Die Reine Rechtslehre auf dem Prüfstand Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions. Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie vom 27.–29. September 2018 in Freiburg im Breisgau 351512568X, 9783515125680

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Die Reine Rechtslehre auf dem Prüfstand Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie vom 27.–29. September 2018 in Freiburg im Breisgau Herausgegeben von Matthias Jestaedt, Ralf Poscher und Jörg Kammerhofer

Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Franz Steiner Verlag

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archiv für rechts- und sozialphilosophie archives for philosophy of law and social philosophy archives de philosophie du droit et de philosophie sociale archivo de filosofía jurídica y social Herausgegeben von der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie (IVR) Redaktion: Dr. Annette Brockmöller, LL. M.

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DIE REINE RECHTSLEHRE AUF DEM PRÜFSTAND HANS KELSEN'S PURE THEORY OF LAW: CONCEPTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie vom 27.–29. September 2018 in Freiburg im Breisgau Herausgegeben von Matthias Jestaedt, Ralf Poscher und Jörg Kammerhofer

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagbild: Justitia, Landgericht Ulm Quelle: shutterstock.com / Georg_89 Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2020 Layout, Satz und Herstellung durch den Verlag Druck: Beltz Grafische Betriebe, Bad Langensalza Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-12568-0 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-12579-6 (E-Book)

Inhaltsverzeichnis / Table of Contents

Vorwort. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

I. Die Grundlagen der Reinen Rechtslehre / The Foundations of the Pure Theory of Law JOHN GARDNER †

Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

ROBERT ALEXY

Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System of Non-Positivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

ALEXANDER SOMEK

The Demystification Impasse

Legal Positivism Divided Against Itself

45

CHRISTOPH KLETZER

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

CARSTEN HEIDEMANN

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

MAXIMILIAN KIENER

Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

II. Rechtstheorie / The Mechanics of Law MATHIEU CARPENTIER

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts

An Essay in Critical Reconstruction

125

6

Inhaltsverzeichnis / Table of Contents

MATHEUS PELEGRINO DA SILVA

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation oder als weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

149

THOMAS HOCHMANN

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?

Zu einer Debatte innerhalb der Wiener rechtstheoretischen Schule

161

RODRIGO GARCIA CADORE

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

Wie geht das Recht mit Fehlern um?

177

BENEDIKT PIRKER

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

The Pure Theory of Law, Interpretation, and Modern Cognitive Pragmatics

203

III. Die Anwendung der Reinen Rechtslehre auf Rechtsordnungen / Applying the Pure Theory of Law to Legal Orders LENA FOLJANTY

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

FERNANDO MENEZES

Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law and their Applicability to a Critical Analysis of the Theory of Administrative Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

245

D. A. JEREMY TELMAN

Problems of Translation and Interpretation

A Kelsenian Commentary on Positivist Originalism

257

TOMASZ WIDŁAK

Kelsen’s Monism and the Structure of Global Law

On the Relevance of a Kelsenian Account for the Polycentric International Law

275

ANNE KÜHLER

Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of the Hierarchy of Norms beyond National Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

291

Inhaltsverzeichnis / Table of Contents

IV. Ideengeschichtlicher Kontext / Kelsen in Context FREDERICK SCHAUER

Fuller and Kelsen – Fuller on Kelsen

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

URSZULA KOSIELI Ń SKA-GRABOWSKA

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

A Case of Scientific Plagiarism?

319

MARIO G. LOSANO

Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre

Die Turiner Schule und die Rezeption Hans Kelsens in Italien

339

STANLEY L. PAULSON

Did Walter Jellinek Invent Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

351

ˇ NIK MARIJAN PAVC

Rechtliche Natur des Staates nach Leonid Pitamic

The Legal Nature of the State according to Leonid Pitamic

361

ULRICH WAGRANDL

Kelsen was no Relativist

Reading Hans Kelsen in the Light of Isaiah Berlin’s Value Pluralism

373

FEDERICO LIJOI

The Democratic Value of Law

Hans Kelsen on the Theory and Praxis of Relativism

393

REUT YAEL PAZ / MAXIMILIAN WAGNER

Salvaging Scientific Socialism?

Hans Kelsen’s Attachments and Detachments to Austro-Marxism

413

7

Vorwort MATHIAS JESTAEDT / RALF POSCHER / JÖRG KAMMERHOFER

Die Reine Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens stellt einen spezifischen Zugang zu Recht und Normativität dar; sie liefert eine eigene Grammatik und eine besondere Nomenklatur, mit deren Hilfe man gewisse rechtswissenschaftliche Begriffe, Konzepte und Probleme als wesentlich und andere als irreführend für die Hauptaufgaben der (rechts)wissenschaftlichen Beschäftigung mit dem Recht ausweisen kann. Grundlegender noch erhebt sie den Anspruch, eine Rechtswissenschaftstheorie zu sein, d. h. eine Theorie darüber, was Rechtswissenschaft ist bzw. sein kann oder sein sollte. Dieser Ansatz zu Bedeutung und Aufgabe einer selbständigen Rechtswissenschaft bleibt freilich oft implizit und wird in der einschlägigen Literatur eher selten adressiert. Auch nach über einhundert Jahren weckt die Reine Rechtslehre die Aufmerksamkeit der Rechtswissenschaft – und das in ebenso heftigem Zuspruch wie Widerspruch. Dabei treten Missverständnisse und Ausblendungen zutage  – bei Kelsens Lehren, bei den Versuchen, sich dessen Lehren anzueignen, und bei den Versuchen, diese zu widerlegen. Die internationale Community setzt sich nach wie vor mit bestimmten Schriften und Konzepten Hans Kelsens recht intensiv auseinander. Darüber geraten andere Wesenszüge und Argumentationslinien der Reinen Rechtslehre gar nicht erst ins Blickfeld. Und während Kelsens auch auf Englisch verfügbare Werke international vergleichsweise intensiv diskutiert werden, gilt Gleiches nicht für die Werke anderer wegbereitender Mitglieder der „Wiener rechtstheoretischen Schule“. Just die Debatte um die Reine Rechtslehre in und zwischen den unterschiedlichen rechtswissenschaftlichen Kulturen und Traditionen ist besonders spannend. Es war also wert, sich im Rahmen der Deutschen Sektion der IVR mit Kelsen und der Reinen Rechtslehre zu beschäftigen und den Versuch zu unternehmen, in einem offenen Diskurs die rechtskulturellen, sprachlichen und disziplinären Disjunktionen kenntlich zu machen und möglichst zu überbrücken, um eine freimütige internationale und intradisziplinäre Debatte um Hans Kelsen und die Reine Rechtslehre zu eröffnen. Mit der Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der IVR am 27.–29.  September 2018 an

10

Vorwort

der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br. zum Thema „Die Reine Rechtslehre auf dem Prüfstand / Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions“ wurde also nichts weniger gewagt, als der heutigen Relevanz der Thesen der Reinen Rechtslehre in einem international und intradisziplinär reflektierten Rahmen nachzugehen. Einer der Gründe für diese besondere Spannungslage eröffnet sich bereits bei einer bloß kursorischen Kontrastierung von Leben und Werk von Kelsen mit Herbert Hart. Harts Geburtsort Harrogate in North Yorkshire und sein Studien-, Arbeits- und Sterbeort Oxford1 liegen keine 250 km Luftlinie auseinander, das ist in etwa die Entfernung vom Tagungsort Freiburg nach Frankfurt. Seine akademische Karriere hat sich exklusiv an der Universität Oxford abgespielt; er hat sich und seine Lehren niemals in anderen Sprachen, gar in anderen Kulturkreisen, verständlich machen müssen. Vita und Oeuvre sind also britisch, eigentlich rein englisch, und verlassen diesen Orbit nicht. Auch ist die Rezeptionsgeschichte des Hartschen Werkes ohne den Aufstieg des Englischen zur wissenschaftlichen lingua franca und der damit einhergehenden Perspektivenverschiebung nicht vollends zu erklären. Bei Kelsen sieht das völlig anders aus; ihm widerfährt ein Schicksal, welches das 20. Jahrhundert für ideologiekritische Protagonisten der wissenschaftlichen Moderne in Deutschland und Österreich vielfach bereitgehalten hat – das der „Vertriebene[n] Vernunft“.2 Kelsen sieht sich im Österreich der 1920er und im Deutschland der frühen 1930er Jahre immer wieder angefochten, angefeindet, unerwünscht und schließlich vertrieben. Von Wien nach Köln, nach Genf, Prag, Harvard und schließlich nach Berkeley muss Kelsen seinen beruflich-wissenschaftlichen Standort wechseln und er und seine Familie auch den sozialen Neuanfang wagen. Sein Geburtsort Prag ist vom Sterbeort Orinda (bei Berkeley) denn auch nicht wie bei Hart 250 km, sondern rund 9.400 km Luftlinie auseinander. Er findet „des Wandermüden letzte Ruhestätte“ am sprichwörtlich anderen Ende der Welt.3 Kelsen lehrt und publiziert zunächst auf Deutsch, sodann auf Französisch, schließlich auf Englisch. Die fast 18.000 Seiten von Originalarbeiten Kelsens sind zu mehr als 50 % auf Deutsch erschienen, rund 6.000 Seiten liegen auf Englisch vor, einer Sprache, die Kelsen im Alter von knapp 60 Jahren als seine Alltags- und Berufssprache zu erlernen gezwungen war und die er bis zuletzt nicht mit der Leichtigkeit und Selbstverständlichkeit, Virtuosität und Nuanciertheit seiner Muttersprache beherrschte. Mit gewisser Vgl. Nicola Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart. The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford 2004. Friedrich Stadler (Hrsg.), Vertriebene Vernunft I. Emigration und Exil österreichischer Wissenschaft 1930–1940, Wien 1987; Friedrich Stadler (Hrsg.), Vertriebene Vernunft II. Emigration und Exil österreichischer Wissenschaft 1930–1940, Wien 1988. 3 Die nach wie vor maßgebliche Biographie Kelsens ist: Rudolf Aladár Métall, Hand Kelsen. Leben und Werk, Wien 1969; siehe auch Hans Kelsen, Selbstdarstellung (1927), in: HKW 1, S. 19–27; Hans Kelsen, Autobiographie (1947), in: HKW 1, S. 29–91. Thomas Olechowski, Geschäftsführer des Hans Kelsen-Instituts, Wien, wird in Kürze eine umfassende Biographie Kelsens im Verlag Mohr Siebeck vorlegen. 1 2

Vorwort

Zuspitzung könnte man sagen, dass der Nationalsozialismus Kelsen nicht nur seine Heimat, sondern auch seine Sprache geraubt hat, ihn zu nicht unwichtigen Teilen sprachlos gemacht und im Diskurs-Niemandsland ausgesetzt hat. In den Vereinigten Staaten, dem Land, das ihm großzügig eine neue Heimat bot, hatte er in des Wortes doppelter Bedeutung Mühe, sich verständlich zu machen.4 Kelsens Vita und Œuvre bezeugen eine Odyssee, die sozusagen die Begleitgeschichte und den Resonanzboden abgibt für die Reine Rechtslehre und die ihre Rezeption und Diskussion bis heute beeinflusst. Man möchte angesichts dieses Befundes meinen, dass die Rezeptionsgeschichte der Reinen Rechtslehre in Deutschland, wo im Gegensatz zum US-amerikanischen Exil doch der sprachlich unmittelbarste und mithin einfachste Zugang zur Reinen Rechtslehre herrscht,5 besonders günstig verlaufen ist. Doch mitnichten: Hierzulande begreift man jetzt erst in Ansätzen, welcher Schatz seit vielen Jahrzehnten vor den eigenen Füßen schlummert. Die Reine Rechtslehre wird in Deutschland dramatisch anders rezipiert als im Gros der übrigen Länder. Kelsen ist auf dem Höhepunkt seines wissenschaftlichen Schaffens und seiner Anerkennung als public intellectual, als der sogenannte Weimarer Methoden- und Richtungsstreit ausbricht und er neben Rudolf Smend, Carl Schmitt und Hermann Heller zum Weimarer Quartett zählt. Doch schon bald, nämlich bereits im April 1933, wird er hors du discours gesetzt. Seine Wiener Schule wird, ohne dass sie sich davon je erholen sollte, zerschlagen. Bis 1945 verhängt die regimehörige Rechtswissenschaft eine damnatio memoriae über den „Juden Kelsen“ und dessen Werk. Die mit der bedingungslosen Kapitulation NS-Deutschlands schlagende Stunde Null ist aber nicht die Stunde, in der Kelsen rehabilitiert wird und seine Ideen mit offenen Armen Aufnahme finden. Die Naturrechtsrenaissance, flankiert von der Radbruchschen Positivismuslegende,6 erübrigt, so ist man sich einig, eine Auseinandersetzung mit Kelsen und seinem Œuvre. Bis weit in die 1960er Jahre bleibt Kelsen hors du discours. Sowohl die Erstauflage der „Reinen Rechtslehre“, die Kelsen 1934 in Genf vollendet, als auch die Zweitauflage 1960, gehören streng genommen zur Gattung der Exil-Literatur, sind also Außenseiter-Schriften im deutschsprachigen Wissenschaftsdiskurs. Ab Mitte der 1980er Jahre scheint sich das Blatt zu wenden, und rund zehn Jahre später beginnt eine Art Kelsen-Renaissance in Deutschland. Nun fängt die Staatsrechtslehre langsam an, sich das bislang ausgeschlagene Erbe nach und nach anzueignen. Eingeübte vorurteilsgetragene Abwehrreflexe sind zwar immer noch virulent, doch überwiegen heute die wissenschaftliche Neugierde und der Wunsch nach Vgl. Jeremy Telman, The Reception of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the United States: A Sociological Model, in: L’Observateur des Nations Unis 24 (2008), S. 299 ff.; Jeremy Telman, A Path Not Taken: Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law in the Land of the Legal Realists, in: Robert Walter / Clemens Jabloner / Klaus Zeleny (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsen anderswo – Hans Kelsen abroad, Wien 2010, S. 353–376. 5 Für Österreich gilt Besonderes. 6 Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, in: Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1 (1946) 105–108 (107). 4

11

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Vorwort

sachlicher Auseinandersetzung mit den vielfach als frisch und unverbraucht in ihrem Provokationsgehalt empfundenen Thesen Kelsens. Im Gegensatz dazu gilt Kelsen im globalen Maßstab als Mastermind der Rechtstheorie; viele Schatzsucher aus Lateinamerika, aus Südostasien, aus Südeuropa, um nur drei besonders Kelsen-affine Weltregionen zu nennen, sind unterwegs; sie sehen sich mit der Sprachbarriere konfrontiert, wenn sie den als solchen erkannten Schatz heben wollen, und sind bereit, diese zu überwinden. Die (zweite Auflage der) Reine(n) Rechtslehre gilt in einer ganzen Reihe von Ländern zumeist des romanischen Sprachkreises als Pflichtlektüre im ersten Studienjahr, gehört also zu den kanonischen Schriften. Nicht zuletzt waren es die ausländischen Kelsen-Schüler zu Wiener Zeiten, die sich als eifrige Exporteure und Verbreiter der Reinen Rechtslehre in ihre Heimatländer und darüber hinaus betätigten, etwa Leonidas Pitamic, Alf Ross, Charles Eisenmann, Luis Recaséns Siches oder Luís Legaz y Lacambra. Daran haben sich reiche rechtsphilosophische und rechtstheoretische Folgediskurse angeschlossen, wie zum Beispiel der argentinische, der mit den Namen von Carlos Eduardo Alchourrón und Eugenio Bulygin verbunden ist. Doch sosehr der Status von Kelsen und der Reinen Rechtslehre in einer Vielzahl von Ländern außer Frage steht, so sehr ergeben sich Rezeptionshindernisse, die mit dem Faktum zusammenhängen, dass nahezu alle wichtigen Schriften der Reinen Rechtslehre im Original auf Deutsch verfasst worden sind.7 Das Arbeiten mit Übersetzungen – mögen sie auch so akkurat und bestechend sein wie jene der Erstauflage der Reinen Rechtslehre durch Bonnie Litschewski Paulson und Stanley Paulson oder jene der Zweitauflage durch Mario Losano8 – bringt unvermeidlicher Weise Probleme mit sich. Diese wachsen um ein Vielfaches, wenn und da eine große Zahl auch sehr wichtiger Schriften insbesondere nicht ins Englische übersetzt sind. Und wer des Deutschen nicht mächtig ist, dem wird sich kaum erschließen, welcher Reichtum und welche Heterogenität sich mit der Reinen Rechtslehre verbindet, die eben nicht nur das isoliert-exklusive Werk des einsamen Genies ist, sondern Ausdruck und Folge einer ungemein kraftvollen, unerschrockenen und fruchtbaren kollektiven Anstrengung von rund 40 jungen Männern und Frauen, die Kelsen als „Jungösterreichische Schule der Rechtstheorie“9 um sich geschart hatte. Um Kelsens Gedankenge-

Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze, Tübingen 1911 = HKW 2, S. 21–878; Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin 1925; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einführung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, Leipzig und Wien 1934; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2. Aufl., Wien 1960; Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Wien 1979. 8 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (übersetzt von Bonnie Litschewski Paulson und Stanley L. Paulson), Oxford 1992; Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto (übersetzt von Mario Losano), Turin 1966. 9 Die Bezeichnung dürfte auf Alfred Verdroß, Bernhard Stark: Die Analyse des Rechts (1916), in: Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 41 (1917), S. 477– 479 (478, 479), und Bernhard Starck, Die jungösterreichische Schule der Rechtswissenschaft und die naturwissenschaftliche Methode, in: Juristische Blätter 47 (1918), S. 301–304, zurückgehen. 7

Vorwort

bäude in seinem Reichtum, in seinen Prägungen, aber auch seinen Spannungen wirklich zu ergründen, kommt man nicht nur nicht an den beiden Hauptschülern, Adolf Julius Merkl und Alfred Verdroß, vorbei, auch die Schriften des Hauptes der Brünner Schule, František Weyr, oder von jüngeren Schülern wie beispielsweise Fritz Sander, Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Schreier, Julius Kraft oder Josef L. Kunz, müssen studiert werden  – solange und soweit aber belastbare Übersetzungen fehlen, kommt man hier ohne Deutsch nicht weit. Zugänglichkeit und Zugangswunsch fallen folglich auseinander: In Deutschland die Möglichkeit, aber nicht (oder nur in geringem Maße) das Interesse – global das Interesse, aber nur eingeschränkt die Zugänglichkeit. Der vorliegende Band will genau hier einsetzen und erblickt in diesem Paradoxon eine Chance wechselseitiger Hilfe, um einen großen Schritt vorwärts zu machen. Und das ist mit den 24 Beiträgen dieses Bandes, die allesamt auf Vorträgen bei der IVR-Tagung basieren, gelungen: Es schreiben Wissenschaftler aus dem In- und Ausland, große Namen – an den tragisch während der Drucklegung verstorbenen John Gardner sei in diesem Zusammenhang besonders erinnert und damit eines Großen des Faches gedacht – wie Nachwuchstalente, diejenigen, welche (vorranging) auf Deutsch und im deutschen Rechts- und Kulturkreis arbeiten und publizieren, diejenigen aus anderen Kulturkreisen sowie diejenigen, deren Vita selbst das Kelsensche Wanderleben zwischen den Kulturen (wenn auch heute weniger brutalen Zwängen geschuldet) widerspiegelt. Die Beiträge sind denn auch heterogen – kritische, neutral analytische wie zustimmend die Reine Rechtslehre anwendende Stimmen finden sich gleichermaßen; die Zugänge sind philosophischer, (rechts)theoretischer, ideengeschichtlicher oder rechtsdogmatischer Natur; die Rechtskreise und -gebiete reichen vom deutschen Privatrecht über das brasilianische Verwaltungsrecht zum Europa- und Völkerrecht. Gemein ist ihnen der Versuch, vorurteilsfrei und offen die Reine Rechtslehre als Zugang wie als Forschungsformation, Kelsens Leben und Werk, zu durchdringen, zu analysieren und so zu neuen Ergebnissen zu gelangen. Wir, die Herausgeber, haben uns zwecks besserer Übersicht erlaubt, eine grobe Gliederung der Beiträge vorzunehmen, freilich ohne dass damit eine Eingrenzung und Einschränkung der enthaltenen Ergebnisse verbunden sein soll. 1. Die Aufsätze von Gardner, Alexy, Somek, Kletzer, Heidemann und Kiener beschäftigen sich vorrangig mit den (rechts)philosophischen bzw. wissenschaftstheoretischen Grundlagen der Reinen Rechtslehre. 2. Demgegenüber wird von Carpentier, Pelegrino, Hochmann, Cadore und Pirker die Dynamik und die Beziehungen der Rechtsnormen zueinander diskutiert, wie auch die den Juristen besonders wichtige hermeneutische Tätigkeit, welche wir zusammenfassend der „Rechtstheorie“ zugerechnet haben. 3. Eine weitere Gruppe von Beiträgen  – nämlich jene von Foljanty, Menezes, Telman, Widłak und Kühler  – beschäftigen sich mit konkreten positiven Rechtsordnungen und deren Problemen, auf die die Argumente der Reinen Rechtslehre angewandt werden.

13

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Vorwort

4.

Schließlich hat die mit Abstand größte Gruppe von Beiträgen verschiedene Aspekte des (ideen)geschichtlichen Kontextes der Reinen Rechtslehre bzw. von Kelsen beleuchtet, nämlich Schauer, Kosielińska-Grabowska, Losano, Paulson, Pavčnik, Wagrandl, Lijoi sowie Paz/Wagner.

Freiburg i. Br., 9. September 2019

I.

Die Grundlagen der Reinen Rechtslehre / The Foundations of the Pure Theory of Law

Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise) JOHN GARDNER †*

Abstract: This chapter deconstructs the concept of normativity by engaging with Kelsen’s

postulate of an irreducible duality between Is and Ought. Supererogatory acts are a test case, because they demonstrate that there must be reasons beyond norms to account for the value of actions. It critiques Kelsen’s conflation of norms, reasons for action (epistemic, prudential and moral) and values. If the normativity of the law is escapable, because it is morally fallible, the special problem of moral normativity arises. Hence, the question of normativity morphs into a question about the relevance of particular inescapable reasons. Keywords: legal philosophy, Hume’s law, Hans Kelsen, normativity, reasons for action, Is

and Ought Schlagworte: Rechtsphilosophie, Humes Gesetz, Hans Kelsen, Normativität, Hand-

lungsgründe, Sein und Sollen

1.

Hume’s law

An Ought cannot be reduced to an Is, or an Is to an Ought; and so an Is cannot be inferred from an Ought, or an Ought from an Is. (GTN 16.I)1

All Souls College, Oxford. This contribution is based on my talk at the IVR German Section conference in Freiburg on 21 September 2018. [Editors’ note: John Gardner passed away on 11 July 2019, before the proofs for his contribution were finalised. The abstract, keywords and all changes (corrections) to the paper as delivered are the editors’.] 1 My Kelsen quotations throughout are from Michael Hartney’s translation of Kelsen’s Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (Vienna 1979), published as Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (Oxford 1991). Since most of the chapters and sections in the book are very short, and readers may well be using different editions, I do not give page numbers. Instead I provide locations for the quoted passages parenthetically in the text, in the *

18

JOHN GARDNER †

By these words in his last book, and no less consistently in earlier books, Kelsen endorses Hume’s Law.2 In fact he fortifies it: Hume worried only about the inference of an ought from an is; Kelsen worries no less about the inference of an is from an ought. That makes his claim stronger than Hume’s. Kelsen’s core argument for this claim is summarized by him as follows: Since something can be without being decreed to be obligatory in a norm, and something can be decreed to be obligatory in a norm without being in reality, therefore when something is it does not follow that something ought to be, or when something ought to be, that something is. The relation between Is and Ought is one of irreducible duality. (GTN 17)

We will come back in a moment to the specialized apparatus of norms (and decrees) that constitute Kelsen’s interpretation of the Ought. For now, we should agree that the argument is sound as far as it goes. But how far does it go? Suppose we replace the word ‘something’ with the letter ‘P’, and see how it looks now: Since P can be without being decreed to be obligatory in a norm, and P can be decreed to be obligatory in a norm without being in reality, therefore when P is it does not follow that P ought to be, or when P ought to be, that P is.

Can we really conclude from this that ‘[t]he relation between Is and Ought is one of irreducible duality’? Surely we can conclude only that the relationship between ‘P is’ and ‘P ought to be’ is one of irreducible duality. ‘You are buying me lunch’ neither entails nor is entailed by ‘you ought to be buying me lunch.’ True enough. But we do not know whether the same goes for the relationship between ‘P is’ and ‘Q ought to be’. For example, we do not know whether the same goes for the relationship between ‘you promised to buy me lunch’ and ‘you ought to be buying me lunch’, to borrow John Searle’s famous attempt at a counterexample to Hume’s law.3 We know roughly how Kelsen would reanalyse that claimed counterexample to explain it away. He would say that there is a hidden ‘Ought’ in the background. He would say that there is a norm in play sub silentio according to which you ought to do whatever you promised. You promised to buy me lunch so, according to the sub silentio norm, you ought to buy me lunch. That is certainly a possible reanalysis of Searle’s claimed counterexample. It is one of the (Humean) reanalyses that Searle is attempting to resist. But offering the reanalysis is not making an argument for it. If you think that it is the correct reanalysis, that is probably because you already endorse Kelsen’s conclusion that ‘[t]he relation

form GTN XX.xx, where XX in Arabic numerals represents the chapter number and xx in roman numerals represents the section number (if applicable). 2 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (2nd ed, ed L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford 1975), 3.1.1. 3 John R. Searle, ‘How to Derive “Ought” from “Is”’, Philosophical Review 73 (1964), 43.

Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise)

between Is and Ought is one of irreducible duality.’ You have done nothing to show that this conclusion is correct. Personally, I share Searle’s broadly Aristotelian resistance to Hume’s law. I mention that mainly by way of a declaration of interest. In the following remarks I will not make any case against Hume’s law. What I aim to do here is merely to draw attention to some ways in which the claim that ‘[t]he relation between Is and Ought is one of irreducible duality’ can easily be made to seem more plausible than it is. What I will suggest is that there are several different distinctions in the neighbourhood, and that the sense of an ‘irreducible duality’ is mainly owed to their conflation. Since Kelsen is an arch-conflater of these distinctions, and one of the few to conflate them openly, deliberately, and even proudly, he will be figuring prominently in a lot of what follows. Towards the end we will, however, turn away from our engagement with Kelsen towards some preoccupations of contemporary moral and legal philosophers. I will suggest that they are overblown or misdirected preoccupations. 2.

Norms and Oughts

What does any of this have to do with my title, ‘Normativity’? ‘Normativity’ is an uncountable noun confected from the adjective ‘normative’, while ‘normative’ is in turn an adjective derived from the countable noun ‘norm’. Maybe I am too literal-minded, but it strikes me as natural to suppose that normativity is the property that all and only normative things have, and things are normative if and only if they are norms. This agrees with Kelsen’s usage, although he uses the word ‘normativity’ very rarely (e. g. GTN 45 n114).4 More interesting and important, for present purposes, is that Kelsen regards the world of norms as co-extensive with the world of Oughts, and normativity, accordingly, as a property of all and only Oughts. I have given this contribution the title ‘Normativity’ partly because it helps us to focus on this Kelsenian doctrine. Norms, for Kelsen as for most students of the subject, are of various distinct types. In his terminology, each distinct type has a different ‘normative function’ (GTN 1.V). The main types of norms recognized and discussed by Kelsen (as by Hart, von Wright, Raz, and many other students of the subject5) are the obligation-imposing, power-conferring, and permission-granting types.6 Yet this variety of ‘normative functions’ lands He is more promiscuous with the word ‘normative’ which is used in as many as 45 of his 61 chapters. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford 1961), 26–32 (on obligations v powers) and 246n (on permissions); G. H. von Wright, Norm and Action (London 1963), ch V (on obligations v permissions) and ch X (on powers); Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (London 1975), chs 2 and 3. 6 Kelsen adds the ‘derogating’ type, but this seems to reflect a muddle on his part between the typology of norms and the sub-typology of normative powers. Derogating is exercising a power that makes an action permissible (either in the sense of removing an obligation or in the sense of yielding a separate permissive norm). See GTN 25.IV for evidence of the muddle. 4 5

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Kelsen with some unique terminological challenges. If, as Kelsen wants to say, the world of norms and the world of Oughts are co-extensive, then, as he points out, ‘the word “ought” is being used in a broader sense than is usual’ (GTN 25.II). More specifically: According to common usage, ‘ought’ corresponds only to commanding; ‘can’ corresponds to empowering and ‘may’ to permitting. We say ‘He “ought”’ only of the person to whom something is commanded; we say ‘He “may”’ of the person to whom something is permitted and ‘He “can”’ of the person empowered to do something. If we say that even an empowering norm decrees an ‘ought’ and that an ‘ought’ obtains even in the case of a permission  – since empowering and permitting are essentially related to an Ought  – then the word ‘ought’ expresses the three normative functions (commanding, empowering, and permitting). (GTN 25.II)

This is not what I find strange. What I find strange is not how broadly Kelsen uses the word ‘ought’, but by contrast how narrowly he uses it. Consider this passage: The norm which decrees a certain behaviour to be obligatory institutes a value. The judgement that some behaviour is ‘valuable’ or ‘has value’ (and in this sense, is ‘good’) means that this behaviour is decreed to be obligatory in a norm, is the content of an Ought. (GTN 16.III)

We will talk more about values below, and particularly about the relationship between obligation-norms and values that is suggested in the first sentence. But for present purposes, let’s think about the second sentence. It identifies the value or goodness of an action with the action’s obligatoriness. Thus there are no valuable or good non-obligatory actions. This seems extremely implausible. To take just one kind of valuable action thereby annihilated, what about supererogatory actions, also known as ‘actions beyond the call of duty’? Possibly Kelsen believes that there are no supererogatory actions. But that hardly seems to warrant his ruling out their existence by definition, such that anyone who thinks that there are supererogatory actions, and that it can be valuable to perform them, must be making a mistake about the very concept of value. Perhaps denying the intelligibility of belief in supererogation is not Kelsen’s only option. Instead he could conceivably invoke his ‘broader sense of the word “ought”’ and argue that supererogatory actions can be fitted into his normative taxonomy in a different place. They are actions that one is permitted not to perform. Now to fit them into his category of valuable actions he only has to make a minor modification: The judgement that some behaviour is ‘valuable’ or ‘has value’ (and in this sense, is ‘good’) means that this behaviour is decreed to be obligatory or permitted to be omitted in a norm.

We may agree with the proposal that supererogatory actions are actions that one is permitted not to perform. They are regulated, in that negative way, by a permissive

Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise)

norm.7 The difficulty is, however, that this is clearly not the feature of supererogatory actions that entails their value. Many actions are permitted to be omitted without being supererogatory and without any implications as to the value of performing them. Under the conditions of my train fare, I am permitted to break my journey overnight or not to do so, at my discretion. Nothing is implied about the value of doing either. True, breaking my journey overnight becomes supererogatory if, for example, I do it at the cost of some personal inconvenience to assist a stranger who is taken ill on the train. The value of the action lies in the assistance I thereby provide. Relative to that value, however, the permission not to perform the action is a surprise and a puzzle. It is even known among philosophers as ‘the problem of supererogation’.8 Given their value, why are supererogatory actions not obligatory? Why, in spite of that value, are they permitted to be omitted? The suggested modification to Kelsen’s claim about value turns this question upside down. It makes it the case that actions that one is permitted to omit are eo ipso valuable to perform. That is a crazy position to take. Of course Kelsen might challenge my example: he might say that my assisting the stranger on the train is an obligation, perhaps a moral obligation of which my legal permission to break my journey overnight happily facilitates the fulfilment. Then he is able to accommodate the case in his original formulation. But he has to be able to give this answer not only for this case but for all alleged cases of supererogation. And if he does, that brings him back to his original difficulty. He is not only denying that there are cases of supererogation. He is denying the intelligibility of the category. He is not solving the problem of supererogation but denying that there could possibly be any such problem. 3.

Reasons beyond norms

The problem of supererogation can be restated as a problem, not about values, but about reasons. Supererogatory actions are those that one has powerful (possibly decisive) reasons to perform, but that one is permitted not to perform because of the burden of performing them. There can also be actions that one has powerful (possibly decisive) reasons to perform but that one has no obligation to perform, never mind any permission not to perform them.9 Your severe symptoms give you decisive reasons to see your doctor, but you have no obligation to see her. Your love of Hitchcock gives For an influential analysis in these terms, see Joseph Raz, ‘Permissions and Supererogation’, American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975), 161. 8 Roderick Chisholm and Ernest Sosa, ‘Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of Supererogation’, Synthese 16 (1966), 321. 9 It follows that not every action that one has no duty to perform is ‘beyond the call of duty’ in the sense that can (in suitable cases) make its performance supererogatory. Only actions that one has no duty to perform and that one is permitted not to perform can be supererogatorily performed. Thus the kind of 7

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you decisive reasons to see the new print of Vertigo, but you have no obligation to see it. Of these actions one might say: they are actions that one ought to perform even though it is not the case that one ought to perform them. Putting it that way invites the charge of contradiction. But there is no contradiction. It is just that there is more than one sense in which we say of an action that it ought to be performed. Sometimes we mean that the action is obligatory; on other occasions we mean only that there are powerful, perhaps decisive, reasons to perform it. Kelsen does not discuss the latter case any more than he discusses the case of supererogation. That is because these are cases, if I may put it this way, of an ‘ought’ without any norm that corresponds to it. The action ought to be performed, and it is a valuable action to perform, but those facts hold irrespective of any ‘commanding, empowering, or permitting’ norm. Just as some deny that there can be supererogation, so some deny that there can be an action that one has decisive reason to perform but that one has no obligation to perform. Some utilitarians, for example, would subscribe to the view that I have an obligation to perform whichever action I have decisive reason to perform.10 But that is a substantive principle. It admits the conceptual distinction between having an obligation and having a decisive reason. Does Kelsen also admit it? To put it another way, does he admit the existence of actions that one ought to perform but not by virtue of any norm under which one ought to perform them? Perhaps he would say that, in the examples of the severe symptoms and of the new Hitchcock print, the way to go is to differentiate different normative points of view. One lacks both a moral obligation and a legal obligation, perhaps, but couldn’t it be that one falls under an analogously commanding norm from the point of view of prudence or from the point of view of aesthetic appreciation? Perhaps he would say that.11 But the answer does not solve his problem. That is because, in order to solve his problem, it is not enough for him to assimilate only decisive reasons to the world of norms. We need to know how to think about reasons more generally, whether decisive or not. Do they or do they not belong to the domain of Ought? So now we see the strange narrowness of Kelsen’s use of the word ‘ought’. If no norm, he says, then no ought. But what if, in spite of there being no norm, there are reasons? If I assert that you have a reason, probably not a decisive one, to eat a hot lunch on a winter’s day, where does my assertion stand in Kelsen’s ‘irreducible duality of Ought and Is’? Does it stand on the ‘Ought’ side or the ‘Is’ side?

permission involved in supererogation is not just absence of duty, which Kelsen calls ‘negative permission’ (GTN 31). It is the kind of permission that exists under a distinct permissive norm. 10 E. g. Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), 229; Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford 1991). 11 He turns to the metaphysics of ‘points of view’ for some similar purposes, e. g. in GTN 58 note 163.

Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise)

4.

Reasons with and without values

Ontologically, reasons are facts, and that may dispose one to place reasons on the ‘Is’ side. What reason do you have to eat a hot lunch on a winter’s day? The fact that a hot lunch will stop you shivering is one reason; the fact that a hot lunch will help keep winter flu at bay is another. But one may think that the ontological classification is a red herring. As Kelsen says: By the very nature of things, even a statement about a norm is an is-statement, a statement about the specific existence (an Is) of a norm (an Ought). But the ‘Is’ of an ‘Ought’, the existence of a norm, is something different from the existence of a fact; it is an ideel and not a ‘real’ Is or existence. (GTN 41)

So there is the fact that a norm exists (e. g. the fact of my obligation). That is different, thinks Kelsen from the fact of a ‘real’ fact’s existence. We may worry a little about the scare-quote-marks around ‘real’. But we may yet be tempted by the thought that the ‘“Is” of an “Ought”’ is something special, and we may think that in this respect the fact of the norm is no different from the fact that constitutes the reason. Both are facts only, so to speak, within the normative domain. They are something special, then, but what makes them special? It is tempting to return here to the relation with values. If I have a reason to φ, and a fortiori if my φing is obligatory, doesn’t that entail that there is some value in my φing? In Kelsen’s version: When a norm decrees behaviour to be obligatory, the actual behaviour which agrees with the norm can be judged (i. e. evaluated) as valuable or good, and the behaviour which does not agree with the norm as ‘disvaluable’ or bad. As was indicated previously, this norm institutes a value, if we mean by ‘value’ agreement with a norm and by ‘disvalue’ failure to agree with a norm. When a certain behaviour is objectively – i. e. purely cognitively – asserted to agree or not with a norm presupposed to be valid (and in this sense is evaluated), the norm serves as a standard of value. (GTN 30)

Notice that Kelsen is a deontologist, i. e. one who believes that the norm institutes the value, rather than the value instituting the norm. Be that as it may, we may think that what makes the “‘Is’ of the ‘Ought’” into something special is the place of value in it. Where there are reasons and norms there are values, and that is what takes reasons and norms out of ‘ordinary’ facticity. Thus: The duality of Is and Ought coincides with that of reality and value. … In the case of an objective value-judgment, the value cannot … be understood as a property of reality, as a colour is a real property of a real object. That something real is objectively ‘valuable’ means that an Is agrees with an Ought. (GTN 16.III)

Again, we may worry about the possibly tendentious use of the world ‘real’ here. But making a value-realist attack on Kelsen is not our immediate priority. Instead, our

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question is whether the domain of Ought is coextensive with the domain of value, once we are thinking of both norms and reasons as belonging to the domain of Ought. The answer is that it is not. Consider epistemic reasons, reasons to believe. That I have reasons to believe P, even decisive reasons to believe P, does not entail or even suggest that there is any value in my believing P. My belief that it is a warm day outside may be supported by evidence (people are walking by without coats), by testimony (I was told by my friend who visited earlier), and by perception (I can feel the warm air through the window). I have decisive reasons to believe that the day is warm. But what is the value of my believing this, while I lie incapacitated in my hospital bed? Perhaps the belief only adds to the curse of my incapacitation. Likewise, while I am bed-ridden, what is the value of my believing that the bus to town will be leaving in seven minutes, or that today there is a strike on the railways? There is no value in my believing either of these things since I am not going anywhere and I don’t have anyone else who is going anywhere to whom I could impart the information. And yet I have decisive reasons to believe both of these things: for both the bus timetable and the local newspaper are right here on my bedside table. Epistemic reasons, to put it crudely, are reasons that do not correspond to any value in the thing that they are reasons for. Could we not say that the truth of one’s beliefs is a value in its own right, and that this is the value served by epistemic reasons? Kelsen rightly rejects this option: ‘Good’ is a value, a moral or legal value, according to whether it is a moral or a legal norm which institutes this value. If we also conceive of truth as a ‘value’, as a logical or theoretical value (as opposed to a moral or legal value which is a practical value), we might believe that the desired parallel or analogy between a statement and a norm can be justified by the claim that both are related in some way to values. But this is not possible: there is no parallel or analogy between the being-true of a statement and the being-good of behaviour, between the judgment that a statement is true and the judgment that behaviour is morally or legally good. The latter is a genuine value-judgment, but not the former. (GTN 45.I)

But this leaves Kelsen with a difficulty. What are we to say about epistemic reasons, reasons to believe? Being reasons that do not correspond to value in what they are reasons for, do they belong to the domain of Ought or the domain of Is? Kelsen offers no answer. He says nothing about epistemic reasons or epistemic norms. In developing his view that truth is not a value, he thinks only of logic, not epistemology. He concludes that the so-called norms of logic are not truly norms: There do not exist any norms of logic prescribing that statements are to be true, and thus instituting truth as a logical value. Logic is not a ‘normative’ science. … Acts of thought as such are not subject to any norms at all (GTN 45.III)

Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise)

We may regard the claim that the norms of logic are not truly norms as a reductio.12 It shows only that Kelsen’s General Theory of Norms is not an explanation of norms in general, but only of a certain specialised type of norms. Be that as it may, the omission of attention to epistemic norms raises independent doubts about Kelsen’s bold conclusion. Cannot a belief be unjustified? Cannot a believer be biased, gullible, superstitious, prejudiced in her reasoning towards her beliefs? Are these not faults relative to her cognition of truth? And if they are faults, should Kelsen not also say that they constitute or entail epistemic norm-violations, notwithstanding that truth is not a value? 5.

Normativity deconflated

Allow me to recap. The distinction between the world of norms and what lies outside it does not correspond to the distinction between the world of reasons and what lies outside it, for there are reasons beyond norms, for example those that tell in favour of supererogatory action. The distinction between the world of reasons and what lies outside it does not correspond to the distinction between the world of value and what lies outside it, for there are epistemic reasons as well as practical ones. Finally, for completeness, the distinction between the world of norms and what lies outside it does not correspond to the distinction between the world of values and what lies outside it, for there are epistemic norms as well as epistemic reasons, and neither corresponds to any kind of epistemic value. There are three quite different distinctions here. Kelsen conflates them. But now we know they are different: Which, we may wonder, constitutes the ‘irreducible duality’ of Ought and Is? Now that we know that there are three different distinctions in the neighbourhood, should we still agree with Kelsen’s claim that The difference between Is and Ought cannot be explained any further: We are immediately aware of the difference (GTN 17)

6.

The special problem of legal normativity

Many contemporary philosophers fret about normativity, and in particular about how normativity is possible.13 But often they are not fretting about normativity in my literal-minded sense, i. e. about the property or properties in virtue of which a norm is a norm. Often their concerns extend beyond norms to reasons that are not norms. In framing a question about reasons, irrespective of whether they are norms, one might But cf Gilbert Harman, ‘Logic and Reasoning’, Synthese 60 (1984), 107. For some recent high-quality fretting, see David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro, and Kevin Toh, Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (Oxford 2019).

12 13

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expect them to have used the word ‘rationality’ instead of the word ‘normativity’. They might have asked: How is rationality possible? But that would be a rather misleading way to express their question. For the word ‘rationality’ is widely used to designate the capacity or propensity to respond to reasons, to follow reasons, or to use reasons in one’s reasoning. In this sense it is a property, not of the reason, but of the reason-user. By contrast, the word ‘normativity’ is not in everyday use so it can be given a technical meaning for philosophical purposes. And perhaps the technical meaning is something like this. Normativity designates the property or properties in virtue of which a reason is a reason. Or, to put it differently, normativity is what differentiates a fact that is a reason from a fact that is not a reason. I said that many philosophers writing about normativity fret about how normativity is possible. They are attempting, we may now think, to address deep doubts about the very possibility of reasons. The doubts, however, come from two contrasting directions, reflected in two contrasting literatures. Among philosophers of law, the doubts are mainly about how so-called ‘legal reasons’ can possibly qualify as reasons. After all, as Kelsen and others taught us, law is a human creation. It is found in or supervenes upon legislative acts, judicial decisions, and customary practices. It is therefore morally fallible. At least sometimes it purports to give us reasons to act which are morally invalid and which, apart from fidelity to the law, there is no reason to treat as reasons. In that case fidelity to the law is surely irrational. So why do we classify legal reasons as reasons? Why not go straight to the moral reasons, relative to which these so-called legal reasons turn out to be nothing but extremely unreliable intermediaries? Call this the ‘special problem of legal normativity’. You will see right away that the special problem of legal normativity is not one that could be encountered by Kelsen. That is because Kelsen regards morality as just another normative order operating with a given social space: Morality is just as much a social order as law, and an individual is just as subject to the morality which is valid in the social group to which he belongs as he is subject to the law which is valid in the social group to which he belongs. (GTN 1 note 4)

Like law, morality is a human creation. Law does not answer to morality any more than morality answers to law. Nor is there any third thing to which both law and morality answer: The Natural Law … is [supposed to be] … a system of norms which is immanent in nature and which is posited by the will of nature. There is, and there can be, no such law. The name ‘Natural Law’ is given to whatever appears just to a given Natural Law teacher, which he then projects onto ‘nature’ in order to give it the necessary authority. (GTN 35 note 90)

Those who worry about the special problem of legal normativity think, on the contrary, that there is something, a set of reasons beyond the law, to which the law must answer. Morality is the name generally given to this set of reasons.

Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise)

One might say that, for Kelsen, both law and morality are relative, whereas for those who worry about the special problem of legal normativity, law is relative whereas morality is real. Those who worry about the special problem of legal normativity worry about how relative reasons are possible, given the existence of real reasons. What space could there be in rational thought for reasons that lack the status of real reasons? There is no such problem for Kelsen, since the relative is, so to speak, as real as anything in the domain of Ought ever gets. Everything there is valid only relative to some system of norms. There is no normative reality beyond that. Remember Kelsen’s rebuke: [T]he ‘Is’ of an ‘Ought’, the existence of a norm, is something different from the existence of a fact; it is an ideel and not a ‘real’ Is or existence. (GTN 41)

These words, however, tend to suggest a problem with talk of the ‘real’ and the ‘relative’. It is not totally clear what is meant by either term. Even Kelsen must resort to scarequotes around the word ‘real’ to convey that fact. Elsewhere, responding to that terminological problem, I have suggested a different way of formulating the special problem of legal normativity. I have suggested that we think of legal reasons as escapable and moral reasons as inescapable.14 The idea is that there is an intelligible question of why I should follow, or even pay attention to, legal reasons. Further reasons, not local to the law, are needed for caring about what the law says. That is the sense in which legal reasons are escapable. But there is no intelligible question of why I should follow, and more generally pay attention to, moral reasons. No further reason is called for. They are among the reasons that are mine to follow, and more generally to attend to, just in virtue of my being a rational agent, i. e. an agent with the capacity to follow and attend to reasons. Formulated in these terms, the special problem of legal normativity becomes: Why attend to these so-called escapable reasons, given that not doing so is ex hypothesi not irrational? Why not just follow the inescapable reasons, such as the moral ones, directly? I already hinted at the answer. For escapable reasons, the question arises of why I should follow them or more generally pay attention to them. The answer to that ‘why’ question needs to be given, ultimately, in terms of inescapable reasons. But it does not follow that one could leap straight to the inescapable reasons and ignore the escapable ones. Suppose I am advised to follow the law, or I promise to conform to the law, or I debate whether I have an obligation to obey the law, or I warrant that I am acting within the law, or I take on a role that requires me to support the rule of law. Naturally there

John Gardner, ‘Nearly Natural Law’, American Journal of Jurisprudence 52 (2007), 1, reprinted with minor corrections in my book Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford 2012). In his ‘Escapable Law: John Gardner on Law and Morality’, Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (forthcoming) Leslie Green makes some telling criticisms of the escapable/inescapable distinction as I originally presented it. I have presented it here in a way that is supposed to steer clear of most of his criticisms. However a couple of criticisms in section 3 of his paper do strike me as rather relativistic and I make no attempt to steer clear of these! 14

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arise questions about the soundness of the advice, the bindingness of the promise, the basis of the obligation, the truth of my warranty and the legitimacy of the role. These questions arise at the level of inescapable reasons. But if there are such reasons they refer to the law, which ex hypothesi a system of escapable reasons. The relevant question is whether I have any inescapable reasons to resort to certain escapable reasons. The escapable reasons do not become redundant just because there is a question of whether I have inescapable reasons to resort to them. On the contrary: it is only if they are not redundant – i. e. if resorting to them would make some difference – that I could possibly have inescapable reasons to resort to them. There can be no reason to resort to anything if resorting to it makes no rational difference. Some people seem to be squeamish about calling escapable reasons, such as legal reasons, ‘reasons’. Much ink was spilt among philosophers of law over the ages in trying to establish that either legal reasons are inescapable or they are not reasons at all. But why so? Presumably those who are squeamish about calling escapable reasons ‘reasons’ would also be squeamish about calling escapable norms ‘norms’. Here they could learn from Kelsen. Since Kelsen thought all norms escapable, his work provides a test case for the cogency of the view that escapable norms are norms. One may think, as I think, that he got a lot of things about norms wrong, including quite a few things about legal norms. But one thing that he clearly did not get wrong is that legal norms are norms in spite of being escapable (or ‘relative’) norms. Why be more squeamish about calling escapable reasons ‘reasons’ than one would be about calling escapable norms ‘norms’? Is it is a norm of Monopoly that one must pay rent if one lands on another player’s property. So there is a reason, so far as playing Monopoly goes, to pay such rent. Naturally that does not allow one to avoid the further question of whether one has any reason to play Monopoly. It is just that such a reason, which ultimately needs to be inescapable, makes essential reference to the escapable reasons given by Monopoly itself. For it is ex hypothesi a reason to play Monopoly, with all its crazy norms and bizarre reasons (all fortunately escapable). 7.

