Diplomacy and Reform in Iran: Foreign Policy under Khatami 9781350986091, 9781786730329

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Edward Wastnidge is Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at the Open University, having previously taught at Manchester Metropolitan University, Keele University and the University of Manchester. He holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Manchester. He is also Politics Editor for the journal New Middle Eastern Studies.

‘This wonderful and timely book makes a significant contribution to skilfully unpacking the meaning of politics in modern Iran. It provides crucial insights into the practical use of soft power and cultural diplomacy in the foreign policy of the Khatami period, 1997– 2005, in negotiating a new relationship in international affairs, in redefining Iran’s place in the world, and in establishing a new position for Iran in regional and international politics.’ Raia Prokhovnik, Reader in Politics, Open University, UK ‘Edward Wastnidge’s detailed study of Khatami’s “Dialogue among Civilisations” illustrates how this new paradigm in international relations set the tone for some improvement in bilateral relations in select cases, and how a new global discourse led to initiatives such as the UN Alliance of Civilisations. For all those interested in conflict, diplomacy and Iranian foreign policy, this book provides useful insights.’ Robert Mason, Lecturer in Political Science, British University in Egypt

DIPLOMACY AND REFORM IN IRAN Foreign Policy under Khatami

EDWARD WASTNIDGE

Published in 2016 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2016 Edward Wastnidge The right of Edward Wastnidge to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. International Library of Iranian Studies 64 ISBN: 978 1 78453 328 1 eISBN: 978 1 78672 032 0 ePDF: 978 1 78673 032 9 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

To my mother

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements A Note on Transliteration Introduction 1. Iranian Foreign Policy in Context 2. Khatami and the Idea of Dialogue among Civilisations 3. The Application of Dialogue among Civilisations at the Bilateral Level 4. The Application of Dialogue among Civilisations at the Multilateral Level – International Organisations

viii x 1 13 25 53 97

Conclusion

145

Notes Bibliography Index

155 189 207

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The production of this book owes a great deal to my colleagues, family and academic mentors who have helped me over the years. As an aspiring academic, I was fortunate to have excellent guidance and supervision, not least from Professor Edmund Herzig and Dr Oliver Bast while part of the department of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Manchester. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to these two scholars who are not only excellent academics but also thoroughly decent people. I would also like to thank the British Institute of Persian Studies for their generous support in allowing me to carry out research in Iran, and to spend time in such a fascinating and welcoming country. I am also grateful to the staff at the Dekhoda Institute in Tehran, and to my former language tutors, Dr Shahram Kholdi and Dr Mozhgan Zolfi-Sistani, for introducing me to the wonderful world of the Persian language. Also, I am thankful to my colleagues in the department of Politics and International Studies at the Open University, for their invaluable support and wise counsel during my time there. Special thanks go to the Enactments programme in the Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance for their financial contribution towards the completion of this monograph. Further thanks are also due to the members of our Manchester Middle Eastern Studies reading group, lovingly fostered by Oliver Bast to provide a venue, namely his home, for discussion and debate

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over our respective projects, which proved to be a highly useful source of constructive criticism, as well as a valuable support group while it was in operation. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Ali Ansari for allowing me to access the resources of the Institute for Iranian Studies at the University of St Andrews, and also the staff of the Institute for Political and International Studies and National Library in Tehran. I am grateful too for the support received from my publishers, I.B.Tauris. In particular I would like to offer special thanks to the editors who have helped bring this project to fruition, Maria Marsh, Azmina Siddique and Thomas Stottor. Firm thanks go to my copyeditor, and friend, Colin Cooper for all of his hard work in preparing the manuscript for submission. Huge thanks also go to all of my dear family and friends in the UK, Iran and beyond for all their support over the years. They have always encouraged me and listened patiently to my ramblings. Finally I want to thank l’amour de ma vie, Dr Jennifer Brown, for putting up with my doubts and general stress over the years, for all her hard work in proof-reading my various works and drafts, and for just being there for me.

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The transliteration system used in this book is based on that used in the Encyclopaedia Iranica, with the omission of diacritics on the consonants. The letter ‘ayn is marked by the ‘open’ inverted comma (‘) and hamza is marked by the ‘close’ inverted comma (’). The Persian ezafe is transliterated by using ‘-e’ after consonants and ‘-ye’ following vowels. The long vowel from the Persian letter alef is marked using the letter a¯. For commonly used names, terms and place names such as ‘Mohammad’, ‘Seyyed’ and ‘Tehran’ the established English forms are used. For works in the Persian language the author names and titles are transliterated using the above system. For English-language works published inside Iran, the English forms given in the publication are adhered to.

INTRODUCTION

The coming to power of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami in 1997 represented a major change in the Iranian political landscape, and had important ramifications for its foreign relations. Although very much a ‘man of the system’ – loyal to the founding principles of the Islamic Republic – Khatami and his accession to the presidency epitomised the desire within Iran for change, both in terms of domestic politics and in relations with the rest of the world. As a Hojjatoleslam1 with an academic background in Western philosophy, Khatami was arguably well positioned to spearhead the reform movement in Iran. His intellectual pursuits and previous incarnation as a (relatively) liberal Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance meant that he had favour with academics, students and young people. Meanwhile, his revolutionary credentials were impeccable – making him palatable, initially, to less liberal factions of the Islamic Republic. In seeking to build on the modest foreign policy successes of his predecessor, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani – which had seen Iran reduce its postrevolutionary international isolation – Khatami brought about something of a cultural turn in Iran’s foreign affairs by invoking Iran’s own rich civilisational inheritance as a basis for forming better relations at a number of levels. Khatami’s concept of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ – in part a response to Samuel Huntington’s well-known Clash of Civilisations thesis, and also a reflection of Khatami’s own philosophical and

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intellectual background – became a key theme in Iran’s foreign relations (alongside de´tente). The concept stands out as a significant public relations success, having been embraced by a wide range of international actors – most notably the United Nations, which passed a resolution in the name of the Islamic Republic declaring 2001 as the ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’. While certain foreign policy priorities from previous years remained, such as solidarity with the Palestinian cause and maintaining independence in foreign relations, Khatami introduced a type of foreign policy that drew on Iran’s own cultural levers as a means of improving its standing with a number of states and international organisations. This book will show how the Dialogue among Civilisations was applied in Iranian foreign policy during the Khatami era (from 1997 to 2005). This concept was not only an attempt at invoking a wider philosophical debate and engagement with other civilisations and cultures, but also something that had a practical application in Iranian foreign policy. The following chapters demonstrate how the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations was applied on multiple levels: building Iran’s bilateral, regional and wider international relations. Studying the promotion by Khatami and others in his administration of this ideational construct, which has its foundations in the academic world, also provides a vantage point for the observation of the interplay between national identity and geopolitics, which found their expression in what can be described as a cultural foreign policy. The Dialogue among Civilisations represented Khatami’s own efforts at creating a new paradigm in international relations,2 emphasising the importance and impact of such ideas on Iranian foreign policy. The de´tente that characterised Khatami’s time in office was based on three key points: firstly, a continuation of the policy of not exporting the revolution (initially implemented by Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini); secondly, promoting rapprochement with Arab states, particularly those neighbouring Iran (something that can be linked to the first point, as Iran was no longer actively supporting subversive Shi‘i movements in the region); and finally, promoting normalisation

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3

of relations with EU states.3 This last point was dependent on drawing a line under two outstanding issues that had hindered Iran’s relations with the EU. The first was the implication of leading Iranian figures in the assassination of Kurdish dissidents at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in 1992. After extensive negotiation with Khamenei, Khatami managed to secure the return of European ambassadors to Tehran after they withdrew following the Mykonos verdict in April 1997.4 The second stumbling block with the EU, and the UK in particular, was Khomeini’s fatwa calling for the death of Salman Rushdie. In 1998 Khatami insisted that his government would not carry out the fatwa, thus furthering rapprochement with EU member states.

Why Iran and the Dialogue among Civilisations? Iran’s geographical location and natural resources have made it strategically important, while the country’s political development has had a major influence on its relations within the wider Middle East and indeed the rest of the world. Its history, culture and contribution to civilisation are considerable, and its well-educated population is rightfully proud of their nation’s historical legacy. These factors have important ramifications for Iran’s self-perception at regional and global levels, helping to shape the public and political debate on Iran’s role and place in the world. All of the above themes are reflected in the Dialogue among Civilisations, with Khatami tapping into a rich vein of national consciousness that understands Iran as a major actor in global affairs due to its rich civilisational inheritance. Iran continues to be at the centre of numerous regional and global events that are given wide coverage in the West, including the well-documented negotiations over its nuclear programme, its prominent role in supporting the Iraqi government in the fight against the so-called Islamic State, continued support of its Syrian allies in that country’s ongoing civil war, and as an onlooker to the Arab Spring, to which it offered its own rhetorical support as a patron of a perceived ‘Islamic Awakening’ in the region. Also, the

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reinvigoration of the reform movement – starting with Khatami’s close association with defeated 2009 presidential candidate MirHossein Mousavi5 and continuing with his support for the recently elected, and reform-inclined President Hassan Rouhani – demonstrates the continued relevance of Khatami as a political figure. There have been numerous attempts made to analyse and interpret Iran’s foreign policy, particularly since the revolution of 1979. There are a wealth of secondary sources available dealing with a whole plethora of foreign policy issues relevant to Iran, from strategic to case-specific and regional studies. However, at the time of writing there have been few dealing with the Khatami period specifically – at least in terms of books produced in the West.6 Since starting research, works such as Ehteshami and Zweiri’s edited volume Iran’s Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad7 have appeared, and various book chapters and articles have sought to analyse Iran’s diplomacy in the light of ongoing regional and international developments.8 This work complements offerings such as Tazmini’s Khatami’s Iran,9 with its focus on the domestic aspects of Khatami’s period in office. The role of Dialogue among Civilisations and how it was actually applied in Iranian foreign relations has been given little attention in the above efforts. What studies there have been on the concept have tended to concentrate on its philosophical and theoretical underpinnings and contribution,10 rather than its practical effect on Iran’s international relations. Conversely, I contend that it formed one of the key planks of Iranian foreign policy, as widely articulated by Khatami and others in his administration. I demonstrate when and how the Dialogue among Civilisations concept first came in to being, how it was applied both in bilateral relations with other inheritors of great civilisations and at the level of multilateral international organisations, and ultimately whether this application of the concept proves its merit as a type of foreign policy doctrine or tool in its own right. The following chapters do not attempt to cover every aspect of Iran’s foreign relations during this period. Therefore a conscious decision has been made to omit detailed discussion of the continuing imbroglio over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Furthermore the case studies

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5

are intentionally illustrative: a means of demonstrating the importance of Dialogue among Civilisations in Iran’s international affairs. Valid arguments could be made for the inclusion of many other inheritors of great civilisations, such as China, or less ‘ancient’ but equally important contributors such as Russia, Europe or the US. However, it is within the relationships that form the case studies that the concept assumes most prominence in comparison to other examples. Jewish civilisation is also remarkably absent from the discourse surrounding Dialogue among Civilisations, perhaps reflecting a political decision on Iran’s part, and emphasising the concept’s more practical, applied aspects. The timeframe is also intentionally limited to the years of the Khatami presidency, as although the Dialogue among Civilisations was continued as a project of Khatami’s after his presidency, it was not taken up by the incoming Ahmadinejad administration. Therefore the concept lost its political, foreign policy application and drew in on itself, becoming more of a philosophical debate among intellectuals and religious figures.

Key themes I have consciously taken a holistic approach in analysing the role of Dialogue among Civilisations in Iran’s foreign policy during the Khatami period. Much of the content remains largely empirical, as historical events are used to provide a narrative account of Iran’s international relations during Khatami’s presidency, emphasising certain themes, in particular the role of culture, identity and geopolitics in Iranian foreign policy. I also make use of theoretical contributions from the international relations (IR) discipline, drawing on arguments from constructivism, realism and the idea of soft power to provide an analytical framework that is designed to provide both theoretical and empirical insight. Geopolitics and national identity The themes of geopolitics and national identity are central to any discussion of Iranian foreign policy, and are particularly prominent in

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the Dialogue among Civilisations. Therefore I highlight the interrelationship between these two strands and how they are not mutually exclusive and essentially serve to reinforce one another. Iran’s geographical location is often proclaimed by its leaders as a resource: in terms of its oil and natural gas natural reserves and position as a ‘gateway’ or ‘bridge’ between East and West, and therefore acts as an important determinant of its foreign policy. Recognising the importance of land routes for trade, namely the old ‘Silk Road’ that passed through Iran, Anderson demonstrates the significance of Iran’s geographical location, stating that ‘Although it is in a sense peripheral, it is highly influential in that it provides the Middle East . . . links with the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia and the Indian Subcontinent.’11 Moreover, the fact that Iran has more neighbours than any other Middle Eastern state is decisive in creating opportunities for both conflict and diplomacy.12 Thus, one of the most basic features of Iran – that of its geographical location – is critical in keeping it at the forefront of regional affairs. As I demonstrate, a great deal of emphasis is placed on Iran’s geostrategic location by scholars and statespeople alike, and while this often relates primarily to strategic or material aims, it is also a prominent rhetorical feature of the Dialogue among Civilisations. Much of the discourse on nationalism and national identity centres on the debate between modernist and primordialist interpretations of the subject. In the former, prominent scholars such as Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson have advanced the modernist argument, positing nationalism as a modern construct. In applying Anderson’s Imagined Communities13 thesis to Iran, Mostafa Vaziri takes a markedly anti-Orientalist position, viewing the historical Iranian national identity as an ‘anachronistic invention of Orientalists’.14 Vaziri strongly contends that a certain type of Western-inspired nationalist historiography is responsible for the creation of an Iranian nationalism that ignores its heterogeneous ethnic make-up.15 Although there was an embracing of certain European perspectives in its nationalist historiographies, there are also conceptions that are important before modernity, such as that of land, an argument proposed by Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet.16 She outlines the importance

INTRODUCTION

7

of land in shaping Iran’s identity, and how its ‘frontier experience’ was essential in forming its self-perception. She notes that ‘theorists have tended to underestimate the centrality of land in the national debate’,17 and directly challenges Vaziri’s argument regarding Iran as an Orientalist construct, stating ‘the impulse to set apart things Iranian – land and language, culture and civilisation – had old roots and simply found a new application and context in nationalism’.18 Key to any discussion of Iranian national identity is the question of what markers of identity we are actually referring to, and the conceptions of Iraniyat and Islamiyat are illustrative in this regard: Iraniyat – literally meaning Iranianess, but generally referring to Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage, which could be anything from Achaemenian through to Sassanian Iran; and Islamiyat – literally meaning Islamic or being Muslim, and therefore a conception of identity that prioritises the Islamic aspects. The classic expressions of these two aspects can be observed in pre-revolutionary Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty, where the pre-Islamic aspect was emphasised at the expense of Iran’s Islamic identity, and following 1979, whereby the Islamic aspect naturally came to the fore. Holliday has discussed how the Khatami period was unique in terms of Iranian national identity because he combined these two strands of Iranian identity and shaped them into an official state discourse.19 I follow Holliday’s contention that Khatami chose to promote an Islamist-Iranian identity,20 part of which I contend was promulgated through the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations and Iranian cultural foreign policy. In a similar vein, Ansari gives a nuanced treatment of Iran’s foreign policy arguing for ‘an acceptance of the importance of cultural determinants in conjunction with material interests’.21 By using Abdolkarim Soroush’s ‘three cultures’ argument, Ansari demonstrates how these three elements (religious, national and Western cultures) were implicit in Khatami’s introduction of Dialogue among Civilisations concept.22 Therefore, culture, and more particularly in Khatami’s case, civilisational identity were central to the formation of foreign policy.23 As Ansari states ‘Khatami’s logic and his understanding of regional politics dictated that, in redefining the

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cultural parameters of an international relationship, the particularities of an antagonism could in time be overcome.’24 International Relations theory My research also builds on the work of constructivist scholars in IR who emphasise the importance of culture as a key determinant in a country’s foreign relations. Much of Iran’s regional foreign policy is, however, arguably shaped by strategic considerations and geopolitical imperatives that can be broadly construed as realist. The quest for hegemony in the Persian Gulf is illustrative of this and provides an interesting thread of continuity from the Shah’s time through to the Islamic Republic: Both governments sought to uphold Iran’s national interest and took it upon themselves to invest heavily in their military capabilities as a means of projecting power and influence in the region. However, realist and particularly neo-realist theories are somewhat lacking in addressing the role played by culture and identity.25 While they are useful in explaining Iran’s material concerns, my contention is that culture played a highly prominent role in Iranian foreign policy during the Khatami era. Although self-interest, maintaining security and establishing at least a regional hegemony continued to be important in Iran’s international affairs, it was a foreign policy drawing heavily on Iran’s own cultural levers, rather than military or ‘hard’ power, which was enacted as a means of meeting these concerns. The liberal interpretation can also be illustrative when considering the shift in Iran’s foreign policy outlook to that of becoming a ‘statusquo power’,26 rather than the revolutionary vanguard state of the 1980s. Examples of this can be seen in Iran’s active participation in international institutions such as the UN, and its promotion of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO). Constructivist IR scholars27 have proposed that there needs to be greater emphasis on issues of culture and identity when analysing international affairs, seeking to demonstrate how world politics is socially constructed.28 I demonstrate how such factors are important in explaining Iran’s foreign policy during this period. Viewing

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9

Khatami’s foreign policy through the prism of the Dialogue among Civilisations is a good exemplar of the importance of identity in foreign policy, in so far as the concept promoted by Khatami was deeply rooted in a particular conception of Iranian national identity. This was an explicit choice taken by Khatami and Iranian foreign policymakers, and is evidenced by their own pronouncements on the importance of culture in Iran’s foreign policy. These ideas – and not just structurally defined materialism – also played a noteworthy role in shaping Iran’s foreign policy during this period. Soft power I aim to plot a path between the key arguments of realism and constructivism; recognising both the material objectives and strategic rationale inherent in Iran’s foreign policymaking, but also the ideational bases and importance of culture and identity in affecting it. A useful theoretical outlet for such an approach is provided by Nye’s conception of soft power.29 Initially applied to US foreign policy, its key premise is the ability to obtain what you want through co-option and attraction rather than the hard power of coercion and payment. According to Nye, the soft power of a country rests in three key areas: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others); its foreign policies (when they are seen as having legitimacy and moral authority); and in its political values (Nye points out that US promotion of democracy around the globe could be considered as such). This could also conceivably be applied to the Islamic Republic, in terms promoting ideas of a modern Islamic politics with religious principles helping to define the state’s social and cultural policies. Certainly Khatami’s attempts at promoting an ‘Islamic Civil Society’ can be viewed as being part of a drive to promote such values. This approach allows culture to be brought in as a key determinant of foreign policy, and all of the related issues of identity that this may entail, but it can also help a country materially. The focus is on appealing to others through shared values and resources30 and this in a sense is what Khatami was attempting to do: seeking to set the agenda in world politics through co-opting people, rather than through coercion.31 As Nye states, ‘it is just as important to

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set the agenda and attract others in world politics as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons’.32 Nye’s theory arguably relies on grassroots and mass appeal to a certain extent, highlighting the impact of US cultural projections – such as music on the youth living behind the Iron Curtain, for example.33 In some ways Khatami’s foreign policy can also be considered as having a ‘grassroots’ element, in spite of its ostensibly top-down appearance. Writing optimistically at the beginning of the Khatami era, one commentator saw a ‘grassroots foreign policy’ being encouraged by Khatami’s promotion of civil society at home, with the potential for sports and cultural exchanges to take place,34 which they inevitably did. The use of Dialogue among Civilisations in Iran’s foreign diplomacy can be seen as an exercise in soft power, as essentially what can be observed is a harnessing of such ‘soft’, less materially defined or hard elements.

Structure and sources Chapter 1 provides a brief context-setting on Iranian foreign policy. It begins by outlining the key developments since 1979 up to the Khatami era to help place the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations within the broader context of Iranian foreign policy. This is followed by an examination of the internal mechanisms of Iranian foreign policy making. Chapter 2 hones in on the domestic context, examining Khatami and the genesis of the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations. It also looks at the roots of reformist thinking in Iran, and the relevance of such developments for the creation of Khatami’s foreign policy direction. The chapter ends with a philosophical background to the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations, again linking the idea to the development of reformist thinking in Iran. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the application of Dialogue among Civilisations in Iranian foreign policy. This is done at two levels: bilateral and multilateral. Chapter 3 covers the bilateral level, and discusses Iran’s use of the concept in its relations with other, similar

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inheritors of ‘great civilisations’ – namely Italy, Greece, Egypt and India. The aim in this chapter is to examine, through the prism of the Dialogue among Civilisations, how the idea or perhaps assumption of civilisational commonalities was used as a basis for foreign policy formulation towards this specific set of countries. Chapter 4 then explores how the concept was applied on the multilateral level, taking three international organisations as its case studies: the United Nations; the regional grouping ECO (the Economic Cooperation Organisation); and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Both chapters end with a thematic, analytical discussion, highlighting three key themes that are brought out in the case studies. The form of these analyses is the same for both chapters, and explores the following: firstly, the motivations behind the concept’s application, secondly the receptivity of the various audiences to it, and finally the malleability of the concept. The Conclusion offers a summary of the main findings of the book and draws out some of the key theoretical concerns that the study seeks to address. Much of the primary source base for my research comes in the form of speeches by key figures such as Khatami, his foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In the cases of Kharrazi and Velayati, collections of their speeches have been made into books and published in Persian by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.35 Kha¯tami az cheh miguyad? (What is Khatami Talking About?) provides a Persian-language collection of speeches from the first two years of his presidency in an edited volume.36 Some of Khatami’s speeches have also been collated into books in English such as Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society; Hope and Challenge: The Iranian President Speaks; and Islam, Liberty and Development. Key speeches by Khatami were also often widely published in their original Persian in Iranian newspapers and other books. Iranian-published English-language journals such as The Iranian Journal of International Affairs and Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly were a further source of speeches by key Iranian government officials.

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I also interviewed ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani, former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance under Khatami, as well as sometime head of the Tehran-based International Centre for Dialogue among Civilisations. The newspaper archives of both the National Library and the Library of the Institute for Political and International Studies in Tehran also helped provide me with ‘real-time’ access to key events during the Khatami presidency.

CHAPTER 1 IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CONTEXT

Iran has long been a significant actor in world affairs. From its position as a key oil exporter and strategic ally of the West during the Cold War, to its revolutionary experience in 1979 and subsequent conflict and cooperation with world powers, it has rarely strayed from the headlines. Iran experienced one of the most brutal conflicts of the twentieth century in its eight-year war with Iraq, and has been at the centre of protracted negotiations over its disputed nuclear programme, which has led to it suffering under crippling economic sanctions and castigated for what Western powers have claimed is a disruptive role in regional politics.

Iranian foreign policy 1979– 2005 Prior to the revolution, and taking into account the political climate of the Cold War during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran had maintained a policy of ‘positive equilibrium’. This meant that while Iran was identified as being militarily orientated towards the West, the Shah also recognised the importance of cultivating relations with the Soviet Union, thus reducing the traditional threat from its neighbour to the north. The revolution in 1979 brought about a change, with Khomeini’s espousal of a policy of ‘neither East nor West’, which can be seen as the very antithesis of a positive

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equilibrium. One can discern two separate stages that characterise the changing nature of Iranian foreign policy since the revolution. The first – which ran contiguous to the Khomeini era from 1979 to 1989 – saw radical, idealistic foreign policy goals in the ascendancy, while the second saw their replacement with more pragmatic objectives that put Iran’s national interests first – something that continued into the Khatami presidency. One of the main aims of the revolution was to reduce Iran’s perceived dependency on the West, and the US in particular. Thus, Iranian foreign policy under Khomeini was characterised by the seeking of greater independence and self-sufficiency. Behrooz notes that Khomeini’s foreign policy formula had two interconnected dimensions: its independence vis-a`-vis the Great Powers and the promotion of Islamic movements in other areas.1 This resulted in mutually antagonistic relations with the two superpowers, support for movements such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and active subversion of restive Shi‘i communities in the Persian Gulf region, which had the effect of souring relations with Iran’s Arab neighbours. The highly ideological nature of the revolution often aligned its leaders against most foreign powers,2 a situation not helped by allegations of Iranian support for international terrorism – a charge that continues to be levelled at Iran today. The hostage crisis and Khomeini’s antiAmerican invective had the effect of completely severing Iran’s relations with the US. Domestic considerations were also important in this regard and Khomeini made effective use of the crisis for internal gains, using the hostage episode to purge many of his opponents, thus strengthening his own position.3 The Khomeini period arguably saw a near total breakdown in Iran’s relations with neighbouring states. Much of this was due to Khomeini’s insistence on the universal nature of the Islamic revolution, and naturally the rulers of Iran’s neighbours became fearful that the Islamic revolution might be exported to their countries. This was particularly the case in countries with large Shi‘i minorities, or majorities in the case of Iraq and Bahrain. The 1980– 8 Iran– Iraq conflict was partly influenced by the actions of Iran and the fears of Iraq regarding the spread of Islamic revolution, although an

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equally important cause can be found in the battle for hegemony in the Persian Gulf and the ambitions of a rising Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. The war was also a source of contention between Iran and the Soviet Union, mainly due to the latter’s role as Iraq’s chief supplier of arms. Iran’s position was further weakened by a rare convergence of superpower views, in American support for Iraq. However, Iran was able to separate political and economic relations, and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union continued throughout the war.4 Relations with Iran’s Arab neighbours were continually poor during the war, as all but Syria sided with Iraq. Indeed, since the revolution, Syria remains one of the few states that Iran can actually call an ally – something that appears surprising considering the ideological distance between Iran’s Islamic and Syria’s secular regime. This shows the continuing importance of realpolitik in Iranian foreign policy, even during its revolutionary phase. Meanwhile, Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia were further worsened by arguments over oil quotas within OPEC, the deaths of Iranian pilgrims during the 1987 Hajj, and a mutually perceived rivalry over the ‘leadership’ of the Muslim world. With Iran’s international isolation almost complete, and revolutionary fervour little match for Iraq’s more advanced weaponry, the war ended in stalemate with Iran’s acceptance of a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1988. It is at this point that one can perhaps detect the beginnings of a move towards a more pragmatic foreign policy approach. As Chubin notes, the late 1980s saw the Islamic Republic placing ‘greater emphasis on Iran’s own situation stemming from the stalemate in the war and Iran’s need to escape from a form of selfinflicted isolation’.5 Also, export of the revolution was hindered by its very much ‘Iranian’ and ‘Shi‘i’ nature,6 despite the universalistic preachings of Khomeini. This perhaps explains why one of the main successes in exporting the revolution was in Lebanon, with support for the Shi‘i Hezbollah in a country that contains a sizeable Shi‘i population. While this broad overview of Iranian foreign policy since 1979 does scant justice to such an important and intriguing subplot in its story, it needs to be highlighted as it evidences one of the most visible

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and bold examples of Iranian adventurism during this period. Chehabi has noted how the historical confessional linkages, and connections made in the pre-revolutionary era by key figures in the Islamic Republic, were to become crucial in Hezbollah’s genesis.7 During the early to mid-1980s, members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard were active in Lebanon – providing training and ideological support to the various groups opposed to the Israeli invasion of that country – with Hezbollah first making its existence public in February 1985.8 However, it soon became evident that such a policy was leading to Iran’s total isolation in an increasingly globalised world, and with a new spirit of pragmatism coinciding with the ascendancy of Rafsanjani, national interests began to take primacy over revolutionary idealism in Iran’s foreign policy. Ramazani has highlighted how ‘An unprecedented confluence of landmark changes both within and outside Iran’,9 including the death of Khomeini in 1989 and the subsequent rise of the Khamenei– Rafsanjani axis of power, the end of the Cold War culminating in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Iraq in the first Gulf War (during which Iran maintained its neutrality), all helped to reshape the foreign policy of Iran. Overall, there was a move towards greater pragmatism in the way Iran conducted its international relations from the late 1980s onwards, although periodic outbursts of revolutionary idealism continued to take place, such as the Salman Rushdie fatwa, and continued invective aimed towards the United States and Israel. One of the key proponents of this change was Ali Akbar HashemiRafsanjani, Iranian president from 1989 to 1997. It is worth noting at this point that the post of president had new powers conferred upon it following a constitutional amendment in 1989, elevating it in the Iranian political hierarchy. Rafsanjani saw the need for a reappraisal of Iranian foreign policy objectives as a means of rebuilding the country following eight years of war; key to this was economic reform in the form of privatisation and, critically, increasing foreign investment. This meant that Iran had to pursue better relations with other states as a means of attracting such investment to help rebuild its shattered infrastructure. The result was a gradual reduction in Iran’s

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international isolation, which had been partly self-inflicted. One tangible result of this move towards greater pragmatism was improved relations with nearly all of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was ostensibly set up to foster greater regional cooperation, but in reality acted as a means of countering Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf region. Naturally, the limited pluralism in Iranian politics allowed the formation of much debate on the placing of national interests over revolutionary idealism, and as a result Ramazani has made a distinction between what he terms ‘radical idealists’ and ‘pragmatic realists’.10 This dichotomy can be seen as indicative of the wider debate within Iranian politics of strict adherence to revolutionary aims or more pragmatic interpretations – although this negates the complexity of the Iranian political scene somewhat. One area where both sides are in agreement is on re-establishing Iranian preeminence in the Persian Gulf region, though this has not come about in the belligerent manner expected of a revolutionary state. Rather, such moves have come about through cooperation and the promotion of good neighbourliness, as Rafsanjani himself has stated regarding the region, ‘We do not want to become the policeman’.11 The end of the Cold War had mixed results for Iran: on one hand it left Iran facing the sole world superpower as its sworn enemy; while on the other, the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 offered new opportunities for Iran to reduce its isolation. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, Iran abandoned revolutionary sentiment for pragmatic national interest. Following the collapse of the USSR, Iran was careful not to antagonise Russia in building relations with the newly independent states, particularly since Russia had become a major arms supplier to Iran. This is further elaborated upon by Chubin, who notes that, ‘If the price of good relations and access to Russian arms supplies is Iranian restraint on its northern frontiers . . . Iran has signalled that the price is acceptable.’12 Russia was also active in assisting Iran in getting its stalled nuclear programme back on track, helping Iran in re-commencing the building of the Bushehr nuclear plant, as in the light of US-led sanctions, Russia, while not the supplier of choice, had become the

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‘supplier of necessity’ for nuclear technology.13 Realpolitik again predominates in Iran – Russia relations, with Iranian quiescence on the plight of fellow Muslims during the Chechen wars of the 1990s a clear example of pragmatism taking precedence over revolutionary fervour and Islamic solidarity. During the early 1990s, Iran was also active in mediation efforts in both the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in Tajikistan’s 1992 – 7 Civil War. One of the main themes of Iranian foreign policy since the breakup of the Soviet Union has been a focus on building relations with the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. While much of this has been on a bilateral level, an enduring feature has been the enthusiasm Iran has shown towards regional cooperation through groupings such as the ECO. Although Iran places emphasis on the cooperative nature of the regional initiatives it is involved in, one can see moves towards greater regionalism as an attempt to undermine outside, namely American, influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Nonetheless, the moves made by Iran in assuming a more constructive regional role help its international image, showing the Islamic Republic as a willing and cooperative partner. One can therefore discern a shift in the guiding foreign policy of ‘neither east nor west’ to one that Ramazani describes as ‘both north and south’.14 The election of Mohammad Khatami as president in 1997 continued the partial international rehabilitation started by Rafsanjani. While the primary concern of this book is to chart how one of the guiding principles of Khatami’s foreign policy outlook was applied in its relations with other states and actors, it is also necessary to give some broader context to Iran’s international relations during this period. As such there are some issues that affected Iranian foreign policy during the Khatami period that merit attention, namely the impasse over Iran’s nuclear programme, and the events of 11 September 2001 and the resultant American-led conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. My commentary here is intentionally brief as, while these issues are important in providing the wider context, they do not form the primary analytical foci of this book.

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Regarding the nuclear issue, Iran has in the early years of the twenty-first century remained at loggerheads with the West over the extent of its nuclear ambitions, though at the time of writing, a deal has finally been reached between Iran and world powers that safeguards its right to produce nuclear fuel. During his presidency, Khatami regularly defended Iran’s rights to have a peaceful, civilian nuclear programme, but also offered assurances to the West, as seen in the 2004 suspension of uranium enrichment – a key confidence-building measure on Iran’s part. While gradual moves towards accommodation on the nuclear issue slowly continued throughout the Khatami era, the climate of global affairs underwent significant change following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. George W. Bush’s designation of Iran as part of the Axis of Evil (alongside Iraq and North Korea) helped strengthen the hand of conservatives within Iran and this, combined with the eventual suppression of Khatami and the reform movement in Iran, led to an increasingly antagonistic tone in Iran’s dealings over the nuclear issue. America’s response to 9/11 was something of a double-edged sword for Tehran. While two major threats to the security of Iran – in the form of Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan15 – were removed, this left Iran encircled by US-led troops in both of these states, and a continued naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The War on Terror helped further crystallise the already stark difference between the (broadly speaking) reformist and conservative camps in Iran. Chubin has highlighted how on one hand, the reformists saw within the war an opportunity to use its overlapping interests with the United States to start a long-delayed dialogue, while on the other, conservatives saw this as further proof of American aggression against fellow Muslims and a pretext for expansion into Central Asia, undermining revolutionary Iran.16 Furthermore, the dualism that exists in the power structures of the Iranian leadership, with Supreme Leader Khamenei retaining the final say on foreign policy, means that mixed signals are often sent out. This is something that stymied Khatami’s efforts at rapprochement with the West, and continues to affect Iran’s relations with the rest of the world.

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Internal mechanisms of Iranian foreign policy making The Islamic Republic polity is characterised by multiple and overlapping centres of power, and a constitutional make-up that easily lends itself towards Balkanisation as a result.17 This makes the internal mechanisms of how foreign policy is formulated, and who the main stakeholders are within that process, particularly noteworthy when analysing Khatami’s room for manoeuvre in this area. There are several different actors prominent in Iranian foreign policy making, something that increases the opacity in determining who plays what role and how decisions are made and carried out. Byman et al. have described this situation as ‘consensus in complexity’, noting that ‘The large number of institutional and non-institutional actors, family ties, personal relationships, overlapping institutional authority, and mixture of religion and politics all contrive to make it difficult to identify who has a say on what issue’,18 but that such complexity is also balanced by a ‘cultural and procedural emphasis on consensus’.19 By means of a broad overview, the main actors can be defined as the Supreme Leader, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the executive branch of government, the Majles (parliament), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Pasdaran). The Supreme Leader has the final say on all foreign, defence and domestic policy issues, controls the armed forces, and appoints his own foreign policy adviser independently of the president and Foreign Ministry – a role filled at the time of writing by former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati. Any issues pertaining to national security and/or national interest fall firmly under Khamenei’s jurisdiction. The SNSC was established following the 1989 constitutional amendments and acts as a key consultative body, ostensibly chaired by the president. The executive branch of government consists primarily of the president, the Foreign and Defence Ministries and, to a lesser extent, the Interior and Intelligence Ministries. The power of the president, as will be seen, is theoretically limited by pervasive deference to the Supreme Leader, and that of the Foreign Ministry even more so. However, there is substantially more room for manoeuvre in non-strategic, non-national

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interest cases. The Majles has a constitutionally defined role under article 152 of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution,20 but its influence largely depends on its make-up at any given time. Generally the Majles will reflect the views of the presidency in foreign policy issues, providing the president’s own parliamentary allies are dominant. Finally, the Pasdaran are formally limited to a representative on the SNSC, however, they arguably have more influence than is recognised by the Constitution, particularly in areas of national security, and increasingly through their economic activities. As Maleki notes, the decisions of the formal structure may also be influenced by informal, outside forces in the form of information derived from diplomatic channels, security agents, miscellaneous media sources, libraries abroad, individual citizens, think tanks and scholarly authorities.21 As a result, any attempt at analysis of decision making in Iranian foreign policy must, as Chubin states, resort to a certain degree of ‘extrapolation, analogy and speculation’.22 Of the above institutions, it is the SNSC that is particularly worthy of attention, as it brings together representatives from across multiple branches of government, helping to integrate the main institutions of power in the Islamic Republic, and is crucial in formulating the foreign, military, and security policies of Iran.23 As noted above, the SNSC was one of the outcomes of the 1989 constitutional revisions and its roles, as defined by article 176 of the Constitution, relate to: determining the defence and national security policies within the framework of general policies determined by the Leader; coordination of activities in the areas relating to politics, intelligence, social, cultural and economic fields in regard to general defence and security policies and exploitation of material and intellectual resources of the country for facing internal and external threats.24 The SNSC is constitutionally defined as consisting of the heads of the three branches of government (the president, the head of the Judiciary and Majles speaker), a secretary (nominated by the president), the officer in charge of planning and budget affairs, two representatives nominated by the Supreme Leader, the foreign, interior, intelligence and defence ministers, and the commanders of

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the Regular Armed Forces and the Pasdaran.25 It should be noted that the secretary’s role is an important one, serving as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator – a role held by current president Hassan Rouhani under Khatami. However, while the president heads up the council and chooses its secretary, all decisions taken by the SNSC are still subject to confirmation by Khamenei. The larger aim of the SNSC is to safeguard Iran’s national interests, which include its sovereignty and territorial integrity. As such, common positions are sought on most issues (or crises) thought to need co-ordination, such as the confrontation with the Taliban in 1998, or the formulation of policy on the Persian Gulf islands disputed with the UAE.26 The SNSC contains a large number of posts that are subject to change, either as a result of presidential elections, which affect the civilian government, or personal appointments, as with commanders of the armed forces. The council will generally reflect the prevailing political faction in Iran at any one time. Thus, for example, under the first and early parts of the Ahmadinejad presidency, there was a broad convergence of foreign policy outlook between the president, Supreme Leader and Armed Forces (particularly the Pasdaran, due to Ahmadinejad’s own links with them). However, it was not quite as harmonious during the Khatami era. Indeed, Chubin has commented on how Khatami complained several times in 2000 that although he was supposed to be responsible for national security, he did not have the necessary tools, nor the adequate authority, to do his job.27 During Khatami’s time in office, presidential power remained circumscribed, and final authority rested then, as it remains today, with the Supreme Leader. Furthermore, the entire executive branch is subordinate to religious authorities, and only the Supreme Leader is deemed fully competent in all general political issues.28 The above has sought to explain some of the complex internal mechanisms of Iranian foreign policy making, and the primary conclusion that can be derived from the discussion is that the president is only one actor among many – and one whose power is often constrained. On issues of national security and national interest, the views of the Supreme Leader, and increasingly the Pasdaran are paramount. Khamenei also has his own foreign policy apparatus

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running parallel to that of the state, which is highlighted by Buchta as resting on several pillars. The Supreme Leader dispatches his representatives abroad to cultural organisations and Islamic centres. Additionally, he wields foreign policy power through a series of other organisations run by his allies. The most powerful of these organisations is the Sa¯zma¯n-e Tabligha¯t-e Esla¯mi (Islamic Propagation Organisation), which focuses its activity domestically but also devotes significant resources to endeavours abroad. The Hajj and Welfare Organisation and Society for Reconciliation amongst Islamic Sects are also used by Khamenei to extend his reach in foreign relations.29 Buchta has also noted how Iran’s cultural bureaus abroad are important, in so far as their appointees are direct representatives of the Supreme Leader, and therefore independent of embassies30 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, it appears that these representatives were also identified as key constituents in promoting the Dialogue among Civilisations through cultural exchange activities with host countries. This can be interpreted as Khamenei’s tacit acceptance of one of Khatami’s foreign policy objectives, providing it serves Iran’s national interests. Arguably, the president does not determine the general guidelines of domestic and foreign policy, nor does he have command over the armed forces and security services,31 and therefore only has limited scope, if any, for implementing his own agenda in sensitive areas. While I have demonstrated that Khatami and his Foreign Ministry had a very clear foreign policy agenda, the application of Dialogue among Civilisations in Iran’s international relations was primarily targeted in settings that were not deemed critical to Iran’s national security. Therefore we can observe the greater room for manoeuvre and diplomacy that was exercised by Khatami in these less sensitive areas – providing the ‘red lines’ in Iranian foreign policy were not crossed – such as relations with the United States and Israel, and the nuclear issue.

CHAPTER 2 KHATAMI AND THE IDEA OF DIALOGUE AMONG CIVILISATIONS

Background to Khatami Prior to becoming the figurehead of the 2 Khorda¯d Movement,1 Khatami played an active role in Iranian politics. After graduating with a BA in Philosophy, he spent time in Qom studying Islamic law, jurisprudence and philosophy. While in Qom, Khatami and other former students of Khomeini formed the Ja¯me‘eh-ye Roha¯niyat-e Moba¯rez (The Society of Combatant Clerics), a group that played a key role in mobilising opposition to the Shah, and went on to constitute the main clerical body of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) following the revolution. In 1978 – just prior to the revolution – Khatami was chosen to head the Hamburg Islamic Institute in West Germany, at the time a hub of opposition to the monarchy, and one that played a key role in organising revolutionary activity among the Iranian diaspora residing there. This paints a picture of a well-educated cleric who could not only count on his religious studies background, but also on a grounding in Western philosophies, both of which went on to influence his future direction in the governmental posts he held, firstly as Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance, and later as President of the Islamic Republic. Following the revolution, Khatami became an active

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participant in Iranian politics, initially as a member of the first Majles in 1980 representing Ardakan, and then in 1983 as Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance in the cabinet of then prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Politically, Khatami was associated primarily with the populist, leftist faction of the Society of Combatant Clerics. Keddie notes that in 1987, following internal disputes within the IRP between the ‘Islamic Left’ and conservatives, Khomeini dissolved the party, which in turn led to a split in 1988 within the main clerical organisation, between the Society of Combatant Clerics, which came to be controlled by conservatives, and the offshoot Association of Combatant Clerics, led by members of the ‘Islamic Left’.2 Khatami was a key player in orchestrating the split, and speaking in 1988 gave his reasons as thus: Members of the Society of Combatant Clerics were split from the very beginning of the revolution. Now, we have no choice but to pronounce our opinions as the Association of Combatant Clerics, because some [of our] views are being ignored . . . There have been differences of opinion among the membership of the Society of Combatant Clerics regarding at least seventeen points . . . We must close the door on those who do not believe in the eternal war between the rich and the poor and who exploit Islam for their own political and material wellbeing . . . [this] American brand of Islam must be eradicated.3 In hindsight it is perhaps surprising, given the pragmatic nature of Khatami’s politics later on, that he would position himself within a group commonly known as radicals fighting those advocating a more pragmatic approach.4 However, this shows the difficulty in trying to label Iranian political blocs along lines that are used in the West, and demonstrates the innate complexity of Iranian factional politics. Indeed, according to Keddie, by the time of the 1997 elections, many of the ‘Islamic Left’ now held liberal reformist views.5 Conversely it is in his role as Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance that the more recognisable, liberal Khatami can be

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observed. Khatami relaxed censorship on printed material, facilitating a rise in the number and variety of publications. He also gave encouragement to the film industry, thus winning favour among intellectuals.6 Consequently, following the constitutional reform after the death of Khomeini in 1989, Khatami continued in his role as culture minister in Rafsanjani’s cabinet, despite his previous ‘political’ alignment. However, in June 1992, following criticism of his supposedly liberal attitude in the cultural field by conservative politicians and the press, Khatami tendered his resignation.7 A key contention of those in opposition was that Khatami had been too lenient in the face of Western cultural invasion, and was therefore undermining the Islamic Republic.8 Rafsanjani initially rejected the resignation,9 but accepted a month later, with the vacant position going to future Majles speaker and nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani.10 Explaining the reasons behind his resignation, Khatami said he quit because of the ‘retrograde and stagnant climate in the country’ and that such a situation threatened to ‘condemn intellectuals, artists and even faithful friends of the Islamic Revolution to indifference’.11 Such comments show the esteem in which Khatami held academics. Also evident are his own fears of such groups being treated with indifference by the state, which were perhaps rather prophetic when one observes their disenchantment with the political process during the latter stages of the Khatami presidency, and indeed afterwards. Khatami subsequently took up a position as head of the National Library, where he was able to pursue his intellectual endeavours, producing two books: Bim-e mawj (Fear of the Wave) in 1993, and Az donya¯-ye shahr ta¯ shahr-e donya¯: sayri dar a¯ndisheh-ye siya¯si-ye gharb (From the World of the City to the City of the World: A Survey of Western Political Thought) in 1994.12 Bim-e mawj concerns itself mainly with efforts of modern Shi‘i thinkers, such as Allameh Tabataba’i, Morteza Motahhari and Mohammad al-Sadr, who sought to reinterpret Islamic thought and help Islam come to terms with modernity. Az donya¯-ye shahr ta¯ shahr-e donya¯ is principally a review of Western political philosophy, emphasising the influence of Locke in particular on the development of liberal political thought, which

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Khatami sees as constituting the very essence of the West in the modern era. He sees liberal political philosophers such as Locke and Hobbes as representing dynamic forces that questioned the problems of their age, and as such there is an implied recognition that Islam, and more so Iran, needs to adapt in a similar fashion. Such perspectives, as shall be seen later, were significant in shaping the nature of the reformist agenda both in the election campaign and during Khatami’s tenure as president. It seems that the less politically charged atmosphere of the National Library suited Khatami well, and indeed he himself noted, ‘without doubt one of the most enjoyable periods of my life was the time that I spent [as head of] the National Library’.13 As his publications show, it was also a time when Khatami could further shape his ideas of reinvigorating political thought in Iran and reconciling Islam with democracy. It is clear to see that he is both a man of the system, someone who had been closely involved in the formation and establishment of the Islamic Republic, and a principled, reform-minded character who would not be quiescent in watching the regression of what he saw as hard-won freedoms. As a figure with both political experience and an intellectual background in philosophy, one can comprehend how he eventually combined these two aspects upon taking office as President of the Islamic Republic. As I demonstrate later on, Dialogue among Civilisations was a concept that typifies Khatami, marrying as it did his love for philosophy with the practical politicking necessary for reform both at home and in Iran’s relations abroad.

