vladimir Grigor’evich Datsyshen is head of the General (World) History Department at the Siberian Federal University in Krasnoyarsk and is a professor at Hebei Normal University in Shijiazhuang, China. He is the author of numerous academic works, including Sovetsko-yaponskaya voĭna 1945 goda. Vzglyad na sobytiya i problemy cherez 70 let (Soviet-Japanese War of 1945. The Overview of Its Facts and Problems after Seventy Years, 2015). His research interests include the problems of international relations of Central and East Asia from the 17th to the first half of the 20th century, with a particular focus on the history of Russian-Japanese and Russian-Chinese relations in the areas of politics, economics, culture, and education. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Grinyuk (1944–2018) graduated in 1968 from the Far Eastern State University in Vladivostok, with a specialization in the Japanese language. He undertook his postgraduate studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet (now Russian) Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS) in Moscow from 1969 to 1972. In 1980–1984, he worked as the deputy chief of the Novosti Press Agency in Tokyo. From 2003 until his death, he served as a leading research fellow at the Center for Japanese Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, in Moscow. Dr. Grinyuk’s research focus was Japanese foreign policy. His published works include Demokraticheskoe studencheskoe dvizhenie v Yaponii posle Vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny: (1945–1964 gg.) (Democratic Student Movement in Japan After WW II: [1945–1964], 1971). - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Sergey (Sergeĭ) Viktorovich Grishachev has been associate professor and head of the Department of the Modern East, Division for History, Political Science and Law at the Russian University for the Humanities (RSUH) since 2014; he also serves as the executive secretary of the Russian Association of Japanologists (Assotsiatsiya yaponovedov). He is a member of the editorial board for the e-journal Yaponskie issledovaniya (Japanese Studies in Russia). His research interests extend to international relations and the history of Russo-Japanese relations, with publications including Istoriya rossiĭsko-yaponskikh otnosheniĭ: XVIII–nachalo XXI vv (The History of Russo-Japanese Relations: 18th–21st Centuries, 2015). Kimie Hara is the Renison Research Professor in East Asian Studies at the University of Waterloo, Canada. She specializes in modern and contemporary international relations of East Asia, border studies, Cold War history, and Japanese politics and diplomacy. Professor Hara’s authored/edited books include JapaneseSoviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace (1998); Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System (2007); Northern Territories, Asia-Pacific Regional Conflicts and the Åland Experience: Untying the Kurillian Knot (2009, with Geoffrey Jukes); and San Francisco System and Its Legacies: Continuation, Transformation and Historical Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific (2015). Hara Teruyuki is professor emeritus of Hokkaido University, Sapporo, where he worked at the Slavic Research Center from 1987 to 2006. A historian of the Russian and Soviet Far East, and Russo-Japanese relations, including the Japanese intervention in Siberia, his published works include Shiberia shuppei kakumei to kanshō 1917–1922 (Siberian Intervention: Revolution and Intervention, 1917–1922, 1989), Urajiosutoku monogatari: Roshia to Ajia no majiwaru machi (The Story of Vladivostok, 1998), and Nichiro sensō to Saharinto (The Russo-Japanese War and Sakhalin Island, 2011). Hatano Sumio has been the director general: a Russian-Asian Crossroads City Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), National Archives of Japan, since 2014 and until recently was professor of Japanese Diplomatic History at the University of Tsukuba, as well as visiting scholar at the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University. Professor Hatano’s numerous publications include books and articles in Japanese and English on World War II and the diplomatic

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history of modern Japan, such as the co-authored The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals (2007). He is currently serving as a chief editor of Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy (Diplomatic Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Ikuta Michiko is professor emeritus of Osaka University and is a specialist in the history of Russo-Japanese relations. She is the editor of the journal Sever (The North), which promotes Harbin and Russian Far East studies in Japan, and the author, editor, and co-author of numerous articles, books, and other publications in Japanese, Russian, English, Chinese, and Hungarian. These include Daikokuya Kōdayū no seppun (The Kiss of Daikokuya Kōdayū, 1997); “Changing JapaneseRussian Images in the Edo Period,” in Japan and Russia: Three Centuries of Mutual Images (2008); Takadaya Kahei (2012); “Representations of Colonialism: Russians and Japanese in Manchuria,” in Japan and Russia. National Identity Through the Prism of Images (2014); and “Two Russias in Harbin,” in Russia and Its Northeast Asian Neighbors: China, Japan, and Korea, 1858–1945 (2017). Kawaraji Hidetake has been affiliated with the Kyoto Sangyo University since 1990, and has been both a professor and a member of the Institute for World Affairs of Kyoto Sangyo University since 2001 and 2012, respectively. He is a specialist in Russian studies and international relations, with recent publications including “Nichiro kankei no kako jūyonen” (Japanese-Russian Relations in the 21st Century), in Nichiro kankei shi. Parareru historī no chōsen (The History of Japanese-Russian Relations. Challenges of a Parallel History, 2015), and “Roshia to Ajia kyōdotai” (Russia and the Asian Community), in Chiiki to riron kara kangaeru Ajia kyōdotai (Asian Community Seen from the Viewpoint of Region and Theory, 2015). Oleg Igorevich Kazakov has worked as engineer, researcher, lecturer, assistant to the state Duma Deputy (Russian Parliament), journalist, and executive secretary of two academic journals. Since 2009 he has been research fellow of the Center for Japanese Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (IFES RAS), in Moscow, and head of the Scientometrics and Information Technology Department at this institute. He is the author of numerous articles on various topics, including Japanese and Russian-Japanese relations, including K 60-letiyu Sovmestnoĭ deklaratsii SSSR i Yaponii 1956 goda (On the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, 2017).

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He is a member of the Council of the “Russia-Japan” Society (Obshchestvo “Rossiya-Yaponiya”) and Russian Association of Japanologists (Assotsiatsiya yaponovedov). Alekseĭ Alekseevich Kirichenko worked at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow following his retirement from military service in February 1987 until November 1989 when he was employed at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS) in Moscow. He was head of the Department of International Relations at that institute until February 1996, and from 1996 a senior researcher there. His principal research area is the history of Russian-Japanese relations. He has authored and co-authored numerous scholarly publications in Russian, Japanese, English, Korean, and Belarusian. His authored publications include Shararezaru Nichiro no nihyakunen (The Unknown Pages of a Two Hundred Year History of RussianJapanese Relations, 2013) and Yaponskaya razvedka protiv SSSR Japonskaja razvedka protiv SSSR (Japanese Intelligence Against the Soviet Union, 2016). Valeriĭ Olegovich Kistanov is head of the Center for Japanese Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (IFES RAS), in Moscow. He is the author of many academic works, including the books Ėkonomicheskoe proniknovenie Yaponii v Latinskuyu Ameriku (Japan’s Economic Penetration into Latin America, 1982) and Yaponiya v ATR: anatomiya ėkonomicheskikh i politicheskikh otnosheniĭ (Japan in the Asia-Pacific: The Anatomy of Economic and Political Relations, 1995). His main research interests include Japanese domestic and foreign policy (economy, defense, social sphere, science, technology, culture, and history), as well as the entire range of issues surrounding Russian-Japanese relations. Kouno Yasuko is professor emeritus of Hōsei University, Tokyo, where she taught political history at the Faculty of Law from 1993 to 2017. She is a diplomatic historian of postwar Japan with research interests on Okinawa reversion in US-Japanese relations, political history and Japanese foreign policy, the political party and parliamentary cabinet systems, and political leadership. Her authored publications include Okinawa henkan o meguru seiji to gaikō (The Reversion of Okinawa, Politics and US-Japan Relations, 1994), for which she won the Ōhira Masayoshi Memorial Prize in 1995, and Sengo to kōdo seichō no shūen (The End of Postwar Period and High Economic Growth, 2002). She co-authored Anzen hōshō seisaku to sengo Nihon, 1972–1994 (Security Policy of Postwar Japan,

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1972–1994, 2016), and Taiwa: Okinawa no sengo (Dialogue: Postwar Period of Okinawa, 2017). Andrey (Andreĭ) Ivanovich Kravtsevich worked from 1977 to August 1987 at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet (now Russian) Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS) in Moscow. He has subsequently worked as a representative of the Academy of Sciences at the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo (1987–1992), where he was responsible for economic analyses; as an associate visiting professor at Keiō University, Tokyo (1992– 1995); and at the Institute of Oriental Studies, where he worked as the head of the Center for Japanese studies (1996–2000). From 2000 to 2019 he was a professor at the Faculty of Law, Hōsei University, Tokyo. His current research interests include Russian-Japanese relations, in particular, the problem of their territorial dispute. His main publications include Nihon to no heiwa jōyaku ni kansuru Roshia no tachiba. Kokusaihōteki sokumen (The Position of Russia regarding a Peace Treaty with Japan: An Aspect of International Law, 2011) and Ugroza Dallesa: mif ili realnost? (The Dulles Threat: Myth or Reality?, 2014). Kurosawa Fumitaka is professor of Japanese Modern History in the Division of International Relations, Department of Global Social Sciences, Tokyo Woman’s Christian University. His main research interests are the history of modern and contemporary Japan, its political and diplomatic dimensions in the interwar period, and Japan’s military history. His publications include Taisen kanki no Nihon rikugun (The Japanese Army in the Interwar Period, 2000); Nihon Seki Jūjisha to jindō enjo (The History of the Japanese Red Cross Society and Humanitarian Assistance; co-editor, 2009); Rekishi to wakai (History and Reconciliation; co-editor, 2011), Taisen kanki no kyūchū to seijika (The Imperial Court and the Politician in the Interwar Period, 2013); Futatsu no “kaikoku” to Nihon (Modern Japan Encounters the World Order, 2013); Nihon seijishi no naka no rikukaigun (The Japanese Army and Navy in Japanese Political History; co-editor, 2013). Viktor Vyacheslavovich Kuz’minkov is senior research fellow at the Center for Japanese Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (IFES RAS), in Moscow, and associate professor at the Japanese Language Department, Institute of Foreign Languages, Moscow City University. He has authored many academic works, including Istoriya rossiĭsko-yaponskikh otnosheniĭ: XVIII–nachalo XXI vv (The History of Russian-Japanese Relations: 18th–21st Centuries, 2015) and

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K istorii territorial′nogo razmezhevaniya mezhdu Rossieĭ i Yaponieĭ: yaponskiĭ vzglyad (On the History of Territorial Delimitation Between Russia and Japan: A Japanese Perspective, 2016). His research interests include the domestic and international politics of contemporary Japan, Russian-Japanese relations, and security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Anatasia Sergeevna Lozhkina is an independent researcher of the history of Russian-Japanese relations. She was a fellow at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies in 2010 and has published a number of journal articles. Her monograph Obraz Yaponii v sovetskom obshchestvennom soznanii (1931–1939) (The Image of Japan in the Soviet Public Consciousness [1931–1939]; 2011) was nominated as the best book on Japan by the Russian Association of Japanologists (Assotsiatsiya yaponovedov). She also presented a special seminar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, in March 2013. Currently, she is the director of Development and Fundraising at the Charitable Foundation “Arifmetika dobra.” Igor Vladimirovich Lukoyanov was a leading research fellow at the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) and professor at the Higher School of Economics (HSE), National Research University, St. Petersburg. He was the author of many academic works, including books, publications of historical sources, and collective works, including Pervaia mirovaia voĭna i konets Rossiĭskoĭ imperii (World War I and the End of the Russian Empire), vol. 1, Politicheskaia istoriia (Political History, 2015). His areas of specialization were Russian history of the 19th and 20th centuries, the history of foreign policy of the Russian empire, and studies in historiography and sources. Tosh Minohara is professor of Diplomatic and Political History at the Graduate School of Law and Politics, Kobe University, where he holds a joint appointment with the Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies. His first book, Hainichi iminhō to Nichibei kankei (The Japanese Exclusion Act and US-Japan Relations, 2002), was awarded the Shimizu Hiroshi Prize by the Japanese Association of American Studies. The most recent of his numerous authored or coedited publications include The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present (2017). In addition to his monthly serialized periodical essays for Kiwameru, Daisan bunmei, and Issatsu no hon, he also contributes a newspaper

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column to the Jiyū minshu of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Sankei shinbun. He is currently co-editing a book, Beyond Versailles: The 1919 Moment in Asia (forthcoming 2019), that examines the aftermath of World War I from an East Asian perspective. Ozawa Haruko (1956–2014) was a Japanese political scientist and historian. She was appointed assistant professor from 1995 and from 1999 professor at the Niigata University of International and Information Studies. Her works include Nihon no kiro to Matsuoka gaikō (Japan’s Turning Point and Matsuoka Diplomacy, 1940–1941, 1993), Rosia no taigai seisaku to Ajia taiheiyō: datsu ideorogii no kenshō (Russian Foreign Policy and ATR-Verification of De-ideologization, 2000). Alexander (Aleksandr) Nikolaevich Panov has worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of USSR and the Russian Federation since 1968 in various diplomatic roles: Russian ambassador to the Republic of Korea (1992–1994), Japan (1996–2003), and Norway (2003–2006); Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1994–1996), and Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (2006–2011). Since 2012 he has headed the Department of Diplomacy of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). He is also a leading research fellow of the Institute for US and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences as well as a member of the Advisory Board of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. He has also authored many publications in the field of international relations, including Rossiya i Yaponiya. Stanovlenie i razvitie otnosheniĭ v kontse ХХ nachala ХХI veka (Russia and Japan: Formation and Development of Relations in the late 20th–early 21st Centuries, 2007). Viktor Nikolaevich Pavlyatenko (1947–2018) was a leading research fellow of the Center for Japanese Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IFES RAS). He authored or co-authored numerous academic works, including the co-authored monograph Yadernoe oruzhie posle kholodnoĭ voĭny (Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War, 2006), as well as having conducted research project for a number of Russian public organizations such as the Russian Association of Japanologists (Assotsiatsiya yaponovedov). He was a member of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Asia-Pacific Security Council. His research interests included Russian-Japanese relations, international politics in East Asia, and security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Yuriĭ Sergeevich Pestushko is the deputy director of the Pedagogical Institute of the Pacific National University (PNU), Khabarovsk, and teaches Japanese history and language at that institution. He is author of many academic works, including books and textbooks. His research interests extend to the domestic/international politics of Japan, subsuming Russo-Japanese relations from the mid-19th to the early 20th century and Japanese policy toward Korea. His publications include Rossiĭsko-yaponskie otnosheniya v gody Pervoĭ mirovoĭ voĭny (1914–1917 gg.) (Russo-Japanese Relations in the Period of WWI [1914–1917], 2008). Konstantin Oganesovich Sarkisov is a leading researcher at the Center for Japanese Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS) in Moscow. He is a professor emeritus of Yamanashi Gakuin University in Kōfu, Japan (2002–2012), and from 1996 to 2012 taught Asian-Pacific foreign policy at several Japanese universities. He has authored and co-authored a number of books and articles on Russo-Japanese relations, Japan’s foreign and internal policy, international relations in East Asia, and Japanese history, including Rossiya i Yaponiya. Sto let otnosheniĭ (Russia and Japan: One Hundred Years of Relations, 2015). His current research focus is on the history of Russo(Soviet)-Japanese relations as well as on the territorial dispute between these two nations. Yaroslav Aleksandrovich Shulatov is associate professor at Kobe University. He has taught at Hiroshima City University and has been a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo, Harvard University, and Hokkaido University. His area of specialization is Russian and Japanese modern history, with a special interest in diplomatic, military, and economic aspects. His current research centers on Russo/Soviet-Japanese and international relations in East Asia (e.g., Korea, China, Mongolia), particularly during the first half of the 20th century. He authored Na puti k sotrudnichestvu: rossiisko-yaponskie otnosheniya v 1905–1914 gg. (On the Path to Cooperation: Russo-Japanese Relations in 1905–1914, 2008) and co-authored a number of books and textbooks on Russo-Japanese relations as well as on the history of Japan and Russia. Tobe Ryōichi is professor emeritus of the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, and the International Research Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto. He was the president of Japan Society of Strategic Studies, and the vice president of the Military History Society of Japan. He has published a number of books,

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including Gyakusetsu no guntai (Army of Paradoxes, 1998) and Gaimushō kakushinha: sekai shinchitsujo no genʾei (The Reformist Group in the Foreign Ministry: Illusions of the New World Order, 2010). Tōgō Kazuhiko has been professor and director of the Institute for World Affairs, Kyoto Sangyo University, since 2010. He served in the Japanese foreign ministry from 1968, and for much of his career has focused his attention on Russia. He retired in 2002, after serving as Japanese ambassador to the Netherlands, and has since taught at universities abroad, including in Leiden, Princeton, Santa Barbara, Seoul, and Taiwan. His recent publications in English include Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2009 (2005), Japan and Reconciliation in Post-war Asia: The Murayama Statement and its Implications (2012; editor), and, East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (2008, co-editor) and Building Confidence in East Asia: Maritime Conflicts, Interdependence and Asian Identity Thinking (2008; co-editor). His research interests include International politics and Japanese foreign policy in East Asia, territorial problems and historical memory in Northeast Asia, civilizational development, conflicts, and convergence. Tomita Takeshi was appointed associate professor at Seikei University, Tokyo, in 1988 and professor from 1991; he retired as professor emeritus in 2014. In 1992, he was guest researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences (IRH RAS), in Moscow. Professor Tomita’s publications include Sutaarinizumu no tōchi kōzō: 1930 nendai (Political Structures of the Stalinist Regime in the 1930s, 1996); Senkanki no Nisso kankei 1917–1937 (Japanese-Soviet Relations, 1917–1937, 2010); and Shiberia yokuryūsha tachi no sengo: reisen ka no seron to undō, 1945–1956 (Siberian Internees After the War: Public Opinion and Movements During the Cold War, 1945–1956, 2013).

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part 1

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The Legacy of the 18th and 19th Centuries: from Hierarchical and Ethnocentric Foreign Relations to a Western Model of Equal International Relations Ikuta Michiko The 18th and 19th centuries were a period of transition in Japanese foreign policy from the system of foreign relations based on the Chinese notions of “civilized people” and “barbarians” to the Western system of international relations. At the beginning of this period Japan viewed itself as the cultural “center,” building relations with neighboring countries hierarchically as part of a system in which there were no borders. With the penetration of Western powers into Asia relations between equal nation-states replaced the hierarchical system of foreign relations. This occurred not only in Japan, but also in China, Korea, and elsewhere; yet, Japan stands out due to the smoothness with which it transitioned to the Western model of international relations, suffering neither defeat in war nor colonization. Japan’s opening to foreign trade and its entry into diplomatic relations with foreign powers has usually been explained as the result of US pressure. As this essay will demonstrate, the Japanese decision to embark on Westernization was shaped by a long-term close exchange during the relative period of isolation (sakoku) from 1639 onward. Russia and the Netherlands were the only Western countries knocking at Japan’s door at this time. If we look through the lens of Russo-Japanese relations there are four stages that mark Japan’s transition from the ethnocentric system of foreign relations to equal international relations of the Western type. 1

Confronting the Western Concept of International Order (1792–1805)

The initial stage of Russo-Japanese relations coincided with Russia’s southward advance along the Kurile Islands (J: Chishima) to Japan in the late 18th century. Bilateral relations in this era were focused on the issue of negotiating the opening of Japanese ports for Russians.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_002

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1.1 Laksman’s Expedition The first Russian expedition to Japan, headed by Lieutenant Adam K. Laksman, arrived near Nemuro in 1792. Laksman brought an official letter from the governor general of Irkutsk to the Matsumae clan that proposed the opening of Japanese ports for trade. While Laksman’s main mission was the establishment of trade, he also returned other Japanese castaways, whose repatriation furnished a pretext for the expedition. Senior Councilor Matsudaira Sadanobu decided to treat the Russians according to the traditional Japanese principle of “politeness and law” (rei to hō). Notably, “politeness” took precedent over law, meaning that within the value system of Japanese foreign policy the notion of “civility” was more important than law. In order to express politeness toward the Russians, who had made the arduous voyage to Japan to return the castaways, the Tokugawa shogunate permitted the returned Japanese men to be received on Hokkaido, even though normal procedure would have required that they be handed over at Japan’s designated location for foreign contacts in Dejima in Nagasaki. During their meetings both Japanese and Russian representatives followed their respective rules of diplomatic etiquette. According to “ancestral law” (inishie yori no hō), the Tokugawa shogunate handed down the official refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Russia. The Russians, however, received a one-off permission to enter Nagasaki harbor in order to continue negotiations. Moreover, at the banquet the Japanese hinted at the possibility of opening trade. The ambivalence of Japanese policy reflected an effort to steer Russians away from the defenseless capital of Edo (present-day Tokyo). 1.2 Rezanov’s Expedition In 1804, Ambassador Nikolaĭ P. Rezanov led the second Russian expedition and entered Nagasaki Bay. The delay in dispatching this expedition was due to the international situation in Europe where the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars were convulsing the countries there. As Laksman before him, however, Rezanov’s purpose was the same: to set up trade relations and return castaways. At the same time, this expedition was a part of the first Russian voyage around the world, which was intended to project the power of the Russian empire. For this reason, this venture was much higher profile: Rezanov was not only an influential aristocrat, but also the president of the Russian-American Company Under the Supreme Patronage of His Imperial Majesty (generally seen as Russian-American Company, RAC; est. 1799). Equipped with a permit to enter Nagasaki harbor, a letter and gifts from Emperor Alexander I to the shogun, the mission was confident of its success.

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Contrary to its grand expectations, however, the deputation did not even receive permission to step ashore and was forced to remain on the ship, anchored in the open sea. It was only when Rezanov became ill that he and some of his crew, together with the Japanese castaways, were allowed on land where they stayed in a former storehouse, enclosed by a bamboo fence, at a location some distance from Nagasaki. Rezanov lived in semi-captivity for six months and reportedly conformed to Japanese etiquette, which included such practices as removing one’s shoes before entering a building. From the standpoint of Western diplomatic etiquette this treatment was seen as so inappropriate that even the head of the Dutch factory at Dejima, Hendrik Doeff, was amazed. After some time and in response to the Russian request, a Japanese representative read aloud a document that declared that Japan’s foreign relations were restricted to four countries: Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, China, and the Netherlands. In effect, there was no room for any newcomers, and ultimately the original permit for the Russians to enter Nagasaki harbor was rescinded and not replaced. The Russians had now understood that they had been denied entry into trade relations with Japan. Yet the Dutch interpreters of Japanese informed Rezanov that the Japanese people wished to trade with Russia but that the shogunate forbad them to do so. In 1805, on the way to Kamchatka, Rezanov inspected the eastern part of Aniva (Aniwa) Bay of Sakhalin Island. Seeing that the northern districts were weakly defended and that trade through the Ainu was already underway, Rezanov decided to resort to harsher methods. Writing to Emperor Alexander I that same year he conveyed his opinion about the possibility of establishing trade with Japan through military force. In the meantime, and without imperial sanction, he ordered his subordinates, Lieutenant Nikolaĭ A. Khvostov and Warrant Officer Gavriil I. Davydov, to attack Japan. Hesitant to launch a military operation without the emperor’s consent, Rezanov then gave further instructions to Khvostov. Initially he ordered to them execute the plan without delay but he then directed them not to carry out any attacks. Because his written commands were extremely inconsistent, his confused subordinates eventually decided to attack Japanese territories in accordance with Rezanov’s first command. 2

Conflict and Settlement within the Western World Order (1806–1821)

The second stage was marked by the attacks by Khvostov and Davydov, the Golovnin Incident, and the detention of Takadaya Kahei. The head of the

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Dutch factory Hendrik Doeff characterized this period in Russo-Japanese relations as one representing “a state of war.” As they sought an exit from their dead-end positions, both sides recognized the necessity of demarcating the border between the two countries. 2.1 Attacks by Khvostov and Davydov In 1807, the shogunate assumed direct control over all of Hokkaido and ordered the head of the Matsumae clan to relocate to the northern part of the main island of Honshu. During this period foreign ships began to be seen frequently in the waters around northern Japan, and the shogunate, too, conducted several explorations of the region. One such expedition learned that a year earlier Lieutenant Khvostov had attacked Sakhalin, had plundered and burned some of the Japanese possessions there, and proclaimed the territory to be Russian. The news about the attack did not reach Japan earlier because of the suspension of the ferry service for the winter. Soon thereafter Japanese authorities received the report that Khvostov and Davydov had launched another attack, this time on the islands of Iturup (Etorofu), Sakhalin and Rishiri. The Russians addressed a letter to the Matsumae clan, threatening that if Japan did not agree to trade with Russia, the latter might choose to occupy the Kurile Islands. The shogunate responded by sending 3,000 troops to Hokkaido, and this led to the situation of the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin becoming disputed territories between Russia and Japan. In Japan these events were referred to as the “Russian Invasion in the Bunka Era” (Bunka rokō), an expression with associations with the Mongol invasions of Japan of 1274 and 1281 that were recognized as nation-defining events in Japanese history. Indeed, this marked the first aggression by a foreign country against Japan since the Mongol invasions. In Russia, however, this incident was called “an expedition” or “a secret expedition” and Russian penetration into the north Pacific has generally become known by the Russian population as the “Kurile epic” (R: Kuril′skaya ėpopeya). 2.2 The Golovnin Incident In 1811, the Russian sloop Diana, tasked with mapping the depth of the waters around the Southern Kurile Islands, approached the island of Iturup. Eight people, including the captain, Lieutenant Vasiliĭ M. Golovnin, came ashore in order to get water and firewood. They were instructed to go to Furebetsu on Iturup, but Golovnin, upon learning from the interpreter that Kunashir Island was located nearby, went there instead. Since Europeans had no knowledge of Kunashir, its mapping was one of Golovnin’s priorities.

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Golovnin landed on Kunashir with his crew and requested water and firewood from the Japanese. The local official stated that it was necessary to obtain permission from the magistrate of Matsumae, the shogunate’s overseer of Hokkaido, and required that one person remain with the Japanese until further instructions arrived. Fearing capture, the Russians tried to escape, which confused the Japanese official, who then ordered that they be arrested. The Japanese side had not intended to trick the Russians, but according to the Japanese system of seniority it was impossible to engage in any interaction with foreigners without instructions from above. Following the attacks by Khvostov and Davydov the shogunate had entertained the idea of “passive trade” limited to the northern districts, but once the local authorities had captured the Russians this solution became unthinkable. Golovnin and his crew were incarcerated and remained in prison for two years and three months. During this period Murakami Teisuke, Baba Sajūrō, Adachi Sanai, and Mamiya Rinzō studied the Russian language and culture with Golovnin. Baba Sajūrō compiled a Russian grammar (Oroshiago shōsei) while Golovnin, after his release, published his Memoirs of a Captivity in Japan During the Years 1811, 1812, and 1813 with Observations on the Country and the People in the Work of Naval Captain Golovnin (Zapiski flota kapitana Golovnina o priklyucheniyakh ego v plenu u yapontsev v 1811, 1812 i 1813 godakh, s ego priobshcheniem zamechaniĭ ego o Yaponskom gosudarstve i narode), which provided valuable information on contemporary Japan. The Memoirs were translated into English, German, French, Dutch, and other languages, and it served to rectify the unfortunate image of the Japanese in the West as a result of Japan’s persecutions of Christians in the 17th century. The Dutch version of Golovnin’s book was even translated into Japanese under the title Sōyaku Nihon kiji. Before the publication of the book, however, Lieutenant Petr I. Rikord, the first mate of the Diana, returned to Russia. He then went back to Japan, bringing Japanese castaways in exchange for Golovnin and his crew. He had the castaways come ashore, but the Japanese side refused to negotiate with the Russians. 2.3 The Internment of Takadaya Kahei The next development that altered the relationship between Russia and Japan came in 1812, when Takadaya Kahei, the captain of the ship Kanzemaru, together with his crew, were captured by Rikord as they passed the Russian sloop Diana. Takadaya, a frontiersman of Japan’s northern districts, had become the richest merchant in the country by doing business along the Iturup-Osaka trade route. He stumbled upon the Diana on the way from Iturup to Kunashir, and once apprehended he assured Rikord that Golovnin was safe and agreed to go to Kamchatka on the condition that he and Rikord could stay together.

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With this move Takadaya was able to position himself as Japan’s representative and was guaranteed maximum access to his influential captor. He brought household goods, food, and clothes from his Japanese ship in order not to be dependent on the Russians. As the shogunate’s designated captain for the northern region, Takadaya was privy to the government’s intentions. He resided with Rikord on Kamchatka, and with the assistance of the Ainu interpreter Olka, as well as others from the local community, Takadaya was also able to gather considerable information about the plans of the Russian authorities. Based on this information, he suggested to Rikord that Golovnin would be released if the Russians could deliver a letter from the governor of Irkutsk stating that the Russian government had nothing to do with the attacks by Khvostov and Davydov. The winter in Kamchatka was so harsh that three hostages died and Takadaya, too, hovered between life and death. Rikord hastened his efforts to bring him and his remaining crew back to Japan, and in May 1813 he took Takadaya and two other Japanese to Kunashir. Takadaya, having recovered from his illness, played the role of mediator between Japan and Russia. In keeping with what he had told the Russians, the Japanese authorities indeed required letters from two high-ranking officials confirming that the Russian government had no connection with the attacks by Khvostov and Davydov. Rikord then returned to Russia and arrived in Hakodate in September 1813 with letters from the head of the Okhotsk port Mikhaĭl I. Minitskiĭ and the governor of Irkutsk Nikolaĭ I. Treskin. The arrangement of the formal meeting was riddled with many difficulties surrounding protocol. One thorny issue was the question of whether shoes should be removed before entering a building in keeping with Japanese custom. Once Takadaya explained to the Japanese officials that the Russians’ short boots were like Japanese leather socks, a compromise was reached by exchanging the Russian long boots with short ones. The problem of removing one’s shoes, which surprisingly had been a stumbling block in earlier RussoJapanese negotiations, was thus resolved due to Takadaya’s insight. Another compromise allowed the Russians to sit on chairs brought from their ship while the Japanese sat on the floor. The negotiations that followed proved quite successful, despite the problematic contents of both letters. Although in his letter Treskin condemned the Japanese actions as immoral, Japanese authorities chose to overlook this and allowed Rikord to write that the letter contained errors. The other letter by Minitskiĭ was more moderate in tone, but it also had no apology; it limited itself to denying the Russian government’s involvement in the attacks by Khvostov and Davydov. Still, the Japanese side acknowledged this letter and

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accepted it as an apology. Golovnin and his crew were released thereby normalizing relations with Russia. These negotiations, however, postponed the resolution of the problem of border demarcation until the following year. In 1814, both sides sent representatives to Iturup for a new round of negotiations but due to bad weather conditions they could not meet. The intentions of the two sides differed markedly. Russia sought to draw a borderline in order to conduct trade at a border town like Kyakhta on the Russo-Chinese border. Japan, however, wanted to set up a border zone around an uninhabited Urup Island, with neighboring islands serving as a buffer in order to keep the peace. In other words, Japan saw the border as a means to halt contacts with other countries. A turning point in Russian policy occurred with the 1821 imperial decree that declared the need to counteract the United States and the United Kingdom, which had begun to enter the north Pacific. Russia’s response was to close all of its territory from the Bering Strait to the Urup Island to foreign entry. In this way, Russia signaled to the world that its territory extended as far as Urup. The same year, 1821, the Tokugawa shogunate restored administrative control over Hokkaido to the Matsumae clan. The activity of the Russian-American Company declined, Russia’s efforts to initiate trade with Japan weakened, and Russo-Japanese relations achieved a relatively peaceful, stable level. 3

Western and East Asian Models of International Relations: from Coexistence to Westernization (1853–1858)

This section deals with the next significant period of Russo-Japanese relations from the arrival of Putyatin’s expedition to the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimoda (formally Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation Between Japan and Russia). 3.1 Putyatin’s Mission The third Russian mission, this time led by Admiral Evfimiĭ V. Putyatin, arrived in Nagasaki in 1853, a month after the American Commodore Matthew Perry. In fact, the US plan to dispatch Perry’s expedition was the reason why Russia decided to send a mission. Putyatin had received instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Navy to promote friendly relations between Russia and Japan and to demarcate the border by peaceful means. In 1853, Perry put pressure on Japan when he sailed his fleet of naval steam ships into Edo Bay; these vessels were described as “Black Ships” (J: kurofune)

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in part because of the black tarred ship hulls and smoke emanating from their coal-steam engines. Putyatin, however, entered Nagasaki harbor in accordance with Japanese law in order to gain the trust of the Japanese side. The shogunate sent Ambassador Kawaji Toshiakira to Nagasaki to deal with the Russians. At their first meeting Putyatin emphasized the demarcation of the border and trade issues as the main topics of negotiation. Kawaji realized that it would be impossible to avoid trade issues, but required a postponement of three to five years. He suggested fixing the boundary on Sakhalin, along the 50th parallel north. The shogunate neither accepted nor rejected the Russian proposal, temporizing instead. Eventually Kawaji offered Putyatin a memorandum stating that Russia would be prioritized if any further foreign countries were permitted to trade with Japan. Moreover, Russia and Japan agreed on fixing their boundary between the Kurile islands of Urup and Iturup. Both sides also consented to send representatives to Sakhalin for a joint investigation of the area, with a view to demarcating the border based on the results of that expedition. In February 1854, Putyatin left Nagasaki to study the international situation conditioned by the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853. He returned in April with an offer to send representatives to Sakhalin for border demarcation. Russia had to abandon the plan, however, when the United Kingdom and France declared war on it in March. Putyatin judged that if the war spread to East Asia, Russia would be unable to defend Sakhalin from the allied British and French forces. In May, Russia relinquished its military presence on Sakhalin. The Treaty of Shimoda and the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce In October 1854, Putyatin arrived in Hakodate to continue negotiations regarding the conclusion of a treaty. Although the shogunate had previously promised Russia priority status in establishing trade relations, Japan by this time had already signed treaties of peace and amity with the United States and the United Kingdom. In November that year Russo-Japanese negotiations resumed in Shimoda on southeastern Izu Peninsula. On the day following the first meeting an earthquake and a tsunami struck Shimoda. The city was completely destroyed and the Russian frigate Diana sank in a nearby bay. Despite the ban on contact with foreigners, the Japanese assisted some 500 Russians by offering them food and shelter. The state of emergency considerably promoted Russo-Japanese rapprochement. The Japanese side provided the shipwrecked Russian sailors with materials and manpower 3.2

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to build a replacement vessel. Japanese and Russians cooperated in building a Western-style ship, which they named Heda, after the village where the stranded Russians were accommodated. The Treaty of Shimoda was signed on January 26 (February 7), 1855. According to the treaty, the border was fixed between the Urup and Iturup Islands, but Sakhalin was not demarcated. Three ports—Nagasaki, Shimoda, and Hakodate—were opened to the Russians while the Americans could only enter Shimoda and Hakodate. Also, unlike the Americans, the Russians were able to undertake transactions with cash and also pay in kind. The most distinguishing feature of the Treaty of Shimoda was Article 8, which stipulated that criminals should be prosecuted according to the laws of their home country. All these points indicate that the Russo-Japanese relationship was more mutually beneficial. To place events in their proper context, it must be remembered that the treaty was signed during the course of the Crimean War when Russia could not apply any armed military pressure on Japan. On the contrary, when the Russian’s own “Black Ship” Diana sank and its 500-men crew became temporary refugees in Japan, it received aid from their hosts. It was within these circumstances that, seventeen days after the sinking of the Diana, the Treaty of Shimoda was signed; twenty-two days later shipbuilding began. This remarkably rapid development of events serves as evidence of Japan’s independent decision and willingness to sign the treaty. In 1856, to the astonishment of the Japanese, the first US Consul General Townsend Harris arrived in Shimoda. Although the Japanese text of the Treaty of Kanagawa did provide for the presence of a US official in Japan, the Japanese side believed that this appointment would take place only with mutual agreement. The English version of the text read, however, that: “Consuls or Agents to reside in Simoda [sic] shall be appointed by the Government of the United States, at any time after the expiration of eighteen months from the date of the signing of this treaty” (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Empire of Japan, Article XI). Harris insisted on going to Edo in order to personally deliver a sovereign letter from the US president Franklin Pierce to the shogun; he eventually obtained an audience with the shogun Tokugawa Iesada. In a symbolic gesture, Harris did not remove his shoes, simply changing into a new pair, and bowed to the shogun, which was seen as a breach of etiquette. From this moment onward, Japan’s diplomatic etiquette began to move in the direction of Western norms. In 1858, as a result of Harris’s stay in Edo, Japan and the United States concluded the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. It opened six other cities for

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trade and granted extraterritoriality to foreigners. Similar treaties between Japan on the one side, and the United Kingdom, Russia, the Netherlands, and France on the other were signed the same year. In all these treaties Japan was forced to apply to other nations the conditions granted to the United States under the “most favored nation” provision. The 1858 Edo Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Russia was one of these so-called “unequal treaties” (J: fubyōdō jōyaku), the revision of which became a matter of vital concern in Japanese foreign relations for decades to come. 4

Seeking Membership in the Western International System (1859–1875)

This section considers such incidents as the murder of Russian sailors, the Tsushima Incident, the Iwakura Mission, and the Treaty of St. Petersburg. These events took place against the backdrop of a major development that shifted the geopolitical balance of the region—namely, Russia received the lands on the left bank of the Amur River that comprised over 600,000 sq km of formerly Chinese territory as stipulated in the Treaty of Aigun signed in 1858. Russia then transferred its eastern center of colonial administration from Alaska to this newly acquired maritime region, which made Sakhalin much more strategically important than before. Japan’s efforts at this time were focused on achieving parity with the “civilized” Western states; it wished to revise the unequal treaty of 1858 with Russia and to demarcate the border. 4.1 The Murav’ev-Amurskii ̆ Incident In 1859, the governor of East Siberia, Nikolaĭ N. Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ, and his naval squadron arrived in Edo Bay. He was carrying an official letter that declared his purpose of taking possession of Sakhalin. Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ disembarked with a group of 300 armed men, and he asserted that Sakhalin had been assigned to Russia in keeping with the Treaty of Aigun. Japan objected, asserting that Japan and China never had negotiations about Sakhalin. The next day, following the second round of negotiations, several Japanese samurai killed two Russians and injured another. Subsequently, such assaults on foreigners in Japan became frequent occurrences, and these became a major destabilizing factor. Russia demanded an apology from the shogunate and the public punishment of the criminals. Once the Japanese side promised to fulfill these demands (and they did), the Russian navy squadron left Japan without resorting to military force or requiring compensation.

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During the course of negotiations, the Japanese representatives proposed the demarcation of the border on Sakhalin along the 50th parallel north. Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ was against border demarcation, however, in order to guarantee the free movement of people between the northern and southern regions of Sakhalin. The negotiations were interrupted without reaching any formal agreement, but in practice the Japanese side accepted the arrangement that Japanese and Russians would live side by side on Sakhalin. Unlike Putyatin, whose negotiation style was honest and friendly, Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ used gunboat diplomacy, and this method deeply damaged Japan’s trust in Russia, one that which Putyatin had earlier patiently nurtured. 4.2 The Tsushima Incident In March 1861, the Russian corvette Posadnik, under the command of CaptainLieutenant Nikolaĭ A. Birilev, landed on the island of Tsushima. The crew came ashore at Imosaki Bay and stayed there for six months, building facilities for a naval base in the process. Since the Russians explained that they needed to repair their ship, the Japanese authorities initially gave them permission to stay. Captain Birilev then informed the local authorities that the United Kingdom was planning to invade Tsushima and requested an audience with the head of the Tsushima clan. The audience was refused but the Russian corvette remained on the island. A clash locally between the Russians and the Japanese occurred in April, leading to casualties. In May, the shogunal Magistrate of Foreign Affairs Oguri Tadamasa demanded that Russians leave Tsushima, but Birilyov did not comply. Elsewhere in Japan, at the Edo temple of Tōzenji, the location of the provisional UK consulate, fourteen samurai assaulted two British diplomats. The consequent process of normalization led to a considerable increase of British influence in Japan. In the wake of this development, the British assumed the role of intermediaries, requiring the Russians to withdraw their corvette from Tsushima. This aligned with the interests of the United Kingdom, which opposed the strengthening of Russian presence in East Asia. As a result of British interference, Admiral Ivan F. Likhachev, Birilev’s commander, realized that the Tsushima issue had turned into a major diplomatic problem. In September 1861, he ordered the corvette to leave Tsushima. The outcome of this incident further eroded the trust in Russia that Putyatin had fostered, thereby contributing to the strengthening of British influence in Japan. 4.3 The Iwakura Mission In January 1868, Japan’s new Meiji government announced to the envoys of all countries its restoration of direct imperial rule and the abandonment of

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the policy aiming to “expel the barbarians” (i.e., foreigners; J: jōi). The new authorities also declared that they would observe all treaties signed by the shogunate. At the same time, the nascent government demonstrated its intention to revise the treaties in order to position Japan on equal footing with all other sovereign states. In 1871, the Meiji government dispatched a mission led by Iwakura Tomomi to the United States and Europe, an embassy that included some of the leading figures of the new regime, such as Ōkubo Toshimichi and Itō Hirobumi, who would go on to shape Japan’s process of modernization. As a result of this mission, the Japanese image of Russia changed significantly. During the Edo period (1600–1868), Russia was considered not only the greatest power, but also a just state. The scholar of “Dutch Studies” (rangaku), Ōtsuki Bankei believed that: “Russia is a neighbor and a large country. It has sent expeditions twice to return [our] castaways. Indeed, it is worthy of being called an upright and friendly country” (Yoshino 1924, 37). At that time the prevailing opinion in Japan held that Russia and the United Kingdom surpassed other countries in the West. Japan viewed Russia as a model because it had carried out its own form of modernization and had reached parity with Western nations. In addition, the United Kingdom, which began the Opium Wars, was considered a rude and egoistic state while Russia was seen as calm and strong. This positive perception was badly shaken by the Tsushima Incident as well as by the intelligence on Russia that began to percolate through British channels. The opinion of the members of the Iwakura Mission, who returned to Japan in 1873 and who had been able to observe Russia first-hand, also contributed to this changing perception: Russia now appeared backward and unstable with an enormous gap between the rich and the poor. 4.4 The Treaty of St. Petersburg Japan’s drive to secure equal rights with members of the Western international order focused its foreign policy on abolishing unequal treaties and demarcating the border with Russia. There was particular attention on Sakhalin, where the situation was becoming increasingly tense. In 1869, Russia made Sakhalin a place to send exiled criminals. With the growing numbers of Russian settlers on Sakhalin, various incidents, including robbery and more violent acts, such as murder, likewise increased. Both the Treaty of Shimoda and the Treaty of Edo (1858) provided that Japan and Russia would retain jurisdiction over their own criminals. According to Russian criminal law, however, the death penalty existed only for political crimes, otherwise the severest punishment was exile to Sakhalin. As the Japanese inhabitants of Sakhalin became more and more anxious about the incidences of crime, they began to discuss the possibility of

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a Japanese military presence or of leaving Sakhalin altogether. Foreign envoys were also apprehensive about the potential of armed conflict between Japan and Russia. The new Meiji leadership was primarily concerned with domestic reforms, but following American and British advice Japan decided to reopen negotiations with Russia in order to resolve territorial problems. Enomoto Takeaki, a former high-ranking shogunate official who had studied international law in the Netherlands from 1863 to 1866, was appointed the Japanese ambassador to Russia. He was given instructions consisting of twelve points that prescribed him to stop Russo-Japanese co-residence on Sakhalin, to demarcate the border, and to receive the Kurile Islands from Urup to Kamchatka in return for giving up Sakhalin. The Russian side agreed to these terms of territorial exchange and the two sides signed the Treaty of St. Petersburg on April 25 (May 7), 1875. This was a landmark achievement of Japanese diplomacy, sometimes seen as Meiji Japan’s first equal treaty with a Western power. 5 Conclusion This essay has traced the long rivalry between Russia and Japan in an effort to paint a picture of Russo-Japanese relations in the 18th and 19th centuries as a case study of Japan’s transition from ethnocentric hierarchical foreign relations to Western-style international relations. The legacy of Russo-Japanese relations in the period under discussion might be summed up in four overarching points. First, in its conflicts with Russia Japan attempted to keep peace by consciously formulating and pursuing a policy of national seclusion. Japan’s experience from negotiating with Russia paved the way for its transition to the Western model of international relations. Through its contacts with Russia Japan realized the advantages of Western “civilization” and began to understand at that time that its future lay in the opening of the country. Concrete examples of Russo-Japanese connections demonstrate that the transition to the Western model of international relations took place not only under pressure from Western powers but was also due to Japan’s own decision to do so. Second, Japan’s knowledge about Western countries increased and developed through the process of bilateral negotiations: “Barbarian Studies” (bangaku) evolved from “Dutch studies” into learning about the West. The Japanese became eager students of medicine, physics, electrics, and chemistry, and equally of the social and human sciences.

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Third, it was during this period that Japan’s basic stereotype of Russia took shape. Japan learned about Russia later than it did about other European countries. Before the castaway Daikokuya Kōdayū returned from Russia, Russians who appeared on the Kurile Islands were not identified with Europe. They were called “red Ainu” (aka-Ezo), “red people” (akahito), or “red devils” (akaoni) because of the color of their skin, hair, and military uniforms. After the return of Kōdayū, who was permitted an audience with Empress Catherine (Ekaterina) II at her palace, Russia was reimagined as a state belonging to Western civilization. Admiration for Catherine II and Emperor Peter I began to spread. Moreover, in 1855 personal contacts between Japanese commoners and shipwrecked Russian sailors gave rise to a sense of closeness at a grassroots level. This image clashed with that of an aggressor nation, first purveyed by Maurice (Móric) Benyovszky from the kingdom of Hungary, who sent shock waves through Japan when he baselessly warned the head of the Dutch factory in 1771 of an imminent Russian attack on Japan, then strengthened by clashes with the Ainu and attacks by Khvostov and Davydov. A negative image became entrenched as a result of Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ’s diplomatic pressure and the Tsushima Incident, and this evolved as the dominant perception in the aftermath of the Iwakura Mission and the takeover of Sakhalin. Fourth, the legacy of Russo-Japanese relations in this era offers examples of parity diplomacy. During this time Takadaya Kahei ended the protracted negative spiral in bilateral relations that Hendrik Doeff referred to as “a state of war.” Diplomacy conducted on equal footing with Russia allowed Enomoto Takeaki to conclude the first equal treaty with Russia through peaceful negotiations. After the demarcation of the border, Russo-Japanese relations developed relatively peacefully for almost thirty years until the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. In the 20th century, however, the border between Japan and Russia has been redrawn not by negotiations but by war: for us today it is especially important to remember the legacy of the 18th and 19th centuries. Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Ikuta Michiko. 2008. Gaikō girei kara mita Nichiro bunka kōryū shi [History of RussoJapanese Cultural Relations from the Perspective of Diplomatic Ritual]. Kyoto: Mineruba. Ikuta Michiko. 2012. Takadaya Kahei. Kyoto: Mineruba Shobō. Yoshino Sakuzō. 1924. Rosia kikan no hyōryūmin Kōdayū [Kōdayū, Castaway Returned from Russia]. Tokyo: Bunka Seikatsu Kenkyūsha.

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Russian Sources



English Sources

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Bolkhovitinov, Nikolaĭ Nikolaevich, ed. Donesenie Glavnogo pravleniya RAK Aleksandru I o neobkhodimosti razvitiya torgovykh otnosheniĭ s Yaponieĭ i osvoeniya Sakhalina/ Rossiĭsko-Amerikanskaya kompaniya i izuchenie Tikhookeanskogo severa 1799–1815. 1994. Moscow: Nauka. Faĭnberg, Ėsfir′ Yakovlevna. 1960. Russko-yaponskie otnosheniya v 1697–1875 gg. [RussoJapanese Relations, 1697–1875]. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura. Golovnin, Vasiliĭ Mikhaĭlovich. 1816. Zapiski flota kapitana Golovnina o priklyucheniyakh ego v plenu u yapontsev v 1811, 1812 i 1813 godakh s priobshcheniem zamechaniĭ ego o Yaponskom gosudarstve i narode [Memoirs of a Captivity in Japan During the Years 1811, 1812, and 1813 with Observations on the Country and the People in the Work of Naval Captain Golovnin]. St. Petersburg: Morskaya tipografiya. Reprinted. 2004. Zapiski flota kapitana Golovnina o priklyucheniyakh ego v plenu u yapontsev [An Account of Naval Captain Golovnin’s Adventures in Japanese Captivity]. Moscow: Zakharov. Kozhevnikov, Vladimir Vasil′evich. 1997. Rossiĭsko-yaponskie otnosheniya v XVIII– XIX vv. [Russo-Japanese Relations in the 18th–19th Centuries]. Vladivostok: Dal’nauka.

Ikuta, Michiko. 2008. “Changing Japanese-Russian Images in the Edo Period.” In Japan and Russia: Three Centuries of Mutual Images, edited by Yulia Mikhailova and M. William Steele, 11–31. Leiden: Brill. Lensen, George Alexander. 1959. The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697–1875. Princeton: Princeton University Press. “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Empire of Japan.” http://www .geocities.jp/sybrma/176nichibeiwashin.eibun.html.

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Russo-Japanese Relations in the 18th and 19th Centuries: Exploration and Negotiation Sergey V. Grishachev Of all East Asian nations Japan is the one of the furthest from Europe, and until the 13th century it was little known outside of East and Southeast Asia. The earliest European record of Japan was by the Italian Marco Polo in his account Livres de merveilles du monde (ca. 1300). Western Europeans (Spanish and Portuguese) initially reached the Japanese archipelago in the mid-16th century. The development of regular contacts between East Asian countries and Russia started somewhat later, with first contact dating to the 18th century.1 This was an age of rapid growth, territorial expansion, and exploration not only of the enormous expanses of Siberia and the Far East of contemporary Russia (Yakutia, Kamchatka, Chukotka) but also of northwestern America. By the time the Russian empire extended its reach to the Pacific coast of America in the 18th century, its territories traversed three continents: Europe, Asia, and America. By contrast, during this period Japan was enacting a policy of relative isolation from the outside world, and the Tokugawa shogunate (bakufu), which came into power in the early 17th century, began to limit all international contacts. Following 1639, Japan’s contacts with foreign nations sharply declined: Catholic missionary priests and merchants from Catholic countries such as Spain and Portugal were expelled, and the only Europeans permitted to trade in the country were the merchants of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC). This policy of isolation would later be referred to as sakoku, or “closed country” (Kazui 1982, 283–84; Toby 1977, 323–24).2 1  The Pope sent the Spanish Augustinian monk Nicholas Melo to preach in the Philippine islands; he left the Philippines in 1599 to travel through Persia and Russia en route to Rome. He was accompanied by a young Japanese man, baptized with the Christian name of Nicholas who, although ethnically Japanese, moved with his parents to the Philippines. During their journey they were involved in political turbulence in Moscovia and appear to have been executed (Pirling 1913, 69–95; Nakamura 1983, 1–30). Their story, however, cannot be considered to mark the beginning of Russian-Japanese contacts. 2  The term sakoku was first appeared in the early 19th century when Shizuki Tadao (1760– 1806), a translator and scientist from Nagasaki, published one of the chapters from Engelbert Kaempfer’s History of Japan (1727) into Japanese, which he titled Sakokuron (Discussion on the closed country). This term became widespread from the mid-19th century onward.

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It is important to note that the East Asian perceptions of neighboring nations were quite specific. These deeply influenced the general attitude toward foreigners, which was based on a particular system of geopolitical concepts adopted from the Chinese. From the Han dynasty (206 bc–220 ad) onward, China developed a system that underscored its national self-identity: the cultural center was China (Zhongguo, “Middle Kingdom”) with the “barbarian” (C: huayi zhibian, “Sino-barbarian dichotomy”) periphery differentiated by the four corners of the globe. Although the people and countries that constituted this “barbarian” periphery varied, China’s attitude to them was equally hostile. Japan was no exception, and the Chinese viewed the Japanese as “Eastern Barbarians” (C: dongyi). This worldview was likewise espoused to a certain extent in other East Asian countries, and this explains the origins in Japan of the concept of kai no sekai (cultural center vs. barbarian periphery). In other words, Japan sought to create its own worldview along similar lines to China, in which it inhabited the cultural center. For them, the Hayato groups in the south and the Ainu in the north assumed the role of barbarian neighbors. This nonetheless did not impact how the Chinese saw the Japanese. This outlook was not the only one, nor was it the most prevalent in East Asia. Nevertheless, the worldview arising from this concept, or more precisely the traditional view arising from it, influenced both national policies as well as the attitudes of the common people. Moreover, the classification of foreigners as “barbarians” living in the four corners of the globe was also reflected in Japan’s view of Europeans. For instance, the Spanish and the Portuguese who arrived in Japan in the 16th century were called nanbanjin (“Southern Barbarians”), a term that had previously been used to refer to Southeast Asians who came from the south in the 10th century on boats along the northern Kuroshio current of the Pacific Ocean. It was not the term used to describe Europeans. The term nanbanjin eventually came to mean people from Catholic countries (e.g., the Spanish and Portuguese) while people from Protestant countries (e.g., the English and Dutch) were commonly called kōmōjin (“Red-haired Barbarians”) (Satō et al. 2008, 249). These descriptions show that the attitudes toward Europeans were condescending at best, and documents from Europeans writing in the 19th century provide further evidence of this viewpoint. Ivan A. Goncharov, the celebrated Russian writer who served as secretary to Admiral Evfimiĭ V. Putyatin during his Japanese mission (1853–1855), writes in his book of essays, Frigate Pallada, that during their stay in 1854 off the coast of the Geomun-do islands, located off the southern coast of the Korean Peninsula, Russian sailors invited local village elders aboard to negotiate the revictualing of their ships:

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The guests were seated at the table and offered some tea, bread, hard chucks [rusks], and rum. Then a vigorous conversation in written Chinese began. They were so dexterous in writing that our eyes could not follow the strokes. First of all, they asked which barbarians we were—those from the north or from the south? goncharov 1952, 251

Such a prejudicial stance indicates that the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations between Japan and European states would have been highly unlikely. It also explains in large part the failures and the enormous hurdles experienced by the Europeans who attempted to make official visits to the Chinese emperors or to the Japanese Tokugawa shoguns. This issue is topical for Japanese historians as well as for more recent Russian scholars studying the history of Russo-Japanese relations (Ikuta 2010, 92–121; Grishachev 2013, 257–67; Shchepkin 2011, 174–79). Japan’s isolationist policy continued until the mid-19th century and therefore the first 155 years (from 1700 to 1855) of bilateral contacts between Russia and Japan coincide with the Edo period (1600–1868) when Japan was governed by the Tokugawa shogunate. It might be instructive here to outline the distinct features of Japan’s foreign policy during the Edo period. The idea that Japan was “closed” to all foreigners except for the Dutch is a somewhat overly simplistic interpretation. This is true to a great extent but the frequent omission of certain details paints an incomplete picture, and there is a need to re-evaluate the historiography regarding the Edo-period policy of sakoku (Arano 2005, 185–216; Kazui 1982, 283–306; Leshchenko 2010, 230–31). It is important to note that the aim in restricting international contacts was not total isolation of the country, rather it was a measure required to limit European influence on Japan. Such an isolationist policy was not unique to Japan during the early modern period (17th–18th centuries). Other East Asian countries at this time enacted similar policies; however, Japan was the first country to do so with its sakoku policy in the first half of the 17th century. The rulers of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) gradually introduced restrictions and achieving complete isolation by the mid-18th century. Although both empires already had trade relations in the late 17th century, the only place where trade with Russia was permitted in the early 18th century was the small Transbaikal border town of Kyakhta. In this regard, trading in Kyakhta on the China-Russia border from the 17th to the mid-19th century might be compared to the Dutch trading in Nagasaki on Japan’s southern island of Kyushu. Both limited the volume of trade and although each regulated the numbers of foreigners (Westerners) entering their

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countries, it was nonetheless permitted and maintained. Korea, too, dependent to a degree on China and Japan, did not have any commercial or diplomatic representatives from Western powers. Like China and Japan, Korea also attempted to prevent European intrusion into its territory in the first half of the 19th century. Even though the extent to which these East Asian countries prohibited international contact evolved over time, they all shared the underlying principle of isolationism until the mid-19th century. Despite these policies Japan continued trade, albeit limited, with its immediate neighbors China and Korea. During the Edo period the Tokugawa shogunate received twelve Korean diplomatic missions, with the number of people in each retinue averaging around five hundred. In terms of trade, for example, the Tsushima domain annually sent up to twenty trading ships to the Korean port of Busan, where Japanese lived in a special settlement known as Waegwan. The arrival of Koreans in Japan was not particularly extraordinary and did not result in hostile relations. The early modern era marked the West’s economic entry into Asia, one that would expand over time. While the isolationist policies adopted by countries in the Far East initially enabled these countries to retain their independence, it would become increasingly difficult to resist outside pressure. In the 19th century, Western powers were united in wanting to force China, Japan, and Korea to abandon their isolationist policies. This fact also speaks to the behavioral commonality of the agents of Western culture in Asia. 1

The 18th Century: Russia’s Early Contacts with Japan and the Far East

As noted earlier, Russia established contacts with countries in the Far East somewhat later than Western Europe. It was only in the 17th century, when Russian pioneers flocked to Siberia, that trade and ambassadorial relations with China began. In the second half of the 17th century Russian adventurers reached the remote outposts of Eastern Siberia and the Pacific. During his Kamchatka Peninsula campaign of 1699–1700, the Cossack Vladimir V. Atlasov found an unusual foreigner being held by the Kamchadals and brought him to Moscow in 1701. The captive was a Japanese man called Denbei, who had served on a merchant ship from Osaka that in 1695 was swept off-course by a storm and several months later washed up on the coast of Kamchatka. In 1702, he was presented to the young tsar Peter I at the country estate of Preobrazhenskoe. Peter I had some understanding of Japan since he had studied in the Netherlands, the only European country at this time that had

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trade relations with Japan. On the tsar’s orders Denbei was employed in the Department of Siberian Affairs (Sibirskiĭ prikaz) and later he was transferred to the Department of Artillery (Artilleriĭskiĭ prikaz) to teach Japanese to several talented officers. Tsar Peter also issued an order to send an expedition to search for navigational routes to Japan. Although he reaffirmed this intention on numerous occasions, the route to Japan was only reached after his death in 1739. The exploration of the Kurile Islands continued nevertheless. We know that Peter I was very familiar with the achievements of Dutch sailors. Earlier in 1643, on the orders of the Dutch East India Company, Captain Maarten (Gerritszoon) de Vries set off on a voyage along the northeast coast of Japan to confirm the claim circulated by returning Spanish sailors that the islands were rich in silver and gold. De Vries was the first European explorer to visit the Sea of Okhotsk and the islands of Urup and Iturup (named Companies Land [Urup] and Stateneiland [Iturup], respectively). During the trip, he visited southern Sakhalin, but due to severe weather conditions and other circumstances, the expedition mistook the southern Sakhalin coastline for a part of Hokkaido (Grishachev 2010, 172). The explorers also believed that Iturup was located near the coast of America (Coen 2010, 39). The maps of Cornelius Coen, who served as navigator on De Vries’s expedition, were used in Europe to construct maps of East Siberia, and these were repeatedly published in Europe, and later in Russia. Despite the cartographical inaccuracies, these maps nonetheless contained useful data, including accurate coordinates and a description of the territories visited by the Dutch. The idea that the American continent was so close and that the tale, later debunked, of the islands were plentiful in gold likewise fascinated Peter I (Grishachev 2010, 175). A full-scale, successful exploration of the empire’s eastern borders required a solid maritime industry. Vitus Bering, a Danish explorer in service to the Russians, played a major role in its development. (His travel into and charting of the eastern border of Russian for Peter I was completed after the death of this reformer emperor.) In 1733, Bering began an expedition to the northern Pacific Ocean in order to clarify the existence of the strait between Asia and America that today bears his name. An additional task was to describe the Kurile Islands and discover a maritime route to Japan. Not surprisingly, these voyages were extremely expensive and demanded a large work force to launch. The expedition was given a broad range of tasks in its search for the American coast, and this necessitated an adequately equipped fleet. Bering’s expedition consisted of two parties: the two ships, Saint Paul (Svyatoĭ Pavel) and Saint Peter (Svyatoĭ Petr), commanded by Bering headed northeast, while the other two, Archangel Michael (Arkhangel Mikhail) and Saint Gabriel (Svyatoĭ Gavriil) under the helm of Martyn P. Shpanberg (Martin Spanberg, a Danish-born officer in Russian service) and Vil’yam Val’ton (William Walton, a - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Scottish-born officer in Russian service) respectively, were charged with going south to confirm whether the coast of America was close to Japan (Grishachev 2010, 177). The Archangel Michael and the Saint Gabriel left the port of Okhotsk in the summer of 1738. Upon reaching the Kamchatka coast they proceeded south along the Kurile Islands and eventually reached Iturup. Food shortages and the brief navigation season forced the party to turn back. In the following year, 1739, Shpanberg made another attempt to reach Japan and to clarify the issue regarding the location of the American coast. His ships left Kamchatka in early May. This time, however, the ships did not go along the coast of the Kurile Islands, rather continued along the meridian southwards from Kamchatka to latitude of 42 degrees north. The absence of a large land mass disproved the theory about the American coast; the ships then turned west, arriving at the coast of Japan. The Archangel Michael moored at several places along the northeastern coast of Japan’s main island, Honshu. Shpanberg tried to contact the local authorities and population. During one stay local Japanese officers boarded the ship and demanded that they leave the settlement, despite the fact that neither Shpanberg nor anyone in his party had stepped ashore. He mapped out parts of the Honshu coastline, but soon bad weather and the worsening health of his crew forced him to sail north (Klimov 2012b, 28–29). The second ship of the expedition, Saint Gabriel, reached Japan’s Awa Province (in presentday Kamogawa, Chiba Prefecture). Val’ton’s had several sailors disembark in order to negotiate with locals on revictualing the ship and to carry out trade. Russian sailors were able to enter the village and received water to replenish the ship but their efforts were further thwarted when local officials arrived and asked them to leave. Val’ton then decided to land at several other spots and made cartographic notes en route. He then steered the ship north, returning to Kamchatka a month later (Klimov 2012b, 32–37). Three years later, in 1742, Shpanberg ventured again to reach Japan in order to establish commercial relations. Storms forced his early return but the voyage resulted in the discovery of a maritime route to Japan from the Russian Far East. While this expedition did not contribute to the development of Russo-Japanese relations, it is significant because it disproved the theory that the Asian and American coasts were near each other in the southern area of the Kurile Islands. The Atlas Russicus, Mappa una Generali et Undeviginti Specialibus Vastissimum Imperium Russicum, published in St. Petersburg in 1745, described Bering’s and Shpanberg’s discoveries of the coastline of the Southeast Eurasia, Kamchatka, the Aleutians, and some of the Kurile Islands. Japan did not attract the attention of the successors of Peter I, yet the idea to establish contact with Japan resulted from several factors. These included the - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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aforementioned events such as the arrival of Denbei, the first Japanese visitor; the tale that certain islands in the Pacific had abundant gold; and Russian proximity to the Japanese coast. The latter should also be viewed together with the issue regarding the eastern borders of Eurasia and the existence of a strait between Eurasia and America. The correlation of Japan’s location, the northwestern coast of America, and the islands described by De Vries created a number of problems, which could only be resolved through systematic exploration that was, to a great extent, fulfilled by the Bering and Shpanberg expeditions. After the end of the second Kamchatka expedition of 1743 the attempts by the government to establish contact with Japan were scaled back. In future, any such efforts were always part of a greater project. Bering’s expedition to the west coast of America and the Aleutians not only showed the accessibility of those lands but similarly boosted the development of the valuable fur trade in sea-otter pelts in these newly discovered territories. Shpanberg’s expedition also found a maritime route along the entire ridge of the Kurile Islands. This made Alaska, the Aleutians, and the Kurile Islands accessible. This resulted in some traders launching their own private fur trading enterprises on the Kurile Islands, at times making unofficial contacts with the Japanese living on the Southern Kuriles and even on Ezo (Hokkaido). Parties of fur trappers crossed the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean in search of game; the expeditions to America yielded a steady, stable income for these traders. Fur trappers and merchants on the Kurile Islands, however, were much less successful. 1.1 Hyōryūmin Denbei’s arrival in Russia in 1701 was followed by a sizable number of other Japanese during the course of the 18th century. Their circumstances were almost identical to Denbei’s: most were sailors whose ships were cast adrift by storms, and in Japanese these men were known as hyōryūmin (“people drifting, or floating, with the current”). Throughout Japanese history, near-shore communications and coastline voyages have always played a more relevant role than river communications. During the Edo period, the building of heavy vessels was forbidden, and the size of merchant ships was strictly regulated. Japanese junks, or single-mast, flat-bottomed ships, were not suitable for long voyages since strong winds and turbulent seas could toss these vessels around like toys. And this accounts for the numbers of sailors being shipwrecked on foreign shores—Korea, China, and the Philippines—despite Japan’s sakoku policy. Some of the ships ventured north from Japan to the Kuriles, Kamchatka, and other areas with the storm. Moreover, the ocean current along Japan’s east coast moves from southwest to northeast, parallel to the Kurile Islands, again

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explaining why Japanese sailors often landed on the shores of Kamchatka and the Aleutians. In many cases their ships had been adrift for weeks or months without sails or rudder. One chronicle from the first half of 19th century reports that three Japanese sailors survived after fourteen months adrift in the Pacific Ocean.3 Japanese boats were mostly merchant ships or fishing vessels laden with fishing gear, and this contributed to the survival of their crews. In all documented cases the sailors survived by eating the food on board and collecting rainwater. Naturally, these circumstances could only ease their suffering to a certain extent, and the death toll of such voyages was fairly high, with many dying from disease and exposure. This makes the survival stories even more remarkable: in the 18th century the most famous concerned the Japanese sailors who found themselves in Russia, the first being the aforementioned account of Denbei. In 1729, the Japanese vessel Wakashiomaru washed ashore in Kamchatka. On board were seventeen survivors (after landing some were killed by the Cossacks), two of whom, Sodza (Soza) and Gonza, were sent to St. Petersburg. There they had an audience with Empress Anna, who offered them residency in Russia. They were converted to the Russian Orthodox Church and given Russian names. In 1736, the empress ordered the founding of a school of Japanese language at the Academy of Science in St. Petersburg—the first of its kind in Europe—and Sodza and Gonza were engaged as teachers. The young Gonza (Russian name: Damian Pomortsev) was especially talented. Although he became extremely fluent in Russian, his knowledge of his native Japanese language was poor since he left the country when he was eleven. In 1754, the St. Petersburg Japanese language school was relocated to Irkutsk, where a number of hyōryūmin were employed, and thereafter any rescued Japanese sailors were taken to Irkutsk. One hyōryūmin who achieved “celebrity” was Daikokuya Kōdayū, whose ship washed ashore on the Aleutian Islands in 1783, and where Russian fur trappers found him and other survivors from their ship. They were taken to Kamchatka and then to Irkutsk. Kōdayū refused to stay in Russia and wished to return to Japan. He was aided in his endeavor by Erik Laxmann, a Swedish-born 3  These three sailors were abroad the Mihama rice-trading ship Hōjunmaru, which was caught in a storm in 1832. They were the only survivors of the fourteen-man crew, and they subsisted by consuming the ship’s rice cargo and collecting rainwater. They eventually landed in North America (present-day Washington state), where they were captured by indigenous Americans, and then handed over to an agent of the Hudson Bay Company before being taken to the United Kingdom. One of them, Otokichi, was engaged as an interpreter and later visited Japan as member of mission of Admiral James Stirling, who signed the AngloJapanese Friendship Treaty (1854). Otokichi died in Singapore aged forty-nine.

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natural scientist who lived in Irkutsk (his Russian name was Kirill Laksman). With Laksman’s assistance, Kōdayū reached St. Petersburg and obtained an audience with Empress Catherine II (Catherine the Great). This resulted in the order to fit out a ship from Okhotsk that would return Kōdayū and two of his fellow sailors to Japan. The target of the mission was not only to return the Japanese to their homeland but also to establish commercial relations. In 1793, Daikokuya Kōdayū and his two companions arrived home (one died while waiting for reception from the Japanese authorities), where they were handed over to the authorities of the Matsumae clan who controlled Ezo. In response to the Russian offer, the Japanese authorities issued a trade license (shinpai) that permitted one Russian merchant ship to visit Nagasaki the next year. The expedition report presented by the Erik Laksman’s son and head of the expedition, Adam K. Laksman, disappointed the empress. The cautiousness of the Japanese officials and the lengthy period of the negotiations led the empress to conclude that Russia could not expect obvious benefits from trade with Japan. Daikokuya Kōdayū was taken to Edo where he appeared before the shogun Tokugawa Ienari in European dress. During the many interrogations Kōdayū recounted his adventures, and spoke about Russian geography, its administrative system, culture, and language. The shogun’s chief physician and rangaku scholar, Katsuragawa Hoshū, wrote several manuscripts based on this information, the most famous of which is Hokusa monryaku (Brief Description of Wanderings in the Northern Seas). It was written for official use only, and therefore was not published in Japan until the 1930s. It was translated into Russian in the 1970s, and remains a valuable fundamental resource about the visit of the Japanese to Russia in the 18th century (Katsuragawa 1978). Each of these cases represented milestones in the history of Russo-Japanese relations. Denbei made the first “Japanese visit” to Russia; the rescue of Sodza and Gonza led to the foundation of the first school of Japanese language in Europe; and the tale of Daikokuya Kōdayū resulted in the first Russian mission to Japan. 2

The First Half of the 19th Century: Developing Bilateral Relations

There were a number of events in the first half of the 19th century that would prove significant in the development of bilateral relations between Japan and Russia. Japan’s geographic location became a relevant economic factor that influenced the entry of Europeans into the country in general and the arrival of Russians in particular. It was no coincidence that the first ally and an ongoing

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intermediary in securing commercial contacts with Japan was the RussianAmerican Company Under the Supreme Patronage of His Imperial Majesty (generally seen as Russian-American Company, RAC; est. 1799). In return, the government tasked it with the delivery of rations cargo to the most remote colonies of the empire in Kamchatka and Alaska. Ration supplies to the eastern colonies of the empire was an acute problem since Kamchatka and Alaska are located in high-latitude regions where agriculture and cattle breeding are practically impossible. The delivery of rations via Siberia was not profitable, and the delivery of goods by sea from the European region of Russia via the Atlantic and the Pacific was too difficult. The best solution was to establish local commercial relations with China or Japan in order to negotiate for the goods produced by the company. This explains why the Russian-American Company never abandoned the hope of forming relations with Japan throughout the first half of the 19th century. It should be noted that the issue was partially resolved with the subsequent foundation in 1812 of a Russian colony located at Fort Ross in the territory of modern California, which was agriculturally fertile. Initially, however, there were great expectations regarding the contacts with East Asian countries. In 1802, the Russian-American Company presented its project to Emperor Alexander I, requesting funds for a circumnavigation expedition to establish commercial contacts with Japan and to expand existing contacts with China in an effort to improve supplies to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiĭ, Okhotsk, and the Alaskan settlements. The expedition leader was Ivan F. Kruzenshtern, and the ambassador leading the negotiations with the shogunal government was Nikolaĭ P. Rezanov. The occasion enabling contact was the return of several Japanese hyōryūmin who were lost in a storm and landed in Russia. While some preferred to stay, others decided to take the opportunity to return to Japan. The hyōryūmin were taken to St. Petersburg where they boarded one of the two expedition ships purchased in England (renamed Nadezhda and Neva) that in the summer of 1803 had left Kronstadt near St. Petersburg, the principal base of the Russian navy from the 17th to 19th century. In the summer of the following year, having crossed the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans for the first time in the history of the Russian navy, the Nadezhda reached Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiĭ after sailing to the Hawaiian Islands (Neva went from there to Alaska). Once repairs were made and the crew rested, it left for Japan and reached Nagasaki in September. Most of their time in Nagasaki was not spent in negotiations, rather on waiting for an answer from the Japanese authorities to the letter from the Russian emperor that was delivered to the Tokugawa shogunate immediately upon their arrival. During this period, Japanese officials made very detailed inquiries

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into Russian intentions and their trading places; they also interrogated the four returned Japanese sailors (Ōtsuki and Shimura 2009). It was only at the end of March 1805 that Rezanov finally met a representative of the shogunal government in Nagasaki. At this time, the mission was ordered to leave Nagasaki. Moreover, it was made clear that should any Japanese sailors be found in Russia, they were to be sent to Japan with the Dutch as mediators. The Russian sailors were provided with rations and other supplies for a two-month voyage, and in April the Nadezhda left Nagasaki. The extreme disappointment over the results of the mission is conveyed in surviving reports by its participants, primarily Kruzenshtern, and Russian historiographers have frequently pondered the reasons for the failure of Rezanov’s mission. This is seen in select sources, as seen in the negative opinion regarding trade prospects with Russia by Hayashi Jussai and Shibano Ritsuzan (Pozdneev 1909, vol. 2, 114–15) and the unwillingness on the part of the Dutch to assist the Russians in the negotiations (Novakovskiĭ 1918, vol. 1, 102). It is important to view these events against the historical backdrop of the period, taking into consideration the standpoint of the Japanese authorities and their attitudes toward foreigners. In the first half of 19th century, the United Kingdom and the United States likewise attempted to form relations with Japan through negotiations; their offers were likewise rejected. On occasion the Japanese response was more aggressive. For example, in 1837 the American ship Morrison, which departed from Macao, was not allowed to enter Uraga Bay in Edo and on its approach was fired upon. In 1846, the two ships under the command of the American Commodore James Biddle ventured another landing in Uraga Bay, but were prohibited from doing so by shogunal officials and forced to leave. The primary justification was the continued “isolationist” policy against Europeans. The underlying reason for Ambassador Rezanov’s extremely controversial, and seemingly ill-thought out, plan remains unclear; yet, the intent was clearly to establish trade with the Japanese. It should be noted that Rezanov proceeded with his plans without waiting for approval from St. Petersburg. Following its departure from Nagasaki, the Nadezhda set off for the Kamchatka coast and then to New Archangelsk (Novo-Arkhangel’sk). While in New Archangelsk he met Lieutenant Nikolaĭ A. Khvostov and Warrant Officer Gavriil I. Davydov, who had been hired by the Russian-American Company as the captains of the ships, Juno (Yunona) and Avos (Avos’), respectively. Shortly before his departure from Okhotsk for St. Petersburg, however, Rezanov sent Khvostov several letters, some of which contradicted his earlier correspondence (Rezanov carried on to St. Petersburg but died in 1807 en route in Krasnoyarsk). They reveal that Rezanov changed the expedition plan six times, introducing amendments to

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the previous instructions and then canceling them. This directly influenced the instructions Khvostov sent to Davydov as the expedition leader (Klimova 2011, 46). In effect, the actions of the captains were not only unauthorized by the government, they were chaotic and contradictory. Juno arrived in Aniva (Aniwa) Bay in October 1806. Rezanov had ordered the Russian sailors to destroy the houses of the Japanese fishermen living there and capture Japanese merchants from Matsumae. They were instructed, however, to be friendly toward the indigenous Ainu people (Klimova 2011, 41–42). While there, they also installed a flag and a notice board in one of the settlements with the inscription: “Russian Frigate Juno was here on the tenth day of October, the year 1806.” Khvostov then returned to Petropavlovsk. The next year the Juno and Avos carried out a similar expedition to the island of Iturup, where they raided Japanese settlements and also set up notice boards. One Japanese was sent to the government of Ezo with a letter stating that due to the rejection by the Japanese authorities of Rezanov’s mission Russia had been obliged to resort to force (Faĭnberg 1960, 101–2). Upon their return to Okhotsk, the captains were detained by the head of the port since their actions were seen as violations of expected behavior. By this time Rezanov had died in 1807 on his way to St. Petersburg, which denoted that the blame for the raids was shifted to the captains. They managed to escape from detention in Okhotsk to Yakutsk, and then to Irkutsk, where they asked for a pardon from the civil governor Nikolaĭ I. Treskin. In May 1808, Emperor Alexander I ordered them to be sent to St. Petersburg. The investigation of Khvostov and Davydov’s case was postponed, and in the meantime the captains were sent to fight in the war against Sweden. They returned to St. Petersburg the following autumn, by which time the admiralty had passed judgment on the case and found the them guilty of aggravated behavior. Their courageous military service in the war against Sweden was taken into consideration, however, and the emperor pardoned them. The lives of the two men ended in an ironic twist on October 14, 1809, when they drowned while crossing the Neva River in boats during stormy weather. The actions of Russian sailors in 1806/1807 on Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands heightened the fears of a possible Russian invasion (Klimova 2013, 252–54). The shogunate had only a vague idea of Sakhalin geography because the Japanese had only a few temporary settlements on the south of the island. For this reason, two Japanese explorers, Mamiya Rinzō and Matsuda Denjūrō, were sent to Sakhalin in 1808 to study the island’s northern and southern coastlines, later recording the expedition results (Klimov 2012a, 136–54; Mamiya 1990, 85–130). The raids by the crews of the Juno and Avos were one reason for Japanese hostility toward the Russians as played out in the case of Captain Vasiliĭ M.

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Golovnin. His ship Diana departed from Petropavlovsk in May 1811, with the task of describing and clarifying the location of some of the Kurile Islands, and in July they moored in southern Kunashir. Golovnin, several of his officers and sailors disembarked to procure food and water, offering to purchase rations from the Japanese there through the local Ainu residents. But the Japanese placed them under arrest. Without waiting for the captain to return to the ship, his second in command, Petr I. Rikord, departed for Okhotsk where he asked the authorities for assistance in securing the release of the captain and his crew members. In the meantime, the Russian captives and their interpreter, a Kurile man named Alekseĭ, were taken to Ezo under guard, first to the port of Hakodate and then to the administrative center of Matsumae. During their many months in captivity they were questioned in the presence of shogunal officials about Russia, Russian territories in the Far East, and the Russian government’s plans concerning Japan. In the summer of 1813, with the permission of the Emperor Alexander I and upon the order of Treskin, the governor of Irkutsk, Rikord attempted to obtain information about the men’s fate by delivering an official letter to the Japanese authorities. He went to Kunashir to negotiate their return, and working through an interpreter named Nakagawa Goroji he was told that the Russian sailors had died.4 After leaving the harbor, he stopped a Japanese vessel and learned from its captain, a one Takadaya Kahei, that Golovnin and the others were still alive and in detention in Matsumae. Takadaya advised Rikord to apologize for Khvostov’s actions in an official letter to the Japanese authorities, and indeed the letters sent to the governor of Ezo from Treskin and the head of the Port of Okhotsk, Mikhail I. Minitskiĭ, the next year were successful in securing the men’s release in October 1813 (Rikord 1816, 113–14). Rikord brought the official letter that apologized for the actions of Khvostov and Davydov. Golovnin and the others were taken to Rikord who was in Hakodate. Soon after his return in 1813, Captain Golovnin published his Memoirs of a Captivity in Japan During the Years 1811, 1812, and 1813 with Observations on the Country and the People in the Work of Naval Captain Golovnin (Zapiski flota kapitana Golovnina o priklyucheniyakh ego v plenu u yapontsev v 1811, 1812 i 1813 godakh, s ego priobshcheniem zamechaniĭ ego o Yaponskom gosudarstve i narode), and

4  A fisherman named “Gorozi” (Goroji) (or Renzaemon; in Rikord’s memoirs his name is misspelled as Leonzaimo) and his friend Saemon were captured on Iturup (Etorofu) Island during Khvostov’s raid in 1807. They stayed in Okhotsk for several years and made a number of failed attempts to escape. Rikord hired him as an interpreter during his years spent in Russia since he had a good command of the Russian language.

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it became a bestseller in Russia. Rikord’s recollections of Golovnin’s story and these appeared the same year (Golovnin 1816; Rikord 1816). Golovnin’s work was published in three volumes. The first two recounted his capture, detention, failed escape, and the betrayal of one of his shipmates, all elements reminiscent of a swashbuckling adventure tale. The action-packed story, peppered with a number of exotic sketches of life in an unknown land, was hugely popular. But the Memoirs are more than just a detailed, embellished fictionalized story of the Russian sailors’ exploits in Japanese captivity. The third volume conveyed information to the best of the author’s knowledge on the administrative system of Japan, its geography, everyday life, and religion as well as the attitude of the Japanese toward the Russians (Golovnin 1816). Contacts with Japan declined following the release of Golovnin’s story, but the relations between the two countries eventually settled on a stance of neutrality that satisfied all the involved parties. The Russian-American Company continued, unsuccessfully, to establish commercial contacts. Its ships arrived on the island of Iturup (Etorofu) in 1814, 1836, 1843, 1844, and 1845, delivering new groups of Japanese sailors with requests for commercial relations (Faĭnberg 1960, 112–17). Up to the mid-19th century, the lack of a clear border between the two countries caused little concern to either government since it satisfied both. Russia’s geopolitical interests were focused on Europe and the Middle East while Japan at this time did not aspire to form any international relations. In fact, China, Korea, and Japan were primarily interested in preserving peace in the region, and European countries with limited interests in them (Russia and the Netherlands) desired the same. The countries that took an opposite, more aggressive stance toward the Far East, including military intrusion, were the United Kingdom and later the United States. The mid-19th century, therefore, corresponded to a period of active colonialization by Western countries in the Far East and witnessed the breaking down of isolationist policies, first of China and then of Japan. Russia’s geographic proximity to the countries of the Far East not only forced its government to participate in securing an economic foothold in that region as other European states had, but it also gave rise to the more pressing situation for Russia regarding the division of territory with its Far Eastern neighbors. During the reign of Emperor Nicholas I, the Russian government had a greater interest in European issues, with its “Asian” interests centered on the Middle East and its ongoing historical volleying with the Ottoman empire, which was receiving growing support from the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, some representatives of the Russian military and the political elite advocated an active policy in the Far East (Kozhevnikov 1997, 51–54), particularly in light of the encroachment of British influence, British aggression toward China

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during the First Opium War (1839–1842), and the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 that marked the beginning of British economic expansion into East Asia. The Nanking treaty, for example, led to the opening of five Chinese ports to the British who enjoyed unhampered trade with minimum custom fees (Grimm 1927, 45–47). From the late 1830s, the United States and the United Kingdom made increasing attempts to lift Japan’s curtain of isolation. In the 1840s, British and American ships were arriving in Japan around once every two years with requests to establish commercial relations. At the same time, a number of Russian military figures, most notably naval officers, and politicians began to push the government to take more aggressive action in the region in order to oppose the activity of other Western countries. Emperor Nicholas I and Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Nessel’rode were against this until 1852. The news that the United States was preparing to send a mission to Japan prompted them to change their views, as they realized that it would be in Russia’s best interest to send its own mission to Japan. Already in 1843, Vice Admiral Evfimiĭ V. Putyatin had submitted a memo on the need for further in-depth exploration of the Russian Far East and organized an expedition in a renewed effort to form relations with Japan. Minister Nessel’rode opposed this idea, however, fearing that relations with the United Kingdom could be exacerbated if Russia made further advances into China. Putyatin’s project, which had already been granted funding, was ultimately rejected. In 1844, Kruzenshtern proposed another project concerning Japan; this was declined as was a similar project by Rikord, who by this time was now an admiral (Kozhevnikov 1997, 52–53). It is clear that the main advocates behind the idea of contact with Japan were high-ranking naval officers. Not surprisingly, Nikolaĭ N. Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ (he was granted the title “Count” in 1858), who was appointed the governor of East Siberia in 1849, was interested in the development of a Far Eastern policy due to the region’s proximity to China and Japan. During his service as governor, he made a concerted effort to demonstrate Russia’s involvement in the region. Western countries revitalized their efforts to have Japan open its borders in the 1850s. Following the dismantling of China’s isolationist policy a decade earlier in the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, their attention now turned to Japan. In 1852, the press published reports of a new American expedition to Japan led by Commodore Matthew Perry. That same year, the Russian government set up the Special Committee for the Far East Policy as its head, and it recommended dispatching a mission to Japan (Putyatin was appointed the head of the mission). It is noteworthy that Philipp Franz von Siebold, a German-born

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doctor and scientist who had spent several years in Japan working for the Dutch East India Company, aided with the preparations for this mission. A respected authority on Japan, his advice was frequently sought after by diplomats; he arrived in Russia in early 1853 upon the invitation of Minister Nessel’rode. Even though Putyatin had already departed by this time, amendments were made to the original brief and forwarded to him. The amendments, based in part on the information obtained from consultations with Von Siebold, also concerned issues of delimitation, in this case the demarcation of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. It stated that: “We could be content with the most southern of the Kurile Islands belonging to Russia, which is the island of Urup; we could demark it as the last point of Russian territory, so that, from our side, the southern edge of the island was (as it actually is) the border with Japan, and from the Japanese side the northern edge of the island would be so” (Sarkisov and Cherevko 1991). Putyatin’s flagship, the frigate Pallada, departed Kronstadt in October 1852 and arrived in Nagasaki in August 1853 with the aim of furthering negotiations. This was soon after the initial visit of Commodore Perry’s fleet in Edo. Unlike Commodore Perry, however, who forced the Tokugawa shogunate to sign the Treaty of Kanagawa the following year by threatening military intervention, Putyatin employed diplomatic means in his dealings with the Japanese (the expedition lasted three years). In addition to diplomatic negotiations, the expedition’s ships were also engaged in the exploration of Sakhalin and the coast of the Primor’e territory. The negotiations finished in Shimoda in 1855—Putyatin left Japan three times during this 1853–1855 period—but during the final stage of the negotiations in December 1854, Shimoda was struck by an earthquake and tsunami. The frigate Diana, by this time Putyatin’s flagship, was seriously damaged. It was decided to take the ship to the bay near Heda village for repairs, but the ship sank en route in January 1855. As the Japanese were interested in acquiring the latest skills in keel shipbuilding that had been denied them during the country’s isolation, the Japanese authorities permitted Russian sailors and Japanese peasants to build a new small schooner named Heda (Nakamura 1983, 169–82). The construction of the schooner Heda coincided with the signing of the long-awaited Treaty of Shimoda on January 26 (February 7), 1855, which established diplomatic relations between the two countries: the Russian-Japanese border was demarcated as between the Urup and Iturup islands while the island of Sakhalin would remain undivided. In addition, the three Japanese ports of Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Shimoda were opened to Russian ships, and a Russian council was founded in Hakodate (Grimm 1927, 53–54). Shortly after

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the signing of the treaty, the Russian mission left Japan in several groups since the Heda could not accommodate everyone. The treaty was ratified by both parties, marking a great achievement in Russian diplomacy, and for his role Putyatin was bestowed with the title of Count. It would take another twenty years, however, to resolve the territorial issue regarding Sakhalin. It was nonetheless the first milestone in the history of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the Russian attempts for over half a century to set up relations with Japan finally bore fruit. The Russian consulate in Hakodate opened in 1858, following the arrival of the Russian consul Iosif A. Goshkevich on the clipper ship Dzhigit. Unlike the missions of other countries, Russia’s was removed from any political center— that is, Kyoto (the imperial capital) and Edo (the administrative bakufu capital). The choice to situate the Russian consulate in remote Hakodate was not random. The main reason for its location there was its geographic proximity to Russia’s Far Eastern borders, which enabled the exploration of that region as the infrastructure of the Primor’e territory was being developed; the heart of this region was the former military post that would come to be known as Vladivostok. The expansion of Vladivostok into a port city would take years, and therefore during the 1860s and 1870s Russian military ships often anchored at Hakodate in order to undertake ship repair, replenish provisions, and so forth. On July 29, 1858, the United States concluded the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. The agreements concluded between Japan and Western nations at this time had provisions for a most favored nation status, and other countries, including Russia, soon followed suit with similar agreements. Putyatin had negotiations, for example, that resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (also known as the Treaty of Edo) on August 7 (August 19), 1858. The treaty opened up several more ports to the Russian navy: Kanagawa and Hyōgo, and somewhat later Edo and Osaka. Russia had the right to appoint its consuls in all ports open for commerce, and Russian citizens in Japan enjoyed the rights of extraterritoriality. The treaty also stipulated the customs fees applicable to Russian goods (Faĭnberg 1960, 184). To a great extent, the Russian treaty, which was valid until 1895, repeated the conditions of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. During the late Edo period or bakumatsu (1853–1868), however, the volume of Russia’s trade with Japan was comparatively small and constituted only 3 percent of all Japanese imports (Faĭnberg 1960, 185). The remoteness from the traditional centers of Russian industry and the lack of good infrastructure in Siberia increased the prices upon delivery to Japan.

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The Middle to Late 19th Century: a Period of Consolidation

The above demonstrates that in the middle to late 19th century Russia’s economic interests in the Far East paled in significance to any political concerns, most notably the issue regarding borders. And the most complicated question in bilateral relations was the status of Sakhalin. Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ had negotiations in Edo in 1859 and, though unsuccessful, in 1862 the shogunal mission visited St. Petersburg to negotiate with Alexander II on their way from Europe. Nationals from both nations continued to live on (and explore) the island, which caused ongoing conflict until 1867 when a temporary agreement concerning Sakhalin matter was issued. As part of the agreement the Russians offered to create a boundary line along the La Pérouse Strait (also known as Sōya Strait) with the island remaining in Russian hands, to retain the Japanese fishing rights on Sakhalin, and to establish temporary regulations for the Russians and Japanese until a compromise could be finalized. The second part of the agreement accepted the demands of the Japanese; however, the Japanese declined the Russian provisions except for the temporary regulations that included the free travel of Russians and the Japanese on the island and granted permission for both nations to pursue their respective trades (Faĭnberg 1960, 216). Nevertheless, the governance of Sakhalin proved troublesome for the Japanese and Russian administrations. The situation was exacerbated further when Emperor Meiji (r. 1867–1912) come to the throne following a restoration of imperial power, and the country entered an era of political “modernization.” The Russian authorities eventually built a military post in Aniva Bay and expanded their military commitment to Sakhalin; the island was later used for exiled convicts transported to the island. Japan, in its turn, created the Colonization Bureau (Kaitakushi) in 1869 and sent around two hundred migrant Japanese to the island. In 1874, Admiral Enomoto Takeaki was appointed the Japanese envoy in Russia, and he was authorized to offer the Kurile Islands to the Russians in exchange for Sakhalin. This option satisfied both parties and led to the signing of the Treaty of St. Petersburg on April 25 (May 7), 1875 (the Japanese signatory was Enomoto and for Russia, the Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr M. Gorchakov). The treaty stipulated that Japan waive its rights to Sakhalin and in return receive the entire group of the Kurile Islands up to Kamchatka. Russia had to compensate the Japanese for their buildings on the island, and the residents could stay but would have to obey Russian law. The Russians allowed the Japanese to carry on duty-free trade in the port of Korsakov for ten years (Sbornik pogranichnykh dogovorov 1891, 292–96). The Treaty of St. Petersburg represented a long-term

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compromise solution that met the demands of the two parties. On the one hand, it was the culmination of two decades of discussions regarding the issue of boundaries, and on the other, it was a foundational document that ensured stable coexistence between Russia and Japan for the next twenty years. The mid-19th century marked a new phase in Russo-Japanese relations that was characterized by a form of diplomacy that was now determined by rules set out by Western powers. This also extended to how Russian-Japanese relations from this period onward were conducted, which similarly witnessed a shift in focus from the economical to the geopolitical. Beginning in 1853, new circumstances meant that both Russia and Japan were now in a position that required a change in their respective international policies. And these circumstances were being dictated by those countries adapting more aggressive policies in the region, principally the United Kingdom and the United States. While other nations were taking advantage of the unequal treaties they had concluded, only Russia demonstrated its involvement through diplomatic channels rather than claim any intentions to influence Japanese policy. Russia did seek to secure the status of a major world power on par with the United Kingdom and the United States in their dealings with Japan—the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) and the Treaty of Edo (1858) laid the groundwork for achieving this goal. In the 1850s, Russia was experiencing one of the most turbulent periods in its history. The last years of Nicholas I’s reign were overshadowed by the diplomatic (Paris Treaty, 1856) failure in the country’s defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856). Efforts were made during the reign of Nicholas’s successor Alexander II to repair the resultant fallout, and moreover, the domestic situation in Russia demanded drastic reformation. The policies regarding Europe and the Middle East were also prioritized so as to re-exert authority of the Russian empire there. All of this complicated Russia’s presence in the Far East, and this explains why the country often had to make concessions and compromises in its dealing with that region. 4 Conclusion The 1850s and 1870s coincided with a period when Russia’s borders and the redivision of its territories were scrutinized. Different from Western diplomatic practice, the task of Russian diplomacy in the Far East also included the issue of the territorial demarcation of neighboring states. The following treaties, concluded by Russia with Japan, China, and the United States, shaped the empire’s borders in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: the Treaty of

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Shimoda between Russia and Japan (1855); the treaties of Aigun (1858), Tianjin (Tientsin, 1858) and the (First) Convention of Peking [Beijing] (1860) between Russia, China, France and the United States; the Alaska Purchase Treaty (1867); and the Treaty of St. Petersburg between Russia and Japan (1875). The Russian empire acquired new regions (Primor’e territories), divided the island territories of the Sea of Okhotsk with Japan, and lost its territories in America. Japan was facing its own challenges at this time. From the 1850 to 1870s its international position was tested due to a number of circumstances. The conclusion of the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854 was the beginning of a new era as the country embarked on political and social modernization. During the late Edo period and throughout most of the Meiji period (1868–1912) Japan’s main aim vis-à-vis its international relations (and policy) was the abolishment of the unequal agreements concluded with Western nations. The natural consequence of this process of modernization, one that adopted elements from Europe and the United States, was a new objective in its international policy— that is, to assume a dominant place in the region. Like a number of European countries Japan did an unprecedented turn with its desire to create a colonial empire, and this marked the first time in Japan’s history that it implemented an active, and even aggressive, international policy. The diplomatic mission led by Iwakura Tomomi went to Europe and America in 1872 with the brief to negotiate the abolishment of unequal agreements, but it was unsuccessful. In this light, the conclusion of the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875 must have represented a great achievement for the Japanese since it is regarded as the first equal agreement with a Western nation. The formal recognition of this equality was important to the nascent Meiji government, which had sought the end of unequal agreements and to achieve parity with European countries. The delimitation of colonial territories with a European country as well as the winning of some economic preferences was, at least on paper, a great boost for Japan. Together these established a precedent for the future negotiations by the Japanese government with other Western countries. And as a result of this compromise, these two colonial empires coexisted in peace until the end of the 19th century. Acknowledgments This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Grant No. 19-18-00017).

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Klimov, Artem Vadimovich. 2010. “Hokuidan. Rasskazy o severnykh Ėdzo” [Hokuidan. Tales of Northern Ezo]. In Vol. XXXII, Orientalia et Classica. Trudy Instituta vostochnykh kul’tur I antichnosti [Works of the Institute for Oriental and Classical Studies], 258–79. Moscow: Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ gumanitarnyĭ universitet (Russian State University for the Humanities). Klimov, Artem Vadimovich. 2012a. “Ostrov Sakhalin v dnevnikovykh zapisyakh Matsuda Denjūrō” [Sakhalin Island in the Diaries of Matsuda Denjūrō]. Voprosy yaponovedeniya [Issues of Japanology] 1, no. 4 of Yaponovedenie segodnya (ob­ shchestvo, kul’tura, yazyk) [Japanology Today (Society, Culture, Language)], 136–54. Klimov, Artem Vadimovich. 2012b. Pervye russkie v Yaponii. Ėkspeditsiya M. P. Shpanberga [The First Russians in Japan. Expedition of M. P. Shpanberg]. In SanktPeterburg-Yaponiya: XVIII–XXI VV [St. Petersburg- Japan: 18th–21st Centuries], 21–38. St. Petersburg: Dmitriĭ Bulanin. Klimova, Ol’ga Vadimovna. 2010. Pervaya ėkspeditsiya N. A. Khvostova na Sakhalin v 1806 g. po inserrossiĭskim I yaponskim istochnikam [The First Sakhalin Expedition of N. A. Khvostov in Russian and Japanese Sources]. In Vol. XXXIII, Strany I narody Vostoka [Countries and Nations of the East], 176–89. St. Petersburg: Institut vostochnykh rukopise Rossi sko Akademi Nauk (Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences). Klimova, Ol’ga Vadimovna. 2011. “Podgotovka ėkspeditsii Khvostova na Sakhalin v 1806 g. Analiz instruktsiĭ Rezanova Khvostovu I Khvostova Davydovu” [Preparation of Khvostov’s Sakhalin Expedition in 1806. Analysis of Instructions Given by Rezanov to Khvostov and by Khvostov to Davydov]. In Elaginskie chteniya 5 [Elagin’s Readings 5], 35–50. St. Petersburg: Ostrov. Klimova, Ol’ga Vadimovna. 2013. “Razmyshleniya (vslukh) o chuzhestrannykh korablyakh” kak istochnik, opisyvayushchiĭ reaktsiyu Yaponii na ėkspeditsiyu Khvostova I Davydovai na Sakhalin 1806–1807 gg. [“Thoughts (Aloud) about Foreign Ships” as a Source Describing the Reaction of the Japanese to the Sakhalin Expedition of Khvostov and Davydov in 1806–1807]. In Vol. LI, Orientalia et Classica. Trudy Instituta vostochnykh kul’tur I antichnosti [Works of the Institute for Oriental and Classical Studies], 252–64. Moscow: Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ gumanitarnyĭ universitet (Russian State University for the Humanities). Kozhevnikov, Vladimir Vasil’evich. 1997. Rossiĭsko-yaponskie otnosheniyav XVIII–XIX vv. [Russo-Japanese Relations in the 18th–19th Centuries]. Vladivostok: Dal’nauka. Leshchenko, Nelli Fedorovna. 2010. Yaponiya v ėpokhu Tokugava [Japan in the Tokugawa Period]. Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniya Rossiĭskoĭ Akademii Nauk (Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences). Malevinskaya, Marina Evgen’evna, Tat’yana Sergeevna Fedorova, Sergeĭ Vladimirovich Chernyavskiĭ, and Hoya Tōru, eds. 2011. Istoriya Yaponii v dokumentakh Rossiĭskogo

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gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Voenno-morskogo flota [History of Japan in the Documents of the Russian State Naval Archives]. St. Petersburg: Giperion. [Mamiya Rinzō]. 1990. “Opisanie severnogo Ėdzo” [Description of Northern Ezo]. In Obshchestvo izucheniya Sakhalina I Kuril’skikh ostrovov. Kraevedcheskiĭ byulleten’ [Society for the Study of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Regional Studies Bulletin], no. 2: 85–130. Nakamura, Shintarō. 1983. Yapontsy I russkie. Iz ist sporii kontaktov [The Japanese and Russians. The History of Contacts]. Moscow: Progress. Novakovskiĭ, S. I. 1918. Yaponiya I Rossiya [Japan and Russia]. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Vostok. Ōtsuki, Gentaku, and Shimura Hiroyuki. 2009. Kankai ibun. Udivitel’nye svedeniya ob okruzhayushchikh [zemlyu] moryakh [Kankai ibun. Strange Tales from Surrounding Seas]. St. Petersburg: Giperion. Pirling, Pavel Osipovich. 1913. “Nikolaĭ Melo, ‘Gishpanskoĭi zemli’ chernets” [Nikolaĭ (Nicholas) Melo, a Monk from the Spanish Lands], 69–94. In Pirling P. Istoricheskie stat’ ii zamet ki [Historical Articles and Notes], 69–94. St. Petersburg: Izdaniya Ya. Bashmakova i Ko (Bashmakov & Co.). Pozdneev, Dmitriĭ Matveevich. 1909. Materialy po istorii Severnoĭ Yaponii I ee otnoshe­ niyu k materiku Azii I Rossii [Materials on the History of Northern Japan and Its Attitudes to the Asian Continent and Russia]. 2 vols. Yokohama: Tipografiya Zh. Glyuk—Yamasita (G. Gluck-Yamashita Typography). [Rikord, Petr Ivanovich]. 1816. Zapiski flota kapitana Rikorda o plavanii ego k yaponskim beregam v 1812 i 1813 godakh I snosheniyakh s yapontsami [An Account of the Voyages of the Coasts of Japan in 1812 and 1813 and of the Negotiations with the Japanese for the Release of Its Author and His Companions by Captain Rikord]. St. Petersburg: (publisher unknown). Sarkisov, Konstantin Oganezovich, and Kirill Evgen’evich Cherevko. 1991. “Putyatinu bylo legche provesti granitsu mezhdu Rossieĭ i Yaponieĭ. Neizvestnye ranee istoricheskie dokumenty o spornykh ostrovakh Yuzhno-Kuril’sko gryady.” [It was Easier for Putyatin to Delimit Russia and Japan. Unknown Historical Documents on the Disputed Southern Kuriles]. Izvestiya, October 4. Sbornik dogovorov I diplomaticheskikh dokumentov po delam Dal’nego Vostoka: 1895– 1905 gg. [Collection of Treaties and Diplomatic Documents on the Far East Issues: 1895–1905]. 1908. St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo inostrannykh del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Sbornik pogranichnykh dogovorov, zaklyuchennykh Rossieĭ s sosednimi gosudarstvami [Collection of Boundary Treaties Concluded by Russia with Neighboring States]. 1891. St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo inostrannykh del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Shchepkin, Vasiliĭ Vladimirovich. 2011. Vospriyatie sopredel’nykh stran v Yaponii XVIII v. na material traktata Hayashi Shihei “Sangokutsūran” [Japanese Perception of Bordering Countries in the XVIII Century Based on “Sangokutsūran” by Hayashi Shihei]. Voprosy filosofii, no. 7: 174–79. - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Sokolov, Aleksandr Rostislavovich, ed. 2010. Istoriya Yaponii v dokumentakh Rossiĭskogo gosudarstvennogo istoricheskogo arkhiva [History of Japan in the Documents of the Russian State Historical Archives]. St. Petersburg: Giperion.



Japanese Sources



English Sources

Akizuki Toshiyuki. 1994. Nichiro kankei to Saharintō bakumatsu Meiji shonen no ryōdo mondai [Russo-Japanese Relations and Sakhalin Island. Territorial Problem in the Bakumatsu and the Early Meiji]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. Ikuta Michiko. 2008. Gaikō girei kara mita bakumatsu bunka kōryūshi. Okareta sōgo imēji [History of Russo-Japanese Cultural Relations in the Bakumatsu Period from the Perspective of Diplomatic Ritual: Mutual Images and Representations in Drawings]. Tokyo: Mineruba Shobō. Ikuta Michiko. 2010. “Girei kara miru kinsei kōki no Nichiro kōshō. Nihon keikai chitsujō kara seiyōkei kaichitsujō e mata kinsei kara kindai e” [Russo-Japanese Relations of the 18th to 19th Centuries from the Perspective of Diplomatic Ritual: The Transition of Japan from the Sino-centric System of International Relations to the Western System, or from the Late Middle Ages to Modern Times]. Higashi Ajia kindaishi, no. 13: 92–121. Nakamura Yoshikazu. 1980. “Mosucobia no Nihonjin” [Japanese in Moscovia]. Slavic Studies, no. 26: 1–30. Satō Makoto, Takano Toshihiko, Toriumi Yasushi, and Gomi Fumihiko. 2008. Nihon shi no kenkyū [Japanese History Research]. Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha. Wada Haruki. 1991. Kaikoku Nichiro kokkyō kōshō [Opening of Japan: Russo-Japanese Boundary Negotiations]. Tokyo: NHK.

Arano, Yasunori. 2005. “The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order.” International Journal of Asian Studies, no. 2 (July): 185–216. Howell, David L. 1998. “Territoriality and Collective Identity in Tokugawa Japan.” Daedalus 127, no. 3: 105–32. Kazui, Tashiro. 1982. “Foreign Relations During the Edo Period: Sakoku Reexamined.” Journal of Japanese Studies 8, no. 2 (Summer): 283–306. Lensen, George Alexander. 1959. The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697–1875. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Toby, Ronald P. 1977. “Reopening the Question of Sakoku: Diplomacy in the Legitimization of the Tokugawa Bakufu.” Journal of Japanese Studies 3, no. 2: 323–63.

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part 2

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The Diplomatic Dimension of the Russo-Japanese War: the Portsmouth Conference and Its Aftermath Tosh Minohara Western powers, which had successfully industrialized and modernized much earlier than Asia, began to unleash their imperialistic fury upon the region from the mid-19th century onward.1 By the late 1900s, the imperial powers of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia had successfully carved out most of East Asia, excluding Japan, into their respective spheres of influence.2 A similar fate would have certainly befallen Japan had it not made the decision to depart from its long-standing “closed door” (sakoku) policy and instead embark on a path of emulating and learning from the West. This new path was undoubtedly fraught with new challenges and difficulties, particularly since Japan had to set forth on this journey with the shackles of the so-called “unequal treaties”—extraterritoriality and the lack of tariff autonomy—as a result of being a latecomer to the global stage. Nonetheless, it can be said that Japan was largely successful in its quest of not only facing, but also overcoming, the daunting challenges posed by the extremely rapid modernization and transformation of both nation and society. As a result, Japan was effective in avoiding the more serious aspects of Western imperialism, thereby allowing it to maintain its independence, unlike most of Asia. These tremendous efforts alone were not sufficient to assure Japan’s continued existence as a sovereign state. The struggle for primacy in East Asia was being actively contested among the European powers, but it was Russia that possessed the greatest expansionist momentum. This was due to the fact that during the late 19th century Russia had attempted to expand southward toward the Mediterranean through the Balkans and Crimea. When this ambition collapsed with its defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856), Russia next advanced into Afghanistan, which led to another confrontation with the United Kingdom. Hemmed in on the West, Russia had nowhere to go but eastward, and by the end of the century it demonstrated a far greater interest 1  This chapter is a vastly revised and expanded version of my essay, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Transformation of US-Japan Relations: Examining the Geopolitical Ramifications,” Japanese Journal of American Studies 27 (2016): 45–68. 2  The Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal had also maintained spheres of influence at one time but by the 19th century their influence powers had declined significantly. See Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_004

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in the affairs of East Asia. Russia’s proximity to the region incentivized it to become the most expansionist force there. The true nature of Russian ambition clearly manifested itself in May 1891 with the construction of the TransSiberian Railway, which provided it with the impetus and the means to push its influence further eastward. From the Japanese perspective, this Russian move was extremely alarming because it posed a clear and present danger to its own national security. Tokyo was well aware that Russian expansion would vastly alter the geostrategic significance of the Korean Peninsula because it would now function as a crucial buffer zone against any further Russian growth in the East. Naturally, Japan began to view Russia as the greatest threat to its national security (see Kim 2005, 619–50). In hindsight, Japan’s intense desire to control the Korean Peninsula—the so-called “sharp dagger” (rijin) poised to strike the heart of Japan—motivated its launch of a preemptive strike against Qing China that led to the first SinoJapanese War of 1894–1895. This was the critical first phase in a turn of events that would eventually trigger a major regional power shift in East Asia; in essence, the outcome of the conflict was the catalyst for this geopolitical transformation (see Shinobu 1970). And as a direct outcome of its decisive defeat of China, Japan not only freed Korea from Chinese subjugation but simultaneously secured a foothold on the peninsula as well. Such drastic change to the status quo in international relations can often precipitate a backlash. It was not long, therefore, before Japan faced a national crisis when Russia, Germany, and France joined together—the so-called Triple Intervention—to threaten Japan with military action if it did not relinquish the recently acquired territories on the Liaodong Peninsula that had been ceded to Japan by the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty of 1895 that concluded the war with China. Japan’s initial response was to attempt to counter this hostile move by forming its own coalition in cooperation with other European powers. Yet when no nation came to Japan’s aid it had no choice but to succumb to Russian demands under the national slogan “gashin shōtan” (enduring hardship now for the sake of revenge later). Adding to Japanese angst was that the relinquished possession was later leased to Russia in direct contravention of the initial bilateral agreement. Furthermore, Russia audaciously obtained the right to construct a railway (Chinese Eastern Railway, CER) in 1896 through a secret treaty with China. Then, just two years later, Russia leased Port Arthur (Lushunkou) and Dairen (C: Dalian) at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula while also securing the right to construct a new southern branch line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Naturally, Tokyo was alarmed by these mounting aggressive maneuvers by Russia, which now posed a clear threat to Japan’s national interests.

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At the same time, the traumatic experience of the Triple Intervention and the events that transpired in the aftermath of this incident left an indelible mark upon the Japanese national psyche. Japan’s leaders were now forced to acknowledge the harsh reality of the country’s military vulnerability. They also learned the lesson of the importance of national power on the stage of international relations. In other words, in the fiercely competitive environment, Japan needed to become much stronger economically and militarily; yet, it also had to proceed more prudently so that it did not threaten the interests of the European powers. This humiliating experience instilled a new sense of urgency in the Meiji government’s national goal toward building a “wealthy nation, strong military” ( fukoku kyōhei). Russia, in the meantime, increased the pace of expansion and moved quickly to secure deep-water ports that would not freeze even during the coldest periods of winter. Since Port Arthur partially froze in 1899, the search for an ice-free port was undertaken with a new sense of urgency. Deep-water ports that were accessible all year round were therefore an essential part of Russia’s quest to control the adjacent sea-lanes as steam ships of the time could not travel long distances without access to coaling stations. The maintenance of a string of coaling stations south of the Russian border thus became inseparable from the preservation of Russian national interests. For Japan, however, this increased it wariness toward Russian intentions and ambitions. Tokyo’s initial realpolitik reaction was to accommodate Russian expansion in southern Manchuria as a way to mitigate direct military confrontation with its powerful neighbor. This was the prevailing mood in Japan when it agreed to the terms of the Komura–Weber Memorandum with Russia in May 1896. The Yamagata– Lobanov Agreement further augmented the memorandum in the following month. The objective of these diplomatic arrangements was ostensibly to maintain an independent Korea, although in actuality it was to ensure that neither side could obtain a firm foothold on the peninsula. During the negotiations of the latter agreement, Japan proposed to Russia the idea of drawing a line of demarcation across the 39th parallel as way to diffuse the mounting tensions between the two nations. But an obstinate Russia, undoubtedly viewing Japan as a weaker, inferior power, rejected outright such a compromise. St. Petersburg was confident that it had the upper hand in the negotiations and thus had no need to entertain such a compromise. The international political environment seldom, if ever, remains static. A mere two years elapsed when Russia was forced to reconsider its earlier hardline posture. Russia, being much more deeply entangled in the affairs of

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Manchuria, now realized the need to reevaluate its hitherto uncompromising stance toward Japan. In this way, Russia began to contemplate acquiescing to some form of agreement regarding the future status of Korea. This new position manifested itself in the 1898 Nishi–Rosen agreement that acknowledged Japan’s dominant commercial position on the peninsula. This abrupt policy reversal by St. Petersburg stirred Japan’s leaders into seeking a new agreement with Russia that would essentially redraw the existing spheres of influence. It was Tokyo’s desire that in exchange for allowing Russia to possess a superior position in Manchuria, it would be given the same in Korea. Unfortunately for Tokyo, this plan did not progress as hoped due to Russia’s unwillingness to make any further concessions to a second-rate power. Furthermore, Russia reneged on a previous agreement to withdraw its remaining troops from Manchuria once the Boxer Rebellion had been quelled in 1901. It soon became apparent that Russia had designs on Korea when it demanded the lease of Yongampo in present-day North Korea. Such actions by Russia threatening the status quo— that is, a southward expansion—forced Japan’s leaders into a quandary. The first instinct was to embrace the US Open Door Policy as a means of securing diplomatic support from both the United States and the United Kingdom. This action was not a permanent solution. Two distinct lines of thinking thus emerged regarding the crucial political debate over what kind of foreign policy Japan should pursue with an increasingly recalcitrant Russia (see Itō 2000; Teramoto 1999). The first group, supported by the Itō Hirobumi-Yamagata Aritomo genrō (elder statesmen) camp, believed that any action that had the potential of instigating war with such a large, formidable nation would risk endangering Japan’s very existence. Considering Japan’s limited military and economic strength, it was not only prudent but logical that Japan continue its policy of appeasing Russia while attempting to resolve the issues over Manchuria and Korea through diplomacy. The second group comprised a younger cohort of Japanese statesmen led by the Katsura Tarō-Komura Jutarō camp; they advocated a much stronger approach toward Russia. This group determined that war with Russia was inevitable, and while they did not view Russian occupation of Manchuria as a casus belli per se, they had no hesitation in resorting to war as a way to counter Russian expansion into the Korean Peninsula. In their minds, the geostrategic importance of the peninsula seen within the context of Japanese national security made it sine qua non that Russian was not allowed to secure a foothold there. This hardline position was given a further boost with the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 30, 1902—Japan’s first formal military alliance—which now gave it a formidable ally (for an overview of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, see Kurobane 1966). Russia’s unabated appetite for

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expansion into East Asia threatened the United Kingdom to the point that it was forced to end its long-standing policy of “splendid isolation.” This strategic move by the United Kingdom led to a major shift in the regional power paradigm, which in turn allowed Japan’s decision-makers to consider seriously a military option as a way to deal with an aggressive Russia. Faced with the collapse of its final attempt to reach a diplomatic solution during the February 1904 negotiations between the Japanese Foreign Minister Komura and the Russian minister Roman R. Rosen, Tokyo now made a decisive turn and actively pursued the Katsura–Komura line. Having convinced the genrō of the necessity of this policy change during the conference at Ogikubo, the final impediment that remained in the path to war with Russia was effectively eliminated. Dark skies now loomed over the horizon; what was now at stake was the control of the Korean Peninsula. It was certainly apparent by this time that the final outcome would drastically alter Japan’s own destiny, and it was against this backdrop that the two nations finally collided at Port Arthur in February 1904. 1

The Spinning Wheels of Diplomacy

From the outset of the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese military scored several stunning victories on the battlefield, albeit at an enormous cost of human life.3 On the one hand, Japanese leaders were fully cognizant that a prolonged war of attrition would be to their disadvantage. Therefore, in the aftermath of the decisive Battle of Mukden in February–March 1905, genrō Yamagata Aritomo called for a reassessment of Japan’s political and military strategy. He urged both Katsura and Komura to consider in earnest the taking of steps to end hostilities. On the other hand, the Russian emperor Nicholas II still had not abandoned the hope of victory; he was betting on a reversal of fortune with his powerful Baltic fleet. If this formidable flotilla were to deliver a crushing blow to the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), then the tide of war could turn decisively against Japan since it would prevent the Japanese military from resupplying its troops in Manchuria. 3  For a detailed account of the military dimension of the war, which this beyond the scope of this essay, see the classic study by Tani Toshio, Kimitsu Nichiro senshi (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 2004). A thorough examination of the prelude to the war can be found in Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London: Longman, 1985). The standard work on the subject from a Japanese perspective is Shinobu Seizaburō and Nakayama Jiichi, Nichiro sensōshi no kenkyū (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shinsha, 1959).

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Japan faced other dangers as well. Despite a string of key victories against Russia on the battlefield, Japan was nearing its limits both in terms of material and financial resources. The nation’s ability to sustain the conflict was being severely strained, even though this fact was concealed from the public (for a detailed assessment of Japan’s dire situation, see Furuya 1966, 161–65). Munition plants across Japan were working around the clock but they were far from satisfying the enormous demands of the war effort. Faced with this harsh reality, Japanese leaders quickly realized that ending the ongoing conflict was the only realistic choice. In order to end the war on terms that were favorable to Japan, however, a final decisive blow was necessary to crush the hopes of the emperor who still clung to the possibility of a turnaround victory. The ultimate naval showdown took place on May 27, 1905, in the Tsushima Straits in the Sea of Japan. As a resounding Japanese victory at sea was the prerequisite for peace, the fate of the nation now rested squarely on the shoulders of the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō. On May 28, Japan’s quest to end the war finally gained the much-needed momentum. With the cessation of Japanese naval guns, the emperor’s once mighty fleet had either been sunk, captured, or had fled. It was apparent to all that the Japanese fleet had completely annihilated the Baltic fleet. On this day it was not only Russian vessels that sank but also vanishing into the abyss was the emperor’s hope of victory (for a thorough account of the naval dimension, see Ōe 1999, 169–78). Nicholas II now had little choice but to concede defeat and seek peace with the Japanese. In this way, the military phase of the war was quickly approaching an end, and diplomats seated around the negotiating table would contest the next crucial phase. And undoubtedly victory in the final diplomatic phase would enable Japan to enjoy the fruits of the war. Of course, the wheels of Japan’s diplomacy began spinning much earlier than the peace conference. The first overtures can be traced back to July 1904 when Tokyo seriously considered a meeting between the Japanese ambassador to the United Kingdom, Hayashi Tadasu, and Russian Finance Minister, Sergeĭ Iu. Witte, in a neutral county such as Belgium, with Germany serving as an intermediary. This plan yielded no results when it became apparent that St. Petersburg had no interest in reaching a peace deal. From the perspective of the emperor, the present military situation did not warrant a diplomatic compromise with what he considered a vastly inferior power such as Japan. But some of his close advisors had serious misgivings regarding the mounting financial costs of the war, particularly in the face of the growing domestic social unrest in the country. The emperor had no such fears, however, and instead interpreted Tokyo’s eagerness to negotiate as a sign of weakness.

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The emperor’s confidence in the Russian military further bolstered his bold position, and it was only natural that following each Japanese victory on the battlefield, the peace alternative would become more tenable. The fall of Port Arthur in August 1904, therefore, presented itself as a window of opportunity. Seizing this moment, the US president Theodore Roosevelt provided support to Japan’s initiative and Tokyo once again sounded out St. Petersburg about its desire to seek peace. Unperturbed by the deteriorating military situation, the emperor remained adamant about maintaining international prestige, a crucial concern for imperial Russia since it was unable to accept the humiliation of having to settle with this non-white developing nation. Another explanation of why the early peace initiatives by the Japanese failed was that the German emperor (Kaiser) Wilhelm II was urging his cousin “Nicky” not to relent in his struggle against the “Yellow Peril” (Balfour 1972, 260–61; for a discussion of the “Yellow Peril,” see Hashikawa 2000). Such pressures notwithstanding, the Russians had no recourse but to reassess their position in the aftermath of Japan’s decisive victory at the Battle of Mukden. The increasingly bleak outlook of the situation on the battlefield, combined with growing domestic unrest, made peace a more palatable choice for the emperor. The mood in Tokyo was also changing rapidly. Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, both previously against an early peace with Russia, now believed that it was the opportune moment to end the war. Although Japan had been successful in obtaining additional loans from its allies, this was inadequate in Japan’s prolonged engagement in a conflict. With its financial and military resources rapidly dwindling, Japan’s war-fighting capabilities were being stretched to near breaking point. With Russia’s imperialistic ambitions on southern Manchuria and the Korea Peninsula now thwarted, seeking peace with its enemy was not only a logical move for Japan but also an extremely prudent one. 2

America’s Involvement and the Path to Peace

By late April 1905, Tokyo had decided that it would request President Roosevelt to broker a peace deal with the Russians. Roosevelt had ostensibly maintained a neutral stance regarding the conflict; however, it was readily apparent that he supported Japan because they were “fighting our fight.” Once the Japanese had formally requested US involvement, Roosevelt acted in earnest to bring the Russians to the peace table. At one point, an international conference including other European powers was also considered; this was quickly withdrawn

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because the mutual distrust among the participants would surely make such an undertaking futile. Japan also vehemently objected this idea, fearing that many of the European powers would create a united front against it. Japan was amenable, however, to a bilateral peace conference, and therefore Roosevelt endeavored to have the Russians participate. He had two new tools at his disposal in order to accomplish this task: the capable US ambassador George von Lengerke Meyer in St. Petersburg, who had just been transferred from Rome, and the German Kaiser, who was now faced with an urgent need to have the emperor agree to peace in an effort to avoid domestic unrest spreading from Russia to Germany. Ultimately, Roosevelt convinced the emperor of the merits of ending the war. The announcement of convening a peace conference came on the heels of Japan’s crushing defeat of the Baltic fleet. Convincing the two sides to negotiate peace was just one of many hurdles that needed to be overcome before peace could prevail. Japan and Russia haggled over such details such as the venue of conference. The former proposed Chefoo (present-day Yantai) in China while the latter insisted on a European location such as Paris, the Hague, or Geneva, but Japan remained steadfast in its demand that a European location was unacceptable. In essence, the two countries were attempting to outmaneuver one another in trying to obtain any possible advantage. After a few weeks of sparring, Washington, DC, emerged as the only mutually agreeable setting. Initially, Roosevelt was not enthusiastic about hosting the conference on American soil, but without any other feasible alternative he eventually relented. A serious drawback with hosting the conference in the US capital was that the city became inhospitable during the summer months due to the excessive heat and humidity. In an era prior to airconditioning, the thought of holding a conference under such conditions was far from ideal. Roosevelt sought the advice of his friend, the New Hampshire state governor John R. McLane, about a venue where the Japanese and Russian representatives could engage in thorough deliberations under more pleasant conditions. McLane considered several towns along the East Coast and in the end narrowed it down to two locations: Portsmouth on the coast and Bretton Woods in the mountains. Both were cool in the summer and not teeming with tourists. Portsmouth was ultimately chosen as the site for the peace negotiations due to the proximity of a naval base that not only allowed easy access from the water but also provided more security (Esthus 1966, 75). Japan and Russia agreed to Roosevelt’s suggestion, and attention now turned to the much more substantial issues of the upcoming peace conference. One such issue debated in Japan was who would lead the delegation to Portsmouth in what surely would be a difficult and arduous task. Prime Minister Katsura’s first choice was the former prime minister Itō Hirobumi, who was

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an advocate of pro-Russian policy (Kanayama 1984, 29–30). Furthermore, Itō had several high-level connections in St. Petersburg, which made him an ideal candidate. Itō declined, explaining that since he had been a vehement opponent of the war from the outset, it was more appropriate that the burden of this task should fall on the shoulders of someone who had supported the war. Encountering such pushback, Katsura realized the futility in trying to convince Itō to accept the role. At the same time, Prime Minister Katsura felt it imperative that he remain in Tokyo to oversee and direct the entire negotiation. The next logical choice was to appoint his capable foreign minister since he had also been a strong proponent for war against Russia. Komura, then fiftyyears-old, did not object to the appointment as chief delegate of the peace mission. It was also decided that Takahira Kogorō, the ambassador to the United States, would act as deputy (for an assessment of Takahira’s skills as a diplomat, see Matsumura 2006, 35–64). During Komura’s absence from Tokyo, Katsura would become the acting foreign minister. This strategically placed himself in a position that would permit him to play a key role in directing the negotiations at Portsmouth. 3

Pursuing Peace at Portsmouth

On July 3, 1905, the roster of the Japanese delegation was made public. In addition to Komura and Takahira from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimushō), the diplomats Satō Aimaro, Yamaza Enjirō, Adachi Mineichirō, Honda Kumatarō, Ochiai Kentarō, Hanihara Masanao, and Konishi Kōtarō were selected as the members of the delegation. Also dispatched from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the US advisor, Henry W. Denison, who earned a handsome salary that was nearly double that of the foreign minister. Commander Takeshita Isamu of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Colonel Tachibana Shōichirō from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) completed the military staff of the delegation (for a brief biography of each participant, see Yoshimura 1979, 51–53). The delegation clearly understood the magnitude and the importance of the task at hand, but what weighed particularly heavy on the minds of the delegation was the unrealistically high expectations of the Japanese public. In order to conceal Japan’s desperate military situation from the Russians, the public had been misled to believe that Japan had dealt a crushing blow against Russia and that the enemy was now on its knees. Nothing could be further from the truth, however, since Japan suffered serious shortages in ammunition and other vital military supplies. It also lacked the necessary manpower and

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financial means to remain in the war. Russia, on the contrary, still had many unused army divisions that could be transferred quickly to the Russian Far East via the Trans-Siberian Railway. Unbeknownst to the Japanese public, peace at almost any cost became the prevailing sentiment among Japan’s leaders. In fact, Takahira had informed Roosevelt earlier that “peace without indemnity or territory” was acceptable because he felt that the cost of prolonging the war would far outweigh any amount of indemnity that Japan could extract from Russia (Beale 1956, 249). It should also be remembered that the Shimonoseki Conference of 1895 had become a standard bearer of a successful peace negotiation by the victor in gaining territorial concessions and an indemnity. Tokyo was keenly aware, however, that it would be a near impossible task to extract similar concessions from Russia. Japan’s peace demands were thus lowered to reflect this reality. As the Japanese delegation was preparing to depart Yokohama on July 8, 1905 abroad the steam liner SS Minnesota—one of the largest passenger liners of the day—Komura observed from the deck the cheering crowd below who were enthusiastically waving the Japanese flag as a send-off. He was fully aware that this patriotic fervor could very well turn against him depending upon the conference results. The voyage from Yokohama to Tacoma in Washington state was relatively uneventful, and the entourage arrived in the United States on July 19. Since Komura had been out of contact with Tokyo throughout the trans-Pacific journey, he immediately immersed himself in the cables from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo that had accumulated at the Japanese consulate in Seattle. It was at this time that Komura first learned that his counterpart at the conference would be Witte, instead as he believed, the former Russian foreign minister Mikhail N. Murav’ev. Komura saw this news in a positive light as he knew that Witte had been a staunch opponent of the war. Also contained in the cable was information that Witte would be arriving in New York on August 1. This provided an additional relief as it meant that Komura would be the first to meet President Roosevelt and therefore would be able to keep one step ahead of the Russians (Trani 1969, 119). Without further delay, Komura departed Seattle for Washington, DC, on the first transcontinental train, and arrived in New York via Chicago on the morning of July 25. He was greeted at the station by Ambassador Takahira, who had just arrived from the Japanese legation in Washington, DC. The headquarters for the Japanese delegation was situated in the luxurious Waldorf Astoria Hotel. The first diplomatic task at hand was to reaffirm the “good offices” of Roosevelt. This also coincided with the final military phase of the war that was unfolding just north of Hokkaido on the Sakhalin Islands (for the specifics of the operation, see Tani 2004, 302–30).

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Prior to Komura’s arrival in the United States, Roosevelt had suggested to Takahira that the occupation of Russian territory would vastly improve Japan’s negotiating position in the upcoming peace conference. Although the Imperial Japanese Army had also independently reached the same conclusion much earlier based on the recommendations of the army chief-of-staff Nagaoka Gaishi, the operation was shelved because the Imperial Japanese Navy was unwilling to spare any vessels necessary for the operation with the approaching Baltic fleet. For that reason, it was the victory at the Battle of Tsushima Strait (May 14–15 [May 27–28], 1905) that finally freed up the necessary naval resources in order to proceed with the invasion of Sakhalin. With the prodding of Roosevelt and the blessing of Yamagata Aritomo, what had previously been a low-priority mission became one of utmost diplomatic significance. Fortunately, Sakhalin was secured in time before the convening of the conference, and with Russian territory now in Japan’s possession for the first time, the fate of the islands could be used as an important bargaining chip at the negotiating table. 4

Peace Prevails at Portsmouth

With both Japanese and Russian plenipotentiaries sitting across the table from each other, the stage was now set for the final phase of the Russo-Japanese War. Although Japan had secured a stunning victory in the military phase of the war, the real fruits of this victory could only be realized through a success at the peace conference. It should be remembered, however, that the Russia of 1905 was in a much different state than the utterly devastated Japan in 1945. Russia still had the capability to continue the war in the event that the conference collapsed. The leading voice among the diehard hawks in St. Petersburg was the emperor himself. These circumstances considered, Japan’s most realistic approach was to seek a “soft peace” that did not make huge demands on Russia. Japan’s peace terms were prioritized into three categories. The first contained the key terms on which Tokyo would not budge. These demands represented Japan’s reasons for entering into war against Russia in the first place. In the event that these demands were rejected, Japan had no recourse but to abandon peace. Komura had therefore been given strict instructions not to deviate from following non-negotiable key demands (Gaimushō 1966, 491–92): first, remove all Russian influence from Korea and obtain Russian acquiescence regarding the placement of Korea under sole Japanese control; second, a complete withdrawal of both Russian and Japanese troops from Manchuria; and third, the lease rights to the territories of Port Arthur, Dairen, and several

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other areas within the Liaodong Peninsula in addition to the transfer of all railways and mines south of Harbin to Japan. On the second set of demands, however, Tokyo provided Komura with some room to maneuver: first, payment of an indemnity with the cap set at JPY 15 billion; second, the surrender of all warships that were interred in neutral ports; third, ceding Sakhalin and a few other minor neighboring islands; and fourth, extending coastal fishing rights. The final set of demands consisted of terms that the Russians would most likely reject outright but which Japan did not consider essential. These were perceived as bargaining chips for Komura to utilize in order to secure Russian concessions in the other more key demands such the restriction of a Russian naval presence in Northeast Asia and the demilitarization of Vladivostok such that it would become a commercial port. Except for the first set of demands, Komura was given the exclusive authority to discuss and negotiate the finer points of the peace settlement. In other words, the Japanese demands were set as low as possible; this clearly reflected Japan’s eagerness to reach an agreement. The negotiations did not progress as smoothly as initially hoped, however, in part because Komura steadfastly clung to territorial concessions as well as the receipt of an indemnity from Russia. These were the two demands that the emperor could not accept since it would cast Russia as a nation utterly humiliated by a lesser power. Komura was himself placed in a difficult position because he was acutely aware that the Japanese public, with its bloated expectations about the outcome of the peace conference, would not consent to a peace dividend that was less than what Japan had obtained from China in 1895. Fortunately for Japan, Roosevelt was in its corner. The priority of the US president was to reach a resolution of the conflict. This naturally meant that both Japan and Russia needed to compromise on several key issues. Roosevelt’s advice to Japan was that as a member of the family of “civilized” nations, it had a moral obligation to seek peace now that it had successfully gained a dominant position in southern Manchuria and in the Korean Peninsula. A true broker of peace, Roosevelt also informed the emperor that he should cede Sakhalin to Japan and as it had been in Russian possession for only thirty years this move would not tarnish the emperor’s image. Roosevelt’s persistence eventually paid off, and the emperor begrudgingly agreed to cede the lower half of Sakhalin on the condition that it would not pay an indemnity. It was through this critical concession that peace now seemed within reach. Public opinion also played a role in the peace conference proceedings. High-profile groups such as the Anti-Russian Association (J: Tairodōshikai) and a group of University of Tokyo academics known as the “Seven Professors” (shichi hakase) called for the continuation of the war with Russia. On the other

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side, a few newspapers such as the socialist Heimin shinbun were outspoken proponents for peace. But since the Japanese public had only been informed about the “overwhelming” victories by Japan’s military, they were inclined to support the obtaining of significant concessions in a peace deal with Russia. When it became known that Japan would not receive an indemnity from Russia, an outraged public took to the streets and rioted in Tokyo’s Hibiya Park on September 5, 1905 (known as the Hibiya Yakiuchi Jiken or Hibiya Incendiary Incident). Even the US legation was damaged. The political elites of Japan were completely appalled by this public reaction as it was totally out of touch with the realities that Japan faced: the country was incapable of continuing the war, which made bringing the conflict to a quick end the only realistic course for Japan (see Tani [1912] 1976). 5

The Aftermath of War:  Japan’s Postwar Diplomatic Trajectory

The outcome of the Portsmouth Peace Conference facilitated Japan’s entry onto the global stage as a major power in its own right. Japan could now exploit its new standing to alter the political landscape of East Asia. Japan’s principal reason for going to war with Russia had been to obtain exclusive control over the Korean Peninsula, and in the aftermath of the conflict Tokyo quickly secured agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom in order to cement its position on this matter. In July 1905, Secretary of War William H. Taft and Prime Minister Katsura agreed in the Katsura–Taft Memorandum that United States would recognize Japan’s control of Korea in exchange for a similar recognition of the United States in the Philippines. In this way, the world needed to accommodate Japan’s rise as a new power and acknowledge its emerging sphere of influence. Japan also bolstered its hold of southern Manchuria by quickly placing such vital assets such as Port Arthur, Dairen, and the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) under its control. Another crucial result of the peace treaty was that Japan and Russia now recognized each other’s established spheres of influence. Russia accepted Japan’s exclusive control of the Korean Peninsula and its dominance in southern Manchuria. It could be said that this new reality in itself justified Japan’s decision to go to war. Until this time, the Asian continent had been the stage upon which the major Western powers rushed to expand their imperialistic ambitions. But Russia’s defeat had forced a major shift in the geopolitical dynamics of the region because it was now necessary to make room for a newcomer, Japan. Moreover, the decisive outcome of the RussoJapanese War allowed Japan to strengthen considerably its position in the

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region. It is quite understandable that Japan’s new foreign policy trajectory would lean much more toward expanding its sphere of influence. Emerging from this new reality were three distinct lines regarding the possible course of Japanese foreign policy. The first, supported by the Imperial Japanese Army, advocated direct military rule over the newly acquired Japanese possessions in addition to greater involvement in the affairs of China. The Imperial Japanese Army also advocated outright annexation of Manchuria. Wary of any further territorial expansion by Japan, however, the United Kingdom voiced its objections to this overly aggressive policy. The United States also made its concerns known, conveying to Tokyo its great disappointment if Japan were to embark on this militaristic path. Pragmatism fortunately prevailed in the end, and the Imperial Japanese Army was forced to relent upon intense pressure from Itō who firmly believed that such policies would be detrimental to Japan. The second policy line found its most outspoken proponent in Hayashi Tadasu. This policy was firmly grounded on the ideals of internationalism. In other words, Japan would seek to work in concert with the other Great Powers. Enlightened self-interest was embraced and cooperation took priority over conflict in this course of action. Yet this was a very different approach to international relations, particularly at a time when imperialism was still very much accepted as the norm to diplomacy. Not surprisingly, therefore, this policy line encountered stiff resistance from the genrō who viewed Hayashi’s idealismladen diplomacy not only as weak but also utterly unrealistic. Furthermore, the tremendous surge in Chinese nationalism that manifested itself in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War also hindered Hayashi since many in Japan viewed his benevolent approach to China as fueling the surge of nationalism in China. Another factor that stood in Hayashi’s way was that he was not very popular with the Japanese public. This was despite the fact he had been an extremely competent foreign minister in the first Saionji Kinmochi cabinet where he brought about rapprochement with France and its former adversary, Russia. The third policy line was a continental-oriented foreign policy advocated by Komura. This policy, known as “Komura Diplomacy” (Komura gaikō), prevailed and eventually became the guiding principle of Japanese foreign policy until the early 1920s when the new principles espoused by the Washington Treaty Conference would realign Japan’s diplomatic path in East Asia. With the conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace Conference, Komura’s primary task now shifted and was to ensure that Japan’s new position as a major power in Asia would be acknowledged by other nations. The underlying goal of “Komura Diplomacy” was more than a solidification of Japan’s position on

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the Asian continent; it also sought to boost its global status and international prestige. The pursuit of Komura’s diplomacy thus necessitated a realignment of the existing order in Asia. This would, in turn, prompt a transformation of the status quo in a way that would better address Japan’s national and security interests. 6

Japan Reshapes the Status Quo in East Asia

Japan’s emergence as a new power was primarily at the expense of Russia. But it was Japan’s rise that prompted a cascade of events that would alter the status quo of East Asia. This remarkable geostrategic shift became readily apparent as the European powers acted to readjust their sphere of influence in the region in an effort to accommodate Japan’s entry. This transition can be clearly seen through the following diplomatic processes: the Katsura–Taft Memorandum (July 1905), the extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (August 1905), the Franco-Japanese Treaty (June 1907), the Takahira–Root Agreement (November 1908), and the Russian-Japanese Convention (July 1907), which was later amended and extended in 1910, 1912, and finally in 1916 just prior to the Bolshevik revolution. The year 1907 was a watershed for Japanese diplomacy prior to World War I as Japan was able to normalize ties with its former foe, Russia. This not only significantly reduced tensions in the region but also served as a further layer of security that added to its existing alliance with the United Kingdom. Japan’s rapprochement with Russia also led to the other powers perceiving it as a force working to maintain the status quo rather than as a force trying to undermine it such as in the case of Germany, whose increasingly bellicose actions were viewed with suspicion and alarm. Moreover, the new threat posed by Germany to the existing international order prompted a realignment of strategic partnerships. Russia and France entered into an alliance against Germany. The United Kingdom would later join this group to form the Triple Entente, which would fight a bitter war with Germany and its allies from 1914. Since Japan had treaties with each of the Triple Entente nations, it also became an association partner to the alliance. In this way, and as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War, the powers of Europe were now relying much more heavily on Japan as a stabilizing force in the international system, particularly in Asia. From Japan’s perspective, the forging of these new diplomatic agreements was especially significant because the world in which it existed in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War was markedly different than that after the first Sino-Japanese War. Unlike the

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earlier conflict, all the major European powers now fully acknowledged and accepted Japan’s new status as a regional power as well as its vested interests in southern Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula (Minohara 2005, 7–22). With the European powers so aligned, the only remaining nation that Japan had to deal with regarding the recognition of the new status quo was China. With this in mind, Komura went to China in December 1905 in order to negotiate a new treaty. The resulting Treaty (Convention) of Peking [Beijing] allowed Japan to secure China’s acceptance of the terms set forth in the Portsmouth peace treaty. Three years later, in 1908, Komura was reappointed as foreign minister in the second Katsura cabinet where he worked to halt the construction of the Hsinmintun–Fakumen Railway that posed a direct threat to Japan’s South Manchurian Railway, as the two lines ran parallel. This was achieved in September 1909 with the signing of the Sino-Japanese Agreement Regarding Manchuria. The bilateral understanding also demarcated the border between Manchuria and Korea, which paved the way for Japan’s annexation of the Korean Peninsula in 1910. In the years that followed, the leadership in Japan alternated between Katsura and Saionji. Komura was Katsura’s preferred foreign minister while Saionji clearly favored Hayashi, who opted for a more pragmatic and less confrontational approach to foreign policy. A master in the art of compromise, Hayashi’s diplomatic skills served him well during the delicate negotiations leading to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In the aftermath of the RussoJapanese War, he firmly believed that Japan’s international prestige would be enhanced by working to maintain, not challenge, the postwar status quo. This significantly contrasts Komura’s more aggressive diplomacy, which placed emphasis on seizing the initiative and taking bold, yet calculated, steps so that Japan could further expand its sphere of influence. At first glance, then, it might seem that their approaches to diplomacy were remarkably different; however, upon closer examination it is clear that they were not entirely divergent. For example, Hayashi and Komura strongly felt that a solid US-Japan relationship was an essential element in maintaining Japanese national interests. Moreover, both men were ardent supporters of Japan’s annexation of Korea. In an ironic twist, however, it was also Japan’s decisive victory against Russia and its resulting ascendancy onto the global stage that brought about a major adjustment in US-Japanese relations. The new geostrategic reality, in which Japan emerged as major player in East Asia, meant that it had now emerged as the most ideal regional partner for the United States. Undeniably, the attraction of Japan was also a reflection of the limits of American power since at the time the United States still did not possess the naval strength to defend its possessions in the Pacific—namely, the Philippines, which President Roosevelt

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aptly viewed as an Achilles heel. In the light of Germany’s growing ambitions in the region, Japan was seen as a natural ally who would not only respect US interests but also act as a counterweight in maintaining the regional power balance. As long as Tokyo observed the Open Door Policy with China, therefore, it would have tacit approval from Washington in establishing its own sphere of influence in the region. This was clearly embodied in the 1905 Taft–Katsura Memorandum and the 1908 Takahira–Root Agreement. In this way, Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War and the ensuing Portsmouth Peace Conference were the two key elements that catapulted Japan onto the global stage at the beginning of the twentieth century. Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Furuya Tetsuo. 1966. Nichiro sensō [The Russo-Japanese War]. Tokyo: Chuō Kōron Shinsha. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1966. Komura gaikō shi [The History of Komura Diplomacy]. Tokyo: Hara Shobō. Hashikawa Bunzō. 2000. Kōka monogatari [The Yellow Peril Story]. 2000. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Itō Yukio. 2000. Rikken kokka to Nichiro sensō: gaikō to naisei, 1898–1905 [State Constitutionalism and the Russo-Japanese War: Diplomacy and Domestic Affairs, 1898–1905]. Tokyo: Bokutakusha. Kanayama Nobuo. 1984. Komura Jutarō to Pōtsumasu [Komura Jutarō and Portsmouth]. Tokyo: PHP Shuppan. Kurobane Shigeru. 1968. Nichei dōmei no kenkyū [A Study of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance]. Sendai: Tōhoku Kyōiku Tosho. Matsumura Masayoshi. 2005. “Pōtsumasu kōwa kaigi to Seodoa Ruuzuberuto” [The Portsmouth Conference and Theodore Roosevelt]. Gaimushō chōsa geppō 2: 21–52. Matsumura Masayoshi. 2006. “Mō hitori no Pōtsumasu kōwa zenkeniin” [Another Plenipotenciary Powers of the Portsmouth Peace Conference]. Gaimushō chōsa geppō 1: 35–64. Minohara Toshihiro. 2005. “Nichiro sensō to rekkyō eno taitō” [The Russo-Japanese War and the Rise to Power]. Kokusai mōndai 546: 7–22. Ōe Shinobu. 1999. Baluchiku kantai [The Baltic Fleet]. Tokyo: Chuō Kōron Shinsha. Shinobu Seizaburō. 1970. Nishin sensō [The Sino-Japanese War]. Tokyo: Nansōsha. Shinobu Seizaburō and Jiichi Nakayama. 1959. Nichiro sensō shi no kenkyū [A Study of the Military History of the Russo-Japanese War]. Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shinsha.

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Tani Tateki. [1912] 1976. Tateki ikō [Unpublished Writings of Tani Tateki], edited by Toshie Shimauchi, 4 vols. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. Tani Toshio. 2004. Kimitsu Nichiro senshi [Classified Military History of the RussoJapanese War]. Tokyo: Hara Shobō. Teramoto Yatsutoshi. 1999. Nichiro sensō igo no Nihon gaikō [Japanese Foreign Policy After the Russo-Japanese War]. Tokyo: Shinzansha Shuppan. Yoshimura Akira. 1979. Pōtsumasu no hata [The Flag of Portsmouth]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1979.



English Sources

Balfour, Michael. 1972. The Kaiser and his Times. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Beale, Howard K. 1956. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Dennet, Tyler. 1925. Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War: A Critical Study of American Policy in Eastern Asia in 1902–5, Based Primarily Upon the Private Papers of Theodore Roosevelt. Garden City: Doubleday, Page, and Company. Esthus, Raymond A. 1966. Theodore Roosevelt and Japan. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Kim, Seung-Young. 2005. “Managing the Korea Buffer: Great Power Competition over China, from the Late Nineteenth Century until Today.” Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies 15: 3. Kim, Seung-Young. 2005. “Russo-Japanese Rivalry over Korean Buffer at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century and Its Implications.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 16: 619–50. Langer, William L. (Leonard). 1965. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902. New York: Knopf. Nish, Ian. 1966. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907. London: Athlone Press. Nish, Ian. 1985. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London: Longman. Okamoto, Shumpei. 1970. The Japanese Oligarchy and Russo-Japanese War. New York: Columbia University Press. Trani, Eugene. 1969. The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. White, John A. 1964. The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Russia and Japan in the Late 19th to 20th Centuries: the Road to War and Peace Igor V. Lukoyanov A study of the complicated history of Russo-Japanese relations at the turn of the 20th century should not be interpreted simply as a string of events that would result in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. The primary issue in this discussion is determining whether the conflict was inevitable and when relations between the two countries irreparably broke down. Russian historiography offers various versions about which trajectory ultimately led to the war. The military historian Panteleĭmon N. Simanskiĭ, the first Russian scholar to examine this era in depth, asserted that Japan was entirely responsible for the conflict (Simanskiĭ 1910a).1 After 1917 the Russian monarchy and its policies were blamed. Those who hold Russia accountable believe that it rested on the country’s “military-feudal” imperialism or its “trading capital” and that the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, beginning in 1891, already predetermined the future struggle for Asian markets and global trade routes. Another factor was that later Soviet historiography tried “to reduce” the aggression of Russian imperialism (Kutakov 1988). Russian historians today are less interested in apportioning blame, however, than in analyzing the ineffectualness of the Russian imperial government that was “being split and burdened by ‘irresponsible influences’,” as well as its inconsistency and failure in formulating and defending its position (Ignat’ev and Melikhov 1997, 161). This essay will investigage the incidents that resulted in the Russo-Japanese War and outline the diplomatic outcomes of the conditions of the peace treaty following the conflict.2 1

The Lead-Up to War: Prewar Negotiations

In the second half of the 19th century, relations between Russia and Japan were not hostile, as seen in the resolution of a territorial dispute in 1875 that ended 1  This text is an abriged version of Simanskiĭ’s secret three-volume book, of which only seven copies were printed (Simanskiĭ 1910b). 2  The scope of this essay does not include an analysis of the military history of the Russo-Japanese War; for an in-depth analysis, see Aĭrapetov 2004; Russko-Yaponskaya voĭna 1904–1905 gg. 1910, vols. 1–9; and Russko-Yaponskaya voĭna 1904–1905 gg. 1912–1917, vols. 1–7. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_005

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in Russia securing Sakhalin and Japan the Kuriles. In the autumn of 1892, instructions to the new envoy to Tokyo, Mikhaĭl A. Hitrovo, specified that “no essential controversy” existed between Russia and Japan (Kutakov 1988, 210). St. Petersburg’s interest in the Far Eastern periphery was limited to concerns over the weak defenses of the Russian borders, which was one reason for the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (1891–1901). Tokyo viewed the railway as proof of St. Petersburg’s expansionist intentions in the region (Valliant 1974, 47–67). In 1892, the new Minister of Finance Sergeĭ Yu. Witte expressed interest in the Far East. He pushed for extensive economic involvement in China since he wished to take control of its markets in order to promote the products of Russia’s rapidly growing industries. Most Russian dignitaries and diplomats viewed China as a rival, but the government in St. Petersburg did an about-turn in its policy in the spring of 1895 with the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, that stipulated that China cede the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. At a special consultation earlier on March 30 (April 11) Witte declared that Japan had become Russia’s principle rival in the Far East and that it should not be allowed under any circumstances into the Asian continent. He was concerned about the possible expansion of the Japanese into Manchuria, which the minister wished to see exclusively within the Russian sphere of influence (Popov 1932, 78–83). Although Emperor Nicholas II had not approved the “consultation journal,” the views on Russo-Japanese relations shifted.3 In the first half of April 1895, Prince Esper E. Ukhtomskiĭ published a belligerent article in the newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti in which he urged that the empire remain firm when dealing with Japan: “not an inch of land or a measure of influence on the Asian continent.” Nicholas II assessed this article as “very good” (RGIA [n.d.], f. 1072, op. 2, d. 246). Russia’s anti-Japanese stance was formally acknowledged in a secret Sino-Russian agreement concluded on May 22 (June 3), 1896, with Russia promising military aid to China in the event of a Japanese attack. The Korean issue drove a further wedge between Russia and Japan in the mid-1890s. Despite its renewed contacts with Korea after the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Russia did not take advantage of its “insider” position vis-à-vis the kingdom. For example, the Korean king Gojong fled from Japanese 3  The term “consultation journal,” often translated as “conference” in English sources, is a very special institution of autocracy (osoboe soveshchanie). This “consultation” or “conference” is a temporary meeting of appointed bureaucrats or dignitaries to discuss special problems. The foundation of the consultation took place after the emperor’s decision and would only have been in the form of advice (i.e., the “journal”). This was not a committee.

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“protection” to the Russian diplomatic mission in 1896, where he stayed for a year, and this would have positioned Russia perfectly to have an advantage over the Japanese on the peninsula. St. Petersburg believed that it would annex the kingdom in the future in any case; this view was widespread, as echoed in the words of Hitrovo: “Korea will not escape us and sooner or later, in one way or another, it will become ours” (OR IRLI, f. 325, op. 1, 242, l. 1–3 ob.). Russia’s interest in Korea was also considerably revived in 1897 as it began to look for warm-water ports (Lukoyanov 2008, 252–68). St. Petersburg’s contradictory stance on the Korean issue was reflected in the directive that Count Vladimir N. Lamsdorf released in May 1897 to Roman R. Rosen, who had been appointed the new envoy to Tokyo. It stressed that Russia, having no intentions to annex Korea, would continue to oppose any aspiration by the Japanese in the region. At the same time, Lamsdorf stated that a priority in Russia’s Far East policy was the establishment of friendly relations with Japan, agreeing therefore to grant it trade benefits in the kingdom (OPI GIM 1897, f. 444, op. 1, 105, l. 29–29 ob.). Russia’s capture of Port Arthur and Dalian (J: Dairen) on the Liaodong Peninsula in December 1897 and the conclusion of the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula on March 15 (March 27), 1898, significantly impacted its relations with Japan. It was an important and perhaps even the turning point in the relations between the two countries that some scholars believe pushed Japan toward its preparations of war with Russia (Wada 2009–2010). Japan intensified its attempts to make Russia back down on the Korean issue, but these were unsuccessful. Crucially, the capture of Port Arthur also affected Japanese public opinion: Russia was declared to be the main obstacle in achieving the country’s national goals—that is, the capture of Korea. Meanwhile, St. Petersburg’s interest in Korea dropped dramatically as it focused instead on Manchuria. The difficult question surrounding the essential concessions to Japan regarding Korea nevertheless remained. In March 1898, Lamsdorf reported to Nicholas II: Nowadays we are given an absolutely free hand. We will quite consistently prove that we were dealing with Korea’s internal affairs only at the request of the king and his government, and solely with the purpose of providing the country’s independence. Now we can arrive more easily at an agreement with Japan. Condominium needs to be avoided. GA RF 1898a, f. 568, op. 1, 59, l. 12–13 ob

On March 10 (March 22), 1898, Rosen reported that Japan was ready to recognize Manchuria as outside its sphere of influence. Lamsdorf explained to Nicholas II: “So far this is all we need if Japan also acknowledges Korea’s

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independence and does not interfer too overtly in its affairs” (GA RF 1898b, f. 568, op. 1, 59, l. 15–15 ob.). Japanese claims became the pretext for the creation in the spring of 1898 of an unofficial group led by Aleksandr M. Bezobrazov, once a close employee of the former minister of the imperial court, Count Illarion I. Vorontsov-Dashkov. This “Bezobrazovsky Circle” (Bezobrazovskiĭ kruzhok), including Vladimir M. Vonlyarlyarskiĭ, Alekseĭ M. Abaza, Nikolaĭ G. Matyunin and others (see Lukoyanov 2005, 413–508), insisted on strengthening Russian influence in Korea and believed it was important to protect the kingdom as if it were a Russian territory. Their political aspirations belied commercial interests, however. The group intended to purchase and develop the timber concession at state expense in the basin of Yalu River that the Korean king had granted to the Vladivostok-based merchant Yuliĭ I. Briner. In 1897, Briner offered to sell the concession to the Russian government, which the Bezobrazovsky Circle later purchased with money from the imperial cabinet. Their ambitions also extended to the establishment of control over Korea’s state budget (Lukoyanov 2008, 414–75). Nicholas II supported their plan. They were given the opportunity to act, thereby increasing their role in the face of Witte’s dwindling influence from the end of 1902. The Boxer Rebellion in China (1899–1901) and the advancement of Russian troops into Manchuria were other important factors in Russo-Japanese relations. Japan was unhappy that northern China appeared to be completely under Russian control. Moreover, Russo-Japanese negotiations on Korea had failed due to St. Petersburg’s insistance on the neutral status of the kingdom while Tokyo wanted to have a number of unilateral advantages (OPI GIM 1901, f. 444, оp. 1, 99, l. 195–98; Erukhimovich 1934, 13–14). A private visit to St. Petersburg by the former head of the Japanese government, Itō Hirobumi, in November 1901 represented the final round of the Russo-Japanese negotiations on Korea after the Liaodong Peninsula rental treaty (Convention Between Russia and China on the Lease of the Liaodong Peninsula). Japan not only desired “the right to advise” the Korean king but also wanted to have exclusive rights regarding the presence of its troops entering the kingdom. In exchange, Japan pledged not to build fortifications on the southern coast or to threaten communications of Port Arthur. The Japanese offers contained nothing about Manchuria, and therefore in reply to Russia’s concession Tokyo increased its pressure. This would sow the seeds of the future conflict. Russian ministers viewed the agreement with Tokyo from an entirely different angle. For Russia, the issue was not of how to reduce tensions surrounding the Manchurian question but how to maintain Russian positions in Korea. Dignitaries promised Japan carte blanche in Korea in exchange for keeping

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the kingdom independent, not to use its territory for strategic purposes, and to recognize the privileges of Russia in its northern regions (Erukhimovich 1934, 51–52; Hayashi 1913, 320; Romanov 1928b, 335–36). The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 17 (January 30), 1902, which was directed against Russian policy, came as a surprise to Russia, and indicated that Japan no longer laid store by the agreement with St. Petersburg. The support from the United Kingdom permitted Tokyo to prepare for war even more aggressively. Aware of the increased tensions, both parties made a final attempt to concur on Korea in the summer of 1903. By this time, however, the situation in St. Petersburg had considerably changed. Witte had lost almost all his influence in Far Eastern affairs as well as his post as the Minister of Finance by August 16 (August 29), 1903. Control fell into the hands of the Bezobrazovsky Circle, and the vice regent in the Far East, Evgeniĭ I. Alekseev, backed the move to trade the largest area of Korea for Manchuria alongside Japan’s promise not to build military fortifications on the Korean Peninsula. This meant that Russia would only retain the northern section of the peninsula (the confluence of the Yalu and Tyumen Rivers4) (Pokrovskiĭ, 144–46), and this served to toughen Russia’s position. The Bezobrazovsky Circle and Alekseev were convinced that Japan would not be firm and was apprehensive of Russia. They did not fear war, and in the event of conflict they were convinced of the Russian army’s lightning-fast victory. Earlier, on July 30 (August 12), 1903, the Japanese envoy Kurino Shin’ichirō submitted the Japanese proposal to Minister of Foreign Affairs Lamsdorf to trade Korea for Manchuria; this was despite the fact that Tokyo denied their connection. The exchange was not equal, however. Japan only acknowledged Russia’s special railway interests in northern China, and it wanted unrestricted activity in Korea. The Russian government was unanimous in its view that these conditions were unacceptable. Alekseev, who prepared Russia’s reply, refused to cede all of Korea to Japan. He maintained that Manchuria should not be included as part of Japanese interests, agreeing only to accept Japan’s trading rights there (RGAVMF 1903a, f. 32, op. 1, 156, l. 9–10; Simanskiĭ 1910b, vol. III, 155–56, 165). The Yalu River basin would become a neutral zone with no troops (GA RF 1903a, f. 818, оp. 1, 59, l. 1). Nicholas II supported Alekseev and the separation of the Manchurian and Korean issues, believing it desirable “come with Japan to a real agreement on Korea-based issues” (GA RF 1903e, f. 601, оp. 1, 2421, l. 1–2 ob.).