The special problem of moral normativity

If all this is right, then the special problem of legal normativity is not so much of a problem. It is a storm in a teacup. So we turn our attention now to doubts that come from precisely the opposite direction. They are doubts about what I call inescapable reasons. How can there be such things? How can any reason, or for that matter any norm, have such a hold over us? This might be called the ‘special problem of moral normativity’ for it is most often raised in connection with moral reasons and moral norms. But that already shows where one error is creeping in. For the same question arises with various other kinds of reasons and norms. It arises with respect to prudential reasons and norms, for example. How can my own future have such a hold over me

Normativity (in Kelsen and otherwise)

that I ought to keep an eye on my own health and my own pension? An interesting feature of some writing that treats moral normativity as a special problem is that it treats prudential normativity as fait accompli, and attempts (often in a contractarian spirit) to build moral normativity out of it.15 But such a line of argument is hard to maintain for long. What problem does morality throw up on this front that prudence does not? Both moral and prudential reasons and norms have an inescapable hold over rational beings, and inescapability is supposed to be the puzzling feature of reasons that is being explored under the heading of ‘normativity’. More importantly, perhaps, the same question arises with respect to epistemic reasons and epistemic norms. For they too are inescapable.16 There is no intelligible question of why I should follow them. No further reason is called for. They are among the reasons that are mine to follow, and more generally to attend to, just in virtue of my being a rational agent, i. e. an agent with the capacity to follow and to attend to reasons. Why is the intense worry about the normativity of moral reasons not paralleled, then, by a no less intense worry about the normativity of epistemic reasons? This is a particularly important challenge if we think that what we are looking for is some mysterious ingredient X that differentiates a fact that is a reason from a fact that is not a reason. For surely all facts are epistemic reasons. Any fact that we become aware of supports the inference to some further belief beyond belief in that very fact. Everything is evidence of something else. If that is true, and if we accept that normativity in the relevant sense is a property of facts that are inescapable reasons, then there is no ingredient X that must be added to a fact to turn it into a reason. Rather, the question turns into this one: why is this particular fact a reason for this particular response? And that is not a problem unique to inescapable reasons. Even of legal reasons and Monopoly reasons we have the problem of why this legal or ludic fact is a reason for that response by a competent reason-user. This is surely not a problem of normativity but of relevance. It is not about how reasons can have their inescapable hold over us. It is about what is to be done with them once (inescapably or otherwise) they have their hold over us. It is about what rationalises what. Thinking about epistemic reasons alongside moral reasons has another advantage in defusing worries about moral normativity. It is part of the nature of a belief, as opposed

A no-nonsense example is David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement (Oxford 1987): ‘Morality, we shall argue, can be generated as a rational constraint from the non-moral [=prudential] premisses of rational choice’ (4). 16 Brian Leiter writes: ‘Even in the theoretical domain, there is no real normativity, no norms of belief … the agent must adhere to.’ Leiter, ‘Normativity for Naturalists’, Philosophical Issues 25 (2016), 64 at 75. This is perhaps an attempt to deny the inescapability of epistemic reasons and norms. If so it is misleadingly put. That epistemic reasons and norms are inescapable does not mean that any particular epistemic reason or norm is inescapable. Probably there is room for diversity in approach or technique in arriving at defensible beliefs. Defensibly, some rely more heavily on testimony, some on perception, etc. That is compatible with the inescapability (or what Leiter calls ‘real normativity’) of epistemic reasons and norms taken as a set. 15

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to delusions, flights of fancy, etc. that it responds to reasons for believing. If one is not believing for reasons then one is not exactly believing. Of course sometimes one may get the reasons wrong. But even then there is the question of whether one gets the reasons wrong for reasons. Did one miss the evidence, or misperceive what was going on, for a reason? Responsiveness to the world – to the facts – is part of what it takes to be a believer. Belief, in that sense, entails rationality. Is this not equally true with action? How can one act without intending? And how can one intend if not by acting for what one takes to be reasons? And if one mistakes what are not reasons for reasons, again there is the question of whether one did so for reasons. As lawyers put it, if not justified was one at least excused? Again these are questions that presuppose that we are dealing with rational beings, beings with the capacity and the propensity for paying attention to and making use of reasons. And there we have the answer to the supposed problem of the normativity of moral reasons. As rational beings we cannot but engage with reasons, at any rate the inescapable ones. And among inescapable reasons, moral reasons are nothing special in respect of their inescapability. Their hold over us as rational beings is no different from the hold of prudential reasons, epistemic reasons, and various other inescapable reasons. I say that moral reasons and epistemic reasons are alike in respect of their hold over us. But we already know that they are unalike in another way. Where there are reasons for action there is value in our doing as they would have us do. Where there are reasons for belief, there need be no value in our believing as they would have us believe. If there is something to discuss in ethics that does not equally arise in epistemology, it is that. Could it be that those who believe in the existence of a special problem of moral normativity are really just worried about the place of value in the world? If so, their problem does not extend to epistemology, but it does still extend to prudence, and one wonders why they regard it as a special problem for morality. But one may also ask whether the problem is as intimately connected with our place in the world as the talk of ‘normativity’ leads one to expect. For there is value in the world whether or not there are extant valuers to experience it. The question is not how value comes to be relevant to us or how we come to be locked into engaging with it. We are rational beings, to whom (hence) reasons apply, including practical reasons, which by their nature bring us into constant encounters with the value all around us. The problem, rather, is in the nature of the world. I am not sure that we are well-served by thinking of this as a problem of norms and normativity, or even of reasons and rationality. It is a mistake to think that value is there for the sake of valuers. Valuers, on the contrary, are there for the sake of value.17 If the special problem of moral normativity is really the quite different problem of the existence of value, then I think we should be told.

Tim Macklem and I explore this theme further (and with more subtlety) in ‘Value, Interest and Well-Being’, Utilitas 18 (2006), 362. 17

Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System of Non-Positivism ROBERT ALEXY*

Abstract: Hans Kelsen is a positivist. This, however, does not mean that his ideas are without significance for non-positivism. The opposite is the case. Non-positivism, as a theory of existing law, is necessarily a theory of the dual nature of law, that is, of its real or factual dimension as well as its ideal or critical dimension. This implies that non-positivism necessarily includes elements of positivism. At this point the question arises as to which kind of positivism best fits with non-positivism. The answer to this question is Kelsen’s positivism. Keywords: Positivism, non-positivism, Hans Kelsen’s non-naturalism, basic norm, norma-

tivity, non-positivistic basic norm Schlagworte: Positivismus, Nichtpositivismus, Hans Kelsens Nichtnaturalismus, Grund-

norm, Normativität, nichtpositivistische Grundnorm

Some months before his death on January 7, 2018, Ralf Dreier published an article with the title “Integratives Verstehen  – eine Bilanz” (Integrative Understanding  – a Balance). There he takes stock of his intellectual life. We read that he has fluctuated not only between Habermas and Luhmann but especially between Kant and Hegel, and also between Kelsen and Radbruch.1 We learn that the Kelsen-Radbruch fluctuation concerned him not only over a long period of time, but, indeed, right up to the day he wrote the article.2 These fluctuations can be understood in two ways: first, as an oscillation between all-or-nothing alternatives, that is, either to accept all the theses I should like to thank Stanley L. Paulson for suggestions and advice on matters of English style. Ralf Dreier, Integratives Verstehen  – eine Bilanz, in: Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie Robert Alexys System, ed. Martin Borowski, Stanley L. Paulson, and Jan Sieckmann, Tübingen 2017, 586. 2 Ibid., 583. * 1

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essential for Kelsen or to accept all the theses essential for Radbruch, or, second, as an attempt to connect elements from both camps. The concept of integrative understanding in the title of Dreier’s article points in the direction of connection. Still, talk about connections, like talk about middle ways in general, is of little value if the connections are not constructed in a sufficiently precise way. To contribute to such a construction is the purpose of my paper. I.

The System of Non-Positivism

Kelsen is a positivist, Radbruch a non-positivist. Positivism and non-positivism are two theses that contradict each other. Positivism says that there exists no necessary connection between law and morality. Non-positivism says that there does exist a necessary connection between law and morality. If one could say nothing more about positivism and non-positivism than this, there would be little reason to enquire about connections between positivism and non-positivism. Fortunately, one can, and, indeed, must say more. One way to do so is to relate elements of Kelsen’s legal theory to elements of the system of non-positivism. All positivistic conceptions of the nature of law refer to two, and only two, elements of the definition of law: authoritative issuance and social efficacy. These two elements concern the real or factual dimension of law. All serious non-positivistic conceptions add to these real or factual elements a third element. It refers to the ideal or critical dimension of law: moral correctness, first and foremost justice.3 This is the thesis of the dual nature of law.4 The dual-nature thesis connects a positive side of law with a non-positive side. With this, the path leading to a construction of the connection of elements of Kelsen’s theory and non-positivism is opened. But to open a path is different from traveling on it. For this, a look at the system of non-positivism is indispensable. The system of non-positivism consists of a center, a conceptual framework, and implications based on both. 1.

The Centre: Claim to Correctness

The centre or the Archimedean point of the system of non-positivism is the argument from correctness.5 This argument says that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness, and that this claim refers not only to the real dimension of law, but also to its ideal Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice A Reply to Legal Positivism (first pub. 1992), trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford 2002, 3–4. 4 Robert Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law, Ratio Juris 23 (2010), 167. 5 See on this Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above). 35–9. 3

Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System of Non-Positivism

dimension,6 that is, to moral correctness, first and foremost to justice.7 The argument from correctness is the source of the necessary connection between law and morality. Thus, it is not surprising, that many objections have been raised against it.8 These objections cannot be discussed here. In the present context, only one point is of interest. Kelsen apparently ascribes a certain thesis to all forms of non-positivism, namely, the idea “that an immoral social system is not law presupposes an absolute morality, that is to say, a morality that is valid everywhere and at all times”.9 This idea of Kelsen’s seems to refer to a morality that is connected with three universal quantifiers, that is, with three “alls”: all places in space, all points in time, and  – although not explicit, this is implicit in the sentence quoted – all moral questions. I completely agree with Kelsen that such a morality does not exist and, therefore, cannot be the result of “scientific cognition”.10 But this most radical form of moral cognitivism is by no means a presupposition of the claim to correctness thesis, and, thereby, of non-positivism. To be sure, the claim to correctness thesis would lose its sense if everywhere everything were always morally possible. In this case, nothing but decisions – in Kelsen’s theory, decisions backed by empowerment – would rule the agenda. Countering this decision thesis, however, there is the argumentation thesis. It says that rational argumentation on moral questions is possible, for there exists a system of rules, principles, and forms of rational practical discourse.11 Discourse theory does not say that there exists just one right answer in all cases. But it says that some answers are discursively necessary, some discursively impossible, and some merely discursively possible. Discursively necessary is what is required by the rules of discourse either directly or indirectly, that is, with reference to the procedure of discourse. Human rights and democracy belong here.12 Discursively impossible is what is excluded by the rules of discourse. The racial principle

Robert Alexy, Legal Certainty and Correctness, Ratio Juris 28 (2015), 444. Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law (n. 4 above), 168–72. See, for instance, Eugenio Bulygin, Alexy und das Richtigkeitsargument, in: Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirklichkeit Festschrift für Werner Krawietz, ed. Aulis Aarnio, Stanley L. Paulson, Ota Weinberger, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Dieter Wyduckel, Berlin 1993, 19–24; Robert Alexy, Bulygins Kritik des Richtigkeitsarguments in: Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory Festschrift for Carlos E Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin, ed. Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Werner Krawietz, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Ruth Zimmerling, Berlin 1997, 235–50; Eugenio Bulygin, Alexy’s Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality, Ratio Juris 13 (2000), 133–7; Robert Alexy, On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin’s Critique, Ratio Juris 13 (2000), 138–47; Eugenio Bulygin, Alexy Between Positivism and Non-positivism, in: Neutrality and Theory of Law, ed. Jordi Ferrer Beltrán, José Juan Moreso, and Diego M. Papayannis, Dordrecht 2013, 49–59; Robert Alexy, Between Positivism and Non-positivism? A Third Reply to Eugenio Bulygin, in: Neutrality and Theory of Law (this note), 225–38. 9 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. (from the 2nd German Edition, 1960) Max Knight, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967, 68. 10 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 63. 11 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (first pub. 1978), trans. Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick, Oxford 1989, 187–206. 12 Robert Alexy, Discourse Theory and Human Rights, Ratio Juris 9 (1996), 220–33. 6 7 8

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(Rassenprinzip) and the leader principle (Führerprinzip), as constitutive for the Third Reich, belong here. Discursively merely possible is what can be justified without violation of discourse rules, although the contrary can also be justified without violation of discourse rules. This applies to the abstract level, which concerns, inter alia, human rights as such, as well as to the concrete level, which concerns, in the case of human rights, first and foremost, their application by means of proportionality analysis.13 The broad area of mere discursive possibility, which comprises what Rawls calls “reasonable disagreement”14, does not deprive the claim to correctness of its sense. To be sure, when a case cannot be resolved by argument, a decision becomes necessary, in courts and parliaments normally a majority decision. This is a solution that belongs to the real dimension of law. But with the claim to correctness, the ideal dimension remains alive as a regulative idea. Correctness as a regulative idea implies that the institutional resolution of disagreement remains open for future argumentation.15 2.

Conceptual Framework: Two Elements

Conceptual frameworks can be more or less elaborated. Here, only two elements are of interest: the distinction between the observer’s and the participant’s perspective and the distinction between classifying and qualifying connections between law and morality. a)

Observer’s and Participant’s Perspective

The distinction between the observer’s and the participant’s perspective16 is of fundamental importance for the construction of the relation between positivism and non-positivism. In the system of non-positivism, the perspective of the observer is, with one small exception,17 a positivistic perspective, in contrast to the perspective of the participant which is essentially a non-positivistic perspective. The observer asks questions about and adduces arguments on behalf of a position that reflects how legal questions are actually decided in a legal system, whereas the participant asks questions about and adduces arguments on behalf of what he deems to be the correct answer to a Robert Alexy, The Absolute and the Relative Dimension of Constitutional Rights, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 37 (2017), 46–7. 14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York 1993, 55. 15 Alexy, The Absolute and the Relative Dimension of Constitutional Rights (n. 13 above), 47. 16 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 25. 17 This exception results from the claim to correctness. A system of social rules that does not raise a claim to correctness is not a legal system; Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 34. This conceptual truth concerns, first, the ideal dimension and is, second, inevitable even for one who qualifies himself solely as an observer. 13

Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System of Non-Positivism

legal question in the legal system in which he finds himself. The observer’s perspective is defined by the question “How are legal decisions actually made?” the participant’s by the question “What is the correct legal answer?” These two questions require different kinds of arguments. The observer is confined to fact-based arguments, whereas the participant, say, a judge, has to adduce, alongside fact-based arguments, normative arguments that are not fact-based. This applies to all cases that, owing to the “open texture”18 of law, cannot be resolved solely on the basis of fact-based arguments.19 (1)

The Relation between the Two Perspectives

The relation between the two perspectives is asymmetrical, and this for two reasons. First, all participants must also be observers. Otherwise they could not apply the positive law. In contrast to this, it is possible to be an observer without being a participant, that is, to be a pure observer. The second reason for asymmetry is that a legal system can exist without pure observers, but not without participants. This implies that the participant’s perspective is more fundamental than that of the pure observer. (2)

Naturalistic and Normativistic Positivism

There exist two kinds of pure observers: naturalistic and normativistic pure observers, and, therefore, two kinds of NP ¬NP positivism: naturalistic and normativistic positivism. All normativistic positivists are non-naturalistic positivists. That is to say, naturalistic and normativistic positivism stand in the relation of contradictoriness. If one adds non-positivism to this, one can formulate a triad in which non-positivism ¬P stands both to naturalistic positivism and to non-naturalistic or normativistic positivism in the relation of contrariness: “P” stands here for “positivism”, “N” for “naturalistic”, and “¬” for negation. One might call this triad the “naturalism triad”.

H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3nd edn., Oxford 2012, 128. The distinction between the observer’s and the participant’s perspective has been criticized from the positivistic as well as from the non-positivistic side. See, on the one hand, Joseph Raz, The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism, in: Law, Rights and Discourse The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy, ed. George Pavlakos, Oxford 2007, 22–5, and, on the other hand, John Finnis, Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law’s “Ideal Dimension”, The American Journal of Jurisprudence 59 (2014), 86–90. On replies to this, see Alexy, An Answer to Joseph Raz, in: Law, Rights and Discourse (this note), 45–8, and Robert Alexy, The Ideal Dimension of Law, in: The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence, ed. George Duke and Robert P. George, Cambridge 2017, 324–5.

18 19

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The question arises: Which of the two positivistic contraries to non-positivism fits better into the system of non-positivism? The answer is easy: non-naturalistic positivism. Karl Olivecrona is a paradigmatic representative of naturalism. In his book “Law as Fact”, published in 1939, Olivecrona maintains, with an eye to Kelsen, that “[t]he rules of law are a natural cause – among others – of the actions of the judges in cases of litigation as well as of the behaviour in general of people in relation to each other”.20 One might call this the “natural cause thesis”. In contrast to this, Kelsen, in the first edition of his “Reine Rechtslehre”, published in 1934, defines “law as norm”,21 and norm as “meaning”,22 and the “unique sense” of this meaning as “ought”, and “ought” as a “category”.23 This is the language in which abstract entities are described. Kelsen insists that norms – and thus, law – can be reduced neither to physical events nor to psychical processes. They belong not to natural reality but to an “ideal reality”.24 Such an ideal reality, which exists in addition to the physical and the psychical world, would be a “third realm”25 in the sense of Frege. One might call this the “meaning content thesis”. With its reference to Frege’s “third realm” or Kelsen’s “ideal reality”, the meaning content thesis is a rather strong ontological thesis. Its correctness depends on the fourth concept of Kelsen’s line of concepts used to determine what law is: norm, meaning, ought, and category. The concept of category leads to the problem of the basic norm. This will be our theme in the last part of this article. Here, only one point is of interest: the competition between naturalistic and non-naturalistic positivism. This competition is decided by the claim to correctness, which stands in the centre of non-positivism. The claim to correctness is necessarily connected with argumentation or justification. Correct is what can be justified. Justification is an inferential enterprise.26 A correct or rational performance of an inference has to proceed according to the rules of logic. The rules of logic, however, cannot be directly applied to natural facts. They can only be applied to propositions, be they propositions about what is, be they propositions about what ought to be. I would like to call this the “propositionality thesis”. This implies that naturalistic positivism, as represented by Olivcecrona, is as such incompatible with non-positivism, whereas non-naturalistic positivism, as represented by Kelsen, is, in this respect, compatible. In short, the system of non-positivism includes Kelsen’s non-naturalism.

Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact, Copenhagen and London 1939, 16 (emphasis by R. A.). Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (first pub. 1934), trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford 1992, 13. 22 Ibid., 11, 13–4. 23 Ibid., 24. 24 Ibid., 15. 25 Gottlob Frege, The Thought: A Logical Inquiry, in: Philosophical Logic, ed. P. F. Strawson, Oxford 1967, 29. 26 Robert Alexy, The Nature of Legal Philosophy, Ratio Juris 17 (2004), 162. 20 21

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b)

Classifying and Qualifying Connections

The second element of the conceptual framework to be considered here is the distinction between classifying and qualifying connections between law and morality. This distinction concerns the effects of moral defects. The effect of a classifying connection is the loss of legal validity. By contrast, the effect of a qualifying connection is legal defectiveness or incorrectness that does not, however, undermine legal validity.27 The decisive point here is that the effect of moral defectiveness or incorrectness is legal defectiveness or incorrectness. That morally defective laws are morally defective is a trivial truth. A positivist has no problem agreeing with this. But that these laws are, over and above this, also legally defective is not only not trivial but, indeed, is of the greatest significance for the relation between the real and the ideal dimension of law, and this not only for theoretical reasons, but also for reasons practical in nature. If the defect were merely a moral one, it would be difficult to explain why a higher court – independently of what the positive law says – has legal power to set aside the unjust decision of a lower court in a case in which this unjust decision is every bit as compatible with positive law as a just decision would be.28 3.

Implications

The distinction between the classifying and the qualifying connection implies that three kinds of non-positivism have to be distinguished: exclusive, super-inclusive, and inclusive non-positivism.29 a)

Exclusive Non-Positivism

Exclusive non-positivism is the most radical version of non-positivism. It claims that every injustice, every moral defect of a norm, precludes its being legally valid, its being law. A classical version of this view is expressed by Augustine’s statement that “a law

Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 26. Alexy, The Ideal Dimension of Law (n. 19 above), 327. The logical relations between these three forms of non-positivism can be described by means of the quantifier triad. See on this Robert Alexy, Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights, Ratio Juris 25 (2012), 4–7. 27 28 29

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that is not just would not seem to me to be a law”.30 A recent example is Beyleveld and Brownsword’s thesis “that immoral rules are not legally valid”.31 Kelsen attributes to non-positivism the thesis “that social norms must have a moral content, must be just in order to be considered as law”.32 This attribution is correct with respect to exclusive non-positivism, but incorrect with respect to super-inclusive and inclusive non-positivism. And the argument, already considered,33 concerning the limits of moral knowledge, which he connects with this attribution, is correct, too, but correct only as an argument against exclusive non-positivism, the most vulnerable form of non-positivism. It is not correct as an argument against super-inclusive and inclusive non-positivism. Both acknowledge the limits of moral argumentation, that is, the broad area of mere discursive possibility or reasonable disagreement. That is to say, non-positivism is not destructed by Kelsen’s destruction of exclusive non-positivism. b)

Super-Inclusive Non-Positivism

Super-inclusive non-positivism is the radical counterpart of exclusive non-positivism. Super-inclusive non-positivism goes to the other extreme. It maintains that legal validity is in no way whatever affected by moral defects. At first glance this seems to be a version of positivism, not of non-positivism. This first impression, however, is wrong for two reasons. The first results from the distinction between classifying and qualifying connections which plays a central role in the system of non-positivism. Even if legal validity is in no case affected by moral incorrectness, that is, no classifying effect is assumed in any case of moral defectiveness, a qualifying effect can be assumed in all cases of moral incorrectness, namely legal defectiveness. Strong tendencies in this direction are to be found in the work of Aquinas, Kant, and Finnis.34 But this issue shall not be pursued here. The second reason for the non-identity of super-inclusive non-positivism with positivism is that super-inclusive non-positivism is compatible with moral reasons for legal validity, positivism, as related only to the real or factual dimension of law, not. Both reasons will play an important role in answering the question of whether a basic norm is possible as well as necessary not only in Kelsen’s non-naturalistic positivism but also in the system of non-positivism. This is the basic

Augustinus. De libero arbitrio – Der freie Wille, trans. and ed. Johannes Brachtendorf, Paderborn 2006, 86: “Nam lex mihi esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit” (I, 11). 31 Deryck Beylevld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, Oxford 2001, 76. 32 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 64 (trans. alt.). See further Kelsen’s interpretation of non-positivism as the “thesis that law is moral according to its nature”, ibid., 68 (trans. alt). 33 Above, 31–2. 34 Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law (n. 4 above), 176; Alexy, Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights (n. 29 above), 6. 30

Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System of Non-Positivism

norm question. This question cannot be answered without reference to the third form of non-positivism, inclusive non-positivism. c)

Inclusive Non-Positivism

Inclusive non-positivism claims neither that moral defects always undermine legal validity nor that they never do. Following the Radbruch formula,35 inclusive non-positivism maintains that moral defects undermine legal validity if and only if the threshold of extreme injustice is transgressed. Injustice below this threshold is included in the concept of law as defective but valid law. All three forms of non-positivism can be reconstructed as solutions to the competition between two principles: the principle of legal certainty and the principle of justice. Exclusive non-positivism gives unconditional precedence to justice, super-inclusive non-positivism to legal certainty. Serious objections can be raised to both claims.36 The situation is different in the case of inclusive non-positivism; it establishes a conditional precedence to justice in cases of extreme injustice.37 With this, the question how the Radbruch formula is related to Kelsen’s basic norm enters the picture. II.

Basic Norm

With his basic norm, Kelsen tries to overcome two positions to which the pure theory of law stands in fundamental opposition: naturalism on the one hand and non-positivism on the other. 1.

Basic Norm and “Ought”

The main concern of Kelsen’s confrontation with naturalism is the transformation of an “is” into an “ought”, the main concern of his confrontation with non-positivism is to achieve this transformation without having any recourse to morality, that is, his aim is to establish normativity without morality.

Robert Alexy, A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula, in: Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 8th edn., ed. M.D.A. Freeman, London 2008, 426–8; Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 40–62. 36 Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law (n. 4 above),176. 37 Alexy, Legal Certainty and Correctness (n. 6 above), 445–7. 35

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Kelsen speaks, with respect to the formal structure of his solution of the “is”  – “ought” problem, of a “syllogism”38 which he further qualifies as a “normative syllogism”.39 This syllogism can be called “basic norm syllogism”.40 In The Argument from Injustice, I reconstructed this syllogism as follows.41 The “is” is represented by the first premise: (1) Constitution C has in fact been issued and is socially efficacious.

The “ought” is expressed, inter alia, by the conclusion: (3) It is legally prescribed that one behave in accordance with constitution C.

(3) does not follow logically from (1). For this reason, one has to introduce a further premise which makes the transition from (1) to (3) possible: (2) If a constitution has in fact been issued and is socially efficacious, then it is legally prescribed that one behave in accordance with this constitution.

This additional premise counts as one of many possible formulations of Kelsen’s basic norm. Stanley Paulson has argued that this reconstruction attributes “justified normativity”42 to Kelsen. If one understands by justified normativity morally justified normativity, I do not agree with this. To be sure, Joseph Raz attributes a justified normativity thesis to Kelsen when he says that Kelsen’s conception of the normativity of a legal system presupposes that the system be considered as “morally just and good”.43 Nothing of the kind is contained in my reconstruction. Indeed, I use the expression “legally prescribed” in the formulation of the basic norm. But expressions like “legally prescribed” and “legally binding” (rechtsverbindlich)44 can be used without any moral implications. Paulson argues that a basic norm formulation that employs such expressions “appears to lend support to the justified normativity thesis”.45 Perhaps, these expressions may seduce readers into connecting justified normativity in the sense of morally justified normativity with these concepts. But this seduction can be countered by sound interpretative and systematic arguments. It should be added that the Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 202. Ibid., 212. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 98. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n.  3 above), 96–8; Robert Alexy. Comments and Responses, in: Institutionalized Reason The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, ed. Matthias Klatt, Oxford 2012, 324–5. The numbering has been changed. 42 Stanley L. Paulsen, A “Justified Normativity” Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? Rejoinders to Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz, in: Institutionalized Reason (n. 41 above), 68. 43 Joseph Raz, Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm, in: Normativity and Norms Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed. Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson, Oxford 1998, 47, 58. 44 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin 1925, 99. 45 Paulson, A “Justified Normativity” Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? (n. 42 above), 87. 38 39 40 41

Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System of Non-Positivism

term “legally prescribed”, as used in my basic norm formulation, is just one element of a family of concepts that can be used to express the “ought”. Others are legal validity, objective sense, and empowerment.46 And I agree with Paulson that there is strong textual support to the effect that in “Kelsen’s mature position”,47 already announced in the late 1930s48 and culminating in the second edition of the Pure Theory of Law,49 empowerment is the fundamental normative modality. But in our present context this is of no special importance. Our question is how the transition from an “is” to an “ought” can be brought about, and the answer to this question does not depend on the normative modality representing the “ought”. Furthermore, the textual arguments speaking for the fundamental character of empowerment can be confronted with systematic arguments that speak against it.50 But I shall not elaborate this any further here. For our purposes it is sufficient to state that the basic norm syllogism shows that a basic norm is, as Kelsen puts it, “logically indispensible”51 (logisch unerläßlich) for the transformation of an “is” into an “ought”. According to Paulson all this shows nothing more than that Kelsen’s “appeal to the normative syllogism” amounts to a “begging the question”, “a petitio principii”.52 I agree with this on an important point, but not completely. The point on which I do not agree concerns the analytical power of the basic norm syllogism. The basic norm premise qua second premise of this syllogism is not merely an “assumption”.53 It is a necessary presupposition of the transformation of an “is” into an “ought”. Kelsen himself emphasizes that there exists an alternative to normativism, namely naturalism, according to which the law is nothing more than a system of “power relations”.54 This implies that the necessity of the basic norm premise is not an unconditional necessity but only a conditional necessity.55 This has far reaching consequences for qualifying the epistemological character of Kelsen’s basic norm. It is not simply transcendental, but only “weakly transcendental”,56 and, with this, only a relative a priori category.57 But this is more than nothing. It is a transformation from an “is” to an “ought”.

Ibid., 86–7. Ibid., 83. Hans Kelsen, Recht und Kompetenz. Kritische Bemerkungen zur Völkerrechtstheorie Georges Scelles, in: Hans Kelsen Auseinandersetzungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre, ed. Kurt Ringhofer and Robert Walter, Vienna 1987, 75. 49 See, for instance, Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 26. 50 Robert Alexy, Hans Kelsen’s Concept of the “Ought”, Jurisprudence 4 (2013), 240–5. 51 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 204. 52 Paulson, A ‘Justified Normativity’ Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? (n. 42 above), 70. 53 Ibid. 54 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 218. 55 Alexy. Comments and Responses (n. 41 above), 325. 56 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 110. 57 Robert Alexy, Hans Kelsens Begriff des relativen Apriori, in: Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie, ed. Robert Alexy, Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson, and Gerhard Sprenger, Baden-Baden 2002, 193–202. 46 47 48

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2.

The Necessity of Kelsen’s Basic Norm

Kelsen’s basic norm qua transformation rule is – with respect to its structure, not with respect to its systematic consequences – the simplest form of a basic norm. It confines itself to connecting issuance and efficaciousness on the side of the “is” with validity or another normative concept on the side of the “ought”. One can call it, with respect to its structural simplicity, the “minimal basic norm”. Kelsen’s syllogism argument is successful insofar as it demonstrates that one has at least to presuppose this minimal basic norm if one wants to transform an “is” into an “ought”. This is an analytical argument, and one can characterize Kelsen’s basic norm for this reason as an “analytical basis norm”.58 But to use a certain form of the basic norm in an argument that successfully demonstrates that a basic norm is necessary for the establishment of the “ought”, is not to demonstrate that just this form is necessary, too. To demonstrate that we need a basic norm does not suffice to demonstrate that the basic norm used in this demonstration is the basic norm. In order to show this, “alternative approaches” have to be “ruled out”.59 It is exactly this point that Paulson addresses with his reproach of “begging the question”.60 What is more, Paulson explicitly refers, in the context of the alternative problem, to natural law theory, that is, to non-positivism: “In particular, [Kelsen’s] contemptuous dismissal of natural law theory has no force as an argument, and natural law theory remains, then, as an alternative to his own theory.”61 3.

A Non-Positivistic Basic Norm

Kelsen’s thesis that a basic norm is necessary in order to perform a transformation of an “is” into an “ought” remains, however, true. This transformation can be described as a category transformation,62 and non-naturalistic positivism needs this transformation as well as non-positivism. Insofar as this is the case, Kelsen’s basic norm expresses a universal truth. This universal truth establishes a necessary connection between non-naturalistic positivism and non-positivism. With this, however, the alternative question is not yet answered. The answer consists, first, of the construction of a non-positivistic basic norm, and, second, of its justification. Here, I will focus on the construction. This construction comprises three steps by means of which Kelsen’s basic norm is transformed into a non-positivistic basic norm: first, the insertion of a limiting clause, second, the insertion of an opening

58 59 60 61 62

Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 96. Paulson, A “Justified Normativity” Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? (n. 42 above), 76. Ibid., 70. Ibid., 76. See also ibid., 76, fn.77. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 105.

Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the System of Non-Positivism

clause, and, third, the addition of a level of justification. With this, Kelsen’s analytical basic norm is transformed into a normative basic norm.63 a)

Limiting Clause

The Radbruch formula, which says, in its shortest form, that extreme injustice is no law, is, as already stated, an essential element of inclusive non-positivism, which is endorsed here as the result of balancing legal certainty against justice.64 Super-inclusive non-positivism knows no limiting clause, exclusive non-positivism advocates the extreme counterpart, a limiting clause that knows no limits. Here, only the basic norm of inclusive non-positivism shall be considered. It can be formulated in different ways. Our starting point shall be the following version of Kelsen’s basic norm: (1) The law includes all norms that have been authoritatively issued and are socially efficacious.

The insertion of the Radbruch formula shall be expressed in the following way: (2) The law includes all norms that, first, have been authoritatively issued and are socially efficacious and that, second, are not extremely unjust.

b)

Opening Clause

The Radbruch formula concerns the classifying connection between law and morality. In order to make the non-positivistic basic norm complete, the qualifying connection, too, must be included. This can be done by an opening clause which refers to the claim to correctness: (3) The law includes all norms that, first, have been authoritatively issued and are socially efficacious and, second, are not extremely unjust, and, third, all principles and arguments that are required by the claim to correctness.65

63 64 65

Ibid., 116. Above, ###. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 102, 127.

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(c)

Level of Justification

According to Kelsen, the basic norm is incapable of being established: “Into the basis of the validity of the basic norm there can be no further enquiry.”66 Non-positivism contests this.67 An example for a non-positivist who uses the term basic norm (Grundnorm), even if in part only in quotation marks, is Gustav Radbruch.68 His justification of the basic norm is exclusively the principle of legal certainty,69 occasionally connected with “peace, order” (Friede, Ordnung).70 This exclusive orientation on legal certainty brings Radbruch’s position of 1932 very close to super-inclusive non-positivism, which also could be considered as a kind of moral positivism. Moral positivism, however, is much less acceptable than Kelsen’s detached or analytical positivism.71 All of this shows that the alternative problem, as formulated by Paulson, concerns far more than the problem of the logical reconstruction of the transition from an “is” to an “ought”. It concerns, perhaps, the deepest question of legal philosophy, the relation of law and morality. Robert Alexy

Christian Albrechts University, Faculty of Law, Olshausenstrasse 40, 24118 Kiel, Germany, [email protected]

Hans Kelsen, The Function of the Constitution (first pub. 1964), trans. Iain Stewart, in: Essays on Kelsen, ed. Richard Tur and William Twining, Oxford 1986, 117 (trans. alt.); see also Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n. 9 above), 195. 67 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 113–6. 68 Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 3rd edn. 1932, in: Gustav Radbruch Gesamtausgabe, ed. Arthur Kaufmann, vol. 2, Heidelberg 1993, 313, 324; see also 422. With and without quotation marks the term is used at 324. 69 Ibid., 314, 422. 70 Ibid., 314. 71 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 3 above), 121. 66

The Demystification Impasse Legal Positivism Divided Against Itself ALEXANDER SOMEK

Abstract: Legal positivists emphasize the relevance of law-creating social facts. This em-

phasis bespeaks a healthy skepticism towards the idea that the law lends expression to something natural or necessary. Hence, legal positivism seeks to demystify the law. With regard to the task of demystification, at least two strategies can be distinguished. The first seeks to anchor the purportedly moral foundations of the law in social conventions, while the other reduces the alleged rational force of appeals to morality in the power to make them stick. Interestingly, each strategy of demystification can be used to demystify the other. The upshot is, in the end, a demystification impasse. Keywords: Legal positivism, Inclusive legal positivism, separability thesis, social facts, de-

mystification, conventionalism Schlagworte: Rechtspositivismus, Inklusiver Rechtspositivismus, Trennungsthese, so-

ziale Tatsachen, Demystifizierung, Konventionalismus

Introductory

What makes legal positivism special? The trivial answer has it that, as a position in legal theory, legal positivism insists on separating law and morality. However misleading or even wrong-headed this answer may be,1 it can be rendered least problematic by attributing to legal positivists the view that a sharp line needs to be drawn between propositions concerning what the law is, on the one hand, and postulates with regard

John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 19–53; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, (2d. ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 315–316. 1

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to what it ought to be, on the other.2 Regardless of whether this so-called “separability thesis” captures adequately, let alone fully, the core of what positivists believe there is still something that proponents of the approach share, namely a commitment to recognize, with almost exalted soberness, the relevance of law-creating social facts.3 This commitment implies a healthy scepticism towards the idea that the law lends expression to something natural and necessary or is a manifestation of the order of things or possibly even an exhibit of superhuman design. It was thus not by accident that H. L. A. Hart attributed to one of the arch legal positivists, Jeremy Bentham, the ambition to “demystify” the law and the legal profession.4 One should not be surprised to see the problem that demystification is supposed to resolve arise in the legal context in the first place. The run-of-the mill operations of legal institutions involve the exercise of force. Law supposedly renders the use of such force legitimate, for example, by motivating the morally intransigent to do the right thing in response to coercive threats. Those employing force in the name of the law are likely to rationalize their conduct by putting the best possible face on what authorizes their conduct. The chief means thereto is idealization, that is, the representation of facts in light of appealing ideals, such as justice or the rule of law, or the invocation of awe-inspiring powers, such as the accumulated wisdom of generations.5 Social facts are then seen as lending expression to norms or visions of the reasonable. Hence, the demystification of legal ideas that we encounter in the works of legal positivists is, to a certain extent, also the consequence of taking the separation of law and morality seriously. It makes an end to viewing the substance of law as an embodiment of moral ideas. Unsurprisingly, the world of law is replete with idealizations. Much of the more mundane work of legal positivists, which is of relevance to doctrinal legal scholarship, concerns debunking false idealizations and limiting their scope, if at all, to the level indispensible to render the law as a social fact that is invested with normative significance. Not by accident, schools of legal positivism differ with regard to whether or not they regard these idealizations as necessary in the first place;6 they diverge from each other also inasmuch as they debunk the idealizations embraced by their peers as superfluous and misleading.

H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Harvard Law Review 71, 1958, 593–621. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, 46–47. H. L. A. Hart, Bentham and the Demystification of the Law, Modern Law Review 36, 1973, 2–17. This legacy of legal positivism has more recently been recognized in Anglo-American circles. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, (2d. ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 210; Scott J. Shapiro, Legality, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011, 388–389; Brian Leiter, The Radicalism of Legal Positivism (ssrn.com/abstract=1568333), in: Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, Ethics, 2001, 111–301. 5 The relevant Burkean pretensions were the target of Bentham’s scorn. Hart, (footnote 4), 2–3. 6 As is well known, Scandinavian legal realists do not. Torben Spaak, A Critical Appraisal of Karl Olivecrona’s Legal Philosophy, Heidelberg: Springer, 2014. 2 3 4

The Demystification Impasse

This is the topic of central concern here. What serves to demystify from the angle of one version of legal positivism may appear to be guilty of re-mystification from the perspective of another. This is, arguably, one of the major problems bedevilling the overall approach. Unnecessary or misleading idealizations conceal from the observer what they really are. This explains why not only legal positivists, but also other critical scholars, have perceived the law as being surrounded with an ideological halo.7 The law comes to this world with the aid of ideas obscuring what the law really is. Its self-presentation is aided and abetted by social practices that endow it with an atmosphere of consecration. Demystifying the social appearance of law

The quest to rid the law of unnecessary idealizations can be pursued on at least three different levels. The first is straightforward and concerns the social aura of the law and of the legal profession. The Levellers as well as Bentham have to be credited for incisive interventions meant to expose displays of esoteric legal language and uses of the vestiges of authority as strategies for creating an insuperable distance between those who are in the know and the lay public that is not. Traditional apparel, the comportment of organs of the courts and the ritual quality of legal procedures are means to instil into the uninitiated a sense of awe and respect for the wisdom and dignity of those who master a craft to which are admitted only a few. This type of demystification concerns the broader social context in which the law operates and how an aesthetics – among which not least the indirect communication of complexity – serves the material interests of a privileged profession. The requisite debunking of pomp and circumstance is supposed to pave the way for a simpler legal system and to a practice of law that is more amenable to the horizon of notoriously bewildered and easily flabbergasted ordinary people. Demystifying legal scholarship

The second level of demystification is slightly more difficult to pin down, yet possibly even more important than the first. It is targeted at the manner in which legal scholars and adjudicating bodies – courts, notoriously – make sense of (“interpret”) the legal materials. In this context, we encounter what legal positivists usually understand by D. Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, New York: Pantheon Books, 1982. Alan Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, Law and Society Review 19, 1985, 11–38. 7

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“ideology”, namely, a false representation of legal norms subservient to some partisan agenda. This function is played by ideology even if those who perpetuate false ideas may not be aware of their complicity. It is manifest in how scholars routinely reason about law and in the vocabulary they use.8 While exposing the adverse social consequences of surrounding the law with the aura of majesty and mystery was one great virtues of Bentham’s critique of the English common law tradition, exposing the traces of ideology in legal reasoning was perhaps the greatest achievement of Kelsen’s legal theory, in particular in the field of public law. Three types of critical intervention were used by Kelsen in the pursuit of this objective: challenging dualism, identifying hypostatization, and detecting methodological syncretism. In a manner that anticipated what many decades later would sail under the flag of “deconstruction”9 Kelsen attacked various binary oppositions that predominated the legal thinking of his time. Just as in the case of binaries that would in the late twentieth century become the intellectual sweethearts of deconstructivists10 one pole of a pair of opposites was favoured over the other. Kelsen went about his deconstructive business by showing that the meaning of the disfavoured pole accounted, at least in part, for the significance of its preferred opposite. Kelsen attacked the duality of private and public law and concluded that the distinction was spurious. He submitted the “dualistic” position on the relation between domestic law and public international law to a strident critique in order to replace it with two versions of monism to which he attributed equal plausibility. He tore down the line separating natural personhood and the personhood of legally constituted entities, such as corporations, and upended the traditional relation between rights and laws. All of this work is neatly summarized in the first edition of his Pure Theory of Law.11 Hypostatization is for nominalists of a Kantian persuasion12 a cardinal sin, for it mistakes what is merely a thought for an existing entity. For example, while the concept of

Otto Pfersmann‚ Kelsens Ideologiekritik, in: Hans Kelsen: Die Aktualität eines großen Rechtswissenschaftlers und Soziologen des 20  Jahrhunderts (ed. N. Aliprantis & T. Olechowski), Wien: Manz, 2014, 53–66. 9 Jack Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, Yale Law Journal 96, 1987, 743–786. 10 For an introduction, see Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism, London: Routledge, 1983, 86–87. 11 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (trans. P. Guyer & G. Wood), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press A 395, 1998, 439: “Thus every dispute about the nature of our thinking being and its conjunction with the corporeal world is merely a consequence of the fact that one fills the gaps regarding what one does not know with paralogisms of reason, making thoughts into things and hypostatizing them; from this arises an imagined science, both in regard to affirmative and negative assertions, in that everyone either presumes to know something about objects about which no human being has any concept, or else makes his own representations into objects, and thus goes round and round in an eternal circle of ambiguities and contradictions.” 8

The Demystification Impasse

the state, according to Kelsen, signifies merely the unity of the legal system (which is a rather mystical idea, anyhow) the public scholarship of his time took the state to be a real entity that precedes the legal order. Hypostatization concerns also the concept of the “natural person” which is based on the belief in the reality of something that is the mere point of imputation on which a bundle of norms converges.13 Obviously, there is an internal link between dualisms and hypostatization, for one of the entities that in juxtaposition with another comprises a duality is frequently only posited by thought (such as the natural person or the state). This is part of the deconstruction strategy. The hypostasized entity is usually the preferred pole of the binary. As it falls by the wayside, the “dangerous supplement” is all that remains.14 Finally, uncovering methodological syncretism – the mingling of ways of reasoning or analysis that belong to different disciplines – is the strategy that Kelsen uses early in his work in order to emancipate the legal analysis of acts of will from its entrapment in psychology.15 It is also the battle cry used against any interdisciplinary work in the field of public law scholarship, in particular if it concerns a combination with sociological theory.16 No fertile ground

It bears emphasis that what is perhaps the most important part of Kelsen’s theory did not at all fall on fertile ground in the Anglo-American world even in the case where Kelsen was blessed with the good fortune of having a most gifted student such as Hart. Kelsen’s ideas were simply not relevant there. In the case of the United Kingdom it stands to reason that, perhaps not only in public law, the common law tradition has never had such a strong tradition of legal science as its civil law counterpart. A legal culture that is comfortable with reasoning from case to case while leaving the business of legal theory to high-minded social reformers does not feel prompted to revisit its foundations. By contrast, much of the controversies in German public law in the nineteenth and early twentieth century concerned basic concepts, fundamental ideas such as the Rechtsstaat and developing the correct understanding of relatively recent phenomena such as rights against the state. Hence, incomparable paths of political development and the intellectual shape of legal scholarship may explain why “Germanic” debates Kelsen (footnote 11), 47–51. Culler (footnote 10), 105–106. Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatz, Werke vol. 2.1 (ed. M. Jestaedt), Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008, 192–300. Stanley L. Paulson, A “Justified Normativity” Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? Rejoinders to Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz, in: Institutionalized Reason (ed. M. Klatt), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 62–111 at 65. 16 Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht, Tübingen: Mohr, 1922. 13 14 15

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did not find any resonance in the United Kingdom. In the United States, the situation was even worse for Kelsen. When Kelsen arrived, the vintage critique of conceptualism, as it is particularly evident in the writings of Felix Cohen,17 had already run its course. Clearly, the deconstructive part of the program, which consisted of challenging and overcoming “conceptual jurisprudence” had in large part been already completed by the American legal realist. The constructive vision did not clearly emerge, but it was clear that aside from Llewellyn‘s endorsement of “situation sense”, some social science approach had to matter.18 Understating the point a bit, if anything did not stand out from Kelsen’s writings then this was the idea that legal scholarship ought to be turned into a social science. Indeed, the whole business of clearing up conceptual muddle may have created the false impression that Kelsen was obsessed with topics of legal formalism.19 And, indeed, in many respects Kelsen’s project is deeply steeped in nineteenth century German constructivism.20 Ironically, only the least interesting parts of Kelsen’s theory have caught the attention of most Anglo-American legal theorists, notably the Grundnorm.21 The career of this stillborn brainchild is testament to the lack of interaction between and among the worlds of legal scholarship of the mid twentieth century. Demystifying legal norms

There is, finally and lest we forget, a third level of demystification that we can associate with legal positivism. It concerns the law itself and should not be confused with the first project of demystification that takes aim at how legal institutions generally adorn themselves with dignity and purport to pursue high-minded aspirations. Rather, at this level, demystificiation concerns the substance of laws. How can this be? The critical analysis of legal institutions can become the task of legal theory where the law itself, either mediated by the authority of courts or by means of legislation, comes to incorporate an ideologically distorted understanding of itself. Joseph Raz observes with fine irony that only bad theory can make a practical differ-

Felix Cohen‚ Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, Columbia Law Review 35, 1935, 808–849. 18 Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986. 19 Karl N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. 20 Stanley L. Paulson, Hans Kelsen’s Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism, Modern Law Review 59, 1996, 797–812. 21 The final word appears to have been spoken on this topic now. Stanley L. Paulson, The Great Puzzle: Kelsen’s Basic Norm, in: Kelsen Revisited: New Essays on the Pure Theory of Law (ed. L. Duarte d’Almeida, J. Gardner & L. Green), Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013, 43–62. 17

The Demystification Impasse

ence.22 For example, the law may require us to sustain differences between private and public law. While there is, according to Kelsen, no manner in which such difference can be convincingly sustained, one cannot but muddle through with makeshift conceptual arrangements simply because the law has forced the contrast upon us. Even whole fields of law may rest upon false understandings of their function and their point. For example, a careful analysis of the core category of anti-discrimination law, direct discrimination, reveals that this field of law necessarily serves a redistributive function. Alas, European anti-discrimination law does not recognize this fact.23 Kelsen’s critique of the law of the United Nations was an attempt to expose the dearth of legal expertise extant in the drafting process and the influence of phony ideas on the substance of an international agreement.24 Ironically, thus, misapprehension of the law can be built into a very field of law. The real normativity of law

The remaining discussion will focus on the avowed goal of the second level of demystification, namely that which by all accounts is supposed to be the enlightened apprehension of the law. When it comes to this, we encounter two major approaches that have been developed by legal positivists in the twentieth century. They coincide, not by accident, with its most salient strands, one Anglo-American, the other continental. If one wanted to attach names to these approaches they would read “Hart” and “Kelsen”, respectively. Generally, any project of demystification needs to have at least a rough idea of what the law is supposed to be like once mystifications have been removed and lost their grip on the legal imagination. This means that such projects invariably need to commit themselves ontologically to a certain view of what the law really is. At a most general level, both strands of modern legal positivism agree on two things. First, the law is not merely “patterns of behaviour” but rather manifest in certain directives that are called either “rules” or “norms”. Second, whether or not such directives are authoritative is to be determined with reference to social facts. Hence, both versions of legal positivism agree that claims to legal validity need to be warranted, to the greatest possible

The original lines read as follows: „Theory aims at understanding. By and large, only bad theory can lead to change. If its wrong conclusions are accepted their acceptance may lead to a change in the self-understanding of the culture which will make the bad theory true.” Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 98–99. 23 I, for one, have made an attempt to analyze Anti-Discrimination Law from such an angle. See Alexander Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 19–20. 24 D. A. Jeremy Telman, Law or Politics? Hans Kelsen and the Post-War International Order, Constellations 18, 2011. 22

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extent, by propositions pointing to some law-creating factor that can be described in value-neutral terms.25 In addition to the separability thesis, this emphasis on the factual is undoubtedly the second defining mark of legal positivism.26 Remarkably, however, it also points us to a type of social normativity that inheres in the law and indicates how it differs from the persuasive force of reasons for action. Evidently, in the case of Austin, designating the factual connotes the overpowering force of necessitation. The conception of law as the command of the sovereign suggests strongly that the commander’s power to have his or her way is insuperable. In the case of Kelsen, the overall effectiveness of the coercive legal order, to which reference is made in the conditional part of the Grundnorm, represents something akin to a force of nature. Hart’s concept of a “social rule” insinuates that there is no way for a single person or a few forlorn dissenters to stem the tide of convergent behaviour. The factual that gives rise to law in the guise of sources originates from an alternative to the normativity of reasons and replaces the “non-coercive force of better arguments” (Habermas) with the stubbornness of social power or mindless routine. If a source lacked this nexus to might it would never merit the attention of legal positivists. That’s right. In their eyes, anything claiming to be merely a better argument could never pass as a source of law.27 The transformation of reasons into the having of reasons

In the eyes of Hartian Anglo-American legal positivists, real law is manifest in legal enactments – notably rules – the validation of which is derivative of a social rule that is accepted as the relevant (law-identifying) standard by law-applying officials.28 By contrast, from Kelsen’s perspective, real law is to be found in norms that originate from – and belong to – a dynamic system of law-creation. The key role within such systems is played by legal powers. They are the real real laws in the universe of the Pure Theory of Law.29 As we shall see, they are so for good reasons. In spite of different ontological commitments, it is the case that upon encounters with idealizations both legal positivisms carry out a transformation that is followed by a question concerning authority.