The reform movement, civil society and cultural foreign policy: The domestic –foreign policy link While the main purpose of this book remains as analysing Iran’s foreign policy through the prism of Dialogue among Civilisations during the Khatami era, it is also necessary to give an account of the reformist movement’s rise to power in Iran, as this helps enable further understanding of the policy choices enacted by Khatami, and how reform both at home and abroad remain closely linked.

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Roots of reform Ansari has attributed the origins of the reform movement to ‘the vigorous debates and discussions that emerged in Iran’s universities following the end of the Iran – Iraq war in 1988’.14 This coincides broadly with what has been described by some as the beginnings of the ‘thermidor’ of the Islamic Republic:15 the closing phase of a revolution when revisionist and reformist views increasingly challenge the orthodoxy of hardline revolutionaries. According to Khosrokhavar, the 1990s saw the emergence of new tendencies in Islamic ideology in Iran that called into question the revolutionary tenets of the 1970s and 1980s. Since then the main intellectual trend in Iran has been religious reformism. These new Islamic ideas challenged the supremacy of revolutionary Islam, marked the end of religious radicalism in mainstream intellectual life, and signalled a move towards a new kind of religious reformism.16 Certainly the period did see a slight freeing up of debate within the Islamic Republic about how best to adapt to changing global circumstances, with so-called ‘Islamic intellectuals’ like Abdolkarim Soroush taking the lead. Indeed, Soroush and other key intellectual figures in Iran at the time can be seen as being highly influential in shaping the debate, thus helping create a space for Khatami to come to the fore in 1997. The relative pragmatism of the Rafsanjani era can also be seen as helping to lay the foundations of the reform movement in Iran, as they allowed the conditions for such debates to take place, thus emboldening those who sought to question the Islamic Republic’s actions both domestically and in its international relations. The end of 1996 saw Khatami return to the political fray, with the ‘Followers of the Imam’s Line’ (a group that primarily consisted of those who could broadly be seen as representing the previouslydiscussed ‘Islamic Left’ faction) attempting to persuade him to run in the forthcoming elections in May 1997.17 Following consultations with various factions, including Rafsanjani’s ‘Servants of Construction’ group, Khatami’s candidacy was announced by Salam newspaper in January 1997.18 Importantly for Khatami, the ‘Servants of

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Construction’ group officially announced their support for Khatami in March,19 which provided him with support across a wide spectrum of Iranian political factions including the Islamic left and Rafsanjani’s pragmatic conservatives. Indeed, speaking in March 1997, vicepresident and future Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister under Khatami, ‘Ata¯‘ollah Mohajerani, was keen to note the cross-factional nature of Khatami’s support, stating that: Khatami’s advantage is that all groups such as the Servants [of Construction], the Combatant Clerics Society, the Coalition of the Line of the Imam [Khomeini] and others have already announced that they support him. This shows his widespread popularity which enables him to attract people who may have different views or inclinations.20 Also vital to Khatami was the support of intellectuals and the large youth population, cognisant of his previous image as a (socially) liberal-minded academic. During the election campaign it became clear that it was, to all intents and purposes, a two-horse race between Khatami and the ‘establishment’ candidate, former Majles speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, who had the implicit backing of the Supreme Leader and traditional conservative factions of the political elite.21 Khatami’s campaign reflected his commitments to making Islam compatible with democracy and developing civil society in Iran – features that, in part, reflect his own familiarity with Western political thought as outlined in the discussion around his previous academic works. Khatam 77 percent of the vote, drawing particularly on the votes of women, and Iran’s youth population (voting was allowed from the age of 16 at the time in Iran). The Persian calendar date, 2 Khorda¯d, entered into Iranian political folklore and soon became the name under which the reformist front coalesced. The emphasis on creating greater openness in Iran and with the international community certainly helped him to victory. His discussion of ‘freedom of opinion, human rights, party pluralism, and the balancing of democracy and Islam’22 during the election campaign were decisive in this respect.

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Civil society and democracy During the campaign and afterwards, Khatami placed particular emphasis on establishing greater civil society in Iran. This involved greater institutionalisation of civil laws, respect for the legal framework instituted by the constitution, and active participation of civil society in electing government and performing oversight. Part of Khatami’s reasoning comes from the admission that civil society in Iran was left somewhat underdeveloped by the tumult of the immediate post-revolution period and the Iran–Iraq war, and that by 1997 conditions were finally stable enough to renew commitment to constitutional rule.23 The stances outlined in Khatami’s official campaign platform are telling, with the following excerpts being of particular relevance to the enhancement of civil society: Respecting human rights and dignity – ‘Familiarize people with their inherent rights and prepare grounds for freedom of expression, writing, formation of societies; respecting different perspectives, encouraging criticism, propagating debate and speculation, avoiding despotism and preventing violation of individual and legal rights.’ Islamic and national solidarity – ‘Respecting different perspectives and defending the rights of minorities.’ Public participation and competition – ‘Eliminating obstacles for widespread public participation in all economic, social, cultural, scientific and political fields and profiting from the opinion of scientists, experts and specialists in planning and implementation of government programs. Encouraging wholehearted participation of masses particularly women and the youth and creating an atmosphere of healthy competition and collective cooperation.’ A strong, responsible and serving government – ‘The legibility [sic ] of the government in the Islamic Republic emanates from

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public votes. A strong government chosen by the nation is an efficient body which makes comprehensive and realistic decisions by taking into consideration all latent and evident resources and capabilities. A public appointed government is a servant of the nation and not the master and is responsible to all citizens for all its actions and such a government should profit from international opportunities to serve the elevated goals of the System.’24 The above points show a commitment to good governance and participation that bear some similarities to classic Western notions of civil society, as defined by thinkers such as Locke and Hobbes. Khatami’s chief strategist was Sa‘eed Hajjarian, who like Soroush can be considered as one of the younger, reformist lay-intellectuals to emerge from the 1990s. In common with his contemporaries, Hajjarian sought to find ways of asserting political legitimacy over religious rule as a means of guaranteeing the survival of the Islamic Republic, thus implicitly seeking a reduction in the role of the Supreme Leader and greater assertion of legitimate democratic rule.25 Like Khatami, Hajjarian draws on the work of Western thinkers to help clarify his definition of civil society. He has, for example, cited the work of Locke regarding the ideas of a social covenant in which people give up some rights to a government, but that authority must be legitimised by the consent of the governed, to underscore the commitment of the Khatami administration to building civil society in Iran.26 Khatami’s conception of democracy, or what in Persian he refers to as mardomsa¯la¯ri (literally meaning that people are at the top of the hierarchy), is also important, and is defined by Holliday as ‘government for the people, which is to be achieved through civil society and is upheld by the constitution’.27 Khatami was also keen to stress the need for political parties in Iran: Now we have set up an Islamic republic. Is there any other alternative but formation of parties to involve the people? We mean creation of parties within the framework of our system, while maintaining the old foundations. The fact that there are

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some ambiguities now and the people enter the arena [without any party affiliation], it is because parties have not been organized in advance. We can sit around and collect views and work on formation of parties with their constitution. The parties can nominate their candidates to participate in various elections. If that were to happen, when we are told that so and so is a candidate, we would know what his ideas and manifesto are. At present our people approach various issues by becoming emotional. Truly, sometimes the people’s rights are violated. We have no alternative but to establish organizations of a civilized society in this country.28 Here Khatami is linking the need for political parties to the development of civil society. He sees them as the best means of getting people to become more involved, and interestingly refers to the deficiencies of the current, rather ambiguous system that is more factional than party-based. His admission that ‘truly people’s rights are violated’ is also interesting, as he is implicitly divulging his own distaste for the state of affairs in Iran at the time. While this constituted something of an admission over the lack of representation, it may also have been a veiled reference to broader human rights issues in Iran. In his first, official election campaign speech in May 1997, Khatami spelt out his priorities should he win, and in the following comments it is again possible to discern his commitment to civil society and democracy – themes that would become increasingly prominent once he became president. In his speech, Khatami aims to link civil society to religion, as the following excerpt illustrates: It should be said here that, in this part of the world and, especially, in Iran, religion has been the element calling people to establish and consolidate civil society, a responsible society, a society in which people are participants, a society in which the government belongs to the people and is the servant of the people, not their master, and is consequently responsible to the people; whereas on the other side of the world and in the

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West, Westerners founded civil society by turning their backs on religion and turning away from it as an effective element in social life. This is why materialism became the axis of Western civilization and civil society. Secularism, liberalism and dozens of other -isms rose up from the heart of that society, whereas we try to make civil society comply with religious principles, with the lofty values of God and with a human being that is free, responsible and filled with reverence.29 The salient point here is that, in addition to the linking of civil society with religion that is to be expected from a cleric running for the presidency of the Islamic Republic, Khatami refers to that most democratic of notions: ‘government belongs to the people and is the servant of the people, not their master’. He goes on to note the perceived deficiencies of Western civilisation and civil society – particularly in relation to its materialism – thus alluding to his own academic background. In doing so he attempts to synthesise an ostensibly ‘Western’ ideal of a civil society (based primarily on the rule of law and democracy) with religious and spiritual values. In the same speech Khatami also links his quest for civil society to the works of Ayatollah Mirza Hossein Na‘ini, noting that: It is a source of honour for all of us that the first written charter for civil society [in Iran] was written and prepared by an eminent Shi‘i theologian and jurisconsult, his Eminence Grand Ayatollah Na‘ini . . . a work which became scarce after the constitutional revolution.30 Na‘ini was a prominent figure in the constitutional revolution in Iran. He became more noted among religious intellectuals in Iran following the revolution, as he is one of the most estimable ulema to have given a contemporary theoretical justification for constitutional rule from a Shi‘i Islamic viewpoint.31 Therefore, Khatami is placing himself amongst historical reformist thinkers who sought ways of establishing constitutional rule in Iran, drawing an explicit link between himself and those who sought to challenge despotic rule.

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The discourse surrounding civil society in Iran picked up rapidly following the election of Khatami, and the subsequent appointment of a number of reform-minded cabinet ministers and senior officials.32 According to Kamrava, this discourse has undergone a significant process of ‘indigenisation’, which while still taking its cue from Western conceptions, has been changed significantly in terms of its overall meaning and utility.33 With regards to democracy, Khatami’s own conception of ‘Islamic’ or ‘religious democracy’ (Islamic mardomsa¯la¯ri) is noted by Holliday as being closely linked to the ideas of independence and freedom that were also key slogans of the Iranian revolution.34 As such, Khatami can be seen as legitimising his idea for Islamic democracy by linking it to the revolution and the struggle for independence.35 Following his inauguration as president, Khatami was keen to continue his emphasis on the importance of serving the people. In his inaugural address to the Majles, emboldened by his impressive mandate, he stated that ‘the people must believe they have the right to determine their own destiny’,36 thus further entrenching his belief in forming a government for the people. Khatami’s conception of an ‘Islamic civil society’ is perhaps best outlined in his speech to the Eighth Summit of the OIC in December 1997 (incidentally the same forum at which the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations was first brought to wider global attention). In this address, Khatami offered his thoughts on the necessities of developing ‘Islamic civil society’, noting how this was fundamentally different from the civil society based on Greek philosophical thinking and Roman political tradition. Khatami instead called for such a society to be based on Madinat ul-Nabi (Medina).37 He offered an Islamic conception of civil society that, while mindful of the achievements of Western civilisation, seeks to draw on its own historical antecedents for inspiration, demonstrating a certain degree of Kamrava’s ‘indigenisation’. Drawing on his own understanding of the Muslim world’s struggle to cope with the challenges of modernity, he noted that such a ‘common Islamic home’ should not take the form of regression and withdrawal from the modern world, but rather focus on developing a

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‘deep understanding’ of other societies and cultures. It is at this point that a noteworthy link appears between the idea of developing an Islamic civil society in Iran and the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations. What Khatami is aiming for is an indigenous conception of civil society based in part on an appreciation and understanding of other cultures, that is to say a dialogue with them. This notion of dialogue will be discussed later, but it is in the field of concrete actions and pronouncements of foreign policy objectives that this appreciation and understanding of other cultures was to find its first real application. Foreign policy During the 1997 election campaign it was not particularly clear that the changes desired at the domestic level would be mirrored in Iran’s foreign policy. Khatami’s pre-election statements on foreign policy were typified by reference to ‘aggressive bullying powers’ such as the US, and solidarity with the Palestinian people.38 The tone was bullish, replete with references to ‘preserving independence’ and basing foreign relations on ‘our principles, mutual respect and national interests’ with key issues such as relations with America to be ‘decided by the leader’.39 He was also keen to state the importance of preserving independence, and stated that ‘the most important foreign policy will be to distance the enemy from our region’. This can be understood as Khatami seeking to legitimise his candidacy in the eyes of the conservative elite, and can perhaps be interpreted as Khatami over-compensating – mindful of previous accusations of being too liberal. However, notes of pragmatism were sounded, and sought to build on the regional rapprochement undertaken by Rafsanjani: We are in favour of reducing tension throughout the world, especially in the region. We are in favour of extensive cooperation with our neighbours, with Muslims and with all the independent countries, especially those countries whose position is complementary to our economic and political situation.40

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Khatami also touched upon an idea that was to become a central theme in his administration’s foreign policy, the notion of ‘culture’. Speaking to Iran News in March 1997 some two months prior to the election, Khatami, while referring to the EU’s then policy of ‘critical dialogue’, remarked that there needed to be a shift away from political discussion to something that he described as ‘critical cultural discussions’ with EU countries. He went on to explain that cultural experts, unlike politicians, took the interests of human society into consideration, and that Iran would ‘extend the hand of friendship to all neighbouring countries, particularly Muslim ones’,41 which if one were to take a cynical view might suggest that Iran was pursuing a different course up until that point. It is also interesting that this comparatively softer tone was used when he was interviewed by an English-language publication, which shows that Khatami was cognisant of the need to use more diplomatic language when dealing with certain sections of the press. The emphasis placed on culture would go on to become a key feature of Dialogue among Civilisations, with an emphasis on the contributions of academics and intellectuals rather than politicians. However, it was arguably the politicians who were most astute in using the Dialogue among Civilisations in a form of cultural foreign policy that will be explored further in Chapters 3 and 4. Following his election victory, there appears to be a moderation in tone, with Khatami stating that Iran was ready to ‘extend the hand of cooperation and fraternity to all countries’,42 and that Iran ‘desires good neighbourliness with regional countries’.43 Khatami’s choice for foreign minister reflected the importance he placed on changing Iran’s foreign relations. In selecting Kamal Kharrazi, Khatami chose a media-savvy former diplomat who had previously served as head of the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), and had been Iran’s Ambassador to the UN since 1989. Kharrazi’s early statements on Iranian foreign policy highlight the new direction being taken. Once in his position, Kharrazi set about further explaining the programme for Iranian foreign policy, stating that the Islamic Republic would pursue ‘new diplomacy’ and, in reference to restoring relations with the EU, that he would have

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‘no problem’ in meeting with EU foreign ministers.44 He added that Iran was ‘ready to cooperate with other countries to resolve misunderstandings, build confidence, remove tensions, help build regional and international peace and fight all forms of terrorism’.45 Striking a somewhat realist tone, Kharrazi also emphasised the desire of Iran to ‘elevate its status in the region and the world’, stating that ‘Iran’s key role in charting regional and global equations will be expanded’.46 However, Kharrazi was also keen to emphasise the importance of culture in Iran’s foreign policy, noting that efforts would be made to promote the culture of Iran, the Persian language, and ‘help guide cultural decisions on the international scene’.47 Importantly for Iran’s foreign relations, Kharrazi stated that another important policy initiative that Iran’s new government was to pursue would be ‘efforts for de´tente on the regional and international level and an active presence to safeguard peace and resolve disputes’.48 Thus a new foreign policy posture was clearly being formulated, one that was seeking to distance itself from Iran’s previous actions, and by offering de´tente was tacitly recognising the perceived failures of isolationist foreign policy thinking. This turn has been noted by Mohajerani: In that time [Khatami’s presidency] culture was the main and the first element in Mr Khatami’s government. It was very clear, for example, that the Minister of Culture was so important, sometimes more important than the Minister of Foreign Affairs!49 Indeed, Mohajerani could be seen as a kind of ‘Cultural Foreign Minister’ for Iran, such was his prominence in Iran’s international diplomacy during the first Khatami presidency, due to the elevated role of culture in foreign relations. During this early period of Khatami’s presidency it is also possible to catch the first glimpses of the Dialogue among Civilisations. The first mention of the concept came in Khatami’s inaugural speech to the Majles on 4 August 1997, and it is interesting to note that this first proclamation of the idea appeared in the context of Khatami’s

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discussion of Iran’s foreign policy priorities, as the following excerpt demonstrates: A proud, prosperous and independent Iran on the world scene is the common aspiration of all devoted and dedicated Iranians. Hence, it is of utmost importance for the government to devote itself to promoting the national interests and prestige of the Islamic Republic, commensurate with her historical, cultural, geographical and economic standing. Safeguarding and protecting the rights of Iranian nationals all over the world, defending the rights of the world’s Muslims and the downtrodden, particularly the oppressed people of Palestine, and active participation in collective endeavours toward universal progress and advancement, while resisting wisely and decisively the expansionist policies of the domineering powers, foreign threats or outside aggression in cultural, political and military fields, are all important duties. The government must emphasise that in our world Dialogue among Civilisations is an absolute imperative. We shall avoid any course of action that may foster tension. We shall have relations with any state that respects our independence.50 While much of the above is familiar rhetoric from a president of the Islamic Republic, it is interesting that the Dialogue among Civilisations is first mentioned within the context of outlining foreign policy priorities. Although there is little further explanation of what he means by introducing such a concept, it perhaps demonstrates that Khatami saw it as forming a key part of his administration’s foreign policy. The mention of Iran’s historical and cultural standing (thus implying the importance of identity) and its geographical location are also telling, as these were to become key themes within the Dialogue among Civilisations and Iran’s wider foreign relations during the Khatami period. Speaking a month after his Majles speech, Khatami emphasised the importance of cultural interchange, stressing the need for ‘dialogue between Iran’s rich culture and other civilisations’ in an

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address to Iran’s cultural attache´s serving abroad.51 In the same speech he emphasised the role of culture in foreign relations, and urged his audience to keep in touch with thinkers and intellectuals whom he deemed as the real representatives of national cultures.52 Crucial to this, noted Khatami, was a domestic cultural atmosphere that would allow people to ‘think and create, and culture to flourish’. This again links the desire for greater freedoms at home, effectively creating a civil society, with new thinking abroad. By emphasising culture in foreign affairs, and the importance of academics and intellectuals domestically, Khatami was explicitly paving the way for de´tente and dialogue based on greater dialogue domestically. In a further glimpse of Dialogue among Civilisations prior to its official introduction Kharrazi, when pressed in an interview on how Iran could contribute to improving relations between the West and the Islamic world, stated that: I believe in a dialogue between civilisations not a clash of civilisations. Iran, as a major Islamic nation with a very rich civilisation looks forward to engaging others in such dialogue . . . I believe through such dialogue both sides can understand each other better and thus avoid possible conflicts and try to cooperate with each other.53 What can be observed here, and in Khatami’s other statements, are early indications of the perceived importance of Iranian civilisation, in this case with the emphasis on its Islamic components – something that went on to form a central theme in Iran’s promotion and leadership of the concept in the years that followed. Mohajerani has discussed the importance of Iran’s civilisation, noting that ‘[For myself] as a Minister and others it was very important to show Iran to the world as a country with a very long and rich civilisation and culture’.54 Therefore Mohajerani implies that image considerations were a key aspect of why the Dialogue among Civilisations was promoted. Such considerations are also important in terms of identity, as Kharrazi, Khatami and Mohajerani are all keen to highlight the

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importance and weight of Iran’s culture and civilisation. This is done initially with a focus on Islam but, as shall be seen later, the concept becomes a highly malleable tool that can be applied on a number of different levels, drawing on multiple conceptions of identity depending on the arena in which it is to be applied. This new direction in Iranian foreign policy offered by Khatami was well received by the international community. At the regional level Khatami was quick to underscore Iran’s commitment to improving ties with Middle Eastern states by meeting with Sultan Qaboos of Oman55 and Qatar’s foreign minister, Sheikh Hammad bin Jassem,56 soon after his inauguration. Also, Bahraini Emir Sheikh Isa was keen to draw a line under previous issues in bilateral ties stating that ‘We are optimistic that [good relations] will happen during the new era based on the policy principles declared by Mohammad Khatami’.57 With the positive response generated by the new administration’s foreign policy, the stage was set for Khatami to introduce the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations, initially to a Muslim audience at the OIC summit in Tehran, and then more explicitly to the wider world at the UN in 1998. While this was a concept firmly rooted in the ideational realm, it had a not inconsiderable effect on the conduct of Iranian foreign policy. Indeed, as a result of Khatami’s coming to power and the application of his ideas, Iranian foreign policy experienced a dramatic change both in tone and content.58 What becomes evident when charting the development of the concept is that it displayed a highly flexible nature that allowed it to be applied on multiple levels. However, before examining these varying applications it is first necessary to consider the philosophical background to the concept.

Backdrop to Dialogue among Civilisations: Clash vs dialogue and philosophical underpinnings Clash of civilisations According to Seifzadeh, Huntington’s concept is essentially a modified version of the realist ‘balance of power theory’, containing cultural overtones and projected in this instance to the civilisational

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level.59 Huntington takes a pessimistic view, with the onus very much on future conflicts being based on cultural and civilisational aspects. Written shortly after the end of the Cold War in 1993, Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations thesis posited that although nation states would remain the primary actors in international affairs, the ‘fault lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future’.60 He identifies civilisations as cultural entities that act as the ‘broadest level of identification’ in international affairs, and as such divides them into, for example, ‘Western’, ‘Islamic’, ‘Sinic’ and ‘Latin American’ civilisational blocs, to name but four.61 For Huntington, globalisation has played a key role in so far as it has reduced the ‘size’ of the world, thus allowing greater interaction between civilisations and therefore enhancing the civilisational consciousness of people.62 Also, in a sign of the times in which his piece was originally written, Huntington notes the decreasing ability of state ideologies to rally support and contends that ‘governments will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilisational identity’.63 As such, he sees the ‘intracivilisational clash of political ideas spawned by the West [as] . . . being supplanted by an intercivilisational clash of culture and religion’.64 The language used by Huntington confirms his realist outlook, with calls for Europe, North America and Latin America to ‘club together’ as a means of countering the ‘threat’ from non-Western civilisations intent on building up their military capabilities,65 and the need to ‘exploit differences and conflicts among Islamic and Confucian states’.66 Such hard strategic thinking based on such explicit cultural reference points, and claims like Islam having ‘bloody borders’,67 naturally left Huntington’s ideas open to a wave of criticism, and Khatami’s counter-argument of dialogue as opposed to clash can certainly be included in this. Huntington’s ideas were very much based on the conflicts of the time that were happening in places such as the former Yugoslavia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and as such reflected the cultural aspects of these conflicts. While the concept gained further salience after 9/11, the idea does have several pitfalls. For example, it is alarmingly reductionist in its civilisational categorisations,

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neglecting the innate complexities and factions found within the civilisational blocs used. The idea of ‘fault lines’ is also rather onedimensional – one only needs to look at Turkey as a prime example of a country on a supposed ‘civilisational fault line’, whose identity is arguably rooted in both Western and Islamic civilisations, as well as having its own Central Asian myth of descent.68 Also, it fails to take into account the foreign policy pragmatism and flexibility of countries such as Iran, who build both covert and visible alliances, often to protect their own territorial integrity and even national identity. Indeed, Iran’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan reflects this.69 However, despite Huntington’s clear strategic bent, he does offer a softer analysis in his concluding remarks, noting that the West needs to ‘develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilisations’.70 In this respect, he comes close to Khatami’s concept of Dialogue among Civilisations. Dialogue among Civilisations Khatami, like Huntington, sees the concept as an attempt at creating a new paradigm in international relations. However, contrary to Huntington’s realism, Khatami’s approach can be considered as an Islamic variant on ‘postmodern constructivism’,71 in so far as he believes that human beings can devise, or ‘construct’, their own destiny, and thus construct a new environment for human interaction at the global level.72 The general principles of Dialogue among Civilisations can be considered as follows: 1. Respect for the dignity and equality of all human beings without distinctions of any kind and of nations large and small. 2. Genuine acceptance of cultural diversity as a permanent feature of human society and a cherished asset for the advancement and welfare of humanity at large. 3. Mutual respect and tolerance for the views and values of various cultures and civilisations, as well as the right of members of all

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civilisations to preserve their cultural heritage and values, and rejection of desecration of moral, religious or cultural values, sanctities and sanctuaries. Recognition of diversified sources of knowledge throughout time and space, and the imperative of drawing upon the areas of strengths, richness and wisdom of each civilisation in a genuine process of mutual enrichment. Rejection of attempts for cultural domination and imposition as well as doctrines and practices promoting confrontation and clash between civilisations. Search for common grounds between and within various civilisations in order to face common global challenges. Acceptance of cooperation and search for understanding as the appropriate mechanism for the promotion of common universal values as well as for the suppression of global threats. Commitment to participation of all peoples and nations, without any discrimination, in their own domestic as well as global decision-making and value-distribution processes. Compliance with principles of justice, equity, peace and solidarity as well as fundamental principles of international law and the United Nations Charter.73

Khatami and Huntington use a similar framework, and both would argue that globalisation might lead to a broadening of identity that goes beyond the level of the nation state to include that of civilisation.74 However, Huntington’s approach can be described as a ‘geo-politicisation’ of civilisation, drawing on realist thinking that seeks to preserve Western hegemony in an anarchical state system.75 Table 1, drawn in part from the work of Seifzadeh76 and the author’s own previous research,77 indicates some of the key differences inherent in the two approaches. Through Dialogue among Civilisations, Khatami argued that civilisations could cooperate and converse with one another. In Khatami’s view, such an exchange is essential, as it allows the development of one’s own culture through giving, taking and adapting, rather than clashing.78

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Dialogue and Clash of Civilisations compared

Khatami – Dialogue among Civilisations Egalitarian perspective towards all civilisations ‘Socialisation’ of civilisations through peaceful and cooperative political culture thus leading to dialogue Plurality seen as positive Positive-sum game Optimistic Khatami ¼ ‘constructivist idealist’

Huntington – Clash of Civilisations Hierarchical perspective, seeking to preserve existing structure ‘Politicisation’ of civilisations thus creating rivalry and therefore leading to ‘clash’ Plurality seen as negative – need to maintain hegemony of West Zero-sum game Pessimistic Huntington ¼ realist in favour of a civilisational balance of power

Philosophy Although the introduction of Dialogue among Civilisations is generally traced back to Khatami’s 1997 OIC and 1998 UN General Assembly speeches, the concept has roots in Khatami’s own academic background and that of his close advisers. According to former Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani, two figures – Mohammad-Javad Faridzadeh and Hadi Khaniki – were crucial in helping to develop the concept with Khatami.79 Both are also respected academics, and had a particularly prominent role in shaping the philosophical aspects of the discourse based on their own academic background. As Khaniki has noted, ‘an appreciation of the true place of the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations directly hinges on an examination of its theoretical underpinnings’.80 According to Mohajerani, Faridzadeh was particularly prominent, aiding Khatami in the writing of the majority of speeches on the Dialogue among Civilisations, contributing what he terms the ‘Germanic philosophy’ component of the discourse.81 Furthermore, Mohajerani commented that although Khatami was naturally consulted, the main framework of the speeches came from Faridzadeh.82

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A key starting point when seeking to trace the origins of Dialogue among Civilisations is the work of Dariush Shayegan, an important Iranian intellectual and philosopher who continually refers to questions of ‘civilisation’ in his soul-searching works. Shayegan was a founding director for the Iranian Centre for Studies of Civilisation under the Shah and, importantly, in 1977 had organised his own symposium on ‘dialogue between civilisations’.83 In a similar spirit to that of Dialogue among Civilisations, the aim of the institute was to help further Iranian knowledge of other civilisations. This is a fact widely unreported in works dealing with the Dialogue among Civilisations, even those that have tried to sketch its philosophical antecedents. It is, however, important to note Shayegan’s contribution, as Khatami’s appropriation of the term indicates a certain familiarity with his works, and also helps in further tracing the philosophical background to the concept. Indeed, Mohajerani has himself confirmed this link; however, he feels that this was initially just ‘a simple idea . . . and not really a theory’.84 Such comments may do a disservice to Shayegan’s work as even the most cursory glance at his ideas reveals similarities to Khatami’s. These can be seen in terms of how non-Western civilisations confront and adapt to modernity. Tradition and modernity, East and West, and bridging the gap between Iran and the West are among the topics in which Shayegan has engaged.85 Writing in 1992, Shayegan noted the problems inherent in trying to resist Western influence, which he deems to be reflected in a deep-lying malaise that ‘results from the non-comprehension, or non-assimilation, of a major historical phenomenon: modernity in its broadest sense’.86 It is essentially an invitation to broaden one’s horizons and accept the multicultural nature of the modern world, rather than drawing on a unitary conception of self-identity – such as through Islam alone. Shayegan discusses modernity in terms of its ‘traumatic impact’ on the Muslim world and its traditions, and is highly critical of Islamic thinkers who preach withdrawal from modernity,87 cautioning against the ‘hysterical language of obsessional rejection’.88 This is a point that Khatami himself has made when discussing civil society.89 Shayegan seeks a reflective understanding of the self as a means of

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allowing Islam to come to terms with the modern world and, like Khatami, couches his arguments within a broad civilisational framework, making use of historical allegories and highlighting positive achievements of cross-cultural encounters between different civilisations. As such, dialogue and understanding between them is vital, as ultimately such different blocks of knowledge and modes of being are just different faces of the same humanity. While there are broad similarities in terms of similar civilisational reference points, and both have sincere aims in promoting dialogue, there is a marked difference between the two in the level of criticism of the Muslim world. Although Khatami has also sought to provide a critical interpretation of Islam, drawing on the works of Shi‘i thinkers and Western political philosophy in his academic writings prior to assuming the presidency, Shayegan is far more scathing. He lambasts those in the Muslim world who promote a return to the fundamental precepts of Islam, and who still show interest in ‘longobsolete utopian solutions [such as the] ideal city’.90 He is also particularly critical of the Shi‘i ulema in post-revolutionary Iran, noting their ‘latent fanaticism’ and mastery of psychological control of the masses,91 accusing them of producing an archaic explosion of unprecedented proportions that runs the risk of ‘crudely gambling the spiritual capital accumulated over fourteen hundred years of history’.92 Naturally, Khatami would not concur with such an attack on something with which he is so closely identified. However, in spite of such differences, there is still a common ground in so far as there is a similar emphasis on understanding and gaining knowledge of other civilisations as a means of confronting the distortions that exist in perceiving the other. Shayegan wants Iranians to further their understanding of the West, and states that ‘understanding Western culture is more than necessary, it is vital. Our ignorance of the West is one of the reasons for our baseless enchantment and senseless wrangling about the same.’93 While Shayegan’s interest in civilisational and cultural encounters – and the establishment of his own in initiative for Dialogue among Civilisations in the 1970s – do not necessarily demonstrate a direct influence, there is a mutual perception of Iran as having a worthy place and weight at the

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civilisational level, and a similar recognition of the need for the wider Islamic world to come to terms with modernity through dialogue, rather than regression or confrontation. It is clear to see the parallels with Khatami’s own worldview, which though containing its own more explicit Islamic reference points, seeks to create broader understanding through acceptance and knowledge of other cultures and civilisations. With a greater emphasis on Islam, Khatami has himself made repeated calls for deeper understanding of other cultures and, like Shayegan, sought to find ways of renewal from within. This became particularly prominent once he became president, with Khatami recognising the ‘need for cultural and religious innovation’ as a means of adapting to changing global circumstances94 – in effect modernisation. Like Khatami and his advisers, Shayegan is also influenced by German philosophical thinkers, particularly Heidegger.95 Indeed the dialogical aspects of Heidegger’s work (seeking to construct dialogue based on commonalities with differences notwithstanding96) were a major influence on Shayegan. Also, as previously mentioned, Khatami’s own academic works prior to becoming president, particularly Bim-e mawj, evidence much of the influence that he derived from Islamic thinkers such as Tabataba’i, Motahhari and alSadr, thus giving further insight into the sources of Khatami’s philosophical inspiration. A common claim is that Khatami’s calls for dialogue closely relate to the work of Jurgen Habermas, particularly his theory of ‘communicative action’.97 Within communicative action, Habermas describes something called an ‘ideal speech situation’,98 whereby the participants in such dialogue have an equal endowment in terms of their capacity for discourse, are cognisant of each other’s basic social equality, and mindful of the perils of distorting speech through ideology and misrecognition. The role of communication is key, and according to Habermas the use of language with a view to achieving agreement is the principle purpose of language utilisation.99 While there has been a tendency for some authors to link the theory of ‘communicative action’ to Khatami and the Dialogue among Civilisations, it should be noted that this particular work of

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Habermas’ is primarily aimed at understanding meaning in the social sciences, and therefore understanding the meaning of human actions. As such he devotes much space to the works of Weber, Durkheim, Adorno, Horkheimer and others, arguing that, rather than seeing various paradigms of social science thought as historical successors to one another, they are in fact alternatives competing on an equal footing.100 While these are not particularly influential themes in Khatami’s work, there is some validity in the drawing of parallels between Khatami’s ideas and Habermas’ discussion of ‘speech’ in providing consensus and agreement. ‘Communicative action’ arguably equates to defending the power of dialogue as a tool in solving conflicts, and is something that comes close to what Khatami is aiming for in having a Dialogue among Civilisations. Certainly Khatami himself is familiar with the work of Habermas,101 and being the dialogical philosopher par-excellence there are close parallels between some of his works and that of Khatami’s thoughts on dialogue. However, as Mohajerani’s previous comments demonstrate, this was largely due to the influence of his Germany-based chief speechwriter, Faridzadeh. In short, Habermas argues that understanding should take the form of a real or virtual dialogue between participants, employing the empathic act of Verstehen (broadly understanding and interpreting the meaning of human activities).102 Khatami can be seen as working in the same hermeneutical tradition, as the emphasis that he places on roles of language, listening and understanding within the Dialogue among Civilisations indicates. Regarding Habermas, Hadi Khaniki notes the following: Given Habermas’ dialogical orientation, one may safely attempt a synthesis of the theoretical aspects of his philosophical, political and social views and the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations. Cases in point are Habermas’s theories of ‘communicative action’ in communications and his theory of ‘ideal speech situation’ in political scenes that can serve as suitable theoretical underpinnings for the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations.103

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Although the above points to an appreciation of the merits of Habermas, it is important to consider Khaniki’s analysis on the concept, as the former presidential adviser was an important figure in the development of the Dialogue among Civilisations concept, having acted as one of Khatami’s closest advisers alongside Faridzadeh.104 In discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the concept, Khaniki notes that, while Habermas provides a useful template for further understanding, such ideas are based on an arguably (neo-) Kantian ideal. In short, this equates to the idea of an independent and self-subsistent individual, which Khaniki sees as falling under liberal, individualistic philosophies.105 Such ideals, while important, do not necessarily form the core of Khatami’s thinking on the subject, and Khaniki, due to his closeness to Khatami, is in a particularly privileged position to make such assumptions – thus lending weight to his argument. As such, the link between Khatami and Habermas, while appropriate for some of Habermas’ work, is not always particularly direct. Habermas has had some degree of influence on Iranian intellectuals, and interest in Habermas did grow from the 1990s onwards. In a quantitative study, Paya and Gahneirad observed that the number of articles published in Iranian newspapers and periodicals grew from three in 1994 to a peak of 75 in 2002, the same year that Habermas visited Tehran at the invitation of Iranian academics. The majority of these pieces were found in reformist newspapers such as Hamshahri and Ira¯n.106 The Tehran-based Centre for Strategic Studies, with which several of Khatami’s close advisers, such as Hajjarian, Khaniki and Faridzadeh were closely associated, was also a key actor in disseminating Habermas’ ideas in Iran, translating and publishing his works in periodicals such as Kiya¯n and Gooftegoo. For Khatami and his advisers, the main attraction of Habermas, and indeed the broader work of the Frankfurt School with which he was partly associated, was that it allowed criticism of the West on an intellectual level. This was something that was naturally useful for the religious intellectuals around Khatami. However, in this use of Habermas there is a tendency to appropriate certain useful aspects, such as ‘communicative action’ and the role of dialogue, and

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essentially turn a blind eye to the liberal tendencies of his work that would not suit their own projects. Furthermore, while the influence of Hobbes and Locke may be evident in Khatami’s discourse on civil society, Khaniki sees associated liberal political theory as being too interest-orientated, and therefore not particularly compatible with Dialogue among Civilisations.107 Moreover, he goes on to state that the liberal outlook has actually been responsible for acting as the foundation for Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations, and that ‘the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations, out of theoretical necessities, has distanced itself from the theoretical foundations of the Clash of Civilisations’.108 Accordingly, Khaniki sees Dialogue among Civilisations’ closest affinity as being with communitarian theories, such as those espoused by Alasdair Macintyre and Charles Taylor. Though this book cannot, and does not intend to, provide a detailed look at such theories, they deserve mention as they are highlighted as a critical starting point in understanding the theoretical background to the concept by one of its key architects. For communitarians, the main basis for societal understanding is neither the individual nor individual rationality, but the collective mind and its implied system of meanings. This is seen by Khaniki as having close affinities to the foundations and approaches of Dialogue among Civilisations.109 Thus ‘political ethics must be such that people can align their lives with the interests of the societies to which they accord [their] identity’.110 Khaniki does not see the Dialogue among Civilisations as being just a theoretical construct however, noting that it should not be viewed as being outside the network of power relations,111 thus implying that it also has its own practical aspects. Interestingly, Mohajerani has commented that during his time as head of the International Centre for Dialogue among Civilisations, he and his colleagues put much effort into ‘[trying to] turn the concept into a theory’ – inviting scholars and academics from all over the world to Tehran to further muse on the subject.112 This is revealing, as it implies that the theory was not developed first, rather the idea was seized upon and then developed once it had gained a captive audience. Also his previous comments regarding the importance of showing Iran

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as a great civilisation to the world add further weight to the idea that the concept was conceived with a focus on promoting Iran first. Such a claim certainly has implications for the perception of Dialogue among Civilisations as a foreign policy tool. It shows that, rather than being a highly developed concept that found an application on a foreign policy level, it was in fact first conceived within the context of foreign policy, albeit through the prism of Khatami’s own intellectual pursuits and that of his advisers, and then theoretically developed later. With this in mind, it is now possible to go on and examine how the concept was applied in Iran’s foreign relations.

CHAPTER 3 THE APPLICATION OF DIALOGUE AMONG CIVILISATIONS AT THE BILATERAL LEVEL

It is evident from Khatami’s use of the term ‘civilisation’ that he is placing Iran in a group which differs from other attempts at forging common ground in international relations – often based on economic or regional imperatives. Khatami’s emphasis on Iran’s heritage, and the idea that Iran, in inheriting one of the world’s significant civilisations, should be a central participant in any resulting dialogue between them, gives us an interesting vantage point from which to examine a particular aspect of his administration’s foreign policy: that of drawing upon the idea of commonalities with countries who were also seen as being inheritors of great civilisations. The following case studies of Italy, Greece, Egypt and India illustrate how this concept was applied on a practical level in Iran’s foreign relations. Throughout its history, Iran, in its various incarnations, has interacted with these states and empires on multiple levels. Ancient Persia’s dealings with the Hellenic and Roman worlds are well documented,1 and Persian cultural and political influence in the Middle Ages stretched to modern-day India and China,2 where its impact continues to be felt today. Ancient Egypt’s role in human civilisation is well known but, in addition to this, one also needs to consider its

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centrality in the Muslim world as a historical nexus of political power and learning, and also its role as a modern-day geopolitical rival and counterweight to Iran in the Middle East. This last point leads to the idea of differing imperatives that can be seen in Iran’s approaches to each of these states during the Khatami era. The emphasis on civilisational commonality can be viewed as a starting point from which to pursue certain agendas in relation to these countries, or as an area of common ground that can be built upon to serve broader interests. Although Iran’s use of a cultural foreign policy, with its emphasis on academic and cultural aspects, may be perceived as being quite benign, the Dialogue among Civilisations can be viewed in this context as a flexible concept, with the intention of furthering Iran’s role in regional and international affairs. In analysing the application of the concept one can further explore the motivations of Iran and the aforementioned countries, essentially why this idea was used and built upon. It can also shed light on receptivity to the concept, which can be seen as a key measure of the Dialogue among Civilisations’ success, thus seeing what the responses were. Finally, a certain malleability can be observed as an important feature when considering how Dialogue among Civilisations was used in Iran’s foreign policy.

