A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy 9819900069, 9789819900060

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Qi Feng · Weiping Chen

A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy

A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy

Qi Feng · Weiping Chen

A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy

Qi Feng Department of Philosophy East China Normal University Shanghai, China

Weiping Chen Department of Philosophy East China Normal University Shanghai, China

Translated by Ruzhuang Xu Shanghai, China

Shijun Tong Shanghai, China

Ady Van den Stock Shanghai, China

Paul J. D’Ambrosio Shanghai, China

This work was supported by National Social Sciences Foundation (15ZDB012), Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (2022ECNU-HWCBFBWY002). ISBN 978-981-99-0006-0 ISBN 978-981-99-0007-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7 Jointly published with SDX Joint Publishing The print edition is not for sale in China mainland. Customers from China (mainland) please order the print book from: SDX Joint Publishing. ISBN of Co-Publisher’s edition: 978-7-108-04413-6 © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

This book is an abridged edition of my previous two books, The Logical Development of Ancient Chinese Philosophy and The Revolutionary Course of Modern Chinese Philosophy. Chen Weiping devoted an enormous amount of time and energy to the work of abridgement. I myself reviewed the entire manuscript and finalized the book title. The concise volume is being published for two reasons. First, the two original books come to one million characters in total, which is too long for the average reader. Second, Chinese and foreign scholars have suggested that a concise volume would facilitate translation and publication abroad. After the manuscript was completed, it seemed to me that the abridged version had a definite character of its own. Combining ancient and modern philosophy from the pre-Qin period to 1949, the volume presents a general history worthy of its title, and because it is compact, the thread of general history is more prominent and clearly defined. Chen Weiping’s abridgement is faithful to the original and creatively done. He has for many years been teaching and doing research in the history of Chinese philosophy, and his own insights are quite naturally reflected in the present abridgement, adding to its special character. This English translation was produced jointly by Xu Ruzhuang and Tong Shijun. The many suggestions they made concerning the translation have helped to improve the quality of the book. We are extremely grateful to SDX Joint Publishing Company for its active support for the publication of the book. Shanghai, China August 1991

Qi Feng

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Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Methodology for the Study of the History of Philosophy . . . 1.2 Characteristics of Traditional Chinese Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Struggles Between “Past and Present” and Between “China and the West” and the Revolution in Modern Chinese Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part I 2

3

1 1 5

11 18

The Pre-Qin Period (CA. 1046–256 BCE)

The Rise of Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, and Legalism . . . . . . . . 2.1 Confucius’ Doctrine of the Unity of Humanity and Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Mozi and the Conflict Between Confucianism and Mohism—The Antagonism Between Empiricism and Apriorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Laozi: “The Movement of DaoConsists in Reversion”—The Presentation of the Dialectical Principle of Negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Sunzi Bingfa (Sunzi’s Art of War) and the Rise of the Legalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The High Tide of Contention Among the “Hundred Schools of Thought” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Guanzi: The Confluence of Legalism and Doctrines of the Huang–Lao School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Conflict Between Confucian and Legalist Schools and Mencius’ Doctrine of the Goodness of Human Nature . . . . . . 3.3 Zhuangzi: “Where All Things Are Equal, How Can One Be Long and Another Short?”—Relativism Against Dogmatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21 21

26

31 36 39 41 41 44

52 vii

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Contents

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The Logicians’ Debates on “Hardness and Whiteness,” and on “Similarity and Difference”—A Conflict Between Relativism and Absolutism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Later Mohist Views on the Relationship Between Names and Actualities and on Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Part II

6

66 75

The Summing-Up Stage of Pre-Qin Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.1 Xunzi’s Summation of the Debates Over “Heaven and Humankind”, and Over “Names and Actualities”—The Union of Naïve Materialism and Naïve Dialectics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.2 Han Fei: “Incompatible Things Cannot Coexist” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 4.3 The Yi Zhuan: “The Interaction of Yin and Yang Constitutes the Dao”—The Establishment of the Naïve Principle of the Unity of Opposites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 4.4 The Development of the Doctrine of the Yin-Yang and Five Agents—The Application of the Comparative Method of Dialectical Logic to the Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Part I

5

62

A Brief Summary From the Qin-Han to the Qing Dynasty

The Supremacy of Confucianism and Criticisms of Confucian Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Dong Zhongshu and the Huainanzi—The Antagonism Between the Teleological and Mechanistic Doctrines of Huoshi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Wang Chong’s Materialistic Doctrine of Mowei in Opposition to the Doctrine of Huoshi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mysterious Learning and the Coexistence of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Wang Bi’s Doctrine of “Valuing Non-being” and Pei Wei’s “On the Importance of Being” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Ji Kang’s Challenge to Fatalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The Commentary on the Zhuangzi: “When There is Being, There is Non-being”—The Doctrine of “Self-transformation” Against Metaphysical Ontology . . . . . . 6.4 Ge Hong’s Daoist Philosophy and Seng Zhao’s Buddhism Expounded in Terms of Mysterious Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125

126 135 142 145 147 152

155 161

Contents

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6.5

Fan Zhen’s Summing-Up of the Debate Over Body and Soul—The Application of the Materialist Principle of the Unity of Substance and Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 7

8

9

A Tendency Towards the Confluence of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 The Buddhist Tiantai School’s Doctrines: “The Three Levels of Truth Are in Perfect Harmony with One Another” and “Even Inanimate Things Possess the Buddha-Nature” . . . . . . 7.2 The Buddhist Dharma-Character School’s Doctrine: “Everything Is Consciousness Only” and the Buddhist Huayan School’s Doctrine: The Universal Causation of the Realm of Dharmas—The Antithesis between Idealistic Empiricism and Rationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 The Buddhist Zen (Chan) School—The Completion of Confucianized Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Li Quan’s Religious Daoism with a Voluntarist Orientation . . . . . 7.5 Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi: “Heaven and Human Beings Do Not Interfere with Each Other” and “Heaven and Human Beings Are Evenly Matched”: A Materialist Summary of the Debate Concerning “Effort and Fate” . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Prevalence of Neo-Confucianism and the Criticisms of Neo-Confucianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Zhou Dunyi, Shao Yong, and the Cheng Brothers: Founders of Orthodox Neo-Confucianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Zhang Zai’s Summing-Up of the Debate Over “Being and Non-being (Movement and Tranquility)”—An Exposition of the Principle of the Unity of Opposites In Terms of Qi Monism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Zhu Xi’s System of Principle Monism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 The “Jing Gong New Learning” and the “Utilitarian Learning” as Opposed to the Chengs and Zhu Xi’s Doctrine of Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 Wang Shouren’s System of Mind Monism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 Li Zhi’s “Heretical” Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

173

175

178 184 190

192 202 203 205

208 216

224 228 237 240

The Summing-Up Stage of Ancient Chinese Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . 241 9.1 Wang Fuzhi’s Summary of the Debate over “Principle and Vital Force (The Dao and Concrete Things)” and “Mind and Matter/Things (Knowledge and Action)”—A System of Qi Monism Unifying Naïve Materialism and Naïve Dialectics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

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Contents

9.2

The Enlightenment Thought and Historicist Methodology of Huang Zongxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 Gu Yanwu’s “Practical Learning of Cultivating Oneself and Governing Others” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 Yan Yuan’s Discussion of “Practice” and Dai Zhen’s Discussion of “Knowledge” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part II

262 268 273 279

A Brief Summary

Part III Modern Period 10 The Forerunners of Modern Chinese Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 Gong Zizhen: “The Dominator of the Masses is Called the ‘Self’”—The Beginning of Modern Humanism . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Wei Yuan: “Basing My Ideas on Things” and “Knowing Something After Being Involved in Something”—The Beginning of the Debate Over the Relation Between Mind and Matter/Things (Knowledge and Action) in Modern Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

297

11 The Stage of Evolutionism in the Philosophical Revolution . . . . . . . . 11.1 Kang Youwei: An Advocate of Historical Evolutionism . . . . . . . . 11.2 Tan Sitong: The “Study of Humanity” Aimed at Breaking the Chains of Bondage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 Yan Fu’s “Doctrine of Natural Evolution” and Empiricism . . . . . 11.4 Liang Qichao on the Freedom of the “Self” and the Evolution of the “Group” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5 Zhang Taiyan: “Competition Produces Intelligence, and Revolution Develops People’s Knowledge”—A Rudimentary Version of the Viewpoint of Social Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6 Wang Guowei: The Believability Versus the Lovability of Philosophical Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 Sun Yat-Sen’s Evolutionism and His Doctrine of the Relation Between Knowledge and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

309 310

297

303 308

316 320 327

335 340 345 352

12 The Philosophical Revolution Enters the Stage of Materialist Dialectics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 12.1 Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu: From Evolutionism to Historical Materialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354 12.2 Hu Shi’s “Experimentalism” and Liang Shuming’s Intuitionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362

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12.3 The Debate Over Science Versus Metaphysics and Qu Qiubai’s Historical Determinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 12.4 Lu Xun on National Characteristics and His Aesthetic Ideas . . . . 376 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 13 The Sinicization of Marxism and the Contributions Made by Professional Philosophers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 Li Da and Ai Siqi: First Attempts to Sinicize Marxist Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2 Xiong Shili: New Doctrine of Consciousness-Only . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3 Zhu Guangqian: An Aesthetic Theory of Expression . . . . . . . . . . 13.4 Jin Yuelin: “Applying What Is Attained from Experience to Experience––Realism-Based Unity of Perceptual and Rational Knowledge, and of Facts and Principles” . . . . . . . . . 13.5 Feng Youlan: “The New Rational Philosophy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.6 Marxists’ Critical Investigations on Traditional Thought . . . . . . . 13.7 Mao Zedong: The Dynamic and Revolutionary Theory of Knowledge as the Reflection of Reality—A Summation of the Debate Over the Relation Between “Mind and Matter/Things” in the Philosophy of History and Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

383 384 388 393

397 406 412

415 431

Part III A Brief Summary Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459 Glossary of Chinese Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The Methodology for the Study of the History of Philosophy To investigate the history of Chinese philosophy scientifically, and to understand the historical experiences of the Chinese people in theoretical thinking, one must adopt a scientific methodology. In this introduction I will offer my thoughts on the methodology for the study of the history of philosophy. (1) Understanding the Grounds for the Historical Development of Philosophy Philosophy is a way of understanding the world through theoretical thinking, but what are the grounds for its development? This is a question that must be addressed in the course of developing a methodology for research in the history of philosophy, and we may investigate it in light of the mutual ties between the universal and the particular. As far as the general grounds of theoretical thinking is concerned, philosophy, like science and other intellectual investigations, stems from and is conditioned by social practice; however, the conditioning role of social practice is often carried out through some intermediate links. In the case of philosophy, there are two such links. The first is the struggle in political and ethical thought which reflects the economic relationships of a given age. The second is the development of natural science and the corresponding struggle of science against superstition, both of which reflect the productive forces available to a given society. These links are the two legs which support philosophy and carry it forward. They stand on the same ground and are unified in social practice. We inquire into the grounds of the historical development of Chinese philosophy on the basis of this understanding. The major struggles in the political thought of each period in Chinese social history have had an enormous influence on the development of philosophy, but it is also necessary to make concrete analyses. Generally speaking, in the pre-Qin period and modern times, both being characterized by great social changes, struggles in © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_1

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1 Introduction

political thought are a major driving force in the development of philosophy. The preQin debates over “past and present” (古今gujin) and “rites and law”(礼法lifa) which reflected a controversy over the political status of the landlord class, and the modern debates over “past and present” and “China and the West” (中西zhongxi) which reflected the opposition of the masses to feudalism1 and imperialism, profoundly and strikingly influenced the development of philosophy in the two respective eras. At the same time, the philosophical revolutions of these periods also guided political change. Of course, we must not overlook the connection between scientific developments and philosophy in the two periods. For example, the naïve materialism of Mozi and Xunzi was closely tied to ancient natural science, and the modern philosophy of evolutionism was based on modern Western science. Conditions for the development of philosophy from the Qin and Han dynasties down to the Opium War were somewhat different from those in the times of change as the pre-Qin periodand modern times. The period from the Qin dynasty to the Opium War was one of relatively stable development in feudal society, and philosophical debates unfolded mainly within the landlord class. Debates such as those concerning “righteousness and profit” (义利yi li) and “Heavenly principles and human desires” (理欲liyu) were one ground for philosophical development in that period, but the primary force pushing philosophy forward was the advancement in the natural sciences that accompanied the growth of material production. Philosophical progress depended still more on the struggle of science against superstition. For example, the fact that materialist philosophy from Wang Chong to Wang Fuzhi always took the form of Qi-monism (气一元论qi yi yuan lun) was connected to the fact that contemporary sciences such as agronomy, astronomy, calendrical science, and medicine, all took the basic view that qi is divided into yin and yang, and that yin and yang interact with each other. Prominent philosophers of this period, such as Wang Chong, Fan Zhen, Liu Zongyuan, Zhang Zai, Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi, and Dai Zhen, were all closely involved with science. Now let us examine the distinctive features of philosophy. Philosophy differs from other forms of intellectual investigations in that it takes the relationship between thinking and being as its fundamental question. The different manifestations of this question through the different stages of the history of Chinese philosophy must be carefully examined. In the pre-Qin period, for example, the question appeared in the debates over tian ren(天人Heaven and humankind) and ming shi (名实names and actualities), and in the Western and Eastern Han dynasties overhuo shi (或使someone or something causes things) and mowei (莫为no one or nothing makes things), and over xing shen (形神bodily form and spirit). During the Song and Ming dynasties, after a complicated process of development, the problem found expression in the debates over li (理principle) and qi (气vital force), or Dao (道 Way) and qi (器visible 1

Translator’s note: The term “feudalism” (封建主义,feng jian zhu yi) and its cognates are used in a very broad sense in this book. Feng jian zhu yi is different from the original meaning of feudalism which refers to Medieval Europe. It designates the economic, political, and ideological aspects of ancient China from Zhou dynasty (1111–249 BCE) to the Opium War (1840) which is often regarded as the beginning of the modern history of China. It has a connotation which is analogously close to the French expression “ancien regime”.

1.1 The Methodology for the Study of the History of Philosophy

3

things), and over xin (心mind) and wu (物matter/things). In order to understand the relationship between thinking and being, it is necessary to understand the material universe, the subjective mind, and concepts (categories, laws). These are respectively called qi, xin, and li (or Dao) in Chinese philosophical terminology. The disputes at every stage of Chinese philosophy over the basic question of thinking and being can be understood as controversies concerning the relationships among matter, mind, and principle (wu, xin, and li). Therefore, ancient Chinese philosophy eventually divided into three distinct schools: Qi-monism, a materialistic theory holding that matter is primary; mind-monism, a subjective idealistic theory holding that the subjective mind is primary; and principle-monism, an objective idealistic theory holding that concepts are primary. Taken dialectically, the identity of thinking and being requires certain necessary linksin the cognitive process, such as the perceptual and the rational, the absolute and the relative, the objective lawfulness and subjective agency. These links also constitute contradictions, and under certain conditions the subjects of important philosophical controversies. Moreover, when philosophers enter into such controversies, they all seek to employ logical categories as instruments tojustify their own doctrines or refute those of others. This leads to further controversies concerning logical methods and categories. There were, for example, the debates over “hardness and whiteness” (坚白jian bai) and over “similarities and differences”(同异tong yi) in the pre-Qin period, and the investigation into the logical categories of lei (类class), gu (故cause/reason), and li (理principle) throughout ancient Chinese philosophy. These show that the fundamental problem of philosophy not only has different manifestations in different periods of history, but is also associated with other subordinate issues. In summation, on the one hand, philosophy shares with other forms of intellectual investigation the common universal ground—social practice; on the other, philosophy has its own particular ground—the fundamental problem concerning the relationship between thinking and being—which is distinct from those of other forms of intellectual investigation. If we conduct a synthetic study of both of these grounds, we will better understand the historical development of philosophy. The history of philosophy may therefore be defined as the dialectical movement of cognition originating in human social practice and developing primarily around the relationship between thinking and being. (2) The Union of the Historical Method and the Logical Method The union of the historical and the logical methods is a rational element of Hegel’s philosophy, which has been assimilated into dialectical materialism. It requires, on the one hand, that we adhere to materialism in researching the history of philosophy and regard actual history as the starting point and the basis of logical thinking; on the other hand, that we carefully strip philosophical systems of their outward appearances and avoid distraction by historical accident, so that we can distinguish the links of logical development from the contingent phenomena of history. By the historical method, we mean the identification of the main historical thread of the object of study and the observation of its historical origins, its grounds, and the periods through which it

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1 Introduction

has passed. To properly grasp the underlying historical connections, one must clear away outward appearances and historical accidents in order to analyze the essential contradictions of the object and study the pattern of each developmental period or link. Then, by way of synthesis, one is able to grasp the logical chain and the law of the development; this, as a matter of fact, is precisely the essence of the logical method. The historical method is therefore in union with the logical method. The history of philosophy presents itself as an alternating series of mutually opposing philosophical systems. The philosophical system worked out by each major philosopher was a conceptual framework formed for the exposition and justification of his own ideas. In studying the history of philosophy, we should seek to understand each of these systems of the past, while at the same time breaking through them and identifying the indispensable links of the history of human knowledge. For this reason, we must place each philosophical system of the past in its historical context and examine its social and historical conditions and its epistemological roots. For example, Confucius defended outdated social ideas and his doctrine of the “Mandate of Heaven” reflected a socially conservative stand. However, his epistemological doctrine of the unity of humanity and knowledge was anchored inthe big tree of human cognition,2 for it involved a necessary link in the dialectical movement of human cognition—rational agency. However, Confucius overemphasized the role of this link and took the principle of reason to be absolute, which led to an idealistic philosophical system. If we make a concrete analysis of the various philosophical systems in the past with respect to their social and epistemological roots, we may reveal some links of the chain of human cognition involved, and thus be able to grasp the logical development of the history of philosophy as the quintessence of the history of human knowledge. By uniting the historical method and the logical method in the study of the history of philosophy, we will find that this history reflects the contradictory movement of human cognition. Contradictions are precisely that which philosophers dispute. One contradiction arises, develops, and is resolved; then another, a fresh one, comes into existence and is solved after a period of development. This is a progressive process which moves in cycles and approximates an ascending spiral or a series of circles, so that the whole history of philosophy can be likened to a great circle formed from many smaller ones. Viewed in this way, there seem to be three primary circles in the history of Chinese philosophy. The first circle begins with the primitive doctrine of yin and yang and concludes with the unity of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics achieved by Xunzi, who sorted out the pre-Qin debates over the relationship between “Heaven and humankind” and between “names and actualities” more successfully and comprehensively than his predecessors. Since Xunzi’s theory represents a return to the starting point of Chinese philosophy, it may be understood as having completed the first circle. The second circle was completed when Wang Fuzhi addressed, in a similarly successful and comprehensive way, the philosophical controversies from the Qin and Han dynasties onward, such as the debates over li and qi (principle and matter) 2

Translator’s note: A metaphor from Lenin’s Philosophical Notes.

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or Dao and qi (invisible laws and visible things), and over xin and wu (mind and matter/things) or zhi and xing (知行knowledge and action). Thus, the unity of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics was attained again, yet at a higher stage. In modern times, beginning from the Opium War, the main areas of philosophical controversy concerned the philosophy of history and epistemology, both of which were later concentrated on the debates over xin and wu (the relationship between thinking and being). As practiced in China, Marxist philosophy incorporates the best elements of traditional Chinese philosophy and resolves the modern philosophical debate over xin and wu in light of the dynamic revolutionary theory of knowledge as reflection of reality. Thus, it seems to have returned to Xunzi and Wang Fuzhi and completed the third circle, which has undergone a relatively independent developmental process. Each of these circles can be further divided into a number of smaller ones. It is such a chain of circles that makes up the phases of the history of Chinese philosophy. Each time it has gone through a full circle, philosophy has advanced a step. Accordingly, this book is divided into three parts: the pre-Qin period, the period from the Qin dynasty until the Opium War, and the modern period (1840–1949). The history of Chinese philosophy over several thousand years is exceedingly rich in content and contains much wisdom worth adopting; however, each of the influential philosophical systems in Chinese history has limitations as well. So, we must not accept these views uncritically, but should instead criticize their limitations while acknowledging their value. At the same time, we must not dismiss these philosophical systems outright because of their limitations, but instead make concrete analyses and critically distinguish their achievements from their failures.

1.2 Characteristics of Traditional Chinese Philosophy Ancient Chinese philosophy is a precious heritage in the treasure house of human culture. To appreciate this, we must first understand the characteristics which distinguish it from western philosophy. (1) Characteristics of Traditional Chinese Philosophy and the Four Epistemological Problems A prevalent view of the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy is that Chinese philosophers emphasized ethical questions, while Western philosophers focused on the pursuit of knowledge; as a result, according to this view, epistemology was not developed in Chinese philosophy. To determine whether this view is correct or not we need to properly understand the concept of “epistemology.” In my opinion, four main questions related to epistemology have historically been discussed: (a) Can objective reality be given to us in perception? (b) Is theoretical thinking capable of arriving at scientific truths? That is, how is universal and necessary scientific knowledge possible?

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(c) Is logical thinking capable of grasping concrete truths, such as the principle of the unity of the world and the principle of the development of the universe? (d) Are humans capable of obtaining freedom? That is, how is a free person or an ideal personality to be cultivated? If “epistemology” is narrowly understood as the study of the conditions under which knowledge of positive science is possible, which corresponds to the first two questions, then it may not seem to play an important role in ancient Chinese philosophy. But if epistemology is understood more broadly as encompassing all four questions described above, then it will be seen that all these problems have been discussed repeatedly in the history of Chinese as well as Western philosophy. Ancient Chinese philosophers did not neglect the first two problems. Confucius and Mozi, for example, discussed the relationship between perception and theoretical thinking. Zhuangzi doubted both that objective reality could be given in perception, and that theoretical thinking was capable of arriving at objective truth. Although modern European philosophers for the most part investigated the first two questions, both classical German philosophers and Marxist philosophers thoroughly investigated the latter two. For example, it was in answer to the question of whether logical thinking was capable of grasping concrete truths that Hegel and Marx advanced the principle of the unity of dialectics, epistemology, and logic. Marx introduced his materialist conception of history in order to answer the fourth question: How can humankind achieve the transformation from things-in-themselves to things-for-ourselves, and pass from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, so as to realize the ideal of the unity of the true, the good, and the beautiful? If we understand epistemology in a broad sense, we will appreciate that ancient Chinese epistemology was closely connected with dialectics and logic as well as ethics and aesthetics; as a result, ancient Chinese philosophers investigated the last two questions for a longer timeand more extensively. The question of whether logical thinking is capable of grasping the principle of the development of the universe originated in the pre-Qin debate on “names and actualities,” and the question of how an ideal personality is to be cultivated began with the pre-Qin debate on “Heaven and humankind.” These two debates spanned the whole history of Chinese philosophy. Thus, it is in the investigation of these two questions that the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy manifest themselves. (2) Characteristics in Logic and the Conception of Nature Those who believe that epistemology is less developed in traditional Chinese philosophy than in Western philosophy typically maintain that Chinese philosophy stresses human life over nature and excels at ethics but neglects logic. This view is not altogether unreasonable. It is because of Chinese philosophy’s emphasis on ethics that, although the ancient Chinese made considerable progress in the study of formal logic, they later lost their interest in it and pursued its development less enthusiastically than the Europeans and Indians. But this view is incomplete, because it cannot account for the glorious achievements in science and technology in ancient China. In his Science and Civilization in

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China Joseph Needham argues: “While the Greeks and Indians paid early and detailed attention to formal logic, the Chinese showed a constant tendency to develop dialectical logic. The corresponding Chinese philosophy of organism paralleled Greek and Indian mechanical atomism” (Needham 1959, p. 151) I myself am in basically agreement with this view. If the study of formal logic has had a long history in the West, then in ancient China there was a long period of the development of naïve dialectical logic. For example, in the Laozi, the proposition “the movement of Dao consists in reversion” embodied the principle of negation. The Yi Zhuan 《易传》 ( Appendices of the Book of Changes) put forth the principle of the unity of opposites, which was implied in the statement “one yin and one yang constitute what is called Dao.” Xunzi advanced the basic principles of methodology in dialectical logic, which were implied in his concepts such as “resorting to evidence” (符验fu yan), “analysis and synthesis” (辨 合bian he), and “dispelling obsession” (解蔽jie bi). The embryonic form of dialectical logic appearing in the pre-Qin period was not only further developed by later philosophers such as Zhang Zai, Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi, and others, but also became a pattern of methodology in sciences such as astronomy, calendrical science, phonetics, agronomy, and medicine. In pre-Qin writings such as the Yue Ling 《月 ( 令》 Monthly Ordinances) and the Huangdi Nei Jing 《黄帝内经》 ( Yellow Emperor’s Canon of Internal Medicine), and in some later well-known scientists such as Zhang Heng, Liu Hui, Jia Sixie, and Shen Kuo, we can observe the great achievements of naïve dialectical logic in its application to concrete sciences. So far as the conception of nature is concerned, the Chinese developed a dialectical conception of nature early in their history, whereas the early Greeks devoted their attention to atomism. The dialectical conception of nature in ancient China was based on Qi-monism. It was believed that qi was divided into yin (negative forces) and yang (positive forces), and that the unity of these opposites was Dao, the principle of development of nature. The ancient Chinese sciences mentioned above were all based on Qi-monism. What the Chinese called “qi” is very similar to what is described as a “field” in modern physics. In the West, the study of nature has long been guided by the idea of atomism. Western philosophers did possess the idea of something similar to fields in ancient times, but little attention was paid to this idea until the electromagnetic theory was put forth in the nineteenth century. In ancient China, there were also views comparable to atomism. For example, the Mohist Canon says: “That which is not able to be separated into halves cannot be cut further and cannot be separated. The reason is given under ‘point’” (trans. Needham 1959, p. 92). This affirms that a concrete substance is composed of inseparable points (端duan). The idea of atomism found in the Mohist Canon was not, however, developed further in ancient Chinese philosophy and science. It is a weakness of traditional Chinese philosophy, relative to that of the West, that atomism and formal logic were not fully developed. However, its relatively early development of naïve dialectical logic is a strength, along with its development of a naïve dialectical concept of nature based on Qi-monism. Through these developments, the ancient Chinese did answer, in the affirmative, the question of whether logical thinking could comprehend the principle of the development of the universe.

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(3) Characteristics in the Investigations on the Problem of Human Freedom Human freedom is primarily a matter of how to cultivate an ideal person. On this matter, traditional Chinese philosophy represented by Confucianism emphasized the unity of ethics and epistemology, and argued for the importance of rational consciousness. Confucius, the founder of the Ru (Confucianist) philosophy, put forth the doctrine of the unity of ren (仁humanity, benevolence) and zhi (知knowledge, wisdom), since he believed that ethics and epistemology were unified. This doctrine implied that moral norms were based on the principle of reason. Genuinely moral actions were performed through consciousness, which came from rational cognition; hence humankind could become virtuous through education and self-cultivation. Though divided into different schools, later Confucians, whether Mencius, Xunzi, Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Shouren, Wang Fuzhi, or Dai Zhen, all carried out and elaborated Confucius’ doctrine of the unity of humanity and knowledge, and they all emphasized both the principle of consciousness in ethics and the “methods of learning” (moral education and self-cultivation). It is here that some characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy manifest themselves. A moral action contains three elements. First, a moral ideal is manifested in human action, where it is concretized into rules or norms for regulating relations between persons. Second, the action conforming to moral norms is based on rational cognition, and is hence a conscious act. Third, moral action should be voluntary, the product of free will, and not done under compulsion—otherwise it cannot be considered either good or evil. These elements were investigated by Aristotle in the Westand by Xunzi in China. Both ancient Chinese and Western philosophers pointed out that moral action should be conscious and voluntary. But in fact, there is a distinction between consciousness and voluntariness, since the former is a property of reason and the latter a property of volition. This distinction is precisely the difference between Chinese and Western philosophy in ethics. Though the pre-Qin Confucians—Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi—had noted the unity of consciousness and voluntariness, and of reason and volition, they nevertheless devoted more of their attention to the principle of consciousness than to the principle of voluntariness. They also attached importance to zhi (志will), believing that moral action was to be maintained by willpower, which was developed by dint of rational cognition and through sustained self-cultivation and training. Therefore, they held that human should obey reason, and that “to sacrifice one’s own life for justice” was a conscious act of rational choice. This is no doubt correct, but it can be seen that what they stressed was not the voluntariness of will but the “singleness of purpose” of will. Confucius thought that one should “know the Mandate of Heaven” and “obey the Mandate of Heaven,” and only then could one “follow one’s heart’s desire without transgressing moral principles.” In discussing human freedom in this way, Confucius had already fallen into fatalism. In order to defend feudal monarchy, the orthodox Confucians of later times were even less interested in the role of volition, and they went even further in developing fatalism. The Neo-Confucianists took the sangang (三纲three cardinal guides in human relations—ruler and subject, father

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and son, husband and wife) and the wuchang (五常five constant virtues—benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity) and transformed them into metaphysical principles, the tianli (天理Heavenly principles). They thought that the Heavenly principles were written into the very nature of humankind, and that one had only to recognize them, and to suppress one’s desires in order to recover one’s nature and attain the state of “non-opposition,” in which one would become united with all things, and in the absence of any differentiation, so as to obtain freedom. Such a theory seems to have emphasized the consciousness of reason, but what it actually entails is that everything has already been determined by the “Principles of Heaven” or the “Mandate of Heaven,” and that what humans are required to do is to yield to destiny, consciously. It not only ignores the significance of voluntariness to moral action but also rationalizes fatalism. These constitute the dregs of traditional Chinese philosophy. By comparison, Western philosophy has been more attentive to the problem of voluntariness and freedom of will. In opposition to Stoic fatalism, the Epicureans tried to explain free will by appeal to a kind of “swerving” movement of atoms, as discussed in detail in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura. During the period from the Middle Ages to the Reformation, Western theology had been earnestly inquiring into the question of free will’s relation to the original sin. In the modern period, a profound and lasting tradition of voluntarism has developed, which includes philosophers such as Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, and W. James, as well as the existentialists. In China, some philosophers such as Li Quan and those of the Taizhou School were inclined toward voluntarism, but there was not a long tradition of voluntarism comparable to that of the West. As may be seen from the above, traditional Chinese philosophy investigated comparatively early the principle of consciousness in ethics, thus revealing the distinctive Chinese national character. But in traditional Chinese philosophy, there was also a legacy of fatalism which advocated contentment with one’s destiny. This was an obstacle to social progress in China. (4) Causes of the Characteristics of Traditional Chinese Philosophy Now let us consider what caused traditional Chinese philosophy to acquire its special characteristics. We will begin by examining its social and historical conditions. Traditional Chinese philosophy was essentially the philosophy of China’s feudal period and was closely connected with the patriarchal social system. A unified and centralized state under feudal autocratic rule was formed quite early in China. This, and the fact that the peoples surrounding China were less developed, made Chinese feudalism exceptionally stable. During its long feudal period, China led the world in production as well as in science and technology. At the same time, the scale and frequency of peasant uprisings in Chinese feudal society were unprecedented in world history. The Chinese people’s long-standing, profound, and progressive tradition of diligence in developing production, courage in resisting oppression, and wisdom in the pursuit of scientific truth are the social factors that explain the long tradition of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics in ancient Chinese philosophy. Nevertheless,

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Chinese philosophy bore the deep imprints of feudal autocracy and patriarchy, as reflected, for instance, in fatalism and in the advocacy of “returning to the ancients.” Next, we will examine the relationships between philosophy and science and between philosophy and other forms of intellectual endeavor. The relationship between science and philosophy is very close, since both of them seek to understand the world by way of theoretical thinking. As the feudal economy was primarily agricultural, the sciences which were particularly relevant to agriculture, such as astronomy, calendrical reckoning, topography, medicine, agronomy, and biology, developed more rapidly than others in Ancient China. In the ancient period, scientific theories considered humans and nature to be an organically interconnected, mutually interacting system; this is one reason that naïve dialectical logic and the naïve dialectical conception of nature were given early attention. Ancient Chinese philosophers regarded qi, composed of yin and yang, as a material substance. This conception of nature was connected to the relatively rapid development of those sciences closely related to agriculture. In the West, in contrast, atomism was connected to the development of such sciences as optics, mechanics, and chemistry, which are closely associated with industrial production. The development of philosophy is also connected to other social ideologies. While religion dominated Western thought during the Middle Ages, the situation was different in Chinese feudal society. The Chinese were less religious than other peoples; in fact, the ethnic group of Han people was the least religious people in the world. From the very beginning, the Chinese had attached importance to secular affairs and to this world. It is true that Buddhism and Daoism flourished in certain periods in Chinese history, but the dominant ideology was always Confucianism. Western moral theories were closely linked with religion, precisely because religion was the guiding ideology in the Middle Ages in the West. Similarly, it was because the dominant ideology in the feudal society of China was Confucianism that Chinese ethical thought was inseparable from it. Believing in God is usually blind and voluntary, whereas observing feudal moral codes is generally a conscious but unpleasant activity. Chinese ethics is therefore characterized by its greater emphasis on consciousness and its proneness to fatalism, and Western ethics by its greater emphasis on voluntariness and its presumption of voluntarism. Finally, we will make an analysis from the perspective of the development and evolution of philosophy itself. It was natural that the Mohist School in the pre-Qin period should stress formal logic and develop the idea of atomism, since the school was closely connected with handicraft production. Later, with the decline of Mohism, no further advances were made in these areas. But the naïve dialectical logic and the naïve dialectical conception of nature contained in the Xunzi, Appendices of the Book of Changes, Yellow Emperor’s Canon of Internal Medicine, and Monthly Ordinances were extensively developed and exerted far-reaching influence. The dominance of Confucianism in the Han dynasty and Confucianism’s later fusion with Daoism in the Wei and Jin dynasties made it possible for the positive elements of the two, such as the doctrine of the unity of humanity and knowledge in Confucianism and the veneration of nature in Daoism, to be further developed; it

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also enabled the ethical principle of consciousness as well as the aesthetic theory of the artistic sphere to be explored relatively early. These have had great influence on Chinese culture as a whole. With the decline of Mohism, Mozi’s doctrine of the condemnation of the belief in fate sank into oblivion, while Confucianist and Daoist fatalism became ingrained into the minds of the people. With the confluence of Confucianism and Legalism in the Han dynasty, the Legalist School began to hide behind the banner of Confucianism. This was shown in the fact that feudal autocrats ruled the people by the dual tactics of preaching humanity and righteousness on the one hand, and inflicting punishments on the other. The rulers assassinated people with principles, i.e., under the banner of the “Mandate of Heaven” or “Heavenly Principle,” which the people found themselves powerless to resist. Fatalism consequently drove the masses to seek comfort in Buddhism or Daoism. This was the cause of the deep-rooted fatalist tradition in ancient Chinese philosophy. The characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy have exerted their influence down to the modern times and are closely connected with the development of modern Chinese philosophy.

1.3 The Struggles Between “Past and Present” and Between “China and the West” and the Revolution in Modern Chinese Philosophy In the modern age, China experienced an unprecedented national catastrophe and enormous social transformations. At the same time, a revolution also occurred in the field of philosophy, which gave a new impetus to traditional Chinese philosophy and heralded the beginning of the increasing confluence of Chinese and Western philosophy. (1) The Debates Between “Past and Present” and Between “China and the West” Conditioned the Development of Modern Chinese Philosophy The history of philosophy is understood here as a dialectical movement of human cognition grounded in social practice and primarily centered on the problem of the relationship between thinking and being. Accordingly, social practice in modern China conditioned the development of modern philosophy. Because the modern period in China was one of social revolution, we need to consider how the social contradictions in this period affected the development of philosophy through struggles within the domain of political thought. The central problem in modern China has been “whither China?”, that is to say, the question of what it will take for the Chinese people to extricate themselves from imperialist oppression and regain freedom and liberation. This crucial and epochal question expressed itself in the domain of political thought as the “struggles between past and present and between China and the West”: How could the Chinese people learn from the West while also reflecting on their own

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traditions in such a way as to set them on the path towards freedom and liberation? Actually, these ideological struggles between past and preset and between China and the West reflected the literal battles against imperialism and feudalism waged by the Chinese people. Needless to say, the substance of these struggles changed over time in response to historical developments. These developments run from Wei Yuan’s (1794–1856) slogan of “studying the barbarians’ strengths in order to ward them off” (师夷长 技以制夷shi yi chang ji yi zhi yi) to the proposal to “take Chinese learning as the substance, and Western learning as the function” (中体西用zhong ti xi yong). They extend from Yan Fu’s (1854–1921) observation that “the Chinese people are fond of what is ancient while neglecting the present, while Westerners apply their strength to the present in order to overcome the past” (Yan 1994, p. 1), i.e., the struggle between China and the West was interpreted in terms of the struggle between past and present, to the debates on the difference between Chinese and Western culture during the May Fourth Movement and the theories of “complete Westernization” and of “Chinese culturalism” which issued forth from these debates. They encompass the study of Western revolutionary democracy as well as the view of Marxism as the greatest cultural accomplishment of the West. Although these different stages and levels of development display different understandings of the relationship between past and present and between China and the West, and although the precise meanings of these terms varied throughout the historical periods in question, the struggles between past and present and between China and the West permeated the entire modern period in China. Many of the most accomplished thinkers in modern China embarked on the study of philosophy precisely in order to respond to the question “whither China?” and to resolve the struggle between past and present and between China and the West. In order to do so, it was necessary to come to an understanding of the regularities governing the evolution of human history in general and Chinese history in particular. As a result, questions related to the conception of history became particularly prominent in modern China. At the same time, in order for progressive theories from the West to be fruitfully applied, they needed to be harmonized with the concrete situation in China. Here, we touch upon two crucial epistemological questions, namely, those of the relationships between knowledge and action and between subjectivity and objectivity. In modern China, philosophical debates concerning the connection between thinking and being primarily gained expression in the domains of the philosophy of history and epistemology. This was due to the expectation that philosophy should provide a resolution to the struggle between past and present and between China and the West. These disputes in the philosophy of history and epistemology later converged in the debate concerning the relationship between mind and matter/things; this constitutes the leitmotif of modern Chinese philosophy. The great accomplishments of the modern revolution in philosophy in China are manifested in the unification of Marxism and Chinese revolutionary practice, which provided scientific resolutions to the aforementioned disputes by employing a dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as reflection of reality. This resulted in the successful

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resolution of the struggle between past and present and between China and the West, and in the identification of the proper direction for China’s future. From the perspective of the relatively autonomous development of philosophy, that is to say, if we focus on how philosophy deals with its relevant intellectual resources, it becomes clear that modern Chinese philosophy was diachronically related to traditional Chinese philosophy, while being synchronically related to modern Western philosophy. However, because different thinkers and schools understood these relationships in different ways, we might also speak of struggles between past and present and between China and the West which are internal to philosophy. The entire modern period in China was permeated by such philosophical struggles. A variety of Western schools of philosophy were transmitted to China, of which evolutionary theory and Marxist philosophy proved the most influential. Evolutionary theory was related to the culture of bourgeois democracy, and its introduction into China signified the beginning of the Chinese philosophical revolution. From the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898 to the start of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, a whole generation of progressive intellectuals embraced evolutionism. Marxist philosophy was tied up with the culture of scientific socialism and came to be accepted by progressive Chinese intellectuals after the May Fourth Movement, which meant that the revolution in modern Chinese philosophy had entered into a new stage and had shifted from the level of evolutionism to that of dialectical materialism. It was the unification of Marxist philosophy with Chinese revolutionary practice which allowed the modern Chinese philosophical revolution to succeed. Apart from evolutionary theory and Marxist philosophy, two other relatively influential currents of Western philosophy were introduced into China: first, positivism, and second, irrationalism. Schools such as Machism, pragmatism, new realism, and logical positivism belonged to the positivist camp. Thinkers such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Croce were part of the irrationalist current. The influence of these philosophical schools in modern China has to be analyzed in a concrete manner. For example, the main representative of new realism and logical positivism, Bertr and Russell, made epochal contributions to mathematical logic. Russell’s logic had a positive impact on Chinese philosophy after being introduced by Jin Yuelin (1895–1984).3 Of course, Russell’s idealist viewpoints, first presented by people such as Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929), also had a negative impact in China. It is important to keep in mind that the impact of a given theory’s introduction to China depends not only on the intrinsic value or disvalue of that theory, but also on the situation in China (and the level of need for such a theory) at the time of its introduction. Nietzsche’s voluntarist philosophy and Bergson’s intuitionism, for instance, were highly influential in modern China after being introduced by a series of progressive intellectuals such as Lu Xun (1881–1936), who translated some of Nietzsche’s writings, and Li Dazhao (1888–1927), who sang the praises of Bergson’s theory of creative evolution. Both of them employed these Western theories in opposition to Chinese feudalism. Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s philosophy did not have such an anti-feudalist function in the West. Of course, there were also some 3

Translator’s note: Feng’s mentor at Tsinghua University.

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thinkers in modern China who used Bergson’s philosophy in defense of the feudalist views of Confucius and Mencius, and who used Nietzsche in the service of fascism. This, obviously, ran counter to the progressive tide of history. At the same time, the philosophical revolution in modern China germinated in the native soil of traditional Chinese philosophy. Modern thinkers were particularly attracted to the “debates among hundred schools” during the pre-Qin period. The preQin period is the “childhood” of Chinese culture, and the first page of the glorious history of Chinese philosophy. In modern times, the Chinese have revisited this age with its “eternal charm” as a rich source of inspiration.4 Great thinkers of the late Ming and early Qing period, such as Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), and Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), had a major impact on modern Chinese philosophy. They inherited and continued to develop the naive materialism and the naïve dialectics of the pre-Qin era, and their works already contained early anti-feudal and pro-democratic elements. These figures were held in high esteem by progressive intellectuals in modern China. Huang Zongxi’s An Obscured Paragon of Virtue Awaiting a Royal Visit 《明夷待访录》 ( Ming Yi Dai Fang Lu), for instance, went through several reprints during the Hundred Days’ Reform period and had a significant impact on education. The fact that Chinese progressives accepted Marxist philosophy relatively quickly after the May Fourth Movement is also related to the indigenous Chinese tradition of naïve materialism and naïvedialectics. The spiraling movement of the history of philosophy always seems to involve a return to its point of departure.5 Modern Chinese philosophy entails a return to the great thinkers of the late Ming and early Qing period, as well as of the pre-Qin period. The modernization of Chinese philosophy coincides with the negation of classical learning (经学jing xue). From the Han period onwards, Confucianism heavily emphasized classical learning, and orthodox Confucianism employed the theory of the Mandate of Heaven (天命tian ming) and the dogmatism of classical learning in defense of the social doctrine of names (名教ming jiao). These became the primary targets of the modern philosophical revolution. However, while to outward appearances modern philosophy stood in opposition to classical learning and other remnants of feudalism, it also, to a certain extent, continued classical learning. For example, the methodology of the evidential scholarship of the Qianlong and Jiaqing periods continued to exert an influence in the modern age. In criticizing the limitations of this historical methodology, some modern Chinese thinkers also brought it into connection with the methods of modern empirical science. The notions of “the profound meaning of subtle words” (微言大义wei yan da yi) and “practical statecraft” (经 世致用jing shi zhi yong), and especially the theory of the “three ages” from the Gongyang tradition, all of which were discussed in the New Text School of classical 4

Translator’s note: Feng is quoting from Marx’s description of ancient Greece at the end of the introduction to the Grundrisse (Marx 1993, p 111). 5 Translator’s note: This imagery of the history of philosophy as a “spiral”, which recurs at various instances in Feng’s writings, was inspired by Lenin’s remarks in his Philosophical Notebooks (Lenin 1965, p. 222).

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learning, had a profound impact on thinkers from Gong Zizhen (1792–1841) and Wei Yuan to Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and others. The influence exerted by LuWang’s learning of mind (心学xinxue) in Neo-Confucianism was clearly two-sided: During the Hundred Days’ Reform period, Kang Youwei propagated this learning; whereas during the May Fourth movement, Wu Yu (1872–1949) opposed feudalism by appealing to Li Zhi (1527–1602), whose thought represents a leftist development of the learning of Wang Yangming. All of this serves to illustrate that traditional learning also influenced modern Chinese thought in positive ways. That being said, in the ensuing years, there were also some who defended the learning of the Wang school as a so-called “philosophy of vigorous action” (力行哲学li xing zhe xue),6 which illustrates the hazards associated with this traditional learning. The learning of principle (理学lixue) of the Cheng-Zhu school occupied a dominant position since the Song dynasty and became the philosophy of government officials within the feudal autocracy. Consequently, most progressive figures in the modern philosophical revolution approached this school with a critical attitude. Still, the rationalist spirit present in Cheng-Zhu’s learning of principle also had a positive impact in the modern age. Buddhism also experienced something of a revival during the modern period. The influence of Buddhism can be discerned in the thought of figures such as Gong Zizhen, Tan Sitong (1865–1898), Zhang Taiyan (1886–1936), Liang Shuming (1893–1988), and Xiong Shili (1885–1968). In sum, there are two different ways in which the struggles between past and present and between China and the West in Chinese modernity are related to the development of modern philosophy. First, insofar as philosophy is rooted in social practice, the social contradictions of modern China conditioned the development of philosophy by way of the unfolding of this struggle in the domain of political thought. Second, from the perspective of the relatively autonomous development of philosophy, philosophers combined the intellectual resources of the Western and the Chinese traditions and put them to use in order to respond to the problems in reality. (2) The Transformation of the Characteristics of Traditional Chinese Philosophy in the Modern Period Within the conditions set by the struggles between past and present and between China and the West, the modern Chinese philosophical revolution was a process in which Chinese and Western philosophies were joined together. During this process of confluence, the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy underwent significant change. Following the social revolution in the modern period, progressive intellectuals became increasingly aware of the fact that they would only be able to establish a new form of culture by integrating the best of modern Western culture and the essence of traditional Chinese culture in such a way as to overcome the deficiencies in the traditional Chinese way of thinking and its conception of freedom. As far as the traditional Chinese way of thinking is concerned, modern Chinese philosophy had already begun to pay attention to formal logic, which was neglected 6

Translator’s note: Refers to the Guomindang ideology propagated by Chiang Kai-shek.

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in traditional Chinese philosophy, while at the same time continuing its indigenous tradition of dialectics. Yan Fu explicitly pointed out that it would be necessary to replace the methodology of ancient classical learning with that of modern science. In his view, the flourishing of academic studies in the West during the preceding two centuries was primarily attributable to Bacon’s inductive method. He criticized traditional Chinese learning for its lack of logical analysis. Moreover, he emphasized the importance of studying Western logic in order to transform the methodology of classical learning, which, for example, took quotations from Confucius and the Book of Songs to be authoritative. Afterwards, people such as Zhang Taiyan and Liang Qichao investigated and compared the modes of inference found in the Aristotelian syllogism, the Indian logic of causes (因明yin ming), and the Mohist Canon. Hu Shi (1891–1962) brought the methodology of the philological studies (朴学, puxue) of the Qing dynasty into connection with that of Western empirical science, which he summarized in the phrase “boldly formulating hypotheses while carefully verifying them”. In the 1930’s, Jin Yuelin introduced Russell’s mathematical logic to China. During the same period, both Jin and Feng Youlan (1895–1991) applied the method of logical analysis in their philosophical research. Arguably, one difference between modern and traditional Chinese philosophy is that formal logic is taken seriously by the former but not the latter. In the modern period, many philosophers have focused their attention on further developing the dialectical thinking characteristic of traditional Chinese philosophy. Zhang Taiyan’s An Interpretation of the Chapter “On Making Things Equal”( 《齐物论释》 Qi WuLun Shi) and Xiong Shili’s New Treatise on Consciousness-Only( 《新唯识论》 Xin Wei Shi Lun) attempted to integrate idealism with dialectics. Chinese Marxists employed the method of materialist dialectics in investigating the problem of social revolution and achieved tremendous success, thereby enabling traditional naive dialectics to assume a more self-conscious and scientific form. However, this mainly applies to the dialectics of history, and an analogous modernization of the traditional dialectical conception of nature is still missing. Nor did the Chinese Marxists manage to perform a proper critical analysis of the methodology of classical learning, which is an obvious deficiency. As far as the problem of human freedom is concerned, after having been exposed to Western culture, modern Chinese thinkers came to realize that Westerners generally tend to emphasize the principle of voluntariness in moral action, which leads them to pay particular attention to the problem of free will. This had an enormous impact on modern Chinese intellectuals who turned to the West in their search for truth. Although Yan Fu and Zhang Taiyan were diametrically opposed to each other in ethics because of their respective utilitarian and non-utilitarian stances, they agreed that every human being has an independent personality and that the free will is a precondition for distinguishing between good and evil and between praiseworthy and blameworthy actions. Their shared emphasis on the principle of voluntariness in moral actions was later embraced by proponents of the May Fourth Movement. However, an exaggerated focus on the principle of voluntariness runs the risk of leading to voluntarism. Although there had never been a strong tradition of voluntarism in ancient China, such a tradition managed to take shape in the modern period, and was first manifested in the works of certain progressives. This becomes clear if

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we consider the celebration of the “power of the mind” (心力xin li) by figures such as Gong Zizhen and Tan Sitong, the early Lu Xun’s eulogy of “voluntarism” (意力主 义yi lizhu yi), and so on. At the same time, the Confucian emphasis on the principle of consciousness in moral action continued to exert a strong influence in modernity, as can be seen in many revolutionaries. Others, however, lapsed into fatalism because of the exaggerated attention they paid to the principle of consciousness, such as, for example, Feng Youlan with his notion of the “moral sphere of living” in his “new learning of principle”(新理学xinlixue). The conflict between voluntarism and fatalism became a major theoretical issue in modern Chinese philosophy and also served as the intellectual source of a number of rightist and “leftist” errors among the revolutionary ranks. The Chinese Marxists’ advocation of the perspective of the masses entailed both respecting their voluntariness while also inspiring consciousness on their part. That being said, the influence of the Confucian tradition can also be discerned in the theories of Chinese Marxists. Because they tended to emphasize the principle of consciousness to the detriment of the principle of voluntariness, they were actually unable to arrive at a consistent fusion of these two principles. Consequently, the theoretical conflict between fatalism and voluntarism was never properly resolved. It will be apparent that the outstanding tradition stemming from the characteristics of ancient Chinese philosophy, such as its naive dialectics and the importance it attached to the principle of consciousness, were further developed by the revolutionary process of modern philosophy and led to new theoretical advances at a higher stage of development. At the same time, some of the deficiencies in ancient Chinese philosophy, such as the neglect of formal logic and the principle of voluntariness in morality, were to a certain extent overcome as the result of this process. That being said, we should also recognize that although some of the corrupt traditions shaped under the influence of a longstanding feudal autocracy, such as the dogmatic methodology of classical learning and fatalism, were repeatedly subjected to harsh criticism during the modern philosophical revolution, they were never fully eradicated. This not only led to setbacks in modern philosophy, but also made it possible for these corrupt traditions to rear their ugly heads again during the ten-year turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. Admittedly, the revolutionary process of modern Chinese philosophy has gone through many twists and turns. However, Li Dazhao was right in claiming that “the Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers can stand as symbols for our national spirit. Each of these rivers meets with deserts and gorges, but continues to flow onward majestically, thereby giving shape to its surging muddy waters, as a single current endowed with a momentum built up across thousands of miles.”7 We should feel confident that, just like the waters of the Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers, our nation’s philosophy too will fearlessly conquer all obstacles and challenges in its way, in order to take its rightful place among the great intellectual traditions of world philosophy.

7

Translator’s note: see Li (1923).

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References Lenin. 1965. Collected Works, vol.38. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Li, Dazhao. 1923. A Nation’s Difficult Fate and its Heroic Citizens. In Xin Min Guo vol. 1, no. 2 (December 20). Marx, Karl. 1993. Grunrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. Trans. Martin Nicolaus. London: Penguin. Needham, Joseph. 1959. Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University. Yan, Fu. 1994. On the Speed of Change in the World. In Collected Writings of Yan Fu, ed. by Hu, Weixi. Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publishing House.

Part I

The Pre-Qin Period (CA. 1046–256 BCE)

The pre-Qin period represents the first chapter in the history of Chinese philosophy. An embryonic stage of philosophical thinking had already begun in primitive society, as can be seen in the evidence both from archeological excavations and from ancient myths and legends. Two indications of the beginning of philosophical thinking are the Yijing (Book of Changes) and the Hong Fan (“Great Plan”, a chapter in the Shangshu), both of which appeared around the beginning of the Western Zhou dynasty (eleventh century to 771 BCE). These works respectively described the primitive doctrines of the yin-yang and wuxing (five agents) and applied theoretical thinking to the project of understanding the world. The Book of Changes was originally a reference book for use in divination, in which there were sixty-four hexagrams formed by eight trigrams. The eight trigrams, in turn, were each formed through the combination of two symbols, “—” and “- -”. These two opposing symbols and their various combinations were used to represent and explain various phenomena in the natural world and human society; this was the primitive doctrine of yin-yang. The Hong Fan, in contrast, employed the five categories of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth to explain these phenomena; this was the primitive doctrine of five agents. The doctrines of yin-yang and five agents represented the origins of Chinese philosophical thinking. It was during the Spring and Autumn (770–476 BCE) and the Warring States (475–221 BCE) periods that ancient Chinese culture, after having developed steadily over a long period of time, entered a new stage in which philosophers began to establish philosophical systems of their own. In these periods, “a hundred schools of thought contended,” and philosophy flourished to an unprecedented degree. In the realm of ideology, the debates over “past and present” and “propriety and law” reflected contemporary social upheavals and in particular the transition from a slave society to a feudal one. Since li (propriety) was a superstructural feature of slave economies, the political reforms carried out by the rising landlord class required that government by propriety be replaced by government by law. The debate over “propriety and law” reflected tensions between conservatism and reform or, in the words of contemporaries, between “past and present.” It was around the debate on the relations between “past and present” and between “propriety and law” that the pre-Qin contention of the “hundred schools of thought” began. Over the course of

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this debate, various philosophers rose one after another, and taking advantage of the climate of intellectual freedom, put forward a variety of philosophical systems with different central ideas. Philosophically, one of the central disputes during this period was the debate over “Heaven and humankind.” The slave-owners and aristocrats in the Yin-Zhou dynasties had long used the religious doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, along with certain superstitious beliefs related to the supernatural, in order to maintain their rule, but these ideas became the primary targets of later theoretical critiques starting from the Spring and Autumn Period. Progressive thinkers set atheism in opposition to both religion and superstition and further carried out their debates over the relationship between the Way of humankind (ren dao) and the Way of Heaven (tian dao). Hence, the relationship between “names and actualities" explored in such debates also became one of the central questions in philosophy. Toward the end of the Warring States period, the debates over “Heaven and humankind” and over “names and actualities” reached a stage of development such that Xunzi and the Yizhuan were able to make their critical summations, and in some sense, they returned to the primitive doctrine of yin and yang.

Chapter 2

The Rise of Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, and Legalism

2.1 Confucius’ Doctrine of the Unity of Humanity and Knowledge Confucius, whose surname was Kong, whose personal name Qiu, and whose courtesy name Zhongni, was born in 551 BCE in Zouyi (modern Qufu County, Shandong Province), then a part of the state of Lu. He died in 479 BCE. His thought is preserved primarily in the Analects. As a statesman, Confucius took a conservative stance on the main controversy in contemporary political thought—the debate over “past and present”, and “propriety and law.” He declared, “I believe in and love the ancients” (Analects 7: 1). He held that “the management of a state demands the rules of propriety” (Analects 11: 24), and took as his personal mission the restoration of the rites of the Zhou dynasty1 He openly opposed “casting the criminal law on metal tripods”, which was a legislative reform then being considered in the state of Jin.2 As an educator Confucius initiated the practice of private teaching, accepting and instructing large numbers of disciples. In this way, he broke with the existing custom of institutionalized learning under the supervision of the officialdom. During the course of his teaching, he also compiled and edited a number of ancient books and records. While he largely failed to accomplish his stated political goals, he made enormous contributions in the areas of culture and education. Confucius founded the Ru school of thought (Confucianism) and was the first Chinese philosopher to establish a philosophical system. With respect to the contemporary philosophical debate on “Heaven and humankind” (天人tian ren), he adhered to the old Yin and Zhou dynasty doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, and he also stressed the study of humanity, putting forth the new doctrine of the unity of humanity and knowledge. In the Analects, the word “humanity” (仁ren) and the word “knowledge” (知zhi) frequently appear together. For example, “Fan Chi asked about humanity. Confucius said, ‘It is to love humankind.’ He asked about knowledge. Confucius said, ‘It is 1 2

Translation is adapted from Legge (1891, p. 62). Translation is adapted from Needham (1991, p. 522).

© SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_2

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to know humankind.’” (Analects 12: 22). For Confucius, humanity and knowledge were both essential features of anideal personality (that is, a sage’s personality). The chief problem to be addressed in Confucian theory and practice was that of how to cultivate such an ideal personality through education. (1) Humanity and the Way of Tolerance and Forgiveness According to the Lüshi Chunqiu (Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals, compiled in 239 BCE), “Confucius advocated humanity.” Humanity is at the core of Confucius’ conception of “the Way of humankind”, which represents his ethical thought. The category of humanity had appeared in the philosophical literature prior to Confucius’ time. The ZuoZhuan (Zuo Qiuming’s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals), under the year 529 BCE, states: “Zhongni said, ‘An ancient record says that humanity is to master oneself and return to propriety.’”3 It is obvious that when Confucius advocated humanity, he did so in full acceptance of the conservative implications of this stance—he held that a person should restrain himself and make his words and actions conform to the declining ceremonials of Zhou. But Confucius imbued the concept of “humanity” with fresh meaning This was illustrated by the fact that he not only defined humanity as loving humankind but also regarded tolerance and forgiveness (忠恕zhong shu) as the basic approach to the realization of humanity. He said: A person of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be prominent himself, also helps others to be prominent. To be able from one’s own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others; that may be called the method of realizing humanity. (Analects 6: 30)

He believed that there was “one thread”—“the way of tolerance and forgiveness”—running through the entirety of his own doctrine. The way of conscientiousness and altruism required one to imagine oneself in the place of others, to establish the character of others by way of establishing one’s own, and to seek prominence not merely for oneself but also for others. Confucius also admonished: “Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you” (Analects 12: 2). Confucius tried to realize humanity by showing consideration for others. Here, there are in fact two principles working as prerequisites: one is the principle of the Way of humankind (humanity, love), that is, of affirming human dignity; the other is the principle of reason, that is, of affirming that reason is shared by all, and everyone’s reason can judge right and wrong, good and evil, so that all are able from the self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others. Confucius considered people to be the most important of all things in the world. He believed that human beings, rather than spiritual beings, were of first concern. He asked, “If we are not yet able to serve humankind, how can we serve spiritual beings?” (Analects 11: 12). Human beings are also more important than animals. Once, a certain stable was destroyed by fire. “On returning from court, Confucius asked ‘Was any person hurt?’ He did not ask about the horses” (Analects 10: 11). 3

Translation is adapted from Legge (1871, p. 641).

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As to human relations, Confucius thought that people should display mutual respect, sympathy, and confidence in their dealings with one another. His emphasis on the principle of the Way of humankind represented a politically progressive stance at a time when slavery was on the verge of collapse. Confucius also thought that human reason could master the standards of judging right, wrong, good, and evil: “Only the person of humanity knows how to love people and hate people” (Analects 4: 3). Since the person of humanity judges what is right or wrong according to reason, his or her likes and dislikes and his or her love and hate are all reasonable when he or she deals with others. For Confucius, moral conduct followed from the demands of the human mind (reason), hence the words, “Is humanity far from me? As soon as I want it, it is right there by me” (Analects 7: 30). This respect for the principle of reason also represented a novel idea when Confucius originally presented it. The unity of the principle of the Way of humankind and the principle of reason is the most essential feature of Confucius’ conception of the Way of humankind with humanity as its nucleus. If we grasp this point, we can easily understand why Confucius often spoke of “humanity” and “knowledge” together. (2) The Unity of Epistemology and Ethics It is clear that for Confucius, humanity and knowledge represented a unity. He interpreted “humanity” as “loving humankind” and “knowledge” as “knowing humankind” (Analects 12: 22). He also says: “The person of humanity is naturally at ease with humanity. The person of wisdom seeks humanity for the benefit it brings” (Analects 4: 2). Thus, it can be seen that by “knowledge” he chiefly referred to knowledge of human ethical relations, and such knowledge, he thought, would help people to practice humanity. In addition, Confucius also asked, “Not being wise, how can one be a person of humanity?” (Analects 5: 19). Without true knowledge of ethical relations, there can be no conscious humanity and virtues. Therefore, knowledge is subject to humanity and in turn is a prerequisite for humanity. The unity of humanity and knowledge is equivalent to the unity of ethics and epistemology. In epistemology, Confucius put forward a number of original views. He observed, “To say that you know when you do know and say that you do not know when you do not know—that is knowledge” (Analects 2: 17). He who admits that he does not know nevertheless has some knowledge. Confucius also spoke out against many of the manifestations of subjectivism: groundless conjecture, dogmatism, obstinacy, egoism. He advocated the integration of “learning” with “thinking” (see Analects 2: 15), as well as the judging of people by their deeds as well as their words: “My way is to hear his words and look at his conduct” (Analects 5: 10). All these are valuable comments about human cognition, but it does not follow that Confucius had yet attained a materialist understanding of knowledge. To the contrary, Confucius was an idealist. He stressed reason, but he also believed that the human ability to judge what was morally right or wrong was innate. “Heaven produced the virtue that is in me” (Analects 7: 23). He acknowledged that there were sages who were born with knowledge, and he took the Mandate of Heaven as the ultimate aim of knowledge:

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“Without knowing the Mandate of Heaven, it is impossible to be a superior person” (Analects 20: 3). All of these are idealist views. It must be pointed out that the doctrine of the unity of humanity and knowledge in Confucius’ epistemology is identified with ethics; consequently, his every epistemological claim has ethical implications. “Knowledge” refers chiefly to “knowing humankind,” “learning” is primarily “learning to reach the utmost of the Way” (Analects 19: 7), and “thinking” mainly means “thinking of sincerity in speech, thinking of seriousness in handling affairs,” and “thinking of righteousness when confronting an opportunity for gain” (Analects 16: 10). So every cognitive process— such as when knowledge takes the place of ignorance, when “groundless conjecture, dogmatism, obstinacy, and egoism” are eliminated, when learning integrates with thinking, deeds are matched with words, and so forth—is also a process of cultivating virtues. It is through these processes that humankind becomes virtuous. This is similar to Socrates’ view that “virtue is a kind of knowledge.”4 Confucius’ aim was to cultivate an ideal personality embodying the unity of humanity and knowledge. Being insatiable in learning and tireless in teaching, he himself set an example to his students in moral character. For him, to love a person was to advise and encourage him or her, and to be loyal to a person was to teach him or her: “Can there be love that does not lead to strictness with its object? Can there be conscientiousness which does not lead to the instruction of its object?” (Analects 14: 7). Clearly, teaching a person with tireless zeal is the manifestation of humanity and the practice of the way of tolerance and forgiveness. Confucius further held that an atmosphere of mutual understanding and complete confidence should exist between teachers and students. This atmosphere is apparent even today as we read the dialogues in the Analects, in which Confucius and his students exchange their views honestly and express their wishes straightforwardly. This way of learning is advantageous to the cultivation of genuine character. The nurturing of an ideal person embodying the unity of humanity and knowledge requires subjective effort on the part of the individual; consequently, Confucius laid stress on fostering high aspirations. He believed that anyone would surely become humane so long as he had lofty aspirations, developed his own initiative and worked tirelessly. Confucius once said of himself, “At fifteen, my mind was set on learning. At thirty, my character had been formed. At forty, I had no more perplexities. At fifty, I knew the Mandate of Heaven. At sixty, I was at ease whatever I heard. At seventy, I could follow my heart’s desire without transgressing moral principles” (Analects 2: 4; trans. Chan 1963, p. 20). This does not mean that he did not take to learning until he was fifteen, but that at fifteen he made up his mind to set the realization of humanity and the Way as the objective for which he would strive all his life. From then on, he had an insatiable desire to learn. Recognizing the power of the human will, Confucius says: “A resolute scholar and person of humanity will never seek to live at the expense of injuring humanity. He would rather sacrifice his life in order to realize humanity” (Analects 15: 9; trans. Chan 1963, p. 43). A person that steadfastly practices humanity and constantly deepens his understanding and 4

Translator’s note: Cf. Plato, Meno.

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heightens his awareness will reach a state in which “the person of humanity has no worry, the person of wisdom has no perplexities, the person of courage has no fear” (Analects 14: 28; trans. Chan 1963, p. 42). The spirit that sticks to principles and is courageous in fighting for an ideal has exerted a positive influence in Chinese history. Nevertheless, Confucius’ doctrine of the unity of humanity and knowledge is, in the final analysis, based on the idealistic theory of the Mandate of Heaven, since he believed that moral character was innate and that the cultivation of virtues was merely an awakening of one’s innate moral principles; that is how he was able to know the Mandate of Heaven at fifty, obey it at sixty, and act absolutely freely in accordance with its rules at seventy. (3) “While Respecting Spiritual Beings, Keep Them at a Distance” and “To Stand in Awe of the Mandate of Heaven” Confucius did not talk much about the Way of Heaven, toward which he adopted much the same attitude as Zichan (c. 580–522 BCE) did. Both held that the Way of Heaven was far away, while the Way of Humankind was near. As to spiritual beings, Confucius says: “To devote yourself earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep them at a distance may be called wisdom” (Analects 6: 22). Herein lies Confucius’rationalism. Again, the Analects states, “Confucius never discussed extraordinary things, unnatural strength, disorders, and spiritual beings” (Analects 7: 21). These ideas were associated with the idea of atheism of that time and had an enlightening effect. Confucius was not, however, led by these ideas to atheism and materialism. Instead, he developed an idealist theory of the Mandate of Heaven, with the aim of clothing religion and superstition in more intellectually respectable garb. What he called “Heaven” is not the same thing as “God” in religion, but rather a kind of abstract spirit, the reification of human reason and subjective mind. He proclaimed that the Mandate of Heaven (天命tian ming) could not be defied, and he says: “The superior person stands in awe of three things. He stands in awe of the Mandate of Heaven; he stands in awe of rulers; he stands in awe of the words of sages. The inferior person is ignorant of the Mandate of Heaven and does not stand in awe of it. He or she is disrespectful to rulers and is contemptuous of the words of the sages” (Analects 16: 8; trans. Chan 1963, p. 45). Confucius not only placed the Mandate of Heaven first among the “three things,” but also considered history as something created by the sages in the light of the Mandate of Heaven: “It is only Heaven that is grand, and only Yao who can follow it” (Analects 8: 19). Following Heaven, the sage Yao worked out a set of rules and regulations that were subsequently passed on for generations from one sage to another. While rules and regulations might be added to or removed from this list over time, they could never be entirely discarded or replaced. This conception of history based on the theory of the Mandate of Heaven is metaphysical. In short, Confucius did put forth some reasonable ideas, insofar as he respected reason and recognized subjective human initiative, but at the same time, he constructed an idealistic system of philosophy precisely because he considered the principle of reason and the power of the subjective mind to be absolutes.

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2.2 Mozi and the Conflict Between Confucianism and Mohism—The Antagonism Between Empiricism and Apriorism Mozi (ca. 468–376 BCE), whose personal name was Di, was a native of the state of Lu during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. As a thinker of the preQin period, he was second in prestige only to Confucius. The Mohist School founded by him emerged in opposition to the Confucian School. If Confucius’ thought was colored by the sentiments of the nobility, then Mozi was a philosopher of the masses. The Mohist School mainly represented the interests of the common people and petty proprietors during the transition from slavery to feudalism. Mozi’s thought is principally recorded in the eponymous book, Mozi (fourth century BCE). Mozi adopted a critical attitude toward the ceremonials of Zhou: “He turned his back on the Zhou dynasty practices and made use of the methods of government of the Xia dynasty” (see Huainanzi 21). Opposed to the Confucian doctrine of “back to the ancients,” Mozi says: “It seems to me that what there is that is good in the old should be transmitted, and what is good in the present should be established, so that what is good may increase all the more” (Mozi 46). This was his criticism of Confucius’ claim that “I transmit but do not create. I believe in and love the ancients” (Analects 7: 1). It is obvious that the Confucian and Mohist schools took opposite positions in the debates on “past and present” and “propriety and law.”Philosophically, Mozi established a system of empiricism in opposition to Confucius’ apriorism. Below, we shall discuss Mozi’s philosophical thought by contrasting it with Confucianism. (1) “Universal Love” and Utilitarianism Like Confucius, Mozi emphasized the “Way of humankind.” But, according to Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals, “Confucius advocated the principle of humanity, whereas Mo Di upheld the principle of universality.” The conception of universal love (兼爱jian ai)that Mozi put forth in opposition to Confucius’ “humanity” is the central idea in Mozi’s view of the Way of humankind (ethical thought). Though both Confucius and Mozi discussed “love,” there is a clear difference between their concepts of love. For Confucius, “humanity” meant different grades of love—more for those who were close and less for those who were distant, more for the highly placed and less for the lowly. But Mozi took a different view: “Partiality should be replaced by universality” (Mozi 16). He meant that all should be loved, with no discrimination as to who was close as opposed to distant. Accordingly, love should not vary in strength but should instead be “universal”; that is, others should be loved as the self is loved, so as to make mutual benefit “unified.” Hence, “Let all in the world love universally, loving others as they love their own selves” (Mozi 14). Mozi believed that when all the people in the world loved one another, an equal society would be realized in which “the strong will not overcome the weak, the many will not oppress the few, the rich will not insult the poor, the honored will not despise the humble, and the cunning will not deceive the ignorant” (Mozi 15). This is

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utopian, for it is an “ideal society” based on the moral conception of universal love. Mozi’s doctrine of universal love did, however, express his criticism of the traditional patriarchal idea of “loving one’s parents and respecting one’s elders,” and voiced the common people’s discontent with the patriarchal hierarchy that began in the Yin and Zhou dynasties. This idea of equality and this critical attitude were constantly revived in the peasant uprisings of later dynasties. Mozi undoubtedly affirmed the principle of humanity when he advocated universal love. In this connection, “universal love” is in harmony with “humanity.” Therefore, Mozi says: “Universal love is humane and righteous” (Mozi 16). In explaining humanity, the Later Mohists said that a genuine person of humanity had necessarily to love others as he loved himself and to regard every person as a subject like him- or herself, rather than as an object to be used like a beast of burden. So the Later Mohists emphasized the principle of humanity more definitely than their predecessors, that is to say, they affirmed human dignity and human value. However, Confucius’ way of tolerance is the unity of the principle of humanity and the principle of reason, whereas Mozi’s advocacy of “loving others as one’s self” involves the unity of the principle of humanity and the principle of sensuousness. Mozi believed that every individual sought to be free from hunger and cold and wanted to enjoy a prosperous life. If one loves others as one’s self, one should think about the interests of others in accordance with the sensuous and physical needs of humankind. According to Confucius, the three-year period of mourning for the dead was a reflection of the natural demands of the human mind (reason). Yet, in Mozi’s view, the “elaborate funerals” advocated by Confucianists served only to bury society’s wealth in graves where it could not be of practical use, and “extended mourning” prohibited sons or brothers of the dead from productive activity for long periods, and also interrupted sexual relations between men and women. Hence, elaborate funerals and extended mourning ran counter to the imperatives to “seek wealth” and “increase the population” (see Mozi 25). The conflict of views between Confucian and Mohist schools over funeral rituals embodies the antagonism between the principle of reason and the principle of sensuousness. Wealth and increase of population as human sensuous wishes are essential dimensions of what Mozi called “profit”(利li).The controversy between the Confucian and Mohist schools in the field of ethical thought—the antagonism between the principle of reason and the principle of sensuousness—developed around the issue of “righteousness and profit”(义利yi li). Being a non-utilitarian, Confucius says: “The superior person understands righteousness; the inferior person understands profit” (Analects 4: 16). Mozi, however, was an exponent of utilitarianism, advocating “universal love and mutual benefit” (Mozi 15). As he says: “The business of those who are virtuous is surely the promotion of benefits for the world and the removal of harm from the world” (Mozi 16). He held that the purpose of all moral conduct was to procure benefits for the world and eliminate calamities. Anything apart from this purpose could not be called “the business of the person of humanity.” With respect to motive and effect, Confucius emphasized the former. As he says: “If you set your mind on humanity, you will be free from evil” (Analects 4: 4), believing as he did that there would be no evil conduct so long as one truly set one’s mind on being a

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person of humanity and had a pure motive. Mozi, however, proposed, “You should observe both intention and consequences” (Mozi 49), that is, judge a person both by his motive and its effect. The conflict of ethical views between Confucius and Mozi on the issue of nonutilitarianism and utilitarianism, and on the principle of reason and the principle of sensuousness, is organically associated with the antagonism between apriorism and empiricism in the field of epistemology. (2) The Beginning of the Debate over “Names and Actualities” In the pre-Qin period, epistemology developed chiefly around the debate over “names and actualities” (名实ming shi). Confucius’ doctrine of the “rectification of names” (正名zheng ming) was intended to improve the social life of his time in light of hierarchical roles stipulated by the ceremonials of Zhou. Epistemologically, it was an apriorist view holding that objective reality was determined by concepts. Confucius’ doctrine of the rectification of names was primarily a political doctrine, while Mozi conceived of the relationship between names and actualities as a philosophical issue. He noted that even the blind could say the words “black” and “white,” but that if you mixed up black and white objects and asked the blind to differentiate them, they would be at a loss: “Hence, the reason that I say the blind do not know white from black does not lie in the matter of names, but in the process of selection” (see Mozi 47). Here, Mozi expressed an important idea of materialistic epistemology, though in a naïve way: Concepts should be judged by practical experience. Differentiating things on the basis of concepts while lacking the ability to distinguish them in reality could not be regarded as true knowledge. With respect to the criteria concerning whether the name matches the reality, Confucius thought that the criteria of truth lay in human rational thought, whereas Mozi believed that the criteria for judging right and wrong and truth and falsehood were objective. These objective criteria were what Mozi called the “three tests” or “three rules.” He pointed out that the grounds for establishing a doctrine were three: its basis, its verifiability, and its applicability. First, “it should be based on the deeds of the ancient sage kings,” that is, on the experience of the “sage” rulers of the past. Second, “it is to be verified by the eyes and ears of the common people,” that is, by people’s direct experience. Third, “it is to be applied by adopting it in government and observing its benefit to the country and the people,” that is, it should be put into effect and its social effectiveness should be assessed (see Mozi 35). This theory of three tests is an adequate indication that Mozi was an empiricist of naïve materialism. He had considerable faith in human perceptual experience, and believed that objective reality could be given in sensation. He affirmed that people could examine their knowledge by their experience (what they had seen and heard). But he maintained that the representations acquired through sensation corresponded directly with their objects, and thus he conceived of the principle of perception as absolute, thereby falling into narrow empiricism. This is how Mozi concluded merely from the “testimony of the ears and eyes of the multitude” that the spiritual beings were real.

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Starting from the principle of reason, Confucius put forth a number of commendable ideas concerning the relationship between sensation and thinking, perception and reason. For example, he required hearing much and seeing much, and “further silent meditation on what had been learned.” He asked that the superior person have “nine things as subjects of thoughtful consideration,” that is, comprehending through thought and reflection the “inner principle” of things perceived (Analects 16: 10). He advocated the principle of “learning by analogy” and paid great attention to analogical inference: “If I have presented one corner of the square and they cannot come back to me with the other three, I should not go over the points again” (Analects 7: 8). Though Mozi tended towards narrow empiricism, he still attached great importance to logical thinking on the basis of experience. In this respect, Mozi carried Confucius’ ideas much further. This is shown primarily by the fact that Mozi was the first Chinese philosopher to describe the three logical categories of lei (class), gu (cause/reason), and li (principle). When refuting his opponent in a debate, Mozi used to say, “You have not examined the class of my assertions and you do not understand their causes/reason” (Mozi 19). He meant that his opponent had not been able to make out which things his words referred to and which grounds there were for his words. He said further that “persons of humanity remind each other of the principle of right and wrong and of what is to be accepted and what is to be rejected. The one who has no causes/reasons follows those who have causes/reasons. The one who has no knowledge follows those who have knowledge” (Mozi 39). On the occasion of demonstrating or refuting a statement, one must be able to come up with some convincing argument as to what is to be affirmed and what is to be negated, and those who have no evidence for their assertions should follow those who have, while those who are ignorant should follow those who are enlightened. Mozi’s three logical categories are interrelated: “To remind each other of the principle of right and wrong and of what is to be accepted and what is to be rejected” means that one should “understand the cause/reason” and “examine the class.” Mozi held that when one stated one’s reasons during a debate, one should abide by fundamental categories (class). The Mozi records a debate between Mozi and GongshuPan. Both sides acknowledged that murdering people was incompatible with their moral principles. Mozi argued, “To hold a principle that forbids the killing of few but allows the killing of many cannot be called understanding the fundamental categories.” Mozi’s argument implied that GongshuBan committed a logical error— that he did not understand the class. He knew that the killing of one person was incompatible with his moral principles, yet he had completed the construction of scaling ladders for the state of Chu and was going to attack the innocent state of Song with them and kill many. Mozi’s gu (cause/reason) has two meanings. One refers to the cause that makes things happen; for example, a physician attending a patient has to know the cause of the ailment before he can cure it (Mozi 14). The other refers to the purpose one has; for example, one who is building houses has to know why one is building them (Mozi 48). Mozi claimed that the grounds for his advocacy of universal love consisted not only in revealing that want of mutual love was the cause of calamities in the world, but also in showing that the purpose of putting this doctrine into practice was to procure benefits for the world and eliminate

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its calamities (Mozi 15). In Mozi’s opinion, if one could “understand the class” (make a correct analogy) and “recognize the cause/reason” (set one’s arguments forth with good grounds), then one had gotten “the principle of right and wrong and of what is to be accepted and what is to be rejected.” There is another characteristic of Mozi’s investigation of logical thinking: he not only devoted significant attention to final causes (the reasons for doing things), but also demanded that the means to the end should be shown clearly. He thought that theory, besides pointing out the direction of action for people, ought to inform them of the way to proceed: “Doctrines that can be translated into conduct may be taught frequently. Doctrines that cannot be translated into conduct should not be taught frequently” (Mozi 46), which means that only those doctrines that can be transformed into actions are valuable. It is thus clear that, with respect to the relation between statements and actions, Mozi put more stress on the importance of actions than did Confucius. In the debates over “names and actualities,” even though he tended towards narrow empiricism, Mozi put forth many fresh ideas. (3) “Anti-fatalism” and the “Will of Heaven” In the debate over “Heaven and humankind,” Mozi’s theory contained a contradiction. On the one hand, he had a naïve materialistic idea of anti-fatalism, but on the other he had religious and superstitious views, such as his concepts of the “will of Heaven” (天志tian zhi) and his belief in ghosts and spirits. Mozi leveled criticisms at the Confucian doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven: “To believe in fatalism and yet teach people to learn is like telling them to cover their hair and yet remove their hats” (Mozi 48). What Confucianists said was selfcontradictory: they maintained that the Mandate of Heaven could not be changed, and yet they taught people to learn. In opposition to the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, Mozi stressed human effort. He said that birds, beasts, and insects had their feathers and furs for coats, and water and grass for drink and food, so that the male did not sow seeds or plant crops, nor did the female weave or spin, yet food and clothing were provided. Humankind was different: “Those who exert themselves will live. Those who do not exert themselves cannot live. When the superior people do not attend to government diligently, the jurisdiction will be in chaos. When the common people do not attend to work, supplies will not be sufficient” (Mozi 32). For him, what distinguished a person, whether a superior or an ordinary person, from an animal was that a person had to live by farming and weaving. This indicates that Mozi viewed labor as an essential characteristic of human beings, and that the stratum of which he was the representative paid significant attention to material production and disliked those who profited from the labor of others. Yet Mozi offered a narrow empiricist argument for his condemnation of fatalism: “From antiquity to the present, since the beginning of humankind, has any seen such a thing as fate, or heard the sound of fate? Of course there is none” (Mozi 36). It is of course quite naïve to verify the doctrine of anti-fatalism simply by “what one sees and hears.” Mozi also argued for the existence of ghosts and spirits by appealing to “what one saw and heard,” asserting that they (ghosts and spirits) could foresee what would

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happen after many centuries and were wiser than the sages, in the same way that the sharp-eared and keen-sighted differ from the deaf and blind. Mozi sometimes included the “will of Heaven” in his “three tests” and compared it to the compass of the wheelwright and the square of the carpenter, which can measure all circular and square objects in the world; he regarded the “will of Heaven” as the criterion for judging what was right and wrong and what was good and evil. He explained every phenomenon of nature and human society in light of the will of Heaven, holding that Heaven loved humankind dearly. For example, Heaven ordered the sun, the moon, and the stars to light and guide them, ordained the four seasons to regulate them, sent down snow, frost, rain, and dew to grow the five grains and flax and silk. Moreover, Heaven established states and appointed the dukes and lords to govern, levy taxes, and make laborers engage in material production (Mozi 27). All these showed how dearly Heaven loved humankind. The reason for Mozi’s advocacy of such a teleological doctrine as that of the “will of Heaven” is the fact that he applied erroneously the principle of humanity and utilitarianism to the natural world, taking it for granted that all natural phenomena likewise were for human benefit, and that human moral aims embodied the heavenly will. In summary, the conflict between Confucian and Mohist schools is one between apriorism and empiricism, since Confucius was essentially an idealist apriorist and Mozi basically a materialist empiricist. Confucius, with the role of reason in view, put forth some reasonable ideas, while Mozi had the role of practical experience in view and made significant contributions to epistemology and logic. As a matter of course, the counterproductive elements in Mozi’s thought, such as the “will of Heaven” and “intelligent ghosts and spirits,” are also associated with his empiricism.

2.3 The Laozi: “The Movement of DaoConsists in Reversion”—The Presentation of the Dialectical Principle of Negation The person known as Laozi was surnamed Li. His personal name was Er, but he was also known as “Lao Dan.” His home was in the area of modern Luyi County, Henan Province. At one time, he served as custodian of the imperial archives of the Zhou dynasty. His main ideas are contained in the book Laozi, also known as Daodejing (道德经Canon of Dao and Virtue). Since the book may have been composed after the rise of Confucianism and Mohism, it is natural to discuss it after discussing those schools. The Laozi breaks with both sides in the debates over “past and present, propriety and law,” and instead advocates a return to primitive antiquity. As a recluse, Lao Dan was a representative of the declining nobility, who were discontented with everything arising in the social reform of that period but were powerless to do anything about it. They consequently promoted their own doctrine advocating government by “refraining from action contrary to Nature” (无为wu wei). The Laozi held that the

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Confucian attempt to restore the rituals of Zhou could only cause turmoil: “Propriety is a superficial expression of loyalty and faithfulness, and the beginning of disorder” (Laozi 38). The Laozi also opposed “government by law,” as advocated by the Legalists: “The more laws and orders are promulgated, the more thieves and robbers there will be” (Laozi 57). The book stresses knowledge of “the primeval beginning” (Laozi 14); that is, knowing the primitive society of high antiquity. It was urged that people should return to the “original condition” of a small country with few inhabitants, since that represented the ideal society. Although this sort of historical retrogression is undesirable, it does reflect certain insightful criticisms of contemporary society. The philosophy contained in the Laozi is, in a sense, a self-criticism of slave society (civilized society), and is the first dialectical system of ideas in the history of Chinese philosophy. (1) “Non-action” and the Debate over the Relationship between “Heaven and Humankind” Dao (道) is the supreme concept in the philosophy of the Laozi. This Dao is the principle of the unity of the world and also the law of development of the universe. In the debate over “Heaven and humankind,” Confucius and Mozi emphasized the Way of humankind, but the Laozi stressed the Way of Heaven. The book considers humankind to be but one of the myriadthings in the universe, and therefore regards it as wrong to stress the Way of humankind: “When the great Dao declined, ‘humanity’ and ‘righteousness’ appeared” (Laozi 18). To pursue humanity and righteousness in the way that Confucius and Mozi did represents the abandonment of the great Dao. Instead, humans should “abandon humanity and discard righteousness” (Laozi 19; trans. Chan 1963, p. 149) in order to truly grasp the great Dao. It is apparent that the Way of Heaven and the Way of humankind are seen as opposed to each other in the Laozi, and that the Way of Heaven is seen as the negation of the Way of humankind. The Laozi takes the opposition between these two as the antithesis between no action (nature) and action (artificiality). It is no action which is advocated in the Laozi. No action (无为wu wei) has a dual character in the Laozi. On the one hand, there is “no action contrary to nature”: “The Dao invariably takes no action, yet nothing is left undone” (Laozi 37; trans. Chan 1963, p. 158). The Dao naturally, without consciousness, produces, gives impetus to, and develops all things. The Dao is not a “creator” possessed of will. This represents a rejection of Mozi’s doctrine of the will of Heaven, and represents a more clearly atheistic stand than Confucius’. The Laozi further holds that the sage should be as theDao, “taking no action, yet with nothing left undone” (trans. Chan 1963, p. 162). The sage “supports all things in their natural state, and does not dare to take action” (Laozi 64); that is, according to the principle of non-action, the sage allows all things to take their own natural courses and does not dare to contrive anything. This attitude of respect for the objective natural law is commendable, but on the other hand the wuwei principle is opposed to practice and counsels people not to take any action: “The sage knows without going about, understands without seeing, and accomplishes without any action” (Laozi 47; trans. Chan 1963, p. 162). Knowledge can be gained without practical experience and successes can be achieved through inertia. This viewpoint therefore encourages

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resignation to one’s “natural destiny.” The Laozi calls “returning to roots” in the (Dao) as “returning to destiny.” Humans have no power with respect to destiny: “Heaven’s net is indeed vast; though its meshes are wide, it misses nothing” (Laozi, 73; trans. Chan 1963, p. 173). No one can escape the control of “Heaven’s net.” This idea is similar to the Confucian doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, but is opposed to Mozi’s doctrine of anti-fatalism. (2) The “Nameless” and the Debate over the Relationship between “Names and Actualities” In the debate over “names and actualities,” the Laozi differs from both the Confucianists and Mohists, in defending the doctrine of nameless (无名wu ming).The Laozi holds that ordinary language and concepts cannot represent the Dao, and that therefore “Dao is invariably nameless” (Laozi 32). There is certainly some truth in this, since ordinary concepts are inadequate representations of concrete things or of the law of development of the universe, but the Laozi exaggerates in this respect and goes to extremes. It assumes that the Dao, an integral entity that has never been dissected, is beyond sensory experience or conceptual thinking: We look at it and do not see it; its name is the Invisible. We listen to it and do not hear it; its name is the Inaudible. We touch it and do not find it; its name is the Subtle (formless). These three cannot be further inquired into, and hence they merge into one. Going up high, it is not bright, and coming down low, it is not dark. Infinite and boundless, it cannot be given any name; it reverts to nothingness (Laozi 14; trans. Chan 1963, p. 146).

It is justifiable, in a sense, to say that the Dao is invisible, inaudible, and untouchable, because the principle of the unity of the world, or the principle of development of the universe, is beyond the direct grasp of the sense organs, and it cannot be described by such concepts as “bright,” “dark,” and the like. But the Laozi expounds this in terms of absolutes—“One may know the world without going out the door. One may see the Way of Heaven without looking through the window” (Laozi, 47; trans. Chan 1963, p. 162)—maintaining that people ought to shut their eyes and stop their ears, remaining out of touch with reality. This inevitably leads to obscurantism. It is apparent that the doctrine of the nameless has a dual character. It recognizes the limitations of sensory experience and conceptual thinking but also exaggerates them and entirely denies the role of the senses and of concepts. Thus it can be said that the philosophy of the Laozi denies not only the principle of humanity advocated by both Confucius and Mozi on the issue of “Heaven and humankind,” but also denies the principle of reason and the principle of perception advocated by Confucius and Mozi, respectively, regarding the issue of “names and actualities.” According to the Laozi, in order to comprehend the Dao one has to follow the Laozi’s epistemology, “observing with tranquil mind” (静观jing guan) and “washing away one’s confusing ideas and intuiting the profound truth” (涤除玄览di chu xuan lan). This epistemology also has a dual nature. On the one hand, “washing away one’s confusing ideas” means seeing one’s mind as a mirror to be cleaned until it is “spotless.” This is reasonable to some extent, insofar as it is true that one should be extremely open-minded and reject subjectivism. As the Laozi says:

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2 The Rise of Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, and Legalism He does not show himself; therefore he is luminous. He does not justify himself; therefore he becomes prominent. He does not boast of himself; therefore he is given credit. He does not brag; therefore he can endure for long (Laozi 22; trans. Chan 1963, p. 151).

What is here required of people is that they should see things in their true colors and without any preconceived ideas; success and wisdom will follow. “Observing with tranquil mind,” on the other hand, is a kind of mystical intuition; “In the days of old those who practiced Dao with success were subtly mysterious and profoundly penetrating, and too deep to comprehend” (Laozi 15; trans. Chan 1963, p. 151). This means that such mysterious and profoundly penetrating intuition is beyond the understanding of ordinary people and can only be described with mysterious words. (3) Introduction of the Dialectical Principle of Negation The entire philosophical system of the Laozi is an idealistic one. Though there are some reasonable elements with respect to the ideas of “non-action” and “the nameless,” the Laozi treats them as absolutes, holdings that wu (non-being) is the first all-embracing principle of the world. “Heaven and Earth and the ten thousand things are produced from Being; Being is the product of Non-being” (Laozi 40), and “the tranquil is the rule of the hasty” (Laozi 26). To regard “non-being” as the source of “being,” and “tranquility” as dominant over movement (“the hasty”) is to accept an idealistic view that takes “vacuity-tranquility” as the origin of the universe. Therefore, the Laozi’s “Dao” is in essence a kind of “absolute spirit.” This is an objective-idealist system of philosophy which assumes that all things are derived from the Dao. The Laozi, however, does represent a significant achievement in the area of naïve dialectics. It puts forth the proposition that “the movement of Dao consists in reversion,” pointing out that the transformation of a thing by itself into its opposite is a movement in conformity with a law of its own. Thus is the principle of negation first presented in the history of Chinese philosophy, and this signifies an important stage in the history of the development of dialectics. According to the Laozi, the Dao cannot be expressed using ordinary concepts and words. Only by adopting the form suggested in the proposition “straight words seem to be their opposites” (Laozi 78) can one give true expression to the principle that “the movement of Dao consists in reversion” (trans. Chan 1963, p. 175). Propositions expressed in similar form are “What is most straight seems to be crooked, the greatest skill seems to be clumsy, the greatest eloquence seems to stutter” (Laozi 45; trans. Chan 1963, p. 161); “he produces them but does not take possession of them, he acts but does not rely on his own ability, he accomplishes his task but does not claim credit for it” (Laozi 2; trans. Chan 1963, p. 140); “to yield is to be preserved whole, to be bent is to become straight, to be empty is to be full, to be worn out is to be renewed” (Laozi 22; trans. Chan 1963, p. 151). All these are propositions expressed in the form indicated by the principle that “straight words seem to be their opposites.” As Lenin pointed out, “Dialectics consists in general in the negation of the first proposition, and in its replacement by a second (in the transition of the first into the second, in the demonstration of the connection of the first with the second, etc.)”(Lenin 1976). The Laozi states, “When the people of the world all know beauty as beauty, there arises the recognition of ugliness; when they all

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know the good as good, there arises the recognition of evil” (Laozi 2; trans. Chan 1963, p. 140). The positive knowledge of a thing contains the negation of it. For the generally accepted “first positive proposition”—for example, that “what is straight is not crooked,” or “he produces them and takes possession of them,” or “to yield is not to be preserved whole”—the Laozi puts forth “the second, negative proposition” as a replacement: what is most straight seems to be crooked; he produces them, but does not take possession of them; to yield is to be preserved whole. The book enumerates many contradictions, such as being and non-being, difficult and easy, long and short, high and low, front and back, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, wise and foolish, increase and decrease, honor and disgrace, realizing that for whatever contradiction the correlation and mutual transformation between the two opposites is a constant law; hence the generalization that “the movement of Dao consists in reversion.” The Laozi contains a number of ideas related to military dialectics, elevated, however, to the level of general dialectics. For example, it offers the proposition that “the correct reverts to the perverse, and the good reverts to the evil,” together with another one that “it is upon calamity that happiness leans, and it is upon happiness that calamity rests” (Laozi 58), illustrating the mutual transformation of war situations between the correct and the perverse, and that of social life between good and evil, calamity and happiness. Other claims include “if the army is strong, it will not win; if a tree is stiff, it will break,” “when one is born, one is tender and weak; at death, one is stiff and hard. All things, grass as well as trees, are tender and supple while alive; when dead, they are withered and dried”(trans. Chan 1963, p. 174). From these claims, the conclusion is drawn that “the strong and the great are inferior, while the tender and the weak are superior” (Laozi 76), illustrating that it is not only a law of war but also a universal law of human beings and of nature that the weak defeat the strong. Formulating general principles of dialectics on the basis of particular dialectical elements is an outstanding contribution of the Laozi. The elevation from particular to general involves the application of the category of “class” (类lei), which is here linked with the analysis of contradiction: Thirty spokes are united around the hub to make a wheel, but it is on what is not there that the utility of the carriage depends. Clay is molded to form a utensil, but it is on what is not there that the utility of the utensil depends. Doors and windows are cut out to make a room, but it is on what is not there that the utility of the room depends. Therefore, turn being into advantage, and turn non-being into utility (Laozi 11; trans. Chan 1963, p. 145).

Here, the three instances—making a carriage, making a utensil, and building a house—are cited to analogize and analyze the contradictory relationship between being and non-being: the utility of a wheel depends on the void between spokes; the utility of a utensil on its hollowness; the utility of a room with doors and windows on the empty space. By such analogical reasoning, the Laozi generalizes the principle of the contradictory relationship between “being” and “non-being.” Whether or not “being” can be advantageous to humankind depends on the effect of “non-being.” Thus, the purpose of applying the category of class (类lei) in the Laozi is to bring to light, through analogy and analysis, the contradictions contained within things. This chapter can also be interpreted as an inductive inference, and thus involves an

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application of the category of cause/reason (故gu). While guin the Laozi is shown inlogical expressions such as “therefore” or “for that reason”, it is frequently used in the analysis of contradictions. Such sayings as “therefore turn being into advantage, and turn non-being into utility,” and “therefore being and non-being produce each other; difficult and easy complete each other” (Laozi 2; trans. Chan 1963, p. 140) all illustrate that the internal contradiction within a thing is its cause of motion, while a thing’s motion consists in its two aspects simultaneously contradicting and complementing each other. Other sayings in the Laozi, such as “He does not show himself; therefore he is luminous. He does not justify himself; therefore he becomes prominent” (Laozi 20), are intended to describe the transformation of contradictory arguments in the form suggested by the principle “straight words seem to be their opposites.” Though the book does not examine class (类lei), cause/reason (故gu), principle (理 li), or Dao as logical categories, its use of them has entered into the domain of dialectical thinking. But the exploration of naïve dialectics in the Laozi is left unfinished. Although the book is rightly concerned with the dialectical evolution of thinking from assertion to negation, it fails to progress beyond its observation that a simple and positive assertion (thesis) contains such elements as difference, connection, and transition. It shows no awareness of the fact that a negative proposition (antithesis) still contains an assertion, or the fact that there is a unity in assertion and negation. Consequently, the Laozi is backward-looking. Following the proposition that “the movement of the Dao consists in reversion,” it advances the argument that “the function of the Dao consists in weakness,” suggesting that, once convinced of the principle that “things necessarily reverse themselves when reaching an extreme,” individuals will and should remain compliant and passive in the face of external forces. Moreover, the notion of “government by doing nothing” is a politically dubious one pressed into service later by the Legalists, and one which would come to exert a profoundly negative influence in Chinese history. In summary, the Laozi stresses investigation of the natural “Way of Heaven” and negates the Way of humankind upheld by Confucius and Mozi. It advances the principle of negation in dialectics, establishing its position in the history of Chinese philosophy.

2.4 Sunzi Bingfa (Sunzi’s Art of War) and the Rise of the Legalists The writings of both the “Legalist School” and the “Military Strategist School” are the summation of the political reforms carried out by the rising landlord class during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. (1) Military Dialectics and Sunzi’s Art of War Sunzi’s Art of War (孙子兵法sun zi bing fa), composed in the late Spring and Autumn period, is one of the writings of the Military Strategist school of thought. Its author,

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Sun Wu, a native of the state of Qi, was appointed a general by He Lu, the prince of Wu. Sunzi’s Art of War, the earliest outstanding military science treatise in the world, contains much dialectical thought on military affairs. This military dialectical thought can be seen clearly when the book is compared with the Laozi. Unlike the Laozi, which expresses a negative view of both propriety and law, the Sunzi advocates government by law and opposes government by propriety: “The consummate leader cultivates the Way and strictly adheres to the law, thus he is able to control success” (Sunzi 4). This assumes that it is vital to the success of war to put the legal system into practice in political affairs. Nengwei (能为to be able to do something), emphasized by Sunzi, is obviously different from the wuwei (take no action) advocated by the Laozi. Proceeding from wuwei, the Laozi leads to idealism. By maintaining nengwei, Sunzi demands not only that a commander start from objective reality, but also that he apply the full force of his subjective activity. It holds that in order to vanquish one’s enemy, one should first proceed from reality and should attain a perfect understanding of the objective situation: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete” (Sunzi, Terrain X.31; trans. Giles 2000, p. 45). In addition, Sun Wu regards action ( 为wei) as a process by which humankind creates favorable conditions according to laws. He says: “One may know how to conquer without being able to do it” (Sunzi, Tactical Disposition IV.4; trans. Giles 2000, p. 12). That is, victory can be foreseen, but it cannot be forcibly achieved. This is because the appropriate time for defeating the enemy is not wholly determined by one’s own side; it also depends in part on the enemy, and in particular on whether and when he chooses to expose his vulnerable points. But Sun also says: “Victory can be achieved” (Sunzi, Weak and Strong Points VI.21; trans. Giles 2000, p. 22). By ke wei (可为can be done), he means that a commander should create conditions to impel the enemy to expose his weak points, so that the time for an attack can be decided. For this purpose, the commander must fully exercise his initiative and use his military forces flexibly: “Just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning may be called an inspired commander” (Sunzi VI.32; trans. Giles 2000, p. 23). At that time, the commander’s subjective initiative has reached a superlative condition. Sunzi investigates many contradictions related to warfare, such as those between friend and enemy, subject and object, many and few, strength and weakness, offensive and defensive, advance and retreat, the correct and the perverse, false and true, motion and rest, order and disorder, victory and defeat. Sun thinks that the opposites in each of these contradictions not only depend upon one another for existence, but can also be transformed into one another: “Disorder is derived from order; fear is derived from courage; weakness is derived from strength. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions” (Sunzi, Energy V.18) and “Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off safely” (Sunzi, The Nine Situations XI. 58; trans. Giles 2000, p. 54). Though

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the Laozi also points out many contradictions, as between the strong and the weak, and between the male (active force) and the female (passive force), it still holds that one should maintain a weak or passive position in order to avoid the transformation of a contradiction. Sunzi, however, focuses attention on how to promote the transformation of a contradiction so as to win a war: “At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you” (Sunzi, XI.68; trans. Giles 2000, p. 55). “Exhibiting the coyness of a maiden” may be regarded as a passive or female attitude. The purpose of such an attitude, however, is to confuse the enemy and to prevent it from taking precautions against surprise attacks. Therefore, one is only as “tranquil as a maiden” in order to realize a future transformation to a state of motion as rapid as that of a running hare; its purpose is to win the war, and one is not meant to “keep the female” indefinitely. It is thus evident that Sunzi’sinvestigations into contradiction show an active, enterprising spirit that is different from the passive attitude displayed in the Laozi. As a matter of course, the dialectical thoughts contained in the Laozi are more philosophical, since the author of the book raised military dialectics to general dialectics, while Sunzi’s Art of War confined its discussion of dialectics to the military domain. The latter work, however, contains the philosophical seeds of the unity of naïve materialism with naïve dialectics. This is worthy of admiration. (2) Fan Li, a Pioneer of Legalism Fan Li, who was a native of the state of Chu, was appointed a general in the state of Yue and helped Gou Jian, prince of Yue, to defeat Wu and end its existence. Later, Fan left office to go into business and became enormously wealthy. His ideas are found in a book entitled Sayings of the States (Guo Yu). In the debate over “past and present,” Fan Li maintained the position of the Legalist School. In his view, “one should act on changing conditions” and “times change and one should change with them.” This shows that he tried to conform to the historical trend of his times rather than adhered rigidly to traditional rules that may have been outmoded. As regards the debate over “Heaven and humankind,” some of Fan’s ideas merit special notice. He saw the Way of Heaven as broad, governing both the sun and the moon in their movements. The “Way of Heaven” here refers to the law of natural motion and does not contain any supernatural connotations. Again, he saw Nature as a vast, well-developed, and constantly moving system, but one which lacked a sense of self-satisfaction or self-importance and which did not present itself as a hero. Such an idea is quite similar to those of the Laozi. Like the author of Laozi, Fan held that humans should follow the example of Nature, and he described the category of “following,” or “according to” (因, yin): He who follows the eternal yin-yang (阴阳) and conforms to the always existing Earth and Heaven is soft but unbending, and is strong but not stiff. Of old, those who were the best commanders followed the constant Earth and Heaven and acted in accordance with them. When their troops were behind the enemy lines, they employed the tactics of yin (阴); when their troops were in front of the enemy lines, they employed the tactics of yang (阳). When

References

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their troops were near to the enemy, they employed soft tactics; when distant from the enemy, they employed hard tactics.5

Here following (因, yin) means that one should adopt different tactics, soft or hard, in accordance with the conditions in which one finds oneself. This is different from what the Laozi means by “keeping the soft.” Also, Fan’s following (因, yin) emphasizes the interaction between human activities and natural conditions, which contrasts with the Laozi, which demands that everything should be obedient to Nature. Fan Li says: “Only by integrating human activities with Heaven and Earth can success be achieved.”6 This means that human success requires coordination between the changes in human affairs and the natural conditions. Some of Fan Li’s teachings are further elaborated in the book Guanzi. Fan’s following (因, yin) is very close to “the Way of jing yin” (the principle that correct knowledge should correspond completely with objective reality) advanced by the Guanzi. If the Guanzi’s doctrine of Huang and Lao (黄老之学) provides a philosophical foundation for the Legalist School, then Fan Li is a pioneer of this school.

References Chan, Wing-tsit. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Giles, Lionel. 2000. Sun Tzu on the Art of War. Leicester, England: Allandale Online Publishing. Legge, James. 1871. The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, Part 1. Hongkong: Lane, Crawford & Co. Legge, James. 1891. The Chinese Classics: Part I. Confucius and Part II. Mencius. New York: John B. Alden Publisher. Lenin. 1976. Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic. In Collected Works of Lenin, vol. 38. Marxists Internet Archive. Needham, Joseph. 1991. Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5 6

This passage is from the “Discourse on the State of Yue” from the Sayings of the States. This line is from the “Discourse on the State of Yue” from the Sayings of the States.

Chapter 3

The High Tide of Contention Among the “Hundred Schools of Thought”

During the Warring States period, the political reform movement championed by the rising landlord class progressed vigorously and was finally victorious in the various feudal states. This was strikingly reflected in various theories of the time. The contention among the many schools of thought that had begun in the late Spring and Autumn period reached a high point in the middle and late Warring States period. One of the centers for the contention in those years was in Linzi, the capital of the state of Qi, at a place known as Jixia.

3.1 The Guanzi: The Confluence of Legalism and Doctrines of the Huang–Lao School Among the scholars at Jixia were quite a few who belonged to the Legalist or HuangLao schools of thought. Their writings are partly preserved in the Guanzi, a book that represents a synthesis of Legalism and the teachings of Huang Diand Laozi. Regarding the relationship between past and present, the Guanzi 《管子》 ( ) offers a markedly Legalist viewpoint: “Do not admire the past; do not make a stop in the present. Change yourself as time goes by; conform yourself to customs” (Guanzi, Zheng Shi 47.4). That is to say, one must neither have blind faith in the past nor content oneself to remain at the present level,; instead, one must be prepared to change any and all policies in response to the changing times and customs. As regards the problem of propriety and law, the Guanzi holds that only by “abiding by the law” can the sage-ruler “take his ease while achieving order across the land” (Guanzi, Ren Fa 45.1). It is obvious that this idea is different from that in the Laozi, which advocates casting aside both propriety and law. Nor is it altogether similar to the idea of government by law held by Shang Yang, for the Guanzi, unlike Shang Yang, does not adopt a negative attitude towards propriety and righteousness: “So-called humanity, righteousness, propriety, and music all came from laws. They were used by the early sages to rule over the people” (Guanzi Ren Fa 45.3). All of © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_3

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these were created as tools for ruling over the people and were subordinate to laws. But the Guanzi emphasizes at the same time that laws come from the Dao. “Everything should be observed from the viewpoint of law. Law is enacted according to the standard of weighing advantages and disadvantages. The standard is based on the Dao” (Guanzi, Xin Shu I 36.6). These words show that the Guanzi indeed combines Legalism and the Huang-Lao doctrines. In addition, as a masterwork of economic theory, the Guanzi links the Dao with the developing feudal economy, thus providing a demonstration of the Legalist policy of “fighting for fields and developing agriculture.” This is another aspect of the combination of Legalism and the doctrines of Huang-Lao. (1) Remolding the Laozi through Debates over “Heaven and Humankind” and “Names and Actualities” In the debate over “Heaven and humankind,” the Guanzi’s reinterpretation of the Laozi is chiefly focused on the Laozi’s Dao. The Guanzi agrees with the Laozi that the Dao can be described in terms of non-being and non-action; the Dao (Way) is the all-embracing first principle of all things and de (德) is that which individual objects obtain from the Dao, thus becoming what they are. But the Guanzi reinterprets the Dao materialistically, in contrast to the idealistic conception presented in the Laozi. In the Guanzi, the Dao means qi (matter) and its law of movement. Dao and qi are interchangeable in the Guanzi. For example, there is no essential difference between the Dao and qi in the statements “Qi is what fills the body” (Guanzi, Xin Shu II 37.1) and “now bodily forms are fulfilled by means of the Dao” (Guanzi, Nei Ye 49.2). The Guanzi takes jingqi (subtle and minute substance) as the first principle of all things: “It is always the jing qi (精气) of things that gives them life. Below, it gives life to the five grains; above, it creates the ranked stars. When floating between Heaven and Earth, it is called spirit. When stored in the person’s breast, it is called the sage. For this reason, its name is qi” (Guanzi, Nei Ye 49.1). The view presented here is one on which mutual combinations of the material jingqi produce various things in the universe, including spirits and sages; as such, it is a materialistic view. According to this view, qi is primary while mental phenomena such as thinking and knowing are secondary. The Guanzi holds that the law of nature is associated with material qi: “Having made investigations into the qi of Heaven and Earth, the harmony of cold and heat, the natures of water and soil, and the growth and reproduction of human beings, birds, beasts, plants, trees, and many other things, one can find what is called law ( 则ze) is their general, unchangeable character” (Guanzi, Qi Fa 6.2). That is to say, law is dependent on material qi, and it is stable, unchanging, and present in all things. To succeed, people must abide by the law of nature; otherwise, they will fail: “Those who accord with Heaven will retain their achievements. Those who act contrary to Heaven will embrace misfortune.” (Guanzi, Xing Shi 2.7) This is a materialistic response to the debate over “Heaven and humankind.” What the Guanzi emphasizes, however, is conforming to nature rather than remaking nature. This indicates that the Guanzi still retains vestiges of the idea of “non-action” defended in the Laozi. With respect to the debate over “names and actualities,” the Guanzi also modifies the theory contained in the Laozi. On the one hand, it discards the doctrine of

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the “nameless”; on the other, it introduces the ideas of “tranquil observation” and “washing away confusing ideas and intuiting the profound truth”: “Things have definite forms. Forms have definite names. He who makes names fit actualities is called a sage” (Guanzi, Xin Shu I 36.2). The wisdom of a sage lies in making names conform to objective reality. Such a materialistic view is obviously dissimilar to the doctrine of the nameless in the Laozi. In order to make names fit actualities, the Guanzi demands that one should “cleanse the mansion of his heart, open the doors of his senses, and get rid of selfish ideas and personal considerations. Thus will wisdom come to reside within him” (ibid.). It is easy to see that “opening the doors” is contrary to the idea of “shutting the doors” advocated by the Laozi, which denies the possibility of coming to know the external world through human sense organs. The so-called cleansing of the mansion of the human heart can, however, be traced to the idea of “washing away confusing ideas” originally advanced in the Laozi: “What is to be cleaned is likes and dislikes” (Guanzi Xin Shu I 36.8). While knowing objects, one must avoid one’s own partiality and prejudices. Such a method of thinking is called yin (因, conformity, adaptation) or the way of quiescence and conformity (静因之道, jing yin zhi dao). It is further stated that what is called the way of quiescence and conformity means that one should give up his subjective, preconceived ideas and come to recognize objective things as they really are. That the subject reflects the object is like “the shadow resembling the person, the echo following the sound” (Guanzi, Xin Shu I 36.9). This is a materialist theory of reflection, but a passive, intuitive one, since it stresses the passivity of cognition while overlooking the active human role in the process of cognition. Through reinterpreting the Laozi’sphilosophy, the Guanzi on the whole constructs a system of intuitive materialism, but dialectical thinking is less prominent in the Guanzi than in the Laozi. According to the dialectics of Laozi, “the more laws and orders are made prominent,” “the more thieves and robbers there will be.” The Guanzi holds a different view. What it requires is a sort of dogmatic “Dao” to provide the law with a philosophical foundation. (2) “Dao” as the Philosophical Foundation of “Law” The Guanzi, representing the convergence of Legalism and the doctrines of HuangLao, appeals to the conception of the Way of Heaven, the conception of the way of humankind, and epistemology to support the idea that Dao lies at the foundation of the law. The Guanzi holds that decrees and regulations must be constrained by objective laws: “There is no formulation of decrees and regulations without understanding of laws of nature (则ze)” (Guanzi, Qi Fa 6.3). Thus, it regards the decrees made by the ruling class as the constant Dao, and, in terms of their objectivity, equates them with the laws of nature. One of the constant activities of Heaven is to “cover all things.” Such an activity is kept in order by means of principles; even if it were to come to an end it would still begin all over again. One of the constant activities of the ruler is to shepherd all the people, and such activity is kept in order by means of laws (see Guanzi, Xing Shi Jie 64.3). Such a way of “shepherding the people” is certainly a kind of dogmatism.

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The Guanzi holds that the way of shepherding all the people by means of laws has its foundation in the theory of human nature. It is human nature to avoid disadvantages and seek advantages: “No one does not seek advantages at the sight of them; no one does not avoid disadvantages at the sight of them” (Guanzi, Jin Cang 53.5). Given these natural tendencies, people are likely to find themselves in conflict over limited resources, and so there is a need to use law (法fa) as a standard in order to keep their actions within bounds: “Instruments such as the ruler, line marker, compass, square, scale and dry measure are called law (fa)” (Guanzi, Qi Fa 6.2). The law can be regarded as analogous to such measuring instruments, and can be obeyed by all people because it conforms to human nature. It uses punishments (disadvantages) to discourage and rewards (advantages) to encourage: “Using law to govern people is the same as making pottery in accord with the nature of clay, or smelting according to the nature of metal. As long as where the advantages and disadvantages lie is ascertained, the direction in which the people are going will be clear, as in the case of fire ever keeping away from wetness, or water constantly finding its own level” (Guanzi, Jin Cang 53.8). The law should compel people to submit to control on the basis of their natural tendency to avoid disadvantage and seek advantage. Epistemologically, the Guanzi likens the relationship between the rational and the perceptual to that of the ruler and his subjects: “In the body, the heart holds the position of prince” (Guanzi, Xin Shu I 36.4). The common people are necessarily governed by the ruling class, just as the perceptual is dominated by the rational and the body by the heart (mind). Again, “Just as the heart is in the body, so the prince is in his capital. Under the influence of moral codes, the common people submit themselves to the rule of the prince”. (Guanzi, Jun Chen II 31.9) With such a doctrine, the Guanzi supports the hierarchical structure of the feudal system advocated by the Legalist School; that is, “The superior person supports himself by the Dao; the inferior person supports himself by his own labor” (Guanzi, Jun Chen II 31.10). Taking the Dao as the philosophical foundation of law (fa) has the purpose of providing law with ultimate authority. Thus the Guanzi’s theory of Dao becomes a kind of dogmatism in.

3.2 The Conflict Between Confucian and Legalist Schools and Mencius’ Doctrine of the Goodness of Human Nature The development of the Ru School (儒家Confucianism) initiated by Confucius was mainly carried on after his time by the School of Zisi and Mencius, particularly by Mencius; therefore, the thought of the Ru School has frequently been called the “Way of Confucius and Mencius.” (1) The Conflict between the Confucian and Legalist Schools and the Zisi and Mencius School of Thought

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The Confucian school of thought underwent a division after the death of Confucius. Some Confucians retained the doctrine of returning to the ancients and following the ceremonials of the Zhou dynasty, in opposition to the political reforms launched by the rising landlord class of the early and middle periods of the Warring States. Others, such as Li Kui and Wu Qi, who had been disciples of Confucius’ student Zi Xia, became Legalists. This led to conflict between Confucianism and Legalism, as was made clear in TheBook of Lord Shang (商君书Shang jun shu). Gan Long, Du Zhi, and others opposed the reform of Shang Yang and appealed to the Confucian doctrine of following the ancients and the rites. In reply, Shang Yang said, “Former generations did not follow the same doctrines, as what antiquity should one imitate? The emperors and kings did not copy one another, so what rites should one follow?” (trans. Duyvendak, 2003, p. 172). These words illustrate the conflict between Confucians and Legalists on the issues of “past and present” and “propriety and law.”Among those Confucians who maintained the doctrine of returning to the ancients and following the rites, there were, however, some who accepted the ruling order established by the rising landlord class of their age. These included Zisi and Mencius, who formed the Zisi and Mencius school of thought. Both of them were masters of the Confucian school of the early and middle periods of the Warring States. Zisi (483–402 BCE), whose surname was Kong and personal name Ji, was the grandson of Confucius. His views are largely preserved in a work entitled Zhongyong (中庸The Doctrine of the Mean), which adhered unequivocally to the ideas of returning to the ancients and government by propriety, but held that, for prudential reasons, it was better not to openly adhere to the way of returning to the ancients. It particularly advocated the mean (中庸zhongyong) as the philosophy of life. In Chinese zhong designates that which not excessive, and which neither goes too far nor fails to go far enough. Yong designates that which is ordinary. Zisi held that the superior person should “maintain the mean at all times,” that is, that he should be good at adapting himself to changing conditions and at exemplifying the mean consistently. These admonitions to behave modestly and to content oneself with simple words and deeds were a bit hypocritical, but they were in conformity with the public morals of the rising landlord class. Mencius (c. 372–289 BCE), whose surname was Meng and whose personal name was Ke, was a native of Zou, modern Zouxian in Shandong Province. His teachings are chiefly contained in the eponymous book Mengzi (Mencius). He “always made laudatory reference to the sage-rulers Yao and Shun” (Mencius 3a: 2; trans. Legge 1970, p. 234), advocated “going back to the ancients,” and opposed the Legalist policy of promoting “agriculture and war”; yet, like the Legalists, he was an ideological satellite of the rising landlord class. The conflict between Mencius and the Legalists on the issues of “past and present” and “propriety and law” is one between two different political outlooks within the landlord class. Under the banner of “following the early kings,” Mencius advances the doctrine of benevolent government, the main aim of which is to ensure a constant livelihood (land) to every peasant household in order to support the family and thus provide the feudal rulers with a broad economic base; that is, he advocated support for the small-scale agricultural economy: “The feudal lords have three treasures: land, people, and government” (Mencius 7b: 28;

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trans. Bloom 2009, p. 165). There must first be land and a labor force; when they are combined, political rule is possible. Proceeding from the idea that political rule presupposes labor tied to land, Mencius puts forth his well-known view: “The people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler” (Mencius 7b: 14; trans. Bloom 2009, p. 149). He is less progressive than the Legalists, since his doctrine of benevolent government advocates returning to the ancients, but since he pays great attention to the combination of labor with land he is clearly aware that the small-scale agricultural economy is a prerequisite for the existence of the feudal landlord economy. In Mencius’ time, the debate on “propriety and law” evolved into debates between him and the Legalist School on “governing in a kingly way” and “governing by might” (王霸wang ba) and “righteousness and profit” (义利yi li). Mencius says: “He who, using force, makes a pretense at virtue is a ba (霸). … He who, using virtue, practices humanity is a king” (王, Mencius 2a: 3; trans. Bloom 2009, p. 28). Mencius thinks that there are two ways of unifying the country. One is the way of a king, that is, practicing benevolent government and subduing humankind by virtue. The other is the way of a ba, or feudal hegemony, that is, subduing humankind by force under the guise of humanity and righteousness. The Legalist School emphasizes unifying China through violence: “In general, an intelligent prince relies in his government on force, and not on virtue” (Book of Lord Shang, Establishing Laws 9.4).1 The Legalists assume that the propriety and music advocated by the Confucian school can lead only to a loose and idle life: “Rites and music are symptoms of dissipation and license” (Book of Lord Shang, Discussion about the People 5.1; trans. Duyvendak 2003, p. 206). Only by inflicting punishments can good morals be established among the people: “Virtue has its origin in punishments” (Book of Lord Shang, Discussion about the People 5.5; trans. Duyvendak 2003, p. 210). But Mencius inherited Confucius’ ideas, and opposes utilitarianism. He once said to King Hui of Liang, “What is the point of mentioning the word ‘profit’? All that matters is that there should be humanity and righteousness” (Mencius 1a: 1), showing his belief that humanity, righteousness, and virtue were opposed to utilitarianism. The Legalist School openly advocated what was, in effect, utilitarianism: “One knows ceremonials when his granary is full, knows honor and disgrace when his food and clothing are sufficient” (Guanzi, Mu Min 1.1). This holds that morality comes into being through the development of production. The debates between Mencius and the Legalist School on “governing in a kingly way and governing by might” and on “righteousness and profit” had far-reaching influence on later generations. Judging from the historical conditions of their period, both the views of Mencius and those of the legalists contained something that was true; however, both took their respective kernels of truth and, through exaggeration, turned them into dogmas. Violence and moral education were both indispensable tactics in the struggle of the landlords to keep the peasants under control, and thus Confucianism and Legalism tended to flow together after the Qin and Han dynasties. (2) The Doctrine of the Goodness of Human Nature and Apriorism 1

Translation is adapted from Duyvendak (2003, p. 206).

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The doctrine of the goodness of human nature is the central idea in Mencius’ philosophy. This doctrine further advances Confucius’ doctrine of the unity of humanity and knowledge, which reflects the unity of ethicsand epistemology, and the unity of the way of humankind and the Way of Heaven. Confucius did not talk much about human nature, but in Mencius’ time it became an important topic in the debate over “Heaven and humankind.” The Legalist School believed that human nature consists in a collection of attitudes such as a love of idleness, a hatred of work, and a desire to avoid suffering and pursue happiness; only by means of binding laws and political power can humankind be made “good.” Mencius, in contrast, thinks that humans innately possess the “beginnings of goodness.” He says: The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and yielding is the beginning of propriety. The sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Humans have these four beginnings, just as they have their four limbs. (Mencius 2a: 6)

According to Mencius, it is through expansion and evolution that the four beginnings of goodness, which all humans possess, will become the four morals of humanity, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, all of which are innate. Since everybody had a feeling of commiseration, the previous rulers could carry out a caring government, that is, a benevolent government. Clearly, his doctrine of the goodness of human nature affords philosophical grounds for his political view of benevolent government. The Legalist School maintains that “punishments should recognize no social rank” (Book of Lord Shang, Rewards and Punishments17.4), that everyone is equal before the law, while Mencius thinks that since everybody has the “four beginnings,” everybody can become a Yao or a Shun, that is, everybody is equal before morality. At that time, proposals for “punishments without regard to rank” and for “ethical equality” were of progressive significance since they opposed the system of rank inherent in a hereditary slave society. As a matter of course, Mencius’ doctrine of the goodness of human nature expresses an apriorist idea, because it regards morals as innate and intrinsic. Mencius holds that not only morals but also human knowledge and ability are innate. Such knowledge and ability are called, respectively, liang zhi (良知innate knowledge) and liang neng (良能innate ability).Thus, he stresses the unity of epistemology and ethics from the angle of idealistic apriorism: “The content of humanity is serving one’s parents; the content of righteousness is obedience to one’s elder brothers; the content of wisdom is understanding these two and holding fast to them” (Mencius 4a: 27). What are called “humanity” and “righteousness” are nothing but moral codes embodied in ethical relations, such as the serving of one’s parents and obedience to one’s elder brothers; the role of wisdom is to know these ethical codes and preserve them so as not to lose them. Mencius distinguishes between the perceptual and the rational in human cognitive ability. He calls the perceptual the “small parts of the self,” and the rational the “great parts of the self.” The organs of hearing and sight belong to the former, whereas the heart (mind) belongs to the latter: “The person who follows the parts of himself that are great is a great person, and the person who follows the parts of himself that

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are small is a small person” (Mencius 6a: 15). In Mencius’ opinion, a person should govern the perceptual by the rational, since all his good deeds come out of the natural demands of reason, but many persons fail to know this, so it is necessary to enlighten their rational consciousness by education. Again, Mencius says: “To act without understanding, to do so repeatedly without examination, and to follow that Way all during life without knowing its nature: this is the Way of the multitudes” (Mencius 7a: 5). This is to say, the multitudes always act and yet they do not know why; their actions and habits spontaneously follow the Way of humanity and righteousness and yet they have not any distinct and clear knowledge of it. Without conscious, rational knowledge of morals, Mencius thinks, humans cannot be distinguished from animals. He says: That whereby humans differ from the birds and beasts is but slight. The mass of people cast it away, whereas superior people preserve it. Shun understood the way of things and had a keen insight into human relationships. He followed the path of humanity and righteousness. He did not just put humanity and righteousness into practice. (Mencius 6b: 19)

For Mencius, the difference between humans and beasts lies in the fact that humans are rational beings; however, superior people retain this distinguishing feature while the common people lose it. What the so-called sage (Shun) has done is nothing but to fully apply his reason so that he can have eyes sharp enough to perceive the laws of the multitude of things and the ethical relations that there should be between people, and hence he can “follow the path of humanity and righteousness” consciously, instead of “putting humanity and righteousness into practice” spontaneously. What Mencius emphasizes here is that genuine moral behavior is conscious and associated with rational knowledge; this is a rationalistic view, consistent with that of Confucius. According to this view, virtues can be cultivated through education. What Mencius calls education is no more than the awakening of one’s rational, natural dispositions and the transformation of these dispositions from spontaneous to conscious. The doctrine of the goodness of human nature holds that reason is innate, so Mencius stresses that the process of education is the one through which the lost rational endowments are to be returned; as he says, “The great end of learning is nothing else but to seek for the lost mind” (Mencius 6a: 11). At the same time, this process is also one of moral introspection, that is, of so-called “seeking the cause in oneself instead of in somebody else”. In this way, the inborn nature of humanity and righteousness can be transformed from “in itself” to “for itself.” This is a fundamentally apriorist view of how to cultivate a conscious personality. (3) “Nourishing the Vast, Moving Force” and the Doctrine of the Unity of “Heaven and Humankind” The problem remains of how to cultivate a conscious and free personality by means of education. Like Confucius, Mencius holds that the first step is to set aspirations. Once, Mencius was asked, “What is the business of a scholar?” Mencius replied, “To set his mind on lofty aspirations.” When Mencius was asked, “What do you mean by this?”, his answer was, “Setting it simply on humanity and righteousness” (see Mencius 7a:

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33). That is to say, being a scholar, one has to be determined to become a person who will put humanity and righteousness into practice on a rational and conscious basis; without such determination, one will be a person who has no respect for oneself and gives oneself up as hopeless. Again, Mencius says: It is not worth the trouble to talk to one who does violence to himself, and it is not worth the trouble to make a common effort with one who gives himself up as hopeless. To disown propriety and righteousness in one’s conversation is what we mean by doing violence to oneself; to say ‘I do not think I am capable of abiding by humanity or following the path of righteousness’ is what we mean by giving oneself up as hopeless (Mencius 4a: 10).

In Mencius’ opinion, slandering propriety and righteousness in one’s utterances is “doing violence to oneself”; professing oneself to be unable to become a person of humanity and righteousness is “giving oneself up as hopeless.” No word can be said to advise such a person, and no actions can be taken to lead such a person. Mencius believes that the course of life can be chosen by oneself. Active choice is a feature of volition. Mencius’ saying, “At forty I attained to an unperturbed mind” (Mencius 2a: 2) is the same as Confucius’ saying, “At forty I had no more perplexities.” The reason Mencius could attain an unperturbed mind was that he was “good at nourishing the vast, moving force (noble spirit)” (Mencius 2a: 2): Such is the force (qi); it is most great and most strong. Being nourished by uprightness and sustaining no injury; it fills up all between Heaven and Earth. Such is the force; it is the correlate of righteousness and morality. Without it, humankind is in a state of feebleness. (Mencius 2a: 2)

What he calls qi is similar to the qi incorporated in the modern Chinese term for “courage” (勇气yong qi), as well as the phrase “with justice on one’s side one is bold and assured” (理直气壮li zhi qi zhuang). It refers to a spiritual force embodied in human physical activities or practical actions. This spiritual force is, on the one hand, formed by way of rational knowledge of morality and righteousness; it will become feeble when one’s conduct is not correct and one realizes that justice is not on one’s side. On the other hand, it depends on sustained self-cultivation and training, that is, “being nourished by uprightness and sustaining no injury.” It can be seen that what Mencius calls “nourishing the force” also includes the building up of will power. Mencius also discusses the relationship between will (志zhi) and qi. He demands that one should “firmly maintain one’s zhi and do no violence to one’s qi” (Mencius 2a: 2). One should not only take hold of one’s own aspiration to practice morality but should also take care not dampen one’s own courage. In short, through discussing the relationship between rational knowledge and self-cultivation, as well as that between will and courage, Mencius admonishes people to deepen their understanding constantly and to pay attention to self-cultivation in order to train strong wills and strengthen their spiritual power. The theory of “nourishing the vast, moving force” (养浩然之气yang hao ren zhi qi) recognizes the function of will. Mencius holds that, in order to become perfect, people must steadfastly apply their wills in order to overcome difficulties and train themselves under difficult conditions that will “test their resolution, exhaust their

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bodies, make them suffer starvation, subject them to extreme poverty and frustrate their efforts” (Mencius 6b: 15). However, Mencius wants scholars to “set their minds on morality” and “set their minds on humanity,” holding that the human will should submit to its own reason. He says that the vast, moving force is “produced by the accumulation of righteous deeds”; thus people should constantly deepen their understanding and heighten their awareness just as the flowing water from an ample source, which is such that it does not go further forward until it has filled all the hollows. Mencius believes that, so long as one puts humanity and righteousness into practice in an increasingly conscious fashion under the guidance of reason, and so long as one relentlessly trains one’s will, one can be cultivated into “a great person”—“neither riches nor honors can tempt such a person, neither poverty nor a low social position can change his noble mind, neither threat nor force can bend his will” (Mencius 3b: 2); such a person can even sacrifice his life for a just cause consciously as well as voluntarily, if needed. Mencius’ praise for the consciousness of reason and the firmness of will has played an important role in encouraging the development and flourishing of our nation. However, Mencius drastically overestimates the power of the spiritual “moving force”, holding that, once it “fills up all between Heaven and Earth,” one can attain a state in which one’s influence “flows abroad above and below together with Heaven and Earth” (Mencius 7a: 13). He says: “Those who have exercised their minds to the utmost know their nature. Knowing their nature, they know Heaven. To keep one’s mind preserved and nourish one’s nature is the way to serve Heaven” (Mencius 7a: 1). If people can fully develop and exercise their reason, they can know their intrinsic nature, thus knowing the Way of Heaven. In addition, they should pay attention to self-cultivation, keep their true minds preserved so as not to be lost, and maintain their self-control and good nature uninjured—these are the ways to serve Heaven. Obviously, this is the mystical and subjective-idealistic doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humankind. Proceeding from it, Mencius, as Confucius did, degenerates into the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. He says: “That which is done without human doing is from [the work of] Heaven. That which happens without humankind’s causing it to happen is from Fate” (Mencius 5a: 6). Here, “the Mandate of Heaven” denotes something that is beyond the scope of human power and that cannot be brought about by humankind. Mencius, however, distinguishes between xing (性human nature) and ming (命fate). He thinks that human nature encompasses humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, which superior people do not describe as “fate” but which they instead strive to pursue by means of learning and self-cultivation. As he says: “Whether the sage is suitable to the Way of Heaven is a matter of Fate, but therein also lies human nature. That is why the superior person does not describe it as the appointment of Fate” (Mencius 7b: 24). In this connection, obviously, the philosophy of Mencius is more active and enterprising in spirit than that of Confucius, who attributes the prosperity of the Way to Fate. (4) Investigations on the Concept of “Nature” (Essence) Through his doctrine of the goodness of human nature (性善xing shan), Mencius makes a more complete investigation into the function of reason, especially with

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respect to the category of nature (性xing). “Nature,” a logical category put forward by Mencius’ predecessors, corresponds on the whole to “essence,” though Mencius’ centers more specifically on “human nature.” Mencius once debated with Gaozi on the topic of what “nature” was. Mencius held that what was called human “nature” was the common human essence that differentiated humans from animals. Gaozi says: “That which at birth is so is what is called nature,” believing that nature consisted in humankind’s innate instincts, such as appetites for food, sex, and so on—which are shared by both humans and animals. Mencius asked Gaozi, “Didn’t you mean that the nature of the dog was like that of an ox and the nature of an ox was like that of a person when you said that that which at birth is so is what is called nature?” (Mencius 6a: 3). In Mencius’ opinion, humans, dogs, and oxen all possess natures which are distinctive to their respective categories. Discussing human “nature” requires an understanding of the common essence of human beings, so as to differentiate humans from animals. Mencius claims that the essential difference lies in the fact that humans possess reason. From this, it can be seen that he also understands “nature” as the essence of a kind of thing: “Thus all things that are the same in kind resemble one another” (Mencius 6a: 7). He insists that we must understand a being’s “nature” as the essence of those things which belong to the same kind as that being. Proceeding from this, however, he thinks that the sage is a human being and can “follow the path of humanity and righteousness”; therefore, all humans possess rational natural endowments, namely humanity and righteousness. This leads to idealism. Mencius moreover applies the logical category of cause/reason(故gu) to the examination of “nature.” He says: “All who speak about the natures of things have in fact only their causes to reason from, and the value of a cause is in its being natural” (Mencius 4b: 26). Thus Mencius holds that the purpose of talking about the natures of things is to understand the grounds for their changes and developments, so that people’s actions may be guided appropriately in response to the circumstances. Mencius compared the relationship between humanity and righteousness to that between the willow tree and the cups and bowls fashioned from its wood when he argued with Gaozi, who held that Mencius’ fashioning humanity and righteousness out of human nature was just like making cups and bowls from willow trees. He meant that Mencius regarded raw materials and finished products as the same. Mencius replied, “Can you make cups and bowls by following the nature of the willow? Or must you mutilate the willow before you can make cups and bowls with it?” (Mencius 6a: 1). In his opinion, only by following the willow’s nature can the willow be made into cups and bowls; likewise, only by following human nature can humankind reach the state of humanity and righteousness. Human nature is fundamentally good; starting from this, therefore, humankind may become good. But if one does violence to oneself, gives oneself up as hopeless and does not subjectively cultivate and train oneself, one may lose one’s own nature. By the doctrine of the goodness of human nature, Mencius intends to give reasons for goodness, and to show that humans can be good if they follow the natural direction of human nature; he means to encourage people to apply the full force of their subjective activity, so as to transform possibility into actuality. On the one hand, this idea plays a role in

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encouraging people to make progress, but on the other hand, it is a logical error for Mencius to infer that human nature is originally good from the premise that humankind may become good. For Mencius, human nature has a directional development; for possibility to be transformed into actuality requires a developmental process which conforms to laws. Comparing human nature to swirling water, Gaozi says: “Human nature does not show any preference for either good or evil, just as water does not show any preference for either east or west.” Mencius retorts, “There is no human who is not good; there is no water that does not flow downwards.” Humankind’s inclination to good is a necessary self-movement, just as water necessarily flows downwards. If water goes over one’s forehead or stays on a hill instead of flowing downwards, “it is the external forces applied that cause it,” not the nature of water. Similarly, when people are made to do what is not good, their nature is not different from that of water in this respect; that is, they do what is not of their nature (see Mencius 6a: 2). Mencius holds that all people are endowed by nature with goodness and love, principle and righteousness, though many people exercise these in a spontaneous rather than conscious fashion. It is reasonable that Mencius distinguishes spontaneous moral behavior (that is, putting humanity and righteousness into practice) from conscious behavior (that is, following the path of humanity and righteousness), and stresses that humans should act in accordance with laws (principles) and social norms (righteousness). But what he calls consciousness is simply the awakening of innate principles and righteousness. This leads to idealism. Mencius carries his research on human nature further by applying the logical categories of “class”, “cause/reason”, and “principle” to the exposition of “nature.” He investigates several problems, such as those of the essence that differentiates humans from animals, the reason why human nature is good, and the process through which humans develop from spontaneity to consciousness. As a matter of course, his demonstration of his ideas such as “knowing the class”, “seeking the cause/reason”, “understanding the principle”, and so on, is to some extent, problematic. To sum up, Mencius’ doctrine of the goodness of human nature adds its contributions to the sum of Chinese philosophy, since the doctrine lays stress on comprehending with reason the essence of a thing and the cause for its being so, and also consciously cultivating human virtues. On the other hand, because of his absolutizing reasoning he constructs a kind of a priori system that is more distinctive and systematic than that of Confucius.

3.3 Zhuangzi: “Where All Things Are Equal, How Can One Be Long and Another Short?”—Relativism Against Dogmatism After the age of Laozi, the Daoist School was divided into two groups. Part of the school evolved into the School of Huang-Lao and integrated with the Legalist School

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to serve the rising landlord class. Other members continued to be “recluses” and adopted an uncooperative attitude towards the feudal rulers. Yang Zhu and Zhuangzi were two typical figures in the latter group. Zhuangzi (c. 369–286 BCE), or Zhuang Zhou, was a native of Meng (present-day Shangqiu County, Henan), which was then a part of the state of Song. His philosophical thought is recorded primarily in a book entitled Zhuangzi. In the debate concerning “past and present,” Zhuangzi maintains an attitude of pessimism towards actual politics, and as a result he pushes to an extreme the idea of “government by doing nothing that goes against nature” advocated by the Laozi, even opposing the Laozi’s ideal society of “a small country with few people.” Zhuangzi says: “In the age of perfect virtue, people dwelt together with birds and beasts, and the human race was one with all things. How could there be knowledge of the distinctions of superior and inferior persons?” (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: Horses Hoofs 9).2 In his opinion, it was civilization itself that led to the antagonism between superior and inferior people, and hence disaster after disaster; thus he advocated a return to a primitive society in which people lived together with birds and beasts. In the debate concerning “propriety and law,” he attacks both the Confucian teachings of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and music and the Legalist advocacy of violence. For example, on the basis of the idea of “abandoning sageliness and discarding wisdom”, which is described in the Laozi, Zhuangzi further points out that, “if an end is put to sageliness and wisdom is put away, the great robbers will cease to arise” (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: Cutting Open Satchels10). Again, he regards those who use violence to seize state power as “those who steal a state” (Zhuangzi, Cutting Open Satchels10). Zhuangzi’s fierce criticism of feudal rulers inspired reformers and revolutionaries in later generations, and its historical influence has been positive. After recording his complaints, however, Zhuangzi himself became an itinerant recluse. Zhuangzi was also a poet and a fine writer. We should take note of this when studying his philosophy. He established a relativistic philosophical system. (1) A Pantheistic Conception of the Way of Heaven Like the Laozi, Zhuangzi takes “Dao” as the supreme principle of the world: “Light came from darkness, order from the formless, the spiritual from the Dao, and the bodily from the seminal essence. Thus all the myriad things produced one another after their kind” (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: Knowledge Rambling in the North 22). On his view, tangible and concrete things are produced from formless spirit, and particular spirit from absolute spirit, Dao. This is an idealistic view. In contrast to the Laozi, however, Zhuangzi’s concept of the Way of Heaven has a pantheistic color. Zhuangzi assumes that the Dao is the immanent cause of all things, rather than the Creator outside all the myriad things. This dialogue is recorded in Chapter Knowledge Rambling in the North 22.6 of Zhuangzi: Dongguozi asked Zhuangzi, “Where is the so-called Dao?” Zhuangzi answered, “There is nowhere it is not.” 2

Translation in this section has consulted Legge (1891).