Raz (footnote 3), 47. Raz (footnote 3), 37, where the “social thesis” is presented as saying that “what is law and what is not is a matter of social fact”. 27 It may be doubtful whether this is true also of inclusive legal positivists. 28 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d. ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, 102–103. 29 For an alternative elaboration of the point of the pure theory that puts the reinterpretation of acts of violence in term of sanctions at the centre, see Christoph Kletzer, The Idea of a Pure Theory of Law, Oxford: Bloomsbury Publ., 2018. 25 26

The Demystification Impasse

The task of transformation consists of presenting an appeal to practical reason as a social fact. Reason can be translated into something factual30 only if the having of a reason is treated as a state of belief (which may possibly be caused by some other fact). Hans: We:

This is wrong. Hans believes this to be wrong.

Legal positivism distinguishes itself from other approaches to law by recasting reasons for action as beliefs in such reasons and, in addition, attributing these beliefs to someone who has them. This is not to say that this transformation already provides us with the full picture, yet it captures adequately its demystifying ethos. Hans: We (1): We (2): We (3): We (4):

You ought to do this. Hans believes that we ought to do this. Hans wants us to do this. Hans wants us to do this because he wants it. If Hans has authority over us we have reason to do what Hans wants us to do because he wants it.

The transition from (1) to (2) is possible because Hans believes we have to do this. If Hans really believes31 that we ought to do something then he wants us to do something. Emphasizing the having of reasons for action, that is, a having of reasons regardless of their content, accounts for the transition form (2) to (3). This is the consequence of transforming a belief into a social fact. It marks the major step taken by legal positivists by shifting from a content-dependent to content-independent perspective.32 What Raz calls the “social thesis”33 turns out to be an implication of the separability thesis. If the reason for action is not derivative of the full and unrestrained examination of pros and cons it has to be somehow tied to a fact that is internally indifferent to reasons (for that is what we mean by “content-independent”, aside from the fact that we have reason to do something because somebody else has said so). Finally, (4) merely points to the normative premise that is needed in order to invest the social fact of wanting with authority. Transforming moral claiming into content-indifferent wanting or endorsing

Facts can be reasons, but reasons are not facts. I believe that in an ideal world men should wear at least business attire, if not tuxedos, when they attend an operatic performance. I believe that in an ideal world this should be so, and I am aware of the fact that it is never going to be that way in our real world. Actually, I also believe that in the real world people shouldn’t be forced to wear a suit and a tie if they do not want to. Nevertheless, I believe that in a counterfactual world it should be the case that people adhere to a dress code. Such a belief does not fall into the category of the “real” belief that is of relevance here. By contrast, I also believe that people should not kill each other. I do not want them to kill each other. This is a real belief. 32 It is clearly the step that calls for the justification of authority. See Raz (footnote 3), 214 (on the normal justification thesis). 33 Raz (footnote 3), 37. 30 31

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is the essence of the positivist project of demystificiation. Not by accident, it simultaneously raises the question of legitimate authority. Anglo-American demystification

To your claiming that morality enjoins us from doing or omitting something legal positivists reply that all that we really know, if you are sincere, is that it is you who believes in this moral demand. A high-minded moral claim is thus brought down to the realm of social facts. At the outset, it was mentioned that demystification aims at removing idealizing sugar coatings from the legal materials. Here is an example of such a sugar coating, variations of which can be encountered relatively frequently in the literature.34 Mystification: Human dignity is at the heart of all modern constitutional systems. Nowhere can a law violating this ideal pass constitutional muster.

The demystification that Anglo-American legal positivists would engage in would roughly amount to the following: Anglo-American demystification: The relevance of appeals to human dignity is based upon a social rule that either accepts appeals to human dignity as appeals to valid law or permits (or even requires) extra-legal standards to determine judicial decisions.

Insiders will immediately realize that the formulation attempts to cover (“incorporate”) both inclusive and exclusive legal positivism.35 In both cases, an open set of substantive Shapiro (footnote 4), 270; Raz (footnote 22), 193. Shapiro (footnote 4), 273–274. “Inclusive” legal positivism stands for the view that moral principles can be binding on legal officials because they are valid law. Such principles are taken to be valid law if they or any other appeal to moral merit is recognized as a source of law within the rule of recognition. “Exclusive” legal positivism, by contrast, insists that the morality that is thereby appealed to is not incorporated into the legal system. A norm can count as law only if it has a social pedigree and can be identified without engaging in, or recourse to, a moral argument. For extensive discussion of these issues, see Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 106–109, 153. It appears to be Shapiro’s take on exclusive legal positivism that it requires judges to take moral principles as moral principles into account. See Shapiro, note 4 at 272: “[…][T]he fact that American judges are simply under a[] [legal, A. S.] obligation to apply nonpedigreed norms does not imply that they are compelled to apply preexisting law; rather, they are merely under an obligation to reach outside the law and apply norms of morality instead.” It should be noted that, at least more recently, Raz has conceived of exclusive legal positivism differently. According to him, judges – as human beings – are always under an obligation to be guided by moral standards, for this is what it takes for human beings to act appropriately. If the law has authority it is morality that carves out space for content-independent reasons – that is, rules that are derivative of the authority of law – and thereby precludes a determination of conduct on the basis of a full examination of the moral merits of the situation. Morality is that which “incorporates” the law, and not the other way round. Therefore, it would be rather odd to believe that morality first incorporates law in order to incorporate itself subsequently into what it has itself incorporated. It is much sounder to assume that the 34 35

The Demystification Impasse

moral arguments (called, euphemistically, “non-pedigreed norms”) is considered to be legally relevant on the ground of either its “incorporation” into the rule of recognition36 or an explicit or implicit “validating purport”37 by the law with regard to this set.38 The important point is, at any rate, that Anglo-American legal positivists transform the claims that moral standards make on us into a de facto shared and practiced belief that standards of this type – no matter which there are39 – are relevant for the adjudication of legal disputes. Whether or not the belief in this relevance is accepted as law depends on whether it guides the practice of legal officials and that they would be criticised for committing mistakes if they failed to take these standards into account. In other words, the acceptance of moral standards is manifest in a rule-guided social practice. It follows that the awareness of this social fact is supposed to provide us with a demystified account of moral reasoning in the legal context. The aura of natural law disappears. We grasp that the social fact of acceptance is that which confers relevance to arguments that appear to invoke “natural law”. Dworkin has pointed out vis-à-vis Coleman’s variety of inclusive legal positivism that what is remarkable and puzzling about this form of demystification is that it leaves everything as it is.40 Practice does not have to alter a bit. Indeed, it is essential for such

law, when referring to reasons of morality, makes various exemptions from the general exclusion of judging matters on their moral merits. The “inclusion” of morality is rather a partial revocation of its self-limitation. See Raz (footnote 22), 188–190. 36 Coleman (footnote 35), 107, distinguishes between the grounds of the criteria of legal validity and these criteria themselves. While according to inclusive legal positivism the relevance of the criteria is grounded in a social convention (i e , a social fact) “[…] the criteria themselves need not state social facts”. In the case of human dignity mentioned in the example above this means that the relevance of appeals to “human dignity” is conventionally established, even though there is no social rule or other set of facts that determines what human dignity means, let alone demands, in singular cases. The meaning is relevant even though it is up for grabs. One should not be surprised that one encounters in Coleman’s works statements such as the following (116): “Judges may agree about what the rule is and disagree with one another over what the rule requires.” It is puzzling to imagine an agreement over what courtesy is and disagreement over what it requires in every single instance. We would call this type of agreement a merely seeming agreement. Coleman is aware of this, of course, and adds that judges could not disagree in every case or even in most cases. But this implies that some of the criteria of legality or some applications of these must be conventionally given. Inclusive legal positivism cannot eliminate the social fact element from the criteria altogether and restrict it to the formulation of rule as an empty shell. 37 I take this from Hart’s discussion of dualism in international law. See H. L. A. Hart, Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in: Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (ed. S.L. Paulson & B. Litschewski Paulson), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 553–581, at 560–561. The point of such validating purport is to sustain the difference in the relation of the legal orders involved. Raz goes to some length to point this out. See Raz (footnote 22), 193. 38 I shall leave aside, for the moment, Raz’s more sophisticated alternative to incorporationism which treats the relevance of morality as an exclusion of exclusionary reasons. 39 This is a point that is repeatedly emphasized by Coleman. See merely Jules Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in: A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (ed. D. Patterson, 2d ed.), Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 228–248 at 238; Coleman (footnote 35), 116. 40 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press , 2006, 207.

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inclusive legal positivism not to assimilate morality to mere conventional standards.41 It is not the case, therefore, that inclusive legal positivists claim that the moral appeals that we encounter in a legal contexts necessarily invoke conventional morality. Rather, these appeals are intended to be direct appeals to what is morally right or wrong. What demystification accomplishes is to highlight that their legal authority has its root in a conventional social foundation. They: We:

In hard cases we have to invoke moral standards. They observe a convention that requires them to invoke moral standards in hard cases.

As Dworkin correctly observed, there is evidently something amiss here.42 The inclusion of moral appeal into the sources of law does in no manner contribute to legal certainty. The import of moral standards is not at all uncontroversial. Very likely there will be disagreement concerning their relevance or their proper application.43 The attention that legal positivists pay to social facts, however, would require identifying those who are actually calling the shots when it comes to applying the convention that says that the morally correct outcome counts. The talk of a coordinating convention – or a shared co-operative activity44 – may in fact conceal relations of power amongst the law-applying officials. The very idea that the identification of valid law is based on a social rule to the application of which every official is an equal partner may reflect a moderate determinacy of application or a “settledness” of law that does not stem from the solidity of the conventional standard but from effective relations of subordination.45 In a field where disagreements and controversies are not unlikely to abound, potential dissenters are hushed into acquiescence with subtle means of co-optation or by involving them in rituals at the end of which they can hope to pass as initiates. The predicament

But the problem cuts even deeper. Moral arguments that do not invoke conventions (“We do not…”) aim at giving an answer that does not only state – report and reassert – a belief from a particular first person plural perspective. They want to be correct tout court. Hence, they have to base themselves on conceptions of the morally most attractive understandings of certain terms, such as human dignity, or of moral ideas,

Coleman (footnote 35), 127. Dworkin’s objections are usefully summarized in Coleman & Leiter (footnote 39), 237–238. See also Shapiro (footnote 4), 276. Coleman (footnote 35), 96–98; Shapiro (footnote 4), 204–208. See the observations in Alexander Somek, The Legal Relation: Legal Theory after Legal Positivism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 35. 41 42 43 44 45

The Demystification Impasse

such as impartiality. Arriving, if necessary, at such a conception involves moving beyond that which is merely conventional. While, for example, we may regard the eating of meat as morally impeccable it may nonetheless be true that upon reflection the practice turns out to be cruel. A distinction emerges, hence, between what is convention and what is substantively correct. From the point of view of the latter the truth of a moral claim does not depend on communis opinio or convergent behaviour among the members of an in-group. It follows that everyone who is confident enough to claim to know what is morally right may legitimately assert what he or she believes to be the moral truth. In relation to existing conventions this means that either everyone would have to be entitled to say what the law is or, alternatively, nobody would have to be. If this right had to be conceded to everyone we would end up with a situation of radical legal pluralism. It would amount to an equivalent to Hobbes’ right to everything. Legally speaking, whoever claims to know the right answer would have to have the power to lay down the right answer as law, for otherwise the inclusion of morality into the criteria for law would not make any sense. Alternatively, everyone could be denied this right. In both cases, however, the result would be radical legal indeterminacy. This result would be inconsistent with what legal positivism sets out to do, for there would be no more social fact left determining what accounts for the existence of valid law. This is, very briefly put, the major problem of inclusive legal positivism. It seeks to accommodate the non-conventional within the conventional. To the convention that has the form “This is what we do, and I do what all others do” it adds “What we do is to have each determine for him – or – herself what we do”. What one gets, then, is a “rule” saying that what we do is to have each determine for all what we do. If each has the power to determine for all what the law is there can be no stable social fact. The convention that allegedly incorporates appeals to morality into a rule of recognition does not give rise to facts that are capable of generating law. They are “fake facts”. The convention turns out to be a self-denying ordinance. Turning to continental demystification

Inclusive legal positivists may want to reply that the above analysis is uncharitable and transforms their position into something outright absurd. The legal order allocates powers to say what the law is in a hierarchical manner and confers such a power in the final instance to the highest courts and not to lay persons.46 In the event that a conflict arises between their respective judgments the view of the court must prevail. I take it that this reply is similar to Coleman’s attempt to rebut an objection by Dworkin (footnote 35), 157–158. Dworkin pointed out against Coleman’s construction of inclusive legal positivism that if the content of the criteria of what is valid law are not conventional the law applying officials might never agree 46

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If this is the reply given by “incorporationists” then they have already conceded that what matters, from a legal point of view, is the allocation of powers to state authoritatively what morality demands and not what morality itself requires.47 They have thereby shifted, tacitly, to another mode of demystification that no longer anchors cloudy appeals to values or ideas in conventions for making such appeals but rather in concrete powers to make them stick. This is the continental way. Continental demystification: The courts invested with the power of judicial review of legislation have discretion to attribute any meaning to human dignity as they see fit and to invalidate laws on that ground.

A different picture emerges here, and one is inclined to call it true – as opposed to existing – exclusive legal positivism. True (or truly) exclusive legal positivism insists on translating the determination of legally relevant moral claims into the exercise of the legal power to say and to lay down what the law is.48 This, at any rate, is consistent with a Kelsenian mindset, which appears to reflect the original critical spirit of legal positivism. From this perspective, the alleged convention underpinning genuine appeals to moral values always has be to read as a rule authorizing such appeals. Appeals to “non-pedigreed norms” are made within the confines of powers that provide them with a legal pedigree.49

on what these are. This is the equivalent of the observation made in the text that the quest for the morally right answer does not commit anyone to arrive at an answer that elicits the consent of all. To this objection Coleman replies that the ground of the inclusion of morality, the rule of recognition as a social rule, is best understood to be a shared cooperative activity. While such an activity may give rise to a number of disagreements it commits law-applying officials to settle disagreements and to converge on certain views. This reply makes it plain that morality is not relevant per se but only subject to the norms governing the shared cooperative activity (on these norms, see ibid 96–99). 47 Coleman’s idealized account of the rule of recognition as a shared cooperative activity of course must raise the suspicion of mystifying relations of social power. 48 The difference to Raz’s exclusive legal positivism should be duly noted. From Raz’s point of view judges are under a moral obligation to arrive at morally defensible resolutions of legal questions. The law merely modifies the way moral obligations affect judges. It is, however, not easily to parse from Raz’s text how this is supposed to work. See Raz (footnote 4), 196: „References to moral considerations in constitutions are typically not cases of the incorporation of morality but blocks to its exclusion or modification by ordinary legislation. […] Judicial review not only makes the block to the exclusion of modification of constitutionally protected moral considerations by legislation enforceable; in addition in [sic] conferring on the courts powers to enforce that block, it gives them, when adjudicating on the compatibility of legislation with the constitutionally protected moral considerations, the power to modify the application of those moral considerations themselves.“ It does not emerge clearly what such a modification is supposed to consist in. Moreover, while Raz’s idea concerning the partial exclusion of the exclusion of moral consideration is undoubtedly very elegant, it is doubtful whether it can fully account of the idea that judges are guilty of committing legal – and not merely moral – mistakes if the do not take morality into account. Why should the law make morality legally relevant if all that it does is to cede the ground back to morality? 49 I take it that exclusive legal positivists would agree with that view.

The Demystification Impasse

In 1926, in the course of a discussion at a meeting of the German public law teachers’ association, Hans Kelsen memorably put this basic demystifying thrust of legal positivism in the following famous words:50 The question that natural law theory is after is the eternal question of what lies behind positive law. Whoever tries to find an answer, I am afraid, discovers neither the absolute truth of a metaphysics nor the absolute justice of a natural law. Whoever lifts the veil and does not close his eye is going to be stared at by the gorgonian head of power.

Power is the fabric that legal relations are made of. The only idealisation that a non-reductive form of legal positivism cannot dispense with consists of viewing the exercise of power as authorized by power-conferring norms. These norms can be reconstructed by interpreting an effective coercive order as composed of social practices that find their organising core in abiding by legal norms. Another predicament

But this is not the end of the story. The recurring question within “dynamic” legal systems that govern their own creation and application is under which conditions a legal power is indeed successfully exercised. The question is, in other words, whether officials exercising their power do so truly or merely seemingly. If they do not exercise it truly, their acts have to be regarded as void. Interestingly, continental legal positivism encounters at this point a predicament that is strikingly similar to the impasse of inclusive legal positivism. The question is whose interpretation concerning the exercise of legal powers counts. Since the days that Rex v. Hampden was decided,51 this has been the arch-constitutional question: Quis iudicabit?52 It may appear that the solution to this question has to parallel the way out of the inclusive legal positivist’s predicament. The legal order allocates powers to settle questions concerning the scope of powers. Ultimately, such a power to interpret powers may be vested in a court. Yet, even when the whole legal order becomes construed as a set of interlocking power-conferring rules the question remains whether those to whom the system designates the task to serve as the ultimate interpreters of powers have used their powers of interpretation excessively or not. It follows that, just as in Hans Kelsen, in: Veröffentlichung der Vereinigung deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer 3, 1927, 54–55 (my translation). 51 Rex v. Hampden, 3 State Trails 862, 1637, partly reprinted in: The Stuart Constitution ,1608–1688, (ed., J. P. Kenyon, 2d. ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 98–103. 52 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. I. Shapiro), New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010, 166 (chapter 26); Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963, 122. 50

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the case of claiming moral insight, everyone has equal standing when it comes to adjudicating the question whether the ultimate interpreters exceeded their powers (acted ultra vires) In particular, there is no reason to assume that legal officials are in a better position to say what is within an organ’s power than uninvolved and disinterested scholars adopting the internal perspective of participants in the legal system. Therefore, the question must arise that has been explored by Adolph Julius Merkl already a century ago.53 The powers of government can be rendered differently from the perspective of the real insiders using the system and of outsiders assessing their behaviour by adopting, apprehensively, the internal, critically reflective attitude. Depending on the perspective, the legal system can be given different “faces”. The question which of the two faces shows us the law as it really is? Leaving aside the fierce debate that this question gave rise to among members of the early Viennese school,54 the underlying problem can be stated as follows: The legal power and the act exercising the power need to match somehow. Loosely put, the legal power has to be comfortable with accepting an exercise as its own; the exercising act, in turn, must be convinced that the legal power is right for what it wants to achieve. The determination is never a one-way street. Rather, just as the power, properly interpreted, needs to recognize the act that wishes to be covered by it, the act needs to recognize the power as appropriate to its end. Unsurprisingly, the only media available in legal systems that facilitate such mutual recognition are the social conventions of interpretation. This point is more important than it may seem. Unless conventions that guide the interpretation of legal rules are practiced and provide guidance to those operating the system the normativity underlying the effective order could not exist. Effective legal orders are effective legal orders only if they give effect to norms or rules. The normative quality of these norms or rules has to be manifest in the behaviour of officials who share views as to what these rules require, at any rate in standard cases. Without the existence of such views – shared conventions – no legal system could ever exist and legal scholars would have nothing to describe. No legal system could ever do without conventions, for their existence logically precedes and mediates the existence of law. This explains, however, why the views of the law applying officials have priority over the views by critically reflective scholars. Their influence accounts for the effectiveness of the overall system. Without their views there would be nothing for scholars to describe. If a social practice merely consisted of acts of power that do not observe any rule-like constraints it would not amount to a legal system. While legal scholars may believe that their understandings of the limits of Adolf Julius Merkl‚ Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz. Eine Betrachtung aus der Erkenntnistheorie des Rechts, 1918, 47 Juristische Blätter 425–427, 444–447, reprinted in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule (ed. H. Klecatsky, R. Marcic & H. Schambeck), Vienna: Europaverlag, 1968, vol. 1, 1167–1201. 54 On this see a forthcoming contribution by Rodrigo Cadore. 53

The Demystification Impasse

legal powers ultimately count these understandings are necessarily derivative of, and secondary to, the conventions that are practiced. Practice has priority over theory. This is the demystification that Anglo-American legal positivism has in stock for continental legal positivists that are often inclined to take for granted that the rules allocating powers are somehow “objective”, possibly even abstract entities amenable to detached description from some theoretical point of view. On the contrary, if the practice view of meaning is correct then the meaning of rules resides somehow in their routine application.55 Conclusion

Apparently, we end up, thus, with a relation of mutually assured deconstruction. We are looking at a demystification impasse. Anglo-American demystification re-mystifies. It conceals the indeterminacy that inheres in conventionalism. The demystification can be overcome by shifting the focus from conventions to legal powers. But continental demystification is also guilty of re-mystification, for it fails to recognize that the limits of legal powers become originally drawn in convention-based practice. Law as a system of interlocking power-conferring rules presupposes the efficacy of conventions. The source of all this bewilderment may well be that legal positivism has never explained the “factness” of the social facts that are supposed to function as legal sources. But that is a different story the answer to which leads us already beyond legal positivism. It will be remembered what the decisive step is (see above p. 52–54). It consists of transforming belief into the fact of belief or, alternatively put, of transforming judgment into the fact of judgment. This is something that we ordinarily do in the case of moral disagreement. We allow others to go forward with what they happen to believe. It is from such mutual recognition of judgments that legal relations arise. That the law is based upon sources is a reflection of this way of relating to one another. This indicates that the perplexity surrounding legal positivism can be overcome by altering our view of the sources. Legal relations allow someone to have a say. That’s the whole secret of authority. Sources of law are not primarily social facts but embodiments of subjectivity. They provide us with knowledge of the law. Social facts are relevant to how the law is known in the forms of sources.

55 Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. For a general restatement of this view, see Christoph Menke, Die Souveränität der Kunst Ästhetische Erfahrung nach Adorno und Derrida, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988, 223.

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Legislation, for example, in virtue of resting on a decision, recognizes what the law is with an eye to what has been decided. Knowing the law from the perspective of legislation, therefore, requires adhering faithfully to the text of a statute or to its original meaning. The pertinent maxims of interpretation mark what it takes to know the law “legislatively”. By contrast, the law is known in a manner congenial to customary law if claims are made that “this” or “that” is not what we are ready to condone here. If the law is known “customarily” this knowledge is replete with appeals to common understandings. Finally, law that is known “scholarly” comes about in appeals to a different form of fact, actually to argumentatively established differences in situations that are supposed to warrant the application of the appropriate legal rule. The law emerges, ideally, from a better argument. It is indeed only at this point that the law transcends the domain of the factual, however, only in order to become reabsorbed by it in the case of decisions. The forms of legal knowledge that are inherent in sources epitomize varieties of subjectivity. They, in turn, make a legal consequence conditional upon something factual. The sources say “you ought to” because “we see it that way”, “we have decided it that way” or “the stronger argument requires that you follow this rule”. The law flows from common understandings or decisions or, finally, from better views concerning what is to be considered the applicable rule. I can only posit here that by carrying this view of sources forward the predicaments of legal positivism can be finally overcome. Alexander Somek

Institute of Legal Philosophy, University of Vienna, Schenkenstraße 8–10, 1010 Vienna, Austria, [email protected]

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence CHRISTOPH KLETZER

Abstract: One important, yet still under-theorised aspect of the Pure Theory of Law is its

treatment of what Kelsen called the ‘legal technique’, ie an analysis of how exactly the law does what it does. In this paper I try to outline both the specific intermediary theoretical location of the legal technique and its decentralised nature by comparing the technique of the law with another one: the technique that allows us to transfer data on the internet, the so-called internet protocol suite. This will help us, I believe, in getting a clearer understanding of the different levels or layers of analysis and keep separate what is done from how it is done. After having determined the exact yet often misallocated level of some of the most relevant insights of the Pure Theory I will then analyse the specific architecture of what I call the legal stack. This is followed by a discussion of the operation of the legal protocol and an analysis of the nature of its decentralisation. I argue that this stack analysis helps us see more clearly that (i) the law is ultimately always a matter of the use of force; that (ii) the law operates not by simply telling people what to do, but that it tells people what to do by conditioning the use of force; and (iii) that whilst the use of force might be fundamental to the legal system, it is not its most significant part: what is more significant than the use of force is all the things the law does by means of this use of force. Keywords: Hans Kelsen, decentralisation, networks, protocol, primitive law, Pure Theory

of Law Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Dezentralisation, Netzwerke, Protokoll, primitives Recht,

Reine Rechtslehre

When thinking about the relation of the world of facts and the world of the law most of us, jurisprudes, legal experts and laymen alike, work from a model of detached dependence: we take both worlds to be inextricably entangled, yet conceptually (or at least provisionally) separable from one another. Most contemporary jurisprudential theories can be plotted somewhere on the spectrum marked out by the extremes of

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pure detachment and pure dependence: on the extremes we have a natural law theory based on divine revelation, stressing the complete detachedness of the law from this world and its determination by another, transcendent world, on the one hand, and a reductive, sociologist realism, highlighting the complete dependence of law on actual facts and the merely illusionary or ideological character of any detachedness or independence of the law, on the other. Legal Positivism of a Hartian tint, for instance, sits somewhere between those extremes in that it takes the law to be both a social fact and a normative phenomenon. Now, whilst this dualist ontology is certainly plausible and to an extent helpful it has the disadvantage of hiding what I believe to be a key element of a full understanding of the law, namely, the peculiar mechanics of the relationship of the two worlds. This mechanism is what in the context of the Pure Theory of Law has been called the legal technique.1 The analysis of this legal technique has been one of the main, yet, I believe, under-appreciated, contributions of the Pure Theory of Law: the Pure Theory aims to enlighten us about the law not primarily by investigating what its essence or nature is but by analysing how exactly it works. In what follows I want to highlight the attractiveness of this approach.2 I try to do this by discussing a feature of the legal technique which has so far been, I believe, largely overlooked: the decentralised nature of the legal technique. In order to get a better grip of both the specific intermediary theoretical location of the legal technique and its decentralised nature, I want to start off by comparing the technique of the law with another one: the technique that allows us to transfer data on the internet, the so-called internet protocol suite. This will help us, I believe, in getting used to manoeuvring between different levels or layers of understanding and keep separate what a certain phenomenon does from how it does it. After that I will apply the insights to the law and analyse the architecture of what I call the legal stack. This is followed by a discussion of the specific working of the law and an analysis of the nature of its decentralisation. A.

Decentralisation

It is a curious fact about the internet that one cannot easily switch it off. A government might be able to block its domestic users from accessing certain online content, but no single actor could feasibly switch off the internet altogether. Why is that? The answer

See, for instance, Hans Kelsen, ‘The Law as a Specific Social Technique’ 9 University of Chicago Law Review 1941: 75–97. 2 Many of the jurisprudential arguments presented in this paper have already been defended, more formally and extensively, in previous publications. See Christoph Kletzer, ‘Primitive Law’ in 4 Jurisprudence 2013: 263–72 and The Idea of a Pure Theory of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing) 2018. 1

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence

Figure 1

is not as obvious as one might think. After all, if one considers the architecture of a typical communication network, it would be rather easy to shut it down: when, say, my grandfather staying in the Bristol wanted to call his friend at the Sacher Hotel, his call had to be relayed via a couple of switchboards: the hotel-switchboard gave him an outside line and connected him with the city-switchboard, which was connected to all the hotels in the city. This city-switchboard then connected him to the switchboard of the Sacher, which in turn was connected with all the rooms in the Sacher and which connected him with his friend. Take network A from Figure 13 to illustrate the city telephone network of Vienna in the Thirties where each station represents a hotel or a private telephone station. The central node is the city switch-board that connects these stations. It is clear that in such a set-up one would only have to take out the central node to make any telephone communication between hotels or private stations impossible and to thus shut down the entire city network. Now whilst the problem is easily identifiable the solution is less so. After all, this star-shaped, hub-and-spokes network architecture is not entirely accidental: we do need some method to keep an authoritative record of which stations are connected to the network and how to reach them. This essential function is provided by the central switchboard. Without it, it seems, there would be no operative network to start with. It is thus the central switchboard that represents the unity of the network.

Diagram from Paul Baran, ‘On Distributed Communications Networks’ P-2626, 1962, RAND Corporation. 3

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Yet, at the same time the centralised architecture presents an unacceptable vulnerability: telephone network downtime might have been an inconvenience for my grandfather, for military communication it would have been a disaster, especially so in a post-nuclear-attack scenario. The fact that a star-shaped US command and control network would quite certainly be rendered inoperative by a Soviet first strike also meant that the US would likely be incapacitated to issue a timely counter-strike. Within the logic of the cold war, which was stabilised only by the assurance of mutual complete destruction, this presented a potentially deadly game-theoretical itch: since there was a high possibility that the US would be rendered incapable of retaliating in time the only option left open to the US would be not to wait for a situation where it would need to retaliate but rather anticipate any attack by striking first. This led to a dangerous finger on the trigger mentality. And all of this was caused mainly by unreliable network design. A survivable second strike capability was needed to move down from a guns loaded, hair-triggered command and control doctrine. It was within this context that Paul Baran in 1960 presented a series of papers showing that with sufficient network redundancy, ie with sufficiently many extra connections between the stations, a network can become surprisingly resilient to the taking out of individual stations.4 Reliable networks can be built out of unreliable elements by using redundancy. Baran called such a mesh-network ‘distributed’.5 Such a network architecture was, of course, a wonderful idea. However, in the 1960ies it was but an idea. After all, what was missing was the crucial bit: finding out how to allow the stations to communicate with each other on such a network, ie without there being a central node that relays the messages from the sender to the right recipient. As mentioned before, the hub-and-spoke design of a centralised network did not emerge by accident. Rather, the star-shaped setup seemed necessary to make sure a message could find its way from one node to the other. Conversely, if there were no central node controlling communications, opening and closing lines, connecting servers, confirming transmissions and keeping records of all nodes, it seemed impossible to make sure a message from one part of the network finds its way to another part of the network. What solved this problem was the development of a so-called network protocol. A protocol is a computer programme that uniformly runs on each station and tells each station how to package, address, relay and confirm messages sent on the mesh network. It is the uniformity of this protocol that allows a decentralised or distributed network to operate. In a sense the protocol takes over the role of the central hub and thus represents the unity of the network. There is thus a shift in the paradigm of what Paul Baran, ‘On Distributed Communications Networks’ P-2626, 1962, RAND Corporation and ‘On Distributed Communications: Introduction to Distributed Communication Networks’, Memorandum RM3420-PR, 1964, United States Air Force Project RAND. 5 In this paper we will not follow Baran’s nomenclature but rather call them ‘decentralised’. 4

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence

represents the unity of the network. We move from a master-unity paradigm to a protocol-unity paradigm. In the case of the internet this network protocol is called the internet protocol suite or TCP/IP. Let us have a closer look at where exactly in the logic of the network this protocol operates and thus also where the important paradigm shift occurred. In computer science it is common to think of computer systems to be a stack of so-called abstraction layers operating on top of each other. In the case of the internet this stack would look something like this:

Figure 2

At the bottom we have the physical link layer. It represents the hardware of a variety of different servers at different physical locations linked to each other by cables or wireless radio connections. This hardware alone might form a physical net but it is not yet a network. After all, data has to be able to travel from one server to the other. On the very top we have the application layer. In this layer we find the internet applications we use every day, like the applications that allow us to read newspapers, access our bank account, order books, stream movies, go through the publications of colleagues and so on. When we think of the internet, most of us think only about these two layers: we know there must be some kind of physical connection and we know what we want to do with this connection. However, as we have seen in the brief historical digression, the truly crucial bit that is missing in this picture is neither of the two but rather what lies in between: the so called data link, transport, and network layers, which is taken care of by the TCP/IP. This protocol makes or establishes the actual communication network. It represents the unity of the internet. In a sense it is the internet. Without it, you would only have hardware laying around. Without it, you could not watch any movies, order any books or read any newspapers, as no station would know how to communicate with any other station. The top layer tells you what you do with the internet, the

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bottom layer is where you do what you do on the top layer. The intermediary layer, however tells you how to do all of that. B.

The Legal Stack

  

regulating Law

Application Layer

What?

Legal protocol

transport/Network Layer

how?

Legal Facts

Link Layer

Who?

Figure 3

Now, in the law, too, we tend to only think about two layers in a stack. On the one hand we see all the things that the law does: it tells people what to do, it makes demands, it regulates affairs, sets down taxes and so on. This can be called the application layer of regulatory law. It is what most jurisprudes in the Anglo-American tradition of jurisprudence focus on exclusively. On the other hand, there are the social underpinnings of these legal affairs: people speaking to each other, judges pronouncing things, voters voting, and so on. This is the world of the social and psychological forces into which the law is embedded, or on top of which the law is built. Sociologists of law and legal realists focus exclusively on this realm. Legal reductionists claim that it is the only realm that really exists. But in the law there is, too, the intermediary layer, a layer corresponding to the transport/network layers of the internet stack. It is, I believe, this layer that Hans Kelsen was addressing when he was writing about the legal technique and it is this layer on which the most significant discoveries and insights of the Pure Theory of Law have to be located. Whilst the rule of recognition, for instance, is a device of the top application layer of regulating law, the basic norm of the Pure Theory can only be understood as operating in this intermediary layer. The exact manner in which I understand the Pure Theory to model the operation of the legal protocol will be discussed in the next chapter. I want to use the remaining paragraphs of this chapter to say a couple of words about the architecture of the legal stack as a whole.

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence

This architecture can be understood under a loosely emergentist paradigm.6 Under this paradigm the world is structured in higher and lower layers of existence where the properties of the higher layers are grounded or anchored in the realities of the lower level and in this sense do not exist independently of them. However, at the same time and crucially they are not reducible to them.7 The relation between the layers can be described as follows: whilst a bottom layer is more fundamental than the others, the top layer is more significant. Whilst the cable network is more fundamental it is certainly not the significant part of the internet, which can be found in the applications we are using every day. The applications of the higher abstraction layer, however, are dependent in their running on the more fundamental physical network. We could never understand how the application layer operates if we were completely ignorant of the other layers building its foundations. If we knew nothing about the physical network and the internet protocol, the applications of the internet would have to seem rather miraculous. Now, importantly, the internet protocol suite inhabits a wold between what is significant but non-fundamental, on the one hand, and what is fundamental but in itself in-significant, on the other. This middle layer is at the same time significant and fundamental. The legal stack has a similar design. On the bottom there are fundamental facts which are fundamental but taken by themselves legally in-significant. On the top we have significant yet non-fundamental legal phenomena of regulative law. As mentioned, most jurisprudes in their analysis of the law focus exclusively on the top layer and relegate everything which does not inhabit this layer to legal sociology.8 By doing so, I believe, they miss out on a good chunk of significant and fundamental insights of the intermediary level. By neglecting the more fundamental layers many jurisprudes face the impossible task of explaining the operation of an application layer which without reference to the intermediary protocol layer must seem rather miraculous. In trying to provide answers on this level of legal technique, the Pure Theory is neither trying to uncover the essence of the regulating law, nor its nature. Its object might be more fundamental than the legal applications but that does not make it more significant. Rather the opposite. The stack analysis tells us how exactly the law does what it does. This, however, does not mean that what the law does can be reduced to this operation. Klaus Brunner and Bert Klauninger, ‘An Integrative Image of Causality and Emergence’ in Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation, ed Vladimir Arshinov and Christian Fuchs, (Moscow: NIA-Parioda, 2003), 23–35, 26. 7 David Blitz, Emergent Evolution: Qualitative Novelty and the Levels of Reality (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), 179. 8 See, for instance, Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 104–105. 6

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C.

The Legal Protocol

Now that we have made some progress in determining the level on which many of the explanations offered by the Pure Theory operate, let us go ahead and try to find out what exactly this legal protocol according to the Pure Theory of Law is. On the top level the law issues demands, regulates conduct, creates norms and so on. But how exactly does it do all of that? If we want to answer how the law does what it does, we cannot in our answer, by threat of circularity, make reference to the concepts and ideas that operate on the top level. Questions of legal normativity, of the legal ought in general and of the demands the law creates in particular operate on the top level. When answering how the law can be normative and create legal demands this language of legal normativity is as unavailable to us as the techniques of the application layer of the internet are Figure 4 unavailable at the protocol layer. Rather conversely, we have to build our stack from the bottom up. Just as the internet protocol can be understood only insofar as it makes a specific use of the underlying physical link so our legal protocol can only be understood insofar as it makes specific use of the facts underlying it. So to understand how the legal protocol operates, we have to accurately model the medium in which this protocol does what it does. What we find in this bottom layer is agents doing things, where doing things includes saying things. At this stage of modelling it is not yet relevant what exactly these agents do. What we are facing, rather, at any given moment is a set of agents with a certain capability to do things. We could call these capabilities the agents’ forces and represent them as arrows pointing in different directions. So, seen independently from the layers above, the bottom layer can be represented as a set of agents and their forces pushing in different directions. Again, what the exact content of these forces is is as of yet irrelevant. The forces are not necessarily aligned. As mentioned, the agents communicate with each other and insofar as these communications affect other agents, they are part of the forces that operate between them. Now, whatever the law does on the top layer, it certainly has to affect those forces: it regulates behaviour, co-ordinates action and ultimately monopolises the use of force. So in order to do anything at all, the law has to be able to influence these social forces and to bring some kind of order to them. How exactly this order which the law brings to the social forces looks like is not yet relevant and will vary depending on the state of legal development and specific historic and cultural features of a given legal system. What matters here is the more basic problem of how the law can bring any order to these forces at all.

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence

So how is this to be done? There are three classic answers to this problem: (i) communication, (ii) self-interest, and (iii) force. I will go through each of the answers in turn. A first (i) answer to the question of how the law brings order to the world would look something like this: the law influences its subjects’ actions mainly by communicating standards to them. The subjects then voluntarily take an internal perspective towards these standards and comply with them. It is roughly along these lines that Hart wrote: The principal functions of the law as a means of social control are not to be seen in private litigation or prosecutions, which represent vital but still ancillary provisions for the failures of the system. It is to be seen in the diverse ways in which the law is used to control, to guide, and to plan life out of court.9

Under this model the law basically functions as a naked demand made on us. Such a system of pure or un-fortified demands will likely bring about at least some level of co-ordination of behaviour. However, there are a couple of well known difficulties with this model: first of all, this view models the law to function in the same way as morality does, ie by simply telling people what to do. Now whilst it might seem attractive to have such a functional alignment of normative practices, this approach produces a host of so far unresolved difficulties. After all, we do ascribe a different mode of origin, operation, content and effect to legal and moral rules. All these differences may be covered up in the demand-paradigm but they re-surface at various intersections of contemporary jurisprudential debates about the law, where they are pressed down only to surface at another point. Since there is no consensus that such a Whack-A-Mole approach will ultimately be unsuccessful (or that there can be anything else than such an approach in philosophy in general) I do not take this to be a debunking argument. What comes closer to such a debunking argument is the second well known criticism: it argues that in relying entirely on the voluntary co-operation of the subjects such a pure demand model is incapable of explaining the level of co-ordination and ultimately the monopolisation of the use of force you find in legal systems. Note that the claim presented in this paper does not maintain that the law does not demand anything nor that these demands do not have any effect whatsoever. The claim is only that taken in isolation the demand model is incapable of enlightening us about how the law actually moves about the forces in the bottom layer and how it ultimately monopolises the use of force. A second (ii) approach do deal with the problem would be to embellish the theory of pure standards or demands with a theory of self-interest. After all, it seems to be mostly in the self-interest of the individual agents to align their acts with the legal order. However, there is, of course, a missing link between self-interest and the actual

9

HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) 33.

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alignment of action. After all, whilst it is certainly in one’s self-interest to benefit from social order (be it in the form of peace, prosperity or security), it is not necessarily in one’s self-interest to bear one’s share of the costs of this social order, especially given one’s knowledge that everybody else will make similar calculations: self-interest taken by itself advises us to appear to be aligning our actions with the legal order and we can appear to be aligning our action in two ways, either by actually aligning our actions or by pretending to align our action.10 The fact that in some instances it may be easier and less costly to actually align our actions to the legal order rather than to only make it appear that we are doing so does not weigh very heavily, since in cases where the stakes are high, the differential payoffs of a good show will more and more outweigh the benefits of honest play. After all, the costs of putting up a show remain relatively constant whereas the costs of actual honest commitment vary heavily depending on the task involved. The claim that there might be a strong incentive to free-ride does not, of course, by itself refute the argument that it might nevertheless be in the self-interest of individual agents to co-operate or to align their actions and this claim thus does not establish that the spontaneous emergence of co-operation would be impossible. Rather, conversely, some kind of emergence of a propensity towards co-operation or alignment of behaviour is likely to emerge even from evolutionarily aligned forces of self-interest taken in isolation. Strategies which are maximally prone to free-ride or diverge from common behaviour might actually not constitute what has been called an evolutionary stable strategy:11 in the context of everyone free-riding or diverging it will be beneficial to develop some kind of tendency towards co-operative or convergent behaviour since such a tendency, if met with other such tendencies, would out-compete the lone divergent free riders. Such a spontaneous emergence of co-operation and behavioural convergence will, however, only occur in pockets of rather limited co-operation and by the same evolutionary reasons cannot grow beyond a certain limit: just as the evolution of a ‘hawkish’12 strategy that never co-operates will be out-competed by gangs of co-operating ‘doves’, so a society composed of purely dovish players is easy prey for hawkish exSome forms of social coordination do seem to require actual alignment. The traffic rule to drive on the left hand side of the road benefits only drivers who actually drive on the left hand side. This, however, is a special case as it is unclear how one could appear to drive on the left hand side without actually driving on the left hand side. From most other traffic rules, however, like the rules not to park on certain spots, not to exceed a certain speed limit, not to jaywalk, not to kill pedestrians by running them over and so on, one can benefit without actually being in compliance with them, but rather by successfully appearing to be in compliance. 11 John Maynard Smith defines an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as “an uninvadable strategy” and defines this quality of univadability mathematically in terms of the payoffs of certain strategies. John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 10. 12 Maynard Smith uses the terms ‘dove’ and ‘hawk’ to represent the two strategies modelled in his HawkDove game, where the hawk escalates and continues until injured or until opponent retreats, whereas the 10

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence

ploitative behaviour. In a world of doves, a single hawk can make a lot of easy prey and at a certain saturation point the benefits of turning hawkish will simply be too great to forgo. The question thus is not whether human nature is such that it does or does not favour behavioural alignment and co-operation but rather which behavioural strategies would become too costly to resist even for the best natured being. Whatever the level of such an emergent co-operation resulting from an equilibrium of the hawkish and dovish forces pulling in opposite directions, I think it is safe to say that it represents but the minimal fall-back level of locally limited pockets of co-operation and social ordering on the scale of families and tribes. Going beyond this minimal level of spontaneous co-ordination and social ordering and moving towards some kind of monopolisation of the use of force will demand much more of agents and will put their willingness to forgo the benefits of free-riding under ever more strain. I think it is safe to say that any regime that claims to have law has a level of social order that goes far beyond that minimum of what people want to do ‘naturally’, ie merely out of self-interests co-ordinated by evolutionary strategies. How would such level of the alignment and ordering of social forces be achieved? How could people be made to do things that go beyond and against what they are willing to do naturally? The only remaining answer (iii), it seems, is force: if people do not align their behaviour naturally or willingly, it seems they need to be forced to do so. On the face of it, this might appear a promising route. However, there is a principled problem with such an approach that relates to the possible holder of such a force, to the agent that is supposed to force the others. Let us say the amount of cumulative resistive force to be overcome in order to bring people into alignment is Z. Now, no single individual of the group will be strong enough so that his individual force X > Z. Thus any individual aiming to dominate a group by force will have to make use of the forces of other members, say a group of henchmen or myrmidons. Say, the combined force of the myrmidons is quantified as Y. In order for this suggested alignment by naked force to work, Y has to be greater than Z. At the same time, for the leader to control his helpers by force alone it has to be the case that X > Y. But if both X > Y and Y > Z, then it follows by necessity that X > Z: if the purported leader were strong enough to dominate by sheer force the myrmidons which in turn were strong enough to dominate by sheer force the wider public then the purported leader would by necessity be strong enough to dominate the wider public by sheer force directly. Since this is certainly not the case – after all we needed to go through the myrmidons only because we established that X ≯ Z – it cannot be the case that the supposed ruler truly dominates the myrmidons by force alone. And this makes perfect sense. It is likely that they are not truly forced by him but follow him voluntarily, ie either by following his naked demands (see above (i))

Dove retreats at once if the opponent escalates. John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 12.

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or by concluding it is in their self-interest (see above (ii)) to follow him independently of the use of force. But there is a last option we missed: could it not be the case that no individual agent, but the group as a whole exercised force to keep individual agents in line? Could there not be some some Durkheimian social forces13 at play that are in a sense external to and coercive of individual actors? Could not ‘the community’ make sure that people come and stay in line? This is an attractive option, however, without going into details of Durkheim’s theory, it can be ruled out at this stage as it posits and takes as given exactly what we want to explain, namely, the social force that aligns the individual forces. The explanation of how the individual forces are aligned, how the legal force is constituted, thus has to go down a different route than the ones taken by the above theories and might well involve some kind of interplay of them. It requires a shift from the master-paradigm to the protocol paradigm. The legal technique as presented by the Pure Theory does just that. I think that neither communication nor self-interest nor force taken in isolation is capable of creating the alignment of forces which would constitute the monopolisation of the use of force we see in modern societies. So how can it work? In discussing primitive legal systems Kelsen gives a curious answer: In primitive law, the individual whose legally protected interests have been violated is himself authorised by the legal order to proceed against the wrongdoer with…coercive means. This is called self-help. Every individual takes the law into his own hands. Blood revenge is the most characteristic form of this primitive legal technique. Neither the establishment of the delict nor the execution of the sanction is conferred upon an authority distinct from the parties involved or interested. In both these aspects the legal order is entirely decentralised…Nevertheless, in a primitive community the man avenging the murder of his father upon one whom he considers to be the murderer is himself regarded not as a murderer but as an organ of the community…The distinction between murder, as a delict, and homicide, as a fulfilment of a duty to avenge, is of the greatest importance for primitive society. It means that killing is only permitted if the killer acts as an organ of his community, if his action is undertaken in execution of the legal order. The coercive act is reserved to the community, and is, in consequence, a monopoly of this community. The decentralisation of the application of the law does not prevent the coercive act as such from being strictly monopolised.14

To illustrate this idea, take the following situation: say X kills A. In revenge A’s brother B kills X. In revenge Y kills B, then C kills Y and Z kills C.

See, for instance, Emile Durkheim, Suicide (London: Routledge, 2002) and The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1995). 14 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1949) 338–9. 13

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7

In terms of the pure facts at the basic level, this is but a series of mutual killings. It is a war-like and un-ordered chaotic state of affairs. If we apply Kelsen’s logic of primitive law, however, whilst the situation in terms of pure facts remains the same, the legal assessment has fundamentally changed: now the end-of-alphabet group (X, Y, Z) are marked as culprits or criminals and the beginning-alphabet-group (B and C) are marked as legal organs. In a global context we can thus see how the law picks out certain agents by reference to their specific direction of force and marks this force as the force of the law. Note that this force of the law is not created by the law but only co-opted by it. The force has existed as force before the existence of law and independently of it. It is a force which operates on the basic, ‘physical’ layer. It is not created by the law, but it is identified by the law amongst the existing forces of society. This force is thus by definition always already directed in the legally right direction. The law thus solves the problem of how to create order neither by demanding that the direction of forces be changed or by relying on the self-interest of agents to change the direction of their force or by forcing the use of force. It does not immediately change the direction of forces at all. Rather it confirms the direction of certain forces in contrast to others. This may, of course, have the mediated effect of gradually changing the direction of forces of the agents by the feeling of that being demanded, by calculation of self-interest or by the actual fact that in an instance the use of force marked out as lawful might happen to be stronger than the one marked out as unlawful. This mediated effect, however, is but a secondary effect. The primary method, conversely, is the identification of a social order. The problem discussed above of how to direct social force in a certain way is here already resolved: the law does not need to move about forces in the right direction but

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it identifies the correctly directed forces as its own force. The strongest, historically prevailing force will be considered the legal force. It is only after this establishment of the legal force that the legal force will consolidate itself by means of centralisation and thus by means of a successive weeding out of unlawful force. What needs to be seen, though, is that even at this primitive stage the law, whilst not yet being able to centralise the use of force, it is already capable of monopolising the use of force: the law allows us to distinguish between lawful use of force (sanctions by state organs) and unlawful use of force (crimes by criminals). Every use of force is thus marked out as either allowed or forbidden. This is all that is needed for monopolisation, since the monopolisation can neither mean the total absence of the use of force altogether or even the total absence of the unlawful use of force. Even in modern states, where the use of force is uncontroversially monopolised, there is still a lot of unlawful use of force. What monopolisation means is that all lawful force is wielded by the state as identified by the law. This analysis of the legal stack helps us to see rather clearly the importance as well as the practical limitations of this legal protocol. Let us, again, compare the legal stack to the internet protocol suite. TCP/IP might establish the foundation of the modern internet, but taken in isolation, ie without a further developed application layer running on top of it, is rather useless. Similarly, the legal protocol does establish the foundations of the legal system, it does create peace and order but it does so only in a very formal sense: using the protocol we can interpret the raging war between two families not as war but as peace-keeping. One family acts as the organs of the state, the other as band of criminals. This is war understood as peace-keeping but, of course, not yet peace or security in a substantive sense. But it is more than nothing. It is the germ of a legal order around which this legal order can grow. So when Hart argues that this primitive law is not yet law, he is both right and wrong: he is right in pointing out that the protocol layer is not the application layer, that the legal protocol is not yet regulatory law. He is, however, wrong, in overlooking the fact that the protocol layer is a fundamental ingredient of all law, including our modern law. This protocol layer describes the legal technique, it describes how the law does what it does, it describes how the law orders and regulates society. D.