Italy The peoples of what now constitute modern-day Iran and Italy have interacted with one another since antiquity. Some of the earliest landmarks include the conflict between the Roman Republic and the Parthian Empire in 66– 65 BC , subsequent battles involving the Roman and Parthian Empires from 59 AD , and the continued struggle between the Roman and Sassanian Empires from 230 AD .3 Moving on to the next incarnation of a Persian Empire, that of the Safavids from 1501, one can find documented evidence detailing Safavid Persia’s dealings with the various governments and states, including the Venetians, that were present on the Italian peninsula during that period.4 However, there has been little in the way of investigation into Iranian– Italian relations during the modern era, and one period

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which would be of interest – but still suffers from a paucity of research regarding links between these two countries – is that of 1922–45. It was this period that coincided with the reigns of Benito Mussolini and Reza Shah, and although Iran’s links to Germany during the interwar period are well documented,5 scholarly work concerning Iran’s links with the Italian fascist movement remain scarce in the English language. This is perhaps a reflection of Italy’s commitments in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa at the time.6 It could, however, be speculated that Reza Shah’s sympathies towards the ideology of fascism as a tool for his own state-building project7 might have led the two towards a closer relationship, had their respective periods in office not been terminated during World War II. It is interesting to note that Mussolini also drew upon Italy’s own ancient civilisation in one particular aspect concerning his regime’s foreign policy: the plan to revive the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean as ‘mare nostrum’ (‘our sea’).8 As has already been discussed, Khatami’s ascension to the presidency in 1997 was marked by a perceptible ‘softening’ of Iran’s foreign policy stance under the framework of Dialogue among Civilisations and de´tente in international affairs. When examining Iran– Italy relations during this period, one needs to take into account the broader Iran – EU context of the time. The cautious reengagement under Rafsanjani, which saw the EU following a policy of ‘critical dialogue’ vis-a`-vis Iran, had been stymied following the Mykonos verdict in 1997. During the trial, German courts implicated key Iranian figures in the assassination of Kurdish dissidents at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in 1992.9 Subsequently, the EU recalled its ambassadors from Iran in protest, and suspended all ministerial contact.10 The ambassadors were only to return six months later,11 following extensive negotiations between Khatami and Khamenei.12 The speech given by Khatami at the Tehran meeting of the OIC in December 199713 can be seen as an important turning point in Iran’s relations with the EU, and indeed with the broader international community. Although Khatami’s election earlier that year had been well received in EU quarters, the fallout from the Mykonos

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affair – with the trial verdict being passed the month prior to his election – had hampered relations during the initial stages of his presidency. Khatami’s OIC speech was important in the broader international context, because although it did not mention the EU specifically, it helped broadcast Khatami’s message to an international audience. Further public statements by Khatami promoting the Dialogue among Civilisations reinforced this,14 and Italy was at the forefront of states expressing their receptiveness to such efforts by his administration.15 The tone of these early statements on the Dialogue among Civilisations reflects its malleability as an idea because although, as will be evidenced, Khatami sometimes draws on Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage, here, as he often did, he chose to focus on the broader issue of Islam and the West.16 Italy was also receptive to such thinking with the then Prime Minister of Italy Romano Prodi expressing the importance of Iran and Italy in their responsibility for relations between Islam and Christianity.17 At the same time, Khatami continued to stress Iran’s ancient heritage, reminding viewers during an interview with CNN, that Iran’s ancient civilisation was concurrent with that of classical Greece and Rome.18 The positive fallout from this early period in Khatami’s presidency continued with the resumption of Iran– EU ministerial ties in February 1998,19 and it was the Italian foreign minister Lamberto Dini who became the first European politician to visit Iran in almost a year shortly afterwards.20 The visit was greeted by both sides as a success with Khatami praising Italy for its fairer and more realistic stance towards Iran.21 Though both sides continued to stress their ‘common civilisational heritage’, as well as the need for greater dialogue between Islam and Christianity,22 the visit by Dini had significant economic imperatives; the Mykonos affair had badly damaged relations between Iran and Germany, and therefore undermined Germany’s position as Iran’s leading EU trade partner, a role in which it had been historically dominant. Hence, we see in Italy’s swift moves to promote its bilateral relations with Iran, an attempt to capitalise on this situation and boost its own existing trade links with Iran,23 while concurrently supporting the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations. This provides a clear example of how

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the Dialogue among Civilisations was a useful tool in helping Iran’s relations with a major Western country, cementing mutually beneficial economic ties and showing it as a rational and trustworthy actor in international affairs. Italy positioned itself as something of an EU representative with regards to relations with Iran during this period, and with the more open climate that was prevailing at the time. Italy was also the first EU state to send a head of government on an official visit to Tehran in 1998,24 a decision that was described as a purely political visit to ‘understand the situation in Iran’.25 While it can be argued that economic and political imperatives may have been the main practical motivations underlying Iran–Italy relations at this time,26 the Dialogue among Civilisations remained something of a public face in so much as it was a concept regularly drawn upon by both sides in bilateral contacts, with a specific emphasis on the role of both countries as ‘centres’ of world religions.27 Indeed, putting this ‘veneer’ on relations was also necessary as it allowed Iran to overcome the legacy of the Mykonos affair without losing face. Following Khatami’s speech to the UN General Assembly in 1998 and the subsequent designation of the year 2001 as ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’, one can observe more concrete steps taken to instite dialogue between the world’s ancient civilisations. A key application of this was the establishment of a working group of experts and officials from Iran, Italy, Greece and Egypt. Though this was in itself a multilateral grouping, it can be argued that drawing on civilisational commonalities furthered opportunities for cooperation on bilateral issues between the participating states. For example, with regards to Egypt, one can see broader strategic implications and its use in providing a platform from which to pursue de´tente in bilateral relations. Iran – Italy ties were further cemented during Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi’s visit to Italy in December 1998. The seminar on Islam and Christianity that was attended by Kharrazi and his Italian counterpart Dini can be seen as further evidence of the Dialogue among Civilisations’ application on the international level.28 Kharrazi’s speech here also highlighted the continued emphasis on

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the broader question of relations between Islam and Christianity within the Iran – Italy relationship. In a later speech during the same visit, he also acknowledged Iran’s role as chair of the OIC in creating rapprochement between the Islamic world and the West.29 Kharrazi was keen to emphasise both countries’ civilisational heritage during this visit, stating that ‘We believe that Italy and Iran, as two countries which have rich and historical civilizations, will be able to help mankind. It is for this reason that the Islamic Republic of Iran pursues intensely the issue of dialogue between civilisations.’30 There was much optimism on the economic front also, with Kharrazi noting that Iran – Italy trade had exceeded $2.4 billion, and that there was an expectation that this trade was set to ‘increase rapidly in the future’.31 Kharrazi went on to note how ‘among European countries, Italy is the country that Iran has particularly close historical and friendly relations with’, and that Iran – Italy relations could act as a ‘model’ for friendly relations within the Iran – EU framework.32 Tehran– Rome ties were buoyed further by Khatami’s visit to Italy in March 1999, the first such visit by an Iranian leader to Western Europe since the Islamic revolution. In his prioritising of relations with Italy, Khatami described the country as the ‘representative’ of Western Civilisation, and noted that Iran and Italy enjoyed a special stance within the Dialogue among Civilisations.33 Khatami placed much emphasis on his principles of dialogue during this trip, stating that both nations had contributed greatly to society through their ancient civilisations.34 He further elucidated on the importance that he himself placed on Iran– Italy relations in the following: Given the special importance I place on Irano-Italian ties and in view of Italy’s status as the bridge between Islam and Christianity as well as the major role played by Italy in the European Union, I have chosen Italy for my first European tour because of its importance and beauty. Ties and cooperation between the two countries can serve as a symbol and model for the proximity between East and West and Islam and Christianity.35

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Once again, the framing of Tehran– Rome relations in terms of broader issues concerning Islam and Christianity is observable, and it shows how Khatami concentrated on relations with particular states as a means of promoting the Dialogue among Civilisations in the international arena.36 Khatami also met with Pope John Paul II during his visit to Italy, again emphasising the idea that the dialogue among religions was equally important. On a practical level, three memoranda of understanding were signed alongside an agreement for increased economic cooperation.37 The improving nature of the Iran– Italy relationship was evidenced again – soon after Khatami’s trip to Italy – with an Italian warship making a port call at Bandar Abbas, a significant event in that it was the first European naval ship to do so since 1979.38 Although Khatami often stated that the Dialogue among Civilisations needs to be held primarily among academic thinkers rather than politicians, it is interesting to note that the main actors, or at least the most publicised, always seemed to be the politicians themselves. Perhaps taking this on board, Khatami noted that although it was the thinkers that needed to be deeply involved in such dialogue, it was the responsibility of the politicians to prepare the ground for it to take place.39 Khatami’s background as an academic (and specifically his interest in philosophy) combined with his role as President of the Islamic Republic, thus qualifies him on both counts, and perhaps allows him more licence to assign roles to participants in such dialogue. Cultural foreign policy was also in evidence with Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister ‘Ata¯‘ollah Mohajerani’s visit to Italy in November 1999, where a joint communique´ was issued, aiming to develop cultural ties.40 Such an example demonstrates how Iran placed an emphasis on cultural issues as a means of solidifying the relationship. The links that were being built between Iran and Italy were therefore multilayered, dealing with economic, political, academic and cultural concerns. Although much space is given in news reports and even academic analyses regarding major economic and political matters and the grandiose statements of political leaders, it is the lower-level cultivation of relationships and ‘soft’

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exchanges that are equally important here, as these form an important part of Iran’s attempts to portray itself positively. To this end, the Iranian and Italian foreign ministers announced the mutual opening of cultural institutes in Rome and Tehran during Kharrazi’s visit to Italy in 2001, to help promote the teaching of each country’s respective languages.41 The year 1999 also saw a continuation of the multilateral meetings of countries representing ancient civilisations, with Rome hosting a gathering of parliamentary speakers of those countries in November.42 This session produced a statement by the participants emphasising their opposition to a clash of civilisations, and decided that Iran – as a ‘bridge between eastern and western civilisations’ – should hold the next major gathering with the participation of the UN in 2000.43 Following the development of ties as detailed above during the first few years of the Khatami presidency, Iran–Italy relations began to take on a distinctly more practical hue. While the intercivilisational grouping continued to meet, the more explicit role of Dialogue among Civilisations seemed to decrease as the two countries increasingly focused on pursuing mutual economic interests in a number of fields, including oil and gas exploration, mineral exploitation and anti-narcotics issues. The notion of Dialogue among Civilisations was still referred to, such as during the Italian prime minister Giuliani Amato’s visit to Tehran in 2001,44 but the focus seems to have shifted away from cultural issues to those mentioned above. Although great emphasis was placed on the Dialogue among Civilisations initially, the fact that this concept was seemingly relegated in favour of the more tangible benefits found in trade links is indicative perhaps of the real motivations behind the cultivation of good relations. In this aspect, it is possible to see how the Dialogue among Civilisations could be perceived as an act of shrewd diplomacy, with regards to Iran and Italy, in so much as it laid the foundations for the development of mutually beneficial economic links. Such links also have their own strategic dimension, which can be seen in Italian attempts to mediate in the escalating confrontation over Iran’s nuclear programme towards the end of the Khatami era,45 despite their differences over the US-led invasion of Iraq, and Italy’s

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moving closer to the United States in its foreign diplomacy during the Berlusconi presidency.

Greece As with Italy, relations between the peoples of Iran and Greece have a long history dating back to antiquity. Although there has tended to be a focus on the enmity between the Athenians and Achaemenian Empire, it was this very enmity that laid the foundations for a great cultural exchange between these two vanguards of ancient civilisation.46 This was further cemented during the Seleucid period, following Alexander the Great’s defeat of the Achaemenians and in the continuous fluctuation of boundaries between the culturally Greek Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empires and the Parthian and Sassanian Empires, up until the Islamic Conquest of Persia. From the Middle Ages through to the modern period there is little historical evidence of any significant links, due in no small part to the rise of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia. Interestingly, it was the Greek experience within this very empire that arguably laid the foundations for the development of Iran– Greece links towards the end of the twentieth century. Historical animosity between Greece and Turkey, and Iran’s own suspicions towards Turkey – which also have their own historical context – can be seen as a key geopolitical reason for both sides to pursue good relations with one another. It is also necessary to contextualise Iran– Greece relations within the broader framework of Iran– EU ties prior to and during the Khatami era. Following the Islamic revolution, Greece was an active trade partner with Iran, conducting, for example, barter deals for the supply of Iranian crude oil to the Greek market.47 By 1991 Iran was supplying up to 30 per cent of Greece’s oil needs.48 With relations on a sound footing, Greece was therefore loath to cut ties in the aftermath of the Mykonos affair. Greece had been a participant in the EU’s policy of ‘critical dialogue’ towards Iran, and was the only EU member not to withdraw its ambassador in protest following the culmination of the Mykonos trial – a Greek government spokesman claiming at the time that isolating the country ‘was not the best way

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to bring Iran into the international community’.49 Greece’s split with the EU on this affair highlights the importance that it placed on its ties with Iran during this period. Greece was looking to protect its economic and trade links with Iran, and perhaps, as was the case with Italy’s actions during the same period, the Greek government can be viewed at this time as seeking to improve on its position and become a leading EU trade partner for Iran. In examining Iran– Greece relations during the Khatami era, it is noticeable that the Dialogue among Civilisations was not promoted as forcefully at the beginning as it was with Italy. This difference is perhaps due to exchanges between Iran and Italy being at a slightly higher level, with both states’ foreign ministers exchanging visits in 1998 and the Italian prime minister visiting in the same year. However, it would seem that the academic and cultural aspects of Iran’s foreign policy, which formed such a key part of the Dialogue among Civilisations ideal, were not so prevalent throughout 1997 and most of 1998 in high-level, widely reported Iranian– Greek dealings, where the emphasis lay instead on the burgeoning trilateral relationship between Iran, Greece and Armenia. This relationship had clear economic and strategic imperatives at its core, although these were still often justified in terms of the cultural links between those states. A significant application of the Dialogue among Civilisations in Iran– Greece relations during the earlier part of the Khatami presidency was the gathering of representatives of four of the world’s ancient civilisations in Delphi, at the invitation of the Greek government, on 11 November 1998. The discussion that took place was entitled ‘The Heritage of Ancient Civilisations: Implications for the Modern World’, and was based around recognising the interactions that had taken place through their own civilisations and how these could serve as a model for furthering peace and mutual understanding in the modern era. A key outcome of this meeting of experts and government representatives, such as ambassadors and foreign affairs advisers, was the signing of the ‘Athens Declaration’.50 Within this declaration, the four countries agreed to institute a further series of meetings that would help prepare the ground in the

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lead-up to 2001, the ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’. While this is a multilateral initiative, with an obvious institutional dimension in its relevance to the UN (being organised in conjunction with UNESCO), one can still see its relevance to bilateral affairs, as it evidenced Greece’s own receptivity to Khatami’s call for dialogue, in so far as it took the initiative seriously enough to organise this particular gathering.51 A further meeting of the quadrilateral grouping in Tehran in December 1999 provides an interesting angle with which to view Iran’s use of the Dialogue among Civilisations in its dealings with these states. Although this departs from Iran – Greece relations specifically, when one looks at the statements made by Kharrazi at this meeting it is possible to observe how the Dialogue among Civilisations was developing and was being used as a malleable concept by Iran in its foreign relations. This flexibility is reflected in Iran’s use of this concept in different settings. In talking about Iran’s ancient heritage Kharrazi stated that: Iranian civilisation in the pre-Islamic era and Islamic era has always had constructive interaction with various civilisations, whether Greek civilisation, Roman civilisation, Egyptian civilisation . . . and others, and their influences have been reciprocal.52 What is apparent from such statements is that key figures in the Iranian government use the Dialogue among Civilisations as a malleable concept. As was evident in the discussion of Iran and Italy, there was a tendency to stress both countries’ religious roles, and the concept was used more to refer to the broader question of relations between Islam and the West. It appears that in the setting of the grouping of ancient civilisations, and indeed in Iran– Greece bilateral interactions, the idea becomes more Iran-centred, which evidences the importance of national identity in a foreign policy setting, as it is drawing upon Iranian civilisation more explicitly. Commenting on the expansion of cultural relations between the two countries in light of the November 1998 meeting, the Iranian cultural

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attache´ in Greece, Gholam-Reza Nourmohammadan, announced that an Iranian cultural week was to be arranged in Athens. (He also noted both countries’ relations were good on all levels.)53 Iranian cultural foreign policy towards the Hellenic world was also extended towards Cyprus with the Foreign Ministry’s Director of Cultural Affairs Mohammad Masjed-Jamei’s visit to the island in February 1999.54 Although the visit only produced a reaffirmation of the desire to expand Iran’s cultural relations with Cyprus, this, alongside the stress on common civilisational heritage made during such visits, shows Iran’s prioritising of cultural issues in its foreign policy through the continued promotion of Dialogue among Civilisations. Further developments were seen in women’s affairs, with the foundation of a joint Greek–Iranian women’s committee, established to organise joint seminars and to develop women’s networks with a particular stress on cultural and environmental issues,55 although there is little tangible evidence of this committee’s activities after its foundation. During Greek president Stephanopoulos’ visit to Tehran in October 1999,56 there was an emphasis on expanding political, economic and cultural ties, and the accent on culture in particular can be seen in Iran’s holding of a Greek cultural week concurrent to this visit.57 Stephanopoulos was also accompanied on the trip by his then culture minister Elisavet Papazoi.58 In the statements that Khatami, Stephanopoulos and even Khamenei made during this visit, there was a clear emphasis by both sides on their common civilisational heritage, with Stephanopoulos stating that ‘Iran and Greece are inheritors of rich cultures and as a result feel they have greater responsibility for present issues concerning humanity.’59 Khamenei also voiced his tacit approval of expanding Iranian– Greek relations under the framework of Dialogue among Civilisations in noting that Iran and Greece’s role as founders of great civilisations ‘provides a good basis for consolidating their friendship’.60 Naturally Khatami himself also emphasised how the Dialogue among Civilisations was the main framework through which he saw Iran and Greece expanding their cultural relations.61 Khatami’s return visit to Greece in March 2002 was used again to promote cultural as well as economic and political ties under the

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aegis of Dialogue among Civilisations, with Khatami emphasising the cultural commonalities between the two countries as constituting a basis for expanding cooperation in all fields – sentiments that were also echoed by his Greek counterpart.62 Five memoranda of understanding were signed during this visit aiming for expansion of ties in political, economic and cultural areas. As has been mentioned above, political and economic imperatives were also of primary importance in Irano-Greek relations during this period. In addition to the economic links that were being built up by Greece prior to Khatami taking office, one needs to consider the burgeoning trilateral relationship that developed between Iran, Greece and Armenia during this period. The development of this relationship can be understood in clear geo-strategic terms. The 1990s saw the development of a strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel, as well as the emergence of an independent Republic of Azerbaijan with close links to Turkey. Military and defence cooperation between Turkey and Israel, as well as Israel’s courting of Azerbaijan, as a means of securing access to its oil, gave rise to a discernible axis that naturally alerted neighbouring states such as Greece, Armenia and Iran. It is not my intention here to dissect every aspect of the historical animosities between these states but some context needs to be given. Greece and Turkey, in addition to their historical enmity and the continued impasse over Cyprus, had been at loggerheads during the 1990s due in no small part to alleged Greek support of Kurdish separatists in Turkey. This is all the more surprising considering both are members of NATO, but, as is broadly appreciated, their membership of this pact is more a reflection of their strategic place in the bipolar world of the Cold War rather than any actual alliance. Armenia’s historical grievances with Turkey in the form of the Ottoman Empire and its alleged genocide of Armenian citizens at the end of World War I are well-documented, and relations have been continually poor in light of Turkey’s close links with Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Iran’s tacit support of Armenia during this war (which had its own domestic context for Iran in light of its large

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Azeri-speaking minority) is yet another variable in this complex geo-strategic puzzle. The development of the Turkish–Israeli – Azerbaijani axis can clearly be perceived as a threatening one by the Islamic Republic, only adding to its sense of insecurity. With Greece and Armenia also having their own reasons for viewing such an alliance suspiciously, one can see why the three chose to instigate a number of trilateral initiatives. Although the emphasis, as shall be seen, was often placed on cooperation in fields such as transport, tourism and culture, the strategic dimension of this relationship is one of its more distinctive features. While this was never mentioned implicitly by Iran, Greece and Armenia, it was certainly perceived in such a light by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and indeed Iranian officials were often at pains to play down the significance of any defence and military cooperation, even to the point of outright denial in the face of Azerbaijani accusations of such cooperation taking place.63 This is understandable in light of Iran’s own carefully balanced relations with both Turkey and Azerbaijan, and also shows the weight of realpolitik in the strategic calculus of these three countries, although they continued to couch their relations in more benign terms, concentrating on areas such as transport and tourism. One can see the beginnings of this trilateral relationship in 1996 during a visit to Greece by the Armenian president and foreign minister, where both sides identified strengthening ties with Iran as a first step in improving cooperation with regional countries.64 Interestingly the then Foreign Minister of Greece Theodore Pangalos also included Georgia in this equation, stating that ‘The core of this cooperation may be Armenia, Greece and Iran, but we will try to convince Georgia to participate.’65 Seemingly Georgia was caught in the middle of this formation of two rival alliances, and although it was a participant in quadrilateral talks with these three states in 1996,66 pipeline politics dictated that it pursued closer relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, as the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan transit route demonstrates. It is worth mentioning this dimension in Iran – Armenia ties also, as Iran acts as a major supplier of energy to that country.

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The memorandum of understanding signed in December 1997 between the three states’ foreign ministers established several working groups, with a view to holding regular meetings in the fields of transport and telecommunications, tourism, technology and energy.67 Kharrazi referred to what he saw as the underlying commonalities of this grouping. In drawing on their common geocultural heritage, he noted that the ‘unique geographical conditions of Iran along with lingual, cultural and ethnic commonalities, serve as a catalyst in [the] deepening and expansion of relations.’68 Throughout 1997 and 1998 Iran, Greece and Armenia took part in a number of trilateral initiatives with agreements signed on telecommunications69 and transportation,70 with a further memorandum being signed following the first meeting of the working groups mentioned above in September 1998.71 Plans to institute cooperation in the defence sphere, though initially promoted by the Greeks in particular,72 seemed to be shelved in 1999 following Armenian and Iranian claims to the contrary,73 which again alludes to the sensitive geopolitics of the region and Iran’s own carefully balanced relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Although this departs from Iran–Greece bilateral relations somewhat, the tripartite relationship was nonetheless an important feature of Iranian– Greek diplomacy during this period, and it was this relationship that was most prevalent during the early stages of the Khatami presidency, rather than the more explicit use of Dialogue among Civilisations seen in relations with Italy and later on in the Iran– Greece relationship. There was, however, continued emphasis by Iran on the cultural dimension of the links between the three states. At the fourth trilateral foreign ministerial meeting in Tehran in 2001, Kharrazi stated that ‘Our trilateral cooperation has roots in [our] culture and civilisations’, and that ‘Our cultural and historical commonalities can provide well-established grounds for enduring relations and the expansion of peace and security in the region.’74 This again highlights the emphasis Iran placed on culture and civilisational commonalities in its foreign policy actions during the Khatami era. With Greece, one can see how such emphases were used to enhance and complement existing economic linkages, and

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how they were drawn upon to create new opportunities for cooperation in political and strategic spheres.

Egypt Iran and Egypt, as inheritors of ancient civilisations and centres of power in the Middle East, have historical relations dating back to the Achaemenian period. Egypt was an Achaemenid satrapy prior to Alexander’s conquest of Persia and was also briefly ruled by the Sassanians before the Islamic conquest. Egypt occupies an important role in the history of the Islamic world, having been the seat of the Fatimid and Abbasid Caliphates, and has also played a significant role as a centre of Muslim learning in the form of the al-Azhar university. Its status as the most populous Arab nation and as a historical power in the Middle East has helped shape its relations with Iran in the modern period. Following the short-lived marriage in 1939 of Mohammad Reza Shah and Princess Fauzieh of Egypt, relations were good, and cultural ties were strong with academic exchanges taking place between the two nations.75 The Iran – Egypt relationship deteriorated somewhat during the 1950s following the rise of Gemal Abdul Nasser in Egypt and the 1953 coup in Iran that saw the Shah assume overall control. Iran’s relationship with Israel and Nasser’s propagation of panArabism, along with the broader Cold War context of the time in terms of the Iranian – US relationship and Nasser’s courting of the Soviets, all contributed to towards an atmosphere of mutual distrust between the two sides. Relations did, however, improve under Anwar Sadat and remained good throughout the 1970s until the Iranian revolution. Three events in this period have been a major influence on Iran– Egypt relations and continue to be so right up to the present day. Firstly, the signing of the Camp David accords by Sadat in 1978, which had been supported by the Shah, was naturally viewed as anathema by the revolutionary leadership in Iran, as in the Palestinian cause, Iran’s new government saw a clear example of fellow Muslims suffering under oppression. Secondly, Egypt’s offer of

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refuge to the ailing Shah (where he eventually died) and his family further angered the Iranian leadership. Iran’s chance to respond to this perceived insult came with the assassination of Sadat in 1981, and can be seen in the naming of one of Tehran’s main thoroughfares after his assassin, Khalid Islambouli. Relations continued to be poor during the 1980s, with Egyptian accusations of Iranian support for terrorism and Islamic fundamentalist movements and Egypt’s patent support of Iraq during the Iran– Iraq war. The move towards a more pragmatic foreign policy under Rafsanjani, and a confluence of interests with regards to containing Iraq helped improve relations though, and on 28 April 1991 interest sections were opened in both Cairo and Tehran.76 Also the more favourable climate of Iran– Arab relations during the 1990s, at least in comparison to the previous decade, meant that by the eve of the Khatami era, grounds existed for further rapprochement. In some ways the Iran– Egypt relationship has a more immediate geopolitical dimension to it than Iran’s bilateral relations with a country like Italy, for example. As a result there was less of an emphasis on cultural foreign policy and the Dialogue among Civilisations did not occupy as prominent a position in the tangible, bilateral dealings between these two nations. This is not to underestimate its importance, however, as a means of providing a foundation for improved relations. The Dialogue among Civilisations was also often presented alongside de´tente in Iran’s foreign policy, and one can view the latter as being particularly important in Iran’s dealings not only with Egypt, but with the wider Arab world and Middle East in general, as Khatami sought to build upon the rapprochement seen during Rafsanjani’s time in office. Khatami’s emphasis on increasing cooperation and friendly relations specifically with the Islamic world and regional countries,77 which he announced as being ‘one of the principles of Iran’s foreign policy’,78 was well received among Middle Eastern nations. In addition, Khatami’s positive statements on relations with Egypt were reciprocated by the then Foreign Minister of Egypt Amr Moussa.79 Khatami was seeking to create a favourable atmosphere for the normalisation of ties with Egypt, but in doing so adopted a different

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approach to that directed towards Italy and Greece, where the emphasis lay more on consolidation of an existing relationship. In contrast, Iran–Egypt bilateral links were stalled at a low level and seemed to remain clouded in mutual suspicion, despite the positive gains of the Rafsanjani era. The importance of Dialogue among Civilisations to this relationship is not particularly obvious in terms of its direct application on a practical level. Although Egypt was a participant in the quadrilateral grouping of ancient civilisations, the concept was rarely used explicitly in bilateral relations between the two nations. Perhaps the broader context of Khatami’s foreign policy in terms of de´tente with the Arab world was of greater importance here which therefore gave the tone of Iran– Egypt relations a less cultural and more political flavour. It appears that emphasis was placed on generating a more trusting atmosphere between Iran and Arab nations (and the wider Muslim world), which could then pave the way for further development of relations. Perhaps alluding to this, Deputy Foreign Minister Sadeq Kharrazi himself noted that ‘before entering in dialogue with other Civilisations, Muslim countries had to foster dialogue among themselves first’.80 It is also interesting to note the conspicuous absence of references to Egypt’s own Shi‘i heritage under the Fatimids, and also how the emphasis placed by Khatami on both countries’ standing in the Islamic world contrasts with the tone of the quadrilateral ancient civilisations meetings, which make reference to their pre-Islamic pasts. This latter aspect was not dwelt upon in high-level contacts as it would have compromised Islamic orthodoxy regarding jahiliyyah (the ‘time of ignorance’ before Islam). This opens up a whole new discussion regarding Iranian and Shi‘i interpretations of this concept that cannot be discussed here, but it does once again reveal the fluid nature of Dialogue among Civilisations, in so much as there are differing applications visible on a number of levels. Iran hosted the OIC summit in December 1997.81 The then Foreign Minister of Egypt Amr Moussa headed the Egyptian delegation and met with Khatami in Tehran. In their meeting, Khatami stated that ‘Tehran has a special respect for Cairo and

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differences of political opinions, which are natural, must not undermine these countries’ axes and historical and cultural commonalities.’82 He added that ‘two great and civilised countries’ such as Iran and Egypt were more than capable of settling their differences through renewed dialogue with one another.83 When asked about Iran – Egypt ties after meeting the Egyptian delegation at the summit, Khatami described Egypt and Iran as forming ‘two great wings of Islamic Civilisation’,84 adding ‘we are willing to solve the problems between Tehran and Cairo’.85 From such remarks one can see how Khatami was seeking to draw attention to both nations’ historical roles and civilisational inheritance as a starting point from which to pursue better ties, while tacitly recognising that differences remained at the political level.86 Consequently, although we do not see the same level of cultural exchange taking place as was evident with Italy and Greece, there is a mutual recognition of the need to draw upon such aspects as a means of improving relations. One can therefore see the importance of Khatami’s language in promoting de´tente. It is also interesting to note Khatami’s emphasis on both countries’ Islamic civilisational heritage, rather than implicitly mentioning ancient Egypt, as a way of further reinforcing commonalities in a similar vein as was seen with Italy and relations between Islam and Christianity. Iran, it seems, was attempting to unify the OIC and play as constructive a role as possible, while recognising the differences of opinion regarding the Palestinian issue in particular. Iran placed a strong emphasis on increasing cooperation within the OIC during its presidency of the organisation, with Kharrazi stating that ‘[within the OIC] gaining confidence without expanding economic and cultural cooperation is not feasible’.87 Kharrazi also adapted Dialogue among Civilisations to encompass the OIC as representative of the Islamic world stating ‘exchange of scholars and academics must be undertaken in order to define Islamic perspectives in relation to important topics, including human rights, that are the most fundamental of issues in our dialogue with other civilisations’.88 In using the OIC as a platform from which to promote Iranian perspectives on cooperation, we can again see how the Dialogue

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among Civilisations was used as a malleable concept, with application on a number of different levels. Further into the Khatami era, the Dialogue among Civilisations and de´tente continued to be shaped according to circumstance. For example, Kharrazi applied the concept to the wider, yet still related question of Iran– Arab relations in 1999, stating: The policy of de´tente, confidence-building, dialogue and the promotion of the spirit of cooperation and brotherhood in the region are the priorities of Iran’s foreign policy . . . de´tente is the first step in attaining regional confidence, the confidence that is the missing link in relations between the countries of the Middle East, especially in the relations of Iran and Arab countries.89 He also noted in the same speech to the Irano-Arab Conference in Tehran how the successful meeting of the OIC in the same city in 1997 had improved prospects for Iran – Arab relations,90 and noted that ‘In the Dialogue among Civilisations, which believes in the plurality of cultures and civilisations, culture and virtue, not power and wealth, play the pivotal role.’91 What is evident from examining the views of figures such as Kharrazi, and indeed Khatami himself during this period, is that the Dialogue among Civilisations was applied on the broader, more theoretical level alongside de´tente. The above-mentioned conference is one example of how the concept was used as a means of developing contacts initially in an academic setting, albeit one with active political participation. In creating such an atmosphere Iran was able to show how it could be a trustworthy and reliable international partner, with full participation in regional and global fora. Other practical applications, seen in terms of cultural exchange with Greece and Italy for example, may not be so evident but in using the Dialogue among Civilisations as a means of improving Iran’s image, the Khatami administration was able to generate a favourable climate in which to actively pursue closer economic and political ties with Arab states such as Egypt.

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The successful holding of the OIC summit in Tehran, which constituted the first major, international event of this kind to be held in Iran since the revolution, and active Iranian participation in the OIC, helped lay good foundations for an expansion of Iran– Egypt relations. It is evident that Iran wanted to stress the cultural heritage of both nations as the starting point from which to pursue closer links, as Kharrazi himself noted after the Tehran OIC summit: Our two countries and nations are culturally rich and influential in the region. In view of the fact that we share common grounds for cooperation in the region, we must work together.92 Egyptian president Mubarak was also positive on the state of Irano-Egyptian ties during this period and expressed his personal desire for normalisation of relations.93 The year 1998 saw a strengthening of links in the economic sphere, with the signing of a joint accord in July between the Iranian Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Egyptian Industries, designed to boost economic and trade cooperation.94 Political ties were also enhanced, again within the framework of the OIC, with the inauguration of the Islamic Inter-Parliamentary Union in Iran in December of that year, in which Egypt was a signatory.95 When one examines the development of Iran–Egypt ties during this period, it is evident that the majority of exchanges between the two sides came within the context of their membership of multilateral groupings such as the OIC. This was no doubt aided by Iran’s then presidency of the organisation, which meant that its contact with Egypt were always likely to increase out of necessity. This was beneficial for both sides, as it helped maintain a more cooperative atmosphere which naturally helped improve bilateral relations as Iran was seen as displaying an active pragmatism in its foreign policy, fully participating in significant international groupings. Cooperation in groups such as the Islamic Inter-Parliamentary Union, which allowed further exchanges of visits by respective parliamentary delegations, and espousal of common positions on various issues such as the Chechen

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crisis96 were indicative of the positive state of relations at the time, and which were further buoyed by Iran’s accession to the G15 Group of Developing Nations.97 This event was significant not only for its highlighting of Iran’s participation in ‘extraterritorial economic decision making’,98 but also because it provided the impetus for rare contact between the Iranian and Egyptian leaders, with Mubarak telephoning Khatami to offer his congratulations on joining the group.99 This was the first direct contact between leaders of the two nations since the revolution, further demonstrating the desire to improve ties, and Khatami once again used the occasion to draw attention to both nations’ civilisational heritage, noting the special roles played by Egypt and Iran in establishing Islamic civilisation.100 This contact was also important as it paved the way for an expansion of academic ties, seen in the holding of a conference on Iran–Egypt relations at the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s Institute for Political and International Studies in July 2000,101 and a visit by a delegation from al-Azhar University in 2001.102 Despite the optimistic atmosphere surrounding the rapprochement between Iran and Egypt and continued talk of the desire to establish full diplomatic relations103 (seemingly a recurrent theme in ministerial-level contact between the sides), ties continued to remain at the level of interest sections in the respective capitals. It is interesting that there seemed to be something of a dip in Iran – Egypt interaction during Khatami’s second term, and perhaps this was linked to the conclusion of Iran’s presidency of the OIC in 2001, thus reducing the opportunities for cooperation within that grouping. Ahmad Mahir, who succeeded Amr Moussa as Egyptian foreign minister in 2001, did not visit Iran until 2003 and spoke then of any resumption of normal ties as being ‘premature’.104 Indeed, earlier that year Mubarak himself had ruled out any normalisation in strong terms, asking ‘How can we establish normal relations when they name a Tehran street after the assassin of Sadat and shelter Egyptian terrorists?’105 Despite these obstacles, 2003 did see a historic meeting take place between Khatami and his Egyptian counterpart at the sidelines of a UN technology summit in Geneva. The meeting, which was said to

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have been initiated by Khatami,106 saw a well-publicised handshake between the two and had a highly symbolic value, as it was the first face-to-face contact between Iranian and Egyptian leaders since the revolution. Both presidents expressed their optimism regarding the improvement of ties, and again alluded to their countries’ importance in the Islamic world.107 However, in spite of positive developments such as this, and further endorsement of the rapprochement seen during Kharrazi’s visit to Cairo to participate in the D8 summit there,108 full normalisation remained unattainable. The presence of Islambouli Street, along with a large mural in central Tehran dedicated to him, continued to obstruct further development. Although the Tehran city council agreed to change the road name in 2004, which elicited a positive response from the Egyptian side,109 by the time that Khatami’s term came to an end in 2005, relations were still not fully normalised and remain at the level of interest sections to this day.

India As with the previously discussed case studies, the peoples and descendants of what today constitute the nations of India and Iran have long-established ties. These two states have some of the strongest cultural and ethno-linguistic links out of all of the case studies explored here. The Indo-European family of languages, which has its common root in the Aryan tribes of southern Siberia and Central Asia that subsequently migrated to northern India and Iran, as well as geographical proximity, provided a basis for such links. These are evidenced in the concurrent development of Zoroastrian and early Vedic religions, whose respective languages of Avestan and Sanskrit bear close resemblance to one another. Later, parts of western India and present-day Pakistan formed part of the Achaemenid Empire, after which Buddhism spread from India into parts of Iran during the Seleucid period. Trade relations were maintained throughout the Parthian and Sassanian eras, and during the Islamic conquest of Persia the well-documented flight of Zoroastrians to India, to become the present-day Parsees, took place.

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During the Safavid period, at which time diplomatic relations between the Safavids and the Mughal Empire were established, ties for the most part remained friendly.110 Following the decline of both the Safavid and Mughal Empires, Iran– India relations deteriorated to the point of Nader Shah’s invasion of India in 1739, famously taking the Peacock throne and the Koh-i Noor diamond in the process. In the Cold War era, India’s close relationship with the Soviet Union, despite its declared non-alignment, had kept relations cool as Iran’s own alignment was firmly with the West. Iran’s good relations with Pakistan during that period were also a contributory factor. There was, however, a marked improvement in relations towards the end of the Pahlavi era where a confluence of economic interests, and the Shah’s perception that cooperation was vital for the stability of Asia, saw a number of high-level visits on both sides as well as increased economic links being developed.111 A further connection that has helped foster relations has been the historical confessional linkages between Iran and India’s Shi‘i population. Although India’s experience of Muslim rule was under the nominally Sunni Mughal Empire, several of the smaller Indian states were led by Shi‘i kings. While the exact figure is not known, the population is sizeable, with concentrations in the historically Shi‘i cities of the Deccan and in Lucknow. Notable Shi‘i dynasties in India included the ‘A¯dil Sha¯s, Qutb Sha¯s and Niza¯m Sha¯s who ruled between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries in the Deccan before succumbing to Mughal rule, and the Nawabs of Oudh (Awadh) in Lucknow, who ruled in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries before being deposed by the British.112 The cultural influence is evident today, with Lucknow still referred to as the ‘Shiraz of Awadh’.113 Estimating the Shi‘i population of India is difficult as they do not form readily identifiable communities as in the Middle East and may also practice taqiyya in light of being a minority.114 Estimates generally place India as either second or third (after Pakistan) to Iran in terms of the worldwide Shi‘i population,115 a point further emphasised by former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh, who in 2005 noted that ‘Iran is the largest Shia Muslim country in the world [and] we have the second largest Shia population in our

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country . . . and I do believe that [through] part of our unique history we can be a bridge.’116 In addition, Momen has noted how the traditionally large numbers of people who participate in Moharram ceremonies are not necessarily indicative of a wider Shi‘i population, due to his veneration across confessional lines.117 As an example, the traditionally Shi‘i cities of Lucknow and Hyderabad, where the majority populations are Hindu, have historically seen widespread non-Shi‘i participation in Ashura processions,118 with a Hindu veneration of Hossein as if he were an ‘Indian god of death’.119 Furthermore, the religio-historical links between India and Iran also extend into the broader cultural sphere, with Persian cultural influence evident in the continued popularity of its poetry and language, something that Khatami was himself keen to emphasise on his 2003 presidential visit to India, claiming that ‘Persian is the language of wisdom and India, the land of wisdom’,120 when discussing the influence of Persian language and culture in India. Cultural commonalities were often prominent in pronouncements on Iran– India relations, and the Shi‘i connection provides us with an interesting vantage point to view a two-way soft power exchange that benefits both parties. On the one hand, Iran as the predominant Shi‘i power is able to exert its cultural and religious influence over Indian Shi‘a who in turn look to Iran as an important and brotherly state. This was helped by the Islamic revolution, which, as Nasr highlights, ‘introduced new forms of socio-political organisation, activism and leadership’ to Shi‘a in India, and indeed in Southern Asia more broadly.121 India, on the other hand, is able to use this cultural link as a means of cultivating an important ally in the Muslim world to help offset its problematic relationship with Pakistan. This is a somewhat unexplored element in the strategic links between the nations, which understandably focus on their economic complementarity and mutual geopolitical aims as the key aspect in bilateral relations. It shows that cultural links can be used to boost strategic advantage, and that soft power can be a viable tool in international relations, particularly when both sides are able to benefit. The length and breadth of Indo-Iranian links and the ‘lasting imprint of Persian language and culture’ in the Southern Asian

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region122 gives an interesting basis from which to study their bilateral relations in this most recent period, particularly in light of the Dialogue among Civilisations, which as shall be evidenced found fertile grounds for discussion between the two countries during the Khatami era. Initially, though, it is important to illustrate the nature of Iran– India relations prior to Khatami taking office. As we have seen in the previous example of Egypt, the tone used by Khatami contrasted significantly with that of previous administrations. This highlights the importance of language as a key factor in Iran’s foreign relations, as the change in the tenor of communication was important in allowing Iran to pursue improved ties. Following the Islamic revolution there was a move on Iran’s behalf towards a more ‘thirdworldist’ conception of foreign policy. This was in keeping with the revolution’s ideals and support for the mostaz‘afin (oppressed), which was extended to relations with other states, particularly those that had undergone their own struggles against colonial rule,123 and the creation of the slogan ‘neither East nor West’. In the immediate post-revolutionary period, relations unsurprisingly took a downturn, with Iran being increasingly vocal on issues sensitive to India such as Kashmir and the status of its own large Muslim population.124 One would have expected, however, that India’s status as a pioneer of non-alignment would have given it at least some kudos amongst those in charge of Iran’s foreign policy in the early years of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, Iran sought to use its continued membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a platform from which to promote closer ties as a more pragmatic conception of Iranian foreign policy took hold towards the end of the 1980s and into the Rafsanjani-era. Though still using meetings of the grouping to air its views on issues that may have set it apart from India, such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,125 Iran used the NAM to promote commonly held positions, such as forging a joint stance on trying to prevent the Gulf War in 1991.126 Interestingly, Afghanistan later moved from being an area of disagreement between the two sides to one of convergence in the late 1990s, where both sides supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, thus highlighting shared strategic concerns

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regarding Pakistan’s motives in the region. It is also interesting to note that Velayati, specifically in his speeches to the NAM, devoted much time to articulating the struggles of Muslims worldwide, in places such as Lebanon, Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and yet maintained a conspicuous silence on Kashmir and India’s own Muslim population.127 This is indication perhaps of the growing recognition of India as an important partner in the international community, and of the usefulness of the NAM as a forum in which to promote better relations. This is not to say that Iran remained completely silent on the Kashmir issue however.128 Rapprochement was aided further by the changing global political climate of the early 1990s and attempts by the Rafsanjani government to ‘open up’ Iran’s foreign policy in the era of postwar reconstruction. The economic imperatives behind the relationship came to the fore in this period and 1993 saw the first visit of an Indian prime minister since the revolution, when Narsimha Rao came to Iran, while Rafsanjani himself visited India in 1995. The complementary nature of both states’ economies, with Iran’s natural resources being seen as valuable in helping India further develop its growing economy, were particularly important and remain a central feature of ties to the present day. During the Khatami era, economic considerations continued to be important to bilateral ties. Energy and access to Central Asian markets via Iran were common themes, and in some ways the early part of the Khatami period saw a continuation of projects started under the Rafsanjani government, such as the tripartite transit agreement with Turkmenistan,129 which allowed Indian goods greater access to Central Asia, and the possible laying of natural gas pipeline from Iran, via Pakistan, to India. However, despite Kharrazi’s recognition of the Indian need for Iran’s natural resources to fuel its rapidly growing economy, seeing it as ‘a sound basis for Tehran –New Delhi ties’,130 India’s hostile relations with Pakistan, and American pressure on both states, has prevented the pipeline project from becoming a reality thus far. Although the expansion of economic links and cooperation via developing world groupings such as the NAM and G15 remained

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important, Khatami’s emphasis on the Dialogue among Civilisations and culture brought a new variable into Iran’s relations with India. As with the other countries examined, there is a fluctuation in the foundation of the relationship seen with the introduction of Khatami’s ideas. This reflects changing foreign policy articulation on Iran’s side, although, as has been mentioned, much of the economic aspect of the relationship was merely building on the work of the previous administration. In considering the Dialogue among Civilisations in Iran–India bilateral relations, it becomes clear that there was a good degree of receptivity to use it as a means of furthering ties. Whereas contacts in the first few years of the Khatami presidency had centred on trade issues and strategic concerns regarding the nuclear arms race on the Subcontinent131 and Afghanistan,132 the lead-up to the 2001 UN ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’ saw increased emphasis on the more cultural aspects of Khatami’s foreign policy. Indian officials were keen to support such dialogue, especially in light of their commonalities, with then Foreign Minister of India Jaswant Singh on a visit to Tehran stating that Iran– India relations ‘have roots in history and cultural affiliation’, and that India was ‘encouraged by Khatami’s call for a Dialogue among Civilisations’.133 Khatami himself also used the opportunity to stress commonalities, noting that Iran and India were two of only a few nations whose civilisations have ‘influenced the destiny of the world’, and that ‘solidarity between the Iranian and Indian nations is not based on temporary political and material interests, but it has roots in the Eastern outlooks of the two countries toward the universe and humanity’.134 Such statements highlight the emphasis placed on cultural links and commonalities, in keeping with the language of Dialogue among Civilisations, and show how a kind of cultural foreign policy was being developed by Khatami. Although, as later statements show, this was often followed by more economic-based themes, the cultural stress implied by Khatami is a marked shift from the language of his predecessors. Further evidence of the importance placed on Dialogue among Civilisations in the Iran–India relationship was seen in India’s active participation in events such as the UNESCO Roundtable,

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at which Khatami launched the 2001 ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’ in September 2000.135 India proved to be one of the most receptive countries to Khatami’s call for dialogue, taking the initiative to organise its own events in collaboration with Iranian scholars, such as the conference on ‘Dialogue among Civilisations and National Identity’, held in Rajasthan in November 2000. At this conference Khatami’s initiative was praised for ‘promoting understanding among nations of the world’,136 while Khatami’s representative to the meeting, Ali Mohammad Najafi, was keen to stress how India and Iran had a ‘strategic partnership’ for the protection of civilisation and culture.137 The tone of such meetings indicates a sense of obligation that appears to be felt on both sides. This is perceived as a sense of duty, in that as inheritors of ancient civilisations they are therefore well placed to have an important say on contemporary global issues such as globalisation. This line was further highlighted at the same meeting by then–Indian Ambassador to Iran, Paripuran Singh Haer, who noted that: The initiative is completely understandable to us here in India, as our thinking also goes along the same line that [an] ancient civilization such as India needs to cooperate with Tehran in order to see and determine a common ground on which we can take stand when we talk to other countries of the world to promote understanding and better relations.138 The Dialogue among Civilisations continued to be a prominent theme in bilateral relations, and was praised by then Prime Minister of India Atal Behari Vajpayee during his visit to Tehran in April 2001. Vajpayee, in his address to the Majles, applauded the efforts of Khatami to promote dialogue and drew upon the commonalities shared by the two nations, expressing his wish to ‘renew the strong links between the great civilisations of India and Iran’.139 In the address he also emphasised the secular nature of India, and explained how it was particularly important in protecting the rights of all religious minorities in India.140 This can be interpreted as a way of assuaging Iranian concerns over Indian Muslims.