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The other said, “Specify an instance of it.” Zhuangzi said, “It is here in the ant.” Dongguo replied, “That must be its lowest manifestation.” Zhuangzi said, “No, it is in the panic grass.” The other said, “What about a lower example?” Zhuangzi said, “It is in the earthenware tile.” “Surely brick and tile must be its lowest place?” “No, it is in the excrement.” To this Dongguo made no reply. Zhuangzi finally said, “There are three terms: Completeness, All-embracingness and the Whole. These three names differ, but denote the same reality; all refer to the one thing.” He describes the Dao’s ubiquity by the terms “Completeness,” “Allembracingness,” and “the Whole,” which is obviously different from the Laozi’s description of the Dao as the one merged into by “the Invisible,” “the Inaudible,” and “the Subtle (formless).” What Zhuangzi emphasizes here is that the Dao as the principle of the unity of the world lies within things themselves, while the Laozi stresses that the Dao as the principle of the unity of the world cannot be touched by sense organs. In Zhuangzi’s opinion, since the Dao is ubiquitous there should then be no boundary between the Dao and things: “That which makes things what they are has not the limit which belongs to things” (Zhuangzi, Knowledge Rambling in the North 22.6). Proceeding from this, Zhuangzi combats the two mutually opposite doctrines concerning the relationship between Dao and wu (things, 物): the doctrine of huoshi (或使) and the doctrine of mowei (莫为). Huoshi means that there is a substance that transcends the myriads of things and is the “governor” of their becoming and their changes. To Zhuangzi, the myriads of things are always changing, “but we do not know what it is that makes them do so. It might seem as if there were a real governor, but we find no sign of his being” (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Adjustment of Controversies 2.3). Zhuangzi denies the existence of any sign of “a real governor,” as well as the existence of a “Creator.” This shows that Zhuangzi holds an atheistic view. Mowei means that any changes of Heaven, Earth, and the myriads of things are natural and spontaneous, and are not caused by the so-called governor. Zhuangzi criticizes the doctrine of mowei advocated by Ji Zhen because, in regarding the Dao as “having no name and no real being, and being vacancy and no thing,” it seems to entail that Dao is diametrically opposed to things, and that similar diametric oppositions exist between vacancy and actuality and between having no name and having a name. He stresses that the universe is infinite: “When I look for the origin of things, it goes back into infinity; when I look for their end, it proceeds without termination” (Zhuangzi, Miscellaneous Chapters: Ze-yang 25.12). Since the universe is infinite and unceasing, Dao, when it is regarded as non-being, must be the principle within things. Zhuangzi holds that the common error of the doctrines of huoshi and mowei lies in that both of them fail to recognize this point. He says: To regard it as in the category of things is the origin of the language that it is caused, or that it is the result of doing nothing; but it would end as it began with things. […] To say that it

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causes or does nothing is but to speak of one phase of things, and has nothing to do with the Great Subject (Dao). (Zhuangzi, Ze-yang 25.12)

Both doctrines seek the origin of things, but they take the origin as the opposite of the Dao, holding that between the Dao and things there is a gap and a relation of beginning and end. According to Zhuangzi, therefore, these two doctrines take a one-sided approach to the infinite “great Dao” and fail to know it. As already mentioned, Zhuangzi believes that the Dao is ubiquitous and that there is no lucuna between it and things; meanwhile, he points out that the Way of Heaven and the universe is infinite, absolute, and unconditioned. All these reflect his pantheistic conception of the Way of Heaven; however, this conception of his is not yet divorced from his relativistic philosophy, for it overemphasizes the fact that movement and change are absolute. As he says: “The existence of things is like a galloping horse. There is no movement through which they do not become modified, no time when they are not changed” (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: The Floods of Autumn 17.6). Things move and change incessantly, vanish into thin air in the twinkling of an eye, and never remain in their same states. Though Zhuangzi sees the absoluteness of movement, he overemphasizes this point and consequently denies the qualitative determination of a thing. Again he says: They examine with discrimination the cases of fullness and want, not overjoyed by success, nor disheartened by failure, knowing the inconstancy of the human lot. They know the plain path in which things proceed, therefore they are not overjoyed to live nor count it a calamity to die, knowing that the end and the beginning of things never occur twice in the same way. (Zhuangzi, The Floods of Autumn 17.3)

If one comes to know that movement is absolute, one can consider the success and failure of the human lot like the change of fullness and want of the moon, and the lives and deaths of people and of things as proceeding in the same plain and quiet path that changes with each passing day. Consequently, success and failure, along with life and death, lose their qualitative differences, and there is neither joy nor misery. It is clear that Zhuangzi’s conception of the Way of Heaven is ultimately characterized by relativism. (2) The Natural and Spontaneous in Opposition to the Artificial Zhuangzi takes a relativistic view of life, and he thinks that since humankind is merely one of the myriad things, it is not necessary to give special attention to human dignity. He denies, more thoroughly than the Laozi, the principle of the way of humankind which is advocated by Confucianism and Mohism. In Zhuangzi’s opinion, everything that is natural is good, while that which is “artificial” is not: That oxen and horses should have four feet is what is of tian [Nature, 天]. That a halter should be put on a horse’s head, or a string through an ox’s nose, is what is [the doing] of humankind. So I say, do not let what is of humankind obliterate what is of tian [Nature]; do not let what is purposeful obliterate Fate; do not sacrifice your own nature for your fame. (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: The Floods of Autumn 17.7)

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What is called “of tian” here is that which exists originally and naturally, such as the four hooves of an ox or a horse. What is called “of humankind” here is that which is imposed purposefully upon nature through human actions, such as the halter on a horse or the piercing in the nose of an ox. What Zhuangzi emphasizes here is that we must not inflict damage on Nature by our actions, that we must not resist natural fate through purposeful activities, and that we must not sacrifice our natural instincts for personal fame and social status. Starting from the view that the natural and the artificial are mutually exclusive and opposed to one another, Zhuangzi thinks that humanity, justice, and virtue, as purposefully practiced by humans, have served to destroy humankind’s innate nature: “The presumption is that humanity and righteousness are not constituents of human nature” (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: Webbed Toes 8.1). This is just the contrary of Mencius’ view that humanity and righteousness come from humankind’s innate nature. In addition, Zhuangzi says that according to a prevalent view, one who makes a sacrifice for the sake of humanity and righteousness is “a superior person,” and one who makes sacrifice for the sake of goods and riches is “an inferior person”. In actuality, Zhuangzi says, both “humanity and righteousness” and “goods and riches” result from man’s purposeful activities, and therefore both the superior and the inferior person, though with different occupations and reputations, “equally destroy their lives and do injury to their natures” (Zhuangzi, Webbed Toes 8.3). Since artificiality can only destroy men’s innate natures, it is necessary for Zhuangzi to completely deny the principle of humanity. The state that he wants to reach is that in which “one has the shape of a person, but not the passions and desires of a person” (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Seal of Virtue Complete 5.5). Such a complete denial of the principle of humanity is in itself a kind of conception of the way of humankind as well. This conception takes Nature as its principle, and holds that true freedom (“complacency,” “seeking one’s own pleasure”) lies in letting people run their natural course (follow innate nature), and that a person who possesses an ideal personality is a “perfect person” who unreservedly identifies him- or herself with Nature. Zhuangzi considers that nothing in the real world has freedom, because everything that exists remains dependent on something else. This is what he called youdai (有 待), dependent on some conditions for existence. In his Chap. 1 “Enjoyment in Untroubled Ease,” Zhuangzi says that although some beings may appear to be free and unrestrained–such as the Peng bird which ascends on a whirlwind to a height of ninety thousand li, or Liezi, who rides the wind where he pleases—they are all dependent on something external for their apparent freedom. The bird depends on its great wings, for instance, and Liezi depends on the wind; therefore, neither should be considered truly free. According to Zhuangzi’s ideal, only those perfect people who are not dependent on anything can possess absolute freedom: Suppose there is one who rides upon the normality of the universe and drives before him the changes of the six energies [of the seasons] as his team, roaming thus through the realm of the inexhaustible: on what would he need to depend? Therefore it is said that the Perfect One has no self; the Spiritual One has no achievement; the Sage has no name. (Zhuangzi, Enjoyment in Untroubled Ease 1.3)

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One whose excursions into the infinite are unrestrained—one who follows the natural currents of the universe, carried along by the six energies—is a “Perfect One” (or “Spiritual One,” or “Sage”) who depends on nothing. Such a person is selfless, and pursues neither achievements nor fame. When uniting to become one with the Way of Heaven, the Perfect One can become absolutely free and independent of any conditions, thus reaching the state in which “Heaven and Earth come into being together with me, and with me, all things are one” (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Adjustment of Controversies 2.9). In such a state, the Perfect One will think nothing of life or death, high rank or low rank, richness or poverty, praise or blame, and can accept any of these calmly. This is, of course, a realm of mysticism. The final outcome of such enjoyment of ease, untroubled by life and death or gains and losses, is a fatalism that requires humans to submit entirely to Nature, to rejoice in Heaven, and to content themselves with Fate. Zhuangzi says: When we have got what we are to do, there is the time of life in which to do it; when we lose that at death, submission is what is required. When we rest in what the time requires, and manifest that submission, neither joy nor sorrow can find entrance to the mind. This would be what the ancients called “loosening the cord by which the life is suspended.”(Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Great and Most Honoured Master 6.4)

On his view, if one is resigned to destiny, one will not be disturbed by joy or sorrow. This is called “loosening the cord” (extricating oneself). To proclaim that freedom can be acquired through such means is highly deceptive. Zhuangzi’s doctrine of freedom does contain some reasonable elements. Humankind is indeed a product of nature; people must develop themselves through the interaction between themselves and Nature; they will be free only when they and Nature combine into one, that is, when they act in accord with natural laws. Therefore, Zhuangzi is justified in requiring humankind to “allow all things to take their natural course, and to admit no personal or selfish consideration” (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Normal Course for Rulers and Kings 7.3). (3) Relativism in the Debate over “Names and Actualities” Zhuangzi gives a relativistic and skeptical answer to the epistemological question of whether names and concepts can reflect the objective world or not. Relativism is typically presented in the history of philosophy as the opposite of dogmatism. Among such philosophers as Confucius, Mozi, Guanzi, Shang Yang, and Mencius, who were all either earlier than or contemporary with Zhuangzi, there were some who showed an empiricist-dogmatic tendency and some who showed a rationalistic-dogmatic tendency. Mozi, for example, held that only perceptual experience was reliable. He said that we were obliged to believe in the existence of that which some people had heard or seen, and to disbelieve in the existence of that which no one had heard nor seen. In contrast to Mozi, Mencius had a great deal of faith in conceptual thinking and believed that humans could use their innate faculties to judge what was right and what was wrong. He said: “The feeling of right and wrong belongs to all people.” Zhuangzi, however, is opposed to both forms of dogmatism. He says:

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3 The High Tide of Contention Among the “Hundred Schools of Thought” People eat flesh; deer feed on grass. Centipedes enjoy snakes; owls and crows delight in mice. Of these four who knows the right taste? [...] Mao Qiang and Li Ji were considered by men as the most beautiful of women, but at the sight of them fish dived deep in the water, birds soared high in the air, and deer hurried away. Of these four, who knows the right standard of beauty? (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Adjustment of Controversies 2.10)

According to Zhuangzi, both the standards of taste and the standards of beauty are dependent on the perceptual experience of the cognitive subject. But since this experience varies from subject to subject, it follows that there are no objective criteria for right and wrong. Perceptual experience is relative, and so is conceptual thinking. Zhuangzi says: “The principles of humanity and righteousness, the paths of ‘that’s it’ and ‘that’s not,’ are inextricably confusing; how could I know how to discriminate between them?” (Zhuangzi, The Adjustment of Controversies 2.11). Humankind is unable to draw a clear line of demarcation between good and evil or between right and wrong. This is because there is no objective standard for judging truth. Again, Zhuangzi says: Suppose that you argue with me […]. Is one of us right and the other wrong? Or are both of us right and both of us wrong? Both of us cannot come to a mutual and common understanding, and others are all in the dark. Whom shall I ask to settle this dispute? I may ask someone who agrees with you; but since he agrees with you, how can he settle it? I may ask someone who agrees with me; but since he agrees with me, how can he settle it? I may ask someone who differs with both of us; but since he differs with both of us, how can he settle it? I may ask someone who agrees with both of us; but since he agrees with both of us, how can he settle it? In this way, you and I and others would all be unable to come to a mutual and common understanding. (Zhuangzi, The Adjustment of Controversies 2.12)

That is to say, neither side in a debate, nor a third person, can judge which side is right and which is wrong. Here, the theory of relativism is used by Zhuangzi in a demonstration of the unreliability of sensation and reason, and leads to the erroneous conclusion that the world is unknowable. Nevertheless, Zhuangzi’s questions concerning the perceptual and the rational have sparked interest in important epistemological problems, such as those of whether objective reality can be given in sensation, and whether human thinking (which includes argument and demonstration) can arrive at scientific truths. This represents Zhuangzi’s contribution to epistemology. Zhuangzi’s treatment of the various schools of thought and their exponents presupposes that there is no right and no wrong. He argues that all of the controversies which occupy them originated from the point of view of things, which explains why each school held its own doctrines to be valuable and the doctrines of other schools to be worthless (see Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: The Floods of Autumn 17). He means that each school, constrained by existing conditions, considers itself always to be right, taking its own doctrine as ultimate truth and regarding all other doctrines as wrong. In his opinion, “From the standpoint of the Dao, there is nothing that is valuable or worthless” (Zhuangzi, The Floods of Autumn 17.5). From the point of view of the Dao, there is no distinction between right and wrong among the various schools of thought. Again he says: “The ‘this’ has one standard of right and wrong, and the ‘that’ has another standard of right and wrong” (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters:

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The Adjustment of Controversies2.5). Zhuangzi obviously adopts an indiscriminate and conciliatory attitude towards the various schools of thought and their exponents. In his own words, “The sage harmonizes the right and wrong and rests in natural equalization” (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Adjustment of Controversies 2.6), and “He does not condemn the right and wrong of others, so that he may live in peace with the prevalent views” (Zhuangzi, Miscellaneous Chapters: Tian Xia 33.6)). This claim—that there is no right and no wrong—is incorrect, but, on the other hand, it shows a tolerant attitude towards the various schools of thought. Proceeding from this idea, Zhuangzi opposes Mencius’ rebuke of Yang Zhu and Mozi as persons who denied the special relationship with the ruler or with the father, and he opposes the dogmatism and absolutism advocated by Shang Yang, who put forward the slogan of “one doctrine” and tried to prohibit all other doctrines by administrative measures. Zhuangzi says: “Each school had its peculiar excellence, and there was a time for the use of it, but nevertheless no one covered or extended across the whole [range of truth]” (Zhuangzi, Miscellaneous Chapters: Tian Xia 33.1). Although each exponent of the various schools of thought is merely a “scholar of limited views” who possesses only one-sided truth and whose views cannot be assessed as either true or false, he should not be treated with a dogmatic attitude, and his doctrine should not be totally and indiscriminately prohibited. In his Chapter 33 “Tian Xia”, Zhuangzi assumes an attitude which is both critical and affirmative towards the doctrines of various schools. This kind of tolerant attitude is consonant with dialectical thinking. Zhuangzi holds that all differences between right and wrong are produced from chengxin (成心subjective feelings or wishes): “To have opinions as to right or wrong before the subjective feelings are produced in the mind is as mistaken as to say that one goes to the state of Yue today and arrives there yesterday” (Zhuangzi, The Adjustment of Controversies 2.4). That is to say, without subjective feelings or wishes it is impossible to have opinions as to right or wrong. This idea is obviously incorrect, because in reality there are rights and wrongs whose status as such is determined by objective standards rather than subjective feelings. By this statement, however, Zhuangzi describes the requirement to overcome subjective one-sidedness; that is, he opposes the dogmatic principle according to which “we are to follow what is formed in our mind as a guide” (Zhuangzi, The Adjustment of Controversies 2.4). He points out that the factors which cause philosophers to adopt such dogmatic, subjective, and one-sided views can be identified: A frog in a well cannot discuss the sea; he is confined to the limits of the well-shaft. A summer insect cannot have a conversation about ice; it knows nothing beyond its own season. A scholar of limited views cannot engage in conversation about the Dao; he is bound by a teaching. (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: The Floods of Autumn 17.2)

Like a frog in a well or a summer insect, the exponents of various schools are conditioned by location and time, and are bound by the educations that they have received, thus becoming “scholars of limited views.” Zhuangzi’s words contain a reasonable element, that is, that one must break with one-sidedness and grasp comprehensive truth (the “great Dao,” in Zhuangzi’s terms).

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The problem of the relationship between names and actualities is also a problem of logic. Armed with relativism, Zhuangzi makes three claims concerning whether yan (speech) and yi (thought, logical thinking) can grasp the Dao (the law of development of the universe). The first claim is that abstract concepts and speech cannot grasp concrete things. He says: “In reality, the Dao has no limitation, and speech has no eternity” (Zhuangzi, The Adjustment of Controversies 2.10). The Dao cannot be separated, whereas human speech and concepts are always abstract and comprehend a concrete thing through separation. Once the separation is made there are limitations, and the thing will no longer be a whole. Therefore abstract concepts cannot grasp the Dao. The second claim is that concepts are static and cannot express movement: “For speech is not merely the blowing of wind. The speaker has something to say, but what he says is not final” (Zhuangzi, The Adjustment of Controversies2.4) and, again, “Knowledge depends on something in order to be correct, but what it depends on is uncertain and changeable” (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Great and Most Honoured Master 6.1). Insofar as it differs from the blowing of the wind, “speech” must aim at some objects, that is, it must “depend on something.” Human knowledge is correct only when it conforms to objects, but these objects are uncertain and may undergo a myriad of changes in the twinkling of an eye. The changes of things are absolute, while the fact that concepts reflect things demands a corresponding and relatively static relation between the two. Therefore, Zhuangzi comes to the conclusion that the moving and changing Dao is incapable of being comprehended by concepts. The third claim is that limited concepts cannot convey infinity. He says: The subtle and the gross both presuppose that they have a bodily form. Where there is no bodily form there is no longer a possibility of numerical division; where it is not possible to encompass a mass there is no longer a possibility of numerical estimate. What can be discoursed about in words is the grossness of things; what can be reached in idea is the subtlety of things. (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: The Floods of Autumn 17.4)

Here, he means that, though words can convey the grossness of things, and ideas can convey the subtlety of things, both of them are confined to things that have physical form, whereas the Dao is formless and infinite. It cannot be calculated and encompassed with numbers. Therefore, the Dao cannot be grasped by speech or thought. Zhuangzi’s three claims provide a negative answer to the question of whether speech and concepts can express the Dao; consequently the claims lead to agnosticism, and thus lead down an incorrect path. However, Zhuangzi’s debunking of the contradictions in logical thinking—such as the abstract and the concrete, the static and the dynamic, and the finite and the infinite—helps to deepen our understanding. (4) A Nascent Theory of the Artistic Sphere Zhuangzi is a poet, and he excels in expressing his philosophy through poetry. For him, philosophy itself is poetry and Nature itself is beauty (美mei): “The operations of Heaven and Earth proceed in the most beautiful way, but they do not talk about them” (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: Knowledge Rambling in the North 22.2). Zhuangzi thinks that it is impossible to adequately describe the great beauty of the universe,

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either through speech or knowledge, but also thinks that poems, allegories, and fables can evocatively suggest this beauty. In his anecdote about Cook Ding’s cutting up an ox, for example, Zhuangzi describes Ding’s every bodily movement in picturesque, poetic language: Every blow of his hand, every heave of his shoulder, every tread of his foot, every thrust of his knee, every sound of the rending flesh, and every note of the movement of the chopper was in perfect harmony—rhythmical like Mulberry Grove dance, harmonizing with the Jingshou music. (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: Nourishing the Lord of Life 3.2)

The cook is so knowledgeable in the anatomy of an ox that his each and every movement is in complete accord with the rhythm of the famous dance and music, and his labor has become a kind of art. Through long practice, he is perfectly aware of the physiological structure of an ox, so that his chopper can “follow the natural structure” and “take advantage of what is already there,” because “there is more than enough room for inserting [the knife] into the interstices.” Two points related to this story merit attention. First, the philosophical idea that human freedom lies in the identity of subjective mind and natural laws is embodied in a concrete, vivid artistic image, and thus a poetic artistic sphere is formed. Second, so far as the story of Ding is concerned, Zhuangzi does not deny artificiality completely. What is required of humankind is to return to nature from artificiality and, proceeding from skill, to advance into the Dao. Only when reaching the state in which one “works with one’s mind and not one’s eyes” (Zhuangzi, Nourishing the Lord of Life 3.2) after long practice can one form a single body with Nature and gain one’s freedom. The term “freedom” here refers to the freedom of aesthetic activity rather than moral freedom. These two ideas can also be found in other parables from the Zhuangzi, such as the stories of Wheelwright Pian (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: The Way of Heaven 13.9), cabinetmaker Qing (The Full Understanding of Life 19.11), and the hunchback who catches cicadas (Zhuangzi, Outer Chapters: The Full Understanding of Life 19.3). These are all meant to convey the thought that when a worker’s skills reach a sufficient level, then his labor will become completely free and he will able to derive considerable aesthetic enjoyment from it. This freedom is possible because, “where the will is not diverted from its object, the mind is concentrated” (Zhuangzi 19.3); as time passes, people will become totally oblivious to themselves and will form one body with Nature. The hunchback gentleman caught cicadas on the tip of a rod with single-hearted devotion, saying, “I would not for all the ten thousand things exchange the wings of my cicadas.” The cabinetmaker Qing forgot all his four limbs and his whole person while he was carving a bell-stand. When he went into the forest and selected suitable wood for processing, he was able to “combine his own nature with Nature”; that is, his skill—which was natural to him since it was formed through long practice—and the natural qualities of the wood combined into one. On the one hand, these allegories convey through artistic images the philosophical idea that freedom is the recognition of necessity; on the other hand, they touch on the law of artistic creation as spiritual production, that is, the law of a continuous development from “skill” to “Dao,” and from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. It can be

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said that the theory of yijing (artistic sphere, 意境) in classical Chinese aesthetics originated in Zhuangzi’s philosophical ideas. In this respect, his influence on later generations is positive. On the negative side, the fact that Zhuangzi set the principle of humanity in opposition to the principle of nature may lead to the loss of contact with human life. The Zhuangzi studied and discussed nearly all of the major problems put forward in ancient times, and it also attained a high level of philosophical reasoning. Its exposure of contradictions in logical thinking and its investigation into freedom in human aesthetic activities have exercised a particularly far-reaching influence on later generations. Zhuangzi’s philosophical system of relativism could awaken thinkers from their dogmatic dreams. His thought raised many enlightening questions and constituted an essential link in the development of Chinese philosophy. On the other hand, Zhuangzi’s wholesale skepticism and his unprincipled view of life have had a harmful influence that must not be underestimated. Many politically dissatisfied gentry of later periods found consolation in his philosophy, and the feudal rulers used it to justify their “aloofness” and “detachment” in order to hoax the people.

3.4 The Logicians’ Debates on “Hardness and Whiteness,” and on “Similarity and Difference”—A Conflict Between Relativism and Absolutism All the philosophers of the pre-Qin period expressed their opinions concerning the debate on “names and actualities.” There was a logical dimension to this debate, and this dimension was of especially great concern to the Mohists and to the members of the School of Names (or Logicians). Hui Shi and Gongsun Long were among the exponents of the School of Names. (1) Hui Shi’s Discourse on the “Unity of Similarity and Difference” Hui Shi (c. 370–310 BCE), a native of the state of Song in the mid–Warring States period, had once served as prime minister of the state of Wei. He often debated with Zhuangzi on various problems. Hui Shi’s works have all been lost, and what we know today of his philosophical ideas is derived from passages in the Zhuangzi (Chapter 33), the Xunzi, the Han Feizi, and the Lüshi Chunqiu. Hui Shi advocated the “unity of similarity and difference.” One of his ten paradoxes recorded in Chapter 33 of Zhuangzi is that: A great similarity is different from a small similarity; this is called the lesser similarity-anddifference. All things are similar to one another and different from one another; this is called the great similarity-and-difference. (Zhuangzi, Miscellaneous Chapters: Tian Xia 33.7)3

In his opinion, “a great similarity” is equal to a great kind, and “a small similarity” to a small kind. For example, if all animals are of “great similarity,” then 3

Translation in this section has consulted Legge (1891).

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beasts are of “small similarity.” Such an examination of the similarity and difference of things from the view of the relation between genus and species is called the “lesser similarity-and -difference.” All things have something in common and something different; this is called the “great similarity-and-difference.” Viewed in terms of their general character, all things are “things”; therefore they are “similar to each other.” Viewed in terms of their specific character, all things have their own characteristics; therefore they are “different from one another.” Hui Shi brings to light the relativity of the relation between similarity and difference. This contains reasonable elements, but he exaggerates. He denies the qualitative difference between things and comes to the conclusion, “Love all things equally. Heaven and Earth form one body.” (Zhuangzi, Tian Xia 33.7) Hui Shi demands that humans love all things without any differentiation, and regard Heaven, Earth, and themselves as an integral whole as close as flesh and blood. Here he takes things of “all similarity” in the abstract as one body in reality. In this way, he confuses the generic relationship with the part-and-whole relationship. Hui Shi and Zhuangzi were close friends. Some of Hui’s paradoxes are very similar to Zhuangzi’s. Zhuangzi says: “When there is life, then there is death; when there is death, then there is life” (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Adjustment of Controversies 2.5), and Hui says: “When the sun is at noon, it is setting; when there is life, there is death” (Zhuangzi, Tian Xia 33.7). Both of them stress that the change of things is absolute; a thing is near death as soon as it comes into being. Again, Zhuangzi says: “If we see things from the point of view of their difference, even liver and gall are as far from each other as the states of Chu and Yue. If we see things from the point of view of their similarity, all things are one” (Zhuangzi, Inner Chapters: The Seal of Virtue Complete 5.1). Hui says: “All things are similar to each other and different from one another” and “Heaven and Earth form one body.” Both philosophers stress that, from the point of view of difference, all things are different from one another and that, from the point of view of similarity, all things are one. Like Zhuangzi, Hui Shi argues that both similarity and difference are relative; therefore, all concepts are changeable and flexible. In this way, however, Hui Shi, like Zhuangzi, denies the stability of any concepts, and this leads to relativism. Hui Shi says: “Heaven is as low as the Earth; mountains and marshes are on the same level” (Zhuangzi, Tian Xia 33.7). For ordinary people, it is evident that Heaven is above and the Earth below, and that mountains are high and marshes low; neither above and below nor high and low can be confused. But, for Hui Shi, “sky is what is above the earth”; notwithstanding the sky above mountains is really very high, it seems very low from the low-lying land; therefore, “Heaven is as low as the Earth.” Moreover, no matter how high mountains are and how deep marshes are, they are equal when compared with the sky covering them. Therefore, “mountains and marshes are on the same level.” It is undoubtedly reasonable for Hui Shi to point out that the antitheses of high and low and of above and below are relative and transformable. But if from this he concludes that all distinctions between high and low, above and below, great and small, and life and death can be discarded, and that any property can be transformed into its opposite without conditions, then he falls into relativistic sophistry. For example, some dialecticians of Hui Shi’s group

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advanced the paradoxes “the egg has feathers,” “a white dog is black.” The egg can transform itself into a feathered creature, so feathers are inherent in the egg. A dog with blind eyes may be called a blind dog; likewise, if a white dog has black eyes, then it may be called a black dog. These paradoxes overstate the flexibility and variability of concepts such as white, black, being, and non-being, and cause them to lose their definite meanings in a certain context, thus violating the law of identity of formal logic. Some paradoxes advanced by the dialecticians of Hui Shi’s group do, however, bring to light the contradictions within things. Hui Shi says: “When the sun is at noon, it is setting; when there is life, there is death.” This exposes the motion existing in a thing at rest, as well as the continuity of motion. Some other dialecticians put forth the paradoxes of “the shadow of a flying bird never moves,” and “the arrow is flying so fast that there are moments when it is neither in motion nor at rest” (Zhuangzi, Tian Xia 33.7). These reveal a state of rest which exists in things in motion, as well as the discreteness of motion. All of these paradoxes reveal that the motion of an object is both continuous and discrete, and they touch on the dialectical idea that motion itself is a contradiction; however, their dialectics is contingent, for though they expose contradictions, they are not aware that contradiction is the essence of things and of concepts. (2) Gongsun Long’s Discourse on the “Separateness of Hardness and Whiteness” Gongsun Long (c. 325–250 BCE) was a native of the state of Zhao during the mid– Warring States period. His ideas are preserved in a book entitled Gongsun Longzi. He explored the paradox of “a white horse is not a horse,” and he advanced the doctrine of “the separateness of hardness and whiteness (离坚白li lian bian).” His grounds for saying that “a white horse is not a horse” are as follows: “Horse denotes the form and white the color. What denotes the color does not denote the form. Therefore we say that a white horse is not a horse”. (Gongsun Longzi, Discourse on White Horse 2.4) He argues that, from the viewpoint of the relationship between names and actualities, the word horse denotes a shape, white denotes a color, and white horse embraces the two elements of shape and color. Since horse simply denotes the shape, a white horse is not a horse. He also says that when you actually ask for a horse, either a yellow or a black one may answer, but when you ask for a white horse, neither the yellow nor the black one may answer, so a white horse is not a horse. Actually, it is common sense to know that a white horse is a horse; however, such a simple proposition really contains the dialectical relationship of mutual combination and exclusion between the individual and the universal. On the one hand, Gongsun Long makes a contribution to the development of logic by showing that the concept of white horse is different from horse in its connotation and extension, and that the individual and the universal are mutually exclusive. But, on the other hand, he takes the two concepts of horse and white horse completely separately, arguing that the universal and abstract horse can exist independently of actual horses; thus he cuts apart the relation between the universal and the individual and his arguments become a kind of sophistry.

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Gongsun Long’s doctrine of “the separateness of hardness and whiteness” holds that hardness and whiteness cannot both be attributes of a stone at the same time, and that they are separate from each other. He says: “When seeing does not perceive hardness but whiteness, there is no hardness to speak of. When touching perceives not whiteness but hardness, there is no whiteness to speak of.” (Gongsun Longzi, Discourse on Hardness and Whiteness 5.8) He concludes that the seen “whiteness” and the unseen “hardness” are separate from each other, since “seeing and not seeing are separate from each other.” By “separate,” he means that “whiteness” and “hardness” are concealed; “To be separate means to be concealed” (ibid.). He believes that general properties such as hardness or whiteness exist independently of concrete things, and that these properties are separate from each other. He further believes that all properties in the world are separate from one another: “[Things] being separate; this is the only correct thing in the world” (ibid.). All properties in the world are separate from one another. Each exists independently and has its suitable name. This is “rectifying” names to correspond to actuality. Such a view of the rectification of names treats concepts (general properties and universals) as existing independently. These are what Gongsun Long calls universal concepts (指zhi). According to him, the relation between zhi and things (物wu) is the same as that between concepts and material objects, or between the universal and the individual. He says: “If there were no zhi in the world, nothing could be called a wu” (Gongsun Longzi, Discourse on Concept and Thing 3.2). For him, things are produced from concepts. This is an idealistic view similar to Plato’s theory that there is a world of ideas outside the physical world, and that any concrete things are embodiments of ideas. In his discourse on “the separateness of hardness and whiteness,” Gongsun Long holds that the differences between concepts do not admit of their being confused: “Therefore it is correct that ‘that’ is limited to that and that ‘this’ is limited to this. But it is incorrect to apply ‘that’ to this, or even to regard ‘that’ as this, or to apply ‘this’ to that and even regard ‘this’ as that” (Gongsun Longzi, Discourse on Names and Actualities 6.12). His remarks imply that between each concept and each object there must be a corresponding relation, which is the foundation of the law of identity of formal logic and an essential prerequisite to logical thinking. This idea is correct, but he thinks of the law of identity in terms of absolutes, believing that since “hardness” is limited to hardness and “whiteness” is limited to whiteness, “hardness” and “whiteness” are separate from each other. He also separates hardness and whiteness from all other properties and claims that every property can exist independently of concrete things. As a result, he slips into absolutism and idealism, and he tends to sophistry. For example, one of his paradoxes says: “A chicken has three legs.” One is the concept of “chicken’s leg” itself; the other two are a chicken’s physical legs, so their sum is three. This is obviously absurd. As a matter of fact, Hui Shi’s relativism on the problem of the “unity of similarity and difference” and Gongsun Long’s absolutism on the problem of the “separateness of hardness and whiteness” expose the essential contradiction of logical thinking. On the one hand, logical thinking has its relatively static state, that is to say, concepts must correspond to objects on a one-by-one basis, and it is necessary to distinguish

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different aspects of a concrete thing in the course of thinking, so as to examine them one by one. On the other hand, in order to embrace all of the real connections between things as well as the law of change and development, the concept must be flexible and active, and be a unity of opposites. Gongsun Long emphasizes the former aspect, while Hui Shi stresses the latter, so Gongsun Long’s absolutism and Hui Shi’s relativism also contain some necessary links in the chain of the development of knowledge.

3.5 Later Mohist Views on the Relationship Between Names and Actualities and on Nature After the death of Mozi, his school was divided into several groups. These groups are here referred to collectively as the Later Mohist School. The representative work of this school is Mo Jing (Mohist Canon), six chapters in the extant Mozi text. The “Canons” comprise Chapters 40 and 41, while the “Expositions of the Canons” are found in Chapters 42 and 43. “Major Illustrations” are given in Chapter 44 and “Minor Illustrations” in Chapter 45The Later Mohists paid great attention to handicraft production techniques, and they made outstanding contributions in such fields as geometry, optics, and mechanics. In the controversies over “past and present,” the Later Mohists opposed the doctrine of returning to the ancients advocated by the Confucians: “Yao was a wise ruler because we judge him from the present, but if the ancients were placed in the present, Yao would be incapable of good rule” (Mozi, Book 10 Exposition of Canon II). Since the times are different, Yao would be incapable of good rule in the present age, though we may infer from the present that Yao was skilled in good government in the past. This is obviously a refutation of the Confucian “never speaking without citing Yao and Shun.” In the discussions about “righteousness and profit,” the Later Mohists continue and develop Mozi’s utilitarianism. Mozi seeks to evaluate human conduct from the viewpoint of the unity of motive(志zhi) and effect(功gong), while the Later Mohists go a step further, explicitly pointing out that the defining feature of a moral conduct is that the motive and effect involved is beneficial to people. Thus “Major Illustrations” says: “Righteousness consists in doing benefit; unrighteousness consists in doing harm. They should be judged by their motives and effects” (Mozi, Book 11 Major Illustrations 12). The difference between righteousness and unrighteousness is that in the one case motives and their effects are beneficial to people, and in the other case they are harmful to people. In addition, the Later Mohists attribute benefit and harm to the feelings of pleasure and dislike: “The beneficial is that which when obtained gives pleasure”; “The harmful is that which when obtained is disliked” (Mozi, Book 10 Exposition of Canon I.26). This is a further development of Mozi’s idea of the unity of the utilitarianism and the principle of sensuousness. (1) A Theory of Knowledge: “Using Names to Designate Actualities”

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In discussions about “names and actualities,” the Later Mohists carried forward and perfected the materialistic theory of knowledge upheld by Mozi. “Canon I.31” says: “General appellation is a description of an actuality,” and “Exposition of Canon I.31” states: “General appellation consists in using a name to designate an actuality.” Names are considered descriptions of actualities; concepts are reflections of the objective world. The doctrine of “using names to designate actualities (以名举实yi ming jü shi) advocated by the Mohist Canon achieves a better understanding of the passive and active aspects of cognition, and of the relationship between perceptual and conceptual knowledge. It points out that human knowledge of the objective world can be divided into several elements. “Canon I” says: “Knowing (知zhi) is the capability”; “meditation (虑lü) is the seeking”; “knowledge (知zhi) is the perceiving”; “mindknowledge (智zhì) is the understanding.” The first element refers to the cognitive capabilities possessed by humankind, such as healthily functioning ears and eyes. Those who are deaf or blind cannot be counted as persons who have the capability of knowing, since they have lost those faculties. The second element refers humankind’s purposeful seeking for and contemplating of things. The third element refers to perceptual knowledge, which is that gained through describing the external objects to be known after they interact with human sense organs. The fourth element refers to conceptual knowledge, by which one is able to make an analytical and comparative study of objects by means of mind-knowledge, so as to comprehend their laws and gain a more profound and distinct understanding of them. These elements describe the process of how to “use names to designate actualities” according to the sequence of human cognition. The Mohist Canon also examines this process by showing the ways of acquiring knowledge and from the point of view of the relation between content and form. “Canon I.81” says: “Knowing (知zhi) comprises hearing (闻wen) about something, making an exposition of it (说shuo), experiencing it personally (亲qin), a coincidence of names with actualities, and then action (wei为).” “Exposition of Canon I. 81” states: Receiving something transmitted is hearsay knowledge. Reasoning unhindered by position in space is experience. What is observed by one’s own body is personal experience. What designate are names; what are designated are actualities. When names and actualities pair with each other, that is the required coincidence. So also, will (志zhi) mated to movement ( 行xing) is action.

There are three ways of acquiring knowledge: hearing, inferring, and experiencing. So-called hearsay knowledge is an indirect knowledge that is passed on to us by others. So-called expositive knowledge is a knowledge acquired by inference, which is not restricted by particular conditions such as time and space. So-called personal experience is a knowledge acquired by personal observation. Considered from the perspective of the relationship between content and form, the cognitive process of “using names to designate actualities” contains four links: ming (name, 名), shi (actuality, 实), ou (coincidence, 合), and wei (action, 为). Ming is the subjective form used to designate an object. Shi is the objective content of an object to be

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designated by a name. Ou is the unity of the subjective form (name) and the objective content (actuality), the way real knowledge is obtained. “Will mated to movement is action” means that knowledge manifests itself in human intentions and then is translated into action. Wei (action) is an activity in which the subjective is translated into the objective, as well as a test of whether names correspond to actualities. The Later Mohists obviously regard the wei as an indispensable link in the cognitive process, and thus to a certain extent overcome the narrow empiricism of Mozi. Starting from the viewpoint of “using names to designate actualities,” the Later Mohists criticize Gongsun Long’s theory of the “separateness of hardness and whiteness.” “Exposition of Canon II.16” says: “When hardness has whiteness, these must pervade each other.” When we feel a stone, we feel its hardness. When we look at a stone, we see its whiteness. But, in fact, both hardness and whiteness are pervasive in the same stone, therefore while we feel a hard stone we at the same time see its whiteness; “Hardness and whiteness are not mutually exclusive” (Canon I.67). The theory of knowledge focusing on “using names to designate actualities” of the Later Mohists thus emerged in the course of their debates with the School of Names, the Logicians. (2) A Scientific Theory of Formal Logic The debate over “names and actualities” also has a bearing on the theory of logic. The Later Mohist doctrine of “using names to designate actualities” is not only a theory of knowledge, but also a theory of logic. The “Minor Illustrations” advances in broad outline the Later Mohists’ views on the aims of logic and on the forms and principles of thinking: Argument (辩bian) serves to make clear the distinction between right and wrong, to discriminate between good and disordered government, to make evident points of similarity and difference, to examine the principles of names and actualities, to differentiate between what is beneficial and what is harmful, and to resolve uncertainties. It describes the forms of myriads of things, and in discussions seeks to compare the various speeches. It uses names to designate actualities, propositions to express ideas, statements to set forth causes, taking and giving according to classes. What one has oneself, one should not blame others for having, and what one is without, one should not blame others for not having. (Mozi, Book 11: Minor Illustrations 1)

The points of this passage may be summarized as follows. First, the tasks of argument (that is, logical argumentation and refutation) are to distinguish right from wrong in expressions of opinion, to make evident the points of similarity and difference among things, to examine the ways of good and disordered government and the principles of names and actualities, to correctly deal with various relations between benefit and harm, and to resolve various doubts. Second, in order to accomplish those tasks, one should objectively describe and generalize the way things actually are and make a comprehensive analysis and comparison of various opinions. Third, one uses concepts to describe things, judgments to express ideas and meanings, and inferences to bring out certain reasons. Fourth, when using such forms of thinking as concepts, judgments, and inferences, one should conform to the principles of classes, that is, the principles of induction from the particular to the universal and deduction

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from the universal to the particular. Fifth, during a debate one should adopt a correct attitude: when one makes a certain mistake, one should not blame others for making the same mistake, and when one lacks certain knowledge, one should not insist on others’ having such knowledge. The three categories of “class” (类lei), “cause/reason” (故gu), and “principle” ( 理li) are explicitly linked in the text of the Mohist Canon, and are regarded as the fundamental forms of logical thinking. The “Major Illustrations 26” says: “Propositions (辞ci) originate from causes/reasons, grow according to principles, and proceed according to classes.” That is, during a discussion there must be grounds (causes) for asserting a proposition; when explaining the grounds, one must infer laws and rules (principles) according to logic; when proceeding to practice the forms of inference, one must abide by the generic relation between things (classes). As mentioned earlier, Mozi put forth the three categories of class, cause/reason, and principle, and other philosophers applied them in their logical thinking, but none of them linked the three categories to one another as the Later Mohists did. The Mohist Canon takes the three categories as indispensable for logical thinking and reflects on the process of logical thinking as such, thus constructing a scientific system of formal logic. Below, we will attempt to elucidate the logic of the Mohist Canon through a discussion of each of the three categories: class, cause, and principle. First, the Mohist Canon inquiries into the category of “class,” which covers some minor categories such as similarity and difference, particular and universal, part and whole, and quality and quantity. As to similarity and difference, the Mohist Canon distinguishes among the four different types of similarity and the four corresponding types of difference: “In similarity there is that of identity, of part-and-whole relationship, of coexistence, and of generic relation” and “In difference there is that of duality, of no part-and-whole relationship, of separateness, and of dissimilarity” (Canon I.88). When two different names designate the same actuality, this is the similarity of identity (重同chong tong). When two different names designate two different actualities, this is the difference of duality (二er). Things whose parts are all related to an integral whole share the similarity of part-and-whole relationship ( 体同ti tong). Things that are not mutually related to something in this way are in the difference of no part-and-whole relationship (不体bu ti). Things that are in the same place have the similarity of coexistence (合同he tong). Things that are not in the same place have the difference of separateness (不合bu he). Individuals of the same class, all of which have characteristics in common, have the similarity of generic relation (类同lei tong). Things that have no characteristics in common are in the difference of dissimilarity (不类bu lei). The Later Mohists divide “names” (concepts) into three types in the light of generic relation: “Names are general (达da), classifying (类lei), and private (私si)” (Canon I.79). According to “Exposition 1,” a “general” name is a name (concept) of the broadest scope, for example, the name “thing” is common to all things. A “classifying” name is the name of a specific class of things, for example, the name “horse” is common to all horses, instead of all things. A “private” name is the name of a particular thing, for example, the name “Zang” is the name of a person. These three types of names, divided according to their extension, embody the generic relation

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between things. On the basis of this view, the Later Mohists attack the doctrine of “unity of similarity and difference” and refute the paradox that “a white horse is not a horse”, as maintained by the School of Names. If viewed from the perspective of a “general” name, all things are “all similar.” If viewed from the perspective of a “private” name or an individual, all things are “all different.” Therefore, if viewed from generic relation, Hui Shi’s paradox that “all things are in one way all similar, in another way all different” is quite reasonable. However, it is wrong to draw from the paradox the conclusion that we should “love all things equally, since the universe is one,” because the similarity of generic relation is not equal to that of part-and-whole relationship. The Later Mohists point out that both a white horse and a black horse are implied by the classifying concept of “horse.” As they say, “A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride a horse. A black horse is a horse. To ride a black horse is to ride a horse” (Minor Illustrations 4). Accordingly, the thesis that “a white horse is not a horse” is unjustifiable. The Mohist Canon further points out that, “Different classes are not comparable” (Canon II.107). Things belonging to different categories in quality cannot be compared with each other in quantity. It illustrates this with some examples: “Difference: What is longer, a tree or a night? Of which is there more, knowledge or rice? Of the four things, rank, parents, conduct, or price, which is more valuable?” (Exposition Canon II.107). A tree cannot be compared with a night in length, because the length of a tree refers to that of space, while the length of a night refers to that of time. Knowledge cannot be compared with rice in quantity, because knowledge is a kind of spiritual value, while rice is a kind of material resource. Likewise, rank, parents, conduct, and price are things of different classes. These examples imply that logical thinking cannot violate the principle that quality determines quantity, and that only things which belong to the same class can be measured against one another. The “Minor Illustrations 2” further maintains that all other methods of reasoning— including huo (the method of possibility, 或), jia (hypothesis, 假), xiao (imitation, 效), pi (comparison, 辟), mou (the method of parallel, 侔), yuan (analogy, 援), and tui (induction, 推)—should be carried out on the basis of generic relation. For example, in explaining the xiao, it states, “Imitation (效xiao) consists in taking a model (法fa). What is imitated is what is taken as a model. If the cause is in agreement with the imitation, it is correct. If it is not in agreement with the imitation, it is not correct.” Thus it can be seen that so-called imitation is to set a model as the standard for judging what is right and what is wrong, and this model (fa) is but a concept of class. “Canon II.166” says: “The mutual sameness of things of one model extends to all things in that class. Thus squares are the same, one to another.” The model of things belonging to the same class is applicable to any members of the class. For example, the “square” as a model is applicable to all square things. It is evident that xiao as a method of reasoning and demonstration is indeed the method of deduction used widely in scientific research to develop formulas and models. Such models should reflect the essences of the relevant classes. Though the Later Mohists failed to study the figures and modes of the syllogism as carefully as Aristotle did, their advocacy of xiao nevertheless reveals the essence of deductive reasoning.

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Second, the Mohist Canon inquiries into the category of cause/reason (故gu). “Canon I.1” says: “A cause is that with the obtaining of which something becomes.” A gu is the ground or reason by which we may arrive at a certain statement. According to the Mohist Canon, a cause/reason may belong to one of two types, the minor causes/reasons and the major causes/reasons. “Exposition of Canon I.1” says: “A minor cause/reason is one with which something may not necessarily be so, but without which it will never be so. […] A major cause/reason is one with which something will of necessity be so, and without which it will never be so…” From the viewpoint of logic, this “minor cause/reason” is equivalent to what is today called a necessary but insufficient condition, while the “major cause/reason” is equivalent to what is today called a necessary and sufficient condition. What the Mohist Canon emphasizes is the use of “statements to set forth causes/reasons,” holding that what is called reasoning is the setting forth of causes/reasons as grounds for argument. Every proposition in the text of “Canon II” includes such a sentence as “the reason is given under…,” while every corresponding proposition in “Exposition of Canon II” sets forth some “causes/reasons” to expound and prove the proposition in the text of “Canon II.” For example, “Canon II.107” says: “Different classes are not comparable. The reason is given under ‘measurement.’” And in support of this proposition, “Exposition of Canon II.107” provides five instances as evidence, for instance “What is longer, a tree or a night?” “Of which is there more, knowledge or rice?” Actually, this is a proposition inductively inferred from five instances, showing that a quantitative comparison must be made between things of the same class. And all these instances are “minor causes/reasons” of the conclusion that “different classes are not comparable.” In another example, “Canon II.136” says: “To say that in a debate there is no winner is incorrect. The reason is given under ‘debate.’” The Exposition says: In speaking, when what is said does not agree, there is dissent. There is agreement when one of two persons says it is a puppy, and another says it is a dog. There is dissent when one says it is an ox, and another says it is a horse. When neither of them wins, there is no debate. Debate is that in which one person says a thing is so, and another says it is not so. The one who is right will win. (Exposition of Canon II.136)

“Canon II” argues that the view that “in a debate there is no winner,” put forth originally by Zhuangzi, is incorrect, while the Exposition gives some reasons for this judgment. Concerning a given object there is no debate, for example, if one person says it is a puppy and another says it is a dog, since what is said by both of them designates the same object. There is no debate either if one says that the dog is an ox and another says that it is a horse, because neither of them is right, though what is said by each of them designates a different object. Therefore, if there are no right and wrong and no winner and loser in a “debate,” then it cannot be considered an actual debate. The aim of the debate is to distinguish right from wrong and to arrive at a judgment of the object in question. Of the judgment that “this is a dog,” for example, one must either say that it is right or that it is wrong. The one who is right is the winner. The aforementioned proposition of “Exposition of Canon II”, as an argument

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for the proposition that “it is incorrect to say that there is no winner in a debate”, thus provides the “cause” of its argument through rigorous deductive reasoning, a sufficient and necessary condition in logic. Third, the Later Mohist School touches on the category of principle (理li), which encompasses the essential laws of logical thinking. “Exposition of Canon II.169” says: That (that is, the corresponding proposition in “Canon II”) refers to the rectification of the names “that” and “this.” “That” and “this” are correct when the that-ness of “that” stops at “that” and the this-ness of “this” stops at “this.” “That” and “this” are not correct when “that” is moreover “this,” and “this” is also moreover “that.”

To rectify names is to distinguish “that” from “this.” If “that” is called “that” instead of “this” while “this” is called “this” instead of “that,” that and this are clearly demarcated. If “this” is called “that,” while “that” is called “this,” then that and this are mixed. This idea is identical with Gongsun Long’s, as both hold that there should be a relationship of correspondence between a name and its actuality. Such a relationship is the foundation and essence of the law of identity of formal logic. The Mohist Canon is also opposed to the doctrine that “both contraries may be affirmed”: “A debate is a conflict over something. In a debate, the one who wins is right” (Canon I.74) and “In a debate, one says it is an ox, and the other says it is not. This is conflict over something. They cannot both be right” (Exposition Canon I.75). Here, “something” refers to a proposition yet in debate. Their views are contradictory when one affirms this proposition and the other denies it. This is called “conflict over something.” According to the Mohist Canon, in a debate, it is not possible either to affirm both of the contradictory positions or to deny both of them. One must either affirm or deny one of the two propositions. This reflects an understanding of the law of the excluded middle. Meanwhile, two contradictory propositions cannot both be right. This reflects an understanding of the law of contradiction. The Mohist Canon constructs a highly-sophisticated classical Chinese system of formal logic. It also overcomes some of formal logic’s limitations. For example, concerning the relationship between similarity and difference, “Canon I.39” says: “Similarity is that with respect to which separate things are one.” So long as there is something in common between different things, there is similarity. Thus, the way of defining “similarity” in terms of “difference” contains a certain dialectical element. Another idea which the Mohist Canon advances is that “when similarity and difference are jointly considered, what is present and what is absent can be set forth” (Canon I.89). Similarity and difference are interconnected and complement each other. For example, “Exposition of Canon I.89” says: “When it deals with measurement, it is a question of how much or little.” There is a difference of much and little existing in a quantitative comparison between things, but such a comparison can only be made between things of the same kind. Though this idea is not quite the same as the dialectical doctrine of contradiction, it still shows that even the most ordinary logical thinking contains elements of dialectics.

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The system of formal logic of the Mohist Canon does, however, have some limitations. Its modes of reasoning are comparatively simple, and some are ill-conceived. A few propositions, for example, “to kill a robber is not to kill a person,” are refuted by Xunzi, a later philosopher. Despite these shortcomings, the logical system of the Mohist Canon as a whole can be favorably compared with ancient Greek logic and the ancient Indian science of causes (the Hetu-vidya). (3) An Atomistic and Empiricist Conception of Nature With respect to the debate on “Heaven and humankind,” the Later Mohists do not emphasize the “will of Heaven”(天志tian zhi) to the same extent as Mozi, nor do they conceive of the Way of Heaven speculatively, as did the Confucians, Daoists, and Logicians. Instead, the Mohist Canon has a naïve-materialistic conception of nature which is colored by atomism. The Mohist Canon advances its own concept of “points” (端duan), which are analogous to “atoms” in the Western classical theory of atomism. “Canon I.62” says: “A point is that part of a line which is without thickness (volume) and comes at the very beginning.” One of Hui Shi’s theses is “that which has no thickness cannot be increased in thickness, yet in extent it may cover a thousand miles.” The surface or plane of geometry cannot be three-dimensional, since it is without thickness, but it can cover a large two-dimensional area. However, the Mohist Canon holds that when divided enough times, to the point of division into that which is “without thickness,” a substance will eventually reach the last “point”. The “point” as a material particle can no longer be divided. As “Canon II.161” says: “If it is cut in no other way except in half, then there will be no action of cutting. The reason is given under ‘point.’” According to the Mohist Canon, if a stick one foot in length is cut in half once every day, then it will one day reach its “point,” and it will no longer be possible to divide it further. It is said there are two ways to reach the “point.” One way is to the aforementioned method of dividing a thing in half repeatedly until an indivisible point is reached. The other way is to progressively pare away the material from a thing’s margins, until eventually all that is left is the individual point that was located at the thing’s center. It can be seen that when something is cut it will surely be divided into two parts, no matter how the cutting is done, and if there is a particle that can no longer be cut into two parts, then the “point” has been attained (see Exposition Canon II.161). Proceeding from the standpoint of empirical sciences, the Mohist Canon argues that a material substance possessing certain properties is made up of indivisible particles. The dialecticians of Hui Shi’s group hold, however, that a material substance can continue to be divided indefinitely, saying, “Take a stick one foot long and cut it in half every day and you will never exhaust it, even after ten thousand generations.” It is evident that the opposition between the two different views displayed by the Mohist Canon and the dialecticians of Hui Shi’s group is that between empiricism and rational speculation. This antagonism is most clearly reflected in their concepts of space and time. In Hui Shi’s opinion, “The greatest has nothing beyond itself; it is called the small oneness” (Zhuangzi: Miscellaneous Chapters: Tian Xia 33.7). The “great oneness” (

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大一da yi), which has nothing beyond itself, refers to infinite space and time, while the “small oneness” (小一xiao yi), which has nothing within itself, refers to the minimum that is reached through division, which is equivalent to the ideal “point” in a geometrical sense. This is a rational and speculative idea of infinity, yet the Mohist Canon induces its concepts of space and time from experience: Duration (久jiu) is persistence of different times (Canon I.40). Duration is what unites past and present, morning and evening (Exposition of Canon I.40). Space (宇yu) is extension of different places (Canon I.41). Space is what covers east and west, south and north (Exposition of Canon I.41). This is to say, “duration” is the sum total of specified and finite times, such as past, present, morning, evening, and “space” is the sum total of various space relations: east, west, south, north. Such a time concept is a generalization based on experience and is measurable, as is the space concept. Concerning the concept of “commencement” (shi, 始), “Canon I.44” says: “The commencement is plumb with the time”, and “Exposition of Canon I.44” states: “Of the times of a movement, there is one that has duration and one without duration. The commencement is plumb with the one without duration.” Duration is the sum total of times and has its own length, while “commencement” is the beginning of time and has no duration and length of its own as yet. The relationship between duration and commencement is analogous to that between a line and its point. The commencement might be regarded as the point of duration. This is obviously an atomistic view. As to the infinity of space, the Mohist Canon takes an empiricist view, saying, “If somewhere there is no room for a measured length, it is limited. If everywhere there is room for a measured length, it is limitless” (Exposition of Canon I.42). This view is very similar to John Locke’s, who says in his Essay on Human Understanding that, just as a mariner can reach no bottom when he measures the depth of the sea by letting down a large portion of his sounding-line, so persons can never have a distinct notion of infinity when they measure space or time by numbers of feet, yards, hours, or days. It can be seen that the Later Mohist atomistic and empiricist views on the conception of nature manifest themselves distinctly in the conception of space and time. Generally speaking, the merits of the Later Mohist School lie in its concern for empirical facts and its reliance on the methods of formal logic. However, owing to its dislike of speculative philosophy, the Later Mohist School ignores the doctrines of yin-yang and qi-monism, thus neglecting the naive materialist conception of nature associated with those two doctrines. This may be considered a weakness in the Later Mohist conception of nature.

References

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References Bloom, Irene. 2009. Mencius. Ed. Philip J. Ivanhoe. New York: Columbia University Press. Duyvendak, J. J. L. 2003. Reform of the Law. The Book of Lord Shang. Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, LTD. Legge, James. 1891. The Writings of Chuang Tzu. London: Oxford University Press. Legge, James. 1970. The Works of Mencius. New York: Dover Publications Inc.

Chapter 4

The Summing-Up Stage of Pre-Qin Philosophy

The development of the philosophy of the pre-Qin period reached its summing-up stage in the late Warring States period. At that time, the rival principalities were in the process of being replaced by a unitary feudal state, and the political reforms initiated by the landlord class were nearing completion. In correspondence with this situation, philosophy itself, in the context of conflicts between past and present and between propriety and law, also reached its stage of critical summary, having passed through the period of the contention of a hundred schools of thought on the relationships between “Heaven and humankind” and between “names and actualities.”

4.1 Xunzi’s Summation of the Debates Over “Heaven and Humankind”, and Over “Names and Actualities”—The Union of Naïve Materialism and Naïve Dialectics The man who made a critical summary of pre-Qin philosophy was Xunzi (c. 313–238 BCE), whose personal name was Kuang and whose courtesy name Qing, a native of the state of Zhao in the late Warring States period. He was honored three times as the official responsible for the sacrificial wine offering in the state of Qi. The eponymous book Xunzi contains his works. Taking a generally progressive stance, Xunzi makes a critical summary of the debates on “past and present” and on “propriety and law.” The fundamental position Xunzi holds in regard to these debates is that “the person versed in ancient matters will certainly support them with evidence from the present” (Xunzi, Chapter 13 The Way to be a Minster; trans. Chan 1963, p. 132). He emphasizes that current reality should be taken as the basis for testing the teachings handed down from ancient times. Starting from this view, Xunzi advocates “following the later kings” instead of “following the early kings” as preached by the School of Zisi and Mencius. Xunzi, however, devotes more pages of his book to the theory of propriety (礼li) than to © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_4

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other theories. This indicates that he is still a Confucian. But he provides a new explanation of propriety. As he says: “Propriety contains laws for the primary social distinctions and guiding rules of human relations” (Chapter 1 An Exhortation to Learning); propriety can be considered as a sum of legal and ethical relations. In his opinion, propriety and law (法fa) are uniform since both refer to the hierarchy and the ruling order of feudal society. In addition, the debate between “propriety and law” is related to the debate over “governing in a kingly way and governing by might.” Disagreeing with Mencius’ view that governing in a kingly way is incompatible with governing by might, Xunzi maintains that the two can supplement each other: “The ruler who highly exalts propriety and honors the worthy governs in a kingly way, and the ruler who stresses law and loves the people governs by might” (Chapter 16 The Strong State; trans. Chan 1963, p. 122). The way of the king who “highly exalts propriety” and the way of the feudal leaders who “stress law” are not incompatible. Instead, they are two indispensable elements for forming a unitary and centralized feudal state power. Xunzi emphasizes that propriety and righteousness, on the one hand, and punishment and law, on the other hand, are the two wings supporting the same bird, and that both are necessary to bring order to the land. It is evident that Xunzi had an idea of tempering propriety with law and unifying governing in a kingly way and governing by might, thus setting a precedent for the confluence of Confucianism and Legalism in the Han dynasty. (1) The Conception of the Way of Heaven: “Understanding the Distinctive Functions of Heaven and Humankind” Xunzi’s summary of the debate over “Heaven and humankind” manifests itself conspicuously in his materialistic thesis that one should “understand the distinctive functions of Heaven and humankind (明于天人之分ming yu tian ren zhi fen).” It implies that nature (Heaven) and humankind have different functions: natural phenomena cannot be used to explain social order or disorder because natural laws are independent of human will; humankind’s functions consist in establishing a rational social order and taking advantage of laws to control nature, thus gaining freedom. It is apparent that this argument of Xunzi’s covers various aspects of the Way of Heaven and the way of humankind. Now let us first analyze the argument from Xunzi’s conception of the Way of Heaven. Xunzi points out that what is called Heaven (天tian) is nothing more than the material natural world, without consciousness. He says that “Heaven”—as the term is used by the people in their daily lives—refers to the natural world, where “the fixed stars rotate in succession, the sun and moon shine alternately, the four seasons follow one another, the yin and yang effect their great transformation, and the wind and rain spread over all things” (Chapter 17 Discourse on Heaven; trans. Chan 1963, p. 117). He assimilates the Daoist idea that the Way of Heaven takes no action contrary to nature, holding that all motions in the material natural world are natural, spontaneous, and unconscious. Xunzi says: “To accomplish without any action and to obtain without any effort is what is meant by the office of Heaven” (Chapter 17 Discourse on Heaven; trans. Chan 1963, p. 117). In his opinion, the “office of Heaven” (the function of nature) lies in taking no purposeful action and effort since all things

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themselves are naturally so. Hence, “Heaven can produce things, but cannot discern them; Earth can hold people, but cannot rule over them” (Chapter 19 A Discussion of Rites). Nature can produce all things and human beings but this is not a conscious action. Accordingly, nature is incapable of taking such intentional actions as discerning things or administering human society. According to Xunzi, inasmuch as functions of nature are so, the changes of natural phenomena have nothing to do with social order or chaos. He says that the movements of the sun, the moon, the stars, and planets, the changes of spring, summer, fall, and winter, and the dependence of plants on land for their growth, all were the same in the time of Yu (sage-king) as in that of Jie (wicked king), yet Yu brought about order while Jie brought about chaos; therefore, “order and chaos are not due to Heaven,” “order and chaos are not due to the seasons,” and “order and chaos are not due to the Earth” (Chapter 17 Discourse on Heaven; trans. Chan 1963, p. 119). That is to say, order and chaos are not determined by nature. Hence, Xunzi is opposed to the superstitious doctrine of the mutual response between Heaven and humankind, which holds that there is a causal connection between natural variations and social order or chaos. As he says: “The falling of stars and the noise of trees are the changes of Heaven and Earth. […] It is all right to marvel at them, but wrong to fear them” (ch. 17; trans. Chan 1963, p. 120). He thinks that while it is natural and proper to be curious about natural phenomena, it is not appropriate to live in fear of them. Xunzi holds that the natural world is not itself conscious, and that it exists independently of human consciousness. He says that Heaven does not give up the winter because people dislike cold, and that Earth does not give up its expanse because people dislike distance. To his mind, the operation of nature has its own constant law, which is independent of human subjective will. One of his well-known sayings is as follows: “Heaven operates with constant regularity. It does not exist for the sake of (sage-emperor) Yao, nor does it cease to exist because of (wicked king) Jie” (ch. 17; trans. Chan 1963, p. 116). Even the supreme rulers such as Yao and Jie cannot overrule the constant law of the operation of nature. Carrying forward and developing qi-monism as embodied in the Guanzi, Xunzi explains how all things in the natural world come into being and grow naturally and spontaneously as the result of vital forces. He thinks that the combination of the heavenly force and earthly force and the meeting of the negative force (yin) and positive force (yang) bring about all things and their transformations. He further supports this view on the evidence of the varied forms of matter, saying, Water and fire possess vital forces but are without life; shrubs and trees have life but no perception; birds and beasts have perception but no standards of righteousness. Humankind has vital force, life, perception, and also standards of righteousness. Hence it is the highest being on Earth (Chapter 9 The Rule of a True King).

All forms of matter, ranging from inorganic substances (water, fire), plants (shrubs, trees), and animals (birds, beasts) to human beings are made up of forces, yet their forms are different. The most precious being among all things is humankind, because humans have morals as well as life and perception. Thus it can be seen that Xunzi believes that spiritual activities, whether perceptual or moral, depend on the human

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body for existence; as he says: “When the body is provided, the spirit will be born” (Chapter 17 Discourse on Heaven; trans. Chan 1963, p. 118). Such a naïvematerialistic view on the relationship between body and spirit is more definite than the Guanzi’s. Which respect to humans themselves, Xunzi argues that humankind has its own function distinct from that that of anything else in the natural world. On his view, humankind’s function is none other than to remake nature in accordance with natural laws through the application of human subjective activity. This idea manifests conspicuously itself in his statement that humankind should “control the Mandate of Heaven and use it.” Thus Xunzi declares: Instead of regarding Heaven as great and admiring it, Why not foster it as a thing and regulate it? Instead of obeying Heaven and singing praise to it, Why not control the Mandate of Heaven and use it? Instead of looking on the seasons and waiting for them, Why not respond to them and make use of them? Instead of letting things multiply by themselves, Why not exercise your ability to transform (and increase) them? Instead of thinking about things as things, Why not attend to them so you won’t lose them? Instead of admiring how things come into being, Why not do something to bring them to full development? Therefore to neglect human effort and admire Heaven is to lose the nature of things (ch. 17; trans. Chan 1963, p. 112).

From this passage, we may see that Xunzi identifies the “Mandate of Heaven” (天 命tian ming) with the natural laws, believes that humankind has an ability to master these laws and remake the natural world, and opposes inertia and passivity in the response to nature. In conceiving of the Way of Heaven in this way, Xunzi correctly describes the interplay of Heaven and humankind, and of nature and human effort. On the one hand, only by valuing and conforming to the objectivity of natural laws can human effort bring about good results; on the other hand, only by one’s effort can one understand the truth of all things, thus remaking nature and working for the wellbeing of humans. With such a conception, Xunzi on the one hand combats Mencius’ idealistic doctrine of the combination of Heaven and humankind, which exaggerates one-sidedly the human subjective role; on the other hand, he opposes Zhuangzi’s fatalism, which persists in blindly submitting to nature while denying completely humankind’s active role. As he says: “Zhuangzi was misled by his conception of nature and failed to see humankind” (Chapter 21 Dispelling Obsession). It may be said that Xunzi’s conception of the Way of Heaven embodies the unity of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics. Xunzi makes both a materialistic and dialectical summary of the debate over “Heaven and humankind,” but there are still some shortcomings in his conception

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of the Way of Heaven. For example, he conceives of nature as operating by way of endless, cyclical movements; as he says: “As in a cycle without a starting point, the beginning is the end and the end is the beginning” (Chapter 9 The Rule of a True King). Obviously, this relates to sciences such as astronomy and calendrical science, which were then limited only to observing and recording the circular motion of planets and the cycle of the seasons. (2) The Conception of the Way of Humankind: “Making Social Distinctions Clear and Forming a Social Organization” and “Transforming Nature and Arousing Effort” With respect to the Way of Heaven, Xunzi’s argument that humans should “understand the distinctive functions of Heaven and humankind” manifests itself in his two propositions—that people should “make social distinctions clear and form a social organization” and that people should “transform their nature and arouse their effort” ( 化性起伪hua xing qi wei). The former describes Xunzi’s conception of social history and the latter his theory of human nature. In Xunzi’s opinion, if human beings want to control the natural world, then they have to establish a rational social order so as to ensure success. Consequently, Xunzi advances the idea of “making social distinctions clear and forming a social organization” (Chapter 10 Enriching the State). With regard to humankind, Xunzi says: His strength is not equal to that of the ox; his running is not equal to that of the horse; and yet the ox and horse are used by him. How is this? I say that it is because people are able to form social organizations, whereas these others are unable (Chapter 9 On the Kingly Way).

In order to maintain their existence, humans must “plan and use what is not of their kind to nourish their kind” (Chapter 17 Discourse on Heaven; trans. Chan 1963, p. 118). In other words, they must make use of and remake natural things that can be taken as the material means of human livelihood. However, an individual is powerless on his own; it is by the collective strength of a social organization that people are able to use oxen as farm animals. Hence the fact that “people are able to form social organizations” is an essential prerequisite to their utilization of nature to serve their own purposes. “How is it that people are able to form social organizations?” inquires Xunzi. “Because of their social distinctions.” “How can these distinctions be carried out?” he continues, “Through standards of righteousness” (Chapter 9 On the Kingly way). People are able to form social organizations through the division of labor and the distribution of resources; the reason why these divisions and distributions are possible is that people are encouraged and conditioned by certain politics, laws, and moral standards, that is, that there is “righteousness.” Thus it can be seen that Xunzi’s idea of “making social distinctions clear and forming a social organization” implies that the emergence of rules of proper conduct is meant to transform nature in an environment of a rational social order. The next question is why a rational social order needs to be regulated and restrained by rules of proper conduct. According to Xunzi, it is because there are conflicts among the people related to the pursuit of their material interests. He says:

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4 The Summing-Up Stage of Pre-Qin Philosophy When do the rules of proper conduct arise? The answer is that humans at birth have desires. When these desires are not satisfied, they cannot remain without seeking their satisfaction. When this seeking for satisfaction is without measure of limit, there can only be contention. When there is contention, there will be disorder; when there is disorder, everything will be destroyed. The early kings hated this disorder, and so they established the rules of proper conduct and standards of justice so as to set limits to this confusion, to satisfy people’s desires, and give opportunities for this satisfaction, in order that desires should not be stretched to the breaking point by things, nor things be used up by desires; that both these two should mutually support one another and so continue to exist. This is how the rules of proper conduct originated (Chapter 19 A Discussion of Rites).

This is his answer to the question of why the rules of proper conduct are required for a rational social order. Xunzi’s idea of “making social distinctions clear and forming a social organization” has progressive significance, since it is an attempt to explain the origin of social systems from the viewpoint of material life. His ideal social organization, however, is a hierarchical feudal society. In his opinion, this form of organization allows various social groups—the poor, the rich, the lowly, and the noble, all of whose rights and stations are delineated by certain rites and codes of conduct—to govern one another’s behavior. Xunzi’s positive view of feudalism reveals his bias in favor of the landlord class. According to Xunzi’s idea of “making social distinctions clear and forming a social organization,” humans have certain desires from birth. This involves his understanding of human nature. On the basis of his viewpoint of “understanding the distinctive functions of Heaven and humankind” he makes another point, that is, the idea of “transforming nature and arousing effort” (Chapter 23 The Nature of Man is Evil). This may be regarded as his theory of human nature. The phrase “transforming nature and arousing effort” is primarily intended to illustrate the difference between human nature and human effort. Xunzi says: “Human nature is the product of Heaven; it cannot be learned and cannot be worked for […]. What is in humankind and can be learned or accomplished through work is what can be achieved through effort. This is the difference between human nature and human effort” (ch. 23; trans. Chan 1963, p. 129). “Nature” (性, xing) here refers to natural qualities that humans have at birth and need not acquire through learning and activity; “effort” (wei, 伪) refers to human activity, which can be achieved through learning and working. Thus it can be seen that the “difference between nature and effort” is the expression of the “difference between Heaven and humankind” with respect to the theory of human nature. Again Xunzi says: “Nature is the unwrought material of the original; what is acquired are the accomplishments and refinements brought about by culture and the rules of proper conduct” (ch. 19). He holds that human nature is an original and unadorned material, but culture and the rules of proper conduct are the results of human activity. A person who can understand the “difference between nature and effort” and combine effort with nature (that is to say, a person who can handle the original material by acquired processing) will become a sage. Just as Gaozi and Mencius liken the relation between human nature and the virtues to the making of cups and bowls from the willow, so Xunzi compares the relationship

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between nature and effort to that between a raw material and the processing which it later undergoes. But Xunzi is opposed to Gaozi’s doctrine that “human nature is neither good nor evil,” and also disagrees with Mencius’ doctrine that “human nature is originally good.” He himself sets forth the doctrine that “the nature of humankind is originally evil.” As he says: Now, humankind’s inborn nature is to seek for gain. If this tendency is followed, strife and rapacity result and deference and compliance disappear. By inborn nature one is envious and hates others. If these tendencies are followed, injury and destruction result and loyalty and faithfulness disappear. By inborn nature, one possesses the desires of ear and eye and likes musical sound and beauty. If these tendencies are followed, lewdness and licentiousness result, and the rules of proper conduct and standards of justice disappear…From this point of view, it is clear that the nature of humankind is evil and that its goodness is the result of activity” (Chapter 23The Nature of Man is Evil).

Since human nature as a raw material is “evil,” the civilizing influence of sages and laws and the guidance of propriety and righteousness are required for it to become good: “The sages transformed human nature and aroused it to activity. As activity was aroused, propriety and righteousness were produced, and as propriety and righteousness were produced, laws and systems were instituted” (ch. 23); this is the process of “transforming human nature and arousing human activity.” According to Mencius’ doctrine of the goodness of human nature, just as “one can make cups and bowls by following the nature of the willow,” so the “goodness” is the result of following humankind’s innate beginning of goodness. According to his doctrine of the evilness of human nature, Xun Zi claims that just as “crooked wood must be heated and bent before it becomes straight,” so humankind’s originally evil nature must be corrected by the rules of proper conduct and laws (ch. 23; trans. Chan 1963, p. 132). Xunzi’s doctrine affirms that virtue is an accomplishment achieved over the course of one’s life; Xunzi objects to the aprioristic view of innate morals maintained by Mencius’ doctrine of the goodness of human nature. In spite of this, the doctrine of the evilness of human nature is still idealistic, because Xunzi does not understand that both goodness and evilness as ethical values belong to the categories of social consciousness and result from certain social relations, and that human nature is neither originally good nor evil. Thus it can be seen that Xunzi’s doctrine of the evilness of human nature is idealistic and superfluous to his philosophical system of naïve materialism. Nonetheless, Xunzi’s doctrine of “transforming nature and arousing effort” evidently contains some reasonable elements, in that it emphasizes that one is the product of one’s environment and education. In Xunzi’s opinion, though human nature does not result from human activity, it can be transformed; people’s habits are not originally in them, but can be acquired through activity. People’s way of life and social customs can cause their natures to change; if they are absorbed in business and studies instead of diverting their attention, then their experience and knowledge will accumulate. In addition, though one person’s nature is similar to another person’s, the one may become superior while the other becomes inferior because of differences in their respective educations and environments. A person who knows how to speak and

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act cautiously with regard to way of life and customs and who continually accumulates and compares what he learns will become a superior person, and a person who is indulgent of his emotions and desires and who does not study hard will become an inferior person (see Chapter 8 The Achievements of the Confucianists). For Xunzi, the important things are to strengthen education and to afford an opportunity to learn. Xunzi emphasizes that morality can be acquired through education, and in this, he agrees with Confucius and Mencius. However, Mencius thinks that morals are innate, and that the aims of education are to awaken people to their own original natures and to transform spontaneity into consciousness; therefore, the formation of virtues is none other than the recovery of humankind’s original nature. Unlike him, Xunzi holds that morals are the result of human activity, and that education aims at “transforming nature and arousing effort”, and he urges people to accumulate, inspect, and study what they have achieved; therefore, virtues are formed by the accumulation of goodness, just as “mountains are formed by the accumulation of earth, seas by the accumulation of water” (Chapter 1 An Exhortation to Learning), while evil nature is continually corrected and transformed. Xunzi’s idea of “transforming nature and arousing effort,” in the final analysis, is a sort of idealist conception of history. This is because “effort,” on his view, makes a difference only to concrete individuals, while it exercises no influence over the nature of all human beings as a kind, which remains evil from generation to generation. Moreover, Xunzi’s term “effort” refers exclusively to the activity of individuals, and especially to that of the sages. As he says: “Propriety and righteousness and laws and systems are the products of the activity of the sages” (Chapter 23 The Nature of Man is Evil; trans. Chan 1963, p. 130). Hence he assigns civilization to the creation of the sages. (3) Names are Instituted in Order to “Indicate Actualities” and “Discriminate Between Similarities and Differences” Xunzi sets forth his argument that “names are instituted in order to indicate actualities”(制名以指实zhi ming yi zhe shi), which is his summary of the debate over “names and actualities.” The thesis has two aspects. Epistemologically, it means that a name (concept) is the reflection of an object, and it is a process to reach the correspondence between the name (concept) and the object. Logically, it means that in order to reach the identity of names and actualities, thinking must be logical. Now let us examine these two aspects respectively. So far as the first aspect is concerned, the thesis affirms that objectively existing things are primary, while names (concepts) are secondary and used to describe and denote objective things. On the basis of this materialistic conception of names and actualities, Xunzi inquires about the process of human cognition. First, Xunzi holds that the material world can be known by humankind and that the human acquisition of knowledge is an unceasingly cumulative process. He says: “That which can know is the nature of humankind, and that which can be known is the law of the material world” (Chapter 21 Dispelling the Obsession). That is to say, humankind has senses at birth and has the ability to know, and the laws of objective

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things are knowable. People can correctly reflect reality in their ideas and concepts of the actual world, thus achieving the correspondence of names and actualities. What Xunzi emphasizes, however, is that human knowledge of things cannot be accomplished in one single step. He says: It is the common person in the street who, having accumulated goodness and wholly completed his cultivation, is called a Sage. First one must seek and only then will one obtain; one must do it, and only then will one reach perfection; one must store it up, and only then will one rise; one must complete its cultivation, and only then can one be a Sage. Thus the Sage is a person who has accumulated goodness. A person who accumulates practice in hoeing and ploughing becomes a farmer; who accumulates practice in cutting and carving wood becomes a carpenter; who accumulates practice in buying and selling becomes a merchant; who accumulates practice in propriety and righteousness becomes a superior person (Chapter 8 The Achievements of the Confucianists).

We may remember that Mencius has said that everybody can become a Yao or Shun. Similarly, Xunzi says that even an ordinary person in the street may become a sage. The two statements seem similar and yet there is an essential practical difference between them. In Mencius’ opinion, both excellent knowledge and excellent ability are innate. Yet to Xunzi, knowledge must be sought and only then can it be obtained; similarly any ability has to be practiced, and only then can it be perfected. Thus, there is neither innate knowledge nor innate ability. No master farmer, carpenter, merchant, or superior person owes his status to nature; instead, he comes to be what he is through the accumulation of experience over time. Thus it can be seen that Xunzi rejects apriorism with respect to the problems of knowledge and ability, and that he regards human knowledge as an unceasingly accumulative and upward movement. Second, Xunzi examines the relationship between the perceptual and the rational in a cognitive process. He says: The heart checks the knowledge of the senses. It is because the heart checks knowledge that it is possible to know sound through the ear and form through the eye. But the check of knowledge must also depend on the natural organs first registering it according to its classification. If the five organs register it without knowing what it is, and the mind checks it without understanding it, then everyone says there is no knowledge (Chapter 22 On the Rectification of Names; trans. Chan 1963, pp. 125–126).

Taking the heart (心xin) as the organ responsible for conceptual thought in the light of the level of science of that age, Xunzi believes that it can carry out the activities of comparison, analysis, and judgment, that is, that it can check (征zheng) the information detected by the senses. However, this check requires the presence of senseexperience, the acquisition of which depends on whether the relevant external objects interact with the various sensory organs (天官tian guan). Relatively speaking, Xunzi here correctly describes the relationship between the perceptual and the rational, since he not only stresses the role of conceptual thought but also shows its dependence on sense-experience in cognitive processes. In Chapter 21 (Dispelling Obsession) of the Xunzi, there is a parable which satirizes a meditator who ignores his sense-experiences. According to the story, there was once a man named Ji. He was good at devising riddles, and he liked to meditate. But if his eyes or ears were aroused by any stimulus, his thoughts became

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distracted; if he heard the buzzing of mosquitoes or flies, it destroyed his concentration. Therefore he withdrew himself from all stimuli and went to a cave where he would be far away from the buzzing of mosquitoes and flies, and there, living in quietude and calm meditation, he perfected his art. The fictional meditator being mocked by Xunzi is very probably a reference to Zisi, because his personal name is Ji and he pays attention to “introspection” by meditating behind closed doors. This parable vividly illustrates the fact that if a person meditates behind closed doors in complete isolation from sensible things, then any “wisdom” he produces, no matter how profound it seems, will consist merely of riddles. In the same chapter, there is another satirical parable which depicts a narrow empiricist who ignores conceptual thought. According to this story, to the south of Xiashu there once lived a man called Juan Shuliang, who was stupid and prone to fear. Once he went for a walk when the moon was shining brightly. Stooping down, he saw his shadow and took it to be a crouching devil; looking up, he caught sight of his hair and took it to be a standing demon. He turned and ran. When he arrived at his house, he lost his breath and died. This parable vividly illustrates the fact that, if a person neglects conceptual thought and distinguishes truth from appearance only by his or her sense organs, he or she will take unreal spiritual beings to be real. This parable can be understood as an attack on Mozi, who affirms the existence of spiritual beings on the basis of what one sees and what one hears. Third, Xunzi gives a relatively correct exposition of the relationship between knowledge and action in a cognitive process. He says: It is better to hear than not to hear; it is better to see than hear; it is better to know than see; it is better to do than know. The culmination of learning is doing. When some doing is taken the reason of things can be understood.[...]Therefore, without seeing there must be absurdities though what is heard may be extensive; without knowing there must be errors though what is seen can be kept in memory; without doing there must be straits though what is known is comprehensive (Chapter 8 The Achievements of the Confucianists).

In this passage, man’s cognition is described at several levels. Hearing nothing is not as good as hearing something. Merely hearing something (vicarious experience) is not as good as personal experience. Mere experience is not as good as understanding. Mere understanding is not as good as putting knowledge into practice. Only by reaching the level of doing can the learning (cognitive) process be regarded as complete; on the other hand, the possibility of action is conditioned on the presence of clear and perfect understanding. Here, Xunzi attains the naïve-materialistic conception of the unity of knowledge and action, since he not only points out that “knowing” guides “doing” but also affirms that “doing” is superior to “knowing.” Undoubtedly, Xunzi’s theory of the cognitive process described above incorporates some rational ideas from other philosophers’ discussions of the debate over “names and actualities” and contains genuine knowledge and insight. However, this theory also has some limitations. For example, human cognition, for Xunzi, seems only a process of quantitative accumulation; when it accumulates to the level of the sages, it will reach its end. Xunzi also thinks that the mind is similar to a pan of water. When the clear water collects on top, a man can see his beard and eyebrows reflected clearly in it. The mind is the same way. If the mind is in the state of pure

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illumination, it will reflect objects clearly and accurately. This is a theory of intuitive reflection. Now let us turn to the second aspect—the logical aspect. In Xunzi’s opinion, the current situation is that “names and actualities have been confused, and the standard of right and wrong is not clear”; therefore, it is necessary to “rectify names” (ch. 22). According to the view that “names are instituted in order to indicate actualities,” “the rectification of names” is not to “use names to rectify actualities,” but rather to make names (concepts) conform to changing actualities. Hence, from the viewpoint of logic, names are instituted in order to “discriminate between similarities and differences.” Xunzi says: Should a true king appear, he would certainly retain some old names and create new ones. This being the case, the reason for having names, the causes for the similarities and differences in names, and the fundamental principles on which names are instituted must be clearly understood (Chapter 22 On the Rectification of Names; trans. Chan 1963, p. 125).

According to him, the following three points must be examined. First, “the reason for having names”. As to the question of why names are to be instituted, Xunzi answers: “Men of wisdom sought to establish distinctions and instituted names to indicate actualities, on the one hand clearly to distinguish the noble and the humble and, on the other hand, to discriminate between similarities and differences” (ch. 22; trans. Chan 1963, p. 125). “To distinguish the noble and the humble” means that the rectification of names is aimed at the political goal of strengthening and stabilizing the feudal hierarchy. “To discriminate between similarities and differences” means that the rectification of names is logically aimed at discriminating between the similarities and differences of objective things. Xunzi’s claim to “discriminate between similarities and differences,” which is identical with the logic of the Mohist Canon, is undoubtedly right, though his idea of the functions of the rectification of names reveals his political bias towards the landlord class. Second, “the causes for the similarities and differences in names.” This point refers to the epistemological foundation for the rectification of names. Xunzi says: The organs of members of the same species with the same feelings perceive things in the same way. Therefore things are compared and those that are seemingly alike are generalized. In this way they share their conventional names as a common meeting ground (ch. 22; trans. Chan 1963, p. 125).

That is to say, all people that are of the same class and have the same feelings have the same impressions of objective things; therefore, people can comprehend the immense variety of phenomena with their sense organs. But, since the different phenomena of things have something in common, people can make a comparative study of them by means of their own conceptual thoughts. Thus people can exchange their thoughts after they employ concepts to describe those that are alike and express them by names established by usage. Third, “the fundamental principles on which names are instituted.” In Xunzi’s opinion, the principles are that “similar actualities are given the same name and different actualities are given different names” (ch. 22; trans. Chan 1963, p. 126).

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That means that there must be a one-to-one correspondence between names and actualities. Like the Later Mohist School, Xunzi asserts that the law of identity is the most fundamental principle of logical thought. As already mentioned, the Mohist Canon divides “names” into three types—general, classifying, and private—in the light of the generic relation of things. Xunzi further points out that, if viewed from the generic relation, a higher class concept can be called a “general name,” that is, a concept of genus, while a lower class concept can be called a “classifying name,” namely, a concept of species, but such a distinction is simply relative. A general name can continue to be generalized further until it reaches the point of maximal generality; that is, it can be generalized until it reaches the most general name, which Xunzi takes to be “things” (see ch. 22). Likewise, a classifying name can continue to be classified further until there is no room for further classification; that is it can be classified until it arrives at the individual, which is maximally specific. Here, Xunzi explains that both the concept of genus and the concept of species are relative and can be transformed into each other. Thus it can be seen that Xunzi not only affirms the law of identity of formal logic but also brings to light the transitional relations between the individual and the universal, and between similarities and differences, thereby showing that dialectics is a property of ordinary logical thinking. On the basis of his examination of the above-mentioned three points, Xunzi criticizes three fallacies. The first is typified by the Later Mohist paradox that “to kill a robber is not to kill a person.” Xunzi holds that this is an example of the fallacy of using names in such a way as to confuse them. Once we examine it in the light of the functions of names (concepts) and realize that it violates the principle that names are instituted in order to discriminate between similarities and differences, we can safely reject this argument. The second is typified by Hui Shi’s paradox that “mountains are on the same level as marshes.” Xunzi thinks that this is an example of the fallacy of using actualities in such a way as to confuse names, that is, the fallacy of using the relativity of similarities and differences between phenomena in such a way as to deny that concepts should have definite meanings. Once we understand how concepts are formed on the basis of perceptual facts, we can reject this argument. The third is typified by Gongsun Long’s paradox that “a white horse is not a horse.” Xunzi argues that this is an example of the fallacy of using names in such a way as to confuse actualities, that is, the fallacy of thinking of differences between concepts in terms of absolutes and forcing them on actualities. Once we check it against the definitions of conventional concepts and point out its logical error—what it has rejected (a horse) contradicts what it has accepted (a white horse)—we can reject this argument. Refuting those sophisms set forth by Hui Shi, Gongsun Long, and others, Xunzi rules out their relativism and absolutism and thus has come to understand something correct about the contradictory essence of logical thought. As he points out, in order to perform the function of “discrimination between similarities and differences,” we must examine the causes for similarities and differences in names and for the fundamental principles on the basis of which names are adopted. As for the causes, he points out that, on the one hand, sensible phenomena such as forms, colors, sounds, and smells differ in thousands of ways, but, on the other, the human intellect

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can make a comparison between them and generalize about them, so that people can exchange their thoughts with one another on the basis of conventional terms. As for the fundamental principles, he not only points out the logical principle that names and their actualities must correspond, but also affirms a mutually transitive and transformational relation between general names and classifying names. Again, Xunzi says: “Names have no corresponding actualities by themselves. The actualities ascribed to them are given by convention. When the convention is established and the custom is formed, they are called names of such-and-such actualities” (ch. 22; trans. Chan 1963, p. 126). The relation between names and their actualities is not fixed and unchangeable. Names should be changed in accordance with the changing actualities, and names and language as social phenomena are historically established by usage. All this shows that Xunzi recognized the dynamic state, as well as the static state, of logical thinking. Accordingly, Xunzi broke through the limitations of formal logic in some respects, and the seeds of dialectical logic are present in his thought. These seeds of dialectical logic also find expression in Xunzi’s inquiries about names or concepts (名ming), propositions (辞ci), and explanations or inferences ( 说shuo). Xunzi does not pay attention to the forms and structures of names, propositions, and inferences like the Mohist Canon does, but instead to the dialectical elements of logical thought embodied in them. He says: “Names are that whereby we define various actualities. Propositions are the combination of names of different actualities wherewith to discuss one idea. Dialectics and explanation take one actuality and its name under discussion, so as to understand the principles of movement and tranquility” (ch. 22). Every concept arises from many actualities of the same kind, every proposition is the combination of different concepts, and the principles of movement and quiescence can be discussed and explained on the condition that those applied concepts are not surreptitiously superseded by different concepts. It can thus be seen that any concept, proposition, or inference is the identity within which there are differences; if we want to explain the principles of movement and quiescence, on the one hand, we must abide by the law of identity of formal logic and not use other concepts surreptitiously to supersede the applied concepts, and on the other we must employ concepts flexibly and actively. That is to say, the form of thinking as such should be the unity of movement and tranquility. Though Xunzi cannot yet have conscious dialectical thought, so far as his idea that “names are instituted” in order to “discriminate between similarities and differences” is concerned, he has shown us to some extent that dialectics is a property of ordinary logical thinking. (4) “Resorting to Evidence,” “Analysis and Synthesis,” and “Dispelling Obsession” Xunzi’s philosophical summary of the issues of “Heaven and humankind” and “names and actualities” in dispute among the pre-Qin philosophers is inseparable from his methods of thinking such as “resorting to evidence” (符验fu yan), “analysis and synthesis” (辨合bian he), and “dispelling obsession” (解蔽jie bi). These

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methods of thinking meet the essential demands of dialectical logic for looking at problems objectively and from all sides. Xunzi says: The person versed in ancient matters will certainly support them with evidence from the present, and he who is versed in the principles of Heaven will certainly support them with evidence from the world of men. In any discussion, the important things are analysis and synthesis and resorting to evidence. One can then sit down and talk about one’s doctrine, propagate it, and put it into practice (Chapter 23 The Nature of Man is Evil; trans. Chan 1963, p. 132).

In this passage, Xunzi gives a summary of the political issue of “past and present” as well as the philosophical issues of “Heaven and humankind” and “names and actualities.” As regards the relationship between past and present, he holds that the person who succeeds in talking about ancient matters must support his claims with evidence from the present, and as regards the relationship between Heaven (nature) and humankind he holds that the person who succeeds in talking about the principles of nature must support his claims with evidence from occurrences in human life. Obviously, Xunzi’s summary is on the basis of the materialistic conception of names and actualities. As to the relationship between names and actualities itself, Xunzi argues that any doctrine must go through “bian he (辩合)” and “fu yan (符验).” By “bian he (辩合),” he means analysis and synthesis; by “fu yan (符验)”, he means that a doctrine must be verified by facts. When these two points are accomplished, “one can then sit down and talk about one’s doctrine, propagate it, and put it into practice.” That is, at that time one reaches the unity of knowledge and action, and of names and actualities. So we may say that Xunzi has described the rudiments of methodology—the unity of analysis and synthesis, and the unity of theory and reality. The view that “the important thing is resorting to evidence” is characterized by naïve materialism, and the view that “the important thing is analysis and synthesis” by naïve dialectics. In Xunzi’s opinion, the objective grounds for analysis and synthesis are the relations between the similarities and differences of things; if one wants to conduct analysis and synthesis correctly, then one must correctly employ the categories of “class” (类lei), “cause/reason” (故gu) and “principle” (理li). Xunzi pays much attention to using the categories of “class,” “cause/reason,” and “principle” as the methods of explanation or analysis and synthesis. As he says: Differences should be discriminated without mistake; things should be classified without error. When one listens to the words of others, one should bring them into accord with the proper forms; when one discourses on one’s own ideas, one should give a complete explanation of the causes/reasons. By means of the right principle one can distinguish wickedness, as with the plumb-line one may determine the crooked and the straight. For this reason, unorthodox doctrines will be powerless to cause confusion and the fallacies of the hundred schools will have nowhere to hide (Chapter 22 On the Rectification of Names).

Here, Xunzi discourses on the three interconnected categories—“class,” “cause/reason,” and “Way” (principle). He holds that reasoning should be carried forward in the light of the generic relation and must not run counter to the principles

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of formal logic, and that during a debate one should adduce all reasons in support of one’s case. In Chapter 6 “In Refutation of Twelve Scholars”, Xunzi attacks many contemporary schools of thought on the grounds that they violate the principle that “when one discourses on one’s own idea, one should give a complete explanation of the causes/reasons”. Though they may have sufficient grounds for their views and speak in a rational and convincing way, “all of them have become obsessed by a small corner of truth and failed to comprehend the fundamental principle” (Chapter 21 Dispelling Obsessions). This fundamental principle is none other than the Way (Dao). Therefore, what Xunzi emphasizes is that “by the Way one can completely comprehend things” (Chapter 5 Against Physiognomy), and that one should approach problems from the overall viewpoint of the Way. This is equivalent to another saying of Xunzi’s: “Use the one to know the myriad” (ch. 5). It carries two implications. The first is that a person should “find a basis for unity in the Way and on this basis examine the facts” (ch. 21), that is, a person should examine everything from the viewpoint of the uniform and correct Way. Logically, this is the deductive method from general to particular. The second is that “if you wish to know a thousand years, then consider today; if you wish to understand ten or one hundred thousand, then examine one or two” (ch. 5), that is, if one makes an examination and study of one or two typical objects, then one may draw a general conclusion from the particular facts. Logically, this is the inductive method. From Xunzi’s applications of the categories of “class,” “cause/reason,” and “principle,” we can discern his thoughts on dialectical logic—looking at problems from all sides, the unity of the general and the particular, and the unity of deduction and induction. According to Xunzi, if one wants to make a correct explanation or analysis and synthesis, then one must “dispel his obsessions,” that is, one must do away with the subjective one-sidedness in one’s mind. Xunzi analyzes the objective and subjective causes which contribute to one-sidedness. He says: What are the sources of obsession? One may be obsessed by what is desired or by what is disliked, by beginning or by end, by nearness or by distance, by the broad or by the shallow, by the past or by the present. When one makes distinctions among the myriad things, these distinctions all become potential sources of obsession. This is a danger in the use of the mind that is common to all men (Chapter 21 Dispelling Obsessions).

Objectively, everything has its contradictory opposite, for example, desire versus dislike, beginning versus end, distance versus nearness, and so on, but people are apt to see one side alone while the other side is overlooked, thus leading to one-sidedness. Subjectively, one-sidedness is often caused by people’s partiality towards their own accumulated knowledge and experience. Xunzi says: “He clings to what has been accumulated in him and is loath to hear ill spoken of it; he judges some different theory on the basis of his old prejudices and, when he encounters it, he is loath to hear it praised” (ch. 21). Xunzi is aware of the errors of subjectivism and one-sidedness that are easily committed in people’s thought; therefore, he puts forward the slogan of “dispelling obsession.” In order to “dispel obsession,” Xunzi advances his view that “all things are to be put on an equal basis and to be kept in balance” (ch. 21). That is to say, if one

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can comprehend all internally contradictory sides of a thing and judge them by the standard of the all-embracing “Way” (Dao), then one will not be obsessed but will see the thing in its true colors. According to this view, Xunzi makes an analysis of the exponents of various schools of thought and points out that each of them is obsessed by something while having insight about something else. He says: Mozi was obsessed by utilitarian considerations but did not understand the value of culture. Songzi (Song Xing) was obsessed by desires but did not understand morals. Shenzi (Shen Dao) was obsessed by the concept of law but did not understand the part to be played by the sages. Shen Buhai was obsessed by power but did not understand the role of human intelligence. Hui Shi was obsessed by words but did not understand the truth that lies behind them. And Zhuangzi was obsessed by the conception of Heaven but did not understand the importance of humankind (ch. 21).

And: [Shenzi] had insight about following but not about leading. [Laozi] had insight about bending but not about expansion. [Mozi] had insight about equality but not about inequality. And [Songzi] had insight about having few desires but not about having many desires (Chapter 17 Discourse on Heaven; trans. Chan 1963, p. 123).

Xunzi holds that each of these philosophers notices only a certain side of the contradiction, that is, each has insight about something but does not notice the other side; this is precisely because each has been obsessed by what he himself has insight about. So, what one has insight about and what one is obsessed by are interconnected. Xunzi’s analysis and criticism embody the method of dialectical logic which maintains that everything has two aspects. However, Xunzi’s way of thinking still has some limitations. He holds that the feudalist “Dao” is constant and unchanging, and he believes that to rule in accordance with the Dao requires the extensive use of punishments instead of reasoned arguments. This is a feudalist autocratic view. (5) The Doctrine of Cultivating an Ideal Person The most essential problem in Xunzi’s mind is how to cultivate a perfect personality (成人cheng ren), an interest which is shared by all Confucians. Xunzi says: The superior person knows that what lacks completeness and purity does not deserve to be called beautiful. Therefore he recites the classics sentence by sentence in order to have a thorough knowledge of the Way, ponders in order to understand it, associates with those who embody it, puts it into practice in order to make it part of himself, and shuns those ideas and feelings that are harmful to the Way in order to sustain and nourish it (Chapter 1 An Exhortation to Learning).

That is to say, only a complete and pure personality can be considered real or beautiful. For this reason, one must not only make unremitting efforts to study, ponder, and practice but one must also pay attention to self-cultivation and dispel those ideas and feelings that are harmful to the Way. By these means, one may become a real person of virtue and integrity through lifelong efforts. Xunzi goes on:

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Keep resolute in virtue and integrity because only then can you be firm of purpose. Be firm of purpose because only then can you be responsive to all. One who can be both firm of purpose and responsive to all is truly to be called a perfect person (ch. 1).

It seems that Xunzi’s words are similar to Mencius’. Nevertheless, there is an essential difference between them. In Xunzi’s opinion, the process of cultivating an ideal person is the one in which “virtues are formed by accumulation of goodness”; through study, meditation, and self-cultivation, a person will make virtues his natural habits. According to Mencius, to cultivate an ideal person is to recover his or her innate nature by means of study and self-cultivation. For Xunzi, the accumulation of goodness requires perseverance. Accordingly, he makes an examination of the features of the will. He says: The heart (mind) is the ruler of the body and the master of its godlike intelligence. It gives commands, but it is not subject to them. Of its own volition it prohibits or permits, snatches or accepts, acts or stops. Thus the mouth can be forced to speak or to be silent, the body can be forced to stoop or to stand upright, but the mind cannot be made to change its intention. What it considers right it will accept; what it considers wrong it will reject. Hence we may say that it is the nature of the mind that no prohibition may be placed upon its selections, and inevitably it will manifest itself autonomously. And although the objects it perceives may be many and diverse, if its acuity is of the highest level, it cannot become double-minded (Chapter 21 Dispelling Obsessions).

Here, Xunzi discourses on the two qualities of the will—its autonomy and its single-mindedness. Xunzi holds that the Way (Dao) must be mastered by rationality on the grounds that the will bears the burden of its free choices without restrictions, so that humankind can weigh the advantages and disadvantages. He says: Superior persons find a basis for unity in the Way and on this basis examine and compare the facts. Since they have the unity of the Way as their basis, their approach will be correct; and since they examine and compare the facts, their knowledge will be clear. With thinking that is based upon a correct approach, and action that is based upon clear knowledge, they are able to control all things (ch. 21).

That is to say, if a person has not only good behavior but also clear knowledge, then he can become the master of all things, thus gaining freedom. In Xunzi’s view, the will should be subject to rationality, and freedom comes from the recognition of necessity (the Way). Such a rationalistic view is consistent with Confucius’ and Mencius’. Xunzi pays greater attention to the role played by rites (li礼) and music (yue乐) in the cultivating of an ideal person than Confucius and Mencius do. He writes two treatises dedicated to these subjects—“A Discussion of Rites” and “A Discussion of Music”—and his followers elaborate on the ideas expressed in these two works, thus developing a complete Confucian theory of rites and music. Xunzi expounds the educational role played by rites and music from the angle of philosophy (especially aesthetics). In “A Discussion of Music,” Xunzi points out that there are three elements in music. First, music expresses human feelings and will. He says: “Superior persons

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utilize bells and drums to guide their wills, and lutes and zithers to gladden their hearts” (Chapter 20A Discussion of Music). Thus music is indispensable for satisfying people’s emotional needs. As he says again, “Now music is the expression of joy. This is something that human feelings make unavoidable” (ch. 20). Second, both the sound of music and the movements associated with it have harmonious rests and notes. He says: “When there is joy, it must be expressed in sound and given embodiment through movement and repose” (ch. 20). These sounds and dance movements are not disorganized but have rests and notes as harmonious as the music of the Ya and Song. Third, music gives expression to the Way and has artistic appeal. He says: “Its indirect and direct appeals, its complexity and simplicity, its frugality and richness, and its rests and notes may stir up the goodness in people’s minds and prevent evil feelings from gaining any foothold” (ch. 20). Here, Xunzi has advanced an essential argument of the theory of expression—that human feelings and will find expression in sound, rhythm, and images, which embody a certain ideal. In Xunzi’s opinion, rites are also the expression of human feelings. He says: “In general […] when rites are at their best, human feelings and ceremonials are both fully expressed” (Chapter 19 A Discussion of Rites). Rites embody certain moral codes that are the expressions of a certain moral ideal. Again, Xunzi says: “Hence the rites are to serve Heaven above and Earth below, honor our ancestors, and make eminent our rulers and teachers” (ch. 19). Once the making of rites and music is accomplished, they will play a role in cultivating and educating people, since they are the expressions of human feelings. Xunzi says: Through the performance of music the will is made pure, and through the practice of rites the conduct is brought to perfection, the eyes and ears become keen, the temper becomes harmonious and calm, and prevailing habits and customs are changed. All the world becomes peaceful and joins together in the joy of beauty and goodness (Chapter 20 A Discussion of Music).

On the one hand, music helps to cultivate humankind’s inner feelings and will; on the other hand, human virtue (goodness) gradually changes into something habitual and even natural, and becomes an object of beauty; both the personality and human life trigger our sense of beauty. This is the “freedom” in aesthetics. Xunzi’s doctrine of how to cultivate an ideal person displays his thoughts on the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty, though in a naïve way. As the saying goes, “what lacks completeness and purity does not deserve to be called beautiful”. What is required of a person is that he make himself a perfect person—one who has comprehensive knowledge, or “has the unity of the Way as one’s basis” (that is, truth) and has pure virtues, or has “a correct approach and action” (i.e. goodness), and one who cultivates one’s own feelings through enjoying the music as melodious as the Ya and Song, thus obtaining the “joy of beauty and goodness.” These ideas are indeed very valuable Of course, such a doctrine as held by Xunzi has some historical and class limitations since the people whom he wants to cultivate are the so-called superior persons of the feudal landlord class. To sum up, in his excellent summary of the debates over “Heaven and humankind” and “names and actualities,” Xunzi has reached the unity of naïve materialism and

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naïve dialectics, and has made outstanding contributions to the conception of the Way of Heaven, and to the theory of knowledge and logic. As to the conception of the way of humankind, his doctrines of “making social distinctions clear and forming a social organization,” “transforming nature and arousing effort,” and “cultivating an ideal person” have quite a few reasonable elements. As a matter of course, some metaphysical and idealistic views remain in his system of philosophy. In particular, his thoughts are clearly colored by despotism because of the historical conditions of his time. He maintains that rulers should suppress “wicked doctrines” by force and use similarly violent methods to govern the behavior of the people. In fact, Xunzi can be understood as having laid part of the intellectual groundwork for the Burning of the Books which occurred later, during the reign of Qin Shi Huang (first emperor of the Qin dynasty). The feudalist, autocratic tendencies in Xunzi’s works were later developed much further by his student Han Fei.

4.2 Han Fei: “Incompatible Things Cannot Coexist” The Lüshi Chunqiu (Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals), the representative work of the Eclectic School (zajia杂家), appeared during the summing-up stage of pre-Qin philosophy. The Eclectic School is an amalgamation of many philosophical and scientific schools of thought, and the Lüshi Chunqiu reflects this, presenting ideas from a variety of philosophical traditions as well as reporting scientific achievements made in areas of astronomy, calendrical science, medicine, and so on. Philosophically, the theory in the book is eclectic. For it, “One” is none other than a compromise of “Many.” For example, no foxes are completely white, but many individual fox furs can be made into a composite fur which is completely white by having their white sections cut out and pieced together. Each school of thought has strong points as well as weak points; the works that can amalgamate and incorporate all of the strong points will be perfect. The Lüshi Chunqiu was compiled on the basis of this theory. While the Lüshi Chunqiu emphasizes the unity of opposites, Han Fei emphasizes the struggle of opposites. Han Fei (ca. 280–223 BCE), a student of Xunzi, was a native of the state of Han. Seeing the decline of his native country, he repeatedly presented ideas of reform to the king of Han in his early years. But none was accepted. When his written works were brought to the state of Qin, the king of Qin admired them very much. Then Han Fei went to the Qin. But later he had to commit suicide in prison, owing to the intrigue by his schoolmate Li Si and other Qin officials. His written works are preserved in a book entitled Han Feizi. A Legalist, Han Fei holds that all other doctrines should be banned. He says: Just as ice and burning charcoal do not remain long in the same container and as winter and summer do not arrive at the same time, so heretical and contradictory teachings cannot be expected to prevail simultaneously and result in orderly government (ch. 50; trans. de Bary et al. 1965, p. 140).

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That is to say, Legalism and those unrefined and conflicting doctrines practiced by various philosophers cannot exist together. When such a proposal of banning “heretical and contradictory teachings” was put into practice by Qin Shi Huang, it led to the Burning of the Books. Philosophically, such a proposal represents a form of dogmatism that stresses struggle and violence as opposed to eclecticism; as Han Fei says: “What is mutually incompatible should not exist together” (ch. 49). (1) The Idea of Governing by Law and the Conception of an Evolutionary History As regards the debate over propriety and law, Han Fei epitomizes the thought of the Legalist School of the pre-Qin period and proposes that government should take law as its core and combine the use of law (法fa), statecraft (术shu), and power ( 势shi). “Law,” enacted by the monarch, consists of policies and decrees. “Statecraft” refers to the means by which the monarch governs his citizens. By “power,” Han Fei means the monarch’s supreme authority. During the time prior to Han Fei, Shang Yang put stress on “law,” Shen Buhai on “statecraft,” and Shen Dao on “power.” Han Fei makes a critical summary of them, holding that all three are indispensable tools for monarchy, and “law” is the most essential among them. If the monarch acts according to the law, concentrates all power in his own hands, and maintains his supremacy over those he rules, then he will put his state in order. Proceeding from this view, Han Fei denounces Confucians who advocated the doctrine of propriety and righteousness as those who “brought confusion to the law with their learning” (ch. 49) and as chief among the “five vermin.” By that time, the debate over propriety and law had focused its attention on the issues of “governing in a kingly way” and “governing by might” (wang ba 王霸) and of “virtue and power” (de li 德力). Xunzi advocates using the dual tactics of moral education and government by law (or, equivalently, the two tactics of humanity and violence), whereas Han Fei holds that moral education and government by law (or humanity and violence) are opposite, and they are irreconcilable to each other. Han Fei says: “The severe household has no fierce slaves, but it is the affectionate mother who has spoiled sons. From this, I know that an awe-inspiring power can prohibit violence and that virtue and kindness are insufficient to end disorder” (ch. 50; trans. Chan 1963, p. 253). The prohibition of violence and disorder must depend on the ruler’s power instead of moral education. Again, he says: “Moreover, people are submissive to power and few of them can be influenced by the doctrine of righteousness” (ch. 49). In his eyes, Mencius’ proposal of “convincing people by virtue” is futile. In regard to the debate over past and present, the Legalist School first explicitly advances the evolutionary conception of history. The Book of Lord Shang has already mentioned that the evolution of history might be divided into several stages such as “the highest antiquity,” “middle antiquity,” and “later days,” which represent a long evolutionary process from primitive to civilized society. Han Fei further develops this early Legalist view of evolutionary history. In Chapter 49 (The Five Vermin), he describes the process, which is from “the age of remote antiquity” (the time of “Nest-Builder” and “Fire-Maker”), “the age of middle antiquity” (the time of Yao,

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Shun, Gun, and Yu), and “the age of recent antiquity” (the time of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties) to “the present age” (the time of the Warring States period). Through these ages, human material life and social systems gradually improved; therefore, “if somebody in this present age should praise the ways of Yao, Shun, Tang, Wu, and Yu, he would certainly be ridiculed by contemporary sages” (ch. 49). Here, Han Fei stresses that social history is unceasingly evolutionary. There is no denying that such a view is right. Han Fei attempts to explain the cause of historical evolution as the contradiction between population increase and the means of life. He points out that, in ancient times, “there were few people and plenty of supplies; therefore, the people did not contend for them.” But later people did not consider a family of five children as large, and, with each child having again five children, before the death of the grandfather there might be twenty-five grandchildren. Thus the rate of population increase exceeded the rate at which new resources could be developed: “The result is that there are many people and few supplies …. So the people fall to quarreling, and though rewards may be doubled and punishments heaped up, one does not escape from disorder” (ch. 49). In addition, Han Fei explains moral phenomena from the view of conditions of material life, as he says: The ancient indifference to goods was not because of moral virtue, but because of the abundance of goods. Nor are the present-day struggles for acquisition due to moral decadence, but because of the scarcity of goods. It was not because of moral excellence that (in the past) one lightly declined the position of Emperor, but because of the limitations of one’s power. And it is not because of moral decadence that (today) one strives fiercely for government employment, but because of the weightiness of the authority (ch. 49).

Han Fei’s explanations of social history and moral phenomena are undoubtedly progressive in comparison with the Confucian historical conception of the Mandate of Heaven, the Daoist conception of historical regression, and the Yin-Yang School’s cyclical theory of history. He concludes that “people of high antiquity strove for moral virtue; people of middle times sought out wise schemes; people of today vie to be known for strength” (ch. 49), holding that this is the objective law of historical development. According to such a law, “circumstances differ with the age” and, “as circumstances change, the ways of dealing with them alter too” (ch. 49); therefore, “humanity and righteousness served for ancient times, but no longer serve today” (ch. 49). Only through government by law and violence can a state be put in order in the present day. Han Fei’s ideas provide a foundation for the conception of history in the Legalist political doctrine. As a matter of course, Han Fei overemphasizes government by law, completely denies moral education, and considers violence as something that determines everything else. All this is substantially an expression of the idealistic doctrine of violence. (2) “Acting in Accordance with the Dao and Principles” and “Making Use of Human Feelings” In the debate over Heaven and humankind, Han Fei continues along Xunzi’s line of naïve materialism. He says: “Be like Heaven, be like Earth; then who will be close

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to you, who will be distant? He who can model himself on Heaven and Earth may be called a sage” (ch. 8; trans. Watson 2003, p. 39). In his view, material nature is without consciousness and treats everything on the equal footing. Han Fei stresses that humankind should “keep to the proper order and act in accordance with nature” (ch. 29). That is to say, humankind should act in accordance with the natural law. However, since he overemphasizes to “act in accordance with nature,” his dialectical thought is less developed than Xunzi’s. Han Fei’s important contribution to the conception of the Way of Heaven lies in his investigations of Dao (the Way) and principle (li). He says: “Those who act in accordance with the Way and principles will certainly succeed” (ch. 20; trans. Chan 1963, p. 260). The “Dao” and “principles” here refer to, respectively, the general law and particular laws. Again, he says: “The Dao is that by which all things become what they are. It is that with which all principles are commensurable. Principles are patterns according to which all things come into being, and the Dao is the cause of their being” (ch. 20; trans. Chan 1963, p. 260), arguing that the “Dao” is the sum of laws and the general basis for the particular laws (that is, principles) embodied in innumerable concrete things. The “principles”, as particular laws of concrete things, differ from one another and each of them is bound in some particular locality; therefore, they may be called “definite principles.” “According to definite principles, there are existence and destruction, life and death, flourishing and decline” (ch. 20), because all concrete things are changeable. Hence, definite principles cannot be regarded as “eternal,” whereas the Dao is eternal due to its transcendence of changes and definite principles. Han Fei says: “What is eternal has neither change nor any definite particular principle” (ch. 20; trans. Chan 1963, p. 261). On the one hand, the Dao exists from the very beginning of the universe and will neither die nor decline until Heaven and Earth disintegrate, but, on the other, the Dao has “no fixed mode of life” for it exists within all principles. As he says: “The Dao is commensurate with all principles [as one]; therefore, it has to go through the process of transformation” (ch. 20; trans. Chan 1963, p. 260), that is to say, the Dao is not a rigid form but always adapts itself to the laws of changing concrete things as time goes on. Here, Han Fei touches on the dialectical relationship between general law and particular law—the Dao is the basis for principles while it resides in them, or the general law conditions particular laws while it resides in them. In his analysis of the relationship between “Heaven and humankind,” Han Fei often links the idea of “following Heaven” with that of “doing as humankind wishes.” “Acting in accordance with nature” contains two components—“Do not oppose the natural order” and “Do not inflict injury upon human feelings and nature” (ch. 29). With regard to the second component, Han Fei holds that human nature consists in liking the profitable and disliking the harmful. Accordingly, he proposes that the ruler should use rewards and punishments in accordance with the nature of humankind to rule over the people. As he says: “All ruling of the empire must be done by utilizing human nature. In human nature, there are the feelings of like and dislike, and hence rewards and punishments may be employed” (ch. 48; trans. Bodde 1952, 326). Before him, Shen Dao pointed out that it is called “serving themselves” (自为zi wei) that all people act in their own interests, whereas it is called “serving me” (为我wei wo)

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that I want to transform the other person’s nature in order to have him or her do me favor, and he argued that the ruler can only take advantage of people’s feelings of “serving themselves” but not demand that people serve him alone. Han Fei accepts this view and thinks that people are all selfish; as he says: “They all harbor the idea of serving themselves” (ch. 32). He stresses that all relations between people are transactional and based on egoism. For example, a physician often sucks people’s wounds clean and holds the bad blood in his own mouth, not because he is bound to his patients by any tie of kinship but because he knows that there is profit in serving them; the wainwright making carriages hopes that others will grow rich and eminent, not because he is kindhearted but because he knows that if people do not become rich and eminent his carriages will never sell; the carpenter fashioning coffins hopes that people will die prematurely, not because he harbors any ill-will towards them but because he knows if people do not die there will be no market for coffins; and when consorts, concubines, and heirs have organized into cliques, they long for the ruler’s death because, unless he dies, their position will never really be strong (see ch. 17). For this reason, the ruler must administer his state by means of the law, statecraft (that is, the art of conducting affairs and handling men), and power. In this way, Han Fei completely rejects the principle of humanity. He says: “It is hazardous for the ruler to trust others, for he who trusts others will be controlled by others” (ch. 17). Respecting and trusting others is a fundamental element of the principle of humanity advocated by Confucius and Mencius. This element was first attacked by the Laozi and Zhuangzi, and at last completely abandoned by Han Fei, who is in favor of despotism. Precisely because of his total rejection of the principle of humanity, Han Fei’s materialistic views on the relationship between “Heaven and humankind” are highly dogmatic. This is born out by the following points. First, Han Fei lays one-sided stress on the fact that the Way (Dao) transcends all things. Though he mentions the view that the Way inheres in all things—in the course of his investigation of the relationship between the Way and principle (理li)—he puts greater stress on the claims that “The Dao does not identify itself with the myriad things; its Power (德de) does not identify itself with the yin and yang […] or a ruler with his ministers. […]The Dao itself is never plural, therefore it is called a unity. For this reason the enlightened ruler prizes solitariness, which is the characteristic of the Dao” (ch. 8; trans. Watson 2003, p. 37). He argues that the Dao is unparalleled since it transcends all things, including the yin-yang, just as a ruler is superior to his ministers. Second, Han Fei lays one-sided stress on the difference and exclusion between opposites. In his analysis of the “definite principle,” he speaks of the connection and transformation between opposites. As he says: “In all cases, principle is that which distinguishes the square from the round, the short from the long, the coarse from the refined, and the hard from the brittle” (ch. 20), and “According to definite principles, there are existence and destruction, life and death, flourishing and decline” (ch. 20; trans. Chan 1963, p. 261). However, he is more in favor of “either-or” expressions to highlight the view that the two opposites cannot coexist. He holds that, the yin and the yang, authority and moral education are opposite to each other, and these

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opposites cannot exist together and are therefore mutually exclusive. That is to say, the yang does not exist while the yin exists, and vice versa; moral education does not exist while authority exists, and vice versa. It is obvious that Han Fei thinks of the struggle between opposites in terms of absolutes. Third, Han Fei regards the enlightened ruler as a sage who accumulates virtue while attaining complete vacuity, maintaining steadfast quietude, and taking no action. He says: “Affairs lie in the four quarters (i.e., the outside world). What is important is in the center. The sage holds what is important, and the four quarters come to imitate him” (ch. 8; trans. Bodde 1952, p. 330). The sage here refers to the autocratic monarch of a centralized state, who arrogates all powers to himself and is unfathomable, since he attains vacuity and maintains quietude: “The enlightened ruler reposes in non-action above, and below his ministers tremble with fear” (ch. 5; trans. Watson 2003, p. 16). Here, the idea contained in the Laozi that “the sage is not humane” is followed to an extreme by Han Fei; the sage is none other than a dictator who makes his subjects tremble with fear. (3) “Examining One’s Words by Comparison and Verification” In the debate over “names and actualities,” Han Fei also continues along Xunzi’s materialistic line. He says: “Judge between right and wrong according to names and actualities. Examine words by comparison and verification” (ch. 14). He means that people should judge their words according to whether names match actualities, and that they should examine the advantages and disadvantages of words by comparative analysis and the verification of facts. The term can yan (参验comparison and verification) advanced by Han Fei emphasizes the testing of human knowledge on the basis of its practical results (that is, utility). He says: “All theories and all practices should aim at desired utility” (ch. 41). Here is an example. Any person may take a bow and arrow and shoot at random. It is quite possible that he may by chance hit a hair-tip. But we do not call him a good archer, because he has no constant target to aim at. Likewise, a person’s words and practices should not amount to random shooting. The term canyan also implies comparison. In Han Fei’s opinion, when one draws a comparison between theories, one should consider them from many sides and try to find their faults. One should be good at piecing clues together, and one should be willing to make examinations of the localities, the timeliness, the inherent laws of things, and the human relationships, and willing to use these examinations to test theories. By testing one’s theory against these four kinds of examinations, its correctness or incorrectness can be determined (see ch. 48). What Han Fei says here expresses his admonishment to look at problems from all sides and to make a logical exposition and demonstration. Moreover, Han Fei’s term can yan particularly stresses examining one’s words by the law of contradiction of formal logic. In the history of logic, Han Fei is the first to put forward the concept of contradiction (矛盾mao dun). He offers the following parable of a man who contradicted himself. In the state of Chu, there once lived a man who sold spears and shields. At first, taking up a shield, he boasted that his shield was so solid that nothing could pierce it. After a moment, he held up a spear and bragged that his spear was so sharp that it could pierce anything. Then a bystander asked him:

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“What will happen when you stab your shield with your own spear?” The seller was unable to answer. This parable is supposed to show that people should use the law of contradiction as an intellectual tool for the examining of words. Accordingly, he holds that “appointing persons on their merits” is logically contradictory to “appointing persons by power”, and that two logically contradictory things cannot coexist; if they could, it would be as ridiculous as the man who contradicted himself in selling his spear and shield. Han Fei, however, does not understand that some contradictory relations cannot be resolved by the rules of formal logic alone. Some of the contradictions which he examines through the lens of formal logic are contradictions that can and should be resolved by dialectical methods instead. He says: What is mutually incompatible should not exist together. To reward those who kill their enemies in battle and at the same time to exalt acts of kindness and benevolence, to bestow honors and offices to those who capture cities and at the same time to believe in the doctrine of universal love, to sharpen weapons and strengthen troops as preparation for emergency and at the same time to praise the style of flowing robes and ornamental girdles (worn by the literati) […] how can an orderly and strong state result from such self-contradictory acts? (ch. 49; trans. Chan 1963, p. 258)

According to Han Fei, power and virtue, ice and burning charcoal, yin and yang, and so forth, have an either-or relation; “both this and that” is impossible. In this way, he mistakes the law of contradiction of formal logic for the fundamental principle of worldview and thus falls into the metaphysical mode of thought. Therefore, compared to Xunzi’s ideas of resorting to evidence (符验fu yan) and analysis and synthesis ( 辨合bian he), Han Fei’s idea of can yan (参验comparison and verification) is less dialectical and more dogmatic. To sum up, Han Fei expounds the Legalist conception of evolutionary history; examines the relationship between the Way (Dao) and principle (li) in the light of his conception of the Way of Heaven; and in the realm of epistemology, he puts forth the concept of can yan. There are reasonable elements in all of these projects. But Han Fei also overemphasizes the role of violence and struggle, completely rejects the principle of humanity, and regards the mutual exclusion of opposites as an absolute. These errors lead to metaphysical dogmatism. His doctrines are also particularly well-adapted to the sensibilities of the oppressive feudal leadership. Therefore, the influence exerted by Han Fei on later generations, both positive and negative, should not be underestimated.

4.3 The Yi Zhuan: “The Interaction of Yin and Yang Constitutes the Dao”—The Establishment of the Naïve Principle of the Unity of Opposites The Yi Zhuan (The Appendices of the Book of Changes), a commentary on the Yi Jing (The Book of Changes), consists of seven appendices, namely, “Tuan Zhuan”

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(Appendix 1, Pts. 1 and 2), “Xiang Zhuan” (Appendix 2, Pts. 1 and 2), “Xi Ci Zhuan” (Appendix 3, Pts. 1 and 2), “Wen Yan” (Appendix 4), “Shuo Gua Zhuan” (Appendix 5), “Xu Gua Zhuan” (Appendix 6), and “Za Gua Zhuan” (Appendix 7). It is my view that the ideas embodied in the Yi Zhuan were already in circulation by the Warring States period, although the book itself may have been composed slightly later. With respect to the debate over “past and present,” the Yi Zhuan has an idea of evolutionary history which is opposed to those of the previous Confucian classics. Its description of this historical process is as follows: “When in early antiquity Bao Xi (that is, Fu Xi) ruled the world. […]He made knotted cords and used them for nets and baskets in hunting and fishing”; this was the age of hunting and fishing. On the death of Bao Xi, there arose Shen Nong: “He fashioned wood to make the plowshare, and bent wood to make the plough handle,” that is to say, he cultivated crops; moreover, “when the sun stood at midday, he held a market,” that is to say, the exchange of commodities arose.1 The civilized age began from Huang Di, Yao, and Shun: “They introduced double gates and night watchmen with clappers in order to deal with robbers”—which implies that by their time, there was private and family property to protect; moreover, “they made use of bow and arrow in order to keep the world in fear”—which implies the existence of states and armed forces (see Appendix 3: 2). The Yi Zhuan not only regards human history as being unceasingly evolutionary and developmental but also fully affirms the role of social revolution in history. It says: “Heaven and Earth bring about revolution, and the four seasons complete themselves thereby. Tang and Wu brought about political revolutions because they were submissive toward Heaven and in accord with men. The time of revolution is truly great” (Appendix 1). With respect to the debate over “Heaven and humankind,” what the Yi Zhuan constructs is an idealistic system. It says: “The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way (Dao). What issues from the Way is good, and that which realizes it is the individual nature” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, pp. 465–466). That is to say, the Way (Dao) means the opposition and unity of the yin and yang; to inherit the Way is good; to realize and develop the Way is human nature. Such a view, which requires humankind to carry out the Way so as to achieve goodness in the realization of human nature, is the development of Mencius’ aprioristic doctrine of the goodness of human nature. According to the Yi Zhuan, the principle of change is eternal, a priori, and beyond space and time, and nothing, not even Heaven, can infringe upon it. Hence, the Yi Zhuan makes a well-known claim—“What exists before the physical form and is therefore without it is called the Way. What exists after the physical form and is therefore with it is called a concrete thing” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, p. 537). The formless Way is prior to concrete things with physical forms, which is undoubtedly an objective-idealistic view. Proceeding from this view, the YiZhuan further says: What is manifested is called form (象xiang). What has taken physical form is called a concrete thing (器qi). To control and use things is called method (法fa). And when they are

1

These translations are taken from Bodde (1952, p. 394).

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used to advantage, either in this or that way, so all people utilize them, that is called spirit ( 神shen) (Appendix 3: 1).

This saying is quite similar to Xunzi’s slogan, “Control the Mandate of Heaven and use it”; however, Xunzi’s starting point is materialism while the Yi Zhuan’sis objective idealism, because it admits that the principle of changes (易yi) is a priori. With respect to the debate over “names and actualities,” the YiZhuan advocates apriorism. It says: “The Yi is a book vast and great, in which everything is completely contained. The Way of Heaven is in it, the Way of Earth is in it, and the Way of humankind is in it” (Appendix 3: 2). The Book of Changes represents the model of the whole world including Heaven, Earth, and humankind, and everything in the world comes from the model. Again, it says: The eight trigrams (卦gua) are arranged according to completeness; thus the forms are contained in them. Thereupon they are doubled; thus the lines (爻yao) are contained in them. The strong and the weak displace each other, and change is contained therein. The judgments, together with their counsels, are appended, and movement is contained therein (Appendix 3: 2).

That is to say, each of the eight trigrams is combined with another, one upon the other, thus making sixty-four hexagrams, each of which consists of six lines, divided or undivided, where the divided represents the weak, and the undivided represents the strong. All changes can be explained in terms of the strong and weak displacing one another, and thus these hexagrams symbolize all possible situations; the lines of the hexagrams can even be used to describe and predict human events, which is why they were used in fortunetelling. For the Yi Zhuan, the speculative system constructed by the sages with the eight trigrams is enough to describe all of the world’s changes. Obviously, it takes names (that is, trigrams and their forms) as primary, and actualities as secondary. In addition to its idealism, the Yi Zhuan is colored by mysticism. As it says: “Heaven suspends its emblems (that is, stars, sun, moon, and so on) from which are seen good and bad fortune” (Appendix 2: 1). However, the Yi Zhuan contains much that is dialectical, though it is enveloped in idealism and mysticism. The Yi Zhuan designates yi (changes) or Dao (the Way) as the law of development of the universe: “The Yi means production and reproduction” and “The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way (Dao)” (Appendix 3: 1). Again: “The succession of closing and opening constitutes transformation” and “As Heaven ( 乾qian) and Earth (kun坤) take their respective positions, the system of Changes is established in their midst” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, pp. 267). All these remarks regard the antithesis between yin and yang, or between qian and kun, as the law of development of all things in the world, and thus express in a naïve way the idea that development is a unity of opposites. As already mentioned, the Laozi first put forward the principle of negation in its proposition that “The movement of Dao consists in reversion” and the form of dialectical thinking, that is, “Straight words seem to be their opposites.” But it abandons its dialectical project halfway. Later, as the result of Zhuangzi and some logicians’ questionings, more doubts arose and at the same time more examinations were made into the issue of whether logical thinking is

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capable of comprehending the law of development of the universe and the principle of unity of the world. Subsequently Xunzi was much concerned with the dialectics of knowledge and concepts, but paid less attention to the law of development of the universe as such. The eclectics stressed unity, whereas Han Fei emphasized struggle; both of them fell into one-sidedness. Therefore, the principle that “development is unity of opposites” was not established until the Yi Zhuan put forth the idea that “the successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way.” The Yi Zhuan holds that the principle of unity of opposites or the law of development of the universe can be understood by way of concepts. On the one hand, it is conscious of the contradiction between words and ideas, or names and actualities; just as it says: “Words cannot express ideas completely” (Appendix 3: 1). But on the other, it says: “The system of Change (that is, the Book of Changes) […] distinguishes things by means of suitable names, and makes decisive judgments by means of the right words. Then, everything is complete” (Appendix 3: 2). Hence the words again: “The system of Change is tantamount to Heaven and Earth, and therefore can always handle and adjust the Way of Heaven and Earth” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, p. 265). That is to say, the system of Change corresponds to the Way of Heaven and Earth, namely, conceptual dialectics corresponds to objective dialectics. In this way, the Yi Zhuan gives an affirmative answer to the question of whether logical thinking is capable of comprehending the law of development of the universe. According to the Yi Zhuan, each form of the hexagrams represents a class concept of universal character. Therefore, “distinguishing things by means of suitable names” is exactly “distinguishing things by means of their kinds.” And any kind is nothing more than the unity of opposites between yin and yang. The saying of “making decisive judgments by means of the right words” makes greater strides than the Laozi’s saying, “straight words seem to be their opposites.” For example, the Yi Zhuan says: “[Kun]means closing and qian means opening. The succession of closing and opening constitutes transformation. The alternate going and coming of [yin and yang] is called continuity” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, p. 267). Moreover, “When a thing has run its course, it has to be transformed. Through transformation, continuity is achieved. Through continuity, duration is achieved” (Appendix 3: 2). Here, the saying that “When a thing has run its course, it has to be transformed” embraces the implication of the Laozi’s saying that “the movement of the Dao consists in reversion” and shows that a positive assertion contains difference, connection, and transition within itself. The Yi Zhuan further points out the connection between negative and positive in its illustration of the view that “through transformation, continuity is achieved” by the saying that “the succession of closing and opening constitutes transformation; the alternate going and coming is called continuity.” It thus fairly comprehensively describes the dialectical idea of the unity of opposites between assertion and negation. The Laozi one-sidedly emphasized the triumph of weak over strong, while the Yi Zhuan says: “As the strong and the weak lines displace one another, change and transformation arise” (Appendix 3: 1). The Laozi “had insight about bending but not about expansion” (Xunzi’s words), while the Yi Zhuan says: “To go means to contract and to come means to expand. Contraction and expansion act on each other and thus advantages are produced” (Appendix 3: 2; trans. Chan 1963,

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p. 268). It is obvious that the Yi Zhuan overcomes the one-sidedness embodied in the Laozi and embodies the dialectical insight that everything, objective or conceptual, has two aspects. The Yi Zhuan carries the idea of the unity of opposites through its investigations on the categories of “class” (类lei), “cause/reason” (故gu), and “principle” (理li) or the “Way” (Dao). The Yi Zhuan holds that each class consists of contradiction, being a unity of similarity and difference. Its explanation of the hexagram opposition is: “Above, fire; below, the lake: the form of opposition. Thus amid all similarities the Superior Person should see their differences” (Appendix 2) and “Heaven and Earth are opposites, but their action is concerted. Man and woman are opposites, but their interests are in harmony. All things stand in opposition to one another, but their functions are similar” (Appendix 1). This hexagram is composed of trigram li above, that is, flame, which burns upward, and dui below, that is, the lake, which seeps downward. The two elements, fire and water, are at once exclusive and united, just as Heaven and Earth are opposites though their actions are concerted. Therefore, when observing different things, we must see their similarities; when observing similar things, we must see their differences. According to the Yi Zhuan, any class not only contains contradiction within itself, but also can be transformed into one another. It discourses on the reciprocal transformation of hexagrams (that is, class concepts). For example: “Tai denotes things having free course. Things cannot forever have free course, and so this is followed by pi (denoting things’ being shut up and restricted)” (Appendix 6). It argues that the whole arrangement of hexagrams in the Book of Changes is an endless transitional process such as that from tai to its opposite pi. The category of “class” received deeper and deeper investigations as pre-Qin philosophy developed. The Mohist Canon inquired into the meaning of “class” from the point of view of formal logic, and demanded that reasoning conform to the rules of general relation. Xunzi required people to look at problems from an all-sided and consistent point of view. And the Yi Zhuan explicitly points out that class itself contains contradiction and that classes can be transformed into one another. In fact, both Xunzi and the Yi Zhuan have recognized the significance of class in dialectical logic, according to which we should proceed to examine the similarities and differences of things from a comprehensive point of view, so as to grasp the contradictory movement and reciprocal transformation of the class of things in question. To employ the category of “class” to conduct analysis and synthesis in (辩合bian he) is, in its substance, to use the comparative method of dialectical logic. Though the demand of “distinguishing things by means of their kinds” in the Yi Zhuan does lead to quite a few absurd analogies—for example, it compares qian (one of the eight trigrams) to Heaven, father, and horse, and kun to Earth, mother, and ox—yet actually the Yi Zhuan regards the forms of hexagrams (class concepts) as algebraic symbols when it classifies things in those categories. The use of these algebraic symbols in the description of actualities provides a wide variety of analogies and conjectures for all kinds of things and processes in the phenomenal world and for their organic interconnections and reciprocal transformations. Such analogies and conjectures, if

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closely combined with “resorting to evidence” (符验fu yan), can become a scientific method. Methodologically, the main task of “distinguishing things by means of their kinds” is to “obtain a form” (取象qu xiang), that is, to form a correct class concept and take it as a model. The Yi Zhuan says: “If the number of changes is increased to the utmost, they determine all forms on Earth” (Appendix 3: 1), assuming that if one arranges fifty yarrow stalks in a given order then one may determine all forms of hexagrams and thus make attributes of all things appropriately shown therein. Without a doubt, this is superstitious; however, its demand to comprehend a class concept by the quantitative relation between things is of great methodological importance. Moreover, “determining the forms” does not mean that the forms are immutable. What it stresses is to “proceed through the changes” (Appendix 3: 1). From this point of view, one should observe both “time,” represented by a hexagram, and “position,” represented by a line, when one practices divination in order to try to predict good or bad fortune. This, of course, is also superstitious, but at the same time it is methodologically significant. It implies that one should place a thing under a particular time condition during the examination of its changes, and one should take action on the current situation. In short, the Yi Zhuan presents some of the essential points of the comparative method of dialectical logic, and represents a more significant advance than does Xunzi’s use of the category of “class” to conduct “analysis and synthesis” (辩合bian he). In regard to the category of cause/reason, the Yi Zhuan holds that “the system of Changes (the Book of Changes) has neither thought nor action, because it is in the state of absolute vacuity-tranquility”, but “when acted on, it immediately penetrates all things” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, p. 267), that is, it can know thoroughly why all things are so. This indeed shows the apriorism and mysticism of the Yi Zhuan. Its investigations on the category of “cause/reason,” however, also contain some dialectical ideas. It emphasizes that one should “know the causes of what is hidden and what is manifest” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, p. 265) and qian and kun are exactly the causes the of changes of all things. It says: “[Qian] directs the great beginning, and [kun] brings to completion” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, p. 248). This means that qian is the cause of all beginnings and kun is the cause of alfufilments. So far as human activity is concerned, “[qian] means the shaping of forms, and [kun] means to model after them” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, p. 266). That is to say, when people begin the process of acting, they have an idea or plan, or a “form”, in their minds; this is called qian. Their actual, concrete actions are modeled after the qian, and they are called kun. In short, any change, natural or artificial, can be reduced to the unity of opposites between qian and kun. Thus it can be seen that the Yi Zhuan recognizes that contradictions are the sources of all changes. Towards the category of principle (li), the Yi Zhuan adopts an apriorist attitude, holding that the system of Changes (the Book of Changes) encompasses all laws of things in the world, as it says: “The system of Changes […] encompasses all ways on Earth” (Appendix 3: 1). However, it explicitly points out that natural laws are “unfabricated” (无妄wu wang), which is to say necessary. It says: “Under Heaven,

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thunder rolls; all things attain the natural state of the unfabricated. Thus the early kings, rich in virtue and in harmony with the times, fostered and nourished all beings” (Appendix 2). The hexagram wuwang is composed of Heaven (乾qian) above and thunder (zhen) below; hence the words, “Under Heaven, thunder rolls.” All things conform to the necessary law of nature, but the sagacious kings can nourish all beings according to the law and the conditions of their times. For the Yi Zhuan, people can “know the subtle emergence of an activity (that is, the possibility of a change)” if they are in harmony with the law and conditions. It says: “The subtle emergence ( 几ji) is the minutest beginning of an activity or that which is the first trace of good fortune (or misfortune) that shows itself” (Appendix 3: 2). Ji denotes not fictional but real possibility which has certain budding manifestations. The sages “reach the utmost of things and examine their subtle emergence” (Appendix 3: 2). In this way, they can grasp the possibility of development at the level of inherent laws of things, and make concrete things in the light of human purposes so as to accomplish their great undertakings. The dialectics of the Yi Zhuan is active and vigorous. One of its famous sayings is “Heaven, in its motion, is vigorous. The superior person, in accordance with this, spurs himself to ceaseless activity”(Appendix 2). It presents a sharp contrast to the Laozi’s passive thesis that “Weakness is the function of the Dao,” which is derived from its central claim that “the movement of the Dao consists in reversion.” The YiZhuan, however, also has some limitations. One of them, for example is, that in order to defend the feudal hierarchical system, it falls into metaphysics: “Heaven is high, the Earth is low, and thus […] Heaven and […]Earth are fixed. As high and low are thus made clear, the honorable and the humble have their places accordingly” (Appendix 3: 1; trans. Chan 1963, p. 265). The other example is that it remains entangled with the cyclical theory according to which “when there is end, there is beginning again” (Appendix 1). Moreover, it contains quite a few regrettable superstitious elements, which were expanded and developed in the Yi Wei (Apocryphal Treatise on the Changes) during the Han dynasty. As a matter of course, the tremendous influence on later generations exerted by the dialectics of the Yi Zhuan is positive after all.

4.4 The Development of the Doctrine of the Yin-Yang and Five Agents—The Application of the Comparative Method of Dialectical Logic to the Sciences Xunzi and the Yi Zhuan already presented the basic principles of naïve dialectical logic, but at the same time there was another doctrine—the doctrine of the yin-yang and five agents, which, as a natural philosophy, was closely related to astronomy, calendrical science, musicology, medicine, agronomy, and so on, and accordingly the logic of this doctrine is more obviously related to scientific methods. In the Lüshi Chunqiu and the Nei Jing (Yellow Emperor’s Canon of Internal Medicine), the

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comparative method of dialectical logic was applied to the realm of concrete sciences and became a highly effective method. The Yue Ling (Monthly Ordinances), a chapter of the Li Ji (Record of Rites), comprises the first sections of each of the first twelve chapters in the Lüshi Chunqiu which correspond to the twelve months of the calendar. It illustrates the connection between science and myth, reflects the level of knowledge of astronomy, calendrical science, and agricultural production in the Warring States period, and incorporates superstitious elements in correlating each of the twelve months of the year with a particular divine ruler, attendant spirit, and so on. The Lüshi Chunqiu says: “Whatever one does, one cannot go against the order of Heaven, and must act according to the season and follow the class to which what one does belongs” (ch. 8). In the discourse on offering sacrifices to gods, it continues: “It is necessary to draw a comparison for the sake of examining the quality of sacrifices. We need to measure them so as to make sure that they meet the standard of the mean” (ibid.). These words embrace the essential view and method of the doctrine of the yin-yang and five agents, whose main links consist of “drawing a comparison” (比 类bi lei), “modeling after a form” (取象qu xiang), “making a measurement” (度量du liang), and “acting according to the season” (顺时shun shi). The application of this view and method by the Monthly Ordinances contains materialistic and scientific elements as well as idealistic and superstitious ones. On the one hand, it is scientific when it discourses on the “order of Heaven,” “acting according to the season,” and “following the class” in such contexts as the following, among others: In this month (August), day and night are equally long, thunder ceases to be deafening, the insects and reptiles that are going to hibernate get near to their secluded places, and the negative (yin) force is getting more pervasive and stronger while the positive(yang) force is weaker day by day. …People are persuaded to seed the fields with wheat on time, or else they will miss the season (ch. 8).

But on the other hand, there are quite a few forced analogies in the same chapter. For example, it says: “The first two days of the month (August) are geng and xin, its divine ruler is Shao Hao, its attendant spirit, Ru Shou. Its creatures are hairy, its musical notes shang, its pitch-pipe nan-lü, its number nine. Its taste is hot, its smell stinking…” (ch. 8). It is worth noticing that the logical categories of “number,” “class,” “time,” and so on, employed by the Monthly Ordinances, are all similar to those of the Yi Zhuan. Moreover, when the Monthly Ordinances discourses on the “order of Heaven” and on the correspondences between the twelve pitch-pipes and the months of the year, it places much greater emphasis on grasping these class concepts in terms of the quantitative relations. Ancients knew long ago that a sound is determined by the length of a pitch-pipe and hence that different musical notes can be explained by the differing quantitative proportions of their respective instruments. In the case of the pitch-pipes, the Guanzi first presented the “method of decreasing or increasing onethird of the pitch-pipe”; the Lüshi Chunqiu presumed that music is generated from the measurements and explained the twelve pitch-pipes using the method introduced by the Guanzi. Later, both the third chapter of the Huainanzi and the twenty-third

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chapter (“Treatise on the Pitch-pipes and the Calendar”) of the Han Shu (History of the Han Dynasty) followed this pattern. For example, the length of the linzhong pitch-pipe (which is yin) is six inches; that of the huangzhong pitch-pipe (which is yang), nine inches; that of the taicu pitch-pipe, eight inches. In other words, linzhong is two-thirds the length of huangzhong, while taicu is four-thirds the length of linzhong. Following the same formula, the length of each of the remaining nine pitch-pipes is derived from that of its predecessors by alternately multiplying by 2/3 and then by 4/3. The mutual promotion between the yin and yang leads to the twelve pitch-pipes in which six are yang and the other six yin. By the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the Chinese study of pitch-pipes was already rather accurate. Thus, the study of the quantitative relationships between musical notes is a scientific one. Moreover, the division of the year into four seasons and twelve months can also be explained in terms of quantitative relations, namely, by the alternating lengths of day and night, and the ebb and flow of the yin and yang, or winter and summer. Accordingly, the Monthly Ordinances holds that the twelve pitch-pipes can be matched with the months of the year; for example, huangzhong is matched the eleventh month, linzhong with the sixth, taicu with the first, nanlu with the eighth, and so on. That the pitch-pipes and the calendar reflect common quantitative relations is one of the deep-rooted ancient Chinese beliefs. By a logical extension of this point, the movement of celestial bodies, the growth of all things in the natural world, and the evolution of human society, like the pitch-pipes and calendar, all represent the ebb and flow of opposing forces between yin and yang and have a common order in respect of quantitative relations; therefore logical thinking can comprehend the contradictory movement of the examined class in terms of its quantitative relations. Such is the method which the School of Changes called modeling after a form (取 象qu xiang) or applying the number (运数yun shu). This method, if subjectively used, will unavoidably bring about absurd views, as is illustrated by the apocrypha of the Han dynasty; if objectively used, that is, used in a way which adheres to the principle of “analysis and synthesis” and “resorting to evidence” advocated by Xunzi, it is a fruitful method, as is the case in the sciences of musicology and calendric science. The integration of ancient naïve dialectical logic with the doctrine of the yin-yang and five agents succeeded the most conspicuously in the area of medicine. The Yellow Emperor’s Canon of Internal Medicine explores some fundamental problems related to the unity of opposites between the yin and yang and the mutual promotion and restraint among the five agents, and thus possesses a wealth of medical dialectical ideas. It may be said that the book reached the unity of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics in the area of medicine. The Canon of Internal Medicine consists of two parts: Part One, “Pure Questions” and Part Two, “Spiritual Pivot.” As regards the relationship between “Heaven and humankind,” the Canon of Internal Medicine says: I (the Yellow Emperor) hear that the people who are versed in the principles of Heaven will certainly support them with evidences from the world of humankind. The people versed in ancient matters will certainly find something suited to the present. The people versed in human affairs will certainly draw something from them to fit their own needs. In this way,

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they will not be puzzled about the Dao and will grasp fundamental principles, and therefore they are wise (1: 39).

Since these words are very similar to Xunzi’s, we may infer that Xunzi probably influenced the Canon of Internal Medicine. Methodologically, both of them place stress on “resorting to evidence,” holding that claims about the Dao of Heaven should be tested by human affairs and that claims about ancient matters should be tested against present facts. And the Canon of Internal Medicine believes that one is similar to others, while Xunzi also says: “Judge others by oneself.” But there is a difference between them: Xunzi endorses both “understanding the distinctive functions of Heaven and humankind” and “controlling the Mandate of Heaven and using it,” and thus emphasizes the human struggle against nature; the Canon of Internal Medicine, in contrast, stresses the organic connection between humankind and nature, and admonishes us to scrutinize the human body from the point of view of organic connection. The Canon of Internal Medicine says: Since ancient times any person who penetrates Heaven has his or her foundation of life, which is generated from the yin and yang [...].Nine orifices (the eyes, noses, ears, mouth, urethra and anus), five viscera (the heart, liver, spleen, lung and kidney) and twelve joints (the large joints of the four limbs), all are penetrated by heavenly vital force (qi) (1: 3). If the internal (materials) and the external (functions) work in harmony, the human body will not be invaded by evils (ibid.). If acting in accordance with the principles, one will enjoy one’s natural long life (ibid.).

In other words, the human body is closely bound up with nature. A person who manages to secure coordination between internal and external, humankind and Heaven, and yin and yang will not be disordered by evils; a person who preserves his health according to the natural laws can prolong his life. This is a materialistic doctrine of the unity of Heaven and man. As to the problem of “names and actualities,” the Canon of Internal Medicine says: “The combination of the yin and yang brings about physical things; their names are to be rectified with their changes” (1: 9). This, obviously, is also a materialistic view. How, then, can one capture an objectively changing process through the use of concepts? The Canon of Internal Medicine also emphasizes “making the measurements”. It says that the measurements of various parts of the human body should be made on the basis of objective observation and dissection so as to obtain data on solid organs, hollow organs, blood, and the like (see 2: 12). Without a doubt, this is a scientific attitude. In addition, the Canon of Internal Medicine puts forth the method for diagnosing diseases by using “discrimination and comparison between the classes.” Diverse changes of pulse condition may be measured and discerned using the tips of the fingers, and the condition of the five viscera may be inferred by a comparison between the functions of the viscera the manifestations of their functioning that are visible on the surface of the body. Such reasoning from analogy is obviously not made on the basis of generic relation, but on the basis of making observations, comparisons, and conjectures by means of the categories of the yin-yang and five agents. The application of the class concept by the Canon of Internal Medicine is similar to

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that of the Yi Zhuan, but the Canon of Internal Medicine does not advocate the Eight Trigrams. In the Canon of Internal Medicine, the human body and natural phenomena are reduced to the five kinds of wood, fire, earth, metal, and water (that is, the five agents), and are generalized into the unity of two opposite properties between the yin and yang. There is certainly something implausible in the Canon of Internal Medicine’s use of such categories to draw analogies between the five agents and the five viscera, or the five sense organs (nose, eyes, lip, tongue, and ear), or the five tastes (acrid, sweet, sour, bitter, and salty), or the five modes of emotion (excess joy, anger, sorrow, terror, and anxiety), or the five climates (windy, hot, wet, dry, and cold), or the five positions (east, west, south, north, and middle), or the five seasons (the four seasons plus June in the lunar calendar), and so on. Such analogies, however, are valuable insofar as they contain the idea of organic connection. According to the Canon of Internal Medicine, the human body is an organic entity since its five viscera, six hollow organs (gall-bladder, stomach, large intestine, small intestine, urinary bladder, and triple warmer), five sense organs, five tissues (tendon, vessel, muscle, skin, and bone), and system of channels and their collaterals are all interrelated, sharing the work and cooperating with one another. The physiological changes of the human body and its mental activities (joy, anger, and so on) are interrelated and interactive; the human body and the natural world are also interconnected due to the close relations between human health or illness and the surrounding natural circumstances, especially changes of climate. The method of “making a comparison between the classes” and “modeling after a form” applied by the Canon of Internal Medicine is substantially the comparative method of dialectical logic, which requires making comparisons of similarities and differences between two kinds of things and thus the comprehension of the contradictory movement (the ebb and flow of the yin and yang) of the examined object so as to form proper surmises. The Canon of Internal Medicine says: “Matters that consist of the yin and yang may number from ten to a hundred, or from a thousand to tens of thousands, and may even be beyond counting. But their principles are the same” (1: 6). It means that all things in the world can be reduced to and explained by the unity of opposites between the yin and yang, which is the fundamental cause that brings about development and change in everything. So far as the natural world is concerned, the light and lucid yang represents Heaven, while the heavy and turbid yin represents Earth. The earthly qi (water vapor) ascends and turns into cloud, while the heavenly qi (cloud) falls and turns into rain. Rain comes from the earthly qi, while cloud comes from the heavenly qi (1: 5). This just shows that the yin and yang are interdependent and transform into each other. So far as the human body is concerned, “the yang forms vital energy and the yin shapes up the body,” that is, health depends on the coordination between the yin and yang: An excess of the yin leads to deficiency of the yang, and an excess of the yang leads to deficiency of the yin. An excess of the yang may bring about heat syndromes, and an excess of the yin may lead to cold. An overabundance of cold will transform to heat, and an overabundance of heat will transform to cold (1: 5).

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This also shows the mutual dependence and transformation of the yin and yang. Accordingly, in diagnosing a disease, “a good doctor will first differentiate the yin and yang by means of observing a patient’s state of mind and feeling his pulse” (ibid.). That is to say, a disease, whether it belongs to the yin or yang category, must first be identified. As to the principle of treatment, the Canon of Internal Medicine asserts that “the disorder of yang may be treated with yin, while the disorder of yin may be treated with yang.” It can be seen from the above-mentioned analysis that the author of the Canon of Internal Medicine is good at dialectical thinking, and that those statements, all well express the contradictory movement of thinking, that is, the unity of opposites between affirmation and negation, in the structure of their reasoning. However, the Canon of Internal Medicine holds that the principles that “an excess of the yin leads to deficiency of the yang, and an excess of the yang leads to deficiency of the yin” and “the disorder of yang may be treated with yin, while the disorder of yin may be treated with yang” can never be applied subjectively, and that it is imperative to start from objective facts and concretely analyze conditions so as to identify measures which are suitable for the particular time, place, and patient. The Canon of Internal Medicine places great stress on “time,” saying, “One who carefully bides one’s time may recover from a disease. One who misses one’s time will never recover […]. Therefore, carefully waiting for an opportunity for acupuncturing the points where qi [vital force] lies is called catching a favorable opportunity” (2: 76). Such an attitude of taking therapeutic measures rigorously on the basis of the objective motion of matter and its time condition truly reflects a materialist spirit. Of course, there are some subjective forced analogies and thus some absurd conclusions in the Canon of Internal Medicine when it uses the method of “making a comparison between the classes” and “modeling after a form.” It says: The sky is round and the Earth square; accordingly a person’s head is round and his or her foot square. The sky has the sun and moon, and a person has two eyes. The Earth has nine continents, and a person has nine orifices. The sky has wind and rain, and a person has excess joy and anger. The sky has thunder and lightning, and a person has voice and sound [...]. A year consists of three hundred and sixty-five days, and a person consists of three hundred and sixty joints (2: 71).