4  This is an archaic name of the Tumen (Tumannaya) River on the border of China with present-day Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

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In Rosen’s official reply to Tokyo on September 20 (October 3) Russia offered to exchange Korea for Japan’s commitment to abandon any activity in Manchuria. At the same time, the Japanese were to pledge not to fortify the Korea Strait and to establish the demilitarized zone to the north of the 39th parallel (Simanskiĭ 1910b, vol. III, 158–59). The Japanese responded to Rosen on October 18 (October 31), rejecting for the most part the Russian offers. Tokyo agreed to recognize only the “special rights” of Russia in Manchuria, having dropped its own “special interests” there. In exchange, St. Petersburg would allow unrestricted Japanese domination in Korea. The single real concession was the promise not to fortify the Korean coast militarily (Simanskiĭ 1910b, vol. III, 175–76). For Russia, the linking of the Korean and Manchurian issues seemed unacceptable. Its troops had already been in Manchuria for several years, and there were no Japanese troops in Korea. Alekseev’s harsh stance and his readiness for a military conflict deeply concerned Nicholas II. As a result, the emperor made the quite characteristic decision to continue negotiations “quietly, but persistently” without making fundamental concessions (GA RF 1903b, f. 568, оp. 1, d. 180, l. 57). Nevertheless, in contradiction to Alekseev’s position the emperor chose not to insist on the recognition of Manchuria outside the sphere of Japanese influence. The emperor did support the demand for a neutral zone in Korea, however, and he instructed Alekseev to lay down Russia’s terms and conditions (GA RF 1903c, f. 568, оp. 1, d. 180, l. 64). This represented something new in Russia’s negotiation tactics. It meant thereafter that the reply was prepared in parts and separately by individuals who had differing views on the agreement. Moreover, on November 23 (December 6), Nicholas II, responding to numerous requests from the Japanese envoy to St. Petersburg, ordered that he be sent counterproposals, thereby bypassing Rosen and rejecting Alekseev’s strategy of protracted negotiations (RGAVMF 1903b, f. 32, op. 1, d 484, l. 12). The core of the discussions regarding (and the formulation of) the Russian stance had quietly moved from Port Arthur to St. Petersburg, which led to Alekseev’s weakening influence. Nonetheless, the Russian reply of November 28 (December 11) was still somewhat in the spirit of Alekseev’s proposal. Russia again divided the Manchurian and Korean issues and left out Korea in the draft document. St. Petersburg removed restrictions on Japanese troops entering the Korean kingdom and agreed to link the railroads. One disputed matter remained—the demilitarized zone to the north of the 39th parallel (Simanskiĭ 1910b, vol. III, 182–83). By December it appeared that the Korean question was about to be resolved. Tokyo seemed inclined to accept the Russian offers, even though the Manchuria question was unsettled. In its reply, received on December 9 (December 22), Japan concurred not to link the Korean and the Manchurian issues. Generally speaking, Tokyo’s - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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demand to delete the article about the neutral zone from the agreement was the main sticking point for St. Petersburg. A week later, on 16 December (December 29), 1903, Nicholas II convoked a special consultation in St. Petersburg in an effort to draft the Russian reply. Grand Duke Alekseĭ Aleksandrovich chaired the meeting, which was also attended by Lamsdorf, the Imperial Minister of War Alekseĭ N. Kuropatkin and Rear Admiral Abaza (Simanskiĭ 1910b, vol. III, 190–92). Unable to reach a unanimous consensus on the major issues, the consultation ended in failure. Under the circumstances the members of the Bezobrazovsky Circle then took an unconventional step. In the last half of December, Bezobrazov met with the translator of the Japanese mission in St. Petersburg, Tani Yutaka, to explain Russia’s stance: the government was ready to meet Japan’s ambitions in Korea but not in Manchuria (PRO FO 1904a, 65/1678, l. 16; Wada 2009–2010, ch. VIII, section “Kurino kōshi to Bezoburāzofu,” 234–40). Bezobrazov’s visit forced the Japanese envoy Kurino to act. On December 29, 1903 (January 11, 1904), Kurino met with Witte, and the latter was criticized for Russia’s policy in the Far East. The dignitary claimed that when St. Petersburg reached the point of feeling more powerful than Tokyo, it would act, not based on agreements but according to its own interests. For Russia, therefore, Japan’s presence in Korea would not be secured through any agreements (PRO FO 1904b, 65/1678, l. 91; Romanov 1955, 258–59). Witte discredited the negotiations, believing that in the event of war Russia would face serious hardships. It would finally lead to the removal of the Bezobrazovsky Circle from power and, Witte hoped, in his reinstatement. Lamsdorf attempted to convince Nicholas II that the Russian occupation of Manchuria would result in other countries voicing their discontent and would give Japan the opportunity to act upon its own interests, thereby demanding Korea in exchange for the fight against the Russian presence in Manchuria (GA RF 1903d, f. 568, оp. 1, 180, l. 99–100). Lamsdorf had astutely pinpointed the most disquieting issue of the entire political situation, which would dictate the actions by the two countries. Rosen handed the third Russian reply to the Japanese on December 24, 1903 (January 6, 1904). It not only retained the provision on the neutral 39th parallel zone but St. Petersburg also reinserted the Manchuria provision. It had kept all contract rights for foreigners there, including the Japanese, barring the arrangement of settlements (Simanskiĭ 1910b, vol. III, 193–94). On the surface, it seemed to be a smart move. Russia merely gave the impression of a basic concession since foreigners had very few contract rights in Manchuria. The reply to Rosen on December 31, 1903 (January 12, 1904), was the final communication. It appeared at this time that both parties were approaching a consensus on Manchuria. If Russia observed the contract rights of foreigners in the - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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region, Japan would recognize Manchuria as outside its sphere of influence as well as Russia’s special interests and the rights to their protection (this was not the Open Door Policy desired by the United Kingdom and the United States). Japan removed the clause in Article 5 regarding the disuse of Korea in its strategic goals, and as such the kingdom as neutral zone remained the main issue of contention (Simanskiĭ 1910b, vol. III, 196). A special consultation was convoked in St. Petersburg on January 15 (January 28), 1904. In attendance were previous members as well as the Minister of the Navy Fedor K. Avelan (OPI GIM 1904, f. 444, оp. 1, 105, l. 166–72). The majority supported the ceding of Korea to Japan and the preservation of the neutral zone. Again, no general consensus was reached. The divided opinions and the clearly weak arguments floored demonstrated that the political will and the views of high-ranking officials had witnessed a collapse. Emperor Nicholas II again found himself somewhere in the middle, having suggested that the article on the neutral zone be kept secret (GA RF 1904, f. 568, оp. 1, 661, l. 76–77). The final Russian suggestions included no demands regarding the neutral zone, even though Nicholas II had ordered Rosen to persuade the Japanese to sign the “special confidential article” on it at any cost (Simanskiĭ 1910b, vol. III, 205–7). Unfortunately, it was now too late because Japanese leaders had decided on January 19 (February 1) to end negotiations. Kurino reported that Lamsdorf could not guarantee when the Russians would reply. Earlier, on January 8 (January 21), Tokyo had received an even a more pessimistic report on the conversation between Kurino and Witte. An order arrived on January 21 (February 3) in which Kurino was told not to make any additional efforts in securing a Russian reply until he received further instructions (Gaimushō 1958, 91–92). Lamsdorf notified Kurino on January 22 (February 4), 1904, that St. Petersburg’s reply had been sent to Alekseev, who would not make any drastic changes. Russia agreed to remove the article concerning the neutral zone from the agreement and the clauses about the recognition of contract rights of foreigners in Manchuria. Yet three hours prior to Tokyo obtaining messages regarding the communications with Lamsdorf, three dispatches were sent to Kurino in St. Petersburg that instructed him to break diplomatic relations with Russia. Although this was surprising, most officials in Russia would not have interpreted this severance of diplomatic relations as a sign of imminent war. Nicholas II expressed serious alarm about a possible conflict with Japan for the first time on January 24 (February 6) but at this stage, exhausted by the entire process, the emperor wanted only certainty: “if it’s war, let it be war, if it’s peace, so shall it be peace” (Kuropatkin 1923, 128).

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Tokyo began the preparations for war, even though at this juncture there was a chance, albeit remote, to avert the conflict. The Russian reply was reported to London on January 21 (February 3), and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne was completely satisfied with it much to the chagrin of the Japanese envoy to the United Kingdom, Hayashi Tadasu. It was perhaps then that the Japanese envoy decided that the telegram regarding the Russian offers should not be sent to Tokyo (Simanskiĭ 1910b, vol. III, 222). Did this delay have crucial importance? It is believed that it did not since the text of the Russian reply did not impact Japan launching its military operations. Several days before the first Japanese attack, the Russian Pacific Squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Oskar V. Stark departed Port Arthur. It was engaged in various marine maneuvers for a day or so but Vice Regent Alekseev refused to make the squadron fully operational (Nikitin [Fokagitov] 1955, 50). Japanese historian Wada Haruki has unearthed information that by 7 p.m. on January 21 (February 3) the Japanese Navy had received information that the Russian squadron was already at sea. At 10:30 a.m. the next day the cabinet of ministers decided to attack Russia, and the imperial meeting, beginning at 2.25 p.m., supported this (Wada 2009–2010, vol. 2, ch. VIII, section “Nihon kokkō danzetsu no kakugi kettei,” 282–86). As the Japanese were disembarking in Korea on January 26 (February 8), another consultation was being held in St. Petersburg to discuss, not the articles of the agreement, but the probable landing of Japanese troops in Korea (Kuropatkin 1923, 130–32). Did Alekseev, who had been long convinced of the inevitability of a Russo-Japanese war, provoke the launching of military operations? A more convincing explanation might rest in Alekseev’s thoughtlessness, especially when he urged sailors that there was no risk of war. In any case, he was not the only player responsible on the Russian side. The Bezobrazovsky Circle also welcomed war but its stance did not dominate Russian government policy; the group’s influence by the beginning of 1904 was not so great as to unleash war. It must be said, however, that Witte played a considerable role in these developments as he strongly pushed for possible armed conflict. The Russia monarchy distinctly felt that the empire was on the brink of war and appeared incapable of preventing it. 2

The Portsmouth Peace Treaty

Japan was the first to prepare for the peace talks before war’s end. In the summer of 1904, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura Jutarō laid out twelve points, the principal being that Russia pay reparations; Japan be granted freedom

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of activity in Korea; Russia withdraws troops from Manchuria, transferring to Japan the Kwantung Peninsula and part of Chinese Eastern Railway from Harbin to Port Arthur as well as the transfer of Sakhalin; and Tokyo be granted fishing rights in Russian coastal waters (Okamoto 1970, 112–13). In January 1905, the terms were discussed with the US president Theodore Roosevelt, who mediated the preparation of the peace treaty. In Russia, only Witte advocated peace, and the support of his position increased following the fall of Port Arthur on December 23, 1904 (January 5, 1905), and failure in the Battle of Mukden (February–March 1905). Lamsdorf, Dmitriĭ M. Sol’skiĭ, and Vladimir N. Kokovtsov backed him, but they received no assistance from Nicholas II. Following Russia’s heavy losses at the Battle of Tsushima Strait on May 14–15 (May 27–28), 1905, and the Japanese occupation of Sakhalin, Russia’s position was untenable. The members of a military meeting on May 24 (June 6), 1905, concluded that “internal welfare is more important to us than victories. It is necessary to make an immediate attempt to clarify the peace terms and conditions” (Romanov 1928a, 201). On May 25 (June 7), Nicholas II accepted Roosevelt’s role as mediator in the peace negotiations during the audience for the US envoy George von Lengerke Meyer. Nicholas II attempted three appointments as the head of the Russian delegation. Both the ambassador to Paris, Aleksandr I. Nelidov, and the ambassador to Rome, Nikolaĭ V. Murav’ev, declined. Finally, on June 29 (July 12), Witte, who wanted the appointment, accepted the post, and a group of eleven experts was sent to assist him. The Japanese sent Komura, who was known for his tough stance on Russia. The instructions for the Russian delegation defined the limits of concessions that could be made to Japan on the following four points: 1) the unacceptability of losing any Russian territory; 2) reparation; 3) the restriction of naval powers in the Far East; and 4) the yielding of any part of the Chinese Eastern Railway (excluding South Manchurian Railway). Any remaining demands by Japan were meant to be neutralized by existing international treaties and individual concessions (Sbornik diplomaticheskih dokumentov 1906, 78–89). The Japanese terms and conditions, approved on June 22 (July 5), consisted of three groups. The first contained the unreserved, categorical conditions: 1) to have a dominant position in Korea; 2) the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Manchuria; and 3) the transfer of Port Arthur to Japan together with the part of the South Manchurian Railway. The second listed the important conditions of reparation, Sakhalin, and interned Russian vessels as well as fishing rights in coastal waters, including additions that limited Russian naval power in the Far East (Okamoto 1970, 124–25). Japan’s minimum demands and Russia’s maximum concessions were generally not conflictive, and this offered the chance of successful negotiations.

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The Russian delegation arrived in New York on July 20 (August 2) (Komura arrived one week prior to Witte). So as to sweeten the deal with Roosevelt, Witte informed him of Russia’s future lifting of import duties on US mechanical engineering products and giving the United States the most favored nation status in terms of trade. Witte visited the New York Stock Exchange on July 21 (August 3) and met with top Jewish bankers on August 1 (August 14). The negotiations began on July 27 (August 9) in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Official (with protocols) and unofficial meetings were scheduled every day, and on July 28 (August 10), the Russian delegation received the written text of the Japanese terms and conditions. The most important of the twelve points were: 1) that Russia relinquishes Korea and has exclusive rights over Manchuria; 2) that Sakhalin and the Kwantung Peninsula, together with South Manchurian Railway (SMR), go to Japan; 3) Russia pay Japan appropriate war reparations; 4) Russian interned war ships will be transferred to Tokyo; 5) Russia limits its naval powers in the Far East; and 6) Japan gains the right to fish along the coast of the Bering Sea, and the seas of Japan and Okhotsk (Korostovets 1918, 112–13). Witte responded before receiving instructions from St. Petersburg on July 30 (August 12). In his reply he stated that Russia was ready to give up Korea and Kwantung, and that Manchuria could be returned to China without any benefits to the Russians. It staunchly refused, however, to move on the issues of Sakhalin, reparation, the neutralization of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the restriction of its fleet. The Russian delegation was working on the premise that both parties would be interested in reaching a lasting peace, and this would only be possible if the balance of interests was respected and reciprocal concessions were made. Notwithstanding Witte’s gloomy expectations, the Japanese did not break off the negotiations. The discussions were challenging, and the Russian representative was prepared for a breakdown in the talks that ultimately ended on August 5 (August 18). Four points still remained in dispute: Sakhalin, reparation, vessels in neutral ports, and the restriction of naval powers. Yet except for the matter of reparation, Witte was ready to yield to the Japanese on these controversial issues. He believed the best solution would be the transference of all of Sakhalin without remuneration. Despite the strong pressure placed on Nicholas II, initially by Roosevelt and as a result of the suggestion of various combinations for further concessions for Russia, the emperor remained firm. He adhered to the principle: “Not an inch of land, not a ruble of payment of military expenses” (Sbornik diplomaticheskih dokumentov 1906, 137). The destiny of Sakhalin and the issue of reparation payments were decided in St. Petersburg during negotiations between Nicholas II and the US ambassador Von Lengerke Meyer. The emperor was in an advantageous position since

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the perlustration of correspondence meant that he was aware of the contents of President Roosevelt’s proposals beforehand. With the support of the German Emperor Wilhelm II, President Roosevelt insisted on trading northern Sakhalin for a financial payment. Nicholas II rejected this on August 10 (August 23) but promised to pay a generous amount of reparation to prisoners of war and to transfer the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan, which he did not consider native Russian territory in any case (Russia gained southern Sakhalin in 1875) (RGIA 1905, f. 1328, op. 2, 5, l. 78). From the night of August 14 (August 27) into the morning of August 15 (August 28) the Japanese government, wishing to expedite the peace process, accepted Russia’s terms (Okamoto 1970, 150–55) and withdrew its objections on August 16 (August 29). The peace agreement was finally signed on August 23 (September 5), 1905, in Portsmouth. The Portsmouth Peace Treaty, written in French and English (French was the principal language), contained fifteen main and two supplementary articles (original copies are today housed in the Diplomatic Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow). A number of these are noteworthy. Russia renounced all influence in Korea (Article 2); Russian and Japanese troops should be withdrawn from Manchuria for eighteen months, and St. Petersburg was refused exclusive rights there (Articles 3 and 4). The railway between Chang-chunfu (Changchun), Kuanchangtsu (Kuancheng), and Port Arthur, as well as the part of Sakhalin to the south on the 50th parallel, was passed to Japan (Articles 5, 6, and 9). Article 10 deals with property and the rights of Russians in Manchuria; the Japanese obtained fishing rights along the coasts in Russian possession in the Japanese, Okhotsk, and Bering seas (Article 11). Compensation for the costs of maintaining prisoners of war (Article 13) was a veiled indemnity: Russia paid 45,967,620 rubles and 52 kopecks, which was several times more than the actual costs, an amount that roughly corresponded to Japan’s annual budget deficit (Romanov 1955, 565). And finally, the system of reciprocal favorable treatment in trade and navigation was restored (Article 12) (Adamov and Koz’menko, 337–44). Emperor Nicholas II and Emperor Meiji ratified the treaty on October 1 (September 18), 1905. In 1906–1908, several agreements regarding the separation of the railway lines and borders of Sakhalin were concluded within its framework. Most countries welcomed peace between the two countries. In Japan, however, the terms of the agreement caused mass discontent and led to citywide riots, such as the Hibiya Incendiary Incident (Hibiya Yakiuchi Jiken) on September 5, 1905. In Russia, many reproached Witte for ceding Russian territory, and satirists dubbed him “Graf Polusakhalinskiĭ,” or “Count Half-Sakhalin.”

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3 Conclusion The late 19th and early 20th centuries marked an era of growing mistrust in Russo-Japanese relations when their conflicts of interest were clearly being mapped out. The peace treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), Russia’s lease of Port Arthur (1898), the occupation of Manchuria (1900), and the fluctuating policy in Korea became crucial points in this history. Russia had no secure interests in Korea and gradually moved toward making concessions to Tokyo. Moreover, the course of negotiations up to 1904 indicated no serious conflict of interest between the two countries. Japan would not advance into Manchuria simply based on the interests of other world powers (most notably the United Kingdom and the United States), whereas Russia was unwilling to fight over the issue of Japan in Korea. The Russo-Japanese War was, therefore, the consequence of shortsighted politicians, their poor decisions and actions. In the case of Russia, it was due to the lack of a focused approach and the pursuit, since 1898, of two policies in Korea (the official imperial stance/the unofficial imperial stance embodied by the Bezobrazovsky Circle). In the case of Japan, it was due to the country’s suspicions of Russia and an imperialist desire to control Korea. When viewed as such, both sides were to “blame,” although ultimately Japan was responsible for igniting the 1904–1905 conflict. Bibliography

Russian Sources

Adamov, Evgeniĭ Aleksandrovich, and Irina Vasil’evna Koz’menko, ed. 1952. Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami 1856–1917 [Collection of Treaties of Russia with Other States 1856–1917]. Moscow: Gospolitizdat. Aĭrapetov, Oleg Rudol′fovich, ed. 2004. Russko-yaponskaya voĭna: vzglyad cherez stoletie [The Russo-Japanese War: A Look at the Century]. Moscow: Tri kvadrata. Erukhimovich (Ermashev), Isaak Izrailevich. 1934. “Nakanune russko-yaponskoĭ voĭny (dekabr’ 1900–yanvar’ 1902)” [On the Eve of the Russo-Japanese War (December 1900–January 1902)]. Krasnyĭ arkhiv, no. 2 (63): 3–54. GA RF (Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1898a. f. 568, op. 1, 59, l. 12–13 ob. “V. N. Lamsdorf. Konspekt vsepoddanneĭshego doklada 3 (15) marta” [V. N. Lamsdorf. Abstract of the Most Humble Report, March 3 (15)]. GA RF (Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1898b. f. 568, op. 1, 59, l. 15–15 ob. “V. N. Lamsdorf. Konspekt

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vsepoddanneĭshego doklada 10 (22) marta” [V. N. Lamsdorf. Abstract from the Most Humble Report, March 10 (22)]. GA RF (Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1903a. f. 818, op. 1, 59, l. 1. “G. A. Planson. “Proekt dogovora s Yaponieĭ” [Draft Treaty with Japan]. (late August). GA RF (Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1903b. f. 568, op. 1, 180, l. 57. “Pis’mo V. N. Lamsdorfa Nikolaiu II 19 noiabria (2 dekabria)” [V. N. Lamsdorf. Letter to Nicholas II, November 19 (December 2)]. GA RF (Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1903c. f. 568, op. 1 , 180, l. 64. “Pis’mo V. N. Lamsdorfa E.I. Alekseevu 25 noiabria (8 dekabria)” [V. N. Lamsdorf. Letter to E. I. Alekseev, November 25 (December 8)]. GA RF (Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1903d. f. 568, op. 1, 180, l. 99–100. “Pis’mo V. N. Lamsdorfa Nikolaiu II 22 dekabria (4 ianvaria 1904)” [V. N. Lamsdorf. Letter to Nicholas II, December 22, 1903 (January 4, 1904)]. GA RF (Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1903e. f. 601, оp. 1, 2421, l. 1–2 ob. “Zapiska Nikolaia II E.I. Alekseevu, kopiia” [Nicholas II. Note to E. I. Alekseev” (copy)]. GA RF (Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1904. f. 568, op. 1, 661, l. 76–77. “Pis’mo Nikolaia II V. N. Lamsdorfu 21 ianvaria (3 fevralia)” [Nicholas II. Letter to V. N. Lamsdorf, January 21 (February 3)]. Hayashi, Tadasu. 1913. “Zapiski grafa Hayashi ob anglo-yaponskom soiuse” [Notes of Count Hayashi on the Anglo-Japanese Union]. Izvestiya MID, no. 5: 312–37. Ignat’ev, Anatoliĭ Venediktovich, and Georgiĭ Vasil′evich Melikhov. 1997. “Dal’niĭ Vostok v planakh i politike Rossii. Proiskhozhdenie russko-yaponskoĭ voĭny” [The Far East in Russian Plans and Policy. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War]. In Istoriia vneshneĭ politiki Rossii. Konets 19–nachalo 20 veka (ot russko-frantsuzskogo soiuza do Oktiabr’skoĭ revolutsii) [The History of Foreign Policy of Russia. The End of the 19th to the Beginning of the 20th Century (From the Russian-French Union to the October Revolution)], edited by A. V. Ignat’ev, 133–62. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. Korostovets, Ivan Yakovlevich. 1918. “Mirnye peregovory v Portsmute” [Peace Talks in Portsmouth in 1905]. Byloe, no. 2 (30): 110–46. Kuropatkin, Alekseĭ Nikolaevich. 1923. Dnevnik [Diary]. Nizhniĭ Nóvgorod: Nizhpoligraf. Kutakov, Leonid Nikolaevich. 1988. Rossiia i Yaponiia [Russia and Japan]. Moscow: Nauka. Lukoyanov, Igor Vladimirovich. 2008. “Ne otstat’ ot derzhav … Rossiia na Dal’nem Vostoke v kontse 19–nachale 20 v” [Not to Lag Behind the World Powers … Russia

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in the Far East from the End of the 19th to the Beginning of the 20th Century]. St. Petersburg: Nestor-istoriia. Nikitin (Fokagitov), Dmitriĭ Vladimirovich. 1955. “Kak nachalas’ voĭna s Yaponieĭ” [How the War with Japan Began]. In Port-Artur : vospominaniya uchastnikov [Port Arthur. Recollections of Participants], 43–56. New York: Chekhov Publishing House of the Eastern European Fund. OPI GIM (Gosudarstvennyĭ istoricheskiĭ muzeĭ, Otdel pis’mennykh istochnikov) [State Historical Museum, Department of Written Sources]. 1897. f. 444, оp. 1, 105, l. 29–29 ob. “Chernovik instruktsii R.R. Rozenu, odobrennyĭ Nikolaem II, 9 (21) maia (kopiia)” [Draft of the Instruction to R. R. Rosen Approved by Nicholas II, May 9 (21)” (copy)]. OPI GIM (Gosudarstvennyĭ istoricheskiĭ muzeĭ, Otdel pis’mennykh istochnikov) [State Historical Museum, Department of Written Sources]. 1901. f. 444, оp. 1, 99, l. 195–98. “A. P. Izvol’skiĭ. Donesenie v Ministerstvo inostrannykh del 5 (18) ianvaria (kopiia)” [A. P. Izvol’skiĭ. Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 5 (January 18) (copy)]. OPI GIM (Gosudarstvennyĭ istoricheskiĭ muzeĭ, Otdel pis’mennykh istochnikov) [State Historical Museum, Department of Written Sources]. 1904. f. 444, оp. 1, 105, l. 166– 72. “Zhurnal Osobogo soveshchaniya 15 (28) ianvaria (kopiia)” [Journal of a Special Consultation January 15 (28) (copy)]. OR IRLI (Otdeln rukopsie Instituta) [Manuscript Department of the Institute of Russian literature (Pushkinskiĭ House)]. 1896. f. 325, op. 1, d. 242, l. 1–3 ob. “Chernovik pis’ma M. A. Hitrovo A. B. Lobanovu-Rostovskomu, bez daty (posle 21 fevralia/4 marta)” [M. A. Hitrovo. Letter to A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskiĭ] (n.d., after February 21/ March 4) (draft copy). Pokrovskiĭ, Mikhail Nikolaevich, ed. 1925. Russko-yaponskaya voĭna. Iz dnevnikov A. N. Kuropatkina i N. P. Linevicha [The Russo-Japanese War. From the Diaries of A. N. Kuropatkin and N. P. Linevich]. Leningrad: Gosizdat. Popov, Aleksandr L’vovich. 1932. “Pervye shagi russkogo imperialisma na Dal’nem Vostoke (1888–1903 gg)” [The First Steps of the Russian Imperialism in the Far East (1888–1903)], Krasnyĭ arkhiv, no. 3 (52): 34–124. RGAVMF (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota) [Russian State Archives of the Navy]. 1903a. f. 32, op.1, 156. l. 9–10. “Pis’mo E. I. Alekseeva R. R. Rozenu 30 i 31 avgusta (12 i 13 sentiabria)” [E. I. Alekseev. Letter to R. R. Rosen, August 30 and 31 (September 12 and 13)]. RGAVMF (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota) [Russian State Archives of the Navy]. 1903b. f. 32, op. 1, 484, l. 12. “Pis’mo V. N. Lamsdorfa E. I. Alekseevu 23 noiabria (6 dekabria)” [V. N. Lamsdorf. Letter to E. I. Alekseev, November 23 (December 6)]. RGIA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ istoricheskiĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Historical Archives]. [n.d.]. f. 1072, op. 2, d. 246. “Korrekturnyi ottisk stat’i E. E. Ukhtomskogo

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s rezoliutsieĭ Nikolaia II, bez daty” [Proof-sheet of E. Ukhtomskiĭ Article with the Resolution of Nicholas II, undated]. RGIA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ istoricheskiĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Historical Archives]. 1905. f. 1328, op. 2, 5, l. 78. George von Lengerke Meyer to State Secretary Elihu Root. August 24. Romanov, Boris Aleksandrovich, ed. 1928a. “Konets russko-yaponskoĭ voĭny (Voennoe soveshchanie 24 maia 1905 goda v Tsarskom Sele)” [The End of the Russo-Japanese War (Military Meeting in Tsarkoye Selo on May 24, 1905)], Krasnyi arkhiv, no. 3 (28): 182–204. Romanov, Boris Aleksandrovich, ed. 1928b. Rossiia v Man’chzhurii (1892–1906). Ocherki po istorii vneshneĭ politiki samoderzhaviia v ėpokhu imperialisma [Russia in Manchuria (1892–1906) [Essays on the History of the Autocracy’s Foreign Policy in the Era of Imperialism]. Leningrad: Leningradskiĭ Vostochnyĭ Institut imeni A. S. Enukidze. Romanov, Boris Aleksandrovich. 1955. Ocherki diplomaticheskoĭ istorii russko-yaponskoĭ voĭny 1895–1907 [Essays on the Diplomatic History of the Russo-Japanese War 1895– 1907]. Moscow and Leningrad: Akademiya nauk SSSR (Academy of Sciences of the USSR). Russko-yaponskaya voĭna 1904–1905 gg.: Rabota voenno-istoricheskoĭ komissii po opisaniiu russko-yaponskoĭ voĭny [The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905: Work of the Military and Historical Commission in Describing the Russo-Japanese War]. 1910. Vol. 1 of 9. St. Petersburg: (no publisher). Russko-yaponskaya voĭna 1904–1905 gg.: Rabota istoricheskoĭ komissii po opisaniiu deĭstviĭ flota v voĭnu 1904–1905 gg pri Morskom General’nom shtabe [Work of the Historical Commission in Describing Actions of the Fleet in the War of 1904–1905 by the Navy General Staff]. 1912–1917. Vol. 1 of 7. St. Petersburg: (no publisher). Sbornik diplomaticheskikh dokumentov, kasaiushchikhsia peregovorov mezhdu Rossieĭ i Yaponie o zakluchenii mirnogo dogovora 24 maia–3 oktiabria 1905 goda [Collection of Diplomatic Documents Concerning Negotiations between Russia and Japan on the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty]. May 24–October 3, 1905. (1906). St. Petersburg: (no publisher). Simanskiĭ, Panteleĭmon Nikolaevich. 1910a. Sobytiya na Dal’nem Vostoke, predshestvovavshie voĭne, i podgotovka Rossii i Yaponii k etoĭ voĭne v politicheskom otnoshenii v: Russko-yaponskaya voĭna 1904–1905 gg. Rabota voenno-istoricheskoĭ komissii po opisaniiu russko-yaponskoĭ voĭny [The Events in the Far East Preceding the War and the Political Preparation of Russia and Japan for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Work of the Military and Historical Commission to Describe the Russo-Japanese War]. Vol. 1 of 9, 1–84. St. Petersburg: (no publisher). Simanskiĭ, Panteleĭmon Nikolaevich. 1910b. Sobytiia na Dal’nem Vostoke, predshestvovavshie russko-yaponskoĭ voĭne (1891–1903) [Events in the Far East Preceding the Russo-Japanese War (1891–1903)]. Vols. 1–3. St. Petersburg: (no publisher). - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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English Sources

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Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1958. Nihon gaikō bunsho [Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy]. Vol. 37, no. 1. Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai. Wada Haruki. 2009–2010. Nichiro sensō: kigen to kaisen [The Russo-Japanese War: The Origins and the Beginning of the Conflict]. 2 vols. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Lukoyanov, Igor Vladimirovich. “The Bezobrazovtsy.” In World War Zero. Vol. 1, The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective, World War Zero, edited by John W. Steinberg, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David Wolff, and Shinji Yokote, 65–86. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005. Okamoto, Shumpei. 1970. The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. New York: Columbia University Press. PRO FO (Public Record Office. Foreign Office). 1904a. 65/1678, p. 16. “Sir Charles Scott to Lord Lansdowne, January 6.” PRO FO (Public Record Office. Foreign Office). 1904b. 65/1678 р. 91. “Sir Charles Scott to Lord Lansdowne January 20.” Valliant, Robert Britton. 1974. Japan and the Trans-Siberian Railroad, 1885–1905. PhD diss., University of Hawai’i Press. Wolff, David, Steven G. Marks, Bruce W. Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, John W. Steinberg, and Yokote Shinji, eds. The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective, World War Zero. Vol. II. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007.

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part 3

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Japanese-Russian Relations after the Treaty of Portsmouth: between Friendship and Suspicion Kurosawa Fumitaka The Japanese Imperial Conference of February 4, 1904, resulted in the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia and the declaration of war against it but until this point certain Japanese leaders remained somewhat reluctant to enter into war. Even the genrō (elder statesman) Yamagata Aritomo, who since the beginning of the Meiji period (1868–1912) had consistently viewed Russia as a potential threat to Japan, argued on December 12, 1903, that he had never approved war against Russia when asked by Prime Minister Katsura Tarō about how to proceed if Japan’s demands regarding Korea were not met. The Russians, for their part, were also unwilling to wage war against Japan. Emperor Nicholas II did not want war—he even accepted the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula—and his cabinet ministers sought ways to avert a conflict. But Japan and Russia did go to war in February 1904. Alekseĭ S. Suvorin, publisher and editor-in-chief of the influential Russian newspaper Novoe vremya, reported the following on January 23 (February 5), 1904, following the outbreak of hostilities: Whether Russia wants it or not, in war, you must fight and hate the enemy country even if you hate to hate it. You cannot spare your own life. You cannot spare your opponents’ lives. You must just fight. This is a tragedy, one full of horror and bloodshed, full of whipped-up war spirit and force, full of the frantic fervor for war. He also remarked: In the Far East, where we are going to fight, what are we looking for? What are our purposes? Are they vitally important? These are the questions that we must ask and find genuine answers to. We must not be guided by the boom for useless things that will soon disappear, such as one’s love of honor, national pride, and insults hurled at us as a group, regardless of how sage or inane they are. We must retain calmness in order to decide about war and peace. We must retain the power of reason and keep things in perspective. We must be sure of what we want to achieve. wada 2009–2010, vol. 2, 295–96

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_006

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Historians frequently maintain that Japan and Russia were drawn over their interests in the Korean Peninsula following the first Sino-Japanese War (1894– 1895). The bitterness over this issue reached a new level when the Russians occupied Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901), and this eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War. The question remains, however, about how “vitally important” such issues (and the justification for war) actually were. What was the “vitally important” reason that drove Russia and Japan to resort to the most extreme act of war? It is clear that a dispute between the two nations over the control of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria did in fact exist but as Suvorin ponders in the above passage were they truly significant in the face of “calmness” and “reason”? Were both countries not “guided” by “the boom for useless things that would soon disappear, such as one’s love of honor, national pride …”? And was the war not the outcome of various “misunderstandings” and “erroneous assumptions”? For the leaders of Russia and Japan the dispute over the control of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria provided grounds for war, even if there were certain psychological factors, such as honor or national pride, that were deeply embedded in the decisions made in the run-up to the conflict. “The integrity of Korea is a matter of constant concern to our empire,” announced Emperor Meiji in the imperial edict of February 10, 1904, on the declaration of war against Russia. Japanese leaders, in other words, believed that Russia endangered the “territorial integrity” of Korea, thereby validating the resolution to enter into war. This viewpoint of the Japanese side demonstrates that the Russo-Japanese War was indeed an imperialistic war: both Japan and Russia harbored strong suspicions that the other would invade them or their interests and saw each other as potential threats. During this period, war was believed to be warranted when one country felt that its territories, as well as those of countries deemed within their sphere of influence or with interests of “vital importance” to their national security, were under threat, or that there was a diplomatic or ideological conflict over a particular region. Imperialism, being a system that promotes the expansion of politic, diplomatic, economic, and military aspiration, in turn, resulted in deeply rooted misgivings between Russia and Japan. Although the Russo-Japanese War concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5 (August 23), 1905, imperialism did not; it remained the foremost political instrument in the workings of international relations. Imperialism during this era was double sided. On the one hand, a country developed an exclusionary sphere of influence and on the other it maintained an open door policy, with equal opportunities in commerce and industry, and guarantees of territorial integrity. A delicate balance of strength

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was required among the Great Powers in order to maintain world peace. War could easily erupt once this balance was lost and evolve into a situation that the journalist Suvoran described above as “full of horror and bloodshed, full of whipped-up war spirit and force, full of the frantic fervor for war.” 1

The Relations between Japan and Russia under Imperialism

Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 was a major turning point for the international standing and security issues of the hitherto insular Japanese nation. The two major diplomatic issues of the Meiji period—control of Korea and the unequal treaties—were finally resolved, respectively, with the annexation of Korea in 1910 and the signing of new treaties in 1911 between the United States (Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Japan and the United States) and the United Kingdom (Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation). National security was ensured and equal sovereignty was established on par with Western powers, as evinced by the change of the Japanese legation in the United Kingdom to the Embassy of Japan in December 1905. Japan was now officially acknowledged as one of eight major nations comprising the Great Powers, the others including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and the United States. The profound change in Japan’s international status had an enormous impact on Japanese policy-makers, diplomats, and military leaders. Before the Russo-Japanese War, the annual operation plan of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) included a defensive strategy in the event that enemy forces landed on the Japanese mainland. The Minister of the Navy, Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyōe (Yamamoto Gonbei), defined Japan as an island empire that had geopolitical features of a maritime state and with it a high degree of foreign trade. He stated in late June 1903, “It is all right to lose Korea. For the Empire of Japan to defend its own territories is enough.” At the core of this “island empire” (shima teikoku) theory, one also advocated by the Japanese Imperial Navy (JIN), was the defense of the mainland. This remained the primary military strategy for Japan; moreover, the notion of an “island empire” contributed to Japan’s image of itself. Following the Russo-Japanese War, Russia relinquished the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway south of Changchun to Japan, and it also returned its leases of Port Arthur and Dalian (J: Dairen) to China that were then handed over to Japan. As a result, Japan secured substantial overseas interests in Manchuria as it embarked on making Korea a Japanese protectorate before its annexation in 1910. The acquisition of interests and colonies on the

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continent eventually shaped this insular nation into a continental nation that was at the same time a maritime state. This tremendous change in imperial Japan’s status pressed the military to make a tactical about-turn, with the operational guidelines now to be built on the offense on the continent rather than the defense of the mainland. In the February “1906 Outlines of Imperial Japanese Army Strategic Planning” (Nihon teikoku rikugun sakusen keikaku yoryō) the Imperial Japanese Army, for the first time, published its plan of offense regarding the continent, which would later become an integral part of the “Imperial National Defense Plan” (Teikoku kokubō hōshin) of April 1907. 2

The Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Continued Wariness toward Russia

Japanese political and military leaders, fearing that Russia might take revenge, renewed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in August 12, 1905, during the final stage of the war. It was both an offensive and defensive alliance, obliging Japan to enter the war immediately and attack Russian forces in Manchuria in the event that the United Kingdom went to war with Russia. The renewal of the alliance treaty was one significant military factor for the aforementioned strategical change on the continent. The second Anglo-Japanese Alliance with the United Kingdom provided the Imperial Navy with a certain military advantage by deterring the Russians from rebuilding their navy. It was more difficult for the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) however, since they believed that Russia would launch a revenge attack on Japan. Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka Giichi, who greatly assisted in drafting the 1906 Imperial National Defense Plan, maintained that if war between Japan and Russia broke out in Manchuria, the British army’s operational activities in the Indian border areas would have little impact on the fighting. Yet if the British and Russians were already fighting and Japan then declared war on Russia, it was very possible that Japan would be conducting a major war following the escalation of a conflict initially intended as a minor branch war. And in this light Tanaka averred that: “It is understood that all the gain from the campaign will be of service to Britain.” He very clearly expressed his dissatisfaction when he said, “I have to say that I find it hard to see whether the offensive and defensive alliance between Japan and Britain would benefit our army at all in operational influences, except regarding to infiltration.” Tanaka was not alone. There were many skeptics in the Imperial Japanese Army regarding the alliance with the United Kingdom because the British army

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was unlikely to make a sizable military contribution to Japan in the event of a second Russo-Japanese War. Yamagata Aritomo promoted the maintenance and the building of stronger ties with the Chinese Qing-dynasty (1644–1912) in his national security plans at the end of the war because he was concerned about the possibility of Russia’s deepening ties with the Chinese empire. He was fearful that Japan could find itself fighting against a coalition of “the main enemy of Russia and the secondary enemy of China.” The second division head of the General Staff Office, Matsuishi Yasuharu, who had participated in drafting the Imperial National Defense Plan in 1906, asked in his “Opinions on National Defense” (Kokubō hōshin ni kansuru iken) of December 1906, “What kind of alliances will they form in the future to cope with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance?,” stating that a Russian, a Russian-Chinese, or even a Russian-German alliance could be construed as imaginary enemies. In fact, the worst-case scenario cited in the Imperial National Defense Plan was the formation of an alliance between Germany and Russia. The global imperialist environment had therefore shifted post RussoJapanese War, and Japan, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France were now building closer ties than previously. Japanese military leaders still remained somewhat cautious of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In its dealings with Russia, it was necessary to assess a number of possible scenarios, this process culminating in the first Russo-Japanese Agreement in July 1907. 3

The Deepening Ties between Japan and Russia

The 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth stipulated that the Russian and Japanese armies should be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula (Gaimushō 1960, 538) within a period of eighteen months after the date of implementation. This meant that until the deadline of April 15, 1907, the two countries were on terms of a so-called “armed peace.” By 1906, however, there were signs of rapprochement, as the withdrawal of troops by both countries progressed. A confidential document from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs dating to April 13, 1906, urged that Japan improve its relations with Russia since the first principle of diplomacy with Russia required that it, as a victor nation, must be open-minded and make Russia forget old grudges and encourage friendship between the two countries. The document continued to state that “Britain is about to achieve a better relationship with Russia in Central Asia and that the British and American sentiment toward Russia is greatly improved. Such sentiments explain why Japan must attempt to establish lasting

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peace in the Far East by building a closer relationship with Russia” (Gaimushō 1959, 228). In his “Thoughts on Policies on China” (Tai Shin seisaku shokan) from January 1907, Yamagata Aritomo backed a Russo-Japanese partnership that would not contravene the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Moreover, he believed that such a partnership was needed to counter the rise of Chinese nationalism in the postwar era of the first Sino-Japanese War: “Exchanging opinions with the Russians and negotiate a trade treaty … is, if you ask me, the most urgent matter within this climate of international affairs.” Diplomatic views in Russia were likewise in flux following the RussoJapanese War and the Revolution of 1905, particularly once the former envoy to Japan, Aleksandr P. Izvol’skiĭ, became Foreign Minister. Russia’s emerging foreign policy was now one based on “harmony and balance.” In his view, Russia’s state security could only be ensured if it sought cooperation with the Great Powers in the region spanning the Far East to Europe. One of the fruits of his efforts was the Anglo-Russian Entente, signed on August 31, 1907, that settled their disputes in Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia. Russia’s endeavors to establish more harmonious relations with Japan began more precisely in February 1907 when Foreign Minister Izvol’skiĭ conveyed Russia’s wish to negotiate an agreement to the Japanese minister to Russia, Motono Ichirō. Izvol’skiĭ’s Japanese counterpart and a member of the first Saionji Kinmochi cabinet, Hayashi Tadasu, agreed, as did the genrō Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo. Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and former Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, by now ambassador to the United Kingdom, likewise understood its necessity. Finance Minister Sakatani Yoshirō also supported this move from a financial point of view. He believed that RussoJapanese and French-Japanese Ententes would be the most effective way to allay the skepticism by both the Japanese and Russian military such that in the future they would not resort to military expansionism driven by fear. The Russians and the Japanese had opposing views regarding the Mongolian problem but overall the negotiations proceeded smoothly with the assistance from the United Kingdom, which was moving closer to signing the AngloRussian Entente, and France, which was negotiating the Franco-Japanese Treaty (signed June 10, 1907). The first Russo-Japanese Agreement was signed on July 30 (August 12), 1907, but symbolically Russo-Japanese detente had been noted a month earlier at the second Hague Conference in June, when the Russian representative Aleksandr I. Nelidov, who presided over the conference, refused to meet the three secret Korean emissaries dispatched by the Korean emperor in the hope of persuading the international community of the invalidity of a second Japan-Korea Treaty (November 17, 1905). With Japan’s

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support he also blocked them from attending the conference. Following this incident, known as the Hague Secret Emissary Affair, and the subsequent abdication of the Korean emperor Gojong, the third Japan-Korea Treaty (July 24, 1907) was concluded, and Korea became a full Japanese protectorate. The objective of the first Russo-Japanese Agreement, as mentioned in the text’s foreword, was to reconcile the interests of the two countries, to prevent conflict and maintain order in East Asia, and to consolidate relations of peace and good neighborliness in order to remove every possible cause for future misunderstanding in the relationship between the two empires. This treaty differed greatly from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which as noted above was basically an offensive and defensive alliance that was put in place to counter an imagined enemy. In essence, the Russo-Japanese Agreement and the AngloJapanese Alliance were able to function side by side. The British foreign secretary Edward Grey expressed his view to the Ambassador Komura Jutarō once the British Foreign Office was informed of the agreement, and before its formal announcement, stated the British government was satisfied that the new agreement between Russia and Japan would certainly expand the core idea of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. A complete withdrawal of Russian and Japanese troops, the conclusion of the agreement between the two nations, together with the signing of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and the Fisheries Convention on July 15 (July 28), 1907, marked the beginning of a new postwar era for the two nations. Russia nonetheless remained an imagined enemy in the Japanese psyche, and in the Imperial National Defense Plan Russia was the principal (i.e., hypothetical) enemy state. Taking this into consideration, the establishment of each country’s sphere of influence under the first Russo-Japanese Agreement was seen, by the Japanese ruling class at least, as a safeguard to protect Japan’s interest in southern Manchuria and to prevent possible Russian movement southwards into Korea. 4

The American Attempt to Neutralize the South Manchuria Railway and the Second Russo-Japanese Agreement

The second Katsura Tarō cabinet was ushered in during August 1908. Komura Jutarō returned to the post of Foreign Minister, and he advised on the Imperial Foreign Policy Guidelines (Teikoku no taigai seisaku hōshin) that the Katsura cabinet had approved in September. The text of the policy guidelines reaffirmed the significance in “the maintenance of peace,” not only as the principal purpose of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance but also of the first Russo-Japanese

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Agreement. The guidelines stated that “the two agreements with Russia and Britain, respectively, have consolidated Japanese security in East Asia like never before” (Gaimushō 1960, 75–76). On the other side of the Pacific, relations between the United States and Japan were quite strained following the Russo-Japanese War. But a cooperative relationship was resurfacing by November 1908 as demonstrated by the signing of the Takahira–Root Agreement negotiated between Elihu Root, the secretary of war under US president Theodore Roosevelt, and Takahira Kogorō, Japanese ambassador to the United States. In March 1909, however, William Howard Taft assumed the US presidential office. Philander Chase Knox, secretary of state in the Taft administration, shocked both Japan and Russia in November by proposing the “neutralization” of the South Manchuria Railway to the Great Powers. His plan was to have Qing-dynasty China purchase the railways in Manchuria with funds from an international syndicate. Knox’s intention was to topple Japanese and Russian dominance in Manchuria by placing the railways under international control. This would effectively deny both countries their respective spheres of influence, the existence of the latter at the heart of the US Open Door policy. For Japanese leaders, Knox’s proposal was as equally shocking as the diplomatic Triple Intervention of 1905 between Russia, Germany, and France. Deputy Minister of the Navy, Takarabe Takeshi, did not hide his frustration regarding this development: “We shed so much blood for this. How dare they try to benefit from our blood as much as we do?” The Russians shared this sentiment. In January 1910, Japan and Russia jointly rejected the “neutralization” plan proposed by the United States, and this served to draw Japan and Russia closer. There was an increased call within the Russian government to update the country’s relationship with Japan, prompting Foreign Minister Izvol’skiĭ to pay heed to Japanese opinions regarding a new trade agreement in January 1910. Prime Minister Katsura’s government reacted positively. On a trip back to Japan the Japanese ambassador to Russia, Motono Ichirō, told the Russian ambassador in Tokyo, Nikolaĭ A. Malevskiĭ-Malevich, that “Our Agreement in 1907 was a passive one.” In this light, the second Russo-Japanese Agreement, signed on July 4 (July 17), 1910, recognized the exclusive right of each country within their own spheres of influence. The secret convention of the agreement defined each country’s sphere of influence or the respective spheres of their special interests in Manchuria by the demarcation line established in the first agreement. The document also stipulated that they “recognize the right of each in its sphere freely to take all the necessary measures to safeguard and defend such interests” and that if either country’s special interests are “threatened,” the two countries would act in “concert with each other” and “lend support to

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each other” in order to defend the status quo (Gaimushō 1962, Articles I–III, p. 139, no. 87). Moreover, it stated that: In case any event arises of a nature that would threaten the abovementioned status quo, Japan and Russia shall, in each instance, enter into communication with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may judge necessary to take for the maintenance of the said status quo. In case those special interests are threatened, Japan and Russia shall act in concert with each other regarding the measures to be taken, in view of common action or support to be lent to each other in order to safeguard and defend those interests. gaimushō 1962, Article V, 140

Relations between Japan and Russia were now more intimate than ever. Though still arguing that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had the top priority in Japan’s foreign policy, Komura welcomed the new agreement with Russia. He believed that it represented not only the logical conclusion of the first agreement approved by the United Kingdom but also the solution to the causes of a possible future war that would “offer the strongest assurance to the maintenance of peace in the East” (Gaimushō 1962, 153–54). The significance of Japan’s annexation of Korea in the same year (1910) cannot be overlooked from the standpoint of the maintenance of order in East Asia. When Prime Minister Katsura and his cabinet decided to take the dramatic step of annexing this peninsular nation, its main concern was how the Russians would react since it had clashed with Japan over the control of Korea. The cabinet agreed that the timing of the annexation had to be done at the appropriate moment—that is, “right after the resolution of the problem about which we are negotiating with Russia.” Japan formally annexed Korea in August 1910 following the signing of the second agreement with Russia and with Russia’s prior approval. 5

The Xinhai Revolution and the Third Russo-Japanese Agreement

On October 10, 1911, the Xinhai Revolution erupted in China, which resulted in the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC). At this time, Japan, now under the second term (1911–1912) of Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi, was very close to the inclusion of southern Manchuria as part of its sphere of influence that was in keeping with the second Russo-Japanese Agreement and following the confirmation of

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agreements in the Portsmouth Treaty and Convention of Peking [Beijing]. On October 24, two weeks after the eruption of the Xinhai Revolution, the Saionji cabinet affirmed its determination to keep Manchuria and that Japan, for the first time, would attain a position of predominance on mainland China. The Imperial Japanese Army, anticipating that the revolution would spill over into Manchuria, planned to send troops in order to protect the railway if needed, demonstrating that Japan might possibly find itself in the same position as Russia’s countermeasure against the riots during the Boxer Rebellion. The Saionji cabinet hoped that the disorder caused by the revolution would be brought under control by Japan in concert with the United Kingdom, but the British attempted to resolve the situation without consulting Japan. This greatly undermined Japan’s confidence in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The disappointment among Japan’s military leaders was clear, not only within the army, who had on occasion expressed skepticism and claimed that the alliance was now becoming an empty shell, but also within the navy. The chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Tochinai Sōjirō, for example, observed that the fact that the United Kingdom had not consulted Japan and had acted unilaterally was extremely regrettable. It violated, he believed, the spirit of the alliance and partnership. In March 1912, Tanaka Giichi, now chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs, remarked that “if Japan is in a subordinate position to the United Kingdom, which is now a mere shadow of the ally that it once was, what can we expect of our future development and prosperity?” (Nagaoka Gaishi Kankei Bunsho Kenkyūkai 1989, 206–7). The disappointment and displeasure at the course of events not only extended to political and military leaders. In early 1912, the Japanese press began to release reports that communicated its mistrust of the United Kingdom and offered negative evaluations of the alliance. On January 18, 1912, the newspaper Tōkyō nichi nichi shinbun argued that the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in July 1911 would now be almost meaningless because of what was being done in its name. On February 4, 1912, the newspaper Kokumin shinbun reported that the alliance is now of hugely reduced value. The Kokumin shinbun scathingly criticized the alliance by stating that “today’s Anglo-Japanese Alliance is, as it were, only a shell of a cicada. It looks as it used to be, but its soul is long gone.” However, another opinion called for an alliance with Russia. The April 1912 issue of the popular monthly Chūō kōron, for instance, declared that “the Russo-Japanese Alliance must be established as our national policy, and with our full effort, with the government and the people acting in concert.” Outer Mongolia declared its independence in December 1911, and Russia supported its actions, making note of its special relationship with that country. The Japanese government now contemplated whether it would demand

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that Russia establish a sphere of influence over Inner Mongolia, which had not been detailed in the second Russo-Japanese Agreement. Mongolia had in fact been a continued source of concern for Japan. The formation of the international consortium comprising the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Germany, along with the commencement of its operations in Manchuria after November 1910, irritated both Japan and Russia. It was at this point that Russia employed the general term “Mongolia” to refer to the region. Japan wished to avoid any future “misunderstanding” and to make a clear the extent of the Russian and Japanese sphere of influence in Mongolia. The Russians, for their part, wanted to begin negotiations with Japan over the partition of Mongolia and Manchuria because many Russian officials believed that the annexation of Manchuria was an unresolved problem that required prompt settlement. Negotiations were eventually launched in January 1912, and the third Russo-Japanese Agreement was concluded on July 8. The third agreement redrew the spheres of influence in order to remove potential sources of misunderstanding regarding each country’s special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. The demarcation line decided in former agreements was to be extended westward and Inner Mongolia would be divided into eastern and western sections, each of which would be integrated in the respective sphere of influence (Gaimushō 1963). In doing so, the efforts by Japan and Russia to exercise regional control expanded from “Manchuria” to “Manchuria and Mongolia.” It also explains how Japan was gradually driven closer to Russia as a result of the growing skepticism regarding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance after the Xinhai Revolution, the British response to it, and the change of the situation in Mongolia. 6

The First World War and the Fourth Russo-Japanese Agreement

On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, marking the outbreak of World War I. On August 28, Okuma Shigenobu’s cabinet formally declared war on Germany following a British request for assistance under the leadership of Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki. The United Kingdom withdrew the request only days before Japan’s declaration of war, however, thereby causing great discord between the two nations. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the French and Russian governments expressed their wish to participate in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. France wished to secure French Indochina, and Russia wanted to reserve its troops stationed in Siberia for the campaign against Germany. Senior Japanese leaders including Yamagata Aritomo and Inoue Kaoru supported the idea, even though Foreign Minister Katō objected

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to an announcement that the four-nation alliance must wait until the end of the war. What concerned Katō was the prospect that if Russia and France are invited, it would become pointless and lose its role as an offensive and defensive alliance. Katō was sure that it would be nothing more than a type of entente, making the validity of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance unacceptably weak. The plan of a quadruple alliance stopped there. On January 9, 1915, the French and Russian ambassadors to Britain visited the British foreign secretary Edward Grey to propose the formation of an eternal alliance between Japan, the United Kingdom, France and Russia or otherwise to invite Japan to the London Declaration of September 1914—that is, the Triple Entente “No Separate Peace Agreement,” which did not bring about the quadruple alliance. There were winds of change in Japan, however. Yamagata Aritomo was very wary about the possibility of a white-men’s coalition against the socalled “Yellow Peril,” as advocated by Emperor (Kaiser) Wilhelm of Germany. Yamagata believed that Japan needed Russia as an ally in order to prevent a Russian-German Alliance, and to this end he, together with other genrō, Inoue Kaoru, Matsukata Masayoshi, and Ōyama Iwao, wrote the “Discourse on a Russo-Japanese Alliance” (Nichiro domei ron), which was sent to Prime Minister Okuma on February 21. Foreign Minister Katō dismissed this, criticizing the elder statesmen of “putting too much water in the whiskey” (Katō Takaaki haku denki Hensan Iinkai 1929, vol. 1. 662; vol. 2. 49). The genrō group therefore overly played down the significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Still, there was no end in sight to the war. Russian troops were struggling against the Germans on the Eastern Front, and they eventually requested assistance from Japan. It was then decided at the Conference of Marshals held in June 1915 to send Russia 100,000 rifles and 20 million rounds of ammunition. The support for Yamagata Aritomo’s idea of allying with Russia was now growing, even among the Imperial Japanese Army. For instance, Terauchi Masatake, then Resident-General of Korea and one of the most experienced leaders, expressed his views that in the future, even if Japan keeps the alliance with the United Kingdom, it also needed to strengthen the relationships with Russia in order to counter the approach to China by the Great Powers. Otherwise, he said, the Japanese empire might lose ground to stand on. Tanaka Giichi, who would become deputy chief of the General Staff in October that year, argued that “it is necessary to promote our alliance with Russia” (Terauchi Masatake Kankei Bunsho, 315–37). On July 10, Yamagata Aritomo met Prime Minister Okuma and Foreign Minister Katō to call, for the third time, for an alliance with Russia. Yamagata stated that if Japan allied with Russia, creating a relationship equal to that with the United Kingdom, it could mediate between the two powers so that

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they would not clash. He maintained, in other words, that the Russo-Japanese Alliance could stand with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and that it would be extremely useful to do so. It was not until Katō stepped down in a cabinet reshuffle in August, however, that the pro-Russian alliance statesmen and the military finally had their way. The new Minister of Justice Ozaki Yukio, who had always supported the alliance with Russia, now had increased influence in the cabinet: “I have always tried to persuade Prime Minister Okuma to have a more amicable relationship with Russia, and if possible in the form of an agreement that is very similar to an alliance. When Mr. Okuma said yes, Japan was finally ready for closer relations” (Chiba 2008, 308). Ishii Kikujirō, then ambassador to France but who would later be appointed as Katō’s replacement, had not been impressed with the possible alliance with Russia on the grounds that it could severely restrict Japan’s postwar foreign policies. But even he was supportive of the idea by August, when the risk of a separate peace between Russia and Germany became clear and with the infiltration of a Russo-German Alliance into East Asia. For Ishii, the AngloJapanese Alliance has achieved its purpose, and he in fact believed that the British were becoming somewhat apprehensive about it. He did not find it particularly problematic if Japan and the United Kingdom invited a new participant, Russia, with British approval to partake in the alliance. Underlying Ishii’s change of opinion was the United Kingdom’s own shifting attitudes. Edward Grey, who had been more or less hesitant to invite Russia into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was now expressing concern that a struggling Russia could “change sides” and conclude a separate peace with Germany. In effect, the British foreign secretary had himself altered his views in an effort to prevent Russia from doing this. He requested that Japan do what it could for Russia in order to secure the United Kingdom’s own interests—in other words, through a Russo-Japanese Alliance within the limits and spirit of the AngloJapanese Alliance and military aid. Such switches in opinions on both sides led to broader change, but progress was slow. Even after Japan joined the London Declaration of 1914 in October, Foreign Minister Ishii was still disinclined to conclude an alliance with Russia. Japan’s indecisiveness was finally broken on January 12, 1916, when the Russian Grand Duke Georgiĭ Mikhailovich visited Japan. One staff member in his retinue, head of the Far Eastern Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry Grigoriĭ A. Kozakov, conveyed a message from Foreign Minister Sergeĭ D. Sazonov to Japanese leaders, including the head of the reception committed Terauchi Masatake. In essence it noted that as it was Germany’s intention to make China into a subject state similar to Turkey, Russia and Japan must

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cooperate. It was imperative that they devise a plan to invade China, to assist each other in a diplomatic capacity, and to sign a new agreement in order to build a firmer partnership. Japan was asked to provide the weapons and military supplies that Russian needed, and in return Russia would be ready to hand over part of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun to Songhua (Sungari) River to Japan. On February 14, Prime Minister Okuma’s cabinet decided on the governmental policy, and the following day gave instructions regarding the draft of the new Russo-Japanese Agreement to Ambassador Motono. At this juncture, the two countries launched negotiations and after roughly five months, on July 3, signed the fourth Russo-Japanese Agreement (Russo-Japanese Alliance). The intention was to cement further the genuine friendship between Russia and Japan. The agreement stipulated that if either country was at war with a hostile third-party country, they would provide military assistance to one another through the mobilization of troops. A separate peace was ruled out. British Foreign Secretary Grey, after unofficially seeing the draft of the agreement, remarked to then Japanese ambassador to the United Kingdom, Inoue Katsunosuke, that “I am satisfied that this Agreement makes the Anglo-Japanese Alliance stronger, as the former is a supplement to the latter” (Gaimushō 1967, 158). The relationships between Japan and Russia had finally evolved into an alliance. 7

Conclusion: from Enemy States to Friendly States

The above discussion indicates that ties between Japan and Russia gradually became stronger after the first agreement between the two countries in July 1907 and accompanying the broader change in international relations. The agreement developed from “completion” to “supplement” in the second agreement of July 1910 into an effectively offensive and defensive alliance in the third agreement of July 1912, and covering all of China in the fourth agreement of July 1916. The second agreement was triggered by the common threat of US dollar diplomacy, thereby clarifying the limits of each country’s sphere of influence. The third agreement was concluded in the aftermath of the Xinhai Revolution and served to expand and define the areas that were addressed in the document. And finally, the fourth agreement—the Russo-Japanese Alliance—was aimed at building closer relations as members of the Allied powers in World War I, an unprecedented total war. The basic character of each agreement lay in the reconciliation of both countries’ East Asian interests, the prevention of conflicts, and the maintenance

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of order. The formation of the agreements was testament to the elevation of Russo-Japanese relations during World War I. Yet following the Russo-Japanese War Russia still remained the primary “imagined” enemy for Japanese political and military leaders. Many members of the Japanese army, including Yamagata Aritomo, were fearful that Russia might wage a war of revenge against Japan, and this was clearly reflected in the “Imperial National Defense Plan.” The later developments in the links between the two countries were therefore not entirely rooted in the notion of mutual trust. In reality, the Russo-Japanese agreements were nothing more than documents between two imperial powers. Both countries continued their attempts at expansion, as demonstrated by the fact that as late as 1911 Yamagata insisted that Russia held an ongoing grudge against Japan and that it would surely try to take revenge on Japan sooner or later. This could not be stopped, he believed, prompting his request for the second Saionji cabinet to station two more divisions permanently in Korea. Even Ambassador Motono Ichirō, who had always advanced closer ties with Russia, had no allusions regarding the genuineness of the friendship between the two nations. With the outbreak of World War I, he stated that Japan should assist the Allied nations (United Kingdom, France, and Russia) as much as possible and be prepared for the peace treaty at war’s end. He even went as far as to say that Japan’s participation in the war had dispelled anti-Japanese sentiment in Russia and forced the Russians to recognize Japan as “its only friend.” The situation created an obvious opportunity for Japan to acquire increasing greater commercial interests in China from Russia. The steady development of relations into a “cordial” alliance, even if they were formed due to the special circumstances of World War I, was remarkable, particularly when considering the Triple Intervention roughly a decade earlier that contributed to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. In 1916, Japan and Russia, now erstwhile enemies, were on friendly terms. From that viewpoint, the two nations had more or less developed a mutual trust made possible in the age of imperialism after the series of Russo-Japanese agreements. One factor that cannot be ignored in the discussion of the Russo-Japanese relations is the United Kingdom. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had led to Russia becoming a common “imagined” enemy. Therefore, the building of closer ties between Japan and Russia in the agreements, including the AngloRussian Entente, might have weakened the significance of the alliance. The evolving relations between the three nations—Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom—could inherently change the perception of Russia as an imagined enemy. The third Anglo-Japanese Alliance of July 1911, which intended to deal with the possible dramatic changes occurring in China as it faced a revolution, was signed in the hope of “maintaining of China’s integrity” rather than

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as a move to contain Russia. Yet the United Kingdom pursued its China policy following the Xinhai Revolution without Japan. Despite the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan became distrustful of the United Kingdom. The Japanese Foreign Ministry believed that the alliance was nonetheless useful to maintain the status quo in China. At the same time, it should also be noted that concurrent with the third Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the United States, too, was no longer viewed as an “imagined” enemy state. The United Kingdom sought a solution to the difficult problem of maintaining its friendship with the United States and its alliance with Japan. For Japan, the United States was seen as the second “imagined” enemy state within the hostile climate existing between Japan and the United States after the Russo-Japanese War (this related to the control of Manchuria and immigration to the United States). Japan, however, would eventually accept the British proposal, depriving the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of its original intent as a deterrent against the United States. This prompted a backlash in the Japanese Imperial Navy, which criticized the government’s decision as marking the beginning of the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance because it would be rendered completely meaningless. Even Yamagata Aritomo expressed grave concerns that the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would rule out the British assistance in the event of war between Japan and the United States. What made the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a “true alliance” was the premise that both countries “shared a common enemy,” whether it be Russia or the United States. But on the eve of the Xinhai Revolution the alliance was beginning to lose its role as an offensive and defensive alliance. Within this climate, there were some, most notably Komura and Katō, the two organizers of the negotiations for the 1911 revision, who strongly believed that Japan’s top foreign policy priority must be the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. At the same time, however, it became clear that others were skeptical as early as 1902 of what this relationship as allies actually meant. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Russo-Japanese Agreement were two cogs in the wheels of Japanese foreign policy following the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth. And most Japanese diplomats were of the view that the AngloJapanese Alliance was the master while the Russo-Japanese Agreement was the servant—in other words, the former was a general alliance between Japan and the United Kingdom to East Asia and the latter a regional agreement between Japan and Russia regarding a part of Manchuria and Mongolia. For example, the China expert Komura Shunzaburō, an official interpreter at the Japanese Legation in China and Komura Jutarō’s cousin, expressed this view in “Current Affairs and Japan’s Policy on China, the First Plan” (Jikyoku to Taishi gaikō dai issaku) of October 1914. Such a stance also underlines why those who advocated

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the prioritization of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were reluctant about an alliance with Russia during World War I, voicing concerns that it would further undermine the significance and role of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It must also be pointed out that the change in East Asian international relations as a result of the outbreak of World War I had greatly influenced the offensive and defensive Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the shift in the RussoJapanese agreement that played a vital, stabilizing role in regional order. Europe’s drawback from East Asia prompted Japanese leaders to advance their plans to secure a dominant position in China. To this end, Japan understood that it should principally negotiate with Russia more than with the United Kingdom, whose presence in East Asia was now considerably weakened, in order to maintain the integrity of China and the general regional order in East Asia following the capture of Tsingtao from the Germans. The relative elevation in the influence of Russo-Japanese relations, which had long been based on common problems, such as the reconciliation of interests, the prevention of conflicts, and the maintenance of order, was crucial in changing from a “regional” agreement to a “broader” East Asian wide alliance. In this way, Russia and Japan came to enjoy a stronger, more far-reaching friendship because of the unprecedented imperialist nature of the total war of World War I, and this was how events were unfolding on the eve of the Russian Revolution in 1917. Bibliography

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Chiba Isao. 2008. Kyugaikō no keisei 1900–1919 [Japanese Diplomacy, 1900–1919]. Tokyo: Keisō Shobō. Chūō kōron. April 1912. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1955. Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabi ni shuyō bunsho [Chronology of Japanese Diplomacy and Principal Writings]. Vol 1. Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1959. Nihon gaikō bunsho [Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy]. Vol. 39, no 1 (1906). Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/39-1 .html. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1960. Nihon gaikō bunsho. Vol. 37/38. Separate volume, Nichiro sensō [The Russo-Japanese War]. Vol. 5. Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/ b2-5.html.

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Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1960. Nihon gaikō bunsho. Vol. 40, no. 1 (1907). Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/40-1.html. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1962. Nihon gaikō bunsho. Vol. 43, no. 1 (1910). Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/43-1.html. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1963. Nihon gaikō bunsho. Vol. 45, no. 1 (1912). Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/45-1.html. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1967. Nihon gaikō bunsho. Vol. 5, no. 1 (1916). Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/t5-1.html. Itō Yukio. 2000. Rikken kokka to Nichiro sensō: gaikō to naisei, 1898–1905 [State Constitutionalism and the Russo-Japanese War: Diplomacy and Domestic Affairs, 1898–1905]. Tokyo: Bokutakusha. Katō Takaaki haku denki Hensan Iinkai, ed. 1929. Katō Takaaki. 2 vols. Tokyo: Hōbunkan. Kitaoka Shin’ichi. 1978. Nihon rikugun no tairiku seisaku [The Japanese Army and Continental Policies]. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. Kobayashi Michihiko. 1996. Nihon no tairiku seisaku: 1895–1914: Katsura Tarō to Gotō Shinpei [The Japanese Continental Policies: 1895–1914: Katsura Tarō and Gotō Shinpei]. Tokyo: Nansōsha. Kurosawa Fumitaka. 2013. Futatsu no “kaikoku” to Nihon [Modern Japan Encounters the World Order]. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. Kurosawa Fumitaka. 2017. Meiji matsu Taishō shoki no Nichiro kankei [Japan-Russo Relations from the End of Meiji Period to the Early Taishō Period]. Journal of the Diplomatic Archives (March). Tokyo: Diplomatic Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Nagaoka Gaishi Kankei Bunsho Kenkyūkai, ed. 1989. Nagaoka Gaishi kankei bunsho shokan shorui hen [Nagaoka Gaishi Related Documents, Letters, and Documents]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan. Ōyama Azusa. Yamagata Aritomo iken sho [Written Opinions of Yamagata Aritomo]. Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966. Terauchi Masatake Kankei Bunsho [Terauchi, Masatake Related Documents], 315–37. Tokyo: Kensei Shiryōshitsu [Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room], National Diet Library, Japan. Tsunoda Jun. 1967. Manshū mondai to kokubō hōshin: Meiji kōki ni okeru kokubō kankyō no hendō [The Manchurian Question and Japan’s Defense Plan: Changes in the Defense Setting of Japan in the Late Meiji Period]. Tokyo: Hara Shobō. Wada Haruki. 2009–2010. Nichiro sensō: kigen to kaisen [The Russo-Japanese War: The Origins and the Beginning of the Conflict]. 2 vols. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

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Russo-Japanese Relations from 1905 to 1916: from Enemies to Allies Yuriĭ S. Pestushko and Yaroslav A. Shulatov 1

Russia and Japan Immediately after the War

The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, 1905, brought an end to the bloodshed of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). The protracted nature of this conflict led to the depletion of Japanese material and human resources, and Japan’s need to cease hostilities as soon as possible. At the same time, the revolution of 1905, which erupted following the events of Bloody Sunday in January 1905 in St. Petersburg, as well as the defeat at the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905, forced the Russian imperial government to accept the proposal by the US president Theodore Roosevelt to launch peace negotiations. Under the terms of the treaty, Russia recognized Japan’s special rights in Korea, transferred the lease rights for Port Arthur, Dalian (J: Dairen), ceded the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) from Port Arthur to Changchun along with southern Sakhalin (Nichirokan jōyaku kyōteishū 1923, 9–13). The Russo-Japanese War radically changed the political landscape of the Far East, and it occasioned fundamental changes in the military balance in the region. The Russian empire lost its leverage over the situation on the Korean Peninsula and was compelled to withdraw its troops from Manchuria. The naval base of Port Arthur, together with the Liaodong Peninsula, was transferred into Japanese hands. The condition of the military facilities of the Priamur’e region was unsatisfying, and during the war the empire essentially lost its naval forces. The strategic situation in the Far East therefore looked extremely unfavorable for Russia. Immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, Russian military analysts observed that the outcome of the war “overturned the political equilibrium in the Far East and put us in an almost hopeless strategic position.” It was vital for the empire “to ensure … peace through diplomatic channels for ten to fifteen years,” or “the goal … to stay on the shores of the Pacific Ocean could not be achieved” (RGAVMF 1907b, f. 418, op. 2, d. 290, l. 3–3 ob.). Military experts, in particular those belonging to the navy, opined that in the few years following the war there were no other options than to establish peaceful dialogue with Tokyo. With no allies in the Far East, Russia’s international position in the region was extremely vulnerable. France’s interests were in Indochina; the

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global confrontation with the United Kingdom remained, and the United States, which took a pro-Japanese stance during the war, acted as a new postwar rival. Moreover, the evolving revolution in Russia likewise ended any active foreign policy for the next few years. St. Petersburg’s presence in the Far East was dramatically weakened. This opened the way for Tokyo to take a prominent role and gain a firm foothold on the mainland, thereby sending a clear message of its desire to pursue an active policy in East Asia. The latter inevitably meant Japan’s increased role as a strong competitor of the United Kingdom and the United States, and this resulted in the deterioration of relations with these powers. This did not escape the attention of Russian diplomats, who commented on London’s dissatisfaction with Tokyo’s policy “for persistent violation of international principles of equality in Manchuria” (RGIA 1906, f. 560, op. 28, d. 228, 59–60), as well as a marked tension in relations with the United States. Historian Yoshimura Michio posits that with this situation, the “collaboration with yesterday’s enemy, Russia,” became Japan’s “daily agenda” (Yoshimura 1991, 7, 11–12). After 1905, the two empires occupied strategically similar positions in Manchuria in their resistance to the competition from other nations. And this evolved as one of the most important reasons in terms of foreign policy that later led to Russian-Japanese rapprochement. 2

From Confrontation to Common Interests: the Fundament of Rapprochement

The political establishments of Russia and Japan had hardline figures and groups that supported further confrontation. Noteworthy on the Japanese side were Tōyama Mitsuru, Kōno Hironaka, Ogawa Heikichi, Ōkuma Shigenobu, and Kodama Gentarō, who headed the Japanese General Staff until 1906. On the Russian side were right-wing parties such as the Russian Monarchist Union, Union of the Russian People, Union of the Archangel Michael as well as Pavel F. Unterberger, Arkadiĭ M. Valuev, Alekseĭ N. Kuropatkin, Vladimir A. Sukhomlinov, and others who believed that Russia should regain its lost positions in Korea and China through a new war with Japan (Pestushko 2010, 88–90). The Japanese military expressed similar concerns. In the Imperial National Defense Plan, presented to Emperor Meiji in 1906, Russia was referred to as the most likely opponent of the country (Oyama 1962, 170–77). The government made every effort to enhance the empire’s military potential, and this did not escape the attention of Russian representatives. In turn, the lack of a fleet, the backward infrastructure of the Priamur’e Military District, and the regions of

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Transbaikal, Priamur’e, Pacific coast region, and Sakhalin, for example, triggered an extremely acute perception of the Japanese threat by the Russian military and the governors of the country’s Far Eastern territories. Both the military and its administration were convinced that Japan was systematically preparing for new aggression against Russia and that this would happen in the near future (Shulatov 2008, 107–19). The cautious attitude adopted by the military of the two countries remained a serious factor in subsequent bilateral relations. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a crucial role in the strategy toward Japan, however. Immediately following the Russo-Japanese War, the ministry, headed by Vladimir N. Lamsdorf, tried to exert pressure on Tokyo regarding one of the key political issues of bilateral relations: Korea. The Russian government, “recognizing the permanence of Korean sovereign rights … invited the latter to another round of the Hague Conference” (AVP RI 1906). St. Petersburg tried to hinder the process of transformation of the Korean government as a protectorate of Japan. The Korean issue was a priority in Japan’s foreign policy, which firmly rejected the possibility of compromise. It refused to make any concessions and in some cases ignored international law (Shulatov 2008, 72–106). Japanese diplomats secured reliable support regarding the resolution of the Korean issue by signing secret agreements with the United Kingdom and the United States on the eve of the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty that granted it carte blanche in Korea. The fierce diplomatic wrangling between Russian and Japanese representatives over the Korean problem reached a peak in February–March 1906. St. Petersburg became isolated internationally and was forced to yield to Tokyo’s demands by agreeing with the Japanese position. The resolution of the Korean question through bilateral relations was also linked to the appointment of Aleksandr P. Izvol′skiĭ to the post of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. He supported British-Russian and Russo-Japanese agreements, and almost immediately after taking office sent a secret telegram to Tokyo, indicating his fundamental concessions and in fact recognizing the Japanese protectorate in Korea (AVP RI 1906). Although both sides continued to exchange invectives on the Korean issue for some time, St. Petersburg decided not to exacerbate the situation with Tokyo further, and eventually they acknowledged the Japanese position on almost all issues. The year 1906 was marked by a series of events that contributed to the normalization of Russo-Japanese relations. Earlier that year, the two sides exchanged diplomatic missions. The ad interim chargé d’affaires Grigoriĭ A. Kozakov arrived in Tokyo and in March he was replaced by the envoy Yuriĭ (Georgiĭ) Bakhmet’ev. His Japanese counterpart in St. Petersburg was Motono Ichirō who, following his arrival in St. Petersburg, began to nurture

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a relationship with the Russian establishment. After meeting with Sergeĭ Yu. Witte, Lamsdorf, and Emperor Nicholas II, Motono believed that Russian politicians were favorably disposed toward the postwar development of good neighborly relations with the Japanese empire (Gaimushō 1959, vol. 39, no. 2, 651, 655). The Sypingai Memorandum, which forbad free movement of foreign subjects in Manchuria, was abrogated on September 28 (October 11), 1906, and in December St. Petersburg settled on an early withdrawal of its troops from Manchuria. In the meantime, there were a number of unresolved important issues. The concession on the Korean issue—a sine qua non condition in order to normalize bilateral relations in Tokyo’s eyes—would not result in a sound grounding for rapprochement between the two powers. Japan was especially focused on the acquisition of fishing rights in Russian territorial waters while also seeking to expand its zone of economic influence from Manchuria to the north. RussoJapanese consultations on the trade treaty and fisheries convention began in the summer of 1906 and proceeded with great difficulty, most notably concerning the fishing issue. This was largely due to the complex demands set forth by the Japanese (Mandrik 1996; Shulatov 2007). In particular, a fierce debate broke out around the definition of the sites designated for Japanese fishing, as well as the type of marine products that could be caught. In addition, the two countries had serious disagreements on issues surrounding trade and economic relations. The stagnation in the negotiations in October and November 1906 was evidence of a new crisis in Russo-Japanese relations. Both sides were ready to halt negotiations. It was obvious that in order to overcome mutual mistrust they needed to develop a formula that would take into consideration the interests of the two parties in the region. In an effort to find some common ground, Russian diplomats and analysts in Beijing, Tokyo, and St. Petersburg exerted great efforts in studying Japanese postwar internal and external positions. Russian officials paid special attention to the state of the Japanese economy and finances, particularly in light of the fact that the primary reason forcing Japan to seek peace was the depletion of its economic and military resources. Russian representatives in Tokyo, most notably the financial attache Nikolaĭ A. Raspopov, navy attache Apolinariĭ N. Voskresenskiĭ, and military attache Vladimir K. Samoĭlov, analyzed the situation and concluded that the dire state of the Japanese treasury and the enormous burden of debts would have made it impossible for Japan to declare war anytime in the near future (Shulatov 2008, 111–14). This knowledge gave Russia a chance to normalize relations with its Far Eastern neighbor before Japan completed large-scale rearmament programs for the army and navy, which concerned both the military and many diplomats.

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St. Petersburg was also well aware of London’s role and the key significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in Japanese foreign policy. The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Izvol′skiĭ, pointed out that for him, “it was clear that the agreement with Japan is impossible, as long as we have strained relations with its ally Britain.” The minister believed therefore that his primary task was “to establish good relations with Britain” and then “to find the way for an agreement with Japan.” The Russian minister also noted that the Japanese envoy to St. Petersburg, Motono Ichirō, specified that Japan’s principal interest was the provision of fishing rights (Shulatov 2008, 121, 127). This explains in part Izvol’skiĭ’s decision to make concessions on this issue. External political factors also played a crucial role. By 1905, the balance of military and political forces in Europe was dictated by disputes between the United Kingdom and France on the one hand and Germany on the other. During a period when European countries were slowly moving toward war, it was crucial for Paris and London to convince Russia and its army to participate in European events, and not in Asian policies. To this end, France exerted financial pressure on St. Petersburg, linking negotiations on providing loans to Russia with the settlement in the Far East (Ignat’ev 1986, 21–22, 54). The Russian imperial government, in turn, seeing its interest in the Anglo-French bloc, called upon France and United Kingdom to assist in swaying Japan if negotiations with the latter reached an impasse. The moment was well chosen because at this time the Japanese government was negotiating a financial loan with Paris. Nicholas II’s call out to France influenced Tokyo. The United Kingdom also undertook actions to remedy the situation that arose in RussoJapanese negotiations through consultations between British ambassador Arthur Nicolson and Motono Ichirō in St. Petersburg (Ignat’ev 1986, 155). The Japanese government was cautioned that the decision to grant the loan would directly depend on the positive outcome of Russo-Japanese negotiations (Gaimushō 1961, vol. 40, no. 2, 50). By that time, in January 1907, St. Petersburg and Tokyo began consultations in an effort to arrive at a general political agreement relating to the division of the spheres of influence in the region. The preconditions that emerged for the normalization of relations between Japan and Russia thus arose from a broad range of foreign and domestic factors. The most important of these included the deepening of AmericanJapanese and English-Japanese competition in East Asia—the outcome of Japan’s increasingly strong position in the region—together with the growing Anglo-German antagonism in Europe and the reorientation of Russian foreign policy toward Europe. It should be noted, however, that the two countries were basically incapable of renewed confrontation—Russia due to a decline in its military capabilities and internal political unrest, and Japan, first and

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foremost, due to financial difficulties. The peaceful demarcation of interests in the region would be advantageous to both empires. The desire to protect these, in addition to the mutual benefit in maintaining the status quo, encouraged the former enemies to seek compromise and to revise the basis of bilateral relations. By the end of February into early March 1907 the format of the general political agreement was approved. Russia surrendered two-thirds of Manchurian territories to Japan but received Outer Mongolia as part of its sphere of interest in exchange for Korea. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that “in the unequal struggle for predominance in Manchuria, we, as the weakest side have to cede … even in northern Manchuria in the sphere of our real interests” (AVP RI 1907). The inclusion of Mongolia in the text of the convention should be regarded as a success for St. Petersburg, given that Russia’s position there was not as entrenched as Japan’s position in Korea. The Russo-Japanese political convention, signed on July 30 (July 17), 1907, consisted of public and secret articles. The agreement declared that Japan and Russia recognized the independence and integrity of China, as well as the principle of “equal opportunities” regarding the trade and industry of all countries. The secret sections of the agreement defined the division of Manchuria into Russian (northern) and Japanese (southern) spheres of influence; the parties also acknowledged their respective special interests in Mongolia and Korea (Grimm 1927, 168–70). This agreement not only reflected the balance of power in the region in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, but also laid the groundwork for the further development of the relations between St. Petersburg and Tokyo toward a deepening mutual cooperation. Soon after the conclusion of the Russian-Japanese Convention, St. Petersburg and London signed the political agreement. By the autumn of 1907, this led to an interconnection between similar agreements with the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Japan, thereby emphasizing the priority of European theater for Russian foreign policy. 3

Developing Cooperation: on the Path to Alliance

In May 1908, the Japanese diplomatic mission in St. Petersburg became an embassy and Motono Ichirō became its ambassador. In turn, the Russian mission in Tokyo also became an embassy; the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreted the prospects for the development of relations with Tokyo as positive. Nicholas II, the Minister of Finance Vladimir N. Kokovtsov, and a number of

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other key figures generally shared these views. The Russian army and navy remained concerned, however, about the Japanese threat of war and continued to boost their military power. After 1907, diplomats and the military continued to clash on this topic with growing intensity. Russia’s most dangerous potential enemy was the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The Russian military considered Japan to be “no less threatening,” pointing out its “feverish military preparations.” The beleaguered state of defenses on the Asian borders of the Russian empire, as well as the lack of any tight coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, resulted in a heightened state of alarm among the military command and the Priamur’e Governor-General Unterberger, who can be described as one of the main ideologues of anti-Japanese sentiment within the Russian establishment (Shulatov 2008, 140–60). After 1907, however, Russian diplomats no longer regarded Tokyo as the main enemy. Taking into consideration that both empires held similar positions in Manchuria, St. Petersburg was more inclined to find spheres of common interest with Japan than to allow new competitors into the region. Particular attention was paid in Russia to the growing importance of international factors that contributed to Russian-Japanese rapprochement, among which the active US expansion in Manchuria should be stressed. In November 1909, the US Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox put forward an initiative that offered a loan to the Chinese government so that it could buy back those railways owned by foreign countries, including the South Manchuria Railway (SMR) and the Chinese Eastern Railway. In theory, the loan was to be a special bank consortium of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, however, Washington’s initiative in fact disguised a protective measure of the Open Door Policy and its desire to ensure Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. With the provision of a loan Washington was scheming to consolidate itself economically in northeastern China, displacing Russia and Japan in the process. It is clear that the United States relied on St. Petersburg’s consent regarding the railway resale. Tensions still existed between Japan and Russia despite the signing of the postwar agreements. Opposite to the predictions of the White House, however, the attempt by the United States to involve itself in the issue of the Chinese railways prompted St. Petersburg and Tokyo to deliver joint countermeasures. These measures represented a common platform that later defined Japanese and Russian policy in China (Marinov 1974, 76). In effect, the Knox plan only escalated the differences between Japan and the United States; at the same time, it contributed to a closer rapprochement between Russia and Japan.

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In early 1910, Motono, Izvol′skiĭ, and the Russian ambassador Nikolaĭ A. Malevskiĭ-Malevich discussed the terms and conditions of the Russo-Japanese Agreement that would protect interests of the two countries in China. Unlike the Russo-Japanese negotiations in 1906–1907 that required the mediation of the United Kingdom and France, this time the discussions between Tokyo and St. Petersburg about the conditions of the future contract were held without any significant disputes. The Russo-Japanese Agreement, including the public and secret sections, was signed in St. Petersburg on July 4 (July 17), 1910. The agreement noted the obligations of both parties to assist each other in the development of railways and to consult on those measures that would maintain the status quo in northeastern China. In the secret section of the agreement Russia and Japan made commitments not to violate each other’s specific interests in the areas outlined in the secret terms of the 1907 agreement, not to impede their further strengthening and development (i.e., enlargement of railways, status of the Korean Peninsula, Outer Mongolia, northeastern China), and to refrain from political activity in these areas (Grimm 1927, 176–77). In fact, the agreement targeted the presence of any third states—most importantly the United States—in China. The signing of the Russo-Japanese Agreement in 1910 completed the postwar stage in the normalization of relations between the two countries (1907–1910): the two empires pledged to take joint actions against any third parties, moving from the unity of interests to the unity of actions. The intergovernmental agreement of 1907 was signed in part due to the mediation by the United Kingdom and France; Japan and Russia drafted the agreement of 1910 because of a mutual desire to protect interests in China without the mediation of these powers. The conclusion of the 1910 agreement marked the transition of bilateral relations to the next stage (1910–1916) and a period of shared Japanese-Russian policy in China with progress toward concluding an alliance. In August 1911, Saionji Kinmochi became Japan’s prime minister for the second time (he had previously served in this capacity from 1906 to 1908). He had a reputation as a liberal and an opponent of the military. In terms of foreign policy, Saionji was oriented toward Europe, and unlike his predecessor Katsura Tarō he did not consider relations with Russia to be a priority within Japan’s foreign policy. The new cabinet, communicating through the Japanese ambassador to Russia, notified St. Petersburg that there would be no changes to Tokyo’s foreign policy. In addition, it was stated that, despite the change in government, the Japanese would follow the same line in relations between the two countries and strive for the further strengthening of bilateral ties. Statements regarding the reinforcement of Russo-Japanese relations were also made on the official government level. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs,

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Uchida Kōsai, highlighted the favorable state of Russo-Japanese relations in an address to the Japanese parliament on January 11, 1912. He stressed that the governments should observe the agreements of 1907 and 1910, and that the final dissolution of a number of mutual claims would remove all the complicated issues in Japanese and Russian relations (RGVIA 1912a, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7843, 32–33). At first glance, the above gestures (and statements) can be seen as normal diplomatic etiquette, and it appears that the Japanese politicians were in fact quite genuine. For a couple of years in the postwar period Japan and Russia were successful in eliminating the negative factors that had earlier hindered the establishment of bilateral relations. It is significant that the tone of the Japanese press had also considerably changed, and this served a kind of barometer of public opinion. Japanese newspapers emphasized the solidarity of Japanese and Russian interests in the Far East as well as the growing mutual trust and respect between the two nations. The Japan Times went so far as to point out that Japan no longer celebrated the date of the defeat of Russian Second Pacific Squadron at Tsushima Island on May 27–28 (May 14–15), 1905. Even in 1909 this event was celebrated on a grand scale throughout Japan as a national holiday with fireworks, celebrations, and enthusiastic speeches in honor of the Japanese fleet, but a report from 1911 states that: “Over the past two years these celebrations have considerably abated and on the third day nothing revealed a festive mood in Tokyo, except that the schools were closed” (RGVIA 1912b, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7843, 55). The further strengthening of Russo-Japanese relations and the forging of a joint policy in East Asia was largely due to the unfolding situation in the region. As a result of the expanding revolution in China, Outer Mongolia, until that point within the Russian sphere of influence, declared its secession from China. The national liberation movement in Outer Mongolia and other areas of the collapsing Qing dynasty that prompted this move against the Qing government had emerged in Inner Mongolia. Japan had economic and political interests in Inner Mongolia, and this is why in January 1912 the Japanese government offered to enter into an agreement with Russia about the division of the region. Similar to the Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1910, both countries had no substantial differences regarding the content of the future treaty. St. Petersburg did not agree with Japan’s proposal of division that included almost all of Inner Mongolia within the Japanese sphere of interest and recognized special interests of Russia in western China. The first amendment of the agreement was adopted immediately, yet this provision became the subject of a brief discussion between the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sergeĭ D. Sazonov and Ambassador Motono Ichirō. The Japanese ambassador told the

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head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Japan would agree to this only if Fujian Province, located across from the island of Formosa (present-day Taiwan), was accepted as a zone of Japanese influence. Sazonov immediately concurred with this agreement, and Motono reminded him of Tokyo’s obligation to report all concluded treaties to its ally, the United Kingdom. In order to avoid the process of having to notify the British government, however, the two parties decided to acknowledge Japanese interests in Fujian Province and Russian interests in western China in the form of a memorandum. This diplomatic trick, proposed by the Japanese representative, once again testified to the significant changes that had taken place in Japanese and British relations. Immediately following the Russo-Japanese War, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remained the cornerstone of Tokyo’s foreign policy, yet the cooling of relations with London gradually led the Japanese ruling elite to rely on other centers of influence in the region. Working under these conditions the Japanese considered it plausible to make a new deal with Russia but at the same time conceal the details from its ally, the United Kingdom (Shulatov 2008, 210–11). On July 8 (June 25), 1912, a third secret Russian-Japanese Convention was concluded, which stipulated that the demarcation line in northeastern China—as established in the 1907 agreement—was to be extended to the extreme border of Inner and Outer Mongolia. Inner Mongolia was divided into Japanese (east) and Russian (west) spheres of special interest. And, similar to the agreements of 1907 and 1910, the convention reiterated the obligation that both parties recognize and not violate each other’s interests in their respective regions (Grimm 1927, 180). Different from previous agreements, the terms of the 1912 convention extended to northeastern China—in other words, the southernmost point that marked Russian and Japanese spheres of influence was approximately 70 km away from the Chinese capital and reached the Great Wall. The agreement not only reinforced the positions of the two powers in the region, and the world, but also clearly demonstrated their desire to continue with a further division of China. By hiding the secret provisions of the agreement from rivals, as well as from their closest allies the United Kingdom and France, Russia and Japanese signaled their priorities in cooperating with each other in the region. The Russo-Japanese partnership had reached the level of allies by the start of World War I, thereby attracting attention on the international stage. Seven years after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan and Russia had made considerable progress: the resolution of war-related disputes, the delineation of their respective spheres of interest in East Asia and the adoption of a joint regional policy. There have been relatively few examples in world history of such a constructive and mutually beneficial development of relations between

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two erstwhile enemies. But it should be noted that a certain level of mistrust lingered in the military circles of the two countries, even though this was certainly less evident than in the pre-1910 period. The Russian intelligence service surveilled the Japanese position in Korea, monitoring the activity of Japanese military and political societies, which advocated Japan’s expansion to the north (the continent) and to the South Seas. It also recruited Russian respected scholars, Evgeniĭ D. Polivanov and Nikolaĭ I. Konrad, allocating them tasks during their trips to Japan (Shulatov 2008, 280–95). From 1913, influential politicians representing military and political circles in Japan, such as Katsura Tarō, Ōkuma Shigenobu, and Tanaka Giichi, began to test the waters regarding the conclusion of a political agreement with Russia that was designed to establish Allied relations de jure (RGVIA 1914, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7843, 116–17). Such a union was to be the logical continuation of the development of Russo-Japanese relations since 1907. Japan anticipated that it could exploit the imminent collision of European powers in order to heighten its own position in the region. To this end it needed, at the very least, Russia’s neutral, but friendly, stance regarding Chinese affairs, and, at the very most, St. Petersburg’s active support in postwar reconstruction. In Russia, the conclusion of a military-political alliance with Tokyo was associated with the possibility of receiving military assistance from Japan and the direct participation of Japanese troops in war. Also, the imperial government needed additional guarantees of security for its Far Eastern territories. 4 Allies de Facto and de Jure The first version of a new Russian-Japanese Convention was prepared in early August 1914. Due to a degree of unpreparedness regarding the project and the outbreak of the World War I in Europe, however, no further work was done on this document, and it was delayed. With the declaration of war on Germany on August 23, 1914, Japan became a de facto ally of Russia. Less than a decade after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the two countries were now joined against a common enemy. Beijing’s adoption of the “Twenty-One Demands” sent from Japan to China on January 8, 1915, and the approval of Japanese policy in China by the Russians ended the stagnation in the talks about the terms of the Russo-Japanese Alliance. During this period, anti-British statements appeared more frequently in the Japanese press, and Malevskiĭ-Malevich, witnessing the events in Japan, reported to the Foreign Ministry in Russia that the breakdown in relations between Tokyo and London was the result of their different views on the Chinese

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issue. Malevskiĭ-Malevich noted that in recent years Japanese public opinion increasingly believed that maintaining a union with the United Kingdom was futile, but the idea of concluding an alliance with the Russian empire was gaining popularity (Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya 1935c, vol. 8, ch. 1, 84–86, 274–77). Japan initiated the negotiations between Tokyo and Petrograd (former St. Petersburg). Ambassador Motono strongly advised Sazonov to boost negotiations on the terms of the union agreement. The Japanese government made it clear that a direct initiative on this issue must come from Russia. Sazonov felt that Petrograd should not neglect the Japanese proposal, as this might impact its pride and encourage rapprochement “with the hostile states” (Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya 1935c, vol. 8, ch. 1, 528). In December 1915, Russia’s Grand Duke Georgiĭ M. Romanov went to Japan, and this marked the beginning of bilateral negotiations. The official representative of the Romanov dynasty came to Japan to congratulate Emperor Taishō on his accession to the throne and express gratitude for the assistance provided to Russia since the beginning of the war in Europe. The head of the Far Eastern Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Grigoriĭ A. Kozakov, accompanied the Grand Duke, and he was instructed to begin confidential negotiations about signing an alliance, supplying Japanese weapons, and the possible compensations to Japan from Russia (Molodyakov 2005, 149). During the Tokyo round of talks, Japan and Russia did not reach agreement on a new convention, compensation, and military supplies. Although the negotiations did not lead to any tangible results, it did map out general issues for further discussion. Despite this somewhat negative outcome, bilateral consultations concerning the signing of an alliance between the two countries and the search for solutions to related issues, such as the granting of privileges to Japanese fishermen and traders, and supplying Japanese weapons to Russia, were continued. The most difficult topic of further negotiation was the question of the possible transfer of rights to Japan of the Harbin–Changchun Railway. Petrograd agreed in essence to make certain concessions to Japan in return for the signing of the alliance and augmented military aid. The Japanese insisted on the transfer of the entire railway, and this was out of the question since the tsarist government was willing to yield only part of the railroad— namely, from Changchun to the intersection with Songhua River. In return for the transfer of part of the Chinese Eastern Railway Russia had counted on a number of counter-concessions from Japan. Within the framework of this discussion the Russian side proposed to the management of the South Manchuria Railway the idea of unifying transportation tariffs on the Japanese section from Dairen to the intersection of the Russian railways in Manchuria, with Russian rail rates from that point until

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Vladivostok. If Japan implemented this both countries would have equal opportunities in terms of transportation. The Russian Foreign Ministry demanded that Japan cease the delivery of goods to northern Manchuria in standard postal parcels, which were subject to a reduced domestic tariff (AVP RI 1916 (?), l. 13). Japan was also invited to join the Russo-Chinese Agreement signed on May 21 (May 8), 1916, that banned the production and trade of alcohol along the approximately 53 km border of Manchuria with Russia (Nihon Gaikō Shiryōkan, 3.1.64). Japan gave a vague, but lengthy, response indicating its willingness to negotiate with Russia on the elimination of “any steps that are damaging to the common interests” in the running of the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) and the Chinese Eastern Railway (AVP RI 1916 (?), l. 14). But Japan refused to equate tariffs, considering this requirement too categorical. In addition, Tokyo decided that the Russian condition to terminate the delivery of goods by post, as well as the proposal to accede to the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1916, were not directly related to the issue of a railway line transfer. In actual fact, as Japan did not approve any of the above conditions regarding the transfer of part of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Petrograd considered it unnecessary to debate the topic further: “It is not possible to insist on these in the current political situation” (AVP RI 1916 (?), l. 14). Subsequent negotiations proceeded without any discussions about the transfer of the said railway to Japan.1 The Russo-Japanese Alliance was officially conducted on July 3 (June 20), 1916. The agreement consisted of public and secret sections. The main section designates that the two sides pledge not to engage in political actions directed against either of the parties. In the event of a threat to territorial rights or to the special interests of Japan and Russia in the Far East, the two states would agree upon reciprocal protection. The secret section, valid for a five-year period, confirmed the previous Russian-Japanese conventions and stipulated the adoption of joint measures to prevent the political domination in China of any third power hostile to Russia or Japan. The agreement stated clearly that in the event of one party’s involvement in war due to the possible adoption of such measures, the other party should assist the ally on first demand and should not conclude peace with the third party without mutual consent. It also envisaged that Japan and Russia would also provide reciprocal military aid to each other only after 1  Negotiations on the transfer of part of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan were continued after the signing of the Russo-Japanese Alliance. By August 1917, Japan and the Russian provisional government agreed to sell this area for JPY 23 million, but the deal was breached when the Bolsheviks came to power (Grigortsevich 1965, 530).

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securing support from its allies and depending on the severity of the military conflict (Grimm 1927, 191–92). 5

The Rise and Fall of the Russo-Japanese Alliance

As a rule, it is possible to give an objective, unbiased assessment of an international agreement only after a certain period of time. But history did not provide such an opportunity with the Russo-Japanese Alliance. Just a few months following its signing the Russian monarchy was overthrown, and the Bolsheviks seized power in the autumn of 1917. These events not only had a tremendous impact on the situation inside Russia but also on its foreign policy and its relations with other nations. The deep crisis of governance in Russia did not help to implement the provisions of the alliance, and thus it is impossible to evaluate the Russo-Japanese military and political alliance of 1916 on the assumption of goals and objectives pursued at the time of its signing. The conclusion of this agreement was a logical result of the normalization of bilateral relations between Russia and Japan in the prewar period and demonstrated their willingness to make compromises in resolving complex issues. Without such a balanced approach to foreign policy bilateral interests, the alliance agreement between the two countries would not have been signed. The agreement of 1916 pursued its main objective of protecting the positions of the two countries in East Asia from the United States and the United Kingdom. Seen from this perspective, the Russo-Japanese Alliance of 1916 was of great significance both to Japan and Russia. As a result, Tokyo considerably strengthened its positions in southern Manchuria and in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, which opposed the interests of London and Washington. Russia received additional security guarantees for its Far Eastern borders as well as the ability to resist German espionage and Anglo-American competition in China. When seen from a historical perspective, Russia and Japan bridged the gap of an armed confrontation over an amazingly short period of time following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Russo-Japanese cooperation lasted a little more than a decade, however, and this positive experience did not receive further development in bilateral relations. The military and a number of influential political figures from both empires continued to regard one another with considerable wariness, and they did not rule out a new war. The weakening of Russia during World War I and events of 1917 that led to the collapse of the empire destroyed any hopes for the transformation of Russo-Japanese cooperation in the long-term. Tokyo immediately took advantage of these circumstances to increase its influence in the region at the expense of its former

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ally, and the aspirations of Japan’s military and political elite turned to the Russian Far East. After Japanese intervention in Russia during its civil war from 1918 to 1922 suspicion and mistrust toward Japan took even firmer root—and not just among the military elite—such that bilateral relations once again became confrontational. At the same time, the development of Russo-Japanese relations from 1905 to 1916 is evidence that the ability to find a compromise is an effective instrument in dealing with complex inter-nation problems. Thanks to the political will of both the Russian and Japanese governments, these countries, in the short term at least, were able to settle issues related to the recent Russo-Japanese War and to establish a mutually beneficial cooperation in political, economic, and military spheres. This positive historical experience has not lost its relevance. Whether Japan and Russia will be able to draw on the positive initiatives laid down early in the last century will greatly impact their ability to forge bilateral relations in the present day. Bibliography

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AVP RI (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki rossiĭskoĭ imperii) [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire]. 1905. f. 150, op. 493, d. 171, l. 32. MID Rossii—poslanniku v Pekine (31 oktyabrya 1905 g.) [Russian Foreign Ministry to the Envoy to Peking [Beijing] (October 31, 1905)]. AVP RI (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki rossiĭskoĭ imperii) [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire]. 1906. f. 150, op. 493, d. 171, l. 168. MID Rossii—poslanniku v Tokio (aprel′ 1906 g.) [Russian Foreign Ministry—to the Envoy to Tokyo (April, 1906)]. AVP RI (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki rossiĭskoĭ imperii) [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire]. 1907. f. 150, op. 493, d. 202, l. 81–82. Depesha MID (mart 1907 g.) [Foreign Ministry Cable (March, 1907)]. AVP RI (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki rossiĭskoĭ imperii) [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire]. 1916 (?). f. 143, op. 491, d. 3445, l. 13–14. Grigortsevich, Stanislav Seliverstovich. 1965. Dal′nevostochnaya politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav v 1906–1917 gg. [The Far Eastern Policy of Imperialistic Powers in 1906–1917]. Tomsk: TGU. Grimm, Ėrvin Davidovich, ed. 1927. Sbornik dogovorov i drugikh dokumentov po istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniĭ na Dal′nem Vostoke (1842–1925) [Collection of Treaties and Other Documents on the History of International Relations in the Far East (1842–1925)]. Moscow: Moskovskiĭ Institut Vostokovedeniya (Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies).

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Ignat′ev, Anatoliĭ Venediktovich. 1986. Vneshnyaya politika Rossii v 1905–1907 gg. [Foreign Policy of Russia in 1905–1907]. Moscow: Nauka. Kutakov, Leonid Nikolaevich. 1988. Rossiya I Yaponiya [Russia and Japan]. Moscow: Nauka. Mandrik, Anatoliĭ Timofeevich. 1996. “Istoriya yaponskogo rybolovstva v tikhookeanskikh vodakh russkogo Dal′nego Vostoka (konets XIX–20-e gg. ХХ v.)” [History of Japanese Fisheries in the Pacific Waters of the Russian Far East (late 19th c.–1920s)]. In Izvestiya Rossiĭskogo gosudarstvennogo istoricheskogo arkhiva Dal′nego Vostoka, vol. 1, 111–24. Vladivostok: Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ istoricheskiĭ arkhiv Dal′nego Vostoka. Marinov, Vsevolod Aleksandrovich. 1974. Rossiya i Yaponiya pered pervoĭ mirovoĭ voĭnoĭ (1905–1914 gody). Ocherki istorii otnosheniĭ [Russia and Japan before World War I (1905–1914)]. Ocherki istorii otnosheniĭ. Moscow: Nauka. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v ėpokhu imperializma (MOEI). Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitel′stv 1878–1917 [International Relations in the Era of Imperialism]. 1935a. Series III, vol. 6, ch. 1. Moscow and Leningrad: Sotsekgiz. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v ėpokhu imperializma (MOEI). Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitel′stv 1878–1917 [International Relations in the Era of Imperialism] 1935b. Series III, vol. 7, ch. 1. Moscow and Leningrad: Sotsekgiz. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v ėpokhu imperializma (MOEI). Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitel′stv 1878–1917 [International Relations in the Era of Imperialism]. 1935c. Series III, vol. 8, ch. 1. Moscow and Leningrad: Sotsekgiz. Molodyakov, Vasiliĭ Ėlinarkhovich. 2005. Rossiya i Yaponiya: poverkh bar′erov. Neizvestnye i zabytye stranitsy rossiĭsko-yaponskikh otnosheniĭ (1899–1929) [Russia and Japan: Beyond the Barriers. Unknown and Forgotten Pages of Russian-Japanese Relations (1899–1929)]. Moscow: AST (ACT). Pestushko, Yuriĭ Sergeevich. 2008. Rossiĭsko-yaponskie otnosheniya v gody Pervoĭ mirovoĭ voĭny (1914–1917 gg.) [Russia and Japan in the First World War (1914– 1917)]. Khabarovsk: DVGGU (Dal′nevostochnyĭ Gosudarstvennyĭ Gumanitarnyĭ Universitet). Pestushko, Yuriĭ Sergeevich. 2010. “Diskussii v rossiĭskikh politicheskikh krugakh po voprosam vneshneĭ politiki i perspektivam otnosheniĭ s Yaponieĭ (1905–1914 gg.)” [Debate in the Political Circles of Russia on the Issues of Foreign Policy and the Future of the Russo-Japanese Relations (1905–1914)]. Vlast I upraqvlenie na Vostoke Rossii, no. 1 (50): 84–91. RGAVMF (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota) [Russian State Archives of the Navy]. 1907a. f. 418, op. 2, d. 290, l. 4–18. “Neobkhodimye sily i sredstva dlya uspeshnogo vedeniya voĭny na Dal′nem Vostoke” [The Required Forces and Resources for the Successful Conduct of the War in the Far East]. Dokument Morskogo general′nogo shtaba [Document of the Naval General Staff, MGSH].

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RGAVMF (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota) [Russian State Archives of the Navy]. 1907b. f. 418, op. 2, d. 290, l. 3–3 ob. “Хarakter voĭny na Dal′nem Vostoke” [The Nature of the War in the Far East]. Dokument Morskogo general′nogo shtaba [Document of the Naval General Staff, MGSH]. RGAVMF (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota) [Russian State Archives of the Navy]. 1909. f. 418, op. 2, d. 200, l. 14–40 ob. “Obshchiĭ plan oborony gosudarstva i sootvetstvuyushchie meropriyatiya na blizhaĭshee desyatiletie” [The General National Defense Plan and Related Activities for the Next Decade]. Dokument Glavnogo upravleniya General′nogo shtaba (GUGSH) [Document of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSH)]. RGIA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ istoricheskiĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Historical Archives]. 1906. f. 560, op. 28, l. 228, l. 59–60. “Donesenie finansovogo agenta v Tokio N. A. Raspopova ministru finansov V. N. Kokovtsovu” [Report by the Financial Agent in Tokyo, N. A. Raspopov to the Minister of Finance V. N. Kokovtsev]. September 21. RGIA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ istoricheskiĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Historical Archives]. 1909. f. 268, op. 2, l. 592, l. 19–21. “Kopiya ves′ma sekretnogo doneseniya Malevskogo-Malevicha” [Copy of the Secret Report of Malevskiĭ-Malevich]. November 17. RGVIA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voenno-istoricheskiĭ arkhiv) [The Russian State Military-Historical Archives]. 1911. f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7843, l. 14. “Sekretnaya telegramma Vremennogo upravlyayushchego MID na imya poverennogo v delakh v Tokio. SPb.” [Secret Telegram from Interim Foreign Minister to the Chargé d’affaires in Tokyo. St. Petersburg]. October 6. RGVIA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voenno-istoricheskiĭ arkhiv) [The Russian State Military-Historical Archives]. 1911. f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7843, l. 10–11. “Depesha Bronevskogo” [Bronevsky’s Cable]. August 26. RGVIA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voenno-istoricheskiĭ arkhiv) [The Russian State Military-Historical Archives]. 1912a. f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7843, l. 32–33. “Depesha Bronevskogo” [Bronevsky’s Cable]. January 14, 1912. RGVIA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voenno-istoricheskiĭ arkhiv) [The Russian State Military-Historical Archives]. 1912b. f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7843, l. 55. “Doveritel′noe pis′mo Gofmeĭstera Malevskogo-Malevicha. Tokio” [Reliance Letter of Hofmeister Malevskiĭ-Malevich. Tokyo]. May 16. RGVIA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voenno-istoricheskiĭ arkhiv) [The Russian State Military-Historical Archives]. 1914. f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7843, l. 116–17. “Depesha Gofmeĭstera N.A. Malevskogo-Malevicha. Tokio” [Message of Hofmeister MalevskiĭMalevich. Tokyo]. April 24. Shulatov, Yaroslav Aleksandrovich. 2008. Na puti k sotrudnichestvu: rossiĭsko-yaponskie otnosheniya v 1905–1914 gg. [On the Path to Cooperation. Russo-Japanese Relations in 1905–1914]. Khabarovsk and Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniya RAN.

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Japanese Sources



English Sources

Bāruishefu, Edowarudo [Baryshev, Eduard]. 2007. Nichiro dōmei no jidai 1914–1917. “Reigai teki na yūkō” no shinsō [The Era of the Russo-Japanese Alliance, 1914–1917: The Truth about an “Exceptional Friendship”]. Fukuoka: Hana Shoin. Bōei-chō Bōei Kenkyūjo [National Institute for Defense Studies]. 1911. f. Т2–46. Rikugunshō mitsu dainikki. Kantō totoku rikugun daijin ate, 1911 nen, 8 gatsu 21 nichi [Secret Documents of the Military Department. Kwantung Administration to the Minister of War]. (August 21). Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. Nihon gaikō bunsho [Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy]. 1959. Vol. 39, no. 2. Tokyo: Gaimushō. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1961. Vol. 40, no. 2. Tokyo: Gaimushō. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1962. Vol. 43, no. 1. Tokyo: Gaimushō. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1962. Vol. 44, no. 1. Tokyo: Gaimushō. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1967. Vol. 1 (1916). Tokyo: Gaimushō. Nichirokan jōyaku kyōteishū [Collection of Russo-Japanese Treaties and Agreements]. 1923. Тokyo: Gaimushō Ajia Kyoku Daiikka. Nihon Gaikō Shiryōkan [Archives on Japanese Foreign Policy]. 3.1.64. Enkaishū e shusei yunyū kinshi ikken [On the Prohibition of Liquor Imports to the Primor’e Region. Russo-Chinese Agreement]. Oyama Azusa. 1962. “Yamagata Aritomo. Teikoku kokubo hōshin an” [Yamagata Aritomo. Draft Imperial National Defense Plan]. In Kokusai seiji [International Politics], no. 19, Nihon gaikōshi kenkyū. Nisshin Nichiro sensō [Studies on the History of Japanese Diplomacy: Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Anthology]: 170–77. Yoshimura Michio. 1991. Nihon to Roshia [Japan and Russia]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha.

Berton, Peter. 1956. The Secret Russo-Japanese Alliance of 1916. PhD diss., Columbia University. Dickinson, Frederick R. 1999. War and National Reinvention. Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919. Harvard East Asian Monographs 177. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Asia Center. Shen, Mo. 1960. Japan in Manchuria. An Analytical Study of Treaties and Documents. Manila: Grace Trading. Shulatov, Yaroslav. 2007. “Re-establishing Economic Relations Between Russia and Japan After the Russo-Japanese War: The 1907 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.” Acta Slavica Iaponica no. 24: 100–11.

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part 4

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World War I, Revolution, and Intervention: from the Perspective of the Japanese Diaspora in Russia Hara Teruyuki 1

The Vicissitudes of the Japanese Diaspora in Russia

The February Revolution of 1917 led to the fall of the Russian monarch and later that year the October (Bolshevik) Revolution resulted in the establishment of the Soviet authority. The spread of the revolution across the country faced resistance by opponents of this new regime, and the political struggle for power in various parts of the country escalated into armed confrontation and the start of the civil war in 1918. The nature of the civil war was complex and was accompanied by the Allied military intervention. The Japanese armed forces played a leading role in the intervention in the Far East, what was referred to as the “Siberian Expedition.” The deployment of Japanese troops to this region, which continued amid the fierce resistance by the populations in the occupied areas, delayed the end of the civil war until 1922. During World War I, parts of Siberia and the Far East were seen to be in the hinterland, far removed from the theater of operations. During the civil war, however, these regions became not only the site of military conflict but also logistical bases situated in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield. In 1918, the region east of Lake Baikal, then occupied by the Japanese army, was a foothold controlled by the Japanese armed forces with the involvement of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries of the Entente in a joint intervention in certain areas. In the spring of 1920, Japanese troops, having cut through the front line, remained the only invading army. Moreover, in the summer of that year the Japanese army began a five-year occupation of northern Sakhalin, where all power was in the hands of a military administration. It should also be remembered that the area was also the location of the deployment of the Imperial Japanese Army and was densely inhabited by Japanese immigrants. The establishment of a Japanese diaspora in Russia began in the first half of the 1870s. Immediately before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, the diaspora entered its first period of prosperity; it then declined until soon after the end of the Russo-Japanese War when it recovered temporarily. During World

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_008

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War I there was a trend toward growth, and by the time of the 1917 Revolution there were 5,891 Japanese residents in Russia (based on the statistics from late June 1917). The events of the October Revolution confined the Japanese living Russia to the east of the country. In 1918, 153 Japanese residents (among them, ninety-five in Petrograd, fifty-three in Moscow) in the European part of Russia departed together with the members of the Japanese Embassy and the Consulate General in Moscow. This was followed by a phased evacuation of the Japanese from the Asian regions in Russia’s hinterlands: Blagoveshchensk, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, and other cities. The number of Japanese who left Vladivostok and other cities of Primor’e was small. When, in 1918, for example, Japan launched a full-scale military intervention in the Russian Far East, Primor’e and Russia’s hinterland absorbed a great many Japanese immigrants. This resulted in a 40 percent rise in Japanese immigrants in 1919, compared to two-years earlier (8,295 people). During 1917–1919, the number of Japanese residents in Vladivostok rose from 3,282 to 5,915, an increase from 56 to 71 percent. This growth trend reversed in the first half of 1920. The reasons for the shrinking Japanese diaspora were the military defeats of the White Army forces that had collaborated with the Japanese government, as well as Japanese ground and naval forces, and the fact that the Japanese were losing support from the local population. The latter corresponds with the mounting anti-Japanese sentiment among the different strata of Russian society. The local population’s anti-Japanese sentiment peaked following the tragic incident in Nikolaevskon-Amur (Nikolaevsk-na-Amure). The hardship and adversity experienced by Japanese residents was common throughout the entire region, and the movement of Japanese immigrants moved from the main cities of Russia’s inland regions and from the southern part of Primor’e centered in Vladivostok. By the time the Japanese government issued a statement on the evacuation of the Vladivostok Expeditionary Force in June 1922, the number of registered Japanese residents in Russia had reached its apogee, totaling 11,102. This can be seen as a temporary situation, however, and such a large number can be primarily explained because of the clear influx of migrants into northern Sakhalin. With the completion of the evacuation of Japanese troops from northern Sakhalin in May 1925, most Japanese left their homes in Russia. In October that year, the number of Japanese living in the Asian part of Russia dropped nine times the amount compared to six years earlier. In 1925, there were 985 Japanese residents in Russia, including in the country’s European region (the site of resettlement). This corresponds with the total tally of Japanese living in the Soviet Union during this first year of the normalization of Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations (Table 1). - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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World War I, Revolution, and Intervention table 1

The number of Japanese residing in different areas of Russia

1921

1923

1925

2,104   696   544   351   315   169    33

5,915 5,004   677   353   374   232   890

  719

590   7

   38

 25

  485   341

3,283   573   499   338   295   215   127    29   258   379

   64    35   *   645   350

2,536   343

 55 244

Subtotal: Asian area European area

4,683 4,628    33    51

4,470 5,738    88   153

8,295 6,244

3,636

921  64

Total

4,716 4,681

4,558

8,295 6,244

3,636

985

Vladivostok Khabarovsk Nikolaevsk Blagoveshchensk Nikolsk Chita Irkutsk Aleksandrovsk Other

1902

1913

1915

2,996   201   254   203   544

2,201   668   528   399   353   107    33

1917

5,891

1919

* This column has no data; the data here, from August 1921 (publication of the military administration of northern Sakhalin, Statistical Table of Northern Sakhalin for 1924), suggests that the population of Japanese numbered 2,855. Note: The research data is from June 30 of each year, except 1902 (December 31), 1913 (December 31), and 1925 (October 1). Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the Empire for 1902, 1913, 1915, and the table of data itemizing the professions of Japanese immigrants residing in foreign countries.

The Japanese who remained in Russia throughout World War I, the Revolution, the Civil War, and intervention suffered severe economic, political, and military disruptions. The periods of prosperity and desolation directly related to the alternating offensive or retreat of the Japanese army. The statistical evidence of abrupt changes in the number of Japanese residents is nothing more than historical material, reflecting the situation in its most obvious form. What is the accurate image of the Japanese living in Russia during that turbulent period of history? What was the Japanese attitude to the revolution, what were their views about the interventionist policies of their own government, what were their relations with the fighting Japanese army, and what were the circumstances of these immigrants who now called Russia home? This essay will attempt to highlight the problems of Japanese-Russian and Japanese-Soviet relations from the early 20th century to World War I and the - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Civil War by examining the entrepreneurial activity in those areas with dense populations of Japanese. It will focus on two well-known and influential entrepreneurs of the time: Shimada Mototarō in Nikolaevsk and Horie Naozō in Vladivostok. Shimada and Horie are unusual among the Japanese living in Russia because information about them exists, and they have previously been the topic of research. Previous studies have fallen short, however, since they have been restrained by the narrative of local history (e.g., on Nikolaevsk, see Morikawa 1979; Yuzefov 1999; on Vladivostok, see Horie 2002; Horie 2005). This study moves beyond a purely empirical examination to analyze and compare the activities of these two men. 2

Shimada Mototarō: the Main Critic of the Russian Revolution

In a discussion of Japanese emigrants in Russia during World War I and the Civil War, there was one event, in particular, that attracted great public attention and caused deep-seated concern: the “Nikolaevsk Incident” of March to May, 1920. It was described at the time as “an incident of mass murder of Japanese civil servants and civilians” in the port city of Nikolaevsk where more than 300 Japanese citizens, together with soldiers at the Japanese military garrison there, died. The incident received wide coverage in the Japanese press, and Shimada became famous as the “King of the Japanese” living there. Although Shimada was in Japan at the time and did not experience the tragic events first-hand, some twenty-five people close to him, including all of his store employees, family, and business customers were murdered. He subsequently initiated and organized various campaigns not only in connection with the Nikolaevsk Incident but also generally, to collect aid for the families of the victims as well as for the former settlers whose lives and property in Russia were impacted. His activities, together with the policy of the Japanese government, contributed to the formation of public opinion that equated the Japanese living in Russia after 1917 with victims of a natural disaster. Shimada became known much earlier, however, when he was decorated with an order in 1909. Shimada was born in Nagasaki Prefecture in 1870, and he arrived in Siberia in 1886 (Kokuritsu kobunshokan shozō shiryō A10112669900). He spent three years traveling from the mouth of the Amur River to Mongolia and Manchuria, and after taking stock of the circumstances in different areas, he settled on Nikolaevsk as his base. He initially lived in a Chinese shop, learning the essentials of the trade, and some time later, in 1893, he opened his business Shimada

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Shōten, which dealt in the fishing sector. This period corresponded with the sharp increase in the number of Japanese fishing vessels intent on fishing the flourishing fish stocks at the mouth of the Amur River. In 1899, Shōda Kazue, then the head of customs in Hakodate and later the finance minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake (his government from 1916 to 1918 coincided with the Russian revolution), inspected fishing in the lower reaches of the Amur River. In a written report he mentioned the activities of the old “Saitō–Shimada Cooperative” and the new “Okayasu–Niwa Cooperative.” According to Shōda, “the cooperatives charge fishermen 5 percent commission for mediation services, they formalize fishing contracts, carry out exports of fish, and so forth” (Shōda ka bunsho). The mediation and settling of differences between Japanese fishermen and the Russian administration seems to have been an important part of the Shimada business. Shimada had attained a certain status in Russian society. In 1903, for example, he received the business license as the “top merchant Petr N. Shimada” and documents identify him as a member of the Nikolaevsk merchant’s guild (Gaimushō kiroku B09072792900). Shimada’s success in business affairs conducted between Japan and Russia gave him the opportunity to perform select consular roles. Before the establishment of the Japanese consulate in Nikolaevsk “the public and personal matters relating to Japanese settlers were accepted for consideration in the Shimada Shōten.” Moreover, after its opening the Shimada Shōten was engaged in drawing up various reports on fishing and trade issues, and more generally on the lives of Japanese settlers. Over the course of a number of years, these reports were presented to the agent of the Japanese commercial agency in Vladivostok and “were useful reference material.” Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese consulates in Russia were located only in Vladivostok and in Korsakov on Sakhalin. But Shimada, who carried out the duties of the consul, lived in Nikolaevsk. Therefore, when a consular office was opened in Nikolaevsk in 1908 and Suzuki Yōnosuke was appointed the vice consul, Shimada immediately turned to him with proposals to establish the Society of Japanese Residents (Nihonjin Kyoryūminkai) and to approve the society’s statute. Both were accepted. The content of the society’s statute was consistent with that of the Vladivostok Society of (Japanese) Residents (Urajiosutoku Kyoryūminkai), founded earlier in 1902. Shimada served as the first chairman of the society (Gaimushō kiroku 3.8.2.29). A Study of Japanese Businesses Abroad (Zaigai honpō jitsugyōsha no chōsa), published by the Trade Department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, defined “businessmen” as those whose annual transactions or value of production exceeded JPY 10,000. The handbook collates data on individual

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Japanese consular offices within consular districts, including such information as business owner and company names, location, types of business activities, capital stock, transaction amounts, production values, as well as employee numbers. The Study of Japanese Businesses Abroad suggests that after the RussoJapanese War Shimada was an entrepreneur in the areas of foreign trade, banking, storage, shipping, and consignment (data from 1907 ed.). In addition to ownership of the parent company, Shimada augmented his business through the establishment of commercial branches (data from 1909 ed.). He was the manager of the Shimada Shōten, which was engaged in activities such as “retail and wholesale of household goods, fisheries, banking, marine transportation, storage, production of canned food and Japanese noodles, management of an insurance company branch. He also served as chairman of the Credit Cooperative of Japanese in Nikolaevsk (Nikoraefusuku Nihonjin Shinyō Kumiai)” (data from 1911 ed.). This cooperative was created to assist Japanese residents, and as a financial institution it used the money from the bailout fund allocated by the Japanese government as compensation for the damage that Shimada suffered due to the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian government was attentive to the fact that the Japanese in the Lower Amur region were active in diverse industries and in the financial sector. The head of the General Department of the Amur Expedition, Vladimir F. Romanov, reported that “there is a lack of low-interest loans for the development of production and there is no branch of the State Bank in the province,” but he mentioned the name of the Japanese capitalist Shimada (Romanov 1911, 5, 94). The Priamur’e Governor-General, Nikolaĭ L. Gondatti, wrote to the Russian emperor in 1911 that: “The local fishing industry, which is undoubtedly characterized by high profitability and resource wealth, has been developed owing to the fact that the raw products are almost entirely sold to the Japanese, and thanks to financial support from the Japanese” (RGIA DV; f. 702, op. 1, d. 712, l. 15–16). The Shimada Shōten thus succeeded in pushing local companies out of the market to become a leading Japanese company operating in Russia. And although initially the annual statistics suggest that the Shimada Shōten (Table 2) had its share of ups and downs, no other Japanese company in Russia rivaled its influence for many years. It boasted a staff of 180 employees, and the “illegal” demands for higher wages following the 1917 Revolution by the company’s workers no doubt came as a surprise to Shimada. With the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia’s Far East in 1917, Shimada, aware of the critical situation now placing the lives of “all the Japanese residing in Russia on the brink of death,” was one of the first to oppose the new order.

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World War I, Revolution, and Intervention Table 2

Results of entrepreneurial activity of Shimada Shōten in Nikolaevsk (data from December 31 of each year)

1907 1909 Annual amount of deals (rubles) Number of workers (persons)

1911 1913

9,276 48

58

1915

1917

1918

1919

7,300 4,500 10,360 26,499 65

180

73

 68

 39

Source: A Study of Japanese Businesses Abroad (respective editions)

Although the political situation in the Russian Far East had become total chaos in the first ten days of December 1917—only a month after the armed October uprising in Petrograd—the situation in the border town of Nikolaevsk was still relatively calm. Influenced by the turning tide in Russia, a group of workers for Shimada demanded higher wages, and Shimada fired seven of his Russian employees. After delivering an address about the “plight of Japanese citizens in the troubled Siberia,” he returned to Japan. Once home, he presented a “Petition on Trade with Russia” (Tairo bōeki ni kansuru chinjōsho) to Minister for Foreign Affairs Motono Ichirō and his old friend, the Minister of Finance Shōda Kazue. This document deserves closer scrutiny because of the fact that Shimada was a Russian resident proposing an interventionist policy to the Japanese government. Shimada’s petition, “The Existing Situation in Russia’s Primor’e” (Rokoku Enkaishū no genjō), along with the appendix “German Merchants on the Russian Market and the Readiness of Japanese Merchants” (Roryō shijō ni okeru Doitsu shō no seiryoku to Waga kuni shōnin no kakugo), were published in the January 1918 issue of Tsūshō kōhō (Trade Bulletin) from the Japanese Trade Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shimada clearly sets forth his capitalist rationale, stating that meeting the demands of the illegal workers for higher wages and a reduction of working hours in the climate of a revolutionary Russia would damage both the fishing and mining industries. The situation was similar in the manufacturing sector, in which the workers’ unbridled conduct made it impossible to maintain a “normal” state of enterprise management. “Therefore,” Shimada asserts, “we should properly maintain control by passing it into the hands of the Japanese.” Shimada concluded that Japan “has both geographical advantages and dignity” and thus “truly the most opportune [action] in this situation” would be to secure for itself “rights

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in perpetuity to the lands in all the regions where Japanese companies operate” (Tsūshō kōhō 1918, 114). The section of the document, which the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not publish, stated that the most important thing was to take the initiative in order to counter the infusion of British and American capital into Russia. Moreover, since the “conditions to proceed with the acquisition of rights” had now been created, there was no recourse but to turn to “the power” of Japan to counter the current critical situation—this was, in other words, a metaphorical call for military intervention (Gaimushō kiroku B10073749800). Once the revolutionary crisis was over, the Shimada Shōten, under the control of Admiral Aleksandr V. Kolchak, entered a period of recovery. During this time “Shimada banknotes” with Shimada’s own signature and photograph were widely circulated in Vladivostock. By 1919, the value of transactions, when compared to the era of the Russo-Japanese War, had increased tenfold and now totaled JPY 13 million (Gaimushō kiroku B09073204400). This enormous wealth would be suddenly destroyed as a result of the Nikolaevsk Incident. 3

Medium-Sized Entrepreneurs and the Society of Japanese Residents

At this juncture, it might be instructive to cast our net wider and touch upon all of Russia’s Far East to show the distribution of Japanese owners of mediumsized enterprises during the first two decades of the 20th century. The figures in Table 3 illustrate that clear regional differences existed. It should be pointed out that during this era medium-sized Japanese businesses were principally centered in the most economically developed city of Vladivostok. Much data on other districts is unavailable, and the research results are therefore incomplete. For instance, in 1903, Japanese merchants of the top Russian guild were actively engaged in entrepreneurial ventures in Nikolaevsk; however, the data on the city for that year is missing. Furthermore, the absence of information on Nikolaevsk for the year 1919 can be explained by the fact that the Japanese consulate ceased operating following the Nikolaevsk Incident in 1920. In any case, the table clearly shows that Nikolaevsk was firmly in second place after Vladivostok. The economic growth beginning in the 1890s with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway witnessed an unprecedented surge in Japanese entrepreneurial activity by the early 20th century. The sections in Table 3 corresponding to the years 1907–1915 indicate that the number of medium-sized businesses remained relatively unchanged for some time after the Russo-Japanese War.

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World War I, Revolution, and Intervention table 3

Number of Japanese enterprises with an annual turnover exceeding JPY 10,000 in various regions of Russia (data from December 31 of each year)

1903* 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1918 1919 1921 Vladivostok 39 Khabarovsk Nikolaevsk Blagoveshchensk Nikol’sk 4 Chita AleksaandrovskSakhalinskiĭ Iman Spassk Remaining Asian regions Moscow 1 Total 44

19 4 1 3

1

22 1 6 2 1 1 1

19 1 8 2

30 2 6 2

1 1

1

14 2 4 1 2

1

102 101 138 58 13 9 8 2 3  1  9 1 2 3

1 29

2 36

2 33

2 44

4 23

1

2

25  2  4

135 112 141 96

* The source, published in January 1905, did not specify the year and month of the data; it is assumed that this is for 1903. Source: A Study of Japanese Businesses Abroad; in 1919 the title changed to A Study of Japanese Businessmen Living in Foreign Countries (Kaigai Nihon jitsugyōsha no chōsa). The table was compiled based on the publication’s data for the relevant year.

This was apparently due to the stagnation in Japanese-Russian economic relations during this period. Japanese trade statistics generally divide the Russian empire into “Russia” (its European region) and “Russian Asia” (the Russian Far East). The value of Japan’s exports to the Russian Far East during the five years before the RussoJapanese War averaged JPY 2.5 million annually. During postwar restoration, the volume of exports increased sharply in 1906 to reach around JPY 10.5 million and then witnessed a period of stagnation. In 1910, the value of exports fell below the average of the five years before the war (Nihon bōeki seiran 1975, 350). These trade conditions justify a revision of the view that the “twelve years from the Russo-Japanese War to the Russian Revolution was an era of Japanese-Russian ‘friendship’ and the development of economic relations,” at least regarding the first third of the period.

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Recent research into the Japanese diaspora of the early 20th century has elucidated many of the issues under discussion in this essay. These studies reveal that the bankruptcy in 1908 of the largest Japanese trading business, Sugiura Shōten, together with the enactment in January 1909 of the law abolishing the duty-free importation of foreign goods in the Far East and threatening the very existence of Japanese enterprises there, occurred in the twelve years from the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1905) to the Russian Revolution (1917). Under pressure from the Russian government the Vladivostok Society of (Japanese) Residents in was faced with self-dissolution (Saberiefu 2005, 176, 263). Japan’s exports to the Russian Far East increased sharply beginning in 1914, achieving a record high of around JPY 117.7 million in 1916 (Nihon bōeki seiran 1975, 350). With the outbreak of World War I the structure of Russia’s foreign trade completely changed from the prewar period when it was largely driven by Germany. Vladivostok now became the country’s largest port to receive imports and to service the needs of the wartime economy. Under these conditions, the number of Japanese residents and medium-sized entrepreneurs living in Vladivostok rose dramatically. Eyewitness reports remarked on the situation in September 1914 immediately after the declaration of war: “Presentday Vladivostok is flooded with Japanese businessmen, who have brought a great variety of goods” (Piamurskie vedomosti 1914). In 1916, Ōta Kakumin, a priest of the Buddhist temple, Honganji, in Vladivostok, made the following observation: “Revitalization is seen for the first time in Vladivostok where my countrymen can be seen on almost every street in the city” (Nichiro jitsugyō shinpō 1916, 16). The number of medium-sized entrepreneurs regarded as “industrialists” exceeded 100 individuals in 1917, and in 1919 there were 138 Japanese enterprises in Vladivostok alone. 4

Horie Naozō: from Trade and Manufacturing to Military Deliveries

Like Shimada, Horie Naozō was born in 1870. He hailed from the city of Maizuru in Kyoto Prefecture, and his decision to emigrate to Vladivostok was based on advice from Kōmuchi Tomotsune, who served in the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Horie experienced difficulties during his youth, and he contemplated going to the United States following his studies. He consulted with Kōmuchi, who was conversant with the situations in foreign countries, about his plan, and Kōmuchi advised him to go to Vladivostok because it was a city with great prospects for development (Enkaishū jijō 1921, 268). Horie traveled by ship to Vladivostok, arriving there in 1892. He witnessed the beginnings of unprecedented economic recovery against the backdrop - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway that began a year earlier. Virtually penniless, Horie was diligent and resilient, and after working in a shop he eventually opened his own business with a signboard reading “Nishizawagō” (literally, “Nishizawa name”). The Study of Japanese Businesses Abroad lists that before the Russo-Japanese War Horie was engaged in “wholesale and retail trade in consumer goods and wholesale trade in rice and fruit,” with capital equaling JPY 68,500 and ten employees. In addition, he had a business for the production of footwear and tabi (toed socks) with a capital of JPY 15,000 and six employees. Horie went back to Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, and upon his return he opened a shop in the Manchurian city of Yingkou where he sold general merchandise to the military. He then returned to Vladivostok in 1907 and began importing consumer goods and fruit. He also established a cannery with a large work force. The market for Horie’s goods spanned from the Amur region across the Trans-Siberian Railway to distant areas of the European region of Russia (Enkaishū jijō 1921, 269). Horie’s idea to engage in intense production to overcome the crisis was astute. In response to the Russian government’s enactment of a law canceling the duty-free regime for foreign goods in January 1909, Horie continued to trade in fruit, vegetables, and general merchandise. Moreover, he sought to diversify his business by focusing on the production of goods exempt from customs duties, as well as on the harvesting of local seafood and so forth. In the 1909 Study of Japanese Businesses Abroad, however, there is no record of Horie’s business activity, and in the following year it lists types of private enterprise under his name such as “knitwear, Japanese noodles, canned food production, fruit, and general merchandise.” The yearbooks regularly published data on the two main spheres of business activity until 1918: production and import trade. The 1921 regional publication, The Situation in Primor’e and the Status of Japanese Subjects, was issued as an appendix and included data on three diplomats and thirty-four Japanese residents, most of them businessmen. Horie is praised as “the central figure in the Japanese-Russian trade circles,” and the publication states that in 1917 he held the honorary posts of deputy chairman of the Vladivostok Society of (Japanese) Residents and deputy chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Furthermore, Horie “is lauded as the only successful individual who ensured the current ongoing business prosperity in Vladivostok” (Enkaishū jijō 1921, 269). Horie was certainly a prosperous businessman but he was not the only one, as there were many successful individuals who, like Horie, excelled in business development. With the outbreak of World War I, Horie combined his role as a business administrator with his activities as the head of the local Japanese community. Horie’s granddaughter Horie Machi remarked that the Horie family - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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tree includes entries made by her grandfather on the subject of his public positions: “Two years in the position of president of the Society of Japanese Residents, two years in the capacity of vice president, two years as chairman of the Society of Friends of Entrepreneurs (Shōyūkai), four years as chairman of the Fruit Merchants’ Cooperative (Kudamono Shōkumiai)—resigned from all positions in 1921” (Horie 2002, 40). Although no biographical details are available, it is known that he held the position of president of the Society of Japanese Residents from 1915 to 1917, that of the vice president from 1917 to 1919 (he was succeeded by Daikō Kisaku), and he was chairman beginning in 1919. From 1915 to 1917, the Horie name appears among those of the leaders of the Vladivostok Society of (Japanese) Residents, and Deputy Consul General in Vladivostok, Nomura Motonobu, reported this to the Japanese government in August 1916. This list includes the following executives: President Horie Naozō (trade in vegetables, general merchandise) and six inspectors: Daikō Kisaku (export business, rice-mill business), Itō Tadasu (branch manager of the Ōsaka Shōsen, a Hayashi Kaisōten company), Kuranari Asakichi (rice-mill business), Kawabe Tora (hotel owner), Senō Kenji (general merchandise, rice-mill business), and Ikeda Chōtarō (Japanese gardens) (Gaimushō kiroku B03051073800). It is intriguing that for three of the six executives on the list rice-milling was either recorded as a primary or a sideline business. The entrepreneurs mentioned above were successful in managing rice-milling factories and importing unhulled rice principally from Korea that was exempt from customs duties. The cancelation of a duty-free program for foreign goods in the Far East was a turning point. In the Study of Japanese Businesses Abroad of 1915, Daikō Kisaku’s Kyōshin Yōkō is earmarked as a leading company, employing thirty-three people as store staff and sixty-five people as employees and plant workers. The company’s transactions equaled RUB 2.140 million, less than half of that of the Shimada Shōten. Another source states that there were two Japanese companies listed as the “top merchants” in Vladivostok in 1911: a sub-branch office of Mitsui Bussan and a department of the Matsuda Bank (a branch of the Eighteenth Bank of Nagasaki). In 1915, the Kyōshin Yōkō was added (Gaimushō kiroku B11090016300). Medium-sized entrepreneurs are worthy of attention for their contribution to business development following World War I. For instance, the Ishido Shōten, which ran a trade business concurrently with military deliveries, is known for the so-called “Ishido Incident” (Ishido Jiken) that involved the murder of a Japanese entrepreneur by an unidentified perpetrator. There are other businesses—Kanegae Shōten, Ōkami Shōten, and Hori Shōten—that

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switched over to the import of industrial commodities, medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and so forth in response to wartime needs (Enkaishū jijō 1921, 248, 249, 263, 278). The Study of Japanese Businessmen Living in Foreign Countries for 1919 records that Horie Naozō managed two enterprises simultaneously: the Nishizawa-gō Horie Shōten, which was engaged in the “manufacturing of general merchandise, canned food, imports, and wholesale trade in fruit,” and the Shiberia Shōji Co. Ltd., which was involved in “military deliveries.” The Shiberia Shōji had a capital of JPY 1 million, its transactions amounting to JPY 1.2 million, and with thirty-five employees. This made it considerably bigger than the Nishizawa-gō Horie Shōten with its capital of JPY 50,000, transactions of JPY 300,000, and seven employees. The 1921 Study of Japanese Businessmen Living in Foreign Countries does not record Horie Naozō, but the name Horie Shōzō appears for the first time in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiĭ. Horie Shōzō was Naozō’s son, a young entrepreneur who began trading “in furs and general merchandise” in a new region. Naozō returned to Japan that year. There are almost no written documents on the twenty years of activity of the Vladivostok Society of (Japanese) Residents. The rare exception is the “A Brief History of Japanese Residents living in Vladivostok” (Urajiosutoku ni okeru Nihon kyoryūmin shōenkaku), which was appended to the petition “On Credits at Low Interest Rates for the Vladivostok Society of (Japanese) Residents” (Urajiosutoku kyoryūmin teiri shikin kashitsuke seigan ni kansuru ken) compiled by the Society of Japanese Residents in December 1920. The document records that there were two causes of the suffering of the Japanese living in Russia during World War I and the Civil War: the Russian Revolution and the “illegal decrees of the vicious reforms.” It notes, in particular, that after the fall of the Kolchak regime beginning in early 1920 and as a result of the reforms enacted in June that year, many Japanese nationals were forced to return home because “they have lost almost all their wealth earned through many years of work and also due to the fact that the number of stores were decreasing or were closed” (Gaimushō kiroku B11100074100). This situation was the principal reason for Horie Naozō’s departure from Vladivostok. The fall of the Kolchak regime resulted in a rapid deterioration of the local Russian population’s attitude not only toward the Japanese army but also toward ordinary Japanese people living in Russia. The Horie-owned Shiberia Shōji opened a trade post in Blagoveschensk and filed a petition requesting financial aid, in which it explained that “before the departure of the Japanese army the Russians’ attitude toward Japanese had dramatically deteriorated” (Gaimushō kiroku B09073213100).

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5 Conclusion The history of the Japanese diaspora in Russia is a research field inhabiting the “archeological layers” within a broader common history that extends beyond the borders of Northeast Asia. Beginning in the early 1990s, considerable light was shed on the history of the diaspora to which Russia bore witness: this not only concerned immigration to Russia but emigration from Russia. This occurred because following the disintegration of the Soviet Union the earlier tightly closed borders to the outside world opened. The deeply embedded “archeological layers” of common history were unearthed and in their wake increased opportunities emerged that enabled fresh discoveries (Kotkin 1995, 10). This essay has attempted to rediscover these “layers of history” by focusing on the medium-sized entrepreneurs who inhabited a central place among Japanese residents in Russia. Shimada, the first chairman of the Society of Japanese Residents, was affiliated with the group of people who through their own efforts contributed to this society’s formation. Horie, who lived within the existing framework of the organization, was elected by general vote and appointed the society’s president. And an examination of these two individuals therefore assists in elucidating aspects of this previously unknown history. Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Enkaishū jijō oyobi Nihonjin hatten roku [The Situation in Primor’e and the Development of Japanese Compatriots]. 1921. Tokyo: Imon Taimusha. Gaimushō kiroku [Documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MOFA]. B03051073800. Kakkokujijō kankei zassan. Roryō Shiberia [Miscellaneous Documents Relating to Circumstances in Different Countries. Russian Siberia]. Gaimushō kiroku [Documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MOFA]. B08090018200. 1901. Kawakami Toshitsune yori Katō Takaaki gaishō ate [Message from Kawakami Toshitsune Addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Katō Takaaki]. March 25. Gaimushō kiroku [Documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MOFA]. B09072792900. Nichiro senbotsu no tame kaburitaru songai baishō seigansho [Petition Regarding the Payment of Indemnities in the Russo-Japanese War]. Gaimushō kiroku [Documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MOFA]. B09073204400. Rokoku kakumei kyūjutsu ikken, shinseisho. Nikō jiken, Nagasaki fu [Request for Aid in Connection with the Revolution in Russia. Nikolaevsk Incident, Nagasaki Prefecture].

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Gaimushō kiroku [Documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MOFA]. B09073213100. Rokoku kakumei kyūjutsu ikken shinseisho. Kyoto ken [Request for Aid in Connection with the Revolution in Russia. Kyoto Prefecture]. Gaimushō kiroku [Documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MOFA]. B10073749800. Nichiro bōeki shinkōsaku kankei zakken [Miscellaneous Materials Related to the Policy of Promoting Japanese-Russian Trade]. Gaimushō kiroku [Documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MOFA]. B11090016300. Kaigai kakuchi ni oite shinyō aru naigaikoku shōnin no eigyō shurui oyobi sono jūsho nado chōsa ikken [Study of the Types of Business Activities and Addresses of Trustworthy Japanese and Foreign Businessmen]. Gaimushō kiroku [Documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MOFA]. B11100074100. Urajiosutoku kyoryūminkai teiri shikin kashitsuke seigan ni kansuru ken [On Credits at Low Interest Rates for the Vladivostok Society of (Japanese) Residents]. Gaimushō kiroku [Documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MOFA]. [3.8.2.29]. Zaigai kakuchi Kyoryūminkai kankei zakken [Miscellaneous Materials Associated with the Society of (Japanese) Residents in Foreign Countries]. Gendaishi shiryō: Kaigun. Katō Hiroharu nikki [Materials on Contemporary History: Navy. Diary of Admiral Katō Hiroharu]. 1994. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō. Hara Teruyuki. 1989. Shiberia shuppei. Kakumei to kanshō. 1917–1922 [The Siberian Expedition. Revolution and Intervention. 1917–1922]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. Horie Machi. 2002. Harukanaru Urajio. Meiji-Taishō jidai no Nihonjin kyoryūmin no sokuseki o otte [The Distant Vladivostok. The Trail of Japanese Residents in the Meiji and Taishō Periods]. Osaka: Shinpū Shobō. Horie Machi. 2005. Urajiosutoku no Nihinjin gai [The Japanese District in Vladivostok]. Tokyo: Tōyō Shoten. Isome Rokurō. 1918. Shiberia keizai chiri [Economic Geography of Siberia]. Tokyo: Gaikō Jihōsha. Kokuritsu kobushokan shozō shiryō. Jokun gian. Fūzoku bunsho [The State Archive Collection Documents. Supplement]. A10112669900. Mishima Ainosuke (Seiken Gakuzin). 1918. Urajiosutoku jijō [The Circumstances in Vladivostok]. Tokyo: Min’yūsha. (See also Seiken Gakujin below.) Morikawa Shoshichi. 1979. Hokkai no otoko. Shimada Mototarō no shōgai [A Man from Northern Seas. The Life of Shimada Mototarō]. Nos. 1–12. Tokyo: Bonanza. Nichiro jitsugyō shinpō [Bulletin of Japanese-Russian Entrepreneurship]. 1916. Vol. 2., no 10 (October 15). Nihon bōeki seiran [Overview of the Japanese Economy]. 1975. Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha. Saberiefu, I. [Savel’ev, I.]. 2005. Imin to kokka—Kyokutō Roshia ni okeru Chūgokujin, Chōsejin, Nihonjin [Immigrants and the State—Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese in the Russian Far East]. Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō.

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Seiken Gakujin (Mishima Ainoske). 1915. Urajiosutoku jijō [The Circumstances in Vladivostok]. 1915. Vladivostok: Hirobe Shokai. (see also Mishima Ainoske above) Shōda ke bunsho [Documents of the Shōda family]. Microfilm no. 67. Kokuryūko Endōshū shigatsu gaiyō [General Summary of the Expedition along the Amur River]. Tsūshō kōhō [Trade Bulletin]. 1918. No. 484.



Russian Sources



English Source

Priamurskie vedomosti. 1914. No. 2182. September 14. RGIA DV (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ istoricheskiĭ arkhiv Dal’nego Vostoka) [Russian State Historical Archives of the Far East]. f. 702, op. 1, d. 712, l. 15–16. Romanov, Vladimir F. 1911. Nuzhdy Nikolaevskogo raĭona Primorskoĭ oblasti. Trudy Amurskoĭ ėkspeditsii. Vyp. 10, Spb [The Needs of the Nikolaevsky District of the Primor’e Region. Works of the Amur Expedition. Issue 10]. St. Petersburg. Yuzefov, Vladislav Innokent′evich. 1999. Petr Pervyĭ Amurskiĭ (Iz istorii yaponskogo predprinimatel′stva na Nizhnem Amure i v g. Nikolaevske-na-Amure. 80-e gody XIX veka. 1925 [Peter the First of the Amur. From the History of Japanese Entrepreneurship in the Lower Amur and in the City of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. The Decade of the ‘80s in the 19th Century. 1925]. Vestnik Sakhalinskogo muzeya, no. 6.

Kotkin, Stephen. 1995. Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far East. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

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Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War and Japanese Troops in Russia’s Far East, 1918–1922 Sergey V. Grishachev and Vladimir G. Datsyshen The years 1918–1922 occupy a special place in the history of Russian-Japanese relations, however, the significance of this era is not limited to the presence of a Japanese army in the Russian Far East.1 Both sides were forming contacts against the backdrop of conflicting socio-political doctrines, the appearance of a new system of international relations, and a new global order. The events of this period should therefore be viewed within the broader context of international relations in Europe at this time, of the Russian Civil War, and of the conflict between the Russian Red (Bolshevik) and White (anti-Bolshevik) armies. Russian-Japanese relations in early 1917 were mixed. On the one hand, there was the lingering historical memory of the recent Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, but on the other, the two countries had enjoyed rapprochement for over a decade, and they were allies in World War I. The situation was further complicated due to the democratic revolution in Russia in February 1917. The Japanese government was cautious about the political changes but recognized the Russian Provisional Government, which honored the former commitments made by the imperial Russian regime, including those linked with foreign policy. When the Bolshevik party took power following a political revolt in Petrograd in October 1917, however, it refused to continue any former foreign policies. Germany acknowledged the new government under Vladimir I. Lenin—after July 1918 known as the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)—yet the Entente countries of France and the United Kingdom did not. The Bolsheviks renounced all commitments to former governments in 1918, and most diplomats from leading countries left Russia temporarily, among them the Japanese ambassador Uchida Kōsai. The separate Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers of Germany, AustriaGermany, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman empire was signed in March 1918, and this ended Russia’s participation in World War I. This facilitated Germany’s 1  Japanese troops left Vladivostok in 1922, and this meant the end of an Allied campaign, military intervention, and political conflict in the Russian territory. Japanese occupation of the northern part of Sakhalin continued from 1920 to 1925, however, and thus strictly speaking it was not “intervention.” The 1920–1925 era was closer to occupation. The future of Sakhalin and the matter of its return to Russia was discussed during later diplomatic negotiations between representatives of Soviet Russia and Japan in 1923–1925.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_009

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position during World War I, enabling it to mobilize sizable forces on the Western Front. This, in turn, created further problems for Russia’s former allies of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Despite the Bolsheviks rise to power, Russia still had patriotic political factions that viewed the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a treasonous act. The Entente countries relied on these factions, and they began discussions regarding an armed intervention in Russia and assistance to anti-Bolshevik forces in late 1917. Yet there was no unity between the Allies about the intervention plan and the degree of their respective involvement. Japanese leaders, too, had divergent opinions. For instance, Ambassador Uchida, who returned to Japan in March 1918, maintained that it would be pointless to send troops to fight the Bolsheviks. This was echoed by Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo in his comments in parliament: “The Japanese government has never suggested or encouraged any country to start a military campaign in Siberia … We have a deep affection for the Russian people and wish to develop our sincere friendship” (Molodyakov 2006, 92–93). This contrasted the opinions of politicians such as Gotō Shinpei who, while backing intervention, also wanted an administration committed to furthering economic cooperation with Japan to remain in power. Most Russian diplomats refused to recognize the Bolshevik government, and they tentatively agreed that a military intervention would be necessary to overthrow the Soviets. The ambassador to China, Nikolaĭ A. Kudashev, believed that: “We … can have no objections to Japan’s campaign … The restoration of order by the Japanese would be welcomed by the population, despite the fear of unavoidable Japanese occupation” (Livshits 1991, 7). 1

Japanese Intervention in the Russian Far East, 1918

Allied troops invaded Russia in the spring of 1918, soon after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. British forces were to operate in the north, in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, as well as in the South Caucasus, while French troops moved across southern Ukraine. US and Japanese troops landed in the Far East. The landing operation in Vladivostok near the country’s border with China began on April 5, 1918, at which point Rear Admiral Katō Kanji (Katō Hiroharu) addressed the Vladivostok population: Citizens! I, Commander of the Japanese Squadron, sincerely empathize with the situation Russia has found itself in and wish a quick end to all fighting and that your revolution is a resounding success … I have deep concerns, however, that ongoing political disputes may become

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extremely heated; the city functions as though it has no police, and I cannot help but worry about the life and property of subjects of the Japanese empire and Entente countries residing here … I simply have to send in landing forces … and take the measures I deem necessary before I ask the Japanese Imperial Government for further instructions … I would encourage the Russian people not to worry and to continue their daily routine. Dokumenty vneshneĭ politiki SSSR 1957, 226–27

Japanese troops were instructed to seize the main centers of the Russian Far East—Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk—and take control of Russia’s strategic site in Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), which linked Chita to Vladivostok and was formerly a part of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Concurrent with the Japanese landing in Vladivostok, Ataman Grigoriĭ M. Semenov, with the support of Japanese diplomats, launched an offensive from Manchuria to Chita in the Transbaikal region. Earlier in January 1918, Semenov held a meeting with Japanese Consul General Satō in Harbin: “Major Kuroki, appointed by the Japanese government as my advisor, has arrived … in Manchuria and he was successful in speaking with the Chinese authorities regarding the continuing existence of my Manchurian base” (Semenov 1999, 114). A Japanese mission was deployed to the headquarters of Semenov in April 1918: A battalion of Japanese volunteers, up to 600 men, was stationed at the headquarters … The Japanese battalion was formed at the initiative of Captain Kuroki, who sent employees of his mission, Mr. Andzio [Anzio?] and Syo Eitarō [Sho Eitarō?] to South Manchuria for recruiting volunteers from among reservists. They successfully accomplished their mission and recruited several hundred men, soldiers who had just been discharged. The valiant officer, Captain Okumura, was the battalion commander. semenov 1999, 158

Semenov’s unit crossed into Russia near the Manchuria Rail Station on April 29, 1918; he recalls the battle: Major Takeda of the General Staff, who replaced Captain Kuroki during the latter’s trip to Japan, personally took command and led his battalion against the Reds’ offensive. The battalion suffered heavy casualties but won back the hill. semenov 1991, 164

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In the summer of 1918, the Czechoslovak Corps Mutiny created a balance of Siberian political forces in support of anti-Bolshevik forces. Formed in 1917, the Czechoslovak Corps comprised Czech and Slovak soldiers formerly in the Austro-Hungarian army who had been taken prisoner by the Russians during World War I. Many of the prisoners expressed their wish to fight against the Austro-Hungarian empire and Germany, and to win independence for their country. The Soviet government permitted the evacuation of Czechoslovak forces to Vladivostok on the Trans-Siberian Railway in the spring of 1918 so that they could travel to Europe to assist France. In mid-May 1918, however, Czechoslovak Corps soldiers, fearing capture by the Bolsheviks when their trains were stranded en route to Vladivostok, revolted and seized control of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The toppling of Soviet authorities in the Transbaikal and Primor’e territories by the Czechoslovak soldiers accelerated the consolidation of political forces in East Siberia, and as one eye witness from the Transbaikal territory wrote: The Czechs led by Haida [Radola Gajda] and the Siberian troops … made their way to Manchuria, having beaten the Reds everywhere, and encountered Semenov and the Japanese near the Onon … The Japanese cavalry crossed the Onon and greatly contributed to the peaceful outcome. The Czechs did not dare start a battle in which the Japanese could intervene. guins 2007, 161

Anti-Bolshevik forces increasingly mobilized across Russia in the spring and summer of 1918. Most were members of the Volunteer Army led by Mikhail V. Alekseev and Anton I. Denikin in European Russia and the troops under Aleksandr V. Kolchak in Siberia. Kolchak went to the United States in the summer of 1917, then to Japan in 1918, and later to China where he met with Kudashev, the Russian ambassador to Beijing. The ambassador offered Kolchak the opportunity to take charge of and consolidate the anti-Bolshevik movement in Siberia. Kolchak began with a trip to Harbin, the administrative center of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and it was there that he formed the core of his army with the support of the British, the Americans, and the Japanese. The arrival of the massive Japanese contingent began in late summer 1918. About 2,000 Japanese troops of the 12th Division led by Lieutenant General Ōi Shigemoto landed in Vladivostok on August 11, with the principal contingent then stationed in the Amur region. Alekseĭ P. Budberg wrote in his diary: “August 30. The Japanese swiftly marched toward Khabarovsk and clearly were a success … September 1. The Japanese have taken over Iman … September 7.

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The Japanese have taken over Khabarovsk, which is a rather important step in the fight against the Reds” (Budberg 1990, 219–21). Japanese troops took Pos′et on October 19, 1918, and established power in the territory bordering Korea. The 3rd Division under General Ōba Jirō, now headquartered in Chita, secured the Transbaikal territory, and General Fujii Kōtsuchi’s 7th Division was stationed at the Manchuria rail station. Having crossed the Russian-Chinese border in the upper reaches of the Amur River, the Japanese gained control of the railroad as they advanced. A train carrying the intervening forces arrived in the town of Rukhlovo (Skovorodino) on September 8, 1918, and a Japanese battalion captured the Magdagachi rail station. Japanese forces crossed the Amur from the Chinese border town of Sahelian (Heihe) and seized Blagoveshchensk on September 18, 1918. Writing in March 1919, an officer of the Amur district headquarters noted that: Japanese troops have taken positions along the Amur Railway to protect stations, bridges, and other rail infrastructure from Bolshevik attacks and damage. Blagoveshchensk is the principal base of the Japanese: a brigade under General Yamada is posted there. He has two armored trains and eight airplanes … Stations mostly accommodate small units, no larger than a platoon, with the exception of important locations, such as Alexeevsk and Bochkarevo, where larger forces are deployed. myshov 2008, 76

Forward units of the Japanese army even crossed Lake Baikal. General Mutō Nobuyoshi’s military mission and the units in General Ōba’s division were posted in the eastern Siberian city of Irkutsk. Seven hundred members of the naval infantry arrived in Khabarovsk in September 1918 to take control of the Amur River flotilla. Another battalion was stationed in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur (Nikolaevsk-na-Amure), a city crucial for the access to the Amur River and as a gateway to Sakhalin. The Japanese contingent in Russia topped 70,000 troops by the end of 1918, and Japanese forces were rotated in the Russian Far East in 1919. The Amur region was taken over by the 14th Division of Lieutenant General Kurita Naohachirō, who was replaced by General Shirōzu Owashi in November. One of the division’s brigades was deployed in the vicinity of Blagoveshchensk under the command of General Yamada. Earlier, the 16th Division assumed control of the Chinese Eastern Railway from the 7th Division while General Suzuki’s 5th Division replaced the 3rd Division in the Transbaikal territory from the late summer to early fall 1919.

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This extensive intervention immediately created conflict and a degree of hostility in the relations between anti-Soviet Russian forces and the Japanese army. Georgiĭ K. Guins, who traveled with a mission of the head of the Siberian Provisional Government, Petr V. Vologodskiĭ, from Omsk in southwestern Siberia to Vladivostok in September 1918, remarked in his diary: There are Japanese soldiers and officers everywhere, starting with Chita. None of the Japanese military officials wished to meet with the Siberian government head. The Japanese were persistent in doing their job without making any noise and seemed to be fully indifferent to the Russian authorities. guins 2007, 174

In his diary General Vasiliĭ G. Boldyrev observes, “Vladivostok. December 14. Visited by Japanese vice consul Rie Watanabe [Watanabe Rie] … Watanabe does not deny mistakes made by certain representatives and soldiers but reiterates sincere support of Russia by the Japanese people” (Boldyrev 1925, 124). In late 1918, the Japanese army, together with the White Army, stepped up the repression of the Bolsheviks and their sympathizers. Their actions were particularly brutal in the Amur region, leading to a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment. During 1919, the Japanese forces not only occupied huge swathes of territory but also took active part in the hostilities and the punitive operations against Red Army guerrillas and the civilian population. Initially, the Japanese army arrested Bolshevik sympathizers and handed them over to the White Army but subsequently there were numerous cases of Japanese military aggression against civilians as the Japanese command attempted to deprive guerrillas of their support from the local population through intimidation. One of the most tragic events was the incident in the village of Ivanovka in the Amur region on March 22, 1919, that resulted in the deaths of more than 250 residents. 2

Kolchak and the Provisional All-Russian Government

Kolchak seized power in November 1918, declaring himself the Supreme Ruler of Russia. He organized the so-called Provisional All-Russian Government (PARG, i.e., the Omsk government), which was acknowledged by the Entente countries. Japan also entered into a relationship with the Omsk government and appointed Admiral Tanaka as head of the Japanese mission. Consul General Matsushima Hajime, who replaced Satō in January 1919, and Colonel Fukuda

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Hikosuke, the head of the military mission, represented Japan within Admiral Kolchak’s government in 1919. The Japanese military command avoided overt assistance to Kolchak’s army. When it was planned to send the 3rd Division to defend Omsk during the final stage of war and to replace the Czechoslovak Corps with the Japanese, the head of the military mission in Omsk, Major General Takayanagi Yasutarō, commented that “it would be hard to explain to the Japanese public the need for sending troops west of Irkutsk, outside the sphere of Japanese interests” (Livshits 1991, 81). Therefore, on July 23, 1919, the Japanese Foreign Ministry formally notified Kolchak’s representative in Tokyo about its refusal to send troops west of Irkutsk, the capital of East Siberia. As an eyewitness reported in August 1919 regarding Irkutsk, “the arrival of a special Japanese mission in Irkutsk for negotiating traffic on the Transbaikal railway. Japan shows interest in our rail traffic as it needs to know whether its troops scheduled to replace the Czechoslovaks as a security force in Siberia could be transported by rail” (Romanov 1994, 361). The Kolchak government nonetheless tried to arrange the supply of arms from Japan. The right to build a railway in the Far East was granted in exchange for Japanese aid, and negotiations were held relating to Japanese investment in the Sakhalin and Cheremkhovo coal mines. Japanese banks opened offices in many cities, and an agreement was also signed that extended the RussianJapanese Convention Concerning Fisheries (signed on July 15 [July 28], 1907). On March 14, 1919, Kolchak’s Railway Minister Leonid A. Ustrugov signed a declaration with the Allies, including with the Japanese representative, on the joint use of Russian railways and the Chinese Eastern Railway in Vladivostok. The Allies, among them Japan, provided the White Movement with defense hardware and weapons; the Kolchak government repaid them with a portion of the Russia’s gold and foreign currency reserves. Russian Soviet and certain older school Russian historians attempted to prove that most of these reserves were removed from Russia and deposited in US and Japanese banks (Sirotkin 2000, 174–75). Recent studies have shown, however, that it would have been impossible to sell a lion’s share of the gold on the global market (although some was in fact sold) since the quantity of gold reserves was so large that no buyer could offer the appropriate lump-sum payment. Moreover, the Bolsheviks took possession of a large part of the gold and foreign currency reserves (Budnitskiĭ 2008, 415–16). Irkutsk was the center of Japanese influence in Siberia, and many businessmen came to Siberia following on the soldiers’ heels. It was reported that on “October 31. The Japanese stationed in Irkutsk celebrated a national holiday.