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Surprisingly for a president of the Islamic Republic, Khatami himself also lauded India’s secular traditions, saying that he held them in ‘high regard’.141 The visit saw much emphasis on the Afghanistan crisis with both countries’ forging of a common position. However, Kharrazi was quick to point out that the visit did not include negotiations on military cooperation,142 thus hoping to mollify Pakistan’s potential worries regarding the developing closeness of the Indo-Iranian relationship. The memoranda of understanding that were signed during this visit dealt mainly with developing economic relations and expanding cooperation in technological and scientific areas, and were seen as a ‘framework’ to guide ties in the future.143 From the reporting of the visit in both the Iranian and Indian press, there is an obvious appreciation by Khatami and Vajpayee of both countries’ historical and cultural closeness, but the underlying motivation could well be perceived as using this as an opportunity to boost ties in the strategic and trade spheres. However, while national interests seem to be dictating the actions of Iran and India, the explicit recognition of their civilisational roles can be viewed here more as an overarching theme which helps to create a more conducive environment, with Khatami’s framing of relations in broad, civilisational terms giving an added impetus for Iran and India to strengthen their association. Perhaps one can describe it as a kind of ‘veneer’ that makes the development of ties seem less threatening to other states, such as Pakistan and the US, that may view such moves with concern, thus evidencing the rhetorical value of the Dialogue among Civilisations in foreign policy. Khatami’s return visit to India from in January 2003 helped further cement the Iran– India relationship. While there was the expected emphasis on more material aspects, the Iranian president maintained the cultural slant by speaking to academics and students of the Persian language in New Delhi, and continued on the theme of cultural commonality by focusing on the impact of Persian poetry in India.144 He also illustrated the idea of using such affinities as a base from which to advance relations, noting that ‘we should, with reliance upon these elements, strengthen economic, scientific and

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technical cooperation’.145 The resultant Delhi Declaration saw a raft of cooperation agreements signed in the aforementioned fields, and the confluence of views on regional affairs in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Subcontinent furthered the blossoming strategic alliance between the two – an alignment that did not go unnoticed in the West.146 In India itself the visit provoked further debate on the nature of Dialogue among Civilisations and its application to relations between Iran and India,147 which again shows the Indian receptivity to the concept. This receptivity was further evidenced by India’s organising of the ‘Dialogue Among Civilisations – The Quest for New Perspectives’ conference in July 2003 in New Delhi, a gathering that was held under the auspices of UNESCO.148 India’s eagerness was demonstrated in its willing to cover nearly all the expenses and the highlevel of delegates in attendance, with Vajpayee opening the conference.149 There was also a feeling on India’s behalf that it needed to somehow ‘wrestle’ the initiative from Iran to a certain degree, which was evidenced in the ‘concept paper’ circulated before the conference, in which it was written that: India, China, Japan, [and] Indo-China . . . have been kept at the fringes of a debate that should legitimately concern Asian and Pacific-Rim civilizations that constitute a third of the global population and represent major civilisational centres of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism.150 The idea in India that the Dialogue among Civilisations was ‘largely confined to the Christian West and the Arabs [sic ]’151 shows that there is a slight feeling of being marginalised in the dialogue, despite the positive statements made by Khatami and Vajpayee during their respective visits. In a sense, this shows the difference in application of the Dialogue among Civilisations here, once again highlighting its continued flexibility in being applied in a number of different contexts, showing that it acts as a broad, unifying theme on the bilateral level, but perhaps illustrating the difficulty of conceptualising it on a wider, multilateral scale.

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Analytical discussion While focusing on country-specific case studies gives a clear narrative of how the Dialogue among Civilisations was applied in these specific relationships, there are broader issues to consider when exploring how a concept such as this is used in a country’s foreign relations. For example, why the Dialogue among Civilisations was employed (motivations), in what way it was received (receptivity), and the various ways in which it was applied in Iranian foreign policy (malleability). Motivations In stepping back from the detail provided in the preceding accounts, it is possible to gain more of an insight as to why Iran employed this particular concept at a bilateral level. A primary motivation is meeting both strategic and economic material needs, from Iran’s perspective and from those of the countries discussed. Within this, one can firstly observe the more direct, material motivations driving Iran to employ this idea, and also the less tangible motivational features, relating to Iran’s seeking of an improved global image for example. While the emphasis is primarily on Iran’s own motivations, it is also necessary to highlight that this is a two-way process, and that the broader strategic picture will be extended to the other countries’ strategic rationales also. Initially, the idea of strategic motivations can be viewed through a perhaps realist or even neo-realist perspective, taking into account the centrality of the state and its national interests. The differing imperatives that shaped Iran’s relations with these countries can be broadly understood in such terms, as much of Iran’s desire to (re)assert itself in regional and global affairs is based on the perceived importance of its geo-strategic position, the quest for hegemony in the Persian Gulf and perhaps wider Middle East, and its natural resource potential. This first variable is often quoted by scholars and statesmen alike and Khatami continued this theme, as Takeyh notes: As with his predecessors, President Khatami routinely proclaims that Iran, by virtue of its location, demography

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and resources, has earned the role of dominant regional power, particularly in the Persian Gulf. Unlike them, he is driven more by considerations of realpolitik than religious fervour.152 However, Khatami’s immediate predecessor Rafsanjani was also driven by such considerations,153 and in a sense similar motivations can be seen at play under Khatami, albeit with an additional cultural flavour. In emphasising cultural commonalties in the form of mutual civilisational inheritances, Khatami was able to target Italy and Greece, two EU member states with which Iran already had reasonable, existing relationships, particularly in the field of trade. With Greece’s participation in oil barter deals with Iran throughout the 1980s, and Italy’s historical position as one of Iran’s leading European trade partners, it is easy to see how these established relations, through a reinvigorated appreciation of their mutual contribution to civilisation, were set to assume increased importance under Khatami. It is interesting to note that it was also these two states that were the least vigilant with regards to the EU’s decision to break diplomatic ties following the Mykonos trial, with Greece’s ambassador remaining in Iran, and Italy being the first country to arrange a high-level visit to Tehran on the resumption of Iran – EU relations. It may therefore be assumed that both countries could have been viewed by Iran as something of a ‘soft underbelly’ to the EU, and that drawing on certain feelings or themes of commonality may have been useful for Iran in terms of facilitating broader Iran – EU rapprochement. The cultivation of these relationships can be seen as being beneficial to Iran on a number of levels; for example in terms of providing a way of circumventing US-led sanctions, and in providing a stable market for Iran’s oil and natural gas. Alongside economic complementarity there are also the strategic considerations of the Iran, Greece and Armenia trilateral relationship. In this case, it is once again possible to observe the broader geopolitical permutations, with Iran actively seeking further involvement with an EU member state in an alliance aimed at US interests in the shape

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of its Turkish, Israeli and Azerbaijani allies. For Iran, pursuing such an alliance enables it to gain international support in the shape of a group that is ostensibly targeted against three of its key regional rivals. Conversely, there is not such an explicit advantage for a country like Greece to participate in this trilateral group, where the only real concern that it shares with the other members is its own deep-rooted rivalry with Turkey. However, the strategic advantage for Iran, and Armenia to a certain extent, is more overt in this instance. Conversely, there is also the possibility of Greece acting as a link between Iran and the West, and more specifically the US. This can be seen in the fact that Greece was also active in its diplomacy with Iran following the US-led coalition’s decision to remove the Taliban, with then Foreign Minister of Greece George Papandreou noting how Greece could be a valuable ‘conduit’ in allowing Iran to voice its ‘valuable views’ on Afghanistan.154 With regards to Egypt, the motivations can be viewed within the broader context of Iran– Arab rapprochement, which while having more immediate geopolitical imperatives in terms of Persian Gulf security and cooperation in the oil sector, remains important in relation to Egypt due to its position as a main strategic rival in the wider Middle East. It is not so clear with Egypt where the material gain lies in seeking to improve relations, at least in comparison to the two EU states discussed and indeed India. The attempts to instigate a rapprochement of sorts can therefore be seen less in such terms and more as emblematic of Khatami’s declared aim of de´tente in Iran’s foreign affairs. While Egypt’s own foreign policy may not sit comfortably with the aims and objectives of the Islamic Republic, it is possible to speculate that Iran would have derived considerable benefits from developing closer ties. With Egypt being the largest Arab state and an active participant in Middle Eastern diplomacy, the knock-on effects of full normalisation of relations could have been positive for Iran, particularly in terms of greater acceptance in the region and even with regards to the difficult issue of Iranian– US relations. As with Iran and the EU, a central driving force behind the bilateral relationship with India is seen in the complementary nature

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of their economies, with a rapidly growing India keen to secure access to oil and a need on Iran’s side for a market free from the constraints of US trade embargoes. There is also the strategic need on both sides to curb Pakistan’s growing influence, particularly in relation to Afghanistan, and cementing bilateral relations sits well with a distinctive aim of both countries’ declared foreign policies, that of independence and non-alignment. While the above serve to exemplify some of the material driving forces behind these relationships, it is also necessary to consider the less tangible concerns of Iran regarding its global image. This was a priority Kharrazi himself sought to emphasise early on in his tenure as foreign minister with his desire to ‘elevate the Islamic Republic’s status in the region and the world’.155 While such thinking can easily be conceived as having material motivations, Kharrazi also notes in the same interview that ‘use will be made of Iran’s economic and cultural levers to promote the Islamic Republic’s foreign strategy’.156 We can therefore see an explicit appreciation of how culture can also be introduced as a variable that allows Iran to build relations in a positive way, and it was also a tactic that helped Iran’s international image. Indeed, the Khatami era has been judged as ‘profoundly positive in terms of its transformation of Iran’s international image and opportunities’.157 Another main aspect of Khatami’s foreign policy was that of de´tente, and the principle of Dialogue among Civilisations played a pivotal role in the realisation of this policy.158 Khatami sought reconciliation, which is particularly applicable to Egypt and indeed the broader EU following the Mykonos trial, but a reconciliation that was based on preservation of national identity and sovereignty.159 Clearly, pursuing such an agenda and presenting a more palatable face has its practical benefits, as highlighted previously, but there is a sense that the use Dialogue among Civilisations is more than just a means to a material end. Particularly within Iranian writings on the foreign policy of Iran, there is the age-old emphasis on Iran’s cultural and civilisational weight, which alongside its geographical location serves as justification for advancing its role in international affairs.160

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From this vantage point, the parallel themes of geopolitics and national identity become more evident. Khatami is drawing upon what he himself has termed Iran’s ‘Iranian – Islamic identity’161 in order to further Iran’s role geopolitically. Although this work can only give limited space to the issue of identity, it remains an important determinant within Iranian foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Dialogue among Civilisations. Having given examples of the development and application of the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations, it becomes clear that if this indeed is to be viewed as a foreign policy doctrine, then it is one that contains an explicit ideational slant, having implications on a theoretical level as it evidences the importance of identity in foreign policy. While such an idea has clear foreign policy implications, and therefore realpolitik motivations and outcomes, its basis in the less tangible realm of ideas and even philosophy necessitate an appreciation of how this was an attempt at reasserting Iran’s role in world affairs based on a particular fusion of Iranian – Islamic national identity. Furthermore, the Iranian geopolitical imagination is bound up in its national identity, and land is also a crucial determinant in that very identity, and thus the two are intertwined, and not necessarily mutually exclusive. The issue of identity invites a constructivist approach to the understanding of Iran’s foreign policy under Khatami. Hence the epistemological question arises as to what degree the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations was affecting a physical reality and not merely reflecting it.162 In this case it would be central to both generating and shaping interests.163 Indeed, when examining the motivations that lay behind Iran’s application of the Dialogue among Civilisations within the framework of bilateral relations, it is easy to go down the well-trodden path of realist and neo-realist thinking, assuming the centrality of national interest with the search for power and security being the dominant logic.164 However, while certain material interests have doubtlessly motivated the pursuit of Dialogue among Civilisations, it appears that a ‘particular construction of selfidentity in relation to the conceived identity of others’165 remains equally important here.

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The choosing of civilisational commonalities as a basis from which to pursue better relations exemplifies the ideational aspects at play, and therefore what is at stake here are the ideational bases of realpolitik behaviour. The example of the use of Dialogue among Civilisations in bilateral relations shows the importance of looking beyond national interest (although this may be the ultimate priority), to the deeper issue of how identity had a profound effect on the application of this concept in foreign policy. Receptivity While some analyses have concentrated on measuring the success of the initiative through its institutional establishment,166 assuming that it has become reified, or treat it as something of a monolithic whole and make an evaluation in terms of its theoretical value or contribution,167 the degree of receptivity to the concept is another area that can act as a measure of success. In a similar way to motivations, practical, tangible aspects that show the receptivity to Dialogue among Civilisations, can be observed alongside more rhetorical applications. An example might be where Khatami’s call for dialogue was used more as a ‘veneer’ in relations rather than taking the form of reciprocal involvement in initiatives linked to the discourse. In directing Iranian foreign policy towards a ‘cultural orientation’,168 Khatami was able to draw on certain commonalities with other countries that, like Iran, had previously been seats of great civilisation. This had the result of acting as something of a ‘door opener’, particularly in relation to the two EU states discussed here, and it is possible to see that the initial use of Dialogue among Civilisations helped Iran, with the result being increased access to the material benefits of having good relations with states within that grouping. Each of the states discussed in this chapter exhibited differing degrees of receptivity to this component of Iran’s foreign policy during the Khatami era. On a practical level, it appears that India seemed to be one of the most receptive countries. In some ways India seems to be attempting to assert greater ownership of the idea as can be seen in the comments of the participants in various fora related to Dialogue among Civilisations, which echoed the feeling

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that India needed to be a more active participant. It is also interesting to observe how an avowedly secular state like India found so much common ground with a state with a unique form of theocratic government, and that had historically styled itself as protector of the world’s ‘oppressed’ Muslims, including those in India.169 One might argue that the secular credentials of the then-ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were questionable, but this does not take away from the surprising nature of the Indo-Iranian dialogue given the distinctly anti-Muslim impetus of Vajpayee’s Hindu nationalist movement. However, as discussed previously, India has a long-established Shi‘i community whose rituals and traditions are practised across sectarian lines, and importantly, the cultivation of relations with Iran gives India an important ally in the Muslim world. With regards to Egypt, the degree of receptivity to the Dialogue among Civilisations is less easily evaluated in terms of its direct application, as this was not so evident in the bilateral relationship. Iran–Egypt relations were characterised primarily by de´tente and the use of positive rhetoric from both sides, and while Khatami’s ideas were well received officially, they were only ever applied on a more abstract level. As a result, previously confrontational rhetoric and loudly voiced opposing views on important regional issues such as Palestine were substituted for mutual appreciation of each others’ civilisational contribution. This is a good point from which to advance to a discussion of some of the less tangible, rather more rhetorical aspects of the receptivity to Dialogue among Civilisations, as these also had a noteworthy effect on Iran’s relations with the countries discussed, and indeed the wider international community. Khatami’s foreign policy helped to reduce Tehran’s self-imposed diplomatic insularity and isolationism,170 thus showing its rhetorical value and highlighting the importance of language in foreign diplomacy. Indeed, the Greeks were keen to emphasise their potential to act as a conduit for Iran–US relations following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, and as a Greek diplomat remarked ‘sometimes diplomacy is about understanding codes and the symbols of the language. And in that sense, we’re better trained – as be it through war or peace, we’ve had a lot more contact with the Iranians.’171

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The receptivity to Khatami’s ideas is also reflected in Iran’s relations with the EU, with the shift from a policy of ‘critical dialogue’172 to one of ‘comprehensive dialogue’,173 a change which has been linked directly to Khatami’s less confrontational manner in international relations.174 Khatami’s attempts at reform at home were also critical in helping improve Iran’s standing, further aiding the receptivity to his ideas, as the efforts of his administration at promoting greater civil society in Iran ‘speedily impressed the world’.175 The sources that provided the majority of the information used in this chapter have clearly evidenced that one of the main ways in which the Dialogue among Civilisations was used was on this rhetorical level. On numerous occasions Khatami and his fellow presidents, prime ministers and other high-ranking statespersons included the Dialogue among Civilisations in their joint statements, often without instituting anything further than a mere appreciation of each other’s civilisational heritage and contribution. As such, it can therefore be perceived as a kind of ‘veneer’ that acts as a gloss or enhancer of certain relationships. The willingness of high-ranking officials on all sides to use this concept, even if it is only on an abstract level, thus shows that it was something that was received positively. Therefore, while other analyses understandably concentrate on its theoretical worth, and often come up with a negative evaluation,176 it can be argued here that on the basis of receptivity, at least within the confines of this particular set of bilateral relationships, that the initiative was a success. Malleability Perhaps the most intriguing feature of the Dialogue among Civilisations that follows on from the above discussion is the concept’s astonishing malleability. The preceding accounts have highlighted how it was used as a flexible tool that displays a considerable variation in application depending on the context in which it was used. To comprehend this malleability it is necessary to take the two key components of the discourse, namely the concept of ‘Civilisation’ and that of ‘Dialogue’. It would appear that both are lacking strict definitions. The term ‘civilisation’ seems to be applied

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on a number of different levels, drawing upon different conceptions of civilisations depending on with which country it is being discussed. While Khatami clearly is instigating a kind of cultural foreign policy, which has its roots in Iran’s own rich culture and civilisation,177 it inevitably leads us to ask what civilisation, or more specifically what conception of Iranian national identity or broader Islamic identity, is being referred to. As Maloney notes, ‘Dialogue among Civilisations appears to be an ingenious effort to revert to a predominantly nationalist conception of Iranian interests while implicitly retaining its Islamic referents and prickly sense of sovereignty.’178 While Khatami himself may be seeking to project a synthesised Iranian– Islamic identity, which allows him to draw on both pre-Islamic and Islamic civilisational aspects, the reality is that the term ‘civilisation’ is used in the broadest sense. When it is applied at the level of nation states, which in itself can be viewed as being problematic due to the fact that some would argue that these are indeed purely modern creations179 with only fabricated links to the empires and civilisations that were once based on their territories, the term is made to fit within the confines of that county’s civilisational inheritance. It would appear then that Khatami’s thinking is in keeping with those who emphasise the cultural basis of political action, and as a result see the appropriate unit of analysis to be civilisation rather than state.180 However, in reality he draws on a fusion of both state and civilisation at this bilateral level. Therefore while some have made the observation that Dialogue among Civilisations is not ‘state-centric’,181 it clearly is an idea that can be applied at the state level thus highlighting its flexibility. The malleable nature of the term ‘civilisation’ can be clearly observed in the varying application of the term within these different bilateral relationships, and it appears that this is related to the seeking of commonalities by Khatami from which to build relations. Consequently, we see Khatami drawing upon a more religious-based conception of civilisation when dealing with Italy, for example, where the emphasis lies on both countries’ historical roles as centres of world religions. This is Dialogue among Civilisations writ large, and perhaps comes closest to the way in which it is promoted at the

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UN, with an emphasis on dialogue between Islam and Christianity in the interests of furthering world peace and preventing a clash of civilisations. However, the later apparent relegation of Dialogue among Civilisations within the Iran– Italy relationship in favour of more material concerns shows that in this instance the idea was used more as a basis from which to pursue further ties between the two states, thus evidencing its use as a foreign policy tool and act of shrewd diplomacy. With Greece there seems to be more of an Iraniyat conception of national identity at play, with emphasis on the historical contribution and cultural closeness of the two nations. Again the idea of civilisational closeness and/or inheritance seems to be used here as a framework from which to expand ties, and it is interesting to note how cultural bonds are used, in part, as the logic behind the trilateral relationship with Armenia. Egypt provides further evidence of how the Dialogue among Civilisations can be used on a number of different levels. Firstly, there is the participation in the quadrilateral grouping of ‘ancient civilisations’. Here we see an implicit recognition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of both countries’ pre-Islamic heritage and contribution to civilisation. This was made possible due to the more academic nature of the gathering, which was in keeping with Khatami’s aim of having thinkers and academics playing a central role in the dialogue. However, when there is reference to civilisation in higher-level meetings between Iranian and Egyptian representatives, such as at the level of foreign ministers, the emphasis shifts to an appreciation of their mutual contributions to Islamic civilisation rather than dwelling on their pre-Islamic pasts. Also, Iran is naturally loath to mention Egypt’s own Shi‘i heritage under the Fatimids, as this would go against the search for commonality and the spirit of de´tente that Khatami was trying to invoke. In using the idea of common civilisational inheritance with India, Khatami chose to place particular emphasis on both countries’ cultural bonds, and there is a feeling that they shared a grave responsibility in preventing a clash of civilisations. Again it is interesting here to note how the emphasis is on certain pre-Islamic

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aspects, going back to ethno-linguistic links and common Aryan heritage, as well as highlighting historical interconnectedness that is partly due to their geographical proximity. In all of the cases discussed there is clear evidence that the term civilisation is often used loosely so as to allow it to act as an area of commonality which can then be used to expand relations. In applying such logic, Khatami chooses ‘dialogue’ as the tool with which to further understanding of other civilisations and Moshirzadeh and others have noted how Khatami comes close to the ideas of Habermas in terms of ‘communicative action’.182 In short, this posits the idea that language can be used to create consensus between actors within such a dialogue. The onus is therefore on understanding rather than competition, thus seeking resolve possible disagreements through dialogue and an appreciation of commonalities through discourse.183 As a result the use of dialogue is therefore necessary in understanding both the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in order to create ‘us’.184 Using dialogue can also be linked the idea of image as was mentioned when discussing the motivational features behind Iran’s choosing of this course in its foreign diplomacy. By proposing dialogue, which contrasts strongly with Iran’s previously nonconformist stance on many global issues, Khatami was seeking to present a more ‘civilised’ and palatable image of Iran to the international community. The call for dialogue, alongside de´tente, may not have had the same immediate material objectives as other openly declared foreign policy formulations of the twentieth century, but it served a useful objective in terms of its rhetorical value. When combined with an appreciation of mutual contributions to civilisations this helped act as a base from which to expand ties with these countries. In this way it can be viewed as something a dialogue among ‘civilised’ nations. It could also be argued that this is Khatami using a kind of soft power.185 While this idea developed by Nye is more relevant to US foreign policy certain parallels can be drawn with Khatami’s foreign policy. The focus is on appealing through shared values and resources186 and this is conceivably what Khatami was attempting to

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do: seeking to set the agenda in world politics through co-opting people rather than through coercion.187 With Iran, Khatami was not necessarily looking to project US-style soft power (although he was arguably looking to expand Iran’s cultural reach), but rather use it in a more accommodatory way to build trust and confidence on the basis of more ‘soft’ cultural and civilisational commonalities. These variations in application that have been highlighted have shown how the Dialogue among Civilisations can be perceived as a tool, or a strategy in Iranian foreign policy, but one that has a sincere basis. While it could be argued that this is something that was cynically manipulated for material ends, or acted as a ‘door opener’, observing its malleability also poses questions in terms of Iranian national identity. Sariolghalam states that ‘Due to a long history and ancient culture, Iranians feel at ease with different and sometimes contradictory layers of behaviour and personality adapting to different layers at different times.’188 Though this may be a rather crass ethno-centric assumption, it does help illustrate the flexibility that has emerged as one of the central themes that have come from examining the application of the Dialogue among Civilisations at this level.

CHAPTER 4 THE APPLICATION OF DIALOGUE AMONG CIVILISATIONS AT THE MULTILATERAL LEVEL — INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

At the bilateral level, traditional diplomatic means were often used as the most common medium through which to promote the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations; however, Khatami also ‘employed the possibilities inherent in a wide range of global institutions . . . to bypass diplomatic channels and to directly thematise the issue for world public opinion’.1 Applying the Dialogue among Civilisations on a multilateral level gave Iran even greater reach, and such an application can also be perceived as more appropriate than doing so bilaterally, as the concept deals with broader, civilisational issues that at times can be difficult to apply to the level of modern-day nation states. The cultural and regional organisations that will be discussed here arguably form their own, regional or cultural/civilisational blocs and, in the case of the UN, provide the ideal forum for developing the concept further. Indeed, Kharrazi noted the importance of such organisations in reference to developing common aims and objectives stating that ‘the significance of the United Nations and the

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complementary role of regional organisations . . . is indisputable.’2 The three case studies offered in this chapter provide ample opportunity to see the concept in action, and once again display its fluidity as it is applied on multiple institutional levels and often in less than obvious arenas.

United Nations As shall be seen later, the Dialogue among Civilisation gained wider international recognition following Tehran’s hosting of the OIC summit in December 1997; however, it is at the UN that Khatami’s call for dialogue reached its widest and most receptive audience. Indeed, as Ahmadi has commented, Khatami’s term in office can be considered as one of ‘the most positive and dynamic period[s] in the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and international organisations, especially the United Nations’.3 A significant moment for the concept and its application in the UN came with Khatami’s inaugural speech to the UN General Assembly in New York on 21 September 1998. In this speech, Khatami refers to Iran’s civilisational heritage, stating: I come from the noble land of Iran, representing a great and renowned nation, famous for its age-old civilisation as well as its distinguished contribution to the founding and expansion of the Islamic civilisation.4 It is quite clear in this instance that he is bringing what he feels are two prominent strands of Iranian identity to the fore. Drawing upon these aspects shows how emphasising historical grandeur and civilisational weight formed a key part of Iran’s foreign policy under Khatami. The nod to Iran’s pre-Islamic civilisation in such an important setting also marked a departure from what the world was used to hearing from Iran’s leaders. However, he also (perhaps unsurprisingly) goes on to draw upon Iran’s experience as a revolutionary state, and it is with reference to this that he first explicitly mentions the idea of a Dialogue among Civilisations:

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The Islamic Revolution of the Iranian people was a revolt of reason against coercion and suppression. Certainly, a revolution which resorted to logic in the phase of destruction is much better disposed to resort to dialogue and reason in the place of construction. Hence it calls for a dialogue among civilisations and cultures instead of a clash between them.5 Khatami’s framing of the need for dialogue within Iran’s revolutionary experience demonstrates his own loyalty to the Islamic Republic’s founding ideals, and perhaps serves as a reminder that despite his departure from the at times confrontational rhetoric of his predecessors, Khatami remained very much a ‘man of the system’. A further salient point in this speech was Khatami’s proposal to designate the year 2001 as the ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’, which he saw as a ‘first step’ in realising ‘universal justice and liberty’.6 He goes on to call for efforts to institutionalise such dialogue through the UN, but stops short of actually recommending how this should be carried out. That said, it needs to be remembered that this speech still represents an early attempt to implement the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations, rather than offering much in the way of prescriptions as to how this should take place. In suggesting how this can be achieved Khatami notes that: The establishment and enhancement of civility, whether at the national or international level, is contingent upon dialogue among societies and civilisations representing various views, inclinations and approaches.7 Although not explicitly mentioned here, it can be assumed that Khatami is expressing his desire for de´tente, a theme which formed a distinctive aspect of Iran’s foreign relations during his presidency. Khatami is seeking to create a more amiable climate in which to conduct international relations, not only for Iran but for the world in general, and felt that this was best articulated by adopting a civilisational framework. On a more theoretical level, Moshirzadeh has discussed how this call for dialogue and greater civility in

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international affairs comes close to a Habermasian conception of an ‘ideal speech situation’.8 Indeed, Lynch has argued that Khatami tried to enable such an environment by ‘creating an international public sphere within which communicative action might take place’.9 Much of the remainder of this speech contains the familiar foreign policy stances of the Islamic Republic concerning the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Kosovo and Afghanistan as well as expounding the ruling establishment’s views on reform of the UN Security Council. Despite the recurrence in the speech of such ideas common in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy discourse, Khatami does try to incorporate themes of oppression and (in)justice into his calls for a Dialogue among Civilisations, thus allowing him to integrate some of the more anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist types of reasoning into his argument. Hence, while others before him may have used issues such as the Palestinian– Israeli conflict to exemplify such themes, Khatami – while still referring to them – instead focuses more on how they serve as a justification for instituting a Dialogue among Civilisations. Consequently, Khatami can be seen as holding on to the key reference points of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, while at the same time opening up a new channel in which to institute de´tente and dialogue. Thus, while common themes remain, rather than dwelling upon them and seeking to admonish the usual culprits, Khatami is in effect spinning them so as to incorporate them into a concept that has an inherently positive outlook. In addition, this has the effect of improving Iran’s international image, as by promoting his ideas to the UN, Khatami was reaching out to the broadest possible international audience. It is useful to compare Khatami’s tone at the UN with that of the previous administration. For example when one examines the speeches made to the General Assembly by former foreign minister Velayati, there is a notable contrast. Addressing the General Assembly in 1986, Velayati’s speech was characterised by references to defeating colonialism and developing ‘south–south’ cooperation.10 The tone was often confrontational and critical of the UN, and much space was given to outlining the crimes of the Iraqi regime against

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the Islamic Republic in relation to the ongoing conflict with that country, pointing to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and lambasting countries that were giving both moral and practical support to Iraq.11 Velayati’s address to the 46th General Assembly in 1991 reflected the climate of change sweeping the globe following the implosion of the Soviet Union, congratulating the formerly oppressed peoples of the Soviet bloc in their new found ‘freedom’,12 and seemingly revelling in the collapse of the bipolar system and ushering in of a new, but as yet undefined world order. Further speeches to the 47th and 48th General Assemblies13 contained themes common to many of the Islamic Republic’s speeches to the UN, focussing on Palestine and Afghanistan and calling for Security Council reform – themes that were continued by Khatami, but arguably treated in a more nuanced way with his incorporation of calls for Dialogue among Civilisations. The proposal to have the year 2001 proclaimed as the ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’ was adopted as a resolution by the General Assembly on 4 November 1998.14 This acceptance of Khatami’s proposal can be viewed as something of a public relations coup for the Iranian government, as the initiative was co-sponsored by all EU member states, China, India, Russia, Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbours including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and many more in Africa, Latin America and Asia.15 The United States and Israel are conspicuous by their absence in this broad support, though this is perhaps understandable given the historical animosity and lack of formal diplomatic ties between the Islamic Republic and these two states. The press release accompanying the adoption of the resolution contains many supporting statements from the UN ambassadors of the resolution’s co-sponsors. It is interesting that, in particular, the ambassadors of Egypt and Syria, and the OIC’s own UN observer all drew upon what they felt was their own civilisational heritage in their supporting comments: Egypt’s Ambassador Abdelaziz referred to his country’s own ‘multicultural civilisation’, Syria’s representative noted the contributions of broader Arab civilisation, while OIC observer Mokhtar Lamani acknowledged the role of Islamic culture

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as well as recognising the contribution of Persian civilisation to Islam.16 In contrast, the Solomon Islands’ ambassador was one of the few to point out some of the problems that lay ahead for initiating such a dialogue, musing over whether this was something that would only be carried out by certain elites.17 Although his comments were directed more at the societal level, they could be viewed as reflecting a concern among smaller states about being sidelined in any ensuing dialogue. In this instance, Iran was rather less prominent in asserting its own civilisational contribution and inheritance, perhaps comfortable in the fact that its own president had developed the idea and had already expounded on Iran’s own heritage when proposing the concept be adopted by the UN. The then Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Mohammad-Javad Zarif, chose instead to focus on more general themes, noting that Iran’s call for dialogue ‘stemmed from the belief that through the better articulation of differing ideas, visions and aspirations, violence could be avoided’, and that ‘central to Iran’s initiative . . . was the premise that diversity of humankind was a source of strength and not a cause for division’.18 This initial example highlights how Khatami had already gone beyond his predecessors in gathering together a broad coalition of nations, including major Western powers, behind a cause championed by the Islamic Republic. The very fact that the resolution was passed in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran and had such support is indicative of the receptivity to the Dialogue among Civilisations initiative. In addition, this kind of proactive participation by Iran in the world’s preeminent international organisation evidences the new course taken by the Khatami administration in terms of foreign policy, and also emphasises the importance placed on such institutions, as Kharrazi noted: Dialogue among Civilisations is a new global paradigm that must embrace all aspects of social interaction at the national, regional and international levels. Various international organisations including the United Nations, UNESCO and the many regional organisations can play an effective and important

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role in facilitating this dialogue and they can establish the forums for realising this process.19 Iran sought to maintain a prominent role in the ensuing initiatives that were related to the concept in the years following Khatami’s inaugural General Assembly speech. Of all the UN’s numerous agencies, it appears that UNESCO was the most prevalent in organising events linked to Dialogue among Civilisations, arranging 19 conferences related to the concept, each with their own subsequent publication.20 As the cultural wing of the UN, it is unsurprising that UNESCO took the initiative so seriously, and Iran was often one of the chief contributors to such events, either as organiser or participant. The first major speech by Khatami to UNESCO came at their annual session in Paris in October 1999. This also coincided with a landmark visit by Khatami to France, the first such visit by an Iranian president since the revolution. Rather than dwell on Iran’s own contribution, Khatami instead chose to further develop and sketch out the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the concept in his speech.21 It is also interesting that, rather than refer to America by name when discussing the issue of world hegemonic peace, he instead chooses to use the term ‘pax-Romana’ rather than ‘pax-Americana’ – thus showing how he is cognisant of the need to offer an alternative tone when speaking at such events22 and again using language that is in marked contrast to that of his predecessors. Just prior to the year 2000 UN Millennium Summit in New York, Khatami also spoke at a roundtable event in the same city, organised by Iran in conjunction with UNESCO. This event was essentially seen as the starting point in preparations for the 2001 ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’. This was also noteworthy as it was one of the first UN/UNESCO-backed events specifically relating to the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations and held in its name23 (though as we shall see later the OIC and its own cultural wing ISESCO had already held its own conference on Dialogue among Civilisations in May 1999). Then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was present alongside various world leaders, and the event was also

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significant in that American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was in attendance. According to an Albright aide, the then Secretary of State had purposefully come ‘to hear what Khatami has to say’.24 In this speech Khatami – having emphasised how this particular meeting was a good opportunity to discuss some of the political aspects of Dialogue among Civilisations – goes on to highlight what he perceives as one of its most important ‘non-political’ constituents. In doing so, he explicitly relates the concept directly to Iran and its unique geographical position, as the following excerpt demonstrates: Firstly, allow me to address the historical and theoretical background and mainly non-political aspects regarding the Dialogue among Civilisations: One of the most important aspects that I have an opportunity to refer to here is that of Iran’s unique geographical position, a position that connects the Far East, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent and various areas of Asian culture and civilisation to Europe. This exceptional situation has caused Iran to be placed in the path of political storms, trade relations and the breeze of cultural exchange.25 As a result Khatami is drawing on one of the oft-repeated themes of Iranian geopolitical thinking, even though he states that this is a non-political aspect. It can be argued that he is merely doing this for illustrative purposes, but such emphasis indicates an underlying intent, which brings in familiar themes in relation to identity and national pride in the ‘land’ of Iran – common in Iranian IR discourse, as the following quote from the same speech indicates: One of the natural consequences of this geographical location has been the fostering of a certain cultural sense that can be considered as one of the principal elements of the Iranian soul in the course of its history.26 Khatami goes on to note Iranians’ ‘extraordinary capacity’ to integrate, absorb and learn from other cultures throughout their

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history,27 in a further demonstration of how he feels that there is a certain destiny or inevitability in Iran’s championing of this concept, and its leadership in pursuing it through the international system. The UN continued to be a prominent platform for promoting the Dialogue among Civilisations, and was the most important international body to support the concept. The wide-ranging support Khatami’s ideas received even contributed to the first signs of a tentative rapprochement between Iran and the US, as Albright’s attendance at the UNESCO Millennium Summit illustrates. Indeed, there was optimism that this most thorny of relationships could be reinvigorated, and Albright’s attendance came some months after she herself had taken the step of acknowledging America’s role in the anti-Mossadeq coup of 1953, as well as its subsequent support for the Shah.28 Kharrazi was also keen to stress how the work of Khatami in promoting Dialogue among Civilisations at the UN could help the Iran– US relationship, noting that the initiative could help establish greater dialogue between them, breaking down the walls of mistrust and thus ‘opening a new path for contact between the two nations’.29 Such comments evidence some of the overtly political objectives of the Dialogue among Civilisations initiative, and show how it can be perceived as a type of foreign policy tool. While Khatami was often quick to emphasise the role of scholars, thinkers and artists in the Dialogue among Civilisations, the very fact that it also facilitated tentative contact between these two enduring adversaries demonstrates its use, and indeed effectiveness, as an instrument of foreign diplomacy. While Iran pursued a foreign policy that used this framework of de´tente and Dialogue among Civilisations – improving its global image in the process – normalisation of relations with the United States still remained a step too far for both countries. However, the level of cultural exchange did witness an upswing during the Khatami era, with reciprocal visits by sports teams, particularly in wrestling, taking place.30 The year 2001 saw two major conferences supported by the UN/ UNESCO on Dialogue among Civilisations, the first from 23 to 26 April in Vilnius, Lithuania and the second in Kyoto on 3 August, which dealt with the ‘political aspects’ of the concept. In his address

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to the Vilnius Conference, ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani, in his role as the head of the Tehran-based International Centre for Dialogue among Civilisations, continued Khatami’s theme of drawing on Iran’s own experiences that were seen in the aforementioned UNESCO address in New York. Interestingly, Mohajerani chooses to emphasise the features of Iran’s own heterogenic ethnic make-up, and its relationship with an overarching Iranian culture, stating: Iran is a good example and is a microcosm of diverse pluralistic identities and common universal values. For centuries in Iran diverse ethnic groups with different dialects, languages, traditions and mores have lived side by side. This concord and peaceful co-existence have taken place despite the fact that Iran has its own common identity that has served as a solid foundation on which the civilization and culture of our nation is built. This has also always existed as a strong and enduring attachment to this shared national identity.31 Mohajerani’s speech continued with further explicit references to the acceptance of a ‘common Iranian identity in the face of pluralistic identities’, and this highlights the importance placed by Iran on issues of national identity within its promotion of Dialogue among Civilisations. Perhaps this was done again purely to provide an illustration, rather than as a bold assertion of Iranian nationalism, but the very fact that it was brought into a discussion at an international, UN-sponsored event by a high-ranking member of the Khatami administration evidences the important role of Iranian identity within the concept’s discourse. The resultant Vilnius Declaration was a further attempt to crystallise some of the underlying concepts of the Dialogue among Civilisations, and contained the by now familiar themes of mutual respect and tolerance of pluralism, interestingly warning against any political exploitation of such dialogue.32 As the instigator and chief architect of the initiative, Iran was well placed to use the concept to its advantage. While it could be argued that Iran may have cynically manipulated the Dialogue among Civilisations, perhaps a more balanced viewpoint would consider it as a project that

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certainly contained elements which were exploitable for political ends, but which came from a sincere desire to foster a climate of de´tente and dialogue. Interestingly, for the subsequent Kyoto Conference on the ‘political aspects of Dialogue among Civilisations’, there was no Iranian delegate present, nor even a message from an Iranian representative that would usually accompany such a gathering. It is not immediately clear why this was the case. Though Iran’s promotion of Dialogue among Civilisations was slowly bringing Iran back into the international fold, proving it to be a constructive actor in world affairs, the events of 11 September 2001 were to have a negative effect on the course of Khatami’s initiative. The ensuing US-led ‘War on Terror’, despite ultimately removing from power two of Iran’s major regional foes in the shape of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, rapidly undermined Iran’s attempts at continuing dialogue. It also unsettled the whole spirit of the 2001 ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’, as many, particularly those in mainstream media, saw the attacks as an exact illustration of Huntington’s predictions of a clash of civilisations coming to fruition. Despite this, Khatami continued to promote his concept to the UN, stating that he was seeking to establish a ‘coalition for peace’,33 thus trying to harness what remained of the spirit of his initiative. In his message to the UNESCO Conference in November 2001, he again emphasised the need for continuing dialogue in the face of the ensuing crisis in global affairs, and also cautioned against the seeking of revenge as a result of what had recently taken place.34 However, the continued fallout from 11 September also gave rise to George Bush’s famous ‘Axis of Evil’ comment in his State of the Union address in January 2002. Labelling Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, and placing it alongside its then longtime adversary, Iraq – at a time when Iran was covertly cooperating with the Americans in their campaign against the Taliban – further depleted what residual goodwill there was left between the two nations, and arguably helped to ‘undo’ much of Khatami’s work in improving Iran’s global image. Indeed, Mohajerani himself has laid the blame for this squarely at the feet of Bush and his ‘Axis of Evil’ comments.35 Hence, the consequent scaling back of the Dialogue among Civilisations,

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which, though remaining an important feature of Iranian foreign diplomacy and a continued passion of Khatami’s, saw less exposure at the highest level. This period also saw greater questioning of the effectiveness of Khatami’s initiative in the Iranian press. An anti-reformist broadside from the hardline Kayhan newspaper ridiculed the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations, deriding the ‘amateurish reformist politicians’ who trumpeted its success at the UN, and questioning the integrity of Mohajerani as head of the International Centre for Dialogue among Civilisations.36 Further dissatisfaction was expressed in the Englishlanguage Iran Daily, which added that ‘Few will dispute that the year we just left behind produced nothing substantial in terms of building bridges of friendship between nations in the context of the Dialogue among Civilizations.’37 This ‘scaling back’ of Dialogue among Civilisations may have been apparent in terms of the lesser coverage it was receiving, but UNESCO did continue to organise conferences until after Khatami’s second term. However, Khatami’s ‘lame-duck’ status during his second term, and the fact that he was essentially hamstrung by his conservative opponents, meant that his executive power was on the wane, which consequently had a negative outcome on his effectiveness as a harbinger of de´tente and dialogue between Iran and the international community.

