A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System: National Service in War and Peace (1925-1975) [2/7] 0932764002

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A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell Systein National Service in War and Peace (1925-1975) Prepared by Members of the Technical Staff, Be ll Telephone Laboratories. M . D. Fagen, Editor.

Bell Telephone Laboratories, Incorporated

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Copy right '9 1978 Bell Teleph one Laboratories, Jn c. All rights reserved

First Printing, 1978 Internatio nal Stan dard Book Number: 0-932764-00-2 Library of Cong ress Catalog Card Number: 75-31499 Printed in the U n ited States of America

Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

Acknowledgments

1.

Part I. The World War II Period Introduction .................................. 3 I. Bell System Technology Enters Its Second Fifty Years, 3. II. Bell System's Role in Military Research and Development, 4. III. Events Leading to the War Effort, 5. IV. Bell Laboratories Mobilizes for War, 9. V. Scope of the Wartime Effort, 13. VI. The Human Side, 14.

2.

Radar .... .... .. ..... ................ ........ 19 I. Background, 19. II. Technology, 26: Radar Transmitter, 28; Radar Modulator, or Pulser, 30; Antenna, 34; Duplexing, 41 ; Radar Receiver, 42; Video and Indicator Systems, 48; Measurement of Angles: the Fieldof-View Problem, 51; Range Measurement, 60; Radar Data Transmission, 62; Microwave Propagation and System Design Equations, 63. III. Radar Systems, 66: Shipboard Systems, 67; Submarine Radars, 75; Ground-Based Radars, 81; Airborne Radar, 89. IV. Magnetron Research and Development, 113: The British Breakthrough, 114; The Bell Labs and Western Electric Contribution, 115. V. Radar Test Equipment, 125. VI. Summary, 131.

3.

Electrical Computers for Fire Control .......... 133 I. Electrical Analog Computers, 133: The Dream, 134; Early Planning for an Antiaircraft Director, 137; Development of the T-10 Director, 139; First Tests and Standardization: M-9 and Its Companions, 145; Defense Against the Buzz Bomb, 147; Alternative Choices in the Design of Antiaircraft Systems for Tactical Situations, 150; Alternative Design for Army Use: the T-15 Director, 151; Fire Control for Coast Artillery, 155; Fire Control for Naval Dual-Purpose Guns, 158; Other Wartime Analog Computer Applications, 162; Postwar Military Applications of Electrical Analog Computers, 163. II. Digital Computers, 163: From Dial Sys-

v

Enginttring and Science in lb~ &U Splfta

vi

tems to Relay Digital Computers, 163; Wartime Relay Digital Computers, 167; Postwar Relay Digital Computers for the Military, 170. Ill Summary, 171 .

4.

Acoustics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

n. Underwater Applications, 176:

I. Introduction, 175.

Underwater Acoustic Measurements, 176; The Sounds o f the Sea, 177; Sonar, 178; Magnetic Detection of Submarines, 184; Acoustic Mines and Torpedoes, 187; Seawater Batteries, 201; Practice Attack Meter, 205. Ill. Ground and Above-Ground Applications, 208: Telephone Instruments for Military Use, 209; Gun Locator, 214. IV. High-Power Auditory Systems, 215: Air-Raid Sirens, 215; Shipboard Battle-Announcing Systems, 219; Sonic Broadcasting to Friend and Foe, 222. V. Summary, 227.

5.

Communications

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

I. Introduction, 231. II. The Common Carrier Network, 232: The Switched Network in Wartime, 232; Extensions and Modifications of the Common Carrier Network, 234. III. The Global Military Communication Network, 238: Introduction, 238; Military Communications Materiel Before World War II, 239; Factors Bearing on the Ch oice of Facilities and End Instruments, 239; Impact of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 242; Composition of the World War II Global Military Network, 243; The Role of the Teletypewriter Network, 278; Fixed Plant Telephone Netw orks: The Backbone Facilities, 283; Communications Systems Engineering, 286; Summary, 291. IV. Secure Speech Transmission, 291: Historical Background, 291 ; Bell Work on Privacy Systems, 292; Project X-A True Secrecy System for Speech, 296. V. Mobile Radio Systems, 317: Bell Labs' Background in Mobile Radio, 318; Major Wartime Radio Equipment, 319. VI. Multichannel Microwave Radio Relay SystemAN / TRC-6, 335.

6.