Decentralised Centralisation

Whilst the protocol layer of the internet is irreducibly decentralised, the abstraction layer on top of it, ie the application layer, is not: whilst, say, Google is linked to millions of different computers, the webpage of the Londonderry Bridge Club is connected only to a couple and whilst there are millions of webpages like the Londonderry Bridge Club, there are but a couple like Google. The internet is thus actually quite centralised.

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence

However centralised the application layer may be, this centralisation is still created on top of and thus by means of the irreducibly decentralised internet protocol suite. Something similar holds true for the legal stack. Modern law is certainly radically more centralised than the primitive law system sketched above. Still, even in modern law the centralisation is effected by means of the fundamentally decentralised method of the legal protocol. How, then, does the centralisation of the law work exactly? Again, since we are working within a layered stack we cannot simply assume the availability of any techniques or concepts of a higher stack. Rather, we have work our way from the bottom to the top and have to explain the functioning of these higher-order techniques and concepts by means of the lower ones. We thus have to start with the primitive legal protocol and see how centralisation can be achieved by using only this protocol. The protocol above can be formalised as follows: [1] If X, then the use of force is lawful.

According to the Pure Theory of Law, this is the fundamental form of the law in general. It is also the so-called basic norm. What distinguishes modern law from primitive law is not the legal form as such or the way of its operation as a legal protocol layer, but only the specific content of X, the content of the condition of the lawfulness of the use of force. What we aim to show, then, is how centralisation can be implemented by changing only the content of the condition X. In primitive law the content of the condition X is rather straightforward: the lawfulness of the use of force is conditioned by simple facts, eg the fact that someone has killed someone else who himself has not killed someone else. [2]

If A has killed B who himself has not killed someone then killing A is lawful.

Now, the first step towards centralisation would be to require not only that A has killed someone but also that a third person (call him a ‘judge’) has authorised the killing of A. It is important to note that this requirement would not feed into the law as a bare demand but that it would be introduced into the condition X. [3] If A has killed B who himself has killed C but A has not been authorised to kill B by D then killing A is lawful.

The recursive nature of this rule has the effect that now any killing has to be authorised by a judge in order not to have the effect of rendering a killing of the last killer lawful. Note that this centralising move is effected neither by telling A what he can do or cannot do, nor by telling D (the “judge”) what he can do or cannot do, but by telling everyone what they can do to A. Take again our case illustrated in Figure 6. X kills innocent A and then B kills X. Under rule [2], this last killing would have been lawful which means nothing else than

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that a killing of B by, say, Y, would be unlawful which, in turn means nothing else than that a killing of Y would be lawful and so on. If we apply rule [3], however, the situation looks entirely different: in this case, if B had not been authorised by J (the “judge”), then his killing of X remains unlawful, even if X might have in fact previously killed A. This in turn would render a killing of B lawful. However, if now Y comes along and kills B without himself having been authorised by J, his killing of B is unlawful which in turn means that killing him would be lawful, as long as authorised by J, and so on. Note, that rule [3] operates not by rendering more killings unlawful but by rendering them lawful Or, put differently: it renders certain killings unlawful by rendering others lawful. Under rule [2] alone, killing B would not be lawful. Under rule [3] killing B is lawful. The recursive applicability of rule [3], however, makes sure that no killing unauthorised by J is lawful. The recursive nature of this rule has the effect that now any killing has to be authorised by a judge in order not to have the effect of rendering the killing of the last killer lawful. Now, apart from the requirement that a judge authorises the killing, other requirements can be introduced into the condition X. These can include the rules about how exactly the judge has to go about to authorise the killing, how the killing has to be conducted, who can do the killing, who counts as a judge and so on. Furthermore in referring to certain valid rules and procedures these conditions refer to the valid creation and abrogation of new rules feeding into X. Thus, for instance, the condition X may include requirements like: ‘as has been decided by a person appointed as a judge in accordance to the requirements as set out in the laws regulating the appointment of judges as created by parliament in accordance with the constitution which has been created in accordance with international law.’ It is via this route, ie as specific content of the condition X, that the entire content of the modern, centralised legal system enters the primitive legal rule. It is thus in this content X that the entire application layer of the regulatory law has to be located. E.

Conclusion

Understanding the law not as a flat, one-dimensional phenomenon but adding some depth to it by understanding it as a stack of various layers helps us, I believe, get a much clearer understanding of how it works and also what it is. It helps us, I think, see more clearly three facts. First, the law is ultimately always a matter of the use of force. What distinguishes modern from primitive law is but complexity and sheer number of the conditions that condition the lawfulness of the use of force. It is thus no wonder that we as lawyers and jurisprudes can sometimes get lost in the legal material and start to overlook that logically it all plays the same role, namely that of conditioning the lawfulness of the use of

Decentralisation and the Limits of Jurisprudence

force. Of course, modern law regulates many trivial things which do not in themselves seem to be matters of the use of force. The stack analysis presented here, however, shows that as soon as we try to analyse how the law regulates even those trivial things we find out that it regulates them by ultimately holding out the use of force. This use of force, is of course, heavily conditioned, but it is always there. Secondly, and relatedly, the law operates not by simply telling people what to do, but it tells people what to do by conditioning the use of force. It involves a shift from a master-paradigm of social unity in which there has to be some real or projected unified agent behind the law to a protocol-paradigm where the social unity is explained by means of the uniform operation of a protocol or code. The ease with which the law makes people do things might sometimes seem miraculous. It has to remain miraculous as long as we do not inquire into how exactly the law can make people do things. In its technique the law has recurse to a decentralised and in this sense ‘social’ reservoir of pure force. It establishes this social force by identifying it. Thirdly, whilst the use of force might be fundamental to the legal system, it is not its most significant part. What is more significant than the use of force is all the things we do by means of this use of force. Christoph Kletzer

King’s College London, The Dickson Poon School of Law, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom, [email protected]

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Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen*1 CARSTEN HEIDEMANN

The ‘Fact of Legal Science’ in Hans Kelsen’s Theory of Law Abstract: The ‘fact of science’ is, in two different senses, at the core of Kelsen’s neo-Kantian

theory of law during the twenties. On the one hand, Kelsen defines his theory, following Kant, Trendelenburg, and Cohen, as a critical theory of legal science, that is, of legal dogmatics. Legal science is a fact insofar as it is established as a social practice; and it is the task of the Pure Theory to analyse the presuppositions of the claim to objectivity, normativity and positivity, which is raised by dogmatic statements, and to reconstruct legal science in accordance with these presuppositions. On the other hand, Kelsen identifies the fact which is established by legal science, the legal norm, with the hypothetical judgment of legal science wherein antecedent and consequent are connected by the category of imputation. This judgment is not a psychic entity or procedure, but an objective structure; its validity might plausibly be taken to consist in the normative demand to think according to this judgment. Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Hermann Cohen, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, fact of legal

science, transcendental method, validity Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Hermann Cohen, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Faktum der

Rechtswissenschaft, transzendentale Methode, Geltung

1.

Einleitung

Der Bezug auf das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ ist für Kelsens neukantische Rechtstheorie der zwanziger Jahre von zentraler Bedeutung, und der entsprechende Ausdruck erscheint in der ersten Auflage der Reinen Rechtslehre an prominenter Stelle. Kelsen schreibt dort, die Möglichkeit und Erforderlichkeit einer normativen Theorie

* Ich danke Monika Zalewska für hilfreiche Kommentare zum Text.

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des Rechts sei schon durch das „jahrtausendalte Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ erwiesen.1 Und in seiner einzigen ausführlicheren Auseinandersetzung mit neukantischen Theorien, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht von 1922, heißt es, dass die Beziehung auf das Faktum einer Wissenschaft das „Um und Auf der Transzendentalphilosophie“ sei.2 Im Folgenden werde ich kurz die Genese der Wendung vom Faktum der Wissenschaft, ihre doppelte Bedeutung und ihre Funktion innerhalb der Reinen Rechtslehre darstellen. 2.

Das Faktum der Wissenschaft bei Cohen, Kant und Trendelenburg

Das Faktum der Wissenschaft zählt, als Ansatzpunkt der „transzendentalen Methode“, durch die in der Nachfolge Kants notwendige Bedingungen der Möglichkeit objektiver Erkenntnis begründet werden sollen, zum Grundbestand neukantischer Theorien. Dort wird das entsprechende Theorem vor allem von Hermann Cohen vertreten. 1877 schreibt Cohen: „Nicht die Sterne am Himmel sind die Objekte, die jene Methode betrachten lehrt, sondern die astronomischen Rechnungen, jene Fakten wissenschaftlicher Realität sind gleichsam das Wirkliche, das zu erklären steht, auf welches der transzendentale Blick eingestellt wird. […] Jene Fakten von Gesetzen sind die Objekte; nicht die Sternendinge“.3

Und in der 2. Auflage seiner Schrift Kants Theorie der Erfahrung heißt es dann 1885: [„Den Ausweis der apriorischen Elemente] bringt die transzendentale Methode, deren Prinzip und Norm der schlichte Gedanke ist: solche Elemente des Bewusstseins seien Elemente des erkennenden Bewusstseins, welche hinreichend und notwendig sind, das Faktum der Wissenschaft zu begründen und zu festigen.“4

Cohen gibt dies als Rekonstruktion des Kerns der theoretischen Philosophie Kants aus. In der Tat lässt die Konzeption sich auf den ersten Blick auf Kants Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik5 stützen. In dieser didaktisch vereinfachenden Zusammenfassung von Teilen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft unterscheidet Kant die in der Kritik angewandte anspruchsvolle synthetische oder progressive Begründungsweise, die ausgehend von der skepsisresistenten transzendentalen Einheit des Selbstbewusstseins die apriorischen Geltungsbedingungen objektiver Erkenntnis begründet, von Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1. Aufl.), Wien und Leipzig 1934, 37. Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht. Erledigung eines Versuchs zur Überwindung der „Rechtsdogmatik“, in: ZöR 3 (1922), 128. 3 Hermann Cohen, Kants Begründung der Ethik, Berlin 1877, 20 f. 4 Hermann Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (2. Aufl.), Berlin 1885, 77. 5 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, Werke (hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel), Bd. 5, Frankfurt/M. 1977, 134 f. (A 38 f.), 139 f. (A 46 f.). 1 2

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen

der leichter fassbaren analytischen oder regressiven der Prolegomena, die ausgehend von den in Mathematik und reiner Naturwissenschaft „gegebenen“ synthetischen Urteilen a priori deren Ermöglichungsbedingungen nachweist. Die synthetische Methode ist die eigentliche philosophische Methode. Sie macht den Kern von Kants theoretischer Philosophie aus. Dieser geht es angesichts der Unmöglichkeit, eine Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes mit einem erkenntnisunabhängig gedachten Gegenstand zu vergleichen, darum darzulegen, ob und auf welche Weise Gegenstandsbezug und Objektivität innerhalb der Erkenntnis zustande kommen können. Sie setzt nicht voraus, dass es synthetische Urteile a priori gibt (denn dies könnte durch den Skeptiker bezweifelt werden), durch die sich die Gültigkeit der Kategorien sonst leicht belegen ließe; vielmehr müssen die Kategorien als notwendige Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Gegenstandserkenntnis von einer unbezweifelbaren Prämisse aus bewiesen werden. Dieser unbezweifelbare Ausgangspunkt ist für Kant die transzendentale Einheit der Apperzeption, das „ich denke“, das alle unsere Vorstellungen und Urteile begleiten können muss. Sie lässt sich wohl am ehesten als „Gleichursprünglichkeit“ von Erkenntnissubjekt und einem kohärenten System referierender, also sich auf einen Gegenstand beziehender, Urteile oder Propositionen begreifen.6 Ob und wie es Kant gelungen ist, von diesem formalen Ausgangspunkt aus inhaltlich bestimmte Kategorien nachzuweisen, ist fraglich; jedenfalls dürfte es sich bei der Beweisführung nicht um eine einfache „Deduktion“ handeln. Möglicherweise kommt für die Rechtfertigung der transzendentalen Einheit der Apperzeption selbst ein „elenktisches“ Argument in Frage,7 während die Gültigkeit der Kategorien im Rahmen einer „Sequenz analytischer Implikationsschritte“8 nachgewiesen werden könnte. Denkbar ist auch, dass die synthetische Begründung stets einer Ergänzung durch einen Beweis nach analytischer Methode bedarf.9 Die analytische Methode ist deutlich anspruchsloser. Sie ist für Kant kein philosophisches Begründungsverfahren, sondern eine ausschließlich für Prolegomena zulässige Darstellungsweise. Sie müsse sich auf etwas stützen,

Aschenberg meint, dass das Prinzip der transzendentalen Einheit der Apperzeption grundlegender als die Kontrastrelation zwischen Subjektivem und Objektivem sein müsse (vgl. Reinhold Aschenberg, Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie, Stuttgart 1982, 185 f.). Das scheint mir aber nur dann der Fall zu sein, wenn die Einheit des Urteilszusammenhangs bei Kant sich wirklich kategorial trennen lässt von der Einheit des empirischen Gegenständlichen, was m. E. zweifelhaft ist; vgl. unten 3.3. Zur Gleichursprünglichkeit der beiden Elemente vgl. auch Hansgeorg Hoppe, Die Bedeutung der Empirie für transzendentale Deduktionen, in: Kants transzendentale Deduktion und die Möglichkeit von Transzendentalphilosophie, Frankfurt/M. 1988, 131. 7 Reinhold Aschenberg, Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie (Fn. 6), 383 ff. 8 Reinhold Aschenberg, Einiges über Selbstbewusstsein als Prinzip der Transzendentalphilosophie, in: Kants transzendentale Deduktion und die Möglichkeit von Transzendentalphilosophie, Frankfurt/M. 1988, 55. 9 Vgl. etwa Christian Krijnen, Nachmetaphysischer Sinn, Würzburg 2001, 56 f. m. w. N., der von einer notwendigen Komplementarität der beiden Begründungsmethoden ausgeht. 6

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„was man schon als zuverlässig kennt, von da man mit Zutrauen ausgehen und zu den Quellen aufsteigen kann, die man noch nicht kennt, und deren Entdeckung uns nicht allein das, was man wusste, erklären, sondern zugleich einen Umfang vieler Erkenntnisse, die insgesamt aus den nämlichen Quellen entspringen, darstellen wird.“10

Die Möglichkeit der analytischen Methode ergebe sich daraus, dass „gewisse reine synthetische Erkenntnis a priori“ zwar nicht unbezweifelbar, aber doch „wirklich und gegeben“ sei, nämlich die Urteile der Mathematik und der reinen Naturwissenschaft.11 Ihr Vorteil ist, dass sie nicht aus einem unbezweifelbaren, aber formalen Prinzip zu inhaltlichen Ergebnissen gelangen muss, sondern bestimmte nichtempirische, aber dennoch synthetische Urteile voraussetzen darf. Entsprechend heißt es bei Kant zu den Vorzügen der analytischen Methode: „[Sie] erleichtert das Geschäfte sehr, in welchem die allgemeinen Betrachtungen nicht allein auf Facta angewandt werden, sondern sogar von ihnen ausgehen, anstatt dass sie in synthetischem Verfahren gänzlich in abstracto aus Begriffen abgeleitet werden müssen“.12

Doch wird für Kant die eigentliche Begründungslast von der synthetischen Methode getragen; denn mittels der analytischen Methode kann lediglich die relative Geltung apriorischer Elemente bezogen auf die Sätze der Mathematik und reinen Naturwissenschaft nachgewiesen werden.13 Wenn Cohen die „transzendentale“ Methode mit der analytischen Methode Kants identifiziert, relativiert er den Kantschen Ansatz also erheblich. Darüber hinaus findet sich bei Cohen eine zweite Relativierung des Begründungsansatzes Kants, die vermutlich auf den Einfluss Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburgs zurückzuführen ist. Trendelenburg fordert Mitte des 19.  Jahrhunderts angesichts des desolaten Zustands der Philosophie nach dem Niedergang des deutschen Idealismus, dass sie sich an die seinerzeit blühenden Naturwissenschaften anschließen möge, zum wechselseitigen Nutzen, denn diesen würde eine kritische Methodologie fehlen. Bereits 1840 schreibt Trendelenburg: „Die Tatsachen, die [die Logik, d. h. die erkenntnistheoretische Philosophie] beobachten sollte, um sie abzuleiten, sind die Methoden der einzelnen Wissenschaften; denn diesen

Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena (Fn. 5), A 40. A. a. O. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena (Fn. 5), A 47. Vgl. zur analytischen/synthetischen Methode auch Immanuel Kant, Logik, Werke (hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel), Bd.  6, Frankfurt/M. 1977, 581 (§ 117): „Die analytische Methode ist der synthetischen entgegengesetzt. Jene fängt von dem Bedingten und Begründeten an und geht zu den Prinzipien fort […], dieses hingegen geht von den Prinzipen zu den Folgen oder vom Einfachen zum Zusammengesetzten. Die erstere könnte man auch die regressive, so wie die letztere die progressive nennen. […] Für den Zweck der Popularität ist die analytische, für den Zweck der wissenschaftlichen und systematischen Bearbeitung des Erkenntnisses aber ist die synthetische Methode angemessen.“ 10 11 12 13

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen

hat der erkennende Geist in den größten Abmessungen sein eigenes Wesen eingedrückt. Die Wissenschaften versuchen glücklich ihre eigentümlichen Wege, aber zum Teil ohne nähere Rechenschaft der Methode, da sie auf ihren Gegenstand und nicht auf das Verfahren gerichtet sind. Die Logik hätte hier die Aufgabe zu beobachten und zu vergleichen, das Unbewusste zum Bewusstsein zu erheben und das Verschiedene im gemeinsamen Ursprunge zu begreifen. […] Ohne sorgfältigen Hinblick auf die Methode der einzelnen Wissenschaften muss sie ihr Ziel verfehlen, weil sie dann kein bestimmtes Objekt hat, an dem sie sich in ihren Theorien zurechtfinde.“14

Und 1870 heißt es dann in der dritten Auflage von Trendelenburgs Logischen Untersuchungen, die Wissenschaften stellten der Skepsis ein „Factum“ entgegen, und die Tatsache der Wissenschaft sei die Basis des logischen Problems.15 Damit wird Trendelenburg zu einem Begründer der Wissenschaftstheorie.16 Zwar kann sein Einfluss auf Cohens Konzeption des „Faktums der Wissenschaft“ nicht direkt nachgewiesen werden, denn Cohen hat für seine Auffassung nie explizit auf Trendelenburg Bezug genommen. Doch hatte er als Student in Berlin in der ersten Hälfte der 1860er Jahre nicht nur unmittelbaren Kontakt zu Trendelenburg;17 er beteiligte sich auch maßgeblich (und zwar im Wesentlichen auf Trendelenburgs Seite) an dem Streit um die „Trendelenburgsche Lücke“, in dem es um die Frage ging, ob Kant seine Einordnung von Raum und Zeit als subjektive Anschauungsformen überzeugend begründet habe.18 Ferner entspricht Cohens Begrifflichkeit weitgehend derjenigen Trendelenburgs. Darüber hinaus lässt sich seine Deutung der analytischen oder regressiven Methode kaum ohne Trendelenburgs Einfluss erklären. Denn diesem geht es nicht, wie Kant, um die konstituierenden Elemente apriorischer synthetischer Urteile, sondern um den Aufweis der Methoden und Voraussetzungen der aposteriorischen Naturwissenschaften schlechthin. Das findet sich entsprechend bei Cohen, der das wissenschaftliche Faktum als Ansatzpunkt der transzendentalen Methode, wie die oben zitierte Passage belegt, nicht (nur) in den apriorischen synthetischen Sätzen der reinen Naturwissenschaft und Mathematik, sondern generell in den Tatsachen der wissenschaftlichen „Gesetze“ sieht.19 Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen (1. Aufl.), Berlin 1840, Vorrede IV. Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen (3. Aufl.), Leipzig 1870, 130 f., 312. Vgl. Klaus Christian Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus, Frankfurt/M. 1993, 35 ff. Vgl. Deutsche Biographie, Artikel „Cohen, Hermann“ (abrufbar unter https://www.deutsche-biographie. de/sfz8558.html). 18 Vgl. dazu insbesondere Klaus Christian Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus (Fn. 16), 257 ff. 19 Vgl. dazu auch Klaus Christian Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus (Fn. 16), 272: „Dass schon 1840 von Trendelenburg gesagt worden war, die Logik müsse sich auf die Wissenschaften richten, weil sie sonst kein bestimmtes Ziel und Objekt habe, und damit erstmals eine ‚Theorie der Wissenschaft‘ ihrem Anliegen nach gefordert war, sollte den Gedanken erleichtern, der Vater des neukantianischen Scientismus, Cohen, habe tatsächlich weit mehr, als bislang gesehen worden ist, von jenem gelernt.“ 14 15 16 17

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Diese Kontingenz des Ausgangspunktes wirkt sich im Übrigen bereits bei Cohen, mehr noch bei seinem Schüler Paul Natorp, in einer eigentümlichen Dynamik der Erkenntnisbedingungen aus: Zwar verkörpert das Faktum der Wissenschaft das erreichbare Höchstmaß objektiver Erkenntnis; es ist aber nichts Feststehendes, sondern ein „Fieri“,20 und mit ihm können sich auch die notwendigen Bedingungen seiner Möglichkeit verändern. Wenn Cohen für seine Theorie dennoch den Anspruch erhebt, die theoretische Philosophie Kants zu rekonstruieren, dann reduziert er die Transzendentalphilosophie letztlich auf eine „methodenkritische Wissenschaftstheorie mit erweiterten polizeilichen Vollmachten“.21 Das bedeutet allerdings nicht unbedingt eine Trivialisierung. So wie Kant die traditionelle Ontologie nicht wirklich „zermalmt“, sondern sie in einer Verstandesanalytik aufgehen lässt,22 so verwirft Cohen seinerseits Kants Verstandeskritik nicht, sondern deutet sie in eine kritische Wissenschaftstheorie um. Die klassische Ontologie wird quasi in der neukantischen Wissenschaftstheorie „aufgehoben“. 3.

Das Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft bei Cohen und Kelsen

Nach Kelsens eigener Auskunft wird er durch eine Besprechung seiner Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre auf Parallelen zwischen seiner Theorie und der von Cohen 1904 in der Ethik des reinen Willens entwickelten aufmerksam.23 Diese betreffen zwar vor allem den Personen- und Willensbegriff; in Cohens Schrift heißt es jedoch auch ausdrücklich, dass jede Philosophie auf das „Faktum von Wissenschaften“ angewiesen sei,24 das sei „das Ewige in Kants System“. Und die Wissenschaft, an die Cohen seine Ethik in sehr eigenwilliger Weise andockt, ist die Rechtswissenschaft. 3.1

Die faktische Rechtswissenschaft

Dabei modifiziert er sein eben geschildertes Konzept allerdings erheblich. Cohen erklärt nie genauer, was er unter dem „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ versteht. Einerseits scheint die ausgeübte Rechtswissenschaft für ihn nicht (wie für Kelsen) mit der Rechtsdogmatik identisch zu sein. Vielmehr lokalisiert er sie auf einer abstrakteren Paul Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, Leipzig und Berlin 1910, 14. So treffend Andreas Hoeschen, Das „Dostojewsky“ – Projekt Lukács‘ neukantianisches Frühwerk in seinem ideengeschichtlichen Kontext, Tübingen 1999, 113. 22 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke (hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel), Bd. 3, Frankfurt/M. 1974, 275 (A 246/B 303). 23 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (2. Aufl.), Tübingen 1923, Vorrede XVII; ders., Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), Vorwort IX. 24 Hermann Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens, Berlin 1904, 62. 20 21

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen

Ebene als die Naturwissenschaft; sie ist für ihn als Allgemeine Rechtslehre eine „Mathematik“, also gewissermaßen eine Methodik, der Geisteswissenschaften schlechthin.25 Diese Allgemeine Rechtslehre scheint er jedoch andererseits vor allem der institutionalisierten Rechtsdogmatik entnehmen zu wollen. Ferner eignen sich die Gesetze der Naturwissenschaften als Ausgangspunkt der transzendentalen Methode, weil sie das Ideal objektiver Erkenntnis weitestgehend annähern. Sie sind als allgemeingültige Regeln experimentell belegbar und erlauben zuverlässig Vorhersagen. Rechtswissenschaftliche Sätze dagegen sind für Cohen nicht deswegen tauglicher Ansatzpunkt, weil sie einem vergleichbaren Erkenntnisideal genügen, sondern weil sie Bestandteile einer soziokulturell etablierten, systematisch vorgehenden und Objektivität beanspruchenden begrifflichen Praxis sind.26 Ihm scheint es ausschließlich darum zu gehen, die Bedeutung ethischer Begriffe, die für alle Geisteswissenschaften von Interesse sind, wie „Handlung“, „Person“, „Wille“ etc., nicht abstrakt entwickeln zu müssen, sondern sie aus einer gegebenen Praxis herauspräparieren zu können.27 Unmerklich wird so das „wissenschaftliche Faktum“ als das der transzendentalen Analyse Gegebene durch den „faktischen Wissenschaftsbetrieb“ ersetzt; dessen Urteile erhalten ihre Dignität nicht aufgrund ihrer Objektivität oder Allgemeingültigkeit, sondern schlicht dadurch, dass sie in der Wirklichkeit institutionalisiert ist. Dies bedeutet eine Annäherung an den Neukantianismus der südwestdeutschen Schule, für den die theoretische Philosophie von vornherein deswegen an das Faktum der Wissenschaft anknüpft, weil und soweit diese Kulturbestandteil ist.28 In seiner später erschienenen Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls radikalisiert Cohen diesen Ansatz im Übrigen; er verzichtet dort völlig auf das Bezugsfaktum einer Wissenschaft und lässt die transzendentale Methode direkt am „Faktum der Kunst“ ansetzen.29 Rückblickend bezeichnet er dort als Aufgabe der theoretischen Philosophie, zu zeigen, „wie sich das Kulturbewusstsein, von der Mathematik geleitet, in den Gebieten der Naturwissenschaft darlegt“;30 soweit es um die Ethik geht, benennt er als Bezugsfaktum nicht mehr die Rechtswissenschaft, sondern die „sittliche Kultur in Recht und Staat“.31

Hermann Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens (Fn. 24), Vorrede I, 60 ff. Hermann Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens (Fn. 24), Vorrede I. Vgl. Hermann Cohen, Ethik des reinen Willens (Fn. 24), Vorrede I: „[Es] wird hier der Versuch gemacht, die Ethik auf die Rechtswissenschaft zu orientieren. Diese ist die Mathematik der Geisteswissenschaften. Die Methodik ihrer exakten Begriffe hat die Ethik für ihre Probleme der Persönlichkeit und der Handlung zu belauschen.“ 28 Vgl. Heinrich Rickert, Vom Begriff der Philosophie, in: Logos, Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur (1910), 18. Zur Problematik vgl. auch Hans-Ludwig Ollig, Die Frage nach dem Proprium des Neukantianismus, in: Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie (hrsg. v. Robert Alexy, Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson und Gerhard Sprenger), Baden-Baden 2002, 81. 29 Etwa Hermann Cohen, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, Berlin 1912, Vorrede X. 30 Hermann Cohen, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (Fn. 29), 4. 31 Hermann Cohen, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (Fn. 29), 5. 25 26 27

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Das ursprüngliche Anliegen des transzendentalen Beweises im Sinne Kants, aus einem unbezweifelbaren Punkt universale Ermöglichungsbedingungen objektiver Erkenntnis zu deduzieren, wird damit ein drittes Mal relativiert. Trotzdem geht es auch dieser extrem abgeschwächten Version der kritischen Methode um die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von (normativer) Erkenntnis, und ihr Ergebnis bietet letztlich eine Ontologie des jeweiligen Gegenstandsbereichs; insofern ist der Bezug auf Kant gerade noch berechtigt. Kelsen übernimmt Cohens Ansicht, dass die transzendentale Methode nur an das „Faktum der Wissenschaft“ anknüpfen könne, und er geht auch grundsätzlich davon aus, dass dieses im Bereich des Rechts mit der als soziokulturelle Praxis existierenden Rechtswissenschaft zu identifizieren sei. In zwei Punkten distanziert er sich jedoch vom Cohenschen Ansatz: Zum einen fasst er das Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft enger; er versteht darunter ausschließlich die Rechtserkenntnis der Rechtsdogmatik. Zum anderen und vor allem teilt er – trotz seiner fundamentalen These eines Dualismus zwischen Sein und Sollen  – nicht Cohens Auffassung, dass ein fundamentaler Unterschied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Erkenntnis besteht. Im Bereich der theoretischen Philosophie ist die Durchführung der transzendentalen Methode für Cohen, wie gezeigt, Aufgabe der Logik, d. h. der Erkenntnistheorie, die an die mathematischen Naturwissenschaften anknüpft. Im praktischen Bereich tritt an die Stelle der Logik die Ethik, die zwar an die Rechtswissenschaft anknüpft, aber weniger die Bedingungen der objektiven Geltung rechtswissenschaftlicher Urteile, als vielmehr ein System der rechtlichen Grundbegriffe herausarbeitet, um mit deren Hilfe eine Analyse der Geisteswissenschaften schlechthin vornehmen zu können. Die Rechtswissenschaft spielt für Cohen eine Rolle, die der der Mathematik für die Naturwissenschaften analog ist. Kelsen dagegen siedelt die Rechtswissenschaft auf einer den Naturwissenschaften analogen Ebene an; es geht ihm um die Voraussetzungen der objektiven Geltung der Urteile einer szientistisch verstandenen Rechtsdogmatik.32 Er kombiniert gewissermaßen das Anliegen der theoretischen Philosophie Cohens, die Voraussetzungen der Objektivität wissenschaftlicher Urteile festzustellen, das sich daraus rechtfertigt, dass naturwissenschaftliche Urteile das höchstmögliche Maß an Erkenntnis enthalten, mit der Relativierung der Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft auf eine bestimmte „historische“, in der Wirklichkeit etablierte Praxis in der praktischen Philosophie Cohens. Für Kelsen ist diese Variante aus zwei Gründen attraktiv. Zum einen kann er die an die „gegebene“ Rechtswissenschaft anknüpfende transzendentale Methode ohne weiteres in sein in den Hauptproblemen entwickeltes System integrieren. Schon dort hat er seine Theorie in erster Linie als „Methodologie“ der etablierten Rechtsdogmatik

32

Vgl. insbesondere Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 128.

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen

aufgefasst;33 nun gelingt ihm ohne Aufwand die Einordnung in einen philosophischen Zusammenhang. Zum anderen kommt sie der spezifischen Zielsetzung seiner Theorie entgegen: Während Trendelenburg und der „frühe“ Cohen den Status der zweifelhaft gewordenen Philosophie durch die Anbindung an die erfolgreichen Naturwissenschaften wiederherstellen wollen, möchte Kelsen umgekehrt die durch methodische Verirrungen zweifelhaft gewordene dogmatische Rechtswissenschaft mittels des Anschlusses an die neukantische Wissenschaftstheorie sanieren. Die Objektivität rechtsdogmatischer Sätze ist für diesen Ansatz kein relativ skepsisresistenter Ausgangspunkt, sondern bleibt, als bloßer Anspruch, problematisch, und die Reine Rechtslehre stellt nur die Bedingungen fest, unter denen diesem Anspruch stattgegeben werden könnte. 3.2

Die transzendentale Methode

Was Kelsen genau unter der transzendentalen Methode versteht, und wie diese auf das Recht bzw. die Rechtswissenschaft angewendet werden kann, wird von ihm nie näher erläutert. Dadurch, dass er einerseits den wissenschaftstheoretischen Ansatz der frühen Lehre Cohens übernimmt, dessen Ansatzpunkt die Gesetze und Methoden der exakten Naturwissenschaften sind, weil sie das Höchstmaß an Objektivität und Allgemeingültigkeit verkörpern, andererseits seine eigene Theorie in der Folge der späten Lehre Cohens als „transzendentale“ Analyse der soziokulturellen Praxis der Rechtsdogmatik versteht, ergeben sich letztlich zwei verschiedene Deutungen der transzendentalen Methode: Nach der ersten setzt die transzendentale Analyse direkt am wissenschaftlichen Urteil an, denn dieses ist „der Grund- und Eckstein der Transzendentalphilosophie, die eben darum nur Kritik der Wissenschaft, Erkenntniskritik, weil Analyse des synthetischen Urteils sein kann“.34

Aufgabe der transzendentalen Methode ist es nach dieser Deutung, die nichtfaktischen Ermöglichungsbedingungen der hypothetischen Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft herauszuarbeiten; deren Existenz und Geltung wird vorausgesetzt. Ergebnis einer solchen Präsuppositionsanalyse sind u. a. die Kategorie des Sollens als urteilskonstituierende Kategorie35 und die Grundnorm als oberstes Geltungskriterium36. Nach der zweiten Deutung setzt die Analyse an der rechtsdogmatischen Praxis (und ihren alltagssprachlichen Derivaten) an, in der normative Sätze wie „X sei dazu berechtigt, Y dazu verpflichtet, usw.“ verwendet werden; Ausgangspunkt sind also „all 33 34 35 36

Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (1. Aufl.), Tübingen 1911, Vorrede III. Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 128. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 21 ff. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 66 f.

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die Tausende von Aussagen, in denen das Rechtsleben sich täglich äußert“.37 Nach dieser Deutung ginge es allgemeiner um die Voraussetzungen der mit der Äußerung solcher Sätze beanspruchten Normativität und Objektivität; der Rechtssatz als Urteil der Rechtswissenschaft wäre weniger Ausgangspunkt der Analyse als vielmehr Ergebnis einer kritischen Rekonstruktion faktisch geäußerter rechtswissenschaftlicher Sätze. Für diese Deutung spricht, dass Kelsen die Rechtswissenschaft nicht nur analysieren, sondern auch einer Methodenkritik unterziehen will. Will man beide Deutungen miteinander vereinbaren, könnte Kelsens Konzeption der transzendentalen Methode in drei teilweise ineinander übergehende Schritte eingeteilt werden: Der erste Schritt besteht in einer interpretierenden Bestandsaufnahme. Zunächst wird festgestellt, welche universalen formalen Eigenschaften die Sätze der Rechtsdogmatik nach dem Anspruch der sie Äußernden in der Regel aufweisen, nämlich Objektivität,38 Normativität39 und Positivität.40 Zusätzlich argumentiert Kelsen auf der Grundlage seiner neukantisch-szientistischen Wissenschaftsauffassung dafür, dass diese Eigenschaften auch notwendig beansprucht werden: Dass mit wissenschaftlichen Sätzen Objektivität beansprucht werden muss, ergibt sich unmittelbar aus dem Wissenschaftsbegriff.41 Normativität muss beansprucht werden, damit eine Abgrenzung des Gegenstandsbereichs der Rechtswissenschaft möglich und somit ihre Eigenständigkeit gewährleistet ist.42 Positivität muss beansprucht werden, weil wissenschaftliche Urteile auf empirisches „Material“ als Bedingung ihrer Geltung angewiesen sind.43 In einem zweiten Schritt werden die notwendigen nichtfaktischen Voraussetzungen der Möglichkeit solcher Urteile festgestellt. Allgemeine Voraussetzungen jeder Wissenschaft sind zunächst die Einheit und Einheitlichkeit ihrer Urteile und die Ausschließlichkeit des wissenschaftlichen Urteilssystems für seinen Gegenstandsbereich. Objektivität setzt Gesetzlichkeit voraus; diese wiederum setzt die Form des Rechtssatzes als dem Kausalgesetz analoges hypothetisches Urteil (in einem logischen Sinn) voraus.44 Positivität setzt die Existenz von Regeln voraus, die bestimmte empirische Tatbestände  – insbesondere Setzungsakte  – als Normgeltungsbedingungen festle-

Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 35. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), Vorwort III. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 33 f. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 14; ders., Eugen Hubers Lehre vom Wesen des Rechts, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (1921), 223, 233. 41 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Fn. 23), Vorrede VII. 42 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 35. 43 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 14, 64 f. 44 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Fn. 23), Vorrede VII. 37 38 39 40

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen

gen;45 die Annahme rechtlicher Normativität schließlich setzt die Kategorie der peripheren Zurechnung voraus, durch die Bedingung und Zwangsausübung innerhalb des Rechtssatzes miteinander verbunden werden.46 Zuletzt werden in einem dritten Schritt, dem der Kritik, jene Sätze oder Konzeptionen aus der Rechtswissenschaft ausgeschieden, die nicht mit diesen Präsuppositionen zu vereinbaren sind oder sich nicht in der Gestalt des Rechtssatzes oder seiner Bestandteile rekonstruieren lassen.47 Dadurch werden insbesondere soziologische oder moralische Normbegründungen aus dem Recht ausgeschlossen; und die Begriffe des subjektiven Rechts, der Pflicht und der Person werden als Implikate des Rechtssatzes, seiner Bestandteile oder des Zusammenhangs von Rechtssätzen nachgewiesen bzw. auf diese reduziert.48 Eine exakte Abgrenzung der drei Schritte dürfte allerdings kaum möglich sein. Ohne eine generalisierende Interpretation rechtsdogmatischer Sätze wird man am Anfang der Analyse nicht auskommen können. Dass mit ihrer Äußerung ein Anspruch auf Objektivität, Normativität und Positivität verbunden ist, ist aber nicht unbezweifelbar, und Kelsens Zusatzargument, dass dieser Anspruch erhoben werden muss, wenn die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtsdogmatik gewahrt bleiben soll, geht eigentlich über die Aufgabe einer transzendentalen Analyse im Sinne Cohens hinaus und beruht auf einer bestimmten Auffassung von Wissenschaftlichkeit. Ferner scheinen einige Rechtselemente, wie das subjektive Recht und die Pflicht, eine „Doppelrolle“ zu spielen. Zum einen gehören Aussagen über Rechte und Pflichten, wie aus den oben zitierten Beispielen Kelsens für „naive“ Aussagen innerhalb der Rechtspraxis hervorgeht, zum „Input“ für die transzendentale Methode. Zum anderen sind sie, in geläuterter Form als „reflektierte“ sekundäre Rechtsbegriffe, Ergebnis einer kritischen Rekonstruktion der dogmatischen Rechtswissenschaft.49 3.3

Das rechtswissenschaftliche Faktum

Die „faktische Rechtswissenschaft“ als Ansatzpunkt der transzendentalen Methode ist also identisch mit der soziokulturellen Praxis der Rechtsdogmatik. Es bleibt die Frage, was Kelsen unter der innerhalb der faktisch gegebenen dogmatischen Rechtswissenschaft festgestellten Tatsache versteht, dem „rechtswissenschaftlichem Faktum“ als Äquivalent zum Naturgesetz, an das jedenfalls der „frühe“ Cohen die transzendentale Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 64 f.; ders., Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff, Tübingen 1922, 94 f. 46 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 23. 47 Hans Kelsen, Zur Theorie der juristischen Fiktionen, in: Annalen der Philosophie (1919), 47 ff.; ders., Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 1. 48 Etwa Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 47 ff. 49 Etwa Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 47 ff. 45

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Methode im naturwissenschaftlichen Bereich anknüpft. Die Antwort liegt nach dem oben Ausgeführten nahe: Das rechtswissenschaftliche Faktum ist die Rechtsnorm, und diese ist identisch mit dem Urteil der Rechtswissenschaft selbst. Dies erläutert Kelsen vor allem im Rahmen seiner Debatte mit Fritz Sander. Dort heißt es zunächst zu der auch seiner Reinen Rechtslehre zugrundeliegenden neukantischen Erkenntnistheorie, Erfahrung als Wissenschaft sei ein Verfahren der Erkenntnis, in dem der reine Verstandesbegriff (die Kategorie) auf sinnliche Anschauungen bezogen werde. Diese Einheitsbeziehung realisiere sich in den synthetischen Urteilen der Naturwissenschaft, deren Zusammenhang die „Erfahrung als Wissenschaft im Sinne Kants“, also letztlich die Natur, darstelle.50 Das Recht der Rechtswissenschaft sei analog der Natur der Naturwissenschaft zu begreifen, wobei an die Stelle des Anschauungsmaterials das Willensaktmaterial des Gesetzgebers trete: „Im erkennenden Bewusstsein, d. h. in den als Rechtssätzen auftretenden Urteilen der Rechtswissenschaft, drückt sich das – in der Urteilssphäre objektivierte – Wollen als Sollen aus. Nur in dieser Sphäre kommt aber das Recht als Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft in Betracht. Als Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft ist dann das Recht ebenso ein System von Urteilen über das Recht, wie die Natur als Gegenstand der Naturwissenschaft ein System von Urteilen über die Natur.“51

Das aus Normen bestehende Recht ist daher identisch mit dem System der hypothetischen normativen Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft, den Rechtssätzen. Die Rechtsnorm selbst ist also ein hypothetisches Erkenntnisurteil, in dem die Kategorie der normativen (peripheren) Zurechnung zur Anwendung kommt.52 Innerhalb der Theorie Kelsens ist diese Konzeption – die er um 1940 herum wieder aufgibt53 – im Rahmen seiner nichtrealistischen neukantischen Erkenntnistheorie konsequent; sie hat auch hohes Erklärungspotential. Sie ermöglicht ihm, den Normbegriff ohne Rekurs auf eine Theorie erkenntnisunabhängiger abstrakter Entitäten zu explizieren. Ferner wird die in der Reinen Rechtslehre insgesamt nicht klare und dementsprechend in der Sekundärliteratur umstrittene Definition der Geltung als Existenz oder Sollen der Norm54 unproblematisch; es handelt sich einfach um die GelHans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 127. Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 181. Angesichts der eindeutigen Formulierung ist die Auffassung Christoph Kletzers, Kelsen wolle in dieser Passage eine abbildtheoretische Erkenntnistheorie vortragen, unhaltbar; sie wird von ihm auch nicht weiter begründet (vgl. Christoph Kletzer, Fritz Sander, in: Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen, Wien 2008, 459). 52 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Fn. 23), Vorrede VI; ders., Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin 1925, 48 ff. 53 Kenntlich insbesondere an der Unterscheidung zwischen der Rechtsnorm und dem Rechtssatz (verstanden als Urteil über die Rechtsnorm), die erstmals in Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, in: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 55 (1941), 44–70, durchgeführt wird. 54 Vgl. beispielhaft Joseph Raz, Legal Validity, in: ders., The Authority of Law, Oxford 1979, 146 ff.; Eugenio Bulygin, An Antinomy in Kelsen‘s Pure Theory of Law, in; Normativity and Norms Critical Perspectives on 50 51

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen

tung eines Urteils im logischen Sinne; diese ist dann gegeben, wenn der Urteilsakt bzw. der das Urteil formulierende Satz wahr ist. Auch logische Beziehungen zwischen Normen sind unkompliziert möglich, wenn diese als Erkenntnisurteile aufgefasst werden.55 Zuletzt vermeidet die Konzeption die sich aus der späteren Trennung zwischen der Rechtsnorm, als einer der Erkenntnis vorgegebenen Entität, und dem Rechtssatz, als einer isomorphen Reproduktion der Norm auf der Erkenntnisebene, ergebenden Probleme.56 Kelsen gibt zu, dass es einen „Schein der Paradoxie“ habe, wenn das Recht mit den Urteilen „über“ das Recht identifiziert werde,57 doch hält er seine Auffassung für unvermeidlich, wenn man mit Kant davon ausgeht, dass die Erkenntnis selbst ihren Gegenstand konstituiert und Erkenntnis sich stets in logischen Urteilen äußert. Und tatsächlich beruft Kelsen sich durchaus zu Recht auf Kant. Wenn Referenz nach Kant als eine Angelegenheit innerhalb der Erkenntnis gedacht werden muss, dann kann sie letztlich allein durch die Konstitution des Erkenntnisgegenstandes in gültigen Urteilen herbeigeführt werden. Denn Kant führt alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urteile zurück;58 und um im Rahmen der metaphysischen Deduktion die Herleitung der Kategorien aus der Tafel der Urteilsfunktionen zu rechtfertigen, schreibt er: „Dieselbe Funktion, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen in einem Urteile Einheit gibt, die gibt auch der bloßen Synthesis verschiedener Vorstellungen in einer Anschauung Einheit, welche, allgemein ausgedrückt, der reine Verstandesbegriff heißt.“59

Begriffe werden also im Urteil durch dieselbe Funktion und dieselbe Verstandeshandlung zur Einheit gebracht wie Vorstellungen in einer Anschauung zur Einheit des kategorial bestimmten Erkenntnisgegenstandes; Kant unterscheidet nicht klar zwischen „propositional-logischer“ und „kategorial-erkenntnistheoretischer“ Synthesis:60 Indem die Kategorien Urteile konstituieren, konstituieren sie zugleich den objektiven Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Zwar mag es so scheinen, dass dies nur auf einer begrifflichen Äquivokation beruhe, weil Kant in seiner vorstellungstheoretischen Diktion nicht den Fall der Gegenstandssynthese (Subsumtion einer Anschauung unter einen Begriff) von dem der Urteilssynthese (Subsumtion eines Begriffs unter einen anderen Kelsenian Themes, Oxford 1998, 297 ff. 55 Vgl. zur urteilstheoretischen Normkonzeption, ihren Vorteilen und den Gründen für ihre Aufgabe Carsten Heidemann, Noch einmal: Stanley L. Paulson und Kelsens urteilstheoretischer Normbegriff, in: ARSP 93, 2007, 345–362. 56 Zu diesen Problemen vgl. etwa Carlos Santiago Nino, Some Confusions surrounding Kelsen‘s Concept of Validity, in: Normativity and Norms Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (hrsg. v. S. L. Paulson und B. Litschewski Paulson), Oxford 1998, 253 ff.; Roberto J. Vernengo, Kelsen‘s „Rechtssätze“ as Detached Statements, in: Essays on Hans Kelsen (hrsg. v. R. Tur und W. Twining), Oxford 1986, 99 ff. 57 Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 182. 58 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Fn. 22), 110 (A 69/B 94). 59 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Fn. 22), 117 f. (A 79/B 104 f.). 60 Vgl. dazu Reinhold Aschenberg, Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie (Fn. 6), 106.