These forced analogies attempting to prove the “corresponding relation between the human body and nature” are fallacious. However, they will be overcome, provided that people adhere to materialism and consistently test their theories against the facts. This has been borne out by the later history of Chinese medicine. During the Warring States period, the School of the Yin-Yang and Five Agents split up. Some of its members, such as Zou Yan (ca. 305–240 BCE), tended towards idealism. According to the Han dynasty historian, Sima Qian, in his Records of the Historian, “Zou Yan’s words were exaggerated and unorthodox. He invariably examined small objects and extended this to larger and larger ones until infinity.” Though Zou Yan advocates examining small objects first, he extends his survey to infinity too quickly and ceases to test his theory against the facts, thus falling into a “weird and impractical argument.” When discoursing on history, Zou Yan extends the five agents to the realm of political affairs and puts forth the cyclical

References

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theory of the Five Virtues. In his opinion, the cyclical restraint among the five agents determines the rise and fall of historical dynasties. For example, the succession of the three dynasties of Xia, Shang, and Zhou is the result of the virtue of fire (the Zhou) overcoming the virtue of metal (the Shang), and the virtue of metal overcoming the virtue of wood (the Xia). This doctrine obviously cannot be tested and verified since it violates Xunzi’s principle that “the person versed in ancient matters will certainly support them with evidence from the present, and he who is versed in the principles of nature will certainly support them with evidence from the world of humankind.” A forced analogy also appears in the thirteenth chapter of the Lüshi Chunqiu, which may be regarded as a doctrine belonging to Zou Yan’s group. It says: When some new dynasty is going to arise, Heaven exhibits auspicious signs to the people. During the rise of Huang Di (the Yellow Emperor), large earthworms and large ants appeared. He says: “This indicates that the agent Earth is in the ascendant, so our color must be yellow, and our affairs must be placed under the sign of Earth.” During the rise of Yu the Great, Heaven produced plants and trees that did not wither in autumn and winter. He says: “This indicates that the agent Wood is in the ascendant, so our color must be green, and our affairs must be placed under the sign of Wood.” During the rise of Tang the Victorious, a metal sword appeared out of the water. He says: “This indicates that the agent Metal is in the ascendant, so our color must be white, and our affairs must be placed under the sign of Metal.” During the rise of King Wen of the Zhou, Heaven exhibited fire and many red birds holding documents written in red flocked to the altar of the dynasty. He says: “This indicates that the agent Fire is in the ascendant, so our color must be red, and our affairs must be placed under the sign of Fire. Following Fire, there will come Water. Heaven will show when the time comes for Water to dominate. Then the color will have to be black, and affairs will have to be placed under the sign of Water. And that dispensation will in turn come to an end, and at the appointed time, all will return once again to Earth. But when that time will be we do not know (ch. 13).2

Such a doctrine extending the mutual promotion and restraint among the five agents to the evolution of history is a cyclical theory of history. The Xunzi (ch. 6) says of Zisi and of Mencius: “Based themselves on ancient traditions, they fabricated theories that they called [those of] the five agents.” This criticism is completely appropriate for Zou Yan’s group of the School of the YinYang. Their analogies are actually characterized by idealist “fabrication of theories.” This is a lesson learned from negative experience: people must adhere to the principles of “resorting to evidence” and “analysis and synthesis” advocated by Xunzi when they use the method of “making a comparison between the classes” and “modeling after a form.”

References Bodde, Derk. 1952. A History of Chinese Philosophy by Fung Yu-lan, vol. 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

2

The translation has consulted Needham (1991, p. 238).

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Chan, Wing-tsit. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. De Bary, Theodore, Chan, Wing-tsit and Watson, Burton. 1965. Sources of Chinese Tradition. New York: Columbia University Press. Needham, Joseph. 1991. Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Watson, Burton. 2003. Han Feizi: Basic Writings. New York: Columbia University Press.

Part I

A Brief Summary

I Philosophy is a generalization and summation of our knowledge of nature and society. Class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experimentation are the motive forces which push philosophy forward. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, when China’s society was in the midst of a great upheaval, the philosophical struggle reflected the class struggle of that time, and in turn the philosophical revolution ushered in political reforms. In the late Spring and Autumn period, feudalism as a new system of exploitation was replacing slavery, which had been in decline. In response to this social upheaval there arose the various schools of thought—Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, Legalism, and so on—which sparked a great debate concerning “past and present” and “propriety and law.” The Military Strategist School, the Legalist School, and the School of Huang-Lao, representing the interests of the then-rising landlord class, advocated government by law and opposed the doctrine of “back to the ancients,” thus laying the theoretical groundwork for the landlord class to seize state power and institute its desired political reforms. Originally, the Confucian School, representing the interests of the declining slave-owner class, advocated the preservation of the ancient ways and the restoration of the ceremonials of the Zhou. But later, when Mencius advanced the idea of “the kingly Way” or “benevolent government,” the school changed its political orientation and began to advocate for the interests of the landlord class under the banner of “following the early kings.” Xunzi’s theses of “carrying out both propriety and law at the same time” and “combining governing in a kingly wayand governing by might” set a precedent for the confluence of Confucianism and Legalism. During the late Warring States period, these writings, including the Xunzi, Han Feizi, the Lüshi Chunqiu, and the Yi Zhuan, prepared the public intellectually for the establishment of a unified and centralized feudal state power. By the end of this period, the various schools of thought active since the late Spring and Autumn period had tended towards unification, as was described metaphorically by the Yi Zhuan—“In the world there are many different roads but the destination is the same.” The contention among the

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various schools of thought during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods caused a philosophical revolution, which paved the way for the political establishment of the feudal system. But this revolution was incomplete, since the state needed to practice despotism in politics and metaphysics and idealism in philosophy in order to strengthen its unity. By the end of the Warring States period, this tendency had arisen. In spite of their great achievements in the areas of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics, the philosophical systems of Xunzi, Han Fei, and the Yi Zhuan contained certain idealistic and metaphysical ideas which served the purposes of feudal despotism. Apart from that, the history of pre-Qin philosophy shows that the philosophical struggle is directly related to the struggle between science and religious superstition, and that philosophy and science can help each other forward. The religious doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, along with blind belief in spiritual beings, both of which had been the dominant ideology since the age of the Yin and Zhou, began to be seriously challenged in the Spring and Autumn period, when an ideological tendency towards atheism became very influential. Among the Confucian, Mohist, Daoist, and Legalist schools of thought, some expressed doubt about and even denied the existence of spiritual beings, while some also opposed the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven and religious superstition on the basis of their materialist views. These philosophical achievements also served to advance science. In the maternal body of philosophy, science took shape and grew up. By the late Warring States period, natural science had made significant progress, and a number of treatises on astronomy, geography, calendrical science, agronomy, and medicine were produced. Significant achievements were also attained in mechanics, optics, and geometry, most of which were recorded in the Mohist Canon. It was on the basis of these achievements in the natural sciences that the materialistic theory of knowledge and logic, represented by the Mohist Canon and Xunzi, came into being. This whole pre-Qin philosophy may be regarded as a historical process in which science and philosophy helped each other to advance. In ancient times, philosophy and science were often inseparable, and scientific results were preserved in the books written by various philosophers. Another example of this is the Canon of Internal Medicine, which was both a medical book and philosophical one. Some philosophers of the pre-Qin period, as previously mentioned, were scientists as well. But the natural sciences of that time were so fragmentary that it was inevitable that philosophers would substitute fabrications for truth when they tried to develop cosmology and natural philosophy. In this respect, the doctrines of the yin-yang and five agents and the Yi Zhuan are two typical instances. The materialism of the former and dialectics of the latter were conducive to science, but later their fictitious systems became entwined with religious superstition and thus formed a theological system for the Confucianism of the Han dynasty, in order to suit the needs of the increasingly conservative feudal ruling class.

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II The fundamental problem of philosophy is the problem of the relationship between thinking and being, which was investigated extensively by the various pre-Qin schools of thought and their exponents, chiefly through their discussions on the relationships between “Heaven and humankind” and between “names and actualities.” A fairly comprehensive summary was made by Xunzi. We may look upon the developmental process of pre-Qin philosophy as a circle, which starts from the primitive doctrine of the yin-yang and, through a tortuous road, ends at Xunzi, who accomplishes the unity of naive materialism and naive dialectics. This circle consists of two smaller circles: the first runs from the primitive doctrine of the yin-yang (via Confucius andMozi) to the Laozi; the second runs from the Guanzi (via Mencius and Zhuangzi) to Xunzi. Philosophy advanced; Xunzi–Lüshi Chunqiu and Han Fei–Yi Zhuan may rank as a small circle of the summing-up stage. Confucius respected reason and stressed human initiative; accordingly, he fell into apriorism and remolded the traditional religious doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven into a relatively refined idealistic system. Mozi focused his attention on experience, believed that objective reality could be obtained in sensation, and advocated “anti-fatalism,” so he was essentially a materialist; however, his philosophy had some limitations, for the empiricism which Mozi embraced was narrow, and he continued to preach “the will of Heaven” and “the belief in ghosts.” The philosophical thoughts of both Confucius and Mozi focused on the Dao of humankind, which was a denial of the primitive doctrine of the yin-yang and five agents that concerned the Dao of Heaven. The Laozi contained abundant dialectical thoughts, which manifested themselves in its advocacy of “non-action” with respect to the relationship between Heaven and humankind and in its maintenance of “non-name” with respect to the relationship between names and actualities. It placed stress on the Dao of Heaven and seemingly returned to the primitive doctrine of the yin-yang and five agents. But, the Laozi conceptualized “non-action” and “non-name” in terms of absolutes, and adopted a universally negative attitude towards sensations and concepts, and consequently, it slipped into idealism. Sunzi advocated “active action” in his Art of War and combined his dialectics with materialism, but his discussion was confined narrowly to the military realm. The Guanzi correctly identified Heaven with the material, natural world, and thus its doctrine of Huang-Lao overcame the idealism of the Laozi, but its materialism was passive, since it emphasized that humankind should adapt itself to the natural world and that human cognition was entirely receptive. Based on Confucius’ idea of valuing reason, Mencius advanced his doctrine of the goodness of human nature and his idealistic doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humankind. For him, the sustained effort of cognition was necessary to awaken humankind’s innate ideas; thus he placed emphasis on the active side of human cognition. Although Mencius and the Guanzi were in conflict with respect to idealism and materialism, both shared a commitment to rationalism and to dogmatism. Zhuangzi, on the one hand, objected to his predecessors’ dogmatism and had a vision of the

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relativity of human knowledge, but, on the other, doubted everything and denied objective truth, thus becoming a skeptic and relativist. The antagonism between the two groups of dialecticians headed respectively by Hui Shi and Gongsun Long was also that of relativism and absolutism. Through struggles between relativism and absolutism, and skepticism and dogmatism, investigations on the debates over “Heaven and humankind” and “names and actualities,” especially on the category of “class” (lei), went deeper and deeper. Then, the Later Mohist School proceeded to construct a scientific system of formal logic on the basis of the naïve-materialistic theory of knowledge. Finally, Xunzi made a summary of the debates over “Heaven and humankind” and “names and actualities,” and realized the unity of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics. This seemed to be a second return to the starting point of Chinese philosophy. Philosophy continued toevolve. Han Fei followed the direction of materialism, but his dialectical thoughts weakened as the result of his one-sided emphasis on struggle. In contrast, the Lüshi Chunqiu slipped into eclecticism with its one-sided emphasis on unity. The Yi Zhuan developed dialectics, but it was an idealistic system. Therefore, there is a small circle even in the summing-up stage of pre-Qin philosophy. We think of pre-Qin philosophy as a dialectically developmental process of relatively integrated cognition unfolding itself around the debates over “Heaven and humankind” and “names and actualities.” Over the course of this process, there are conflicts between apriorism and empiricism, relativism and absolutism, and passive materialism and idealistic dialectics, while the struggle between materialism and idealism runs through all of these. When we not only comprehend those philosophers’ systems but also overcome them, we may see that the rational and the perceptual, the absolute and the relative, and materialism and dialectics are the necessary links in the chain of pre-Qin philosophy. In fact, these links are also indispensable for the history of philosophy in other periods, for the developmental history of each science, and even for the cognitive process of an individual. Having traversed its spiral path, pre-Qin philosophy at last arrived at a relatively correct solution to the debates over “Heaven and humankind” and “names and actualities.” Therefore, we can see what process human cognition must undergo before it reaches the stage of dialectics, and how the movement of cognition, taking dialectics as its object, begins and subsequently develops. Originally, dialectics is a “thing-in-itself”; it is a property of the essence and law of the objective world as well as a human cognitive process. In order to transform a “thing-in-itself” into a “thing-for-us,” it is necessary to undertake detailed and comprehensive investigations, to debate different opinions, and to carry on the struggle between views or philosophical systems opposite to one another. Any form of argument and, generally speaking, any act of theoretical thinking must be governed and guided by logic, as well as continuously tested against reality. At first, philosophers make spontaneous use of logic in their demonstrations or refutations; later, they make further study of forms of thought and their fundamental categories; after that, they have the science of logic, and accordingly they begin to use logic purposefully (though, of course, their consciousness is still relative). Mozi first put forward the

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categories of “class,” “cause/reason,” and “principle.” Mencius applied them to his exposition of human nature while Zhuangzi applied them to his elucidation of “Dao,” but their logical thoughts and methods were not scientific. It was not until the Later Mohist School that a true investigation of these categories was made from the point of view of scientific formal logic. Xunzi further regarded them as steps for making an analysis and synthesis. From the perspective of dialectical logic, the Yi Zhuan reduced the categories of “class,” “cause/reason,” and “principle” to the general principle of the unity of opposites. The development of pre-Qin philosophy shows that the human grasp and application of logical categories is a progressive movement from spontaneous to conscious and from less conscious to more conscious, and a developmental process from simple to complex, that is, a process in which more and more categories are brought to light and our knowledge of them becomes more and more profound. During the pre-Qin period, however, much controversy about logical categories concentrated on the debates over “hardness and whiteness” and “similarity and difference”—this was a controversy about the category of “class.” Indeed, pre-Qin philosophy paid greater attention to “class” than to “cause/reason” and “principle.”

III Pre-Qin philosophy encompasses a wide range of disciplines, such as natural philosophy (or the conception of the Dao of Heaven), epistemology, logic, philosophy of history, ethics, aesthetics, and so on, in which reasonable elements are too numerous to mention individually. The main achievements of pre-Qin philosophy can be seen in two fields—epistemology and logic. In the case of epistemology, philosophers of the pre-Qin period had already touched upon some elements of the materialistic theory of representation and the dialectics of human cognition. Mozi, the Guanzi, and the Later Mohist School developed materialistic theories of knowledge, while Confucius, Mencius, the Laozi, Zhuangzi, and dialecticians, respectively, examined some links of human cognition as well. Xunzi summed up his predecessors’ achievements and made important contributions. He was convinced that knowledge and capacity are acquired as opposed to innate, that the world is knowable, and that cognition is an accumulated process from ignorance to knowledge and from limited knowledge to substantial knowledge, as well as a movement of the unity of opposites between the perceptual and the rational and between knowledge and action. Both Xunzi and the Yi Zhuan held that people can obtain a relatively comprehensive truth through debates between different views and through “dispelling obsessions” and making a correct application of logical categories. Thus they gave an affirmative answer to the question of whether words and thoughts were capable of grasping the Dao. Meanwhile, they came to realize that the cognitive process is one in which the objective law must be mastered so as to control the natural world, and that once human knowledge is identical with objective necessity, humankind becomes free.

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These views are naïve and have limitations (for example, neither Xunzi nor the Yi Zhuan understood the position and role of social practice in the cognitive process, and both of them failed to genuinely resolve the relationship between the absolute and the relative), but the pre-Qin philosophers’ outstanding contributions to epistemology were, and remain, admirable. In the case of logic, a debate arose among the various pre-Qin philosophers as to the relationships between “names and actualities” and between “hardness and whiteness” or “similarity and difference.” Zhuangzi posed some questions about them; the two groups of dialecticians made investigations into the different sides of them respectively; and afterwards, the Later Mohist School constructed a system of formal logic, described its basic principles—“Propositions originate from causes/ reasons, grow according to principles, and proceed according to classes”—and investigated the law of identity as well as the law of the excluded middle and of contradiction. With respect to dialectical logic, the Laozi was the first to advance the principle of negation. As early as the age of Xunzi and the Yi Zhuan, dialectical logic appeared in embryonic form. Xunzi presented a view on which all concepts, judgments, and inferences contain contradictions, and on which dialectics is therefore a property of ordinary logical thinking. He pointed out that only by way of “analysis and synthesis” and “resorting to evidence” can logical thinking attain the unity of concept and reality. He also used the categories of “class,” “cause/reason,” and “principle” to develop a proper methodology for “analysis and synthesis,” that is, looking at problems from all sides; and he also argued that it is necessary to “dispel obsessions”, that is, to critically examine various fallacies. The Yi Zhuan more explicitly formulated the principle of the unity of opposites than its predecessors, and it presumed that the law of development of the universe can be understood through the dialectical transition of categories. It also investigated the meaning of the category “class” from the point of view of dialectical logic, and demanded that thinking should proceed from the viewpoint of all-sided connection to compare similarities or differences of things and to grasp the contradictory movement of the class examined. We may see from the Monthly Ordinances and the Canon of Internal Medicine that the comparative method of dialectical logic was applied to a wide range of concrete sciences such as calendric science, musicology, medicine, and so on, and was responsible for many important advances. Of course, the dialectical logic used in ancient times was naïve, and for lack of consciousness some of its methods—for example, “drawing a comparison” (比类 bi lei), “modeling after a form” (取象 qu xiang)—were apt to be applied subjectively and thus led to absurd conclusions. It should be affirmed, however, that pre-Qin philosophy put forth essential points of dialectical logic, which demonstrated the vitality of such logic and which have played a positive role in promoting science. This is an important achievement. Although Xunzi’s subjective logic exhibits objective logic in all respects, he does not talk much about the Dao of Heaven (the law of development of the universe) as such. As a matter of course, both “The movement of Dao consists in reversion” (Laozi) and “The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Dao” (Yi Zhuan) are presented as objective dialectics. The qi-monism which

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exerted such a far-reaching influence on later generations had its foundations laid by the Guanzi, the Xunzi, and the doctrine of the yin-yang and five agents. With respect to the Dao of humankind, it was certainly impossible for a truly scientific theory of humankind to have been produced in ancient times, but a few of the ancient ideas on this subject are nevertheless reasonable. For example, both the Legalist School and the Yi Zhuan recognized that history is an evolutionary process, and Xunzi tried to explain the origins of institutions such as the state and morality by appeal to “making social distinctions clear and forming a social organization,” and so on. Especially in connection with the issue of human freedom, Confucianism and Mohism put forth the principle of humanity, Daoism put forth the principle of naturalness and spontaneity, and Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi presented the principle of consciousness in ethics, all of which later exercised a strong influence upon our national culture. Moreover, the theory of the artistic sphere in aesthetics appeared in embryonic form in some parables written by Zhuangzi and in “A Discussion on Music” by Xunzi. Each school and system of pre-Qin philosophy, then, presents us with a number of lessons on theoretical thinking. And each such lesson, whether it takes the form of positive and creative achievements, or the form missteps and false starts, is valuable. The pre-Qin philosophers left a great store of intellectual wealth for later generations.

Part II

From the Qin-Han to the Qing Dynasty

Throughout the period from the Qin-Han dynasties to the Qing dynasty (prior to the Opium War of 1840), China remained a feudal society. Confucianism was favored by the rulers of the Han dynasty to the exclusion of all other ideologies, and it retained its status as the official orthodoxy in subsequent dynasties. As a result, the active atmosphere of the contention of a hundred schools of thought disappeared. But social contradictions continued to develop throughout this period, as did scientific progress, and, accordingly, philosophical debates continued to arise and philosophical advancement continued to occur. Wang Chong and certain other Han dynasty figures criticized the theological system that developed out of Confucian doctrine. During the Wei-Jin period, there was significant interest in the Mysterious Learning (玄学xuan xue), which represented a fusion of Confucianism and Daoism. Subsequently, there was a period of time in which the Confucians, Buddhists, and Daoists coexisted and their respective worldviews interacted fruitfully. By the time of the Song dynasty, Confucianism had evolved into what is now known as Neo-Confucianism and was divided into several different groups. By the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, ancient Chinese philosophy entered a second summing-up stage. A number of philosophical controversies remained active throughout this long historical period, but nevertheless underwent significant changes. The relationship between the Dao (the Way) and matter, which was conceived as a cosmological question during the Han period, was reconceptualized as an ontological question concerning “being and non-being” (or “movement and tranquility”) in the Wei-Jin period and then further reconceptualized into the debate over “principle and vital force” (or “Dao and concrete things”) in the Song period. As Buddhism because increasingly influential in China, the debate over “body and soul,” another central issue in dispute in the Han period, evolved into a controversy concerning the relationship between mind and matter/things, which was closely related to the debate over “knowledge and action” during the period of the Northern Song. Meanwhile, the debates over “Heaven and humankind” and over “names and actualities” continued in various forms. All these controversies were in the end summed up at the turn of the Ming and Qing by Wang Fuzhi, who raised the unity of naïve materialism and naïve

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dialectics to a higher level, thus completing the second large circle of the logical development of ancient Chinese philosophy.

Chapter 5

The Supremacy of Confucianism and Criticisms of Confucian Theology

The Qin dynasty, though the first unified feudal empire in Chinese history, collapsed and was replaced by the Western Han dynasty after existing for only fifteen years. The rulers of the Han period believed that the primary reasons for the Qin dynasty’s early demise were its stubborn insistence on government by law, its overemphasis on violence, and its failure to provide a role for virtue, all of which had the effect of intensifying the conflict between the ruler and the ruled (most of whom were peasants). Having learned from this historical lesson, the rulers of the Han dynasty took care to implement the rule of virtue alongside government by law. Hence the words of Xuan Di (a Western Han emperor): “The Han house knows how to rule the country, that is, by combining governing by might (that is, force) and governing in a kingly way (that is, benevolence and righteousness)” (Xuan 1965, p. 277). Moreover, the Western Han rulers’ understanding of “the king’s way” changed over time, being at one point based on the doctrine of Huang-Lao School but later based exclusively on Confucianism. The Huang-Lao doctrine which advocated “government by doing nothing that goes against nature” was popular for a while during the early period of the Western Han, when the government’s policies were geared towards restoring production and increasing the population. But in the reign of Emperor Wu Di, who was largely responsible for the Western Han’s power and prosperity, there was an official shift to Confucianism at the expense of all other ideologies, in accordance with Dong Zhongshu’s proposal. From that point forward, the ideology of feudal rule showed a general evolutionary tendency towards the combination of force and virtue—in effect, an amalgamation of Confucianism and Legalism, though it was publicly described as “Confucianism”. In the meantime, the officially-sanctioned form of Confucianism also incorporated some of the ideas of the Yin-Yang School and of Daoism. Why did feudal rulers want to “grant exclusive favor to Confucianism”? In other words, why were they interested in publicly identifying themselves with Confucianism? The answer is that when the slave-owning system collapsed in China, the patriarchal system based on clan consanguinity persisted, albeit in a weakened form, due to its deep-roots. Not only were there close ties between the feudal autocratic © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_5

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system and the patriarchal system, but the small-scale peasant natural economy, a necessary condition of the landlord economy, naturally tended to encourage patriarchy. Therefore, those Confucian ideas inherited from the preceding slave society, including the rituals which maintained the social hierarchy and the moral codes which embodied clan consanguinity, such as filial piety, fraternal duty, and so on, could serve feudal rule provided they were appropriately improved. And the Confucian doctrine of the unity of humanity and knowledge, which stressed the consciousness-building effects of education, was actually conducive to the country’s long-term stability. However, the paramount role occupied by Confucianism led to its developing a theological character. Feudal rulers merged Confucianism with political power and theocracy, thus encouraging the propagation of religious superstition. During the period from the Warring States to the Qin and Han dynasties, Confucians and Magicians, or the Confucian School, the Yin-Yang School and the School of Immortals, tended towards syncretism, and a theological complex gradually emerged which fused both idealism and religious superstition. This theological complex formed the basis for Dong Zhongshu’s theologized version of Confucianism. However, science and technology also made great advances in the Western Han period, when some scientific books of worldwide significance appeared one after another; for example, the Nei Jing (The Yellow Emperor’s Canon of Internal Medicine) and the Jiuzhang Suanshu (Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art). And the great scientist Zhang Heng laid a cosmological foundation for ancient Chinese astronomy. Without the struggle against religious superstition, there could be no advancement in the sciences, and the struggle between science and religious superstition significantly influenced the trajectory of philosophical debates during the Han dynasty. Cosmological problems, along with problems related to the relation between mind and body, were central to Han philosophy. Were the universe and its contents created by God, or are they the evolutionary products of matter? Which is primary, body or mind? Of all philosophical problems, these two are the most closely related to astronomy and medicine, and the right solutions to them have a direct anti-religious significance. The former is concerned about the origin and formation of the universe, and unfolds through the debate over huoshi (there is something that causes an activity) and mowei (there is nothing that causes an activity); it addresses the problem of the relation between the Dao and matter which is part of the theory of the Way of Heaven. The latter is largely a problem of epistemology.

5.1 Dong Zhongshu and the Huainanzi—The Antagonism Between the Teleological and Mechanistic Doctrines of Huoshi (1) Philosophical Manifestations of the Conflict Between Confucianism and Daoism of the Western Han Period

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In the early Western Han dynasty, rulers advocated the doctrines of Huang Di and Laozi, but there was still a rather intense struggle between these doctrines and Confucianism. For instance, Yuan Gusheng, a Confucian, once criticized the Laozi as commonplace before the Empress Dowager Dou, who was fond of the doctrine of Huang-Lao. He was subsequently sent to a piggery to become a butcher as a punishment. Philosophically, the conflict between Dong Zhongshu and the book of Huainanzi can be taken as representative of the struggle between Confucianism and Daoism in that period. Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE), a native of Guangchuan (in modern Zaoqiang County in Hebei Province), had a number of books to his credit, among which was the well-known Chunqiu Fanlu (Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals), which consisted of eighty-two short essays. He was a master of the New Text School of Confucian Classics, taking the slogan “Ban the hundred schools and confer exclusive dominance on the Confucian teachings” as representative of his brand of Confucianism. The Huainanzi, a lengthy work of twenty-one chapters, was compiled by Liu An (179–122 BCE), prince of Huai Nan, and some scholars at his court; however, in opposition to Dong Zhongshu, it was intellectually in favor of the doctrine of Huang-Lao. For example, it contains (ch. 18) the well-known story “The Old Man Lost His Mare”. In this story, an old man living on the frontier lost his mare, but the loss turned out to be a blessing in disguise. It vividly illustrates the thesis that “Calamity is that upon which happiness depends. Happiness is that in which calamity is latent” (Laozi). In opposition to Dong Zhongshu’s proposal of granting exclusive favor to Confucianism and excluding all other schools, the Huainanzi embraces Zhuangzi’s tolerant attitude towards various schools. It holds that the coexistence of a hundred schools is just like the ensemble of various musical instruments; although different instruments may produce different tones, when combined they produce harmony (see ch. 11; Huainanzi 1998, pp. 799–800). But, there is no divergence between Dong Zhongshu and the Huainanzi with respect to feudal ruling tactics; both take humanity and righteousness as fundamental, and punishment and law as incidental. Dong Zhongshu says: “Instruction is fundamental to government; prison (punishment) is incidental to government. They are different in kind but their work is identical” (Dong 2005, p. 178). The Huainanzi states: “The fundamentals of government are humanity and righteousness; and what is incidental of government is law[…]. The fundamental and the incidental are interrelated” (Huainanzi 1998, p. 1422). It can thus be seen that Dong Zhongshu’s Confucianism is integrated with Legalism, while the Huainanzi absorbs the Confucian idea of humanity and righteousness while maintaining its core commitment to the combination of the Guanzi’s Huang-Lao doctrine and Legalist thought. Dong Zhongshu’s Confucianism holds that that Heaven and humankind interact with each other, believing that fortune and misfortune in the human world correspond to events in the natural world; thus he constructs a metaphysical system of theological idealism. The Huainanzi, in contrast, exhibits a more scientific spirit. For example, its Chap. 3 is an important treatise on astronomy, calendrical science, and musicology, and its Chap. 7 tackles the problem of body and mind, which is very closely connected

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to medicine. It is this kind of connection between philosophy and science that makes the Huainanzi a relatively materialist work, at least when contrasted with Dong Zhongshu’s theological system. The Huainanzi does, however, endorse the idea of immortality, as found in the School of Immortals. Philosophically, the conflict between Dong Zhongshu and the Huainanzi, asrepresentatives of the controversy between the Confucianism and Daoism of the Western Han, is an antagonism between the teleological and mechanistic doctrines of huo shi. (2) Dong Zhongshu’s Theological Teleological Doctrine of Huoshi According to Dong Zhongshu, the three cardinal guides (ruler guides subject, father guides son, and husband guides wife) and the five constant virtues (humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity) as specified in the feudal ethical code are immutable and determined by Heaven. His philosophical work is aimed at explaining and supporting this view. Hence the words: “The great source of right principles derives from Heaven; Heaven does not change, nor do these principles.”1 In his opinion, Heaven represents the first principle of the world; Heaven and principles (the Way) are always unchangeable. Therefore, the Way of the Spring and Autumn Annals elaborated by Confucius is to “serve Heaven and model oneself after the ancients” (Dong 2005, p. 25), that is, to follow the Mandate of Heaven and model oneself after ancient sages and kings. With the combination of Confucius and Mencius’ doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven and the doctrine of the yin-yang and five agents, Dong Zhongshu develops his conception of cosmology which is essentially a kind of theological teleology. Dong Zhongshu says that “Origin (元yuan) is the root of all things” (Dong 2005, p. 320). All things derive from yuan; it exists before all things, and yet it accompanies the beginning and end of all natural things and human beings. This yuan is nothing but “Heaven,” for, he goes on, “This yuan is the same as source (原yuan)” (Dong 2005, p. 320), and “The great source of right principles derives from Heaven.” Accordingly, Heaven is conceived of as the Creator that produces and dominates all things, or as an anthropomorphic God, just as he says: “Heaven is the great ruler of hundreds of gods” (Dong 2005, p. 943). Proceeding from this point, Dong Zhongshu holds that there are ten fundamental categories that constitute the cosmos and all things. As he says: “Heaven (nature), Earth, the yin and yang, wood, fire, soil, metal, and water, make nine; together with humankind, they make ten. Heaven’s number is with this made complete” (Dong 2005, p. 1085). Taking the yin-yang and five agents as the pattern of the world, he argues that nature and humankind interact witheach other according to the pattern, and that this reflects Heaven’s will or mandate. Dong Zhongshu applies the categories of “class,” “cause/reason,” and “principle” to his demonstration of the theological teleological conception of cosmology. From the point of view of “class” (or kind), for Dong, there are many correspondences between Heaven and humankind. He says:

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See “The Biography of Dong Zhongshu” in the History of the Han Dynasty.

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Thus if a grouping is made according to class, Heaven and humankind are one. Spring represents the feelings of joy; therefore, there is germination. Autumn represents the feelings of anger; therefore, there is destruction. Summer represents the feelings of pleasure; therefore, there is nourishment. Winter represents the feelings of sadness; therefore, there is concealment. Such are what Heaven and humankind have in common (Dong 2005, p. 267).

Spring, autumn, summer, and winter are the expressions of Heaven’s joy, anger, pleasure, and sadness, and joy, anger, pleasure, and sadness are the expressions of man’s spring, autumn, summer, and winter. Humankind is a copy of Heaven, the universe in miniature, and the universe is magnified humankind. Human activities are conscious and purposeful, and changes of nature are the results of Heaven’s conscious and purposeful activities. The yang is the embodiment of Heaven’s favor and the yin that of Heaven’s punishment, and nature’s spring, summer, autumn, and winter match Heaven’s beneficence, rewards, punishments, and executions respectively. It is thus clear that Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine of mutual response between Heaven and humankind is based on the logical premise that Heaven and humankind are similar in class. To him, things of the same class will arise in response to each other. Suppose two lutes are tuned and played. When the note G is struck on the one, the note G on the other will respond. When a horse neighs, another horse will respond. Therefore, if the proposition that Heaven and humankind are similar in class has been proven, then the conclusion that they respond to each other is self-evident. From the point of view of “cause/reason,” for Dong, behind the phenomenon that things of the same class respond to each other there is an external and invisible driving force, which propels all things forward. He says: When the note of G is struck in the lute, the G notes of other lutes sound of themselves in response. This is a case of things being activated because they are similar in class. The activity takes place in sound and is invisible. Not seeing the form of their activity, people say that they sound of themselves. Furthermore, since they activate each other invisibly, it is thought that they do so themselves. In reality, it is not that they do so themselves, but that there is something that causes them to do so. In reality things are caused, but the cause is invisible (Dong 2005, p. 814).

According to him, the resonant phenomenon displayed by lutes is not caused by the lutes themselves; rather, there is something invisible that explains this change, as there is for all other changes of things. Dong Zhongshu uses an anecdote to illustrate that the “something that causes them” is none other than the purpose of Heaven: King Wu predicted that the House of Zhou was about to rise when he saw that large, red crows were gathering on the roof of his house with grain in their beaks. In this way, Dong demonstrates that changes of things are the expressions of the purpose of Heaven. He shows here his view of the theological teleological doctrine of huo shi (或使). The so-called huo shi refers to an external force giving impetus to the change and movement of a thing, to a transcendent, substantial agent as the efficient cause. Dong Zhongshu interprets efficient causes idealistically, since he thinks of the purpose of Heaven as the ultimate cause and believes that all phenomena represent the conscious, purposeful intentions of Heaven. Accordingly, Dong’s “efficient cause,” which makes things of the same class activate each other, is actually the “final cause” (purpose). He holds that everything in the world is purposefully created by Heaven

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for the sake of supporting human beings. For example, it is Heaven that provides human beings with foodstuffs that can be eaten, as well as with materials which can be made into clothing and ornaments so that they may look dignified (Dong 2005, p. 331). Furthermore, Dong Zhongshu appeals to the category of “principle” to demonstrate that the Way of Heaven, which respects the yang and disdains the yin, is always unchangeable. For him, though the purpose of Heaven is difficult to discern because it is invisible, it manifests itself in the movements of the yin-yang andfive agents. He thinks that the Way of Heaven embodied in the yin and yang is “single and not dual,” that is, that it is consistent and not contradictory. Dong says: The constant Way of Heaven is that things in opposition to each other cannot both arise simultaneously. Therefore this [Way of Heaven] is spoken of as oneness. That it is single and not dual: such is the movement of Heaven. The yin and the yang are these mutually opposite things. Therefore when one of them expands outward, the other retracts inward; when the one is to the left, the other is to the right (Dong 2005, p. 776).

That is to say, the yin and the yang, as two opposite things, always distribute themselves in different time and space. In the case of time, when the yin expands outward, the yang retracts inward, and when the yin retracts inward, the yang expands outward. In the case of space, when the yin is to the right, the yang is to the left, and when the yin is to the left, the yang is to the right. Consequently, the yin and the yang will not constitute a contradiction. Here, Dong sees things as static and isolated, conceiving of the law of identity in terms of absolutes and taking it as the fundamental principle of his worldview, thus falling into a typical mode of metaphysical thought. And Dong denies the principle of the unity of opposites, believing that there is no mutual transformation between the yin and the yang—the yang is always dominant and the yin subordinate. The Way of Heaven is always respectful of the yang and disdainful of the yin, and “dear to the yang and estranged from the yin” (ch. 53; Dong 2005, p. 791). Thus, the three cardinal guides, which determine relationships between ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife, find their permanent foundation therefrom. Dong Zhongshu derives his conception of the Way of humankind from his theological teleological doctrine of huo shi as a kind of conception of the Way of Heaven. To him, since Heaven is supreme over all things, humankind has to “receive commands from Heaven” (Dong 2005, p. 947). Humankind cannot disobey Heaven’s commands but must “carry forward the purpose of Heaven, thus conforming to its decree.” According to him, both Heaven and humankind belong to the same class, and humankind is a copy of Heaven; therefore, “Heaven has its dual operations of yin and yang, and the person also has his or her dual nature of humanity and greed” (Dong 2005, p. 633). Humankind’s dual nature of humanity and greed is endowed by Heaven’s yin and yang. As a consequence, Dong divides human nature into the three grades: “the nature of the sage” is entirely good; “the nature of pecks and hampers” is completely greedy; “the nature of the average person” is a mixture of goodness and greed and may become more thoroughly good through education. Such is the theory of the three grades of human nature. The third nature is that of most

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people. The process of improving one’s nature through education, according to the Way of Heaven that respects the yang and restrains the yin, should allow one to overcome one’s greedy desires. Proceeding from this point, Dong places stress again and again on “keeping human desires in proper check” and “diminishing human desires,” and admonishes that moral conduct should not be preoccupied with personal gains and losses. Although Dong Zhongshu’s idea of “completing one’s nature through education” implies more or less the cultivation of conscious moral character through education which was already expressed by pre-Qin Confucians, it entirely ignores the principle of voluntariness in moral behavior that was also pointed out by the pre-Qin Confucians (especially by Xunzi). It is at the mercy of fatalism, since his “completing one’s nature” is linked with “conforming to Heaven’s commands” and “keeping one’s desires in proper check”. And Dong’s fatalist idea was carried forward by later orthodox Confucians. (3) The Mechanistic Doctrine of Huoshi in the Huainanzi In its attempt to sum up the contemporary achievements of astronomy and calendrical science, the Huainanzi advances its own doctrine of huo shi—a mechanistic theory of cosmogony. Having carried forward the Daoist tradition, the Huainanzi holds that all things are generated not by Heaven but by Formlessness, as it says: “Formlessness is the great originator of things” (Huainanzi 1998, p. 57). The Huainanzi, however, is not completely similar to the Laozi and Zhuangzi in this respect. For, it applies the doctrine of the yin-yang and five agents to the formative process of the cosmos. It says that before Heaven and Earth took shape, there was only undifferentiated formlessness. Therefore, it was called the great beginning. The Dao started from vacuity and vacuity produced the universe of space and time. The universe produced the vital force. That which was clear and light drifted up to become Heaven, and that which was heavy and turbid solidified to form Earth. It was especially easy for the clear and rarefied to unite but extremely difficult for the heavy and turbid to solidify. Therefore Heaven was formed before the Earth. The vital forces of Heaven and Earth combined to form yin and yang. The concentrated forces of yin and yang became the four seasons, and the scattered forces of the four seasons became the myriad things. Such a theory of the cosmic system was closely related to the level of natural sciences of those days. Since the sciences were still naïve at that time, the Huainanzi’s description of the primitive state of the cosmos and its evolution cannot help but rely on speculation and fabrication. Nevertheless, the Huainanzi’s cosmology is different from Dong Zhongshu’s theological teleology. In contrast to Dong’s view, it denies that Heaven is the originator of all things. Moreover, it objects to Dongs teleological explanation of the world, and to his claim that everything in the world was intentionally created by Heaven for the sake of human beings. Instead, it maintains that all changes in the world are natural and spontaneous. In the natural world, it says, there are the yin and yang and the four seasons, which do not exist for the sake of producing all things, and there are the rain and dew, which do not exist for the sake of cultivating bushes and trees; when spirits meet together and the yin and yang combine, the myriad things come into

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being naturally (Huainanzi 1998, p. 1380). For the same reason, things in the natural world are not purposefully created for humankind. In its view, the sun in the sky and resources in the earth are not bestowed as a favor bythe Creator, but humankind can take advantage of these natural resources through the application of its own labor (Huainanzi 1998, p. 1022). The Huainanzi, though not applying a sort of theological teleology in its explanation of the world, maintains a doctrine of huo shi as well. It says: The mutual influence between things of the same class is mysterious and subtle, and it can be neither discussed with knowledge nor explained through argumentation. Therefore, there is something that causes it when the east wind comes, the wine overflows, or when silkworms produce their silk, and the string of the shang note (in the Chinese scale) breaks… (Huainanzi 1998, pp. 450–451).

The description of these so-called respondent phenomena is not scientific; the assertion that “there is something that causes it,” however, admits that there is a mysterious and subtle force that makes things of the same class activate each other and then bring about change. Such a force, according to the Huainanzi, is nothing but a kind of fine and miraculous qi (vital force). It is the interaction between the yinqi (negative force) and the yangqi (positive force) that makes the myriad things become those of the same class and thus respond to each other. As the Huainanzi states: A yangsui (a kind of mirror) becomes hot and creates fire when it is putunder the sun. A fangzhu (another kind of mirror) becomes moist and forms water when it is put under the moon[...]. Their activating each other is caused by the yin and yang forces (Huainanzi 1998, pp. 454–456).

Besides that, the yin and yang, as such, can interact with each other; for example, “the yin and yang hurl themselves upon one another and this is the cause of thunder. Their forcing their way through each other produces lightning” (Huainanzi 1998, p. 170). The Huainanzi’s doctrine of huo shi reduces the cause of a change to the yin and yang forces, that is, to the material cause. When it says that a yangsui creating fire under the sun or a fangzhu forming water under the moon is the result of an interaction caused by qi (vital forces), and that thunder and lightning result from the interaction of the yin and yang on one another, it conceives of “activating each other” or “hurling upon one another” as a mechanical action and as an external force so far as any particular object is concerned. The Huainanzi illustrates the claim that “largeness produces smallness, and the many produces the few; this is the law of Heaven” (Huainanzi 1998, p. 1381) with phenomena such as: small hill cannot give rise to clouds and rain; rainwater cannot produce fishes and turtles; violent sweating of an ox or a horse can give birth to body lice. And the case that violent sweating produces small creatures confirms that “transformation is caused by an external force” (Huainanzi 1998, p. 1381). That is to say, all movements and changes are caused by the mechanical action of an external force. Proceeding from the theory of external cause, the Huainanzi seeks the first cause of things, and consequently it takes vacuity and non-being as the first principles of the world. As it

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says: “Being derives from non-being, and reality derives from vacuity;” thus it falls unavoidably into idealism (Huainanzi 1998, p. 59). Moreover, and unsurprisingly, given the limitations imposed by the level of scientific advancement at the time of its writing, the Huainanzi uses some rather forced analogies to illustrate its doctrine of “mutual influence between things of the same class”. Like Dong Zhongshu, it regards Heaven and humankind as things of the same kind, and believes that they can respond to each other. For example, when the nation’s existence is in peril and chaos looms, Heaven will provide warning in the form of visitations and prodigies. Although the Huainanzi explains natural changes and social order and disorder in terms of the interaction between the finer forces (精气jing qi), which distinguishes it from Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine of the purpose (will) of Heaven, this still leads to superstition. (4) The Antagonism Between the Two Kinds of Doctrine of Huoshi as to the Debate Over Body and Soul The views of Dong Zhongshu and the Huainanzi on the debate over body and soul— another major philosophical dispute during the Han period—are also quite different. Dong Zhongshu affirms that there are ghosts and gods who are the objects of sacrifice and worship. He believes that sacrificial rites can connect people with ghosts and gods, both of which are incorporeal (see ch. 76; Huainanzi 1998, p. 1018). By contrast, the Huainanzi maintains an atheistic view. It develops the Guanzi’s theory that “the spiritual is nothing but a kind of finer vital force (气qi).” As it says: The murky force went to form animals, and the fine force to form humankind. Hence what is spiritual belongs to Heaven, and what is physical belongs to Earth. When the spiritual returns to its door (Heaven), and the physical reverts to its root (Earth), how can I continue to exist? (Huainanzi 1998, p. 504). All things, including human beings, are made of forces, either coarse or fine; what is spiritual is a kind of especially fine force. After a person’s death, the force forming his soul returns to its origin, while the body of the dead person becomes rotten beneath the earth. This entails that humans, after death, cannot be transformed into ghosts or gods. As regards the relationship between soul and body, both Dong Zhongshu and the Huainanzi hold that this is a relationship between principal and subordinate. Like the Guanzi, Dong compares the relationship between body and soul to that between subject and ruler, saying, “The ruler of a state is just like the heart of a body” (Huainanzi 1998, p. 1069) Therefore, just as an official must be loyal to his sovereign, so the body must be obedient to its soul. According to Dong, humankind must “respect the soul” and “highly value the soul” (Huainanzi 1998, p. 385). And, the Huainanzi’s remarks are that “The body is the lodgment of life. The vital force is the stuff of life. The soul is the dominator of life” (Huainanzi 1998, p. 82). Obviously, its view is that the soul should control the body. This thought is identical with Dong’s, but there is a difference between the two in that Dong, on the basis of his theological teleology, thinks that the soul’s domination of the body is determined by the purpose of Heaven, whereas the Huainanzi, on the basis of its mechanistic view, holds that the soul’s control over the body has material causes. Of course, the Huainanzi fails

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to overcome its body-soul dualism, since it distinguishes the soul from the body in terms of whether the constitutive force is fine or coarse. In Dong’s opinion, what is extraordinary about the sages lies in that their spirits are more vigorous and concentrated than that of common people, so that they reach the state of intelligence and wisdom. He says: People of intelligence, sageliness, and spirit introspect and listen to themselves, and their words become intelligent and sagely. The reason why introspection and listening to oneself alone can lead to intelligence and sageliness is because one knows that one’s original mind lies there (Dong 2005, p. 814).

What the sages need to do is only to uncover their original mind through introspection; in this way, they can understand the purpose of Heaven and speak for Heaven. Again he says: Heaven speaks not, yet it enables humankind to make evident its intention. It acts not, yet it enables humans to conduct themselves in accordance with the name. Names, therefore, constitute Heaven’s purpose as it has been discovered by the sages, and as such they should be deeply looked into (Dong 2005, p. 647).

The names judged by the sages are all in conformity with the purpose of Heaven; therefore, when the sages use them to designate things, the truth about things will be discovered. Hence the words, again: “Names show up truth and falsehood as a measuring line shows up crooked and straight” (Dong 2005, p. 647). Here, Dong Zhongshu combines the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names with the idealistic doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. According to the Huainanzi, what is extraordinary about the sages lies in that their minds are tranquil, their desires minimal, and their spirits concentrated, so that they reach the state of intelligence and spirit that is impossible for the common people to obtain. This view is similar to Dong’s. To the Huainanzi, however, the sages of intelligence and spirit are not those who introspect their original minds and speak for Heaven, but those who can “take no action, and yet there is nothing left undone.” It says: “By ‘non-action,’ we mean we do not do anything until things appear. By ‘nothing left undone,’ we mean we let things take their own course” (Dong 2005, p. 48). Accordingly, the Huainanzi stresses that when we speak of “non-action,” we do not mean we do nothing, but that we do nothing that goes against nature. It says again: What is meant, therefore, in my view, by non-action, is that no private will interferes with the universal Dao, and that no desires lead the true course astray. One must act on principles, perform meritorious services by the help of material resources, and follow the natural trend of things forward. These admit of no one-sided ideas as grounds (Dong 2005, p. 1322). According to the Huainanzi, “non-action” demands that people act on objective laws, establish their merits by means of material conditions, and follow the natural trend of things forward, instead of taking subjective and one-sided ideas as grounds for action. Thus it pushes the Daoist notion of spontaneity a step forward toward materialism. Nevertheless, just as the Huainanzi’s doctrine of huoshi cannot work out a fullfledged materialism in cosmology, so its body-soul dualism leads to the theory of immortality of the soul that takes the body and soul separately in the debate on their relationship. To it, there is a sort of immortal human existing together with Heaven

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and Earth, whose “body may suffer destruction, but the soul never undergoes a change” (Dong 2005, p. 530). This furnishes a lesson of theoretical thinking for later generations as well.

5.2 Wang Chong’s Materialistic Doctrine of Mowei in Opposition to the Doctrine of Huoshi Wang Chong (27–100 BCE), who was styled Zhongren, was a native of present-day Shangyu County in Zhejiang Province. He came from a poor family without social prestige and influence. After studying at a national academy in the capital, he held several posts as a lowly official. In his later life, he retired from public service and returned home to write. Only one of his works is extant—the Lun Heng (Balanced Inquiries), which consists of eighty-five essays. In this book, Wang Chong not only criticized but also absorbed to some extent the thought of the Daoism, Legalism, and Mohism of the pre-Qin period. And, as for Confucianism, which had been the supreme doctrine in China, he boldly pointed out the mistakes made by its exponents, Confucius and Mencius, while accepting its proposals of “benevolent government” and “government by virtue.” The primary aim of the Lun Heng, however, was to criticize the Confucian theology of prognostications and apocrypha during the Han dynasty. Wang Chong spoke of this aim without mincing words: “Though the chapters of my Balanced Inquiries may be numbered in the tens, one phrase covers them all, namely, ‘Hatred of fictions and falsehoods’” (Wang 1990, p. 776). After Dong Zhongshu’s theologized Confucianism was affirmed by feudal rulers, Confucianism further evolved into a kind of theology of prognostications and apocrypha. Prognostication (谶 chen) refers to a sort of religious divination or fortunetelling which uses metaphorical words or charts. The apocrypha are a group of books which offer dubious interpretations of the Confucian classics in religious terms. The combination of the theory of prognostications and apocrypha and the feudal ethical code reached its height in the year 79 AD at the meeting held in the White Tiger Hall. The book Baihu Tongyi (Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall) reports the theoretical content the discussions held during this meeting. Meanwhile, the struggles against religious superstition continued and never stopped; they ranged from Yang Xiong’s objection to supernatural prodigies in the time of the late Western Han dynasty and Huan Tan’s open attack on prognostication literature in the early Eastern Han dynasty to Wang Chong’s comprehensive criticisms of the theology of prognostications and apocrypha when the the Baihu Tongyiwas prevailing. The main idea of the theology of prognostications and apocrypha is still Dong Zhongshu’s teleological doctrine of huoshi. Wang Chong’s critical approach to it, philosophically, is chiefly an application of the materialistic doctrine of mowei to his objection to the doctrine of huoshi. (1) The Conception of the Way of Heaven Characterized by the Doctrine of Mowei

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With the help of the materialistic doctrine of mo wei (莫为), Wang Chong criticizes the doctrine of mutual response between Heaven and humankind, or the theological teleological doctrine of huoshi maintained by both Dong Zhongshu and the Baihu Tongyi. He says: “The course of nature is not caused by someone or something,” definitely denying that there is a prime mover beyond nature (Wang 1990, p. 779). Having adopted and developed the monism of vital force (气qi) defended by both the Guanzi and the Huainanzi, Wang Chong holds that the principle of all things is vital force, which is without purpose and will. He says: Heaven moves without the desire to produce things and yet things are produced of themselves. That is spontaneity. Vital force is given forth and distributed without the purpose of producing things and yet things are produced of themselves. That is non-action. What do we mean when we say that Heaven is spontaneous and takes no action? It is vital force (Wang 1990, p. 776; trans. Chan 1963, p. 298).

Here, Wang denies that the purpose of Heaven is the external force dominating all things and their changes, and stresses that the vital force as the principle of all things is without desire and the process in which all things derive from vital force is natural and spontaneous. Theological teleology is contrary to his idea that the course of Heaven is spontaneous and takes no action since it conceives of all things as purposefully created by Heaven for the sake of human beings. As he says: Some say that Heaven produces the five grains in order to feed people and produces silk and hemp in order to clothe people. This is to say that Heaven becomes a farmer or a mulberry girl for the sake of humankind. This is contrary to spontaneity (Wang 1990, p. 775; trans. Chan 1963, p. 297).

Obviously, Wang Chong’s conception of the Way of Heaven is opposed to theologized Confucianism and in accordance with the views of the School of Huang-Lao; he himself describes his doctrine as “contrary to Confucian teachings but in conformity with the doctrine of Huang-Lao” (Wang 1990, p. 785). Moreover, Wang develops the Huang-Lao thoughts contained in the Guanzi and the Huainanzi. Both books advocate the doctrine of huoshi, that is, they take vital force as an external cause beyond all things. Proceeding from his doctrine of mo wei, however, Wang Chong emphasizes again and again that “things are produced of themselves,” “vital forces spontaneously change,” “the vital force of yang comes forth itself,” “the vital force of yin arises of itself;” (Wang 1990, p. 776) “the Earth is solid and it will shake of itself,” and “the star is solid and it will move of itself” (Wang 1990, p. 221). He definitely affirms that Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things are all set in motion by themselves. Thus he takes a great step forward toward the direction of materialism from Huang-Lao’s idea that the course of Heaven is natural and spontaneous. Both doctrines of huo shi, Dong Zhongshu and the Huainanzi’s, though they differ in terms of teleology and mechanism, have something in common; that is, both of them believe that Heaven and humankind belong to the sameclass and can respond to each other. According to Dong, everything in the natural world is Heaven’s conscious and purposeful activity, therefore Heaven and humankind’s activities are of the same class. According to the Huainanzi, the mutual response between nature and humankind is caused by the interaction between the vital forces of yin and yang;

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thus Heaven and humankind are also regarded as being of the same class. Wang Chong wages a struggle against the theory of mutual response between Heaven and humankind and the doctrine of huo shi, pointing out that Heaven and humankind are not of the same class because the Way of Heaven takes no action while the Way of humankind is active. He says: “The Way of Heaven is that of spontaneity, which consists of non-action. But if it were to reprimand humankind, that would constitute action and would not be spontaneous” (Wang 1990, p. 636). He argues that any change in the natural world is unintentional, but human activities, for example, to reprimand humankind by words, are intentional. Theological teleology’s theory of mutual response between Heaven and humankind, by taking natural disasters as Heaven’s reprimands of humankind commits a mistake of treating non-action as action. The Huainanzi does not talk about the theory of “reprimands,” but it approves of Dong Zhongshu’s theory of “cold and warmth.” A change in temperature may be ascribed to the ruler’s joy or anger; when the ruler is joyful there is warmth, and when he is angry there is cold. Both joy and warmth belong to the category of yang, while both anger and cold to the category of yin, and consequently joy and warmth or anger and cold may respond to each other since they are of the same class. Wang Chong also criticizes this theory. In his opinion, a change in temperature is a matter of the Way of Heaven, and “the Way of Heaven is that of spontaneity, and this spontaneity means non-action”; the ruler’s joy and anger are related to acts of government, and “when they are to be regarded as responses to acts of government, that will constitute action and will not be spontaneous” (Wang 1990, p. 631). It is thus evident that Wang Chong not only objects to Dong Zhongshu’s theological teleology but also criticizes the Huainanzi’s mechanistic theory of mutual response. As he attacks this theory of “cold and warmth” (寒温han wen),Wang Chong also points out that another shortcoming of the theory is that it mistakes a mere accident for a necessary causal connection. As he says, the arrival of hot or cold weather does not depend on any governmental actions, but warmth and cold may happen to correspond with rewards and punishments by government, and it is for this reason that the interaction of Heaven and humankind is described as having a causal connection (Wang 1990, p. 628). Wang argues that the theory of mutual response between Heaven and humankind eventually slips into mysticism since it attempts to prove respondent relations between Heaven and humankind on the basis of accidents. Before Wang Chong, philosophers of the Han dynasty had advanced some different theories as to the origin of all things. Dong Zhongshu conceived of Heaven as the “originator” of all things, and of the first cause as the final cause. The Huainanzi regarded “Formlessness” as the “originator” of all things, and the first cause as the material cause. And the Yi Wei (Apocryphal Treatise on the Changes) held that the forces of yin and yang, and Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, all derived from the principles of qian and kun, thus taking the formal cause as the first cause. These three arguments differ in some respects, but all of them presuppose that there is an “originator” which transcends Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as the cause of motion. Therefore, they all advocate the doctrine of huo shi (that is, the doctrine of external cause), and they all embrace the doctrine of the mutual response between Heaven and humankind on the basis of accidental connections. Yang Xiong was

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against theology. He endorsed the Huang-Lao view that the Way of Heaven is spontaneous andtakes no action, and utilized the doctrine of mo wei to oppose that of huoshi, thus becoming a precursor of Wang Chong in his criticism of the theology of prognostications and apocrypha. Yang took the formless or imageless mystery ( 玄xuan) as the supreme first principle of the universe, and held that the Mystery is embodied in Heaven, Earth, and spiritual intelligence, thus displaying his pantheistic thought. But this also shows that Yang still regarded the formal cause as the first cause. In the struggle against the theology of prognostications and apocrypha, Wang Chong criticized various schools of thought, opposed diverse doctrines of huo shi which had previously appeared, affirmed that the material cause is the first cause, and clearly expounded his view of the self-movement of matter, thus developing the doctrine of mo wei. However, he failed to make a further examination of the source of self-motion. (2) The Distinction Between Necessity and Contingency and the Opposition Between “Fate” and “Human Nature” Wang Chong’s doctrine of mo wei stands for spontaneity of the Way of Heaven, which, according to his philosophy, involves both necessity and contingency. He holds that the theory of mutual response between Heaven and humankind mistakes a contingent connection between Heaven and humankind for a necessary causal one. As a result, Wang Chong studies the subject in detail at the same time he attacks the theory of mutual response between Heaven and humankind. His thoughts on necessity and contingency constitute an original contribution in the history of Chinese philosophy. Wang argues that the development of nature has its own necessary laws; as he says: “The sun and moon move in a regular way” (Wang 1990, p. 232). There also exists necessity between things; as he says again, “All those that can restrain one another are necessarily different in their natures. All those that can supplement one another are necessarily made of the same force [qi]” (Wang 1990, p. 638). That is to say, there is the necessity of “things of the same force supplementing one another” or “things of different nature restraining one another,” as found in things. It is, in effect, an explanation of respondent phenomena of things in the perspective of the mechanistic view upon the premise of self-movement of matter. For him, there is not only necessity but also contingency in the natural world. He says: In spring, the seed sown grows, in autumn it is cut and harvested. Seeking things one obtains them, and doing things one completes them, but we cannot call that luck [yu]. That which comes of itself without any seeking, or is completed of itself without any doing, is called luck. It is like picking up things lost on the road, or taking something thrown away in the country, like the fertility of Heaven and the productiveness of Earth, or the assistance of ghosts and the succor of the spirits (Wang 1990, p. 9).

According to Wang, it is necessary that young crops grow in spring and ripe crops are harvested in autumn, since they are determined by their nature, but a thing such as pocketing something found on the road is a mere accident. Both the necessary and the accidental are natural and spontaneous, and yet a necessary event can be foreseen by people and they can achieve success so long as they act on necessary

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laws, whereas an accident cannot be foreseen and it may bring good or ill fortune to people. Now the question is: What is the cause of contingent phenomena, given that the natural world is governed by objective laws? Wang seeks to answer the question in terms of a mere coincidence of two series of necessary connections. He points out that when the series of falling heavenly qi (vital force) and the series of rising earthly qi (vital force) meet, all things are produced of themselves by chance (Wang 1990, p. 146). Such an explanation of contingency is a vigorous criticism of theological teleology, though it fails to comprehend scientifically the dialectical connection between necessity and contingency. The next question is: since things are spontaneously produced due to the coincidence of two series of necessary connections, what then is the role of humankind’s intentional activities in the process? Wang Chong makes an investigation into the relations between human effort and necessity or contingency. He says: “However, in spite of spontaneity, there must also be activity to help. Ploughing, tilling, weeding, and sowing in spring are human activities” (Wang 1990, p. 780; trans. Chan 1963, p. 298). When human purposes and the measures taken to put them in to practice are based on objective and necessary laws, human activities will assist the natural and spontaneous process. Meanwhile, Wang argues that, “after the grains have entered the soil, they grow by day and night. It is not something humankind can do” (Wang 1990, p. 780) and that “whether they grow up and ripen or not depends upon chance and spontaneous action” (Wang 1990, p. 146). These remarks reveal his materialist attitude and scientific spirit of respecting the objective laws of the natural world, and may be regarded as an inheritance from Xunzi’s idea of “understanding the distinctive functions of Heaven and humankind.” However, they lack the boldness of vision and dialectics as embodied in Xunzi’s idea of “controlling the Mandate of Heaven and using it.” When he carries out his theory of necessity and contingency into the Way of humankind, Wang Chong falls into fatalism. Wang Chong ascribes social order or disorder to the time and circumstances of nature. In his eyes, good or bad weather will cause a bumper crop or poor harvest, and a bumper crop or poor harvest will determine whether a society is stable or not. According to him, “the causes of disorder” consist in “the prevalence of robbery” and “the disregard of moral obligations by the people”; “all these difficulties arise from want of grain and other foods, for the people are unable to bear hunger and cold”. The reason why grain and other foods are sometimes in short supply is that “when a year is devastated by floods or droughts, the five grains do not grow. The government is not responsible for this, but rather time and circumstances” (Wang 1990, p. 772). This shows that his subjective desire is to apply materialism to the socio-historical realm and to explain the order and disorder of society from the angle of material life. Such an interpretation, however, completely excludes the influence of human activities upon the historical course. Therefore he emphasizes the role of accidents in history. As he says: “A wise ruler happens to rise in an era pre-ordained for order,” and “an unprincipled sovereign happens to be born during a period fraught with disturbances” (Wang 1990, p. 774) arguing that whether a ruler is wise or not cannot affect social order or disorder, for order or disorder is contingent. True, it is

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rational for Wang Chong to deny the idea that the security and peril of a nation is entirely dependent on the sovereign. But, on the other hand, he completely ignores the role of human activities in history and explains social order and disorder solely by appeal to accidents, thus falling unavoidably into fatalism. Wang says: “Whether officials’ instructions have any effect and whether the people are well governed or in revolution depend on fate” (Wang 1990, p. 768). History is entirely determined by fate (命ming), which is quite similar to Confucius’ idealistic doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. As to an individual person’s fate, Wang Chong argues that it has two patterns. There is fate governing calamity and good fortune, reward and punishment, and so on, encountered accidentally by a person, and also fate governing his strong or weak physique and long or short existence, which depends on whether a person’s vital force is thick or not (Wang 1990, p. 28). Humankind can do nothing about these two patterns of fate; as Wang says again, “This fate may not be forced nor the time coerced” (Wang 1990, p. 20). Accordingly, Emperor Gaozu of the Han dynasty (that is, Liu Bang) was destined to be an emperor, while Han Xin, Zhang Liang, and Xiao He, who gave their valuable support to Emperor Gaozu, were produced by their times. When the two sides, each of which had its own necessary destiny and time, met by chance, the outcome was the rise of the Han dynasty. Here, Wang Chong also makes an explanation of contingency in terms of a series of necessary events, but that explanation has already become a kind of propaganda which fetishizes fate. In Wang Chong’s philosophical system, the two categories of “fate” and “human nature” are closely interconnected. He says: “Endowed with vital forces, one forms one’s nature. Once one’s nature is completed, one’s fate will be decided” (Wang 1990, p. 59). Vital forces determine whether a person is talented or stupid, whether his nature is good or evil, and whether his life will be long or short. It is obviously a fatalist view. To Wang Chong, whether a person’s nature is good or evil depends on whether one’s vitalforces are thick or thin. In consideration of the various degrees of thickness of the vital force, Wang Chong shares the view that human nature has the three grades of upper, middle, and lower. But, on the one hand, he asserts that, once human nature is completed, it cannot be controlled by human effort; on the other hand, he argues that human nature can be transformed and virtues can be acquired through education. He says: “If we speak of the natures of people, there are in truth some that are good and some that are bad. The good ones are definitely so of themselves, whereas the bad ones may be taught to become good by undergoing inculcation through efforts” (Wang 1990, p. 68). That is to say, anybody may abandon evil and do good so long as he learns conscientiously and accepts instruction. Thus, the concepts of “fate” and “human nature” become opposite to each other in Wang Chong’s philosophy. For, the former is regarded as unalterable whereas the latter is changeable. Again, he says: Hence wisdom or stupidity in overseeing matters, and purity or corruption in conducting affairs, are questions of one’s own nature and talents, whereas noble or mean position in an official career, and poverty or wealth in business, depend upon fate and time (Wang 1990, p. 20).

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According to him, things that are related to nature and talents may change through instruction and subjective efforts, but things that are determined by fate and time cannot be changed by human efforts. Wang Chong’s writings express his frustration with the fact that success in life does not always correlate with merit: “A mediocre person has respectful status and great renown, whereas an outstanding figure is in dire straits.” However, in light of the logical contradiction between fate and human nature, fatalism is a major defect of Wang Chong’s philosophical system. (3) “The Soul Depends on the Body” and “The Nature of Things Can Be Known Through Learning” As regards the problem of the relationship between body and soul (mind), Huan Tan, the precursor of Wang Chong, pointed out that the dependence of one’s soul on one’s body is just like the dependence of the flame on a candle, comparing the soul to the flame and the body to the candle. Just as when a candle is used up the flame will go out, so when the body perishes the soul does likewise. It corrects the Huainanzi’s notion that there is a “supernatural person” who can keep his soul even when his body perishes. Developing Huan Tan’s idea, Wang Chong says: “There is in the world no fire burning from itself. How can there be a spirit in the world that has consciousness from itself but is without a body?” (Wang 1990, p. 875; trans. Chan 1963, p. 301). His final determination is that, “when a creature is not yet dead, its soul depends on its body” (Wang 1990, pp. 825–822). With these words, Wang reveals a more distinctly atheistic stand than Huan Tan. Wang Chong, however, also fails to overcome body-soul dualism. Like the Guanzi and the Huainanzi, he considers the spirit as a sort of fine matter, that is, a fine vital force. In his opinion, humankind is intelligent and wise because it possesses the fine vital forces, which are in the five internal organs. If the five organs are unimpaired, one is wise. If they become diseased, one becomes hazy and confused. When one dies, one’s five organs rot and decay. The vital forces will have nothing to attach to and will be extinct. If so, one will lose one’s consciousness. Wang’s conclusion is that “the body needs the vital forces in order to be complete [that is, to become a living body], and the forces need the body in order to have consciousness” (Wang 1990, p. 875; trans. Chan 1963, p. 301). As a result, Wang Chong falls into body-soul dualism. Wang Chong investigates the distinction between sages and spirits as well, which is related to the problem of the relationship between body and soul. According to the theologized Confucianism of Dong Zhongshu and the Baihu Tongyi, Confucius is not only a sage but also a god. Because of their innate intelligence and wisdom, the sages’ knowledge extends thousands of years into the past and ten thousand generations into the future, so they can foresee future events and are able to communicate with spirits. Wang Chong objects to these mystical claims. For him, sages and spirits are not the same; “sages are not looked upon as spirits, nor are spirits held to be sages,” because the so-called sages are those who possess lofty morals and unusual wisdom and talents, while the so-called spirits are those who are “obscure, diffuse, and formless entities” (Wang 1990, p. 1100). And, “the so-called spirits have knowledge without learning, and the so-called sages require learning to become sages” (Wang 1990,

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p. 1082). On the basis of distinguishing sages from spirits, Wang Chong affirms that human knowledge is all acquired through learning. He says: “A person’s intelligence may be high or low, but the nature of things can be known through learning. There is no knowledge without learning, and no understanding without inquiry” (Wang 1990, p. 1082). He holds that all knowledge originates in learning and inquiry. In this way, Wang combats apriorism. According to Wang Chong, the process of knowing things has two aspects. On the one hand, people “must rely on their ears and eyes so as to ascertain the real characters of things,” that is, they must examine things by means of their sensory experiences (Wang 1990, p. 1084). On the other hand, they “do not merely depend upon their ears and eyes, but exercise their intellect” (Wang 1990, p. 963), that is, they should not only depend upon their sensory experiences but also engage in theoretical thinking. It can be thus seen that Wang Chong holds that a correct knowledge of things must be tested with facts and demonstrated with logical reasoning. As he says: “In things there is nothing more clarifying than having an example, and in argument there is nothing more decisive than having evidence” (Wang 1990, p. 962). In this way, he tries to refute theology and superstition. For instance, Wang adduces examples (a house struck by lightning, bushes and trees on fire, when a person is struck to death by lightning his hair and skin are scorched, and so on) to test the statement that “lightning is essentially fire.” Then he concludes that “there are five tests for the statement that lightning is essentially fire; however, there is no evidence to support the argument that the roar and roll of the thunder is the voice of Heaven’s anger” (Wang 1990, p. 309). Here, he employs the inductive method in logical demonstration. In short, Wang Chong’s philosophy, so far as its theory of the Way of Heaven is concerned, is opposed to the doctrine of huo shi, is a development of the doctrine of mo wei, and is a clear-cut presentation of the notion of the self-motion of matter, thus elevating investigations on the principle of the unity of the world and the law of development of the universe to a new level. That is an outstanding achievement of Han philosophy in its inquiries into cosmological questions. In addition, it is also valuable that Wang Chong, proceeding from the doctrine of mo wei, distinguishes necessity from contingency and combats mysticism and superstition in the debate over body and soul. As a matter of course, his philosophy had a fatalistic defect.

References Chan, Wing-tsit. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dong, Zhongshu. 2005. Annotated Edition of the Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals. Annot. Zhong Zhaopeng. Shijiazhuang: Hebei People’s Publishing House. Huainanzi. 1998. Annotated Edition of Huainanzi. Annot. He Ning. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.

References

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Wang, Chong. 1990. Annotated Edition of Lun Heng. Annot. Huang Hui. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Xuan, Di. 1965. “Annals of Emperor Yuan”. In History of the Former Han 48–33 BCE. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.

Chapter 6

Mysterious Learning and the Coexistence of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism

Along with the downfall of the Han dynasty came an end to the supremacy of Confucianism in that period. During the successive eras from the Wei-Jin to Southern and Northern dynasties, the Mysterious Learning (or the Metaphysical School, 玄学xuan xue), a philosophical sect that arose out from the interaction between Confucianism and Daoism, first appeared. Later, with the expansion of Daoism and Buddhism, a new situation gradually emerged in which Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism coexisted. During this period, the feudal families of power and influence (that is, the despotic landlords) occupied a dominant position. In order to maintain the feudal hierarchy, in which “the highest stratum had no humble origin, whereas the lowest no powerful family,” they needed the feudal ethical code (名教ming jiao) to serve themselves. Since the late Han dynasty, however, the ming jiao had fallen into crisis. This crisis was provoked from two sides: the first was the peasants’ challenge of feudal hierarchy, especially through the Yellow Turban uprising in the year 184AD, and the second was that the feudal ruling class, even as it publicly promoted and professed its adherence to the ming jiao, did not actually comply with the Confucian ethical code, and thus the ming jiao became associated with hypocrisy and lost its moral authority. In order to overcome this crisis, the rulers of the Wei and Jin needed a new philosophical theory to take the place of Confucian theology, which had been dealt a deadly blow. So they appealed to Daoism and explained Confucian doctrines with the thought of the Laozi and Zhuangzi; they regarded the Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Book of Changes as the “Three Mysteries”(三玄san xuan) and searched for the metaphysical foundations of the mingjiao therein. In this way, the Mysterious Learning represented by He Yan and Wang Biemerged at this historic juncture. Moreover, pure talks (清谈qing tan) about problems of the Mysterious Learning represented a way for literati and officials to take part in intellectual life while also staying safe in the unsettled social environment of the time. During the period from the Wei-Jin to the Southern and Northern dynasties, there were many new advances in the sciences. In medical science, the Shanhan Lun (A Treatise on Fevers) by Zhang Zhongjing, a noted physician of the late Han dynasty, © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_6

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established the principle of diagnosis and treatment based on an overall analysis of the illness and the patient’s condition. In agricultural science, Jia Sixie of the Northern Wei dynasty made a systematic summing-up of ancient agricultural production in his book Qimin Yaoshu (The Manual of Important Arts for the People). In mathematical science, Liu Hui’s commentary on the Jiuzhang Suanshu (Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art) at the transitional period betweenthe Wei and Jin dynasties laid the foundation for traditional Chinese mathematics. In addition, there were also important achievements in the areas of astronomy, calendrical science, geography, alchemy, and so on. With the advancement of science, philosophy developed as well. Generally speaking, philosophers of that period ceased to copy apocrypha unthinkingly. Some of them, such as He Yan and Wang Bi, developed the relatively refined, idealistic system of the Mysterious Learning, which attached importance to speculation, and some of them, such as Ji Kang, Pei Wei, and Fan Zhen, showed a tendency towards materialism and atheism. In this period, the main philosophical controversies centered on the relationships between “words and ideas” and between “being and non-being (movement and tranquility)”. The debate over “words and ideas” derived from the earlier debate over “names and actualities” from the pre-Qin and Han periods. Some thinkers of the Han dynasty, such as Wang Fu and Zhong Changtong, highlighted the issue of names and actualities so as to expose the hypocrisy of feudal morality and the emptiness of Confucian doctrines. Wang Bi, applying the method that “by forgetting the words one may get the ideas” in his commentaries on the Book of Changes, made a clean sweep of over-elaborate numerology and of various strained interpretations contained in the apocryphal Han treatises on the Changes. Thus the debate over “names and actualities” developed into the one over “words and ideas.” This was an important landmark of the emergence of the Mysterious Learning. The question of how the universe was formed, which was discussed most heatedly during the Han dynasty, developed into an ontological debate on “being and non-being (movement and tranquility)” by the time of the Wei-Jin dynasties. In addition, the debate over “body and soul” continued and was given a critical summary by Fan Zhen in the Southern dynasty. The debate over “Heaven and humankind” also continued; in particular, controversies on “necessity and chance” and on “destiny decreed by Heaven and humankind’s exertions” deepened the discussion on the issue of the relationship between Heaven and humankind. The philosophy of that period bore another important characteristic, that is, it was closely associated with literature and art. Most philosophers were persons with literary reputations, who were good at writing poems and essays. Moreover, the philosophical issues in dispute, such as “being and non-being,” “movement and tranquility,” “body and soul,” and “words and ideas,” were closely related to aesthetic and artistic theories. This phenomenon was sufficiently reflected in Liu Xie’s Wenxin Diaolong (Carving a Dragon at the Core of Literature), one of China’s famous works of literary criticism, which laid the foundation for classical Chinese literary theory.

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6.1 Wang Bi’s Doctrine of “Valuing Non-being” and Pei Wei’s “On the Importance of Being” The chief proponent of the doctrine of “valuing non-being” in the Mysterious Learning was Wang Bi (226–249), whose courtesy name was Fusi, a native of Shanyan in the state of Wei (in modern Jiaozuo County, Henan Province). Although he lived for only twenty-three years, when he was a teenager he had already gained a name as a young philosopher and became a departmental secretary. Appealing to Daoism in his doctrine of “valuing non-being”(贵无gui wu), Wang Bi tries to overcome the crisis of the feudal ethical code by means of the Daoist principle of “spontaneity and non-action”(自然无为zi ran wu wei). Differing from Dong Zhongshu, who argues that the feudal ethical code is an expression of “the purpose of Heaven,” Wang Bi prefers to speak of the Dao instead of “the purpose of Heaven” and holds that the feudal ethical code is produced from “Dao” or “non-being”. According to him, “Dao” is “the mother of the five codes”; although customs vary from past to present, the Dao’s status as the mother of the five codes is unchanging (Wang 1980, p. 195). The so-called five codes, in Mencius’ words, refer to feudal human relations, namely, “between father and son, there should be affection; between ruler and minister, there should be righteousness; between husband and wife, there should be attention to their separate functions; between old and young, there should be a proper order; between friends, there should be faithfulness.” Since he considers the relation between the Dao and the feudal ethical code as that between mother and son or roots and branches, Wang Bi stresses holding onto the mother to preserve the son, and honoring the roots in order to promote the branches. He says: “Mother is the roots and son is the branches. One should find the roots in order to understand the branches, but one should not cast away the roots in order to pursue the branches” (Wang 1980, p. 139). In his opinion, if the ruler casts away the roots while pursuing the branches and uses the criminal law and ethical code merely to maintain ranks, titles, and upper and lower grades, then disorder may arise. The right way is for the ruler to place himself in a “nameless” and “formless” position, to govern his state by doing nothing that goes against nature, and to cause the common people to have no knowledge and no desires. If one “finds the roots in order to understand the branches,” the feudal ethical code can be naturally established. (1) “Non-being as the Root” and “Inseparableness of Substance and Function” As regards the conception of the Way of Heaven, the philosophers of the Han dynasty displayed an interest in cosmology, while the Mysterious Learning of the Wei-Jin dynasties was more interested in ontology. Consequently, the discussion with regard to the relationship between the Dao and matter, which centered on the origin, structure, and evolution of the universe in the philosophy of the Han period, developed into a debate over “being and non-being (movement and tranquility)” by the time of the Wei and Jin. The Laozi says: “All things in the world come from being. And being comes from non-being” (Laozi, ch. 40). In general, the philosophers of the Han period interpret

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this as a cosmological claim, but Wang Bi comments: “All things in the world come from being, and the origin of being is based on non-being. To have being in total, it is necessary to return to non-being” (Wang 1980, p. 110). Here, Wang demonstrates the argument that “the origin of being is based on non-being” from an ontological point of view. Any concrete thing takes “being” as its existence, and the generation of all “being” is based on “non-being.” When he argues that all “being” originates from “non-being,” he does not mean that there was a stage of “non-being” before Heaven and Earth arose, but means that the generation of all things must rely on “non-being.” Therefore, it is necessary to “return to the base” and hold “non-being” in order to keep “being” at any time. “Non-being” as the origin of all things is, in Wang’s philosophy, equivalent to the “Dao” of the Laozi. He holds that the Dao is the name of non-being, the consistent principle permeating all things and the general law which governs all things, but as such, it is quiescent and invisible, and cannot be expressed by words or symbols (Wang 1980, p. 624). Owing to their absoluteness, according to Wang Bi, the “non-being” and “tranquility” of the Dao are not opposed to “being” and “activity.” He says: Whenever movement ceases, there is tranquility, but tranquility is not opposed to movement. Whenever speech ceases, there is silence, but silence is not opposed to speech. Thus although Heaven and Earth are vast, possessing the myriad things in abundance, where thunder moves and winds circulate, and while there is an infinite variety of changes and transformations, yet its original substance is absolutely quiet and perfect non-being. Therefore only with the cessation of movements within Earth can the mind of Heaven and Earth be revealed. If being were to be the mind, things of different categories would not be able to exist together. (Wang 1980, p. 337)

The quiet and formless original substance is absolute, while “movement” and “being” are relative and temporary. Since “the mind of Heaven and Earth” is based on non-being, it can possess the myriad things in abundance. If being were to be the mind of Heaven and Earth, then it would find itself in a relative and conditioned position and could not embrace everything. Wang’s view that non-being or tranquility is an absolute original substance is theoretically objective-idealist, and yet it has a pantheistic tendency. When commenting on Confucius’ saying “Does Heaven say anything?,” Wang Bi argues that Heaven is not a personified god who can speak, and the Mandate of Heaven or “the mind of Heaven and Earth” is just embodied in the law of alternation of cold and heat or of the seasons (Wang 1980, p. 634). This idea is obviously different from Dong Zhongshu’s theological teleology. In the history of Chinese philosophy, Wang Bi is the first philosopher who explicitly advances the two interrelated categories of “substance” (体ti) and “function” (用yong) in the course of his demonstrating the view of “having non-being as the root.” According to him, “substance” and “function” are unified, or inseparable. He says: Although Heaven and Earth are engaged in great undertakings and have great wealth in possessing the myriad things, each thing still has its own character. Although it is valuable to have non-being as its function, there cannot be substance without non-being. (Wang 1980, p. 94)

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The sages model Heaven and Earth so that they have great undertakings and wealth; this is “having non-being as the function,” for great undertakings and wealth are the functions and manifestations of the Dao. However, since undertakings and wealth depend on the functioning of “non-being,” “there cannot be substance without non-being.” Wang Bi here emphasizes the unity of substance and function, that is, that the functioning of “non-being” can be realized only when “non-being” is really taken as the substance. Such a way of understanding the unity of substance and function in terms of “Dao” or “non-being” is in harmony with Wang’s objective-idealism. It is worth noting that Wang Bi’s thought of “inseparableness of substance and function” implies that substance (Dao) takes itself as the cause, and all things in the world are the functions and expressions of “Dao” and take it as their cause; however, “Dao” is not an external force, but a cause inherent in them. He says: Dao does not oppose nature and therefore it attains its character of being. To follow nature as its standard is to model the square while within the square and the circle while within the circle, and not to oppose nature in any way. (Wang 1980, p. 65)

For him, “Dao” exists within nature and, as the cause of all things, it follows the natural course of things. Proceeding from this view, Wang Bi promotes the doctrine of mo wei and opposes that of huo shi. As he says: “Heaven and Earth leave what is natural (self-so) alone. They do nothing and create nothing;” thus he denies that Heaven, as a purposeful final cause of creation, dominates the world (Wang 1980, p. 13). Wang Bi’s idea of “inseparableness of substance and function,” despite its idealism, contains some dialectical elements, for it points out that the original substance is inherent in all things and that these things are the manifestations of the self-movement of the original substance. We may make a comparison between Wang Chong of the Han period and Wang Bi: the former, who opposes theological teleology, explicitly puts forward the view of the self-movement of things, but fails to investigate the cause of self-movement, while the latter makes clear that the cause lies in the things themselves, but falls into idealism. (2) “By Examining the Words One Perceives the Ideas” and “By Forgetting the Words One Gets the Ideas” During the Wei and Jin period, the debate over “names and actualities” turned into one over “words and ideas.” Wang Bi upholds that “words cannot completely express ideas,” that is, subtle and real ideas (意yi) cannot be expressed and explained through words (言yan), symbols and images (象xiang). In Wang Bi’s opinion, symbols serve to express ideas and words serve to explain symbols. For the expression of ideas, there must be symbols, and for the explanation of symbols, there must be words. Therefore, he says: “The words are intended for the symbols. Hence by examining the words one may perceive the symbols. The symbols are intended for the ideas. Hence by examining the symbols one may perceive the ideas” (Wang 1980, p. 609). Wang Bi affirms here that it is necessary to grasp the ideas by means of words and symbols. However, he further argues: “The purpose of words is to explain the symbols, but once the symbols have been grasped, the words may be forgotten. The purpose of symbols is to preserve the ideas, but once

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the ideas have been grasped, the symbols may be forgotten” (Wang 1980, p. 609). Therefore, what he emphasizes is that only by forgetting the words and symbols can one truly grasp the ideas. As he says: “By forgetting the symbols one gets the ideas; by forgetting the words one gets the symbols. The acquisition of the ideas depends upon forgetting the symbols, and the acquisition of the symbols depends upon forgetting the words” (Wang 1980, p. 609). This theory—“by examining the symbols one may perceive the ideas” and “by forgetting the words one gets the ideas”— is significant in that it opposes the scholasticism of contemporary Confucian doctrine. Wang Bi points out that, when interpreting the Book of Changes, the Han Confucians often rigidly observed its numerological forms and paid attention only to the words and symbols but forgot the meanings to be expressed by the words and symbols. As he argues, to use a horse and cow to explain qian and kun is to express the principles of firmness and compliance, but if the principles have been truly apprehended, “What need for kun to be made into a cow? What need for qian to be made into a horse?” (Wang 1980, p. 609). This illustrates that what the Han Confucians were concerned about was only to make an analogy between a concrete thing and the lines of a hexagram, and in consequence they kept the forms of the hexagrams in mind while neglecting their contents. Wang Bi’s criticism of the Han Confucians contains something that is reasonable, but he overemphasizes the claim that one can “get the ideas” by forgetting the symbols and words, and he regards the ideas as something that may be independent of words and symbols, thus leading to idealism. When he says that, “by forgetting the words one gets the ideas,” Wang Bi’s means that the words cannot completely express the ideas. He holds that words and ideas are contradictory to each other. Following Laozi and Zhuangzi, he questions whether logical thinking can grasp the “Dao.” As he points out, a name (that is, concept) is employed to “point to a particular affair and construct a form” (Wang 1980, p. 1). As such, a name requires a one-to-one correspondence relation with its object. Accordingly, “a name determines a form” (Wang 1980, p. 63), and “if there is a form, then there are parts or lots” (Wang 1980, p. 113); names divide an object into parts, thus making themselves one-sided. However, the Dao is “what is undifferentiated, complete, and formless” and cannot be apprehended by names (concepts) (Wang 1980, p. 63). Ouyang Jian (c. 267–300), a philosopher who came slightly after Wang Bi, wrote a treatise defending the thesis that “words can completely express ideas,” as opposed to the doctrine that “words cannot completely express ideas.” He says: Principles are apprehended by the mind, but without words they cannot be communicated. Things hold their positions in relation to other things, but without names they cannot be distinguished. Names shift in accordance with the transformations of things, and words also change in accordance with the alternations of principles. This is the same as an echo responding to the sound, a shadow attaching to the body. In neither case can they be separate. If this separableness can be avoided, there will be no case in which words do not completely express meanings. (Ouyang 1958)

That is to say, if names maintain a correspondence relation with their objects and change in accordance with the changes in their objects, then words can express

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any idea. Ouyang Jian’s theory that “the words can completely express the ideas” is indeed quite right in the sense of the law of identity of formal logic. However, he ignores the opposition between words and ideas since he focuses solely on their uniformity. (3) Pei Wei’s “On the Importance of Being” Pei Wei (267–300), whose courtesy name was Yimin, was a native of Wenxi (in modern Shanxi Province). Like his father, who was one of the founders of the Western Jin dynasty and an outstanding geographer, Pei Wei had wide and ample knowledge, and in particular had a good command of medicine. He was greatly dissatisfied with the prevailing general mood of “talking about what is impractical and not observing rites or laws.”1 In order to maintain the feudal ethical code, he wrote an article entitled “On the Importance of Being” (Chong You Lun). In his opinion, if our philosophical theories exalt non-being at the expense of being, then “all the institutions and ceremonials will never exist and it will be impossible to govern the state.”2 Pei Wei levels criticisms at Wang Bi’s idealist theory that “being is the product of non-being,” which holds that concrete things are produced from abstract principles. He says: That which contains and lumps the substances of myriad things is the supreme Dao. That which differentiates itself due to its special attribute from others is a thing ordinary. That which possesses an evident figure is a body of a creature. And the complicated transformations and communications of things are the source from which principles make their appearances.[...] What can be observed and tracked when it makes an appearance is called principle (li理); what principle takes as substance is called being.3

That is to say, the supreme “Dao” embraces myriad things (万有wan you), which are divided into different kinds; the things in different kinds differ from each other due to their special attributes and forms, and are all substances possessing production and transformation; their transformations and interactions are complex and are the source of objective laws; the thread that runs through their transformations and can be tracked is called “principle”; the substance to which the principle attaches itself is called “being.” Here, Pei Wei upholds the materialistic view that “principle depends on substance” as opposed to the idealistic view that “principle (Dao) takes priority of substance.” Since being is not the product of non-being, where does being come from? Pei’s answer is: “Being is produced by itself.” He says: The absolute non-being can never produce things. Therefore what is first produced is not produced by non-being but by itself. Produced by itself, the substance of it must be being. When being is negated, production will then be impossible.4

1

See “A Biography of Pei Wei,” in History of Jin Dynasty. See Pei Wei, “On the Importance of Being,” in History of Jin Dynasty. 3 See Pei Wei, “On the Importance of Being,” in History of Jin Dynasty. 4 Pei Wei, “On the Importance of Being,” in History of Jin Dynasty. 2

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Moreover, a being, as a concrete thing, is finite and insufficient; therefore, it has to depend upon other things; as Pei Wei says: “That upon which a being depends is called support.” On his view, not only concrete things but also persons are dependent upon certain conditions for their existence; therefore, non-action can never be regarded as a state of inertia, as the doctrine of “valuing non-being” held. Pei illustrates this view with examples—if one desires the fish deep in the water, one cannot obtain them by lying down to rest; if one desires the birds high above a wall, one cannot shoot them down by standing calmly. It can thus be seen that only by attempting something and accomplishing something can one benefit oneself; just as Pei Wei says: “Whatever benefits a being must be another being.” For Pei Wei, those who “take non-being as substance” are in fact those who take the mind as substance, regarding the mind as “non-being” and things as “being.” He says: “Mind does not belong to things and it is up tomind to take control of things. It is preposterous, however, to call mind non-being because things are not controlled by themselves.”5 The doctrine of “valuing non-being” is mistaken in arguing for the thesis that “being is the product of non-being” on the basis of the idea that “it must be mind to control things”, because the mind to control things is also a “being.” Accordingly, human beings come to understand the natural world through encountering external objects, and to engage in production and establish institutions in accordance with laws; this is a process of benefiting a “being” with another “being.” Pei Wei’s criticism of the doctrine of “valuing non-being” in his essay “On the Importance of Being”shows his materialist stand. However, he fails to make clear that things are produced by themselves from a point of view of dialectical contradiction, thus displaying his dogmatic tendency to make “being” and “non-being” absolutely opposite to each other.

6.2 Ji Kang’s Challenge to Fatalism During the period of the Wei and Jin, the aims of those who advocated the Mysterious Learning were not completely uniform. Some of them did so in order to ease the crisis of feudal morals and institutions and to cover up the rulers’ lives of dissipation, and some of them engaged in “pure talks” about philosophical matters in order to express their protests against persons in power. Of the latter, Ji Kang was an eminent representative. Ji Kang (224–263), who styled himself Shuye and was a native of Giaoguo Zhi (in the southwest of present-day Su County in Anhui Province), had been a senior official in the state of Wei. He was a writer and musician as well as a thinker, and was one member of the so-called Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove. His writings were compiled into a book entitled Ji Kang Ji (Collected Writings of Ji Kang). He had declared himself publicly against Tang (king of Shang) and Wu (king of Zhou) as well as the ceremonials of the Zhou dynasty (Ji 1962, p. 122). On hearing of this, 5

Pei Wei, “On the Importance of Being,” in History of Jin Dynasty.

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Xiang Xiu, also a member of the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove, was greatly alarmed and advised Ji Kang not to do so lest he suffer personal consequences, to which Ji Kang responded with laughter. Despising Confucianism, he put forward the idea of “transcending the established doctrines of social relations and letting nature take its own course,” which required the casting off of the yoke of feudal morals and the gratification of natural human desires. This idea had been transmitted in one continuous line from the Daoist thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi, since Ji Kang thought of the feudal ethical code as conflicting with the natural order and held that the code went against human nature. But his attitude towards life was different from what Zhuangzi called “escaping from the world” and “having completeness of living.” He stuck to his aspirations; when he received a letter from Shan Tao, a good friend of his and also a colleague of the Seven Sages, advising him not to offend persons in authority, Ji Kang flew into a rage and immediately wrote back to say that their friendship should be broken off. Even as he was about to beexecuted on the charge of “behaving with utter disregard for social and intellectual convention,” he still determinedly held on to his own aspirations, playing the classical tune of Guangling San calmly and unhurriedly. This is a manifestation of the Confucian and Mohist spirit of sacrificing one’s life for justice, instead of the Daoist ideal of life. As to the conception of the Way of Heaven, Ji Kang holds that all things in the world are derived from changes in the original force (元气yuan qi); this idea is largely inherited fromthe monism of vital force (气qi) advocated by Wang Chong of the Han dynasty. Among Ji Kang’s philosophical ideas is his challenge to fatalism in the guise of a heretic under the feudalist autocratic reign, which is worthy of special attention. Influenced by the Daoist religion, Ji Kang claims that it is possible for an ordinary person to live for several hundred or even a thousand years by refining and purifying his spirit and vital force; this merely requires that he be good at nourishing his life, that he have few desires and a sense of peace with events, and that he perform certain breathing exercises and take certain drugs. It is possible that Ji Kang does not literally accept these claims about longevity; his real purpose may be to oppose fatalism, which maintains that “death and life are determined by Fate; wealth and rank depend upon Heaven.” According to fatalism, a person’s life and destiny are predetermined in such a way that one cannot escape one’s destined misfortunes, even by means of wisdom, nor secure happiness, even by making efforts. Ji Kang adopts a critical attitude toward this idea and says that it is true that life and death are naturally determined, but whether one can reach the limit of one’s life depends on one’s own efforts. Just as the land may or may not yield good crops owing to different ploughing and weeding practices, so one may die young through stupidity or may achieve long life through wisdom. With respect to the relationship between effort (力li) and fate (命ming), accordingly, Ji Kang emphasizes human effort. In his opinion, those who are wise in nourishing their lives regard glory, wealth, and rank as mere worldly possessions. For him, they are not hard to acquire; the thing that is difficult to do is to stick to one’s own aspirations. If one can do so, one will feel happy even when one leads a

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life of poverty. In the eyes of Ji Kang, it is the most important thing for a person to set up his aspirations; a person is not a real person without aspirations. After Confucianism became the officialorthodox, Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven was dominant. Wang Chong also fell into fatalism, since he regarded necessity and contingency as opposed to each other. Looking at the problem of the relationship of necessity to contingency from the point of view of the inseparability of substance and function, Wang Bi concluded that the necessary eternal Way (Dao) and contingent changes were unified, but that the important thing was to grasp necessity. As he says: “Things never err; they always follow their principle” (Ji 1962, p. 591). By this, he meant that all things in the world had to follow the necessary law; this law was called “the Mandate of Heaven,” which could not be disobeyed. Thus, contingency is actually absorbed into necessity, and fatalism became more sophisticated. In his conception of the Way of human beings, Ji Kang affirms the role of human effort and sings high praise for “aspirations” (Ji 1962, p. 116). This implies a challenge to fatalism, which was quite rare at that time. On his view, each person—regardless of whether he is in poverty or holds a high rank– should “hold firmly his or her lofty aspirations,” maintaining high moral principles and acting rightly not out of a sense of duty, but as an expression of his natural inclinations (Ji 1962, p. 316). Ji Kang here holds that the cultivation of a person’s virtues must rely on will power, and that moral conduct should be based on voluntary choice, for only when one acts on that basis will one feel at ease with one’s own conduct. The pre-Qin Confucians had already pointed out that volition has a dual nature, since it consists of both “consistency” and “voluntariness.” Ji Kang’s original contribution is his integration of the voluntariness of volition with the Daoist principle of nature. He says: “The nature of the common people is loving peace and hating danger, and loving ease and hating work. Therefore, if they are not disturbed, their wishes will be realized; not forced, they will follow their aspirations” (Ji 1962, p. 259). To him, Confucian teachings and morals can do nothing but lure people to seek fame and position, and to suppress their natural desires; this is a “disturbance” to and “forcing” of human nature. Therefore, people must throw off the shackles of conventional morality and social institutions and do everything of their own accord, refusing to allow external forces to influence their behavior; if they do, they can truly be at ease. Moreover, people in remote antiquity could “find peace without learning,” though they had no written language and education (Ji 1962, p. 264). Thus it can be seen that Ji Kang emphasizes the ethical principle of voluntariness, but at the same time he somehow ignores the principle of consciousness, that is, he does not understand that conscious virtues can be cultivated through education. However, his daring spirit and his bold challenge to fatalism made valuable contributions to Chinese philosophy.

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6.3 The Commentary on the Zhuangzi: “When There is Being, There is Non-being”—The Doctrine of “Self-transformation” Against Metaphysical Ontology During the Wei and Jin period, in relation to the debate on “being and non-being (movement and tranquility)”, Wang Bi put forward his doctrine of “valuing nonbeing,” while Pei Wei used his doctrine of “exalting being” to oppose it explicitly. And in their Commentary on the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi Zhu), Xiang Xou and Guo Xiang presented their theory of the unity of being and non-being (movement and tranquility), since they advocated that “when there is being, there is non-being” and all things “are transformed of themselves in the profoundly mysterious state,” thus substantially promoting relativism and opposing metaphysical ontology (Guo 1961, p. 804). Xiang Xou (c. 227–272), whose courtesy name was Ziqi, was a native of Huai in Henei (in the southwest of present-day Wuzhi in Henan Province). Guo Xiang (? –312), whose courtesy name was Zixuan, was a native of Henan (in modern Luoyang in Henan Province). The authorship of the Commentary on the Zhuangzi has long been the subject of controversy. Some hold that authorship should be attributed to Xiang Xou, on the grounds that his commentary was simply plagiarized by Guo Xiang. But others argue that Guo Xiang significantly modified and improved upon Xiang Xou’s original commentary, and that authorship should therefore be attributed to him. In my opinion, the extant Commentary on the Zhuangzi should be regarded as a joint product of Xiang Xou and Guo Xiang. As regards the relationship between the feudal ethical code (名教ming jiao) and nature, the authors of the Commentary on the Zhuangzi assume that the former is identical to the latter. The work fuses Confucianism with Daoism and analogously unifies the feudal ethical code with nature. According to the Comenentary, the “Sage” of Confucians is identical with the “Spiritual Man” of Zhuangzi; as it says: “The Spiritual Man is today’s so-called Sage” (ch. 1). The sages Yao and Shun, for example, were supreme rulers who stressed the feudal ethical code and the institutions that embody it, but mentally they were no different from those spiritual men who were absolutely careless and free. Hence the words: “Although the sage is working in government, his mind seems to be in remote mountainsand forests” (Guo 1961, p. 28). Proceeding from the idea that the feudal ethical code is identical to nature, the Commentary reinterprets Lao-Zhuang’s advocacy of “government by doing nothing that goes against nature.” This proposal does not mean that one should “fold one’s arms and sit in silence” and live in seclusion, but means that each person should behave to his capacity and that each person should be placed in a suitable position. The Comentary says: “When one attends to one’s own responsibility, both the ruler and the ruled will be contented and the principle of taking no action is attained” (Guo 1961, pp. 465–466). That is to say, it is entirely rational to rank the ruler and the ruled in a feudal hierarchical order, and in this way “the principle of nature will operate of

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itself.” This is quite dissimilar to Lao-Zhuang’s critical and satirical attitude towards the current rule in light of the idea of “government by doing nothing.” (1) The Unity of Being and Non-being and “Self-transformation and Having a Mutually Conditioned Relationship” The Commentary on the Zhuangzi denies that “being comes from non-being,” as did Pei Wei. It says: “Not only is it impossible for non-being to be changed into being. It is also impossible for being to become non-being” (Guo 1961, p. 763). Neither “being” nor “non-being” can be changed into each other; “being” means existence, while “non-being” means emptiness. Again it states: “Although being as a substance undergoes infinite changes and transformations, it cannot in any instance become non-being. This being so, there is no time when there is no being; being eternally exists” (Guo 1961, p. 763). Since “being” eternally exists, its changes and transformations are endless. According to the Commentary, “being” is nothing but change, and is identical to “transformation” (化hua). It says: Of the forces that are imperceptible, none is greater than that of change. It transports Heaven and Earth towards the new. It carries hills and mountains to quit the old. The old never stops for a minute, but suddenly has already become the new. Thus Heaven, Earth, and all things are ever in a state of change.[...] We touch the arm [of some passerby] now and lose it. Everything imperceptibly passes away. Therefore the “I” of the past is no longer the “I” of today. (Guo 1961, p. 244)

Change, though it is an “imperceptible force,” that is, a force behind which there is no other force (substance) to impel it, does give a strong impetus to the transformation of all things, including Heaven, Earth, hills, mountains, and so on. The whole world is a constant flow of changes, in which nothing will remain and “being” turns into “non-being.” In the Commentary, this state tends to be called “the profoundly mysterious state,” and yet it is not the same as nothingness, but rather the formless and imperceptible vacuity; as the Commentary says: “The Mystery, whose name is non-being, does not mean nothingness” (Guo 1961, p. 257). The Commentary affirms that “being” and “transformation” are absolute, and advocates the union of reality with change, which is taken as the first principle of the world. This actually amounts to a static description of motion, which holds that at this moment an object is in this position, and at the next moment it is in the next position. Motion is conceived of as a continuity of numberless alternations of production and extinction in the twinkling of an eye, and, in the final analysis, as the Mystery or vacuity. The entire philosophical system of The Commentary on the Zhuangzi can be reduced to one statement, that is, “when there is being, there is non-being.” Here, “non-being” refers to “the Mystery” instead of “nothingness”; “being” and “non-being” are integrative. This strategy to argue for vacuity by denying the qualitative determinations of things in light of absolute motion was first used by Zhuangzi. The distinguishing characteristic of the Commentary on the Zhuangzi lies in its presenting the new doctrine of “self-transformation,” which holds that all things are both self-transformed and mutually conditioned, and that they imperceptibly form an organic whole. This invisible connection is called “silent harmony”or “Dao.”

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The doctrine of “self-transformation” defended by the Commentary on the Zhuangzi is a doctrine of mo wei(莫为). It explicitly affirms Ji Zhen’s doctrine of mowei, and furthermore, it advocates that “things are natural and not caused by something else” (Guo 1961, p. 56). All things are natural and spontaneous, producing and changing themselves, and there is no force that causes them to do so. This is the meaning of “transformation” as used by the Commentary on the Zhuangzi. This doctrine is both significant and valuable, in that it denies the existence of a Creator and a metaphysical, spiritual substance. The Commentary on the Zhuangzi says: “Let us ask whether there is a Creator or not. If not, how can he create things? If there is, he is incapable of materializing all the forms.[…] Hence everything creates itself without the direction of any Creator” (Guo 1961, pp. 111–112). This passage is an application of the dilemma of formal logic. There are only two possible answers as to the question of whether there is a Creator: if there is not, then “non-being” cannot create things; if there is, then “being” as a concrete thing cannot create a multitude of things. Consequently, the conclusion is that there is no Creator at all. The Commentary defends atheism; it not only denies the existence of the Creator but also opposes theological teleology. It says: “Today we see the physical form of a person. What causes it? A person is not purposefully produced, but produces himself at a certain time” (Guo 1961, p. 263). That is to say, the physical form of a person is not purposefully created by God, but comes to exist the way it does spontaneously and naturally once certain conditions are satisfied. This is opposed to Dong Zhongshu’s saying that “Heaven and Earth produce persons purposefully.” Like Wang Bi, the Commentary calls the Dao “nonbeing,” and yet its doctrine of “self-transformation” puts forward the proposition that the “Dao is incompetent” instead of looking upon the Dao as “substance.” According to the Commentary, the Dao is incapable of producing all things and causing them to become so, and is not a motive force; all things produce themselves and become so naturally (Guo 1961, p. 251). The Commentary denies Wang Bi’s view that the Dao as spiritual substance is the formal cause prior to Heaven, Earth, and all things. Such an attitude is close to materialism, since it is opposed to the doctrine of “valuing non-being” as well as the doctrine of huo shi (或使). It is commendable that the doctrine of “self-transformation” affirms the selfmovement of things and denies the existence of a Creator a spiritual substance which exists prior to things; however, the Commentary stops here and holds that there is no need to make further investigations into the source of the self-movement of things. It holds that things don’t have a source for their transformation; therefore, it is unnecessary inquire into the causes behind the phenomena. On this point, the Commentary on the Zhuangzi is close to phenomenalism. The Commentary pays attention to a “mutually conditioned relationship” while it stresses “self-transformation,” asserting that there are universal and organic connections between things. But this kind of connection does not mean that things are causally interdependent; besides, the connection is invisible. As all things are selftransformed and independent, they hold a conditioned relationship to each other and thus “the state of the Mystery” is attained through their invisible connections. The Commentary says:

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There are no things in the world which do not hold a relationship to one another as of the “self” and the “other.” Yet both the “self” and the “other” equally desire to act for themselves, thus being as opposed to each other as are east and west. (Guo 1961, p. 579)

All things hold a relationship to one another as of the “self” and the “other” and are mutually opposed. But, on the other hand, the things that are opposite are always complementary to each other; the mutually opposed “self” and “other” are inseparably interconnected just as “east and west; at the same time they are mutually indispensable,” and like the relationship between the lips and the teeth, though they have different functions, “when the lips are gone, the teeth feel cold” (Guo 1961, p. 579). Again, the Commentary says: “However insignificant one’s body may be, one needs the whole universe to be the condition of one’s existence. Everything in the universe could not exist without the existence of everything else” (Guo 1961, p. 225). That is to say, each individual is connected with the whole of the universe, and each appearance in the universe is connected with all other appearances. Also the Commentary: “Heaven and Earth, or the yin and the yang, though being opposite to each other, produce themselves together. Rights and wrongs, or order and disorder, exist together” (Guo 1961, p. 583). All this contains the elements of dialectical thinking. However, this is no more than a kind of subjective dialectics, which gives people specious contentment but cannot reveal the inherent essence of the objective world. The instances of the unity of opposites mentioned by theCommentary on the Zhuangzi in such contexts as “The lips and teeth are closely related and mutually conditioned,” “east and west, though mutually opposed, at the same time are mutually indispensable,” and the like, are only back and forth inferences between opposite concepts; they do not reflect the real development of the contradictions in things. Its “selftransformation in the profoundly mysterious state” means, in effect, that the world is a harmonious and non-contradictory entity; therefore, in the final analysis, this is a relativistic theory and a disguised form of metaphysics. (2) Humanity and Righteousness Come from Human Nature and “Whatever One Meets Is Fate” As regards the conception of the Way of humankind, the Commentary on the Zhuangzi puts forth the two statements that humanity and righteousness come from human nature and that “Whatever one meets is Fate.” What the Commentary maintains is different from Zhuangzi’s theory concerning the relationship between natural and artificial. According to Zhuangzi, haltering a horse’s head or piercing an ox’s nose is damage done to the horse’s or ox’s natural instincts. The Commentary on the Zhuangzi, on the contrary, holds that such “human affairs” are really “natural.” In order to control and employ a horse or an ox, one must put a halter on the horse’s head or pierce an ox’s nose with a string; these acts are in conformity with the necessity of nature (Guo 1961, p. 591). Moreover, starting from the view that “human affairs” are “natural,” the Commentary does not agree with Zhuangzi that humanity and righteousness should be understood as damage caused by human activities to human natural instincts. Instead, human relations such as

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humanity, righteousness, and so on also come out of human nature (Guo 1961, p. 318). In this way, the Commentary proves that the feudal ethical code is nothing but nature if viewed from the relationship between Heaven and humankind, and thus combines the Confucian principle of humanity with the Daoist principle of nature. Although humanity and righteousness come from human nature, this nature is changeable, just as the Commentary reads, “Humanity and righteousness are principles of human nature. Human nature undergoes changes and is different past and present” (Guo 1961, p. 519). Hence, human morals likewise change historically. Again, it says: Xi Shi [a well-known beautiful woman in ancient China] exemplifies one whose manners were suitable for the occasion; the ugly woman exemplifies one who failed to cast them aside even after the proper occasion for them had passed. (Guo 1961, p. 516)

This idea—that the difference between beautiful and ugly, or good and evil, lies in whether they are suitable for human nature and for certain occasions–is more reasonable than the apriorism that advocates an immutable human nature. So far as its conception of the Way of humankind is concerned, the other proposition in the Commentary on the Zhuangzi—“Whatever one meets is Fate”—represents fatalism in disguised form. The Commentary discusses the relationship between necessity and contingency as well. In its view, the Dao is the necessary order and law; as it states, “To follow the Way (Dao) is to keep order” (Guo 1961, p. 471). It is imperative for things to develop in conformity with the law, that is, “Things have to follow their Way (Dao)” (Guo 1961, p. 471) and “What things do is never erroneous” (Guo 1961, p. 219). Movements and changes of all things in the world are necessary according to their Fate. Proceeding from this point of view, the Commentary argues that human history has its own necessity. Zhuangzi believed that, under the reign of Yu (the founder of the Xia dynasty), people became wicked and the whole country was thrown into great disorder. On the contrary, the Commentary reads: The developments of a hundred past generations, combined with the changesof recent times, are responsible for the present crisis. It is not caused by Yu.[...] But the world itself inevitably becomes disorderly. (Guo 1961, p. 529)

That is to say, order in the world is caused by long-term developments of history and current conditions together; it is not caused by Yu or any other individual. Obviously, it is sensible to comprehend historical necessity by appeal to “the developments of a hundred past generations” and “the changes of recent times” together, so far as the investigation into necessity made by the Commentary on the Zhuangzi is concerned. However, theCommentary on the Zhuangzi fails to genuinely comprehend the historical law. It says: The principles of things are from the very start correct. None can escape from them [...]. The fact that I happen to be here is not something that spiritual beings of heaven and earth, sages and worthies of the land, and people of supreme strength of perfect knowledge can violate. What we are not, we cannot be. What we are, we cannot but be. (Guo 1961, p. 212)

In its view, whatever one does and whatever one meets are necessary and cannot be violated even by spiritual beings and sages, that is to say, all contingent appearances

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are in fact necessary. From this, it concludes that “whatever one meets is Fate” (Guo 1961, p. 156). Though “Fate” is not an external and mandatory force, yet people must be resigned to it and be at ease with themselves in the face of whatever they meet. Once they do so, they will become free. Thus there is not any essential difference between the Commentary’s view of necessity and Dong Zhongshu and Wang Bi’s fatalism. As regards the relationship between necessity and contingency, Wang Chong emphasizes their differences and takes them separately; Wang Bi speaks of their unity, but contingency is absorbed into necessity; the Commentary on the Zhuangzi also admits their unity, and yet it levels necessity down to contingency. Consequently, they all lead to fatalism in their views of the Way of humankind. (3) The Unity of Body and Soul and the “Application of Words to Opposites” In regards to the relationship between body and soul, theCommentary on the Zhuangzi reads: “When a man is born, he is necessarily endowed with an ability to meet external objects; he is not like tiles and bricks that are limited to their physical forms” (Guo 1961, p. 692). For the Commentary, a person is endowed with a soul as well as a body, and one’s spiritual activities are triggered by one’s encountering external objects. This is a materialist view. In particular, the Commentary emphasizes that the body and the soul are united in the Sage, who “has sound mind and a concrete shape” and “whose body becomes merged with all things” (Guo 1961, p. 96). Again, the Commentaryclaims: The Sages always roam in the transcendental world in order to enlarge the mundane world. Having no deliberate thoughts, they are in accord with things. Therefore, though they work their bodies day in and day out, their essential spirits are not affected. Though they are engaged in various activities, they stay calm (Guo 1961, p. 742).

That is to say, a sage’s working his body is not incompatible with his enjoying spiritual freedom, for these two aspects have naturally merged into one. It is clear thatthe Commentary tries to show that the feudal ethical code is nothing but nature by means of proving the unity of body and soul. In the Commentary on the Zhuangzi, the state in which “the Sage becomes merged with all things” is described as a mysterious state in which the difference between subjectivity and objectivity is obliterated and there is no need for logical thinking. Is it possible, then, to employ words or concepts to describe such a mysterious state? For the Commentary, Dao is beyond words and ideas. It says: What is called words and ideas is being. What words and ideas want to express is non-being. Therefore, we seek help from the expression of words and ideas, and yet we enter into the realm of no words and no ideas. That is the way how Dao is captured (Guo 1961, p. 573).

Such a realm of no words and no ideas is equal to the “chaos” of Zhuangzi. Such being the case, is it completelyunnecessary to say anything? TheCommentary on the Zhuangzi answers this question in the negative, saying, “If words cannot be applied to opposites and harmonize them with each other, then ‘I’ will no longer be in harmony with all things” (Guo 1961, p. 950). When I genuinely

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reach the realm of no words and no ideas, I and all things combine into one; however, the realization of the harmony between all things and me is based on the application of words to opposites. Here, the Commentary stresses the flexibility of concepts and admonishes us to work through the differences between concepts which are opposites. The following expresses what it means: When their physical forms are compared, Mount Tai is larger than an autumn hair. But if everything is in accord with its nature and function, and is silently in harmony with its ultimate capacity, then a large physical form is not excessive and a small one is not inadequate. (Guo 1961, p. 566)

According to the Commentary, “largeness” means “sufficient,” while “smallness” means “not excessive”; in that way, even Heaven and Earth may be regarded as being not excessive, while even an autumn hair is sufficient. So there is no essential difference between “smallness” and “largeness,” since both of them are “general names” denoting all things, that is, concepts reflecting the most general attributes of things. In fact, this idea is relativistic, for it fails to capture the objective dialectics that can expose the essential contradictions of things, although it demonstrates a certain level of dialectical thinking insofar as it pays attention to the flexibility of concepts. All in all, the Commentary on the Zhuangzi includes both idealist speculation and materialist and dialectical elements. One of the results of developing its doctrine of “self-transformation” is Seng Zhao’s Buddhist philosophy influenced by the Mysterious Learning; the other is Fan Zhen’s “On the Extinction of the Soul”, which is undoubtedly influenced by the Commentary on the Zhuangzi on the problems of “being and non-being” and “body and soul.” These two results reflect two opposite orientations. Furthermore, these speculative and abstract theories can become vivid and concrete when combined with images. It can thus be said that the theory provides an intellectual foundation for the literary and artistic theories of the Wei and Jin and Southern and Northern dynasties, as represented by Wenxin Diaolong by Liu Xie, who reveals the dialectics of thinking in images. The development of the classical Chinese theory of the aesthetic sphere during this period is due to the corresponding achievements made by contemporary philosophers in their discussions on “being and non-being (movement and tranquility),” “words and ideas,” and “body and soul.”

6.4 Ge Hong’s Daoist Philosophy and Seng Zhao’s Buddhism Expounded in Terms of Mysterious Learning During the time of the Eastern Jin dynasty, when Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism had come to coexist, both the theology of Daoism and that of Buddhism made rather rapid progress. The rise of Daoism as a religion and the introduction of Buddhism into China can be traced back to the Han dynasty. The Taiping Jing (The Canons of Justice) of the Eastern Han dynasty, a book that contained numerous and jumbled views; among

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these views are some which give expression to the interests of the working people and peasants against oppression; others which lay the ideological groundwork for the establishment of Daoism; and still others which provided ideological motivation for the Yellow Turban uprising at the end of the Han dynasty. Accordingly, Cao Cao, who put down the uprising, ordered that Daoism should be prohibited. Nevertheless, the later feudal rulers turned back to Daoism. During the Jin, Southern, and Northern dynasties, Daoism came to flourish. The Baopuzi (The Master WhoEmbraces Similicity), written by Ge Hong of the Eastern Jin dynasty, provided Daoism with a philosophical foundation. When Buddhism was first transplanted to Chinese soil, it conflicted with traditional Chinese thought in many ways, and it had to undergo a process of localization and acclimatization before it was generally accepted. The Mysterious Learning (玄学xuan xue) was prominent in the period of the Wei and Jin dynasties, and Buddhism initially had to be explained in terms of this learning. At that time, both famous literati and eminent monks liked to use Laozi and Zhuangzi’s ideas to expound Buddhism. Such Buddhism of the Eastern Jin, Southern, and Northern dynasties was often called the doctrine of Prajna (sage wisdom), one of whose exponents was Seng Zhao. (1) Ge Hong’s Baopuzi Ge Hong (284–364), who styled himself Zhi Chuan, also called Baopuzi (“the master who embraces simplicity”), was a native of Jurong (in present-day Jiangsu Province) in the Jin dynasty. His book of the Baopuzi consists of two parts—an “inner section” and an “outer section.” The former, in his own words, belongs to Daoism, the latter to Confucianism. Thus it is a compromise between Daoism and Confucianism, specifically, between nature and the mingjiao (the feudal ethical code). On the one hand, it makes farfetched connections between Daoism and the teachings on immortals and elixirs, but on the other it upholds the feudal ethical code and expresses dissatisfaction with the prevailing practice of “pure talks” beginning from the Wei and Jin. The Baopuzi plays an important role in the history of science and technology. Its “inner section” includes accounts of many concrete methods of refining medical drugs and elixir pills for immortality, and thus advances alchemy, a forerunner of modern chemistry. Meanwhile, Ge Hong adds to the sum of medical knowledge in his other books such as the Zhou Hou Bei Ji Fang (Prescriptions for Emergencies), among others. Because of these kinds of achievements, Ge Hong’s Daoist theology cannot be ignored. Philosophically, the Baopuzi is primarily concerned with the problems of “being and non-being” and “body and soul.” Ge Hong says: “The Mystery (玄xuan) is the first ancestor of nature and the great parent of multitudes of things.[…] It is existent due to thousands of kinds of things, and it is non-existent due to the accompaniment of its concealment and stillness” (Ge 1985, p. 1). According to him, the “Mystery” is the origin of the world. It is Dao, which is the unity of “being” and “non-being.” Ge Hong’s remarks are mystical, but he believes that all things in the world are naturally produced. The light and lucid vital force (气, qi) ascends and turns into Heaven, and the turbid vital force falls and turns into Earth; between Heaven and Earth, the two forces interact on each other

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and thus all things are produced. All this is naturally, not purposefully so. As Ge Hong says: “Though Heaven and Earth embrace all things, yet all things are not purposefully produced by Heaven and Earth” (Ge 1985, p. 137). It is obvious that Ge Hong absorbs some thoughts of Daoism into his belief that the production of myriad things in the natural world is natural and spontaneous. As to the relationship between natural and artificial, however, Ge Hong, who speaks of “action,” disagrees with the Daoism, which advocates “non-action.” In his opinion, nature is changeable and Change may make one kind of thing turn into another kind; therefore, humankind may be able to use “the art of Change.” He says: “As for the art of Change, there is nothing it cannot accomplish” (Ge 1985, p. 284). For example, water and fire, which are in the heavens, may be obtained through the burning-mirror and the dew-mirror; white lead can be turned red through a chemical transformation; clouds, rain, frost, and snow can be reproduced in synthetic form by the alchemist; and so forth. These assertions have more or less scientific grounds. But some of his other examples are utterly groundless, such as “the body of humankind can naturally be seen, but there are means to make it invisible,” “ghosts and spirits are naturally invisible, yet there are means whereby they can be caused to appear,” “men or women may be transformed into cranes, stones, tigers, monkeys, sand, or turtles,” and so on. Ge Hong says: “Change is inherent in the nature of Heaven and Earth” (Ge 1985, p. 284). The idea that humankind can play an active role in changing things by means of creating conditions in conformity with laws of the change of nature is a scientific one. But, on the other hand, it is a myth or superstition that all things can be transformed into one another unconditionally and that the human art of Change can attain such a powerful state. Ge Hong states: “Among the creatures of nature, humankind is the most intelligent. Therefore those who understand creation slightly can employ the myriad things, and those who get to its depth can enjoy long life and everlasting existence” (Ge 1985, p. 46). It is not wrong to admonish people to act positively„ but overemphasizing this point and believing that a person can achieve material immortality leads to a Daoist theology. As to the relationship between body and soul, Ge Hong says: “The establishment of the body must depend upon the soul” and “The body is the house of the soul” (Ge 1985, p. 110). He thinks that the soul is the governor of the body, on the one hand, and that the soul cannot exist independently of the body, on the other hand. He emphasizes that one can become an immortal through nourishing one’s body with drugs, thus advocating the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. So the Baopuzi goes into minute details about how to refine elixir pills for immortality, how to take medicines, how to do breathing exercises, and so on. Obviously, there are superstitious nonsense, but they contain Ge Hong’s doctrine of “Fate” (命ming) and “Effort” (力li). He ascribes the length of a person’s life to the effects of the constellations on his development as a fetus (Ge 1985, p. 136). This is also superstition. In this way, however, he holds that one’s life (Fate) is determined by contingent factors instead of by Heaven, Earth, or one’s parents, though one took shape through receiving the vital forces (qi) in one’s mother’s body and then was born in the midst of Heaven and Earth. In Ge Hong’s opinion, the differences between the vital forces with which different fetuses are endowed are caused by chance, but whether one can become

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immortal depends not only upon one’s initial endowment but also on whether one has strong willpower. He says: “If you want to prolong your life and cultivate yourself to the level of the Dao, the key to success lies in your will” (Ge 1985, p. 17). Only by bringing one’s subjective willpower into play and maintaining it in the face of obstacles can one attain the Dao of immortals. Here, Ge Hong shows his tendency toward voluntarism. The conflict between human effort and Fate during the period of the Wei and Jin represents one aspect of the debate on “Heaven and humankind.” The main trend of the Mysterious Learning is to stress that “Fate” is beyond human effort, so Wang Bi demands that people be “submissive to their Fate” and Guo Xiang thinks that people should be “contented with their Fate.” Ji Kang launches his challenge to fatalism and on the whole takes up a materialistic attitude toward the conflict between human effort and Fate. Ge Hong adopts an eclectic attitude towards this, believing that Fate is determined by the vital force one receives, which shows his fatalist view, but on the other hand stressing that one can do anything by means of one’s will, which shows his tendency towards voluntarism. Religious Daoism advocates “taking action” and pays attention to human effort, which embodies the scientific idea that humankind can conquer nature. However, overemphasizing this point will certainly lead to voluntarism, which can be seen clearly in the later thought of Li Quan. (2) Seng Zhao’s Treatises: The Emptiness of the Unreal and The Immutability of Things Seng Zhao (384–414), an eminent monk of the later Qin, whose original surname was Zhang, was a native of Changyang (modern Xi’an in Shaanxi Province). In his early years, he took a special liking to Laozi and Zhuangzi. But he later converted to Buddhism and became noted for his study of the doctrine of prajna (wisdom). Among his works are the Zhao Lun (Seng Zhao’s Treatises) and Commentaries on the Vimalakirtinirdesa Sutra (Commentaries on the Scripture Spoken by Vimalakirti). He was one of the four outstanding pupils of Kumarajiva (344–413), the renowned translator of Buddhist texts. In his two treatises “On the Emptiness of the Unreal” and “On the Immutability of Things,” Seng Zhao focused on the philosophical debate over “existence and non-existence (motion and rest),” and advocated his views on “neither existence nor non-existence” and “finding of stillness in motion.” To prove that all things are at once non-existent and not non-existent, Seng Zhao begins by discussing the relationship between their nature and phenomenal appearances. According to him, things are non-existent if viewed from their nature, while things are existent if viewed from their appearances; however, since the nature of things is “non-existent,” the “existence” of phenomena is merely a kind of unreal existence instead of real or true existence. As he says: Suppose we say that all is existent. Such existence is not true. Or suppose we say that all is non-existent. But phenomena have already taken shape. In so far as things have already taken shape, they cannot be said to be non-existent, and since they have no true existence, they cannot be said to be really existent. (Seng 2010, p. 56)

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Since the “existence” of phenomena is not really existent, it is emptiness. The unreal is nothing but emptiness, which is exactly the meaning of “the emptiness of the unreal.” Seng Zhao compares such a doctrine to a person produced by magic, saying that “this person is not non-existent, but it is a person produced by magic and not a real person” (Seng 2010, p. 56). That is to say, everything in the world is a mirage, which is unreal but cannot be said to be non-existent; therefore, everything is “neither existent nor non-existent.” It can be seen that Seng Zhao’s theory of “neither existence nor non-existence” takes vacuity-tranquility as the first principle. He says: The Supreme Vacuity that neither comes into nor goes out of existence is probably the subtle principle in the reflection of the mysterious mirror of prajna (wisdom) and the source of all existence. Unless one possesses the intelligence and special penetrating power of a sage, how can one harmonize one’s spirit with the realm of neither existence nor non-existence? (Seng 2010, p. 33).

This passage shows us that, so far as ontology is concerned, absolute vacuity is regarded as the substance of all things, namely, “the source of all existence,” and, so far as epistemology is concerned, absolute vacuity is regarded as the mysterious state of wisdom and intuition, and true intelligence lies in comprehending the principle of the unity of existence and non-existence so as to attain this state. In his treatise “On the Immutability of Things,” Seng Zhao states: “Rest must be sought right in motion. From this we know that things are immutable.” Although he thinks that rest cannot separate itself from motion, his purpose is to prove that the world is completely at rest. He says: Past things by their very nature exist in the past and have not gone there from the present, and present things by their nature exist in the present and have not come here from the past. This is why Confucius said, “Hui, every day I see something new. Although you and I have been associated with each other for a long time, in a single moment you are no longer the same as before.” Thus it is clear that past things do not come and present things do not go. As there is not even a subtle sign of going or returning, what thing can there be that can move? (Seng 2010, p. 17).

That is to say, there is nothing that undergoes a developmental process from past to present. Past things are those that remain in the past, while present things are those that appear in the present. There is no contact between them. Therefore, “things are immutable”; the world is completely at rest. Such a theory, like the pre-Qin logicians’ paradox that “the shadow of a flying bird never moves,” exposes the rest in motion. Seng Zhao’s concern, however, is not to discuss the contradiction between motion and rest but to explain motion from a point of view of absolute rest. His saying that “in a single moment you are no longer the same as before” is similar to Zhuangzi’s and Guo Xiang’s in wording, but quite different from theirs in meaning. When Guo Xiang says that “we must go with what there is today,” he also describes motion from a point of view of rest; however, he takes “being means transformation” as the first principle of the world, holding that motion is absolute, that everything changes in the twinkling of an eye, and that consequently we will end up with a profoundly mysterious state. Seng Zhao

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takes absolute vacuity-tranquility as the first principle of the world, holding that rest is absolute, but that it does not separate itself from motion, and that we may demonstrate the eternal tranquility of the world in term of the changing of all things. Seng Zhao says: “When one talks about truth, one speaks in terms of things being immutable, but when one wants to lead the ordinary folk, one talks in terms of things moving on like a current” (Seng 2010, p. 27). He means that there is truth only when one talks about immutability. All things are in a state of absolute rest, and have no development or mutability at all: “As neither does the past reach to the present nor does the present reach to the past, everything, according to its nature, remains for only one period of time” (Seng 2010, p. 27). Time is viewed as a completely tranquil framework; hence there is in fact no time or duration at all. What Seng Zhao defends in his two treatises of “The Emptiness of the Unreal” and “The Immutability of Things” is absolute vacuity-tranquility; therefore, his thought can be understood as a development of the Commentary on the Zhuangzitowards the right. Meanwhile, he discusses the problem of “existence and non-existence (motion and rest)” which was the focus of the Mysterious Learning in the light of Buddhism, thus beginning the process of Buddhism’s organic integration with traditional Chinese thought.

6.5 Fan Zhen’s Summing-Up of the Debate Over Body and Soul—The Application of the Materialist Principle of the Unity of Substance and Function During the Southern and Northern dynasties, Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism struggled with and influenced one another. In that period, most rulers attempted to take advantage of both the Confucian ethical code and the Buddhist or Daoist religious superstitions in order to deceive the ruled. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul was fundamental in Buddhist and Daoist doctrines. Consequently, as a reflection of the struggle between science and religious superstition in philosophy, the controversy on the problem of body (形xing) and soul (神shen) became prominent. During the Southern dynasties, He Chengtian of the Song period, a well-known astronomer, refuted the Buddhist doctrine of the immortality of soul. During the Qi and Liang periods of the Southern dynasties, Fan Zhen summarized the long-standing debate on body and soul in his Treatise “On the Extinction of the Soul”, thus elevating classical Chinese naïve-materialism and atheism to a new level. Fan Zhen (c. 450–515), who was styled Zizhen and was a native of Wuyin in Nanxiang (in the northwest of present-day Biyang County in Henan Province), came from a poor family. After his treatise was published, he was condemned by Emperor Wu Di of the Liang and his ministers. But Fan Zhen held firmly to the truth and was not deterred. A tireless defender of the Confucian ethical code, he voiced his opposition to Buddhism on the grounds that it was incompatible with feudal ethics. The widespread adoption of Buddhism, he believed, would lead to the abandonment

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of the Confucian ethical code and by extension to various social disasters: families would be destroyed, fortunes would be lost as people looked to gods for help and worshiped the Buddha, selfish concerns would replace patriotic ones in the minds of the people, and so on. Fan Zhen’s conception of the Way of Heaven was influenced by the doctrine of “self-transformation” of the Commentary on the Zhuangzi, which can be seen in his saying, “Creation is a gift of nature; all things transform themselves.”6 His materialist view, however, was more clear-cut than that of the Commentary. Firmly upholding the materialist monism of vitality (气qi), he thought that one’s vitality and shape came from Heaven and Earth, and that after one’s death one’s shape went back to the soil and one’s vitality vanished into the air, thus one’s mind and sense ceased to exist since one’s body had decayed and one’s vitality had dispersed (Fan 1991, p. 59). (1) The Inseparability of the Soul as Function from the Body as Substance The essential views of Fan Zhen’s “On the Extinction of the Soul” are as follows: (a) The soul is inseparable from the body, (b) the body is the material substance of the soul and the soul is the function of the body, and (c) the body and the soul are different in name but the same in reality. These show that Fan Zhen applies the materialist principle of the unity of substance (质zhi) and function (用yong) (or the inseparability of substance and function) to the problem of the relationship between the body and the soul. Fan Zhen regards the substance of a thing as the material cause and the function as the self-movement or natural manifestation of the material substance. Taking such a point of view of the relationship of the soul to the body, he argues that, the body is the material cause or substance of the soul and the soul is the function of the body. “Function” depends upon “substance” and the soul cannot exist independently of the body, as he says that “the soul will exist when the body exists and it will be inexistent as soon as the body withers”. He also claims: “when we speak of the body, we mean its material substance; when we speak of the soul, we emphasize its function. The two should by no means be separated from each other” (Fan 1991, p. 59). That is, the soul is the self-movement and natural manifestation of a particular physical form (that is, a human body) and the body and the soul are not two things which have an external relation; instead, they are “different in name but the same in reality.” Thus Fan Zhen expresses opposition to idealism and dualism, which hold that the body and the soul can be separated from each other and the soul can forever exist independently of the body since the body does not possess consciousness whereas the soul possesses it. Moreover, with the principle of the unity of substance and function, Fan Zhen successfully avoids a defect which is present in previous materialist accounts of the relationship between the body and the soul. For them, the soul, just like fire, is made of the fine vital force, while the body, like a candle or a piece of wood, is made of the coarse vital force. From Huan Tan and Wang Chong to He Chengtian, they all illustrate the relationship between the body and the soul with the analogy of fire and 6

Fan Zhen, “A Treatise on the Extinction of the Soul,” in “the Biography of Fan Zhen,” in the History of Liang Dynasty.

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wood or of the flame and candle so as to refute the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. However, such an analogy cannot overcome the dualism of body and soul, and it may even be exploited by theists. For example, Hui Yuan, a Buddhist monk of the Eastern Jin dynasty, says: “The transmission of fire in the firewood is similar to the transmission of the soul in the body. Fire is transmitted to another piece of firewood in the same way as the soul is transmitted to another body.” (Hui 1991, p. 32) That is, just as the transmission of fire is endless, so the soul is immortal because it can be transmitted from one body to another. Thus the analogy of fire and wood is converted into a weapon for demonstrating “the immortality of the soul.” Fan Zhen gives up this analogy and instead compares the relationship of the soul to the body to that of sharpness to a knife. He says: The correlation of the soul to its material substance is like that of sharpness to the edge of a knife, while the correlation of the body to its function is like that of the edge to sharpness.[…]There could be no edge if sharpness is non-existent, nor does sharpness obtain if the edge is destroyed. If it is impossible for a destroyed edge to still be sharp, how can it be admitted that the soul could remain when the body is annihilated? (Fan 2020, p. 740).

It is apparent that Fan Zhen regards the relationship of the body to the soul as that of the material substance to its function. In this way, he eliminates the defect inherent in the analogy of fire and wood and deepens the materialists’ understanding of the relationship between the body and the soul. In Fan Zhen’s opinion, different substances have different functions due to their inseparability. Spiritual activity is not a function possessed by all substances. As he says: “The material substance of a person is a substance that possesses consciousness; while the material substance of a tree is a substance that does not possess consciousness.” (Fan 2020, p. 740) Of course, a dead person has a material substance that is the same as that of a tree and does not have the consciousness that differentiates him or her from a tree. The living body is not the dead one, nor is the dead body the living one; consciousness is possessed only by the living body. In addition, Fan Zhen tries to explain the physiological foundation of a person’s spiritual activity in light of his view that the body is the material substance of the soul and the soul is the function of the body. Physiologically, the relationship of substance to function is that of the physiological structure to its functions (the psychological function included). He divides spiritual activity into two parts: one is the sensation of pain or of itching, and the other is the thought of discriminating right and wrong. He says: “The shallower consciousness is called sensation, whereas the deeper, thought.”(Fan 2020, p. 742) Sensation depends upon sense-organs, while the discrimination of right and wrong is determined by the instrument of the heart (mind). It is right to say that different mental abilities depend upon different physiological organs. However, Fan Zhen cannot thoroughly defeat idealism since he oversimplifies the relationship of the soul to the body as the soul’s dependence upon the body, and is not aware that, from the very beginning, consciousness is a product of social practice. Meanwhile, Fan Zhen fails to deal correctly with the relationship between necessity and contingency. In his opinion, people’s destinies are just like the flowers of

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a tree: some flutter onto a beautiful cushion in a sitting-room with the wind and become honorable, some fall into a latrine and become humble. The view that all this is caused by chance is opposed to Confucian doctrine, which ascribes the order of high and lowranks to the Mandate of Heaven, and to the Buddhist doctrine of karma, which ascribes one’s wealth or poverty to whether one did good or evil works in one’s previous existence. Fan Zhen’s theory is instructive, and yet he holds that “everybody should follow the principle of Heaven and no one should go beyond his or her own nature”; that is, everybody should be submissive to the natural principle of Heaven and know his or her own place. It can thus be seen that Fan Zhen regards “what one meets as Fate” and assimilates necessity into contingency as the Commentary on the Zhuangzi does. (2) The Logic of “Exhaustive Reasoning” in “Treatise on the Extinction of the Soul” Now let us make an analysis of Fan Zhen’s Treatise “Treatise on the Extinction of the Soul” from the perspective of the debates on “names and actualities” and on “words and ideas.” A questioner who upholds the doctrine of the immortality of the soul argues that Fan’s point on the inseparability of the soul from the body does not hold water, because “what does not possess consciousness is called body whereas what possesses it is called soul. It is obviously different whether a thing possesses consciousness or not, and it is out of all reason to identify the soul and the body.”(Fan 2020, p. 740) This argument sounds plausible since it subscribes to the view that names and actualities should have a corresponding relation. But in Fan Zhen’s opinion, “When we speak of the body, we mean its material substance; when we speak of the soul, we emphasize its function. The two should by no means be separated from each other.[…] They are different in name but the same in reality.”(Fan 2020, p. 740) This answer contains two ideas. On the one hand, the body and the soul are different in name and what they denote respectively is different, so they really do have a corresponding relation. Just as Fan says: “What we call sharpness is not the same as the edge, and what we call the edge is not the same as sharpness,” so the names of the body and the soul cannot be confused. On the other hand, Fan does not remain at the same level as Ouyang Jian’s view that “people want to distinguish things, so they give them different names,” but further points out that the body and the soul “should by no means be separated from each other” and demands that people comprehend the integral whole of the body and the soul (that is, a concrete whole) through their different names. Here, he touches upon the idea, though naïvely, that only by grasping the relationship of the soul to the body from their connections, namely, by grasping from all sides the relations of “the inseparability of the soul from the body” and “the body as the material substance of the soul and the soul as the function of the body” can we truly comprehend the concrete whole. What is required here is to think dialectically and bring to light the truth from connections between concepts. Fan Zhen strictly distinguishes between “an exhaustive sophism” (穷辩qiong bian) and “an exhaustive reasoning” (穷理qiong li). According to the questioner, the fact that Zhuang Zhou (Zhuangzi) dreamed that he was a butterfly shows that,

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in fact, body and soul can be separated from each other, while the fact that as soon as he awoke he found himself Zhuang Zhou again shows that the body and the soul combine into one again. Fan Zhen argues that this is “an exhaustive sophism” confusing dream with reality, but not “an exhaustive reasoning.” He points out that, if Zhuang Zhou had truly become a butterfly in his dream, then there should have been a dead butterfly left after he awoke since his soul had returned to his body, but in fact there was nothing left (Fan 1991). Therefore, we will find that this sophistry does not hold water if we test it by facts. A true example of “exhaustive reasoning,” to Fan Zhen, is to advance “exact reasons” (精据jing ju) and to make “valid judgments” (雅决ya jue) (Fan 1991). An actual example of the application of “exhaustive reasoning” is Fan Zhen’s Treatise “On the Extinction of the Soul,” which can be divided into three parts. The first part covers the first four paragraphs of the text, which lay the groundwork for what is to follow. The proposition to be supported is “The soul will exist when the body exists and it will be non-existent as soon as the body withers.” The basic grounds of the argument are as follows: “The soul is inseparable from the body,” “The body is the material substance of the soul and the soul is the function of the body,” and “The body and the soul are different in name but the same in reality.” Here, the relationship of the soul to the body is discussed on the basis of the materialist principle of the unity of “substance and function,” which can be verified by the fact of the inseparability of the edge of a knife and its sharpness. The second part is the main part of the text, which develops the aforementioned argument from various angles such as “the material substance of a person and that of a tree,” “the living body and the dead one,” “sensation and thought,” “the body of a sage and that of an ordinary person,” and so on, in order to demonstrate the theses that “the body and the soul cannot be separated from each other” and “the soul will be non-existent as soon as the body withers.” The third part, the last long paragraph of the text, answers the question “Is there any benefit when we understand the extinction of the soul?” That is to say, it explains what aim the doctrine of the extinction of the soul wants to achieve. These three parts can be regarded as three interconnected links, each of which embodies the “analysis and synthesis” and “resorting to evidence” of Xunzi, and levels criticism at the questioner’s fallacies. This logical structure of “an exhaustive reasoning” is to a large extent equivalent to the three moments of the method of the combination of analysis with synthesis in the sense of dialectical logic, namely, beginning, development, and aim. Fan Zhen, of course, fails to make such a summary in clear-cut logical terms, but his Treatise on the Extinction of the Soul does pursue this method consciously or unconsciously. In any case, the “exhaustive reasoning” has shown its great logical strength.

References

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References Fan, Zhen. 1991. A Reply to Cao Siwen, Teaching Assistant at the Imperial Academy. In Collection of Hong Ming. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House. Fan. Zhen. 2020. On the Extinction of the Soul. In The History of Liang Dynasty. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Ge, Hong. Annotated Edition of the Inner Chapters of Baopuzi. Annot. Wang Ming. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Guo, Xiang. 1961. Commentary on the Zhuangzi. Annot. Guo Qingfan and Wang Xiaoyu. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Hui, Yuan. 1991. On Buddhists’ Irrelevance to the Emperr. In Collection of Hong Ming. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House. Ji, Kang. 1962. Annotated Edition of the Collected Works of Ji Kang. Annot. Dai Mingyang. Beijing: People’s Literature Publishing House. Ouyang, Jian. 1958. Words Can Completely Express Ideas. In A Collection of Essays of the Jin Dynasty. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Seng, Zhao. 2010. Annotated Edition of the Collected Essays of Seng Zhao. Annot. Zhang Chunbo. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wang, Bi. 1980. Annotated Edition of the Collected Works of Wang Bi. Annot. Lou Yulie. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.

Chapter 7

A Tendency Towards the Confluence of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism

With the establishment of a consolidated feudal regime during the Sui and Tang dynasties, the tripartite balance among Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism that had existed since the Southern and Northern dynasties began to be destabilized. On the whole, all three doctrines had tended towards syncretism, and they were coming to resemble each other more closely over time, although there were still conflicts among them. Buddhism flourished in Sui and Tang, and the Daoist religion flourished as well due to the energetic encouragement of the royal family of the Tang, who claimed to be descendants of Li Er (that is, Laozi). The theoretical commitments of both religions became increasingly Confucianized so as to better serve ruling needs of the Chinese landlord class. Meanwhile, Confucianism was nourished intellectually by Buddhism and Daoism, and the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius acquired elements of fideism, ultimately developing into the Neo-Confucianism of the Song dynasty. Needless to say, this process of confluence generated an overflow of religious theology and idealism. In the process, however, philosophy continued to undergo progressive developments. During that period, there arose such materialistic philosophers as Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi, and certain aspects of conceptual thinking were examined more deeply than ever in the form of idealism. Philosophy made progress in a zigzag way during the Sui and Tang dynasties in the form of religious idealism, and finally it broke the bound of idealism. Religion conceptualized the world dualistically, setting the spiritual world against the secular one and the other worldliness against this worldliness. Consequently, the issue of the relationship between the feudal ethical code and nature, debated in the period of the Wei and Jin dynasties, was transformed into that of the relationship of the secular world to Heaven. The confluence of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism meant that the two worlds were prepared to unite as one. The monks of the Zen School argued: “It is said that as long as you practice this way, the Western Region (Paradise) will surely appear before your eyes” and “Carrying water [with a shoulder pole and buckets] and cutting firewood are nothing but [practicing] the wonderful Way” (Huineng 1984, p. 43). They asserted their belief that the kingdom of Heaven was in the everyday life of the real world. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_7

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And Li Ao said: “Therefore, the sage institutes the rules of propriety to keep all men under proper restraint, and creates music to keep them in harmony.[...] In this way he teaches men to forget indulgence and desire, and to return to the Way of nature and of destiny” (Li 1992, p. 7). He stresses that the sage advocated propriety and music in order to teach people to live a monk-like life with serenity and without desire. Both these remarks, in fact, renounced the real world. Such an attitude found expression in philosophy. Scholars, from Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist traditions, tried in various ways to demonstrate vacuity-tranquility as the first principle of the world. Accordingly, the debate over “being and non-being (or activity and tranquility)” continued to be a locus of controversy in the Sui and Tang, while the debate over “mind and matter/things” grew more and more prominent. Buddhism was the most popular doctrine during the Sui and Tang dynasties. After the arrival of the Mahayana (literally, Great Vehicle) schools of emptiness (Madhyamika) and being (Yogacara) to China, Chinese Buddhist scholars inheriting the Mysterious Learning were very fond of discussing the problem of the relationship of “being” to “emptiness,” which was always interconnected with the debate over “mind and matter/things” (or nature and phenomenon). To Buddhists, the old problem of “whether a person may be able to become a sage and how the ideal personality is cultivated” turned into one of “whether and how a person may be able to become a Buddha.” In order to resolve the problem, Buddhist scholars investigated human mental phenomena from the angles of ontology and epistemology and sought the relationships between emptiness and being, mind and matter/things, and nature (the nature of dharmas) and phenomenon (the phenomena of dharmas). Associated with the debates over “mind and matter/things” and “being and nonbeing,” the debates over “words and ideas” and “effort and destiny” also continued. These philosophical controversies underwent a tortuous development in the hands of idealist philosophers, but in the end Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi made materialism ascend the throne of philosophy again. Based on the monism of the vital force (气qi), both of them made a study of the relationships between “being and non-being” and between “movement and tranquility,” and summed up the debate on “effort and destiny” arising from the Wei and Jin dynasties on, thus returning on a higher plane in the spiral to Xunzi’s view that “one should understand the distinctive functions of Heaven and humankind.” The progress of Sui and Tang philosophy was primarily related to the development of science and culture. The literature and arts under the Tang were splendid, and many important poems were composed as a hundred flowers blossomed. Meanwhile, a series of important scientific works appeared: Li Chunfeng and others’ commentaries on Ten Classics of the Mathematical Art in the field of mathematics, Sun Simiao’s Precious Prescriptions in medical science, and the astronomical work of monk Yi Xing, who was the first in the world to organize and conduct a survey of the length of the meridian line. Two great history books, Liu Zhiji’s Critique of Historical Works and Du You’s Encyclopedia, were the major accomplishments in historical studies in this period. In addition to all this, great advances in philosophy were also encouraged by the academic climate in which a hundred schools of thought were

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allowed to contend and by the international cultural exchanges which took place under the Tang.

7.1 The Buddhist Tiantai School’s Doctrines: “The Three Levels of Truth Are in Perfect Harmony with One Another” and “Even Inanimate Things Possess the Buddha-Nature” The Tiantai School was a Buddhist school established in China. Its real founder was Zhiyi (538–597), whose lay surname was Chen and who was a native of Yingchuan (present-day Xuchang in Henan Province). He became a monk at the age of eighteen and henceforth lived primarily on the Tiantai (literally, Heavenly Terrace) Mountain. His major works are known as the “Three Great Works of the Tiantai,” including Fahua Xuanyi (Profound Meaning of the Lotus), Fahua Wenju (Words and Phrases of the Lotus), and Mohe Zhiguan (Great Concentration and Insight). The Tiantai School fused Southern and Northern Buddhist schools into one. Originally, the Buddhists of the Northern dynasty placed more emphasis on “deep meditation and mental concentration” (dhyana and samadhi), that is, they paid attention to mental cultivation, while those of the Southern dynasty placed more emphasis on “principle,” that is, they paid attention to theory and wisdom. Later, with the gradual unification of the Southern and Northern dynasties, the Tiantai School put forth the doctrine of “concentration and insight” (止观zhi guan), which advocated that one should “practice both concentration and wisdom.” According to Zhiyi, neither concentration nor insight should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. “Concentration” here refers to a method of accomplishing deep meditation through freeing oneself from vexation and cultivating one’s moral character. “Insight” here refers to a method of gaining wisdom through clearing away mental confusion and developing intelligence. These two approaches are like the two wheels of a cart or two wings of a bird; the practice should have no bias in favor of either side, and combine “concentration” with “insight” (Zhiyi 1988, p. 1). This proposal, if viewed from the perspective of epistemology, simply means that people must introspect in the process of meditative practice. It is a theoretical feature of the Tiantai School to underline that wisdom can be obtained only through introspection or reflection. The central doctrine of the Tiantai School is “the three views immanent in the single mind” or “the perfect harmony of the three levels of truth.” This is its principle acquired through the method of meditation, as well as its philosophical attitude towards the debates over “mind and matter/things” and over “being and non-being.” The “three views immanent in the single mind” are the view of emptiness, the view of unreality, and the view of the mean, all of which are possessed by the cognitive subject (mind), while the “perfect harmony of the three levels of truth” is concerned about the object of cognition, which involves “the genuine truth”, “the secular truth”, and “the truth of the mean,” which correspond to the “three views.” So the two theses

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are essentially the same. In his Great Concentration and Insight, Zhiyi points out that all things (dharmas) that come into being subject to causes and conditions are not substances which independently exist, but instead are imaginary and unreal. This is the view of emptiness, or the truth of emptiness. This so-called emptiness does not equate to a “non-existent” void, but rather a “unreal being” that will appear when the necessary causes and conditions are properly aligned. This is the view of unreality, or secular truth. Emptiness is unreality and vice versa; once one understands this principle and also understands that a substance is identical to its phenomenon, one understands the middle way or the truth of the mean. According to the Tiantai School, one mind acquires the three real characters of emptiness, unreality, and the mean simultaneously through meditation; these three characters are inseparable from one another, and have no prior or posterior relationship; therefore, it may be said that they are in “perfect harmony.” As attributes of a spiritual substance, the three levels of truth are innately possessed by human beings. The process of achieving the “perfect harmony of the three levels of truth” through “concentration and insight” is not a kind of “gradual practice” divided into stages, nor is “creation and making” dependent on spiritual strength, but simply a process of doing away with confusion and awakening “natural characters and virtues.” Extending the theory of “the perfect harmony of the three levels of truth” to the relationship of the mind to all dharmas, that is, to the debate on “mind and matter/things”, the Tiantai School holds that “the three thousand worlds immanent in an instance of thought.” In Zhiyi’s view, each person’s mind contains all the manifestations of the universe that are either hidden or apparent. This is a natural corollary of the one mind’s possessing “emptiness,” “unreality,” and “the mean.” He says: Now one mind comprises ten dharma-spheres, but each dharma-sphere also comprises ten dharma-spheres, giving a hundred dharma-spheres. One sphere comprises thirty kinds of worlds, hence a hundred dharma-spheres comprise three thousand kinds of worlds. These three thousand are contained in an instance of thought. Where there is no mind, that is the end of the matter; if mind comes into being to the slightest degree whatsoever, it immediately contains the three thousand. One may say neither that the one mind is prior and all dharmas posterior nor that all dharmas are prior and the one mind posterior.[…] If one derives all dharmas from the one mind, this is a vertical relationship. If the mind all at once contains all dharmas, this is a horizontal relationship. Neither vertical nor horizontal will do (Shi 1983, p. 461; trans. De Bary and Bloom 1999, p. 461).