Overview of the War Years ................... 339 I. The People and the Job, 339. II. Management Techniques, 341. III. Influence of Prior Research and Development, 343. IV. Chemistry and Materials Research, 344. V. Some Atypical Projects, 346. VI. The End and a Beginning, 350.

Part II.

Post-World War 11-1945 to 1975

Introduction 7.

.. ......... .. .. ... ... ........ .. 355

Air Defense ........... ..... .... . . ... ... . .... 359

Contents

vii

I. Air Defense Weapons Systems, 360: The T33/M33 Antiaircraft Fire Control Syste m, 360; Nike R and 0 , 370; Tactical Ni ke System - NikeAjax, 384; Te rrier, 387; Nike-Hercules, 388; Antiballistic Missile Program, 394. 11. Early Warning for Air Defense, 455: Early Studies and Tests, 455; The DEW Line, 456; Links With Globa l Communications Netwo rk, 460. III. Summary, 461.

8.

Underwater Systems .... ..... . ... . . . ... . . .. .. 465 I. Introduction, 465. II. Principa l Features of the Naval Facilities, III. Research Contributions, 469: Sound Transmissio n, 469; 467. Ambie nt Sea Sounds, 471; Signal Processing, 474. IV. Development Contributions, 477: Acoustic Arrays, 478; Underwater Transmission Systems, 480; Sea Installation, 483; Beamformi ng, 484; Projectors, 486. V. Two Peripheral Contributio ns, 487: MILS, 487; PARKA, 488.

9.

Radar . . . ... . . ... .... ..... . .. ... . .. . ..... . .. 489 I. Airborne Radars, 489. II. Navy Shipboard Radars, 498: Mark 25 Radar, 498; Mark 17 Radar, 499. Ill. Submarine Radars Developed After World Wa r II. 500: SV-3 Radar, 500; SS-1 and SS-2 Radar, 501; AN / BPS-1 Antenna, 501; AN / BPS-3 Antenna, 501; AN /SPG-48 Antiaircraft Radar, 501.

10.

Tactical and Strategic Defense Systems . . ....... 505 I. Introduction, 505. II. Field Facilities, 507: Air Force Atlantic Range, 507; Vandenberg Air Force Base, 509. III. Early Mission Analysis Results, 511. IV. Extension of the Western Electric/ Bell Laboratories Guidance System to Space Applications, 512. V. Syste m Description, 514: Radar, 514; Computer, 516; Missile-Borne Guidance Equipment, 517; The Guidance Function, 521. VI. Follow-on Program, 523. VII. Summary, 524.

11.

Command and Control . .. . . .... . ... . ....... . . 525 I. Mark 65 Program, 525: Introduction, 525; Initia l Bell Laborato ries Study of Naval Antiaircraft Defense, 526; Predamage Studies, 529; Exploratory Development of Phase 2 and Phase 3 Co mputers and the Gunnery System Simulator, 529. II. Design of Tactical Command Equipment, 534. III. CAG Systems-Guns and Guided M issiles, 537. IV. Other Gun and Missile Ships (CLGs, D LGs, DDGs, DEGs, and CV As), VI. Summary, 539. 538. V. Other Studies, 538.

viii

Englneerlns and Scien ce In the IHI/ Sy•lem

12.

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . .. 541 I. Military Communication• S tudies and Developmenta, 542: Commu· n lcatlo ns Studies- Navy, 542; Communications Studies-Army, 544; Communicatio ns Studies-Air Force, 546; Commun icatio ns StudlesDefensc Communication Agency, 547; Communications Systems Develo pme nts, 549. II. Integrated Government Communications Systems, 571 : Introduc tion, 571; SAGE, 573; FAA A ir-Route Trame Control Syste m, 581 , Defense Communications Switching Sys tems, 585; Dedicated Military Networks, 601 ; Summary, 6 12.

13.

Military Systems Engineering and Research ... . 617 I. Military Systems Engineering, 617. II. Research and Exploratory Development, 621: Military Transistor Development, 621; Transistorized Digital Compute rs for Military Projects, 625; Millimeter-Wave Radar, 636; Side-Looking Rada r Development, 637; Chirp Technique, 639; Electrical Scanning and Stabilizing of Antennas, 640; Nuclear Electronic Effects Program, 644; Gen eral Research Support, 645. III. S ummary, 646.

14.