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Begriff) unterscheide.61 Ferner werden wichtige Teile der Kritik der Vernunft, etwas das Schematismuskapitel, überflüssig, wenn Urteils- und Gegenstandssynthese identisch sind. Aber wenn alle Verstandeshandlungen auf Urteilen beruhen, dann ist es kaum denkbar, wie die Kategorien außerhalb eines Urteils angewendet werden sollten und wie die Gegenstandssynthese anders als im Urteil erfolgen sollte. Man kann Kelsen daher auch keine Fehlinterpretation Kants vorwerfen. Zwar ist Kelsens Gleichsetzung von Urteil und Erkenntnisgegenstand, soweit der letztere als „Objekt“ verstanden wird, kontraintuitiv; plausibler ist es, zwischen dem gegenstandskonstitutiven, aber selbst nicht gegenständlichen Urteil, das durch einen Aussagesatz ausgedrückt werden kann, und dem innerhalb eines Urteils der Metaebene zum Gegenstand „gemachten“ objektiven Urteil, der Tatsache, die durch einen dass-Satz bezeichnet werden kann, zu unterscheiden.62 Doch entspricht die urteilstheoretische Konzeption des wissenschaftlichen Faktums durchaus dem damaligen Stand der akademischen Philosophie. Wenn Cohen wissenschaftliche Fakten in den als hypothetische Urteile verstandenen „Gesetzen“ lokalisiert63 und Frege Tatsachen als „wahre Gedanken“ definiert,64 bewegen sie sich grundsätzlich in demselben Theorieraum wie Kelsen. Charakteristisch für Kelsens Konzeption des wissenschaftlichen Urteils sind zwei weitere Merkmale: Zum einen ist das Urteil eine objektive Struktur;65 es darf nicht mit dem psychischen Urteilsakt oder einem mentalen Gehalt identifiziert werden. Die psychologischen Tatsachen seien im Verhältnis zu den logischen Geltungen nur die conditio sine qua non, aber nicht die conditio per quam des Rechts in seinem Geltungsaspekt,66 Dieser „Logizismus“ lässt sich bereits auf Kant zurückführen, der in den Prolegomena schreibt, dass „hier nicht vom Entstehen der Erfahrung die Rede sei, sondern von dem, was in ihr liegt. Das erstere gehört zur empirischen Psychologie, und würde selbst auch da ohne das zweite, welches zur Kritik der Erkenntnis und insbesondere des Verstandes gehört, niemals gehörig entwickelt werden können.“67

So Reinhold Aschenberg, Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie (Fn. 6), 105 f. Vgl. dazu Carsten Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache, Baden-Baden 1997, 297 ff. Etwa Hermann Cohen, Kants Begründung der Ethik (Fn. 3), 20 f. Vgl. auch Hermann Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntniss, Berlin 1902, 299: „Die Kategorie des Gesetzes erweist sich als solche auch in den Geisteswissenschaften: in der Ethik, als ihrer Logik; sowie in der Jurisprudenz, als ihrer Mathematik […]. Alle haben in dem hypothetischen Urteil und in der Bedingung ihren Typus.“ 64 Gottlob Frege, Der Gedanke, in: ders., Logische Untersuchungen (hrsg. v. G. Patzig, 3. Aufl.), Göttingen 1986, 74. 65 Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 205 ff. 66 Etwa Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, Tübingen 1920, Vorrede VI. 67 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena (Fn. 5), 304 (A 87). 61 62 63

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen

Die Abgrenzung logischer bzw. erkenntnistheoretischer Argumente von psychologischen Argumenten wurde später von Frege und Husserl aufgenommen und gehört seither zum Grundbestand des Neukantianismus Marburger68 und südwestdeutscher69 Prägung. Zum anderen ist das objektive, mit dem Erkenntnisgegenstand identische Urteil stets ein „geltendes“ Urteil;70 Geltung ist gewissermaßen die logische Daseinsweise des Urteils. Dabei tendiert Kelsen, ohne dass dies eindeutig wird, zu einem normativen Geltungsbegriff. Das entspricht einem zentralen Theorem der südwestdeutschen Schule; und so nimmt Kelsen nur zweimal kurz und etwas unklar Bezug auf Windelbands Gleichsetzung von Geltung und Sollen der logischen Gesetze71 und geht sonst ohne weitere Erläuterung davon aus, dass die Geltung eines objektiven Urteils, sein „Tatsachesein“, nicht der Existenz eines Dinges zu vergleichen ist und sich auch nicht seiner Übereinstimmung mit einer von ihm unabhängigen Wirklichkeit verdankt. Vielmehr sei darunter zu verstehen, dass es den Erkenntnisregeln genügt72 – „Tatsache ist, was ich denken soll“, wie Rickert dies formuliert.73 Diese normative Geltungskonzeption geht auf Hermann Lotze zurück, für den Geltung die nichtgegenständliche normative Daseinsform von „Wahrheiten“ ist.74 Sie macht Kelsens Sollensbegriff ambivalent:75 Denn das Sollen der geltenden Norm liegt zum einen darin, dass eine bestimmte Handlung „gesollt“ ist, zum anderen in der normativen Anforderung, entsprechend zu urteilen. Folglich gilt die Norm „man soll x tun“, als normatives Urteil, genau dann, wenn man denken oder urteilen soll, dass man x tun soll.76 Auf diese Weise können der Norm- und der übergeordnete Tatsachenbegriff ohne eine „starke“ Ontologie abstrakter Entitäten erklärt werden; zugleich liefert diese Konzeption ein Argument gegen jede Form eines Psychologismus. Allerdings darf das „Denkensollen“ des Urteils nicht dem robusten inhaltlichen Sollen der Norm-alsFaktum verglichen werden – es ähnelt eher dem impliziten praxisimmanenten Sollen einer Wittgensteinschen Regel, die keine gegenständliche Existenz hat. Eine vergleichbare zeitgenössische Version dieser Konzeption findet sich etwa in Hilary Putnams internem Realismus; dort heißt es – wenn auch tentativ – : Etwa Hermann Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntniss (Fn. 63), 52 ff. Etwa Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (2. Aufl.), Tübingen 1904, Vorrede VI. Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 205. Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 207 ff.; ders., Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff, Tübingen 1922, 81 f. 72 Hans Kelsen, Die Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus, Charlottenburg 1928, 62. 73 Heinrich Rickert, Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie, in: Kant-Studien 14, 1909, 185. Diese These macht Rickert sich in Auseinandersetzung mit der Theorie Theodor Lipps zu eigen. 74 Hermann Lotze, Logik, Leipzig 1874, 501 ff. 75 Hans Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht (Fn. 2), 208. 76 Vgl. dazu näher Carsten Heidemann, Geltung und Sollen: Einige (neu-)kantische Elemente der Reinen Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens, in: Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie (hrsg. v. Robert Alexy, Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson und Gerhard Sprenger), Baden-Baden 2002, 203–222. 68 69 70 71

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„Würde ich es wagen, ein Metaphysiker zu sein, dann würde ich wohl ein System schaffen, in dem es nichts als Verpflichtungen gibt. […] In meinem Phantasiegebilde von mir als dem metaphysischen Superhelden würden sich alle Tatsachen zu Werten auflösen. Dass in meinem Zimmer ein Stuhl steht, würde als eine Menge von Verpflichtungen analysiert […]: etwa die Verpflichtung, zu denken, dass in diesem Zimmer ein Stuhl steht, falls die epistemischen Bedingungen ‚gut‘ genug sind.“77

Putnams Theorie des internen Realismus lässt sich durchaus der neukantischen Ideenwelt zuordnen. Im Übrigen lassen sich auch bei Kant selbst die Grundzüge einer normativistischen Erkenntnis- und Geltungstheorie nachweisen – so werden Begriffe von ihm (auch) als Regeln aufgefasst, und die nach der Kritik der reinen Vernunft grundlegende Eigenschaft des Verstandes, Spontaneität, hängt letztlich von seiner Fähigkeit zum Regelfolgen ab.78 4.

Resümee und Ausblick

Ich fasse zusammen: Das „Faktum der Wissenschaft“ macht in doppelter Bedeutung den Kern des Kelsenschen Neukantianismus in den zwanziger Jahren aus. Zum einen versteht Kelsen seine Lehre in der Folge von Kant, Trendelenburg und Cohen als methodenkritische Theorie der als soziale Praxis etablierten und insofern als Faktum gegebenen dogmatischen Rechtswissenschaft; ihre wesentliche Aufgabe ist es, die Präsuppositionen der mit der Äußerung rechtswissenschaftlicher Sätze beanspruchten Objektivität, Normativität und Positivität herauszuarbeiten und die Rechtsdogmatik so zu rekonstruieren, dass sie mit den dabei gewonnenen Resultaten im Einklang steht. Für diesen Theoriestatus beruft Kelsen sich zwar zu Recht auf die Kantsche Philosophie; er ist aber das Resultat einer dreifachen Depotenzierung der transzendentalen Analyse Kants: Kants Ausgangspunkt ist die unbezweifelbare transzendentale Einheit der Apperzeption, aus der „progressiv“ die Kategorien als notwendige Ermöglichungsbedingungen jeglicher Gegenstandserkenntnis gewonnen werden können. Schon bei Kant wird dieser Ansatz ein erstes Mal relativiert, indem er die transzendentale Analyse für den Zweck einer leichter erfassbaren Darstellung an den synthetischen apriorischen Urteilen, die in Mathematik und reiner Naturwissenschaft „gegeben“ sind, ansetzen lässt. Eine zweite Relativierung findet sich in der Theorie

Hilary Putnam, Wozu die Philosophen?, in: ders., Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Reinbek 1993, 203–220, 215. 78 Vgl. dazu Markus Willaschek, Die „Spontaneität des Erkenntnisses“. Über die Abhängigkeit der „Transzendentalen Analytik“ von der Auflösung der dritten Antinomie, in: Metaphysik und Kritik Interpretationen zur „Transzendentalen Dialektik“ (hrsg. v. Jiří Chotaš, Jindřich Karásek und Jürgen Stolzenberg),Würzburg 2010, 165–184. 77

Das „Faktum der Rechtswissenschaft“ bei Hans Kelsen

Trendelenburgs und den frühen Schriften Cohens, deren Ansatzpunkt die (aposteriorischen) Methoden und Ergebnisse der systematisch vorgehenden und „erfolgreichen“ Naturwissenschaften sind. Zu einer dritten Relativierung kommt es in der Ethik Cohens, die an der Rechtswissenschaft als einer „gegebenen“ soziokulturellen Praxis ansetzt. Kelsens neukantische Erkenntnistheorie verbindet den szientistischen Ansatz der Relativierung der transzendentalen Methode auf die objektiven, exakten Naturwissenschaften mit dem Ansatz der Relativierung dieser Objektivität auf die Praxis der Rechtsdogmatik. Zum anderen setzt Kelsen das rechtswissenschaftliche Faktum, die Rechtsnorm, mit dem hypothetischen Zurechnungsurteil der Rechtswissenschaft gleich, das nichtpsychologistisch als objektive Denkstruktur zu verstehen ist und dessen Daseinsweise oder Geltung in der Folge Lotzes und Windelbands nicht analog der Existenz eines Dinges aufgefasst werden darf, sondern am ehesten als normative Anforderung zu verstehen ist, dieses Urteil so zu denken. Beide Konzeptionen sind von zentraler Bedeutung innerhalb der Reinen Rechtslehre. Legt man Kelsens Deutung der transzendentalen Methode zugrunde, so ist es zwar einerseits Aufgabe seiner Theorie des Rechts eine „Rechtsontologie“ auszuarbeiten; insofern liefert sie durchaus eine Metaphysik des Rechts. Andererseits ergibt sich diese Rechtsontologie aber (nur) als Ergebnis einer Präsuppositionsanalyse der in der existierenden soziokulturellen Praxis der Rechtsdogmatik erhobenen Ansprüche. Das ist eine metaphysisch bescheidene Konzeption, die auch unabhängig vom Theorierahmen der Reinen Rechtslehre plausibel ist. Innerhalb der Reinen Rechtslehre hat sie hohen Erklärungswert  – beispielsweise dürfte der Status der Grundnorm ohne sie kaum verständlich sein79 – und bedingt zugleich ihre kritische Funktion: Die zur Rechtsontologie gehörenden notwendigen Elemente des Rechts umfassen (nur) das rechtswissenschaftliche Zurechnungsurteil, seine Bestandteile, seine Implikate und seine Voraussetzungen.80 Das bedeutet, dass alle Rechtsbegriffe entweder auf diese Elemente zurückgeführt oder aus der Rechtserkenntnis ausgeschieden werden müssen bzw. als Norminhalt nur kontingenter Bestandteil des Rechts sein können. Dies Eine Präsupposition eines Urteils ist eine notwendige Voraussetzung dafür, dass es überhaupt geltungsbzw. wahrheitsdifferent ist. Die Grundnorm ist unter Zugrundelegung der Darstellung Kelsens z. B. insofern eine Präsupposition jeder Rechtsnorm / jedes rechtswissenschaftlichen Urteils, als sie überhaupt erst die Möglichkeit schafft, geltende von nichtgeltenden rechtswissenschaftlichen Urteilen zu unterscheiden. 80 Dabei kommt es in den zwanziger Jahren zu einer merkwürdigen „Ungleichzeitigkeit“ der Konzeptionen Kelsens. Die Auffassung der Rechtsnorm als dem Kausalgesetz analog strukturiertes Zurechnungsurteil passt zu der eindimensionalen statischen Normauffassung, die Kelsen in den Hauptproblemen der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt hat. Mit der Übernahme der Merklschen Stufenbautheorie sind Formen der Rechtsnorm erforderlich geworden (Ermächtigungsnorm, individuelle Norm), die nicht auf das hypothetische Zurechnungsurteil reduziert werden können; dies macht letztlich Kelsens Unterscheidung zwischen einer eindimensionalen „statischen“ Rechtsbetrachtung (die mit der Form des hypothetischen Urteils auskommt) und einer „dynamischen“ Rechtsbetrachtung erforderlich, die nur bedingt ineinander übersetzbar sind. 79

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betrifft u. a. die Begriffe des Staates und der Person, die jeweils als Mengen von Rechtssätzen aufgefasst werden, sowie der Pflicht und des subjektiven Rechts, die als Implikate des Rechtssatzes bzw. als auf diesen reduzierbar aufgefasst werden.81 Noch positiver muss die Bewertung des urteilstheoretischen Normbegriffs ausfallen. Mit ihm werden die Aporien von Kelsens späterer korrespondenztheoretischen Erklärung der Normerkenntnis ebenso wie die Probleme einer Willenstheorie der Norm vermieden,82 und die schwierige Aufgabe, Objektivität, Normativität und Positivität des Rechts miteinander zu vereinbaren, lässt sich ohne großen Aufwand bewerkstelligen: Normativität ist eine Frage der spezifischen Urteilsmodalität; Objektivität wird gewährleistet durch die Urteilsform; Positivität ist eine Frage der empirischen Kriterien für die Geltung der normativen Urteile.83 Insgesamt handelt es sich damit um eine Konzeption, mit deren Hilfe der komplexe Status der Rechtsnorm zwischen Sein und Sollen auch außerhalb des Kontextes der Reinen Rechtslehre ohne großen metaphysischen Aufwand plausibel erklärt werden kann. Carsten Heidemann

Bordesholm, [email protected]

Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Fn.  1), 46 (zur Pflicht), 40 (zum subjektiven Recht), 52 ff. (zur Person), 115 ff. (zum Staat). 82 Vgl. dazu Carsten Heidemann, Noch einmal: Stanley L. Paulson und Kelsens urteilstheoretischer Normbegriff (Fn. 55), 352, 354. 83 Zu einem Versuch einer Rekonstruktion des urteilstheoretischen Normbegriffs mittels der Methodik der sprachanalytischen Philosophie vgl. Carsten Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache (Fn. 62), 324 ff. 81

Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law MAXIMILIAN KIENER

Abstract: This essay raises a new challenge for Hans Kelsen’s The Pure Theory of Law, i. e.

what I call the Cognitivist Challenge This challenge concerns the question as to how to retain Kelsen’s view about relative legal norms, i. e. that one can objectively cognise these norms, while not rejecting his view about absolute moral norms, i. e. that one cannot objectively cognise those norms. After explaining the Cognitivist Challenge in detail, I will present Positive Legal Fictionalism as a solution to it. I will claim that Positive Legal Fictionalism is rooted in Kelsen’s own statements and provides the specific epistemic advantages that Kelsen’s project of cognising the law requires. Positive Legal Fictionalism thereby deepens the understanding of Kelsen’s project as a ‘theory’ and as ‘pure.’ Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Legal Positivism, Fictionalism, Cognition, Validity, Basic Norm Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Rechtspositivismus, Fiktionalismus, Erkenntnis, Geltung,

Grundnorm

Introduction

Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) was one of the leading so-called ‘legal positivists’ in the 20th century. He was a legal positivist because he exclusively focused on “questions of what the law is and how the law is made [i. e. the law as it is posited], not [on] (…) questions of what the law ought to be.”1 Kelsen separated his position from natural law theory by denying that law, in order to be law, “must have some concern for justice, be it a matter

Kelsen, Hans. Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory A Translation of the First Edition of the Reine Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law (Henceforth abbreviated as PTL1). Translated by B. L. Paulson and S. Paulson. 2004, Oxford Clarendon, 7. Emphasis added. In addition to referring to the English translation, I will also provide references to the German original. See Kelsen, Hans. Reine Rechtslehre Studienausgabe der 1  Auflage 1934 Edited by M. Jestaedt. (Henceforth abbreviated as RR1). 2008, Tübingen Mohr Siebeck, 15. 1

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of assuring an ethical minimum, be it a matter of attempting, however inadequately, to be ‘right’ law, that is, simply, to be just.”2 However, unlike many other positivists, Kelsen denies that the validity of legal norms (or in other words their normative bindingness) can ever be derived from the fact that people by and large comply with them. Kelsen adheres to a strict distinction of ‘is’ versus ‘ought’ and claims that a norm (i. e. an ‘ought’) can never receive its validity from a fact (i. e. an ‘is’) but only from another norm. Accordingly, a norm is valid if and only if it can be traced back to a higher norm which confers validity upon it. As the chain of validity-conferring norms cannot go back infinitely, Kelsen claims that the validity of legal norms ultimately depends on a first norm, the validity of which no longer depends on another norm. Kelsen calls such a norm the basic norm and presents it as a non-positive norm (i. e. a norm that is not posited and therefore not part of a given legal system) and as a norm that is merely presupposed in thought. The basic norm authorises the highest positive norm, e. g. the constitution, and can be schematically formulated as follows: “Coercive acts ought to be performed under the conditions and in the manner in which the historically first constitution, and the norms created according to it, prescribe. (In short: one ought to behave as the constitution prescribes.)”3

As the basic norm is necessary for the validity of norms, it will also be crucial for the cognition of the law as objectively valid, which Kelsen describes as his main objective: “my aim from the very beginning was to raise it [i. e. jurisprudence] to the level of a genuine science, a human science. The idea was to develop those tendencies of jurisprudence that focus solely on cognition of the law rather than on the shaping of it, and to bring the results of this cognition as close as possible to the highest values of all science: objectivity and exactitude.”4

In this essay, I aim to make two contributions to the debate on Kelsen. Firstly (1), I want to draw attention to a serious challenge to Kelsen’s project of the cognition of the law, pertinent to both editions of The Pure Theory of Law, which I call the Cognitivist Challenge and which has not received attention in the literature. Secondly (2), I want to show how trying to solve the Cognitivist Challenge leads to a deeper understanding of Kelsen’s project as a ‘theory’, i. e. a project concerned with cognition, and how it is ‘pure’, i. e. separated from morality as well as separated from sciences concerned with Kelsen, PTL1, 22. (RR1, 32.) Kelsen, Hans. Pure Theory of Law Translated from the Second (Revised and Enlarged) German Edition by Max Knight. (Henceforth abbreviated as PTL2). 2009, Clark The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 201. Also with regards to the second edition, I will provide references to the German original: Kelsen, Hans. Reine Rechtslehre Studienausgabe der 2  Auflage 1960 Edited by M. Jestaedt. (Henceforth abbreviated as RR2). 2017, Tübingen Mohr Siebeck, 359. See also Kelsen, RR1, 76. 4 Kelsen, PTL1, 1. (Footnote 1). 2 3

Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law

matters of fact as opposed to norms. In particular, I will aim to solve the Cognitivist Challenge by presenting an account I call Positive Legal Fictionalism. From an exegetical perspective (2.1), I will claim that Positive Legal Fictionalism can be firmly rooted in Kelsen’s own statements, albeit it sometimes needs to develop Kelsen’s statements further rather than taking them for granted. Therefore, Positive Legal Fictionalism will be a Kelsenian but not quite Kelsen’s own account. From a systematic perspective (2.2), I will then explain the specific epistemic advantages that Positive Legal Fictionalism provides for Kelsen’s project of cognising the law, thereby solving the Cognitivist Dilemma, and emphasise the value of fictionalism for legal positivism. Finally (3), I summarise my results and draw conclusions. This essay is very ambitious. To address and solve the Cognitivist Challenge, I will need to take into account a very wide scope of Kelsen’s primary texts: Kelsen’s early writings, the two editions (from 1934 and 1960) of Kelsen’s The Pure Theory of Law, work from Kelsen’s late period, as well as Kelsen’s correspondence with other scholars. In addition, I will need to link the debate on Kelsen to claims from the philosophical and metaethical debate on so-called fictionalism, i. e. a link which has not been explored in the debate on Kelsen so far. And finally, I will also always need to balance exegetical and systematic aspects in the course of developing my arguments. The combination of such ambition and the usual space constraints will prevent me from discussing the wide body of secondary literature on Kelsen’s work in detail. On the one hand, I will thereby have to leave the reader with room for further inquiry, i. e. an inquiry into how my approach exactly aligns or conflicts with the majority view on some of Kelsen’s claims. On the other hand, it is precisely such an approach that will enable me to focus on very important exegetical and systematic aspects in sufficient depth, thereby providing a fresh take on many of Kelsen’s claims. Hence, I hope that the way in which I will proceed in this essay, including my scare treatment of secondary literature, is not only excused with reference to space constraints but also appreciated as intrinsically linked to the object to my inquiry and the ambition I pursue. 1.

The Cognitivist Challenge

Hans Kelsen presents The Pure Theory of Law explicitly as a “theory.” By “theory”, he means that The Pure Theory of Law “aims solely at cognition of its subject-matter”5 and is therefore a genuinely scientific project. Kelsen then identifies as the subject-matter the legal norm, which he claims can be stated in the form of a conditional: it (legally) ought to be the case that if some natural event X occurs then the legal consequence Y is imposed. Kelsen continuously emphasizes that one can reach objective cognition

5

Kelsen, PTL1, 7. (Footnote 1).

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of the legal norm, and at its core the ‘legal ought’, thereby grounding a genuine “Rechtswissenschaft”6 (legal science). Objective cognition consists in the cognition of a legal norm’s objective validity. A legal norm is objectively valid if and only if it is genuinely normatively binding, which means that the legal norm’s normative force cannot be reduced to either subjective wishes or preferences or to any other psychological or sociological facts. On the other hand, Kelsen endorsed a diametrically opposed view about moral norms. Most notably in the first edition of The Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen contends that a moral norm is a “logosfremdes Objekt”7 (alien to objective inquiry8) and “cannot be accounted for by way of rational cognition.”9 That something morally ought to be the case does not qualify as a suitable object of a “Wissenschaft.” Moral norms cannot be objectively valid because, if they exist at all, they always depend on psychological or sociological facts. And if they cannot be objectively valid, there cannot be objective cognition of them in the sense outlined. Hence, taken at face value, Kelsen draws a stark contrast between legal and moral norms in the first edition of The Pure Theory of Law. However, a closer look reveals that there is another hidden distinction. When Kelsen talks about moral norms in the first edition, he always talks about absolute moral norms;10 and when he talks about legal norms, he always talks about relative legal norms. A norm is absolute if its validity does not depend on any other norm, and relative if its validity depends on another norm. Therefore, Kelsen does not contrast moral norms with legal norms after all. He contrasts absolute moral norms with relative legal norms. Unfortunately, employing these two different distinctions at once (i. e. moral versus legal, relative versus absolute) obfuscates what Kelsen aims to say. This is because the distinction between moral and legal norms does not map on to the distinction between absolute and relative norms: there may be relative moral norms (as ethical relativism claims) and absolute legal norms (as natural law theory claims). And Kelsen explicitly recognises this in the second edition of The Pure Theory of Law. But if there can be relative moral norms and absolute legal norms, this leaves us with the following question: do absolute moral norms fail as objects of cognition because they are moral norms or because they are absolute norms? What exactly is Kelsen’s position? Unfortunately, both alternatives lead to problems. Let us first assume that norms cannot be an object of cognition if they are moral norms and thereby follow what Kelsen seems to claim in the first edition. On this Kelsen, RR1, 15. See also the foreword. “Rechtswissenschaft”, unlike “legal science”, does not suggest affinity to natural sciences. (Footnote 1). 7 Kelsen, RR1, 27. (Footnote 1). 8 The translation in Kelsen PTL1 as “alien to logic” seems too narrow. See Kelsen, PTL1, 17. (Footnote 1). 9 Kelsen, PTL1, 17. (Footnote 1). 10 In PTL1, Kelsen always implies that moral norms are absolute. See Kelsen, PTL1, 16–18, 22–23, 28, 34. (RR1, 26–29, 33, 40, 47). (Footnote 1). 6

Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law

reading, the combination of Kelsen’s view about legal and moral norms becomes very puzzling. This is because Kelsen himself stressed that the ‘legal ought’ and the ‘moral ought’ converge on the category of ‘ought’ as their genus proximum.11 Therefore, one might think if the ‘legal ought’, unlike the ‘moral ought’, can be an object of cognition, this must be because of what is distinct about the ‘legal ought.’ However, Kelsen’s answer is that the “distinction between law and morality consists in the fact that the law is a coercive order”12 whereas morality is not such a coercive order, viz. morality does not impose a “coercive act of the state.”13 But this does not explain why one ‘ought’ (legal) is an object of cognition while the other ‘ought’ (moral) is not. Hence, this first interpretation of Kelsen’s contrast of different norms seems to lead to a dead end. But how about the interpretation, according to which Kelsen claims that norms cannot be an object of cognition if they are absolute? This seems to be the position that Kelsen later endorsed in the second edition of The Pure Theory of Law. Kelsen claims that “an absolute value in general and an absolute moral value in particular is rejected from the point of view of scientific cognition.”14 On this basis, both moral and legal norms can be objectively valid and an object of cognition, as long as they are relative. Consequently, Kelsen concedes in the second edition, opposing his claims in the first edition, that ethics is the “discipline directed toward their [i. e. moral norms’] cognition”15 and refers to ethics as “the science of morals.”16 However, even on this reading, it remains puzzling why only relative but not absolute norms can be an object of cognition? How can relativity facilitate objective validity and objective cognition? And moreover, after giving up the distinction between the moral and the legal, how can Kelsen preserve the distinction between morality and the law, which he is so keen to stress as part of legal positivism? Hence, the second interpretation of Kelsen’s contrast of different norms also leads to difficult questions. In the following, I will use the term Cognitivist Challenge to describe the challenge of how to retain Kelsen’s view about the relative legal norms, i. e. that one can objectively cognise these norms, while not rejecting his view about the absolute moral norms, i. e. that one cannot objectively cognise these norms A solution to the Cognitivist Challenge will be of vital importance for understanding Kelsen’s project as a ‘theory’, viz. a

See Kelsen, PTL1, 26. (RR1, 37.) (Footnote 1). Kelsen, Hans. The Function of a Constitution, in: Essays on Kelsen. Edited. by R. Tur and W. Twining. 1986, Oxford Clarendon, 112. See also Kelsen, RR1, 37. (Footnote 1). 13 Kelsen, PTL1, 26. (Footnote 1). 14 See PTL2, 63. (RR2, 128). See also Kelsen, PTL2, 18, 67, 68–69. (RR2, 50, 134, 137). Kelsen, Problem der Gerechtigkeit, in Kelsen, RR2, 689 In my translation: Kelsen rejects “from the point of view of scientific knowledge (…) the existence of an absolute in general and absolute values in particular (…) and only [recognises] the validity of relative values.” (Footnote 3). 15 Kelsen, PTL 2, 59. (RR2, 119). (Footnote 3). 16 Kelsen, PTL2, 86. (RR2, 169). See also Kelsen, PTL2, 8, 19, 22, 64. (RR2, 33, 51–52, 56, 126). (Footnote 3). 11 12

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project of objective cognition and as a project that is ‘pure’, viz. a project separated not only from empirical sciences but also from morality. 2.

Positive Legal Fictionalism as a Solution to the Cognitivist Challenge

In this section, I will develop what I call Positive Legal Fictionalism as a solution to the Cognitvist Challenge. Support for Positive Legal Fictionalism comes from an exegetical perspective, showing that it can be firmly rooted in Kelsen’s own statements, and from a systematic perspective, demonstrating how it effectively assists Kelsen’s project of cognising the law and thereby solves the Cognitivst Challenge. However, before I elaborate on these two perspectives, I want to outline my proposal. Positive Legal Fictionalism consists of the following two claims: Error Theory: There are no objectively valid norms. Hence, there is no objective cognition of norms17 and any statement asserting the existence of objectively valid norms is false. Legal Fiction: Employing a fiction facilitates objective cognition of relative legal norms, which would otherwise not be possible, and provides further epistemic advantages for the cognition of the law. In a nutshell, the solution that Positive Legal Fictionalism proposes to the Cognitivist Challenge is the following: it is correct that no norm, legal or moral, relative or absolute, can be an object of cognition – actually speaking. However, resorting to a fiction allows us nevertheless to separate the class of relative legal norms from all other norms and promote legal norms in a way that facilitates objective cognition of them. One caveat is required here: there can be objective cognition of these norms qua norms insofar these norms’ validity does no longer depend on any facts or psychological preferences but only on another norm, i. e. the fiction, which I will shortly explain with reference to the basic norm; and therefore the legal norms’ validity as well as their cognition can be objective, notwithstanding the fact that such validity will be fictional just like the fiction itself. Positive Legal Fictionalism understands ‘fiction’ as a false assumption and identifies as the fiction the assumption of an existing basic norm. The basic norm qua fiction is supposed to ensure that Kelsen’s project is a theory, i. e. concerned with objective cognition, as well as that Kelsen’s project is pure, i. e. separated from morality and empirical sciences. The fiction can do this by providing the basis for objective va-

Note, it is about objective cognition of norms qua norms This is still consistent with saying that there can be objective cognitions of norms understood as sociological or psychological facts. 17

Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law

lidity, i. e. validity which cannot be reduced to either subjective wishes or preferences or to any other psychological or sociological facts, but which depends on norms only. This solution to the Cognitivist Challenge sidesteps the dead end from the first interpretation of Kelsen’s contrast mentioned earlier: Positive Legal Fictionalism does not consider the law as a coercive order as being the reason why legal norms, but not moral norms, can be an object of cognition. Moreover, Positive Legal Fictionalism also sidesteps the difficult questions for the second interpretation: it does not imply that it is just the relativity of norms that makes them suitable objects of cognition. It is the fiction applied to the positive law that renders relative legal norms suitable for objective cognition. As the fiction is applied to legal norms only, Positive Legal Fictionalism is consistent with Kelsen’s claim in the first edition of The Pure Theory of Law that only legal norms, but not moral norms, can be objects of cognition. Moreover, Positive Legal Fictionalism is also in accordance with Kelsen’s claim in the second edition of The Pure Theory of Law that only relative norms can be objects of cognition: the fiction is an absolute norm (i. e. the basic norm) which is not itself an object of cognition but only facilitates the cognition of other relative norms, the validity of which depend on the fiction in the relevant way. One caveat is required at this point: Error Theory must not be confused with Adolf Julius Merkl’s “Fehlerkalkül”, which is an entirely different idea. The term Error Theory, as I use it, is not concerned with the question as to whether or to what extent those legal norms which contradict other higher legal norms are still legally valid, but rather focuses on the systematic falsity of certain statements. So understood, Error Theory is common terminology in philosophical metaethics and, in particular, stems from John Mackie’s seminal work in his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. To further explain and vindicate Positive Legal Fictionalism as a solution to the Cognitivist Challenge, I will firstly highlight the exegetical basis of Positive Legal Fictionalism in Kelsen’s work (2.1) and then, on this basis, elaborate on how, from a systematic perspective (2.2), Positive Legal Fictionalism solves the Cognivist Challenge. 2.1

The Exegetical Perspective: The Basis of Positive Legal Fictionalism in Kelsen’s Work

Error Theory generalises Kelsen’s claims about absolute moral norms to all norms. Not only moral and absolute norms but also legal and relative norms are barred from being an object of cognition. Error Theory is supported by Kelsen’s own statements. Emphasizing a clear distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, Kelsen held that any norm (legal or moral), i. e. any ‘ought’, could derive its validity (i. e. objective validity) only from another norm, i. e.

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an ‘ought’, but never from facts, i. e. an ‘is’.18 However, the chain of norms conferring validity on other norms cannot extend infinitely. Therefore, if a particular norm is to be objectively valid, there has to be one first norm the validity of which no longer depends on another norm, i. e. there has to be one absolute norm. However, Kelsen rejects the existence of absolute norms, and in the absence of absolute norms no norm can be objectively valid. Hence, Error Theory Note that this is consistent with anything Kelsen says about the basic norm. Kelsen does not claim that the basic norm actually exists but only presents it as a condition necessary for the validity of norms. While Error Theory corroborates Kelsen’s statements about norms not being suitable objects of cognition, Legal Fiction aims to explain how Kelsen can still claim that there is objective cognition of relative legal norms. Legal Fiction claims that a fiction can separate the class of relative legal norms from all other norms and promote these relative legal norms in such a way as to make them objects of cognition. Legal Fiction proposes to recast Kelsen’s account of ‘presupposing the basic norm’ as ‘employing a fiction’ and thereby explain the role of the fiction. As already mentioned, Kelsen introduced the basic norm to explain the validity of relative legal norms. The basic norm is the first and absolute norm that stops an infinite regress of the chain of validity conferring norms. Kelsen explains the basic norm as merely ‘presupposed’ (“voraus-gesetzt”) and as a purely non-positive norm. Kelsen calls the basic norm a ‘hypothesis’ and a transcendental condition of the very possibility for positive law to be objectively valid.19 Kelsen claimed that all norms in a legal system have to converge on one single fundamental norm, the ‘basic norm’, if they are to be considered objectively valid. Converging on the basic norm makes these norms objectively valid because their validity cannot be reduced to either subjective wishes or preferences or to any other psychological or sociological facts. Their validity ultimately depends on a norm, i. e. the basic norm. Recasting Kelsen’s account of ‘presupposing the basic norm’ as ‘employing a fiction’ then leads to the following explanation of Legal Fiction: the fiction is the basic norm and the fiction is employed by presupposing the basic norm in thought. The basic norm qua fiction is only applied to positive legal norms within a legal system and thereby separates the class of legal norms from other norms, e. g. moral norms. The basic norm qua fiction makes such legal norms objects of cognition by providing the necessary basis for their objective validity: a first and absolute norm, i. e. the basic norm which invests all the positive legal norm with objective validity. The basic norm

See Kelsen, PTL 1, 193. (RR 2, 346). (Footnote 1 and 3). See Kelsen, PTL1, 58, 64, 70. (RR1, 77, 85, 93) Kelsen, PTL2, 101–107. (RR2, 197–207). (Footnote 1 and 3). Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of Law and State. Translated by A. Wedberg. 1945, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 110, 134, 401, 406, 437. Kelsen abandons the notion of “hypothesis” in favour of a fiction in: Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of Norms. Translated by Michael Hartney. 1991, Oxford Clarendon, 256. I will later take up this point once more. 18 19

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renders all these legal norms into relative legal norms, which ultimately depend on the basic norm. So understood, Legal Fiction is an interpretation as well as a further development of Kelsen’s doctrine of the basic norm. To see where it is interpretation and where it is further development, I need show in greater detail how Legal Fiction accords with Kelsen’s own statement on fictions (2.1.1) and his alleged method for cognising the law: Kantian transcendentalism (2.2.2). 2.1.1

Kelsen on Fictions

Kelsen thought about fictions at several points in his career. Two such points deserve special attention. Firstly, as early as in 1919, Kelsen writes on Vaihinger’s account of legal fictions. Agreeing with Vaihinger, Kelsen claims that there are “true, i. e. epistemological fictions in legal science (…) of the attempt to know the law, dictions of the intellectual mastery of the legal order.”20 It is indeed most noteworthy that, from a very early stage, Kelsen claims that there are epistemological fictions, i. e. fictions that are supposed to assist the “intellectual mastery of the legal order.”21 However, Kelsen does not elaborate much on this point. He only mentions the ‘person’ as a legal fiction and argues that using such a fiction may provide the “advantages of illustration and simplification ”22 The ‘person’ provides these advantages by offering a vivid picture instead of the mere juridical and technical description of a bundle of obligations and rights. Secondly, from 1960 onwards, Kelsen draws his attention again to legal fictions. Two significant differences occurred at this point, however. Firstly, Kelsen now considers his own account from a fictionalist standpoint and not only other accounts like Vaihinger’s. He thinks of his basic norm as a fiction.23 Secondly (and related to the first point), whereas Kelsen’s 1919 essay was only concerned with fictions within the law (the ‘person’) Kelsen’s consideration of the basic norm as a fiction now focuses on fiction about the law as a whole. Unfortunately, Kelsen’s position from 1960 onwards is inconsistent with his position in 1919. This inconsistency is most obvious when Kelsen, after 1960, claimed that the basic norm is a fiction insofar as it “contradict[s] reality”24 and explicitly revokes earlier statements about norms (‘Ought’) not being able to contradict reality (‘Is’),

Kelsen, Hans. On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special Consideration of Vaihinger’s Philosophy of the As-If, in: Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice. Edited by M. Del Mar and W. Twining. 2015, Switzerland Springer, 5. 21 Ibid., 5. 22 Ibid, 7. Emphasis in original. 23 See for instance Kelsen, Hans. On The Pure Theory of Law. Israel Law Review, 1966, 1–7. 24 Kelsen, Hans. The Function of a Constitution, in: Essays on Kelsen. Edited. by R. Tur and W. Twining. 1986, Oxford OUP, 117. 20

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which formed the basis of his view in 1919. As a result, any fictionalist interpretation of Kelsen needs to take sides. Following Kelsen completely in his view in 1960 and later would partly sidestep the Cognitivist Challenge This is because his 1960 view less emphatically stresses the distinctness of the realm of ‘ought’ and norms, i. e. what Kelsen aims to reach objective cognition of. My aim in this essay is therefore to retain Kelsen’s view that norms cannot contradict reality. I will consider the basic norm as a fiction, not in the sense of fictions contradicting reality (i. e. in the realm of ‘Is’), but in the sense of stating something that does not exist in the realm of ‘Ought’. Hence, Positive Legal Fictionalism embraces Kelsen’s claims concerning fictions about the law (i. e. the fiction is the basic norm), the claim about fictions providing genuinely epistemic advantages, and claims about the distinctness of ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Positive Legal Fictionalism is thereby maximally close to Kelsen’s own statements. It only departs from Kelsen where Kelsen’s contradicting statements made a departure inescapable and the choice between contradicting statements was made with an eye to upholding rather than sidestepping the Cognitivist Challenge. However, it must also be stressed that Positive Legal Fictionalism goes beyond Kelsen’s owns statements. It goes beyond Kelsen’s claims by recommending that the view on fictions, developed from Kelsen’s own claims, be applied to all phases of Kelsen’s work, including the first and second edition of The Pure Theory of Law, and not only to the later sceptical phase in Kelsen’s life that is usually associated with Kelsen being a fictionalist if he is considered a fictionalist at all. This is a first reason why Positive Legal Fictionalism is a Kelsenian but not quite Kelsen’s own account. 2.1.2

Kelsen on Kantian Transcendentalism

By expanding the fictionalist reading to all phases of Kelsen’s work, Positive Legal Fictionalism competes with the most widely accepted interpretation of Kelsen’s method in cognising the law: Kantian transcendentalism. In this subsection, I will claim that fictionalism is a better exegetical basis for Kelsen’s method in cognising the law than a qualified version of Kantian transcendentalism. In The Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen focuses on the conditions under which the cognition of positive law as objectively valid becomes possible. Kelsen claims that this approach resembles Kant in his inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of cognition in the natural sciences.25 Therefore, the basic norm, i. e. what Kelsen identifies as the

25

See Kelsen, PTL2, 202. (RR2, 361). (Footnote 3).

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condition for cognising the positive law as objectively valid, is to be considered “cognitively and theoretically transcendental in terms of the Kantian philosophy.”26 Despite such alleged common ground, many commentators correctly pointed out that Kelsen’s link to Kantian transcendentalism is rather loose.27 To begin with, whereas Kant’s inquiry (and also the inquiry of Neo-Kantians like Cohen whom Kelsen refers to) was about the very conditions of cognition as such, Kelsen’s inquiry is only about one way of looking at one particular area of the world, i. e. the positive law. Kelsen indeed claims that: “The Pure Theory of Law is well aware that the specifically normative meaning of certain material facts, the meaning characterized as ‘law’, is the result not of a necessary interpretation but of a possible interpretation, possible only given a certain basic presupposition.”28

As a result, Kelsen admits that one could simply refuse to accept his conditions of cognising the law as objectively valid and instead consider legal norms as mere acts of power and domination. However, in Kant’s account, in contrast, it was not possible simply to reject the transcendental conditions of cognitions and choose a different way of looking at things. Secondly (and as a result of the first difference), Kant’s and Kelsen’s uses of the term ‘hypothesis’ diverge considerably. When Kant identifies the conditions of cognition as such, he states these conditions as ‘hypotheses’. By ‘hypotheses’, he means claims that he cannot directly prove but only postulate through the transcendental method. Nevertheless, for Kant, a hypothesis is something that can be true and is indeed assumed to be a good candidate for a true claim. This is different in Kelsen. Although the basic norm is also called a ‘hypothesis’, Kelsen does not mean something that can be true. The basic norm, being a norm, cannot be true, according to Kelsen. And Kelsen explicitly states that the basic norm does not exist. Referring to these differences, commentators suggested that Kelsen lacked sufficient acquaintance with Kantian transcendentalism.29 However, this is a rather un-

Kelsen, PTL1, 25. (RR1, 36). (Footnote 1) Kelsen expresses his allegiance to Kant in other places too. See Letter to Treves in Kelsen papers, 171. Similar statements also appear in earlier and later work. For earlier work, see Kelsen, Hans. Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre Entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze (from 1923). 1960, Aalen Scientia, Vorrede, XVII. 27 See Wilson, Alida. Joseph Raz on Kelsen’s Basic Norm. The American Journal of Jurisprudence 27 (1982), 49. Dreier, Horst. Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 1986 Nomos BadenBaden, 44, 81–89. Winkler, Günther. Rechtstheorie und Erkenntnislehre Kritische Anmerkungen zum Dilemma von Sein und Sollen in der Reinen Rechtslehre aus geistesgeschichtlicher und erkenntnistheoretischer Sicht 1990, Wien New York Springer, 107–108. 28 Kelsen, PTL1, 34. Emphasis added. (RR1, 47). He repeats this point in Kelsen, PTL2, 218 (RR2, 393). (Footnote 1 and 3) See also Kelsen, Hans. Value Judgments in the Science of Law, in: What is Justice? Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen 2013. Clark The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 226–227. 29 See for instance Wilson, 1982, 48. (Footnote 27). 26

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charitable interpretation and in this subsection I want to claim that Kelsen’s departure from Kant was to a great extent deliberate and should therefore be appreciated rather than criticised. Framing Kelsen’s method in fictionalist terms rather than transcendental terms can charitably capture Kelsen’s departure from Kant and should therefore be the preferred interpretation of Kelsen’s method in cognising the law. Support for a fictionalist interpretation comes from what commentators sometimes overlook, namely that Kelsen himself stressed that he employs the Kantian philosophy only “by analogy”30: it is just the focus on conditions of the possibility of cognition that links Kelsen to Kantian Philosophy in some loose sense. There are other aspects of (Neo)-Kantian transcendentalism that Kelsen explicitly rejects. In a little-known letter to Renato Treves from 1933, Kelsen contrasts the conditions of the possibility of cognition developed by Kant and Cohen with his own conditions of the possibility of cognizing the positive law. Kelsen claims that Kant and Cohen adhered to a “contentually constituted, materially determined a priori”31, by which he meant that Kant and Cohen adhered to substantial value judgements and potentially a form of value realism, i. e. the assumption of absolute values. Kelsen, in contrast, rejects such values and is looking only for “purely formal categories of a priori validity.”32 The basic norm is supposed to be completely formal in the sense of not including any substantial or absolute values, or any restriction on what legal norms may proscribe. The basic norm merely supports whatever the highest positive legal norm, i. e. the constitution, states. Moreover, in the same letter, Kelsen claims that moral relativism is “something that Cohen – exactly like Kant on this point – was not prepared to accept, if only because of his religious convictions.”33 However, moral relativism is key to Kelsen’s own account. Kelsen fiercely rejects absolute norms and denies they could be accounted for by way of rational cognition. In order to keep the basic norm purely formal as well as defend ethical relativism, Kelsen had to claim that the basic norm is indeed just one contingent way of looking at the positive law as well as deny that the basic norm can be true in the sense Kantian hypotheses can be true. If the basic norm were a materially-determined, true, and absolute norm, Kelsen would undermine his relativism about norms and the purely formal nature of the conditions of cognising the positive law. Therefore, Kelsen’s letter to Treves shows that his departure from presenting the very conditions of cognition as such and the adherence to ‘hypotheses’ as truth-apt was not simply due to a lack of acquaintance with Kant. It can be seen as deliberate and

Kelsen, PTL2, 202. (RR2, 361). (Footnote 3). Kelsen, Hans. The Pure Theory of Law, ‘Labandism’, and Neo-Kantianism. A Letter to Renato Treves, in: Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed. by Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski. 1998, Oxford Clarendon, 173. Original emphasis. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 30 31

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necessary to uphold central features of his account, even if Kelsen did not explicitly say so in the Pure Theory of Law. Therefore, it is no surprise that Kelsen, even though he still declares allegiance to Kant and Cohen in focusing on an inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of cognition, rejects Kant’s and Cohen’s overall framework as versions of “natural law theory.”34 These exegetical data require a choice: one could either continue interpreting Kelsen as employing Kantian transcendentalism but with all these necessary qualifications that (as commentators correctly claim) take away what is genuine about Kantian transcendentalism; or one could develop a different interpretation that aligns more closely with all of Kelsen’s claims. In the rest of this subsection, I will opt for the second route and claim that a fictionalist framework, as given by Legal Fiction, can account for all of Kelsen’s claims and should therefore be adopted. To begin with, Legal Fiction recognises Kelsen’s attempt to identify the conditions under which cognising the law as objectively valid is possible. Legal Fiction recognises the basic norm qua fiction as the necessary condition for the possibility of objection cognition of relative legal norms. As such, Legal Fiction can be understood per analogiam to Kantian transcendentalism in the restricted sense Kelsen refers to. But operating with a fiction leaves no doubt that employing the fiction is only one way of looking at the positive law. My fictionalist proposal does not imply that the basic norm is the only way, or even an especially privileged way, of looking at the positive law. And it is precisely the contrast between a fiction and a Kantian hypothesis that maps on to the contrast between Kelsen’s basic norm and a Kantian hypothesis. A fiction is something we do not assume to be true but actually know is false or non-existing. This is exactly what Kelsen says about the basic norm but what would be misleading to say about a ‘hypothesis’. And in fact, Kelsen later abandoned the notion of ‘hypothesis’ in favour of the notion of a “fiction”.35 As a result, the fiction is purely formal and not, as Kelsen thought about Cohen’s and Kant’s approach, contentually-constituted and materially-determined. The fiction is the basic norm and as such comprises only what Kelsen attributes to the basic norm. Finally, since the basic norm is a fiction, applied to the law, it does not imply any claims about morality. Therefore, it is compatible with ethical relativism as Kelsen defends it. Hence, Legal Fiction can account for all of Kelsen’s claims. On this basis, I propose reconstructing Kelsen’s method of cognising within a fictionalist framework rather than within a framework of Kantian transcendentalism. However, it must be noted that preferring fictionalism over Kantian transcendentalism does not imply abandoning the characterisation of Kelsen’s account as Kantian or Neo-Kantian altogether. Other aspects of Kelsen’s account that are usually considered (Neo)-Kantian can still

34 35

Ibid. Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of Norms, 1991, Oxford Clarendon, 256. (See Footnote 18).

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remain in place. These aspects are: (i) the assumption of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ as separate and irreducible categories; (ii) the assumption of the validity of norms in terms of binding force; (iii) the emphasis of genuine normativity of legal science, where legal science is sharply contrasted with more empirical approaches like legal sociology.36 2.1.3

Summary

This section (2.1) outlined the exegetical basis of Positive Legal Fictionalism in Kelsen’s own claims. However, Positive Legal Fictionalism did not merely adapt Kelsen’s claims but went beyond them in two ways: firstly, as there was no consistent account of a legal fiction in Kelsen, Positive Legal Fictionalism had to reconstruct such an account from Kelsen’s contradictory claims. Positive Legal Fictionalism then applied this account to all of the different phases in Kelsen’s work and not only to the latter sceptical phase. Secondly, Positive-Legal-Fictionalism suggested reinterpreting Kelsen’s method in cognising the law as a fictionalist approach rather than as a Kantian transcendental approach. In the next section (2.2), I will elaborate on how Positive Legal Fictionalism contributes to a project of cognition required to solve the Cognivist Challenge. 2.2

The Systematic Perspective: The Contribution of Positive Legal Fictionalism to a Project of Cognition

It may seem paradoxical that a fictionalist account, i. e. an account relying on false claims, could ever contribute to a project of cognition. However, if Positive Legal Fictionalism is to be a solution to the Cognitivist Challenge, I need to explain how it contributes to objective cognition. To do this, I will firstly elaborate on fictionalism as a scientific method more generally (2.2.1), then specify the particular epistemic advantages that come with the assumption of the basic norm qua fiction (as made by Positive Legal Fictionalism) (2.2.2), and finally explain how Positive Legal Fictionalism not only provides epistemic advantages but also remains loyal to legal positivism (2.2.3).

See Bulygin, Eugenio. An Antinomy in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, in: Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed. by Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski. 1998, Oxford Clarendon, 297–315. 36

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2.2.1

Fictionalism as a Scientific Method

Recall that Kelsen claimed that there are “epistemological fictions in legal science (…) of the attempt to know the law, dictions of the intellectual mastery of the legal order.”37 In order to illustrate how a fiction could assist such intellectual mastery, Kelsen gives the following example: “And we have to speak of a fiction as soon as cognition (and especially juridic cognition) takes a detour in knowing its object (and in juridic knowledge this object is the law, the legal order, the legal ought), a detour in which it consciously sets itself in contradiction to this object; and be it only in order to better grasp it: just like a rock-climber, in order to avoid an obstacle and reach his goal more easily, is sometimes forced to temporarily climb downwards, i. e. in a direction directly opposed to his goal, the peak.”38

So, according to Kelsen, a fiction can be a device that helps to overcome an obstacle to cognition. Such an obstacle can be overcome, Kelsen argues, if we allow the fiction to take us on a “detour” and thereby identify an alternative path to cognition. Unfortunately, Kelsen does not elaborate on how such a “detour” can be mapped out in detail. However, the metaphor of rock-climbing is instructive. And most interestingly, it resembles a method that Vaihinger, whom Kelsen knew, once attributed to Fermat’s solution of a mathematical problem. Therefore, Vaihinger’s interpretation of Fermat may help to specify Kelsen’s take on how fictions assist cognition, even if Kelsen does not explicitly refer to it. Vaihinger presented his reader with the following mathematical task: suppose you would like to divide a line into two parts, x and a-x, so that the term x2(a-x) is maximally large. Vaihinger claims that it was impossible to provide a solution until Fermat employed a particular trick. Fermat substituted the x in the term x2(a-x) with (x+e), leading to the new term: (x+e)2(a-x-e). He then equated the original term with the new one, reaching the following equation: x2(a-x) = (x+e)2(a-x-e) By equating both terms, Fermat consciously made a false assumption, Vaihinger claims. Fermat knowingly equated two unequal terms. After multiplying all the terms, Fermat then reached the following equation: 2ax + ae = 3x2 + 3xe + e2 In order to reverse his initial false assumption (i. e. arbitrarily adding e to the equation), Fermat cancelled all the terms containing an e. However, arbitrarily cancelling all the terms containing an e is in itself another false assumption, Vaihinger claims: one must not simply leave terms out of an equation.