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November 10. Japanese commercial travelers appeared in the city to sell haberdashery, paper, and so forth” (Romanov 1994, 44). Eight Japanese parliament members visited Siberia in the summer of 1919. The White Movement in eastern Russia suffered a series of defeats in the summer of 1919. The Kolchak army began to retreat, and the Japanese mission was the last to leave Omsk for Irkutsk on November 8, 1919, together with the evacuation of the Kolchak government. The Katō mission stayed in Irkutsk until early 1920, having declared its neutrality. By early 1920 the Kolchak army no longer existed. A coup was staged in Irkutsk and the pro-Bolshevik Political Center located in Irkutsk, who wanted Kolchak removed from power, grabbed control. Kolchak was arrested, convicted, and executed. The Japanese army did not interfer in the coup. The battalion still in Irkutsk only protected Japanese subjects and the diplomatic mission, and the Japanese retreated to the suburbs on January 18. The Bolsheviks eventually took control of almost all Siberian territory in early 1920. Semenov continued his mounted resistance in the Transbaikal territory. There was a short cessation of hostilities in the Far East in 1920—attention was now focused on Crimea—where the future of the troops of the Russian army led by Petr N. Vrangel was at stake. 3

The Formation of the Far Eastern Republic and the Nikolaevsk Incident

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) could not afford an open armed conflict with Japan due to its domestic and international situation. It was proposed instead to create a political buffer state known as the Far Eastern Republic (FER), which appeared to have been formed by different political forces. The “buffer” idea was not generated in the Kremlin, rather it was suggested by local politicians in Siberia. Soviet leaders approved of the buffer idea, and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided a month later to suspend the declaration of a Soviet regime east of Baikal. On April 6, 1920, the Far Eastern Republic was announced in Verkhneudinsk (Ulan-Udė), which was established at its capital. The position of the Siberian Bolsheviks on Japanese policy significantly differed from that of the Kremlin. They wanted action, and in April 1920 the Revolutionary Military Council of the People’s Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic (FER) proposed to continue the offensive toward Chita. Lenin placed a temporary freeze on the hostilities against the Japanese in a cable dated April 6. The reason for this was obvious—by then Soviet Russia had yet to defeat the remaining forces of the White Movement in Crimea.

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The leadership of the young Far Eastern Republic began negotiations with the Japanese command on the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Verkhneudinsk and the entire Transbaikal region. One of the most dramatic events during the period of the civil war and of foreign intervention in the history of Russian-Japanese relations was the so-called Nikolaevsk Incident of spring 1920. The city of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur was located at some distance from the main events; however, as a part of the intervention framework a Japanese garrison was stationed there in 1918 because of the city’s strategic location on the estuary of the Amur River opposite the island of Sakhalin. Furthermore, since the end of the 19th century, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur was the territory’s center of gold mining. In addition to the small garrison deployed in 1918, Japanese civilians also inhabited the city, among them the consul and his family. The guerrilla unit of the anarchist Yakov I. Tryapitsyn, who formally recognized the Soviet regime, approached the city in January 1920. An agreement was reached with the Japanese garrison, and the unit was allowed entry. The peaceful coexistence between Red guerrillas and the local population did not last, however, and soon the soldiers launched a hunt for individuals sympathetic with the White Movement, who were arrested and executed. Arrests and executions of wealthy civilians followed, and by March the conflict embroiled the Japanese military. The garrison was given a disarmament ultimatum, which it rejected, and this led to the outbreak of armed conflict on March 12. The Japanese were sorely outnumbered: Japanese soldiers led by Major Ishikawa Masatada, who were sheltering in the barracks, and civilians, including the consul and his family, were burned alive. Japan viewed the killing of the members of the military garrison, the consul and his family as sufficient grounds to deploy additional troops to the city and to occupy northern Sakhalin (opposite Nikolaevsk-on-Amur) for an indefinite period. Japanese units were sent to the Amur estuary from Khabarovsk and warships neared the shore in May. Given the circumstances, Tryapitsyn’s unit retreated only after having laid the entire city to waste: wooden structures were set alight and stone structures blown up. The remaining population of the city retreated together (they were taken from the city by force) with the unit but a revolt erupted only a short distance from the city in the town of Kerbi. Tryapitsyn was arrested, convicted, and executed on July 9, 1920, for the crime of undermining confidence in the communist regime among the working population (Molodyakov 2012, 194). Soviet and modern Russian historians have conflicting views regarding the 1920 events in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. Soviet historians claim that “the socalled Nikolaevsk Incident was intentionally provoked by the Japanese military in March 1920 … This incident was used by the Japanese military as a pretext for various provocations for a number of years” (Kutakov 1985, 65).

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Some contemporary Russian scholars occasionally express a similar opinion: “The Japanese military command chose Nikolaevsk-on-Amur to be a venue of provocation … Japanese militarism deliberately sacrificed its own soldiers” (Dal’niĭ Vostok Rossiĭ 2003, 366–67). There is, however, another historiographic account. Already in 1924, the acclaimed journalist Anatoliĭ Gan (the pen name of Anatoliĭ Ya. Gutman) published a chronicle of the events in his book Ruin of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur: Episodes of the Civil War in the Far East (Gibel Nikolaevskana-Amure: Stranitsy iz istorii grazhdanskoĭ voĭny na Dal′nem Vostoke). Gan traveled to Siberia and the Far East at the time of the civil war. He lived in the Primor’e territory from 1919 to 1920, and therefore was well placed to report on the brutal events of the spring of 1920 (Gutman 1924). Today, many historians agree in the description of Tryapitsyn’s actions as unprecedented, baseless cruelty: “the intentional burning of an entire city, killing thousands killed with immeasurable ruins and devastation of the territory that had no parallels in the history of that war” (Nelyubova 2012, 291). Most authors also concur that the events in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur complicated the already oppositional relations between the Soviet Russians and the Japanese. Despite the general tensions and the opposing political viewpoints and ideologies, the Japanese and the Bolsheviks understood that compromise was needed. As a military operation, Japan’s intervention required vast human and material resources. The defeat of the White Movement and the final breakdown of earlier political and economic relations made it clear that the military operation in Russia must cease. Both sides attempted to come to terms in negotiations that began in June 1920. Although initially they failed to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement, on July 15, 1920, the Far Eastern Republic delegation and the command of the Japanese expedition forces in Siberia signed a truce agreement at the Gongota rail station, 125 km east of Chita. It declared a truce starting on July 18 and set the Yablonoi Mountains as the demarcation line (the agreement had six provisions in total). Troops were fully withdrawn from the Transbaikal territory on October 15, 1920. General Ōi announced the withdrawal from Khabarovsk on September 18, 1920, and the pullout was complete by September 21. After leaving the Transbaikal territory, the Amur region, and Khabarovsk, Japanese forces were posted in the Primor’e territory, northern Sakhalin, and the port of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. 4

Primor’e from 1921 to 1922 and Soviet-Japanese Diplomacy

The truce represented a first step, yet further complex issues still required resolution. After some months, in the summer of 1921, the Far Eastern Republic

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initiated negotiations with Japan in the city of Dalian (J: Dairen). The agenda was extensive, including the evacuation of the remaining Japanese troops from Primor’e and the establishment of economic relations. The negotiations were challenging and difficult; they were often paused and in April 1922 they ceased altogether. The Far Eastern Republic continued to expand its influence toward Primor’e and demonstrated an increasingly pro-Bolshevik stance in the removal of members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party from its administration. Military Minister Vasiliĭ K. Blyukher had already began preparations for an offensive against Primor’e in January 1922. Under these circumstances the Japanese command once again relied on anti-Bolshevik forces in the territory and backed a revolt in Vladivostok in May 26, 1922. Vladivostok was the last base for the Japanese forces. From 1920 to 1922 the political landscape of the city was extremely diverse, and it often developed in isolation from events in other parts of the Far East. A revolt was staged in the city in January 1920, soon after the defeat of the Kolchak army. Kolchak’s administrative representative General Sergeĭ N. Rozanov was deposed. The revolt was organized by a broad coalition comprising Mensheviks, SocialistsRevolutionaries, and Bolsheviks. They assumed power in Vladivostok and formed the Maritime Region Zemstvo Board. The military officer Sergeĭ G. Lazo would become one an active member of the board. In the spring of 1920, the Maritime Region Zemstvo Board established contacts with the Far Eastern Republic, although Primor’e was still isolated from its principal territory. Surprisingly, Japanese units stationed in the city did not offer armed support, even though they had evacuated Rozanov from the city. The Zemstvo Board and the Japanese command elaborated upon and approved regulations regarding their relationship, and in December 1920 the Primor’e Bolsheviks announced that they were now a part of the Far Eastern Republic. A further revolt occurred in Primor’e in the spring of 1921. The bourgeois government took control, led by the Merkulov brothers, Spiridon D. and Nikolaĭ D., and with Japanese support. The Merkulov government was initially successful; its troops moved north and captured Khabarovsk. But the Far Eastern Republic Army launched an offensive against Khabarovsk in the winter of 1922 and used the situation to turn events in its favor with the fight near the Volochaevka rail station. This opened the way to Primor’e. With the take over of Khabarovsk the Red troops approached the Amur estuary, with the result that the Japanese command withdrew some of its forces from Nikolaevsk-onAmur and the adjoining territories along the coast of the Tatar Strait. Northern Sakhalin, however, remained in Japanese hands. It became increasingly clear that the Bolsheviks had won in Russia and that their occupation in Primor’e was imminent. The situation became increasingly

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conclusive. Even the instatement of General Mikhail K. Diterikhs to power in Primor’e in the summer of 1922 would do little to effect drastic change. The Japanese began to evacuate its forces from Primor’e in late August, and General Diterikhs’s army retreated along the rail line, in fact, in the tracks of the withdrawing Japanese units. In the meantime, the Japanese government tried to establish diplomatic contact with the Far Eastern Republic, whose leadership agreed to hold another meeting in June on the condition it would be attended by RSFSR representatives. The conference ultimately took place in Changchun from September 4 to September 26, 1922. It addressed the same issues as the Dairen Conference from August 26, 1921 to April 16, 1922—that is, the evacuation of Japanese troops from the Far East and the Nikolaevsk Incident. Japan declared the intention to pull its troops from Primor’e by November. In addition, both sides discussed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic. Japan refused to continue with the negotiations, however, because of the RSFSR’s irreconcilable stance and its intention to absorb the Far Eastern Republic. This resulted in the Changchun Conference being cut short. Following the defeat near Spassk in early October, General Diterikhs withdrew from Vladivostok. Some of the retreating troops were transported to Manchuria, some went to Pos′et and were taken to Korea (then the territory of the Japanese empire), and some left Vladivostok on October 23 aboard ships under the command of Counter Admiral Georgiĭ K. Stark. After the departure of the remaining troops of the White Army, the Japanese command and a Far Eastern Republic delegation signed an agreement on the final evacuation of Japanese forces on October 24, 1922. Units of the FER People’s Revolutionary Army entered the Primor’e capital city the next day. The withdrawal of Japanese troops from the continental region of the Russian Far East signaled a new phase in the history of Eastern Russia and Russian-Japanese relations. The Far Eastern Republic was dissolved on November 15, 1922, and on the eve of 1923 joined the newly formed Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The adeptly conceived removal of Japanese forces from the Russian Primor’e territory spared any remaining anti-Bolshevik forces violence at the hands of the advancing troops of the People’s Revolutionary Army. A significant number of the Russians who retreated to Pos’et were transported to the city of Genzan (present-day Wonsan in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK, North Korea]) but assistance from the Japanese government to the Russian refugees was only temporary. A large contingent of the Stark squadron eventually ended up in China and the Philippines.

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5 Conclusion From 1918 to 1922 Russian-Japanese relations experienced one of the most complex periods in their history. The principal conflict of that period was Russia’s own internal political turmoil, in which the Japanese government sympathized with the losing anti-Bolshevik side. The Bolshevik regime demonstrated its viability and strength, however, and Japan soon realized the need for political dialogue with the new government, even though its first attempt, the Dairen Conference, was unproductive. Japanese intervention in Russia was just one aspect of the global events that coincided with World War I and the postwar world reorder. Japan’s move was not anti-Russian, but simply the result of its inability to understand accurately the direction of the development and realities of Russian national society. In other words, the Japanese intervention was not a move against Russia, as posited by Soviet historians. Japan had its own reasons to dispatch troops to Russia and it did so with one of the political sides—the White Army (antiBolshevik)—because they promised to honor earlier financial, economical, and military commitments. The Whites were defeated in the civil war, however, which meant that the Japanese government erred in its assessment of the reality of the situation. Throughout most of the 20th century the chronicling and evaluation of the events of 1918–1922 were determined by political realities. The extraordinary degree of politicization and the uncompromising opinions from Soviet historians at this time, in part influenced by the propaganda of the Soviet state, stem from the fact that the Bolsheviks were victorious. Despite the general view held by most historians, Japanese military invention itself was not an insurmountable obstacle to the development of Russian-Japanese relations even during the Soviet period, as testified in the active cooperation between the two nations from 1925 to 1929. The causes and factors leading to a new outbreak of Soviet-Japanese confrontation in the 1930s would ultimately lay elsewhere. Acknowledgments This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Grant No. 19-18-00017).

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Ablova, Nadezhda Evgen′evna. 1999. Istoriya KVZhD I Rossiĭskoĭ ėmigratsii v Kitae (Pervaya polovina ХХ veka). [History of the Eastern Chinese Road and Russian Emigration to China (First Half of the 20th Century)]. Minsk: Belarusskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ universitet (Belarusian State University). Boldirev, Vasiliĭ Georgievich. 1925. Direktoriya, Kolchak, interventy: Vospominaniya [The Directory, Kolchak, the Interventionists: Memoirs]. Novonikolaevsk: Sibkraĭizdat. Budberg, Alekseiĭ Pavlovich. 1990. Dnevnik [Diary]/Ledyanoĭ pokhod [The Ice Campaign]. Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya. Budnitskiĭ, Oleg Vital’evich. 2008. Den′gi russkoĭ ėmigratsii. Kolchakovskoe zoloto [Russian Emigration Money. Kolchak’s Gold]. Moscow: NLO. Dal’niĭ Vostok Rossiĭ v period revolyutsii 1917 goda I grazhdanskoĭ voĭny [Russian Far East During the Period of 1917 and the Civil War]. 2003. Vladivostok: Dal′nauka. Dokumenty vneshneĭ politiki SSSR. Tom 1 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Vol. 1]. 1957. Moscow: Politizdat. Guins, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich. 2007. Sibir′, soyuzniki i Kolchak. Povorotnyĭ moment Russkoĭ istorii 1918–1920: Vpechatleniya I mysli chlena Omskogo pravitel′stva [Siberia, Allies, and Kolchak. A Pivotal Moment in Russian History. Impression and Ideas of an Omsk Government Member 1918–1920]. Moscow: Kraft. Gutman, Anatoliĭ Yakovlevich. 1924. Gibel′ Nikolaevska-na-Amure: Stranitsy iz istorii grazhdanskoĭ voĭny na Dal′nem Vostoke [Ruin of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur: Episodes of the Civil War in the Far East]. Berlin: Russian Economist (Russkiĭ economist). Iz istorii grazhdanskoĭ voĭny v SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov I materialov [History of the Civil War in the USSR. Collection of Documents and Materials]. 1961. Vol. 2. Moscow: Sovetskaya Rossiya. Kutakov, Leonid Nikolaevich. 1985. K istorii diplomaticheskikh otnosheniĭ mezhdu SSSR I Yaponieĭ [On the History of Diplomatic Relations between the USSR and Japan]. Voprosy istorii, no. 12: 64–76. Livshits, Solomon Grigor’evich. 1991. Politika Yaponii v Sibiri v 1918–1920 [Japan’s Policy in Siberia in 1918–1920]. Barnaul: BSPI (Barnaul State Pedagogical Institute) (Barnaul′skiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ pedagogicheskiĭ universitet). Molodyakov, Vasiliĭ Erinarkhovich. 2006. Goto Shinpei I russko-yaponskie otnosheniya [Gotō Shinpei and Russian-Japanese Relations]. Moscow: AIRO-XXI. Molodyakov, Vasiliĭ Erinarkhovich. 2012. Rossiya I Yaponiya: V poiskakh soglasiya (1905– 1945) [Russia and Japan in Pursuit of Concord (1905–1945)]. Moscow: AIRO-XXI. Myshov, Nikolaĭ Aleksandrovich. 2008. “Oni … predstavlyayutsya naseleniyu v roli zavoevateleĭ” Otchet belogvardeĭskogo ofitsera. [“The Population Sees Them as Conquerors.” White Army Officer’s Report]. Otechestvennye arkhivy, no. 3: 73–81.

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Nelyubova, Svetlana Nikolaevna. 2012. “Sobytiya grazhdanskoĭ voĭny na nizhnem Amure glazami ochevidtsev” [Civil War Episodes in the Lower Reaches of the Amur Through Eyewitnesses], 291–95. In Chetvertye arkhivnye nauchnye chteniya imeni V. I. Chernyshevoĭ: materialy vserossiĭskoĭ nauchno-prakticheskoĭ konferentsii. [Fourth Archival Academic Readings of V. I. Chernysheva: Materials of All-Russia Scientific and Practical Conference]. Khabarovsk: Khabarovskaya kraevaya tipografiya. Romanov, Nit Stepanovich. 1994. Letopis′ goroda Irkutska za 1902–1924 gg. [Chronicles of the City of Irkutsk 1902–1924]. Irkutsk: Vostochno-Sibirskoe knizhnoe izdatel′stvo (East Siberian Publishing House). Semenov, Grigoriĭ Mikhaĭlovich. 1999. O sebe. Vospominaniya, mysli I vyvody. [About Myself. Memoirs, Thoughts, and Conclusions]. Moscow: AST (ACT). Sirotkin, Vladlen Georgievich. 2000. Zarubezhnoe zoloto Rossii [Russia’s Foreign Gold]. Moscow: OLMA-Press.



English Source

Dunscomb, Paul E. 2011. Japan’s Siberian Intervention, 1918–1922: “A Great Disobedience Against the People.” Lanham: Lexington Books.

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part 5

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Japanese-Russian Relations in the 1920s: Struggles between Anti-Soviet and Pro-Soviet Forces Tomita Takeshi Japan in the 1920s can be characterized as an era when mutually opposing political and social forces—the anti-Soviet and pro-Soviet—came into play. The conservative forces sought to stand up against the rising tide of the social movement in Japan that was a continuation of the revolution in Russia and attempted to preserve kokutai (a tennō regime).1 The progressive forces involved in the wave of “Taishō Democracy” tried to implement political and social reforms through the leadership of political parties in the parliament. These forces, moreover, defended the idea of international cooperation, including coexistence with the new Soviet government. Gotō Shinpei and the Japan-Russia Association that he chaired played a crucial role not only in the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries (e.g., Soviet-Japanese [Japanese-Soviet] Convention on Basic Principles, for Mutual Relations signed January 1925) but also in the maintenance of friendly relations (this would change with the Manchurian Incident of September 1931). Although Japanese and Soviet interests in Manchuria did not always coincide, as seen in the competition between the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) and the South Manchurian Railway (SMR), both sides were careful to avoid armed clashes. The “Tanaka Memorandum,” which it was believed had been presented to Emperor Shōwa in July 1927 by Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi and subsequently the basis of the Japanese imperialist aggression on the continent, has been established as spurious (Tomita 2010b, 174–75; Tomita, 2010a, 83). The efforts of the Japanese business community to access the Chinese and Soviet markets in order to reduce dependence on US and British capital cannot be ignored, however. A group of fishery companies engaged in the supply of seafood to the domestic and foreign market exerted considerable influence on the Japanese government, securing a revision of the Japanese-Russian Fisheries Convention of 1907. Gotō visited the Soviet Union in January 1928 and successfully completed the negotiations; this resulted in preserving the competitive coexistence of Japanese and Soviet fishing companies. 1  The doctrine of kokutai (literally, “national body”) views the country of Japan, the sacred, omnipotent emperor (tennō) and Japanese subjects as a single, family-like unity.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_010

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With the support of the Japanese government and the navy, coal and oil companies invested capital in northern Sakhalin; these investments created the basis for the concession agreement with the USSR. Although the concession companies caused numerous disputes at their sites of operation, they nevertheless supplied coal and petroleum products to Japan and at the same time technology and equipment to the USSR. The wave of Japanese intellectuals interested in Russian culture that surfaced following the translations by the modern writer Futabatei Shimei during the Meiji period (1868–1912) familiarized the Japanese with Russian literature. This should not be underestimated. While most Japanese feared communism, they were also interested in the “new realities” of the Soviet system such as social equality and social guarantees. Although the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was repressed from 1928 to 1931 in accordance with the 1925 and 1928 (revised) “Public Order Protection Act” (Chianiji hō), the Japanese, at least the intellectual community, remained empathetic toward Soviet Russia until the mid-1930s regarding the conditions of the Great Depression that swept across the global capitalist economy. And in the 1920s, many Japanese supported cultural exchange between the two countries in the fields of literature, painting, music, ballet, theater, and cinema. One such example occurred in January 1928 when actors from the Kabuki Theater (Kabuki-za) went to Moscow and Leningrad on its first foreign tour. 1

From Military Intervention in Siberia to Restoration of SovietJapanese Diplomatic Relations

Launched in August 1918, the military expedition to Siberia resulted in an unjustified war. Japan sent the largest military contingent (70,000 troops), which was a violation of the agreement between the partners of the joint military expedition (United States, United Kingdom, and France), and it failed to establish a stable anti-Bolshevik power in three Far Eastern regions (Primor’e, Amur, and Transbaikal regions) (Hara 1989, 356–59, 434–47). The German Revolution (i.e., the end of World War I) invalidated the pretext of an allied expedition to prevent German “expansion into the East that encourages the extremists” and following the evacuation of the Czech corps from Vladivostok the allied mission of their “rescue” from Germany and the extremists also became untenable. The Japanese military remained in Russia despite the fact that in the early 1920s, the United States and then the United Kingdom and France withdrew their troops from the Far Eastern regions. The international community criticized Japan. This led to discontent in Japan regarding the military intervention, with public sentiment and a movement calling - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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for “non-interference in Russian affairs.” On the one hand, the Nikolaevsk Incident, which resulted in the killing of Japanese residents in Nikolaevskon-Amur (Nikolaevsk-na-Amure), gave rise to a fear of “extremists” in Japan. On the other, it prompted the discussion about whether the interference in Russian affairs could be justified. Liberal intellectuals, including Ishibashi Tanzan and Yoshino Sakuzō, initially criticized the military expedition, and the issue of the expedition was discussed in the parliament. The emergence of left-wing socialists ensued. A resolution demanding the “immediate withdrawal of troops from Siberia” was adopted during the first May Day meeting in Japan held on May 1, 1920. In 1921, following reports in the media about the famine in Russia, the Movement to Aid the Starving (Kikin Kyūsai Undō) was organized in Japan, and the slogan for the “recognition of the State of Russian workers and peasants” (rōnō Roshia shōnin) was coined during the May Day rally in 1922. Public opinion had moved from a criticism of the senselessness shedding of Japanese blood to sympathy toward the people of Russia and a demand to acknowledge the Soviet power. This demand reflected an awareness by trade unions and socialists, as well as capitalists, who sought to develop trade in an effort to overcome the post-WW I depression. Gotō Shinpei was the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of the military expedition to Siberia, and in 1920 he was elected chairman of the Japan-Russia Association. Cognizant of the current situation, Gotō took the initiative to negotiate with Russia on the restoration of diplomatic relations, and in February 1923 he invited Adolph Joffe to Japan for talks. This was not only a realistic policy, recognizing in effect the domination of Soviet power in Russia, but it also represented the geopolitical and strategic plan of Japan’s alliance with the Soviet Union and the aim to counter the influence of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Far East. Gotō was also the first chairman of the South Manchuria Railway, and he was aware of the importance of the Manchurian market and the role of the Harbin Products Exhibition Hall (Harubin Shōhin Chinretsukan). The latter was founded in 1918 and administered by the Japan-Russia Association, which explains Gotō’s consideration of Japan’s possible cooperation with the Soviet Union in Manchuria. 2

Confrontation and Cooperation Surrounding the Japan-USSR Fisheries Industry

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territorial waters off the coast of Kamchatka, Primor’e, and elsewhere. Fishing was regulated through a lease system and annual auctions allocated the use of fishing areas to Japanese and Russian fishing enterprises. Japan secured a greater number of fishing areas as a result of the auctions; moreover, their fishing technology and equipment was superior to Russia’s (Table 1). The Fisheries Convention was suspended de facto during the Bolshevik Revolution and the ensuing civil war and armed intervention, but as the Soviet Union gained strength negotiations regarding the lease of fishing areas in the form of general agreements were completed between the Soviet regional authorities and the Japanese. Fishing resumed as it had before with Japan again in a stronger position. After the civil war, Lenin introduced the “New Economic Policy” (NEP, a market oriented economic policy), and the Soviet leadership now paid greater attention to fisheries as one of the main sectors in the economic development of the Far East. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership demanded the revision of table 1

Number of fishing areas leased by Japan and Russia

 

Japan

Russia

 

Japan

Soviet Union

1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922  

119 183 157 224 214 215 210 214 203 218 245 247 315 227 272  

14 37 23 30 29 49 54 51 42 73 80 87 73 59 57  

1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

268 245 261 268 255 255 303 318 309 392 357 386 395 399 391 386

 34  50  50  47  41  42 162 272 301 301 352 365 414 419 424 409

Source: Roryō Suisan Kumiai, ed., Roryō gyogyō no enkaku to genjō (Tokyo: Roryō Suisan Kumiai, 1938), 88–89

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the fishing convention with Japan since it was felt that it was necessary to create the fishing industry as part of national ownership. Negotiations on these issues took place in Moscow from late 1925 to early 1928, and the last round of the talks was held during Gotō’s visit to Moscow from December 22, 1927, to January 21, 1928. Each side had no differences regarding the paragraph in the 1907 Fisheries Convention about the principal role of the auctions; however, there were conflicts of interest since the Soviet side wanted to secure a certain number of state fishing areas and the Japanese side wished to retain the rights it previously acquired under the general agreements. In the meantime, Japan’s fishery organization, the Union of Fisheries in Russian Territories (Roryō Suisan Kumiai), was exerting pressure on the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. This caused disagreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which wanted to work out a deal (Tomita 2010a, 142–50). Gotō, who traveled Moscow as the authorized representative of Prime Minister Tanaka, also experienced difficulties. So as not to humiliate Gotō, the Soviet Union, with the approval of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), inserted the following lines in the draft convention: “The Soviet government recognizes the economic importance of fisheries conducted by Japanese citizens in the areas determined by the Fisheries Convention and will make sure that the reasonable and lawful interests of the Japanese people are not infringed upon within the framework of the convention.” Before Gotō’s departure to Japan, therefore, both sides reached an agreement and signed the Fisheries Convention. Unlike the 1907 convention, the new agreement stipulated that not all fishing areas would be leased by auction—the areas reserved by the state were excluded from the bidding—and the leased areas were restricted to the coast of Kamchatka (Fig. 1). It could be conjectured that the Soviet Union now had the chance to regain the fishing conditions in Russian waters that were previously deemed disadvantageous. Even in its first year of operation (1929) the Fisheries Convention led to disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union due to differences in interpretation. First, there were areas within the fishing sectors declared by the Soviet side to be reserved for state-run enterprises; these had previously been fished by the Japanese. Second, the Soviets who participated in the bidding process received financial assistance from state institutions (banks), and third, the areas long acquired and operated by the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company (Nichiro Gyogyō Kabushiki Kaisha) were acquired in an auction in 1929 by Uda Kan’ichirō on behalf of a Soviet citizen.

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figure 1

Tomita

Russian territory Kamchatka fishing areas Reference: Mishima Yasuo, Hoku yōgyo no keiei shiteki kenkyū (Tokyo: Minerva Shobō, 1971), 3 (with modifications)

The Japanese protested the first point, seeing it as a contravention of the paragraph in the convention that referred to the “care about the interests of the Japanese people.” The Soviet side returned some of the areas, and negotiations were held on the issues concerning the provision of alternative fishing areas rather than those lost. The second point gave no formal cause to violate the convention, and Japanese fishing companies agreed to negotiate the reassignment of fishing areas in exchange for compensation (in actual fact, only partial reassignment occurred). The third point proved challenging since it was suspected that the USSR ambassador to Japan, Aleksandr A. Troyanovskiĭ, had intervened in the internal conflict between Uda and management at the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company in order to influence the bidding process (AVP RF f. 0146, op. 12, d. 93, por. 351, 1. 2). This incident occurred against the backdrop of close relations between Japanese and Soviet fishing enterprises that in fact offered each other the convenience at the expense of a turnover of fishing gear, boats, fishermen, and capital. Such a situation had existed since the enactment of the old convention, and in most instances the Japanese side was the active party.

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The Japanese fisheries union operating in Russian waters mobilized its members and pressured the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the negotiations in an attempt to secure compromises from the Soviet side. The corporation even issued a statement about “free access to fishing”—that is, access to fishing without the lease payments meant to be made after winning the auction, without securing visas for members of the team, and without compliance to other formalities. From the Soviet Union’s standpoint, the “problem of unfair participation of Uda in the auction” was an internal Japanese problem, and as such the release of a declaration regarding “free access to fishing” would then necessitate diplomatic negotiations. This issue also included the factor of confrontation between small- and medium-sized enterprises on the one side and the large Japanese-Russian Fishing Company, which expressed a strong anti-monopolist sentiment, on the other, making it difficult to find a solution for a time and causing a rift in the company (a separate organization formed around Uda). The business community mediated a settlement: Uda broke the lease agreement and the renounced fishing areas went to the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company in the form of a lease from the Soviet side. The Japanese-Russian Fishing Company paid Uda rent and commission charges to the Soviet Union (Tomita 2010a, 168–70). The clash between the Soviet Union and Japan over fishing areas resurfaced in 1930 because of the problems regarding the state’s reservation of the areas and that the lease payment for fishing areas was principally in rubles. The confrontation escalated into a large-scale movement for the protection of fisheries, and there were even occasional calls by fishery companies to “break off relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.” Thanks to the compromises reached by the two diplomatic missions, the two sides signed the Karakhan–Hirota Agreement in 1932, according to which the auctions were nominally preserved and the fishing areas were shared equally between Japan and the Soviet Union (Tomita 2010a, 184–86). This was realized due to the Soviet Union’s desire to collectivize and nationalize fisheries based on the first five-year plan and of Japan’s interest in the promotion of a monopolization around the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company at a time of economic crisis (Table 2.1 and 2.2). More precisely, in order to avoid confrontation each year the two nations reached a compromise by emasculating the content of the fishing convention, choosing instead the path of stabilization in their relations.

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162 table 2.1

Tomita Number of fishing areas of the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company in Russian territory

1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934

Japan (in its entirety)

Japanese-Russian Fishing Company

Percentage

264 269 255 255 303 318 309 392 357 386

100 112 126 123 123 141 133 298 332 355

37.9 41.6 49.4 48.2 40.6 44.3 43 76 93 92

* The halt to the company’s expansion in 1929 was due to the Uda incident. Source: Nichiro gyogyō keieishi, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Suisansha, 1971), 129, 290, 547 table 2.2 Percentage of separate fishing areas and fish catch in the Russian Far East

State management 

Partnership cooperation 

Total

 

Number of fishing areas

Percentage Number of of fish catch fishing areas

Percentage Number of of fish catch fishing areas

1929 1930 1931 1932

228 224 182 217

50 49 48.9 51.3

30.8 32.2 39 36.8

502 558 805 798

  863   959 1,157 1,031

* The Far East was not only area for the Russian fishing industry; other areas are also included. Source: Anatoliĭ Timofeevich Mandrik, Istoriia rybnoi promyshlennosti Dal’nego Vostoka (1927–1940 gg.) (Vladivostok: Dal’nauka, 2004), 41, 49

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163

Japanese Concession Companies in Northern Sakhalin

Oil and coal concession agreements on northern Sakhalin were signed in December 1925, almost ten months after the signing of the Soviet-Japanese (Japanese-Soviet) Convention on Basic Principles for Mutual Relations. The forty-eight articles in the oil concession agreement contain the following provisions: 1) 50 percent of the oil-bearing areas are handed over to Japan for use during forty-five years; 2) The land plots with an area of fifteen dessiatines (16,3875 hectares) each are marked in the oil field in the form of grid squares; 3) Exploration drilling in the oil fields is allowed during five to ten years within the area of 1,000 square versts (1,138 square km); 4) The payment of the concession fee in the amount of 5 to 15 percent of the production volume (maximum 45 percent for the oil-well flow). Article 10 lists the regulations for the eight oil fields, including the Okha field (Fig. 2). The sites of the concessioner enterprises and state areas were interspersed such that none of the sites of each respective concessioner bordered another in any direction (east-west, north-south), and accordingly no state area would be next to another. Article 18 details the concession fee based on the total annual production volume (the flow of the oil wells depended on the daily production volume) (Murakami 2004, 361–81). The system of concessions (R: kontsessia) proposed by Lenin in the early period of Soviet power permitted the production of mineral products by developed Western nations in an economically backward Russia, and this allowed them to dispose freely of the products in exchange for a fixed concession fee. In theory this was a mutually beneficial system, although it can be said that the system was more advantageous to the side granting the concession since it acquired the production equipment and technology when the concession contract expired. Friction between the two sides regarding their respective interests was unavoidable, and even during the concession period disputes could easily erupt if the relations among the concessioners became tense. The oil concessions in northern Sakhalin were a classic example of such a situation. Japan nevertheless decided to conclude an oil concession agreement with the USSR because its own crude oil refining capacities did not exceed 3,700 tons per year (1930). Japan sought to free itself from dependence on imports from the United States and other countries. In fact, after the conclusion of the agreement the annual oil production volume at the Okha oil field amounted to 33,037 tons in 1926. The navy, which admitted the future possibility of a war

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figure 2

Tomita

Northern Karafuto (Northern Sakhalin): oil and coal concessions Source: Jon J. Sutefuan ( John J. Stephan), Saharin—Ni/ Chū/So kōsō no rekishi (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1973), 132 (with modifications). - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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with the United States and the United Kingdom, was keenly interested in the acquisition of oil concessions in northern Sakhalin. The director and most of the business managers of the newly created Northern Sakhalin Oil Company (Kita Karafuto Sekiyū Kabushiki Kaisha) were admirals of the naval fleet. The majority purchase of crude oil was for the navy’s fuel depots, comprising more than 90 percent of the oil produced (Murakami 2004, 124–35). Research by the historian Murakami Takashi reveals that the oil production for the Sakhalin Oil Company’s Okha field developed favorably: 77,227 tons were produced in 1927; approximately 121,356 tons in 1928; and 186,641 tons in 1929 (Murakami 2004, 144). In 1928, however, the Northern Sakhalin Oil Company and the Soviets found themselves in dispute following the competition emerging from the creation of the Soviet state-run Sakhalin Oil Trust. The Soviets referred to Article 7 of the concession agreement, which gave it “the right to inspect the progress of production and trade activities of concessioner companies.” For example, the Soviet side demanded that personnel should not work overtime and during public holidays. The Northern Sakhalin Oil Company objected, stating that it would be difficult to introduce the restrictions for all workers, but the Soviet authorities totally banned it. In 1929, the Soviet authorities reduced the number of entry visas for Japanese workers from 700 to 300, justifying this move as a reciprocal measure in response to the dismissal of Soviet workers in the previous year. The Northern Sakhalin Oil Company objected to this as well, citing that it had sent an application to Khabarovsk for the hiring of some 1,000 Soviet workers; it had taken on only 300 workers and therefore intended to bring a further 700 from Japan. The company had to accept the quota of 300 workers (Murakami 2004, 304–5), and this situation represented the opposition to the recruitment practices of the concessioner. The Northern Sakhalin Oil Company did not want to employ Soviet workers, and ultimately it hired a large number of Japanese as seasonal laborers for the summer period so as to avoid operations during the cold winter months. The Soviet Sakhalin Oil Trust engaged in the large-scale hiring of Soviet workers, ranging from cable to rotary drillers. It significantly increased its production volume because production was conducted even in the harsh winter conditions; the speed and depth of drilling had also grown (Murakami 2004, 243– 44). In 1932, the trust had a production volume of 188,900 tons compared to the 184,000 tons produced by the concessioner company (Table 3). In the final year of the first five-year plan (1932), the concessioner company had caught up with the concessioned.

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166 table 3

Tomita Oil production in Northern Karafuto (Northern Sakhalin)

Oil wells

Volume of Volume of extracted oil (t) purchase

Domestic sales

1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935

 17  26  36  58  79 100 132 163 127 186

 34,000  77,000 122,000 184,000 192,000 186,000 186,000 192,000 162,000 163,000

         27,300 112,500 135,000 124,700 123,182  40,000

1936

212

180,000

 

        199,000 272,700 313,500 313,200 241,400 170,000 (expected)  

Source: Economist (March 1, 1936; November 4, 1940)

4

USSR-Japan Confrontation in Manchuria

Competition between Russia’s Chinese Eastern Railway and Japan’s South Manchuria Railway began after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and continued following the transfer of the former to joint Soviet-Chinese management in 1924. During the Russian revolution and military intervention, the United States and other countries also schemed to secure international management of the CER, but after its failure the rivalry between the USSR and Japan intensified. There was a struggle between Japan and the Soviet Union regarding cargo. Except for those goods destined for the local consumption, the Soviet Union transported exported soybeans, soybean meal, wheat, wheat flour and other products from northern Manchuria to Vladivostok. Japan transported the same products to Dalian (J: Dairen) and then shipped them abroad. In the meantime, the Ussuri Railway and the SMR concluded an agreement in April 1925 that stipulated that 45 percent of the grain would be exported to the east and 55 percent to the south (Roa jihō 1925, 30–35). The conflicts between the USSR and Japan for control of Manchuria were not restricted to economic interests but also expanded into political hegemony. The Soviet Union opposed the construction of new railways by Japan, especially in the northern area beyond the CER, as they viewed this as a military

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threat. This wrangling for control created a complex scenario: it involved the independent Manchuria, represented by Zhang Zuolin, who enjoyed Japanese support; the Beijing government; and the revolutionary government in southern China supported by the USSR. Moreover, the “movement for the restoration of Chinese rights” was also drawn into the conflict. There was additionally criticism within the Soviet Union’s leadership over its own “imperialist” approach to China in connection with the 1925 rebellion by Guo Songling against his commander Zhang Zuolin and its resolution (Kartunova 2008, 609–13). At the same time, the Soviet Union pursued a policy in southern Manchuria that recognized Japan’s “zones of influence,” although Japan was the greatest threat to the USSR and it was on the condition that Zhang Zuolin would be deterred. The document, which reflects the Soviet Union’s policy during this period, constituted a resolution by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the AUCP (b) of April 1, 1926, entitled “On Our Country’s Attitude Toward China and Japan.” In essence, it states that the emerging Chinese revolution and the Soviet Union under the NEP needed “breathing space,” so the Soviet Union had to reach an agreement with Japan since it was the most dangerous of the great imperialist powers hostile to the Chinese revolution, in terms of geographical location as well as its pressing economic and military interests in Manchuria. The Soviet Union acknowledged Japan’s demand for the “autonomy of Manchuria” on the condition that Zhang Zuolin not advance into the area of Quannei (north China) and would refrain from interfering in the affairs of other regions (except northeastern China). It was believed that if Zhang Zuolin agreed to the above, a trilateral Soviet-Chinese-Japanese conference on issues of operation and construction of the Manchurian railways would be called. Moreover, if the joint Soviet-Chinese management of the CER was strictly implemented and if the Soviet Union continued to control the railway’s practical operation (e.g., traffic management, accounting, technology), the Sinification of the railway in a cultural and political sense would be recognized. This would include such things as the use of two languages and the establishment of Chinese railway schools. The Soviet Union, however, strongly opposed the extension of Japanese railways to the north beyond the CER, the construction of a railway line toward Hailar, and its connection to the CER east of Jilin (VKP(b) 1996, 163–72) (Fig. 3). The cabinet of Tanaka Giichi, who concurrently held the positions of prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, was formed in April 1927. Due to the first Shandong Expedition, carried out under the pretext of defending Japanese residents against Chiang Kai-shek’s army, in May that year and the Eastern Conference on Japanese continental policies held later in June and July in

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South Manchurian Railway and plan for extension, ca. 1925 Source: Katō YŌko, Shōwa tennō to sensō no seiki (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2011), 171

Tokyo, Tanaka’s cabinet is often regarded as promoting a “positive policy” visà-vis China. But this is not entirely true. The decree of Minister Tanaka, made public on the last day of the Eastern Conference and entitled “Brief Contents of the Policy with Respect to China,” conveyed a friendliness toward Chiang Kai-shek and the right wing of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China). It also voiced its respect for the “interests of Manchuria and Mongolia” and the support of the “influential individual of the three eastern provinces” (Zhang Zuolin) who maintained political stability.

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The document, “Policy Toward the Soviet Union,” which was released in September by the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs Debuchi Katsuji, stated that that Japan and the Soviet Union not only share common borders but are also closely linked economically: oil and coal concessions on Sakhalin, fishing and forest concessions in Primor’e, and the railways of the two countries that connect in Manchuria. These relations demanded development. In speaking about Manchuria, Debuchi noted that it must be careful not to harm the “valid rights and interests of Russia” and not to give the impression that Japan sympathized with the Chinese movement for the restoration of rights. Further, he wished to advance the development of the rich resources of Siberia “while respecting Russia’s national traditions and being guided by the concept of mutual trust,” in order to expand trade with Russia, to overcome the obstacles of state monopoly and commercial settlement methods, and to promote the implementation of the “2nd and 3rd NEPs” (pro-capitalist policies) (Tomita 2010a, 66–68). In January 1928, Tanaka sent Gotō to the Soviet Union in the hope of achieving a breakthrough in the negotiations on fishing. Gotō, in accordance with Tanaka’s foreign policy, outlined his thoughts on the “Japanese-RussianChinese Alliance,” or, more precisely, the Japanese-Russian joint “defense and good governance” of China, to Georgiĭ V. Chicherin and Joseph Stalin. Chicherin and Stalin disagreed with Gotō, however, and explained to him the importance of China as an independent state and the meaning of the national liberation movement generally. The Soviet Union was also in a contradictory position between the national interest of preserving its own rights in CER and the international cause of supporting China’s movement for the restoration of its own rights. At the end of 1929, this would culminate in the Soviet Union’s military confrontation with the authorities of northeastern China under the rule of Zhang Xueliang. The Kwantung Army in Manchuria seized the initiative when in June 1928 it attempted to kill Zhang Zuolin with a bomb planted on a train. The army also took the first steps at a take-over, that is, the colonization of Manchuria, which at last forced the resignation of Prime Minister Tanaka. The army ground forces abroad were against the home War Ministry and eventually made the home government aware of the facts. Viewed within this context, Gotō’s statement to the Soviets about his wish to participate in the management of the CER (January 1929) and the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s proposal to the Chinese to end the dominance of the Soviet Union in the CER management (prepared in October 1930) were perceived as manifestations of Japan’s imperialist claims (Tomita 2010a, 70–72).

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The Activities of the Japan-Russia Association

The Japan-Russia Association (J: Nichiro Kyōkai), chaired by Gotō, significantly contributed to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan, and it played a crucial role in the maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries. The association’s leadership comprised influential businessmen, individuals associated with the SMR, and the top brass from the army and navy. Their efforts were with a view to expanding Japanese-Soviet trade (Table 4), settling fisheries issues between Japan and the Soviet Union, and developing coal and oil concessions on Sakhalin. The Union of Exporters to Russia (Tairo Yushutsu Kumiai) and the Union of Fisheries in Russian Territories (Roryō Suisan Kumiai), which were in the Japan-Russia Association’s sphere of influence, constituted powerful lobbying organizations. table 4

Japanese-Russian trade in the interwar period

Units (in thousands of yen)

Entire Soviet trade (in millions of rubles)

 

Exports

Imports

Balance (excess of imports)

Exports

Imports

1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934* 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

 3,635  5,303  8,465 12,494 17,337 28,318 17,076 14,443 13,665 13,005 28,319 31,350 27,968  5,183    202

14,969 24,676 26,132 24,112 25,955 39,801 34,651 32,435 37,029 40,808 17,904 21,333 13,534   756    99

11,334 19,373 17,487 11,616  8,618 11,483 17,575 17,992 23,364 27,803 –10,415 –10,017 –14,434 –4,427 –103

      3,519 4,046 4,539 3,553 2,518 2,167 1,832 1,609 1,359 1,729 1,332  

      4,175 3,857 4,637 4,840 3,083 1,525 1,018 1,057 1,352 1,341 1,423  

* In 1934, 1 ruble = 2.5 yen. Source: Roa jihō, no. 174 (April 1934); Economist (October 11, 1934)

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Gotō keenly promoted the resettlement of Japanese farmers to Primor’e but this was not implemented because of the Soviet Union’s cautious attitude. Its plan of developing Soviet-Japanese cooperation, with Chinese involvement, in an effort to counter the United States and the United Kingdom was an alternative global strategy. Concession activities in northern Sakhalin were driven by Japan’s desire to free itself from a dependence on raw materials from the United States and the United Kingdom and were consistent with the Navy’s concept of war against these two countries. Gotō formulated this policy based on a geopolitical standpoint and criticized the “Russophobia” that was grounded in the fear of communist ideology. Saitō Makoto, who became chairman of the Japan-Russia Association following Gotō’s death in April 1929, inherited this policy, advancing cooperation with the USSR. The association’s activities during his tenure met the requirements of the markets of the business community at a time of a global economic crisis due to the Great Depression. At the same time, the association also began to play a role in reigning in diehard anti-Soviet politicians such as Araki Sadao, whose presence increased following the Manchurian Incident. The Japan-Russia Association owned the Harbin Products Exhibition Hall that contributed to the development of Japan’s trade with China and the Soviet Union, and encouraged Japanese investments in Manchuria. In 1929, Japanese imports ranked first in the foreign trade of northern Manchuria at 24.1 percent. (In foreign trade with China, excluding southern Manchuria, Japan ranked second in imports at 16.8 percent.) Japan outperformed the USSR with the share of Soviet imports to northern Manchuria equalling 3.6 percent. The Product Exhibition Hall encouraged Japanese exports to and investment in northern Manchuria. At least prior to the global economic crisis and the Manchurian Incident, it likewise greatly contributed to the mediation in the commercial transactions between the White and Red Russians, as well as the Chinese and the Japanese in northern Manchuria (Tomita 2010a, 248–50). In 1920, the Japan-Russia Association opened the School of the Japan-Russia Association (J: Nichiro Kyōkai Gakkō) in Harbin—renamed the Harubin Gakuin [Harbin Institute] in 1933—which trained students for business and Russian language experts for activities in Manchuria. Also, the contribution by teachers and cultural figures of the White Russian émigré community should not be overlooked, for example, L. G. Ulyanitskiĭ and Nikolaĭ V. Ustryalov, the latter who, as a member of the Smenovekhovtsy movement of pro-Soviet émigré intellectuals, was executed on his return to the USSR in 1935. One of the school’s graduates was Sugihara Chiune, who worked as a Russian language teacher. He later issued emigration visas to Jews at the Japanese Consulate in Kaunas (Lithuania), and for his efforts he is known as the “Japanese Schindler.”

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Together with the Association of Russian and Japanese Art, the Japan-Russia Association also played a key role in cultural exchanges between the USSR and Japan. Events, in addition to the 1928 Soviet tour of kabuki actors, included the visit of the writers Akita Ujaku, the playwright and actor Osanai Kaoru, and other cultural figures to the Soviet Union in 1927; an exhibition in Japan on the 100th anniversary of the birth of Leo Tolstoy in 1928; meetings on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the death of the playwright and writer Anton Chekhov in Japan in 1929; a concert in the USSR by the conductor and composer Konoe Hidemaro in 1931; and a Japanese music festival in Japan on the 50th anniversary of the death of the composer Modeest Mussorgsky (Table 5). table 5

Year

Japanese-Russian cultural and economic exchange in the interwar period

Japan

1925 September: Trade unionist Ivan Lepse comes to Japan at the invitation of the Hyōgikai 1926

1927

March–May: Writer Boris Pilnyak comes to Japan

October: Industry-Culture Exhibition “Russia Day” November: Soviet delegation at the Pacific-Sciences Conference May–July: Modern Russian Art Exhibition September–October: Second trip to Japan by philologist Nikolaĭ Iosifovich Konrad

Soviet Union July–August: Visit from Asahi shinbun correspondents by airplane July–September: Visit by philologist Saatoshi Yasugi and others to National Academy of Sciences, 200 Years

April 5: “Japanese Literature Evening,” Moscow July–September: Visit by exhibition director, Mr. Mori, of the Harbin Trade Center

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the 1920s: Struggles between Anti-Soviet and Pro-Soviet Forces table 5

Year

Japanese-Russian cultural and economic exchange in the interwar period (cont.)

Japan October: Economic/educational observation group from the Russian Far East

1928 June: Commemorative exhibition celebrating the centenary of Lev Tolstoy’s birth

1929

1930

173

October: Commemoration of the 25th anniversary of Anton Chekhov’s death

October: Celebration of 35 years of Evgeniĭ Genrikhovich Spalvin’s research

Soviet Union

November: Anniversary of the Revolution, visit by the author Ujaku Akita and Yonekawa Fumko; the industrialist and politician Kuhara Fusanosuke stays in Moscow on return from observation trip to the West December: Visit by Tokyo former mayor/foreign minister Gotō Shinpei January 3: “Japanese Culture Evening,” Moscow

August–September: Kabuki actor Ichikawa Sadanji performs in Moscow, Leningrad October: Exhibition in Moscow of Japanese children’s books

March: Twelve experts sent to offer instruction to Soviet Railway July: All-Union Educational Exposition, Leningrad

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Year

1931

1932

Tomita Japanese-Russian cultural and economic exchange in the interwar period (cont.)

Japan November: Lectures commemorating the 20th anniversary of Lev Tolstoy’s death

March: Concert commemorating the 50th anniversary of Modeest Petrovich Mussorgsky’s death September: The Nauka Bookstore opens November: Evgeniĭ Genrikhovich Spalvin departs Japan May: Pilnyak visits Japan a second time

November: Sibiryakov-gō (ship on North Pole Expedition) stops at port 1933 December: Memorial services for Evgeniĭ Genrikhovich Spalvin

Soviet Union

February: Konoe Hidemaro performs in Moscow, Leningrad

July: Visit by Yonekawa Fumiko (Masao’s sister)

April: Actor Yamada Kōsaku performs in Moscow, Leningrad

The Soviet partner of the Japan-Russia Association was the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS). But the activities of these two organizations did not necessarily overlap. VOKS, for example, focused principally on cultural exchange. The USSR ambassador to Japan, Aleksandr A. Troyanovskiĭ, maintained relations with the association and was its honorary chairman. Troyanovskiĭ sought to maintain friendly relations between the USSR and Japan. His official documents and diaries reveal that he frequently communicated with the leaders of the association, in particular, Gotō and Saitō.

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Conclusion: the Activity of the Japanese Communist Party

It might be instructive to touch upon the relationship between the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Soviet Union, and the Comintern, which cannot be ignored in the research of Soviet-Japanese relations during the 1920s. The JCP, thought to have been formed in July 1922, had 200 to 300 members. It exercised no influence on the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union (Table 6). Nonetheless, its political and social influence was perceived to be greater that it was in reality, and this led to harsh crackdowns from the authorities. From the outset, the party operated underground, and it was subject to harsh repression under the “Public Order Protection Act” as an organization that attempted to “abolish the institution of private property and change the kokutai regime.” With the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan in 1925, however, Japanese political and business groups, most notably the Japan-Russia Association that opposed a dependence on the United States and United Kingdom, engaged in the development of economic cooperation and cultural relation between the two nations. The JCP was formed by members of the Socialist Union of Japan (Nihon Shakaishugi Dōmei; est. 1920) through the debates about the alternatives of “Anarchism or Bolshevism,” and it was initially led by Arahata Kanson and Yamakawa Hitoshi. The JCP charter was far removed from the Bolshevik model, and the party program also circumvented the issue of the monarchy due to the memory of the “High Treason Incident” (Taigyaku jiken) in 1910 that led to the execution of twelve socialists. Therefore, the Japanese Communist Party could hardly be regarded as a branch of the Comintern; it did not meet the requirements of a vanguard party as stipulated in the conditions of admission at the table 6

Numbers of Japanese Communist Party (JCP) members and cells from written report to Moscow

Day/Month/Year

Party members

Numbers of cells

01/03/1923 01/08/1926 01/01/1928 01/03/1931

361  66 245 100 (less than)

62 12 29 (factories) 13

Source: RGASPI, f. 127, d. 58, l. 7-12; d. 61, l. 9-13; d. 149, l. 34-38; d. 235, l. 16-37, d. 299, l. 1-18

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2nd Comintern Congress in 1920. The JCP was soon persecuted by the authorities and after the Great Kantō Earthquake on September 1, 1923, it transferred its headquarters to Vladivostok. Failing to meet Moscow’s demands to adhere to the tactics of a united front as determined at the 4th Comintern Congress of 1922 and create a proletarian party (Musan Seitō), however, it was dissolved in February 1924. The reconstruction of the JCP took place with direct and indirect guidance from Moscow, and under the supervision of the Comintern chairman Grigoriĭ E. Zinov’ev and the Far Eastern secretariat in Shanghai Grigoriĭ N. Voĭtinskiĭ. The core of the party was formed by a new generation: Tokuda Kyūichi, Sano Manabu, Nabeyama Sadachika, Sano Fumio, and others. Arahata and Yamakawa, who supported the “united front” party opposed the “party’s bolshevization”—the corresponding resolution adopted at the 5th Comintern Congress in 1924—did not participate in the party’s reconstruction. Following the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1925, the USSR Embassy in Japan became the point of contact between Comintern and the JCP. Trade commissioner Yakov D. Yanson was in charge of guiding the Japanese Communist Party. After 1926, Fukumoto Kazuo’s prestige rapidly increased in the restored party leadership. Unusual, difficult to comprehend theories prevailed, most notably the theory of “division and unification” that advocated cleaning up the Communist Party first and then forming mass organizations. The party’s reconstruction congress in December 1926 also took place within an atmosphere influenced by this “Fukumoto Theory.” Yanson was dismissive of it, however, and requested assistance from Moscow. The Comintern could not ignore this situation, and the main members of the JCP leadership were summoned to Moscow where the “Fukumoto Theory” was criticized. They were eventually forced to abandon it. In July 1927, the Comintern Executive Committee adopted the “Resolution on the Japanese Issue,” the draft of which was written by the Comintern chairman Nikolaĭ I. Bukharin and in August the Pravda newspaper published the document. It called for an overcoming of the “two deviations,” namely, “Yamakawa-ism” (defeatism) and “Fukumoto-ism” (sectarianism), in order to build a vanguard party that relied on the workers and party-affiliated cells at factories. Such a one-sided statement from above caused confusion among the members of the JCP leadership in Japan. The members of the JCP headquarters, including the Japanese leaders now back from Moscow, accepted this thesis nonetheless, and in 1928 the party, led by Watanabe Masanosuke, Ichikawa Shōichi, and Nabeyama Sadachika, mounted a thorough party reconstruction. The JCP then organized preparations for the general elections in February; this was the first election under universal suffrage. And at this time the JCP suffered

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a major blow with the mass arrests of party members and sympathizers on March 15, 1928, and April 16, 1929. The JCP, the All-Japan Communist Youth League (Kyōsan Seinen Dōmei), and the Japanese Trade Union Council (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai) were suppressed by the “Peace Order Protection Act” that resulted in their dissolution (Tomita 2002, 30–44). The JCP was subordinate to the Comintern, reliant on instructions and even money from Moscow. In an effort to secure further funds the party exaggerated the number of the party members in its reports. Arahata and Yamakawa left the Japanese Communist Party, and the ossification of the party following the Comintern’s adoption of the “class-against-class” strategy and the theory of “social fascism” (at the 6th congress, 1928) continued. Large-scale crackdowns twice weakened the party. The Soviet Union, pinning increasing hopes on the revolution in China, subsequently expected the JCP to bear the responsibility of the anti-war and anti-imperialist movement in the Far East. In 1930, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Yanson, an official at the Soviet Embassy in Japan, of providing support to Japanese Communist Party, which constituted a violation of the Soviet-Japanese (Japanese-Soviet) Convention on Basic Principles for Mutual Relations. Thereafter, the Soviet Union recalled Yanson (Gaimushō, Nihon gaikō bunsho, vol. 3, 12), and this clearly indicated the reduction of Soviet hopes for a revolution in Japan. The ruling establishment of prewar Japan succeeded in integrating people into the kokutai regime, threatening them with the Reds, the small JCP, and the large neighboring country of the Soviet Union. Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. Nihon gaikō bunsho, Shōwa ki [Diplomatic Documents of Japan, The Shōwa Period]. Vol. 3, part 3. Hara Teruyuki. 1989. Shiberia shuppei. Kakumei to kanshō. 1917–1922 [The Siberian Expedition. Revolution and Intervention. 1917–1922]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. Murakami Takashi. 2004. Kita Karafuto Sekiyū konsesshon. 1925–1940 [Northern Sakhalin Oil Company Concession. 1925–1940]. Sapporo: Hokkaidō Daigaku. Roa jihō. 1925. no. 72. Tomita Takeshi. 2002. Kominterun to Nihon Kyōsantō. Kyū Soren aruhifu shiryō kara [Comintern and JCP. From Archival Materials of the Former Soviet Union]. Rekishi hyōron, no. 627: 30–44. Tomita Takeshi. 2010a. Senkanki no nissho kankei. 1917–1937 [Japanese-Soviet Relations in the Interwar Period 1917–1937]. Tokyo: Iwanami.

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Russian Sources

AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. F. 0146, op. 12, d. 93, pol. 351, 1. 2. Kartunova, Anastasiya Ivanova, ed. 2008. Perepiska I. V. Stalina i G. V. Chicherina s polpredom SSSR v Kitae L. M. Karakhanom 1923 g.–1926 g. [Correspondence of I. V. Stalin and G. V. Chicherin with the USSR Ambassador to China L. M. Karakhan. 1923–1926]. Moscow: Natalis. Tomita, Takeshi. 2010b. Fal′sifikatsiya dokumentov o politike yaponskogo imperializma (Memorandum Tanaka) [Falsification of Documents on the Policy of Japanese Imperialism (Tanaka Memorandum)]. Voprosy istorii, no 3: 174–75. VKP(b) (Vsesoyuznaya kommunisticheskaya partiya (bol′shevikov) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]. Komintern i Kitai. Dokumenty [Comintern and China. Documents]. 1994. Vol. 1. 5 vols. Moscow: AO “Buklet,” 1994–2007.

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Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1920s: from Hostility to Coexistence Vladimir A. Grinyuk, Yaroslav A. Shulatov, and Anastasia S. Lozhkina 1

The End of Intervention: First Attempts to Establish Contacts

The unsuccessful Japanese intervention in the Russian Far East and Siberia from 1918 to 1922, the establishment of Soviet control over the most of Russia’s territory, and an international situation that was generally unfavorable for Japan—together these circumstances forced Tokyo’s decision to withdraw the bulk of Japanese troops from the Soviet Russia, except for northern Sakhalin, by the end of October 1922. The Far Eastern Republic (FER) subsequently became officially part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), and as a consequence Soviet Russia and Japan faced the need to establish diplomatic relations. Following the intervention in Russia and the non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921, Tokyo attempted to mend fences with its northern neighbor. The Japanese public generally supported this plan. For example, the Japan Federation of Labor, a group of more than sixty trade unions and boasting 30,000 members, espoused the notion of recognizing “Russia’s Workers and Peasants.” The Japanese Student Social Science Movement was also favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union; it united approximately 1,500 students from forty-five Japanese educational institutions (Suzuki 1925, 251–53; Hayashi 1925, 279). In the first half of the 1920s, Japan’s economic positions in Asia were weakened in part because of the fiercer competition from the United States and the United Kingdom. American and British capital was pushing Japan out of Chinese and Pacific markets, and from the exclusion zone to the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) operating across Manchuria. The volume of Japanese trade in the Pacific had shrunk from JPY 180 million in 1920 to JPY 97 million in 1923. Japanese imports to the United States, in particular, raw silk and manufactured silk fabric, were also sharply reduced. Amid the heightened tensions with Washington and London, the dependence on the US market made the Japanese business community, especially those eyeing the Russian Far East and northeastern China, interested in developing relations with the USSR, which they saw as both a market and a source of raw materials (Kutakov 1962, 15–16). Moscow was also seen as a kind of counterbalance to the Anglo-Saxon block. Many representatives of the Japanese establishment, including the Tokyo

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_011

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mayor and later chair of the Soviet-Japanese Society, Gotō Shinpei, shared this view (Sakai 1988, 27–40). Viewed as one of the most outstanding Japanese orators of the period, Gotō was influential in initiating cooperation with Russia prior to 1917 and continued to do so despite the revolution and the formation of the Soviet government. He exercised a crucial role in calming relations with the USSR and in advancing bilateral contacts by securing support from notable players among Japan’s political and economic elite. On January 10, 1923, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uchida Kōsai, instructed the Japanese chargé d’affaires in Beijing, Obata Yūkichi, to invite Adol’f A. Ioffe, the Soviet diplomatic representative of the Far East, to Japan as a tourist. This made for an unofficial, yet extremely significant, contact between the two governments. The invitation was accepted at the end of January 1923, and Ioffe arrived in Japan shortly thereafter. Unofficial preliminary negotiations between Ioffe and Japan’s unofficial representative, Gotō, and later with the official representative, Kawakami Toshitsune (Toshihiko), on the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations began in February and lasted until the end of July 1923. The Japanese reached no consensus on establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Russia; in fact, a number of key government figures actually objected to it (Kutakov 1962, 23). Concurrent with the discussion of political issues Ioffe had also been engaged in talks since April 1923 with Japanese fishery industrialists about fishing in Soviet waters. As early as March 2, 1923, the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom, SNK)—the government of the RSFSR and the government of the USSR until 1946—adopted a resolution regarding the decree on fishing in the Far East. The resolution declared that all fishery contracts signed prior to the reunion of the Far Eastern Republic with the RSFSR were invalid (SNK Decree, no. 378, 676–77). With the fishing season approaching, the parties accelerated their efforts to find a solution to this key bilateral economic issue. The Japanese wished to begin fishing as soon possible. Although Moscow was highly skeptical about making concessions on this, it agreed to make a compromise, and the first agreement on fishing rights was signed on May 21, 1923. It stipulated that Japanese industrialists would pay over JPY 3 million for the use of lots in 1920–1921. In 1923, they were allowed to lease 255 lots (out of 511) and fourteen crab lots (out of forty-seven) that were valued over 1,126 gold rubles (Kutakov 1962, 35). Yet Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the fishing situation would subsequently remain an integral part of later SovietJapanese relations. During Ioffe’s discussions with Gotō, and later with Kawakami, the Japanese side raised the issue of purchasing northern Sakhalin from the Soviet Union. The Soviet government seriously considered this bid, but ultimately rejected

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it when Japan offered a price ten times lower than that set by Moscow (150 million and 1,500 million gold rubles, respectively) (Sevost′yanov 2007, vol. 1, 211–19). The second stage of unofficial negotiations between the representatives of the USSR and Japan began on June 28, 1923 (Ioffe was Kawakami’s counterpart). On July 28, 1923, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgiĭ V. Chicherin ordered a halt to the negotiations as they were not official and therefore would not resolve the issue of establishing normal diplomatic relations. The Soviet government suggested again that the Japanese government should launch official negotiations as soon as possible (Kutakov 1962, 39). 2

The Process of Official Recognition

On September 1, 1923, the catastrophic Great Kantō Earthquake and ensuing tsunami struck the Tokyo-Yokohama area, killing over 100,000 people. Seventeen days later, on September 18, 1923, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a special resolution permitting aid to the Japanese; a Central Commission for Assistance was set up and 200,000 gold rubles set aside for the victims. The resolution also stipulated provisions to the affected population via favorable fishing lots and timber allocation. On December 5, 1923, the Japanese envoy to Beijing, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, conveyed to the representative of the USSR in the Far East that Japan was ready to accept the Soviet offer but only if it transferred fishing and timber lots to Japanese industrialists who would then contribute a portion of the income to the earthquake victims. The Soviet government rejected this proposal (Kutakov 1962, 49). A new Soviet diplomatic representative in the Far East, Lev M. Karakhan, arrived in Beijing in early September 1923. In a conversation with Yoshizawa on September 22 Karakhan conveyed his condolences to the earthquake victims and reminded Yoshizawa of the offer to begin negotiations on establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Tokyo was still not ready for such a step, however. In June 1924, a government led by Katō Takaaki, the leader of the opposition political party, Kenseikai (Constitutional Association), was established. The seasoned diplomat Shidehara Kijūrō was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. A former ambassador to the United States from 1919 to 1922, Shidehara was known as one of Japan’s most eminent diplomats. In Japan, he was so closely identified with a liberal-pacifist foreign policy that this is often referred to as “Shidehara Diplomacy” (Shidehara gaikō)—in other words, a “passive policy” ( judō seisaku) involving a non-violent approach to China and neighboring

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countries. Shidehara also announced a “new policy” (shin seisaku) toward the USSR, taking into consideration that the situation had changed with the United Kingdom and other nations recognizing the state. His policy concerning the USSR was more realistic than those of previous Japanese ministers of foreign affairs. Finally, Katō’s cabinet made the major decision to begin consultations on establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow. On May 14, 1924, official negotiations were launched in Beijing between Yoshizawa and Karakhan. Their main agenda included discussions about the plan to evacuate Japanese troops from northern Sakhalin and economic issues, first and foremost the terms regarding concessions for Japan in that region. Tokyo viewed these concessions as a form of compensation for the withdrawal of its troops from seized Soviet territory. Initially they insisted on “royaltyfree concessions” and then agreed on the formula of “beneficial, long-term concessions.” The protracted and complicated Soviet-Japanese negotiations concluded with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Soviet-Japanese (Japanese-Soviet) Convention on Basic Principles for Mutual Relations and Japan on January 20, 1925, in Beijing. The Soviet Union was forced to acknowledge that the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, would remain in force. It insisted, however, on the inclusion of the following provision: “recognition … of the validity of the Portsmouth Agreement of September 5, 1905, does not mean at all that the government of the Soviet Union shares political responsibility with the former imperial government for the conclusion of this agreement” (Lozovskiĭ and Stein 1945, 8). The 1925 Soviet-Japanese convention affirmed the wishes and intentions of the two nations to coexist in peace and amity, respecting the indisputable sovereign right of a state to determine its own destiny without external influence and to defend itself against any act that might endanger that country’s order and the security of the two nations. Protocol A, signed together with the convention, stated that it was agreed that all questions regarding the debts owed to the Japanese government or subjects as a result of public loans and treasury bills issued by the former Russian governments (Imperial and Provisional governments) should be left for adjustment at later negotiations. The Japanese government agreed to a full withdrawal of its troops from northern Sakhalin by May 15, 1925 (Lozovskiĭ and Stein, 5–6). Protocol B specified that the Soviet Union grant Japan the concession to exploit 50 percent of the area in each of the oil fields in northern Sakhalin, which are mentioned in the Japanese memorandum submitted on August 29, 1924 (the document specified oil and coal exploration lots for Japan in northern Sakhalin at that time). Protocol B also provided concessions

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for coalfields. The concession royalties paid to the USSR stipulated that the Japanese allocate from 5 to 8 percent of their gross production in the case of coalfields and from 5 to 15 percent of their gross production of oil (Kutakov 1962, 55). In the addendum to the convention, the Soviet party also conveyed an “expression of sincere sympathy concerning the Nikolaevsk Incident of 1920” (Akagi 1936, 425). Concession agreements were signed in December 1925 in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Convention. Two large firms with government shares were founded six months later in Japan, each with an equity of JPY 10 million: the Northern Sakhalin Oil Company (Kita Karafuto Sekiyū Kabushiki Kaisha) and the Northern Sakhalin Mining Company (Kita Karafuto Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha). Shidehara assessed the signing of these concession treaties as representing Soviet Union’s interest in “Russian-Japanese economic cooperation” and as “evidence of good-neighbor sentiments uniting the two nations” (Akagi 1936, 425–26). In general, the conclusion of the convention should be viewed as a success for Soviet diplomacy. The USSR established diplomatic relations and achieved recognition of its eastern frontiers by the most powerful “capitalist” power of the region, thereby restoring de-facto Russia’s pre-revolutionary official status quo. Soviet representatives highly rated the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese convention. For Moscow, official recognition by Tokyo was not only of great importance regarding its position within the Far East but also generally in relation to its foreign policy. The establishment of ties with Japan gave Moscow room to maneuver on the world stage, particularly in light of the tense relations with Western powers, above all, the United Kingdom. The stabilization of Soviet-Japanese relations was equally beneficial for Japan. Although Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were quite cautious about cooperation with the USSR, the stabilization in relations was widely supported by the Navy, members of the political elite, and a number of influential political figures, most notably Gotō Shinpei. All of them opposed the so-called “Washington System” of international relations created after World War I, in which the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and other European colonial powers agreed to respect their respective interests in China and the Pacific, and the Anglo-Saxon block—namely, the United Kingdom. Moreover, Tokyo required good relations with Moscow in order to protect its stakes in Manchuria (Sakai 1992, 151–55). It is clear that one segment of the Japanese political establishment relied on the cooperation with the USSR to counteract Chinese nationalism, working under the assumption that the Soviet side was interested in safeguarding the rights of the CER.

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First Soviet Ambassador Viktor Kopp: a New Policy Proposal

Under these circumstances, the selection of who would be the Soviet diplomatic representative to Tokyo was vital. On February 25, 1925, a resolution by the Politburo, the executive committee of the Communist Party, officially appointed Viktor L. Kopp as the Plenipotentiary (Ambassador) to Tokyo (Sevost′yanov 2007, vol. 1, 344). Kopp was known for his work in Germany not only as a diplomat but also in his efforts regarding Russian prisoners of war. Since 1923 he was a member of the board of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) and was its representative at the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars. He left for Tokyo on April 8, 1925. The Japanese greatly impressed the Soviet delegation. In one of his first reports from Tokyo, Kopp wrote to Chicherin about the special attention paid by Japanese officials to Soviet representatives during the trip, and also noted that Japanese journalists were very accommodating. Soviet leaders closely scrutinized such details, and Chicherin asked Kopp’s advice on how they should respond to Japanese hospitality. It was clear that these gestures extended beyond the usual diplomatic decorum, and Moscow obviously did not want “to lower the level” of bilateral contacts. Kopp therefore offered “to go beyond our official politeness as well,” believing that “any courtesy from our side will be very highly valued in Japan and will extend the honeymoon we now have in our relations with Japan” (AVP RF, f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 2–4). The Soviet ambassador had no illusions about the length of this “honeymoon,” but he believed that the positive atmosphere surrounding the official start of SovietJapanese diplomatic contacts would help to lay the foundation for the further development of bilateral relations on the basis of existing common interests in certain areas. On May 4, 1925, Kopp sent Chicherin his first dispatch in which he set forth his views on the situation in the Far East and on Soviet-Japanese relations. At the center was the “Manchurian Issue,” which the ambassador felt included three main policy points: Japan; Zhang Zuolin, the Manchurian warlord and leader of one of the Chinese warring factions, the of Fengtian Clique (Feng Xi Junfa); and the USSR. In Kopp’s opinion the Japanese plans relating to northeastern China “can be reduced to the formula of strategic penetration into Manchuria right across our railway link with Primor’e in an effort to establish a strong connection with the Korean railway system and Korean ports.” Commenting on the Lianoning provincial government under the Fengtian Clique, which included Zhang Zuolin (son of Zhang Xueliang) and which controlled all of Manchuria, Kopp noted that although Moscow once regarded Zhang Zuolin as “just a toy in the hands of Japan,” in reality the position of this Chinese “Grand Marshal” was

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much more complicated and that Zhang Zuolin’s political aspirations were to strengthen “Manchurian statehood, balancing between the Japanese and us, using both to achieve his goals.” Kopp observed that Zhang established relative order in Manchuria, thereby stabilizing its financial position to an extent and creating its own military and bureaucratic apparatus. In short, Zhang Zuolin was one of the relevant players in the regional political arena and clearly with his own interests at heart. Kopp concluded that “the key to protection of our railway interests in northern Manchuria lies not so much in Mukden [the capital of Zhang Zuolin’s government] but in Tokyo.” He emphasized that the “inability of the USSR to completely replace the Japanese with Zhang Zuolin both militarily and economically,” as well as the fact that “we inspire his rivals from the south and … threaten his very existence” made “attempts to agree with Zhang Zuolin on future railway interests fruitless and futile.” The railway construction in Manchuria was a significant component in Soviet-Japanese relations; however, Kopp was convinced that “by skillfully maneuvering the benefits that an agreement with us could bring Japan, it would be possible to achieve the recognition of our railway interests in northern Manchuria and to make an acceptable compromise” (AVP RF, f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 5–11). The ambassador’s comment that “this view is absolutely shared by all the colleagues” who spoke with him on the subject is hugely significant.1 His policy concerning Japan was therefore the outcome of an analysis by a group of prominent Soviet diplomats and intelligence agents working in the Far East. This explains the well preparedness and the integral character of Kopp’s proposals on the new policy toward Japan, one that he sent to Moscow in less than in a month in Tokyo. The essence of these proposals can be detailed as follows. First, to launch negotiations with Japan on coordinating railway interests in Manchuria “following the scheme of the old agreement that we have,” which evidently meant a series of pre-revolutionary Russian-Japanese agreements dividing the spheres of influence in the region. Second, Kopp intended to resort to “cautious pressure” on Zhang Zuolin in order to force him to recognize Soviet interests, but at the same time “not to create … the image of our principal hostility in Manchuria as an image of our hostility toward him.” Third, the ambassador suggested the employment of mechanisms of economic “linkage” with northern Manchuria 1  Including Arvid Ya. Zeybot (Grant), head of the Intelligence Staff of the Revolutionary Red Army from 1921 to 1924 and of the USSR General Council in Harbin from 1924 to 1926, as well as the coordinator of Soviet agents in Manchuria from 1925; Alekseĭ N. Ivanov, general manager of Soviet section of the Chinese Eastern Railway from 1924 to 1926; Marsel I. verg, Soviet diplomat and spy; and Nikolaĭ K. Kuznetsov, the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo.

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as much as possible and the active use of the CER for Soviet freight (AVP RF, f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 5–11). The protection of Soviet interests in the CER was the primary goal. Yet the strategic course offered by Soviet diplomats was extremely close to the thinking conveyed in undisclosed section of the general political conventions that the imperial Russian government signed with Japan in 1907–1916 and declared invalid in 1918 by the then Bolshevik government. Kopp suggested that there should not simply be a restoration of former Russian-Japanese agreements. Different from the pre-revolutionary period when the Russian and Japanese empires were dominant players in northeastern China, in the 1920s there was a third force that required reckoning with— the aforementioned Mukden government of Zhang Zuolin. To accommodate Soviet interests in Manchuria, Kopp recommended the coordination of steps with Japan and the granting of certain guarantees to Zhang Zuolin’s regime in exchange for the recognition of the USSR’s position about the CER. It is clear that Kopp and certain Soviet officials of the Far East considered the safeguarding of railway interests in northeastern China a priority in the Soviet policy of this region. This point of view later appeared to diverge from the general course of the party and the government in the Far East. The situation concerning the CER was a very sensitive issue for Moscow, which was looking for ways to protect its interests. Nonetheless, top Soviet diplomats in the Politburo, Karakhan and Chicherin, as well as Joseph Stalin, took a different stance regarding the direction of Chinese policy, most notably, that concerning Zhang Zuolin. Kopp was particularly interested in the relationship with the command of the Japanese Navy, which was keen to develop oil concessions in northern Sakhalin and actively supported the idea of cooperation with the USSR. This became apparent in 1923 with the amendment of the Japanese empire’s defense strategy, the principal document in Japan’s military strategy, in which the United States once again became the navy’s potentially major rival (Yoshimura 1977, 4–5; Sakai 1988, 28). Having establishing Soviet-Japanese diplomatic contacts, Japan’s navy offered to arrange a flight by Japanese pilots to the USSR as a way to demonstrate the spirit of cooperation between the two countries, and Kopp insisted that the flight showcase the friendship between Russia and Japan. Persuaded by Kopp’s arguments Soviet leaders changed their minds and agreed to accept the invitation. As noted above, the issue of railway concessions in Manchuria was a crucial area in the relations between Tokyo and Moscow. Moscow particularly objected to the Japanese construction of the Taonan–Qiqihar line, which was to cross the CER through the town of Ang’angxi. Soviet representatives considered this line to be of utmost military significance and a potential threat to the Soviet railroad (Tomita 2010, 64). The problem was complicated further

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since the Mukden government wanted to implement the project regardless of Japan’s stance, even if it meant cooperation with the USSR. But the NKID and the Politburo rejected the project, above all because the line was too close to the Soviet border (AVP RF, f. 0146, оp. 8, d. 110, 3, l. 68–69). Taking the Chinese position into account, Kopp considered that cooperation with Tokyo was the most effective means to protect Soviet interests. In fact, the ambassador suggested sharing Manchuria with Japan by splitting it into northern and southern regions with the guarantee of non-participation in the construction of the railway in each party’s respective areas. Without external support, therefore, Zhang Zuolin’s project was doomed to fail. Moreover, this stratagem closely mirrored the spirit of the Russian-Japanese conventions signed in 1907–1916. In essence, the views of the Soviet diplomat were relatively close to the Far East policy pursued earlier by imperial Russia. One of the key reports that Kopp sent to Moscow on May 18, 1925, was related to “old agreements” that were very explicit regarding the dualistic nature of Soviet foreign policy. In declaring the principle of national self-identification in Asian policy, the Soviet Union was forced “to undertake necessary measures” for the protection of its own interests. A typical example associated with China was the situation surrounding the CER. If the USSR decided to keep control of the track in its hands, it would be forced to safeguard its interests and this would inevitably clash with the Chinese, triggering action from local authorities. This also explains why Kopp felt that an alliance with Japan on the issue seemed like a natural solution and an effective tool (AVP RF, f. 0146, оp. 8, d. 110, 3, l. 61–64). Kopp’s ideas, however, did not find support among top Soviet leaders. For the Politburo and the NKID, the path taken by China—namely, its support of the national revolutionary movement—became a priority area in its Far East policy. This, too, differed from the pre-revolutionary period: now China, not Japan, was at the core of the country’s foreign policy efforts in Northeast Asia. As the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin highly valued Japan’s welcoming attitude and also expressed interest in reaching an agreement with Tokyo in order to safeguard the rights of the CER. He remained skeptical, however, about the idea of returning to the Russian-Japanese agreements declared invalid after the 1917 Revolution. Kopp was informed that his Commissariat colleagues found the former agreements with Japan “absolutely unacceptable for the revival” and suggested that he continue to work on a new agreement with Japan. On July 7, Chicherin outlined the thinking behind the Politburo’s decision on the matter to Kopp. The Soviet government believed that its position on China—that is, the extensive support of the national movement and the criticism of Western colonial powers—met with understanding

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on the part of the Chinese people and therefore justified its continuation. “Military threats,” as well as “agreements of imperialistic nature … based on the carving up of the spheres of influence, be they covert or overt,” including those “with Japan on the basis of the 1910 agreement” were insupportable. Moscow did not oppose the idea of agreements with Tokyo; it even suggested possible economic compensation if the Japanese government agreed not to create obstacles regarding the issue of the CER (AVP RF, f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l–l. 29, 79, 147). But the policy direction on Japan was closely connected with the general strategy of the state in the Far East and its stance on the Chinese situation. The views by Kopp and Karakhan concerning the strategy in China fundamentally differed, and Chicherin and Stalin supported Karakhan, thereby sounding a death knoll to Kopp’s projects. 4

The End of the Soviet-Japanese Honeymoon

From the first half of the 1920s, the Soviet government had provided substantial assistance to the Chinese revolutionary leaders Sun Yat-sen, the first president of the Republic of China and head of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China), and Chiang Kai-shek (Kartunova 2003). Since the spring of 1925, Feng Yuxiang, one of the leaders of the Chinese military group, became of particular interest to Moscow, and he received increasing support from the Soviets. On May 4, Karakhan wrote to Stalin: “A conflict between Zhang Zuolin and Feng Yuxiang is inevitable. If it occurs soon, Feng could be defeated, and then we will be left with nothing in the north” (Kartunova 2008, 496–97). Kopp did not share Karakhan’s polemic spirit. On June 6, the Soviet ambassador sent a telegram to Moscow in which he called for a more sober assessment of the situation regarding Feng, mentioning that Karakhan had earlier considered this military leader as “the most decent of all militarists” fighting for power. Now, however, Kopp advocated limiting all Soviet policy in China to the support of Feng. Kopp described Karakhan’s scheme as futile, particularly in light of the enormous costs of the Feng aid plan and his skeptical assessment of the Red Army Command set forward by Mikhail V. Frunze (AVP RF, f. 0146, op. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 87–91). Although Soviet leaders criticized certain aspects of the plan to support Feng, the Politburo ultimately decided to assist him in his fight against Zhang. In a letter to Karakhan dated May 29, 1925, Stalin expressed support of the “absolutely correct position” that the ambassador had taken “on the big issue of China” (Kartunova 2008, 525–27). Moscow subsequently became more actively involved in the events in China. On May 7, the Politburo adopted a resolution

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that satisfied Karakhan’s requests connected with the Canton (Guangzhou) situation, and approved sending weapons, 200 military instructors, and 500,000 gold rubles to supply armed revolutionary groups (Titarenko 1994, 554). Kopp’s proposals concerning any new policy toward Japan were now unrealizable. Kopp noticed that his relations with Japanese officials were gradually cooling, since they generally saw the USSR as a serious threat to their interests in China (AVP RF, f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 100–1,113, 116). By the autumn of 1925 Soviet-Japanese relations became even more unstable, and on October 26, the Politburo adopted an action plan on China drawn up by Frunze. Zhang Zuolin was now seen as the most dangerous enemy to the Chinese revolution and his toppling was identified as a top priority (Titarenko 1994, 656–57). In November 1925, Feng, acting in concert with General Guo Songling, seized Beijing and swiftly advanced to Mukden. The growing Soviet influence was a direct threat to Japan’s exclusive position in Manchuria; military commanders, initially quite cautious in their assessment of the USSR, signaled concern. There was a broad consensus of opinion in Japanese society, in general, and the political establishment, in particular, about the unacceptability of the Sovietization of Manchuria and permitting the fall of the Mukden government. The intervention was now inevitable (Sakai 1992, 172–74). Japan’s Kwantung Army supported the troops of Zhang Zuolin, who launched an offensive, and in late December 1925, Guo Songling’s troops were defeated and Guo executed. In January 1926, Feng resigned and fled to Moscow (Usui 1971, 8–12), which resulted in the rapid deterioration of relations between the USSR and the Mukden government. On January 21, Zhang Zuolin’s administration arrested the Soviet general manager of the CER, Alekseĭ N. Ivanov, placing further pressure on Moscow to act. All these events unavoidably impacted Soviet-Japanese relations. In early January 1926, Kopp described the changes in bilateral contacts, “in the minds of Japanese politicians and slowly in the minds of the ordinary [Japanese] people the USSR is becoming Japan’s enemy and a threat to its vital interests.” Kopp’s views on the prospects of the development of Soviet-Japanese relations were progressively pessimistic, even going as far to opine that Japan’s unleashing a war against the Soviet Union “becomes increasingly more probable, and under certain conditions this should be considered absolutely inevitable” (AVP RF, f. 0146, оp. 9, p. 117, d. 2, l. 1–2). The discrepancy between Kopp’s and Moscow’s understanding of the situation in the Far East gradually became increasing apparent. Kopp apparently began to lose interest in his work in Tokyo as top officials in Moscow continued to ignore his proposals and opinions, and there was a hiatus in correspondence. Kopp’s shift in behavior did not go unnoticed by Moscow, who attempted to change the tone of communications with the ambassador, but

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with little success (AVP RF, f. 0146, оp. 9, d. 117, d. l. 14; Kartunova 2008, 615–19). Kopp was soon recalled to the USSR. On April 1, 1926, the Politburo adopted a resolution about the future direction of Soviet policy in Japan and China. Although Japan was seen as the main enemy of the Chinese revolution, Moscow recognized the necessity of assuaging tensions with Japan. For that reason the government decided to consider the signing of an agreement with Tokyo, acknowledging under certain conditions the “independence” of Zhang Zuolin and other issues (Adibekov 2001, 28–34, 31, 65). The failure of the Politburo’s plan to overthrow the Mukden government meant a move toward adopting a more workable plan, which Kopp had set forward earlier. By the middle of 1926, Moscow concluded that it was necessary to settle Soviet-Japanese contacts, and the Soviet government began to pay greater attention to its communications with the Japanese. 5

Cultural Exchange

The Politburo draft resolution dating to August 13, 1926, regarding actions to improve relations with Japan, noted that there was “the need to assume a friendly tone toward Japanese citizens and especially Japanese journalists in order to manipulate Japanese public opinion.” The document set the of task organizing “mutual information exchange from various spheres of life in the USSR and Japan” and so as to fulfill this the USSR planned to “regularly supply Japanese illustrated publications [journals, bulletins, and so forth] through our diplomatic mission with descriptive images, as well as a selection of movies.” In addition, it was considered reasonable “to find suitable candidates among top scientists to lecture in Japan during one or two semesters, and also to coordinate our and Japanese scientific work through the Academy of Sciences of the USSR” (Sevost′yanov 2007, vol. 2, 46–47). The period from 1926 to 1929 was therefore one of intense cultural exchange between Japan and the USSR. In Japan, various societies were also created to this end. The Japanese-Soviet Art Society (Nichiro Geijutsu Kyōkai), for example, laid the foundation of Soviet cultural ties in Japan. Established in 1925 by Japanese writer, critic, and public figure Akita Ujaku and with 2,000 members, the society published the magazine Nichiro geijutsu (Japanese-Russian Art). Mention should also be made of the Japanese-Soviet Cultural Society (Nisso Bunka Kyōkai), whose members were mainly young writers, artists, and journalists. The main activities chosen to develop Soviet-Japanese cultural relations included exhibitions, concerts, film screenings, theater tours, literary, botanical,

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and scientific exchange. A trade and industry exhibition, which opened in January 1926 in Osaka’s Daimaru department store under the sponsorship of the newspapers, Ōsaka asahi shinbun and Ōsaka mainichi shinbun, marked the first of such ambitious events. That same year the Soviet writer Boris A. Pil′nyak made his first trip to Japan to gather material for his novel Roots of the Japanese Sun (Korni yaponskogo solntsa, 1926). On April 5, 1926, during an “evening” of Japanese literature, the actors of the Vsevolod Meĭerhol’d (Meyerhold) Theater in Moscow performed an adaptation of the kabuki play Kagekiyo. Later, in May 1927, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), together with the Soviet-Japanese Association (Sovetsko-yaponskaya assotsiatsiya) and the Asahi shinbun newspaper, mounted an exhibition of around 140 paintings and 200 drawings by Russian avant-garde artists such as Aleksandr G. Tyshler and Vladimir A. Grinberg. In September 1927, Soviet pilots flew from Moscow to Tokyo to mirror the earlier 1925 Tokyo-Moscow flight. Almost a year later, in August 1928, the Kabuki Theater (Kabuki-za) staged a number of performances in Moscow and Leningrad, and this marked the first time a kabuki troupe performed abroad. It was a great success with the Soviet public, and the Japanese actors also had a chance to meet with cultural figures, including those affiliated with the Soviet theater and film industry (Savelli 2002). Despite their best efforts, the forming of cultural ties did not dispel the feelings of mistrust between the USSR and Japan. In August 1926, upon the request of the Soviet government, the ad interim Soviet chargé d’affaires in Japan, Grigoriĭ Z. Besedovskiĭ, met with the Japanese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Debuchi Katsuji to offer the signing of a non-aggression pact. On September 30, Debuchi conveyed to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that Japan could not conclude a non-aggression pact because the parties had yet to exhaust the obligations undertaken in keeping with the Soviet-Japanese [Japanese-Soviet] Convention on Basic Principles for Mutual Relations signed on January 20, 1925 (Kutakov 1962, 72). 6

Soviet-Japanese Relations in an Era of Crisis

Unable to cope with the financial crisis that rocked Japan in 1927, the Kenseikai government under Wakatsuki Reijirō resigned, and General Tanaka Giichi, the leader of the political party, Rikken Seiyūkai (Constitutional Association of Political Friendship), formed a new cabinet in April 1927. Tanaka’s government announced the new so-called “positive policy” (sekkyoku gaikō), which stipulated a review of the outcome of the Washington Conference (International

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Conference on Naval Limitation, 1921–1922) that sought to limit the naval arms race and establish security agreements in the Pacific region and a more proactive role in China’s civil war. One of the government’s first practical steps was the dispatching of troops to Shandong in May 1927 in an effort to resist the advance of the Kuomintang Army on Beijing where the pro-Japanese warlord general Zhang Zongchang was installed. In June 1927 and March 1928, the USSR ambassadors to Japan, Valerian S. Dovgalevskiĭ and Alexandr A. Troyanovskiĭ, set forth the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Japan with Prime Minister Tanaka. The Japanese leader refused on both occasions (Adibekov 2001, 17; Kutakov 1962, 94). Gotō Shinpei visited Moscow from December 1927 to January 1928 with the primary task of reaching a possible agreement about deterring the national revolutionary movement in China, in particular, the Chinese communists (Sevost′yanov 2007, vol. 2, 192, 197). During the last days of his stay in Moscow Gotō participated in the formulation of the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Convention. The convention was signed on January 23, 1928, after a long process of approval, and it remained in force until 1936 (Adibekov 2001, 11). The terms of the Fisheries Convention specified Japan’s adherence to the regulations established by the Soviet government. In 1928, the first year of this new convention, the Soviets leased 255 lots to the Japanese—to industrialists as it had done in 1923—and these constituted 96 percent of all the sites in use. Not wishing to create further tensions with Japan, the Soviet government did not alter the average number of lots leased to the Japanese fishermen by opening new sites for operation. In 1929, Japan had 303 lots while the USSR had 162 (65 and 35 percent, respectively). Two years later, in 1931, Japan had 309 lots, and Soviet organizations 307 (51 and 49 percent, respectively) (Kutakov 1962, 92). The Fisheries Convention remained one of the main irritants to Soviet leaders. The USSR was interested in developing its own production and processing of seafood, with the aim of boosting domestic enterprises. But the lack of Soviet skilled labor forced the government to recruit Japanese workers. In a move to hamper the progress of the Soviet crab-fishing industry the Japanese government then issued an order forbidding the employment of Japanese workers on Soviet floating-crab factory ships without the prior approval from the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. In a countermeasure, during the 1930 fishing season the Politburo decided to lease only twelve crab-fishing sites to Japanese fishing companies, instead of thirty as in the previous year (Sevost′yanov 2007, vol. 2, 301–3). Any violations of the Fisheries Convention by the Soviet side were also registered, most notably the increase in the rental price for fishing lots by 200–300 percent in 1930. There were incidents involving

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weapons in the summer of 1930 that resulted in the prosecution and detention of Japanese poaching ships or belligerent vessels off the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia’s Far East (Sevost′yanov 2007, vol. 2, 367–69). In the early 1930s, Soviet-Japanese relations rapidly declined, and there was an assassination attempt on March 16, 1931, in Tokyo on the life of the Soviet trade representative Pavel V. Anikeev. According to the Japanese news agency Shinbun rengō, the criminal “attempted to kill him, feeling offended by the business negotiations, in particular, those regarding the fishery issue” (Sevost′yanov 2007, vol. 2, 401). Not surprisingly, the conflictive situation between the USSR and Japan at this time meant that the bilateral trade agreement was not signed. There were also issues relating to the activities of concessionary entities in northern Sakhalin, most notably that of the Northern Sakhalin Oil Company, which violated the ratio stipulated in the concession treaty about the number of Japanese and Soviet workers (75 percent Japanese and 25 percent Soviet citizens) (Sevost′yanov 2007, vol. 2, 382). A separate problem was the activity in Japan of the Comintern, an organization promoting world communism. Tokyo accused Moscow of coordinating subversive communist propaganda following the revival in December 1926 of the Japanese Communist Party. On January 19, 1930, the Japanese ambassador to Russia, Tanaka Tokichi, lodged a statement of protest from the Japanese government to the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Karakhan about the support by Soviet diplomats of the subversive activities of the Japanese Communist Party. The transferal of funds and instructions to the heads of the party by the USSR trade representative in Japan, Karl Emanuel Jansson (Yakov D. Yanson), and the USSR vice consul in Shanghai, Solomon L. Vil’de, were discovered during an investigation of arrested Japanese communists and later cited as evidence (Sevost′yanov 2007, vol. 2, 313–15). In response to the accusations of subversive Comintern propaganda in Japan the Soviet government noted that it “cannot bear responsibility for activities of an international organization of an absolutely private nature located in its territory” and “it therefore has no power to impact any of the activities of this organization and its local branches” (Adibekov 2001, 53). This was clearly untrue. The reality was that since March 1919 the Comintern in Moscow acted as the “General Staff of the World Revolution,” whose strategic goal was the creation of “the global Soviet republic” at its Moscow center and at its numerous communist party affiliates. State and public figures from Japan and elsewhere frequently, and increasingly, viewed Comintern and the Soviet government as one and the same. It was difficult for representatives of the USSR to find convincing arguments to prove otherwise.

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7 Conclusion Relations between the Soviet Russia (Far Eastern Republic, Soviet Union) and Japan in the 1920s were extremely complicated. Stabilization and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1925 replaced the military rivalry at the beginning of the decade, and for a brief period Soviet-Japanese contacts were comparatively cordial. The Japanese political elite entertained the hope of furthering relations with the USSR, viewing it as a potential ally in the face of other Great Powers, above all, the United Kingdom. It also expected to boost economic contacts, especially regarding the development of resources in the Far East. China was a separate case where the interests of both countries converged. Japan believed that Moscow wanted cooperation with Tokyo in the efforts to counteract Chinese nationalism in Manchuria and to guarantee the rights of the CER. This point of view was shared in part by a number of Soviet diplomats in the Far East, including Ambassador Kopp who maintained that the cooperation with Japan was necessary in order to protect the interests of the railway. Kopp’s proposal to Tokyo about recovering in part the general RussianJapanese political agreements of the pre-revolutionary period were not accepted by the Politburo. Moscow opposed any agreements that were aimed at splitting its spheres of influence in China since it believed that this would trigger fiercer opposition from the Chinese national movement, which was one of the most important components of the USSR’s Far Eastern policy. The antagonism between the two countries’ political systems remained a significant aspect of bilateral relations. Moscow aspired to advance the communist movement in Japan; however, the popularity of the Japanese Communist Party did not extend beyond an extremely narrow segment of Japanese society. The USSR and Japan were also direct rivals in China, and this, in many respects, caused a high level of mistrust in their bilateral contacts of the second half of the 1920s. By the early 1930s both countries faced a number of unresolved external economic issues. Japanese fishermen were unhappy about the reduction and separation of the allocated fishing lots and the bidding principle. There were also a number of disputed issues concerning the work at the Japanese concessions in northern Sakhalin. These, along with the fishing concessions, were a source of serious irritation for Soviet leaders. Despite the conflicts in foreign policy, as well as trade and economic issues, the development of Soviet-Japanese cultural relations was buoyant. For a short period, the two countries were able to achieve considerable progress. The establishment of scientific ties, visits by outstanding Soviet scientists to Japan, the organization of tours of kabuki performers, exhibitions of Russian avantgarde artists, and exchanges between Soviet and Japanese writers should be

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singled out. It was against this backdrop of lukewarm political relations that such cultural exchange became one of the few spheres in which both countries could realize the full potential of cooperation. Bibliography

Russian Sources

Adibekov, Grant Mkrtytchevitch, ed. 2001. VKP(b), Komintern i Yaponiya, 1917–1941 [CPSU, Comintern, and Japan, 1917–1941]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 2–4. Tokyo Ambassador, Kopp, to People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin (May 4). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, op. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 5–11. Kopp to Chicherin (May 4). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 22–28. Kopp to Chicherin (May 7). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3. l. 29–30. Chicherin to Kopp (May 12). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3. l. 61–64. Kopp to Chicherin (May 18). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3. l. 68–70. Chicherin to Kopp (June 2). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 77–82. Head of the Far East Department, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Mel’nikov Boris Nikolaevich (1896–1938), to Kopp (June 3). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 86–91. Kopp to Chicherin (June 6). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 100–1. Kopp to Chicherin (June 9). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 113–17. Kopp to Chicherin (July 2).

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AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1925. f. 0146, оp. 8, pol. 110, d. 3, l. 147. Chicherin to Kopp (July 7). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1926. f. 0146, оp. 9, pol. 117, d. 1, l. 1–2. Chicherin to Kopp (January 12). AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1926. f. 0146, оp. 9, pol. 117, d. 1, l. 14. Chicherin to Kopp (March 12). Kartunova, Anastasiya Ivanova. 2001. Politika Moskvy v natsionalno-revolutsionnom dvizheniĭ v Kitae: voennyĭ aspekt (1923 g.– iyul 1927 g.) [Policy of Moscow on the National Revolutionary Movement in China: Military Aspects (1923–July, 1927)]. Мoscow: Institut Dalnego Vostoka RAN. Kartunova, Anastasiya Ivanova, ed. 2003. V. K. Blukher v Kitae. 1924–1927 gg. Novye dokumenti glavnogo voennogo sovetnika. [V. K. Blyukher in China. 1924–1927. New Documents of the Chief Military Advisor]. Мoscow: Natalis. Kartunova, Anastasiya Ivanova, ed. 2008. Perepiska I. V. Stalina i G. V. Chicherina s polpredom SSSR v Kitae L. M. Karakhanom 1923 g.–1926 g. [Correspondence of I. V. Stalin and G. V. Chicherin with the USSR Ambassador to China L. M. Karakhan. 1923–1926]. Moscow: Natalis. Katayama, Sen. 1925. Yaponiya i Amerika [Japan and America]. Мoscow: Litizdat of People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs NKID. Kutakov, Leonid Nikolaevich. 1962. Istoriya sovetsko-yaponskih diplomaticheskih otnosheniĭ [History of the Soviet-Japanese Diplomatic Relations]. Moscow: Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Lozovskiĭ, Solomón Abrámovich, and Borís Efímovich Stein, eds. 1945. Vneshnyaya Vneshnaya politika SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov [Foreign Policy of the USSR. Collection of Documents]. Vol. III, 1925–1934. Moscow: Vysshaya partiĭnaya shkola Vysshaya Partiinaya Shkola (The Higher Party School). Savelli, Dany. 2002. “Boris Pil′nyak kak klyuchevaya kluchevaya figura Sovetskoyaponskih otnosheniĭ (1926–1937)” [Boris Pil’nyak as a Key Figure of Soviet-Japanese Cultural Relations (1926–1937)]. Vestnik evrasii, no. 2: 18–45. Sevost′yanov, Grigoriĭ Nikolaevich, ed. 2007. Моskva-Tokio. Politika i diplomatiya Kremlya 1921–1931. Sbornik dokumentov [Moscow-Tokyo. Policy and Diplomacy of the Kremlin 1921–1931. Collection of Documents]. 2 vols. Moscow: Nauka. SNK Decree, no. 378. “O poryadke ėkspluatatsii ekspluatatsii rybnih i zverinih promyslov na Dalnem Vostoke 2.03.1923” [On the Exploration of Fishing and Animal Lots in the Far East of 2.03.1923]. Sobranie uzakoneniniy i rasporyazhenin rabochego i krestyanskogo pravitelstva, no. 36, Оtdel pervyĭ (1923). Narkom yus: 676–77.

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Titarenko, Mikhail Leont′evich, ed. 1994. VKP(b), Коmintern i natsionalno-revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae. [VKP(b), Comintern and the National Revolutionary Movement in China]. (Documents, vol. 1, 1920–1925). Moscow: Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History (RTsHIDNI).



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English Sources

Hayashi Kimio. 1925. “Gakusei Shakai Kagaku Undō no kako genzai” [Past and Present of the Student Social Science Movement]. Каizo (1): 276–80. Hayashi Kimio, Sakai Norichika, Suzuki Bunji, and Tomita Takeshi. 1925. “Nihon Rōdō Sōdōmei no genkei” [The Current State of the Japan Federation of Labor]. Kaizo (1): 251–54. Sakai Tetsuya. 1992. Taishō demokurashii taisei no hōkai: naisei to gaikō [The Collapse of the Taishō Democracy Structure: Domestic Policy and Diplomacy]. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. Tomita Takeshi. 2010. Sen kanki no Nisso kankei 1917–1937 [Japanese-Soviet Relations in the Interwar Period 1917–1937]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Usui Katsumi. 1971. Nicchū gaikō shi: hokubatsu no jidai [The History of JapaneseChinese Diplomacy: The Era of the Northern Expedition]. Тokyo: Hanawa Shobō. Yoshimura Michio. 1977. “Nihongun no Kita Karafuto shenryō to Nisso kokkō mondai” [Occupation of Northern Sakhalin by the Japanese Army and the Problem of Japanese-Soviet Diplomatic Relations]. Seiji keizai shigaku (132): 1–15.

Akagi, Roy Hidemichi. 1936. Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1935. A Short History. Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press. Sakai, Тetsuya. 1988. “The Soviet Factor in Japanese Foreign Policy, 1923–1937.” Acta Slavica Iaponica (6): 27–40.

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part 6

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Japan’s Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931–1941: the Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact Tobe Ryōchi This essay examines changes in Japanese policy toward the Soviet Union from the Manchurian Incident in 1931 to the beginning of the Pacific War in 1941, with a focus on the response to the possibility of a Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. Through a review of the discussions and policies regarding the non-aggression pact, it sheds light on the core Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union. The first section evaluates Japanese responses to the Soviet proposal for the non-aggression pact during the period following the Manchurian Incident. The second section shows that the non-aggression pact continued to be considered as a policy option toward the Soviet Union even after Japan declined the Soviet proposal in later 1932. Finally, the third section scrutinizes the process that led Japan to renew their consideration of a Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, which followed the overall review of its foreign policy after the Japanese defeat in the Nomonhan Incident of 1939 and the outbreak of World War II in Europe. This result in the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in April 1941. 1

Non-aggression Pact Proposals after the Manchurian Incident

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1925 the Soviet Union had approached Japan several times with proposals for a non-aggression pact. This was in accordance with the Soviet foreign policy of committing to non-aggression or neutrality treaties with its neighbors. Japan had persistently viewed such proposals unfavorably. In 1928 , for example, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tanaka Giichi set one such proposal aside, explaining that it was still premature and that the priority was the conclusion of the treaty of commerce and resolution of outstanding economic issues (Hattori 1998). The Soviet proposal was shelved for a period and was raised once again after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. In late December 1931, the ambassador to France and future foreign minister, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, stopped in Moscow on his way home and was offered a proposal for the conclusion of the non-aggression pact by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Foreign © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_012

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Minister Maxim M. Litvinov. The Soviet Union felt threatened by the move of the Japanese Kwantung Army into northern Manchuria and replied with a message of appeasement that sounded more like a “sign of distrust” than of friendship with Japan (Hirai 1965). Yoshizawa knew that Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and his minister of war, Araki Sadao, were skeptical about the Soviet proposal and did not place the issue of a Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact on the cabinet agenda. He nonetheless instructed the First Section of the Bureau of Euro-American Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study the matter. The First Section came up with three options: 1) immediate acceptance of the proposal; 2) refrainment from immediate acceptance; and 3) rejection. In its opinion, if a pact were to be concluded, the Soviets might assume that Japan would not recourse to an outright military counterattack, and they might strangle Japanese regional interests through “crafty measures.” The First Section reasoned that as Japanese and Soviet interests clashed following the Manchurian Incident, the Soviets would certainly respond to Japanese actions in a “domineering manner.” Furthermore, the section pointed out that in the future a pact might be concluded but until that time the problems of fisheries and concession rights should be resolved and interests in northern Manchuria coordinated (Satō 1986). Tentative conclusions were thus reached among Foreign Ministry officials; however, the final decision was postponed after the fall of the Inukai cabinet following the May 15 Incident of 1932, in which Premier Inukai was assassinated. The next prime minister and navy elder, retired full admiral of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Saitō Makoto, had been the head of the Japan-Russia Association. Although not a strong supporter of the Soviets, he had expressed a willingness to work with them. In fact, shortly before the launching of the Saitō cabinet, the Soviet plenipotentiary representative, Ambassador Troyanovskiĭ, contacted the former chief of the Naval General Staff and secretary of the Japan-Russia Association, Katō Hiroharu, to discuss a proposal for Saitō to visit the Soviet Union in order to improve Japanese-Soviet relations (Sakai 1984). The issue of the non-aggression pact would once again be broached during the Saitō cabinet. In the meantime, the Soviet side continued to lobby. In March 1932, Litvinov attended the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and met with the Japanese ambassador to the United Kingdom, Matsudaira Tsuneo. After expressing Soviet concerns about Manchuria, Litvinov urged the conclusion of the non-aggression pact to dispel all mutual misgivings. In May, the Soviet official newspaper Izvestiya published an editorial calling for the signing of the non-aggression pact that would facilitate a peaceful settlement of unresolved disputes and unravel the Japanese-Soviet entanglement. In November, when

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Matsuoka Yōsuke, in the role of the governmental plenipotentiary envoy, stopped in Moscow on his way to the League of Nations in Geneva, Litvinov stressed his willingness to recognize Manchukuo and to agree to the JapaneseSoviet Non-aggression Pact. In the same month, the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lev M. Karakhan, informed the Japanese chargé d’affaires to the Soviet Union, Amō Eiji, that the Soviets might consider signing one nonaggression pact with Japan depending on latter’s wishes, and at the same time another with Manchukuo. It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union indicated that it wanted to tie its recognition of Manchukuo with a package containing the non-aggression pact. In late August, the Saitō cabinet settled on a position in its foreign-policy relations with the Soviet Union, “at least for the time being, avoiding conflict is of utmost importance,” and thus without recourse to a Manchurian-Soviet or a Japanese-Soviet treaty the Japanese and Soviets should aim to ease tensions through “reciprocal declarations of intentions of non-aggression.” Even if unable to reach a non-aggression pact, they sought measures that might lead to such an outcome. The naval initiative, headed by Prime Minister Saitō, moved in this direction (Sakai 1984). The ambassador to the Soviet Union, Hirota Kōki, returned home in midOctober; his evaluation of the non-aggression pacts that the Soviets had concluded with other countries was positive. He stated that “Japan should conclude a non-aggression pact if it has any such interests.” Hirota dismissed concerns relating to the Soviet “ideological intrusion” accompanying the nonaggression pact, noting that “even Italy and Turkey, which dislike communism, have already concluded such treaties, and nowhere have they seemed to cause any trouble.” Similarly, Prime Minister Saitō made a telling observation about the Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact: “taking some kind of reassuring measures to stabilize mutual relations is wise. As the current mood between the two countries has improved, we are looking into the treaty problem in order to seize the opportunity and move the Japanese-Soviet relations further into reassurance” (Kaji 1932). Although some in the army, such as the vice minister of war, Koiso Kuniaki, favored a Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, the general feeling among the Army about such a pact was negative (Terayama 2001). Mainstream army figures, including Minister Araki; vice chief of the General Staff, Masaki Jinzaburō; and head of the Third Division, General Staff, Obata Toshishirō, of the Kōdōha (Imperial Way Faction), were staunchly anti-communist and envisioned a future Japanese-Soviet confrontation for geopolitical and ideological reasons. This was also true in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where individuals such as the head of the Information Bureau, Shiratori Toshio, strongly opposed a

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pact. Furthermore, since some viewed a non-aggression pact as a JapaneseSoviet alliance, there was also the argument that such a move would harm friendly relations with the British and the Americans (Hirai 1965). As noted above, it seems that the majority in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were in favor of the cautious approach adopted by the First Section of the Bureau of Euro-American Affairs. The cautious approach favored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the opposition from the army were the decisive factors in a postponement of a non-aggression pact. Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai (Yasuya) had initially been interested in a potential pact, but he became discouraged in the face of opposition from the army. Ultimately, the Saitō cabinet adopted the same provisional policy as the earlier Inukai cabinet, delaying a possible agreement on a nonaggression pact with the Soviets. It should be noted, however, that postponement did not represent total dismissal. In December of 1932, Foreign Minister Uchida replied to Troyanovskiĭ, rejecting the Soviet proposal. Uchida went no further than repeating that prior to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact there were outstanding issues to be resolved and that it was too early for a treaty. It took an entire year from the proposal by Litvinov to reach such a response. 2

From the Non-aggression Pact Proposal to the Anti-Comintern Pact

Although Japan declined the non-aggression pact at this juncture, they did not rule it out as an option. The newly appointed head of the Bureau of EuroAmerican Affairs, Tōgō Shigenori, submitted a long memorandum to Foreign Minister Uchida in April 1933 concerning the alarming state and future direction of Japanese foreign policy following the Manchurian Incident and after the country’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, where he discussed Japanese-Soviet relations. Tōgō observed that since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident the Soviet Union had recognized the real strength of the Japanese in the Far East, and it had consistently exhibited an attitude of reciprocal concessions and compromise to avoid conflict with Japan. Japan had no reason to decline the conclusion of the non-aggression pact, and a Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact might also have a pre-emptive effect on future rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union. He also remarked that the domestic situation in Japan was not ready for the treaty, and it was not clear whether the Soviets were still keen to sign it. For the time being, therefore, Japan would keep the non-aggression pact off the agenda and move forward instead with negotiations dealing with the conclusion of a trade agreement, boundary

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demarcation, the prevention of military clashes in border areas, revision of the fisheries treaty, resolution of northern Sakhalin concession rights, and the joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway with an eye to its future purchase. In this way, Japanese-Soviet relations would promote stabilization and friendship (Tōgō 1952). It is noteworthy that Tōgō kept in mind the conclusion of the nonaggression pact and that he blamed the Japanese domestic situation for the inability to realize such a conclusion. The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact had been delayed, but it still remained on the table as a policy option. Ōta Tamekichi replaced Hirota as the ambassador to the Soviet Union, and he also was in favor of the non-aggression pact. In September 1933 he vigorously appealed for the conclusion of the non-aggression pact. He stated that the Soviet Union had recently been reinforcing its armaments in the Far Eastern area, because, from the Soviet perspective, Japan had evaded signing the nonaggression pact and anti-Soviet hawks were in power. He noted that if Japan was going to devote its energies to the development of Manchuria, it should enter into friendly relations with the Soviet Union, neutralize the threat, and if things went wrong, prevent a situation in which it would have to confront enemies from front and rear positions. For Ōta, completing a non-aggression pact, and then a trade treaty, would serve to ease the strained atmosphere in the Far East and aid in a Chinese Eastern Railway purchase. Furthermore, it would contribute to restraining the British in India and the Middle East (Gaimushō 1997, no. 322). It was around this time that the Saitō cabinet began to formulate its foreign policy. Having withdrawn from the League of Nations, Japan was now preparing for the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935 in London, and the process included deliberations on policies centering on the Soviets (Gaimushō 1997, no. 4). Working on the assumption that Japan would concentrate on the development of Manchuria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered it advisable to conclude a non-aggression pact in the event that the Soviets agreed to ban communist propaganda altogether and resolve mutual problems including, but not limited to, the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a relaxation of the Soviet-Manchurian arms race, and concession rights over northern Sakhalin, fisheries, and the development of West Siberian natural resources. Although the Foreign Ministry did not explicitly call for a pact to be signed, it was mentioned. The hardline counterproposal from the army, however, advised that Japan resolve its various issues by applying pressure on the Soviets, specifically that it “remove the menace posed by Soviet military reinforcements in the Far East” and eliminate the Comintern’s ideological provocation by “resorting to all forcible means and aiming at the disintegration of the Soviet state from the inside.” The army proposal had a strong anti-communist flavor typical of the

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Kōdōha, and since it aimed at internal disintegration of the Soviet Union, a non-aggression pact was out of the question. Seen in this light, it seemed impossible to bridge the gap between the army’s hardline distrust of the Soviets and the Foreign Ministry’s inclination to proceed with the non-aggression pact. The final decision of the Saitō cabinet was based on the Foreign Ministry’s proposal, but it did recognize some of the arguments set forth by the army. More specifically, the decided policy meant that both the Japanese and Soviets differed in their “basic ideologies of the origin and the constitution of the state.” Since the Soviets looked for every opportunity to spread “malicious propaganda” and engage in behavior “at variance with civilized countries,” there was a need to be cautious and, for the time being, concentrate on the sound development of Manchuria, and “for now, avoid military skirmishes with the Soviets.” The policy did not greatly diverge from the Foreign Ministry’s proposal; however, any reference to a non-aggression pact was removed. The negotiations surrounding the acquisition of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) ran into rough waters around this time. The negotiations started in June 1933 in Tokyo, but no agreement on a price was reached for some time, and on several occasions it seemed that negotiations were in danger of being suspended, until eventually a substantive agreement was reached in December 1934. The details were hammered out in the final agreement of March 1935. There was discord within the army over the Chinese Eastern Railway acquisition. Obata, director of the Third Division of the General Staff in charge of military transportation and traffic, and the Kōdōha were hesitant about the purchase. They opposed the transaction on the grounds that payment to the Soviets would only benefit the “enemy” and aid to the fulfillment of its fiveyear plan. Some of them argued that finalization of the new South Manchurian Railway (SMR) construction plans meant that the Chinese Eastern Railway would be encircled, thereby depreciating its value. There was no need for a hasty deal (Morishima 1950). Another member of the General Staff and head of the Second Division, Nagata Tetsuzan, expressed satisfaction with the deal (Tōgō 1952). Diplomats in the field who advocated the stabilization of Japanese-Soviet relations supported the negotiations on the railway purchase from the sidelines. Even without the confirmation of a treaty, they nonetheless believed that during negotiations, “the reality of non-aggression” would continue, and in time it would provide the momentum for the build-up of a consensus for the signing of a treaty (Morishima 1950). In fact, as the railway purchase negotiations progressed toward a conclusion, a new version of the non-aggression pact was brought to the table. In March 1935, the president of the House of Peers, Konoe

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Fumimaro, met with Soviet ambassador to Japan, Konstantin K. Yurenev, to speak about the possibility of reaching a non-aggression pact through a mutual relaxation of tensions by establishing a demilitarized zone in the ManchurianSoviet boundary area. From here the Soviets and Japanese would pull back their armies (Terayama 2005). In January of the same year, Ashida Hitoshi, a member of the political party Rikken Seiyūkai (Constitutional Association of Political Friendship) raised the question of Japanese-Soviet military tensions in the plenary session of the House of Representatives and asked whether some kind of constructive action, such as a neutrality zone or a non-aggression pact, should be forthcoming (Hirota 1966). There was no further movement toward the conclusion of a non-aggression pact even after the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway. There were two reasons for this. First, the strong anti-Soviet feelings represented by the Kōdōha were difficult to mitigate. Second, the Soviet Union, having improved its diplomatic and military position, was no longer willing to have as pro-active a stance as before regarding a non-aggression pact. The forging of diplomatic relations with the United States in November 1933 and the admittance to the League of Nations in September 1934 were indicative of the Soviet Union’s rising stature. Prompted by the advance of the Japanese Kwantung Army into northern Manchuria after the Manchurian Incident, the Soviet war machine in the Far East massively expanded. Estimates by the Japanese Army General Staff suggest that the Soviet forces in the Far East at the end of 1935 exceeded the total troop strength of the Japanese forces stationed in Korea and Manchuria by threefold, and the gap was still growing. Furthermore, the Soviets embarked upon the double-track expansion of the Amur Railway, which, on completion, was assumed would double its transportation capacity. Fortification construction was underway on a large scale along the Manchurian-Soviet boundary and in-depth defenses constructed around Tochka. The Soviet military build-up, together with the high-alert levels of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies, led to frequent military skirmishes along the boundary. The clashes steadily increased in frequency and size (Bōei-chō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu 1967). In August 1935, Ishiwara Kanji was appointed the chief of the General Staff Operations Section, and he was astounded to discover the poor state of the forces facing the Soviets. Confronted with the Soviet military threat, Ishiwara sought to expand the military arsenals of the Japanse forces, prioritizing the avoidance of antagonism with the Soviets. As a result of the revision of the National Defense Plan in June 1936, the Soviet Union was now on par with the United States as Japan’s most likely enemy. In August of that same year, however, in a similar revision of the

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foreign policy, the cabinet of Hirota Kōki, while stressing the threat of Soviet Russia, strictly warned against any Japanese move that might trigger conflict and determined that outstanding issues should be resolved “only by peaceful means.” It also decided on a policy calling for the establishment of a commission dealing with border demarcation and dispute settlement, a proposal for a demilitarized zone, and a declaration that it would be willing to proceed with the conclusion of the non-aggression pact if the Soviets wished and if an agreement was reached about the balance of military forces in the Far East. (Gaimushō 2008, no. 41). The non-aggression pact therefore remained a distinct policy option but no opportunities for non-aggression treaty negotiations surfaced. Moreover, there were no positive signs from the Soviet side. The resolution of other outstanding issues had also stalled. Borderland disputes often reappeared and only served to exacerbate tensions. Rather than advance toward stabilization, Japan instead tended toward diplomatic efforts and military restraint in its dealings with the Soviet Union. This path avoided military confrontation with the Soviets. At the same time, it sought rapprochement with the Great Powers, including the United Kingdom and the United States, and revolved around the concept of “anti-Communism” or opposition to the Soviets. Japan prioritized cooperation with the Great Powers at the expense of relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the vice minister of foreign affairs, Shigemitsu Mamoru, in support of Hirota diplomacy, attempted to control the army’s interventionism in China by attracting its attention to the north, and emphasizing the meaning of the anti-Comintern policy as a part of the defense strategy against the Soviet Union (Sakai 1984). Yet, the only country that concluded an AntiComintern pact with Japan was Germany. This pact, pitted against the Soviet Union, obviously exasperated Japanese-Soviet relations. 3

The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact

Japan went to war with China in July 1937 and in August the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with China, providing moral and material support in its war of resistance against Japan. Believing that China could only continue to fight with Soviet and British support, Japan therefore tried to end the war through diplomatic channels. This resulted in negotiations with Germany and Italy in late 1938, and the surfacing of an “anti-Comintern pact consolidation.” The aim was for Germany to restrain Russia from aiding China, both militarily and economically, in its war against Japan, for Italy to prevent the British and

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French from providing aid to China, and for the United Kingdom to serve as an intermediary in peace negotiations between Japan and China. There were severe disagreements within the government relating to the consolidation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and this caused protracted negotiations. In May 1939, Japanese and Soviet militaries clashed over an area of uncertain boundary delimitation between Manchuria and Mongolia, and the confrontation, known as the Nomonhan Incident, escalated into a de facto local war. Quite suddenly in late August 1939 the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact was announced, and Japan was not only shocked but also embarrassed by the development. Germany, Japan’s partner in the alliance negotiations against the Soviet Union, had just concluded an agreement with its supposed common enemy, one it had just recently clashed with in the Nomonhan Incident. World War II broke out in Europe shortly thereafter. Faced with an explosive, new international situation, Japan had to revise the general course of its foreign policy. In mid-September, the army requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertake a study in relation to their new foreign policy proposal. In it, the army argued for the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations as one of the “key urgent measures” and emphasized that border disputes would be resolved not through military might but through “peaceful means” (Gaimushō 2011, no. 295). Around this time, too, the army was revising its military expansion plan, taking into consideration the defeat in Nomonhan and the impact of the war in China. They found that even if the plan were accomplished in the five years from 1940, Japan would still have only 70 percent of the forces necessary to fight the Soviets in war. It had no room to enter into war with the Soviet Union. In its counterproposal the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised certain issues, including border resolution, the conclusion of trade and fisheries agreements, and the resolution of northern Sakhalin concession rights, as measures toward normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. The Ministry decided that unless the Soviets abandon aid to China and dismantle the military preparations threatening Japan and Manchukuo, or until Japan expands its military capabilities to face the Soviets, the issue regarding the non-aggression pact would not be broached (Gaimushō 2011, no. 309). In December most of the Foreign Ministry’s proposal was adopted as government policy. The section referring to the non-aggression pact carried a new proviso that stipulated, “in order to carry out its policy against the United States, Japan should give the impression that it was seeking rapprochement with the Soviet Union” (Gaimushō 2013, no. 13). It is notable that this new proviso linked Japanese-Soviet relations with Japanese-US relations.

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Some parties around this time advocated for the conclusion of a German mediated Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, or a Four-Power Pact between Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union, but neither the government nor the military were sympathetic to such requests. The basis of the policy toward the Soviet Union of the then cabinet of Abe Nobuyuki was to “normalize” or “calm” bilateral relations; it was averse to, or at least quiet about, the nonaggression pact. The Abe cabinet undertook to resolve the Nomonhan Incident and in general to reconcile Japanese-Soviet relations. The incident was settled in September through the conclusion of an armistice agreement. In October, preliminary negotiations on a trade agreement started, and in November negotiations on the establishment of commissions dealing with border dispute settlement and territorial delimitation also began. A provisional arrangement was soon reached between the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Tōgō Shigenori, and People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov. Ambassador Tōgō monitored the progress in negotiations and reported to his government on the possibility of a Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. Tōgō recollects that the United States had approached the Soviets in order to put pressure on Japan, and a proposal for a non-aggression pact would restrain such a move (Tōgō 1952). Abe’s cabinet did not adopt Tōgō’s advice. Border demarcation negotiations in the Nomonhan area were then deadlocked, and as a result, from February 1940 onward the pre-arranged negotiations on the founding of the commissions on territorial delimitation and border dispute settlement stalled. Formal negotiations on a trade agreement, which started in January, were also stalemated and were terminated in mid-April. The situation in Europe, once again, took a dramatic turn at this time. Germany initiated its blitzkrieg on the Western Front and the Netherlands, Belgium, and France capitulated. Shortly thereafter, Germany launched a large-scale air raid in an effort to capture the United Kingdom, and Italy joined the war on its side. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, annexed the three Baltic countries, and occupied a part of Romania. In Japan, Yonai Mitsumasa’s cabinet was sworn in during January 1940, and in late May the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arita Hachirō, sent instructions to Ambassador Tōgō to initiate negotiations on the conclusion of a neutrality treaty in order to break through the current deadlock. The Foreign Ministry investigation reports written in the postwar period reveal that a single-issue based approach, such as a border resolution or trade negotiations, would no longer work, and the Ministry tried to stabilize Japanese-Soviet relations by searching for “political arrangements” seen from a “broader perspective.” But

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fearing a negative impact on its relations with the United Kingdom and the United States, the Ministry made an offer of a neutrality, not a non-aggression, pact (Gaimushō 1946). Tōgō offered the proposal for a neutrality treaty to Molotov on July 2. The objective of the agreement was that when a third party launches an attack on one party, the other would maintain neutrality for the duration of the conflict. Tōgō added a request that the Soviet Union should take into consideration Japan’s northern Pacific fisheries and northern Sakhalin concession rights, and terminate its aid to the Chongqing (Chungking) government (Gaimushō 2012, no. 171). Not long thereafter, the political scene in Japan shifted again with the establishment of the second Konoe cabinet in late July, and the Soviets withheld any response. Molotov finally answered on August 14 with the following points. The Soviets understood and appreciated that the Japanese proposal of a neutrality pact included both non-aggression and refrainment from participation in adversary coalitions. Because Japanese companies had not yielded any positive results in the development of the northern Sakhalin coal and oil concessions, they should be returned to the Soviet Union. Japan would benefit substantially from the conclusion of the neutrality pact in its pursuit of the “Southern Advance” (nanshin), an expansion into the Southeast Asia, but in the process the Soviets would be placed at a disadvantage in their relations with the Chinese, British, and Americans. They wanted to know, therefore, what measures Japan would take in regard to the minimization of such Soviet loss (Gaimushō 2012, no. 182). The outline of these positions by Molotov, coupled with the replacement of the Japanese ambassadors to Moscow, were enough to interrupt negotiations. The second Konoe cabinet placed the weight of its foreign policy on the alliance with Germany and Italy and on its Southern Advance. The foreign policy adopted shortly after the inauguration of the new cabinet called for rapid promotion of political cohesion with Germany and Italy, and for “dramatic adjustment of diplomatic ties with Soviets” (Gaimushō 2011, no. 326). For the army and navy, the dramatic adjustment of diplomatic ties with the Soviets meant that the government would not be bound by past decisions, and would have to “resort to bold measures [such as a non-aggression pact] to stabilize the north” (Sanbō Honbu 1967). But this dramatic adjustment would not be realized for some time; Japanese advances into northern French Indochina and negotiations over the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy were prioriticized. It was only when the prospects for the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact seemed brighter in late September that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to contemplate in earnest an adjustment in Japanese-Soviet relations. The East Asian Bureau first drafted the proposal and after a partial revision by the

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Executive Committee it was put before the meeting of representatives from the ministries of foreign affairs, as well as the army and navy. It was then returned in October to become the formal draft by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hosoya 1963). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs draft stipulated the following items as part of a non-aggression pact: 1) non-aggression and respect for territory and sovereignty; 2) retention of neutrality when one party is attacked; 3) refrainment from participation in enemy alliances against any of the signatories; 4) establishment of border dispute settlement and boundary demarcation committees; and 5) prohibition of actions threatening the peace and tranquility of the other party (i.e., so-called “Red Actions”). As items of expected common agreement the draft raised the mutual recognition of Japanese “traditional interests” in Inner Mongolia and northern China and Soviet “traditional interests” in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang (Sinkiang), a mutual toleration of a Japanese advance into southeastern Asia and a Soviet advance into Central Asia, as well as the termination of Soviet aid to China and the restriction of the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-Japanese struggle. In return, Japan would tolerate the existence of Chinese communists in northwestern China and other locations. It should be noted that initially the East Asian Bureau’s draft mentioned an “inevitable development of the Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact and the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Pact into a Four-Power Pact,” which was revised by the Executive Committee to state that: “Japan, Germany, and Italy should steer the Soviet Union toward cooperation in the construction of a new world order.” But the item was dropped at the meeting of the representatives from the three ministries. Any article referring to the Four-Power Pact was thus removed from the agenda. On October 30, the newly appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union, Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, made a proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact based on the items (1) to (3) of the ministerial draft. But on November 18 the Soviet side offered a counterproposal for a neutrality pact in combination with a protocol on the northern Sakhalin concessions. The Soviet neutrality pact incorporated items (1) and (2) of the ministerial draft, and the protocol principally focused on the dissolution of Japanese coal and oil concessions in northern Sakhalin, along with a Soviet pledge to provide Japan with 100,000 tons of petroleum annually. Molotov emphasized that any non-aggression pact that did not include the recovery of the lost territories in southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands would be unacceptable (Gaimushō 1946). Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke expressed skepticism about the dissolution of Japanese concessions in northern Sakhalin. He, in turn, instructed Ambassador Tatekawa to propose the purchase of northern Sakhalin; Molotov

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dismissed such a proposal as out of the question. Ambassador Tatekawa reported home about the possibility of striking a deal by offering to transfer the concessions, but Matsuoka remained unmoved. Matsuoka then decided that he would be involved directly with the negotiations with the Soviet Union. A number of solid academic studies have been made on the drafting of the guidelines for negotiations, on the subsequent visit of Matsuoka to Europe, and on his negotiations in Moscow over the neutrality pact. It might be instructive here to outline several key points raised in them. The basis of Matsuoka’s negotiation guidelines is what is referred to as the “Ribbentrop Plan” (Gaimushō 2012, no. 193). During negotiations for the Tripartite Pact, Germany expressed a willingness to act as an “honest broker” on behalf of Japanese-Soviet rapprochement, and thus Matsuoka asked Germany for the promised mediation between Japan and the Soviet Union. The German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop responded by informing Japan beforehand of the proposal he would present to Molotov when the latter came to Berlin. The Ribbentrop Plan stipulated that: 1) the Soviet Union would recognize the “leading status” of Japan, Germany, and Italy in the Asian and European New Orders, and the three would in turn honor Soviet territorial integrity; 2) the three countries and the Soviet Union would not aid any enemy of the signatory parties; and 3) the parties would recognize their future spheres of influence, with the Japanese in the South Seas, the Soviets in Iran and India, the Germans in Central Africa, and the Italians in north Africa. The Ribbentrop Plan approximated the idea of the Four-Power Pact. Ribbentrop revealed his plan to Molotov in Berlin in mid-November. Molotov did not immediately respond to the Ribbentrop Plan, but after his return he sent a conditional reply containing uncompromising conditions that bordered on rejection. In early January of 1941, Matsuoka undertook preparations for his trip to Europe, including the drawing up of a draft for negotiations with Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The policy was determined following consultations with the army and navy ministries, and remained essentially unaltered from Matsuoka’s original draft. The new policy in negotiations with the Soviet Union was based on the presumption that the Soviets would accept the Ribbentrop Plan and that they would cooperate with Japan, Germany, and Italy in bringing down England. It argued that the conditions for negotiations should be that: 1) the Soviets should sell northern Sakhalin through German mediation, or, should the Soviets decide not to sell, Japan would renounce the concessions there in exchange for a negotiated price, including regular oil shipments, to be paid by the Soviets; 2) Japan would acknowledge the Soviet “status” in Xinjiang and Outer Mongolia, and the Soviets would recognize Japanese “status” in north China and Mengjiang; 3) Soviets would be made to abandon their aid

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to China; and 4) Japan and the Soviets would conclude negotiations on fisheries and other issues. The demands on Germany and Italy included such items requiring that the two countries “restrain the Soviets, and in case the Soviets attacked Japan or Manchuria, the two countries would immediately retaliate against the Soviet Union” (Gaimushō 2012, no. 193). The Japanese-Soviet partnership arrangements were always characterized by a mutual distrust between the two nations. In mid-March, Matsuoka departed for Europe. On his way home he stopped in Moscow, and formal negotiations began in early April. Due to the poor state of German-Soviet relations, any German mediation based on the Ribbentrop Plan was out of the question. Matsuoka initially suggested an unconditional conclusion of a non-aggression treaty, and he inquired about the purchase of northern Sakhalin. Molotov replied that the Soviet Union was seeking to recover lost territories and that a non-aggression pact was impossible. He repeated his counterproposal, combining a neutrality pact with a protocol for the Soviet retrieval of concession rights in northern Sakhalin. At the second round of talks, Matsuoka retracted his idea for a non-aggression pact and agreed to the Soviet idea of a neutrality pact but refused to abandon Japanese concession rights in northern Sakhalin. Molotov did not retreat from his package approach of combining a neutrality pact with a protocol for northern Sakhalin concessions recovery. Matsuoka then proposed a mutual recognition of the spheres of influence in China. Molotov did not commit, however. At the third round of talks, Matsuoka suggested the submission of an aidememoire in English that the parties would endeavor to resolve problems related to the northern Sakhalin concessions. He emphasized that this was his final compromise, yet Molotov would not alter his stance. The negotiations were on the verge of breakdown, when at a meeting with Joseph Stalin, the Soviets withdrew their proposal for a protocol, and instead accepted Matsuoka’s idea of an English aide-memoire, with the added qualification that the parties would strive to resolve the problems associated with the liquidation of the northern Sakhalin concessions within several months. Matsuoka accepted these “very minor changes” (Gaimushō 2012, no. 214), and the two parties were back on course toward the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. On April 13, the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was signed for a five-year period, and at the same time undisclosed, unofficial letters were exchanged between Matsuoka and Molotov that pledged to work for the conclusion of the trade and fishery agreements, the resolution within several months of the problems related with the “disposition” of the northern Sakhalin concessions, and the establishment of a committee to deal with the border issues. The Japanese translation was modified from the “liquidation” to the “disposition” of

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concessions; the English original was not adjusted. The Japanese government acknowledged Matsuoka’s report of a change in course from a non-aggression pact to a neutrality pact. When it received the report on the successful conclusion of the pact, even the army seemed to view it favorably, and there were few voices of concern regarding the negotiations for the “disposition” of the northern Sakhalin concessions. Matsuoka stressed in a statement released after his return to Japan in late April that the neutrality pact would not have any adverse effect on the Tripartite Pact, and that it would in fact enhance it (Gaimushō 2012, no. 232). He explained to the Privy Council that “this is a preemptive move to forestall Anglo-American schemes toward the Soviets.” He also stated that the Chongqing government would feel the greatest shock from the pact and that he would move forward to a peace settlement with China (Gaimushō 2012, no. 236). In short, the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact had evolved into something quite different from its original aim. 4 Conclusion The war on the Eastern Front started some two months later, in late June 1941. Ribbentrop and Hitler conveyed to Matsuoka during his stay in Berlin that German relations with Soviets were at their lowest point. Ribbentrop clearly warned Matsuoka that the Germans were going to war with Soviets (Gaimushō 2012, no. 302). Matsuoka knew that with the deterioration of German-Soviet relations, there was no longer any grounds for a Four-Power Pact. He would have viewed the deterioration in German-Soviet relations as an opportunity for Japan in its negotiations with the Soviets but he failed to foresee the looming German invasion into Soviet Russia two months later. In addition, Matsuoka determined that the goal of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was to restrain the United States and to apply pressure on the Chiang Kai-shek government. Following the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, Matsuoka expressed the view that priority should be given to the Tripartite Pact over the JapaneseSoviet Neutrality Pact, and he continued to take an ambiguous stance regarding the pact’s validity. Furthermore, Matsuoka advocated the “Northern Advance” (hokushin), an expansion into the Russian Maritime Province and East Siberia, and argued for an attack on the Soviet Union in response to the German move. Within the army, and especially within the General Staff, there were calls to invade the Soviets. The precondition of the attack on the Soviets was the expectation that German aggression would bring the Soviet Union to

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the verge of collapse. This never came to fruition. Ultimately, Japan would not take the bold move to renege on its obligations under the neutrality pact. For Matsuoka, the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was meant to provide effective restraint against the United States and to apply ample pressure on China. On the one hand, even if this was effective, albeit only temporarily, it would eventually be canceled with Germany’s entry into war with the Soviets. On the other, when Japanese relations with the United States deteriorated as a result of Japan’s intrusion into southern French Indochina, the need for security in the north facing the Soviet Russia only increased. The impact of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was reaffirmed with the implementation of the Japan’s Southern Advance. In this regard, the neutrality pact played a pivotal role in Japan safeguarding a “silence in the north.” Translated by Radmir Compel Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Bōei-chō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu [War History Office, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Agency], ed. 1967. Daihon’ei rikugunbu 1 [Army Department of Imperial General Headquarters 1]. Senshi sōsho [War History Series]. Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1946. Gaikō shiryō, Nisso gaikō kōshō kiroku no bu [Diplomatic Documents, Records Section of Japanese-Soviet Diplomatic Negotiations]. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1997. Nihon gaikō bunsho, Shōwa ki [Japanese Diplomatic Records, The Shōwa Period]. Vol. 2. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 2008. Nihon gaikō bunsho, Shōwa ki [Japanese Diplomatic Records, The Shōwa Period]. Vol. 5. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 2011. Nihon gaikō bunsho, Nitchū sensō [Japanese Diplomatic Records, Sino-Japanese War]. Vol. 1. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 2012. Nihon gaikō bunsho, Dai niji Ōshū taisen to Nihon [Japanese Diplomatic Records, Japan and the Second European War]. Vol. 1. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 2013. Nihon gaikō bunsho, dai niji Ōshū taisen to Nihon [Japanese Diplomatic Records, Japan and the Second European War]. Vol. 2, part 1. Hattori Ryūji. 1998. “Tanaka naikaku to Soren” [Tanaka Cabinet and the Soviet Union]. Seiji keizai shigaku 387: 1–9.

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Hirai Tomoyoshi. 1965. Manshū jihen to Nisso kankei [Japanese-Soviet Relations and the Manchurian Incident]. Kokusai seiji 31: 99–113. Hirota Kōki denki Kankōkai, ed. 1966. Hirota Kōki denki [Biography of Hirota Kōki]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Jigyō Shuppan. Hosoya Chihiro. 1963. “Nisso chūritsu jōyaku” [Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact]. In Taiheiyō sensō e no michi [The Road to the Pacific War], ed. Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyō Sensō Gen’in Kenkyūbu, 227–331. Vol. 5. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha. Kaji Ryūichi. 1932. “Nisso fukashin jōyaku seiritsu e no michi” [The Road to the Establishment of the Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact]. Kaizō (December): 40–48. Morishima Morindo. 1950. Inbō, ansatsu, guntō [Conspiracy, Assassination, Saber]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Nishi Haruhiko. 1965. Kaisō no Nihon gaikō [Reminiscences of Japanese Diplomacy]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Sakai Tetsuya. 1984. “Nihon gaikō ni okeru Soren kan no hensen (1923–37)” [Tuouhe Change in the Images of the Soviet Union in Japanese Diplomacy (1923–37)]. Kokka gakkai zasshi 97 (3/4): 106–36. Sanbō Honbu [Imperial Japanese Army General Staff], ed. 1967. Sugiyama memo [Memorandum of General Sugiyama]. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Hara Shobō. Satō Motoei. 1986. “Saitō Makoto naikaku ni okeru tai so seisaku” [Policy Toward the Soviets at the Time of Saitō Makoto’s Cabinet]. Chūō shigaku 9: 83–104. Terayama Kyōsuke. 2001. “Chūnichi Soren zenken daihyō Troyanovskiĭ to 1932 nen no Nisso kankei” [Soviet Representative Plenipotentiary to Japan Troyanovskiĭ and Japan- Soviet Relations]. Tōhoku Ajia kenkyū 5: 67–91. Terayama Kyōsuke. 2005. “Sutaarin to Chūtō tetsudō baikyaku” [The Sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Stalin]. In Kindai Chūgoku Tōhoku chiikishi kenkyū no shin shikaku [New Historiography of Modern Chinese Regional History], ed. Enatsu Yoshiki et al., 154–84. Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha. Tōgō Shigenori. 1952. Jidai no ichimen [One Aspect of the Times]. Tokyo: Kaizōsha.

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Soviet-Japanese Relations after the Manchurian Incident, 1931–1939 Anastasia S. Lozhkina, Yaroslav A. Shulatov, and Kirill E. Cherevko The 1930s were a difficult era in Soviet-Japanese relations. The invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931, was a notable manifestation of Japanese expansionist efforts, and this transformed the political and military landscape in the Pacific region. Like the earlier Russian imperial government, the Soviet leader’s understanding of Japan was far from complete. Moreover, their image of Japan was colored by the memory of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and the Japanese intervention in the Far East in 1918–1922. This led the majority of the Soviet political elite to adopt a suspicious attitude toward Japan. And given the threat of Japanese aggression along the Far Eastern borders of the USSR, the attention of Soviet leaders was now focused on this region, where its Red Army military units faced one of the world’s best armies and the third largest navy. In order to navigate this and other issues in its relationship with Japan, the Soviet leadership needed more reliable information about it in order to make strategic decisions and to formulate a workable foreign policy. An analysis of archival materials reveals that reports by the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), diplomats, and military commanders, records of personal meetings with officers of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), reviews from the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), and data from the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) were the principal and most vital sources of information about Japan for the Soviet leaders.1 It should be noted that the OGPU/NKVD played a significant role in the functioning of the state machinery and in providing information to Stalin’s regime. Working within a tripartite chronological framework, this essay touches upon six issues that shaped Soviet-Japanese relations in the 1930s and that remain topics of discussion in contemporary historical discourse: 1) the aforementioned Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 and its consequences; 2) the signing of a fisheries convention; 3) the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER); 4) the operation of oil and coal-mining concessions 1  In July 1934, the OGPU was reincorporated into the then newly formed People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyĭ komissariat vnutrennikh del, NKVD).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_013

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in northern Sakhalin; 5) the issue of non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union; and 6) the causes and consequences of the battles at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol River (also known as Nomonhan). 1

Japanese Invasion of Manchuria: 1931–1933

Once Japanese aggression in Manchuria commenced in September 1931, Joseph Stalin opted for a cautious policy toward Japan and evaded any serious clashes with that country. Instead, he launched an ideological campaign to mold the image of Japan as the enemy. He realized that the Soviet Union did not have sufficient military power to deter an attack by the Japanese army. In a letter dated September 23, 1931, to his close associate, the Politburo member and first secretary of the Moscow Obkom of the Communist Party Lazar M. Kaganovich, Stalin observed that “Military intervention by us is absolutely impossible, and at this moment our diplomatic intervention is unreasonable since it might unite the imperialists; it is to our advantage that they quarrel” (Khlevnyuk 2001, 116). The worsening geopolitical climate in the Far East forced the Soviet government to prepare this region for possible aggression. In early 1932, a decision was reached regarding the development of the military and industry: the numbers of armed forces increased and improvements to equipment commenced. The maritime borders were likewise strengthened, and such active measures in developing the Far Eastern region were undertaken with the aim of border protection. Considering the situation in China and based on the information provided by the OGPU, Soviet political leaders hoped that the Soviet Union would be able to mount the appropriate military response in the event that Japan chose to invade Russia after resolving the “Manchurian Problem.” Soviet leaders sought to stabilize the Far East in the 1930s, adhering to a policy that avoided confrontation with other powers due to its own involved domestic situation, to its vulnerable international position, to the lack of political allies and foreign economic assistance and, most importantly, to the fact that the Soviet Union was facing the threat of aggression from a formidable, yet little understood, rival. Another reason for this so-called “non-violent” policy was that the Soviet Union did not have enough experience in conducting large-scale military operations against a serious power. The USSR had been successful in the military conflict with the Chinese warlord Zhang Xueliang over the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929, but Japan posed a new threat on an entirely different level. In order to ensure the security of the Far East, which

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was a priority, particularly when considering the accelerated industrialization and military reinforcement there, the Soviet government made a number of attempts to sign a non-aggression pact with Japan. The fact that the Soviet leadership itself was not united in its attitude toward Japan was also at play. Some historians note that Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lev M. Karakhan, and later Grigoriĭ Ya. Sokol’nikov, oversaw the course of Far Eastern policy and “stood for a tough stance in Soviet-Japanese relations while Foreign Policy Commissar Maxim M. Litvinov was concerned about the European situation, especially in the period after 1933 and was inclined to compromise” (Peskov 2000, 33). Litvinov and the government thought that it was not possible to form a coalition in that region, and for a number of reasons a resolute policy was practically unattainable. The Soviet government therefore focused on bolstering the forces stationed in the Far East to create strategic reserves in the event of war with Japan while at the same time promoting a non-aggression pact. Both sides negotiated the pact under extremely labyrinthine circumstances. The Soviet Union outlined the need to sign a non-aggression pact on December 31, 1931, at a meeting between Foreign Policy Commissar Litvinov and Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who soon would be officially appointed foreign minister. Yet the proposal was at odds with the wishes of the Japanese government and was rejected. The historian Grant Adibekov opines that certain members of the Japanese establishment sought Soviet concessions in trade and economic affairs in exchange for Japan’s agreement to sign the pact (Adibekov 2001, 17). The incidents related to the Chinese Eastern Railway and the question of its sale created serious tensions in bilateral relations and hindered the signing of the pact. Archival documents show that Stalin was concerned about finding a solution to this problem, trying to remove the source of possible conflict with Japan as soon as possible. Yet the Japanese military authorities viewed the CER, jointly operated by the Soviet Union and China, to be the main obstacle to the total control of Manchuria and its complete transformation into a Japanese colony. From the outset of its occupation, the Japanese command had attempted to take command of the railway and exploit it to its advantage. With the Japanese advance on the CER, Moscow ordered Soviet board members “to stick to the principle of neutrality and not to agree to transport by either of the conflicting sides to the front by the Chinese Eastern Railway” (Ershov 1968, 671). In effect, that directive seriously hampered the realization of the plans of the Japanese army command. The Japanese had already begun to dictate their terms regarding the management of the CER in February 1932. The Japanese ambassador in Moscow,

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Hirota Kōki, visited Karakhan on February 27 to convey a request from his government about permitting “the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway’s eastern line for transporting Japanese troops” (Deev 1969, 147). Concerned about the developments in Manchuria, Moscow made the exception to allow the transportation of a limited number of Japanese troops from Harbin (Izvestiya 1932). The Japanese established the puppet state of Manchukuo on March 1, 1932, and assumed every contractual commitment related to the railroad management on March 12. The issue of the CER had now shifted from the economic to the political. In an effort to pressure the Soviet Union to relinquish its interests in the CER to the Japanese, Manchurian officials deliberatively provoked the Soviet government by arresting Soviet workers of the railway and obstructing the activity of the Soviet management—this was a violation of Soviet property rights in Manchuria. The Japanese military command eventually entered into negotiations regarding the CER on October 14, 1932, with the delegation led by Fujiwara Ginjirō, an important figure in the Mitsui zaibatsu (a financial and industrial conglomerate). The Soviet plenipotentiary representative (ambassador) to Japan, Aleksandr A. Troyanovskiĭ, was his counterpart. The question of selling was raised during the meetings between Ambassador Hirota and Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Karakhan (Deev 1969, 794). By agreeing to an unofficial exchange of opinions on the sale of the CER, the Soviet Union sought to eliminate the source of conflict intentionally created by the Japanese-Manchurian side (Deev 1969, 791). However, the Soviet administration could not allow itself to be manipulated by the railway issue. The rapprochement with Nanjing, the seat of the Chinese government from 1927 to 1937, and the United States was seen as the principal leverage over the Japanese. On June 29, 1932, writing from Sochi to Kaganovich and another close associate, the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Stalin remarked that: If the Japanese were to conclude a pact [with us], this is probably because they want to spoil our negations with the Chinese about the pact in which they, the Japanese, appear to believe in earnestly. That’s why we shouldn’t break off the negotiations with the Chinese. On the contrary, we should continue and protract this [the negotiations] in order to make the Japanese nervous about our possible rapprochement with the Chinese, thereby forcing them to expedite the signing of a pact with the USSR. khlevnyuk 2001, 184

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Stalin understood that there was a real threat in the East but at the same time the situation in the Pacific region was favorable in strengthening the Soviet position on the international stage. The resolution of the fisheries issue was also an integral part of SovietJapanese relations at this time. But it was problematic for the Soviet side since Japanese fishermen continued to poach and trespass the borders defining the harvesting areas for fish and crab. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions on the Far Eastern borders, the Soviet government, fully aware of the significance of this issue for the Japanese, attempted to alleviate the situation as much as possible rather than to exacerbate it further. Ultimately, an agreement was reached in August 1932 after the Japanese government initiated negotiations on the fishery issue in 1931. Despite the Soviet concessions in the CER matter, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially declined the Soviet proposal regarding a non-aggression pact on December 13, 1932, on the pretext of outstanding disagreements on many issues and that the signing of such a document would therefore be premature. The Soviet reply dated January 4, 1933, stressed that the pact was not a short-term instrument but followed on from the Soviet’s “peaceful” policy (Adibekov 2001, 17). Another unsettled issue in bilateral relations was the operation of Japanese oil and mining concessions. The Japanese owned 50 percent of the oil fields explored in northern Sakhalin, and their concessions dominated the Far East in terms of quantity and quality (i.e., the size of their investments). For Tokyo, northern Sakhalin was not significant within the overall volume of Japanese oil imports, but the government still viewed it as an important source of oil and as a reserve in the event of possible disruptions in fuel supplies from other regions. The deteriorating political situation in the Far East and the development of Soviet oil, coal, and timber industries complicated the operation of the northern Sakhalin concessions. One of the first measures taken by the Soviet administration was to enact stricter control over Japanese concessions. On April 23, 1933, the Polituro decided “to force the People’s Commissariats and local bodies to coordinate their measures regarding the Japanese concessions using the surveillance apparatus of the People’s Commissariats for Heavy Industry (NKTP) and Internal Affairs (NKVD)” (Adibekov 2001, 102). The extension of such a policy included the issuing of passports to the Sakhalin population, and the resettlement of “unreliable” and criminal elements from areas close to the Japanese concessions. The actions of the Soviet administration concerned the Japanese, who frequently used the question of concessions as a bargaining chip in negotiations on the non-aggression pact.

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As the Japanese threat on the eastern borders increased, the Soviet leadership began to examine Japanese history and culture in an attempt to understand more fully the “mentality” of the Japanese people and Japanese society. Such an interest by the Soviet political elite to expand their knowledge about Japan could be explained by the mistakes made by the earlier imperial government, which had underestimated its Far Eastern neighbor in the RussoJapanese War of 1904–1905. Stalin’s archive houses three books about Japan, and his notations in these provide an insight into his views about Japan: The Military Fascist Movement in Japan (Voenno-fashistskoe dvizhenie v Yaponii, 1933), The Naval Forces of Japan (Voenno-morskie sily Yaponii, 1932), and Taid O’Conroy’s The Menace of Japan (Yaponskaya ugroza, 1934). The Military Fascist Movement in Japan was written for Special Far Eastern Army commanders, Far Eastern party activists, and scholars. An examination of Stalin’s comments indicates his attention to economic problems, the position of workers and peasants, and the army’s role in Japan. Presumably his keen interest in those social groups derived from a more pragmatic desire to learn about the possibility in and conditions needed for disseminating socialist ideas among the Japanese, the extent of the opposition, and the struggle against the ruling regime. The Naval Forces of Japan was a classified book for Red Army commanders, and it provided information about the Japanese navy. Stalin’s notes suggest that he was particularly keen to know about the recruitment, personnel training, the organization of naval management under the emperor, and the development of the submarine fleet. These matters would have had a practical value in the formulation of a foreign policy and a strategic course in the Far East. O’Conroy’s work, The Menace of Japan, described the psychology of the Japanese, their everyday life and traditions. Stalin’s remarks in O’Conroy’s work are pejorative, describing the Japanese as “bastards” (svolochi) and “scoundrels” (merzavtsy) (RGASPI 1934, f. 558, op. 3, d. 98, l. 77, 90). These indicate his negative attitude toward Japanese culture and a complete lack of understanding of their customs and manners—in other words, he viewed the Japanese as “barbarians.” This image was further amplified by Stalin’s negative impressions of Japan resulting from the RussoJapanese War and the intervention of 1918–1922. Not surprisingly, this adverse sentiment surrounding Japan increased with the strengthening of the Soviet army in the Far East and the mounting disagreements between the two countries on a number of issues. The Soviet press, too, assumed a more dismissive stance toward Japan, a trend noted by the Japanese military (RGASPI 1932– 1936, f. 558, op. 11, d. 47, l. 61).