Economic Cooperation Organisation The ECO was formed in 1985, as a successor organisation to the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) grouping that had brought together the states of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. In 1992, the five newly independent, former Soviet republics of Central Asia38 joined the organisation, along with Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. The basic charter of the ECO is the Treaty of Izmir, signed by the then RCD countries in 1977. All of the ECO countries share an Islamic heritage, are geographically contiguous, and can be viewed as constituting part of the ‘new regionalism’ that prevailed in the international climate following the end of the Cold War.39 Indeed, as

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Pomfret notes ‘as a regional organisation, ECO has some coherence, bringing together all of the [Muslim] non-Arab countries of West and Central Asia’.40 The main objectives of the ECO are the expansion of trade and the promotion of cooperation in the transport, communication, scientific and cultural fields. This includes: the reduction of trade barriers through the establishment of a preferential tariff system; establishing joint ventures; provision of transport and communication infrastructures; technical assistance, and the establishment of an ECO investment and development bank and reinsurance company. The ECO has an institutionalised structure, including a Council of Ministers (consisting of the member states’ foreign ministers), a Council of Deputies, a Regional Planning Council, as well as several technical committees and specialised agencies. The ECO’s permanent secretariat is based in Tehran, and Iran in particular has been one of the organisation’s more enthusiastic members in terms of using the ECO as a means of furthering regional cooperation, particularly in the cultural sphere. The ECO’s primary raison d’eˆtre, like that of its predecessor, the RCD, is ostensibly economic. However, the grouping has proved to be largely ineffective, with other member states giving the ECO a fairly low priority. Apart from modest successes in the field of transportation, the grouping’s declaratory record is arguably more impressive than any actual concrete, practical achievements, and intra-regional trade within the grouping has remained low. While an organisation whose primary purpose is cooperation in the economic sphere may not appear at first glance to be the most obvious choice of multilateral bodies at which to examine the Dialogue among Civilisation’s application, regional cooperation through the ECO became an important feature of Iranian foreign affairs throughout the 1990s, as Iran sought out ways to circumvent US-led attempts at containment and to come out of its own diplomatic isolation. Iran was the chief sponsor of the ECO’s enlargement in 1992, arguably in response to Turkey’s initiatives in Central Asia. The location of key ECO institutions in Tehran, such as the group’s secretariat, reflects Iran’s willingness to shoulder responsibility, and importantly cost, for them.

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Furthermore, the ECO’s relevance here can be found in the cultural remit of the bloc, which, though secondary to its economic concerns, found a keen advocate in the shape of Iran, particularly as Iranian foreign policy took on a more ‘cultural’ flavour during the Khatami presidency. Iran aimed to draw further on the cultural commonalities of the organisation, particularly its common Islamic heritage, which was a perfect opportunity for Tehran to execute a form of cultural foreign policy in keeping with the ideals of the Khatami administration. As mentioned above, the ECO contains several specialised agencies, one of which is the ECO Cultural Institute. The ECO Cultural Institute was established following the fourth ECO Summit in Islamabad on 15 March 1995. It was decided by the ECO member states41 to re-establish the former RCD Cultural Institute that had ceased to exist in 1983 and a new ECO Cultural Institute was subsequently opened in Tehran in 1999. According to the ECO Cultural Institute, the main impetus behind revitalising the old RCD Cultural Institute was the ascendancy of the new ECO members in 1992.42 The RCD Cultural Institute was active from 1966 until 1983, and had its headquarters located in Tehran, with branches in Pakistan and Turkey.43 While the RCD’s contribution to the expansion of trade and economic collaboration between the three member states was modest, its efforts in the realm of culture lead to a significant promotion of cultural cooperation.44 The RCD Cultural Institute was established in June 1966 and its cultural programmes included the exchange of musicians, artists, scholars, sportsmen and cultural educational delegations; the holding of seminars, sports tournaments and photographic exhibitions; and the publication of books on history and literature.45 The RCD Cultural Institute was arguably more active than its successor, with a reasonably active publishing house producing a number of works related to Iranian, Pakistani and Turkish culture. The RCD also sought to promote cooperation in the sporting arena with a biennial ‘RCD Cup’ in football from 1965 to 1974. There was an attempt to resurrect this in 1993, but to date this is the only recorded intra-ECO sporting event.46

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The basic aims of the ECO Cultural Institute include carrying out research into the ‘common cultural heritage’ of countries of the region, publishing selected works by eminent writers and artists of the region, coordination of cultural exchange programmes, and promotion of cooperation in educational and academic fields.47 One can easily see the neat correlation between the institute’s stated ambitions and those of Khatami’s call for a Dialogue among Civilisations. The establishment of the ECO Cultural Institute gave Iran further opportunities to promote a cultural agenda within the ECO. Indeed, the opening of the institute in Tehran in 1999, when Khatami’s concept had already entered international discourse and was being actively applied in its foreign diplomacy, came at a propitious time for Iran in terms of promoting its own form of cultural foreign policy within this organisation. In addition, the setting up of this centre in Tehran allowed Iran to assume the most prominent position within the ECO’s cultural affairs, and again reflects the priority Iran placed on using the grouping as a way out of its international isolation. Consequently, its formative publications and expressions relating to the aims of the organisation can perhaps be seen as reflecting Iran’s own priorities in the field of cultural foreign policy, rather than that of the ECO as a whole. Indeed, efforts were made to apply the Dialogue among Civilisations initiative within the organisation, with the Cultural Institute calling for the ‘special attention of member states to contribute to the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations in the Englishlanguage quarterly journal of the Institute’.48 The Cultural Institute was also keen to ‘underline’ the importance of Dialogue among Civilisations to one of its early research projects entitled ‘Common Cultural Heritage’.49 Workshops were also arranged by the Cultural Institute in subsequent years under the banner of Dialogue among Civilisations,50 and the Institute also contributed articles on the subject to the Iran News newspaper,51 and to the ECO’s own Bulletin publication.52 The sense of Iranian leadership in the ECO’s cultural affairs was further reinforced by the themes explored in the Cultural Institute’s journal which, while seeking to give a broad representation of all the ECO member states, initially had a clear weighting in favour of

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articles dealing with Iranian culture. The emphasis on Iranian cultural figures and poets, Iranian contributions to art and architecture, and celebrations such as Nawruz is not surprising considering the Cultural Institute’s Tehran location, but they can also be interpreted as an attempt to assert the historical importance of Persian culture in the region. The ECO counts three nations among its membership in which Persian, or at least dialects of Persian, serves as the official language, as well as states such as Uzbekistan, where considerable Tajik minorities live in the historically Persian-speaking cities of Bukhara and Samarkand. Persian culture has had a significant imprint in nearly all of the countries of the ECO region. Here we can point to the importance of Persian as one of the chief cultural and literary, as well as bureaucratic and administrative, languages of both the Ottoman and Mughal Empires, where in the latter it also served as an official language, the popularity of Persian poetry in Pakistan and northern India, and its historical role as the language of academic and cultural exchange throughout large parts of Central Asia and modern-day Pakistan.53 The exercise of Iranian control of parts of Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Caucasus during the Safavid era provides a further uniting feature from an Iranian perspective. Hence, all of the above may go some way to help explain the sense of Iranian leadership in the ECO’s cultural affairs and any subsequent Persian/ Iranian flavour found in the Cultural Institute’s scholarly output. The Cultural Institute has gamely sought to promote joint cultural ventures across the ECO. It has set up various conferences and forums that primarily focus on Iranian cultural activities. Examples include the hosting of a conference on Ferdowsi,54 and participation in the Tehran-based Fajr International Film Festival.55 Later, scholarly output from the Cultural Institute saw less of an Iranian flavour,56 perhaps in recognition of the need to expand its appeal if any further cultural cooperation is to be achieved. Tehran’s attempt at encouraging closer cooperation in the cultural field can, however, be traced back prior to the establishment of the Cultural Institute in Tehran, namely to Khatami’s first address to the ECO in his speech at the fifth Summit in Almaty, Kazakhstan on 11 May 1998. In his address, he drew heavily on the ECO member

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states’ ‘common culture and history’. While it is no surprise that Khatami would naturally utilise such aspects as a matter of course, he went on to note how this feature of the organisation should be given greater consideration, as the following excerpt demonstrates: By referring to this subject, [common cultural heritage] I do not simply intend to repeat the expression that is customarily made in political speeches, often taken as the prelude to the main theme. I invite our esteemed participants to reflect on the deep and comprehensive implication of the concept.57 Khatami went on to note how the regional governments of the ECO ‘must set forth their objectives and macro economic and political plans in a way to cope with the same commonly shared realities, i.e. shared cultural and historical backgrounds’,58 thus implicitly drawing a link between the ECO’s economic remit and its own cultural features. He goes on to discuss the roots of Indo-European culture in the region, as well as the contribution of the Greater Khorasan and Transoxania regions to Islamic thinking, and how such features again serve as a common point from which to view such organisations as cultural institutions in addition to their economic role. At this point it is worth comparing Khatami’s speeches with that of the previous administration. In previous ECO summit speeches by Rafsanjani, such as to the third ECO Summit in Islamabad in 1995, there is also some comment on the grouping’s ‘age-old common cultural and historical links’,59 but the mention is only fleeting, rather than the ‘deep and comprehensive’ reflection of Khatami. The speech instead reflects more practical concerns, concentrating instead on Iran’s role in reducing tension in the conflicts involving fellow ECO members Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Rafsanjani’s speech to the fourth ECO summit in Ashgabat concentrated on the recently installed Tejen–Sarakhs–Mashad rail link and the possibilities that it would create for furthering intra-ECO cooperation and trade.60 It was also noteworthy for its heavy criticism of Israel, a point which was not particularly well received by the Uzbek

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delegation, with President Karimov threatening to pull Uzbekistan out of the ECO due to what he perceived as Iran’s politicisation of the grouping.61 Therefore, Khatami’s tone and language is again in marked contrast to his predecessors, with the cultural emphasis arguably finding a more receptive audience. In his address to the sixth ECO Summit in Tehran in 2000, Khatami again sought to assert the importance of the cultural cohesion of the grouping, referring more explicitly to Dialogue among Civilisations, and going on to state that ‘the most important contribution to furthering our solidarity and unity within ECO originates from a common culture and civilization’.62 With the Dialogue among Civilisations being one of the defining features of Iranian foreign policy during this period, it is perhaps no surprise that Iran attempted to apply this initiative within the ECO. The holding of the sixth summit in Tehran also coincided with the appointment of Abdulrahim Gavahi, a former advisor to Kharrazi, as Secretary General of the ECO, thus further reinforcing active Iranian participation in the organisation.63 In this same speech referred to above, Khatami also addresses the issue of the ‘Silk Road’, and comments on how the formerly great trading network should be revived. Referring to the Silk Road as ‘civilisation building’, Khatami notes how intra-ECO cooperation in the transport sector could facilitate such a revival. The invocation of the Silk Road provides a useful example of how cultural and economic affairs were synthesised, and it fits in well with the tone of Tehran’s foreign policy during this period. Therefore a link can be observed between Khatami’s own style of drawing on historical antecedents and commonalities in the organisation, and practical, trade-related concerns that are ECO’s ostensible raison d’eˆtre. This perhaps signifies an awareness on Khatami’s part that any pushing of a cultural agenda by Iran needs to be tempered with practical realities and therefore suggestions as to how these can contribute to the ECO’s primary aim of facilitating greater regional cooperation in the economic sphere. Certainly, the ECO could be viewed as an organisation replete with geopolitical rivals for Iran in the form of Turkey, Pakistan and possibly Uzbekistan also. Therefore,

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any attempt by Tehran to promote its own agenda within the grouping would meet with a certain degree of resistance. Certainly, President Karimov of Uzbekistan’s threat to withdraw his country from ECO would indicate as such. Therefore, what can be observed in the workings of Iranian foreign policy within the ECO during the Khatami period is a synthesising of the cultural spin favoured in Iranian foreign policy at the time with more tangible issues. Such an approach would certainly have been viewed more favourably by fellow members than any bolder Iranian attempts at cultural leadership. Indeed, it is in the field of transportation that the ECO has had the most, albeit modest, success,64 thus giving hope to those who view the reestablishment of the Silk Road as a crucial part of encouraging greater intra-ECO cooperation. Tehran’s attempts at promoting a more urgent regional agenda within the ECO have been traditionally hampered by a lack of real commitment by some of the member states. Turkey, for example, has a long-standing ambition to become part of the EU, though that ambition has been in comparative decline in recent years, but this and other regional priorities mean that the ECO is not a main concern for their government. Iran on the other hand has been keen to promote the ECO where it can, as it believes it offers a viable way of reducing its international isolation, and also offers a way of circumventing American-led attempts at containment. With the permanent secretariat being located in Tehran, Iran’s own, much-trumpeted geographical location, and the nature of Iranian pronouncements on the organisation, Iran perceives itself as something of a ‘hub’ for the ECO. Tehran also used its chairmanship of the OIC, running from December 1997 through to December 2000, as a means of promoting greater cooperation between the ECO and the OIC,65 with all ECO member states after all also being members of the OIC. During the Khatami period, the Islamic Republic was keen to stress the cultural links between member states perhaps more than others, who preferred to view the ECO as a purely economic grouping. In addition, the fact that Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkey are key US allies makes it problematic for Iran’s attempts to push its own regional agenda within the framework of

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the ECO. Attempts to assert Iranian ‘cultural leadership’ over the organisation may also prove to be a thorny issue in the future. As a well-established sovereign nation, Iran was well-placed in the 1990s to establish its claims for the ECO’s cultural assets in comparison with its newly admitted members, who were either still wracked by civil conflict (in the cases of Afghanistan and Tajikistan), or newly independent themselves (in terms of the ex-Soviet states). There has been, however, more confident assertions of claims to certain cultural figures, particularly in the Persianate world. Hence we can observe Tajikistan’s embracing of the great Persian poet Rudaki,66 arguably as a means of helping its nation-building project, and similar moves on Afghanistan’s part in terms of Mawlana (Rumi).67 While Iran has sought to embrace this reconnection with its promotion of a ‘Union of Persian Speaking Nations’,68 it is debateable whether there is any real appetite for such Iranian leadership amongst Tajikistan and Afghanistan.69 It does, however, prove the continued salience of culture and identity in international affairs.

Organisation of Islamic Conference70 Some scholars have traced Khatami’s first public introduction of the Dialogue among Civilisations to the OIC summit in Tehran in December 1997, and the resultant Tehran Declaration issued after this meeting.71 Nevertheless, the genesis of this concept can be traced back further and is first mentioned in Khatami’s inaugural speech to the Majles in August 1997. However, the significance of the summit should not be downplayed, as it was on that occasion that Dialogue among Civilisations was explicitly mentioned for the first time in an international setting. The Tehran OIC summit, and its chairmanship of the organisation during the Khatami period, has also been recognised as a significant turning point in Iran’s relations with the international community,72 giving Khatami the opportunity to present his agenda for improving Iran’s foreign relations to an international audience. It also marked the largest international gathering, at the level of heads of state, seen in Iran since the revolution.73

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Before discussing the role of Dialogue among Civilisations in Iran’s relationship with the OIC, it is necessary to provide some background on Iran’s relations with this grouping. This illustrates some of the marked differences found in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy prior to the Khatami administration. Ramazani has discussed how Iran’s relations with OIC states (and more specifically members of the Gulf Cooperation Council) were particularly strained following the revolution and during the subsequent Iran– Iraq war.74 Naturally, the rhetoric emanating from the Islamic Republic following the revolution put it at odds with other members, particularly neighbouring states who perceived the revolution as threatening the internal stability of their own countries. A brief exploration of some of Velayati’s speeches to the OIC, in his role as foreign minister of the Islamic Republic from 1981 to 1997, provides an interesting contrast with the shift in tone once the Khatami administration took office. In his speech to the 14th Meeting of OIC Foreign Ministers, in Dhaka, 1983, Velayati began by airing the mandatory calls for solidarity with the Palestinians and decrying the lack of unity over the issue. He then focused on pressing issues facing the organisation, such as the conflicts in Lebanon and Afghanistan. In referring to Afghanistan, Velayati was forceful in his conviction that the Islamic Republic ‘could not be impartial or stay silent [on the issue]’.75 As is to be expected, Velayati also used the gathering to address the ongoing conflict between Iran and Iraq. In doing so he stated that Iraq’s ‘blatant aggression’ was against one of the clauses found in the founding charter of the OIC (the principle that force should not be used to settle disputes between member countries),76 thus indirectly chiding the OIC for its lack of action against Iraq. Velayati went on to use the opportunity to point out the perceived crimes of the Iraqi regime and its ‘foreign supporters’, perhaps a veiled reference to fellow OIC members who had been supporting Saddam. The following year, when addressing OIC foreign ministers in Sana‘a, Velayati again took a confrontational tone, lambasting the organisation for its re-admission of Egypt, in spite of its peace treaty with Israel, declaring it a ‘green light for collaboration with the

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enemy’,77 adding that continued suspension of Egypt was a necessity, warning of grave consequences for the future of the OIC and its ideals.78 The tone and the content of Velayati’s speeches show that Iran’s relations with the OIC were somewhat strained, and how during the 1980s it was used by the Iranian government as a platform from which to air its grievances about key issues such as the Arab–Israeli peace process and the war with Iraq. Indeed, Borha¯ni terms the period from 1979 to 1988 as a ‘period of challenge’ for Iran’s relations with the OIC.79 A further source of conflict at OIC level was Iran’s difficult relations with Saudi Arabia, particularly in light of the problems surrounding Iranian pilgrims participating in the Hajj,80 the Saudis’ tacit support for Iraq during the war, and their strategic alliance with the USA and the West. Iranian–Saudi relations were also characterised by an ongoing battle for leadership within the organisation. Furthermore, the rhetoric coming from Tehran at the time exacerbated the tensions with its neighbours, leaving them fearful of Iran’s intentions vis-a`-vis their own restive Shi‘i populations and thus helping to entrench their support for Saddam. In sum, it is fair to say that throughout the 1980s Iran had been using the OIC mainly as a forum in which to chide fellow members as opposed to a place of dialogue. The end of the Iran– Iraq war brought a period of ‘renewed attention’ given by Iran to the OIC, during which Tehran began to act in a more constructive manner within the organisation.81 Within the OIC, Iran played an important role in organising an emergency meeting of the OIC’s foreign ministers in order to address the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the meeting, however, Iranian–Saudi rivalry came to the fore again, with competing initiatives of how best to proceed in supporting Bosnian Muslims in their war against the Yugoslav army and its Bosnian-Serb proxies. Indeed, Sheikh characterises this as an attempt by the Saudis to ‘beat the Iranians at their own game of political exhibitionism’.82 However, this renewed attention to and activity in the OIC on Iran’s part, coinciding with the Rafsanjani era of ‘pragmatic peace’,83 did lead to the first attempts at a tentative rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh as the period saw Iran attempt to mend fences and reinvigorate its relations with the Arab world as a whole. As such, it was the

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Rafsanjani administration that helped lay the foundations for Iran’s successful assumption of the OIC chairmanship in 1997, which as we shall see next constituted one of the first noteworthy public relations coups of the Khatami presidency. As has been mentioned previously, the OIC summit contained the first major international broadcasting of the call for Dialogue among Civilisations. While I have discussed the genesis of the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations in more detail in Chapter 2, it is necessary here to place it within the context of the OIC, as the organisation also played a significant role in its development. The eighth summit of the OIC was entitled the ‘Session of Dignity, Dialogue and Participation’. In his address to the OIC, Khatami, before explicitly mentioning the Dialogue among Civilisations, sets the scene by explaining the ‘preponderance of Western culture and civilisation’ and notes how the understanding of its values is imperative in enhancing Islamic civilisation.84 He also offered his thoughts on the necessities of developing ‘Islamic civil society’, and how this was fundamentally different from the civil society based on Greek philosophical thinking and Roman political tradition, calling for it instead to be based on Madinat ul-Nabi (Medina).85 He thus put the call for dialogue not only within the context of greater understanding of the West, but also based it on an Islamic conception of civil society that, while mindful of the achievements of Western civilisation, seeks to draw on its own historical antecedents for inspiration. Perhaps aware of accusations of preaching fundamentalism, he went on to state that such an establishment of a ‘common Islamic home’ should not take the form of regression and withdrawal from the modern world but rather focus on developing a ‘deep understanding’ of other societies and cultures, and, crucially, engage in ‘dialogue’ with them, even choosing to use the English word in a speech otherwise delivered in Persian. This can be seen as a means of adding emphasis for the benefit of his largely non-Persian speaking audience.86 This is followed by the first explicit mention of Dialogue among Civilisations: The relations between the Islamic world and others is also fraught with mistrust, misunderstanding, and misconceived

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perceptions, part of which is rooted in history and another part of which emanates from hegemonic relationships, or are a consequence of the fanning of chronic misunderstandings by hegemons. In this connection, through providing the necessary grounds for dialogue among civilisations and cultures, with the people of intellect taking a pivotal role, we should open the way towards a fundamental understanding which lies at the very foundation of genuine peace.87 Within this statement, Khatami clearly expressed his aspiration for a new era of peace and understanding; however, the call is still couched in familiar terms in so far as ‘world hegemonic powers’ are to blame for most of the misunderstanding. Once again a great deal of importance is being placed on academics and intellectuals as being vital in any such dialogue, a theme repeated throughout Khatami’s proclamations on Dialogue among Civilisations, and one that was certainly relevant in terms of shaping the philosophical and theoretical aspects of the concept. In Khatami’s closing address to the summit the reference to the Dialogue among Civilisations is more explicit, when stating: Muslim countries . . . desire Islamic dignity and greatness and constructive and effective participation in global issues and international decision making, based on dialogue between civilizations and refraining from conflict and hostility. Constructive and well-intended dialogue between different nations and societies, and also between various religions, ideologies and civilizations in the world, is the best available solution for reducing the atrocities of the international system.88 A further point which needs to be mentioned here are the welldocumented differences between the speeches given to the summit by Khatami and Khamenei respectively, which were discussed in detail around the time by a range of commentators.89 In his speech, Khamenei devoted much time to lambasting the corrupting influence of the West on the Islamic world, which had contributed

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to what he described as its present ‘calamitous condition’.90 Certainly, there is an obvious contrast between Khatami drawing on the positive achievements of Western civilisation and Khamenei stating that ‘Western materialistic civilisation is directing everyone toward materiality, while money, gluttony, and carnal desires are made the greatest aspirations.’91 Conversely, Ramazani has discussed how the American press was ‘transfixed’ by the contrast in the two speeches, focusing exclusively on the differences between them rather than the arguably positive aspects contained in Khamenei’s address relating to Islamic civil society and greater cooperation.92 Indeed, although Khamenei’s speech did contain well-worn themes, such as decrying America’s continued position in the Persian Gulf 93 and the plight of the Palestinians in the face of ‘Zionist aggression’,94 these were also present in Khatami’s own summit address.95 Hence, while differences can be observed, perhaps more in terms of tone and emphasis and especially in Khatami’s recognition of what he deemed the positive achievements of Western civilisation, common themes remained. It would appear, then, that the president and Supreme Leader were closer, at least in their wishes for Iran’s chairmanship of the OIC, than some have argued. Thus while there was no specific mention of Dialogue among Civilisations in Khamenei’s speech, he does share Khatami’s ideas on creating an Islamic civil society as a means of restoring the role of the Islamic countries in world affairs.96 At the conclusion of the summit, the OIC instituted the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations with the support of the heads of member states in the summit’s final communique´, which encourages ‘opening up to the rest of the world within the framework of Dialogue among Civilisations’.97 This, however, is one of only two explicit mentions of Dialogue among Civilisations in the final communique´, and the resultant ‘Tehran Declaration’ and ‘Tehran Vision Statement’ produced by the conference. They are effectively buried deep within the document rather than forming the crux of it.98 In short, the Tehran Declaration pronounced that Islamic civilisation has always been rooted in peaceful coexistence, cooperation, mutual understanding, as well as constructive dialogue with other civilisations, beliefs and ideologies. It also underlined the

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need to establish understanding and interaction among cultures in keeping with Islamic teachings of tolerance, justice and peace.99 Hence, while the concept is not referred to explicitly in the texts of the final declarations, Khatami’s closing address and the whole spirit of the Tehran Declaration taken together come close to what could be conceived of as the formal, international launch of the Dialogue among Civilisations as is recognisable today. The response to Tehran’s hosting of the summit was broadly positive, with favourable commentary in Western and regional media.100 Fellow OIC member states were also quick to praise Iran’s hosting of the summit and chairmanship of the organisation.101 Another positive outcome was the response from Iran’s more immediate neighbours, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE, as a result of Khatami’s less confrontational rhetoric, but perhaps also due to Khamenei stating in his address that Iran posed no threat to any of its neighbours.102 During the summit Khatami utilised the unprecedented gathering of regional statesmen in Iran to hold talks with Bahraini foreign minister Sheikh Mohammed ibn Mubarak Al-Khalifa and UAE counterpart Sheikh Rashid Adullah al-Nuami.103 Sheikh Mohammed noted that ‘Arab nations have trust in the policies you have put forward to eliminate disagreements between Iran and the Arab nations’,104 while Khatami himself was keen to stress his desire for solving the disagreement with the UAE over the three disputed islands in the Persian Gulf that are claimed by both sides. Two rounds of talks were also held between the Saudi then Crown Prince Abdullah and Khatami, with Abdullah hailing the rapprochement between both Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Iran and the Arab world in general.105 Following on from the Tehran summit, the first concrete steps made in officially instituting the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations and formalising its application within the OIC can be observed. Abolhosseini-Sha¯hreza¯ has discussed how following the eighth summit it was the OIC Secretary General’s role to help form a group within the OIC’s secretariat to further explore the concept.106 He also mentions Iran’s involvement, both at the national level and within the framework of the OIC, and notes how a working ‘group of

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experts’ was formed in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop the concept further.107 This group also sketched the proposal for 2001 to be proclaimed the ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’, and furthermore compiled the draft resolution to be presented to the UN.108 Borha¯ni also notes the importance of this same group of experts and points to the presence of Dialogue among Civilisations as a central theme of the 25th Foreign Ministers Meeting in Doha, Qatar a few months later109 as one of the main results of their work.110 Indeed in Kharrazi’s speech to that same gathering the Iranian foreign minister was keen to stress the importance of the concept: In the cultural field, we must revive dialogue among civilizations and renounce all causes of differences in light of our right Islamic norms. There is a need for holding dialogue between the Islamic countries and other civilizations with the aim of encouraging mutual understanding and advancing cooperation.111 Here it is possible to see a reaffirmation by Kharrazi of the key aims and objectives of the eighth summit in Tehran and further promotion of Dialogue among Civilisations at an international gathering. While this and many of the above excerpts have clearly shown the importance placed by Tehran on establishing greater dialogue between Islamic and other civilisations and cultures, the desire for greater intra-Islamic cooperation, effectively a ‘Dialogue within (Islamic) Civilisation’ was also a central theme of Iran’s chairmanship of the OIC. Certainly, this ties in well with the cultural turn undertaken in Iranian foreign policy during the Khatami era. In a speech to the OIC Committee for Confidence Building in May 1998, Kharrazi was keen to emphasise such an outlook, noting that ‘attaining confidence was not feasible without [first] establishing cultural cooperation’,112 and again emphasised the importance of instituting greater cultural exchange through academics and researchers.113 Khatami, in his role as Chairman of the OIC, also continued to push the agenda of Dialogue among Civilisations

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within the organisation dispatching a letter to member states’ heads in December 1998, calling on their cooperation in furthering the concept. He also invited them to take part in the ‘Islamic Symposium on Dialogue among Civilisations’ in Tehran in May 1999.114 It is at this point that the role of the OIC’s own cultural wing, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO) needs to be mentioned. This subsidiary body of the OIC, effectively an Islamic UNESCO, played a prominent role in promoting the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations and, much like its UN counterpart, was an active participant arranging several conferences and workshops, of which the aforementioned Tehran symposium was the first. In his address to the Tehran symposium in May 1999, Kharrazi was keen to build on the momentum generated by Khatami’s UN General Assembly speech the preceding September. Drawing attention to the successful passing of a resolution in Iran’s name at the UN, Kharrazi went on to emphasise that ‘intellectuals of the Islamic world need to embark on a serious discussion [of] . . . how to implement dialogue between Islamic and other civilisations’.115 It is also interesting that despite the title of his address, ‘Dialogue of Islamic Civilisation with other Civilisations’, the focus was almost exclusively on Islam’s relations with the West – with no mention of other civilisations. The resultant ‘Tehran Declaration on Dialogue among Civilisations’ was noteworthy in that it followed the first major international event linked to the concept (as well as producing yet another ‘Tehran Declaration’!). Although the idea was brought to wider global attention several months previously at the UN, and even earlier to the eighth OIC summit in Tehran, the declaration was significant in that it can be counted as the first international document, UN resolution notwithstanding, that relates specifically to the concept116 and that sets out a clear vision for its further development. The declaration itself sets out the following general principles for Dialogue among Civilisations: areas of and participants in dialogue – therefore enhancement of mutual understanding, confidence building, promoting a culture of tolerance, all involving scholars, artists, thinkers, intellectuals, scientists and people of arts and culture. It also notes that governments and their representatives have

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a vital role to play; promotion of the ‘culture of dialogue’ – such as involving governments, civil society groups and NGOs in various events and conferences related to the subject; its application in ‘critical’ areas of international relations – relating to global commitment to peaceful means of conflict resolution, eradication of nuclear weapons and terrorism; contribution of OIC member states to dialogue – inviting all members to contribute to the project; and methodology, mechanisms, structure and financing of the dialogue – essentially setting up working committees to oversee the implementation of the project.117 ISESCO continued to be involved in Dialogue among Civilisations, organising some ten international conferences on the subject between 1999 and 2007, and the concept still retains its status as one of its ‘special programmes’.118 The organisation congratulated itself by noting that its ‘contribution to the international year for Dialogue [among Civilisations] was distinguished and widely acclaimed at the international level.’119 ISESCO also published its own book entitled The White Book on Dialogue among Civilisations, published in 2002 following the 2001 Year of Dialogue among Civilisations. This book was effectively a collection of documents relating to the concept, consisting of relevant resolutions, recommendations, communique´s and documents.120 The various ISESCO symposia were helpful in sustaining the Dialogue among Civilisations’ place on the international agenda and it continues to be active in promoting the concept. However, the resultant declarations were largely a restatement of the Dialogue among Civilisations’ key tenets, essentially repeating the same themes, and as such did not offer much in the way of further conceptual development. While ISESCO’s subsequent conferences following the initial Tehran symposium in May 1999 were useful in terms of developing the concept theoretically and philosophically, they only merit a brief mention here as it should be remembered that the main aim of this book is to sketch the Dialogue among Civilisations’ application in Iran’s foreign relations. Hence once the concept has become established other actors become involved and it becomes less of an Iranian initiative, and takes on a broader hue.

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It is the establishment of the concept within the OIC, rather than any concrete actions afterwards, which has the most relevance to Iran in a foreign policy sense. While the OIC, in conjunction with the UN, whose Secretary General Kofi Annan proved to be a keen proponent of the Dialogue among Civilisations, continued to be involved in developing the concept further, it is these first few years of the Khatami presidency that one can observe the most tangible foreign policy successes of his administration. Therefore, the placing of his ideas on the agenda of several international organisations was a significant public relations coup for Iran, in terms of its regional and international standing as well as within the Islamic world.

Analytical discussion At the level of a general overview, what becomes apparent when researching the application of Dialogue among Civilisations at the level of international organisations is that it is in the earlier part of the Khatami presidency that we see the highest level of diplomatic activity related to the concept. While the UN and OIC in particular were receptive and helped promote the idea, concentrating particularly on developing its theoretical aspects for example, it was the placing of Dialogue among Civilisations on the international agenda rather than the actual executing of the concept that proved to be most useful for Tehran. This broadly shows that the initial bursts of activity, particularly in the UN and OIC, were of the most significance. It was these initial efforts that produced the most constructive, tangible results, with Iran leading the promotion of the concept and its application in these international fora. However, following the introduction of the concept at the institutional level, there tends to be a reduction, or certainly a dilution, in Iran’s role due to the broadening of actors, and thus it has less of a foreign policy application for Iran. Also, certainly within the OIC and ECO, there is the predictable apprehension at Tehran’s positioning of itself in any kind of leadership role, which would have reduced Iran’s room for manoeuvre and promotion of the concept as a recognisable foreign policy tool as was seen at the bilateral level. External challenges, such

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as the events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath, also played a major role helping to reduce enthusiasm for the concept on the international stage, despite the fact that Dialogue among Civilisations potentially may have had even greater potency in the light of such a tragedy. Motivations Within Iran’s application of Dialogue among Civilisations at the institutional level it is possible to observe an implicit understanding that there needed to be a paradigm shift in Iranian foreign policy. Hence the need to move away from using such international bodies as a pulpit from which to preach opposition and dwell on differences, and rather utilise them as constructive fora in which to emphasise commonalities and promotion of rapprochement. Central to this was Iran’s own desire to be seen as a ‘status quo power’121 both regionally and in the wider international system, which though at odds with its revolutionary aspirations served Iran far more constructively in the 1990s during its postwar reconstruction and into the Khatami era. A crucial aspect of assuming such a stance is conforming with accepted norms in international affairs, hence the increased activity on the part of Iran in engaging with international organisations as a means of demonstrating its commitment to such standards. By applying the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations to the regional, cultural and global institutions discussed above, Iran was able to not only show its commitment to these norms, but also project its influence through soft means that were far more palatable to its neighbours and the international community. When considering why Iran chose to do this, two important external factors need to be considered: firstly, the continued effects of the sanctions regime placed on Iran by the United States which was both a feature of and cause of its international isolation, certainly in terms of competitive access to the global market; and, secondly, the political isolation caused by years of mutual mistrust between Iran on the one hand and the West and the majority of Middle Eastern states on the other. This, combined with a desire on Tehran’s part to improve its standing, can certainly be considered as a significant

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contributing factor as to why Tehran sought ways out of its international isolation. From Iran’s perspective, the application of Dialogue among Civilisations with these institutions can therefore be seen as an attempt to portray Iran in a more rational light; showing it to be a reliable and trustworthy international partner, one that can contribute to international affairs in a constructive manner – something that is in marked contrast to its previously widelyperceived role as a revolutionary vanguard state. As Kharrazi noted, the UN and other organisations were considered as indispensable for Tehran in constructing the common aims and objectives that Iran sought as part of the Dialogue among Civilisations.122 As the world’s pre-eminent international grouping, the possibilities inherent in using the UN to promote a concept that has important ramifications for Iranian foreign policy are clear. In presenting the concept to the UN, Tehran was reaching out to the broadest international audience, cognisant of the fact that the world would be watching. It was also ‘important to show Iran as a civilised country’, as Mohajerani has commented.123 Indeed, in the founding ideals of the UN, some parallels with the basic principles of Dialogue among Civilisations can be observed, namely: maintaining and promoting international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; cooperation in solving international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and acting as a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in attaining these ends.124 Therefore, there is an implicit recognition that the UN could provide a perfect platform from which to display the paradigm shift that had been undertaken in Iran’s foreign relations. Having seen the positive response generated by introducing the concept at the OIC and various OIC-linked events throughout 1998, taking the discourse to the highest international level was an obvious progression. Also, with the cultural turn undertaken in Iranian foreign policy under Khatami came a natural affinity with cultural groupings such as UNESCO, hence the use of the UN’s cultural wing as the ideal forum in which

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to promote and develop the concept further. The contrast with Iran’s previous actions within the UN is also stark. One only needs to spend some time looking at the speeches of Velayati for instance,125 to observe the marked differences between the language used in the Khatami period and the at times confrontational rhetoric of his predecessors. Using the UN to promote the concept also ties in well with both its academic, philosophical and more overtly political aspects as it contains different mediums in which to pitch the discourse. With UNESCO there is a ready-made, non-political organisation that can concentrate on shaping the idea, while the General Assembly provides a paramount international gathering at which to promote it, with all of the benefits that can be derived from having a captive audience of world leaders and press. The choosing of the UN as a venue in which to promote a concept that has important corollaries for Iranian foreign policy lends itself well to several theoretical approaches. Firstly, the motivations could be considered in realist terms. Here, Tehran was to all intents and purposes pursuing a discourse that runs concurrent to its own national interests, essentially projecting its influence on the world stage as a means of reducing its international isolation and improving its position vis-a`-vis other powers in the anarchical state system. Conversely, liberal perspectives can also serve up a particularly strong case for providing further understanding. The fact that in the UN we see the ultimate manifestation of a liberal institution, replete with all the founding principles as mentioned previously, ties in well with the application of Dialogue among Civilisations at this level. Certainly, the liberal idea that peace can be achieved through cooperation and interdependence fits in with Khatami’s own ideals. It could be argued that Khatami is very much an idealist thinker himself, one who emphasises the rule of law and compliance with international norms, hence why the UN gave the warmest welcome to the Dialogue among Civilisations. Also, the emphasis liberalism places on foreign policy acting as an extension of a state’s domestic policies could be evidenced by Khatami’s own attempts to promote civil society at home alongside de´tente and dialogue abroad.

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However, the arguments of constructivism provide a more nuanced understanding. Whereas liberalism and realism essentially maintain some kind of materialist precepts, constructivism recognises these but also seeks to address the impact of ideas and identity in international relations. In this form of analysis, the ideational aspects of Iranian foreign policy, understood through the idea of Dialogue among Civilisations, play a significant role. It is in the sphere of perceptions that the crucial work is undertaken, as by altering perceptions of Iran in the international arena, Khatami was able to further his country’s standing politically by drawing on its cultural levers. By promoting a discourse that has its foundations more in the academic and philosophical realms, rather than dealing with the power politics that tie in with realism, Khatami was able to place a non-threatening concept on the international agenda while at the same time scoring a propaganda coup for the Islamic Republic, with all the advantages, material or not, that such a move would entail. Furthermore, this could again, as with the bilateral application, be seen as an exercise in soft power. Rather than using the language of threats, or hard power of coercion, Iran was instead using the UN to co-opt and attract, using its cultural weight in part as justification. Knowing the ability of the UN to act as a global forum for the exchange of ideas, and particularly with UNESCO as a means of channelling a cultural agenda, it can be assumed that Iran was aiming to affirm the importance of culture in its international relations through its calls for dialogue. This was arguably Iran’s strongest hand in terms of its soft power abilities, as all other attempts at promoting its influence ideationally had been tarnished by its attempted export of the revolution and confrontational rhetoric previously. With all of the above considered, it would appear that the UN was clearly the most suitable vehicle for garnering the broadbased support needed to make the initiative a success – and this is why Khatami and his advisers chose to make it a centrepiece of his speech to the General Assembly in 1998. The application of the Dialogue among Civilisations in the ECO is an interesting case considering the fact that the grouping is essentially an economic one. A key aspect that needs to be considered

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when assessing the motivations behind Iran’s use of the initiative in this forum is Iran’s broader relations with the post-Soviet states of Central Asia. The independence of these nations in 1991 placed Iran in a unique and privileged strategic position,126 providing Iran with a good opportunity to expand its influence at a time when relations with the West were less positive than they became under Khatami. Though much was made of the opportunities for Iran in the region, and also possible Turkish– Iranian competition for influence,127 Tehran’s ideological agenda had to be set aside and more prosaic concerns, such as transport cooperation, assumed greater importance. The establishment of the ECO Cultural Institute in Tehran, fortuitously coinciding as it did with the early part of Khatami’s presidency, allowed Iran to exert a new, ‘softer’ influence in the ECO region. By pursuing a cultural agenda, Iran was seeking to cultivate a more prominent role in ECO affairs. The desire to expand the ECO’s cultural remit ties in well with the cultural foreign policy practised by the Khatami administration, and can perhaps be viewed as an attempt to reinvigorate an organisation whose declaratory record far outweighs its actual concrete achievements. Indeed, a more active ECO suited Iran’s interests as it sought ways to reduce its international isolation and circumvent American-led efforts at containment. There may also be some residual desire left to ‘reconnect’ with a region that once contained large areas that were under nominal Iranian control, and in which its cultural influence still continues to be felt. This historical legacy combines with Iran’s own geopolitical imperatives to make the ECO an important focus of Iran’s foreign relations, which is why Iran attempted to apply one of the defining features of its foreign diplomacy at the time to the organisation. Much of Iran’s desire to establish closer working relations within the ECO can be traced back to the current of ‘new regionalism’ that prevailed throughout the 1990s, a regionalism that sought to emphasise cultural, social and political integration alongside economic integration.128 Although this was often only a ‘shallow and rhetorical’ form of regionalism,129 it can still be considered as a distinctive feature of Iranian foreign policy during this period. Certainly, Iran was very

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much in favour of multilateralism and regional cooperation and integration.130 Again, as with the UN, both realist (in terms of furthering national interests and power projection) and liberal (regarding institutions as the best vehicle to promote cooperation) theories can also account for the motivations behind Tehran promoting the concept in the ECO. However, a constructivist emphasis on the importance of culture would again seem the most suitable analytical framework here, particularly if it were to be considered as an exercise in soft power. Applying a concept such as Dialogue among Civilisations was essentially an attempt to promote an agenda through soft power actions, and the highlighting of historical and cultural commonalities further exemplifies the importance of identity in foreign policymaking. This explains the realisation by Iran that its best chance of asserting its prominence in the grouping was through the area where its influence was most pervasive – that of culture. Arguably Turkey could stake just as valid a claim on cultural influence, or conversely so could the states of Central Asia, considering the central role that peoples from that region have played in the histories of all ECO member states. However, with most of the ECO’s member states prioritising relations with their respective neighbouring regions and the West, the desire to project their influence within the grouping was less than in Iran’s case. At the OIC, it would appear that the emphasis was very much on repairing relationships with the organisation. As has been noted earlier, Iran– OIC relations leading up to 1997 were at best strained, with its various summits providing an ideal venue for Iran to launch verbal attacks against fellow members, particularly regional states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The gathering of OIC heads of state in Tehran for the eighth summit was an ideal opportunity for Iran’s new government to display its credentials, offering as it did a new face of Iranian foreign policy. As the first major international event of the Khatami presidency at which Iran took part, as well as being the largest gathering of its kind in Iran since the revolution, it was natural that this summit would be used as an exercise in public diplomacy by Iran. With Khatami and his advisers certainly aware of the generally good feeling that his

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election had created in the international community, the summit provided a chance to build on such goodwill, and as a result it was here that some early indications of what was to become the Dialogue among Civilisations can be seen. This was therefore effectively an opportunity to project Khatami’s own foreign policy priorities of de´tente and dialogue through an international organisation, which would give his ideas added kudos and greater weight. The timing is again fortunate, with the OIC chairmanship falling to Iran very early on in the Khatami presidency, thus giving added prominence to Iran both within the organisation and internationally. There are also the economic and geopolitical permutations to consider. By explicitly displaying the paradigm shift in Iranian foreign policy at the OIC, in part through promoting Dialogue among Civilisations and greater cooperation within Islamic civilisation, Iran rightfully calculated that this would bring about an improvement in ties with formerly problematic neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Alongside the desire to improve relations and display the change in Iran’s foreign relations, other Iranian objectives within the OIC need to be considered, most importantly that of leadership of the Islamic world. Iran’s play for the leadership of the ummah following the revolution is well known, and while this may have become less of a foreign policy priority following the death of Khomeini, the Islamic Republic continued to maintain a kind of self-perceived moral high ground in world Muslim affairs. What appears to be implicit in the calls for Dialogue among Civilisations within the framework of the OIC is that Iran is perhaps asserting some kind of leadership of the ummah, in a sense acting as its representative while it holds the chairmanship of the organisation. However, rather than going about this in the at times confrontational, moralistic manner of previous administrations, Khatami instead chose to couch his calls in diplomatic terms, no doubt aware of the attention that was inevitably going to fall on Iran during the summit. Khatami was able to assert Iran’s position in a soft manner, that – while containing no explicit references to Iranian leadership – put Iran at the forefront of a notable public relations success under the auspices of the OIC.