37 38

Kelsen, Footnote 19, 5. Ibid.

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After cancelling all terms containing an e and shifting everything but x to the left side, Fermat reaches 2a/3 = x and this is indeed the solution to the problem: if the line x is divided into parts, x and a-x, so that 2a/3 = x, the term x2(a-x) is maximally large. On Vaihinger’s interpretation, Fermat used two false assumptions as tools in his arithmetic operation. He made a first false assumption (i. e. arbitrarily adding e to the equation) to facilitate an easier arithmetic calculation and made a second false assumption (i. e. dropping all terms containing an e) in order to reverse the initial false assumption. Vaihinger calls this the “method of opposite errors”, i. e. errors that neutralise each other. Fermat’s solution, at least in Vaihinger’s description, seems to illustrate what Kelsen says about the metaphor of the rock-climber: “just like a rock-climber, in order to avoid an obstacle and reach his goal more easily, is sometimes forced to temporarily climb downwards, i. e. in a direction directly opposed to his goal, the peak”39, so is Fermat, in order to avoid a mathematical obstacle, forced to temporarily depart from the truth, i. e. think in a direction directly opposed to his goal, the truth. Fermat does this by means of his first false assumption. And just as the rock climber’s adjustment of his position allows him to “reach his goal more easily” 40 later, so can Fermat reach the true solution to the problem more easily after relying on a false equation that he later neutralised by means of a second well-chosen false assumption.41 Vaihinger’s interpretation of Fermat’s solution illustrates how false assumptions, i. e. fictions, may help to achieve cognition. Moreover, Vaihinger’s interpretation is strikingly close to how Kelsen himself describes how fictions can help legal science, and Kelsen in fact knew Vaihinger’s book containing this interpretation.42 Therefore, applying Vaihinger’s interpretation to Kelsen’s Pure Theory of the Basic Law may be a plausible way of explaining the epistemic significance of the fiction in Kelsenian terms. So, let us transfer this take on fictions to Kelse’s Pure Theory of Law: Just as Fermat faced an arithmetic predicament, Kelsen can be seen to face a predicament concerning the validity of norms. According to Error Theory, there are no objectively valid norms. However, legal science in Kelsen’s sense, if it is to be possible at all, is only possible if there are objectively valid norms. Just as Fermat employed a false assumption to overcome an arithmetic predicament and facilitate an easier arithmetic calculation, Kelsen can be seen as employing the

Ibid. Ibid. Vaihinger, Hans. Die Philosophie des Als Ob System der theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit auf Grund eines idealistischen Positivismus Mit einem Anhang über Kant und Nietzsche 1918, Leipzig Meiner, 200 ff. 42 Admittedly, it is not certain that Kelsen knew this passage when writing about fictions, but it is nevertheless likely. Vaihinger’s book was published in 1918 and Kelsen published a review of it in 1919, the same year in which his other paper appeared from which the rock-climbing metaphor is taken. See Kelsen, Footnote 20. 39 40 41

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basic norm qua fiction to overcome the legal predicament of there being no objective validity. Once the basic norm, understood as a fiction, is presupposed, all relative legal norms within a particular legal system are invested with objective validity. However, just as Fermat reversed the initial false assumption in order to reach the correct result, Kelsen also has to prevent the fiction from distorting the results reached. After the basic norm qua fiction is presupposed, Kelsen’s can be interpreted as adding something like a tag to any legal norm saying that legal norms are valid only on the basis of the fiction, i. e. on the basis of this mere product of thought, but not valid in any more robust sense. Kelsen may have done this by introducing the Rechtssatz (rule of law) as opposed to the Rechtsnorm (legal norm). Kelsen explains both terms as follows: “Rules of law [i. e. Rechtssätze] (…) are hypothetical judgments stating that according to a national or international legal order, under the conditions determined by this order, certain consequences determined by the order ought to take place. Legal norms [i. e. Rechtsnormen] are not judgments, that is, they are not statements about an object of cognition. According to their meaning they are commands, they may also be permissions and authorizations.”43

Hence, Rechtsnormen are the legal norms that I presented as the subject-matter of The Pure Theory of Law. Rechtssätze are statements about those norms and usually take the following form: according to the legal system X, such and such ought to be the case. The prefix ‘according to the legal system X’ can be read as the required tag. On a fictionalist interpretation, this prefix can be read as “according to the fiction in legal system X”. This tag makes clear that objective validity still depends on the fiction and prevents the results from being distorted, that is from stating objective validity independent of a mere product of thought. Hence, similarly to how Fermat’s dropping all terms containing an e neutralised his initial false assumption, Kelsen’s prefix in his Rechtssätzen prevents the potential false assumption of objective validity that exists independently of the fiction and makes clear that objective validity is still dependent on arbitrary presupposition. However, there seems to be a difference between Fermat and Kelsen. Whereas Fermat’s second false assumption neutralised his first false assumption, Kelsen – on this interpretation – only highlights but does not neutralise the use of a fiction. The falsity of stating norms of objective validity does not disappear. Error Theory is still in place and, as I will show in section 2.2.3, still plays an important role. At this point, I only want to highlight this difference from Fermat. Kelsen prevents distorted results by a different strategy from that which Vaihinger attributes to Fermat.

43

Kelsen, PTL2, 71. (RR2, 141). (Footnote 3).

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2.2.2

The Epistemic Advantages of the Legal Fiction

In the last subsection (2.2.1) I tried to explain the seemingly paradoxical claim that fictions, i. e. deliberate departures from truth, can sometimes be used to reach the truth. I claimed that both Fermat and Kelsen can use an initial fiction to overcome a predicament and later prevent the fiction from leading to distorted results. This method strikingly resembles Kelsen’s own description of the use of fictions in his metaphor of the rock-climber, and it is a plausible assumption that Kelsen knew about Vaihinger’s interpretation of Fermat and was inspired by it. In this subsection (2.2.2), I want to be more specific and describe the particular epistemic advantages that come with the basic norm interpreted as a fiction. These epistemic advantages fall into two groups: firstly, there are all the epistemic advantages that Kelsen attributes to the basic norm independent of considering it a fiction. Since I proposed to recast Kelsen’s account of presupposing the basic norm as employing the fiction, the epistemic advantages of the basic norm can be re-interpreted as the epistemic advantages of the fiction. Secondly, however, there are also epistemic advantages that specifically stem from the basic norm being a fiction. Such epistemic advantages are not already among those which Kelsen highlights but still contribute to his overall project of cognising the law. Let me start with the first set of advantages, those already associated with the basic norm independent of considering it a fiction. Consider the following passage from Kelsen: “That an assembly of people is a parliament, and that the result of their activity is a statute (in other words, that these events have this ‘meaning’), says simply that the material facts as a whole correspond to certain provisions of the constitution. That is, the content of an actual event corresponds to the content of a given norm.”44

Kelsen here claims that a legal norm renders “actual events” into something with legal significance: there is a parliamentary law (i. e. legal event) and not only a group of people writing down some rules they wish to be complied with (i. e. natural event); there is an instance of murder (i. e. legal event) and not just an instance of killing (i. e. natural event), etc. Without a legal norm, or more precisely without objectively valid legal norms, there would only be natural but not legal events. Kelsen seems to think of something like a parallel or augmented reality. 45 However, all this is only possible

Kelsen, PTL1, 10. (RR1, 19). (Footnote 1). See Kelsen, Hans. Value Judgments in the Science of Law, in: Kelsen, H. What is Justice? Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen 2013. Clark, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 227: “If the system of legal norms is an ideology, it is an ideology parallel to a definite reality.” See also 2008, 49, where Kelsen qualifies the pure theory as an ideology behind a reality which is supposed to conform to this ideology. See also “Welt des Sollens” and “Welt des Seins” in Kelsen, 1960, e. g. 5 ff. (Footnote 26). 44 45

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after presupposing the basic norm because only the presupposition of the basic norm ensures objective validity. Therefore, legal practice arises and is intelligible as a legal practice only by presupposing the basic norm. Hence, Kelsen’s own statements allow the extracting of a specific reason for employing the basic norm as a fiction: presupposing the basic norm makes the legal practice – insofar as it is concerned with legal cognition – intelligible. More particularly, these passages allow us to extract two ways in which presupposition of the basic norm contributes to “cognizing positive law.”46 Firstly, it facilitates legal propositional knowledge, viz. knowing that there are certain legal things (parliamentary law, murder, etc.), which would not legally exist without the presupposition of the basic norm. Secondly, it facilitates legal understanding, viz. understanding why actual events bring with them certain legal characteristics. It is because they correspond to norms which are invested with validity by the presupposition of the basic norm. On this basis, the legal scientist can know that there are certain norms, certain legal events, also that a group of norms leading back to the same basic norm belong to the same legal system, and understand why all this is true: namely because of the link to the basic norm. However, over and above those epistemic advantages associated with the basic norm independent of its interpretation as a fiction, there are also epistemic advantages specifically connected with the basic norm qua fiction Firstly, fictionalist accounts can avoid the disadvantages of realist accounts or natural law theories but still have the same advantages as these views. A disadvantage of realist accounts of norms or natural law theory is often seen in their commitment to complicated ontology. However, the advantage of these theories is their simple semantics. Realist accounts and natural law theory make genuine propositional assertions about norms. As a result, such statements can be robustly true or false and they are subject to principles of logic and inference. Such simple propositional semantics, truth-aptness, and the applicability of logical principles seem to be conducive to a scientific project, other things being equal. Fictionalism can avoid the disadvantage of complicated ontology but still provide the advantages of realist accounts. Fictionalism can avoid complicated ontology by adhering to an error theory, e. g. rejecting any absolute norms, which natural law theory claims exist and which Kelsen continuously highlighted as ontologically incomprehensible. At the same time, however, fictionalism can still claim that there are genuine assertions about the subject matter. It may be true that there are no norms. However, one can still state that ‘according to the legal fiction, such and such a norm exists’ (i. e. Kelsen’s Rechtssätze). Such statements are genuine assertions with propositional content. As such, these statements fall under simple realist semantics and can therefore be robustly true or false as well as subject to principles of logic and inference. Hence, a first

46

Kelsen, PTL1, 58. Emphasis added. (RR1, 77). (Footnote 1).

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epistemic advantage of fictionalist accounts like Positive Legal Fictionalism is that it can avoid complicated ontology while providing the same advantages as natural law theory. Secondly, another advantage of Positive Legal Fictionalism comes from a distinction available to all fictionalist accounts, namely the distinction between accepting and believing claims. Accepting a claim means endorsing it for the time being without believing it to be true. Believing a claim in contrast means taking the claim to be true. Fictionalist accounts can make this distinction by interpreting certain claims as systematically false (e. g. due to a Error Theory) and thereby oppose believing in those claims. However, fictionalist accounts can still argue that one should accept these claims for reasons other than their literal truth (e. g. the specific advantages connected to the fiction, which may be epistemic, pragmatic, political, or aesthetic.) L. J. Cohen used this distinction in a discussion of methods in science more generally. He argued that a scientist who only accepts his hypotheses, claims, and theories is superior to a scientist who believes them. Concerning the later, he says: “possession of a belief that p might make him less ready to change his mind about accepting that p if new evidence crops up or a better theory becomes available. It might even make him less ready to look for new evidence or a better theory, when otherwise he would have done so.”47

Hence, ‘accepting’ instead of ‘believing’ claims leads to a greater open-mindedness and willingness to revise one’s theories, which may be conducive to a project aiming at cognition. Positive Legal Fictionalism, being a fictionalist account, can resort to the distinction between acceptance versus belief and thereby provide an epistemic advantage for a Kelsenian project of cognising the law. Due to Error Theory, a legal scientist embracing Positive Legal Fictionalism would never believe in legal norms, that is take them to be objectively valid, full stop, or even take them to be true. A legal scientist would only accept the legal norms provisionally, that is accept them as part of a contingent legal system and on the contingent fictionalist assumption of a presupposed basic norm. As a result, a legal scientist embracing Positive Legal Fictionalism does not cling on to legal norms in any way but is indifferent to changes in them. As a result, the statements about those norms, the Rechtssätze, are also subject to radical contingency. They are radically contingent because they would need to change whenever Rechtsnormen change. And this is the case even though Rechtssätze – unlike Rechtsnormen – can be robustly true or false. So, the fictionalist legal scientist only accepts Rechtsnormen and, since Rechtsnormen are the basis for Rechtssätze, he is also maximally open-minded for changing Rechtssätze whenever “new evidence crops up or a better theory becomes available”, to use Cohen’s phrase again.

47

Cohen, Laurence Jonathan. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, 1992, Oxford OUP, 88.

Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law

Hence, insofar as open-mindedness can be considered an epistemic virtue in line with Cohen’s description, Positive Legal Fictionalism – being a fictionalist account – can claim to provide this virtue for a project of cognising the law. 2.2.3

Fictionalism and Legal Positivism

In the last two subsections (2.2.1 and 2.2.2), I tried to explain the use of a fiction as a scientific method more generally as well as specify the particular epistemic advantages of the basic norm qua fiction. In this subsection (2.2.3), I wish to highlight how my fictionalist proposal, amidst all cognitivist aspirations, still remains loyal to legal positivism, thereby also returning to a claim I made at the end of section 2.2.1. It is indeed the specifically fictional take that aligns with legal positivism: the take on there being no objectively valid norms (Error Theory) but only a fiction that ensures fictional objective validity (Legal Fiction). In order to see how these claims provide advantages, let us consider the opposite account of a richer cognitivist project that abandons Error Theory and the assumption of a fiction. Such a project does not seem to be terribly attractive vis-à-vis Kelsen’s legal positivism. The last thing that Kelsen should arrive at is a cognitivist account that tends towards recommending certain norms are really true and ought to be complied with.’ Kelsen indeed stresses that the Pure Theory is not supposed to legitimise the law in any way but remain agnostic on the moral worth of the positive law.48 And Dreier is correct when he says that it was never Kelsen’s aim to hedge the arbitrariness of positive law.49 Error Theory is in accordance with these claims and emphasizes that full normative necessity in law is still compatible with the utmost moral depravity of the legal system. As such, keeping Error Theory in place facilitates an interpretation that is carefully nuanced between cognitivist and positivist aspirations. This justifies labelling my proposal Positive Legal Fictionalism. 2.2.4

Summary

This section (2.2) aimed to explain how Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law can be a cognitive project after the adoption of Error Theory. Referring to Positive Legal Fictionalism, I made three claims: firstly (2.2.1), the epistemic function of a fiction can be explained according to Kelsen’s metaphor of the rock-climber. Just as Fermat employed a false assumption to solve a mathematical challenge, Kelsen can use a fiction to solve a legal challenge, i. e. how to explain objective validity. Secondly (2.2.2), presupposing the baMost notably Kelsen, PTL1, 7, 18. (RR1, 15, 29). Kelsen, PTL2, 1, 68–69. (RR2, 21, 136–138). (Footnote 1 and 3). 49 See Dreier, 1986, 59 (Footnote 27). 48

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sic norm qua fiction then specifically facilitates the following epistemic advantages: it provides legal propositional knowledge and it provides legal understanding. Furthermore, it avoids complicated ontology while facilitating simple propositional semantics and leads to a particular open-mindedness in legal theorizing. Finally (2.2.3), over and above these epistemic advantages, a fictionalist account is also particularly suited to legal positivism, thereby balancing cognitive and positivist aspirations. 3.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this essay, I identified two objectives: drawing attention to the Cognitivist Challenge as a serious challenge to Kelsen’s account and proposing Positive Legal Fictionalism as a solution to the Cognitivist Challenge. The Cognitivist Challenge was a challenge of how to retain Kelsen’s view about the relative legal norms, i. e. that one can objectively cognise these norms, while not rejecting his view about the absolute moral norms, i. e. that one cannot objectively cognise these norms I claimed that a solution to the Cognitivist Challenge is of vital importance for understanding Kelsen’s project as a ‘theory’, viz. a project of objective cognition, and as a project that is ‘pure’, i. e. separated not only from empirical sciences but also from morality. The solution that I proposed, Positive Legal Fictionalism, proceeded in two steps: firstly, relying on Error Theory, Positive Legal Fictionalism claimed that no norms are objectively valid – actually speaking. It thereby accounted for all of Kelsen’s statements about certain norms, e. g. absolute moral norms, not being objects of cognition. Secondly, relying on Legal Fiction, Positive Legal Fictionalism presented the use of a fiction as the tool to facilitate objective cognition of relative legal norms. Presupposing the basic norm qua fiction invests all relative legal norms with objective validity and facilitates several epistemic advantages: legal propositional knowledge, legal understanding, realist semantics without complicated ontology, open-mindedness. These advantages form the basis of Kelsen’s project of cognising the law. Hence, Kelsen’s project should be understood as a ‘theory’ along these fictionalist lines and considered ‘pure’ to the extent that the legal fiction applies only to positive legal norms and not moral norms, as well as to the extent that the fiction facilitates the genuine normative validity, which cannot be reduced to facts. I hope to have shown that Positive Legal Fictionalism is also firmly rooted in Kelsen’s account from an exegetical basis. However, Positive Legal Fictionalism is only a Kelsenian but not quite Kelsen’s own account. This is because Positive Legal Fictionalism went beyond Kelsen’s own claims by (i) applying a unified account of fictions about the law to all the different phases in his work, (ii) explaining Kelsen’s claims about the method of cognising the law in terms of a fictionalist rather than a qualified Kantian framework, (iii) explicitly linking Kelsen’s take on the epistemic use of fictions to Vaihinger,

Fictionalising Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law

and (iv) developing from the previous points specific epistemic advantages which Kelsen himself did not highlight: i. e. simple semantics without complicated ontology, open-mindedness on the basis of the distinction between acceptance and belief. Therefore, Positive Legal Fictionalism may be seen as a proposal for how to develop Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law further, rather than as account that merely summarises its present status. Acknowledgment

I want to thank Leslie Green, John Hyman, Jörg Kammerhofer, and Matthias Jestaedt for their detailed and very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. I also benefitted considerably from presenting an earlier version of this essay at the 2018 Conference of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR): Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions, at the University of Freiburg (Germany). The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the European Research Council, under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (project ID: 789270). Maximilian Kiener

University of Oxford, St. Peter’s College, OX1 2DL Oxford, UK, [email protected]

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Rechtstheorie / The Mechanics of Law

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts An Essay in Critical Reconstruction MATHIEU CARPENTIER

Abstract: This article focuses on Hans Kelsen’s late period, in which, breaking from views

that he had previously held dear, Kelsen espoused a novel theory of normative conflicts. He claimed that since the principle of non-contradiction does not apply to norms, normative conflicts are not logical impossibilities. Two equally valid norms may conflict; whether the law provides the tools to solve such a conflict is not a logical matter, but is dependent on contingent positive legal norms, also known as “metarules” such as Lex posterior. However, Kelsen did not want to cut the link between normative conflicts and invalidity (or non-validity). He claimed that conflicts are solved through derogation. This is the claim the present paper intends to analyse and ultimately refute. I then go on to introduce a new conception of metarules conceived as norms of applicability, with no special bearing on the conflicting norm’s validity. Keywords: Hans Kelsen, derogation, normative conflicts, normative systems, legal valid-

ity, applicability Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Derogation, normative Konflikte, normative Systeme, rechtli-

che Geltung, Anwendbarkeit

In1 1962, Hans Kelsen published an article called “Derogation”2, in which he shook up some of his own well-entrenched beliefs. Even if the shortcomings and inconsistencies of his earlier views did not totally disappear, that article made a crucial step in (what Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Legal Philosophy Seminar of the University Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona and at the Conference of the German Section of the IVR in Freiburg. I would like to thank Jose Juan Moreso, Chiara Valentini, Stanley L. Paulson, Jörg Kammerhofer and Thomas Hochmann for invaluable comments. 2 Hans Kelsen, Derogation in: Essays in Jurisprudence in Honour of Roscoe Pound, ed. Ralph Newman, 1962. This essay was reprinted in Hans Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy, 1973. I cite and quote it here from the 1973 edition. 1

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I believe is) a good direction. It opened the way to Kelsen’s so-called late, sceptical3 period and was re-used – sometimes verbatim – in his last opus magnum, the General Theory of Norms. In this paper I shall try to re-elaborate and defend some of the basic tenets developed by Kelsen in the “Derogation” article, while trying to solve some of its main inconsistencies. Here are some of the things which, controversial as they may be, I think Kelsen basically got right: (1) Repeal – or abrogation, or derogation4 – is a specific, self-standing normative function. It does not prescribe, nor prohibits nor authorizes any behaviour. It suppresses the validity of another norm from the normative system they both belong to. (2) Normative conflicts are not a matter of logical contradiction. Two conflicting norms may be equally valid in a legal system; therefore, two conflicting normative propositions (Sollsätze, descriptive propositions about norms) may be true in the same time5. This is a major move by Kelsen away from what he “Sceptical” should not be understood here as referring to so-called “rule-scepticism”, i. e. the thesis according to which rules can never guide behaviour. Although Kelsen has sometimes been understood as somehow paving the way for an interpretation-centred rule-scepticism, it is not what is at stake here – see, on such an understanding, Michel Troper, La Théorie du droit, le droit, l’Etat, 2001, 67 ff.; Riccardo Guastini, Rule-Scepticism Restated, in: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 1, ed. Leslie Green / Brian Leiter, 2011, 138 ff.; for a critique, see Christoph Kletzer, Kelsen’s Development of the Fehlerkalkül-Theory, Ratio Juris 18 (2005), 53. The later Kelsen is sometimes dubbed sceptical because of his newfound stance that there are no logical relations between norms (Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (trans. M. Hartney), 1991, 189–193), or at least that norms are subject neither to the principle of non-contradiction nor to rules of inference; but as Bruno Celano notes, Kelsen has to grant that at least some logical relations between norms may exist (see Bruno Celano, Norm-Conflicts: Kelsen’s View in the Late Period and a Rejoinder, in: Normativity and Norms, ed. Stanley Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson, 1998, 345 ff.). 4 In what follows, I will use all those terms as broadly synonymous. Kelsen himself argues that the classical distinction between abrogation (as total repeal) and derogation (a partial repeal) is mistaken, due to a failure to appreciate the importance of (1). See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 111–112. Therefore, I will use the three words interchangeably. I must warn at the outset that in my own native language, French, “derogation” does not mean the suppression of a norm, or of the validity thereof, from a normative system; rather it means the creation of an exception in an individual case (as in “accorder une dérogation”, which means roughly “to grant an exception”). When one uses the word “dérogation” in French, it is obvious to any speaker that what is at stake is not a validity problem, but rather a momentary non-application of a norm. Since I will argue that what is at stake in most normative conflicts is a matter of applicability and not of validity, I shall make it clear that I will only use “derogation” in the technical meaning defined above, lest I am accused of begging the question by using a French-infested notion of “derogation”. 5 Indeed, the downside of this conception is that two conflicting normative propositions (i. e. descriptive propositions about norms) may be true in the same time. Depending on whether normative propositions describe the norm-content or the norm’s validity, such a claim may entail very unfortunate consequences. Kelsen himself does not seem to choose between the two functions of normative propositions, although he only mentions propositions about validity (See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 164). As Kelsen shows (Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 223) statements about the validity / existence of the conflicting norms are not contradictories: if p = there is a valid norm to the effect that that it is obligatory that P and q = there is a valid norm to the effect that it is forbidden that P, since q ≠ ~ p, p and q are not contradictories. Whether such statements of validity amount to statements of fact will not be discussed here (see generally 3

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts

(3)

wrote just two years before in the second edition of the Pure Theory of Law: “A conflict of norms is just as meaningless as a logical contradiction”6. In “Derogation”, Kelsen claims that when two descriptive propositions contradict each other, one of them is false from the outset, whereas in the case of a conflict of norms, both norms are valid until one is repealed – or both are. Metarules (such as, per Kelsen, Lex Posterior7) are not logical principles but positive legal norms8.

And here are the main flaws and shortcomings of Kelsen’s new theory: (4) Kelsen’s classification of normative conflicts is clumsy at best. It confuses two distinct problems: the conflict’s scope (regarding the classes of cases covered by the norm’s antecedent) and the conflict’s nature (regarding the deontic features of the norm’s consequent). (5) More importantly, due to a confused notion of legal validity, Kelsen could not take himself to apply (2) above to conflicts arising between norms of different ranks within the normative hierarchy. Just a few paragraphs after writing that a conflict between two norms does not entail anything about either norm’s validity, Kelsen writes that in the case of “unconstitutional statutes” “no conflict exists”. This is due to a confusion made by Kelsen (and many others) between validity as membership (of a norm within a legal system) and validity as conformity with higher ranking norms, including those prescribing the procedure by which lower-ranking norms are to be created. More on this later. (6) Although Kelsen’s formulation on this matter is quite ambiguous9, he seems to believe that the only solution to a normative conflict is through repeal and

Carlos E. Alchourrón / Eugenio Bulygin, The Expressive Conception of Norms, in: Normativity and Norms, ed. Stanley Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson, 1998, 383 ff.). On the other hand, if normative propositions describe the norm-content, the description of a normative conflict necessarily yields two contradictory descriptive statements: if p = “it is forbidden to phi” and q = “it is not forbidden to phi”, then p and q are contradictory. The same goes for r = “it is obligatory to phi” since r → q according to the axiom D of standard deontic logic. Kelsen’s new tenet that the principle of non-contradiction does not hold for norms entails that it does not hold any more for descriptive propositions about the content of norms. 6 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (2nd ed., trans. Max Knight), 1967, 206; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 210. 7 For reasons soon to be obvious, Kelsen refers only to Lex Posterior, and sets aside Lex Superior and Lex Specialis. 8 For an overview of Kelsen’s shifting positions throughout his lifetime, see Stanley L. Paulson, On the status of the Lex Posterior Derogating Rule, Liverpool Law Review 5 (1983), 5–18. 9 Kelsen writes: “The conflict can, but need not be, solved by derogation” (Hans Kelsen, Derogation, 271). There are two ways to understand this sentence: on the first reading, Kelsen means that conflicts can be left unsolved, but that when they are solved, the solution is always derogation; on the second reading, Kelsen means that conflicts can be solved by derogation, but may also be solved through other means. Context indicates that the first interpretation is correct as an exegetical matter – although I will argue that, as a matter of fact, Kelsen should have meant the second one.

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that metarules are “norms which regulate derogation” (in the sense of repeal). But this is clearly not the case as a matter of empirical fact. Judges often solve normative conflicts without altering the validity of either norm. Even if we grant that metarules are “norms which are about derogation”  – which I am going to argue is not the case – there still remains an ambiguity regarding what they actually do. On one interpretation, they are (pro futuro) derogating norms. For instance, Lex Posterior means: “whenever a conflict occurs, the prior norm ceases to be valid whenever the posterior norm becomes valid”. On another interpretation, they are norms regulating derogation, that is, power-conferring norms giving some officials (e. g. judges) the power to repeal one of the two conflicting norms (or both).

In this paper, I will try to vindicate propositions (1)–(3) while showing that most of the shortcomings of (4)–(7) can be avoided. Throughout, my claims will not be exegetical in nature; my aim is to offer a conceptual and critical reconstruction of Kelsen’s later views, by trying to build a coherent picture of normative conflicts on what I believe are correct intuitions on Kelsen’s part. My main claim is that normative conflicts are a matter of applicability, not validity, and that metarules are not norms of derogation but norms of (in)applicability, even if some legal systems also empower certain law-applying organs to repeal one of the conflicting norms (or both). The paper is comprised of four parts. In the first part, I will propose a tentative and incomplete classification of normative conflicts; in the second part I will try to adumbrate the distinction between validity and applicability; in the third part, I will show that metarules are norms of applicability, beginning with Lex posterior. This claim vindicates Kelsen’s intuition that Lex Posterior is a positive law norm and not a logical principal and in the same time rebuts his tenet that the only way to deal with normative conflicts is through derogation. In the last part I will try to show that the same holds for Lex Superior, against Kelsen’s clear and trenchant claims to the contrary. I.

Types of Normative Conflicts

Let us assume that legal norms (and perhaps other norms as well) are conditional norms. A conditional norm has the following structure: a factual antecedent specifying the norm’s scope, that is, the properties of the generic or individual case regulated by the norm; a normative consequent (or as Alchourrón and Bulygin would put it, a normative solution), prescribing the behaviour to be adopted when the antecedent is instantiated; and between the two a logical link (a conditional) which I will leave

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts

non-specified10. In that perspective, categorical norms are conditional norms whose antecedent is T, i. e. whatever tautology. This presentation of legal norms as conditional norms11 leaves unanswered the question of the individuation of norms. I shall not try to defend any theory of norm-individuation here. A crucial distinction has to be made between, on the one hand, the nature of a normative conflict, i. e. the ways two norms may conflict with each other, and, on the other hand, the scope of the normative conflict, i. e., the classes or subclasses or cases in which the conflict actually occurs. A.

Contradiction, contrariety, incompatibility

The conflict occurs when the normative consequents of both conflicting norms cannot be applied in the same time. Contrary to a persistent misconception, the criterion of a normative conflict is not that both norms cannot be obeyed at the same time12. As a matter of fact, what I will call normative contradiction is about two conflicting norms which can both be obeyed. However, they cannot both be applied in the same timeby law-applying organs: a law-applying organ cannot use both norms to justify its decision. If we were to say that norms conflict only when they fail to motivate behaviour, we would reduce norms to motivational reasons. Here I will primarily take norms as providing justificatory reasons for action. If you disagree with that, it does not matter terribly, since it is rather a side issue for the present purposes. There are three kinds of normative conflicts13. The first kind of normative conflict can be called normative contrariety. In such a case, the conflict involves two normative solutions with the same deontic operator and opposite internal negations: for instance, OA (it is obligatory to do A) and O~A (it is Here I will not elaborate on the problems that representing that link as the material implication (whether internal or external) creates (see on this Mathieu Carpentier, Norme et exception Essai sur la défaisabilité en droit, 2014, 92–106). Neither will I ask here whether normative conflicts – and, more specifically, the kind of normative conflict which is called in the literature “defeasibility” – call for a specific, defeasible conditional. On this, see for instance, Mathieu Carpentier, Norme et exception, 268–281. For the present purposes, I shall assume that all these problems have already been settled, one way or another. 11 Which is endorsed by Kelsen himself, see Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 100. 12 A pathbreaking analysis in this respect is H. Hamner Hill, A functional taxonomy of normative conflict, Law and Philosophy 6 (1987), 227 ff. 13 This typology borrows a lot from H. Hamner Hill (footnote 12), and also Stephen Munzer, Validity and Legal Conflicts, Yale Law Journal 82 (1973), 1041–1043 and Risto Hilpinen, Normative conflicts and Legal Reasoning, in: Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life, ed. Eugenio Bulygin / Jean-Louis Gardies / Ikka Niinuluoto, 1985, 195). However, neither Munzer nor Hilpinen consider what I call normative incompatibility, and they both write about normative subcontrariety (PA and P~A) which does not strike me as involving a genuine normative conflict (which Hilpinen candidly acknowledges). The very distinction between normative contrariety and contradiction, which I share with Hilpinen and Munzer, can already be found in Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, 1970, 110–111. 10

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obligatory not to do A), which is the same as ~PA. Those solutions are deontic contraries. In such a case, both norms cannot be obeyed in the same time14. The second kind of normative conflict can be called normative contradiction: here again we have two normative solutions with the same deontic operator but opposite external negations: for instance, OA (it is obligatory to do A) and ~OA (it is not obligatory to do A), which is the same as P~A. Obviously such a conflict does not involve a motivational conflict. One can obey both norms, simply by doing A. You cannot be said to have disobeyed a norm which permits you not to help your neighbour if you do in fact help your neighbour, unless, of course there is also a norm forbidding you to help your neighbour, which ex hypothesi is not the case here (if it were we would have a case of normative contrariety, not contradiction). So, both norms can be obeyed. However, both norms cannot simultaneously justify one’s behaviour. If a norm forbids you to steal and another one authorizes you to steal, a judge who has to apply both is faced with a genuine dilemma. The third kind of normative conflict can be called normative incompatibility15 It involves two actions A and B which can only be described by two incompatible propositions. Two propositions p and q are incompatible if and only if they cannot both be true, but they can both be false: p and q are incompatible iff p ^ q is always false and it is false that ~(~p^~q). It means that although p →~q and q →~p, it isn’t the case the p↔~q nor that q↔~p, because it is not the case that ~p→q nor that ~q→p. Two actions can be called incompatible if they can be described by two incompatible propositions. For instance: it is obligatory that all houses are entirely paint in white and it is obligatory that all houses are entirely paint in blue. Such norms are incompatible. Normative incompatibilities break into two distinct subclasses, according to the kind of deontic operator at stake. For any two incompatible actions A and B, there is a normative contradiction-incompatibility when OA and PB (or ~O~B) and there is a normative contrariety-incompatibility when OA and OB. What is the point of distinguishing normative incompatibility (and its two subclasses) from normative contradiction and contrariety? When two actions A and B are incompatible, it is not the case that ~A→B (and vice versa). Therefore, even though According to Lars Lindahl, Conflicts in Systems of Legal Norms: A logical point of View, in: Coherence and Conflict in Law, ed. Bob W. Brouwer / Ton Hol / Arend Soeteman / Willem van der Velden / Arie de Wild, 1992, 39, only normative contrarieties are genuine normative conflicts since only them cannot be simultaneously obeyed. But as I have hinted, I will consider normative conflicts as involving not only conflicting motivations, but also, and mainly, conflicting normative justifications. I would add that what some normative incompatibilities (see infra) also involve conflicting motivations. 15 Such cases are not to be confused with what Uta Bindreiter calls “normative incompatibility”, which is what happens when obeying simultaneously both norms is materially possible but is morally – or otherwise normatively – subject to blame. (See Uta Bindreiter, Why Grundnorm?, 2000, 139–141). Bindreiter also refers to what he calls empirical incompatibility, when there is an empirical impossibility to perform both actions: for instance: you ought to work from noon to midnight; you ought to work from midnight to noon. Neither cases are normative conflicts for the purpose of this paper. 14

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts

A→~B, O~A^O~B is not a normative conflict, whereas O~A^O~~A is a normative conflict: it is a normative contrariety. If it is forbidden to paint one’s house in white and not to paint one’s house in white, we have a normative contrariety; if it is forbidden to paint one’s house in white and to paint one’s house in blue, there is no normative conflict whatsoever. Just paint your house in pink or in purple. This triple (or even quadruple) distinction between contrariety, contradiction and incompatibility is indeed schematic. It does not account for a certain type of normative conflicts which are not predicated on the classical deontic modalities (permission, prohibition, obligation). For instance, it does not prove useful in case of a conflict between two power-conferring norms16. B.

The Scope of Normative Conflicts

Normative conflicts do not always occur in all cases. They occur modulo the facts specified in the norm antecedent. Therefore, conflicts differ in their scope. Here I will use (and marginally modify) Alf Ross’ famous classification of normative conflicts in On Law and Justice17. He distinguishes between three kinds of conflicts in what concerns their scope. The first kind is what Ross calls total (or, more precisely, total-total) conflicts, when the sets of cases X and Y regulated by both norms are identical. For instance: for every x, if x is a vehicle, it is forbidden for x to enter the park; for every x, if x is a vehicle, it is permitted for x to enter the park. The second kind is what Ross calls total-partial conflicts, when the set of cases X regulated by one norm is a subset of the set of cases regulated Y by the other. The conflict occurs only when an instantiation of X obtains, and not when other cases belonging to Y but not to X obtain. For instance, for every x, if x is a vehicle, it is forbidden for x to enter the park; for every x, if x is an on-duty ambulance, it is permitted for x to enter the park. The third kind is what Ross calls partial (or, more precisely, partial-partial) conflicts when the set of cases X regulated by one norm intersects with the set of cases Y regulated by the other norm (a non-normative example of such a conflict is the famous Nixon Diamond used in most systems of non-monotonic logic). The conflict occurs only when an instantiation of X∩Y occurs; it does not in other instantiations or X nor

See for instance what Lindahl and Reidhav call “capacitative conflicts” (Lars Lindahl and David Reidhav, Conflict of Legal Norms: Definition and Varieties, in: Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking, ed. Michał Araszkiewicz / Krzysztof Płeszka, 2015, 49 ff.). 17 Alf Ross, On Law and Justice, 1958, 129. For a recent formalisation of Ross’s taxonomy, see Abdullatif Elhag / Joost Breuker / Bob Brouwer, On the Formal Analysis of Normative Conflicts, in: Legal Knowledge Based Systems (JURIX ’99), ed. Jaap van den Herik, 1999, 37–38. 16

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Y. To borrow an example from Jorge Luis Rodriguez18: if the light is red, one should stop one’s vehicle; if one is driving through a military zone, one should not stop one’s vehicle. This classification seems correct. I will add a caveat however. In cases of partial-partial conflicts, no specificity-based criterion of conflict-resolution (such as Lex Specialis) can be used, because none of the conflicting norms is “more special” than the other. Or so Ross claimed19. It is however a bit more complicated than that. In most legal systems, what seems to be a prima facie partial-partial conflict will often be transformed in total-partial conflict due to certain (conscious or unconscious) interpretative assumptions. Consider the two following norms. N1: For every x, if x wilfully causes the death of another human being, x shall be punished with thirty years in prison N2: For every x, if x is suffering from a psychological disorder and commits a crime, x shall not be punished Now it seems that what we have here is a partial-partial conflict, which cannot be solved using Lex Specialis. However, most lawyers share an interpretative assumption of specificity which operates in favour of N2. Either they presuppose an additional norm N3: whoever commits a crime shall be punished, in which case there is a total-partial conflict between N2 and N3; or they conceive N2 as being not a single norm, but the sum of a great number of specific norms, such as N2’: For every x, if x is suffering from a psychological disorder and commits murder, N2’’: For every x, if x is suffering from a psychological disorder and commits theft, etc , in which case there is a total-partial conflict between N2’ and N1. This is why Lex Specialis applies even in cases where the conflict at hand looks like a partial-partial one, due to some specificity assumption. C.

What About Kelsen’s Own Classification?

In “Derogation”20 and in General Theory of Norms21, Kelsen worked out a theory of normative conflicts which rests on a specific typology. Conflicts are distinguished according to whether they are “necessary” or “possible”, “bilateral” or “unilateral”, and “total” or “partial”. I have criticized this classification elsewhere, and I will not rehearse my arguments here22. Suffice it to say that it is riddled with confusions, insofar as it fails to distinguish between the nature of a conflict and the scope thereof. For instance, the notion of a necessary conflict rests on considerations about the conflict’s scope: a conflict is necessary when it occurs in every case, whereas it is

Jorge Luis Rodríguez, Contradicciones Normativas. Jaque a la concepción deductivista de los sistemas jurídicos, Doxa 17/18 (1995) 372. 19 Alf Ross, On Law and Justice, 131. 20 Hans Kelsen, Derogation, 269 21 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 123 ff. 22 See Mathieu Carpentier, Norme et exception, 228–230. 18

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merely possible when it occurs only on some cases. The notion of a bilateral conflicts deals with the presence of a conflict “on the side” of the norm: in what Ross calls a total-partial conflict, the conflict is necessary on the side of the special norm, and merely possible on the side of the general norm. The problem with such a classification is that what Kelsen calls an “unilateral” conflict is not a conflict at all. His example of such a “conflict” is the following: “Norm 1: Murder is to be punished by death, if the murderer is over 20 years of age. Norm 2: Murder is to be punished by death, if the murderer is over 18 years of age”. There is no conflict on the side of Norm 1, but according to Kelsen there is a possible conflict on the side of Norm 2 (since Norm 2 may entail the punishment of a 19-year-old murderer for instance). Whatever problems are raised by the formalization of conditional norms, it is common ground that the antecedent of a norm is a sufficient condition of the realization of the consequent. But Kelsen’s notion of a unilateral conflict rests on a more robust conception of conditional norms, which is predicated on the antecedent being a necessary condition as well. There is a conflict between Norm 1 and Norm 2 only if Norm 1 is reinterpreted as “Norm 1a: Murder is to be punished by death, if and only if the murderer is over 20 years of age”. Norm 1a implies Norm 1b: “If it is not the case that the murderer is over 20 years of age, then murder is not to be punished by death” which then (and only then) conflicts with Norm 2. It is what Ross calls a partial-partial conflict, since the class of cases about murderers over 18 intersects with the class of cases about murderers under 20. But if Norm 1 expresses only a sufficient condition, there is no conflict since the same normative solutions is applied to two classes of cases one of which is included in the other. There is no conflict between Norm 1 and Norm 2, not any more than between Norm 3: “If one owns farm animals, one ought to pay a tax” and Norm 4: “If one owns a cow, one ought to pay a tax”. To sum up: Kelsen’s classification of conflicts is flawed; hence I will use the classification elaborated above instead of Kelsen’s, however partial and incomplete it may be. II.

A Few Words on the Validity / Applicability Distinction

It is well known that Kelsen defines validity as the specific mode of existence of norms23. This definition rests on an assimilation of the norm’s existence with its bindingness. There exists a norm to the effect that one ought to φ if and only if it is the case that one On this, see (among an extensive literature), Dick W. P. Ruiter, Legal validity qua specific mode of existence, Law and Philosophy 16 (1997), 479–505; Carlos S. Nino, Confusions surrounding Kelsen’s concept of validity, in: Normativity and Norms, ed. Stanley Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson, 1998, 255 ff.; Andras Jakab, Problems of the Stufenbaulehre. Kelsen’s Failure to Derive the Validity of a Norm from Another Norm, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 10 (2007), 35–68. A very clear introduction can be found in Clemens Jabloner, Der Rechtsbegriff bei Hans Kelsen, in: Rechtstheorie: Rechtsbegriff – Dynamik – Auslegung, ed. Stefan Griller / Heinz Peter Rill, 2011, 24 ff. 23

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ought to φ. A norm’s existence coincides with the duty to obey it. Such a conception of validity may be labelled a strong conception of validity. It can be contrasted with a weak notion of validity which treats validity as a matter of membership of a norm within a normative system. According to the weak conception, a norm exists only if it belongs to a normative system. A legal norm exists if and only if it belongs to a legal system. The notion of membership is useful insofar as it has no stakes in the ontological question of what makes a norm exist qua norm. In that sense, legal validity, understood as membership within a legal system, is what endows a norm with its legal character – i. e. what makes it exist qua law –, regardless of what makes it exist qua norm in the absolute. It answers the question: why is it the law that one ought to φ? And it sets aside the quite trickier question: what makes it the case that one ought to φ? On the weak conception, a legal system uses a set of criteria of membership which will be picked out by a specific rule or set of rules. This is roughly the Hartian notion of a rule of recognition, and it is quite remote from the Kelsenian conception of validity as bindingness (although Kelsen occasionally comes close to using “validity” in the weak sense24). On the weak conception, derogation is merely about the suppression of a norm’s membership, and it does not bear on other dimensions of what is usually called “validity”. Indeed, a weak notion of validity allows us to distinguish membership from applicability. The notion of applicability in contemporary jurisprudential literature (flowing mainly from Eugenio Bulygin’s seminal work25) is a reinterpretation of the notion of bindingness, severed from the membership dimension of normative validity. The applicability of a legal norm is to be understood as the duty (or power) that a law-applying organ has to apply it. As Bulygin has shown, a norm’s applicability is contingent on the legal system containing norms of applicability, i. e. norms which regulate the way other norms ought to be applied. Such norms of applicability regulate not only norms of the legal system but norms belonging to other normative (not necessarily legal) systems as well. Norms of applicability come in various types. They may be general norms meant to be applied to a vast range of norms: for instance, the nullum crimen principle and the principle of retroactivity in mitius are such general norms of applicability. They also may be particular norms regulating the applicability of a specific norm or set of

For instance, Kelsen writes: “Why does a certain norm belong to a certain order? And this question is closely tied to the question: Why is a norm valid, what is the reason for its validity” (Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 193). In the German original text: “warum gehört eine bestimmte Norm zu einer bestimmten Ordnung? Und diese Frage steht in einem engen Zusammenhang mit der Frage: Warum gilt eine Norm, was ist ihr Geltungsgrund?” (Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 196). However, Kelsen is clear that “closely tied” is not the same as “equivalent”. And in the following paragraph, Kelsen does equate validity with bindingness (Verbindlichkeit). 25 See mainly Eugenio Bulygin, Time and Validity, in: Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. Carlos Bernal et al., 2015, 171–187. 24

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts

norms: for instance, the section of a statute which deals with the statute’s own “entry into force”. Applicability thus understood is a kind of bindingness. In order to grasp the difference between applicability and membership, we can go back to the Ross/Kelsen debate on validity. As Alf Ross showed in a famous article26, a distinction must be made between a legal norm’s bindingness and a legal obligation. For instance, legally you may not kill or steal. Legally a judge may not refuse to adjudicate a matter brought before her. Those are legal statements, referring to legal obligations (or rather prohibitions). Bindingness, on the other hand, must be understood as a duty to obey. As Ross astutely noticed, there is no legal obligation to obey the law. There only is a legal obligation or permission to φ. This is why Ross dismissed Kelsen’s conception of validity as bindingness as hopelessly infected with some natural law disease. An obligation to obey the law cannot be legal; it must be a moral obligation. As Bulygin observed27, the nexus of Ross’s objection to Kelsen’s notion of validity is that it ultimately rests on an absolute conception of bindingness: absolute bindingness means that a norm is binding on its own (moral) merits. However, the notion of applicability reveals a thoroughly relative conception of bindingness, which allows for a specifically legal kind of bindingness: courts are vested with a duty (or at least a power) to apply legal norms, which is grounded in other legal norms, which Bulygin calls norms of applicability. When we say that laws are binding on judges we do not mean that they have a duty to obey, but rather a duty to apply. Legal norms are legally binding when a certain set of officials is under the duty to apply them. This kind of bindingness is strictly legal, since it is predicated on the existence of a specific set of legal norms. The distinction between membership and bindingness understood as applicability28 is not necessarily incompatible with Kelsen’s general outlook since it does not say anything about the question of absolute bindingness. And it is able to account for legal complexities that the mere identification of validity with bindingness cannot allow. For instance, it allows us to account for situations where applicability and membership are somehow disjoined. In cases of vacatio legis, the norm belongs to the legal system (which is proven by the fact that normative operations such as amendment or derogation are possible in the interim) but it is not yet applicable: though it is not

Alf Ross, Validity and the Conflict between Positivism and Natural Law, in: Normativity and Norms, ed. Stanley Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson, 1998, 153. 27 Eugenio Bulygin, The Problem of Legal Validity in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, in: Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. Carlos Bernal et al., 321. 28 I have raised doubts about this distinction in Mathieu Carpentier, Validity versus Applicability: a (Small) Dose of Scepticism, Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche, 18 (2018), 107–132. However, my doubts do not as much bear on the correctness of the conceptual distinction itself as they are concerned with the poor heuristic value of the notion of “mere membership”. 26

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quite normatively inert29 in the meantime, judges and other officials have no duty to apply them. This shows that membership is not a sufficient condition of applicability. Conversely, it is not a necessary condition either: a judge is sometime bound to apply a foreign legal norm when a choice-of-law rule directs her to do so. And in cases of normative post-activity, a judge is sometimes bound to apply a norm to a set of cases which occurred after the removal of the norm from the legal system. III.

Metarules as Norms of Applicability

My claim in the present paper is that metarules are norms of applicability. I will first show it using the very metarule Kelsen focuses on: Lex posterior. Following the distinction sketched out in (7) above, I will try to show that Lex posterior is neither a pro futuro derogating norm, nor a power-conferring norm regulating derogation. A.

Meta-rules are not pro futuro derogating norms

Derogation is a central feature of legal systems. A legal authority could not properly discharge her job or fulfil her function if she were not able to cancel past pronouncements made by her predecessors or by herself. It would be difficult to conceive a legal system close to the ones we know, and work with, that would not have such a feature. Derogation is a specific normative function, as Kelsen pointed out. A derogating norm has the sole effect of removing the norm from the legal system; that is, because the legislature enacted the relevant norm, a previous norm disappears from the legal system. Derogation is what allows a legal system to change; it is a function of what Hart called the “rules of change” of a given legal system30, which empower lawmakers to repeal earlier las and to make new ones. It is tempting to think that this is the kind of process which is captured by the maxim Lex posterior derogate a priori31. However, I will argue that Lex Posterior captures another kind of situation. Indeed, it should be stressed out that there is no conflict between a derogating norm and the norm it derogates. If Lex Posterior is to play the role of a metarule allowing officials to solve a normative conflict that, it makes no sense to argue that it should be used when a norm derogates another. On the contrary, Lex Posterior, qua metarule, deals with situations where a norm is neither a derogating norm,

Mathieu Carpentier, Validity versus Applicability: a (Small) Dose of Scepticism, 122. On which see infra. See e. g. Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law, 2011, 157–158: “it seems obvious how the problem of change is a problem of norm-conflict, what is being argued is the reverse, namely that change in law presupposes the lex posterior maxim”.