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A change in the policy toward Japan can be traced to correspondence during 1933 between Stalin and Kaganovich. Stalin signaled the need for heightened media coverage of the events unfolding on the eastern borders and that the blame should be squarely placed not on Manchuria, rather on the Japanese government. The media coverage of Japanese activities demonstrated the formation of the Soviet’s tougher policy vis-à-vis Japan. Another explanation of the changing attitude toward Japan after 1933 was the Soviet Union’s strengthened position on the international stage. It sought support from the United States, as seen in the negotiations between the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov and the US president Franklin D. Roosevelt (Khlevnyuk 2001, 403). By the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations with a number of countries and had become a member of the League of Nations on September 18, 1934. The inception of a long-term ideological campaign, which created a negative image of Japan and portrayed it as an enemy in the eyes of the political elite and the Soviet public, is demonstrated in a letter written by Stalin to Molotov and Kaganovich in October 1933. In it Stalin defined Japan’s position within the context of the Soviet Union’s domestic and foreign policy: I think it is time to begin broad and well-conceived—but not vociferous—preparations and an indoctrination of the public in the USSR and in all other countries regarding Japan and Japan’s militarists generally. We should develop this in [the newspapers] Pravda and partly in Izvestiya. We should also use GIZ [the State Publishing House] and other publishing houses to print relevant brochures and books. We should familiarize the public not only with the negative but also with the positive features of Japanese life and environment. We should clearly present the negative, imperialist, and invasive militarist features. khlevnyuk 2001, 396

The political elite also required a campaign that created an image of Japan that would distract the Soviet population from the serious domestic socioeconomic problems and to mobilize human resources on the home front. The picture of the “Land of the Rising Sun” fashioned by the authorities for public consumption was significantly different from the picture the authorities reserved for themselves. Soviet leaders demonized Japan and promoted the image of “Japanese saboteurs” as a way to camouflage domestic purges and to conceal the role it played in supporting terror in its own land. With the formal authorization from Stalin in the October 1933 letter to Molotov and Kaganovich members of the political administration leveled

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harsh criticism against Japan. Written correspondence and speeches include descriptions of the Japanese as “militarists” (militarist), “impudent” (nagletsy), and “bastards.” The Soviet government still sought a non-aggression pact with Japan, however. At the same time, they continued to monitor the situation in Europe and to receive reports from the OGPU foreign affairs department about Japan’s plans and its increasing militarization. Despite the increasing mistrust between the USSR and Japan, SovietJapanese cultural and scientific relations moved ahead since academic communities in Japan and in the Soviet Union had already enjoyed robust exchange for a decade. Documents of the Soviet’s All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries show that Japanese and Soviet researchers corresponded frequently, exchanged books, and sent plants and materials to each other in the 1930s despite the strict controls in place. In 1932–1933, Hayashi Takashi visited Ivan P. Pavlov, a peerless authority in the field of physiology and worked for about eleven months at the Soviet’s All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine, where he studied surgical techniques and methods regarding the ideas of conditioned responses. Pavlov praised the achievements of Japanese physiologists and supported the nomination of neurologist Kure Ken and physiologist Katō Gen’ichi for the Nobel Prize in 1935. The high level of Japanese scientific practice was valued by Soviet and foreign scientists at the 15th International Congress of Physiology held in Leningrad in 1935, where Katō and his six assistants demonstrated amphibian nerve micro-physiology experiments that drew the attention of both Soviet and foreign colleagues. Cultural exchange in the arts was also promoted. The Soviet public was fascinated with Japanese art, as seen, for example, in the keen reception by Muscovites of an exhibition in the early 1930s drawn from the collection of the Museum of Fine Arts (Muzeĭ izyashchnykh iskusstv) and the Oriental Museum (Vostochnyĭ muzeĭ). 2

The Ongoing Polarization of Bilateral Relations: 1933/1934–1936

In 1933–1934, the negotiations on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railroad continued but the atmosphere surrounding them was extremely complicated. The Japanese felt they possessed the upper hand; they continued to push for a lower price and also made fresh demands. Stalin had his own instruments of persuasion by responding “to the Japanese campaign with a media countercampaign claiming that the Japanese are not willing to buy the Chinese Eastern Railway, rather want to get it for free or to take it over and declare war on the Soviet Union, and that the Japanese are conducting an aggressive policy and looking for a reason to go to war” (Khlevnyuk 2001, 426). Stalin continued to

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emphasize the need for a Soviet “peaceful policy” to thwart the possibility of Japanese aggression. On the whole, the Soviet leader tried not to exacerbate the CER situation further, and so as to avoid confrontation the government did not place any additional demands on the Japanese. The USSR continued to appeal for a moderate position when it became apparent that the danger of a Japanese assault was indeed serious. NKVD sources maintained that Japan was planning to attack the USSR in 1934, based on the reasoning that: 1) the Great Powers would be unable to stop it; 2) Japan needed to resolve the war issue before the later international naval conference between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, which might impose restrictions on the navy if a new international treaty were signed; 3) Japan was convinced that it would not be alone in the conflict since it believed Poland and Germany would join the war against the Soviet Union; 4) the USSR would receive little help while Japan would be supplied with materials from abroad; and 5) the United States, weakened by the crisis for a few years, would remain neutral. The NKVD concluded that Japan was likely to start a war against the Soviet Union within one to two months and that it would begin by bombing Vladivostok (RGASPI 1934, f. 558, op. 11, d. 187, l. 24, 36–37). Such reports clearly put the Soviet leaders on edge. Karakhan had a lengthy conversation with the Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Ōta Tamekichi, on April 24, 1933. Ōta called for the “signing of some kind of a political act” between the Soviet Union and Japan, hinting that the Soviet Union should sell the CER and acknowledge Manchukuo (Dolya 1970, 832). In May, Litvinov continued talks with Ōta, and the Soviet authorities finally agreed to sell the CER. The negotiations on price began in Tokyo on June 26, 1933. The Soviet delegation asked for 250 million gold rubles, which was equivalent to JPY 625 million. They wanted to transfer all assets and liabilities of the CER to Manchukuo in order to prevent any possible future claims. The Manchurian delegation, however, made an extremely low counter offer of JPY 50 million. Not surprisingly, the Soviet side was dissatisfied with this offer, and the bargaining was in effect suspended. In 1934, Japanese and Manchurian pressure regarding the issue of the CER intensified. A campaign of arrests, and even the murder, of Soviet employees and the imprisonment of their family members was begun to force the USSR to make concessions over the CER issue. The bargaining process resumed in February 1934, and by mid-August the Soviet Union reduced its price from 625 million to JPY 160 million, or four times lower than the original offer. The Manchurian side raised its offer from JPY 50 million to 120 million, almost two and a half times greater. The Soviet ambassador in Tokyo, Konstantin K. Yurenev, agreed to the sum of JPY 140 million in his talks with Hirota on

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September 19, 1934, in a move to avoid any further protracted negotiations. But the Soviet government demanded a number of conditions such as payment in gold so as to prevent any monetary loss due to the devaluation of the Japanese yen (Deev 1971, 603). The Soviet leadership was concerned by the OGPU/NKVD reports based on intercepted messages from Japanese intelligence that outlined the level of Japanese military preparedness in 1934. The reports confirmed that the Japanese were preparing for an offensive in earnest and that they were closely monitoring any new Soviet military equipment and analyzing the circumstances of the Red Army, including the morale of soldiers and top brass (RGASPI 1934, f. 558, op. 11, d. 187, l. 37). It was obvious that the Soviet army still had to deal with numerous challenges, and the intercepted information also drew Stalin’s attention as it was relatively complete in detailing the situation of the Red Army. The information gleaned for use in the OGPU/NKVD reports influenced Soviet policy regarding its Far Eastern neighbor. The ongoing war in China clearly raised doubts about Japanese military’s skills and its ability to conduct a systemic analysis of a particular country as well as the global situation. The Soviets no longer saw Japan as a powerful enemy since it, too, was weak militarily. Mikhail I. Kalinin made the following observation on the errors the Japanese made in China: “They thought they would march through without suffering any casualties and the people would hail them as rescuers who had come to restore order, but instead they encountered resistance” (RGASPI 1934, f. 78, op. 6, d. 67, l. 159). It should also be noted that Soviet leaders believed that the United Kingdom encouraged Japan to clash with the Soviet Union because to do so would enfeeble its two potential rivals. This report concluded that: “England is interested not only in defeating communism but also in making certain Japan does not come away unscathed” (RGASPI 1934, f. 78, op. 6, d. 67, l. 163). The UK government calculated that militarily Japan would be unable to seize control of the Soviet Union quickly and that both countries would become embroiled in a military conflict. As such, they would be unable to stop UK foreign policy. The Soviet leaders suspected “London’s hand” in all the European crises. Ultimately, they regarded Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany as their main military rivals. Given Japan’s increased pressure on the USSR, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries sought to strengthen cultural ties with Japan in order to demonstrate the USSR’s peaceful stance. This Soviet organization paid a particularly important role in the Japan’s International Society for the Promotion of Culture (Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai, KBS or ISPC), which was established in 1934 after Japan left the League of Nations and supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of its tasks was the mitigation of

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negative consequences following the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the broadening of cultural exchange with foreign countries. The Soviets valued the contacts with the ISPC not only because it benefited the All-Union Society but also because it provided an important channel of communication between Moscow and Tokyo. In order to develop relations with Japan the AllUnion Society proposed inviting Japanese sportsmen and musicians to visit the USSR as well as organizing events such as exhibitions of Japanese art. Despite these attempts, by 1935 relations between countries were increasingly strained. The Soviet government hoped for a quick resolution of the Chinese Eastern Railway issue as it was a source of potential military conflict with Japan (Adibekov 2001, 15). The protracted negotiations eventually led to an agreement signed in Tokyo on March 23, 1935, stipulating that the Soviet Union would sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo for JPY 140 million.2 Historians generally interpret the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway as a major compromise by the Soviet side with significant economic consequences, on one hand, and the elimination of a real source of conflict with Japan, on the other hand. The Soviet Union could hardly hope for more under these circumstances. Although the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway was now resolved, the fisheries problem remained unsettled, and the 1935 negotiations on the signing of a fisheries convention were fruitless. The Japanese government in fact urged the abolishment of the contention-based auctions and the fixing of existing Soviet and Japanese fishing sectors as well as the guarantee to Japanese fishermen of the same fishing rights as those for Soviet enterprises (Adibekov 2001, 11). The Soviet Union would not agree to these terms. Meanwhile, tensions on the Soviet eastern borders were escalating. NKVD reports from January to July 1935 state that Japanese aircraft violated the Soviet airspace twenty-four times; that there were thirty-three incidents in which the Soviet territory and border troops were fired upon from Manchuria by mostly Japanese forces; and that four soldiers were killed and one wounded (Ivanchishin and Chugunov 1972, 710). By 1936, the Far East was a priority in the USSR’s military and strategic planning. The army command saw a military conflict with Japan as highly probable, and therefore developed a complex set of measures in order to study Japan as its principal rival and Manchuria as its main theater of war. Soviet military personnel were meant to acquire in-depth knowledge, for example, 2  The document had the extremely long title “Soglashenie mezhdu Soyuzom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Man’chzhou-Go ob ustupke Man′chzhou-Go prav Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik v otnosheniĭ Kitaĭskoĭ Vostochnoĭ zheleznoĭ dorogi (Severo-Man′chzhurskoĭ zheleznoĭ dorogi” (The Agreement Between the USSR and Manchukuo on the Transfer of Rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway [the Northern Manchurian Railroad] to Manchukuo). - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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about the Japanese army, its tactics, and equipment. Using this as a basis, the high command planned to dispatch detailed instructions to the troops in the Primor’e and Transbaikal regions (RGVA 1930, f. 33879, op. 1, d. 44, l. 109–10). From 1935 to 1937 Stalin received regular updates from Soviet intelligence regarding Japan’s imminent attack on the Soviet Union; these were supported by detailed reports based on information from Japanese military attaches. Another source of information about the situation in Japan and its preparations for aggression was Richard Sorge, whose reports are included in the Stalin archive. For instance, in a memo from December 14, 1937, “Ramzai” (Sorge’s pseudonym) provided information that the Japanese General Staff changed its attitude regarding the tactics against the USSR, tending toward “containing combat.” According to Sorge’s sources, the Japanese military was confident that the Red Army would respond to a Japanese “provocation” by launching an attack from Chita and Blagoveshensk. In such a scenario the Japanese would lead the enemy—the Red Army—deep into Manchuria where they would stage a powerful attack. Many of reports noted, however, that the Japanese did not wish protracted aggression against the Soviet Far East. It is not possible to draw definitive conclusions from archival materials about how much Stalin trusted this information and to what degree he depended on it in his decision-making. That Stalin believed a military conflict with Japan was possible is borne out by his comment, “A war with Japan is unavoidable; the Far East will definitely become a theater of military actions. We should completely purge the army and the home front, ridding it of spies and pro-Japanese elements” (Milbakh 2007, 144). Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continued a restrained policy toward Japan despite reports about an impending attack. Border guards were ordered to display self-control and caution in any incident, and not to engage in military clashes since this could lead to hostilities that the Soviet Union was still ill-equipped to deal with. A study of the events that occurred in the second half of the 1930s reveal that the Soviet Union was cautious and offered measured responses to actual events. In light of the Soviet Union’s tangled geopolitical position, the escalating political tensions in Europe, and its own domestic difficulties, Soviet diplomacy could not afford to take a tough stance concerning Far Eastern policy. 3

The Eruption of Local Conflicts between the Soviet Union and Japan: 1937–1939

While strengthening its position in the Far East, the Soviet Union signed the Protocol on Mutual Assistance with the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) on March 12, 1936, which summarized their cooperation in the military sphere. - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Like Russia’s Far East, Moscow saw Mongolia as an important defense line against the backdrop of the tense relations with Japan and intended the treaty with Mongolia as a warning to the Japanese government. Nonetheless, Japan pursued its expansionist aspirations, attacking China on July 7, 1937, and occupying its northern territories, Shanghai, and Beijing. These events, in addition to Japan’s countless rejections of Soviet offers to sign a non-aggression pact, the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded between Japan and Germany in 1936, and a sizable increase in the Soviet military might in the Far East, served to alter Soviet policy on Japan. Above all, the path to signing the pact had veered since the issue “was no longer seen as immediately relevant.” The Soviet government held its ground, and a Politburo protocol stated that the Soviet Union would retaliate in the event of the slightest Japanese provocation: “The conflict will not be local if Japan stages acts of provocation in Soviet waters” (Adibekov 2001, 208). At the same time, however, and despite its firm stance on certain issues, the Soviet Union was not interested in a further deterioration of bilateral relations, even as tensions escalated because Japanese concessions continued operation. In 1936, four of the twenty foreign concessions that remained in the Far East in 1936 were Japanese. In the following year, only five foreign concessions were left, including the four Japanese enterprises operational in 1936. Three of them—the Northern Sakhalin Mining Company (Kita Karafuto Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha), the Northern Sakhalin Oil Company (Kita Karafuto Sekiyū Kabushiki Kaisha), and the Sakai Partnership—were operating in northern Sakhalin (Zagorulko 2005, 730–31, 733). The Soviet authorities denied the Northern Sakhalin Mining Company a concession to run a mine in the Agnevo district in northern Sakhalin in September 1937, even though the concession agreement was not officially terminated (Ostashev 2002, 68–70). The negotiations on the fishery issues were difficult, but a protocol was signed in Moscow on May 28, 1936, to extend temporarily the 1928 Fisheries Convention until December 31, 1936. The Soviet Union rejected a new convention drafted by the Japanese government in November 1937, and debates on a fisheries convention were delayed indefinitely. This issue was repeatedly discussed later during World War II but no agreement was reached (AP RF 1921– 1966, f. 3, op. 66, d. 1011–13). In the meantime, Japanese fishermen were causing trouble by crossing the maritime borders and fishing illegally (Shirokorad 2005, 470). Foreign concessions in the Soviet Far East were slowly grinding to a halt, and the Soviet government did much to encourage this, even though, surprisingly, the Northern Sakhalin Oil Company was allowed to continue its operations. On July 4, 1938, the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom, SNK) made an unprecedented decision in Soviet practice regarding the

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Northern Sakhalin Oil Company concession. The secret resolution “On the Oil Concession in Sakhalin” (O neftyanoĭ kontsessii na Sakhaline) was adopted to enable the Central Committee of the Union of Oil Refineries to initiate negotiations with the management of the Japanese concession company on the extension of a collective agreement. This document also granted the northern Sakhalin coal-mining concession permission to export logged timber to Japan. Furthermore, the concession was also allowed to organize telephone communications between industrial facilities, to construct water mains, and to engage in extraction, drilling, and geological exploration (Adibekov 2001, 203–4). Given the protracted war in China, Japan needed to elevate its image of authority on the international stage, primarily vis-à-vis its allies who were signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact. With this in mind, the Japanese launched a campaign in May-June 1938 around “the disputed territories” between Manchuria and Soviet Primor’e with the hostilities taking place near the Zaozernaya (C: Changkufeng) and Bezymyannaya (C: Shachaofeng) Hills around Lake Khasan in the southernmost part of the Soviet Primor’e territory, where the borders of Manchuria, Korea, and the Soviet Union converge. The hills are relatively low—some 150 meters—but they dominated the otherwise flat terrain (Shirokorad 2005, 473). The Red Army had not readied the region for combat, and there were no fortifications along the border. Once the Japanese troops had been sited, border guards occupied Zaozernaya Hill on July 12, 1938, and began to dig trenches and erect barbed wire. The Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union at this time, Shigemitsu Mamoru, laid Japanese claims to the area near Lake Khasan on July 20. The Soviet Union sent a note of protest to Japan on July 22 and strongly rejected the Japanese claims. Six days later, on July 29, the Japanese crossed the border, attacking both the Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya Hills in what would be known as the Battle of Lake Khasan. Another offensive by two regiments on July 31 advanced 4 km inside Soviet territory, and these forces secured the Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya Hills after only four hours. Decisive battles against the Japanese in the border area were fought between August 6 and August 9, thereby liberating the Soviet territory. The following day, on August 10, both sides reached an agreement on the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the status quo on the border between the Soviet Union and Manchukuo. At 10 a.m. on August 11, Soviet troops were ordered to cease fire at midday. Although the conflict lasted only thirteen days, each side suffered considerable casualties: Japan lost 500 soldiers with 900 wounded whereas the Soviet Union had 717 fatalities and 2,752 wounded (Krivosheev 1993, 74–75). While the Khasan events had great international significance because of their scale and consequence, it did nothing to stabilize the border situation.

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The next test of Soviet and Japanese military capabilities was the Battle of Khalkhin Gol River, which Western and Japanese historians refer to as the Nomonhan Incident, so called after one of the hills in the area. The Japanese military had already begun preparations for an invasion of the Mongolian People’s Republic in the early 1930s, and an area on the bank of Khalkhin Gol River was chosen as the site to launch the offensive. Japanese aircraft bombed the positions of Mongolian border forces on May 15, 1939, and Red Army units were deployed two days later. Soviet troops crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and pushed the Japanese back to the border on May 22. An offensive mounted by the 23rd Division of the Japanese Kwantung Army on May 28 enabled the Japanese to readvance to the river in June. A commission led by Georgiĭ K. Zhukov, who was made the special corps commander, was assigned to assist the command of the 57th Soviet special corps and Mongolian forces (Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 73). From June to August there were fierce air battles between the two sides. Initially Japanese aircraft had air supremacy, but the Soviet Union then seized the initiative following the dispatch of experienced pilots under the helm of Yakov V. Smushkevich to the war zone. The Soviet troops held back the Japanese offensive in early July, pushing the Japanese troops back across the Khalkhin Gol River on July 5. Meanwhile, the Soviet command led by Zhukov and Grigoriĭ M. Shtern concentrated large-scale forces, including tanks and armored units, and prepared a massive counterattack. An offensive, which was begun on August 20, resulted in the Soviet troops encircling and delivering a resounding defeat of the Japanese forces. The fighting reached a climax on August 24 after the Kwantung Army brigades came to the rescue of fellow servicemen trapped on the Mongolian border and attempted to break the siege following an intense artillery attack. Yet the Soviet forces successfully fended off each attack by the Japanese, who were then forced to retreat on August 25. The encircled units of the Kwantung Army were either killed or captured during the hostilities of August 28–31 (Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 74–75). On September 9, the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Tōgō Shigenori, made an offer to the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on the behalf of the Japanese government to broker an armistice and to set up a commission on border demarcation. Foreign Commissar Molotov accepted the offer on September 10 but opposed the formation of a demilitarized zone in the Khalkhin Gol sector. Molotov agreed with Ambassador Tōgō and was in favor of a suspension of hostilities on Japanese terms on September 15, 1939. Both Soviet and Japanese ground and air forces ceased fire at 2 p.m. on September 16, 1939.

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Russian historians are split in their opinions regarding the causes and consequences of the armed conflicts at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol River. The first group interprets these conflicts as premeditated, belligerent actions by Japan against the Soviet Union. They assert that the Soviet Union did not want a war with its Far Eastern neighbor and that the conflicts resulted from Japan’s own aggressive policy that included the occupation of Manchuria and the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo (Derev’yanko 1998; Kol′tyukov 2005; Koshelev 2009; Koshkin 1989). Moreover, these historians maintain that the demonstration of Soviet military superiority played a key role in altering the trajectory of Japanese aggression. Some Western historians, such as Stuart D. Goldman, concur with this view and believe that the events of 1938–1939 had an enormous impact on the geopolitical balance of power on the world stage (Goldman 2012). Historians of the second group understand these conflicts as border disputes exacerbated by weak international law, including the insufficiently clear (or absent) demarcation of the border (Cherevko 2003; Molodyakov 2005; Nevezhin 2007). They primarily link Japan’s shifting foreign policy to the changing political climate and the new diplomatic balance created in Europe in the summer and autumn of 1939. Furthermore, they posited that the outcome of the Khalkhin Gol River conflict was determined more by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact) of August 23, 1939, between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany than by any Soviet army successes. The two camps of scholarly opinion aside, the defeat of the Japanese near the Khalkhin Gol River raised the prestige of the Soviet Union and provided Soviet diplomats with a trump card in their negotiations with the Japanese. Had the outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939, not occurred, it is not unthinkable that the Soviet Union and Japan could have signed a nonaggression pact that year. The actualities of the world war meant that the pact was never realized; instead, the two sides signed a neutrality pact eighteen months later in April 1941. 4 Conclusion Generally speaking, the military-political situation in the Far East in the late 1930s was characterized by escalating tensions between Japan and the Soviet Union. Japan was bolstering its military might on the Far Eastern borders and exercising a policy of expansion into the Pacific region. Taking into consideration the remoteness of the Far East from industrially developed areas of the

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USSR, the meager industrial potential of the region, the sparse local population, and the absence of reliable communication, the Soviet military-political leadership sought to transform this territory into an economically viable area as quickly as possible. Efforts were also made to expand the Far Eastern contingent of ground and air forces alongside the formation of a navy (Mil’bakh 2007, 21). After their first “show of strength,” the Soviet military command, including Zhukov, credited Japanese soldiers for their determination and loyalty to their homeland. They also remarked on the insufficient training of Japanese officers who were at times unable to cope with operative tasks. The experience of Soviet-Japanese conflicts from 1938 to 1939 served as a valuable lesson to the Soviet military command as they familiarized themselves with Japanese traditions and cultures, discovering more about Japan from an unexpected angle. Furthermore, the military conflicts at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol River uncovered serious flaws in the Red Army. It became clear to the Soviet government that the military practices and achievements of other countries should be studied and adapted, taking into consideration the specific features peculiar to the USSR and its own evolution. Japan was viewed as a strong geopolitical and military rival that threatened Soviet interests in the Far East—a new actor on the global political arena. Information about the growing strength of the Japanese army, the level of its preparedness, and the escalating tensions in Europe threatened the Soviet Union with a war on two fronts. Therefore, the Soviet leadership continued to seek a non-aggression pact with Japan, despite the remaining difficulties, as a way to escape that danger. In the 1930s, bilateral relations between Soviet Union and Japan underwent a number of complex developmental stages as outlined by the three chronological divisions in this essay. Each corresponded with a rise in mutual mistrust that would eventually lead to a series of military engagements by the end of the decade. Bibliography

Russian Sources

Adibekov, Grant Mkrtytchevitch, ed. 2001. VKP(b), Komintern i Yaponiya, 1917–1941 [CPSU, Comintern, and Japan, 1917–1941]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. AP RF (Arkhiv prezidenta Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Archives of the President of the Russian Federation]. 1921–1966. f. 3, op. 66, d. 1011–1013. Yaponiya. 1921–1966. Sovetskoyaponskie rybnye peregovory [Japan. Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Negotiations].

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Cherevko, Kirill Evgen’evich. 2003. Serp i molot protiv samuraĭskogo mecha [The Hammer and Sickle against the Samurai Sword]. Мoscow: Veche. Cherevko, Kirill Evgen’evich, and Alekseĭ Alekseevich Kirichenko. 2006. “Sovetskoyaponskaya voĭna. 2 avgusta–2 sentyabrya 1945. Rassekrechennye arkhivy: (predystoriya, khod, posledstviya)” [Soviet-Japanese War. August 9–September 2, 1945. Declassified Archives: (Prehistory, Progress, Consequences)]. Мoscow: BIMPA. Deev, G. K., ed. 1969. Dokumenty vneshneĭ politiki SSSR. Tom 15, 1 yanvarya–31 dekabrya 1932 g. [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Vol. 15, January 1–December 31, 1932]. Мoscow: Politizdat. Deev, G. K., ed. 1971. Dokumenty vneshneĭ politiki SSSR. Tom 17, 1 yanvarya–31 dekabrya 1934 g. [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Vol. 17, January 1–December 31, 1934]. Мoscow: Politizdat. Derev’yanko, Anatoliĭ Panteleevich. 1998. Pogranichnyĭ konflikt v raĭone ozera Хasan v 1938 g. [Border Conflict at Lake Khasan in 1938. Materials for the Sixtieth Anniversary of Khasan Events]. Vladivostok: Ussuri. Dolya, P., ed. 1970. Dokumenty vneshneĭ politiki SSSR. Tom 16, 1 yanvarya–31 dekabrya 1933 g. [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Vol. 16, January 1–December 31, 1933]. Мoscow: Politizdat. Ershov, P. I., ed. 1968. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. Tom 14, 1 yanvarya–31 dekabrya 1931 g. [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Vol. 14, January 1–December 31, 1931. Мoscow: Politizdat. Ivanchishin, Petr Aleksandrovich, and Aleksandr Ivanovich Chugunov, eds. 1972. Pogranichnye voĭska SSSR 1929–1938 [Soviet Border Forces 1929–1938. Collection of Documents and Materials]. Moscow: Nauka. Izvestiya. 1932. February 29, no. 59/4626. Khlevnyuk, Oleg Vital’evich, ed. 2001. Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931–1936 [Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936]. Мoscow: Rosspen. Kol′tyukov, Aleksandr Arkad′evich. 2005. Vooruzhennyĭ konflikt u ozera Хasan: na granitse tuchi khodyat khmuro … [Armed Conflict at Lake Khasan in Sullen Clouds Moving Past the Border for the Sixty-fifth Anniversary of the Events at Lake Khasan: Analytical Materials]. Мoscow: Kuchkovo Polye. Koshelev, Aleksandr Ivanovich. 2009. Sovetsko-yaponskie voĭny 1937–1945 [SovietJapanese War 1937–1945]. Мoscow: Eskmo. Koshkin, Anatoliĭ Arkad’evich. 1989. Krakh strategii ‘speloi khurmy’. Voennaya politika Yaponii v otnosheniĭ SSSR. 1931–1944 [Collapse of the “Ripe Persimmon” Strategy. Japan’s Military Policy on the USSR. 1931–1944]. Мoscow: Mysl’. Krivosheev, Grigoriĭ Fedotovich, ed. 1993. Grif sekretnosti snyat: Poteri vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deĭstviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh. Statisticheskoe issledovanie [Declassified: Casualties of the Soviet Armed Forces in Wars, Hostilities, and Military Conflicts. Statistical Survey]. Moscow: Voyenizdat.

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Mil’bakh, Vladimir Spartakovich. 2007. Osobaya Krasnoznamennaya Dal′nevostochnaya armiya (Krasnoznamyonnyi Dalnevostochnyi front). Politicheskie repressii komandno-nachal′stvuyushchego sostava, 1937–1938 [Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army [Red Banner Far Eastern Front]. Political Repression Against Commanders, 1937–1938]. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University (SanktPeterburgskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ universitet). Molodyakov, Vasiliĭ Ėlinarkhovich. 2005. Rossiya i Yaponiya: mech na vesakh. Neizvestnye i zabytye stranitsy Rossiĭsko-yaponskikh otnosheniĭ (1929–1948) [Russia and Japan: Unknown and Forgotten Pages of Russian-Japanese History (1929–1948)]. Moscow: AST. Nevezhin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich. 2007. Esli zavtra v pokhod … Podgotovka k voĭne i ideologicheskaya propaganda v 30–40-kh godakh [If We March Off Tomorrow … Preparations for War and Ideological Propaganda in the 1930s–1940s]. Moscow: Eskmo. Ostashev, Aleksandr 2002. Ostrov Sakhalin. Ėtapy stanovleniya ugol′noĭ promyshlennosti 1925–1944) [Sakhalin Island. Stages in the Development of the Coal-Mining Industry (1925–1944)]. Ugol (11): 66–70. Peskov, Vladimir Mikhaĭlovich. 2000. Voennaya politika SSSR na Dal′nem Vostoke v 30-e gody 20 veka [Military Policy of the Soviet Union in the Far East in the 1930s]. PhD diss., Khabarovsk State Pedalogical University (Хabarovskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ pedagogicheskiĭ universitet). RGASPI (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv sotsial′no-politicheskoĭ istorii) [Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History]. 1932–1936. f. 558, op. 11, d. 447. Correspondence between Stalin and Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhacheevskiĭ on the methods of fighting the Japanese fleet. RGASPI (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv sotsial′no-politicheskoĭ istorii) [Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History]. 1934. f. 558, op. 3, d. 98. T. O’Conroy. The Menace of Japan. RGASPI (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv sotsial′no-politicheskoĭ istorii) [Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History]. 1934. f. 558, op. 11, d. 187. OGPU INO notes, information, translations of foreign diplomatic documents pertaining to JapaneseSoviet relations. RGASPI (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv sotsial′no-politicheskoĭ istorii) [Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History]. 1934. f. 78, op. 6, d. 67. “Stenogramma besedy tov. M. I. Kalinina s gruppoi priglashennykh tovarishchei po voprosam Yaponii” [Minutes of Conversation between Comrade M. I. Kalinin and a Group of Visiting Comrades Regarding the Japan Issue]. May 2. RGVA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voennyĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Military Archive]. 1930. f. 33879, op. 1, d. 9. Voenno-politicheskie svodki 4-go otdela shtaba OKDVA, 1931 g. [Military-Political Reports of the 4th Department of the Special Red Banner Far

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Eastern Army Headquarters (OKDVA), 1931], 2–10. In 4-yi otdel shtaba OKDVA komandarmy V. K. Bliukheru [Fourth Department of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army Headquarters for Army Commander V. K. Blyukher]. December 30. RGVA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voennyĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Military Archive]. 1932. f. 33879, op. 1, d. 30, l. 79. Materialy po poezdke komandarma Blyukhera po Zabaĭkal′yu, 1932 g. [Materials on Army Commander Blyukher’s Trip to the Transbaikal Territory, 1932]. Blyukher Revvoyensovet SSSR, Shterny [Blyukher Soviet Revolutionary Military Council to Shtern]. September 8. RGVA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voennyĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Military Archive]. 1933. f. 33879, op. 1, l. 44. Postanovleniya RVS OKDVA za 1933 g., l. 107–13 ob. Postanovlenie RVS OKDVA O prieme novykh chasteĭ v 1933 g. [Resolutions of Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army’s Revolutionary Military Council of 1933, 107–13. Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army’s Revolutionary Military Council Resolution “On Admission of New Units in 1933”]. Khabarovsk, October 15. Shirokorad, Aleksandr Borisovich. 2005. Russko-yaponskie voĭny 1904–1945 [RussianJapanese Wars 1904–1945]. Мoscow: АСТ. Shishov, Alekseĭ Vasil′evich. 2001. Rossiya i Yaponiya: istoriya voeynnykh konfliktov [Russia and Japan: History of Military Conflicts]. Мoscow: Veche. Zagorul’ko, Maksim Matveevich, ed. 2005. Inostrannye kontsessii v SSSR (1920–1930): Dokumenty i materialy [Foreign Concessions in the USSR (1920–1930): Documents and Materials]. Vol. 2. Moscow: Sovremennaya Ėkonomika i Pravo.



English Source

Goldman, Stuart D. 2012. Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army’s Victory That Shaped World War II. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.

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part 7

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Wartime Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, 1941–1945 Hatano Sumio 1

Japan-Soviet Relations and the Outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War

1.1 The Option of Attacking the Soviet Union At the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, the Axis- and Allied-powers were turning their attention toward the Soviet Union. Working through the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Maxim M. Litvinov, the US powers sought to establish bases in the Far East for joint operations with the Soviet Union and to conduct bombing campaigns against Japan. At the same time, the Soviet Union sought to understand, and then reject, the twofront strategy of East (Asia) and West (Europe); it also voiced its intention to Japan to maintain the Neutrality Pact concluded in April 1941 between Japan and the Soviet Union. Moreover, there was no change in Soviet policy, which concentrated its national power on the war with Germany, even after the outbreak of the conflict between Japan and the United States (Suravinsukii 1996, 193–95). Ending the war on terms advantageous to the Axis powers meant that the ideal situation would pull the Soviet Union toward the Axis powers, separating it from the war with Germany and focusing the Japanese and German war efforts on the conflict with the United States and the United Kingdom. This point of view was based on the notion that such an approach would maintain the “tranquility” between Japan and the Soviet Union. Two options existed to facilitate the Soviet Union’s separation from a war with Germany: 1) the diplomatic option of mediation between “Germany and the Soviet Union for peace,” and 2) the military option of “Japan entering into war with the Soviet Union.” The former option was to push the Soviet Union toward peace through Japanese diplomatic efforts. The latter was intended to drive the Soviet Union back in defeat through attacks on the Eastern and Western Fronts, thereby creating potential for a peaceful posture; this was in the interests of the Axis powers. Both options were not acted upon by political and military leaders before the German-Soviet war, but the outbreak of the war contributed to them becoming realistic options (Tajima 2008, 56–59). Germany, using these two options as a basis, consistently demanded throughout the Pacific War that Japan fight the Soviet Union. Many among the Army General Staff agreed on this point. Yet a

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_014

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Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, as echoed in German demands, would be tantamount to entering into conflict in the northern and southern theaters. And this would be difficult from the standpoint of Japanese national power. A strike against the Soviet Union was only workable if accompanied by one of the following developments. The first was that US military bases would be constructed in the Russian Far East for attacking Japan. The second was that the German military forces would suppress Soviet military forces as a result of a German-Soviet War. In July 1942, the Imperial General Headquarters Government Liaison Conference decided not to comply with Germany’s demand to enter into war with the Soviet Union under the conditions that existed at that time (Sanbō Honbu 1967, 135). Conversely, the diplomatic option of drawing the Soviet Union into the Axis powers through the mediation of a German-Soviet peace pact had continuously been pursued since the beginning of the war. The proposal had the support of Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori, who maintained that “the diplomatic battle in this war is to win over the Soviet Union” (Tōgō 1967, 299). He passionately proclaimed the advantage of a German-Soviet peace pact. The possibility of such an agreement was debated by the army and navy during the first half of 1942, and frequent deliberations on the subject were also conducted with the German embassy in Japan. It became clear, however, that what Germany expected of Japan was not the mediation of a German-Soviet peace pact, rather the entry into war with the Soviet Union (Ōki 1997, 59). The Liquidation of Japanese Oil and Coal Concessions in Northern Sakhalin Even before the war erupted between Japan and the Soviet Union, the two countries were grappling with the issue of the liquidation (the restoration for the Soviet Union) of oil and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin and the problems regarding the revision of the 1932 Fisheries Convention. After Japan entered into war with the United States, there was a concern about the issues regarding the navigation of Soviet vessels through the Tsugaru Strait. Japan was most concerned that a portion of the Russian Far East might be offered to the United States for the construction of US bases that US military forces would use to launch attacks on Japan. In April 1942, the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Satō Naotake, met for the first time with Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. Molotov. Satō sought reassurance of neutrality from Molotov as well as a clarification of the Soviet position on the problem (Gaimushō 2010, nos. 359, 360). Molotov indicated that the Soviet Union would not provide the United States with land for its bases but his reassurance did not assuage Japan’s distrust. As the advance of US forces toward the northeastern 1.2

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Pacific became increasingly clear, however, Japan’s suspicions grew. But the Soviet Union maintained its position regarding the United States to the very end. Satō observed that the Soviet Union was in fact keenly interested in the stabilization of its relations with Japan. After all, Soviet military power was concentrated on the European front; it simply did not have the capacity to attack Japan. For its part, Japan sought to use this state of affairs to maintain “tranquility” and concentrate its efforts on securing more consistent military gains in its operation in the southern theater. Satō stressed the need to address the issues of contention between the two countries in his negotiations. He remained quiet on the issue regarding the merits of a German-Soviet peace pact, which was in danger of being interpreted by the Soviet Union as an attack. And for this reason, Satō sought to resolve the issue surrounding the liquidation of oil and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin through negotiations and to revise the Fisheries Convention, which by this time had already been a problem for eight years (Gaimushō 2010, no. 361). To settle the disputed rights to oil and coal in northern Sakhalin, the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke promised in a semi-official letter to Commissar Molotov that the countries would reach “a solution on the issue within several months” (Lensen 1972, 16–17). Yet the problem of oil and coal concessions emerged because the Japanese government allowed the problem to continue after Minister Matsuoka’s letter. Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori, for example, adopted a “prolonging of measures” on the issue (Sanbō Honbu 1967, 37). Japanese-Soviet negotiations on the question began in 1943 under Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru following strong calls by the Soviet Union for Japan to take steps on the semi-official Matsuoka–Molotov letter. In early June 1943, Molotov indicated to Satō that if Japan had not issued the semi-official Matsuoka–Molotov letter, the conclusion of the neutrality pact between the two countries would most likely not have been possible (Gaimushō 2010, no. 363). This was Molotov’s attempt to force the Japanese government to clarify their stance on the question of rights in northern Sakhalin. At a cooperative conference on June 19, Japan decided to cede rights in northern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union in an effort to resolve the various concerns that complicated Japanese-Soviet relations. The point was made during the conference that the domestic impact of conceding territorial rights to the Soviet Union would not translate into real national interests. Shigemitsu countered, however, that Japan’s “friendly relations with the Soviet Union are an immediate priority” (Gunji Shigakkai 1998, 394). After Satō entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union on the northern Sakhalin concessions, a new issue challenged the discussions. Soviet vessels,

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which had allegedly been transferred to the Soviet Union by the United States, were met and interned by the Japanese Imperial Navy in April 1943. Negotiations on northern Sakhalin commenced in earnest following concessions from the Japanese side to an unconditional release of the interned ships. Japan sought monetary compensation for the release of the northern Sakhalin rights, in addition to the provision of 200,000 tons of oil and 100,000 tons of coal over a five-year period following the release of those rights. The Soviet Union, in response, offered no monetary compensation and maintained that the country would not supply oil and coal provisions until after the war. Negotiations continued into the following year. In late January 1944, Molotov presented a compromise: a compensational sum of RUB 5 million and 50,000 tons of oil over a five-year period following the end of the war. The Japanese side was not satisfied with the proposal but indicated that it would be possible, in principle, to concede the rights to northern Sakhalin. The cooperative conference reached a compromise on February 2, 1944 (Gaimushō 1946, 99–108). In its Secret War Diary, the Army General Staff proclaimed that the decision to concede northern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union was the “wisest decision in the process of the Greater East Asia War” (Gunji Shigakkai 1998, 485). It was the result of the compromised negotiating positions by both the Japanese and the Soviets. 2

Unstable Japan-Soviet Relations

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Japan’s Foreign Policy Regarding the Soviet Union The resolution of the northern Sakhalin territorial rights issue and the impasse surrounding the seized vessels in March 1944 gave Japanese leaders reason for optimism regarding the possibility of maintaining neutrality in JapaneseSoviet relations. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu saw the resolution of outstanding concerns as a way to damage the “strengthened siege posture toward Japan” in the US-British-Soviet relationship (Shigemitsu Mamoru Kinenkan 2010, 129). He sought, therefore, to advance the mediation of a German-Soviet peace pact and a conciliation policy between Japan and the Soviet Union on the China question. When the Japanese approached the Soviets to mediate a German-Soviet peace pact, it had already petitioned to send a special envoy to Moscow in September 1943. Molotov indicated that the Soviets would not agree to a ceasefire or truce with Adolf Hitler. In September 1944, based on the policy of the 2.1

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newly formed cabinet of General Koiso Kuniaki to “engage in the expedient realization of peace between Japan and the Soviet Union,” Shigemitsu again petitioned Molotov for permission to send a special envoy to Moscow. Molotov also refused this request (Gaimushō 1946, 141, 147–48). In August 1944, Japan approached Germany about the German-Soviet peace initiative through its ambassador to Berlin, General Ōshima Hiroshi. Hitler did not recognize the signs of a thawing of relations by the Soviet government toward Germany, however, and refused to enter into talks with the Soviet Union. This resulted in a stalling of the German-Soviet peace initiative and without any understanding from either the Germans or the Soviets (Gaimushō 1952, 161; Gaimushō 2010, no. 419). In September 1944, discussions within the Japanese government about specific proposals for compensation to the Soviet Union entered their most serious phase and pertained to the impasse on sending a special envoy to Moscow. The conditions that the Japanese Foreign Ministry drafted based on the Soviet Union’s agreement to a neutrality pact constituted a broad negotiation proposal. These conditions contained items similar to those that the Japanese leaders had agreed on in May 1945, such as the abrogation of the Portsmouth Treaty (1905) and the Soviet-Japanese [JapaneseSoviet] Convention on Basic Principles for Mutual Relations (1925), including Japanese fishery rights and the neutralization of Manchukuo (Gaimushō 1952, 162–64; Gaimushō 2010, nos. 422, 1012). These conditions for negotiation were never communicated to the Soviets, however, in part because Shigemitsu’s approach to the Soviet Union had evolved into an attempt to gain a Japanese-Soviet compromise on the China issue. As the Chinese Communist Party (Yen’an Regime) gained prominence in China’s war of resistance, Japan changed its “anti-Communist” policy on China to a “pro-communist” policy. Shigemitsu sought to use this shift in Japanese policy toward China as a tool to improve Japanese-Soviet relations, exploring the prospects for a non-aggression pact between Japan and Russia together with a security pact between Japan, the Soviet Union, and China (Gaimushō 2010, nos. 970, 977, 988, 989; Hatano 1996, 250–57). Satō considered this approach to Japanese policy toward the Soviet Union to be “inconsistent with international situations” and began deliberations with Shigemitsu in early 1945. Molotov’s position was markedly cool regarding the discussion, emphasizing only the Soviet Union’s diplomatic position of “autonomy” and “non-interventionism” in the domestic affairs of China. Satō was concerned about Shigemitsu’s policy toward the Soviet Union, which focused on prospects for the creation of a relationship that exceeded maintaining a neutral position, even as Japan allowed the United States, the United Kingdom,

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and the Soviet Union to strengthen their ties. The strengthened unity among these three powers became apparent on November 6, 1944, in a speech by Stalin that celebrated the 27th anniversary of the October Revolution (Gaimushō 2010, nos. 981, 983, 987, 993). Stalin’s speech aligned Japan with Germany as an “aggressor country.” Molotov subsequently explained that the remarks were “nothing more than a theoretical perspective” and that the Soviet Union’s policy toward Japan had not altered (Gaimushō 2010, no. 984). Although Molotov’s explanation persuaded Shigemitsu and Satō that Stalin’s remarks were not indicative of the Soviet Union’s intention to go to war with Japan, the incident nevertheless gave rise to caution on the Japanese side. 2.2 Problems on the Extension of the Neutrality Pact On November 11, 1944, Minister Okamoto Suemasa stated in a cable from Sweden to Shigemitsu that Stalin’s remarks were an expression of the “promise at the Tehran Conference that the Soviet Union should, in principle, enter into war with Japan following the conclusion of its war with Germany.” Okamoto explained that this was a view expressed by “a certain secret agent” (Gaimushō 2010, no. 982) but there is no evidence that the Japanese government took this state of affairs seriously. The Allied powers continued to discuss the question of going to war with Japan after the conclusion of the Tehran Conference (28 November–1 December, 1943). In December 1944, US president Franklin D. Roosevelt communicated his request for Soviet participation in the war to Stalin through W. Averell Harriman, the US ambassador to Moscow. In exchange for Soviet participation in the war Stalin sought compensation in the form of rights to southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The Soviet Foreign Ministry was gravitating toward the abolishment of the neutrality pact in January 1945 shortly before the Yalta Conference, but Deputy Foreign Commissar Solomon A. Lozovskiĭ suggested to Molotov that the notification regarding the abolishment of the neutrality pact should be postponed to allow for broader negotiations with the Japanese. Stalin did not want to miss the opportunity, however, to make up for the losses of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and the Siberian Expedition (Suravinsukii 1996, 310). At the Yalta Conference in early February 1945 Stalin secured the restoration of Soviet rights to the territories, including southern Sakhalin, Port Arthur, and Dalian (J: Dairen), that had been “violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904.” Stalin also finally secured compensation in the form of a handover of the Kurile Islands from the United States and the United Kingdom in exchange for the agreement that the Soviet Union would go to war against Japan two to three months after Germany’s surrender.

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On February 22, 1945, Ambassador Satō held a conference with Commissar Molotov following his return from the Yalta Conference, at which time Satō had inquired whether the Soviets had discussed “the Far East problem” with the United States and the United Kingdom. Molotov responded that “the JapanSoviet relationship is a bilateral issue between Japan and the Soviet Union.” Satō interpreted this as the Soviet Union’s maintainence of its “autonomy” in diplomacy. In addition, Satō and Molotov agreed to discuss the problem regarding an extension of the neutrality pact in advance of the four-year anniversary of that agreement’s conclusion on April 25. But thereafter Molotov avoided subsequent discussions on the subject (Gaimushō 1946, 119–20; Suravinsukii 1996, 302–6). Toward the end of March Satō prepared a draft protocol between Japan and the Soviet Union that would go a step further than a simple extension of the existing neutrality pact. This draft protocol assumed that the Soviet Union would not permit a continuation of the 1925 Convention on Basic Principles between Japan and the Soviet Union because that agreement referred to the Portsmouth Treaty, which was seen as a “stain on Russian history” even in postrevolutionary Russia. Satō’s approach therefore sought to transfer their bilateral relationship to the neutrality pact by pulling out of the Potsdam Agreement and the 1925 convention (Gaimushō 2010, no. 1001). On April 5, however, just before this proposal was to be assessed by the Japanese government, Molotov communicated to Satō that the Soviet Union did not intend to extend the neutrality pact. Satō had indicated his wish for the neutrality pact to be renewed after it reached the end of its period of validity—which had one year remaining at that point—in the interest of maintaining peace in the Far East beyond the end of the agreement. Molotov responded in ambiguous terms, stating that “future matters are complicated under current conditions in international relations” (Gaimushō 2010, no. 1002). By March 1945, the War Guidance Section of the Army General Staff determined that the abolition of the neutrality pact was “all but certain.” However, the War Guidance Section did not foresee that the Soviet Union would enter into war with Japan, thereby rapidly turning around a policy approach in its relations with Japan. Because the war against Germany was expected to end “by the middle of the year,” and the United Kingdom and the United States remained at odds with the Soviet Union over its peace with Japan, the War Guidance Section overlooked the possibility of war. It believed that “it will be possible to realize a thread of favorable prospects in our negotiations with the Soviet Union.” This assessment gave the Japanese grounds to exercise the upper hand in expressing their expectations of the Soviet side (Kurihara and Hatano 1986, vol. 1, 505–10).

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Final Negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union and the Outbreak of War

Foreign Minister Tōgō’s Shigenori’s Negotiations with the Soviet Union In the most worrying scenario of the Army General Staff’s plan for the final fight for the Japanese homeland, the Allied powers would impose a blockade on the Japanese mainland during the period Japan entered into war with the Soviet Union. On April 22, 1945, Deputy Chief of Staff Kawabe Torashirō visited Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori, who was recently instated in the new cabinet of Suzuki Kantarō (formed on April 7). On the occasion of this visit, Kawabe recommended to Minister Tōgō that the country should take a “bold approach” to the Soviet Union in order to ensure its neutrality. Kawabe promised comprehensive support from the Japanese ground forces. Tōgō, in response, was committed to using this “hope of the military” to usher in peace with the United States and the United Kingdom (Tōgō 1967, 328). This approach to foreign policy was extremely delicate and attempted to turn negotiations with the Soviet Union, which were aimed at preventing the outbreak of war, into peace negotiations with the Soviet Union as a mediator. The critical reason for the Japanese army’s initial choice of a conclusive battle for the homeland was because it had determined that there would be strong pressure for an unconditional surrender. This would have dire outcomes, such as the destruction of the kokutai (“national body”), in the event of a “submissive peace” with the United States and the United Kingdom (Kurihara and Hatano 1986, vol. 2, 61–66). Therefore, the suppression of a battle for the homeland in favor of peace negotiations with the Soviet Union was not an option. Against this backdrop, Tōgō sought to gain a buy-in from the main members of the “Big Six” (prime minister, foreign minister, army minister, navy minister, chief of the army general staff, and chief of the navy general staff) to nurture a “readiness for feelings of peace” among the top government and military leaders (Tōgō 1967, 330–31). The first “Big Six” meeting was held on May 12, 1945. On May 14, the final day of the meeting, these leaders agreed to the following three options for negotiations with the Soviets: 1) to prevent the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific War; 2) to entice Moscow into “favorable neutrality”; and 3) to ask for Moscow’s mediation to terminate the Pacific War on terms favorable to Japan. This agreement was based on the premise that the Soviet Union was “the only foreign power able to usher in peace on better terms than an unconditional surrender,” which was the shared opinion of the “Big Six” leaders (Tōgō 1967, 332). 3.1

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The “Big Six” meeting also proposed to provide broad concessions, such as the abolishment of the Portsmouth Treaty and the Convention on Basic Principles for Mutual Relations, the return of southern Sakhalin, and the leases of Port Arthur and Dairen to the Soviet Union, the abrogation of Japanese fishery concessions, the opening of the Tsugaru Strait, the transfer of the Japanese railways in northern Manchuria, and, if necessary, the surrender of the Northern Kurile Islands, which were secured from Russia in 1875. In short, the “Big Six” meeting determined that the Soviet Union’s greatest interest would be the abolishment of the Portsmouth Treaty, and it sought to offer a response to that interest. Furthermore, the “Big Six” were prepared to preserve Korean “neutrality” and the Manchukuo region’s “independence,” as well as to establish “a cooperative regime among Japan, the Soviet Union, and China” in order to maintain postwar Asian security. This approach aimed at using the Soviet Union, which the “Big Six” expected would constitute a counter-balancing power to the United States in the postwar period, as a way to improve Japan’s external relations (Gaimushō 1952, 328–30). Different from their discussions on the Soviet Union, the “Big Six” did not debate what peace conditions Japan should offer the United States and the United Kingdom. The reason for this outcome was the fact that Foreign Minister Tōgō and the new War Minister General Anami Korechika could not agree on Japan’s remaining war capabilities and the prospects of the war. Anami argued that “while Japan is still occupying large tracts of enemy land, the enemy only has laid a small hand on Japanese territory” and “our conditions for peace with the United States and the United Kingdom should reflect this reality.” Tōgō, for his part, expressed pessimism about Japan’s war-faring ability in the future. Anami and Tōgō continued to disagree on the issue. Ultimately, consensus was reached on the third option: to ask for Moscow’s mediation in terminating the war on terms favorable to Japan as agreed at the May 14 “Big Six” meeting. Japan would sound out Moscow’s feelings on the role of mediator via former Premier Hirota Kōki (Tōgō 1967, 333). 3.2 The Hirota–Malik Talks Following the “Big Six” meeting, Tōgō made three requests to Hirota in the preparation of a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to Tokyo, Yakov A. Malik: 1) that Hirota would aim to prevent the Soviet Union from entering into war with Japan, secure a favorable neutrality as a primary goal, and “avoid requesting from our side” that the Soviet Union should mediate a conclusion; 2) that to direct the Soviet Union toward these primary objectives Hirota should explain the importance of coordination between the three powers of Japan, the Soviet

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Union, and China; and 3) that Hirota should avoid discussing the issue of compensation, but in the event that it could not be averted, Hirota should explain Japan’s “considerable determination” to deliver compensation to the Soviets (Hirota Kōki denki Kankōkai 1966, 359). Hirota visited Malik on June 3, 1945, explaining that “security in Asia can only be built through the cooperation of the Soviet Union, Japan, and China.” According to Hirota, “friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Japan are the foundation of such a cooperation.” This proposal accorded with the agreement reached at the “Big Six” meeting—namely, the establishment of “a cooperative regime between Japan, Soviet Union, and China” for postwar Asia. On June 4, the day after Hirota’s visit, Malik inquired about the details of Hirota’s proposal and the method through which Japan intended to implement it. Hirota answered that Japan intended to enhance its friendly relations with the Soviet Union and subsequently pull China into the relationship (Hatano 2004, 8–9). Malik and Hirota’s next meeting occurred on June 24. On June 18, however, the “Big Six” meeting decided to “sound out the Soviet intentions” on the third option, as concluded at the May 14 meeting, under the condition that Japan would “pay the utmost attention” to the timing and method of that option’s implementation. This decision was confirmed at the semi-official “Big Six” meeting summoned by the Japanese emperor on June 22 known as the Secret Imperial Conference (Itō 1999, 890–91). The third “Big Six” meeting, on June 24, made no progress because Tōgō was unable to impress upon Hirota the merits of taking a new direction. The gap between Tōgō’s outlook on the war and Japan’s current circumstances, on the one hand, and the military’s outlook, on the other, remained insurmountable. It was impossible for them to decide on the conditions for peace with the United States and the United Kingdom. At the final meeting between Hirota and Malik on June 29, Hirota finally submitted two memoranda for Soviet consideration. One was a proposal for a mutual, non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union. The other outlined the three conditions for such an agreement: 1) the neutrality of Manchukuo (Japan would withdraw its forces from Manchukuo after the war); 2) the abrogation of Japanese fishery rights if the Soviet Union supplied Japan with petroleum (Japan would give up its fishing rights as stipulated in the Portsmouth Treaty); and 3) Japan would be ready to consider any other proposals that the Soviet Union would wish to negotiate. These proposals were also communicated to Molotov through Malik, but all that Molotov promised to Satō was that the Soviets would “seriously study” them (Hatano 2004, 11–12; Gaimushō 1946, 153; Gaimushō 2010, no. 1027; Suravinsukii 1996, 332–33).

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Stalin made no effort to answer the Japanese proposal. Stalin’s emphasis was on the Yalta Conference, and he instead prioritized a postwar cooperation between the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, Stalin was influenced by the psychological motivation that the role of a mediator would in no way allow the Soviet Union to avenge the RussoJapanese War or the Siberian Expedition (Pureshakofuv 1993, 192–94). In the summer of 1945, Stalin prepared the Soviet Union for its eventual entry into war with Japan and invited Soong Tse-ven to Moscow in order to understand the secret agreement China had concluded at Yalta. In other words, the Soviet Union’s war against Japan was now inevitable. 3.3 Special Envoy Konoe and Deployment Negotiations By late June 1945, Tōgō had given up hope that the Hirota–Malik talks would produce results. As the Potsdam Conference approached, he concluded, “There is no option but to send someone to Moscow.” Prime Minister Suzuki approved this move, and according to Tōgō, the right person for this job was the former prime minister Konoe Fumimaro. Having received Tōgō’s request on July 8, Konoe stated that his conditions were that the negotiations should “start from a clean slate” by order of the emperor (Kurihara and Hatano 1986, vol. 2, 219–28). On July 12, the emperor’s confidential letter was delivered to Satō so that he could explain the reasons for Konoe’s mission. This confidential letter did not request peace in a straightforward manner. Rather it emphasized that Japan would have no choice but to fight to the very end if the United States and the United Kingdom intended to obtain unconditional surrender at all costs. Due to this state of affairs, the emperor’s letter stated, the blood of the people of the warring countries would flow. The letter proclaimed that this was not the emperor’s desired outcome and expressed Japan’s hope for “the restoration of peace” (Gaimushō 2010, no. 1028). On July 13, the day after the delivery of the letter, Satō sent a telegram to Japan expressing his belief that despite the likelihood that the Soviets would understand the emperor’s intentions as a “peace-loving people,” Konoe’s mission in the country was unclear. Satō’s fears would become reality when, on July 18, Deputy Foreign Commissar for the Soviet Union Lozovskiĭ responded that the request for a special envoy could not be answered because Konoe’s mission was ambiguous (Gaimushō 2010, nos. 1035, 1042). After receiving Lozovskiĭ’s response the “Big Six” clarified in a meeting on July 20 that Konoe’s mission in the Soviet Union would be to request Stalin’s aid in concluding the war. But no agreement was reached on the subject of compensation for the Soviets and conditions for peace (Itō 1999, 916). The conditions for the Soviets that Hirota presented to Malik on June 29 had also not

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been approved at the “Big Six” meeting. On July 21, Tōgō requested in a telegram that Satō communicate the decision of the “Big Six” meeting the previous day to the Soviet side. Regarding the “specific conditions” that the Soviet side had requested from Japan, Tōgō was to report that “expressing [those conditions] is not possible for reasons related to our internal affairs and external relations” (Gaimushō 2010, nos. 1045, 1046). Tōgō’s priority, more than a decision on conditions, was to answer Konoe’s “blank-slate mandate,” and he focused on the expedition of Japan’s request to the Soviets to accept Konoe’s deployment. On July 25, Lozovskiĭ indicated to Satō at a meeting that he understood Japan’s request for Soviet assistance in bringing an end to the war, but pressed Satō about what “detailed purpose” that objective would serve. Satō, in response, simply emphasized the importance of assigning a special envoy (Gaimushō 2010, no. 1049). The Potsdam Proclamation was announced the next day. 4

The Japan-Soviet War of 1945

4.1 Soviet Proclamation of the War against Japan It was not until August 14, 1945, that the Japanese government finally accepted the Potsdam Proclamation (announced July 26), which constituted a summons for the country’s surrender. Two factors contributed to breaking the standstill in “Big Six politics” regarding the conditions for peace: the atomic bomb and the entry into war with the Soviet Union, which created “external pressure” (J: gaiatsu) for the “Bix Six” meeting. These factors invited the conclusion of a surrender by means of two “Sacred Decisions.” The character of the two factors differed; while the atomic bomb was an unexpected event, the Soviet Union going to war with Japan was not unpredictable. At the end of May, the Imperial General Headquarters issued its “Operation Plan Against Soviet Union in the Manchurian-Korean Theater” (Man-Sen hōmen tai So sakusen keikaku). In early July, the Kwantung Army, having received the operation plan, finalized its “Preparation for Operations Against the Soviet Union” (Tai So sakusen junbi), which aimed to finalize preparations for war against the Soviets by the end of September (Hasegawa 2007, 95). The Army General Staff determined in early August that the Soviet Union would have prepared to mobilize its forces by the end of the month and that the war would begin “early this autumn” (Hasegawa 2007, 264, note 1). Research on the diplomatic measures made in preparation for the Soviet Union’s entry into war with Japan began at the Japanese Army Ministry in late July. The research findings from shortly before the outbreak of war suggest that the Soviet Union would not pursue a “surprise attack” but instead would

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favor an “ultimatum to Japan.” In addition, the research averred that the Soviet Union would position the war as an “autonomous” effort, not one conducted in conjunction with the Allied powers (Hasegawa 2007, 95–96; Kurihara and Hatano 1986, vol. 2, 362–64). The fact that the Soviet Union was not party to the Potsdam Proclamation provided evidence of the Army Ministry’s determination and gave the Japanese hope that the Soviet Union would respond favorably to their proposal to send Konoe as a special envoy to Moscow. This expectation lasted until just before the war finally erupted. The Army Ministry’s conclusions were entirely nullified when the Soviet Union went to war with Japan on August 9, 1945. Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s declaration of war was not only unpreceded as an “ultimatum to Japan,” but the country also became a signatory to the Potsdam Proclamation. The Soviet Union’s “autonomous” position thus proved to be an incorrect conclusion. The Soviet Union’s proclamation of war against Japan was conveyed to Satō on the evening of August 8 (Moscow time) and seven hours later on the morning of August 10 from Malik to Tōgō. The proclamation made no mention of the neutrality pact between Japan and the Soviet Union that had been concluded on April 1941, thereby removing the foundation of the Japanese government’s proposal to seek Soviet assistance in the mediation of peace through a rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation. The declaration of war certainly indicated that the Soviet Union was to be a signatory to the Potsdam Proclamation in response to requests by the Allied powers. Furthermore, the Soviets also explained that their reason for entering into war with Japan was the fact that war was the only tool with which the Soviets could save Japan from additional “sacrifice and suffering.” Tōgō and Satō persistently questioned their counterparts about the evidence supporting their claim that Japan had rejected the Potsdam Proclamation (Gaimushō 1946, 165–66; Gaimushō 2010, no. 1067). The Japanese government had taken a decision regarding the acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation and the negotiations with Moscow on the possibility of Japan sending Konoe as a special envoy to Moscow were ongoing. Malik, however, repeatedly remarked that the reason was Japan’s refusal to surrender. The Soviet Union’s entry into war against Japan was the most critical element in Japan’s process of surrender but from the perspective of the development of postwar Japanese-Soviet relations, the Japanese-Soviet war, which continued past August 15, also has significant meaning. 4.2 Invasion of the Kurile Islands and the Occupation Plan of Hokkaido On August 9, the Soviet armed forces crossed the border into Manchukuo and began an invasion of the territory. A defensive position was already in effect in the Sakhalin area. On the next day, August 10, Marshall Aleksandr M. Vasilevskiĭ,

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heading a special high command of the Soviet forces in the Far East, issued the order to the army of the Second Far East Front to invade southern Sakhalin on August 11. Soviet forces commenced their attack on southern Sakhalin that morning but they met strong resistance from the Japanese armed forces in the region near the border. On August 16, the Soviet armed forces landed at Maoka on the west coast of Karafuto and launched their fight against the Japanese forces. The Fifth Area Army in Sapporo predicted that the Soviet armed forces would concentrate their soldiers in Ōtomari for an assault on Hokkaido and ordered the 88th Division of the Sakhalin defense forces to protect southern Sakhalin. This decision was based on the expectation that the Soviet armed forces would assemble their units in Ōtomari in an effort to conduct an invasive attack on Hokkaido. In reality, the territory of Sakhalin was less important to the Soviet Union than the territory’s value for the Hokkaido and Kurile operation (Nakayama 1995, 45–48). On the morning of August 15, General Douglas MacArthur ordered a ceasefire for all US forces in the Pacific. But on the same day, General Alekseĭ I. Antonov of the Soviet Union declared that Japan’s statement of surrender was nothing more than a general declaration and that the Soviets would proceed with their attack because the Japanese forces continued resisting and had not issued their own order to cease war operations. The Japanese response was delayed. Japan’s Imperial General Headquarters did not order an “immediate ceasefire” to all but only to those involved in operations that constituted battles for self-defense until the later hours of August 16. There was a more important reason, however, for the Soviet Union to continue its war against Japan. As of August 15, the Soviet Union had been unable to seize central and southern Manchukuo, and the Soviets encountered heavy resistance from the Japanese even after crossing the border into Sakhalin. Moreover, the Soviets had not been able to set foot on the Kurile Islands (Nakayama 1995, 45; Hasegawa 2005, 267–68). On August 20, Soviet armed forces arrived in Maoka on southern Sakhalin. In order for the Soviets to occupy Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands, it was necessary for them to concentrate their forces and resources in Ōtomari and Maoka. The latter was completely defenseless, and the amphibious assault on the city’s shores resulted in many civilian deaths. On August 25, the Soviet armed forces arrived in Ōtomari and successfully occupied Sakhalin. On the following day, the Fifth Area Army issued an order to all units to surrender. This ended the Sakhalin operation but that was only a part of the Soviet Union’s Hokkaido and Kurile operations. The Soviet Union’s military operations in Manchukuo, Korea, and Sakhalin advanced steadily, yet the dedision regarding the strategic plan for the attack

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on the Kurile Islands was rushed and had not been prepared in advance. On August 15, Aleksandr M. Vasilevskiĭ ordered that the Second Far Eastern Front and the Pacific fleet were to take over the Northern Kurile Islands in concert with the assault on Maoka. The Second Far Eastern Front directed the commander of the Kamchatka Defense District to occupy the four northernmost islands in the archipelago (Shumushu [Shumshu], Paramushiru, Onekotan, and Kharimkotan). The Yalta Agreement promised the handover of the Kurile Islands but it did not define the scope of what constituted these islands. At the US-Soviet meetings of military staff in Potsdam both countries agreed that the Kurile Islands, other than the four northernmost islands, constituted the scope of US military operations. The Soviet Union’s Kurile Island operations therefore needed to be executed swiftly, but the Soviet Union also needed to be watchful of the US reaction (Hasegawa 2005, 269). Early on the morning of August 18, the Soviet armed forces initiated a fierce launch on Shumushu, the northernmost island of the Kurile archipelago. The battle with the 99th Division was brief but fierce, ending in a ceasefire and the disarmament of the Japanese forces. Over 1,500 lives were lost in the battle to capture the island (Itani 2011, 31). On August 16, in a letter to US president Harry S. Truman, Stalin requested that the lands surrendered by the Japanese forces should not only include the Kurile Islands but also the northern part of Hokkaido as delineated by the route from Rumoi in the west to Kushiro in the east. The reason, Stalin explained, was that when one considered that a portion of Russian territory had been under Japanese administrative control during the Siberian Expedition, “Russian public opinion would be seriously offended” if the Soviet Union failed to occupy some part of Japan proper (FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 635–37). In addition, on August 17, Stalin directed General Kuz’ma N. Derev’yanko, the Soviet military representative to the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Manila, to forge an agreement with General Douglas MacArthur in establishing a Soviet occupation zone in Tokyo, together with its occupied territory in northern Hokkaido (Nakayama 1995, 41; Hasegawa 2005, 271–72). Even though US president Truman agreed that all of the Kurile Islands would be included in areas that were to be surrendered to the Soviet Union, on August 18 he rejected Stalin’s request regarding the Soviet occupation of the northern part of Hokkaido (FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 670). On August 22, Stalin ceased the Soviet attempt to occupy Hokkaido and also rejected Truman’s request for the construction of an airbase in the center of the Kurile Islands. In the meantime, the Soviet armed forces had been proceeding with preparations for an invasion of Hokkaido but they halted the preparations on the same day as Stalin’s decision (FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 687–88).

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On August 23, one day after the order to stop the Hokkaido occupation, the Soviet State Defense Committee (GKO) concluded its resolution “On Reception, Placement (Internment), and Use of Labor of 500,000 Japanese Prisoners of War.” This resolution, however, was contrary to Lavrentiĭ P. Beria’s directive to the Far Eastern commanders from August 16 not to send Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) to the Soviet Union, as it did not comply with the Potsdam Proclamation. The reason for this change was that there was a concern about the possible shortage of Japanese labor as a result of the Soviet Union ending their Hokkaido operation and in the wake of the movement of people from northern Hokkaido. The decision was therefore a supplementary measure to fend off that possible outcome—in other words, the order to stop the occupation of Hokkaido contributed to the forced detention of Japanese POWs (Boburenyofu 1992, 22–24; Hasegawa 2005, 273–74). Following the end of fighting on Shumushu, the landing of the Soviet armed forces on the Kurile Islands proceeded peacefully. On September 1, the Soviet armed forces arrived on Kunashiri (Kunashir) and Shikotan islands. Their occupation of the Habomai Islands occurred on September 4, after Japan signed its surrender declaration. Due to Stalin’s order to stop the Hokkaido operation, the Kuriles occupation became an important objective for the Soviet Union. The decision also led to the unintended result that allowed the Soviet Union to capture the Kurile archipelago in its entirety. Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Boburenyofu, Urajimīru Arekusandorobichi [Bobrenev, Vladimir Alexandrovich]. 1992. Shiberia yokuryū hishi: KBG no mashu ni torawarete [The Secret History of Japanese Prisoners of War in Siberia: Imprisoned by the Evil Influence of the KGB]. Tsuruoka: Shūsen Shiryōkan Shuppanbu. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1946. Gaikō shiryō, Nisso gaikō kōshō kiroku no bu [Diplomatic Documents, Records Section of Japanese-Soviet Diplomatic Negotiations]. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1952. Shūsen shiroku [Historical Records on the End of the War]. Tokyo: Shinbun Gekkansha. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 2010. Nihon gaikō bunsho, Taiheiyō sensō [Japanese Diplomatic Records, The Pacific War]. 3 vols. Tokyo: Gaimushō. Gunji Shigakkai, ed. 1998. Kimitsu sensō nisshi [The Secret War Diary of the War Guidance Section, Army General Staff]. Tokyo: Kinseisha. Hatano Sumio. 1996. Taiheiyō sensō to Ajia gaikō [The Pacific War and Japan’s Asian Policy]. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Hatano Sumio. 2004. “Hirota–Malik kaidan to senji Nisso kankei” [Hirota–Malik Talks and Wartime Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union]. Gunji shigaku, no. 116: 3–28. Hirota Kōki denki Kankōkai, ed. 1966. Hirota Kōki denki [Biography of Hirota Kōki]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Jigyō Shuppan. Itani Hiroshi. 2011. Shumushu tō: 1945 nen 8 gatsu [The Shumushu Islands: August 1945]. Kyōkai kenkyū, no. 2. Itō Takashi, ed. 1999. Takagi Sōkichi: nikki to jōhō [Takagi Sōkichi: Diary and Information]. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō. Kurihara Ken and Hatano Sumio, eds. 1986. Shūsen kōsaku no kiroku [Materials on Peace Operations]. Vols. 1 and 2. Tokyo: Kōdansha. Nakayama Takashi. 1995. “Karafuto/Chishima no bōeisen to Soren no Hokkaidō senryō keikaku” [Battles for the Defense of the Kuriles and Karafuto and the Soviet Plan for the Capture of Hokkaido]. In Dainiji sekai taisen 3 [World War II, 3], edited by Gunji Shigakkai, 32–48. Tokyo: Kinseisha. Ōki Takeshi. 1997. “Dokuso wahei modai to Nihon” [Question of Soviet-German Peace and Japan]. In Taiheiyō sensō no shūketsu [The End of the Pacific War], edited by Hosoya Chihiro et al. Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō. Pureshakofu, Konstanchin Bikutorobitchi [Pleshakov, Konstantin Viktorovich]. 1993. “Taiheiyō sensō: Staarin no ketsudan” [The Pacific War: Stalin´s Choice]. In Taiheiyō sensō [The Pacific War], edited by Hosoya Chihiro et al., 181–200. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. Sanbō Honbu [Japanese Army General Staff], ed. 1967. Sugiyama memo [Memorandum of General Sugiyama]. Vol. 2. Tokyo: Hara Shobō. Shigemitsu Mamoru Kinenkan, ed. 2010. Shigemitsu Mamoru gaikō ikensho shū [Collections of Diplomatic Opinions of Shigemitsu Mamoru]. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Gendai Shiryō Shuppan. Suravinsukii, Borisu [Slavinksiĭ, Boris (Nikoraevich)]. 1996. Kōshō Nisso chūritsu jōyaku [Examination of the USSR-Japan Neutrality Treaty and Stalin’s Diplomacy]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Tajima Nobuo 2008. “Higashi Ajia kokusai kankei no nakano Nichi-doku kankeishi” [The History of the Relationship between Japan and Germany in International Relations of East Asia]. In Nichidoku kankeishi, 1890–1945 [The History of JapanGerman Relations, 1890–1945], edited by Kudo Akira and Tajima Nobuo. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. Tōgō Shigenori. 1967. Tōgō Shigenori gaikō shuki [Memoires of Tōgō Shigenori]. Tokyo: Hara Shobō.



English Sources

FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). 1945. Vol. 6, The British Commonwealth, The Far East. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969. - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, ed. 2005. Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. 2007. The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Lensen, George Alexander. 1972. The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations during the Second World War 1941–1945. Tallahassee: The Diplomatic Press.

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Soviet-Japanese Relations during World War II: the Origins of Territorial Dispute Andrey I. Kravtsevich When viewed from the perspective of their influence on present-day bilateral relations, Soviet-Japanese relations during World War II reveals two main, closely interconnected events: first, the Soviet Union’s entry into war against Japan was in violation of the existing and valid Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, and, second, the military occupation and the eventual incorporation of the Kurile Islands by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did not enter into war with Japan without premeditation. The decision to do so followed a long period of reflection by Premier Joseph Stalin, and it was discussed and linked to the state of military affairs in both Europe and the Pacific. Final consent was ultimately given based on a number of political conditions, some of them territorial. The leaders of the so-called “Big Three” Allied powers—the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom—set these conditions at the Crimea Conference (or Yalta Conference after the location) of February 4–11, 1945, and codified them in the Yalta agreements on the Far East in accordance with which the Soviet Union commenced hostilities against Japan. During the Cold War era the Yalta agreements were variously interpreted, which today make it necessary to clarify the entire dynamics of their preparation, conclusion, and fulfillment. 1

The Beginning of the Soviet-German War and Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan

Japan had to determine its position under the new circumstances created by Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union. Earlier, on September 27, 1940, Japan had signed the Tripartite Pact, and Article 3 therein states that: Japan, Germany and Italy … agree to co-operate in their efforts … They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if one of the Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at present [the moment when the Pact was signed in September 1940] not involved in the European War or in the Japanese-Chinese conflict. The Avalon Project, “Three-Power Pact” 1940

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Article 5 of the same pact further clarifies that: “Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the above agreement affects in no way the political status existing at present between each of the three Contracting Powers and Soviet Russia” (The Avalon Project, “Three-Power Pact” 1940). The Tripartite Pact therefore did not compel Japan to fight the Soviet Union in the event of Germany’s attack on the latter. The signing of the neutrality pact between Soviet Union and Japan, designed to ensure the neutrality of both nations during World War II, was viewed cynically by the two parties. Tokyo was facing a choice between continuing southward expansion, which started back in 1940, or using the occasion to strike the USSR. After ten days of debates between political authorities and military command, the Japanese government and the Imperial Staff decided on July 2, 1941, not to become involved in the Soviet-German war immediately but to continue with its southward expansion. The formal argument for such a decision was that Germany did not coordinate its plans to wage a war on the Soviet Union. The Japanese authorities were very disappointed with Germany’s attitude toward its ally. Adolf Hitler did not warn Japan about the intention to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol River in 1939, did not divulge the decision to attack the Soviet Union during the visit of Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka Yōsuke to Berlin in spring 1941, and did not notify Tokyo in a timely fashion about breaching the non-aggression pact and waging a war on the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Germany’s Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop definitely indicated at his meeting with Matsuoka in Berlin on March 29, 1941, that the German Reich was interested in the non-involvement of its ally, Japan, in a possible war on the Soviet Union because Germany wanted to defeat the Soviet Union unaided and to use its territory independently. Japan was expected to assist by attacking Singapore, the main British military base in Southeast Asia (Koshkin 2010a, 222). Neither the Trilateral Pact nor the Anti-Comintern Pact contained any mention of Japan’s obligations to attack the Soviet Union at the request of Germany or Italy. Purely military factors also played a significant role in Japan’s decision. Previous military conflicts with the Red Army in 1938–1939 demonstrated that the northward offensive was fraught with great risk while the easy occupation of French Indochina gave grounds to believe that the southward offensive, particularly into the Dutch East Indies with its oil reserves, would be much simpler and less expensive. In addition, Japan expected that its southward advancement, particularly into French Indochina, would cut off the military assistance to the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China) from the United States and the United Kingdom via Vietnam and Burma.

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Ultimately, however, the main reason was economic. Engagement in a war against the Soviet Union within the context of the specific military and political conditions of mid-1941 would not help resolve Japan’s pressing domestic problems, notwithstanding the outcome of the hostilities. Japan needed raw materials and energy resources to fuel its further southward expansion, but the Soviet Far East could not offer these at this time and in any case existing resources were already being used by Japan through its concessions in northern Sakhalin. Moreover, the decision did not imply a final refusal regarding an attack the Soviet Union. The stance on the “northern problem” (the Soviet Union) was formulated in a descriptive manner by the Minister of Defense, later Prime Minister, Tōjō Hideki: “The attack should be conducted when the Soviet Union would be ready to drop to the ground like a ripe persimmon” (GA RF f. 7876, op.1, d.482, l.968.). This meant that Japan had placed its stance on the Soviet-German war on hold at least temporarily, reserving the right to alter it and to attack the Soviet Union in the event of a military defeat of Soviet troops by the Germans. That condition was never realized, however. Already in July 1941, when Hitler demanded that Japan join the war, Tokyo was still waiting. This was despite direct threats that unless Japan renounced the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union before the end of July, “Germany would feel free to act and after defeating the Soviet Union would … use the entire acquired influence and might in its own interests” (Goldberg 1959, 165). This implies that Japan could not count on acquiring the lands in Siberia and the Far East without getting involved in the war. The change in the overall military-political situation in late 1941, in connection with the large-scale war with the United States, practically removed the question of war against the Soviet Union from the agenda. Furthermore, following a series of defeats in the Pacific, Japan had to shift from offensive operations to strategic defense in spring 1943. That is why in the autumn that year Japan confirmed its adherence to the neutrality pact. It also agreed to keep the promise given in April 1941, when the agreement was signed, to liquidate its oil, coal, and timber concessions in northern Sakhalin and to review the terms of the bilateral fisheries convention with due account of the demands made by the Soviet Union. As Japan shifted to strategic defense in spring 1943, it would have been logical to raise the following question about whether Japan’s aggression against the Soviet Union was at all possible in 1941–1942. All Soviet and many Russian historians usually answer this affirmatively, indicating that the Japanese Kwantung Army stationed on the Soviet Far Eastern borders was a constant threat. This argument is usually substantiated by citing the Kantokuen (Kantōgun Tokubetsu Enshu, or “Kwantang Army Special Exercises”) operation

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plan of September 1941, which was created for the invasion and occupation of the Soviet Union’s Far East. There was, however, nothing exceptional about the existence of such a plan. Military staff from all countries would have had such plans in place in the event of hostilities with neighbors, and therefore the very existence of the Kwantang Army plan does not mean that it would have been implemented. The Soviet army, too, would have had similar operative plans for hostilities with Japanese and Manchurian opponents. The military historian Viktor P. Safronov singles out a number of important conditions for the possibility of Japan’s attack on the Soviet Union, without which the fulfillment of the war plan looked doubtful at best. He asserts that Japanese aggression was possible in the event of a sharp decline in the number of Soviet troops stationed in the Far East and also in the event that it began in the period from August 15 to September 10, 1941, because: 1) until the middle of August the Kwantung Army was much smaller than the Soviet force and was unable to achieve parity or the preponderance required for an offensive, and 2) a war started in a later period would be pointless due to weather conditions (Safronov 1992, 283–84). The historian Kirill E. Cherevko believes that once the decision was made on July 2, 1941, in favor of southward expansion the possibility “to begin and successfully conduct hostilities against the Soviet Union during the year 1941 and in winter of 1942 was practically non-existent from the point of view of available resources, oil, in the first instance.” The Minister of Commerce and Industry Kobayashi Ichizō clearly indicated in late June 1941 that “the empire did not have resources and materials … to sustain a war on land and at the sea” (Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 120). The Kwantung Army received Order No. 506 (July 11, 1941), which required the raising of troop preparedness for hostilities against the Soviet Union under the “special exercises” plan (the aforementioned Kantokuen). Secret mobilization was accomplished in two stages by early August 1941 in accordance with it. The size of the Kwantung Army more than doubled by the middle of the year, from 300,000–350,000 troops to 850,000 (including troops stationed in Korea), which was comparable with the number of opposing Soviet troops (700,000). Yet the quality of that army left much to be desired: only 300,000 troops were trained regular servicemen. According to staff estimates, it would have taken approximately two months to complete preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. It would be autumn or winter by then, which the Japanese military thought to be an unacceptable time to commence hostilities—in other words, there were insufficient forces and means to implement the prior operative plans of occupation of Eastern Siberia and the Far East.

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On August 4, 1941, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters decided it would stick to the neutrality pact if the Soviet Union did the same and did not allow a third country to use its territory for actions targeting Japan. This decision was reached after considering the slowed pace of the offensive by the German troops and the pessimistic forecast by the intelligence department of the General Staff for the Soviet-German front—namely, that Germany would be unable to defeat the Soviet Union before the end of 1941 and that such an outcome of the war in 1942 was also quite unlikely. With this in mind, it was decided at a joint meeting of the Japanese cabinet and the Imperial General Headquarters to postpone the Kantokuen until the spring of the following year. 2

The Changing Attitudes to the Neutrality Pact by Japan and the Soviet Union

Following the outbreak of war with the United States in December 1941, Japan naturally concentrated its energies on that front and the decision to avoid military engagement with the Soviet Union was made in spring 1942 to prevent fighting on two fronts. Moreover, the Japanese administration realized that in the event that Japan launched military operations against the USSR Moscow would immediately permit shuttle flights of US aircraft via the Soviet Far East that were engaged in the large-scale bombings of Japan’s major cities. Bombings were Japan’s worst fear, and as a result it ignored Hitler’s and Ribbentrop’s insistently harsh demands that it enter the war and support the German offensive in Stalingrad. The Ground Forces General Staff began to develop a new plan of attack on the Soviet Union, “Operation 51,” but it was doomed to remain another war-game plan. Plans for war against the Soviet Union were shelved in June 1942 after the catastrophic defeat suffered by the Japanese fleet at the Battle of Midway (4–7 June). Given these circumstances, and except for a brief period in the summerautumn of 1941, the probability of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union was highly problematic in 1941–1942 due to material restrictions and military strategic factors. The probability of war was reduced to very low or even zero in the consequent years. Soviet authorities, who did not know the details of Japan’s military planning and could not possibly possess such knowledge, perceived the threat of Japan’s attack to be real. They maintained a substantial number of forces in the Far East even in the spring of 1945, fearing that Japan could potentially mount an attack if it learned of the Soviet decision to wage war. It is

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for this reason that Stalin insisted that the Yalta agreements regarding the Far East become classified documents. The other side of this drastic change in the Japanese position in the Pacific War was the shifting attitude of both countries toward the neutrality pact. As they concluded this treaty, both parties pursued their own national interests and from the outset intended to comply with it only as long as it was advantageous and served their own goals. The Soviet Union was objectively more interested in the neutrality pact at the initial stage, from 1941 to spring 1943, and Japan was ready, at least in principle, to breach it if deemed necessary to do so. Later Japan was more interested in adhering to the agreement, which it did until the end of war. As soon as war broke out in the Pacific, the Soviet Union decided to break the neutrality pact and join the fight against Japan as soon as it was prepared—this occurred in August 1945. 3

The Problem of Terminating the Neutrality Pact

Although the process of the negotiations, the signing, and the denunciation of the neutrality pact has been thoroughly scrutinized by Russian, Japanese, and other historians, the termination of the pact deserves further attention. Vyacheslav M. Molotov told Ambassador Satō Naotake on April 5, 1945, about the Soviet government’s wish to renounce the neutrality pact, which, because of the new international situation, “had lost its meaning” and could not be extended. The ambassador broached the subject of the Soviet government’s stance during the year left until the expiration of the pact. Molotov said initially that “Soviet-Japanese relations would actually return to the position that existed before the pact was signed.” Yet Satō pointed out that such an interpretation meant the termination of the pact, which was at variance with the terms of denunciation, “prescribing that it should remain in effect for one year.” Molotov then confirmed the Pact’s validity, “upon the expiry of the fiveyear period of the treaty, Soviet-Japanese relations will obviously return to the situation that existed before the Pact was signed” (Slavinskiĭ 1995, 266). This raises two important questions. First, at a time when the decision to join the war against Japan had already been made and that it was clear that Japan could not attack the Soviet Far East, Stalin and Molotov used the Soviet government statement not for annulment (revocation), rather for the denunciation of the neutrality pact. As a result, this placed the Soviet Union in formal breach of international law after declaring war on Japan. They could have declared an early annulment of the Pact, which was and still is acceptable under international law, and in the future would have prevented subsequent

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criticism of Moscow for the violation of an international treaty. Whether this was an error on the part of Molotov or the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs staff is no longer significant. What is important is the fact that due to this error the USSR, in a formal legal sense, was infringing upon international law. Moreover, if the Soviet Union annulled the pact it could participate in the formulation of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, thereby including provisions securing its interests in the terms for unconditional surrender. It is quite probable that in such a case Japan would have immediately accepted the Potsdam terms of surrender. And thus there would have been no SovietJapanese war. It should be remembered, however, that in order to join the drafting of the Potsdam Declaration the Soviet Union would have first had to declare war on Japan, which, as noted above, was inexpedient without being duly prepared. By choosing to denounce the neutrality pact, the Soviet Union sent a clear message to Tokyo—in essence, it was a warning of the impending war. Only politically shortsighted leaders would have failed to understand or ignore this. Several Soviet and Russian Japanologists have opined that the aggression unleashed by Japan against the United States and the United Kingdom made it a subject rather than an object of hostilities. That it neglected to fill the terms of Article 2 of the neutrality pact for that reason is similarly noteworthy. Sergeĭ L. Tikhvinskiĭ, for instance, maintained that “since December 1941 the pact no longer imposed any obligations on the Soviet Union and was a mere sheet of paper because of Japan’s treacherous attack on the United States and the United Kingdom, by then allies of our country in the anti-Hitler coalition on December 7, 1941” (Tikhvinskiĭ 1996, 26). What remains therefore is the question of why the Soviet Union strictly complied with the terms of that “sheet of paper” for more than three years and denied assistance to the Allied powers strictly under its obligations of the neutrality pact. The future of the Soviet Union was determined on the battlefield with Nazi Germany, and any complications on the Far Eastern borders would have significantly weakened its ability to resist the Nazi aggressor. In effect, the neutrality pact was a sort of “insurance,” although not one that was 100 percent reliable. The second question is whether the Soviet Union had any legal grounds within the framework of international law to declare war on Japan in an obvious breach of the neutrality pact. In examining this question, I have intentionally not included a discussion of the problem of violations of the pact by the Japanese side. It is today generally acknowledged that both sides breached the pact, and each was well aware of those violations throughout the war years. Nevertheless, these transgressions did not result in termination of the pact,

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which implied that each side did not see those violations as serious enough to discard it. The historians Cherevko and Konstantin B. Strel’bitskiĭ offer examples of such cases that demonstrate that most “violations” were not violations, rather the consequences of actions by third countries (Cherevko 2003, 57–68; Strel’bitskiĭ 1996, 88–89). In connection with these “mutual violations” it should be noted that the international juridical evaluation handed down by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, April 25, 1946–November 12, 1948) regarding the obstacles set by the Japanese against Soviet shipping in the Far East as an indirect preparation for a war against the USSR, and consequently in violation of the neutrality pact, was not objective. It was one-sided and prejudiced. In many cases it had no ties with Japan. And since obstacles to shipping would have been implemented by both sides responsibility would also have been mutual. That is why real or alleged violations of the neutrality pact by Japan could not be grounds for declaring war on that country. It seems, in contrast to the Allies and despite the extremely cynical attitude of Soviet authorities to the neutrality pact, that Stalin and Molotov understood that in declaring war on Japan they breached international law. For that reason, they asked the US president Harry S. Truman to provide a “cover” for the Soviet Union with a formal request from its allies to join the hostilities. Molotov related to Truman in Potsdam: A request from the Allies would create a convenient opportunity for the Soviet Union to join the war against Japan. It could be said that, considering Japan’s rejection of the demand to capitulate, the United States and England, who want the war to end sooner and thereby to reduce the level of bloodshed, ask the Soviet Union to join the war on Japan. AVP RF f. 06, op. 4, pap. 2, d. 31, l. 96

The US president declined to make that request but in a letter dated July 31, 1945, to Stalin he offered to use Clause 5 of the Moscow Declaration of the Four Powers, signed by the “Four Nations or Powers” (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China), and Articles 106 and 103 of the UN Charter. And it was far from being a formal excuse (Vsemirnaya istoriya [1945], no. 358). Clause 5 of the declaration pledged that: … for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security they will consult with one another and as

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occasion requires with other members of the United Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations. Moscow Conference, October 1943

Articles 106 and 103 of the UN Charter prescribed that: Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the FourNation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. UN Charter, Article 106, Chapter XVII

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. UN Charter, Article 103, Chapter XVII

The UN Charter was adopted and signed on June 26, 1945, at a special conference in San Francisco. It entered into force only on October 24. Truman was naturally aware of the charter but did not see it as an impediment: “Though the Charter has not been formally ratified, at San Francisco it was agreed to by the Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet Government will be one of the permanent members of the Security Council” (FRUS 1945, “The Conference of Berlin,” no. 1282). In order to understand the thinking behind Truman’s proposal, one should remember that Articles 103 and 106 belong to Chapter ХVII—“Transitional Security Arrangements”—of the UN Charter. It implies a “transitional” period from the signing of the Charter until its ratification by member states and the formal entry of the charter into force. In other words, Chapter XVII defined the procedure for political and military decisions to be made by Allied powers in this transitional period. As the Soviet Union joined the war against Japan with the consent of the Allies, that particular move by the Soviet Union had sufficient legal grounds.

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There is another very significant factor at play that deserves mention. Article 107 of Chapter ХVII justifies the Soviet violation of the neutrality pact even further, “Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action” (UN Charter, Article 107, Chapter XVII). As this Article is also part of the chapter about security arrangements during the transitional period it provided a legal excuse for the violation of the neutrality pact. It should be added that had the Soviet Supreme Council Presidium ratified the UN Charter before the war was declared on Japan, rather than on August 20, then the legal position of the Soviet Union would have been much more solid. Molotov could thus have legally referred to it as a reason for breaching the terms of the neutrality pact. The Japanese stance on the matter is quite understandable. In joining the United Nations in 1956, it had to accept all obligations and provisions of the UN Charter. Japan allegedly maintained a somewhat more strictly legal interpretation—in other words, when the Charter did not take effect before the declaration of war by the Soviet Union, it should have been seen as a violation of international law. Yet the legal foundation set out in Chapter ХVII of the Charter was intentionally hushed up. It is surprising that many American experts and scholars, in contrast to US presidential opinion, had been accusing the Soviet Union of a breach of the neutrality pact since the onset of the Cold War. Moreover, they ignored the fact that it was the US and British political and military authorities who insisted on the fulfillment of the Soviet’s obligations to the Allies and its engagement in the war on Japan as the earliest opportunity. 4

The Attitude of the Allies toward the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact

The US president Franklin D. Roosevelt raised the question of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the war on Japan to Soviet ambassador Maxim M. Litvinov on December 8, 1941, the day following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. On the same day, the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull repeated the question and asked for transit basing of US bombers in the Russian Far East because US heavy bombers were unable to fly from airbases in the Philippines to Japan and back without refueling. Molotov conveyed Stalin’s decline of this request, referring to the neutrality pact and the need to concentrate his forces on the German front. Without exception all scholars—be they Russian,

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American, British, or Japanese—believe this was a formal excuse although in actual fact the underlying motivation was the logical, strategic task of avoiding war on two fronts. Ultimately, the United States had to accept Moscow’s position. While the Soviet Union was an ally in Europe, it was neutral in Asia (Hull 1946, 1111–12). The United States at that time was certain that Japan would attack the Soviet Union, which meant that the latter would have to fight the Japanese. Already in April 1942 US president Roosevelt ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to work out the possible scenarios of joint operations with the Soviet Union in the event of a Japanese attack on Russia. Stalin, too, was of the same mind, and he expressed his opinion to the chairman of China’s National Military Council, Chiang Kai-shek, that Soviet Russia would battle with Japan because the latter would most definitely violate the neutrality pact (Feis 1953, 8). Until that happened Stalin was doing everything in his power not to provoke a Japanese attack and not be forced to wage war on two fronts. This explains why the Soviet Union was unable to grant the US president’s request to set forth its official position in a public announcement (Sovetsko-Americanskiye 1984, 145). Once Germany had attacked the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941), the United States and the United Kingdom almost immediately made public their support of the Soviet Union in its war on Hitler. This explains why the Americans expected the Soviet Union to reciprocate by declaring war on Japan. Moscow could not afford a war on two fronts and therefore could not directly demonstrate where its loyalties lay. The Soviet administration waited until December 11, 1941, when Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, to make America its de facto ally in Europe. The following day it strongly voiced its negative attitude to Japanese policy: “The Japanese aggressor has plunged into a highly risky venture, which will bring nothing but its defeat” (Pravda, December 12, 1941). The US government was nonetheless persistent in its attempts to persuade the Soviet Union to join the Pacific War. In mid-December, seeking to involve the Soviet Union in planning joint operations against Japan at a multilateral level, Roosevelt put forward the idea of a conference between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China. In late September, he proposed a plan of setting up a supreme military council of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and China (Safronov 2007, 273–75). The United States attempted to use the visit of the British minister of foreign affairs Anthony Eden to Moscow in the second half of December 1941 to the same end. Stalin rejected the British official’s request that the Soviet Union participate in the war on Japan, but the Soviet leader softened his refusal by saying that the Soviet Union would be able to assist its allies in the Far East,

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but only in the spring of 1942 (FRUS 1941, vol. 4, 1029). Although this was not a promise, it nonetheless indicated that the Soviet Union agreed in principle and if the opportunity arose (or when possible) could fight Japan. Stalin noted that the best way to create such an opportunity was to induce Japan to violate the neutrality pact (Rzheshevskiĭ 1994, 105, 118), and this demonstrates that he was unwilling to breach international law. By April 1942, Roosevelt decided to refocus the country’s main efforts from the Far East to the European theater of operations, and the attempts to engage the Soviet Union in the war on Japan were delayed, albeit temporarily. The Soviet Union encountered a critical situation in its southern regions in the summer of 1942 with the German troops mounting an offensive and rapidly moving toward the Volga and the Caucasus. Stalin agreed to receive the delivery of US bombers from Alaska to the Western Front via Siberia. At the same time, the Soviet Union had to keep 1.6 million troops in the Far East and Siberia to counter the million-strong Japanese forces. It was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to deter the Germans and to defeat them in Stalingrad without calling in fresh reserves from the Far East. It was only in the winter and autumn of 1942, when the probability of a Japanese attack was scaled back due to weather conditions and following Japan’s serious loss in the Battle of Midway (June 4–7, 1942), that the Soviet command dared to move troops from the Far East. In doing so, they determined the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943). Having acquired information from intercepted and deciphered Japanese diplomatic mail, Roosevelt informed Stalin on August 5, 1942, that Japan had decided not to attack the Soviet Union. Perhaps, this was why Stalin directly conveyed to Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the US presidential representative W. Averell Harriman during a visit to Moscow in mid-August that the Soviet Union intended to join the war against Japan as soon as circumstances permitted him to do so (Deane 1947, 226). At the same time, Stalin turned down Harriman’s request for the use of Far Eastern bases by US air forces. The persistent attempts to have the Soviet Union participate in the war on Japan, which would have been unavoidable had the Soviet Union yielded to US pressure and allowed the Americans to use airfields in the Soviet Far East, continued during the autumn and winter of 1942. But on January 13, 1943, Stalin revoked his permission for the US representative for the Alaska-Siberia air bridge, Major General Follett Bradley, to have observation access of Far Eastern airfields. The United States drastically changed its strategy toward the Soviet Union, which Roosevelt clarified at a meeting with Churchill in Casablanca in January 1943: “It would be desirable … to achieve a certain pledge of Russia … to join the fight against Japan as soon as Germany is removed from the war”

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(Safronov 1992, 284). Within this context, “certain” implied a written obligation because the verbal promise that Stalin had already given to Roosevelt’s personal representative in Moscow, Brigadier General Patrick J. Hurley, in midNovember 1942 was seen as inadequate. Only at the end of 1943, first in Moscow and later at the Tehran Conference of the “Big Three” (November 28–December 1, 1943), Stalin officially promised to join the war against Japan after Hitler’s defeat. There appears to be two reasons why it took him so long to do this. First, Japan’s defeat in the naval battles of 1942–1943 signified that Tokyo would lose that war with or without the involvement of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Stalin suspected that the United States, the United Kingdom, and China, who had discussed the war on Japan at the Cairo Conference on November 22–26, 1943, concluded a secret deal on the postwar settlement in the Far East. This would not have included the Soviet Union, and it would have made the fulfillment of its strategic interests in that region impossible. Stalin’s suspicions were ultimately well founded. Following the war, it became known that Chiang Kai-shek had agreed to the postwar deployment of US military bases in China at the Cairo Conference and even promised the lease of Port Arthur to Roosevelt (Bogaturov 1998, ch. 8). This explains why that by promising that the Soviet Union would join the war on Japan, Stalin ensured the participation of Moscow in any peace process following the end of the Pacific War. The statement he made to Roosevelt and Hull was categorical: “Russia will participate in the war and the peace process in Asia whether it is invited to do so or not” (May 1955, 165). Second, Stalin believed that the promise to join the war on Japan might contribute to the opening of a second front in Europe by the Allies. Clearly the Soviet Union was expected to fight the Japanese Kwantung Army. This meant that the Allies did not have to mobilize their forces for a potential invasion of China and therefore the possibility to use that potential on the European theater of operations broadened. These two reasons presumably prompted Stalin’s decision not to demand any compensation for the Soviet engagement in the war at this stage. Even though Stalin promised to join the war on Japan, he declined Roosevelt’s request for rendering direct or indirect assistance to the Allies in planning naval and airborne operations in the northwestern areas of the Pacific Ocean (Vsemirnaya istoriya, Perepiska Predsedatelya 1943, nos. 144 and 145). Later, he agreed to supply the Allies with intelligence information, and Molotov gave only verbal consent (Sovetsko-Americanskiye 1984, 471–72). It should be emphasized that the knowledge that the Soviet Union’s participation in the war on Japan was an irrevocable contravention of the neutrality pact and breached international law did not stop the United States and the United Kingdom from trying to persuade the Soviet Union into taking that

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step. Yet the Allied leadership and its diplomats never discussed this matter with their Soviet counterparts or between themselves, or even acknowledged its existence. This author found nothing to indicate otherwise in documents of the period, and the historian of the war in Far East, Ernest R. May, draws the same conclusion. During the war US interests were in effect shaped by military considerations. Whenever Roosevelt offered the hand of cooperation in the Far East, it was never with the altruistic intent of good Russian-US relations: At Yalta he signed a political agreement with Stalin in order, primarily, to fit Russian operations into American plans … His proposals were intended to hasten the defeat of America’s enemies and save American lives … Neither he nor his subordinates seemed unduly influenced by the past professions of the American government. No official … is known to have spoken of the sanctity of Soviet neutrality, as so many Americans had spoken of the sanctity of their own neutrality. Had an official in Washington been questioned about the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, he might well have dismissed it as a “scrap of paper.” American actions were thoroughly self-interested. Roosevelt, Truman and their advisers always sought to discover and do what was wisest and best for the United States. (May 1955, 174) Nevertheless, the reproach of a “treacherous violation of the neutrality pact” has become a clichéd interpretation in almost all Western studies on the subject of Soviet-Japanese relations published since the Cold War (e.g., Brown 2016; Nimmo 1994; Williams 2007). They seem to ignore the fact that the Tokyo Tribunal, which put Japanese war criminals on trial—its prosecutors and judges were in fact chosen and appointed by US Occupation authorities—formally accepted the Soviet arguments regarding Japan’s breach of the neutrality pact as sufficient legal grounds to justify the Soviet Union’s involvement in the war on Japan. Stalin reconfirmed the Soviet promise to enter the war on Japan after Hitler’s defeat at a meeting in Moscow in October 1944 with Churchill and attended by Eden, Harriman, and the head of the US military mission in Moscow, John R. Deane, Jr. He also promised to deploy US airbases in Primor’e (Maritime Province) and to open Far Eastern seaports for Allied warships, which were tasked to support those airbases. Stalin, however, refused to put any of this in writing under the pretext of secrecy. This was obviously an excuse because at the same meeting Stalin presented the Allies with copies of the list of landlease supplies needed to prepare for war against Japan. Stalin had not made a

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final decision on the “political dimensions of the Soviet participation,” which stipulated the terms of this participation, or he believed it was premature to present these dimensions to the Allies. Stalin offered a general idea of these “political dimensions” at a meeting with Harriman on December 15, 1944. The Kuriles and southern Sakhalin must be returned to Russia, the lease of Port Arthur, Dalian (J: Dairen) and the Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER) must be resumed, and the status quo of Outer Mongolia must be recognized (FRUS 1945, vol. 6; Yalta Agreement, 378–79). Several weeks before the “Big Three” conference in Crimea, Stalin presented Harriman with a list of what the Soviet Union wished to receive in compensation for its participation in the war on Japan, with an additional demand of the lease of the South Manchurian Railroad (SMR). Stalin vowed to sign a treaty of friendship and alliance with Chiang Kai-shek in order to facilitate the Allied acceptance of the Soviet terms. Given the colossal interest on the part of the Allies for the Soviet Union’s expedient participation, Stalin had a practically free hand in setting the terms, and according to Harriman, this explains why Roosevelt was amazed at the modesty of Soviet leader’s demands (Rose 1953, 25). In fact, Stalin insisted that the Soviet Union regain the lease rights and territories possessed and controlled by imperial Russia, the sole exception being the Kuriles. Roosevelt was prepared for the latter, however, since long before he received the list of Soviet demands the US president had included the Kuriles in a list of “trophies” that the Allies were ready to pay for Soviet participation in the war on Japan. Roosevelt accepted all of Stalin’s requests with just minor modifications: Dairen must be internationalized, and both rail lines must be operated together with the Chinese government. In doing so, Roosevelt successfully resolved his major political tasks in the postwar period—that is, to limit Soviet territorial gains and the degree of Soviet involvement in China’s domestic policy, to restore China’s sovereignty over Manchuria, and to obtain the Soviet promise to support the Kuomintang regime as the only government of China. Concessions made by both sides delivered a compromise solution at a meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin on February 8, 1945. A secret protocol was signed on February 11, 1945, to declare the Allied agreement on the Far East, which in essence met Soviet demands: The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

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1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People’s Republic, MPR) shall be preserved. 2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.: (a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union; (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored; (c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria; 3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin. The heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated. For its part, the Soviet Union expresses it readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke. (Yalta Agreement) During the signing of the Yalta Agreement regarding the Far East why did the United States and the United Kingdom, both leaders in the democratic camp, not care that: 1) their insistence on Soviet engagement in the war directly breached the neutrality pact with Japan, what constituted an inadmissible move from the standpoint of international law, and 2) their agreement about the Soviet Union’s annexation of the Kuriles in fact violated the principle of “no aggrandizement, territorial, or other” as enshrined in the Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941), and the Cairo Declaration (November 27, 1943). Why did Roosevelt and Churchill agree to Stalin’s “political terms,” which violated the norms and principles of international law?

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Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s Decision to Push Stalin to Violate the Norms of International Law

There are various interpretations about why Roosevelt granted Stalin’s demand for the Kuriles: his fatigue and wish to terminate the tedious debates quickly, his aspiration for Soviet assistance that could save the lives of US soldiers, his intention to develop cooperation with the Soviet Union even after the war, a tactical concession preempting additional terms that could do harm to China, and so forth. Clearly all of these factors played a certain role, barring fatigue, which Roosevelt’s biographer James M. Burns dismisses outright (Burns 1970). But there are also simpler explanations such as the compelling conclusion by the historian Russell D. Buhite. He believes that the president could hardly confront the Soviet request for those territories because in February 1945 no one was eager to preserve the Japanese territories as they were (Buhite 1986, 101). The answer is, however, most likely linked to military-political circumstances. It should be remembered that no one expected in 1944, and even at the beginning of 1945, that the war against Japan could end so soon. Deputy Foreign Minister Solomon A. Lozovskiĭ recommended in his classified memorandum to Stalin on January 15, 1945, that the settlement of relations with Japan be delayed for twelve to eighteen months, with a more definitive stance to be taken only at the end of 1945 (AP RF f. 03, op. 66, d. 1067). The Allies held a similar stance regarding the Pacific War. At the time of the third Washington Conference (May 12–25, 1943), the United States and the United Kingdom assumed that the war on Japan would end in 1948. At a similar bilateral conference held in Quebec in September 1944, they were working on the notion that the conflict would end at least eighteen months following the defeat of Germany, and even at a conference of US and UK chiefs of staff in late January–early February 1945 it was predicted that eighteen months of war would continue after Hitler’s fall. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius recalled in his memoirs that military advisors informed Roosevelt during the Yalta Conference that Japan would capitulate no earlier than 1947, and some believed it would be even later. It was common belief that the United States would have sacrificed the lives of a million US soldiers if it had to defeat Japan without Russia (Stettinius 1949, 211). The US military, in preparing for military operations in territories of Japan proper, was aware of the powerful presence of Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea. Military intelligence assessed their size at approximately two million fully equipped, well-trained soldiers. This explains why the worst-case scenario would be the relocation of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese army stationed in Korea to the Japanese archipelago, which would augment the size

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of Japanese military contingents opposing the Allies from four to five million to six to seven million. Of course, that would require a sizable increase in the number of landing troops and would ultimately result in much greater casualties. US military experts therefore maintained that the Soviet participation in the war against Japan was crucial to prevent the move of Japanese troops from China and Korea to Japan proper. Soviet troops were at least meant to keep Japanese troops on the continent or at best defeat them (Stimson 1947, 618–19). The military did not change their opinion, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the president before his departure for Crimea that they wanted Russia to join the war as soon as possible, as soon as it is able to launch an offensive. They also noted that they were ready to provide broad support as long as it did not affect their principal operations against Japan (Stimson 1947, 503). Roosevelt went further and admitted frankly to Stalin in Yalta on February 8, 1945, that he wished to evade landing operations against Japan unless absolutely necessary so as to prevent heavy casualties. The diplomatic language implied that Soviet troops were expected to conduct main ground operations. President Truman, who doubted the expediency of the Soviet engagement in the war for geopolitical reasons, admitted to his wife in a letter from Potsdam that the Soviet Union’s entry into war with Japan would not only save lives of US soldiers but would also help end the war one year earlier than anticipated (Alperovitz 1955, 142–43; Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 225). By the time of the Yalta Conference of the “Big Three” in early February, 1945, Stalin held the majority of the trump cards since it was clear that the Soviet Union would play a dominant role in Eastern Europe as well as a major independent role in the policy of Germany’s occupation. In effect, the timing of the war’s end in the Far East was also in his hands. The historian Athan Theoharis succinctly observed that Roosevelt’s diplomacy in Yalta reflected not so much an overconfidence in the ability to pacify Stalin by means of personal diplomacy as an understanding of the weakness of the US diplomatic position, or even legitimacy of the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the Far East, and Germany (Theoharis 1972, 220). Ernest R. May notes that the Allied wish for early Soviet involvement placed Stalin in a remarkably advantageous position at the Yalta negotiations. That position was so strong that Stalin’s “demands seem astonishingly mild. He could have asked to be guaranteed a share in the occupation of Japan or, perhaps, the division of Japan into occupation zones. Reasonably, too, he might have pressed a Russian claim to take part with the United States in any plan for restoring internal unity and public order in China” (May 1955, 169). The view by historian Lisle A. Rose is analogous: Stalin could have delivered a series of ultimatums in regard to Eastern Europe at the conference, could have refused to discuss plans of participation in the war on

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Japan, could have denied any discussion on the issue of reparations, or could have claimed anything as a trophy. One look at the map and the positions held by the Red Army in February 1945 would have been sufficient (Slavinskiĭ 1996, 99). Although it may appear to be something of an exaggeration, Rose’s view is actually close to the real state affairs at that moment. Moreover, Andreĭ A. Gromyko’s hint at possible moves of the Soviet Union in the event that the Allies turned down the Soviet demands was not accidental: “What could the Soviet Union do at a time when Nazi Germany had already been defeated, what boundaries could the mighty wave of Soviet troops reach if the Soviet Union were not loyal to its Allied commitments?” (Gromyko 1984, 541). And this is the reason why Roosevelt sent a personal message to Stalin, consenting to Soviet demands on the morning of the day after the conference opened and before the discussion of the Soviet Union’s participation in the war on Japan. That message would serve to create an amicable atmosphere at the discussion. On the one hand, neither Roosevelt nor Churchill foresaw any problem with the cession of the Kuriles to the Soviet Union, even though it was at odds with the aforementioned principle of “no aggrandizement, territorial, or other.” On the other hand, and as discussed below, demands regarding China presented a much greater problem to the United States. The Western Allies were also totally unconcerned about the inevitable violation of formalized norms of international law—that is, the terms of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact if the Soviet Union kept its promise to join the war on Japan two or three months after Hitler’s defeat. It should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union’s affiliation with the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration was providently stipulated with the proviso that “the practical implementation of the Charter’s principles would be inescapably conformed to the circumstances, needs, and historical features of one country or another” (Atlantic Charter). This means that the Soviet Union did not fully recognize the principles of both the charter and the declaration in full, and therefore was obliged to meet their provision only to the degree specified by this proviso. With the principal aim of this present publication being the examination of the historical dynamics of modern Russian-Japanese relations, it would seem natural here to raise questions about the Soviet territorial gains that were acquired with authorization of the Allies as a result of the Yalta Agreement. The discussion is generally focused on the Kuriles while the return of southern Sakhalin is somewhat left out of the equation since it apparently falls under the category of Japanese territories “taken by violence and greed,” which, according to the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, “Japan should be … stripped off” (The Cairo Declaration 1943; Potsdam Declaration 1945). In fact, in keeping

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with the international legal norms at the beginning of the 20th century, the war did not abolish prior agreements—with the exception of commerce and navigation treaties—but simply suspended them during the period of hostilities. Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura Jutarō, the Japanese representative at the Portsmouth Peace Conference (August 6–30, 1905), remarked that the war terminated all treaties and agreements. This was strongly criticized by the Russian plenipotentiary representative Minister of Finance Sergeĭ Yu. Witte and the Russian legal counselor Friedrich F. Martens, who insisted on the validity of the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg (Glushkov and Cherevko, 520, 543–44). From a strictly jurisprudential standpoint the abolishment of that treaty created a legal hurdle in Russian-Japanese relations: the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda was repealed by the 1895 Treaty of Commerce, which reinstated bilateral relations to the 1855 position and based on whether Russia would regain the Central and Northern Kuriles. 6

The Problem of the Cession and Annexation of the Kurile Islands

The most pressing issue in Russian-Japanese relations was the problem of the annexation of the Kuriles by the USSR or, to be more exact, the consent by Roosevelt and Churchill to such a cession. A number of eminent historians in the West, who have examined this issue, agree that Roosevelt’s decision primarily derived from a poor understanding regarding the history of the original issue—namely, that the US president mistakenly believed that Japan took the Kuriles after the Russian-Japanese War of 1904–1905 (Gaddis 1972, 79; Hayes 1972, 6; Rees 1985, 61; Stephan 1974, 155, 216). That interpretation was presented in the memoirs of Roosevelt’s interpreter, Charles E. Bohlen, and Under Secretary of State Benjamin S. Welles. The latter claimed that Roosevelt told him in September 1943 that “the Russians should definitely re-acquire the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin lost under the Portsmouth Treaty” (Welles 1946, 299). Bohlen was also of the same opinion (Bohlen 1973, 197–98). This does not prove that Roosevelt was mistaken, especially as there are serious doubts about the credibility of the evidence (Gallicchio 1991, 73–74). If this were actually the case, the Kuriles should have fallen under Clause 2 of the Yalta Agreement and along with southern Sakhalin should have been returned to the Soviet Union: “The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored.” Yet the Kuriles are mentioned in the special Article 3: “The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union” (Yalta Conference). There are no grounds to believe that Roosevelt was so ignorant about history. A research team from the Japanese broadcasting corporation NHK discovered

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that long before the Yalta Conference the US president selected the Kuriles as a “trophy” to reward the Soviet Union for its entry into the war. At a secret meeting on October 5, 1943, attended by specialists from the Department of State and devoted to formulating a strategy for the upcoming conference of Allied foreign ministers in Moscow, Roosevelt proposed, to everyone’s surprise, the cession of the Kuriles to Russia as a reward for its participation in the war (Hasegawa 1998, 44; NHK 1995, 6). What is more, this was done following the territorial subcommittee of the Post-War Advisory Committee (PWAC) presented a report in May that disagreed with the Soviet annexation of the Kuriles and recommended that at the very least that Japan keep the southern islands. The existence of this report proves that the Kurile issue was discussed by the US government long before Stalin set his “political terms,” and even thereafter presidential aides and advisors had adequate time to inform the president about the actual state of affairs. The historian Marc Gallicchio has analyzed almost all the minutes of Roosevelt’s meetings and conferences, and has not unearthed any evidence that Roosevelt somehow linked the Kuriles to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. In fact, Roosevelt always viewed these islands separately from Sakhalin (Gallicchio 1991, 73–74). Gallicchio found proof that “the Kurile Islands” occupied a significant place in Roosevelt’s postwar plans and that the US president had looked into the future of the islands more carefully than any of his subordinates or historians suspected (Gallicchio 1991, 73). Roosevelt suggested in March 1943 that in order to prevent postwar Japanese aggression the United States, the USSR, and China should create a network of “strongpoints” around Japan. Roosevelt concretized his idea at a meeting with Secretary of State Hull in October, noting that these “strongpoints” should be under international trusteeship. He included the Kuriles as one of them, but added straight away “although the Kuriles should really go to Russia” (FRUS 1943, vol. 1, 544; Gallicchio 1991, 75). By the time of the Tehran Conference in December 1943, Roosevelt was so committed to his decision in transferring southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union that he actually conveyed this opinion to Stalin because at this time the Soviet leader refused to specify territorial claims. The minutes of Roosevelt’s speech at a meeting of the Pacific Military Committee on January 12, 1944, demonstrates that the president understood the different statuses of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. He stated, in particular, that Stalin wanted all of Sakhalin to be returned to Russia and that the Kuriles be turned over to Russia so that it could control the straits leading to Siberia in compensation for entry into war with Japan (Perras 1997, 81). The minutes of the Tehran Conference indicate, however, that Stalin said nothing of the sort. This is a very significant point because Stalin and other Soviet representatives had not yet declared

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officially or unofficially their compensation demands for their participation in the war—this was only done in late January or early February 1945. Roosevelt’s statement therefore suggests that Stalin may have told Roosevelt about the Soviet conditions for going to war unofficially and on the sidelines of the Tehran Conference, but Stalin’s interpreter Valentin M. Berezhkov remarked that no specific conversation about such compensation ever took place (NHK 1995, 23–24). It is also noteworthy that the United Kingdom arrived independently at almost the same conclusion about the Kuriles as the United States. It submitted a memorandum to the Department of State on October 8, 1943, inquiring about the US stance on any territorial gains of the Soviet Union in the area of Sakhalin or the Kuriles (Gallicchio 1991, 75). The fact that Roosevelt did not use the word “return” in any form when speaking of the Kurile Islands—rather the term “hand over” or “turn over”— undoubtedly indicates that he was fully aware of the strategic value of the islands. Moreover, he had already determined their future long before the Yalta Conference. Shortly before the trip to Yalta, when Harriman explained Stalin’s terms of entry into the war at a meeting with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 4, 1945, Roosevelt said that he was ready to accept all the demands but wished to gain China’s approval vis-à-vis Outer Mongolia. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not raise any objections, although the establishment of a base on the Kuriles was given a “highly necessary” status within the committee’s plans of deploying a network of US military bases in the postwar period (FRUS 1945, vol. 6; FRUS 1945, “Conferences at Malta and Yalta” 1945, 564–67; Gallicchio 1991, 77). Another fact deserving of mention is that, according to Robert A. Eden, British chiefs of staff also accepted Stalin’s demands and expressed no disapproval. In turn, Secretary of State Stettinius concluded from personal experience and conversations with Harriman and Harry L. Hopkins that “the agreement on the Far East was a well-conceived solution and not based on a decision hastily made in Yalta” (Stettinius 1949, 95). Judging from the minutes, Roosevelt and Stalin only briefly discussed the issue of ceding Japanese territories to the Soviet Union on February 8, 1945. After the Soviet leader raised the question regarding the “political terms” of the Soviet Union’s entry into war against Japan, the US president delivered a laconic response that “the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands would be handed over to the Soviet Union” and straight away turned to other matters (Krymskaya konferentsiya 1945). In the American minutes, Roosevelt’s position was that there would be no difficulty at the end of war to transfer southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles to Russia (FRUS, “Conferences at Malta and Yalta” 1945, 768). Churchill, who took no part in the discussion, expressed no

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doubts and raised no objections during the signing of the Yalta agreements on the Far East. Roosevelt’s reaction is intriguing. It showed that the US president did not foresee any problems with either handing over the Kuriles or returning Sakhalin, even though both actions breached the principle noted above of “no aggrandizement, territorial, or other.” He was evidently more concerned, and justifiably so, with issues connected with China. The question relating to the recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia—actually the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic—was fraught with legal problems. According to the 1915 Treaty of Kyakhta between China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia, the latter received an autonomous status within the Republic of China in exchange for the acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty. This autonomy was terminated in 1919 by the Chinese army, and in 1921 the troops of Russian General Roman F. von Ungern-Sternberg and the Mongolians in fact liberated Outer Mongolia. Later that year the Red Army, supported by units of the Far Eastern Republic and Mongolian Reds, defeated Von UngernShternberg’s forces. A people’s government was formed, and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) government signed an agreement on neighborly relations on November 5, 1921. That agreement and the presence of Red Army troops guaranteed the country’s de facto independence. Mongolia proclaimed itself a people’s republic in 1924 (Mongolian People’s Republic) but only the Soviet Union recognized its status. On May 31, 1924, the agreement on the General Principles for the Settlement of Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was signed. In Article V of the agreement, the government of the Soviet Union “recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China’s sovereignty therein.” The same could be applied to the other “political terms” pertaining to China. By signing this 1924 agreement, the Soviet Union “declares that all Treaties, Agreements etc., concluded between the former tsarist government and any third Party or Parties affecting the sovereign rights or interests of China are null and void” (Article IV). Article III states that the government of two “Parties agreed to annul … all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contacts, etc., concluded between the government of China and the tsarist government and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, etc., on the basis of equality, reciprocity and justice” (League of Nations Treaty Collection, 176–78). But it should be remembered that the former Russian imperial government’s agreements on lease of Port Arthur and rail lines in Manchuria were far from being equal. And unlike Japan, China was a US ally in World War II; it was difficult

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for the US president to make decisions affecting Chinese interests, particularly with the absence of China at the negotiating table. During the first decades of the postwar period and throughout the Cold War era, politicians, diplomats, experts, and academicians criticized Roosevelt for the allegedly excessive concessions made to the Soviet Union in Yalta. Critics of the Yalta Conference disregarded the limited possibilities and the maneuvering space that the US policy had at the beginning of 1945. The US president had to keep all this in mind, and these critics distorted his real intentions and tactics. It is true, however, that Roosevelt made concessions to Stalin, but they were far from unilateral and were based on the principles of reciprocity. For instance, US concessions to the Soviet Union under the Yalta agreements were limited to the: – recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia; – cession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union; – a Soviet base in Port Arthur; – preferred Soviet interests in Dairen and Manchurian railroads. Stalin, for his part, also made concessions and agreed to the: – recognition of the Kuomintang as the only legitimate government of China and the signing of a relevant agreement; – denial of support and assistance to Chinese communists; – preservation of China’s integrity, including its political system, and pledge not to yield to the temptation to annex Manchuria and to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty over it; – the internationalization rather than the lease of Dairen; – joint operation instead of the lease of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Southern Manchuria Railway; – assignment of airbases in Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Komsono’sk-na-Amure) or in Nikolaevsk to the United States; – permission to US ships to bring supplies to US airbases in the Amur region; – trusteeship over Korea and the guardian status of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States; – trusteeship over Indochina. An amendment made to the Soviet draft by Harriman at Roosevelt’s recommendation initially included the internationalization of both Dairen and Port Arthur instead of the lease. Stalin had no objections regarding Dairen but disagreed with the internationalization of Port Arthur. With support from Churchill, Stalin demanded a reinstated lease of Port Arthur as a temporary naval base in the postwar period until the Soviet Union could built its own ports in the Far East. The Soviet leader promised that afterwards Port Arthur and Dairen would be restored under full Chinese jurisdiction.

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It is noteworthy that the expert in Soviet-Japanese relations George Lensen believes the United States gained almost everything it wanted in Yalta while the Soviet Union had to yield on certain matters (Slavinskiĭ 1996, 110). For the historian Melvin P. Leffler, the Yalta agreements had no “inherent defects” but reflected the realities of the European situation and the need to engage the Soviet Union in the Pacific War. It also provided hope for postwar cooperation at the United Nations (Leffler 1986, 91). Another accusation leveled against Roosevelt was that he kept the Yalta agreements secret not only from the congress but even from his closest associates. These accusations are mostly based on remarks by Byrnes and Truman. Historians of the Cold War, Leffler and Theoharis, have shown that Byrnes was just lying and that he knew nothing about the Yalta agreements. He was simply trying to shift the blame onto Roosevelt (Theoharis 1966, 210–41; Theoharis 1972, 581–92). The Yalta agreements on the Far East were classified for military reasons. Japan was not privy to them and in turn Roosevelt insisted on not sharing them with China either. In his report to the congress on March 1, 1945, Roosevelt rejected the notion that the Far East problem was discussed in Yalta. But the Yalta agreements on the Far East were not Roosevelt’s personal secret deal. The Soviet Union’s involvement in the war on Japan was the primary political objective of the United States. Before the conference, the Department of State and the Department of War (also known as the War Office) prepared materials regarding US policy and goals. Representatives from these departments participated in the conference and helped draft political decisions and the protocol of the Yalta agreements on the Far East. This means that they were aware of the final terms, including those published in the communiqué of February 11, 1945, and those that were classified. Roosevelt was counting on the cooperation with the Soviet Union and its involvement in the United Nations in order to ensure peace and security, on one hand, and to have a non-confrontational mechanism of deterrence against the USSR, on the other. Not everyone in the US establishment shared his strategy, and in fact almost the entire Department of State was against this course. This explains why Roosevelt, for some time, chose to ignore the Department of State’s stance, tacitly rejecting its political recommendations. As a result, the text was not appropriately edited and clearly formulated, thereby containing numerous ambiguous phrasings that led to the weakness of the agreements. Moreover, this accounts for the fact that the limits of the postwar role of the Soviet Union in China and in Japan, in particular, were not accurately defined. The actual exclusion of the Department of State from the negotiating process ultimately made the Yalta agreements on the Far East extremely vulnerable. Their implementation was not a matter of consensus between US ruling elites,

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rather they expressed consent of incumbent President Roosevelt to accept the reality of Soviet influence and the spirit of cooperation with the USSR and to hope for the possibility of its further expansion. This spirit determined the general atmosphere of the Crimea Conference. Truman, who took office following Roosevelt’s death in 1945, was not involved in the formation of Roosevelt’s foreign policy, and this explains why he was highly susceptible to the opinions of political advisors from the Department of State, whose recommendations were ignored in Yalta. Furthermore, Truman did not feel obligation bound and intended to use the ambiguous wording of the Yalta agreements on the Far East to avoid concessions. As soon as Germany capitulated, the Truman administration immediately began to review the risks and benefits of the concessions and concluded that the United States would gain little from adhering to the many wartime agreements. They choose not to pursue further alliance, rather interpreted the agreements in a way that prioritized the deterrence of the Soviet Union and the spread of US influence. The Soviet Union also had to evaluate the benefits of adhering to wartime agreements. The Kremlin chose to interpret this adherence in a manner that made it possible to maximize its control over Eastern Europe, restrict the influence of Western allies and any possibilities in Eastern Germany, and strengthen its own impact in China. This meant that Moscow preferred unilateral security measures over a cooperative attitude regarding postwar reconstruction. Both sides believed that the price of adherence to the wartime agreements outweighed any benefits; they began to take tentative steps toward the rejection or re-interpretation of keynote provisions. Each move of this kind raised suspicions of the potential adversary, inducing reciprocal countermeasures. On April 16, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally re-evaluated American dependency on Soviet aid and concluded that no matter how desirable Soviet military assistance was, US foreign policy should not be based on its consideration (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945). Nevertheless, chief of Staff of the US Army and General of the Army George C. Marshall, remarked on April 23, 1945, that they should stick to prior agreements because of the impossibility of winning the war in the Far East without Soviet military assistance (Theoharis 1966, 229). Experts from the Joint Chiefs of Staff changed their position on June 18, 1945, stating that Soviet assistance was desirable but not crucial (Alperovitz 1955, 119). It was only on July 27, 1945, after the successful tests of a nuclear bomb earlier on July 16 in Alamogordo, New Mexico that Marshall agreed with War Secretary Henry L. Stimson that the Soviet entry into the war was no longer necessary. He maintained, however, that the Soviet Union could still enter the war and secure practically everything it wished as terms of capitulation. The Department of State was likewise looking into the matter. On May 12, 1945, the Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew sent a memo to War Secretary - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal asking the military to determine their vision of the Yalta agreements on the Far East. The memo gave a detailed account of the Department of State’s objections to the Yalta obligations and voiced suspicions about Soviet goals. It questioned whether the United States should remain loyal to the terms of the Yalta Agreement and if so, whether it should do so fully or in part. Before informing Chiang Kai-shek about the agreements, Grew commented that the United States should obtain the Soviet Union’s agreement to influence Chinese communists for the sake of unity under Chiang Kai-shek’s command. Stimson’s reply of May 21, 1945, declared the importance of Soviet military assistance for the earliest possible defeat of Japan. He said that the Soviet influence on the Far East could not be avoided and that a conference of the “Big Three” tasked to discuss and possibly review the Yalta agreements would be undesirable. Suspicious about Soviet intentions and following the US policy to limit Soviet influence, Stimson nevertheless did not believe that the US administration could be successful in revising the terms of the Yalta agreements. He also said that any such attempts would delay Soviet military intervention without any reduction of Soviet influence in the region (Alperovitz 1955, 96–100). On May 28, 1945, Stalin confirmed in an official letter to Hopkins the Soviet Union’s intention to enter the war and that he expected Soviet troops to participate in the occupation of Japan. Stalin also said it was time to initiate a discussion of the Yalta obligations between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang, which were due to begin no later than July 1. The Soviet Union would be ready to participate in the war on August 8 but only on the condition that a SovietChinese agreement had been signed (Alperovitz 1955, 102). On June 9, 1945, Truman personally informed Chinese prime minister Soong Tse-ven about the provisions of the Yalta agreements relating to China and offered to launch the negotiations with the Soviet Union. In addition, Patrick J. Hurley, the US ambassador to China, was instructed to inform Chiang Kai-shek about the Yalta terms. Soong felt that China’s position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was weak. He requested US and international guarantees of the treaty and the US interpretation of the notion of the Soviet Union’s “preferred interests” regarding Dairen and the railroads. Truman declined both requests. The US approach was ambivalent at the first (June 30–July 14) and the final (August 1–14) stages of negotiations. The United States never condemned Soviet demands and always declined to clarify its position. On July 4, the Truman administration formally repeated its refusal to be bound by any specific interpretation of the Yalta agreements because that would circumstantially involve the United States in negotiations and implicate it in the enforcement of its results. In fact, this was a violation of the Yalta agreements in which the US president undertook to “ensure China’s - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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consent.” The reason for the equivocal US position was not indifference at all. The situation was simple. Since the Soviet Union was unwilling to go to war before signing an agreement with China, the Truman administration stalled intentionally or, to be more exact, it did not promote an earlier resolution of Soviet-Chinese negotiations. This was a way to delay the Soviet entry into the war while at the same time of remaining formally adherent to the Yalta deal. By June, US policy was based on the premise that Soviet military engagement in the war against Japan was not mandatory. This new stance was supported with the now changed attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that was announced on June 18, 1945, which maintained that Soviet assistance is desirable but not crucial. With this in mind, the Joint Chiefs of State recommended that the concessions made for the Soviet Union’s involvement in the war be withdrawn (Alperovitz 1955, 119). And these considerations would guide both Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes in Potsdam. On July 17, 1945, in response to the Soviet leaders’ announcement of their readiness to accept China’s control over Manchuria and to recognize the Kuomintang as the only legitimate authority in China, Byrnes confined himself to the formal statement that the United States adhered to the precise interpretation of the Yalta agreements on the Far East and, feigning ignorance of the situation, asked Stalin about the problems at the negotiations. Truman and Byrnes concluded from Stalin’s response that the Soviet-Chinese differences were so fundamental that the two sides were unlikely to reach an agreement at any time in the near future. Truman therefore instructed Chiang Kai-shek not to make any additional concessions but at the same time the US president insisted on the implementation of the Yalta agreements on the Far East. He urged Chiang Kai-shek to resume Soong’s negotiations in Moscow. In effect, Truman’s instructions were pushing negotiations into a deadlock. Without consulting the Soviet Union the US administration eventually drew up a formal declaration that demanded Japan’s unconditional surrender. It also made a unilateral decision to accept the Japanese request of August 10, 1945, in clarifying the terms of capitulation, in particular, the future of the emperor (Alperovitz 1955, 181–82, 191–92). Truman and his advisors often behaved as if the United States had no secret agreements regarding the Far East (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945, 109). For instance, after his return from Potsdam and following the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Truman already denied the existence of any agreements on Manchuria at the first meeting of his cabinet (Blum 1973, 474). Truman’s policy failed to halt the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, however. Even though a Soviet-Chinese treaty had not been signed and the United States had neither requested nor encouraged Soviet intervention in the summer

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of 1945, the Soviet Union nevertheless declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945, and moved its troops to Manchuria and northern China. Stalin warned Soong on August 10 that Chinese communists would be permitted to cross into Manchuria unless a formal treaty was signed. The Soviet Union’s support of the communists was Chiang Kai-shek’s worst fear, and this led to his acceptance of the Soviet demands on every outstanding issue and the signing of the treaty on August 14. The Truman administration, for its part, did not wish to break openly with the Soviet Union. While the Yalta agreements on the Far East were not formally disavowed, they were also not declassified after Japan’s capitulation on August 14, 1945. Soon thereafter, the Soviet Union claimed southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles under the terms of the Yalta agreements. 7

Was the Soviet Occupation of the Kurile Islands Illegal?

It is important to clarify the issue surrounding the occupation of the Kuriles. In the Soviet historiography of the Soviet-Japanese War this issue has not been investigated thoroughly. This author believes that the only Russian historian to deal with the topic is Kirill E. Cherevko (Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 233–34). History books published in the United States claim that the division of Japan into zones of occupation after its defeat was not discussed in Yalta. Instead, the division was agreed on in principle at the Potsdam Conference by Allied military specialists who were devising a plan of air and naval operations in the Far East (FRUS 1945, “Conference of Berlin,” 344–52). Drawing on the research by David Rees, the historian Yuriĭ V. Georgiev writes that the Soviet and US commanders-in-chief decided at a meeting in Potsdam on July 24–26, 1945, that Soviet troops would operate north of the La Pérouse Strait. The line of division between troops on the Kurile Islands was supposed to run between Paramushir and Onekotan—that is, the Soviet Union was due to operate in the north while the Central and Southern Kuriles were assigned to the operations of US troops (Georgiev 1998, 116). According to that agreement, the Soviet zone of occupation included only two of the northernmost islands of the Kurile archipelago, Shumshu (Shumushu) and Paramushir (Paramushiru), while the US forces planned to occupy the other islands (Deane 1947, 267–69; Gallicchio 1991, 81, 84; Theoharis 1966, 587). The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore drew up a memorandum on August 14, 1945, to begin the preparations for the acceptance of the capitulation of the Kuriles south of the fourth Kurile Strait (separating Onekotan and Paramushir) (Allison, Kimura, and Sarkisov 1993, 91; Hasegawa 1998, 61). There are in fact four islands north to the fourth Kurile Strait, but another two

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islands—Atlasov (Alaid) and Antsiferov (Shirinki)—are very small and generally were not usually mentioned. John R. Deane’s reports on conversations with Stalin in Moscow were taken into consideration, especially those held on October 14, 1994. Stalin was notified in Churchill’s presence about the US vision of the Soviet Union’s participation in the war on Japan. The strategic tasks of the Soviet troops did not include hostilities on the Kuriles, and Stalin did not object to this (US Department of Defense 1995, 36). Furthermore, the Soviet leader said in a conversation on October 17, 1944, that he wished that the US had taken control of the Kuriles before the Soviet Union went to war against Japan (Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 186). General Order No. 1 was drawn up based on these preliminary agreements and assigned occupation zones where Allied troops were expected to accept capitulation from Japanese troops. Truman sent a copy of the order to Stalin on August 15, 1945, but the order made no mention of the Kuriles. Perhaps it was assumed that this issue had already been resolved through agreements by military representatives. Marc Gallicchio and Hasegawa Tsuyoshi argue it was not accidental, opining that the author of the order, Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel III, omitted the Kuriles intentionally so as to reserve a larger chunk of the archipelago for the US Occupation forces. This would potentially “bury” the Yalta agreements relating to the Kuriles (Gallicchio 1991, 84; Hasegawa 1998, 61–62). Gallicchio also notes that Bonesteel was the only officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who objected to the cession of the Kuriles to the Soviet Union under the Yalta agreements. Bonesteel had also framed the text of the Potsdam Declaration from the American side, and Hasegawa believes this is why the Soviet Union was debarred from its formulation and why Soviet interests were deliberatively disregarded. Stalin proposed two amendments that actually demanded that Soviet troops accept the capitulation of Japanese forces in southern Sakhalin, all the Kurile Islands, and the northern part of Hokkaido. Truman agreed to all the Kuriles but strongly objected to Hokkaido. Significantly, this was not just a conflict over the division of zones as part of Japanese capitulation but in fact the Truman administration’s policy that determined the Soviet Union’s role in the occupation of Japan and, in particular, the attitude toward the Yalta agreements on the Far East. Truman was not ready for confrontation, however, and his reply was moderate in tone. He interpreted his previous demand for an airbase on one island in the middle Kuriles as a request for stopover in flights from Alaska to Japan or China. Yet he noted that the Kuriles were not a Soviet territory since the Yalta agreements allegedly permitted only occupation and that the ultimate status of the islands would be ascertained at a future peace conference. Stalin granted the request for stopover rights but rejected the

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unresolved status of the Kuriles. The historian Gar Alperovitz has pointed out that in a letter sent to Truman on August 30, 1945, Stalin maintained that cession was permanent and final, and that any future peace negotiations would only ratify this fact. This author could find no such phrasing in the Russianlanguage text of the document (Vsemirnaya istoriya [1945], no. 367). Alperovitz asserts that Truman’s primary objective was to minimize the Soviet’s role, especially in Japan but also in the occupation of China (Alperovitz 1955, 190–91). By contrast, the Japanese historian Wada Haruki believes that Korea, and not the Kuriles, was Truman’s primary concern and that the United States pondered whether Stalin would agree to the division of Korea (Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 254). This is why, when Stalin did not raise objections, Truman immediately granted Stalin’s “request” for the Kuriles. Hasegawa Tsuyoshi asserts that neither the Department of State nor the army and navy objected to this decision, thereby deciding the future of the islands that Japan later referred to as the “Northern Territories” (hoppō ryōdo) (Hasegawa 1998, 64–65). Not surprisingly, in this letter Truman offered his interpretation of territorial obligations under the Yalta agreements on the Far East, and this was the first attempt to present the Yalta deal as preliminary and non-committal. Truman’s interpretation of the Yalta deal was done so at the initiative of Secretary of State Byrnes (Messer 1982, 39, 70), who claimed at a press conference on September 4, 1945, that he “remembered well” the Yalta debate on the Kurile and southern Sakhalin and that he denied a final agreement. As noted above, there were absolutely no “debates” in the discussion of territorial issues, and Byrnes was not present at the signing of the protocol on the Far East on February 11, 1945, because he had already left Yalta on February 10. By confirming the Soviet right to those territories under the Yalta agreements, Byrnes indicated the stance of the Truman administration, which was that the cession of southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles was a prerogative of the international peace conference. Quite remarkably, Byrnes failed to make any mention of the press conference in his memoirs, claiming instead that he learned of the Yalta agreements on the Far East only on February 10, 1946! (Byrnes 1958, 266, 268). Another ally of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, took a different position. Soviet and Russian historians have not analyzed the British stance on the territorial dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan but it was generally understood that the United Kingdom backed the United States. Cherevko, again, is the only Russian scholar to mention the special position of the United Kingdom with reference to the documents dating to 1946–1947 (International Foreign Office Memorandum 1946). In a separate memorandum from November 1947, the British Foreign Office acknowledged the efficiency of

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the Yalta agreements on the Far East and the responsibility of all sides in their fulfillment as a fait accompli (Cherevko 2003, 278). The Foreign Office viewed the Yalta agreements on the Far East as final and not requiring confirmation through a formal peace conference (Gallicchio 1991, 91). Earlier, on April 6, 1947, the Foreign Office replied to the statement of Japanese Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi, officially declaring that the United Kingdom considered the cession of the previously Japanese Kurile Islands to the USSR as final and not to be a topic to be confirmed in a peace treaty. The statement on territorial issues made at the Potsdam Conference was not limited to the earlier Cairo Declaration, but actually substituted it whenever it was considered that provisions of the two declarations “were at odds with one another.” Therefore, “the text of the Yalta agreements is absolutely mandatory for the parties concerned in relevant matters” (Cherevko 2010, 337–38). In her meticulous examination of original Foreign Office documents, the historian Fiona Hill has discovered that the United Kingdom had a definite stance based on its interpretation of the Yalta agreements. Hill concluded that domestic legal norms meant that from the outset the United Kingdom recognized the Yalta agreements on the Far East as an international legal document. It thus supported and accepted Soviet territorial gains following Japan’s defeat: “the Soviet Union de jure acquired sovereignty over the Kurile Islands by means of occupation and de facto possession … Under the San Francisco Treaty, Japan waived its rights to the territories mentioned in Yalta and therefore could not claim them again” (Hill 1995, 42). The United Kingdom’s stance remains unchanged until the present day. In January 1946, the attention of the US State Department focused on Soviet occupation of the Kuriles because it suggested that all islands seized from Japan should be placed under international trusteeship. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson was asked at a press conference on January 22, 1946, whether the Soviet Union would place the Kuriles under international trusteeship. Acheson confirmed an agreement about Soviet control over the islands and believed that the Yalta agreements permitted the Soviet military occupation of the Kuriles but not their immediate cession. This implied that a final decision regarding the islands would be made at an international peace conference, and this decision might allow the Soviet Union to retain full control over the islands (Theoharis 1972, 590). But, according to Acheson, until that point the Kremlin had no rights to the Kuriles. The Soviet Union promptly disputed Acheson’s statement. A Radio Moscow broadcast on January 26, 1946, declared that the Yalta agreements on the Far East provided cession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union immediately after Japan’s defeat. It denied the temporary nature of

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the agreement allegedly related only to military operations. The Soviet Union soon released a statement quoting the exact wording from the secret protocol signed in Yalta (FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 670, 687–88, 692; Leffler 1986, 110). In turn, US Secretary of State Byrnes admitted at a press conference on January 29, 1946, that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were ceded to the Soviet Union in Yalta and that other agreements were made in regard to Port Arthur and Dairen. He added, however, that those agreements would not become mandatory until ratification of the peace treaty with Japan. Such a stance definitely contradicted the final provisions of the Yalta agreements, which stated that: “The heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated” (Yalta Agreement, 68, 78). On the order from the Department of State in early 1946 the expert on Japan, Hugh Borton, prepared a memorandum that recommended that the United States accept a definition of the Kurile Islands, excluding the Habomai Islands that legally remained a Japanese territory. A dossier of Soviet violations of the agreements with the Allies—a report by Clark M. Clifford and George M. Elsey—prepared in the summer of that year made no mention of the Kuriles. Yet in 1947 the director of the Policy Planning Staff George F. Kennan suggested that Japan should keep Iturup (Etorofu), Kunashir (Kunashiri), Shikotan, and Habomai. But grounds for such a recommendation were tenuous. The staff geographer of the Department of State officially stated that Habomai and Shikotan were not a part of the Kuriles. The same could not be said about Kunashir and Iturup, however. The verdict of a legal counselor was even more affirmative, claiming that Kunashir and Iturup had always been considered part of the Kuriles (FRUS 1948, 687–89). The Department of State concluded that there were no legal grounds to support Japan’s claims for those islands (FRUS 1949, 904–6). The United States would invariably maintain that position regarding the “Northern Territories.” There are two further questions related to the Soviet military occupation of southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The first deals with the repatriation of Japanese residents from those territories, which was not a private decision by the USSR but rather a common policy of the Allied powers command. Japanese residents were repatriated from all countries and territories that were excluded from Japanese jurisdiction—that is, Korea, China, Taiwan, the Mariana Islands, and other Pacific islands, as well as from the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) GHQ issued special orders, instructions, and memorandums to that effect, including Directives No. 822 (March 16, 1946), No. 927 (May 7, 1946), and No. 1421 (September 10, 1946).

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In addition, with authorization from SCAP, General Douglas MacArthur, the Soviet Union and the United States signed agreements on the repatriation of Japanese civilians from Soviet territory and territories controlled by the Soviet Union on November 27, 1946, and on December 19, 1946. Known by the surnames of Soviet and American representatives at SCAP GHQ, Lieutenant General Kuz’ma N. Derevyanko and Lieutenant General Paul J. Muller, these agreements dictated that repatriates from the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were registered as foreign nationals migrating from the USSR to another state— that is, in accordance with Soviet legal provisions. At this time, the Japanese government raised no objections to the repatriation. Quite the opposite. It insisted that the Allied authorities accelerate the process, and the Japanese emperor Hirohito released rescripts No. 651 and No. 652 (November 22, 1945) to assist in that process with the establishment of a special department supporting repatriates from southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. This included all the modern-day “Northern Territories” due to the fact that these territories were removed from Japan due to the end of the Pacific War (Cherevko 2003, 278). There were, in other words, no legal grounds to lay claims against Russia regarding the repatriation of Japanese citizens from southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. (The incidents that resulted from the illegal and cruel actions by particular Soviet military or security officers and local authorities during the repatriation process should today be acknowledged and condemned. And it would be appropriate to deliver an official apology for such actions.) The second question relates to the definition of the Kuriles as an “illegally occupied” (J: fuhō senkyo). As the Japanese viewed the occupation as illegal, blame was squarely laid on the Soviet Union and modern Russia. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Soviet Union occupied southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles under an agreement between the Allies and based on General Order No. 1, which delineated the zones of occupation. It is generally acknowledged that Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, which reiterated provisions of the Cairo Declaration, the latter stating that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to” four main islands and other “such minor smaller islands as we [the Allies] determine.” The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note (SCAPIN) No. 677 (January 29, 1946), which the GHQ sent to the Japanese imperial government, excluded the Kurile Habomai islets and Shikotan islands from Japanese jurisdiction. Although Article 6 of this memorandum states that: “Nothing in that directive shall be constructed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration” (Allison, Kimura, and Sarkisov 1993, 139–40), there is no document of the Allied powers terminating or canceling the occupation - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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or restoring Japanese jurisdiction over those territories. Even if we accept the Japanese view that these islands continue to be occupied, there would be no legal grounds to pronounce that occupation illegal. When the occupation of particular islands occurred—before or after the formal signing of the act of Japan’s capitulation to the Allied powers—is absolutely irrelevant. Once they were included in the Soviet occupation zone, the Soviet Union was entitled to dispatch troops there at any time. The policy of the Truman administration conflated cause and effect. Melvin P. Leffler is correct in concluding that the Americans were educated to view Soviet transgressions as the cause of postwar turmoil and as the principle threat to American national security rather than to see the Kremlin as the main beneficiary of the socioeconomic unrest and revolutionary nationalist upheaval. The result was that Americans never really grasped the reasons for and the extent of their own government’s disengagements from the wartime agreements. leffler 1986, 122

Once Truman assumed the presidential office in 1945 and the war ended in Europe, his advisors sought to ensure a US withdrawal from many wartime agreements in order to support democracy and capitalism in Europe as well as deter communism and revolutionary nationalism in Northeast Asia and across the globe. Truman said in the spring of 1947 that the Soviet Union had failed to fulfill any agreement, claiming that he would have to resort to other methods such as the policy of unlimited rivalry (Public Papers 1947, 239). In citing Soviet violations, US officials excused their own deviations from war-time agreements, justifying any unilateral measures for US interests using reasons based on national security. But these US initiatives were not simply a reaction to Soviet violations. For most part, it was not Soviet violations that caused US non-compliance with the agreements, and one cannot say Soviet violations legalized those non-compliances. For instance, most Soviet actions taken in Eastern Europe in the spring/winter of 1945 were legally permissible within the framework of agreements on the cessation of hostilities. It is noteworthy that Athan Theoharis supposes that the attempts of the Truman administration to “repeal” the Yalta agreements were the actual cause of the Cold War (Theoharis 1972, 212). This is why US foreign policy expert Lloyd C. Gardner concludes, for example, that the United States was largely responsible for the shape of the Cold War (Gardner 1970, X). Nevertheless, the list of Soviet violations drawn up by the Department of State—the aforesaid Clifford-Elsey Report—and read out by Truman clearly simplified the realities of the situation. Leffler justly notes that the - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Kremlin’s pattern of compliance with wartime agreements in the immediate aftermath of World War II appears no better or worse than the American record. The record of the Yalta Conference makes clear … that the Soviet expectation for … the Polish Provisional Government … was a reasonable interpretation of the Crimean agreement. Likewise, the Soviet belief that the United States conceded a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe was a reasonable inference for the Kremlin to draw from Roosevelt’s acquiescence to the deletion of enforcement provisions from the Declaration on Liberated Europe … Soviet infractions of the Yalta and Potsdam provisions on Liberated Europe and Germany hardly constitute the source of Europe’s travail in the aftermath of depression, war and Nazi domination … The total clampdown on Eastern Europe followed, rather than preceded, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan; the blockade of Berlin followed rather than preceded the decisions to suspend reparations, boost the level of German industry, and carry out the currency reforms in the western zones … The experience of the early Cold War reveal that wartime agreements were violated not only by the Soviets alone but by all the signatories and not necessarily because of evil intent but because of apprehension and expediency. leffler 1986, 121–23

8 Conclusion Four main points have been touched upon in this discussion about the issues of dispute in Soviet-Japanese relations during World War II. First, the Soviet entry into war against Japan was dictated by geostrategic considerations. Almost all of Stalin’s demands to the Allies in return for his country’s involvement in the war were intended to strengthen Soviet security in northeastern Asia. Second, the Soviet participation in the war against Japan while the bilateral neutrality pact was still in force did not formally breach international law. The legality of such a step was already provided for in the new international legal norms related to the collective efforts toward curbing aggression, restoring peace, and maintaining international security under Chapter XXVII of the UN Charter and Article 5 of the Declaration of the Four Nations of October 30, 1943. It should also be noted that the Soviet Union’s position under international law would have been more solid had the UN Charter had been ratified before the declaration of war on Japan. Third, the territorial dispute with Japan primarily originated from the US refusal to adhere to its obligations as set out in the Yalta agreements on the Far East. This meant that in fact the agreements on

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the Far East were not equal—the Soviet Union met its obligations, the Allies did not. America’s failure to acknowledge the Yalta obligations, however, did not result from a breach of the Yalta agreements on Europe and the Far East, as all sides violated wartime agreements. Rather, the primary reason was the beginning of the Cold War that caused the “reversed course” of US policy on Japan, which Truman Doctrine transformed from an enemy of the United States into its principal ally in the Far East. And lastly, the Japanese claims of the “illegal occupation” of the Kuriles are not grounded in international law. Japan’s accusations of the Soviet Union regarding the forced repatriation of the Japanese population of the Kuriles are equally irrelevant from the standpoint of international law. The problem of Japanese prisoners of war is, however, another story. Bibliography

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the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Signed at Peking [Beijing]. May 31, 1924.” 176–78. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/ LON/Volume%2037/v37.pdf. Leffler, Melvyn P. 1986. “Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and Experience of the Early Cold War.” International Security 11, no. 1 (Summer): 88–123. May, Ernest Richard. 1955. “The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Far Eastern War, 1941–1945.” Pacific Historical Review 24, no. 2 (May): 153–74. Messer, Robert Louis. 1982. End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Nimmo, William F. Japan and Russia. A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era. London: Greenwood Press, 1994. Perras, Galen Roger. 1977. “We Have Opened the Door to Tokyo: United States Plans to Seize the Kurile Islands, 1943–1945.” The Journal of Military History 61, no. 1 (January): 65–74. Potsdam Declaration. 1945. http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. 1947. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1963. Rees, David. 1985. The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles. New York: Praeger. Rose, Lisle Abbott. 1973. After Yalta. America and the Origins of the Cold War. New York: Scribners. Stephan, John J. 1974. The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Stettinius, Edward Reilly, Jr. 1949. Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference. Garden City: Doubleday. Stimson, Henry Lewis, and Bundy McGeorge. 1947. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper & Brothers. Theoharis, Athan. 1966. “James F. Byrnes: Unwitting Yalta Myth-Maker.” Political Science Quarterly 81, no. 4 (December): 581–92. Theoharis, Athan. 1972. “Roosevelt and Truman on Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War.” Political Science Quarterly 87, no. 2 (June): 210–41. US Department of Defense. 1955. The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War with Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. Welles, Sumner. 1946. Where are We Heading?. New York: Harper & Brothers. Williams, Brad. Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute. Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations. London: Routledge, 2007. Yalta Agreement. http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h2066.html.

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part 8

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The Reality of the Siberian Internment: Japanese Captives in the Soviet Union and Their Movements after Repatriation Tomita Takeshi This chapter examines the major points of research in recent decades regarding the so-called “Siberian Internment” of Japanese prisoners of war (POWS) as seen from both Japanese and Russian sides. It will identify the principal issues that still remain under-researched and require further clarification. Also outlined are the main arguments from the Russian position regarding internment. There are both differences and similarities between the Japanese and Russian positions, and the clarification of these points is the necessary first step in creating a dialogue surrounding the various versions of this complicated history in Russia and Japan. 1

Historical Backdrop and Causes of Internment

On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union entered into war against Japan, even though the neutrality pact between the two countries remained in force until April 1946. While Japan had accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, to which the Soviet Union was also party, the Soviet Army continued military operations until September 5, 1945. The USSR was expeditious in wishing to occupy all of the territories extending as far south as Shikotan Island in the Kurile range that the Allies secretly promised it at the Yalta Conference of February 4–11, 1945. Furthermore, in direct contravention of Article 9 of the Potsdam Declaration that stipulated, “the Japanese military forces … shall be permitted to return to their homes,” the Soviet Union State Defense Committee ordered on August 23, 1945, the forced transport of over 500,000 of Japanese officers and soldiers to Soviet territory, where they would remain for several years. These actions by the Soviets were in violation of international law, the Potsdam Declaration, and the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which neither the USSR nor Japan had joined at the time. The Japanese side was not entirely free of blame, however. It had actually provided the Soviet Union with an excuse to start the internment. One theory states that the Japanese “offer of a labor force” was allegedly made to the Soviets at the ceasefire negotiations at the border village of Zharikovo

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_016

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on August 19, 1945, but this allegation has been difficult to prove in the absence of any substantial evidence. The August 26 “Report on the Termination of Hostilities in the Kwantung Army Area” documents a meeting between the Kwantung Army Special Envoy Lieutenant Colonel Asaeda Shigeharu with a general of the Soviet Transbaikal front, during which the Japanese representative verbally conveyed the details of the Japanese offer of a labor force to his Soviet counterpart (Shirai 2010, 144–45). This proposal was the revival of the “Offer of Labor Force as Compensation,” which Konoe Fumimaro had intended to present to the USSR in return for Soviet mediation of the terms of Japan’s peace with the Allies. But Konoe’s Moscow trip never materialized. The Soviets had nonetheless managed to acquire information about this proposal beforehand through intelligence channels. It would not have been surprising in any case had the USSR decided to commence the internment program even without the Japan offer of “human compensation,” given the fact that the Soviet Union was already detaining and exploiting German and other Axis prisoners of war on its territory (Vsevolodov 2010, 72–73). On August 16, three Soviet officials, Minister of the Interior Lavrentiĭ P. Beria, staff member of the Supreme High Command Nikolaĭ A. Bulganin, and Chief of Staff Alekseĭ I. Antonov, issued a decree ordering the Red Army to detain Japanese servicemen in Manchuria. The State Defense Committee order of August 23 overrode the Beria-Bulganin-Antonov Directive and instructed the commander-in-chief of Soviet Far Eastern Army, Aleksandr M. Vasilevskiĭ, to transport the Japanese to the USSR. This order is still disputed and continues to provoke controversy within historians. One interpretation maintains that Stalin overturned the earlier decision not to intern the Japanese in the USSR after the US president Harry S. Truman rejected his request to occupy the northern part of Hokkaido. The historians Elena L. Katasonova and Hasegawa Tsuyoshi propose different views. Katasonova believes that the decision to commence internment was Stalin’s “retaliation for his enormous political defeat” at being rejected by Truman. Hasegawa claims that the “500,000 Japanese POWs physically fit for hard labor” was compensation for the Soviets’ unfulfilled occupation of northern Hokkaido (Katasonova 2003, 273, Hasegawa 2011, 468). Historians even today do not have access to the archival documents that could resolve the debate. During a visit to the Russian State Archives of SocioPolitical History (RGASPI) in March 2013, I was permitted to see the records of the USSR’s State Defense Committee; however, the Beria-Bulganin-Antonov Directive of August 16 was not among the documents (RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 457, l. 58–64). It could be probably concluded that the directive was an urgent order issued without passing through committee deliberations. My search for the stenographic records of the State Defense Committee meetings also bore no fruit. The Russian historian, Oleg V. Khlevnyuk, an authority on the - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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archives relating to the top echelons of Soviet power, has also confirmed the absence of the shorthand records (author’s conversation with Oleg Khlevnyuk in Moscow, March, 2013). 2

POWs and Internees

On August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito released his “Imperial Rescript on the Termination of War” (Daitōa sensō shūketsu no shōsho) to the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, followed the next day by a decree from the army section of the Imperial General Headquarters stating that “the servicemen and civilian employees (gunzoku) of the imperial forces who have come under the control of the enemy forces after the issuance of the Imperial Rescript will not be considered prisoners of war” (Bōei-chō Bōei Kenkyūjo, 492). The officers and soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), for years governed by the military code (senjinkun) of “not to bear the shame of being taken prisoner alive,” surrendered their weapons and themselves to the Soviet army upon receiving this decree. The above decree meant that any Japanese servicemen conversant with the 1929 Geneva Convention would be unable to use it as a shield to protect themselves and rank-and-file soldiers when dealing with the Soviet army or camp authorities. For the Soviets, however, the fact that the hostilities did not cease until September 5, despite the Japanese Imperial Rescript and the ceasefire agreement at Zharikovo, indicated that all Japanese servicemen captured up until that date were considered POWs, whether or not they continued to resist Soviet attacks. Manchukuo government officials, employees of the South Manchuria Railway (SMR), and the executives of the Concordia Association (Kyōwakai) were neither servicemen nor civilians attached to the military, and were thus considered civilian internees. Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Army insisted that they were not POWs; even after repatriation, they defined themselves as “forced internees” (kyōsei yokuryūsha). This definition, however, is inaccurate as it erases the difference between former servicemen and the civilian internees who had no connection to the military. An opposing view asserts that all Japanese citizens interned in the Soviet camps were POWs. This position is supported by the fact that the officers and soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army—the Kwantung Army, the Japanese Korean Army, the garrisons on southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands under the command of the Fifth Area Army—considerably outnumbered civilian captives. This claim carries less weight, however, if one includes the number of civilian internees, the 160,000 Japanese non-combatants in the Soviet-occupied - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Dalian (J: Dairen) and the 240,000 civilians trapped on southern Sakhalin in the early days of the Soviet entry into the war who were unable to flee to Hokkaido (Table 1). table 1

USSR announcement of the number of Japanese captives: numbers of individuals already repatriated and pending

Announcement Total date number

1945.9.12 1949.5.20 1950.4.22

594,000 594,000 594,000

1946.12a

998,901

1945 actual release

70,800 70,800

Repatriation completed

  418,166 510,409 137,283

War criminals and others

9,954 2,467

(therein)

Thereafter   repatriated

  95,000 0 861,618 Liaodong 159,325 Northern Korea 3,620 USSR 698,673 (therein)

     

Karafuto (Sakhalin) 243,346 POWs 455,327

a Reference: Soren kanri chiiki no Nihonjin horyo sōsū sude (ni) sōkansha sū [Total number of Japanese POWs in Soviet-controlled regions] (Numbers of individuals already repatriated, based on data still unannounced officially). Sources: Pravda, September 14,1945, 1; May 20, 1949, 2; April 22, 1950, 2; and AVP RF, f. 0146, op. 31, por. 15, pap. 289a, l. 23

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Due to these complex issues this essay uses the more inclusive descriptive term “POWs and internees.” The accuracy of this term is also reflected in the fact that the Soviet agency responsible for the management of foreign captives treated them all as POWs—in contrast to the definition in the Geneva Convention—was called the Main Administration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees (GUPVI). It was part of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (from March 1946 it was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, MVD). 3

The Treatment of the POWs and the 1929 Geneva Convention

As its name suggests, the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of the Prisoners of War, was the international document that regulated the handling of POWs. The document detailed the terms regarding the treatment foreign captives: – “prisoners of war are entitled to respect for their persons and honor” (Article 3); – the duty of the “detaining Power … to provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war” (Article 4); – the POWs’ right to keep in possession all of their personal effects and articles (Article 6); – the belligerents’ obligation to “notify each other of all captures of prisoners as soon as possible” (Article 8); – the requirement that “the food ration of the prisoners of war shall be equivalent in quantity and quality to that of the depot troops” of the detaining Power (Article 11); – the same power’s obligation to supply the prisoners of war with “[c]lothing, underwear and footwear” (Article 12); – “to take all necessary hygienic measures to ensure the cleanliness and sanitation of camps and to prevent epidemics” (Article 13); – the detaining power “may employ as workmen as prisoners of war who are physically fit, other than officers” (Article 27); – “[n]o prisoners of war may be employed on work for which he is physically unsuited” (Article 29). Furthermore, Article 34 regulated the POWs’ entitlement to remuneration for their work, and according to Article 36 they had the right to send letters and postcards to their families (International Committee of the Red Cross, “Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War”).

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The treatment of foreign, not just Japanese, POWs in the Soviet camps contravened each of the above articles. Onoe Masao, a Japanese jurist and expert on international law interned in Siberia until January 1950, was the first to point out most of these violations. Here, however, I will touch on some of the points overlooked in his research. Soviet guards and camp employees routinely appropriated the personal belongings of internees, ranging from watches to more valuable items. Food rations provided in most camps were well below the minimum amounts set by the NKVD, especially during the early period of internment when most internees suffered from chronic malnutrition. In the severe cold of the Siberian and Far Eastern regions, the authorities also failed to provide internees with appropriate winter clothing and footwear. The trains transporting internees and their living quarters (camp barracks) were kept in unsanitary conditions, which often led to the spread of infectious diseases. 62,000 of the approximately 610,000 Japanese internees died during internment, and over 80 percent of these deaths occurred in the brief time between the autumn of 1945 and the spring of 1946. Although malnourished and diseased internees were forced to work, wages were not paid in the early period of internment in order to keep the costs of production low. The camp authorities then reduced the wages, checking off the costs of maintaining POWS (e.g., food, clothes). This was despite the fact that the later 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War stipulated that POWs, “were given free food supply regardless of their earnings (works)” (Article 62, [Third] Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War). The same convention states that at the time of repatriation camp authorities are obliged to hand back, in exchange for receipts, all of the internees’ personal effects and any wages that exceeded the costs of maintenance at the camps. In reality, however, none of these were provided to the internees before they boarded repatriation ships. The lack of respect on the part of Soviet authorities regarding the dignity and honor of Japanese POWs was most evident in the humiliating treatment of the Japanese during their transit to the camps. It is not an exaggeration to say that they were treated no better than animals. The rough conditions at worksites were further proof of the inadequate consideration of the well-being of Japanese captives. It was perhaps most obvious, however, in how the Soviets disposed of the bodies of those who had died in captivity; they were commonly deserted and the places of burial neglected. This was in contravention of Article 76 stipulating the rights of deceased POWs to be “honorably buried.” Initially, each camp authority maintained an individual register of deaths and managed the camp’s burial ground. Yet many of these registers were incomplete, or contained numerous errors. Following Stalin’s death and

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Beria’s execution in 1953 both POW camps and correctional labor camps under the jurisdiction of the NKVD were gradually closed, and camp burial grounds and graveyards fell under the supervision of local soviets (councils). When, in February 1959, the Soviet authorities ordered a nationwide inspection of the burial grounds with Japanese POWs, it became clear that many cemeteries had ended up on industrial sites and communal construction zones. Some were even abandoned because nearby railway stations and villages were closed or evacuated (Kuz’mina 1996, 100) (Table 2). Internees’ rights of correspondence were also curtailed, and despite holding detailed information on the Japanese captives—as witnessed in the existence of individual registers—the Soviet government refused to share this information with the Japanese. The only time that Soviet authorities provided official statements on Japanese POWs was in September 1945 in the newspaper Pravda, and in statements by the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) from May 1949 and April 1950. But these only ever gave the general numbers of the Japanese to be repatriated. Beginning in the autumn of 1946, a year after the table 2

Numbers of internment dead (based on unannounced official data)

Announcement date 1947.2.20

15,986

30,728

1947.6.1 1947.8.9

48,931 57,836

1956.10.13

61,855

Deaths at internment camps on Manchurian battlefronts Deaths at internment camps within Soviet territory 48,931 + 1,323 (in Mongolia) + 1,082 (at repatriation camps) + 6,500 (Southern Karafuto [Southern Sakhalin])

Note: Kōseishō (Ministry of Health and Welfare) official figure: 53,000 Sources: Maksim Matveevich Zagorul’ko, Voennplennye v SSSR. 1930–1956: Dokumenty i materialy. Moskva (Literature 5), no. 3, 71; AVP RF, f. 0146, op. 31, por. 16, pap. 289a, l. 48, 94–95; and V. P. Galitskiĭ , Yaponskie voennoplennye i internirovannye v SSSR, Novaya i noveishaya istoria, no. 3, 1999, 32–33.