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This concept was fluid enough to be framed as a reference point for both a broader Islamic civilisation on the one hand, and a more Iranian conception of the idea on the other. This attempt to assert greater prominence within the OIC does have some realpolitik implications, as the case of regional relations and possible desires for hegemony within the OIC demonstrate. However, Tehran was clearly mindful of the perils of politicising the organisation as it had done during the 1980s, and thus stuck to its cultural agenda and used the OIC as a forum to promote a broader understanding with the West, drawing on Islam as its cultural lever, but in a far more palatable way than before. There is also the presence of ISESCO, which could act as an ideal forum for developing the concept further. Therefore, once again soft power politics in the deliberations of Iranian foreign policy making can be observed. In summary, the OIC was perceived as an ideal vehicle for the promotion of Dialogue among Civilisations for the following reasons: firstly the fortunate timing of Iran’s chairmanship of the organisation, meaning that it would have an elevated status in proceedings, including the summit itself; secondly, the awareness that this was the first major gathering of its kind in Iran since the revolution and all the subsequent attention that would bring; thirdly, it could act as a venue for discussion of problematic regional issues in the spirit of dialogue and rapprochement, building on the work of Rafsanjani as well as the goodwill generated by the early days of the Khatami presidency; and finally, it fitted well with Iran’s perceived importance in the Islamic world, allowing it an opportunity to position itself as the representative of Islamic civilisation despite its minority status as a Shi‘i state. Perhaps the most pertinent reason as to why Iran chose to apply the concept at the institutional level is the desire to evidence the change in Iranian foreign policy under Khatami. Central to this desire is the need to have an improved global image and be seen to be acting in accordance with international norms. Thus we see a far more proactive Iran participating in international institutions, and within this an implied recognition of their importance as arenas in which to pursue foreign policy choices. Applying a concept such as Dialogue

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among Civilisations within these organisations showed that Iran was ready to fulfil its duty as a status quo power, and also demonstrates clever manoeuvring by the Islamic Republic in terms of using culture as a main plank of its foreign diplomacy in settings where its ideational aspects may have caused it problems in the past. Receptivity The UN General Assembly’s positive reception of the Iranian initiative, Khatami’s addresses to UNESCO, and the active role played by the OIC/ISESCO and UN/UNESCO reflect the opportunities offered by international organisations. From the first use of the concept at the OIC, it is possible to observe a positive response from across the Muslim world to the idea, as well as Iran’s chairmanship of the organisation, with praise drawn from Libya, Afghanistan and the GCC to name but three.131 This exemplifies the high esteem in which Khatami and his ideas were held by many other OIC leaders. Also, though not directly attributable to Dialogue among Civilisations, receptivity to Khatami’s broader foreign policy outlook can be observed, particularly in terms of the rapprochement seen between Iran and its Arab neighbours in particular. Hence the geopolitical advantages of using such international gatherings as a platform from which to promote rapprochement. In terms of the OIC furthering the Dialogue among Civilisations, the group of experts that was set up under the joint supervision of the Secretary General and Iranian Foreign Ministry demonstrates the receptivity to the idea within the organisation. Indeed, it was this group that were crucial in preparing the concept for presentation to the UN General Assembly in 1998. In addition, the OIC’s keenness to engage with the concept further through the work of the various conferences organised by ISESCO also illustrates the positive response overall. But it is perhaps at the UN that the most active interest in the call for Dialogue among Civilisations can be seen, particularly in relation to the designation of 2001 as the ‘UN Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’. The passing of a UN resolution in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with such wide-scale international support, was not only a publicity coup for Iran, but also a tangible

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achievement that set in motion a whole series of actions related to the concept. Perhaps the greatest receptivity can be viewed within UNESCO, which, like its OIC counterpart, was heavily involved in organising conferences and events linked to the idea (19 in total), most notably its New York Roundtable in 2000 that launched the 2001 ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’. It is evident therefore that these two organisations were certainly very responsive to the initiative and, as such, went on to play a major role in its development. However, within the ECO it is more difficult to discern how positive the response was. While Tehran attempted to place Dialogue among Civilisations on the group’s agenda, the efforts did not result in the ECO taking up the initiative as seriously as the UN or OIC. The very fact that this was attempted by Iran does highlight the role of culture within its foreign policy, and in the ECO Cultural Institute there was certainly a possible arena in which to apply a kind of Dialogue within Civilisation. The reality was, however, that the ECO remained primarily an economic institution and, while the Cultural Institute, essentially under Iran’s leadership, gamely sought to promote the concept, the silence across the media, academic works and comments of key figures relating to the ECO is telling. The tangible reception to Dialogue among Civilisations at the institutional level can be measured reasonably easily in terms of active participation in events, such as conferences, linked to the idea. However, the rhetorical level of receptivity also needs to be considered. A foreign policy that emphasises dialogue and that uses positive and sometimes conciliatory rhetoric should in theory elicit positive responses from those towards whom it is aimed. Thus, as Lynch has pointed out, Khatami was able to create an international public sphere in which ‘communicative action’ might take place.132 Indeed, this proved to be the case and can be seen in the comments of Kofi Annan, recognising Khatami as an ‘able and aspiring person’ to chair the OIC, and lavishing praise upon the way in which he was elected to the Iranian presidency in particular.133 Annan also praised Khatami for introducing the idea, as well as the ‘ceaseless efforts of the Islamic Republic in taking the idea forward’.134 Indeed, as

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‘Ana¯di-A¯lamouti notes, Annan ‘diligently followed up the idea’ within the UN,135 and proved to be a keen proponent of the idea, working closely with Khatami throughout his presidency and afterwards. A further interesting point is Annan’s decision to appoint Giandomenico Picco as his special representative for Dialogue among Civilisations. Alongside his work as Assistant Secretary General at the UN, Picco was also central in negotiating with Iran during the hostage crises in Lebanon during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is interesting that Annan chose a diplomat with such close experience of dealing with Iran as his own representative, and perhaps shows his awareness of Iran’s role in promoting the discourse at the UN. What can be seen in the application of the concept at the institutional level are not only attempts to further dialogue through the specific actions of institutional bodies, arguably reifying the concept, but also the capacity of rhetoric to improve Iran’s standing. The responses generated by Khatami’s addresses to both the OIC eighth summit and the 53rd UN General Assembly136 are therefore testament to the power of agency in international relations. However, while the concept was broadly popular internationally, as was reflected in the comments of the press and statespersons at the time, this was not necessarily wholly mirrored in Iran. Whilst there are examples of positive comments in the Iranian press and certain periodicals,137 there were also criticisms, as the aforementioned negative press comments during Khatami’s second term testify. It could be argued that this is a reflection of the widespread censoring of the reformist press that became increasingly evident as conservatives in the Iranian political system sought to curtail Khatami’s and the reformists’ influence. Indeed, Mohajerani has referred to the issues when asked about the reception within Iran, noting that: in Iran it is complicated because all the parties and all the trends were against Mr Khatami, also they were against this idea . . . it was [a] political point of view, because, for example, they thought that if they support this idea [then] it means that they are supporting Mr Khatami, but they were against

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Mr Khatami in that time. I think that politics disturbed this idea in Iran.138 Thus the political tensions within Iran are clearly observable, and in the same interview Mohajerani also went on to discuss the press issue and how this relates to Dialogue among Civilisations: Mr Khatami explained to me that [when he was talking to international journalists] ‘They [the journalists] ask me “you believe in the Dialogue among Civilisations and in your country the journalists, they can’t write the articles”’. For example banning the newspapers . . . it’s not Dialogue between Civilisations. So, in Iran at that time, Mr Khatami’s era, there was [sic ] problems to establish this idea as a main idea in interior affairs . . . but outside Iran it was accepted as an idea.139 This final point is revealing, as it demonstrates the contradictions inherent in promoting such free dialogue in the international arena while struggling to have a free press at home. Such difficulties further reflect the political divide within Iran and the domestic problems faced by Khatami. However, returning to the international level it seems that the language used acted as a positive veneer, in a sense a kind of ‘gloss’ or ‘enhancer’ that could be applied to Iran’s activities within these organisations, as a result when examining Iran’s actions at the institutional level during this period, the emphasis remains, largely, on Iran’s positive contribution. As Ahmadi had noted, ‘Dialogue among Civilisations initially played an important role in shifting the views of nations with regards to Iran and helped create a better public image for the Iranian government.’140 It is interesting to note, however, that promoting the initiative at the General Assembly and UNESCO did not completely rehabilitate Iran in the eyes of the UN. Just two months after the resolution was passed declaring the year 2001 as ‘UN Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’, the UN’s own human rights commission passed its own resolution drawing attention to Iran’s human rights record.141 Interestingly, such resolutions concerning

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Iran’s human rights records have been passed by the General Assembly at every session since 1985, bar just two years, 1991 and 2002.142 The importance of rhetoric in international relations has been noted by several scholars working in the field of ‘post-realism’ in IR. Studies into the role of rhetoric in foreign policy have shown that decision making is powerfully influenced by persuasiveness and appeal, an area often overlooked by realist analysis.143 Within this perspective, words are taken seriously as their use can affect conduct in international relations.144 Thus, in Iran’s case, the change in tone can be seen as having a major effect on the way it was perceived, highlighting the role that rhetoric plays in shaping relations, something further accentuated by the willingness shown on all sides to engage with the concept. The positive response that the application of Dialogue among Civilisations elicited at the institutional level will certainly have been pleasing to Khatami in terms of gaining recognition for his ideas, with the numerous conferences and workshops that resulted helping to shape and develop the concept further. However, there are also foreign policy implications, and this is something that would not have been lost on Khatami and his foreign policy advisers. Human rights issues notwithstanding, the result was that Iran’s relations with the UN and OIC were vastly improved by the way in which Khatami presented his ideas, casting Iran in a more positive light that allowed Iran to assume the role of a seemingly rational actor, rather than the revisionism of previous years. Hence one can observe the value of using such a concept as a foreign policy tool, which while working on the more abstract, theoretical level, can be shaped to fit into a number of different settings. Indeed, the value of Dialogue among Civilisations as a positive aspect of Iran’s foreign policy has been noted by Ahmadi: ‘Dialogue among Civilisations as a prevailing and basic discourse could, among other things, reflect President Khatami’s vision towards foreign policy and his belief in the use of diplomacy as a main instrument to resolve conflicts.’145 Malleability As the above has demonstrated, there are clear motivational factors that led Iran to apply the concept of Dialogue among Civilisations at

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the institutional level. Such factors appear to be differentiated depending on the institution in question, as does the degree of receptivity to the concept. A further outcome of the examination given at this level is the highly malleable nature of the concept given the varying applications. Consequently, what can be observed is a high degree of flexibility with shifting emphases, as was seen at the bilateral level. When examining how the concept was applied within the UN, there appears to be a more explicit focus on Iran. Khatami’s framing of the need for Dialogue among Civilisations with reference to Iran’s Islamic and pre-Islamic heritage, as well as its experience of revolution, emphasises the role of Iran in such a discourse. The proposal to have 2001 designated as ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’ was very much an Iranian initiative, and therefore Tehran adopted a leadership role seen in the passing of resolution 53/22 and its active involvement in follow-up conferences with the UN and UNESCO. There was also the spinning by Khatami of causes close to the Islamic Republic’s heart, such as Palestine, as a reason for pursuing such dialogue, thus weaving in a familiar face of Iranian foreign policy discourse with its new, more conciliatory aspects. It would appear then, that while the UN was used to promote this new facade of Iranian foreign policy, there are still familiar reference points, but ones which were cleverly assimilated in to the discourse, thus highlighting its flexibility. The fact that it received such a positive response regardless is testament to its worth as a foreign policy tool, whether explicitly intended or not. The emphasis on Iran’s ‘Islamic-Iranian’ identity146 is also noteworthy, as it was an attempt by Khatami to synthesise these two prominent strands of Iran’s identity and present them to the world through Dialogue among Civilisations. Mohajerani’s comments on this subject are again revealing: When as Iranian[s] we say that we believe in a dialogue between civilisation it means, for example as Iranians before Islam [when] we had a very great, important civilisation . . . and also [as an] Islamic civilisation . . . It means that as an Iranian

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you belong to two important civilisations. When you want to learn about Iranian culture and civilisation [the two] are mixed [with] each other. For example, when we talk about Hafez and Mawlana, it’s impossible to distinguish between Islam and Iran. I think that the essence of Iranian culture is Islam.147 Hence what can be seen in Mohajerani’s comments is recognition of the importance of both aspects of Iranian identity in the Dialogue among Civilisations. It is understandable that he is more inclined to view the essence of Iranian culture as Islam due to his own religious background, and this is a conception that comes close to what Khatami himself thinks. The importance this has in terms of flexibility is that it not only allows different emphases to be added depending on the setting in question, but also in terms of the way in which it is interpreted. A projection of identity that has broader, more easily identifiable reference points, rather than the narrower Islam-first prism of previous years can therefore be better received and also more easily shaped or manipulated depending on the level at which it is applied. As such, there is an obviously natural emphasis on Islam as the key reference point when Iran is using the concept at the OIC for example. At the OIC, there is Iranian leadership in so far as it was Iran that introduced the concept, and also played an important role in shaping it further – particularly in developing the idea for presentation at the UN. However, when discussing Dialogue among Civilisations in this setting, Khatami and Kharrazi both tend to concentrate more on relations between Islam and the West. Thus again it is possible to discern Iran’s own ummah-wide aspirations, with emphasis on wider Islamic civilisation rather than any particularly Iranian emphasis. Indeed, ‘Ana¯di-A¯lamouti notes that one of the most important aspects of Khatami’s promotion of Dialogue among Civilisations in collaboration with the OIC was the efforts to present the grouping as the official representative of Islamic civilisation.148 This was successful to a certain degree, with a generally unified effort to promote the concept. Naturally, any attempts to assert a particularly Iranian or even Shi‘i influence

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within the concept would not be well received in the OIC, hence the appeal to Islamic unity and acting as one voice in dialogue with other civilisations, and the West more specifically. There is also the emphasis placed on repairing relations within the OIC, which while not explicitly related to Dialogue among Civilisations certainly can be thought of in the same spirit, effectively a dialogue within civilisation. However, once the idea gains wider international recognition at the UN there appears to be less in the way of Iranian activity within the ISESCO conferences than compared with its endeavours with UNESCO. This can perhaps be interpreted as a tacit recognition on Iran’s part that its interests are better served at the far larger scale UN than in the OIC. The hopeful attempts to apply Dialogue among Civilisations in the ECO are possibly the clearest example of the concept’s malleability. The very fact that it was being applied in a regional economic grouping such as the ECO is testament to its flexibility. At the UN, Dialogue among Civilisations was used on a broad scale, with emphasis on Iran not only as an ancient civilisation, but also as a crucial actor in Islamic civilisation. With the OIC there is the attempt to promote that grouping as an official representative of the Islamic world, with emphasis on dialogue between Islam and the West. However, in the ECO this use of the concept is scaled down to be used as something of a reference point within a region that Iran is effectively referring to as a civilisation in its own right. Here, a more Iran-centred conception can be observed, but like the OIC there is also an intra-civilisational dialogue being attempted. This on its own highlights some of the difficulties in trying to categorise such civilisations, be they religio-cultural, regional or indeed global in scale, hence the flexible use of the idea that could be used as a viable foreign policy tool by Tehran. As a result there is a use of certain cultural markers and unifying characteristics and as such it is moulded in to a kind of cultural discourse that can be used by foreign policy makers in Iran to direct its relations with ECO countries. The emphasis on the Silk Road and the region’s common cultural heritage reflects this and can be conceived as a kind of soft power exercise by Iran, seeking to co-opt

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and attract rather than coerce. There also appears to be a recognition that Iran’s best interests are served by continuing to pursue regionalism in its foreign relations, with the ECO providing the best opportunity for this. Cooperation at the regional level can be seen as a prerequisite for successful participation in the international system, and as such Iran can be seen as trying to build on the previously mentioned ‘shallow and rhetorical’ form of regionalism149 that existed between itself and Central Asia. Thus, as the post-Cold War world order tended towards greater regionalisation, Iran was effectively seeking to deepen the scope of regional organisations,150 and found a useful way of doing so by drawing on its cultural levers. By using varying points of reference, be they cultural commonalities or shared causes, and an elastic definition of civilisation (or rather civilisation as undefined), Iran was able to project its own soft power within these institutions. In this instance, using a seemingly benign soft power proved to be far more constructive, as it had the knock-on effect of Iran gaining at least partial international recognition as a constructive international actor.

CONCLUSION

One of the key questions this book has sought to address is whether Khatami’s Dialogue among Civilisations was purely an attempt at wider academic and cultural discourse in response to Huntington, or a means of furthering Iran’s role in regional and global politics? Therefore, to what extent can the concept be considered as a foreign policy tool or form of doctrine? Chapter 2 showed how the concept is best understood by first examining it within the broader domestic context of the reform movement in Iran and Khatami’s own political and intellectual background. Arguably, it was the intellectual debates emerging from the time of the end of the Iran– Iraq war that allowed the reform movement to take root in Iran, and this created a space for a figure like Khatami to come to the fore and attempt to bring his own academic background into the mainstream politics of the Islamic Republic. Introducing the concept as Khatami did provoked considerable philosophical debate and this is an aspect which continued to be felt after Khatami’s presidency, as is shown by the continued presence of the Foundation for Dialogue among Civilisations in Geneva,1 and the initiatives of Khatami, Kofi Annan and other leading luminaries such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu that aim for a continuation of such dialogue.2 However, as Mohajerani explained, the concept started more as a vague idea and, as such, the theorising came later. Furthermore, the initial impetus was to show Iran as a great civilisation to the world.

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Therefore, in terms of its initial application and development, the concept can be thought of more as a feature of Iran’s foreign diplomacy than any great philosophical appeal. Indeed, this is demonstrated by the initial flurries of activity seen when the concept was first introduced in Iran’s relations with other actors, to then only be paid lip service to once relations were more firmly established. This is not to deny Khatami’s sincerity in proposing such an idea, and the genuine philosophical dimension to the launch of the concept, as proven by the significant contribution of the intellectuals in Khatami’s advisory team such as Faridzadeh and Khaniki, but rather to acknowledge that the concept in its unrefined, early stages was used more as a tool in Iran’s foreign diplomacy discourse. As a result, the earliest use of Dialogue among Civilisations can be seen being introduced in the context of Iran’s foreign relations as Khatami’s inaugural speech to the Majles demonstrates. In this sense, the use of the concept can be understood as fitting into the cultural form of foreign policy being promoted by Khatami and others in his administration. A further, important aspect of cultural foreign policy was creating a domestic atmosphere that would allow people to think and create, promoting culture to flourish, thus linking the desire for greater freedoms and civil society at home with new thinking abroad. The elevation of culture in Iran’s foreign policy during the Khatami era is also evidenced by the highly active role played by Khatami’s choice as Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance, ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. As shown by his regular activity in Iran’s diplomacy during the early part of the Khatami presidency, Mohajerani assumed something akin to the role of a ‘Cultural Foreign Minister’, due to the enhanced role that culture played in Iran’s foreign relations. Two further aspects of Iran’s foreign policy during the Khatami period that this book has sought to draw attention to are geopolitics and national identity. Analyses of Iranian foreign policy, however they might otherwise differ in their assessments, agree on the primary importance of the land of Iran in a physical sense, that is to say, as a specific territory in a particular location. Unsurprisingly then, the importance of Iran’s critical location is often referred to in Iranian foreign policy discourse under Khatami as the president’s speeches on

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Dialogue among Civilisations to the UN in particular demonstrate. Khatami’s focus on Iran’s location indicates a desire to incorporate deep-rooted themes of identity and national pride in the ‘land’ of Iran that is common in Iranian IR discourse. Geopolitical imperatives also appear to have played a significant role in the promotion of Dialogue among Civilisations at both of the levels discussed in this study, not only in terms of notions of territory, but also in a strategic sense as the examples of Greece, ECO and the OIC demonstrate. The use of Dialogue among Civilisations in Iranian foreign policy was also an attempt to portray a certain conception of Iranian identity to the world. The examples that have been discussed point to a concept that appears to be highly flexible, drawing upon different strands of identity depending on the audience, state or organisation to which it was being promoted. Much of this malleability stems from the broad definition of ‘civilisation’ that is employed by Khatami and others in his administration. In seeking to project what he himself has termed as a synthesised ‘Iranian –Islamic identity’ the term ‘civilisation’ is used in the broadest sense, which allows its application on multiple levels. Bilaterally, it is evident that the concept played a central role in Iran’s pursual and maintenance of relations with other states deemed as fellow inheritors of great civilisations, particularly in the early stages of the Khatami presidency. It is interesting that an idea that has such a broad appeal to wider, civilisational identity was applied at the nation-state level in Iran’s bilateral relations. Hence the discourse became something of a Dialogue among ‘Civilised Nations’, with the emphasis very much on each of the countries’ civilisational inheritance and shared commonalities. The very fact that this form of cultural foreign policy was so prominent in Iran’s dealings with the four states examined adds weight to the argument that Dialogue among Civilisations was used as a kind of foreign policy tool in this context. The fact that the Dialogue among Civilisations was broadly well received in the countries in question highlights its value as a tool of diplomacy, and points to the importance of rhetoric and language in international relations. In some ways it can be perceived as a kind of

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veneer, which can be applied to certain relationships in so far as it can act as a kind of gloss or enhancer. The fact that, by and large, the Dialogue among Civilisations appears to assume a less prominent role in bilateral relations as the Khatami period progressed also lends weight to such an assumption. One might argue that it had proved its worth as a foreign policy tool that helped open doors, and was useful in furthering existing relations but became less necessary once the proverbial ball had been set rolling. Furthermore, the practical aspects of Dialogue among Civilisations can be observed in the concept’s surprising malleability, in so far as it proved to be a flexible discourse that could be applied on a number of different levels. Therefore in relations between Iran and Italy, the concept was often referred to in terms of broader relations between Islam and Christianity. In a sense there is a feeling of real commonality with Italy, as both nations have their own, proud ancient civilisations, but also have their standing as centres of a world religion to draw upon. With Greece, the emphasis is arguably more on both nations’ shared historical experience, especially in antiquity (to which there seem to exist far fewer references in the relationship with Italy, the ‘great civilisation’ of which appears to be less the Roman Empire but the Catholic Church, with the Holy See in Rome). What is stressed in the relationship with Greece is the value of ‘knowing each other’ through a similar and mutually experienced memory. Somewhat mirroring the Italian situation, the application of Dialogue among Civilisations in the Iran – Egypt bilateral relationship focuses less on their pre-Islamic experiences as great civilisations, and instead chooses the commonalities of their shared status as centres of Islamic history and learning. And finally, with India there is the alliance between the Hindu Nationalist BJP party ruling India at the time, and the Islamic Republic, showing the recognition of having a usefully placed ally and drawing on the cultural links between the two nations. In all of the cases outlined above, the term ‘civilisation’ is seemingly used in its loosest, broadest sense so as to encompass any possible commonality that can be drawn upon to boost relations. This all points to a concept that in its innate malleability had a clear foreign policy application.

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While Chapter 3 outlined some of the mutual benefits that could be derived from Iran’s cultivation of bilateral relations through the prism of Dialogue among Civilisations, the analysis at the multilateral level in the subsequent chapter focused on how the concept was used to further Iranian interests within international organisations that are regional and international in scope. The OIC was crucial in this regard, providing as it did a forum in which to test the receptivity to the concept before taking it to a wider audience at the UN. Promoting an ideal such as Dialogue among Civilisations at the OIC, and also effectively calling for a greater dialogue within Islamic civilisation, had a positive effect on Iran’s standing in the group, providing the opportunity to show Iran in a more favourable light. The fortuitous timing of Iran’s chairmanship of the OIC and subsequent hosting of the summit in Tehran, coinciding as it did with the early part of Khatami’s presidency, was certainly helpful in this regard also. Iran was able to assert itself within the organisation, but did so by using a soft approach that was in marked contrast to the language of previous administrations. At the UN, the passing of a resolution in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran was a major propaganda coup for the Iranian government, and it was arguably at the UN, at least in terms of the General Assembly and UNESCO, where the Dialogue among Civilisations received its most favourable response. This had the effect of broadcasting Khatami’s ideas to a wider audience and helped elevate Iran’s standing in international affairs. However, the continuing difficulties faced by Iran at the Security Council over the nuclear issue and the concerns expressed at the UN over its human rights record, showed that the placing of Dialogue among Civilisations on the international agenda by Iran was not a panacea for all its troubles. Regardless, Tehran sought to continue applying the idea and attempted to integrate this part of its foreign policy thinking into its relations with the ECO. Although the fit was not quite as good with ECO as it proved at the UN and OIC, the very fact that it was directed towards a regional economic grouping is indicative of the concept’s perceived importance in Iran’s foreign policy at the time. Iran’s actions within the ECO also provide a good illustration of the elevation of

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culture in Iranian foreign policy under Khatami, and, furthermore, demonstrate the importance placed on Central Asia as a region with which Iran has been seeking to reconnect. The fact that the Dialogue among Civilisations found an application across three contrasting international organisations is again indicative of its applicability as a foreign policy tool. The use of the cultural wings of each of the organisations discussed (UNESCO, ISESCO and the ECO Cultural Institute) helped facilitate Iran’s drive towards a culture-orientated foreign policy and, in the case of the OIC and UN, they were useful in helping shape and develop the Dialogue among Civilisations concept further, albeit with the result of taking away the initiative from Iran and turning it into a broader philosophical debate. Indeed, it was through the initial introduction of the concept by Iran within these multilateral organisations that Iran was most prominent. It is from this newly acquired (positive) prominence (as opposed to notoriety) on the international arena that Iran drew the most success. Therefore, while the UN and OIC in particular were very receptive and helped promote the idea, concentrating particularly on developing its theoretical aspects for example, it was arguably the placing of the Dialogue among Civilisations on the international agenda rather than the actual executing of the concept that proved to be most useful for Tehran at the institutional level. Certainly a more critical view might assess this as evidence of Khatami being better at dealing in ‘ideas’ rather than designating and implementing concrete policies. Applying a concept such as Dialogue among Civilisations within Iran’s international affairs was essentially an attempt to promote an agenda through soft power actions. Furthermore, the highlighting of historical and cultural commonalities exemplifies the importance of identity in foreign policy making. A projection of identity that has broader reference points with which it is easier for the other side to identify, rather than the narrower, exclusive emphasis on Islam of previous years, evidently has a chance of being better received and is also more easily shaped or manipulated depending on the level at which it is applied. Looking at the application of Dialogue among Civilisations in this way, national identity and geopolitics again emerge as significant,

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parallel themes in Iran’s foreign policy. Khatami drew on a particular synthesis of Iranian identity, which was then used on a pragmatic, practical level with often clear geopolitical or geostrategic implications. Khatami is drawing upon what he calls Iran’s ‘Iranian–Islamic identity’ in order to further Iran’s role geopolitically. Following on from this, if Dialogue among Civilisations is to be viewed as a foreign policy doctrine, then it is one that has an explicit ideational slant. Theoretically this sits well with the constructivist approach, in so far as identity – however it is conceived and constructed – is central to shaping and generating interests. This book has attempted to plot a path between the key arguments of realism and constructivism, recognising both the material objectives and strategic rationale inherent in Iran’s foreign policy making, but also the ideational bases and importance of culture and identity in effecting it. As discussed throughout this study, Nye’s conception of soft power can be readily applied to the role of Dialogue among Civilisations in Khatami-era foreign policy. This approach allows culture, and all of the related issues of identity that this may entail, to be considered as a key determinant of foreign policy, that may help a country materially. With this in mind, one can see the relevance of both realist and constructivist approaches for any attempt to gauge Dialogue among Civilisations with the tools of IR theory. The use of Dialogue among Civilisations in Iran’s foreign diplomacy can arguably be seen as an exercise in soft power as what we witness is a harnessing of ‘soft’, less tangible but nevertheless ultimately very effective elements. Iran drew on its culture as a means for promoting greater understanding and also used this as an attempt to assert moral authority by calling for dialogue and promoting de´tente in Iran’s foreign relations. Hence, at the bilateral level one can see the emphasis placed by Iran on courting relations with other inheritors of great civilisations, using references to their allegedly shared cultural weight as a means for pursuing better relations (which also had inevitable ‘material’ benefits as discussed above). At the multilateral institutional level, the use of soft power as a viable analytical tool is also discernible. For example at the UN, Khatami can be observed using the world’s pre-eminent international organisation as a vehicle in which to

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promote a concept that draws on Iran’s rich cultural heritage. This is one of the clearest expressions of the application of a cultural foreign policy, with Iran projecting its influence through ‘soft’ means that coopt and attract, rather than coerce. Iran arguably had a strong hand in terms of its soft power abilities and it successfully used this to elevate its status in world affairs by channelling this through by promoting the Dialogue among Civilisations in its foreign affairs. My approach was something of a departure from other studies of the Dialogue among Civilisations, which have tended to look more at the theoretical underpinnings of the concept. They tend to treat it as more of a utopian grand theme in the discourse of international affairs, seeking to find ways to further its establishment, or examine the concept’s contribution within political theory. While this book has alluded to these areas, and certainly takes note of the concept’s theoretical and philosophical underpinnings and contribution, it has also shown how the Dialogue among Civilisations had a practical usage in Iran’s international affairs. The wider philosophical debate that the concept initiated remains important and perhaps comes closer to the utopian ideals of Khatami, the philosopher. However, Khatami, the president, while arguably ‘intellectualising’ Iranian foreign policy discourse, was also aware of the practical benefits that could be derived from casting Iran in such a light. In analysing how Dialogue among Civilisations was used in a number of different settings, I have demonstrated that the concept can indeed be considered a type of foreign policy tool, albeit one whose roots cannot be reduced to mere expediency, if not cynicism, but an approach that had a sincere intellectual basis. Although much is made of the philosophical importance of the concept, this study has shown that while the academic discourse surrounding the idea remains a commendable pursuit, the concept’s initial usage was primarily about furthering Iran’s role in international affairs by drawing on its widely recognised, strong cultural assets. This book also raises important issues about the role of identity in foreign policy, and shows how geopolitics and national identity, rather than being mutually exclusive determinants, are in fact mutually reinforcing of one another. The application of Dialogue

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among Civilisations in Iran’s foreign relations can therefore be seen as a type of ‘cultural geopolitics’ that sought to bring civilisational identity into international affairs. Although this book has focused on Iran, it is the author’s opinion that culturally defined foreign policies should be examined in relation to other states also. This could have the effect of bringing area studies, foreign policy analysis and IR closer together, pooling the insights of each discipline and allowing the empirical test cases that constructivist IR theorists desire. Finally, this offering has focused on the Khatami presidency from 1997 to 2005, as a means of demonstrating how a key feature of his philosophical thinking was translated into tangible foreign policy actions. To this end it provides a snapshot of this particular era of Iranian foreign, and – to a lesser extent – domestic politics. The coming to power of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 represented a significant change in Iranian politics, heralding the arrival of the reform movement on the Iranian political stage. While the reformist tide was largely stymied by the second term of Khatami’s presidency, it retained a foothold in Iranian politics, and came to the fore once again in the disputed 2009 elections, taking the form of the ‘Green Movement’, which saw unprecedented protests against the Islamic Republic’s rulers. Khatami’s own links to the Green Movement, and his vocal support for the movement’s leaders Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi, have subsequently led to him being censured. In 2015 the Iranian press were banned from mentioning his name and printing images of him. Subsequently, the Persian hashtag ‘‫ ﺭﺳﺎﻧﻪ ﺧﺎﲤﯽ ﻣﯽ ﺷﻮﯾﻢ‬#’ (‘we will be Khatami’s media’) was set up by reformist supporters on Twitter, and they continue to circumvent the media ban on Khatami through social media. Like his contemporaries Hassan Rouhani, Mohammad-Javad Zarif and even Supreme Leader Khamenei, Khatami maintains a presence on social media channels banned in Iran, though at the time of writing his Twitter account has lain dormant since late 2014. The current position of the Islamic Republic vis-a`-vis Khatami’s political standing therefore far from indicates his decline; rather it demonstrates his continued relevance as a political figure in Iran.

NOTES

Introduction 1. A middle-ranking cleric in the Shi‘i Islamic tradition. 2. Mohammad Khatami, Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society (Canberra: Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies – Australian National University, 2000), p. 2. 3. Edward Wastnidge, ‘De´tente and Dialogue: Iran and the Organisation of Islamic Conference’, Politics, Religion and Ideology, 12 (4), 2011, 413 – 31. 4. Wilfred Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), p. 129. 5. Khatami served in Mousavi’s cabinet as Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance when the latter was Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic from 1981 to 1989. He held this role from 1983 under Mousavi and into the Rafsanjani presidency until he was forced to resign in 1992 (see Chapter 2 for further details). Furthermore Khatami withdrew his candidacy in the 2009 elections in order to give his support to Mousavi’s presidential bid. 6. Within Iran, however, several articles on Khatami’s foreign policy were produced, though these were written during the course of his presidency, 1997– 2005. For example: Saideh Lotfian, ‘Iran’s Middle East Policies Under Khatami’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 10 (4), 1998– 9, 421 – 48; Ahmad Naghibzadeh, ‘Rectification of Iran’s Foreign Policy Shortcomings During the Khatami Presidency’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly 3 (3), 2002, 85 – 100; Ziba Farzin-Nia, ‘The Seventh Iranian Presidential Election and its Probable Impacts on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 9 (2), 1997, 192– 207; Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Detente in Khatami’s Foreign Policy and its Impact on the Improvement of Iran– Saudi relations’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 2 (2), 2000, 155 – 78.

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7. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri (eds), Iran’s Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008). 8. See for example: Ali Ansari, ‘Iranian Foreign Policy Under Khatami: Reform and Reintegration’, in Ali Mohammadi and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds), Iran and Eurasia (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2000), pp. 35 – 58; Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘Iran– Iraq Relations After Saddam’, The Washington Quarterly, 26 (4), 2003, 115– 29. 9. Ghoncheh Tazmini, Khatami’s Iran: The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform (London: I.B.Tauris, 2009). 10. See for example: Hossein Seifzadeh, ‘Cooperation within Global Civilisations and Coexistence of Diverse Cultures’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (1), 2001, 43 – 60; Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Khatamism: A New Political Symbolism in International Relations’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (2), 2001, 23 – 46; Homeira Moshirzadeh, ‘Dialogue of Civilisations and International Theory’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs 16 (1), 2004, 1 – 44; Marc Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres’, Millennium Journal of International Studies, 29 (2), 2000, 307 – 30; Fred Dallmayr and Abbas Manoochehri (eds), Civilisational Dialogue and Political Thought: Tehran Papers (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007); Hadi Khaniki, ‘Dialogue of Civilisations: Objective Grounds and Theoretical Guidelines’, in Civilisational Dialogue and Political Thought, pp. 83–100; Seyyed Kazem Sajjadpour, ‘Dialogue of Civilisations and International Relations’, in Civilisational Dialogue and Political Thought, pp. 6–68; Fabio Petito, ‘Khatami’s Dialogue among Civilisations as International Political Theory’, in Civilisational Dialogue and Political Thought, pp. 161–81; Behzad Shahandeh, Dialogue among Civilisations: Vital for Humanity on the Threshold of the Third Millennium’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 1 (3), 2000, 99–106; and Mohammad Ali Mohimani, Guftogu-ye farhang va tamadonha¯ [Dialogue among Cultures and Civilisations] (Tehran: Nashr-e sa¯les [Sales Publishers], 1379 [2000–1]). 11. Ewan Anderson, The Middle East: Geography and Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 216. 12. Ibid., p. 217. 13. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991). 14. Mostafa Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation (New York: Paragon House, 1993), p. 5. 15. Ibid., pp. 99 – 130. 16. Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804– 1946 (Chichester, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 17. Ibid., p. 10. 18. Ibid., p. 18. 19. Shabnam Holliday, Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishers, 2011). See also Shabnam Holliday, ‘The Politicisation of

NOTES

20.

21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31.

TO PAGES

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Culture and the Contestation of Iranian National Identity, in Khatami’s Iran’, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 8 (1), 2007, 27 – 45. Khatami has himself referred to this dual Iranian identity, terming it ‘Iranian – Islamic’; see ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar jam‘e-ye mo‘atamadin, da¯neshga¯hia¯n va roha¯nioun-e a¯sta¯n-e sista¯n va baluchista¯n’ [Speech at the gathering of notables, universities and clergymen of Sistan and Baluchistan Province], 1 Ordibehesht 1377 (21 April 1998), in Mas‘ud La‘ali (ed.), Kha¯tami az cheh miguyad? [What is Khatami Talking About?] (Tehran: Nashr-e Ekhla¯s [Ekhla¯s Publishers], 1378 [1999 – 2000]). Ali Ansari, ‘Civilisational Identity and Foreign Policy in Iran’, in Brenda Shaffer (ed.), The Limits of Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 241– 62 (p. 243). Ibid., p. 257. Ibid., p. 259. Ibid., p. 261. Traditional realism does, however, give some space to issues of ‘culture’, particularly in Hans Morgenthau’s works. See for example, Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1949). For a further explanation of the importance of this concept in early realist thinking see Julie Reeves, Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 95 – 111. See Mohsen Milani, ‘Iran, the Status Quo Power’, Current History, 104 (678), 2005, 1–30. Milani uses this term to describe the nature of Iran’s foreign relations following the death of Khomeini in 1989. He sees this as a distinct transformation of Iranian foreign policy following its revolutionary phase that lasted up until 1989. This is evidenced by Iran’s lack of involvement in the first Gulf War following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the pursuing of relations with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the acceptance of a ‘cold peace’ with Baghdad throughout the 1990s, and the improvements seen in relations with the EU, China and Russia during the Rafsanjani and Khatami eras. For example see works in particular by Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organisation, 6 (2), 1992, 391– 425; ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, 20 (1), 1995, 71 – 82; and Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal of International Relations, 3 (3), 1997, 319– 63. Wastnidge, ‘De´tente and Dialogue’, p. 416. Joseph S. Nye Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 5.

158

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10 –16

32. Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘Hard Power and Soft Power’, in Akbar Ahmed and Brian Forst (eds), After Terror: Promoting Dialogue among Civilisations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 166– 170. 33. Ibid., p. 167. 34. Moustafa Torkzahrani, ‘Iran After Khatami: Civil Society and Foreign Policy’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 9 (4), 1997, 499– 512. 35. See Kamal Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯: majmu‘ah-ye sukhanra¯niha¯-ye Kamal Kharrazi [Our Foreign Policy: A Collection of the Speeches of Kamal Kharrazi] (Tehran: Markaz-e asna¯d va ta¯rikhi dipluma¯si [Centre for Documents and Diplomatic History], 2002); and Ali Akbar Velayati, Didga¯hha¯-ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n: majmu‘eh-ye sukhanra¯niha¯-ye vazir-e omur-e kha¯rijah-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n dar maja¯me‘e-ye beynolmella¯li [Worldviews of the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Collection of the Islamic Republic of Iran Foreign Minister’s Speeches at International Assemblies] (Tehran: Veza¯rat-e omur-e kha¯rejah, 1373 [Tehran: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995]). 36. Mas‘ud La‘ali (ed.), Kha¯tami az cheh miguyad? [What is Khatami Talking About?] (Tehran: Nashr-e Ekhla¯s [Ekhla¯s Publishers], 1378 [1999 – 2000]).

Chapter 1 Iranian Foreign Policy in Context 1. Maziar Behrooz, ‘Trends in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979– 1988’, in Nikki Keddie (ed.), Neither East nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 13 – 35 (p. 15). 2. Nikki Keddie, Introduction, in Nikki Keddie (ed.), Neither East nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 1 – 10 (p. 7). 3. Farhad Kazemi and Jo-Anne Hart, ‘The Shi‘i Praxis: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Iran’, in David Menashri (ed.), The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 58 – 72 (p. 62). 4. Ibid., p. 65. 5. Shahram Chubin, ‘Iran and the Persian Gulf States’, in David Menashri (ed.), The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 73 –84 (p. 73). 6. Farhang Rajaee, ‘Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 1990), pp. 63–80 (p. 77). 7. See Houchang Chehabi (ed.), Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006) – see in particular the chapters by Houchang Chehabi and Hassan Mneimneh, ‘Five Centuries of Lebanese – Iranian Encounters’, pp. 1 – 50, and Houchang Chehabi, ‘Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade’, pp. 201 – 30.

NOTES

TO PAGES

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159

8. Chehabi, ‘Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade’, p. 220. 9. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy: Both North and South’, Middle East Journal, 46 (3), 1992, 393– 412 (p. 393). 10. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, ‘Iran’s Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends and Means’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 1990), pp. 40 –62 (p. 42). 11. Cited in Ramazani, ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy: Both North and South’, p. 394. 12. Chubin, ‘Iran and the Persian Gulf States’, p. 8. 13. Daniel Byman, Sharam Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Jerold Green, Iran’s Security Policy In the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 59. 14. Ramazani, ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy: Both North and South’, p. 393. 15. Iran came close to open conflict with the Taliban following the disappearance and subsequent murder of 11 Iranian diplomats and journalists from the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i Sharif in August 1998. By September 1998, Iran had massed nearly 200,000 troops along the Afghan border. For further details see Wilfred Buchta, Who Rules Iran, pp. 146– 8. 16. Shahram Chubin, Wither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security (London: Routledge, 2002). 17. Mehran Kamrava, ‘Iranian National Security Debates: Factionalism and Lost Opportunities’, Middle East Policy, 14 (2), 2007, 84–100. 18. Byman et al., Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-revolutionary Era, pp. 21 – 2. 19. Ibid., p. 22. 20. Article 152 – the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. See official website of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an English translation of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, accessible online at: http://www.mfa.gov. ir/cms/cms/Tehran/en/Tourism/Constitution.html. 21. Abbas Maleki, ‘Decision Making in Iran’s Foreign Policy: A Heuristic Approach’, Journal of Social Affairs, 19 (73), 2002, 39–59 (p. 39). 22. Shahram Chubin, ‘Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security’, International Institute for Strategic Studies: Adelphi Paper (342) (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 38. 23. Ibid., p. 40. 24. Article 176 – the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 25. Ibid. 26. Chubin, Whither Iran?, p. 38. 27. Comments taken from Iran Radio, cited in Chubin, Whither Iran?, p. 39. 28. International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution’s Soul’, ICG Middle East Report, No. 5 (August 2005). 29. Buchta, Who Rules Iran?, pp. 49– 50. 30. Ibid., p. 50. 31. Ibid., p. 3.

160

Chapter 2

NOTES

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Khatami and the Idea of Dialogue among Civilisations

1. So called after the Persian calendar date on which Khatami was elected, 2 Khorda¯d 1376 (23 May 1997). 2. Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots of Revolution, 2nd edn (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 260. 3. Mohammad Khatami discussing formation of Association of Combatant Clerics, Ettela¯‘a¯t, 14 Ordibehesht 1367 (4 May 1988). 4. For further detail see David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 53–4. Pragmatic in this sense refers generally to the element led by Rafsanjani who sought to reconstruct Iran in the postwar era through a partial opening up to the West, at least in the economic sphere so as to aid Iran’s recovery. 5. Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 269. 6. Ibid., p. 269. 7. Tehran Times, 17 June 1992. Furthermore, according to Cherry Moteshar, writing in The Observer in 1992, Khatami reportedly offered to resign in April, just prior to that year’s Majles elections, but Rafsanjani had asked Khatami to stay on temporarily – Cherry Moteshar, ‘Hardliners force out ‘liberal’ minister for Islamic Guidance and Culture’, The Observer, 19 July 1992. 8. Wilfred Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), p. 30. 9. Tehran Times, 18 June 1992. 10. ‘New Culture Minister takes office’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts –Middle East, 17 July 1992. Doc. number – bbcme00020011123do7h0039r. 11. ‘Culture Minister explains his resignation’, Agence France-Presse, 18 July 1992. Doc. number – afpr000020011106do7i01uqe. 12. Mohammad Khatami, Bim-e mawj [Fear of the Wave] (Tehran: Nashr-e sima¯-ye java¯n [Voice of Youth Publishers], 1372 [1993– 4]); Mohammad Khatami, Az donya¯-ye shahr ta¯ shahr-e donya¯: sayri dar a¯ndisheh-ye siya¯si-ye gharb [From the World of the City to the City of the World: A Survey of Western Political Thought] (Tehran: Nashr-e Nay [Nay Publishers], 1373 [1994 – 5]). 13. Ettela¯‘a¯t, 15 A¯zar 1378 (6 December 1999). 14. Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), p. 148. 15. See for example Matthew C. Wells, ‘Thermidor in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Rise of Muhammad Khatami’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 26 (1), 1999, pp. 27 – 39. Wells contends that the thermidor phase

NOTES

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

TO PAGES

29 –34

161

began following the death of Khomeini and the ascendancy of more pragmatic-minded policies of Rafsanjani; Farhang Rajaee, ‘A Thermidor of “Islamic Yuppies”? Conflict and Compromise in Iran’s Politics’, Middle East Journal, 53 (2), 1999, pp. 217–31. Conversely, Rajaee sees the thermidor as beginning later following the election of Khatami. Farhad Khosrokhavar, ‘The New Intellectuals in Iran’, Social Compass, 51 (2), 2004, 191– 202 (p. 193). Iran News, 11 November 1996. Sala¯m, 7 Bahman 1375 (26 January 1997). Hamshahri, 19 Esfand 1375 (9 March 1997). Akhba¯r, 28 Esfand 1375 (18 March 1997). Two other candidates were also officially approved to run by the Guardian Council. These were former intelligence minister and cleric Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri, widely regarded as an ultra-conservative, and lawyer and sometime Guardian Council member Reza Zavare‘i, also considered conservative. Buchta, Who Rules Iran?, p. 29. Farzin-Nia, ‘The Seventh Iranian Presidential Election’, p. 197. Iran News, 5 April 1997. For further explanation see Sa‘eed Hajjarian, ‘Ja¯me‘e-ye madani va ira¯n-e emrooz’ [Civil Society and Today’s Iran], Ma¯hna¯meh-ye Ettela¯‘a¯t-e siya¯si-eqtesa¯di [Political and Economic Ettela¯‘a¯t], 9 –10, 1376 (1997 – 8). Sa‘eed Hajjarian, Interview with Sa‘eed Hajjarian in Ma¯hna¯meh-ye Ettela¯‘a¯t-e siya¯si-eqtesa¯di [Political and Economic Ettela¯‘a¯t], 117– 18, 28 –47 (p. 30). See also profile of Hajjarian – ‘Hajja¯ria¯n: Dinda¯r-e nawa¯ndish va esla¯htalab’ [Hajjarian: A Religious Intellectual and Reformist], Kiya¯n, 51, Farvadin – Ordibehesht 1379 (March – April 2000), 2 – 4. Shabnam Holliday, Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishers, 2011), p. 117. For a more detailed explanation of mardomsa¯la¯ri, see Khatami’s book of the same title. Mohammad Khatami, Mardomsa¯la¯ri [Democracy] (Tehran: Nashr-e Tahr-e No [Tarh-e No Publications], 1380 (2001/2). Mohammad Khatami, remarks during roundtable discussion on the election on Iranian Television 20 May 1997 (sourced originally from Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 May 1997. Doc. number – bbcme00020010929dt5n007j3. Mohammad Khatami, Pre-election speech broadcast by Iranian Television on 10 May 1997 (sourced from Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 May 1997. Doc. number – bbcme00020010929dt5d0075r. Ibid. Nikki Keddie, Iran: Religion, Politics and Society: Collected Essays (Oxford: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1980), p. 8.