According to Zhiyi, if viewed from time, there can be no relation of priority or posteriority between the one mind and all dharmas, and, if viewed from space, there can be no relation of inclusion between them. Both the School of Dasabhumikasutra sastra and the School of Mahayanasamparigraha sastra in Buddhism argue that the production of all dharmas has to depend on a certain prior or external spiritual substance. The Tiantai School criticizes the arguments of these two schools with the theory of “the three thousand worlds immanent in an instance of thought,” stressing that “the mind is all dharmas and all dharmas are the mind” (Shi 1983, p. 461; trans. De Bary and Bloom 1999, p. 461). When people examine their own mental activities through introspection, they can indeed experience the unity of spirit (mind) with

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spiritual phenomena (characters of the mind), and realize that there is no prior or external spiritual substance on which spiritual phenomena are dependent. So far as this point is concerned, what Zhiyi says is reasonable. But he holds at the same time that there is no objective reality except that all dharmas are derived from the one mind and the mind contains all dharmas. This is a mystical illusion. In accordance with the saying “the three thousand worlds immanent in an instance of thought,” the Mohe Zhiguan (Great Concentration and Insight) advances the following two views: “An instance of thought is equivalent to the three ages” and “A particle of dust is equivalent to the ten cardinal directions.” The book expounds these views in simple words. A monk once asked an outsider to close his eyes and mentally imagine (that is, to use the method of introspection) a single small hair-pore on the body and then a great city several tens of miles in extent. When the outsider imagines the hair-pore, it is only his own mind that in its totality produces the small hair-pore. When he imagines the great city, it is then his own mind that in its totality produces the great city: The mind, being single, has neither largeness nor smallness. The hair-pore and the city both embody the single total mind as their substance. From this we should realize that the hairpore and the city are integrated in substance and everywhere the same (Shi 1983, p. 402; trans. Bodde 1952, p. 372).

According to the Tiantai School, both a great city and a small hair-pore, or both Mount Sumeru and a mustard seed, are subjective in their spatial size. Therefore, on the one hand, the properties of largeness and smallness, being originally non-existent, are the same; on the other, since they are both manifestations of the one mind, one may say that the small admits of the large and the large incorporates the small, so that two are one. For the same reason, long or short duration is also the manifestation of the one mind and thus subjective. For example, in one’s dream one may see things happening over a span of five or ten years or of a few days, but after waking up one knows there has elapsed only the duration of a meal while one was asleep. On the basis of what is realized in meditation, these arguments assert that the content of a person’s thoughts may not be restricted in space and time since an instance of thought can be equivalent to the three ages or to the ten cardinal directions, while the activities of a person’s thinking are frequently in a concentrated state regardless of what he or she is imagining—a small hair-pore or a great city. It is important to expose the contradiction between thought and objective reality through these spiritual phenomena that can be realized through introspection (reflection). However, those arguments slip into sophistry when such phenomena are used in support of idealism. During the years 742–779 of the Tang dynasty, when the Huayan (Flower Garland) and Chan (Meditation) schools of Buddhism were in vogue and the prosperity of the Faxiang (Dharma-Character) School was declining, the Tiantai School resurged due to Zhanran’s efforts. Zhanran (711–782), whose lay surname was Qi, was a native of Jingxi of Jinling in Changzhou (present-day Yixing in Jiangsu Province) and became a monk at the age of thirty-eight. He wrote commentaries on the three great works of the Tiantai School, produced other works, and was honored as the ninth patriarch of the Tiantai School.

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Apart from preaching the doctrine of “the perfect harmony of the three levels of truth,” Zhanran presented his new theory that “even what lacks feelings [also] possesses the [Buddha] nature.” Historically, Zhu Daosheng (355–434), an eminent monk of the Eastern Jin dynasty, had advanced the view that “none of all sentient beings is not a Buddha” (Shi 1983, p. 204), arguing that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature, and even those non-Buddhists who are profoundly wicked are capable of achieving Buddhahood. Just as a bright mirror will appear after the dust on it is wiped off, so all sentient beings will turn into Buddha when they undergo instruction from the Buddha and wipe off the dust with which their Buddha-nature is covered. In the days of Zhanran, all Buddhist schools, with the exception of the Dharma-Character School (also called the Consciousness-Only School), accepted Zhu Daosheng’s theory that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. Zhanran developed this theory further in his work entitled Jingang Bi (Diamond Stick). He believed that not only all sentient beings but also inanimate things possessed the Buddha-nature. He said: “Both a single particle of dust and the single mind comprise the mind-nature of all sentient beings and Buddhas” (Shi 1983, p. 238). That is to say, all things, whether objective (a single particle of dust) or subjective (the single mind), and whether sentient or inanimate, are the manifestations of the Buddha-nature. This is a logical corollary of the Tiantai School’s theory of “the three thousand worlds immanent in an instance of thought.” All sentient beings and inanimate things (even grass, trees, and the soil included) are contained in the three thousand worlds, so they are all manifestations of the mind or Buddha-nature and thus equal. Thus it can be seen that Zhanran’s theory that “even inanimate things possess the Buddha-nature” makes the Buddhist idealism of the Tiantai School more thoroughgoing: the spiritual substance embraces everything and is immanent in everything; the Buddha-nature is omnipresent and equal to nature. However, this theory verges on pantheism. To dissolve the Buddha-nature in inanimate things such as grass, trees, the soil, and so on, certainly reduces the supreme dignity of Buddhahood and has the effect of weakening religious belief. It shows that if we take a step forward from pantheism we will arrive at materialism.

7.2 The Buddhist Dharma-Character School’s Doctrine: “Everything Is Consciousness Only” and the Buddhist Huayan School’s Doctrine: The Universal Causation of the Realm of Dharmas—The Antithesis between Idealistic Empiricism and Rationalism Under the Tang dynasty, Xuanzang (or Hsuan Tsang), who translated a vast number of Indian Buddhist scriptures into Chinese and introduced them into China, along with his disciple Kuiji, became the real founder of the Chinese Dharma-Character ( 法相fa xiang) School. After the flourishing of the Dharma-Charactr School, Fazang

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founded the Huayan School. The Dharma-Character philosophy is a kind of empirical idealism, it tries to argue through an analysis of dharma-characters that “all dharmas are consciousness only,” whereas the Huayan School represents a kind of rationalistic idealism, it advocates the doctrine of “the universal causation of the realm of dharmas” so as to reveal the rational noumenon. Both schools take the form of Buddhist idealism, but the one stresses character (phenomenon or perceptual experience), and the other nature (essence or conceptual thought), respectively. (1) Xuanzang’s Doctrine: “Dharma-characters Are Consciousness Only” Xuanzang (600–664), whose lay surname was Chen and given name Wei, was a native of Goushi of Luozhuo in Henan (south of present-day Yanshi County in Henan Province). He undertook a difficult journey to India in search of Buddhist texts, and upon his return to China he because a famous translator of such texts and a renowned scholar. He wrote the Records of Western Travels (Da Tang Xiyu Ji), in which he described the geographical features and social customs of India, Nepal, and other countries he had visited. His doctrine that “dharma-characters are consciousness only” can be found primarily in the Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only (Cheng Weishi Lun), which he translated and edited. The central doctrine of the Dharma-Character School is that “everything is consciousness only.” As with other Buddhist schools, this School’s stance towards the relationship between “consciousness” (mind) and “dharmas” (things) is idealistic; the difference is that this school seeks to destroy the two erroneous beliefs—the belief in self and the belief in dharma— through the method of subjective-idealistic empiricism, arguing that both the “self” as a cognitive subject and “dharmas” as objects have a false basis and lack any real nature of their own. According to the Dharma-Character School, the so-called subject and object of cognition are actually the “perceiving division” (Darsana-bbaga) and “perceived division” (Laksanabbaga) manifested by one’s consciousness itself. The “perceiving division” refers to a part possessing cognitive ability, that is, to “what can cause” (Salambana); the “perceived division” refers to a part whose shape and characters are perceived, that is, to “what is caused” (Alambana). These two divisions are the transformations and manifestations of the same “noumenon of consciousness.” The substance is aware of its possessing consciousness by itself. This is called the self-corroboratory division (Svasamvitti-bbaga). Both the “perceived division” and “perceiving division” are dependent on the “self-corroboratory division.” Actually, this doctrine regards each and every thing or phenomenon as a compound of empirical elements (“perceiving division” and “perceived division”) and denies that the objective world exists independently of “consciousness.” It is rather similar to Berkeley’s, Hume’s, or Mach’s views in the history of Western philosophy. In addition to the six consciousnesses (the five senses and the sense-center consciousness) that are generally recognized, the Dharma-Character School believes that there are two additional consciousnesses: the seventh or thought-center consciousness (manasvijnana), and the eighth or storehouse consciousness (alaya). The alaya consciousness stores the “seed” (that is, potency) of all dharmas and is the spiritual substance of all phenomena. It is in fact another name for the soul. As

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to the seventh consciousness, it is a link between the eighth consciousness and the first six consciousnesses. The Dharma-Character School’s doctrine that “everything is consciousness only” means that all things in the world are false appearances and the products of the alaya consciousness. The writings of this school offer the following demonstration of this doctrine. In the seventh chapter of Xuanzang’s Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only, a naïve materialist asks: “The external spheres of color and so forth are clearly and immediately realized. How can what is perceived through immediate apprehension be rejected as non-existent?” (Xuanzang 1998, p. 493; Chan 1963, p. 390). Here, “immediate apprehension” (现量xian liang) means direct experience. According to common sense, the various external objects are those that can be seen with one’s own eyes, and objective reality can be given to us in sensation. Since the objective existence of a thing has been verified by one’s direct experience, how can we say that it is “non-existent”? Xuanzang answers: At the time the external spheres are realized through immediate apprehension, they are not taken as external. It is later that the sense-center consciousness discriminates and erroneously creates the notion of externality. Thus the objective spheres immediately apprehended are the perceived portions of the consciousnesses themselves. Since they are the transformations of consciousness, we say they exist. But since color and so forth, which the sense-center consciousness conceives as external and real, are erroneously imagined to be existent, we say they are non-existent (Xuanzang 1998, p. 493; Chan 1963, p. 390).

Such a demonstration is based on the common idealist-empiricist view that what one perceives in one’s experience cannot pass beyond the limits of one’s subjective world. Since the Dharma-Character School takes subjective sensation as the only existent thing, it is bound to confuse reality with dreams. The Treatise reads: “Objective spheres of color and so forth are not colors but appear to be colors, and are not external but appear to be external. They are like objects in a dream, and should not be taken as real, external color.” In Xuanzang’s opinion, things in reality are the same as what people dream about, both are within the realm of sensation, so they cannot be taken as real objects. A person’s life is really a dream. Prior to one’s true awakening, one is perpetually dreaming; after awakening, one will feel that everything is imaginary and unreal. If everything is “consciousness” only, how do the various differences in the phenomenal world (the so-called thousands of dharmas) come into being? All Buddhist schools employ the doctrine of “depending on causes for production” to resolve this problem, but the Dharma-Character School’s answer has its own distinctive features. According to this school, the alaya consciousness stores the “seeds” of all dharmas, which serve the function of producing phenomena similar to their own qualities; therefore, the “seeds” are the major cause for the production of all dharmas. The relationship between the “seeds” and consciousnesses in their manifested activities is that of potential energy to reality; once the “promotive conditions” have been fulfilled, the potential “seeds” will become manifested, and the manifested consciousnesses in turn will make the potential “consciousnesses”

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perfumed (influenced). So far as the perfuming influence is concerned, the manifestations are what perfume, and the “seeds” are what are perfumed. Thus it can be seen that the “seeds” are the cause of the manifestations, and vice versa. Through these analyses, the Dharma-Character School shows that the production of phenomenal spheres depends on “causes and conditions” and that all phenomena are swept into the network of cause and effect, but that, in the final analysis, they rely on the alaya consciousness. As a result, the network of causality for phenomenal spheres is the expression of the constant flux of the alaya consciousness. According to the school’s theory of “depending on causes for production,” all mental subjects and functions (that is to say, “all minds” and all things that are “perceived by the mind”) are illusory and unreal. The Dharma-Character School is radical in its demands that “dharma-clinging” (belief in the realness of dharmas) be exploded; this is a sign of the school’s rejection of the objective world and its reduction of the myriad things to vacuity and non-existence. The Dharma-Character School uses the Indian logic of causes (Hetu-vidya) to support its arguments for the doctrine of “consciousness-only.” In the beginning of the book Yinming Ruzheng Lilun (The Theory of How to Correctly Grasp Hetu-vidya), translated by Xuanzang from Sanskrit into Chinese, there is a stanza that roughly shows the main content of the logic of Hetu-Vidya. The stanza tells us that demonstration and refutation, along with the exposure of hidden fallacies in demonstrations and refutations, are the means which enable others to obtain knowledge; sensation and reasoning, along with the exposure of hidden fallacies in sensation and reasoning, are the means which enable oneself to obtain knowledge. The introduction of Hetuvidya into China provided an opportunity for the renewal of formal logic, but in fact the Chinese largely ignored the Hetu-vidya and it was gradually forgotten with the decline of the Dharma-Character School. This was because ancient Chinese philosophy paid more attention to the naïve dialectical logic and various traditional sciences tended to seek methodological support from itand thus Chinese mind developed a tendency of neglecting formal logic. (2) Fazang’s Doctrine of “Principle and Fact” The real founder of the Buddhist School of Huayan (Flowery Garland) is Fazang (634–712), who was originally a native of Sogdiana in the Western Regions (including what is now Xinjiang and parts of Central Asia). Having a good command of Sanskrit, he took part in translating the eighty-volume Huayan Jing (Flowery Splendor Scripture). Later, he was respectfully called “Master Xian Shou” since Wu Zetian (Emperor Sheng Shen) bestowed the title of “Xian Shou” (Head of Sages) on him. Among his main works are the Huayan Jing Yihai Baimen (Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Flowery Splendor Scripture) and Huayan Jing Tanxuan Ji (Record of the Quest for the Mystery of the Flowery Splendor Scripture). The central doctrine of the Huayan School is “the causation of the realm of dharmas.” The “realm of dharmas” refers to the phenomenal world and its noumena. Making use of the theory of causation to explain the realm of dharmas, the Huayan School argues that all things in the world are universally interconnected instead of existing independently. The school takes the “single real realm of dharmas” as the

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original source of the world. Such a “real realm of dharmas” is equivalent to “mind” or absolute spirit, which penetrates “all beings” and manifests itself in their external connections. As idealist rationalism, the Huayan School is different from the idealist-empiricist Dharma-Character School. It maintains that the understanding of the doctrine of the realm of dharmas must rely on conceptual thought. It points out that so long as a person purifies his or her mind through self-cultivation, he or she can apprehend the wholeness of the truth by way of speculation. Fazang says: “All things and dharmas are manifested in accordance with the mind. As there is no obstruction to the instant of thought, all dharmas are consequently harmonized. Therefore, in an instant of thought, all facts and things in the three ages (past, present, and future) are clearly seen” (Shi 1983, p. 116). This remark is similar to but at the same time somewhat different from Zhiyi’s “the three thousand worlds immanent in an instance of thought.” When saying that “all things and dharmas are manifested in accordance with the mind,” Fazang believes that the “mind” is something that things and dharmas depend on. However, Zhiyi argues that the three thousand worlds are inherently immanent in an instance of thought and there is no need for maintaining the “dependence.” As far as their epistemology is concerned, the Huayan School’s doctrine of “causation of the realm of dharmas” largely appeals to rational speculation while the Tiantai School’s doctrine of “the three views immanent in the single mind” appeals to introspection (reflection). Starting from the point of view of idealist rationalism, the Huayan School approaches the debate over “being and non-being” in terms of the relationship between “fact” (character) and “principle” (nature). Here, “fact” does not refer to an objective thing but to a phenomenon shown by the “mind,” and “principle” does not refer to objective laws but to the spiritual substance or nothingness as the first principle of the world. Fazang says: Because fact has no substance, it follows principle and becomes perfectly harmonized with it. Because substance involves facts, therefore principle follows fact and is in complete accord with it. Thus they always exist but are at the same time ever empty, for Emptiness does not destroy existence. They are always empty but at the same time ever existent, for existence does not obstruct Emptiness (Shi 1983, p. 116; Chan 1963, p. 424).

“Principle” here means “non-existence”; “fact” means “existence” (or “false existence”). The relationship between “principle and fact” is that of “Emptiness” to “existence.” Principle and fact do not obstruct each other. “Principle” is the absolute spiritual noumenon; “fact” is a concrete phenomenon. However, “principle” is immanent in “fact,” because truth is inseparable and everything, even every particle of dust, embraces all truths. This is just like the relationship between the nature of water and a wave. The nature of water in its totality finds expression in waves, while each wave is a motion of water. In addition, the Huayan School advocates the idea that “facts do not obstruct each other,” believing that phenomena are universally interconnected and that the whole world is like “Indra’s net.” “Indra’s net” refers to the crown worn by the King of Heaven (Indra) in Hindu mythology; woven from a mesh resembling a net, the

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crown bears a bright jewel on each knot in the mesh. Each of these jewels reflects not only the image of every other jewel, but also the reflections contained in every other jewel, the reflections in these reflections, and so on to infinity. In order to vividly demonstrate the idea that “facts do not obstruct each other,” Fazang gives the following illustration. He takes ten mirrors, arranging them, one each, at the eight compass points, and above and below, in such a way that they are a little over ten feet apart from each other, all facing one another. Then he places a Buddha image in the center and illuminates it with a torch so that its image is reflected from one mirror to another. That is, each mirror not only reflects the image of the mirrors but also all the images reflected in each of those other mirrors. Fazang says again: In each and every hair there are an infinite number of lions, and in addition all the single hairs, together with their infinite number of lions, in turn enter into a single hair. In this way, the geometric progression is infinite, like the jewels of King of Heaven Indra’s net (Shi 1983, p. 116; Chan 1963, p. 412).

Here, the “lion” is a metaphor for the phenomenal world. He tries to show the principle that “things are mutually penetrated without obstacle,” but this imagery is actually not scientific. When examining the universal connection between phenomena, Fazang advances his “one-is-many” and “many-is-one” philosophy and his view of the “perfect harmony of the six characters.” In his view, many depends on One for existence, and One depends on Many for existence. For example, if a house is missing a single rafter, then the whole house cannot be counted as a house, and at the same time each rafter is also dependent on other rafters, pillars, tiles, bricks, and so on. Hence, the One is the Many, and the Many are the One. Fazang also uses the relationship between a house and its rafters to illustrate the idea of the “perfect harmony of the six characters.” The “six characters” include three pairs of categories, that is, the characters of totality and specificity, of similarity and difference, and of formation and disintegration. The character of totality refers to the wholeness of the thing, while the character of specificity to various parts of the thing. For example, the house represents the former, while rafters, tiles, and so forth represent the latter. Being parts of the whole house, rafters, tiles, and so forth have something in common; this is called the character of similarity. But, rafters, tiles, and so forth are more or less different; this is called the character of difference. Since the combination of many rafters, tiles, and so forth becomes a house, this is the character of formation. But as each of the various parts retains its own structure and does not become a house as a whole, this is the character of disintegration. Everything in the phenomenal world is a combination of the six characters. The Huayan School’s examinations of the universal connection between phenomena and of categories such as one and many, wholeness and part, similarity and difference, and formation and disintegration, exceed the bounds of formal logic which maintains that “a whole is the sum total of its parts”, and are suggestive of dialectical thinking. However, these examinations are the products of pure speculation and are not informed by science, so they belong only to subjective dialectics.

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7.3 The Buddhist Zen (Chan) School—The Completion of Confucianized Buddhism The Zen (Chan) School has two major subdivisions: the Southern school and the Northern School. I focus on the Southern School here. The school combines the theory of Buddhism with Confucian doctrine and signifies the completion of Confucianized Buddhism in China. Thus the Zen School became the most prevalent of Buddhist schools in this country. The monk who founded the Southern school of Zen Buddhism was called Hui Neng, a contemporary of Fazang. Huineng (638–713), whose lay surname was Lu, was born in Xinzhou in the south of Five Ridges (in the eastern part of present-day Xinxing in Guangdong). He came from a poor family. In his childhood he lost his father and then had to live by selling firewood to support himself and his mother. Huineng and Shenxiu were originally two outstanding disciples of Hongren, who was the fifth patriarch of the Zen School. Later, they established the Southern and Northern schools respectively due to their divergent understandings of the doctrine of Buddhism. Hongren appreciated Huineng very much and handed down his mantle and alms bowl to him. Huineng’s speeches were edited into a book entitled the Liuzu Tanjing (Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch) after his death. After the An Lushan–Shi Siming Rebellion (755–763), incidents of intense unrest as well as outbreaks of warfare continued to occur in China. Faced with the decline of aristocratic families and individuals of power and influence, the Buddhist schools, which were initially dependent on such families for patronage, also declined. The distinguishing characteristic of the Zen School is its comparatively popular style. Previously prominent Buddhist schools had held that Buddhahood requires a lifetime of practice, the extensive distribution of charitable donations, a great deal of study, and so on. However, these things are only possible for aristocratic families and individuals of power and influence. The Zen School rejected this view, and instead held that it was possible for any person to become a Buddha through “sudden enlightenment.” This relatively cheap and painless procedure for becoming a Buddha satisfies the theological demands of minor or less wealthy landlords, and also possesses appeal for the masses. As a result, the Zen School spread extensively and rapidly. Another reason for the Zen School’s popularity is that it unites Buddhism with Confucianism and asserts that the human world and Heaven, or ordinary people and the Buddha, are unified. According to the Zen School, Buddhahood is in the human world and there is no need to go beyond the human world to seek Buddhahood; ordinary people and the Buddha are similar and their difference lies only in an instance of thought. Huineng says: “To hold on to a previous deluded thought makes a person an ordinary person, but the next thought, if enlightened, makes one a Buddha” (Huineng 1984, p. 36). Once one comes to recognize oneself as a Buddha, the “Buddhist Paradise” is at hand. The Zen School denies the traditional view that it is only possible to enter the Buddhist Paradise through long term cultivation, such as by reading scriptures and meditating. Instead, it holds that the Buddha is an ordinary person who carries on ordinary tasks–relieving one’s bowels, passing water, wearing

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clothes, eating meals, and lying down when tired, and yet when he achieves enlightenment he gains freedom from afflictions. In this way, Buddhism and Confucianism are united. Like other schools, politically, the Zen School tries to persuade people to be satisfied with the existing state of affairs and not to protest against injustice in the real world. Philosophically, however, its significance consists in its opposition to scholasticism, its rejection of various traditional Buddhist concepts, its claim that emancipation should rely on a person’s own efforts, and its examination of the active role of the subject. (1) “One’s Own Mind Is Buddhahood” and “Buddhahood Is Achieved through Sudden Enlightenment” The theoretical dissimilarity between the Zen School and other Buddhist schools lies in that the former advances the views “one’s own mind is Buddhahood” and “Buddhahood is achieved through sudden enlightenment.” In regard to the relationship between “mind and matter/things,” each of the Buddhist schools maintains that “there is nothing outside the mind” and that all dharmas are “mind-dharmas.” The difference between these schools is that each overemphasizes a different aspect of the mind. The Tiantai School’s doctrine of “concentration and insight,” of “the perfect harmony of the three levels of truth,” and of “the three thousand worlds immanent in an instance of thought” are the results of employing the method of reflection; the Dharma-Character School’s doctrine that “all dharmas are consciousness only” shows that the school uses perceptual experience to explain everything; the Huayan School’s doctrine of “the causation of the realm of dharmas” takes conceptual thinking as the sole reality. And the Southern School of Zen Buddhism assigns paramount importance to selfconsciousness, holding that “one’s own mind is Buddhahood” and believing that one’s own intelligent consciousness is Buddhahood. Moreover, it emphasizes the integration of consciousness and treats leaps in human cognition in absolute terms, arguing that the understanding of the views that “one’s own mind is Buddhahood” and “one’s self-nature is Buddhahood” is suddenly realized; therefore, it maintains that “Buddhahood is achieved through sudden enlightenment.” As to the relationship between “mind and nature,” Huineng compares the “mind” to a territory and the Buddha-nature to its ruler. He says: “The mind is the ground and the nature is the king. With the nature, there is king. Without the nature, there is no king. When the nature remains, our body and mind exist. When the nature is gone, our body and mind are destroyed.”1 That is to say, the Buddha-nature is the essence of the human spirit and governor of the human body and mind. What, then is the Buddha-nature? According to the Zen School, the Buddha-nature is nothing more than the intelligence in one’s own mind and the pure consciousness of those who listen to Zen Masters. Therefore, everybody possesses the nature of becoming a Buddha and human nature is the Buddha-nature. Such being the case, why is there a difference between the Buddha and ordinary human beings? Huineng’s answer: “If his self-nature is deluded, even a Buddha will become an ordinary human being. 1

See also Huineng (1999, p. 64).

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If their self-nature is enlightened, all sentient beings will be Buddhas” (Huineng 1984, p. 95). “Enlightenment” and “delusion” refer to the states in which the innate Buddha-nature in one’s own mind is, respectively, awakened or not awakened. In Huineng’s opinion, as long as one awakens to the Buddha-nature immanent in one’s own mind, one will immediately enter the Buddhist Paradise of the Pure Land. Huineng maintains that the human mind is not only the foundation of achieving Buddhahood but also the foundation of the objective world. There is a story that, once, Huineng came to the Faxing Monastery in Guangzhou and saw two monks discussing whether a flag was moving by itself or whether it was being moved by the wind. One monk said that it was the wind that moved the flag, not the flag itself; the other maintained the opposite. To resolve the endless debate between them, Huineng said that “neither the flag nor the wind is moving. There is only a movement within your own minds” (Huineng 1984, p. 95). According to him, all things are false appearances; if one regards them as real, then one’s mind is deluded. Only by doing away with these false appearances can one’s mind-nature be shown. Doing away with all false appearances and knowing all dharmas entirely through the self-mind is in accord with awakening to the principle that the self-nature is Buddhahood. The Zen School stresses that “delusion” and “enlightenment” are the two spheres of the same mind. From “deluded” to “enlightened,” the mind remains the same; however, once one achieves enlightenment, one can see truth and grasp the Way at any time, though one still lives and behaves as usual. The leap from delusion to enlightenment, to Huineng, is suddenly realized; this is called “sudden enlightenment.” The debate between the Southern and Northern Schools as usually spoken of is the one on “sudden or gradual enlightenment.” Tradition has it that, in order to determine his successor, the fifth patriarch (Hongren) one day asked his two senior pupils to write a verse to show the doctrine of Buddhism. Shenxiu’s verse says: The body is the tree of perfect wisdom [bodhi]. Mind is the stand of a bright mirror. At all times diligently wipe it. Do not allow it to become dusty. Shenxiu lays stress on the gradual practice of “wiping the dust diligently.” Holding that this verse “fails to see one’s own nature,” Huineng composes his verse, which says: Fundamentally perfect wisdom has no tree. Nor has the bright mirror any stand. Originally there is nothing at all. Where is there any dust? In his opinion, Shenxiu’s remark of “wiping the dust diligently” shows no sign of understanding the principle that “originally there is nothing at all.” One’s self-nature is originally clear and pure and originally possesses everything; once one achieves enlightenment thoroughly, one can “seek in one’s own mind the sudden realization of the original nature of True Thusness.” Without a doubt, such a doctrine of “sudden enlightenment” is a theological dogma. Still, there are some points meriting philosophical attention. First, the

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doctrine emphasizes the active role of the subject, holding that enlightenment is a kind of self-enlightenment or self-consciousness and that it must rely on one’s own efforts instead of external forces. Reading scriptures, sitting in meditation and so forth are only conditions of awakening consciousness; one should not be fettered by them in the pursuit of Buddhahood. Second, enlightenment is realized in an instant and represents a sudden change or leap in the process of cognition. Third, “enlightenment” means a sudden grasp of a whole and a comprehensive knowledge of that whole. In short, the Zen School’s doctrine of “sudden enlightenment” has a vision of humankind’s active role in the process of cognition, especially the cognitive leap through which comprehensive knowledge is acquired and a whole thing can suddenly be seen in a clear light. However, the Zen School overstates this point and conceives of “sudden enlightenment” as a kind of mystical intuition. (2) Using the Relativistic “Method of Opposites” to Combat Scholasticism In reference to the debate over “being and non-being” (character and nature), the Zen School regards vacuity and tranquility as the first principle of the world since it argues that “there is originally nothing at all.” Consequently, Huineng adopts absence-ofthought and absence-of-characters as his doctrine. However, the so-called absence of thought does not mean the literal absence of all thought; rather, it refers to the absence of erroneous thought and to keeping a clear and quiet mind. And the socalled absence of characters does not mean that there are no physical characters, but rather that physical characters are essentially emptiness. Such being the case, the nature of Thusness cannot be grasped through concepts, nor can it be expressed in written language. Therefore, the Zen School maintains that “a teaching is transmitted independently of written texts” and admonishes us to “point directly to the human mind.” How is it possible to teach the doctrine of Buddhism without the use of written texts? Before his death, Huineng summoned his ten senior disciples and told them that they should use the method of opposites to lecture to people on the doctrine of Buddhism. He demonstrates the method with thirty-six pairs of antithetical terms. One example is brightness and darkness: Suppose someone asks you: “What is the meaning of darkness?” Your answer should be: “Brightness represents a cause, and darkness a condition. Without brightness there is no darkness. Use brightness to show darkness and use darkness to show brightness. This is just like coming and going, which are mutually conditioned and construct the doctrine of the Way of the Mean” (Huineng 1984, p. 97).

Here, so-called brightness means using plain language to point directly to the human mind; therefore, it represents a “cause.” So-called darkness means using suggestive language to enlighten people; therefore, it represents a “condition.” That is to say, when words are employed to reveal the principles of the Zen School, there should be darkness in brightness and brightness in darkness, so that they can be in conformity with “the Way of the Mean.” This method of opposites is largely a form of relativistic sophistry, but it nevertheless has some positive features. Mazu or the Patriarch Ma (709–788), an eminent

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monk of the Zen School, was once asked: “Why do you say that the very mind is Buddha?” Ma Zu answered: “I simply want to stop the crying of children.” “Suppose they do stop crying?” asked the questioner. “Then not-mind, not-Buddha,” was the answer (see Recorded Sayings of Ancient Worthies, ch. 1). Mazu here sets forth two successive phrases. The first is, “The very mind is Buddha,” and the second, “Not-mind, and not-Buddha”; this is an application of the method of opposites. His emphasis on the idea of “not-Buddha,” however, plays a destructive role in Buddhism. Yixuan (?–867), founder of a sect of the Zen School known as the Linji School, makes more radical claims. When he stresses that “the very mind is Buddha,” he says: If you want to have the right understanding, you must not be deceived by others. You should kill everything that you meet internally or externally. If you meet Buddha, kill Buddha. If you meet the Patriarchs, kill the Patriarchs. If you meet the Saints, kill the Saints (Xiao 1994, p. 65).

Such a speech of “berating Buddha and the Patriarchs” shakes the traditional authority of Buddhism. In the Buddhism of the Tang Dynasty, the doctrines of the Dharma-Character, Tiantai, Huayan schools had grown badly overcomplicated; therefore the Zen School’s opposition to those scholastic dogmas has the effect of renewing the traditional doctrine of Buddhism. Nevertheless, its use of relativism to oppose dogmatism and scholasticism cannot be an effective criticism of the doctrine of Buddhism, because its aim is to overcome the Buddhist crisis and restore belief in Buddhist authority. (3) The Way of “Transmitting Teachings” and the Education of Worldview The tremendous success of the Zen School is due in large part to Zen masters’ special methods of training and educating their disciples. The central goal of “transmitting teachings” is to impart the worldview. The Zen School takes this problem seriously and provides some lessons of conceptual thinking in the education of worldview and the cultivation of ideal personality. The sect headed by Mazu, whose pupils numbered more than one hundred, was the most successful in the Zen School after the death of Huineng. How does the monk teach his pupils? The answer can be found from a dialogue between Patriarch Mazu and Huihai, who came to pay his respects to the patriarch for the first time. The Patriarch asked: “What do you intend to do over here?” “I come here to seek the Law preached by the Buddha,” was the answer. The Patriarch asked: “Why do you forsake your home and wander everywhere, regardless of your own treasure?” Hui saluted and asked at once: “What is my own treasure?” The Patriarch answered: “The man who is now asking me the question is just your own treasure. Everything is available and nothing is lacking. Since it is easy to operate, why do you still want to look for it from the outside?” (Shi 2010, pp. 384–385).

Mazu here points out to his pupils that the conscious subject who asks questions, namely, self-consciousness, possesses all treasures originally; the intelligent consciousness inherent in a person is precisely the same as Buddhahood. By this, he encourages his pupils to be self-confident and take the initiative in the study of the Law of Buddha.

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Yixuan, master of the later Linqi School, places more emphasis on self-confidence and keeping the initiative in one’s own hands. He says: “Nowadays, people who engage in spiritual cultivation fail to achieve their ends. Their fault is not having faith in themselves” (Xiao 1994, p. 62). In his opinion, if one wants to be a free person, one must first have self-confidence, recognizing that one’s self-nature is good enough and that there is no fundamental difference between oneself and the patriarchs or Buddha, and one must recognize oneself as a true person capable of self-emancipation. Only then can one achieve enlightenment. Generally speaking, the education of worldview and the cultivation of ideal personality should proceed by following both the principle of voluntariness and the principle of consciousness. The Confucians of the pre-Qin period had a record of theoretical study as well as practical success in this regard. But after Confucianism came to be supreme in the Han dynasty, the principle of voluntariness was cast aside in deference to the feudal morals and institutions which demanded conscious obedience under the pretence of the “Mandate of Heaven.” This is harmful to the cultivation of true character. In light of this fact, Ji Kang issued his challenge to fatalism and offered the slogan “transcend the ethical code and let the mind run its natural course.” He combined the principle of voluntariness with the principle of nature, and yet he ignored the principle of consciousness. The dominant trend of the Mysterious Learning of the Wei and Jin dynasties was still a kind of fatalism. Only by the time of the Tang dynasty was the tradition of Mencius revived by Zen Masters, and thus the combination of the principle of voluntariness and the principle of consciousness received attention again. Zongmi (780–841), the fifth patriarch of the Huayan School, summarizes the proposals of the group headed by Mazu as follows: “Everything is an embodiment of the Way and let the mind run its course.” That is to say, when one realizes that all one’s deeds result from the functioning of Buddhahood in its totality, one acquires a high level of consciousness, and meanwhile all one’s deeds originate in one’s own will and are therefore natural. The Zen School does not endorse fatalism; its spiritual claims (“everything is an embodiment of the Way and let the mind run its course”) and its attitude toward life (“the only thing to be done is to rid yourself of your old action, as opportunity offers, and not to create new action from which will flow new calamities”) both tend to convince adherents that their lives are better than they actually are, and that they can escape from Fate. This is the reason why many old Chinese intellectuals “run away to the Zen School” to seek comfort when they cannot achieve their political ambitions. Moreover, every movement and act, every tree and blade of grass and so on, all embody the Way, as we know from sayings such as “Everything is an embodiment of the Way” and “Wherever one is, one can do everything on one’s own responsibility,” so that “self-nature” appears in a figurative way and becomes a perceived image. As a result, the doctrine of the Zen School assumes poetic and aesthetic dimensions that can be captured through enlightenment. This is the reason why many people of later centuries liked to talk about poems and paintings in terms of the doctrine of the Zen School. The ultimate goal of the Zen School is, however, to cultivate people into Buddhist monks or obedient laymen who are consciously and voluntarily content with the status

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quo and are able to adapt themselves to different circumstances, since the school regards that every act of a person is a perfect embodiment of the Buddha-nature and thus magnifies chance into necessity. Its doctrine of “sudden enlightenment” asserts that once a person achieves sudden enlightenment, he or she will turn suffering into happiness and become a Buddha. This is really spiritual opium for the masses of the people, who live in abject misery. The Zen School’s doctrine that “the self-nature is Buddhahood” and “Buddhahood is achieved through sudden enlightenment” has a vision of the active role of a subject with consciousness, yet it exaggerates this role, which leads to idealism. The philosophy of the Zen School is quite similar to that of Mencius. Consequently, the inscription written by Liu Zongyuan on Huineng’s tombstone reads: “He teaches men to begin with the goodness of nature and end with the goodness of nature. He does not include cultivation in his methodology and takes tranquility as the first principle” (Liu 2008, p. 92). But without cultivation people tend to indulge in empty talk. In this way, many later Zen masters became those who had neither learning nor skill. Some of them concentrated on the method of “shouting and beating” (bang he 棒喝) alone to help the leap to enlightenment and liked frightening their students; such masters are called “wildly arrogant Zen masters.” This serious defect of the Zen School encounters criticism from many later thinkers.

7.4 Li Quan’s Religious Daoism with a Voluntarist Orientation During the period from the Sui and Tang to the Five Dynasties (589–960), religious Daoism flourished, but its influence was not as great as that of Buddhism. Among the well-known Daoist scholars of this period are Cheng Xuanying, Wang Xuanlan, Sima Chengzhen, Li Quan, Tan Qiao, and so on. In view of the development of philosophy, Li Quan’s doctrine of “stealing for oneself the secret forces of others” deserves special attention. There is no biography of Li Quan in the new and old Tang Shu (Histories of the Tang). He was a native of Longxi (in present-day Gansu province) and was known as Da Guanzi, and was probably a contemporary of Emperor Xuanzong (712–756) of the Tang dynasty. Li Quan had lived in solitude in the Songshan Mountain and later came out and secured the official position of prefectural governor. He was fond of the Daoist doctrine of immortals and paid attention to the study of military arts as well. He made notes and commentaries on the Daoist Book of Yin Fu Jing (Harmony of the Seen and the Unseen) and the Book of Sunzi, and wrote a book on the art of war himself. In reference to debate over “being and non-being (movement and tranquility),” Li Quan carries forward the traditional Daoist view that “being is produced from non-being.” He says that the sun and the moon, the yin and the yang, Heaven and Earth, the myriad things, and even human beings “all come from the vacuous and

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tranquil Dao” (Quan 1991, p. 9). It can thus be seen that he regards “the vacuous and tranquil Dao” as the first principle of the world. In accordance with the traditional cosmology of the yin-yang and five agents, he describes the creation of the universe as follows: with the creation of being from non-being, the yin and yang are produced; the yin (negative) force descends and turns into Earth, while the yang (positive) force ascends and turns into Heaven; the five substances (water, fire, wood, soil, metal) that are produced from the yin and yang are called the “five agents,” and then there are the “seven forces” (the total of five agents and two forces of the yin and yang); lastly, the “seven forces” produce the myriad things. The distinguishing characteristic of Li Quan’s philosophical thought lies in his vision of the opposition between humankind and Heaven, or between mind and matter/things, and in his emphasis on mankind’s control over nature. He points out that both animals and plants are dependent on the yin and yang forces for their production and growth, so it may be said that the myriad things result from the “theft” of yin and yang forces, and humankind can also “steal” these forces to nourish itself. For example, farming, silkworm breeding, and so forth are all made possible when humans seize the seven forces, and in this way humankind can obtain the means of livelihood. The myriad things in turn themselves “steal” what humankind possesses, which results in misfortunes such as natural disasters, illnesses, and so on. Accordingly, Li Quan stresses that it is a “principle of nature,” namely, a natural law, that there exist conflicts between Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, on the one hand, and human beings, on the other hand, and they “steal each other.” He calls such stealing “stealing for oneself the secret forces of others,” and illustrates the concept as follows: Originally, human beings had no clothes, but they knew that the fur of a beast could be used to make clothes (Quan 1991, p. 11). So they devised a scheme in secret and made arrangements to achieve the conversion of the real possibilities provided by objective laws into a reality. For instance, they obtained fleece by raising sheep and then turned it into clothes to satisfy their own needs. According to Li Quan, the “stealing must be under the guidance of the Dao. If one acts on laws, one will be lucky, or else one will meet with misfortune. Therefore, if one wants to “steal,” one must “examine the principle” (Quan 1991, p. 8). Only in this way can one convert possibilities into reality that suits one’s needs. The reason that one can achieve one’s goals is that one has “mind.” In Li Quan’s opinion, human beings, grass, trees, animals, and so forth are all produced by the forces of yin-yang and five agents, but human beings have intelligent minds that can “reflect” their own nature and investigate the origins of all things, thus recognizing the law of the yin-yang and five agents and acting on it. As a result, human beings become immortals. There are some reasonable elements in Li Quan’s theory of “stealing for oneself the secret forces of others.” For example, he realizes that things in the natural world are opposed to one another, that in order to conquer the natural world humankind must fully apply its initiative and devise schemes to convert the possibilities in its favor into reality, and that humankind can triumph over nature when it stores grain in a granary so as not to let it sprout in spring and covers crops with some materials so as not to let them be frostbitten in autumn. Nevertheless, Li Quan’s exaggeration

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of humankind’s subjective initiative leads to idealism and religious superstition. He believes that as long as one can “steal” the most wonderful force from the yin-yang and five agents through design and nourish oneself with it, one will be immortal. This is simply religious nonsense. Like the Zen School, Li Quan’s idealism comes about through the exaggeration of the subjective initiative. The Zen School has a perspective on the cognitive leap occurring at the time when the mind acquires comprehensive knowledge of a thing and thus has an experience of sudden enlightenment, and yet it exaggerates this point, which leads to the doctrine that “Buddhahood is achieved through sudden enlightenment.” And Li Quan believes that the mind can make plans in accordance with knowledge and then put them into action so as to enable the world to suit human needs, but he exaggerates this point, which leads to a theological theory with a bias toward voluntarism. According to him, one with a brilliant mind can certainly make one’s every intention in conformity with the Dao of Heaven and, consequently, one’s powers are unlimited and one will surely succeed in whatever one tries, since all things in the universe are under one’s control (Quan 1991, p. 3). When extending his theory of “stealing the secret forces of others,” which is suggestive of voluntarism in its interpretation of society, Li Quan maintains that those administering a country and directing military operations must resort to stratagems, violence, and political trickery. To him, punishments can change human nature, and violence and power can be used to control people and order them about. This shows that his theory has negative effects when applied to politics.

7.5 Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi: “Heaven and Human Beings Do Not Interfere with Each Other” and “Heaven and Human Beings Are Evenly Matched”: A Materialist Summary of the Debate Concerning “Effort and Fate”2 When religious idealism was on the rise in the Tang dynasty, the two materialist philosophers Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi also made their appearance. They inherited and then developed the traditional monism of vital force (气qi) and Xunzi’s idea of “clarifying the distinction between heaven and human beings” and also put forward their own ideas according to which “heaven and human beings do not interfere with each other” and “heaven and human beings are evenly matched.” Liu Zongyuan (773–819), whose courtesy name was Zihou, was a native of the county of Jie in the prefecture of Hedong (in what is presently the town of Jiezhou, located in the city of Yuncheng, Shanxi province). He attained the degree of jinshi in the imperial examinations. His work was compiled in the Collected Works of Liu Hedong (Liu Hedong ji). Liu Yuxi (772–842), whose courtesy name was Mengde, 2

Translator’s note: this section was translated by Ady Van den Stock.

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was born in Luoyang (now part of Henan province). He also obtained the title of jinshi. His writings were brought together in the Collected Works of Liu Binke (Liu Binke ji). Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi were close friends, and their philosophical standpoints were basically in agreement. Both of them were at the forefront of the Yongzhen Reforms, which advocated suppressing the annexation [of land by regional rulers] and opposed the secession of military districts and the power of eunuchs, in order to safeguard the central power of the Tang court. After the failure of the Yongzhen Reforms, they were both forced to undergo a long period of banishment and exile and acquired an acute sense of the hardships of the common people. In some of their literary works, they gave expression to the misfortunes suffered by the lower classes. Furthermore, Liu Zongyuan was one of the main proponents of the classical prose ( 古文gu wen) movement of the Tang dynasty. In their philosophical thought, they adopted an analytical and critical attitude towards Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism alike. Unlike their contemporary Han Yu, who used Confucianism to refute Buddhism, they advocated an eclectic and tolerant attitude towards Buddhism, the teachings of Laozi, and the various other schools of thought, while still taking Confucianism as the main current. In Liu Zongyuan’s view, Buddhism, Laozi, and the other masters were not completely incompatible with Confucianism. Teachings differing from Confucianism ought to be approached by “developing all of their respective strengths, while getting rid of their pernicious aspects, [because] they essentially share the same path with Confucius” (“Preface to ‘Send off the Hermit Yuan Shiba on his Journey South’”, Song Yuan Shiba shanren nanyou xu). At the same time, he did not believe the Confucian classics without questioning them. In his “Refutation of the Discourses of the States” (Fei Guoyu) for instance, he criticized the Discourses of the States for its many “preposterous and depraved” theories. In his “Treatise on the Six Defiances” (Liu ni lun), he criticized those “rigid Confucians” who sheepishly follow the Confucian dogma. This kind of analytical and critical spirit had a very timely significance. The evolution of philosophy in the Tang dynasty came down to a process in which Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism influenced each other and tended to converge. The Confucianization of Buddhism and the combination of Confucianism and Daoism in the work of Li Quan were expressions of this process. However, because of the influence of Buddhism and Daoism, philosophy remained constrained by religion, that is to say, these influences required it to retain an otherworldly orientation. Following the development of science, art, and literature, philosophy had to liberate itself from these constraints in order to allow the theoretical fusion of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism to acquire a non-religious or this-worldly form. Two different options were available for putting this requirement into practice: firstly, there was the selective adoption of Buddhist and Daoist elements by Han Yu and Li Ao, which remained committed to maintaining the dominant position of the Confucian tradition and endowed Confucianism with the idealist form it would take on in the learning of principle (理学li xue). Secondly, there was the kind of factually and evidentially oriented analytical and critical attitude towards Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism displayed by figures such as Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi, which allowed philosophy to regain a materialist form.

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(1) A Response to the Debate on “Being and Non-being (Movement and Tranquility)” Through the Monism of Vital Force In their perspectives on the way of heaven, Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi attempted to provide a resolution to the debate concerning “being and non-being” (or movement and tranquility). Liu Zongyuan wrote: The idea of a state of nothingness at the beginning of things is a tradition passed on by deceitful persons. How could one possibly speak of a great spirit within a dark stillness? [There was only a confounding of] light and dark where little can be discerned and it is most difficult to advance. The vast darkness went through a transformation, but the original vital force (原气yuan qi) was preserved, so how could it possibly be something made [by a spirit]? (Liu 2008, p. 228)

In his view, the groundless theories which speak of a state of desolate nothingness before the beginning of heaven and earth were fabricated by deceitful figures. All notions of a great spirit which created heaven and earth are inconsistent, for what could one possibly say [about such a state]? In an entwinement of light and dark, the myriad things evolved from obscurity and all represent natural transformations of original vital force. So why would there be a creator? In this passage, Liu is unambiguously denying the idea that the world arose out of a state in which “being emerges from non-being,” and affirming the fact that the world is united through an original form of vital force. Heaven, earth, and the myriad things spontaneously emerged from this original vital force. His affirmation of the fact that the world is united through vital force clearly entails a celebration of “being” and an opposition to theories which favor “nonbeing.” Liu Yuxi too put forward his own views on “emptiness” or “non-being.” He wrote: “Emptiness refers to the vagueness and indistinctness of form. Substance is not something which impedes [individual] things, and function too must always inhere in something existing; they must rely on things in order to have a form” (Liu 1990, p. 71). This means that “emptiness” (kong) is nothing but space (空间kong jian), and that there is a subtle and minute form of matter within this space, which cannot be discerned with one’s eyes. The existence of space does not hinder individual things, since its function can only manifest itself by means of individual entities endowed with form. For example, in building a house, the height and width of the interior space are part and parcel of the whole edifice. At the same time, Liu also pointed out: “What has been called formless since ancient times merely indicates what does not have a constant form, since it can only be observed through things” (Liu 1990, p. 71). So-called “non-being” and “emptiness” do not have fixed shapes, but nor are they complete nothingness. There is no such thing in the world as a “formlessness” that exists independently from things. Liu Zongyuan expressed his profound agreement with this argument: “The idea that the so-called formless is what lacks a permanent form is most adequate” (Liu 2008, p. 504). Zhang Zai’s idea that “emptiness is identical to vital force” originated with Liu Yuxi. Both Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi were convinced that heaven, earth, and the myriad things had emerged out of the spontaneous movement of original vital force,

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which means that they also adhered to the idea that “no one or nothing made things the way they are” (莫为mo wei) as opposed to “someone or something caused it to be thus” (或使huo shi). Liu Zongyuan remarked: “Lightning, thunder, snow, and frost; these are all nothing but the same vital force, there is no mind at work within these things” (Liu 2008, p. 58). He considered natural phenomena to be transformations of original vital force instead of intentional occurrences. Consequently, Liu condemned theories according to which Heaven is able to “reward achievements and punish wrongdoings” as “great lies” (Liu 2008, p. 286). Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi investigated the causes behind the movements and transformations in the natural world. In offering a response to the question “where is the root of the three combinations of yin and yang, how do they transform?” in Qu Yuan’s poem “Heavenly Questions” (天问Tian wen) from the Warring States period, Liu Zongyuan proposed that the three elements involved, namely, yin, yang, and Heaven, are all identical to the same original vital force, and that the natural spontaneity of this vital force was the reason behind its designation as “Heaven”. When this energy moves slowly, it creates a blistering heat, when it moves rapidly, it gives rise to fierce cold. If heat and warmth are combined and yin and yang, as the two forms of vital force, affect each other, this gives rise to the transformation of the myriad things. What Liu is expressing here is the notion that the contradictions within matter itself are the origin of movement. On his part, Liu Yuxi went on to introduce a dialectical conception of “contradiction” (矛盾mao dun). He writes: “The movements in the embryo of fortune or misfortune are hard to discern. The principle behind the contradiction between their mutual alternation is very clear” (Liu 1990, p. 81). Han Feizi introduced “contradiction” as a formal logical concept. Before that, the Laozi had already touched upon the idea that “good luck and misfortune mutually alternate,”3 without mentioning the word “contradiction”. In this passage, Liu Yuxi is the first to have used “contradiction” in a dialectical sense. What he called “contradiction” refers to the fact that things contain their own opposites within themselves. An egg for instance contains the “embryo” of its own negation within itself. An embryo is an actual possibility and its conformity to lawful movements helps bring about the transformation a thing into its opposite. Therefore, “contradiction” is the source of movement. Obviously, Liu Zongyuan’s and Liu Yuxi’s investigations into the origin of the movement of matter constituted a step forward in comparison to the theory of the “self-transformation of vital force” (气自变qi zi bian) put forward by Wang Chong and the notion of “self- transformation” (独化du hua) (where an entity is the cause of its own movement) advocated by Guo Xiang and Fan Zhen. (2) A Critical Summary of the Struggles Over “Effort and Fate” Since the Wei and Jin Period Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi also brought the problem of the relationship between Heaven and human beings to the foreground. They made a critical summary of the debate on “effort and fate” (力命li ming) that were part of the debate concerning the relation between heaven and human beings, a summary which amounts to a return to 3

Translator’s note: See chapter 58 of the Daodejing.

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Xunzi’s argument of “clarifying the distinction between Heaven and human beings” on a higher level. Liu Zongyuan attached a great deal of importance to the impact of human effort: “Changing misfortune into good luck, and transforming the crooked into the straight, what does this have to do with the Mandate of Heaven? It is accomplished by my own effort” (Liu 2008, p. 41). However, he placed an even stronger emphasis on the idea that “Heaven and human beings do not interfere with each other”. He writes: “The blossoming of life and natural disasters, these are [the result of] Heaven. Lawfulness and chaos, these are [due to] human beings. The two are utterly distinct and do not interfere with each other’s affairs” (Liu 2008, p. 503). Following the reign of Wu Zetian, emperors of the Tang dynasty constantly talked about “auspicious signs,” “omens of the Mandate of Heaven” and the like. When Liu stressed that “Heaven and human beings do not interfere with each other”, he did so precisely in order to oppose such ideas, in which there is a “divine appointment of sovereign power” and a form of resonance between Heaven and human beings. In Liu Yuxi’s opinion, Liu Zongyuan had not pursued his theory of the relation between Heaven and human beings to its logical endpoint, which caused him to write his “Treatise on Heaven” in order to provide a more complete account of the relation between Heaven and human beings. He pointed out that there had always been two different viewpoints on this matter: firstly, the conception of Heaven as something able to reward accomplishments and punish trespasses; and secondly, the view of Heaven as identical to the Dao which is natural does not act. Liu Yuxi considered both of these perspectives to be one-sided and went on to introduce his claim that “Heaven and human beings are evenly matched,” and “what heaven is able to do lies beyond the capacities of human beings. Conversely, what human beings are capable of lies beyond the reach of Heaven. This is why I say that Heaven and human beings are evenly matched” (Liu 1990, pp. 67–68). This means that Heaven has the functions of birth and growth and of nurturing the myriad things, whereas the function of human beings is to regulate them. The mutual struggle and relation of decrease and growth between the opposite forces of yin and yang are activities of nature. By contrast, the organization of society and the establishment of legal regulations in order to distinguish between right and wrong are human activities. These two cannot be substituted for each other. But what does Liu Yuxi mean by “Heaven conquering human beings” and “human beings conquering Heaven?” According to his interpretation, “Heaven conquers human beings without exerting itself. Why is this so? That which lies beyond the control of human beings can be attributed to Heaven. On the other hand, if human beings exert themselves, they are able to conquer Heaven. Why? Heaven is selfless (无私wu si), which is why human beings are able to conquer it” (Liu 1990, p. 70). He did not consider Heaven as something which consciously strives to overpower human beings. If the latter are unable to control nature, the forces of nature will automatically perform their function. Human beings can surpass Heaven if they truly make an effort, because Heaven is completely devoid of personal intentions. As a result, human beings are able to conquer nature by making conscious use of laws.

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Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi’s ideas of “Heaven and human beings not interfering with each other” and “Heaven and human beings being evenly matched” appear to constitute a return to Xunzi’s notion of “clarifying the distinction between heaven and human beings.” It should be pointed out that their ideas did not transcend the perimeter set by those of Xunzi. However, within the historical conditions of the Tang dynasty, their theories were of great significance. Since the Han period, the idealist doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven had held a dominant position. With the advent of the Wei and Jin period, controversies surrounding “effort and Fate,” as a specific aspect of the debate concerning the relation between Heaven and human beings, had gained particular prominence. Furthermore, the Tang dynasty saw the appearance of the Chan school of Buddhism and of Li Quan, who attached a great deal of importance to the active role of human beings. The exaggeration of active role of the subject led to the formulation of subjective idealist philosophical theories. Han Yu emphasized subjective initiative as well, but he also propagated the idea of the Mandate of Heaven and turned the latter into the basis for his “transmission of the Dao” (道统dao tong). Within these circumstances, in their return to Xunzi’s idea of “clarifying the distinction between Heaven and human beings,” Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi provided a critical summary of the debate on “effort and Fate” from a materialist perspective, which undoubtedly stimulated the further development of philosophy. This critical summary also manifested itself in the unprecedented depth of their analyses of the origins of religious superstition. Liu Zongyuan writes: “If one has enough strength, one takes it from other human beings; if one is lacking in strength, one takes it from the gods. The meaning of ‘having enough’ is sufficiently [grasping] the Dao” (Liu 2008, p. 750). In his opinion, the superstitious belief in demons and gods is an expression of the impotence of human beings. If we could grasp the “Dao” (laws and norms), this would give us the strength to control nature, and religious superstition would disappear. In his “Treatise on Heaven”, Liu Yuxi provided a detailed analysis of the epistemological and social reasons behind the religious doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. He introduced the notion that “one talks about Heaven when principles (理li) remain obscure.” He considered the superstitious belief in Heaven, demons, and gods to be a result of “principles remaining obscure,” that is to say, of an insufficient understanding of the laws of nature. He gave the example of steering a boat: when the boat is sailing through a small stream, human beings are able to control whether the boat goes fast or slow and sails or stops. Even if the boat were to run aground or capsize, the person steering it would be able to know why. In such circumstances, “the person in the boat would not mention Heaven. And why not? Because he understands the relevant principles.” By contrast, if a person were sailing a boat surrounded by surging waves with a ferocious wind, he would be unable to control whether the boat goes fast or slow and sails or stops. As a result, “the person in the boat would not be able to refrain from invoking Heaven. Why is this so? Because he does not understand the principles.” Here Liu provides an analysis of the origin of the religious doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven from an epistemological perspective. He also pays attention to the social conditions of religious superstition. In his view, establishing a social

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system and setting up legal norms had allowed human beings to conquer Heaven. That being said, there are three distinct ways in which laws are put into practice: “laws reaching far and wide,” “laws being non-existent,” and “laws being lax.” In the first situation, there is a stable rule of law. At this point, “human beings clearly understand the Dao,” and they will not attribute rewards and punishments or good luck and misfortune to Heaven. In the second situation, there is chaos in society, so that “human beings are blind to the Dao.” Right and wrong and rewards and punishments have turned into their opposites, and people will attribute their misfortunes and strokes of luck to Heaven. In the third situation, right and wrong become confused. Those who do good will not necessarily be rewarded, nor will wrongdoers necessarily be punished. Under these conditions, people’s perspective on the relation between Heaven and human beings will also become confused. Liu Yuxi indicated that religious superstition is related to whether or not people are capable of grasping the laws of nature and to the socio-political circumstances in which they find themselves, which is a very valuable insight. In his critique of the religious doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, Liu Yuxi provided an analysis in light of the relation between the subjective initiatives of human beings on the one hand and objective regularities on the other. He believed that the fact that “human effort conquers Heaven” is due to “understanding principles,” and that “understanding principles” consists in recognizing the “regularity” (数shu)4 within “tendencies” (势shi). In the course of his investigation into these categories, he makes the following argument: “When various things are united or occur together, there must be regularity in their midst. Such regularities persist, after which a tendency takes shape in between them” (Liu 1990, p. 70). In his view, when different entities are united (such as a boat with water), there is certainly a form of “regularity”, that is to say, certain necessary and lawful relations between things. When Liu writes that “regularities persist and tendencies come into being,” he means that laws are manifested within the developmental tendencies of things (Liu 1990, p. 70). Every possible movement or transformation “accords with a certain regularity and straddles a certain tendency”, or in other words, manifests itself as an actual tendency in accordance with necessary laws. “Regularities” are located within “tendencies.” In order to gain knowledge of the regularities within tendencies, human beings have to rely on “their wisdom in order to observe them”, that is to say, they have to be grasped through reason. Consequently, Liu goes on to argue that “the strongest of the hairless creatures (倮虫luo chong)5 have the greatest intelligence. If one is able to hold fast to the principles of human existence, then one can be a match for Heaven.” In other words, human beings are the highest of the “hairless creatures” and have the most well-developed intelligence. They are able to employ the “principles of human existence” in competing with heaven, that is to say, to make use of the resources of nature in accordance with natural laws, and furthermore, to establish law and order in human society. In Liu Yuxi’s view, this is the function of human activity. 4

Translator’s note: shu literally means “number”. Translator’s note: literally, “naked insect”, one of the “five creatures” (wu chong) in the traditional Chinese taxonomy of living beings.

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(3) Liu Zongyuan’s Philosophy of History: The Focus on “Tendency” Liu Zongyuan employed the category of “tendency” (shi) to explain historical evolution. He clearly indicated that there are objective and necessary tendencies in the history of humanity and also used this category to analyze historical events. Liu took up Xunzi’s notion that “it is not Heaven which brings order to chaos” and strove to account for the origin of the state system from within society itself. In his view, as the human population increased, there was a corresponding increase in competition over the material resources necessary for the maintenance of life. The ranks of the nobility, the regional feudal lords, and the emperor as the Son of Heaven appeared in order to put an end to such competition and gave shape to a state system. Liu Zongyuan made a further summary of debates about the system of prefectures and counties and of feudal enfeoffment since the Qin and Han periods. He argued that the historical process through which the feudal system emerged, developed, and finally declined—to be replaced by a system of prefectures and counties—was “not...the intention of the sages, but the result of tendencies” (Liu 2008, p. 43). He writes: “None of the sage kings of old, neither Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang nor Wen and Wu, were able to abolish feudal enfeoffment. This was not because they did not desire to do so, but rather because the prevailing tendencies made it impossible” (Liu 2008, p. 43). Liu argued that the fact that a feudal system was put into place when a state was first formed was the result of the objective tendencies in human society at that time. Additionally, that this system was not abolished during the reign of Tang, Yu, and the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties was also because the tendencies did not allow for it. He went on to point out that with the advent of the Eastern Zhou period, many corrupt practices enabled by the feudal system became apparent. Subsequently, the first emperor of the Qin dynasty unified China, replaced feudal enfeoffment with the system of prefectures and counties, and exercised centralized power, which in turn was also in accordance with the developmental tendencies of that time. By interpreting the origin of the state and the evolution of the sociopolitical system by means of the concept of “tendency”, Liu Zongyuan rejected the many previous idealist conceptions of history concerning the “Mandate of Heaven”, such as Zhou Yan’s theory of “the alternation of the five agents/virtues” (五德终始wu de zhong shi) and Dong Zhongshu’s idea of the “three systems” (三统san tong). He also managed to transcend the theories of previous materialists such as Han Feizi and Wang Chong, who had already attempted to explain social order in terms of circumstances such as population growth and climatic conditions. It precisely through his use of this historical outlook emphasizing “tendencies” that Liu was able to offer an explanation for the necessity of the historical reality of the replacement of feudal enfeoffment with the system of prefectures and counties, so that the longstanding debates concerning the problem of feudalism could be concluded in a critical manner. As Su Shi rightly stated, “After Zongyuan’s text appeared, the treatises of all the other masters could be dispensed with. Even if a sage were to rise up, he would not be able to change this.” Liu Zongyuan’s historical outlook on “tendency” also discerned the contradiction between the objective trends of historical development on the one hand, and

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the subjective motives of individual figures participating in historical events on the other. He writes: “The Shang and Zhou dynasties did not enact reforms; this was inevitable” (Liu 2008, p. 48). The subjective motivation for the rulers of these dynasties to implement feudal enfeoffment was their desire to be served by the nobles and to preserve their royal household for posterity: “They wanted to have power to themselves and to safeguard it for their own posterity” (Liu 2008, p. 48). However, the result was exactly the opposite. The nobility became rich and powerful and impossible to control. Likewise, when the first emperor of Qin dynasty transformed the feudal system into that of prefectures and counties, he was also subjectively motivated by his own interests and those of his household. “His intentions were selfish” and he wanted to buttress his own authority and make all his subordinates and the common people obey him. However, objectively speaking, his actions reflected the necessary tendency of history. Therefore, “his establishment of this system was of the utmost of impartiality (公gong)” (Liu 2008, p. 43). At this point, Liu indicated that objective tendencies are hidden behind people’s subjective intentions and touched upon the problem of the contradiction between contingency and necessity. Arguably, Liu Zongyuan already recognized that there are inevitable forces (“tendencies”) at work behind people’s subjective motives (“the intention of the sages,” the “selfish intention” of the first emperor of Qin dynasty, etc.). Subjective motivations are contingent and, although they direct our actions, they play a secondary role in explaining the total—which is to say, historical—outcome of human activity. Consequently, although it may seem that such contingencies have a dominant position, they are actually governed by necessity. Liu’s insights truly outstripped those of figures such as Wang Chong, Wang Bi, and Guo Xiang. That being said, we should not go so far as to describe Liu Zongyuan’s outlook on history with its stress on “tendency” as scientific. If we further inquire into what such historical tendencies are determined by, we find Liu arguing that the emperor “receives his mandate from the intentions of the people,” that is to say, that “tendency” is determined by the intentions of the common people. This remains an idealist view of history. However, his historical outlook has to be seen as one of the most important contributions of his philosophy. (4) Liu Zongyuan’s Theory of “Achieving Oneself” When Liu Zongyuan uses the expression “achieving oneself” (成人cheng ren) in his writings, he is basically reviving the pre-Qin theories concerning the cultivation of an ideal personality. In Liu’s view, the point of departure for “achieving oneself” is “directing the will towards the Dao” (志于道zhi yu dao). He describes himself as “studying the way of the sages, continuously striving for it through my willpower in spite of physical hardship” (Liu 2008, p. 551). Furthermore, in order to study the Dao of Confucius, one must make efforts to put it into practice, while at the same time molding oneself through literature, relying on the help of teachers and friends to overcome one’s shortcomings, and so on. Accordingly, by “diligently pursuing” (敏以求之min yi

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qui zhi)6 and “acting without becoming weary,”7 after protracted efforts, a person will be able to attain the horizon of “peaceful joy,” at which he can “follow the mind” without exceeding the proper norm.8 Just like Mencius, Liu adhered to the idea that human nature is good and emphasized that the sages and normal people “are of the same kind” (Liu 2008, p. 527). However, there is also a certain difference between Mencius and Liu. Mencius called humaneness, righteousness, loyalty, and sincerity “Heavenly nobility” (天爵tian jue), meaning that he approached the moral qualities of humaneness and righteousness as something bestowed on human nature by Heaven. In Liu Zongyuan’s view, the natural order endows human beings with a “vigorous vital force” and a “pure vital force”: “when vigorous vital force is concentrated in human beings, it becomes the will,” “when pure vital force coalesces in human beings, it becomes intellect.” The distinction between these two forms of vital force manifests itself in the difference between willpower and rationality as two faculties of the human being. By “diligently pursuing things” through reason and relying on our willpower in order to “act without becoming weary,” we are able to constantly improve our morality. This is why he writes that “those who understand Heavenly nobility are not necessarily the most morally accomplished in loyalty and sincerity; intellect and willpower are all that is needed” (Liu 2008, p. 50). Obviously, Liu Zongyuan’s theory of “achieving oneself” emphasized the interaction between reason and willpower. Before Liu, Ji Kang had already stated that “intellect and courage have a distinct function, the one cannot lead to the other” (Liu 2008, p. 249), thereby driving a wedge between reason and willpower (courage), a mistake which Liu was fairly successful in correcting. He argued that if a person relies on his willpower in working hard, displays a fondness for learning, and delights in what is good without giving up, but “is not accomplished when it comes to intellect,” he will still lose his way and suffer many setbacks. Conversely, if someone relies on his intellect in investigating the world, so that nothing remains hidden from his insight, but his “will has not been established,” he will also end up losing his personal integrity and waste his intellect on improper things. That is why it is necessary to “use intellect to understand it and employ willpower to obtain it.” It is only when these two aspects mutually reinforce each other that the origin of morality, that is to say, vigorous and pure vital force, can develop into the qualities of humaneness, righteousness, loyalty, and sincerity, and thereby create the ideal personality of the sages and worthies. Liu’s combination of “intellect” and “willpower” implies a unification of reason and will and of the principle of consciousness with that of voluntariness. Such a unification is part of an outstanding tradition stemming from the pre-Qin period which was reawakened through the influence of the practices of Chan Buddhism. Perhaps this is what led Liu to the realization that “there truly are some aspects of Buddhism which cannot be refuted. These are often in agreement with the Book of Changes and the Analects” (Liu 2008, p. 425). However, maybe this was also the reason why he did not clearly distance himself from Buddhist idealism. 6

Translator’s note: a reference to the Analects 7:20. Translator’s note: see Analects 7:34. 8 Translator’s note: see Analects 2:4. 7

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After the failure of the political reforms they were engaged in, both he and Liu Yuxi sought spiritual refuge in the Buddhist teachings. This prevented them from offering a critical summary of the wide-ranging investigations into the activities of consciousness and the process of knowledge found in the various schools of Buddhism of the Sui and Tang periods.

References Bodde, Derk. 1952. A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Fung Yu-Lan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. De Bary, Wm. Theodore, and Iren Bloom. 1999. Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2nd ed, vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press. Huineng. 1984. Annotated Edition of the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, Annot. Ding Fubao. Taipei: Shin Wen Feng Press. Huineng. 1999. The Platform Sutra: The Text of the Dunhuang Manuscript with Notes, Annot. Li Shen, and Fang Guang Chang. Taiyuan: Shanxi Guji Press. Jun, Shi. 1983. Selected Literature of Chinese Buddhism, vol.2. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Li, Ao. 1992. Collected Works of Li Ao. Lanzhou: Gansu People’s Publishing House. Liu, Yuxi. 1990. Collected Works of Liu Yuxi, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Zongyuan. 2008. Collected Works of Liu Zongyuan. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House. Quan, Li. 1991. Commentaries on the Yin Fu Jing. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Shi, Daoyuan. 2010. Record of the Transmission of the Light, vol. 6. Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House. Xiao, Jiefu. 1994. Recorded Sayings of Ancient Worthies. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Xuanzang. 1998. Annotated Edition of the Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only, Annot. Han Tingjie. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhiyi. 1988. Annotated Edition of the Doctrine of Concentration and Insight, Annot. Li An. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.

Chapter 8

The Prevalence of Neo-Confucianism and the Criticisms of Neo-Confucianism

During the Song dynasty, when Chinese feudalism entered its later stages, Confucianism was revived in the form of Neo-Confucianism (the School of Principle) and resumed its paramount position in Chinese philosophy. Neo-Confucianists did not regard themselves as successors of the Han Confucians. To them, “after the death of Mencius the doctrine of the sages ceased to be transmitted,” and so the line of transmission did not directly continue until their day (Cheng and Cheng 2004,s p. 640). Neo-Confucians considered all doctrines with the exception of Confucianism as “heretic ideas,” but in fact they assimilated important elements of Buddhist and Daoist thought. For example, both Shao Yong’s Diagram of What Antedates Heaven (xiantiantu) and Zhou Dunyi’s Diagram of the Great Ultimate (taijitu) originated in religious Daoism and could be traced back to Chen Zhuan, a Daoist priest of the early Song; Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, known as the Cheng brothers, and Zhang Zai all “had believed in Daoism and Buddhism” for a quite long time and afterwards “converted to Confucianism.” However, the Neo-Confucianists cast aside Buddhist and Daoist forms of “other-worldliness” and maintained feudal institutions and morals, believing that an ideal or perfect personality could be cultivated only in ethical relations. This was in line with the longstanding Confucian standpoint. The essential characteristic of Neo-Confucianism is the absorption of Buddhist and Daoist elements and the incorporation of those elements into a Confucian theoretical system. There were two socio-historical motivations for the rise of Neo-Confucianism. It was motivated, first, by opposition to the peasant uprisings of the late period of Chinese feudalism, which sought to achieve “equality between rich and poor,” and, second, by resistance to the demand for political reforms within the landlord class. In opposition to these two tendencies, Neo-Confucianists put forth their political and ethical slogan—“Preserve the principle of Heaven and suppress human desires.” They regarded the peasants’ demand for “equality between rich and poor” as “a human desire” that went against “the principle of Heaven” and thus could never be tolerated. Again, they conceived of the measures pushed by reformers of the landlord class as placing “profit ahead of “justice,” that is, as regarding “human desires” as more important than “the principle of Heaven,” and opposed the reforms on these © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_8

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grounds. As founders of Neo-Confucianism, Zhou Dunyi, Shao Yong, the Cheng brothers, etc., were all opposed to Wang Anshi’s theory of “New Laws.” Being the official philosophy of the late period of Chinese feudalism, NeoConfucianism occupied a dominant position in all forms of ideology. Nevertheless, there existed conflicts between various schools of thought. In the formation of orthodox Neo-Confucianism there arose its opposite—Wang Anshi’s theory of “New Learning.” Later, there were controversies between Chen Liang and Ye Shi, on the one hand, and Zhu Xi, on the other hand, and criticisms of Wang Yangming leveled by Luo Qinshu and Wang Tingxiang. Even within Neo-Confucianists, there was considerable divergence of opinion, for example, between Zhang Zai (a materialist) and the Chengs (idealists) and between Zhu Xi (an objective idealist) and Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming (subjective idealists). The central problems disputed among these philosophical schools represented a new development of the issues discussed earlier. The long-standing debate over “being and non-being (movement and tranquility),” arising from the Wei and Jin onwards, was critically summed up by Zhang Zai, and then developed into the debate over the relationship between “principle and vital force (the Dao and concrete things).” Meanwhile, the problem of the relationship between “mind” and “things” (dharmas), which had been investigated from many angles by the Buddhists, became more closely integrated with the debate over “knowledge and action” during and after the Song dynasty; moreover, the problem of “the extension of knowledge through the investigation of things” held a special attraction for thinkers of that time. Consequently, the debate over “mind and matter/things (knowledge and action)” became another center of philosophical controversy. In association with these two centers, the debates over “Heaven and humankind” and over “names and actualities” continued in various forms. The relationship between “nature” (human nature and moral character) and “habit” (the force of habit and habitual practice) and the relationship between the logical categories (象xiang) and the law of development of the universe (Dao) also received more careful examinations than ever before. The shift in the central philosophical problems was primarily related to the development of science and technology in that period. During the period of the Song and Yuan, ancient Chinese science reached the apex of its development with the appearance of such great scientists as Shen Kuo. Chinese science led the world until the middle of the Ming dynasty. With the progress of science, logical thinking demanded a more thorough and comprehensive investigation on the category of “law” (“principle”). In addition, the progress of science conflicted with Neo-Confucianists’ fideistic tendency to indulge in empty talk of mind and nature and to lose contact with practice. As a result, it provided abundant nourishment for the materialist thought of the same period, and forced idealism to assume a more refined form as well.

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8.1 Zhou Dunyi, Shao Yong, and the Cheng Brothers: Founders of Orthodox Neo-Confucianism It was not until Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi (known as the Cheng brothers) that the idealistic system of orthodox Neo-Confucianism was constructed. Since their teacher was Zhou Dunyi and Shao Yong was their good friend, we take the four of them as founders of orthodox Neo-Confucianism. Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), whose courtesy name was Maoshu, was a native of Yingdao in Daozhou (in present-day Daoxian County in Hunan Province). He had repeatedly been a prefectural official. Among his main philosophical works are the Tai Jin Tu Shuo (An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate) and the Tong Shu (Penetrating the Book of Changes). Zhou Dunyi’s treatise, An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate, takes the existing Daoist work on alchemy and repurposes it into a cosmological system. Its first sentence is: “The Ultimate of Non-being and then the Great Ultimate!” The state of the Ultimate of Non-being is prior to that of the Great Ultimate; this implies that “being comes from non-being.” It continues: “The Great Ultimate through movement generates yang. When its activity reaches its limit, it becomes tranquil. Through tranquility the great Ultimate generates yin” (Zhou 2009, p. 4; trans. Chan 1963, p. 463). The forces of yang and yin are produced from the movement and tranquility of the Great Ultimate. The separation of yang and yin gives rise to Heaven and Earth; through the transformation of yang and its union with yin, the five agents of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth arise; the interaction of the two forces and the five agents engenders and transforms the myriad things; the myriad things produce and reproduce, resulting in an unending transformation. It is obvious that Zhou Dunyi’s cosmology is an idealistic theory that maintains that the spiritual substance (“the Great Ultimate”) generates matter (“the vital force”). In addition, Zhou Dunyi holds that movement and tranquility exclude each other and a concrete thing is either active or tranquil; that the function of “the Great Ultimate” as the first principle of the universe is mysterious and wonderful, and is beyond movement and tranquility. This is not a dialectical but a metaphysical view. From the Wei and Jin onwards, the debate over “being and non-being (movement and tranquility)” in the Mysterious Learning and Buddhism was primarily an ontological one, and the cosmogony of the Han was carried on and developed chiefly by Daoist scholars. Under the influence of religious Daoism, Zhou Dunyi and Shao Yong raise the question of cosmogony again. Their views are idealist, but are significant because they encourage people to inquire into the origin, evolution, and structure of the cosmos. All Neo-Confucianists assert that an ordinary person can become a sage through learning. The question is how to learn. Zhou Dunyi’s answer is that the essential way is “having no desire” and “keeping tranquility.” He says: “Having no desire, one is vacuous while tranquil, and straightforward while in action” (Zhou 2009, p. 31; trans. Chan 1963, p. 473). If one can truly “have no desire,” one’s mind is pure and peaceful, and thus one naturally becomes intelligent and penetrating in cognition and

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upright and impartial in behavior. This conception of a “sage” as “having no desire and being tranquil,” is strongly suggestive of fideism. Shao Yong (1011–1077) was styled Yaofu. His forebears had been natives of Fanyang in Hebei Province. In his childhood, Shao Yong moved to Gongcheng (in present-day Huixian County in Henan Province) along with his father. He was offered official positions several times but he declined. He wrote a number of works, but the most important is the Huang Ji Jing Shi (Supreme Principles of Governing the World). Similarly to Zhou Dunyi, Shao Yong emphasizes cosmogony. Their difference in this field is that the former advocates the doctrine of the five agents and the latter the doctrine of the eight trigrams. Shao Yong also takes “the Great Ultimate” as the first principle of the world, and he further claims that “the mind is the Great Ultimate” (Shao 2010, p. 152). Hence “the mind” is in fact considered as the first principle of the world. According to him, “the Great Ultimate is unmoved,” but it manifests in miraculous transformations, and consequently “when it is aroused, it becomes spirit. Spirit engenders number, number engenders form, and form engenders concrete things” (Shao 2010, p. 162; trans. Chan 1963, p. 481). More details of this process can be filled in as follows: the Great Ultimate produces the Two Modes (of yin and yang), the Two Modes produce the Four Forms (major and minor yin and yang), the Four Forms produce the Eight Trigrams (Heaven, water, fire, thunder, wind, water in motion, mountain, and Earth), and “the Trigrams intermingle and generate the myriad things” (Shao 2010, p. 107). Moreover, such a process can be described with “number,” that is, “the one is differentiated into the two, two into four, four into eight, eight into sixteen, sixteen into thirty-two, and thirty-two into sixty-four …” (Shao 2010, pp. 106–7). “The study of forms and numbers antedating Heaven” (numerology) thus constructed contains some scientific materials and valuable speculations; for example, in his Diagram of What Antedates Heaven, the order of the eight trigrams and sixty-four hexagrams contains an embryonic notion of the binary system. Nevertheless, Shao Yong’s numerology is on the whole a subjectively fabricated system. In his opinion, in the study of what antedates Heaven, the mind is basic; the diagram, form, and number devised by the mind have predetermined the myriad things in the universe, and therefore the mind is omniscient and omnipotent when it uses “number” to calculate (see Shao 2010, p.159). This is essentially a mythology. The real founders of orthodox Neo-Confucianism are Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi. Cheng Hao (1032–1085), who was styled Bochun, was a native of Luoyang in Henan Province. And Cheng Yi (1033–1107), styled Zhengshu, was Cheng Hao’s younger brother. Both brothers lectured in Luoyang for a long time and their school of thought was called “the School of Luo.” The Cheng brothers were opposed to Wang Anshi’s “New Laws” and “New Learning.” Their speeches and writings are compiled into the Er Cheng Quan Shu (The Complete Works of the Cheng Brothers), which includes surviving works, additional works, and so forth. The Cheng brothers take “the principle of Heaven (天理tian li)” as the first principle of the world. Cheng Hao says: “Although in my learning there are things I have received from others, the two words, Heavenly principle, I have picked up myself”

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(Cheng and Cheng 2004, vol. 12, p. 424). The Chengs had been students of Zhou Dunyi, but the concept of “the principle of Heaven,” which represents the keystone of their philosophy, was put forth on the basis of their own experience. What is the so-called principle of Heaven? Cheng Yi explains: “You do not do it but it is accomplished, and you do not expect it to occur but it occurs; that is the principle of Heaven” (Cheng and Cheng 2004, vol. 18, p. 215). Thus it can be seen that the principle of Heaven is a kind of mysterious, irresistible necessity. It is substantially a refurbished version of the idealist doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. Unlike Zhou Dunyi and Shao Yong, who take pains to construct a diagram of the origin and evolution of the universe, the Cheng brothers emphasize the ontological study of the principle of Heaven. In their view, as an objective spiritual substance, the principle of Heaven “does not exist because of sage-emperor Yao, nor does it cease to exist because of wicked Jie”; it “is self-sufficient and from the very beginning lacks nothing. […] The constant principles governing the relations of father and son and of ruler and minister are unchangeable” (Cheng and Cheng 2004, vol. 18, p. 43). The principle of Heaven embraces hundreds of various principles, the majority of which concern social relations between people in different positions. As a result, the principle of Heaven advocated by the Chengs is actually a metaphysical formulation of the feudal ethical relations. The Cheng brothers use the idealist doctrine of the principle of Heaven to oppose the materialist theory of vital force. They differentiate between principle and vital force, and between the Dao and concrete things in terms of “what exists before physical form” and “what exists after physical form.” Cheng Hao says: “What exists before physical form [and is therefore without it] constitutes the Dao. What exists after physical form [and is therefore with it] constitutes concrete things.” In their opinion, the various changes and transformations caused by the interaction of the two vital forces of yin and yang are all concrete things that exist after physical form, and the original source of changes and transformations is the principle or Dao, which exists before physical form. Accordingly, Cheng Yi says: “There is vital force when there is principle” (Cheng and Cheng 2004, p. 1030). Moreover, “the Dao generates the myriad things naturally,” and the vital forces of yin and yang and all things in the universe are derived from the Dao (principle) (Cheng and Cheng 2004, p. 149). The Cheng brothers extend their view of the Dao of Heaven to human nature. They discuss human nature from the angle of the relationship between principle and vital force, holding that one should not only differentiate between “the nature that is endowed by the Mandate of Heaven” and “the nature that is endowed at birth by the vital force,” but also combine them together to make a study of human nature. Cheng Hao often emphasizes that “nature is the same as principle,” and “capacity means the endowment of the vital force.” Human nature comes from the principle of Heaven, and therefore there is nothing in this nature itself that is not good; meanwhile, the vital force is either clear or turbid, and therefore people are either sagacious or stupid, and good or evil. Cheng Yi explains the goodness of human nature in accordance with his view that “nature (essence) is the same as principle,” and tries to prove that human nature has three different levels—higher, middle, and lower—in accordance with his view of the endowment of the vital force, thus making a synthesis of Mencius’

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doctrine of the goodness of human nature and Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine of the three characters of nature, and setting forth a more comprehensive and a priori doctrine of human nature than his predecessors. As to the debate over “Heaven and humankind,” the Chengs uphold the idealist doctrine that Heaven and humankind form a single body. In their view, reason or the principle of Heaven is inherent in the human mind. But it is possible to lose one’s understanding and one’s reason may become dim due to the limitations of the vital force as well as obsession with human desires; therefore, the way of learning and self-cultivation is “to get rid of one’s desire and preserve the principle of Heaven,” and “to overtake one’s vital force and recover one’s nature” (Cheng and Cheng 2004, p. 252). In particular, such learning and self-cultivation include two components— “understanding the principle of Heaven” and “seriousness.” Cheng Hao says: “The student need not reach out but search right here in him- or herself. All that he or she has to do is to understand the principle of Heaven and to be serious” (Cheng and Cheng 2004, p. 20). That is to say, if one understands the principle of “Heaven and humankind forming one body” and is aware that one’s innate knowledge and capacity are completely sufficient, then one need not seek them outwardly but only preserve them with seriousness, and thus one will naturally “recover one’s nature.” Cheng Yi further develops “understanding principle” into “investigating things and making inquiries into principle to the utmost” for the sake of “the extension of knowledge.” It is somewhat reasonable for the Cheng brothers to recognize that people should improve their rational knowledge and practice self-cultivation in the process of acquiring a worldview. But their “making inquiries into principle to the utmost” does not mean seeking the law-governed knowledge of the objective world, but awakening the principle of Heaven in the mind. On many occasions, “seriousness” means suppressing the reasonable demands of human nature with the feudal ethical codes; for example, under the excuse that “dying of starvation is a minor matter whereas losing one’s chastity is a major matter,” Cheng Yi objects to a widow remarrying (Cheng and Cheng 2004, p. 301). Later, by following and developing the doctrine of the Cheng brothers, integrating their ontology with Zhou Dunyi and Shao Yong’s cosmology and absorbing some of Zhang Zai’s thoughts, Zhu Xi constructs a colossal system of idealism, and thus orthodox Neo-Confucianism assumes its mature form.

8.2 Zhang Zai’s Summing-Up of the Debate Over “Being and Non-being (Movement and Tranquility)”—An Exposition of the Principle of the Unity of Opposites In Terms of Qi Monism Zhang Zai is a well-known Neo-Confucianist of the Song dynasty and one of the founders of Neo-Confucianism. Zhang Zai (1020–1077), styled Zihou, was a native of Hengqu in Fengxiang (in modern-day Meixian County in Shaanxi Province).

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The school of thought headed by him was called “the School of Guan” because of Guanzhong, where he gave lectures. Among his main philosophical works are the Zheng Meng (Correcting Youthful Ignorance), the Yi Shuo (Comments on the Book of Changes), and the Xi Ming (Western Inscription). Similar to the Cheng brothers in the debate over “principle and desire,” Zhang Zai sets “the principle of Heaven” against “human desires.” In his short treatise Western Inscription, he likewise generalizes feudal morals into “the principle of Heaven,” and declares that the feudal ethical code is natural and rational and, consequently, that a person should submit to the feudal ruling order in life and be at peace in death (Zhang 1978, p. 63). With respect to their views of “human desires,” however, there is a slight difference between Zhang Zai and the Chengs. Zhang Zai does not support “suppressing human desires,” but only opposes “exhausting human desires” and holds that the natural desire for food and sex cannot be eliminated. Thus his doctrine is not suggestive of asceticism in the same way as the Cheng brothers’. As a conservative Neo-Confucian, Zhang Zai disapproves of Wang Anshi’s reforms. Nevertheless, he is a scholar who bravely seeks the truth. He is more concerned about the common people’s sufferings than many other philosophers, has a special interest in the study of natural science (which can be seen from his exposition of the Chinese heliocentric theory, a major contribution to astronomy), and advances some valuable views on education. In addition, he has a better understanding of Buddhism and Daoism, and levels more profound criticisms at the Buddhist and Daoist idealism. All these features contribute to his fundamental philosophical tendency toward materialism and his higher achievements in philosophy. (1) Summing up the Debate over “Being and Non-being (Movement and Tranquillity)” From the Wei and Jin onwards, the relationship between “being and non-being (movement and tranquility)” became a long-standing central theoretical controversy related to the Way of Heaven. As already mentioned, both the Mysterious Learning and Buddhism took “non-being” (vacuity-tranquility) as the first principle of the world. Xiang Xiu and Guo Xiang proposed the idea of the union of being with non-being and yet they both slipped into relativism; while Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi’s return to Xunzi opened up the way to settle the debate, they failed to make a sufficient case for their claims and could not make a clean break from Buddhist idealism. It is not until Zhang Zai, who explicitly advances the view that “principle is dependent on vital force,” that the debate over “being and non-being (movement and tranquility)” receives a relatively well-founded summing-up on the basis of the monistic theory of vital force. From now on, the debate concerning the conception of the Way of Heaven evolves into a debate over “principle and vital force (Dao and concrete things).” Zhang Zai takes vital force (气qi) as the first principle of the world. He says: All that has shape pertains to being; all being consists of forms; and all forms consist of vital force. The nature pertaining to the vital force is fundamentally vacuous and miraculous. Hence the miraculous and the vacuous both definitely exist in the vital force. (Zhang 1978, p. 63)

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Without vital force, there would not be any real “forms of things,” and without forms of things there would not be any human concepts. The vital force itself is a unity of being with non-being and of reality and unreality. Precisely because vital force is such a unity, “the Great Vacuity is nothing but vital force.” Zhang Zai says: If we realize that the Great Vacuity is identical with vital force, we know that there is no such thing as non-being.[…] The doctrine of those superficial and mistaken philosophers who draw the distinction between being and non-being does not get to the utmost of the principle (Zhang 1978, pp. 8–9; trans. Chan 1963, p. 503).

That is to say, “being “and “non-being” cannot be separated, and there is no absolutely empty “non-being.” The proposition that “the Great Vacuity is identical with vital force” has two implications. One is that the broad space is formless but is filled with tiny matter, and the other is that “the Great Vacuity has no physical form. It is the original substance of vital force” (Zhang 1978, p. 7). As a substance, vital force is vacuous and formless. So far as its function is concerned, vital force acts as changes and transformations of the myriad things. Thus it can be seen that Zhang Zai’s proposition contains the application of the principle that “substance and function are inseparable.” With the theory that “the Great Vacuity is identical with vital force,” Zhang Zai levels criticisms at Laozi and Wang Bi’s objective idealism “valuing non-being” and at the Zen masters’ subjective idealism. In his view, the substance of vital force is the unity of being and non-being, of reality and unreality, and its function is the unity of “the integration and the disintegration” and “the appearance and the disappearance” of the myriad things. He points out: If it is argued that vital force is produced from the Vacuity, then because the two are completely different, the Vacuity being infinite while vital force is finite, the one being substance and the other function, such an argument would fall into the naturalism of Laozi, who claimed that being comes from non-being and failed to understand the eternal principle of the undifferentiated unity of being and non-being. If it is argued that all phenomena are but things perceived in the Great Vacuity, then since things and the Vacuity would not be mutually conditioned, since the physical form and the nature of things would be self-contained, and since these, as well as Heaven and humankind, would not be interdependent, such an argument would fall into the doctrine of the Buddha, who taught that mountains, rivers, and the total stretch of land are all subjective illusions. (Zhang 1978, p. 8; trans Chan 1963, p. 502)

According to Laozi, the Vacuity or non-being is infinite while the motion of matter is finite, thus “substance” and “function” are completely separated from each other. According to the Buddha, phenomenon (“physical form”) and essence (“nature”) are not interconnected, so are human knowledge (“humankind”) and the real world (“Heaven”) and things in the natural world are only subjective illusions. Both Laozi and the Buddha “know superficially that the substance of the nature of things is the Vacuity, the Void, but do not know that function is based on the Dao of Heaven. Instead, they try to explain the universe with limited human knowledge” (Zhang 1978, p. 8; trans Chan 1963, p. 502). That is to say, they both take substance and function

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separately, one-sidedly exaggerating the “Vacuity” of “substance,” and are not aware that all real functions are the embodiments of the self-movement of substance. Zhang Zai’s proposition that “the Great Vacuity is identical with vital force” means that vital force is not only a unity of “being and non-being” but also a unity of motion and rest. He says: “As the Great Vacuity, vital force is extensive and vague. Yet it ascends and descends and moves in all ways without ever ceasing” (Zhang 1978, p. 8). The vital force as “the Great Vacuity” is in constant movement, which is a unity of motion and rest. First, the motion of the natural world is spontaneously, consistently, and constantly governed by laws, hence “such motion is a motion with rest” (Zhang 1978, p. 113). Second, so far as the relationship between the substance of vital force and the myriad things is concerned, vital force possesses the contradiction of motion and rest in itself, which finds expression in the antithesis between motion and rest in the changes of the myriad things. Zhang Zai makes deep inquiries into the cause of the material movement, explicitly pointing out that this movement is a process of the unity of opposites. He endorses the doctrine of mo wei, and is opposed to the doctrine of huo shi. He says: “The motion of all those things that move around must have its own motivation. Since it is caused by internal motivation, it is not caused by an external force” (Zhang 1978, p. 11). This means that the celestial bodies follow their circular courses as the result of some internal motivation. In view of the material world as a whole, vital force proper contains “the motivation of reality and unreality, of motion and rest, and the beginning of yin and yang, as well as the elements of strength and weakness” (Zhang 1978, p. 8). Since vital force contains the antitheses of reality and unreality and of yin and yang, “its expansion and contraction are unlimited and its movement is unceasing. They are not caused by anything” (Zhang 1978, p. 12). Zhang Zai calls the source and evolutionary process of the material motion “creation and transformation,” and thinks that the Book of Changes is merely an exposition of the same. He says: The principle of Change means creation and transformation. […] Due to the principle of Change, being and non-being, and motion and rest, can be concurrently emphasized but neither should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. (Zhang 1978, p. 206)

Thus the “creation and transformation” expounded in the Book of Changes is a unity of being and non-being and of motion and rest. Zhang Zai’s term “creation and transformation” expresses the thought of the unity of opposites, which shows that the motion of matter is determined by the contradiction immanent in itself and the inherent contradictory movement is a movement of the unity of opposites. Zhang Zai further differentiates between “change” and “transformation” in the process of the material motion. He says: “Change is apparent, and transformation is gradual (and imperceptible)” (Zhang 1978, p. 70). “Transformation” here is analogous to the modern concept of “absolute motion.” In his view, the difference between absolute and relative is relative, and therefore absolute motion can be naturally divided into some different processes and stages (for example, the four seasons in a year), and the change from one stage to another is apparent. Here, Zhang Zai

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has touched on the relationship between absolute motion and relative rest, which is further expounded by Wang Fuzhi later. Zhang Zai explains the development of vital force by appeal to the principle of the unity of opposites. According to him, the movement of vital force has diverse forms, such as integration, disintegration, attraction, repulsion, and so forth, and yet it is governed by law, as he says: “Although vital force in the universe integrates and disintegrates, and attracts and repulses in a hundred ways, nevertheless the principle according to which it operates has an order and is unerring” (Zhang 1978, p. 7). As to the general law of vital force, he states: In its original state of Great Vacuity, vital force is absolutely tranquil and formless. As it is acted upon, it engenders yin and yang, and through their integration gives rise to forms. As there are forms, there are their opposites. These opposites necessarily stand in opposition to what they do. Opposition leads to conflict, which will necessarily be reconciled and resolved. (Zhang 1978, p. 10)

Here, Zhang Zai employs the term “necessarily” twice, holding that what he describes is a necessary law. Nevertheless, his conclusion that “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved” is not completely right. It is because some conflicts between things are reconciled through repulsion and struggle, but some are resolved through one side taking over the other side. According to Zhang Zai, things will necessarily be “reconciled and resolved of vital force and finally are disintegrated into the vital force as ‘Great Vacuity.’” This shows that he fails to understand that the resolution of conflicts results in elevation to a new and higher stage and ends up with a certain form of cyclical theory. On the whole, Zhang Zai’s summing-up of the debate over “being and non-being (movement and tranquility)” achieves the unity of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics. However, his summing-up is defective; for example, Heaven, to him, possesses wisdom and is intelligent. This makes his monistic theory of vital force suggestive of pantheism. (2) Ushering in the Debate over “Principle and Vital Force (Dao and Concrete Things)” Apart from his summary of the debate over “being and non-being (movement and tranquility)” which arose from the Wei and Jin onwards, Zhang Zai initiates the debate over “principle and vital force (Dao and concrete things)” which runs throughout the Song and Ming periods, and which takes place mainly between him and the Cheng brothers. The difference of opinion between Zhang and the Chengs on the relationship between “principle and vital force (Dao and concrete things)” primarily lies in the question of whether the world is based on vital force or principle. Zhang Zai’s answer is “vital force,” and the Cheng brothers’ answer is “principle.” With a straight forward denial of Zhang Zai’s view that “the Great Vacuity is identical with vital force,” Cheng Yi says: “Since all is principle, how can it be called Vacuity? In the universe there is no substance except principle” (Cheng and Cheng 2004, vol. 3, p. 66). He regards “principle” as the sole substance of the universe. Zhang Zai stresses that principle

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is the orderliness of vital force and dependent on things. He says: “Principle is not dependent on humankind but on things, since humankind is one of the things” (Zhang 1978, p. 313). In his conception of the Dao of Heaven, the two terms “the Dao” and “principle” can be exchanged, but under normal conditions principle refers to the law of increase and decrease of concrete things and the Dao to the first all-embracing principle of natural creation and transformation. In any case, however, neither of them can separate itself from the motion of matter. Zhang Zai says: The Great Harmony is called the Dao. […] Unless the whole universe is in the process of fusion and intermingling like fleeting forces moving in all directions, it may not be called Great Harmony. When those who talk about the Dao know this, then they really know the Dao, and when those who study Change understand this, then they really understand Change. Otherwise, even though they possess the admirable talents of Duke Zhou, their wisdom is not praise worthy. (Zhang 1978, p. 7)

From the transformation of vital force, there is the Dao. The Dao is nothing but the transformational process of vital force and the harmonious order of the natural world. According to Zhang Zai the Cheng brothers’ “wisdom is not praiseworthy” because they talk about the Dao or principle without consideration for vital force. Zhang Zai holds that vital force is infinite without beginning and end. He says: The Great Vacuity of necessity consists of vital force. Vital force of necessity integrates to become the myriad things. Things of necessity disintegrate and return to the Great Vacuity. Appearance and disappearance following this cycle are a matter of necessity. (Cheng and Cheng 2004, vol. 15, p. 163)

Although such a remark fails to break away from the cyclical theory, his assertion that vital force has neither coming into being nor ceasing to be is suggestive of an early understanding of the conservation of matter. Cheng Yi is opposed to it and says that when a thing disintegrates, its vital force is forthwith exhausted. There is no such thing as vital force returning to its source. The universe is like a vast furnace. Even living things will be incinerated in the end, and will exist no more. How can vital force that is already disintegrated still exist? Furthermore, what is the need for such a disintegrated vital force in the creative process of the universe? It goes without saying that the force used in creation is vital and fresh. In his opinion, vital force is a material without definite quantity, which, because it is bounded in time by birth and extinction and because it may increase or decrease, is always limited; in contrast, “the principle of Heaven” is without “life and death” or “increase and decrease,” and therefore it is eternal and limitless. In Zhang Zai’s opinion, very change in the universe is a process of the unity of opposites. Although the Cheng brothers also acknowledge that there are a variety of phenomena opposed to each other in the world, as they say, “All the myriad things have their opposites. When there is yin, there is yang. When there is good, there is evil” (Cheng and Cheng 2004, vol. 15, p. 163). Yet the Chengs do not think that contradiction is the source of motion nor that the unity of opposites is the law of change and development. Cheng Yi says: The Dao is that through which yin and yang operate, the very term “vital force” implies a duality and the very expression “opening and closing” implies one thing acting on another.

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Wherever there is a duality, there is always such an action. The Dao is that through which opening and closing operate, and opening and closing are the same as yin and yang. (Cheng and Cheng 2004, vol. 15, p. 163)

Vital force has the changes and interaction of yin and yang and of opening and closing, but the cause of these changes and interaction is the Dao. Moreover, the Cheng brothers reduce their idea of “having opposites” to the doctrine of the Mean. Cheng Hao says: “The principle of the Mean is perfect. Nothing can be produced with yin and yang alone. Those who possess them partially are animals and barbarians, while those who possess them in balanced proportions are humans” (Cheng and Cheng 2004, vol. 2, p. 17). When one adopts an impartial and compromising attitude toward opposites, one can grasp the principle of Heaven. Once one grasps the principle, one achieves a position of “having no opposite.” Thus it can be seen that what the Cheng brothers seek is a sphere in which all opposites have been eliminated, though they both speak of “having opposites.” In the debate over “principle and vital force (Dao and concrete things)” between him and the Chengs, Zhang Zai for the most part defends the materialist monistic theory of vital force, which lays a foundation for developing and resolving this debate in later times. (3) “Transforming Physical Nature by Means of Knowledge and Propriety” Zhang Zai regards learning as a process of transforming physical nature by means of “knowledge” and “propriety” so as to achieve virtues. Such a doctrine belongs to epistemology and ethics. In Zhang Zai’s philosophical thought, epistemology and ethics are unified. According to Zhang, the transformation of vital force produces everything in the world. Human beings come from clear vital force, whereas things from turbid vital force. Furthermore, Zhang Zai differentiates between “the physical nature” and “the original nature endowed by Heaven and Earth” of human beings. Zhang says: “With the existence of physical form, there exists physical nature. If one successfully returns to the original nature endowed by Heaven and Earth, then it will be preserved” (Zhang 1978, p. 321). Again: Nature endowed by Heaven completely permeates the Dao. It cannot be obscured by vital force (one’s physical nature) whether it is clear or dark. What has been decreed by Heaven completely permeates one’s nature. It cannot be destroyed by one’s fortune, whether it is good or evil. If they are obscured or destroyed, it is because one has neglected to learn. (Zhang 1978, p. 321; trans. Chan 1963, p. 508)

Everybody possesses his or her “original nature endowed by Heaven and Earth,” which is in harmony with the Dao of Heaven. On this view, virtue is innate and evil is not a natural part of human nature. Such being the case, why is that people are capable of being evil? The first part of the explanation lies in a person’s physiological condition, and the second part in a person’s bad fortune under the influence of customs and circumstances. Zhang Zai emphasizes that, through education and hard study, one can overcome the influence of customs and transform one’s physical nature condition so that one’s nature, endowed by Heaven and Earth, will then reveal itself;

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as he says: “The great benefit of learning is to enable one to transform one’s physical nature oneself” (Zhang 1978, p. 321; trans. De Bary et al 1965, p. 698). It is apparent to Zhang Zai that the process of seeking knowledge is identical with that of cultivating virtues. So far as his “knowledge” is concerned, Zhang Zai’s epistemology contains a contradiction. On the one hand, he holds that sensation is dependent on external objects, as he says: “When there are objects, there is sensation” (Zhang 1978, p. 313). Sensory experience is limited, since “what one hears and sees is insufficient to involve all things” (Zhang 1978, p. 25). Therefore one should not be hampered by one’s limited sensory experience in the pursuit of deep understanding of things, that is, one should “not allow what is seen or heard to fetter one’s mind” (Zhang 1978, p. 24). All these views are in conformity with materialism. But, on the other hand, Zhang Zai fails to grasp the relationship between the perceptual and the rational accurately, separating “knowledge obtained from seeing and hearing” from “knowledge obtained on the basis of virtue.” He says: “Knowledge obtained on the basis of virtue does not originate from seeing or hearing,” believing that such knowledge is a priori and not dependent on sensory experience (Zhang 1978, p. 24). In order to acquire “the knowledge obtained on the basis of virtue,” one has to undergo a process in which “sincerity results from enlightenment and enlightenment results from sincerity.” The process from “enlightenment” to “sincerity” means awakening the truth inherent in “the original nature endowed by Heaven and Earth” through “making investigations of principle to the utmost,” while the process from “sincerity” to “enlightenment” means recognizing the principles of things in light of the truth possessed by the original nature. All this illustrates Zhang Zai’s idealistic aprioristic view. To Zhang Zai, the main content of education is “propriety,” which can be understood in a broad sense. Economy, politics, and morality are all included in the education of propriety, and therefore “propriety” encompasses all feudal ruling institutions and is something which Neo-Confucianists want to promote; as Zhang says: “Without propriety there would be no extensive undertaking” (Zhang 1978, p. 191). Meanwhile, propriety can preserve a person’s nature, and therefore it has significance for cultivating a person’s moral character. Zhang Zai holds that integrating “knowledge” with “propriety” can result in “achieving the nature,” that is, the cultivation of a perfect person. Such a person possesses moral character and thus his or her conduct can consciously follow the principles of humanity and righteousness. Moreover, a person should exert him- or herself to the utmost by means of his or her volition and should always do good; only in this way may one “achieve one’s nature.” Once one’s nature is truly achieved, one will be self-confident and self-enlightened and act on one’s moral principles naturally and without reluctance. Accordingly, Zhang Zai strongly emphasizes the role of the will. On the whole, he returns to the pre-Qin Confucians’ thoughts of the unity of reason and will and of the principle of consciousness and the principle of voluntariness. In his opinion, one can deepen one’s understanding through one’s volition and learning, that is, one can strive to transform one’s physical nature by oneself and to become a perfect person; therefore, in his view, one’s inborn physical nature does not limit one’s growth. As a matter of course, Zhang’s “perfect person”

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is no more than a person who acts in obedience to the Mandate of Heaven, as he describes himself, “In life I follow and serve [Heaven and Earth]. In death I will be at peace.” Furthermore, his “achieving the nature” consists in forming a single body with “the Mandate of Heaven.” Consequently, Zhang has a fatalistic tendency as well. Later, Zhang Zai’s philosophical thought exerts great influence on both Zhu Xi, an orthodox Neo-Confucianist, and Wang Fuzhi, an outstanding materialist of the Ming and Qing periods.

8.3 Zhu Xi’s System of Principle Monism In the history of Chinese philosophy, Zhu Xi epitomized the thought of the orthodox Neo-Confucian school and constructed an all-encompassing objective-idealistic monistic system of principle (理li). Zhu Xi (1130–1200), styled Yuanhui and known as Hui’an, was a native of Wuyuan in Huizhou (in modern-day Jiangxi Province). His writings and letters were compiled into two books—the Zhu Zi Wen Ji Da Quan (Collected Works of Zhu Xi) and the Zhu Zi Yi Shu (The Nachlass of Zhu Xi)—and his conversations in his teaching were later compiled into the Zhu Zi Yu Lu (Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi). Zhu Xi criticized Wang Anshi’s reforms many times, and yet he devoted his energy mainly to lecturing and writing. All his lectures and writings were focused on one view, that is, “With thousands and thousands of words, the Sages are only to teach people to understand the principle of Heaven and suppress their desires. When the principle of Heaven is understood, there is no need of lecturing” (Zhu 2010, vol. 14, p. 367). In his opinion, the criterion for differentiating between “the principle of Heaven” and “human desires” was the feudal ethical code (propriety), and propriety was the same as the principle of Heaven. Thus Zhu Xi’s thought aimed at maintaining feudal morals and institutions. As an educationist and scholar, Zhu Xi was a learned man who studied Confucian classics, history, literature, phonology, and even natural sciences, and he put forth many original views. During his long teaching career, he developed some general epistemological and methodological principles, which have valuable features that should not be ignored. In addition, he stressed that one should read extensively and think analytically and accurately; such a style of study exerted a positive influence on later generations. (1) “Principle Is Prior to Vital Force” and “Though Principle Is Unitary, It Is Nevertheless Manifold in Its Distinctions” Regarding the relationship between principle and vital force or the Dao and concrete things, Zhu Xi carries on and develops the Cheng brothers’ theory. He says: Principle refers to the Dao, which exists before physical form [and is without it] and is the root from which all things are produced. Vital force refers to concrete objects, which exist after physical form [and is with it]; it is the instrument by which things are produced. (Zhu 2010, vol. 23, p. 2755)

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Principle is the “root” of things, namely, the essence of things, while vital force is the building material of things. In his view, everything is a unity of principle and vital force, but “the distinction between the Dao and concrete things is rather clear” (Zhu 2010, vol. 23, p. 2755). It is because principle, which exists before physical form, cannot create and make things, while vital force, which exists after physical form, can integrate itself to produce things. Actually, Zhu Xi regards “principle” as the formal cause and “vital force” as the material cause, which is similar to Aristotle’s philosophy. According to Zhu Xi, the production of any particular thing depends on both principle and vital force and everything is a combination of them both; however, in terms of the difference between “before physical form” and “after physical form,” principle is prior whereas vital force is posterior. He says: Principle has never been separated from vital force. However, principle “exists before physical form [and is therefore without it]”, whereas vital force “exists after physical form [and is therefore with it].” Hence when spoken of as being before or after physical form, is there not the difference of priority and posteriority? (Zhu 2010, vol. 14, p. 115; trans. Chan 1963, p. 634)

And again, What are called principle and vital force are certainly two different entities. But considered from the standpoint of things, the two entities are merged one with the other and cannot be separated with each in a different place. However, this does not destroy the fact that each of the two entities is an entity in itself. When considered from the standpoint of principle, before things existed, their principles of being had already existed. Only their principles existed, however, and not yet the things themselves. (Zhu 2010, vol. 14, p. 114; trans. Chan 1963, p. 673)

That is to say, first there must be abstract principles and then there are things that are made up of concrete materials, and first there are forms of things and then there are their contents. So far as the relationship between principle and Heaven and Earth is concerned, “before Heaven and Earth existed, there was after all only principle. As there is this principle, therefore there are Heaven and Earth” (Zhu 2010, vol. 14, p. 114). And so far as the relationship between principle and all sorts of things is concerned, “before these things existed, there was first this principle” (Zhu 2010, vol. 17, p. 3204). In other words, before the boat or cart exists, the principle of that boat or cart is already there; before the ruler or minister exists, the principle of that ruler or minister is already there. Zhu Xi’s view attempts to explain the origin and production of the myriad things through an analogy between the human activity of making implements and the creation of the natural world. It is true that, before making the boat or cart, people must possess the concept of the boat or cart and may even use this concept to draw up plans or blueprints. Nevertheless, people’s abstract concepts of the boat, cart, and so on come from objective reality; however, Zhu Xi considers concepts as substances that exist before physical form and produce the myriad things. The transformation of human concepts into concrete things has to rely on human labor. Since Zhu Xi’s principle is “invisible,” how does it transform into visible

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things? In order to answer this question, Zhu Xi absorbs Zhou Dunyi’s thought contained in his treatise An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate, explaining transformation by appeal to the cosmological theory that “the Great Ultimate generates the yang through movement and generates the yin through tranquillity.” Zhu calls the totality of principles “the Great Ultimate” (太极tai ji) as he says: “The Great Ultimate is the sum of the principles of Heaven and Earth and the myriad things”” (Zhu 2010, vol. 17, pp. 317–318). And he interprets “the Ultimate of Non-being (无极wu ji)” as something that “has no sound and smell,” “occupies no position,” and “has no shape or appearance,” holding that “The Ultimate of Nonbeing evolves into the Great Ultimate” merely means “It lacks shape but contains principle.” Being “the pivot of creation and transformation,” the Great Ultimate is the final source of Heaven and Earth and the myriad things. “The Great Ultimate generates the yang through movement and generates the yin through tranquillity” and then the two forces of yin and yang interact with each other, thus producing the five agents of metal, wood, water, fire, and earth, which constitute Heaven and Earth and the myriad things. Accordingly, Zhu Xi puts forward the position that “Though principle is unitary, it is nevertheless manifold in its distinctions.” In his view, when considered from branch to root or from five agents and the two forces of yin and yang, these agents and forces are derived from the Great Ultimate, namely, the totality of all principles, and therefore “so far as the totality of the myriad things is concerned, there is but one Great Ultimate” (Zhu 2010, vol. 13, p. 117), when considered from root to branch or from substance to function, “each of the myriad things possesses in it a Great Ultimate” (Zhu 2010, vol. 13, p. 117). That does not mean that the myriad things partake of the Great Ultimate as their substance and thus split it up into parts, but rather that each of the myriad things in itself possesses the Great Ultimate in its entirety. This is similar to the fact that there is only one moon in the sky, but when its light is scattered upon rivers and lakes, it can be seen everywhere. Though the thousands of moons reflected in rivers and lakes are different from each other, yet they are not parts of the moon, and on the contrary each of them possesses the moon in its entirety. Without a doubt, Zhu Xi’s views that “principle is prior to vital force” and that “though principle is unitary, it is nevertheless manifold in its distinctions” are metaphysical speculations and reflect his apriorism. In the perspective of the development of philosophy, however, his investigation of “principle” is deeper than his predecessors’. First, Zhu Xi explains the meaning of “principle” in terms of the relationship of principle to matter. In his opinion, principle is the absolute spirit prior to the myriad things; as a fundamental philosophical concept, it represents the reason why a thing is so and the norm according to which a thing ought to be so. He says: “As to things in the universe, each of them necessarily possesses the reason why it is naturally so and the norm by which it ought to be so; that is called principle” (Zhu 2010, vol. 6, p. 512). “The reason why a thing is so” refers to “principle” or the efficient cause; “the norm by which a thing ought to be so” refers to the maxims and norms, primarily ethical, by which one should abide in one’s purposeful actions. As “a norm by which a thing ought to be so,” “principle” is the final cause. Being both efficient

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cause and final cause, “principle” represents the objective necessity of things, which is independent of a person’s will. From his exposition of the meaning of the term “principle,” we can see that Zhu Xi argues that “necessity” consists of two aspects— “the reason why a thing is so” and “the reason why a thing ought to be so”—and that while everything in the natural world has “its norm by which it ought to be so,” the norm of human action is also objective and necessary (Zhu 2010, p. 526). In this way, he erroneously confuses rule with law, and “the norm by which a thing ought to be so” with necessity in the natural world. Second, Zhu Xi conducts a more thorough investigation than his predecessors of the manifoldness and specificity of principle than his predecessors. He says: Considering the fact that things come from one source, we see that their principle is the same but their vital force different. Looking at their various substances, we see that their vital force is similar but their principle utterly different. The difference in vital force is due to the inequality of its purity or impurity, whereas the difference in principle is due to its completeness or partiality. (Zhu 2010, vol. 22, p. 2130; trans. Chan 1963, p. 637)

Although both humankind and things come from “principle,” their vital force differs in its level of purity; therefore, “their principle is the same but their vital force different.” Although both humankind and things are based on vital force, they are different kinds and have different rules; therefore “their vital force is similar but their principle utterly different.” According to Zhu Xi, even among “people,” their “principle is different” (for example, the principle of the emperor and his minister is different from that of the father and his son) and, even among “things,” their principle is also different (for example, the principle of the ox and horse is different from that of the grass and tree). Every category of people and things in the universe “has its own principle” and furthermore, each part of the whole and each individual has its specific principle.. Zhu Xi expresses some thoughts that contain dialectical elements when he constructs his cosmogony according to the doctrine that “the Great Ultimate generates the yang through movement and generates the yin through tranquility.” As the summation of principle, “the Great Ultimate” is the root cause of the production of the myriad things, and yet it is never an absolutely isolated “one” that “has no opposite,” because it not only gives rise to thousands of things which are opposed to itself but also “has in it opposites,” such as “movement and tranquility” and “yin and yang” (Zhu 2010, vol. 17, p. 3202). Accordingly, there is an endless process of “one dividing into two”, such as “the Great Ultimate engenders the Two Modes, the Two Modes engender the Four Forms, and the Four Forms engender the Eight Trigrams” (Zhu 2010, vol. 16, p. 2218). Besides the Great Ultimate, all things contain various kinds of opposites, for example, left and right in figure, high and low in space, priority and posteriority in time, many and few in quantity, similarity and dissimilarity in quality, and so on. Hence, Zhu Xi says: “In the universe there is really no thing that is absolutely isolated and has no opposite” (Zhu 2010, vol. 22, p. 1904). The idea that “there is no single thing that does not have opposites” contains a certain dialectical element that is instructive for posterity. However, Zhu Xi fails to distinguish the antithesis apprehended by common representation from the contradiction

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in the sense of dialectics. He says: “There is a division into the yin and the yang, and the Two Modes (Heaven and Earth) are thus established. The results of the division are necessary and will never be changed” (Zhu 2010, vol. 13, p. 72). Moreover, “principle” as the original source of yin and yang and movement and tranquility, to him, is absolutely unmoved. Thus, in the final analysis, “movement is controlled by tranquility” (Zhu 2010, vol. 1, p. 167). Eventually, this leads to metaphysical one-sidedness. (2) The Doctrine of “Nature” and “Fate” and the Doctrine of “Recovering Nature” Zhu Xi develops Zhang Zai’s and the Cheng brothers’ views on human nature, further differentiating the dual meanings of “nature”—“nature endowed by Heaven and Earth” and “physical nature.” He says: When we speak of the nature endowed by Heaven and Earth, we refer to principle alone. When we speak of the physical nature, we refer to principle and vital force combined. Before vital force existed, basic nature was already in existence. Vital force does not always exist, but nature is eternal. Although nature is implanted in vital force, yet vital force is still vital force and nature is still nature, without being confused or mixed up. As to its immanence in things and universal existence, regardless of whether vital force is refined or coarse, there is nothing without its principle. (Zhu 2010, vol. 4, p. 196; trans. Chan 1963, p. 624)

Although “the nature endowed by Heaven and Earth” refers to principle alone, when principle finds expression in a concrete person it cannot be separated from vital force; such principle combined with vital force becomes the person’s physical nature. In Zhu Xi’s opinion, principle is perfectly good. As regards vital force, there are differences in it according to its clarity or opacity and its purity or turbidity, and therefore in physical nature there are differences in goodness and evil. The reason that an individual may be either wise or stupid is that he may have received vital force that is clear or vital force that is turbid. Zhu says: The one who is endowed with the vital force in its purity is a sage or a worthy. He or she is like a precious pearl lying in clear cold water. But the one who is endowed with vital force in its turbidity is obtuse and degenerate. He or she is like a pearl lying in turbid water. (Zhu 2010, vol. 4, p. 203)

According to Zhu, the “nature” spoken of by Mencius in his doctrine of the goodness of human nature should be understood as referring to “the nature endowed by Heaven and Earth”; only when it is understood in this way can the origins of evil be satisfactorily explained (since, of course, human nature is originally good). Like “nature”, “destiny” has two meanings—“the destiny in which what is destined by Heaven is called nature” and “the destiny in which life and death are destined.” Zhu Xi says: The destiny in which life and death are destined is related to vital force since the vital force people receive is different in quantity and thickness. The destiny in which what is destined by Heaven is called nature is simply referred to as principle; however, what is destined by Heaven is inseparable from vital force after all. (Zhu 2010, vol. 4, p. 208)

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It is obvious that “the nature of what is destined by Heaven” (principle) is equal to “the nature endowed by Heaven and Earth,” while “the destiny of life and death” is determined by “the destiny of receiving vital force.” “The destiny of receiving vital force” determines not only life and death but also poverty and wealth, high and low rank, and sagacity and stupidity. All these differences are unchangeable since they are destined by the inborn endowment of vital force (Zhu 2010, vol. 4, p. 213). This is a very strong form of fatalism. Based on the difference between “the nature endowed by Heaven and Earth” and “physical nature,” the same “mind,” to Zhu Xi, has two forms—“the moral mind” (道 心daoxin) and “the human mind.”(人心renxin) “The moral mind” originates from “the nature endowed by Heaven and Earth,” while “the human mind” originates from “physical nature”; therefore, the former perceives principle (primarily moral principle, including humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom) and the latter perceives sound, color, smell, and the need for food and clothing. Like stupid, humble people, wise sages come into being through the combination of principle with vital force, therefore they cannot but possess a physical nature and hence a human mind. Likewise sages, stupid, humble people possess the inborn nature endowed by Heaven and Earth, and therefore they cannot but have a moral mind. The difference between the two kinds of people is that the sages subordinate the human mind to the moral mind whereas stupid, humble people are exclusively controlled by the human mind. As a result, the former’s behavior is in conformity with “the principle of Heaven” while the latter merely indulge in “selfish human desires.” In accordance with this theory, Zhu Xi develops his doctrine of “recovering nature,” holding that doing good and removing evil is a matter of returning to one’s inborn and perfectly good nature, as endowed by Heaven and Earth. In his opinion, all people possess virtue and the principle of Heaven at birth, and thus each person has the innate capacity to deal appropriately with every situation. “Virtue” here is the same as “the nature endowed by Heaven and Earth.” However, innate virtue “is restricted by what is endowed by vital force and can sometimes become obscured by human desires, thereby becoming opaque” (Zhu 2010, vol. 6, p. 16). For this reason, people need to “preserve the principle of Heaven and extinguish human desires” through practice, and through recovering and developing their “nature endowed by Heaven and Earth,” which is already restricted by the endowment of vital force and obscured by human desires but which has not as yet gone out completely. Zhu Xi’s doctrine of “recovering nature” lays great emphasis on the principle of consciousness, arguing that only through education can virtue enter into a conscious stage. Zhu says: “When one comes to know the principle according to which one ought to act, one will demand oneself surely to follow it” (Zhu 2010, vol. 24, p. 3587). Moreover, once one acquires consciousness, one will do something “of one’s own free will.” For example, patients may feel an ache when they take a moxibustion treatment; however, if they understand that this is needed for their health, then “they will be willing to do it and cease to feel an ache” (Zhu 2010, vol. 22, p. 8). Hence, Zhu Xi’s true purpose is to teach people to consciously tolerate their discomfort so as to “preserve the principle of Heaven and extinguish human desires,” when he generalizes “principle” (feudalist morality) into “the nature endowed by Heaven and

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Earth” or “the Mandate of Heaven,” which is imperative and necessary and cannot be violated by anyone. In fact, Zhu Xi denies the principle of voluntariness completely, and therefore his doctrine of “recovering nature” is a refined form of fatalism. (3) “Knowledge Is Prior and Action Posterior” and “Acquiring Knowledge by Means of Examining Things” With respect to the debate on “mind and matter/things (knowledge and action),” Zhu Xi carries on and develops the Cheng brothers’ theory. Assuming apriorism as a premise, Cheng Yi stresses that “knowledge is prior to action;” so does Zhu Xi. He says: Knowledge and action always require each other. It is like a person who cannot walk without legs although he or she has eyes, and who cannot see without eyes although he or she has legs. With respect to order, knowledge comes first, and with respect to importance, action is more important. (Zhu 2010, vol. 9, p. 298)

According to Zhu Xi, neither knowledge nor action should be ignored since knowledge and action are united, and action is in a more important position; each of these views is, to some extent, reasonable. When he affirms that “knowledge is prior and action posterior,” however, he actually separates knowledge and action, acknowledging that in the first place there is a stage of “knowledge” in which there is no “action.” Besides, so-called action, to him, refers to the enactment of feudalist morality, and so-called knowledge refers to awakening “the principle of Heaven” in the mind. The way of awakening “the principle of Heaven,” according to Zhu Xi, is “to extend knowledge through investigating things.” Developing Cheng Yi’s doctrine of the “investigation of things,” Zhu says that the words “the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things” mean that we should investigate things to the utmost so as to gain an exhaustive knowledge of their principles. This is because there is no human intelligence utterly devoid of knowledge, and no single thing in the world without principle (Zhu 2010, vol. 6, p. 20). But because the knowledge of these principles is not exhaustive, this knowledge is in some ways incomplete. This is why the first instruction of the Great Learning is that the student must, for all the separate things in the world, proceed, by means of the principles already known to him, to gain a further exhaustive knowledge of those others with which he is as yet unfamiliar, in this way seeking to extend his knowledge to the utmost. When one has exerted oneself for a long time, finally one will attain complete understanding. Thereupon there will be thorough comprehension of all the multitude of things, external or internal, fine or coarse, and every exercise of the mind will be marked by complete enlightenment. Here we can see that “investigating things to extend knowledge” is the same as “investigating things to the utmost so as to gain an exhaustive knowledge of their principles.” Why? Zhu Xi’s explanation includes three points. First, in a person’s mind there is innate knowledge, which is the starting point of cognition, and a person’s cognitive activity is to awaken “the principle of Heaven,” which has been restricted by the endowment of vital force and obscured by selfish human desires. Second,

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“knowledge” means knowing the “principle” of things in the world to the utmost. This presupposes that “Things and ‘I’ have a common principle.” Accordingly, once one recognizes the “principle” of things, one awakens the principle in one’s mind too; in other words, when we say that one recognizes the principle of external objects, we simply mean that one takes the principle in one’s own mind to mirror external objects. Third, through the accumulation of today’s investigation of one thing and tomorrow’s investigation of another, knowledge will achieve a sudden leap and eventually absolute truth can be grasped. Zhu Xi’s mysticism on this point is similar to the Zen School’s doctrine that “Buddhahood can be achieved through sudden enlightenment.” Moreover, the “principle” that Zhu Xi wants to grasp refers to feudalist moral principles, and consequently his epistemology is identical with ethics. Zhu emphasizes the mutual dependence of “the extension of knowledge” and “holding fast to seriousness” and the correspondence between deepening one’s understanding and practicing self-cultivation. Such an epistemology, on the whole, is mysterious, idealistic speculation. Furthermore, Zhu Xi’s theory of “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” is a methodology as well as an epistemology. According to him, the method for “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” can be roughly divided into three steps. The first step is a search for knowledge at the level of laws on the basis of extensive learning. Zhu Xi pays a great deal of attention to extensive learning, holding that a person who is ill-informed cannot be counted as erudite (Zhu 2010, vol. 14, p. 857). From human affairs to the natural world, from the most essential and most fundamental to the most trivial or mundane, everything should be investigated so as to know, first, why things and affairs are the way they are and, second, how things and affairs ought to be. In Zhu’s opinion, learning should not be content with erudition, but should move from erudition to essentials. Only in this way can a person possess extensive rather than fragmentary knowledge and essential rather than rough knowledge (Zhu 2010, vol. 6, p. 528). Zhu Xi’s ideas are significant, in that they both show respect for experience and acknowledge the importance of systematizing and analyzing experience so as to achieve a more profound form of knowledge. The second step consists in careful thinking and subtle discrimination based on analysis. In Zhu’s view, through extensive learning one can draw comparisons between the principles of things, and in so doing may raise some questions. Once a variety of questions arise as one reads books, one’s knowledge may make a great leap. That is to say, questions always promote thinking and discrimination. The art of thinking and discrimination mainly lies in analysis, as Zhu Xi says: “Knowledge is obtained through careful analysis’” (Zhu 2010, vol. 10, p. 315). His method of analysis has the following two aspects; one is an analysis of a whole into several parts, just like the dissection of an ox into several pieces so as to actually comprehend its physiological structure, and the other is an analysis of a thing into several levels so as to understand it step by step, which is like eating an apple—first paring off its skin, then eating its flesh, and even to the point of breaking its core by biting. Such an analytical method embodies some scientific spirit.

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The third step consists in reasoning through the combination of universality and particularity. In Zhu’s opinion, “investigating things to the utmost” does not mean investigating each and every thing in the world but instead means “comprehending them by analogy” (Zhu 2010, vol. 6, p. 528). His so-called analogy requires us first to comprehend the essence of a kind of thing, and then to extend that understanding so as to apply it to other, parallel kinds. It implies the integration of deduction and induction and of universality and particularity. That is to say: It is important to recognize both the fact that general principles are shared by the myriad things, and the fact that the nature and feelings of various things differ from one another.” According to Zhu Xi, one will achieve “a wide and far-reaching penetration” through such analogical reasoning. As a methodology, Zhu’s “investigation of things and extension of knowledge” requires people to make analysis and analogy on the basis of extensive learning, which contains a reasonable element of scientific abstraction. Nevertheless, he thinks of the role of abstraction in metaphysical (non-dialectical) terms, arguing that abstract concepts acquired through analysis and analogy belong to the unchangeable “principle” from which the whole world is derived. Thus what he constructs is an idealistic philosophical system.

8.4 The “Jing Gong New Learning” and the “Utilitarian Learning” as Opposed to the Chengs and Zhu Xi’s Doctrine of Principle During the Song dynasty, Wang Anshi’s “New Learning and Chen Liang and Ye Shi’s theory of “Utilitarian Learning,” appeared in opposition to the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle. The debates between Wang, Chen, and Ye on the one side and the Chengs and Zhu on the other side facilitated the development of philosophy. (1) Wang Anshi’s “Jing Gong New Learning” Wang Anshi (1021–1086), styled Jiefu and known as Banshan, was a native of Linchuan in Jiangxi Province. He launched political reforms with the aim of restoring the power and prosperity of the Northern Song, although he ultimately failed in this goal. His main extant works include the Wang Wengong Wenji (Collected Writings of Wang Anshi). His New Meaning of the Three Classics and other writings, serving as the theoretical basis for his proposed reforms, formed the so-called New Learning of Jing Gong. With the New Learning, Wang Anshi refutes Neo-Confucianists who stand in the way of of reform on the pretext of the Mandate of Heaven and ancestors; as he says: “Heavenly portents need not be feared, the examples of our ancestors need not be followed, and what most people say need not be worried about.” As to the debate on “principle and vital force,” Wang Anshi is opposed to the Cheng brothers’ monistic theory of principle, advocating instead the monistic theory

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of vital force. He says: “The Dao has its substance and function. So-called substance means that the primordial vital force is unmoved, and so-called function means that the permeating force moves between Heaven and Earth” (Wang 1979, p. 8). The substance of the Dao refers to the primordial vital force, which is divided into the yin and the yang along with the permeating force (冲气chong qi). These three forces further transform into the five agents and then the myriad things. This is a traditional naïve-materialistic theory of cosmology. However, when Wang Anshi considers substance as being “unmoved,” he separates it from function in essence. Nevertheless, Wang’s expositions of the motive force of movement and the transformation of the natural world contain some ideas that are dialectical. As he points out, the reason why a thing can move and change is that it “possesses a couple” (有藕you ou) within itself; for example, nature may be gentle or firm, a shape obscure or clear, an affair lucky or unlucky, and so on. Moreover, “there is another couple within a couple,” which is just the source of changes of the myriad things. Wang emphasizes that the change caused by contradictions is a process of new things continuously superseding old things. According to him, “the suppression of the old by the new” is a general developmental law of the natural world and human society. As a matter of course, Wang’s dialectics is incomplete. He says: “Only the sages have no opposites in the myriad things,” regarding “having no opposites” as the highest realm of life (Wang 1979, p. 4). As to the debate on “mind and matter/things (knowledge and action),” Wang Anshi is opposed to the Cheng brothers’ idealist apriorism. He says: “Mind is produced from vital force, and vital force is produced from the body,” holding that mind is dependent on a person’s body and affirming that matter is primary while mind secondary (Wang 1999, p. 243). In his opinion, a person at birth possesses powers of perception and thinking, as he says: “One can see with one’s eyes, hear with one’s ears, and think with one’s mind; all this is caused by nature” (Wang 1979, p. 51). However, only by means of one’s initiative can one develop one’s native capabilities, as Wang says again, “Eyes become sharp through seeing, ears become quick through hearing, and mind becomes ordered through thinking; all this is caused by human efforts” (Wang 1979, p. 40). A person’s wisdom and intelligence are acquired through learning, and social progress also relies on human efforts. As a matter of fact, Wang’s emphasis is on “action”, in opposition to the Chengs’ doctrine that “knowledge is prior while action posterior.” As to the debate on “Heaven and humankind (nature and habit)”, Wang Anshi is opposed to the Cheng brothers’ doctrine of “recovering nature.” He maintains that “habits will become one’s second nature.” Here, “second nature” refers to acquired virtue; as for innate nature, it does not possess morals such as humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness and therefore it does not vary in its goodness and evilness. In this way, Wang expresses opposition to the Cheng brothers’ views that “nature is the same as principle” and “physical nature has a difference of goodness and evilness” in their doctrine of “recovering nature.” In his view neither wisdom nor stupidity is inherently unchangeable: “Those who do good things persistently are called men of wisdom and those who do evil things persistently are called men of plain stupidity” (Wang 1999, p. 243). Although Wang emphasizes training

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and educating people through their “habitual practice” (Wang 1999, p. 253), he also notes the importance of “following their nature.” He proposes to “tame people by the Dao” (Wang 1999, p. 277). That is, to help people receive education completely voluntarily without a sense of enforcement, as natural as beasts happy with living in a howling wilderness, and fishes living in lakes. This shows that Wang Anshi pays a great deal of attention to the principle of voluntariness so far as education is concerned, which is quite different from the doctrine of “recovering nature,” which ignores this principle entirely. Wang Anshi’s New Learning criticizes Neo-Confucian idealism and exerts a certain influence on later anti-Confucian thinkers. (2) Chen Liang and Ye Shi’s “Utilitarian Learning” Chen Liang and Ye Shi were contemporaries of Zhu Xi. Chen Liang (1143–1194), who was styled Tongfu and whose childhood name was Runeng, was a native of Yongkang in Zhejiang Province and was often called Master Longchuan by scholars. His writings can be found in a book entitled the Longchuan Weiji (Collected Writings of Chen Liang). Ye Shi (1150–1223), styled Zhengze, was a native of Yongjia in Zhejiang and was often called Master Shuixin. Among his works are the Shuixin Ji (Collected Writings of Ye Shi) and Xixue Jiyan (Reading Notes). Both Chen Liang and Ye Shi use their theory of “Utilitarian Learning” to combat the Chengs’ and Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle. Chen Liang and Zhu Xi directly debate the problems of “govering in a kingly way and govering with might” and of “righteousness and profit.” In Zhu Xi’s opinion, the antagonism between governing in a kingly way and govering by might with regard to public affairs, and that between righteousness and profit, is the antagnonism between the principles of Heaven and human desires. In his view, the Three Dynasties (Xia, Shang, and Zhou) and before exclusively followed the principle of Heaven, and their age therefore saw the flourishing of kingly government, whereas subsequent dynasties, especially the Han and Tang dynasties, followed human desires exclusively, and their era therefore saw the suspension of the orthodox doctrine of Confucius and Mencius. Chen Liang, in contrast, maintains that it is wrong to think of governing in a kingly way, righteousness, and the principle of Heaven as conflicting with governing by might, profit, and human desires. Although the Three Dynasties followed kingly government, the people of these dynasties also had their own desires; without profit there would be no righteousness, and without utility there would be no principle of Heaven; and the principle of Heaven (Dao) finds expression in human pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy, and hate. As he says: “The Dao is nothing other than pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy, love, and hate, all attaining their appropriate expression” (Chen 1987, vol. 1, p. 101). As far as the debate on “Dao and instrument” is concerned, Zhu Xi holds that the principle of Heaven is an eternal and spiritual substance which transcends space and time. Chen Liang, on the contrary, argues that “the Dao is something operating within affairs and things,” and asks: “Is it conceivable for the cosmos to have anything extraneous to the Dao?” (Chen 1987, vol. 2, p. 361). Proceeding from his concept of the immanence of the Dao, Chen thinks that in the socio-historical realm we cannot

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“have Dao without people”; without people’s activities, there would be no “Dao of humankind” (Chen 1987, vol. 2, p. 110). However, he considers “the existence or absence of Dao” as “something that can be foreseen by people,” overemphasizing humankind’s subjective initiative and ultimately accepting a view with subjectiveidealistic elements. As to the debate on “knowledge and action,” Chen Liang pays the most attention to “action,” whereas Zhu Xi pays more attention to “knowledge.” While Zhu tries to teach people to be “pure Confucians” who sit all day long and cultivate themselves with seriousness, Chen wants to bring up heroes who “overwhelm the whole generation by their cleverness and bravery.” In Chen’s opinion, the cultivation of such talents must be made in action. He says: “one’s talents can be shown only in their use. We cannot rely on those who have talents but sit all day long” (Chen 1987, vol. 1, p. 3). Whether a person has real talents or not should be judged by what he or she does. Ye Shi also advocates “Utilitarian Learning” in a straightforward way. Those NeoConfucians such as the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi look upon Dong Zhongshu’s words as a dogma, that “one should pursue what is right or appropriate without consideration of any consequent benefit, and understand the Dao without consideration of any consequent utility” (Ye 1997, vol. 1, p. 324). But Ye Shi refutes this and says: “Since Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine, followed by the Confucians of later generations, does not advocate utility, his words about the moral principle are simply empty and useless,” explicitly asserting that the moral principle cannot be separated from utility (Ye 1997, vol. 1, p. 3). With regard to the relationship between “Dao and instrument,” Ye Shi points out that the Dao and the Ultimate (极ji) are non-existent beyond the concrete things spoken of by those orthodox Confucians. He says: “Where there are things, there is the Dao” and “Those who do not know things cannot reach the Dao” (Ye 1997, vol. 2, p. 702). He holds that the Dao cannot exist independently of things and that only after knowing concrete things can one achieve knowledge of the Dao. Meanwhile, Ye affirms that only after knowing the Dao can one summarize concrete things. Proceeding from the viewpoint of the inseparability of the Dao and concrete things, Ye Shi criticizes Zhu Xi for separating the Dao (or the Great Ultimate) and concrete things into “what exists before physical form” and “what exists after physical form,” thinking that “if ‘before physical form’ is spoken of without reference to ‘after physical form,’ then the Dao will remain in concealment more and more” (Ye 1997, vol. 2, p. 702). With regard to the debate on “mind and matter/things (knowledge and action),” Ye Shi explicitly criticizes the Neo-Confucianists who one-sidedly “respect the role of thinking and understanding and downplay the role of hearing and seeing.” In his opinion, Neo-Confucianistss focus only on practicing self-cultivation introspectively and completely lose contact with sense experience, “regarding the penetration of the mind as their doctrine and almost discarding what they see and what they hear” (Ye 2010, vol. 2, p. 603). According to him, the right way of knowing includes two components—the internal and the external. On the one hand, one should depend upon the sensory experiences provided by the ears and the eyes, since they can convey

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external information to the internal mind, and on the other hand one must rely on the conceptual thinking performed by the mind, since it can transform internal thinking into external conduct. The former is the foundation of the latter and their combination will lead to reliable knowledge (Ye 2010, vol. 1, p. 207). As to his conception of history, Ye Shi tries to explain history in terms of “timeliness (时shi)” or “tendency(势shi),” as opposed to Zhu Xi’s attempt to distinguish the Three Dynasties from the Han and Tang dynasties on the basis of their respective adherence to “the principle of Heaven” and “human desires.” Like Liu Zongyuan, Ye ascribes the rise and decline of social systems in history to tendencies, holding that both the social system of enfeoffment instituted during the Three Dynasties and the system of prefectures and counties instituted from the Qin and Han dynasties were determined by tendencies; furthermore, he held that the most important trait for a successful ruler is the ability to understand the dominant tendency in the world in his time and to act accordingly. A ruler of foresight, such as Emperor Gaozu (Liu Bang) of the Han dynasty or Emperor Taizong (Li Shimin) of the Tang dynasty, is successful because what he does is in conformity with the tendency of the development of history, and as a result of this conformity he is able to administer his state effectively. Like Chen Liang, however, Ye Shi maintains that “the existence or absence of the Dao” depends upon humankind, putting undue stress on humankind’s role in socio-historical development.

8.5 Wang Shouren’s System of Mind Monism Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle, along with the corresponding objective-idealistic system, encounters criticism from two sides—the materialist views advocated by Chen Liang and Ye Shi, and the subjective-idealistic views advocated by Lu Jiuyuan and others. Lu Jiuyuan (1139–1193), whose courtesy name was Zijing and who styled himself Cunzhai, was a native of Jinxi in Fuzhou (in present-day Jiangxi Province). His honorary title was “Master Xiangshan,” since he had lectured at the Temple of Xiangshan (Elephant Mountain) in Mount Yingtian in Jiangxi. His poems, essays, letters, and the sayings in his lectures were later compiled by his son into the Xiangshan Xiansheng Quanji (Complete Works of Lu Jiuyuan). Lu attached the label of the doctrine of mind to his thought and formed the other wing of NeoConfucianism, alongside Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle. The issues debated between Lu Jiuyuan and Zhu Xi chiefly concern the relationship between the Dao and concrete things and the method of learning (how to cultivate and educate people). With respect to the debate on “Dao and instrument,” Lu Jiuyuan criticizes Zhu Xi for separating the Dao and concrete things into the two categories of “what exists before physical form” and “what exists after physical form,” instead holding that the Dao is the same as concrete things and vice versa. The Dao and concrete things cannot be separated and the Dao lies in the movement and change of the yin and yang; as he says: “Outside of the Dao, there are no events, and outside of events, there is no

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Dao” (Lu 1980, p. 395). He thinks that the reason why the Dao and concrete things— and principle and events—cannot be separated is that they are united in the mind. He famously says that “The universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe,” as he regards everything in the universe as a manifestation of “mind” (Lu 1980, p. 273). Such a form of subjective idealism, taking “mind” as the original source of the universe, is indeed dissimilar to Zhu Xi’s view on which “principle” is the first principle of the universe. As to the problem of “the method of learning,” there is a debate between Lu Jiuyuan and Zhu Xi on “honoring one’s virtue” and “following the path of inquiry and study”. In Lu’s view, the method of understanding principle through “extensive reading,” emphasized by Zhu Xi, is fragmentary and overelaborate. Since “the mind is principle,” to cultivate and educate people is first of all to “discover their original mind” (Lu 1980, p.149); once they achieve consciousness, they can naturally understand “principle.” Accordingly, Lu Jiuyuan places greater emphasis on the power of will and the role of intuition. Being a bit crude, Lu Jiuyuan’s doctrine was not particularly influential during the periods of the Song and Yuan. The doctrine of mind did not become a mature philosophical system until, as the result of Wang Shouren’s exposition in the middle of the Ming dynasty, it broke the monopoly which the Chengs’ and Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle had enjoyed since the Southern Song dynasty. Wang Shouren (1472–1528), whose courtesy name was Bo’an, was a native of Yuyao (in present-day Zhejiang Province). He lived for a time in the Yangming cave in his hometown and was called Master Yangming. His writings were compiled into the Wang Wencheng Gong Quanji (Complete Works of Wang Shouren), among which there are two major philosophical works—the Daxue Wen (Inquiry on the Great Learning) and the Chuanxi Lu (Instructions for Practical Living). With respect to the debates on ““governing in a kingly way” and “governing by might”, “righteousness and profit,” and “principle and desire”, there are no major theoretical differences between Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Shouren, on the one hand, and the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, on the other hand. Wang says: “In learning to become a sage, the student needs only to get rid of selfish human desires and preserve the principle of Heaven” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 32). In his opinion, “the main barrier to getting rid of selfish human desires and preserving the principle of Heaven is people’s utilitarian orientation” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 62). According to Wang„ people must accept his doctrine of mind, which demands the “extension of innate knowledge”, as opposed to Buddhist and Daoist doctrines or Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle, in order to overcome the utilitarian orientation. As a result, Wang’s “doctrine of mind” appears among the various doctrines in opposition to the Chengs’ and Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle. Thus, on the one hand he criticizes the doctrine of principle in favor of a more thoroughgoing idealist theory, and, on the other hand, by challenging its dogmas, he inspires the unorthodox views later defended by Li Zhi and others. (1) “Outside of the Mind There Is No Principle” and “The Unity of Knowledge and Action”

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Wang Shouren sums up his thoughts with phrase of “the extension of innate knowledge” (致良知zhi liang zhi). He says: “the extension of innate knowledge is the gist of learning and the first principle of the teaching of the sage” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 80). Assuming a monistic view of mind, Wang integrates the problem of “principle and vital force (Dao and concrete things)” with the problem of “mind and matter/things (knowledge and action)” into the two sides of the problem of “the extension of innate knowledge.” He says: “Outside of the mind there is no affair, outside of the mind there is no principle, and therefore outside of the mind there is no learning” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 267). Here, so far as the original substance (“innate knowledge”) is concerned, “outside of the mind there is no affair” and “outside of the mind there is no principle,” and so far as practical effort (“extension of innate knowledge”) is concerned, “outside of the mind there is no learning.” The original substance and the effort are originally united since the effort is nothing but to “recover that original substance.” This is the main idea of Wang’s doctrine of “the extension of innate knowledge.” Below, let us analyze it in terms of original substance and effort respectively. Wang Shouren says: “Innate knowledge is the original substance of the mind.” Innate knowledge has three characterizations, which are different from one another but inter-connected (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 69). First, Wang says: Innate knowledge is nothing but the sense of right and wrong, and the sense of right and wrong is nothing but to love and to hate. Love and hatred encompass the entirety of the sense of right and wrong, and the sense of right and wrong applies to all affairs and their variations. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 126)

Thus he holds that “innate knowledge” can judge whether some conduct is right or wrong and make a choice between love and hate. Therefore, “innate knowledge” is nothing but “conscience” in the sense of ethics, namely, the subject of moral consciousness. Once “innate knowledge” grasps moral norms and standards, it can form its correct judgment of what is right and what is wrong and what is good and what is evil in numerous and complicated human affairs and their variations, and then make its choice. Second, Wang says: Innate knowledge is where the principle of Heaven is clear and intelligent. Therefore innate knowledge is identical with the principle of Heaven. Thinking is the emanation and function of innate knowledge; whatever one thinks about is the principle of Heaven. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 81)

Thus he holds that “innate knowledge” is “innate principle”. Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Shouren’s doctrine of mind often says that “mind is the same as principle,” arguing that the essence and connotation of the mind is identical with “the principle of Heaven,” namely, the principle endowed by Heaven or innate principle, and that “innate knowledge” is in the perception and consciousness of “the principle of Heaven.” If thinking is not contaminated by “private wishes” but is instead “the emanation and function of innate knowledge,” then the content of what one thinks is just “the principle of Heaven.” Third, Wang says: Innate knowledge is the spirit of creation. This spirit produces Heaven and Earth, spiritual beings, and the God. They all come from it. Truly nothing can be opposed to it. If people

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can recover it in its totality without the least deficiency, then they will surely be more than satisfied. I do not know if there is anything in the world happier than this. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 119)

Innate knowledge is the original substance to which nothing is opposed, and people’s cognitive and practical activities are aimed at returning to this original substance. And Wang Shouren’s three characterizations of “innate knowledge” are mutually connected. He generalizes feudalist morals metaphysically into “the principle of Heaven”; “the principle of Heaven” is something inherent in people’s “innate knowledge”; and “innate knowledge” is the original substance which produces the myriad things. Taking “innate knowledge” as “the original substance of the mind,” Wang Shouren stresses that “outside of the mind there are no affairs” and “outside of the mind there is no principle.” According to him, the mind is the master of the body, and when the pure intelligence and clear consciousness of the mind are not obscured by human material desires, they are innate knowledge in the original sense. When this innate knowledge as the subject of consciousness is influenced by things and events and responds to them, there will be a variety of mental or intentional activities, which find expression in things and events; as Wang says: “For the intention to function, there must be the thing in which it is to function, and the thing is an event” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 53). “Innate knowledge” is the substance of the intention and the thing or event is the functioning of the intention; therefore, “outside of the mind there is no affair” and “outside of the mind there is nothing” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 32). Again, Wang says: “Outside of the mind there is no principle.” With respect to the two sayings of the Chengs and Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle—“The mind possesses a multitude of principles” and “What is inherent in a thing is principle”—Wang Shouren agrees to the former and disagrees with the latter. He says: “The word ‘mind’ should be added to the saying to mean that when the mind is engaged in a thing, there is principle”, thinking that the “principle” of a thing comes from “innate knowledge” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 137). This is similar to Kant’s view that “the understanding is itself the lawgiver of nature.” However, what Kant speaks of is the causal necessity of the natural world, while what Wang speaks of is the feudalist moral norm.. As far as the debate on “Dao and concrete things” is concerned, Zhu Xi emphasizes that “there is a clear distinction between the Dao and concrete things,” whereas what is stressed by Wang Shouren is that principle and vital force, or Dao and concrete things, are united in the mind. In Wang’s view, the universal operation of “innate knowledge” is “vital force,” and the order of “innate knowledge” is “principle”; vital force and principle are inseparable and they are both the properties of the single mind. On the one hand, Wang says with emphasis: “My clear intelligence is the master of Heaven and Earth and spiritual beings,” raising “my clear intelligence” to the level of the Creator and thus revealing his subjective-idealistic commitments (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 141). And, on the other hand, he says: “Separated from Heaven, Earth, spiritual beings and the myriad things, there will be no clear intelligence either. Thus they are all permeated with one vital force. How can they be separated?” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 141). This reveals the pantheistic elements of his view.