Special Projects - Sandia and Bellcomm ........ 649 I. Sandia Laboratories, 650: O rigins, 650; Bell System Res ponsibility

for the Operation of Sandia Laboratory for the Government, 652; Sandia Corporation- The Early Years, 656; Development and Testing, 658; The Middle Years, 662; Sandia in the 1970s, 668. II. Belkomm, 672: Introduction, 672; Bell System Efforts in the Manned Space-Flight Program, 673; The New Company, 675; Evolution to Maturity: The Arrival of Mueller an d Phillips, 683; Bell Laboratories' Support, 687; Growth a nd Change, 688; Doing the Job: Fall 1966- July 1969, 691; Apollo Applications Program, 69 1; Advanced Manned Missions, 691; Apollo Prog ram Progress, 692; Seven-Year Hig h lights, 694; Winding Down, 695; Conclud ing the Work, 698; Conclusion, 699.

Postscript: In Defense of the Nation .. . . . . .... . 701 Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Designations .... 705 Bibliography ... . .. .. .. ..... .. . .. . ... .... .. .. 711 Credits . . ..... . . . .. ... . . ..... ...... . . .... ... 721 Index .. . .. . . . . . . .. ..... ... . ... .. .. .. .. . ... . 723

Foreword The year 1925 marked the founding of Bell Laboratories and also the first half cen tury of the telephone. By that time there were 17 million telephones in the United States, 12 million of them in the Bell System . Alexander Graham Bell's vision that " ... a man in one part of the country may communicate by word of mouth with another in a distant place" had already become a reality. The engineering and science that made this reality possible have been recorded in the first volume of this series. Other volumes will describe the succeeding contributions of Bell Laboratories to science and to telecommunications technology. This volume tells the story of national service by Bell Laboratories and Western Electric from pre-World War II to the mid-1970s. The central subject is engineering for urgent national-defense applications-how the technology of communications, already richly endowed in the late 1930s was adapted quickly and in manifold ways to the compelling n eeds of a nation at war. The United States and its World War II allies gained decisive advantage from the circumstance that there existed this body of technology to draw from and build upon. During World War II, some 2,000 separate projects for the Army, Navy, and National Defense Research Committee were pursued by Bell Laboratories. These projects, in addition to major radar and gun director systems, included an encompassing range of specialized communica tions equipment designed for aircraft, ground, and shipboa rd applications. The systems were also designed for use in areas from battlefield to worldwide, including global high-speed radio teletypewriter and telephone systems having a degree of message security never before known. Greatly improved sonar systems, a new magnetic airborne detector for loca ting submarines, proximity fuzes, and extremely sensitive and rugged magnetic mines were other innovations of the Bell System during th e war years. Also related in this volume are such little-known stories as the origin of the bazooka, the development of an acoustic torpedo that during a critical period sank 39 German U-boats and seriously damaged 18 others, and the establis hment of communica tions lin es by paying out wire from aircra ft. Jn the area o f mater ials research, important contributions were made in the familiar fields of dielectrics, synthetic rubber, and magnetic materials, and a most sign if.cant advance was achieved in the separation of the U2ic; isotope. Dased on Bell System operations experie nce, it was realized ea rl y that ix

x

Engln~ulng and Sci~nc~

in th~ BeJJ System

the outpouring of new and !K>phi,ticated military equipm ent would be ,.ff,·rhve only if it4 uwrs were thoroughly trained . To this end, Bell Laboratori"~ School for War Training was established, and thousands o f officerft were tra ined in the proper use and maintenance o f communicationBand weapon' systems. No Jess than 650 different instruction books wcr' w,u effort. Supporting the technical ('(fort was a larg ...· ecret;irial. purchasing. Sl•cunty . •ind nunwrou-. otlwr ... upport tash. Sinn• tt·chn1c.il workt.·rs Wl'rt' rn v,•rr -.lwrt ..,upplv. tlw1r tot.11 number d1tl not ch,rng'' grt.•atly during World W.u II. but tlw1r l flt•t ltVl'nt.'!>..'> W rt•ach ing 80 or 90 hour. Holidav:. wt>rt.• rt•duct•d to ont• or t"" o pt•r vt>ar 0

~An ' n1u1v.alo·111 mo·mtwr "' h ...·hn1c.1 I ..1.111 1Tir11,.un uf numlwr 111 h·1 hn11.al f"'.·oplr u-..·d 1t•d1111r11l 1•11 I w1• "UJ'J'"rtinl( h•chnu