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start of the internment program, the internees were gradually allowed to send letters to their families using the standard “POW postcard” (pochtovaya kartochka voennoplennogo). Internees were not allowed to write about the conditions in the camps and, needless to say, all outgoing correspondence had to pass the inspection of camp officials. In July 1947, the Soviet Union started its Japanese-language radio broadcasts from Moscow, which announced the names of individuals nearing their date of repatriation. Yet these broadcasts rarely reached the families of the internees, rather the radio programs were the Soviet Union’s way of exploiting the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) to its own ends. The JCP also scored points in this game as they found an outreach channel to the families of the internees (Sengo Shakai Undō Mikōkan Shiryō Kankō Iinkai 2007). 4

Delays in the Repatriation of POWs and Internees

Under pressure from international public opinion, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the United States in December 1946 on the repatriation of the Japanese POWs and internees from Soviet camps. This agreement envisaged the return of 50,000 Japanese citizens each month. But during the winter months the Soviet authorities suspended the repatriation, using the freezing up of Soviet ports as an excuse; as a result, the average monthly figure was below 50,000. In reality, the Soviet port of Nakhodka, which was used for the repatriation of Japanese captives, rarely froze over. Moreover, the US government offered to provide icebreakers but the Soviets still insisted on the suspension of repatriation for over three months, citing the provision in the agreement regarding the “temporary suspension of repatriation due to unforeseen circumstances (e.g., weather conditions)” (Table 3). At the time, the Soviet authorities and the members of the Soviet propaganda education program for POWs and internees, the so-called “Democratic Movement,” spread propaganda messages blaming the Japanese government for the delayed repatriation. These claims asserted that the Japanese did not provide sufficient transportation (repatriation ships) for the return of Japanese captives. This was far from the truth, however. The responsibility to assemble repatriates from each camp, to prepare them for departure, and to contact the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the US Occupation requesting ships lay squarely with the Soviet side—namely, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Soviet Council of Ministers for Repatriation. Furthermore, contrary to Soviet claims at the time, documents from various archives in Russia reveal

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Japanese Captives in the Soviet Union and Their Movements table 3

Number of ships and repatriated from the USSR (by month)

Year/Month 1946 12 1947 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1948 1–4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12–1949/1 2 3–5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total

313

Number of repatriated

Requisitioned ships/Supply ships

28,421

25,500/33,200

83,438 63,693 90,606 58,083 51,920 49,125 46,564 30,418 36,181 35,181 47,667 3,676

86,000/86,700 60,000/67,100 90,700/104,700 50,000/62,700 50,400/54,400 52,200/53,400 52,300/59,000 30,000/35,900 35,000/41,400 37,000/41,800 42,222/50,200 3,800/4,000

0 46,345 44,999 46,034 40,030 37,214 37,420 37,929 0 14 0 10,245 20,467 18,000 20,261 13,840 12,160 1,009,931

0/0 48,500/62,100 46,000/56,800 46,300/56,800 40,500/49,300 37,500/45,800 37,500/47,800 37,350/44,700 0/0 – – – – – – – –

Source: Kōseishō (Ministry of Health and Welfare), ed., Hikiage engo no kiroku (Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan, 1950), 60, 73 - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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that the delays in the repatriation of Japanese internees was due to the Soviet side. For example, none of the seventeen echelons of Japanese internees, scheduled for departure from Nakhodka by June 3, 1946, missed its embarkation deadline, whereas the nine echelons, expected to arrive in Nakhodka in May, had not reached the repatriation port in early June (AVP RF, f. 0146, op. 32, pol. 13, pap. 298, l. 122). These delays were caused, in part, by the difficulties of transporting the repatriates from distant regions in the Soviet hinterland since the USSR’s railway networks had yet to be completely reconstructed following the devastation of the Soviet-German War. Yet in most cases camp authorities or provincial government officials, who feared loss of the Japanese labor force, intentionally lowered the number of repatriates. The central authorities also adopted this approach. In March 1947, the Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs Sergeĭ N. Kruglov, whose ministry oversaw the GUPVI, issued an order in direct contravention of the 1946 Soviet-American agreement on repatriation. Kruglov instructed the repatriation departments to send back only 20,000 Japanese internees per month, setting the annual total for 1947, excluding the four winter months, at 160,000 (AVP RF, op. 31, por. 15, pap. 298a, l. 64–66). Similarly, the repatriation of 240,000 Japanese civilian internees from the southern half of Sakhalin, meant to be completed via the port of Kholmsk beginning in March 1947, could not be concluded because the local authorities responsible for the region’s economy vehemently opposed the repatriation of this valuable labor force (Kim 2010, 49–58). 5 From POWs to War Criminals During the Siberian internment program the Soviet authorities selected around 9,000 Japanese POWs for investigation as suspected “war criminals.’ Around 3,000 of these were eventually brought to trial and convicted for war crimes. Perhaps the most widely known was the December 1949 Khabarovsk Military Tribunal, where several members of the Japanese Unit 731, a covert biological and chemical weapons research and development unit, were tried on charges of “manufacturing and utilizing bacteriological weapons.” At Khabarovsk, the former commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada Otozō, and eleven other officers and soldiers received verdicts from life sentences to two years of correctional labor. The judgment, contrary to the verdict of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, later the Tokyo Tribunal), was not based on the charges of “crimes against peace” and “crimes against humanity.” It was based instead on the “Law of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR” of April 19, 1943. The sentences were meted out

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according to the law used to try war criminals of the Nazi army for their abuse of and atrocities against Soviet citizens and POWs, spies among the Soviet citizens, traitors, and collaborators (Zolotarev 1996, 282–83). The Japanese army had not abused or committed atrocities against Soviet POWs in the Soviet-Japanese War of August 1945; for this reason, the articles of the 1929 Geneva Convention could not be used in persecuting the former Imperial Japanese Army officers. The Soviet side adjudicated the Japanese POWs according to domestic criminal law (Article 58 of the Penal Code of the Russian Federative Republic), the same article that was used in indicting Soviet political prisoners. Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka Yoshihisa, who founded the Russian Language Training Unit (Rogo Kyōikutai) in the Kwantung Army and who at the time of Japan’s defeat headed the Qiqihar Secret Military Intelligence Unit, was charged with “anti-Soviet activities” (Item 6, Article 58 of the Russian Criminal Code) and sentenced to death. He was executed in March 1947 by a firing squad (Zabelin 2001, 67). Two years later the scope of Article 58 was expanded: on August 3, 1949, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of the Soviet Union decided to apply it to a range of criminal acts allegedly committed by the Japanese. Those believed to have engaged in intelligence, counterintelligence, and subversive activities on behalf of foreign nations were to be punished under Sections 4 and 6 (“assistance to international bourgeoisie” and “espionage,” respectively), and those thought to have planned war against the Soviet Union and organized the military incursions near Lake Khasan and the Nomonhan River under Sections 2 and 4 (the former the “assistance to international bourgeoisie”). The leaders of the Concordia Association in Manchukuo, seen as a fascist organization by the Soviets, were to be adjudicated under Sections 4 and 11 (the latter the “organizational and support actions”) (Zolotarev 1996, 517–18). Section 2 was directed toward counterrevolutionary activities, as well as armed revolts or uprisings aimed at undermining Soviet authority; Section 4 dealt with helping the international bourgeoisie opposed to the Soviet Union; Section 6 adjudicated espionage activities; and Section 11 covered any kind of organizational and support activities in carrying out any offenses mentioned in Article 58. The provisions outlined in each section, however, were vague and were open to interpretation and application. The above might lead to the conclusion that the Soviet trials of “war criminals” were conducted in an arbitrary manner. In acknowledgment of the tyrannical nature of the decisions, the Soviet state restored the honor of the many victims of these trials during the perestroika era, including Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka. Perhaps the most typical example of the arbitrary nature of the verdicts was the fact that simply being able to speak Russian was sufficient grounds for

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the prosecutors to suspect someone of espionage. At the same time, it is also true that some Russian-speaking Japanese captives who were given high positions in the camps were caught in a particularly difficult position, trying to navigate between the camp authorities and their fellow internees. Moreover, some graduates of the Harbin Institute (Harubin Gakuin) and Russian Language Training Units in Tokyo and Shinkyō (modern-day Changchun) were employed by military intelligence units and the Kenpeitai (Military Police Corps). Many of these graduates, who had never worked for the above organizations, were similarly investigated under the suspicion of espionage activities, often receiving twenty-five-year prison sentences at trials and imprisoned in corrective labor camps. Uchimura Gōsuke, for example, was sentenced to twenty-five years in the camps for being a graduate of the Harbin Institute and having worked in the 2nd (Intelligence) Division of the Kwantung Army Command Headquarters. After serving his term in camps in various regions of the USSR, Uchimura was eventually repatriated in 1956 (Uchimura 1967). 6

The Aims and Outcomes of Anti-fascist Political Education

When hundreds of thousands of Nazi soldiers fell into Soviet hands as POWs, the Soviet leadership devised and carried out an anti-fascist political education program, which was also applied to Japanese POWs. The objectives (and significance) of these programs were intended to make former enemy soldiers reflect on the tyranny of fascism and militarism and to promote a process of remorse regarding the atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht and the Imperial Japanese Army. Seen in this light, the programs achieved some success, but the outcomes rarely went beyond the stated goals of advancing reflection and repentance. The Democratic Movement had found support among the lowerranking Japanese internees who were resentful of the old hierarchies carried over from the Imperial Japanese Army into the Soviet camps. The ideological schooling of the Democratic Movement activists, however, eventually gave rise to the over-glorification of Stalin and Soviet socialism. It also resulted in vilifying “kangaroo courts” being held against Japanese internees deemed to be “reactionary elements” (handō bunshi). The spread of activism was so extreme that it even exceeded the original expectations of the Soviet camp authorities, some of whom, in turn, even criticized the excess (RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 35a, d. 7, l. 138; Takasugi 1950). The Democratic Movement evolved from a crude anti-military campaign eventually into an overly ideological political movement. This transformation culminated in the May 1949 “Letter of Gratitude to Generalissimo Stalin”

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(Sutaarin daigensui ni taisuru kanshajō) signed by 64,434 Japanese internees. This letter, sent by the Japanese to thank the man who was the most responsible for their long-term internment and cruel exploitation represents an incredible conversion. It conveys the impression that in the minds of the Japanese soldier, the Imperial Japanese Army and the Soviet POW camps represent strikingly similar existences. This is a reminder how both the state and the military in prewar Japan considered the soldiers (heishi) and the public (taishū) as one—a uniform, standardized body trained to be mobilized by a single order—perhaps best characterized by the Nazi term Gleichschaltung, or “forced assimilation.” Although they, quite surprisingly, encountered pro-demonstrations and meetings at the port of Maizuru in Kyoto Prefecture on the coast of the Sea of Japan, many Japanese internees made a complete about-turn when back in their hometowns and villages. This was true not only about internees who, in the hopes of larger food rations or earlier repatriation, had cooperated with camp productivity campaigns and sympathized with the Democratic Movement, earning, in the process, the nickname “red radish” (akadaikon). Even genuine activists changed their positions when they saw that the economic conditions in Japan were not as bad as reported by the camp propaganda newspaper Nihon shinbun. Their fervent desire to join the “political battles” and “class struggle” was dampened in conversations with family and friends. In this regard the Soviet Union’s scheme to strengthen the Japanese Communist Party by sending in Democratic Movement activists who could be put to use in “democratizing” Japan was a total failure. This was on top of the severe damage to the Soviet Union’s image in Japan due to the fact that it had illegally kept the Japanese and delayed their repatriation until the last possible moment. As a result, the Soviet Union easily became “the most hated nation” in postwar Japanese society (Table 4). table 4

The Jijitsūshinsha (Jiji Press) public opinion poll: ‘Countries liked’/‘Countries disliked’ (%)

June 1949 Countries liked United States United Kingdom Switzerland France

Countries disliked 62.0 4.0 2.0 1.0

USSR China Republic of Korea (South Korea) United States

53.0 7.0 3.0 1.0

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318 table 4

Tomita The Jijitsūshinsha (Jiji Press) public opinion poll (cont.)

Countries liked USSR Others No response

Countries disliked   1.0 3.0 26.0

United Kingdom Others No response

 1.0 1.0 34.0

June 1960 (in response to various questions) Countries liked United States United Kingdom Switzerland France West Germany India China USSR Republic of Korea (South Korea) No response

Countries disliked 47.4 39.7 31.9 25.6 16.6 15.8 4.4 3.3 1.4 27.6

USSR Republic of Korea (South Korea) China United States United Kingdom West Germany India France Switzerland No response

50.4 46.6 39.3 5.9 3.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 0.7 34.5

Sources: Yoshida Yutaka and Kawashima Takane, eds., Jijitsūshin senryōki yoron chōsa (Tokyo: Ozorasha, 1994) and Jijitsūshin reporter, Okuyama.

7

Relations between POWs and Soviet Citizens and the Economic Value of POW Labor

Throughout history, POWs have been isolated from the local population of the country where they are interned, and this was also true regarding the Soviet Union. According to the 1939 law establishing POW camps there, foreign captives were to be kept “in the conditions of total isolation from the surrounding civilian population.” The camp management system was intended to ensure this through the use of barbed wire, armed guards, and watchtowers, which were to eliminate completely any possibility of escape from camp zones. With the exception of some detention facilities located in cities and along railway lines, many camps were built near mines, forests, and poor, under-populated villages. This made any direct contact with civilian populations extremely - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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unlikely. Any unnecessary interactions with the local population at worksites or any exchange of goods or provisions were strictly prohibited (Zagorul’ko 2000, 640). The regions of the Far East, Siberia, and Central Asia were experiencing severe labor shortages during this period. The accomplishment of numerous important projects, from the construction of industrial factories to the building of public facilities in urban areas, was very dependent on POW labor. For this reason, local populations and Japanese POWs frequently came into daily contact, in numerous cases working shoulder-to-shoulder at sites. Japanese internees record in their memoirs that in agricultural areas they were mobilized for work in collective farms (kolkhoz), and their contribution was particularly valuable during the busy harvesting season. And while the scarcity of foodstuffs, the spread of contagious diseases, and the rising numbers of casualties during the winter of 1945–1946 meant the introduction of a strict regime relating to isolation and quarantine, the gradual improvement of the food situation and the stability of camp management resulted in a considerable easing of the situation. Japanese returnees recollect that Soviet authorities demonstrated a magnanimous attitude to cultural and recreational activities in the camps. The POWs were allowed to form music bands and stage theatrical performances, and it was not unusual for Soviet citizens to attend these. The memoirs of Japanese internees also point out that because many the Soviet camp chiefs and employees had themselves been POWs in the Nazi camps during the Soviet-German War, it was not rare to find officers who empathized with them. Soviet archives reveal concerns among the authorities about contacts between the POWs and local populations. This is clearly seen in the September 1946 report on “Intolerable Cases of Exchange between Local Populations and POWs” from the Khabarovsk regional party committee. The report drew on information from the city of Komsomol’sk-na-Amure, where Japanese POWs allegedly communicated with the local population on a regular basis, visiting their homes and playing with their children. The informant wondered whether such exchanges should be allowed, even though a municipal party secretary said: “We hate the German invaders of our motherland, but what about the Japanese?” Eventually, the the regional party committee decided to “limit exchange,” and this move in itself indicates that the interactions between Soviet citizens and Japanese captives must have been fairly frequent (GAKhK, f. 35, op. 3, d. 237, l. 51, 82–88). Russian research on the contributions of internees to the Soviet economy has argued that the economic benefits of POW labor were consistently below the costs of their maintenance until 1949, when, for the first time, the returns matched expenditure. In other words, Russian scholars contend that forced - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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POW labor was never profitable; however, the economic reasoning and the calculations behind these claims are barely substantiated. Moreover, the question of why the Soviet authorities continued to rely on an economically inefficient workforce remains insufficiently addressed. Elena L. Katasonova claims that because the Soviet authorities had already been well acquainted with the practice of exploiting convict labor since the 1930s, they did not veer from this practice during the 1940s. Katasonova asserts that regional chiefs and officials responsible for planning were more concerned about solving problems by enlisting a large workforce rather than attempting to raise labor productivity (Katasonova 2005, 78–79). This explanation, however, seems a somewhat moot point. The historian Aleksandr L. Kuz’minykh has estimated that the overall contribution of POW labor to the fourth five-year plan (1946–1950) was around 4 to 8 percent. The weight of this contribution would have varied depending on the province, region, or union republic. Obviously, the impact of POW labor was much more significant in regions with a severe shortage of labor, such as Central Asia or the Far East. This can also be inferred from the fact that the Japanese accounts of internment in such republics as Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or Kyrgyzstan, state that the diligent work and the skills of the Japanese POWs, seen in the solid buildings they constructed, received the highest praise, and as a result, gave rise to pro-Japanese feelings (Ajikata 2008; Dulatbekov 2011). 8

Did the Japanese Government Assist Repatriates from the USSR?

Internal divisions among the Siberian internees caused by their struggle for compensation continued for decades after repatriation. For this reason, objective investigations into the subject have been difficult. The year 2011 saw the publication of Nagasawa Toshio’s monograph The Siberian Internment and Postwar Japan: The Returnees’ Struggle (Shiberia yokuryū to sengo Nihon: kikansha tachi no tatakai) but there are few narratives about the early postwar years. Those that do exist are largely devoted to the National Association for the Compensation of Internees (Zenkoku Yokuryūsha Hoshō Kyōgikai, or Zenyokukyō) (Nagasawa 2011). In an effort to address this gap, in 2013 I published a monograph on the post-repatriation lives of returnees (Tomita 2013). The main arguments in that book are summarized here. At the end of World War II, over 6 million demobilized servicemen and civilian repatriates returned to a defeated Japan. In September 1946, around 4.4 million of these overseas Japanese were back on their home islands; among them, 1.5 million had no jobs, and another 1.27 million were seen as potentially

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unemployable (Mainichi shinbun, September 18, 1949). Relief payments from the government were inadequate; moreover, when the repatriated disembarked at Japanese ports, they received a meager one-time allowance that did little to assist their living costs. Their livelihoods were meager: there were few jobs for the unemployed or funds for those wishing to start their own businesses. This meant that the repatriated had to rely on a vigorous public welfare livelihood protection system that did not recognize their specific claims to protection beyond those of other war victims. In May 1948, with the beginning of the second wave of repatriation from the Soviet Union, the government established the Repatriate Relief Agency (Hikiage Engo-chō). In December 1947, Japan’s National Diet adopted the “Law on Paying Allowances to Unrepatriated Persons” (Mifukuinsha kyūyohō); one year later saw the passing of the “Special Law on Payments to Unrepatriated Persons” (Tokubetsu mikikansha kyūyohō). Yet the former was directed toward unrepatriated military personnel and civilians attached to the military with payments to be made to their families in Japan, whereas the second law was to serve the ordinary Japanese citizens still in in Soviet-occupied territories (Hikiage Engo-chō 1950, 45–46). The regulations also envisioned a payment of a small livelihood allowance. But the financial difficulties in postwar Japan, as well as the US GHQ’s deflationary policies under the 1949 “Nine Principles of Economic Stabilization” (Keizai antei kyūgensoku) meant that relief payments to repatriates were soon curtailed. The result was that returnees had to rely only on themselves and on support from public volunteering initiatives, such as the Charity Movement (Ai no Undō), including the Red Cross as well as other charitable and religious organizations. The good will of the latter proved invaluable in resolving housing shortages; many repatriates came to rely on their assistance in finding housing. During this period, Occupied Japan did not yet have the authority to conduct its own foreign policy and could only deal with other countries through the offices of the Allied Council for Japan (USSR, United States, United Kingdom, and China), and US representatives. One example of Japan’s diplomatic helplessness was in the appeal of the Central Liaison Office to the US GHQ on the issue of unreturned earnings, dated March 18, 1947. This appeal was based on reports that the earnings and personal effects of the Siberian internees were being confiscated at the time of repatriation, and it requested that such confiscations cease. In the event that these seizures could not be stopped, the document demanded that the Soviet side produce formal receipts, and upon their receipt in Japan “the Japanese government would pay their value in place of the Soviet Union” (Shūguin kōsei rōdō iinkai gijiroku 2002). (It is impossible to establish whether the US representatives conveyed the Japanese appeal to the Soviets,

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and what the response by the Soviet representative was, if any.) Furthermore, in June 1947 the Japanese government sent a memorandum to the Soviets via the US representative at the Allied Council for Japan that contained requests for information pertaining to the lives and deaths of Japanese internees in the Soviet Union. The Japanese side, in particular, asked the Soviet Union to share information about the Japanese POWs and internees, to permit Japanese repatriates to return with the lists with the names of the deceased and those still in the USSR, as well as the funerary urns with the ashes of the dead and their belongings. Apparently, the Soviet side never replied to the memorandum, which is today housed in the Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). In reality, however, the Soviets did not satisfy any of the demands in the documents (AVP RF, f. 0146, op. 31, pol. 16, l. 289a, l. 94). 9

The Cold War and Confrontation between Returnee Organizations

Conservative associations dominated the organizations that lobbied for the early return of Japanese citizens stranded abroad or for the support of repatriate families. Groups such as the Association for Supporting Compatriots in Manchuria and Mongolia (Manmō Dōhō Engokai) were influential in the early years. The repatriate movement was united under the leadership of the National Association for the Acceleration of Repatriation of Overseas Compatriots (Zaigai Dōhō Kikan Sokushin Zenkoku Kyōgikai, or Zenkyō), as repatriation from the Soviet Union increased from 1948 and as the Democratic Movement sprang up even after the internees left the Soviet camps. The movement would soon become polarized primarily between conservative and JCPleaning groups. The repatriates who disembarked from ships in May 1948 had been initiated into the Democratic Movement from the spring of 1947. As soon as they reached Japanese soil, they immediately joined the newly founded (in April 1948) Alliance for Supporting the Livelihoods of Returnees from the Soviet Union (Soren Kikansha Seikatsu Yōgo Dōmei, or Sokidō). In July 1948, when a train carrying Siberian returnees arrived at Tokyo’s Ueno Station, a skirmish broke out between conservative student groups and activists from the Japanese Communist Party that had assembled at the station. Later, in September, these two opposing sides clashed once again at a meeting of the National Rally of the Families of the Missing (Zenkoku Rusu Kazoku Taikai). And in November, a group of returnees with strongly anti-Soviet views beat up fellow repatriates onboard a repatriation ship who were sympathetic with the Soviet state.

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Concurrent with these clashes and with the start of the so-called “Reverse Course” of US Occupation policies toward Japan in late 1948, the monitoring of the returnees from the USSR by the US GHQ intensified. At the repatriation port of Maizuru, the government offices responsible for supporting the repatriates conducted initial identifications and checks, and distributed the one-time allowance to the returnees. In addition, the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC, or 441st Civil Intelligence Corps Detachment) of the US GHQ selected roughly one out of ten returnees to conduct “ideological examinations” (shisō chōsa) into the nature of their alleged participation in the Democratic Movement and to extract information about the Soviet Union’s military and civilian facilities (Senryōgun chian chōhō geppō 2006). Memoirs by returnees reveal that for some the checks and interrogations did not end at Maizuru. Once back in their hometowns they were then summoned to Tokyo and interrogated at the CIC headquarters, where select interrogation sessions were carried out with the use of a polygraph/lie-detector machine. The Soviet representative office in Tokyo also sent personnel to Maizuru and in close cooperation with the Sokidō launched a range of countermeasures to the US GHQ’s checks and interrogations (AVP RF, f. 0146, op. 32, pol. 14, pap. 298, l. 33–38; pol. 15, pap. 298, l. 75–88). Sokidō added to its usual platform of advocating livelihood support and early repatriation in such slogans as “Smash the Anti-Soviet, Anti-communist Demagoguery and Fight for the Total Eradication of Fascist Militarism!” or “Hand-in-Hand with All Democratic Groups, Struggle for the Nation’s Complete Independence and for the Establishment of Everlasting Peace around the World!” It is evident from these rallying cries that Sokidō came to embody the political line of the Japanese Communist Party, according to which any talk about the cruelty of the Siberian internment was “anti-Soviet, anti-communist demagoguery,” whereas “telling the truth about the Soviet Union” meant glorifying the life in the camps, focusing on everyday labor and cultural activities (Sokidō shinbun). When the Japanese Communist Party won thirty-five seats in the National Diet in the January 1949 general elections, the US GHQ and the Yoshida government embarked on their anti-communist offensive. On May 20 of that year TASS announced that only 95,000 Japanese remained in the USSR at the time. This provoked the anger of the GHQ, the Yoshida government, and the conservative groups that believed the Soviets were holding as many as 400,000 Japanese internees. In late June, at the start of the third year of repatriation, mainstream Japanese newspapers sensationalized the news about a group of Democratic Movement activists disembarking from the repatriation ships. There were reports of repatriates waving the red flag and singing revolutionary

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songs, marching on without casting a single glance toward their families who waited anxiously on the wharf (Mainichi shinbun, June 28, 1949). A spate of three “mysterious” events that occurred from July to September 1949, coupled with the August 1948 government ordinance dictating the repatriates to maintain order, further deepened alarm about returnees from the Soviet Union.1 The issue of Siberian internment became the focus of Cold War confrontation internationally and domestically when, in December 1948, the Soviet representative at the Allied Council for Japan left the session in protest at his US counterpart’s claim that 370,000 Japanese internees still remained in the USSR. The narrative about the “370,000 unrepatriated” became the official position of the Japanese government in the “Repatriation White Paper” (Hikiage hakusho) published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1951. It also became the popular interpretation within society, widely propagated by the mass media until the start of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations on the restoration of diplomatic relations. It was only at this time that the references to the 370,000 unrepatriated Japanese citizens finally stopped. Documents declassified at the Diplomatic Archives in 2000 reveal, however, that the Japanese officials were aware at the time that the actual number of unrepatriated Japanese citizens in the USSR stood at around 1,500 people. In a memorandum dated October 7, 1949, Wajima Eiji, a bureau chief at the Japanese foreign ministry, had written, “the truth is that the number [370,000] was actually forced on us by the GHQ.” 10

The “Tokuda Request” and the Break-Up of the Japanese Communist Party

A statement made by the US representative at the Allied Council on March 1, 1950, further aggravated the political confrontation over the internment issue. The allegation that Tokuda Kyūichi, general secretary of the Japanese Communist Party, had requested that the Soviets detain the “reactionary elements,” first appeared in a testimony by a Japanese returnee interned at the camp in Kazakhstan. Speaking as a witness at the House of Councilors Special Committee on Repatriation, the former internee testified that the political officer at his camp had made a statement about Tokuda’s request in an address 1  The so-called “Three Mysterious Railway Incidents” of 1949 were the Shimoyama Incident on July 5–6, when the president of the Japan National Railways Shimoyama Sadanori was murdered; the Mitaka Incident ten days later involving the crashing of a sabotaged train into Mitaka Station that killed six people; and the Matsukawa Incident on August 17, a derailment of a high-speed train on the Tōhoku Main Line that killed three engineers.

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to the Japanese captives. This testimony further raised the alarm about “POWs turning red” (horyo no sekka) (Mainichi shinbun, March 2, 1950). In mid-March, Tokuda was summoned to the above special committee, and in early April he also testified at the House of Representatives Investigative Committee. The interpreter who had translated the political officer’s speech to the Japanese internees at the Karaganda camp, Kan Sueharu, was also summoned to testify at the investigative committee. Despite his insistence that he had used the verb “expect” (kitai suru) in his translation when talking about Tokuda, Kan was obstinately hounded by the conservative committee members who claimed that Tokuda had actually “requested” that the Soviets detain reactionary elements. Following this testimony, Kan committed suicide. The committee’s final verdict was that the JCP had obstructed the repatriation of Japanese citizens from the Soviet Union, indirectly through the Democratic Movement, and directly through Tokuda’s request to the Soviets (Japanese National Diet, Records of the House of Representatives Special Committee on Repatriation and the House of Councilors Special Investigative Committee). At this time, the Japanese Communist Party was divided following the criticism by the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) of Nosaka Sanzō’s line of “Peaceful Revolution.” In addition to these troubles, the party was hit hard by the “Tokuda Request” (Tokuda yōsei) campaign. When TASS announced “the completion of repatriation” from the Soviet Union on April 22, 1950, the movements advocating early repatriation were deprived of their platforms, and the Japan Alliance of Repatriates (Nihon Kikansha Dōmei, or Nichikidō), Sokidō’s new name from October 1949, found itself in difficult times. The eruption of the Korean War in June 1950 became the pretext for outlawing the JCP, and the Nichikidō’s activities were seriously curtailed. Eventually, the JCP, having chosen the path of armed struggle for national liberation, lost all of its seats in the National Diet following the 1952 general elections. It was eventually marginalized from the public sphere. To say that the Japanese Communist Party had always followed Moscow’s lead would not be entirely accurate, however. Secretary Tokuda, for example, had continuously requested that the Soviet representatives in Japan provide information on the real numbers of Japanese internees in the USSR, and Chairman Nosaka had urged the repatriated Democratic Movement activists to conduct their activities in full compliance with conditions in Japan (Akahata, December 26, 1947; July 30, 1948). Until the “Tokuda Request” incident, the Soviet Union had not criticized the JCP in relation to the issue of the internment. Yet according to Soviet archival documents, the authorities in Moscow had judged that Tokuda’s actions “were objectively a great help to the anti-Soviet campaigns of the US and Japanese reactionary forces” (RGASPI,

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f. 485, op. 280, d. 85 (l), l. 69–71). This statement is an example of Soviet cynicism and double standards. 11

The Late Repatriation of Military Leaders

Although Japan regained its independence following the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951, it could not engage in diplomatic negotiations with the USSR because the latter was not a signatory to the treaty. The issue of repatriating Japanese “war criminals” still detained in the Soviet Union, negotiated in both countries with the help of the Red Cross, finally resulted in an agreement in October 1953, seven months after Stalin’s death. Repatriation was therefore carried out in eleven waves between December 1953 and December 1956, and detainees such as General Yamada Otozō, chiefof-staff general Hata Hikosaburō, staff officer Sejima Ryūzō, and Asahara Seiki, once the general manager of the Democratic Movement who had fallen out of favor with the Soviets, could finally return to Japan. Conservative groups dominated the repatriate movement, the main organizing force provided by rightish organizations. Prominent among these were the Association for the Acceleration of the Repatriation of Compatriots from the Soviet Union (Zaiso Dōhō Kikan Sokushinkai), founded by the first group of repatriates from the USSR, and the Japan Healthy Youth Association (Nihon Kenseikai), whose head, Suetsugu Ichirō would later become advisor to Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (Table 5). The movement was divided, however, regarding the ongoing Soviet-Japanese negotiations. One side of the divide argued that Japan should not make “hostages” out of the Siberian internees and should instead push forward the demands for the return of its “own” territories, whereas their opponents viewed the repatriation of the internees as a top priority. Ultimately, the latter position prevailed. When the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration was signed in October 1956, the parties mutually agreed to renounce any claims for compensation against each other. In other words, any demands that POWs should be “paid a fair working rate by the detaining authorities”—that is, the Soviet Union—were ruled out by the agreement between the governments. In 1979, the conservative and progressive factions of the repatriate movement finally set their differences aside and founded the aforementioned National Association for the Compensation of Internees under the helm of Saitō Rokurō in order to lobby for compensation. But the conservatives soon broke away to form their own group, the National Association of Forced Internees (Zenkoku Kyōsei Yokuryūsha Kyōkai, or Zenyokukyō) under the leadership of Aizawa Hideyuki since they were

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unable to agree with the progressives led by Saitō Rokurō. The major point of difference was about the principle of demanding compensation from their own country (Japan) and the support of the belief that all claims for compensation should be made to the Soviet Union. This divisive principle was gleaned from the example of repatriate organizations in West Germany, who had realized the possibility of extending the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War to allow for the transfer of the duty to pay compensation to their home country (Saitō 1981, 169–70). table 5

Survey by the Kenseikai of the repatriated on the ship Takasagomaru (%)

At the time

Two months later

Question 1. What Do You Think about the Democratic Movement of That Period? Believe that it existed as it should 83.9 37.9 Believe that it went to extremes  8.8 48.5 Don’t know  7.3 13.8 Question 2. What Do You Think of the Newspaper, Nihon shinbun? They report the truth 57.6 27.5 Frequent reporting of propaganda and lies 17.6 66 Don’t know 24.9  6.5 Question 3. How Do You See the Living Conditions of the People? Believe they are better than in the USSR 21.2 Normal 37.4 Believe they are worse than in the USSR 41.4 No response  4

66 21 11.6  1.4

Question 4. How Do You See the Conditions Surrounding the Reconstruction of War Damage? Believe they are better than in the USSR 21.2 73.9 Normal 51.4 18.1 Believe they are worse than in the USSR 27.4  6.5 No response  0  1.5 Question 5. Have You Found Employment? Found employment Found no employment No response

44.2 52.9  2.9

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Tomita Survey by the Kenseikai of the repatriated on the ship Takasagomaru (%) (cont.)

At the time Question 6. Why Are You Not Working? No desirable work No occupation Body is weak and cannot (work) For the time being, good to be idle Others No response

Two months later

15.1 43.8  5.5  2.7 27.4  5.5

Question 7. At the Time of Disembarkation, Did You Enter the Communist Party? Entered immediately 11.6 Reluctantly entered  8 Did not enter 76.1 No response  4.3 Question 8. Is It Good to Join the Japanese Communist Party? Good 14.8 Left (the party) 14.8 Did not leave (the party)  7.4 Still thinking 51.9 Question 9. Which Political Party Do You Support? Kyōsantō (Communist Party) 22.5 Minjitō (Democratic Liberal Party)  2.9 Shakaitō (Socialist Party)  1.4 Minshutō (Democratic Party)  0.7 Others  2.2 Do not support a political party 70.3 Source: “Sakigake,” no. 8 (September 15, 1949), 2 (one section omitted); however, there was no record of the method of examination. The follow-up investigation was difficult and records only one-seventh of the collected material. (Suetsugu Ichirō suggested that the follow-up investigation covered seventy percent of the questionnaires.)

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The Enduring Division between Repatriate Groups

Saitō Rokurō’s National Association for the Compensation of Internees and Aizawa Hideyuki’s National Association of Forced Internees had split precisely because of the disagreements over the method of paying the returnees compensation for their labor. There was also another issue at the heart of their disagreement—the debate over whether the Siberian internees should be viewed as “POWs or internees.” The Saitō group believed that because the Japanese captives were POWs, the articles of the Geneva Convention applied to them. This was countered by Aizawa’s group, who maintained that because the Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters Order of August 18, 1945, did not acknowledge the Japanese servicemen as POWs, the Geneva Convention should be applied mutatis mutandis. Moreover, the urgency with which each group put forward its demands to the Japanese government significantly varied. On the one hand, the majority of the members in the Aizawa group were career military men, officers, or non-commissioned servicemen who had been receiving military pensions (restored in 1952 following the enactment of the San Francisco Peace Treaty). On the other hand, many of the members of the National Association for the Compensation of Internees had been conscripts who had joined the army through “call-up papers” (akagami). There were many among them who had served in the army for less than one year before being taken captive by the Soviets and therefore were ineligible for military pension even though they had spent four years in Soviet camps.2 From the outset there were other serious differences between the groups. These ranged from their respective attitudes toward and the evaluation of the Democratic Movement, the ideological differences manifested in their like or dislike of the Soviet Union and communism, and divergences in their assessment of Japan’s prewar expansionist policies on the mainland, the Manchukuo puppet empire, and the role of the Kwantung Army. Such differences could also be seen in the political allegiances of their leaders: whether they supported, on the one hand, the Japan Socialist Party and the JCP, or, on the other, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It would be imprudent, however, to claim that individual returnees could be divided into groups along the lines of these separate issues, such as the evaluation of the Democratic Movement and the Soviet 2  To receive military pension, the applicant was required to have served in the army for twelve years. Even though one year of the internment was equated to two years of normal service, someone who had just spent one year in active service and four in Soviet camps would only have had nine years of service—in other words, three short of the twelve year minimum.

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Union, or the denouncement of imperial Japan’s abandonment of its own soldiers by offering them to the Soviets. In June 2010, Japan’s National Diet adopted the “Special Law on Postwar Forced Internees” (Sengo kyōsei yokuryūsha ni kakaru mondai ni kansuru tokubetsu sochihō), which ordered special payments to all surviving Siberian internees, regardless of their membership in either of the above groups. The debate over the compensation method thus ceased to be an issue. Today, the average age of surviving returnees is ninety-five, and the fact that they are receiving unified, government support, serves, one hopes, to elucidate the provisions of the special law and to guarantee that the stories of the internees will be handed down to future generations. Translated by Sherzod Muminov Bibliography

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English Sources

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.

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International Committee of the Red Cross. “Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 27 July 1929.” https://www.icrc.org/ihl/ INTRO/305?OpenDocument. “Working Pay.” Article 62. (Third) Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, August 12, 1949. https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/375?OpenDocument.

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The “Маnchurian Blitzkrieg” of 1945 and Japanese Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union Alekseĭ A. Кirichenko and Sergey V. Grishachev The USSR and Japan established diplomatic relations in 1925, yet the ties between them remained tense for the next two decades, at times leading to armed conflicts such as the battles at Lake Khasan (1938) and Khalkhin Gol River (1939). The powers would ultimately sign the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941, which came into force for five years after its ratification on April 25. From 1941 to 1945 both parties observed neutrality, which each interpreted in accordance with the international situation dictated by the events of World War II. The Japanese command abandoned their initial plans to attack the USSR after the defeats in the battles of Midway (1942) and Guadalcanal (1942–1943) but the Soviet Union, as an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom, began its own war preparations. The Kremlin made its final political decision regarding the war with Japan on August 16, 1944, at a private meeting that was attended by the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav M. Molotov; chief of the political department of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA), Aleksandr S. Shcherbakov; chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, Andreĭ A. Zhdanov; and USSR ambassador to Japan, Yakov A. Malik. Joseph Stalin, it should be noted, also participated in the meeting. The probability of war with the USSR may have already been evident to the Japanese government following Stalin’s speech at the solemn commemoration of the 27th anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 1944, when he referred to Japan as an “aggressor” (агрессор). Such suspicions signaled the real possibility of war with the Soviet Union after the unilateral denouncement by Moscow of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact on April 5, 1945. Although Molotov assured the Japanese ambassador Satō Naotake that the Soviet Union would faithfully comply with the terms of the treaty before its termination on April 25, 1946, Japan remained unconvinced, and it frenetically began to strengthen its Kwantung Army. In actual fact, the Soviets adopted several decrees in the first half of 1945 dealing with the preparation of war with Japan, and in the summer vast military forces were relocated to the Far East.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_017

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The Entry into War with Japan, a “Manchurian Blitzkrieg”

The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, outlines the terms of Japan’s unconditional surrender; however, there were still segments of the Japanese command that refused to accept the terms of surrender and claimed that they would fight to the last soldier. This unsound decision provoked the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, respectively, as well as the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan. At 5 p.m. on August 8, 1945,1 Molotov conveyed to Ambassador Satō the news that the Soviet Union would go to war with Japan the following day. Although Soviet leaders had formally given Japan advance notice about the beginning of war, it was only on August 9 that the Soviet chief diplomat received the Japanese envoy in the Far East. The Soviet army invaded Manchuria (Manchukuo), taking the Japanese troops by surprise in what could be described as a “Manchurian Blitzkrieg.” Russian historians have demonstrated that the Soviet action complied with international law, proving that Japan was not the subject of aggression in World War II (Kuz’minkov 2010, 121). The Japanese historian Yokote Shinji has challenged its legality, claiming that the USSR ignored the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact that should have remained in force until April 25, 1946 (Yokote 2003, 193). The well-mobilized, well-trained Soviet troops were already experienced from fighting the forces of Nazi Germany and were equipped with state-ofthe-art weapons. They also greatly outnumbered the Japanese, and the Soviet units invading Manchuria encountered almost no resistance. Seventy percent of the Soviet’s infantry troops and ninety percent of the tanks and artillery were concentrated along the main axis of advance at the Transbaikal front. In the first three days of the campaign, for example, the 6th Guards Tank Army under command of Colonel General Andreĭ G. Kravchenko advanced by 450 km with no opposition and halted only because the transport aircraft had not been able to supply the necessary fuel (Vnotchenko 1971, 187). Their ammunition reserve remained intact due to the absence of the enemy. The swift advance of the Soviet troops was also facilitated by the command of the Kwantung Army, which ordered its troops to retreat and not to engage in 1  It must be remembered that with the seven-hour time difference, 5 p.m. on August 8, Moscow time, was already midnight in the Far East; this was precisely the moment when Soviet troops crossed the border into Manchuria. Formally, Molotov presented the document the day before entering the war, but in actual fact he presented the document at the same time as the beginning of the invasion.

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open confrontation with the enemy, but at the same maintain the local fortified districts on the border of Manchuria and the USSR. This is perhaps why the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East, Marshal Aleksandr M. Vasilevskiĭ, wrote in a report to Stalin on the progress of military operations that “the main forces of the Kwantung Army have as yet not materialized, been located or detected” (TsAMO RF 1945, f. 360, оp. 6134, d. 34, l. 25). By August 1945, the Kwantung Army was no longer as powerful and efficient as it had been in the early 1940s. Soon after its first great losses in 1943, the Japanese were forced to use divisions of the Kwantung Army to “patch up the holes” on other fronts or to reinforce the protection of its own domestic borders. The former chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters Operations, Colonel Kusachi Teigo, reveals in his memoirs that he found it challenging to follow the infinite instructions from Tokyo to transfer the most capable divisions from Manchuria to other battlefields. Kusachi writes that from October 1943 to March 1945 the 163 units of the Kwantung Army were relocated to the areas of military operations in the south or to protect the country (Kusachi 1976, 23). Moreover, new infantry divisions formed from border guards, as well as from untrained and aging recruits (Japanese colonists in Manchuria), were quickly mobilized in order to replenish the shrinking forces (Kusachi 1976, 23). It is possible to estimate the numbers and personnel of the Kwantung Army based on the list of its divisions transferred to the Soviet command at the end of August 1945. It records army divisions and units, which by the time of capitulation in Manchuria, were located in northern Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. The total of 712,966 people were part of the 1,250 units scattered across numerous garrisons in a territory measuring 1.5 million sq km. The Japanese troops, whose direct responsibilities included combat operations, had only 357,541 combat personnel—that is, less than half the number than in 1939. This was the result of the forced transfer of troops to other regions such as China and Southeast Asia (Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 263). It should be noted that the list has noticeable gaps. There is, for example, almost no data on Japanese pilots. When the Soviet advance began the Kwantung Army had 325 warplanes; however, most of them had left for Japan on August 14 without engaging Soviet aircraft. This meant that there were no Japanese pilots in Soviet captivity, except the commander of the 2nd Air Army, Lieutenant General Harada Uichirō, and several staff officers. Moreover, the list makes no mention of the Manchukuo (Manchurian) “army” since the Japanese dismantled it on the eve of the Soviet invasion, and its weapons were employed for newly formed units. Select units of the Manchurian army were used for the construction of military fortifications. The vast majority of Soviet soldiers and officers fought heroically during the military operations in the Far East and the number of fallen totaled 12,000. But - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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it should likewise be noted that the Japanese troops were unable to mount a convincing resistance, both in terms of quantity and quality. Regrettably, there were Soviet soldiers and officers who resorted to violence against Japanese colonists, and such inhumane acts were already occurring during the advance across the Soviet territory. The illegal actions by looters and rapists were severely pursued by the Red Army Command; their unchecked behavior was reported to Moscow and military courts sentenced the violators to execution. Yet unfortunately such behavior was not only perpetrated by Soviet soldiers but also by the forces of Anti-Hitler Coalition Allied armies. These events are further testimony to the fact that war is one of the most inhumane phenomena in the history of human society and that any army, regardless of its allegiance, has members who commit acts of moral turpitude. By August 15, 1945, when the Japanese radio broadcast the “Imperial Rescript on the Termination of War” (Daitōa sensō shūketsu no shōsho), the Soviet army occupied only a third of Manchuria. The campaign to seize the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, southern Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands had yet to begin. The situation was becoming increasing perilous for the Kremlin, however, since US Allied troops could potentially occupy the territories claimed by the Soviet Union. For this reason, following Douglas MacArthur’s Order No. 1 of August 16, which effectively put an end to the offensive, Stalin ordered Marshal Vasilevskiĭ to seize the territories that were still under Japanese control. At this time, the Red Army had only liberated part of Manchuria. On August 18, Marshal Vasilevskiĭ ordered the commanders at the front to proceed with air and sea landings. Vasilevskiĭ’s task was to win at least several days in order to delay a meeting with the command of the Kwantung Army. The Soviet command refused large-scale operations, beginning instead to employ air and sea landings, which easily secured cities, naval bases, and pushed the surrender of the Japanese military. By the date when Japan was due to sign the surrender, Soviet troops had taken control of almost all the targeted territories. Overall, they captured 41,199 Japanese soldiers as prisoners and accepted the capitulation of more than 600,000 soldiers and officers (Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 249–51). An explanation of the Japanese Imperial Rescript followed on August 17, 1945, which stated that the military personnel who laid down their arms according to the Imperial order were not considered prisoners of war (POWs). For the Japanese military, however, this was a very significant moment as they regarded capture as shameful. In the Soviet Union, these Japanese were considered prisoners of war, and detained civilians were regarded as internees. It is noteworthy that 90 percent of prisoners of war were apprehended in Manchuria and Korea, and not in the territory of Japan. - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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The Transport and Maintenance of Japanese Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union

Initially, the Soviet government probably did not expect that Japanese prisoners of war would be transferred to USSR territory. But a resolution of the State Defense Committee adopted on August 23, 1945, stipulated the transport of over 500,000 Japanese prisoners of war to USSR territory (RGASPI 1945, f. 644, op. 1, ed. hr. 458, l. 58–64). As a result, Japanese prisoners of war and internees were placed extrajudicially in camps and classified as criminals. And tens thousands of Japanese “slaves” were placed in camps as “separate labor battalions” (otdel’niĭ rabochiĭ batal’on [voennoplennyh i internirovannyh], ORB), which were at the disposal of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Military tribunals sentenced several thousands of people to lengthy imprisonment, yet even the Soviet judges did not view the majority of Japanese military personnel as war criminals. These prisoners were used to work on various projects, such as construction or in the mines, within the Soviet Union. On October 19, 1956, the Soviet-Japanese Declaration restored diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan, and the reciprocal claims between the two countries were dropped. The Japanese received a report in 1945 that stated 594,000 Japanese servicemen were taken captive and 507,589 civilians were interned (Cherevko and Kirichenko 2006, 270). Most of the civilians were repatriated from 1946 to 1951. It was also detailed that about 3,957 Japanese— prisoners of war who died in Soviet captivity—were buried at twenty-two cemeteries, and Soviet representatives stated that there was no information on the 60,000 who did not return to Japan. For many years thereafter, the Soviet party chose to ignore the problem of Japanese prisoners of war, treating it as if it had never existed. In Japan, by contrast, the problem of internees was a topic of frequent discussion. The recollections of tens of thousands of returned prisoners of war were published; by contrast, in the USSR any publications on this subject remained banned until the end of the 1980s during the perestroika era (Kirichenko 1989, 20; Kirichenko 1990, 39). In 1990, a symposium on the issue of prisoners of war was organized in Japan in close cooperation with the president of the National Association for the Compensation of Internees, Saitō Rokurō, and thanks to the assistance of the president of the Union Council of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Evgeniĭ M. Primakov. A number of scholars working in different parts of the former USSR have since expressed interest in this field (Bondarenko 1997; Kuznetsov 1997). During the visit of the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev to Tokyo in April 1991 a list of 38,000 deceased prisoners of war was given to the Japanese (the

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number of POWs was later increased). The Soviet and Japanese ministers of foreign affairs signed the agreement, which stated that relatives of Japanese prisoners of war who died in Soviet camps would be able to visit their graves and to have their remains repatriated. The government gave the Japanese further lists with the names of 40,000 compatriots who died in captivity. They also sanctioned visits to grave sites in the regions where foreigners were previously not permitted entry, and they allowed exhumations. To date, the remains of more than 18,000 Japanese have been exhumed and repatriated. There are still outstanding problems that can only be resolved at the federal government level, in particular, the issue of compensation for forced Japanese labor in the detention camps. The basic documents that regulated the status of a prisoner of war are the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1929. The USSR had signed the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (1864; renewed 1906) but did not intend to sign the 1929 convention regarding prisoners of war. A provision on prisoners of war adopted on March 19, 1931, by the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom, SNK) became in many respects the Soviet response to the Geneva Convention (Zagorulko 2000, 60–64). In other words, when it came to their policies about prisoners of war Soviet authorities were guided exclusively by domestic legislation. For its part, the Japanese delegation signed the Geneva Convention on July 27, 1929, although the Japanese parliament did not ratify the document. By the beginning of the war with Japan in August 1945, the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD; after March 1946 the Ministry of Internal Affairs, MVD) already had a degree of experience of working with enemy prisoners of war. Up until 1952, the Main Administration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees (GUPVI) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs dealt with these issues. Since 1952 the responsibility of convicted enemy prisoners of war were transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR’s Prison Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. By the time that the USSR had entered into war with Japan, the country’s leaders most likely had not thought about the transportation of Japanese prisoners of war to Soviet territory. This is confirmed by the joint directive of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the People’s Commissariat of Defense (NKO), and the General Staff of the Red Army that ordered commanders of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts to set up a camp for prisoners of war only in the territories liberated from Japanese troops—that is, Manchuria, northern Korea, Sakhalin, and Kurile Islands (RGVA, f. 1/p, оp. 23a, d. 6, l. 112). But in Manchuria, for example, there were no troops available

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to transport the prisoners, and therefore after the end of military operations some regiments from the regular army combat troops were urgently transferred to the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs to undertake this task. It was most likely the increased tensions with the United States at this time that pushed the USSR to violate Article 9 of the Potsdam Declaration and “to capture” the Kwantung Army. In September 1945, 450 NKVD officers were relocated to the Far East to staff the Japanese POW camps at the expense of the front network in the West. Three front camps, a “safe” camp located close to military operations but behind the position of the regular army from which prisoners were then moved to a permanent prison camp, and two collection points were scheduled for relocation to the Far East. Meanwhile, the departments for POW affairs were set up at the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts. All these measures were actioned in September, after the Japanese had been captured. With much delay and, most likely, in great haste, Directive No. 196 (November 12, 1945) of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, “On Creating the Proper Living, Nutrition, Health, and Working Conditions in the Camps for Japanese Prisoners of War” was issued. Directive No. 221 (November 24, 1945) of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs on the “Improvement of Conditions for Japanese Prisoners of War” followed (Zagorulko 2000, 231–33). The instructions contained in these documents were in practice very difficult to understand. One of the main reasons for the desperate plight of the Japanese prisoners of war and internees was the severe shortage of food. The food rations allocated to Japanese and other prisoners by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs existed on paper only. In reality, every camp suffered severe shortages in almost every food group since the camp administrations were unable to fulfill the designated targets. In January–February 1946, the GUPVI inspected sixteen POW camps, including Camps 503, 525, and 526 in the Kemerovo region where Japanese were imprisoned and where the extreme shortages had caused an increased death rate among inmates and consequently a reduction in work productivity. The following items were in meager supply in the Kemerovo camps during the fourth quarter of 1945: fish (48,621 kg), meat (4,603 kg), fats (6,635 kg), sugar (11,665 kg), bread (23,191 kg), and vegetables (53,977 kg) (Zagorulko 2000, 250). It should be added that these shortages were not substituted with other products. The poor rations for prisoners of war at Kemerovo, as well as at other camps, resulted in higher mortality and dystrophy, and this meant that only 52 percent (15,300 people) were able to work (Zagorulko 2000, 250). Medical care was likewise wanting, with only twenty-eight staff doctors among the sixty-seven appointed personnel. There were only 108 paramedics out of 140, and the lack

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of medics was replaced in part by specialists from within the ranks of the prisoners of war. This situation was similar in the many of the camps and was such that in the winter of 1945–1946 the death rate of Japanese prisoners of war rose with a great many of the captives also becoming gravely ill. The Soviet authorities not only failed to have Japanese prisoners of war work productively but also failed to care for them adequately. Several secret operations were conducted in which especially emaciated prisoners were moved from the Soviet Union. According to Resolution 3828–338 of April 13, 1946, from the Soviet Council of Ministers, a covert evacuation of sick Japanese to northern Korea was carried out. In line with the Order No. 00385 of May 4, 1946, from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 20,000 sick Japanese prisoners of war were to be transported to northern Korea and healthy Japanese prisoners of war in northern Korea to be sent to the USSR (Zagorulko 2000, 777–80). In order to carry out the order, however, it was necessary to select bed-ridden patients—mainly those with severe malnutrition—but there were more than 30,000 such patients. Instead, they were taken to Pos’et (Primorskiĭ Kraĭ) and placed in a quarantine camp where over 2,700 died. Those who did survive were sent on the steamship Saratov to northern Korea from where there they were shipped out to Japan (Zagorulko 2000, 811–13). The deteriorating condition of the prisoners of war concerned the heads of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and this led to a convening of an allunion meeting of the interior ministers of the federal and autonomous republics and the chiefs of regional departments of Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs Sergeĭ N. Kruglov addressed the meeting with a report in which he outlined the complexity of the situation. He recommended a strengthening of the controls over nutrition, labor, and the medical conditions, clearly setting out the following: Internal rules and procedures in labor camps should be simplified and tailored to the interests of labor use and preserving the physical condition of prisoners of war. If a prisoner of war has to go to work by 8 o’clock, then it is not necessary to wake him at 5 o’clock, let him stay in bed longer, you know that the more the person rests, the less he hungry he is. zagorulko 2000, 69–70

The archive has a chilling note written in brackets after these words that reads “the audience burst out laughing.” On April 29, 1947, the Central Financial Department of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a report on the “average cost” to maintain prisoners of war, which until September 16, 1946, was 228 rubles 53 kopeks per month/

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prisoner (7 rubles 62 kopeks/day), and thereafter it was 414 rubles 51 kopeks a month (13 rubles 82 kopeks/day). What appears to have been a generous allocation actually had hidden costs. More than half (153 rubles 15 kopeks per month) was allocated for the personal needs of a prisoner of war (from 9/16/1946, 310 rubles 38 kopeks). This sum subsumed the food expenses for a prisoner of war: 110 rubles 21 kopeks (from 9/1946, 267 rubles 44 kopeks). Quite surprisingly, the funds—34 rubles 5 kopecks and from September 16, 1946, 50 rubles 46 kopecks (per prisoner/year)—to maintain the camp apparatus was deducted from the same funds. The maintenance of the convoy troops was, for example, 21 rubles 44 kopeks (from 9/16/1946, 31 rubles 74 kopeks). The list also included “extra charges” of 2 kopeks a month per prisoner for the maintenance of the “moles” spying on prisoners. In other words, informants were paid out of the funds allocated for individual prisoners of war (Zagorulko 2000, 305–6). It should also be noted that these represented only the budgeted costs; they were never adhered to and the allocated funds were frequently reduced. With the majority of able-bodied prisoners of war being enlisted for badly paid, unskilled jobs, their performance efficiency would not be enormous. Working conditions in many of the camps, which were defined by the orders of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, were regularly violated. Rations were often reduced, which led to a deterioration in the prisoners’ physical health; ultimately, they were exempt from work and sent for treatment. Eventually the GUPVI heads prepared a detailed report on the situation and a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers in which they offered to introduce some financial incentives to the prisoners of war in the camps. But even these moderate measures to optimize POW labor went no further than Minister Kruglov. The meaning behind his reaction to these measures is obvious: Let the authors see me and report to me. I am confused by the following issues: 1) why are we asking the government about the right of a prisoner of war to send money from his earnings home if we know that a prisoner of war does not have this money? and 2) what is the sense of giving additional money to prisoners of war, thereby increasing the maintenance costs of the camps, especially if they [the camps] do not pay the money back as it is? TsAMO RF, f. 67, оp. 267216, d. 68, l. 51–57)

The majority of POW camps were economically inefficient—in other words, the state expended more to maintain them than what it received from their labor production. The statistics of the Khabarovsk Kraĭ camp serves as just one example (Table 1): - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Maintenance expenses: Khabarovsk Kraĭ POW camp (1946–1949)

Year

Expenses over income (rubles) State donation (rubles)

1946 1947 1948 1949 Total

129,798 358,560 184,307  21,060 727,232

140,533 346,015 154,717   1,859 689,593

Source: Zagorulko 2000, 1047

The Financial Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs repeatedly raised the issue of the economic ineffectualness of these camps. The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs even issued Order No. 388 of September 24, 1945, that offered a bonus for employees of the camps that effectively organized POW work. But this decree was short lived. The Ministry of Internal Affairs Order No. 380 of October 12, 1946, canceled it due to the mass fraud by top camp management in window dressing the results of POW work (Zagorulko 2000, 624–26, 677–78). 3

The Criminality of Japanese Prisoners of War and the Tokyo Tribunal

Military personnel of the Kwantung Army and Japanese civilians were forcibly and extrajudicially transported to the USSR and placed in camps run by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs. The fact that the vast majority of Japanese prisoners of war had not been convicted under Soviet law before reaching these penitentiary locations is remarkable. A search had already begun in the camps, however, in order to investigate and find those who had committed crimes against the USSR, and by March 22, 1949, 8,870 such criminals had been identified. By the end of 1949 and following the Khabarovsk Trial of December 25–30 that year, in which the developers of biological weapons (twelve members of the Kwantung Army) were found guilty, the number of prisoners of war accused of war crimes increased. According to the GUPVI, as of December 12, 1949, 4,547 Japanese POWs had police records: 1,670 were to be repatriated, 2,877 were tried, and 953 were to be transferred to the government of the People’s Republic of China (Zabelin 2012, 107–9). In 1950, those who had committed war crimes in Chinese territory were handed over to the PRC government. This - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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included 969 Japanese prisoners of war, twenty-four Mongolian internees, and the former Manchukuo emperor Puyi and his retinue of fifty-eight. Some victims of political repression died in forced-labor camps, and about 1,000 were “pardoned” by the Soviet government. This latter group of Japanese prisoners of war and internees were in the “General’s Camp No. 48” (the settlement of Cherntsy in the Ivanovo region) and in the “Regime Camp No. 16” (Khabarovsk). They arrived back in Japan at the end of December 1956. Long before their return, however, certain Japanese prisoners of war became involved in the largest trial of the period—the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. In 1946–1948, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, later the Tokyo Tribunal) for the trial of all Japanese Class A War Criminals took place in Tokyo. It seems that only events, beginning with the 1938 Battle of Lake Khasan, were considered. Especially valuable at the Tokyo Tribunal were the testimonies by the Japanese command personnel in the Soviet camps— namely, generals, and senior officers who took part in military operations, battle strategists as well as those involved in intelligence and counter-intelligence. A special team set up in Khabarovsk prepared witnesses for the Soviet prosecution in January 1946. The head of the office of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Ministry of Internal Affairs from March 1946) in Khabarovsk Kraĭ, Lieutenant General Ivan I. Dolgikh, led this group. A group of experienced investigators was sent from Moscow to assist him, and in total more than 1,000 people participated in this group. After an in-depth selection process, candidates for witnesses were divided into two groups of three people each: – the first group: chief of Manchukuo Railway Operation, Lieutenant General Kusaba Tatsumi; deputy chief of the Kwantung Army Staff, Major General Matsumura Tomokatsu; and chief of the Operations Divisions of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant Colonel Sejima Ryūzō; – the second group: commander of the 3rd Army of the 1st Front of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant General Murakami Keisaku; chief of the general affairs of the Manchukuo Government (Prime Minister) Takebe Rokuzō; and chief of the cryptographic department of the Kwantung Army, Major Matsuura Kusuo. The witnesses were comfortably lodged at a “special facility” on the banks of the Amur River, not far from Khabarovsk, that Marshal Vasiliĭ K. Blyukher used as his country house until his arrest in 1938. There they rehearsed the possible scenarios that might occur at the Tokyo Tribunal, with special attention paid to the types of answers they would give to the potentially provocative questions posed by the American and Japanese defense lawyers. Once the special commission was convinced of the trustworthiness of the witnesses and their readiness to testify at the tribunal, the background information on each candidate

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was again conveyed to Stalin. If he approved, witnesses were groomed appropriately and transported by plane under guard to the military airfield at the Uglovaya Station near Vladivostok. There they boarded another military plane for Tokyo’s Haneda Airport where they were met by Soviet representatives and taken to the headquarters of Mitsubishi that provided accommodation. These witnesses received good food (and even watched movies!); they were taken to the trial and back under tight security. The witnesses “performed” in a manner the Soviet side had wished by exposing Japan’s aggressive policy. Not all went smoothly, however, as on the eve of his appearance, Lieutenant General Kusaba Tatsumi committed suicide. The US defense, in response to requests from the accused, demanded that the Japanese internees in Soviet camps should have been brought to Tokyo. Yet Soviet authorities refused to satisfy this request, and in actual fact there was a dispute behind the scenes during the Tokyo process between the USSR and its former allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. Put simply, each party pursued its own interests, ignoring those of their partners at the tribunal. US prosecutors demanded, for example, that several people be handed over to them, and the Soviets likewise set out its demands, asking the United States to hand over Lieutenant General Ishii Shirō, the chief of Unit 731, a covert biological and chemical weapons research and development unit. The Americans refused. By this time, the opposition between the USSR and its former allies had surfaced, and this was especially evident in the case of Major General Arimura Tsunemichi. Even before the Tokyo Tribunal British lawyers requested the transfer of Arimura, who they maintained had been interned by Soviet troops in Manchuria and who they wanted tried because he had been the chief of the POW camp at Changi in Singapore, where many British died from the end of 1942 to early 1944. In 1943, Arimura resigned from the rank of colonel on health grounds but the government summoned him again to serve because of the acute shortage of commanding personnel in the Kwantung Army. As a gesture of gratitude he was awarded the rank of Major General, and this explains why he was in Soviet captivity. The Soviet side expressed a readiness to transfer Arimura to the British, but only in exchange for the former police chief, Vasiliĭ A. Solikovkiĭ, who in 1943 had ordered the execution of members of Molodaya gvardiya (Young Guard), an underground anti-fascist resistance organization in the then Germanoccupied city of Krasnodon. He was in the British displaced camp Saint Martin in Austria. The British refused, and the deal collapsed. This was reported to Stalin who ordered that everything possible be done to save Arimura, who was now critically ill. But doctors could do nothing. He died in 1949 and was buried

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at the Khor Station of Khabarovsk Kraĭ. His relatives repatriated his ashes to Japan in 2007. The United States opposed the trial of Lieutenant General Ishii Shirō, who received immunity from the United States because he had disclosed information regarding Japan’s experiments with germ warfare, including vivisection. This prompted the Soviet Union to carry out the aforementioned Khabarovsk Trial in December 1949, where the twelve members of the Kwantung Army directly involved in the activities of biological and chemical weapons units No. 731 and No. 100 were convicted on various charges. The former commander of the Kwantung Army General, Yamada Otozō, was sentenced to twenty-five years. The trial was swift and clearly politically biased because by this time Soviet-American relations were at breaking point. 4

Repatriation and “Re-education”

The repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war took place from 1946 to 1949 (after 1949 only convicted “criminals” remained in the USSR). This process was beset with the ongoing confrontation with the United States, which used any delays in returning Japanese home as part of its anti-Soviet propaganda. This issue is covered in detail in the 292 documents gathered together by the scholars Elena L. Katasonova and Viktor A. Gavrilov on Japanese prisoners of war (Katasonova and Gavrilov 2013, 276–382). In addition to seeking out criminals among the Japanese prisoners of war, the Soviet government also tried to influence them. The Department of International (External) Policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) oversaw the political re-education of all prisoners of war of former enemies, including the Japanese. From 1945 to 1949, the newspaper for Japanese prisoners of war, Nihon shinbun, was published in Khabarovsk. In 1995, the Japanese correspondent Tanaka Akira interviewed its former editor-in-chief Ivan I. Kovalenko, who noted that the newspaper’s purpose was to inform Japanese prisoners of war about life in Japan and that it included no revolutionary slogans or appeals. Kovalenko characterized the newspaper as a modest media form that reported on Japanese current affairs (Tanaka 1996, 163–64). In actual fact it was a propaganda newspaper with a circulation of 150,000 copies, the main focus of which was on the glorification of Stalin, Soviet life, the Japanese Communist Party, and the development of a “democratic movement” in POW camps. Its also maligned American imperialism and Japanese militarism.

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In 1947, three-month vocational courses on training anti-fascist activists were created under the political departments of POW camps. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Seventh Department of GLavPUR (Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie armii i flota), the Soviet Army’s Main Political Directorate normally managed these. There were three categories of specialists: the foremen of production teams, commandants, and anti-fascist functionaries. Students were to be educated in the spirit of loyalty to the USSR and to abhor capitalism; yet, the main objective of graduates should have been the concern for labor efficiency among the imprisoned Japanese. In March 1948, GLavPUR reported to the Central Committee of the AllUnion Communist Party about the first 116 Japanese POW graduates— democratic activists from the abovementioned “separate labor battalions” in the Primor’e Military District. It was also reported that from March 19 classes for another ninety people would begin, and from April 1 a further 105 people would be involved in a course in the Transbaikal Military District (RGASPI 1948, f. 17, оp. 128, ed. hr. 623, l. 16). Yet the indoctrination of prisoners of war who remained loyal to communist ideology did not yield the expected results. The creation and recruitment of a network of field agents from the camps was actively pursued. This was the responsibility of the operations divisions of the camps under the direction of the Operations Department of the GUPVI. At the beginning of February 1948, the Information Committee at the Council of Ministers—from 1947 to 1951 the main institution of Soviet foreign intelligence—ordered the Ministry of Internal Affairs to prepare the hand-over of the cases of agents from among prisoners of war from enemy forces, including the Japanese, that could be used after repatriation. They agreed that “informants” should be of a certain background, taking into consideration origin, social position, influential relatives at home, education, and so forth. In other words, the Soviets needed agents who in the long term could take up such positions in their home countries, thereby opening up access to intelligence data (GA RF 1948, f. 9401, оp. 1, d. 2434, l. 89–95). Major Yuriĭ A. Rastvorov of the Ministry of State Security (MGB, after 1954 the KGB) picked agents from among the most prominent Japanese internees in terms of their rank and status. In total, 201 agents were selected from all the Japanese listed under the Committee of Information, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of State Security. By 1950, the majority of Japan prisoners of war were repatriated to Japan and Rastvorov soon followed them since he was working with the agents he selected. In the spring of 1954, however, he defected to the United States, where

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he lived under his new identity as Martin P. Simmons. He would give a detailed account in an interview that generated much public response.2 The Soviet Union kept silent about the affair: Higurashi Nobunori, one of the agents who Rastvorov had informed upon, committed suicide by jumping from a window. It is noteworthy that the others did not receive even a minimal sentence as the defense was unable to prove they plotted against Japan (Kirichenko and Totrov 2004, 18–19). The initial “infiltration” of the Japanese repatriated from the Soviet Union was carried out by US counter-intelligence at the former imperial Japanese naval base in Maizuru in Kyoto Prefecture, which was one point of entry for prisoners of war returning from the USSR. Americans intelligence officers interrogated these Japanese POWs, and they were assisted by former agents of the Japanese (imperial) intelligence services. Some agents from among the Japanese prisoners of war confessed that they colluded with the USSR intelligence agencies for one purpose only—to survive and to return home. Some of these agents also worked as double agents for US and Japanese intelligence agencies. It could be concluded that the network of agents created in the POW camps, which was extremely costly both in financial terms but also in effort, had no noticeable effect. 5 Conclusion When viewed through the lens of postwar standards, the USSR can be seen as having greatly benefited from the seemingly easy “Manchurian Blitzkrieg,” not only in terms of territory and the expansion of influence but also in avenging its earlier defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. But with the advent of the 21st century the criteria by which we judge what constitutes “benefits” has considerably changed. And this gives rise to the question of whether the Soviet Union needed the “Manchurian Blitzkrieg” at all. The numerous polls taken in postwar Japan consistently reveal that the majority of the Japanese population did not trust the Soviet Union. The primary reason lay in the fate of more than 600,000 Japanese who were cruelly enslaved in Soviet camps, and it is estimated that this directly touched 7 to 8 percent of Japanese families (Shimizu 1979, 296).

2  Rastvorov was interrogated by US authorities and in 1954 published three articles in Life magazine, in which described his life and work. He wrote about the prominent Japanese personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were supposed to be his agents: Shoji Hiroshi, Takamore Shigeru, and Higurashi Nobunori. - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Japanese prisoners of war did not meet the expectations of Soviet leaders, be it in their usefulness economically, politically, or in intelligence gathering. A considerable number of Japanese were trained by Soviet authorities to advance socialism in Japan, but most Japanese in Soviet camps were prepared to do anything to escape and secure their freedom in order to return to Japan. Having accomplished this, the majority became staunch opponents of socialism. The lengthy imprisonment of the Japanese in the Soviet camps played one positive role in that they were able to communicate with the Soviet people. These Japanese experienced first-hand the fact that many Russians were compassionate and kind, and in the difficult postwar era had not lost their humanity and more than once proffered a helping hand to the Japanese. By the same token, the communication between Russians and Japanese prisoners of war also led to the unexpected conclusion that the Japanese were not all “angry samurai” as touted in Soviet propaganda. Ties of friendship and trust between the Soviet people and Japanese prisoners of war certainly grew out of this period that withstood the Soviet propaganda machine. Today, a reciprocal understanding between ordinary Russians and Japanese could pave the way to the start of improved relations at the national level between the two states. But there are still many unanswered questions regarding the fates of former Japanese prisoners of war in the USSR that require resolution. Bibliography

Russian Sources

Bondarenko, Elena Yur’evna. 1997. Yaponskie voennoplennye na Dal’nem Vostoke Rossii v poslevoennye gody [Japanese Prisoners of War in the Far East of Russia during the Postwar Years]. Vladivostok: Izdatel’stvo Dal’nevostochnogo universiteta. Bondarenko, Elena Yur’evna. 2002. Inostrannye voennoplennye na Dal’nem Vostoke Rossii, 1914–1956 gg. [Foreign Prisoners of War in the Far East of Russia, 1914–1956]. Vladivostok: Izdatel’stvo Dal’nevostochnogo universiteta. Cherevko, Kirill Evgen’evich and Alekseĭ Alekseevich Kirichenko. 2006. Sovetskoyaponskaĭa voĭna (9 avgusta–2 sentyabrya 1945 goda): Rassekrechennie arhivy [The Soviet-Japanese War (August 9–September 2, 1945): Declassified Archives]. Moscow: BIMPA. GA RF (Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1948. f. 9401, оp. 1, d. 2434, l. 89–95. “Dokladnaya zapiska zamministra I. A. Serova ministru MVD S. N. Kruglovu (fevral’ 1948)” [Note of the Deputy Minister I. A. Serov [1905–1990] to the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs S. N. Kruglov (February 1948)]. - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Katasonova, Elena Leonidovna. 2003. Yaponskie voennoplennye v SSSR: Bol’shaya igra velikikh derzhav. [Japanese Prisoners of War in the USSR: A Big Game by the Big Powers]. Moscow: IVRAN. Katasonova, Elena Leonidovna. 2005. Poslednie plenniki Vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny: Maloizvestnye stranitsy rossiĭsko-yaponskikh otnosheniĭ [Last Captives of World War II: Little-known Pages of Russian-Japanese Relations]. Moscow: IVRAN. Katasonova, Elena Leonidovna and Viktor Aleksandrovich Gavrilov, eds. 2013. Yaponskie voennoplennye v SSSR. 1945–1956. Dokumenty [Japanese Prisoners of War in the USSR. 1945–1956. Documents]. Moscow: MFD. Kirichenko, Alekseĭ Alekseevich. 1989. “Skol’ko eshche zabytykh mogil …” [How Many Graves Are Still Forgotten …]. Novoe vremya, no. 40: 20. Kirichenko, Alekseĭ Alekseevich. 1990. “200 tysyach yapontsev zhdut nasheĭ pomoshchi. Obretut li pokoĭ usopshie?” [200 Japanese Wait for Our Help. Will the Deceased Rest in Peace?]. Novoe vremya, no. 41: 39. Kirichenko, Alekseĭ Alekseevich. 2011. “Reshenie problem yaponskogo internirovaniya— vazhneĭshaya zadacha Rossii” [The Solution to the Problem of Japanese Internees— The Most Important Task of Russia]. Yaponiya nashikh dneĭ, no. 3 (9): 43–60. Kirichenko, Alekseĭ Alekseevich, and Yuriĭ Khangereevich Totrov. 2004. “Tainstvennyĭ beglets” [The Mysterious Fugitive]. Sovershenno sekretno, no. 4 (179): 18–19. Kuz’minkov, Viktor Vyacheslavovich. 2010. “Pakt o neĭtralitete mezhdu SSSR i Yaponieĭ s pozitsiĭ segodnyashnego dnya” [The Current View on the Neutrality Pact between USSR and Japan]. Problemy dal’nego vostoka, no. 5: 113–22. Kuznetsov, Sergeĭ Il’ich. 1997. Yapontsy v sibirskom plenu (1945–1956) [Japanese in Siberian captivity (1945–1956)]. Irkutsk: IGU. RGASPI (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoĭ istorii) [Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History]. 1945. p. 644, оp. 1, ed. hr. 458, l. 58–64. Posstanovlenie Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony (GKO) No. 9898-ss (23 avgusta 1945 g.) [Resolution of GKO no. 9898-ss (August 23, 1945)]. RGASPI (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoĭ istorii) [Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History]. 1948. f. 17, оp. 128, ed. hr. 623, l. 16. Doklad Glavpura Ministerstva Oborony v TsK VKPb (mart 1948) [Report by GlavPUR of Ministry of Defense to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (March 1948)]. RGVA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voennyĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Military Archives]. 1945. f. 1/p, оp. 23a, d. 6, l. 112 Direktiva NKVD, NKO, Genshtaba (16 avgusta 1945 g.). [Directive of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the People’s Commissariat of Defense, and the General Staff (August 16, 1945)]. RGVA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voennyĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Military Archives]. 1945. d. 451/p, оp. 2, d. 6, l. 1–61. Spravka shtaba Kvantunskoĭ armii [Report of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army].

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RGVA (Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voennyĭ arkhiv) [Russian State Military Archives]. 1945. f. 451/p, op. 20, d.3, l. 36 Peredislokatsiya voĭsk [Re-deployment of Troops]. TsAMO RF (Tsentral’nyĭ arkhiv ministerstva oborony Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation]. 1945. f. 360, оp. 6134, d. 34, l. 25. A. M. Vasilevskiĭ—I. V. Stalinu (9–14 avgusta 1945 g.) [A. M. Vasilevskiĭ to I. V. Stalin (August 9–14, 1945)]. TsAMO RF (Tsentral’nyĭ arkhiv ministerstva oborony Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation]. 1945. f. 67, оp. 267216, d/68, l. 51–57. Dokladnaya zapiska ministru MVD S. N. Kruglovu [Report to the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs S. N. Kruglov]. Vnotchenko, Leonid Nikolaevich. 1971. Pobeda na Dal’nem Vostoke [Victory in the Far East]. Moscow: APN (Agentstvo Pechati “Novosti”). Zabelin, Aleksandr Evgen’evich. 2012. “Hlopok, dyni i samurai. Yaponskie spetssluzhbisty i ikh posobniki—beloėmigranty v Uzbekistane” [Cotton, Melons, and Samurai. Japanese Special Servicemen and Their Associates—White Emigrés in Uzbekistan]. Yaponiya nashikh dneĭ, no. 3 (13): 105–31. Zagorulko, Maksim Matveevich, ed. 2000. Voennoplennye v SSSR. 1939–1956: Dokumenty i materialy. [Prisoners of War in the USSR. 1939–1956: Documents and Materials]. Moscow: Logos.



Japanese Sources

Kirichienko, Arekusei A. (Kiriсhenko, Alekseĭ Alekseevich), ed. 2003. Shiberia yokuryū shibōsha meibo [Register of Deceased Siberian Prisoners of War]. Sendai: Tōhoku Daigaku, Tōhoku Ajia Kenkyū Sentā. Kirichienko, Arekusei A. (Kiriсhenko, Alekseĭ Alekseevich). 2013. Shirarezaru Nichiro no nihyakunen/200 let neizvestnykh yapono-rossiĭskikh otnosheniĭ [Two Hundred Years of Unknown Japanese-Russian Relations]. Translated by Nakoshi Akiko. Tokyo: Gendai Shichō Shinsha. Kusachi Teigo. 1976. Kantōgun sakusen sanbō no shōgen [Testimony of Staff Officers of the Kwantung Army]. Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō. Kyōdō Tsūshinsha, ed. 1999. Chinmoku no fairu: Sejima Ryūzō to wa nan datta no ka [Silent Files: What was It about Sejima Ryūzō?]. Tokyo: Kyōdō Tsūshinsha. Shimizu Hayao. 1979. Nihonjin wa naze Soren ga kirai ka [Why Do the Japanese Hate the Soviet Union?]. Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō. Wakatsuki Yasuo. 1970. Shiberia horyō shūyōjo [Camps of Japanese Prisoners of War in Siberia]. Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai. Yokote Shinji. 2003. “Sutaarin ga tainichi sansen o ketsui shita hi desu” [The Day Stalin Decided to Go to War Against Japan]. Chūō kōron, no. 10: 182–95.

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part 9

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From Peace to the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations: Soviet-Japanese Territorial Relations, 1951–1970 Kouno Yasuko and Shimotomai Nobuo On August 15, 1945, the Japanese emperor broadcast the “Imperial Rescript on the Termination of War” (Daitōa sensō shūketsu no shōsho) in which he accepted the Potsdam Declaration; the Instrument of Surrender was then signed on September 2. Through these actions, Japanese territory was stipulated to include only the four Japanese home islands of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Hokkaido as well as such minor islands as the Allies would determine. The issue of how to deal with the territories relinquished by Japan became a problem for the Allies and not one over which they could easily come to an agreement since each particular piece of territory soon developed its own unique issues. As a result, the divisions between the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union grew increasingly serious. Postwar affairs were addressed at the December 1945 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, with both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) establishing their own spheres of influence. Each side tacitly agreed to American control over the Japanese home islands and Soviet control of southeastern Europe (Romania and Bulgaria). The Allies also created a framework under which Japan would be administered via the Japanese government, with the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) serving as supervising agencies. This was, however, to be a transitional state of affairs, in place only until the conclusion of a peace treaty that would make final determinations on issues such as territory and compensation. And in practice the reformation of Japan would proceed under de facto US leadership. The Allies had agreed at the Yalta Conference of February 4–11, 1945 that Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands were to be transferred to the Soviet Union, a fact that would ultimately be revealed by the US deputy chief of mission in Moscow, George F. Kennan, in January 1946. On January 29, 1946, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), established the “MacArthur Line” off the coast of Nemuro, Hokkaido, thereby cutting off the islands of Shikotan and Habomai from the control of Occupation authorities. The Soviet Union then announced its unilateral annexation of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands on February 20. It did not, however, become

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particularly involved in the FEC and ACJ’s management of Japan after the two bodies were established in early 1946. Appointed to the ACJ was the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Andreĭ A. Gromyko, the first Soviet representative to the FEC and Lieutenant General Kuz’ma N. Derevyanko, the Soviet representative at the Japanese surrender in September. He would continue in that position until May 1950, leaving shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25. These were the circumstances under which MacArthur proposed a peace treaty between Japan and the Allies in May 1947 in an effort to determine formally the territorial arrangements in terms of international law. The Soviets, however, preferred to have agreements made between the four major Allied powers (United Kingdom, United States, China, and USSR) take precedence; this would become another complicated area in Soviet-American relations. The British Commonwealth, which had its own views on the topic, also asserted itself in the dispute. The de facto emergence of two states on the Korean Peninsula in 1948 (Republic of Korea in August and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in September), neither of which recognized the other, meant that the north-south division of the peninsula became fixed. The Chinese civil war also intensified during this time. The Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China) was driven to Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949. The founding of the PRC boosted Kim Il-sung’s inclination to use force to reunify the Korean Peninsula. He secretly visited the USSR in April 1950 to meet with Stalin and then launched a sudden invasion of the South on June 25. Seoul fell and the Korean People’s Army pushed on into the southernmost parts of the peninsula. With the Soviet Union absent from the UN Security Council, the United Nations entered the war, naming MacArthur as the head of its forces. UN forces landed in Incheon in September and later crossed the 38th parallel and captured Pyongyang. In response, China sent the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) into Korea, retaking Pyongyang; the northern forces again crossed the 38th parallel in January of the following year. Northeast Asia had thus become the stage for a de facto war between China and the United States. These events resulted in a radicalization of the policies of the PRC and the Soviet Union’s toward Japan (the two nations had become allies with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950). The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) had advocated a postwar path of peaceful revolution but in January 1950 Nosaka Sanzō, a key member of the party, was denounced by the Cominform for this approach. This caused the party to split. With the outbreak of the Korean War, JCP Chairman Tokuda Kyūichi and Nosaka fled from Japan and established the

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secret overseas leadership body, “Beijing Center” (Beijing Kikan). As the war intensified, radicalized party members—primarily Korean residents in Japan and students—took the lead in calling for armed resistance. After consulting with Stalin in Moscow in August 1951, the Tokuda-Nosaka party leadership accepted this platform of armed struggle. These developments immediately preceded the San Francisco Peace Conference and meant that the political environment in East Asia over the demarcation of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Kurile Islands had become even further polarized; it became difficult to achieve international and domestic Japanese agreement over the terms of the peace treaty. Deliberations over the peace treaty were thus being accelerated amid an environment that both fractured the Allies and caused discord within Japan. John F. Dulles, an advisor for the US State Department, had visited Japan in June 1950, immediately prior to the beginning of the Korean War, to begin earnest treaty negotiations with the Japanese government. With the outbreak of war, the United States favored the rapid conclusion of a treaty. Following some preliminary negotiations, Dulles met with the Soviet ambassador Yakov A. Malik on October 26 to discuss the matter. He attempted to gain Soviet agreement by dangling US support for the provisions of the Yalta Agreement (Soviet possession of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands) before Malik; however, the Soviets were determined to support the PRC participation in the peace talks. The two spoke again on November 20, but the Soviets asserted they would make their own comprehensive peace with Japan. The gap between the United Kingdom and the United States, on the one hand, and the Soviets, on the other, only continued to grow through late 1950 as the Chinese entered the war against the UN forces. Anglo-American relations were also complicated by the British recognition of Mao Zedong’s government despite US support for the Kuomintang in Taiwan. While the State Department had stated in its “Seven Principles” on a peace treaty with Japan that the status of Taiwan was to be left to a future decision by the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, the US treaty draft ultimately released in March 1951 only stipulated that Japan would renounce its claim to the island. Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands would become long-standing issues between Japan and the Soviet Union. There had been no particular mention of either in the Potsdam Declaration, although the Allies had agreed as part of the Yalta Agreement that the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin would be transferred to the Soviet Union. The initial US drafts had thus contained stipulations to this effect. This had been done under the presumption that the Soviets would sign and ratify the treaty, however. It was decided later on the basis of a Canadian proposal that Japan would merely “renounce” the Kurile

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Islands and Sakhalin since it was considered undesirable to provide backing to their cession to the Soviet Union (Mainichi shinbun 1952, 93). The San Francisco Peace Conference began on September 4, 1951. Amendments proposed by the Soviets were rejected by the conference, and the Japanese representative Yoshida Shigeru accepted the draft treaty supported by forty-nine of the fifty-two participants on September 8 (the three exceptions were the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia). Japan would therefore become independent on April 28 of the following year. Under the treaty, Japan lost all rights to Taiwan (including the Pescadores Islands), Korea, the Kurile Islands, and Sakhalin (Article 2). The Ryukyu (Okinawa), Amami and Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands were placed under US administration under Article 3, but Japan’s residual sovereignty over these areas was recognized. While Yoshida made clear in his address to the conference that the Japanese viewed the circumstances of the Northern and Southern Kuriles differently and asserted that the two islands comprising the Southern Kurile Islands had historically been Japanese territory, these statements had no legal weight (Shigeta 2003, 112). It should be noted that Dulles, the American representative at the conference, also expressed an understanding that the “Habomai Archipelago” was not part of the Kurile Islands (it is ambiguous whether or not Shikotan was included in this statement). Yoshida signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (US-Japan Security Treaty) under which Japan agreed to the stationing of the US military in Japan and leased it bases for this purpose on the same day as the peace treaty. Not surprisingly, the Soviet representative Gromyko harshly criticized the Anglo-American treaty draft and asserted that the PRC had sovereignty over China. He also submitted a Soviet treaty draft, which stipulated that the USSR had complete sovereignty over southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands (Shigeta 2003, 108). When this was rejected, Gromyko refused to sign the peace treaty in line with instructions he had received beforehand from Stalin. Although Japan renounced numerous territories via the text of the treaty, including the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Kurile Islands, it remained ambiguous to whom these territories were being transferred. Article 26 of the treaty enabled those countries that had not signed the treaty to conclude bilateral treaties with Japan on the same terms, provided they did so within three years. In other words, this clause meant that once April 1955 (three years after the treaty went into effect) passed, it was inevitable that peace negotiations between Japan and those who had not signed, such as the USSR and the PRC, would become a source of discord for the former Allied nations. In the National Security Council (NSC) policy statement, “US Policy

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Toward Japan,” of April 1955 the United States called for Japan’s conservative forces to unify so as to provide stability for US military bases. Japan’s postwar “1955 System” (Gojūgonen taisei), the party system in place from from 1955 to 1993, was one more legacy of this Cold War international environment. 1

The 1955 System and the Restoration of Soviet-Japanese Diplomatic Relations, 1953–1956

The Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, died on March 5, 1953, amid the intensification of the Cold War as witnessed in the events of the Korean War. The death of Stalin, who had believed in the inevitability of war between the capitalist and socialist nations of the world, triggered many changes, including those in Soviet-Japanese relations. The adoption of a course of peaceful coexistence between capitalism and socialism by the new Soviet leadership under First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev led to steps toward the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. While the new leadership also included conservatives such as Vyacheslav M. Molotov, who had returned to the post of foreign minister, Premier Georgiĭ M. Malenkov, and others supported reform. Khrushchev’s power grew with the arrest of Lavrentiĭ P. Beria in June and his execution in December, and the dismissal of Malenkov. He also deepened his association with the new premier Nikolaĭ A. Bulganin and Anastas I. Mikoyan. The developments in East-West relations triggered by the new Soviet approach of peaceful coexistence also brought major changes to Asia, as observed in the 1954 Geneva Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference. Most significantly, the Soviet Union also extended its new strategy of peaceful coexistence to Asia (as seen in the July 1953 ceasefire in Korea) and began moving toward normalizing relations with Japan. The Soviet leadership pursued a determined strategy of neutralization through these tactics, seeking to alienate countries such as Japan and West Germany from the United States. Foreign Minister Molotov signaled this change in Soviet policy toward Japan when he hinted at re-establishing diplomatic relations with Japan in a September 1954 statement to the Japanese newspaper, Chūnichi shinbun. And Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing and discussions with Mao Zedong a month later would serve as an especially important catalyst for change. A joint Sino-Soviet communiqué was released on October 12 in which the two nations stated that they would pursue a peace treaty with Japan. Khrushchev stopped in Lushun on his return trip, where he announced that the Soviet navy would be withdrawn from the port (to be completed in May 1955). He also traveled to Sakhalin. In North Korea, the pro-Soviet foreign minister Nam Il began looking

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for a way to establish diplomatic relations with Japan in February (Shimotomai 2011, 159). Even as the post-Stalin Soviet Union was beginning to re-examine its relationship with Japan, US-Japan relations were headed in an opposite direction over the issues of Okinawa and Sino-Japanese relations. This is because the year 1953 corresponded with the US settlement on its policy regarding the long-term possession of Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands. Earlier, when negotiating in March 1951, Dulles was clear in his position on Okinawa that the United States “should not lightly assume responsibility for nearly a million alien people thousands of miles from its shores” (FRUS 1951, vol. 6, 836). He had not, at the time, necessarily been in favor of lengthy US control of Okinawa. Intense criticism was, however, voiced by some participants of the San Francisco Peace Conference over the idea of returning the islands to Japan. As Dulles stated in his speech at the conference, this lack of agreement among the conference’s participants over what should be done about Okinawa led to the drafting of Article 3 of the peace treaty (Mainichi shinbun 1952, 487). The article represented a compromise that allowed for the possibility of the US administration of Okinawa as part of the United Nations trusteeship system. At the same time, speeches by the American and British representatives acknowledged Japan’s residual sovereignty over the islands. When the US president Dwight D. Eisenhower and his administration took office in 1953, however, it rejected the return of Okinawa to Japan, a decision that reflected the military’s deep distrust of the Japanese. Only the Amami Islands, which were of little military value, were returned. The possibility of UN trusteeship of Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands was also abandoned at this time. In his statement on the matter, Secretary of State Dulles confirmed that American possession of Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands was for the long term and would continue “so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East.” The San Francisco Peace Treaty thus left both the United States and the Soviet Union with territorial disputes with Japan. British representative Kenneth Gilmour Younger raised the point that while the peace treaty did not remove Japanese sovereignty from the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands, it did stipulate that Japan completely renounce its sovereignty over the Sovietoccupied Kurile Islands. This contrast, he asserted, was worth remembering (Mainichi shinbun 1952, 505). He could see an attempt to drive a wedge between Japan and the Soviet Union by leaving a territorial dispute in place between the two nations. In Japan, the pro-American Liberal Party government of Yoshida Shigeru reached its end in December 1954 and was replaced by a Democratic Party

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government under Hatoyama Ichirō. Shigemitsu Mamoru, a former foreign ministry bureaucrat who had served as an ambassador to the Soviet Union before the war, became the new government’s foreign minister. Relations with the Soviets nonetheless remained poor. At the same time, the restoration of Japanese independence meant that Soviet representation in Japan through the Occupation-era FEC and ACJ ceased to exist. Gromyko thus proposed granting diplomatic authority to the Soviet trade delegation in Japan as an alternative, and to this end he had Andreĭ I. Domnitskiĭ, a member of the delegation, contact the Japanese trade minister (Mainichi shinbun 1952, 71). It was for this reason that Domnitskiĭ suddenly appeared at Prime Minister Hatoyama’s home in Otowa on January 25, 1955, bearing a letter asking for negotiations on a peace treaty. The Hatoyama and Khrushchev governments bickered over where they were to be held but the Soviet-Japanese peace treaty negotiations finally began in London on June 1, 1955. Malik, the Soviet ambassador to the United Kingdom who had also served as ambassador to Japan during the war, participated as the chief Soviet representative; the Japanese were represented by Matsumoto Shun’ichi, a former diplomat and a member of the Diet (Matsumoto 2012, 22). The Democratic Party generally favored peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union while the orientation of the Liberal Party was anti-Soviet and anti-communist. The Japanese first needed to decide which to negotiate first: the restoration of diplomatic relations or a peace treaty. There was a difference of opinion over the issue between Prime Minister Hatoyama, who wanted a quick agreement, on the one hand, and the Liberal Party under Ogata Taketora and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, on the other. Shigemitsu came from a foreign ministry background and was cautious about dealing with the Soviets. Matsumoto believed that Japan should quickly seek to conclude a peace treaty. The United Kingdom and the United States differed in their views regarding the issues in dispute, particularly over the question of the restoration of Kunashiri (Kunashir) and Etorofu (Iturup) to Japan. The British government implied that Japan had already relinquished the two islands (i.e., the Southern Kurile Islands) at San Francisco (Tanaka 1993, v). The Soviet-Japanese negotiations seemed to have reached an impasse following the June 24 discussions on the territorial issue. This situation changed following events at the general meeting of the Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party held in Moscow on July 12, however, when the reformists under Khrushchev prevailed over conservatives like Molotov in the foreign policy debates regarding Yugoslavia and Germany. The Geneva Summit, which began on July 18 and was attended by US president Eisenhower, the British prime minister Robert A. Eden, French prime minister Edgar Faure, and Bulganin, also promoted an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence. It was at this

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time that the Soviets adopted a new course of action in their negotiations with Japan. Ambassador Malik returned to the United Kingdom in early August and suggested on August 5 that Habomai and Shikotan be transferred to Japan (this was formally proposed on August 9). Malik had become a candidate for the Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress and together with Gromyko was lending his support to Khrushchev’s new diplomatic approach (Matsumoto 2012, 40; Shimotomai 2011, 274). This proposal was the origin of the two-island solution. Although it’s unclear why Khrushchev proposed Habomai and Shikotan, Prime Minister Yoshida had stated during a debate on March 8, 1951, in the House of Representatives that Habomai was Japanese territory and not part of the Kurile Islands. Dulles had also unambiguously stated that Habomai was Japanese territory at the San Francisco Peace Conference (Hasegawa 2000, 495; Shimotomai 2011, 225). Yoshida was initially a supporter of the two-island solution. This proposal received a cool reception in Tokyo, and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Kōno Ichirō, who had arrived in London on August 11, suggested waiting for the results of consultations with the United States. When the Japanese government (Shigemitsu and others) sent telegraphic instructions in late August that all four disputed islands were intrinsic parts of Japan, negotiations once again began to deteriorate. Matsumoto temporarily returned to Japan on October 1, but Shigemitsu and the foreign ministry were not inclined to accept the two-island solution. The foreign ministry’s cautious faction, comprising experienced individuals who had worked in Moscow before and during the war such as Shigemitsu, chief of the Treaties Bureau, Shimoda Takesō, and head of the section in charge of the negotiations, Hōgen Shinsaku, began to hold sway within the ministry. Conflict within domestic Japanese politics was another factor in the rejection of the Soviet proposal. The union of the conservative parties into the LDP in November 1955 meant that the Hatoyama government’s support in the Diet was now spread across multiple factions. With the addition of former anticommunist LDP members such as Ogata Taketora, it became difficult to unify opinions within the party. Due to the conservative union, the hardline antiSoviet arguments of the former Yoshida faction circulated within the LDP. In that sense, and as Matsumoto Shun’ichi also pointed out, the Soviet-Japanese negotiations became a “sacrifice” of the conservative merger (Matsumoto 2012, 73). Matsumoto reopened negotiations with Malik in London in early 1956 in any case, but these again ran into trouble when he proposed on February 7 at their 19th meeting that all four islands be returned to Japan. Convening with a group of Diet members from Japan, Khrushchev spoke of the two-island

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compromise, telling them that “given how close the islands of Habomai and Shikotan are to Japan, we need to consider Japan’s interests.” On February 20, Matsumoto informally suggested a compromise under which the Soviets would permit the former Japanese inhabitants to administer the Southern Kuriles (what would later be referred to as a “Two-Plus-Alpha” solution). Malik promised to speak with the Soviet leadership at the 20th Communist Party Congress in Moscow. When he returned to London on March 9, however, he told Matsumoto that, while it was extremely regrettable, he had been unable to “bring back any gifts” concerning “Kunashiri and Etorofu,” the position adopted at the “highest level” was to “transfer the smaller Kurile Islands to Japan.” Moscow was not prepared to make any concessions beyond what they referred to as the “smaller Kuriles”—that is, Habomai and Shikotan (Matsumoto 2012, 89). Meanwhile, the Japanese foreign ministry had also become increasingly firm in its position that all four islands must be returned to Japan. Notably, Hōgen Shinsaku, who was now a deputy minister, made the new assertion in February that “Kunashiri and Etorofu” were not part of the “Kuriles” that Japan had renounced. This was then repeated by parliamentary vice minister Morishita Kunio at the Diet on February 11 (Honda 2013, 385). The chief of the Treaties Bureau, Shimoda Takesō, made the first use of the expression “the Northern Territories” (hoppō ryōdo) at the Diet on March 20, thereby bundling the two Southern Kuriles (Kunashiri and Etorofu with Habomai and Shikotan). The Northern Territories were defined as consisting of all four islands, which together were intrinsic parts of Japan. This new terminology can be considered analogous to the practice of referring to Okinawa as the “southern issue” (nanpō mondai), which also began around this time. This new definition set the limits within which the peace treaty negotiations were to be conducted, and the London negotiations were effectively broken off on March 20. The difficult Soviet-Japanese negotiations over fishing also became intertwined with the issue of normalizing relations, as the Soviet government enacted new restrictions on Japanese fishing in the northern Pacific following the breaking off of the London territorial negotiations. Kōno Ichirō, who was in Moscow for the fishing negotiations, met with Premier Bulganin on May 9 and proposed that normalizing diplomatic relations be given precedence over the conclusion of a peace treaty. With the deadlock over the territorial issue, the Soviets were also inclined to move on to regulating relations. Both sides thus agreed to begin normalization negotiations without overly concerning themselves with territorial decisions, an approach that had previously been taken by the West German Adenauer government. These negotiations would begin in July.

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Foreign Minister Shigemitsu traveled to Moscow in late July to negotiate with Dmiitriĭ T. Shepilov, the new Soviet foreign minister. Shepilov did not come from a diplomatic background and was awkward during the negotiations (Matsumoto 2012). For his part, Shigemitsu, who was known for having taken a hardline as ambassador to the USSR before the war, was expected to do the same during these negotiations. On August 11, however, he suddenly sent word to Tokyo proposing that Japan “bear the unbearable” (taegataki o tae) and offer a settlement based on the two-island solution. Matsumoto, who had to break off negotiations twice due to unyielding instructions received from Shigemitsu, viewed this drastic change in Shigemitsu’s position as “incomprehensible” (Matsumoto 2012, 118). The Japanese government and foreign ministry were baffled that the foreign minister himself would propose accepting the Soviet offer. It was at this point that the Okinawa issue and relations with the United States became entangled with the Northern Territories dispute. Shigemitsu, who was also vice president of the Democratic Party, went to the United States in August 1955 following the formation of the Hatoyama government at the end of the previous year. But when he sounded out Dulles about the possibility of revising the US-Japan Security Treaty, this was rejected. As a result, the Japanese proposal to make Okinawa subject to the treaty’s terms was scrapped. This meant that the US administration of Okinawa was faced with a crisis of legitimacy when the “all-island protest” (shimagurumi tōsō) erupted in June 1956 as the United States began to expropriate land from local Okinawans in July 1955 in an effort to expand its bases as part of an anti-Soviet strategy. The proposed two-island settlement thus emerged from the Soviet-Japanese normalization negotiations. Dulles and Shigemitsu met at the London Suez Canal Global Conference in August. Shigemitsu touched upon the Soviet proposal to return two of the islands at a meeting with Dulles on August 19 and asked whether accepting this proposal would be permissible under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Dulles replied that the United States would likely pursue complete sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) if Japan recognized Soviet sovereignty over the Kurile Islands. In other words, he threatened that the United States would annex Okinawa should a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty be concluded in which only two islands were returned to Japan. Even before meeting with Shigemitsu, Dulles had been determined not to allow Japan’s negotiations with the Soviets raise issues related to Okinawa and Taiwan over which agreement was impossible. He had stated in April that Soviet rights over the Kurile Islands were equivalent to US rights over Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands and that the United States would have no choice but to return Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands if the Soviet Union returned

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even part of the Kurile Islands to Japan. In other words, Dulles was cognizant of the correlation between the Northern Territories and Okinawa/Ogasawara and predicted that it would stimulate other unresolved territorial disputes in Asia should the Soviet-Japanese negotiations reach a two-island compromise. Dulles’s threat was grounded in this understanding, even though it came as a great shock to the Japanese government. Meanwhile, the LDP was equally in disarray. Former prime minister Yoshida had announced his opposition to the Hatoyama government’s policy toward the Soviets on September 11. This led to pro-Yoshida members of the LDP, who comprised roughly 40 percent of the party and included figures such as Ikeda Hayato, to oppose it as well. Matsumoto and Gromyko, communicating by letter, thus ultimately adopted an Adenauer-style approach of prioritizing the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. The Japanese government informed Bulganin on September 11 that it sought negotiations to normalize SovietJapanese relations, with the understanding that “the territorial issue would be resolved and a peace treaty concluded” in the future. It was thus decided that Hatoyama would visit the Soviet Union in October. The beginning of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization policy had caused unexpected shocks within the Soviet Union and had a major impact on all the world’s communist states. Asia was no exception. In China, the Communist Party dropped the expression “Mao Zedong Thought” (Maoism) at its 8th party congress. And in North Korea, there was an increasing backlash against Kim Il-sung’s cult of personality by the members of the Workers’ Party under Chinese and Soviet influence. This would culminate in the August Faction Incident. Mao Zedong was especially hostile toward Kim, and members of the North Korean party leadership’s pro-Chinese (Yanan) faction, including Vice Minister Choe Chang-ik, supported Kim’s dismissal. The old guerrilla faction supported Kim and began to push back against these efforts. Although Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai and Anastas I. Mikoyan, a member of the Soviet Politburo, secretly visited Pyongyang to try and deal with the crisis, by late September Kim’s position had actually become stronger. These were not the only setbacks: in October popular rebellions also broke out in Hungary and Poland. Khrushchev was showered with criticism, not just from the party’s conservative faction but also from progressives, thereby weakening his negotiating position. In fact, representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, would visit the USSR and attend the Presidium immediately following Hatoyama’s trip. This visit resulted in the release of a declaration in late October confirming that the communist parties of all nations were of equal status and as a consequence would push Khrushchev’s progressivism into a corner. Hatoyama’s group, however, was largely ignorant of

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these developments within the Soviet Union, and the Japanese believed that Bulganin was the ultimate decision-maker in the USSR. These were the circumstances under which Hatoyama negotiated for the normalization of diplomatic relations from October 12 to 20. The purpose of the visit was just this, and it did not necessarily involve negotiations about the territorial dispute. But even so, due to the LDP’s position on the issue, territorial negotiations were held between Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Kōno, and Khrushchev to confirm the outcome of the London negotiations. Incidentally, the Russians released a partial record of these negotiations in the 1990s, which demonstrates that during their negotiations on October 18 Khrushchev deleted the phrase “resolution of the territorial issue” from the passage in the draft statement stating that the two nations agreed “to continue … negotiations for the resolution of the territorial issue and the conclusion of a peace treaty.” But according to the papers of the official Japanese interpreter at the talks, Noguchi Yoshio, which were made public in 2006, the draft from which Khrushchev deleted the phrase had actually been provided by the Soviets. This shows that a difference of opinion existed between Gromyko, the drafter of the text, and Khrushchev (Hori 2008, 156). But as Khrushchev resolutely demanded the removal of the reference to the “territorial issue,” the Japanese ultimately accepted the amended draft after checking with Hatoyama. In addition to accepting the joint declaration, they also took steps to ensure that the contents of a letter between Matsumoto and Gromyko still contained the phrase “continued discussion of a peace treaty, including the territorial issue.” The situation in Poland worsened on October 19, the day of the signing ceremony, and Khrushchev did not attend. When the Japanese representatives in attendance asked to have the Matsumoto–Gromyko letters made public alongside the joint declaration, Bulganin agreed (Matsumoto 2012, 161). The “territorial issue” thus barely managed to survive, and the outcome of the talks was ambiguous. The negotiations with the Soviets stimulated moves toward a peace treaty with the PRC, a Soviet ally. Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai referred to such on October 14, but Hatoyama was unreceptive (Matsumoto 2012, 125). The SovietJapanese Joint Declaration restoring Japanese-Soviet diplomatic ties went into force when Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolaĭ T. Fedorenko visited Japan on December 12, and instruments of ratification were exchanged. With diplomatic ties restored, the political obstacle to Japanese membership in the United Nations was removed. The UN Security Council advised the General Assembly to grant Japan membership on December 12, and this was passed unanimously six days later on the 18th.

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The Cold War, High-Speed Growth, and Japanese-Soviet Relations, 1957–1970

Embassies were opened in the capitals of both nations following negotiations between the two governments beginning in December 1956. Japanese foreign vice minister Kadowaki Suemitsu was appointed ambassador to the USSR in March 1957 and Ivan F. Tevosyan, a former deputy premier, was appointed to Tokyo in February. Tevosyan met with Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who had just replaced the short-lived government of Ishibashi Tanzan, in mid-March and spoke about improving Soviet-Japanese relations over fishing. Kishi hailed from Yamaguchi Prefecture and had been a reform bureaucrat in Manchuria before the war. A minister in the Tōjō Hideki cabinet, he was detained as a suspected Class A war criminal after the war and forbidden from holding public office during the Occupation. He joined the Liberal Party after his return to politics due to his ties with his younger brother Satō Eisaku, a member of the Yoshida faction. He soon fell out with the party, however, and joined Hatoyama’s Democratic Party. He was agile at maneuvering through political conflicts and came to the attention of the United States, particularly during his visit there in the summer of 1955. The Soviet Communist Party seemed uneasy about Kishi’s position during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations (Shimotomai 2011, 306). With the normalization of diplomatic relations accomplished, SovietJapanese negotiations over the fishing of salmon and trout, as well as the issue of the safe operation of Japanese fishing vessels, became the topics of discussion between the two countries. Fishing had played a large role in the two countries’ economic relations since before the war. Its importance can be seen in the fact that the preparations for the normalization negotiations had been undertaken by Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Kōno Ichirō and Fishing Minister Aleksandr A. Ishkov. These fishing issues were closely tied to those of territory and operations in coastal waters. Tevosyan died in March and was replaced by Deputy Minister Fedorenko, who arrived via China in September. The two countries signed a cultural agreement and a commercial treaty. A group of Socialist Party members, including Katayama Tetsu, visited the Soviet Union in September and had discussions about a fishing agreement and nuclear testing, the latter an issue between the United States and the USSR at the time. The peace treaty problem was not an easy one. The central focus of Soviet diplomatic efforts was trying to turn Japan, who was caught between the United States and USSR in the Cold War, into a neutral state. Gromyko, who had

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become foreign minister following the fall of the anti-Khrushchev Anti-Party Group in 1957, criticized attempts to revise the US-Japan Security Treaty in December 1958. The Japanese rejected this as interference in internal Japanese politics. Miki Takeo of the LDP visited the USSR in August 1959 and met with Khrushchev. But Kishi’s foreign policy focused on improving relations with the United States by revising the security treaty, and Gromyko frequently expressed his dissatisfaction at the slow pace at which Soviet-Japanese relations advanced. The so-called “Northern Territories” issue and that of Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands were closely linked within the context of the Cold War. The Soviets attempted to alienate Japan from the United States and the United States similarly attempted to use the territorial dispute to distance Japan from the Soviet Union. As long as the Northern Territories remained a “card” in the Cold War, they were more a symbolic barometer between the two countries than as an actual issue in pressing need of resolution. For the USSR, the peace treaty issue and the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan were ways to alienate the two halves of the US-Japan alliance from each other. On January 27, 1960, after the Kishi government had signed a revised USJapan Security Treaty and an agreement on the status of forces earlier that month, Gromyko handed a memorandum to Ambassador Kadowaki. In the document he criticized the new security treaty and stated that Habomai and Shikotan would not be transferred to the Japanese as long as foreign military forces remained in Japan and that the Kishi government’s revision of the USJapan Security Treaty in June was not in line with improving Soviet-Japanese relations. By sending a memorandum in which they made the removal of all foreign military forces from Japan a prerequisite to peace treaty negotiations, the Soviet government made any such negotiations less likely (Kubota 1983, 222). Khrushchev also criticized the US-Japan Security Treaty in late February, causing Kishi to reject this as interference in internal Japanese affairs. Therefore, when the American and Japanese governments exchanged the instruments of ratification for the revised treaty on June 23, the Soviet government stated that the treaty needed to be eliminated for Soviet-Japanese relations to improve. While this may have been useful for the Japanese anti-government movement, it also negatively impacted relations between the two countries. Despite the above developments, which created further hurdles to overcome regarding any potential peace treaty, the new parameter of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation also became a factor as Japan underwent high-speed growth. In addition to the aforementioned fishing negotiations, a Japanese industry trade show opened in Moscow in August 1960. Mikoyan accompanied a Soviet trade fair to Japan in August 1961 and exchanged opinions about the

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US-Japan Security Treaty. Khrushchev referred to the territorial issue as resolved in letters he exchanged with Prime Minister Ikeda, but Ikeda disputed this. In October, the Japanese government reaffirmed its consensus view that the Northern Territories were not part of the “Kuriles” mentioned in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The US State Department supported Japan’s position in December, and the Soviets asserted that the US position was in violation of the Yalta Agreement. It was around this time that the development of Siberia became a topic of discussion. Mikoyan visited Japan again in 1964 and the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) pushed for more full-fledged development of Siberia in response (Suzuki 1998, 35). In a letter addressed to Ikeda in late December 1963, Khrushchev called for the peace treaty and territorial issues between the two countries to be resolved peacefully rather than through the use of force. The intensifying Sino-Soviet split served as one reason for Khrushchev’s letter. Mao Zedong, who had previously taken a pro-Soviet position, suddenly changed his stance in July 1964, telling a group of Japan Socialist Party delegates that the Japanese demands over the Kuriles were correct. By doing so, he gave the impression that not only Sino-Soviet territorial negotiations but also Sino-Soviet relations in general were in dire straits. Meanwhile, the Ikeda government looked at US-Japan relations and worked hard to repair the domestic divisions that had been created by the revision of the security treaty. When he met with President John F. Kennedy in June 1961, Ikeda cautiously avoided discussing the Okinawa issue in terms of returning its administration to Japan. By this time the role of the bases on Okinawa had shifted to dealing with regional conflicts in Southeast Asia rather than responding to an all-out Soviet nuclear attack. Japan’s rapid growth meant that the gap between the Japanese mainland and Okinawa widened, resulting in a high political cost of Okinawa for the US administration. Ikeda appraoched this problem strategically by greatly augmenting the financial support provided by the Japanese government to Okinawa. But the Japanese government’s increased financial support did not immediately make the return of the islands to Japanese administration easy. In February 1962, the Ryukyuan legislature sent a “Resolution Urging the Reversion of Administration” to the United Nations. This resolution stipulated that Okinawa was an American colony and referred to the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” passed by the UN General Assembly. Khrushchev had proposed this declaration during a speech at the General Assembly in September 1960. Japan’s admission to the United Nations, which had been enabled by the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of December 1956, made this dispute

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possible. Dulles had already pointed out in January 1957 that it was feasible for Japan, now having joined the United Nations, to make Okinawa into an international issue with the backing of the nations of Asia and Africa. British and French colonialism had suffered diplomatic defeats from the Suez crisis and the wave of anti-colonialism that had spread through Algeria, Indochina, and Cyprus. Dulles wanted the United States to avoid their fate in Okinawa and had tried to make moves to that effect (FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 23, 244). The Japanese and US governments went to work at the United Nations and just barely succeeded in convincing it not to accept the Ryukyuan legislature’s resolution. The government of Satō Eisaku was formed in November 1964 after Prime Minister Ikeda retired due to illness. Ikeda, a central figure of the Yoshida faction, had been pro-American, anti-Soviet, and emphasized the economy. While Satō was also a member of the Yoshida faction, the anti-Yoshida Kishi Nobusuke was his elder brother, and he assumed a diplomatic posture that moved away from that of the Yoshida faction (Kanda 2012, 19). Shiina Etsusaburō, who had continued on as foreign minister from the Ikeda government, proactively attempted to improve relations with Taiwan and South Korea, especially stressing the latter. Members of the Japanese business world such as Uemura Kōgorō of the Keidanren began to push actively for better relations with the USSR. The fairly moderate Miki Takeo, who had visited the Soviet Union in the past, was also critical of a Yoshida-style, pro-American foreign policy. By this point, China had successfully conducted a nuclear test, was becoming increasingly estranged from the Soviet Union, and had embarked on the Cultural Revolution. These events were reflected in the Satō government’s stance toward China, which had been pro-Taiwanese from the outset. The state of Sino-Soviet relations was thus another factor that led to an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. There was also the emergence of an anti-Soviet, proChinese tendency among some of the foreign ministry’s Soviet hands such as Hōgen, the ambassador to India (Kanda 2012, 270). The bipolar orientation of the Cold War had begun to shift to the multi-polarization of the 1970s. The stance of Shimoda Takesō, who had worked in Moscow in 1943, was an expert on the Soviet Union, and had the trust of Prime Minister Satō and Foreign Minister Shiina, seems to have been especially important. He was serving as ambassador to the USSR when he was appointed to the position of foreign vice minister in June 1965. This development inspired a certain level of expectation that relations between the two countries would improve. After he took office Satō sent a telegram reply to Premier Alekseĭ N. Kosygin (AVP RF 146/53/239/2/72). At a meeting of ambassadors in May 1966, Shimoda, still acknowledging the significance of relations with the United States, proposed

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a diplomatic course that instead emphasized the Soviet Union and Southeast Asia due to the threat posed by China, where the Cultural Revolution had just begun. Shiina’s visit in January 1966 to the Soviet Union was noteworthy in this respect. The increasing importance being placed on the USSR by the Japanese can be seen from the visits to the country by a number of later foreign ministers such as Miki Takeo and Aichi Kiichi. In July 1966, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko responded by going to Japan and entered into negotiations with Shiina (Kanda 2012, 220; Rozman 2000, 74). This was the first visit of a Russian or Soviet cabinet minister to Japan in the history of the relations between the two countries. Japan and the Soviet Union signed the Soviet-Japanese Consular Agreement in July 1967, opening consulates in Nakhodka and Sapporo as well as establishing agreements on holding regular bilateral talks, civil aviation, science, and technology. Scholars in the fields of history and nuclear physics, among others, started to engage in personnel exchanges, including the trip of the University of Tokyo professor and historian Hayashi Kentarō to the Soviet Union. Visits to graves in Siberia also began. And the recognition of the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1972 showed that Satō and Shiina would not shy away from embarking on pro-Soviet positions amid the Sino-Soviet standoff. In July 1967, therefore, Premier Kosygin, who was also charged with foreign policy duties at the time by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, suggested to Foreign Minister Miki that the peace treaty issue be resolved through an “intermediate treaty.” He invited Satō to Moscow. Not surprisingly, the peace treaty negotiations that followed between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Shimoda went poorly. Nevertheless, the level of personnel exchanges increased: a group of Communist Party figures, among them Secretary Mikhail A. Suslov, came to Japan in January 1968 and Transportation Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro went to the Soviet Union to organize arrangements regarding flights to the USSR by Japan Airlines. At the same time, the Satō government moved forward with its idea of ending the postwar era by returning Okinawa to Japan. Satō had made his position on the topic clear while seeking the LDP presidency in the summer of 1964, stating at a press conference that “if I become prime minister, I will directly seek the return of Japanese administration [over Okinawa].” When he traveled to the United States in January 1965 soon after becoming prime minister, he told President Lyndon B. Johnson that the Japanese people desired the reversion of Japanese administration. From the autumn of 1966, the foreign ministry increased its contacts with the United States concerning changes to the roles of the bases following the reversion of Okinawa. During these discussions, Japan touched upon its readiness to fulfill its regional responsibilities to

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the extent allowed by its constitution. For example, the participation in peacekeeping operations to resolve the Vietnam War and Japan’s interests in South Korea’s national security were raised. During Satō’s visit to the United States in November 1967, he and Johnson agreed to determine the time for the return of the islands “within two or three years.” Both governments had the US-Japan Security Treaty, due to expire in 1970, in mind when they made this agreement. Their intention was to resolve the territorial issue in advance of the treaty’s renewal, and the Satō government was therefore interested in resolving both the Okinawa issue with America and the Northern Territories issue with the Soviet Union. For the United States in the late 1960s, the relative importance of US-Japan relations as a whole—one centered on the security treaty—had become increasingly high. The Okinawa issue was an obstacle to the stability of that relationship. Underpinning this situation was the increasingly meaningful presence that Japan had within the liberal Western camp due to its high-speed economic growth. From the US perspective, Japanese cooperation in areas such as economic support for Southeast Asia had become indispensable because of the worsening US balance of international payments because of the Vietnam War. The US strategy toward the Soviet Union was also shifting. The advancement of weapons technology had made the nuclear weapons deployed on Okinawa (Mace B missiles) less useful. As emphasis shifted to submarinelaunched nuclear weapons rather than land-deployed missiles, Okinawa’s role as a nuclear base was diminishing. With the understanding that an agreement over the timing of the return of Okinawa would be reached before 1970, the American and Japanese governments began examining in 1969 what the post-reversion roles of these bases would be. After the Nixon administration took office in January 1969, it was decided in a late May 1969 National Security Council policy statement: 1) to extend the US-Japan Security Treaty past 1970; 2) to agree to the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration in 1972; 3) to seek as much of a free hand as possible in the use of the bases for Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam; and 4) if the agreement was satisfactory, consider the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa, so long as the right of the United States to stockpile and pass nuclear weapons through the islands in the case of an emergency was maintained. A realistic examination of the post-reversion roles of the bases became a necessary task with the knowledge that the return of Okinawan administration to Japan would be decided upon prior to the 1970 extension of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Prime Minister Satō made clear in his response to a March 1969 Diet question that he would seek “the removal of nuclear weapons” (kakunuki) and “equivalence with the mainland” (hondo-nami) for the bases. In

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other words, his goals were the application of the prior consultation system (as existed on the mainland) and the three non-nuclear principles to Okinawa. The confirmation of what Japan’s burden of regional responsibilities would be was another issue. Specifically, Japan had stated that it had security interests related to South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Satō showed what Japan’s regional responsibilities would be when he visited the United Sates in November. In his joint statement with Nixon and his speech at the National Press Club, Satō stated that South Korea’s security was essential to Japan and that maintaining peace and security in the Taiwan area was “a most important factor” for Japan. He also stated that Japan would provide a “constructive and rapid” (maemuki katsu sumiyaka) response in prior consultations should it become necessary for bases in Japan to be used as takeoff bases in the event of an armed attack against South Korea. The progress in dealing with the United States regarding the Okinawa issue made any new efforts toward a peace treaty a challenge for Japan and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Translated by Robert D. Eldridge Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Hara Kimie. 2000. San Furansisuko jōyaku no mōten [Blind Spots in the San Francisco Treaty]. Tokyo: Tansuisha. Hara Yoshihisa. 1988. Sengo Nihon to kokusai seiji [Postwar Japan and International Politics]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha. Hasegawa Tsuyoshi. 2000. Hoppō ryōdo mondai to Nichiro kankei [The Problem of the Northern Territories and Japanese-Russian Relations]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. Honda Ryōichi. 2013. Nichiro genjō shi: hoppō ryōdo—owaranai sengo [A History of the Current State of Japan and Russia: The Northern Territories—An Unending Postwar]. Sapporo: Hokkaidō Shinbunsha. Hori Tetsuo. 2006. Sayōnara, minasan—Hatoyama Nisso kōshō 50 nen me no shinsō [Farewell, Everyone!—The Fiftieth Year of Truth about the Japanese-Soviet Negotiations with Hatoyama]. Tokyo: Kimoto Shoten. Kanda Yutaka. 2012. Reisen kōzō no henyo to Nihon no taichū gaikō: futatsu no chitsujokan 1960–1972 [Structural Changes in the Cold War and Japan’s Diplomacy Toward China: A View of Two Systems, 1960–1972]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Kimura Hiroshi. 2005. Shinpan Nichiro: kokkō kōshō shi hoppō ryōdo henkan e no michi [New Edition: The History of Japan-Russia Talks on the State Border. The Path Toward the Return of the Northern Territories]. Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten.

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Kouno Yasuko. 1994. Okinawa henkan o meguru seiji to gaikō [Politics and Diplomacy on the Return of Okinawa]. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. Kubota Masaaki. 1983. Kuremurin e no shisetsu—hoppō ryōdo kōshō, 1955–1983 [Message to the Kremlin—Negotiations on the Northern Territories, 1955–1983]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha. Mainichi shinbun, ed. 1952. Tainichi heiwa jōyaku [Peace Treaty with the USSR]. Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha. Matsumoto Shun’ichi. 2012. Nisso kokkō kaifuku hiroku—hoppō ryōdo kōshō no shinjutsu [Secret Documents on the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between the USSR and Japan—The Truth about the Negotiations on the Northern Territories]. Asahi Sensho 892. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Shuppan. Nakashima Takuma, ed. 2012. Okinawa henkan to Nichibei anpō taisei [Reversion of Okinawa and the System of Japan-US Security Arrangements]. Tokyo: Yūhikaku. Shimotomai Nobuo. 2011. Nihon raisen shi [A History of the Japanese Cold War]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Suezawa Shōji, Kawabata Ichirō, and Shigeta Hiroshi, eds. 2003. Nichiro (Soren) kihon bunsho shiryōshū. Kaiteiban [A Collection of Foundational Japanese-Russian (Soviet) Documents and Materials. Revised Edition]. Kawasaki: RP Purintingu. Suzuki Keisuke. 1998. Zaikai taiso kōbō shi [A History of the Struggle of Financial Circles with the Soviet Union]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha. Tanaka Takahiko. 1993. Nisso kokkō kaifuku no shiteki kenkyū: sengo Nisso kankei no kiten 1945–56 [A Historical Study of the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union: Origins of Postwar Japanese-Soviet Relations 1945–56]. Tokyo: Yūhikaku. Wada Haruki. 1999. Hoppō ryōdo mondai: rekishi to mirai [The Problem of the Northern Territories: History and Future]. Asahi Sensho 621. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha.



Russian Sources



English Sources

Aleksandrov-Agentov, Andreĭ Mikhailovich. 1994. Ot Kollontaĭ do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya diplomata, sovetnika A. A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L. I. Brezhneva, Y. V. Andropova, K. U. CHernenko i M. S. Gorbacheva Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [From Kollontai to Gorbachev: The Reminiscences of a Diplomat and Advisor to A. A. Gromyko, and Assistant to L. I. Brezhnev, Yu. V. Andropov, K. U. Chernenko and M. S. Gorbachev]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. f. 146, op. 53, d. 239, l. 72.

FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). 1955–1957. Japan. Vol. 23, part 1, 244. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/ cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS195557v23p1. - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Goodby, James E., Vladimir I. Ivanov, and Nobuo Shimotomai, eds. 1995. “Northern Territories” and Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives. Westport: Praeger. Rozman, Gilbert. 2000. Japan and Russia, The Torturous Path to Normalization, 1949– 1999. New York: St. Martins.

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Postwar Relations between the USSR and Japan from the Late 1940s to the 1950s Sergey V. Chugrov 1

The San Francisco Peace Conference and the USSR

There were many twists, turns, and poignant moments in the diplomatic history of Soviet-Japanese relations, and the 1950s were particularly dramatic. The political course of Moscow, which sought what it felt was the appropriate peaceful resolution in Northeast Asia, was defined by the context of the Cold War (1947–1991). The Soviet Union did not operate in isolation, however. The reluctance of Western democracies to undertake social responsibility in Asia in the postwar era involuntarily pushed the “Asian riot into the hands of the Soviets” (Van Aduard 2012, 145). The main objective of Washington, another major player on the Asia-Pacific stage, was to “keep Japan in the camp of the Western coalition and prevent its reconciliation with the communist bloc” (Hara 2013, 147). Soviet and post-Soviet schools of historiography have presented different interpretations when evaluating some of the more serious events of the then recently emerging Cold War period that largely explain Moscow’s position regarding a peaceful settlement with Japan. Yet it should be noted that the first half of 1949 was marked by, at times, violent riots in Japan that led to the large-scale dismissal of employees in Japanese public and private enterprises. For example, riots broke out as a result of an incident at Mitaka Station near Tokyo on July 15, 1949, in which a number of innocent people were injured and killed by an unmanned train. There was unrest in Taira and Hiroshima triggered by the lockout of railway servicemen, the assassination of the president of the Japanese National Railways, and an attack by activists on a police station in Fukushima. Within this climate, Moscow attempted to exploit the position of Japanese communists to its own advantage. In August 1951, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin held secret negotiations with leaders of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which pushed the JCP to a left-wing “military course” (see Kuznetsov 2002, 54). Moreover, the “Iron Curtain Speech” of March 5, 1946, by the British prime minister Winston Churchill reflected the alarming tone that characterized international relations during this period. In April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was forged, in August the Soviet Union launched its first nuclear weapon, and

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in June 1950, the war on the Korean Peninsula erupted, which, according to the historian Anatoliĭ V. Torkunov, Stalin “believed that the Korean War was beneficial for the communist bloc, since it restricts the US forces and inflicts damage on positions of the Washington administration” (Torkunov 2000, 238). Stalin evolved new ambitions, and Moscow’s position on the Korean War caused extreme irritation in the West—it would leave an indelible imprint on the further development of the situation dealing with a peaceful reconciliation with Japan. Even against the backdrop of the growing conflict between the USSR and the United States, preparations were underway for a conference to draw up a peace treaty between Japan and the Allied forces. Begun in 1945, immediately following the end of the Pacific War and by the time of its signing six years later in 1951, the treaty process was characterized by countless agreements between the Allies over draft treaties. As these complicated events date back to the 1940s, it might be instructive to mention a typical example in this “marathon” of preparations. At this time, the United States persisted in its attempts to connect the issue of establishing guardianship over Micronesia, which would turn a considerable area of the Pacific Ocean into what Russian journalists referred to metaphorically as an “American Lake” (amerikanskoe ozero) regarding the issue of transferring the Southern Kuriles to the Soviet Union. In November 1946, Moscow made it clear that Washington should not deploy military bases on the Pacific islands where they planned to establish guardianship. The Department of State countered by stating that the United States desired the same custodial rights over the territories as the Soviet Union would have over the Kurile Islands. Initially, Moscow wished to use its position on Micronesia as a bargaining chip at the peace conference, although it did not want a further widening of the differences with Washington regarding the territorial issue. In February 1947, therefore, the Soviet Union agreed not to aggravate the problem of Micronesia and not to use its right of veto in the UN Security Council. This concession was not, however, appreciated by Washington (Hara 2013, 180–81). From the early 1950s onward, the divide between the United States and the USSR deepened. On March 2, 1950, the Soviet representative to the Allied Council, General Kuz’ma N. Derevyanko, demanded information on the military program that the United States had proposed for Japan because Moscow believed that it contravened the Potsdam Declaration. General Douglas MacArthur denied these accusations, but many in the Japanese leftist press expressed sympathy for the Russian point of view. These types of divisions were to escalate rapidly. At the end of October 1950, the Secretary of State John F. Dulles gave the then Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, Yakov A. Malik,

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a memorandum regarding the general principles for a peace treaty with Japan. It was sent to other members of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and clearly demonstrated the desire to preserve an American presence on the Japanese archipelago. Moscow decided to launch a counter offensive, and on October 19, 1950, it halted its boycott of the Far Eastern Commission. On November 8, Derevyanko appeared at the weekly meeting of the Allied Council after an eight-month absence but his position had not changed. On May 7, 1951, notes on the US draft peace treaty were released. Around a month later, on June 10, Moscow demanded that the peace conference on the Japanese issue be convened in July or August, and that all nations previously drawn into the war should attend. Both Soviet and Japanese historians note that Moscow had insisted that the Chinese delegation be present (Utsumi 2009, 142). The Kremlin fiercely opposed separate treaties with Japan, and this was its third official response to the proposals by Dulles. The first was an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of 1950 in order to clarify the positions of the respective countries. Thereafter, the Kremlin fell silence for a time, observing with interest the negotiations between the Commonwealth prime ministers in London in early January of 1951. In mid-March 1951, the Soviet Izvestiya newspaper issued a warning that Russia had not forgotten about the issue of peace with Japan and suggested that the peace treaty with it should be prepared jointly by the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Van Aduard 2012, 193). According to Soviet historians and the media, almost every meeting of the Allied Council in Tokyo was beset with new hurdles. Many of these could have been easily removed had not fundamental ideological differences existed between the three Allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, and China— and the USSR. The coordination between Washington and London was at times extremely difficult, marked by ongoing conflicts of interest between the Allied nations (Morris 1947). For example, London suggested that Beijing have the opportunity to participate in a peaceful settlement but the British were forced to bow to the Americans who accused China of supplying aid to North Korea. And in order to appease the British during the course of the war, the White House removed Douglas MacArthur from his post of commander-in-chief of the UN forces (Slavinskiĭ 1994–1995, no. 5, 58). London, in turn, conceded on the issue of the return of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands to China. The final stage of negotiations became an exhausting marathon filled with diplomatic intrigue, one that Dulles referred to as the “eleven-month peace conference.”

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An approved text of the US-British draft peace treaty was presented in Moscow on July 6, 1951. Soviet and post-Soviet historiography claimed that the United States had made every effort to prevent the participation of the Soviet Union in the peace process. And it is true that Washington persisted, sometimes subtle and diplomatic, at other times direct and aggressive, in an effort to push forward its own interests. Documents from the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (APV RF) reveal, however, that Moscow also strongly defended its position, knowing that the US Department of State left open the doors for the Soviet Union to participate in the peace conference (Slavinskiĭ 1994–1995, no. 6, 52). Yet Dulles, who was deeply enmeshed in a complicated diplomatic game, avoided a trip to Moscow. Washington did not wish to have direct, in-depth discussions with the Soviets about the conditions of the treaty within the framework of the Council of Foreign Ministers where Moscow had the right of veto. The first secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, wrote about this in his memoirs: Our claims to solve Japan’s postwar fate raised the ire of our allies, and Stalin, overestimating his capabilities, answered them with the same antipathy. In short, the relationship with the United States began to deteriorate. We were often ignored, sometimes our opinion was not taken into consideration—we were harassed. khrushchev 1979, 1–635

The Kremlin agreed to participate in the conference in order to avoid giving the impression that it did not wish to build normal relations with Japan. On August 20, 1951, the Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted the guidelines for the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Peace Conference. This instruction set the stage that enabled the Soviet delegation to quit the conference “in case of objections to the discussion of our amendments, or rejection of these amendments, as well as in case of a proposal to proceed to the signing of contract without its substantial discussion” (Slavinskiĭ 1994–1995, no. 7, 96–97). There is documentary evidence that Dulles and US Secretary of State Dean Acheson were surprised that Moscow finally accepted the invitation, and they began preparations in advance in order to stop the Soviets from becoming a “destructive force” (Slavinskiĭ 1994–1995, no. 6, 57). In this light, the assertion by Soviet historians that Washington “twisted Moscow’s arm” is quite plausible. But Stalin added further fuel to the fire with his suspicion of and hostility toward Western leaders. It was within this climate that at 6:45

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p.m. on September 4, 1951, at the Opera House in San Francisco (today the War Memorial Opera House), where six years earlier the UN Charter was drafted, US Secretary of State Acheson, interim chairman of conference, declared the forum open. Fifty-two countries, including Japan, were in attendance. Some of the important players who did not attend were North Korea, Mongolia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and China. Already at the beginning of the first plenary session on September 5, Andreĭ A. Gromyko, the first deputy minister of foreign affairs and the Soviet representative, made a statement about the desire to see representatives from China among the invited delegates. Acheson did not consider the reasons put forward by Gromyko on formal grounds, which included the fact that mainland China had been the principal victim of the Imperial Japanese Army, having suffered enormous human losses, and that China’s leaders had previously signed major documents with the Allies (e.g., the Cairo and Potsdam declarations). According to procedural conditions the conference was clearly held for the signing. The amendments, as emphasized by the secretary of state, went beyond the agreed issues, rules, and procedures of the conference and therefore were rejected (Provisional Verbatum 1951, 4, 11, doc. 11 VM/3). In his speeches and remarks Gromyko noted that the US-British project aimed at drawing Japan into a military group that posed a real threat to its neighbors, in particular, China and the Soviet Union (Provisional Verbatum 1951, 113, 115, 121). He also emphasized that Soviet rights in the southern part of Sakhalin Island and in all the adjacent islands, including the Kuriles, then under Soviet sovereignty, were incontestable (Conference 1951, 109). Washington, in turn, unambiguously renounced the Yalta agreements on the territorial issue. Ambassador Matsumoto Shun’ichi, who from 1955 to 1956 held the negotiations to restore relations with the USSR, makes an interesting observation in his memoirs that the governments of the Allied powers and their authorized representatives during the negotiations in San Francisco did not have sufficient historical knowledge regarding the Kuriles. And many Japanese were also confused following the military defeat and seemed to have forgotten certain facts. For example, the Japanese envoy to the conference, then Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, attempted to explain Japan’s basic position on the “Northern Territories” (Kurile Islands) in his address (8th Plenary Session, September 7, 1951) in order to draw attention to the fact that the Kunashir (Kunashiri) and Iturup (Etorofu) Islands were “indigenous Japanese” territories (Matsumoto 1970, 5). Yoshida pointed out that tsarist Russia had never opposed Iturup and Kunashir being part of Japan and that only the islands to the north of Urup had a mixed Russo-Japanese population. Moreover, the Shikotan and Habomai Islands, located close to Hokkaido, were inseparably linked to Japan (Gaimushō

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1951, 302–3; Shigeta and Suezawa 1988, 121). It was, perhaps, the greatest rebuff delivered by Japan at this time. Yet it should be noted that Yoshida referred to Iturup and Kunashir as the “Southern Kurile Islands” (Minami Chishima)—in other words, he followed the Soviet view that they were a part of the Kuriles chain, not a different archipelago connected to the Japanese coast. According to the terms of the peace treaty, Japan would have to relinquish the Kuriles (Glaubitz 1995, 39–40).1 Yoshida was treated as the representative of a defeated nation and was not allowed to finish his speech, with his protests falling on deaf ears. It was also quite clear that Acheson ignored Japan’s arguments and fended off Gromyko’s objections. The result was quite predictable: Gromyko, following instructions from Moscow, was absent from the signing ceremony. Czechoslovakia and Poland refused to sign the treaty, and not surprisingly China likewise did not recognize the document. It is interesting that the Japanese Communist Party also requested that the Soviet Union not sign the treaty (Shimotomai 2004). So why did Moscow boycott the signing ceremony and refuse to sign the treaty, thereby opposing the other forty-nine participating countries? There are five points that can be singled out. First, as the leader of the socialist bloc in the early years of the Cold War the Soviet Union tried to show solidarity with communist China as much as possible and to express its indignation about the violation of the rights of the Chinese in Taiwan (Formosa), the Pescadores (now Penghu), Paracel, and Spratly islands, which were lost as a result of Imperial Japanese Army aggression. Second, within the growing climate of isolation and hostility over the course of the Cold War, Moscow had no credible chance of legal representation regarding its rights to annex the Kurile Islands since the US proposal of the peace treaty stipulated that Japan should relinquish the islands, even though it did not indicate which country should in fact take control of them. Of course, for Moscow it was important that the treaty formalized Japan’s renunciation of all claims and rights to the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin (Ch. II, “Territory,” of the San Francisco Peace Treaty). Moscow was unable, however, to ensure that the terms of the treaty clearly spelled out who should acquire the islands; this was later proved advantageous for the Japanese in their justification of territorial claims. It was absurd to imagine that the rights to the 1  On September 8, 1956, Yoshida said in an article published in the newspaper, Sankei shinbun, and coinciding with the 5th anniversary of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, that his speech at the conference stressed that Kunashir and Iturup do not belong to the Kurile Islands, but appear to be an integral Japanese territory. A prominent Japanese expert on the subject, Wada Haruki, described Yoshida’s words as an “obvious lie” (Wada 1991, 20).

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Kuriles could be transferred, not to the Soviet Union, which in fact had control over the islands, but to another country entirely (Chugrov 2008, 118–19). Third, the Soviet Union sought to express its disagreement with the desires of the United States to use the treaty as a way to maintain its military hegemony in the Pacific region. The treaty did not contain any guarantees against the deployment of US troops on Japanese soil, and the Soviet proposals for the inclusion of provisions in the treaty on Japanese neutrality were ignored. Fourth, the text of the agreement did not contain any actual guarantees against the revival of militarism in Japan, and lastly, Moscow believed that Washington sought to secure the economic benefits that US business enjoyed during the years of Allied Occupation (1945–1952) in Japan. The historical evaluation of the Soviet position at the San Francisco conference remains ambivalent. Today, more than six decades after the signing of the peace treaty, it is clear that the Soviet refusal to sign was historically shortsighted and that this would complicate the future work of Russian diplomats. At that time, it worked in favor of those politicians who claimed that the absence of a signature under a formal agreement freed Tokyo from its obligations relating to the Soviet Union/Russia. Khrushchev observed that: Stalin was discontent, and justifiably discontent about Truman’s policy. It is one thing to be dissatisfied, but quite another to take wrong actions that are harmful to our state. We were invited to sign a peace treaty with Japan, and we refused. The situation became unclear, and it lasts to this day. khrushchev 1999, 635

Fifty years after the signing of the treaty the scholar Yuriĭ D. Kuznetsov called Moscow’s refusal to sign the treaty “a mistake” that damaged national interests (Kuznetsov 2002, 51). If we recall the context of the Cold War, it is impossible to imagine that Moscow, operating within the framework of a communist ideology and as the leader of the communist camp, could really have taken a different position. Everything was done in keeping with the ideological tenets of the party, and in this sense its decision cannot be seen as a shortsighted miscalculation. Considering the experience of the last sixty years, we can only agree in part with Khrushchev’s revelations about the Soviet Union taking the “wrong actions.” One thing is certain, however. As a result of its decision, the Soviet Union, in keeping with the text of Article 25, did not fall under the definition of “Allied Powers.” Moscow’s choice not to sign the treaty, thereby losing rights accordingly, created a situation that would prove problematic for decades to come:

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The San Francisco Treaty was ratified without conditions and was not followed by a formal protest by the Japanese parliament. Moreover, it may be recalled that on October 19, 1951, Nishimura Kumao, director of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry of Japan, confirmed in Parliament, that the name “Kurile Islands” as it is used in the peace treaty, refers both to the northern and the southern part of the archipelago. shigeta and suezawa 1988, 1112

The resolution of the Lower House of Japan’s National Diet on July 31, 1952, regarding the territorial issue indicated that the areas that needed to be returned were Okinawa and Ogasawara (Bonin) in the south and the Shikotan and the Habomai Islands in the Kuriles. It was only in 1955, when for tactical reasons and under pressure from the United States, that the Japanese claims to the Soviet Union “acquired their final form” (Wada 1991, 18–21). Following the San Francisco Peace Conference, the USSR faced a number of logistical hurdles as well. The Russian mission, seen as the apparatus of the Soviet representatives in the Allied Council, was established in Tokyo. When the treaty entered into force, the multilateral Allied Council for Japan, created alongside the Far Eastern Commission to supervise the Allied Occupation, in effect ceased to exist, and the Russian mission automatically lost its right to remain in Japan. On April 23, 1952, at the last session of the Council, the permanent member from the USSR, Major General Alekseĭ P. Kislenko, strongly protested against its dissolution, but the Council was dissolved on April 28. Although the Japanese government did not demand that Soviet diplomats leave the country, it no longer recognized their official status. There were only two options left for the Soviet representatives: either to continue negotiations regarding a peace settlement or to leave the country. According to Article 26 of the San Francisco Treaty: Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this

2  The importance of this is testified by the fact that the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor A. Rogachev quoted Nishimura’s statement verbatim in one of the principal publications on the subject in Izvestiya (April 24, 1991).

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obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Though inevitable, Moscow sadly missed this chance within the context of Cold War politics. Another significant event of September 1951 that represented a threat to the Soviet Union at this time was the signing of the security treaty between the United States and Japan within just a few hours following the signing ceremony for the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It created a new paradigm for Japan. Japanese political scientists maintain that the widely discussed concept of “Japan as a normal country” assumed that postwar Japanese security policy stood out for its “abnormality.” The agenda for Japan, one that is still discussed within the context of the anti-militarist article of its constitution, is based on the realities of the postwar peace settlement and in the “postwar consensus” formed in San Francisco (Soeya 2011, 72–73). 2

Restoring Diplomatic Relations between the USSR and Japan

Moscow and Tokyo had to work continuously for several years to overcome the controversial political legacy of San Francisco—its disappointing results and unresolved issues. For the respected Japanese diplomat and Sovietologist Tōgō Kazuhiko “considering that the Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Treaty, the question of the restoration of peace and the resolution of all issues related to this problem, including territorial, were open to bilateral discussions” (Togo [Tōgō] 2010, 232). Clearly neither Moscow nor Tokyo could be satisfied with the abnormal situation that ran counter to their national interests. In August 1953, a statement of intent was made during the session of the Supreme Soviet that the USSR should react positively on any steps by Japan that aimed at the normalization of relations with Moscow. In April the following year, the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) was established to develop trade relations with Moscow. In a quite different light, Western historians describe extremely unfavorable conditions in which the normalization of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tokyo developed. For example, one British staff report identifies Japan as the main East Asian objective of Russian imperialism and China as a powerful agent of international communism (Weste 2008, 43). Today declassified British diplomatic documents testify to the fact that the West seriously considered the Soviet threat to Japan as an excuse to begin World War III with the use of atomic weapons. At the same time, the US military believed that the

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establishment of a powerful Japanese ground force was necessary in deterring Russian amphibious attacks on Japan (Iokibe et al. 2008, 13). The normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations matured within a difficult international environment, encountering the consequences of the rising tensions between East and West. It is not clearly understood, for example, why the third secretary of the Soviet Mission in Tokyo and lieutenant colonel of the Soviet State Security, Yuriĭ A. Rastvorov, disappeared from his office in the second half of January 1954. Six months later, on August 14, the Japanese government announced that he had applied for asylum in the United States (Swenson-Wright 2008, 145). Accusations against Moscow of allegedly deploying a vast intelligence network in Japan were a serious obstacle in the creation of the right atmosphere for rapprochement. Moreover, the first Russo-Japanese communications on the peace treaty were complicated by the political intrigues in Japan surrounding around the establishment of the “1955 System”—the party system in effect from 1955 to 1993—as well as partisan differences and personal interests of the players who quite puzzlingly hindered rapprochement with Moscow. Nevertheless, Hatoyama Ichirō, who formed the cabinet on December 10, 1954, was enthusiastic about the idea of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union in an effort to promote Japanese interests through trade (e.g., with China). He hoped to achieve three objectives with normalization: 1) the liberation of Siberian prisoners of war; 2) provision of support for Japan to join the United Nations, which would be a signal of the county’s return to the international community (Iokibe et al. 2008, 4); and 3) perhaps, of no less significance for the Japanese, the conclusion of a convention on fishing. Many called for the construction of normal relations in the region, and Asian socialist countries were unanimous in their desire to normalize relations with Japan. Even the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), Nam Il, expressed such an intention in a statement made on February 25, 1955 (Shimotomai 2006, 159). In January 1955, Prime Minister Hatoyama met with the Soviet official Andreĭ I. Domnitskiĭ who, although a trade representative to Tokyo, had a low diplomatic rank. Difficulties appeared even during the initial discussions regarding the venue for the negotiations. Japan insisted on New York, while the Soviets, not wishing to have Americans as hosts since they thought they would interfere in the negotiations, suggested Moscow or Tokyo. A compromise was agreed to hold the first round in London, and the Soviet-Japanese talks at the ambassadorial level began on July 3, 1955. The USSR was represented by Malik, now Soviet ambassador to the United Kingdom, and Japan by Ambassador

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Matsumoto. Both historians and diplomats have often described the course of the negotiations as a roller coaster but it might be instructive here to focus on the disputed points that the Soviet propaganda machine at times interpreted in a politically engaged and inequitable manner. Before the commencement of negotiations in London on May 26, 1955, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemitsu Mamoru unexpectedly made the statement that Japan would seek the return of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. This led to the exacerbation of Japanese territorial claims that aimed at revising the postwar borders which, according to the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, returned southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union and ceded it to the Southern Kuriles. This was a move that Washington later reneged on. The combination of political, historical, and ideological circumstances meant that this issue would become a powder keg in the negotiations. Initially, the Soviets took a critical stance, rebuking the legitimacy of any territorial claims that they felt were unacceptable and maintaining that Tokyo had to limit its demands on the return of the four islands of the Southern Kuriles (Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, and Habomai). An unanticipated turn ensued when on August 9, in the garden of the Japanese embassy in London, the head of the Soviet delegation Malik, then much preoccupied with Khrushchev’s irritation that the negotiations were moving ahead too slowly, conveyed to Matsumoto in an informal conversation that Moscow was ready to hand over Shikotan and Habomai to Japan in exchange for signing a peace treaty. Historians today agree that Malik, who had not consulted the members of the delegation, was too quick in disclosing the backup position earlier approved by the Politburo as a measure of last resort. Khrushchev wished to demonstrate the Soviet desire to find a compromise position that allowed the possibility of a transfer of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan as a last-ditch concession. He approached the situation with a fair amount of naivety, which is borne out in his words: We had long consultations with USSR leaders and concluded that it is necessary to meet the wishes of the Japanese and to agree to transfer these islands (I cannot recall their names now), but with the condition that Japan would sign a peace treaty with the Soviet Union and US troops would withdraw from the Japanese archipelago … We believed that such a concession was not that important for the Soviet Union. These are desert islands only used by fishermen and the military … But the friendship that we wished to win from the Japanese people—our mutual friendship—would be of enormous value. Therefore, territorial concessions

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above all overlapped with the interest in those new relationships that would develop between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Japan. khrushchev 1999, 644

Ambassador Matsumoto was naturally delighted with Malik’s surprise revelation and later confessed that he wished to seal the deal immediately at that moment. But the Japanese draft of a treaty presented on August 16, 1955, again contained a provision on the transfer of the southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to Japan. This point caused a further stalemate in the negotiations. Tokyo was not in a hurry, however, and Japan interrupted the negotiations, perhaps to challenge the resolve of its negotiating partners. As often transpires in diplomatic practice, a completely different scenario came into play—that is, economic interests gradually began to push Tokyo toward an early normalization of political relations. The presence of the fishing lobby intensified behind the scenes of the negotiations, seeking to expand salmon fishing in regions adjacent to the coast of the Kurile Islands. Even before this time, the Soviet government had adopted a decree to regulate salmon fishing in the Bering Sea and in the Pacific Ocean bordering the Soviet territorial waters, but this was put on hold until the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into force. To expedite the process the fishing lobby initiated a visit to Moscow in April 1956 with the delegation headed by the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Kōno Ichirō, who was seen as a credible figure in financial circles. Following the “fishery negotiations” in the Soviet capital in May 1956, the parties signed a convention on fishing and an agreement to assist any individual in a situation of distress at sea. It is notable that Kōno played an important role in linking the economic interests of Japan with the negotiations on a peace treaty. And it appeared that the parties were close to a breakthrough. The chief representative of the USSR, Sergeĭ L. Tikhvinskiĭ, who had replaced Domnitskiĭ, arrived in Japan, and this signaled the recognition from the Japanese of the official status of a Soviet diplomat. Even before the establishment of diplomatic relations, however, Japanese fishermen were already catching salmon during the 1956 season, and the Japanese media, perhaps quite tongue-in-cheek, referred to the Soviet Mission as “fishing” (shutsugyō). The signing of conventions regulating the fisheries thus became a litmus test of the state of relations between Moscow and Tokyo. With the resumption of negotiations in Moscow on July 31, 1956, the only issue left to settle was territorial. This time the Japanese delegation was led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemitsu, who sought to hasten the negotiations

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in order to attend the Suez Canal Global Conference in London (August 16–23, 1956), and in August 1956 he was ready to conclude a peace agreement on the conditions of the return of Habomai and Shikotan. This contradicts Soviet sources, which stress instead Tokyo’s intransigence on the issue, but according to the journalist Kubota Masaaki the position of the Japanese delegation during the negotiations was in fact quite flexible (Kubota 1983, 32–34). Washington decisively stepped into the negotiations in keeping with the politics of the Cold War. In his memoirs, Ambassador Matsumoto wrote that the watershed moment in the negotiations was in connection with the “Dulles’s Warning,” his reference to the ultimatum by John F. Dulles, who warned Minister Shigemitsu that the United States would appropriate Okinawa if Tokyo agreed to sign an agreement on Moscow’s terms (Tanaka 1995, 266). Whether or not this or other accounts in the memoirs are veracious— their reliability is in fact questionable—it fits well with US actions, which were dictated by Cold War ideology. In this light, US diplomatic correspondence contains an interesting document, the “Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, Ambassador Aldrich’s Residence, London, August 19, 1956,” which is evidence of the State Department’s direct link regarding the status of the four Kurile Islands and the Ryukyu archipelago (Okinawa). The document states, in particular, that: The secretary reminded Mr. Shigemitsu that the Kuriles and Ryukyus were handled in the same manner under the surrender terms and that while the United States had by the peace treaty agreed that residual sovereignty to the Ryukyus might remain with Japan, we had also stipulated by Article 26 that if Japan gave better terms to Russia we could demand the same terms for ourselves. That would mean that if Japan recognized that the Soviet Union was entitled to full sovereignty over the Kuriles we would assume that we were equally entitled to full sovereignty over the Ryukyus. FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 23, doc. 89

This is, in fact, what Ambassador Matsumoto conveyed in his own diplomatic language. The text of the memorandum demonstrates, however, that this combination of territories was offered to Japan as a sort of bargaining chip, although from Moscow’s perspective this did not alter its aims and meaning. Moscow was completely unprepared for such a diplomatic somersault. The US Secretary of State Dulles wrote from London that “Shigemitsu is apparently worried and distraught because of the collapse of the Soviet peace treaty

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talks … He says that when Japan talks to Russia face to face, Russia is ‘very hard’ and does not even listen” (FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 23, doc. 90). Much more important was the new US government memorandum, dated September 7, 1956, which contained Washington’s view on the matter: The United States has reached the conclusion after careful examination of the historical facts that the islands of Iturup and Kunashiri (along with the Habomai Islands and Shikotan which are a part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan proper … and therefore Japan can only require the return of the four islands. FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 23, doc. 101

The significant shift in the US position from the legal consequences of Japan’s surrender of claims to Kurile Islands to “the study of the historical facts” is noteworthy. Hara Kimie believes that Washington’s stance was dictated precisely by the understanding that Moscow would never agree to the option of renouncing claims to the Southern Kurile Islands and that “the notion of the ‘four islands’ was the ‘wedge’ between Japan and the Soviet Union within the ideology of the Cold War” (Hara 2013, 147). As a result, the Russian side proposed a regulation of relations in accordance with the “Adenauer Formula” successfully implemented in Europe—in other words, to restore diplomatic relations without a peace treaty. The Japanese side did not object and what followed was a prolific exchange of diplomatic notes. The situation reached a climax with the arrival of Prime Minister Hatoyama and Kōno Ichirō in Moscow on October 12. The next day they met with the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikolaĭ A. Bulganin, at the Kremlin, and on October 19, 1956, they signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration toward the normalization of relations, which would become a cornerstone in the relations between the two countries (Matsumoto 2012, 188–89). The National Diet of Japan and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified the declaration without any complications. On December 12 at the conference hall of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikolaĭ T. Fedorenko and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu exchanged the ratifications as well as the protocol on trade development and the reciprocal granting of the most-favored nation status. They entered into force on the date that the ratifications were exchanged. The positive ramifications of this event cannot be overestimated, and the content of the declaration should not be seen solely as an attempt to resolve the territorial problem. The signed document ended the state of war between the two countries and restored diplomatic and consular relations (e.g., the

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2001 Joint symposium). The USSR refused reparations, granted amnesty, and repatriated Japanese prisoners of war. The first session of the Russian-Japanese Fisheries Commission was held in early 1957, during which Moscow agreed to a remarkable increase in salmon quotas. Later that year, in December, a SovietJapanese trade agreement was also signed, which initiated a series of mutually beneficial agreements in the economic sphere. This was followed by an agreement on the establishment of a regular shipping line between Nakhodka and Yokohama (June 3, 1958). The Soviet Union participated in the Osaka International Trade Fair in 1958, and the Japanese Industrial Exhibition was held in Moscow in 1960. Historians, including the late Boris N. Slavinskiĭ and Vadim B. Ramzes, unanimously assert that the Joint Declaration will be remembered as a document that regulated the territorial dispute. Article 9 of the declaration, which laid the cornerstone of the bilateral relations, would become a stumbling block within just a few short years since it states that the Soviet Union and Japan: … agree to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty … In this connection, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration of the interest of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. Article 9 of the Joint Declaration

Differences in the interpretation of Article 9 were immediately apparent. The Soviet Union viewed the declaration as a document that covered the territorial issue while the Japanese regarded it as part of a set of documents, including diplomatic notes, that had been exchanged between the parties. They insisted that the Joint Declaration was a prelude to new negotiations on the transfer of Kunashir and Iturup to Japan. Although the Soviet leaders believed that the Joint Declaration included almost all the issues that would normally form the basis of a peace treaty, the inclusion of Article 9 illustrates the failure of the Soviet Union and Japan to conclude a full-fledged peace treaty. When understood in terms of diplomatic language, it should be emphasized that the Soviet Union’s reference to the “transfer” of islands to Japan was as a pledge for future good relations, rather than the actual “return” as Japanese leaders were inclined to view it. In other words, the Soviets wished to emphasize that the USSR had expressed a readiness to hand over a portion of Soviet, not Japanese,

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territory for the purpose of building future friendly relations (Chugrov 2008, 123–24). Such hopes would not be realized, although both parties endeavored to break the deadlock. A series of advisory meetings were eventually held in Moscow and Tokyo following a long break. During a visit to Japan in January 1972, Gromyko hinted to Prime Minister Satō Eisaku that it was possible to return to the “1956 model” (the principles of the 1956 Joint Declaration). A series of negotiations continued when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited Moscow in October of 1973. Even at this time, the “1956 model” was once again mentioned. This “1956 model” would also resurface at the negotiations between Gorbachev and Kaifu Toshiki in Tokyo in 1991, as well as during the post-Soviet era. But “the wedge driven between the USSR and Japan during the Cold War remains today despite the fact that the Cold War ended a long time ago” (Hara 2013, 151). 3

The Problem of Japan’s Entry to the United Nations and Russian Diplomacy

The normalization of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan enabled the latter to improve its international standing and to open the way to UN membership. There was a degree of intrigue surrounding Japan’s admittance into the United Nations, and as it is a topic mentioned only tangentially in Soviet and Russian studies, it is deserving of special consideration here. The Japanese needed to orchestrate a full-scale entry into the global community, and it actively partook in a number of specialized UN agencies, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and it contributed to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA). Japan had already applied for UN membership in 1952 as part of the competition between the Soviet bloc and the West but its application has been consistently rejected. When bilateral talks on the normalization of relations began in London, however, the Japanese had the expectations that the negotiations would quickly pave the way for joining the United Nations, thereby bypassing any objections that the Soviets might raise. But when negotiations were at an impasse in the summer of 1955, Moscow announced that it would agree to Japan’s entry to the UN only after the establishment of diplomatic relations. There was another aspect that is only mentioned indirectly in Soviet historiography—that the support for the Japanese application was also linked to the Soviet Union’s promotion of Mongolia becoming a UN member. It used this issue as a bargaining chip in the negotiations with Tokyo on the normalization of relations between

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the two countries. In October 1955, Canada put forward a proposal that presupposed the membership of Japan and Mongolia in the United Nations based on universal principles (there were seventeen countries in the package, including Italy, Spain, countries of the Soviet bloc, Ceylon, and others) (Kurusu 2008, 114). By the time Canada had offered a package deal the bilateral negotiations had stalled due to the Japanese-Soviet territorial deadlock because Mongolia’s membership to the United Nations was part of the deal. On November 3, 1955, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy, Leonid M. Zamyatin, privately and informally approached the senior political advisor to the US Mission at the United Nations, John McSweeney, in order to secure some firm assurance about the admission of the Soviet candidates. The next day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. Molotov supported the British suggestion that the obvious solution was to adopt all candidates as members (Kurusu 2008, 119). In Geneva on November 13, 1955, Molotov and Dulles discussed the question of new members. Dulles informed Molotov that the United States would not use the right of veto in the Security Council, and stressed that if Moscow put aside reservations about Japan and Spain, the United States would be able to find a way to accept countries of the Soviet bloc, with the exception of Mongolia.3 Mongolia continued to be a negotiating asset in the US-Soviet confrontation surrounding the admission of Western countries of the earlier Nazi block to the United Nations. Mongolia’s admission to the United Nations was later done in exchange for the admission of Italy, Spain, and Japan. Molotov pointed out that the US difficulties regarding Mongolia were not dissimilar to the Soviet doubts about Spain: “Yet the United States does not seem to understand that Mr. Molotov is unlikely to accept Spain if the package does not include Outer Mongolia” (National Archives 1955, UN 22516/191, FO 371/117477). At a later press conference, the Soviet diplomat Vladimir N. Kuznetsov announced that the Soviet Union would strongly support the package of now eighteen countries, but would use the right of veto if the United States did not cooperate. Overall the United Nations backed the Canadian proposal, and members of the organization began to realize that the United States was attempting to ruin any chance of a comprehensive agreement (Kurusu 2008, 122). According to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasiliĭ V. Kuznetsov, 3  Article 1 of the Yalta Agreement dealt with the conservation of Mongolia’s status quo. Article 3 assumed that it would require Chiang Kai-shek’s consent and based on Stalin’s advice the US president would take measures to ensure that such an agreement was secured (Vneshnyaya politika 1947, 111–12). Historically, Taiwan was considered a part of Chinese territory and that prompted its subsequent veto.