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When Wang Shouren carries his subjective idealism to extremes, he slips into solipsism. There is a well-known dialogue between Wang and one of his friends, which is recorded in the Instructions for Practical Living. It reads: The Teacher was roaming in Nanzhen. A friend pointed to flowering trees on a cliff and said, “[You say] there is nothing under Heaven external to the mind. These flowering trees on the high mountain blossom and drop their blossoms of themselves. What have they to do with my mind?” The Teacher says: “Before you look at these flowers, they and your mind are in the state of silent vacancy. As you come and look at them, their colors at once show up clearly. From this you can know that these flowers are not external to your mind.” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 141; trans. Chan 1963, p. 685)

According to Wang, since colors cannot exist independently of human sense, there is nothing under Heaven external to the mind. So far as his pantheist inclination is concerned, however, it may be said that Wang’s stand is already close to materialism. Wang says: The eye has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the colors of all things. The ear has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the sounds of all things. The nose has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the smells of all things. The mouth has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the tastes of all things. The mind has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the right or wrong of the influences and responses of Heaven, Earth, and all things. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 141; trans. Chan 1963, p. 685)

What he emphasizes here is that the mind is not transcendent; on the contrary, it is immanent in the influences and responses of all things. Some later thinkers, such as Liu Zongzhou, Huang Zongxi, Yan Yuan, and the like, accept and deepen Wang’s pantheist view, further developing the materialist elements. So far as the aspect of effort in his doctrine of “the extension of innate knowledge” is concerned, Wang Shouren emphasizes that “outside of the mind there is no learning,” and accordingly advances his theory of “the unity of knowledge and action.” In his opinion, in Zhu Xi’s doctrine of knowledge and action, “knowledge and action have been separated because people seek principles outside the mind.” According to Wang, “the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action of the Confucian school means seeking principles in the mind” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 48). Influenced by Zhu Xi’s doctrine that “one must know before one can act,” many people discuss and learn knowledge first, saying, “We wait until we truly know before we put our knowledge into practice.” But, in fact, “to the last day of life, they will never act and also will never know,” says Wang Shouren (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 5). It is in order to correct this abuse that Wang puts forth the doctrine of “the unity of knowledge and action” (知行合一zhi xing he yi). The effort of “the unity of knowledge and action,” to Wang Shouren, is to strive to “recover that original substance,” and so far as the original substance is concerned, knowledge and action are originally united. He takes the example of a person “loving beautiful colors” to support his argument, saying: Seeing beautiful colors appertains to knowledge, while loving beautiful colors appertains to action. However, as soon as one sees that beautiful color, one has already loved it. It is not

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that one sees it first and then makes up one’s mind to love it. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 5; trans. Chan 1963, p. 669)

What Wang describes here is a kind of intuitive and instinctive activity; as soon as one has knowledge, one responds through action immediately. According to Wang, not only one’s instinctive activities but also all humankind’s complex activities and purposeful efforts embody the unity of knowledge and action. He says: “Knowledge in its genuine and earnest aspect is action, and action in its intelligent and discriminating aspect is knowledge” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 47). Again, “Knowledge is the direction for action and action the effort of knowledge, and knowledge is the beginning of action and action the completion of knowledge” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 5). That is to say, every purposeful human activity is a process in which knowledge and action are combined into one, and this process begins with ideas that are the directions for action. Nevertheless, this does not mean that knowledge is prior to action. For example, although one must have the desire to travel before one knows the road and the desire to travel is the beginning of action, whether the road is rough or smooth cannot be known until one has traversed it. Therefore, true knowledge is completed in action. There are some rational elements in Wang Shouren’s doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action due to its opposition to the separation of knowledge from action. But, in fact, for Wang, the unity of knowledge and action is based on knowledge, and action should be attributed to knowledge. He says: “When a thought is aroused it is already action,” holding that an aroused thought (intention or motive) is already the beginning of action (Wang 2011, vol. 1, pp. 109–110). It is obvious that Wang denies the objective and social practical significance of action. The content of his so-called knowledge is nothing more than the self-consciousness of feudal ethics and morality, and his so-called action is nothing but the implementation of such ethics and morality. In addition, Wang Shouren discusses the problem of “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” in light of his view that “outside of the mind there is no learning.” He disagrees with Zhu Xi’s doctrine of the “investigation of principle in things to the utmost as we come in contact with them” and offers another explanation of “the investigation of things.” He says: “To investigate is to rectify. It is to rectify that which is incorrect so that it can return to its original correctness” (Inquiry on the Great Learning), and argues that “the word ge [investigation] in the term of gewu [the investigation of things] is the same as the ge in Mencius’ saying that ‘a great man rectified [ge] the ruler’s mind” (Instructions for Practical Living, pt. 1). That is to say, the investigation of things is the same as “the rectification of the mind,” which is the activity of cultivating good and removing evil from the mind. In Wang’s view, cognition is nothing more than awakening one’s own “innate knowledge,” the sole business of learning is “extending innate knowledge,” and “extending knowledge” is the same as reinforcing “innate knowledge;” as he says, “to extend the innate knowledge of mind is the matter of the extension of knowledge, and for all things to attain their principle (or orderliness) is the matter of the investigation of things”. Here, the word “extend” not only means “reach,” but also has an implication of “carrying out

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knowledge into affairs and things”; therefore, Wang’s “extension of knowledge and investigation of things” covers the meaning of “the unity of knowledge and action.” The view that “the investigation of things” is identical with “the rectification of the mind” represents a kind of subjective-idealistic theory of knowledge. However, Wang stresses that the standards of right and wrong are included in “innate knowledge.” As he says: “Your innate knowledge is your own standard. When you direct your thought your innate knowledge knows that it is right if it is right and wrong if it is wrong. You cannot keep anything from it” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 105). The “innate knowledge” in the mind is the sole standard for judging whether words are right or not, regardless of whose mouth they come from. The important thing in learning is to acquire learning through the exercise of the mind. If words are examined in the mind and found to be wrong, although they have come from the mouth of Confucius, I dare not accept them as correct (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 85). Such a view is destructive to tradition. Li Zhi, a later philosopher, extends it and says, “Do not take Confucius’ standard as the standard of right and wrong.” Wang Shouren attaches primary importance to “the extension of innate knowledge” so as to oppose the exclusive dominance of the Chengs’ and Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle. Objectively, his doctrine plays a role in challenging feudalist dogmas and constitutes a link in the whole chain of philosophical development. But, at the same time, he goes to the other extreme, considering reading, writing, and gaining experience as “riding a hobby that saps one’s will to make progress”. Consequently, Wang Shouren’s doctrine of mind in its later development became more and more like empty talk and finally led to obscurantism. (2) The Speculative Method of the Developmental Process of “One Principle” and the Method of Cultivating Virtues Lu Jiuyuan has a low opinion of to Zhu Xi’s analytical method, saying: “It is a great fault for students to be thirsty for analysis and discrimination.” Wang Shouren agrees with him, holding that “the more carefully the principle is analyzed, the more fragmented and isolated its learning becomes” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 257). Like Lu, who upholds monism, Wang thinks that the main point is to grasp the “one principle,” since “ten thousand principles” are the manifestations of the “one principle.” For this reason, Wang lays emphasis on “one,” “concentrating on one thing,” or “forming a unity” in his speculative method. As to the “one,” can people comprehend it through concepts or express it through words? In Wang Shouren’s opinion, if one truly wants to understand the state in which “the human mind and the principle of Heaven are undifferentiated,” one must rely on one’s personal experience” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 13). It is just as “a mute person cannot tell you about the bitterness of the bitter melon he or she has just eaten. If you want to know the bitterness, you have to eat a bitter melon yourself” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 42). However, it is still necessary, for Wang, to make an analysis and discrimination by concepts in order to understand that “principle is one.” In fact, Wang pays a great deal of attention to the way in which the connections between concepts reveal absoluteness. For instance, he says:

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Principle is one and no more. In terms of its condensation and concentration in the individual, it is called nature. In terms of the master of this accumulation, it is called mind. In terms of its emanation and operation under the master, it is called thought. In terms of the clear consciousness of the emanation and operation, it is called knowledge. And in terms of the stimuli and responses of this clear consciousness, it is called things. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, pp. 86–87)

Such instances concerning definitions of concepts are too numerous to mention in Wang’s writings. In his view, the spiritual substance is absolute and unique, but it can be defined from different angles, that is, it can be described according to the connections between different concepts. We can see here that Wang Shouren starts from his monistic viewpoint of mind and proceeds to define those concepts of human nature, mind, thought, knowledge, and things in terms of their connections. Even though different concepts are interconnected and form a unity, and principles are described in minute and complete detail, Wang thinks that we cannot regard this as a “rigid pattern” but must instead act “according to the circumstances” in order to grasp “one principle” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 23). In accordance with such a view, Wang puts forth the following well-known argument: A history deals with events while a classic deals with principles. However, events are really principles and principles are really events. Thus the Spring and Autumn Annals also is a classic, whereas the other five classics are also histories. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 11)

In short, “the six classics are all histories.” This not only lowers the hallowed position of the six classics but also implies that the Confucian classics must be viewed with a historical attitude and understood as the products of particular historical conditions. Wang says: “The six classics present a record of my mind. The reality of the six classics resides in my mind” and “The six classics are nothing other than the constant Dao in my mind” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 284). That is to say, the six classics embody a historical process in which the substance of the mind unfolds itself. According to Wang Shouren, the growth of an individual’s wisdom is also a developmental process of the substance of the mind. There is a dialogue between a student and Wang: “I asked, ‘What should one do when one finds no progress in knowledge?’ The Teacher said, ‘In study there must be a source. One must work from the source and gradually move forward’” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 284). This is similar to the growth of an infant. When the baby is still in its mother’s womb, it is “small but complete in all respects” and already possesses a source for developing. After its birth and progress through several developmental stages, the “source” originally possessed by the fetus is fully developed. Similarly, in study one must work from one’s “source,” that is, work hard at “extending innate knowledge” so as to seek one’s own substance of the mind. Still, the development and growth of the substance of the mind must undergo a process. Wang Shouren’s remarks, as described above, are idealist on the whole, but they constitute an important link in the progressive movement of philosophy, since Wang sets “forming a unity” against Zhu Xi’s “analysis and discrimination” and conceives of the development of principle as a gradual process. Wang Shouren’s speculative method of comprehending “one principle” in its historical development is at once a method of developing a worldview and a method

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of cultivating human virtue. The view that one must strive to “recover human nature” by way of “preserving the principle of Heaven and extinguishing human desires” is shared by the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan, and Wang Shouren. Unlike Zhu, however, Lu and Wang do not analyze the links of “the method of learning” one by one, but stress that the point of the method of the sage is to resort to the inner world. Meanwhile, this effort of “extending innate knowledge” through the inner mind, in Wang’s view, has to undergo a developmental process. He often likens the process of cultivating a person to that of planting a tree. He says: The love between father and son and between elder and younger brothers is the starting point of the human mind’s spirit of life, just like the sprout of the tree. From here it is extended to humaneness to all people and love of all things. It is just like the growth of the trunk, branches, and leaves. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 16; trans. Chan 1963, p. 676)

This shows that the cultivation of a person’s virtues progresses from filial piety and fraternal duty to “humaneness to all people and love for all things.” Again, he says: “In discussing learning with others we should also do so according to their capacity. For instance, when the tree has sprouted only a little, give it a little water. As the sprout grows, give it more water” (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 30). This shows that the gradual accumulation of a person’s knowledge is a result of uninterrupted education. In Wang’s view, a person’s lofty aspirations also undergo a process from the beginning to full realization through cultivation; as he says: If students make up their minds to have one thought to do good, their minds will be like the seeds of a tree. If only they neither force it to grow nor neglect it, but keep on cultivating and nourishing it, the tree will naturally grow larger every day and night. Its vitality will be increasingly great and its branches and leaves more luxuriant. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 37)

As a matter of course, the developmental processes of a person’s virtues, knowledge, and aspirations all belong to the growing process of the same substance of the mind. Since Wang Shouren’s doctrine of “the unity of knowledge and action” permeates his method of cultivating virtue, this method embodies the unity of reason and will and the unity of the principle of consciousness and the principle of voluntariness. He pays a great deal of attention to the power of will, likening “making up one’s mind” to “planting the roots of a tree”; as he says: In study one must make up one’s mind first. If one does not do so, one cannot accomplish anything though one may work hard. This is just like planting a tree. If you do not plant its roots first, your labors will be fruitless even though you cultivate and nourish it and give it water. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 289)

Meanwhile, he holds that “once it is realized that the highest good is in the mind and does not depend on anything external, the mind will have definite direction” (Wang 2011, vol. 2, p. 1068). The orthodox School of Principle always preaches fatalism and neglects the principle of voluntariness, but Wang Shouren corrects this inclination to some extent, owing to his great attention to the power of will. According to Wang, the education of a person should be accomplished according to his ability (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 24). In this way, one will not feel that education is an imposition,

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and one will be able to accept education out of one’s own free will. For instance, the education of children must be carried out according to their physical and mental characteristics. He says: Generally speaking, it is the nature of young children to love to play and to dislike restriction. Like plants beginning to sprout, if they are allowed to grow freely, they will develop smoothly. If oppressed and interfered with, they will wither and decline. In teaching young children, we must make them lean toward uplifting themselves so that they will be happy and cheerful at mind, and then nothing can check their development. (Wang 2011, vol. 1, p. 99)

Such a teaching method contains some reasonable elements. However, these elements are associated with the apriorist theory that the substance of the mind is already complete in all respects. Wang Shouren’s monistic system of mind, because it challenged the exclusive dominance of the Chengs’ and Zhu Xi’s doctrine of principle, encouraged the rise of the “heretical” thought in opposition to the orthodox doctrine of principle.

8.6 Li Zhi’s “Heretical” Thoughts With the prevalence of Wang Shouren’s doctrine of mind, there emerged some schools of thought, among which was the Taizhou School which was considered heretical by those who adhered to the contemporary orthodox. The school defended a claim— “The daily use of the common people is the Dao,” which openly supported “profit and desire” and opposed the idea of “preserving the principle of Heaven and extinguishing human desires.” Meanwhile, the school made another claim, i.e., “Destiny is created by me”, opposing voluntarism to Neo-Confucian fatalism. Under the ideological influence of the Taizhou School, Li Zhi’s “heretical” thought came into being. Li Zhi (1527–1602), whose courtesy name was Zhuowu or Hongfu and who was also known as Lay Buddhist Wenling, was a native of Jinjiang in Quanzhou (in present-day Fujian Province). He acknowledged some scholars of the Taizhou School as his teachers. In his later years, he began to believe in Buddhism. He was often persecuted by rulers of the Ming dynasty for his ideas, which differed from the orthodox feudalist thought; finally, he was driven to commit suicide in prison. His important works are Book Burning, Supplement to Book Burning, Book Holding, and Supplement to Book Holding. Considering himself to be a “heretic,” Li Zhi condemns Neo-Confucian scholars as hypocrites who “outwardly pursue the Dao but inwardly seek wealth and rank, dress themselves in Confucian robes but act like dogs and swine” (Li 2011, p. 584). This is a continuation of Wang Chong and Ji Kang’s critical spirit, but also reflects the new spirit of its age. He says: “All contacts between persons in the world are in order to do business in the marketplace” (Li 2011, p. 585). Neo-Confucian moralists pose as persons of high morals but in fact their minds are set on doing business and making more money. Li Zhi’s exposure of the hypocrisy of Neo-Confucianism reflects the increasingly capitalist orientation of the burghers, though in an indirect way.

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Li Zhi’s philosophical theory fails to fully escape the limitations of Wang Shouren’s doctrine of mind, since he also regards the “mind” as the original source of the world. He says: Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things “are all only a few things in my wonderful, clear, and pure mind,” holding that “all things in the world are external manifestations of the mind” (Li 2011, p. 230). Despite this, Li advances some “heretical” thoughts not in conformity with the orthodox feudalist doctrine. Li Zhi opposes his view that “people must be selfish” to the Neo-Confucian doctrine of “preserving the principle of Heaven and extinguishing human desires.” He says: “Selfishness is the mind of humankind. People must be selfish so that what is in their minds can be made known,” believing that selfishness is a natural human instinct and is unavoidable even for sages such as Confucius (Li 1974, p. 544). This view pertains to the theory of human nature in the abstract, but has progressive significance insofar as it opposes Neo-Confucian asceticism. With respect to the debate on “principle and vital force (Dao and instrument),” Li Zhi adopts a critical attitude toward the Cheng-Zhu view that “principle is prior to vital force” and “the Dao resides outside of affairs.” In his opinion, the genesis of all things in the world depends upon the antithetical relationship between the vital forces of yin and yang, just like a baby is given birth by a male and a female, and there is no “Great Ultimate” at all. Principle is not the beginning of things and things cannot be produced from “Nothingness.” Li says: “I speak only of the duality of male and female, not of the ‘One’ or of ‘principle.’ And if I speak not of the One, how much less would I speak of Nothingness; and if not of Nothingness, how much less of No-Nothingness” (Li 2009, p. 1). In addition, Li levels criticisms at the NeoConfucian theory of “the tradition of the Dao.” According to this theory, there is an eternal Dao transcending history. But, in Li’s view, there is no “Dao” that is divorced from social history; as he says: Dao existing in humankind is just like water existing in land. Humankind seeking the Dao is just like discovering water through digging the land. Just as all water is in store in the land, so every person holds the Dao. (Li 1974, p. 517)

According to Li, the relationship between the “Dao” and humankind is similar to that between water and land; there is neither any “Dao” that is independent of a particular human society nor any human society that is without “Dao.” As a result, the Neo-Confucian view that “the tradition of Confucianism” had been disrupted after the death of Mencius is “an utterly absurd fallacy” (Li 1974, p. 517). Because the “Dao” cannot be divorced from the history of human society, it varies from time to time in accordance with historical changes in human society. It is ridiculous that Neo-Confucians sing high praise of the Three Dynasties and attempt to use the “Dao” of that time to serve the world of today, in the same way as one who cuts a mark on the side of one’s boat to indicate the place where one’s sword has dropped into the river. As far as the debate on “mind and matter/things (knowledge and action)” is concerned, Li Zhi accepts Wang Shouren’s doctrine of “the extension of innate knowledge” and further advances his own doctrine of the “childlike mind.” He says: “The childlike mind is nothing but a pure mind” (Li 2009, p. 172). Here, the childlike mind

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is identical with “innate knowledge” as well. Everybody has a “childlike mind” and can at birth make a clear distinction between right and wrong and between true and false. Once “one loses one’s childlike mind,” says Li, “one loses one’s pure mind. And once one loses one’s pure mind, one loses one’s true character” (Li 2009, p. 172). Actually, people often lose their “childlike minds” in reality; this occurs as a result of reading Confucian classics and learning “moral principles.” In order to protect the “childlike mind” from being lost, Li Zhi argues, people must not regard Confucian classics as the standard for judging what is right and what is wrong. This involves the problem of the relativity of truth. According to Wang Shouren, “innate knowledge” is the standard in one’s own mind. “If words are examined in the mind and found to be wrong, although they have come from the mouth of Confucius, I dare not accept them as correct,” says Wang. Li develops this view, holding that, like the periodical alternation of day and night, rights and wrongs vary from time to time, and therefore one should not obstinately cling to Confucius’ dogmas and take Confucius’ standard as one’s own, but should judge right and wrong according to one’s “innate knowledge” and “childlike mind.” Li says: “Each person Heaven gives birth to will have his or her own individual function and he or she does not need to learn this from Confucius” (Li 2009, p. 42). He considers his own Book Holding to be a text on “the judgments of right and wrong for hundreds of years,” but readers are free to interpret it differently, so long as they do not judge by Confucius’ orthodox texts (Li 2009, p. 27). In expressing his opposition to the view that Confucius is the embodiment of truth, Li contributed to the intellectual emancipation that was ongoing in his time. Nevertheless, he overemphasizes the relativity of truth; as he says: “No fixed quality was reached in a person’s initial judgments of right and wrong, and no final conclusion was reached on a person’s judgments of right and wrong” (Li 2009, p. 1). To him, everybody has his or her own standard, and different standards of right and wrong can coexist without coming into conflict. This is indeed a relativistic view. Li Zhi goes on to develop the view that “the everyday needs of the people are identical with the Dao,” advocated by the Taizhou School, and says that “to wear clothing and eat food—these are the principles of human relations” (Li 2009, p. 21). Accordingly, he stresses recognizing the original mind from the daily needs of the common people, thus awakening “innate knowledge.” He also says that just from observing the everyday needs of the people, he himself has learned that everybody has the same desire for “seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages” (Li 2009, p. 80). Li Zhi’s thoughts show a “heretical” tendency against the orthodox feudalist thought in their criticisms of Neo-Confucianism, authoritarianism, and dogmatism. However, all these criticisms are based on taking “mind” (will) as the first principle, and this leads to a bias in favor of voluntarism. Li’s assertion that the desire for advantages is “caused by Heaven” and his incitement to disorderly behavior have an unfavorable effect upon society.

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References Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chen, Liang. 1987. Collected Works of Chen Liang, ed. Liu Gongchun. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Cheng, Yi, and Hao Cheng. 2004. Collected Works of the Cheng Brothers, ed. Wang Xiaoyu. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Li, Zhi. 1974. Books to Hide. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Li, Zhi. 2009. Collection of Comments by the Pond of Dragon. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Li, Zhi. 2011. Annotated Edtion of Books to Burn and Supplement to Books to Burn. Annot. Chen Renren. Changsha: Yue Lu Publishing House. Lu, Jiuyuan. 1980. Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan, ed. Zhong Zhedian. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Shao, Yong. 2010. Collected Works of Shao Yong, ed. Guo Yu. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Theodore, De Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and Burton Watson. 1965. Sources of Chinese Tradition. New York: Columbia University Press. Wang, Anshi. 1979. Wang Anshi’s Commentary on the Daode Jing, ed. Rong Zhaozu. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wang, Anshi. 1999. Complete Works of Wang Anshi, ed. Qing Ke. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House. Wang, Shouren. 2011. Complete Works of Wang Yangming, ed. Wu Guang. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House. Ye, Shi. 1997. Reading Notes. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Ye, Shi. 2010. Collected Works of Ye Shi, ed. Liu Gongchun. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhang, Zai. 1978. Collected Works of Zhang Zai, ed. Zhang Xichen. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhou, Dunyi. 2009. Collected Works of Zhou Dunyi, ed. Chen Keming. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhu, Xi. 2010. Complete Works of Zhu Xi, vol. 14, ed. Zhu Jieren. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House and Heifei: Anhui Education Publishing House.

Chapter 9

The Summing-Up Stage of Ancient Chinese Philosophy

Chinese feudal society had entered its final phase by the time of the transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasty. Its internal contradictions were at the point of exploding. Slogans used during the late Ming peasant uprising called for the fair allocation of land and freedom from grain taxes, challenging the most fundamental elements of feudal land control. Already in the mid-Ming, the sprouts of capitalism were growing in tough places; Neo-Confucianism, which occupied a position of authority, was exposed as decadent. This shows that, while Chinese feudal society had not yet collapsed, it had already entered a historical stage of self-criticism. During this period, a group of progressive thinkers appeared, with Wang Fuzhi (d. 1692), Huang Zongxi (d. 1695), and Gu Yanwu (d. 1682) as the major representatives. In their criticism of Neo-Confucianism, these thinkers took it upon themselves to put forth summaries of classical Chinese philosophy. By the transition of the Ming and Qing dynasties, classical Chinese philosophy had already had a history of thousands of years. At the center of philosophical debate were pre-Qin arguments on the relationship and distinctions between “Heaven and humans” (天人tian ren) and “names and actualities” (名实ming shi). These were developed, in the Song and Ming dynasties, to “principles and vital force (理气li qi) (or the Dao and concrete things [道器dao qi])” and “mind and matter/things” (心物xin wu) (or knowledge and action [知行zhixing]). In providing a summary of classical Chinese philosophy, progressive thinkers during the transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasty first criticized Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, which was a summarizing critique of “principles and vital force (or the Dao and concrete things)” and “mind and matter/things (or knowledge and action).” During Song-Ming times, there were various accounts of the distinction between “principles and vital force” and “mind and matter/things”, and three philosophical schools were formed. There were qi (vital force) monists, principle monists, and mind monists. Zhang Zai (d. 1077) is the most notable representative of the first school; the Cheng brothers—Cheng Hao Translator’s note The introduction and first three sections of this chapter were translated by Paul J. D’Ambrosio. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_9

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(d. 1085) and Cheng Yi (d. 1107)—and Zhu Xi (d. 1200) the second; and Wang Yangming (d. 1529) and Lu Jiuyuan (d. 1192) the third. In advancing their summaries, Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi, and Gu Yanwu primarily conducted investigations and criticisms of these schools. So they developed their thought with debates around “principles and vital force” and “mind and matter/things”. Similarly, they comprehensively investigated the relationship between “Heaven and humans,” which had evolved to include destiny or fate (命ming) and power or will-power (力li), as well as nature (性xing) and practice (习xi), and also the relationship between “names and actualities,” which had evolved to include language (言yan) and meaning (意yi), and phenomena (象xiang) and the Dao. Additionally, their criticisms of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism did, on a certain level, criticize the essence of feudal absolutism, and even included some new ideas about democracy. No thinkers before them had ever had such ideas.

9.1 Wang Fuzhi’s Summary of the Debate over “Principle and Vital Force (The Dao and Concrete Things)” and “Mind and Matter/Things (Knowledge and Action)”—A System of Qi Monism Unifying Naïve Materialism and Naïve Dialectics Wang Fuzhi, whose courtesy name was Ernong and whose literary name was Jiangzhai, was born in Hengyang in Hunan Province. In his later years, he lived at the foot of Chuanshan Mountain, and was known as Mr. Chuanshan. After the collapse of the Ming dynasty, he became a hermit and wrote about philosophy, as well as history, literature, economics, astronomy, calendrical science, geography, and other subjects. His works were collected at the end of the Qing dynasty in the book Chuanshan yishu (Collected Works of Chuanshan). Wang Fuzhi heavily criticized Zhu Xi’s notion of “preserving Heavenly principles and extinguishing human desires.” In his commentary on the Analects, Wang Fuzhi writes, “achieving various desires is in great unity with Heavenly principles” (Wang 2011, vol. 6 p. 640). In other words, we cannot talk about “Heavenly principles” without recognizing “human desires,” and “Heavenly principles” are within “human desires.” “Heavenly principles” speak to everyone’s desires being reasonably satisfied. In this way, Wang argues that a reasonable society should “equalize everything in the world.” Wang writes, “Peace in the world is equalizing the world” (Wang 2011, vol. 3 p. 472). This “equalizing the world” is, most importantly, directed at the suppression of annexing lands. Similarly, Wang Fuzhi also proposed theories criticizing feudalistic absolutism and Legalism. He lists Laozi (d. 531 BCE) and Zhuangzi (d. 286 BCE); Buddhism; and Shen Buhai (d. 337 BCE) and Han Feizi (d. 233 BCE) as the three greatest harms of ancient and contemporary times: “above there was Shen and Han, below there must be Buddhism and Laozi” (Wang 2011, vol. 10 p. 653). In other words, Shen and Han promoted the tyrannical abuse of power (above), ordinary

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people felt the danger everywhere, therefore they talked about empty and mysterious things, using Buddhism and Daoism as outlets for comfort (below). Wang Fuzhi’s criticism of Legalism differs from that of the Neo-Confucians. The Neo-Confucians used the flag of moralism to reject Legalists’ utilitarianism, but Wang Fuzhi rejected the tyranny of Legalism. Neo-Confucians wanted to use moralism to disguise and ultimately preserve this tyrannical aspect. Philosophically, Wang Fuzhi, starting with vital-force monism, makes a fairly accurate summary of the debates on “principles and vital force (理气li qi) (or the Dao and concrete things” and “mind and matter/things (心物xin wu) (or knowledge and action).” Through this he arrives at a unification of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics. In summarizing Song-Ming philosophical arguments, Wang actually also summarizes all of classical Chinese philosophy. Through criticisms and summary, Wang describes the vital-energy monistic system in a more mature form, making creative contributions to the theory of the Dao of Heaven, the theory of the Dao of human beings, epistemology, and logic, etc. (1) Summarizing the Debate on Principles and Vital Force (the Dao and Concrete Things) Wang Fuzhi’s summary and criticism of the debate on principles and vital force (or the Dao and concrete things), which took vital-force monism as a starting point, made a significant contribution to perspectives on the Dao of Heaven (天道tian dao). Wang Fuzhi developed Zhang Zai’s vital-force monism. Wang agreed with Zhang that, even in emptiness or non-presence, there is vital force; he used the interaction ( 絪缊yin yun) between yin and yang to describe the root of vital force, and the coming together and being scattered (聚散ju san) to describe the relationship between the root and all things. Wang writes: “Yin and yang, the two vital energies, fill the cosmos, and there is nothing outside this” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 26). In other words, vital force is the only substance, there is nothing besides vital force, and everything is composed of this material vital force. Vital force itself never changes, but the interactions of yin and yang produce change and transformation. Wang writes that “when they come together things are born” and “when they are scattered things return to the cosmos” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 19). This is a rejection of the Buddhist view that phenomena are illusions, and of the idea held by the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi that “vital force can be generated and destroyed”—both of which are flawed theories. Instead, Wang is providing a philosophical argument that substance cannot be destroyed. Wang Fuzhi also uses the ideas that “principles are within vital force” and “the Dao is not separate from concrete things” to refute the idealist views of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, who argued that “principle is prior to vital force” and “the Dao is prior to concrete things.” Wang writes that “vital force is what principles rely upon” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 419). Here, we see that Wang believes that principles depend on vital force for their existence. There is no principle that is beyond substance or space and time. The Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi use “above forms”1 (形而上xing 1

Translator’s note: “Form” here refers to actual shape, and has nothing to do with the Platonic notion of “forms”.

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er shang)2 and “within forms” (形而下xing er xia) to distinguish between principle and vital force, and between the Dao and concrete things. They argue that the Dao is empty, whereas concrete things are real or actual. First there was the Dao, above forms, and then there were concrete things, which reside within forms. Wang Fuzhi makes the exact opposite claim, saying that “the Dao is substance and concrete things are empty” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1027). In other words, the Dao depends on concrete things and affairs, and is thereby real or actual. In turn, concrete things and affairs can be abstracted through rational thinking. Wang Fuzhi also says: “In the world, there are only concrete things. The Dao is the Dao of concrete things” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1027). Clearly, this points to all things in the world as concrete substances; principles exist within things and cannot be separated from them. Thus, there is no “Dao” that exists before manifest things. The debate on principles and vital force (or the Dao and concrete things) is a development of the debate on “being and non-being” (有无you wu) (and movement and stillness[动静dongjing]). Laozi began to argue that non-being generates being, taking vacuity-stillness as the first principle of the world. Later, Buddhism, and then the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan, and Wang Yangming all take vacuitystillness as the first principle. Wang Fuzhi criticizes this, saying, “Laozi takes Heaven and Earth as a bellows; with movement, wind is generated; and their vacuity allows nothingness to generate being and for transformation to continue ceaselessly.[…]but who makes the bellows produce vital force?” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 24) In other words, Laozi uses this metaphor to describe how non-being produces being, but does not that presuppose that there is someone who blows on the instrument? Or, if we take vacuity-stillness as the first principle, do we still need an all-powerful controller or a God to be the first mover? Wang Fuzhi thinks that being is limitless and absolute, and non-being has limits and is relative. Daoists and Buddhists have reversed this relationship. Wang writes, “Those who speak of non-being are excited by those who speak of being, and proceed to destroy this [notion of being]. They simply deny the being emphasized by those who speak of being” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 411). That is to say, “non-being” is relative to “being”, it is a denial of “being”. Wang uses illustrations here: compared with the hair of a dog, turtles have no hair; and compared with the horns of a deer, rabbits have no horns. Therefore, if one wants to take non-being as ontologically absolute, one should “search for it far and wide throughout all four corners of the world and throughout both past and present, but there will be no end to this search” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 411). In terms of the debate on movement and stillness, Wang Fuzhi develops Zhang Zai’s thinking, giving further expression to the dialectical relationship between absolute motion and relative stillness. Wang writes, “The Great Ultimate moved and generated yang, the very movement of motion. Stillness generated yin, the stillness of motion. With stillness as complete motionlessness, where comes yin?” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 402). Here, the “the Great Ultimate” is the substance of vital force. Wang thinks that the complete motionlessness or absolute stillness means extinction—and 2

Translator’s note: This term is often translated as “metaphysical”.

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there is nothing like that in the world. The movement of things is absolute. Stillness is only the stillness of movement; it is a momentary state of stillness. Wang correctly points out that stillness implies motion: “stillness is still movement, it is not no movement” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 411). Stillness is movement orientated towards stability that creates a phenomenon’s transient condition; “movement generates things that are still” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 23). As mentioned above, Zhang Zai uses the principle of unifying opposites to express transformations of vital force in the Dao. Wang Fuzhi provides a deeper explanation of this. First, Wang Fuzhi is clearer than Zhang Zai in noting that the inherent contradictions in material things are the source of movement. Wang says: Now yin and yang are the two substances of vital force, and motion and stillness are its two signs. If the substances are the same but their functions differ, they will respond to each other and give rise to motion. If motion gives shape to appearances, stillness ensues. The signs of motion and stillness are at the origin of what is gathered and dispersed, what comes forth and withdraws, what is formed and what remains formless. (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 23)

So the original vital forceas material substance contains yin and yang as its two aspects, which are the source of movement, change, and transformation. The contradictory functions of yin and yang allow for the possibility of movement or stillness. All change and transformation is produced from moments of stillness and movement. There lies the “the cause for the flexion and extension of Heaven, Earth, humans, and all things” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 24). So the real cause for movement is the inherent contradiction in vital force. The Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi thought that there was first the movement and stillness of the Great Ultimate (太极tai ji), which did not rely on material things, and then later yin and yang, as well as the natural world and all things, were generated. Wang Fuzhi refutes this position, emphasizing that “movement and stillness are the movement and stillness of this yin and yang” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 24). Yin and yang are material vital energies, and movement is their attribute. Second, movement is part of the process of contradiction. Wang Fuzhi thinks that, from the perspective of the objective process of the transformation of vital force, yin and yang, hardness and softness, and other conflicting aspects, are, in some respects, complementary. They remain complementary even while they repel one another, and are in conflict. In another sense, they are cooperative with one another, and without the one the other cannot exist. In the end, they return to the great vacuity. In terms of the relationship between humans and things, humans and the natural world mutually repel one another: “Those who benefit things do so at a cost to themselves, and those who benefit themselves do so at a cost to things.” However, humans cannot but rely on things. This contradiction develops until it is “harmonized and thereby dissolved.” Here, Wang Fuzhi does not cast off the limitation of the cyclical theory of dialectics in ancient Chinese thought. Following Zhang Zai, a number of philosophers had discussed the issue of “two” and “one”, including the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Shouren, Chen Liang (d. 1194), Ye Shi (d. 1123), and others. From different angles, the movement of contradictions had been investigated. But

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these people did not talk about negation and the transformation of contradictions. It was not until Wang Fuzhi that negation and the transformation of contradictions were affirmed. Wang Fuzhi thinks that “opposites are able to communicate with one another” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1112). Therefore, there is no reason to be worried about the opposing struggle in contradictions. Instead, it is better to be good at seeing how opposites can be unified; “the great person is skilled at interactions and does not worry about struggles” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 980). Starting from this position, Wang Fuzhi emphasizes that a positive and optimistic attitude should be held when facing negative and contradictory transformations: “the great person is optimistic in the face of reversal” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1112). According to Wang, there are two forms of contradictory transformation. One form is an unprecedented intensification: this is where one side must overcome the other in order to solve the contradiction. Wang writes that “when a tendency has reached its utmost intensity, it will necessarily give rise to its exact opposite and only then come to a state of stabilization” (Wang 2011, vol. 11 p. 201). In the other form of contradictory transformation, the opposites of a contradiction are “sometimes interconnected and then joined together, their features alternating in quick succession; there is only stillness if there is motion, and motion only comes forth if there is stillness. Stillness contains motion, motion is never without stillness” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 430). Opposites are continually transforming, and penetrate one another, but always maintain dynamic balance. Third, the existence of yin and yang as opposites is universal, and every type of thing or event has its own unique laws. Wang Fuzhi notes that “there are no things or events with only yang, and there are no things or events with only yin” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 37). Everything is “the unified ends [of yin and yang] as one body”—in other words, the unification of yin and yang as opposite ends. Yin and yang, as unified opposites, are the universal law of existence in all things and events, but different things also have their own specific laws. Wang Fuzhi points out that the “features of a thing are in accord with that thing’s class” and that “each has its own order,” so the movement, change, and transformation of each thing has its own cause. Wang writes that “contracting and stretching, coming and going, each goes according to its cause, and they are never chaotic” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 19). Wang Fuzhi combines the universal laws of things with their particular laws to show that the Dao of transforming qi is a process of unifying opposites. Wang views the Dao as law. On a general level, the transformation of yin and yang is called Dao, and Dao cannot be separated from concrete things, and Dao is expressed differently according to different concrete things, but it is not subject to any particular restrictions in space and time. On a more specific level, Dao includes the various objective orders of things, as well as the norms of human action; and these particular laws and norms have their own specific functions and scopes. Before Wang Fuzhi’s time, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi had talked about “the principle as one and its manifestations as many” (理一分殊li yi fen shu). Wang Yangming took “the principle as one” to be a process, Wang Tingxiang (d. 1544) emphasized the “ten thousand principles” (理 万li wan). Each has their insight, and each has that to which they are blind. When Wang Fuzhi discusses Dao in a general sense, he also addresses “the principle as one and its manifestations as many” and takes the unfolding of the “principle as

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one” as a process. At the same time, however, he points out that Dao also exists in a more specific sense, namely as the particular principles that various types of things possess. Therefore, the idea of “the principle as one and its manifestations as many” cannot itself be taken as an overarching principle. For example, the fact that a lunar eclipse has its own particular principle cannot be explained by means of this idea. Wang Fuzhi made a fairly detailed analysis of “principle” (Dao) as law and provided us with a much more precise account than any of his forebears. In sum, in terms of the theory of the Dao of Heaven, Wang Fuzhi offered a rather strong criticism of the principle monism of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi as well as of the mind monism of Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming, provided a major impetus to a further development of Zhang Zai’s monism of vital force, and proposed a more or less adequate solution to the problem of the relation between principle and vital force (Dao and concrete things). (2) Summarizing the Debate on the Mind and Matter/Things (Knowledge and Action) Assuming a monism of vital force, Wang Fuzhi summarized the debate on mind and matter/things (knowledge and action) and made important contributions to the field of epistemology. Concerning the origin of knowledge, Wang Fuzhi unambiguously opposed the apriorist view, according to which human beings “know things from birth.” In his own words: “The ears have a keen sense of hearing, the eyes see things clearly, the mind is farsighted and wise. Entering into the sounds and sights of the world and investigating their principles constitutes the Dao of human beings” (Wang 2011, vol. 6 p. 852). In his view, investigating the laws governing things by immersing oneself in the sights and sounds of the myriad phenomena in the world through sensible cognition is the path available to humanity for knowing the world. When it came to the relation between subject and object in cognitive activity, Wang Fuzhi made use of the categories of “substance and function” (体用ti yong) to provide a good description of the relation between “neng” (能, the subject of knowledge) and “suo” (所, the object of knowledge). The basic view on the relation between “neng” and “suo” (or subject and object) in Buddhism is that the cognitive object of knowledge is a form of “illusory being” (假有jia you) produced by the knowing subject. Wang criticizes this standpoint as amounting to “an elimination of the object by assimilating it to the subject and turning the subject into something objective” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 377), that is, as a fusion of the cognitive object with the knowing subject in which the subjective comes to replace the objective, thus eliminating the objective world. Wang claims: “We call a cognitive horizon (境jing) that depends on a certain function (yong)the ‘suo’. Since it depends on a function, this ‘suo’ must necessarily have its own real substance (ti) as well” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 376). “Suo”refers to something objective that is dependent on the impact of a subject. However, such an object is not a form of “illusory being” but by definition presupposes that it “has its own real substance.” He adds: “When function succeeds in affecting a cognitive horizon, we speak of a ‘suo’ […] That which has the ability to affect something that awaits the effects of function is ‘neng’. This ‘neng’ in turn

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must necessarily have its own function (yong) as well” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 376). Wang thinks that the word neng refers to a subject that has the ability to successfully affect the object. The subject is not null and void, but by definition “has its own function as well” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 376). As such, Wang Fuzhi believes that the relation between “subject” and “object” should be conceived in the following manner: on the one hand, this relation is dependent on the cognitive effects of the object on the subject it stimulates, so that “the emergence of the subject relies on the object”; on the other hand, since “function” affects the object, subjectivity has to be in accordance with objectivity, which means that “the subject cannot but conform to the object” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 376). Additionally, Wang Fuzhi provided a good account of the problem concerning the relation between knowledge and action. He criticized the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi in the following terms: “They claim that knowledge comes before action and establish a strictly divided order [between knowledge and action], pinning scholars down within knowledge and perception and causing them to lose their bearings altogether” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 311). Wang thinks that the notion of “knowledge coming before action” introduces a separation between knowledge and action and traps people inside the realm of “knowledge and perception” (知见zhi jian), thereby completely detaching them from reality. He criticizes Wang Shouren’s idea of the “unity of knowledge and action” for actually “reducing action to knowledge” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 312), even if this idea presents itself in the guise of an opposition to the separation between knowledge and action in the works of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi. He thinks that, in uniting action with knowledge, Wang Shourenhas completely annulled action. In his view, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi as well as Lu Xiangshan and Wang Shouren have all “left behind action in creating knowledge” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 314). As such, their different approaches lead to the same result. Concerning the problem of knowledge and action, Wang Fuzhi puts forward the propositions “knowledge and action support each other in order to serve as each other’s function” (Wang 2011, vol. 4 p. 1256) and “it is possible to know through acting” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 314). He considers action to be the foundation of knowledge and thinks that action occupies the primary position: “It is possible to know through acting, but impossible to act through knowing” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 314). This is because cognition can only be achieved if it is grounded in practice, whereas practice does not depend on cognition in order to succeed: “It is obvious that knowledge is accomplished through action. Action, however, is not brought about through knowledge” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 314). At the same time, Wang Fuzhi believes that knowledge and action can be seen as different stages, but does not separate them from each other. He indicates that there are two possibilities when it comes to the problem of whether knowledge or action comes first: in the first case, knowledge comes before action, meaning that “one knows what needs to be done from knowledge,” and theoretical knowledge serves to guide action (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 312). In the second case, action comes before knowledge, so that “one acts from action and only then comes to knowledge,” which means obtaining a given form of knowledge through practice (Wang 2011, vol. 6 p. 600). In his view, both of these

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possibilities “must advance side by side in order to be fruitful” (Wang 2011, vol. 6 p. 600). Here, we see Wang Fuzhi’s view of the unity of knowledge and action. Concerning the problem of the process of cognition, philosophers during the Song-Ming period had heated debates surrounding the different interpretations of “investigating things and extending knowledge” (格物致知ge wu zhi zhi). For Wang Fuzhi, “investigating things” and “extending knowledge” constitute two different ways as well as two separate stages of knowing. He writes: There are two manners of knowing. They support each other, but still each has its own origin. Extensively pursuing appearances and numbers and searching far and wide in both past and present in order to come to an exhaustive understanding of principle, this is what is called investigating things. Abiding in vacuity in order to bring about to understanding, reflecting in order to get to the bottom of what remains hidden, this is what is called extending knowledge. (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 312)

In his view, “investigating things” means coming to an extensive understanding of the appearances of things, investigating their historical transformations, and thereby trying to grasp the laws that govern them. Open-mindedly engaging in logical reflection and grasping the inner essence of things is “extending knowledge.” However, “investigating things” and “extending knowledge” are connected with each other. Wang claims that in the stage of “investigating things,” principles have to be sought out on the basis of each individual thing, and the senses and the mind have to be employed to an equal degree. At this stage “learning is primary and is assisted by reflection” (Wang 2011, vol. 6 p. 406). At the stage of “extending knowledge,” even if engaging in logical reflection is a function of the mind, still, “reflection is primary and is assisted by learning” (Wang 2011, vol. 6 p. 406). This is why Wang Fuzhi believes that “extending knowledge” without “investigating things” risks giving rise to illusions and leading people astray and why, conversely, “investigating things” without “extending knowledge” will cause us to be misled by external phenomena. These thoughts of Wang Fuzhi provided us a dialectical analysis of the relation between sensibility and reason in the process of cognition. Wang Fuzhi sees learning and thinking as a dialectical movement. He writes: Learning is accomplished by gathering things together, the old and the new support each other and make new what is old. Thinking is gained through what lasts, the subtle and the manifest succeed each other and the manifest can be investigated through what is subtle. (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1008)

In other words, learning and knowing are a continuous process of accumulation, with the interaction between new and old knowledge constantly giving rise to innovation. Knowing is developed within continuous movement; manifest appearances and their hidden essences are investigated in succession; and phenomena can be explained through their essences. Because Wang Fuzhi approaches knowledge, the development of human thought, and the growth of human abilities as progressive and dynamic processes, he places particular emphasis on “movement” (动dong). He denounces those who advocate stillness and non-action: surely it cannot be that when “Yu tamed the floods, the duke of Zhou conquered the barbarians and drove out the wild beasts, and Confucius composed the Spring and Autumn Annals,” they

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were no match for those who laze about all day and are supposedly more capable of “getting to the bottom of the principles of things and responding to the occasions they offer” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 948). Wang believes that sitting motionless cannot in any way lead to the growth of wisdom. Human knowledge and capabilities have to be developed within action; human virtue has to be nurtured through practice. Wang Fuzhi’s strong focus on “movement” and on the spirit of “action” is diametrically opposed to the doctrine of “emphasizing stillness” in Neo-Confucianism. That being said, while Wang Fuzhi manages to offer a fairly accurate account of the relation between knowledge and action, at times he still lapses into apriorism. He explains spirit through the vital force with which human beings have been endowed (气禀qi bing), and considers virtuous knowledge as something the mind is already equipped with, it becomes self-evident truth once awakened. (3) The Unity of Words, Appearances, Meaning, and Dao The debate on “names and actualities” (名实ming shi) in the pre-Qin period was continued after the Qin and Han dynasties in different forms and changed into a debate concerning “words and ideas” (言意yan yi) during the Wei and Jin period. In the Song and Ming dynasties, the debate concerning “names and actualities” and “words and meaning” was connected to the problem of the relation between “appearances” (象xiang) and Dao. Wang Fuzhi discussed the contradictory unity of names and actualities, words and meaning, and appearances and Dao on the basis of a materialistworldview. He writes: “Names are not Heavenly creations, they cannot but follow the actualities that belong to them” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 448). Furthermore, “It is certain that words, appearances, meaning, and Dao belong together and that none of them can be left out” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1040). Here, we find a new critical summary of the debate concerning “names and actualities” that took up the ideas of Xunzi and made significant contributions to the fields of of logic and methodology. Wang Fuzhi sees actualities as primary and names as secondary. “Names arise from actualities,” meaning that concepts are a reflection of objective reality (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 449). However, does this mean that concepts are able to accurately describe reality? In particular, is logical thought able to grasp the law of development of the universe? These questions never ceased to be debated from the pre-Qin period onward. Laozi, Zhuangzi, and the Zen school of Buddhism all held that concepts are not sufficient to express the Dao of transformation and that one can attain a unity with noumenon only by doing away with names and appearances altogether. NeoConfucian scholars were influenced by Daoism and Buddhism and took the mind of the sage to resemble a clear mirror that merely “responds to things when they present themselves,” without any concepts being left behind in the mind. Wang Fuzhi opposed this conception of “being without thought” (无念wu nian) or “refraining from thinking” (罔念wang nian) and emphasized the importance of “being able to think” (克念ke nian), which actually refers to the mind’s wordlessly penetrating things and becoming good at thinking. Wang Fuzhi looks at concepts as processes and believes that one should not become attached to concepts and allow them to ossify: “When it comes to thoughts, these must certainly not be clung to” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 389). However, the movement of concepts should also not be approached as

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something that perishes as soon as it has arisen without leaving any traces behind, because thought constitutes a real flux that has its own origin and direction: “The past and the future are there in present thought and not merely evanescent” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 390). In other words, the past is preserved within the present and the future can be anticipated from within the present. Therefore, reason is capable of establishing a relation between the past and the future within conceptual understanding in the present. As Wang Fuzhi emphasizes, in a mind that has become good at thinking in a correct manner, thoughts are continuous with each other and every present concept encompasses a summary of the past and a prognosis of the future. The concepts used by an individual mind in thinking transcend the limitations of the time and place in which that particular human being finds him- or herself and are capable of enveloping the experiences of countless individuals and the infinite variety of things: “Today is a continuation of yesterday; opposite things contain each other. If one is able to think of them then these matters exist, if one refrains from thinking of them then they perish” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 391). Here, Wang Fuzhi has touched upon the dialectical essence of logical thinking: the movement of concepts is a process of development in which before and after are a continuous whole and opposite things are contained in each other. Within this process, each concept exists within the present while also transcending the limitations of a particular time and place and thus becoming something general and emcompassing. Therefore, through the cognitive process in which things as well as thoughts are continuous, individual knowledge can be constantly accumulated, and human culture is able to give rise to tradition. For its part, logical thinking becomes able to penetrate the essences of phenomena and reveal the laws of transformation governing reality. As a matter of fact, Wang Fuzhi’s theory of concept which centers on “being able to think” interprets the unity of names and actualities as a dialectical process of movement. Based on his view about the unity of names and actualities described above, Wang Fuzhi proceeds to put forward his theory of the unity of “words, appearances, meaning, and Dao.” In addressing the relations among these four notions, he uses the concepts of humaneness and righteousness as an example: Humaneness, righteousness, moderation, and correctness can be explained and given names within the mind. If one grasps the meaning of compassion, then it will be named humaneness. If one grasps the meaning of shame, then it will be named righteousness. Thus, by providing proof for humaneness and righteousness through affairs and actions and regulating things by caring for human beings, the appearance of humaneness and righteousness will become manifest. (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 74)

This passage means that, as objective forms of existence, the principles (Dao) of humaneness, righteousness, moderation, and correctness are known by human beings and are accorded meaning through the mind. In turn, their meaning is conveyed by the names (“words”) “humaneness and righteousness,” and verified within real action, so that the “appearance” of humaneness and righteousness becomes manifest. Therefore, “words” are the form in which “meaning” is expressed and “meaning” is the conceptual content of “words,” content and form being inseparable. “Dao” and “appearance,” on the other hand, refer both to the actual objects that words

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indicate, as well as to the laws and categories grasped by “meaning.” “Appearance” and “Dao,” too, cannot be separated from each other. Wang Fuzhi writes: “There is no Dao outside of the appearances in the world” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1038). He thinks that the relation between Dao and appearances is not as that between father and son, which “are two different things,” but rather as that of the ear to its sense of hearing and the eye to its sense of sight, which “are one and the same.” He adds: “Appearances are gathered together to form the Book of Changes, the whole of the Book of Changes consists of appearances, these appearances themselves are nothing but the Book of Changes” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1039). He thinks that the Book of Changes is a system shaped by the entirety of “appearances,” that is to say, categories. As a totality, the Book of Changes can be summarized as the contradictory movement of the “opposite appearances” of the even and the uneven or Heaven and Earth. From an analytical perspective, there are countless appearances in the Book of Changes, which is an organically related and flexible system of categories. It is precisely through the dialectical relations and movement of these categories that the law of the transformation of the universe, that is to say, the Dao of change, is revealed. The above is essentially a further development of the logic of “establishing appearances to exhaust meaning and to exhaust words through the appended commentaries” in the Yi Zhuan. However, Wang Fuzhi’s theory opposes both the numerology of “appearance and number” that is accepted from the Han Confucians down to Shao Yong, as well as the kind of metaphysics encountered in Wang Bi’s idea that “when meaning is attained, appearances can be forgotten; when appearances are attained, words can be forgotten” and in the separation the Song Confucianists introduced between Dao and concrete things. In Wang Fuzhi’s view, the idealist numerology of “appearance and number” in the works of Jing Fang (d. 37 BCE), Shao Yong, and Cai Shen (d. 1230) forms a worldview through the combination of the Eight Trigrams and the Forty-Six Hexagrams in a subjective manner: “These are all human-made skills; when nature gives rise to things, it does not happen in this way” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 440). Wang believes that the doctrine of the relations of “production and control between the five agents”3 of yin-yangmagicians commits the following error: “They leave out the real substance and true function of the five agents and force them together on the basis of external resemblances” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 350). In other words, yinyangmagicians do not make scientific comparisons based on the essence of things, but rather make subjective deductions by employing the superficial resemblances between things and drawing forced analogies between human affairs and nature. This results in the superstitious belief in a “resonance between heaven and human beings.” Wang is convinced that, in order to truly grasp the different “classes” ( 类lei) of things, it is necessary to use the method of “comparing classes” (比类bi lei). Doing so requires us to gain knowledge through the relations of “similarity” and “difference” between things, as well as their transformations from “contraction” to 3

Translator’s note: Fire produces earth, earth produces metal, metal produces water, water produces wood. Fire controls metal, metal controls wood, wood controls earth, earth controls water, water controls fire.

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“expansion,” which allow us to grasp the essence of things step by step and to form accurate concepts of class (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 106). Wang Fuzhi’s opposition to the numerology of “appearance and number,” with its forced subjective analogies, does not imply that logical thought cannot make use of the concepts of “appearance” and “number.” He thinks that “appearance,” that is to say the notion of “class,” and “number” are interconnected. He writes: “Appearances and numbers accompany each other; appearances give rise to numbers; while numbers in turn give rise to appearances” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 338). This means that “appearance” and “number” depend on each other. The natural world comprises entities and shapes belonging to an endless number of classes, which can be memorized through numbers and grasped within numerical relations. This is what he means by “appearances giving rise to numbers.” On the other hand, within their activities, human beings are able to create all sorts of instruments and artifacts by means of numerical relations, which is why he also speaks of “numbers giving rise to appearances.” Ancient Chinese science attached a great deal of importance to the method of “comparing classes,” the latter also being related to the procedures of “choosing appearances” in divination and “using numbers” (measuring). The great Song dynasty scientist Shen Kuo (d. 1095) paid attention to “choosing appearances” as well as measuring. His methodology had a positive, stimulating impact on the development of science. Wang Fuzhi’s notions of “comparing classes” and “appearances and number accompanying each other” can be seen as a further summary of ancient Chinese scientific methodology on a philosophical level. Of course, such a method still differed from that of modern empirical science. Starting from Wang Bi’s introduction of the notion that “when meaning is attained, appearances can be forgotten,” the idealism that runs straight from Wei and Jin “mysterious learning” and Buddhism to Neo-Confucianism consistently employed the metaphysical methods of “forgetting appearance once meaning is attained” and “discussing Dao outside of concrete things.” Wang Fuzhi criticized such metaphysical methods. In his view, “Dao” exists within “concrete things,” and “words” and “appearances” are able to reach the “meaning” of “Dao” by describing and differentiating concrete things. Consequently, it is absolutely impossible to “forget appearances” and “forget words” after having “attained meaning.” He indicates that these metaphysical methods actually introduce a separation between “substance” (Dao) and “function” (concrete things): “Those who are not adept at speaking of Dao establish an illusory substance and consequently eliminate function” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 862). By turning nothingness into a substance, the real existence of the phenomenal world is annulled. Wang Fuzhi is diametrically opposed to this view and believes that “those who are adept at speaking of Dao reach substance by means of function” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 862). He affirms the existence of substance by departing from the reality of function and understands the phenomenal world as a manifestation of the self-movement of material substance. He indicates that the world of phenomena is a causal chain in which “all things depend upon each other” and a stream of transformation where “the new comes about as an extension of the old.” Consequently, on a methodological level, “reaching substance by means of function” points towards the fact that the necessary laws governing the self-movement of

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matter have to be investigated from a perspective that encompasses comprehensive connectedness as well as the ceaseless transformation and renewal of things. From the Wei and Jin period on, philosophers gained an increasingly thorough knowledge of the causes behind the movement of things, that is to say, of the logical category of “cause/reason” (故gu), by employing the distinction between “substance and function.” They came to the correct conclusion that “there is no duality between substance and function”: material substance is its own cause and function is the selfmovement of this substance. The viewpoint according to which “there is no duality between substance and function” is of crucial methodological significance. This was already sufficiently reflected in Fanzhen’s summary of the debate on body and spirit and Zhang Zai’s summery of the debate on “being and non-being” (movement and stillness). Wang Fuzhi’s notion of “reaching substance by means of function” counts as a further development of the methodological principle according to which “there is no duality between substance and function.” In Wang Fuzhi’s view, the unity of “words, appearances, meaning, and Dao” does not mean that there is an immediate identity between words, appearances, meaning, and Dao without any contradictions. He writes: “As the saying goes, ‘Books do not exhaust words, words do not exhaust meaning.’ That is why there are subtle words to clarify Dao” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1002). It is precisely because of the fact that words are not enough to attain meaning that Dao has to be conveyed by means of “subtle words” (微言wei yan). But what are such “subtle words”? According to Wang Fuzhi, The Book of Changes states that “the alternation of yin and yang is called Dao” [一阴一 阳之谓道yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao]. According to some, the alternation in question is a gathering together and a unifying, while others claim that in this alternation, yin and yang remain divided from each other. Alas! In this way, subtle words are undone. (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1002)

The statement “the alternation of yin and yang is called Dao” is an example of “subtle words” that embodies what Hegel called “the connection between judgments that are analytic and synthetic at the same time.” However, some people place a one-sided emphasis on synthesis, while others pay attention only to analysis, and thereby destroy such “subtle words.” Wang Fuzhi indicates that Daoism, Buddhism, the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, Lu Xiangshan, and Wang Shouren all stressed either synthesis or analysis one-sidedly. He writes: “If yin and yang remain divided from each other, this means that they cannot deviate from themselves in the slightest: yin remains yin and yang remains yang, while Dao exists in their midst […] This is what gives rise to the doctrines of Laozi” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 pp. 1002–1003). He thinks that Laozi one-sidedly emphasizes analysis and introduces a separation between yin and yang. As a result, yin remains yin and yang remains yang; Dao becomes something which drifts outside of yin and yang and is treated as nothingness. In his opinion, Buddhism on the other hand one-sidedly emphasizes synthesis: If the alternation of yin and yang is taken to be a gathering together and a unifying, this means that yin and yang are united accidentally. What is the same becomes different, what is a unity becomes separated, formation becomes destruction, and Dao remains outside of

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yin and yang […] This is what gives rise to the doctrines of the Buddha. (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1003).

Buddhism overemphasizes synthesis and claims that substance envelops everything. As a result, things such as yin and yang become illusory phenomena formed by a coincidental conjunction and distinctions such as those of identity and difference are eradicated, with Dao being treated as a mind that is of a perfected nature. Within the Neo-Confucian school, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi are similar to Daoism in their emphasis on analysis, whereas Lu Xiangshan and Wang Shouren come close to Zen Buddhism in their focus on synthesis. Consequently, Wang Fuzhi’s criticism of Daoism and Buddhism amounts to a critique of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi as well as of Lu Xiangshan and Wang Shouren. According to Wang Fuzhi, the “subtle words” of the statement “the alternation of yin and yang is called Dao” make possible the understanding of Dao by uniting the methods of analysis and synthesis. In taking Dao and yin and yang to be unified, while also seeing that Dao exerts a unifying and directing as well as a differentiating and mediating influence on yin and yang, he has managed to show the relations of duality (opposition) and oneness (unity) between Dao and yin and yang. In his own words: “The unification of the two into one is already fully contained in the division of the one into two” (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1027). This means that the statement according to which “the alternation of yin and yang is called Dao” explains the contradictory unity of yin and yang and Dao by dividing the “one” (Dao) into a duality (yin and yang) while at the same time “uniting the two into one.” As a result, from a logical and methodological point of view, Dao has to be grasped analytically as well as synthetically. In sum, Wang Fuzhi’s logical theory concerning the unity of “words, appearances, meaning, and Dao” brought the dialectical movement in the unity of names and actualities to light, offered a critique of the major methods of certain idealist theories in ancient Chinese philosophy, and gave a more penetrating account of the logical categories of “class,” “cause/reason,” and “principle” than his forebears. In terms of the method of “comparing classes,” he put forward the idea that “appearances and numbers accompany each other.” Concerning the method of “looking for causes/reasons,” he introduced the notion of grasping substance within the mutual dependence of things in their constant state of transformation. When it came to the method of “clarifying principle” (clarifying Dao), he introduced the notion of the unity of analysis and synthesis. These concepts are all forms of dialectical logic and represent a major leap forward in comparison to Xunzi and the Yi Zhuan. That being said, his dialectical logic was still of a rudimentary kind. (4) A Philosophy of History Which Emphasizes That “Principle and Tendency Are United” The debates on the relation between “principle and vital force” (Dao and concrete things) in the Song and Ming period were also controversies concerning the theory of the Dao of human beings. When Wang Fuzhi put forward the proposition that “there is no Dao without the corresponding concrete thing,” he was speaking primarily from the viewpoint of social history. Wang writes:

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There is no Dao without the corresponding concrete thing. Few are able to explain this principle, but its certainty is beyond doubt. Since there was no Dao of abdication in primordial times, the Dao of just war4 did not exist during the times of Yao and Shun, and the Han and Tang dynasties did not have the Dao we know today, it is all the more clear that the Dao of days still to come will also be different from that of the present. (Wang 2011, vol. 1 p. 1028)

Wang looks at human society as a process of ceaseless change and development and believes that every historical epoch has its own distinctive laws. In his Notes onReading the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government (Du Tongjian lun), Wang Fuzhi expresses his agreement with the description of changes in the social system from the perspective of “tendency” (势shi) in Liu Zongyuan’s Discourse on Enfeoffment (Fengjian lun). Drawing inspiration from this work, Wang proceeded to introduce a historical conception in which “principle and tendency are united” (理势合一li shi he yi). He writes: “When principle has been obtained, a tendency will spontaneously form itself. At the same time, principle can only be observed within the necessity of tendency” (Wang 2011, vol. 6 p. 994). Furthermore, “That which follows the inevitability of tendency is principle. The natural spontaneity of principle is Heaven” (Wang 2011, vol. 11 p. 177). This means that everything that corresponds to the laws of historical development will naturally form a developmental tendency; it is precisely such an inevitable tendency that embodies the laws of the development of history. The history of humanity is a natural process in which principle and tendency are united. The regularity of this process can be observed within the necessary tendencies of historical development. Wang Fuzhi adds: “Tendency depends on time, principle depends on tendency” (Wang 2011, vol. 10 p. 458). In his view, tendency depends on actual historical conditions. Since historical conditions vary, there are different tendencies in the development of history, and the latter are governed by different historical laws. Wang’s view on the unity of principle and tendency comes close to Hegel’s proposition according to which “what is real is rational, what is rational is real.” From a dialectical perspective, not every actual entity or historical activity is unconditionally real. Reality manifests itself as necessary developmental tendencies within the process of the development of history, and it is these tendencies that are by necessity rational. Just as there is a relation between the categories of principle and tendency, there is also a relation between necessity and contingency in the development of history. In his Discourse on Enfeoffment, Liu Zongyuan had already pointed out that historical development cannot be explained in terms of the motivations of separate individuals within history and that necessity lies hidden inside of contingency. Wang Fuzhi further clarified this viewpoint. He writes: The Qin emperor abolished the feudal enfeoffment and established the system of prefectures and counties by approaching the world as his own possession, but Heaven made use of this selfishness to put its great commonality into practice. How unfathomable are the things that are preserved in its luminosity! (Wang 2011, vol. 10 p. 68)

4

Translator’s note: The term diao fa literally means “paying condolence [to the people] and punishing [those who have committed crimes]”.

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In his view, when the first emperor established the system of prefectures and counties, he was subjectively motivated by his own interests, but the replacement of feudal enfeoffment with the system of prefectures and counties was still in accordance with the tendency of historical development. For Wang Fuzhi, the emperor’s motivation was something contingent, but historical necessity exists precisely behind such contingent motivations. In addition, Wang put forward the idea of discovering historical necessity by “seeing through the eyes of the people” (民视min shi): “If something can be put into practice for thousands of years without changing, this is due to the people, that is to say, to Heaven. Heaven observes by seeing through the eyes of the people” (Wang 2011, vol. 10 p. 698). He thinks that if a certain system can be carried out for thousands of years without going through any changes, this must mean that it is voluntarily accepted by the people, and if something is voluntarily accepted by the people, it must necessarily conform to the natural spontaneity of principle (“observed by Heaven”). What is expressed here are the beginnings of a humanist way of thinking that sides with the common people. (5) “As a Person’s Nature Grows Daily, It Comes to Completion” and “the Way of Achieving Oneself” After Li Ao introduced the idea of “recovering nature” (复性fu xing) in the Tang dynasty, the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, Lu Xiangshan, and Wang Yangming all came to advocate this notion. In their view, a person can attain the realm of sagehood simply through the practical effort of “preserving Heavenly principles and extinguishing human desires” and by recovering the nature of the Mandate of Heaven. The crucial feature of this theory of “recovering nature” is its fatalism. Wang Fuzhi inherited and further developed the doctrine of “bringing one’s nature to completion” (成性cheng xing) found in pre-Qin Confucianism (Xunzi and the Book of Changes) and criticized the notion of “recovering nature.” He made further contributions to the theories on human nature and the cultivation of an ideal personality which originated in ancient Chinese philosophy. The opposition between Wang Fuzhi’s idea of “bringing one’s nature to completion” and the doctrine of “recovering nature” in Neo-Confucianism manifests itself in Wang’s theory on human nature. In putting forward the proposition that “as a person’s nature grows daily, it comes to completion,” he provided good description of the relation between Heaven and human beings, Fate/destiny (命ming) and power (力li), and nature and habit (习xi). Regarding the relation between Heaven and human beings, Wang Fuzhi draws a distinction between “Heaven as it is for Heaven” (天之天tian zhi tian) and “Heaven as it is for human beings” (人之天ren zhi tian). In his General Commentary on the Book of Songs (Shi guangzhuan), he points out that “Heaven as it is for Heaven” can be transformed into “Heaven as it is for human beings”: “What was once Heaven as it is for Heaven has now become Heaven as it is for human beings” (Wang 2011, vol. 3 p. 463). What he calls “Heaven as it is for Heaven” is the self-sufficient material world that exists independently from human consciousness. “Heaven as it is for human beings,” on the other hand, is the natural world owned and used by human

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beings. His idea that “Heaven as it is for Heaven” can be transformed into “Heaven as it is for human beings” bears a certain resemblance to the idea that “things as they are in themselves” (自在之物zi zai zhi wu) can be transformed into “things as they are for us” (为我之物wei wo zhi wu) in Marxist philosophy. It represents a continuation and development of Xunzi’s notion of “clarifying the distinction between Heaven and human beings.” In terms of the relation between Fate/destiny and power, Wang Fuzhi affirms that “the Mandate of Heaven has a principle, but is without mind.” Such a “Mandate” is nothing but a “flowing forth of principle,” which human beings cannot go against. As such, he stresses that “the way of humanity is the way of Heaven” (Wang 2011, vol. 5 p. 617). In his view, the laws of human activity conform to the regularity of nature. On the other hand, Wang also confirms that human beings have the ability to “create their destiny” (造命zao ming). It is not only “rulers and ministers who can create their destiny”; rather, this is something that every single human being is capable of: “Even a humble scholar can contribute to creating his own destiny” (Wang 2011, vol. 10 p. 937). Consequently, he stresses that we should not “rely on Heaven,” but rather that we must “assist Heaven” (Wang 2011, vol. 5 p. 617). Wang believes that human beings are not powerless in the face of nature, but have the ability to assist and control nature by appealing to their subjective initiative. As far as the relation between nature and habit is concerned, Wang Fuzhi endorses the idea that “human nature comes to completion with the development of habit.” He points out that there is a difference between human beings and animals: “Animals use themselves up in employing their primary mandate, but the mandate of human beings is renewed each day” (Wang 2011, vol. 3 p. 464). The innate instincts of animals determine their entire lives. In contrast, human beings are not satisfied with their innate instincts and constantly transform themselves and cultivate their virtues within the process of interaction with nature. It is in this sense that “the mandate of human beings is renewed each day.” Because Wang sees the cultivation of virtue as a process of interaction between Heaven and human beings, he thinks that the “habits” (acquired skills, conventions, and customs) of human beings can ultimately be traced back to their interactions with nature and that it is precisely through such interactions that human virtue is shaped. In his view, human nature does not remain unchanged once it has been shaped through this kind of interaction, but instead “comes to completion by growing daily” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 299). Human nature is constantly brought to perfection by growing and developing every single day. On the one hand, this process of the formation of human nature is the result of influences from the natural world; on the other hand, it is also the outcome of subjective human judgment and choice, of “choosing for oneself and making use of things oneself” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 300). As such, the fact that “human nature comes to completion with the development of habit” can “bring about the goodness of human nature” as well as “the evil of human nature.” In its completed state, human nature has both good and evil in it. However, Wang Fuzhi still believes that the “innate ability” (良 能liang neng) of the “Mandate of Heaven” is fundamentally good. In this respect, he still abides by the theory of the goodness of human nature.

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The fact that Wang Fuzhi ultimately did not depart from the traditional theory of the goodness of human nature makes it clear that he was not yet able to clarify the objective basis of morality in a scientific manner and that he remained trapped in an abstract discourse on human nature. That being said, the proposition according to which “as one’s nature grows daily, it is brought to completion” conceives of human nature as a process and entails a criticism of the Neo-Confucian doctrine of “recovering nature,” which sees the “nature of the Mandate of Heaven” present at the moment of birth as perfect and self-sufficient. As such, he surpassed all previous theories concerning human nature and made a giant leap forward in the direction of truth. The opposition between Wang Fuzhi’s idea of “bringing one’s nature to completion” and the Neo-Confucian idea of “recovering nature” expressed itself in Wang’s approach to “the way of achieving oneself,” that is to say, in the cultivation of an ideal human personality. In this regard, Wang introduced the theses “completing oneself and completing human nature” (成身成性cheng shen chen xing) and “establishing human nature by following feelings” (循情定性xun qing ding xing). Although Wang Fuzhi was a Confucianist, the ideal human personality which he envisioned bore little resemblance to the “pure Confucians” praised by scholars of the learning of principle. In his own words: “I dread those who are lacking in desires and therefore also weak when it comes to principle. People who are too weak to subject themselves to what is in the world are also too weak to assume responsibility for the world” (Wang 2011, vol. 3 p. 374). Obviously, his ideal personality is a real person who has the courage to “assume responsibility for the world.” Such a person is not an ascetic at all, but rather someone who personally empathizes with the joys and misfortunes of the people in the world. This is why Wang says that “bringing one’s nature to completion” (training one’s virtue) cannot be separated from “completing oneself.” He writes: “If sounds, colors, smells, and tastes follow their proper course, they will not go against or harm humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. When these two series of things are brought together, they form each other’s substance” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 121). In his view, human nature involves both natural desires (“sounds, colors, smells, tastes”) and moral norms (“humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom”). If sounds, colors, smells, and tastes “follow their proper course,” then they will conform to the normative criteria of reason. As such, not only will natural desires conform to humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom, but they will reinforce and be reinforced by these normative criteria. Wang believes that within the process of “completing oneself,” “bringing one’s nature to completion” is a process of mutual interaction between subject and object. He points out: “Colors, sounds, and taste were conferred upon me by Dao and so I must receive them through my nature” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 407). The sensible properties of objective things such as color and sound are given to us through “Dao” (objective laws and necessary principles); the fact that we have received “Dao” causes our nature to “come to completion in growing daily.” At the same time, Wang claims that “colors, sounds, and tastes were conferred upon me by nature, so that in receiving them I must follow the Dao that is proper to each of them” (Wang 2011, vol. 2 p. 407). Our “nature” becomes manifest by means of

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sensible activity. Through their own particular “Dao” (different methods and rules), objective things that have characteristics such as color, sound, and taste have the ability to objectify the “nature” of human beings. In this respect, Wang Fuzhi pays considerable attention to the integral development of sensibility and reason and also shows his opposition to the notion that “the sage has no desires” in the Neo-Confucian learning of principle. For Wang Fuzhi, in the process of interaction between subject and object—where “completing oneself” and “completing nature” constitute a single unity—“the self,” which is to say, the conscious subject, plays a crucial role. Within this self, reason, will, and emotion form one body. He writes: “If one rectifies one’s will in accordance with Dao, one will obtain the principles of all things. This is the reason why teaching should be grounded in rectifying the will” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 188). He believes that the cultivation of the human personality is based on “rectifying the will” (正 志zheng zhi). This means causing the will to conform to the rational knowledge of Dao and holding on to this knowledge persistently. In his view, the intentions or motivations that result from transient impressions are tied up with individual prejudices, and it is difficult to determine whether any such prejudice is good or bad. However, “if one’s will is fixed but one’s thoughts remain impure, one is still able to become conscious of this and change one’s way of thinking” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 189). It suffices for a person’s will to incline towards what is proper and to find joy in persevering in order to gain a high degree of self-awareness, enabling one to reflect autonomously on and correct oneself if impure intentions and motivations are to arise. In this respect, Wang Fuzhi offered a fairly accurate description of the relation between reason and will. He criticized the determinism we find in the Neo-Confucian learning of principle and also opposed the tendency towards voluntarism of the Taizhou School. Concerning emotions, Wang introduced the theory of “establishing nature by following feelings.” He writes: “Emotions are the sprouts of human nature. Human nature can be established by following feelings” (Wang 2011, vol. 3 p. 353). In this context, “establishing nature” means “bringing one’s nature to completion.” He approaches emotions as manifestations of nature that offer us initial clues into nature. If one becomes skilled at guiding emotions in the right direction, one will “excel at discerning the beginnings [of nature] and ceaselessly carrying them forward,” so that one can attain the result of having “settled one’s nature” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 130). Since there is a difference between sincere and exaggerated emotions, Wang emphasizes the importance of ridding oneself of uncommitted feelings (浮情fu qing) and of allowing emotions to contribute to the stabilization and realization of a person’s intentions: “If the will is settled, there will be no uncommitted feelings” (Wang 2011, vol. 3 p. 363). In sum, emotions should be subordinated to the will and the will must be grounded in knowledge of Dao. It will be apparent that Wang Fuzhi pays considerable attention to the integral development of knowledge, intentions, and emotions in the cultivation of virtue. Accordingly, for him, cultivating virtue implies a search for the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. In his theory of “establishing nature by following feeling,” Wang also offered a penetrating investigation into the question of beauty. He writes: “Music embodies luminosity and is brought to completion by human beings” (Wang 2011, vol. 3 p. 511).

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In his view, music reveals the luminous movement of clear and dynamic vital force, while also being a human creation. This is not limited to music and other art forms, but applies to all aesthetic creations, which, though created by humans, all have a natural basis. Wang Fuzhi adds that nature expresses itself in the form of emotions and that emotions are able to establish a connection with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things by means of “sounds” (music) and “sights” (external appearances and forms): “The relation of human beings to Heaven and the myriad things [consists of] nothing but appearances and sounds” (Wang 2011, vol. 3 p. 511). In his view, in aesthetic activity and artistic creation, sounds and colors (sounds and sights) are conferred upon a person by “Dao” and received by that person in order to “bring his or her nature to completion.” Sounds and colors have been conferred upon a person by their nature (as manifested in emotions) and are received according to their own particular “Dao” (order, rhythm). Accordingly, human nature becomes objectified within artistic forms and human beings can gain direct insight into their own essences from within these forms. Such artistic works have the function of nurturing human nature and emotions. These notions provided a philosophical basis for his theory of artistic sphere. In discussing poetry, Wang Fuzhi says that poems should express “luminous principle” by merging emotions with the natural setting (境jing) of the poem. He writes: “The setting is united with emotions, and emotions emerge from the setting. The two are initially not separated from each other, and they are expressions of the intention of the writer” (Wang 2011, vol. 15 p. 826). Furthermore, “Intention (意yi) is the most important, while tendency (势shi) comes next. Tendency is the luminous principle within intentions” (Wang 2011, vol. 15 p. 820). In this passage, yi refers to intentions, which more or less correspond to what we now call aesthetic ideals. Uniting emotions with the setting and unfolding them together serves to convey an aesthetic ideal; such an ideal manifests itself as a certain “tendency” within the unfolding of emotions and settings. Here, “tendency” means momentum (气势qi shi) and refers to the tangible embodiment of the “luminous principle” within “intention.” Wang Fuzhi’s theory of artistic sphere opposed the notion of “conveying Dao through literature” (文以载 道wen yi zai dao) as well as the viewpoint according to which art is a form of moral instruction. At the same time, he also went against the trend towards art for art’s sake apparent in Yan Yu’s (d. 1241) Remarks on Poetry (Canglang shihua). Needless to say, there were still certain limitations to Wang Fuzhi’s theory of human nature and his conception of “the way of achieving oneself.” When he writes that “the virtues of yin and yang and firmness and flexibility are rooted in goodness” (Wang 2011, vol. 12 p. 129) and that “(Heaven) reaches the peak of beauty in human beings and becomes luminous” (Wang 2011, vol. 3 p. 513), he is searching for the foundation of goodness and beauty within yin and yang as the two states of vital force and within the natural world. This makes it clear that he did not understand that human virtue and the human spirit should first and foremost be interpreted on the level of social existence. That being said, his theory of human nature and his conception of “the way of achieving oneself” were largely reasonable. Wang Fuzhi provided us with a critical summary of the debates concerning “principle and vital force” (Dao and concrete things) and “mind and things” (knowledge

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and action). At the same time, he also offered a new critical summary of the debate on “Heaven and human beings” and “names and actualities.” In doing so, he established a system of vital-force monism uniting naïve materialism and naïve dialectics and gave shape to one of the culminating moments in the development of ancient Chinese philosophy.

9.2 The Enlightenment Thought and Historicist Methodology of Huang Zongxi Wang Fuzhi’s contemporary Huang Zongxi also made a critical summary of the NeoConfucian learning of principle. Huang Zongxi (d. 1695), whose courtesy name was Taichong and whose literary name was Nanlei, was known to scholars as Lizhou. A native of Yuyao in the present-day province of Zhejiang, Huang studied with Liu Zongzhou (d. 1645) and once led the struggle of the Fushe Society of literati against influential eunuchs at the imperial court. When Manchu troops advanced south, he recruited an army of loyal soldiers to take up arms in resistance. After the fall of the Ming dynasty, he lived as a recluse and devoted himself to writing books and teaching. He studied calendrical science as well as the dynastic histories. His greatest contributions were made in the field of history and his academic style influenced the Eastern Zhejiang school of historians in the Qing dynasty. Huang’s main works include Case Studies of Ming Confucians (Mingru xue’an), An Obscured Paragon of Virtue Awaiting a Royal Visit (Mingyi daifang lu), and Selected Writings of Nanlei (Nanlei wenyue). If we can say that Wang Fuzhi’s critical summary of the Neo-Confucian learning of principle presented itself as a comprehensive summary of ancient philosophy, then Huang Zongxi’s critical summary of Neo-Confucianism already radiated with the splendor of Enlightenment thought. (1) Democratic Thought in An Obscured Paragon of Virtue Awaiting a Royal Visit An Obscured Paragon of Virtue Awaiting a Royal Visit is the first work in Chinese history that provides a systematic account of democratic thought. Throughout these pages, Huang Zongxi puts forward a democratic plan of reform on a political, legal, and economic level, voices his opposition to feudalist autocracy, and unmasks the Neo-Confucian learning of principle as a tool in the service of feudalist despotism. On the level of politics, Huang Zongxi criticized the system of feudal despotism for reversing the relation in which “the world is the host (主zhu), and the ruler is a guest (客ke)”5 into one where “the ruler is the host, and the world is a guest” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 2). He writes: 5

Translator’s note: The reader may note that these terms are related to the modern Chinese words for subject (zhu ti) and object (ke ti). In this context, retaining the more literal meaning of zhu and ke as “host” and “guest” seems preferable to using the more abstract epistemological terms “subject” and “object.”.

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Formerly, the world was considered to be the host, and the ruler the guest. All the accomplishments and endeavors of the ruler were devoted to the world. Nowadays, the ruler is the host, and the world has become a guest. If there is no longer a single place left in the world where there is peace, this is because of the ruler. (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 2)

He indicates that, in ancient times, “people were all concerned with themselves and strove after their own advantage” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 2). Subsequently, they endorsed as their leader a person who was capable of promoting “common advantage” and reducing “common harm.” However, the despotic system of rule reversed the original relation between “host and guest” (or subject and object), so that the ruler “attributes all of the advantages in the world to himself and blames all the harm in the world on others” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 2). The ruler no longer serves the world, but has deprived the people in the world of a place to settle themselves. In Huang Zongxi’s view, it is precisely because of this reversal of the subject-object relation between the ruler and the world that the people have all been forced to satisfy the ruler’s desires and to distort their natural inclination to be concerned about themselves and strive after their own advantage. In this sense, the ruler has brought great harm to the people of the world. He writes: “The one who brings the most harm to the world is the ruler. If we could get rid of the ruler, people would all obtain what concerns them and what is in their own interest” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 3). Huang Zongxi affirms that it is rational for people to “obtain what concerns them and what is in their own interest,” which is representative of the standpoint of the bourgeoisie. The fact that he takes the emperor, as the symbol of feudal despotism, to be a source of great harm in the world is a manifestation of his unambivalently democratic ideas. On the basis of his views on democracy, Huang Zongxi criticizes the despotic system of feudalism and puts forward the tentative idea of turning schools into advisory organs of government. He indicates that in the feudalist system, “the laws are those of one household and not of the whole world,” so that “what are called laws are not laws at all” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 7). Furthermore, “The laws of one household” should be replaced by “laws of the whole world.” He emphasizes that “human beings can only be governed when laws have been brought to order” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 7). If an adequate system of laws is put in place, then even if the ruler “is personally mistaken, this will not lead to disasters or bring harm to the world” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 7). Here, we can already see the beginnings of the modern rule of law. Inspired by the advisory function certain academies performed during the Ming dynasty, Huang Zongxi proposed turning schools into bureaucratic organs to supervise the ruler in order to limit his power. He writes: What the son of Heaven considers to be right is not necessarily right, what he considers to be wrong is not necessarily wrong. As such, the son of Heaven should not presume to make up what is right and wrong for himself, but rather allow right and wrong to be publicly determined within the schools. (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 10)

In his view, the ruler’s political opinions and decisions are not always correct. Therefore, the ruler should not issue orders because he thinks he is in the right, but should allow everyone to evaluate publicly the merit of his political views and decisions in schools: “It is necessary to make sure that the means to govern the world

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all issue forth from the schools” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 10). This is the earliest instance of the idea of a parliamentary system in China. On the economic level, Huang Zongxi put forward the idea that “both artisans and merchants are fundamental” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 41). He opposed the traditional policy of protecting the natural economy and “treating artisans and merchants as nonessential” and reflected the demands of the class of the bourgeoisie. Although his proposal to reinstall the nine-square system (井田制jing tian zhi) was certainly utopian, in his own time, it had positive significance insofar as it encouraged restraint in the annexation of land. Huang also exposed the irrationality of the system of taxation in a feudal state and proposed that “in reassessing taxes in the empire, they should as a rule be as low as possible” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 24). That is to say, the amount of taxes paid should be restricted to a minimum. Because Huang Zongxi’s An Obscured Paragon of Virtue Awaiting a Royal Visitcontained a democratic consciousness opposed to feudalist despotism, it was banned for a long time during the Qing dynasty. It was only at the end of the Qing period, with the rise of the bourgeois movement for constitutional reform and modernization, that it went through several reprints and became widely known. (2) Historicist Methodology and the Creation of “Heroic Figures” In the field of philosophy, Huang Zongxi employed a theory which reflected certain pantheist tendencies to criticize the idealism of the Neo-Confucian learning of principle. He developed WangShouren’s learning of the mind in a pantheist direction and put forward the novel notion that “the mind has no fundamental substance; what is accomplished through practical effort is its substance” (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 3). He wrote: “Everything between Heaven and Earth is permeated by vital force” (Huang 2012, vol. 8 p. 890), while also claiming that “everything between Heaven and Earth is permeated by the mind” (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 3) and that “the mind is nothing but vital force” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 60). He believed that the principle of the unity of the world is vital force as well as the mind and that matter and spirit form a single substance. As such, he used pantheism to negate the idealist view of substance as residing in absolute vacuity- stillness. At the same time, Huang Zongxi understood this substance, which is “both the mind and vital force,” as a process unfolding itself in line with “ effort” (工夫gong fu) (human cognitive activity). In turn, Huang investigated this process from two separate angles: as a totality, it constitutes the historical process of human knowledge, which leads him to introduce a historicist methodology. From the perspective of the individual, this process is that of the cultivation of an ideal personality, which leads Huang to put forward the idea of creating “heroic figures” (豪杰hao jie). Accordingly, in his Case Studies of Ming Confucians and Case Studies of Song and Yuan Learning (Song Yuan xue’an), he investigates Neo-Confucianism as a historical process of human knowledge. In his preface to the Case Studies of Ming Confucians, he writes: All of these scholars had profound insights as well as more superficial ones; they saw each other’s strengths and shortcomings. They achieved all of this by exerting themselves and

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became accomplished scholars only by applying their minds to the myriad particulars. None of them ever used his spiritual ignorance to beguile people with nonsense. (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 7)

In his view, these outstanding scholars all applied themselves to “getting to the bottom of the myriad particulars of the mind.” Even though their approaches differed, each accomplished something of his own through “effort” (human cognitive activity) and each had his own insights into “substance” (truth). Therefore, the truth is revealed through disputes between different schools where “each has its own profound and more superficial insights and sees the others’ strengths and shortcomings.” This historicist outlook on the truth as a process contains certain dialectical elements and also embodies the democratic spirit of showing equal regard for the academic accomplishments of different schools of thought. Basing himself on a historicist attitude, Huang Zongxi put forward a historicist methodology that comprises the following aspects: First, he stresses the importance of grasping the “overarching aim” (宗旨zong zhi) of different schools of thought. He writes: “In general, each school has its own overarching aim, which is what its followers draw strength from and which serves as the point of entry for scholars who study this school” (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 5). In his view, a scholar has to grasp the “overarching aim” of each school on the basis of a careful study of the available materials. What he calls an “overarching aim” refers to the essentials of a system of thought. Grasping this aim and using it to analyze how thinkers argue for their own viewpoints and refute those of others allows us to come to an understanding of their system. Second, he stresses the importance of paying attention to the creative insights of different schools of thought and individual scholars. Huang Zongxi writes: “In the way of learning, truth is attained when each scholar uses his own insights to obtain it” (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 6). In his opinion, we have to take the creative insights of scholars seriously. The kind of people who “take over other people’s viewpoints and copy them slavishly” are to be ignored. He thinks that the differences among various schools of thought should be investigated carefully, because that is how we can come to a genuine understanding of their creative aspects. In his own words: “There are one-sided views and contrary standpoints. A scholar should focus his attention on precisely such differences in order to reach insight” (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 6). Even “one-sided views” and “contrary standpoints” can be given attention as long as they are creative. In Huang’s opinion, the truth is not the monopoly of a single school of thought, but rather is contained within the work of various thinkers and schools: “Dao is not the private possession of one school. The arduous path of the sages and worthies is scattered throughout the hundred schools” (Huang 2012, vol. 10 p. 351). Here, we can see his opposition to the orthodox Confucian “transmission of Dao” ( 道统dao tong) reflected in his democratic attitude of praise for the disputes among the various schools. Third, different schools of thought have to be investigated in relation to each other in order to grasp the common thread running through them. Huang Zongxi approaches the history of learning as “a single root with many offshoots.” He thinks

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that one should begin with an analysis of the various schools in which one makes “a division between the different origins and currents in order to bring out their common overarching aim,” clarifying the manner in which different schools put forward their respective overarching aims and grasping whether “they originally shared a teacher who invented [the doctrines in question]” (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 4). Afterwards, one should go on to investigate the different schools in a unified manner, following the line of evolution and development which runs through them and grasping “the current of learning running through the centuries” (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 4). Fourth, grasping the common thread of learning has the purpose of leading people towards realistic effort. Huang Zongxi compares his Case Studies of Ming Confucians to a jar of wine and says that “it is like a jar of wine in a thoroughfare, which people will later be able to drink from at will holding only a small cup or a spoon. None of them will be left with an empty stomach” (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 4). In his view, a single root has many offshoots, and the various schools of thought are all manifestations of “the substance of the mind” (心体xin ti), so that all scholars can absorb something beneficial to them from the Case Studies. If his Case Studies would “only lead scholars to multiply their opinions without engaging in realistic effort,” they would be of no use to people in the future (Huang 2012, vol. 7 p. 6). Huang emphasizes the unity of knowledge and action and the importance of guiding moral practice through learning. Huang Zongxi’s methodology contains the beginnings of the principle of the unity of logic and history. He thinks that the history of learning or the history of philosophy is not an accumulation of accidental affairs or something that is passed on from one generation to the next in a family, but rather constitutes a continuous thread that develops according to certain laws. Such regularity or continuity can be grasped by “dividing the different origins and currents in order to bring out their common overarching aim.” Huang Zongxi investigated the notion that “what is accomplished by effort is substance” from the viewpoint of the cultivation of an ideal personality. The ideal personality he envisioned bears no resemblance to what Zhu Xi called “pure Confucians,” but is instead a “heroic figure” (hao jie) capable of “governing the world” and “making great contributions and accomplishing great tasks” (Huang 2012, vol. 10 p. 433). This notion clearly represents a continuation of the “practical learning” (事功之学shi gong zhi xue) of the Eastern Zhejiang school of the Song dynasty, but also had profound significance in Huang’s own time. In his view: “The spirit of heroic figures must always reside somewhere.” All outstanding creations throughout Chinese history, regardless of whether they belong to the fields of philosophy and literature or politics and science, are places where the spirit of “heroic figures” resides. In case “it cannot reside anywhere, it will behave like a caged dragon or a wounded tiger, like a warrior who has been imprisoned,” and the outbreak of fierce struggles or conflicts will cause “Heaven and Earth to be transformed” (Huang 2012, vol. 10 p. 62). This makes it clear that Huang Zongxi sees “heroic figures” as fighters imbued with a spirit of resistance and that the spirit of “heroic figures” manifests itself in resistance and the struggle to escape from “imprisonment.”

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Huang Zongxi thinks that in order to create a “heroic figure,” the first thing to be done is to firmly establish a person’s will: “If his will is firmly established, he becomes a heroic figure. If his will is not firmly established, he remains an ordinary person” (Huang 2012, vol. 1 p. 151). In order to truly establish one’s will, the will has to be realized within words and deeds. The “will” refers to willpower. However, for Huang, just as is the case with Wang Fuzhi, an ideal human personality requires the integral development of “knowledge, intentions, and emotions.” In terms of the relation between reason and will, he indicates that “the will has knowledge as its substance” and that the will has to be grounded in reason. At the same time, he points to the importance of “nurturing vital force and holding firm to the will,” so that “nothing in vital force will remain without principle.” It is the realization of willpower within reason that accounts for the unity of will and reason. When it comes to the relation between reason and emotion, Huang argues that “literature is primarily guided by principle, but without the advent of emotions, principle would also remain superficial” (Huang 2012, vol. 10 p. 669). Texts require the unity of principle and emotion, and the same goes for the human personality. Because literature resembles human beings, poetry and prose are a manifestation of the human personality. Huang Zongxi sees “the texts of Han Yu (d. 824) and Ouyang Xiu (d. 1072), the poems of Li Bai (d. 762) and Du Fu (d. 770), the music of Master Kuang, the researches into the calendar and history of Guo Shoujing (d. 1316), the plays of Wang Shifu (d. 1336) and Guan Hanqing (d. 1320)” as places where the spirit of “heroic figures” resides, that is to say, as the artistic embodiments of an ideal personality (Huang 2012, vol. 10 p. 62). Consequently, Huang made a considerable number of inquiries in the theory of aesthetics and art. His proposal of “expressing intention” is connected to his idea of the spirit of “heroic figures,” which strongly expresses itself in his dislike for the Confucian penchant for poems that are “gentle andhonest” and in his call for a “tempestuous literature” (fenglei zhi wen; literally, “literature of wind and thunder”), which is full of passion and fury. He writes: His writing is characterized by the yang aspect of vital force in Heaven and Earth. If the yang aspect recedes, then it is restrained by double yin, and [the two] will crash into each other and develop into thunder. If the yin aspect recedes, it will be enveloped by double yang, and the two will struggle and develop into wind. (Huang 2012, vol. 10 p. 13)

In this passage, Huang Zongxi further develops Han Yu’s notion, according to which “inequality leads to outcries” (不平则鸣bu ping ze ming) and claims that truly “accomplished literature” is always produced in times of intense social contradictions. Social contradictions set off proverbial thunderbolts and gusts of wind, manifesting themselves in imposing works of art that move people through their tragic nature and can have the long-lasting effect of allowing readers to find inspiration and a way of observing the world, as well as to come together and express their grievances.6 “Tempestuous literature” is precisely the place where the spirit 6

Translator’s note: An allusion to the Analects 17:9: “The Songs can provide a person with inspiration and with a way of observing things. They allow us to come together and express our complaints”.

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of “heroic figures” resides. Huang Zongxi already touched upon the essence of the sublime, which counts as a contribution to the field of aesthetics. Huang employed “tempestuous literature” to call upon “heroic figures” to break out of their “imprisonment” and to struggle for the advent of a new age. He truly counts as a great thinker who had his feet firmly planted in the reality of his own time, while also orienting towards the future.

9.3 Gu Yanwu’s “Practical Learning of Cultivating Oneself and Governing Others” Gu Yanwu was a contemporary of Wang Fuzhi and Huang Zongxi. He used the notion of a “practical learning of cultivating oneself and governing others” (xiu ji zhi ren zhi shi xue) to criticize the shallowness of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism (specifically the learning of the mind), initiated the academic discussion of “practical statecraft” (jing shi zhi yong), and introduced a scientific methodology for studying the Confucian classics. He not only influenced the “unadorned learning” (pu xue) of the Qing dynasty, but also had an impact on modern thinkers. Gu Yanwu (d. 1682), whose birth name was Jiang and whose courtesy name was Ningren, was born in the town of Tinglin in the county of Kunshan (in the presentday Jiangsu Province), which is why he also went by the literary name Tinglin. In his early years, he participated in the Fushe literary society and opposed the power of influential eunuchs at the imperial court. After the fall of the Ming dynasty, he joined in the uprising against the Qing. Following the failure of the uprising, he traveled far and wide throughout the country and made investigations everywhere he went. He collected documents extensively and thereby laid the empirical foundation for his later work. Gu Yanwu was a person of enormous erudition and carried out research into the classics, history, the various philosophers, astronomy, geography, the legal system of decrees and regulations, and so on. His contributions to the field of phonology were especially significant. His main works include Record of Daily Knowledge (Rizhi lu), Strengths and Weaknesses of the Different Regions of the Country (Tianxia junguo libing shu), Five Books on Phonology (Yinxue wushu), and Collected Writings of Tinglin (Tinglin wenji). Like Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu offered a rather penetrating criticism of feudalist despotism. After reading An Obscured Paragon of Virtue Awaiting a Royal Visit, he wrote a letter to Huang to express his appreciation: “When I read your book three times, I knew that I had never been alone in the world, that the mistakes of the many kings may be rectified, and that the glory of the Three Dynasties can be slowly restored” (Gu 2011, vol. 21 pp. 298–299). Regarding his own Record of Daily Knowledge, he added that “what I discuss in this book for the most part corresponds to your work” (Gu 2011, p. 299). It will be apparent that his political thought was fundamentally in line with that of Huang Zongxi. That being said, Gu did not put forward a plan for democratic reform in the same unambiguous fashion as Huang.

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Additionally, the ideal individuals that Gu described were “heroic figures” similar to those which interested Huang. He writes: “When Heaven gives birth to heroic figures, they must certainly take on their responsibility” (Gu 2011, vol. 21 p. 299). “Heroic figures” assume personal responsibility for the rise and fall of the world. Gu points out that “the fall of the country” merely signifies a transition from one dynasty to the next, whereas “the rise and fall of the world” refers to the much graver matter of the survival of the people as a whole. Therefore, “Even the humblest of people has a responsibility in safeguarding the world” (Gu 2011, vol. 18 p. 526–527). It is precisely by cherishing this attitude of assuming personal responsibility for the rise and fall of the world that Gu Yanwu puts forward his “practical learning of cultivating oneself and governing others” (Gu 2011, vol. 18 p. 308). In his view, with the popularity of the learning of the mind towards the end of the Ming dynasty, Neo-Confucianism had become a “empty teaching” much like Zen Buddhism, and had wrought havoc in the country and brought ruin to the people. Consequently, he emphasized that “in ancient times, the learning of principle was the study of classic texts” (Gu 2011, vol. 21 p. 109). Negating the learning of principle through the study of classic texts comes down to replacing “empty words concerning the elucidation of the mind and the observation of human nature” with a “practical learning of cultivating oneself and governing others” (Gu 2011, vol. 18 p. 308). This “practical learning” means replacing empty speculation, far removed from reality, with “practical statecraft,” and countering subjective conjectures by means of evidential research that seeks truth from facts. (1) The Unity of “Broadly Studying All Forms and Learning” and “Conducting Oneself with a Sense of Shame” Gu Yanwu’s approach to the debate concerning “the mind and matter (things)” tended towards pantheism. This expressed itself in his interpretation of spirit in terms of the vital force with which human beings have been endowed: “When vital force flourishes, it becomes luminous” (Gu 2011, vol. 18 p. 78). In his view, spirit is the most vigorous form of material vital force. As such, he fuses spirit with matter. In terms of the debate concerning “principle and vital force,” Gu Yanwu tends towards materialism. He writes: “That which permeates everything between Heaven and Earth is vital force” (Gu 2011, vol. 18 p. 78). He sees everything that exists as the gathering and dispersal of vital force and considers “principle” to be the order in the flow of vital force, which qualifies as something objective. Since the “mind” is the quintessence of vital force, “principle is contained within my mind but must be examined within things” (Gu 2011, vol. 19 p. 718). “Principle” is something present within the “mind,” but has to be verified within external things. Gu Yanwu’s “practical learning of cultivating oneself and governing others” is mainly an epistemological argument that advocates the unity of knowledge and action as well as the unity of epistemology and ethics. He writes: “In my humble opinion, the way of the sages consists in ‘broadly studying all forms of learning’ (Gu 2011, vol. 19 p. 718) and ‘conducting oneself with a sense of shame’” (Gu 2011, vol. 21

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p. 93).7 “Conducting oneself with a sense of shame” not only refers to self-discipline, but also and above all points towards a feeling of responsibility for the rise and fall of the world. If one does not manage to save the common people from disaster, one has to feel personally ashamed. “Broadly studying all forms of learning” refers to the idea that the system of rituals, music, and all other forms of human culture belong to the sphere of learning. It is this combination of “broadly studying all forms of learning” and “conducting oneself with a sense of shame” that constitutes a “practical learning of cultivating oneself and governing others.” Gu Yanwu criticizes the scholars of Neo-Confucianism for abandoning knowledge gained through extensive study in their search for an all-embracing method, making no mention of the great poverty in the world and instead discussing theories about “concentrating on the precariousness [of the human mind] and the subtlety [of the Dao]”8 for days upon end. In other words, Gu criticizes them for neither “broadly studying all forms of learning” nor “conducting themselves with a sense of shame” (Gu 2011, vol. 21 p. 92). In epistemological terms, Gu argues that one should not “abandon knowledge gained through extensive study in searching for an all-embracing method.” He emphasizes that it is impossible to search for a comprehensive abstract theory without relying on first- or second-hand experience, and stresses the importance of paying experience and sensibility the attention which they warrant. In his own words, “Things heard and seen by the sages are nothing other than Change” (Gu 2011, vol. 21 p. 138). In his view, the “Dao of Change” is not external to sensible experience and abstract principles are located inside of concrete things: “If there were no concrete things, Dao would remain without a place to reside” (Gu 2011, vol. 18 p. 79). At the same time, Gu Yanwu indicates that knowledge cannot remain at the level of sensibility, but has to “observe interconnections” on the basis of extensive study and come to a genuine understanding of the principles that run through everything. He writes: Confucius guided himself by cherishing the past while also remaining inquisitive9 and gaining knowledge through extensive observation.10 However, he gave more precise examples [of this practice] as well […] Although the three hundred poems in the Book of Songs are extremely wide-ranging, Confucius said that “in one word, they can be summarized as saying ‘Oh, do remain without deviation.’”11 […] This is what he meant when he said “for me, a single thread runs through everything”. (Gu 2011, vol. 18 p. 315)12

In other words, it is only on the basis of “cherishing the past” and “extensive observation,” and through bringing experience to the level of theory, that one gains a comprehensive grasp on the essence as well as the details. For example, Confucius summarized the three hundred poems in the Book of Songs through the expression 7

Translator’s note: Analects 17: 20. Translator’s note: Reference to the Book of Documents (Shangshu) and Counsels of the Great Yu (Da Yu mo). 9 Translator’s note: Analects 7: 20. 10 Translator’s note: Analects 7: 28. 11 Translator’s note: Analects 2: 2. 12 Translator’s note: Analects 15: 3. 8

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“Oh, do remain without deviation.” If the comprehensive principle has been grasped, the rest can be understood by analogy. It will be apparent that, in epistemology, Gu Yanwu’s “practical learning of cultivating oneself and governing others” basically investigated the relations between knowledge and action and sensibility and reason in the perspective of naïve materialism. (2) A Scientific Method of Scholarly Research On a methodological level, Gu Yanwu’s “practical learning of cultivating oneself and governing others” introduced a scientific method of scholarly research and made prominent achievements in the study of the classics, phonology, geography, and other fields. In doing so, Gu laid the foundation for the method of “unadorned learning” in the Qing dynasty, and as a result he would come to be venerated as a pioneer of this current of thought. His methodology primarily consists of the following steps: First, he proposes that one should systematically collect sources and that it is especially important to engage in field study. Gu Yanwu thinks that “broadly studying” involves “experiencing the customs of the nine regions and researching the historical documents of the previous dynasties” (Gu 2011, vol. 19 p. 1116). It is important to systematically acquire experience, and personal experience is especially important. For example, he points out that, in order for one to become truly skilled in hydraulics, one has to “take the water as his teacher” (Gu 2011, vol. 13 p. 560). An engineer must come to a personal understanding of the real conditions of a waterway; if he neglects the actual circumstances and is guided solely by the notes in ancient books, he will become the laughingstock of experts. Throughout his life, Gu Yanwu roamed all over the country, and every time he arrived somewhere new, he made a field study. Many of his works were written by combining field studies with knowledge gained through reading. Second, Gu points to the necessity of making scientific comparisons and inductions. In his preface to the Record of Daily Learning, Pan Lei (d. 1708) notes that “when Gu Yanwu had doubts, he repeatedly investigated the matter himself. When he had a personal insight, he invoked the old in order to prove the new, and would only stop after having overcome all the obstacles in his theory” (Pan 2011, p. 12). “Doubts” refers to doubts concerning traditional explanations. “Personal insights” refers to creative interpretations. In order to resolve such doubts, it is necessary to compare different texts and also to compare books with facts. Only through a repeated process of textual reading and comparison is it possible to arrive at new insights to replace traditional points of view, which is what is meant by “personal insight.” Logically speaking, putting forward a “personal insight” involves formulating a hypothesis and then researching it empirically. Borrowing the expressions of the Ming scholar Chen Di (d. 1617), Gu Yanwu points out that evidential research requires “primary evidence” (本证ben zheng) as well as “additional evidence” (旁 证pang zheng). “Primary evidence” refers to proof within a given text itself, whereas “additional evidence” refers to proof found in other texts. This method of delivering proof is an inductive one. The scientific method of induction comes down to formulating a standpoint (hypothesis) by means of a comparative analysis of facts and

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proceeding to collect evidence in order to verify this hypothesis. If there is sufficient and convincing evidence and no proof to the contrary, then it can be taken as conclusive. If, however, there is convincing proof to the contrary, the hypothesis in question should be abandoned. Third, Gu indicates that it is necessary to engage in historical research in order to “lay bare the source and the course of development [of history].” In his research on the Confucian classics, Gu Yanwu writes: The learning of classics has its own source and course of development. From the Han period to the Six Dynasties and the Tang and Song period, they all have to be researched one by one until one reaches the writings of recent Confucian scholars. Only then can one gain knowledge of all their points of similarity and difference or agreement and disagreement. (Gu 2011, vol. 21 pp. 139–140)

In his view, it is only through historical research into the classics that a person can come to a profound understanding of their “points of similarity and difference or agreement and disagreement,” that is to say, of the laws of their transformation and development. In his Record of Daily Learning, he approaches the meaning of the classics, as well as the study of history, politics, economics, the system of rituals, geography, art, and many other disciplines by devoting himself to “laying bare their respective sources and their course of development and correcting their mistakes through research”” (Pan 2011, p. 12). As such, his work embodied the unity of a historicist attitude and a critical spirit. Fourth, it is necessary to examine things and thereby to constantly renew one’s own knowledge. Time and again, Gu Yanwu emphasizes that “an exemplary person engages in learning in order to clarify the Dao and to save the world”” (Gu 2011, vol. 21 p. 148). Since learning has to come in the form of “practical statecraft,” it stands to reason that it cannot be detached from reality and that it is necessary to examine one’s own viewpoints through actual things. In his field studies, Gu would often ask for the opinions of common people and whenever he discovered that what they were saying “did not conform to what I usually heard, I would go into a bookstore, open up a book and check it against what I found there.” Additionally, he stressed that scholars should “be capable of perceiving their own mistakes” and should constantly correct their own errors, thereby increasing their knowledge (Gu 2011, vol. 21 p. 144). This amounts to a rejection of the apriorism that strives for an all-encompassing and absolute truth achieved through sudden enlightenment. Seen from the perspective of the evolution of thought, Huang Zongxi mainly inclined towards a criticism of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers, while retaining some of the traces of the learning of mind of Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming. By contrast, Gu Yanwu was primarily focused on criticizing Lu Xiangshan and Wang Shouren. We could say that, in his methodology, he developed Zhu Xi’s method of “investigating things and extending knowledge” in a materialist direction. Zhu Xi’s requirement that analysis and analogy be based on “extensive learning” contains some rational elements of scientific abstraction. However, at the same time, he turned the abstract concepts gained by means of analysis and analysis into something metaphysical, lapsing into apriorism. Gu Yanwu gave a major impetus to the further development

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of the rational elements in Zhu Xi’s methodology while overcoming its metaphysical and aprioristic elements. Gu’s methodology was inherited and developed by the School of Han Learning during the Qing period, but only in a one-sided manner, because this school ran counter to the primary intention of Gu’s “practical statecraft,” as its adherents limited themselves to immersion in and extensive study of ancient texts. While Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi, and Gu Yanwu each made his own contributions to methodology, these great thinkers failed to provide a method for the modern natural sciences. During the same period, Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo had already laid the foundation for a methodology of the modern empirical sciences in the West and thus stimulated the development of science. Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi, and Gu Yanwu had a strong scientific spirit and, in thisrespect, they were hardly inferior to the European scientists who were their contemporaries. However, the conditions prevailing in China in their time did not lead them into laboratories and factories, but rather brought them face to face with real social problems and the project of summarizing and reflecting on history. Consequently, their contributions to methodology can mainly be found in fields such as philosophy, history, and textual criticism.

9.4 Yan Yuan’s Discussion of “Practice” and Dai Zhen’s Discussion of “Knowledge”13 During the period of the Qing dynasty, the rationalistic Neo-Confucianism of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi regained its position as an orthodox official philosophy. Nevertheless, the critical trend which attacked such Neo-Confucianism did not completely disappear. Yan Yuan and Dai Zhen were the most conspicuous of those thinkers who adopted a critical attitude towards Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism. Yan Yuan (1635–1740), styled Yizhi or Hunran but best known as Xizhai, was a native of Boye (in present-day Hebei Province). In his early years, Yan was interested in Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Shouren’s doctrines and later converted to the doctrine of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, but he finally turned to criticizing Cheng and Zhu, claiming to restore the doctrine of Duke Zhou and Confucius. In his later years, Yan was invited to be the director of the Zhangnan Academy in Feixiang. Among his main philosophical writings are Collected Thoughts on Four Topics, Corrections of Wrong Interpretations of the Four Books, and Commentaries on the Collectd Sayings of Zhu Xi. Dai Zhen (1723–1777), styled Dongyuan, was a native of Xiuning in Anhui Province. As a youth, he worked in business and taught at a primary school. In his later years, he was appointed as the editor of the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries and assumed this responsibility until death. Dai was an expert in astronomy, mathematics, history, and geography, and made important contributions to the study of Confucian classics and philosophy. He is viewed as a great master of “unadorned learning”. His main philosophical works include On 13

Translator’s note: Starting here the rest of the chapter was translated by Xu Ruzhuang.

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the Nature of Goodness and Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Book of Mencius. Yan Yuan and Dai Zhen’s criticisms of the rationalistic Neo-Confucianism of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi have their respective peculiarities: the former emphasizes “practice” and the latter “knowledge.” (1) Yan Yuan’s Discussion of “Practice” Yan Yuan, together with his disciple Li Gong (1659–1733), set up the Yan-Li school of thought, which stressed “practice” and was opposed to the Neo-Confucian school of principle, which, Li believed, was engaged mainly in empty talk concerning mind and human nature. With respect to the debate over “righteousness and profit,” Yan Yuan defends utilitarianism. He revised Dong Zhongshu’s well-known phrase, “Those who pursue what is right or appropriate give no consideration to any consequent benefit, and those who understand the Dao give no consideration to any consequent utility,” into “Those who pursue what is right or appropriate give consideration to the consequent benefit, and those who understand the Dao give consideration to the consequent utility” (Yan 1987, vol. 1 p. 163). He regards righteousness and profit, or the Dao and utility, as being united. He criticizes Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism for its emphasis on the study of outdated texts and “not concerning itself with practice and managing worldly affairs” (Yan 1987, vol. 1 p. 257). Such a utilitarian view comes down in one continuous line from Chen Liang and Ye Shi. As to the debate over “principle and vital force,” Yan Yuan claims that “principle and vital force are amalgamated into a single continuum,” expressing his pantheistic inclination, which is similar to Huang Zongxi’s. Yan’s major contribution to philosophy is that he focuses more on the epistemological significance of “practice” than his predecessors did, and that he presents anapparent materialist view on the debate on mind and matter/things (knowledge and action). His view can best be understood by considering its three main elements. First, Yan Yuan stresses that “the extension of knowledge” is aimed at “action.” He says: “Knowledge has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of things. It is similar to the fact that the eye has no substance of its own; its substance consists of physical forms and colors” (Yan 1987, vol. 1 p. 159). The eye loses its function as soon as it is divorced from physical forms and colors. Objective things are the foundation of human cognitive function. According to Yan Yuan, among the five activities of “learning, questioning, thinking, discriminating, and acting,” only “acting” is the source of “knowledge.” As a result, Yan offers a novel interpretation of the term ge wu (格物) in that “when things (wu) are ge (examined, investigated), true knowledge is extended (acquired),” holding that “the word ge is the same as that in the expression, to ge (capture and kill) fierce animals with one’s own hands’” (Yan 1987, vol. 1 p. 159). That is, the word ge means acting on a thing with one’s own hands. For instance, one may know by its shape and color that the radish can be eaten; however, if one wants to know its taste, one has to eat it oneself. Hence the words: “Only by acting on things with our own hands can we achieve knowledge” (Yan 1987, vol. 1 p. 159). Yan Yuan is aware that knowledge depends upon practice and that one

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cannot achieve any true knowledge without taking efforts in practice. Accordingly, Yan levels criticisms at Zhu Xi, whose emphasis on “knowledge” at the expense of “action” cannot result in true knowledge. Second, Yan Yuan’s conception of “practice” also involves the verification of knowledge. One cannot come to know music merely by reading a musical score, even if one does so hundreds of times. One simply has to strike and blow musical instruments, sing with one’s own voice, dance with one’s own body and go through all these oneself before one knows what music really is. Only in this way will one know music perfectly. Likewise, a person who reads hundreds of medical books but cannot feel the pulse, make medicines, or cure patients cannot be regarded as a physician who has a good command of the art of healing. Therefore, an individual’s virtue and learning must be tested against his “practice”, rather than merely against what he says and writes. Third, Yan Yuan thinks that one’s knowledge, capacities, and morals tend to develop along with accumulations of one’s own “practice.” He says: “What Confucius teaches people is simply how to practice things. It is not until principles are sought from things that a perfect understanding is obtained” (Yan 1987, vol. 1 p. 71). The knowledge of things is completed only when their objective laws are comprehended in praxis. And “seeking principles” from “practicing things” has to undergo a process. Take, for example, one who desires to play the lute. As a beginner, one plucks its strings with one’s fingers and makes them accord with tones; this is called “learning the lute.” Soon afterwards one can play the lute in a high or low and quick or slow tone in conformity with the norm; this is called “practicing the lute.” Finally, one can integrate the musical instrument, notes, and one’s own body and mind into a harmonious whole; this is called “being skillful at the lute” (Yan 1987, vol. 3 p. 78– 79). In Yan’s opinion, a person’s virtue also undergoes a similar developmental process and therefore, in the very beginning of his Analects, Confucius exhorts his pupils “to learn and to practice from time to time what has been learned” (Yan 1987, vol. 2 p. 668). Only through “practice” can the perfection of human nature be achieved. Yan Yuan underlines the role of “practice” in the acquisition of knowledge, which is somewhat reasonable. However, his overestimation of the role of perceptual experience is suggestive of empiricism. (2) Dai Zhen’s Discussion on “Knowledge” Dai Zhen attacks Neo-Confucianistss for “killing people with principles” since they, especially the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, condemn normal human desires as wicked and try to suppress them by appeal to the “principle of Heaven,” which is essentially a metaphysical generalization of feudal ethical codes. As he says: “The distinction between human desires principle becomes an instrument for murdering people” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 209). This criticism is to some degree reflective of the concerns of burghers at that time. With respect to the debate over “principle and vital force (the Dao and concrete things),” Dai Zhen inherits and develops the monistic theory of vital force from Zhang

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Zai onward. Dai says: “The transformations of vital force produce and reproduce without pause. That is why this process is called the Dao” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 172). The vital forces of yin and yang are substances and the process of their changes is the Dao. In his opinion, to use “what exists before physical forms”(形而上xing er shang) and “what exists after physical forms” (形而下xing er xia) to designate respectively “the Dao” and “concrete things” is only to discriminate between the two different existing forms of vital force. As he says: “Form” is a designation for what has already assumed shape and substance. To speak of “what exists before physical forms” is like speaking of “what is prior to shapes”; to speak of “what exists after physical forms” is like speaking of “what is posterior to shapes.” It is obvious that the yin and yang, not yet having assumed shapes and substances, should therefore be referred to as “what exists before physical forms,” and not as “what exists after physical forms” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 173)

This is opposed to Cheng-Zhu’s view that “principle” is outside of “vital force” and “the Dao” is outside of “concrete things.” Furthermore, the developmental process of unceasing production and reproduction of the myriad things is law-governed, and every kind of thing has its specific laws, that is, the so-called orderly principles (条 理tiao li) or principles of differentiation (分理fen li). Scientific research is aimed at grasping these laws. Being dependent upon concrete things, these “orderly principles” and “principles of differentiation” cannot be derived from the all-embracing “principle” (the Great Ultimate), but should be apprehended through the study of concrete things. In this way, Dai Zhen rejects Cheng-Zhu’s idealism, which takes principle as the original substance of things. Dai Zhen’s major contribution to philosophy is that he makes a materialistic exploration of the debate over “mind and matter/things (or knowledge and action),” especially of “knowledge,” and sets forth some original views. First, as to the relationship of mind to matter/things, Dai Zhen definitely asserts that matter is the original substance of the mind. He says: “There exist mind and intelligence only when there are human blood and vital force” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 9). He points out that knowledge, perceptual and rational, does not emerge on its own but is produced from contacts between external objects and the subject. He says: “Tastes, sounds, and colors lie in external objects, but they come in contact with our blood and vital force. Principles and righteousness lie in affairs, but they come in contact with our mind and intelligence” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 155). That is to say, only when those objectively existing sense-objects come into contact with one’s sense organs will one have sensations, and only when affairs come into contact with a one’s mind and intelligence, may one comprehend the “principles and righteousness” embodied in affairs. Proceeding from this point of view, Dai Zhen criticizes those rationalistic NeoConfucianists who regard “principle” as the spiritual substance independent of things and affairs, and who “separate principle and vital force into two different substances” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 175). What he emphasizes is that there is only “one original substance” in the universe, namely, the vital world, which is the source of the mind. Mind derives from matter, and cognition takes place in human body. Only through learning can we achieve supreme intelligence.

Second, Dai Zhen distinguishes between opinion and truth in clearer and more definite terms. He says:

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Only when minds generally agree upon something can it be called principle and righteousness. What does not meet general agreement, but is merely a single person’s opinion, is neither principle nor righteousness. General agreement exists when each individual maintains that a thing is so, and throughout the world all generations say it is something unchangeable. (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 153)

Here, “principle” refers to objective laws and “righteousness” to social norms regulating people’s conduct. “Principle” and “righteousness,” as truths, are generally acknowledged to be unchangeable, whereas opinion is something mingled with one’s private biases. Consequently, Dai holds that there must be a distinction between opinion and truth, and that one can never obstinately take one’s opinion for truth. It is the rationalistic Neo-Confucianists who “take their own opinions for principles and righteousness,” regarding their own subjective views as truth and imposing them on others. (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 153) Dai Zhen’s criticism of the absolutist character of Song-Ming rationalistic Neo-Confucianism has profound significance for his times. According to Dai, there are two ways to avoid mistaking subjective opinion for truth. One is to “get rid of selfishness” through strengthening altruism, that is, “Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you,” and the other is to “disperse delusion” and get rid of one-sidedness through hard study; as he says: “The best way to get rid of selfishness is to strengthen altruism. The best way to disperse delusion is to study” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 20). Once one accomplishes the goals of “getting rid of selfishness” and “dispersing delusion,” one reaches the state of the unity of “humanity and wisdom” that is claimed by Confucius. As Dai says: “A person of humanity and wisdom is one who does not possess selfishness and delusion” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 21). This is obviously influenced by Xunzi’s thought. Third, the difference between human beings and beasts, according to Dai Zhen, is that human beings can achieve wisdom and freedom through learning. As he says: “Things follow the natural, while human beings understand the necessary; this is the difference between human beings and things” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 79). Here, he distinguishes naturalness and necessity, as representing a pair of antithetical categories. The term “necessity,” so called by Dai Zhen, refers to “principle” and “righteousness,” that is, objective laws and standards for human conduct. In his view, human beings aim at recognizing necessity from naturalness and thus relegate naturalness to necessity. He says: “Concrete objects and concrete events are nothing but natural. When they arrive at the state of being necessary, Heaven, Earth, humankind, things, events, and activities will be in accord with principle” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 163). That is to say, all objective things and events are natural and spontaneous, but they will arrive at the state of being necessary when their laws (“principles”) are comprehended and used to prescribe things and events. Likewise, “Desire is natural to our blood and vital force.[…] A clear and complete understanding of natural desire, without even the minutest mistakes, is called its necessity” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 170). When a person’s natural desire is appropriately gratified, it reaches the state of being necessary and thus becomes his or her virtue. In Dai’s opinion, one cannot discuss “what is necessary” apart from “what is natural,” that is, one must neither seek “principle” apart from things and events nor seek moral goodness apart from human natural desire, but one should instead heighten one’s awareness endlessly and develop oneself from “what

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is natural” into “what is necessary.” And when one reaches the state of beingnecessary, what one achieves is a perfect development of one’s natural character. This is a developmental process acquired in one’s life, not a process of “returning to one’s beginning” as spoken of by those rationalistic Neo-Confucianists. As Dai says: “To attribute what is natural to what is necessary, thereby giving a finished perfection to what is natural: this is what is known as developing the natural to its highest point” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 12). Dai Zhen’s discussion on “what is natural” and “what is necessary” touches on the dialectical cognitive process from “in itself” to “for itself” and from “what is spontaneous” to “what is conscious.” Lastly, Dai Zhen’s understanding of “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” has a scientific methodological significance. As a methodology, “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge,” according to Dai, has two main requirements: “making examinations of things so as to completely comprehend their actual situations” and “thinking over things so as to achieve thorough knowledge of them” (Dai 1991, vol. 2 p. 23–24). So far as the first demand is concerned, it is necessary to comprehend specific laws of things through an exact analysis of them; as Dai says: “As to the principles of things, it is necessary to analyze the things themselves with the utmost minuteness, and then their principles will be obtained” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 205). And so far as the second demand is concerned, it is necessary to obtain “a very comprehensive idea.” The “very comprehensive idea” refers to the kind of understanding whichpossesses adequate and comprehensive evidence, has strong logical connections, and is in harmony with those principles which are already proven. In contrast, there is non-comprehensive idea which must be rejected since it relies on “hearsay,” sticks to “opinion,” rests on empty words without factual grounds, or is supported by only a single piece of evidence. It can thus be seen that Dai’s methodology of “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” requires not only an examination and analysis of things but also an exact logical proof so as to achieve a deep, scientific understanding. However, Dai Zhen’s philosophical thought isstrongly biased towards metaphysics as opposed to dialectics. For example, he discusses “knowledge” apart from “action,” stressing the need to “devote one’s efforts to knowledge first” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 207). He argues that the “categories” of things are unchanging; as he says: “The distinctions between categories have been the same for a thousand ages” (Dai 1991, vol. 1 p. 176). He makes use of the metaphor of tally to explain the relation between ear and sound, eye and color, and mind and principle, and holds that the subjective corresponds directly with the objective. In his view, knowledge of a thing or event can be acquired in a single act of knowing, which is indeed an expression of his mechanical theory of reflection.

References

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References Dai, Zhen. 1991. Complete Works of Dai Zhen, ed. The Editorial Committee of Dai Zhen. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. Gu, Yanwu. 2011 Complete Works of Gu Yanwu, vol. 21, ed. Huang Kuan Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House. Huang, Zongxi. 2012. Complete Works of Huang Zongxi, ed. Wu Guang. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji Publishing House. Pan, Lei. 2011. “Introduction to the Record of Daily Knowledge.” In Gu Yanwu, Complete Works of Gu Yanwu, vol. 21, ed. Huang Kuan (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House. Wang, Fuzhi. 2011. Complete Works of Chuanshan, ed. Editorial Committee of Chuanshan. Changsha: Yuelu Publishing House. Yan, Yuan. 1987. Collected Works of Yan Yuan, ed. Wang Xingxian. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.

Part II

A Brief Summary

Below, we provide a brief summary of the logical development of Chinese philosophy during the period from the Qin and Han to the Qing (prior to the Opium War of 1840).

I As a generalization and summation of natural knowledge and social knowledge, philosophy is firmly rooted in human social practice. It is social practice that pushes philosophy forward through the struggle between political schools of thought and the struggle of science against religion and superstition. On the basis of this understanding, we make an examination of the history of Chinese philosophy during that period. We might reasonably divide the history of China’s feudal society into four stages: the Warring States—its beginning stage; the Qin and Han dynasties to the Tang dynasty —its earlier stage; the Song and Yuan dynasties to the Ming dynasty —its later stage; and the period from the middle of the Ming dynasty to the Qing dynasty (prior to the Opium War of 1840)—its last stage. During all four of these stages the principal class conflict was between the peasantry and the landlord class. However, there were still sharp conflicts between the declining slave-owning class and the rising landlord class during the beginning stage of feudal society, and conflicts between the stratum of burghers and the forces of feudalism arose with the appearance of the seeds of capitalism in the last stage of feudal society. During the pre-Qin period, political and ideological struggles centered around the debates on “past and present” and on “propriety and law.” With the confluence of Confucianism and Legalism in the Han dynasty, the landlord class publicly identified with the doctrine of “upholding the exclusive dominance of Confucianism,” while in effect using the dual tactics of punishment and moral education to manage the people they ruled. The dominant form of ideology at that

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time was the Confucian ethical code, the metaphysical foundation of which—“the Mandate of Heaven”—shaped the four patterns of feudalist authority: political authority, religious authority, clan authority, and the authority of the husband. These four kinds of authority were the strong ropes with which the landlord class bound the peasantry. Nevertheless, insurgent peasant armies marched with slogans such as “No kings, dukes, generals and ministers are such by birth”, “Equality between high and low and between rich and poor,” “Equalization of landownership,” “Freedom from taxation,” and so on, expressing their demands for political and economic equality and their opposition to the feudal hierarchy in increasingly explicit terms. This was a struggle between two antagonistic worldviews held respectively by the landlord class and the peasantry. Such a struggle did exert a profound influence upon the development of philosophy, but the philosophical struggle was mostly waged within the landlord class. Being dissatisfied with oppression and humiliation by the largest landlords, small and mid-size landlords demanded checks on the annexation of their lands and other reforms and readjustments to be carried out within the feudal system. As a result, in the debates over “righteousness and profit” and over “principle and desire,” the intellectual defenders of the small and mid-size landlords frequently adopted a utilitarian attitude and were interested in exposing hypocrisy in the Confucian ethical code. This was an important factor in inclining them towards materialism, but was not sufficient in itself to lead to materialist thinking. It was not until the transition of the Ming dynasty to the Qing dynasty, when the social stratum of burghers was on the rise, that progressive thinkers such as Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu, Wang Fuzhi, and others presented substantive criticisms of feudal despotism and gave a powerful impetus to the development of philosophy towards materialism. During the period from the Qin-Han dynasties to the Qing dynasty, however, the primary impetus to the advancement of philosophy came from the increase in material production and the progress of science. Through the struggle of science against superstition, the development of material production conditioned the development of philosophy and led to a series of successes for materialism in its struggle against theology and idealism; hence the development of philosophy took place in the form of several smaller leaps before it completed its last qualitative change. Specifically, the relationship between the progress of science and the development of philosophy during that period can be explained by the following three observations. First, the sciences that made the most rapid progress from the Qin-Han period on were primarily those related to agricultural production, such as astronomy, calendrical science, medicine, pharmacology, agronomy, and so forth. As a result, Chinese materialism primarily assumed the form of the monistic theory of vital force for a long time; it was frequently integrated with naïve dialectics, and in turn the conception of nature that regarded the forces of yin and yang as the original material substance became the philosophical foundation of those above-mentioned sciences. The Mohist School of the pre-Qin period had brought forward the idea of atomism and constructed a scientific system of formal logic, but these theories failed to be developed significantly after the Qin and Han. One of the reasons for

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the decline of Mohism lay precisely in its lack of connections with those sciences related to agricultural production. Second, the relationship between science and philosophy was constantly changing. In the remote antiquity of China, there was only an all-embracing learning called dao shu (道术, philosophy, literally, the learning of the Dao); later, various sciences split off one by one from philosophy, which was an inexorable trend. The differentiation of philosophy into many sciences was beneficial both for philosophy itself and for its daughter disciplines, but also led to the risk that philosophy would come to be divorced from the sciences. The separation of philosophy from science was bound to encourage idealism. Only when philosophy was capable of absorbing and summarizing the achievements of science would it be possible to advance further along the path of materialism in a way which would enable philosophy to provide useful guidance for science. Thus, philosophy faced a dilemma: on the one hand, it had to allow scientific disciplines to split off from it intermittently, but on the other hand, it had to draw inspirations from the sciences as well as take them under its guidance. Only under a narrow set of historical conditions could some outstanding thinkers offer a correct solution to this dilemma. After the pre-Qin period, the respective eras of Wang Chong and Zhang Heng, of Fan Zhen and Jia Sixie, of Zhang Zai and Shen Kuo, and of Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu, and Wang Fuzhi all furnished such historical conditions. At those times, the sciences in certain areas made epoch-making advances through long-term accumulation, winning great triumphs in their struggle against superstition; philosophy and the sciences were closely interconnected and promoted each other. These conditions allowed the materialistic monistic theory of vital force to achieve great advances and also led to smaller advances that indicated different stages in the history of philosophy. Third, at each stage of the history of human knowledge, science and myth struggled with each other and were interconnected in various ways at the same time. Myth tends to become superstition, for it tries to conquer natural forces and detach itself from reality by means of imagination, but it does vividly represent humankind’s certain mental powers and needs. Myth may be fragmentary, whereas religion is a myth that has been systematized in such a way that it becomes a way of comprehending the world in a given historical stage. Now that myth represents humankind’s mental powers, religious theology may likewise contain certain links of the movement of human cognition under given historical conditions (not all historical periods), therefore they should not be ignored by a historian of philosophy. The Confucian theology of the Han dynasty, Buddhism and Religious Daoism in the Wei, Jin, Southern, Northern, Sui and Tang dynasties, can all be taken as cases in point. Of course, science will eventually break with religion and superstition since there is no room for compromise between them. In the periods in question, science waged repeated struggles against superstition, as did atheism against theology and materialism against idealism. Meanwhile, all these struggles were interwoven with the conflicts between various theological or idealist sects. With the progress of science and the continuous overcoming of superstition, forms of idealism became more and more refined, through the development of Wei-Jin

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Mysterious Learning from Han Confucian theology and of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism from Sui-Tang Buddhism and Daoist theology. Meanwhile, materialism was developing steadily, not only in summing up new achievements of the sciences but also in exploringthose links examined by idealists. After several lesser leaps indicating different stages, philosophy once again realized a unity of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics on a much higher level and completed a qualitative change at the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, when China’s feudal society finally reached a stage of self-criticism. The self-criticism stage of China’s feudal society was brought about by changes of social economic conditions and class relations. From the middle Tang to the early Song, China’s feudal society underwent a change from an earlier to a later stage; Liu Zongyuan’s and Liu Yuxi’s important positions in the history of philosophy were primarily the result of such socio-historical conditions. Combining the history of the mutual promotion between science and philosophy with the change in social class struggles, we may explore how social practice pushed philosophy forward so that we can grasp the course of the history of Chinese philosophy from the Qin-Han to the Qing.

II The history of philosophy is a dialectical movement of knowing centering on the fundamental problem of philosophy. We might reasonably compare the course of philosophical development from the Qin to the Qing, that is, from Xunzi to Wang Fuzhi, to a great circle that consists of several small circles. For example, the debate on huoshi and mowei came full circle at the point of Wang Chong; the debate on “body and soul” came full circle at the point of Fan Zhen; the debate on “effort and fate,” as one aspect of the debate on “Heaven and humankind,” formed a small circle which continued until the period of Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi; the debate on “being and non-being” (movement and stillness) came full circle at the point of Zhang Zai; the period from Zhang Zai to Wang Fuzhi could be also regarded as a small circle in which the debates centering on the fundamental problem of philosophy were focused on the relationships between “principle and vital force (the Dao and concrete things)” and between “mind and matter/things (knowledge and action),” which were summed up by Wang Fuzhi. It is obvious that these circles were identical with the abovementioned periodic changes of philosophy examined in terms of the root of social practice. However, the term “circle” is just a vivid figure of speech and can never be considered as a rigid pattern. The logical development of philosophy in this period bore some similarities to that of the pre-Qin period, that is, in the process of development centering on the fundamental problem of philosophy, both of them were full of the tensions between empiricism and apriorism, between relativism and dogmatism, and between intuitive materialism and idealistic dialectics, while the struggle between materialism and idealism penetrated into all these tensions from beginning to end.

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During the Han period, the center of philosophical controversy shifted to the area of cosmology and the debate over “body and soul.” Dong Zhongshu’s theological teleology was of apriorism, while the author of the Huainanzi employed an empiricist method to demonstrate that the interaction between the vital forces of yin and yangis a mechanical action. Criticizing both teleology and mechanism on materialist grounds, Wang Chong asserted that “truth and falsehood do not depend upon the ear and eye, but require the exercise of intellect”—a good view of the relationship between the perceptual and the rational. In the Wei and Jin period, ontological explorations centered on the debate on “being and non-being (movement and stillness)” arose. Both Wang Bi’s doctrine of “valuing non-being” and Pei Wei’s doctrine of “exalting being” had a dogmatic bias, since they each emphasized one aspect of the problem. In their Commentaries on the Zhuangzi, Xiang Xiu and Guo Xiang argued that “when there is being, there is non-being,” opposing the relativistic doctrine of “self-transformation” to the metaphysicalview of being. The development of the doctrine of “self-transformation” on the one hand resulted in Seng Zhao’s doctrine of “neither existence nor nonexistence,” which was a more radical kind of relativism; on the other hand, it resulted in the development of the principle of the unity of material substance and function, which was embodied in Fan Zhen’s good summation of the debate on “body and soul.” Prior to this, idealistic apriorists had always taken body and soul to be separate, holding, in one way or another, that “the soul does not become extinct as soon as the body decays,” while materialists had asserted both the body and the soul to be made of vital force, coarse or refined, and had applied such an empiricist approach as the metaphor of a candle and its fire to their demonstrations. The notions that “the body is the material substance of the soul and the soul is the function of the body” and “the inseparability of the soul from the body” spoken of by Fan Zhen were at once materialistic and dialectical. After the Wei, Jin, and the Southern and Northern dynasties, the debate over “mind and matter/things” replaced the issue of “body and soul” and became the focal point of arguments. The sects of Sui-Tang Buddhism investigated the relationship between “being and non-being (movement and stillness)” in the form of idealism; the disagreement among the Dharma-Character School, the Huayan School, and the Tiantai School was one in which the three different schools emphasized experience, thinking, and introspection, respectively, all within a framework of idealism. These sects all assumed a form of scholasticism. Overelaborate religious doctrines remained until the Zen School, which maintained that “a teaching is transmitted independently of written texts but points directly to the human mind,” completely denying that truth could be grasped by means of written language, concepts, or judgments and arguing that truth could only be grasped suggetively through the “method of opposites.” This was a relativistic method. Moreover, the debate over “effort and fate,” as one aspect of the debate over “Heaven and humankind,” received attention from the time of Ji Kang’s challenge to fatalism onwards. Under the Tang, Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi, following the Zen School’s advocacy of “letting the mind run its course” and Li Quan’s overemphasis on the subjective power of will, reinstated the authority of

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materialism in terms of the traditional monistic theory of vital force and made a critical summation of the debate on “effort and fate” in their re-examination of the dialectical relationship between Heaven and humankind. It was not until the Song dynasty that Zhang Zai reached a more reasonable solution to the debate on “being and non-being (movement and stillness),” through his criticism of the “method of opposites” advocated by the Zen School, and defended the principle of the unity of opposites on the basis of the monistic theory of vital force. From then on, philosophical controversies began to center on the debate over “principle and vital force (the Dao and concrete things)” and over “mind and matter/things (knowledge and action).” Among the philosophers of this period, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, who maintained that “principle is prior to vital force” and “knowledge is prior to action,” were apriorists; Chen Liang and Ye Shi, who advocated “utilitarian learning,” emphasizing “action” and subjective initiative, were empirically inclined. Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Shouren, who argued that “the mind is the same as principle” and “knowledge and action are unified”, were also apriorists. Unlike Cheng and Zhu, however, they especially exaggerated subjective initiative. The development of Wang Shouren’s doctrine of the mind to the left inspired the “heretical” thoughts of Li Zhi, who opposed relativism to dogmatism. In the end, Wang Fuzhi made a critical summing-up of the debate on “principle and vital force (the Dao and concrete things)” and on “mind and matter/things (knowledge and action)” and reached a unity of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics, thus lending the monistic system of vital force a finished form. Meanwhile, Huang Zongxi’s summing-up of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism was suggestive of idealistic dialectics, Gu Yanwu’s summing-up was biased in favor of intuitive materialism, and Dai Zhen’s inclination towards intuitive materialism was even more apparent. Having examined the conflicts between these antagonistic philosophical systems, we can see that there is a certain kind of recurrence in the history of philosophy, but in a spiral curve instead of a mere repetition. Once we overcome these systems, we discover the necessary links in the process of human cognition, such as the perceptual and the conceptual, the absolute and the relative, and objective laws and subjective initiative. The circle from Xunzi and the Yi Zhuan (Appendices of the Book of Changes) to Zhang Zai consists of these links, among which the antithesis between the relative and the absolute developed comparatively fully. The circle from Zhang Zai to Wang Fuzhi also consists of these links, among which the antithesis between subjective initiative and objective laws also developed comparatively fully. In order to further explore the cognitive movement directed towards the target of dialectics in the history of Chinese philosophy, we must take care to examine, apart from the aforementioned links, how the philosophers of the past investigated “human nature” and “the Dao of Heaven” in terms of the logical categories (also links) of “class” (kind), “cause/reason,” and “principle,” and through a developmental course from spontaneous to conscious and from less conscious to more conscious.

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With the development of the debate over “names and actualities” in the pre-Qin period, a prominent discussion of “class” took place, and the categories of “cause/ reason” and “principle” were introduced as well. Besides that, both the Mohist system of formal logic and Xunzi’s and Yi Zhuan’s comparative method in the form of dialectical logic, had taken shape by that time. Down to the Han period, Mohism declined while the analogical method of dialectical logic, whether it paid particular attention to “forms” or to “numbers,” played a positive role in the concrete sciences. However, such a method, if used subjectively, would inexorably lead to strained comparisons and absurd conclusions. For example, when Dong Zhongshu said that “if a grouping is made according to class, Heaven and humankind are one,” he made a forced analogy between humankind’s purposeful activities and phenomena of the natural world, in order to support his theory that “Heaven and humankind activate each other.” In a comprehensive criticism of Confucian teleology, Wang Chong opposed the doctrine of mowei (there is nothing that causes an activity) to the doctrine of huoshi (there is something that causes an activity). The debate on huoshi and mowei involved not only “class” but also “cause/reason.” Emphasizing as a principle of formal logic that “different classes cannot be compared with each other,” Wang Chong criticized the theory of external causes, and affirmed the “self-transformation of vital force” and the “self-motion of things;” that is, he held that matter is moved by itself. Such an idea of self-motion was also accepted by Zhang Heng, a well-known astronomer of that time. Owing to the development of the current of thought of name-and-principle discrimination (辩名析理bian ming xi li) during the Wei and Jin period, the debate over “words and ideas” became prominent and philosophers probed deeply into the categories of “substance” and “function.” The phrase “inseparability of substance and function” meant that substance took itself as the cause and motion was the function and manifestation of substance; this interpretation advanced Wang Chong’s idea of the “self-transformation of vital force.” Although various later philosophical schools all maintained the “inseparability of substance and function,” idealists separated function from substance in reality, because they considered “vacuity-stillness” as the first principle of the world. On the other hand, materialists utilized the principle of the “inseparability of substance and function” as a scientific method. Fan Zhen, for example, accounted for the relationship between body and soul in terms of the principle of the unity of material substance and function, while Jia Sixie of the Northern Wei dynasty picked out the principle of the unity of essence and function as the theoretical foundation of scientific classification in his book entitled The Manual of Important Arts for the People. These were their outstanding contributions to philosophy and sciences. From the Han to the Tang, philosophers examined many categories related to “cause,” such as “the final cause,” “the material cause” and “the formal cause,” “substance” and “function,” and “cause of itself (causa sui)” anduniversal connections, and so on. Logical thinking wanted to inqure further into the source (the fundamental cause) of cause of itself (causa suri). Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi put forth their idea that matter’s own contradiction was the source of movement (in fact,

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this was a return to an ancient idea). Down to the Northern Song, Zhang Zai and Wang Anshi pointed out more explicitly that the movement and transformation of matter was a process of the unity of opposites. Taking the principle of the “inseparability of substance and function” and the unity of opposites as his methodology, Zhang Zai provided a critical summary of the debate on “being and non-being (movement and stillness)” beginning from the Wei and Jin. Shen Kuo, a scientist of the Northern Song, brilliantly employed the method of analyzing contradictions in his Dream Stream Essays and devoted his creative energies to numerous sciences. According to Shen Kuo, scientific research must “generalize into a principle” and show people “the necessity of the principle.” The category of “principle” had been advanced far earlier, but the philosophers of the Song and Ming made deeper and more multifaceted inquiries into it through their discussions on the relationship between principle and vital force, between the Dao and concrete things (principle to affairs), between principle and tendencies, among necessity, out-to-ness (normativity), and freedom, and between general laws to special laws, accompanied by an increasingly deep examination of the relationship between “two” and “one” and between “disintegration” and “integration.” Zhu Xi maintained the idea of “one uniform principle and its multitudinous distinctions,” yet he laid emphasis on “an exact understanding and a careful analysis” of the principle. Wang Shouren stressed “combining into one,” yet he held that “one principle” manifested itself as a historical and growing process. In his critical summation Wang Fuzhi examined almost all logical categories brought forward by preceding philosophers and achieved mastery through his comprehensive studies of them, thus constructing a system in which the law of development of the universe (the principle of Change) was shown in the dialectical connection and movement of these categories (forms). Based on Zhu Xi’s analytical spirit of “investigating things and making a study of principle to the utmost,” Gu Yanwu advanced his scientific scholarship. And Huang Zongxi absorbed Wang Shouren’s idea of regarding the original substance as a process, creating a methodology of historicism in his study of intellectual history. To sum up, in ancient Chinese philosophy, the comprehension and application of logical categories underwent a course of development from simple to complex, with ever-heightening consciousness, through discussions on the relationship between names and actualities, between words and ideas, and between forms and the Dao. Although the three categories of “class,” “cause/reason,” and “principle” had been examined as a wholein the pre-Qin period, from the Qin and Han dynasties onward, knowledge of them had deepened step by step, and more and more other categories were discovered. It was through the application of all these categories as links and methods that both the knowledge of the Dao of Heaven (the principle of the unity of the world and the principle of development of the world) and the knowledge of the Dao of humankind (the conception of history and the philosophy on life) became more and more profound.