29 30 31

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nor a compound of norms one of which being a derogating norm, yet it conflicts with a previous norm of the legal system32. From here, one of the easiest moves is to claim that Lex posterior itself is a derogating norm: whenever two norms conflicts, Lex posterior derogates the prior norm. This is the view Kelsen seems to espouse, both in “Derogation” and in the General Theory of Norms: derogation is “the function of (…) a positive legal norm; this norm [Lex Posterior] is not one of the two conflicting norms but a third norm which specifies that one of the two conflicting norms loses its validity, or that both norms lose their validity”33. This view leads to a theory of implied repeal. Due to norm A (Lex posterior), whenever norm B conflicts with posterior norm C, then B is not valid, and is thereby repealed whenever C becomes valid34. When we say that C impliedly repealed B, what we mean is that B is repealed by Lex posterior itself. Kelsen maintains that this a matter of positive law, not logical truth. He is right in that respect. However, this picture is not without problems in other respects. First, it happens that metarules conflict one with another. Whenever the posterior norm is more general than the earlier norm, there is a conflict between Lex posterior and Lex specialis35. For instance, let us suppose that, due to norm N1, vehicles have permission to enter the park between 6PM and 6AM, and they are forbidden to do so between 6AM and 6 PM. Then, let us say that a norm N2 is enacted to the effect that ambulances on duty are allowed in the park at all times and that a few months later a norm N3 is enacted to the effect that N1 is derogated and vehicles are banned from the park at all times. Does Lex posterior or Lex specialis apply? Which of these two metarules ought to prevail? It is plain that N3 derogates N1 insofar as N1 permits cars This I take to be Kelsenian orthodoxy. See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 108. See also on the same idea Giovanni Battista Ratti, Negation in Legislation, in: Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking, ed. Michał Araszkiewicz / Krzysztof Płeszka, 2015, 147, who accepts this picture but admits that “it is interesting to observe that, strictly speaking, no act of derogation is carried out here”. 33 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 125 (see also Hans Kelsen, Derogation, 273). 34 Kelsen would accept, I think, that this picture is oversimplified. Norm B may remain applicable however repealed by C if C is due for entry into force at a later date. But it does not affect the basic point made by Kelsen here. 35 In cases of total-partial conflicts Lex specialis seems particularly well suited to resolve the conflict, for instance by creating an exception. It may seem strange to claim that creating an exception derogates, that is repeals, the rule from which it is excepted; in other words, it seems strange to conceive Lex specialis as a derogating norm. However, it is plain that if Lex Specialis is a derogating norm, it is only insofar as it derogates the general norm pro tanto. What is derogated from the legal system is not the defeated norm, but som” logical consequence of that norm (on the idea of legal systems are deductively closed, insofar as they comprise not only valid norms but also the logical consequences thereof, see Carlos E. Alchourrón / Eugenio Bulygin, Normative Systems, 1971, 185; Carlos E. Alchourrón / Eugenio Bulygin, Análisis lógico y Derecho, 1991, 129, 163, 219…). In the context of a discussion of defeasibility and implicit exceptions, J. Ferrer Beltran and G. B. Ratti have recently made a case for this notion of exception as pro tanto derogation (see Jordi Ferrer Beltran, Giovanni Battista Ratti, Validity and Defeasibility in the Legal Domain, Law and Philosophy 29 (2010), 601–626). I will not have the time to study this theory in detail; suffice it to say that I intend to defend a contrarian view in the present paper. 32

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to enter the park between 6AM and 6PM. But does N3 “implicitly” (or “impliedly”) derogates N2 as well? (to reformulate: does Lex Posterior derogates N2 as well?) Or is it the case that N2 is still valid, and that N3 is “impliedly” derogated by Lex specialis insofar as it prohibits ambulances on duty? If both metarules are derogating norms36, this conflict of metarules entails that N2 and N3-insofar-as-it-covers-ambulances are both valid and invalid. This seems rather unfortunate. On the other side, the idea of a conflict of norms of applicability is much more appealing since it is common-sensical that a judge can be subject to two conflicting duties. Another defect with the view of metarules as derogating norms is that in such a conception metarules (that is, per Kelsen, mainly Lex Posterior) play the same role in the positive law conception of normative conflicts than in the logical conception, which Kelsen once espoused before rejecting it at a later stage, as proposition (2) above has shown. Under the logical conception, when two norms conflict, it is impossible that both be valid in the same time, so it must be the case that one of them ceases to be valid. So if Kelsen’s new stance is that although it is not a logical necessity, it is always the case that a normative conflict produces derogation as all legal system have a Lex posterior metarules as part of their positive law, one cannot see clearly what is gained in Kelsen’s new view and why it should be deemed ground-breaking. Once we distinguish between membership and applicability, we can understand how a norm may cease to operate due to some normative conflicts without being forced to draw the conclusion that it stops belonging to the normative system. A third defect is that such a conception of metarules in general, and Lex Posterior in particular, does not fit with some of our basic intuitions about what is commonly called – in UK law for instance – “implied repeal”, which, it turns out, is not about repeal at all. The very fact that judges use Lex Posterior shows that there is a conflict in the first place, and that the conflict has not been pre-emptively solved by an implicit repeal. If there is a conflict to be solved, then there is a conflict in the first place. Moreover, if there is a conflict between N1 and N2 (N2 having been enacted at a later time than N1) and if N2 is itself repealed by a subsequent repealing norm N3, then the earlier law N1 becomes applicable again, without any further act from the lawmaker37 (whereas in cases of derogation, it is commonly admitted that the derogation of a derogating norm does not reinstate the norm that was derogated in the first place). Interpreting that repealing norm, to wit N3, as not only abrogating N2, but also as somewhat implicitly “re-enacting” N1 seems quite a heavy price to pay. Therefore, Lex Posterior is best un-

I set aside the hypothesis that Lex specialis and Lex posterior do not discharge the same function. I will say more about this at the end of this paper. 37 As Jeffrey Goldsworthy (who writes about the UK doctrine of implied repeal) puts it : “The inconsistent provisions of the earlier statute are not, as it were, expunged from the statute book: if the later statute were to be formally repealed, the earlier one should be fully revived” ( Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates, 2010, 289). 36

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derstood as a norm of applicability directed at legal officials, and mainly law-applying organs. It directs officials not to apply the earlier of two conflicting norms. One last point. As Kelsen observed38, in some legal systems Lex Posterior coexists with Lex Prior, according to which the earlier of the two conflicting norms is repealed in case of a conflict. For instance, in the UK, the doctrine of “constitutional statutes” asserts that when a statute is of constitutional significance, the doctrine of implied repeal cannot be used to solve conflicts with later statutory norms. Instead, the courts ought to disapply posterior statutory norms which conflict with constitutional statutes insofar as they clash with them39. But it would make little sense to claim that the later norm is repealed in the process, unless we are ready to be committed to the idea of a norm’s nullity (rather than its annullability): the later norm would then never exist in the legal system, even though it was duly passed and enacted. This is not a conceptual impossibility, but it does sound counter-intuitive. Indeed, if the idea of Lex posterior as a derogating rule is attractive, it is because of the intuition I mentioned in the beginning of the present section: a future legislator must be able to change past legislation. As there is “explicit repeal”, there should be “implied” repeal when none of the conflicting norms are derogating norms. But as soon as we notice that Lex prior cannot be reasonably described as operating this way, we can have doubts about the derogating function of Lex posterior itself. B.

Meta-rules are not power-conferring norms regulating derogation

As we saw in (6) there is another option on the table: we can analyse metarules as rules regulating derogation. On such a conception, meta-rules are norms empowering a certain subset of officials to repeal whichever of the two conflicting norms is defeated. Let us examine this view in further detail. First, a basic distinction between law-creating and law-applying organs should be assumed40. Such an assumption will not be disputed here, however debatable it may be. There is no doubt that law-creating organs are empowered to derogate earlier norms. That’s part of the very notion of normative empowerment. But again, Lex Posterior, and metarules in general, do not apply to derogating norms enacted by the lawmaker

Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 126. See the opinion by Lord Justice Laws in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin). This doctrine has recently been espoused by the Supreme Court: see H v The Lord Advocate, [2012] UKSC 24; R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, [2014] UKSC 3. See also, for an audacious use of the notion of “constitutional statutes” (although it does not concern the implied repeal doctrine) R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5. 40 See on this distinction Paolo Sandro’s important new book, The Creation and Application of Law: A Neglected Distinction, 2020 (forthcoming). 38 39

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itself: it is agreed that law-creating organs are empowered to repeal norms from the legal system, because it is what lawmakers do. In the view discussed here, law-applying organs, which have to deal with normative conflicts, are empowered to repeal the norm which is defeated due to the application of a meta-rule, sometimes with retroactive effect. Thus understood, meta-rules empower judges and other officials to derogate, that is suppress the norm from the legal system. I am not sure such an interpretation is consistent with what Kelsen has to say about Lex posterior. However, as we shall see in the next section, the idea that one of the conflicting norms is resolved through derogation by a certain organ other than the lawmaker is essential in the way Kelsen deals with conflicts (or, according to Kelsen, the absence thereof) arising between lower- and higher-ranking norms. For now, suffice it to say that the claim that normative conflicts are necessarily solved through derogation of either conflicting norms by the law-applying organ does not square well with the common conception of law-application. Removing a norm from a legal system is not normally part of the job a law-applying organ. Such is rather the lawgiver’s task. The distinction between membership and applicability allows us to understand what happens when a judge resolves a normative conflict: meta-rules do not as much direct her to remove the norm from the legal system (which is a matter of membership) as they empower her to disapply the defeated norm. Of course, further power-conferring norms, which are not identical to metarules themselves, may empower the law-applying organ to resolve the conflict through derogation. But it is by no means a conceptual necessity. It is contingent on the existence of further norms within particular legal systems. The default option available to judges and other law-appliers is the use of metarules which are merely norms of applicability. Of course, as Kelsen claimed throughout his later writings, the existence of meta-rules themselves is a contingent matter, since it is thoroughly dependent on positive law. However, from a conceptual point of view, it makes much more sense to claim that metarules are norms of applicability rather than norms regulating derogation, given that they are to be used by law-appliers rather than by law-creators. Besides, although it is true that no metarule expresses a logical law, it is necessarily41 the case that a legal system should at least comprise one metarule, whatever it is. Judges and other officials are always bound to be faced with normative conflicts, and necessarily at least one metarule will emerge, if only by way of custom. Sometimes they will also be empowered to derogate norms, but that is quite distinct from applying Lex posterior or Lex specialis.

This may not be a logical or conceptual kind of necessity. A weaker conception of necessity (e. g. material, or natural, necessity) will suffice for the present purposes. 41

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IV.

And the Same Goes for Lex Superior

Until now, I have talked of metarules in the abstract, although my main example was Lex posterior. A special case seems to be Lex superior. On Kelsen’s view, Lex superior is not a meta-rule proper, it is rather a structural feature of every legal system. In other words, the reason why Kelsen never pays attention to Lex Superior is that he is still committed to the logical conception of it: Lex superior as a logical principle is precisely what Kelsen means by legal dynamics. In any legal system a norm is valid if and only if it has been created according to the procedure set out in a higher-ranking norm. In this fourth and last section I intend to claim that Kelsen should have bitten the positive-law bullet; he should have acknowledged that Lex superior is no more a logical principle of legal systems than Lex posterior ever was. In other terms, he should have realized that Lex superior is a meta-rule like any other, and that it has no bearing on the conflicting norms’ membership, but only on their applicability. A.

The Problem of Unlawful Law

The problem of unlawful law is as old as legal philosophy itself42. Hobbes famously pronounced that no law may be deemed unlawful since all law derives from the sovereign. Modern constitutionalism grappled with this problem, never to completely solve it. If law is to be the expression of the sovereign (even more so in case of a popular sovereign), it cannot be circumscribed by legal limits: the sovereign cannot bind itself. However, modern legal doctrine during after the French and American Revolutions evolved a series of conceptual tools43 which allowed to solve this paradox – or so it was claimed. The notion of unconstitutional statutes, and, more generally, of unlawful law, created a different kind of problem for Kelsen, and for other members of the Vienna School as well44. The paradox is well known: if a norm is valid, then its creator must ex hypoth-

See generally Paulo Sandro, Unlocking Legal Validity: Some Remarks on the Artificial Ontology of Law, in: Legal Validity and Soft Law, ed. Pauline Westerman / Jaap Hage / Stephan Kirste / Anne-Ruth Mackor, 2018, 112 ff. 43 Such as the pouvoir constituant vs constitué distinction by Sieyès (on which the best analysis remains Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 1928, 98 ff.). 44 See Christoph Kletzer, Kelsen’s Development of the Fehlerkalkül-Theory, 46 ff.; Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law, 189 ff.; Johannes Buchheim, Fehlerkalkül als Ermächtigung? Kelsens Theorie des Rechts letztverbindlicher Entscheidungen vor dem Hintergrund von H. L. A. Harts Rechtstheorie, Rechtstheorie 14 (2014), 59–78; Thomas Hochmann, Les théories de la “prise en compte des défauts” et de l’“habilitation alternative”, in: Un classique méconnu: Hans Kelsen, ed. Thomas Hochmann / Xavier Magnon / Regis Ponsard, 2019. 42

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esi have been empowered to take such a norm45. Therefore, if a norm is valid it cannot – as a matter of logical principle – conflict with higher-ranking norms, since its very conformity with higher-ranking norms grounds its legal validity. The logical conclusion is that whenever a conflict occurs between two norms whose rank in the normative hierarchy is different, the conflict is only apparent. This conclusion is paradoxical insofar as unconstitutional statutes do not look like they are logical incompatibilities. If they were, one could hardly understand why Kelsen would (rightly) be celebrated as the creator of European-style constitutional courts46. If unconstitutional norms were a logical impossibility, that is if unconstitutional norms were null ab initio, there would be no need for a special organ empowered to remove them from the legal system. Only if unconstitutional statutes are valid in the first place is such an organ necessary. And, of course, Kelsen rightly endorsed the idea that legal norms are not null, insofar as they are only annullable47. It is well known that Kelsen solved this paradox by developing a theory of alternative authorisations. The basic idea is that a Constitution does not only comprises norms empowering the legislature to legislate in such-and-such manner. The Constitution also contains an “alternative” clause which empowers the legislature to act as it sees fit. Whenever the legislature (for instance) passes a statute that conflicts with a constitutional norm, this statute must be deemed consistent with the alternative authorization, which is why it is valid. It is valid insofar as, though conflicting with a constitutional norm, it conforms with an alternative constitutional norm which empowers the legislature to pass this statute. This is a strange idea, after all: a constitution is meant to be a frugal menu, not an all-you-can-eat buffet. If the Constitution creates a special procedure for legislation, then it should implicitly preclude any other procedure from being lawfully followed by the legislature48. Expressio unius, exclusio alterius. The crucial point is that, according to Kelsen, when a constitutional court finds a statute to be unconstitutional and thereby repeals it, it does not entail that the statute

I gloss over some serious problems which I will not be able to address at length: for instance, there may be an asymmetry between on the one hand procedural constitutional norms which regulate the procedure the legislature must follow if it is to legislate and on the other hand substantive constitutional norms which regulate the content of legislation. For brevity’s sake, I will lump those (arguably) very different dimensions together and focus only on the scope of the constitutional empowerment. 46 A very interesting contribution on Kelsen’s role in the creation and early life of the Austrian Constitutional Court is Christian Neschwara, Kelsen als Verfassungsrichter, Hans Kelsen: Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20  Jahrhunderts, ed. Stanley L. Paulson / Michael Stolleis, 2005, 353 ff. 47 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 276 ff. It bears noticing that in his seminal 1929 article on constitutional adjudication, Kelsen was not very clear on that problem, since he claimed that nullity and annulability were equivalent, and equally plausible, ways of organizing a normative system (see Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit. 2. Mitbericht von Professor Dr. Hans Kelsen in Wien, Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 5 (1929), 44–49). He later repudiated this view. 48 Kelsen sometimes seems to think that the only thing a statute must have to be valid is to be published in the Official Gazette (see Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 46). 45

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts

was void ab initio, even though the court’s decision may be retroactive. What the court does is repealing a perfectly valid statute, just as a legislature would do, hence the famous theory of the “negative legislator”49. However, the court can only do so on the grounds of the statute’s incompatibility with the explicit constitutional norm, whereas the legislature may repeal an earlier statute for whatever reason it likes. But when no organ (other than the lawgiver) is empowered to “annul” the defective norm, then the norm remains fully valid (it fully belongs to the legal system). However, Kelsen, adhered until the end of his life to the notion of alternative authorization, and he did so well after his “sceptical turn”50. In the General Theory of Norms, he wrote: “[In the case] of an unconstitutional statute, it should be noted that according to positive law a so-called ‘unconstitutional’ statute can be valid, but its validity can be repealed by a special procedure provided for in the constitution, e. g. by the decision of a special court. In such a case, there is no conflict of norms. For if the norm in question is valid, it is also constitutional, that is, the constitution empowers the legislator to enact the statute in question but provides that it can be repealed by a special procedure”51. B.

The Possibility of Genuine Normative Conflicts Between Lowerand Higher-Ranking Norms

There are many problems with Kelsen’s view. The main one is that Kelsen refuses to allow that there are genuine normative conflicts between lower- and higher-ranking norms. I aim to show that such genuine conflict is possible, although the conflicting norms are equally valid. Such a hierarchical normative conflict is to be solved by metarules. Lex superior is one such metarule, and like any other, it is a norm of applicability. On such a view there is no need to have recourse to the baroque notion of an alternative authorization. The downside is that the very notion of legal dynamics is put into question; law is then seen as a system of non-hierarchical sources of validity. How can such a bizarre (but sound) theory be achieved? There are actually many ways to that, and although I have advocated for one specific theory somewhere else52, I

Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 54. For a very interesting reconstruction of Kelsen’s later views on the unlawful law problem, see Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law, 192–193. Kamerhofer argues that in his sceptical phase, Kelsen would have distinguished between a norm’s existence (which results from any kind of act of will) and its membership (which is a specific property of certain norms). However, such a distinction does not explain how un unlawful law may still belong to the legal system, which is the very problem addressed here. 51 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 125 (taken verbatim from Hans Kelsen, Derogation, 272). 52 Mathieu Carpentier, Sources and validity, in: Legal Validity and Soft Law, ed. Pauline Westerman / Jaap Hage / Stephan Kirste / Anne-Ruth Mackor, 2018, 84 ff. In the same vein, see Michael Giudice, Understanding the Nature of Law, 2015, 113 ff., where Giudice argues for what he calls a “contingent relation between invalidity and unconstitutionality”. 49 50

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will not rehearse my arguments here. Suffice it to say that such a theory must somehow assume that a norm’s membership within a legal system is to be divorced from its conformity with higher-ranking norms53. Under such an assumption, a norm may belong to a legal system although it conflicts with higher-ranking norms. In this outlook, higher-ranking norms are power-conferring norms – what Hart calls “rules of change”54. They regulate the way legal norms ought to be posited – or derogated – and to some extent their content. Whenever a norm conflicts with a higher-ranking norm, it does not mean that it does not belong to the legal system; it just means that the law-maker acted ultra vires. So, we do not need to abandon the idea of a hierarchical structure of the legal system; what we need to do is to divorce this legal structure from the notion of a dynamic production of legal validity – insofar as validity is understood as mere membership within a given legal system55. One way to achieve such a theory is to use the notion of a rule of recognition, conceived as a social fact. The rule of recognition picks out the legal system’s criteria of validity. In a positivist outlook, sources are such criteria. A norm is valid, i. e. it belongs to the legal system, if and only if it can be traced to a source of law, that is to a complex set of social facts. Whether it conflicts with higher-ranking norms is prima facie irrelevant as long as the basic facts for there to be a legal norm are present. Of course, such facts overlap to some extent with the “facts” that make up the procedure through which the norm ought to be produced according to higher ranking norms. When the facts in the overlap are missing, not only is the norm contrary to a higher-ranking norm, but there may be doubts whether the “norm” is a legal norm at all. For instance, if the French President enacts a “statute” which has not been passed in either House of Parliament, I am not sure such a statute would be at all treated as a legal norm. However, this example shows that two different questions are at stake. First, there is a demarcation problem: is this “thing” a law, i. e. a legal norm, or is it a non-law? If I sign a piece of paper where I “enact” a “law”, no one will dispute that this is not a law: the reason why it is not a law is not that I have violated some constitutional requirement or any other power-conferring norm; it is because the basic facts for there to be a law in the first place are missing. We could argue that the same goes in our example, even though the President is a legal authority. The second question is whether the president has acted ultra vires, i. e. whether he has been violating a higher-ranking norm56. These are two distinct questions. A careful (albeit different from mine) analysis of the distinction between conformity and validity can be found in: Régis Ponsard, Validité et conformité juridiques, in: Un classique méconnu: Hans Kelsen, ed. Thomas Hochmann / Xavier Magnon / Regis Ponsard, 2019. 54 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd ed.), 2012, 95 ff. 55 Of course this is debatable, and it is clear that Kelsen’s is a much more robust notion of validity. But as I made clear in Section II above, I am working with a weak notion of validity. 56 One objection could be that in our example, there is not a conflict in the sense elaborated in Section I above, since the conflict is not about the content of the norms at stake. This is correct; however I have hint53

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts

There are many other ways through which such a result may be achieved without divorcing membership from conformity. You can claim that validity is a compound of membership and conformity – that is you can save to some extent Kelsen’s dynamic theory of law – and, in the same time, accept that norms may be valid even though they conflict with higher-ranking norms. In other words, you do not have to agree with the previous paragraph in order to accept that genuine conflicts between equally valid, different ranking norms exist. For instance, some authors distinguish existence from validity57, in which existence is understood as some kind of presumptive or prima facie validity. The upshot is that any theory that allows for genuine normative conflicts between lower-and higher-ranking norms serves better the Kelsenian motto that “laws are not null but only annullable” than Kelsen’s own theory of alternative authorizations. Kelsen is right to argue that before it is repealed by a constitutional court, an unconstitutional statute is perfectly valid within the legal system. As we framed it in section III, Kelsen is right to claim that Lex superior is not a pro futuro derogating norm (even if he erroneously thought such was the case with Lex posterior) However, as we shall now see, he is wrong to argue that the conflict must be solved through derogation. C.

Lex Superior as A Norm of Applicability

We saw in Section III that metarules are not power-conferring norms regulating derogation. The same goes for Lex superior. Indeed, the reason why Kelsen was so reluctant to mention at all Lex superior as a metarule is not only that Kelsen refused to treat conflicts across the normative hierarchy as genuine conflicts; it is also that Kelsen thought that metarules (such as Lex posterior) function as derogating norms. And since there is no nullity, but only annullability, Lex superior cannot be such a derogating norm. However, Kelsen’s theory of alternative authorizations and of the role of constitutional courts may be reframed as a specific theory of Lex superior, understood as a power-conferring norm directing law-applying organs (or a subset thereof) to derogate an inferior norm whenever it conflicts with a higher-ranking norm. Kelsen seems to presuppose that the only way to solve the “conflict” (which according to him is only

ed that the classification sketched out in Section I was incomplete (it excludes what Lindahl and Reidhav call capacitative conflicts). However, I needed such an example because the overlapping facts I focused on are generally facts about procedure and not facts about content. The fact that a norm has such-and-such content has nothing to do with the source of that norm’s legal character (i. e. with its membership). However, the fact that a norm was passed in Parliament and enacted by the head of state is generally part of the reason why it is a legal, rather than a non-legal, norm. 57 In the recent literature, see Paolo Sandro, Unlocking Legal Validity: Some Remarks on the Artificial Ontology of Law, 114 ff.; see also Matthew Grellette, Legal Positivism and the Separation of Existence and Validity, Ratio Juris 23 (2010), 22 ff.

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apparent) is through derogation, i. e. repeal. But, as Kelsen was well aware58, it need not be so. Kelsen was right to insist that before the court rules, the statute is still valid. But there are many cases in which the statute remains valid after the court’s decision. Many courts (be they constitutional courts or supreme courts) are not empowered to repeal unconstitutional statutes. They are only empowered to disapply them or to enjoin lower courts from applying them59. This mundane observation points to another solution, which is predicated on the general tenets outlined in Section IV.B above. Once we understand that Lex superior is not about membership at all and that the reason why norms belong to a legal system is not because they are created within the scope of the powers conferred upon their creators, it makes it easier to treat Lex superior as a mere norm of applicability. In that respect, Lex superior is a metarule like any other. Such is actually the crux of Chief Justice John Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury v Madison (and Alexander Hamilton’s reasoning in the Federalist 78)60 Interestingly, when discussing unconstitutional statutes, Marshall does not use the common phrase “null and void”; he only says that such statutes are “void”. Moreover, Marshall insists that judicial review is part of the ordinary province of the judiciary, because an unconstitutional statute does not differ from ordinary normative conflicts. “If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty”61. Judges have always been faced with normative conflicts and they solve them by disapplying the defeating norm. The same goes for unconstitutional statutes, and for unlawful laws in general. Of course, in many legal systems, judges are specifically barred from applying Lex superior, at least in what regards unconstitutional statutes. Some legal systems have not adopted judicial review, be it American- or European-style. This shows that Lex superior as a norm of applicability is not part of their positive law, or that, in what regards legislation, Lex posterior defeats Lex superior. In other legal systems, further norms empower law-applying organs to repeal (i. e. derogate) the inferior norm, but, as we saw at the end of Section III, it is a purely contingent matter. Sometimes law-applying organs (or a subset of them, e. g. Constitutional courts) are further empowered to repeal unconstitutional statutes: such is the case in France, where the Constitutional See Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American Constitution, The Journal of Politics 4 (1942), 184 ff. 59 Mathieu Carpentier, Validity versus Applicability: a (Small) Dose of Scepticism, 115 ff. 60 Marbury v Madison, 5 U. S. 137 (1803). I am aware of the political overtones of Marshall’s opinion, which must be taken with a grain of salt. I should be clear that I do not use Marbury to prove my point, but rather to illustrate it by way of a very famous example. 61 Marbury v Madison, 5 U. S. 137, 177–178. 58

Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts

council is empowered to repeal an unconstitutional statute. But remember that European-style constitutional courts are specialised organs. They are law-applying organs insofar as they apply the Constitution, but they are not part (not even at the top) of the ordinary judiciary, and they are never called upon to apply statutes62. Hence, they are never really faced with genuine normative conflicts, insofar as they are not bound to apply one of the two conflicting norms in the first place. Only when a court must apply both the constitution and the unconstitutional statute is there a genuine normative conflict. When it is the case, the court will apply Lex superior and disapply the statute. Whether the court can also repeal the statute is a different question entirely. Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to vindicate some intuitions which are central to Kelsen’s last, sceptical move. In the same time, I have aimed to identify and solve some flaws in Kelsen’s account of normative conflicts and derogation by showing that it was not a radical enough move. Kelsen is right to claim that metarules (such as Lex posterior) are not logical necessities. They are part of a legal system’s positive law: even though they are not necessarily formally enacted, some metarules at least exist under a customary form. Kelsen is also right to argue that derogation is a specific normative function. But he is wrong to assume that derogation is a function of metarules. The link between normative conflict resolution and derogation is weaker than Kelsen is willing to accept. This is shown by the fact that metarules are most and foremost norms of applicability. This goes for Lex posterior, which is the only metarule actually discussed by Kelsen. But as I have shown, the same goes for Lex Superior. Deflating it as a logical principle gives room for a much more flexible view of hierarchical normative conflicts. It could be objected that the unified conception of metarules which has been advocated here is mistaken. Metarules, the objection goes, serve each a different function. Such is the view espoused by Riccardo Guastini63 and Giovanni Battista Ratti64. They claim that Lex superior is a criterion of invalidity ex tunc, whereas Lex posterior is a criterion of derogation ex nunc, and Lex specialis is a criterion of priority, in the sense that it derogates some logical consequences of the more general norm. It bears stressing out that this picture still rests on a strong link between normative conflict This is over-simplistic. I am mainly talking here about constitutional review; constitutional courts generally have other functions (such as adjudicating electoral disputes), where they will have to apply statutes as well as other sources of law. 63 Riccardo Guastini, Interpretare e argomentare, 2011, 113 ff. 64 Giovanni Battista Ratti, Normative Inconsistency and Logical Theories: A First Critique of Defeasibilism, in: Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence, ed. Michał Araszkiewicz / Jaromír Šavelka, 2013, 133; Giovanni Battista Ratti, Negation in Legislation, 147 62

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resolution and derogation. As such, there are many problems with it. For instance, the idea that Lex superior is a criterion of invalidity ex tunc can be understood two ways. On a “strong” reading, it means that in a hierarchical conflict, the defeated norm has never been valid in the first place: I refer the reader to Section IV.A and B above for my arguments against this idea. On a weak reading, it means that when courts invalidate an unconstitutional statute, such an invalidation has retroactive effect. But this claim is wrong as an empirical matter of fact. Moreover, I could argue that a unified conception of metarules as rules of applicability fits better our intuitions about how legal systems function and law-applying organs solve normative conflicts. It rests on a simple distinction between membership and applicability and does not need any further distinction or superfluous elaboration. As such it serves better than its rivals the requirement of Denkökonomie65 which is central to Kelsen’s jurisprudential method. One last thought. The reader may ask: what is the philosophical relevance of all this? Why analyse normative conflicts in the first place? Pierluigi Chiassoni once quipped that there are two traditions in modern jurisprudence: one the one side, there are the watch makers “who deal with a clumsy conceptual machinery laid down by tradition and embodied in lawyers’ common sense”; on the other side, there are the philosophers who address “the real, big, theoretical (and practical) issues at stake”66. The present paper is definitely an essay in watch-making. However normative conflicts have philosophical relevance as well. They are ubiquitous in practical reasoning, and moral philosophy has been debating for centuries the question whether there are genuine moral normative conflicts. Law and legal reasoning are the product of human reason; the way they deal with normative conflicts is instrumental for any study of law’s inner (ir)rationality. Mathieu Carpentier

Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, 2, rue du Doyen-Gabriel-Marty, 31042 Toulouse cedex 9, FRANCE, [email protected]

Kelsen borrowed this methodological principle from Mach via Pitamic. Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze, 1922, xv 66 Pierluigi Chiassoni, A Tale from Two Traditions: Civil Law, Common Law, and Legal Gaps in Analisi e diritto 2006, ed. Paolo Comanducci and Riccardo Guastini, 2007, 49. Chiassoni uses the distinction between the watchmaker and the philosopher in the course of an analysis of the literature on legal gaps, but it can be generalized to cover the topic of normative conflicts as well. However, Chiassoni identifies these two traditions with the civil law / common law divide. This seems to me to be over-simplistic. Joseph Raz for instance is certainly both a watchmaker (see for instance his Concept of a Legal System) and a philosopher in that respect; so is Robert Alexy. 65

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation oder als weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm? MATHEUS PELEGRINO DA SILVA

Suspension as a Kind of Derogation or as Another Function of the Legal Norm? Abstract: According to Robert Walter the suspension should be understood as a kind of

derogation and not as a different normative function. In the article it is highlighted that the consequences of the suspension of a norm are different from the consequences of the derogation of a norm, since a derogated norm must be considered as completely invalid, while the suspended norm may eventually continue to be valid. In order to support the conception of the suspension as a normative function and not as a kind of derogation one of Merkl’s ideas is employed, according to which the derogation of a norm requires an empowerment for such a legal act, so that it can be analogically argued that the possibility of suspending a norm presupposes an empowerment to suspend norms. Keywords: Derogation, Hans Kelsen, Invalidation, Suspension, Theory of the hierarchical

structure, Robert Walter Schlagworte: Derogation, Hans Kelsen, Invalidation, Suspension, Stufenbaulehre, Robert

Walter

I.

Einleitung

Nach Adolf Julius Merkl sind Rechtsnormen in der Regel unveränderlich, und ihre Veränderlichkeit muss positiv bestimmt werden, d. h. jede Änderung ist von einer Ermächtigung zur Derogation abhängig.1 Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist, Robert Walters „Weyr sieht den Verfassungssatz, der die Unabänderlichkeit postuliert, für abänderbar an – sein logisches Prinzip kann ihm selbst durch einen Rechtssatz für den bestimmten Fall nicht entkräftet werden –, ich postuliere dagegen, um zur Erkenntnis der Abänderlichkeit zu gelangen, angesichts der über ihre Abänderbarkeit schweigenden Verfassung einen Rechtssatz, der Abänderbarkeit statuiert; denn die Unabänder1

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Auffassung von der Suspension als einer besonderen Art von Derogation anhand von drei Fragen darzustellen und zu zeigen, dass anders als von Walter behauptet die Suspension als eine weitere Funktion der Rechtsnormen zu identifizieren ist. Um Klarheit über die Natur der Suspension zu gewinnen, wird auch erläutert, aus welchen Gründen die Invalidation, im Gegensatz zu Suspension und Derogation, keine Normfunktion ist. Schließlich wird die Relevanz der Unterscheidung zwischen Derogation und Suspension für die Diskussion über die Möglichkeit eines Stufenbaues nach der derogatorischen Kraft aufgezeigt. II.

Die Suspension als eine eigene Normfunktion

In „Der Aufbau der Rechtsordnung“ hat Robert Walter die Suspension auf folgende Weise beschrieben: Eine gewisse […] derogatorische Kraft käme den Anordnungen in einer bestimmten Rechtsform zu, wenn sie nach den Bestimmungen des positiven Rechts zwar die Geltung einer Anordnung beeinträchtigen, diese jedoch nicht vollständig vernichten können, da sie wegen dieser eintretenden Derogationswirkung fehlerhaft und deshalb zu beseitigen sind, wenn durch die Beseitigung die in ihrer Geltung beschränkte Anordnung wieder uneingeschränkte Rechtswirkung erlangt.2

Walter präsentiert die Suspension als eine Wirkung der Erzeugung einer Norm, die angesichts der direkten Ermächtigung nicht hätte erfolgen dürfen. Das heißt: Wäre der Erzeuger der Norm ermächtigt, diese Norm zu erzeugen, hätte er eine derogatorische Norm erzeugt. Weil er dazu nicht ermächtigt ist, es ihm wegen einer alternativen Ermächtigung aber rechtlich möglich ist, diese Norm zu erzeugen, wird die von ihm erzeugte Norm eine andere Norm suspendieren. Im Folgenden werden nun einige Aspekte von Walters Auffassung von der Suspension mittels dreier Fragen behandelt, um deren Unvollkommenheit aufzuzeigen. 1. Frage: Ist die Suspension eine notwendige Wirkung der gültigen Erzeugung einer Norm, die das Ziel hat, eine andere Norm zu derogieren, aber nach den positivrechtlichen Bestimmungen keine derogatorische Kraft in Bezug auf diese andere Norm hat, lichkeit ist mir normlogisches Prinzip. Ist mir aber die Abänderung einer über ihre Abänderungsmöglichkeit schweigenden Verfassung eine Denkunmöglichkeit, so wird mir bei verfassungsmäßiger Statuierung der Abänderbarkeit (der Verfassung und gleich ihr anderer Gesetze) die Unabänderbarkeit im einzelnen Fall zur Normwidrigkeit, welche, um diesen Charakter zu verlieren, die Formen der Verfassungsänderung annehmen muß.“ Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Unveränderlichkeit von Gesetzen – ein normlogisches Prinzip, Gesammelte Schriften (hg. von Dorothea Mayer-Maly / Herbert Schambeck / Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann), Bd. I/1, 1993, 165. 2 Robert Walter, Der Aufbau der Rechtsordnung, 1964, 58.

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation oder als weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm?

sodass die Autorität, die diese Norm erzeugt, keine Ermächtigung erhalten hat, diese Norm zu derogieren? Zwei der Probleme bezüglich Walters Auffassung der Suspension sind einmal die Idee, dass die suspendierende Norm irgendwann notwendigerweise als rechtswidrig anerkannt werden wird,3 und zum anderen die Ansicht, dass die suspendierende Norm die Geltung der schon gültigen Norm notwendigerweise beeinflusst. In einem konkreten Fall kann man von „Suspension“ sprechen, wenn zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sind: 1. Eine mit derogierender Absicht erzeugte Norm4 wird definitiv beseitigt; in dieser Situation kann man behaupten, dass die vermeintlich derogierte Norm als gültig betrachtet werden kann. 2. Die Geltung dieser zweiten Norm wird für den Zeitraum zwischen der Erzeugung der mit derogierender Absicht erzeugten Norm und der Erklärung, dass diese Norm ungültig ist, als provisorisch aufgehoben betrachtet. Diesfalls kann auch eine generelle positivrechtliche Bestimmung mittels über die Alternativermächtigung erzeugte Normen existieren,5 nach der die in dieser Situation zu derogierende Norm als provisorisch ungültig betrachtet werden soll.6 Die Suspension als Normfunktion muss zuerst (mittels genereller oder individueller Normen) positiviert werden, bevor es möglich ist, sie in einer Entscheidung als konkretisiert betrachten zu können. Wenn das nicht passiert, dann ist die obige Frage zu verneinen, und beide Normen sind gültig und stehen (möglicherweise)7 miteinander in Konflikt.8 Dies entspricht Merkls Auffassung, dass die Derogation einer Norm Anders ist der Fall bei Lippold, der die Möglichkeit der Nicht-Anerkennung der rechtswidrigen Norm problematisiert. Vgl. Rainer Lippold, Recht und Ordnung Statik und Dynamik der Rechtsordnung, 2000, 417. 4 Diese Absicht kann auf zwei unterschiedliche Arten und Weisen erfolgen: Es kann sein, dass die zweite Norm nur das Ziel hat, eine andere Norm zu derogieren, oder dass die zweite Norm denselben Tatbestand der anderen Norm mit einer von dieser Norm abweichenden Folge verbindet, sodass sie mittelbar die erste Norm derogiert. 5 Bezüglich der österreichischen Rechtsordnung ist das der Fall. Vgl. Robert Walter, Der Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen Kraft im österreichischen Recht, Österreichische Juristenzeitung (1965), 171. 6 Auch wenn keine generelle positivrechtliche Suspensionsbestimmung existiert, kann die in einer Entscheidung angewendete Suspension trotzdem dank Alternativermächtigung als gültig betrachtet werden. Zur Bedeutung der alternativen Ermächtigung, siehe Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2. Aufl., 2017, 472– 487. 7 Sie sind im Konflikt miteinander, wenn eine Norm etwas vorschreibt und die andere Norm etwas anderes vorschreibt, aber nicht wenn die zweite Norm das einzige Ziel hat, die erste Norm zu derogieren. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, 1979, 86. 8 Hier ist zu berücksichtigen, dass Walter möglicherweise Folgendes angenommen hat: Weil es in einigen Fällen der Normerzeugung mittels Alternativermächtigung passieren kann, dass aufgrund der Erzeugung dieser Norm ein Normenkonflikt entsteht, und solange vorausgesetzt war (sowie Walter früher vertreten hat), dass kein Normenkonflikt entstehen kann, dann ist anzuerkennen, dass es für das Vermeiden von Normenkonflikten notwendig ist, auf irgendeine Weise – beispielsweise durch Postulierung eines suspensiven Effektes – diese Normenkonflikte zu vermeiden. Es ist nicht möglich zu bestimmen, aus welchem Grund Walter trotz des (durch Merkls Auffassung inspirierten) Einwands, dass die Ausübung einer Funktion von der Ermächtigung für die Ausübung dieser Funktion abhängig ist, die Suspension und den suspensiven Effekt als notwendige Eigenschaft einer Rechtsordnung identifiziert hat. Eine mögliche Erklärung ergibt sich 3

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von einer Ermächtigung zur Derogation abhängt. Anhand einer analogen Betrachtung kann gesagt werden, dass eine Norm als suspendiert betrachtet werden kann, wenn eine Autorität in der einen oder anderen Form die Ermächtigung bekommen hat, diese Norm zu suspendieren. Einerseits könnte die Suspension in einer Rechtsordnung als Normfunktion vorbestimmt werden, sodass in solchen Fällen suspensive Normen existieren würden, die nicht wegen einer „fehlerhaften“ Normerzeugung zustande gekommen sind, sondern dank einer normgemäßen Normerzeugung – d. h. die Rechtsordnung würde bestimmen, dass durch Erfüllung bestimmter Bedingungen eine Autorität ermächtigt (direkte Ermächtigung) war, suspensive Normen zu erzeugen. Ist das nicht der Fall, dann kann die Suspension in individuellen Rechtsnormen konkretisiert werden und das auch, wenn die Autoritäten, die diese Normen erzeugen, keine generelle Ermächtigung bekommen haben, um Normen als suspendiert betrachten zu können. Existiert keine generelle positivrechtliche Bestimmung über die Suspension (keine Ermächtigung zur Normsuspension), dann kann (muss aber nicht) die in einer Entscheidung angewendete Suspension dank einer Alternativermächtigung als gültig betrachtet werden. 2. Frage: Kann die Suspension als eine Art Derogation betrachtet werden, oder ist sie (neben den von Hans Kelsen identifizierten Normfunktionen)9 eine weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm? Walter präsentiert uns die Suspension als eine Art von Derogation, die eine unvollständige „Vernichtung“10 einer Norm bewirkt.11 Aber abgesehen von einem gleich zu behandelnden Aspekt, kann die Suspension nicht als eine Art von Derogation betrachtet werden, da ein wesentliches Merkmal der Derogation die Tatsache ist, dass die derogierte Norm nicht mehr gültig werden kann, da sie (vollkommen) vernichtet

aus Walters Auffassung hinsichtlich der Existenz von Normkonflikten, denn wie Kammerhofer bemerkt, habe Walter erst ab 1966 anerkannt, dass es Normenkonflikte geben könne: „Entgegen Walters Aussagen im 1955 erschienenen ‚Widerspruch‘ [gemeint ist Robert Walters Schrift „Über den Widerspruch von Rechtsvorschriften“], wo die von Kelsen definierte Situation wohl in die Kategorie der faktischen Unvereinbarkeit der Rechtsfolgen gefallen wäre, liegt der Normkonflikt jetzt [in Walters Artikel „Recht und Logik“ aus dem Jahr 1966] in der ‚Situation, wonach a (eine Rechtsfolge) nach der einen Norm sein soll, wogegen nach der anderen Norm diese Rechtsfolge nicht – somit: non a – sein soll.‘“. Jörg Kammerhofer, Robert Walter, die Normkonflikte und der zweite Stufenbau des Rechts, in: Gedenkschrift Robert Walter, hg. von Clemens Jabloner u. a., 2013, 243. 9 Diese sind: Ermächtigen, Erlauben, Gebieten / Verbieten sowie Derogieren. Vgl. Kelsen (Fn. 7), 3. 10 Walter (Fn. 2), 57. 11 Früher hatte Walter die Ansicht vertreten, dass beide Normen als gültig zu betrachten wären, aber auch danach hat er die Situation nicht als Konflikt betrachtet, da für ihn eine der Normen zurückgedrängt war. Da in diesem spezifischen Fall Walters Schrift die Problematik in Bezug auf die österreichische Rechtsordnung betrachtet, sind seine Bemerkungen im Hinblick auf diese Rechtsordnung begründet. Vgl. Robert Walter, Können Verordnungen Gesetzen derogieren?, Österreichische Juristenzeitung (1961), 3 und 7.

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation oder als weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm?

ist.12 Es kann von Teilvernichtung (und Teilderogation) gesprochen werden, da eine derogatorische Norm ein Gesetz (als Sammlung von Normen)13 zum Teil derogieren kann, die Idee einer provisorischen Vernichtung aber ist als contradictio in adiecto zu identifizieren.14 Der Wesensunterschied zwischen Derogation und Suspension zeigt sich in folgender Überlegung: Ist die Beeinträchtigung der Geltung einer Norm das Kriterium für die Klassifizierung, dann können Derogation und Suspension nebeneinandergestellt werden. Auch unter diesem Kriterium kann die Suspension nicht als eine Art Derogation betrachtet werden. Ist die Suspension in der einen oder anderen Weise in der Rechtsordnung positiviert, dann hebt die suspensive Norm die Geltung von Rechtsnormen provisorisch auf. Diese Funktion kann die Derogation nicht ausüben, denn es existiert keine provisorische Derogation einer Norm. Deshalb ist die Suspension als eine weitere Funktion der Rechtsnormen und nicht als eine Art von Derogation zu identifizieren. Die Suspension wie die Derogation können aber als zwei Arten von „Beseitigung“15 oder als zwei Arten von Geltungsvernichtung von Normen einer Rechtsordnung betrachtet werden. Wegen der Erzeugung einer suspensiven Norm ist die Geltung einer anderen Norm in einer änderbaren Weise beeinträchtigt, sodass, solange die suspensive Norm gültig bleibt, die suspendierte Norm als eine ungültige Norm zu betrachten ist. Sie ist also mit Vorbehalt aus dem Bereich der gültigen Normen ausgeschlossen. Wegen der Erzeugung einer derogatorischen Norm ist die Geltung einer anderen Norm in einer unveränderbaren Weise beeinträchtigt mit der Folge, dass die derogierte Norm immer und ohne Vorbehalt aus dem Bereich der gültigen Normen ausgeschlossen ist. Die Suspension unterscheidet sich von der Derogation, denn jene ermöglicht die Beschreibung einer Eigenschaft der gültigen Normen einer Rechtsordnung, die durch die Anwendung des Begriffes „Derogation“ nicht erfolgen kann. Entweder sind Normen derogiert und deswegen für immer als ungültig zu betrachten, oder sie sind

„The attempt to repeal the validity of a norm which has derogated the validity of another norm in regard to this norm, by means of a derogating norm, would be without effect. The norm whose validity was terminated by the first derogating norm would not regain its validity by the second derogating norm.“ Hans Kelsen, Derogation, in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, hg. von Hans R. Klecatsky / René Marcic / Herbert Schambeck, Bd. 2, 2010, 1170. 13 Walter benennt die nach seiner Auffassung existierenden zwei Arten von Derogation folgendermaßen: “Derogation als vollständige Vernichtung“ und „Derogation als beschränkte Beseitigung“. Walter (Fn. 2), 57 f. 14 In einer früheren Schrift hat Walter behauptet: „Anders als im Bereich der Natur kann die Vernichtung wieder vernichtet, das Gesetz rückwirkend wieder zum Leben erweckt werden.” Walter (Fn. 11), 3, Fn. 28. Walters Argumentation kann nicht gefolgt werden, da keine überzeugenden Gründe angeführt werden, warum man eine neue Bedeutung des Wortes „vernichten“ schaffen sollte, nur um die Suspension als eine Art Derogation klassifizieren zu können. 15 Walter (Fn. 2), 58. 12

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nicht derogiert und deswegen als gültig zu betrachten. Die Eigenschaft einer gültigen Norm, dass sie unter bestimmten Bedingungen als ungültig betrachtet werden soll, diese schwebende Natur der Geltung dieser Norm, ist eine Besonderheit, die durch die Anwendung des Begriffes „Derogation“ nicht ausgedrückt werden kann. Aus diesem Grund ist die Suspension eine Funktion der Normen, die nicht als eine Art von Derogation betrachtet werden kann, denn der Begriff „Suspension“ drückt eine Situation aus, die durch die Anwendung des Begriffes „Derogation“ nicht ausdrückbar ist. 3.  Frage: Sind angesichts der Beschreibung selbständiger Normen (für die Rechtsordnung) die Wirkungen der Erzeugung einer suspensiven Norm dieselben wie die Wirkungen der Erzeugung einer derogatorischen Norm? Ausgehend von Kelsens Definition einer unselbständigen Norm ist es möglich, die selbständige Norm zu definieren. Nach Kelsen ist eine Norm unselbständig, denn „sie bestimmt nur […] die Bedingung, an die die zweite [Norm] die Sanktion knüpft“.16 Die Norm ist als selbständige Norm zu verstehen, die die Bedingungen einer Sanktion oder eines Zwangsaktes und die bedingte Sanktion oder den bedingten Zwangsakt miteinander verknüpft. Ist die Suspension in einer Rechtsordnung für den Fall der Rechtserzeugung dank der Alternativermächtigung tatsächlich positiviert, kann gefragt werden, ob eine suspensive Norm mit einem bestimmten Inhalt genau wie eine derogatorische Norm mit demselben Inhalt eine selbständige Norm ändern wird. Sind in diesem Zusammenhang die Wirkungen der Erzeugung einer suspensiven Norm dieselben wie die Wirkungen der Erzeugung einer derogatorischen Norm, dann kann die Suspension in dieser Hinsicht dennoch als eine Art von Derogation betrachtet werden, d. h. als eine Art von Derogation, die eine provisorische Wirkung hat. Diese Situation involviert zwei mögliche Antworten, von denen eine Walters Auffassung der Suspension als eine Art von Derogation in einem relativen und qualifizierten Sinn bestätigen wird. Ist beispielsweise wegen der Erzeugung einer Erlaubnisnorm eine Gebotsnorm suspendiert, dann wird eine selbständige Norm, die früher diese Gebotsnorm umfasste, jetzt und in einem ganz bestimmten Sinne einen anderen Inhalt haben. Dank der Erzeugung dieser suspensiven Norm wird die Gebotsnorm jetzt, in diesem Moment, nicht gültig sein. In diesem Sinne und nach einer Perspektive, die nur einen bestimmten Zeitpunkt bei der Beschreibung der selbständigen Normen berücksichtigt, wird eine suspensive Norm eine selbständige Norm so ändern, wie eine derogatorische Norm mit demselben Inhalt diese selbständige Norm ändern würde. Unter diesem Aspekt ist es in der Tat so, dass die Suspension als eine Art von Derogation betrachtet werden kann, sodass angesichts eines (vordefinierten) Zeitpunkts über die „Beseitigung“ einer Norm gesprochen werden kann.