162

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TO PAGES

35 – 40

32. For a good overview of the development of civil society discourses in Iran see Mehran Kamrava, ‘The Civil Society Discourse in Iran’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 28 (2), 2001, 165– 85. 33. Ibid., p. 167. 34. Holliday, Defining Iran, p. 120. 35. Ibid. 36. Mohammad Khatami, inaugural speech to the Majles, 3 August 1997. Ettela¯‘a¯t, 13 Morda¯d 1376 (4 August 1997). 37. Statement by Mohammad Khatami to the eighth session of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, Tehran, 9 December 1997, in Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi [Document Collection of the Eighth Meeting of the Heads of Islamic Countries] (Tehran: Markaz-e cha¯p va entesha¯ra¯t-e veza¯rat-e omur-e kha¯rejeh [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Print and Publishing], 1378 [1999/2000]), p. 56. For an English translation see Mohammad Khatami, Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society (Canberra: Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies – Australian National University, 2000), pp. 16 – 18. 38. Mohammad Khatami, Pre-election speech (note 29). 39. Mohammad Khatami, remarks during roundtable discussion on the election on Iranian Television 20 May 1997 (sourced from Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 May 1997. Doc. number – bbcme00020010929dt5n007j3. 40. Mohammad Khatami, Pre-election speech (note 29). 41. Mohammad Khatami, Interview, Iran News, 25 March 1997. 42. Mohammad Khatami, Taken from meeting with Sultan Qaboos of Oman, 6 August 1997, Ettela¯‘a¯t, 16 Morda¯d 1376 (7 August 1997). 43. Mohammad Khatami, Taken from meeting with Qatari foreign minister, Tehran 13 September 1997, Ettela¯‘a¯t, 23 Shahrivar 1376 (14 September 1998). 44. Kamal Kharrazi, Interview, Iran Daily, 28 August 1997. 45. Ibid. 46. Kamal Kharrazi, comments by Kharrazi explaining Iranian foreign policy priorities, Iran Daily, 23 August 1997. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. 50. Mohammad Khatami, ‘Covenant with the Nation’ – Inaugural speech to the Iranian Majles, 3 August 1997. Taken from Mohammad Khatami, Islam, Liberty and Development (Binghamton, NY: Institute of Global Cultural Studies, 1998), emphasis added. See also, Ettela¯‘a¯t, 13 Morda¯d 1376 (4 August 1997). 51. Mohammad Khatami, speech to Iranian cultural representatives abroad on 2 September 1997, Iran Daily, 3 September 1997. 52. Ibid.

NOTES TO PAGES 40 – 44

163

53. Kamal Kharrazi, interview with Middle East Insight magazine, reproduced in Iran Daily, 9 October 1997. 54. Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. 55. Ettela¯‘a¯t, 16 Morda¯d 1376 (7 August 1997). 56. Ettela¯‘a¯t, 23 Shahrivar 1376 (14 September 1998). 57. Sheikh Isa bin Suleman Al-Khalifa, Emir of Bahrain. Interview with Khaleej Times newspaper, reproduced in Iran Daily, 28 August 1997. 58. Bijan Assadi, ‘Iran and the Persian Gulf Security’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (1), 2001, 111– 30 (p. 115). 59. Hossein Seifzadeh, ‘Cooperation within Global Civilisations and Coexistence of Diverse Cultures’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (1), 2001, 43– 60 (p. 45). 60. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’, Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), 1993, 22 – 34 (p. 22). 61. The other civilisational groupings identified by Huntington are: ‘Orthhodox’; ‘African’; ‘Hindu’; ‘Buddhist’ and ‘Japanese’. Ibid., p. 23. 62. Ibid., p. 23. 63. Ibid., p. 25. 64. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 54. 65. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’, p. 32. 66. Ibid., p. 32. 67. Ibid., p. 27. 68. Conversely, it could be argued, perhaps rather crudely, that the present struggle between the guardians of Turkey’s secular Kemalist ideology on the one hand, and parties drawing upon Islamic reference points such as the AKP on the other, typify such a fault line. However, this would constitute a whole other work in itself. 69. See Chapter 3 for further details. 70. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations, p. 32. 71. Seifzadeh, ‘Cooperation within Global Civilisations’, p. 43. 72. Ibid., p. 44. 73. These were first outlined in the ‘Tehran Declaration’, issued following the OIC/ISESCO-affiliated ‘Islamic Symposium on Dialogue among Civilisations’, Tehran, 3 – 5 May 1999. For further details see Chapter 4. For ‘Tehran Declaration’, see also – http://www.isesco.org.ma/english/dialogue/ tehran1999/dialogue1999.php?idd¼ TDD_REF_SP&page ¼ /Home/Special %20Programmes/Dialogue%20among%20civilizations. 74. Wastnidge, ‘De´tente and Dialogue’, p. 414. 75. Ibid., p. 415. 76. Seifzadeh, ‘Cooperation within Global Civilisations’, pp. 48 –50. 77. Wastnidge, ‘De´tente and Dialogue’, p. 415. 78. Ibid., p. 415.

164

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TO PAGES

45 – 48

79. Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. Mohammad-Javad Faridzadeh – a former professor in history and philosophy based in Germany until 1997 when he returned to Iran to become Khatami’s chief speechwriter. He went on to become head of the Tehran-based International Centre for Dialogue among Civilisations and also served as Iran’s ambassador to the Vatican. Hadi Khaniki – a media and cultural studies specialist based at Allameh Tabatabaee University, Tehran. Khaniki served as cultural adviser to Khatami and also served as director of the International Centre for Dialogue among Civilisations in Tehran. 80. Hadi Khaniki, ‘Dialogue among Civilisations: Objective Grounds and Theoretical Guidelines’, in Fred Dallmayr and Abbas Manoochehri (eds), Civilisational Dialogue and Political Thought: Tehran Papers (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 83 –100 (p. 83). 81. Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. 82. Ibid. 83. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), p. 148. 84. Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. 85. Asadollah Athari-Maryan, ‘Shayegan: Philsophical Approach to the Problems of Iran’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (1), 2001, 61 – 110 (p. 62). 86. Dariush Shayegan, Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Societies Confronting the West (London: Saqi Books, 1992), p. 3. For further examples of Shayegan’s work see Dariush Shayegan, Botha¯-ye zehni va kha¯tere-ye a¯za¯li [Idols of the Mind and Perennial Memory] (Tehran: Intesha¯ra¯t-e Amir Kabir [Amir Kabir Publications], 1355 [1975–6]), and Dariush Shayegan, Asiya¯ dar bara¯bar-e gharb [Asia Faces the West], also published in French as L’Asie face a` l’Occident (Tehran: Intesha¯ra¯t-e Amir Kabir [Amir Kabir Publications], 1358 [1978–9]). 87. Shayegan, Cultural Schizophrenia, p. 14. 88. Ibid., p. 2. 89. Khatami, in his speech to the eighth OIC Conference in Tehran, cautioned against ‘regression and withdrawal’ from the modern world and instead sought ‘deep understanding’ of other societies and cultures. 90. Shayegan, Cultural Schizophrenia, p. 25. 91. Ibid., p. 158 92. Ibid., p. 178. 93. Shayegan, Botha¯-ye zehni va kha¯tere-ye a¯za¯li, p. 63. 94. Mohammad Khatami, speech to Iranian cultural representatives abroad. 95. Athari-Maryan, ‘Shayegan’, p. 65. 96. For further detail see Martin Heidegger, ‘Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’, in Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 1 – 57. 97. See for example Ali Ansari, Islam, Iran and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2006), p. 133;

NOTES

98. 99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104.

105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

TO PAGES

48 –53

165

Homeira Moshirzadeh, ‘Dialogue of Civilisations and International Theory’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 16 (1), 2004, 1 – 44; Marc Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres’, Millennium Journal of International Studies, 29 (2), 2000, 307– 30. For further detail see Ju¨rgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). Ibid., p. 288. Ibid., p. 140. According to Juan Cole, Khatami studied the work of Habermas during his time as head of the Islamic Centre in Hamburg. See Juan Cole’s personal weblog ‘Informed Comment’ – ‘Could Khatami be Iran’s Obama?’, 9 February 2009. http://www.juancole.com/2009/02/could-khatami-be-irans-obama.html. However, Mohajerani’s comments on the role of Faridzadeh in providing the Germanic philosophical influence are telling, showing that it was perhaps more Faridzadeh’s influence as a philosopher and key speech writer for Khatami that was of greater significance. Austin Harrington, Hermeneutic Dialogue and Social Science: A Critique of Gadamer and Habermas (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 2. Hadi Khaniki, ‘Dialogue among Civilisations: Objective Grounds and Theoretical Guidelines’, p. 86. Unfortunately there are no published works on Dialogue among Civilisations by Faridzadeh, though as Mohajerani has commented a look at any of Khatami’s speeches on the subject of Dialogue among Civilisations shows his influence. Ibid., p. 95. Ali Paya and Mohammad Amin Ghanneirad, ‘Habermas and Iranian Intellectuals’, Iranian Studies, 40 (3), 2007, 305– 34 (pp. 312 – 13). Ibid., p. 84. Ibid., p. 97. Ibid., p. 91. Ibid. Ibid., p. 98. Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani, London, 30 December 2008.

Chapter 3 The Application of Dialogue among Civilisations at the Bilateral Level 1. See A.R. Burn, ‘Persia and the Greeks’, in Ilya Gershevitch (ed.), The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 2: The Median and Achaemenian Periods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 292 – 391; E. Badian, ‘Alexander in Iran’, in The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 2, pp. 420 – 500; Otto Kunz, ‘Cultural Relations Between Parthia and Rome’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 3 (I): The Selucid, Parthian

166

2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

NOTES

TO PAGES

53 –55

and Sassanian Periods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 559 – 67. See for example Yaqoob Azhand, ‘The Global Impact of Iranian Culture’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (1), 1999, 185– 96. See Kunz, ‘Cultural Relations’, and Nina Garsoı¨an, ‘Byzantium and the Sasanians’, in The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol 3 (I), pp. 568– 92. The Sassanians mainly fought with the Eastern Empire following partition in late third-century AD , and therefore mainly dealt with the ‘Greek’ portion of the ‘Roman’ world after this point. Mohammad Hassan Ka¯vusi-‘Ara¯qi, A¯sna¯d-e rava¯bet-e dawlat-e Safavi ba¯ hukumatha¯-ye Ita¯liya¯ [Documents on Relations of the Safavid State with Italian Governments] (Tehran: Veza¯rat-e umur-e kha¯rejah, markaz-e cha¯p va entesha¯ra¯t, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Print and Publishing], 2000). See also Giorgio Rota, ‘Safavid Persia and its Diplomatic Relations with Venice’, in Willem Floor and Edmund Herzig (eds), Iran and the World in the Safavid Age (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012). See for example Ruhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, 1500– 1941 (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1966), pp. 277– 98; Yair P. Hirschfeld, Deutschland und Iran im Spielfeld der Ma¨chte: Internationale Beziehungen unter Reza Schah, 1921– 1941 [Germany and Iran in the field of the Great Powers: International relations under Reza Shah, 1921– 1941] (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1980). For a good examination of Italy’s Middle Eastern affairs during the Mussolini era see Manuela A. Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935– 1940 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Masoud Kamali, ‘Multiple Modernities and Islamism in Iran,’ Social Compass, 54 (3), 2007, 381 and Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 101. Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad, p. 34. ‘Translation of German Statement on ties with Iran’, Reuters, 10 April 1997. Doc. number – lba0000020011002dt4a07lig. ‘EU invites members to recall ambassadors from Iran’, Reuters, 10 April 1997. Doc. number – lba0000020011002dt4a07llc. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 17 November 1997. Wilfred Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), p. 129. Mohammad Khatami, Statement by Mohammad Khatami to the eighth session of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, Tehran, 9 December 1997, in Ali Abolhoseini-Sha¯hreza¯, Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi [Document Collection of the Eighth Meeting of the Heads of Islamic Countries] (Tehran: Markaz-e cha¯p va entesha¯ra¯t-e veza¯rat-e omur-e kha¯rejeh [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Print and Publishing], 1378

NOTES

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

29.

TO PAGES

55 –58

167

[1999/2000]). An English translation of this speech can also be found in Khatami, Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society, 14–25. Mohammad Khatami, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 15 December 1997. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 22 December 1997. Khatami, Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society, pp. 15– 16. Romano Prodi, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 22 December 1997. ‘Transcript of Interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami’, 7 January 1998, from CNN website – http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/ 07/iran/interview.html. ‘EU to start new dialogue with Iran’, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 25 February 1998. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 2 March 1998. Mohammad Khatami, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 4 March 1998. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 4 March 1998. Throughout the 1980s Italy remained active in pursuing trade relations with Iran, particularly in the oil sector. See for example ‘Cooperation and Trade with Italy’ (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East, 12 March 1985. Doc. number – bbcme00020011205dh3c001vk. See also ‘Italy in pole position to develop trade with Iran’, Financial Times, 9 August 1988. Italy was also one of the first Western states to send a government minister to Iran following the Iran–Iraq war ceasefire; see ‘Italy seeks to step up trade links with Iran’, Reuters, 2 August 1988. Doc. number – lba0000020011203 dk8202dzk. ‘Italy’s Prodi invited by Khatami to visit Iran’, Reuters, 25 June 1998. Doc. number – lba0000020010925du6p021tn. Comment by Italian prime ministerial spokesman – ‘Prodi comments on historic visit to Iran next week’, Xinhua News Agency, 30 June 1998. Doc. number – xnews00020010928du6r0052u. This is evidenced by the emphasis on trade deals between the two countries seen in the latter stages of Khatami’s presidency, as will be shown further on in this section. For example Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi highlighting Italy and Iran as ‘cradles of divine religion’, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 8 April 1998. ‘Text of speech delivered by Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the seminar on ‘Islam and Christianity’, Torino, 1 December 1998’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 10 (3), 1998, 365 – 72. ‘Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye Ira¯n dar a¯sta¯ne-ye heza¯r-e jadid’ [Iran’s foreign policy on the eve of the new millennium], transcript of speech to Italian Society for International Organisations, Rome, 11 A¯zar 1377 [2 December 1998], in Kamal Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯: majmu‘ah-ye sukhanra¯niha¯-ye Kamal Kharrazi [Our Foreign Policy: A Collection of the Speeches of Kamal Kharrazi] (Tehran: Markaz-e asna¯d va ta¯rikhi dipluma¯si [Centre for Documents and Diplomatic History], 2002), p. 216.

168

30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

NOTES

TO PAGES

58 – 61

An English translation of this speech is also available – ‘Iran’s foreign policy on the eve of the new millennium: text of remarks by Dr Kamal Kharrazi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of I.R. Iran. Rome, 2 December 1998’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 10 (4), 1998– 9, 508 – 16. ‘Foreign Minister holds talks with Italian President’ (sourced from Iranian Radio), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 3 December 1998. Doc. number – bbcmep0020010922duc3005a5. Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, p. 218. Ibid., p. 218. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 10 March 1999. ‘Iranian President describes Italy as a bridge between Islam, Christianity’, speech given at banquet held in Khatami’s honour by the Italian president (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Europe – Political, 10 March 1999. Doc. number – bbceup0020010901dv3a00wrx. Ibid. Khatami also addressed a gathering of academics during this visit at the University of Florence where he commented further on the philosophical background of the Dialogue among Civilisations. For a full transcript of this speech see the Iranian.com website – http://www.iranian.com/News/ March99/speech2.html. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 12 March 1999. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 17 March 1999. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 12 March 1999. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 15 November 1999. ‘Foreign Ministers hail Iran – Italy Relations’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Europe, 17 January 2001. Doc. number – bbceup0020010710dx1h00bl9. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 29 November 1999. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 30 November 1999. ‘Iranian President, Italian Prime Minister hold talks in Tehran’ (sourced from Iranian Radio), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 24 February 2001. Doc. number – bbcmep0020010710dx2o009a8. ‘Italy endorses Iran’s nuclear stand – Iran agency’ (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Newsfile, 19 April 2004. Doc. number – bbcmnf0020040419e04j003jt. For an interesting take on the ancient Athens – Persia relationship that looks beyond the commonly held view of mutual hatred between the two sides see Margaret C. Miller, Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century B.C: A Study in Cultural Receptivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 1–88 and 243–58. See ‘Greece has increased its trade ties with Iran’, Textline Multiple Source Collection Database, 28 August 1984. Doc. number – tmsc000020011207 dg8s02dgd. See also ‘Greece and Iran have signed $42m barter deal’, Middle East Economic Digest (14), 10 August 1984.

NOTES

TO PAGES

61 – 66

169

48. ‘Crude oil supply agreement signed with Greece’ (agreement signed on 15 November), BBC Monitoring Service Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East, 27 November 1990. Doc. number – bbcme00020011129dmbr00146. 49. ‘Greece hesitant to recall ambassador to Iran’, Reuters, 11 April 1997. Doc. number – lba0000020011002dt4b0754q. 50. The ‘Athens Declaration’ was sent to the UN Secretary General on 11 January 1999 for consideration at the 54th General Assembly later that year. For full text of Declaration of Athens see United Nations website – http://www.un. org/documents/a54-60.pdf. 51. Athens again played an active role in this grouping in 2002, hosting a gathering of parliamentary delegates from the four countries, at which a communique´ was issued renewing the pledge on dialogue and setting out aims to initiate further cultural and scientific cooperation; see ‘Iranian, Italian, Greek, Egyptian parliamentarians renew pledge on dialogue’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 19 February 2002. Doc. number – bbcmep0020020219dy2j0058x. 52. ‘Mira¯s-e tamadonha¯-ye kohan: a¯sa¯r va paymadha¯-ye a¯n bara¯ye donya¯-ye jadid’ [The Heritage of Ancient Civilisations: Implications for the Modern World], transcript of speech given by Kamal Kharrazi at the quadri-lateral meeting of Iran, Italy, Egypt and Greece at the Centre for International Political Studies, Tehran, 13 Azar 1378 [4 December 1999]), in Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, p. 332. 53. Gholam-Reza Nourmohammadan, Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 22 Aban 1377 (13 November 1998). 54. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 23 February 1999. 55. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 8 March 1999. 56. Stephanopoulos visited Iran for four days on a tour beginning on 13 October 1999. 57. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 12 October 1999. 58. Interestingly Papazoi had lived and worked in Iran as a civil engineer and had expressed her admiration for Iranian culture and civilisation; see Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 1 October 1999. 59. Konstantinis Stephanopoulos, Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beyolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 23 Mehr 1378 (15 October 1999). 60. Ibid. 61. ‘Iranian, Greek presidents call for expansion of ties in first round of talks’ (sourced from Iranian radio), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 13 October 1999. Doc. number – bbcmep0020010901dvad00e17. 62. ‘Khatami says Iran – Greece cooperation benefits all countries’ (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 14 March 2002. Doc. number – bbcmep0020020314dy3e000b5. 63. ‘Iranian envoy in Azerbaijan denies military cooperation with Greece, Armenia’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Central Asia, 15 July 1999. Doc. number – bbcca00020010901dv7f009ls.

170

NOTES

TO PAGES

66 – 69

64. ‘Greece and Armenia want more cooperation with Iran and Georgia’, Agence France-Presse, 18 June 1996. Doc. number – afpr000020011012ds6i02ayt. 65. Ibid. 66. ‘Iran –Armenia – Georgia– Greece meeting on economic cooperation ends’ (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Former USSR, 6 December 1996. Doc. number – bbcsu00020011016dsc6001dp. 67. ‘Regular Ministerial meeting of Armenia, Iran and Greece held’, SNARK News Agency (Armenia), 22 December 1997. Doc. number – snarkn0020011003 dtcm0008l. 68. Kamal Kharrazi, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 24 December 1999. 69. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 14 October 1997. 70. ‘Armenia, Iran, Greece sign transport agreement’ (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Former USSR, 25 May 1998. Doc. number – bbcsu00020010922du5p009i3. 71. ‘Iran, Armenia, Greece sign memorandum on closer cooperation’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East, 8 September 1998. Doc. number – bbcme00020010922du98004ay. 72. ‘Iran to sign defence cooperation agreement with Armenia, Greece’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 29 June 1999. Doc. number – bbcmep0020010901dv6t00ee1. 73. ‘Armenia, Iran and Greece not planning military cooperation – Armenian minister’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Central Asia, 7 September 1999. Doc. number – bbcca00020010901dv97003a1. See also ‘Iranian envoy in Azerbaijan denies military cooperation with Greece, Armenia’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East, 3 September 1999. Doc. number – bbcme00020010901dt7k9006en. 74. Kamal Kharrazi, ‘Ira¯n, yuna¯n va armenista¯n: zamineha¯-i hamka¯ri se janebe’ [Iran, Greece and Armenia: Grounds for tri-lateral cooperation], transcript of speech given by Kamal Kharrazi at the fourth trilateral meeting of foreign ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Greece and the Republic of Armenia, Athens, 18 Esfand 1379 (8 March 2001), in Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, p. 574. 75. Seyyed Assadollah Athari, ‘Iranian-Egyptian Relations’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (2), 2001, 51. 76. Ibid., p. 63. 77. See, for example, Mohammad Khatami, ‘Mosa¯hebe ba¯ sima¯-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi’ [Interview with Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting], 27 and 28 Aban 1376 (18 and 19 November 1997), in Mas‘ud La‘ali (ed.), Kha¯tami az cheh miguyad? [What is Khatami Talking About?] (Tehran: Nashr-e Ekhla¯s [Ekhla¯s Publishers], 1378 [1999 – 2000]), p. 157. 78. Mohammad Khatami, noting that Iran desires good neighbourliness with regional countries, Ettela¯‘a¯t, 23 Shahrivar 1376 (14 September 1997). 79. Moussa commented that Egypt was also ‘looking to improve relations’ following Khatami’s positive statements on Iran–Egypt ties, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 30 May 1997.

NOTES

TO PAGES

70 –74

171

80. Sadeq Kharrazi, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 30 April 1999. 81. Iran held the rotating presidency of the OIC from 1997– 2000 whereupon Qatar assumed the presidency. 82. Mohammad Khatami, Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 21 Azar 1376 (12 December 1997). 83. Ibid. 84. Mohammad Khatami, in conversation with domestic and foreign news correspondents, Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 24 Azar 1376 (15 December 1997). 85. Ibid. 86. Edward Wastnidge, ‘De´tente and Dialogue: Iran and the Organisation of Islamic Conference’, Politics, Religion and Ideology, 12 (4), 2011, 413– 31 (p. 424) 87. ‘Hamka¯ri dar jeha¯n-e isla¯mi’ [Cooperation in the Islamic World], transcript of speech given by Kamal Kharrazi at the meeting of the confidence building committee of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, Tehran, 29 Ordibehesht 1377 (19 May 1998) in Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, p. 148. 88. Ibid., pp. 148– 9. 89. ‘Ira¯n va jeha¯n-e arab, gooftegoo-ye tamadonha¯’ [Iran and the Arab World, Dialogue among Civilisations], transcript of speech given by Kharrazi to Irano-Arab Conference, Tehran, 23 Aban 1378 (14 November 1999), in Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-e ma¯, p. 315. 90. Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, p. 315. 91. Ibid., p. 316. 92. ‘Foreign Minister Kharrazi comments on ties and dialogue with Saudi, Egypt, Europe, USA’ (sourced from interview with Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran TV Network 2, 18 December 1997), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East, 22 December 1997. Doc. number – bbcme000 20010929dtcm001xg. 93. Hosni Mubarak, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 9 February 1998. 94. Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 26 Khorda¯d 1377 (16 June 1998). 95. Alongside Egypt and Iran, Kuwait, Sudan, Pakistan, Mali and Palestine were the initial signatories to this grouping, see Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 25 Azar 1377 (16 December 1998). 96. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 31 January 2000. As chair of the OIC during this period Iran was also prominent in expressing the organisation’s concern over the Chechen issue. It is interesting to see how Iran maintained its moral position in its expression of concern but also exercised restraint because of the need to maintain good relations with Russia. Indeed the tone of Iran’s comments on the issue were more noticeably muted than its criticisms of other crises involving Muslim populations. See for example, ‘Muslim world concerned about loss of life in Chechnya’, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 28 January 2000.

172

NOTES TO PAGES 74 –75

97. The G15 grouping, established following the Belgrade Non-Aligned Movement summit in 1989, was established as a working group of developing nations with the aim of being a ‘logical dialogue partner’ of the G8. The grouping now has 19 members but retains the same name and counts Egypt among its founder members. For further information see the G15 website – www.g15.org. Iran was admitted to grouping at the 10 G15 Summit in Cairo on 19 June 2000. See Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 2 Tir 1379 (22 June 2000). 98. Athari, ‘Iranian– Egyptian Relations’, p. 69. 99. ‘Egyptian, Iranian presidents hold friendly phone talks’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Newsfile, 21 June 2000. Doc. number – bbcmnf0020010804dw6l00dq6. 100. Ettela¯‘a¯t, 3 Tir 1379 (23 June 2000). 101. This conference was attended by head of the Egyptian al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, Abd al-Menem; see ‘Iran– Egypt relations benefit entire region’, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 12 July 2000. 102. Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 15 January 2001. 103. During Kharrazi’s visit to Egypt in September 2001, Kharrazi talked of resuming bilateral ties at the ambassadorial level, but his Egyptian counterpart Ahmad Mahir was less positive, acknowledging that there was indeed a need to restore ties to their full level but preferring not to set a date for such talks. See ‘Egypt, Iran take “big steps” towards rapprochement, Kharrazi says’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 30 September 2001. Doc. number – bbcmep0020011001dx9u0012y. 104. ‘Egypt to attend meeting in Tehran but says any normalisation premature’, Agence France-Presse, 6 May 2003. Doc. number – afpr000020030506dz56003ak. 105. ‘Mubarak rules out normal ties until Iran gets rid of “terrorists”’, Agence FrancePresse, 28 January 2003. Doc. number – afpr000020030128dz1s007kf. 106. ‘Khatami– Mubarak handshake highlights deepening Arab – Iranian links’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly. Reports – Politics, 5 (2), 2003, 217– 18. 107. ‘Iranian and Egyptian presidents hold landmark meeting, call for better ties’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Newsfile, 10 December 2003. Doc. number – bbcmnf0020031210dzca004mp. 108. The D8 grouping comprises 8 Islamic industrialising nations including Egypt and Iran, and again evidences the use of multilateral groupings to provide a platform for enhancing bilateral ties. For report of this meeting see ‘Iranian, Egyptian Foreign Ministers agree to keep relations on track’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Reports – Politics, 5 (3) 2004, 228– 31. 109. ‘Iran street name change “very positive” – Egypt’s foreign minister’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Newsfile, 6 January 2004. Doc. number – bbcmnf0020040106e016003bh.

NOTES

TO PAGES

76 –78

173

110. Iran– India relations were bolstered during the early Safavid period by the alliance of Shah Isma‘il I and Babur, the founders of the Safavid and Mughal Empires respectively, and the friendship of their successors Shah Tahmsap I and Humayun. For an in-depth treatment of Indo-Persian relations during the Mughal Empire see Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations (Tehran: Iranian Culture Foundation, 1970). 111. A.H.H. Abidi, ‘Relations Between India and Iran, 1947 –1979’, The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 8 (4), 1996, 891– 8. 112. Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam (New Haven and London, Yale University Press: 1985), pp. 307– 9. 113. For further discussion of the Iranian/Shi‘i influence in India see Juan Cole, ‘Iranian Culture and South Asia: 1500 – 1900’, in Nikki Keddie and Rudi Mathee (eds), Iran and the Surrounding World (Seattle and London: Washington University Press, 2002), pp. 15 – 34. 114. Momen estimates that the population of Shi‘is in India could be anywhere between 8 and 28 million. Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, p. 277. 115. See Tracey Miller (ed.), Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population (Washington, DC: Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Pew Research Centre, 2009). 116. Manmohan Singh, ‘Interview: Prime Minister Singh’, The Washington Post, 20 July 2005. 117. Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, p. 277. 118. David Pinault, ‘Shi‘ism in South Asia’, The Muslim World, 87 (3– 4), 1997, 235– 57 (pp. 235– 6). 119. Juan Cole, Roots of North Indian Shi‘ism in Iran and Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722– 1859 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 117. 120. Mohammad Khatami, Ettela¯‘a¯t, 8 Bahman 1381 (28 January 2003). 121. Vali Nasr, ‘The Iranian Revolution and Changes in Islamism in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan’, in Keddie and Mathee (eds), Iran and the Surrounding World, pp. 327– 54 (p. 334). 122. John Calabrase, Revolutionary Horizons: Regional Foreign Policy in Post-Khomeini Iran (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1994), p. 112. 123. For example, article 152 of the Iranian Constitution drafted after the Islamic Revolution states that the Islamic Republic ‘supports the rightful struggle of the oppressed people against their oppressors anywhere in the world.’ Taken from Mehdi Moslem, ‘Appendix – Articles from the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, in Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002), p. 282. 124. Harsh V. Pant, ‘India and Iran: An Axis in the Making?’, Asian Survey 44 (3), 2004, 369– 83 (p. 371). 125. See for example then Foreign Minister Ali Akbar’s speech to the eighth NAM Foreign Ministerial meeting in Luanda, Angola, in 1985: ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar hashtomin konfara¯ns-e vozara¯-ye kha¯rejah-ye keshvarha¯-ye nehzat-e a¯dam

174

126. 127.

128.

129.

130.

131.

132.

133.

NOTES

TO PAGES

78 – 80

ta‘ahhod, Luanda, Shahrivar, 1364 [Speech at the eighth Conference of NonAligned Movement Foreign Ministers, Luanda, August/September 1985], in Ali Akbar Velayati, Didga¯hha¯-ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n: majmuʻeh-ye sukhanra¯niha¯-ye vazir-e omur-e kha¯rijah-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n dar maja¯meʻeye beynolmella¯li [Worldviews of the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Collection of the Islamic Republic of Iran Foreign Minister’s Speeches at International Assemblies] (Tehran: Veza¯rat-e omur-e kha¯rejah, 1373 [Tehran: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995]), pp. 157– 8. ‘Iran, India call for Non-Aligned bid to halt war’, Reuters, 26 January 1991. Doc. number – lba0000020011124dn1q00j6v. See the aforementioned speech by Velayati and subsequent speeches to the NAM, for example ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar ejla¯s-e fowqola¯deh-ye vozara¯-ye kha¯rejahye daftar-e hama¯hangi-ye keshvarha¯-ye gheyr-e mota‘ahhed dar khosus-e masa¯’el-e na¯mibia¯, dehli-ye now, Farvardin, 1364 [Speech at the extraordinary meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement Foreign Ministers’ Coordination Bureau concerning the affairs of Namibia, New Delhi, March/April, 1985], in Velayati, Didga¯hha¯-ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n, pp. 121– 32. Velayati also praised the work of the recently assassinated Indira Gandhi in relation to the NAM in this speech, see p. 123. Velayati did, however, comment on Kashmir following a visit to Pakistan in 1991, stating that Iran ‘could not remain indifferent to the destiny of Muslim people’; see ‘Iran asks India to let Kashmiris decide their future’, Reuters, 30 July 1991. Doc. number – lba0000020011124dn7u04s7e. The agreement, originally signed in February 1997 by Velayati and his Indian and Turkmen counterparts, was eventually finalised under Khatami’s government in February 1999. See ‘India ready to expand ties with Iran, says Indian foreign secretary’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Economic (sourced from IRNA), 23 February 1999. Doc. number – bbcmee0020010901dv2n00132. ‘Iran, India study possibility of laying gas pipeline’ (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East, 2 March 1999. Doc. number – bbcme00020010901dv32008i8. Iran expressed its concern at the Indian nuclear tests carried out in May 1998; see ‘Iran Asks for India’s Explanation Over Nuke Tests’, Xinhua News Agency, 19 May 1998. Doc. number – xnews00020010928du5j00do6. Interestingly, Kharrazi was quick to praise Pakistan’s own subsequent tests later in the same month, stating that ‘Overall, Muslims of the world are happy that Pakistan has this capability’; see ‘Iran praises Pakistani tests, India increases defence spending’, Chicago Tribune, 1 June 1998. ‘India and Iran share “strikingly similar” views on Afghanistan’ (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Asia-Pacific, 18 October 1997. Doc. number – bbcfe00020010929dtai0055u. Jaswant Singh, Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 2 Khorda¯d 1379 (22 May 2000).

NOTES

TO PAGES

80 –83

175

134. ‘Khatami discusses ties, regional issues with Indian foreign minister’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 22 May 2000. Doc. number – bbcmep0020010804dw5m00i71. 135. See UN Press release GA/9748 ‘Roundtable launching “Year of Dialogue among Civilisations” concludes at Headquarters’, 5 September 2000. Available online at – http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000905.ga9748.doc.html. 136. ‘Indian parliamentary official supports dialogue of civilizations’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 18 November 2000. Doc. number – bbcmep0020010804dwbi00bmw. 137. Ali Mohammad Najafi, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 20 November 2000. 138. ‘New Indian ambassador calls for dialogue of civilizations’ (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East – Political, 18 November 2000. Doc. number – bbcmep0020010804dwbi00bmm. 139. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Address to Majles 10 April 2001, Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 23 Favardin 1380 (11 April 2001). 140. C. Raja Mohan, ‘Our Secular Bond Will Not Weaken: Vajpayee’, The Hindu, 12 April 2001. Available online at – http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/ 2001/04/12/stories/01120001.htm. 141. Ibid. 142. Kamal Kharrazi, Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 7 Bahman 1381 (27 January 2003). 143. Ibid. 144. Mohammad Khatami, Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 8 Bahman 1381 (28 January 2003). 145. Mohammad Khatami, Ettela¯‘a¯t International, 30 January 2000. 146. Stanley A. Weiss, ‘Realignment: India þ Iran ¼ a foundation for stability’, International Herald Tribune, 6 February 2003. Available online at – http:// www.iht.com/articles/2003/02/06/edstan_ed3_.php. 147. See for example Mushirul Hasan’s article entitled ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’, The Hindu, 29 January 2003. Available online at – http:// www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/01/29/stories/2003012900211000.htm. 148. For a more detailed account of activities of UNESCO in relation to Dialogue among Civilisations see Chapter 4. The ‘New Delhi Declaration’ presented at the culmination of this meeting is available online at – http://www.unesco. org/dialogue/delhi/delhi_declaration.html. 149. ‘Past forward – India ready to host meet of civilisations’, India Express, 17 June 2003. Available online at – http://www.newindpress.com/ayodhya/index.asp? Topic¼ 155&Title ¼ In þ Court&ID ¼ IEH20030615125235&nDatn ¼ 6/ 16/2003. Vajpayee’s opening address to the conference is available online at – http://www.unesco.org/dialogue/delhi/vajpayee.html. 150. India Express, 17 June 2003. 151. ‘Dialogue among civilisations for better world’, The Times of India, 2 July 2003. Available online at – http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articles how/56204.cms.

176

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TO PAGES

85 –88

152. Ray Takeyh, ‘Pragmatic Theocracy – A Contradiction in Terms?’, The National Interest (Spring, 2000), 94 – 100 (p. 96). 153. Rafsanjani has been quite open in displaying the need for pragmatism in Iran’s international relations, for example noting that ‘[. . .] we need the West for technology, knowledge and even their markets and international collaborations.’ see ‘Interview: Hashemi – Rafsanjani’s views on Iran’s Foreign Policy’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (2), 2001, 1 – 22 (p. 4). 154. George Papandreou, The Guardian, 6 November 2001. 155. Kamal Kharrazi, Iran Daily, 23 August 1997. 156. Ibid. 157. Suzanne Maloney, ‘Identity and Change in Iran’s Foreign Policy’, in Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, ed. by Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 88 – 116 (p. 114). 158. Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Detente in Khatami’s Foreign Policy and its Impact on the Improvement of Iran– Saudi relations’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly 2 (2), 2000, 155– 78 (p. 164). 159. Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Khatamism: A New Political Symbolism in International Relations’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (2), 2001, 23 –46 (p. 24). 160. For examples in English language works see ‘Roundtable: Iran’s Foreign Policy during the Khatami Presidency’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 2 (1), 2000, 1 – 38; ‘Roundtable: Effects of Globalisation on the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 2 (2), 2000, 1 – 31, particularly comments by Elahe Koulaei, p. 23 and Assadollah Atahari, p. 27; Mohammad Sariolghalam, ‘Theoretical Renewal in Iranian Foreign Policy’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (3), 2002, 67 – 84 (pp. 68, 71 and 75); Abbas Maleki, ‘Iran’s North-eastern Borders’, in The Boundaries of Modern Iran, ed. by Keith Machlachlan (London: UCL Press, 1994), pp. 11 – 20; Pirouz MojtahedZadeh, ‘Territorial Disputes and Security of West Asia. Is the New Heartland Stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea?’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 13 (2 –3), 2001, 254– 77. For examples in Persian see Seyyed ‘Ata¯ Taqavi-A¯sl, Zheopolitk-e jadid-e ira¯n: az qaza¯qesta¯n ta¯ ta¯jikesta¯n [New Geopolitics of Iran: From Kazakhstan to Tajikistan] (Tehran: Daftar-e mota¯le‘a¯t-e siya¯si va beynolmellali [Institute for Political and International Studies], 1379 [2000 – 1]); Javad Eta¯‘at, Zheopolitk va siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye Ira¯n [Geopolitics and Iran’s Foreign Policy] (Tehran: Nashr-e safir [Safir Publishers], 1376 [1997 – 8]); and Ahmad Naghibzadeh, Tafsir-e farhang-e melli bar siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye jomhouri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n [The Effect of National Culture on the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran] (Tehran: Daftar-e mota¯le‘a¯t-e siya¯si va beynolmellali [Institute for Political and International Studies], 1381 [2002 – 3]). 161. Khatami, ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar jam‘e-ye mo‘atamadin, da¯neshga¯hia¯n va roha¯nioun-e a¯sta¯n-e sista¯n va baluchista¯n’, in La‘ali (ed.), Kha¯tami az cheh miguyad?, p. 114.

NOTES

TO PAGES

88 – 92

177

162. Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal of International Relations, 3 (3), 1997, 319–63, p. 325. 163. Renald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 33– 75 (p. 60). 164. Scott Burchill, ‘Realism and Neo-realism’, in Scott Burchill (ed.), Theories of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 70 – 102 (p. 86). 165. Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security’, p. 60. 166. See Mark Downes and Rory Keane, ‘Dialogue among Civilizations: The Road to Deconstructing Unipolarity’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 11 (2), 2000, 221 – 36. 167. Farid Mirbagheri, ‘Narrowing the Gap or Camouflaging the Divide: An Analysis of Mohammad Khatami’s “Dialogue of Civilisations”’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 34 (3), 2007, 305– 16. 168. Bijan Assadi, ‘Iran and the Persian Gulf Security’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (1), 2001, 111– 30 (p. 118). 169. See Velayati’s comments, for example ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar hashtomin konfara¯ns-e vozara¯-ye kha¯rejah-ye keshvarha¯-ye nehzat-e adam-e ta‘ahhod’, Luanda, Shahrivar, 1364 [Speech at the eighth Conference of Non-Aligned Movement Foreign Ministers, Luanda, August/September 1985], in Velayati, Didga¯hha¯ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n, pp. 157– 8 and Pant, India and Iran: An Axis in the Making?, p. 371. 170. Jahangir Amuzegar, ‘Khatami’s First-term Presidency; an Outsider’s assessment’, SAIS Review, 22 (1), 2002, 1 – 21 (p. 7). 171. Comments of an unnamed Greek diplomat in ‘Greece Brings Iran in From the Cold’, The Guardian, 6 November 2001. 172. For further detail see V. Matthias Strewe, The Policy of “Critical Dialogue”: An Analysis of European Human Rights Policy towards Iran from 1992 to 1997, Durham Middle East Papers (Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1998). The policy ‘critical dialogue’ was suspended following the Mykonos verdict in April, 1997. 173. Ibid., p. 69. See also the EU external relations website http://ec.europa.eu/ external_relations/iran/intro/. 174. Barzegar, ‘Khatamism’, p. 41. 175. Ahmad Nagibzadeh, ‘Rectification of Iran’s Foreign Policy Shortcomings During the Khatami Presidency’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 3 (3), 2002, 85 – 100 (p. 99). 176. See for example Mirbagheri, ‘Narrowing the Gap or Camouflaging the Divide’. 177. Assadi, ‘Iran and the Persian Gulf Security’, p. 118. 178. Maloney, ‘Identity and Change in Iran’s Foreign Policy’, p. 115.

178

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92 –98

179. See modernist literature on national identity and nationalism such as – Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Elie Kedourie Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960), and for Iran see Mostafa Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation (New York: Paragon House, 1993). 180. Richard A. Falk, ‘Culture, Modernism and Post-modernism: A Challenge to International Relations’, in Culture and International Relations, ed. by Jongsuk Chay (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 267– 79 (p. 268). 181. Homeira Moshirzadeh, ‘Dialogue of Civilisations and International Theory’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 16 (1), 2004, 1 – 44 (p. 1). 182. For a more detailed treatment of the relation between Khatami’s Dialogue among Civilisations and the ideas of Habermas see Homeira Moshirzadeh, ‘Dialogue of Civilisations and International Theory’, ibid. 183. For further detail see Ju¨rgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). 184. Behzad Shahandeh, ‘Dialogue among Civilisations: Vital for Humanity on the Threshold of the Third Millenium’, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, 1 (3), 2000, 99 – 106 (p. 104). 185. Joseph S. Nye Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 186. Ibid., p. 7. 187. Ibid., p. 5. 188. Sariolghalam, ‘Theoretical Renewal in Iranian Foreign Policy’, p. 74.

Chapter 4 The Application of Dialogue among Civilisations at the Multilateral Level – International Organisations 1. Marc Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres’, Millennium Journal of International Studies, 29 (2), 2000, 307– 30 (p. 311). 2. Kamal Kharrazi, ‘Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-e Ira¯n dar a¯sta¯ne-ye heza¯r-e jadid’ [Iran’s foreign policy on the eve of the new millennium]. Transcript of speech to Italian Society for International Organisations, Rome, 11 A¯zar 1377 (2 December 1998), in Kamal Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯: majmu‘ah-ye sukhanra¯niha¯-ye Kamal Kharrazi [Our Foreign Policy: A Collection of the Speeches of Kamal Kharrazi] (Tehran: Markaz-e asna¯d va ta¯rikhi dipluma¯si [Centre for Documents and Diplomatic History], 2002), pp. 211–18 (p. 212). An English translation of this speech is also available – ‘Iran’s foreign policy on the eve of the new millennium: text of remarks by Dr Kamal Kharrazi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of I.R. Iran. Rome, 2 December 1998’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 10 (4), 1998–9, 508–16. 3. Korush Ahmadi, ‘Iran and the United Nations during Khatami’s presidency’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 28 (1), 2005, 21 – 52 (p. 21).