11

mrml,..r 111 lrch nH.11 •lnl employing highly sophisticated electronic circuitry. The training h.id to be supported by a highly informative set of training manuals, which served not only as texts for training but as reference materials for solving problems arising when the operator was on his own far from the original source of instruction . Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the armed services requested Bell Laboratories to set up a school called the School for War Training in which key men could be prepared to train others in military schools. A faculty was quickly assembled from the Bell Laboratories s taff. Mos t had no prior experience with military electronics, but they had the ability to absorb new technical concepts and impart them to others. The firs t class began in April 1942. Before the end of the war some 125 courses w e re given to a total of over 4,000 students, who varied in backgrou nd from radio repairmen fresh from their workbenches to graduate engineering officers with months of training at M.l.T. All Naval officers training for fire-control assignments attended the school, and a graduate of the school was required aboard each major combat vessel. At its maximum enrollment, the school, headed by R. K Honaman as director, had a staff of about 75 instructors, mostly members of the Bell Laboratories technical staff or engineers lent by the various Operating Telephone Companies. These instructors were supported by a staff of clerks, guards, and laboratory technicians. The school provided instruction on every major piece of equipment or system developed by the Bell System. For each equipment there was a special textbook. The development department had basic responsibility for the technical details of each book, but the school faculty often wrote the manuals and textbooks. To care for the rapidly expanding load o f publications writing, editing, and preparation, an editorial department was established which worked closely with the training school and technical departments involved in book preparation and publication . In 1944, 366 separate instruction books and manuals were prepared, aggregating nearly 60,000 pages of text and 17,000 illustrations. In that year, Bell Laboratories became the country's largest publis her of new books. A few of the books are shown in Fig . 1-5. The members of the training school staff and the book editors were truly among the unsung heroes of the war. They worked long hours in new field s. They trained thousands of people and anonymously wrote hundreds of books, yet they published no papers to give them personal fame .

17

Introduction

~I

·... .......

Fig. 1-5. Sample of instruction books and technical manuals produced by Bell Laboratories for the armed services.

...'

The FEFs were also part of this large anonymous group, working as they did in remote parts of the world often in positions of great danger. For all these people the chief satisfaction was the knowledge that without them the sophisticated weapons produced for the Allied forces might well have ended as piles of deteriorating electronics that had mastered th eir users instead of being used to promote a successful conclusion to the war. In retrospect, it is clear that much of the secret of the Allied su ccess in applying electronics to weaponry lay in the cooperation among the organizations involved and the close liaison among all me mbers of the production team from invention to installation and use of the finished products. It was a truly remarkable example of what could be accomplished by a team of highly dissimilar individuals working in concert. It was integration of effort at its best. While outstanding credi t for this successful cooperation must go to the individuals involved, no small part is owing to the integrated organization that cultivated this approach as the basic way for solving technical problems.

Chapter 2 Radar Radar systems, used for locali11g objects al a dista11ce, played a most i111porla11I part i11111a11y phases of World War 11 . /11 n se11se ii was n two-edged weapo11. II .eri>ed 11ot 011/y to rnlin11cc the effectiv1•11css of major offe11sive ll'eapo11s in the air, 011 the sen, n11d l1e/ow its surface, but also to i11crense the capabilities of defe11sive il eapo11s i11 the three media. To a co11sideral1/e degree, World War 11 was a battle 1

waged between scimtists designing radar systems for these contendi11g roles. Development of this new i11stru111entality of warfare ranks amo11g the very highest in its contributio11s to the Allied victory in World War II, and Bell Laboratories played a much larger role i11 the development of radar tha11 any other industrial laboratory. Prior to 1937, knowledge of radar was closely restricted to military organizations, but in that year the United States Navy asked the Bell System to provide assista11ce 011 radar development a11d productio11. Until that time, neither Bell Laboratories nor a1111 other industrial laboratory had any direct knowledge or experience with radar. However, it was k11ow11 to the military that Bell Labs had considerable experience with microwave transmission, antenna design, waueguides and other tecl111ology which the Naval Research Laboratory experts believed would be of value. This belief was well justified, since duri11g the war years more tha11 half of all radars used by the U11ited States armed forces were designed by Bell Labs a11d produced by Western Elect ric, i11cluding nearly all of the fire control radar aboard naval seaborne a11d undersea vessels. Bell Laboratories 110/ 011ly cont ribut ed to all aspects of radar but also made major contributions lo tile fast-developing technology 011 which the radar developments were based. I. BACKGROUND