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Moscow still had significant doubts about Spain and Japan joining the United Nations, and he stated at a press conference that if Mongolia were deleted from the list, the Soviet Union would demand that Spain also be removed (but not Japan!). The Soviet position was reiterated by Ambassador Malik, who told José Vicente Trujillo, the chairman of the Hispanic Caucus and the Ecuadorian representative to the United Nations, that if Mongolia was not admitted, the Soviet Union would use its veto against Spain since it was a former fascist country and an ally of the United States (Kurusu 2008, 123). On December 1, the Special Political Committee hosted a discussion on the Canadian proposal, and the Soviet representative Arkadiĭ A. Sobolev made assurances that the Soviet Union would support it. And a few days later, Ambassador Malik told the Japanese ambassador to the United Nations, Kase Toshikazu, that Moscow had decided to vote for the admission of Japan and Spain. It was truly a breakthrough in the negotiations, and this time the Soviet Union was determined more than ever to achieve its goal. For example, it asked Greece, which opposed the inclusion of Albania, to vote on December 7, 1955, for the entire list. Ultimately, the Special Political Committee approved the Canadian draft resolution by a vote of fifty-two for and two against (Cuba and Taiwan) with five abstentions (United States, Belgium, France, Greece, and Israel) (Kurusu 2008, 125). The US president Dwight D. Eisenhower asked Chiang Kai-shek to be patient and not to use the veto against Mongolia. But on November 29, 1955, Taipei issued a press statement in which it confirmed that it would use the veto against the admission of Mongolia. On December 13, the Security Council voted for a draft resolution submitted by Brazil and New Zealand on the admission of eighteen new members. Then events took a dramatic turn with the result of the vote playing out the worst-case scenario: Taipei vetoed the entry of Mongolia and in response the Soviet Union vetoed the admission of all thirteen Western candidates. The outcome was that no single country was recommended (Kurusu 2008, 128). On the morning of December 14, 1955, however, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasiliĭ Kuznetsov unexpectedly asked that the Security Council convene an urgent meeting. He expressed a wish to revoke the Soviet veto of the previous day’s meeting and offered to accept sixteen countries, postponing the question of the membership of Japan and Mongolia until the next session. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the US representative to the United Nations, wanted everything to be decided on the same day “to leave less time for the Japanese to make any fuss” (National Archives 1955, UN 22516/279, FO 371/11747б). The United Kingdom proposed to include Japan on the list, in case the Soviet Union used its veto. During the break, it was agreed that the United States would offer to add Japan; there was no opposition from the Soviet Union. Thereafter,

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everything went according to plan: the United States submitted a list to the vote, which included Japan, and the Soviet Union used the veto to the Japanese application (with ten “yes” votes). (The Soviet Union subsequently came up with a proposal for another list that included Mongolia and Japan but it was rejected, with ten abstaining countries.) Despite the fact that Taiwan, the United States, and Belgium abstained from casting their votes on individual candidates, there were no votes against the final proposal, which was finally adopted by eight “yes” votes. The Security Council thus recommended that the General Assembly admit sixteen-member states to the United Nations. Furthermore, Lodge offered a resolution that endorsed accepting Japan during the eleventh session. Kuznetsov also issued a statement that contained the same wish (Kurusu 2008, 128). It might be useful here to touch upon the efforts of Japanese diplomacy in 1956 in light of the problems surrounding Japan’s membership to the United Nations. Following an unproductive mission by the Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu in Moscow, Prime Minister Hatoyama sent a letter to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikolaĭ Bulganin. It listed five conditions, including that of the support by the Soviet Union of Japan’s admission to the UN, which were subject to approval before the completion of negotiations on the diplomatic normalization with Moscow. Two days later, Bulganin accepted Hatoyama’s terms. During the talks in Moscow, the Soviet delegation endorsed Japan’s membership to the United Nations without imposing any preconditions. Yet Hatoyama, still skeptical, proposed that Japan and the Soviet Union exchange memoranda to confirm the position in support of Japan’s membership. When the Joint Declaration was signed on October 19, 1956, however, it remained unclear whether the Soviet backing would come into effect since the document had not been ratified. In December, Bulganin gave the Japanese government assurance that this time Russia would support Japan without any conditions. The long-awaited positive outcome of this protracted tale quickly followed on December 12, 1956. When the Joint Declaration entered into force, the Security Council endorsed the Peruvian draft resolution that recommended Japan’s admittance. Six days later, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously admitted Japan to the United Nations, and it soon received a non-permanent, two-year membership on the Security Council. 4 Conclusion The major Japanese players of this exhausting, and at the same time exciting, diplomatic marathon would soon leave the political arena. In December 1956, under fire from critics and keeping to his promise given before the signing of - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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the Joint Declaration, Prime Minister Hatoyama resigned. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu died six weeks after he introduced Japan as a new member at the United Nations. The fate of Article 9 of the Joint Declaration was similarly dramatic. The renegotiation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in January 1960, which confirmed the presence of US armed forces on the Japanese archipelago, influenced the interpretation of the basic tenets of the Joint Declaration on the territorial issue. This triggered a vocal national protest against ratification, and Japanese authorities, under pressure from opponents, had to cancel the visit of the US president Eisenhower in 1960. On the night of May 19–20, on the order of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, more than 500 police officers occupied the Diet Building. But in spite of the protests, the treaty was ratified and came into force. The legacy of the 1950s is today more relevant than ever, influencing the fluctuating political climate of bilateral relations. Although the peace treaty was never signed, in all other respects relations between the USSR and Japan developed normally (and positively) in most areas. The approach to a resolution of the situation is undoubtedly grounded in an accurate understanding of the political significance of the events of the 1950s and the milieu in which they occurred. And this is why it is important to evaluate the role and motives of the United States in a measured and constructive way, without falling prey to ideological “tunnel vision.” As for the Japanese side, many scholars believe that the United States was the key actor in this drama since “neither economic nor strategic interests can be considered as the driving force behind Japan’s rigid position” (Bukh 2010, 112). There is still a counterproductive sensitivity and nervousness surrounding the territorial issue. As long as this situation prevails in Russo-Japanese relations, no real progress on the peace treaty can be achieved. The Joint Declaration of 1956 nonetheless will remain the cornerstone of modern bilateral relations between our two countries as a valid legal document, ratified by lawmakers in both countries, and with the character of an international treaty. And therein lay its enduring legacy. Bibliography

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AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. f. A. Y. Vyshinskogo, op. 24, d. 32, d. 396, ch. 2, l. 91–116. AVP RF (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation]. 1951. Ukazaniya delegatsii SSSR na konferentsii v San-Frantsisko 20 avgusta [Guidelines for the Soviet Delegation at the San Francisco Conference on August 20]. Bogaturov, Alekseĭ Demosfenovich, ed. 2004. “Sovmestnaja deklaracija o normalizacii sovetsko-japonskih otnosheniĭ” [The Joint Declaration on the Normalization of Soviet-Japanese Relations]. Sistemnaja istorija mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij v chetyreh tomah. Sobytija i dokumenty. 1918–2003 [The History of Systematic International Relations in Four Volumes. Events and Documents. 1918–2003). Vol. 4, Dokumenty 1945–2003 [Documents 1945–2003]. Moscow: Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Chugrov, Sergeĭ (Sergey) Vladislavovich. 2008. “Otnosheniya mezhdu SSSR (Rossieĭ) i Yaponieĭ posle Vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny” [Relations between the Soviet Union (Russia) and Japan After World War II]. In Vneshnyaya politika Yaponii. Istoriya i sovremennost’ [Japan’s Foreign Policy. Past and Present], 117–44. Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Association of Japanologists. Moscow: Vostochnaya literaturа. Khrushchev [Xrushchev], Nikita Sergeevich. 1999. Vremya. Lyudi. Vlast’. Vospominaniya [Time. People. Power. Memories]. 4 vols. Мoscow: Moskovskie novosti. Kuznetsov, Yuriĭ Dmitrievich. 2002. “Pochemu Moskva ne podpisala San-Frantsisskiĭ mirnyĭ dogovor s Yaponieĭ” [Why Did Moscow Not Sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan?]. Znakom’tes’—Yaponiya, no. 34: 45–55. Slavinskiĭ, Boris Nikolavevich. 1994–1995. “San-Frantsisskiĭ mirnyĭ dogovor s Yaponieĭ i sovetskaya diplomatiya (novye dokumenty iz arkhiva MID Rossii)” [San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Soviet Diplomacy (New Documents from the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry)]. Znakom’tes’–Yaponiya, nos. 5–7: 53–59, 74–81, 50–58, respectively. Sovmestnyĭ sbornik dokumentov po istorii territorial’nogo razmezhevaniya mezhdu Rossieĭ i Yaponieĭ [Joint Collection of Documents on the History of the Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia]. 2002. Moscow and Tokyo: MID RF i MID Yaponii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation]. Torkunov, Anatoliĭ Vasil’evich. 2000. Zagadochnaya voĭna: koreĭskiĭ konflikt 1950–1953 godov [A Mysterious War: The Korean Conflict of 1950–1953]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoĭ voĭny [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union during World War II]. 1947. Vol. 3. Moscow: Gospolitizdat.

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Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. San Furanshisuko kōwa kaigi gijiroku (1951) [San Francisco Conference Transcript]. Tokyo: Gaimushō. Hara Kimie. 2013. San Furanshisuko heiwa jōyaku no mōten: Ajia taiheiyō chiiki no reisen to “Sengō mikaiketsu no shomondai” [Blind Spots of the San Francisco Peace Treaty: The Cold War in the Asia-Pacific Region and the “Unresolved Problems”]. Hiroshima: Keisuisha. Kubota Masaaki. 1983. Kuremurin e no shisetsu—hoppō ryōdo kōshō, 1955–1983 [Message to the Kremlin—Negotiations on the Northern Territories, 1955–1983]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha. Matsumoto Shun’ichi. 2012. Nisso kokkō kaifuku hiroku—hoppō ryōdo kōshō no shinjutsu [Secret Documents on the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between the USSR and Japan—The Truth about the Negotiations on the Northern Territories]. Asahi Sensho 892. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Shuppan. Shigeta Hiroshi and Suezawa Shōji, eds. 1988. Nisso kihon bunsho shiryōshū [A Collection of Foundational Japanese-Russian Documents and Materials]. Tokyo: Sekai no Ugokisha. Shimotomai Nobuō. 2004. Ajia reisenshi [A History of the Asian Cold War]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha. Shimotomai Nobuō. 2006. Mosukuwa to Kin Nissei: reisen no naka no Kita Chōsen 1945– 1961 nen [Moscow and Kim Il-sung: North Korea within the Cold War 1945–1961]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Tanaka Takahito. 1995. Nisso kokkō kaifuku no shiteki kenkyū: sengo Nisso kankei no kiten, 1945–1956 [Historical Research of Recovering Japanese-Soviet State Relations: Basic Points of Oostwar Japanese-Soviet Relations]. Hitotsubashi Daigaku hōgakubu kenkyū sōsho [Hitosubashi University Law School Research Series]. Tokyo: Yūhikaku. Utsumi Aiko. 2009. San Furanshisuko kōwa jōyaku to higashi Ajia [The San Francisco Peace Treaty and East Asia]. Vol. 1, Sengō Nihon sutadizu [Studies of Postwar Japan], edited by Iwasaki Minoru, Ueno Сhizuko, Kitada Akihirō, Komori Yōichi, and Narita Ryūichi. Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten. Wada Haruki. 1991. “Yontō henkanron wa kakute kimerareta” [Creation of the Concept of the “Four Islands Return”]. Sekai shūhō (January 15–22): 19–23.

Buckley, Roger, ed. Allied Voices, 1946–1951. 2012. Vol. 5, The Post-War Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952. Selected Contemporary Readings. From Pre-Surrender to Post-San Francisco Peace Treaty. Series 1: Books. edited by Roger Buckley. 10 vols. Tokyo and Leiden: Edition Synapse; Global Oriental, 2012.

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Bukh, Alexander. 2010. Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy. Russia as Japan’s “Other.” Sheffield: Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies, Routledge Series. Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951)— San Francisco, California. September 4–8, 1951. Record of Proceedings. Washington, DC: Department of State Publications. FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). 1955–1957. Vol. 11. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 1988. Memo from Senior Political Advisor to Mission at UN (McSweeney) to IOA Staff of Mission at UN (Joseph Sisco). November 3, 1955. FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). 1955–1957. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 1988. Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary’s Suite, Geneva. November 13, 1955. FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). 1955–1957. Japan. Vol. 23, part 1, document 89. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 1955–1957. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, Ambassador Aldrich’s Residence, London, August 19, 1956, 6 p.m. USDel/MC/48. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1/d89. FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). 1955–1957. Japan. Vol. 23, part 1, document 90. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 1955–1957. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Department of State, London, August 22, 1956. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1/d90. FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). 1955–1957. Japan. Vol. 23, part 1, document 101. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 1955–1957. http:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1/ch1. Glaubitz, Joachim. 1995. Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s. London: Hurst & Co. Goodby, James E., Vladimir I. Ivanov, and Nobuo Shimotomai, eds. 1995. “Northern Territories” and Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives. Westport: Praeger. Hara, Kimie. 1998. Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations Since 1945: A Difficult Peace. Nissan Institute, Routledge Japanese Studies. London and New York: Routledge. Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, and John Weste, eds. 2008. Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration. Routledge Series in the Modern History of Asia. Oxon and New York: Routledge. Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi. 2012. “The Rising Sun Was No Jackal.” In The Challenge of Grand Strategy, edited by Jeffrey W. Taliferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell, 224–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kurusu, Kaoru. 2008. “Japan’s Struggle for UN Membership in 1955.” In Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration, edited by Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, and John Weste, 114–35. Routledge Series in the Modern History of Asia. Oxon and New York: Routledge.

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Matsumoto, Shun’ichi. 1970. Northern Territories and Russo-Japanese Relations. Tokyo: Northern Territories Policy Association, Simul International. Morris, John. 1947. The Phoenix Cup. Some Notes on Japan in 1946. London: Cresset Press. National Archives, Kew. 1955. UN 22516/191, FO 371/117477. I. T. M. Pink, FO, New Members of UN. November 12. National Archives, Kew. 1955. UN 22516/279, FO 371/11747б. Delegation to UN to FO, 3181. December 14. Provisional Verbatum Minutes of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. 1951. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sakamoto, Kazuya. 2013. “Conditions of An Independent State. Japanese Diplomacy in 1950.” In The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan, edited by Makoto Iokibe. Translated and annotated by Robert D. Eldridge, 50–80. London and New York: Routledge. Soeya, Yoshihide. 2011. “A ‘Normal’ Middle Power: Interpreting Changes in Japanese Security Policy in the 1990s and After.” In Japan as a ‘Normal Country’?: A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World, edited by Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro, and David A. Welch, 72–97. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Swenson-Wright, John. 2008. “The Lucky Dragon Incident of 1954: A Failure of Crisis Management?” In Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration, edited by by Iokibe Makoto, Caroline, Rose, Tomaru Junko, and John Weste, 139–63. Routledge Series in the Modern History in Asia. Oxon and New York: Routledge. Togo [Tōgō], Kazuhiko. 2010. Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2009. The Quest for a Proactive Policy. 3rd ed. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Van Aduard, E. J. L. 1954. Japan from Surrender to Peace. With a foreword by John Foster Dulles. New York: Praeger. Reprinted in Peace, 1950–1952. Vol. 9, The Post-War Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952. Selected Contemporary Readings. From Pre-Surrender to Post-San Francisco Peace Treaty. Series 1: Books, edited by Roger Buckley, 138–48. 10 vols. Tokyo and Leiden: Edition Synapse; Global Oriental, 2012. Weste, John. 2008. “Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament, 1945–60.” In Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration, edited by Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, and John Weste, 34–53. Routledge Series in the Modern History in Asia. Oxon and New York: Routledge.

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part 10

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Soviet-Japanese Relations and the Principle of the “Indivisibility of Politics and Economics,” 1960–1985 Ozawa Haruko In his March 1971 speech to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev included a special mention of Japan. This was the first time, before and since the 1970s, that the leadership of the Soviet Union publicly acknowledged the importance of Japan’s role in international politics. At the time, bilateral relations largely followed the line of the territorial dispute. Why, then, was there this change in the Soviet leadership’s attitude toward Japan? The first reason lay in the rapid growth of the Japanese economy from the 1960s onward. Building cooperative relations with the economically strong Japan was very attractive to the USSR; moreover, there was a possibility that the progress of economic relations would have a certain positive effect on the diplomatic relations. Second, the international relations in East Asia between the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s was changing at a dizzying speed. The relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, an era known as Détente, also led to an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. Following the border clashes around Zhenbao (Damanskiĭ) Island in March 1969, however, the USSR’s relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) moved into the phase of all-out confrontation. When in July 1969 the United States expressed its intention to withdraw from the conflict in Vietnam following its Guam Doctrine (Nixon Doctrine) released on July 25, 1969, Sino-American and Sino-Japanese approaches quickly intensified. With the situation of Sino-Soviet confrontation and the improvement in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations, the Soviet Union was keen to avoid international isolation in East Asia. From this perspective, it is possible to understand why the Soviet leadership viewed an improvement in relations with Japan as absolutely necessary. This essay will initially examine the impact of East Asian international relations on Soviet-Japanese relations, with a special focus on Sino-Soviet, SinoJapanese, and US-Japanese relations. It will then look at the potential paths for the development of the Soviet-Japanese relations during the years of the Cold War era from 1960 to 1985, giving special consideration to the economic cooperation between the two countries. Through this twofold analysis this paper aims to explore the possibilities and limitations for the progress of SovietJapanese relations during this era.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_020

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Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1960s

When the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan (US-Japan Security Treaty) was revised in January 1960, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andreĭ A. Gromyko sent his government’s memorandum to its Japanese counterpart, in which Moscow called for the addition of a new stipulation regarding the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956. The condition was linked to the Soviets’ promise to return two of the four disputed islands in the Southern Kuriles (J: hoppō ryōdo, or “Northern Territories”), Habomai and Shikotan, to Japan. Now that Japan had a new security treaty with the United States, Moscow demanded that the return of the islands would be possible only if, as stated in the Gromyko statement of January 28, 1960, that “military bases of foreign countries are removed from Japanese territory.” The Soviet Union’s subsequent stance toward Japan hardened, with disagreements over Habomai and Shikotan underlining the gulf between the sides regarding the territorial dispute. The Gromyko memorandum was therefore a protest against the revision of the security treaty and the strengthening of the USJapan alliance. While the Soviet government did not formally acknowledge the US-Japan Security Treaty—its reaction to the 1960 revision was restrained— one could argue that the treaty did not have a substantial impact on SovietJapanese relations. The 1960s were in fact a decade during which time signs of progress in Soviet-Japanese economic relations become more conspicuous. In diplomatic relations, too, there were significant advances. In August 1961, a trade fair for Soviet commercial and industrial companies opened in Tokyo’s Harumi district, with First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan arriving in Japan expressly to attend the event. Mikoyan proclaimed at the fair that “Soviet-Japanese trade can equal a billion dollars in a few years.” In reality, the trade turnover between the two nations at this time stood at just over USD 200 million, and it would not reach the billion-dollar mark until 1972. Mikoyan’s visit to Japan nevertheless became the occasion following which the interest of the Japanese economic world in the Soviet market soared. In August 1962, a year after Mikoyan’s trip to Japan, a delegation of Japanese business leaders visited the Soviet Union under the leadership of the president of Komatsu Limited, Kawai Yoshinari. Yet the reaction in Japan to the Kawai delegation was rather indifferent. The members of the delegation, starting with its leader Kawai, met with top Soviet officials responsible for economy and trade: First Deputy Premier Mikoyan, chairman of the All-Soviet Chamber of Commerce Mikhail Nesterov, and the Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolaĭ S. Patolichev. Most importantly, the Japanese delegates were given an audience with Nikita Khrushchev, who was

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on holiday in Yalta at the time, and exchanged opinions on various issues concerning the methods, targets, and articles of bilateral trade. The visit of the Kawai delegation to the Soviet Union therefore laid the foundations of SovietJapanese economic cooperation. In May 1964, Mikoyan once again went to Japan, this time as the head of the official delegation of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union. Some months later, in July 1965, a Japanese trade delegation led by Nagano Shigeo, president of the Fuji Iron and Steel Company and deputy chairman of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, traveled to the Soviet Union. The sides came to three major decisions during the negotiations in Moscow: 1) to set up a Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee in Japan and Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee in the Soviet Union in order to facilitate exchange and cooperation between the worlds of business and commerce in the two countries; 2) to convene a joint annual meeting of the above economic committees so as to promote communications and an exchange of technology and expertise in the sphere of commerce and economics; and 3) to hold the joint meetings of the economic committees in alternate years in the two countries. December 1965 thus witnessed the launching of the Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee. A few months before the establishment of the two economic committees as bilateral consultative organs, another Japanese mission visited the Soviet Union. Between August 26 and September 16, 1965, the Japanese government under the leadership of Uemura Kōgorō, the deputy chairman of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) dispatched a trade delegation. It was the first official economic mission sent by the Japanese to the Soviet Union since the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1956. At the negotiations in Moscow, Uemura and the Soviet Premier Alekseĭ N. Kosygin exchanged opinions on the role to be played by the two economic committees and the possibilities of cooperation on future development projects in the Far East and Siberia. In March 1966, the 1st Joint Congress of the Japanese-Soviet and Soviet-Japanese Economic Committees opened in Tokyo. Furthermore, in July 1968 the basic agreement on setting up the First Project for the Development of Far Eastern Forestry Resources was signed. With this enterprise as a starting point, numerous projects directed at developing the natural resources in the Far East and Siberia were discussed at the joint meetings of the two economic committees and put into practice. It should be stressed that the materialization of Japanese government trade and business delegations to the USSR boosted diplomatic relations. In July 1966, the Soviet foreign minister Gromyko went to Japan, and the two governments agreed to hold regular meetings on the foreign ministerial level. Putting this agreement into practice a year later, in July 1967, the Japanese foreign

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minister Miki Takeo visited the Soviet Union to attend the first conference of the Soviet-Japanese foreign ministers. It is remarkable that in the 1960s, with no Soviet-Japanese peace treaty in sight and the territorial dispute ongoing between the two countries, that the Soviet and Japanese governments agreed to hold an annual conference with their foreign ministers. 2

Gromyko’s Japan Visit in January 1972

While both sides agreed to hold regular meetings between their foreign ministers, fundamental differences on the Northern Territories issue meant that soon after the first conference there was a long hiatus in the annual meetings. The second conference was held in January 1972, over four years following Miki’s Moscow visit, when the Soviet foreign minister Gromyko traveled to Japan. Why, despite the serious disagreements over the territorial issue, did Gromyko go to Japan in 1972? The first reason was related to the widening Sino-Soviet split in the late 1960s and the improving relations between China, the United States, and Japan. It was possible that the improvements in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations in the early 1970s could result in the Soviet Union’s international isolation in East Asia, and the Soviet leaders therefore understood the need to have better relations with Japan. Moreover, economic friction between the United States and Japan, intensifying since the late 1960s, had become a major issue in the relations between the two allies. The US-Japan textile dispute was finally resolved when the two governments signed an agreement on January 3, 1972. Throughout the two decades of postwar US-Japan economic relations, however, no trade dispute had had such a lasting effect and had been so protracted. The Soviet Union observed the progress of this dispute with great interest, anticipating that the economic tensions between the two allies would have an effect on the workings of the US-Japan Security Treaty. In other words, Soviet attempts to avoid insolation in East Asia meant that it made overtures to Japan in the hope that there would be a rupture in US-Japan security. What did the Soviet foreign minister Gromyko discuss with his Japanese partners during his 1972 trip to Japan? Where did the top Soviet diplomat set his sights after more than four years of a lull in relations with Japan? It is difficult to surmise anything new from the official statements made following the negotiations. From the records of Gromyko’s meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo, it is difficult to discern any concrete proposals relating to the peace treaty or the territorial dispute. Moreover, Gromyko did not pursue the demands made in the 1960 Soviet memorandum.

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This led Japanese newspapers at the time to report that the Soviet foreign minister may have hinted at returning to his country’s stance in the 1956 SovietJapanese Joint Declaration, which envisaged the return of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan (Asahi shinbun, January 28, 1972). In recent years, officials and experts in Russia have claimed, based on their memories of the period, that views expressed in Japanese newspapers at the time were actually close to the truth. According to these media reports, on January 7, 1972, the Central Committee of the CPSU arrived at a new decision about the Habomai and Shikotan islands. This resolution maintained that if the Japanese were serious about signing a peace treaty, Gromyko, who was about to embark on his Japan visit, would convey the Soviet Union’s readiness to return to the conditions of the 1956 Joint Declaration. In fact, Gromyko spoke about this proposition only with the Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, whose reaction was not overly enthusiastic. As a result, the Soviet diplomatic maneuver, aimed at securing a peace treaty and improving relations with Japan by promising the return of the two disputed islands, was a failure. The reason for Japan’s reluctant reaction to the Soviet offer lay in Tokyo’s insistence that not only Habomai and Shikotan, but all four of the disputed islands, should be returned to Japan. Ultimately, it was the Japanese side that aborted the offer of a peace treaty. 3

The Restoration of Sino-Japanese Relations and the Soviet Union

The opportunity for a breakthrough in Soviet-Japanese relations in 1972 was therefore missed. The Soviets failed to put into practice their plan of achieving a peace treaty with Japan through a balancing of Sino-American and SinoJapanese relations and the exploitation of US-Japanese trade frictions. Despite the failure in concluding a peace treaty, the year 1972 nonetheless remains one of historic advances in Sino-Japanese relations. In September, the PRC and Japan signed an agreement that restored diplomatic relations. The Soviet Union was anxious about the possibility of furtherance in Sino-Japanese relations as its own split with the PRC deepened. How did it react to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two East Asian nations? In July 1972, the Satō cabinet was replaced by the incoming administration of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. During Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to Beijing in September the diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC were restored. The main Soviet newspapers, including Pravda and Izvestiya, issued four major statements about the event. First, the newspapers argued that the Sino-Japanese normalization would have a significant influence on

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Asia. Second, the improving Sino-Japanese relations were not necessarily a negative development as long as they did not have a detrimental effect on Soviet-Japanese relations or require a sacrifice of the interests of third countries. Third, the restoration of contact with the PRC meant that Japan could also pursue a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. And finally, the Japanese government had assured Moscow that it would not engage in any activities that might lead to a deterioration in Soviet-Japanese relations. Following the Sino-Japanese rapprochement Soviet state newspapers continued to assess the event positively by publicizing statements such as “The Sino-Japanese rapprochement has been too late in coming” or “The normalization of relations between Japan and China is undoubtedly a favorable development for peace and security in Asia.” Why would the Soviet newspapers return such composed, positive assessments of China’s reconciliation with Japan? Three reasons stand out. First, according to the principles of Soviet foreign policy there was little reason to condemn it, and in fact there might have been reasons to welcome the establishment of Japan’s diplomatic ties with the PRC. From the Soviet point of view it was unusual that Japan and China had not had any diplomatic contacts for over twenty years. Second, even if diplomatic contacts were restored, this did not necessarily translate into a remarkable advance of Sino-Japanese relations when compared to those between Japan and the Soviet Union. China had only just reached the same level of relations with Japan as the Soviet Union had already enjoyed for over a decade. Third, the Tanaka administration had also expressed a desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union. It is for these reasons that the official Soviet—official reaction to the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations was rather measured. Although the Soviet Union did officially embrace the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, it nevertheless continued its vigilance in tracking the progress of these relations and paid close attention to their course. In October 1972, the Japanese Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi visited Moscow to undertake negotiations with his Soviet counterpart Gromyko. At this stage, there was no reference by the Soviet top diplomat to the 1956 Joint Declaration, and unlike the Tokyo talks in January of the same year, the atmosphere of the meeting was cool. This in itself demonstrates that the Soviet Union had been eager to conclude the peace treaty with Japan before the latter restored its diplomatic relations with the PRC. 4

Tanaka’s Visit to Moscow and Soviet-Japanese Economic Relations

In December 1972, the CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev proclaimed that “the main purpose of Soviet-Japanese negotiations scheduled for next year will be - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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to settle a range of issues that have remained since the end of World War II.” This was a clear indication of the political will to improve relations with Japan. It demonstrated the attention that the Soviets were paying to the development of Soviet-Japanese relations following the Sino-Japanese normalization and Moscow’s preparedness to explore all possibilities in an effort to achieve better relations with Japan. On October 8, 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei arrived in Moscow for negotiations with General Secretary Brezhnev. The Soviet-Japanese Joint Statement, presented on October 10, stated that “the two sides acknowledged that the settlement of issues still unresolved since World War II will contribute to the establishment of truly neighborly and friendly relations between the countries. The sides discussed a range of issues related to the peace treaty.” Interestingly, the Japanese side was referring to “the unresolved issue” (mikaiketsu no sho mondai), singling out the Northern Territories issue. For the USSR, however, the wording was “unresolved issues” (nereshennye voprosy); the Soviet side was clearly attempting to avoid a setting apart of the territorial dispute. Eventually, it was the Soviet formulation of “unresolved issues” that was included in the final version of the joint statement. The opinions of Japanese scholars are divided regarding the Soviet-Japanese Joint Statement. Some argue that the Soviet insistence on the plural form of “unresolved issues” was an indication of Moscow’s “nil return” policy regarding the Northern Territories. In other words, since Gromyko’s January 1972 offer on the resolution of the territorial dispute fell on deaf ears in Japan, the Soviet Union saw no reason to make any further concessions (Wada 1999, 280). Other scholars believe that the contents of the joint statement hinted at new possibilities for the advancement of bilateral relations. For this group the joint statement represented a step forward; even if the wording “unresolved issues” did not meet Japanese expectations, it nonetheless meant that the Northern Territories issue was part of the joint statement. Furthermore, this line of reasoning played up the fact that when Tanaka stressed at the last meeting that “the territorial issue includes four islands,” Brezhnev had twice hinted his acceptance of this view. Some therefore interpreted the joint statement as a step forward from the 1956 Joint Declaration (Tōgō 2007, 93–94). While negotiations over the territorial issue stalled, there were possibilities for progress in other areas. Tanaka’s visit to the Soviet Union gave the SovietJapanese economic relations a tremendous boost. The Soviet-Japanese Joint Statement expressed the Japanese government’s support for bilateral economic partnership and the realization of development projects in Siberia. Tanaka promised the provision of bank loans subject to sufficient private sector support for the realization of development projects. This would eventually serve to boost economic cooperation between the two countries. The Japan - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Export-Import Bank (JEXIM) gave bank loans directly to Soviet financial institutions. This resulted in the launching of one large-scale project after another in the mid-1970s. The first of these projects was the South Yakutia Coalmine Development Project, the agreement for which was signed on June 3, 1974. The Japanese side supplied the project with a bank loan worth USD 450 million in exchange for its exports of machines and equipment valued at around USD 190 million, and of consumer goods worth USD 60 million made possible by the bank loans. In the two decades between 1979 and 1998, Japan imported 104.4 million tons of coal from the Soviet Union. In addition, the Japan Export-Import Bank issued a USD 100 million loan for a natural gas exploration project in Yakutia, agreed upon in December 1974, and a USD 25 million loan for a continental shelf oil and gas exploration project on Sakhalin Island, agreed upon in January 1975. Thanks in part to these exploration projects of natural resources, the SovietJapanese trade in the 1970s dramatically increased. In 1972, bilateral trade grew over 25 percent compared to the previous year and for the first time surpassed USD 1 billion. The year 1973 was even better for commercial exchanges between the countries, with 42.4 percent annual growth from 1972. This trend continued in subsequent years: year-on-year trade growth in 1974 reached a massive 60.9 percent, whereas in 1975 it stood at 11.2 percent and in 1976 at 22.3 percent. In 1976, the total value of bilateral trade equaled almost USD 3.5 billion (SorenTōō bōeki chōsa gappō, April 1976). In short, the 1970s witnessed an enormous expansion of Soviet-Japanese economic relations. Opinion in Japan has been divided even on this development. One view evaluates the economic cooperation positively, claiming that it is reflected in the current state of Russo-Japanese relations. The 1975 Sakhalin natural resource project, for example, continued to exist even after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and remains productive to this day. Another view holds that when everything is taken into consideration, Soviet-Japanese trade relations were determined by the international environment of the period and bound by the framework of diplomatic relations. Despite the growing economic and trade contacts, there was no progress on the Northern Territories issue. Tanaka, who was oblivious to the political and strategic value of projects involving Siberia’s natural resources, could not connect them to the political and diplomatic interests. Tanaka cut off economic projects from any political leveraging and failed to use them as trump cards (Kimura 1993). This view equally maintains that any cooperative projects between the Soviet Union and Japan benefited greatly from the tailwind of the Soviet-American Détente. As the interested parties candidly acknowledged at the time, the greatest expectations from the Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation were related to the

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Western Siberian Oil Development Project and the Tiumen Oil Development Project. It was estimated that USD 1 billion in bank loans would be allocated to these projects. Yet when the Soviet side decided to change the supply method somewhat from the originally planned pipeline to railway transportation along the Baikal–Amur Mainline (BAM), the Japanese side became wary about the profitability of the enterprise. One of the underlying reasons for this was strong opposition from China. In this sense, at least, Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation in the 1970s was strongly influenced by the political climate of the era. 5

The Soviet Union and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship

In April 1975, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was established following the unification of North and South Vietnam. In August of the same year in Helsinki, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe culminated in the Helsinki Accords. These events meant that the second half of the 1970s witnessed, once again, the rise of tensions on the international stage. The impact of the events in Indochina on Sino-Soviet relations was particularly great, and condemnatory exchanges between the two countries reached fever pitch. Amid this war of words between the two communist powers, the PRC labeled Japan’s 1970s demands to return the Northern Territories as “the battle with the hegemony of Soviet imperialism.” Mao Zedong had come out in support of Japan’s campaign for the return of the Northern Territories on July 7, 1964. China’s new stance additionally recognized the legitimacy of the Japanese claim, and from around the mid-1970s the struggle for Japan’s lost territories were suddenly in the eyes of the Chinese, “the strife of the Japanese people against Soviet hegemony.” It was proclaimed that the Chinese people resolutely supported the Japanese people’s fight for justice. The negotiations for the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship started in January 1975 in these circumstances. On June 17 the same year, the Soviet government issued a statement on Sino-Japanese relations, signifying the importance Moscow attached to the progress of negotiations. The largest problem this statement addressed was the actions of the Chinese side that allegedly intended to drag Japan onto an anti-Soviet path. In short, while the statement was critical of the PRC, it was reserved in its criticism of Japan. In January 1978, Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao visited Moscow to attend the regular Soviet-Japanese foreign ministerial meeting. The Japanese side’s goal

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was to gain assurances from the Soviets that the “unresolved issues” mentioned in the Soviet-Japanese Joint Statement included the territorial dispute. The Soviet foreign minister Gromyko did not recognize the Japanese assertions; he not only refused to consider the terms proposed by Sonoda but also did not read them. The regular meetings between the Soviet and Japanese foreign ministers were then suspended until 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Soviet intentions in pursuing a treaty based on cooperation and a goodneighbor policy were not entirely clear at the time. As the Sino-Japanese negotiations progressed, relations between Japan and China were advancing conspicuously ahead of those between the Soviets and the Japanese. By publicizing its offer to Japan in the Izvestiya newspaper on February 23, 1978, the Soviet side was also attempting to keep Japan in check. This was another sign of stagnation in diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Moscow during this period. In June 1978, an agreement between the two countries became a real possibility as Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations moved into their final stage. The Soviet ambassador to Japan, Dmitrĭ S. Polyanskiĭ, visited the Japanese deputy minister of foreign affairs, Arita Keisuke, to lodge his protest but on August 12 Japan and the PRC signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The most controversial clause in the treaty was Article 2, which read, “The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” Different from the Chinese, whose usage of the term “hegemony” was a pointed reference to the Soviet Union, the Japanese side interpreted it in the most general sense of the term and not as a direct reference to the USSR. On August 23, the Soviet government issued a note verbale criticizing Japan for subscribing to the Chinese anti-Soviet line. The Japanese actions were not only condemned in relation to the Sino-Japanese treaty but the statement also hinted at the possibility of the Soviet side taking countermeasures. And, indeed, between 1978 and 1979 the Soviet Union deployed new troops and reinforced military facilities on the two disputed islands of Kunashir (Kunashiri) and Iturup (Etorofu), raising alarm about a Soviet threat among the Japanese population. But was the reinforcement of the two Kurile Islands really a measure opposing the Sino-Japanese treaty? It is certainly possible to view it as such, and this could be inferred from circumstantial evidence even without regard to the Sino-Japanese agreement. In the second half of the 1970s, the Soviet-American Détente regressed and the relations between the superpowers once again entered a tense phase. The strengthening of Soviet military capabilities on Kunashir and Iturup therefore should not be seen simply as the USSR’s response to Japan and China signing a peace treaty. Rather, this move

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should be analyzed within the broader context of the Soviet grand strategy that was aimed at the United States as the first priority. And while the Soviet Union repeatedly criticized Japan following the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty, there is little evidence to suggest that the USSR was planning concrete measures that would lead to the deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations. It could be conjectured that the negative impact of the Sino-Japanese Treaty on the Soviet-Japanese relations was limited. 6

The Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan and Anti-Soviet Sanctions

When the Soviet Union started its military intervention in Afghanistan in late December 1979, international politics once again returned to the path of intensifying tensions. US president Jimmy Carter adopted a range of countermeasures: 1) suspension of all contacts with the Soviet Union; 2) economic sanctions against the USSR; and 3) a boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games planned to open in the summer of 1980. The US government expressed a wish that Western European nations and Japan also support these measures. On December 29, the Cabinet of the Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi, following consultations led by the foreign minister Ōkita Saburō, issued a demand that the Soviet government immediately stop its intervention in Afghanistan. On January 8, 1980, the Japanese government publicized its own sanctions against the Soviet Union. These consisted of two major measures: 1) to limit all contacts with the Soviet Union, and 2) to put a freeze on all joint development projects in the Soviet Far East and Siberia. Japan also suspended its participation in the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. A freeze on the joint development projects of natural resources became a topic of debate. To what extent would this economic countermeasure be effective, and would it not, in actual fact, have consequences for the Japanese economy? Nagano Shigeo, chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in particular, claimed that US anti-Soviet sanctions and the SovietJapanese economic cooperation should be kept separate: “It is necessary to view economics and diplomacy as distinct issues” (Yomiuri shinbun, January 8, 1980). Despite the boldly worded announcement of sanctions against the USSR, the Japanese government eventually decided not to interrupt existing projects, even though the Japan Export-Import Bank suspended the line of credit to any new joint Soviet-Japanese projects and ruled out any additional bank loans for ongoing projects. The Japanese government was plainly making a distinction between ongoing and new projects.

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Nevertheless, the limitations imposed on contacts between Japan and the Soviet Union had an inevitable impact on the realization of existing projects. A range of enterprises stagnated, such as the third Far Eastern Forestry Project, the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development Project, the South Yakutia Coalmine Development Project, as well as the Japanese exports of large diameter steel pipes to the Soviet Union. These developments once again attracted criticism from the business world. “Our cooperation with the USSR is not aid. It is business,” proclaimed Nagano Shigeo, who was critical of the actions of the Japanese government (Nisso-Nichiro keizai kōryūshi 2008, 78). This criticism by business leaders was based on the belief that the Japanese economy lost the opportunity of trade with the Soviet Union as a result of international politics. Western European nations such as West Germany ignored US demands to isolate the USSR economically and insisted on retaining economic cooperation with the Soviets. In March 1980, it became known that the Japanese government was negotiating with the United States regarding two exceptions in Japan’s economic sanctions against the USSR—namely, the Japanese side was seeking the US government’s acceptance of a restart of the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development Project and of Japanese exports of technology and infrastructure to the Soviet Union. In April, the US government announced its willingness to exclude the Sakhalin project from the economic sanctions. Furthermore, in May the Japanese government decided to restore the line of credit from the Japan Export-Import Bank in exchange for commodities that did not contribute to the buildup of the USSR’s military capabilities, and for this reason the third Far Eastern Forestry Project was given a Japanese bank loan. Significantly, the Japanese government portrayed the resumption of these projects in terms of a continuity of existing plans. In the first half of 1980, therefore, the Japanese economic sanctions toward the Soviet Union were being canceled one by one. How did Soviet-Japanese economic relations evolve in the first half of the 1980s? One look at the volume of trade reveals year-over-year growth: this growth stood at 6.1 percent in 1980, 13.8 percent in 1981, and 5.7 percent in 1982. Bilateral trade was not particularly good the following two years, however. In 1983 the number of transactions shrank to 76.6 percent from the 1982 level, and in 1984 it constituted only 91.5 percent from the preceding year. It was only in 1985 that bilateral trade actually grew year-over-year at the rate of 6.8 percent (Soren-Tōō bōeki chōsa gappō, April 1986, 2). Despite the Japanese government economic sanctions against the USSR, the sum total of trade between the two countries did increase from 1980 to 1982. The value of trade in 1982 alone stood at USD 5.58 billion, impressive even

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when compared with the mid-1970s, which saw the birth and expansion of large-scale Soviet-Japanese projects (Soren-Tōō bōeki chōsa gappō, April 1986, 2). If any conclusion can be drawn from this figure, it is that the Japanese economic sanctions did not have any real impact on bilateral trade. Yet it must be remembered that for two consecutive years, 1983–1984, bilateral trade shrank. During this time, both Japanese imports from and exports to the USSR were in decline, and it would be difficult to assign this downturn to purely economic reasons. The downing of the Korean Airlines passenger plane (KAL 007) by the Soviet Union on September 1, 1983, created tensions not only in SovietJapanese relations but internationally. It was not surprising that the strained international situation, as represented by this incident, had a deleterious global effect on trade relations. As noted above, the increase in Soviet military capabilities between 1979 and 1980 on the disputed islands of Kunashir and Iturup, together with the USSR’s intervention in Afghanistan, created widespread apprehension among the Japanese population about the “Soviet menace.” Books with provocative titles were published in great numbers—Soviet Army Invades Japan!, The Day of the USSR’s Aggression against Japan, Hokkaido Occupied, Imaginary Enemy, Soviet Union, or Can Japan Survive Against the Soviet Enemy? (Kimura 2002). While one can clearly see the contradiction between the publication of popular titles that prophesied a Soviet attack against Japan at any time and the boom in trade between the two countries, these two events were the most peculiar characteristics of bilateral relations at the time. Then, in March 1985, the administration of Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. 7 Conclusion This essay has looked at two broad developments in Soviet-Japanese relations between 1960 and 1985. The Sino-Soviet confrontation that intensified in the 1960s–1970s and the improvement of Sino-American and then Sino-Japanese relations had an enormous impact on the progress of Soviet-Japanese relations. When the PRC and Japan restored diplomatic relations in 1972, the Soviet Union’s reaction was subdued. Despite the reality of rapprochement in Sino-Japanese relations, the latter were hardly advancing beyond that of Soviet-Japanese contacts. The Soviet Union continued to observe the progress of Sino-Japanese relations; yet, Moscow’s reaction to the signing in 1978 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was different. Not only did the Soviet Union severely criticize Japan for allegedly supporting the PRC’s anti-Soviet line, it also hinted at the possibility of reconsidering its own policy

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toward Japan. In other words, the reaction of the Soviet side to the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972 and to the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1978 were decidedly different. But the question of what the Soviet Union actually reconsidered as its Japan policy remains unanswered. It is true that in 1978–1979 the Soviet Union deployed new troops to and increased its military capabilities on the disputed islands of Kunashir and Iturup. This move led to heightened tensions in bilateral relations. It is difficult, however, to claim definitively whether the USSR adopted this measure in response to the signing of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. The following two points can be brought forward in a discussion of the consequences of US-Japanese relations on Japan’s interactions with the USSR. First, relations with the United States were at the core of Japan’s foreign and diplomatic policy. They determined Soviet-Japanese relations to a large extent. It should nonetheless be pointed out that the influence of the US-Japan Security Treaty on the Soviet-Japanese relations was limited. True, the Soviet Union’s protest regarding the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in January 1960 added a condition to its promise of returning Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, stipulating the removal from Japanese territory of the “military bases of foreign countries.” Nevertheless, the existence of the US-Japan Security Treaty had very little direct impact on Soviet-Japanese relations. The USSR was cautious, not about the security treaty itself, but about its implications. It was apprehensive that the signing of a security agreement between Japan and the United States as well as a peace and friendship treaty between Japan and China would lead to a strengthening of relations within the US-China-Japan triangle, thereby consigning the Soviet Union to international isolation. Second, in the sphere of economic cooperation, it is evident that even during the Cold War there were possibilities for the development of bilateral relations. In the 1960s, for example, Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet economic committees were set up and held regular joint conferences. A number of joint projects in the development of natural resources in the Soviet Far East and Siberia were discussed and put into practice. In October 1973, during Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to the Soviet Union, the two sides issued a joint statement on bilateral cooperation. This document states that joint development projects would be financed by loans from the Japan Export-Import Bank. As a result of these deals, large-scale energy and natural resource projects were launched, and the Soviet-Japanese trade in the mid-1970s showed significant progress. This expansion of trade and economic cooperation ultimately failed to outgrow the limits of international politics and Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. Following the Soviet Union’s military intervention in Afghanistan in

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1979, the Japanese government expressed solidarity with the United States and imposed economic sanctions on the USSR. In reality these sanctions were soon scrapped, and from 1980 to 1982 Soviet-Japanese bilateral trade grew significantly. At the same time, the Japanese population grew increasingly apprehensive at an unprecedented level about the “Soviet menace.” Such fluctuations require us to pay close attention to the progress of the Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s. In January 1972, when the Soviet foreign minister Gromyko visited Japan, the Japanese government expressed some interest in the Soviet proposal for a peace treaty that would be signed following the transfer to Japan of two disputed islands, Habomai and Shikotan. As international relations entered a tense phase in the latter half of the 1970s the peace treaty negotiations became a dead letter, and the possibility of further tensions in bilateral relations resurfaced. But if we were to view relations broadly it is possible to see that cooperative contacts evolved despite the climate of the Cold War, even though neither the territorial dispute nor the peace treaty negotiations advanced during the 1970s. When reconsidering the history of Soviet-Japanese relations, these points should be given due consideration. Translated by Sherzod Muminov Bibliography (Note: due to the author’s untimely death before publication, the editors were unable to complete all the bibliographical information.)



Russian Sources



Japanese Sources

Petrov, Dmitriĭ Vasil′evich. 1970. “Japan: 25 Years After Surrender.” In Mirovaya ėkonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, no. 9: 31–41. XXIV Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim Report. 1971. Moscow: Publishing House of Political Literature.

Kimura Hiroshi. 1993. Nichiro kokkyō kōshōshi. Ryōdo mondai ni Ika ni torikumu ka [The History of Negotiations on the State Border between Japan and Russia: How to Deal with the Territorial Problem?]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha. Kimura Hiroshi. 2002. Tooi ringoku—Rosia to Nihon [Distant Neighbors—Russia and Japan]. Tokyo: Sekai Shisōsha.

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Nisso-Nichiro keizai kōryūshi Shuppan Guruupu, ed. Nisso-Nichiro keizai kōryūshi [The history of the Japanese-Soviet and Japanese-Russian economic cooperation]. 2008. Tokyo: Tōyō Shoten. Ozawa Haruko. Soren-Tōō bōeki chōsa gappō [Monthly News on the Investigation of Foreign Trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe]. April 1976, no. 4. Ozawa Haruko. 1991. Nichibei kankai to Soren—Burejinefu kara Gorubachofu made [Japanese-American Relations and the Soviet Union—From Brezhnev to Gorbachev]. In Paaru Haabaa 50 nen—Nihon, Amerika, sekai [Fifty Years of Pearl Harbor—Japan, America, the World]. Tokyo: Tōkyō Keizai Shinbunsha. Ozawa Haruko. 1995. “Nitchū kankei ni okeru Soren (Rosia)” [Soviet Union (Russia) in Japanese-Chinese Relations]. In Ajia no naka no Nihon to Chūgoku: yūkō to masatsu no gendai shi [Japan and China in Asia: A Modern History of Friendship and Contradiction], edited by Masuda Hiroshi and Hatano Sumio. Tokyo: Yamakawa. Tōgō Kazuhiko. 2007. Hoppō ryōdo kōshō hiroku. Ushinawareta godo no kikai [Secret Records of Negotiations on the Northern Territories: Five Missed Opportunities]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha. Wada Haruki. 1999. Hoppō ryōdo mondai: rekishi to mirai [The Problem of the Northern Territories: History and Future]. Asahi Sensho 621. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbuns.

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Soviet-Japanese Relations from 1960 to 1985: an Era of Ups and Downs Viktor V. Kuz’minkov and Viktor N. Pavlyatenko 1

Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1960s: the Formation of the New Post-WW II Policy Lines

Following the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, the Soviet administration chose the path of coexistence between the two dominant world systems at this time: the socialist and the capitalist. Moscow sought to inspire cooperation with US allies, primarily in the field of economics, in an effort to weaken Western pressure on the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. But such a policy required the improvement in the quality of relations with Japan through the process of political normalization. The ultimate goal was to “detach” Tokyo from its unwavering orientation toward a military-political bloc with the United States and to realize the withdrawal of US military bases from Japanese territory, which were deemed to be a source of direct military threat to the Soviet Union’s Far Eastern borders. In the late 1950s, the then Soviet administration did not see Japan, then on the brink of its own economic breakthrough, as a serious economic partner. Instead, the emphasis was on political and ideological factors—in other words, it intended to use the strong postwar pacifist and democratic sentiment in Japanese society and the liking for the USSR among those who were most critical of the United States. The US-Japan Security Treaty of September 8, 1951, between the United States and Japan was criticized not only by left-wing forces but also by a portion of the political establishment that in principle did not object to military cooperation with the United States, yet was unhappy with the inequitable Japanese-US military relationship in which Japan was assigned the role of a junior partner. Moscow hoped that Japanese political leaders would refuse to extend the security treaty and under pressure from the mass domestic protests against an alliance with the United States would decide in favor of neutrality, which would be advantageous for Moscow. Those hopes were not realized. An updated edition of the security treaty, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, was signed in Washington, DC, on January 19, 1960. The United States retained all of its bases in Japanese territory, and Japan undertook to cover their principal expenses. The new treaty provided greater equality but actually

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_021

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formalized a military alliance in which Japan still remained a junior partner.1 From Moscow’s point of view, Japan consciously chose participation in the US military strategy in the Far East—one that targeted the Soviet Union—by agreeing to continue hosting US military bases in its territory. Based on that thinking, Japan breached the spirit of the Joint Declaration of 1956, and its signature of the security treaty was an openly hostile step against the Soviet Union. That considered, the Soviet government opted to make some adjustments to its policy regarding Japan. The new approach was expressed in three memos sent by the Soviet government to Tokyo from January to April 1960. The memo dated January 27, 1960, pointed out that the military treaty between Japan and the United States “created a new situation in which the Soviet government would be unable to keep its promise to transfer the Habomai and Shikotan islands to Japan” because the Soviet government “could not assist in the expansion of the territory used by foreign troops with the transfer of the aforesaid islands to Japan.” It also stated that Habomai and Shikotan would be transferred to Japan, consistent with the terms of the 1956 Joint Declaration “only on the condition of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japanese territory and the signing of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan” (Izvestiya, January 29, 1960). As a result, the Soviet Union made the withdrawal of US military bases from Japanese territory an additional condition of the fulfillment of the 1956 Joint Declaration. In its reply to the Soviet government on February 5, 1960, Japan made clear that “the Japanese government could not approve of the position of the Soviet Union, which had set additional conditions for the fulfillment of the Joint Declaration on the territorial issue and, by doing so, tried to change the content of the declaration.” Japan underscored that it “would relentlessly pursue the return of not only the Habomai archipelago and the island of Shikotan but also other native Japanese territories” (Nanpō Dōhō Engokai 1966, 192–94). It should be noted that the demand that the islands of Iturup and Kunashir (Kunashiri) “be returned” was not related to the content of the 1956 Joint Declaration and actually became a further condition of its implementation set by Tokyo. The Soviet government responded with a memo to the Japanese on February 25, 1960, which highlighted the “unfounded claims of Japan regarding the territorial issue” that “had long been resolved by relevant international 1  For example, the previous treaty’s provision on using US troops for “keeping order” in Japan was repealed; a provision on mandatory bilateral consultations on troop deployment issues was added, with the treaty thereby acquiring a definite time frame.

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agreements” (Pravda, February 26, 1960).2 The same idea was mentioned in the Soviet government memo dated April 22, 1960. The Japanese government’s reply of March 1, 1960, reiterated that “the people of Japan deemed the demand to transfer the native Japanese territories—the Islands of Iturup and Kunashir—to be natural” (Nanpō Dōhō Engokai 1966, 197–99). The opposing positions became final during the tenure of Ikeda Hayato, who succeeded Kishi Nobosuke as prime minister on July 18, 1960. The first deputy chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, Anastas I. Mikoyan, paid an official visit to Japan in August 1961 on the occasion of a Soviet industrial and trade exhibition in Tokyo. Mikoyan delivered a personal message from the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikita Khrushchev. The message said that “Japan’s entry into a military alliance with the United States of America and the remaining presence of foreign military bases in its territory” were hindering the full normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations, and Japan should rid itself of US military bases for that reason (Perepiska Predsedatelya 1961, 3). Mikoyan repeated the Soviet stance at a press conference on August 22, stating that Habomai and Shikotan would not be transferred to Japan until the dismantlement of the Japanese-US security system (Asahi shinbun, August 23, 1961). Ikeda sent a message to Khrushchev on August 26, 1961, pointing out that full normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations required a peace treaty based on “the return of ‘inherently’ Japanese territories” (Perepiska Predsedatelya 1961, 5–6). Khrushchev’s answer, sent on September 25, 1961, repeated that the territorial problem “had long been resolved by a series of international agreements” and wondered how they “could ask for returning non-Japanese territories to Japan” (Perepiska Predsedatelya 1961, 8). Japan’s stance on territorial delimitation with Moscow soon became even more explicit. During a meeting of the Budget Commission Ikeda remarked that the “St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 defined the Kurile Islands (Chishima rettō) as eighteen islands situated north of Urup” (Shigeta 2003, 174–75). Asked about the explanations given by the director of the treaties bureau, Nishimura Kumao, who said that the Kurile Islands abandoned by Japan were divided into southern and northern, Ikeda noted twice that “Nishimura was mistaken.” The US Department of State openly backed Japan with a statement released on December 13, 1961, which stated that the Southern Kuriles were “an ‘inherently’ native Japanese territory” (Mainichi shinbun, December 14, 1961). Since 2  The reference to the international agreements includes the Yalta Agreement of 1945, the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, and other documents signed by representatives of the Allies.

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the moment of the signing of the new security treaty, the governments of the United States and Japan regarded the slogan “return of the Northern Territories” as a convenient tool to incite anti-Soviet sentiment within Japanese public opinion. The US-Japan “security treaty” signed in 1960 and the consequent tightening of positions by both sides created a new international political situation in which Moscow and Tokyo deliberately settled on mutual political distancing. The fulfillment of the 1956 Joint Declaration was frozen indefinitely. 2

In the Pursuit of Ways to Strengthen Neighborly Relations: the 1960s

At least initially, Prime Minister Ikeda acted with caution and attempted to avoid strong conflicts with opposition parties. The security treaty had already taken effect, and most of the problems in its relations with the United States were resolved. A certain alleviation of international tensions in the mid-1960s fostered a progressive development of Soviet-Japanese relations in the field of the economy, politics, culture, science, and technology. The public movement for Japanese-Soviet friendship, now evolving in Japan, had a positive effect on the strengthening of bilateral relations. The trip of a Soviet Supreme Council delegation led by Mikoyan to Japan also made an important contribution to contacts between the two countries. Delegation members spent two weeks, from May 14 to May 27, 1964, familiarizing themselves with the state of Japanese economic and political affairs. They met with businessmen and representatives of mass organizations and addressed numerous rallies and assemblies. The sentiments of the business community, which expressed a growing interest in joining long-term development projects in Siberia and the Far East, had a significant impact on the policy of the Japanese government. A number of Japanese business delegations demonstrated their keen desire for trade with Moscow with their visits to the Soviet Union in 1962–1963. The scope of Soviet exports to Japan greatly increased from the 1960s onward. On the one hand, this was explained by the large demand of Japanese processing industries for raw materials and fuel, and on the other, the mounting export potential of the Soviet Union, especially in mining, oil and metallurgical industry products, as well as timber (Krupyanko 1982, 44–45). Economic relations did not advance steadily, however, under pressure as they were from the current political climate of the Cold War. In early 1963, Japan agreed to honor the prohibition on supplying the Soviet Union with a number of strategic goods listed by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) of Western bloc powers, which imposed a discriminative

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ban or restrictions on exporting those goods to the USSR and other socialist countries. Unlike West European countries, the Japanese government yielded to the US demand to limit exports of large diameter pipes for the oil industry to the Soviet Union. Bowing to US pressure, Japan then cut back on the exports of certain machine building products to the Soviet Union, including microwave equipment and hardware for Sakhalin thermal power plants. It also refused to display navigation equipment at the 1960 show in Moscow under the pretext that it could be used for military purposes (Krupyanko 1982, 54). Japan’s foreign policy remained centered on the military-political alliance with the United States after Satō Eisaku took office as prime minister in November 1964. The economic growth in Japan somewhat changed the balance of forces in that alliance, thereby boosting Japanese confidence. Tokyo regarded an improvement of relations with the Soviet Union as a factor in its stronger position vis-à-vis the United States and on the international stage. The creation of a consultative mechanism at the level of foreign ministers played a positive role in bolstering Soviet-Japan relations. Japanese foreign minister Shiina Etsusaburō paid an official visit to Moscow on January 16, 1966, at the invitation of the Soviet government (Izvestiya, January 22, 1966). The negotiations resulted in an agreement to convene meetings periodically between the two foreign ministers in order to exchange opinions on bilateral issues and important global affairs. In addition, the first five-year trade and settlements agreement for the 1966–1970 period was signed on January 21, prescribing substantial expansion of the bilateral trade turnover to RUB 450 million in 1970 (Pravda, January 22, 1966). Both sides also signed an agreement on direct flights between Moscow and Tokyo. The emphasis on global affairs was a new element in the negotiation process between the Japanese foreign minister and Soviet government officials. For the first time in the history of bilateral relations, their discussions went far beyond the scope of bilateral relations. The Soviet Union and Japan conferred on a broad range of international issues as they were fully aware of their responsibility for détente and the promotion of a lasting peace, primarily in Asia. For instance, both countries hailed the Tashkent Declaration of India and Pakistan of January 10, 1966, which laid the foundation in normalizing the relations between these two countries. A joint Soviet-Japanese communiqué also declared the significance of signing an effective treaty banning nuclear weapons in accordance with the resolution of the 20th session of the UN General Assembly of January 21, 1966 (Izvestiya, January 22, 1966). The discussion of Soviet-Japanese relations continued during the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Andreĭ A. Gromyko to Japan in July 1966. It was the first official visit of a Soviet foreign minister to Japan in the history of bilateral

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relations, and it resulted in the signing of a Convention on Consular Relations on July 23, 1996. The establishment of consular relations and the opening of consulates in Nakhodka and Sapporo provided a more solid foundation for cultural and business relations. The Japanese press underlined the fact that “the signing of a consular convention would rank second after the Joint Declaration by the role it played in the improvement of relations between the two countries” (Tōkyō shinbun, July 29, 1966). The joint communiqué signaled the satisfaction of both sides with the heightened relations in the economy, culture, and science. They also voiced the common opinion on the possibility of further development of bilateral relations in all spheres based on the principles of mutual benefit, equality, and non-interference in internal affairs despite differences in their social systems (Izvestiya, July 30, 1966). A tangible step toward bolstering bilateral political contacts was made during Gromyko’s negotiations in Tokyo: each side acknowledged that consultations between their foreign ministers should become “regular” rather than “periodical,” as agreed a year before during the Japanese minister’s visit to Moscow (Izvestiya, July 30, 1966). The Japanese government’s interest in consultations with Soviet officials is borne out by visits of special representatives of the Japanese prime minister and prominent Japanese statesmen to Moscow. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) co-leader Kawashima Shōjirō visited Moscow in May 1967 as the prime minister’s special representative. Kawashima’s visit aimed to pave the way for an official trip to the Soviet Union by the new Foreign Minister Miki Takeo and to assess the possibility of negotiations between the two chiefs of state (Asahi shinbun, May 31, 1967). Miki went to Moscow on July 20–25, 1967, and his visit highlighted a number of bilateral affairs and global issues of relevance to both countries (Pravda, July 26, 1967). The fisheries problem—significant for Soviet-Japanese relations—was high on the negotiation agenda. The 1956 Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Convention, which expired in 1966, was automatically extended for one year. An agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in fisheries, signed during Miki’s visit, was equally consequential; it stipulated the annual adoption of an action plan and exchanges of delegations and experts (Kutsobina 1979, 278). In addition, both sides exchanged letters to supplement the agreement on cooperation in rescuing persons in distress at sea (Pravda, July 26, 1967). Although certain positive changes had occurred in Soviet-Japanese relations, the countries objectively “remained on different sides of the fence” in the global confrontation between the two warring camps. The Soviet Union continued its criticism of Japan in “obediently following” US foreign policy. As US involvement in the Vietnam War escalated in the early 1960s, Japan was openly

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condemned for its political and economic backing of the US intervention, for its rear support of US troops, and for giving carte blanche to US military bases stationed in Japanese territory and their engagement in the hostilities. In turn, Tokyo made the territorial dispute, the existence of which was denied by Moscow, a condition for signing a peace treaty (Kutakov 1988, 87–88). In fact, Satō believed it was impossible to normalize the political dialogue with Moscow separately from the territorial issue. Any attempts by the Soviet administration to foster cooperation with Japan in the field of international security, including the Soviet initiative of a collective security system in Asia put forward in 1969, were viewed by Tokyo exclusively through the prism of its allied relations with the United States. For that reason, they did not receive any response (Fergusson 2008, 45–46). The reaction of the Japanese establishment to the Soviet-German Treaty signed in Moscow (Treaty of Moscow) in August 12, 1970, drew some attention since the treaty began a new stage in Soviet-German relations and played an important role in détente. The Moscow treaty was based on the real state of affairs created by the war and postwar development. The two sides declared the absence “of any territorial claims to anyone and pledged not to make new claims in the future” (Izvestiya, September 13, 1970). Tokyo had mixed feelings about that event. On the one hand, the Japanese administration had to admit that the Moscow treaty recognized the inviolability of WW II outcomes and, on the other, it tried to pretend as if that event had no relation to its territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. 3

Soviet-Japanese Political Relations in the Early 1970s

The period from the late 1960s until the early 1970s witnessed profound positive transformations in global affairs, first of all, in détente that prompted the Soviet Union and the United States to lower the risk of a nuclear war by coordinated measures. The end of war in Vietnam in 1975 also had a favorable influence on the state of affairs in Asia. The US defeat in Vietnam reduced the US military presence in Asia and enlarged the responsibilities of US allies, an idea set out in the Guam Doctrine by US president Richard Nixon (released July 25, 1969). Soviet-Chinese disagreements played a role, too. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet administration was seriously preoccupied with the deteriorating relations with China, the anti-Soviet policy of which resulted in a major armed clash near the border island of Zhenbao (Damanskiĭ) in 1969. In addition, the Chinese administration exhibited a wish to normalize relations with the

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United States and Japan in the late 1960, which Moscow clearly saw as an attempt to strengthen anti-Soviet rhetoric. Once China began to normalize relations with the United States and Japan in the early 1970s, Moscow faced a real threat of the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc in the Far East, and consequently it stepped up its efforts toward political normalization with Japan. Japan’s foreign policy also underwent profound changes in the early 1970s. Tokyo was extremely displeased with the US pressure in trade and economic relations, and the blatant disregard of its foreign political interests. For instance, President Nixon visited China in 1972 without prior notice to Tokyo. The “Nixon shock” convinced the Japanese establishment that it was time for more independent actions by Japan on the international stage. The activity of Japanese diplomats was rooted in the long-standing aspiration of the government to situate Japan within the global arena as a significant political force and “to reconcile Japan’s political influence on global affairs with its increased economic might” (Petrov 1973, 53). The Soviet administration demonstrated its amicable stance toward Japan in order to prevent China-Japan rapprochement and to take advantage of the complicated atmosphere in Japanese-US relations. Given the process of normalization of US-Chinese relations, which started in 1971, Moscow tried to seize the initiative and to win over Japan as a way to avert an anti-Soviet coalition. To begin with, it signaled a readiness to change its attitude on the territorial problem. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to Tokyo in January 1972 laid the groundwork for that process: he attempted to test the waters in the Japanese establishment and to assess the possibility of resolving the territorial issue under the 1956 Joint Declaration. Foreign Minister Gromyko met with Prime Minister Satō in Tokyo on January 27, 1972, and to the surprise of Soviet diplomats in his entourage he stated that “the Soviet government would like relations between our countries to develop without any impediments and, in case the Japanese government is interested, he could suggest the return to the territorial dispute’s formula of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration to the Politburo upon his return to Moscow” (Kapitsa 1996, 155). The then Soviet ambassador to Japan, Oleg A. Troyanovskiĭ, provided a detailed account of these events in his memoirs. He wrote that during his Tokyo visit Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko announced the readiness of the Soviet administration to consider the transfer of two of the four islands claimed by Japan: The Japanese hailed that statement. The then Japanese foreign minister Takeo Fukuda [Fukuda Takeo] said at the banquet in the honor of the

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Soviet guest that Andreĭ Gromyko, formerly also known as “Mr. No” in Japan, could now be called “Mr. Yes.” But later Fukuda told me privately that two islands would not be enough. troyanovskiĭ 1997, 287

The joint Soviet-Japanese communiqué issued at the end of negotiations called for holding peace treaty negotiations at a convenient time. It was also agreed to carry on efforts toward long-term economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan and expressed the readiness to negotiate a scientific and technical cooperation agreement. Nonetheless, Satō did not respond to Gromyko’s proposal. The scholar Wada Haruki believes there are two reasons for this. First of all, a resolution of the territorial problem with Moscow through the transfer of two islands did not seem enough for Japan when seen against the backdrop of a returned Okinawa in 1972. And secondly, Satō was about to retire and did not appear to have the will to pursue the further development of relations with the Soviet Union (Wada 1999, 280). After Tanaka Kakuei assumed the prime ministerial office in summer 1972, Japan put forward foreign policy initiatives on major global matters without prior coordination with Washington, thereby launching the so-called “omnidirectional diplomacy.” The Tanaka government instigated diplomatic relations with China in 1972 before the US government could do so. Moreover, Japan established diplomatic relations with Vietnam, Mongolia, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Japanese Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi visited Moscow in October 1972 at the invitation of the Soviet government. He then met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko regarding the agreement reached by the Soviet Union and Japan in January 1972 to negotiate a bilateral peace treaty. A press release said that the negotiations were held within an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding (Sankei shinbun, January 4, 1972). The convening of two meetings between Soviet and Japanese foreign ministers within one year was proof that both countries were attempting to create a favorable atmosphere to expand Soviet-Japanese political contacts on various levels. The same goal was pursued by the exchange of messages between the secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and the Japanese prime minister in 1972–1973. Messages from both countries declared the wish to build bilateral relations and to resolve problems on the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, mutual benefit, equality, neighborliness, and cooperation. The Japanese-Soviet Friendship Association, in which deputies from all parliamentary parties participated, was set up by the Japanese parliament

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in February 1973. The association was an impetus to inter-parliamentary relations and exchanges. A delegation of the association led by its chairman, Ishida Hirohide, visited Moscow in August–September 1973 at the invitation of the Soviet parliamentary group. These efforts created a useful setting for an official visit of Prime Minister Tanaka to the Soviet Union on October 7–10, 1973, and this became a landmark event in Soviet-Japanese relations. The two sides exchanged opinions and expressed mutual satisfaction with the positive development of bilateral relations, as well as the substantial progress made in the political, economic, and cultural fields following the restoration of bilateral relations in 1956. The Moscow talks paid much attention to the broadening of economic contacts between the Soviet Union and Japan, with each side calling for desirable economic cooperation in as many sectors as possible based on the principles of mutual benefit and quality. The joint statement voiced a convergence of opinions on the need to “accelerate economic cooperation, in particular, as relates to mineral development in Siberia” and to promote trade and cooperation in agriculture, transportation, and other areas. It was settled that “governments of both countries would foster those types of economic cooperation and encourage contracts between Japanese companies and relevant Soviet entities” (Pravda, October 11, 1973). Both sides attached great store to earlier Soviet-Japanese fisheries contacts, agreed to ensure long-term, stable fishing in the northern Pacific Ocean, and exchanged opinions on Japanese fishing in areas requiring additional agreements. The signing of a peace treaty was an item on the agenda of the SovietJapanese negotiations. Tokyo evidently realized that Moscow was ready to transfer the two islands and decided to increase pressure for “regaining” all four islands. And this was the agenda pursued by Prime Minister Tanaka in Moscow. He underscored Japan’s unwavering claim for the four islands at negotiations with the secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and Prime Minister Alexeĭ N. Kosygin in what Troyanovskiĭ, also a participant in these talks, describes as “a rather rude or even somewhat impudent manner” (Troyanovskiĭ 1997, 288). Troyanovskiĭ noted that “Brezhnev was indignant” at the way the Japanese prime minister presented that standpoint. He proposed to take a break, stood up, and remarked rather loudly: “We will give nothing” (Troyanovskiĭ 1997, 288). Before the negotiations the Soviet government presumably intended to repeat the two-island offer made by Gromyko in Tokyo. The course of Moscow negotiations showed there would be absolutely no progress in the resolution of the territorial problem. Still, neither side wanted the negotiations to fail. After

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having discussed various ways of formalizing talks outcomes in the final communiqué, they acknowledged the following: Aware that the settlement of issues outstanding since World War II and the signing of a peace treaty will contribute to the establishment of genuine neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries, the sides had negotiations on matters pertaining to the peace treaty’s content. The sides agreed to continue negotiations on a peace treaty between the two countries in the relevant period of 1974. Pravda, October 11, 1973

The negotiations held in 1973 and the documents signed in Moscow gave fresh impetus to Soviet-Japanese cooperation. The official visit of the Japanese foreign minister Miyazawa Kiichi to Moscow on January 16–17, 1975, was useful in the deepening of mutual understanding. Both sides noted at the negotiations that Soviet-Japanese relations had evolved in various areas, especially since the time of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1973. The negotiating parties expressed reciprocal interest in signing a peace treaty as soon as possible (Pravda, January 19, 1975). 4

Economic Cooperation in the 1970s

By the early 1970s, Japan was second among capitalist countries, after the United States, in terms of its economy and volume of industrial production. The agreements reached at Soviet-Japanese summit negotiations in Moscow in 1973 accelerated economic relations. Soviet-Japanese trade nearly doubled in the first half of the 1970s to RUB 6.1 billion, consistent with the second fiveyear trade and settlements agreement of 1971–1975. The bilateral trade turnover grew by 69 percent in 1974 alone, with Soviet exports soaring 46 percent and imports more than doubling to 108 percent (Kazakov 1976, 95). As a result, Japan’s share in the overall trade turnover of the Soviet Union grew from 3.1 percent in 1971 to 3.8 percent in 1975, which made Japan first and second among the industrially developed capitalist countries trading with the Soviet Union (Krupyanko 1982, 58). The Soviet share in Japan’s foreign trade was smaller than that of either the United States or Australia but some Soviet commodities held a prominent position on the Japanese market. The Soviet Union principally imported Japanese machines and hardware for chemical, oil refining, car, metallurgical, textile, paper and pulp industries,

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marine transport, and agriculture. In addition to buying package equipment, the Soviet Union ordered certain types of rolled ferrous metals and large diameter pipes. The constant procurement of Japanese consumer goods greatly satisfied the needs of the Soviet people. This was also advantageous for Japan, primarily its small and medium businesses manufacturing these types of products. As before, the Soviet Union mostly provided Japan with industrial raw materials and fuel, which accounted for up to 80 percent of the overall export cost. The range of exported products was also broadening: the Soviet Union delivered timber and lumber, pig iron, oil and petroleum products, cotton, nonferrous metals, asbestos, talc, and potassium salts. Coastal trade was successful, growing from RUB 20.6 million in 1972 to RUB 50 million in 1975 (Latyshev 1987, 349). In the 1970s, coastal trade supplied Japan with fish, seafood, timber and lumber, coal, various types of local construction materials, marble, honey, wax, and medicinal herbs. Costal trade imports of the Soviet Union predominately consisted of consumer goods such as clothes, textile products, footwear, fresh fruit and vegetables, and construction materials. The 1973 agreements to step up Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation projects boosted the activity of Soviet entities and Japanese companies. Intergovernmental banking protocols were signed in Tokyo in April 1974 for the first time in the history of economic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. The Soviet Union was given over USD 1 billion in governmental loans from the Japan Export-Import Bank (JEXIM). It was the first loan of its kind granted by the Japanese government-controlled Export-Import Bank and was large compared to all previous loans that were rather modest and received by private companies. The Japanese government’s support of domestic companies participating in economic projects with Soviet entities elevated SovietJapanese economic relations to a completely new level. The earlier general agreements were also being successfully implemented. The first dealt with the delivery of Japanese equipment, hardware, machines, materials, and other goods for timber processing in Siberia and the Far East, and Soviet lumber supplies to Japan. This was fulfilled by the end of 1973. Over a period of five years, the Soviet Union was provided with equipment, materials, and consumer goods under a RUB 140.7 million loan; it repaid that loan with merchantable wood totaling RUB 155.6 million (Stolyarov 1977, 253). A general agreement on the Soviet delivery of South Yakutian coke to Japan and the Japanese delivery of equipment, machines, materials, and other goods for the South Yakutia Coalmine Development Project was signed in Moscow on June 3, 1974, within the framework of the intergovernmental protocol on loans. An agreement granting a loan equivalent to USD 450 million was signed in Tokyo on June 26, 1974; 390 million from that loan was allocated for the

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purchase of equipment, machines, and materials while 60 million was spent on consumer goods that would cover in part Soviet expenses on the growth of the South Yakutian coal basin. The Soviet Union pledged to repay the loan within twenty years starting in 1979 with Kuznetsk and South Yakutian coal (Kazakov 1976, 104). The agreement enabled Soviet entities to buy Japanese equipment and materials for the development of the South Yakutian coal basin and for the construction of the BAM (Baikal–Amur Mainline)–Tynda–Berkakit rail line connecting the Baikal-Amur Railroad to the South Yakutian coal-mining complex. The BAM–Tynda–Berkakit rail line was ready in late 1978, and the Neryungri opencast mine produced its first coal in 1979. A substantial portion of bank loans granted under the intergovernmental protocol on loans financed the second general agreement expanding the development of forest resources in the Far East, and this was signed in Tokyo on July 30, 1974. This document and the accompanying loan agreement signed in Moscow in October 1974 stated that Soviet entities received a bank loan of USD 550 million to purchase Japanese equipment, machines, ships, materials, and other products for an expansion of logging in the eastern areas of the Soviet Union in 1975–1978. The Soviet Union repaid the aforementioned Japanese loans in 1975–1979 with the delivery of 17.5 million cubic meters of wood and 900,000 cubic meters of lumber (Krupyanko 1982, 130). The volume of that agreement doubled the first general agreement on forest resources. The third general agreement was concluded in March 1981. Japan furnished equipment and machines for developing forest resources in the Far East and along the BAM–Tynda–Berkakit rail line. Beginning in 1981 the Soviet Union pledged to repay the loan with 12 million cubic meters of merchantable wood within six years (Krupyanko 1982, 130–31). During the exacerbated global fuel and energy crisis in the 1970s, Japan’s interest in the continuous supply of resources, especially relating to energy, and the growing confidence of Japanese businessmen in the reliable and lasting nature of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation brought about a general agreement on cooperation regarding the exploration of oil and gas fields and the extraction of gas and oil on the Sakhalin shelf. This agreement was signed in Tokyo on January 8, 1975. The agreement prescribed an extensive program of oil and gas geological works, including geophysical studies and deep-water drilling. Japan supported that agreement with a loan of USD 150 million. The project jointly implemented by Soviet workers and engineers and Japanese experts strengthened scientific and technical relations between the Soviet Union and Japan (Kutakov 1988, 151–52). An addition to the general agreement was signed in Japan in June 1979 to provide the Soviet Union with an extra loan for completing prospecting works

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and for beginning the extraction of shelf resources; the loan repayment by the Soviet side was guaranteed with successful prospecting. The loans were due to be repaid with oil and gas from Sakhalin shelf deposits, for the development and operation of which Japan pledged to supply various kinds of machines and services through a government company specially founded using bank loan terms in the event that prospecting was successful. After the loan was repaid, the Japanese side received the right to annual purchases of 50 percent of oil and gas produced by the discovered and developed fields. Large-scale, long-term agreements evidenced a quality change in the nature of Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations. The first half of the 1970s saw positive trends in business cooperation, as well as trade and economic relations, between the Soviet Union and Japan. Major Soviet and Japanese business players showed an interest in that collaboration, yet West European companies came to dominate Japan’s business in trade with the Soviet Union by the end of the 1970s. Different from Japanese businessmen, those companies agreed to set up joint industrial facilities with the Soviet Union, to further industrial cooperation in the fulfillment of foreign trade orders of third states, and to exchange bank representative offices. From the late 1970s onward, Japanese companies increasingly lost contracts to West German businessmen who offered better terms in package equipment supplies. The main reason is that Japanese companies, unlike their West German colleagues, did not enjoy governmental support. Due to political considerations the Japanese government did nothing for some time to stimulate exports of package equipment to the Soviet Union through preferential export loans, and the result of this inactivity was damaging. 5

Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Relations in the 1970s

A greater demand by many countries and new opportunities created by scientific and technological progress increased the significance of global maritime use in the 1970s. Applicable modern international laws were required, and the 3rd United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was tasked to accomplish the mission in 1973. The proposal to give coastal states the right to declare a zone up to 200 nautical miles wide for exercising their sovereign rights to the local fauna was an important item on the table. Before a convention to that effect was signed, a number of countries established 200-mile economic or fishing zones along their coastlines and proclaimed their sovereignty over bio-resources in those areas. Laws on 200-mile fishing zones were adopted in the United States, Norway, and Canada on April

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13, 1976, and the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and a few other countries announced the intention to set up 200-mile economic or fishing zones off their coasts on January 1, 1977. Similar zones were created earlier by some countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Konstantinov 1978, 71–72). The Soviet Union did not remain on the sidelines. The Soviet Supreme Council Presidium published the order “On Temporary Measures for Conservancy of Bio-Resources and Regulation of Fishing in Soviet Coastal Waters” on December 10, 1976. Article 1 of the order stated that the Soviet Union would exercise its sovereign rights to fish and harvest other bio-resources for the purposes of prospecting, harvesting, and conservancy in the Soviet coastal waters up to 200 nautical miles wide, which were calculated from the same baselines as the Soviet territorial waters. Article 3 declared that “harvesting of fish or other bio-resources, as well as prospecting and other fishing-related operations, could be done by foreign legal entities and individuals within the areas defined by Article 1, therein only the basis of treaties or other kinds of understanding between the Soviet Union and foreign states” (Izvestiya, December 10, 1976). The Soviet Union therefore urged other states to allow foreign fishing vessels to harvest fish resources in their 200-mile zones to a scientifically permissible degree that was not used by the littoral states. New fishing regulations enforced by the Soviet Union required the adjustment of fisheries relations with Japan, as many earlier fisheries agreements failed to comply with the new terms. Soviet-Japanese negotiations on a new fisheries agreement began in Moscow on March 15, 1977. Japan tried to link fishing regulations for Soviet coastal waters to suit its own territorial claims. The Japanese delegation bluntly refused to include a reference to the Soviet Council of Ministers’ resolution in the prospective agreement dated February 24, 1977, which definitively named the areas where the temporary measures were applicable, including the Kurile Islands. Japan made renewed attempts to complicate Japanese-Soviet relations after the Japanese parliament passed laws that expanded Japanese territorial waters from three to twelve miles and declaring a 200-mile fishing zone around Japan on May 2, 1977. Japanese officials said it was planned to apply those laws to the Southern Kuriles owned by the Soviet Union. Japanese newspapers published maps of Japan’s fishing zone, which included areas adjoining the Southern Kuriles (Latyshev 1987, 358). Given the intransigent position of the Soviet Union, the Japanese delegation shifted its tactics and proposed to separate the fisheries issue from one that was territorial so that the outstanding territorial problem between the countries was acknowledged at some point (Konstantinov 1978, 78). Yet the Japanese government had to sign the agreement on fishing in Soviet coastal

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waters after realizing the futility of its attempts to gain Soviet concessions and as a result of mounting pressure from fishing businesses. The Agreement Between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan on Fishing in the Soviet Coastal Waters in the Northwestern Part of the Pacific Ocean was signed in Moscow on May 27, 1977. The document’s preamble recognized Soviet sovereign rights to bio-resources within the 200-mile zone for the purposes of prospecting, harvesting, and conservancy, as stated in the Soviet Supreme Council Presidium’s order dated December 10, 1976. Once the Soviet Union had imposed a 200-mile zone, the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Convention of 1956, which regulated salmon and herring fishing in the northwestern areas of the Pacific Ocean, failed to comply with the new terms. The Soviet Union notified Japan on April 29, 1977, of its intention to renounce the 1956 fisheries convention, and this raised the question of Japan’s future salmon harvesting outside the 200-mile coastal zones of the Soviet Union and Japan. This business was crucial to Japan due to its traditional cultural practices, its engagement of a large number of fishermen, and the value of harvested fish. Agreements on the cooperation of salmon harvesting in the northwestern areas of the Pacific Ocean were signed in Moscow on April 21, 1978. Both sides resolved to conserve and not to overfish the region outside the 200-mile coastal waters, and a protocol was signed with the understanding to spell out the procedure and the terms of salmon fishing. It defined fishing areas, the amount of harvesting permitted for each side outside 200-mile coastal zones, fishing procedure and tools, as well as the procedure for control over the fulfillment of those requirements. 6

Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1970s–1980s

There was a period of political cooling in Soviet-Japanese relations during the second half of the 1970s, with opposing opinions on the terms of the peace treaty proving problematic. Japan insisted that the wording “unresolved issues” (J: mikaiketsu no sho mondai; R: nereshennye voprosy) in the 1973 communiqué indicated the existence of the territorial problem while the Soviet Union denied it. Moscow was negative about Japanese attempts to interpret provisions of the Soviet-Japanese statement of October 10, 1973, as the Soviet recognition of the existence of the territorial problem. The official stance of the Kremlin was formulated by Brezhnev in his answers to questions from the Asahi shinbun

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editor-in-chief, Hata Shōryū, in July 1977, who stated that the “claims that there are certain ‘unresolved issues’ in relations between our countries are a unilateral and incorrect interpretation” (Pravda, July 7, 1977). Considering the differences regarding the peace treaty, in 1977 the Soviet Union proposed to discuss the possibility of signing a treaty on neighborliness and cooperation covering those areas of Soviet-Japanese relations in which solid agreements were possible. A draft of that treaty was presented to Japan at a meeting between Soviet minister Gromyko and Japanese foreign minister Sonoda Sunao in Moscow on January 9, 1978 (Pravda February 24, 1978). Moscow proceeded from the premise that the proposal of signing a treaty on neighborliness and cooperation did not resolve the question of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan, and that the treaty itself would improve the climate for peace treaty negotiations and become an important step toward its conclusion. The Japanese government rejected the Soviet offer under the pretext of the unresolved problem of the Northern Territories. In 1978, the Yomiuri shinbun quoted the cabinet secretary General Abe Shintarō as saying that: The Japanese government is not going to acknowledge or comment on the Soviet draft of a treaty on neighborliness and cooperation. We have no intention of considering it. In order to put Japanese-Soviet relations on a firm footing, it is necessary to work insistently on the return of the Northern Territories and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Yomiuri shinbun, February 24, 1978

Another factor that complicated Soviet-Japanese relations was the restored diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Beijing, which were negotiating a treaty on peace and friendship. The Chinese administration insisted that the treaty have a provision on the joint countering of “hegemony” of a third country—in other words, the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Gromyko, who visited Tokyo from January 9 to January 13, 1976, told Prime Minister Miki that the Soviet Union would be unable to hold peace treaty negotiations in case the hegemony provision was added to the treaty with China. Troyanovskiĭ, who also attended the meeting, observed that “It seemed to me that Miki pulled a long face and was a bit upset by that statement.” In his words, Japanese politicians “understood what the refusal to discuss the territorial issue implied” (Troyanovskiĭ 1997, 293). On August 12, 1978, Japan and China signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which contained a “hegemony” article that included a provision on countering efforts of any third country to establish “hegemony” in the

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Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese government voiced reservations that the article was not targeted against the Soviet Union, but Moscow viewed the Japanese stance as unfriendly. This led to the “shutting down” of the “the territorial issue” for over a decade. Japan thus missed a chance to begin negotiations on the territorial problem with the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Neither side seems to have been able to advance toward a resolution of the territorial problem, but the very fact that peace treaty negotiations were taking place could have had a certain influence on global affairs in the Far East. The incident of September 6, 1976, when Soviet captain Viktor I. Belenko hijacked a new modification of the interceptor plane Mikoyan MiG-25P and flew to Japan, became another stumbling block in the already tense Soviet-Japanese relations. In violation of the provisions of the Convention on Consular Relations, Japanese authorities stalled the plane’s return to the Soviet Union. The plane was dismantled, thoroughly examined by Japanese and US experts and returned to the Soviet Union only on November 15, 1976. Statements released by the Soviet government on September 9 and 22, 1976, described those actions of the Japanese authorities as “flagrantly unfriendly” (Pravda, September 26, 1976). With the renewed outbreak of the Cold War in the early 1980s the situation between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated after Soviet troops were deployed to Afghanistan in December 1979. Washington proactively involved its allies in the bipolar confrontation, and Japan was no exception. Japan decided to boycott the XXII Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980. The Japanese government refused to comply with provisions of a Soviet-Japanese trade and settlements agreement for 1981–1985 (dated May 22, 1981), which envisaged annual intergovernmental meetings to address its fulfillment. At the same time, Tokyo stepped up a propaganda campaign aimed at proving the lawfulness of the Japanese territorial claims against the Soviet Union. Notably, the campaign was initiated and actively supported by governmental agencies. In September 1981, Japanese prime minister Suzuki Zenkō was the first Japanese leader to go on a fact-finding “inspection” (shisatsu) of the Southern Kuriles in the company of journalists. The Suzuki cabinet decided in January 1981 that February 7 should become the “Northern Territories Day” (hoppō ryōdo no hi).3 It was also determined to subsidize the Nemuro sub-prefecture on Hokkaido for the purposes of “consolidation and growth of a movement for the return of the Northern Territories.” In 1972, the prime minister’s 3  The first Russian-Japanese treaty of commerce and navigation, the Treaty of Shimoda (formally the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation Between Japan and Russia) was signed in the Japanese town of Shimoda on January 26 (February 7), 1855.

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office hired staff to “research the problem of the Northern Territories” and to foster a relevant public attitude. In the early 1980s this department intensified its activities. Substantial funds from the national budget were allocated annually for this purpose, and the media recorded that the prime minister’s office assigned JPY 510 million for associated events in 1981 alone (Hokkaidō shinbun, February 16, 1981). The office’s allocations grew to JPY 650 million in 1982, while the Hokkaido budget contributed an additional sum of about JPY 182 million (Hokkaidō shinbun, February 16, 1981). The “Law on the Special Measures Promoting a Resolution of the Problem of the Northern Territories” (Hoppō ryōdo mondai tō kaiketsu sokushin tokubetsu setchihō, referred to as Hokutokuhō) was adopted in Japan in September 1982 to encourage the campaign of territorial claims against the Soviet Union. The Japanese government was also making numerous attempts to internationalize the problem of the Northern Territories. Japanese diplomats were energetically seeking support of international organizations through the UN platform. In 1981, the Japanese Foreign Ministry pressured cartographic publishing houses of the countries that were signatories to the San Francisco Peace Treaty into amending their maps to show the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, and Shikotan, as well as the Habomai Ridge, as territories owned by Japan rather than the Soviet Union. Most countries did not respond to Japan’s appeal. Nakasone Yasuhiro assumed office as Japan’s prime minister in November 1982, and his government continued the course of its predecessors. Nakasone’s policy speech directly conditioned a stable relationship with the Soviet Union and the signing of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty on the resolution of the “Northern Territories Problem” (Pravda, December 4, 1982). He would reiterate that stance many times in his later speeches. The military element of the Japanese-US military and political alliance was clearly evident during Nakasone’s tenure. The outcome of negotiations between Nakasone and US president Ronald Reagan in Washington, DC on January 17–21, 1983, was crucial in that regard. During the negotiations, Nakasone reaffirmed the “allied” nature of bilateral relations, which was first mentioned in the Japanese-US communiqué released after the Suzuki–Reagan meeting in May 1981. Unlike his predecessor, however, Nakasone did not deny the military dimension of that vision. In fact, in an interview with the Washington Post the Japanese prime minister stated that Japan must become a strong country militarily, “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” capable of counteracting Soviet strategic aircraft, and that it must control the straits used by the Soviet navy to reach the Pacific from the Sea of Japan, so that it could “jam” the Soviet fleet in that area in “an emergency situation” (Washington Post, January 19, 1983).

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The Japanese government persisted in its use of various pretexts for inflating anti-Soviet campaigns in 1983–1984. When Soviet air defense downed a South Korean passenger plane (KAL 007) that crossed into prohibited Soviet airspace on September 1, 1983, the Japanese government sided with the Reagan administration and imposed a number of sanctions against the Soviet Union. This included, for instance, Japan’s suspension of bilateral flights in violation of the intergovernmental agreement on air traffic. But Soviet intelligence maintained that there was ample evidence to confirm that “the plane was performing a reconnaissance mission and that its pilots intentionally flew 500 kilometers inside the Soviet Union” (Koskin 2010, 359). Japan did not respond to peace initiatives from the Soviet Union, including the offer to discuss a possible agreement on guarantees that would formalize in a relevant legal form the obligation of the Soviet Union not to use nuclear weapons against Japan and Japan’s obligation to adhere strictly and consistently to its non-nuclear status. The Japanese government maintained negative toward the proposal of negotiating a treaty on neighborliness and cooperation that had been put forth earlier and was still valid. Bibliography

Russian Sources

Kapitsa, Mikhail Stepanovich. 1996. Na raznykh parallelyakh. Zapiski diplomata [At Various Parallels. Notes by a Diplomat]. Moscow: A/O Kniga i Buznes. Kazakov, Igor Vasil′evich. 1976. Sovetsko-yaponskie ėkonomicheskie otnosheniya. [SovietJapanese Economic Relations]. Problemy dal′nego vostoka, no. 1. Moscow: Nauka. Konstantinov, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich. 1978. Sovetsko-yaponskie otnosheniya v oblasti rybolovstva [Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Relations]. Мoscow: Nauka. Koshkin, Anatoliĭ Arkad′evich. 2010. Rossiya i Yaponiya: uzly protivorechiĭ [Russia and Japan: Knots of Contradictions]. Мoscow: Veche. Krupyanko, Mikhail Ivanovich. 1982. Sovetsko-yaponskie ėkonomicheskie otnosheniya [Soviet-Japanese Economic Relations]. Мoscow: Nauka. Kutakov, Leonid Nikolaevich. 1988. Moskva—Tokio: ocherki diplomaticheskikh otnosheniĭ, 1956–1986 [Moscow-Tokyo: Essays on Diplomatic Relations, 1956–1986]. Мoscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. Kutsobina, Natal′a Konstantinovna. 1979. Rybnoe khozyaĭstvo Yaponii [Japanese Fisheries]. Мoscow: Nauka. Latyshev, Igor Aleksandrovich, ed. 1987. SSSR i Yaponiya [The USSR and Japan]. Мoscow: Nauka.

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Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Хrushcheva s Prem′er-Ministrom Yaponii Хayato Ikėda [Correspondence between Soviet Council of Ministers, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev and Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda]. 1961. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, no. 11. Petrov, Dmitriĭ Vasil′evich. 1973. Yaponiya v mirovoĭ politike [Japan in Global Politics]. Мoscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. Stolyarov, Yuriĭ Sergeevich, ed. 1977. Yaponiya v sisteme mirovykh khozyaĭstvennykh svyazeĭ [Japan in the Global Economic System]. Мoscow: Nauka. Troyanovskiĭ, Oleg Aleksandrovich. 1997. Cherez gody i rasstoyaniya [Through Years and Distances]. Мoscow: Vagrius.



Japanese Sources



English Source

Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 1970. Waga gaikō no kinkyō 14 [Current State of Japanese Diplomacy]. Tokyo: Okurashō Insatsukyoku. Nanpō Dōhō Engokai, ed. 1966. Hoppō ryōdo mondai shiryōshū [Collection of Documents on the Northern Territories Problem]. Tokyo: Nanpō Dōhō Engokai. Suezawa Shōji, Kawabata Ichirō, and Shigeta Hiroshi, eds. 2003. Nichiro (Soren) kihon bunsho shiryōshū. Kaiteiban [A Collection of Foundational Japanese-Russian (Soviet) Documents and Materials. Revised Edition]. Kawasaki: RP Purintingu. Wada Haruki. 1999. Hoppō ryōdo mondai: rekishi to mirai [The Problem of the Northern Territories: History and Future]. Asahi Sensho 621. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha.

Fergusson, Joseph P. 2008. Japanese-Russian Relations: 1907–2007. Routledge Contemporary Japan Series 19. New York: Routledge.

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part 11

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The Rise to Power of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Policy of “Expanding Equilibrium” Shimotomai Nobuo In March 1985, the reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). His new policy of perestroika, or “reconstruction,” took on the grandiose challenge of transforming the Soviet system by shifting its priorities. His foreign policy, known as novoe politicheskoe myshlenie, or “New Political Thinking” (also seen as novoe myshlenie, or “New Thinking”), represented part of this change and carried with it the implication of a “diplomatic revolution” whereby foreign priorities would be subjugated to domestic goals. These momentous changes also led to new phases in Japanese-Soviet relations, though the results are difficult to assess. Some scholars such as Archie Brown predicted that Gorbachev would change his mind on Japan, which had previously been neglected by Soviet leaders, and that a swift improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations would follow. In his excellent book, The Rise and Fall of Communism, Brown even asserted that Gorbachev might have solved the territorial problem had he been able to survive in power for a few more years (Brown 2012, 1). In reality, however, when Gorbachev did finally visit Tokyo in April 1991, just a few months before the demise of the Soviet Union, the results of the meeting between him and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu were ambiguous, or at the very least less productive than expected. At that time, he was more focused on concluding the new “Federal Treaty,” although he ended up being confronted by the August coup and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. Why had the possibilities of improving relations failed? This essay will analyze Japanese perceptions and policies regarding perestroika, as well as the determinants of Soviet policy toward Japan. It also seeks to explain why expectations on both sides were not met. 1

The Beginning of Perestroika and Policy Stagnation toward Japan

Japanese-Soviet relations in the first half of the 1980s—that is, prior to perestroika—was the most stagnant period of mutual relations between the two nations. This was in contrast to the 1970s when the Brezhnev leadership was

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engaged in Siberian development. Both sides had their own reasons for this lack of attention. Japan had become less interested in Soviet energy supplies because energy-saving technology advanced during the 1970s. Following the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978, Japanese business were also more inclined to concentrate on the Chinese market. The Fukuda cabinet (1976–1978) persisted with omnidirectional diplomacy, including with the USSR. The government of Ōhira Masayoshi (1978–1980), however, was less interested in comprehensive diplomacy, especially after the outbreak of the Afghan crisis, and the subsequent government of Suzuki Zenko followed suit. The conservative influence of US president Ronald Reagan was felt strongly on global affairs. His counterpart, General Secretary Yuriĭ V. Andropov wanted to promote change and innovation in the system. Yet the strategy of concentrating deterrent forces in the Sea of Okhotsk that was pursued by Minister of Defense Dmitriĭ F. Ustinov only provoked anti-Soviet sentiment in Japan. At the time, Japanese media was full of anti-Soviet campaigns, including publications on the cccupation of Hokkaido by the USSR. In 1981, the “Northern Territories Day” (hoppō ryōdo no hi) was instituted to occur on February 7. Although Soviet Foreign Minister Andreĭ A. Gromyko attempted to bring about some improvements, his general stance toward Japan was low key and the results were minimal, as was recalled by such diplomats as Karen N. Brutents and others (Brutents 2005). Having been a Politburo member since 1973, Gromyko was more oriented to US-Soviet relations. He rehabilitated the CPSU membership of his boss, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, in 1984. The downing of the Korean Airlines passenger plane (KAL 007) only heightened the tense climate, particularly over the Far East. The next leader, Konstantin U. Chernenko, was also conservative, and short-lived since he died on March 10, 1985. Expectations therefore increased when the new Gorbachev leadership came to power in March 1985. Born in March 1931, Mikhail Gorbachev was then fifty-four-years old and had been secretary for agriculture, then second secretary, and was eventually promoted to general secretary following the death of his predecessor Chernenko and upon the recommendation by Gromyko. Gorbachev was expected to revive the stagnant economy and foreign policy. He began by changing personnel. He ousted long-seated Gromyko from his twenty-eight years of control over the Foreign Ministry and was replaced by Edward A. Shevardnadze, former first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party. Gromyko’s neglect of Japan was already apparent, and Gorbachev’s new appointees took a different view. For instance, the new secretary on ideology, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, a former ambassador to Canada and then director of the top Soviet think tank, the Institute of World Economy and International

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Relations (IMEMO), was known as a Soviet multipolar theorist who placed particular emphasis on the roles of Japan and Europe. Japanese perceptions of Gorbachev’s new leadership were initially not particularly significant, with the exception of a few experts. The Japanese prime minister Nakasone, however, took the opportunity to attend the funeral of General Secretary Chernenko. His foreign minister, Abe Shintarō, was also active in promoting relations with Moscow, even though mainstreamers in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed less enthusiastic about new developments in Moscow. In the meantime, Gorbachev was already making ideological innovations, especially on nuclear and other global issues. In fact, he became involved in the new initiative on nuclear disarmament in Geneva when he met with President Reagan in November 1985. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Tokyo for the first time in January 1986. He appeared naive regarding Japan but he did not reject any of the issues between the two countries, including the goal of securing a peace treaty. The Japanese side, including Foreign Minister Abe and the Soviet desk officer, Nomura Issei, seemed positive about this change. Shevardnadze soon realized that relations with Japan would be doomed without a solution surrounding the territorial issue. After returning to Moscow, he made a proposal at the Politburo meeting at the end of January about the normalization of the bilateral relationship. According to the memoirs of Soviet diplomat Mikhail S. Kapitsa, Shevardnadze insisted on going back to the “two islands” formula, which had been shut down for a considerable amount of time. Yet both Gorbachev and Gromyko seemed less enthusiastic over Japan (Kapitsa 1996, 175). The Soviet foreign ministry also followed this line, with the result that the Politburo was similarly negative. Inertia also prevailed in Japan. During this period, there was a succession of Japanese prime ministers: Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–1987), Takeshita Noboru (1987–1989), and Uno Sōsuke (June–August 1989). It was Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (1989–1991) who invited President Gorbachev to Japan and Miyazawa Kiichi (until August 1993) who witnessed the demise of the Soviet Union. during this period there were also five foreign ministers: Abe Shintarō (1982–1986), who supported Nakasone; Kuranari Tadashi (1986–1987); Uno Sōsuke (1987– 1989); Mitsuzaka Hiroshi (June–August 1989); Nakayama Tarō (1989–1991); and Watanabe Michio (1991–1993). They were basically recruited from the Nakasone and the Abe factions (Mitsuzuka and Nakayama) from within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Abe Shintarō was leader of his faction, the Seiwakai, and was perceived as a heavy-weight politician. Standing out from the other leaders was Nakasone Yasuhiro, who had a long tenure as the prime minister from 1982 to 1987. He was originally from

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the Ministry of the Interior and had thus been considered a nationalist. He turned out, however, to be a neo-liberal, pro-American politician who had a close relationship with President Reagan. But Nakasone was also interested in maintaining good ties with Moscow. Even with the appointment of Takeshita as his successor as prime minister, Nakasone still kept an eye on foreign policy, including that on the Soviet Union, by establishing a new Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS; Heiwa Anzen Hoshō Kenkyūjo). Part of the reason for the appointment of Uno Sōsuke, a former prisoner of war in Siberia, as foreign minister was Nakasone’s ambition to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Abe Shintarō, the son-in-law of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, was similarly active on Soviet policy. The Japanese Foreign Ministry was nonetheless committed to an alliance with the United States and was skeptical about any ties with the Soviet Union. Their cool policy regarding the USSR lay at the core of what is referred to as the pro-American “1955 System” (Gojūgonen taisei) under LDP dominance. The term “Northern Territories” (hoppō ryōdo) was first used in February 1956 and was widely accepted by the 1960s; it was also during this period that the USJapan alliance was established. Still, there was an orientation toward omnidirectional diplomacy according to which the Soviet was regarded as a potential energy cooperation partner during the 1970s. At this time Moscow was equally seen as a useful counterweight to China. On the whole, however, by the 1980s a stereotyped diplomacy toward the USSR had become so entrenched that even the prime minister could not affect any policy change toward Moscow. The Japanese policy of requesting the return of all four islands (yontō ikkatsu henkan) was more or less taken for granted. The Japanese Communist Party was more vocal on this issue and wanted the entire Kurile island chain handed back; however, in the late 1970s some began to voice more nuanced views, including Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo. By the time that perestroika began, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was run by expert diplomats such as Tokō Takehiro, director of the Eurasian Department (1988–1990), and his successor Hyōdō Nagao (1990–1992). Yakovlev, once head of the Propaganda Department, had in the meantime advanced the idea of “Three Centers of Imperialism” as part of the new party program of the CPSU that held Japan and West Germany in high regard. Following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in April 1986 Gorbachev had to change gear from nuclear management to disarmament. In May 1986, Gorbachev criticized the old-style Gromyko diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and promoted the program of “New Political Thinking.” Foreign Minister Abe visited Moscow in May 1986 and issued a joint communiqué, which stated that US-Japan relations would not hamper relations with

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Moscow. Visas were also simplified to enable visits to graves in the Northern Territories. And yet, as was later admitted by Gorbachev, the time was still not ripe for innovative thinking regarding Japan. This pattern was repeated in the famous Vladivostok speech in the summer of 1986 in which Gorbachev outlined his ambition to change policy regarding the Asia-Pacific region. He declared that the USSR was an Asian country, thus suggesting the activation of new policies toward China and Japan. In accordance with the changing priorities of the Kremlin, academics at think tanks began to express new interest in Japan and China. It was Beijing, rather than Tokyo, however, that proved more responsive, and in fact Deng Xiaoping became more interested in the USSR. Gorbachev had hinted at removing what were described as the “three obstacles” (Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Vietnam), and China began to soften its stance toward Moscow. Japan remained less enthusiastic, in part because Gorbachev’s address was too vague. In his memoirs he would later describe Japan’s reaction as cool and hostile (Gorbachev 1996). Naturally, there were voices calling for Gorbachev to be welcomed to Japan, yet a gap in perceptions and sluggish reactions prevented this chance from being exploited. At the same time, some Japanese diplomats were ousted, resulting in a deterioration in mood. One reason for this reaction is related to the activation of Soviet-US relations. The results of the Reykjavik Summit of September 1986 were particularly positive, suggesting that all strategic nuclear weapons would be scrapped. Both Reagan and Gorbachev pushed forward the agenda of nuclear disarmament, thus triggering the negotiations regarding the abolition of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). As a result of this move forward in Soviet-US relations, the Soviet-Japanese agenda was naturally downgraded. By the end of 1987, pessimism prevailed in both Moscow and Tokyo, and expected visits by both leaders were postponed. Furthermore, in March 1987 the Toshiba-Kongsberg Incident erupted, in which the Japanese company Toshiba had illegally exported machine tools that could be employed with Kongsberg numerical control (NC) instruments manufactured in Norway. This was in violation of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) agreement. Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated as Soviet-US relations warmed. What was interesting in this regard was that the slow development of Soviet-Japanese relations was also noticed in Washington. By the spring of 1987, a two-track joint research program on perestroika began between Tokyo and Washington. The co-organizers were McGeorge Bundy, former National Security Advisor to President John F. Kennedy, and Ambassador Ogawara Yoshio. Japanese members included the political scientist Satō Seizaburō and an expert on the Soviet economy, Satō Tsuneaki, along with other young

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scholars. There were also Japanese diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Russian School with a knowledge of Soviet affairs, such as Hyōdō Nagao and Tanba Minoru, who were generally pessimistic about the reforms. They were expected to publish their report in 1990. Takeshita Noburu was appointed prime minister in October 1987, and Uno Sōsuke became foreign minister. By this time public debates about Gorbachev’s reforms and their foreign impact were now more evident in Japan, especially through the efforts by eminent scholars such as Nakajima Mineo, a specialist on China, and Wada Haruki and Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, both historians on Russia. Wada and Nakajima maintained that the traditional goal of “Four Islands” should be modified and replaced by a “Two Islands-Plus-Alpha” (2+arufua) formula. In addition to the traditional and conservative foreign ministries in both countries, new players began to emerge on the domestic front. Political parties and social organizations began to speak up about Soviet issues. Public agendas changed, and both socialist and communist leaders began to react. The female socialist leader Doi Takako was particularly central to these developments, and before her visit to Moscow in May 1988, a public debate and forum, to which prominent former diplomats and academics were invited to speak, was organized in Japan to discuss perestroika. Facing these new realities, Gorbachev was forced to assert that the territorial issue was not settled. The communist leader Fuwa Tetsuzō also rushed to Moscow despite the fact that his party had not been on good terms with Moscow since the 1960s, and he was skeptical of Gorbachev’s line. Gorbachev writes in his memoirs that Fuwa proposed that he cut relations with the socialists in order to monopolize the channel with the opposition (Gorbachev 1996, vol. 2, 316). Social organizations such as the modern Buddhist religious movement, Sōka Gakkai (“Value-Creating Society) and the Japanese cultural organization, Taibunkyō, were also active. Former Prime Minister Nakasone paid a visit to Moscow in July 1988 to meet with Gorbachev and to give a talk at IMEMO. Nakasone insisted on a sober solution to the territorial issue while Gorbachev replied negatively that the postwar settlement should be respected. Gorbachev did, however, recognize the stagnant and delayed nature of relations with Japan. In fact, after this meeting Gorbachev pointed out in a Politburo discussion that “every Japanese government raised the issue of the territories and something had to be done” (V politbyuro KPSS 2006, 187). Following a Stalinist resurgence with the Nina Andreeva Affair of March 1988, when Gorbachev won over conservatives regarding Stalin and other issues, political reforms gained momentum and the reformist leader, Yakovlev, became increasingly influential. Within Moscow think tanks, prominent scholars on Japan such as Konstantin O. Sarkisov, Vladimir I. Ivanov, and Georgiĭ F.

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Kunadze began to speak in favor of a normalization with Japan and the necessity of solving the territorial issue. Sarkisov and Kunadze, in particular, criticized the official line from the point of view that both countries had so far no internationally recognized border. Kunadze would later be elevated to number two in the Russian Foreign Ministry. The postwar internee or POW issue, known as the Siberian Internment, was also a point of focus in the reevaluation of history. Alekseĭ A. Kirichenko, a former expert from the Institute of Oriental Studies, and Elena L. Katasonova are pioneering scholars in this area. In June 1990, a Siberian POW symposium took place in Tokyo for the first time. Kirichenko’s report highlighted the problem of the Siberian POWs, implying criticism of Stalin for his role in the situation. His criticism provoked a moving reaction from former POWs, both those in favor and against the government. Kirichenko’s report was harshly condemned, however, by conservatives such as Igor A. Latyshev and Anatoliĭ A. Koshkin, who were controlled by Ivan I. Kovalenko, a tough conservative who was head of the Japan desk of the CPSU. 2

Gorbachev’s Visit and the Demise of the USSR

Meanwhile, a severe wave of political reforms rushed through the perestroika movement, and the 27th Party Conference of the CPSU was a watershed moment. Gorbachev succeeded in removing the stubborn conservative of Soviet diplomacy, Andreĭ Gromyko. By September 1989, a new chapter appears to have opened with the appointment of Yakovlev as commission chair for foreign policy in the Central Committee. After a two-year interval, Gorbachev himself addressed Asian policy at Krasnoyarsk. He underlined the goal of improving relations with Japan and South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) in connection with the Seoul Olympics of September 1988. The USSR normalized relations with South Korea from 1990. It was within these circumstances that Shevardnadze made an official visit to Tokyo in December 1988 to see Prime Minister Takeshita and Foreign Minister Uno. As a result of this visit, a standing commission for the peace treaty was established, and seven working meetings took place before Gorbachev’s official visit in April 1991. This notwithstanding, mainstream Japanese attitudes remained committed to a solution based on the return of all four islands. In a meeting with his counterpart in Paris in January 1989, for instance, Foreign Minister Uno suggested that the return of the islands was a prerequisite for Gorbachev’s visit. As a result, discussions of history went round in circles, and negotiations were in a state of total disarray.

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The Republican George H. W. Bush and his administration entered the US presidential office in early 1989. In April, Uno visited Moscow and proposed a five-point diplomatic plan based on the concept of “Expanding Equilibrium” (J: kakudai kinkō). This was at variance with the previous formula that stressed the principle of the inseparability of politics and economics. In other words, the new policy, conceived by Deputy Minister Kuriyama Takakazu and Soviet desk officer Tōgō Kazuhiko, departed from the position that there would be no economic aid without political gains. The intention was to achieve political progress by means of the leverage of economic cooperation. Still, Gorbachev himself made no policy innovations regarding the aim of returning the four islands (Gorubachofu 1996, 21). Foreign Minister Shevardnadze asked that negotiations take place without any preconditions (Panofu 1992, 34). The second stage of perestroika began in the second half of 1989. Although the Bush administration was not quick in its reaction to the rapid changes in Soviet policy, perestroika assumed the trajectory of regime change. In the latter half of 1989, dynamic movements at a grass roots level had brought about the “civic revolutions” in the countries of Eastern Europe. Glasnost and political reform continued without restriction, and it was within this radical context of change that Gorbachev decided to visit Japan in 1991. In opposition to these powerful reformist tendencies, conservative forces committed to preserving the Soviet Union at any cost came to the fore. Open hostility to perestroika surfaced, especially among military and security organizations, as well as within all-union level economic institutions. Perestroika as a “revolution from above,” and employing the communist apparatus as a tool, had reached its limits. Faced with this political polarization, Gorbachev responded by moving to introduce a presidential system as a form of “crisis management” in an effort to stabilize the situation. By this stage, however, he was no longer solely a subject in control of decision-making, he was also an object manipulated by other realities. There was a growing outcry from scholars and policy intellectuals who were afraid of the slow development of relations with Japan. In particular, in November 1989 Politburo member Yakovlev, who was seen as the most farreaching reformist, came to Japan with others, including the Kazakh former dissident intellectual and anti-nuclear activist, Olzhas Suleĭmenov. Yakovlev proposed a third solution to fill the gap between the two countries. At this time, however, the Japanese foreign ministry was involved in solidifying the policy of “Expanding Equilibrium.” As such, Shevardnadze proposed to his counterpart Abe Shintarō, then general secretary of the LDP, to establish a bridge between the two governmental parties in order to facilitate contacts. Abe, in his turn, proposed a wider and more positive policy toward the USSR. Thus, in

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January 1990 Abe visited Moscow to propose a new “Eight-point Program,” covering relations in the spheres of economy, science, technology, humanitarian exchange, vocational training, exhibitions, and humanitarian affairs, that was intended to expand exchanges between the two countries, and he was cautious not to overemphasize territorial questions. In his talks with President Gorbachev, Abe underlined the importance of “wisdom” while refraining from broaching the territorial question. The Abe faction included such politicians as Katō Mutsuki and Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, who favored a positive policy toward the USSR. By the end of 1989, the Soviet situation dramatically changed. The Cold War eventually ended after the “civic revolutions” in Eastern Europe. The Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation—at this stage it was still known as a Soviet Republic—proposed new initiatives in May 1990. Its speaker, Boris Yeltsin, had once been a candidate Politburo member but was expelled by Gorbachev for criticizing the slow progress of perestroika. On June 12, 1990, Yeltsin declared the sovereignty of Russia, including over the Northern Territories, thus eroding the prerogatives of the USSR. Following these developments, a solution to the territorial issue would become difficult without consulting with Russia. Before his appointment as head of the Russian Federation, Yeltsin made an informal visit to Tokyo to see Prime Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama and to propose a “Five-Stage Solution Plan” (J: godankai kaiketsuan; R: pyatiėtapnyĭ plan resheniya problemy) regarding the territorial dispute. This move signified that a new power center had emerged (Kimura 2002, 565). The five stages of the plan were: 1) recognition of the problem; 2) setting up a freetrade zone; 3) demilitarization; 4) conclusion of the peace treaty; and 5) reaching an end solution. On the one hand, Yeltsin never said what was meant by an “end solution,” but on the other, he did hint that the Soviet leaders would be ousted once he delivered the disputed territories, thus depriving the Soviet president of initiative. Divisions and schisms became apparent in Moscow between the USSR and Russia. A reformist Russian government emerged in June 1990 following the decision of the Congress of People’s Deputies. A young diplomat, Andreĭ V. Kozyrev, was appointed Russian foreign minister and assisted by such reform-minded specialists as Vladimir P. Lukin and Kunadze, who had worked in Tokyo. Several ideas were floated among experts and presidential aides as possible solutions to the territorial issue and as a way to advance relations with Japan. For example, Gorbachev’s aide Georgiĭ K. Shakhnazarov promoted the idea of concluding a peace treaty with Japan in exchange for economic cooperation in Russia’s Far East and the withdrawal of US military bases from Japan

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(Radchenko 2007, 22). The political situation was still such that it seemed impossible for the Politburo to solve the dispute even with the “two islands scenario.” Meanwhile in Tokyo, a scandal forced Prime Minister Uno to resign after two months and in August 1990 the government was replaced by a new cabinet led by Kaifu. The ambitious politician Ozawa Ichirō became the general secretary of the LDP, thus marking his involvement in policy toward Moscow. Ozawa began to contact high-ranking communist officials such as Gennadiĭ I. Yanaev and Arkadiĭ I. Vol’skiĭ. This move represented competition with the Japanese Foreign Ministry that normally monopolized contacts with Moscow. In September 1990, Edward Shevardnadze visited Tokyo to decide on the visit of President Gorbachev in January 1991 (Panofu 1992, 39). Expectations were such in Tokyo that LDP leaders began to develop plans for purchasing the disputed islands. The ambitions of Yeltsin in Moscow and the activities of Ozawa in Tokyo began to coalesce. Both Soviet and Russian governments made a joint program to move toward a market economy. Stanislav S. Shatalin and Grigoriĭ A. Yavlinskiĭ, along with other liberal economists, orchestrated this program, which was known as the “500-Day Plan” (500 dneĭ). Reportedly, a huge Japanese investment was envisaged in order to carry out this transition. The Japanese Foreign Ministry also confidentially proposed a transitional program, amounting to USD 10 billion, though this had nothing to do with the Shatalin/Yavlinskiĭ plan. The Japanese Ministry of Finance was proud of Japan’s model of economic development that was at variance with the ideas of Russian liberal economists and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There was also a plan to invite President Gorbachev to the inauguration ceremony of the Japanese emperor Akihito. Against this backdrop, Ambassador Edamura Sumio, who had previously worked in Indonesia, was appointed to Moscow in June 1990. Since he was not a diplomat of the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Russian School, his appointment was regarded as representing a fresh approach in part because diplomats of the Russian School diplomats were perceived as being too tough. Edamura himself set the agenda of the preparations for the peace treaty. Included among his subordinates were Minister Shigeta Hiroshi, Amae Kishichiro, and Chargé d’affaires Kawato Tetsuo. Led by Politburo member Yakovlev, the Soviet side organized a preparatory commission for the presidential visit to Japan but Yanaev was appointed the new head with the political crisis of January 1991. Yanaev would be the organizer and leader of the coup d’état in August; this was a bad omen for the future. Others involved in the commission were several Gorbachev assistants,

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including Shakhnazarov, Vol’skiĭ, and Anatoliĭ S. Chernyaev. Vol’skiĭ had been aide to General Secretary Andropov and had strong ties with the economic departments of the Communist Party. In the summer of 1990, he also established the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Union. Moreover, Vol’skiĭ had connections with Japanese counterparts Kumagai Hiroshi and Sugimori Kōji. Initially, the Yanaev commission had Russian representatives, but as tensions between the USSR and Russia evolved the Russian representatives became alienated—in other words, this strengthened the power of the future coup d’état faction led by Yanaev (Panofu 1992, 95). This may explain why the Kaifu government first looked somewhat favorably on the August coup. In any case, the quasi-chaotic reform and decentralization process provoked a strong reaction. By the autumn of 1990 a conservative backlash against Gorbachev and Yeltsin emerged among those who were fearful of the Soviet Union’s demise. As a consequence, the reformist coalition collapsed, and Boris Yeltsin denounced the Gorbachev government on October 17. Conservatives headed by Anatoliĭ I. Lukyanov, a personal associate of Mikhail Gorbachev from his student days, came under counter-attack. Lukyanov openly criticized him in November. In December, Yanaev was appointed vice president, and in the same month Foreign Minister Shevardnadze resigned, alarmed at the prospect of a coup. In fact, there were shooting incidents in the Baltic Republics, a serious sign of mounting conservative influence. Valentin I. Pavlov, a conservative politician who advocated stronger presidential rule, was now appointed prime minister. This shift toward conservatism had repercussions on the Japanese front. Such prominent reform-minded politicians as Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Nikolaĭ Ya. Petrakov lost influence. The newly appointed Russian foreign minister Andreĭ Kozyrev emphasized the leading role of Russia over the USSR regarding Japanese issues, thereby checking the role of recently appointed Soviet foreign minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, a middle of the road diplomat. Within such a complex situation, Gorbachev could be neither innovator nor conciliator. The preparatory commission was engaged in preparations for the visit of the president at the end of November 1990. Representatives from the Communist Party, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, KGB, and academic think tank IMEMO were all invited. Diplomat Panov of the Foreign Ministry was involved and proposed two scenarios. The first was a compromise based on the 1956 Joint Declaration—that is, the eventual handover of two islands. The second was the final resolution of the issue by means of a mutually acceptable agreement based on the four islands. The first variant was a direct solution while the second was indirect and unwelcomed by some within the Soviet elite

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(Panofu 1992, 85). These two variants were in fact proposed to the president simultaneously. Five institutions were assigned to prepare the materials. Within the commissions of the Communist Party, which were headed by CPSU secretary Valentin M. Falin and Brutents, reform-minded individuals such as Vasiliĭ I. Saplin and Japanologist Konstantin Sarkisov became prominent figures. Still, relations with the republics were troublesome. At the preparatory commission, the proposal from the Foreign Ministry was adopted on February 26. Meanwhile, President Gorbachev convened a meeting at the end of March, in which conservatives including Yanaev and Bessmertnykh were invited. In his memoirs Ambassador Edamura notes that Bessmertnykh was against the first plan because of the strong opposition by military and fishery lobbies (Edamura 1997, 151). Conservatives, including Vladimir A. Klyuchikov and Dmitriĭ T. Yazov who represented the hard core of the later coup, did not attend. As a result, the second option—the zero option—was adopted. This decision by the Soviet authorities was conveyed to the Russian Republic, and it was adopted by the Supreme Soviet Foreign Commission on March 27. The Japanese side also tried to widen the negotiation horizon in the meantime. Party-to-party relations, in particular, developed between the ruling LDP and the communists. There was also a secret negotiation between the preparatory commission and the LDP, specifically with General Secretary Ozawa Ichirō who visited Moscow in early March 1991. He had with him the proposal for the return of the islands in exchange for an economic cooperation program worth USD 28 billion that had been developed by Kumagai’s team. According to this plan, Japan proposed a normalization of relations and USD 28 billion in aid founded on the German unification model. Ozawa visited the USSR at the beginning of March to propose a soft solution that would see the initial return of two islands based on the 1956 Joint Declaration, in return for a rough economic aid proposal. Brutents referred to some JPY 3 trillion, including a USD 450 million credit line (Brutents 2005, 225). Gorbachev remained skeptical about Ozawa who had closer relations with pro-coup politicians such as Yanaev. Gorbachev met Ozawa at the Central Committee building on March 25, although Ozawa’s plan had been leaked in advance in the newspaper Yomiuri shinbun. This leak was a result of the joint opposition to Gorbachev. Ozawa’s people met with Falin, but some in Vol’skiĭ’s circle were close to Yeltsin. The first meeting was a failure, prompting Ozawa to make an immediate request for another meeting with Gorbachev. Ozawa urged the Soviet leader to solve the territorial issue in return for economic aid. Again, there was no breakthrough. Ambassador Edamura accompanied Ozawa and he judged the reason

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for the failure to be a miscommunication between Gorbachev as the president and Yanaev as the chair of the official preparatory commission (Edamura 1997, 145). Given these developments, Gorbachev’s official visit to Japan from April 16 to April 19, 1991—the first by a communist leader—was carried out against a backdrop of increasing political chaos. There was even an appeal by the communists, the military, and the military-industrial complex to postpone the visit altogether (Panofu 1992, 23). Individuals such as Sergeĭ F. Akhromeev, military advisor to the president, were in actuality against any compromise with Japan. As such, the eight meetings with Prime Minister Kaifu, which lasted until after midnight, were rather drawn out and tedious. The focal point was the official recognition of the 1956 Joint Declaration, but Japanese officials, including Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō, failed to make progress on this point. Brutents argued that, even if he were personally inclined to solve the Kurile issue, about which he himself was not convinced, it would have been impossible for them to do so through political channels, something that might have been possible some years earlier (Brutents 2005, 226). Still, there were some positive results of the visit, including visa-free travel to the disputed islands, a trade agreement that replaced the existing one, and the offer of the list of names of Siberian detainees. In all, there were fifteen agreements. During the preparatory stages of the official visit, a secret group of international law experts had advanced the idea that the USSR had a duty to return the two small islands (Habomai and Shikotan), a claim that negated the Soviet official position. They also argued that even the official possession of Etorofu (Iturup) and Kunashiri (Kunashir) was not without questions. Gorbachev, however, did not fully endorse this report. The political reason for this failure is obvious: the delegation to Japan included conservatives such as Yanaev, who later turned out to be pro-coup, as well as radicals such as Kunadze, who was deputy of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Given their differences in outlook, it was impossible for them to agree on this issue. Gorbachev’s political power was also in decline. Gorbachev’s first official visit can be described as rather fruitless, even though both sides agreed that the four islands were discussed officially and the problem of territorial demarcation was raised. The Japanese goal of confirming the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration was ultimately not attained, despite several meetings. Surely these efforts were the reason for the confirmation of the 1951 speech by Nishimura Kumao, then director of the International Treaties Bureau, to the effect that the joint historical project, conducted by both Japanese and Russian foreign ministries in 1992, would soon see this statement as valid. Yet what was the starting point of the

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Japanese line for negotiation? Two or four? Is this position consistent with the February 1956 statement by Vice Minster Morimoto Kunio regarding the Northern Territories? After returning from his visit to Tokyo, Gorbachev began to launch political reforms by concluding new federal treaties with the republics. This was expected to be completed by August. But the conservative wing of the Gorbachev team, including Yanaev and Lukyanov, were critical and ultimately attempted a coup d’état. In return this brought about a rise in the power of the republics. After the attempted coup, Gorbachev resigned from the position of the general secretary of the Communist Party and disbanded the Central Committee on August 24, 1991. This became the prelude to the demise of the Soviet Union. In the intervening period, Ruslan I. Khasbulatov visited Japan in September to deliver a personal letter from the Russian president. One the one hand, a new Russian concept of relations with Japan based on law and justice that had been developed by Deputy Minister Kunadze was now emerging. Yeltsin shows his willingness to work toward a peace treaty in his November article “Appeal to the Russian People” (Panofu 1992, 188–91). On the other, Japanese Minister Nakayama visited in November and advanced a new idea about flexibility on the timing of the delivery of the islands, provided that Russia recognize Japanese sovereignty over them. His successor Watanabe Michio, the foreign minister from 1991 to 1993, followed this line after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 3 Conclusion For forty-six years following the demise of the Japanese empire in 1945 to the end of Soviet Union of 1991, top Japanese leaders visited the Soviet Union only twice apart from funeral visits in the early 1980s—namely, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit during the normalization of negotiations in 1956 and Tanaka Kakuei’s official visit in 1973. The only top Soviet leader to visit Japan was Gorbachev to Tokyo in April 1991, just six months before the collapse of the USSR. These facts signify how limited the mutual relations were and the problems that this caused each nation. This was not only related to the period of the Cold War. Stalin took Japanese militarism seriously, especially after the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The widespread famine of 1932–1933 in the Soviet Union was related to threats from Japan. Stalin regarded the Soviet intervention against Japan in August 1945 as revenge for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. He also viewed the US and USSR partition of Japan and eventual occupation of the “Northern Territories”

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by the USSR as a safeguard against any potential revival of Japanese militarism. The specter of Japanese militarism even became the backdrop of the USSRChinese alliance. On the one hand, this stereotype led to a failure to recognize fully the emergence of Japan as an economic power as a result of the rapid economic growth after 1955. On the other, the failure of Soviet neutrality and arbitration by Stalin at the end of World War II, the Soviet intervention in Asia and eventual occupation of the Northern Territories, as well as the Siberian POW issue, simply pushed Japan into dependence on and an alliance with the United States. Against the backdrop of an intensified Soviet-Chinese conflict and following the shift to a multipolar system of geopolitics in Northeast Asia, Japanese business nonetheless became interested in Siberian energy resources and the region’s development in the latter half of the 1960s. Japan lost some interest in the USSR during the latter half of the 1970s, in particular, due to the stagnation of the Brezhnev regime and the appeal of the drive toward Chinese modernization launched by Deng Xiaoping. Japanese business simply shifted to the Chinese market. Yet the appeal of Soviet and Chinese communism simply decreased as their realities were increasingly revealed. Moreover, the fierce struggle between them had the effect of lessening interest among Japanese progressive intellectuals regarding the idea of Japanese neutrality. SovietJapanese relations were at an impasse. Despite the possibility of moving ahead as a result of the improved mutual perceptions caused by perestroika, both had already lost the dynamic of an improving relationship. Japanese political leaders belatedly acknowledged the chance offered by perestroika but it was already too late. By the time they began to consider the opportunity seriously, there was no longer anything with which to negotiate. Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Buraun, Āchī (Brown, Archie). 2012. Kyōsanshugi no kōbō [The Rise and Fall of Communism]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha. (first published: Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 2009). Edamura Sumio. 1997. Taikoku kaitai zengo. Chū Mosukuva Nihon taishi no kaisō 1990– 1994 [Before and After the Collapse of the Empire—The Reminiscences of Japanese Ambassador to Moscow 1990–1994]. Tokyo: Toshi Shuppan, Tokyo. Gorubachofu, Mihaeru [Gorbachev, Mikhail]. 1996. Gorubachofu kaisōroku [Gorbachev’s Memoirs]. Vol. 2 (First published Mikhaĭl Gorbachev, zhizn′ i reformy, vol. 2, 1995). Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

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Kimura Hiroshi. 2002. Tooi ringoku—Rosia to Nihon [Distant Neighbors—Russia and Japan]. Tokyo: Sekai Shisōsha. Panofu, Arekusandoru (Panov, Aleksandr [Alexander]). 1992. Fushin kara shinraie. Hoppō ryōdo koshō no naimaku [Beyond Distrust to Trust. Inside the Northern Territories Talks with Japan]. Translated by Takahashi Minoru. Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai. Tōgō Kazuhiko. 2007. Hoppō ryōdo kōshō hiroku. Ushinawareta godo no kikai [Secret Records of Negotiations on the Northern Territories: Five Missed Opportunities]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.



Russian Sources



English Sources

Aleksandrov-Agentov, Andreĭ Mikhaĭlovich. 1994. A. M. Aleksandrov Agentov, ot Kollontaya do Gorvacheva [A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, from Kollontai to Gorbachev]. Moscow: Mezhdnarodnye otnosheniya. Brutents, Karen Nersesovich. 2005. Nes’yvsheesya-Neravnodushnye zametki o perestroĭke [The Unfulfilled. Not Indifferent Notes on Perestroika]. Moscow: Mezhdnarodnye otnosheniya. Kapitsa, Mikhail Stepanovich. 1996. Na raznykh parallelyakh. Zapiski diplomata [At Various Parallels. Notes by a Diplomat]. Moscow: A/O Kniga i Buznes. V politbyuro KPSS … -po zapisyam Anatoriya Chernyaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiya Shakhnazarova (1985–1991) [In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. From the Notes of Anatoriya Chernyaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, and Georgiya Shakhnazarova (1985–1991)]. 2006. Moscow: Gorbachev Fond (Foundation).

Radchenko, Sergey. 2007. “Perestroika and Japan: Central and Regional Perspectives.” Paper Presented at the Conference, “Russia as a Regional Power: Its International Status and the Elections in 2007–2008.” Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University, February 22–23, 2007. Rozman, Gilbert. 1992. Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985–1991. A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One. Princeton Legacy Library. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rozman, Gilbert. 2000. Japan and Russia, The Torturous Path to Normalization, 1949– 1999. New York: St. Martins.

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Perestroika and Russian-Japanese Relations, 1985–1991 Konstantin O. Sarkisov The conflict that existed in Russian-Japanese relations since the mid-1990s– excluding the period from 1906 to 1917—and that reached a peak during armed conflicts and wars evolved into “a normal state of affairs” in the postwar period. It was predicated on a “surrogate” peace treaty, the Joint Declaration of 1956. The possibility of navigating the political arena without an official peace treaty and of developing relations in its absence was only ever realized in the case of Germany after World War II. For Japan, the absence of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union remains a problematic element in their bilateral relations, regardless of what some Russian academicians and politicians may believe. Perestroika and the “New Political Thinking” (novoe politicheskoe myshlenie; also seen as novoe myshlenie, or “New Thinking”) in the USSR were the first actual attempts by the Soviet Union (Russia) to achieve a more stable and constructive relationship with Japan through dialogue and a search for solutions rather than political and other types of “coercion” from each side. Although on the surface this appears a reasonable, “civilized” course, its implementation is invariably more difficult when confronted with historical realities. And history itself offered opportunities to effect change. The period analyzed in this essay coincided with an era of reforms of the Soviet system known as perestroika, or “reconstruction,” when changes in every sphere of life of this expansive country also extended to the highly sensitive field of foreign policy. The “New Political Thinking” proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev implied cooperation—not just peaceful coexistence—between the two blocs based on human values that were placed above ideological and class confrontations. Initially, the international community was skeptical about such ideas but thereafter took a more favorable stance, viewing the ideas espoused in “New Political Thinking” as a means to end all that represented the Cold War era. Japan’s reaction was essentially the same, with one fundamental difference. The new ideology was primarily seen through the prism of the territorial dispute regarding the ownership of four Kurile Islands—Shikotan, Habomai, Kunashir, and Iturup. (Japan referred to these as the “Northern Territories” and the Soviet Union as the “Southern Kurile Islands.”) This dispute was at the heart of Japan’s policy toward its neighbor in the late 1950s. A “solution” implied the simultaneous transfer of all four islands to Japan while various time frames

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and terms of that transfer were seen as possible compromises or concessions. Although this type of compromise was unlikely at least in the period from 1985 to 1991, and in the foreseeable future, Japan saw Gorbachev’s rise to power on March 11, 1985, as an opportunity to work toward that goal, even if the chances of success were slim. 1

Ushering in an Era of “New Political Thinking”

The Kremlin administration changed in 1985 and provided a renewed impetus to those inside and around the Soviet leadership who attempted to alter the hardened foreign policy already in place during the Andropov era. Anatoliĭ S. Chernyaev, the future assistant to Gorbachev and the then employee of the International Department of the Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party, wrote in his diary (not intended for publishing, his views are extremely frank): April 11, 1985 … Visited [Georgiĭ A.] Arbatov. He said he stayed in touch with Gorbachev, writing notes, visiting and calling. “Supplied him with forty-one pages” within two weeks … Also said we should show the Americans more often that we could do without them but that [we] needed Western Europe. Added that public statements and initiatives should not be frequent … That peace with the Chinese should be promoted in a more energetic manner. And that two or even four islands should be given to the Japanese, otherwise there will be no deal with them. chernyaev 1985, 31

He later stated on May 5 that “Gorbachev was following the path already beaten by Andreĭ A. Gromyko (and letting go of foreign policy)” (Chernyaev 1985, 31). The “New Political Thinking” did not imply a readiness to shift postwar borders, and Gorbachev clearly conveyed this to Nakasone Yasuhiro at the funeral of Konstantin U. Chernenko, who had died on March 10, 1985: “You, Mr. Prime Minister, know well that our stance on this issue is unwavering” (Asahi shinbun, March 16, 1985). The statement, however, did not discourage Nakasone, who declared Japan’s equally resolute position on the territories. Nakasone did not anticipate more than this, realizing above all that it was a “process,” a term favored by Gorbachev. But it is important to note that Gorbachev was not averse to listening to the opinions and arguments of his Japanese counterparts. Nakasone invited Gorbachev to visit Japan for further in-depth discussions, and while his reaction was equivocal it was generally cordial. In speaking

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of his trip to Moscow in the Japanese parliament, Nakasone underscored the friendly and “human nature” (J: ningensei) of his Russian counterpart, which offered the chance to begin a conversation about the territories for the first time (Asahi shinbun, March 16, 1985). Gorbachev would later recall that episode and his feelings at that moment: The invitation to visit Japan was one of the first I received in the capacity as secretary general of the Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party … An extended period of poring over that subject began, and it appeared to be extremely difficult … I have to say we did not have a wellconceived policy on the Japanese track in the context of “New Political Thinking” at that time … I did not even want to discuss the matter at our first meetings, as I believed the postwar territorial division was final and irreversible. I did not admit the existence of the problem per se. According to the “Gromyko formula,” it was resolved “as a result of the war” and the four islands were rightfully owned by the Soviet Union, which did not have “any spare land” despite its vast size. Alongside the formation of the “new [political] thinking” policy, a closer look into the fundamentals of the case, and influenced by the arguments presented by Japanese politicians who I met increasingly more frequently, however, I had to engage, finally, in the discussion on the “territorial problem.” gorbachev 1995

This did not happen immediately, however. The very ideology of “New Political Thinking” encouraged taking a fresh look at an old problem and an opportunity to launch a new dialogue. The mention of the “Gromyko formula” in the passage above was a veiled critique of “Mr. No,” the nickname given to Gromyko in Japan. The new foreign minister Edward Shevardnadze visited Tokyo in January 1986, only six months after he entered office. It is worth noting that he did not have any clear-cut formula for the islands either, and he preferred to reiterate Gromyko’s stance, albeit in softer terms. Evading a discussion with the Japanese on the territories, Shevardnadze sought instead to focus attention on broader issues, including the elimination of nuclear weapons, agreements on bilateral consultations on political issues, and cultural exchange (Asahi shinbun, January 20, 1986). Nonetheless, elements of this “New Political Thinking” did not go unnoticed. Alexander (Aleksandr) N. Panov, the future Russian ambassador and the then counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Japan who was directly involved in the work of the Soviet delegation, recalled that Shevardnadze exhibited a

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different negotiating style—friendly, constructive, and essentially positive in its approach. Shevardnadze said at a press conference that the Japanese side “has the right to raise any questions, including that about the territories” at the negotiations. Panov admitted that many of the materials prepared for the negotiations in Moscow, in accordance with the old, pre-perestroika clichés, had to be modified during the course of the negotiations. He explained that by saying that “Shevardnadze had yet to grasp the main stumbling block of SovietJapanese relations, such as the territorial issue in all its dimensions, which was only natural—he was a ‘new’ minister.” Still, Shevardnadze understood from the very first contacts with Japanese politicians that the problem had to be taken seriously and that solutions had to be sought (Panofu 1992, 27). Following his return to Moscow, Shevardnadze tried to draw attention to the development of relations with Japan and the need to take a closer look at the territorial problem in his report delivered at a meeting of the Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party Politburo. It received no support, however (Panofu 1992, 28). This period represented the peak in Gorbachev’s struggle against the old conservative forces of the party in the preparation and hosting of the party’s 27th congress from February 25 to March 6, 1986. In his report, Gorbachev observed that “A pivotal point was reached not only in domestic affairs but also in external affairs. Developments in the contemporary world were so profound and significant that they required rethinking, a comprehensive analysis of all factors.” These sentiments might also apply to Japan, and in all probability, this is most likely how the Japanese foreign minister Abe Shintarō interpreted these during his visit to Moscow in June 1986. Abe was tasked with discovering which form of “rethinking” might be the most reliable regarding the territorial issue. Moscow made clear its willingness to be flexible in “related matters” without giving in on the main issue of sovereignty over the islands. Eleven years later, for example, a simplified procedure was introduced that enabled former residents of the four islands to visit family graves. The Soviet Union was ready to develop relations with Japan irrespective of its relations with other countries, implying its acceptance of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The concessions by the Soviet side were real by comparison. The Japanese Foreign Ministry were nevertheless wary of pursuing that path, even though its response was generally favorable. The Japanese Foreign Ministry was afraid, however, that the resolution of issues of “secondary” importance could divert attention from the more significant territorial problem. Meanwhile, following the initial attempts to “open Japan” there was a break in Soviet diplomacy. To an extent, this is explained by the domestic political situation: perestroika was progressing with increasing difficulty as the Soviet Union was struggling with

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its own worsening economic and social circumstances. Added to this was the fact that the tenure of Prime Minister Nakasone was drawing to a close. The inertia of the Cold War era, which remained a framework for bilateral relations, was now unambiguous. Japan’s participation in the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a missile defense system, and the legal action against Toshiba and the Norwegian firm Kongsberg for the delivery of machine tools for precision milling of nuclear submarine propellers in violation of CoCom regulations were factors. All of these factors cooled the enthusiasm of those in Moscow who hoped that the “New Political Thinking” might advance relations with Japan. Prime Minister Nakasone’s cabinet resigned in November 1987, and Takeshita Noboru assumed the prime ministerial office. Different from his predecessor, Takeshita was seen as having little knowledge of foreign policy, and as such, he followed the beaten path and simply replicated old patterns. Nevertheless, he did not miss the opportunity to send former prime minister Nakasone to Moscow on a fact-finding mission to the Kremlin on July 22, 1988. Gorbachev did not conceal his disappointment that, while the relations between the Soviet Union and many other countries had advanced markedly over three years of perestroika, they remained “stalled” in the case of Japan (Izvestiya, July 23, 1988; Panofu 1992, 30). But at the same time, Japanese newspapers noted it was the first time that the secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party did not reiterate the well-worn observation that “the territorial problem does not exist” (Asahi shinbun, February 3, 1988). Together with Gorbachev’s appeal for establishing joint ventures, Japan interpreted this as an expression of readiness to “think about” prospective concessions in the territorial problem in exchange for economic cooperation (Yomiuri shinbun, August 3, 1988). This episode displayed the “wishful” thinking that Japan frequently exhibited in later years. In fact, Moscow ruled out the possibility of transferring any islands and was looking to other means—material rather than moral—that might prompt Tokyo’s active support of the perestroika policy. This was all seen against the backdrop of the deplorable state of the Soviet economy: the fall in oil prices, the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–1989), and the anti-alcohol campaign (1985–1990) overburdened what had already been a highly inefficient Soviet economy. The fact that Japan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) surpassed that of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s had a psychological impact on the Soviet administration. Nakasone again invited Gorbachev to pay a state visit to Japan, and Gorbachev conveyed his gratitude at the gesture but made no promises. It might be conjectured that a trip at this time might have been more successful than later in 1991 at the end of the Gorbachev era. Such a visit was unrealistic

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for a number of reasons, however, most notably because Japan did not conceal its desire to resolve the territorial issue and to treat all other matters as secondary. The rigid linking of bilateral relations to the resolution of the territorial problem described as the “inseparability between politics and economy” was strongly rejected by Moscow, and in addition Tokyo was mostly acting in a forthright, “non-diplomatic” fashion. The then Japanese foreign minister, Uno Sōsuke, told the US president George H. W. Bush in the presence of Takeshita that: “We need four islands to sign a peace treaty with the Soviet Union … The Soviet Union would like to cooperate in Siberia. But we cannot do so until this problem is resolved” (Asahi shinbun, February 3, 1988; Saitō 1993, 285). The thinking that the Soviet Union’s worsening economic condition would make Gorbachev more compliant regarding the territorial issue was fundamentally flawed. In fact, it was quite the opposite. The deepening economic problems of perestroika undermined the political position and authority of its architect (Gorbachev) and rendered even the slightest territorial concessions impossible. Tokyo failed to notice, or noticed too late, that moment when perestroika crossed the “red line” and headed toward collapse. With the deterioration of the country any chance of territorial concessions by Gorbachev was in effect delusory. Nevertheless, Japan continued to pin high hopes on Gorbachev’s visit, and Moscow, too, believed that the visit would be useful even if the results were modest. Both sides began to concur on what should be the intent of the Soviet president’s upcoming visit to Tokyo only during Shevardnadze’s second visit to Japan on December 18–21, 1988. It was at this time that each side agreed to start preparations for the visit and to form a working group of deputy foreign ministers to discuss the peace treaty, including the territorial problem. The Soviet Union was satisfied with the outcome of the trip, as during Gorbachev’s visit Tokyo agreed to prepare for signing documents on environmental protection, as well as cooperation regarding the peaceful uses of outer space, economic principles, tourism, and the opening of bank offices in the two countries (Panofu 1992, 33). It was, however, too early to celebrate. Contacts maintained at the top diplomatic level, such as the Paris meeting with Uno on January 8, 1989, proved that the close link between the territorial problem and all outstanding issues remained at the core of Japanese policy. Seen from that angle, Uno’s visit to Moscow on April 30–May 5, 1989, was counterproductive. Gorbachev went to Beijing ten days after Uno’s meeting. The path of “New Political Thinking” was being stalled on the Japanese side but it yielded productive results with other countries, including China. The year 1989 was crucial. Soviet troops left Afghanistan in the spring, and forces were being withdrawn from Mongolia. Under Soviet pressure, Vietnam declared a willingness to

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withdraw from Cambodia, and the numbers of Soviet forces stationed near the Chinese border were scaled back. Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in May 1999 and his contacts with Deng Xiaoping ended a phase of severe confrontation between the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese presence, which was weakening the Soviet Union’s position in the region throughout the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s, became more or less neutral and at one point extremely promising. These changes did not pass unnoticed by Japan’s Foreign Ministry. The policy, which strongly tied politics to the economy, began to exhibit signs of strain. Debates inside the Japanese Foreign Ministry generated the theory of “Expanding Equilibrium” (J: kakudai kinkō). The strategic goal—the four islands—was intact but how that would be achieved changed. Judging from comments made later in the Japanese press, the architect of this idea was the then head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Soviet affairs department, Tōgō Kazuhiko (Mainichi shinbun, August 11, 1990). Uno first presented the concept of “Expanding Equilibrium” to Moscow in early May 1989. It did not have the desired impact, either because the concept was still being formulated or because of the negative attitude toward Uno, who was associated with Japan’s ultimatum-like demands (Panofu 1992, 34). Furthermore, Gorbachev asked Uno to convey to the Japanese administration his proposal of delaying the visit, with a resumption of discussions about a possible rescheduled date in early 1990. 2

The Quest for a Formula of Territorial Resolution

Moscow was unhappy with the impasse. But it was also searching for a way out, hoping that half-measures might work and that it might be conceivable to pretend that the territorial problem could be resolved at some point without the promise of transferring territory to Japan. The term “Northern Territories Problem” (J: hoppō ryōdo mondai; R: territorial′naya problema), which implied the need for concessions, was replaced with the softer phrasing of “border delimitation” (J: kokkyo kakutei mondai; R: pogranichnoe razmezevanie). The Soviet delegation head, Deputy Foreign Minister Igor A. Rogachev, formulated that position in March 1989 before Uno’s visit to Moscow during meetings of the bilateral working group at the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s mansion located near the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. The idea of resolving the territorial dispute based on the terms of the 1956 Declaration, in other words, the transfer of two of the Kurile islands (Habomai and Shikotan) to Japan, was still suggested behind the scenes. Rogachev hinted at another potential scenario—that is, the

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possibility of delaying the resolution of this issue “until better days”—and moreover that the Japan-China dispute over the Senkaku (C: Daioyu) Islands set a precedent. The Japanese Foreign Ministry declined all three scenarios, seeing the first two (a vague allusion to the resolution of the problem and a solution based on the 1956 Joint Declaration) as a “slick trick” hoping to upend the strong stance about the simultaneous return of all four islands and the third as inappropriate due to fundamental differences within a historical context (Asahi shinbun, April 29, 1989). The visit of the head of a Soviet Supreme Council delegation, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, to Japan in November 1989 attempted to break the tough standpoint of the Japanese. The thinking was simple: whenever positions are conflictive, the pursuit of “a third way” was wiser. In this light, one might recall the Japanese character trait of “wishful thinking” mentioned above in assessing the significance of Yakovlev’s visit. Japanese newspapers interpreted it as a positive sign—in other words, it was noteworthy that Gorbachev’s closest associate in the construction of a new architecture of relations was able to “squeeze in a visit to Tokyo” before the preparations for the Malta Summit on December 2–3, 1989, which would determine the future of East European countries (Asahi shinbun, November 14, 1989). Yakovlev’s arrival in Tokyo was also viewed as symbolizing change in the Soviet stance. On the whole, Japan was willing to exaggerate the significance of any Soviet move, even the most mundane, as noted by Chernyaev in his diary: July 12, 1991. Friday … Ambassador Edamura [Sumio], accompanied by a special envoy from Kaifu, visited M. S. [Mikhail Sergeevich (Gorbachev)] yesterday. Those Japanese are real sticklers for detail: for us, these meetings are petty things—whether someone is received depends on the mood, “on me” [the assistant], and on probabilities, and for them, it’s either development or decline in interstate relations! chernyaev 1991, 51

Yakovlev’s visit did not clarify the Soviet position about the territorial dispute, and he was inundated with demands to return the islands. According to Panov, the phrase “Northern Territories” (hoppō ryōdo) was used more than fifty times in various combinations in the conversation between Yakovlev and a prominent Japanese politician (Panofu 1992, 36). Yakovlev repeated that any territorial or other concessions required the appropriate setting—first and foremost one of economic cooperation—and that the Japanese response was reminiscent of a scene from the popular comic Russian novel, Utrom den′gi—vecherom stul′ya (Money in the Morning, Chairs in the Evening), about a con man

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attempting to secure chairs first and pay later and a seller requiring money first then promising the chairs later. The changes in global geopolitics starkly contrasted the stagnation in SovietJapanese relations at this time. The Supreme Council delegation was visiting Japan against the backdrop of the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the meeting of the Soviet and US presidents in Malta in December, signaled the end of the Cold War. This caused mixed feelings in Tokyo, since the West had begun to build a new relationship with Gorbachev as a token of appreciation of his efforts, particularly regarding the unification of Germany. The “soft landing” of the Soviet regime, in which few had faith only a year earlier, was becoming a reality. Still, its ultimate success required enormous economic and moral support for Gorbachev. Tokyo feared that, because of its special relationship with the United States, Japan would be drawn into that support process without receiving the territories as compensation. The Japanese Foreign Ministry consoled itself with the possibility that Japan and the United States might not see eye-to-eye on economic assistance to the Soviet Union (Asahi shinbun, December 4, 1989). Tokyo brought its concerns to Washington’s attention. It seems that US secretary of state James A. Baker and Japanese foreign minister Nakayama Tarō made a purely diplomatic decision at their meeting on December 14, 1989, to keep on raising the territorial issue during negotiations with Gorbachev. It was agreed not to pressure him so as not to undermine his position and jeopardize his policy of a “soft landing” for the Soviet regime (Asahi shinbun, December 15, 1989). In actual fact, the US backing had little influence on the territorial issue. Support to Gorbachev became the centerpiece of the American policy the following year, in 1990, when the future of Germany and the Middle East (Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, which led to the Gulf War in January 1991) was being determined. The US declarations of solidarity with the Japanese territorial claims were more than anything just political gesturing and therefore had little chance of developing into any form of concrete political pressure. The territorial issue was included in the G7 statement released in Houston on July 9–11, 1990, but this too had no impact on Moscow, except as cause of irritation to the Kremlin. Ultimately, President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State Baker gave Gorbachev assurances of full US support of his policy at the Soviet-US summit in Helsinki in September 1990 (Chernyaev 1990, 39). Although very ill at this point, Abe Shintarō re-entered the stage in the hope of regaining a top position (he died in May 1991). He visited Moscow in January 1990 in order to meet with Gorbachev. The Soviet leader, who had canceled a series of meetings with other foreign leaders under the pretext of being busy

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with domestic affairs, received the Japanese politician. Japanese newspapers maintained that the economic situation in the Soviet Union was allegedly so bad that Gorbachev decided to meet with the former foreign minister in the hope that Japan would contribute to the economic assistance coming from the West (Asahi shinbun, January 6, 1990). Yet Chernyaev offered a more banal explanation for this in his diary: January 6, 1990 … at my initiative [Gorbachev] had already canceled all January meetings before New Year’s Eve … All of a sudden [Valentin Mikhaĭlovich] Falin told me yesterday morning that he had received a call [from Gorbachev] when in his [government] car, ordering [him] to prepare a meeting with Abe on January 15. (I quickly realized that the idea was coming from Yakovlev, who had recently visited Japan.) I wrote a note for M. S. to ask if he knew what he was doing; what will the others you have declined to meet think? I pressed the subject again when he called in the evening. “Come on, Tolya, he needs twenty minutes before television. By the way, you were right about the ‘source’” (a laugh). chernyaev 1990, 5

Chernyaev’s cynical recollections were not always fair. Gorbachev was clearly interested in what Abe could offer. Abe suggested an “Eight-point Program” covering relations in the spheres of economy, science, technology, humanitarian exchange, vocational training, exhibitions, and humanitarian affairs. The proposal of sharing Japanese business and industrial management practices for the purposes of higher labor productivity and quality control was particularly attractive. This pleased Gorbachev since it was the first experience of the fruits of “Expanding Equilibrium” (Panofu 1992, 38, 39). As Chernyaev remarked: January 21, 1990 … M. S. met with Abe on January 15 … Transparent hints at the possibility of resolving “difficult problems” (the islands). All of Japan is buzzing and speculating. M. S. told me afterward, “They will have to be disappointed with Gorbachev.” chernyaev 1990, 5

Abe did not know—or did not wish to know—Gorbachev’s reaction. He used his relations with Gorbachev and progress on the territorial issue as a trump card in the political struggle against the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions, the Kochikai (Ikeda Hayato’s former faction) and the

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Keiseikai (Takeshita Noboru’s faction following Tanaka’s withdrawal). He could have counted on victory had it not been for the severe illness that prevented another visit to Moscow. Abe had planned his trip on September 20–26, 1990, taking advantage of the city’s hosting of the festival “Days of Japanese Culture.” His meeting with Shevardnadze was scheduled for September 21, and a meeting with Gorbachev on September 24. All was in place, including an unprecedented escort of sixty-one Japanese parliamentarians from all factions of the ruling party, and the excitement was clearly palpable (Yomiuri shinbun, September 16, 1990). Three days before his departure, however, Abe was forced to cancel due to “doctor’s orders.” It must be noted that even if that trip had occurred it would have changed little. By then, Gorbachev was convinced that Japan’s only interest was in the Kurile Islands, and whatever the efforts of Abe and his supporters they would make little sense. His feelings, however, were not entirely unjustified. On July 21, 1990, in the wake of Japanese press reports, Soviet newspapers quoted Foreign Minister Nakayama as telling businessmen in Nagoya, “Financial assistance given to the USSR now would be like throwing good money after bad” (Panofu 1992, 37, 38). 3

The Year before Tokyo

At home, Gorbachev faced a new crisis of power in July 1990. The Soviet Communist Party was falling apart under the influence of perestroika. At the final 26th party congress on July 2–13, 1990, the conservatives now constituted a minority. The “democrats,” represented by Boris Yeltsin and his followers, wanted nothing to do with the party, and they announced their withdrawal at the congress. Although Gorbachev was re-elected secretary general, he lost his leverage in controlling the party, and speakers at party plenary meetings demanded that he step down. Parties in the republics declared their independence, and some members of Gorbachev’s inner circle (Yakovlev and Shevardnadze) were promoting an alternate party. Against this backdrop, Gorbachev met with Sakurauchi Yoshio, the speaker of Japan’s lower parliamentary chamber, on July 25, 1990. In their commentaries on the two men’s thirty-minute conversation Japanese newspapers reported that Gorbachev had categorically stated that “a territorial problem between the Soviet Union and Japan was absent” and that the postwar borders were inviolable (Yomiuri shinbun, September 16, 1990). This contradicts Panov’s recollections in his memoirs: “The manner in which Yoshio Sakurauchi tried to conduct the conversation with Gorbachev on July 25, 1990, was not the best;

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it centered solely on the territorial problem” (Panov, 42, 43). Chernyaev was even more frank about Gorbachev’s sentiments following the meeting with the Japanese parliamentarian: July 29, 1990. It was a hard week. Gorbachev met with Japan’s Sakurauchi and became angry. He said he would not go to Japan for a visit if all they wanted to talk about was the islands. chernyaev 1990, 33

The meeting with Ikeda Daisaku, the leader of the Buddhist religious movement Sōka Gakkai (“Value-Creating Society”), “alleviated the negative impression [on Gorbachev] from the conversation with Sakurauchi.” Chernyaev wrote: July 29, 1990 … An interesting individual [Ikeda]. He kept patting Gorbachev on the shoulder and sporadically shouted something in Japanese to express his admiration of the great personality. That inspired Gorbachev. He began to philosophize and again “went too far.” chernyaev 1990, 33

Preparations for the visit began in September 1990, despite any misgivings and despite domestic and foreign crises such as the declaration by certain Soviet republics of their readiness to secede from the Soviet Union, together with Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait on August 2. Shevardnadze’s visit to Japan in September 1990, when it was decided to host President Gorbachev there in the spring of 1991, served as a prelude. But in actual fact the preparations for the trip had been in the pipeline since 1988, the date of the establishment of a joint permanent group on a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The group had held seven meetings by this time to discuss every aspect of the peace treaty, whose core issue was, not surprisingly, territorial delimitation. The resolution of the territorial problem required a profound psychological readiness on the part of the inhabitants in both countries and an awareness of the real history of the territorial issue based on facts rather than damaging stereotypes formed by Cold War ideology and policy. Initiated by Panov, the Soviet Foreign Ministry therefore proposed to release a joint collection of documents pertaining to the history of territorial delimitation between the two countries. It was important for the Soviet people, who believed all the Kurile Islands were their “native land,” to learn “about the initial division of the Kurile Islands and that the four islands were recognized by Russian side as Japanese

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territory” (Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation Between Japan and Russia, signed at Shimoda on January 26 [February 7], 1855), which led to the peaceful exchange of the Kurile Islands for Sakhalin, and other historical facts. It was equally important for the Japanese to learn about a later phase in history, including the behavior of the US president Franklin D. Roosevelt in Yalta, and the vicissitudes of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and so on. Moscow was the first to set an example of a willingness to publish materials that did not necessarily cast it in a favorable light. An article by this author and Kirill E. Cherevko, published in the Izvestiya newspaper on October 4, 1990, presented a draft of the additional directive from Evfimiĭ V. Putyatin approved by Emperor Nicholas I on February 27, 1853, for negotiations on a treaty with Japan. The Soviet Foreign Ministry provided the document for that article, which demonstrated that Russia believed that a border through the strait between the Kurile islands Urup and Iturup was fair (AVP RI 1853, f. 296). This was not the only article dedicated to the territorial problem. The discussion of whether or not to give the islands away had been a topic in the Soviet press for some time. Opinions were conflictive, ranging from the conservative (“there is no territorial problem whatsoever”) to the radical proposals of transferring the four islands to Japan without further debate. In fact, there were three principal schools of thought. The first insisted on “giving away nothing” and refused to consider the very idea of negotiations. The second called for compromise while the third proposed to give away the islands. Many followers in the third camp said that the islands could be sold since the country was badly in need of money. The position that supported giving up four islands or selling them to Japan triggered a nationalistic outburst, and the number of those who were against any discussions about islands increased. Boris Yeltsin’s views on the Kurile islands greatly influenced the Soviet left wing and liberals. He suggested a “Five-Stage Solution Plan” for the resolution of the problem during a trip to Japan on January 16, 1990. He acknowledged the existence of the territorial problem and the fact that its resolution was “unavoidable” (Stage 1), proposed free economic activity for Japanese enterprises (Stage 2), and the demilitarization of islands (Stage 3). Stage 4 of the plan, which was slated to occur over a period of fifteen to twenty years, recommended the signing of a peace treaty, while Stage 5 was intended to ensure a practical solution. Yeltsin maintained that it would be difficult to predict the outcome, and for the Japanese press this did not rule out the return of all four islands (Asahi shinbun, January 17, 1990). The reaction of the Japanese Foreign Ministry was nonetheless measured, and sources from the Japanese Foreign Ministry said that Yeltsin’s proposal contained “nothing new and that his plan was the same as an old idea of shelving a solution” (Asahi shinbun, January 17, 1990).

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Having studied “a dossier” on Yeltsin’s conduct in Japan, Chernyaev conceded Yeltsin’s ability to create an attractive concept without yielding on the main point of the territories: January 21, 1990. [Yeltsin] put forward a reasonable plan (unfortunately, his entire “lecture” scored a bull’s-eye …). chernyaev 1990, 5

Yeltsin visited the Kurile Islands in his capacity as the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in August 1990. There he responded to the criticism of his “Five-Stage Solution Plan” by the local population, “The Kuriles should be ours, at least in the foreseeable future. This problem will be resolved in the future, in approximately twenty to thirty years, when international relations undergo a drastic change and a new generation of politicians arrives. One should not guess how” (Gudok, August 24, 1990). He delivered Gorbachev an ultimatum in December 1990: “You should either coordinate all this [the territorial issue] with us in advance or we will notify the Japanese administration that we cannot recognize agreements concerning the territory of Russia, a sovereign state” (Moskovskie novosti, December 2, 1990). There was also a polarization within Japan about how to resolve the territorial problem, although the situation was not as drastic as in the Soviet Union. For example, a number of prominent political scientists and politicians advocated abandoning the firm conservative formula of “all four and at once.” Some even dared to say that “two islands” would be enough. The political heavyweight and Liberal Democratic Party co-leader Kanemaru Shin belonged to the latter camp (Panofu 1992, 71). But the overwhelming majority in Japan supported the conservative approach while in the Soviet Union a liberal approach prevailed. Japanese conservatives remained flexible about when the islands should be transferred but were intransigent regarding the number—that is, the Soviet Union must recognize that the four islands, Shikotan, Habomai, Kunashir (Kunashiri), and Iturup (Etorofu), are Japanese. Their “return” could, however, be a phased process. Diplomats in both countries made commendable efforts to reconcile the situation, and such diplomatic cooperation was paramount because of Gorbachev’s approaching visit. The conditions of the visit and the circumstances surrounding it became increasingly complicated, which diminished the chances of reaching a mutually acceptable decision on the territorial issue. Arrangements for the visit continued, nonetheless, and the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the International Department of the Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party, and a number of other agencies were tasked to prepare their

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proposals on the visit concept. The Foreign Ministry proposed two possible scenarios (Panofu 1992). The first recommended searching for a compromise based on the 1956 Joint Declaration. The second did not envisage the conclusion of a peace treaty but instead emphasized new aspects that might bring the two sides closer to a potential compromise. The Soviet Union admitted the existence of the territorial problem and for the first time proposed to record that the root of the issue lay in the different opinions of the two sides regarding the sovereignty over the four islands—this was something that had not appeared in the 1956 Joint Declaration. Significantly, a list of all “disputable islands” had to date never been presented in a Soviet-Japanese document. Moreover, there was a declaration of the willingness to take a number of unilateral steps: to reduce the Soviet military contingent stationed on the Southern Kuriles, to enact a liberalized, visa-free travel regime for Japanese citizens visiting the islands, to broaden contacts between the population of adjoining regions of Hokkaido and the Southern Kuriles, and to begin mutually advantageous economic activity in that area. All these proposals were included in the text of a joint statement signed at the end of the visit. The recommendations were submitted to the Gorbachev administration in January 1991. Chernyaev described Gorbachev’s attitude in early 1991: January 7, 1991 … M. S. no longer looks into anything related to foreign policy. He is busy with “structures” and “petty things”—talking to those imposed on him, Brongman [Edgar Miles Bronfman, president of the World Jewish Congress], Japanese parliamentarians, and others. He is not preparing for anything. Keeps saying the same thing a dozen times. chernyaev 1991, 3

4

The Final Preparations before the Visit

The bloody events of January 11–13 in Lithuania, following its declaration of independence the previous year when civilians were killed and injured by Soviet troops, quickly sobered Gorbachev and those around him. It was within this climate that the new Foreign Minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, who took over from Shevardnadze after the latter had quite dramatically left his post at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with Foreign Minister Nakayama on January 16, the day after he (Bessmertnykh) assumed office. Bessmertnykh was thrown into the discussions, and the commission preparing the Soviet president’s visit to Japan, led by Soviet vice president Gennadiĭ I. Yanaev, was already at work in January.