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III Philosophical development during the period from the Qin and Han to the Qing added many substantial achievements to Chinese philosophy. First, let us examine the achievements in epistemology. Based on the achievements made in the pre-Qin period, the philosophers of the next period further summarized some materialistic fundamentals of epistemology and the dialectics of the cognitive process. Those who explored the particular links of the cognitive process and added new contributions included not only many materialists, such as Wang Chong, Ji Kang, Yan Yuan, and Dai Zhen, but also some idealists, such as Wang Bi, exponents of various Buddhist schools, Li Quan, the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan, and Wang Shouren. With respect to the debate on “mind and matter/things,” Fan Zhen applied the principle of “the inseparability of substance and function” to the relationship between body and soul, and Wang Fuzhi applied this principle to the relationship between neng (the subject) and suo (the object); they both made outstanding contributions. The controversies on “knowledge and action” and on “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” after the Song deepened the study of the dialectics of the cognitive process. With respect to the debate on “knowledge and action,” Wang Fuzhi attached primary importance to action while at the same time affirming the interdependence of knowledge and action and their influence upon one another. As to the problem of “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge,” Wang argued that “the investigation of things” meant “to investigate the principle in things to the utmost” on the basis of extensive learning, and “the extension of knowledge” meant to do logical thinking with modesty. He regarded “the investigation of things” and “the extension of knowledge” as two inseparable and mutually facilitating phases of the human cognitive process. Although Xunzi had earlier pointed out that cognition was a movement of the unity of opposites between the perceptual and the rational and between knowledge and action, there is nevertheless no doubt that Wang Fuzhi greatly developed Xunzi’s doctrine. Moreover, the philosophers of this period carried forward Xunzi’s thought of “dispelling obsession” and Yi Zhuan’s thesis that “there are a hundred deliberations but the result is one”; for example, both Wang Fuzhi and Huang Zongxi held that “the Dao is not in the private possession of one school” and that all philosophical schools “are not in unconformity with the Dao but have their prejudices”; consequently, only through debates and the exploration of different opinions could one-sidedness be overcome and comprehensive truth be grasped. They both had the idea that “truth develops as a process.” Dai Zhen further discriminated between opinion and truth, emphasizing the materialist view that one could not take a subjective opinion for an objective truth. In various debates, the materialists, ranging from Wang Chong, Liu Zongyuan, Liu Yuxi, and Zhang Zai to Wang Fuzhi, Yan Yuan, and Dai Zhen, exposed the epistemological roots of idealism more and more deeply. With regard to the problem of freedom, Wang Fuzhi advanced an argument that “Heaven-for-itself” was continuously transformed into “Heaven-for-humankind”; Yan Yuan stressed

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that one may gain freedom in one’s virtues and capacities with the development of one’s “practice”; Dai Zhen asserted: “To cause nature to conform to [moral] necessity, thereby giving a finished perfection to its naturalness: this is what is known as developing the natural to its highest point.” They all touched to a certain degree on the matter of humankind’s cognitive leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. All these are reasonable factors in epistemology, which are abundant. But ancient Chinese philosophers lacked the perspective of social practice and did not genuinely understand the dialectical relationship between relative truth and absolute truth. And lacking the materialist interpretation of history, they certainly could not scientifically describe the progressive spiral along which humans move from necessity to freedom. Second, we examine contributions to logic. Not only those materialists and dialecticians among philosophers but also many scientists such as Liu Hui, Jia Sixie, Shen Kuo, and the like made important contributions to logic. On the whole, Zhang Zai, Shen Kuo, Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi, and Gu Yanwu embodied the achievements made in logic and methodology in this period. Zhang Zai affirmed that the application of the categories (forms) characterized by the unity of opposites and judgments was enough to express the law of Change, thereby giving an answer to the criticisms offered by the Zen School of Buddhism. Shen Kuo paid a great deal of attention to investigation and experimentation, on the one hand, and called, on the other hand, for the classification of things according to their functions, seeking to summarize general principles through the method of combining universality with particularity and the method of analyzing contradictions. His scientific methods played an active role in advancing the sciences of the Song and Yuan dynasties. Wang Fuzhi exposed some dialectical features of “names, judgments, and inferences” and advanced his doctrine of the unity of “words, forms, ideas, and the Dao,” thus criticizing the methodology of numerology, Mysterious Learning, Buddhism, and Neo-Confucian idealism while expounding the logical categories of “class,” “cause/reason,” and “principle” more profoundly than his predecessors. Huang Zongxi focused on the methodology of the history of philosophy, sowing the seeds for the combination of the logical method with the historical method. And Gu Yanwu, according to his spirit of practical learning, presented a scientific inductive method, which was later developed by the Qianjia School, though in a lopsided way. Ancient Chinese philosophers and scientists made deep contributions to dialectical logic and scientific methodology, yet they had their deficiencies. Formal logic failed to make advances after the pre-Qin Mohist Canons, and the experimental method of modern sciences, which had been worked out by Westerners, failed to emerge during the Ming and Qing period. Third, we examine achievements in the conception of the Dao of Heaven. The conception of the Dao of Heaven here refers to the doctrine of the principle of the unity of the world and the principle of the development of the world. Wang Chong, Liu Zongyuan, Liu Yuxi, Wang Anshi, Zhang Zai, and Wang Fuzhi all more or less developed the monistic theory of vital force. In particular, Zhang Zai summarized the debate over “being and non-being (movement and stillness),” and, later, Wang Fuzhi summarized the debate over “principle and vital force (the Dao and concrete

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things),” thus making outstanding contributions to the conception of the Dao of Heaven. Based on his use of many elements from concrete science as evidence for the conservation of matter, Wang Fuzhi argued that “without concrete things, there is no Dao” and pointed out that real existence was absolute while non-existence was relative, and that movement was absolute while stillness was relative. From Zhang Zai, who spoke of change and transformation, to Wang Fuzhi, who spoke of movement and stillness, the relationship between the absolute movement and relative stillness of matter was initially brought to light. Again, Wang summarized two patterns of the transformation of contradictions, and from the angle of the combination of universal laws and special laws clarified the principle that every change and development of a thing was a unity of opposites. From Liu Yuxi, who spoke of “contradiction,” and Zhang Zai, who spoke of “two aspects of one thing,” and Wang Anshi, who spoke of “a pair of antitheses existing within another pair of antitheses,” to Wang Fuzhi, who spoke of two forms of the transformation of contradictions, the fundamental principle of the unity of opposites as the process of material movement received many multifaceted examinations, which was one of great achievements in the history of Chinese philosophy. Ancient Chinese philosophy affords us the dialectics of objective logic as well as the dialectics of subjective logic. As a matter of course, many propositions, offered speculatively due to the limitations imposed by historical conditions, were short of modern scientific demonstrations. Finally, we turn to the conception of the Dao of humankind. The term “the Dao of humankind” in ancient Chinese philosophy covers both social development and individual growth. As to the socio-historical aspect, first Liu Zongyuan spoke of “tendencies” and advanced his view that historical development had its necessary tendencies; later, Wang Fuzhi, based on Ye Shi’s elaboration on Liu’s view, developed it into the conception of history that affirmed “the unity of principle and tendencies.” The so-called unity of principle and tendencies contained the seeds of the notion of the unity of logic and history, which was properly embodied in Huang Zongxi’s works on the history of learning. Of course, this had not as yet become the materialist conception of history. Still, these thinkers, from Xunzi to Wang Fuzhi and Huang Zongxi, all thought that the laws of history should be understood in terms of the evolution of history on its own, rather than in terms of God or the phenomena of nature; this was undoubtedly a correct orientation. So far as the Dao of “individual growth” is concerned, it was a problem of the theory of human nature and philosophy of life, that is, a problem of how to find a way through which one could transform one’s natural instincts into virtues and cultivate one’s ideal personality. Among those progressive thinkers of this period, Ji Kang, Liu Zongyuan, and Liu Yuxi combated fatalism through the debate on “effort and fate,” while Wang Anshi, Wang Fuzhi, and Dai Zhen combated the doctrine of “recovering nature” through the debate on “nature and practice.” In the struggle against fatalism and the doctrine of “recovering nature,” the idea of the unity of the principle of consciousness and the principle of voluntariness was further elaborated. And in Wang Fuzhi’s theory that “As a person’s nature grows daily, it comes to completion”, human nature was understood as a process; such a theory was outstanding at

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the time, though it was still a theory of human nature in the abstract. With respect to aesthetics, Han Yu promoted the development of the theory of expression after the establishment of the theory of the ideal artistic sphere, while Wang Fuzhi and Huang Zongxi explored the essence of beauty and the sublime. All of them contribute creative ideas.

IV On the whole, the Chinese society of this period was still a feudal society, and Chinese philosophy was still at the stage of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics. Nevertheless, it can be seen from Yan Yuan and Dai Zhen that the appeal of naïve dialectics was beginning to fade, while some characteristics of metaphysical materialism were appearing. For example, Dai Zhen stressed “principles of differentiation,” “orderly principles,” the need to analyze things with as fine a grain as possible in order to grasp their special laws. As Friedrich Engels points out: The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms—these were the fundamental conditions of gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last four hundred years. But this method of work has also left us as legacy.[...] the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought. (Socialism: Utopian and Scientific)

It was indeed an advance for both science and philosophy to analyze nature into its individual parts for the sake of study and to detach their details from their general connection and examine each one separately, but this would beget a metaphysical mode of thought. We might predict, according to Dai Zhen’s metaphysical inclination, that the next stage of development of Chinese philosophy would be metaphysical. Just as Chinese feudal society would develop into a capitalist one, so the stage of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics would develop into a stage of mechanical materialism (in fact, it proved to be a stage of evolutionism). The thought having the significance of enlightenment in modern times, raised by those great thinkers of the Ming and Qing dynasties in their criticisms of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, did not achieve as remarkable a development as the Enlightenment thought of the Western Renaissance. In China, the capitalist mode of production was difficult to take shape, as were modern philosophy and modern experimental science. The forceful feudal autocracy was like an immense stone weighted upon the seeds of capitalism, which were just emerging and could not yet provide a strong forward push to the development of industry and science. In comparison with Europe, the Chinese nation fell behind in social development as well as in the development of science and philosophy. Here, we do not intend to explore the causes of this delayed development in a comprehensive way, but only to discuss two important lessons in the realm of theoretical thinking.

Part II: cA Brief Summary

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First, in conjunction with the rule of feudal autocracy, Confucian idealism arrested the progress of society and fettered the development of science. Confucianism under the Han dynasty was granted exclusive dominance, and, during and after the Song dynasty, rationalistic Neo-Confucianism was always in a dominant position, placing restrictive fetters on the minds of the people. Zhu Xi possessed a scientific spirit, but because he was made use of by the rulers, his philosophy had the effect of impeding the development of science for a long time. The school of Wang Shouren indulged in empty talk, and the idealist school of numerology promoted a variety of superstitions. Down to the late Ming and the early Qing dynasties, Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi, and Gu Yanwu all became aware that neither science nor society could make progress unless Neo-Confucianism was criticized. However, the existence of theoretical criticisms of Neo-Confucianism did not mean that it had lost its dominant position in society. In order to strengthen its autocratic control, the ruling clique of the Qing dynasty continued to give strong support to Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism. Accordingly, Yan Yuan and Dai Zhen still offered penetrating criticisms of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi. Such criticism went on until modern times. Second, the methodology of modern experimental science, which had been shaped in the West, failed to be worked out during the Ming and Qing periods in China. This is a weak point that must be acknowledged. So far as the development of ancient China’s scientific methods is concerned, Shen Kuo had paid attention to experimental measures and stressed a mathematical method. This approached the method of modern experimental science, though it could not yet be counted as such. When some Western missionaries came into China in the late Ming, they brought a little scientific knowledge with them but failed to introduce the Copernican theory. Having been exposed to some Western culture by that time, Xu Guangqi recognized by his keen insight the importance of the mathematical method and experimental measures. His observation of celestial bodies by telescope was only about twenty years later than Galileo’s. It was he who first translated Euclid’s Elements into Chinese and criticized the people of that time for neglecting mathematics. According to Xu Guangqi, there were two causes for this neglect: one was the fact that Neo-Confucianists looked down upon the study of practical subjects, and the other was that the idealist doctrine of numerology encouraged a mystical and superstitious approach to numbers. As Xu pointed out, mathematics was a tool like an axe or ruler in the hand of a worker, which could be applied not only to calendrical science and musicology but also to all other things; the mathematical method should be applied to all sorts of sciences, in the same way that tools should be used by workers in their building of palaces and houses. During the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, Fang Yizhi wrote his Small Encyclopedia of the Principles of Things, in which he recorded and examined the traditional natural sciences in China and the sciences imported from the West and presented his fresh idea of “matter and measurement” (质测zhi ce, science), displaying a scientific, matter-of fact spirit. And the scientific inductive method initiated by Gu Yanwu proceeded to formulate a hypothesis on the basis of investigations and studies and then to prove it, an approach that was closer to the methodology of modern positive

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science. By that time, those advanced figures in China had been approaching modern natural science from different directions. Nevertheless, even Gu Yanwu’s inductive method could not evolve into the method of experimental science. The most fundamental cause for this was that society failed to provide a powerful motive force to further the study of the natural world and the growth of productive forces. The secondary cause was that Neo-Confucian idealism hampered the development of science. The third was related to the undeveloped state of formal logic in ancient China. The first two causes have been mentioned above and now a further analysis of the third one is made below. If we compare China with the West, we will see that there was an ancient tradition of formal logic in the West; Aristotle’s deductive logic was first embodied in Euclid’s geometry, and then received further study by the Stoic School and scholastic philosophers. On the other hand, the Chinese ignored the Mohist Canons after the Han dynasty. Xuanzang introduced the Indian Hetu-Vidya into China. The Hetu-Vidya achieved a little progress in Tibet later, but was lost in the Han region. In his rendering of the Elements by Euclid, Xu Guangqi became aware of the importance of formal logic; nevertheless, neither the Elements nor An Introduction to Aristotle’s Dialectics, translated by Li Zhizao of the late Ming, had much influence in China. Sciences in ancient China, of course, observed formal logic, too. But they sought methodological guidance mainly from naïve dialectical logic, and consequently neither philosophers nor scientists attached much importance to the study of formal logic. As we know, the method of modern experimental science cannot be divorced from the mathematical method. Great mathematicians in ancient China, from Liu Hui and Zu Chongzhi to Shen Kuo, were all very interested in revealing the dialectical elements in mathematical logical thinking. This is a strong point that showed that the notion of the unity of shape and quantity had existed in China for a long time and that the infinitesimal calculus was already present in embryonic form. However, this was accompanied by a weak point, which is that the Chinese paled beside Westerners with respect to the systematization of logic and failed to construct an axiomatic system such as Euclidean geometry. The development of modern experimental science began with mechanics, which concentrates primarily on research into mechanical movement and which is particularly reliant on formal logic. Accordingly, the fact that the Chinese overlooked formal logic was very likely an important cause of the failure by the Chinese in the Ming and Qing periods to work out the methods of experimental science. Both the positive achievements and the shortcomings of ancient Chinese philosophy left a deep imprint in the great movement of Chinese philosophy toward modernization.

Part III

Modern Period

Modern Chinese history began in 1840, with the start of the Opium War. In modern times, the Chinese people’s struggle in the corporeal realm against imperialism and feudalism is reflected in the ideological realm in the form of the debates over the relation between past and present and between China and the West. Conditioned by these debates, the revolutionary process of modern Chinese philosophy (in contrast to the logical process of ancient Chinese philosophy) centers on the problems concerning epistemology, logic, methodology, and the conception of history. The philosophical debates over these problems are influenced by modern Western philosophy, but also represent a continuation of traditional Chinese philosophical debates, such as those over the relation between principle and vital force or Dao and instrument/concrete thing, between mind and matter/thing (knowledge and action), between name and actuality, and between Heaven and humankind. The debate over the relation between principle and vital force in the Song and Ming dynasties originally centered on the conception of the Dao of Heaven and concerned the conception of history only in a derivative sense. As it developed in modern times, however, this derivative part of the debate emerged into the foreground. The conception of history as “becoming” is presented in terms of Dao and instrument/concrete thing as early as Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan, Wang Tao, and Zheng Guanying. Their ideas are developed later into the explanation of historical transformations, in terms of the theory of evolution coming from the West, and are developed further into the materialist conception of history and the more general dialectical conception of development. Here, we can see that the revolution of modern Chinese philosophy, which takes the form of discussing old problems in new contexts and in new ways, proceeds by stages. The central problem of epistemology in modern China was, as before, the relation between mind and matter/things (knowledge and action). But Wei Yuan discusses the problem of the relation between knowledge and action in close connection with the problem of “whither China,” endowing it thereby with a modern flavor. After a circuitous process of development, the discussions concerning the conception of history and epistemology are combined with each other as two sides of a single debate over the relation between mind and matter/thing, and become the main axis

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along which modern Chinese philosophy developed, and which is summarized by Marxists in the “dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as a reflection of reality.” Other debates from traditional Chinese philosophy, such as those over the relation between name and actuality, and over the relation between Heaven (nature) and humankind, also continued into modern times. The former problem is discussed in the field of logic and methodology. One of the problems that captures the attention of most modern Chinese philosophers is the difference between Chinese and Western cultures in their modes of logical thinking. The latter problem, namely the problem of the relation between Heaven and humankind, involves many subproblems. Seen from the perspective of the Dao of humankind (in contrast to the Dao of Heaven), it is first of all a matter of discussing the problem of human freedom in terms of the relation between Heaven and humankind, which expresses itself in the relations between the natural and the artificial, between fate/destiny and power, between human nature and custom/practice, and so on. The problem of human freedom is especially prominent in modern times. Philosophers are quite enthusiastic about discussing problems such as “How to build up a ‘realm of freedom’?” and “How to cultivate an ideal, free personality?”. But although it is an important problem, no one in modern times manages to sum up systematically the debates over logical methods and the theory of freedom.

Chapter 10

The Forerunners of Modern Chinese Philosophy

10.1 Gong Zizhen: “The Dominator of the Masses is Called the ‘Self’”—The Beginning of Modern Humanism The advancement of the proposition by Gong Zizhen that “the dominator of the masses is called ‘self’” on the eve of the Opium War signified the awakening of self in China. In Chinese history, this development is equivalent to the appearance of humanism during the Renaissance in Europe. Gong Zizhen (1792–1841), styled Puren, also known as Ding An, was a native of Renhe (present-day Hangzhou), Zhejiang Province. Both a thinker and a poet, he was well known for his poems and essays, which drew attention to society’s errors, offered advices that often shocked the public He is one of several thinkers who contributed to enlightening the general mood of society in the late Qing dynasty. His writings are collected in the Complete Works of Gong Zizhen. Gong initiated the debate over the relation between past and present in modern times. With the sensibility of a poet, he pointed out that the Qing dynasty at that time, though it appeared to be flourishing, was actually in a state of decay. He criticized sharply those who rigidly adhered to the past and the old ways. He demanded that people pay more attention to reality and “comprehend the present state of affairs” (Gong 1999, p. 114). In a famous poem, he expressed his hope that “talented people” with the consciousness of “self” would rise in great numbers so as to change the current situation in which “ten thousand horses stand mute,” and effect reforms which would restore vitality to society (Gong 1999, p. 521). These kinds of reforms, according to Gong, are not essential for qualitative change, since the essential Dao is unchangeable. To him, what needs to be changed are the outdated “ancestral methods.” That is why he says that “it is impossible for the land under heaven not to be changed for eight hundred years, it is possible nevertheless for the Dao not to be changed for hundreds of millions of years” (Gong 1999, p. 5). From this, we can see that Gong understood the relation between past and present basically from the perspective of reformist among the landlord class. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_10

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(1) A Philosophical Eulogy on “Self” It is the feudal dictatorship, according to Gong Zizhen, which strangles the masses’ real “mind,” leading society towards a lifeless “declining age.” For this reason, the masses must be made conscious of their “selves” before the decline can be reversed. To this end, he praises the “self” highly in philosophical terms. He says: Heaven and Earth are created by humankind, or rather by the masses themselves, instead of by the sages. The so-called sages are those who stand in contrast with the masses, and the dominator of the masses is neither Dao nor the Ultimate, but what I call “self.” (Gong 1999, p. 12)

This “self,” which every individual holds as his/her subjective spirit, is an omnipotent creator. In Gong’s words: The self’s light creates the sun and the moon, its force creates mountains and rivers, its operation creates different kinds of lives, its principle creates words and speeches, its vital force (气qi) creates Heaven and the Earth, which in turn creates human beings, and its differentiations create ethical rules. (Gong 1999, pp. 12–13)

No one before Gong Zizhen in the history of Chinese philosophy had placed “self” in such a high position—as the first principle of the world—nor defended such a strongly voluntaristic philosophy. It is thoroughly subjectivist, of course, but it also signifies the awakening of the “self” and the beginning of modern humanism for the first time in the Chinese history. Starting from his basic idea of “self” as the first principle of the world, Gong criticizes the orthodox Confucianism that demands absolute obedience to the Mandate of Heaven and strangles people’s individuality. He opposes the Confucian theory of the correspondence between humankind and Heaven, and thinks that it is wrong to predict political events by appealing to yin, yang, visitations, and prodigies. He also rejects the idea of the Mandate of Heaven as absolutely definite and the derived idea of imperial decrees as absolutely rational. He says: As to Heaven, the natural phenomena such as coldness, warmth, wind, rain, fog, and thunder are either fully predictable, or fully unpredictable. If the former is the case, then Heaven is not supreme; if the latter is the case, then Heaven is not supreme either. (Gong 1999, p. 83)

In Gong’s view, on the one hand, natural phenomena are necessary and predictable; on the other hand, they are also contingent and unpredictable. That’s why people complain a lot. The same applies to imperial decrees. Confucians regarded imperial decrees as totally reasonable, for in their view monarchs “thoroughly understand the causes of affairs both in past and present,” “clearly elucidate the intricacies of all things on the Earth,” and “reward, punish, give to, and take from their subjects without any mistake.” Gong points out that Confucians preach this theory only to sell their own teachings, since it is implausible that imperial decrees would give everybody their due (Gong 1999, p. 84). Gong Zizhen’s conception of the Mandate of Heaven and imperial decrees implies that both are indeterminate and not wholly reasonable, and that determinism does not cover everything. In attacking the Confucian idea of the Mandate of Heaven, Gong absorbs some Buddhist ideas. The Buddhist explanation of all kinds of changes through the idea of

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“arising through causation” is, according to Gong Zizhen, superior to the Confucian idea of “the Mandate of Heaven.” Moreover, Buddhism, unlike Confucianism, does not pay respect to “the Mandate of Heaven,” for it demands one to “respect one’s own mind.” “If one’s mind is respected,” he says, “then one’s organs and speeches are respected too. And if one’s organs and speeches are respected, one’s personality is also respected” (Gong 1999, p. 84). Placing emphasis on the dignity of the human personality is the essential trait of modern humanism, and the dignity of personality derives from one’s respect for one’s own mind. Hence, Gong accepts Buddhism because he finds some agreement between Buddhism and his humanist inclination. Of course, when his desire for political reform is repeatedly defeated, Gong seeks comfort in the Buddhist “sphere of silence and death,” and the other side of his voluntarism is revealed. Connected with his nihilist attitudes derived from Buddhism, is the fact that Gong does not really succeed in escaping from “the Mandate of Heaven.” He says: “What the upright people have to accept, the evil people have to accept, and what the people who are neither upright nor evil have to accept might be named ‘destiny’” (Gong 1999, p. 85). Here, Gong is actually still suggesting that people be content with their supposed destinies. It should be admitted approvingly, however, that Gong’s high praise of “self” is fairly modern in its opposition to feudalism. (2) The Conception of History as Changing and the Ideal of Life for the Liberation of Individuality The proposition of “the dominator of the masses is called ‘self’” also runs through Gong’s conception of history and his ideal of human life. First, Gong’s conception of history. Starting from the proposition that “the dominator of the masses is called ‘self’,” Gong argues that, in terms of the knowledge of history, a historian must “respect his own mind” before he can “make out the Dao from history”; history itself is created by the masses and is constantly changing, making necessary the exploration of the laws causing this change. From the Song and Ming dynasties on, there has been a debate in the field of history over the relation between Dao and instrument (or principle and affairs). Wang Shouren advanced the proposition that “the six classics are all histories,” which was developed by Zhang Xuecheng, a member of the School of Historians of East Zhejiang, into the proposition that to say that the six classics are all histories is like saying that the six classics are all instruments. Zhang argued that one must discuss the Dao according to instruments, and learn the Dao from history. This idea was inherited and developed by Gong Zizhen. “The Dao is based on instrument,” he says, “and the rite is derived from the number. […] do not indulge in emptiness and stick to given rules. You will be followed by the people if you seek what is true from what is actual” (Gong 1999, p. 226). Furthermore, “only by proceeding from history can you penetrate the Dao, and before you comprehend the Great Dao you have to study history” (Gong 1999, p. 81). According to Gong Zizhen, not only the six classics but also the works by the representatives of various schools of thought during the period from pre-Qin times to the early years of the Han dynasty are histories. That is to say, each doctrine is advanced under specific historical conditions, and each

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school is a product of a specific historical period. The Great Dao can therefore be comprehended only through treating the historical literature from a historical point of view. What is most important about “make out the Dao from history,” according to Gong Zizhen, is that historians “respect their own mind”. He says: What is respectable about historians as professionals consists not in their work of describing and evaluating, but in their respect for their own minds. How is one’s mind respected? By being good at stepping in […] How is one’s mind respected again? By being good at stepping out. (Gong 1999, pp. 80–81)

Here, “being good at stepping in” means to be as familiar with the geographical, cultural, political, military, legal, institutional, and anecdotal literature of all ages as with one’s own family matters; while “being good at stepping out” means not only to be familiar with those facts, but also to treat them like one is viewing a performance of actors and actresses: although it is full of scenes of joy and sorrow, the viewer still sits quietly and comments soberly. Gong Zizhen’s search for the law of historical transformations, derived from his proposition that “the dominator of the masses is called ‘self’,” displays itself in the following three ways: First, he thinks that history is created by the masses. In an essay entitled “Explanation of Wind,” he calls humankind the eldest of the “naked animals.” After coming into being, humankind made Heaven and the Earth “revolve and move” while it “revolved and moved around itself” to form history. So Gong says that “Heaven, the Earth, and the succession from the past to the present are all created by animals,” meaning that history is created by the common people. This is in opposition to the traditional Confucian conception of history as created by sages. Second, he interprets the “theory of the three ages” of the Gongyang School of the Spring and Autumn Annals as a universal law of historical transformation. The history of society continuously changes itself, according to Gong Zizhen, along with the succession of the kind of naked animal called humankind from generation to generation: “The ancient age evolved swiftly into the present age, and the present age will evolve swiftly into the age to come” (Gong 1999, p. 128). As to the law of continuous historical change of society, Gong explains it with the “theory of three ages” of the Gongyang School. He says: The entire history from the ancient times to the present times can be divided into three ages. The entire period covered by the Spring and Autumn Annals can also be divided into three ages. This is applicable to the system of jiazi [in which a cycle is composed of sixty years] invented by Da Nao as well as to each day, each year, each zhang [which amounts to nineteen years] and each bu [which amounts to seventy-six years]. (Gong 1999, p. 48)

The historical transformations, which can in turn be divided into three periods, are composed of various cycles on different levels. He says: “Everything in the world proceeds in this way: in the first stage it arises, in the second stage it turns into its opposite, and in the third stage it reverts to its original state” (Gong 1999, p. 16). Though Gong regards continuous change as the main characteristic of this process, his proposition that “at the third stage it reverts to its original state” shows that he

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does not regard the continuous changes in turn as progressive movements, and that he is still holding a theory of cyclical change, which is characteristic of the traditional Chinese conception of history. It remains for Kang Youwei’s evolutionary theory of history to break the theory of cyclical change, and to understand the three ages as a forward movement. Third, Gong Zizhen explains the origin of the patriarchal system with the idea that “everybody is selfish.” Gong thinks that every individual has his own “self,” hence everybody has some selfishness (Gong 1999, pp. 91–93). From this, he explains the origin of the patriarchal system: It is when the natural grain withered and the planted grain flourished that intelligence and physical strength were esteemed by the people. Those who were able to produce grain on limited land became the owner of it […]. People in ancient times were not afraid of talking about private property; and the owner of a large amount of land naturally wanted to have his sons as his inheritors. (Gong 1999, p. 49)

It is on the basis of this private or “selfish” mode of agricultural production that the patriarchal system emerged, and in turn it is on the basis of this system that the political and moral institutions regulated by humanity (仁ren), righteousness(义yi), and other Confucian ideas arose. Gong says that “the upper levels came into being gradually after the lower ones,” but Confucians reversed historical events, believing that political and moral institutions were derived “from above,” namely from the sage kings or the Mandate of Heaven (Gong 1999, p. 49). What follows are some reasonable elements in Gong’s efforts to find the causes of historical transformation through the analysis of its economic basis. Concerning the problem of the human ideal, the proposition that “the dominator of the masses is called ‘self’” has a modern analog in the demand for the liberation of individual “selves.” With reference to the problem of the ideal personality, Zhu Xi debated with Chen Liang in the Song dynasty: While Zhu required one to be a pure and honest Confucian who preserved the principle of Heaven and extinguished human desires, Chen Liang suggested bringing up heroes with “the intelligence and courage to reject an age.” This view was shared by Huang Zongxi, a thinker who opposed NeoConfucianism, when he asked people to be “heroes summoning wind and thunder.” Inheriting these ideas, and from the standpoint of the common “masses,” Gong Zizhen regards all common people who make discoveries and creations as heroes: “There were no goldsmiths at first. […] The first ones were heroes in the world” (Gong 1999, p. 172). This shows that Gong begins to replace the traditional conception of the sage as the ideal personality with the modern conception of the common people as the ideal personality. As to the bringing up of heroes or talented people, Gong thinks that the most important thing is to follow everybody’s distinctively individual character. Or in his words: “A talented person can be brought up only by following hisown temperament” (Gong 1999, p. 338). For this reason, he thinks, various yokes imposed on the people must be removed, and “all trivial forms of bondage” must be released; otherwise, even such miraculous skills as “the butcher Pao Ding’s dissecting oxen” and “the musician Bo Ya’s playing of the qin” could not have been developed (Gong 1999,

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pp. 34–36). In his famous essay “A Note on the House with a Diseased Plum,” he describes vividly how the plums grew naturally after the artificial restraints imposed on them had been removed, a metaphor for the idea that people should also shake off all kinds of shackles in order to develop their own individuality. Gong Zizhen especially emphasizes that the key to bringing up talented people and making great achievements is to freely exercise one’s subjective, spiritual force. “Those whose minds are incompetent,” he says, “are called mediocre people. Attaining revenge against one’s foe, curing one’s serious illness, resolving difficult problems, planning an important mission, and learning the Great Dao are all based on one’s “mind-power” (Gong 1999, pp. 15–16). Here, what is called “mind-power” is just one’s spiritual force, especially one’s willpower. A person without willpower, Gong thinks, is like a walking corpse. He says: “An unfulfilled ambition should never be given up nor suspended. How can it be suspended? By one’s death” (Gong 1999, p. 417). That is, renouncing one’s unfulfilled ambition amounts to one’s death. Gong Zizhen places emphasis not only on one’s willpower, but also on one’s emotions, opposing Neo-Confucians in their demand that one “be unruffled by emotion” and “devoid of desire”: “I tried to eliminate what is called emotion before,” he says: “[B]ut I failed. Then I tolerated it. But I could not restrain myself from moving further. Then I respected it” (Gong 1999, p. 232). He believes that we should countenance and respect our emotions, since we are unable to eliminate them. The fact that Gong Zizhen strongly emphasizes the power of will and emotion is, on the one hand, connected with his opposition to the Neo-Confucianism of Cheng and Zhu which fetters the development of individuality; on the other hand, it is responsible for some irrationalist elements in his philosophy that can be seen in the theological elements contained in his works, such as the claim that the sage Confucius possessed some “magical enlightenment” inaccessible to the “mortal people.” What is important about Gong’s philosophy, however, is the fact that, in opposition to orthodox Neo-Confucianism, he advances the proposition that “the dominator of the masses is called the ‘self’,” which was not only progressive at the time it was advanced, but also had a great influence on modern Chinese philosophy as a whole. The characteristics of modern Chinese philosophy that are different from those in ancient Chinese philosophy, such as stressing the “self,” exalting the “mind-power,” and emphasizing the exploration of historical laws, are almost all derived from Gong Zizhen. The situation in which “ten thousand horses stand mute,” nevertheless, could not be broken by a few “selves.” Nihilism is often resorted to when voluntarism, its opposite, is rebuffed. That is why in his last years Gong turned to Buddhism, which, however, did not actually show him the true way out.

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10.2 Wei Yuan: “Basing My Ideas on Things” and “Knowing Something After Being Involved in Something”—The Beginning of the Debate Over the Relation Between Mind and Matter/Things (Knowledge and Action) in Modern Times Wei Yuan was another forerunner of modern Chinese philosophy who enjoys popularity equal to that of Gong Zizhen. Wei Yuan (1794–1857), called Moshen, was a native of Shaoyang, Hunan Province. He praised the New Text School highly and advocated utilitarianism. He firmly supported Lin Zhexu’s effort to ban the opium trade and resist military aggression from the British, and personally joined the armed struggle himself. He was the editor of the well-known book An Illustrated Gazette of the Maritime Countries (Hai Guo Tu Zhi), which introduced facts about the outside world into China. He wrote prolifically, and many collections his works are available today, such as, the Collected Works of Wei Yuan and the Complete Works of Wei Yuan. Wei Yuan’s position on the debate over the relation between past and present was similar to that of Gong Zizhen, demanding the introduction of political reforms based on the present situation. He restated Xunzi’s famous remark that “Those who are good at talking about the past must be able to test it with what is going on at present” and opposes those who continue to follow the old ways. He said: “There is no law that lasts hundreds of years without being corrupted, nor is there any law that can remain absolutely unchanged forever” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 408). Because he personally experienced the great social changes that occurred after the Opium War, he was able to see the relation between past and present from a broader perspective, and advocated “learning the barbarian’s superior technique, and then using it to conquer the barbarians” (Wei 2011, vol. 4, p. 1). Thus, he initiated “the debate over the relation between China and the West” in modern times, and combined it with “the debate over the relation between past and present,” producing “the debate over the relation between past and present and the relation between China and the West.” The admonition “to learn the barbarian’s superior technique and to use it to conquer the barbarian” reflected the modern idea of opening up to the outside world and learning from the West, which was in direct opposition to the Confucian tradition of shielding the Chinese from that which was foreign (or “barbarian”). His admonition to “learn the barbarian’s superior technique,” however, mainly concerned the knowledge required to produce Western “strong ships and formidable cannons." This shows that he was, in the end, only a reformist within the ruling landlord class. (1) “The More the Past Has Changed, the More the People Have Benefited” Wei Yuan’s position in the debate over the relation between past and present and between China and the West involves a specific conception of history. Like Gong Zizhen, he regards historical changes as irresistible. The reason that historical evolution constitutes an irreversible tendency is that it is in fact “beneficial to the people.” “The more the past has changed,” he says, “the more the people have benefited. […] What is reversible in the world is that which does not benefit the people, and what

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is irreversible is that which benefits the people” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 49). That is to say, Wei Yuan, just like Gong Zizhen, regards the historical “tendency” as being created by the masses. His “what is beneficial to the masses” includes “tendency,” “interest,” and “ethics.” So, he thinks, a ruler should, for the public benefit, “make use of power, interest, and ethics to serve the public” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 44). That is, to induce “the common people in the world” to engage in material production and derive benefits from it, and to educate the people in Confucian ethics so that “the gentlemen in the world” know what is encouraged and what is prohibited; in this manner the masses are induced to form a “tendency”. That is the way in which order and peace can be achieved across the land. From this standpoint, Wei says that “the son of Heaven is shaped by the masses” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 45). The masses, gathering around the son of Heaven (the monarch of the country), can form a tendency that makes the son of Heaven wise: “So if the son of Heaven regarded himself as one of the masses, he would regard the world as belonging to the people” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 45). Here, we can find some elements of modern humanist thought. Wei Yuan’s proposition that “the more the past has changed, the more the people have benefited” contains the idea of history as evolution, but it has not yet reached the theory of historical evolution. His conception of historical change is also connected with the debate over the relation between the Dao and instrument/concrete thing. He says: The situation in which people accumulate their efforts is called order; the succession of the order in different periods makes a history composed of past and present; the fact that there are downturns and prosperity, corruptions and corrections derives from the instruments and the Dao. (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 194)

The Dao is not separated from the instruments: it pervades ethical, ritual, military, legal, economic, and commercial institutions. The six classics recorded these institutions, so as to make it possible for the later generations to “seek the Dao in order to administer affairs” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 23). But Wei Yuan thinks that, “Although the operation of the vital force [qi hua] changes constantly, the Dao remains constant, and thus unchangeable” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 48). Later on, with Kang Youwei, the conception of history that regarded the instruments as changeable and the Dao as unchangeable was abandoned, and the theory of historical evolution was developed. (2) Some Modern Propositions on the Debate over the Relation between Mind and Mater/Things (Knowledge and Action) Wei Yuan’s major contribution to philosophy consists in his advancement of some propositions with modern significance on “the debate over the relation between mind and things (knowledge and action).” The first proposition: “turning from sleep to consciousness, and turning from emptiness to reality.” Wei Yuan was very dissatisfied with both the Neo-Confucianism and the Han School that dominated academic circles at that time. Wei accused them of indulging either in idle talk about human nature and principle, “nothing of which can be tested by everyday life and things” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 36); or in philological

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studies; the two schools “confine all those who are intelligent and talented to nothing but useless enterprises” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 283). He asks people to face the actual hardships of life and to turn from obscurantism to enlightenment and from empty talk to realism. He says: “If no hardship is suffered, then no intelligence arises” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 39). And “if no trouble happened in the world, no one would appear to be mediocre; if no distresses arose as a swarm in the world, no one would become a hero” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 53). In his “Preface” to An Illustrated Gazette of the Maritime Countries, Wei makes special remarks on how difficult and dangerous situations contribute to the emergence of people with outstanding talents. He says that the Book of Odes was written out of anger, and the Book of Changes was written by King Wen of the Zhou dynasty as a result of his suffering: “Anger and suffering are those things by means of which the Dao of Heaven ends the hexagram Pi(否), and starts the hexagram Tai (泰),1 which consequently stir people’s mind from sleep to wakefulness, and talented people from emptiness to reality.” To Wei’s mind, only if the disease of “the sleep of the people’s minds” and the disease of “the emptiness of talented people” are cured can the nation be rejuvenated and flourish (Wei 2011, vol. 4, p. 2). Wei Yuan’s call to cure the “disease of sleep” and “the disease of emptiness” is both a political demand and an intellectual one. These two demands precondition the direction of development of modern Chinese philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. Modern Chinese epistemology is characterized by its emphasis on “turning from sleep to consciousness” and “turning from emptiness to reality;” namely, it urges the Chinese people to awaken, to reject empty talk, to face reality, and seek the truth for the salvation of the nation. The second proposition: “Those who are good at talking about self must base their ideas on things.” The relations between fact and mind, between norm and humankind, and between things and self discussed by Wei Yuan in his “Preface” to Collections of the Experiences of Dynasties actually all concern the epistemological problem of the relation between mind and things. Gong Zizhen, as we said before, paid great attention to “self” and attached great significance to “respecting one’s own mind.” Wei Yuan expresses similar ideas when he discusses the relation between mind and things. Just as thousands of red stamps are made by one single imperial jade seal, he points out, things must also be based on one’s mind; just as a carriage that moves a heavy cargo on a long journey must have a driver who knows the road, norms must be based on humankind. From this metaphor, he supports the notion that “self” is the origin of “things,” and “things must be based on self.” On the other hand, however, he observes that “those who are good at talking about mind must test their ideas with facts,” “those who are good at talking about human beings must accord their efforts with norms,” and “those who are good at talking about self must help themselves with things.” The relations between things and mind, between norms and humankind, and between object and self examined here by Wei Yuan concern three terms in the debate over the relation between mind and things, namely mind (self), thing (fact), principle 1

Translator’s note: Pi and Tai are two of the 64 hexagrams in the Book of Changes, denoting “obstruction, adversity” and “pervading, good fortune.”

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(norm), as well as the problem of the relation between society and individual (self and others). It is one of the major characteristics of modern Chinese philosophy that the debate over the relation between mind and things, and that between society and individual, are combined into one and became the key problem of epistemology and the theory of history and society. Gong and Wei were the first to discuss the problem in modern times. Compared with Gong’s proposition that “the self’s light creates the sun and the moon, and the self’s force creates the mountains and the rivers,” Wei’s proposition that “those who are good at talking about self must base their ideas on things” expresses an obvious materialist tendency. Relating the proposition that “self is the origin of things” with the proposition that “the self’s ideas must be based on things,” however, we know that Wei Yuan’s philosophy as a whole is pantheistic. According to him, the spirit (神shen) is just vital force (气 qi), and “the spirit’s movement is just the vital force’s movement.” On the one hand, the spirit exists in visible bodies or, in his words, “the minds exist in one’s body”; on the other hand, the visible body exists in the spirit as well, or, in his words, “the body exists in one’s mind” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 13). These ideas that identify the spirit with the vital force and the body with the mind are very close to those held by Huang Zongxi. The third proposition: “knowing something after being involved in something.” Wei asserts that knowledge comes after action. He says: “One knows something after being involved in something, and feels different after being engaged in some action, so how can one know anything without action?” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 7). This is a materialistic idea in that it emphasizes the necessity of coming into contact with real things in order to obtain the relevant knowledge. He opposes accordingly the apriorism that admits of innate knowledge. He says: Is it the case that sages had knowledge at their birth? If that is the case, why should they act? Why did Confucius work so hard as to forget his meals? Why did Ji work till dawn? Why did King Wen write the Book of Changes in times of hardship? Why did Confucius spend years studying the Book of Changes? The fact that King Wen, Duke Zhou (Ji), and Confucius learnt and worked so hard verifies that they did not have innate knowledge. (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 9)

Wei Yuan’s criticism of apriorism, compared with the materialists before him, has some new features distinctive to his times, which can be seen from his ideas that “talent comes from emotion” and “learning depends on questioning.” He says that “talent comes from emotion, and an emotionless person can acquire no talent. […] From ancient times to present times, no one can help society and other people with his or her talent without having affection for society and other people” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 35). Furthermore, Wei Yuan observes that “no one can have knowledge without relying on questioning. […] An opinion acquired on one’s own must be inferior to what comes from cooperation and agreement with many people” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 35). These ideas, being in straight opposition to the Neo-Confucian dogma that the Principle of Heaven can be known only under an emotionless and desireless condition, and that every word of the sages is correct, reflect an incipient modern humanism.

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In line with his pantheistic thought, however, Wei Yuan still keeps in a sense the apriorist conception of knowledge, that is, he thinks that cognition is essentially a process of making explicit in a “reflective” way the talent inherent in one’s mind. The fourth proposition: “nature can surely be conquered by humankind, and humankind is cultivated by itself.” Gong Zizhen says something critical of the Confucian idea of Heaven as the supreme being, but Wei Yuan regards “Heaven as both the beginning and the endpoint” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 5). That is, Heaven is the first principle of the world, and knowledge is supposed to return to the Mandate of Heaven. Therefore, he advocates the “oneness of Heaven and human beings” and a situation in which humankind and Heaven merge into each other and “the soul suddenly becomes conscious of itself and shares virtues with Heaven and Earth.” If, in Wei’s view, one concentrates one’s mind on the spiritual, one can arrive at, in the long run, the situation in which “the origin of mind is thoroughly enlightened, and the light is entirely restored,” hence great knowledge and great consciousness are acquired. One can, therefore, be one with the creator and able to create and cultivate oneself. Thereby, one can also “create one’s destiny” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, pp. 6–8) and “conquer Heaven” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, pp. 13–14). The idea of “creating one’s destiny” had been advocated before Wei Yuan by the School of Taizhou and Wang Fuzhi. But the idea acquires a new feature in Wei Yuan distinctive of his times. He says that If a common person creates and cultivates his own volition, then the son of Heaven cannot make him rich (without his consent), and the supreme God cannot give him a long life. How can such a person who chooses his own destiny be bounded by destiny? Heaven can surely be conquered by humankind […] by praying to Heaven for immortality, and creating and cultivating oneself, how can such a person who makes his or her own destiny be bounded by Heaven? (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 21)

Like Gong Zizhen’s “power of the mind,” Wei Yuan’s emphasis on the strength of one’s will represents one of the characteristics of modern Chinese philosophy, that is, giving great importance to the “self’s will.” Wei Yuan, like Gong Zizhen, converted to Buddhism in his later years, thinking that “the doctrine of ghosts and gods has a great function in bringing good to the human mind, and assisting invisibly the kindly teachings” (Wei 2011, vol. 12, p. 3). This is the backward idea of setting up a religion with deities. But it is undeniable that Wei Yuan is one of the forerunners of modern Chinese philosophy. The thunderous transformation expected by Gong and Wei took place during the revolution of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom led by Hong Xiuquan. Absorbing some elements from Christianity, and combining them with ideas of equality and Great Unity in the Chinese tradition, the leaders of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom set up the “the Society of God Worshippers.” Their revolutionary ideas, on the one hand, intensely criticized the feudalist ethical codes of Confucianism, and resulted in what was called by Zeng Guafan the “surprising distortion of the ethical codes”; on the other hand, they implied a revolutionary world view, though dressed in the garb of religion, that “the new Heaven, the new earth, the new men, and the new world” are to be realized through the struggles of the masses. The revolutionary process of the modern Chinese people grew from the spontaneous stage to the conscious

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stage. During the period of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the revolutionary world view was still in its latent stage. With the development of the democratic revolution, it assumed a scientific form, making possible a conscious struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism and feudalism. Some backward ideas distinctive of peasants, such as egalitarianism and the fetishization of the imperial power, of course, also produced somewhat negative effects on the modern Chinese democratic revolution, in which peasants were a major force. The institutional reforms envisioned by Gong and Wei acquired a relatively explicit modern content of developing capitalism in the early reformist thinkers of 1860s. Like Gong and Wei, these reformist thinkers discussed the relation between China and the West in the traditional terms of Dao (substance, root) and instrument (function, branch). They justified the necessity of introducing Western learning and institutional reform with the theory of “Chinese learning as the Dao versus Western learning as instrument” or “Chinese learning as substance versus Western learning as function.” This was of progressive significance at that time. Some even had the insight that Western learning had both its own “substance” and “function,” which broke through the framework of the theory of “Chinese learning as substance and Western learning as function.” This thought paved the road for modern Chinese philosophy to replace the outdated idea that the metaphysical Dao is unchanging with the theory of evolution.

References Gong, Zizhen. 1999. Complete Works of Gong Zizhen, ed. by Wang Peizhen. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House. Wei, Yuan. 2011. Complete Works of Wei Yuan. Changsha: Yuelu Publishing House.

Chapter 11

The Stage of Evolutionism in the Philosophical Revolution

The disastrous defeat in 1895 of the Chinese in the first Sino-Japanese War heralded an end to the “Movement of Westernization” led by a group of so-called Westernizers in the ruling class since the 1860s; this movement was aimed at strengthening the existing system by introducing Western technology and machinery, and forcing the Chinese people to face the threat that the nation was to be carved up by imperialist powers. Hence arose the Reform Movement of 1898, which was a signal that the Chinese bourgeoisie had arrived on the political stage, and which was a movement of both national salvation and of enlightenment. Before that time, the debate over the relation between past and present and that between China and the West started by Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan evolved mainly around the relation between Dao and instrument and the theory of “Chinese learning as the Dao and Western learning as the instrument”. This theory, originally progressive in that it was meant to allow a role for Western learning, now turned into a position of the “Westernizers,” who actually stood against institutional reform. At that time, modern Western sciences were introduced into China more widely than before, among which the theory of evolution contributed significantly to the development of the philosophical theory of evolution in modern China. Yan Fu’s translation of and commentary on Huxley’s Theory of Evolution and Ethics signaled that Chinese knowledge of Western learning had progressed from the domain of “instrument” to the domain of “Dao.” It is under such historical conditions that modern Chinese philosophy entered the stage of evolutionism. Kang Youwei transformed the theory of “three ages” of the Gongyang School into a theory of historical evolution; Yan Fu advocated “the philosophy of natural evolution.” Both of them took the theory of evolution as the weapon for fighting against the conservatives, who held that “Dao will never change as long as Heaven does not change,” and the Westernizers, who advocated “Chinese learning as the substance and Western learning as the function.” This marked the beginning of the philosophical revolution in modern China.

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11.1 Kang Youwei: An Advocate of Historical Evolutionism Kang Youwei (1858–1927) took the lead in developing the philosophical theory of evolution. Known as Guangxia, he was a native of Nanhai, Guangdong Province. He was educated in Confucian thought when he was a child. After being influenced by Western capitalist culture, he turned to studying Western learning. He presented seven petitions to the Guangxu Emperor to request institutional reform, the most famous one of which was “A Petition Presented by Public Officials” of 1895. After the Hundred Days’ Reform Movement in 1898, which he led, was frustrated, he gradually turned to the conservative side, opposing first the democratic revolution led by Sun Yat-sen and then the May Fourth Movement or the Movement of the New Culture. Among his major works are A Study of the Forged Classics of the Xin Period, A Study of Confucius on Institutional Reform, Lectures on All Heavens, Commentary on Dong Zhongshus’ Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals, Commentary on the Evolution of Rites, and The Book of the Great Unity. Kang Youwei presents a relatively comprehensive program of institutional reform: politically, transforming the system of government from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy; economically, basing the nation on commerce and encouraging the formation of private industrial and commercial enterprises; culturally, abandoning the system of imperial examinations, setting up Western-style schools, and studying Western culture. The philosophical basis of the institutional reform and renovation advocated by Kang is evolutionism, just as Liang Qichao says: “The Master’s [Kang Youwei’s] philosophy is the philosophy of an evolutionist.” It was on evolutionist grounds that Kang attacked the propositions of the conservatives and the Westeners, such as “the Dao will never change as long as Heaven does not change,” and “Chinese learning as the substance and Western learning as the function.” Kang Youwei, however, advocated institutional reform “on the disguise of imitating the past.” That is to say, he spread his ideas of institutional reform in the name of Confucius. This means that Kang Youwei, on the problems of the relation between past and present and between China and the West, still preserved something of the proposition of “Chinese learning as the substance and Western learning as the function,” even while weakened this view. As a reflection of this fact, Kang’s philosophy contains both the old and the new, and looks neither Chinese nor Western: the historical evolutionist theory presented in the form of the doctrine of “three ages” of the Gongyang New Text School. (1) “Change is the Dao of Heaven” and “The Origin is the Substance” The orthodox Confucians held that “the Dao will never change as long as Heaven does not change,” implying that the Dao of Heaven is the basis of the human Dao. Kang Youwei’s theory of historical evolution is diametrically opposed to this view. “Change,” according to Kang, “is the Dao of Heaven.” It is this proposition that is the basis of his theory of historical evolution. Contrary to the traditional Chinese view that nature is unchanging, Kang Youwei justifies the proposition that “Change is the Dao of Heaven” with scientific knowledge

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from the modern West. “Heaven,” says he, “could not have days without having nights, nor could it have winters without having summers. It is because of its ability to change that Heaven can sustain itself” (Kang 2007, vol. 4 p. 35). Kang Youwei accepts the Kant-Laplace nebular hypothesis, arguing that celestial bodies are not changeless and immutable. He says: All celestial bodies were formed from shapeless gas that floated in the universe. It is called the “nebula” because the molecules of which it was composed attracted each other; actually it was a huge lump of gas. (Kang 2007, vol. 12 p. 20)

With Copernicus’ and Newton’s theories as a basis, Kang criticizes the traditional theory of the structure of the universe that “Heaven is above the Earth.” Because ancient people relied only on the naked eye, he remarks that “they, within the limited scope of the naked eye, regarded what seemed vast to those who looked up as Heaven and what seemed boundless to those who looked down upon as the Earth, without ever knowing, however, that the Earth is actually extremely tiny in comparison with Heaven, which is extremely huge” (Kang 2007, vol. 12, p. 19). Hence Heaven was taken as absolutely above the Earth. The Earth, in fact, is also “a floating star moving around the sun.” Since the Earth is also a star, if seen from another planet, it would also seem to move through Heaven splendidly. “Since we are living on a star,” Kang said, “we are living in Heaven too; therefore we who are people on the Earth are all people of Heaven too” (Kang 2007, vol. 12 p. 11). The traditional conception of the universe arose, says Kang, because people’s knowledge was limited by the technology of that time. No telescopes were available then. Although telescopes are coarse “instruments,” it was precisely due to these new tools that people’s conception of the universe (the Dao of Heaven) was changed. So Kang Youwei says that “though Dao is superior to instrument, instrument may well change [the knowledge of] Dao too” (Kang 2007, vol. 3, p. 366). Kang Youwei’s idea that “change is the Dao of Heaven” represents a kind of modern consciousness, but this idea of the substance of the universe remains traditional and outdated, according to which “the origin is the substance.” The “origin,” in Kang’s view, is the original thing from which everything in the world derived. He says that “the Dao has the origin as its substance, and yin and yang as its function” (Kang 2007, vol. 7, p. 4). Kang referred to the “origin” as vital force: “Heaven and Earth were created from the vast and noble vital force” (Kang 2007, vol. 7, p. 4). It is also, however, a kind of spiritual entity. According to him, the “original vital force” is the same as the “spiritual vital force,” and is the same thing as “intelligent vital force,” “spiritual intellect,” “the enlightening,” and “bright virtue,” though different from the latter in name. Moreover, Kang regards magnetism and electricity as spiritual forces similar to the human mind, “which cannot bear to see the suffering of others.” This shows that in his idealist ontology of “taking the origin as the substance” lies a tendency towards pantheism. Kang Youwei’s idea of “taking the origin as the substance” places the spiritual “origin” in a supreme position, and thus turns it into a synonym for God. That is why he at last affirms the existence of God: “It is a common presupposition in all religions

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that there is God in Heaven. By Heaven, the Chinese mean something dominating, and the dominator is God.” The fact that the new idea of “change as the Dao of Heaven” coexists with the old idea of “taking the origin as the substance” reflects the dual nature of Kang’s philosophy as both progressive and backward. (2) The Doctrine of “Three Ages” and the Ideal of “Great Unity” The most outstanding contribution made by Kang Youwei as a pioneer of the philosophical theory of evolution in modern times consists in his advocacy of historical evolutionism. Liang Qichao says: “The major tendency in the history of learning in China for thousands of years, roughly speaking, is towards conservatism. Either it is thought that the civilized world was in the past, and the world degenerated day by day”—this is the view of those who advocate restoring what was ancient—or it is thought “that there has long been a rule that periods of order and periods of disorder occur in the world alternately.” Kang Youwei makes a unique and innovative interpretation of the theory of three ages in the Spring and Autumn Annals and arguesthat the civilized world lies in the time to come, and that the world progresses day by day. Kang is thus the pioneer of all those who in China talked about evolution” (Kang 2007, vol. 12 p. 430). Kang Youwei’s theory of historical evolution consists in precisely the theory of the “three ages” and the ideal of “great unity.” The major point of Kang’s theory of the “three ages” is that it is the universal law of the evolution of human society that it progresses from the Age of Disorder first to the Age of Rising Peace, or the Age of Lesser Prosperity (xiao kang), and then to the Age of Universal Peace, namely the Age of Great Unity (da tong). Kang says: The theory of three ages is the extraordinary implication of Confucius, which was elucidated by him in the name of Spring and Autumn Annals. The Legendary Age, to him, is actually the Age of Disorder, the Learnt Age is the Age of Rising Peace, and the Envisaged Age is the Age of Universal Peace. The Age of Disorder is the age in which culture and ethics were still foreign to the people. The Age of Rising Peace, or the Age of Lesser Prosperity, is the age in which culture and ethics came gradually into being. And the Age of Universal Peace is the Age of Great Unity, in which all distinctions are eliminated, and culture and ethics exist in the full sense. (Kang 2007, vol. 2, p. 324)

Here, Kang Youwei connects the theory of the “three ages” of the Gongyang School and the Confucian notions of “lesser prosperity” and “great unity” found in the “Evolution of Rites”. But his theory of the “three ages” is fundamentally different from that of the Gongyang School and the idea of great unity in the “Evolution of Rites” in the Book of Rites. According to the Gongyang School in the Han Dynasty, “the Dao in the Spring and Autumn Annals consists in following Heaven and imitating the past;” moreover, “what a Monarch needs is the nominal reform of institutions, rather than the substantial change of the Dao.” This is a version of cyclical view of history. The “Evolution of Rites” describes primitive society as a society in which “the Great Dao prevailed and the world belonged to the public,” while the Xia, Shang, and Zhou, the first three dynasties of civilized society, are described as societies in which “the Great Dao receded, the world became private property” and only a Dao of lesser prosperity could exist. This is a conception of history as degeneration. Kang

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Youwei’s theory of historical evolution from the Age of Disorder through the Age of Rising Peace to the Age of Universal Peace, therefore, advances a new idea that is different from the traditional ideas of history as cyclical or degenerating: the ideal society lies not in the remote past but in the future, and society should progress according to the law of historical evolution. The three-age process of evolution in Kang’s mind is actually a process of evolution with three social formations (or rather, three types of political system) as different stages. He says: Now the three institutions coexist on the earth. Generally speaking, in the Age of Disorder, rule by monarch is advocated; in the Age of Rising Peace, rule by both the monarch and the people is advocated; and in the Age of Great Unity, rule by the people is advocated. (Kang 2007, vol. 5 p. 464)

That is to say, the three political systems existing in the world at that time (autocratic monarchy, constitutional monarchy, and democracy) represent three different stages in the process of evolution of human history. He regards it as historically necessary that one stage is succeeded by another. He says: “The Spring and Autumn Annals elucidated the meaning of the three ages, namely the Age of Disorder, the Age of Rising Peace, and the Age of Universal Peace. Each age has its distinct Dao” (Kang 2007, vol. 3, p. 263). In this way, Kang Youwei broke from the theory held by Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan, and early reformers that “the Dao will never change as long as Heaven does not change,” and justified more convincingly the necessity of institutional reform. It is unscientific, however, for Kang to put history into his rigid model of the theory of the three ages. His theory of historical evolution, moreover, unsuitably allows only “gradual change” instead of revolution, and reduces the mechanism of historical evolution to the human instinct of avoiding hardship and seeking happiness, and to “the mind that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others.” Kang also looks at the evolution of humanity from the idea of the equality of human nature. Different people, in his view, have similar natures, so people are equal: “Similarity is what equality means, so in terms of uncultivated human nature, people are equal in that they all taste, hear, and see. In this sense, there is no way to differentiate a noble man from a bad man” (Kang 2007, vol. 1, p. 341). He believes that human beings are equal because everyone is born with the same natural capacities. Though justifying the equality of human nature in terms of biological facts, his proposition that people are equal which is based on the argument that people are similar by nature has a modern implication. As to the content of human nature, Kang refers to the human desire to avoid hardship and seek happiness. From their similar nature, therefore, people are all avoiding hardship and seeking happiness. And what the term “the Dao of humanity” means, according to Kang, is that which reduces people’s hardship and increases their happiness. He said: The Dao of humanity (人道ren dao) is either suitable or unsuitable. That which is unsuitable is hardship, while that which is suitable is happiness. Therefore the Dao of humanity arises when humankind is viewed as being the Dao. What is relevant to humankind being viewed as Dao is related to its

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management of hardship and happiness. In order to benefit the people, one should do nothing but reduce hardship and seek happiness for the people (Kang 2007, vol. 7, p. 6). Just because the Dao of humanity is avoiding hardship and seeking happiness, the criterion with which to evaluate what Kang calls the evolution of the Dao of humanity is the degree to which human hardship is reduced and human happiness is increased. Or in his words: What is called evolution is that which causes people to have more happiness and less hardship, and the Dao of which is good; what is called degeneration is that which causes people to have more hardship, but not more happiness, and the Dao of which is evil. (Kang 2007, vol. 7, p. 184)

This is obviously a negation of the inhumane idea of “preserving the Principle of Heaven and extinguishing human desires” advocated by the Neo-Confucians. Considering Kang’s theory of human nature as a whole, which agrees with Mencius’ idea of “the mind that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others,” Kang’s evolution of the Dao of humanity can also be seen as the expansion of this kind of “mind,” and not merely the approach to an external goal, that is, the ideal of “great unity.” The world of great unity is a paradise in which everybody can avoid hardship and seek happiness. In order to realize this ideal, Kang thinks, people must expand their “minds that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others,” or expand their instinct of loving their fellow humans. During the Age of Disorder, he says, only one’s blood relations are loved, while during the Age of Rising Peace, other people are also treated benevolently; and in the future Age of Universal Peace, “all living creatures are the same in nature, therefore people will love all nonhuman creatures also” (Kang 2007, vol. 5, p. 415). Here, Kang understood the process from the Age of Disorder through the Age of Rising Peace to the Age of Universal Peace as a process in which the loving instinct of the people is expanded. As the result of the expansion of their loving instinct, people can gradually eliminate the nine distinctions, such as those caused by different states, classes, and races, which are the ultimate origin of people’s hardship in the world, and realize the ideal of great unity in the long run. These ideas are no doubt utopian. But they have real, historical content. Both Hong Xiuquan and Kang Youwei longed for a world of great unity in which “the world belongs to the public,” but their ideals were totally different in their content. The Institution of Land of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom sketched a kind of agricultural socialism based on a small-scale peasant economy, while Kang Youwei’s The Book of Great Unity described in detail the bourgeois social ideal with modern humanism as its key tenet. Kang said: I absorbed ideas such as great unity, universal peace, Pure Land, longevity, neither-life-nordeath, the art of unlimitedness and ultimateness, in order to rescue all my fellow humans in the world from suffering forever; all these ideas come to nothing but human rights, equality, and independence. (Kang 2007, vol. 7, p. 164)

It is the practical demands of the bourgeoisie that are reflected in the humanist utopia envisioned by Kang in his the Book of Great Unity, which was aimed to fight

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against feudalism with the bourgeois theory of natural rights, and the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity. (3) Apriorist Methodology and Its Modern Implication The method with which Kang Youwei develops his system of the theory of historical evolution is aprioristic, but it is also an early attempt at methodological modernization. On the problem of the relation between mind (心xin) and things (物wu) and that between knowledge and action, Kang argues that the human organ for thinking is that from which human thought and emotion are derived, and that which commands the whole body, therefore “the mind is superior to the body” (Kang 2007, vol. 2, p. 392). If one can predict the consequences of one’s actions, then one can surely act reasonably, and therefore “intelligence comes first”. From his emphasis on the role played by one’s spirit and intelligence, Kang vigorously calls for developing intelligence ( 开智kai zhi). In order for the people to overcome their ignorance and stupidity, according to Kang, the spirititive drive must be summoned to break conventions. He says, therefore, that “those who try hard to learn in adverse circumstances become intelligent;” moreover, he believes that “old habits are rooted deeply … Therefore the more one acts against them, the better one’s knowledge is” (Kang 2007, vol. 1, p. 341). Kang’s stress on the role played by human reason and spiritive drive suggests a modern criticism of feudalist obscurantism, but it is, in the end, a version of idealist apriorism. This can be seen in the fact that he insists that the ability to learn about the human soul (reason) come after the possession of knowledge: “Everybody has a share of the origin of Heaven and Earth as his soul before he possesses knowledge, and only after he possesses knowledge is he able to learn anything” (Kang 2007, vol. 1, p. 152). Kang’s apriorism runs though the methodology with which his system is constructed. Mathematics, according to him, is the most exact branch of learning, and the mathematical method is the most efficient method for discovering truth. According to his self-compiled The Chronicle of Kang Youwei’s Life, in 1885, he “was involved in studying mathematics and writing The Human Axioms with geometric methods.” In 1886, he “wrote another book entitled The Book of Axioms, which was also written using the geometric method.” From the preserved part of his Encyclopedia of Practical Principles and Universal Laws, we can see that at the time he was constructing his theory, he was in a way imitating Euclid, introducing several “practical principles” (analogous to definitions and axioms in geometry) as the presuppositions from which were deduced “universal laws” of human society, so as to show that his theory of historical evolution was necessarily true and that it could be proven with the same axiomatic methods used in geometry. In the 1890s, when Kang Youwei developed the system centering on the theory of the three ages, he claimed that he was applying the algebraic method. He said: The Spring and Autumn Annals was written to imply institutional reform. The text of the book is like algebra, functioning as symbols for real implications. That is why it is called a “pretext.” Because numbers cannot be used directly, they are replaced with symbols such as jiazhi and tianyuan. (Kang 2007, vol. 2, p. 329)

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Both the geometric and algebraic methods are imitated by Kang in an apriorist way, for he regarded the “practical principles” as “self-evident” presuppositions from which he deduced subjectively a system with something like the “three ages” as its algebraic symbols. Kang’s apriorist methodology, however, contains some modern significance. One important part of the philosophical revolution in modern China is the transformation of ways of thinking, that is, the replacement of the outdated methods of classical learning with the modern method of scientific thinking. Kang’s “institutional reform in the disguise of the past” had not yet broken its ties with the form of classical learning, but his apriorist methodology of algebra and geometry breathes some modern life into philosophy, and foreshadows a future in which Chinese philosophy would eventually embrace the rich benefits provided by modern science. Generally speaking, although Kang Youwei’s philosophy contains a few outdated elements, by advocating the theory of historical evolution, he succeeded in taking the first step into the period of the theory of evolution in the development of modern Chinese philosophy.

11.2 Tan Sitong: The “Study of Humanity” Aimed at Breaking the Chains of Bondage Tan Sitong (1865–1898), called Fusheng, also known as Zhuangfei, was a native of Liuyang, Hunan Province. As a radical member of the Hundred Days’ Reform Movement of 1898, led by Kang Youwei, he sought a “new theory aimed at breaking the chains of bondage.” When he was young, he travelled all over the country and came to be thoroughly in touch with society. During the period preparing for the reform in 1898, he took part in managing the School of Current Affairs, and established the Newspaper of Hunan. During that period, he was appointed as a secretary to the Council of State, and played an important role in the reform. He died a heroic death after the movement was defeated. His works were compiled as Collected Works of Tan Sitong. On the problem of the relations between past and present and between China and the West, Tan Sitong argued, contrary to the prevailing opinion, that Chinese and Western learning could coexist. He said: “The countries in the continents of Europe and America have become prosperous because of their preference for the new … while countries in the continents of Asia, Africa, and Australia have declined because of their preference for the old” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 319). For this reason, the Chinese should stop being complacent and conservative, and become aware of the fact that “that Dao is not monopolized by the sages, nor monopolized by the Chinese” (Tan 1981, vol. 1, p. 197). Hence, Tan Sitong formed his “theory aimed at breaking the chains of bondage” on the basis of his assimilation and reconstruction of the intellectual resources from both China and the West. The first chain Tan wanted to break was that of the Confucian ethical rites and codes of feudalist society. He

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fiercely attacked their use by feudalist rulers as a way of restraining people’s minds, especially those regulating the relationship between the monarch and his subjects. He observed: “For the past two thousand years, the relationship between the monarch and his subjects has been especially dark and inhumane, and it has become worse in recent times” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 337). Of all human relationships in the world, to his mind, that between friends is “the most beneficial and least harmful,” because it is a relationship of equality, “the tenet of which is nothing but preserving one’s right of autonomy” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 350). Tan Sitong’s call to break the chains of bondage, therefore, is basically a call to reject the feudalist moral rites and codes, and to replace them with the bourgeois ideas of liberty and equality. (1) Nominalism and a “Theory of Ether” Rejecting the feudalist ethical codes as a chain of bondage, Tan Sitong calls his “theory aimed at breaking the chains of bondage” the study of humanity (仁学ren xue), because in his view “the first principle of humanity is communication” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 291). With communication (通tong) as the first principle, the Dao of humanity (人道ren dao) makes it possible for “China and the West,” “the high and low,” “male and female,” and “others and I” to communicate with each other and to be combined into one, and to arrive at a thoroughly equal state. He declares that “the expression of communication is equality” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 291). The Dao of humanity cannot be realized, according to Tan, because the Confucian system of ethical codes gives rise to an array of confusing categories or names for each person’s social role as defined in this system. Tan believes that “the distortion of humanity originates from names”, moreover, “communication is blocked because names are confused” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 291). Tan Sitong’s “study of humanity,” therefore, implies a nominalist position. In Tan’s view, that the Dao of humanity is distorted by “names” is due to two factors. On the one hand, “names” that were invented by people to refer to different kinds of things have no actuality of their own, so they can easily be confused. On the other hand, “names” are confused because of certain social forces—taking advantage of “what is accumulated by power” and “what is worshiped by custom.” Some people “invent a wide-ranging system of names as a tool of control, complementary to the control of the world by cruel retribution” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 291). Philosophically speaking, this is a notion of nominalism. Tan says: “I keenly felt the evil of what is nominal, I want to remedy it with what is actual” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 436). This idea of “replacing what is nominal with what is actual” shows the tendency in Tan Sitong’s thought towards nominalist materialism and empiricism, which is in opposition to the then-dominant Neo-Confucianism, a Chinese counterpart of the form of realism that regards “names” or concepts as actual things. In order to get rid of those names or categories imposed on people as chains, Tan Sitong thinks we should do away with “dichotomy (对待dui dai), because names are all dichotomous. All dichotomies, according to Tan, can be reduced to the dichotomy between “I” and “others.” He says: “dichotomy arises from differentiation between this and that, and differentiation arises from egocentricity. First comes the self, then come others, and that is followed by the interaction between the self and others” (Tan

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1981, vol. 2, p. 316). After these arise all sorts of names that are dichotomous from each other. The key to the eradication of dichotomy, therefore, lies in eradicating the “notion of self.”1 Tan makes a case for “selflessness” on the basis of the absoluteness of movement (things come into being and pass away simultaneously): “If I am taken as living, I could perish in an instant; if I am taken as dead, I once lived. Therefore it makes no difference whether you say I exist as a living thing or as a dead thing” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 315). To eradicate dichotomy with relativism in this way is typical of the philosophies of Zhuangzi and Zen Buddhism. What is unique about Tan Sitong is the fact that he appealed to modern science in order to do away with dichotomy. He says: “dichotomy is eradicated as soon as science is developed—that is the highest knowledge a person of learning can get” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 317). Various properties of things, in his view, are relative, because all things can be reduced to sixty-four chemical elements, while the latter can in turn be reduced to “ether,” which has neither birth nor death: “it cannot be regarded as being, since it has no birth; it cannot be regarded as non-being, since it has no death” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 306). Thus, Tan Sitong rejects dichotomy by using the scientific knowledge available to him at that time. In his effort to reject dichotomy by using scientific knowledge, Tan Sitong resorts to “ether,” and thus gives it, as a concept in the physics of that time, an ontological meaning. According to Tan, the universe is filled with ether, from which originate Heaven, Earth, and everything in the world, and in whose movement consists every kind of change in the world. He writes: In all worlds of dharma, non-beings, living beings, there is something that is the greatest, finest, and smallest. It cements, communicates with, attracts, and fills all things. It is invisible to the eye, inaudible to the ear, and it does not have odor or taste. Since there is no readily available name for it, we name it “ether” […] The world of dharma, the world of non-beings, and the world of living beings all come from it. (Tan 1981, vol. 2, pp. 293–294).

Even though ether as an entity is not perceptible, “it shows its existence through its operations such as waves, forces, particles, and flows” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 434). In this sense, “ether” is a physical entity. At the same time, however, he refers to “ether” as “the force of mind”: “Ether is actually a name for the force of mind which exists in electricity and other simple things” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 291). In this sense, “ether” refers to a spiritual entity. From this, we can see that Tan Sitong’s philosophy, like Kang Youwei’s, is close to pantheism. Actually, he is trying to replace the concept of vital force (qi) in traditional Chinese philosophy with the concept of “ether” from modern Western science. This can be regarded as an attempt to modernize Chinese philosophy. (2) Evolutionist Ideas and the Tendency Towards Voluntarism Tan Sitong’s study of humanity, aimed at “breaking the chains of bondage,” is connected with evolutionism. 1

Translator’s note: “the notions of self” translates wo xiang (我相). Wo xiang in turn translates a Buddhism notion, the sanskrit a¯ tmasam . jñ¯a in the Diamond Sutra.

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In his earlier years, Tan Sitong accepted and developed Wang Fuzhi’s idea that “Dao exists in nothing but instrument.” He argues: “Dao is the function, while instrument is the substance. The function works only where the substance is established, and the Dao does not pass away insofar as its instrument exists” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 317). From this position, he poses a question: “How could Dao remain unchanged when its instrument changed?” His idea is a negation of the proposition that “Dao is changeless even if its instrument changed” (Tan 1981, vol. 1, p. 197). From this idea, we can easily get the result of evolutionism if it is developed a step further. Later, Tan Sitong combined Wang Fuzhi’s idea that “the operation of Heaven and Earth is renewed daily” with the notion of “ether,” believing that the evolution of nature was the “constantly renewing flux” of “ether.” He states: “Everything in the three worlds will pass away if ether does not renew itself” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 318). The cause of movement for the renewal of ether lies in itself. Tan argues: “From what does the constant renewal originate? The answer is: from ether’s cause of movement” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 319). Tan takes the phenomenon of thunder and lightning to illustrate that the constant renewal is the movement of “ether” itself: at first there is nothing in the sky, then rain clouds appear in which there is positive and negative electricity. He claims that “two cloud formations either have the same electricity, or have different kinds of electricity. In the former case they attack each other, while in the latter case they attract each other. Thus arise the thunderous and deafening noises” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 320). Here, Tan Sitong explains that in “ether” itself there are contradictory and moving forces. This means that he is aware of the fact that the internal moving force of the constant renewal and evolution of things is the struggle between two different forces. As to the evolution of social history, Tan Sitong advances his theory of “two cycles of three ages,” which combines Kang Youwei’s “doctrine of the three ages” with six lines of the first hexagram Qian (乾) in the Book of Changes. From the Age of Universal Peace in the remote past, to the Age of Rising Peace of the period of eight legendary emperors, the Age of Disorder, and the Three Dynasties of Xia, Shang, and Zhou, is a history of “the reverse sequence of the three ages of the inner trigram”. After the Three Dynasties, there was a long period of the Age of Disorder, during which monarchy dominated; then there is the Age of Rising Peace, when global integration is accomplished; finally there will be the Age of Great Unity, when democracy becomes dominant everywhere. This is a history of “normal sequence of the three ages of the outer trigram” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 370). This, of course, is a fiction. But Tan’s description of the history of human society as a tortuous process that first goes backwards and then goes forwards has something do with the dialectical conception of development as a forward but spiral movement. As to the Dao of humankind, Tan Sitong thinks that the origin of constant change lies in nature (性xing), which is a function of “ether.” He explains: “What we call ‘nature’ is that which one receives when one is born […] Nature is a function of ether. It is because ether has the ability to bring up and love nature. Hence nature is said to be good” (Tan 1981, vol. 2 p. 300). From this point of view, he identifies the evolution of humankind with the evolution of the human soul (spirit), the ultimate

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goal of which is a state in which “only the soul, not the body, exists” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 366). As a result of his emphasis on spirit, Tan Sitong, on the relation between knowledge and action, says: “Instead of action, I highly value knowledge,” because “knowledge is a matter of the soul, while action is a matter of the body” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 369). Tan Sitong’s idealist notion, which emphasizes spirit and values knowledge rather than action, implies a tendency towards voluntarism. Following Gong Zizhen, he highly praises the “power of mind.” He states: What makes humankind spiritual is the mind. If there is something which is unreachable by one’s physical force, there is nothing which is unreachable by one’s mind. […] Even Heaven and Earth cannot be compared to the power of mind. Heaven and Earth are infinitely huge, nonetheless, the mind can, if it so wishes, make, destroy, or remold them. (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 460)

Tan believes in the miraculous power of the mind, claiming that “with the power of mind, nothing is impossible to achieve” (Tan 1981, vol. 2, p. 357). In Tan’s opinion, China is afflicted with disasters because its “people’s minds are mostly mechanical.” Therefore, he is determined to “employ the power of mind to rescue the nation from its misfortune.” This kind of voluntarism is theoretically wrongheaded, but is historically important, because it was a task of historical urgency in Tan’s time to break the chains of bondage of the categorical obligations in Confucian morality. When the people are still unconscious of their interests and historical roles, a few revolutionary and enlightened members of society can awaken the people with their own struggle, even with their blood and life. Tan Sitong, Zhang Taiyan, and the early Lu Xun were all such heroes.

11.3 Yan Fu’s “Doctrine of Natural Evolution” and Empiricism Yan Fu’s “doctrine of natural evolution” was an indication that the evolutionist philosophy in modern China was maturing. Yan Fu (1853–1921), called Ji Dao, was a native of Houguan (present-day Minhou), Fujian Province. As a young man he studied at the Fuzhou Naval College. In 1877, he was sent to England to study. After returning home, he was appointed, among other things, academic dean at the Peiyang Naval Academy. During the Reform Movement around 1895, he published a series of articles advocating institutional reforms. His life-long work was to introduce Western academic works into China through his elegant translations, among which are the “eight famous books translated by Yan Fu”: Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, J. S. Mill’s On Liberty and Logic, Spencer’s Study of Sociology, Edward Jenks’s A History of Politics, William Stanley Jevons’ Elementary Lessons in Logic, and Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Law. On the problem of the relations between past and present, and between China and the West, Yan Fu radically criticized the theory of “Chinese learning as substance and

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Western learning as function,” which was then cited mainly to oppose institutional reform. He said: “We can talk about substance and function only in regard to certain things,” and “Chinese learning has both its substance and function, so does Western learning. They exist only when one’s substance and function are not mixed with the other’s” (Yan 1986, vol. 3, p. 559). That means that in order to learn the “function” of Western learning, one has to know its “substance” too. The “substance of Chinese learning” and the “function of Western learning” can no more be combined than one can “take an ox as the substance while a horse as the function.” Just because the theory of “Chinese learning as substance and Western learning as function” is absurd, we should not confine our efforts in learning from the West, as the advocates of the theory suggested, merely to learning their “techniques” for building strong ships and fierce cannons, we should also grasp the “lifeblood” of Western learning. Few achievements had been made in more than half a century since the Opium War in learning from the West. According to Yan Fu, because the Chinese, fettered by the theory of “Chinese learning as substance and Western learning as function,” had failed to grasp the essential “lifeblood” of Western learning. He explains: What is the lifeblood? To put it in a few words: academically they dismiss falsehood while seeking truth, and politically they subdue what is private to what is public. These two principles were originally not different from what was regarded to be right by the Chinese. The fact that they are carried out successfully in the West but not in China is connected with the distinction between freedom and non-freedom. (Yan 1986, vol. 1, pp. 2–3).

He said that “the sages of previous generations in China have all been afraid of the notion of freedom, and have never developed it into a theory”: “In the highest position the Chinese place the Three Cardinal Guides, while the Westerners place equality.” Yan Fu reduced the differences between China and the West to the difference between the bourgeois ideas of freedom and equality and the feudalist ethical codes, from which were derived the differences in scholarship and politics. Yan Fu’s criticism of the theory of “Chinese learning as substance and Western learning as function,” and his suggestion to differentiate Chinese learning from Western learning in terms of the “lifeblood” of the latter, do not mean to “get rid of everything old in our country in order to seek new things in the West,” but rather to deal analytically with traditional Chinese thought, so as to “discard the outdated part while preserving the valuable part of it” (Yan 1986, vol. 3, p. 560). That is to say, he strove to combine the “valuable” things of both modern Western culture and traditional Chinese thought. This kind of combination can be illustrated with his “theory of natural evolution.” (1) A “Philosophy of Evolution” in Which the Theory of Evolution is the World Outlook The reason why Yan Fu’s “philosophy of evolution” is a mature version of evolutionist philosophy is that he consciously introduced and developed the theory of evolution not as a biological theory but as a Weltanschauung. The major difference between China and the West, according to Yan Fu, is in the field of Weltanschauung. He says:

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I think the greatest difference between China and the West, which can never disappear, is that the Chinese are fond of antiquity but neglect the present, while the Westerners are striving for the present in order to supersede the past. The Chinese consider the cycle of order and disorder, prosperity and decline as typical of nature and human society, whereas the Westerners consider that progress should be made every day and without an end, and regard it as the ultimate principle of scholarship and politics that a prosperous period should not be replaced with a declining one, and an orderly period should not be replaced with a disorderly one. (Yan 1986, vol. 1, p. 1)

It is clear that Yan Fu introduces the theory of evolution in order fundamentally to change the Weltanschauung of the Chinese, and to put the theory of evolution in its place as the leading theory for observing the universe and human society. On the basis of the theory of evolution, Yan Fu describes the evolution of nature and of human society. Yan Fu’s conception of nature is based on Newtonian mechanics, so he describes the evolution of nature in Newtonian terms. In his view, the world is the unity of matter and force: “Mass interacts with force in the huge universe. Apart from mass, force cannot be observed, whilst apart from force, mass cannot be displayed” (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1320). Here, the term “mass” refers to objects with qualities, such as atoms, and the term “force” refers to the cause of movement, in particular the mechanical force. It is in the interaction between these two, according to Yan Fu, that the secret of the evolution of the universe is contained: “The evolution of nature consists in the fact that things get condensed into mass, and they diffuse as force” (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1327). Yan Fu explains the evolution of living beings in terms of Darwin’s theory of evolution. He says: “The principle of competition among species and of natural selection was originally developed by Darwin” (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1325). Yan Fu pays much attention to this principle. According to Yan Fu, “competition among species means the struggle among species for survival, and natural selection means the preservation of the fittest species” (Yan 1986, vol. 1, p. 16). Based on modern positivist sciences, Yan Fu’s evolutionist conception of nature goes further than the traditional Chinese conception of nature, that is, the naïve monism of vital force(气qi). It is true that Yan Fu also talks about the evolution of nature in the terms of vital force, regarding it as a process in which “all things are developed from the one single vital force.” But Yan Fu defines the category vital force in a new way. In his commentary on Zhuangzi, he observes: What is called vital force today is something with particles, attracting and repulsing, whose weight can be weighed and whose movement can be observed. The sixty kinds of things listed in chemistry, when heated enough, can all be transformed into vital force. The common things on the earth are nothing but nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen. (Yan 1981b, p. 18)

Defined in this way, vital force becomes largely a concept of matter based on modern experimental science. Although a continuation of the monism of vital force in ancient China, Yan Fu’s theory of natural evolution is essentially different from it. Applying the theory of natural evolution to the field of social history, Yan Fu says that “it is a definite fact that society progresses, and later generations supersedes earlier ones” (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1360). Moreover, he thinks that humankind,

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like other species, follows the law of “competition among species and selection by nature.” He said: “According to Darwin, various species struggle with each other, and the fittest one survives. It is true of political and moral institutions as well as of vegetation and animals” (Yan 1986, vol. 1, pp. 26–27). In this sense, Yan Fu agrees with Spencer’s social Darwinism, but criticizes Huxley for his idea of the “innate conscience,” or sympathy, as the principle of social evolution. According to Huxley, the law of evolution, namely the competition among species and selection by nature, does not apply to human society, for there are innate moral norms in society that are absent in non-human species. It is with these moral norms that human society has been maintained. Yan Fu objects that Huxley “mistook the effect for the cause when he said that society arose from people’s sympathy” (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1347). For in his view, it is to protect each person’s security and interest that people formed society, and it is to meet the demands of society that moral norms came into being. Yan Fu criticizes Spencer while absorbing some of his ideas, and agrees with Huxley on some points in addition to criticizing him. When he talks about why he chose to translate Evolution and Ethics, Yan Fu says: Huxley’s intention in this book was to remedy Spencer’s idea of committing to the domination of natural powers. Much of what was said in this book is consistent with the ancients’ words in our country. Moreover, the matter of self-strengthening in order to protect the human species was stressed repeatedly in this book. (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1321)

Spencer’s social Darwinism implies that a weak nation should submit to the operation of the law of “competition of species and selection by nature,” and wait willingly to be eliminated. This, in Yan Fu’s opinion, is inconsistent with the urgent requirement of Chinese people to “self-strengthen so as to self-protect,” for it neglects the active role of humankind and demands that one “submit oneself to the domination of nature.” In contrast, Huxley stresses the role played by humankind in the evolution of humankind itself. Yan Fu says: Huxley values force as natural operation, and values virtue as human striving. Nature would triumph over human beings if they contended with each other, and brought about disorder; however, human beings would triumph over nature if they got along with each other and preserved order. This thought is consistent with the remarks on nature by Liu Yuxi and Liu Zongyuan in the Tang dynasty, and contrary to the idea of the Confucianists since the Song dynasty, who believed that principles belong to Heaven, while desires belong to human beings. (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1395)

In order to allow the strength of humankind to be exercised so as to make human survival and development possible, it is necessary to rely upon the strength of groups. Yan Fu observes: “The process of natural evolution will enable those who are sociable to survive, and cause those who are not sociable to perish; it will also enable those who are good at organization to survive, and those who are not to perish” (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1347). Evidently, Yan Fu proposed his philosophy in order to call on the Chinese people to unite in order to salvage the nation, and to work hard for the prosperity of the country. On the whole, Yan Fu’s philosophy of natural evolution, with a view on China’s actual situation, chooses some elements from evolutionism in the West, at the same

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time it combines itself with the fine tradition of ancient Chinese philosophy while criticizing the orthodox schools of Confucianism. In this sense, Yan Fu’s evolutionist philosophy is a worldview based on modern sciences, blended with the fine traditions of China. Influenced by Spencer, however, Yan Fu thinks that “in the evolution of the people, which is an endless process, we should never expect sudden changes” (Yan 1986, vol. 1, p. 25). He denies, therefore, the possibility of leaps in the process of evolution. This is a vulgar concept of evolutionism. (2) An Empiricist Theory of Knowledge and Logic Yan Fu advocates an empiricist theory of knowledge and stresses the importance of the inductive logic associated with empiricism. Defending a position close to Locke’s idea of the tabula rasa, Yan Fu opposes Wang Shouren’s theory of “innate knowledge”(良知liang zhi) He says: “Knowledge comes from one origin, in which one’s mind is like a blank sheet of paper or a cup of pure water, while one’s experiences are like colorful drawings on paper or seasoning in the water” (Yan 1986, vol. 4, p. 1050). Apriorism, in his view, is a “prejudiced theory.” He criticizes “the theory of Lu [Jiuyuan] and Wang [Shouren] because there are too many elements of prejudiced theory in it” (Yan 1981a, b, p. 192). The School of Mind of Lu and Wang, as we know, was utilized by and praised highly by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao in order to inspire the movement of institutional reform. Compared with Kang and Liang, who displayed a tendency towards apriorism, Yan Fu is basically an empiricist. From his empiricist assumptions, Yan Fu argues that genuine knowledge comes from direct experience. He says: “Knowledge acquired through reading is a secondhand thing. Genuine knowledge comes only from regarding the universe as a book, and people’s affairs as the words” (Yan 1986, vol. 1, p. 29). This remark is contrary to the School of Song, which was engaged in unproductive discussions about human nature and heavenly principles, and the School of Han, which was occupied with textual criticism in Yan’s time. Yan Fu divides a cognitive process into a stage of “original knowledge” and a stage of “discursive knowledge” (Yan 1981a, p. 5). The so-called original knowledge is basically the knowledge acquired through direct experience, also called “immediate knowledge”, whereas discursive knowledge is knowledge acquired through reasoning, also called “distant knowledge.” He stresses the importance of direct experience, which in his view is the origin of all knowledge. He says that for one “not to mistake discursive knowledge for original knowledge is a matter of direct relevance to truth or error” (Yan 1981a, b, p. 6). Of course, he also remarks that one should not be content with direct experience, but should “derive the unknown facts from the known facts, and trace the unseen things from the seen things” (Yan 1981a, p. 7). From his empiricist position, Yan Fu interprets the traditional Confucian proposition of “exhausting principles through investigation of things.” He says: Generally speaking, the process of making an exhaustive inquiry into principles consists of three stages. The first one is identifying, or collecting things of the same kind and telling

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truth from falsehood. The second one is generalization, or drawing general conclusions from different facts. […]The scholars engaged in inquiry in ancient times, Western as well as Chinese, did nothing other than these two, no matter whether their achievements were good or not. That is why the universal laws they acquired are often false. Consequently, scientists in modern times remedy their predecessors’ mistakes with a third stage called experimentation. The more carefully arranged an experiment is, the truer its conclusion tends to be. (Yan 1986, vol. 1, p. 93).

Yan Fu’s intention here is obviously to replace the traditional method of speculation with the modern scientific method. In order for Chinese philosophy to assume a modern form, according to Yan Fu, special emphasis should also be paid to logic. The fact that many concepts (“names”) in traditional Chinese learning are ambiguous, in his view, is due to the latter’s lack of formal logic as its basis. He takes the term qi (气 vital force) as an example. With the help of this term, many terms can be formed such as zheng qi (正气), xie qi (邪 气), yuan qi (元气), yin qi (淫气), and yu qi (余气), and “it is entirely impossible to grasp their specific meanings” (Yan 1986, vol. 1, p. 18). Yan Fu observes that: Other terms, such as xin (心), tian(天), Dao (道), ren (仁),yi(义), and so on, are all extremely important in ancient texts, but their meaning in each specific use is ambiguous. (Yan 1981b, p. 19)

Yan Fu reflects: “words are so ambiguous in speech and writing, how is it possible to do exact and profound science and philosophy?” (Yan 1981b, p. 19). So he thinks that Chinese philosophy can be modernized only after the conceptual ambiguities are cleaned up and, in order to do so, it is necessary to learn formal logic from the West. He says: “A term should have its definite meaning, and a sentence its definite sense. These two are the basis of thinking, which logicians stress very much” (Yan 1981b, p. 106). Of logic, it should be noted, Yan Fu prefers induction to deduction, a position shared by the British empiricists. “The true method of science,” he says, “consists in induction” (Yan 1981b, p. 66). Induction means “observing the changing facts and making generalizations from them.” In his view, deduction is included in induction. Deduction is one of the four “skills” of induction. Only induction, in his view, can lead to the acquisition of new knowledge. He says: The method of deduction is limited to speculation. But if we are confined to deduction, we are doing nothing more than drawing one principle from other principles acquired by the ancient people, just like pouring water from one bucket to another. Thus, where can we get new knowledge? (Yan 1981b, p. 65)

Moreover, Yan Fu thinks that the presuppositions from which deductions are made, including the most abstract mathematical axioms, must also be acquired through induction. Although induction is very important, an salient feature of traditional Chinese learning is its neglect of induction, and its emphasis on making deductions from the principles of the ancients; this is demonstrated by common phrases such as “the Book of Songs said so-and-so” and “it was said by Confucius that thus-andsuch,” which are actually prior “prejudiced doctrines.” Consequently, Yan Fu argues

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that “for learning at present, induction is a more important method” (Yan 1981b, p. 64). Yan Fu’s preference for induction over deduction, obviously, is connected with his empiricism. His real contribution to the modernization of Chinese philosophy in this respect lies in the fact that he exposes traditional Chinese philosophy’s deficiency in formal logic. Like British empiricism, Yan Fu’s empiricism has a positivistic tendency, according to which anything beyond sensations is unknowable. Yan Fu says: “I have said that the substance of all things cannot be known; and what can be known is confined to sensations” (Yan 1981a, p. 1036). From such an agnostic position, he regards all things that cannot be known through sensations, such as “the origin of heaven and the earth,” “the creator-dominator,” “the origin of force,” and so on, as “inconceivable” (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1380). This reveals a mystical dimension to his philosophy. (3) Ideas on Freedom and a Utilitarian Theory of Ethics “Freedom,” in Yan Fu’s sense, is not only a political concept but also a philosophical one. He thinks of freedom as both the driving force and goal of the evolution of humanity. He says: One’s behaviors, regardless of whether they are good or evil, do not come from oneself unless they are free. In this case, one can only talk about happiness or unhappiness, and no progress of the people’s morality is possible. The great order can be achieved as long as the people are allowed to be free and are allowed to take advantage of natural selection. (Yan 1986, vol. 1, p. 133)

This is to regard freedom as the driving force of the evolution of humanity. In addition to this, Yan Fu says: From the time they are born, animals, driven by vital force, can decide nothing for themselves. They are not free, but are all bound up with other things. Human beings are unique in standing between spirits and non-human things, because they are both free and fettered. The higher the level of natural evolution towards the goal of order, the more things human beings can decide freely for themselves. (Yan 1986, vol. 1, p. 133)

This is to regard freedom as the goal of the evolution of humanity. Because Yan Fu regards freedom as the goal and driving force of the evolution of humanity, he argues that moral responsibility presupposes one’s freedom of will while obligation presupposes one’s autonomy. When he compares Chinese moral ideas with those of the West, he points out that Westerners value “freedom, therefore they value promise-keeping and resolute action,” while the Chinese “respect their parents, therefore they underestimate promise-keeping and resolute action” (Yan 1986, vol. 1, p. 31). These remarks contain an important ethical principle: to be highly responsible for one’s own words and deeds, or to be “true in word and resolute in deed,” presupposes one’s freedom of will. As to rights and obligation, Yan Fu says that “obligation is the opposite of rights. The rights which people enjoy come before the obligations they are supposed to fulfill. Apart from rights, the obligations imposed on the people are not real obligations, but slavery” (Yan 1986, vol. 4, p. 1006).

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The ethics that Yan Fu accepted and advocated is progressive in the sense that Western morality is superior to feudalist morality, and it is utilitarian, which is connected with his empiricist position. He says: “I regard happiness as good and hardship as evil. It is on the basis of happiness or hardship that we identify a thing as good or evil” (Yan 1986, vol. 5, p. 1359). Yan Fu regards as human nature the tendency to prefer advantage and happiness to disadvantage and hardship, and holds that good and evil refer respectively to advantage and disadvantage, and that the latter two in turn can be reduced respectively to happiness and hardship. The Mohists in China had a similar view, but while they placed “loving others” and “serving others” before everything, Yan Fu regards “serving oneself” as of greatest importance, for in his view, only by benefiting oneself can a group and a nation be benefited. An individual’s demands for survival, happiness, and the fulfillment of desires are the basis of human society: “Appetites for food, drink, and sexual relations are fundamental desires of human beings, they are the principles of the Dao of Group. The Dao of Group would be abolished if one of them were absent” (Yan 1986, vol. 1, pp. 100– 101). It is solely because every person pursues his individual interests, in Yan’s view, that the development of society is possible. He states: “Few people intend to serve other people, while many people intend to serve themselves. Selfish efforts accumulate for the public good, and herein lies the cause of prosperity for the society” (Yan 1986, vol. 1, 101). For this reason, he opposes setting the private (私si), against the common (公gong) and righteousness(义yi)against interest(利 li), but calls on people to pursue their own interests in an enlightened manner (Yan 1986, vol. 5, 1359), that is, to seek benefit with the help of righteousness. This idea of “rational egoism,” while progressive insofar as it represents an anti-feudalist morality, has its own limitations, for it bases morality on the interests of individuals. Yan Fu’s evolutionist philosophy is an important part of the evolutionist stage of modern Chinese philosophy. But, in his last years, he tended to be politically conservative; he was academically respectful towards Confucius, and advocated reading the Confucian classics. His philosophical thought in his later years paled into insignificance; the splendor of his early thought was all gone.

11.4 Liang Qichao on the Freedom of the “Self” and the Evolution of the “Group” During the institutional reforms of 1898, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were usually mentioned together. When he was young, Liang Qichao inquired into the freedom of the “self” and the evolution of the “group,” and thus left an indelible impression on modern Chinese philosophy. Liang Qichao (1873–1929), called Zhuoru, but best known as Rengong, was a native of Xinhui, Guangdong Province. As a young man, he followed Kang Youwei, and was the latter’s competent assistant in leading the Hundred Days’ Reform. After the reform failed, he fled to Japan, and was engaged there in promoting ideological

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enlightenment. Liang’s life was characterized by frequent changes in his academic ideas and political positions. His main works are in the Collected Works of the Ice-Drinking Chamber. As a reformist, Liang Qichao, like Kang Youwei and Yan Fu, regarded “developing people’s intelligence” as his supreme mission. He called himself “a Chen She [the leader of the peasant uprising in the late Qin period] in the new academic circle,” explicitly showing that he intended to be a rebel against the monopoly of Confucianism in the ideological realm (Liang 1989, vol. 34 p. 65). So, although he had been supportive to Kang Youwei’s “institutional reform in the disguise of the remote past,” he came to realize at last that such an artificial analogy between modern Western learning and Confucianism reflected the fact that Kang was still enslaved by Confucianism. He says: Those who are frequently ready to make artificial analogies between Western learning and Chinese learning are actually conservative even though they claim to be progressive. They encourage the slavish mentality to an ever greater degree in the circle of thinking. (Liang 1989, vol. 9, p. 59)

It is because he is unsatisfied with Kang Youwei’s “relying on” Confucius, he says that “my ideas are frequently inconsistent with my Master’s, and Liang’s school was divided therefore from Kang’s school” (Liang 1989, vol. 34, p. 65). Although Liang Qichao was formerly one of Kang Youwei’s disciples, he had his own ideas that were different from Kang’s, the major ones of which are reflected in his remarks on the freedom of the “self” and the evolution of the “group.” (1) “Elimination of Slavery of the Mind” and “Revolution of Morality” Demanded by the Theory of “New People” In his famous theory of “new people,” Liang Qichao maintains that, in order to make China a new type of modern country, it is necessary to bring up a new type of people. He states: “if we want to renovate our country, we should first renovate our people” (Liang 2005, p. 75). In his opinion, the people trained by Chinese feudal ethical rules have a slavish mentality. China can be salvaged only after this kind of mentality is eliminated and replaced by the idea of freedom. He says: The disaster caused by corruption, which has existed for thousands of years, now comes to a new height. The ultimate root of it lies in the people’s slavish mentality. Without getting rid of this mentality, China can never become an equal member of the international community Now, the meaning of freedom is basically to make people know their own nature, and not to allow others to control them. At present, the disease of servility can be cured by no other medicine than this one. (Liang 2010, p. 116)

So his theory of “new people” is intended to enlighten the people, to eliminate their slavish mentality with the idea of freedom, and to cultivate a new type of ideal personality. Liang’s “freedom,” as a philosophical category, refers to the freedom of the self-spirit. He said: It is the freedom of the self that is referred to by one’s freedom. Each man, nevertheless, has two selves: one is the self who faces other people. That is, one’s body standing uprightly in the world; the other is the self who stands in contrast with the body. That is, one’s spirit living lustrously in one’s soul (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 46).

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Liang’s discussion of “the self’s freedom” here is a continuation of Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan’s discussion on the problem of the relation between “self” and “thing.” Liang Qichao explicitly divides the problem into two sides: one concerning the relation between the self and the masses, namely the relation between the self and others or groups, and one concerning the relation between mind and things, namely the relation between spirit and matter. On the former problem, Liang Qichao advances his demand for a “revolution of morality” and the theory of historical evolution; on the latter problem, he advocates epistemologically the ideal of the “elimination of slavery in people’s minds.” “Self,” according to Liang Qichao, is just the spirit standing in contrast with the body. “What is this thing called ‘self’? It is one’s organ of thinking” (Liang 1989, vol. 4 p. 46–47). Genuine freedom, therefore, consists in making up one’s mind, which is the most supreme of all one’s organs, and making the self the master of things, rather than things the master of the self. He says: “The most serious humiliation is caused by the slavery of one’s mind, compared to which the slavery of one’s body is next to nothing” (Liang 1989, vol. 4 p. 47). As examples of “the slavery of one’s mind,” he takes anyone praising and imitating Confucius “to be a slave of the ancients;” being at another’s beck and call is “to be a slave of the common view”; being obedient to fate is “to be a slave of circumstances;” and to subject one’s mind to the slavery of one’s own body is “to be a slave of lust” (Liang 1989, vol. 4, pp. 46–50). Varieties of the “slavery of one’s mind” are all formidable enemies to the liberation of one’s “self.” He observes: “If one wants to attain genuine freedom, one must, to begin with, eliminate the slavery in his mind” (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 47). Liang compares his idea of the “elimination of the slavery in one’s mind” to the philosophy of Bacon and Descartes. He says: “Although different from each other, the schools of Bacon and Descartes made a great contribution to the world with the same achievement: eradicating the slavish mentality in academic circles” (Liang 1989, vol. 13, p. 11). He believes that Bacon’s suggestion to eliminate all kinds of “idols” and the Cartesian methodology of “systematic doubt” were intended to oppose a slavish mentality, and to advocate “the spirit of freedom, independence, openness, and avoiding the mistakes of others” (Liang 1989, vol. 13, p. 12). This kind of spirit of independence actually inclines towards Cartesian rationalism. He claims: I can hear, see, and think. Moreover, since I live in the world of the present with a brilliant civilization, I can collect the academic achievements both in China and abroad, in the past and at present, and, like a judge in court, I can decide what is right and what is wrong, and what I am going to accept and what I am going to discard. Isn’t this the most delightful thing to a heroic man? (Liang 1989, vol. 9, p. 56)

The fact that Liang Qichao appoints the self’s reason as judge, with the authority to pass judgment on all theories displays Liang’s revolutionary heroic spirit and rationalist mentality, similar to those seen in the modern Western scholars of the Enlightenment. In Liang’s view, truth would emerge steadily if the “slavery of the mind” is eliminated, and “reason” is made capable of free activity. “The freedom of thinking,” he

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says, “is the origin of true ideas” (Liang 1989, vol. 5, p. 9). All valuable cultural and academic works are the result of the free activity of reason, which in turn is the very nature of the genuine self or “innate knowledge.”(良知liang zhi) He claims that “the origin of freedom lies in nothing other than innate knowledge” (Liang 1989, vol. 13, p. 62). This idea, which regards the genuine self or innate knowledge (reason) as the first principle of the world, tends to be the apriorist version of idealism. In his essay “Idealism,” he writes: “Circumstances are produced by the mind. All objective circumstances are illusory, only the circumstances made by the mind are real” (Liang 1989, vol. 13, p. 62). From this presupposition, he, following Gong Zizhen and Tan Sitong, praises highly “the power of the mind” and tends towards voluntarism. Another major point of Liang Qichao’s theory of “new people” is “making anew the people’s morality,” which amounts to having a “revolution of morality.” Under the impact of modern Western civilization, conservatives in China were still proud of traditional Chinese morality, claiming that it was far more advanced than Western morality. Liang Qichao, nevertheless, challenged the old morality fearlessly: I know that the idea of the revolution of morality surely will be denounced all over the country. It is a pity that I am not able to match this force. Nonetheless, I am not afraid, nor do I shirk the fight against all the vulgarities in the world. (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 15)

Liang’s “revolution of morality” is meant to urge people to break away from slavish morality and acquire a free and independent personality. Consequently, he discusses in detail the ethical problem of the relation between “self” and other people, or between individuals and groups. Liang Qichao divides morality into two categories, public morality and private morality: “It is called private morality when each person pays attention to his or her own moral cultivation without thinking of others; it is called public morality when each person contributes to the improvement of his or her group. These are both indispensable to human life” (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 12). Public morality, he thinks, is the morality of socialization. The old morality in China stressed private morality at the expense of individuals’ ethical relationships with groups (society, nation), or insisted on “refraining from committing mistakes” without paying attention to the rise or fall of the country, or reduced the individuals’ moral obligations to the country to “a private matter of paying a debt of gratitude” by subjects to the monarch (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 13). Therefore, Liang thinks that one must have the idea of nation and the idea of group. At the same time, however, he remarks that “the freedom of groups is the result of the freedom of individuals” (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 46). A group can acquire freedom and independence only after the individuals in it are free and independent. So we should not set independence and socialization, nor freedom and social sanction (legal and moral prescription), in opposition to one another. He observes: “The self-esteem of a country can be cultivated only after all its citizens respect themselves” (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 70). In the last analysis, Liang’s intention is to urge the people to fulfill “the obligation of serving the group and the nation” with their independent and self-esteeming personality (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 14). According to Liang Qichao, selfishness and altruism can be made consistent with each other. On the one hand, he admits that everybody is selfish, that “the most serious

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possible defect with a person is the mentality of expecting others’ help, rather than making one’s own effort, and expecting to be benefited by others, rather than by oneself” (Liang 1989, vol. 5, p. 48). On the other hand, he thinks that since people cannot live apart from groups, “those who are good at benefiting themselves must begin with benefiting their groups; in this way alone can their private interests be improved” (Liang 1989, vol. 5, p. 49). This means that Liang agrees with Benthamite utilitarianism, which regards the greatest happiness of the majority as the greatest good. Another of Liang’s ideas is the idea that happiness grows in direct proportion to knowledge. “Happiness grows out of power,” he says, “and power out of intelligence.” Among a group of people, “if the majority of them are intelligent, then the majority of them also enjoy happiness” (Liang 1989, vol. 10, p. 68). For the same reason, if most people are living in ignorance, it is impossible for the majority to attain maximum happiness. In this sense, Liang Qichao reduces the task of “renovating the people’s morality” to “developing the people’s intelligence.” It can be said from what is presented above that Liang Qichao’s “revolution of morality” is intended to establish a new type of ethical relation that is the unity of independence and socialization, of selfishness and altruism, and of morality and knowledge. In his opinion, no contradiction exists between these elements, for all of them arise from human nature. He observes: “Human beings by nature seek knowledge, independence, and socialization” (Liang 1989, vol. 5, p. 29). Human nature is, according to Liang, nothing but the human spirit or “true self,” namely, the “conscience” in ethics. He argues that “moral duty arises from freedom of conscience” (Liang 1989, vol. 13, p. 62). Here, Liang Qichao is reducing his “revolution of morality” to “obeying conscience and obeying the true self,” an idea which is obviously idealist. On the whole, Liang Qichao makes a great contribution to modern Chinese philosophy by his theory of “new people,” which demands the “elimination of slavery in one’s mind” and a “revolution of morality,” exalts the freedom of the human spirit, and presents clearly the relation between mind and matter/things, and between the group and the individual. (2) Historical Evolutionism and Methodology of “New History” Liang Qichao is a historian and is an advocate of “new history”. When we study his philosophy, therefore, we should pay attention to his conception of history and his methodological ideas. He defines history in this way: “First, history is that which records the phenomena of evolution;” “second, history is that which describes the phenomena of the evolution of human groups;” “third, history is that which describes the phenomena of the evolution of human groups in order to find in them universal principles and facts” (Liang 1989, vol. 9, pp. 7–10). The former two points in the definition express Liang’s historical evolutionism, while the last one expresses his methodology of history. Liang Qichao’s idea that the object of history is “the phenomena of evolution” further develops Kang Youwei’s historical evolutionism in that he points out that the evolution of history is an endless process, and its “progress is not linear, but follows a

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spiral course, so that a big step forward might be followed by a small step backward, or a big rise accompanied by a small fall” (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 7). He criticizes Mencius’ theory of history as a circle in which “a period of order and a period of disorder succeed each other,” arguing that this theory arose because he “was led by the appearance of the spiral to mistake it for a circle, without knowing the overall tendency of the history of millions of years since humankind came into being, and without finding the true direction of this history” (Liang 1989, vol. 4 p. 8). Liang also introduces the idea of reform or revolution(革ge) into his evolutionism. He states: “Ge is an inevitably universal fact in the world of natural evolution. […] The meaning of ge is to eliminate some kind of human affairs” (Liang 1989, vol. 4, p. 41). Namely, ge means to make artificial selection consciously, and replace outdated things with new things, so as to readjust human activities and institutions to their times and their environments. When renovation and elimination are made piece by piece, we refer to gradual reform; when the stress is on “toppling something thoroughly and cleaning up it totally,” we refer to a kind of abrupt and complete reform, namely revolution. He argues that ge is a necessary law of historical evolution, and for this reason we, in order to rescue China, should carry on not only political revolution, but also a revolution of history, morality, poetry, and fiction. Although Liang stood against the revolutionaries, represented by Sun Yat-sen, who came after him, his idea of revolution as the motive force of evolution was developed further by the revolutionaries. Liang Qichao’s historical evolutionism stresses that, in history, “the group is the substance,” or “social psychology” is the substance. Yan Fu explained historical evolution as “conflict among groups.” From this stance, Liang moves further by saying that “group” is the subject (“substance” of historical evolution): One has to pay attention to groups in order to trace the process of evolution. If individuals had kept separate from each other, evolution would have been inconceivable and history would not have started. Actually, the evolution of humanity is the evolution of groups instead of individuals. (Liang 1989, vol. 9, p. 9)

As far as individuals are concerned, ancient and modern people are not very different from each other in their physique and intelligence. But, as the result of the fact that in human society one generation succeeds the other as a group, people at present are much superior to those in the past in terms of their knowledge, abilities, and morality. The “group” (群qun) in Liang Qichao’s view, is “the personality that transcends individuals,” namely the “macro self,” which refers to the common features of certain (social) groups presented in so-called social psychology, the spirit of a nation and the mentality of the people. “The psychology of a nation or a society,” therefore, “is actually composed of or extended from individual psychology, and is presented in turn in the actions of individuals” (Liang 1989, vol. 73, p. 114). In this sense, “taking group as the substance” is just “taking social psychology” as the substance. Hence Liang Qichao claims: The most important task of a historian is to investigate the operation of social psychology— how society is composed, how it is motivated, how it changes—and to investigate in more detail in what way it is composed and presented in individual psychology. (Liang 1989, vol. 73, pp. 114–115)

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Here, Liang mentions two approaches to studying the evolution of human society: one approach centers on the relation between the “mind” of social history (macro self) as the substance and its functions (expressions), and the other approach centers on the relations between the micro self and the macro self (social psychology), and between the individual and the universal. As to the relation between substance and its expressions, Liang Qichao thinks that social psychology is the substance, while society is the result of the operation of this substance. He states: “a society is produced by the psychology of the people in this society” (Liang 1989, vol. 17, p. 2). The path of history, he says, seems neither continuous nor discontinuous, neither conscious nor unconscious, but through its rising and falling movement approaches its “common and constant goal,” which is made possible by the fact that “the nation’s will stands behind history” (Liang 1989, vol. 73 p. 100). According to Liang, the arising and transformation of this spiritual substance—the nation’s will—is the result of the inheritance and variation of the consciousness of groups. He writes: “What is the psychology of the people? What is the psychology of a society? They are what have been bequeathed by the dead to the living in the whole society” (Liang 1989, vol. 17, p. 4). This kind of heredity of group consciousness runs through the whole process of human groups. At the same time, he points out that group consciousness shows variation, for the movement of human psychology is extremely free and is capable of mutation. Moreover, changes in the environment can also effect changes in psychology. As a result of the variations in group psychology, the historical facts “multiply and renovate themselves day by day” (Liang 1989, vol. 73 p. 116). In terms of the relation between individual and group, between individuality and generality, Liang Qichao explores the role played by important historical figures in the process of the evolution of human groups: The words and actions of the so-called “great men” can influence the course of history only when they have causal relations with societal psychology. The words and actions of great men are valuable not because, as individuals, these men are important, but because, as members of a class or a party or a nation, they are important. (Liang 1989, vol. 73, p. 115)

Liang holds the view that heroes produce their times, arguing that the history of thousands of years in both China and abroad is a history in which heroes and sages left impressions on society with their individualities, and made the latter the general feature of one age or one group. He claims: Chinese history contains at least one chapter which is the collectivization of Confucius’ individuality; the political circle of the period of Warring States can be called the realization of Shang Yang’s individuality; and the circular thinking in the late Ming dynasty can be called the realization of Wang Shouren’s individuality. (Liang 1989, vol. 73, p. 114)

This is obviously a version of the conception of history as determined by heroes, but Liang’s idea that there is a “causal relation” between the words and actions of outstanding figures and the psychology of society is reasonable in some respects. In his Theory of New History, Liang Qichao advocates not only historical evolutionism, but also a methodology for exploring the laws of historical evolution, which, on the one hand, incorporates the method of textual criticism of the School of Qianjia

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and the historicism of the Eastern Zhejiang School and, on the other hand, introduces some of the methods of the modern positivist sciences in the West, as well as Liang’s own experiences in academic research. First, he broadens the domain of historical research. It had traditionally been stressed by Chinese historians that historical materials should be collected as completely as possible, but Liang Qichao still found it necessary to significantly broaden the domain of historical materials. He states: In order to find out the truth of the evolution of human groups, one must have an overview of humanity for a while so as to make comparisons, and have a good knowledge of the records both of the past and of the present, either official or unofficial. (Liang 1989, vol. 9, p. 10)

That is to say, from small groups to the entire world, from underground fossils and ancient artifacts to the news of yesterday or today, these facts are historical materials, and should be connected and compared with each other. He observes that “the struggle between Liu Bang and Xiang Yu was closely connected with the rise and fall of the states in Central Asia and India, and had an impact on the eastern part of the Greek territory” (Liang 1989, vol. 73, p. 101). He took this fact as an instance of the idea that “the history of the whole of humankind as well as the history of a country is ‘holistic’” (Liang 1989, vol. 73, p. 104). Although the “relations” mentioned by Liang Qichao are not necessarily essential relations, the call to grasp historical materials as a whole and in their interrelatedness represented a much broader viewpoint than traditional history. Second, Liang Qichao holds that it is necessary to pay attention to the relationship between history and other disciplines. According to Liang, disciplines such as geography, geology, ethnology, anthropology, linguistics, sociology, politics, the science of religion, the science of law, and economics are all closely connected with history. It is especially important not to separate history from the philosophy of history. Liang believes that, The objects of history are the facts of past and present; the subjects of history are the philosophical ideas in the minds of those who write and read history. A history with objects but without subjects is like a person with a body but without soul, and one can thus deny it as history. (Liang 1989, vol. 73, p. 10)

Liang himself studies history on the level of historical evolutionism, and develops his “theory of new history,” which was praised by people of that time. Third, Liang Qichao emphasized the synthetic method of research. In methodology, he advocates Bacon’s methods of experimentation and reduction, but is more strongly attracted to Cartesian methods of deduction and synthesis. He says: “The strict method of textual criticism is merely the method of reduction applied by modern scientists” (Liang 1989, vol. 73, p. 80). He thinks that this method is useful in distinguishing true historical materials from false ones. In order to comprehend the law of historical evolution, however, one must engage in synthetic research. Liang Qichao observes: A historian should take the entire history of hundreds or thousands of years as an organism, and the history in each age as one of its cells. Examined separately, their actions would seem

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to be absolutely meaningless; examined synthetically, however, the nation’s so-called will becomes vividly clear. (Liang 1989, vol. 73, p. 101)

That is to say, only through synthetic research can we reveal the living process of the evolution of a nation’s will or the psychology of society, and find out the causal laws of history. In his later years, however, Liang denied the causality of history, maintaining that history is the result of free will of human beings; correspondingly, with regard to methodology he claims that history as a whole can be grasped only by intuition (Liang 1989, vol. 40, p. 1–7). Liang Qichao did not develop a penetrating and systematic philosophy. The major tendency of his thought is subjective idealism. But in his theory of “new people” and “new history,” he advanced some ideas that were unknown to his predecessors, and contributed to enlightening people’s minds.

11.5 Zhang Taiyan: “Competition Produces Intelligence, and Revolution Develops People’s Knowledge”—A Rudimentary Version of the Viewpoint of Social Practice In the heated debate between bourgeois revolutionaries and reformists, Zhang Taiyan (1869–1936) advanced the idea that “competition produces intelligence, and revolution develops people’s knowledge,” which displays a bud of the materialist conception of history in his evolutionist thought. Zhang, whose name was Binglin, called Meishu, but best known as Taiyan, was a native of Yuyao, Zhejiang Province. As a young man, he was arrested and imprisoned for his revolutionary activities in opposition to the Manchu regime of the Qing Dynasty. After being released, he went to Japan, and acted there as the editor of Min Bao, a revolutionary publication. After the May Fourth Movement, he was gradually converted to venerating Confucius and reading classics. His numerous works have been compiled in Collected Works of Zhang Taiyan. On the relations between past and present and between Chinese and Western learning, Zhang’s position is, on the whole, a nationalist one. On the one hand, he makes a call to “inspire the ethnic sense of the people and improve their patriotic enthusiasm with the national essence,” with a view to carry forward the history and the cultural tradition of the Han nationality. On the other hand, he opposes “Europeanization,” and argues for learning from the West selectively and trying to surpass it. (1) Evolutionism with Revolutionary Contents Zhang Taiyan’s evolutionism contains explicitly revolutionary ideas and is an important part of the evolutionist stage of modern Chinese philosophy. Zhang Taiyan talks about the evolution of the universe and nature on the basis of modern science in the West. He advances a theory of “apparent heaven” (视

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天shi tian), maintaining that the vast heaven, “inside which is air, and outside which are atoms,” is not a physical entity (Zhang 1981, p. 39). He criticizes Tan Sitong for his analogy between “ether” and the Confucian concept of “humanity” and the Buddhist notion of “the ocean of original nature” (性海xing hai). He thinks that everything is composed of atoms, and that “atoms have shape and weight. Ether is fluid, though even more minute than atoms.” However, since, as the medium of light, ether’s vibration “has speed, it cannot be regarded as shapeless. “Since it has shape, it can be measured. But the Buddhist “ocean of original nature,” as a spiritual entity without magnitude, cannot be measured. Therefore, these two things cannot be compared with each other. In this way, Zhang gives “ether” a sense accepted by natural science at that time, and objects to explaining it idealistically. Zhang Taiyan tends to explain the cause of the evolution of life in terms of Lamarckism. He thinks that it is because of disuse that the eyes of fish and shrimp in deep water, the feet of whales, the horns of male sheep, and the wings of ostriches have become functionless (Zhang 1982, vol. 3, pp. 190–193). Obviously, here, Zhang Taiyan is applying Lamarck’s theory of “evolution through use and degeneration through disuse.” From this position, Zhang Taiyan reduces the motive of evolution to will and thought. He says: “If a thing has its will, it will try hard to compete with nature. That is why things from the past to the present can change themselves” (Zhang 1982, vol. 3, p. 191). He believes that “it is because of its will to create itself that humankind arose from other things” (Zhang 1981, p. 65). It is a voluntarianist view. The evolution of human society, according to Zhang Taiyan, is different from that of animals. He says: “It is with instruments that human beings compete with each other […]. Archaeologists differentiate one age from another by the fact that knives were made from stone or copper or iron” (Zhang 1982, vol. 3, p. 191). That is to say, Zhang Taiyan was already aware of the organic relation between the changes in productive instruments and the evolution of history. Moreover, Zhang thinks that it is because humans can “join groups” that they can conquer animals. He reflects: “How can humans protect themselves? The reply is that it is because humans can join groups and differentiate their roles” (Zhang 1981, p. 81). Zhang Taiyan’s special contribution, however, lies in the fact that he combines the idea of “competition with instruments” with the idea of “joining groups,” and explains the origin of “groups” and “rites” in terms of the production and application of instruments. He points out that making bows and arrows, building castles, producing vehicles, sewing clothes, constructing palaces, and inventing calendars in ancient times were all processes of cooperation among many people. So it is in the process of producing instruments that groups arose. Zhang Taiyan points out that ritual institutions were also instruments with which different groups of people competed with each other, which also changed according to the laws of evolution. He says: It is with instruments and rites that people compete with each other. Those things which were useful before become disused now. Had the people not suffered attacks from animals, the rite of hunting wild bear would never have been developed; had the society not had ghosts

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and spirits, the red silks and drums used in rites would also have been abandoned. (Zhang 1982, vol. 3, p. 191)

This kind of explanation of the evolution of human society contains the bud of the materialist conception of history. Zhang Taiyan gives a deep theoretical explanation for his observation that only through revolution is the evolution of humanity possible. Kang Youwei, then a royalist, said that “to the people’s mentality in present-day China, the universal principles have not been illuminated, and old customs have not been discarded, hence no revolution should be carried out.” Zhang Taiyan argues against this view, saying that: [t]he evolution of the people’s mentality relies on making consistent efforts. […]The universal principles, about which the people have not been clear, can be made clear through revolution; the old customs, none of which have been eliminated, can be eliminated through revolution. (Zhang 1982, vol. 4, p. 181)

Revolution, in his mind, is not a “strong purgative” that is merely used to destroy the old world, but a “good medicine” that serves to build a new world as well as to destroy the old world. While Liang Qichao thinks that society is determined by social psychology and “the strength of scholarship is its mastery of the world,” Zhang Taiyan thinks that academic activity, rather than controlling the world, should be explained in social terms. He says: “A doctrine cannot be developed on the basis of an assumed heaven which is elegantly vast. An original doctrine can only be developed on the basis of geographical location, political customs, and individual characteristics” (Zhang 1982, vol. 3, p. 133). It seems that Zhang Taiyan implies here the materialist conception of history that social consciousness should be explained in terms of social existence. Another particular feature of Zhang Taiyan’s evolutionism is his “theory of dual evolution.” He does not agree with Hegel’s idea that “the development of the world is the development of reason” and that the direction of the evolution of nature and society is towards the ultimate goal, which is perfectly beautiful and good. He states: Evolution as evolution does not consist in movement in one single direction, but in movement in two opposite directions. […] In terms of morality, what evolves is evil as well as good; in terms of livelihood, what evolves is hardship as well as happiness. (Zhang 1982, vol. 3 p. 133)

This actually reflects Zhang Taiyan’s perplexity with the process of evolution in his realization that the progress of material civilization in the West has brought about many social problems, such as degeneration of morality, a wide gap between rich and poor. But his criticism of Hegel is philosophically significant, too. He is not satisfied with Hegel’s idea of the development of the world as the development of reason, mainly because Hegel regards reason as an absolute entity, reducing will to a subordinate position, and making freedom a synonym of rationality and legality. Zhang Taiyan says:

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It is only by one’s own mind instead of by some outside agent that a thing or an event is judged as licit or not. And the human mind need not abide by a fixed rule in judging something as licit or not. The behavior of a living creature, if it is free, is licit. (Zhang 1982, vol. 3, p. 412)

This idea contains an element of indeterminism and voluntarism. It is from this position that he denies that evolution has an ultimate goal, and argues for the theory of dual evolution. To get rid of “dual evolution,” he thinks, “one can do nothing but resort to nihilism, which denies government, all levels of group, humanity, all forms of life, and the world itself.” (2) A Theory of Knowledge Stressing Revolutionary Activities and a Theory of Logic Emphasizing Deduction Zhang Taiyan’s proposition that “competition produces intelligence and revolution develops people’s knowledge” is also included in his theory of evolution, as a proposition of epistemology stressing that human intelligence grows with revolutionary activities. He criticizes both the apriorism that places knowledge before action and the reformist idea that no revolution is possible before people’s intelligence is developed. “The intelligence of people, he says, “arises after competition. People’s intelligence at present need only be developed by revolution and nothing else” (Zhang 1982, vol. 4, p. 180). He takes as examples the peasant uprising led by Li Zicheng in late Ming dynasty, the Boxer Uprising, and the political uprising led by Tang Caichang in the late Qing dynasty, to explain that people’s ideas, thoughts, strategy for struggle, and so on, are all improved through revolutionary practice. This is a seed of the idea of social practice, which is related to the elements of the materialist conception of history implied by his idea of “competition with instruments.” The problem of the relation between knowledge and action is a problem that is discussed frequently by Zhang Taiyan. According to him, in the process of acquiring knowledge, taken as a natural process, action needs to come before knowledge. He states that “in the process of initial learning, knowledge comes after action,” but once knowledge has been acquired, it precedes action, and one’s actions are conscious and free; “in the sphere of freedom, knowledge comes before action” (Zhang 1982, vol. 3, p. 150). He is also of the opinion that the process of knowledge both starts and ends with action. He says that “making up one’s mind is the starting point,” after which sensations and perceptions are possible; in this sense, “action comes before knowledge.” On the other hand, the process of getting impressions from perceptions, forming abstract concepts with the help of language, and acting according to abstract thinking tells us that “knowledge comes before action.” This two-sided analysis of the process of knowledge obviously contains the rational element of dialectically treating the relation between knowledge and action on the basis that action is superior to knowledge. Although Zhang Taiyan confirms that knowledge should be acquired through one’s sense organs, he finds that the knowledge acquired in this manner is not sufficient, and must be therefore improved to the level of rational knowledge. That is why he praises Yan Yuan, who stressed the role of sensations as a great Confucian after Xunzi, but also criticizes him for “neglecting the function of concepts and abstraction” (Zhang 1982, vol. 3, p. 152). Although of the view that neither sensitivity nor reason should

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be overemphasized at the expense of the other, Zhang Taiyan, under the influence of Kantian philosophy, lapses into apriorism at last. He regards the Kantian a priori categories as “prototypical ideas,” thinking that, to gain knowledge of something, it is necessary for “prototypical ideas” to come before the synthesis of apperception. Moreover, Zhang Taiyan compares “prototypical ideas” to the seeds of alaya. That is understandable since Zhang, after all, was not able to explain the unity of sensitivity and reason on the basis of social practice. Zhang Taiyan shares with Yan Fu the emphasis on the role played by logic. But unlike Yan Fu, who stressed reduction, Zhang stressed deduction. After he made comparisons among Aristotelian syllogism, the Indian Hetu-vidya, and the Chinese MohistCanons, Zhang Taiyan generalized the “Dao of argumentation” as follows: “Firstly, in the Dao of argumentation the major idea is advanced, secondly the basis of it is clarified, thirdly an analogy or comparison is made, and as a result of these, the cause of a thing becomes visible” (Zhang 2006, p. 101). (3) The Ethics of Opposing Utilitarianism and Stressing Will In ethics, Zhang Taiyan criticizes utilitarianism, emphasizes the role played by the revolutionary will, and advocates the doctrine of “self-reliance instead of reliance on others.” Zhang Taiyan’s criticism of the utilitarianism advocated by Yan Fu can be read in the following remarks: All people with reason can agree that it is a great righteous cause to renovate one’s country, and that it is a shameful thing to be conquered by other nations. Ever since the times of Confucius and Laozi, the literati have long had as their nature the habit of clearly differentiating gains from losses, and preferring the former to the latter. The prevalence of utilitarianism at the time helped greatly to consolidate this intention. Consequently, the examination of success and failure frequently obstructs the views of right and wrong, and people tend to discuss the strategy relevant to one’s success or failure without putting effort into arguing over sophistries and quibbles. (Zhang 1982, vol. 4, p. 335)

A revolutionary, according to Zhang, must have the “inflexible character” of insisting on the principles. Unfortunately, however, “the character of Chinese literati and the common people is more flexible than inflexible.” This flexible character has resulted from Confucianism, which maintains that “a promise need not be kept, and an action need not be resolute.” It is also encouraged by the utilitarianism introduced from the West. He thinks that morality need not be justified deeply, and “it is sufficient to make people strengthen their resolve, keep their promises, and feel no fear of death” (Zhang 1982, vol. 4, p. 227). He differentiates sixteen kinds of people according to their professions, concluding that the lower one’s social rank, the higher one’s morality, and the higher one’s social rank, the lower one’s morality. He believes that the more powerful and wealthy one is, “the further from morality one’s behaviors are” (Zhang 1982, vol. 4, p. 283). So only by opposing utilitarianism can a revolutionary be a truly moral man. Although disagreeing with Yan Fu’s utilitarianism, Zhang Taiyan agrees with Yan Fu that moral responsibility presupposes the freedom of will. His proposition of “self-reliance instead of reliance on others” is merely intended to stress that a moral

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action presupposes that one makes a decision for oneself and stands independent of gods, spirits, and other people. “The key to preserving morality,” he says, “is nothing more than to be self-reliant instead of reliant on others” (Zhang 1982, vol. 4, p. 374). On the basis of his idea of “self-reliance instead of reliance on others,” Zhang Taiyan discusses the relation between individuals and groups. Zhang does not regard an individual’s will as subordinate to society, saying that “humans come into the world for themselves rather than for others. Since there is no creator, there is no imperative from a creator either” (Zhang 1982, vol. 4, pp. 444–445). He thinks that altruism could be explained in two ways. In the first case, one helps others out of the “innate love in one’s mind,” instead of the expectation of reward. In this case, one’s good behavior, coming from one’s innate nature, is not prescribed by any outside rules. In the second case, one helps others so that others will help one in return. In this case, one’s good behavior, “being forced by the tendencies in society, is not predetermined by any natural law either” (Zhang 1982, vol. 4, p. 445). Moral behavior, in other words, always comes from one’s independent personality and free will. In Zhang Taiyan’s view, Buddhism is characterized by its emphasis on “selfreliance instead of reliance on others.” So he holds that Buddhism could be used to cultivate revolutionary morality and ideal personalities. This obviously cannot be realized. But his emphasis on the role played by the will’s dual characters of persistence and autonomy in cultivating morality is of significance in modern times.

11.6 Wang Guowei: The Believability Versus the Lovability of Philosophical Theories While the revolutionaries and reformists were involved in heated debates, Wang Guowei was occupied with the contradiction between the “lovability” and the “believability” of philosophical theories. Wang Guowei (1877–1927), called Jing’an, also known as Guantang, was a native of Haining, Zhejiang Province. He lectured on philosophy, psychology, logic, and other subjects. He was an expert on the history of Chinese dramas, ci (词Song dynasty lyrics), and qu (曲Ming dynasty drama), ancient Chinese history, ancient artifacts, and phonology. He was well accomplished in textual research and the interpretation of inscriptions on bones or tortoise shells, and inscriptions on ancient bronze objects. In 1925, he became a professor at the Faculty of Chinese Cultural Studies at Tsinghua University. Two years later, he drowned himself in the Kunming Lake in the Summer Palace in Beijing. Most of his works are collected in The Collected Works of Master Wang Jing’an of Haining. Believing that the only purpose of academic work was to discover truth, Wang Guowei held that, if a proposition is true, then it is true irrespective of whether it belongs to older learning or modern learning, to Chinese learning or Western learning. From this point of view, on the problem of the relations between past and present, and between China and the West, he tries to break the prevailing classification of ideas into either the Chinese, the old, or the West, the new. He believes that “It is

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irrelevant whether learning is new or old, Chinese or West” (Wang 2009, vol. 14 p. 129). After extensive study in philosophy, he made the following remarks when he was thirty years old: Generally speaking, those philosophical theories that are lovable are not believable, and those are believable are not lovable. […] Great metaphysics, rigorous ethics, and pure aesthetics— of these we are extremely fond. However, in searching for what is believable, we turn instead to the positivist theory of truth, the hedonistic theory of ethics, and the empiricist theory of aesthetics. I know the latter are believable but I cannot love them, and I know the former are lovable but I cannot believe them. This has caused me great distress in the last two or three years. (Wang 2009, vol. 14, p. 121)

Here, Wang expresses his attitudes towards the two kinds of philosophical movements introduced from the West at that time. What he thinks of as “lovable but unbelievable” are the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer, while what he regards as “believable but unlovable” is positivist philosophy. Wang esteems science, so he tends to agree with positivist philosophy, which is related to the positive sciences; but he finds Schopenhauer’s philosophy more attractive and lovable. The conflict between empiricism and apriorism, and that between positivism and metaphysics (including irrationalism) are two important phenomena in the history of modern Western philosophy. The fact that Wang is afflicted by these conflicts means that they also had great impact on modern Chinese philosophy. Although unable to resolve the contradiction between “believability” and “lovability” Wang is influenced both by that which is “believable” and that which is “lovable.” His positivist tendency makes its presence felt in his analysis of the categories in traditional philosophy and his scientific methodology, while his beloved “pure aesthetics” encourages him to present his aesthetic theory of the artistic sphere. (1) The Analysis of the Categories of Traditional Philosophy and Scientific Methodology In a positivist way, Wang Guowei systematically studies and analyzes such categories in Chinese philosophy as nature (性xing), principle (理li), and destiny(命ming), and thereby contributes, following Yan Fu, to clarifying the implications of the concepts in traditional philosophy. This can be illustrated with his analysis of the concept of “principle” in Cheng-Zhu philosophy, in his essay entitled “An Explication of ‘Principle’.” The term principle (li), says Wang, may be understood in either a broad or narrow sense. Li in its broad sense is “reason.” That is, with regard to the natural world, there is a reason why everything comes into existence; and with regard to human knowledge, every proposition needs justification. In this sense, therefore, the law of sufficient reason is both “a universal law of the world” and “a universal form of understanding.” In its narrow sense, li is “reason,” or “our ability to construct concepts and define their relations, namely one of the understanding abilities” (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 29). In addition to these notions, however, Zhu Xi’s li has a metaphysical implication:

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What is called principle by Zhuzi and the Greek Stoics was derived from the presupposition that there was an objective principle before the creation of Heaven, Earth, and the human being, of which the principle of our minds is merely a part. (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 28)

Regarded as “a particular thing” that is separated from both mind and object, li becomes the metaphysical “ultimate.” Wang further points out that, although criticizing Cheng-Zhu’s Neo-Confucianism, Dai Zhen, like Zhu Xi, regarded goodness and truth as “the attributes of li, and gave in this way to the term li a moral value.” But that is not justified, because “the function of reason is relevant only to truth or falsehood, not to good or evil” (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 30). Therefore, the concept li should not imply an ethical meaning. Through his detailed analysis of the concept li, Wang defines epistemological meaning (cause and reason), makes clear the fact that the concept has been mixed up with metaphysical and ethical meanings, and explicates clearly the concept’s implications. This kind of work is quite necessary for advancing the modernization of Chinese philosophy. Wang’s positivism can also be seen in his academic methodology. First, he is good at making comparisons. Chen Yinque said of him that “he complements the study of ancient texts with research on material artifacts”, “he consults foreign records to edit our own classics,” and “he verifies the ideas coming from abroad with domestic materials” (Chen 2009, p. 213–221). This is certainly true. In his study of inscriptions on tortoise shells and ancient history, he interprets the material objects by using linguistic records; in his study of the geography of border areas and the history of the Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties, he corrects the ancient books of foreign nations and our own nation; when he writes his Remarks on the Dream of the Red Chamber, On Song and Yuan Drama, and Remarks on Song Lyrics and the Human Condition, he investigates traditional Chinese culture with reference to Western ideas. Wang also has a relatively conscious historicist approach. He says that he studies history in order to “trace the transformations of things and elucidate their causalities” (Wang 2009, vol. 14, p. 129). Moreover, he explains in detail why, in order to comprehend the historical causalities, one must first make clear the social backgrounds of historical phenomena. He states: “To know the ancients, one must inquire into the society in which they were situated.” Second, one must trace a historical phenomenon back to its origins: “To know the later generations, one must know former times” (Wang 2009, vol. 14, p. 133). Wang’s historicism, of course, cannot expose the fundamental cause of historical transformations. Wang’s other methodological principle is to understand an object through the unification of the universal with the individual, and the part with the whole. He says: “Nothing in the world can be known in its parts without being known in its totality, neither can it be known in its totality without being known in its parts” (Wang 2009, vol. 14, p. 132). He argues that, in order to explain one thing scientifically, one must understand the whole of “the truth of the universe and human life,” while truly grasping a particular fact also contributes to the knowledge of the truth of the universe and human life (Wang 2009, vol. 14 p. 132). Here, Wang is actually advocating the unity of induction and deduction as a method for systematically studying objects.

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The scientific position of Wang Guowei’s methodology, however, is impaired by his apriorist idea that the law of causality is subjective, an idea which is derived from Kant. (2) The Aesthetic Theory of the “Artistic Sphere” Combining the aesthetic theories of Kant and Schopenhauer with traditional Chinese aesthetic ideas, Wang Guowei advanced his original theory of the “artistic sphere”( 境界jing jie).This is his major contribution to modern Chinese philosophy. The “pure aesthetics” of which Wang is fond is the formalist aesthetics of the West. “All kinds of beauty,” he says, “are beauty of forms” (Wang 2009, vol. 14, p. 107). Beauty and aesthetic feeling, according to him, transcend practical considerations. When enjoying natural beauty or artistic beauty, one does not think of whether its substance and content are useful to human beings. He says: “A beautiful thing becomes what it is without any relevance to our interests; when we are viewing a beautiful thing, we are not conscious of our interests either.” One only intuits its “form,” while an intuiting self is “a purely disinterested self” (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 39). The particular contribution made by Wang Guowei to aesthetics is that he is the first person who managed to connect the theory of artistic types in the West to the traditional theory of the artistic sphere in China. He writes: What the fine arts describe are not the traits of individuals, but the traits of all human beings, while what is important with the fine arts themselves is the concrete rather than the abstract. It turns out to be the case that the traits of all human beings are subsumed under individuals. […] Those who are good at observation can see the traits of all human beings in individual facts. (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 76)

Artistic images are intended to describe individuals, but they are not confined to the traits of individuals. Rather, they disclose, through concrete individualities, general traits of human beings, that is, to construct types. People in the West advanced the theories of artistic types at a very early stage, referring mostly to works of the visual arts and to works of the narrative arts, such as drama and epic poetry. In contrast, Chinese aesthetics has a long tradition of paying attention to the theory of artistic sphere, referring to works of the lyric arts, such as music and lyric poetry. In his aesthetics, Wang begins to combine the theory of types and the theory of artistic sphere. He says: All spheres that occur to my mind while also being present in external things are temporary. But a poet can put this kind of temporary thing into immortal words, which makes readers feel that the poet is expressing thoughts which they, the readers, shared all along but were unable to express. That is the secret to being a great poet. (Wang 2009, vol. 2, p. 424)

That is to say, a poet’s work is to disclose, through “temporary things,” what is common and universal to everybody, and to create in this way a poetic sphere. It is clear, therefore, that the main idea of the theory of the artistic sphere is the demand that, through artistic creation, artists discover what is universal in what is individual, and arrive at an immortal sphere.

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The “sphere,” to Wang Guowei, also means the unity of theory and practice. He says: A created sphere is different from a described sphere. From this comes the difference between the idealists and the realists. But it is quite difficult to draw a clear line, because the spheres created by a great poet must correspond to what is natural, and the sphere described by him must approach what is ideal. (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 461)

On the one hand, to create a sphere is to idealize something, but the materials through which the idealization operates come from actuality, and the process of idealizing must not violate natural principles. Hence, he states: “In this sense, an idealist is also a realist.” On the other hand, to describe a sphere is to describe something actual, but in the act of describing one does not copy all actual connections, rather one selectively makes artistic generalizations. “In this sense, a realist is also an idealist” (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 462). On the unity of idealism and realism, Wang Guowei’s Remarks on Song Lyrics and the Human Condition contains many good remarks. The ideal element in an artistic sphere, according to Wang Guowei, is presented in the form of the image of an emotion. He says: Literature contains two basic elements, namely, “scene” and “emotion,” the former refers to the description of the facts of nature and human life, while the latter refers to one’s mental attitude toward these facts. (Wang 2009, vol. 14, p. 93)

That is to say, the aesthetic ideal is presented in art through fusing emotions with scenes. On the one hand, ideals should be displayed in emotions, rather than explained with abstract remarks. On the other hand, one should not merely record facts but employ one’s imagination, like Qu Yuan, “combining the emotion of the northern people with the imagination of the southern people” (Wang 2009, vol. 14, p. 100). According to Wang, the criterion of artistic spheres is, “in one word, naturalness” (Wang 2009, vol. 3, p. 113). In this respect, he regards Yuan dynasty dramas as typical: “The writers of the Yuan dramas […] make the genuine li [principles] and the spiritual qi [vital force] prevail in their descriptions of their emotions and the situations of the age.” Here, the term li is used to represent artistic ideals, while the term qi is used to refer to the degree to which an ideal is vividly and smoothly represented in the artistic work. It is through the description of one’s subjective emotions and objective situations that the vivid ideal naturally reveals itself. The key to this is that the artistic expressions “get rid of ‘artificiality’” (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 477). Wang Guowei thinks that his theory of the artistic sphere moves further than his predecessors in disclosing the nature of artistic spheres. He says: What is called “inspired gusto” by Yan Yu, and what is called “spirit and tone” by Wang Shizhen concern no more than the appearance of the art of poetry, they are inferior therefore to my reaching the essence of it with the term “sphere.” (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 463)

Furthermore, Wang claims: “I prefer talking about ‘sphere’ to talking about ‘disposition’ and ‘spirit and tone,’ for the first term is the root, while the other two terms are the branches, which can be derived from ‘sphere’” (Wang 2009, vol. 1, p. 501).

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Wang Guowei’s “reaching the essence” is to explain the essence of an artistic sphere in terms of the unity of the ideal and the actuality, and the unity of what is individual and what is general. That makes it possible for him to expose more clearly the fact that it is by combining the elements of imagination with the elements of emotion that an artistic sphere reveals an ideal and expresses it in a certain way, which should be consistent with the principle of naturalness. Thus, he raises the traditional theory of artistic sphere to a new level, and modernizes it. This is the genuine start of modern Chinese aesthetics. Wang’s aesthetic theory contains, of course, undesirable formalist elements.

11.7 Sun Yat-Sen’s Evolutionism and His Doctrine of the Relation Between Knowledge and Action Sun Yat-sen’s evolutionism and his theory of the relation between knowledge and action represent the positive achievements of modern Chinese philosophy in the evolutionism stage of its development. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), originally named Wen, best known as Zhongshan, was born into a peasant family in Guangdong Province. In his early years, Sun studied in Honolulu and Hong Kong, and was educated in the cultural milieu of Western capitalism. As a great pioneer of the democratic revolution in China, he led the bourgeois revolutionaries to victory in the Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the feudal monarchy that had dominated China for more than two thousand years. After that, moving forward along with his times, Sun developed the old version of his “Three People’s Principles” into a new one. Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen was published by the People’s Publisher in 1956, and Collected Works of Sun Yat-sen began to be published in 1981. On the problem of the relations between past and present and between China and the West, Sun Yat-sen’s ideal was characterized by the fact that he was good at predicting the future of China in terms of the general trend of the world. It was the feudalist dictatorship, he pointed out, that was responsible forclosing China off from the world. He said: “The Chinese have been isolationists and arrogant for too long; they have never known the benefits of international cooperation, so they failed to learn from others’ strong points to offset their own weaknesses” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 224). He called strongly for the overthrow of the feudalist system and advocated the opening of China to international exchange and cooperation, believing that this was the way to make China a wealthy, strong country. As a person with a strong sense of national pride, he thought that if the Chinese revolution succeeded, China would be able to make unprecedented contributions to humankind as a whole: “Once we realize the great goal of reconstructing China, not only will a new age dawn upon our beautiful country, but the whole of humanity will share an ever brighter future” (Sun 2006, vol. 1, p. 225). This means that Sun took the reality of China as his intellectual foundation, had the whole world in his view, and looked to the future. (1) The Theory of Evolution as “Surpassing”

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The major feature of Sun Yat-sen’s evolutionism is his theory of “surpassing” (突 驾tu jia), according to which the process of evolution can contain instances in which latecomers surpass those with an established position. On the basis of Darwin’s theory of evolution and other contemporary ideas in the natural sciences, Sun’s conception of evolution as “surpassing” divides the evolution of the universe into three stages: “The first stage is the evolution of matter, the second stage is the evolution of species, and the third stage is the evolution of humanity” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 195). In the stage of the evolution of matter, that is, “in the original period, the Great Ultimate [太极tai ji, a term used to translate “ether”] moves to produce electrons, the electrons condense into elements, the elements combine to form matter, and matter gathers to form the Earth” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 195). When life emerges on Earth, the universe enters the period of the evolution of species. He states: The second stage of evolution is the period starting with the appearance of the first living organisms and ending in human beings. The species develop from invisible to visible, simple to complex, according to the principle of the competition of species and selection by nature. Humankind is produced as a result of a process of millions of years where the superior species survive and new species surpass the old ones. (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 195)

The stage of the evolution of humanity, according to Sun Yat-sen, started when humankind broke away from animal nature. He believes that “during the first period, human beings were not different from animals. After tens of thousands of years of evolution, human nature was developed and human evolution started” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 195). The principle of the evolution of humankind is different from that of the evolution of animals, because “the principle of the evolution of animal and plant species is competition, while the principle of the evolution of humankind is cooperation” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, pp. 195–196). Sun is right in opposing the social Darwinists who apply the principle of “competition of species and selection by nature” mechanically to human society, but his “principle of cooperation” is also not sufficient to capture the real law of the development of human society. According to Sun Yat-sen’s conception of evolution as “surpassing,” the law of the evolution of human history is irresistable. “The world’s trend,” he said, “moved from theocracy to monarchy, and from monarchy to democracy. Since the trend has reached the point of democracy, the latter cannot be resisted” (Sun 2006, vol. 9, p. 267). In light of this vast and mighty worldwide trend, those who follow it will prosper, and those who resist it will perish. This shows that, contrary to Zhang Taiyan’s pessimistic “theory of dual evolution,” Sun’s evolutionism contains an optimistic attitude towards the evolution of humankind. This historical trend, according to Sun Yat-sen, is a result of mass psychology. He says: “In terms of the theory of historical evolution, democracy is not an innate idea.” Sun argues that Rousseau’s theory of innate human rights in The Social contract “was popular among the people of his time because this theory happened to be consonant with the people’s psychology at that time” (Sun 2006, vol. 9, p. 266). He stresses the point that “the trend of a nation is the result of the psychology of millions of people. As long as the trend comes into being, it can never be changed by a few shrewd opportunists” (Sun 2006, vol.