NOTES

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179

4. A full, English translation of Khatami’s speech to the eighth Plenary Session of the 53rd UN General Assembly, 21 September 1998, can be found online at the UN Documentation Centre – www.un.org/documents/a53pv8.pdf. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. For a more detailed treatment of the relation between Khatami’s Dialogue among Civilisations and the ideas of Habermas, see Homeira Moshirzadeh, ‘Dialogue of Civilisations and International Theory’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 16 (1), 2004, 1 – 44. 9. Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations’, p. 311. 10. Ali Akbar Velayati, ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar chehel o yekomin ejla¯s-e majam‘eye‘omumi-ye sa¯zma¯n-e mela¯l-e mottahed’ [Speech to the 41st meeting of the United Nations General Assembly], 2 October 1986, in Ali Akbar Velayati, Didga¯hha¯-ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n: majmu‘eh-ye sukhanra¯niha¯-ye vazir-e omur-e kha¯rijah-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n dar maja¯me‘e-ye beynolmella¯li [Worldviews of the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Collection of the Islamic Republic of Iran Foreign Minister’s Speeches at International Assemblies] (Tehran: Veza¯rat-e omur-e kha¯rejah, 1373 [Tehran: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995]), p. 204. 11. Ibid., pp. 211 – 22. 12. Ali Akbar Velayati, ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar chehel o sheshomin ejla¯s-e majam‘eye‘omumi-ye sa¯zma¯n-e mela¯l-e mottahed’ [Speech to the 46th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly], 26 September 1991, in Velayati, Didga¯hha¯-ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n, p. 422. 13. See Ali Akbar Velayati, ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar chehel o haftomin ejla¯s-e majam‘eye‘omumi-ye sa¯zma¯n-e mela¯l-e mottahed’ (Speech to the 47th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly), 25 September 1992, and ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar chehel o hashtomin ejla¯s-e majam‘e-ye‘omumi-ye sa¯zma¯n-e mela¯l-e mottahed’ [Speech to the 48th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly], 4 October 1993, in Velayati, Didga¯hha¯-ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n, 447 – 60 and 461 – 74. 14. Resolution number A/RES/53/22. Agenda item no. 168. Full text of this resolution can be viewed at the UN Documentations Centre accessed via – http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5414173.html. 15. UN Press release GA/9497, 4 November 1998, available online at – http:// www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981104.ga9497.html. 16. Comments of the UN Amassadors of Egypt (Majed Abdelaziz), Syria (Fayssal Mekdad), and OIC observer (Mokhtar Lamani) in relation to the UN General Assembly’s proclamation of 2001 as Year of Dialogue among Civilisations, UN Press release GA/9497, 4 November 1998, ibid. 17. Comments of the Solomon Islands’ Ambassador to the UN, Harold Fruchtbaum, in relation to the UN General Assembly’s proclamation of 2001 as Year of Dialogue among Civilisations, UN Press release GA/9497, 4 November 1998, ibid.

180

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102 –106

18. Comments of Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Mohammad-Javad Zarif in relation to the UN General Assembly’s proclamation of 2001 as Year of Dialogue among Civilisations, UN Press release GA/9497, 4 November 1998, ibid. 19. Kamal Kharrazi, ‘Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-e Ira¯n dar a¯sta¯ne-ye heza¯r-e jadid’ [Iran’s foreign policy on the eve of the new millennium], in Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, p. 215. 20. A collection is available online at – http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID¼ 37085&URL_DO ¼ DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION ¼ 201.html. 21. See text of address delivered to UNESCO, Paris, 29 October 1999 entitled ‘Dialogue and the New Millennium’ in Mohammad Khatami, Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society (Canberra: Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies – Australian National University, 2000), pp. 26– 40. 22. Ibid., p. 32. 23. Accompanying booklet available online at – http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev. php-URL_ID¼ 37085&URL_DO ¼ DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION ¼ 201. html. 24. ‘Albright goes to hear Iranian leader on Dialogue’, Reuters, 5 September 2000. Doc. number – lba0000020010821dw95092um. 25. Mohammad Khatami, Speech to UNESCO Conference on Dialogue among Civilisations. New York, 5 September 2000. Full transcript (in Persian) available in Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beinomella¯li [Ettela‘at International], 17 Shahrivar 1379 (7 September 2000). 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. See Madeleine Albright’s speech to the Asia Society, ‘Iranian–American Relations’, Washington DC, 17 March 2000. Available online at – http://www. asiasociety.org/speeches/albright4.html. 29. Kamal Kharrazi, ‘Hamka¯ri-ye chand ja¯nebeh dar a¯sia¯’ [Multi-lateral Cooperation in Asia], speech to the Asia Society, New York, 6 Mehr 1379 (27 September 2000), in Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, pp. 495 – 504 (p. 503). 30. ‘US wrestling team visits Iran’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/s/w_asia/ 57339.stm. After this ground-breaking visit, the first by an American sports team since the revolution, exchange programmes in education, health, astronomy, philosophy/theology, the environment, and film followed between 1998 and 2004 – Ramin Asgard, ‘US–Iran Cultural Diplomacy: A Historical Perspective’, paper given at the seventh Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Iranian Studies, Toronto, 1 August 2008. 31. ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani, speech to Vilnius Conference on Dialogue among Civilisations. Vilnius, Lithuania, in Dialogue among Civilisations: The International Conference in Vilnius, 23–26 April 2001 (Paris: UNESCO, 2002), p. 73. 32. See Vilnius Declaration, available on the UNESCO website – http://www. unesco.lt/r/new-page/civilizacijudialogas/vilniusdeclaration/.

NOTES TO PAGES 107 –111

181

33. Comment by Khatami to reporters before leaving Tehran for UN General Assembly, New York, 9 November 2001 – http://former.president.ir/khatami/ eng/cronicnews/1380/8008/800818/800818.htm#b2. 34. The message of Mohammad Khatami to the 31st session of the General Conference of UNESCO, Paris, November 2001 – http://unesdoc.unesco. org/images/0012/001244/124449e.pdf. 35. Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. 36. Kayha¯n, 9 Esfand 1380 (28 February 2002). 37. Iran Daily, 16 Dey 1380 (6 January 2002). 38. Consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 39. Bjorn Hettne has discussed this further in several works, most notably ‘Globalisation and the New Regionalism’ (New York: St Martins Press, 1999). This ‘new regionalism’ seeks to emphasise cultural, social and political integration alongside economic integration. 40. Richard Pomfret, Central Asia Turns South? Trade Relations in Transition (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chameleon Press, 1999), p. 4. 41. ECO member states that signed up to the 1995 charter establishing the ECO Cultural Institute are – Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan. Currently Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are not signatories and therefore do not participate in the work of the ECO Cultural Institute. 42. ECO Cultural Institute, ‘Introduction and History’, available online at – http://www.ecieco.org/portal.aspx?tabid¼420. 43. ‘Preamble’, Charter of ECO Cultural Institute, available online at – http://www. ecieco.org/portal.aspx?tabid¼421. 44. Ahmed Montazeran and Kashif Mumtaz, ‘Iran – Pakistan: Cooperation for Regional Stability and Peace’, Strategic Studies, 24 (1), 2004, 1 – 11. 45. Behc et Kemal Yes¸lbursa, ‘The Formation of RCD: Regional Cooperation for Development’, Middle Eastern Studies, 45 (4), 2009, 637 – 60 (p. 650). 46. See the website of the Rec.Sport. Soccer Statistics Foundation – http://www. rsssf.com/tablesr/rcd-pact (for RCD Cup information) and http://www.rsssf. com/tablese/eco93.html (for ECO Cup information). 47. ‘Aims and functions [of the ECO Cultural Institute]’, ECO Cultural Institute Guide Book (Tehran: Publishing House of the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000), pp. 18–21. 48. Ibid., p. 14. 49. Ibid. 50. For example the women’s workshop on the theme of ‘dialogue among civilisations in embroidery and weaving’ in June 2002. See ECO Cultural Institute Annual Report for the 12th Council of Ministers, 2002 – http:// www.ecieco.org/portal.aspx?tabid¼462. 51. Iran News, 27 and 28 November 2001.

182

NOTES

TO PAGES

111 –115

52. ECO Bulletin, November 2001. 53. See Jan Rypka, History of Iranian Literature (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1968). 54. ‘ECI Commemorates Persian Epic Poet’, 27 May 2009, taken from ECO Cultural Institute’s website – http://www.ecieco.org/rendermodule.aspx? SelectedSingleViewItemID¼6357&ModuleID¼ 728&rendertype¼ print. 55. ‘ECI participates in 27th Fajr Int. Film Fest’, 17 February 2009, taken from ECO Cultural Institute’s website – http://www.ecieco.org/rendermodule.aspx? SelectedSingleViewItemID¼6231&ModuleID¼728&rendertype¼print. 56. See for example ECO Heritage: The Quarterly Cultural Magazine of the ECO Cultural Institute (2007– 8). This publication was a replacement for the previous ECO Cultural Institute Cultural Quarterly publication. There is a much broader spread in this publication, with less than a quarter of the articles relating specifically to Iran. For further information, and evidence of this broadening spread, see the ECO Cultural Institute’s website – http://en.eci eco.org/news/news/. 57. Mohammad Khatami, ‘Speech to the fifth ECO Summit, Almaty, Kazakhstan. 11 May 1998’, taken from ECO website – http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ (exact URL unobtainable due to website layout, see under headings ‘Brief Introduction’, ‘Brief History’, ‘ECO Summits since 1992’). 58. Ibid. 59. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, ‘Speech to the third ECO summit, Islamabad, 14 May 1995’, taken from ECO website – http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ (exact URL unobtainable due to website layout – see under headings ‘Brief Introduction’, ‘Brief History’, ‘ECO Summits since 1992’). 60. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, ‘Speech to the fourth ECO summit, Ashgabat, 14 May 1996’, taken from ECO website – http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ (exact URL unobtainable due to website layout – see under headings ‘Brief Introduction’, ‘Brief History’, ‘ECO Summits since 1992’). 61. Karimov warned that ‘If there are attempts to use this forum for political means . . . we will terminate our membership’; see ‘Walkout Threat Rocks Iran-based Economic Group’, Reuters, 14 May 1996. Doc. number – lba0000020011018ds5e07xth. 62. Mohammad Khatami, ‘Speech to the sixth ECO Summit, Tehran, 10 June 2000’, taken from ECO website – http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ (exact URL unobtainable due to website layout – see under headings ‘Brief Introduction’, ‘Brief History’, ‘ECO Summits since 1992’). 63. Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynomella¯li [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 24 Khorda¯d 1379 (12 June 2000). 64. For example the Tejen – Sarakhs – Mashad rail link, inaugurated between Iran and Turkmenistan in 1996. This linked Central Asia to the Iranian rail network, and gave Central Asia access to the Persian Gulf. It was also of major significance to Iran in gaining further access to Central Asia. The Guardian, 13 May 1996. Although efforts have been made to improve the transport

NOTES

65.

66.

67. 68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

TO PAGES

115 –117

183

network and reduce tariff barriers to stimulate trade, problems still remain, such as Uzbekistan’s refusal to sign the 1995 Transit Transport Framework Agreement. Mora¯d ‘Ana¯di-A¯lamouti, Ira¯n va sa¯zma¯n-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi [Iran and the Organisation of Islamic Conference] (Tehran: Markaz-e cha¯p va entesha¯ra¯t-e veza¯rat-e omur-e kha¯rejeh [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Print and Publishing], 1381 [2002]), pp. 122– 3. This is a point that has raised hackles in Tehran. For example, see state-run Press TV’s annoyance with the BBC’s reference to ‘Tajik poet Rudaki’ in ‘BBC Distorts Iran’s History’, 16 November 2007, available online at – http://www. presstv.ir/Detail.aspx?id¼31295§ionid ¼ 351020105. Edward Wastnidge, ‘Pragmatic Politics: Iran-Central Asia and Cultural Foreign Policy’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 15 (4), 2014, 119 – 30 (p. 128). Sergey Medrea, ‘Persian-Speaking Union Created by Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan’, Central Asia-Caucusus Institute Analyst, available online at – http:// www.cacianalyst.org/?q¼node/4832. For further detail see Wastnidge, ‘Pragmatic Politics’ (pp. 125–8), and also Brenton Clark, ‘Iranian Foreign Policy Toward Tajikistan and Afghanistan during the Ahmadinejad Presidency: The Rising Salience of Persian National Identity’, Journal of Central Asian & Caucasian Studies, 7 (13), 2012, pp. 73– 105. Some parts of this section and the subsequent analysis have previously been published in the following article by the book’s author – Edward Wastnidge, ‘De´tente and Dialogue: Iran and the Organisation of Islamic Conference’, Politics, Religion and Ideology, 12 (4), 2011, 413– 31. For example, Ramin Asgard, ‘US–Iran Cultural Diplomacy: A Historical Perspective’, Al Nakhlah: The Fletcher School Online Journal for Issues Related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, Spring, 2010, p. 7. Available online at – http://fletcher.archive.tusm-oit.org/al_nakhlah/archives/Spring2010/Asgard, %20US-Iran%20Cultural%20Diplomacy.pdf. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds), The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States (London: Lynne Reiner, 2002), pp. 283–309 (p. 306); Ruhollah K. Ramazani, ‘The Emerging Arab–Iranian Rapprochement: Towards an Integrated US policy in the Middle East?’, Middle East Policy, 6 (1), 1999, 1–12. Seyyed Hadi Borha¯ni, ‘Sa¯zma¯n-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi, ira¯n va ejla¯s-e tehra¯n’ [The Organisation of Islamic Conference, Iran and the Tehran Summit], Ettela¯‘a¯t Siya¯si-Eqtesa¯di [Political and Economic Ettela‘at], 121 –2, 1997, 122 – 33 (p. 132). Ramazani, ‘The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement’, pp. 1 –2. Ramazani identifies four major factors contributing to this: 1) Khomeini’s belief that security in the Persian Gulf could only be obtained by regional states cutting their ties with the US; 2) the attempt to export the revolution to neighbouring states, and involvement in Shi‘i uprisings in the region; 3) Arab support for

184

75.

76. 77.

78. 79.

80.

81. 82. 83. 84.

85. 86.

NOTES TO PAGES 117 –119 Iraq during the Iran– Iraq conflict; 4) Superpower support for Iraq during the war. Ali Akbar Velayati, ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar chaha¯rdahomin ejla¯s-e vozara¯‘-ye kha¯rejeh-ye keshvarha¯-ye ‘ozv-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi’ [Speech at the 14th meeting of Foreign Ministers of Islamic Conference member countries], Dhaka, 1983, in Velayati, Didga¯hha¯-ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n, p. 60. Ibid., p. 62. Ali Akbar Velayati, ‘Sokhanra¯ni dar pa¯nzdahomin ejla¯s-e vozara¯‘-ye kha¯rejeh-ye keshvarha¯-ye ‘ozv-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi’ [Speech at the 15th meeting of Foreign Ministers of Islamic Conference member countries], Sana‘a, 1984, in Velayati, Didga¯hha¯-ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuri-ye esla¯mi-ye ira¯n, pp. 108 – 9. In this speech Velayati specifically refers to OIC resolutions 18/10-P and 3/11-P, the former dealing with Egypt’s suspension from the OIC and the latter which reaffirms that all member states should sever relations with her. Egypt was re-admitted to the OIC in 1984. Syria and Libya also raised objections to Egypt’s re-admittance to the organisation at the Sanaʻa meeting. Ibid., p. 109. Borha¯ni, ‘Sa¯zma¯n-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi’, p. 129– 30. Borha¯ni discusses further the impact of the revolution on Iran’s relations with what he terms as the ‘traditional conservative powers’ of the region, namely Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, and how this shaped ties in the post-revolutionary period. During the 1987 Hajj, following protests by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca against the ‘enemies of Islam’, clashes broke out between the protesters and Saudi security forces, resulting in a stampede and the deaths of some 275 Iranian pilgrims. Borha¯ni, ‘Sa¯zma¯n-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi’, pp. 131–2. Naveed S. Sheikh, The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States (London: Routledge-Curzon, 2003), p. 73. Ramazani, ‘The Emerging Arab – Iranian Rapprochement’, p. 2. Statement by Mohammad Khatami to the eighth session of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, Tehran, 9 December 1997, in ‘Ali AbolhoseiniSha¯hreza¯, Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi [Document Collection of the Eighth Meeting of the Heads of Islamic Countries] (Tehran: Markaz-e cha¯p va entesha¯ra¯t-e veza¯rat-e omur-e kha¯rejeh [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Print and Publishing], 1378 [1999/2000]), pp. 53 –65 (p. 55). An English translation of this speech is available, entitled ‘The Islamic World and Modern Challenges’, statement by Mohammad Khatami to the eighth session of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, Tehran, 9 December 1997, in Khatami, Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society, pp. 14 – 25. Abolhosseini-Shahreza¯, Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi, p. 56. Ibid., p. 57.

NOTES

TO PAGES

120 –122

185

87. Ibid., p. 61. Emphasis added. See also Khatami, Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society, p. 21. 88. Mohammad Khatami, ‘Speech to the closing session of the eighth OIC Summit’, Tehran, 11 December 1997, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East, 12 December 1997. Doc. number – bbcme00020010929dtcd001k1. 89. Ramazani,‘The emerging Arab – Iranian rapprochement’, pp. 6 – 7; Sheikh, The New Politics of Islam, pp. 71– 2; Anthony Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces in Transition (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p. 5; Douglas Jehl, ‘US Presence in Gulf is Denounced in Iran’, New York Times, 10 December 1997; Paul Taylor, ‘Iran Leaders Show Contrasting Faces to OIC Summit’, Reuters, 9 December 1997; Robert Fisk, ‘Muslim Glare Turns on Divided Iran’, The Independent, 10 December 1997. 90. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, opening address to the eighth OIC Summit, Tehran, 9 December 1997, in Abolhosseini-Sha¯hreza¯, Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi, pp. 41–51 (p. 45). 91. Ibid., p. 43. 92. Ramazani, ‘The emerging Arab – Iranian rapprochement’, p. 6. 93. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, in Ali Abolhosseini-Sha¯hreza¯, Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi, pp. 41 – 51 (p. 50). 94. Ibid., pp. 46 – 7. 95. Khatami’s speech to eighth OIC Summit, Tehran, 9 December 1997, in Abolhosseini-Shahreza¯, Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi, p. 61. 96. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, in Ali Abolhosseini-Sha¯hreza¯, Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi, p. 52– 3. 97. Final Communique´ of the eighth OIC Summit, note 112, available online at – http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/8/8th-is-summits.htm#Tehran% 20Declaration. 98. The two references can be found on the final communique´ at notes 110 and 112, ibid. 99. ‘Tehran Declaration’, eighth OIC Summit, Tehran, 9 –11 December 1997, available online at – http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/8/8th-is-summi ts.htm#Tehran%20Declaration. 100. See for example ‘Iran Back on World Stage’, Gulf News, 9 December 1997; Editorial comment on OIC summit in Tehran, Jordan Times, 10 December 1997; Editorial – credit due to Iran, Al Akhbar, 11 December 1997; Robin Allen, ‘Standing of Moderates in Tehran boosted’, Financial Times, 12 December 1997; Vahe Petrossian, ‘Islamic Summit – Iran Puts Best Foot Forward’, Middle East Economic Digest, 15 December 1997; Christophe de Roquefeuil, ‘Khatami Emerges as Star of the Tehran Summit’, Agence FrancePresse, 12 December 1997. Doc. number – afpr000020011005dtcc03phm. 101. Gaddafi praises Iran’s role in Islamic World’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Newsfile, 28 December 1998. Doc. number – bbcmnf

186

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111.

112.

113. 114. 115.

116.

117.

118. 119.

120.

NOTES

TO PAGES

122 –125

0020010922ducs0024r. ‘Gulf Arabs send Positive Signals to Iran’, Reuters, 22 December 1997. Doc. no – lba0000020011003dtcm00tsg. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, in Ali Abolhosseini-Sha¯hreza¯, Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi, p. 42. ‘Iran Moves to Warm Ties with Bahrain, UAE’ (sourced from IRNA), Agence France-Press, 11 December 1997. Doc. no – afpr000020011005dtcb03o10. Ibid. ‘Saudi Arabia Hails Rapprocement with Iran’, Agence France-Press, 16 December 1997. Doc. no – afpr000020011005dtcg03mkl. Abolhosseini-Sha¯hreza¯, Majmou‘ah-ye a¯sna¯d-e ejla¯s-e hashtom-e sara¯n-e keshvarha¯-ye esla¯mi, p. 19. Ibid. Ibid. The 25th OIC Foreign Ministers Summit took place in Doha, Qatar from 15 – 17 March 1998. Borha¯ni, ‘Sa¯zma¯n-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi’, p. 146. Kamal Kharrazi’s speech to the 25th OIC Foreign Ministers Summit, Doha, Qatar. 15 March 1998, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Middle East, 16 March 1998. Doc. number – bbcme00020010922du3h00cdn. Kamal Kharrazi, ‘Hamka¯ri dar jeha¯n-e esla¯m’ [Cooperation in the World of Islam], speech to the meeting of the OIC Commitee for Confidence Building, Tehran, 29 Ordibehesht 1377 (19 May 1998), in Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, pp. 145 – 9 (p. 148). Ibid., pp. 148– 9. Jomhuri-ye esla¯mi, 2 Dey 1378 (23 December 1998). Kamal Kharrazi, ‘Guftogu-ye tammadon-e esla¯mi ba¯ diger tammadonha¯’ [Dialogue of Islamic civilisation with other civilisations], speech to the InterIslamic Symposium on Dialogue among Civilisations, 13 Ordibehesht 1379 (3 May 1999), in Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, pp. 243 –6 (pp. 243 –4). Mora¯d ‘Ana¯di-A¯lamouti, Ira¯n va sa¯zma¯n-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi [Iran and the Organisation of Islamic Conference] (Tehran: Markaz-e cha¯p va entesha¯ra¯t-e veza¯rat-e omur-e kha¯rejeh [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Print and Publishing], 1381 [2002]), p. 148. For further detail see ‘Tehran Declaration on Dialogue among Civilisations’, available online at – http://www.isesco.org.ma/english/dialogue/tehran1999/ dialogue1999.php?idd¼ TDD_REF_SP&page ¼ /Home/Special% 20Programmes/Dialogue%20among%20civilizations. See ISESCO website for more detail – http://www.isesco.org.ma/english/ dialogue/dialogue.php?page¼/Home/Dialogue%20among%20Civilizations. ‘ISESCO’s Role in the Promotion of Dialogue among Civilisations’, available as a pdf from the ISESCO website – http://www.isesco.org.ma/english/di alogue/documents/Dialogue%20paper%20English%202008.pdf. Available on ISESCO website – http://www.isesco.org.ma/english/publications/ dlg/Menu.php.

NOTES

TO PAGES

127 –137

187

121. See Mohsen Milani, ‘Iran, the Status Quo Power’, Current History, 104 (678), 2005, 1 – 30. 122. Kamal Kharrazi, Siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ma¯, p. 212. 123. Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. 124. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles, available online at – http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.shtml. 125. See, for example, Ali Akbar Velayati, Didga¯hha¯-ye jaha¯ni-ye jomhuuri-ye esla¯miye ira¯n. 126. Mohammad Farhad Atai, ‘Iran and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia’, in Iran and Eurasia (Reading: Garnett Publishing 2000), pp. 111 – 23 (p. 114). 127. See for example Eva Raekel, ‘Paradigms of Iranian Policy in Central Eurasia and Beyond’, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 2 (3– 4), 2003, 549 – 71; Houman Piemani, Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey, and Russia (Westport, CT & London: Praeger, 1998). 128. Bjorn Hettne ‘Globalisation and the New Regionalism’. 129. Edmund Herzig, ‘Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia’, International Affairs, 80 (3), 2004, 503–17 (p. 509). 130. Saideh Lotfian, ‘Iran’s Middle East Policies Under Khatami’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 10 (4), 1998– 9, 421– 48 (p. 440). 131. See ‘Gaddafi praises Iran’s role in Islamic World’, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts – Newsfile, 28 December 1998. Doc. number – bbcmnf0020010922ducs0024r. See also comments made by then Afghan president Rabbani on Iran’s OIC Chairmanship, Ettela¯‘a¯t-e beynolmela¯lli [Ettela¯‘a¯t International], 22 Ordibehesht 1377 (12 May 1998); and ‘Gulf Arabs send Positive Signals to Iran’, Reuters, 22 December 1997. Doc. no – lba0000020011003dtcm00tsg. 132. Marc Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations’, p. 311. 133. ‘UN Secretary General’s Tehran News Conference’ (sourced from IRNA), BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 December 1997. Doc. no – bbcme00020010929dtcd001lk. 134. ‘Message of the UN General Secretary to the meeting of OIC Foreign Ministers in Burkina Faso’, Jomhuri-ye esla¯mi, 9 Tir 1378 (30 June 1998). 135. ‘Ana¯di-A¯lamouti, Ira¯n va sa¯zma¯n-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi, p. 148. 136. In terms of press articles that offered praise for Khatami’s foreign policy and Dialogue among Civilisations, see ‘Iran’s Diplomatic Offensive’, New York Times, 25 September 1998; Robert Fisk, ‘Muslim Glare Turns on Divided Iran’, The Independent, 10 December 1997; Peter Kiernan, ‘Khatami’s Challenge’, The Middle East, May 1998. See also Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres’; Moshirzadeh, ‘Dialogue of Civilisations and International Theory’; and Ramazani, ‘The Emerging Arab–Iranian Rapprochement’. 137. See for example ‘Political Evolution in Iran’, Iran Daily, 16 August 1997; Alidad Vassigh, ‘Good Neighbourliness’, Iran Daily, 23 August 1997;

188

138. 139. 140. 141.

142. 143.

144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150.

NOTES

TO PAGES

137 –145

‘Khatami addresses domestic and foreign news correspondents – comment’, Ira¯n, 17 December 1997; Puya¯ Ahmadza¯deh, ‘Fasl-e ta¯zeh dar siya¯sat-e kha¯reji-ye ira¯n’ [A Fresh Chapter in the Foreign Policy of Iran], Ira¯n-e Farda¯, 40, Bahman, 1379 (January 2001). Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. Ibid. Koroush Ahmadi, ‘Iran and the United Nations during Khatami’s presidency’, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 28 (1), 2005, 21 – 52 (p. 23). See Resolution 53/158, ‘Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ – http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/767/71/PDF/ N9976771.pdf?OpenElement. Though this resolution is broadly critical of Iran, it does note some of the efforts made by Tehran in promoting the rule of law and encouraging greater open debate there. See UN document centre, ‘General Assembly Resolutions’ – http://www.un. org/documents/resga.htm. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, ‘ Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations’, in Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1996), p. 2. Ibid., p. 11. Ahmadi, ‘Iran and the United Nations’, p. 23. An in-depth treatment of which is given in Shabnam Holliday, Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishers, 2011). Interview by author with ‘Ata¯’ollah Mohajerani. ‘Ana¯di-A¯lamouti, Ira¯n va sa¯zma¯n-e konfara¯ns-e esla¯mi, p. 148. Herzig, ‘Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia’, p. 509. Ehteshami, ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, p. 305.

Conclusion 1. See website of the Foundation for Dialogue among Civilisations – http://dialogue foundation.org/?Lang¼en&Page¼29. 2. For example the ‘Alliance of Civilisations’ initiative, co-sponsored by thenSpanish and Turkish prime ministers Jose Luis Zapatero and Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an and presented to the UN in 2005. A high-level group was formed by Annan involving Khatami, Tutu, and others to continue efforts at preventing Clash of Civilisations forming the United Nations Alliance of Civilisations (UNAOC). See website of United Nations Alliance of Civilisations – http:// www.unaoc.org/.

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INDEX

11 September 2001 (9/11), 18 – 19, 42, 107, 127 Achaemenian Empire, 7, 61, 68 Afghanistan, 18 –19, 78, 80, 82, 86 –7, 89, 100– 1, 108, 112– 13, 115– 17, 135, 181n41 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 4 –5, 22 al-Azhar University, 68, 74 Albright, Madeleine, 104– 5 ‘ancient civilisations’, quadrilateral grouping (Egypt, Greece, Italy and Iran), 57, 60, 62 – 3, 70, 93 Annan, Kofi, 103, 126, 136– 7, 145, 188n2 Arab Spring, 3 Arab states, Iran’s relations with, 2, 14 – 15, 69 – 70, 72, 86, 118, 122, 135, 183– 4n74 Armenia Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 18, 42 –3 tri-lateral relationship with Greece and Iran, 62, 65 – 7, 85– 6, 93 ‘Axis of Evil’, 19, 107 Azerbaijan, 18, 42 –3, 65 – 7, 86, 108, 113, 115, 181n41

Bahrain, 14, 41, 122 Berlusconi, Silvio, 61 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 90, 148 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 79, 118 Bush, George W., 19, 107 Central Asia cultural links with, 75, 104, 112, 132 Iran’s foreign policy towards, 6, 17 – 19, 79, 83, 131, 150, 182n64 regional cooperation in, 108– 9, 143 Chechnya, 18, 73, 171n96 China, 5, 54, 83, 101, 157n26 Christianity, 56, 57 – 9, 71, 83, 93, 148 civil society, 9 – 11, 28, 30 – 6, 40, 46, 51, 91, 119, 121, 125, 129, 146, 162n32 Clash of Civilisations, 1, 40 – 5, 51, 60, 93, 99, 107, 188n2 Cold War, 13, 16 – 17, 42, 65, 68, 76, 108, 143 Constitution, Iranian, 16, 20 – 1, 27, 31– 4, 173n123 constructivism, 5, 8, 43, 45, 88, 130, 132, 151, 153 culture cultural attache´s, 23, 40

208

DIPLOMACY AND REFORM

in domestic politics, 26 – 7, 39, 40, 146, 155n5, 160n7 in foreign policy of Iran, see foreign policy of Iran intercultural dialogue, 36, 39, 43 –5, 47 –8, 72, 105, 119– 20, 122– 3, 164n89 and IR theory, 8 –10, 157n25 Cyprus, 64 – 5 democracy, 9, 28, 30 – 5, 161n27 de´tente, 2, 38, 40, 55, 57, 69 – 72, 86 – 7, 93 – 4, 99 – 100, 105, 107– 8, 129, 133, 151 Dialogue among Civilisations in bi-lateral relations, 53 – 95 in multi-lateral relations, 97 – 143 general principles, 39 – 40, 43 – 5 malleability of, 91 – 5, 139–43, 147– 8 motivations, behind application of, 84 –9, 127–35 philosophical background, 45 – 52 receptivity to, 89 – 91, 135– 9 ‘Year of . . .’, 2, 57, 63, 80 –1, 99, 101, 103, 107, 123, 125, 135–6, 138, 140 Economic Cooperation Organisation, the cultural institute of, 110– 12, 131, 181n41 historical development of, 108–10 political relations within, 113– 15, 131, 142– 3, 182n61, 183n66 publications of, 111– 12, 182n56 speeches of Iranian government figures in relation to, 112– 14 summits, meetings of, 112–14 trade relations in, 109, 113– 15, 182– 3n64 Egypt de´tente with, 69, 71 – 2, 170n79 governmental visits to Iran, 70, 73 –5, 172n101

IN IRAN

historical relations with, 54, 68 – 9, 93 – 4 Iran’s OIC chairmanship and relations with, 70 – 1, 73 Khatami – Mubarak meeting, 74 – 5 normalisation of relations with, 75, 86, 172n103 road naming issue, 69, 74 – 5 elections 7th presidential elections (1997), 1, 18, 26, 28 – 30, 33, 35 – 7, 153, 160– 1n15 2009 elections, 4, 153, 155n5 Majles elections, 26, 160n7 reception to Khatami’s 1997 victory, 35, 55, 91, 132– 3 European Union, the, 3, 37 – 8, 55 – 8, 61– 2, 85 – 7, 101, 115, 157n26 Faridzadeh, Mohamamd-Javad, 45, 49– 50, 146, 164n79, 165n101 foreign policy of Iran analysis of, 4, 7, 8, 87 – 8, 146, 156n6, 176n160 culture in, 1 – 2, 5, 7 – 8, 23, 28, 37 – 41, 54, 59 – 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 77, 80 – 2, 85, 87, 89, 92– 3, 95, 110– 16, 127– 8, 130– 2, 134– 6, 142– 3, 146– 53 de´tente in, 2 – 3, 38, 40, 57, 69 – 72, 86 – 7, 90, 93 – 4, 99 – 100, 105, 107– 8, 129, 133, 151 historical background to, 13 – 20, 117 identity in, 5 – 9, 39 – 41, 43, 46, 63, 88 – 9, 92 – 3, 95, 98, 104, 106, 116, 132, 141, 146– 7, 150–3, 157n20 ideology in, 13 –16, 18, 78, 100, 117, 133, 157n26 Khatami and, 36 – 41, 52, 69, 90, 92, 100, 133– 6, 139, 152, 187n136 making of, 7, 9, 20 – 3, 132

INDEX pragmatism in, 15 – 17, 18, 43, 55, 73, 78, 157n26, 176n153 revolution in, 1– 2, 8, 13 – 14, 17, 78, 117, 127, 130, 133, 157n26 role of president, 20, 22 –3 role of Supreme Leader, 19 – 23, 36, 121 role of Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), see Supreme National Security Council G15 group, 74, 79, 172n97 geopolitics, 2, 5 – 6, 8, 54, 61, 67, 69, 77, 85 – 6, 88, 104, 114, 131, 133– 4, 146– 7, 150– 3, 176n160 Georgia, 66 Green Movement, the, 4, 153 Greece ‘ancient civilisations’, quadrilateral grouping, 62 – 3 cultural relations with, 63 – 4, 66, 72 governmental visits to Iran, 64, 169n56 historical relations with, 61 – 2, 85, 148 Khatami’s visit to, 64 –5 trade with, 61 – 2, 65, 67, 85 tri-lateral relationship with Armenia and Iran, 62, 65 – 7, 85– 6, 93 Gulf Cooperation Council, the, 17, 117, 135 Gulf War, the, 78, 157n26 Habermas, Jurgen, 48 – 50, 94, 100, 165n98, 165n101, 178n182 Hajj, 15, 118, 184n80 Hajjarian, Sa‘eed, 32, 50, 161n25 Heidegger, Martin, 48, 164n96 Hezbollah, 14 – 16 Hobbes, Thomas, 28, 32, 51 hostages Lebanon, 137 US Embassy, Iran, 14

209

Huntington, Samuel, 1, 41 – 5, 51, 107, 145, 163n61 Hussein, Saddam, 15, 19, 107 India cultural links with, 75, 77 – 8, 80, 82, 9, 112, 148 governmental visits to Iran, 81 historical relations with, 75 – 6, 78, 173n110 Iranian governmental visits to, 79 Khatami’s visit to, 82 – 3 Muslim population of, 76, 78 – 9, 81, 90, 174n128 Shi‘i population of, 76 – 7, 90, 173n114 trade with, 76, 79, 82, 87 intellectuals (Iran), 27, 29 – 30, 32, 34, 37, 40, 46, 50, 145– 6 international relations (theory), 5, 8 – 9, 139; see also constructivism; liberalism; realism Iran– Iraq war, 13 – 15, 29, 31, 69, 79, 117–18, 145 Iraq, 3, 14 – 16, 18 – 19, 29, 31, 60, 69, 100–1, 107, 117–18, 145, 157n26 Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO), 103, 124– 5, 134–5, 142, 150 Islamic Propagation Organisation, 23 Islamic Republican Party (of Iran), 25 Israel, 16, 23, 65 – 66, 68, 86, 100– 1, 113, 117– 18 Italy cultural relations with, 54, 59 – 60 historical relations with, 54 – 5 governmental visits to Iran Iranian governmental visits to, 57 –9 Khatami’s visit to, 58 – 9 trade with, 56 –7, 59 – 60 Karimov, Islam, 114– 15, 182n61 Karoubi, Mehdi, 153

210

DIPLOMACY AND REFORM

Kashmir, 78 – 9, 174n128 Kazakhstan, 122, 181n41 Khamenei, Ali, 2 – 3, 11, 16, 19 – 20, 22 – 3, 55, 64, 120– 2, 153 Khaniki, Hadi, 45, 49–51, 146, 164n79 Kharrazi, Kamal, 11, 37 – 8, 40, 57 –8, 60, 63, 67, 70 – 3, 75, 79, 82, 87, 97, 102, 105, 114, 123– 4, 128, 141 Khatami, Mohammad as Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance, see Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance biography, 25 – 8 election in 1997, see elections speeches, 11, 33 – 5, 38 – 40, 45, 55 –7, 98– 100, 103–4, 112– 14, 116, 119– 21, 124, 130, 146– 7, 157n20, 164n89, 168n36 works of (academic), 27 – 8, 30, 47 –8, 160n12 worldview, 7 – 8, 26 – 7, 35 – 6, 43 –8, 94, 119– 20, 164n89 Khomeini, Ruhollah, 2 – 3, 13 –16, 25 – 7, 30, 133, 157n26, 160– 1n15, 183– 4n74 Khorda¯d, 2nd of, 25, 30, 160n1 Lebanon, 14 – 16, 79, 117, 137 liberalism in IR theory, 8, 129– 30, 132 in political theory, 27 – 8, 34, 50 – 1 Locke, John, 27 – 8, 32, 51 Majles (Iranian parliament), 20 – 1, 26 – 7, 30, 35, 38 – 9, 81, 116, 146 media, 21, 27, 37, 82, 101, 107– 8, 121– 2, 129, 136– 7, 153 Medina, 36, 119 Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance Khatami as, 1, 25 – 7, 155n5 Mohajerani as, 12, 38, 40, 45, 59, 137– 8, 146

IN IRAN

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Iran), 11, 20, 23, 64, 74, 123, 135 Mohajerani, ‘Ata¯’ollah, 30, 38, 40, 45– 6, 49, 51 59, 106– 8, 128, 137–8, 140– 1, 145– 6, 165n101 Mousavi, Mir-Hossein, 4, 26, 153, 155n5 Moussa, Amr, 69 – 70, 74 Mubarak, Hosni, 73 – 4, 122 Mughal Empire, 76, 112, 173n110 Mykonos incident, 3, 55 – 7, 61, 85, 87 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 18, 43, 65 Na‘ini, Mirza Hossein, 34 Nasser, Gemal Abdul, 68 Nateq-Nuri, Ali Akbar, 30 national identity Iranian, 6 – 7, 39 – 42, 46, 63, 88, 92, 93, 95, 98, 104, 106, 147, 151–3 Iraniyat and Islamiyat, 7, 93 Khatami on, 7, 40, 88, 98, 104, 140, 157n20 literature on, 6 – 8, 92, 178n179 Mohajerani on, 40, 106, 140– 1 relevance in foreign policy, 2, 8 – 9, 63, 88 – 9, 104, 116, 130, 146, 150, 152 National Library, the (Iranian), 12, 27– 8 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 78, 172n97 nuclear programme, Iranian, 3 – 4, 13, 17– 19, 23, 60, 149 Nye, Joseph, 9 – 10, 94, 151 oil, 6, 13, 15, 60 – 1, 65, 85 –7, 167n23 Oman, 41 Organisation of Islamic Conference, the historical relations with, 117– 19, 129, 132, 134, 141, 184n77 Iran’s chairmanship of, 58, 70 – 2, 74, 98, 115, 116, 119–24, 133, 135, 141, 171n81, 171n96 Khamenei’s address to, 120– 1

INDEX Khatami’s address to, 35, 45, 55 – 6, 119– 22, 135, 137, 149, 164n89 responses to Iran’s hosting of eighth summit, 122, 128, 135, 137, 149 speeches of other Iranian government figures in relation to, 117– 19, 123– 4, 171n96 summits, meetings of, 35, 41, 45, 55, 72 – 3, 98, 116, 119, 122, 132, 149 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 15 Orientalism, 6 – 7 Ottoman Empire, 61, 65, 112 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza (Shah of Iran), 7–8, 13, 25, 46, 68–9, 76, 105 Pakistan, 75 – 7, 79, 82, 87, 108, 110, 112, 114– 15, 174n131 Palestine, 39, 79, 90, 101, 140 parliament, of Iran, 21, 60; see also Majles Parthian Empire, 54 Persian Gulf, 8, 14 – 15, 17, 19, 22, 84 – 6, 111, 121– 2, 182n64 Persian language, 11, 38, 77, 82, 112, 116, 120, 153 presidency, of Islamic Republic of Iran, 4, 16, 18, 20 – 3, 28, 34, 38, 59, 82, 84, 102– 3, 121; see also elections; Khatami Prodi, Romano, 56 Qaboos, Sultan, 41 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 1–2, 16–18, 27, 29–30, 36, 55, 69–70, 78–9, 85, 113, 118–19, 134, 155n5, 160n4, 160n7, 176n153 realism, 5, 9, 43, 130, 139, 151, 157n25 reform movement (Iran), 1, 4, 10, 19, 26 – 30, 32, 34 – 5, 50, 91, 108, 137, 145, 153

211

Revolution, Constitutional (1906), 34 Revolution, Iranian (1979) export of, 2, 8, 14 – 18, 78, 117, 131, 133, 183– 4n74 ideology, 8, 14, 29, 35, 47, 78, 98 – 9, 133, 173n123 impact of, 1, 4, 8, 13, 14 – 16, 19, 29, 31, 77 – 8, 98 – 9, 117, 133, 140, 157n26, 184n79 Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), 20– 2 Roman Empire, 53 – 5, 61, 63, 148, 166n3 Rouhani, Hassan, 4, 22, 153 Rushdie, Salman, 3, 16 Russia, 5, 17 – 18, 101, 171n96 Safavid Empire, 54, 76, 112, 173n110 Sassanian Empire, 7, 54, 61, 68, 75 Saudi Arabia, 15, 101, 118, 122, 132–3, 184n79, 184n80 Shah Isma‘il, 173n110 Shah, Mohammad Reza, see Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, Nader, 76 Shah, Reza, 55 Shah Tahmsap I, 173n110 Shayegan, Dariush, 46 – 8 Shi‘ism, 14 –15, 27, 34, 47, 70, 76 – 7, 90, 93, 118, 134, 141, 155n1, 173n114 Singh, Manmohan, 76 social media, 153 soft power, 9– 10, 77, 94 – 5, 130, 132, 134, 142– 3, 150–2 Solomon Islands, 102 Soroush, Abdolkarim, 7, 29, 32 Soviet Union, the (USSR), 13, 15 – 18, 68, 76, 78, 101, 108, 116, 131, 157n26 sports, 10, 105, 110, 180n30 Stephanopoulos, Konstantinos, 64, 169n56

212

DIPLOMACY AND REFORM

Supreme Leader, 2, 11, 19 – 23, 30, 32, 121, 153; see also Khamenei; Khomeini Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the, 20 – 2 Syria, 3, 15, 101, 184n77 Tajikistan, 18, 113, 116 Taliban, the, 19, 22, 78, 86, 107, 159n15 Turkey, 43, 61, 65 – 7, 86, 108– 10, 114– 15, 132 Turkmenistan, 79, 174n129, 182n64 Twitter, 153 United Arab Emirates (UAE), the, 22, 101, 122, 133 United Nations, the Alliance of Civilisations, 188n2 General Assembly, 41, 45, 57, 98, 101, 103, 129, 135, 137– 8, 149 historical relations with, 8, 15, 100– 1, 129 human rights, 128, 138– 9, 149

IN IRAN

Khatami’s speeches to, 41, 45, 57, 98 – 9, 103– 4, 149, 151 Security Council of, 100– 1, 149 Year of Dialogue among Civilisations (2001), 2, 57, 63, 80 – 1, 99, 101, 103, 107, 123, 125, 135– 6, 138, 140 UNESCO, 63, 80, 83, 102– 3, 105–8, 124, 128–30, 135–6, 138, 140, 142, 149– 50, 175n148 United States, the, 5, 9 –10, 14 – 17, 19, 23, 36, 60 – 1, 68, 79, 85 – 7, 90, 94– 5, 101, 103–5, 107, 109, 115, 118, 121, 127, 131 Uzbekistan, 112–15 Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 81 –3, 90 Velayati, Ali Akbar, 11, 20, 79, 100– 1, 117–18, 129, 174n128, 184n77 War on Terror, the, 19, 107 Zarif, Mohammad-Javad, 102, 153