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The commission was set up in early November 1990 with Yakovlev as its chair. It was tasked to address trade and economic relations with Japan and to identify promising areas of cooperation for which agreements could be signed before or during the Soviet president’s Japan visit. The very first meeting of the commission once again made it clear, however, that any discussion of extensive economic cooperation projects with Japan would be irrelevant without spelling out the position on the territorial issue. The makeup of the commission changed under Yanaev’s helm, focusing instead on two interrelated issues: the stance on the territorial problem to be taken at Tokyo negotiations and the prospects of Japanese economic support to the economic reforms in the Soviet Union. In late January, the newspaper Vechernyaya Moskva published an article by the Russian businessman and political activist Artem M. Tarasov alleging that Gorbachev had sold the islands to Japan for USD 250 billion (Vechernyaya Moskva, January 30, 1991). It was a blatant attempt by Gorbachev’s opponents to “stab him in the back” (Panofu 1992, 90–92). Yet Gorbachev appears to have decided that nothing should be given away and did not react to the allegation. Despite the degenerating situation in the Soviet Union, it did not occur to Gorbachev to cancel or postpone the Japanese trip. Instead, the president scheduled a conference for after March 20 to discuss the purpose of his Japanese visit and what standpoint should be presented at the peace treaty negotiations. The conference was attended by Vice President Yanaev; Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh; head of the Soviet presidential administration, Valeriĭ I. Boldin; Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party Politburo member and head of the Committee’s international affairs department, Falin; and the presidential advisors and aides Yakovlev, Chernyaev, and others. Opinions were said to differ. Some advocated the first scenario suggested by the Soviet Foreign Ministry that a solution should be based on the formula of the 1956 Joint Declaration. The opinions set forth at this time would not determine the course of discussion, however, since another factor at play was the complicated domestic political situation in the Soviet Union. Notably, the KGB chairman Vladimir A. Kryuchkov, Defense Minister Dmitriĭ T. Yazov, and their deputies, who had made their positions on the matter of the islands absolutely clear on a number of occasions, did not attend the conference (Panofu 1992, 97). Gorbachev did not wish to assume responsibility under these circumstances, as Chernyaev observed: March 20, 1991 … Fiddling about a program of Gorbachev’s visit to Japan … There is still no “concept” for this visit: whether or not to give away the islands. We should not even bother going there without a “concept.” - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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March 24, 1991 … The Foreign Ministry proposed to revive the 1956 formula. Having studied multiple analyses and as a result of brainstorming at research institutes, I said that I concluded that we would have to give away the islands nonetheless. The only question is when and how. Yeltsin will do it if you don’t. He will become the Russian president and will give them away with the accompaniment of Russian people’s applause … M. S. answered, “I would be very glad to pass on this mission to Yeltsin.” He kept on talking, lecturing, but decided not to give away the islands; he was inclined to stall the matter with elegant words and to promise “a process”—[then] a fashionable term for his “theory of compromises”… chernyaev 1991, 27, 28

Ozawa Ichirō, then secretary general of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, arrived in Moscow later the same day. He knew nothing about Gorbachev’s decision “not to give away the islands.” Though worn out by the political storms raging up until that point, Ozawa nonetheless retained influence in Japanese political circles; he remained active for a length of time, believing quite sensibly that any steps would be senseless until there was a real chance for success. Now, however, he felt that the moment had come to restore his embattled position. And clearly Ozawa’s hopes were not ill-founded. He initiated unofficial contacts in the autumn of 1990, and Arkadiĭ I. Vol’skiĭ, then chairman of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, was his Soviet counterpart. Ozawa’s messenger, Kumagai Hiroshi, secretary general of the Takeshita faction, visited Moscow twice, in January and in mid-March, for secret negotiations (Yomiuri shinbun, March 17, 1991). Already on March 21, the Yomiuri shinbun published a surprisingly detailed list of projects Ozawa was planning to present to Gorbachev. The assistance program on offer was valued at USD 28 billion and included the construction of a machine-building plant in Bryansk, a petrochemical enterprise in Tobolsk, oil and gas extraction projects on the Sakhalin shelf, as well as a number of smaller-scale projects. In an interview with the Yomiuri shinbun “a source from the Soviet government” revealed that the assistance program would be the central item on the agenda of the Gorbachev–Ozawa meeting (Yomiuri shinbun, March 17, 1991). Seeking to calm suspicions of “selling out” the islands, Ozawa came to Moscow with a plan of the phased return of the islands under a “Two-Plus-Two” (J: ni purasu ni) formula. The day before his departure, on March 23, he met with Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki and, according to newspaper reports, agreed to offer extensive economic aid in exchange for the Soviet leader’s promise to give back the islands: “It does not have to be all at once” (Asahi shinbun, March 24, 1991). Moreover, a number of Japanese media sources, including the - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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newspapers Asahi shinbun and Yomiuri shinbun, about Ozawa’s plan created the impression that he was not certain of success in Moscow. The Japanese politician continually reiterated that his primary mission was a frank conversation with Gorbachev in an effort to understand what the Soviet leader might propose the following month in Tokyo. Generally speaking, this somewhat adventurist plan had an element of self-advertisement and of scoring points within the Liberal Democratic Party and domestic political affairs (Yomiuri shinbun, March 17, 1991). Tokyo suspected that Gorbachev was desperate for urgent economic assistance and was ready to make certain political moves in that direction. For example, the Security Council in Moscow discussed the country’s food shortages, the supplies of which were lower than the average six million tons of bread required. This resulted in long lines at city stores: March 31 … There are lines in Moscow, other cities, similar to the “sausage” lines two years ago. There could be hunger by June unless we find something … Scraped the bottom of the barrel to get hard currency and loans and to buy abroad. But we are no longer solvent. No one gives us loans: there is hope for Roh Tae-woo (M. S. agreed to make a stopover on the Jeju Island on his way back from Japan and to discuss a USD 3 billion loan with the South Korean president) … There is also hope for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait seems to be declining, although Faisal promised; thanked M. S. for support against Iraq. chernyaev 1991, 30

Japan was not on this list, a sign that the Soviet Union pinned no hopes of receiving aid from the Japanese. Ozawa was naïve to think that his tactics would yield promising results, yet he was attentive to Gorbachev’s lengthy and thoughtful speech at the meeting in the Kremlin on March 25. Gorbachev himself described the conversation with Ozawa: I told Ozawa that my renewed position was as such: let’s cooperate, let’s search for ways to develop our relations, let’s discuss all issues. We will continue the work on the peace treaty; anyway, we have good will for that. We would like to, but as yet we have been unable to meet each other halfway. Yet we should do so in order to achieve a new level of cooperation that will create a new situation. Ozawa was not original; he kept repeating what I had already heard from Japanese officials … So, I started to repeat my arguments as well … gorbachev 1995

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The meeting ended here to Ozawa’s great disappointment since he had understood that the purpose of his visit would not simply be a discussion but rather an in-depth “face-to-face” talk. Afterward, he sought another meeting through his private channels, the businessman and senior aide to Gorbachev, Vol′skiĭ, and Yanaev: It seemed to me that Ozawa realized that I could not and would not say anything further. But they told me in the evening that he was insisting on another meeting. I was surprised and did not like that, the situation obviously unprecedented. Still, I decided that I would not “offend” that official, once again in order to prevent misunderstandings in the process that I deemed to be the beginning of an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations … I understood from the second conversation that the Japanese would place me under great pressure during the visit … gorbachev 1995

Chernyaev commented on the same episode in a simple, brief notation: March 29. Friday … Ozawa paid a visit … M. S. “gave him nothing” and promised him nothing. Why go there at all? Nothing will happen. It is not that we won’t get a billion for the islands. We will not even be able to spend the funds. Nothing fits! … chernyaev 1991, 9

In fact, something did “fit” and in that regard Gorbachev’s visit to Japan might be described as one step on the long road toward the signing of a peace treaty. His successors, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, scrutinized his experience in great depth. Putin did what Gorbachev dare not do and though in a somewhat vaguer form Yeltsin had accomplished a recognition of the 1956 Joint Declaration and proposed to have negotiations based on it. 5

Halfway Results

The visit of the Soviet president on April 13–16, 1991, did not result in any breakthroughs but it could be seen as historic for a number of reasons. Gorbachev achieved what was later ascribed to Yeltsin, most notably: – recognition of the territorial problem as real rather than “far-fetched”; – determination of geographic limits of the disputable territory, listing all four Kurile islands in question;

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– agreement that the resolution of that dispute was a condition for signing a peace treaty; – declaration of the loss of meaning of the UN Charter’s provision on “former hostile states”; the Soviet Union was the first of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to insert that provision in an official document. Elements of the “New Political Thinking” should also be included since these were applied to Japan and formalized by official documents: – the readiness to sign a peace treaty with Japan irrespective of the USJapanese Security Treaty, which indirectly disavowed the 1960 memo of the Soviet government to the Japanese government; – the absence of intentions by the Soviet Union to do anything detrimental to Japan’s relations with its friends and allies (Shevardnadze, December 20, 1988); recognition of the special relations between Japan and the United States, as well as the statement that solid Japanese-US relations, which did not target third countries, were a stabilizing factor in regional and global politics; – the end of the criticism of a “revival of Japanese militarism” and acknowledgment of the defensive nature of Japanese military development; – confidence-building measures in the military field through an active promotion of cooperation between the defense agencies of the two countries; – cooperation in solving topical international problems (the joint SovietJapanese statement made in connection of the Gulf events in September 1990). Bibliography

Russian Sources



Japanese Source

AVP RI (Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki rossiĭskoĭ imperii) [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Empire]. 1853. f. 296, op. 1, d. 75a, l. 138–58. February 27. Chernyaev, Anatoliĭ. 2003. Dnevniki. Proyekt. Sovetskaya politika 1972–1991—vzglyad iznutri [Dairies. Project. Soviet Policy—Insider View]. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu// rus/Chernyaev.html. Gorbachev, Mikhail. 1995. Yaponiya. Ofitsial′nyĭ vizit prezidenta SSSR. Zhizn′ i [Japan. Official Visit of the Soviet President. Life and Reforms]. Vol. 2, ch. 26. Moscow: News. http://www.gorby.ru/Gorbachev/zhizn_i_reformy2/.

Panofu, Arekusandoru (Panov, Aleksandr [Alexander]). 1992. Fushin kara shinraie. Hoppō ryōdo koshō no naimaku [Beyond Distrust to Trust. Inside the Northern

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Territories Talks with Japan]. Translated by Takahashi Minoru. Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai.



English Sources

Rozman, Gilbert. 1992. Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985–1991. A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One. Princeton Legacy Library. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Saitō Motohide. 1993. “Japan’s ‘Northward’ Foreign Policy.” In Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change, edited by Gerald L. Curtis, 274–302. Studies of the East Asian Institute. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

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part 12

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From the Tokyo Declaration to the Irkutsk Statement, 1991 to 2001 Tōgō Kazuhiko The 1990s marked a fundamental turning point in post-Cold War history. The Cold War was a “war” between the United States and the Soviet Union—between capitalist and socialist doctrines—that the United States won decisively. As Francis Fukuyama signaled in his The End of the History and the Last Man, systemic competition ended at this time, and Western values based on democracy and a market mechanism became the guiding principles in the new world order (Fukuyama 1992). The Soviet Union, which ended the Cold War through its own internal disintegration, embarked on a new path with only half of its population and three quarters of its territory still intact. It was suffering from a fatal loss of systems and values, and the profound shock experienced by the Soviet Union was difficult for outside observers to comprehend. Mikhail Gorbachev initiated change, Boris Yeltsin then became the first Russian leader in the post-Cold War era, and Putin succeeded him in the 21st century. Japan, having pursued the path of a “rich and peaceful country,” had become an economic behemoth at this time, even threatening the United States at the close of the Cold War. But following the Cold War it witnessed the collapse of the bubble economy, experienced unsuccessful political reform, failed to meet demographic changes adequately, and lost the trust of the United States as the result of its continuing pacifism. In short, for Japan the 1990s was a decade when the country was more adrift than victorious, symbolized as it were by the appointment of no fewer than seven prime ministers. Under these circumstances, how did Japanese-Russian relations proceed in the 1990s? Initially the relationship went through an unprecedented era of rapprochement, reflecting the success of Western values, yet the two countries could neither resolve their territorial issues nor achieve a fundamental improvement of bilateral relations. The first section of this essay analyzes the period from December 1991 to 1993; the second deals with the years 1994–1996, an era when Russia was primarily focused on domestic politics, and at this time Japanese-Russian relations were fairly stable. There was a temporary lull in negotiations but relations revitalized during Boris Yeltsin’s second presidency in 1997. Russia gradually regained domestic stability yet it was deeply offended by the eastward expansion of NATO, and this ignited Russia’s renewed interest in Japan. In the intervening

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period, Japan slowly recovered from the explosion of the bubble economy. It gradually improved its relations with the United States but, now faced with the new phenomenon of the rise of China, Japan seriously began to seek Russia’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. The third section in this study analyzes the years from 1997 to 1999, the so-called “Hashimoto-Yeltsin Era.” The spirit created during this period was maintained during the next phase of bilateral relations and resulted in the Mori-Putin Irkutsk Statement of March 2001. The fourth section examines the period from 2000 to March 2001. 1

The First Negotiations with the Russian Federation: December 1991 to 1993

1.1 Japanese-Soviet Relations under President Gorbachev In order to understand the initial period following the establishment of the Russian Federation, there are three points worth noting regarding Soviet-Japan relations during President Gorbachev’s tenure. First, given the importance of Japanese-Russian relations for both countries, Gorbachev’s visit to Japan was belated. By the time that Gorbachev finally came to Japan in April 1991, the attacks by the conservatives, who insisted on the preservation of the Union of Soviet Republics, and the reformist forces, who were highly critical of the Communist Party dictatorship, had considerably weakened his domestic power base. Second, despite his weak political position, Gorbachev established an important negotiation framework for a future bilateral relationship. In the communiqué adopted during his Japan visit, he acknowledged that Kunashiri (Kunashir) and Etorofu (Iturup) were objects of negotiation and that it was necessary to resolve the question of these islands in order to conclude a peace treaty. He did not acknowledge the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration, however, which determined the fate of Habomai and Shikotan. The Kunashiri-Etorofu and Habomai-Shikotan issues constituted the framework for negotiations with the Russian Federation from that moment onward. Third, four months after his trip to Japan, on August 19, a conservative coup d’état took place that lasted only three days, yet it was the prelude to one of the most dramatic periods in Japanese-Russian relations. In the autumn of 1991, responding to an earnest plea by the newly emerging Russian Federation to improve the two nations’ mutual relations, the Japanese government quickly undertook three policy initiatives. At the end of September Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō presented Japan’s “Five Principles to Govern Japanese-Soviet/ Russian Relations” (Nakayama gogensoku) at the United Nations General

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Assembly. Subsequently, in early October, the Japanese government established a new policy of reform assistance of USD 2.5 billion that consisted of a Japan Export-Import Bank (JEXIM) loan and government-guaranteed Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) export insurance. During his October visit to Moscow, Nakayama made the first concessionary proposal ever on the Northern Territories: “If the sovereignty of the four islands is confirmed, Japan agrees to deal flexibly with the timing, modality, and condition of the transfer of these islands” (Tōgō 2011, 209). The expectation of enhanced negotiations surfaced, but on December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned from the presidency, and the Russian Federation succeeded the Soviet Union. Yeltsin now assumed the presidential post. 1.2 Negotiations Regarding the Russian Confidential Proposal of 1992 From early 1992 onward, the two countries were looking at a genuine window of opportunity for negotiations, especially compared to 1956 when the balance of power between the Soviet Union and Japan had overwhelmingly been in favor of the Soviet Union. The latter had not only been a victor in World War II but also one of the two superpowers in the post-WW II era. As one of the countries defeated in World War II, Japan lost practically everything it had accumulated since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. For the triumphant Soviet Union an agreement on the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan would have been concession enough but Japan would not agree to these terms. There are perhaps three reasons for this: 1) Japan’s deep-seated anger about the treacherous actions by the Soviets in the summer of 1945; 2) domestic politics within the two major conservative parties that did not permit the adoption of any solution other than four islands; and 3) American pressure not to allow a territorial resolution between the Soviet Union and Japan. Whatever the explanation, the territorial issue was left unresolved. In 1992, the power balance had completely shifted. The Russian Federation lost much of the glory amassed during the Soviet period and now found itself at the point of restart from ground zero. The initial policy direction was to cooperate with Western countries having democratic values and a market economy. Japan was a sparkling example of the success of Western values in Asia, and therefore it is no surprise that the Russian leadership sought maximum cooperation from Japan. Russia’s new policy was also reflected in a new proposal on the territorial problem in response to Japan’s initiatives in the autumn of 1991. Foreign Minister Andreĭ V. Kozyrev, accompanied by Vice Minister Georgiĭ F. Kunadze, made an official visit to Tokyo in March 1992. Following formal ministerial talks on March 21 they held an informal meeting with Foreign Minister Watanabe

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Michio and Deputy Minister for Political Affairs Saitō Kunihiko. During this informal meeting the Russian side made an unprecedented concessionary proposal; however, since this was an exclusively informal proposal the two sides agreed not to disclose it. For many years following this gathering it was speculated that some kind of confidential proposal had been made, even though its contents were never released. This situation changed at the end of 2012—twenty years after the proposal was first made. The content was leaked to the press, first by the Russian side, then by the Japanese. In late December, Kunadze, who was seen as the original drafter of the proposal, conveyed to a Japanese correspondent of the newspaper, Hokkaidō shinbun, that the Russian side proposed to conclude a peace treaty based on the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan, and then continue negotiations on the question of Kunashiri and Etorofu. I saw this report and immediately realized that the content differed from the minutes that I had read during my tenure as the deputy chief of mission at the Japanese embassy in Moscow from 1994 to 1996. I then briefed a Sankei shinbun newspaper correspondent in January 2013 that the Russian side proposed to conclude an agreement to transfer Habomai and Shikotan, and then negotiate on Kunashiri and Etorofu in order to conclude a peace treaty that would resolve the four islands issue. Whatever the actual content of the proposal, both my and Kunadze’s memory of events intersected regarding a proposal from the Russian side that attempted to go further than “two smaller islands only.” The Japanese side did not accept this proposal as the basis for further negotiations, and a disenchanted Yeltsin canceled his trip to Tokyo in September 1992. For a while negotiations completely lost momentum. So why were the Japanese unwilling to accept the Russian proposal as the basis for further negotiations? The Japanese side obviously misjudged the limits of the Russian concession. A fixation on the “four islands in a bunch” (J: yontō ikkatsu) solution, the inability to overcome the temptation of “asking too much,” and a lack of trust on the other side might elucidate this misjudgment (Tōgō 2011, 219). But on the whole, in 1992 Japan most likely failed to exploit the greatest window of opportunity after the Cold War. 1.3 Overcoming the Failure Leading to the Tokyo Declaration At the nadir of the negotiations in September 1992, the Japanese side had no other option than to try and improve relations with Russia. The Japanese side certainly made serious efforts to overcome the damage caused by the cancelation of Yeltsin’s visit. Japan’s attempts were supported by the United States and Europe, which were generally supportive of Yeltsin’s reform policy, and gradually Japanese endeavors began to bear fruit.

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In January 1993, Bill Clinton assumed the US presidency and launched a new policy of support for Yeltsin, who had adopted democracy and a market economy as the fundamentals of nation building. Japan happened to be the chair of the G7 Summit held in Tokyo from July 7 to July 9, 1993. Taking into consideration the generally positive attitude of other G7 countries, Japan announced that it would provide another assistance package of USD 1.82 billion at the meeting of the G7 Finance Ministers in April 29 that year. The presence of a Russian president at a G7 Summit was already an accepted practice, and Japan had no way of refusing this. Yeltsin issued a message at the airport upon his arrival in Japan that he regretted the cancelation of his visit the previous year. A thorny debate on Japanese-Russian relations was quietly avoided at the G7 Summit. Yeltsin’s bilateral visit was now scheduled for October; the summit thus ended without turbulence. But Russian domestic politics did go through a turbulent period after the summit. Radical economic reform ignited hyperinflation, and this, in turn, erupted into social unrest. From the end of September until the beginning of October the Russian parliament challenged the president, rioted, and locked itself in the parliament building. President Yeltsin mobilized his troops, and gunfire was needed to quell the disturbance. For Yeltsin, the Tokyo visit scheduled in mid-October became an opportunity to erase the bloody images of the suppression of the Moscow riot. In order not to repeat the failure of September 1992, the two administrations did their best to pre-negotiate the territorial problem. The Tokyo Declaration, which was to be adopted by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, was verbally agreed upon before the visit. Fundamentally, the issues discussed at this time were the same as those discussed during Gorbachev’s visit in 1991. The first issue was about how clearly the two sides would respond in writing regarding Kunashiri and Etoforofu as the object of negotiation. The three guiding principles of “historical and legal facts, past agreed documents, as well as law and justice” (Tōgō 2011, 235) were satisfactory to the Japanese side, but none of these were compelling enough to go beyond a recognition of the existence of the territorial problem surrounding the four islands. Ultimately, it ended up, more or less, with the confirmation of what had already been determined under Gorbachev. The second issue—the confirmation of the 1956 Joint Declaration—was a more complex process. The Russian side did not agree to confirm the 1956 Joint Declaration in writing. An agreement was apparently reached that stated that the Russian Federation was the successor to the Soviet Union and that “Soviet international agreements bound the Russian Federation” as its successor, whereas the 1956 Joint Declaration was part of the binding agreements

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inherited by the Russian Federation. But during the summit meeting, when Prime Minister Hosokawa asked President Yeltsin to confirm that Hosokawa’s interpretation was correct, Yeltsin exploded in anger, only saying “I will state what we agreed here.” When a question was raised at the press conference regarding the 1956 Joint Declaration, however, Yeltsin did confirm that it was part of the international agreements that the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet Union. This issue was therefore resolved through an indirect, halfway confirmation. 2

A Temporary Lull in the Negotiations: 1994 to 1996

Japanese-Russian relations generally gain momentum when the international and domestic conditions of the two countries are ripe for negotiations. Japan is in a position to proceed with negotiations regardless of these conditions because it can change the status quo. But the Russian situation varies substantially, depending on both international and domestic circumstances. If the three years (1991–1994) following the fall of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation were opportune for the staging of negotiations, the years thereafter until 1997 witnessed the Russian government distancing itself considerably from them. From 1994 to 1996, the Yeltsin government principally focused on the stable development of the political and social system. Japanese-Russian relations, which had acquired a relatively stable status due to the Tokyo Declaration, were not center stage. At the same time, Japanese-Russian relations also ceased to be a focal point of Japan’s foreign policy. Attention was also mostly centered on domestic politics: in the mid-1990s the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was trying hard to regain power from the opposition-coalition parties. Economic issues required a quick remedy in order to overcome the collapse of the bubble economy. In foreign affairs, the restoration of relations with the United States and the restructuring of relations with Asian countries were the primary concern. This is not to say that Japanese-Russian relations were stagnant from 1994 to 1996, but what occurred at this time only bore tangible fruit after this period. In economic relations “reform assistance” became one of the two pillars of Japan’s policy toward Russia, together with the “Northern Territories Problem” (J: hoppō ryōdo mondai). Japan spent an enormous amount of time and effort in implementing the reform assistance packages that equaled USD 2.5 billion (in 1991) and USD 1.8 billion (in 1993). Investment and trade with support by the Japan Export-Import Bank loan and trade insurance from the Ministry of

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International Trade and Industry as well as “technical cooperation” to help establishing a market economy likewise required much attention. Considerable steps forward were similarly made in the realm of security and defense. Representatives of the Ministry of Defense joined the security dialogues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that started at the end of 1990. April 1996 saw the first visit ever by a Japanese minister of state for defense to Russia, and a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) escort vessel participated in the ceremony to commemorate 300 years of the Russian navy held at Vladivostock in July 1996. As for the issues directly related to the Northern Territories, preliminary talks began in April 1994 about Japanese fishing activities in the territorial waters surrounding the four islands, which had been stepped up after the fall of the Soviet Union. The preliminary talks soon developed into formal negotiations. At the highest political level, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō held talks with First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg N. Soskovéts, who was in charge of economic matters during the G7 Summit in Naples (July 8–10, 1994), and he proposed a Japanese “assistance plan for Russian trade and industry.” Hashimoto became prime minister in January 1996, and had his first talks with Yeltsin in April that year when he attended a nuclear summit that Yeltsin had organized in Moscow. A fundamental reactivation of Japanese-Russian relations, however, had to wait for President Yeltsin’s full recovery of leadership. He was re-elected to the presidency on July 3, 1996, but had a heart attack just prior to the election. He then disappeared from the electoral stage, appearing in public only once in August, and underwent a bypass operation in November. The disappearance of the president created a political vacuum in Moscow. In the meantime, diplomats from both countries began efforts to reactivate the relationship and waited for President Yeltsin’s return. The Japanese side proposed a new concept of “multi-layered development of the relationship.” Another conceptual development was to ensure the parallel advancement of “sovereignty negotiations” and “environmental structuring.” The purpose of the latter was to guarantee an orderly “environment” around the four islands such that they would not create a negative psychological environment. Agreements already made regarding former Japanese islanders visiting their ancestors’ graves and no-visa exchanges continued, with a fishery agreement within the territorial waters of the four islands a primary objective. In November 1996, Foreign Minister Evgeniĭ M. Primakov, who had replaced Kozyrev earlier in January, visited Japan and had talks with Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko. Primakov proposed joint economic activities on the four

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islands, and Ikeda responded positively that this could be considered as long as it would not harm the legal position of the two sides. Primakov withdrew his proposal of “shelving the issue” disclosed in January when assuming the post of foreign minister. The Japanese side welcomed this. 3

Hashimoto-Yeltsin Years: 1997 to 1999

3.1 Negotiations between Hashimoto and Yeltsin: March 1997 to July 1999 The turning point began on March 6, 1997, when President Yeltsin recovered from his illness and presented his presidential speech in parliament. In the foreign policy arena, the most difficult issue to tackle was NATO’s expansion to the east. Backed by presidential authority Primakov organized a Russia-US summit in Helsinki in March, signed a Russia-NATO basic protocol in May, and broke ground for the Russian acceptance of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join NATO at the its Summit in Madrid on July 8–9, 1997. But this was a painful process for Russia. The fact that former allied countries in Eastern Europe became members of NATO—the symbol of anti-Soviet actions by the West during the Cold War—must have been a humiliation that many Russians found hard to swallow. This feeling of humiliation and anger created the basis for the renewed Russian interest in Japan. On the Japanese side, Hashimoto Ryūtarō was one of the few politicians in Japan known for his expertise on security matters and strategic thinking. As the chairman of the policy coordination committee of the Liberal Democratic Party during the opposition years, Hashimoto appears to have concluded that the most difficult issue facing Japan was the navigation of the rise of China, whose interests were increasingly colliding with the interests of the United States. Hashimoto was clear in his view that Japan’s fundamental security was grounded in an alliance with the United States. But the overall situation in the Asia-Pacific region was so tense that Japan could not proceed on the basis of an alliance with the United States alone. Tensions were already high across the Taiwan Strait due to the presidential election in Taiwan, where Lee Denghui was likely to be elected. Would Japan become entangled in the rising US-China rivalry? At the same time, the rise of China was inevitable. China had begun to play a leading role in the East Asian regional cooperation at APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and APEC’s related Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF). Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) was also becoming a serious issue on its agenda. Was it possible that the United States and China would shake hands at some point and that Japan

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would be abandoned? For Hashimoto’s strategy, and in order to overcome Japan’s strategic ambivalence as a result of the rivalry between China and the United States, it now became imperative to improve Japanese-Russian relations and accept Russia as a partner in the Asia-Pacific region. With such dual strategic considerations in the minds of both sides, the relationship began to evolve quickly and can be summarized as follows: 1) On June 20, 1997, at a breakfast meeting at the Denver G7 Summit (June 20–22), the leaders agreed to hold a “Confidence-building Summit” somewhere in the Far East by the end of 1997. 2) In Tokyo on July 24 at the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Dōyūkai), Hashimoto made a strategic speech that surprised the Russian leadership. Their impression was overwhelmingly positive. First, he captivated the Russians with his global perspective that the settlement of NATO’s eastward expansion in western Eurasia would start a new era of cooperation on the eastern side of the Eurasian continent. Second, Hashimoto proposed as his key concept of Japanese-Russian relations three principles of “trust, mutual interests, and a long-term perspective,” which was very different from the image of Japan always seen as pushing the islands issue to the forefront. Third, and most unexpectedly, Hashimoto proposed that these three principles should become the guiding principles in the resolution of the islands issue. He thus explicitly denied a solution in which one side would appear as the victor and the other as the loser (Wada 1991, 366). 3) On November 1–2, the two leaders met at Krasnoyarsk for a confidencebuilding summit. They agreed “to conclude a peace treaty by 2000” and Hashimoto proposed the “Hashimoto-Yeltsin Economic Cooperation Plan.” The spirit in which Hashimoto attended this meeting, namely, to “hold talks based on trust, without preconception, prior conditions or fear,” became the guiding, representative principle of the negotiations at Krasnoyarsk (Tōgō 2011, 318). 4) On November 25, at the APEC Summit Meeting in Vancouver (November 24–25), Russia was accepted, under Hashimoto’s guidance, as full member from 1998 onward. 5) On February 21, 1998, Foreign Minister Obuchi Keizō and First Deputy Prime Minister Boris E. Nemtsov signed a fishery agreement in Moscow regarding the territorial waters of the four islands. 6) On February 23, Obuchi announced, during his Moscow visit, Japan’s intention to supply USD 1.5 billion of untied financial loans. 7) On April 18–19, a second confidence-building summit was held at the Japanese Kawana Resort Hotel in Shizuoka Prefecture, and Hashimoto

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made a confidential proposal “to delineate boundaries at the northern side of the four islands and ‘for the time being’ (tobun no kan) Japan would recognize Russia’s administrative right.” The Russian side agreed to return home with this proposal, in which the Japanese side essentially made two concessions. First, it accepted the notion of the delineation of boundaries. This should be a concept easier to accept than the transfer of territory. But a more substantial concession was to accept Russia’s administration “for the time being.” Since there is no way of legally defining when this time will end, the present status quo may continue for many years to come. In comparing Nakayama’s October 1991 proposal, that is, “If the sovereignty of the four islands belonging to Japan is confirmed, the timing, modality, and condition of the transfer can be dealt with flexibly,” it could be argued that Hashimoto went to the extreme in Kawana, preserving the position of sovereignty of the “four islands in a bunch,” but abandoning de facto the issue of actual transfer. Judging from all available records, President Yeltsin showed great interest in this proposal. But no subsequent Russian leader, in any politically or administratively responsible position, agreed to this proposal. As a result, it gradually lost its impact. 8) On May 15, a bilateral summit was held at the Birmingham G8 Summit (May 15–17); neither side took any initiatives. 9) On May 27, the financial crisis erupted in Russia. 10) On July 12, the LDP suffered a substantial defeat in the House of Councilors (Sangiin) election; Hashimoto resigned the following day, bringing the so-called Hashimoto-Yeltsin era to a close. Negotiations between Obuchi and Yeltsin: August 1998 until December 1999 Prime Minister Obuchi succeeded Hashimoto, and he wanted to improve relations with Russia. Since the Japanese side had made a substantial concessionary proposal at Kawana, now it was Obuchi’s turn to await a Russian counterproposal. This Russian proposal was made on November 12, 1998, in Moscow, on Obuchi’s return visit. Due to President Yeltsin’s declining health at this stage the Russian proposal mostly reflected the viewpoints of the Russian diplomatic services. At the summit meeting President Yeltsin stressed the importance of Krasnoyarsk and Kawana, expressing his dissatisfaction that peace treaty negotiations were not proceeding quickly enough. But he did not make any concrete proposal to break the impasse. The meeting was de facto chaired by his close assistant, and the Russian counterproposal was a three-page paper that was clearly drafted by expert diplomats. The Russian side stated that the 3.2

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Japanese side should examine this proposal carefully and not dismiss it. The Moscow Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership Between Japan and the Russian Federation was issued at the close of the summit meeting. It was a holistic document synthesizing the “multi-layered approach” and other recently developed conceptual frameworks; it declared the determination to “enter into an era of agreement through consolidating trust.” An agreement was also reached to establish “free island visits” to facilitate the easier entry of Japanese to the four islands. The Japanese side returned from their Moscow visit with a sense of frustration due to the contrast between the vigorous statement by the ailing President Yeltsin on the importance of Krasnoyarsk and Kawana and the rather cautious three-page proposal drafted by Russian diplomats. Be that as it may, after Obuchi’s visit to Moscow the Japanese side made an all-out effort to convince the Russians that the Kawana Proposal would be best suited to resolve the issue. The Russian side, on the contrary, did their best to convince the Japanese that their proposal was best suited for the resolution. Another impasse ensued. The essence of the three-page Russian proposal was to conclude two treaties. The first would designate the four islands as a special legal district comprising joint legislature. The second treaty would delineate the frontier and as such would constitute a peace treaty. Initially, however, there was some confusion because it was not clear whether the first or second treaty was the actual peace treaty. But even when the confusion lifted the Japanese side was not ready to treat this proposal as the basis for a future agreement. After the Moscow meeting in November 1998 President Yeltsin appeared only once in summit talks with Prime Minister Obuchi, and that was during the G8 Summit in Cologne (June 18–20, 1999). He once again expressed his willingness to further peace treaty talks but nothing concrete was revealed at the Cologne meeting. In November 1999, former Prime Minister Hashimoto visited Moscow and had telephone talks with Yeltsin. In a somewhat nostalgic tone, Yeltsin told Hashimoto: “Ryū, Ryū, why have you left office? You and I wanted to resolve the Kurile issue, but destiny carried us in different directions.” Finally, on December 31, 1999, Yeltsin resigned from presidency and Putin assumed the post of acting president, opening the last phase of the negotiations to “conclude a peace treaty by 2000.” 4

The Mori-Putin Era: 2000 to April 2001

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generally supported by the Russian people, but totally unknown regarding his views on Japan. From that moment onward, the Japanese government made an all-out effort to realize the agreement “to conclude a peace treaty by 2000.” This was an imperative because only one year remained, and a peace treaty was clearly still out of sight. But “a roadmap of negotiations toward the 21st century” would be a possibility. This became the Japanese government’s fundamental view (Tōgō 2011, 374), and gradually its new strategy became clear, as outlined in the following points: 1) restrain the foreign policy offensive until the presidential election in March, bearing in mind that this is an era of domestic politics in Russia; 2) establish personal relations based on trust between the Japanese Prime Minister and Putin from March until the 26th G8 Summit (July 21–23, 2000) in Okinawa, so that they would share common views on the importance of a broad spectrum of Japanese-Russian relations; 3) engage in a total diplomatic offensive on peace treaty negotiations from the Okinawa Summit until the end of the year, and conclude the negotiations with two summit meetings. The negotiations in fact proceeded as such: 1) On April 4, Suzuki Muneo, an influential LDP member appointed as special envoy of Prime Minister Obuchi, met with president-elect Putin. But Prime Minister Obuchi suffered a stroke immediately after Suzuki’s appointment, meaning that Suzuki spoke on behalf of Obuchi’s replacement, the LDP general secretary Mori Yoshirō. Suzuki told Putin a moving story about Mori’s father, mayor of the town of Neagari in Ishikawa Prefecture. He worked hard to improve friendship with Russia during the Cold War through sister-city relations with Shelekhov near Irkutsk. When Mori’s father passed away the people of Shelekhov built a tomb there housing some of his ashes in a gesture of thanks for his efforts in strengthening this friendship. 2) Prime Minister Mori visited St. Petersburg on April 29–30 and held a fullday meeting with President Putin on April 29. They spoke about the importance of strategic and geopolitical relations, the possibility of a wide range of economic relations, and the task of concluding a peace treaty. The gatherings ranged from a plenary meeting, tête-à-tête talks, and lunch to a visit to an ice-hockey game. 3) At the Okinawa Summit, Mori warmly greeted Putin as the chair. On July 23, bilateral talks were held in preparation of Putin’s official visit to Tokyo in September. 4) President Putin made an official visit to Tokyo on September 3–6, 2000. The substantial talks on territorial problems resulted in the issue of a “Statement on Peace Treaty Negotiations by the Japanese Prime Minister - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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and the Russian President” on September 5. This document created the guidelines for negotiations until the Irkutsk meeting in 2001. More importantly, on September 4, Putin stated that the “1956 Joint Statement is valid.” Putin now fully recognized what had been previously rejected by Gorbachev (to Prime Minister Kaifu) and only indirectly acknowledged by President Yeltsin (to Prime Minister Hosokawa). It was a clear step forward. While respecting the efforts made by the Japanese side, Putin also stated that the Kawana Proposal could not form the basis for further negotiations. Putin’s statement of September 4 regarding the 1956 Joint Declaration provided a clear direction for the Japanese government’s negotiation strategy. First, Japan had now gained firm ground for frank talks about the meaning of the recognition of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Second, this firm ground could also be used to “conclude a peace treaty resolving the four islands issue, including Kunashiri and Etorofu” as advocated by Kaifu and Gorbachev in 1991, Hosokawa-Yeltsin in 1993, and now by Mori-Putin in 2000. The issue became a roadmap for concluding a peace treaty. At this point it was not yet clearly envisaged that Irkutsk in March 2001 would represent the final talks to “conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2000” as Hashimoto and Yeltsin had envisaged. But there was no doubt that one more agreement was necessary to meet that objective. A seven-month period of negotiations therefore commenced on all diplomatic levels, including that of prime minister and president, and these can be outlined as follows: 1) On October 23, 2000, talks on the vice ministerial level were held in Tokyo between Deputy Minister Katō Ryōzō and Vice Minister Aleksandr P. Losyukov. Both sides explained in detail their respective interpretation of the 1956 Joint Declaration. The Russian side stated that it was ready to speak about Kunashiri and Etorofu but that it would only be a discussion. As for the transfer, the Russian side could only agree to the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan and nothing more (Tōgō 2011, 420). 2) On November 1–4, Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei visited Moscow. He called President Putin on November 2 and had talks with Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov the following day. The Japanese and Russian interpretations of the 1956 Joint Declaration differed, but a possibility now emerged to confirm in writing the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration in the next agreed document. 3) On November 15, Mori and Putin met on the eve of the APEC Summit held on November 16 in Brunei. They agreed that the meeting to conclude the year 2000 would be held at Irkutsk. 4) On November 30 and December 1, a high-level meeting of officials was held in Moscow between Deputy Minister Aleksandr P. Losyukov, director of the European Affairs, Tōgō Kazuhiko, and director of the Treaties - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Bureau, Yachi Shōtarō. The structure of the Irkutsk Statement was beginning to take shape. 5) On December 25, Suzuki Muneo, acting on behalf of Prime Minister Mori, met the secretary of the Security Council, Sergeĭ B. Ivanov, and proposed to use this communication line as a parallel high-level channel, together with that of the Foreign Ministry, but the Russian side suggested sticking to the diplomatic channel. 6) On January 16, 2001, Kōno met Ivanov in Moscow. A tense debate took place regarding the issue of the “two versus four islands.” The date of the Irkutsk meeting was first set at February 25, but then the Russian side reproposed the date of March 25. 7) On February 13, Mori and Putin had telephone talks and agreed to hold the Irkutsk meeting on March 25. 8) On March 5, the Katō–Loshukov meeting was held in Tokyo. Much progress was made on the content of the Irkutsk Statement. 9) On March 19, the Tōgō–Loshukov meeting took place in Moscow. The Irkutsk Statement was virtually agreed. 10) On March 25, Mori and Putin attended the Irkutsk meeting. For the first time in Japanese-Russian relations, the 1956 Joint Declaration, which agreed on the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan, and the Tokyo Declaration, which stated the resolution of Kunashiri and Etorofu, were laid down in writing in the same document. Mori also proposed to Putin to hold parallel negotiations on Habomai-Shikotan and Kunashiri-Etorofu to which Putin responded, “Posmotrim” (Let’s see). Putin’s response to Mori’s parallel negotiations proposal was priceless. It was agreed that nothing would be guaranteed on the outcome regarding Kunashiri and Etorofu when the negotiations started. This outcome was actually expected to emerge as the result of the negotiations, which should be conducted without any prior conditions. The negotiations entered a crucial stage. Concrete proposals made by Hashimoto in April 1999 and by Yeltsin in November 1999 bore no fruit, but the “Krasnoyarsk spirit” to “hold talks based on trust, without preconception, prior conditions or fear” was reflected in the Irkutsk Statement. 5 Conclusion Three clear characteristics emerged in the Japanese-Russian talks in the 1990s. The first was a convergence of realistic and rational approaches to the territorial negotiations. This was based on the Cold War history surrounding the issue

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of the four islands created by the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1956 Joint Declaration. The fundamental logic was a recognition of the existence of the Kunashiri and Etorofu issue and the confirmation of the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration on Habomai and Shikotan. Based on these, the final stage of negotiations on what to do about Kunashiri and Etorofu could be reached. This approach remained consistent from the Kaifu–Gorbachev talks in 1991 to the Irkutsk talks in 2001. Meanwhile, there had been Japanese efforts to propose a compromised solution within the concept of “four islands in a bunch” (J: yontō ikkatsu) (1991 Nakayama Proposal; 1998 Kawana Proposal). They helped to vitalize the negotiations, but failed to yield concrete results. Likewise, the Russian side made a unique proposal based on joint governance (1998 threepaper proposal), but this also had no concrete results. The second characteristic was in the efforts made to broaden and deepen the scope of bilateral relations. The guiding principle for the relationship was “Expanding Equilibrium,” reflecting Gorbachev’s notion of perestroika. There were, moreover, Nakayama’s “Five Principles to Govern Japanese-Soviet/ Russian Relations,” which resulted from the new situation arising from the demise of the Soviet Union. This was followed by the “reform assistance,” the “multi-layered approach,” and the parallel advancement of “sovereignty negotiations” and “environment structuring,” all reflecting the emergence of Yeltsin’s reform policy. They were embodied in Obuchi-Yeltsin’s “Creative Partnership” of 1998. The overall amount of reform assistance accumulated was USD 6 billion. In the security domain, the security dialogue that started at the beginning of the 1990s led to the first visit by the defense state minister to Russia in 1996 and other confidence-building measures. The consequence of the relationship based on trust between Hashimoto and Yeltsin led to Japanese guidance of Russia toward APEC membership. The decade discussed in this paper was particularly noteworthy for the strengthening of mutual trust between negotiators on both sides, with efforts made to learn from past mistakes—this represents the third characteristic. The subsequent delay of Gorbachev’s visit slowed the development of bilateral relations considerably. This did not have a direct impact when dealing with the Russian proposal of 1992 but it did on the activation of relations between Hashimoto and Yeltsin, and the agreement reached between Mori and Putin at Irkutsk. The informal and non-committal talks by the two sides in the last phase leading to the Irkutsk meeting played a fundamental role in enhancing the negotiations and deepening the trust between the negotiators. It is indeed impressive to observe how a few negotiators operating in the early 1990s evolved into a substantial number of trusted negotiators by the beginning of the 2000s.

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Bibliography

Japanese Sources



English Source

Tōgō Kazuhiko. 2011. Hoppō ryōdo kōshō hiroku. Ushinawareta gotabi no kikai [Secret Records of Negotiations on the Northern Territories: Five Missed Opportunities]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha. Wada Haruki. 1999. Hoppō ryōdo mondai: rekishi to mirai [The Problem of the Northern Territories: History and Future]. Asahi Sensho 621. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha.

Fukuyama, Francis. The End of the History and the Last Man. Free Press, 1992.

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Russian Policy toward Japan, 1992–2001: from Over-optimism to Realism in Developing Relations Alexander N. Panov With the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 the emerging Russian leadership faced the task of formulating the course of the new state’s foreign policy, not only in conceptual terms but also in connection to a broad range of specific countries, including Japan. Even while Russia was still part of the Soviet Union, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to actively promote the building of bilateral ties and expressed great interest in the development of RussianJapanese relations. A number of experts on Japan working in the Russian Foreign Ministry included individuals from the USSR Foreign Ministry. The Russian Federation, which was a part of the USSR that shared a border with Japan, believed that without the Russian leadership a discussion of the issue of relations with Japan, the territorial issue, in particular, would be impossible. They maintained that the Soviet leadership, including President Mikhail Gorbachev, took an unjustifiably tough stance on the territorial problem (Southern Kurile Islands) with Japan. Further, they opined that it was necessary to display flexibility and a preparedness to compromise, and to find an expeditious solution, thereby enabling the creation of fundamentally new relations with a nation that played a major role in both Asia and internationally. In the second half of 1991, the Russian government repeatedly signaled to the Japanese leadership its readiness to adopt a “new approach” toward the settlement of the territorial problem. There was no clear plan, however, or even a notion of what exactly that “new approach” should be. For instance, in early September 1991 the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Ruslan I. Khasbulatov, visited Japan and at a meeting with Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki conveyed the personal message from the Russian president Boris Yeltsin that called for comprehensive development of Russian-Japanese relations in all spheres. He emphasized the Russian leadership’s willingness—in contrast to the former Soviet leadership—to accelerate the negotiating process with a view to finalizing a peace treaty based on the “principles of lawfulness and justice,” abandoning the concept of dividing the states into the winners and losers in World War II. The Japanese government welcomed these ideas. In early November 1991, President Yeltsin delivered an address to Russian citizens that focused solely on the issue of Russian-Japanese relations. He

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_025

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confirmed the intention of the Russian leadership to search for a solution to the problem of a peace treaty with Japan, “the presence of which hampers the development of Russian-Japanese relations and does not allow the new democratic Russia to overcome the legacy of the past.” He said he was determined to approach the issue of a peace treaty with Japan based on the principles of justice, lawfulness, international law, and humanism. Foreign affairs experts and the Soviet public took such an unusual address by the Russian president to the country’s citizens as a signal of the Russian leadership’s willingness to make territorial concessions to Japan. The domestic situation in the USSR was, in the meantime, evolving quickly, and by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. With the emergence of a new democratic Russia, its leaders were faced with numerous challenges, including the implementation of a fresh foreign political strategy. Initially there was no comprehensive conceptual vision of that strategy; moreover, there was also no foreign policy doctrine for the nascent state. It was no coincidence therefore that during this early period Russian diplomacy was distinguished by an inconsistent, impulsive, romantic, and opportunistic approach but, above all, by a lack of professionalism. All these shortcomings manifested themselves in the actions of Russian diplomacy, both in connection to the general Asia-Pacific region and in connection to specific key countries there. For example, it had not been determined how to build relations with China, Russia’s great neighbor. On the one hand, China was seen as a communist state different from democratic Russia, while on the other, there was an understanding that it was necessary to establish a common framework for the furtherance of relations and to address the increasing number of practical issues connected to them. Dealings with India, especially at the political level, were virtually frozen. An ill-founded decision was made not to terminate any “special partnership” with New Delhi established during the Soviet period. It was unclear what kind of a relationship should be advanced with India, which had traditionally played a key role for Russia. The restructuring of relations with the former Soviet allies Vietnam, Cambodia, and Mongolia comprised simply the cessation of assistance, and this was accompanied by a sharp curtailing of political, economic, and military contacts. Ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) had particularly deteriorated, and the Russians did not shy away from voicing their critical attitude to that country’s political system. Political, economic, and military contacts with North Korea, as well as links with its citizens, were entirely disrupted. There was also no due attention paid to the development of relations with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), once the participation in ASEAN regional activities was considered

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irrelevant. The generally negative and passive attitude to Russia’s involvement in Asia-Pacific regional organizations and forums prevailed. And dialogue with the more influential countries in the region, such as Australia and New Zealand, was left completely underdeveloped. The above serves to characterize the initial stage in Russia’s new diplomacy—that is, from 1991 to 1994. The second stage from 1995, typified by the construction of a foreign policy and the formulation of policies toward specific individual states, began gradually, step by step. But during the initial stage Russian-Japanese relations were to a large extent evolving, based on an impromptu “romantic” scenario. The prevailing view among the Russian leadership at this juncture was that Russia, having declared itself a democratic state and thereby sharing in the “common values with the West,” would be immediately accepted not just as an equal partner but as an ally of the United States and Western European states. It would be admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and other organizations of those states. Japan was also regarded as one of the members of the so-called “Western community.” 1

An Uneasy Start to Relations

The “revolutionary euphoria” of the early 1990s corresponded with the desire to rid the country of “the Soviet past” and to reconcile foreign political problems based on “the rule of law and justice” rather than on communist ideology and rules dictated by earlier “imperial thinking.” Against this backdrop, those advocating the formation of new relations with the West, including Japan, proceeded from the assumption that conditions for a quick settlement of the territorial dispute with Japan had already been established. Many Japanese scholars say that this guided the architects of the Russian “new course” in their dealings with Japan and not by the severe weakening of Russia’s political, economic, and military power following the disintegration of the USSR. On March 20–21, 1992, Russian Foreign Minister Andreĭ V. Kozyrev visited Tokyo. He was accompanied by his deputy Georgiĭ F. Kunadze, who for many years during the Soviet period was engaged in research regarding the issue of Soviet-Japanese relations. At a meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio on March 21, senior Russian Foreign Ministry officials put forward a four-point plan for settling the territorial problem. It had been more than two decades since the Russian and Japanese sides had disclosed the details of the proposal, and this was done in December 2012. The Japanese press only reported that Kozyrev proposed to conclude a peace treaty with Japan

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dependent on the handover of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, and after the signing of a treaty would continue negotiations on the other two islands, Kunashir and Iturup. But the Japanese representatives responded that it would be impossible to sign a peace treaty unless the future handover of Kunashir and Iturup was guaranteed (Asahi shinbun, May 21, 2002). In December 2012, the newspaper, Hokkaidō shinbun, published an interview with Kunadze who gave a detailed account of the 1992 Russian plan for the territorial problem settlement, which proposed that the procedures, terms and conditions, and the schedule regarding the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan be determined during the first stage of the plan in accordance with Article 9 of the 1956 Joint Declaration. It was suggested to finalize a peace treaty and to formalize the transfer of these territories to Japan in compliance with international law during the plan’s second stage. The third stage would correspond with a handover of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, and if an analysis of the state of Russian-Japanese relations during the fourth stage determined that they were improving, then negotiations could be started on the future of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup. Despite the expectations of the Russian representatives, who proceeded with the understanding that the plan was a considerable concession on the Russian side and generally met Japan’s interests, the Japanese reaction was negative. In effect, their response was that Japan would only sign a peace treaty if the handover of Kunashir and Iturup were guaranteed and if a time frame for their return was secured. In commenting on Kunadze’s interview the Japanese diplomat Tōgō Kazuhiko referred to the Japanese record of the Kozyrev–Watanabe meeting, and noted that the Japanese participants had the impression during the meeting that the Russian representatives offered the handover of Habomai and Shikotan ahead of the signing of the peace treaty. It was then scheduled to hold talks on the future of the Kunashir and Iturup, and once an agreement concerning the issue was reached to conclude a peace treaty ( Japan Times, January 12, 2013). It is also possible that the interpreting from Russian to Japanese at the meeting was not accurate, and clearly Kunadze’s presentation of the Russian plan was closer to the truth. In any case, Kunadze maintained that the Russian plan had not been approved with President Yeltsin and therefore was “unofficial.” Such actions by the Russian Foreign Ministry leadership underline the fact that no due order existed in the development, adoption, and implementation of the most important foreign political steps of the nascent Russian state. The lack of skill in organizing the negotiating process in a measured fashion, which took into consideration the potential reactions of all partners, also played a role.

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In the meantime, the Japanese leadership—and not just the Japanese Foreign Ministry—understood the Russian proposal to be an “insufficient concession,” proof of the Russian side’s weak position, and therefore that it could apply further pressure. Furthermore, before the meeting of the foreign ministers in Tokyo the Japanese assumed that if Russia agreed to accept Japan’s potential sovereignty over the four islands—Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup—then Japan would be prepared to be flexible regarding the time frame and conditions of their return. And following the Tokyo meeting it concluded that it could exert pressure on Moscow with a view to securing “the earliest and simultaneous actual return” of all four islands. During a visit to the Soviet Union on October 12–18, 1991, Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō put forward for the first time the proposal on the recognition of Japan’s potential sovereignty over the four islands. Foreign Minister Watanabe, Nakayama’s successor, repeated this at talks with Kozyrev during a later trip to Russia on January 27, 1992. The conclusion regarding the possible securement of the return of not two, but all four, islands was widely circulated among Japanese politicians, political science experts, and especially among Japanese diplomats who were in close contact with their Russian counterparts. It should be pointed out that the prevalent view among the Russian public was that the Russian Foreign Ministry had a generally positive attitude regarding the transfer of the islands to Japan. Vyacheslav V. Kostikov, President Yeltsin’s press secretary at the time, writes about this in his book Romance with the President (Roman s prezidentom). He cites a document prepared in August 1992 by the Russian presidential administration’s Operative Information Service, which reported that the Russian media saw the Russian Foreign Ministry’s actions on the issue of the Southern Kuriles as either “benevolent” toward Japan or “pro-Japanese.” “It seems,” Kostikov writes, “that the president himself had apprehensions that it was the Foreign Ministry at that stage of the development that had erred, giving rise to the hopes for a quick solution to the territorial problem” (Kostikov 1997, 92). From the spring of 1992 onward, the rejection of any territorial concessions to Japan was widely supported by the Russian public. With few exceptions, political figures, lawmakers, scientists, and journalists were against the transfer of any islands to Japan. But what spawned the rising wave of “protecting Russian territory from Japanese claims” in the spring and summer of 1992? For the Russian public the process of its country losing territory was a painful process. The mention now of a possible “voluntary” transfer of any other territories was met with extreme negativity. In the eyes of the Russian people Japan was still largely viewed through the “lens of past relations,” which involved lingering, at times confronting, sentiments in its collective historical memory. It should be pointed

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out that the Japanese, for their part, did not make any serious effort to demonstrate a policy that would contribute to the building of a fundamentally new relationship with the emerging democratic Russia. There was strong public opinion in Russia that Japan only wished to take advantage of the temporary weakening of the Russian state in order to secure the territories and was not actually interested in promoting Japanese-Russian relations. There were, in fact, grounds for such views. The government of Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi made a grave error when attempting to mobilize international pressure on Russia regarding the territorial issue. At the 18th G7 Summit in Munich on July 6–8, 1992, Japan insisted on the inclusion of a point calling for a “full normalization of Japanese-Russian relations in order to resolve the territorial problem” in the Summit’s political statement. Kostikov writes that this Japanese position “produced an unfavorable impression on the entire Russian presidential team and naturally, on Yeltsin himself, who was invited to the summit as the first president of a new democratic Russia” (Kostikov 1997, 104). Even more significant for the Russian leadership was that the Japanese government demonstrated no willingness to abandon the strategy of “linking politics to the economy”—in other words, to agree to provide large-scale assistance to Russia during the most difficult period for the nation and to develop broad economic cooperation with it without tying these activities to the settling of the territorial problem. It was therefore not surprising that at a press conference on August 21, 1992, President Yeltsin remarked that of all the “Western” countries Japan was providing the least economic assistance to Russia. Moreover, he drew attention to the fact that the principle of “nonseparation of politics and economics” persisted in Japan’s policy discourse. In late August 1992, the Japanese government confirmed that it would advance economic collaboration with Russia only after the recognition of Japan’s sovereignty over the islands. Foreign Minister Watanabe affirmed this decision in Moscow on August 29 when preparations were to be completed regarding the upcoming visit of President Yeltsin to Japan in September 1992, an agreement about which had already been reached in February 1992. The meeting that followed between Yeltsin and Watanabe was, not surprisingly, tense. According to Kostikov, Watanabe “did not bring anything new from Tokyo. Yeltsin’s disappointment was great … Yeltsin was very irritated and unhappy with that meeting” (Kostikov 1997, 104). As a consequence, Russia postponed the president’s trip to Japan only four days ahead of its scheduled start. The cancelation of the visit shocked Japan, who saw it as an “insult.” To a considerable extent, this situation resulted from the lack of a clear understanding in Japanese political circles—above all, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs— of the political processes underway in Russia at that time, and of the position

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and intentions of the Russian leadership toward Japan. The Japanese attitude regarding all the political processes in Russia was shaped by the notion of “settling the territorial problem as soon as possible.” Public sentiment in Russia was almost unanimously against the “simultaneous and prompt handover of the islands,” but the Japanese did not take it seriously. The shock over the cancelation of the Russian president’s visit was followed by a hiatus in bilateral relations. Such interruptions in the contacts between Moscow and Tokyo increasingly contrasted Russia’s more active development of relations with European countries and the United States, where the recently elected President Bill Clinton supported the Russian reforms and called for improved contacts between Russia and Japan. The Japanese began to soften their stance against Russia, not least because of the influence of US policy. An agreement was reached during President Yeltsin’s trip to Tokyo in October 1993 that ended with the adoption of two important documents on October 13: the Tokyo Declaration and the Declaration on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation. 2

The Tokyo Declaration and Japan’s New Approach to Relations with Russia

The Tokyo Declaration—the first high-level political document in the history of Russian-Japanese relations—was especially vital. It specified the principles upon which the new Russia and Japan intended to expand their relationship. The statement that Russia and Japan “share the universal values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for fundamental human rights” was of particular significance. In other words, it acknowledged that the era of Russian-Japanese confrontation was over and that both countries could now fashion an essentially new association, moving toward the “full normalization of relations” through the conclusion of a peace treaty that resolved the territorial issue. Both sides were also in accord regarding the principles upon which to continue negotiations “on the ownership of the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai.” These included historical and legal facts, the principles of legality and justice, as well as documents worked out between the two countries. The 1956 Joint Declaration was not mentioned in the text since the USSR had promised to give Japan two islands, and at this stage Russia was unwilling to acknowledge this, but at the same time did not devalue it. Instead, the Russians only agreed to note that Russia “is the successor of the Soviet Union, and that all other international treaties and agreements between the

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Soviet Union and Japan continue to be applied in the relations between the Russian Federation and Japan.” It was also clear that Russia conceded that the four islands were indeed the subject of the negotiations, yet nothing more than that. But certain Japanese political scientists and even high-ranking diplomats, however, began to view this provision of the Tokyo Declaration as an alleged confirmation by the Russians of the fact that the four islands were Japanese territory, that the issue of Habomai and Shikotan had already been resolved in the 1956 Joint Declaration, and subsequently the negotiations would address the conditions of the return of Kunashir and Iturup. In response to the Japanese view on the issue, Russia offered (and continues today to offer) explanations—namely, the Russian party to the Tokyo Declaration only recognized that the question of ownership of the four islands between Russia and Japan is not yet entirely settled under international law. But this did not mean that the Russian side accorded that these islands are, or even “potentially,” Japanese territory. The first official visit of the Russian president to Japan helped to stabilize Russian-Japanese relations and served to lay the foundations for their future development. Following the Tokyo Summit, however, bilateral contacts at the political level were not intensified, with the result that trade and political contacts were at a standstill. In general, no major changes occurred to bilateral relations. It became obvious to Japan’s political elite that there was no hope for a quick return of the “Northern Territories” (J: hoppō ryōdo, i.e., the Kurile Islands) as compared to 1992. The prevailing sentiment was that relations with Russia should not be hurried, and that it was necessary to wait until the political and economic situation stabilized so as to provide measured assistance to the efforts of Russia’s reformist forces. Moscow saw the Japanese approach to the development of relations with Russia and responded to the “Japanese passive approach” with an equally “passive Russian approach.” The then prevalent opinion was that Japan was only interested in solving the territorial problem on its own terms, and was unwilling to build new relations with a democratic Russia. The brief “honeymoon period” from January to September 1992 in Russian-Japanese relations was replaced by a “period of inactivity” lasting almost five years. It was only in mid1997 that bilateral relations were stepped up, and in terms of their intensity and effectiveness these relations entered a period of unprecedented development that lasted until the end of 2001. By 1997, the basic principles of Russian policy in the Asia-Pacific region were formulated and their implementation begun. The main aim of this policy was the creation of a “belt” of good neighborliness, trust, and security in the country’s east in the interests of ensuring favorable conditions for Russia’s economic

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and social development, and the successful execution of reform policies. The aim was to expand bilateral relations with countries of the region as much as possible and to advance this policy as far as acceptable for the Russian partners. Great importance was attached to Russia’s involvement in the activities of all regional organizations and forums. This policy resulted in considerable progress over a fairly short period. Russia had signed the Declaration on Strategic Partnership with China in spring 1996, and contacts with that country radically changed for the better. Political dialogue with India was resumed, and Russian-Indian relations also began to improve rapidly. Moreover, Russia began to take heed of its dealings with Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, as well as contacts with North Korea. Relations with South Korea were similarly developing in a broad range of spheres, as were those with ASEAN countries. Russia joined the dialogue with ASEAN and applied for membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Within the framework of this policy, increased attention was paid to relations with Japan. It appeared unusual that, while participating in the G7 summits, Russia had the least developed relations with one of the most important and economically advanced members of this “club”—Japan. And at this time, certain changes in attitudes toward Russia were surfacing among the Japanese political elite. The then current view was that the process of democratization and the transition to a market economy in Russia was now irreversible, that Russia consequently shared common values with Japan and other Western democracies, and that it was necessary to develop relations with Russia in various spheres and to look for a solution to the territorial issue. Japan’s new approach to its links with Russia was outlined by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō on July 24, 1997, in his speech at the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Hashimoto 1997). It aimed to improve Japanese-Russian relations based on three principles. The first was the establishment of “real trust between those at the negotiating table” and for Prime Minister Hashimoto this also meant his relationship with President Yeltsin. The second was predicated on the principle of mutual benefit, which inferred that no attempts should be made to secure any unilateral advantage. And the third involved the principle of a long-term approach; this implied the need to create a solid foundation for the improvement of bilateral relations. This approach envisaged that by developing Japanese-Russian relations based on these three principles it would be possible to solve the territorial problem. In general, the specified approach provided in the search for a solution to the most complicated territorial issue through a comprehensive development of Japanese-Russian relations, made them, in the words of Prime Minister

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Hashimoto, “multifaceted.” The Japanese prime minister described the problem of the “Northern Territories” as the most difficult question in bilateral relations during the fifty years of the postwar era. He suggested that this issue could only be reconciled through the three principles of Japanese-Russian relations noted above. The principle of trust, for example, would promote the discussion in an open, straightforward manner that did not evade the difficult questions, thereby generating trust and creating an unprecedented positive climate. The principle of mutual benefit would imply that the territorial issue would be resolved in such a way that neither side would be compromised, and there would be no winners or losers. The third principle regarding a longterm approach would require the use of accumulated positive experience in confidence-building in dealing with the issue of the islands—namely, Japanese visits to graves, exchanges between the residents of the four islands and Japan, and negotiations on an agreement on safe fishing. All this would be necessary in order to “guide the direction to the solution of the territorial problem.” “We,” Prime Minister Hashimoto emphasized, “intend to continue negotiations in a calm, measured fashion, and based on the long-term approach.” 3

Negotiations on a Peace Treaty

Prime Minister Hashimoto’s speech implied that the task was not to reconcile the territorial problem by the end of the 20th century, rather “to identify the direction to its solution”—in other words, to find a “path” (J: michisuji) to resolution. It was a reasonable approach that was consistent with the state of bilateral relations at this time and envisaged the search for a solution to the most complicated problems through the comprehensive development of JapaneseRussian relations. The Russian leadership interpreted the Japanese prime minister’s announcement of a new approach to relations in a positive light because it corresponded to the Russian public sentiment of the time over the “most reasonable conduct of affairs in relation to Japan.” This approach to the settlement of the territorial problem also appealed to the Russia leadership. This “Hashimoto Doctrine” cleared the way for the active expansion of Russian-Japanese relations. As early as November 1–2, 1997, the first informal Yeltsin–Hashimoto summit meeting was held in Krasnoyarsk, and it led to a number of significant agreements. First, the sides agreed on a detailed plan for the progressive development of Russian-Japanese economic relations known as the “Hashimoto-Yeltsin Economic Cooperation Plan.” Japan, in response to Russia’s request, expressed its readiness to offer an unconditional loan worth USD 1.5 billion in order to support Russian reform. Second, Japan said that it

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intended to support Russia’s entry to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which Japan previously blocked. Third, it was agreed to step up the dialogue on issues surrounding security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and to expand the contacts and exchanges between the defense departments of the two countries. But the greatest attention focused on the agreements relating to the negotiations on a peace treaty. In conducting such negotiations, both parties concurred that they would actively evolve the entire range of bilateral relations and make efforts to settle the practical issues linked with the disputed territories. Finally, and most importantly, “the two leaders agreed to exert every effort to conclude a peace treaty by 2000 based on the 1993 Tokyo Declaration.” Remarkably, it was the Russian president who presented this proposal. President Yeltsin’s proposal was an unforeseen move not only to the Japanese participants at the meeting but also to the Russian representatives who prepared the meeting in Krasnoyarsk. There was much speculation thereafter as to why Yeltsin made such an extraordinary and unanticipated proposal. Yeltsin himself did not comment on his decision after this. It is fair to assume, however, that the setting forth of an initiative for a peace treaty was in keeping with how Yeltsin behaved, who amazed the leaders of many states on more than one occasion with his unexpected remarks. This was done, apparently, in order to “intensify the situation to a greater degree” so as to forge a clearer understanding of whether the situation was ready to achieve a particular outcome. Yeltsin’s Krasnoyarsk Proposal could be interpreted as an “invitation” to consider in earnest whether it was plausible to finalize a peace treaty within the given historical conditions and what was required to create an environment in which it would be possible to achieve the result. And if the objective of signing a peace treaty by the specified date was not met, then the efforts exerted would not have been in vain since both parties will have trialed the options for a settlement and would have made significant progress in advancing bilateral relations. Subsequent events confirmed this conclusion. Both sides lodged proposals on the settlement of the peace treaty problem: the Japanese side made the Kawana Proposal in April 1998 while the Russians submitted the Moscow Proposal in November 1998. And even though each country failed to finalize a peace treaty by 2000, bilateral ties began to progress at a pace unprecedented in the history of Russian-Japanese relations. The essence of the Kawana Proposal was submitted at the second informal Hashimoto–Yeltsin meeting on April 18–19, 1998, held at the Japanese Kawana Resort Hotel in Shizuoka Prefecture. It proposed to stipulate in the peace treaty that the JapaneseRussian border runs between Iturup and Urup, and until a separate agreement

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could be reached between the two countries Japan would recognize the legitimacy of the Russian administrative control over Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai. In other words, the Russian side would need to accept Japan’s “potential sovereignty” over the four islands. For Russia, the acknowledgment of Japan’s potential sovereignty over the four islands would have meant a de facto recognition that the Japanese position on the territorial problem and the eventual transfer of the islands to Japan was justified. And this was something that the Russian president would not concede, and as early as September 1997 Yeltsin remarked during one of his public speeches that “the islands cannot be transferred to Japan because Russian public will not accept such a solution.” According to a public opinion poll conducted in Russia on the eve of Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō’s visit to Moscow in November 1998, sixty percent of Russian citizens opposed the idea of giving Japan sovereignty over the Southern Kuriles. The number of those who were against this idea in the Southern Kuriles, as well as in Sakhalin, was even higher: 75 percent and 83 percent, respectively (Asahi shinbun, October 31, 1998). The Russian side in the November Moscow talks between Yeltsin and Obuchi responded to the Japanese Kawana Proposal with their own submission that was characterized as a “compromise” position. The Russian side proposed to agree and sign a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation by 2000 that would stipulate that both sides would continue to look for a mutually acceptable formula in solving the border issue. It was therefore actually planned to sign two treaties: the first, the aforementioned Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, and the second, the Border Treaty. The first treaty proposed that the parties would encourage and promote extensive contacts between the residents of the islands and Japan, as well as the Sakhalin region, in order to create advantageous conditions for the final settlement of the problem of territorial demarcation. It would also work out a special legal regime, without prejudicing the state interests and political positions of both parties; it would contribute to producing a favorable environment and a legal framework for joint economic and other activities on the islands. The agreement would fix each party’s obligations to conduct negotiations on a separate agreement regarding the establishment of a border between Russia and Japan in the regions of the islands. The Russian side, believing that the time was not yet ripe for the final settlement of the territorial issue, proposed to conclude “an interim agreement.” This would represent the “path”—the aforementioned michisuji—to securing a final settlement of the territorial demarcation problem that Prime Minister Hashimoto referred to in his speech in July 1997. The Moscow Proposal was not

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about how to avoid the territorial issue, rather about how to achieve a phased solution. The 2000 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation was therefore meant to document the intentions of both parties in the resolution of the territorial issue, and the second treaty was meant to specify the boundary lines. The Russian side boldly took an unorthodox step in proposing the development of a special legal regime jointly with the Japanese so as to ensure legal and other conditions for joint economic, social, environmental, and other activities on the four Kurile islands. There are very few examples in international practice whereby one nation offers another the opportunity to create, jointly, a special status for a section of its territory. It was a major compromise on the part of the Russians. The Japanese did not accept the Moscow Proposal, considering it “insufficient.” Nevertheless, the Russian and Japanese sides, having put forward the Kawana and Moscow proposals, respectively, clearly identified their “initial positions” at the peace treaty negotiations. Subsequently, they worked toward bilateral rapprochement and sought a mutually acceptable compromise; Russia made a number of very important steps in that compromise process. During his official visit to Japan on September 3–5, 2000, President Vladimir Putin confirmed verbally that in its entirety the 1956 Joint Declaration was in effect for the Russian side. This contained the “territorial”-related Article 9, which stated that the declaration was ratified by both sides and that it was binding for Russia, as the Soviet Union’s successor state, and for Japan. Following the talks between President Putin and Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō in Irkutsk on March 25, 2001, the Russians agreed to mention in their joint statement that the 1956 Joint Declaration between the USSR and Japan was understood as the basic legal document that initiated the negotiating process on a peace treaty after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This was the first time since 1956 that the Russian side recorded in an official document that the Joint Declaration remained valid for Russia, without any qualification. Thereafter, the stance set forth in the Soviet party’s note of 1960, which stated that the “territorial article” of the Joint Declaration has lost its relevance for Moscow because of the conclusion of the Japan-US “security treaty,” could thus be seen as entering “history.” A discussion ensued in Japanese political circles, the academic community and the Japanese Foreign Ministry on how to react to the Russian position. There were advocates of the idea of “an interim treaty” or a “two-track formula”: “Two [islands] Plus Two [islands]” (J: ni purasu ni). Based on the Russian recognition of the “territorial article” of the 1956 Joint Declaration, it was proposed initially to sign the treaty on the return of Habomai and Shikotan with the understanding that the negotiations on the transfer of Kunashir and Iturup

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would be ongoing and would ultimately end with the signing of a corresponding treaty. Yet the supporters of the “traditional approach,” who envisioned the simultaneous return of all the islands, eventually won. Koizumi Jun’ichirō stated after his election as prime minister in April 2001 that “Japan will seek Russia’s recognition of the fact that all the Southern Kuriles are Japanese territory. Only then will Japan be ready to display a flexible approach to the terms and conditions of their transfer.” In other words, adherence to the Kawana Proposal was confirmed. Compared to the two-track formula, which even in some small measure can be interpreted as the willingness of the Japanese side to compromise, “the traditional stance” left no room for any maneuver. It was proposed to discuss the specific conditions of the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan, as well as of the ownership (implying the transfer) of Kunashir and Iturup, “in a single package” because the four islands were seen as a single Japanese entity. Russia could not agree to continue the negotiations on this basis, and this led to a breach in the talks between the two nations for more than a decade. Moreover, Russia was aware of the fact that its acknowledgement of the impact of the 1956 Joint Declaration was viewed by the Japanese either passively (neutrally) or, more frequently, negatively—that is, as “inadequate.” This stance sent a signal to Russia that when negotiating with Japan it was necessary to bear in mind the very important point that each “concession” or “step forward” was perceived “as a matter of course” and as “natural.” Russia had made concessions but Japan did not reciprocate and instead immediately put forward new demands. It is noteworthy that at the Soviet-Japanese summit talks in April 1991 Prime Minister Kaifu attempted to convince President Mikhail Gorbachev of the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration in its entirety, and Japan was solely disappointed when this failed. When Russia took this step without any “external” pressure, this again caused disappointment on the Japanese side, albeit of a totally different nature. Such an approach did not provide any further impetus in an active engagement in the negotiation process on the part of the Russians. President Putin stated at a news conference on December 23, 2004, that the resolution as soon as possible of all the problems hindering the development of bilateral relations met the national interests of both Japan and Russia. One of the most difficult problems was the conclusion of a peace treaty. “The Russian Federation,” Putin said, “is the legal successor to the Soviet Union, and we will certainly try to fulfill all international legal obligations that had been assumed by the Soviet Union, no matter how hard this may be for us” (Kremlin. ru 2004). In this regard, Putin noted that the 1956 Joint Declaration, in particular Article 9, states that:

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… the mandatory precondition for the possible transfer of the two islands is the signing of a peace treaty, which unequivocally reads as the settlement of all further territorial disputes … Secondly, it says that the Soviet Union was ready to hand over the two islands. It does not specify under which conditions they should be handed over and when and whose sovereignty extends to these territories. All these things are the subject of our careful study and collaboration with our Japanese colleagues. 4

Unprecedented Comprehensive Development of Russian-Japanese Relations

Although both sides failed to sign a peace treaty in the first decade following the establishment of relations between Japan and Russia in the 1990s, contacts between the two countries witnessed positive change—unparalleled in their history—within a relatively short period, and most notably in the second half of the 1990s. The negotiations on a peace treaty were unprecedented in the level of reciprocal activity, with significant results achieved in the political sphere. This included the signing of the Tokyo Declaration, which laid the political foundations for the furtherance of Russian-Japanese relations. In the Moscow Declaration, signed in Moscow by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Obuchi on November 13, 1998, both parties agreed to build a constructive partnership in Russian-Japanese relations based on close and organized cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, technical, and humanitarian spheres with the desire to settle the outstanding issues and to move toward the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Moscow Declaration emphasized the parties’ determination to carry out constructive partnership and at the same time contribute to peace and stability not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also globally, to interact in the international arena, to sharpen collaboration in addressing global challenges, and to develop bilateral relations by transitioning from an era of trust to an era of accord. For the first time in the history of Russian-Japanese bilateral relations a joint document mirrored the common positions of both countries on an extremely broad range of detailed international problems. The documenting in the Moscow Declaration of the common positions of both sides on many important international issues was followed by their concrete joint actions on the world stage. Russia almost immediately supported the concept of multilateral talks on the problem of ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula that was put

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forward by Japan in the spring of 1998. Russia and Japan had close or similar positions on the disarmament issues. Moscow and Tokyo were equally in favor of the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996) while the United States refused to approve it. With a unified voice, the Russian and Japanese spoke in favor of strengthening the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). Moreover, Japan did not oppose the Russia-sponsored UN resolution in support of the preservation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), even though it abstained from the vote and despite the fact that Japan’s ally, the United States, was against the resolution. Russia and Japan, recognizing the need to counter global challenges, such as international terrorism, began to forge understanding and cooperation regarding these critical issues. Different from other G7 members, Japan did not criticize the Russian anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya in 1998 and prevented the adoption by the G7 of a statement criticizing the actions of Russian authorities because of “the excessive use of force and human rights violations.” The Russian party expressed its understanding regarding Japan sending its troops to Afghanistan to participate in the anti-terrorist operation there. In February 2002, the parties signed a joint statement on combatting terrorism and launched the relevant bilateral consultations. The practical result of the Russian-Japanese cooperation on anti-terrorist was an agreement on the joint fight against the drug threat from Afghanistan. This bilateral political dialogue was unprecedented. Both sides had regular meetings at the highest level, hosted visits by the respective foreign ministers, and held consultations through various departments of their ministries of foreign affairs. In July 1998, for the first time in the 150-year history of bilateral contacts, the head of the Russian government paid an official visit to Japan. In May 2000, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Aleksiĭ II, made an inaugural trip to Japan, where the Japanese emperor Akihito received him. 5

An Era of Unparalleled Exchange

The period 1992–2001 was equally marked by “first-ever” exchanges in the history of Russian-Japanese bilateral relations. For example, both sides advanced the dialogue on the issue of security and trust in the military sphere, and in April 1996, the Japanese defense minister went to Russia for the first time. As a result of the Moscow negotiations, the parties signed a protocol, according to which the defense departments of the two countries agreed to notify each other of large-scale maneuvers and to step up high-level mutual exchange.

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Within a short period, Russian-Japanese military contacts and exchanges, which in effect began “from scratch,” began to evolve at a fairly rapid pace. In December 1996 and March 1997, Russian and Japanese defense departments held their initial consultations on issues of bilateral and regional security, and confidence-building measures in the military field. A few months later, in May 1997, Russia’s defense minister made his first trip to Japan. In 1998, Russian and Japanese chief military officials traveled to each other’s countries for the first time. In May 1998, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Japan’s SelfDefense Forces went to Russia, and in December, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces went to Japan. There were also later visits from 1999 to 2001 between the Russian Air Force commander-in-chief and the chief of the general staff of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF); the chief of the Main Directorate of the Russian Ground Forces and the chief of the General Staff of Japan Ground Self-Defense Force; and the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy and the chief of the General Staff of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. These all indicated the forging of strong ties between the leadership of all branches of the armed forces of the two countries. They were followed by the development of parallel relations at the regional level, as seen in the mutual visits of Russian and Japanese warships. In June 1996, a destroyer of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) went to Vladivostok where it participated in a naval parade held on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Russian navy. In June 1997, the Admiral Vinogradov, the large antisubmarine destroyer of the Russian Pacific fleet, called in at Tokyo, and this marked the first visit of a Russian warship to Japan since the cruiser Admiral Kornilov in 1894. Thereafter, such exchanges became regular events. With these increased exchanges in the field of security and defense, Russia and Japan marked another first in the signing of a memorandum in Moscow on August 16, 1999, by the Russian and Japanese defense ministers on the establishment of a framework for dialogue and contacts. The Japanese had previously only signed such documents with its military ally, the United States. All of these occasions of contact and exchange between the military of both nations demonstrated the degree to which bilateral relations between them had shifted and that the process of replacing the Cold War period with rapprochement began even within such a particularly sensitive sphere as security. Interaction in important spheres such as border guard departments and law enforcement agencies received a legal framework for the first time in the practice of Russian-Japanese relations. The parties signed a memorandum on cooperation between the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia and Japan’s Maritime Safety Agency, as well as an intergovernmental memorandum on cooperation in the field of law enforcement. As early as mid-September

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2000, a delegation of the Maritime Safety Agency paid its first visit to Russia, and in December that same year, the director of the Russian Federal Border Guard Service went to Japan. It should be noted that in late April 2000, the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk patrol boat of the Russian border guard service called in at Yokohama port—this, too, was a groundbreaking event in the history of Russian-Japanese relations. It participated in a parade of the Maritime Safety Agency and in joint border guard exercises. Measures were taken to boost trade and economic relations and their mutual cooperation. The parties signed the Declaration on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation in 1993, and following President Putin’s trip in September 2000 the “Hashimoto-Yeltsin Economic Cooperation Plan” of economic cooperation and a program for deepening collaboration in the fields of economics and trade. From late May to early June 2001, after a twenty-five-year hiatus, a major delegation of Japan’s Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), led by its chairman, Imai Takashi, went to Russia. By 2001, Russia began to settle its outstanding debt to Japanese companies, which had accumulated during the Soviet period and now totaled USD 2.6 billion. This period also coincided with the formation of an interdepartmental commission on trade and economic issues. Meetings were planned between Russian-Japanese and Japanese-Russian committees on economic cooperation that involved the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations. The parties signed and effected a bilateral agreement on mutual encouragement and the protection of investments, and to this end established the Russian-Japanese Trade and Investment Promotion Organization. In the early 1990s, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) paid two credit tranches to Russia (USD 400 and 500 million, respectively). Japan likewise greatly assisted with the training of managerial staff for economic organizations. By 1999, some 6,500 Russian interns were trained in the banking, marketing, and management fields in Japanese centers promoting Russian reforms. Based on the results of the November 1997 Krasnoyarsk meeting, the Japanese expressed a readiness to offer a non-binding loan worth USD 1.5 billion through the Japan Export-Import Bank (JEXIM) in an effort to support Russian reform. In late 1999, Japan responded to Russia’s request by organizing a loan worth USD 375 million; this allowed the Russian government to solve the acute budget problems caused by the 1998 default. Yet, despite the measures taken in the field of trade and economic relations in the 1990s, no serious progress was achieved in improving bilateral trade or in increasing Japanese investment in the Russian economy. This transpired not only because of the “political constraints” created by the “territorial problem” but also due to the

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absence, in the view of Japanese businesses, of reliable and suitable conditions in the Russian market to conduct business. During this period, however, both sides were nonetheless laying, incrementally, the foundation and creating the conditions for a broader, more dynamic cooperation between their two countries in the spheres of trade and economics. The 1990s were characterized by changes in the political climate, as well as the actual circumstances, surrounding the region of the disputed islands. In April 1992, for example, visa-free travel by the residents of the Southern Kuriles to Japan and of Japanese residents to these islands began. This idea was the outcome of a Russian proposal. In the spring of 1992, the Krabozavodskoe, Yuzhno-Kuril’sk, and Severo-Kuril’sk ports on the Kurile Islands—closed for forty-six years—were opened for regular visits by Japanese vessels. In the winter of 1992, the first batch of Japanese humanitarian aid was delivered to the islands through the Japanese Red Cross. On February 21, 1998, Russia and Japan signed the notable Agreement on Certain Issues of Cooperation in the Fishing Operations Involving Maritime Resources. Under the terms of this agreement on safe fishing, Japanese fishermen were granted the right to fish in Russian territorial waters off the Southern Kuriles. The summer of 1998 also saw the first joint expedition of Russian and Japanese volcanologists to study the Tyatya Volcano on Kunashir Island. Over two years later, on September 4, 2000, the two countries signed a program of Russian-Japanese cooperation aimed at deepening joint economic activities on the Kuriles, which in the initial stage of cooperation envisioned the implementation of projects to cultivate select maritime resources (i.e., seafood processing). The program stipulated that the phased development of joint economic activity would be aimed at building mutual understanding and trust between Russia and Japan, at producing favorable conditions for the promotion of the peace treaty negotiations, and at improving the overall climate in Russian-Japanese relations. Sadly, neither side undertook any specific action to implement this agreement. In the 1990s, bilateral contact and exchange through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and between various population groups significantly increased. For instance, in 1998, the Committee of the 21st Century (Komitet XXI veka) was created in Russia, and in Japan the Japanese-Russian Friendship Forum (Nichiro Yūko Foramu), uniting almost all the NGOs of the two countries that were interested in furthering contacts and exchanges between ordinary people. They aimed at promoting the development of mutual understanding and cooperation between the people of Russia and Japan. The numbers of scholars, political scientists, and members of the public involved in discussions on diverse topics—from international to bilateral

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issues—increased to a certain degree. Beginning in mid-1999, Russian students learning Japanese, young soldiers, teachers, cultural workers, journalists, as well as athletes, began to travel to Japan through the Japan-Russia Youth Exchange Center, which had been founded in 1998 following an agreement between President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Obuchi. While such bilateral cultural exchanges rose significantly, the number of individuals from either side involved in various forms of contacts, was still rather limited. 6 Coda The considerable number of documents presented in this essay confirm that unprecedented changes occurred in the history of Russian-Japanese relations in the 1990s and particularly in the second half of the decade, a comparatively short period in historical terms. The main obstacle in realizing the potential of opportunities to construct creative or strategic partnerships that opened up following democratic Russia’s entry onto the world stage lay, however, in the ongoing issue regarding a peace treaty that neither party was willing to sign. This was due in large part to a sense of wariness by both nations and to their ongoing negative perceptions of each other. Bibliography

Russian Sources



English Source

Kostikov, Vyacheslav Vasil′evich. 1997. Roman s prezidentom [Romance with the President]. Moscow: Vagrius. Kremlin.ru. 2004. Ezhegodnaya press-konferentsiya Vladimira Putina [Annual Press Conference of Vladimir Putin].

Hashimoto, Ryūtarō. 1997. Address by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives. 24 July. http://www.kantei.go.jp/ foreign/0731douyukai.html.

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part 13

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Japanese-Russian Relations in the 21st Century, 2001–2015 Kawaraji Hidetake Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzō paid an official visit to Russia from April 28 to April 30, 2013, where he met with Russian president Vladimir Putin, and they released a joint statement regarding the development of Japan and Russia’s partnership. This was the first visit and joint declaration since Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō’s trip to Russia a decade earlier in 2003. At this time, it was expected that Prime Minister Abe and President Putin would break new ground in Japanese-Russian relations.1 Japanese-Russian relations were rather favorable until around February 2014, and Prime Minister Abe visited Russia concurrent with the opening ceremony at the Sochi Olympics (February 7–23). Relations once again worsened after the Olympics due to Japan’s involvement in economic sanctions implemented in protest of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Throughout 2015, Russia’s attitude toward Japan remained cool. Japan postponed President Putin’s visit there, and in August 2015 Prime Minister Dmitriĭ A. Medvedev ignored Japan’s warnings and visited Etorofu Island. Despite these tensions, both countries still wished to engage in dialogue, and the meeting of the heads of state in Sochi in May 2016 is clear evidence of this. The importance of Japan and Russia’s ties within the world of international relations and their potential for development is certainly not insignificant. And the roles both countries can play in international politics continue to grow in the 21st century. This essay presents a general overview of JapaneseRussian relations in the early 21st century, focusing on peace treaty negotiations and the territorial dispute between the two nations. 1

2001 to 2008: Resumption and Digression

Japanese-Russian relations in the 21st century began with the signing of the Irkutsk Statement by Japanese prime minister Mori Yoshirō and Russian 1  Unless otherwise indicated, the texts from various statements, the meetings of heads of state and foreign ministers, and so forth are taken from the Japan’s Gaimushō (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA) homepage (see bibliography, Gaimushō 2013).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_026

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President Putin on March 25, 2001. Once this statement was signed, heated discussions surfaced in Japan about how to negotiate with Russia regarding the territorial dispute between the two nations. In April that year Japan had a new cabinet with Koizumi Jun’ichirō as prime minister. The new foreign minister, Tanaka Makiko, declared that the 1973 “agreement” with Russia would be the starting point for relations, thereby turning Japanese policy backward by trying to reclaim all four “Northern Territories” (Southern Kurile) islands: Etorofu (Iturup), Kunashiri (Kunashir), Shikotan, and Habomai. Furthermore, the new position, which sought to have Russia hand over Shikotan and the Habomai Islands first and based on the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, led to a political reaction, and Diet member Suzuki Muneo and other high-ranking foreign ministry officials were harshly censured. This scandal and the lack of unity in Japan probably led to distrust on the part of the Russian authorities. Japanese-Russian relations therefore suffered a setback due to Japan’s domestic circumstances. Prime Minister Koizumi’s January 2003 visit to Russia was an opportunity for a fresh start. Over the next two years and more, however, there were no concrete compromises that contributed to progress between the two countries. The year 2005 marked the 150th anniversary of the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation Between Japan and Russia (1855), as well as the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II. There were expectations that some sort of event would occur that could give momentum to improving relations. On February 22, the Japanese House of Representatives adopted the “Resolution Relating to Rapid Progress in Japanese-Russian Relations upon the 150th Anniversary of Amity Between Japan and Russia” (Nichiro shūkō 150 shūnen ni atari, Nichiro kankei no hiyakuteki hatten ni kansuru ketsugi) at a plenary session. While this resolution did call for “rapid progress” in relations between the two countries, in reality, it repeated Japan’s usual assertions and could have caused the negotiation process, constructed in the time leading up to the Irkutsk Statement, to return to square one. In November 2005, President Putin visited Japan, and at this time twelve documents were signed. None mentioned the territorial issue or peace treaty. Earlier in October that year, however, the Russian government drew up a plan for the socio-economic development of the Kurile (Chishima) Islands, including the four islands of the Northern Territories claimed by Japan. The government approved this plan in August 2006, declaring that a total of RUb 18 billion would be invested from 2007 to 2015. The plan also included greatly increasing the population of the Kurile Islands. This measure did not allow for negotiations with Japan about the territorial issues, and it was seen as a reflection of the country’s hardened determination to further “Russiafy” this territory.

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The Abe Shinzō cabinet was formed in September 2006. The prime minister was eager to rebuild Japanese-Russian relations, and in November that year a heads-of-state meeting was held between him and President Putin at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit. Furthermore, at the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on December 13, Minister of Foreign Affairs Asō Tarō proposed to resolve the territorial dispute by splitting the Northern Territories into two blocks of equal surface area. His proposal garnered attention because it demonstrated the Japanese government’s willingness to revise its demand to return all four islands at once, even if it were merely thrown out to gage domestic public opinion and Russia’s reaction. But the next day Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki Yasuhisa declared that there was no change in the government line. In 2007, at a meeting of Japanese-Russian heads of state held at the Heiligendamm Summit (June 6–8), Prime Minister Abe proposed the “Initiative on Strengthening Japanese-Russian Cooperation in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia” (Kyokutō higashi Shiberia chiiki ni okeru Nichiro kan kyōryoku kyōka ni kansuru inishiatibu). While separate from the territorial issue, his initiative showed Japan’s great interest in Russia’s efforts to develop this area and to integrate it into the Asia-Pacific region. Japan saw itself as a necessary partner for Russia, and the initiative was applauded as a constructive proposal by the Abe administration, which was trying to advance the relationship between the two countries. The political situation in Japan was unstable, however, and Abe’s cabinet ended after just a year. And since then, Japanese heads of state have frequently changed. Primarily due to circumstances in Japan, the room for focused negotiations between Russian and Japan was now lost. In September 2007, the Fukuda Yasuo administration assumed power in Japan, and a new order began in Russia under President Medvedev in May 2008. Moreover, an announcement of the “Current Shared View Regarding the Negotiations for Concluding a Peace Treaty” (Heiwa jōyaku teiketsu kōshō ni kansuru gendankai de no kyōtsū no ninshiki) was made at a meeting of JapaneseRussian heads of state during the 34th G8 Summit in Tōyako, Hokkaido (July 7–9, 2008), confirming that both countries were determined to solve the territorial issue. The Fukuda administration also ended after a year, with the Tarō Asō cabinet taking control in September 2008. When Prime Minister Asō participated in the November APEC Summit in Lima, Peru from November 22 to November 23, 2008, he spoke with President Medvedev and stated candidly that negotiations regarding the peace treaty had not truly progressed from where matters stood a year and a half previously when he was the minister of foreign affairs. The two heads of state met again in February 2009 in Sakhalin

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and agreed on the following points regarding the territorial issue: 1) to resolve it within our generation; 2) to work based on the agreements and documents that had been created until that point; 3) to work based on a “new, creative, and unconventional approach” indicated by President Medvedev; and 4) to provide additional instructions in order to accelerate matters such that the territorial issue (decisions regarding national borders) would eventually be resolved. Discord between Japan and Russia once again emerged following this meeting. 2

2009 to 2011: a Worsening of Relations and Unilateral Behavior on Both Sides

In 2009, harsh words were exchanged between Japan and Russia, giving the impression that the effort to find a compromise had been brushed aside. On May 20, Prime Minister Asō responded to a question in the Diet, saying that it is a shame that “Russia’s unlawful occupation” of the Northern Territories continued. On May 29, at the presentation ceremony of the new Japanese ambassador to Russia, Kōno Masaharu, Medvedev replied to this statement, remarking he could not accept Japan’s attitude that called into question Russia’s sovereignty of the four Southern Kurile islands (Asahi shinbun, May 30, 2009). On June 11, a Japanese House of Representatives plenary session unanimously adopted the “Law on the Special Measures Promoting a Resolution of the Problem of the Northern Territories” (Hoppō ryōdo mondai tō kaiketsu sokushin tokubetsu setchihō, referred to as Hokutokuhō), which led to considerable protest from Russia. On June 24, the Lower House of the Russian Federal Assembly (State Duma) called for the scrapping of this law and declared that peace treaty negotiations cannot be concluded as long as the law exists (Roshia geppō, June 2009). In July, at the heads-of-state meeting between Japan and Russia, President Medvedev stated that he was uncomfortable with such negative developments in Japan, to which Prime Minister Asō responded by stating, “If there are no arrangements in Russia aiming for concrete progress on the peace treaty issue, then a relationship as partners in the Asia-Pacific region will not be constructed.” Thus, Japanese-Russian relations deteriorated even further. Then, in September, the Asō Liberal Democratic administration lost power, and the Democratic Party cabinet of Hatoyama Yukio took control as a result of that party’s decisive victory in the general election of the House of Representatives. Hatoyama Yukio’s grandfather was responsible for reviving diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia, having signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration

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of 1956. Russia certainly had hopes for his grandson’s politics. In reality, however, the Democratic Party’s policies toward Russia were even more hardline than that those of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). On October 17, for example, when Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Maehara Seiji observed Kunashir from the ocean, he stated that the Northern Territories are being “unlawfully occupied” by Russia, once again inflaming feelings on the Russian side (Roshia geppō, October 2009). At a cabinet meeting on November 24 the Japanese government agreed upon a document that stated that Russia was “unlawfully occupying” the Northern Territories. On the same day, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released another statement in protest (Roshia geppō, November 2009). In this way, the shift in the Japanese administration to the Democratic Party only served to worsen Japan-Russia relationships; even this change could not find a way to better the situation. The Japanese government was led by the Hatoyama cabinet until the beginning of June 2010, followed by the Kan Naoto cabinet until the beginning of September 2011, and the Noda Yoshihiko cabinet until December 2012. During this time, Japan-Russia relations made no advances regarding the territorial issue or the conclusion of a peace treaty. Rather, the situation grew steadily more serious, and Russia ceased to see Japan’s cooperation as essential in developing Siberia and the Russian Far East. As mentioned above, Russia had worked on a plan for the socio-economic development of the Kurile Islands from 2007 to 2015. Based on this plan, the country pushed ahead with infrastructure development on the four islands claimed by Japan, and their townscapes dramatically changed, becoming more modern with the development of airport, roads, ports, and so forth. Russia decided that South Korean companies would be attracted to the islands, and Japan’s support became unnecessary. On July 2, 2010, a meeting on the social and economic advancement of the Russian Far East was held in Khabarovsk. President Medvedev said in a speech that the trade growth rate with Asia-Pacific countries was being maintained, that the volume of trade with China and South Korea was increasing compared to the previous year, that border cooperation with Mongolia and northeastern China was flourishing, and so forth. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Sergeĭ V. Lavrov gave a speech in which he emphasized South Korea as a cooperative partner and also touched upon economic cooperation with Mongolia and New Zealand. Japan’s name was not mentioned. This can be seen as being a candid declaration that Japan was no longer a necessary partner in economic cooperation. This shocked Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (on this meeting, see Roshia geppō, July 2010; Tōgō 2011; Nagaoshi 2011).

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This dilution of interest in or contempt for Japan was most directly expressed when President Medvedev visited Kunashir on November 1, 2010. This was the first time a top Russian leader entered the “Northern Territories,” even including during the era of the Soviet Union. This event was seen as a move on the part of the Medvedev administration to declare decisively that these islands belong to Russia. Government-affiliated individuals made repeated visits thereafter. On February 7, 2011, designated “Northern Territories Day” (hoppō ryōdo no hi) in Japan, Prime Minister Kan criticized the Russian president’s visit as an “outrage difficult to forgive,” further straining Japanese-Russian relations. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced Japan’s hostility toward Russia. In March, high-ranking officials from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation revealed a plan to deploy missiles on the coast of the Kurile Islands. All of a sudden, it appeared that Japanese-Russian relations had returned to those of the Cold War era. In September that year, the Noda Yoshihiko administration came to power, but this did not alter the situation. 3

Contesting Views of History

The territorial issue easily connects to the problem of how to view the historical facts that gave rise to this issue. Historical events—such as rule and submission, invasion and colonization, justice and betrayal—coalesce with the national memory regarding historical facts and lead to an emotional conflict that is hard to separate from hatred and rancor. For example, the dispute over the Diaoyu (J: Senkaku) Islands between Japan and China is frequently understood by China through the lens of Japanese militarism and policies of aggression. Korea understood the dispute over the Dokdo (J: Takeshima) Islands (also referred to as the Liancourt Rocks) between Japan and Korea as inseparable from Japan’s annexation of Korea and the issue of war-time “comfort women.” Such historical issues create complicated scenarios between states that make territorial issues unresolvable by purely legal means. It cannot be denied that Japan’s indignation toward the Soviet betrayal of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, the Soviet army’s barbarous acts in Manchuria, the issue of the internment of Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) in Siberia, the Stalin administration’s unilateral expansionist policies that ignored international norms, among other things, serves as the basis of the country’s uncompromising position that demands the return of all four islands. As long as these historically sensitive issues are brought into the world of politics, there will be no room for any compromise by Japan. A fundamental issue for Japan is how to seal off such problems in order to overcome the territorial issue. When

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asserting its legitimacy regarding the territorial issue Russia emphasizes that it was the victor over a militarist Japan, however, and therefore Russia should not be expected to make room for compromise. And it seems that Russia’s assertion of its rights, along with China, as a victor country grew stronger during 2010. In May 2010, for example, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Russia and participated in a ceremony marking the 65th anniversary of both countries’ triumphs in World War II. On May 9, Presidents Medvedev and Hu had a headsof-state meeting, and Medvedev’s statements are encapsulated as such: Your participation in this event symbolizes two things. First, that we have a shared view of the previous war in which our two nations fought. Second, that we are in a strategic partnership … This is a very important event that should be commemorated because there is a continual effort to revise past events and the result of World War II. Our shared position is that this result should not be undermined. (Prezident rossii, May 9, 2010) On July 7, 2010, the Lower House of the Russian Federal Assembly approved a bill that makes September 2, when Japan signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, a day that memorializes the end of World War II (Prezident rossii, July 25, 2010). This step was described in the Japanese media as “Russia, which claims that its effective control over the Northern Territories is a result of World War II, aims to strengthen its foothold in the territorial dispute and restrain Japan by stressing its victory” (Asahi shinbun, July 9, 2010, 9). The Russian bill was approved by the Upper House on September 14 and signed by the president on September 25. Russia and China’s shared view of history was most conspicuously on international display during President Medvedev’s visit to Russia in late September 2010. On September 27, the heads of state of both countries released a joint statement regarding the 65th anniversary of the end of World War II, which stated that: Immediately after Japan’s invasion of China, the Soviet Union provided large-scale support to our neighboring countries. The pilots of both countries joined together to fight. People dispatched from China also fought in the Soviet army, whose liberation of northeastern China is highly regarded in China. The glorious historical page of friendship between soldiers and the mutual support between nations constructed the immutable foundation of the current Russia-China strategic partnership and cooperative relationship. In light of the significance of the victories of both our countries, Russia and China in 2010 are carrying out a joint ceremony

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to memorialize the 65th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II … Russia and China firmly criticize efforts to fabricate World War II’s history, to see Nazis, militarists, and their followers as heroes, and to desecrate liberators. We never will accept revisions to the result of World War II that was settled by the Charter of the United Nations and other international documents. These just heighten hostile tendencies between states and ethnic groups. Such a plot brings us back to an ideological way of seeing international relations. Furthermore, it is nothing more than a vain effort with respect to the desirable efforts of the international community that is trying to face global demands and threats. Prezident rossii, September 27, 2010

If we view President Medvedev’s visit to Kunashir on November 1, 2010, in this context, the Russian government’s intention regarding the territorial issue becomes clear—in other words, the Russians demonstrated, both domestically and internationally, that the territorial issue had already been decided historically and that there was no room for discussion. Russia insisted that the territorial problem was a “fabrication” of history, and announced, with China on its side, its intention to fight for them. It is significant that in 2010 the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands became prominent. In September that year, a Chinese fishing boat clashed with a Japanese Coast Guard vessel, and its captain was arrested. This led to a worsening of Japan-China relations, and it made the territorial issue surrounding these islands a priority. This assisted in laying the groundwork for Russia and China to join hands, with territorial issues acting as the medium. If we consider the Dokdo Islands between Japan and China, it could be conjectured that Japan’s engagement with Russia, China, and Korea was solely based on territorial issues. It must also be noted, furthermore, that these issues are not separate since they share common ground as a problem of historical awareness. In other words, a fight merely over sovereignty would not lead to the agitated reactions by China and South Korea regarding these territorial issues. The very reason that there are such emotive reactions can be seen as relating to Japan’s own past colonial rule. Although at present there are no efforts to link the Northern Territories dispute with that of the Dokdo Islands, the conditions for connecting the Northern Territories dispute with the Diaoyu Islands are in place due to China and Russia marching in step vis-à-vis their respective views of history (on the danger of connecting territorial issues with issues of historical awareness, see Tōgō 2013; Iwashita 2005 asserts that it is necessary to solve this territorial issue after having separated it from a historical context).

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During the past several years, the Japanese government has criticized Russia’s “unlawful occupation” of the Northern Territories, while Russia has maintained the position that the issue is resolved and that Japan should accept the results of World War II. The space needed for resolving the territorial dispute and concluding a peace treaty no longer exists but it does appear that conditions for breaking the bottleneck are slowly forming. As noted above, Putin’s return to the position of president is significant. In March 2012, Putin pointed out in a meeting with the press corps that accepting a “draw” is important in order to solve the territorial issue. This showed an approach that pursued political compromise, with Putin not seeking to draw clear distinctions between “good” and “bad” views of history. It could be said that the territorial issue and negotiations to conclude a peace treaty are necessary in order to make decisions about a historical problem. Wisdom is needed from the Abe and Putin administrations about how best to solve this historical issue as a “draw,” without forcing the other country to change its view of history. Rehashing issues of historical awareness can give rise to rage and a desire for revenge in countries (or ethnic groups) that were once enemies. The only possibility regarding the issue of the Northern Territories is for both countries to detach themselves from issues of historical awareness and to adopt a realistic perspective that considers national interest and long-term national strategies that can answer the demands of the 21st century. 4

Searching for a Constructive and Creative Approach

The two countries are attempting to reinvigorate their relationship in all respects with an eye on how to best serve their national interests. The territorial issue aside, steady progress is apparent in their cooperative relationship. In the sphere of security, there has been cooperation between Japan’s Defense Agency (present-day Ministry of Defense) and Russia’s Ministry of Defense on various levels since a memorandum on the subject was signed in 1999 between the two countries. Such a move would have been unthinkable in the Cold War era. In 2006, the memorandum was revised, leading to a steady expansion in cooperation. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Russian military dispatch observers to each other’s exercises, and periodically defense authorities exchange opinions. Furthermore, during the APEC Summit in Hanoi on November 18–19, 2006, Prime Minister Abe and President Putin agreed during a meeting to construct

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a “partnership based on shared strategic interests.” Abe and Putin welcomed the beginning of a “strategic dialogue” between top-level administrators from their respective ministries of foreign affairs. In January 2007, the first strategic dialogue was held in Moscow. Included on the agenda was the issue of North Korea and Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, the situation in the AsiaPacific region, including Northeast Asia, and the state of affairs in Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Within this global field of vision, plans were made to identify shared strategic interests between Japan and Russia. The eleventh of these strategic dialogues was held in February 2013. The deputy foreign ministers of both countries discussed wide-ranging themes, including North Korea and the situation in the Middle East. Within the realm of security, it should be pointed out that it was agreed during a meeting of Japanese-Russian heads of state in April 2013 to hold socalled “Two-Plus-Two” (J: ni purasu ni) ministerial meetings between the foreign ministers and defense ministers of both countries. After the United States and Australia, Russia became the third country with which Japan has held such “Two-Plus-Two” meetings. In September that year, Prime Minister Abe and President Putin met and agreed to hold the first meeting in early November in Tokyo. It is expected that Japan and Russia will further strengthen their trust in the field of security, find shared interests, and work together constructively regarding the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world. The economic relationship between Japan and Russia is also steadily progressing. Data from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals that in 2001 and 2002 the sum of trade between the two nations was at a standstill (USD 4.6 and 4.2 billion, respectively). In 2003, it increased to USD 6 billion USD, and by 2008 rose rapidly to USD 29.8 billion. While trade fell to USD 12.1 billion in 2009, in part due to the global financial crisis, it has continued to develop in the years since. In 2011, when political relations between Japan and Russia were at their coolest, trade reached USD 30.7 billion. The number of Japanese companies expanding business into Russia has consistently grown. There were 192 companies in 2001, in 2010 there were 427, over twice the number. These figures indicate that the slump in political relations due to the territorial dispute has not hindered the development of economic relationships. It must also be pointed out that advancing economic exchange will not necessarily solve the territorial issue. That said, however, economic interests, particularly in the energy field, completely align. Russia wishes to expand the energy resource market to its Far East, and Japan urgently needs such energy resources. In this way, the relationship between the two countries has assumed a complementary form. When considering that energy has strategic importance for a country, the deepening

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of a mutually dependent relationship between Japan and Russia in this field could bring stability to East Asia as a whole, not to these two countries alone. In fact, in 2006, Russia worked out a policy to integrate the economy of its Far East into the Asia-Pacific’s overall dynamic economic development. In response, in June 2007, Japan proposed an “Initiative on Strengthening Japanese-Russian Cooperation in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia” (Kyokutō—Higashi Shiberia chiiki ni okeru Nichiro kankyōryoku kyōka ni kansuru Inishiatibu). Moreover, Russia is pushing ahead with a project to extract crude oil and natural gas from the ocean floor oil and gas fields off Sakhalin (Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II). The Japanese government and private companies have cooperated, providing a valuable supply of energy for Japan. In March 2011, the devastating Tōhoku Earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant disaster brought about unexpected momentum in the Japanese-Russian relationship surrounding the supply and demand of energy. Following the disaster, the Russian government quickly established a support camp for Japan, sent a 161-person relief team to the affected area as well as relief supplies. Russia also proposed an increase to its supply of liquid natural gas (LNG) to Japan because it faced an energy shortage crisis due to the nuclear accident. This led to the acceleration of negotiations between the governments of the two countries, not only regarding the LNG supply but also to the development of gas fields in Russia’s Far East, the new establishment of oil and natural gas plants, the construction of a transport pipeline, and so forth (on Russia’s response to the Tōhoku Earthquake and tsunami, see Ishigōka 2013). The economic relationship between Japan and Russia exists today within an extremely favorable environment. There will probably be no future conflicts of national interest between Japan, which must cease its reliance on nuclear energy, and Russia, which wants to expand the energy it supplies to the rest of Asia. The 21st century demands that Japan and Russia translate this reciprocal relationship into concrete policies that can serve as the basis for the overall security and peace of East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. 5 Conclusion Japan has been unable to construct a truly stable relationship with neighboring countries: the issues of the Northern Territories exists between it and Russia, of the Diaoyu Islands between it and China, of Dokdo between it and South Korea, and of US military bases in the country (e.g., the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma). Depending on one’s viewpoint,

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the latter can be said to be a territorial issue between Japan and the United States. Furthermore, Japan’s surroundings have become more militarized. It is surrounded by China’s reinforced navy, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, and the strengthening of the Russian army in the Northern Territories. In 2011, US president Barack Obama visited Australia after the APEC summit in Honolulu (November 12–13) and made clear that he has “directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific a top priority,” declaring that the US military in Japan and Korea will be maintained and that it will be stationed in Australia. It is clear that this is intended to prevent Chinese military hegemony. At the same time, the Japan Self-Defense Forces held large-scale military exercises in Kyushu and Okinawa, which are near China. While the formation of a free-trade sphere and an integrated military would normally reduce military antagonism, in the Asia-Pacific region, the expansion of economic cooperation is in fact linked to such antagonism. This goes against the national interests of Japan, which attempts to be an economy-oriented nation. The removal of military tension from this region coincides with Japan’s own national interests, and I believe this is the country’s mission. Japan is presently engaged in a battle between the United States and China over hegemony. Japan shoulders part of the former’s military policies. Can Japan escape this situation and play a role that turns the Asia-Pacific region into a free economic zone? It appears that the key to doing so lies in its relationship with Russia. Russia has its own regional multi-country system, separate from APEC and the East Asia Summit (EAS, Russia first participated officially in 2011). For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization created by China and Central Asian Countries marked its 10th anniversary in 2011. In October that year, Putin, then prime minister, announced his idea for a “Eurasian Union,” which would link the Asia-Pacific with Europe, and as a step forward would enter into free-trade agreements with post-Soviet bloc countries. And September 2011 witnessed the opening of a natural gas pipeline linking Sakhalin, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok. This is expected to go through North Korea and be extended into China and South Korea. There is also a plan to build a railroad that would connect Russia, North Korea, and South Korea. In other words, it appears that there are attempts to form an East Asian economic sphere comprising Russia, China, North Korea, and South Korea. Russia is pushing ahead with its plan for a 2007–2015 socio-economic development on the Kurile Islands, which will most likely be incorporated into its Asian strategy. Russia has announced at every opportunity its willingness to develop the Northern Territories with Japan. Should Japan not be forward-thinking in their

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views about this? Russia’s development plan can probably be carried out without Japan, and the Kurile Islands are certainly going to evolve as part of the aforementioned Northeast Asian economic sphere. Even if Japan does not participate, it can be expected that the economic connections between these countries will nevertheless strengthen. For Japan, it is undesirable that any cooperation between the United States and Russia intensify without its inclusion. Under such circumstances, Japan will have to adopt the same policies as the United States, as is currently the case. If this happens, the military tension surrounding Japan will increase, not decrease. I would argue that Japan should carry out diplomacy with an eye to forming a Northeast Asian economic sphere with Russia, China, North Korea, and South Korea. Linking this economic sphere with the Asia-Pacific region will in all probability be effective. And such a policy not only has merits for the Japanese economy but will also become a condition for removing the military tension encircling Japan. There is a need to acknowledge the fact that a cementing of antagonistic military relations regarding Japan is not in the country’s national interests. My belief is that Japan’s role in reducing the military tension surrounding it is grounded in the construction of a shared economic sphere in Northeast Asia with Russia as a strategic partner and in its integration into the Asia-Pacific economic sphere. Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Asahi shinbun. May 30, 2009. “Hoppō ryōdo mondai de Nihon no taiō hihan” [Japanese Counter-criticism of the Northern Territories Problem], 8. Asahi shinbun. July 9, 2010. “Roshia kain ryōdo mondai de Nihon kensei” [Russia’s Lower House, Japanese Diversion on the Northern Territories Problem], 9. Gaimushō [Ministry for Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 2013. Nichiro pātonāshippu no hatten ni kansuru Nihon koku sōri daijin to Roshia renpō daitōryō no kyōdō seimei (shuyō pointo) [Joint Statement by the Japanese Prime Minister and the President of the Russian Federation regarding the Development of a Japanese-Russian Partnership (Main Points)]. April 29. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000004183. pdf#search=%27日露パートナーシップの発展に関する%27. Ishigōka Ken. 2013. Burajīmiru Pūchin: genjitsu shugisha no Taichū tainichi senryaku [Vladimir Putin: A Realist’s Strategy Toward China and Japan]. Tokyo: Tōkyō Shoten. Iwashita Akihiro. 2005. Hoppō ryōdo mondai—4 demo 2 demo naku [The Northern Territories Issue—Neither Four nor Two]. Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho.

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Nagoshi Kenrō. 2011. “Chikara busoku no Chōsen hantō seisaku: Roshia” [A Korean Peninsula Policy that Lacks Power: Russia]. Tōa, no. 525 (March): 24–30. Roshia geppō. June 2009. No. 792. Roshia geppō. October 2009. No. 796. Roshia geppō. November 2009. No. 797. Roshia geppō. July 2010. No. 805. Tōgō Kazuhiko. 2011. “Bunkōban no tame no maegaki” [Preface, Paperback Edition]. In Hoppō ryōdo kōshō hiroku. Ushinawareta godo no kikai [Secret Records of Negotiations on the Northern Territories: Five Missed Opportunities]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha. Tōgō Kazuhiko. 2013. Rekishi ninshiki o toinaosu: Yasukuni, ianfu, ryōdo mondai [Reconsidering Historical Awareness: Yasukuni, Comfort Women, and Territorial Issues]. Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten.



Russian Sources

Prezident rossii [President of Russia]. May 9, 2010. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/7689. Prezident rossii [President of Russia]. July 25, 2010. http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/ news/8444. Prezident rossii [President of Russia]. September 27, 2010. http://www.kremlin.ru/ supplement/719.

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Russia and Japan at the Beginning of the 21st Century: an Era of Untapped Potential Oleg I. Kazakov, Valeriĭ O. Kistanov, and Dmitry V. Streltsov Even in the 21st century Russia remains a vital partner to Japan. The Japanese leadership has recognized that it shares common values with Russia and other Western democracies, and understands the importance of Russia due to its geographical proximity. Unlike the Сold War era from the late 1940s to the early 1950s, when Japan perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to its national interests, particularly in the military sphere, in the early 21st century grounds for such concerns no longer existed. Russia, for its part, implemented economic reforms and introduced a market economy, with the result that Japanese business circles paid increasing attention to the new prospects of Russian-Japanese economic cooperation. Within this newly configured framework in international relations following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of a bipolar system Japan became progressively aware of the importance of having Russia as a serious partner, most notably in achieving the strategic goal of enlarging Japan’s place in the international arena but also to ensure stability and security. This was especially the case in Northeast Asia, a region most sensitive to Japanese interests because of Japan’s inclusion there. For Russia, Japan remained valid as a large neighboring economy and as a crucial source of technology and investment. Equally significant was that at this time Moscow was rethinking the role of the “security treaty” between the United States and Japan, acknowledging that the Japanese-US alliance was not anti-Russian and focusing instead on maintaining regional balances of power and preventing new threats from escalating out of control. This meant that Japan was not viewed as one of Russia’s geopolitical rivals. A key consideration in the reassessment of Japan’s value within Russian foreign policy doctrine is connected to the fundamental shift in the balance of power in East Asia that was associated with the military and economic rise of China that Moscow perceived as a challenge. Russia required full-fledged political relations with Tokyo to secure a more balanced positioning in the Asia-Pacific region, where the process of economic integration increased in strength in the early 21st century.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_027

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Relations in the Political Sphere

The positive legacy of political cooperation that accumulated during the first decade of the post-bipolar era gained momentum in the 2000s. Since 2000 political contacts at the highest level have been regularly held and with relatively full agendas. These included meetings between the heads of states and governments during working visits as well as on the sidelines of various international meetings in multilateral formats, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the G8, and the G20. There were numerous meetings of foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers: high-ranking Russian and Japanese officials, for example, had numerous opportunities to interact at the meetings of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation that was formed in November 1994. Moreover, dialogues and interactions between specific ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (Minenergo of Russia) and the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), were also initiated. Regular dialogue at the highest level was buoyant during this period. Following the change of leadership in Russia in 2000, the successful establishment of personal contacts between the new president of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and the Japanese political leadership became of paramount concern. Putin met the Japanese prime minister Mori Yoshirō on April 29, 2000, in St. Petersburg during an informal meeting in which the two leaders began to address each other by name, a demonstration of the friendlier nature of their meeting. At the next meeting held on the sidelines of the 26th G8 Summit in Okinawa (July 21–23), the parties agreed on the official visit of President Putin to Japan in September that year. President Putin made that first official visit to Japan on September 2, 2000. The three rounds of negotiations with the Japanese prime minister included discussions on a broad spectrum of issues linked to Russian-Japanese cooperation. A range of documents was signed, such as a joint statement on the coordination between the Russian Federation and Japan in international affairs, the Program for Deepening the Trade and Economic Relationship Between Japan and Russia (signed September 2000) as well as a statement by the heads of the two governments on the issue of a peace treaty. Although the latter would deal with the intention by both parties to intensify efforts in raising awareness about the significance of concluding a peace treaty, there was no new information on the territorial issue in this document. The parties actually ignored the Krasnoyarsk Agreement, a bilateral pledge to conclude a peace treaty by 2000 (the parties implicitly rejected this pledge). The results of the official visit included the signing of the Program of the Russian-Japanese Cooperation on

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the Development of Joint Economic Activity on the islands of Iturup (Etorofu), Kunashir (Kunashiri), Shikotan, and Habomai. This aimed at the gradual growth of inter-mutual economic activities on the Southern Kurile Islands through a strengthening of mutual understanding and trust between the two countries, creating favorable conditions to promote bilateral talks on the peace treaty, and improving the overall atmosphere of Russian-Japanese relations. On January 16, 2001, as part of the preparations for the visit of the Japanese prime minister to Russia, negotiations were held between the foreign affairs ministers Igor S. Ivanov (Russia) and Kōno Yōhei (Japan). The parties signed a memorandum on the new version of the Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issues Between Russia and Japan and on activities to raise the awareness of the general public of both nations about the importance of concluding a peace treaty. This was published in 2001 and included documents signed after 1993. Some two months later, on March 25, 2001, the city of Irkutsk hosted a meeting between the president of the Russian Federation and the Japanese prime minister. Given the recent meeting of the two leaders on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Brunei (November 12–16), this marked the height of the meetings held by them during the course of the year. “It turns out that I meet with Vladimir Putin more often then with the others,” said Mori Yoshirō in Irkutsk (NEWSru.com 2001). The Irkutsk meeting resulted with the president of the Russian Federation and the Japanese prime minister signing the Irkutsk Statement regarding the continuation of talks on the peace treaty. This was the first time in the short history of relations between post-Soviet Russia and Japan that mention was made of the 1956 Joint Declaration between the USSR and Japan, which was described as “the basic legal instrument that initiated the process of negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries.” This statement also contained a reference to the documents of the 1990s, in which the parties agreed to accelerate negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty by solving the issue of ownership of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai, and thus to achieve full normalization of bilateral relations on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration about Russian-Japanese relations signed in 1993. At the press conference following the talks, Putin stated that “the 1956 [Joint] Declaration is important but it is not the only document underpinning the development of our relations” and “regarding Article 9 of the declaration concerning the fate of Shikotan and Habomai, the work by experts of both states is required for its uniform understanding” (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭkoĭ Federatsii 2001c). On May 14, 2001, the Russian minister of foreign affairs Ivanov conveyed the official opinion about the meeting’s outcome:

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There are reports regarding the former Japanese prime minister Yoshirō Mori [Mori Yoshirō] stating that a certain plan for negotiations about the principles of transfer for part of the Kurile Islands to Japan had been developed during the top-level meeting in March. I would like to say the following: no new negotiation plans have been ironed out. As noted in Irkutsk during the negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty, it is very important to maintain an atmosphere of understanding, trust, and broad, mutually beneficial cooperation in Russian-Japanese relations. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii 2001a

Although each party had a different understanding of the Irkutsk Statement, its role in Russian-Japanese relations cannot be underestimated. It was a genuine attempt to adopt a document that would create favorable conditions for the development of relations between the two countries and that took into consideration the separate approaches of the parties in resolving the territorial problem. The political dialogue also continued with the change of the Japanese government in the spring of 2001 to the administration of Koizumi Jun’ichirō. During the meeting between the Russian and Japanese leaders on July 21, 2001, at the G8 summit in Genoa (July 21–22), both sides confirmed that all earlier agreements, including those achieved in Irkutsk, would be respected, and that these would become the “basis for the building of relationship in future” (Kremlin.ru 2001). On August 20, 2001, however, it was made public that the Japanese prime minister had sent the Russian president a message that expressly stated that he “cannot agree” to permitting vessels belonging to third countries to fish close to the Southern Kuriles and that it “is concerned that the current situation will have a negative impact not only on the peace treaty negotiations with Japan, but on the entire scope of bilateral relations.” This statement was tied to an earlier move by the Russians to allow South Korean vessels to fish Pacific saury close to the Southern Kuriles; the same licenses were issued to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and a Ukrainian company (Kommersant 2001). The latter would give the license to Taiwanese fishing vessels. The Japanese government felt that Russian permittance to third countries to fish near the Southern Kuriles undermined its position in the dispute over the ownership of these islands. Another sensitive issue in bilateral relations was the problem of illegal marine poaching. On October 9, 2001, Tokyo hosted consultations between the Russian and Japanese ministries of foreign affairs, during which the parties shared opinions on the importance of an early adoption of effective practical steps to block the illicit export of seafood from waters adjacent to Japan

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and agreed to intensify the development of such measures (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii 2001b). Later, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr P. Losyukov noted that “Japan is sensitive to fishery by third countries in proximity to the Southern Kuriles, but Russia is more concerned about the thriving poaching there.” He believed that the actions of poachers in Russian waters caused damage to the country’s interests and that it required the reaction of Tokyo officials (Sakhalin.info 2001). The Russian side was also annoyed that Japanese political maps designated the Southern Kuriles as Japanese territory. On November 20, 2001, the media reported that Japanese and South Korean representatives in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk circulated maps that showed the Southern Kuriles as Japanese territory. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a message in which it noted that such actions—if they did indeed take place—did not contribute to the strengthening of good neighborliness, friendship, and trust between Russia and Japan, or the creation of a partnership between the two countries (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii 2001c). On February 1–2, 2002, Ivanov visited Tokyo. He met the Japanese prime minister on February 1 to discuss a wide range of issues dealing with RussianJapanese cooperation. Ivanov and his Japanese counterpart Kawaguchi Yoriko, who had only been appointed to this position a day earlier, signed a joint statement regarding the fight against international terrorism, which, in particular, condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. They expressed deep sympathy and condolences to the many countries and families of the victims, as well as the people and government of the United States. On February 5, 2002, at a specially organized press conference Kawaguchi noted that earlier Ivanov had “inaccurately stated to reporters the agreement to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty reached in Tokyo on February 2” (NEWSru.com 2002). She stated that during the meeting they agreed that they would begin consideration of the problem of the Southern Kuriles in March based on the “Two-Plus-Two” formula. (The expression “twoplus-two” [J: ni purasu ni] connoted that both sides would separately solve the problem of Habomai and Shikotan [two], and the problem of the other two islands, Kunashir and Iturup [plus two].) Kawaguchi remarked that Ivanov not only approved the scheme, but also agreed to launch “simultaneous and parallel” negotiations on both groups of islands. With Ivanov’s visit to Japan, the deputies of the Russian State Duma voiced their suspicions that “ceding the Russian territories” went behind the back of the Russians, and that there was an agreement on the transfer of Southern Kuriles to Japan based on the “Two-Plus-Two” formula (Gosudarstvennaya

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Duma 2002a). The minister of foreign affairs was invited to the television program “Government Hour” (Pravitel’stvennyĭ chas) at the State Duma in which high-ranking government officials were questioned on different topics. Speaking on the program on March 13, 2002, Ivanov emphasized that: “I want to state for the record that there is no bargaining with the Japanese side on the transfer of certain islands. We are searching for solutions to the issue of border demarcation. To put it bluntly, we are talking about documenting the border between Russia and Japan in the text of the peace treaty in the event of its signing.” In answering the question about the necessity of concluding a peace treaty with Japan, he also noted: “Of course, we can live without a peace treaty, but it is better to live with a peace treaty, when the borders are actually documented on a contractual basis. Any state is committed to this, yet there would hardly anyone who would wish to live within the borders [of a place] where there are disputed areas” (Gosudarstvennaya Duma 2002b). On the initiative of the Sakhalin Regional Duma, the State Duma held parliamentary hearings, “Southern Kuriles: Problems of Economics, Politics, and Security” (Yuzhnye Kurily: problemy ėkonomiki, politiki I bezopasnosti), on March 18, 2002. They were meant to develop recommendations by the State Duma for federal and regional state authorities of the Russian Federation on the strengthening of Russian state sovereignty over the Southern Kuriles. The adopted document, in particular, argued that the “reference of the Japanese party to the second part of Article 9 of the 1956 [Joint] Declaration is currently unjustified” and the Russian president was advised: … to steer the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs toward actively promoting the idea of signing an integrated (comprehensive) treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation, bearing in mind that peace between Russia and Japan had already been restored in 1956 and an additional peace treaty is not required. [This] represented modern realities and the need in the development of bilateral relations between the two countries without mentioning the “border issue.” Rekomendatsii 2002

At the same time, a scandal surfaced in Japan involving an influential MP from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Suzuki Muneo. He was accused of lobbying for state funds for the construction of the so-called House of Friendship on Kunashir, the beneficiaries of which were Japanese companies close to the politician. Suzuki, who was also called “the secret curator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” was proactive in his support of the development of relations with Russia; he had visited Russia on a number of occasions as a special envoy of the Japanese prime minister. Following an investigation by - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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the Tokyo prosecutor, Suzuki was convicted and excluded from politics for an extended period. Japanese diplomats working in Russian-related departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also suffered, as they were accused of being too “pro-Russian.” For instance, on April 3, 2002, Tōgō Kazuhiko, who headed the European department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was dismissed. The “Suzuki Scandal” seriously damaged Russian-Japanese relations, such that the scheduled 2002 visit of the Japanese prime minister to Russia was postponed. In this light, the visit of the Japanese prime minister to Moscow from January 9 to January 11, 2003, became a milestone in Russian-Japanese relations. On January 10, a joint statement on the adoption of an “action plan” was signed: this was a broad political document reflecting the improvements made toward building a constructive partnership between the Russian Federation and Japan as set forth in 1998. This document outlined the future direction of efforts regarding the deepening of political dialogue, negotiations on the peace treaty, cooperation in the international arena, trade and economic interaction, advancement of relations in the law enforcement and defense areas, as well as the expansion of cultural and humanitarian exchange. This “action plan” was positioned as a kind of road map for the development of bilateral relations. It must be admitted, however, that this plan only conveyed the intentions of the parties and did not specify the steps required to achieve any concrete goals. It appears that it was determined by the understanding that some of the documents signed in the 1990s, in particular, a promise in 1997 to sign a peace treaty by 2000, remained unimplemented. Prime Minister Koizumi went to Khabarovsk from Moscow, and this marked the first visit of the Japanese prime minister to the Russian Far East. Japan’s interest in this region had traditionally been due to the rich deposits of hydrocarbons and other raw-material resources there that could be potentially tapped for Japan’s economic benefits and as a solution to the diversification in resources supply. And, there were certain circumstances that made it necessary for the Japanese to act in this area since at this time the Russians were discussing the construction of two alternative pipelines from the most potentially productive regions of East Siberia: the Angarsk–Daqing (China) route proposed by the Yukos Oil company, and the Angarsk–Nakhodka route exiting at the Russian Pacific coast, which ensured the access of Russian oil not only to Chinese markets but also to other Asia-Pacific countries. Japan attempted to have Russia settle on the second option; however, Russia eventually decided to build both. The end of 2003 is remembered for the establishment of the RussianJapanese public organization known as the Council of Wise Men, which Putin and Koizumi agreed to create during a meeting on October 20, 2003, in the - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Thai capital Bangkok. It was formulated as a platform for informal talks on peace treaty issues between the two countries. Putin signed the corresponding decree on December 15, 2003, that initiated the Russian side of the council. The mayor of Moscow , Yuriĭ M. Luzhkov, was the co-chairman for the Russian side of the council and his Japanese counterpart Mori Yoshirō. The composition of the council was determined by February 2004: seven “wise men” from each side, including a number of prominent public figures, represented RussianJapanese business and mass media sectors. One remarkable omission on the Russian side was the absence of any experts on Japan. The Council of Wise Men was successful in contributing to the creation of an atmosphere of trust and openness, but it was clear that the problem surrounding the signing of a peace treaty could only be solved by top political leaders from the two countries. The council, in providing an interactive (dialogue) format of the “second track” to discuss the most complicated issues of bilateral relations, was only able to play a supporting role. The council lasted until March 2007, when Mori publicly announced its termination. The territorial issue continued to be one of the central items on the agenda of bilateral relations. On November 14, 2004, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergeĭ V. Lavrov detailed the Russian position on the territorial dispute with Japan during the airing of the program “Orange Juice” (R: Apel’sinovyĭ sok) on the Russian NTV channel. Commenting on the issue of border demarcation between Russia and Japan, Lavrov declared that Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, recognized the obligations under the 1956 Joint Declaration and was ready to end the territorial issue based on this document. At the same time, Lavrov remarked that Russia and Japan still had to discuss how that promise should be implemented (BBC Russian.com 2004). Later, President Putin called Lavrov’s interview “good” and thanked him “for the comprehensive picture of our foreign policy priorities” (Rossiĭskaya gazeta 2004). The Japanese reaction to these statements was measured, and Prime Minister Koizumi stated that Japan would only sign a peace treaty when all four islands were defined as belonging to Japan. President Putin paid an official visit to Japan in November 2005, which led to the adoption of a solid range of documents aimed at strengthening relations in various fields. The leaders of the two countries also affected a program of cooperation in combating terrorism; the parties signed an agreement on measures to simplify the visa regime, on the completion of talks on Russia’s accession to World Trade Organization (WTO), and on expanding coordination in the energy field. Putin took part in a Russian-Japanese business forum that brought together about 400 representatives from business circles of both nations, and the scale of this event was unprecedented in the history of bilateral

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relations. Of the eighteen documents signed during the trip, twelve related to the expansion of collaboration in the economic field. Putin and Koizumi also signed a formal document for Russia and Japan regarding collaboration in the battle against terrorism. Relations in the political sphere continued to evolve following Koizumi’s departure as prime minister in 2006. Top-level meetings between the heads of both governments were regularly held; Vladimir Putin, now the Russian prime minister, went to Japan from May 11 to 13, 2009. During the visit the entire gamut of Russian-Japanese cooperation in trade and economics was discussed: energy, transport, peaceful use of atomic energy, the environment and energy saving, Information and Communications Technology (ICT), agriculture and fisheries, law enforcement and customs activities, as well as regional economic ties. Russia pinned particularly high hopes on the agreement signed between the Russian Federation and Japan on the collaboration in the peaceful use of nuclear energy; however, the natural and man-made (Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant) disaster following the Tōhoku Earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, hindered any actions in this arena. From the summer of 2009 onward, political relations between the two countries have cooled. On June 11, 2009, the Lower House of the Japanese National Diet unanimously adopted amendments to the 1982 “Law on the Special Measures Promoting a Resolution of the Problem of the Northern Territories” (Hoppō ryōdo mondai tō kaiketsu sokushin tokubetsu setchihō, referred to as Hokutokuhō) in which the “Northern Territories” (hoppō ryōdo) were called “indigenous territories” (koyū no ryōdo). These amendments led to wideranging protest from the Russian public, and both houses of the Russian parliament immediately issued statements linked to it. On August 7 of the same year, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the termination of Japanese humanitarian assistance to the Southern Kuriles. In response to an inquiry by the House of Representative MP Kondō Shōichi, from July 3, 2010, the Japanese government employed the phrase “illegally occupied” ( fuhō senkyo) in reference to the status of the islands. The Japanese later described the visit of the Russian president Dmitriĭ A. Medvedev to Kunashir Island on November 1, 2010, as a step that “complicated” bilateral relations, with the Japanese prime minister Kan Naoto describing this visit as “inexcusable rudeness” (Ria novosti 2011) and the Japanese minister of foreign affairs Maehara Seiji saying the visit “hurt the feelings of Japan’s population” (Interfax 2010). The ambassador was recalled to Russia “for consultations” and the Japanese media launched an anti-Russian campaign. The string of mutual verbal attacks was only interrupted by the Fukushima disaster, which led to improved bilateral relations after Russia became one of the countries

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providing Japan with invaluable disaster assistance. Japan greatly appreciated the mission of Russian rescuers sent to the earthquake devastated city of Sendai, and made special note of the fact that Russia had immediately sent the most needed supplies to the affected areas—that is, dosimeters, respirators, blankets, and drinking water. The election of Vladimir Putin in 2012 for a third term as the Russian president raised the hopes of Japanese politicians regarding the resumption of dialogue on the territorial issue. President Putin’s own statements contributed in part to this: before the presidential election he spoke in favor of finding a mutually acceptable solution to the territorial dispute. During a press conference on March 2, 2012, the president said that Russia and Japan should seek an acceptable compromise to the territorial dispute (Predsedatel pravitel’stva rossii 2012). He described the situation with a judo term, hikiwake, a “tie” or “draw.” Six days later the Japanese prime minister Noda Yoshihiko, in speaking to the Lower House of the Japanese National Diet, noted that the transference of “only two islands” to Japan (written into the 1956 declaration) as a solution to the territorial dispute “is not hikiwake” (ITAR-TASS 2012). On April 29–30, 2013, Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzō visited Moscow and met with President Putin. Important agreements on cooperation in the gas sector were signed during this trip, most notably those concerning the development of deposits in Yakutia and near Irkutsk, the construction of the pipeline from Eastern Siberia to Vladivostok, and the building of a large plant for liquefied natural gas (LNG) near Vladivostok with an annual capacity of 15 million tons. A significant outcome of the visit was the decision to establish a fund for the promotion of direct private Japanese investments in the Russian economy. The visit also resulted in agreements aimed at strengthening coordination between Russia and Japan in the security sphere. Russia and Japan decided to launch the practice of a “Two-Plus-Two” dialogue involving the participation of foreign affair and defense ministers; this was fundamentally new in Russian-Japanese bilateral relations. The parties agreed to expand relations between the defense ministries of the two countries, initiating regular consultations between the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Federation’s Office of the Security Council, and to continue cooperation in the fight against terrorism and maritime piracy. It was decided to conduct meetings annually, at least, between the foreign affairs ministers. 2

Cooperation in the International Arena and in Security

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their positions on the most topical issues of world politics are similar or even at times identical. This concerns the Middle East settlement, the nuclear issues of Iran and the Korean Peninsula, global economic problems, disarmament, and the recognition by each party of the central role of the United Nations in finding a solution to global and regional problems. Russia and Japan regularly exchange views and coordinate their stances regarding the negotiation process on the problems of the Korean Peninsula. They actively coordinate to solve problems such as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Both partners have paid great attention to the issues of cooperation in regional and global multilateral international organizations. At the 1997 APEC summit in Vancouver (November 24–25), Japan supported Russia’s admission to APEC and in 2010 its entry to the East Asia Summit. In turn, Russia is sympathetic to Japan’s strategic goal to elevate its status in the United Nations to the level of a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The shifting situation in the sphere of East Asian regional security—one associated with the growth of military tensions in the East China Sea and the ongoing political strain between China and South Korea—forced each party to set up a dialogue on security issues. Japan was especially concerned about the furtherance of nuclear missile programs by North Korea, the military rise of China, including its increased military presence of China in the waters around the Senkaku (C: Diaoyu) Islands, which Beijing claims as its territory. Unlike Japan, which emphasizes the development of military and political alliance with the United States in its policy on national security, Russia’s approach to regional security draws on the practice of multilateral dialogue already extant in the East Asian sphere and the creation of a system of cross security guarantees based on the principle of non-alignment. While sympathetic to the US-Japan Security Treaty, Russia relied on the notion of “indivisible security” that called for the provision of security assurances to all countries in the region, not just those that were part of military alliances. The interests of Russia and Japan are either considerably close or overlap on a wide range of international security issues in the East Asian region, such as “denuclearization” and settlement on the Korean Peninsula, the security of maritime communications, confidence-building measures in the region, and combating terrorism and cybercrime. Since the mid-1990s, Russian and Japanese defense ministries have established a stable dialogue; this was unthinkable in the Cold War era. Since 1997, the analytical projections of the Japanese Ministry of Defense had abandoned the idea of “Russia as a potential threat.” Over a short period, Russian-Japanese military contacts and exchanges, which began at practically zero, have reached a level that has facilitated, for example, the participation of warships from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in military exercises of the - 978-90-04-40085-6 Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2020 12:06:26PM via free access

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Russian Pacific fleet. Joint exercises on search and rescue at sea involving ships and aircraft of the two nations became regular events. In 1999, the Russian and Japanese defense ministries signed a memorandum on the furtherance of dialogue and contacts to fix an agreement to carry out constant intensive contacts at all levels. Previously, the Japanese only signed such documents with its strategic military ally, the United States. Both countries maintain contact between the Russian Border Service and Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, including a partnership in the pursuit of illegal vessels and ships violating state borders, joint exercises on rescue at sea, along with exchanges between law enforcement and customs services. In the 2000s, Russia and Japan became allies in the anti-terrorist coalition following the events of September 11, 2001. Bilateral consultations were carried out in keeping with a joint statement on the fight against terrorism, and joint countermeasures dealing with the Afghani drug threat are undergoing. The parties have come together in the preparation and training of local personnel for law enforcement agencies in Afghanistan battling drug trafficking at the center of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Domodedovo. On November 1, 2013, a meeting of Japanese and Russian ministers of foreign affairs and defense was held within the “Two-Plus-Two” framework. An important goal was the creation of communication channels and later a strategic dialogue on the issues of military security. Cooperation in opposing the socalled “new threats”—international terrorism, piracy, and illegal arms trade— was discussed at the meeting. A specific agreement was reached to hold joint exercises to counter terrorism and piracy. 3

Scientific, Cultural, and Educational Exchange

From 2000 into the 2010s, exchanges in the field of culture have widened. Since the first half of the 1990s, “Japanese Spring” and “Japanese Autumn” cultural festivals have been regularly held in Russia. In 2006, Japan launched an annual Russian culture festival, designed to acquaint the Japanese with the national traditions of the peoples of Russia and to find ways to heighten mutual understanding and trust between the two nations. The festival program includes performances of ballet and circus troupes, exhibitions of paintings and children’s drawings, concerts by celebrated choirs and ensembles of Russian folk songs, as well as screenings of contemporary films and retrospectives of old movies. Scientific relations continued between the institutions of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the scientific and educational centers of Japan, many of which were instituted in Soviet times. Inter-university exchanges between

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Russia and Japan extend back to the early 1970s with the signing of the first protocol on cooperation between Lomonosov Moscow State University and Tōkai University. In the 2000s, Russian regional universities also established contacts with Japan. For example, Tomsk State University in Siberia and Orenburg State University signed protocols on cooperation with Hiroshima University, and Ryazan State University formed partnerships with Nagoya University and the University of Toyama. The Far Eastern universities of Russia likewise supported good relations with Japan, most notably, the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok and Kamchatka State University. The Far Eastern Federal University has not only founded partner-university relationships with several Japanese universities but also opened an office in Hakodate. Such inter-university relations involved the organization and implementation of joint research, international conferences and seminars at university venues, exchanges between teachers and academic staff, and the mutual training of undergraduate and graduate students, together with other forms of student exchange such as the Japan-Russia Student Forum. Rectors from leading Russian and Japanese universities convened the JapanRussia Forum of Rectors that assumed a dialogue format in the fields of higher education, scientific research, and cultural relations. Its first meeting was organized on the sidelines of Prime Minister Putin’s visit to Japan in April 2009, and to date there have been seven in total. They offered an opportunity for representatives of Russian and Japanese universities to speak about their institutions and discuss the issues of strengthening and evolving avenues of cooperation. The events were attended by members of the education and science ministries, along with high-profile politicians and public figures from each country. Inter-university exchange, as well as the exchange between youth organizations, relies on a strong regulatory framework laid down at the intergovernmental level. In July 2002, for example, an agreement on cultural relations between Russia and Japan entered into force, which prioritized education and students. This focus was already in evidence in the late 1990s. In March 1999, the governments of the Russian Federation and Japan signed a framework agreement on creating a Japan-Russia Youth Exchange Commission that supported the coordination of study visits of youth and youth forums. Exchanges in the field of education also took the form of internships for Russian entrepreneurial managers of enterprises and civil servants of the Russian Federation at a Japanese center of technical assistance established in Moscow and its branches in the regions that were part of the Program on Training Managers, which was envisioned under the “Hashimoto-Yeltsin Economic Cooperation Plan” established in November 1997. Six Japanese centers are currently operating

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in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. 4

Trade and Economic Ties

During President Putin’s official visit to Japan in September 2000, he and Japanese prime minister Mori signed the Program for Deepening the Trade and Economic Relationship Between Russia and Japan, which contained specific measures for enhancing and expanding the Hashimoto-Yeltsin plan. The trade turnover between the two countries has witnessed rapid growth since the first half of the 2000s, when Russia enjoyed an economic boom due to the rising global price of energy resources. From 2003 to 2007, exports from Russia to Japan increased threefold and imports from Japan almost sevenfold. In 2012, the trade turnover reached a record level of USD 31.2 billion; exports from Russia to Japan amounted to USD 15.5 billion and imports were at USD 15.7 billion (Portal vneshneėkonomicheskoĭ informatsii 2013). The value of trade relations between Russian and Japan has been consistently low when compared to their dealings with other countries. For example, Russian exports to Japan in the 2000s amounted to no more than 1.5 to 2 per cent and Japanese imports into Russia were less than 6 per cent. Moreover, Russia’s share in Japan’s trade balance has never exceeded 1 to 2 per cent. In 2012, Russia was ranked fifteenth among Japan’s trading partners, and Japan was eighth for Russia (Portal vneshneėkonomicheskoĭ informatsii 2013). The structure of trade has not experienced significant changes throughout the decades: Russia acted mainly as a supplier of certain raw materials for the Japanese market while Japan primarily purchased energy resources, nonferrous metals, seafood, and timber from Russia. In the 2000s, the dominant trend in trade relations between the two nations was the rapid growth of Russian exports of oil and gas to Japan, which became more than half of its total cost of Russia’s exports to Japan. Russia’s role as an energy supplier became especially important for Japan after the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant disaster on March 11, 2011, which forced the country to abandon nuclear power. In 2012, Russia ranked sixth among the nations supplying oil to Japan (4.8 percent of total volume of oil imports) and fourth among LNG suppliers (8.2 percent) (Kanzei 2013a). Russia’s achievement in reaching Japanese gas markets is exceptional considering the fact that before 2009 Russia did not supply Japan with any LNG. Japanese customs statistics indicate that oil placed first within Russian exports to Japan in 2012 (35.1 percent), followed by LNG (29.8 percent), non-ferrous metals (9.1 percent),

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coal (8.6 percent), and seafood (7.3 percent) (Kanzei 2013b). Consumer goods, most notably cars, represented a large segment of Russian imports from Japan. It should be noted, however, that a significant proportion of Japanese brands, particularly household appliances and cars, are supplied to the European part of Russia (i.e., west of the Urals), not by Japan, but by affiliates of Japanese companies located in third countries in Europe or in Southeast Asia. As a result, these are not recorded as a part of bilateral trade in customs statistics. The main problem surrounding trade relations between Russia and Japan is the lack of a sufficient level of interdependence that would permit us to speak about the “mutual complementarity” of the two economies. This is due to the fact that Russian sales of energy, other resources and supplies to Japan, as well as the supply of finished goods from Japan to Russia, were not “country driven.” They could, if necessary, be replaced by alternatives. The expansion of investment cooperation between Russia and Japan was similarly brisk from 2000 into the 2010s. The legal and institutional framework for this was based on the Agreement Between the Governments of Japan and of the Russian Federation Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments, which was signed in November 1998 during an official visit on November 11–13, 1998, of the Japanese prime minister Obuchi Keizō to Russia. Following the the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant disaster Japan began to stress Russia’s role as a promising investment partner amid the reorientation of the country’s energy needs related to hydrocarbon fuel. As a result, the energy sector assumed a predominant position in the industrial structure of Japanese investments in Russia. The highest profile of these was the development of offshore oil and gas fields on Sakhalin Island—the so-called “Sakhalin Projects”—that began in the 1970s. In 2006, Russia commenced deliveries of Sakhalin oil to Japan, and from the end of 2012, when construction on the second stage of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline was completed, oil exports began from Eastern Siberia to Japan. In the future, Japan is expected to become one of the largest buyers of Russian oil. In February 2009, an LNG plant in southern Sakhalin, with the capacity to produce 10 million tons of LNG annually, was built with Japanese investment and technological assistance. Companies in Japan acted as strategic investors for Sakhalin-2 (part of the above Sakhalin Projects), suppliers of equipment packages and technologies, and were the main consumers of the Russian energy carrier: in effect, up to 60 percent of the gas produced is shipped to Japan. The Japanese prime minister Asō Tarō described the Sakhalin-2 project as “a symbol of Russian-Japanese cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region” (Ria novosti 2009). In 2013, agreement was reached on the construction of a new LNG

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plant near Vladivostok that was scheduled for completion in 2018 (at the time of writing, the project has been shelved). Investment cooperation is not limited to natural resources. Since the late 2000s, Japanese companies began to express interest in wholesale and retail trade, the timber and woodworking industry, the automotive industry, and the production of automotive components. In late 2007, the Japanese automotive company Toyota built the first Russian car assembly plant near St. Petersburg; thereafter, all the major Japanese automakers began construction of assembly plants in Russia. With the arrival to Russia of other of the largest Japanese manufacturers, such as Nissan, Komatsu, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba, leading Japanese financial institutions also entered Russian markets, including the Tokyo-Mitsubishi-UFJ and Mizuho banks, as well as the Nomura Securities (Nomura Shōken) and Daiwa Securities (Daiwa Shōken) investment companies. A series of mutually beneficial economic projects in other high-tech fields was equally successful. The most notable of these was the laying of fiber optic cables on the seabed between Russia and Japan in 2008; this was jointly funded and organized by the Russian and Japanese telecommunications companies TransTeleCom and the NEC Corporation. Russia reaped tangible benefits from this project through an access to Japanese information and telecommunication technologies, and Japan, in turn, through providing a cheaper, reliable, and higher-quality traffic of information to Europe. The active position of the Japanese government greatly contributed to the increased investment activity of Japanese companies in Russia. In 2007, during the G8 summit in Heiligendamm (June 6–8), the Japanese initiated the establishment of Japanese-Russian cooperation in the regions of the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia in the following areas: energy, transport, communications, environment, healthcare and medicine, alongside the improvement of trade and investment climate, and the development of inter-regional exchanges. The investment flow from Japan remained at a relatively low level when seen against the totality of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Russia. In June 2013, the volume of accumulated Japanese investment in Russia amounted to USD 10.5 billion, or 2.8 percent of the total FDI (tenth among foreign investor countries) (Federal’naya sluzhba gosudarstvennoĭ statistiki 2013). The vast majority of investments were in the field of oil production and refining. The Japanese FDI to Russia remained very modest when viewed against many other nations receiving Japanese investment. For example, in 2012, Japan invested only USD .76 billion in Russia. Compare this with Japan’s investment in the United States (USD 31.78 billion), China (USD 13.48 billion), South Korea (USD 4 billion), and India (USD 2.8 billion) (JETRO 2013).

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5 Conclusion Russian-Japanese relations from 2000 into the 2010s did not realize their full potential and the opportunities for cooperation between the two countries— particularly in the field of economics—are still largely untapped. Positive trends in the evolution of trade and economic relations, in the field of security, and in humanitarian spheres have yet to reach a level that would permit us to speak of an emergence of interdependent bilateral relations. This, in turn, does not foster hopes for the strengthening of our partnership and its transition to a higher level in the near future. The Russian and Japanese positions regarding the territorial dispute remain incompatible, which indicates that in the foreseeable future, at least, Russia and Japan will not overcome the “vestiges of the past” and sign a mutually acceptable peace treaty. The primary goal at present is that existing contradictions do not hinder the further development of relations between our two countries. Bibliography

Russian Sources

BBC Russian.com. 2004. “Rossiya mozhet peredat’ Yaponii dva ostrova” [Russia Can Transfer Two Islands to Japan]. November 15. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/ news/newsid_4011000/4011981.stm. Federal’naya sluzhba gosudarstvennoĭ statistiki [Federal State Statistics Service]. 2013. “Ob”em nakoplennykh inostrannykh investitsiĭ v ėkonomike Rossii po osnovnykh stranam-investoram” [Volume of Accumulated Foreign Investments in the Russian Economy by Main Investing Countries]. http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/B04_03/ IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/174inv21.htm. Accessed March 2, 2014 (no longer accessible). English site: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/main/. Gosudarstvennaya Duma [State Duma]. 2002a. “Stenogramma zasedaniya Gosudarstvennoĭ Dumy ot 6 fevralya 2002 g.” [The Transcript of the Meeting of the State Duma on February 6, 2002]. http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/1781/. Gosudarstvennaya Duma [State Duma]. 2002b. “Stenogramma zasedaniya Gosudarstvennoĭ Dumy ot 13 marta 2002” [The Transcript of the Meeting of the State Duma on March 13, 2002]. http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/1758/. Interfax. 2010. “Posol Rossii vyzvan v MID Yaponii v svyazi s poezdkoĭ Medvedeva na Yuzhnye Kurily” [Russia’s Ambassador Summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Connection with the Visit of Mr. Medvedev to the Southern Kuriles]. Interfax, November 1, 2010, 08:48. http://www.interfax.ru/russia/163079.

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ITAR-TASS. 2012. “Tokio pretenduet na vse chetyre yuzhnokuril’skikh ostrova” [Tokyo Claims all Four of the Kurile Islands]. March 8. http://itar-tass.com/ mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/503302. Kommersant. 2001. “Yaponskiĭ prem’er protiv dopuska sudov tret’ikh stran v zonu Yuzhnykh Kuril” [The Japanese Prime Minister is Against the Access of Vessels from Third Countries to the Zone of Southern Kuriles]. August 20. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/922484. Kremlin.ru. 2001. “Stenograficheskiĭ otchet o vstreche s zhurnalistami” [Excerpts from the Transcript of a Meeting with Journalists]. July 21, Genoa. http://www.mid.ru/ru/ maps/jp/-/asset_publisher/zMUsqsVU9NDU/content/id/586992. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, MID]. 2001a. Otvet ministra inostrannyx del rossiĭkoĭ federatsii I. S. Ivanova na vopros korrespondenta ITAR—TASS v svyazi s vyskazyvaniyami byvshego prem’er-ministra Yaponii Ĭ. MORI. 14 maya 2001 g. [The Response of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov to the Question of ITAR-TASS Correspondent in Connection with the Statement of Former Prime Minister of Japan Y. Mori. May 14, 2001].http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/jp/-/ asset_publisher/zMUsqsVU9NDU/content/id/583166 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, MID]. 2001b. Diplomaticheskiĭ vestnik. November. http://www .mid.ru/bdomp/dip_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567370042ee43/8796017b9e47c4 15c3256b290041b2d1!OpenDocument (no longer accessible). Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, MID]. 2001c. “Vystuplenie prezidenta rossiĭskoĭ federatsii V. V. Putina i otvety na voprosy na sovmestnoĭ press-konferentsii po itogam vsrechi s Prem’er-ministrom Yaponii E. Mori” [The President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin Answers Questions at a Joint Press Conference After a Meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister Y. Mori]. March 25, Irkutsk. http://www.mid.ru/ru/ maps/jp/-/asset_publisher/zMUsqsVU9NDU/content/id/586992. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, MID]. 2001c. Communication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Ob informatsii v otnosheniĭ rasprostraneniya v YuzhnoSakhalinske yaponskimi i yuzhnokoreĭskimi predstavitelyami geograficheskikh kart s izobrazheniem Yuzhnykh Kuril’skikh ostrovov kak territorii Yaponii” [On the Dissemination of Geographical Maps Showing the Southern Kurile Islands as a Territory of Japan by Japanese and South Korean Representatives in YuzhnoSakhalinsk]. November 20. http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/dip_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717 c733c32567370042ee43/292d09eedd0acf7fc3256b450033ad2a!OpenDocument (no longer accessible).

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NEWSru.com. 2001. “Prem’er-ministr Yaponii Iosiro Mori “chashche vsego” vstrechaetsya s Putinym” [The Japanese Prime Minister Yoshirō Mori Meets with Vladimir Putin “More Often Than with Others”]. March 24, 14:18. https://www.newsru.com/ russia/24mar2001/mori2.html. NEWSru.com. 2002. “V Tokio utverzhdayut, chto rossiĭskie ofitsial’nye litsa taĭno soglasilis’ otdat’ Kurily” [Tokyo Claims that Russian Officials Secretly Agreed to Give the Kuriles Away]. February 5, 2002, 22:01. https://www.newsru.com/world/05feb2002/ russia_japan.html. Portal vneshneėkonomicheskoĭ informatsii [Portal of International Business Information]. 2013. “Torgovo-ėkonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo mezhdu Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsieĭ i Yaponieĭ” [Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Japan]. http://www.ved.gov.ru/exportcountries/jp/jp_ru_relations/ jp_ru_trade/. Accessed March 2, 2014 (no longer accessible). Predsedatel pravitel’stva rossii [Prime Minister of Russia]. 2012. “Predsedatel’ pravitel’stva rossii V. V. Putin vstretilsya s glavnymi redaktorami vedushchikh inostrannykh izdaniĭ” [The Chairman of the Government of Russia Vladimir Putin Met with Chief Editors of Leading Foreign Newspapers]. March 2. http://archive .premier.gov.ru/events/news/18323/. “Rekomendatsii parlamentskikh slushaniĭ Yuzhnye Kurily: problemy ėkonomiki, politiki i bezopasnosti” [The Recommendations of the Parliamentary Hearings Regarding the Southern Kuriles: Problems of Economics, Politics, and Security]. 2002. Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Deputatskaya gruppa po svyazyam s parlamentom Yaponii. Informatsionno-analiticheskiĭ byulleten [The State Duma. The Parliamentary Group for Relations with the Japanese Parliament. Informational and Analytical Bulletin], March 18, no. 19: 23–30. http://ru-jp.org/iab19.pdf. Ria novosti. 2009. “Taro Aso nazyvaet “Sakhalin-2” simvolom dvustoronnego sotrudnichestva” [Tarō Aso (Aso Tarō) Calls Sakhalin-2 a Symbol of Bilateral Cooperation]. February 18. http://beta.rian.ru/economy/20090218/162436371.html. Ria novosti. 2011. “Naoto Kan nazval vizit Medvedeva na Kurily nepozvolitel’noĭ grubost’yu” [Naoto Kan (Kan Naoto) Calls Medvedev’s Visit to the Kurile Islands “Inexcusable Rudeness”]. Ria novosti. February 7, 2011, 09:32. https://ria.ru/politics/ 20110207/331246377.html. Rossiĭskaya gazeta. 2004. “Novost’ bez sensatsii. V zayavlenii Lavrova po Kurilam net nichego novogo. No est’ pozitsiya rossii” [The News without Sensation. There is Nothing New in Lavrov’s Statement About the Kurile islands But Russia’s Position is Clear]. November 16. https://www.rg.ru/2004/11/16/lavrov.html. Sakhalin.info. 2001. “V Rossii ozabocheny masshtabami brakon’erstva u Yuzhnykh Kuril” [Russia is Concerned About the Extent of Poaching Near the Southern Kurile Islands]. November 20. http://www.sakhalin.info/news/7857/.

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Japanese Sources

JETRO (Nihon Bōeki Shinkō Kikō) [Japan External Trade Organization]. 2013. Chokusetsu tōshi tōkei [Statistics of Direct Foreign Investment]. http://www.jetro .go.jp/world/japan/stats/fdi/. Kanzei [Customs]. 2013a. Nihon no ekitai tennen gasu yunyū aitekoku joi jukkakoku no suii [Dynamics of the Import of LNG from Ten Major Supplier Countries to Japan]. http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/data/y8_3.pdf. Kanzei [Customs]. 2013b. Tai Roshia shuyō yunyuhin no suii [Import of Major Russian Products]. http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/data/y7_9.pdf.

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part 14

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The “Northern Territories” Problem: a Continuing Legacy of the San Francisco System Kimie Hara The territorial and border dispute between Japan and Russia, known in Japan as the “Northern Territories Problem” (hoppō ryōdo mondai), emerged during the contentious post-World War II disposition of Japan.1 The currently disputed Northern Territories comprise the four islands of Kunashiri (Kunashir), Etorofu (Iturup), Shikotan and the Habomai Islands, which the Japanese government claims are distinct from the Kurile Islands that Japan renounced in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Conversely, the Russian government considers those islands as the southern part of the Kurile Islands. This dispute did not exist before World War II. Borders between the two countries had been demarcated by mutual agreements, both in times of peace and as a result of war. The two countries, however, have yet to reach a common consensus as to where their post-World War II borders should lie (Fig. 1). National boundaries between Japan and Russia changed several times in the past. Their first frontier was established in 1855 when Imperial Russia and the Tokugawa shogunate signed the first treaty between the two countries: Treaty of Shimoda (formally Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation Between Japan and Russia). It set the border between Etorofu and Urup that Japan still claims today. The treaty also stipulated that the island of Sakhalin would be open to settlement by both nations. In 1875, the imperial Meiji government abandoned all claims to Sakhalin as a result of the Treaty of St. Petersburg (formerly, Treaty of the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands) and in exchange for the entire Kurile chain. This eliminated mixed settlement and clarified national boundaries between the two countries. Japan acquired southern Sakhalin in 1905 following its victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and in accordance with the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. At the end of World War II, the physical boundaries shifted yet again. In the summer of 1945, the USSR occupied southern Sakhalin and all the islands between Hokkaido 1  This essay builds upon the author’s earlier research and publications, including JapaneseSoviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace (1998), Cold War Frontiers in the AsiaPacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System (2007), and “Hoppō ryōdo mondai to heiwa jōyaku kōshō,” in Higashi Ajia kingen daishi, Iwanami kōza (2011), vol. 7, 322–42.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_028

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Boundaries between Japan and Russia Source: Kimie Hara, “‘Hoppō ryōdo mondai’ (The Northern Territories Problem), A Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia,” ed. Carl Grundy-Warr, Eurasia, World Boundaries, vol. 3 (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 167. (Partially modified)

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and Kamchatka, including those now disputed. Their occupation continues to this date, even after the administrating authority changed from the USSR to Russia at the end of 1991. 1

The Soviet Entry into War against Japan: Yalta Blueprint and the Kuriles

The Soviet going to war against Japan was based on the US-UK-USSR Yalta Agreement of February 1945. US president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill promised Soviet premier Joseph Stalin that southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles would be ceded to the USSR in return for its participation in the war against Japan. Other wartime international agreements also related to Japanese territories. The 1943 Cairo Declaration outlining the Atlantic Charter principle of “no territorial expansion” stipulated that Japan would be expelled from all territories it had taken “by violence and greed.” But the Yalta Agreement went beyond the principle of “no territorial expansion.” The status of the entire Kurile chain had been determined not by violence but by two treaties, mutually agreed on by Russia and Japan in peacetime, and southern Sakhalin was the only territory in the region that Japan had taken “by violence.” The Yalta Agreement implicitly recognized a distinction, stating that the Kuriles were to be “handed over,” while southern Sakhalin was to be “returned” to the USSR. Prior to the Yalta Conference, the US State Department had suggested to President Roosevelt in a briefing report that Japan should retain the Southern Kuriles. Roosevelt, however, made his own political decision and promised the entire Kurile chain to Stalin. The Cold War structure in Europe was often attributed to the “Yalta System,” which originated from wartime agreements over the construction of the postwar international order made at the Yalta Conference. The major concern of these powers was to continue their cooperative wartime relations into the postwar era and to clarify their postwar spheres of influence. While recognizing the emerging new power balance and the differences of interests among them, the three leaders nevertheless sought ways to achieve stability in the postwar world and to sustain their cooperation. Soviet territorial expansion into the Kuriles agreed at Yalta, and into territories such as Poland and East Prussia in Europe, hardly accorded with the principle of “no territorial expansion” in the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration. Roosevelt made concessions to Stalin since he attached importance to Soviet participation in the war against Japan and other issues, among them the establishment of the United Nations. The Yalta Agreement over the Kuriles was in effect a reward for cooperation.