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6, p. 207). Therefore, even people as great as Washington and Napoleon “are not the original moving forces of the revolutions in America and France” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 207). The true original moving force is the psychology of the masses of a given time. Here, we see that in Sun’s evolutionism the people’s power holds an important position. Sun Yat-sen thinks that, if we follow the law of historical evolution, and respond to the demands of the people, we can help to bring about changes in history through our personal efforts. He says: “An enterprise must be successful if it conforms to the principle of Heaven (nature), the people’s mentality, the worldwide trend, and the masses’ demands, together with the resolute action of those who have foresight” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 228). It is on the basis of this idea that he advances his theory of evolution as “surpassing,” which stresses the active role of human beings. Some royalists such as Kang Youwei hold that “we have to move forward step by step,” meaning that only after a period of constitutional monarchy could a republic be established in China. These people, according to Sun Yat-sen, go against “the universal principle of historical evolution, and are ignorant of the true value of civilization” (Sun 2006, vol. 1, p. 283). In his own view, China can surpass the West as a latecomer if it learns from the West. He takes producing locomotives as an example. The first locomotives were of poor quality. With the aid of gradual improvements, however, the Chinese need not continue to produce these poor-quality locomotives, but can learn to produce the newest and best of locomotives. That is to “catch up swiftly.” He observes: “In learning from foreign countries, we should catch up with them, rather than follow them” (Sun 2006, vol. 9, p. 252). In this sense, the Chinese can surpass other nations, not only Japan, but also Britain and the United States of America: Chinese civilization has existed brilliantly for five thousand years; the Western nations cannot match this achievement. But in the middle phase of its development China tended to be conservative, while the Western nations still progressed. But the transformation of ideas [in China] in the last decades has been very quick. If this speed persists, we can probably grasp all aspects of Western civilization in ten or twenty years. It is even imaginable that we can surpass the Westerners. (Sun 2006, vol. 1, p. 282)

Sun Yat-sen’s evolutionism, which aims to bring about historical progress through human effort, is in opposition to the idea of the Mandate of Heaven advocated by the feudal rulers. “Those who occupy the position of emperor,” he says, “often fabricate Heaven’s will as their warrant, meaning that their privileged position has been endowed by Heaven, and the people would be offending Heaven if they dared to fight against them” (Sun 2006, vol. 9, p. 285). To carry out a revolution, in Sun’s view, is to fight against the Mandate of Heaven. Sun Yat-sen’s evolutionism, of course, has not reached the level of a materialist conception of history. This can be seen from the fact that, influenced by Kropotkin’s “cooperationism”, he regards cooperation as a principle of the evolution of humankind, and opposes the theory of class struggle. Moreover, he thinks that “in the last analysis, the core of history is the life of human beings instead of matter” (Sun 2006, vol. 9, p. 365). This is to reduce the development of history to the human desire for existence.

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(2) The Theory that “Knowledge is Easy and Action is Difficult” The major epistemological issue examined by Sun Yat-sen is on the relation between mind and matter/things, and between knowledge and action. He develops a new theory that “knowledge is easy and action is difficult,” and gives it the title “Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine.” Sun Yat-sen explicates the relation between mind and matter/things in terms of the relation between “name” and “actuality.” He holds the materialist view that facts come before names and words, that “it is a universal fact in the universe that facts come before speech” (Sun 2006, vol. 9, p. 264). To the relation between “body” and “spirit,” he applies the traditional Chinese categories “substance” and “function,” stating that: Chinese scholars also have a tradition of admitting both substance and function. What does the term “substance” mean? It means matter. What does the term “function” mean? It means spirit. In one’s body, for example, one’s organs and bone are the matter, while one’s ability to speak and act, which is motivated by one’s spirit, is the function. These two sides cooperate with each other, and cannot be separated from each other. (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 12)

These ideas are basically a continuation of the materialist tradition in China on the relation between “body” and “spirit.” As to the relation between knowledge and action, Sun first affirms that action comes before knowledge. He says: Practice, experiment, exploration, and adventure are what motivate civilizations. The practice of an apprentice is his action in the field of which he is ignorant with a view to acquiring some desired skills; the experiment of a scientist is his action in the field of which he is ignorant with a view to acquiring some knowledge; the exploration of an explorer is his action in the field of which he is ignorant with a view to making some discovery; the adventure of a hero is his action in the field of which he is ignorant with a view to making great achievements. (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 222)

Though Sun has not acquired the Marxist conception of social practice, his idea “to act in the field of which one is ignorant with a view to acquiring some knowledge” does imply the Marxist proposition that knowledge is based on practice. Sun Yat-sen thinks that if we follow the reformists’ view that only after the people’s intelligence has been developed will reform be possible, then “institutional reform in China cannot be performed until the relevant knowledge is acquired. But since the knowledge cannot be acquired in this way, the reform will never be performed” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 198). In this way, Sun develops further Zhang Taiyan’s idea that “revolution develops the people’s intelligence.” The relation between knowledge and action, in Sun’s opinion, is also a dialectical one. On the one hand, human civilization originates in action without relevant knowledge. He states: “All progress of humanity comes from action before knowledge. This is a natural principle which cannot be changed by scientific discoveries” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 222). On the other hand, having acquired scientific knowledge, people can apply the logic of science in seeking new experience and new knowledge. He claims that “the most worrying thing in the world is the possibility of knowing. If true knowledge can be acquired according to scientific principles, it is surely not

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difficult to act accordingly” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 203). Of this process in which scientific theories lead to actions, Sun gives a concrete analysis: No matter how delicate an enterprise is, how huge a project is, we can accomplish them happily in a few days if we can construct images from knowledge, draw principles from images, make plans according to principles, and make efforts conforming to the plans. (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 204)

Here, Sun is talking about a few moments in the process of applying scientific theories in practice. Sun’s theory of the relation between knowledge and action presented above is, on the whole, correct. But he somewhat exaggerates the power of human minds when he says that “human minds are the origin of everything” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 159). Moreover, he overestimates the difficulty of knowledge when he says that “while knowledge is difficult and action is easy”. He separates in a sense knowledge from action, experience from theory, when he divides the history of human knowledge into three stages—“acting without knowing,” “knowing after acting,” and “acting after knowing”—and divides people into three types—inventors, or “those who have foresight”; advocates, or “those who follow the ideas of others”; and practitioners, or “those who are ignorant and unconscious” (Sun 2006, vol. 6, p. 203). (3) The Idea of “Great Unity” and the Philosophy of Life Centering on “Serving the Masses” Following Hong Xiuquan and Kang Youwei, Sun Yat-sen reconstructs and develops the traditional idea of “great unity,” and advances his own theory of an ideal society. At first, the content of Sun’s idea of great unity is Lincoln’s “government of the people, by the people, and for the people,” but later he thinks that it is consistent with communism as well. He says: We cannot regard communism and democracy as two different things. By democracy, we mean government of the people, by the people, and for the people, which in turn means that the country is shared by the people, the polity is co-managed by the people, and the benefits are enjoyed together by the people. In this sense, people are supposed to share not only the property of the country but everything in it.[…] That is what Confucius expected as a world of great unity. (Sun 2006, vol. 9, p. 394)

It is not correct for him to mix the idea of great unity in the Confucian classic, the Evolution of Rites, which represents an image of primitive communism, and capitalist democracy, which refers to a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, and the proletarian ideal of socialism. But the important point here is that Sun’s remarks reflect the fact that the revolutionaries were changing their conceptions of ideal society. It is a common fact that revolutionary thinkers in modern China tended to connect the problem “Whither China?” with the future of the world, and to connect the ideal of the Chinese revolution with the process of humankind’s achievement of the great unity; moreover, with the development of the revolutionary situation, these thinkers changed the contents of their projects related to certain historical periods and classes, while preserving the form of these projects as striving for the ideal of the great unity. In his later years, Sun Yat-sen and the

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revolutionaries as a whole tended to change their social ideal from democracy to socialism. In order to realize this social ideal, a noble personality is needed. The evolution of humankind is, in Sun Yat-sen’s opinion, to replace animal nature with human nature: In order for human beings to have noble personality, it is necessary to reduce animal nature and increase human nature. Being rid of brutish nature, one naturally would not do evil things; being full of human nature, one naturally has noble morality. (Sun 2006, vol. 8, p. 316)

This, of course, is a version of the abstract theory of human nature. But in terms of the relation between individuals and groups, this idea contains an philosophy of life that is full of humanist spirit. From Sun’s point of view, the contrast between human nature and animal nature is merely the contrast between altruism and egoism. He says: “We can know the truth clearly if we compare two points of view among human beings. One of them is egoism, the other is altruism. […] Everybody should aim to serve others, rather than to exploit others” (Sun 2006, vol. 9 pp. 298–299). To replace “egoism” with “altruism,” and “the aim to exploit others” with “the aim to serve others,” is just to replace the principle of competition with the principle of cooperation, and animal nature with human nature. He thinks that the progress of modern human civilization has brought forth a new morality, “according to which those who are intelligent and competent should serve the masses. This morality of service to the masses is a new trend of morality in the world” (Sun 2006, vol. 10, p. 156). Manifested in “making one’s mind,” to Sun’s view, this new philosophy of life demands one to make one’s “mind” to accomplish great enterprises rather than to become a high official, and the “great enterprise” is nothing but to serve the masses, and to struggle for a strong and wealthy country. Though how this philosophy of life can be put into practice raises questions of its own, it conforms, on the whole, to the requirement of the revolution to cultivate a noble personality, getting rid of feudalist bureaucratic practices and philistinism. If we regard modern Chinese philosophy as a process in which the revolutionary worldview of the Chinese people develops from the situation of being-in-itself to the situation of being-for-itself , then Sun’s revolutionary worldview is the link between Hong Xiuquan and the Chinese communists. In his last will and testament, Sun says: “For forty years, I have devoted myself to national revolution. Freedom and equality in China are the sole purpose of my endeavor. Forty years of experience gives me to understand that in order to reach the goal [of equality and freedom for China] we must awaken the people and ally ourselves in a common struggle with those peoples of the world who treat us on the basis of equality” (Sun 2006, vol. 11, p. 639). The level of consciousness of the revolutionary worldview in this remark is far higher than that in the revolution of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. But Sun Yat-sen fails to summarize the achievements of this process from the philosophical point of view. In the evolutionism stage of modern Chinese philosophy, progressive thinkers all thought that Western democracy could save China. With the theory of evolution as a philosophical weapon, they particularly investigated the philosophy of history and

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the epistemological problem of the relation between knowledge and action in order to solve the problem “Whither China?”. In the field of philosophy of history, Kang Youwei reconstructs the theory of the three ages of the Gongyang School, and Yan Fu advocates the philosophy of natural evolution. Both of them thus begin to replace the conception of history as change with the conception of history as evolution, and fiercely refute the metaphysical theory of history as changeless and as determined by the Mandate of Heaven. Liang Qichao further points out that history is a process of the evolution of groups, but reduces it to the psychology of society. Zhang Taiyan interprets the origin and evolution of groups in terms of the production and application of instruments, and justifies his proposition that revolution is a regular form of evolution. But his “theory of dual evolution” leads him to nihilism. On the contrary, Sun Yat-sen’s evolutionism becomes the guiding thought for a generation of people. Although evolutionism has not been able to reveal the driving power of history, the evolutionist philosophers’ deep and multifaceted exploration into the theory of historical evolution foreshadows the later Chinese discovery of the materialist conception of history. In the field of the theory of knowledge, Kang, Tan, and Yan all hold that knowledge comes before action, but they differ from each other in that Kang Youwei basically tends to apriorism, Tan Sitong tends to nominalism, and Yan Fu is an empiricist. Liang Qichao praises the freedom of spirit so highly that he is led to subjective philosophy with positive mind (reason and sensation). Zhang Taiyan’s proposition that “revolution develops the people’s intelligence” contains the idea of social practice in rudimentary form. He makes a few remarks on the relation between knowledge and action and that between sensation and reason, but his overestimation of the role played by abstract concepts leads him to Kantianism, while his overestimation of morality leads him to voluntarism. Sun Yat-sen’s account of the relation between knowledge and action goes further than that of his predecessors in that he pays attention to the notion that action comes before knowledge, and to the dialectical relation between the two. These observations do not reach the level of the conception of practice as a social one nor do they explain comprehensively the dialectics of the process of knowledge, but they signal that modern Chinese philosophy is approaching the dialectical and materialist theory of knowledge. The evolutionism stage of modern Chinese philosophy, we might say, paves the road for dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Nevertheless, only with the Chinese proletariat’s emergence on the political stage does the debate on the relation between past and present, and between China and the West acquire new classrelated content, and a new historical significance, while the materialist conception of history and dialectical materialism assume a conscious form. It is a universal law in the development of philosophy that a worldview characteristic of an age can become a truly conscious one only after a process of discussions and debates among different schools. It was historically necessary that the road towards the spread of Marxism be paved by the “contention of a hundred schools of thought” in the May Fourth Movement.

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References Chen, Yange. 2009. Preface to Wang Guowei’s Posthumous Works. In Wang Guowei. Complete Works of Wang Guowei, vol. 20, ed. by Xie Weiyang. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Education Publishing House. Kang, Youwei. 2007. Complete Works of Kang Youwei, ed. by Jiang Yihua and Zhang Ronghua. Beijing: China Renmin University Press. Liang, Qichao. 1989. Collected Works of the Ice-Drinking Chamber, ed. by Lin Zhijun. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liang, Qichao. 2005. Supplement to the Collected Works of the Ice-Drinking Chamber, ed. by Xia Xiaohong. Beijing: Beijing University Press. Liang, Qichao. 2010. Letter to the venerable Master Nanhai. In Chronicle of the Life of Liang Qichao, ed. by Ding Wengjiang and Zhao Fengtian. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sun, Yat-sen. 2006. Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen. Eds. Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Institute of History of Republic of China. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Tan, Sitong. 1981. Complete Works of Tan Sitong, ed. by Cai Shangsi and Fang Xing. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wang, Guowei. 2009. Complete Works of Wang Guowei, ed. by Xie Weiyang. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Education Publishing House. Yan, Fu. 1981a. A Translation of J.S. Mill’s Logic. Beijing: The Commercial Press. Yan, Fu. 1981b. Primer of Logic. Beijing: The Commercial Press. Yan, Fu. 1986. Collected Works of Yan Fu, ed. by Wang Shi. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhang, Taiyan. 1981. Selected Works of Zhang Taiyan, ed. by Zhu Weizhen and Jiang Yihua. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Zhang, Taiyan. 1982. Complete Works of Zhang Taiyan, ed. by Sheng Yanguo. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Zhang, Taiyan. 2006. An Evaluation of the National Heritage. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House.

Chapter 12

The Philosophical Revolution Enters the Stage of Materialist Dialectics

The May Fourth Movement signaled that the Chinese proletariat had arrived on the political stage, and that the Chinese democratic revolution had grown out of the period of old democracy and stepped into the period of new democracy. With this change, modern Chinese philosophy had gone from the stage of evolutionism to the stage of materialist dialectics. The magazine Youth (later renamed New Youth), edited by Chen Duxiu, was founded in 1915, ushering in the New Culture Movement. With “Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science” as its banner, this movement carried out an unprecedentedly fierce attack on feudalist culture and ideology (a popular slogan at that time was “Destroy the antique shop of Confucius!”) and a heated debate between new and old trends of thought. The debate over the relations between past and present, and between the Chinese learning and the Western learning unfolded in a much larger scale, which accelerated the modernization of Chinese philosophy. The criticism of Confucianism was focused on the theory of the Mandate of Heaven and the Confucian dogmatism that functioned as the basis of the Confucian ethical codes and rites. As far as the modernization of philosophy was concerned, science and democracy were meant, in terms of forms of thinking, to replace the methodology of the study of Confucian classics and, in terms of ideas of value, to replace feudalist authoritarianism with the modern principle of freedom. The New Culture Movement, therefore, clarified the targets of attack and the tasks of struggle in the philosophical revolution in modern China. With the development of the labor movement, the New Culture Movement became a Marxist movement, after Marxism was introduced by the progressive Chinese intellectuals after the October socialist revolution in Russia. After the May Fourth Movement, Marxist philosophy (and especially its materialist conception of history) began to be disseminated in China. Several progressive thinkers underwent the same political conversion from radical democracy to scientific socialism, and the same philosophical conversion from evolutionism to the materialist conception of history. They began to apply the materialist conception of history to solving the problem of “Whither China” as well as the problem concerning the relations between past and present and between China and the West. Moreover, the © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7_12

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period of the May Fourth Movement was a period in which different schools of thought engaged in free contention. In addition to Marxism, other Western trends of thought came to China in great numbers. As far as philosophy was concerned, Dewey’s pragmatism, Russell’s new realism, Bergson’s philosophy of life, and Nietzsche’s philosophy of the “superman” were all widely circulated in China. It was through its debates with various non-Marxist schools of thought at that time that Marxism was understood and chosen by the people. These debates were on the relation between “problems” and “isms,” on socialism, on anarchism, on Eastern and Western cultures, and on the relation between science and metaphysics. In these debates, Marxism prevailed and the philosophical revolution developed in depth.

12.1 Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu: From Evolutionism to Historical Materialism The first person who represented the transition of the modern philosophical revolution from the stage of evolutionism to that of materialist dialectics was Li Dazhao. Chen Duxiu followed Li in this respect. Li Dazhao (1889–1927), called Shouchang, was a native of Laoting, Hebei Province. After coming back from Japan, where he studied, he actively took part in the New Culture Movement. One of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, he was arrested and then killed by warlords in April 1927. Li Dazhao’s writings were compiled as Works of Li Dazhao (two volumes). Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), called Zhongfu, was a native of Huaining (now Anqing), Anhui Province. In his early years, he fled to Japan because of his role in the abortive struggle against Yuan Shikai. Upon coming home in 1915, he founded the magazine Youth and acted as its editor. Thus, he became the leader of the New Culture Movement. As the first general secretary of the Communist Party of China, he was charged with opportunism during the period of the first Chinese Civil War (1924–1927), and then with splitting the party. In 1929, he was expelled from the party. From 1932 to 1937, he was arrested and imprisoned by the Nationalist Party. Chen’s works are compiled as Works of Duxiu and Selected Essays of Chen Duxiu. Both Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu compare Chinese culture with Western culture with a view to criticizing feudalism and Confucianism. Li Dazhao says: “Eastern and Western civilizations have their own essentially distinctive characteristics: the former tends to be quiet, while the latter tends to be active.” Furthermore, “The Easterners’ philosophy is a passivity-oriented philosophy, while the Westerners’ philosophy is an action-oriented philosophy. While that which orients itself to passivity is quiet, that which orients itself to action is active.” Consequently, he observes that “the one is natural, the other is artificial; the one prefers ease, the other war; the one is passive, the other active; the one is dependent, the other independent; the one is content with temporary ease and comfort, the other tries to make progress …” (Li 2006, pp. 211– 212). Chen Duxiu also says: “Western nations base themselves on individuals, while Eastern nations base themselves on families.” Moreover, he believes that “western

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nations base themselves on the rule of law and on practical concerns, while the Eastern nations base themselves on emotions and on empty forms” (Chen 2009, pp. 193– 195). These ideas, with emphasis on the essential differences between traditional Chinese culture and modern Western culture, can be traced to their origin in Yan Fu, but are more militant. Later, after they were converted to Marxism, Li and Chen began to learn Marxism from the West in order to solve the actual problems in China, and to review the historical tradition of China on the basis of the “presence” of the proletariat and the masses of people. In this sense, the debate on the relations between past and present, and between Chinese and Western learning entered a new stage. (1) Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu’s Evolutionism Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu regarded evolutionism as the philosophical basis of their ideas on revolutionary democracy. Their positions on evolutionism, however, are different from each other in that while Li’s evolutionism is connected with rationalism, Chen’s is connected with realism (empiricism). According to Li Dazhao, nature, human society, and morality are all in the process of constant evolution, of which there is no dominator in the form of a sage or God. He says: We think that the universe is eternal and natural. All things produced by this natural and real entity causally, mechanically, and gradually arise and evolve according to natural law. Morality is also one of the facts in the universe. Its arising and evolution, therefore, must conform to the society that is actually in the process of natural evolution. Now the process of natural transformation is not at all the endowment from some mysterious dominators, neither is it a legacy from some ancient sages. (Li 2006, vol. 1, p. 246)

Li Dazhao’s evolutionism tends towards pantheism for, in his view, the universe is the expansion of “self.” He says that the universe is a tide of the Great Being; “our ‘selves,’ and our ‘lives,’ always following the whole trend of life, are expanded, continued, progressed, and developed together with the flowing of the Great Being, and ultimately arrive at a situation in which ‘the universe’ is just the self and the self is just the universe” (Li 2006, vol. 2, p. 194). This sounds similar to Gong Zizhen, Liang Qichao, and Zhang Taiyan’s emphasis on “self.” This also means that, on the problem of the relation between thought and being, Li Dazhao was not a materialist at that time. Li Dazhao’s evolutionism is permeated with rationalist spirit. On the one hand, he regards the evolution of the universe as “dominated by the self” in order to “promote the authority of the self, and call forth energetically the awakening of the self”, that is, to awaken the innate reason of the people, and to make them aware of “the light of the self” (Li 2006, vol. 1, p. 169). He refers to this innate reason as “innate knowledge and intuitive ability,” which he also describes as the natural virtues of the people ( 民彝 min yi), as a result of which every person is born with the ability to tell truth from falsehood. He states that “it is up to people’s reason to differentiate right from wrong and true from false” (Li 2006, vol. 1, p. 160). On the other hand, Li’s “self” is intended to fully exercise the power of will, rather than bend to the environment. He says: “So-called civilization is the degree to which human beings, according to

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their innate reason, change their environment and conquer nature” (Li 2006, vol. 1, p. 163). For this reason, he advocates reconstructing the environment with the power of will, and opposes the fatalism that counsels passive adjustment to one’s environment. He says: We must not submit ourselves to passive determinism, and hinder our spirit from forging ahead courageously. We must act according to the theory of free will, make our best effort to progress forward and upward, and change our environment to our benefit. In this sense, I advocate Bergson’s creative evolutionism. (Li 2006, vol. 1, p. 139)

Though idealistic, Li’s idea implies, reasonably, that we must respect truth and the will of the people. Li Dazhao respects the “authority of truth.” “Truth,” he says, “is the ultimate of the human life, and self-confidence is what makes human life arrive at truth” (Li 2006, vol. 2, p. 103). If one trusts in one’s innate reason and expands it, then one will be able to arrive at truth. He points out: The judgment on whether one’s ideas contain true elements or not should be based on observing exactly and reasoning legitimately. The utility of logic becomes clear if these two requirements are met, of which the requirement of being based on facts is especially important. (Li 2006, vol. 2, p. 103)

This kind of rationalism contains materialist elements. At the same time, Li Dazhao thinks that people are essentially the same in virtue of their innate reason. It is precisely because he represents the will of the masses that a hero can play a role in propelling history forward, for “without the generalized will of the people, even a hero is powerless” (Li 2006, vol. 1, p. 156). In the last analysis, history moves forward according to the will of the masses. He claims: “History cannot limit the people’s reason, while the people’s reason is the arbiter of everything” (Li 2006, vol. 1, p. 150). Li Dazhao criticizes Carlyle’s conception of history as being created by heroes, believing that if the people stubbornly expect heroes to bring benefit to them, then they will “lessen their autonomy when they receive favor, and lose their natural abilities when they receive benefits” (Li 2006, vol. 1, p. 157). This idea of opposing heroism and trusting the masses is of great value. According to Chen Duxiu’s evolutionism, everything in the universe follows the law that the superior species survive the inferior ones. “In terms of the fundamental law of the universe,” according to him, “everything under the sun is constantly undergoing evolution” (Chen 2009, vol. 1, pp. 159–160). Consequently, “the ability of a living being to survive and evolve is assessed by whether it has, or to what degree it has, the ability to resist another living being. It is an inevitable law that the superior survive the inferior” (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 178). Since on his view the Chinese lack “the ability of resistance that is crucial to the human conquest of nature,” Chen Duxiu advocates, surprisingly, “animalism” ( 兽性精神 shou xing jing shen) in order to cultivate the ability of resistance that is characterized by the militant spirit of refusal to resign oneself to Heaven and fate. “Animalism” refers to one who possesses indomitable will, and is skillful in battle; the person also has “a strong and healthy constitution to resist the power of nature,” and “relies on his or her instinct, and leads an independent life;” moreover, the person

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is “innocent and natural without any affectation” (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 174). Only by being so, can the Chinese nation become powerful, while “in a powerful nation, both humanity and brutality are developed.” This theory is, of course, one-sided, but it is intended to encourage the people to be militant and to oppose fatalism. The major feature of Chen Duxiu’s evolutionism is its connection with “realism.” Explaining human life in terms of biology, Chen holds that, while an individual is born and then dies, a species exists from one generation to the next and, for this reason, “our actual and present existence” is very precious. From this idea comes the mentality of “realism.” He says: Thinking highly of reality is the mentality of the spirit of the age in modern Europe. This mentality applies boundlessly: in ethics and morality, it appears as utilitarianism; in politics, it appears as the doctrine for the greatest happiness of the majority; in philosophy, it appears as empiricism and materialism; in religion, it appears as atheism; in literature and arts, it appears as realism and naturalism. (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 172)

In a word, he thinks that modern European civilization is characterized by the fact that “the actual and present life is regarded as the basis of all thoughts and actions” (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 172). In order to learn from modern European civilization, therefore, the Chinese must, in his opinion, develop a realistic mentality. The basic tendency of Chen’s realism is materialist, but, like Yan Fu’s philosophy, it has been influenced by the positivist philosophy of the West. Chen Duxiu’s realism also stresses that we should respect science, because science attaches greatest importance to “positivity.” He says: What is science? It refers to our ideas of facts that synthesize objective phenomena and conform to subjective reason in being consistent with each other. What is imagination? It refers to those ideas that are both divorced from objective phenomena, and deviant from subjective reason in being conceived groundlessly, supposed fictionally, and unable to be clarified and justified with the knowledge and intellect available in the world. (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 162)

The keynote of these remarks is materialist, but his placing science in opposition to imagination shows that “reason” in Chen Duxiu is different from “reason” in Li Dazhao. While Li advocates reason as “the light of the self,” and thus holds a position closer to Liang Qichao’s, Chen explicitly inherits Yan Fu’s philosophy of natural evolution, and combines evolutionism with empiricism. Like Yan Fu, Chen places emphasis on induction. He states that “if we want to develop learning and clarify truth, we must replace the sagely teachings with the method of inductive logic and the method of positive science!” (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 427). The empiricist tendency of Chen Duxiu’s realism can also be seen in his utilitarian position in ethics. The consciousness of ethics and morality, according to Chen, is the key step in the evolution of society. He argues that we must replace the Confucian moral codes and rites with Western utilitarianism, which demands the individual emancipation. He repeats an idea of the British empiricists by saying that “it is a natural law of human life that humans prefer happiness to hardship” (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 209). Consequently, “the ultimate end of human life” consists in “the development of one’s individuality on the one hand, and the contribution to one’s

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group on the other” (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 209). He holds that one should benefit others on the premise of benefiting oneself: In his or her life, an individual should make efforts to bring forth happiness, enjoy it, and leave it to society so that the individuals of the generations to come can also enjoy it. Happiness given and received generation by generation in this way can last forever. (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 387)

This is just the rational egoism advocated by Yan Fu as well. From this position, Chen stresses that “the individual’s will and happiness should be respected” (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 386). A moral behavior is one that makes others as well as oneself happy and provides the greatest happiness to the majority of the people; moral responsibility presupposes free will, and for this reason an individual’s autonomous personality should be respected. Chen Duxiu criticizes the feudalist morality of “preserving the principle of Heaven and extinguishing the human desires” as immoral, since it runs counter to the natural human tendency of preferring happiness to hardship; he also denounces the “three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues” as cultivating “the slavish morality which submits one to other people.” These ideas, of course, are of progressive significance. But his idea that “it is a constant and fundamental reason for individuals’ existence” to perform their wills and satisfy their desires is a version of the abstract theory of human nature, and is, to some extent, voluntaristic (Chen 2009, vol. 1, p. 386). (2) Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu’s Conversion to the Materialist Conception of History Li Dazhao’s publication in May 1919 of the article “My Conception of Marxism” signals his acceptance of the materialist conception of history. Li Dazhao’s conversion to the materialist conception of history expresses itself first of all in the fact that he employs this conception to answer the questions concerning the relations between mind and matter and between individuals and groups. Having presented Marx’s idea that the economic base determines the superstructure, he says: Historians have previously explained the transformation in societies solely in terms of the superstructure, regardless of its basis. But history cannot be understood in this way. For changes in the superstructure rely completely on changes in the economic base; history can be explained only in terms of economic relations. (Li 2006, vol. 4, p. 328)

According to the materialist conception of history, he also remarks: Any discovery, any invention, and any practical application of the same, is the result of the labor of people in society similar to us. It is those improvements of history that lead us to the discovery of the history of our own world and of ourselves, and the consciousness that we are the authority over ourselves, that past history was produced cooperatively by people like us, and that future history will remain so. (Li 2006, vol. 4, p. 445)

From these two passages, we can see that Li Dazhao has fundamentally changed his thinking on the two related problems of the relation between mind and matter and that between individuals and groups. He no longer reduces the motive force of history to individuals’ reason or will, but explains it in terms of social existence

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itself; that is, he now believes that the economic basis of a society determines its superstructure and that the working people are the creators of history. Therefore, what he calls “consciousness” at this moment exhibits the correspondence of mind and matter and the unity of individuals and groups. In Li Dazhao, the materialist conception of history in China turns from the spontaneous situation to the conscious situation. Another fact showing that Li Dazhao was converted to the materialist conception of history is his position on the evolution of social organizations and on “stressing the present.” He explains the evolution of social economic formations in terms of the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations. He says: “Social organizations are just social relations, which, like cloth, silk, beans, and grains, are created by men with productive forces” (Li 2006, vol. 3, p. 27). He states: As productive forces develop, conflict looms between these forces and those social institutions which no longer suit them. The result of this process is the inevitable bankruptcy of outdated social institutions. That is social revolution. The new organizations emerging thereafter will share this fate when they come to be inconsistent with productive forces in the future. (Li 2006, vol. 3, p. 27)

Here, Li Dazhao clarifies scientifically the driving force of social evolution and the law governing the emergence of social revolutions. In Li Dazhao, the evolutionist conception of history now assumes a truly scientific form. This also signifies that historical dialectics has turned from spontaneity to consciousness. On the basis of the materialist conception of history, moreover, Li Dazhao advances the idea that “the present amounts to life, motive, action, and creation” (Li 2006, vol. 4, p. 350). The “present,” in his opinion, is human life, action, or practice. Every activity of human beings is actual and present, an “action of leading to something.” Containing the past in the present, and conceiving the future from the present, it is the driving force of history. At the same time, “present,” as an actual action, is labor. He believes that “our future is a result of our present labor with the help of past materials” (Li 2006, vol. 4, p. 444). In this idea of “respecting the present” is shown the Marxist idea of practice and its historical dialectics. Chen Duxiu’s conversion to Marxism occurred in 1920. This is shown first of all in his application of the materialist conception of history in solving the problems concerning the relation between mind and matter and between individuals and groups. First, the relation between mind and matter—relations between evolution and revolution and between natural processes and human efforts. In the debate on socialism, capitalist reformists held that the first things that should be done in China were to develop business and make gradual reforms, rather than to carry out a socialist revolution. Chen Duxiu criticizes this view. He agrees with Cai Hesen’s idea that the “marrow” of Marxism is “the synthesis of the idea of revolution with the idea of evolution,” holding that “it is true that the materialist conception of history contains the idea of natural evolution, but this, however, is not its major idea. Its major idea, to my view, is to tell us that, in history, all changes in institutions come after changes in economic systems,” and that “a human-made revolution” or a revolution of the economic system is “the most efficient and most fundamental method to create history” (Chen 2009,

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vol. 2, p. 411), according to the law that history naturally evolves following changes in the economic system. Here, we can see that Chen Duxiu no longer discusses realism abstractly, but instead realizes that the basis of real life is the economic system of a society, and that changing this system is both a process of natural evolution and the result of humans’ consciously-made social revolution. Chen affirms that the “synthesis of the idea of revolution with that of evolution” is basically to stress the unity of nature and human efforts. Nevertheless, the fact that Chen Duxiu reduces the scientific elements of the materialist conception of history to “the application of the inductive method in studying the social sciences” (Chen 2009, vol. 2, p. 453), and does not mention dialectics at all, shows that he still fails to overcome the positivist or empiricist tendency in his realism. Second, the relation between individuals and groups—the relation between freedom and sanction, and that between individuals and society. The anarchists at that time opposed the Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, demanded the abolition of the state, the law, and all social sanctions, and held that an anarchist society is an association of absolutely free individuals. In his debate with the anarchists, Chen Duxiu responds by pointing to the problems concerning the relation between freedom and sanction, and that between individuals and society according to the materialist conception of history. He says: Considering the fact that society has been gradually developed from the emergence of associations of more than two people up to now, how can we find one single feature, physical or mental, of human beings that is not produced by society but purely individually oriented? We tend to think of some of our special views and temporary hobbies as individual or as counter to society. Actually, they all arise as the result of countless environmental forces. (Chen 2009, vol. 2, pp. 315–316)

Since individuals are conditioned by society, in Chen’s view, the social system must be changed in order for individuals to improve. At the same time, Chen does not deny the role played by individual effort. he says: It is true that individuals’ will cannot create what is impossible. Within the domain of that which is objectively possible, however, it is still possible for an individual’s will to make a difference. Moreover, that which is objectively possible can be reached in due time only with the help of the efforts of individuals and the creation of genius. (Chen 2009, vol. 3, p. 202)

These remarks, on the whole, are consistent with the materialist conception of history, and differ from his previous view that people’s freedom depends only on individuals’ will. But he has not completely converted to the materialist conception of history, because he still fails to overcome his tendency towards the abstract theory of human nature and voluntarism. On the one hand, he holds that “people’s will is a product of the relations in their material life;” on the other hand, he says that “the history of human beings is the product of their insatiably avaricious will” (Chen 2009, vol. 3, p. 202). Moreover, he thinks that the mentality of the masses is often blind and irrational, and from this he concludes that a successful revolution depends on “the forceful submitting of the majority by the minority” who are sober-minded

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(Chen 2009, vol. 2, p. 406). This contempt for the masses lends some dogmatist elements to his voluntaristic tendency. Li Dazhao’s conversion from evolutionism to the materialist conception of history is, on the whole, more radical than Chen Duxiu’s, and the former’s level of Marxist theory is also higher than the latter’s. (3) Li Dazhao’s Ideal of Society and Life: the Unity of Socialism and Humanism The ideal society conceived by the materialist conception of history, according to Li Dazhao, is the unity of socialism and humanism. As in the West, socialism in modern China also undergoes a process from its utopian version to its scientific version. The ideal of great unity, as conceived by Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen, has a utopian nature. Li Dazhao points out that “the difference between utopian socialism and scientific socialism” basically consists in that, while the former “bases itself on human reason alone,” and is thus “like a building on the sand,” scientific “socialism was systematized according to scientific rules. Because its conclusions are historically necessary, it has a strong and solid basis” (Li 2006, vol. 4, p. 316). Thus, Li Dazhao makes it clear that the realization of the ideal of socialism in China is the necessary result of human history, and for this reason this ideal is of a scientific nature. In order to realize the ideal of socialism, according to Li Dazhao, we must perform “the reconstruction of both the material and the ideal, both the physical and the mental” (Li 2006, vol. 2, p. 356). He seeks to “reconstruct the mentality of the people according to humanism, and to reconstruct the economic organization according to socialism” (Li 2006, vol. 3, p. 35). He thinks that a reconstruction of the economic organization through class struggle will enable the humanist ideas of “mutual aid” and “brotherhood” to be implemented. That is to say, scientific socialism can be blended with humanism. The goal of the evolution of the modern societies, Western or Chinese, in Li Dazhao’s opinion, is the world of great unity: to start with the anti-feudal struggle for the emancipation of individuality, to continue with the socialist movement, and to aim at a new social order combining both the liberty of individuals and the unity of the commonwealth. He says: The evolution of the present would proceed along one single line leading to a world of great unity. The origin of this line is the liberty of individuals. […] This movement for the liberty of individuals goes along with the movement for the great unity. These two movements, seeming to be opposite to each other, are actually complementary to each other. (Li 2006, vol. 4, p. 122)

This indicates that modern Chinese philosophy has risen to a higher level in its search for a social ideal. It is the materialist conception of history, according to Li Dazhao, that leads him to a new philosophy of life. This new philosophy of life inherits from the progressives in modern China “the down-to-earth philosophy of life,” which stresses seeking truth from facts, and “the optimistic and enterprising philosophy of life” which opposes fatalism. (Li 2006, vol. 4, p. 445) This new philosophy of life has some elements surpassing his revolutionary predecessors, the most important of which are his idea of

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“respecting labor” and his idea that the masses can “liberate themselves with their own effort.” Like many other anti-feudalist thinkers, Li affirms that “it is human nature that people prefer happiness to hardship” and holds that “the happiness-oriented conception of life alone is the natural and true conception of life” (Li 2006, vol. 2, p. 318). He points out further that “the best way to seek happiness in human life is labor. Every kind of happiness can be created through labor and every kind of hardship can be removed through labor.” This idea of “respecting labor” expresses the conception of life that regards labor as sacred. At the same time, Li Dazhao thinks that in order to emancipate themselves, laborers should not beg for bones from the rulers. “A real emancipation,” he says, “is not to be achieved by begging others to ‘leave three sides of the net open’ and liberating us from the net, but by our own effort to protest, to break down, and to force the rulers to allow us to liberate ourselves” (Li 2006, vol. 4, p. 363). This emphasis on arousing the masses to struggle consciously for their emancipation implies the mass viewpoint that would be strongly emphasized by the Chinese communists after Li Dazhao. From what we have presented above, we can see that Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu accept the materialist conception of history not only because they have been influenced by foreigners, but because they have participated in the discussion on the major problems of modern Chinese philosophy. In this sense, the conversion from evolutionism to historical materialism is a logical development within modern Chinese philosophy itself. Representing the highest level of Marxist theory in China at his time, Li Dazhao gave the development of Chinese Marxism avital starting point.

12.2 Hu Shi’s “Experimentalism” and Liang Shuming’s Intuitionism During the period of the May Fourth Movement, many philosophical schools in the West were also introduced into and spread throughout China. Hu Shi and Liang Shuming respectively introduced and elaborated Dewey’s pragmatism and Bergson’s intuitionism. Hu Shi (1891–1962), called Shizhi, was a native of Jixi, Anhui Province. In his early years, he studied in the United States as a student of Dewey. Lecturing at the University of Beijing, and joining the editorial board of the magazine New Youth, Hu was a well-known figure in the New Culture Movement. But he was a consistent critic of Marxism and the people’s revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party. He left mainland China in 1948. His major works have been compiled into Works of Hu Shi and Recent Writings of Hu Shi. Liang Shuming (1893–1988) was a native of Guilin, Guangxi Province. In his early years, he studied Buddhism and lectured on Indian philosophy at the University of Beijing. Later, he advocated the revival of Confucianism, and thus became a pioneer of the contemporary New Confucianism. He is also known for his role in the Rural Autonomy Movement and his reformist “theory of rural reconstruction.” His major

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works include Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Eastern and Western Cultures and Philosophies, The Essentials of Chinese Culture, and Human Mind and Life. During the May Fourth Movement, Hu Shi initiated a literary revolution. He attacked the adverse effects of Confucianism, and urged his readers to take a “critical attitude” towards traditional Chinese culture, to reconsider its value, and to oppose “the compromises made between past and present and between what is Chinese and what is Western” (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 557). On the other hand, however, he was against the spread of Marxism in China, and was in favor of “studying problems more fully and talking less about doctrines,” which started a debate over “problems versus doctrines.” On the basis of pragmatism, he regarded “doctrines” only as “abstract names,” and advocated making gradual reforms through solving social problems, such as the livelihood of the rickshaw-pullers, rather than trying to find an overall solution to all social problems. This idea was criticized by Li Dazhao on the basis of the Marxist theory of social revolution. Hu Shi held a theory of “blending the Chinese and Western cultures” in the cultural debate over relations between past and present and between China and the West. A new culture, according to him, should be able to “successfully blend the spirit of the modern culture with the essence of the Chinese culture itself” (Hu 1998, vol. 6, p. 10). For this reason, he was engaged in searching traditional Chinese culture for “an adequate basis on which the system of ideas in modern Europe and America can be organically combined” (Hu 1998, vol. 6, p. 10). This adequate basis, in his view, was not Confucianism, but some “non-Confucian schools” such as Mohism and the School of Logicians, and “the ancient books passed on to us by the scholars of the Han School,” especially their methods of studying. But Hu Shi’s views on the national culture later tended towards nihilism, and he even became inclined “to agree to a complete Westernization.” Liang Shuming’s conceptions of Chinese and Western cultures were in opposition to those held by Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi. As a representative of the “School of Eastern Culture,” Liang wrote the book Eastern and Western Cultures and Philosophies during the May Fourth Movement to answer the challenge to Confucianism from the people in the new intellectual fashion, such as Chen and Hu. The Chinese, in Liang’s opinion, should inherit the spirit of Confucianism, rather than discard his doctrine, because the future world culture would be a revival of the Confucian culture. It is true that he also maintained that the Chinese should learn science and democracy from the West, otherwise China could not survive as a nation. But he argued that we must follow the Confucian way and absorb Western culture only as a supplement to Confucianism. Liang’s intention to repair the “old antiquity shop of Confucius” which had been attacked fiercely by people like Chen Duxiu was obviously another version of the theory of “Chinese learning as the substance and Western learning as the function” under a new historical condition. (1) Hu Shi’s Pragmatist Worldview and “Scientific Methodology” In Hu Shi’s view, the main trend in world philosophy from the middle of the nineteenth century onward was positivism, of which the representatives of the two stages in its development were respectively Huxley and Dewey. He claims that “my ideas have been most influenced by two people—one is Huxley, the other is Mr. Dewey” (Hu

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1998, vol. 5, p. 507). Huxley was a defender of Darwin’s theory of evolution, which Hu Shi also accepted. But Hu Shi’s evolutionism started first of all from Dewey’s pragmatism, for in his view, only “with the philosophy of pragmatism are the ideas of evolution found in Darwin’s school of thought able to be applied in philosophy” (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 212). Therefore, Hu Shi’s “experimentalism” (a term he prefers to pragmatism) is basically a copy of American pragmatism. One of Dewey’s contributions, according to Hu Shi, was to “reject everything that has been regarded as a fundamental problem in philosophy since Hume and Kant” (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 228). That is, to claim that the struggle between materialism and idealism is meaningless. Thus comes “the era of philosophy’s rejuvenation” (Hu 1998, vol. 3, p. 293). Dewey’s pragmatism, in fact, is not beyond the struggle between materialism and idealism. He takes experience as his first principle, and understands it as the human action of conquering nature, or the “human enterprise of dealing with the environment” (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 229). Experience, in one word, is in his sense subjective, and he regards the world as composed of such experience. This is an idealist conception of experience. Citing this pragmatist idea, Hu Shi says that “reality is a very docile girl who obediently allows us to apply her makeup and dress her up.” Consequently, he states: The universe of pragmatism [humanism] is an unfinished draft that is in the process of being amended. It will look different after the amending process, but it will never be completed once and for all. […] The universe of pragmatism is still adventurously unfolding. (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 226)

Applied to the problem of truth, the pragmatist version of subjective idealism appears in the maxim that “to be true is to be useful,” which Hu Shi also accepts. Truth, in his view, is “the most convenient man-made hypothesis.” He denies the objectivity and absoluteness of truth, thinking that there can only be relative truth, or “the truth at this moment, in this situation, which concerns my own interests” (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 212). This idea, though contributing positively to the struggle against absolutism with respect to the feudalist moral codes and rites, is incorrect theoretically. The major contribution of Hu Shi to modern Chinese philosophy consists in his methodology, at the core of which lies the well-known maxim “be bold in making hypotheses and be careful in verifying them.” This methodology, which was widely influential during the period of the May Fourth Movement, absorbs the scientific methodology of the modern West, on the one hand, and inherits traditional Chinese methodology, especially that of the Qianjia School, on the other hand. He reduces this methodology to three elements. First, the methodology expressed by the demand “show me the evidence!” Hu Shi says: “Huxley’s agnosticism is a way of thinking, whose major demand is to emphasize evidence. Against all superstitions and traditions he has only one weapon: ‘show me the evidence!’” (Hu 1998, vol. 3, p. 282). Huxley’s agnosticism is what Engels called “a bashful materialism,” because it does contain some materialist elements. And the Qianjia School of Qing dynasty is characterized by its emphasis on “seeking truth from facts” and “believing on the basis of evidence alone.” In Liang Qichao’s

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words, the spirit of Qian School can be captured as follows: “A meaning must be decided on the basis of evidence; any guess without basis in evidence must be discarded” (Liang 1989, vol. 34, p. 34). In this sense, Hu Shi’s maxim, “show me the evidence,” is the combination of Huxley’s agnosticism and the scientific spirit of the Qianjia School. Taking the attitude of “show me the evidence” towards the traditional teachings of the sages, institutions, customs, established behavior, and beliefs, Hu Shi stresses that “anything that has no sufficient evidence can only be left for future investigation, and should not be believed” (Hu 1998, vol. 3, p. 275). This is significant not only for its anti-feudalist intention, but for its methodological stance against subjectivism and dogmatism. “Historians,” Hu Shi says, “should look only for objective order in materials and evidence. If we start by placing ‘principles’ in our minds, which are then used to ‘test’ facts, we tend to turn such ‘principles’ into subjective opinions” (Hu 1998, vol. 3, p. 84). He regards as two fundamentally conflicting ways of thinking the attitude of seeking principles from evidence and that of taking one’s subjective opinions as principles. He criticizes Liang Shuming’s way of taking his subjective opinions as true principles. In his Eastern and Western Cultures and Philosophies, Liang Shuming says: I had a set of ideas of my own before I read the Confucian classics. Only after my own ideas arose from reading Confucian classics did I read the books written by people in Song and Ming dynasties. That is to say, the leading ideas are my own.

Hu Shi criticizes Liang by saying “no one could fail to be a dogmatist if he overtrusts his subjective ideas” (Hu 1998, vol. 3, p. 186). In his view, Liang Shuming subjectively constructed the sequence of the Western, Chinese, and Indian cultures, but was blind to many material facts. At the same time, Hu Shi attacks Marxism for its subjective dogmatism. He writes: “It dogmatically and in a utopian manner places the ideal sphere of communism very highly” (Hu 1998, vol. 3, p. 195). This is, of course, based on his own prejudice. Second, the methodology of scientific experimentation. In Hu Shi’s formulation, Dewey’s methodology of experimentation is composed of five steps: (1) A problematic situation; (2) determining exactly the development of the problems; (3) suggesting various ways to solve the problems; (4) considering the results implied by each of these hypotheses, to see which of them can solve the problem; (5) verifying the result so that people can trust it and apply it, or falsifying it so that people would not believe it (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 233). Of these five steps, Hu remarks, “the most important one is the third step,” because a real scientific methodology consists basically in advancing a hypothesis in order to solve a problem, and then trying to verify or falsify it. Moreover, Hu Shi regards Dewey’s five-step methodology as a combination of induction and deduction, because while “from the first step to the third step the stress is on induction,” “from the third step to the fifth step the stress is on deduction” (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 237). The special contribution made by Hu Shi himself is his summary of the five-step methodology as “be bold in making hypotheses and be careful in proving them,” and his favorable comparison of it with the research methodology of scholars of the Qing dynasty. The

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methodology employed by scholars in the Qing dynasty, he says, can be generalized into no more than the two points: “(1) be bold in making hypotheses; (2) be careful in proving them. One cannot make any invention if one is not bold in making hypotheses; one cannot convince others if one cannot supply sufficient evidence” (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 237). The method of textual criticism in the Qing dynasty, developed primarily by Gu Yanwu, is to advance original ideas or hypotheses on the basis of the comparison and examination of facts and written materials, then to search for evidence backing up the ideas. If an idea is supported by a good deal of evidence, and no counter evidence exists, it is accepted as true; if it is disproved by powerful counter-evidence, it is then discarded. The inductive methodology employed is comparable to the methodology used in modern experimental sciences. One of the remarkable merits of the methodology of modern experimental sciences, however, is its application of the means of experimentation, to which the methodology of textual criticism of the Han School is evidently inferior. Hu Shi points this out: Textual criticism can only follow materials. […] either in collating words or in examining historical facts; it can only verify evidence but cannot produce evidence. The natural sciences, however, are not confined to searching for ready-made materials; rather, they can produce new evidence. The methodology of experimentation is nothing but the methodology of producing evidence. (Hu 1998, vol. 4, p. 110)

This idea is right. But Hu’s thinking seems a bit shallow when he attributes the fact that the Chinese did not, like their Western contemporaries, invent the methodology of experimental sciences during the change from the Ming to the Qing dynasty to the fact that “the evidence of people like Gu Yanwu and Yan Yuan were written materials, but the evidence of Galileo and his colleagues were all material objects” (Hu 1998, vol. 4, p. 109). Another merit of the methodology of the experimental sciences consists in its application of mathematics, that is, to mathematically grounded hypotheses. But Hu Shi neglects this fact, for in his methodology of science he does not mention the importance of the mathematical method. To use the mathematical method is to make justifications and employ reasoning by applying the exact logic of deduction. The fact that Hu Shi neglects the mathematical method betrays that the scientific method in his opinion is only empirical induction. He stresses that one should be bold in making hypotheses, but does not demand to turn a hypothesis into a scientific one by justifying it with the help of deduction. This betrays the empiricist tendency in his methodology. Third, the “genetic method.” Hu Shi says: The result of the application of the idea of evolution in philosophy is the emergence of the genetic method. What then is ‘the genetic method’? It is studying how a state of affairs arose, whence it came, how it became what it is today. This is the genetic method. (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 212)

This is what is generally called “the historicist method” namely, the method of investigating the historical process of the evolution of an object. In the “Introduction” to his Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy, Hu Shi defines the genetic

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method as comprising three moments: “clarifying changes” refers to tracing “the transformations of ideas from the past to the present”; “seeking causes” refers to “finding the causes of these transformations”; while “passing judgments” refers to “disclosing the effects produced by each of the schools of thought” and from these effects finding out the merits of these schools. This is the development of the historicist method which took form in Wang Zhongxi and the Historians of East Zhejiang School, and the continuation of Wang Guowei’s approach of “tracing a thing’s origin, and clarifying the causes of its change.” But Hu Shi’s methodology is more conscious than his predecessors’ in that he explicitly regards the genetic method as the application of the theory of evolution in methodology, and regards it as an organic part of the scientific methodology in general. Hu Shi’s “genetic method,” however, cannot grasp true causal relations and disclose the laws of the evolution, because he holds a pluralistic conception of history. He says: We historians all know that a historical fact has plenty of causes, therefore although we are very ready to accept “the study of economic history” as an important tool for historical research, we cannot help thinking that things like ideas and knowledge are also “objective causes,” which can also “change the society, explain history, and govern one’s outlook on life.” (Hu 1998, vol. 3, p. 173)

This idea, which makes no distinctions between primary and secondary causes, between grounds and conditions, and between essential connections and trivial connections, leads necessarily to his remark that “spitting” and “having an idea” could possibly result in a major historical event. On the whole, Hu Shi’s methodology enhances the exploration into methodology in modern China, but contains some obvious limitations. (2) Liang Shuming’s Voluntarism and Intuitionism In his Eastern and Western Cultures and Philosophies, Liang Shuming explores the philosophical base of the Eastern and Western cultures from the point of view of comparative philosophy. The difference between Eastern and Western cultures, according to Liang, is not due to the fact that one runs faster and the other runs more slowly along the same path, as Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi maintain. Rather it is a difference between fundamental “ways.” “What is culture?” he answers: “It is nothing but the way of living of a nation. What is living then? It is the endless will” (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 352). Out of the differences among the “orientations” of the will, come the differences between Western culture, Chinese culture, and Indian culture. Western culture’s “fundamental spirit consists in the will’s going ahead,” Chinese culture’s “fundamental spirit consists in the will’s harmony and moderation,” “while Indian culture’s “fundamental spirit consists in the will’s moving backward.” These three different “orientations” of culture, in his opinion, are also “three steps” arranged successively in history. First comes Western culture, “whose attention is centered on external matters with the help of intellect;” then comes Chinese culture, “whose attention is centered on the internal life with the help of intuition;” lastly comes Indian

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culture, “whose attention is centered on the inanimate entity with the help of perception (pratyaks.a)” (Liang 2005, vol. 1, pp. 503–504). This conception of Eastern and Western cultures is based on voluntarism and intuitionism, because Liang attributes the cause of the difference among cultures to the impulse of the will, and the “endless will,” or life, can only be comprehended through intuition. This philosophy is a result of blending Bergson’s philosophy of life with the Consciousness-only School of Buddhist idealism and the School of Taizhou developed from Wang Shouren’s philosophy. Life, according to Liang Shuming, is one and the same as living. It is only for the convenience of expression that “by the one we mean the substance, and by the other we mean the function” (Liang 2005, vol. 2, p. 92). The succession of living creates the universe. He says: The whole universe is nothing but a process of living. There was no universe at the outset. It is only because of the succession of living that the universe seems to exist eternally. Actually, the universe is the succession of many things, instead of the eternal existence of one single thing. The universe is in fact an existence made possible by living. (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 376)

It is because of the will that the succession of living arises, for “the essence of living is the will” and “living is the endless will.” This is completely consistent with Bergson’s conception of the world as the “duration” of the will, or “the impulse to life.” What is unique with Liang Shuming is that he compares the “will” to living, which comprises the world, that is, Bergson’s “impulse to life” to the dwelling or abode (alaya) of the Buddhism of the Consciousness-only School, thinking that the will operates through the six instruments of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and the consciousness. He says: Living is the succession of things in a certain domain. What is the so-called thing then? By “a thing” we mean one question plus one answer, or a subjective aspect (见分 jian fen), followed by an objective aspect (相分 xiang fen) in the Consciousness-only School. One thing after another, and another […]. Endless emergence of things is the succession. (Liang 2005, vol. 1, pp. 366–377)

The subjective and objective aspects mentioned here by Liang Shuming are in fact basically what Richard L. H. Avenarius calls physical elements and mental elements. Every sensation or idea in every instant is the unity of subjective and objective aspects, a thing composed of one question and one answer. Liang states: “Things emerge endlessly because questions arise endlessly and answers arise endlessly too” (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 377). It is this endless succession of things, or living, that comprises the universe. Living in this sense is merely a process of one’s mental activity of endless asking and answering questions in one’s mind. This is actually to interpret Bergson’s idea in terms of the Buddhism found in the Consciousness-only School. On the basis of Bergson’s philosophy, Liang Shuming maintains: The substance of the universe is not a fixed or static thing; rather, it is life and duration. The phenomena of the universe are those things which present themselves in living. When recognized by sensation and intellect, however, they seem to be static. The substance, however, cannot be known through sensation and intellect; it can be known only by intuition. Intuition is basically one aspect of existence; intuition and living are fused into one, in which neither

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subject nor object exists. This can be called absoluteness or non-oppositeness. (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 406)

Liang takes the example of artistic appreciation to explain the meaning of intuition, saying that when we appreciate some masterpieces of painting or calligraphy, we can “comprehend through intuition the beautiful or the magnificent meaning and flavor of these artistic works,” which cannot be grasped through sensation or concept, nor can they be attributed to these works as objective things, but are “added without reason or justification by human intuition,” that is, by “our internal life” or human instinct and emotion. He says: It must be known that sensation is irrelevant to our internal life; what is relevant is the intuition attached to the sensation. Intellect is also irrelevant to our internal life; what is relevant is the intuition attached to the intellect. It is through the window of intuition alone that our internal life can be communicated with the outside world (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 468). The sphere that can be arrived at through the communication between the internal life of humans and the life of the universe alone is the sphere in which the subject is fused with the object, or the sphere of humanity or benevolence (仁 ren). He interprets Confucius’s concept of humanity in terms of intuitionism: “This sharp intuition is what Confucius called ‘ren’” (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 453). He thinks that, by the word “ren,” Confucius means to “act freely on the basis of intuition alone.” Furthermore, “ren is just instinct, emotion, and intuition” (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 455). According to the original Confucian teachings, there is no problem with the human desire for food and sex in themselves; that is to say, it is a good thing to act on the basis of these impulses, or on the basis of instinct. Problems arise when “intellect emerges to differentiate objects from subjects, to calculate selfishly, to make intuition retreat, and thus to bring forth non-humanity (不仁 bu ren)” (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 455). Things that are against humanity arise only because humans do harm to their intuition by applying their intellect to calculate losses and gains. Therefore, “the life which runs counter to humanity most seriously is the life of making calculations” (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 461). In a word, only by detaching oneself from considerations of losses and gains, and living a life of doing things for no reason, can one’s life be full of joy and absolute happiness. A person who leads such a life and acts on the basis of intuition alone, to Liang Shuming’s view, is really virtuous. He says: “Nothing can be counted as virtuous unless it comes from one’s intuition within. If one does not act completely freely, one’s intuition cannot be sharp and strong” (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 458). If one gets used to calculating one’s losses and gains, the free movement of one’s intuition will be impaired. The effort of self-cultivation should be dedicated to ending the habit of calculating gains and losses. This theory comes from the Taizhou School of the Wang Shouren School. So Liang Shuming says that “only Wang Xingzhai and his son Wang Dongya, two natives of Taizhou in the late Ming dynasty, are to my liking. Master Xingzhai’s teaching centers on happiness, and his behavior is quite like a sage’s” (Liang 2005, vol. 1, p. 465). The Taizhou School considers people’s will and emotion as naturally reasonable and people’s minds as originally happy; those who act freely on the basis of their innate knowledge are the happiest. In this sense,

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there are some elements of voluntarism and intuitionism inherent in this school, with which Liang Shuming now combines Bergson’s philosophy of life, and constructs a systematic theory of voluntarism and intuition on the basis of this combination. It is against the tradition of rationalism of Confucius and Mencius, however, that Liang Shuming advocates instinct and plays down the intellect. Liang himself is also conscious of this problem, which is why he later abandons the division of human psychology into instinct and intellect and accepts Russell’s trichotomy of instinct, intellect, and spirit. But Liang Shuming replaces “spirit” with “reason,” understanding “instinct” in its biological sense, and referring to human emotion and will as “reason.” He interprets “reason” as the experience and practice of the ethical sentiment, and thinks that the expansion of “reason” can make one arrive at a sphere in which one becomes totally identified with one’s objects. This is still a version of intuitionism, though it contains fewer elements of voluntarism and irrationalism. Hu Shi’s experimentalism and Liang Shuming’s intuitionism, in a word, represented respectively the attempts during the May Fourth Movement to introduce positivism and irrationalism from the West and combine them with traditional Chinese philosophy. They produced a certain impact on modern Chinese philosophy.

12.3 The Debate Over Science Versus Metaphysics and Qu Qiubai’s Historical Determinism In the spring and summer of 1923, Chinese scholars had a debate over “science versus metaphysics,” or over “worldview” (Weltanschauung). It was started by Zhang Junmai (known in the English-speaking world as Carsun Chang), a member of the School of Scientism. The debate centered on the problem of whether science could solve the problems of one’s worldview. People like Zhang Dongsun, Liang Qichao, and Ling Zaiping stood by Zhang Junmai; Hu Shi, Wang Xinggong, Ren Shuyong, and Tang Yue stood by Ding Wengjiang. This debate can be understood as a continuation of the debate over Eastern culture versus Western culture, with the Metaphysical School (玄学派 xuan xue pai) as the representative of the School of Eastern Culture and the School of Scientism (科学派 kexue pai) as the representative of the School of Western Culture. As far as philosophy is concerned, the former maintained Bergson’s philosophy of life (combined with the School of Mind of Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Shouren), while the latter held to Machism and pragmatism (combined with the tradition of the Han School of the Qing dynasty). Marxists also contributed to the later stage of the debate; among them was Qu Qiubai, who offered a critical summary of the debate in his essay titled “The World of Freedom and the World of Necessity.” (1) The Voluntarism of the Metaphysical School and the Positivism of the School of Scientism According to Zhang Junmai and other metaphysicians, World War I signaled the bankruptcy of the Western material civilization, and the revival of the traditional Chinese spiritual civilization. Zhang says:

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Confucians from Confucius and Mencius to the Neo-Confucians of the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties placed particular emphasis on the cultivation of humankind’s inner life, the result of which is a spiritual civilization; Europeans in the last three hundred years placed particular emphasis on the domination of nature by humankind, the result of which is a material civilization. (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 6)

It is only in order to expand the spiritual civilization of Confucius, Mencius, and the Neo-Confucians that Zhang makes an effort to discuss the problems of Weltanschauung. Like Liang Shuming, Zhang Junmai is a follower of Bergson’s philosophy and a voluntarist. One’s worldview, according to Zhang, is chosen by one’s own free will, rather than on the basis of the law of causality. He says: A Weltanschauung can be characterized by subjectiveness, intuition, synthesis, the freedom of will, and uniqueness. It is because of these five features that the solution to the problems of Weltanschauung is beyond the reach of science, however developed it might be, and is instead totally dependent on human beings themselves. (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 6)

Moreover, he believes that “the law of causality in science is confined to matter, and is not applicable to spirit. […] The problem of free will, which is the origin of human activities, can be understood only through metaphysics” (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 81). In Zhang Junmai’s point of view, the human will is absolutely free, therefore everybody is able to hold a worldview on the “imperative of one’s own conscience.” This idea is, generally speaking, shared by other metaphysicians in the debate. The core of the worldview held by the metaphysicians is the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. This can be seen from their views on the relation between righteousness and profit, and that between individuals and groups. Zhang Junmai says: Under the present situation in which national affairs are facing unrest and ethical rules are being abandoned, we should reverse the famous remark by Guangzi to find the principle of pacification, that is, “only after the people know protocol can they have enough food and clothing; only after the people have a sense of honor and disgrace can their granary be made full.” (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 81)

Moreover, he states: What I called “innerness” is what Mencius and Confucius referred to when Mencius said that “it is up to oneself to seek for humanity (仁 ren),” and when Confucius said “to rectify oneself!” To cultivate our moral character according to this idea, we must ignore utilitarian considerations, and be content with doing what we feel at ease with. To administer a country according to this idea, we must abandon the ambition of making our country a rich and strong one. It is precisely because I hold this view that I am not satisfied with the current policies of science, education, industry, and commerce, and demand that they be changed. (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 75)

Here, Zhang Junli is trying to defend the traditional “moral codes” and “Confucian rites” with the idealism of Neo-Confucianism, to oppose utilitarianism, and even to reject the Westernizers’ demand for a strong and wealthy and country. His aim is a society with “equality and peace” and the “great unity with morality,” arrived at through individuals’ “cultivation of their inner lives” (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 75).

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This kind of worldview, which obviously contains some relics of feudal and patriarchal society, is nevertheless different from traditional Confucianism. In ancient China, the orthodox Confucians justified the feudal and patriarchal system with the theory of the Mandate of Heaven, meaning that the monarch’s power came from Heaven, and that his subjects must accept their fates. In modern times, many progressive thinkers opposed fatalism with voluntarism. This is of positive significance in the struggle against feudalism. For the metaphysicians, however, voluntarism becomes a tool for maintaining “moral codes” and “Confucian rites.” This change signifies that the Confucian moral codes and rites no longer have any grounding in reality, and, since they are no longer rational, can only be defended by appealing to the subjective will. Unlike the Metaphysical School, the School of Scientism maintained that Weltanschauung is not beyond the reach of scientific methods. Ding Wenjiang points out that “it is a prejudice of the metaphysicians that scientific methods are not applicable to Weltanschauung” (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 10). Hu Shi maintains that the law of causality “covers everything,” because the cause of the emergence of each Weltanschauung “can be found out through applying scientific methods” (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 23). This is consistent with the trend of advocating the scientific spirit during the May Fourth Movement. But the idea that causal laws can be discovered with scientific methods is a positivist (Machist and pragmatist) one. Ding Wenjiang accepts the positivistic “agnostic idealism,” saying that according to Spencer, Dewey, and Mach, Only through sensation can we know objects, and the concepts of objects are mental phenomena. That is why this position is an idealist one. Beyond that which is sensed, behind that of which one is conscious, the problems of whether there are other things and of what the essence of the objects is, cannot be determined and should be left undecided. That is why this position is an agnostic one. (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 15)

From this positivist point of view, Ding Wenjiang says: “what we call scientific methods are nothing but the classification of facts into different types and the ordering of the same” (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 9). The so-called facts, according to him, are nothing but mental phenomena or subjective sensations and experience. In this sense, to classify facts and to find out their orders is merely to arrange them in a subjective, hypothetical, and convenient way, which cannot be said to be objective or necessary. Ding Wenjiang says: The so-called universal laws in science are actually the methods with which we explain what we have observed. If they are not applicable to the facts newly discovered, they can be changed at any moment. That is what Mach and Pierce meant when they rejected the view that a scientific universal law was necessary. Herein lies the fundamental difference between science and metaphysics. Every metaphysician wants to construct an indestructible “system,” and regards his own system as a final conclusion. (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 147)

These remarks are correct in refuting the metaphysical idea of laws as absolute and changeless, but wrong in abandoning the idea of truth as objective and absolute, thus leading to relativism and indeterminism.

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Hu Shi, referring to the Weltanschauung of the School of Scientism as “a naturalist Weltanschauung,” approves the biological demands of human beings, appreciates Wu Zhihui’s Weltanschauung which underlines “the flourishing of human desire”, and thus holds a position of utilitarianism and hedonism on the debate over the relation between righteousness and profit. On the relation between individuals and groups, Hu Shi refers to his Weltanschauung as “healthy individualism.” He says: Society is in favor of dictatorship. It tends to destroy by force the individualities of individuals, and to suppress their free and independent mentality. But when the individualities of individuals have all been eliminated, and the free and independent mentality disappears, the society itself also becomes lifeless and incapable of progress. (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 488)

For this reason, he thinks that an autonomous society, or republican society, not only makes it possible for individuals to have the right of free choice, but demands that individuals be responsible for their behavior. Otherwise, no independent personality can be brought up (Hu 1998, vol. 2, p. 488). Hu Shi’s attack on the autocracy’s suppression of the individuality of its citizens in the name of society is of anti-feudalist significance; his proposition that, in order to bring up an independent personality, one must have the freedom of will, or “an individual’s right for free choice,” is also correct. But his combination of “regarding oneself” and “regarding others” on the basis of individualism is one-sided, and thus he fails to clarify correctly the relation between individuals and groups. (2) Qu Qiubai’s Summary of the Debate and Its Theoretical Limitations In this debate, Marxists criticize both the Metaphysical School and the School of Scientism, and explain the relations in social history between mind and matter/things (or between freedom and the law of causality) and between individuals and groups (or between society and individuals) in a more correct way. In their theory, however, there is still a certain erroneous tendency, which foreshadows that Marxism will undergo a process full of difficulties in China. Chen Duxiu’s position in this debate is, in the whole, a historical materialist one. He criticizes especially the voluntarist position of the Metaphysical School, arguing that “the freedom of the individuals’ will is a thing governed by, instead of governing, the causal laws of social phenomena and mental phenomena” (Chen 2009, vol. 3, p. 280). At the same time, he criticizes the agnostic idealism of the School of Scientism as “repeating the errors committed by Huxley, Spencer, and others,” and criticizes Hu Shi for his mistake of “holding a dualism of mind and matter” (Zhang et al. 2012, p. 6). But Chen regards pragmatism as well as historical materialism as scientific theories of social history, and thus fails to draw a clear line between Marxism and positivism. It is Qu Qiubai who summarizes the debate on the basis of Marxism in a more correct way. In his essay “The World of Freedom and the World of Necessity”, published in 1923, Qu points out that this debate “is centered on the problems of whether there is the law of causality in social phenomena and whether there is freedom of will. Other problems are all minor matters” (Qu 1985, p. 113). Considering that the Metaphysical School attacks the materialist conception of history as fatalism

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and the School of Scientism defends indeterminism, Qu Qiubai correctly clarifies the relations between consciousness and being, between freedom and necessity, and between ideal and actuality according to the materialist conception of history. He says: Social phenomena are made by humankind, but humans’ wills and actions are in turn governed by causal laws. If humans can grasp these causal laws, their wills and actions can conform to reality to a greater degree, and they can enjoy more freedom. Only then can they begin to realize their reasonable ideals. Therefore, “necessitarianism” is the determinism of society, not “fatalism”. (Qu 1985, p. 122)

The “determinism of society” refers here, above all, to the position on the relation between consciousness and being, that humans’ conscious and purposeful activities, in the last analysis, are dependent on social being, and that human intentions are the results of economic development, which in turn affect social development. Second, this “determinism of society” refers to the position on the relation between freedom and necessity that all social phenomena are governed by causal laws, and “only after one has grasped the causal necessity can one acquire the freedom of applying these causal laws” (Qu 1985, p. 127). Third, it refers to the position on the relation between ideal and reality that, “according to the determinist scientific methodology, there are causal laws in social phenomena, and on the basis of these causal laws we predict the ‘future reality,’ which is nothing but the ‘ideal at present’” (Qu 1985, p. 127). In this way, Qu Qiubai rejects both indeterminism and the accusation made by the Metaphysical School against the materialist conception of history. On the basis of the determinism of society, Qu Qiubai discusses the relation between society and individuals. He says: The ultimate motive of the development of society consists in the “substance of a society”— economy—from which arises the philosophy of life of the masses of an age, and the ideal of individuals in a society. Economy changes according to objective laws, and with change comes gradually the demand of the masses for a change in their philosophy of life, and suitable individuals emerge. […] Changes occur at first in individuals, then in classes and in humankind as a whole; at first it is unconscious and then it becomes conscious—at last it is turned into a practical movement of the masses. (Qu 1985, p. 178)

In Qu Qiubai’s view, one’s Weltanschauung, whether one is an outstanding figure or a common person, is determined by the economic base; outstanding people become what they are because they have sensed the necessary tendency of the historical process and advanced a new social ideal, whose spread “from individuals through classes to humankind as a whole” moves a revolutionary movement of the masses from the unconscious stage to the conscious stage. In the process of the interaction between society and individuals, according to Qu, any outstanding individual is only an “instrument of history”: “Any great man is only an instrument of history in a certain epoch and in a certain place” (Qu 1985, p. 137). A great man is none other than an individual who becomes self-conscious earlier than others, and who, as an instrument of history, arms the masses with the knowledge of the necessary laws of history and turns the struggle of the masses into a conscious movement. Thus is

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started “the great enterprise of proceeding from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom” (Qu 1985, p. 128). This process, according to Qu Qiubai, is also a process in which one moves from regarding oneself to regarding others. The motive of an individual is always selfregarding, and the motive of an individual in a society is always at the same time in the service of his or her society and class. Qu Qiubai says: It is characteristic of the proletariat as a class that they attack the existing system on the basis of its egoism; the practical interests of social phenomena found in the process of class struggles would enable the proletariat to be aware of the fact that “they themselves cannot be emancipated unless humankind as a whole is emancipated and socialism is reached.” This is actually a matter of regarding others. The relation of individuals to their class is just like the relation of a class to humankind. (Qu 1985, p. 126)

That is to say, the process from benefiting oneself to benefiting one’s class is connected to the process from regarding oneself to regarding others. The term egoism (利己主义 li ji zhu yi), used by Qu Qiubai here, has no negative connotations. Like Li Dazhao, Qu also emphasizes the unity of individuals and society, and the unity of regarding oneself and regarding others, and thinks that under the condition of socialism, “not only each nation’s culture, but also the individuality of each individual can be developed freely” (Qu 1985, p. 20). Qu Qiubai’s “social determinism” and his theory of “the instrument of history” are one-sided in some respects. He says: All historical phenomena occur out of necessity. The so-called historical contingency arises only when people have not completely understood the causality in a certain domain, and it is therefore a purely subjective matter. We should never claim that “there is no causality here” on the basis that “we have not identified the causality yet”. (Qu 1985, p. 116)

Mixing contingency with subjectivity, Qu Qiubai rejects completely the objectivity of contingency and reduces necessity to naked laws stripped of contingent elements. This is wrong and leads no doubt to dogmatism. Moreover, he points out that any outstanding figure is an instrument of history, but does not add at the same time that, in the process of history, everybody is both an instrument and an end. Neglecting humankind’s role as an end would lead to neglecting humankind’s role as a subject in historical development, which, of course, is one-sided. Concerning the relation between individuals and groups, Qu Qiubai talks about the unity of regarding oneself and regarding others at the outset, but later stresses the point that an individual is an element of his or her group, and one must “struggle against one’s own individualism” and “overcome one’s individualism” with help from the masses (Qu 1985, p. 475). Thus he sets collectivism against individualism and seeks to replace individualism with collectivism, in contrast to Li Dazhao, who stresses the unification of “reasonable individualism” with “reasonable socialism.” After the 1930s, Qu Qiubai’s idea was shared by most Chinese Marxists, who thus neglected individuals’ freedom and their status as ends in themselves. The one-sidedness of Qu’s “social determinism” and his theory of “instrument of history” were not corrected by the Chinese Marxists for a long time. Here we will learn a profound lesson in theoretical thinking.

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12.4 Lu Xun on National Characteristics and His Aesthetic Ideas Lu Xun (1881–1936) was a great thinker as well as a great writer. Originally named Zhou Shuren, called Yushan (later Yucai), he was a native of Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province. In his early years, he accepted evolutionism, and was a radical democratic revolutionary. During the New Culture Movement, he contributed articles to the New Youth with “Lu Xun” as his pen name. Using this name, he then published a great number of stories and essays. As a result of his revolutionary activities over a long period, he was later converted to Marxism. He is a major representative of the development of the new culture of the Chinese nation. His works are compiled as Complete Works of Lu Xun. On the relation between past and present and that between China and the West, Lu Xun opposes the doctrine of referring “back to the ancients.” With regard to Western culture, he advocates a “take-over policy,” demanding that we “use our brains, take a broader view, and decide things for ourselves,” meaning that we take over Western ideas, “either use them, or put them aside, or destroy them” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 41). That is to say, if we are going to absorb Western culture, we should analyze it, choose the parts we want, and make them an organic part of the new culture. In philosophy, Lu Xun’s major contribution is his analysis of “national characteristics” and his realist aesthetic ideas. (1) On National Characteristics and the Free Personality In his early years, Lu Xun says, he “believed in evolution.” In terms of the conception of nature, he was then a materialist. In terms of the philosophy of life, he was then an evolutionist who, influenced by Nietzschean philosophy, was inclined to voluntarism. In Lu Xun’s opinion, we must change the “national characteristic” of contentment with a position of humiliation, and bring up a militant type of personality, in order to reconstruct Chinese society. For this reason, he was a supporter of Nietzsche’s ideas. Qu Qiubai points out: The basis of Lu Xun’s ideas at that time was Nietzsche’s theory of “stressing individuals but playing down matter.” This kind of individualism is a bourgeois illusion shared by many intellectuals. In China at that time, the urban working class had not become a mighty, conscious political force, and the masses of peasantry in rural areas were limited to spontaneous and unconscious revolts. Most philistines and the conservative, vulgar masses maintained a servile attitude towards the ruling class; such an attitude is an obstacle to reform and progress. This call by Lu Xun for the development of individuality, freedom of thought, and a break with tradition was, objectively speaking, of considerable revolutionary significance at that time in the struggle for freedom and against the blind forces in nature and in the old society. (Qu 1985, p. 530)

Under such historical conditions, it was the desire to change the people’s slavish mentality of submitting to their fate that inclined Lu Xun to voluntarism. After his conversion to Marxism, Lu Xun began to apply the materialist conception of history in analyzing the “national characteristics.” Reviewing the lessons learned

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the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, he observes: “This revolution has been realized easily. The subsequent reform required that the people correct their own deep-rooted bad habits, which the people were highly reluctant to do. So, from now on, the most important thing is to change the national characteristics. Otherwise, the nation will remain unchanged, though it can be labeled as autonomous, or a republic, or something else interchangeably—it does not help at all” (Lu 2005, vol. 11, pp. 31– 32). At this moment, Lu Xun is already clear that “national characteristics” are not abstract things, because “the nation’s people” can be classified into different groups. He says: “We need the kind of destroyer who makes reforms, for he has the ideals in his mind. We should be clear of the difference between this kind of person and bandits and lackeys, and be cautious lest we ourselves lapse into the latter two” (Lu 2005, vol. 1, p. 204). In his view, the old system is composed of bandits and lackeys, and the “deep-rooted bad habits” of the people are both the results of this system and an explanation for its stability. Lu Xun exposes the true character of both bandits (or the so-called upper classes) and lackeys in the old Chinese society. The “upper classes,” he points out, act hypocritically when they talk about following Confucian rites and music, venerating Confucius, preserving national essence, and maintaining justice. He says: But let us look at some people in China, those at least of the upper class. Do they believe in and obey divinities, religion, or the authority of the tradition, or do they simply fear them and try to use them? See how good they are at changing sides and at taking no definite stand, and you will realize that they really believe in nothing, but want to pose as believers. So if you want to look for nihilists, there are quite a few in China. The only difference between them and the Russian nihilists is that the latter speak and act in the same way as they think, while ours think one way but speak another way, act one way off stage but another way on stage. We might distinguish these unusual people by calling them “play-acting nihilists” or “face-keeping nihilists”; even if the adjectives seem hard to relate to the noun in the literal sense. (Lu 2005, vol. 3, p. 346)

Any autocrat needs to bring up a number of lackeys in his service. Lackeys are different from slaves, according to Lu Xun’s point of view, in that while slaves are not content with their position as slaves and struggle to free themselves, lackeys, although they endure hardship and burn with resentment, “try to find beauty in slavery, praising and caressing it or even becoming intoxicated with it, for they try to reconcile themselves and others to be slaves forever” (Lu 2005, vol. 4, p. 604). Moreover, Lu Xun remarks that masters can be lackeys at the same time, and can turn themselves from masters into lackeys: “The other side of being a dictator is being a lackey; when in power one may do all manner of evil, as soon as one loses power and influence one may fall into a slavish mentality” (Lu 2005, vol. 4, p. 604). It is on the basis of this hierarchy composed of masters and slaves that the traditional ethical codes arose as well as the idea of “keeping face” typical to the Chinese tradition. “Face,” Lu Xun says, “is the ‘key to the Chinese spirit’.” “Each class in society” he says, “has a different face” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 130). It is clear then that the idea of “keeping face” is an important element of the traditional ethical codes and is used to back up the feudalist hierarchy. However, in the process of evolvement,

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the distinction between “keeping face” and “losing face” becomes blurred. This can be seen most clearly in the “face-keeping nihilists.” That is why Lu Xun says: It is a good thing that the Chinese want face; the problem is that their face is so flexible, so constantly changing, that it becomes confused with not wanting face. Neosekan Hasegawa said of Robber’s Spring, “Gentlemen of old, disgusted by the spring’s name, would not drink from it; but the gentlemen of today have changed the spring’s name and drink from it.” This is the secret of the face of the “gentlemen of today.” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 132)

Another means used by the ancient sages in China to maintain the hierarchy composed of masters and slaves is the theory of the Mandate of Heaven, which deifies the ruling class and causes slaves to be content with their fate. Lu Xun criticizes this idea of “fate” as well. It is true, Lu Xun says, that the Chinese believe in fate, but no matter whether the fate is an “evil” one or a “strong” one, there is always a way out by means of sacrifice or prayer. So although the Chinese “believe” in fate, they do not “resolutely believe” in it. Connected with the Confucian rites and the theory of the Mandate of Heaven, the idea of “face” and the idea of “fate” are important spiritual pillars of the hierarchy composed of masters and slaves, and exert considerable impact on the national characteristics or national mentality. When the feudal system had become totally rotten, however, those of the upper classes became “play-acting nihilists,” and the lackeys behaved like hoodlums. These two types of people were characterized by “having no will of their own,” and actually destroyed both the Confucian rites and the idea of “the Mandate of Heaven” by turning “face” into hypocrisy and “fate” into fiction. This situation, in Lu Xun’s opinion, was both good and harmful to the people. He says: It may not be a good thing for people to lack “firm convictions” and to vacillate, for this shows that they have “no will of their own.” But in my mind it is a good thing for the Chinese who believe in fate to also believe that fate can be averted. So far we have used superstition only to counteract some other superstition, so that the final result is the same. If in the future we use rational ideas and behavior—science in place of superstition—the Chinese will discard their fatalistic outlook. (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 135)

This is an excellent dialectic analysis. Having been closely connected with the lower classes since his childhood, Lu Xun developed a better-defined viewpoint on the masses after his conversion to Marxism. The masses, he pointed out, “are not such fools as scholars think. They want knowledge, and they want new knowledge. They want to study, and they can absorb new things” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 104). At the same time, he also notes that the role played by intellectuals cannot be neglected: “History teaches us that all reforms are first tackled by those intellectuals conscious of the need” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 104). These conscious intellectuals, in his mind, must possess these characteristics: These intellectuals must study, think hard, use their own judgment, and have perseverance. They use different means, too, but never deception. They pursue various inducements, but never pander to popular taste. Such people do not demean themselves by acting as clowns for the masses, nor do they look down on others and count them as their minions. They are simply individuals in the community. It seems to me that this is the only way to do work for the masses. (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 104)

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Here, Lu Xun depicts the mental attributes of a free personality. First, these people are realists in their studies and resolute in their actions. Second, they combine the consciousness of the group with their own self-consciousness, and regard themselves as members of the group, respecting both themselves and others. Thus, they are free people who reject both the mentality of the “play-acting” bandits and the mentality of slaves and lackeys. In order to bring up this kind of free personality, Lu Xun argues that we must reconstruct the national characteristics produced by the force of habit existing for thousands of years. Otherwise, the social reform or revolution cannot succeed in a real sense. He says that Lenin refers to both “custom” and “habit” as “culture,” and considers it very difficult to reform them. He observes: “If they are not reformed, I think, the revolution will amount to nothing, like a tower built on sand which will soon collapse” (Lu 2005, vol. 4, p. 229). These remarks call for deep consideration even today. (2) Realist Aesthetic Ideas Lu Xun makes many excellent remarks on both the theory of typical characteristics and the theory of the artistic sphere, which are based on his realist aesthetic ideas. First, Lu Xun emphasizes that art and literature should be in the service of human life, a view shared by most progressive thinkers during the May Fourth Movement, the Enlightenment of China. He says: “As to why I wrote, I still feel, as I did a dozen years earlier, that I should write in the hope of enlightening my people, for humanity and for the need to better it” (Lu 2005, vol. 4, p. 526). After he accepted the materialist conception of history, Lu Xun agreed with Plekhanov that artistic production comes after labor: Plekhanov makes it clear that, at the outset, people in society look at things from the utilitarian point of view, and then from the aesthetic point of view. Everything regarded by human beings as beautiful is of utility to them—as significant in their struggle for existence against nature and other people in the society. The utility of an object can be recognized by intellect, while its beauty can be recognized only with one’s intuitive faculty. The utilitarian consideration which is imperceptible when one is appreciating the beauty of an object can nevertheless be made clear through a scientific analysis. Therefore, though the appreciation of beauty is characterized by its immediacy, the object probably would not seem beautiful if the enjoyment of its beauty had not been rooted in its utility. People do not exist for beauty, but beauty exists for people. (Lu 2005, vol. 4, p. 269)

In these remarks, Lu Xun refers to the origin of beauty and aesthetic perception in order to justify the proposition that beauty exists for people and the arts are intended to be for humanity rather than for nothing. This is a materialist idea that is in opposition to idealist and formalist aesthetics. Second, Lu Xun discusses the problem of thinking in terms of imagery and the problem of typification in arts. When talking about caricature, he says that “the most important thing about caricature is truthfulness”, that is, the reflection of reality as it really is. One should not nevertheless be content with making a caricature similar to its object in appearance, because what is important is to depict its essence without violating the principle of truthfulness. Talking about satire, Lu Xun points out that

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most of modern satires are truthful, “unless you write the truth, it cannot be ‘satire’. Untruthful satire—if such a thing exists—is simply rumor and slander” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, pp. 287–288). At the same time, Lu Xun remarks that satires are “often out of good will,” out of the hope that the satirized will be “changed for the better” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 288). Satire, therefore, is both the artistic summary of reality and the well-intentioned criticism of some people. In this sense, it is the unity of real and ideal elements. In order to realize the idea of being truthful both in appearance and in essence, and the unity of reality and the ideal, we must resort to artistic means of typification. Asked why he began to write stories, Lu Xun says: The happenings I described generally arose from something I had seen or heard, but I never relied entirely on facts. I just took one occurrence and modified or expanded it till it expressed what I had in mind. The same was true of the models for characters—I did not pick on specific individuals. My characters were often a mixture of a mouth from Zhejiang, a face from Beijing, and clothes from Shanxi. (Lu 2005, vol. 4, p. 527)

This is the presentation of his experience in molding types by thinking in terms of images. He regards his method as a traditional one in Chinese arts. He says: In the process of an artist portraying a person, for instance, he or she at first observes and surveys people quietly to the point of being extremely familiar with them, then deliberates attentively, and at last finishes the painting at one go. He or she never uses one single model (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 538). Other examples are that “the old Chinese theater has no scenery, and the New Year pictures sold to children show a few main figures only. […] Convinced that such methods suited my purpose, I did not indulge in irrelevant details and kept the dialogue down to a minimum” (Lu 2005, vol. 4, p. 526). The plastic arts and narrative literature are intended to mold typical characters, and in this respect the Chinese ancients made many achievements which display China’s distinctive aesthetics, but which had not been discussed theoretically in detail. Inspired by Western theories of aesthetics, Lu Xun investigates the theory of typical characters by inquiring into the history of story in China and the traditional Chinese arts, and above all, by summarizing his own experience of writing. Herein lies the major contribution made by Lu Xun to aesthetics. Third, Lu Xun makes a creative analysis of artistic spheres. Discussing the problem of the eternity and relativity of literature, Lu Xun says: Literature has its limitations as well as its universal qualities. And some relatively lasting works change according to readers’ experience of life. Inuit in the arctic and Africans in the heart of Africa cannot, I am certain, appreciate Lin Daiyu, an overly delicate Chinese beauty. And the citizens of a healthy and rational society would not be able to understand her either. They would probably feel further removed from her in time than we do when we hear of the burning of the books by the First Emperor of Qin or Huang Chao’s massacres. (Lu 2005, vol. 5, p. 560)

That is to say, the appreciation of artistic works is conditional on and relevant to readers’ social experience, and types such as Lin Daiyu are not eternal and unconditional. On the basis of this idea, Lu Xun criticizes Zhu Guangqian for the latter’s view that “the highest state in art is not passion,” but serenity. The ancient Greeks,

References

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according to Zhu, considered “serenity as the highest state in poetry,” and “such a mood is seldom found in Chinese poetry. Qu Yuan, Ruan Ji, Li Bai, and Du Fu lapse too often into passion and indignation. But Tao Yuanming is all serenity, hence his greatness” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 435). Against this view, Lu Xun argues that there are various kinds of artistic taste; consequently, there are different forms of artistic sphere. To regard serenity as the highest state (sphere) in poetry is only a reflection of the mentality of a certain group of literati. Moreover, “I still think that, when discussing a given essay, we ought to consider all of the author’s other writings, as well as his or her whole life and the state of the society he or she lived in” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 435). Considered in this way, it is not the case that Tao Yuanming is all serenity, for he also writes some poems full of passion and indignation, such as “On Reading the Book of Hills and Seas.” In this sense, we can say that “Tao Yuanming was great just because he was not completely ‘serene’” (Lu 2005, vol. 6, p. 435). This is to hold that, in terms of the method of studying the theory of the artistic sphere, one should make concrete analysis according to the materialist conception of history, rather than think in a metaphysically one-sided way. It is to the artistic spheres of passion and indignation, in Lu Xun’s point of view, that one should pay more attention, because they represent art for the sake of humanity. Lu Xun’s call for literature to reflect social contradictions and to express indignation and revolt against injustice in the society is a continuation of the tradition from Qu Yuan and Si Maqian to Han Yu and Huang Zongxi. The theory of “expression of one’s will/passion” and that of the artistic sphere in ancient Chinese aesthetics have a long tradition and abundant achievements, among which are the tradition of “being gentle and sincere,” the tradition of “being visionary and mysterious,” and the tradition of “being full of passion and indignation.” Si Maqian says that the Book of Songs is mostly written out of poets’ indignation. Han Yu holds the idea that “people will cry out against injustice.” Hang Zongxi praises the “tempestuous literature” as evidence of heroic mentality. Lu Xun intends to remind people of the tradition in ancient Chinese aesthetics of “crying out against injustice,” which is more important than the tradition of “serenity” and “being visionary and mysterious.” Lu Xun’s concrete analysis of the “national characteristics” on the basis of the materialist conception of history moves the investigation of modern Chinese philosophy on the problem of subjectivity a step further; his exploration into the theory of typical character and the theory of the artistic sphere paves the way for a Chinese version of Marxist aesthetics. We can thus say that Lu Xun was one of the first people in whom Marxism became combined with Chinese revolutionary practice (including the great tradition of China).

References Chen, Duxiu. 2009. Selected Works of Chen Du Xiu, ed. Ren Jianshu. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Hu, Shi. 1998. Selected Works of Hu Shi, ed. Ouyang Zhesheng. Beijing: Beijing University Press.

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Li, Dazhao. 2006. Complete Works of Li Dazhao, ed. National Association of the Study of Li Dazhao. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Liang, Qichao. 1989. Collected Works of the Ice-Drinking Chamber, ed. Lin Zhijun. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liang, Shuming. 2005. Complete Works of Liang Shuming, ed. Academic Committee of Chinese Culture Institute. Jinan: Shandong People’s Publishing House. Lu, Xun. 2005. Complete Works of Lu Xun, ed. The Editorial Committee of Luxun. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Qu, Qiubai. 1985. Selected Works of Qu Qiubai, ed. The Editorial Committee of Qu Qiubai. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Zhang, Junmai, Ding Wenjiang, et al. 2012. Science and Philosophy of Life. Changsha: Yue Lu Publishing House.

Chapter 13

The Sinicization of Marxism and the Contributions Made by Professional Philosophers

During the period from the May Fourth Movement to the victory in 1949 of the revolution of the New Democracy, the anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist culture of the people, or the culture of the New Democracy, developed greatly. Philosophy is the essence of the culture of a nation; the development of the culture of the New Democracy signified the victory of the Sinicization of Marxism. The process of the Sinicization of Marxism is a process of combining theory with practice and the masses’ grasp of philosophy, and a process in which the Chinese people’s revolutionary worldview develops from the stage of “being-in-itself” to the stage of “being-for-itself.” Theoretical struggles play an important role in this process as well. There are theoretical struggles on two sides. On the one hand, the struggle inside the revolutionary camp against “the left” and the right deviationist thinking overcomes both dogmatism and empiricism; on the other hand, there is the struggle against various non-Marxist philosophies. The Sinicization of Marxism is a result of both the theoretical struggles on these two sides and the summary of the experiences in revolutionary practice and the achievements in various spheres of culture. Mao Zedong is an outstanding representative of Sinicized Marxism. Applying his dynamic revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, he makes a summary of the debate in modern Chinese philosophy over the relation between mind and matter/things (which occurs mainly in philosophy of history and epistemology), and gives a scientific reply to the problem “Whither China?”. In addition to the aforementioned, there emerged a few professional philosophers, Marxist and otherwise, from the 1920s. While some professional Marxist philosophers contributed to the Sinicization of Marxism, some non-Marxist philosophers tried to blend Chinese and Western philosophies in order to establish their own systems, which, with modern forms and certain reasonable elements in content, also contributed to the modernization of Chinese philosophy. The Sinicization of Marxism and the contributions made by professional philosophers represent the overall tendency towards the meeting and blending in China of Chinese and Western philosophies.

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13.1 Li Da and Ai Siqi: First Attempts to Sinicize Marxist Philosophy After being introduced into China, Marxism was Sinicized through its popularization (being grasped by the masses) and application (being combined with practice). To this process, Li Da and Ai Siqi made substantial contributions. Li Da (1890–1966), also known as Heming, was a native of Lingling, Hunan Province. He studied in Japan as a young man, and then contributed all his life to the spread and study of Marxist theory. His works are compiled as Works by Li Da. Ai Siqi (1910–1966), originally named Li Shengxuan, was a native of Tengchong, Yunnan Province. He also went to Japan to study in his early years, and took it as his life-long work to study, popularize, and teach Marxist philosophy. His works have been compiled as Works by Ai Siqi. After the May Fourth Movement, Li Da points out, the period of introducing Marxism into China was replaced by the period of applying Marxism in China (Li 1980, vol. 1, p. 202). In order to apply Marxism to the reconstruction of Chinese society, according to him, we must have both a systematic comprehension of Marxism and a concrete analysis of the condition of China. Marxist philosophy, he holds, is a truth of universal significance, while Chinese society has its particularities; therefore, to apply Marxist philosophy in China is to “create a theory combining universality with particularity” (Li 1980, vol. 3, p. 24). This is what Li Da wants to do. In his works, he both studies the universal principles of Marxism and observes the particular conditions of China. In his A General Survey of the Industrial Revolution in China, published in early 1929, he applies the materialist conception of history, analyzes the economy of modern China, and explicates convincingly the nature of modern Chinese society as a semi-colonial, semi-feudal one. Regarding the popularization of Marxist philosophy as the “first step in the process of its Sinicization and actualization”, Ai Siqi published a series of articles titled “Lectures on Philosophy” (later collected in a book, entitled Philosophy for the Masses) from 1934 to 1935 in the magazine Life and Reading. In this series, he answered many questions arising among young people at that time relating to Marxist philosophy, in simple and vivid language. With this, he contributed a great deal to the popularization of Marxism. But he thought that, in order to Sinicize Marxist philosophy in a real sense, we should not be content with its popularization, but should move further: “First, we should grasp traditional Chinese philosophy and be familiar with its form of expression; second, we should digest the experiences and lessons of the Resistance War [against Japan] of today” (Li 1980, vol. 2, p. 23). That is to say, Marxist philosophy must be employed to sum up the present practical experience and given a national form by combining it with traditional Chinese philosophy. In their efforts to popularize and apply Marxist philosophy, Li Da and Ai Siqi also advanced some original views of their own and thus contributed to the Sinicization of Marxism.

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(1) Li Da’s Elaboration of Materialist Dialectics In his Outline of Sociology, which was praised by Mao Zedong as the “first textbook on Marxist philosophy written by a Chinese,” Li Dao described some of what he calls “new achievements of my own,” as well as presenting the fundamental principles of Marxist philosophy in a systematic way (Li 1980, vol. 2, p. 6). These “new achievements” include the following aspects. First, ideas on practical materialism or the dynamic theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality. Li Da says: “With the concept of labor as the medium, with the expansion from the knowledge of nature to the knowledge of history, dialectical materialism has brought an essential change to materialism and turned it into a practical materialism.” Consequently, “practice is not only a concept in the social sciences, but also one in the philosophical theory of knowledge” (Li 1980, vol. 2, p. 60). Again he says: The materially dynamic role of human beings displayed in practice becomes a consciously or cognitively dynamic role when reflected in their mental actions. People’s reflection as the reflection in their consciousness of external objects is in this sense a dynamic reflection. (Li 1980, vol. 2, p. 235)

Here, Li Da emphasizes the point that practical materialism is just the dynamic theory of knowledge as a reflection of reality, which refers both to the dialectical and materialist theory of knowledge, and to the historically materialist theory on the relation between social consciousness and the social being. In terms of epistemology, we must understand the representations and concepts arising on the basis of practice as processes of dynamic reflection; in terms of historical materialism, we should know, on the one hand, that it is the social being that determines social consciousness, on the other hand, the social consciousness that reflects the social being in an almost correct way can also exert a dynamic reaction upon the social being. This emphasis on the unity of dialectical materialism and historical materialism on the basis of the practical and dynamic theory of knowledge as reflection, after being developed by Mao Zedong, becomes a striking feature of the Sinicized Marxism. Second, ideas on the circular movement of knowledge. Li Da says: “The knowledge of the objective world proceeds in the following form: From practice to direct concreteness, to abstract thinking, to indirect concreteness, to practice” (Li 1980, vol. 2, p. 266). This is a development in the form of circular movement. Proceeding from direct concreteness to indirect concreteness—this is a dialectical unity of the starting point and the terminal point. Li Da refers to intuitional concreteness, which is the starting point of the process of knowledge, as “direct concreteness,” and the concreteness grasped through dialectical thinking as “indirect concreteness”. He takes the process from direct concreteness through abstract thinking to indirect concreteness as a circular movement of reaching the unity between thinking and being, and between subject and object on the basis of practice. “This circular movement,” he maintains, “is not a metaphysical cycle, but a dialectical development,” that is, a spiral, forward movement consisting of a sequence repeatedly occurring along with the development of practice (Li 1980, vol. 2, p. 266). Consequently, “the circular movement of knowledge is a process of

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historical development from relative truth to absolute truth” (Li 1980, vol. 2, p. 267). This is basically consistent with Mao Zedong’s idea of truth in his On Practice as “the concrete, historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowledge and action.” Third, ideas on the method of analysis of contradictions. Based on the ideas of Marx and Lenin, Li Da affirms that the law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of dialectics. To know an object according to this law, we must grasp “the simplest and most basic relation in it, that is, the essential contradiction in it.” He claims that as soon as [w]e have grasped this essential contradiction, we must start to explore the whole process of the development of the essential contradiction from the beginning to the end and the whole life of the object. Then firstly, we seek the development of the contradiction, in order to prepare conditions for its solution, for its turning itself into a new contradiction, or entering a new stage, or appearing in a new form. Secondly, we seek the qualitative changes of each stage and each side in the process, the particular qualities of all contradictory sides, and the mutual permeation and mutual transformation between various sides of the contradiction. Thirdly, we seek the necessity of the transformation of the object into its opposite as a result of the struggle between opposite sides inside itself, identify all conditions on which the necessity arises and its possibilities, and point out how the possibilities will be turned into actualities and be replaced by new forms. (Li 1980, vol. 2, pp. 133–134)

Here, Li Da explains the analysis of contradictions on three levels in terms of three “seeks”: to observe how the development of an objective contradiction results in new things under the changed condition and thus one single process is divided into different stages; to observe further the qualitative particularities of each side of the contradiction in each stage and their interactions; to observe comprehensively the possibilities of development of the object brought forth by the necessary movement caused by its inner contradictions, and to point out how these possibilities can be realized. These remarks are also consistent with Mao Zedong’s explanation in his On Contradiction of how to make “concrete analysis” of contradictions. (2) Ai Siqi’s Elaborations of Materialist Dialectics Ai Siqi’s elaborations of Marxist philosophy include the following major points. First, ideas on practice and people’s dynamic role. When explaining Marx’s view on practice as expressed in the latter’s Theses on Feuerbach, Ai Siqi says: Applying labor to a given object under a certain social condition in order to change the object and conquer it—that is what is called “the historical activity of humankind.” In terms of the difference between the subject and the object concretely manifested in “an objective activity,” humankind is the subject not only in the sense of the inner consciousness, but in the sense of a being who is acting against the object—this is the subject in the real sense. In their unity, the subject is not only different from the object abstractly, but in reality; there are contradictions and struggles between them. Upon the object the subject can actively exert effects, and impose its reshaping work. (Ai 2006, vol. 1, p. 230)

This is to regard human practice as a concrete, historical activity aimed to reshape the objective world, and the contradictory unity of the subject and the object on the basis of this activity as a dynamic and concrete process in which they interact with

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each other. Consequently, materialist dialectics not only affirms that “thinking is the reflection of the objective world,” but stresses the subject’s active role, for if there were no practical activities, if the subject could not actively reshape the object, no thinking could exist; even if thinking existed, no progress could be made. In this sense, we know that the subject is of equal importance. This idea on the relation between the subject and the object and that between being and consciousness, in Ai Siqi’s view, is not only a part of the dialectical and materialist theory of knowledge, but also a part of the Marxist conception of history. Like Li Da, Ai also emphasizes the dynamic theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality as the unity of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Second, ideas on the development of knowledge in the spiral form. The cognitive process, according to Ai Siqi, develops “from perceptual knowledge to rational knowledge, from rational knowledge to practice, from practice to a new form of perceptual knowledge, and from the latter to a new form of rational knowledge” (Ai 2006, vol. 1, p. 495). This process is cyclical and can repeat endlessly. Our knowledge improves with every cycle, and it follows an open-ended, endlessly increasing and spiral-like path. But while Li Da pays more attention to the development of truth on the basis of practice from concreteness to abstractness and again from abstractness to concreteness, Ai Siqi pays more attention to the practice-based progressive movement composed of the repeated circles of perceptual knowledge and rational knowledge. Later, on the basis of absorbing views from both of them, Mao Zedong makes a more comprehensive theoretical summary of the sequence of the movement of knowledge of human beings. Third, ideas on necessity, contingency, and freedom. These interrelated categories have been discussed during the “debate over science versus metaphysics.” They are also relevant to the struggle against right and left deviationist mistakes. According to Qu Qiubai’s historical determinism, contingency is subjective. Ai Siqi criticizes this “mechanism” and thinks that contingency is objective, and is not only “caused by outside elements,” but is also the manifestation of the inner movement of objects. “Contingency permeates everything in the internal changes of things. It is closely connected with necessity; or rather, everything’s necessity comes from a lot of contingent affairs” (Ai 2006, vol. 1, p. 580). This is Ai’s development of an idea of Engels in the latter’s Feuerbach and the End of German Classical Philosophy. Ai Siqi also elaborates Engels’s idea on the relation between freedom and necessity in the latter’s Anti-Dühring. Freedom in Spinoza’s sense, Ai Siqi thinks, has been “dissolved into necessity,” or reduced to mere knowledge of and conformity to necessity, and thus is not freedom in the real sense. Ai Siqi regards “freedom of will as the freedom of changing and conquering objects” (Ai 2006, vol. 1, p. 232). He points out: Necessity itself is contradictory. The progress of society is necessary, while in the process of progress there are conservative obstacles, which are also of inner necessity. If the necessity of progress does not succeed in overcoming this conservative necessity, progress cannot be realized. Herein lies the reason why people should make their own efforts. Hence we can see that freedom consists not in conforming to necessity, but in following necessity and

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overcoming the contradiction inherent in the system of necessity itself. (Ai 2006, vol. 1, p. 232)

To Ai Siqi’s mind, necessity contains contradictions in itself, so there is more than one possibility of development, and the progressive necessity and the conservative necessity (possibility) struggle with each other. Revolutionaries must exercise their active role, take advantage of suitable opportunities, create conditions according to laws, and try to realize those possibilities which are most favorable to progress. This is an idea of great importance in dialectical logic, which will be developed fully in the methodology of Mao Zedong’s On Protracted War. Li Da and Ai Siqi’s elaborations of materialist dialectics are all contributions to the Sinicization of Marxist philosophy. But their works, like those of other Chinese Marxists, are influenced by the rigid dogmatism of the Soviet Union, and therefore contain some one-sided theoretical views, such as refuting formal logic as metaphysics and exaggerating class struggle.

13.2 Xiong Shili: New Doctrine of Consciousness-Only Among non-Marxist philosophers in the 1930s, Xiong Shili was the first one who constructed his own philosophical system—the new doctrine of consciousness-only. Xiong Shili (1885–1968), originally named Jizhi, also named Shengheng, but best known as Zizhen, was a native of Huanggang, Hubei Province. In his early years, he took part in the Revolution of 1911 and the Campaign to Protect the Constitution. Later, he studied Buddhism and Confucianism, and lectured at the University of Beijing on his new doctrine of consciousness-only (新唯识论 xi wei zhi lun). His major works include New Doctrine of Consciousness-Only, Selected Teachings from Shili, and General Interpretations of Buddhist Concepts. The new doctrine of consciousness-only is a metaphysical system based on Eastern learning. Xiong Shili thinks that while the Western “scientific civilization relentlessly seeks outward,” and thus results in the tendency towards the self-destruction of humankind, “Eastern learning,” the essence of which consists in “returning to the origin, pursuing oneself, and adapting to human nature,” can remedy the maladies of Western civilization. Therefore, “I can do nothing but revive Eastern learning in order to rescue humankind” (Xiong 2001, vol. 4, p. 274). He calls for blending Chinese and Western philosophies on this basis. With this goal in his mind, he acquired comprehensive mastery of both Confucianism and Buddhism, and absorbed some elements from Bergson’s philosophy of life. Xiong Shili’s New Doctrine of Consciousness-Only (the version in classical Chinese) begins with the following remark: I am now constructing this doctrine in order to make clear to those who study metaphysics that substance is not an outside sphere apart from one’s mind, nor a sphere that can be grasped by knowledge; it can only be grasped by resorting to one’s intuition. (Xiong 2001, vol. 2, p. 10)

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This idea, being the central one of his New Doctrine of Consciousness-Only, is basically what was held by the School of Mind of Lu (Jiuyuan) and Wang (Shouren) as well as Buddhism. What is new about Xiong’s theory are his idea that “transformation consists in closing and opening” and his idea of “the unity of nature and cultivation” on the basis of the traditional idea of the unity of substance and function. (1) “Transformation Consists in Closing and Opening” On the subjectivist presupposition that “substance is one’s own mind,” by applying the idea of the “unity of substance and function,” and absorbing the idea from the Book of Changes that “transformation is composed of a moment called closing and a moment called opening” and Bergson’s philosophy of life, Xiong Shili advances his cosmological theory that “transformation consists in closing and opening” (翕辟 成变 xi pi cheng bian). The original substance of the universe, according to Xiong Shili, is both emptiness and its universal operation. In terms of the idea that “transformation consists in closing and opening,” Xiong explains his proposition that the universal operation of substance is the process in which it reveals itself as the objective world. He says: “Transformation is closing and opening. Its origin is a perpetual and unceasing movement” (Xiong 2001, vol. 2, p. 33). The process in which the substance reveals itself as a great function is an eternal flow and absolute movement in which a thing arises and then vanishes in the same instant, and different things succeed each other endlessly. This constant movement is not “directionless and baseless,” but contains a tendency towards “integration,” or positive consolidation, which is called “closing.” But the eternal movement by its nature is of absolute firmness; it “would not change itself to a process of closing,” but “operates in the midst of closing and shows its absolute firmness.” This strong, vigorous tendency which refuses to be materialized is called “opening.” He regards “closing” as a tendency to form physical things and “opening” as mind: “Mind and matter are constructed hypothetically on the basis of the universal operation in the forms of closing and opening” (Xiong 2001, vol. 3, p. 177). It is because the eternal movement of substance is composed of closing and opening that it reveals itself as matter and mind. These two are not separate things, but opposite things that are nevertheless complementary: “We regard the phenomena of matter and those of mind as two sides of the universal operation in which the substance reveals itself, therefore there is no distinction at all between mind and matter, for neither of them is a real thing” (Xiong 2001, vol. 3, p. 154). The only substance is the original mind, not the mind which is in contrast with matter. Phenomena of mind and phenomena of matter are only “constructed hypothetically” as “mind-dharma” and “rupadharma” (sense materials, sense data, senses); but the point is that “neither rupa nor mind are real” (Xiong 2001, vol. 2, p. 33). Though a philosophical fiction based on the subjectivist idealism that regards “substance as the original mind,” Xiong Shili’s cosmology of “transformation as consisting of closing and opening” contains some valuable elements. For one thing, Xiong explains the idea that “transformation consists of closing and opening” in

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terms of the law that two opposite things are complementary to each other; he thus explores the traditional, naïve dialectics of China. He says: “Transformation is a matter which is relative, living, of inner contradictions, and develops through contradictions […] Therefore transformation must follow the rule that two opposite things are complementary to each other” (Xiong 2001, vol. 3, p. 96). Closing and opening, in his view, are two opposite poles that are nevertheless inseparable from each other and comprise a wholeness with contradictions within itself, from which comes its development. That is why he says that “each function contains contradictions in itself;” moreover, “it is an integral whole, which is neither a whole without parts, nor a great mass of particles” (Xiong 2001, vol. 3, p. 249). This is to think that changes and developments come from contradictions inside objects, and consequently the origin of the world is not a pure “wholeness” without contradictions, nor a mass of separate particles. What is more important is that Xiong Shili’s proposition that “transformation consists in closing and opening” overcomes, to a certain degree, one of the limitations of the naïve dialectics in ancient China: the theory of cycles. He says: “The law of cycles and the law of evolution actually interact with each other and contain each other. It is decided by the Dao that two opposite things are complementary to each other” (Xiong 2001, vol. 4, p. 41). He explains the Dao that “two opposite things are complementary to each other” in terms of the fact that movement in cycles and evolution interact with each other and contain each other: Evolution contains cyclical movement; that is why, though all things change swiftly, there are still constant courses in these changes. Cyclical movement contains evolution, that is why, though all things move back and forth, they do not stick to their original states. (Xiong 2001, vol. 4, p. 42)

That is to say, evolution is a process in which things both repeat themselves in cycles and create new things endlessly, neither stick to their original situations nor lose their constant course; it is a spiral and upward movement in conformity with certain laws. This, obviously, is an idea of the modern theory of evolution. (2) “Nature and Cultivation Are Not Two Separate Things” Deriving his theory of human nature from “transformation consists of closing and opening,” Xiong Shili regards human nature as substance; its operation cannot but result in “closing to form physical things,” hence “a person’s material nature can be clear or blocked.” But however blocked a person’s nature may be, if one exercises one’s full mental force, “one’s physical nature can be transformed and will not block one’s real nature” (Xiong 2001, vol. 3, p. 489). This is “closing directed by opening.” On the basis of this theory of human nature, Xiong Shili discusses the problem in traditional philosophy of the relation between Heaven and humankind (or between human nature and habit/practice), and advances the theory that “nature and cultivation are not two separate things” (性修不二 xing xiu bu er). He says: It is because Heaven shares virtues with humankind that human nature and cultivation are not two separate things, and it is possible to develop one’s learning. It is said in The Book of Changes that what is continued is “good” and what is developed is “nature.” To cultivate

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oneself on the basis of one’s complete nature is called “continuation”; to cultivate completely one’s nature is called “development.” The original pure nature is the basis of learning, and it is up to people to clean up their habits later. Hence it is said: “Without Heaven, humankind cannot make efforts; without humankind, Heaven cannot realize itself”. (Xiong 2001, vol. 2, p. 144)

That is to say, Heaven (nature) and humankind (habit/practice), human nature and humans’ efforts to cultivate themselves are united. Without a naturally complete nature, people cannot do good; without people’s own efforts, their original nature cannot be fully developed, either. To Xiong’s view, therefore, to “develop one’s nature” is just to “restore one’s original nature.” In the history of ancient Chinese philosophy, most idealists think that one’s original nature is self-sufficient, and that the effort of learning and cultivation should be put to “restoring one’s original nature” or “recovering the original substance of one’s mind.” On the contrary, materialists hold that “nature is developed through practice,” that people are created by their environments and educations, and that their virtues are formed in the process of learning and cultivation. Later, Wang Shouren advances the idea that “the original nature exists where one makes efforts,” regarding “resuming one’s original nature” as a process unfolding along with one’s efforts; Wang Fuzhi advances the idea that “human nature renews and develops itself every day,” believing that the shaping of virtues is an ever-renewing process of the interactions between humans and nature. Xiong Shili’s theory that “nature and cultivation are not two different things” is, on the whole, a continuation of Wang Shouren and Wang Fuzhi’s ideas. He says: “It is a natural thing that humans are capable of doing something; it is nevertheless up to humans that they form habits.” Furthermore, One can do nothing with one’s nature, but one can do something with one’s habit; it is only in one’s efforts of improving and nourishing one’s clean habit that one’s natural abilities display themselves. That with which nothing can be done can be viewed as being something for which everything has been done, and the heavenly virtues can be shared when human efforts have been made to the maximum (Xiong 2001, vol. 2, p. 67). That is to say, we should pay attention to both “natural thing” and “human efforts,” and place emphasis on both “restoring one’s original nature” and the role played by “habit/practice”; we should constantly improve and nourish our pure habit/practice, overcome our polluted habit/practice, and fully exercise our natural abilities in order to arrive at the sphere of sharing virtues with Heaven and Earth. Thus, Xiong Shili combines to a certain degree the theory of “restoring one’s original nature” with the theory of “developing one’s nature.” In Xiong Shili’s theory, nature and cultivation are not two different things, and special emphasis is placed on the point that life is a process of continual creation. “Every day in one’s life,” he says, “is a day for creation; one should not stop for a single moment in which one creates nothing, neither should one cling to old without creating anything new” (Xiong 2001, vol. 2, p. 87). Although an ever-creating process, human life is a process in which people display their innate vitality: “Through exhausting one’s effort to create new things, one is still displaying what one has already acquired” (Xiong 2001, vol. 2, p. 88). In this sense, this is also a process of “restoring one’s original nature.” But he thinks that the goal of “restoring one’s original nature” cannot

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be reached by what the Neo-Confucians called the efforts of “subduction”, that is, efforts to “eliminate human desires.” He says: Most of the Confucians in the past exaggerated one’s nature, therefore their method is only subduction. […] They thought that nature would display itself if only the acquired contamination was totally eliminated; that is to say, they thought that nature is not created by humankind. But in my view, only by developing one’s ability can one’s nature be developed, and “developing” just means creation. (Xiong 2001, vol. 4, p. 492)

From what has been presented above, we can see that Xiong Shili strongly emphasizes humans’ active role, but he does not realize that all the abilities and virtues of a thinking being are fostered and developed through social practice, rather than resulting from the full development of one’s natural endowments. In advancing his propositions that “nature and cultivation are not two different things” and that “transformation consists in closing and opening,” Xiong Shili incorporates some ideas from Bergson’s “creative theory of evolution,” as he himself says that the philosophy of life in the West “has many insights that are comparable with the new doctrine of consciousness-only” (Xiong 2001, vol. 4, p. 10). At the same time, however, he criticizes Bergson’s voluntarism: “Bergson does not fully clarify intuition and frequently conflates it with instinct. Instinct is nothing but habit. […] Bergson is still confined to habits, and has not really witnessed his own nature. What he calls impulses to life are mere habits” (Xiong 2001, vol. 4, p. 440). In Xiong’s view: A philosopher must resort to his or her innate enlightened consciousness if he or she wants to witness truth. Only if the enlightened consciousness is aware of itself, of the oneness of the internal and external worlds, and of the inseparableness of subject and object, can truth be revealed and witnessed. (Xiong 2001, vol. 4, p. 199)

“Witnessing” refers here to awakening the enlightened consciousness inherent in reason, and intuiting the oneness of the self with Heaven and Earth. This is intuitionism rather than voluntarism. The will, according to Xiong Shili, is not blind impulse: “A will comes from the abyss of self-consciousness and self-enlightenment” (Xiong 2001, vol. 4, p. 133). A will coming from the self-consciousness of reason must be reasonable and not blind. From this idealist presupposition, Xiong Shili stresses the unity of wisdom with the will, and the principle of consciousness with the principle of voluntariness, and thus revives and modernizes the ideas of Mencius and Wang Shouren. When the Chinese fascists advocate “the philosophy of powerful action” and “the will to power,” Xiong Shili criticizes voluntarism and stresses that a voluntary action should come from one’s self-conscious original mind. This is no doubt of positive significance. His self-consciousness, however, refers to “resorting to one’s own enlightened consciousness,” which is based neither on scientific knowledge nor on social practice. He states: “Consciousness means being self-clarified, self-evident, and self-witnessed” (Xiong 2001, vol. 4, p. 97). This metaphysical consciousness, which does not adequately recognize the role of scientific knowledge in the cultivation of human virtues, is problematic. Xiong Shili’s new doctrine of consciousness-only is, on the whole, an idealist and metaphysical system. But in its propositions that “transformation consists in closing

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and opening” and that “nature and cultivation are not two different things,” there are some dialectical elements. Herein lies the major contribution Xiong makes to the exploration of the positive achievements of traditional Chinese philosophy.

13.3 Zhu Guangqian: An Aesthetic Theory of Expression Following Xiong Shili, Zhu Guangqian constructs his own system of aesthetics based on his comprehensive mastery of both Chinese and Western philosophies, which also belongs to voluntarism. Zhu Guangqian (1897–1986), called Mengshi, was a native of Tongcheng, Anhui Province. He graduated from the University of Hong Kong, studied in Britain and France, and then lectured at the University of Beijing and some other universities. Among his many works are Psychology of Tragedy, On Poetry, On Croce’s Philosophy, and History of Western Aesthetics. In the 1930s and 1940s, Zhu was a liberal, and thought that if we advocate “the freedom of thought and speech,” we should not demand “the unity of thinking,” “no matter whether it is demanded by the right wing or the left” (Zhu 1982, vol. 2, p. 497). This means that Zhu Guangqian disagrees both with cultural dictatorship and with the left-wing movement in academic circles. In aesthetics, he held a position of expressionism. In the 1950s, he was converted to Marxism. (1) An Analysis of Aesthetic Experience Heavily influenced by formalist aesthetics from Kant to Croce, Zhu Guangqian believes that some of the fundamental principles affirmed by the formalists are undeniably correct. For this reason, he analyzes aesthetic experience from the point of view of formalist aesthetics. He says: “We most frequently take the attitude traced back through Croce to Kant when we analyze the aesthetic experience” (Zhu 1989, vol. 1, p. 314). The major points of this attitude can be summarized in three points. First, he understands aesthetic experiences as formal intuition (Zhu 1989, vol. 1, p. 359). Second, he affirms that beauty consists not in objects nor in minds but in expression (Zhu 1989, vol. 1, p. 366). Third, he opposes the utilitarian attitude towards the arts, emphasizes formalism, denies arts as having any connection with morality, and regards both artistic creation and appreciation as “doing for nothing” (Zhu 1989, vol. 1, p. 357). Zhu Guangqian agrees to and accepts these points of the formalism and intuitionism represented by Croce. When he analyzes aesthetic experience, Zhu Guangqian says: In the aesthetic experience, it is through intuition rather than perception and concepts that the mind gets in touch with objects; it is the image of an object itself, rather than the terms relevant to it, such as substance, cause, utility, and value, that appears before one’s mind. (Zhu 1989, vol. 1, p. 209)

Intuition, according to Zhu, is just expression, and expression is just creation, art, and beauty. “Beautiful” (美 mei), he says, “is an adjective, which modifies ‘expression’ or ‘creation,’ two nouns derived from verbs rather than ‘mind’ or ‘matter’

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which are originally nouns” (Zhu 1989, vol. 1, p. 347). This means that, in theorizing aesthetic experience and beauty, Zhu Guangqian’s position, on the whole, is one of idealist expressionism. Nevertheless, Zhu Guangqian also criticizes the aesthetics of formalism from Kant to Croce. Croce’s theory, in Zhu’s view, has the shortcoming of being too partial; Bullough’s “psychical distance,” Zhu thinks, gives us a broader rule than “pure formal intuition” (Zhu 1989, vol. 2, p. 225). On the one hand, an aesthetic subject would “put objects out of step with the practical side of things and with our practical attitudes towards them,” and hold them aloof from the world. On the other hand, one would confirm what one sees in artistic works with one’s own experience. This gives rise to what Bullough calls the “antinomy of distance.” Consequently, the key to artistic creation and appreciation consists in properly dealing with the “antinomy of distance”: too great a distance would result in misunderstanding, and too small a distance would result in the overwhelming of aesthetic feeling by practical considerations. The best ideal in art is that “not too much and not too less” (Zhu 1989, vol. 1, p. 221). At the same time, Zhu Guangqian introduces some achievements in modern psychology, such as Lipps’s “empathy” and Groos’s “internal imitation,” in order to enrich formalist aesthetics. Zhu’s major accomplishment in this respect was to introduce Western aesthetics to Chinese academic circles. (2) Interpreting the Artistic Sphere in Terms of Expressionism Applying expressionism to the theory of artistic sphere, Zhu Guangqian, following Wang Guowei, furthers the communication between Western aesthetics and classical Chinese aesthetics. His ideas in this respect include the following: First, ideas on artistic spheres. Regarding poetic sphere Zhu Guangqian says: “The term ‘sphere,’ advocated by Wang Guowei, seems to be both comprehensive and concise” (Zhu 1989, vol. 3, p. 50). It is by following Wang’s approach that Zhu further explores the theory of artistic sphere. There are two elements in literature, according to Wang Guowei, namely emotion and scene. Similarly, Zhu says: “The sphere of each poem must contain the elements of feeling and image” (Zhu 1989, vol. 3, p. 50). “Feeling” and “image” refer respectively to emotion and scene, both of which are necessary in forming an artistic sphere. He says: Viewing attentively, one has in one’s mind only a whole and isolated image without comparison, analysis, or relevance. As a result, the self and the object are both forgotten and thus get combined into one. The feeling of the self and the image of the object communicate with each other, and human emotion and objective facts penetrate into each other. (Zhu 1989, vol. 3, p. 53)

This mutual penetration shows itself, first, in empathy, or “appreciating the objective facts in terms of human feeling”; second, in internal imitation, or “changing human feeling with objective facts.” The internal feeling and the external image combine with and influence each other. On the one hand, feeling varies with scenes, as described by the sentence that “I feel joyful and content at seeing fish swim and

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kites fly, and feel dejected and depressed at hearing the hujia [a reed instrument used by the tribes in ancient China] and an evening horn.”1 On the other hand, each scene varies with emotion, as described by the sentence “When one reluctantly parts from one’s friends, candles seem to be shedding tears; when one is in a good mood, the green hills seem to be nodding to one.” In a poetic or artistic sphere, in other words, emotions are expressed in images. The expressed is emotion, and the expression is image. A sphere is formed as the result of the mind’s synthesis (or intuition) and the merging of emotion and image into one. On the basis of the theory presented above, Zhu Guangqian divides the development of poetry in ancient China into three stages: First, feeling began mastering image; then it succeeded in mastering image; lastly, image arose splendidly as a selfsufficient sphere, and touched off a certain feeling. In the first stage, scene arose from emotion or artistic form arose from emotion; in the second stage, emotion became one with scene. In the third stage, emotion arose from scene or artistic form (Zhu 1989, vol. 3, p. 71). In Zhu Guangqian’s view, the period before the Han and Wei dynasties is the first stage; the period from Nineteen Ancient Poems (a book compiled in the Southern dynasty by Xiao Tong that was written in the late Eastern dynasty) to Tao Yuanming is the second period; and the third period begins in the Six Dynasties era. The key step in the transition from the second stage to the third is the appearance of fu (赋, prose interspersed with verse). This is a systematic sketch of the periods in which poetry developed in ancient China. Second, two ideals of life: classical and romantic. Applying expressionism to explaining poetic sphere, Zhu Guangqian observes the conflict between classicism and romanticism in terms of their relations with image and emotion. He says: “Classicists pay more attention to the completeness and elegance of image, while romanticists pay more attention to the naturalness of feeling. The former stresses form, the latter, content” (Zhu 1989, vol. 3, p. 64). This distinction is similar to Nietzsche’s distinction between Apollonian spirit and Dionysian spirit. Image, according to Zhu Guangqian, is the intuition of Apollo, whose spirit “brings forth epic, painting, and sculpture”; emotion is Dionysus’ activity, whose spirit “brings forth lyric poetry, music, and dance.” Furthermore, the distinction between these two spirits can be described as the distinctions between static and dynamic, between hot and cold, between imagination and feeling, and between intuition and activity. By their psychological constitutions, people tend either to the first type or to the second one (Zhu 1989, vol. 9, p. 249). He thinks that those who tend towards the Apollonian spirit create narrative poems and plastic arts, which are better for expressing the characteristics of classicism, whereas those who tend towards the Dionysian spirit create lyrics and music, which are better for expressing the romantic mentality. From these distinctions Zhu derives his idea about “two ideals of human life,” holding that the ideal of human

1

Translator’s note: The two instruments frequently appear in poems that depict the emotions of officers and soldiers on military campaigns at the frontier.

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life expressed by the arts consists in nothing more than two types of “watching” and “acting”: Those who act in plays experience the full impulse of life at the expense of the pleasure of pondering over it at length; those who see plays ponder over the image of life at the expense of the excitement of “being personally involved in the scene.” (Zhu 1989, vol. 9, p. 257)

“Acting” needs to be enthusiastic and dynamic, and in this sense it is an expression of Dionysian spirit; “watching” needs to be quiet and cold, and in this sense it is an expression of Apollonian spirit. It is difficult for one to enjoy both of them. On the basis of this idea, he discusses how literature and the arts in ancient China display the ideals of Confucianism and Daoism. He says: “Generally speaking, Confucians know how to see plays but pay more attention to acting, while Daoists totally despise acting, know how to see plays and unconsciously regard them as the ideal of life” (Zhu 1989, vol. 9, p. 258). To Zhu’s mind, “one’s ideal of life is determined by one’s character” (Zhu 1989, vol. 9, p. 258). Therefore one who is born to be a person who likes acting is inclined to Confucianism; one who is born to be a person who likes seeing plays is inclined to Daoism. At the same time, he warns against the tendency to exaggerate the distinction between these two types of ideals of life and personalities: “The first class works of arts and literature must be both classical and romantic, and must express rich emotion in perfect images” (Zhu 1989, vol. 9, p. 269). In terms of dramatic arts, “a good performance and a true appreciation both presuppose that one has both emotion and judgment, and is both involved and capable of viewing it from a distance” (Zhu 1989, vol. 2, p. 281). In the final analysis, all the arts, including lyric poetry and plastic arts, should aim at the correspondence between feeling and image, and the unity between “-acting” and “watching.” Third, “self-realization.” Zhu Guangqian’s ideas on poetry and the ideal of life led to his notion of “self.” He disagrees with Wang Guowei’s distinction between “spheres with a self” and “spheres without a self,” and thinks that, “strictly speaking, a poem of any sphere must contain a self, and be a reflection of the character, feeling, and experience of the self” (Zhu 1989, vol. 3, p. 60). People, though different from each other in whether their ideals of life consist in “acting” or “watching,” all seek “selfrealization.” He says: In acting in plays, one must be involved in them, and always resort to the self, so as to make the self the motivating axis of the mechanism, to give rise to changes in the world, and to realize the self in the process of giving rise to changes. In watching plays, one must be distanced from them, always place the “self” aside, and preserve the position of a viewer, so as to absorb all the changes in the world, to make them enjoyable pictures to view, and to realize one’s self in the process of enjoying the changing pictures. (Zhu 1989, vol. 9, p. 257)

In his early years, Zhu Guangqian, influenced by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson, thought that each person had “the will to life” or “vitality,” and that it was such vitality that motivated one’s life, which was actually the self-realization of vitality. “Delight,” according to him, “arises when vitality finds an appropriate means of expression. For this reason, any feeling, including a painful one, can give rise to happiness if it can be expressed freely.” (Zhu 1989, vol. 2, p. 373).

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From this point of view, he explains the delight caused by a tragedy: it is because a sense of vitality is aroused by a painful feeling expressed freely that one’s painful feeling is transformed into a delightful feeling; and the transformation is also made possible by the fact that the art of tragedy can “arouse pity and terror, and at the same time lead to their purification,” and because of the “formal beauty possessed by a tragedy as a form of art” (Zhu 1962, p. 19). Zhu Guangqian’s exploration of the delight caused by a tragedy is significant. But his explanation of the arts in terms of vitalism is idealist. From this idealist position, he opposes the materialist theory of reflection and the theory of “arts as the imitation of nature” first advanced by Aristotle. In Zhu’s view, to regard art as imitation, as naturalists and realists in the field of the arts do, is to reduce art to a mechanical copy of objects in the sense that the types that idealism attempts to grasp are most representative of objects. “In order to be clear on the true nature of arts,” says Zhu Guangqian, “we must refute first of all their method of mechanically copying” (Zhu 1989, vol. 2, p. 53). Thus, Zhu refutes both realism and idealism (in its original sense). Both the realist and idealist aesthetic theories in the West have undergone their own processes of development; the same is true with the theory of typification. But the main trend of Western aesthetics is the development of the theory of typical characters. Zhu Guangqian’s conception of arts as “self-realization” is not only divorced from realist presupposition, but also neglects the theory of typical characters. Zhu Guangqian’s theorizing on artistic spheres, on the whole, is deeper than Wang Guowei’s in that he makes a detailed analysis of the elements of feeling and image, and explains on this basis how images express ideals of life and personalities.

13.4 Jin Yuelin: “Applying What Is Attained from Experience to Experience––Realism-Based Unity of Perceptual and Rational Knowledge, and of Facts and Principles” Among all non-Marxist philosophers at that time, Jin Yuelin (Yueh-lin Chin) is one who deserves the greatest attention, because his “realism” is closest to materialism and he made original contributions to epistemology and logic. Jin Yuelin (1895–1984), called Longsun, was a native of Changsha, Hunan Province. After studying in the United States of America, he returned to China to teach philosophy and logic. His major works include A Theory of Knowledge, A Treatise on Dao, and Logic. In his paper entitled “Chinese Philosophy,” he compares the traditions of Chinese and Western philosophy, observing that while in the West ever since the Greeks there has been a highly-developed consciousness of logic and epistemology, in China this consciousness is undeveloped and Chinese philosophers do not wish to arrange their ideas into systematic treatises. This is one of the weaknesses of Chinese philosophy. At the same time, it is responsible for one of the strengths

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of Chinese philosophy, which is that its ideas are concise in expression and suggestive in meaning. Moreover, in the Chinese tradition, philosophy is closely connected with ethics, and a philosopher is likewise closely connected with his philosophical teachings: “All Chinese philosophers are somewhat like Socrates” (Jin 1995, vol. 2, p. 548). In the modern West, however, Socrates has long been gone. Applying his ideas on Chinese and Western philosophy in his own philosophical work, Jin did a lot to enhance the mutual understanding between these two philosophies in the fields of epistemology and ontology. In order to develop Chinese philosophers’ consciousness of logic and epistemology, he systematically introduces into China the formal logic of the West, especially Russell’s mathematical logic, makes a penetrating study on the Western epistemological tradition from Hume through Kant to Russell, and clarifies on a realist basis the unity between perceptual and rational knowledge and between facts and principles (theoretical knowledge). This, being one of Jin Yuelin’s major contributions to epistemology, represents the result of development of the tradition from Confucius, Mozi, Xunzi and the Chinese tradition up to Wang Fuzhi and Dao Zhen, which underlines that perceptual knowledge is integrated with rational knowledge and that facts are integrated with principles. In ontology, he revives the discussion on the relation between “principles” and “vital force,” which is neglected in modern times, and thus connects modern Chinese philosophy with traditional Chinese philosophy in this field. His works, both the A Treatise on Dao in the field of ontology or the A Theory of Knowledge in the field of epistemology, characterized by their application of the method of logical analysis to organize concepts into an orderly system, thus overcoming a weakness of traditional Chinese philosophy. (1) “The Given is the Manifestation of the Object” The main idea of his A Theory of Knowledge, Jin Yuelin claims, is “to apply what has been attained from experience to experience” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 608). This idea is based on his belief that sensations can give us objective reality. Can sensation give us objective reality? This problem has been debated for thousands of years in the history of philosophy, especially in the modern West. Philosophers from Berkeley, through Hume, Kant, Russell, up to the contemporary positivists, the starting point of whose theories of knowledge is “the subjective experience or experience of here and now,” all claim that sensation cannot give us objective reality. This “subjectivist approach,” Jin Yuelin thinks, has two weaknesses: “one is that it cannot attain genuine and common objectivity and truth,” and thus it necessarily leads to refuting objective truth; the other is that it cannot “infer” or “establish” “the existence of external object” from one’s subjective experience, and thus necessarily leads to denying any independently existing external objects (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 65). A theory of knowledge, according to Jin, should start with the unquestionable proposition that “there are independently existing external objects.” To his mind, this means, first of all, that we should admit the “sense of reality of objects”: objects exist independently of human knowledge of them; their properties are independent of

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human consciousness, although they are in the sphere of relations; objects have their own durable identities, that is, they remain in a relatively stable condition during a given period. This kind of realism, obviously, overcomes the limitations common to the positivist schools and is close to materialism. From the ideas presented above, Jin Yuelin advances his theory that “the given is the manifestation of the object.” The “given” refers to that which is given in experience such as shape, color, and sound; it is the manifestation of objective things in normal sensations, and thus becomes the basic materials of knowledge. He says: The given is the object or part of the object. The given plays a dual role: it is both content and object. In terms of content, it is a manifestation; in terms of object, it is an objective thing or part of the objective thing. The content and the object are identical as the given to a normal sensation. (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 117)

That is to say, in a normal sensation, what people sense as shape and sound are both the contents and the objects of their sensations, and are both manifestations and external objects. In this sense, in a normal sensation, “the given is the manifestation of an object.” To affirm that the content of a sensation is identical with the object of it is basically to affirm that sensations can give us objective reality. The explanation given by old materialists (that is, materialists before Marx) to the relation between manifestations and external objects is typically a “theory of causality” or “theory of representation,” asserting that the cause (external object) and the effect (manifestation), the representation (manifestation) and what is represented, are two separate items or individuals. This explanation was questioned by Berkeley and Hume: Since the manifestation and the object are two separate things, one being inside one’s consciousness and the other outside it, how can you prove that the sensation was caused by the external object rather than other causes? Or, how can you show us that ideas such as color and sound, as copies of the external object, are similar to their “originals”? Sensations, according to them, set a limit to human knowledge, which is illegitimate to surpass. Therefore, no direct relation can be established by experience between consciousness and objects. This approach of demarcation has always been taken by philosophers from Berkeley and Hume to modern positivists to call materialism into question. This theoretical difficulty caused by the old materialist disjunction between the manifestation (the content of the sensation) and external object (the object of sensation) into two separate items, and the barrier inserted between these two disjuncts, is overcome by Jin Yuelin with his theory of “the given as the manifestation of the object,” which asserts that the content of the sensation and the object of it are identical. The sensation, according to Jin’s theory, is not the obstacle separating the subject from the object; rather, it is precisely through sensation, which works as the bridge between the subject and the object, that the external object is continuously transformed into the content of experience. This theory of Jin’s, therefore, represents a significant advance over the old materialism and positivism. Of course, the Marxist notion of social practice was not available to him at that time, so he did not know that the reality of objects is first of all confirmed through practice, which is the typical

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form of sensory activity, and that it is in their practice of transforming reality that human beings attain their sensations of external objects. (2) The Dual Functions of Concepts in Relation to the Given Maintaining that a concept imposes two functions on the given, description and prescription (摹状 mo zhuang, 规律 gui lü), Jin Yuelin’s theory of concept makes quite clear the main idea of his Theory of Knowledge. Jin Yuelin says: “So-called knowledge consists in nothing but applying the ideas abstracted from the given to the given itself” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 165). That is to say, knowledge is just the concepts (or ideas) that have been abstracted from the given and can be applied in turn to the given. Being the results of human abstraction from concrete things, concepts nevertheless transcend the concrete and particular objects, and are universal. For this reason, an abstract concept has two functions in relation to the given: description and prescription. The “description,” according to Jin, “is to symbolically arrange that which is manifested in the given in an ideal scheme in order for the manifested to be preserved and conveyed” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 315). That is to say, the abstraction by which an idea comes from the given is just a sort of description of the given. For instance, we point to a dog and make a judgment that “that is a dog.” Here, the concept “dog” is an abstraction from what is manifested in the given, or a “symbolical arrangement” of the given, for any concept is an abstract symbol. Moreover, the concept “dog” is a conceptual scheme, because it is a structure related to concepts like “domestic animal” and “animal.” So when we make the judgment “that is a dog,” we are arranging “that,” which refers to what is manifested in the given, in the conceptual scheme “dog.” In this way, the “that” is described by “dog,” and thus can be preserved and conveyed. The “prescription,” according to Jin Yuelin, “is to wait for or receive a new given with a conceptual arrangement” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 322). Ideas, as “patterns of receiving,” are abstract, while the given that is to be received is concrete and particular. Prescribing reality has something in common with applying laws or other regulations. Take, for example, the law that stipulates those who murder a person will be sentenced to death. What the law prescribes is not a certain action of humankind, but a certain way to deal with a certain action of humankind: if there is a murder, then a death sentence should be applied to deal with it. In a similar way, the function of the prescription of an idea “is not to prescribe how the given should manifest the object, but to prescribe how we should receive that which is manifested in the given” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 323). Description and prescription, in Jin Yuelin’s view, cannot be separated from each other. When applying a concept (idea) to the given, we are both describing and prescribing it. As far as communication of meaning is concerned, a prescription without description would feel too abstract for people to understand what is being prescribed. Then the audience would ask for an example. To give an example is just to give a description. On the other hand, a description without prescription would make it difficult to express something clearly, because only if one manages to make

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use of a concept as a pattern of receiving is one able to describe an object with this concept. Neither of the two functions of concepts, therefore, can be neglected. According to Jin Yuelin, the process of applying the idea derived from the given to prescribe and describe the given itself, or the process of applying the Dao derived from the given to the given itself, is, from the perspective of the object, a process of turning the given into facts and, from the perspective of the subject, a process in which the subject comes to be conscious of a fact. In this sense, the given does not change itself as the given, although the concept maintains a dual relation to it, that is, description and prescription. Jin Yuelin’s theory of the two-fold function of concept is the result of his penetrating criticism of Hume and Kant. He criticizes Hume for his “negation of abstract ideas” (Jin 1995, vol. 2, p. 145). Regarding a concept as an image describing a certain concrete object, rather than an idea coming from abstraction, Hume denies that concepts, which are meant to grasp the common nature of the objects of a common type, have the universal force of prescription towards these objects. On the other hand, Kant argues that knowledge arises only when sensitivity is combined with understanding and intuition is combined with concepts, maintaining that these two sides have two different origins, one being sensation, the other being a priori principles. Jin Yuelin also criticizes Kant for his apriorism, which attributes concepts (categories) to a priori human reason (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 412). By explicating the proposition that cognitive experience is a process of applying what has been derived (through abstraction) from the given to the given itself, Jin Yuelin answers the question of the relation between sensation and concepts in a relatively dialectical way. Jin’s theory, of course, has not reached the level of dialectics in its full sense. He admits only “abstract concepts,” but not dialectical “concrete concepts.” Consequently, an important stage in the cognitive process, that from the abstract to the concrete, is not included in his account. (3) The Necessary Conditions of Cognitive Experience: Logic and the Principle of Induction The reason why it is possible to have scientific knowledge that is both universal and necessary, according to Jin Yuelin, is that, first, thinking is governed by logic, and second, the principle of induction is eternally true. “Logical propositions,” says Jin Yuelin, “are the basic principles for description and prescription. […] The description of description and the prescription of prescription … and the precondition under which alone an idea can become a pattern of receiving” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 362). That is to say, though logical propositions themselves state nothing about facts, any concept or conceptual structure, in order to become a pattern of receiving and to play the role of description and prescription of reality, must conform to formal logic. For this reason, he refers to the principles of formal logic, the principle of identity, that of the excluded middle, and that of contradiction, as “the principles of thinking,” and makes an in-depth inquiry into their nature. As to the law of identity, Jin says: “Among the three principles of thinking, the principle of identity is really a fundamental one. […] It is the most fundamental

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precondition for the possibility of meaning” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 367). He thinks that if the principle of identity is violated, a concept would lack a definite meaning and no thinking is possible. The principle does not assert that one thing should always be the same; objective things, actually, are always in the process of change. But the concept “change” also conforms to the law of identity. As to the law of the excluded middle, Jin writes: “The law of the excluded middle is like a pair of scissors which cuts the possibility of a given thing into two” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 368). Of any given thing, it is always possible to say that it is either A or non-A; in this sense, the law of the excluded middle reveals the nature of “logical necessity.” The necessity referred to here is one understood from the perspective of formal logic, namely, the exhaustion of all possibilities. The nature of the law of the excluded middle, therefore, lies in the disjunctively exhausted possibilities, the result of which is necessity. Of the law of contradiction, Jin Yuelin says: “The limit of thinking is contradiction; that is to say, that which is contradictory is inconceivable” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 368). The content of contradictory thinking cannot become a structure, therefore only contradictionfree conceptual structures can become patterns of receiving. To sum up, Jin Yuelin defines the nature of the fundamental laws of formal logic in this way: “Identity is the condition of meaning, necessity is that which is accepted by logic, while contradiction is that which is rejected by logic” (Jin 1995, vol. 1, p. 871). It is only because of the above-mentioned nature of the fundamental laws of formal logic that logic is “the fundamental condition any idea must conform to,” in addition to providing “the basic principles of description and prescription.” Therefore, when we apply concepts to describe and prescribe the given, “it is out of the question for the given to manifest anything violating logic. That is to say, it is always possible for us to apply our patterns of receiving” (Jin 1995, vol. 1, p. 413). At the same time, in terms of the relation between logic and science, logic, “on the one hand, excludes those ideas that run counter to its standard, but, on the other hand, works as the tool for organizing any other system, since it supplies the standard for making choices” (Jin 1995, vol. 1, p. 872). Any branch of knowledge, if it is to be systematized at all, must follow logic; in this sense, to any science logic is important as a methodology. In order to make a choice among propositions in various sciences, of course, we also need other standards than logical ones. And among these non-logical standards, according to Jin, the most important is induction. He advocates the thesis that “the principle of induction is the chief principle of receiving the given.” He says: After we get an idea from the given, we can receive the given with this idea. In this process of accepting and responding to what is given, we are consistently applying the principle of induction. […] Whenever we make classification in light of a sample, we are applying the principle of induction. In this sense, when applying ideas one is at the same time applying the principle of induction. (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 406)

Induction consists in drawing a general conclusion from a set of data, and to go further to verify or falsify the conclusion with new data. Therefore, induction consists in the taking of data as the sample of a “class,” and the subsumption of new data into this “class.” This is precisely the process we employ in using concepts. In his Theory of Knowledge and Treatise on Dao, Jin Yuelin justifies in detail the unfalsifiability

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of the principle of induction. Unless time ended and experience stood still, he says, the principle of induction could never be falsified. But “we will never experience the end of time, nor will we experience the falsification of the principle of induction.” (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 407). Jin Yuelin’s discussion of the principle of induction is full of thought-provoking ideas, but, in my view, while it is true that the chief principle of receiving the given includes induction, it does not need to confine itself to induction. It is clear that the process of prescribing facts with concepts is also a process of deduction from the general to the particular. The process in which one applies the concepts derived from the given to the given itself, or as a pattern of receiving to the given, actually contains the dialectical process of combining analysis with synthesis and combining induction with deduction in a small but complete way. When talking about the scientific method, Jin says: The so-called scientific method consists precisely in receiving nature with the laws of nature, or inquiring into nature with the laws of nature as a tool or instrument. […] To apply the laws of nature as a tool is to apply the principles backing the methods applied in experiments and observations. (Jin 1995, vol. 3, p. 450)

Here, Jin is discussing the basic principle of methodology: to apply the laws of nature as patterns of receiving in experiments and observations, or to apply the “principle” of natural processes to these processes themselves, and thus to turn the scientific theories into method. Such a scientific methodology is essentially dialectical, and is not confined to induction. And such a dialectical methodological principle is embodied in the everyday experience of applying the ideas derived from the given to the given in embryonic form. In this sense, we should say that both formal logic and dialectics are necessary conditions for cognitive experience. Although Jin Yuelin’s discussion on the fundamental principles of scientific methodology refers implicitly to dialectical logic, the only logic he explicitly acknowledged at that time was deductive logic or formal logic. Jin Yuelin also refers to logic as the a priori principle, holding that although logic says nothing concerning facts, it can never be violated in all conceivable worlds. In contrast, he refers to the principle of induction as a transcendental principle, because no experience can violate it at all. He justifies both the a priori principle and the transcendental principle in ontological terms: in his Treatise on Dao, “the origin of logic” is “Form,” while the transcendental principle can be traced back to the fact that “Stuff is either in or out (of Form).” Thus, Jin’s philosophy has led to an apriorist metaphysics. (4) “According to Dao, Everything Is in Form and Motivated by Stuff” Jin Yuelin’s Treatise on Dao is intended to discuss the Dao of Nature, or ontology. The first proposition of the first chapter of this book is “Dao is Form-Stuff,” and the last one is that “According to Dao, everything is in form and motivated by Stuff.” His “Dao,” therefore, is the unity of “form” and “Stuff.” Roughly speaking, Jin’s “form” amounts to Zhu Xi’s li (principle), or Aristotle’s “form,” and his “Stuff” amounts to Zhu Xi’s qi (vital force) or Aristotle’s “matter.” After being obscured for a long

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period in modern times, the debate concerning the relation between principle and vital force (理气 li qi) in traditional Chinese philosophy was revived by Jin Yuelin and Feng Youlan, who discuss this problem in new ways. Jin’s Form and Stuff are based on modern science, and thus are considerably different from the principle and vital force of philosophers in the Song and Ming dynasties. Jin Yuelin says: “Form is the disjunctively exhausted possibilities” (Jin 1995, vol. 2, p. 161). Here, the term “possibility” refers to whatever is contradiction-free in the logical sense, including all real universals and unreal concepts. Form is acquired through “inclusively arranging all possibilities.” Thus, Jin has gotten the idea of “form” from mathematical logic. “Stuff,” on the other hand, refers to pure matter. According to Jin, both the changes experienced by macro objects and the transformation undergone by micro particles are actually changes in Stuff. Being in constant movement, Stuff cannot be comprehended by sensations and concepts. Holding that “Form is eternally static and Stuff is eternally dynamic,” Jin Yuelin regards Stuff rather than Form as the “efficient cause,” thus differentiating himself from Aristotle, who regards form instead of “matter” as the efficient cause. Jin’s idea of “Stuff” is closer to the idea of vital force (气 qi) in traditional Chinese philosophy. Another important idea of Jin’s is that “Stuff can neither be created nor destroyed, is neither new nor old, can neither be increased nor decreased,” which he relates to the principle of the “indestructibility of matter-energy.” This means that his idea of Stuff is also a result of his attempt to generalize philosophically the modern scientific theory of the conservation of matter-energy. At the same time, Jin connects Stuff with “possibility”: “So-called possibility means a ‘frame’ or ‘pattern’ in which ‘Stuff’ may or may not exist” (Jin 1995, vol. 2, p. 160). The movement of Stuff is nothing but the constant coming in and going out of a “possibility”: the Stuff coming in or going out of a “possibility” is just a particular thing coming into being or passing away. Because the Form contains all possibilities, the Stuff is always inside the Form, although it may or may not be situated within a particular possibility. “There is no Form separated from Stuff, nor is there Stuff separated from Form.” Form and Stuff cannot be separated from each other, and “it is according to Dao that everything is in the Form and motivated by Stuff” (Jin 1995, vol. 2, p. 177). Jin Yuelin discusses the coming to being of the world of realities in terms of the “realization of possibilities” and “individualization of the realities,” holding that in the never-ending process of reality we may find both the relatedness of universals and the creation and destruction of particulars. The relatedness of universals constitutes the principle of reality, while the creation and destruction of particulars constitutes what he calls “tendency.” He says: “In terms of the change of an individual, its principle is changeless, while its tendency is not inevitable” (Jin 1995, vol. 2, p. 318). According to traditional Chinese philosophy, “any particular thing’s principle is changeless and its tendency is inevitable,” and “principles exist where tendencies are inevitable,” meaning that in the development of realities there are inevitable tendencies, in which laws of the reality are manifested. The meaning of the term tendency (势 shi) in Jin’s philosophy, however, is different from the meaning of the same term in traditional Chinese philosophy. By his proposition that “its tendency is not

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inevitable,” he means that there are contingent elements in the creation and destruction of individuals. This “contingency” should not be understood as unintelligibility. In terms of principle (the relatedness of universals), “it is always possible for us to understand a particular thing’s principle (whether we actually succeed in this is another matter), no matter how it changes.” In terms of tendency (the creation and destruction of the particulars), however, “no matter how we try to understand, we cannot completely control the individual’s change” (Jin 1995, vol. 2, p. 288). That is because the creation and destruction of individuals are “uncertain processes” in the sense that we cannot completely know their history in the past, neither can we predict and decide what kind of particulars would emerge in the future. It is in this sense that Jin says “a thing’s tendency is not inevitable.” But he adds: Though not inevitable, a tendency has something as its basis. When a tendency is not realized, we do not know where it goes; when it is realized, however, it is always possible for us to understand it. An unrealized tendency is not inevitable; when a tendency is realized, it has been realized according to principles. (Jin 1995, vol. 2, p. 323)

In this way, Jin Yuelin acknowledges both that reality changes according to objective laws, because the world is a rational one, and that there are “indeterminable” elements in the process of reality. This point of view is basically correct and helpful to the further project of understanding relations between necessity and contingency, between contingency and freedom, and between rationality and irrationality. The topic of the last chapter of A Treatise on Dao is “From the Ultimate of Nonbeing to the Great Ultimate.” Dao, according to Jin, exists without beginning and end. Though it does not have a beginning, we can trace it backwards infinitely into the past, and call the limit in this direction the “the Ultimate of Non-being” (无极 wu ji).Though it has no end, we can follow its forward trajectory infinitely into the future, and call the limit in this direction “the Great Ultimate” (太极 tai ji). While “the Ultimate of Non-being” refers to a state of chaos from which Heaven, Earth, and everything else between them come, “the Great Ultimate” refers to an ideal situation of “ultimate truth, goodness, beauty, and freedom.” “Dao,” he says, “consists of the process from the Ultimate of Non-being to the Great Ultimate” (Jin 1995, vol. 2, p. 335). By this process, he means both the direction and the end and value towards which the current of the universe or the evolution of nature is heading. Jin Yuelin holds that everything in the world seeks to exhaust its nature by its manifestations, realize its substance by its functions, and conform to its principles by its tendency. The ultimate goal of the world is “ultimate truth, goodness, beauty, and freedom,” namely, the “Great Ultimate,” in which “nothing is contrary to other things and everything is in order; all principles are realized and all tendencies have converged.” This is, of course, a metaphysical and teleological conception of the universe. His “Form” is the disjunctively exhausted possibilities, that is, the result of metaphysicalization of “necessity” in formal logic’s sense. His “Stuff,” supposed to be incomprehensible to humankind through sensations and concepts, betrays the agnostic element in his philosophy. For all this, however, Jin Yuelin’s original contributions to epistemology and logic are indelible.