Radar is an acronym for "radio d etection and ranging." 1 As the origin o f the word impli es, radar is a radio system for locating objects in terms I The acronym ha~ been variously attributed to Commander Samuel M. Tucker, U.S.N., and to R. M. Page, of the N aval Research Laboratory. In any event, the credit goes to the

U .S. Na vy. Radar was made official for nonclass1f1ed use in a d irective by the Office of Naval

Operations dated Novembl'r 18, 1940. Principal authors: W. C. Tmus. W. H . C. Higgins, Walker

19

J. W. Emling. W. H. Doherty, and L. R.

20

Engineering and Science in the /kl/ System

of both distance and direction from the radar equipment. It is unique an a number of ways. Although usually employed for detecting solid ob1ects, it can be used for locating clouds, rain, or any perturbation associated with a change in the dielectric constant of the trans mission medium . Unlike visual and aural detecting methods, it is effective far beyond the range of sight and sound, being operable day or night and through the densest smoke or fog. With these potentialities, it is obvious that radar was of enormous interest and value to all branches of the military, not only defensively (e.g .• for preventing surprise attacks) but also offensively (e.g , for tracking enemy targets and even directing gunfire, bombs, and torpedoes toward their targets). As with many devices, the invention of radar cannot be attributed to any one individual. It had its beginnings with the very first researches on radio, and over the years the concepts behind it grew as the radio art advanced. But in 1937, when the Navy first approached AT&T about a cooperative effort in the field, nothing about the concept of radar as a military instrumentality was known outside the government laboratories of a few major powers. A review of some of the background will give the reader a notion of the embryonic state of the art and of the many problems requiring solutions before radar could become an effective and manufacturable instrumentality. Experimental radio began with the German physicist Heinrich Hertz in the years 1884-1888 (see the first volume of this history, pp. 349-368). He demonstrated that high-frequency electrical oscillations could produce electrical phenomena at a distance and also recognized that the effect was due to electromagnetic waves conforming to the laws of geometric optics. Hertz thus substantiated the predictions of the Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell, whose electromagnetic-wave equation had been published some 20 years earlier, in 1867. Nikola Tesla is said to have predicted radar in 1899 and Christian Hiilsmeyer, a German engineer, was granted a British patent in 1904 on an apparatus using radio waves as a navigational aid to ships. Marconi also foresaw some of the potential of radio waves beyond communication and as early as 1922 strongly urged the use of short radio waves for detecting objects.2 But the principles on which radar is based can be clearly traced to the work of Hertz. He showed that an object "illuminilted" by electromagnetic waves refl ects a portion of the incident energy. Furthermore, he proved that radio waves travel at the constant speed of light. The invention of radar involved a specific application of these two facts. If one

2

For the history of radilr preceding Bell Labs' involvement, we are indebted in large part to L. S. Howeth, Hr;lt>rl/ c>/ Co11111111111cat1011' £lcctro111c 111 llre Umttd Staletrtilt•gy and tactics to use them to maximum advantage. One poc,sible rea'>on wlw the United States and its Allies advanced radar technology faster than tlw Axis powers is that radar in its earliest useful form was regarded a'> a de· fensive device-good only to give early warning of approaching aircraft with a rough indication of direction and range Both Germany and Japan apparently had little interest in defensive developments. since thev planned to fight a blitzkreig war. A little later, when radar had become a powerful aid to offensive military operations, they found themselve'> hopelessly behind. But this is only a partial explanation of the Allies' ultimate superiority in radar. The United States concentrated its full effort in research , development. desig n, and production on means for waging war. Not only was the expenditure on radar multiplied 40-fold between 1940 and 1945, but the technical development and application were accomplished with great flexibility, which expanded its use and constantly took advantage of new developments through retrofitting. Radar performed many functions. A first and continuing one was to give early warning of airborne and seaborne attackers. Its capabilities were increased so that it could track individual attackers to which defenders could be guided. The tracking capability was ultimately harnessed to gun directors, which automatically controlled artillery fire against targets in the air and on the sea at distances far beyond the capability of optical instruments. It was also coupled to aircraft bombsight equipment to give an accuracy at night that was comparable to daytime performance. While radars came to have a wide variety of forms, all have common basic elements. These are: 1. A transmitter to generate high-power pulses of radio-frequency energy at hundreds or thousands of megahertz; 4 The history of the development of radar components and systems in the different countries is a fascinating subject which cannot be covt•rt•d here Since this is a historv of Bell System technology. we shall naturally emphasi.te Bell Systt•m radar development and manufacture. However, it is only proper to note th