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After experiencing a series of East-West tensions in Europe, such as the communization of Eastern Europe and the division of Germany, the Yalta System received international recognition as the status quo in the 1975 Helsinki Accords. But by the early 1990s it had collapsed, accompanied by the demolition of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, the de-communization and democratization of Eastern Europe, the independence of the Baltic States, and the demise of the USSR. Since then, the “collapse of the Yalta System” has tended to be used as a synonym for the “end of the Cold War.” By contrast, the Yalta System never became an actual international order in the Asia-Pacific region, although some agreements affecting Japan were made at Yalta. The terms “Yalta System” or “East Asian Yalta System” are sometimes used to describe the regional postwar order. It was a “blueprint” to be established only if the Yalta Agreement had been faithfully implemented, however, and as discussed below Asia took a different path from that originally planned. The Yalta Agreement was made secret in terms of the Soviet entry into the war against Japan. The Japanese government did not know about the agreement until a year later on January 29, 1946, with the release of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note (SCAPIN) No. 677; it was publicized on February 11, nearly six months after the end of the war. As the war situation deteriorated the Japanese government sought Soviet mediation to make peace and considered various possible concessions. Even in July 1945, the cession of the Southern Kuriles was not included when the plan became one for surrender, including the dissolution of the military and renunciation of Okinawa and the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands (Wada 1999, 156). Okinawa, which in the past also had tributary relations with China, was once an independent kingdom. The Southern Kuriles, however, had never been foreign territory. The Japanese did not intend to relinquish them and did not expect them to be taken away. After all, no mediation plan had taken place. In April 1945, the Soviet Union had already notified Japan that it would not extend their neutrality treaty, which was signed in 1941 and valid for five years. And following German surrender, it was mobilizing military forces on the Manchurian border. On July 26, the US-UK-China leaders issued the Potsdam Declaration, the ultimatum to Japan, which provided “(t)he terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine” (Gaimushō and Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii 1992, 17 [Japanese section], 23 [Russian section]). On August 8, two weeks after the Potsdam Declaration and two days after the first atomic bomb was dropped in Hiroshima, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, thereby joining the Potsdam Declaration. It began an invasion

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into Manchuria and Korea twelve hours before the next atomic bomb was dropped in Nagasaki on August 9. On August 14, only one week after the Soviet entry into the war, Japan informed the Allies of its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. At this point, the Kurile Islands had not been occupied. The Soviets began attacking Japanese positions in Sakhalin on August 11 and the occupation of the Kuriles started on August 18 on Shumushu (Shumshu) Island. On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender, and accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. By then the Soviet military had occupied all the Kurile chain down to the islands of Shikotan. Occupation of the Habomai Islands, however, took place after the official surrender of Japan and was completed by September 5 (Surabinsuki 1993, 86–123, 143–57). 2

Toward the “Unresolved Problem”: the “Kuriles” in the San Francisco System

2.1 The Cold War and the San Francisco System During the six years between signing of the Instrument of Surrender (1945) and the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), the US-USSR confrontation escalated to become a global phenomenon that involved various levels of military or political confrontation. The Soviet development of nuclear weapons abolished a US monopoly, and communism was expanding in Asia, successfully exploiting decolonization movements. By 1950, communist states had come into being on the Chinese mainland and in the northern halves of Korea and Vietnam. Against this backdrop the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson proclaimed the US defense line in the western Pacific as stretching from the Aleutians through the Japanese archipelago to the Philippines. This so-called “Acheson Line” excluded Taiwan and South Korea, which the United States then saw as capable of being “lost” to communism. In 1950, however, with the signing of SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February and the outbreak of the Korean War in June, the United States changed its policy and intervened in the civil wars of Korea and China. In Asia, where the civil wars became internationalized and turned into surrogate battlefields of the superpowers, the Yalta spirit of their cooperation vanished completely. In the meantime, Japan’s position changed from an enemy to be punished severely to a cornerstone of US strategy. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, prepared and signed reflecting such an international situation, was the very “product of the era” (Surabinsuki 1991, 252). In the study of the Asia-Pacific regional Cold War historians differ as much over the origins and responsibilities as within a US-USSR or European context.

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But the use of terminology such as “American Lake” indicates widespread agreement that the postwar regional order was formulated primarily at the initiative of the United States (Dower 1971, 146–97). The San Francisco Peace Treaty is the international agreement that largely determined the postwar political order in the region. With its associated security agreements, such as the US-Japan Security Treaty signed on the very same day (September 8, 1951), this treaty laid the foundation for the “San Francisco System.” The Yalta Agreement was distorted vis-à-vis the now escalating East-West confrontation that began on the Atlantic side of the Eurasian Continent. A postwar Asia-Pacific took a different path from what was originally envisioned: the Soviet Union was the pole of the communist East, and Japan was positioned as a subordinate ally of the United Sates—that is, the pole of the non-communist West. The San Francisco System came into being within these circumstances, not limited to the current territorial area of Japan but covering the areas of East Asia and the Pacific, most of which Japan had once dominated. As such, this system fully mirrored both the strategic interests of the treaty’s drafters, especially the United States, and the region’s political complexity. 2.2 The San Francisco Peace Treaty and Regional Conflicts The San Francisco Peace Treaty disposed of vast territories, extending from the Kurile Islands to Antarctica and from Micronesia to the Spratly Islands. The treaty, however, specified neither their final devolution nor precise limits, thereby sowing the seeds of various conflicts. The major conflicts affecting the regional security in the Asia-Pacific, such as the sovereignty disputes over the Northern Territories (Southern Kuriles), Takeshima (Dokdo), Senkaku (Diaoyu), Spratly (Nansha) and Paracel (Xisha) Islands, the divided Korean Peninsula, the crossTaiwan Strait problem, and the so-called “Okinawa Problem,” all derived from the postwar disposition of the Japanese empire. Each tends to be dealt with as separate and unrelated issues due to their different developments, with their shared foundation in the early post-WW II years often neglected. On the subject of the Northern Territories problem, the peace treaty specified Japan’s renunciation of the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin but it did not identify the USSR as the country to receive them. Their final ownership was left undetermined. In addition, the USSR was not a party to the treaty since it did not sign it. The range of the Kuriles, that is, which islands are or are not included in the island chain renounced by Japan, has long been at the heart of the dispute. The Japanese government claims the group of four islands of the Northern Territories (Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai Islands) as distinct from the Kuriles; it sees the Soviet (Russian) occupation of those islands as illegal.

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The Japanese peace treaty signed in San Francisco was presented as a US-UK joint draft. It was the United States, however, that took the initiative in the postwar disposition of Japan, beginning with the policy regarding occupation. In other words, the United States was the main negotiation counterpart for Japan and the USSR. Early peace treaty drafts prepared by the United States generally reflected the “punitive peace” plan and the Yalta spirit of interAllied cooperation. They were long and detailed, clearly drawing new postwar borders of Japan through the use of latitude and longitude, specifying the names of small islands such as Takeshima, Shikotan, and the Habomai Islands, delineating which countries they belonged to, and indicating their positions on maps. These early drafts roughly followed the Allies’s wartime agreements with particular attention to the avoidance of future conflicts. As the Cold War escalated in Asia, however, Japan became central to US Asian strategy; it was to be secured as a pro-US nation in the West, and the peace terms with it changed from “punitive” to “generous.” The final draft, prepared by John F. Dulles after negotiations within the US government and with other concerned states, became “simple” and ambiguous. This created the potential for various conflicts, including between Japan and its neighbors. The peace treaty signed in San Francisco ultimately did not detail the range of the disposed territories, their final designation, or delineate Japan’s postwar borders. As for the disposition of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, and Taiwan, a formula emerged following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 to determine their future through consultation with the United States, United Kingdom, USSR, and China, or, if no agreement was reached by these four powers, through a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly. This was then impacted by the disposition plan for Korea. That plan was dropped, however, when the Korean War developed disadvantageously for the United Nations, that is, US-led, side. In addition, with British recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the UN resolution formula might result in the loss of Taiwan to the PRC, and therefore the disposition plan for Taiwan influenced those for Korea and the Kuriles. After all, the USSR and China, originally designated in earlier drafts as the countries to receive the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, and Taiwan, had disappeared. The Treaty in fact did not specify the final designation (ownership) of all territories disposed in the treaty. A problem arose during the drafting process as how to deal with the definition and disposal of the Kurile Islands. The guiding star in US-government studies of the Japanese territorial dispositions beginning during World War II was the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941. Once the existence of the Yalta Agreement was revealed, however, various ways of resolving the contradiction

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were thoroughly examined, and a number of treaty drafts were prepared that included the Japanese retention of none, two, and four islands. Ultimately, the definition and final designation of the Kuriles were left undecided in this “simple” treaty. The mention of the USSR—the recipient of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin—disappeared in the June 1951 US-UK joint draft, prepared only three months before the San Francisco Peace Conference. The wording in the draft, even as late as the May 1951 draft, stipulated that the USSR would receive the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, provided it signed the treaty. The mention of China, who was meant to receive Taiwan, had already been deleted, which prompted the Republic of China (ROC) and Canada to propose that the final designation of all territories not be specified for the sake of consistency. The initial reaction to this proposal by the United States was negative because the circumstances of each territory were different. But after further consideration the United States accepted the proposals. In a June meeting with his British counterpart in London, Dulles proposed specifying only the Japanese renunciation of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, making the provision consistent with that regarding Taiwan in the treaty. He justified this on the grounds that the previous draft directly benefited the USSR, and at home it would be hard to persuade the US House of Representatives to pass it. On the one hand, if the USSR did not recognize the peace treaty, Japan could still be considered as having legal sovereignty over these islands. On the other, Soviet occupation would continue, and the United States could possibly become involved in unwanted complications resulting from its defense alliance with Japan. It was important therefore to have Japan renounce these islands but purposely leave their devolution open (Wada 1999, 213–14). The United States also anticipated the psychological effect—namely, the Soviet occupation of potentially Japanese territories would be negatively perceived by the Japanese people while a sympathetic US attitude would be more positively received. The United Kingdom, the joint-drafter of the peace treaty, was showing the attitude of its faithful compliance to the Yalta Agreement until early 1951, when it accepted the US explanation and agreed to remove the USSR from the treaty. The treaty provision was finalized in a draft of June 14 for the disposition of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. 2.3 The San Francisco Peace Conference The USSR was dissatisfied with US preparations for the Japanese peace treaty and had expressed its discontent through the media and in several memoranda to the US government before the San Francisco Peace Conference.

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In general, the USSR held that all basic territorial questions involving Japan had already been settled by international agreements, such as the Cairo and Potsdam declarations as well as the Yalta Agreement, and the peace treaty at most should ratify them. A Soviet memorandum of June 10, 1951, declared that: “Regarding territorial questions, the Soviet Government proposes just one thing: to insure honest implementation of the above-mentioned international agreements” (Shigeta and Suezawa 1990, 77–86). As Dulles admitted in his speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference on September 5, however, the final draft complied only with the Potsdam Declaration (Gaimushō and Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii 1992, 28 [Japanese section], 32 [Russian section]). The USSR unexpectedly attended the peace conference in September. In Korea, cease-fire discussions had begun earlier in July. Although China had not been invited to the conference, the USSR chose not to boycott it. The USSR publicly explained its position, criticized the US-UK joint draft, and requested its revision. At the second plenary session on September 5, Soviet representative Andreĭ A. Gromyko made a lengthy speech. He denounced the US-UK joint draft over the transfer of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, which had been guaranteed to the USSR by the Yalta Agreement, and presented its own proposed amendment. He condemned the devolution of Taiwan and the Spratly Islands as deliberately left unfinished by not specifying “China” and that of Okinawa and Bonin as illegally separating these islands from Japan using the trusteeship as an excuse to place them under US exclusive control. Furthermore, he described the treaty as risking the revival of Japanese militarism since it not only failed to prescribe the withdrawal of foreign occupation forces but also guaranteed that foreign military bases would remain and Japan would participate in aggressive military alliance with the United States. This would thereby open the way for it to join the US military bloc in the Far East. He denounced the US-UK draft as “not a treaty of peace but a treaty for preparation of a new war in the Far East” (Gaimushō and Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii 1992, 29–31). Despite the Soviet presence and Gromyko’s address, the US-UK draft was not amended. The conference was after all a mere signing ceremony among countries chosen and invited by the host, the United States. The USSR, which disagreed with the treaty’s content, had no recourse but to refuse to sign it. No peace treaty was concluded between Japan and the USSR, and the territorial problem was shelved at this point. It was not until 1955 that peace negotiations finally took place between Japan and the USSR.

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Japanese Peace Preparation

In the first decade after the war Japan did not have a fixed single Northern Territories policy. “Northern Territories” originally referred to all former Japanese territories that were occupied by the USSR in the final stages of World War II. These included southern Sakhalin and the entire Kurile chain. The Japanese government began preparing its position for a peace settlement and issued a series of English-language booklets during the period of Allied Occupation. The first booklet concerning the Northern Territories, entitled Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper. Part I. The Kurile Islands, the Habomais and Shikotan, was produced in November 1946. The booklet, discovered nearly half century later in the National Archives of Australia, describes the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu as “Southern Kuriles,” and treats Shikotan and the Habomai Islands as part of Hokkaido, and distinct from the Kurile Islands. Following its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, Japan understood the need to identify the “minor islands” that the Allies would permit it to retain. After disclosure of the Yalta Agreement in 1946, it then became a question of recovering the islands on its northern frontier that were not part of the Kuriles. The 1946 booklet as a whole indicates that the Japanese government’s realistic goal at that time was “two islands”—that is, the recovery of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands (Fig. 2). It presents the “Two Islands Return Thesis” as a result of World War II, reflecting the reality that Japan was a defeated country and the USSR one of the victorious Allies. Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper is proof that Japan had already prepared the basis for future negotiations, in addition to its recognition of the “Kuriles” and of the realistic goal concerning territorial recovery (i.e., the Habomai Islands and Shikotan). The booklet refers to Kunashiri and “Yetorofu” (Etorofu) as the “Kuriles,” but already separates the Kurile Islands into northern and southern groups. Japan had thus divided the territories it stood to lose into three groups, according to the strength of its claims. It presented Shikotan and the Habomai Islands as integral parts of Hokkaido, with Kunashiri and Etorofu as part of the Kuriles, but Japanese territory “since early days” and the rest of the Kuriles as Japanese territory since 1875 (Hara 1998, 24–33). The three levels of the various “islands return theses” contained in Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper may be summarized as follows: 1) “Two Islands Return Thesis” (nitō henkan ron): Shikotan and the Habomai Islands should remain Japanese, as they are not part of the Kurile Islands. [The Yalta Agreement is fully observed on this point.]

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Source: Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper: Part I. The Kurile Islands. The Habomais and Shikotan (Foreign Office Japanese Government, November, 1946). See Hara 2005, 123; 1998, 27–28.

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2) “Four islands return thesis” (yontō henkan ron): Although Kunashiri and Etorofu are part of the Kuriles, those four islands had always been Japanese territories. They have a different background from the rest of the Kuriles promised to the USSR at Yalta and should be treated separately. [The Yalta Agreement is partially observed.] 3) “All Kuriles return thesis” (zen Chishima henkan ron): Although Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and signed the Instrument of Surrender, the Yalta Agreement had not then been released, and Japan never agreed to it. Thus, Japan should invoke the principle of “no territorial expansion” and need not give up the Kuriles because they did not become Japanese as a result of war (Hara 2007, 80). The first Japanese National Diet resolution—“Resolution Regarding the Entreaty for the Return of the Habomai Islands” (Habomai shotō henkan konsei ni kansuru ketsugi)—on the Northern Territories issue was passed in March 1951. Despite the escalation of the Cold War at this time, Japan nevertheless had to face the negotiations for the World War II peace settlement from the standpoint of a defeated nation; it was expected to accept the conditions provided by the victorious Allies. Accepting all relevant international agreements, including the Yalta Agreement, it sought the “Two Islands Return” as they could be included in the “minor islands” in the Potsdam Declaration. 4

Japanese-Soviet Peace Negotiations, the Joint Declaration, and Thereafter

In 1955, four years after San Francisco Peace Conference and a decade after the end of World War II, peace treaty negotiations began between Japan and the USSR. The “four islands return” became the core of Japanese Northern Territories policy during this period of negotiation. The key events that brought this about were the US intervention in Soviet-Japanese negotiations and the establishment of the “1955 System” (Gojūgonen taisei) in Japanese domestic politics. 4.1 The Intervention of the United States The US intervention in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations is well known as the “Dulles’s Warning.” In August 1956, the Japanese plenipotentiary, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, was about to accept the Soviet offer of a “Two Islands Return” and to conclude a peace treaty on that basis. But US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned Shigemitsu that Japan’s residual sovereignty over Okinawa could be endangered if it were to make concessions

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to the USSR (Matsumoto 1966, 114–17; Kubota 1983, 133–37). There were two major reasons for the US intervention. One was to secure US control over Okinawa and the other to prevent a rapprochement between Japan and the USSR. Okinawa’s strategic importance increased with the escalation of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific. Dulles was recorded as stating at the National Security Council in August 1955 that the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) were more valuable to the United States than the Kuriles were to the Soviet Union. The United States had no strong basis for retaining Okinawa, and it would come under considerable pressure to vacate it if Japan settled the Northern Territories problem with the USSR. This was probably one of the objectives of the Soviet “two islands” offer. But Dulles used Article 26 that he himself had inserted in the peace treaty to argue that if Japan made concessions to the USSR over its Northern Territories, the United States could claim Okinawa. Part of Article 26 states: “Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty” (United Nations 1952, 76.) Because the transfer of territories to the USSR had not been mentioned in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Dulles argued that the Japanese acceptance of the Soviet proposal to return only some of them would mean Japan was granting greater advantages to the USSR than to the United States. In that case, Article 26 would enable the United States to claim Okinawa (Hara 1998, 45). The US administration officially supported Japan’s “four islands” claim, not because it considered all these islands distinct from the Kuriles but because it knew that the claim would be unacceptable to the USSR. The primary objectives of US Cold War policy in the Asia-Pacific region were to secure Japan for the Western bloc and to prevent it from achieving a rapprochement with the communist bloc. The Soviet-Japanese peace negotiations began during the “Cold War Thaw” or “Peaceful Coexistence” atmosphere of the mid-1950s. The United States, however, perceived this “détente” as temporary, working strategically to the USSR’s advantage through its “peace offensive.” It appeared to threaten the West through expansion of the Soviet sphere of interest by initiatives responding to or even stimulating nationalistic and anti-colonial movements in Asia. Japan’s conclusion of a peace treaty with the USSR would put the question of normalizing relations between Japan and communist China on the agenda. That, too, was unacceptable to the United States. The real goal of the United States was to prevent any Soviet-Japanese rapprochement regardless of which island territories were involved. The “four islands” claim was a “wedge” set in place as a result of the Cold War (Hara 1998, ch. 3).

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The United Kingdom was an important concerned state that had participated in significant arrangements such as the Yalta Agreement, Potsdam Declaration, and San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Soviet-Japanese peace negotiations then began in London. The reaction of the United Kingdom, however, differed slightly from that of the United States. It closely monitored the development of Soviet-Japanese negotiations with great interest but tried to avoid its political involvement. It was apprehensive of the possible reopening of the San Francisco settlement. The British foresaw problems if the discussion were extended to the territorial clause of the San Francisco Peace Treaty since the status of other territories, including Taiwan, whose final designation was similarly left undecided in the treaty, would also be questioned. In late 1954, the situation of the Taiwan Strait became volatile. Soon after Taiwan’s attempt to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) had been blocked by objections from the United Kingdom, France, and others, communist China proclaimed its intention to “liberate” Taiwan, and intermittent clashes between communist and nationalist forces increased. Fearful of disturbing the fragile balance of regional international relations, the United Kingdom did not want to revisit the San Francisco arrangement. Documents from British diplomatic files of the time reveal the United Kingdom’s misgivings over a possible Japanese attempt to involve the United States and United Kingdom in the territorial negotiations. The British ambassador to Japan, Sir Elser Dening, wrote on August 18, 1955, “(i)f the Japanese can persuade other powers to reexamine the territorial clauses of Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, then it seems to be that the Far East can easily be thrown into turmoil” (Hara 1998, 50). The United States likewise did not welcome the re-opening of the Okinawa question at an international conference. Such a conference might possibly open up “disagreeable questions” regarding Okinawa and Taiwan. When Dulles delivered his “Warning,” Foreign Minister Shigemitsu asked whether the United States would be prepared to take the initiative in convening a conference to discuss the disposition of the Kurile and Ryukyu Islands. Dulles’s response was negative, and the international conference feared by the United Kingdom did not take place, thereby precluding conflict with the United Kingdom over Taiwan’s future and also securing the US position in Okinawa (Hara 1998, 50–51). 4.2 The 1955 System and the “Four Islands Return Thesis” Soviet-Japanese negotiations in the mid-1950s overlapped with the establishment of the long era of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) hegemony in Japan— the so-called “1955 System” that reflected Cold War politics in Japan’s domestic arena. The policies of the two Japanese conservative parties (Liberals and

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Democrats) regarding peace negotiations with the USSR became political bargaining tools between them when they merged to form a large ruling party in an effort to counter the then strengthening socialist parties. With their merger, the new LDP policy for Japanese-Soviet negotiations was announced in the form of a policy document called “Rational Adjustment for Japanese-Soviet Negotiations” (Nisso kōshō no gōriteki chōsei). This made the “unconditional return of the four islands” the minimum necessary condition concerning the Northern Territories. Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō, who was also the leader of the Democratic Party, compromised with the Liberal Party leadership, whose policy priority was cooperation with the United States. The “four islands” claim became established as a core policy of the LDP, which thereafter was tantamount to government policy. Japan’s four islands claim was originally a negotiation tactic devised by the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to draw the Soviet concession of the two islands offer, and it was to be softened depending on the climate of the negotiations. Negotiation policy and a concrete negotiation strategy were formulated prior to the first round of negotiations in London in June 1955. They stipulated that Japan’s maximum claim to present first would be for all of the former Japanese territories occupied by the Soviet Union (i.e., the Habomai Islands, Shikotan, the entire Kurile chain, and southern Sakhalin). It would then gradually soften its claim. The most notable point was that the return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands was considered to be the minimum condition to satisfy the Japanese government (Shimoda 1974, 142). This staged negotiation tactic, the basis for which was already in the aforementioned Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper of 1946, was given to the plenipotentiary representative Matsumoto Shun’ichi. But because the Soviet “two islands” offer came through more quickly than expected, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hardened its position and demanded the immediate return of the “four islands.” In the meantime, this negotiating strategy, which had first been set by the bureaucratic leadership, became a political tool in the struggle between the conservative parties and fixed as the policy of the new ruling LDP (Tanaka 1993, 192–95). In October 1956, Hatoyama visited Moscow with endorsement from the cabinet but not from the LDP. Before the Moscow summit the two countries agreed to restore diplomatic relations—just as the USSR and West Germany had done the previous year (1955)—by shelving the territorial issue and a peace treaty and by accepting the so-called Adenauer Formula in an exchange of letters between the Japanese and Soviet premiers (the Hatoyama–Bulganin letters) in September 1956. In the meantime, an ad hoc LDP policy was adopted that demanded the “immediate return of the Habomai Islands and Shikotan, and the continuation of negotiation for Etorofu and Kunashiri after signing a

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peace treaty.” The Japanese representatives at the Moscow summit, including Hatoyama, were party politicians, and they could not return to Japan without raising the territorial issue as required by the new LDP. But it was already clear from past negotiations that the Soviets would not return the four islands. Japanese-Soviet negotiations finally ended on October 19 with the signing of the Joint Declaration that states in part that: … the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. (Gaimushō and Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii 1992, 38 [Japanese section], 44 [Russian section]) Even though consensus was reached regarding the wording of the Joint Declaration, it had to be interpreted in such a manner so as to save face of the plenipotentiaries at home. Another set of letters, known as the Matsumoto– Gromyko letters, were announced and interpreted together with the declaration. The Matsumoto–Gromyko letters, likewise exchanged before the summit, conveniently stated that the USSR and Japan agreed “to continue negotiations on the signing of a peace treaty, which would also include the territorial issue, after the re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations.” In other words, the Habomai Islands and Shikotan were promised in the Joint Declaration, and the question of Kunashiri and Etorofu was to be settled during negotiations for a peace treaty. The two countries made several agreements in the declaration, such as ending the status of war, the restoration of diplomatic relations, the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs), and the enactment of a fishery agreement. The USSR also promised its support for Japan’s UN membership, which it had vetoed in the past. 4.3 Following the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations Soviet-Japanese relations drastically deteriorated in the 1960s, with the introduction of the revised and renewed US-Japan security arrangement. In January 1960, the USSR unilaterally added the new condition “only if all foreign troops are withdrawn from Japan” to the two islands transfer. The Soviet attitude became more rigid thereafter, and in September 1961 they started to claim that the territorial problem had already been solved in a series of international agreements. This rigid position continued throughout the Cold War era. In the

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meantime, Japan’s claim on the four islands was firmly established among the Japanese public under the long rule of the LDP. After the 1956 summit, Soviet-Japanese summit meetings were held at almost identical seventeen- to eighteen-year intervals, between Tanaka Kakuei and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in 1973, and between Kaifu Toshiki and Mikhaĭl Gorbachev in Tokyo in 1991. Against the background of global détente, there was the expectation of rapprochement on the two occasions. The territorial problem was not solved, however, and a peace treaty was not concluded. The USSR collapsed in 1991, followed by the 1955 System of postwar Japan in 1993. Yet the LDP maintained its influence as a strong opposition party in both houses and would later regain its position as the ruling party. Top-level interactions became more frequent between Russia and Japan. In 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Yeltsin agreed to make the utmost effort in concluding a peace treaty by 2000 at the Krasnoyarsk Summit. But the deadline was never met. With Gorbachev’s diplomacy, described as novoe myshlenie, or “New Thinking” (also seen as novoe politicheskoe myshlenie, or “New Political Thinking”), the USSR (Russia) began to review its own foreign policies regarding territorial claims. Moscow, as a result, softened its rigid attitude that at one point had denied the existence of the territorial dispute and accepted the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Since the late 1980s in Japan, discussions in the media and among academics on the topic have increased, but the Japanese government has not officially shifted its basic position regarding the return of the four islands. In the meantime, it has tried various approaches and negotiation strategies, including those of the “non-separation of politics and economics” (seikeifukabun), “separation of politics and economics” (seikei bunri), “territory as a prerequisite” (ryōdo iriguchi ron), “territory as an outcome” (ryōdo deguchi ron), “return of four islands in a batch” (yontō ikkatsu henkan), “phased return” (dankai henkan ron), “simultaneous parallel negotiation” (dōji heiko kyōgi), and so forth. The two countries have not yet been able to find a “mutually acceptable solution.” 5 Conclusion The postwar peace treaty with Japan should have been a clear settlement to end the war and start a new “postwar” era. Yet before the war could be ended, Japan-USSR relations and the entire Asia-Pacific region became involved in the new wave of international politics—the Cold War. The Northern Territories

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problem was one byproduct of this Cold War. In the early postwar period, Japan’s goal of territorial recovery was the “Two Islands Return,” reflecting the actuality of Japan’s defeat—the “result of World War II.” The “four islands return” claim was put into place later, also mirroring the reality of the new era— the “result of the Cold War.” Rather than the result of Japan-USSR direct conflict in a bilateral framework, the Northern Territories Problem was to a great extent created by third parties, particularly by the main drafter of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the United States, a postwar superpower with strong influence and tactical negotiation skills. The treaty was signed between Japan and forty-eight countries, except for the major concerned states such as the USSR, China, and Korea. This was done against the backdrop of intensifying Cold War conflicts; as such the treaty left room for various interpretations and for the sowing of seeds of conflict. The United States stopped direct involvement in this dispute after the “Dulles’s Warning” of 1956, but the Northern Territories Problem has been firmly fixed in the Cold War structure of the Asia-Pacific region with the passage of time. This regional Cold War structure of confrontation has essentially continued, with the exception being the demise of the Soviet Union. Today, non of the conflicts that share the foundation in the San Francisco Peace Treaty have reached a fundamental settlement. The Northern Territories (Southern Kuriles), Takeshima (Dokdo), Senkaku (Diaoyu), the Spratly (Nansha) and the Paracel (Xisha) islands, lining up along the Acheson Line drawn over sixtyfive years ago, continue to be sources of conflict. Although South Korea and Taiwan have remained in the non-communist West, the unresolved territorial problems regarding Takeshima and Senkaku continue to divide Japan and its neighbors “Korea” and “China,” which are themselves still divided. Unlike the European scenario, the communist and authoritarian regimes in China and North Korea have not collapsed and are still perceived as threats by their neighbors, endorsing the bilateral alliance system with the United States—that is, the San Francisco alliance system. Moreover, the US military presence and its associated issues such as the Okinawa military base problem are ongoing. The Northern Territories issue is to a degree one of the regional conflicts that have supported the structural sustainability of the San Francisco System. Although the global “post-Cold War” developments in international relations have considerably impacted this region, they have not fundamentally disrupted the remaining structure of confrontation. Although economic interdependence has deepened and efforts to enhance confidence-building measures have continued in recent decades, the unresolved nature of these conflicts means that they could escalate or re-erupt at any time. The relaxation

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of tensions seen in the Cold War thaw in the 1950s and détente in the 1970s gave way to a deterioration of East-West relations. Similar phenomena have been repeated in East Asia. Unless the sources of the conflicts are removed, JapanUSSR relations, as well as those of the entire region, will never be released from the vicious cycle of instability and uncertainty. Positive factors for the settlement of regional conflicts could evolve, and these might include domestic and social change in the concerned states, shifts in existing policies by disputing states, breakthroughs in official and unofficial dialogues, and a transformation of international political dynamics. The complex threads of international relations cannot be easily disentangled, yet solutions to problems should never be insurmountable. Bibliography

Japanese Sources

Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA] and Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, MID], eds. 1992. Nichiro kan ryōdo mondai no rekishi ni kansuru kyōdo sakusei shiryōshū/ Sovmestnyĭ sbornik dokumentov po istorii territorial’nogo razmezhvaniya mehudu Russieĭ I Yaponieĭ 1992 god [The Joint Compendium of Materials on the History of the Territorial Issue]. Hara Kimie. 2005. Sanfuranshisuko heiwa jōyaku no mōten: Ajia taiheiyō chiiki no reisen to “sengo mikaiketsu no shomondai” [Blind Spot of the San Francisco Peace Treaty: The Asia-Pacific Region Cold War and the “Unresolved Postwar Problems”]. Tokyo: Keisuisha. Hara Kimie. 2011. “Hoppō ryōdo mondai to heiwa jōyaku kōshō” [The Northern Territories Problem and Peace Negotiations]. In Higashi Ajia kingen daishi [Modern and Contemporary History of East Asia], vol. 7, 322–42. Iwanami kōza [Iwanami Series]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Kubota Masaaki. 1983. Kuremurin e no shisetsu: hoppō ryōdo kōshō 1955–1983 [Mission to the Kremlin: Northern Territories Negotiations 1955–1983]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjūsha. Matsumoto Shun’ichi. 1966. Mosukuwa ni kakeru niji: Nisso kokkō kaifuku hiroku [Rainbow Over Moscow: Secret Documents of the Restoration of Japan-USSR Diplomatic Relations]. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha. Shigeta Hiroshi and Suezawa Shōji, eds. 1990. Nisso kihon bunsho shiryōshū, 1855–1988 nen [A Collection of Foundational Japanese-Russian Documents and Materials, 1855–1988]. 2nd ed. Tokyo: Sekai no Ugokisha.

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Shimoda Takesō. 1974. Sengo Nihon gaikō no shōgen: Nihon wa kō shite saisei shita [Testimony of Postwar Japanese Diplomacy: Japan Regenerated in this Way]. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūjo. Surabinsuki, Borisu [Slavinskiĭ, Boris]. 1991. Muchi no daisho: Soren no tainichi seisaku [Price of Ignorance: Soviet Policy Toward Japan]. Translated by Sugano Toshiko. Tokyo: Ningen no Kagakusha. Surabinsuki, Borisu [Slavinskiĭ, Boris]. 1993. Chishima senryō—1945 nen natsu [Occupation of the Kurile Islands—Summer 1945]. Translated by Katō Yukihiro. Tokyo: Kyōdō Tsūshinsha. Tanaka Takahiko. 1993. Nisso kokkō kaifuku no shiteki kenkyū: sengo Nisso kankei no kiten 1945–56 [Historical Study of the Postwar Japanese-Soviet Diplomatic Restoration Origins of Postwar Japanese-Soviet Relations 1945–56]. Tokyo: Yūhikaku. Wada Haruki. 1999. Hoppō ryōdo mondai: rekishi to mirai [The Northern Territories Problem: History and Future]. Asahi Sensho 621. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha.



English Sources

Dower, John W. 1971. “Occupied Japan and the American Lake.” In America’s Asia, edited by Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, 146–206. New York: Vintage. Foreign Office Japanese Government. November 1946. Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper: Part I. The Kurile Islands, the Habomais and Shikotan. Australian Archives (ACT). A1838/2; 515/4. Hara, Kimie. 1998. Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace. London and New York: Routledge. Hara, Kimie. 2007. Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Dwivided Territories in the San Francisco System. Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese. London and New York: Routledge. United Nations. 1952. Treaty Series Volume 136.

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The Territorial Issue in Russian-Japanese Relations: an Overview Dmitry V. Streltsov The territorial dispute between Russia and Japan is closely linked to the absence of a mutually coordinated legal settlement regarding border demarcation. This is the result of the two countries not having signed a contract or any other legal document following World War II that would have established a well-defined borderline. Japan and Russia clearly view the issue differently, not only in the fundamentals of the territorial dispute but also in the methods and prospects needed for its resolution. Japan believes that the unresolved territorial problem emerged due to the Soviet Union’s unilateral actions during World War II. It maintains that from August 28 to September 5, 1945—that is, after Japan’s adoption of the Potsdam Declaration—Soviet troops seized the territories controlled by the Japanese before the outbreak of hostilities. This included the approximately 3,000 sq km of islands comprising the Southern Kurile Ridge (Habomai, Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan), which were ceded to the USSR without any legal basis. Between 1945 and 1947, the USSR repatriated all 17,291 inhabitants of the Kurile Islands to Japan (Satō 2014). From the postwar era onward, these islands have therefore become the object of Japan’s territorial claims: they are generally referred to as the “Northern Territories” (J: hoppō ryōdo), a term that has since appeared frequently in official Japanese government documents. Russia, for its part, acknowledges that the border demarcation issue between the two countries has remained unresolved since World War II. As the USSR was not a signatory to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, it believes the dispute should be resolved by concluding a bilateral peace treaty aimed at regulating relations between the two nations. The territorial problem assumed special significance after 1977, however, with the introduction of the concept of 200-mile “Exclusive Economic Zones.” Part of this area included about 200,000 sq km of abundant fish and other marine resources around the Southern Kurile Islands. For both countries, the economic value of this area raises the stakes and increases the level of their intransigence in the dispute. The territorial problem has already marred the relations between Russia and Japan for more than six decades. Almost all aspects of relations between these two countries are in some way, either directly or indirectly, affected by the territorial problem that has and continues to poison the climate of these

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relations and hamper their improvement. The issues raised in this section are to a certain extent significant for all stages of postwar Russo-Japanese relations and are in this connection discussed in many of the “historical” chapters of this book. 1

Historical Aspects of the Territorial Dispute: 17th to Mid-19th Centuries

Russia and Japan fundamentally disagree on both the historical and legal aspects of the territorial dispute, with each side insisting on its privileged position vis-à-vis the islands. Even though the Southern Kuriles were first discovered and charted during a 1643 expedition of the Dutch seafarer and Dutch East India Company captain, Maarten (Gerritszoon) de Vries, the Netherlands has never claimed them. Japan asserts, however, that it, not Russia, initially traveled deep into the north, establishing trade relations with the Ainu people living on the Kurile Islands in the first half of the 17th century. According to the chronicle of the Matsumae clan domain, the Shinra no kiroku (Records of Shinra),1 in 1615 Prince Matsumae presented the Tokugawa shogun with a sea otter skin received from the Ainu who lived in the area of Menashi (the word “Menashi” means “Eastern,” but the Ainu presumably lived in the Kurile Islands) (Hokkaido Government 2014). The Kurile Islands—thirty-eight islands to the northeast of the Shiretoko Peninsula and Cape Nosappu—were first recorded on the 1644 Shōhō Era Map under their Ainu names (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, Uruppu, and so forth).2 Many experts point out that this in fact refers to the establishment of trade contacts with the Ainu population of the Kuriles and does not mean that the Japanese were actually present in these territories during this period. The Shōhō Era Map renders the islands in broad outlines, and the lack of detail in their depiction is evidence that they were only drawn from descriptions by the Ainu and as such mapped as territories located outside Japan (gaichi). The first Russian scientific description of the islands of the Southern Kurile Ridge and their cartographical representation was made during the expeditions of the Russian seafarer Martin Spanberg (Martyn P. Shpanberg) in 1737, 1739, and 1742. In the mid-18th century, Russia sent various expeditions to the 1  This Edo-period chronicle compiled in 1643 is named after Shinra Saburō (Minamoto no Yoshimitsu, 1045–1127), from whom the Matsumae clan claimed descent. 2  An original version is in the Shimonoseki City Chofu Museum, Yamaguchi Prefecture; a later version is illustrated in http://www.myoldmaps.com/the-first-japanese-map-of.pdf, p. 13.

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islands during which time they attempted to extract tributes from the Ainu and to convert them to the Russian Orthodox Church. Under a decree signed by Empress Catherine II in 1779, the Ainu, who she considered Russian citizens, were exempt from taxes and duties. In December 1786, the empress signed another decree ordering measures to be taken for preserving Russian rights to the Kurile Islands, including the more remote islands (i.e., the southern), and that any foreigners there were to be thrown out, by force if necessary (Luzhkov 2008, 41). A map of the Irkutsk vice regency printed in St. Petersburg in 1796 shows the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, and Shikotan as Russian territory (Koshkin 2006).3 In the mid-18th century, the Japanese actively developed trade on the Kuriles and founded a number of trading posts as a result of their dealings with the Kurile Ainu, such as on Kunashir and in the town of Akkeshi on Hokkaido. In 1786, a large-scale military expedition was dispatched to the Southern Kuriles led by the explorer Mogami Tokunai, who went to Iturup and Urup islands. The Japanese historian Nakamura Shintarō believes that at the time of the expedition’s arrival many Ainu already had numerous contacts with the Russians and “were fluent in Russian and could even be translators” (Nakamura 1983, 76). But some Russian settlers on the island were taken prisoner: Semen T. Izvozov, for example, was sent to Urup Island with a note declaring that Iturup was Japanese territory and that Russians were banned (Georgiev 1998, 19). Over a decade later, in 1798, a mission led by the Edo official (and explorer) Kondō Morishige was sent to Iturup, and he took several Russian settlers there as prisoners. The shogunal government also sent a military expedition of samurai from the Nanbu and Tsugaru domains to Kunashir and Iturup; it set up military outposts and erected Japanese boundary markers on the islands (Nakamura 1983, 76). In 1806–1807, the Russian officers Gavriil I. Davydov and Nikolaĭ A. Khvostov responded to the Japanese government’s refusal to sign a treaty establishing trade relations with Russia by attacking and plundering Japanese trading posts on Iturup and on Aniva (Aniwa) Bay in Sakhalin. It should be kept in mind that the actions of the two Russian officers had not been authorized by St. Petersburg, and both were punished for taking matters into their own hands (Emperor Alexander I personally refused to decorate them for heroism in the Russo-Swedish War of 1808–1809). Meanwhile, in 1811, the Japanese, certain that the Russian authorities had sanctioned the attack, took Captain Vasiliĭ M. Golovnin, the head of a scientific expedition, prisoner on Kunashir Island and held him in captivity for two years. 3  In the collection of the Russian State Library. https://www.prlib.ru/item/397249.

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Even today the Russians and the Japanese are in no doubt that the Ainu were the indigenous inhabitants of these islands. Until the early 18th century, no Japanese or Russians lived permanently on the islands, and neither country systematically developed these regions. In this light, it would be incorrect to say that the Russian or Japanese were “native” to these territories. Moreover, there were no contracts or other legal documents signed between Japan, Russia, and other states concerning the ownership of the Kurile Islands until the mid-19th century. Although the two countries are keen to use their respective histories as proof that one or the other was the first to discover and advance the islands, this is hardly a strong basis for the possible resolution of the territorial problem. Instead, it serves as a propagandistic tool designed to sway public opinion. 2

The Border Demarcation Issue from the Mid-19th Century to World War II

The first bilateral border treaty (Treaty of Shimoda), signed by then Vice Admiral Evfimiĭ V. Putyatin (Russia) and Kawaji Toshiakira (Japan) on January 26 (February 7), 1855, set the border dividing the two countries between Iturup and Urup islands along the Vries Strait. In other words, the four islands that would later become the object of the territorial dispute in the postwar period were in Japanese hands. The treaty also declared the island of Sakhalin an “undivided zone”—that is, a joint possession of the two countries. The border between the two countries was subsequently subject to numerous changes, and in keeping with the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg, Japan granted Russia sole control over Sakhalin in exchange for all eighteen islands of the Kurile ridge extending up to Kamchatka. Japanese historians refer to the St. Petersburg Treaty as the “Treaty of the Exchange of the Sakhalin and the Kuriles” (J: Karafuto/Chishima Kōkan jōyaku). Russian historians do not use this term since, in reality, Sakhalin was at that time under Russian administrative control. Japan’s policy on the colonization of the island was unsuccessful: there were only a few Japanese settlements in the south of the island and during this period Japan had no serious plans to strengthen its presence there. This actually meant a unilateral transfer of the Kurile Islands by Russia to Japan, and official recognition of Russian claims to Sakhalin would not have harmed Japanese interests. Nevertheless, this treaty was signed completely voluntarily and is an example of a resolution based on neighborliness and mutual respect. The 1895 Russo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed on April 25 (May 7) confirmed the

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provisions of the 1875 St. Petersburg Treaty. The same document declared the Treaty of Shimoda invalid. In the post-WW II era, Japan based its territorial stance on the Treaty of Shimoda, pointing to the fact that it was the first border demarcation treaty with Russia, and therefore its provisions had priority value in relation to all subsequent agreements. To counter this, the Russian side cited historical facts linked with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905, following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. In accordance with the treaty document, Russia conceded the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel to Japan. Moreover, on the initiative of Japan, the Portsmouth treaty annulled all previous treaties between Japan and Russia, including the 1895 treaty, which at that time was the only such treaty that established the borderline between the two countries (Article 12) (Chronos 1905a), and Appendix 10 in the treaty (Chronos 1905b). Japan insisted that the borders must reflect the postwar status quo; it rejected the opportunity to refer to the first border treaty during the discussions on demarcation. The Soviet-Japanese Convention on Basic Principles for Mutual Relations (Beijing Convention) signed in the Chinese capital on January 20, 1925, confirmed the validity of the provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth. At the same time, a special declaration, announced by the Soviet government during the signing, stated that the validity of the Portsmouth treaty “does not mean at all that the government of the [Soviet] Union shares with the former imperial government political responsibility for the conclusion of the abovementioned contract” (Gromyko and Ponomarev 1980). 3

The Territorial Issue in the Yalta-Potsdam System of International Relations

The problem of territorial demarcation as seen today arose as a one of the unresolved issues of World War II. It might be instructive to outline the historical and legal circumstances that led to the creation of this issue—namely, the circumstances of the USSR’s entry into war with Japan. On April 13, 1941, the USSR signed a five-year Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact (also known as the Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact) with Japan. According to Article 2 of the document, the parties undertook the responsibility to observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict “should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers” (Sekai to Nihon 1941). In the event that neither

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contracting party terminated the pact a year before the set expiration date, it would automatically be extended. The Japanese did not respect the Neutrality Pact, however. On December 7, 1941, a Japanese squadron left Iturup Island on its mission to attack the US military base at Pearl Harbor. At that time, the United States was an ally of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition, and as one of the Axis powers, Japan relished the idea of attacking the Soviet Union during World War II. For example, on January 19, 1942, Japan reached an agreement with Germany and Italy, which revealed that in case of a Soviet-Japanese war the Japanese sphere of operations was 70 degrees east at the Omsk Meridian (Koshkin 2011). In April 1945, one year prior to the termination of the pact, the Soviet Union notified Japan of its intention not to continue it. On August 9 that year, the USSR declared war on Japan even though the pact was still in force. Drawing on the agreements set forth in international treaties, Japan viewed the USSR’s actions as illegal and the ensuing military occupation of the Kurile Islands—then under Japanese jurisdiction—as an act of aggression. The Russian position regarding the alleged violation of the Neutrality Pact was that the USSR declared war on Japan because of its obligations set out in the agreements reached between the “Big Three” (USSR, United States, and United Kingdom) at the Yalta Conference (Crimea Conference) that took place February 4–11, 1945, in the city of Yalta on the Crimean Peninsula. The legal basis of the USSR’s entrance into the war was grounded in the provisions of the UN Charter, which was signed on June 26, 1945, by fifty-two countries at a UN conference and ratified by the USSR in July 1945. Japan would later approve the UN Charter when it joined the organization, and of particular note is Article 107 that states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action” (United Nations 1945b). This meant that the UN Charter granted the USSR the right to any operation, including that employing military force, against Japan within the document’s definition of it as “the enemy state.” The USSR had acted in accordance with Article 103 of the UN Charter, which indicated that “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail” (United Nations 1945a). The USSR thus prioritized its obligations in relation to the Allies and based on the UN Charter over its obligations under the neutrality pact. Although the UN Charter only came into force on October 24, 1945, its provisions concerning the obligations of the

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signatory countries regarding their joint actions against enemy states (i.e., Japan) came into effect immediately upon signing. Japan referenced two other documents to justify its position: the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration. The Anglo-American Atlantic Charter, signed on August 14, 1941, contains the following provision that the United States and the United Kingdom “desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned” and seek “no aggrandizement, territorial and other” (National Diet Library 1941). The Soviet Union signed the Atlantic Charter on September 24, 1941. The Cairo Declaration was adopted on November 27, 1943, at a conference in Cairo (November 22–26) in which the United States, United Kingdom, and China participated. It communicated that the Allies “covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion and it is their purpose that Japan will be expelled from all territories which she has taken by violence and greed” (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 1943). The USSR joined the Cairo Declaration on August 8, 1945. Japan believed that with its accession of the Southern Kurile Islands, the USSR disavowed the territorial non-expansion principle and therefore violated its international obligations. The Japanese claimed that since Part 1, Point 8 of the Potsdam Declaration refers to the need to respect the terms of the Cairo Declaration, the non-expansion principle stated in the Cairo Declaration Cairo Declaration that the three great Allies “covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion” (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 2011). Wada Haruki has observed, however, that the compilers of the San Francisco Peace Treaty only referred to the second part of Point 8 of the Potsdam Declaration when detailing its preliminary provisions. No mention was made of the Cairo Declaration (Georgiev 1998, 280). The significant international event of World War II that was directly related to the Southern Kuriles dispute was the aforementioned Yalta Conference. In keeping with the agreement signed there by the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom on February 11, 1945, the Soviet Union promised to enter the war against militaristic Japan “two or three months” after Germany’s surrender. This would be in exchange for securing the Kurile Islands and regaining territory lost in the Russo-Japanese War, including the southern part of Sakhalin Island, as well as preserving the status quo in pro-Soviet Outer Mongolia (Istoricheskiĭ fakul’tet 1945). These claims by the Soviet Union should be “unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.” Japan challenged the agreements made at Yalta, avowing that it did not consider them legally binding since it had not participated in the conference and had not been briefed on the outcome. Russia’s stance was that Japan, as the

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aggressor state against which the agreements were actually concluded, should not in any case participate in the meeting of the Allies, who sought the most expedient end to World War II. The transfer of the Kuriles was viewed as a punitive measure for the aggressive policy pursued by Japan during the war. It should be noted, however, that the United States differed from the USSR in its interpretation of the Yalta agreements regarding the return of the Kurile Islands by declaring that they did not have the same force as international law. They would have to be implemented during a peace resolution, which would set forth an international legal framework for the settlement of new borders. This position was reflected in a memorandum that the US State Department sent to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 7, 1956 (see below). The Allied powers adopted the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945, and Point 8 concerning the terms of surrender of Japan specified that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine” (Georgiev 1998, 143). On August 15, 1945, the Japanese government accepted the terms of the declaration, thereby agreeing that the victorious powers would establish its borders. The Potsdam Declaration made no mention, however, of the provisions of the Yalta Agreement relating to Japan. On August 14, 1945, US president Harry S. Truman approved General Order No. 1, which established the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula as the line of demarcation between the Soviet and US zones for the purpose of accepting the surrender and disarming the Japanese military units stationed in these areas. Joseph Stalin responded by offering to include all the Kurile Islands, which under the Yalta Agreement were to be handed over to the USSR in the Soviet Zone. Truman agreed: “Responding to your message of August 18, I extend my consent to your request to modify Order No. 1 and to include the Kurile Islands in the zone to be surrendered to the commander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in the Far East” (Dokymenty XX veka 1945). From August 18 to August 23, Soviet troops conducted a landing operation against a Japanese garrison on the Kurile island of Shumshu (Shumushu). Japan would later claim that unlike the United States, which ordered the cessation of all military operations upon the announcement of the “Imperial Rescript on the Termination of War” (Daitōa sensō shūketsu no shōsho) on August 15, 1945, the Soviet Union launched a combat operation after the broadcast of the Imperial Rescript had been announced on the radio (Suetsugu 2000, 64). During the Battle of Shumshu, the Soviets suffered 1,567 casualties (dead and wounded), the only time in the entire Far Eastern campaign of 1945 when Soviet losses exceeded those of the Japanese (Slavinskiĭ 1999, 497). On August 23, the Soviet commander of the Kurile Landing Operation, Major General

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Alekseĭ R. Gnechko, and commander of the 9th Japanese Division, Lieutenant General Fusaki Tsutsumi, signed an agreement on the end of military actions. Immediately thereafter, Soviet troops occupied all the territories of the Kurile Islands up to Hokkaido and accepted the surrender of Japanese soldiers. Japan believed that the landing operation on Shumshu, “could only be interpreted as an intention to make the gain of the Kurile Islands as a result of war as a fait accompli” (Suetsugu 2000, 65). At the same time, the Russian side felt that the military occupation of the Kurile Islands, including the disarmament of Japanese garrisons on the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai by the 1st Far Eastern Army between August 28 and September 5, 1945, was in full accordance with General Order No. 1. Early the following year, on January 29, US General Douglas MacArthur listed in the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note (SCAPIN) No. 677 that the islands were excluded from Japanese jurisdiction in accordance with Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration: Chishima (Kurile Islands), the Habomai Island Group (Sushio, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu, Taraku) and Shikotan Island (Zilanov 2002, 98). The Japanese raised no objections to this directive. Five years later, on September 8, 1951, forty-nine countries, including Japan, signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Treaty of Peace with Japan 1951), which sought to settle relations between Japan and the victorious powers. The Soviet Union, which partook in the San Francisco Peace Conference, did not sign the treaty, principally as an expression of solidarity with its strategic ally, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which had not been invited to the conference. Article 2C of the treaty states that: “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth.” Yet it did not specify to which state Japan would hand over the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin, and it also had no concrete definition qualifying the Kurile Islands. Article 8 stipulated that Japan will recognize the full force of the treaties concluded by the Allied powers at this time, or in the future, as part of the Allied efforts to end the state of war initiated on September 1, 1939. This also subsumed any other arrangements by the Allied powers in connection with the restoration of peace. In this way, Japan acknowledged the legality and power of the Yalta agreements, and this is summed up in Article 25, which avers that: For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan … provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. Subject to the provisions of Article 21,

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the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favor of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined. The USSR did not sign the treaty, which prompted the Japanese to claim that the USSR could not be a beneficiary of the Japanese renunciation of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Even though the Soviet Union (and Russia as its assignee) was not an Allied nation as determined by the treaty and therefore its rights vis-à-vis Article 25 were not unconditional, it can be assumed that it still possessed some rights, albeit limited. This was linked with Japan’s rigid stance regarding the renouncement of the Kuriles, while its legal consequences were beyond the framework of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Similar to other peace treaties throughout history, the San Francisco treaty was legally binding not only for its signatories but other (third) countries since the provisions of such treaties became a part of international law and regulate the behavior of all members of the international community, not just the treaty signatories. In that the USSR was not a signatory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it had to settle all postwar unresolved issues with Japan, including that of territory, at a bilateral level. Moreover, the emergence of the San Francisco system of international relations, which did not include the USSR, created a number of legal obstacles for Japan in settling territorial problems with neighboring countries. In particular, Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty stated that: “Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.” In other words, the USSR had to settle its border disputes with Japan through a bilateral treaty. If Japan agreed to cede some of its former territories (e.g., Kurile Islands) through such a bilateral treaty with the USSR, all San Francisco treaty signatories had the right to claim similar territorial concessions from Japan by invoking Article 26. The same refers to other neighboring countries, such as Korea and China, which did not sign the San Francisco treaty and also had to settle border issues with Japan. By renouncing the Kuriles in accordance with Article 2C, Japan forfeited the opportunity to express an opinion on their subsequent ownership. On October 26, 1951, at a plenary session of the Lower House of the Japanese National Diet, Tanaka Man’itsu, then chairman of the special commission on the US-Japan Security Treaty, declared that since Japan, in compliance with Article 2, had renounced sovereignty over Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, it lost any rights

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to these territories (Kokkai kaigiroku 1951a). By having renounced “all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands,” Japan acknowledged this treaty as legally binding regardless of the position of the USSR. In this light, Japan, when setting forth its claims concerning Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai, and Shikotan, maintained that the islands of the Southern Kurile Ridge were not included in the Kurile Islands renounced under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In the early postwar era, these territories comprised both Habomai and Shikotan, and since 1955 the islands of Iturup and Kunashir. It should be pointed out that no official Japanese government document issued between 1945 and early 1955 questioned the status of Iturup and Kunashir as part of the Kuriles. During the ratification process of the San Francisco Peace Treaty by its parliament, the Japanese government repeatedly emphasized that the Southern Kuriles belonged to the Kurile Islands, even if they had a different historical underpinning than the Northern Kuriles. For example, the director of the Treaties Bureau Nishimura Kumao told parliament on October 19, 1951, that: “Regarding the boundaries of the Kurile Islands (Chishima retto), I consider that they include both the Northern and the Southern Kuriles” (Kokkai kaigiroku 1951b). A resolution in the Lower House of the Japanese National Diet dating to July 31, 1952, which already included the claims regarding the extension of the territories “illegally occupied” by the Soviet Union, only referred to Habomai and Shikotan as such territories (Kokkai kaigiroku 1952). As noted above, however, Japan has changed its stance since 1955 and declared its intention to reacquire Iturup and Kunashir. The Japanese did not challenge the fact that geographically all the islands— Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and even Habomai—are subsumed under the larger entity of the Kurile Islands. For example, the Encyclopedia Britannica defines the Kurile Islands before the war as “islands stretching from Nemuro Bay to Kamchatka” and defined the main Kurile Islands as “Urup, Iturup, Kunashir, and Shikotan” (Kozhevnikov 2008). Japanese prewar geographical publications were unambiguous in their interpretation of the disputed territories of the Kurile Islands, including Shikotan and Habomai: these included, for example, the Great Dictionary of Japanese Place Names (Nippon chimei daijiten, 1941), the Japanese Geographical Encyclopedia (1930), and the Navigation Directions for Sakhalin and Chishima Islands, published in 1937 by the hydrographic office of Japan’s Naval Ministry (Alad’in 2001, 74–75). Furthermore, the official 1941 guide by Japanese Government Railways noted that “Chishima” (“Thousand Islands”; i.e., the Kuriles) were a long chain of volcanic islands stretching approximately 710 miles from Nemuro in Hokkaido to Chishima Strait (Shumshu Strait), which separated the islands from the southernmost tip of Kamchatka (Dokymenty XX veka 1941).

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Until 1945, the Kurile Islands were an isolated territorial entity known by the aforementioned name, Chishima. The island of Shikotan was added on June 1, 1885, which is evidence that this island had no special status in relation to the other Kuriles and was perceived instead as simply being lumped together with them. Evidence of this is even seen on the postmark of a prewar stamp that contained the double-barreled name Chishima-Shikotan (Hoppō ryōdo mondai kanren shiryō 2006). Only the Habomai Islands were considered part of Hokkaido and subject to the administration of the village with the same name. Before the war, the Habomai Islands were part of the district, the center of which was the Hokkaido town of Nemuro (Hasegawa 1998, 517–18). In the postwar period Japan asserted that the four islands were not part of the Kuriles, using the first contracts signed with the Russians as proof. In particular, it tried to show that the Southern Kuriles (i.e., “Northern Territories”) were not part of the Kuriles based on the fact that the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda defined them as eighteen islands located to the north of Urup Island. Wada Haruki and Murayama Shichirō have demonstrated, however, that this interpretation resulted from a loose translation of the treaties into Japanese. The only legally valid version is not a text in Russian or Japanese, rather in Dutch (Article 2), which states (here in translation) that: “The island [of] Urup and the other Kurile Islands to the North are in [the] possession of Russia.” It is therefore almost impossible to prove from a reading of the treaty text that the Kurile Islands comprised only Urup and other islands to the north. It is equally implausible to establish the above based on the text of the 1875 St. Petersburg Treaty, which was written in French (Wada 1997, 46–47; Georgiev 1998, 101–4; Hara 2008, 84). Having understood the challenges in proving the difference between Iturup, Kunashir, and even Shikotan and the other Kurile Islands in geographic, administrative, or territorial terms, Japan then claimed a special “political” status for the four islands that set them apart from the Kuriles. The stance of the Japanese government, which considered Shikotan and the Habomai (unlike Iturup and Kunashir) as separate from the Kurile Islands, was established after World War II. Ample proof of this position exists, including data from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was presented in November 1946 in an English-language brochure entitled Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper (Wada 1997, 47; Hara 2008, 24–33), and discovered in 1994 by Hara Kimie in the National Archives of Australia. Even this brochure concedes that “in certain cases the islands of Habomai and Shikotan are included in the Kurile Islands” and that “the group of Southern Kuriles comprises the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, and Shikotan” (Hara 2008, 29). The first claim on an official level that asserted that Iturup and Kunashir were not part of the Kuriles was made by the

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Japanese prime minister Ikeda Hayato in 1961. Wada Haruki believed that the “transition to this position, which might be called forced, was seemingly and most likely made in keeping with the rivalry of the Cold War” (Wada 1997, 47). Japan now principally based its arguments on the fact that, in line with the first bilateral border treaty (Treaty of Shimoda), Habomai, Iturup, Kunashir, and Shikotan were unlike other Kurile Islands and belonged to Japan. This was to indicate that their historical underpinnings were qualitatively different. Russian lawyers usually counter this view by referring to the principle in international law that asserts that if any international legal document does not attach “special significance” to a particular term, it is treated with reference to the common geographical understanding of the name. Most notably, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) discloses that: “The Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose” (United Nations 1969). Kirill E. Cherevko has demonstrated that documented statements made by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs before the signing of a peace treaty with Japan could be used to interpret this phrasing. He states quite succinctly that “the islands have been described in Japanese and international usage as part of the Kurile chain; however, it would be difficult to prove they are not a part of the Kurile islands as the term is used in the San-Francisco Treaty” (Cherevko 2012). In the mid-1950s, the Japanese government coined the name “Northern Territories” (hoppō ryōdo) in an effort to create a special political status for the four islands in the eyes of the public—in other words, for propagandistic aims. Hasegawa Tsuyoshi sees this as an attempt to avoid an absurd situation, whereby the Japanese government interprets the concept of the “Southern Kuriles” (J: Minami Chishima) as separate from the more general entity of the Kurile Islands (Hasegawa 1998, 518). In 1964, a special order by Japan’s deputy minister of foreign affairs recommended that the term “Southern Kuriles” be avoided in official documents, maps, and textbooks when referring to the four islands and to opt instead for the more “politically correct” name “Northern Territories.” It should be noted, however, that the concept of the “Southern Kuriles” has entered into common usage. For example, the online Japanese dictionary Dijitaru daijisen (Shogakukan Publishers) describes “Minami Chishima” as part of the Kurile Islands, which includes Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai, and Shikotan (Goo jiten 2014). The Kotobank search portal designed by the authoritative publishing houses Kodansha, Asahi Shinbun Shuppan, and Shogakukan (Kotobank 2014) reveals similar results, as does the search engine Hatena Keyword (Hatena Keyword 2014).

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The Border Issue in the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956

In 1955, the USSR entered into negotiations with Japan on settling unresolved post-WW II issues and restoring diplomatic relations. The most involute task was deciding upon a formula for territorial demarcation, since both parties had failed to reach a compromise during the course of protracted negotiations. From the outset, Japan demanded the transfer of the four islands, a move that was unacceptable to the USSR. The situation was further complicated by the presence of a third party at the negotiations—the United States—which was not interested in the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. In its support of Japan, the United States aspired to create a constant source of tension in Soviet-Japanese relations, using the territorial issue as ammunition to encourage Japan’s dependence on the United States. Sergeĭ L. Tikhvinskiĭ, who participated in the negotiations, observed that: … the United States constantly interfered in the process of normalization of Russian-Japanese relations and slowed the development of neighborliness between Russia and Japan … the United States actively supported and continues to support the demands of the Japanese government to transfer the islands of the Southern Kurile Ridge to Japan from the Russian Federation, thus, together with Japanese revanchists counts on a revision of the outcome of World War II. tikhvinskiĭ 2011, 88

In an effort to move forward and reach an agreement, the Soviet Union, even in the preliminary stage of negotiations in London in 1955, suggested that it should transfer the islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan. This concession, unexpected by the Japanese, did not accelerate the negotiations, rather slowed them as Japan, believing that it could get more, toughened its stance and also demanded the islands of Iturup and Kunashir. In early August 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemitsu Mamoru in London at the Suez Canal Global Conference. He stated that if Japan agreed to hand the Kurile Islands over to the USSR, the United States would seek to benefit from Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and receive similar concessions from Japan, thereby opting to have a permanent presence in Okinawa (Iokibe 2013, 62). On September 7, 1956, the US State Department sent a memorandum to the Japanese government, in which it insisted that: “The United States regards the so-called Yalta Agreement as simply a statement of common

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purposes by the then heads of the participating powers, and not as a final determination by those powers or of any legal effect in transferring territories” (Sekai to Nihon 1941). The document stated that Japan had no rights in relinquishing sovereignty over the territories, which it renounced under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the United States believed that the countries that were signatories to the treaty had no intention of acknowledging any actions aimed at achieving this goal. The memorandum also noted that: “The United States has reached the conclusion after careful examination of the historical facts that the islands of Iturup (Etorofu) and Kunashir (Kunashiri), along with the Habomai Islands and Shikotan, which are a part of Hokkaido, have always been part of Japan proper and should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty.” To create a legal basis for the shift in the Japanese position, the United States maintained that the final establishment of the border should be agreed upon at an international conference. Once Japan realized that its claims to the four islands had no prospect of success, at least during the negotiations with the USSR, it suggested that the parties should return to discussions about the territorial issue once diplomatic relations were restored. Due to the domestic political situation this was, in fact, a more pressing problem for Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō. Having reached the agreement, on September 29, 1956, Japan and the USSR exchanged missives—the so-called “exchange letters” between the USSR deputy foreign minister Andreĭ A. Gromyko and Japanese negotiator Matsumoto Shun’ichi (the “Adenauer Formula”). The “Adenauer Formula” was a declaration that ended the state of war between the two countries, setting up the exchange between ambassadors and the settlement of outstanding problems at a later stage. The Japanese delegation arrived in Moscow in mid-October 1956. During negotiations with Nikita Khrushchev on October 16, 1956, the representative for Japan, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Kōno Ichirō, unexpectedly raised the issue of including a provision on borders within the text of the Joint Declaration. In his reply Khrushchev indicated that the issue should be taken off the table. Noting that the text of the declaration disclosed the obligation of the USSR to transfer the islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan, Khrushchev believed this to be the final step in resolving the territorial dispute. After some hesitation, the Japanese party agreed to include this provision in the declaration and not to push for the inclusion of the statement regarding further negotiations on the territorial issue, as initially stipulated in the “exchange letters” between Gromyko and Matsumoto. Both Russia and Japan approved Article 9 of the Joint Declaration on the settlement of border issues, which read:

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Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of Japan, agrees to hand over to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan. However, the actual handing over of these islands to Japan shall take place after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Joint Compendium 1956

The first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Khrushchev and Prime Minister Hatoyama signed the Joint Declaration on October 19, 1956, which officially ended the war and restored diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. In accordance with Article 10, it was ratified on the same day, December 8, 1956, by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR and the Japanese National Diet. Four days later, on December 12, the parties in Tokyo exchanged “instruments of ratification,” after which the declaration was submitted to the United Nations. The fact that the declaration underwent a ratification process indicates its status as a document of international law binding the undersigned countries, in this case the USSR (and Russia as its assignee) and Japan. The Russian side stressed that Japan’s signing of the declaration constituted a legal confirmation of the status quo in the territorial sphere at that period. Some lawyers point to the fact that a party cannot transfer more than it possesses, and therefore the Japanese representative who signed this document would have understood, even indirectly, that the USSR had sovereignty over the islands. This is the key difference between the meaning of the term “transfer” (J: hikiwatashi) in Article 9 and the term “return” (J: henkan), which was repeatedly used by the Japanese side in official and unofficial documents dealing with its territorial claims. Immediately after the signing of the Joint Declaration, Japan published the “exchange letters” between Gromyko and Matsumoto, and adopted the stance that the declaration represented an intermediate stage on the path to a definitive solution of the territorial problem. Russia’s position was that the legal status of the declaration was certainly higher than the “exchange letters” and therefore could not be accorded a similar standing. Moreover, the “exchange letters” do not refer to the final text of the declaration, rather to a transitional text. The necessity to carry on negotiations on the territorial issue would have

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been reflected in the text of the declaration, and this was not the case as long as Japan did not oppose it. 5

The Territorial Issue in Bilateral Relations, 1960–1990

On January 19, 1960, Japan signed the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (US-Japan Security Treaty) with the United States. A week later, on January 27, 1960, the Japanese ambassador was summoned to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was handed a memorandum from the Soviets to the Japanese government. It stated that “this treaty actually deprives Japan of independence and that foreign troops stationed in Japan as a result of Japan’s surrender remain on Japanese territory. This situation makes it impossible for the Soviet government to fulfill its promises to return the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan” ( Joint Compendium 1956). As such, the Soviet government found it necessary to declare that Habomai and Shikotan would be transferred to Japan only if all foreign troops were withdrawn from Japan, and if a Soviet-Japanese treaty was signed as outlined in the 1956 Joint Declaration ( Joint Compendium 1956). In other words, the Soviet Union had put forward an additional condition for the implementation of Article 9 of the 1956 Joint Declaration—the removal of all US military bases from Japanese territory. In its response dating to February 5, 1960, the Japanese declared that the Joint Declaration “represents an international agreement regulating fundamentals for relations between Japan and the USSR” and that “it is an official international document which has been ratified by the highest organs of both countries.” It is needless to say that the contents of this solemn international undertaking cannot be changed unilaterally” ( Joint Compendium 1956). Ultimately, the memorandum specified that Japan “will persistently seek the return [of] not only the islands of Habomai and Shikotan but also and other erstwhile Japanese territories” (Georgiev 1998, 265). In a memorandum dated April 22, 1960, the Soviet government pointed out that “the territorial issue between the USSR and Japan has been resolved by the relevant international agreements, which must be observed” (Georgiev 1998, 264). This position did not drastically change during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The joint Soviet-Japanese communiqué signed on October 10, 1973, during a visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei highlighted the importance of settling the “issues that remained unresolved since World War II” and “concluding a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan” ( Joint Compendium 1956). The parties agreed to further negotiate the conclusion of a peace treaty, and for Japan these issues included territorial matters. The Soviets viewed the situation

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otherwise, believing that apart from the territorial disputes they included other aspects of the postwar settlement (Ferguson 2008, 47). The differences in each country’s stance led to the “unresolved issues” not being specified in the text of communiqué, and this left a broad scope for interpretation. In the late 1970s, Soviet-Japanese relations cooled dramatically. NGOs initially launched a campaign to collect signatures in support of the claim to return the Northern Territories but in the early 1980s it gained official support, and this resulted in more than fifty million signatures by the beginning of the 1990s. Furthermore, since 1981, the 7th of February—the anniversary of signing the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda—has been designated “Northern Territories Day” (hoppō ryōdo no hi). The events held on this day have turned into a propagandistic display with the participation of Japanese prime ministers, who have quite often “perused” the Northern Territories from border protection boats or helicopters. 6

The Теrritorial Issue in the 1990s and the 2000s

During a visit to Japan by Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1991, a joint Soviet-Japanese communiqué was signed with a provision on the need to conclude a peace treaty: Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan and President M. S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics held in-depth and thorough negotiations on a whole range of issues relating to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the issue of territorial demarcation, taking into consideration the positions of both sides on the attribution of the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu. Joint Compendium 1956

Soviet leaders of the period were of the view that the 1956 Joint Declaration had become obsolete and therefore relations in this sphere should be built from scratch in the spirit of “New Thinking” (novoe myshlenie; also seen as novoe politicheskoe myshlenie, or “New Political Thinking”). A departure from the total disregard of the territorial problem was now evident, and each of the four islands in question were listed by name. There was equally a shift in the Japanese position. Whereas Japan had previously demanded the immediate “return” of the four islands, it now agreed just to the formal recognition of sovereignty over them in the initial stage of

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negotiations. This stance is reflected in a Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs pamphlet: “Japan is prepared to respond flexibly to the timing and manner of actual return of the four islands if their Japanese attribution is proven” (Gaimushō 2014). Concurrently, the Japanese side began to withdraw their claims on an immediate “simultaneous transfer” of all the disputed islands. Japan also agreed that it was not a “territorial issue” that existed between the two countries, rather an “issue of border demarcation” (R: vopros pogranichnogo razmezhevaniya). This did not refer to territorial claims, but to the specification of borders that considerably reduced the acuity of the issue within the framework of bilateral relations. No concrete agreements were reached in this direction, however. From October 11 to October 13, 1993, the territorial issue was discussed during an official visit to Japan by the Russian president Boris Yeltsin. The two countries signed the Tokyo Declaration on October 13, which announced that “the difficult legacies of the past in the relations between the two countries must be overcome” and “an early conclusion of a peace treaty through the solution of this issue.” The declaration further elaborated, stating that the parties … have entered into serious negotiations on the issue of where Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai Islands belong. They agree that negotiations should continue toward an early conclusion of a peace treaty by resolving this issue based on historical and legal facts, and on the documents that the two countries had agreed upon as well as on the principles of law and justice. Relations between the two countries should thus be fully normalized. georgiev 1998, 369

The Moscow Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership Between Japan and the Russian Federation also admitted the existence of the territorial issue, listing all four islands by name (Japantoday.ru 1998). Adopted in Moscow on November 13, 1998, during the official visit of Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō, the document recommended accelerated negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty by the year 2000 and the establishment of a subcommittee on border demarcation within the framework of the existing Japanese-Russian joint committee on the conclusion of a peace treaty. Russia and Japan diverged in their assessment of the documents dating to the 1990s that dealt with the territorial demarcation issue. Japan believed that the acknowledgment of the territorial problem regarding the four named islands implied Russia’s readiness to transfer (“return”) them to Japan. Russia, for its part, considered that its willingness to discuss the issue did not signify

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consent in transferring territorial sovereignty. And the opening of negotiations was a top priority for Moscow. It was supposed that parallel to the negotiations each party would strive to improve the climate of bilateral relations, build neighborliness, develop economic ties, and border cooperation. It was repeatedly emphasized that resolving such a delicate problem as the territorial issue would be possible only with mutual trust, which should be nurtured over time, perhaps even several generations. This approach was particularly reflected in Yeltsin’s five-point program, which he had already introduced during his visit to Tokyo in 1990—that is, even before his tenure as Russian president (Georgiev 1998, 364–66). By 2000, there was still no mutually acceptable solution regarding the conclusion of a peace treaty. After Vladimir Putin became as the president of the Russian Federation in 2000, Russia amended its stance on the territorial issue and proposed to adhere to Article 9 of the 1956 Joint Declaration as the formula for its resolution. In March 2001, during a working visit to Russia by the Japanese prime minister Mori Yoshirō, the parties signed the Irkutsk Statement on the further continuation of negotiations on the peace treaty issue (Diplomaticheskiĭ vestnik 2001). The document noted, for the first time, that the Joint Declaration between the USSR and Japan, along with other documents signed in the 1990s,4 could form the basis for negotiations on the peace treaty issue. The Russian side argued the priority of international legal obligations over requirements of domestic legislation stipulated in Article 15 of the Russian Constitution. The Irkutsk Statement stressed that: “The Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration is a basic legal document that established the starting point in the negotiation process for the conclusion of a peace treaty subsequent to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries” (Irkutsk Statement 2001). At the same time, the statement acknowledged the value of all documents concerning the problem of territorial demarcation that the two governments accepted in the 1990s. Moscow and Tokyo differed dramatically in their interpretations of the Irkutsk Statement. Russia considered the provisions laid out in Article 9 of the Joint Declaration final. Japan took an opposing view. It believed that Russia’s readiness to discuss the future of the two islands (Kunashir and Iturup), which were not mentioned in the declaration, placed it in a position that might demand further concessions. Moreover, the Japanese considered the declaration 4  Including the Soviet-Japanese Joint Japanese Statement (1991), Tokyo Declaration on JapanRussian Relations (1993), Moscow Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership Between Japan the Russian Federation (1998), and Statement by the Russian President and Japanese Prime Minister on the Issue of the Peace Treaty (2000).

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an intermediate stage on the path to resolving the territorial issue; it focused on the legacy of 1990s, above all, the Tokyo and Moscow declarations. This stance was reflected in the “two-track formula” (J: heikō kyōgi, or “parallel negotiations”) offered by Mori Yoshirō—in other words, conducting parallel negotiations on the fate of Habomai and Shikotan as well as Kunashir and Iturup. The issue of transferring Habomai and Shikotan had already been worked out in the declaration; the main task was now the settling of the situation regarding the remaining two islands of Kunashir and Iturup. The Russian side resolutely rejected this interpretation. In 2002, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov referred to reports about carrying out separate negotiations on the two specified groups of islands as “conjecture and stories” (Sakhalin.info 2002). Russian leaders stated that the 1956 Joint Declaration was the only document that had the legal status of an international treaty and that this should serve as the basis for resolving the issue. They maintained that lawyers should be tasked with clarifying the terms and conditions of the transfer. It was also pointed out that the document contained nothing on the form, conditions, and terms of the “transfer of islands.” The Russians remained staunch in their position and two years later, on November 14, 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Sergeĭ V. Lavrov told the NTV television channel: “We are the statesuccessor of the Soviet Union. The 1956 Joint Declaration is among the obligations of the Soviet Union.” He further explained that it was “the declaration ratified by the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union wherein it was offered to hand Japan two southern … islands, and thus put an end to the issue.” He also clarified that the implementation of the 1956 Joint Declaration “certainly requires negotiations.” Commenting on the foreign minister’s statements, President Putin noted that the obligations under the declaration would be fulfilled “only within those limits in which the Japanese party is ready to carry out the same commitments.” He added that “so far we have not managed to come to an understanding of these volumes as we see it and as it was seen in 1956” (RBC 2004). With the appointment of Koizumi Jun’ichirō as prime minister and his cabinet in 2001, however, Tokyo made clear that it wanted the “immediate return of all the four islands to Japan.” Although Japan still approached the terms and conditions of the transfer with flexibility, it nevertheless sounded like an ultimatum (for a thorough analysis, see Togo [Tōgō] 2011, 123–145). An action plan signed in January 2003 by Prime Minister Koizumi and President Putin mapped out one of the planned areas of cooperation—that is, the conducting of negotiations on signing a peace treaty that would include the discussion of the territorial issue. In addition, the parties agreed on more than one occasion that it was necessary to continue the negotiations in order

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to realize this action plan. For example, during a summit in July 2007 between President Putin and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, the two leaders concluded that both countries needed to make efforts to further the negotiations on concluding a peace treaty for the purpose of the future resolution of the territorial issue (Pravda.ru 2007). But no concrete agreements between the parties were reached at this time. 7

Territorial Issue in Today’s Russian-Japanese Relations

In its approach to the demarcation problem the Japanese government today maintains the position that the four islands—Habomai, Kunashir, Iturup, and Shikotan—belong to Japan while the other Kurile Islands, including the southern part of Sakhalin it renounced in keeping with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, are an “undivided” territory with an ambiguous legal status that should be defined during negotiations. For this reason, the four islands are designated as Japanese territory on Japanese maps; the Kuriles up to the island of Iturup and the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel are painted white (i.e., not indicating a country’s sovereignty). Japanese legislation refers to the four islands, comprising six villages and five districts, as part of Nemuro subprefecture (Hokkaidō fuan magajin 2010). On February 27, 2009, in response to a Japanese MP’s request regarding the trip of Prime Minister Asō Tarō to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the Japanese government indicated its recognition of Russia’s accession of southern Sakhalin and noted that the issue regarding the accession of this territory “is not finalized.” Furthermore, the prime minister’s trip, together with the establishment of the Consulate General of Japan in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk has “no impact on the issue of the legal status of southern Sakhalin.” The government pointed out that after signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 Japan was not authorized to provide explanations concerning the ownership of this territory (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii 2009). Many Japanese politicians, including the leaders of Japan’s two largest political parties, the Democrats (Minshutō) and the Liberal Democrats (Jiyū Minshutō), repeatedly asserted in their public statements that Russia “illegally occupied” ( fuhō senkyo) the four islands of the Southern Kurile Ridge. For instance, on May 20, 2009, Prime Minister Asō addressed parliament and declared the islands to be “indigenous territories” (koyū no ryōdo) and also affirmed that they are “illegally occupied.” Several days later, President Medvedev urged Asō in a telephone conversation “to abstain from public statements and rhetoric on sensitive problems in Russian-Japanese relations” (Pavlyatenko

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2009). Almost a month later, on June 11, 2009, the Lower House of the Japanese National Diet unanimously adopted amendments to the 1982 “Law on the Special Measures Promoting a Resolution of the Problem of the Northern Territories” (Hoppō ryōdo mondai tō kaiketsu sokushin tokubetsu setchihō, referred to as Hokutokuhō), in which they too referred to the Northern Territories as “indigenous territories.” Tokyo’s position has remained constant, even after the Democratic Party came to power in August 2009. At that time, the government, in answering an inquiry by the Japanese MP Suzuki Muneo, again used the term “illegally occupied” regarding the status of the islands (Ria novosti 2012). In February 2011, Japanese prime minister Naoto Kan referred to a visit by Russian president Dmitriĭ A. Medvedev’s to Kunashir on November 1, 2010, as an “inexcusable rudeness” (Polit.ru 2011). Clearly Japan and Russia have divergent views on how to resolve this issue. In Japan, for example, various configurations for the carving up of the disputed territories have been put forward at the private level, such as the so-called Asō Plan named after Japan’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs Asō Tarō. Put forward in December 2006, this plan stated that the area of the disputed islands should be taken into consideration and that a solution to the problem would be facilitated with the transfer of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and 25 percent of Iturup to Japan (Kommersant 2009). Perhaps not surprisingly, this plan gained no traction at an official level. Russia has repeatedly proposed the idea of a joint economic zone for the disputed territories, in which both parties would be engaged in mutually beneficial economic activities. The Japanese side responded negatively to this suggestion, however, asserting that it would not be satisfied if sovereignty, and thus current legislation, remained in Russian hands. At the beginning of March 2012, Vladimir Putin, now prime minister, suggested at a press conference of foreign media that the territorial issue with Japan could be resolved through reciprocal concessions and compromise. Putin used the judo term hikiwake (a “draw” or “tie”) (Ria novosti 2013). The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation adopted in February 2013 noted that in its relations with Japan Russia would continue “the dialogue to find a mutually acceptable solution to unsettled issues” (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii 2013, paragraph 85). The advancement in the negotiations regarding the conclusion of a peace treaty assumed paramount importance during an official visit of the Japanese prime minister Abe to Moscow in April 2013. The parties agreed to continue working on this difficult, yet key issue, as mirrored in the statement released following the visit:

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[In order to] develop further relations between the two countries and to create a broad Russian-Japanese partnership in the 21st century, the heads of the two countries have expressed determination in overcoming the existing difficulties during the negotiations so as to conclude a peace treaty, the final resolution of which would be in a mutually acceptable form. The necessity to settle [this] was confirmed [at this time] and also in the joint statement of the Russian president and the Japanese prime minister on adoption of [this] Russian-Japanese action plan and the Russian-Japanese action plan of 2003 (President rossii 2013). Fielding a question from a Japanese journalist on how long it would take to conclude such a peace treaty, the Japanese prime minister noted that several obstacles hindered the process, admitting that “there is no magic wand in the world that could solve the problem in one fell swoop” (Komsomol’skaya pravda 2013). The highest levels of the Russian government have repeatedly confirmed their readiness to continue searching for a mutually acceptable solution to the peace treaty issue, including the border aspect. It appears that the main prerequisites for productive discussions and mutually acceptable decisions are shaping a platform for broad, multifaceted cooperation between Russia and Japan. This will hopefully nurture the development of a relationship grounded in trust and partnership—one expressed in close and mutually beneficial cooperation in key areas and in the productive interaction regarding international affairs—to create a constructive and calm milieu for ongoing dialogue on this complicated issue. Acknowledgments This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Grant No. 19-18-00017). Bibliography

Russian Sources

Alad’in, Vitaliĭ Vladimirovich (Kirill Evgen’evich Cherevko). 2001. Rossiya i Yaponiya: propushchennye vekhi na puti k mirnomu dogovoru [Russia and Japan: Missed Milestones on the Road to a Peace Treaty]. Moscow: BIMPA.

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Chronos. 1905a. “Portsmutskiy mirnyi dogovor mezhdu Rossiey i Yaponiey” [The Portsmouth Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan]. http://www.hrono.ru/ dokum/190_dok/19050825portsmut.php. Chronos. 1905b. “Prilozhenie № 10 k Portsmutskomu mirnomu dogovoru mezhdu Rossieĭ i Yaponieĭ 1905 goda.” [Appendix 10 to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan of 1905]. http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/190_dok/19050905pril.php. Cherevko, Kirill Evgen’evich. 2012. “O vozmozhnosti okonchatel’nogo uregulirovaniya territorial’nogo spora mezhdu RF i Yaponieĭ” [On the Possibility of the Final Resolution of the Territorial Dispute between the Russian Federation and Japan]. https://riss.ru/analitycs/2522/. Dokumenty XX veka. 1941. “Kuril’skie ostrova v ofitsial’nom putevoditele po Yaponii departamenta gosudarstvennykh zheleznykh dorog Yaponii 1941 g. (Tokio)” [The Documents of the 20th Century. The Kurile islands in the Official Guide to Japan by the Japanese Government Railways, 1941 (Tokyo)]. http://www.doc20vek.ru/ taxonomy/term/306. Dokumenty XX veka. 1945. “Dokumenty XX veka (1945) Strogo sekretno dlya Generalissimusa Stalina ot Prezidenta Trumėna. Polucheno 18 avgusta 1945 goda” [The Documents of the 20th Century. Strictly Confidential from President Truman from Generalissimo Stalin. Received on August 18, 1945]. http://doc20vek.ru/ node/1331. Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA], ed. 2014. “Territorial’naya problema mezhdu Yaponieĭ i Rossieĭ. Za otnosheniya istinnogo doveriya” [The Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia. On Relations of Genuine Trust]. http://www .ru.emb-japan.go.jp/image/POLICIES/pamphlet_r1.pdf. Georgiev, Yuriĭ Vladimirovich, соmp. 1998. Kurily—ostrova v okeane problem [The Kuriles—Islands in an Ocean of Problems]. Moscow: Rosspen. Gromyko, Andreĭ Andreevich, and Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev, eds. 1980. Istoriya vneshneĭ politiki SSSR Tom pervyĭ [History of USSR Foreign Policy. Volume One]. http://sbiblio.com/biblio/archive/gromika_istorija/06.aspx. Istoricheskiĭ fakul’tet Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta imeni M. V. Lomonosova [Faculty of History, Moscow State University. Library of Electronic Resources]. 1945. “Krymskaya konferentsiya. 4–11 fevralya 1945 g. Soglashenie” [The Crimean Conference of February 4–11, 1945. Agreement]. http://www.hist.msu.ru/ ER/Etext/War_Conf/krim19.htm. Japantoday.ru. 1998. “Moskovskaya deklaratsiya ob ustanovlenii sozidatel’nogo partnerstva mezhdu Yaponieĭ i Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsieĭ” [Moscow Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership between Japan and the Russian Federation]. http://japan today.ru/ofitsialnye-dokumenty/moskovskaya-deklaratsiya-ob-ustanovlenii -sozidatelnogo-partnerstva-mezhdu-yaponiey-i-rossiyskoy-federatsiey.html.

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List of Names The following listing includes the full names of individuals mentioned in this volume; birth and death dates are provided, when known.
 This list is compiled by Amy Reigle Newland and JohanChristian Newland. Abaza, Alekseĭ Mikhaĭlovich (1853–1915) Abe Nobuyuki (1875–1953) Abe Shintarō (1924–1991) Abe Shinzō (b. 1954) Acheson, Dean (1893–1971) Adachi Mineichirō (1870–1934) Adachi Sanai (1769–1845) Aichi Kiichi (1907–1973) Aizawa Hideyuki (b. 1919) Akhromeev, Sergeĭ Fedorovich (1923–1991) Akihito, Emperor (b. 1933; r. 1989–2019) Akita Ujaku (1883–1962) Aleksandr (Alexander) I, Emperor (1777–1825; r. 1801–1825) Alekseev, Evgeniĭ Ivanovich (1843–1917) Alekseev, Mikhail Vasil’evich (1857–1918) Aleksiĭ II, Patriarch (1929–2008) Amae Kishichirō (b. 1943) Anami Korechika (1887–1945) Andropov, Yuriĭ Vladimirovich (1914–1984) Anikeev, Pavel Vasil’evich (1888–1938) Anna (Ioannovna), Empress (1693–1740; r. 1730–1740) Antonov, Alekseĭ Innokentievich (1896–1962) Arahata, Kanson (1887–1981) Araki Sadao (1877–1966) Arbatov, Georgiĭ Arkad’evich (1923–2010) Arimura Tsunemichi (1888–1949) Arita Hachirō (1875–1965) Arita Keisuke (1917–2005) Asaeda Shigeharu (1912–2000) Asahara Seiki (1916–1996) Ashida Hitoshi (1887–1959) Asō Tarō (b. 1940) Atlasov, Vladimir Vladimirovich (d. 1711) Avelan, Fedor Karlovich (1836–1916) Baba Sajūrō (1787–1822) Baker, James Addison (b. 1930) Bakhmet’ev, Yuriĭ (Georgiĭ) (1847–1928) Belenko, Viktor Ivanovich (b. 1947)

Benyovszky, Maurice (Móric) (1746–1786) Berezhkov, Valentin Mikhaĭlovich (1916–1998) Beria, Lavrentiĭ Pavlovich (1899–1953) Bering, Vitus (1681–1741) Besedovskiĭ, Grigoriĭ Zinov’evich (1896–?) Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (b. 1933) Bezobrazov, Aleksandr Mikhaĭlovich (1855–1931) Biddle, James (1783–1848) Birilev, Nikolaĭ Alekseevich (1829–1882) Blyukher, Vasiliĭ Konstantinovich (1889–1938) Bohlen, Charles Eustis (1904–1974) Boldin, Valeriĭ Ivanovich (b. 1935) Boldyrev, Vasiliĭ Georgievich (1875–1933) Bond, Niles Woodbridge (1916–2005) Bonesteel III, Charles Hartwell (1909–1977) Borton, Hugh (1903–1995) Bradley, Follett (1890–1952) Brezhnev, Leonid Il’ich (1906–1982) Briner, Yuliĭ Ivanovich (1849–1920) Bronfman, Edgar Miles (1929–2013) Brutents, Karen Nersesovich (1924–2017) Budberg, Alekseĭ Pavlovich (1869–1945) Bukharin, Nikolaĭ Ivanovich (1888–1938) Bulganin, Nikolaĭ Aleksandrovich (1895–1975) Bundy, McGeorge (1919–1996) Burns, James MacGregor (1918–2014) Bush, George Herbert Walker (1924–2018) Carter, Jimmy (James Earl) (b. 1924) Catherine (Ekaterina) II, Empress (1729–1796; r. 1762–1796) Chiang Kai-Shek (1887–1975) Chicherin, Georgiĭ Vasil’vich (1872–1936) Chekhov, Anton Pavlovich (1860–1904) Cherkasskiĭ, Mikhail Borisovich (1882–1919) Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich (1911–1985) Chernyaev, Anatoliĭ Sergeevich (1921–2017) Choe Chang-ik (1896–1960)

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608 Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer (1874–1965) Clifford, Clark McAdams (1906–1998) Clinton, Bill (William) Jefferson (b. 1946) Coen, Cornelius (dates unknown) Daikokuya Kōdayū (1751–1828) Davydov, Gavriil Ivanovich (1784–1809) Deane, John Russell Jr. (1919–2013) Debuchi Katsuji (1878–1947) Denbei (ca. 1670–1714) Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947) Dening, Sir Maberley Elser (1897–1977) Denison, Henry Willard (1846–1914) Derevyanko, Kuz’ma Nikolaevich (1904–1954) De Vries, Maarten Gerritszoon (1589–1647) Diterihs, Mikhail Konstantinovich (1874–1937) Doeff, Hendrik (1764–1837) Doi Takako (1928–2014) Dolgikh, Ivan Ilʹich (1904–1961) Domnitskiĭ, Andreĭ Ivanovich (1909–?) Dovgalevskiĭ, Valerian Savel’evich (1885–1934) Dulles, John Foster (1888–1959) Edamura Sumio (b. 1932) Eden, Robert Anthony (1897–1977) Eisenhower, Dwight David (1890–1969) Elsey, George McKee (1918–2015) Enomoto Takeaki (1836–1908) Falin, Valentin Mikhaĭlovich (1926–2018) Faure, Edgar (1908–1988) Fedorenko, Nikolaĭ Trofimovich (1912–2000) Feng Yuxiang (1882–1948) Forrestal, James Vincent (1892–1949) Frunze, Mikhail Vasilʹevich (1885–1925) Fujii Kōtsuchi (1864–1927) Fujiwara Ginjirō (1869–1960) Fukuda Hikosuke (1875–1959) Fukuda Takeo (1905–1995) Fukuda Yasuo (b. 1936) Fukumoto Kazuo (1894–1983) Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901) Fusaki Tsutsumi (1890–1959) Futabatei Shimei (1864–1909) Fuwa Tetsuzō (b. 1930)

List of Names Gajda, Radola (Rudolf Geidl, 1892–1948) Gnechko, Alekseĭ Romanovich (1900–1980) Gojong (Emperor Gwangmu) (1852–1919; r. 1897–1907) Golovnin, Vasiliĭ Mikhaĭlovich (1776–1831) Gondatti, Nikolaĭ L’vovich  (1860–1946) Goncharov, Ivan Aleksandrovich (1812–1892) Gonza (Damien Pomortsev, 1718?–1739) Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (b. 1931) Gorchakov, Aleksandr Mikhaĭlovich (1798–1883) Goshkevich, Iosif Antonovich (1814–1875) Gotō Shinpei (1857–1929) Grabar, Igor Emmanuilovich (1871–1960) Grew, Joseph Clark (1880–1965) Grey, Edward (1862–1933) Grinberg, Vladimir Arievich (1896–1942) Gromyko, Andreĭ Andreevich (1909–1989) Guins, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich (1887–1971) Guo Songling (1883–1925) Gutman, Anatoliĭ Yakovlevich (Anatoliĭ Gan, 1889–1950) Hanihara Masanao (1876–1934) Hara Takashi (1856–1921) Harada Uichirō (1890–1973) Harriman, William Averell (1891–1986) Harris, Townsend (1804–1878) Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1937–2006) Hashimoto Sanai (1834–1859) Hata Hikosaburō (1890–1959) Hata Shōryū (1915–1994) Hatoyama Ichirō (1883–1959) Hatoyama Yukio (b. 1947) Hayashi Jussai (1768–1841) Hayashi Kentarō (1913–2004) Hayashi Shihei (1738–1793) Hayashi Tadasu (1850–1913) Higurashi Nobunori (1901–1954) Hirota Kōki (1878–1948) Hitrovo, Mikhail Aleksandrovich (1837–1896) Hōgen Shinsaku (1910–1999) Honda Kumatarō (1874–1948) Honda Toshiaki (1744–1821) Hopkins, Harry Lloyd (1890–1946) Horie Naozō (1870–1943) Hosokawa Morihiro (b. 1938) Hu Jintao (b. 1942)

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List of Names Hull, Cordell (1871–1955) Hurley, Patrick Jay (1883–1963) Hyōdō Nagao (1936–2017) Hyuga Rihei (1874–1939) Ichikawa Sadanji II (1880–1940) Ichikawa Shōichi (1892–1945) Ikeda Daisaku (b. 1928) Ikeda Hayato (1899–1965) Ikeda Yukihiko (1937–2004) Imai Takashi (b. 1929) Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915) Inoue Katsunosuke (1861–1929) Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855–1932) Ioffe, Adol’f Abramovich (1883–1927) Ishibashi Tanzan (1884–1973) Ishida Hirohide (1914–1993) Ishii Kikujirō (1866–1945) Ishii Shirō (1892–1959) Ishikawa Kanji (1889–1949) Ishikawa Masatada (d. 1920) Ishimitsu Shinsei (1868–1942) Ishiwara Kanji (1889–1949) Ishkov, Aleksandr Akinovich (1905–1988) Isokichi (dates unknown) Isome Rokurō (1878–1930) Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909) Ivanov, Alekseĭ Nikolaevich (1869–1958) Ivanov, Igor Sergeevich (b. 1945) Ivanov, Sergeĭ Borisovich (b. 1953) Ivanov, Vladimir Ivanovich (b. 1948) Iwakura Tomomi (1825–1883) Izvol’skiĭ, Aleksandr Petrovich (1856–1919) Izvozov, Semen Timofeevich (dates unknown) Johnson, Lyndon Baines (1908–1973) Kadowaki Suemitsu (1897–1985) Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseevich (1893–1991) Kaifu Toshiki (b. 1931) Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich (1875–1946) Kan Naoto (b. 1946) Kan Sueharu (1917–1950) Kanemaru Shin (1914–1996) Kapitsa, Mikhail Stepanovich (1921–1995) Karakhan, Lev Mikhaĭlovich (1889–1937) Kase Toshikazu (1893–2004)

609 Katayama Sen (1859–1933) Katayama Tetsu (1887–1978) Katō Gen’ichi (1890–1979) Katō Hiroharu (1870–1939) Katō Kanji (Katō Hiroharu, 1870–1939) Katō Mutsuki (1926–2006) Katō Ryōzō (b. 1941) Katō Takaaki (1860–1926) Katsuragawa Hoshū (1751–1809) Katsura Tarō (1848–1913) Kawabe Torashirō (1890–1960) Kawaguchi Yoriko (b. 1941) Kawai Yoshinari (1886–1970) Kawaji Toshiakira (1801–1868) Kawakami Toshitsune (Toshihiko, 1861–1935) Kawashima Shōjirō (1890–1970) Kawato Tetsuo (b. 1947) Kazakov, Grigoriĭ (1869–1918) Kennan, George Frost (1904–2005) Kennedy, John Fitzgerald (1917–1963) Khasbulatov, Ruslan Imranovich (b. 1942) Khitrovo, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1837–1896) Khrushchev (Хrushchev), Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971) Khvostov, Nikolaĭ Aleksandrovich (1776–1809) Kido Takayoshi (1833–1877) Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) Kishi Nobusuke (1896–1987) Kislenko, Alekseĭ Pavlovich (1901–1981) Klyuchikov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1924–2007) Knox, Philander Chase (1853–1921) Kobayashi Ichizō (1873–1957) Kodama Gentarō (1852–1906) Koiso Kuniaki (1880–1950) Koizumi Jun’ichirō (b. 1942) Kokovtsov, Vladimir Nikolaevich (1853–1943) Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasil’evich (1874–1920) Komura Jutarō (1855–1911) Komura Shunzaburō (1870–1832) Kondō Morishige (1771–1829) Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945) Konoe Hidemaro (1898–1973) Kōno Hironaka (1849–1923) Kōno Ichirō (1898–1965) Kōno Masaharu (b. 1948) Kōno Yōhei (b. 1937)

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610 Konrad, Nikolaĭ Iosifovich (1891–1970) Kopp, Viktor Leontʹevich (1880–1930) Koshkin, Anatoliĭ Arkadʹevich Koshkin (b. 1946) Kostikov, Vyacheslav Vasil’evich (b. 1940) Kosygin, Alekseĭ Nikolaevich (1904–1980) Kōtoku Shūsui (1871–1911) Kovalenko, Ivan Ivanovich (1919–2005) Kozakov, Grigoriĭ Aleksandrovich (1869–1918) Kozyrev, Andreĭ Vladimirovich (b. 1951) Kravchenko, Andreĭ Grigor’evich (1899–1963) Kruglov, Sergeĭ Nikiforovich (1907–1977) Kryuchkov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1924–2007) Kruzenshtern, Ivan Fedorovich (1770–1846) Kudashev, Nikolaĭ Aleksandrovich (1868–1925) Kumagai Hiroshi (b. 1940) Kume Kunitake (1839–1931) Kunadze, Georgiĭ Fridrikhovich (b. 1948) Kuranari Tadashi (1918–1996) Kure Ken (1883–1940) Kurino Shin’ichirō (1851–1937) Kurita Naohachirō (1861–1926) Kuriyama Takakzau (1931–2015) Kuroki Chikanori (1883–1934) Kuropatkin, Alekseĭ Nikolaevich (1848–1925) Kusaba Tatsumi (1888–1946) Kusachi Teigo (1904–2001) Kuznetsov, Nikolaĭ Kirillovich (1890–1937) Kuznetsov, Vasiliĭ Vasil’evich (1901–1990) Kuznetsov, Vladimir Nikolaevich (1916–2000) Laksman, Adam Kirillovich (1766–1796?) Lamsdorf, Vladimir Nikolaevich (1845–1907) Lansdowne, Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice (1845–1927) Latyshev, Igor Aleksandrovich (1925–2006) Lavrov, Sergeĭ Viktorovich (b. 1950) Laxmann, Erik (Kirill Laksman, 1737–1796) Lazo, Sergeĭ Georgievich (1894–1920) Lee Denghui (b. 1923) Lenin (Ulʹyanov) Vladimir Il’ich (1870–1924) Likhachev, Ivan Fedorovich (1826–1907) Litvinov, Maxim Maksimovich (1876–1951) Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969) Lodge Jr., Henry Cabot (1902–1985) Losyukov, Aleksandr Prokhorovich (b. 1943)

List of Names Lozovskiĭ, Solomon Abramovich (1878–1952) Lukin, Vladimir Petrovich (b. 1937) Lukyanov, Anatoliĭ Ivanovich (1930–2019) Luzhkov, Yuriĭ Mikhaĭlovich (b. 1936) MacArthur, Douglas (1880–1964) Maehara Seiji (b. 1962) Malenkov, Georgiĭ Maksimilianovich (1902–1988) Malevskiĭ-Malevich, Nikolaĭ Andreevich (1856–1917) Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich (1906–1980) Mamiya Rinzō (1775–1844) Mao Zedong (1893–1976) Marumo Naotoshi (1863–1921) Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) Marshall, George Catlett (1880–1959) Martens, Friedrich Fromhold (1845–1909) Matyunin, Nikolaĭ Gavrilovich (1849–1907) Matsuda Denjūrō (1769–1842) Matsudaira Sadanobu (1759–1829) Matsudaira Tsuneo (1877–1949) Matsuishi Yasuharu (1859–1915) Matsukata Masayoshi (1835–1924) Matsumae Michihiro (1754–1832) Matsumoto Shun’ichi (1897–1987) Matsumura Tomokatsu (1899–1979) Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946) Matsushima Hajime (1883–1961) Matsuura Kusuo (1911?–1951?) May, Ernest Richard (1928–2009) McLane, John Roy (1852–1911) McSweeney, John (1890–1969) Medvedev, Dmitriĭ Anatol’evich (b. 1971) Meiji, Emperor (1852–1912; r. 1867–1912) Melo, Nicholas (1550–1614) Merkulov, Nikolaĭ Dionis’evich (1869–1945) Merkulov, Spiridon Dionis’evich (1870–1957) Meyer, George von Lengerke (1858–1918) Miki Takeo (1907–1988) Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich (1895–1978) Minitskiĭ, Mikhail Ivanovich (1772–1829) Mitsuzaka Hiroshi (1927–2004) Miyazawa Kiichi (1919–2007) Mogami Tokunai (1755–1836) Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaĭlovich (1890–1986) Mori Arinori (1847–1889)

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611

List of Names Morishita Kunio (1896–1975) Mori Yoshirō (b. 1937) Motono Ichirō (1862–1918) Muragaki Norimasa (1813–1880) Murakami Keisaku (1888–1948) Murakami Teisuke (1780–1846) Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ, Nikolaĭ Nikolaevich (1809–1881) Murav’ev, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1845–1900) Murav’ev, Nikolaĭ Valerʹyanovich (1850–1908) Mussorgsky (Musorgskiĭ), Modeest Petrovich (1839–1881) Mutō Nobuyoshi (1868–1933) Mutsu Munemitsu (1844–1897) Nabeyama Sadachika (1901–1979) Nagano Shigeo (1900–1984) Nagaoka Gaishi (1858–1933) Nakagawa Goroji (1768–1848) Nakajima Masatake (1870–1931) Nakajima Mineo (1936–2013) Nakasone Yasuhiro (b. 1918) Nakayama Tarō (b. 1924) Nam Il (1913–1976) Nelidov, Aleksandr Ivanovich (1838–1910) Nemirovich-Danchenko, Vasiliĭ Ivanovich (1845–1936) Nemtsov, Boris Efiimovich (1959–2015) Nessel’rode, Karl (1780–1862) Nesterov, Mikhail Vasil’evich (1892–1971) Nezu Hajime (1860–1927) Nicholas (Nikolaĭ) I, Emperor (1796–1855; r. 1825–1855) Nicholas (Nikolaĭ) II, Emperor (1868–1918; r. 1894–1917) Nicolson, Sir Arthur (1849–1928) Nishimura Kumao (1899–1980) Nixon, Richard Milhous (1913–1994) Noda Yoshihiko (b. 1957) Nomura Issei (b. 1940) Nomura Motonobu (dates unknown) Nosaka Sanzō (1892–1993) Ōba Jirō (1864–1935) Obata Toshishirō (1885–1947) Obata Yūkichi (1873–1947) Obuchi Keizō (1937–2000) O’Conroy, Taid (Tim Conroy, 1883–1935)

Ogata Taketora (1888–1956) Ogawa Heikichi (1869–1942) Ogawara Yoshio (1919–2018) Oguri Tadamasa (1827–1868) Ōhira Masayoshi (1910–1980) Ōi Shigemoto (1863–1951) Okamoto Suemasa (1892–1967) Ōkita Saburō (1914–1993) Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830–1878) Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838–1922) Olarovskiĭ, Alexander Epiktetovich (1845–1910) Osanai Kaoru (1881–1928) Ōshima Hiroshi (1886–1975) Ōta Tamekichi (1880–1956) Otokichi (1818–1867) Ōtsuki Bankei (1801–1878) Ōyama Iwao (1842–1916) Ozaki Yukio (1858–1954) Ozawa Ichirō (b. 1942) Palitsyn, Fedor Fedorovich (1851–1923) Panov, Alexander Nikolaevich (b. 1944) Patolichev, Nikolaĭ Semenovich (1908–1989) Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich (1849–1936) Pavlov, Valentin Ivanovich (1937–2003) Peng Dehuai (1898–1974) Perry, Matthew Calbraith (1794–1858) Peter (Petr) I, Emperor (1672–1725; r. 1682–1725) Petrakov, Nikolaĭ Yakovlevich (b. 1937) Pierce, Franklin (1804–69) Pilʹnyak, Boris Andreevich (1894–1938) Polyanskiĭ, Stepanovich Dmitrĭ (1917–2001) Polivanov, Evgeniĭ Dmitrievich (1891–1938) Polo, Marco (1254–1324) Primakov, Evgeniĭ Maksimovich (1929–2015) Przhevál’skiĭ, Nikolaĭ Mikhailovich (1839–1888) Pu I (Puyi, 1906–1967) Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich (b. 1952) Putyatin, Evfimiĭ Vasil’evich (1803–1883) Rastvorov, Yuriĭ Aleksandrovich (1921–2004) Reagan, Ronald (1911–2004) Rezanov, Nikolaĭ Petrovich (1764–1807) Ribbentrop, Joachim von (1893–1946) Rikord, Petr Ivanovich (1776–1855)

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612 Rimsky (Rimskiĭ)-Korsakov, Nikolaĭ Andreevich (1844–1908) Rogachev, Igor Alekseevich (1932–2012) Roh Tae-woo (b. 1932) Romanov, Alekseĭ (Aleksandrovich) (1850–1908) Romanov, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich (1903–1938) Romanov, Georgiĭ Mikhailovich (1863–1919) Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (1882–1945) Roosevelt (Jr.), Theodore (1858–1919) Root, Elihu (1845–1937) Rosen, Roman Romanovich (1847–1921) Rosenberg, Marcel Izrailevich (1896–1937) Rozanov, Sergeĭ Nikolaevich (1869–1937) Rozhestvenskiĭ, Zinoviĭ Petrovich (1848–1909) Sablin, Nikolaĭ Vasilievich (1880–1962) Saigō Takamori (1828–1877) Saionji Kinmochi (1849–1940) Saitō Kunihiko (b. 1937) Saitō Makoto (1858–1936) Saitō Rokurō (1923–1995) Sakatani Yoshirō (1863–1941) Sakuma Shōzan (1811–1864) Sakurauchi Yoshio (1912–2003) Samoĭlov, Vladimir Konstantinovich (1866–1916) Sanō Fumio (1892–1931) Sanō Manabu (1892–1953) Saplin, Vasiliĭ Ivanovich (b. 1949) Satō Aimaro (1857–1934) Satō Eisaku (1901–1975) Satō Naotake (1882–1971) Satō Seizaburō (1932–1999) Satō Tsuneaki (1925–2014) Sazonov, Sergeĭ Dmitrievich (1860–1927) Sejima Ryūzō (1911–2007) Semenov, Georgiĭ Mikhaĭlovich (1890–1945) Shakhnazarov, Georgiĭ Khosroevich (1924–2001) Shatalin, Stanislav Sergeevich (1934–1997) Shatov, Vladimir Sergeevich (1887–1943) Shcherbakov, Aleksandr Sergeevich (1901–1945) Shepilov, Dmítriĭ Trofímovich (1905–1995) Shevardnadze, Edward (Eduard) Amvrosievich (1928–2014) Shibano Ritsuzan (1736–1807)

List of Names Shidehara Kijūrō (1872–1951) Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887–1957) Shigeta Hiroshi (b. 1942) Shiina Etsusaburō (1898–1979) Shimada Mototarō (1870–1945) Shimoda Takesō (1908–1995) Shinbei Futabatei (1864–1909) Shiozaki Yasuhisa (b. 1950) Shiratori Toshio (1887–1949) Shirōzu Owashi (1863–1932) Shizuki Tadao (1760–1806) Shōda Kazue (1869–1948) Shtern, Grigoriĭ Mihaĭlovich (1900–1941) Simanskiĭ, Panteleĭmon Nikolaevich (1866–1938) Slutsky, Abram Aronovich (1898–1938) Smushkevich, Yakov Vladimirovich (1902–1941) Sobolev, Arkadiĭ Aleksandrovich (1903–1964) Sodza (Soza) (1694?–1736) Sokol’nikov, Grigoriĭ Yakovlevich (1888–1939) Solikovkiĭ (Sulikovkiĭ), Vasiliĭ Aleksandrovich (1902–?) Sol’skiĭ, Dmitriĭ Martynovich (1833–1910) Sonoda Sunao (1913–1984) Soong Tse-ven (Song Ziwen, 1894–1971) Sorge, Richard (1895–1944) Soskovets, Oleg Nikolaevich (b. 1949) Spanberg, Martin (Martyn Petrovich Shpanberg; 1696–1761) Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich (Iosif Vissarionovich, 1878–1953) Stark, Georgiĭ Karlovich (1878–1950) Stark, Oskar Viktorovich (1846–1928) Stettinius, Edward Reilly, Jr. (1900–1949) Stimson, Henry Lewis (1867–1950) Stirling, James (1791–1865) Suetsugu Ichirō (1922–2001) Sugihara Chiune (1900–1986) Sugimori Kōji (1933–2001) Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1846–1926) Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) Suslov, Mikhail Andreevich (1902–1982) Suvorin, Alekseĭ Sergeevich (1834–1912) Suzuki Kantarō (1868–1948) Suzuki Muneo (b. 1948) Suzuki Yōnosuke (dates unknown) Suzuki Zenko (1911–2004)

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List of Names Tachibana Shoichirō (dates unknown) Taft, William Howard (1857–1930) Taishō, Emperor (1879–1926; r. 1912–1926) Takebe Rokuzō (1893–1958) Takadaya Kahei (1769–1827) Takahira Kogorō (1854–1926) Takarabe Takeshi (1867–1949) Takasaki Tatsunosuke (1885–1964) Takayanagi Yasutarō (1870–1951) Takeshita Isamu (1870–1946) Takeshita Noboru (1924–2000) Tanaka Giichi (1864–1929) Tanaka Kakuei (1918–1993) Tanaka Makiko (b. 1944) Tanaka Man’itsu (1882–1963) Tanaka Tokichi (1877–1961) Tanaka Yoshihisa (d. 1947) Tanba Minoru (1938–2016) Tani Yutaka (1911–1942) Tarasov, Artem Mikhaĭlovich (1950–2017) Tatekawa Yoshitsugu (1880–1945) Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919) Tevosyan, Ivan Fedorovich (1902–1958) Tikhvinskiĭ, Sergeĭ Leonidovich (1918–2018) Tochinai Sōjirō (1866–1932) Tōgō Heihachirō (1848–1934) Tōgō Shigenori (1882–1950) Tōjō Hideki (1884–1948) Tokō Takehiro (1934–2014) Tokuda Kyūichi (1894–1953) Tokugawa Ienari (1773–1841; ruled 1787–1837) Tolstoy (Tolstoĭ), Lev Nikolaevich (1828–1910) Tomizu Hirondo (1861–1935) Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–1944) Trepov, Dmitrĭ Fedorovich (1855–1906) Treskin, Nikolaĭ Ivanovich (1763–1842) Tryapitsyn, Yakov Ivanovich (1897–1920) Trotsky (Trotskiĭ), Lev Davidovich (Leybi Davidovich Bronstein) (1879–1940) Troyanovskiĭ, Aleksandr Antonovich (1882–1955) Troyanovskiĭ, Oleg Aleksandrovich (1919–2003) Trujillo, José Vicente (1889–1970) Truman, Harry S. (1884–1972) Tsuda Sanzō (1855–1891) Turgenev, Ivan Sergeevich (1818–1883) Tyshler, Aleksandr Grigorʹevich (1898–1980)

613 Uchida Kōsai (Yasuya) (1865–1936) Uchimura Gōsuke (1921–2009) Uda Kan’ichiro (dates unknown) Uemura Kōgorō (1894–1978) Ukhtomskiĭ, Esper Esperovich (1861–1921) Uno Sōsuke (1922–1998) Unterberger, Pavel Fedorovich (1882–1921) Ustinov, Dmitriĭ Fedorovich (1908–1984) Ustryalov, Nikolaĭ Vasiilʹevich (1890–1937) Ustrugov, Leonid Aleksandrovich (1877–1938) Valuev, Arkadiĭ Mikhaĭlovich (1861–1935) Van Aduard, J. E. Lewe (1774–1832) Vasilevskiĭ, Aleksandr Mikhaĭlovich (1895–1977) Vil’de, Solomon Lazarevich (1892–1967) Voĭtinskiĭ, Grigoriĭ Naumovich (1893–1953) Vologodskiĭ, Petr Vasil’evich (1863–1925) Vol’skiĭ, Arkadiĭ Ivanovich (1932–2006) Vonlyarlyarskiĭ, Vladimīr Mikhaĭlovich (1852–1946) Von Siebold, Philipp Franz (1796–1866) Von Ungern-Shternberg, Roman Fedorovich (1886–1921) Vorontsov-Dashkov, Illarion Ivanovich (1837–1916) Voskresenskii, Apolinariĭ Nikolaevich (1879–1930) Vrangel, Petr Nikolaevich (1878–1928) Wakatsuki Reijirō (1866–1949) Walton, William (Vil’yam Val’ton, d. 1743) Watanabe Masanosuke (1899–1928) Watanabe Michio (1923–1995) Watanabe Rie (dates unknown) Weber, Karl Ivanovich (1841–1910) Welles, Benjamin Sumner (1892–1961) Wilhelm II, Emperor (1859–1941; r. 1888–1918) Witte, Sergeĭ Yulʹevich (1849–1915) Yachi Shōtarō (b. 1944) Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolaevich (1923–2005) Yamada Otozō (1881–1965) Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) Yamakawa Hitoshi (1880–1958) Yamamoto Gonnohyōe (Yamamoto Gonbei, 1852–1933) Yamamoto Isoroku (1884–1943)

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614 Yamaza Enjirō (1866–1914) Yanaev, Gennadiĭ Ivanovich (1937–2010) Yanson, Yakov Davidovich (Karl Emanuel Jansson, 1886–1938) Yavliinskiĭ, Grigoriĭ Alekseeevich (b. 1952) Yazov, Dmitriĭ Timofeevich (b. 1924) Yeltsin (El’tsin), Boris Nikolaevich (1931–2007) Yonai Mitsumasa (1880–1948) Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967) Yoshihara Tarō (?–early 1920s) Yoshino Sakuzō (1878–1933) Yoshizawa Kenkichi (1874–1965)

List of Names Younger, Kenneth Gilmour (1908–1976) Yurenev, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1888–1938) Zamyatin, Leonid Mitrofanovich (b. 1922) Zeybot (Grant), Arvid Yanovich (1894–1934) Zhang Xueliang (1901–2001) Zhang Zongchang (1881–1932) Zhang Zuolin (1875–1928) Zhdanov, Andreĭ Andreevich (1896–1948) Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) Zhukov, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich (1896–1974) Zinov’ev, Grigoriĭ Evseevich (1883–1936)

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Index Abe Shintarō 435, 445, 446, 450, 462, 467 Abe Shinzō 521, 523, 544, 598 Accords Helsinki Accords 411, 560 Acheson Line 561, 574 Adenauer Formula 389, 571, 591 Agreements Agreement Between the Governments of Japan and of Russian Federation Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments (R: Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii i Pravitel’stvom Yaponii o pooshchrenii i zashchite kapitalovlozheniĭ; J: Ronichi tōshi shōrei hogo kyōtei) 549 Agreement Between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan on Fishing in the Soviet Coastal Waters in the Northwestern Part of the Pacific Ocean (R: Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Pravitel’stvom Yaponii o rybolovstve u poberezh’ya SSSR v severo-zapadnoĭ chasti Tikhogo okeana; J: Hokusei Taiheiyō no Sobieto shakaishugi kyōwa kokurenpō no chisaki okiai ni okeru 1977 nen no gyogyō ni kansuru Nihonkoku seifu to Sobieto shakaishugi kyōwa kokurenpō to no kyōtei) 434 Agreement on Certain Issues of Cooperation in the Fishing Operations Involving Maritime Resources (R: Soglashenie o nekotorykh voprosakh sotrudnichestva v oblasti promysla morskikh zhivykh resursov; J: Hoppō yontō shūhen suiiki ni okeru Nihon gyosen sōgyō wakagumi ni kansuru kyōtei iwayuru anzen sōgyō kyōtei)  517 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) 391 Karakhan–Hirota 161

Nishi–Rosen 48 Russo-Japanese 87, 88–91, 93, 96–98, 99, 103, 108, 109 Sino-Japanese Agreement Regarding Manchuria (J: Manshū go-anken ni kansuru Nisshin jōyaku; C: Zhongri huiyi dongsansheng shiyi zheng yue jifu) 60 Soviet-Japanese Consular (R: Konsulskaya Konventsiya mezhdu SSSR i Yaponieĭ; J: Nihon koku to Sorenpō to no aida o ryōji jōyaku) 371, 436 Takahira–Root (J: Rūto-Takahira kyōtei)  59, 61, 90 Yalta 255, 259, 264, 274, 277, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285–91, 293, 295, 357, 369, 380, 386, 421, 559, 560, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 568, 570, 584, 585, 590 Yamagata–Lobanov 47 Ainu 5, 8, 16, 19, 29, 30, 578, 579, 580 Alaska 12, 24, 27, 37, 270, 288 Alliances Alliance for Supporting the Livelihoods of Returnees from the Soviet Union (J: Siuoren Kikansha Seikatsu Yōgo Dōmei, Sokidō) 322 Anglo-Japanese (J: Nichiei Dōmei) 48, 59, 60, 67, 86–89, 91–99, 105, 110, 179 Japan Alliance of Repatriates (J: Nihon Kikansha Dōmei, Nichikidō) 325 Russo-Japanese (R: Sekretnyĭ russkoyaponskiĭ [sozyunyĭ] dogovor 1916 g.; J: Daiyoji Nichiro Kyōyaku) 92, 94, 95, 96, 111, 113, 114–15 Triple 107 All-Japan Communist Youth League (J: Kyōsan Seinen Dōmei) 177 Armies fer People’s Revolutionary 144, 148 Imperial Japanese Army (ija) 53, 55, 58, 85, 86, 92, 94, 121, 307, 315, 316, 317, 329, 380, 381 Kwantung 169, 189, 202, 207, 232, 252, 261, 262, 271, 275, 306, 307, 314, 315, 316, 329, 335, 336, 337, 340, 343, 344, 345, 346

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616 Armies (cont.) People’s Volunteer Army (pva; C: Zhongguo renmin zhiyuan jun) 356 Red (R: Raboche krest’yanskaya krasnaya armiya, rkka) 185 White (R: Belaya Armiya) 122, 142, 148, 149 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec)  225 Associations Anti-Russian (J: Tairodōshikai) 56 Association for Supporting Compatriots in Manchuria and Mongolia (J: Manmō Dōhō Engokai) 322 Association for the Acceleration of the Repatriation of Compatriots from the Soviet Union (J: Zaiso Dōhō Kikan Sokushinkai) 322, 326 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) 490, 500, 507 Concordia (J: Kyōwakai) 307, 315 International Atomic Energy Association (iaea) 391 Japan Association of Corporate Executives (J: Keizai Dōyūkai) 491, 507 Japanese-Soviet Friendship (J: Nisso Yūkō Giin Renmei; R: Assotsiattsiya yapono-sovetskoĭ druzhby) 427 Japan Healthy Youth (J: Nihon Kenseikai)  326 Japan-Russia (J: Nichiro Kyōkai) 155, 157, 170–72, 174, 175, 202 National Association for the Acceleration of Repatriation of Overseas Compatriots (J: Zaigai Dōhō Kikan Sokushin Zenkoku Kyōgikai, Zenkyō)  322 National Association for the Compensation of Internees (J: Zenkoku Yokuryūsha Hoshō Kyōgikai, Zenyokukyō) 320, 326, 329, 338 National Association of Forced Internees (J: Zenkoku Kyōsei Yokuryūsha Kyōkai, Zenyokukyō) 326, 329 Soviet-Japanese (R: Sovetsko-Yaponskaya assotsiatsiya) 191 Taibunkyō 448

Index Atlasov, Vladimir Vladimirovich 21 Atlas Russicus, Mappa una Generali et Undeviginti Specialibus Vastissimum Imperium Russicum 23 bakufu 18, 34 bangaku (Barbarian Studies) 15 Banks Japan Bank for International Cooperation (jbic) 516 Japan Export-Import Bank (jexim; J: Nihon Yushutsunyū Ginkō) 410, 413, 414, 416, 430, 485, 488, 516 Battles Guadalcanal 334 Khalkhin Gol River 219, 232, 233 Lake Khasan 219, 231, 233, 234, 315, 334, 344 Midway 263, 270, 334 Mukden 49, 51, 72 Shumshu 584 Stalingrad 270 Tsushima Strait 50, 55, 72 Beijing Center (J: Beijing Kikan) 357 Benyovszky, Maurice (Móric) 16 Bezobrazov, Aleksandr Mikhaĭlovich 66, 69 Bezobrazovsky Circle (Bezobrazovskiĭ kruzhok) 66, 67, 69, 71, 75 Big Six 248, 249, 250, 251, 252 Bloody Sunday (R: Krovaavoe voskresen’e)  101 Bolsheviks 59, 113, 126, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 158, 175, 186 All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)  159, 346 anti-Bolsheviks 137, 140, 147, 148, 149, 156 October Revolution 121 border demarcation (J: ryōdo kakutei; R: pogranichnoe razmezevanie) 9, 10, 13, 208, 210, 232, 540, 542 Boxer Rebellion 48, 66, 84, 92 Brezhnev, Leonid Il’ich 371, 403, 408, 409, 418, 428, 434, 443, 457, 573 Bulganin, Nikolaĭ Aleksandrovich 306, 359, 361, 363, 365, 366, 389, 394, 571

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Index Charters Atlantic 274, 277, 559, 563, 583 United Nations (UN) 266, 267, 268, 294, 380, 478, 582 Chechnya 514 Chicherin, Georgiĭ Vasil’vich 169, 181, 184, 186, 187, 188 Chishima see Islands: Kurile Islands Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer 270, 272, 274, 275, 277, 278, 280, 282, 288, 376, 559 Colonization Bureau (J: Kaitakushi) 35 Comintern (Communist International) 175, 176, 177, 193, 205 Anti-Comintern Pact 204, 208, 230, 231, 260 Commissions Central Commission for Assistance (R: Tsentral’naya komissiya po okazaniyu pomoshchi) 181 Far Eastern Commission (fec; R: Dal’nevostoochnaya komissiya, dvk)  355, 356, 361, 378, 383 Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation 536 Russian-Japanese Fisheries 390 Committees Central Executive Committee of the ussr (R: Vserossiiskii Tsentral’nii Ispolnitel’nii Komitet) 181, 339 Committee of the 21st Century (Komitet XXI veka) 517 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) 422, 447, 463 Japanese-Soviet (Soviet-Japanese) Economic (J: Nisso [Soni] Keizai Iinkai) 405, 416 kgb (Komitet gosudarstvennoĭ bezopasnosti) 347, 453, 474 Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party (Tsentral’nyĭ komitet Kommunisticheskoĭ partii Sovetskogo Soyuza) 361, 379, 460, 461, 462, 472, 474, 592 Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) 325, 356

617 Companies Dutch East India (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, voc) 18, 22, 33, 578 Hudson Bay 578 Japanese-Russian Fishing (J: Nichiro Gyogyō Kabushiki Kaisha) 159, 160, 161, 162 Northern Sakhalin Mining (J: Kita Karafuto Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha)  183, 230 Northern Sakhalin Oil Company (J: Kita Karafuto Sekiyū Kabushiki Kaisha)  165, 193 Russian-American Company (rac) 4, 9, 27, 28, 31 Conferences Bandung 359 Cairo 271, 583 Changchun 148 Conference of Marshals 94 Conference on Security and Cooperation  411 Crimea see below Yalta Dairen 148, 149 Geneva 359 Geneva Conference on Disarmament 202 The Hague 88, 103 Imperial General Headquarters Government Liaison (J: Daihon’ei Seifu Renraku Kaigi) 242 Japanese Imperial (J: Gozen Kaigi) 83 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers  355 Naval Disarmament 205 Portsmouth Peace 45–62 Potsdam 251, 287, 290 San Francisco Peace 357, 358, 360, 362, 376–84, 564, 565, 568, 585 Secret Imperial 250 Shimonoseki 54 Suez Canal Global 364, 388, 590 Tehran 246, 271, 279, 280 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (unclos) 432 Yalta 246–47, 251, 259, 275–76, 279, 280, 282, 284, 294, 305, 355, 559, 582, 583

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618 Conventions Convention Between Russia and China on the Lease of the Liaodong Peninsula  66 Convention of Kanagawa 37 see also Treaties: Treaty of Kanagawa Conventions of Peking 37, 60, 92 Convention on Consular Relations 424, 436 Geneva 307, 309, 315, 329, 339 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field 339 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 327, 339 The Hague 339 Japanese-Russian Fisheries Convention  115, 157, 158, 159 Russian-Japanese (also Japanese-Russian) Fisheries Convention (R: Russko-Yaponskaya rybolovnaya konventsiya; J: Nichiro Gyogyō Kyōtei) 89, 155, 157, 158, 159 Russo-Japanese (J: Nichiro Kyōshū) 59, 106, 110, 111, 143 Soviet-Japanese (Japanese-Soviet) Convention on Basic Principles for Mutual Relations (R: Konventsiya ob osnovnykh printsipakh vzaimootnosheniĭ mezhdu Soyuzom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Yaponieĭ; J: Nisso Kihon Jōyaku) 155, 163, 177, 182, 191, 245, 247, 249, 581 Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Convention (J: Sonichi Gyogō Jōyaku) 192, 230, 242, 243, 424, 434 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vclt) 589 Councils Allied Council for Japan (acj) 321, 322, 324, 355, 356, 361, 377, 378, 383 355 Council of Wise Men (J: Kenjinkai; R: Sovet mudretsov) 541, 542 Japanese Trade Union Council (J: Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai) 177 National Military Council (China) 269

Index National Security Council (nsc) 358, 372, 569 Soviet Council of Ministers (R: Sovet ministrov SSSR) 341, 421, 433: Soviet Council of People’s Commissars (R: Sovet narodnykh komissarov [Sovnarkom], snk) 180, 184, 221, 230, 339 Soviet Supreme Council Presidium (R: Prezidium Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR) 268, 433, 434 Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (rsfsr)  472 UN Security Council 356, 366, 377, 478, 545 Czechoslovak Corps Mutiny 140 Dalian (J: Dairen) 46, 65, 85, 101, 147, 166, 246, 273, 308 Davydov, Gavriil Ivanovich 5, 6–8, 16, 28, 29, 30, 579 Declarations Cairo 274, 277, 290, 292, 421, 559, 560, 565, 583, 584 Declaration of the Four Nations 294 Declaration on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation (R: Deklaratsiya o perspektivakh, torgovo-ėkonomicheskikh i nauchno-tekhnicheskikh otnosheniĭ mezhdu Yaponieĭ i Rossieĭ) 505, 516 Moscow Declaration of The Four Powers (R: Moskovskaya Deklaratsiya Chetyrekh Derzhav) 266 Moscow Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership Between Japan and the Russian Federation (R: Moskovskaya deklaratsiya “Ob ustanovlenii sozidatel’nogo partnerstva mezhdu Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsieĭ i Yaponieĭ”; J: Nihon koku to Roshia renpō no aida no sōzōteki pātonāshippu kōchiku ni kansuru Mosukuwa sengen) 493, 497, 595, 596 Potsdam 265, 277, 288, 292, 305, 335, 340, 355, 357, 377, 380, 421, 560, 561, 565, 566, 568, 570, 577, 583, 584, 585

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619

Index Tashkent Declaration of India and Pakistan 423 Tokyo 486–88, 496, 505–6, 509, 513, 537, 595, 596 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (dprk, North Korea) 67, 148, 356, 385, 500, 538 Departments Far Eastern Department of the Imperial Foreign Ministry (R: Dal’nevostochnyĭ otdel ministerstva inostrannykh del)  95, 112 International Department of the Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (R: Mezhdunarodnyĭ Otdel Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoĭ partii Sovetskogo Soyuza) 460, 472 Dereviyanko, Kuz’ma Nikolaevich 292, 356, 377, 378 Doctrines Guam (Nixon) 403, 425 Hashimoto 508 Truman 294, 295 Domnitskiĭ, Andreĭ Ivanovich 361, 385, 387 dongyi (Eastern Barbarians) 19 Dulles, John Foster 392, 563, 564, 565, 568, 569, 570, 590 Dulles’s Warning 388, 568, 570, 574 Earthquakes Great Kantō Earthquake 176, 181 Shimoda 10, 33 Tōhoku Earthquake xvii, 531, 543, 544 Edo period 14, 20, 21, 24, 34, 37, 578 “expanding equilibrium” (J: kakudai kinkō)  450, 465, 468, 497 Expeditions Bering 22, 24 De Vries 22 Kamchatka 24 Laksman 4 Northern Sakhalin 174 Putyatin 9 Rezanov 4–5 Shandong 167 Shpanberg 24 Siberian xi, 246, 251, 255

“expel the barbarians” (J: jōi) 14 Ezo 16, 24, 26, 29, 30 see also Ainu Far Eastern Republic (fer; R: Dal’nevostochnaya respublika, dvr)  144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 179, 180, 194, 281 Federations Federation of Economic Organizations (J: Keidanren) 369, 405, 516 Japan Federation of Labor (J: Nihon Rōdō Sōdōmei) 179 Five Principles to Govern Japan-Soviet/ Russian Relations (J: Nisso Nichiro kankei gogensoku) 484, 497 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (R: Dialog o putyakh vzaimopriemlemogo resheniya neuregulirovannykh voprosov) 599 Fukuda Takeo 406, 426–27, 444, 446 gashin shōtan (enduring hardship now for the sake of revenge later) 46 genrō (elder statesmen) 48, 49, 58, 83, 88, 94 GLavPUR (Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie armii i flota) 347 Golovnin, Vasiliĭ Mikhaĭlovich 5–7, 8, 9, 30, 31, 579 Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich 391, 412, 415, 443–56, 459–70, 472–77, 483–85, 487, 495, 497, 499, 512, 573, 594 Gorchakov, Aleksandr Mikhaĭlovich 35 Grew, Joseph Clark 284, 285 Gromyko, Andreĭ Andreevich 277, 356, 358, 361, 362, 365, 366, 367, 368, 371, 380, 381, 391, 404, 405, 406–8, 409, 412, 417, 423, 424, 426–27, 428, 435, 444, 445, 446, 449, 460, 461, 565, 591 Gromyko formula 461 Hague Secret Emissary Affair 89 Hakodate 8, 10, 11, 30, 33, 34, 125, 547 Harbin 56, 72, 139, 140, 185, 221 Harbin Products Exhibition Hall 157, 171 Harbin Trade Center 172 Hashimoto Ryūtarō 507, 508, 510, 573 Hatoyama Ichirō 361, 365, 366, 385, 389, 394, 395, 456, 571

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620 hikiwake (“tie” or “draw”) 544, 599 Hiroshima 286, 335, 376, 560 Hirota Kōki 203, 205, 208, 221, 226, 249–50, 251 Hokusa monryaku 26 huayi zhibian (Sino-barbarian dichotomy)  19 hyōryūmin (“people drifting, or floating, with the current”) 24–26, 27 “illegally occupied” (J: fuhō senkyo) 292, 543, 598, 599 Imperial Rescript on the Termination of War (J: Daitōa sensō shūketsu no shōsho) 307, 337, 355 Incidents August Faction 365 Golovnin 6–7 Hibiya Incendiary 57, 74 High Treason 175 Ishido 132 Manchurian 155, 171, 201, 202, 204, 207, 218, 456 Matsukawa 324 Mitaka 324 Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ 12–13 Nikolaevsk 124, 128, 144–46, 148, 157, 183 Nomonhan 201, 209, 210, 232 Shimoyama 324 Toshiba-Kongsberg 447 Tsushima 12, 13–14, 16 Uda 162 Institutes All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine (R: Vsesoyuznyĭ institut ėksperimental’noĭ meditsiny) 225 Harbin 171, 316 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (imemo)  444–45, 448, 453 Research Institute for Peace and Security (rips; J: Heiwa Anzen Hoshō Kenkyūjo) 446 Ioffe, Adol’f Abramovich 180, 181 “island empire” (J: shima teikoku) 85 Islands Aleutian 23, 24, 25, 561

Index Diaoyu (J: Senkaku) 466, 526, 545, 562, 574 Dokdo (J: Takeshima) 526, 528, 531, 561, 562, 563, 574 Formosa (Taiwan) 110, 378, 381 Hawaiian 27 Kurile Chishima 3, 381, 421, 522, 585, 587, 588, 589 Northern Kuriles 249, 255, 278, 587 Southern Kuriles 24, 287, 358, 361, 363, 377, 381, 386, 389, 404, 421, 433, 436, 459, 473, 499, 503, 510, 512, 517, 522, 524, 537, 538, 539, 540, 543, 559, 560, 562, 566, 574, 577, 578, 579, 583, 587, 588, 589, 590, 598 Mariana 291 see also Northern Territories Ogasawara (Bonin) 358, 360, 364, 365, 368, 383, 560, 565 Paracel (Xisha) 381, 562, 574 Pescadores 358, 378, 381 Ryukyu 5, 358, 360, 364, 388, 569, 570 Spratly (Nansha) 381, 562, 565, 574 Tsushima 13, 109 Zhenbao (Damanskiĭ) 403, 425 Itō Hirobumi 14, 48, 52, 53, 66, 88 Iwakura Mission 12, 13–14, 16, 37 Izvol’skiĭ, Aleksandr Petrovich 88, 90, 103, 105, 108 Japan-Russia Youth Exchange Center (J: Nichiro Seinen Kōryū Sentā; R: Yapono-Rossiĭskogo Tsentra molodezhnykh obmenov) 518 Japanese-Russian Friendship Forum (J: Nichiro Yūko Foramu) 517 kabuki 172, 173, 191 Kabuki Theater (Kabuki-za) 156, 191, 194 Kaifu Toshiki 391, 443, 445, 451, 452, 455, 466, 495, 499, 512, 573, 594 kai no sekai (cultural center vs. barbarian periphery) 19 Kamchatka 5, 7, 8, 15, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 35, 158, 159, 160, 559, 580, 587 Kantokuen 261, 262, 263

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Index Karakhan, Lev Mikhaĭlovich 181, 182, 186, 188, 189, 193, 203, 220, 221, 226 Kenpeitai (Military Police Corps) 316 kgb see Committees: kgb Khvostov, Nikolaĭ Aleksandrovich 5, 6–7, 8, 16, 28, 29, 30, 579 Kishi Nobusuke 367, 368, 370, 395, 421, 446 kokutai (“national body”) 155, 175, 177 Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasil’evich 140, 142–44, 147 kōmōjin (“Red-haired Barbarians”) 19 Komura Diplomacy (J: Komura gaikō) 58 Komura Jutarō 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 71, 72, 73, 88, 89, 91, 98, 278 Kōno Ichirō 362, 363, 366, 367, 387, 389, 591 Konoe Fumimaro 251, 252, 253, 306 Kopp, Viktor Leont’evich 184–90, 194 Kozyrev, Andreĭ Vladimirovich 451, 453, 485, 489, 501, 502, 503 Kruzenshtern, Ivan Fedorovich 27, 28, 32 Laksman, Adam Kirillovich 4, 26 Laws Law of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the ussr (R: Ukaz Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 19 aprelya 1943 goda) 314 Law on Paying Allowances to Unrepatriated Persons (J: Mifukuinsha kyūyohō) 321 Law on the Special Measures Promoting a Resolution of the Problem of the Northern Territories (J: Hoppō ryōdo mondai tō kaiketsu sokushin tokubetsu setchihō) 437, 524, 543, 599 Special Law on Payments to Unrepatriated Persons (J: Tokubetsu mikikansha kyūyohō) 321 Special Law on Postwar Forced Internees (J: Sengo kyōsei yokuryūsha ni kakaru mondai ni kansuru tokubetsu sochihō)  330 League of Nations 203, 204, 205, 207, 224, 227, 228 Letters Hatoyama–Bulganin 571 Matsumoto–Gromyko 366, 572 Matsuoka–Molotov 243

621 Lozovskiĭ, Solomon Abramovich 246, 251, 252, 275 MacArthur, Douglas 254, 255, 292, 337, 355, 356, 377, 378, 585 Main Administration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees (R: Glavnoe upravlenie po delam voennoplennykh i internirovannykh, gupvi) 309, 339 Mamiya Rinzō 7, 29 Manchuria Manchukuo 203, 207, 209, 221, 226, 228, 231, 233, 245, 249, 250, 253, 254, 307, 315, 329, 335, 336, 344 Maritime Region Zemstvo Board (R: Primorskaya oblastnaya zemskaya uprava) 147 Matsumoto Shun’ichi 361, 362, 363, 365, 380, 386, 387, 388, 571, 591 Matsuoka Yōsuke 203, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 243, 260 Meetings/talks Gorbachev–Ozawa 475 Hashimoto–Yeltsin 509 Hirota–Malik 249–51 Kaifu–Gorbachev 497 Katō–Loshukov 496 Kozyrev–Watanabe 502 Suzuki–Reagan 437 Memoranda Katsura–Taft 57, 59 Komura–Weber 47 Sypingai 104 Tōgō–Loshukov 496 Mensheviks 147 Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich 359, 365, 368, 369, 404, 405, 421, 422 Ministries Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (maff; J: Nōrin Suisanshō)  192, 362, 366, 367, 387, 591 Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry (meti; J: Keizai Sangyōshō)  536 Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (R: Ministerstvo energetiki Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii Ministerstvo ėkonomiki, torgovli i promyshlennosti Yaponii) 536

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622 Ministries (cont.) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mofa; Japan) (Gaimushō) 53, 54, 74, 87, 125, 127, 128, 177, 202, 203, 204, 205, 209, 211, 212, 222, 227, 324, 348, 389, 445, 446, 489, 504, 521, 530, 539, 540, 541, 544, 571, 584, 588, 595 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mfa; Russia) (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii, mid rf) 103, 106, 107, 109, 110, 446, 453, 473, 525, 526, 540, 543, 593 Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russia) (Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, mvd) 309, 339, 341, 342, 343, 346, 347, 546 Ministry of State Security (R: Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoĭ bezopasnosti, mgb)  347 see also kgb Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaĭlovich 210–14, 221, 224, 232, 242–47, 250, 264–66, 268, 271, 334–35, 359, 361, 392, 444 Mongolia 98, 124, 168, 209, 230, 232, 320, 322, 344, 380, 391, 392, 393, 394, 427, 447, 464, 500, 507, 525 Inner 93, 109, 110, 114, 212 Mongolian People’s Republic (mpr)  229, 232, 274, 281, 371 Outer 106, 108, 109, 110, 212, 213, 273, 274, 280, 281, 282, 392, 583 Movements Charity (J: Ai no Undō) 321 Democratic (J: Minshu Undō; R: Demokraticheskoe dvizhenie) 312, 316, 317, 322, 323, 325, 326, 327, 329 Student Social Science (J: Gakusei Shakai Kagaku Undō) 179 White Movement (R: Beloe dvizhenie) 143, 144, 145, 146 Murav’ev-Amurskiĭ, Nikolaĭ Nikolaevich  12–13, 16, 32, 35 Nagasaki 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 18, 20, 26, 27, 28, 33, 286, 335, 561 Nakasone Yasuhiro 326, 371, 437, 445, 446, 448, 460, 461, 463 nanbanjin (“Southern Barbarians”) 19

Index National Rally of the Families of the Missing (J: Zenkoku Rusu Kazoku Taikai) 322 New Economic Policy (nep; R: Novaya ėkonomicheskaya politika) 158 “new policy” (J: shin seisaku) 182 “New Political Thinking” (R: novoe politicheskoe myshlenie) 443, 446, 459, 460–61, 463, 464, 478, 573, 594 “New Thinking” see “New Political Thinking” Nichiro geijutsu (Japanese-Russian Art) 190 Nihon shinbun 317, 346 Nikolaevsk-on-Amur (Nikolaevsk-na-Amure)  122, 141, 145, 146, 147, 157 1955 System (J: Gojūgonen taisei)  359–66, 385, 446, 568, 570–72, 573 Northern Territories hoppō ryōdo 289, 363, 404, 446, 466, 506, 543, 589 “indigenous territories” (J: koyū no ryōdo) 543, 598, 599 Northern Territories Day (J: hoppō ryōdo no hi) 436, 444, 526, 594 Northern Territories problem (J: hoppō ryōdo mondai) 465, 557, 558, 577 territorial problem (J: ryōdo mondai; R: teritorialnaya problema) 15, 389, 421, 426–28, 433, 434, 436, 443, 461–65, 469–73, 474, 477, 485, 494, 499, 501–5, 506–8, 510, 516, 528, 538, 565, 572, 573, 574, 577, 580, 586, 592, 594, 595 see also Islands: Kurile, and Laws: Law on the Special Measures Promoting a Resolution of the Problem of the Northern Territories Obuchi Keizō 491, 492–94, 497, 510, 513, 518, 549, 595 O’Conroy, Taid 223 Oil development projects Tiumen 411 Western Siberian 411 Okinawa 358, 360, 363, 364, 365, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 383, 388, 427, 494, 525, 532, 536, 560, 562, 565, 568, 569, 570, 574, 590 see also Islands: Ryukyu Opium Wars 14, 32

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Index Organizations North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) 483, 490, 491, 501 Russian-Japanese Trade and Investment Promotion (J: Nichiro Bōeki to Tōshi Sokushin Dantai) 516 World Trade Organization (wto) 490, 542 Osaka International Trade Fair (J: Ōsaka Bankoku Hakurankai) 390 Pacts Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression 201–5, 209, 210, 212 see also Japanese-Soviet Neutrality (R: Pakt o neĭtralitete mezhdu SSSR i Yaponieĭ J: Nissō chūritsu jōyaku) 201, 208–16, 241, 243, 245, 246–47, 253, 259–66, 268–72, 274, 277, 294, 305, 334, 335, 526, 581–82 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact)  233 Tripartite Pact 211, 212, 213, 215, 259, 260 passive policy (J: judo seisaku) 181 Peninsulas Kamchakta 21, 193 Kwantung 72, 73 Liaodong 46, 56, 64, 65, 66, 101 People’s Commissariats People’s Commissariat of Defense (R: Narodnyĭ komissariat oborony, nko) 339 People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (R: Narodnyĭ komissariat po inostrannym delam, nkid) 184, 191, 232, 265 People’s Commissariat for Heavy Industry (R: Narodnyĭ komissariat tyazhëloĭ promyshlennosti, nktp); People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (R: Narodnyĭ komissariat vnutrennikh del, nkvd) 218, 222, 340, 343, 344 see also Ministries: Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russia) People’s Republic of China (prc; C: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo) 343, 356,

623 357, 358, 366, 403, 407, 408, 411, 412, 415, 563, 585 perestroika 315, 338, 443, 446–51, 457, 459, 462–64, 469 Pipelines Angarsk–Daquing 541 Angarsk–Nakhodka 541 Plans 500-Day (R: 500 dneĭ) 452 Five-Stage Solution (J: godankai kaiketsuan; R: pyatiėtapnyĭ plan resheniya problemy) 451, 471, 472 Hashimoto-Yeltsin Economic Cooperation 491, 508, 516, 547 Imperial National Defense Plan (J: Teikoku kokubō hōshin) 86, 87, 89, 97, 100, 102, 207 Marshall 294 Ribbentrop 213, 214 Politburo 159, 167, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 194, 230, 365, 386, 426, 444, 445, 448, 452, 462 Political parties Communist Party of the Soviet Union (cpsu; Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovestkogo Soyuza) 403, 407, 408, 443 Japanese Communist Party (jcp; Nihon Kyōsantō) 156, 175–77, 193, 194, 312, 317, 322, 323, 324, 325, 328, 329, 346, 356, 376, 381, 444, 446, 449, 454 Keiseikai 469 Kenseikai 181, 191 Kochikai 468 Kōdōha 203, 206, 207 Kuomintang 168, 188, 260, 273, 282, 285, 286, 356, 357 Liberal Democratic Party (ldp; J: Jiyū Minshutō) 329, 362, 365, 424, 445, 468, 472, 475, 476, 488, 490, 525, 540, 570 Rikken Seiyūkai 191, 207 Russian Communist Party, see Bolsheviks; Seiwakai 445 Shakaitō 328 Socialist-Revolutionary Party (R: Partiya sotsialistov-revolyutsionerov, psr)  147

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624 Polo, Marco 18 Port Arthur (Lushunkou) 46, 47, 49, 51, 55, 57, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 74, 75, 85, 101, 246, 249, 271, 273, 274, 281, 282, 291 Potsdam Proclamation 252, 253, 256 Primakov, Evgeniĭ Maksimovich 338, 489, 490 Primor’e (Primorye) 33, 34, 37, 122, 127, 131, 140, 146–48, 156, 158, 169, 171, 184, 229, 231, 272 Proposals Kawana 492–93, 495, 497, 509, 510, 512 Krasnoyarsk 509 Moscow 509, 510, 511 Nakayama 497 Protocol on Mutual Assistance with the Mongolian People’s Republic (R: Protokol o vzaimopomoshchi mezhdu SSSR i Mongolieĭ) 229 Provisional All-Russian Government (R: Vremennoe vserossiĭskoe pravitel’stvo) 142 Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich xvii, 477, 483, 493–97, 511, 512, 516, 521, 522, 523, 529–30, 532, 536–37, 541–44, 547–48, 596–99 Mori-Putin Irkutsk Statement 484 Putyatin, Evfimiĭ Vasil’evich xi, 9–10, 13, 19, 32–34, 471, 580 Pyongyang 356, 365 Qing dynasty 20, 87, 90, 91, 109 Rail lines Baikal–Amur (bam) 411, 431 bam–Tynda–Berkakit 431 Chinese Eastern Railway (cer; C: Dongqing tielu; R: Kitaĭsko Vostochnaya zheleznaya doroga, kvzhd) 46, 72, 73, 85, 96, 101, 107, 112, 113, 139, 140, 141, 143, 155, 166, 167, 169, 179, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 194, 205, 206, 207, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 225, 226, 228, 273, 282 Harbin–Changchun 112 Hsinmintun–Fakumen 60 Manchukuo 344 South Manchurian Railway (smr) 57, 60, 72, 73, 113, 155

Index Taonan–Qiqihar 186 Transbaikal 143, 229, 347 Trans-Siberian Railway 46, 54, 63, 64, 128, 131, 139, 140 rangaku 14, 26 Rezanov, Nikolaĭ Petrovich 4–5, 27–29 Rivers Amur 12, 124, 125, 141, 145, 344 Khalkhin Gol River 232 see also Battles: Khalkhin Gol River Neva 29 Nomonhan 315 Songhua 96, 112 Tumen (Tumannaya) 67 Yalu 66, 67 Russian cultural invasion (J: bunka rokō) 6 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (rsfsr; R: Rossiĭskaya Sovetskaya Federatiivnaya Sotsialistiicheskaya Respublika) 137, 144, 148, 179, 180, 281, 472 Sakai Partnership (J: Sakai Kumiai) 230 sakoku (closed country) 3, 18, 20, 24, 45 Satō Eisaku 367, 370, 371, 372, 373, 391, 407, 423, 425–27 Schools of the Japan-Russia Association (J: Nichiro Kyōkai Gakkō) 171 mofa Russian 448, 452 “separate labor battalions” (R: otdel’niĭ rabochiĭ batal’on [voennoplennyh i internirovannyh], orb) 338, 347 Seven Professors (J: shichi hakase) 56 Shevardnadze, Edward (Eduard) Amvrosievich 444, 445, 449, 450, 452, 453, 461, 462, 464, 469, 470, 473 Shigemitsu Mamoru 208, 231, 243, 244–46, 361, 362, 364, 386–89, 394, 395, 568, 570, 590 Shimoda Takesō 362, 363, 370, 371 shinpai (trade license) 26 Ships Admiral Kornilov 515 Admiral Vinogradov 515 Archangel Michael (Arkhangel Mikhail)  22, 23 Avos (Avos’) 28, 29 Diana 6, 7, 11, 30, 33

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Index Dzhigit 34 Heda 11, 33, 34 Hōjunmaru 25 Juno (Yunona) 28, 29 Kanzemaru 7 Morrison 28 Nadezhda 27, 28 Neva 27 Pallada 19, 33 Posadnik 13 Saint Gabriel (Svyatoĭ Gavriil) 22, 23 Saint Paul (Svyatoĭ Pavel) 22 Saint Peter (Svyatoĭ Petr) 22 SS Minnesota 54 Wakashiomaru 25 Societies All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (R: Vsesoyuznoe obshchestvo kul’turnoĭ svyazi s zagranitseĭ, voks) 174, 191, 218, 225, 227, 228 International Society for Promotion of International Culture (ispc; J: Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai, kbs) 227 Japanese-Soviet Art Society (J: Nichiro Geijutsu Kyōkai) 190 Japanese-Soviet Cultural Society (J: Nisso Bunka Kyōkai) 190 Society of Friends of Entrepreneurs (J: Shōyūkai) 132 Society of Japanese Residents (J: Nihonjin Kyoryūminkai) 125, 128, 132, 133, 134 Vladivostok Society of (Japanese) Residents (J: Urajiosutoku Kyoryūminkai) 125, 130, 131, 132, 133 Value-Creating Society (J: Sōka Gakkai)  448 Sorge, Richard 229 Spanberg, Martin (Martyn Petrovich Shpanberg) 22, 578 Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich (Iosif Vissarionovich) x, xx, 169, 186, 188, 214, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223–24, 225, 227, 229, 246, 251, 255, 259, 264, 266, 268–74, 275–77, 279–80, 282, 285, 286, 287, 288–89, 294, 306, 316, 334, 336, 337, 345, 346, 356, 357, 358, 359, 376–77, 379, 382, 419, 448–49, 456–57, 526, 559, 584

625 Statements Soviet-Japanese Joint Statement (of October 10) (R: Sovmestnoe sovetsko-yaponskoe zayavlenie o vizite prem’er-ministra Yaponii v SSSR 10 oktyabrya; J: Nisso kyōdō seimei)  409, 412, 596 Irkutsk Statement 484, 496, 522, 537, 538, 596 Summits Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec) 491, 495, 523, 529, 532, 537, 538, 545 East Asia (eas) 532, 545 Geneva 361 G7 487, 489, 491 G8 492, 493, 494, 504, 507, 523, 536, 550 Krasnoyarsk 573 Malta 466 nato 490 Okinawa 494 Reykjavik 447 Tokyo 506 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note (SCAPIN) No. 677 292, 560, 585 No. 822 291 No. 927 291 No. 1421 291 Tanaka Kakuei 391, 407, 409–10, 416, 427, 428, 429, 456, 573, 593 Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (R: Telegrafnoe agentstvo sovetskogo soyuza, tass) 218, 311, 323, 325 Three Centers of Imperialism (R: Tritsentry imperializma) 446 Tōgō Shigenori 204, 210, 232, 242, 243, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253 Transbaikal 20, 103, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145, 146, 156, 306, 335, 339, 340 Treaties Alaska Purchase 37 Anglo-Japanese Friendship (J: Nichiei washin jōyaku) 25 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (J: Nichiei tsūshō kōkai jōyaku) 85

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626 Treaties (cont.) Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (abmt) 514 Border (J: Kokkyo jōyaku; R: Dogovor o granitse) 510, 580, 581, 589 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (ctbt) 514 Franco-Japanese 59 Japan-Korean 88, 89 Japan-US Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (J: Nichibei tsūshō kōkai jōyaku) 85 Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt) 514 North Atlantic 376 San Francisco Peace 326, 329, 360, 364, 369, 381, 384, 387, 421, 437, 471, 497, 557, 561, 562, 564, 565, 568, 569, 570, 574, 577, 583, 585, 586, 587, 590, 591, 598 Shimonoseki Peace Treaty (J: Shimonoseki jōyaku) 46 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship (J: Nihonkoku to chūka jinmin kyōwakoku to no aida no heiwa yūkō jōyaku; C: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he ribenguo heping youhao tiaoyue) 411–12, 415, 416, 435, 444 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (C: Zhong youhao tongmeng huzhu tiaoyue; R: Sovestko-Kitaĭskiĭ dogovor o ruzhbe, soyuze i vzaimnoĭ pomoshchi)  356, 561 Treaty of Aigun 12, 37 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 137, 138 Treaty of Edo (Treaty of Amity and Commerce) (J: Nichibei shūkō tsūshō jōyaku; R: Rossiĭsko-yaponskiĭ dogovor o druzhbe i torgovle [Ėdosskiĭ dogovor]) 11, 12, 14, 34, 36 Treaty of Kanagawa 11, 33 Treaty of Kyakhta 281 Treaty of Nanking 32 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation (J: Heiwa yūko kyōroku kyōyaku; R: Dogovor o mire, druzhbe i sotrudnichestve) 510, 511

Index Treaty of Portsmouth (also Portsmouth Peace Treaty) 60, 71–74, 83, 84, 87, 98, 101, 103, 182, 279, 557, 581, 585 Treaty of Shimoda (J: Nichiro washin jōyaku, R: Simodskiĭ traktat) (also Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Japan and Russia, J: Nichiro shūkō tsūshō jōyaku; R: Rossiĭsko-yaponskiĭ dogovor o druzhbe, i torgovle  i granitsakh) 9, 10–11, 14, 33, 36, 278, 436, 557, 580, 581, 588, 589, 594; formally Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation Between Japan and Russia 9, 436, 471, 522, 557 Treaty of St. Petersburg (R: Sankt-Peterburgskiĭ dogovor 1875 goda) (also Treaty of the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands, J: Karafuto/Chishima kōkan jōyaku)  xi, xx, 12, 14–15, 35, 37, 557, 580 Treaty of Tianjin 37 unequal treaties 12, 14, 36, 45, 85 US-Japan Security Treaty (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan) (J: Nihon koku to Amerika gasshūkoku to no aida no ōgo kyōryoku oyobi anzen hoshō jōyaku) 358, 364, 368, 369, 372, 395, 404, 406, 416, 419, 462, 478, 545, 562, 593 Tribunals International Military Tribunal for the Far East (imtfe) 266, 314, 344 see also Tokyo Khabarovsk Military 314 Tokyo 272, 314, 343–45 Triple Entente 59, 94 Triple Intervention 46, 47, 90, 97 Tryapitsyn, Yakov Ivanovich 145, 146 Twenty-One Demands (J. taika nijūichijō yōkyū; C. ershiyi tiao) 111 “Two Islands-Plus-Alpha” (J: 2+arufua) 448 Two Islands Return Thesis (J: nitō henkan ron)/“Two Islands Return” 566, 568, 574 “Two-Plus-Two” (J: ni purasu ni) 475, 530, 539, 544, 546

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627

Index Unions (political parties/polities) Russian Monarchist (R: Russkaya monarkhicheskaya partiya) 102 Socialist Union of Japan (J: Nihon Kaishashugi Dōmei) 175 Union of the Archangel Michael (R: Soyuz mikhaila Arkhangela) 102 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ussr; Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik) 267, 281, 355, 390, 434, 572, 592, 594 Union of the Russian People (R: Soyuz russkogo naroda) 102 Unions (working groups) Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (R: Rossiĭskiĭ soyuz promyshlennikov i predprinimateleĭ, rspp) 475 Unit 731 314, 345 US Strategic Defense Initiative (sdi) 463 Vladivostok 34, 56, 66, 113, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 147, 148, 166, 176, 226, 345, 447, 515, 532, 544, 547, 548, 550 Vsevolod Meĭerhol’d (Meyerhold) Theater  191

Wars Crimean 10, 11, 36, 45 Korean 325, 356, 357, 359, 377, 561, 563 Russo-Japanese 16, 45–62, 63, 75, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 97, 98, 101, 103, 106, 110, 111, 114, 115, 121, 125, 126, 128–31, 137, 166, 182, 218, 223, 246, 251, 348, 456, 557, 581, 583 Sino-Japanese 46, 59, 64, 84, 88 Washington System 183 Witte, Sergeĭ Iul’evich 50, 54, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72–74, 104, 278 Yakutia 18, 410, 544 South Yakutia Coalmine Development Project 410, 414, 430–31 Yanson, Yakov Davidovich (Karl Emanuel Jansson) 176 Yeltsin (El’tsin), Boris Nikolaevich 451, 452, 453, 454, 456, 469, 471–72, 475, 477, 483, 486–90, 492–93, 495–97, 499, 502–5, 507, 509, 510, 513, 518, 573, 595, 596 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 516, 539, 548, 598 Zhongguo (Middle Kingdom) 19

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