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13.5 Feng Youlan: “The New Rational Philosophy” Like Jin Yuelin, Feng Youlan also places great emphasis on logical analysis. He calls his philosophy “the new rational philosophy,” (or new learning of principle, 新理学 xin li xue) which highlights its relationship to the Neo-Confucianism of the ChengZhu School, whose name can be translated as “the School of Rational Philosophy” (or learning of principle, 理学, li xue). Feng Youlan (1894–1990), called Zhisheng, was a native of Tanghe, Henan Province. Graduating from the University of Beijing in 1918, he then studied in the United States of America and obtained his Ph.D. After coming back to China, he worked as a professor at the Tsinghua University and at the Southwest Associated University. His “new rational philosophy” is composed of six books written during the Sino-Japanese War, namely The New Rational Philosophy, China’s Road to Freedom, A New Treatise on the Way of Life, A New Treatise on the Nature of Man, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, and A New Treatise on the Methodology of Metaphysics. On the debate over Chinese learning versus Western learning, Feng Youlan prefers the Westernizers’ doctrine of “Chinese learning as the substance and Western learning as the function.” At the same time, he claims that his idea of “Chinese learning as the substance and Western learning as the function” is different from the Westernizers’ idea of “Confucian classics as the substance and Western technique as the function” in that “what is readily available in China is our own morality for organizing society, and what should be added is Western knowledge, technology, and industry” (Feng 2001, vol. 4, p. 332). It is in line with this type of the doctrine of “Chinese learning as the substance and Western learning as the function” that Feng Youlan developed his “new rational philosophy” aimed at combining Chinese and Western philosophy: inheriting the idealist tradition from Confucius, Mencius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, the Logicians in the pre-Qin period through Dong Zhongshu in the Han dynasty, Metaphysicians in the Wei and Jin dynasties, Zen Buddhists in the Tang dynasty, and the Neo-Confucians of the School of Cheng-Zhu in the Song dynasty, giving it a new form by reinterpreting it in the perspective of neorealism and logical positivism from the West. (1) “A Most Philosophical Metaphysics” Feng Youlan regards his “new rational philosophy” as “a most philosophical metaphysics” that is a continuation of the tradition of the Neo-Confucianism of the School of Cheng-Zhu. Feng’s philosophy can be presented from the following three perspectives. First, the basic concepts of “the new rational philosophy”: principle, vital force, the substance of Dao (道体 dao ti), and the great whole (大全 da quan). Feng Youlan agrees with Zhu Xi in holding that any actual thing is composed of principle and vital force. “Everything that actually exists,” he says, “owes its existence to two things: that according to which it exists and that by which it exists” (Feng 2001, vol. 4, p. 43). That according to which an actual thing exists is principle,

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or Plato’s idea and Aristotle’s form; that by which a thing exists is vital force, or matter. While principle, according to which a thing exists, is abstract, and in this sense is a metaphysical Dao, an actual thing is concrete, and in this sense is a physical instrument. Feng makes his analysis of vital force, by which a thing exists, in Aristotle’s terminology. Matter, Feng argues, may be absolute or relative. Bricks and tiles, for example, are materials for building, and thus are those by which a house exists. Bricks and tiles are made from earth, so compared with earth they are particular things rather than mere materials, but compared with a house, they are only materials. That is the relativity of matter. When we remove the nature of bricks and tiles, they will cease to be bricks and tiles but only earth; when we remove the nature of earth, earth will no longer be earth. If we continue this process of removing ad infinitum, we will arrive at a level where nothing can be removed, then we will get absolute matter. Feng calls this absolute matter “the vital force of the true source” ( 真元之气 zhen yuan si qi), which is “ineffable and inconceivable.” The whole of “principles” are called by Feng “the realm of reality,” which amounts to Plato’s world of ideas or the Great Ultimate in Zhu Xi’s philosophy. The realm of actuality, Feng holds, implies the realm of reality, meaning that the existence of a particular kind of thing presupposes the existence of a corresponding principle, but no principle has to be actualized in any concrete thing. In this sense, he says that, logically speaking, “principle exists prior to its actual occurrence” (Feng 2001, vol. 4, p. 43). Feng thinks that since the “vital force of the true source” is formless, it can be termed as “the Ultimate of Non-being” (无极 wuji), and the whole of all principles can be termed as “the Great Ultimate” (太极 taiji). The world of actualities, being composed of all procedures from vital force to principle, can be understood as “the process from the Ultimate of Non-being to the Great Ultimate” (无极而太极 wu ji er tai ji). “In terms of ‘the process from the Ultimate of Non-being to the Great Ultimate’,” he writes, “the Great Ultimate is the substance, ‘to’ refers to the function which includes particular functions, so it is the whole of great function” (Feng 2001, vol. 4, p. 63). The operation of the great function (大用 da yong) is the “substance of Dao” (道体 dao ti). He concludes: The Ultimate of Non-being, the Great Ultimate, and the process from the Ultimate of Nonbeing to the Great Ultimate are, in other words, the vital force of the true source, the totality of principles, and the entire process from vital force to principle, respectively. Collectively speaking, they are called Dao. (Feng 2001, vol. 4, p. 63)

Viewed in terms of the movement of all things, it is called Dao; viewed in terms of the stillness of all things, it is called “universe” or “the great whole.” The great whole is also ineffable and inconceivable. The “new rational philosophy” composed of these four major ideas is a metaphysical system of objective idealism. Second, the methodology of metaphysics. “The task of the new rational philosophy,” Feng says, “is to reconstruct metaphysics after we have experienced the empiricism of the Vienna Circle” (Feng 2001,

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vol. 5, p. 194). According to the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, metaphysical propositions, though synthetic, cannot be verified in experience and are therefore meaningless pseudo-propositions that should be eliminated. In contrast, Feng Youlan holds that it is precisely through the empiricism of the Vienna Circle that he has found a method for metaphysics. In his philosophy, Feng Youlan points out, there are only four sets of metaphysical propositions, respectively denoting the ideas of principle, vital force, substance of Dao, and the great whole. These four ideas are nothing but the formal explanations of experience. He says: Something exists. We make a formal analysis of something and its existence and thus acquire the ideas of principle and vital force; we make a formal synthesis of something’s existence, and thus acquire the idea of “great whole” and “the substance of Dao.” This analysis and this synthesis are formal interpretations of actuality or experience. (Feng 2001, vol. 5, p. 195)

Since these four metaphysical ideas are only formal interpretations of actuality and say nothing particular concerning it, they cannot be falsified by it. Feng calls this metaphysical method the method of “burning the bridge after crossing the river.” He acquires the concepts of “form” and “matter” from his analysis of empirical or factual propositions, metaphysicalizes them respectively into “the realm of reality” (the world of principle) and “the vital force of true source” (absolute matter), and goes further by “burning the bridge after crossing the river” to eliminate the last remaining empirical elements, so as to combine “principle,” “vital force,” and the “substance of Dao” into the “great whole.” To turn the ideas abstracted from experience into absolute and metaphysical ideas with no actual implications is to follow the way of old metaphysicians. He refers to this method of logical analysis as a “positive method.” Later, he thinks that the “negative method,” such as that used by Daoists and Zen Buddhists, is even more important than the positive one. “A perfect metaphysical system,” he says, “should start with the positive method and end with the negative one. If it does not end with the negative method, it fails to reach the final climax of philosophy” (Feng 1958, 342). This negative method, he thinks, is just that of mysticism. Thus, Feng Youlan’s methodology of metaphysics starts with logical analysis and ends with mysticism. Third, logical analysis of some categories in traditional Chinese philosophy. Since Feng Youlan’s “new rational philosophy” takes the transcendental “realm of reality” as the substance, it faces the serious problem of how to bridge the gaps between the transcendental and the empirical and between the realm of reality and that of actuality (the actual world). The real contribution made by the “new rational philosophy” is that it applies the method of logical analysis to Chinese philosophy, and thus carries forward the rational spirit embodied in traditional Chinese philosophy. Many scholars after Yan Fu pointed out that the terms of traditional Chinese philosophy lack clarity. Feng Youlan claims that “the philosophical concepts of China will be clarified with the help of European logic and clear thinking” (Feng 2001, vol. 11, p. 270). He himself did a great deal to clarify Chinese philosophical concepts with the method of logical analysis introduced from the West.

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For example, the word qi (气), translated in the present book as “vital force,” is very ambiguous, as Yan Fu pointed out. Feng Youlan makes the following further attempts to clarify the term. (i) He believes that “absolute matter, which we term as the ‘qi [vital force] of true source,’ is something called qi for short.” This concept in his “new rational philosophy” is nothing but a logical concept, whose referent is indescribable. So qi in this sense should be regarded as a proper name. (ii) He thinks that qi in Cheng-Zhu’s philosophy means matter, but “is not yet a logical idea in the full sense,” because they often talk about “clear qi” or “turbid qi,” while “the so-called qi which is clear or turbid cannot be qi, but something in which qi exists according to the principles of clarity or turbidity.” (iii) He states that qi in the work of qi-monists and materialists such as Zhang Zai refers to an actual thing, for they “think that this or that particular thing’s construction or destruction is the result of the accumulating or dissolving of qi.” But this is “a totally scientific concept” (Feng 2001, vol. 4, pp. 44–45). (iv) He believes that what is called by Mencius as “the noble qi” is, like “courageous qi” or “militant qi,” all of which are of the same kind, some sort of mental state (Feng 2001, vol. 5, p. 20). Another example is Dao. On the basis of his analysis, Feng points out that the term Dao has six meanings. (i) The original meaning of Dao is “road” or “way,” and its derivative meaning is “the road which one should follow in one’s moral behavior.” (ii) Sometimes it is used to refer to the truth or the ultimate truth. For instance, Confucius says that “if you have learnt about the Dao in the morning, you may let yourself die that same evening [without regret].” (iii) Dao for Daoists is shapeless and nameless, and so it is like qi in the sense of the “qi of true source” in the “new rational philosophy.” But the Dao in Daoism can, by itself alone, produce everything, while what we call “qi of true source” cannot be actualized without a principle to follow. (iv) In the “new rational philosophy,” the whole composed of the qi of true source, all principles, and all processes from qi to principle, is termed “Dao,” which refers to the dynamic universe. (v) In “the process from the Ultimate of Non-being to the Great Ultimate”, the “to” is also viewed as Dao. It is the Dao of the NeoConfucians of the Song dynasty. (vi) “Dao” or “Dao of Heaven/Nature” is merely the “principle of Heaven,” that is, the “principle according to which all things in the universe change themselves.” In this sense, Zhu Xi says: “That which exists before physical form is called Dao” (Feng 2001, vol. 4, pp. 43–46). Feng Youlan, in short, tries to clarify the senses in which terms like qi and Dao are used by different schools of philosophy, on the one hand, and to define precisely the meanings of these terms in his own “new rational philosophy,” on the other. In this way, he “clarifies” many important categories in traditional Chinese philosophy, and contributes to the modernization of Chinese philosophy. (2) The Doctrine of Spheres of Living Though his “new rational philosophy” says nothing concerning actuality, Feng Youlan remarks, it has the “great function” of leading people into the sphere of the sages. The basis on which Feng constructs his doctrine of spheres of living is the notion of “understanding and self-consciousness” (觉解 jue jie). He writes: “Human beings

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are different from animals and their lives are different from animals’ in that human life is one of understanding and self-consciousness or of a relatively high level of understanding and self-consciousness” (Feng 2001, vol. 4, p. 472). To possess “understanding and self-consciousness,” one must, first, understand what one is doing (解 jie); and, second, do it self-consciously (觉 jue). To understand something selfconsciously is what we mean by “understanding and self-consciousness,” which, in Feng’s opinion, comes from the “knowing and conscious spirit” of human beings. Without the “knowing and conscious spirit” innate in the human mind, the existence of the universe and human beings would be completely meaningless. Moreover, Feng Youlan points out that while different people may do the same thing, in light of their respective levels of understanding and self-consciousness, this thing and the universe as a whole may have different meanings to them. These people are in different spheres of living. There are, according to Feng, four spheres of living: the natural or innocent sphere, the utilitarian sphere, the moral sphere, and the transcendent sphere. A person in the natural sphere does things almost out of instinct and habit, and rarely with self-consciousness. A person in the utilitarian sphere does things “for his or her own benefit,” that is, out of understanding and self-consciousness of his or her own interests. A person in the moral sphere “does what is just” and “aims to fulfill his or her responsibility.” That is to say, these people follow normative rules in their ethical relations and in their social roles; out of their understanding and self-consciousness of moral norms they fulfill their obligations without considering practical gains or losses. Finally, people in the transcendent sphere identify with the great whole. This highest, sagely sphere is conceived in terms of the four main ideas of the “new rational philosophy”: on the basis of the ideas of principle and vital force, “one’s mind soars to the origin of all things”; on the basis of the ideas of the great whole and the substance of Dao, “one’s mind soars to the whole of all things.” Thus, people can arrive at the highest sphere of living in which they know Heaven/Nature, serve Heaven/Nature, are happy with Heaven/Nature, and identify with Heaven/Nature. In ancient China, Confucians argued repeatedly that moral actions are actions performed as a result of understanding and self-consciousness; only when one understands moral values and follows moral rules self-consciously in one’s actions can one’s actions be counted as moral ones. Therefore, the same action can have different significance to two people if one person’s action reflects his or her rational consciousness and the other’s does not, that is, if they are out of different mental spheres. Inheriting and continuing the Confucian tradition of stressing rational spirit and the principle of consciousness, Feng Youlan’s philosophy had positive significance during a period in which fascists in China were agitating for voluntarism. Moreover, from a dialectical point of view, the elevation of one’s mental sphere and the formation of one’s moral character require a process from being-in-itself to beingfor-itself and from spontaneity to self-consciousness. One’s moral consciousness starts with the state of being-in-itself, then becomes a conscious conception of life through resolving correctly the problems of the relation between righteousness and profit and between group and individual, and further progresses towards a scientific

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worldview. Feng Youlan’s doctrine of spheres of living touches upon some basic problems in this process and, therefore, merits the attention of later generations. Inquiring into understanding and self-consciousness apart from social practice, however, Feng Youlan’s doctrine of spheres of living inherits, in fact, the NeoConfucian tradition of the empty talk about mind, nature, and cultivation in order to arrive at a “fulfilling and enjoyable” sphere. At the same time, he overemphasizes the principle of consciousness at the expense of the principle of voluntariness, and thus inherits the fatalist tradition of orthodox Confucianism. On the problems of the relation between righteousness and profit and the relation between group and individual, Feng agrees with the opinions of orthodox Confucianism: “The distinction between righteousness and profit is merely the distinction between public-mindedness and selfishness” (Feng 2001, vol. 4, p. 550). He not only, from the non-utilitarian position, plays down human desires, but also advocates the submission of “one’s mind to destiny (命 ming),” leaving no roles for the principle of voluntariness in moral action. There are two kinds of destiny, according to Feng Youlan, one of which means “mandate,” as is shown in the proposition “what the Mandate of Heaven confers is called nature,” while the other means “destiny.” From his point of view, principle endows everything with its nature, which is the Mandate of Heaven: People cannot act against the Mandate of Heaven; they can only know it, and consciously follow it in their actions. In terms of human action, “actions of a member of a society, whatever the society may be, are moral if they conform to the rules decided by the principle of the society, and they are immoral if they do not” (Feng 2001, vol. 3, p. 104). In this sense, people can only conform to the Mandate of Heaven, follow given rules, and fulfill the obligations connected to their roles. Ming in the sense of destiny, on the other hand, refers to contingent events that one may experience. With this kind of “unpredictable happenings in one’s life,” one can only “be content with it since one can never know how to change it” (Feng 2001, vol. 3, p. 600). People would have to conform to Ming in both senses consciously: “Ming is what people can only follow but not challenge” (Feng 2001, vol. 3, p. 601). This is a new version of the traditional fatalism of ancient China. Some of Feng Youlan’s contemporaries, such as Xiong Shili and Zhu Guangqian, also talk about “spheres,” but with different implications. Xiong Shili talks about spheres with the aim of distinguishing truth from falsehood; Zhu Guangqian’s sphere is the artistic sphere; while Feng Youlan’s doctrine of spheres of living is intended to classify different levels of goodness. These three philosophers, in fact, deal respectively with the realms of truth, beauty, and goodness. Jin Yuelin rarely uses the term sphere, but in his A Treatise on Dao, he says that the Great Ultimate is “the ultimate truth, goodness, beauty, and freedom,” and adds that “the Great Ultimate is not an uncomfortable sphere,” but a sphere that is not just free, but “the most free.” This is a sphere of absolute freedom. Jin’s Great Ultimate, being a limit that can never be reached, is a metaphysical idea. But his conception of this ideal sphere as the unity of truth, goodness, beauty, and freedom, and his conception of real freedom as consisting in the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty, is very insightful. It is a pity that he does not develop it in sufficient detail. The relation between human freedom

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and truth, goodness, and beauty is a very important problem in axiology, which, however, has not been investigated extensively in modern Chinese philosophy.

13.6 Marxists’ Critical Investigations on Traditional Thought When philosophers such as Xiong Shili, Zhu Guangqian, Jin Yuelin, and Feng Youlan construct their own philosophical systems with modern form and content, great achievements have been made in the Sinicization of Marxist philosophy, which can be seen from, among others, the fact that through their critical investigation of traditional ideas in China, Marxists have provided a scientific foundation on which to combine Marxism with traditional Chinese culture. (1) Criticism of the Idealist Conception of History of Philosophy The 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s saw a lasting attempt by official theoreticians of the ruling Nationalist Party (or Kuomintang) to show that their ideology was in line with the “orthodox Confucian tradition” from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen, an attempt represented by Dai Jitao’s “Sunism (the doctrine of Sun Yatsen, 孙文主义, sun wen zhu yi),” Jiang Jieshi’s “philosophy of resolute action” (力行哲学 li xing zhe xue) and Chen Lifu’s “vitalism” (唯生论 wei sheng lun). These justifications for the Nationalist Party’s totalitarianism in terms of the idealist doctrine of “orthodox Confucian tradition” were sharply criticized by Marxists at that time as the Chinese version of fascism. In the 1930s and 1940s, some non-Marxist scholars, such as Feng Youlan, Xiong Shili, He Lin, and others, though opposed to Jiang Jieshi’s reactionary rule, also regarded their own philosophical systems as the inheritors of Chinese tradition, and committed themselves to the mission of reviving Confucianism, in order to carry forward the national tradition and ignite the people’s patriotic enthusiasm for resisting the Japanese invasion and restoring the nation. Their idealist conception of the history of philosophy also aroused criticism from Marxists. Xiong Shili says: The major Chinese philosophical ideas are nothing but Confucianism and Buddhism (Buddhism, though a religion coming from abroad, has been developed since the Han dynasty into a native philosophy, while Daoism, following The Book of Changes, is actually a collateral branch of Confucianism, and its emphasis on nothingness is close to Buddhism, which is why I did not mention it separately), and both of them embody idealism. Therefore, I make a thorough examination of both Confucianism and Buddhism, together with other classical philosophies, make clear their differences and commonalities, discard their weak points and combine their strong points, and, as the result of absorbing their ideas, I have written A New Doctrine of Consciousness-Only. (Xiong 2001, vol. 3, p. 522)

Feng Youlan, on the other hand, claims that his “new rational philosophy” is “continuous” with the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties, so it is close to the Confucian “leading towards the mean” (道中庸 dao zhong yong) in its application and similar to Daoism, Neo-Daoism, and Zen Buddhism in its

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aspiration for “approaching the transcendent (极高明 ji gao ming)” (Feng 2001, vol. 3, p. 522). According to Feng Youlan, “approaching the transcendent and leading towards the mean,” referring to the highest sphere immanent in people’s everyday life and representing the spirit of Chinese philosophy, is the major tradition in Chinese philosophy. And his “new rational philosophy” is “the latest development of the spirit of Chinese philosophy” (Feng 2001, vol. 5, p. 126). Xiong and Feng, in short, both think that the main trend in traditional Chinese philosophy is idealism and metaphysics, and that they have inherited and developed this tradition. Du Guoyang offers a Marxist criticism of this idealist conception of the history of philosophy. The fine Chinese tradition, Du Guoyang says, does not consist in idealism and metaphysics, but in the spirit of “seeking truth from the facts.” In the whole history of Chinese philosophy, there are more traditions than the one favored by Xiong and Feng, that is, the idealist and metaphysical one. Du says: Trends of thought move in a way very similar to the rise and fall of different social classes. Materialism and idealism alternately rise and fall, one occasionally overshadowing the other, with each both criticizing the other and inheriting some of its views. They were intertwined into a main trend. In this trend there was an underlying and continuous line, but no overwhelmingly orthodox tradition.[…] Neo-Daoism in the Wei and Jin dynasties, Zen Buddhism in the Tang dynasty, Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, are all doctrines which “point to the empty and encompass the boundless.” Besides these, however, there are some realist ideas, manifested in the fact that, in the late Ming dynasty, the School of Wang Shouren declined and at late Ming and early Qing dynasties, philosophers like Huang (Zongxi), Gu (Yanwu), Wang (Fuzhi), and Yan (Yuan) all placed emphasis on “utility.” In the early years of the Qing dynasty, when the Han School of classical studies flourished, Dai Zhen bitterly attacked the Song School of classical studies for its groundless speculations and charged that “nobody would feel pity for a person who was killed for violating principles.” These are all realist ideas (Du 1962, pp. 413–414).

That is to say, one should treat the history of philosophy as a history of the mutual struggles and interactions between materialism and idealism, and not as a history monopolized by the idealist orthodox tradition. In the Marxist view, the best aspect of Chinese philosophy lies in the tradition of “seeking truth from facts,” which deserves to be taken as the focus of research. At the same time, we should treat the idealist schools of philosophy in a realist way, and locate their real positions in history. In order to interpret the history of Chinese philosophy as a history in which idealism and metaphysics enjoy a dominant position, Xiong Shili, Feng Youlan and others often quote philosophers’ words out of context and interpret them in implausible ways. This, Du Guoyang argues, is a dogmatic method “of forcing the concepts of the ancients to suit themselves at any cost” (Du 1962, p. 477). Du Guoyang’s criticism points especially to Feng Youlan’s reduction of the main trend of Chinese philosophy to the Weltanschauung which “approaches the transcendent and leads towards the mean,” arguing that at that time this idea was actually detrimental. This idea amounts to portraying the rulers as “sages dispatched by the Heaven” and asking the masses to be content with their predetermined destiny (Du 1962, p. 434). This is an ideology defending the hierarchy composed of masters and slaves. The force of habit accompanying this ideology is deep-rooted in China. Lu Xun devoted his entire life to fighting tenaciously against this force. The criticism

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and analysis made by Marxists of the idealist conception of the history of philosophy is a continuation of this fight. (2) The Ground-Breaking Study of Traditional Chinese Philosophy In the 1930s and 1940s, some Marxist scholars begin to study traditional Chinese thought systematically and to publish some important books such as Guo Moruo’s The Bronze Age and Ten Critical Treatises, and A General History of Ideas in China by Hou Wailu, Du Guoyang, and others. They did groundbreaking work in the history of Chinese philosophy. These Marxist philosophers’ emphasis was on making clear the relation between the history of society and the history of ideas, with the materialist conception of history as their tool. Guo Moruo says: I have done my best to collect materials, on the basis of which I first try to explain eras and society in general terms, then try to find out the social basis on which a certain doctrine arose, the connections and mutual influences between different doctrines, and the positive or negative relations of a doctrine to society. (Guo 1982, vol. 1, p. 617)

Du Guoyang means the same thing when he says that, among various doctrines in history, there are “vertical relations of inheritance and horizontal relations of influence (or reaction),” and “logical developments within each doctrine.” These relations and developments, however, should be explained in the last analysis in terms of their basis in society: here we have “the unity of ‘the logical’ and ‘the historical.’” From such a point of view, Marxists advance many original ideas in their work on traditional Chinese thought. Guo Moruo, for example, argues that the history from the Spring and Autumn period to the Warring States period is a transitional period in which the slave system becomes a feudal system. On the basis of this fact, he explains the climax in this period of the Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought, the ideas of each school, and their development. The authors of the General History of Ideas in China hold that ancient China is an Eastern type of “premature” civilization, that it makes progress through reform, and thus contains the legacy of the tribal system, and that all these contribute to the delay of citizen-consciousness. Moreover, they observe that the basis of the property of aristocratic families and landlords of the common clans became a basis for the struggle between orthodox and heterodox ideologies in the feudal society. In order to restore the real nature of traditional thought, Marxists not only criticize traditional thought itself, but also correct various distortions brought about by scholars of past generations in their research on traditional thought. This is intended to reject the undesirable elements in traditional thought while absorbing the essence of science, democracy, and materialism which it contains. Guo Moruo wrote Ten Critical Treatises, with the aim of judging the rights and wrongs of the philosophical schools in the pre-Qin period according to the populist idea of “the people as the standard.” He says: I praise highly Confucius and Mencius, because among all schools, their thoughts have the strongest populist color. Xunzi begins gradually to deviate from this central idea, but not to the point of being so shameless as Confucians of later generations. (Guo 1982, vol. 2, p. 482)

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He not only tries to differentiate Confucians in the pre-Qin period from “Confucians of later generations,” but also tries to eradicate the contemporary “‘New Confucians’ blind faith” (Guo 1982, vol. 3, p. 78). This is a step forward compared with the sweeping slogan “Destroy the old antiquity shop of Confucius!” used by the May Fourth Movement in 1919. While Guo Moruo directs his attention to exploring the democratic essence in traditional thought, the authors of General History of Ideas in China put more effort into exploring its scientific elements. In the section covering the pre-Qin period, for example, the book discusses in particular the theories of knowledge and logic in Confucianism, Mohism, Later Mohism, and Xunzi, pointing out their reasonable elements. The book also pays particular attention to those ideas that were regarded as “heretical” and “illegitimate” in the feudal society and the ideas of those materialists who were obscured for so long, so as to show that in the history of Chinese philosophy there is a “heretical” tradition in opposition to the orthodox tradition, and a materialist tradition that is full of the spirit of seeking truth from facts. These intellectual traditions are of tremendous value. The Marxists’ criticism of “new rational philosophy” (Feng Youlan), “new consciousness-only philosophy” (Xiong Shili), and “new philosophy of mind” (He Lin), repeats in a sense the criticism of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties by thinkers at late Ming and early Qing dynasties such as Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu, Wang Fuzhi, and Yan Yuan. New consciousness-only philosophy and the new philosophy of mind are the results of combining the School of Mind with some modern irrationalist philosophies such as vitalism and philosophy of life, while new rational philosophy results from the combination of the School of Principle and the neo-realism of the West. All of them can be said to result from combining Chinese tradition with one of the two major non-Marxist philosophical trends in the West (irrationalism and positivism). It is against this global philosophical background that Chinese Marxists conduct their criticism of these philosophies and their research on traditional Chinese thought; through this criticism and research, they locate the points where dialectical materialism and the fine tradition in Chinese philosophy can be combined with each other, and thus contribute to the further Sinicization of Marxist philosophy. Though their work is only preliminary, and some of their ideas are one-sided, their historical achievements are undeniable.

13.7 Mao Zedong: The Dynamic and Revolutionary Theory of Knowledge as the Reflection of Reality—A Summation of the Debate Over the Relation Between “Mind and Matter/Things” in the Philosophy of History and Epistemology After the development of modern Chinese philosophy for more than one hundred years, Mao Zedong makes a summation of the achievements of this historical period. Mao Zedong (1893–1976), known as Runzhi, was a native of Xiangtan, Hunan

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Province. He actively took part in the New Culture Movement around 1919, and started to accept Marxism at that time. He was a major founding member of the Chinese Communist Party and was the top leader of the party from 1935 up to his death. Devoting his life to public service on the behalf of the Chinese people, he wrote many works of great importance for guiding the people, which have been compiled in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong. Here, we are not going to explore the philosophical basis of Mao Zedong’s thought, but to present, from the perspective of the historical development of Chinese philosophy, Mao Zedong’s work before 1949, which, full of originality, enriched and developed Marxist philosophy, and thus contributed greatly to the revolutionary process of Chinese philosophy. Additionally, we will point out some of the weaknesses in his philosophical thought. (1) The Historical Summation of the Debate Over Relations Between Past and Present and Between China and the West, and the Main Points of the Dynamic and Revolutionary Theory of Knowledge as the Reflection of Reality Since the debate over the relations between past and present and between China and the West conditions the development of modern Chinese philosophy, modern Chinese philosophy can be summed up only on the basis of a scientific summation of this debate. In order for Marxism, a theory introduced from the West, to play its proper role in China, it must be combined with the reality in China and given a national form. For this reason, Marxism not only should not be divorced from the reality of China, but also cannot be divorced from the history of China. Herein lies the necessity of solving the problem of the relations between past and present and between China and the West. Inheriting the spirit of the May Fourth Movement, and analyzing both the history and the reality of China, Mao Zedong criticizes various mistakes in applying Marxism in a subjective and dogmatic way, which result in right and left deviations, and dogmatist or empiricist errors, and grasps the laws of the Chinese democratic revolution. China has become a semi-colonized and semi-feudal society as a result of invasion from Western imperialists. Mao points out that the current revolution in China is a democratic revolution opposing imperialism and feudalism, and should be led by the proletariat in the framework of a democratic united front with the alliance of workers and peasants as its main constituency so that “the rural areas will enclose the urban areas.” After the victory is won, the democratic revolution should soon give its place to the socialist revolution. In the field of culture, the aim of the Chinese revolution is to build a new Chinese culture that is national, scientific, and mass-oriented. In this way, Mao correctly answers the problem “whither China?” which had existed for nearly one hundred years, and scientifically sums up, in political and cultural terms, the debate over the relations between past and present and between China and the West, which had also lasted for nearly one hundred years. Conditioned by the debate mentioned above, the discussion in modern Chinese philosophy on the relation between thinking and being (the debate over the relation between mind and matter/things) occurs in the fields of the philosophy of history

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and epistemology. Mao’s “dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality” is both the summation of the debate over the relation between “mind” and “matter/things” in the fields of philosophy of history and epistemology, and the basis on which he sums up the debate over the relations between past and present and between China and the West. Mao Zedong says: Any given culture (as an ideological form) is a reflection of the politics and economics of a given society, and the former in turn has a tremendous influence and effect upon the latter; economics is the base and politics is the concentrated expression of economics. This is our fundamental view of the relationship of culture to politics and economics, and of the relationship between politics to economics. [...] Marx says, “It is not the consciousness of people that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.” He also says, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” For the first time in human history, these scientific formulations correctly solved the problem of the relationship between consciousness and existence, and they are the basic concepts underlying the dynamic revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality that was later elaborated so profoundly by Lenin. (Mao 1965, vol. 2, pp. 340–341)

With the phrase “dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality,” Mao is summarizing both the basic views of dialectical materialism on the problem of the relationship between thinking and being, and the basic views of the materialist conception of history on the problem of the relationship between social existence and social consciousness. This phrase, therefore, represents succinctly the unity of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Many people have attributed the turbulence in modern Chinese society to the conflict between Chinese and Western cultures. The dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, according to which culture, as an ideological form, is based on economics, whose condensed representation is politics, leads Mao to locate the cause of the conflict between cultures in the economic base of Chinese society. Additionally, he thinks that a change in the economic base of society in turn requires a revolution in the field of politics and a revolution in the field of culture, which reflects in ideological form the requirements for political and economic changes. But, in the process of Chinese evolution, we should oppose both left and right deviations and overcome both dogmatism and empiricism. The epistemological grounds of these erroneous deviations are, as pointed out in Mao’s On Practice, idealism and mechanical materialism. In this sense, only if we look from the perspective of the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as a reflection of reality can we, in the fields of philosophy of history and epistemology, correctly answer the question about the relationship between thinking and being, so as to scientifically solve the problem “whither China?” and to reach the historical and concrete unity of the subjective with the objective, and of theory with practice. With his scientific conception of practice, and taking social history and cognitive activity based on practice as a process in which the objective reality is reflected and the dynamic role of the subject is played, Marx solves the problem of the relationship between consciousness and existence and between social consciousness and social existence both materialistically and dialectically. Here, we can find three interconnected moments: (1) the reflection of objective reality; (2) the dynamic role of the

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subject; and (3) the revolutionary practice. Bringing these moments into a coherent unity, “the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality” gives a scientific interpretation to the debate over the relation between “mind” and “matter/things” in the philosophy of history and epistemology, thus marking a revolutionary leap in the development of modern Chinese philosophy, which is centered on this debate. The perspective of the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality is embodied in the ideology of the Communist Party of China, i.e., seeking truth from facts. To the idiom “seeking truth from facts” (实事求是, shi shi qiu shi) Mao provides a new interpretation: “Facts” are all the things that exist objectively, “truth” means their internal relations, that is, the laws governing them, and “to seek” means to study. We should proceed from the actual conditions inside and outside the country, the province, county, or district, and derive from them, as our guide to actions, laws that are inherent in them and not imaginary, that is, we should find the internal relations of the events occurring around us. (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 12)

That is to say that, on the one hand, we should uphold materialism by proceeding from the actual condition of society and trying to grasp the laws inherent in objective things. On the other hand, we should uphold dialectics by allowing the full exercise of the subjective initiative, deriving knowledge of laws from the sufficient information we have acquired and guiding our practice with this knowledge. The ideological line of seeking truth from facts, in this sense, is a requirement that we carry through, in all our work, the major ideas of the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as a reflection of reality. On the basis of the main ideas of the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, Chinese Communists represented by Mao Zedong correctly identify the way forward for the Chinese revolution, scientifically summing up the debate in the field of philosophy of history and the theory of knowledge over the relationship between “mind” and “matter/things,” as well as the debates over the relations between past and present and between China and the West. This is an achievement of the Sinicization of Marxist philosophy, and is one of the major positive achievements of the revolutionary development of modern Chinese philosophy. (2) A Theory Concerning the Steps of Knowledge At the end of his “On Practice,” Mao Zedong writes: Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop this truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowledge and action. (Mao 1965, vol. 1, p. 308)

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The dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowledge and action presented here contains three points: (1) Practice is the basis of knowledge, and truth is discovered, verified, and developed through the process of practice; (2) a process of knowledge in the full sense contains a leap from perceptual knowledge to rational knowledge and a leap from rational knowledge to practice, aiming at the unity of knowing the world and changing the world, and the unity of changing the subjective world and changing the objective world. (3) The general order of human cognition lies in the spiral, unlimited movement of practice, knowledge, again practice, again knowledge…. Mao’s unique contribution to the dialectical and materialist conception of the unity of knowledge and action consists in his theoretical summary of the general sequence of the movement of knowledge, which can be presented from the following perspectives: First, the spiral movement in which practice and knowledge repeat themselves. The above-cited passage from “On Practice” describes the general sequence of the movement of knowledge in this way: “Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level” (Mao 1965, vol. 1, p. 308). In other words, each cycle of practice and knowledge is a process that starts with obtaining perceptual knowledge from practice, proceeds to rational knowledge, and ends in applying rational knowledge in turn to guide practice. Generally speaking, however, this cycle cannot be concluded once and for all, because, as a result of the limitations imposed by various subjective and objective conditions, one will often discover that one’s theory is wholly or partially incorrect upon applying it. This implies that each cycle of practice and knowledge is a test of knowledge by practice, which makes it possible for people, after comparing a successful result with an unsuccessful result, to verify the true elements and identify the erroneous elements in their theory. With regard to a particular objective process, it is often the case that practice and knowledge have to be repeated many times, and success and failure have to be compared with each other many times, before the correspondence between subjective knowledge and objective law is arrived at and the contradiction between the subjective and the objective, or between theory and practice, is solved. Only then can the movement of human knowledge regarding a certain objective process at a certain stage of its development be considered to be completed. This kind of true knowledge, of course, is only a relative one. But in relative truth there are elements of absolute truth, and it is through countless relative truths that the absolute truth is evolved. Mao Zedong writes: “The movement and change of the world of objective reality is never-ending and so is human cognition and truth through practice” (Mao 1965, vol. 1, p. 306). That is to say, objective truth is inexhaustible. The truth that has been acquired paves the road for further efforts in truth-seeking, and it is through repeated processes of “the concrete, historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowledge and action,” that people’s knowledge of objective truth is deepened and expanded, step by step. The general sequence of the movement of knowledge, therefore, displays itself as a forward movement proceeding cyclically and endlessly, in which practice and knowledge repeat themselves again and again.

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Second, the spiral movement in which the particular and the general repeat themselves endlessly. In his “On Contradiction,” Mao writes: As regards the sequence in the movement of human knowledge, there is always a gradual growth from the knowledge of individual and particular things to the knowledge of things in general. Only after one knows the particular essence of many different things can one proceed to generalizations and know the common essence of things. When one attains the knowledge of this common essence, one uses it as a guide and proceeds to study various concrete things that have not yet been studied, or studied thoroughly, and to discover the particular essence of each; only thus is one able to supplement, enrich, and develop one’s knowledge of their common essence and prevent such knowledge from withering and petrifying. There are two processes of cognition: One, from the particular to the general, and the other, from the general to the particular. Thus cognition always moves in cycles and (so long as the scientific method is strictly adhered to) each cycle advances human knowledge a step higher and so makes it more and more profound. (Mao 1965, vol. 1, p. 321)

The repeated processes of practice and knowledge are just the repeated processes proceeding from perceptual knowledge to rational knowledge and from rational knowledge to practice. What is dealt with and changed by people in their practice is always this or that material. Consequently, the perceptual experience acquired in practice is always individual. But theories are intended to grasp what is general. So the process by which theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and then returned to practice is at the same time the process by which generalization is made from what is individual and the generalization is in turn applied to what is individual. But whether something is general or not is a relative matter. Relative to a higher level of generality, that which is of the lower level of generality becomes a particular, in which the generality is present. The practice-based movement in which the theoretical knowledge becomes deeper and deeper, therefore, must be a repeated process from the particular to the general and from the general, in turn, to the particular. As a result of this process, theoretical knowledge can disclose more and more and penetrate deeper and deeper into the general nature of the change and development of its object, up to a point where the knowledge of the most general laws of material movement, namely the laws of materialist dialectics, is arrived at. It is often said that, while individual things are concrete, general concepts are abstract, and while experience is concrete, theory is abstract. In terms of dialectics, however, only that knowledge which has been obtained through a process in which the particular and the general are repeated is really concrete. That is why it is said that “no truth is abstract and truth is always concrete.” The process in which knowledge proceeds from the particular to the general and from the general to the particular is also a process from the concrete to the abstract and from the abstract to the concrete. Since in their practice people deal with and change concrete objects, knowledge always starts with concrete objects. Only after the practice goes further, the scientific analysis, comparison, and inquiry are made, and the essential nature and causal connections of the object are gradually comprehended, can abstract concepts be formed in one’s mind. This is a process from the concrete to the abstract. But the abstract is contradictory: on the one hand, as abstract knowledge, it can reflect reality more deeply than concrete knowledge; on the other hand, merely because it is abstract,

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it can “become withered and dead.” For the sake of avoiding this tendency, as well as improving knowledge, the movement of knowledge should return from the abstract to the concrete. Thus, on the one hand, research on concrete objects would no longer be conducted blindly, since it is now guided by scientific abstract ideas; and on the other hand, the abstract ideas become concrete ones by obtaining living content, and change into things with “complete objectivity” in the real sense. The moment when a concept has complete objectivity is the moment when “concrete and historical unity” between the subjective and the objective has been reached, as can be verified by practice. Since practice and knowledge will be repeated endlessly, and so will the particular and general, the contradictory movement of becoming abstract and concrete is also an endless one. In terms of the direction of its development, therefore, the general process of knowledge is a spiral movement composed of the process from the concrete (of lower level) to the abstract, and from the abstract in turn to the concrete (of higher level). Third, the unity of the mass line with the theory of knowledge. The process by which knowledge is obtained from practice and is applied to practice again, according to Mao Zedong, is a process of being from the masses and to the masses. Later, in his “Sixteen Points of Working Method,” he says: “the process of forming concepts, judgments, and reasoning is a process of being from the masses, while the process of conveying one’s own ideas and thoughts to the other people is a process of being to the masses” (Mao 1999, vol. 7, p. 358). This conception of the process of knowledge as being from the masses to the masses implies a method of leadership, according to which a leading cadre should follow the mass line. Mao says: In all the practical work of our party, all correct leadership is necessarily ‘from the masses, to the masses.’ This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study, turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and disseminate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them, and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in the action by the masses. Then, once again, gather concrete ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses. And so on over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital, and richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge. (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 119)

The practical experience of the masses is the primary origin of human wisdom, whose content is much richer and more alive than scientific theories. But it is relatively coarse; we can say that the experience of the masses is composed of immeasurable scattered experiences, good or bad, refined or unrefined. Presented in people’s ideas and speeches, the practical experience of the masses includes various sorts of opinions. Since reality is infinitely multifarious, and one’s knowledge is conditioned by greatly different elements, the masses’ opinions must be very rich in content and in color, as well as very scattered and unsystematic. With regard to a certain field, a theory by which practice is guided can only be formed after these experiences are concentrated and systemized. A theory obtained in this way is, as a reflection of reality, more correct, deeper, and more comprehensive than the opinions of the masses. In order for such a theory to be translated into action by the masses, it is

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necessary to educate the masses in the proper way. Theories display their powerful influence upon reality as soon as they are grasped by the masses. The process from the masses to the masses, like the process of knowledge in general, is also one that is repeated endlessly. To sum up, Mao Zedong characterizes the general sequence of the movement of knowledge in terms of three “cycles.” (1) The movement of knowledge on the basis of the masses’ practices is a repeated process from the multiple to the unified and from the unified to the multiple. (2) It is also a process from the particular to the general, and again from the general to the particular. (3) On the whole, in terms of the direction of its development, it is an endless and forward movement proceeding from the one-sided to the multi-sided, from the individual through the particular to the universal, and from the concrete to the abstract and from the abstract, in turn, to the (dialectical) concrete. This is a new idea in Marxist literature. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong’s systematic presentation of the idea of dialectical materialism on the unity of knowledge and action is a scientific summation of the discussion of Chinese philosophy, especially in its modern stage, on the problem of the relationship between knowledge and action. (3) The Unity of Objective Dialectics and Subjective Dialectics In his “On Contradiction,” Mao Zedong systematically discusses the law of the unity of opposites, the main points of which include: (1) Movement originates from contradiction; contradictions inside an object are the basis for its change and development; the internal basis and external conditions are connected with each other. (2) Contradiction can be understood both in terms of its universality and its particularity. With dogmatism as his target, Mao discusses various particularities of contradiction in great detail. He also argues that different contradictions would be solved by different methods, and that one should distinguish between various kinds of contradictions in one thing and the various sides, major or minor, of a given contradiction. (3) Mao discusses the relationship among various sides of a contradiction in the forms of struggle and unity, both of which he describes in a Chinese idiom, “two opposite things are complementary to each other.” Moreover, he points out that contradictions transform themselves in the form of the new superseding the old. Mao’s systematic presentation of the law of the unity of opposites represents a scientific summation of the evolvement from evolutionism to a materialist conception of history and further to the general conception of development in modern China. Mao Zedong’s most important contribution to dialectics, however, lies in the fact that his works are excellent examples of the unity between worldview and methodology, and of the unity between objective dialectics and subjective dialectics. “This dialectic worldview,” he says, “teaches us primarily how to observe and analyze the movement of opposites in different things and, on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for resolving contradiction” (Mao 1965, vol. 1, p. 315). This is to say that a worldview implies a method. “What is the method?” he asks, and then replies: “The method is to familiarize ourselves with all aspects of the enemy’s situation and our own, to discover the laws governing the actions of both sides and to make use of these laws in our own operations” (Mao 1965, vol. 1, p. 187). This is

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to say that an epistemology implies a methodology. He refers to logic when he says, “Objective contradictions, reflected in subjective ideas, give rise to the contradictory movement of concepts, which pushes forward the development of thought and constantly solves problems in human minds” (Mao 1965, vol. 1, p. 317). The contradictory movement of concepts is nothing but logic. Materialist dialectics, therefore, is the unity of objective dialectics, epistemology, and logic. Logic is the reflection of objective dialectics and the summation of the history of knowledge, while method is nothing but the application of logic. The dialectics and epistemology explicated in “On Contradiction” and “On Practice” are precisely the logic applied in “On Protracted War” and “On New Democracy.” Applied as the fundamental law of logical thinking, the law of the unity of opposites is the method of combining analysis and synthesis. In many works, Mao Zedong shows his proficiency in applying this method. In his “On Protracted War,” for example, Mao applies this method to criticize the theory of national subjugation and the theory of quick victory, which were spreading among the people when the anti-Japanese War was started, and to prove that the war, though protracted, must be won by the Chinese people. Put concretely, Mao’s reasoning includes the following three moments. First, one should proceed from reality and objectivity, and comprehensively investigate the current situation and its history, in order to grasp the basis for further change and development. This basis is grasped as a result of investigating the original and fundamental relations of an object. The basis grasped in “On Protracted War,” for example, is determined by all fundamental elements that respectively belong to the Chinese side and to the Japanese side, and which contradict each other. Mao points out, in terms of military, economic, and political forces, that the enemy was stronger than us; in terms of the nature of the war, our war was progressive and just, while the enemy’s was backward and uncivilized. In addition, compared with the enemy, we possessed greater territory, richer natural resources, a larger population, more soldiers, and stronger international support. These facts formed the basis for the prediction that the war would be protracted but that the final victory would be won by China. Second, one should point out various possibilities of development and disclose the necessary tendency of the war through one’s analysis of contradictions. In “On Protracted War” Mao discusses in detail how the contradictions between China and Japan will evolve, and points out that there are two possibilities for the development of the war, national subjugation or liberation, of which the possibility of national liberation through a protracted war is superior. Mao remarks that war is a competition between the characteristics of the warring sides, and the development of the contradictory movement of the war will proceed from the initial disequilibrium (the enemy is stronger than us) to equilibrium (both sides are locked in a stalemate) and in turn to a new disequilibrium (the enemy is weaker than us). The war, therefore, can accordingly be divided into three stages: on the part of China, the war will proceed from the stage of strategic defense through the stage of strategic stalemate to the stage of strategic counter-offensive. Mao concludes: “This is the natural logic of war.”

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Third, one should make it clear how the conditions can be brought forth for the possibility favorable to the people to be realized and the revolutionary goal to be reached. The topic of the second half of “On Protracted War” is simply “how to,” namely, how the Chinese people should create conditions according to the law of warfare and how a plan should be made on the basis of this law, so as to win the final victory and to reach the goal, namely, “to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China with freedom and equality.” This requires that the people act on their conscious initiative combined with natural logic and a subjective endeavor to conduct political mobilization and use correct strategies and tactics in the war. Mao says: “The objective factors provide the possibility for such change, but in order to turn this possibility into actuality, both correct policy and subjective effort are essential. It is then that the subjective plays the decisive role” (Mao 1965, vol. 2, p. 161). That is roughly the logical structure of “On Protracted War” and its method of combining analysis and synthesis. After Marx’s On Capital, Mao Zedong gives us another example of applying dialectical logic. Lenin once wrote that the analysis of commodities made in the On Capital includes “[a] double analysis, deductive and inductive—logical and historical” (Lenin 1930). In other words, the method of dialectical logic of combining analysis with synthesis contains the two sub-methods of the unity of deduction and induction and the unity of the logical and the historical. These are just the methods applied by Mao Zedong when he makes contradiction-oriented analyses of objects according to the law of the unity of opposites. The unity of deduction and induction is the unity of the general and the individual. Mao says that the truth concerning generality and individuality “is the quintessence of the problem of contradiction in things.” According to the logical and methodological requirements implied by the theory concerning the relationship between universality and particularity of contradictions, we should, when studying an object, try to discover both the particular and the universal and their interconnection, to discover both particularity and universality and also their interconnection within the object itself, and to discover the interconnections of this object with the many objects outside it (Mao 1965, vol. 1, p. 328). The unity of the logical and the historical means that, understood in terms of objective dialectics, a law evolves through a historical process of development, and the logic of contradictory movement is present in a historical process of the new superseding the old. This requires methodologically that we analyze, from the point of view that combines both the logical and the historical, how the contradictions inherent in an object transform themselves, how the new elements supersede the old ones in this object as a result of the struggle between them, and how, in the form that quantitative changes are accumulated to a point where a qualitative change is caused, a lower stage of development is replaced by a higher one. Mao Zedong’s dialectical logic, although it has tremendous value, also has some weaknesses which are primarily manifested in two respects. First, his ideas of dialectical logic are, on the whole, generalized from the field of society and history, and are, therefore, only minimally related to modern natural sciences. Second, although his ideas of dialectical logic have the function of fighting against dogmatism inside

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the party, he fails to make it clear that this dogmatism is, in fact, a new version of the method of the study of Confucian classics in feudal society, in the garb of Marxism. Mao has not sufficiently criticized the method of classical learning. (4) A Road Toward Great Unity Through the People’s Democratic Dictatorship In his theory on the people’s democratic dictatorship, Mao Zedong depicts the ideal prospect of the social revolution in China and points out the way towards great unity. He says: Bourgeois democracy has given way to the people’s democracy under the leadership of the working class and the bourgeois republic to the people’s republic. This has made it possible to achieve socialism and communism through the people’s republic, to abolish classes, and to enter a world of great unity. Kang Youwei wrote The Book of Great Unity, but he did not and could not find the way to achieve great unity. There are bourgeois republics in foreign lands, but China cannot have a bourgeois republic because she is a country suffering under imperialist oppression. The only way is through a people’s republic led by the working class. (Mao 1965, vol. 4, p. 414)

What, then, is “the people’s democratic dictatorship?” Mao’s answer: “The combination of these aspects: democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries. This is the people’s democratic dictatorship” (Mao 1965, vol. 4, p. 418). This idea, that is, the idea of dealing with two kinds of social contradictions in the people’s democratic dictatorship, is later greatly developed in Mao’s speech, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” (1957). In ancient China, there was a debate between Confucianism and Legalism over the relationship between “governing in a kingly way” and “governing by might”, in other words, a debate between “rule by morality” and “rule by force.” The historical outcome of this debate is the conclusion that a state ruled by the landlord class needs to “combine governing in a kingly way and governing by might.” That is, the state should combine moral education with the rule by force. In the old era, however, the machinery of the state was in the hands of the ruling minority, and was by its nature a violent tool for the oppression of the people. So-called “benevolent rule” and “moral conduct” were nothing but a cover to hide violence. The people’s republic, on the contrary, is ruled by the masses of the people; it imposes rule by force only upon a few reactionaries. For the masses of people, it is a platform for education through democratic means. Thus, the old problem of the relationship between “governing in a kingly way” and “governing by might” or between “rule by morality” and “rule by force” is, once and for all, solved. This, of course, is only a resolution on the theoretical level. As to how the people can actually become masters of the country, how social contradictions of two different types should be handled properly in practice, and how the masses are to be able to educate themselves autonomously and democratically, these are additional problems that need to be solved. Mao Zedong’s theory on the realization of the ideal of great unity and the elimination of classes through the formation of a people’s republic represents a significant advancement with respect to the question of an ideal society in modern times. The real process, however, was far more complicated and tortuous than was expected by the Chinese people who were preparing for the establishment of the People’s Republic

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of China. Mao’s theory of the people’s democratic dictatorship was advanced at a moment when the class struggle was particularly severe. Therefore, some of the ideas in this theory need to be developed and corrected as conditions change. Mao quite rightly points out, for example, that there is a “serious problem in terms of the education of the peasantry,” but he was never able to make clear exactly how to deal with this problem. In a country where a major part of the population is composed of peasants, it is extremely difficult to overcome the domination of society by the administration and the utopian ideal of agricultural socialism. In other words, the realization of the great unity can be easily distorted by the limited perspective of uneducated farmers who do not understand governance. On another occasion, Mao Zedong says: Only when the people have such a state can they educate and remold themselves by democratic methods on a country-wide scale, with everyone taking part, and shake off the influence of domestic and foreign reactionaries. (Mao 1965, vol. 4, p. 418)

This assertion was correct when the People’s Republic of China was newly established. After he declared that the socialist transformation had been accomplished, however, he still stuck to this assertion, regarding various contradictions among the people as caused by “influences of reactionaries both at home and abroad” or as the reflection of class struggle, and he tried to handle them in the form of violent, stormlike mass campaigns that “cover the whole country and the whole population.” The result of this was a disastrous magnification of class struggle. (5) Revolutionary Utilitarianism and the Mass Viewpoint According to Mao Zedong’s portrayal, free communists have two major personality traits. First, they should be Marxists in term of both theory and practice, or ideals and activities. Mao writes, “Communists should set an example in being practical as well as far-sighted” (Mao 1965, vol. 2, p. 197). Second, they must take the people’s interests as the point of departure for action, and they must be members of society and play their proper role among the people. These are the first two of the party’s “three great styles,” and are essential features of the mentality of communists. In terms of philosophy of life, these two requirements are a Marxist reply to the problem of the relationship between righteousness and profit, and between group and individual, in modern Chinese philosophy. With regard to the problem of the relation between righteousness and profit, Mao advances his so-called revolutionary utilitarianism. He says: There is no “ism” in the world that transcends utilitarian considerations; in a class society there can be only the utilitarianism of this or that class. We are proletarian revolutionary utilitarians and take as our point of departure the unity of the present and future interests of the broadest masses, who constitute over 90 per cent of the population; hence we are revolutionary utilitarians aiming for the broadest and the longest-range objectives, not narrow utilitarians concerned only with the partial and the immediate. […] A thing is good only when it brings real benefit to the masses of the people. (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 85)

Mao’s revolutionary utilitarianism implies that revolutionary morality is consistent with the revolutionary interest, since it is based on the latter, but it also has

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further implications. All that is “good,” in Mao’s view, has, in the final analysis, the people’s interests as its content. This “good” is understood in the broadest sense of the term, covering “good” in the moral sense, “beauty” in the field of art, “truth” in the field of science, and all beneficial institutions—all refer to those things that are to the real benefit of the people. A question of value is implied here, which concerns the problem of whether effect or motive is the ground for evaluative judgment. Related to the problem of the relation between righteousness and profit, the problem of the relationship between will(志 zhi) and achievement(功 gong) or between motive and effect is also a problem that has been investigated for a long time, with no general agreement. Utilitarians on the whole tend to place the focus on effects instead of motive, while non-utilitarians prioritize motive over effects. Mao claims that “we dialectical materialists insist on the unity of motive and effect. The motive of serving the masses is inseparably linked with the effect of winning their approval; the two must be united” (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 88). Applying the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality in the field of value, Mao points out that, on the one hand, “[t]he criterion for judging subjective intention or motive is social practice and its effects” (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 93). Whether a behavior is good or bad, or a work of art is beautiful or ugly, should be decided on the basis of its effects. On the other hand, he also argues that the unity of motive and effect can only be achieved through a process: “A person with truly good intentions must take the effect into account, sum up experience and study the methods or, in creative work, study the technique of expression” (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 93). As soon as one becomes conscious of a mistake, one should engage in self-criticism, and resolve to correct one’s errors. “Only through this process of serious and responsible practice,” in which one strives to bring one’s motive and the effects of one’s action into coherence, “is it possible to gradually understand what the correct stand is and gradually obtain a good grasp of it” (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 93). Only then is it possible to arrive at communist morality, when the correct position, namely a proletarian one, is held (or converted to). With regard to the problem of the relationship between the group and the individual, Mao advances the mass or collective viewpoint as opposed to individualism. Mao says: “At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place his personal interests first; he should subordinate them to the interests of the nation and of the masses” (Mao 1965, vol. 2, p. 198). Marxists in the 1930s and the 1940s, including Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and many others, had largely abandoned Li Dazhao’s view of “the unity of a reasonable individualism and reasonable socialism.” Instead, they placed stress on the opposition between individualism and collectivism, and warned that individualism which subordinates the interests of the party and the masses to those of an individual was a great danger to the revolutionary enterprise. Mao Zedong did, of course, make a distinction between the emancipation of individuality and individualism. In a letter he writes: The emancipation of individuality is certainly included in the democratic revolution against feudalism. Some people accuse us of suppression of individuality, but this accusation is groundless. If the fetters on individuality are not removed, democracy and socialism are not possible. (Mao 2004, p. 216)

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The emancipation of individuality is interrelated with the development of the modern commodity economy. In terms of the process of revolution as a whole, socialism can only be realized via democracy. In terms of the emancipation of individuality, the viewpoint of the masses also implies that we should respect the individualities of the masses. Mao says: Commandism is wrong in any type of work, because in overstepping the level of political consciousness of the masses and violating the principle of voluntary mass action it reflects the disease of impetuosity. […] Tailism in any type of work is also wrong, because in falling below the level of political consciousness of the masses and violating the principle of leading the masses forward it reflects the disease of dilatoriness. (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 266)

A leader should, on the one hand, let the masses do anything they want out of their own consciousness and voluntariness, and allow them to make up their own minds rather than arranging everything for them. However, on the other hand, a leader should be good at pooling the opinions of the masses and leading them towards progress and prosperity. Mao believes that “[o]nly a government based on democratic centralism can fully express the will of all the revolutionary people” (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 352). To allow the full exercise of the wills of the revolutionary people presupposes respect for the will of each individual, which makes it possible for each person to express what he really has in mind, and then to concentrate these opinions into a unified will. This then becomes the motivating force for collective action. This is what Mao refers to when he talks about “a political situation in which there is both concentration and democracy, both discipline and freedom, and both unified will and ease of mind for individuals” (Mao 1992, p. 543). The meaning here is more or less the same as that which Li Dazhao expresses with his idea of “the unity of the emancipation of individuality and the great unity.” Of course, the question of exactly how to bring about such an ideal political situation is terribly complicated. In his theory of the communist personality, Mao pays close attention to promoting human self-consciousness. Another style, as part of the “party’s three styles,” is serious criticism, including self-criticism. Only by frequent reflections on one’s work, by serious criticism and self-criticism, Mao thinks, can the level of consciousness be heightened with regard to seeking truth from facts and combining oneself closely with the masses. He therefore suggests that we “get rid of the baggage and start up the machinery. “To get rid of the baggage” means to free our minds of many encumbrances. Many things may become baggage, may become encumbrances, if we cling to them blindly and uncritically.” “To start up the machinery” means “to make good use of the organ of thought. […] to learn the method of analysis and to cultivate the habit of analysis” (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 173). Here, Mao is explaining how we can constantly raise the level of our consciousness. Quoting Mencius’ remark that “[t]he office of the mind is to think,” Mao says, “he [Mencius] defined the function of the brain correctly” (Mao 1965, vol. 3, p. 173). To free our minds from shackles, to enlighten our reason, and to make full use of our faculty of thinking will all contribute to constantly raising our level of consciousness. These ideas may be regarded as the development of rational consciousness, which figures prominently in the Confucian tradition (especially in Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi). Confucius,

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Mencius, and Xunzi all argue for the unity of humanity and wisdom, thinking that truly moral behavior comes from one’s consciousness, which, in turn, comes from one’s rational knowledge. On the grounds of this presumption they think that it is possible to make a person moral through education, cultivation, and practice. The goal of cultivation consists in nothing more than “dispelling obsession” and raising one’s rational consciousness. The Confucian theory, which stresses the principle of consciousness of moral behavior, plays a positive role in history—and the Chinese communists inherit this tradition. The fact that Chinese communists inherit this tradition can be seen quite clearly in, for example, Liu Shaoqi’s “How to Be a Good Communist.” Although Liu says that the Confucian notion of moral cultivation is idealist, he affirms that there are some reasonable elements in the ideas which Confucius and Mencius express with regard to mental development and moral cultivation. Some examples Liu uses are when Confucius remarks, “I reflect on myself three times a day,” “one should behave cautiously, especially when alone,” and that courage to expose and correct one’s own mistakes is like “solar and lunar eclipses.” According to Liu, these ideas are valuable. Communist morality presents itself through virtues such as “loyalty to and ardent love for” one’s comrades, “putting oneself in the position of others,” and so on, which is, according to Liu Shaoqi, just the proletarian version of the way of zhong and shu (忠恕 the principle that one should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated). He says that a communist should have the breadth of vision to “be concerned about affairs of the world before others, and enjoying comfort after others”; “In times of adversity he will stand out courageously and unflinchingly and, in the face of difficulties he will demonstrate the greatest sense of responsibility. He is able to resist corruption by riches or honors, to resist tendencies to vacillate in spite of poverty and to refuse to yield in spite of threats of force.” If necessary, most communists are prepared “to achieve virtue” or “to lay down their lives for a just cause”. This is not because of their blind revolutionary fanaticism or their ambition for fame, but because of their understanding of the science of social development and the high level of their self-consciousness. The theory of an ideal personality and the virtues of a communist advanced by Liu Shaoqi as well as Mao Zedong is also an important part of the Sinicization of Marxist philosophy, and contains many original insights. However, in this respect their ideas have some weaknesses. Here, we discuss only one of them; namely, the underestimation of the principle of voluntariness of morality. The Confucian tradition has consistently paid attention to the principle of consciousness as it relates to moral behavior, but at the same time neglected the principle of voluntariness. The Chinese Communist Party is influenced by this tradition. Liu Shaoqi, for example, says that “we should talk about ‘whether this job is important or not’,” rather than about “‘whether I am willing to do it or not’.” Liu goes on: To be “willing to” and to be “forced to” are in opposition, yet they are also complementary to each other; they comprise a unity of opposites. We should try to combine “to be willing to” with “to be forced to” on the basis of self-consciousness. When they feel cold, people have to wear more clothes; when they feel hungry, they have to eat. In both cases, they are forced to do things. Since people do these things self-consciously, however, these things become

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what they are willing to do. If a party member is conscious of the importance of a certain task, of the necessity of the task for the revolution, then he or she would try to accept that work, and thus do it voluntarily. (Liu 1981, p. 46)

In other words, though objective necessities are forced upon people, as soon as they find out that these are objectively necessary, that is, as soon as they become conscious that they are necessary, they are willing to do them. In this case, they are not forced, but rather accept these things. This amounts to totally neglecting the principle of voluntariness, and is theoretically one-sided. A moral action is not only a conscious action, but also a freely performed action. (The fact that it is out of one’s voluntary decision that one enters the party is one of the preconditions for one’s acceptance of a task assigned by the party.) Both the level of consciousness and of voluntariness, of course, can be raised only through a process of practice, education, and cultivation, that is, a process in which one’s blindness and passivity are overcome. In this process, intellect and will, which promote one another, are both necessary moments, neither of which can be overestimated at the expense of the other. To neglect one-sidedly the principle of voluntariness, and the preconditions for freewill and independent personality, is, in fact, to neglect the emancipation of individuality and the idea that every person is an end-in-himself. This goes against the idea of “the unity of emancipation of individuality and the great unity,” to encourage the force of habit which treats the masses as if they are fools, and to pave the road for a “cult of personality.” In conclusion, Mao Zedong summarizes the basic principles of dialectical materialism and historical materialism in terms of “the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality,” in which he makes scientific summations of the debate in modern Chinese philosophy over relations between “mind” and “matter/things” and hence between knowledge and action, which are problems of both the philosophy of history and epistemology. Additionally, Mao makes a new theoretical summation of the order of the movement of knowledge, sets up examples for investigating objects with a logical method informed by the law of contradiction, and advances original views on how to construct the road towards great unity and on a unique philosophy of life. All these are major developments in the process of the Sinicization of Marxist philosophy, and are major achievements of the philosophical revolution in modern China. His philosophy, of course, has some deficiencies. Because of the historical conditions of his time, he overestimated the role of class struggle, as well as political and ideological struggles, and leaves the clues to the dogmatic “philosophy of struggle” and voluntarism. In terms of methodology, he did not sufficiently criticize the method of studying Confucian classics. In his theory of freedom, he somewhat neglects the principles of voluntariness. These deficiencies found in his theory are all in some ways connected with the mistakes he committed in his later years, and from these deficiencies we can learn very deep theoretical lessons.

References

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References Ai, Siqi. 2006. Complete Works of Ai Siqi, ed. The Editorial Committee of Ai Siqi. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Du, Guoxiang. 1962. Collected Works of Du Guoxiang, ed. The Editorial Committee of Collected Works of Du Guoxiang. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Feng, Youlan. 1958. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Translated by Derk Bodde. New York: The Macmillan Company. Feng, Youlan. 2001. Complete Works of the Hall of Three Pines. Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Publishing House. Guo, Moruo. 1982. Complete Works of Guo Moruo, ed. The Editorial Committee of Guo Moruo’s Works. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Jin, Yuelin. 1995. Collected Works of Jin Yuelin, ed. The Editorial Committee of Collected Works of Jin Yuelin. Lanzhou: Gansu People’s Publishing House. Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. 1930. Plan of Hegel’s Dialectics. In Lenin Miscellany XII. Translated by Clemence Dutt. Progress Publishers. Marxists Internet Archive. Li, Da. 1980. Selected Works of Li Da, ed. The Editorial Committee of Li Da. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Liu, Shaoqi. 1981. The Cultivation of a Communist in Organization and Discipline. Beijing: Central Party School Press. Mao, Zedong. 1965. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, English ed, ed. The Central Committee of the Communist Party’s Editorial Committee for Mao Zedong’s Writings. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Mao, Zedong. 1992. Collected Works of Mao Zedong After the Founding of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press. Mao, Zedong. 1999. Collected Works of Mao Zedong, ed. The Central Committee of the Communist Party’s Editorial Committee for Mao Zedong’s Writings. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Mao, Zedong. 2004. Selected Letters of Mao Zedong. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press. Xiong, Shili. 2001. Complete Works of Xiong Shili, ed. Xiao Jiefu. Wuhan: Hubei Education Publishing House. Zhu, Guangqian. 1962. Introduction to Aristotle’s Poetics. In Aristotle’s Poetics. Translated by Luo Niansheng. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Zhu, Guangqian. 1982. Zhu Guangqian’s Writings on Aesthetics. Shanghai: Shanghai Literature and Art Publishing House. Zhu, Guangqian. 1989. Complete Works of Zhu Guangqian, ed. The Editorial Committee of Zhu Guangqian. Hefei: Anhui Education Publishing House.

Part III

A Brief Summary

I What laws are displayed in the philosophical revolution of modern China? What similarities and differences are there between the philosophical revolutions in the West and in China? We can discuss these problems from the following perspectives. First, the class struggles in society serve to condition and regulate philosophical development. And philosophical revolutions, in turn, herald political revolution. In the modern West, political revolutions in Britain, France, Germany, and Russia were all preceded by philosophical revolutions. The same is the case in China. However, in China there are some unique aspects to this relationship. The political revolution in China is different from those in the West in that it is a movement for national liberation and a struggle against imperialism and feudalism. The most essential problem for China has always been “whither China?” This is reflected in political and ideological areas such as the debates over the relationship between past and present and between China and the West. The latter debate is also unique to China. The philosophical revolution is a reflection in the area of philosophy of the process in which the Chinese people’s struggle against imperialism and feudalism proceeds from the stage of being spontaneous to that of being self-conscious, and, correspondingly, the process in which the worldview of the Chinese people grows from the stage of being-in-itself to that of being-for-itself. The achievement of this philosophical revolution, in fact, is the scientific representation of the revolutionary worldview of the Chinese people rooted in their practice, and in this sense is the theoretical prerequisite for the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution in China. In the philosophical revolution, even a country that is economically backward can, as Engels said, “play first fiddle” in theoretical areas and become a latecomer which surpasses more established countries. We can probably venture to say that “a latecomer surpassing more established figures” is a regular phenomenon in an era of

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philosophical revolution. In the eighteenth century, France was less developed than Britain. But people like Voltaire introduced into France, with great enthusiasm, British philosophy and science, which became the theoretical weapons of the French Revolution. The result of the French Revolution was the emergence of a generation of Enlightenment thinkers, and the greater development of materialism in France than in Britain. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Germany was backward compared to Britain and France. However, as a result of learning imported from France and Britain, classical German philosophy developed to a level higher than any other in modern Europe; this, of course, gave birth to Marxist philosophy. Similarly, in Russia, a country lagging behind Western Europe, democratic revolutionaries developed Feuerbach’s philosophy and Lenin developed Marxist theory. So, while modern China is much less developed than European countries, this does not prevent the Chinese people from developing greatly their own philosophy by taking pains to learn from the West, to sum up their revolutionary experiences, and develop their own culture. Compared with the philosophical revolution in the West, the philosophical revolution in modern China has its own unique significance. It not only heralds the victory of the democratic revolution, but also prepares for the socialist revolution. In this, it is different from the philosophical revolutions in Britain, France, and Germany, but similar to that in Russia. However, Russian culture is, after all, a part of the Western tradition, while Chinese culture and Western culture differ greatly and have developed independently of each other. The philosophical revolution in China is especially important in that through it, the advanced theories of the West were combined with the fine traditions of China. We might say that, as a result of the philosophical revolution in China, the Chinese and Western cultures in general, and philosophies in particular, have begun to converge, which signals that Chinese philosophy has become an important part of global philosophy. Though this process has only just started, its beginnings are of great historical significance. Second, the development of Chinese philosophy follows the same law, though with unique characteristics, that was discovered by Engels in the history of Western philosophy: the philosophy of dialectical materialism and historical materialism is the result of the development of materialism from the stage in which naïve materialism was combined with naïve dialectics through the stage of mechanical materialism in modern times. Compared with the West, China saw a very long period in which naïve materialism was combined with naïve dialectics, one of its two peaks being the Warring States period, the other being the transitional period from the Ming dynasty to the Qing dynasty. As a result of this fact, there are very deep-rooted traditions of naïve materialism and naïve dialectics in Chinese philosophy. The stage in the development of Chinese philosophy corresponding to the stage of mechanical materialism in the West is a period of evolutionism in modern China. This can be explained in terms of the situation in which the natural sciences developed, and in terms of the needs of Chinese society. When the Chinese bourgeoisie appeared on the political stage in the late nineteenth century, the most influential science in the world as a whole was not Newton’s mechanics, which

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served as the scientific background for mechanical materialism, but Darwin’s theory of evolution. This theory happened to meet the needs of Chinese society in that it encouraged the Chinese people to “strengthen themselves in order to preserve themselves.” This meant fighting against the traditional theory of the Mandate of Heaven and the doctrine of “back to the ancients.” Thus, evolutionism became a philosophical weapon of the progressive Chinese at the time. Chinese philosophy in its stage of dialectical and historical materialism also has unique national features. These features are evident not only from the fact that many traditional philosophical phrases, such as “seeking truth from facts” and “opposite things being complementary to each other,” are frequently used by Mao Zedong and others, but also from the fact that the contents of Marxist philosophy and those of the great tradition of China had been combined with one another. With regard to the fundamental problems of philosophy, some outstanding philosophers in ancient China advanced some very good ideas. On the problem of the relationship between Heaven and humankind, for example, Xunzi advanced his doctrine of “understanding the distinctive functions of Heaven and humankind” and “controlling the Mandate of Heaven and using it.” Wang Fuzhi advanced his theory according to which “Heaven/Nature as it is for Heaven/Nature” can be turned into “Heaven/ Nature as it is for human beings” and people can “make use of Heaven” and “create their own destiny.” These ideas combined naïve materialism with naïve dialectics in that both the materialist presupposition and the subjective initiative of humans are affirmed. Xunzi and Wang also developed some dialectical ideas on the problem of the relationship between knowledge and action, and developed a rudimentary form of dialectical logic. Mao Zedong’s summation of the development of modern Chinese philosophy of the last one hundred years or so is, in some ways, a return to the thought of Xunzi and Wang Fuzhi. The former’s “dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality” was incipiently contained in the philosophies of Xunzi and Wang Fuzhi. The ideas of the ancients, of course, are naïve, while our ideas concerning the dynamic and revolutionary theories of knowledge as the reflection of reality, the dialectical materialist conception of the unity of knowledge and action, the law of contradiction, and the moments of dialectical logic, and so on, are of scientific form. They are thus qualitatively different from the naïve ideas of the ancients. This seeming “return,” therefore, is actually an unprecedented philosophical revolution. Third, Lenin made a scientific summary of the laws of the development of European philosophy in his Remarks on Dialectics by saying that philosophy from the Renaissance to recent times has undergone a development composed of three circles. Each of these three circles, I think, contains three antitheses: the antithesis of rationalism and empiricism, that of dogmatism and skepticism, as well as that of intuitive materialism and idealist dialectics. After overcoming past philosophical systems, we can see that the history of philosophy, as a dialectical movement of knowledge rooted in human social practice, and centering around the problem of the relationship between thought and being, evolves through such moments as the antithesis of sensation and reason, that of the absolute versus the relative, and that

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of materialism versus dialectics (including objective law vs. subjective initiative). On the whole, it is a forward movement proceeding in a spiral-like way. Does Lenin’s law governing modern European philosophy also apply to modern Chinese philosophy? Here, we should make a concrete analysis of the development of modern Chinese philosophy with modern Western philosophy as its reference of comparison, rather than mechanically applying the Western model. Modern Chinese philosophy started with Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan’s propositions, and continued with Kang Youwei’s aprioristic system, Yan Fu’s empiricism, and Zhang Taiyuan’s speculative philosophy—which started as rationalism and ended as voluntarism. During the May Fourth Movement, those who advocated voluntarism and intuitionalism, such as Liang Shuming and Zhang Junmai, were dogmatic metaphysicians, while those positivists, such as Hu Shi and Ding Wenjiang, tended towards relativism and agnosticism. The result of the development of modern Chinese philosophy is dialectical and historical materialism, in which materialism and dialectics are combined with each other. On the basis of this overview, we can say that modern Chinese philosophy almost followed the steps of modern European philosophy. The opposition between empiricism and rationalism and between dogmatism and relativism in China, nevertheless, has some different features when compared with their Western counterparts. Empiricism, for example, was fully developed in the hands of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Gassendi. Equally, rationalism was fully developed by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff. However, neither empiricism nor rationalism was fully developed in China. China has not seen any system of mechanical materialism as constructed by philosophers such as Holbach, who had a dogmatic tendency. Nor did China see any typical agnostic skeptics such as Hume and Kant. China has had no Spinoza or Hegel. One of the characteristics of China in modern times is that China has had one hundred years to undergo a process that took the West several hundred years. Therefore, we Chinese have had to “try hard to catch up,” as Sun Yat-sen pointed out, and to learn new truths from the West as rapidly as possible. Herein lies the reason that modern Chinese philosophy typically proceeded from one stage to another without waiting for the full development and summation of the former. This is like the learning process of a student. Under the guidance of a teacher, a student cannot circumvent the natural procedures of cognition. In other words, the student cannot skip those steps that are necessary in a natural process of knowledge. Advanced mathematics, for example, can only be learned after elementary mathematics. Similarly, Darwin’s theory of evolution should be learned after systematic study of botany. Einstein’s theory of relativity should be learned after Newton’s mechanics. But the learning process of a pupil, as one under the guidance of teacher and triggered by some external factors, need not completely repeat every moment in the process of knowing. Having to catch up to the West, modern Chinese thought did not always fully develop every moment of modern Western philosophy. However, it is still justified for Lenin to say that “each idea amounts to a circle in the great circle [spiral] of the development of human ideas as a whole.” Hegel shares this view. According to Hegel and Lenin, any philosophical idea will reach relative completion through some opposite moments in a tortuous way. The

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achievements of the philosophical revolution in modern China are nothing but a combination of Marxist philosophy with the concrete practice of Chinese revolution (including the great Chinese tradition), and the completion of a circle of development composed of the related moments of sensation versus reason, the absolute versus the relative, and the objective law versus the subjective initiative. No essential moment was skipped. Marxists later made the critical summation of each stage in this process, whereas their predecessors had been too hurried to make it for themselves. The process of the Sinicization of Marxist philosophy is at the same time the process of struggle inside the revolutionary camp against both empiricism and dogmatism, and right and left deviations. In China, the errors committed by the right deviationists manifested themselves as relativism and eclecticism, which overemphasized the compromise between opposites but neglected the struggle between them and overstressed the importance of objective conditions. Additionally, this played down the dynamic role of the subject. On the other hand, the errors committed by the left deviationists manifested themselves as dogmatism in which the “philosophy of struggle” overwhelmed unity and the dynamic role of the subject overshadowed objective conditions. Therefore, the overcoming of these two tendencies actually amount to the relatively complete grasp of the antitheses of sensation versus reason, of the absolute and the relative, of objective law and subjective initiative, and of the struggle and the unity between opposites through critical summation. From such a process comes a philosophy that, being relatively comprehensive, more or less completes the circle of the development. The combination of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese revolutionary practice does make the Sinicized Marxist philosophy a relatively comprehensive theory, in which there are concrete and historical unities between subject and object, between theory and practice, and between knowledge and action. We can say, therefore, that to a certain extent modern Chinese philosophy repeated the same steps found in the development of Western philosophy from the Renaissance to recent times. Moreover, it is through these moments that modern Chinese philosophy completed a developmental circle, and made outstanding achievements. The relative completion of a developmental circle is, of course, just the beginning of a new process of development. The philosophical revolution and the debates over the relation between past and present and between China and the West are not yet over. They continue in a new historical condition and a new form.

II The main thread of the evolution of modern Chinese philosophy is as follows: the philosophical arguments in the field of philosophy of history and the field of epistemology were combined into one in the form of the debate over the relation between “mind” and “matter/things.” This debate was, in turn, resolved by Marxists with their dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of

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relativity—the major positive result of the philosophical revolution in modern China. The debate in modern China over the relation between “mind” and “matter/ things,” a problem which has long been discussed both in China and in the West, can be characterized from the following two perspectives. First, negatively speaking, it can be understood in terms of the major target of attack of the philosophical revolution. Confucius says: “Superior people stand in awe of three things. They stand in awe of the Mandate of Heaven; they stand in awe of great people; and they stand in awe of the words of the sages.” Following Confucius, the orthodox Confucians from Dong Zhongshu to the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi all regarded what the sages said as the criterion of truth. Their epistemology was a dogmatic and authoritative one. As soon as the sages’ teachings were exposed as fraudulent or deceptive, the extreme opposite of dogmatism appeared in the form of relativism or nihilism (although the latter is actually a type of dogmatism as well). This sort of idealist theory of the Mandate of Heaven and the dogmatic study of Confucian classics is a decadent tradition in Chinese philosophy. It was attacked even in ancient times by some progressive thinkers. Under the rule of the feudalist dictatorship, however, this tradition could not possibly be broken. Progressive thinkers in modern times used evolutionism and the materialist conception of history to oppose the conception of history as created by the Mandate of Heaven. Additionally, they tried to oppose dogmatism and nihilism with dialectical materialism. Eventually, these progressive thinkers moved on to criticize this decadent tradition with the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, which is both an epistemology and a philosophy of history (the key to the conception of development in general). Second, positively speaking, in terms of the solution to the problem of the relation between mind and matter/things provided by the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, its characteristic is the combination of epistemology and philosophy of history. In ancient China, the debate over the relation between mind and mater/things was, on the whole, one which took place in the field of metaphysics and the field of epistemology. Since there were no ideas of social being and social consciousness, no questions concerning these two could possibly be discussed at that time. In the modern West, epistemology is above all connected with conceptions of nature. As a result of the urgency of answering the question “whither China,” however, the problems concerning society and history emerged in the foreground. Thus, the problems in the field of philosophy of society and history and the problems in the field of epistemology were closely related to one another, and finally resulted in the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge. The dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as a reflection of reality understands both social history and cognitive activity based on practice as processes in which objective reality is reflected and the dynamic role of the subject is displayed. This theory, therefore, combines the materialist theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality with a perspective on the dynamic role of the subject and practice.

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Right at the beginning of modern times, Gong Zizhen stressed the problem of subjectivity by advancing the proposition “the dominator of the masses is called ‘self’.” The discussion of Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan on the relation between “self” and “thing” was followed by Liang Qichao’s remark that this problem actually contained two aspects. One aspect is concerned with the relationship between individuals and the masses, and the other with the relationship between mind and matter/things. Thus understood, this is a problem which involves philosophy of society and history, and which relates to epistemology. Liang Qichao is the first philosopher who made a serious effort to discuss the epistemological problem of “self,” and the problem concerning social psychology and collective consciousness, though in an idealist form. The epistemological problem of the relationship between knowledge and practice was renewed in modern times by Wei Yuan. He put forth the proposition “knowing something after being involved in something,” which was discussed by both empiricists and apriorists, and eventually gave rise to the debate between those who held that “knowledge comes before action” and those who held that “action comes before knowledge.” Both Zhang Taiyan and Sun Yat-sen advanced certain dialectical ideas as they participated in this debate. Zhang Taiyan, for example, put forth the proposition “competition produces intelligence,” and explained the evolution of human society in terms of the idea of “competition by making use of instruments and rites.” In his evolutionist conception of “competition,” which combines in a sense epistemology and philosophy of history, there exist both a viewpoint of social practice and a materialist conception of history, albeit in rudimentary forms. During the May Fourth Movement, Li Dazhao took the lead in converting from evolutionism to Marxism. Li’s evolutionist conception of history is in a sense a rationalist one. After his conversion to the materialist conception of history, however, he began to explain social consciousness in terms of social being, and the evolution of social formations in terms of the contradictory movements of the forces of production and the relations of production. This basically expresses the idea that knowledge is a reflection of reality. It was because of the materialist conception of history, Li pointed out, that ordinary people were able to know that the working class created history. Thus, he thought, the individual was combined with the masses of the people, and was truly “conscious of his own sovereignty”. According to Li, those who move history forward are those who are brave enough to engage in the actual struggle. If people pay close attention to “the present,” namely, the present work, they can create the future based on the past and propel history forward. Grasping the Marxist viewpoint of practice, Li Dazhao highly praised the dynamic role of the subject; his answers to the problems of the relations between mind and matter/things, between individuals and the masses, and between knowledge and practice essentially contained the idea of a dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as a reflection of reality. But he made more remarks on philosophy of history than on epistemology. After Li Dazhao, Marxist philosophy developed alongside the practice of the Chinese revolution, and underwent a series of difficulties. Outside the Chinese

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Communist Party, struggles were waged against philosophical schools, including voluntarism, pragmatism, and contemporary New Confucianism. Inside the party, Qu Qiubai made a special effort to oppose empiricism and right-deviation, while Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi made a special effort to oppose dogmatism and left-deviation. The problem of “whither China?” was resolved through the combination of the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. And with the phrase “the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality,” Mao Zedong summed up the debate over the problem of the relation between mind and matter/things as a problem both of epistemology and of philosophy of history. On the basis of this theory, which incorporated certain contributions from Li Da and Ai Siqi, Mao explicated the sequence of the movement of knowledge, and characterized the dialectical movement of knowledge as an endless spiral. Here, practice and knowledge repeat themselves again and again, each circle of which, understood as a relatively completed ring in a spiral, is a concrete and historical unity of subject with object. And each circle is a higher stage of truth, unifying theory and practice, knowledge and action. Mao’s theory of knowledge is based heavily on history. At the same time, he generalized from the conception of history the dialectical conception of development in general. In this respect, Mao’s theoretical summary is expressed through the unity of epistemology and the philosophy of history (and the conception of development in general). His remarks on dialectics are related to his materialist and dialectical answers to the problems of the relations between mind and matter/things, between knowledge and action, and between individuals and the masses. Philosophy is the essence of its times. The debate over the relationship between mind and matter/things in epistemology and philosophy of history reflects, in a nutshell, the problems of that era. To correctly resolve this debate, therefore, is also to solve the central problem of the times. Under the guidance of the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, which is embodied in the party’s line of thought (“seeking truth from reality”), the Chinese people achieved the victory of the New Democratic Revolution and solved the problem “whither China?” Some professional philosophers also indirectly reflected the spirit of the times. Jin Yuelin, for example, took knowledge as a reflection of the objective process and the manifestation of the dynamic role of the subject when he justified his own theory of knowledge, according to which reality can be given by sensation. Jin writes that “the given is the manifestation of the object” and “the concept has a two-fold function of description and prescription.” This explicates the unity between sensation and reason and between facts and theory. Jin summarizes his entire theory as “applying what has been attained from experience to experience itself.” Unlike his Marxist contemporaries, Jin Yuelin did not make a synthesis of epistemology and philosophy of history on the basis of social practice. Instead, Jin followed his own road, which also led to the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality.

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This theory is the result of the combination of Marxism with the great tradition of Chinese philosophy, as well as the embodiment of the spirit of the times. It is arrived at through a revolutionary leap along with the absorption of the tradition of naïve materialism and dialectics. As the major achievement of the philosophical revolution in modern China, this theory is not only the scientific summation of the debate over the relation between mind and matter/things in epistemology and history, but also the theoretical guidance for the modernization of methodology and the inquiry into the problem of freedom. The establishment of the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, however, does not mean that no further work needs to be done. It remains for philosophers to develop this theory from various perspectives and, especially, to apply it to methodology and the theory of freedom. In terms of philosophical criticism, a difficult and lasting struggle remains to be made, under the guidance of the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality (or “seeking truth from reality”), against the conception of history as being decided by the Mandate of Heaven, and the dogmatism of classical learning (and nihilism), which, like a chameleon, are very good at changing their colors, and whose influence is very difficult to eradicate.

III An important part of the philosophical revolution is the revolution in the field of logic and methodology. In this respect, modern Chinese philosophers made many explorations, which produced some positive results and had some weaknesses. The essential demand of the methodological revolution is to replace the ancient methodology of classical learning with modern scientific methodology. According to orthodox Confucians, the Dao of Confucians and Mencius (and as expressed in major Confucian classics) has exhausted the truth. Therefore, people in later generations are only supposed to make exegeses and commentaries. New ideas can only be advanced in the form in which they are fully justifiable according to the Confucian classics. This methodology of classic learning is a terrible yoke upon people’s thinking, and a formidable obstacle to the modernization of China. Kang Youwei had already realized the necessity of modernizing methodology, although his philosophy still preserved the form of classical learning. His attempt to apply the methods of geometry and algebra in the field of society and history, though leading to apriorism, foreshadowed the fact that philosophy would, by absorbing rich substance from modern science, develop new methods that would supplant the classical ones. Liang Qichao completely rejected the tradition of Confucian classical learning, which was “dependence and analogy.” He advocated “eliminating the slavery of the mind” and stressed freedom of thought as the origin of truth. Liang also promised that true knowledge would endlessly spring up once reason was emancipated. During the May Fourth Movement, Chen Duxiu upheld the great banners of

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“democracy” and “science,” meanwhile the slogan “Destroy the antiquity shop of Confucians” prevailed. The leaders of the New Culture Movement all highlighted the importance of free discussion and debate, and they were aware of the inseparability of science and democracy. They also understood that, in order for the method of classical learning to be replaced by the scientific method, the principle of free thought must be abided by and the dogmatism of “standardizing everything according to one supreme authority” must be rejected. Li Dazhao made special remarks to the effect that the cult of heroes and sages must be opposed, because even if the sages could bring benefit to the people, their cult would also give rise to serious side effects. For example, the masses who received favors from the sages could easily lose their independent personalities and sink into slavery. So he said that “our Chinese nation started to degenerate with the birth of Confucius.” Now, the question is: what kind of scientific method should replace the method of classical learning? Yan Fu was the first one who consciously introduced Western logic to China. He criticized the Chinese “normal procedure of argumentation,” which starts with “it is stated in the Book of Songs that…” or “it is said by Confucius that...” Accordingly, new knowledge is possible only through induction. In Yan’s view, there are four major steps that comprise induction: first, collecting relevant factual materials by observation and experimentation; second, making a hypothesis on the basis of the collected facts; third, justifying and inferring from the hypothesis through deduction; and lastly, verifying the hypothesis with facts or experimentation. Generally speaking, these four steps do contain the major elements of modern scientific methodology, which were badly needed by the Chinese. But Yan Fu places emphasis on induction only. Unlike Yan Fu, Zhang Taiyan stressed deduction, thinking that the “Dao of argumentation,” or the method of logical reasoning, consists first in putting forth a proposition, second in providing grounds or reasons, and last in making a comparison on the basis of class. Liang Qichao and Wang Guowei both took logic seriously, but their contributions are mainly to the historical method. With the theory of historical evolution as their theoretical basis, they surpassed the historians of the School of East Zhejiang. Hu Shi tried to make a synthesis of what had been done by his predecessors. The first requirement of his methodology is “show me the evidence!” Anything which lacks evidence should be put under suspicion. Under this presupposition, he suggested two fundamental methods: the “method of scientific experimentation” and the “genetic method.” The “method of scientific experimentation” basically means being bold in making hypotheses while cautious in verifying them. Hu Shi made a comparison between the method of textual criticism and the scientific method in the West, to the effect that in both of these methods factual materials are the basis on which hypotheses are advanced; these hypotheses are in turn put to the test, through which those supported by strong evidence are regarded as justified and those falsified by strong counter-evidence are rejected. He pointed out that natural scientists are superior to those who are engaged in textual criticism in that they can produce new evidence by means of experiments rather than by passively following materials. With his “be bold in making hypotheses,” however, Hu Shi more or less

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overlooked the important role played by mathematical proof and inference; this means that he, like Yan Fu, preferred induction to deduction. Hu Shi’s “genetic method” or “historical method,” on the other hand, is a call to trace historical evolution from the evolutionist perspective, to find its causes, and to pass judgment on them. These are, on the whole, reasonable ideas, though Hu Shi’s historical pluralism prevented him from truly clarifying the causal laws in history. Jin Yuelin was the first to introduce Russell’s mathematical logic into China. Jin also developed a penetrating study of the principles of methodology. The laws of formal logic, he said, are basic preconditions for thinking, and the criteria according to which propositions and theories are selected in various sciences. Any science, if it is to be an exact system at all, must take formal logic as its tool. In this sense, formal logic is important as a general methodology. As early as the ancient Greeks, the significant role formal logic plays in the systematization of sciences was known in Europe. This fact is clearly demonstrated by Euclidean geometry. But the Chinese overlooked it. Jin Yuelin, however, provided penetrating theoretical explications about formal logic. Similarly, he pointed out that “the so-called scientific method consists precisely in receiving nature with the laws of nature, or inquiring into nature with the laws of nature as a tool or instrument.” In other words, in their observations and experiments, scientists apply the laws of nature as patterns of receiving, or they apply the “principle” of the natural processes to the natural processes themselves. In these cases, scientific theories are turned into tools and methods. These remarks on the basic principles of methodology of the experimental sciences are close to dialectical ones. However, Jin identified the “chief principle of receiving” with the principle of induction alone. The historical method was greatly developed in the process of the Sinicization of Marxist philosophy. The historians of the School of East Zhejiang sought to understand the Dao (the Dao in general) from facts. The evolutionists attempted to understand causes (the law of causality in positive sciences) through clarifying changes. The materialist conception of history aims to expose the real foundation of the development on the basis of the unity of the historical and the logical, and in this way to grasp the whole process of the development of contradiction. Mao Zedong attached great importance to researching methodology. He was serious about studying the methods of social investigation, the methods of being from the masses and to the masses, and the methods of military research. He also pointed out the unity of methodology and epistemology and the dialectical conception of development. From his works, we can generalize the moments of the methodology of dialectical logic, which can be roughly stated as follows: First, to proceed from reality, to investigate objectively and comprehensively the history and the present situation of the object, and to grasp the grounds of the object’s change and development on the basis of understanding its elementary and essential relations. Second, to apply the law of the unity of opposites as the fundamental method, whose core is the combination of analysis and synthesis. This contains three moments, “beginning, advancing, and termination,” which clarify different possibilities of development on the basis of contradiction-orientation analysis of the

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“grounds.” Here, the emphasis is on the dominant possibility (that is, the necessary tendency of the development), and explaining how the conditions for realizing the possible benefits to people can be created based on objective laws. Third, the combination of induction and deduction. Fourth, the combination of the historical and the logical. The third and fourth points are parts of the method of the combination of analysis and synthesis. In the case where the emphasis of the inquiry into objective contradictions is placed on the horizontal investigation, the combination of deduction and induction is the primary method. In the case where the emphasis is placed on the vertical investigation, the combination of the historical and logical is primary. Fifth, to test the ideas with facts at each step, to combine the theoretical with the practical throughout the whole process, and to analyze the contradictions in reality while commenting on different opinions and viewpoints. The concise summary stated above contains in a critical manner the achievements of the exploration made by modern Chinese philosophers in the field of methodology on the basis of materialist dialectics. The idea held by our predecessors that the method of classical learning should be replaced by the scientific method, the essence of induction, deduction, and historical method, and their methodological application of the categories of class (generality), cause/reason (basis), and principle (law and logic), are all organically combined with one another and placed on the foundation of materialist dialectics. Formal logic, as an essential precondition for thought and a tool for organizing any scientific system, still preserves its position as a separate logic, which cannot be replaced by dialectical logic. It is also necessary to apply the method of analysis in formal logic to philosophical study (including the study of traditional Chinese philosophy), so as to make our concepts clearer and our reasoning more exact. What has been said above, however, is a methodology that had not been outlined until we made a review of the history of modern Chinese philosophy. In fact, before 1949, no systematic summary had been made of the explorations of modern philosophers in the field of methodology. As a result, the methodological mistakes made by Marxists were not exposed. One of the two major mistakes in this respect is the simplification of and overemphasis on class analysis, which is related to the exaggeration of the class nature of human beings. The other major error was due to the fact that insufficient effort was made in analyzing the traditional Chinese way of thinking. This is especially true in terms of calling into question the method of classical learning, including the method of classical learning disguised in revolutionary language. This is why, during the Cultural Revolution, when the cult of personality replaced democratic discussion, quotations from classic Marxists, especially those used by Mao Zedong, replaced scientific justifications. The people were not aware that these phenomena were actually pernicious remnants of feudalist society.

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IV The ultimate goal of the philosophical revolution is freedom, or the reconstruction of society and human beings. In this respect, modern Chinese philosophers also made many explorations, both attaining positive achievements and displaying some weaknesses. The problem of freedom can be presented from two perspectives, one positive and the other negative. From the negative perspective, namely, in terms of the target of attack freedom in the modern sense consists in rejecting the fetters of feudalist authoritarianism, ethical rites, and codes. Following Gong Zizhen’s exposition of and attack on the “decayed age,” modern progressive thinkers incessantly criticized the old world. Tan Sitong fiercely attached Confucian ethics, calling for the chains of bondage to be broken. Under the slogan “revolution of morality,” Liang Qichao criticized both the totalitarian repression by those of the upper class and the slavish mentality of those in the lower class. During the New Culture Movement, an unprecedentedly violent attack was made on the outdated Confucian morality. Lu Xun, who was engaged his entire life in analyzing the “national characteristics,” was aware of the complicated and difficult nature of the reconstruction of society and the people. As Lu saw it, Chinese society was hierarchical—composed of masters and slaves—and this arrangement was defended by Confucian morality and the theory of the Mandate of Heaven. The long-lasting domination of Confucian teachings gave rise to the Chinese ideas of “face” and “fate.” With the decay and collapse of the feudalist system, the rulers and their lackeys were both turned into “play-acting nihilists” who “have no wills of their own.” This kind of nihilism also had a toxic influence on society as a whole, undermining all attempts to build a solid foundation. Considering that these deep-rooted bad characteristics formed over thousands of years, and were extremely resistant to change, Lu Xun remarked, “if they are not reformed, the revolution will amount to nothing; like a tower built on sand, it will collapse in no time.” From the positive perspective, namely, in terms of the goal sought by the people, freedom means establishing the “realm of freedom,” to cultivate the “free personality,” and thus to arrive at the humanist sphere of the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. This can be explained from the following three points of view. First, in terms of the ideal society, modern thinkers typically regarded the ideal society as lying in the future, and opposed the theory of “back to ancient times.” Hong Xiuquan rehabilitated the idea of “great unity” in “Evolutionof Rites”, advocating the establishment of a “Heavenly kingdom” on Earth through the struggle of revolutionary masses. Kang Youwei’s “Age of Great Unity,” on the other hand, was a utopia with human freedom, equality, and fraternity as its essence. Sun Yat-sen’s idea of “a world belonging to the people” was interpreted at the outset as “a government of the people, by the people, and for the people,” and was later related to communism. As was the case in the West, socialism in China underwent a process from utopian socialism to scientific socialism. Li Dazhao took

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the lead in scientifically grounding the ideal of the great unity in the materialist conception of history, and stressed the unity of scientific socialism and humanism, and the unity of the great solidarity and the emancipation of individuality. This is what was described in the Communist Manifesto: “in the place of the old bourgeois society in which there are classes and class struggles will be an association where the free development of each person is the precondition for the free development of all people.” Second, in terms of the ideal of human life, modern philosophers replaced the sage of feudalist times with the free personality of ordinary people as the ideal. Gong Zizhen argued from the proposition that the masses should be the rulers of themselves. Yan Fu and Zhang Taiyan, though opposed to each other in ethics, the one in favor of utilitarianism and the other against it, both affirmed that one’s behavior could be interpreted as good or evil, right or wrong, only if one had an independent personality and free will. Under the feudalist system defended by Confucian morality, those of the upper classes can do whatever they like, while those of the lower classes have to do what they are asked. As a result, there is no need to “be true in word and resolute in deed.” By contrast, in a democracy, individuals have independent personalities and free will, which gives them a stronger sense of moral responsibility for their own behavior. In other words, it makes them take seriously the idea of being “true in word and resolute in deed.” These ideas, stressing the principle of voluntariness of one’s moral behavior (out of free will), have anti-feudal significance—and most people during the New Culture Movement agreed with them. However, overemphasis on these ideas, at the expense of the principle of consciousness, can lead to voluntarism and indeterminism. The debate over science and metaphysics is basically one between those who defended voluntarism and those who believed in indeterminism. During a period after that debate, when the Chinese fascists agitated for voluntarism, Marxists and some professional philosophers placed more emphasis on the principle of consciousness of moral behavior. Qu Qiubai’s historical determinism and the idea of “a person as a tool,” though historically understandable, are theoretically one-sided. Feng Youlan’s differentiation of spheres of living according to the level of understanding and consciousness, on the other hand, though containing reasonable elements, is actually a justification for orthodox Confucianism. But Lu Xun already depicted the image of a truly free personality. A pioneer, he said, should have both a sober intellect and strong willpower, and be ready to fight a tenacious struggle for the benefit of the masses. Genuine pioneers always regard themselves as belonging to the masses: “They use different expedients too, but never deception. They use various inducements, but never pander to the popular taste. Such people do not demean themselves by acting as clowns for the masses, nor do they look down on others and count them as their minions.” Those “play-acting nihilists” who use deception are bandits, while those minions who are absolutely obedient are mere lackeys. Reform or revolution, being intended precisely to destroy the order of bandits and lackeys, therefore demands promoting independent personality and getting rid of the mentalities of bandits and lackeys. The free personality depicted by Lu Xun is consistent with the image of a

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communist who really holds the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality and the three great styles of the party. Such a personality has a revolutionary utilitarian attitude. For these people—who base themselves on the position of the masses—righteousness and profit, motive and effects are respectively are united. People of this type respect themselves as well as others. In their attitudes toward themselves and others, the principle of voluntariness and the principle of consciousness are united. In other words, they solve the problem of the relation between individuals and the masses in a relatively correct way. Third, the problem of human freedom is related to theories of human nature and theories of value. According to orthodox Confucians, human freedom consists in “following one’s destiny” and “recovering one’s nature,” because “what is endowed by Heaven is called nature.” Progressive thinkers in modern times rejected this fatalism, and explained human nature in terms of evolutionism and the materialist conception of history. Evolutionists understood humankind as a biological species. This idea, though belonging to an abstract theory of human nature (that is, reducing human nature to sensuality, reason, desire, and the will), implies the equality of all people and thus has anti-feudalist significance. Marxists, on the other hand, think that “there is only concrete human nature; in a class society, there is only that human nature that is related to class nature.” The theory of human nature connected to a materialist conception of history, though absorbing some reasonable elements from the old theories, including the idea that “nature is developed through habit/ practice,” surpasses all its predecessors in terms of its understanding of freedom and in terms of the practice-based unity of the reconstruction of the environment and the reconstruction of human nature. Regarding labor as the most essential feature of human beings, the Marxist conception of labor attaches special importance to the production of material wealth in society. Marxism identifies labor as the basis for a reasonable system of values. From the viewpoint of laborers, Marxists think that “something is good only if it is in the people’s real interest.” “Goodness,” in its elementary sense, lies at the foundation of people’s most basic interests. It is from these basic interests that ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness are derived. These three values are related to three essential human powers: intellect, will, and emotions, respectively. The notion of both the ideal “realm of freedom” and the ideal free personality as the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty has a long history dating back to ancient times. Now it is provided with a new theoretical grounding; namely, the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality. On the basis of this theory, we can probably define freedom as the realization of ideals. Epistemologically, freedom is the knowledge of what is necessary and, accordingly, the reconstruction of the world. This is the realization of true knowledge as a scientific ideal. Ethically, freedom means that one follows the normative rules (moral norms) in everyday life voluntarily and consciously; that is, norms as the embodiment of the ethical ideal of progressive humans are realized one’s social behaviors and in certain ethical interpersonal relationships. Aesthetically, freedom means that humans intuit themselves in what Marx called “the humanized nature,” or that essential human

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powers are objectified in the humanized nature or in works of art. This is the realization of human aesthetic ideals in vivid images full of human emotions. In different areas, freedom has different connotations; freedom itself, as the realization of a certain ideal, is always historically conditioned. Similarly, the political notion of liberty and the philosophical notion of freedom, though different from each other, are closely connected with each other. Many achievements have been arrived at through the Marxist explorations of the problem of human freedom. Taking the unity of great solidarity and the emancipation of individuality as the goal of the whole nation is to strive for freedom in light of true understanding. To cultivate a free personality of ordinary people, which solves the problem of the relationships between righteousness and profit and between individuals and the masses, and personalizes the unity of the principle of voluntariness and the principle of consciousness, is to strive for a sort of freedom in the new type of ethical relations. Lu Xun based his aesthetic theory on revolutionary utilitarianism, discussed the problem of a typical character, and stressed the fact that there was a tradition of “passion and indignation” in the Chinese arts, which encourages people to boldly expose the contradictions in reality—thus, Lu Xun’s work provided an original foundation for establishing Sinicized Marxist aesthetics. Some philosophers also made contributions concerning the problem of human freedom through their studies in the field of epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Jin Yuelin made penetrating inquiries into the problem of truth, but classified the problem of freedom as a “metaphysical theme.” Both Feng Youlan’s idea of “understanding and consciousness” and Xiong Shili’s idea that “nature and cultivation are not two separate things” are the result of exploring the extent to which certain reasonable elements in Confucian ethical thought are valuable. In terms of aesthetics, the Chinese and Western traditions have their own distinctive features. The theory of a typical character was developed quite early in Western narratives, while the theory of artistic spheres in lyrical arts was developed early in China. During modern times, when Western and Chinese theories of art and aesthetic experience encountered one another, Chinese scholars naturally found differences between them and then tried to interpret and complement the one by using the other. Wang Guowei showed his readers a new world in his interpretation of the traditional Chinese theory of artistic spheres with the help of the Western theory of typical character. Zhu Guangqian explained, in terms of expressionism, how the self is expressed through a combination of the elements of image and feeling in an artistic sphere. Zhong Baihua paid more attention to the “Dao of art,” stressing the ideal aspects of artistic spheres. All these theories eventually led to various types of idealism, but they had given traditional aesthetics a modern form. Given the aforementioned achievements, it should be noted that no systematic summation was made about the modern philosophers’ explorations concerning a theory of human freedom, and the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty. That explains why certain theoretical deviations were not well exposed. There are two such major deviations. First, there is a deviation concerning the nature of human beings. The problem of human freedom is, in the last analysis, a problem

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concerning human nature. Marxism has already given a scientific explanation of human nature. In modern China, however, when class struggles were very fierce, Marxists tended to reduce human nature to class nature. The result was that they often overlooked both human individuality and national psychology (or national mentality). Later, Lu Xun’s penetrating analysis of “national characteristics” was simply ignored. Vigilance was lost with regard to the stubborn force of habit and the influence of tradition, which had existed for thousands of years. To ignore individuality is basically to ignore the principle of voluntary human nature. This resulted in a situation in which the masses were treated as instruments, and the “cult of personality” was greatly developed. Finally came the “campaign against the masses” (as opposed to a campaign of the masses) known as the Cultural Revolution. The second of the two major deviations was that fatalism and voluntarism was not truly abandoned either in theory or in practice. Eventually, the Communist Party was caught in blindness, which led to either left or right deviation. During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the Party went further in exaggerating the dynamic role of the subject and the role played by superstructure, as well as preaching the dogmatic “philosophy of struggle” and voluntarism. Radicalization of voluntarism often leads to its opposite, that is, fatalism and nihilism. During the Cultural Revolution, fatalism ran rampant along with voluntarism. After the personality cult was destroyed, many people simply surrendered to nihilism, hence the subsequent “crisis of belief.”

V In the above sections we made a summary of both the positive achievements and the weaknesses of the philosophical development in modern China. In this section we are going to make an analysis of these weaknesses from the perspective of the origin of philosophy and its relatively independent development––since, in my view, the history of philosophy is a process rooted in social practice having relative independence. As the root of philosophy, social practice advances the development of philosophy both via the struggle in the field of political thought and via sciences (natural and social sciences and humanities)—neither of them can be overlooked at the expense of the other. In modern China, the problem “wither China?” was an extremely urgent problem, a problem of vital importance to the whole nation. In the field of political thought this problem was reflected as the debate over the relation between past and present and that between China and the West, which greatly enhanced the development of modern Chinese philosophy. Therefrom came a striking feature of modern Chinese philosophy: getting impetus and revolutionary spirit from the political struggle of the society and giving the latter great service in return. This fact, however, also resulted in a problem: the progressive thinkers in modern China (including Marxists) overstressed the political function of

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philosophy as a form of ideology, and overlooked the scientific nature of philosophy as a form of theoretical thinking, and its relations with special sciences. It is this demerit of the philosophical revolution in modern China that is responsible for the fact that modern Chinese thinkers did not, like their Western counterparts, establish a close alliance between philosophy and natural science. Many Western philosophers were at the same time natural scientists who made great contributions to development of natural sciences, and their worldviews were also related to the modern natural sciences. But, as a result of the fact that they devoted their greatest enthusiasm and effort to the most urgent political problems, and the fact that modern natural sciences were very underdeveloped in China, they failed to provide for philosophy with a solid foundation connected with natural science. This is the case with Kang Youwei, Sun Yah-sen as well as Mao Zhedong. In modern China, neither bourgeois philosophers nor Marxists managed to make great contributions to the conception of nature. In terms of the relatively independent development of philosophy, the basic foundation of modern Chinese philosophy came from the West and the tradition of China. Here there is also a problem of the relation between past and present and that between China and the West. Weaknesses can also be found in the efforts made by modern Chinese philosophy to solve this problem. As far as the relation between China and the West is concerned, most thinkers in modem China were too utilitarian-minded towards absorbing Western ideas. Urged by the pressing political struggle, very often they wasted no time in copying certain theories from the West and then applying them as a guide for social reform. Their understanding and acceptance of Western culture were, more often than not, shallow. The Sinification of Marxist philosophy is a great achievement of the convergence of Chinese and Western philosophy, but the Chinese learned Marxism mainly via books written by Russians (where there were many rigid dogmas), so they had very little knowledge and made even less systematic study of Western culture and its development, against whose background Marxism was developed. Some dogmatists even set the Sinification of Marxism against learning from the West. Their Sinified Marxism thus became a closed system. With regards to the relation between past and present, modern Chinese thinkers tended to be in one of the two extreme positions: in order to solve the urgent problems in their actual struggles, when they aimed to break the fetter imposed on the peop1e by the strong feudalist tradition, they tended to advocate radical anti-traditional slogans and opinions, while when they found it necessary to arouse the people’s sense of confidence in their own nation, they tended to express more approval of the traditional culture. This means that in the process of philosophical revolution in modern China, no profound and concrete analysis was made of the long cultural tradition and its actual influence. There is a striking phenomenon in modern China: those who had taken lead in seeking truth from West and making sharp criticism of traditional culture in their earlier years went back, nevertheless, to ancient books and Confucian classics in their later years. This is just a result of the blindness in their attitude towards tradition. Chinese Marxists made some analytical investigations on traditional culture. But these investigations are, on the whole,

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quite elementary. Moreover, they underestimated in a way the inertia of the tradition. The result of these facts is that those decadent things in the traditional culture could ran rampant during the Cultural Revolution in the garb of Marxism. From the observations made above from the perspective of both “origin” and “current” of philosophy, we perceive that there are some deficiencies in the process of the philosophical revolution in modern China, which resulted in some weaknesses in the theoretical achievements of this revolution. The deviations of Chinese Marxists in the respects of methodology and the problem of human freedom are two of the most evident examples. The deficiencies of the philosophical revolution and the weaknesses in its achievements made themselves seen most clearly during the Cultural Revolution. Reviewing the modern history after this period, we can be soberly aware of the negative influences of the traditional Chinese culture upon the evolution of modem Chinese philosophy, which have been underestimated before. Herein lie some profound lessons concerning theoretical thinking, which can be explained from the following three points of view. Firstly, the main targets of attack of the modern philosophical revolution—the theory of Mandate of Heaven and the dogmatism of classical learning (and nihilism, the opposite of dogmatism arrived at when the latter is radicalized to a certain point) —are not only philosophical theories, but also social forces which have a long history and are good at disguising themselves. Consequently it is not an easy job to get them eradicated. Chinese politics from the Han dynasty on, supposedly directed by Confucianism as the only dominant ideology, was actually a mixture of the so-called kingly way with the violent way of rule, and that of Confucianism with legalism. The feudalist autocrats were used to “keeping one’s position in a yin way while acting in public in a yang way,” which is suggested by Dong Zhongshu. They publicly claimed to be following the Mandate of Heaven, worshiping Confucius and reading Confucian classics, with the aim to conceal their abuse of violence and punishment. Thus arose the situation in which, though Confucianism was regarded as the only dominant ideology, “those of the upper classes are followers of Shen Buhai and Han Fei, while those of the lower classes are believers in Buddhism and Taoism,” as Wang Fuzi described. The totalitarian rulers oppressed the people under the signboard of “Confucian morality” and “Mandate of Heaven”, and “murdered people with Confucian rites.” Common people (including ordinary Confucians), powerless to resist “Mandate of Heaven” or “Principle of Heaven”, became either apathetic and conformist or pessimistic and world-weary. The theory of Mandate of Heaven, dogmatism and nihilism complemented each other—that is a decadent tradition formed under the totalitarian system of more than two thousand years. In modern times, this decadent tradition appeared with new features. As a result of the gradual bankruptcy of the feudalist system, the Confucian ethical code, classical learning and “Mandate of Heaven” all degenerated into “corpses.” They, however, can still be made use of after being dressed theatrical consumes, to cheat and oppress the people. Hence come what Lu Xun calls “the play-acting nihilists”. In their hearts, they believe in nothing but power and money. They turn all solemn

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slogans into disguises, under which are covered pragmatists and nihilists with regards to the problem of value. These people are of great harm to the society, not only because they are persons in power who can do all sorts of evil directly, but also because they are, as well as their hired men of letters, can spread widely in the society the attitudes of nihilism and skepticism, with their own doings: thinking in one way and behaving in another; saying in way and doing in another; changing mind whenever it brings them profit; having no convictions of their own. We can say that “those of the upper classes act as if they are in play, while those of the lower classes are skeptical of everything” is the modem version of “those of the upper classes are followers of Shen Buhai and Han Fei, while those of the lower classes are believers in Buddhism and Taoism.” As time passes, a force of habit or national mentality characterized by “having no conviction of one’s own”––that is what Lu Xun calls the “deep-rooted bad habit.” The phenomenon Lu Xun describes was in the old society. But the new society comes from the old one. The forces of habit, formed in the course of thousands of years, are so stubborn that they can even turn Marxism into a mere “theatrical costume”, under whose disguise the decadent tradition, in which dogmatism and nihilism complement each other, reappears on the stage. This is evidenced by history during and after the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, when the cult of personality reached its peak, a handful of careerists and literary prostitutes, who believed in “keeping one’s position in a yin way while acting in public in a yang way,” took advantage of the occasion to fan the flames of disorder. This in turn resulted in a serious “crisis of belief” in the society as a whole. Secondly, the dual nature of the peasant consciousness has a profound impact upon modern Chinese philosophy. The process of modern philosophical revolution, as a process in which the revolutionary worldview of the Chinese people developed from the stage of being-in-itself to the stage of being-for-itself, can be illustrated with the development of the idea of “realizing the ideal of the society through the revolutionary struggle of the masses.” This idea, implicit in revolution Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, was given a scientific form by Communists, and thus became a conscious one. The Chinese people, the largest part of them being peasants, both believe in destiny and believe that men can try to change their destiny. This is a promising fact. But in the past they tried in vain, because then they tried to change their destiny by superstition, such as hiring a Daoist priest who knew witchcraft or by believing in the Religion of Worshiping God. The victory was won by the people’s revolution when superstition was replaced by science, and spontaneity by consciousness. That is the process from Hong Xiuquan through Sun Yah-sen up to the Communists. Any sort of being self-conscious, however, is relative. The Chinese Communists won the revolution with the support of peasants and by encircling the cities from the rural areas. But the revolutionary, diligent peasantry and the conservative, superstitious peasantry are the same peasantry. The class of small farmers, connected with the natural economy, is not representative of the new forces of production. They have the Utopian idea of agricultural socialism, and worship those authorities which stand high above them. As soon as these authorities are abolished, however,

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they would turn into a sheet of loose sand, and be in the control of spontaneous forces. This mentality of small peasantry is very obstinate. The combination of this with the national mentality resulted from the long domination of autocracy, as we said above, gives rise to a dilemma in which China is always trapped during its modern era. On the one hand, having scattered and small-scale agricultural economy, it is necessary to form a centralized power to organize the scattered forces of revolution into one in order to resist the invasion and humiliation from foreign countries. This, however, would easily result in the domination of society by administrative powers. Because of the lack of democratic elements in the old system and the influence of the force of habit, on the other hand, those who are in power could easily degenerate into a gang of bureaucrats whose words and deeds are inconsistent with each other and who have no convictions of their own. This would in turn foster the situation of “a sheet of loose sand”. Undergoing such a process of fluctuations since the late Qin dynasty, China remains in this dilemma even now, though it has made some progress. This process of fluctuation being reflected in theory, the development of the revolutionary worldview from being-in-itself to being-for-itself is also a fluctuated one: relapses after progress and set-backs following achievements. The fact that the philosophical revolution in modem China suffered such a serious relapse during the Cultural Revolution after attaining important achievements is related to the dual nature of the mentality of the peasantry. Thirdly, as a result of the demands of revolutionary struggle and the influence of international communist movement, Chinese communists overstressed class struggles (political and ideological ones); this deviation was strengthened by the impact of the Confucian tradition which emphasizes politics and ethics. The tendency appeared after the1930s among the Marxists to overlook the emancipation of individuality and the principle of voluntariness, and the fact that little effort has been paid to expose and criticize the methodology of classical learning, both have something to do with the influence of Confucianism. It should be particularly mentioned that after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, administrative powers were employed many times to start campaigns of struggle and criticism with the aim to “standardize everything according to a supreme authority,” with the result that at first the policy of “letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend” was terribly distorted, and at last a “comprehensive dictatorship” was imposed on the field of ideology and “a thousand horses were made stand mute” during the Cultural Revolution––this, in fact, is a variety of “worshiping Confucianism alone and abolishing all other schools of thought”. What has been said above implies that we must not overlook the negative influence of the traditional culture on the development of modem Chinese philosophy. This itself is a very important lesson. Tradition is a rich and mixed storehouse of both the essence and the dross of a nation’s culture, which cannot be easily differentiated from each other. In the process of philosophical revolution and the Sinification of Marxism in modem China, an important role has been played by the traditions of China––the theories of naive materialism and dialectics, the profound

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enthusiasm of patriotism and the tenacious spirit of struggling for truth found in progressive thinkers of various periods, and the revolutionary worldview implicit in the masses of the people, etc. At the same time, those in the tradition that belong to its dross, such as the theory of the Mandate of Heaven, dogmatism and nihilism, the statecraft of “keeping one’s position in a yin way while acting in public in a yang way” under the domination of Confucianism, and the narrow-mindedness and superstition of the class of small farmers, are playing their part also. With the evolution of modem philosophy, during which the part of essence is developed, and seems to have a very promising future, the part of dross has not passed away automatically, although it changes itself. We cannot deny that the character and the cultivation of such an outstanding person as Mao Zhedong have important impacts upon the development of history. Mao Zhedong said that he had both the “temper of a tiger” and the “temper of a monkey”. This can be seen from the fact that he dared to despise authorities, and went deep into the essence of the traditional Chinese culture. It is because of this that he could make enormous contributions to the Sinification of Marxism. In his later years, however, he encouraged the cult of individuality. This means that his mind is also poisoned by the dross in the traditional culture. When the cult of individuality arrived at a point where nobody except one in the whole nation was allowed to think with his own brain, the damaging function of the decadent tradition grew to an unprecedented extent. To be aware of the deficiencies of the philosophical revolution in modern China, and to learn from them the lessons concerning theoretical thinking, are important preconditions for the continuation of the philosophical revolution.

VI The revolution of modern Chinese philosophy was not accomplished with the victory of the people’s revolution. The book Yi Jing concludes with the hexagram “ji ji” (既济), meaning “completion”, with the last hexagram “wei ji” (未济), meaning “not yet completed”. That means that all completions are relative and development itself is endless. With Sinified Marxist philosophy modern Chinese philosophy completed a circle (spiral) in the process of development. In the “completion”, however, is implied “wei ji”––“not yet completed”. A new page of history has already started. “How to modernize the country?”, a problem concerning construction has replaced “Wither China?”, a problem concerning revolution, as the central problem of the era. We are now constructing a type of socialism with Chinese characteristics through reform and opening to the outside world. Thus the problem of the relations between past and present and between China and the West has gotten new historical content. If the task of modern philosophy was to study the “logic of revolution”, then the task of contemporary philosophy is to study the “logic of construction”. How can the philosophical revolution be developed under the new historical condition? In the remaining part

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of the book we are going to present our three prospects for the future on the basis of our review of the past. Firstly, we should make more effort to develop what we have already achieved, and draw lessons from the theoretical mistakes committed before. As the major achievement of the philosophical revolution in modern times, the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality should be developed further. The task of the gradual modernization of China on the basis of the nation’s conditions, or the realization of Li Dazhao’s ideal of a sort of socialism which is consistent with humanism, and of turning the society into an organism full of vigor in its self-adjustment and self-improvement, requires that we inquire into new facts, resolve new problems, and learn new experiences according to the principle of “seeking truth from reality”, and these in turn require that we develop the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality under the new historical conditions and give it a new form thereby. At the same time, we should make a serious effort to learn lessons from history, and continue the struggle against what is outmoded in tradition. We must not lower our guard against the fact that the phenomena left over by the old society, such as the alienating forces of power and money, and the tradition in which the theory of the Mandate of Heaven and dogmatism accompanied by nihilism, can appear with new features. In terms of subjective elements, one of the reasons why the achievements of philosophical revolution were sabotaged lies in the fact that no effort was made to sum up what has been done with regards to logic and methodology and the problem of human freedom on the basis a conscious application of the dynamic and revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, and therefore not enough exposition and criticism was made of the methodology of classical learning and the ideas of voluntarism and fatalism. On the basis of reflection on history, we know clearly that in order for the democratic self-education of the masses to be possible, deeper study should be made concerning the national characteristics of the Chinese people in the mode of logical thinking and ideas of ethical value; the fundamental principles of logic and methodology (e.g., the relation between formal logic and dialectic logic, the epistemological implications of logical categories, their relation to methodology, and the relation of emancipation of the mind to scientific methods, etc.); the problem of human freedom (e.g., the unity of the ideal society with the ideal life, the unity of the principle of consciousness and the principle of voluntariness in ethics, basic principles of a reasonable system of value, and the relation between human nature and the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty, etc.). These theoretical problems are of great importance to the construction of a socialist spiritual civilization, the development of sciences and culture in our country, and the cultivation of a new, socialist, type of man. We can enhance the philosophical revolution and develop Marxist philosophy greatly if we can learn lessons from past experiences, make summary of the achievements of modern philosophy in the respects of logical methods and theory of freedom, and make up deficiencies in these respects.

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Secondly, we should strengthen the union between philosophy and science, especially with the natural sciences. The dialectical conception of development arrived at in the modem philosophical revolution was, on the whole, generalized from the field of social history, because of the lack of a close connection of this revolution with the natural sciences, which can be seen clearly from both evolutionist philosophy and Mao Zhedong’s “On Contradiction”. This deficiency of modem philosophy not only has not been overcome, but also tends to be more serious. Now we are facing a new revolution of science and technology, the quickly developing natural sciences pose many problems to which philosophy should respond. Thus it is more important now than before to strengthen the union between philosophy and the natural sciences. Ancient Chinese philosophy, especially its tradition of naive materialism, was closely connected with natural sciences at that time. The conception of nature of ancient Chinese philosophers, however, is different from that of the ancient Western philosophers. The Chinese developed at quite an early stage a conception of nature in the form of “Qi-monism”, according to which the origin of all things is qi (气, vital force)––qi divides itself into yi and yang, while the unity or interaction of these two opposite forces gives rise to the Heaven, the earth, and everything else. This conception of nature contains in itself ideas of naive dialectics, and is close to the notion of “field” in modern physics. By contrast, the Westerners developed quite early and quite consistently atomism. The development of modem sciences was heavily influenced by atomism; the latter was a dominant theory in the stage of mechanic materialism. Atomism was introduced into China when sciences in the modern West made their presence felt in China. In modern Chinese philosophy, nevertheless, more attention was paid to “ether” rather than “atom”, mainly due to the fact that the notion of “ether” is closer to the notion of “qi”. Generally speaking, the problem of the relation between “li” (principle) and “qi” (vital force) in the traditional conception of nature was ignored in modern times. Jin Yuelin and Feng Youlan made some investigations into this problem, but they were in the end led to metaphysics. Xiong Shili said that “transformation consists in opening and closing,” an idea, without modem science as its basis, refers back nevertheless to the naive, dialectical conception of nature in ancient China, from which some outstanding contemporary scientists have gotten important inspiration. Modern science can absorb wisdom from ancient Oriental philosophy. Therefore we should, on the one hand, generalize the achievements of the modern natural sciences and answer the questions arising from them according to materialist dialectics, and on the other hand, study, analyze, and criticize the traditional Chinese conception of nature, with the aim to combine these two sides, and, on this basis, to develop the materialist dialectical conception of nature. This is of vital importance to our socialist modernization, especially to the development of science and culture in our country. Thirdly, we should start a new stage of development of materialist dialectics in which “the same goal is reached by different routes, and agreement is reached from a hundred of opinions.” In the sentence that “the same goal is reached by different routes, and agreement is reached from a hundred of opinions” is stated a law of knowledge: a true and

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scientific knowledge, a correct and agreed conclusion, can be arrived at only through discussions among different opinions and debates among different viewpoints (in addition to, of course, logical reasoning and the test of practice). In order to develop our true knowledge, therefore, we must adhere to the policy of “letting a hundred of flowers blossom, and a hundred of schools of thought contend”. This is necessary both for overcoming completely the methodology of classical learning and cultivating the free personality for ordinary people. In modern China, it is through the debates among the different schools of thought that the progressive members of the Chinese society selected, after making comparisons and judgments, Marxism, and achieved the great advancement in the Sinification of Marxism philosophy. The atmosphere of “letting a hundred of schools of thought contend” has been recovered to a certain extent since the end of the Cultural Revolution. In this atmosphere Marxism philosophy will be developed in multiple ways, “by different routes” and “from different opinions”. A group of professional philosophers are needed to make profound analyses and exact demonstrations of philosophical propositions, and to keep firm connections between philosophy and other branches of culture. To be professional is not to be distant from the real life of human beings, or to ignore the mission of “disseminating Dao”; to be enthusiastic about “disseminating Dao” is not to be content with dogmatic preaching. Rather, we should try to make exact demonstrations in clearly defined concepts, and consistently enrich and develop Marxist philosophy on the basis of generalization from various and recent achievements of science and culture. In this respect we can also talk of “the same goal is reached by different routes.” Looking from the perspective of the world as a whole, we are now in an era in which the Eastern and Western cultures are interacting and converging with each other. In this sense we are going to have a situation of “debates among a hundred of schools of thought” on a global level. The convergence of the Chinese and Western cultures and philosophies has already started on the soil of China, which is represented not only by the Sinification of Marxist philosophy, but also by the attempts made by some professional philosophers to construct philosophical systems in which Chinese and Western philosophies are combined with each other. That will remain to be the case in the future. Various new versions of the combination of Chinese and Western philosophies will emerge on the soil of China; those in which the combination is successful and viable can establish themselves as distinctive schools of thought in a worldwide domain. Dialectical materialism should develop itself through the debates among different schools of philosophy on a global level, rather than treat other schools (Marxist or not) in the attitude of “standardize everything according to a dominant system.” At the same time, however, a Marxist should be confident that, since it is a law of human cognition that “the same goal is reached by different routes and agreement is reached from a hundred of opinions,” free debates and discussions will give rise to the development of materialist dialectics. It has been proven that the philosophical revolution in modern China “heralded” a social transformation which was successfully made in the form of democratic revolution and national liberation. This is an event of global significance. Now the

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socialist modernization of China is under way. It is another event of global significant that China, a huge country with a history of thousands of years and a population of nearly one fourth of the population of the world, is to be modernized. Equally significant is the fact that in China the convergence of the Chinese and Western cultures and philosophies has already been started and will be further developed. Both social practice and philosophy itself demand the continuation of philosophical revolution. We can predict that the dialectics of practical materialism will have greater development at the new stage where “the same goal is reached by different routes and agreement is reached from a hundred of opinions.”

Postscript

Feng Qi (1915–1995) was one of the few original, systematic philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century in Mainland China. His unique contribution to philosophy is his theory of wisdom. He is also remembered for his expertise on the history of Chinese philosophy. Feng Qi was born in Zhuji County, Zhengjiang Province. He was enrolled in the department of philosophy at Tsinghua University in 1935, where he studied with Jin Yuelin (1895–1984), Feng Youlan (1895–1990), etc. His study was interrupted because he was actively involved in the anti-Japanese war. He resumed his study in 1939 at South West Associated University joined by Tsinghua University, Peking University, and Nankai University. After he finished his B.A., he entered the graduate school and finished his M.A. thesis in 1944. After that, he taught at Yunan University, Tongji University, Fudan University, and in 1951 he came to the newly established East China Normal University (ECNU) where he spent the rest of his life. He passed away suddenly in March 1, 1995. Soon after his death, a committee was formed in the Department of Philosophy, ECNU, to edit and publish Feng’s writings. The first edition of Collected Works of Feng Qi (hereafter Collected Works, 10 volumes) was published by ECNU Press from 1996 to 1998. In 2015 the Department launched a series of activities commemorating the centennial anniversary of Feng’s birth. One of them was the publication of the second and expanded edition of Collected Works (11 volumes), again by ECNU Press in early 2016. Feng’s most important writings are the “three discourses on wisdom” (Knowing the World and Knowing the Self, The Dialectics of Logical Thinking, and Human Freedom and Truth, Good and Beauty—all were published posthumously in 1996) and “two histories of Chinese philosophy” (The Logical Development of Ancient Chinese Philosophy, first published in 1983–1985, and The Revolutionary Process of Modern Chinese Philosophy, first published in 1989). A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy (1992) is an abridgement of his “two histories of Chinese philosophy”, co-authored by Feng Qi and Chen Weiping. A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy was translated into English by Xu Ruzhuang, Tong Shijun, Ady Van den Stock, and Paul J. D’Ambrosio. It is part of the © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7

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big project on Feng Qi’s philosophy funded by National Social Sciences Foundation (15ZDB012). It is also supported by Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (2022ECNU-HWCBFBWY002). A series of editorial workshops were organized to work on the draft of the translation of the book. Yu Zhenhua, Sean Clancy, and Wen Haizhen spent huge amount of time and energy on the editing of the text. Liu Liangjian, Lu Chenhao, and Mao Yanting also actively participated in the workshops. We want to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to all those involved in this project of translation.

Glossary of Chinese Characters

ben 本 da tong 大同 da yi 大一 dao 道 de 德 dong 动 e 恶 fa 法 gan 感 ge wu 格物 gu jin 古今 jing qi 精气 ji 几 ji 己 li 利 li 理 li 礼 ming jiao 名教 ming shi 名实 ming 名 ming 命 mo wei 莫为 neng wei 能为 qi 器 qing 情 quan 权 qun 群 ren wei 人为 ren xin 人心 ren yu 人欲 ren 仁 © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Q. Feng and W. Chen, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0007-7

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ren xing 人性 se 色 shan 善 shen 神 sheng 圣 shi 实 shi 势 shu 术 si 思 si 私 suo 所 tai ji 太极 tian ming 天命 tian zhi 天志 wan you 万有 wei wo 为我 wei 伪 wu ji 无极 wu ming 无名 wu wei 无为 wu 无 wu 物 xiang 象 xing 形 xing 性 xing 行 xu 虚 xuan 玄 yan 言 yang 阳 yi 意 yin 因 yin 阴 yong 用 you wei 有为 yuan 元 yuan 原 zhen 真 zheng ming 正名 zi wo 自我 zi you 自由 zhi zhi 致知 zhi 指 zhì 智 zh¯ı 知

Glossary of Chinese Characters

Glossary of Chinese Characters

zhi 质 zhong dao 中道 zhong shu 忠恕 zhong yong 中庸 zhong xi 中西 zi wei 自为

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Index

A Ai Siqi, 384, 386 Artistic sphere, 343

B Beauty, 60, 94, 261, 343, 377 Being and non-being, 35, 147, 155, 162, 175, 187, 190, 194, 205, 209, 244 Body and soul, 133, 141, 160, 162, 163, 170 Book of Lord Shang, 45

C Cause, 29, 36, 51, 71, 90, 106, 129, 149, 211, 301, 319 Change, 102, 211 Chen Duxiu, 354 Cheng Hao, 206 Chen Liang, 226 Completing oneself, 200, 259, 261 Confucius, 21 Consciousness, 179 Cosmogony, 131, 205, 206, 219

D Dai Zhen, 273 Dao, 53, 54, 98, 102, 151, 162, 207 Dao and instrument, 226–228, 238 Daoism, 147, 155, 161, 162, 190, 209 Dao of humanity, 317 Destiny, 33, 153, 167, 220, 237, 257, 258, 307, 411 Developing intelligence (kai zhi), 315 Dharma-Character School, 178, 179

Doctrine of huo shi, 129, 130, 132, 137, 157, 211 Doctrine of mind, 228 Doctrine of mo wei, 136, 138, 142, 149, 157, 211 Doctrine of spheres, 409 Dong Zhongshu, 127 Du Guoyang, 413

E Effort, 82, 153 Emotion, 84, 260, 302, 306, 315, 344, 369, 394 Epistemology, 28, 33, 47, 165, 182, 214, 223, 247, 269, 305, 338, 398, 417 Ethics, 47, 214, 223, 233, 304, 312, 327, 339, 357, 398 Evolution, 336, 346 Extension of innate knowledge, 230

F Fan Li, 38 Fan Zhen, 166 Fate, 140, 153 Fazang, 181 Feng Youlan, 406 Freedom, 326, 328 Function, 148

G Ge Hong, 162 Gongsun Long, 64 Gong Zizhen, 297 Goodness of human nature, 50

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466 Great Unity, 307, 349, 425 Guanzi, 41 Guo Moruo, 414 Guo Xiang, 155 Gu Yanwu, 268

H Han Fei, 95 Happiness, 331 Heaven, 128 Heaven and humankind, 42, 73, 78, 97, 102, 109, 127, 136, 208, 225 Historical evolution, 199 Huainanzi, 127 Huang Zongxi, 262 Huineng, 184 Hui Shi, 62 Human desires, 209, 216, 228 Humanity, 21, 127 Human nature, 140, 207 Huo shi, 131 Hu Shi, 362

I Instinct, 369, 370 Intuition, 368

J Ji Kang, 152 Jin Yuelin, 397

K Kang Youwei, 310 Knowledge, 21, 214 Knowledge and action, 227, 248, 304

L Laozi, 31 Later Mohists, 66 Law, 96 Lesser prosperity, 312 Liang Qichao, 327 Liang Shuming, 362 Li Da, 384 Li Dazhao, 354 Li Quan, 190 Liu Yuxi, 194 Liu Zongyuan, 192, 194 Li Zhi, 237

Index Logic, 68 Lu Jiuyuan, 228 Lüshi Chunqiu, 107 Lu Xun, 376

M Mandate of Heaven, 25, 80, 198 Mao Zedong, 415 Marxism, 359, 384, 416 Marxists, 385, 412 Material force, 306 Materialist, 228, 250, 306, 335, 337, 347, 357, 358, 364, 376, 386, 417 Mazu, 187 Mencius, 45 Mind, 206, 229, 238 Mind and matter, 185, 225, 227, 359 Mind and nature, 185 Mind and things, 269 Monism, 243 Monism of material force, 136 Mozi, 26 Mystery, 162

N Nameless, 33 Names and actualities, 28, 33, 57, 62, 67, 84, 100, 103, 110, 149, 169, 250 Nature, 51, 82, 155, 220, 319 Neo-Confucianism, 205, 206, 208 New doctrine of consciousness-only, 388 New history, 331 New people, 328 New rational philosophy, 406 No action, 32, 134 Non-Marxist scholars, 412

O Origin, 128, 137, 311 Ouyang Jian, 150

P Past and present, 53, 66, 77, 102, 297 Pei Wei, 151 Perfect person, 56, 93, 94, 215 Philosophy of evolution, 321 Place, 247 Power, 96, 257, 258 Power of the mind, 320, 330 Practical experience, 274

Index Principle, 98, 130 Principle and material force, 224, 238, 274 Principle of Heaven, 206, 209, 216, 228 Principles and vital energy, 243, 244 Profitableness, 27 Propriety, 77, 214–216 Propriety and law, 77

467 U Ultimate of Non-being, 218 Unity of knowledge and action, 232, 236 Universal love, 26

V Voluntarism, 164, 192, 237, 260, 299, 320, 330, 338, 351, 372, 376, 392, 393

Q Qu Qiubai, 373

R Realism, 357 Recovering nature, 221, 257 Rectification of names, 28 Relation between heaven and human beings, 257 Relationship between heaven and human, 195 Relationship between the body and the soul, 167 Righteousness, 127 Righteousness and profitableness, 274

S School of Eastern Culture, 363 School of Guan, 209 School of Huayan, 181 School of Luo, The, 206 Self, 305 Seng Zhao, 164 Shao Yong, 206 Small oneness, 74 Soul and body, 133 Source, 128 Southern school of Zen Buddhism, 184 Spirit, 306 Statecraft, 96 Substance, 148 Sun Yat-sen, 345 Sunzi’s Art of War, 36

T Tan Sitong, 316 Tendency, 256, 404 Theory of dual evolution, 337 Three ages, 312 Tian, 55 Tiantai School, 175 Transformation, 211

W Wang Anshi, 224 Wang Bi, 147 Wang Chong, 135 Wang Fuzhi, 242 Wang Guowei, 340 Wang Shouren, 229 Way, 153 Way of Heaven, 25, 32, 38, 53, 73, 78, 103, 110, 130, 136, 138, 147, 167, 194, 209 Way of humankind, 158 Wei Yuan, 303 Will, 339, 367 Will of Heaven, 30–32, 73 Words and ideas, 104, 149, 160, 169, 250

X Xiang Xou, 155 Xiong Shili, 388 Xuanzang, 179 Xunzi, 77

Y Yan Fu, 320 Yan Yuan, 273 Yellow Emperor’s Canon of Internal Medicine, 107 Ye Shi, 226 Yixuan, 188

Z Zen School, 184, 185, 192 Zhang Junli, 370 Zhang Taiyan, 335 Zhang Zai, 208 Zhanran, 177 Zhiyi, 175 Zhou Dunyi, 205 Zhuangzi, 53

468 Zhu Daosheng, 178 Zhu Guangqian, 393 Zhu Xi, 216

Index Zisi, 45 Zongmi, 189