16

Kelsen (Fn. 6), 112.

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation oder als weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm?

Es gibt aber auch einen anderen Aspekt, der für den Fall der analysierten selbständigen Norm zu beachten ist. Hat beispielsweise eine Erlaubnisnorm eine Gebotsnorm derogiert, dann wird die selbständige Norm diesen neuen Inhalt ohne Vorbehalt ausdrücken, sodass von nun an ein bestimmter Tatbestand erlaubt ist. Hat anderseits eine Erlaubnisnorm eine Gebotsnorm suspendiert, dann wird die selbständige Norm diesen neuen Inhalt mit einem Vorbehalt ausdrücken, sodass von nun an und solange die suspensive Norm gültig ist, ein bestimmter Tatbestand erlaubt ist. Somit kann die Suspension nicht als eine Art von Derogation betrachtet werden, denn sofern die Beschreibung der selbständigen Norm nicht nur die aktuellen Effekte der Erzeugung einer Norm beachtet und ausdrückt, sondern auch mögliche zukünftige Wirkungen, wird die Suspension einer Norm etwas anderes bedeuten als die Derogation dieser Norm. Weil die Derogation demnach mit dem zeitlichen Element „nie mehr“ verbunden ist, während die Suspension ein anderes zeitliches Element ausdrückt, das Element der Änderbarkeit, der Vorläufigkeit, müssen Derogation und Suspension als unterschiedliche Normfunktionen betrachtet werden. III.

Gründe für den Ausschluss der Invalidation als weitere Normfunktion

Die Behandlung der Derogation und der Suspension als zwei Arten von Exklusion von Normen aus dem Bereich der gültigen Normen einer Rechtsordnung macht auch deutlich, warum die Invalidation nicht als Normfunktion zu verstehen ist. Walter präsentiert als eine Situation von Invalidation den Fall, in dem „eine (neuere) Verfassungsregelung nur zur Erzeugung von Normen bestimmter Art ermächtigt, jedoch – auf Grund bisheriger Verfassung – Gesetzesnormen bestehen, die nach der neueren Verfassungsregelung nicht erzeugt werden dürfen“.17 Bei der Invalidation einer Norm geht es um die Situation, in der eine schon gültige Norm angesichts einer späteren Änderung der Rechtsordnung nicht mehr so erzeugt werden kann, wie sie vorher erzeugt wurde. Wäre diese schon erzeugte Norm nach der Änderung der Rechtsordnung erzeugt worden, könnte sie nicht als eine rechtmäßige Norm betrachtet werden. Weil diese Norm aber vor dieser Änderung erzeugt wurde, entsteht die Frage, wie diese Norm nun betrachtet werden muss, ob sie gültig bleibt oder nicht. Ohne Bezug auf eine konkrete Rechtsordnung ist es nicht möglich, eine Lösung für dieses Problem anzubieten, sondern es können nur drei (grundsätzliche) Alternativen präsentiert werden. Aufgrund der Änderung der Bedingungen für die Erzeugung einer Norm einer bestimmten Art (mit einer bestimmten Rechtserzeugungsform) kann entweder behauptet werden, dass die frühere Norm (1. Alternative) als eine invalidierte Robert Walter, Derogation oder Invalidation, in: Hundert Jahre Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, fünfzig Jahre Verfassungsgerichtshof in Österreich, hg. von Felix Ermacora / Hans R. Klecatsky / René Marcic, 1968, 218. 17

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Norm zu verstehen ist, d. h. als eine gültige, aber normwidrige Norm interpretiert werden muss; oder (2. Alternative) dass die Frage über die normgemäße oder normwidrige Natur der früheren (und vielleicht zu invalidierenden) Norm offen bleibt; oder (3. Alternative) dass die frühere Norm als gültig und normgemäß verstanden wird mit dem Argument, dass der Normerzeuger, obwohl er von dieser Norm wusste (oder wissen konnte), sie hätte derogieren können, dies aber nicht getan hat. Unabhängig von der Alternative, die gewählt wird, muss die (vielleicht) invalidierte Norm als eine gültige Norm verstanden werden, denn es gibt keinen rechtlichen Grund, diese Norm als ungültig zu betrachten. Weil die Invalidation einer Norm keine Änderung in Bezug auf die Beschreibung der gültigen Normen einer Rechtsordnung verursacht und diese Art von Änderung von derogatorischen und suspensiven Normen in der einen oder anderen Weise provoziert wird (d. h. durch die Behauptung der provisorischen oder definitiven Beseitigung einer Norm), ist die Invalidation, anders als die Derogation und die Suspension, keine Art von Normfunktion. IV.

Der Unterschied zwischen Derogation und Suspension und die Möglichkeit eines Stufenbaues nach der derogatorischen Kraft

Walter hat in einer sehr deutlichen Weise dargestellt,18 dass nach Merkls Auffassung die Verhältnisse zwischen den Normen einer Rechtsordnung nicht unbedingt als eine Stufenordnung, als ein hierarchischer Stufenbau (der Stufenbau nach der rechtlichen Bedingtheit) repräsentiert werden sollten, sondern als zwei unterschiedlich konfigurierte Stufenbauten (der Stufenbau nach der rechtlichen Bedingtheit und der Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen Kraft).19 Die Behauptung der Existenz eines Stufenbaues nach der derogatorischen Kraft beinhaltet die Idee, dass wegen positivrechtlicher Bestimmungen Normen mit einer bestimmten Rechtserzeugungsform20 Normen einer

Walter (Fn. 2), 53–66. Wie Merkl hervorgehoben hat, sind hierarchische Verhältnisse zwischen Rechtserzeugungsformen (Arten von Normen) nicht eine notwendige Eigenschaft aller Rechtsordnungen, sondern von konkreten positivrechtlichen Bestimmungen abhängig. „Der rechtliche Stufenbau ist nicht etwas Rechtsimmanentes, das die Rechtssetzung hinnehmen müßte, sondern ist selbst ein willkürliches, verwandlungsfähiges Produkt der Rechtsordnung.“ Adolf Julius Merkl, Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues, Gesammelte Schriften (hg. von Dorothea Mayer-Maly / Herbert Schambeck / Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann), Bd. I/1, 1993, 482. 20 Kelsen hat den Begriff „Rechtserzeugungsformen“ verwendet, während bei Merkl der Begriff „Rechtssatzformen“ zu finden ist. Siehe Kelsen (Fn. 6), 499; Merkl (Fn. 19), 437. Hinter diesen Begriffen steht die Idee, dass mehrere Arten von Normen erzeugt werden können, die wegen der Bedingungen, die von der Rechtsordnung gesetzt sind, voneinander hierarchisch unterschieden werden können. Merkl präsentiert diese Idee mit den folgenden Worten: „Den Hauptanteil an der Differenzierung der Rechtssatzformen hat indes die Komplikation der Rechtserzeugung durch das je nach den verschiedenen Staats- und Regierungsformen wechselnde Zusammenwirken verschiedener Organe, z. B. verschiedener Faktoren der Gesetzge18 19

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation oder als weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm?

anderen Rechtserzeugungsform derogieren können oder nicht. Sind in einer Rechtsordnung Bestimmungen dieser Natur zu finden, dann kann behauptet werden, dass in dieser Rechtsordnung die Normen von unterschiedlichen Rechtserzeugungsformen in hierarchischen Verhältnissen miteinander stehen.21 Im Rahmen der Darstellung der Existenz eines Stufenbaues nach derogatorischer Kraft kann der Fall analysiert werden, in der eine Norm mittels Alternativermächtigung erzeugt wurde, die im Konflikt mit einer anderen Norm steht. Es sind grundsätzlich zwei Möglichkeiten denkbar. Erstens: Enthält die Rechtsordnung eine generelle Normierung für diese Fälle von Normkonflikten und gleichzeitig eine oder mehrere Bestimmungen über die suspensive Kraft von Normen mit unterschiedlichen Rechtserzeugungsformen, dann kann behauptet werden, dass eine vollständige Darstellung der Rechtsordnung auch die Anwendung einer Stufung nach der suspensiven Kraft erfordert, mit der Konsequenz, dass es auch einen Stufenbau nach der suspensiven Kraft geben kann. Darüber hinaus ist zu beachten, dass der Stufenbau nach der suspensiven Kraft eventuell anders dargestellt werden muss als der Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen Kraft, sodass beispielsweise Verordnungen Gesetze suspendieren können, aber keine derogatorische Kraft über Gesetze haben. Zweitens: Enthält die Rechtsordnung keine generelle Normierung für die Fälle von Normenkonflikten, die das Ergebnis der Ausübung einer alternativen Ermächtigung konstituieren, und ist auch nicht der Fall, dass durch Gewohnheitsrecht22 eine allgebung an der Staatswillensbildung. Je komplizierter die Staatswillensbildung, desto mannigfaltiger die in der Rechtserzeugung benutzten Rechtssatzformen.“ Merkl (Fn. 19), 438 f. 21 Dazu schreibt Merkl: „Ein Rechtssatz, der gegenüber einem anderen Rechtssatz derogierende Kraft hat, während dieser andere Rechtssatz ihm gegenüber keine derogierende Kraft hat, ist aus diesem Grunde von höherem Rang und der derogierbare Rechtssatz im Vergleich mit dem derogierenden Rechtssatz von niedrigerem Rang. Wenn dagegen – zum Unterschied von den besprochenen Fällen bloß einseitiger Derogierbarkeit – zwei Rechtssätze gegenseitig derogierbar sind, so ist dies Erkenntnisgrund ihres gleichen Ranges. Z. B. ist das Verfassungsgesetz von höherem Rang als das einfache Gesetz, das Grundsatzgesetz von höherem Rang als das Ausführungsgesetz, das einfache Gesetz wiederum und im besonderen das Ausführungsgesetz von höherem Rang als die Vollzugsverordnung, das Gesetz und die Vollzugsverordnung von höherem Rang als das Gerichtsurteil und der individuelle Verwaltungsakt, wenn und weil der jeweils zuerst genannte dem jeweils an zweiter Stelle genannten Akte derogieren kann, jedoch nicht umgekehrt. Und ein Bundes- und Landesgesetz oder ein einfaches Gesetz und eine sogenannte selbständige Verordnung sind darum als rangsgleich zu erkennen, weil sie einander gegenseitig derogieren können.“ Merkl (Fn. 19), 468 f. 22 Kelsens Auffassung bezüglich des Gewohnheitsrechts ist ambivalent. An einer Stelle der Reine[n] Rechtslehre betont er, dass das Gewohnheitsrecht nur als Rechtsquelle anerkannt werden kann, wenn durch eine oder mehrere positivrechtlichen Normierungen das Gewohnheitsrecht als Rechtsquelle gesetzt wird. „Als objektiv gültige Norm kann aber der subjektive Sinn der die Gewohnheit konstituierenden Akte nur gedeutet werden, wenn die Gewohnheit durch eine höhere Norm als normerzeugender Tatbestand eingesetzt wird.“ Kelsen (Fn. 6), 34 f. Andererseits ist an einer anderen Stelle der Reine[n] Rechtslehre eine Aussage zu finden, nach der das Gewohnheitsrecht eventuell auch ohne positivrechtliche Bestimmung als Rechtsquelle betrachtet werden darf: „Wenn Gerichte als ermächtigt angesehen werden, auch Gewohnheitsrecht anzuwenden, so müssen sie hiezu – ganz so wie zur Anwendung der Gesetze – durch die Verfassung ermächtigt sein; das heißt: die Verfassung muß die Gewohnheit, die durch das habituelle Verhalten der der staatlichen

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meine Lösung identifiziert werden kann, dann müssen beide in Konflikt stehenden Normen als gültig betrachtet werden. Doch im Gegensatz zu Lippolds Behauptung23 wird diese Situation keine Folge in Bezug auf die Vertretung der Existenz einer Stufung nach der derogatorischen Kraft verursachen, denn allein die Existenz von Normen, die in Konflikt mit anderen Normen stehen und mit dem Ziel erzeugt sind, diese anderen Normen zu derogieren, reicht noch nicht, um die Stufung nach der derogatorischen Kraft in Frage zu stellen. Diese Stufung könnte ihre Nützlichkeit nur verlieren, wenn die mittels Alternativermächtigung erzeugten Normen in der Tat in der Lage wären, die mit ihnen in Konflikt stehenden Normen zu derogieren. Solange diese Situation niemals oder nur ausnahmsweise erfolgt, existiert kein Grund, um die Relevanz einer Stufung nach der derogatorischen Kraft in Frage zu stellen. In diesem Fall sind nun zwei Aspekte hervorzuheben: Erstens, dass eine Stufung nach der derogatorischen Kraft immer noch existiert; zweitens, dass es wegen der Abwesenheit von generellen Bestimmungen über die Suspension nicht möglich ist, über eine Stufung nach der suspensiven Kraft zu sprechen. V.

Schluss

Ist wegen der Erzeugung einer Norm eine andere Norm als provisorisch ungültig zu betrachten, dann muss diese zweite Norm als suspendiert betrachtet werden. Weil mittels Erzeugung dieser Norm eine provisorische Konsequenz bezüglich der Geltung

Rechtsordnung unterworfenen Individuen – der Staats-Subjekte (oder Untertanen) – konstituiert wird, als rechtserzeugenden Tatbestand einsetzen. Wird die Anwendung von Gewohnheitsrecht durch die Gerichte als rechtmäßig angesehen, obgleich die geschriebene Verfassung keine solche Ermächtigung enthält, kann die Ermächtigung […] nicht in einer Norm der ungeschriebenen, durch Gewohnheit entstandenen Verfassung gegeben sein, sondern muß ebenso vorausgesetzt werden, wie vorausgesetzt werden muß, daß die geschriebene Verfassung den Charakter objektiv verbindlicher Norm hat, wenn die ihr gemäß erlassenen Gesetze und Verordnungen als verbindliche Rechtsnormen angesehen werden. Dann setzt die Grundnorm – als die Verfassung im rechtslogischen Sinne – nicht nur den Akt des Verfassunggebers, sondern auch die durch das Verhalten der der verfassungsmäßig erzeugten Rechtsordnung unterworfenen Subjekte konstituierte Gewohnheit als rechtserzeugenden Tatbestand ein.“ Kelsen (Fn. 6), 401. 23 „Während der Stufenbau nach der rechtlichen Bedingtheit durch den Fehlerkalkül geradewegs bestätigt wird, wird der Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen Kraft vom Fehlerkalkül in Frage gestellt. Zumindest handelt es sich um eine deutliche Modifikation. Wenn im Fall des uneingeschränkten Fehlerkalküls Rechtsvorschriften der einen Rechtsform (z. B. Gesetze) die Geltung von Rechtsvorschriften einer anderen Rechtsform (die ersteren nach der rechtlichen Bedingtheit übergeordnet sind, hier der Verfassung) dauerhaft suspendieren können, so läßt sich nur noch mit großen Einschränkungen behaupten, letztere seien ersten hinsichtlich ihrer derogatorischen Kraft übergeordnet. Dies gilt zumal dann, wenn die Auslegung ergibt, daß die Abänderung ‚höherrangiger‘ Rechtsvorschriften nicht die Derogation der abweichenden ‚niederrangigen‘ Rechtsvorschriften bewirkt, sondern nur ihre Fehlerhaftigkeit zur Folge hat (sog Invalidation). Spätestens dann kann die derogatorische Kraft nicht mehr als Kriterium eines Stufenbaues herangezogen werden. Von einem Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen Kraft kann dann im strengen Sinn keine Rede mehr sein.“ Lippold (Fn. 3), 418.

Suspension als eine Art von Derogation oder als weitere Funktion der Rechtsnorm?

einer anderen Norm erfolgt und derogatorische Normen dazu nicht in der Lage sind, sind suspensive Normen von derogatorischen Normen wesensunterschiedlich und die Suspension ist als eine eigene Normfunktion anzuerkennen. Die Anerkennung der Suspension als eine Normfunktion ist nicht nur für eine genauere Betrachtung der Normfunktionen wichtig, sondern sie ist auch als Mittel, um in einigen Fällen die Konsequenzen der Rechtserzeugung dank Alternativermächtigung zu erklären, und zu erklären, warum die Existenz von Normen, die mittels Alternativermächtigung erzeugt sind, als solche kein Grund ist, die Möglichkeit einer Stufung der Normen nach ihrer derogatorischen Kraft in Frage zu stellen. Matheus Pelegrino da Silva

LL.M. (Freiburg), Postdoc Stipendiat des CAPES, Verfahrensnummer 88881.171237/ 2018-01, Porto Alegre – RS – Brasilien, [email protected]

159

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft? Zu einer Debatte innerhalb der Wiener rechtstheoretischen Schule THOMAS HOCHMANN

What is the Role of Legal Science? A Debate inside the Vienna School of Legal Theory Abstract: The task of legal science is to describe norms, and not to prescribe them. But

which are the norms that are susceptible of a description by legal science? Can a legal scholar describe a norm that has not yet been applied? Can a legal scholar demonstrate that a legal organ has committed an error, that its decision was an erroneous application of a norm? In other words: is there an independent point of view of legal science, distinct from the point of view of legal organs? On these questions, no unanimity exists inside the Vienna school of legal theory. These points were especially discussed in the early years of the movement by Fritz Sander and Adolf Merkl. According to Sander, one can describe law only through the assertions of competent organs. Legal science exceeds its limits as soon as it asks whether a legal act was “correct”, i. e. whether it was produced in conformity with the superior norms. This thesis was sharply criticised by Merkl in several writings. Kelsen did not expressly refute what Merkl called “Sander’s sceptical resignation,” but he also never supported it. The essay examine Sander’s and Merkl’s views, shows the superiority of Merkl’s position, and try to explain Kelsen’s silence on this issue. Keywords: Legal Science, Adolf Julius Merkl, Fritz Sander, Hans Kelsen, Interpretation,

Pure Theory of Law Schlagworte: Rechtswissenschaft, Adolf Julius Merkl, Fritz Sander, Hans Kelsen, Ausle-

gung, Reine Rechtslehre

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Die Wiener Schule verteidigt bekanntlich ein restriktives Verständnis von Rechtswissenschaft.1 Danach ist es die Aufgabe der Rechtswissenschaft, das positive Recht zu beschreiben. Der Beobachter soll nicht seine eigenen subjektiven Meinungen in diese Beschreibung einschmuggeln, sondern sich immer bewusst bleiben, dass er das Recht nicht ändern kann. Nur die juristischen Organe können rechtliche Normen setzen. Diese unumstrittenen Prämissen können aber zu sehr verschiedenen Auffassungen führen. Hier möchte ich an eine Debatte erinnern, die regelmäßig Autoren gegenüberstellt, die sich mehr oder weniger auf Kelsen stützen: von Adolf Merkl und Fritz Sander2 in den 1920er Jahren bis zu zeitgenössischen Kontroversen zwischen Otto Pfersmann und Michel Troper. Ich werde zunächst die zwei gegnerischen Thesen vorstellen, wobei sich zeigen wird, dass die eine überzeugender als die andere ist. Anschließend werde ich Kelsens vieldeutiges Schweigen in dieser zentralen Frage interpretieren. I.

Die Leugnung der Rechtswissenschaft (Sander)

Jeder der hier behandelten Autoren geht davon aus, dass es nicht Aufgabe der Rechtswissenschaft ist, Recht zu erzeugen. Die Rechtsetzung soll vielmehr ausschließlich den Organen vorbehalten sein, die dafür zuständig sind. Die Rechtswissenschaft gehört nicht dazu. Doch was bedeutet dieser Vorbehalt? Kann die Rechtswissenschaft einen kritischen Blick auf die juristische Ordnung werfen? Anders formuliert: kann sie eine Kritik leisten, die nicht auf politischen Wertungen, sondern auf juristischen Analysen gestützt wird? Kann zum Beispiel die Rechtswissenschaft feststellen, dass ein juristisches Organ eine Norm fehlerhaft angewendet hat? Im Jahr 1923 schrieb Merkl dazu Folgendes: „Die Jurisprudenz hat bis vor kurzem an der Annahme der Möglichkeit und Erkennbarkeit derartigen Organirrtums so gut wie ausnahmslos festgehalten.“3 Bezüglich der heutigen Rechtswissenschaft, zumindest in Frankreich, könnte man eine fast umgekehrte Bilanz ziehen. Es herrscht ein Rechtsprechungspositivismus, der das Recht mit den gerichtlichen Entscheidungen gleichsetzt, und der sich nicht vorstellen kann, diese Entscheidungen einer kritischen Prüfung zu unterwerfen. Michel Troper wird manchmal als rechtstheoretischer Bürge für diese Vorgehensweise betrachtet.

Vgl. Matthias Jestaedt, Der Staatsrechtslehrer Hans Kelsen – Provokateur aus Leidenschaft. Vier Schlaglichter auf ein Jahrhundert wechselvoller Beziehung, in: Hans Kelsen und die deutsche Staatsrechtslehre, hg. von Matthias Jestaedt, 2013, 6 f. 2 Fritz Sander zählte sich selbst nicht zum Kreis von Kelsens Schülern. Biographisch wie substantiell entwickelte sich sein Werk aber in enger Beziehung zu Kelsen. Vgl. Christoph Kletzer, Fritz Sander, in: Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen: die Anfangsjahre der Reinen Rechtslehre, hg. von Robert Walter / Clemens Jabloner / Klaus Zeleny, 2008, 445. 3 Adolf Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff, 1923, 281. 1

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?

Diese Haltung wurde aber schon in den Anfangsjahren der Wiener Schule verteidigt, und zwar insbesondere von Fritz Sander. Dieser Autor bezieht sich auf einen komplexen philosophischen Apparat, er verwendet ein schwieriges Vokabular, und hat – zumindest aus französischer Sicht – wenig gemein mit Tropers immer sonnenklaren Stil. Seine Auffassung des Rechts unterscheidet sich auch zweifelsohne von Tropers. Beide Autoren leisten aber eine ganz ähnliche Kritik der „traditionellen“ Rechtswissenschaft. Für Sander stellt jede Frage „nach der Rechtmäßigkeit einer Organhandlung [eine] Grenzüberschreitung der Rechtswissenschaft“ dar.4 Das Objekt der Rechtswissenschaft ist das Recht, wobei das Recht als Gesamtheit von Verfahren verstanden wird. Die Rechtswissenschaft soll sich damit begnügen, diese Verfahren zu beschreiben. Da nur der Richter zuständig ist, ein Gesetz anzuwenden, sei es sinnlos, die „Rechtmäßigkeit“ der richterlichen Entscheidung zu beurteilen oder zu fragen, ob andere Entscheidungen „möglich“ gewesen wären. In einer Rechtssache, so Sander, „[m]ögen die Parteien behaupten, ihre subjektive Ansicht sei die richtige; diese ‘Richtigkeit kommt für die reine Rechtswissenschaft nur als ‘Naturrecht’ in Betracht, ‘richtig’ ist für die reine Rechtswissenschaft nur die rechtlich erzeugte Rechtssatzform.“5 Sander geht dabei davon aus, dass es keinen Sinn macht, das Recht zu beschreiben, bevor es angewendet worden ist.6 Vor dem Anwendungsakt existiere das Recht einfach nicht, und jede Ansprüche in dieser Richtung seien nur „subjektive Wünsche und Meinungen […], individuelle Abwägung der ‘Chancen’ gewisser Zielsetzungen.“7 Sander betont die „rechtliche Bedeutungslosigkeit der vorprozessualen Rechtslage.“8 Die Rechtswissenschaft könne nur a posteriori beobachten, was passiert ist, was „rechtlich […] wirklich war.“ So könne die Rechtswissenschaft vor dem konkreten Urteil nicht behaupten, dass eine Partei ein „Recht“ auf die Vertragsauflösung habe oder dass ein Dieb zu einer bestimmten Strafe verurteilt werden „solle.“ Solche Behauptungen bildeten nur Wünschen oder Hypothesen, aber keine Beschreibung des positiven Rechts,9 das nur durch den Anwendungsprozess geschaffen werde. Sander hat bestimmt Recht, wenn man an die konkrete Norm denkt. Vor dem Urteil ist der Vertrag nicht aufgelöst, und der Dieb nicht verurteilt. Aber warum sollte es unmöglich sein, die abstrakte Norm vor seiner Anwendung zu beschreiben? Sander aaO, 281. Fritz Sander, Das Faktum der Revolution und die Kontinuität der Rechtsordnung, ZöR (1919), 146, Fn. 2. Vgl. Adolf Merkl, Das doppeltes Rechtsantlitz (1918), in: Gesammelte Schriften, hg. von Dorothea Mayer-Maly, Herbert Schambeck und Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann, Bd. I/1, 1993, 237: Für Sander ist „Das Recht […] vor dem Stadium der Rechtsprechung, dieser letzten Erscheinung der Rechtserzeugung […], nicht bloß unvollendet, sondern im Grunde überhaupt noch nicht gesetzt […]. Das führt zu der Konsequenz, dass es der Rechtswissenschaft überhaupt versagt ist, das Recht inhaltlich irgendwie zu zeichnen, bevor der Rechtsanwender in der Person des Richters oder des Verwaltungsbeamten gesprochen hat […].“ 7 Fritz Sander, Das Faktum der Revolution und die Kontinuität der Rechtsordnung, ZöR (1919), 147. 8 Ebd. 9 Vgl. aaO 148: „Jede Stufe des Rechtssystems bedeutet nur abstrakte Möglichkeit – ‘Hypothesis’ – im Verhältnis zur untergeordneten Stufe.“ 4 5 6

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scheint jede statische Auffassung der Rechtsordnung auszuschließen. Das Recht ist für ihn ein kontinuierlicher Prozess, und die Rechtswissenschaft kann nur diese kontinuierliche Erzeugung beobachten.10 Sander kann also nur an einen a posteriori Beitrag der Rechtswissenschaft denken. Sie kann nur beschreiben, was geschehen ist. In keinem Fall kann sie untersuchen, wie die Dinge im Einklang mit dem Recht ablaufen könnten (oder sollten).11 Viele Jahren später wird Michel Troper zum selben Schluss kommen (wenn auch mit einer anderen Argumentation). Es sei nicht möglich, das Recht zu beschreiben, bevor das zuständige Anwendungsorgan eingetreten ist: „Die anzuwendende Norm existiert noch nicht und kann nicht beschrieben werden.“12 Aus denselben Erwägungen ist es Sander zufolge ausgeschlossen, vom rechtswissenschaftlichen Standpunkt aus nach der Rechtmäßigkeit oder Rechtswidrigkeit eines Rechtsaktes zu fragen: „Eine ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ vor einem konkreten Rechtsmittelverfahren, eine ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ an sich gibt es nicht.“ Alles, was ein Beobachter geltend machen kann, sei eine „Naturrechtswidrigkeit“: „der ‘rechtswidrige’ Akt ist, wenn er überhaupt in der Rechtserfahrung zu finden, also für die Rechtswissenschaft bedeutsam ist, ein rechtlicher Akt, der nur als Tatbestand eines sog. Rechtsmittelverfahrens eine besondere rechltliche Qualifikation, nämlich die der ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ erhält: ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ als Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft ist nur innerhalb des Rechtes, als besondere Art des Rechtes zu finden. Diese positive, rechtsreale ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ ist aber niemals eine ‘apriorische’, sondern immer nur eine ‘aposteriorische’, in einem konkreten Rechtsverfahren gesetzte Rechtswidrigkeit: Eine ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ vor einem konkreten Rechtsmittelverfahren, eine ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ an sich gibt es nicht. Die ‘apriorische’ Rechtswidrigkeit hingegen, von welcher Merkl spricht, ist eine metarechtliche Qualifikation, ist eine ‘Naturrechtswidrigkeit.’ “13

Auch hier kommt Michel Troper zum selben Ergebnis: die Feststellung des Irrtums des Rechtsorgans könne nur eine subjektive und deshalb unwissenschaftliche Wer-

aaO 150: „‘System’ bedeutet aber der reinen Rechtswissenschaft nicht eine geordnete Mannigfaltigkeit gegebener starrer Rechtsdinge (der Rechtssatzformen), sondern kontinuierliche Erzeugung aus einem Ursprunge. Die Dynamik der Methode durchströmt die Statik des Systems. Die starre metaphysische ‘Ding an sich’ der Rechtssatzform wird in kontinuierlich fließende Funktionen aufgelöst.“ Vgl. auch Fritz Sander, Staat und Recht, Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der Rechtserfahrung, 1922, 1190: „Denn Merkl vollzieht eine Umdeutung der Dynamik des realen Rechtes in die Statik der formalen Logik der Rechtswissenschaft.“ Hervorhebung im Original. 11 Eine Entscheidung ist gefallen, und es soll die Rechtswissenschaft gleichgültig sein, ob eine andere Entscheidung möglich war. Vgl. Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1197: „eben rechtlich allein dieses ‘subjektive’ Ermessen wirklich war, wenn auch logisch ein anderes ‘subjektives’ Ermessen möglich war.“ Hervorhebung im Original. 12 Michel Troper, La théorie du droit, le droit, l’État, 2001, 12: „La norme applicable n’existe pas encore et ne peut être décrite.“ 13 Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1206. 10

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?

tung sein.14 Nur die Geltung der Entscheidung sei von Bedeutung. Ihre angebliche (Nicht-)Übereinstimmung mit dem anzuwendenden Recht sei nicht Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft.15 Die eigentliche Rechtswissenschaft prüfe also nicht die Beachtung einer höheren Norm durch eine niedrigere Norm. Sie müsse sich damit begnügen, die Entscheidungen der juristischen Organe zu beobachten. In Sanders Worten: „Die Rechtswissenschaft kann die ‘Wahrheit’ des Rechtes nicht kraft eigener Regeln erfassen, sondern nur durch Analyse der Urteile des Rechtes.“ Es sind „ausschließlich die Urteile des Rechtes, welche ‘Unrecht und Recht erkennen’, während die Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft jene ‘Erkenntnis’ nur reflektierend analysieren, ihre eigene – rechtswissenschaftliche – Wahrheit mittelbar auf die rechtliche Wahrheit stützen.“16 Was allein zählt, ist die „Rechtserfahrung“, das Verständnis, das das Recht von sich selbst gewinnt.17 Die Rechtswissenschaft könne nur die Entscheidungen der juristischen Organen beschreiben, sie könne aber diese Entscheidungen weder juristisch kritisieren, noch sie untersuchen, bevor sie durch ein anderes Organ konkretisiert worden sind. Wie Merkl bemerkt, gelangt Sander damit zu einer Leugnung der Rechtswissenschaft.18 Dasselbe gilt für Troper. Was bleibt, ist eine Beschreibung der Entscheidungen, die nicht mit Rechtsmitteln angegriffen werden können. Diese können zwar kritisiert werden, aber nicht anhand einer juristischen Analyse. Sander und Troper nennen dieses Unternehmen „Dogmatik“.19 Jeder Versuch, die Rechtsordnung rechtswissenschaftlich zu durchdringen, laufe auf eine Art des (unwissenschaftlichen) Naturrechtsdenkens hinaus. Solche Pseudo-Rechtswissenschaft kann allenfalls zum Objekt einer echten Wissenschaft werden: die „Wissenschaft der Rechtswissenschaft.“20

Troper (Fn. 12), 13. aaO 88. Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1208. Hervorhebung im Original. Vgl. Kletzer (Fn. 2), 453. Merkl (Fn. 6), 236: „die Bestreitung dieser Überprüfungsmöglichkeit – was zugleich den Verzicht auf eine Rechtswissenschaft von irgendwelchem Inhalt in sich schließt.“ Vgl. auch aaO 249: „jenen unausgesprochenen Verzicht auf rechtswissenschaftliche Erkenntnis.“ 19 Z. B. Fritz Sander, Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung? Kritische Studie zur Rechtslehre Kelsens, ZöR (1922), 523; Troper (Fn. 12), 5. 20 Der Ausdruck erscheint bei Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1207. Michel Troper und seine Schüler haben zahlreiche interessante Werke zur Analyse der dogmatischen Diskurse geleistet. Vgl. Michel Troper, Pour une théorie juridique de l’Etat, 1994, 44, der eine Rechtswissenschaft erwägt, die sich nicht mit den Normen sondern mit dem rechtlichen Diskurs und der rechtlichen Denkweise beschäftigen würde („une science du droit qui prendrait pour objet non plus les normes, ni les comportements, mais le discours et le raisonnement juridiques, objet à la fois spécifique et sur lequel peuvent être énoncées des propositions vraies.“) Vgl. auch, zur „Wissenschaft der Rechtswissenschaft“, Matthias Jestaedt, Perspektiven der Rechtswissenschaftstheorie, in: Rechtswissenschaftstheorie, hg. von Matthias Jestaedt / Oliver Lepsius, 2008, 189. 14 15 16 17 18

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II.

Die Verteidigung der Rechtswissenschaft (Merkl)

Gegen solche Angriffe hat Merkl die Rechtswissenschaft verteidigt. Sanders Ausgangspunkt ist richtig, erklärt Merkl. Er geht aber zu weit. Die Rechtswissenschaft sei traditionell geneigt gewesen, sich die Rolle der juristischen Organe anzueignen. Sie habe behauptet in der Lage zu sein, die einzige rechtlich erforderliche Lösung in jedem konkreten Fall geben zu können. So hat sie tatsächlich die Grenzen ihrer Beschreibungsfunktion überschritten, weil die anzuwendenden Normen immer ein Ermessen, eine Entscheidungsfreiheit dem Anwendungsorgan überlassen. Darin liegt eine wesentliche Komponente der Stufenbaulehre, die Merkl oft betont hat.21 Deshalb muss „die Rechtswissenschaft den einzelnen Akt der Rechtsanwendung erwarten […], um sagen zu können, was in dem einzelnen Falle Recht ist.“22 Hier muss man aber aufpassen: diese Feststellung bedeutet nicht, dass die Rechtswissenschaft von den rechtlichen Organen „entthront“ wird.23 Es ist ja ein Irrtum, der Rechtswissenschaft eine normative Funktion zuzuweisen. Aber man begeht auch einen Irrtum, wenn man der Rechtsanwendung eine Rechtserkenntnisfunktion zuweist. Sander übertreibe „in entgegengesetzter Richtung,“ erklärt Merkl.24 Er gehe zu weit, wenn er „schon die bloße Fragestellung nach der Rechtmäßigkeit einer Organhandlung als Grenzüberschreitung der Rechtswissenschaft“ ablehnt,“25 oder die wissenschaftliche Beschreibung einer Norm vor ihrer Anwendung verwirft. Solche Stellungnahmen der Rechtswissenschaft bilden für Sander eine „Zerreißung der Einheit der Bedingungen der Rechtserzeugung.“26 Merkl zeigt demgegenüber, dass es durchaus möglich ist, quasi eine Linie durch den Prozess zu ziehen und das Recht auf einer bestimmten Ebene des Stufenbaus zu beschreiben.27 Die Argumente, die Merkl Sander entgegenhält, werden später auch gegen

Vgl. z.B. Adolf Merkl, Das Recht im Lichte seiner Anwendung (1916–1919), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. I/1 (Fn. 6), 104 f. 22 Merkl (Fn. 6), 246. 23 Ebd.: „Es bedeutet dies, wie noch klar werden soll, durchaus keine Entthronung der Rechtswissenschaft, sondern im Gegenteil ihre Selbstbehauptung.“ Interessanterweise erscheint hier eine Formel – die „Entthronung der Rechtswissenschaft“ –, die von Bernhard Schlink in seiner berühmten Kritik des Bundesverfassungsgerichtspositivismus viel später verwendet wurde. Bernhard Schlink, Die Entthronung der Staatsrechtswissenschaft durch die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Der Staat (1989), 161–172. 24 Merkl (Fn. 6), 247: „Die heutige Rechtswissenschaft maßt sich nämlich Fähigkeiten der Rechtsanwendung an, und es ist nur eine gesunde Reaktion gegen diesen Übergriff, eine Reaktion, die freilich als Übertreibung in entgegengesetzter Richtung wirkt, wenn der Rechtsanwendung eine Rechtserkenntnisfunktion zugedacht wird, die ihr fremd ist.“ 25 Merkl (Fn. 3), 281. 26 Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1196: „Wenn wir die Entgegensetzung der logischen Möglichkeit und der rechtlichen Wirklichkeit bis zu ihrer letzten Wurzel verfolgen, so finden wir, dass sie auf einer Zerreißung der Einheit der Bedingungen der Rechtserzeugung […] beruht.“ Hervorhebung im Original. 27 Merkl (Fn. 3), 288. 21

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?

Michel Troper, insbesondere von Otto Pfersmann, verwendet.28 Hier kann ich nur ein paar Beispiele geben. Beginnen wir mit Sanders „rechtliche Bedeutungslosigkeit der vorprozessualen Rechtslage.“29 Zwar existiert kein Recht, bevor es vom zuständigen Organ gesetzt wird. Der Richter ist aber nicht das einzige Rechtsorgan. Recht wird auf jeder Stufe der Rechtsordnung gesetzt. So ist beispielsweise das Gesetz die Grundlage des Urteils wie auch das Ergebnis des Gesetzgebungsverfahrens.30 Jede Norm – bis auf die erste, deren Geltung nur vorausgesetzt werden kann – ist eine Anwendungsnorm. In Merkls Worten, „jede vorprozessuale Rechtslage [ist] zugleich auch nachprozessuale Rechtslage “31 Die Tatsache, dass das Recht sprachlich gefasst wird, begründet auch keine„skeptische Resignation“, wie Merkl Sanders Einstellung nennt.32 Die Unbestimmtheit oder Mehrdeutigkeit der normativen Sätze hindere nicht daran, mehrere Auslegungen als unzweifelhaft richtig oder falsch zu beschreiben.33 Sander – sowie später Troper – sieht in jeder Auslegung eine reine subjektive  – und deshalb unwissenschaftliche  – Wertung.34 Dagegen kann Merkl einwenden: Warum sollte das Recht in einer Sprache verfasst sein, die nur den juristischen Organen verständlich ist?35 Wenn die Sprache keinen besonderen Sinn mitteilen könnte, fügt dann Otto Pfersmann hinzu, wie kann man behaupten, richterliche Entscheidungen, dogmatische Schriften, oder überhaupt irgendeinen Text zu studieren?36 Ein anderes Argument von Merkl wird später in der Widerlegung von Tropers Thesen wieder auftreten.37 Wenn es unmöglich ist, das Verhältnis zwischen einem Akt und die ihn bedingende Norm zu prüfen, wie kann man behaupten, dass ein bestimmtes Organ ein Rechtsorgan ist, dass es als solches zuständig ist, um Rechtsnormen zu setzen?38 Soll die Rechtswissenschaft alles als Recht erkennen, was sich als solche vorstellt? Ist die Rechtswissenschaft nicht in der Lage, die Befehle des Hauptmannes von Köpenick als Nicht-Recht zu brandmarken?39 Das Recht, erklärt Sander demgegenOtto Pfersmann, Contre le néo-réalisme juridique. Pour un débat sur l’interprétation, Revue française de droit constitutionnel (2002), 789–836. 29 Sander (Fn. 5), 147. 30 Merkl (Fn. 3), 282. Vgl. in der selben Richtung Olivier Jouanjan, Une interprétation de la théorie réaliste de Michel Troper, Droits (2003), 43. 31 Merkl (Fn. 3), 282. Hervorhebung im Original. 32 Merkl (Fn. 6), 249. 33 Ebd. 34 Sander (Fn. 19), 523; Troper (Fn. 12) 13, 74. 35 Merkl (Fn. 6), 238. 36 Pfersmann (Fn. 28), 828, 835. Vgl. auch Jouanjan (Fn. 30), 43. 37 Riccardo Guastini, Michel Troper sur la fonction juridictionnelle, Droits (2003), 116 f. 38 Merkl (Fn. 3), 283; Merkl (Fn. 6), 237; Adolf Merkl, Das Problem der Rechtskontinuität und die Forderung des einheitlichen rechtlichen Weltbildes (1926), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. I/1 (Fn. 6), 391. 39 Hans Kelsen, Über Staatsunrecht. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Frage der Deliktsfähigkeit juristischer Personen und zur Lehre vom fehlerhaften Staatsakt (1914), Werke, hg. von Matthias Jestaedt, Bd. 3, 2010, 486, 511. Dieser Beispiel wird auch von Merkl benützt. Vgl. Merkl (Fn. 3), 283, Fn. 1; Merkl (Fn. 6), 239. 28

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über dann tatsächlich, lege sich selbst aus. Es komme darauf an, einzusehen, „dass der objektive Sinn jeder Rechtserscheinung nicht in der Subjektivität der Auslegung, sondern lediglich in der objektiven, verfahrensmäßigen Beziehung dieser Rechtserscheinung auf alle anderen Rechtserscheinungen sich vollzieht […].“40 Wie kann aber die Rechtswissenschaft feststellen, dass ein Vorgang in einer „verfahrensmäßigen“ Beziehung mit anderen steht, wenn solche Urteile ihr verwehrt sind? Schließlich wirft Merkl noch ein politisches Argument auf. Die Unterwerfung der Rechtswissenschaft unter jedem als Recht auftretenden Vorgang würde zu einer Vorstellung führen, die günstig für den Absolutismus ist. Umgekehrt erlaubt das Behalten einer kritischen Fähigkeit, das Individuum vor einem angeblichen Rechtsorgan, das seine Zuständigkeiten überschreitet, zu schützen.41 Merkl betont, dass er auf keinen Fall dazu neigt, solche absolutistische Tendenzen bei Sander zu identifizieren. Man muss hier aber anmerken, dass Sander sich später dem Faschismus angenähert hat.42 Merkl vertritt also überzeugend die Möglichkeit einer Rechtswissenschaft, die keine bloße Registrierungskammer von allem wäre, was sich als Recht ausgibt. Sie muss ihr Objekt identifizieren, und deshalb Recht von Nicht-Recht unterscheiden. Dieses Unternehmen ist die notwendigeVorbedingung für jede Analyse des positiven Rechts.43 Sanders Replik darauf ist brutal – zumindest im Kontext der Wiener Schule. Merkls Theorie sei eine Naturrechtstheorie,44 sie sehe die Rechtswissenschaft als eine Rechtsquelle,45 oder genauer eine Unrechtsquelle.46 Die Rechtswissenschaft sei aber nicht imstande, Recht in Nicht-Recht zu verwandeln. Sanders Kritik verfehlt aber ihr Ziel. Merkl benutzt zwar irreführende Formeln, wenn er behauptet, dass „Recht ist, was die Rechtswissenschaft als wahr erkennt“,47 wenn er von dem „Richterstuhl der Rechtserkenntnis“ spricht,48 wenn er dem „Geltungsanspruch“ von angeblichen Rechtserscheinungen „die höhere Autorität der Rechtswissenschaft“ gegenüberstellt,49 oder wenn er schreibt, dass die Rechtswissen-

Sander (Fn. 19), 522. Hervorhebung nicht im Original. Merkl (Fn. 6), 252; Merkl (Fn. 3), 284, 287, Fn 1. Kletzer (Fn. 2), 463 f. Merkl (Fn. 3), 291. Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1201: „Merkls Gedankengang läuft eben auf die naturrechtliche Spekulation hinaus, dass es ‘Recht’ gebe, welches […] seine ‘Geltung’ nur aus der logischen Anerkennung durch die Rechtswissenschaft schöpfe.“ Hervorhebung im Original. 45 Sander (Fn. 19), 521, Fn. 1. 46 Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1200. 47 Merkl (Fn. 3), 290. 48 aaO, 286. 49 aaO, 286, Fn. 1. 40 41 42 43 44

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?

schaft das Anwendungsorgan „kontrollieren,“50 dass sie die „Erscheinungen, die mit dem Schein von Recht auftreten, als Nichtrecht disqualifizieren“ könne.51 Es ist aber ganz klar, dass diese Urteile der Rechtswissenschaft für Merkl immer deklarativ, und niemals konstitutiv sind. Die Rechtswissenschaft kann nur feststellen, dass manche Rechtsnormen oder scheinbare Rechtsnormen die höheren Normen nicht beachten. Die Rechtswissenschaft verfügt nicht über die Macht, irgendeine Norm zu vernichten oder in Geltung zu setzen. Sie beobachtet nur, dass – aufgrund verschiedener Normen – eine angebliche Rechtsnorm nichtig ist, oder dass sie nur kraft einer anderen Norm trotz ihre Fehlhaftigkeit gilt (Fehlerkalkültheorie).52 Merkl hat nie den Standpunkt des rechtlichen Organs – den Standpunkt des Rechts, in Sanders Theorie  – und den Standpunkt der Rechtswissenschaft verwechselt. Er hat nie vergessen, „dass eben rechtlich allein dieses ‘subjektive’ Ermessen wirklich war, wenn auch logisch ein anderes ‘subjektives’ Ermessen möglich war.“53 Ganz im Gegenteil hat er es oft unterstrichen, dass nur die rechtlichen Organe dafür zuständig sind, Rechtsnormen zu setzen.54 „Will sie [die Rechtswissenschaft] erkunden, was im einzelnen Rechtens sei, dann frage sie – beim Richter an!“55 Die „Antinomie,“ die Verdross später zwischen Sander und Merkl beobachten wird, wird also falsch aufgestellt. Merkl hätte keine Schwierigkeit, der These zuzustimmen, die Verdross als das Gegenteil von Merkls Lehre darstellt: dass „jede Rechtsnorm nur durch einen Organakt niederer Stufe, niemals aber unmittelbar durch die Rechtswissenschaft in verbindlicher Weise ausgelegt werden kann.“56 Die Gegensätzlichkeit zwischen Sander und Merkl dreht sich nicht um die Lokalisierung der Entscheidungsmacht, sondern um die Möglichkeit eines wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis. Denn für Merkl bedeutet das Entscheidungsmonopol der Rechtsorgane kein Erkenntnisprivileg.57 Die Rechtswissenschaft kann nicht statt des zuständigen Organs entscheiden, aber das heißt nicht, dass sie nichts über diese Entscheidung hinaus sagen kann. Das Rechtsorgan genießt nämlich eine Ermessensfreiheit, aber er soll innerhalb aaO, 285. Vgl. auch das folgende Zitat, das Sander (Fn. 19), 522, Merkl zuschreibt, und das ich aber nicht finden konnte: ‚Insoweit kann er [der Rechtsanwender] aber von der Rechtswissenschaft kontrolliert und ins Unrecht gesetzt werden.’ 51 Merkl (Fn. 3), 291 52 Vgl. Merkl, Die gerichtliche Prüfung von Gesetzen und Verordnungen. Die Idee einer gerichtlichen Rechtskontrolle (1921), Gesammelte Schriften, hg. von Dorothea Mayer-Maly, Herbert Schambeck und Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann, Bd. II/1, 1999, 434 f.; Merkl (Fn. 3), 277 ff. und im Besonderen 294 ff. 53 Sander (Fn. 10), Staat und Recht, 1197. 54 Merkl (Fn. 6), 235. 55 Merkl (Fn. 21), 108 56 Alfred Verdross, Eine Antinomie der Rechtstheorie (1951), in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, hg. von Hans Klecatsky / René Marcic / Herbert Schambeck, Bd. 2, 1968, 1126. 57 Merkl (Fn. 21), 110, 113, 132 f.: „Der Rechtsanwender […] hat Recht, […] nicht auf Grund eines Kennens, sondern eines Könnens, nicht weil es besser weiß, sondern weil er es besser kann.“ Vgl. auch Merkl (Fn. 6), 245: „Die Ermächtigung zur Rechtsanwendung bedeutet doch […] zwar die Übertragung einer Willensmacht, aber nicht einer Erkenntnisfähigkeit.“ 50

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der Grenzen dieser Freiheit entscheiden. Die Rechtswissenschaft ist also nicht gezwungen, jede Entscheidung der Rechtsorgane zu billigen, sie soll die Grenzen seiner Freiheit feststellen: „der Rechtsanwender, ebenso wie er in der Willenssphäre frei und der Kontrolle von Seite der Rechtswissenschaft ledig ist, in der Erkenntnissphäre gebunden und der Orientierung durch die Rechtswissenschaft fähig und bedürftig ist.“58 Kurz: die Rechtswissenschaft ist „darauf beschränkt, das Gebiet des freien Ermessen klarzustellen.“59 Die Grenzen dieses Gebiets werden aber von der Rechtsordnung abgesteckt. Die Rechtswissenschaft bemüht sich, sie zu erkennen. Sie entscheidet nichts. Auch die Wahl, sich mit dem Wortlaut der Rechtssätze zu beschäftigen, vermag keine Verweisung ins Naturrecht zu begründen. Die Analyse des positiven Recht erfordert nämlich solche Voraussetzungen. Man kann nicht das Recht studieren, ohne davor klarzustellen, was das Recht ist.60 Das zeigt das Bild von Münchhausen, „der sich am eigenen Zopfe aus dem Sumpf zieht.“61 Eine Vorkonzeption des Objekts ist erforderlich, um dieses Objekt zu erforschen. Betrachtet man die Rechtsordnung als eine sprachliche Erscheinung, wird man dazu geführt, diese Äußerungen zu studieren: „Die Sprache ist aber doch wohl kaum solch ein verbotenes Hinterpförtchen, durch das sich das Naturrecht hereinstiehlt – sie ist vielmehr die breite Pforte, durch die das gesamte Recht ins menschliche Bewusstsein tritt.“62 Die Überlegenheit des Merklschen Ansatzes ist nicht zu leugnen. Er vermeidet Sanders Widersprüche und traut der Rechtswissenschaft eine viel interessantere Rolle zu. Sie kann das Recht vor seiner Anwendung beschreiben, und einen kritischen Blick auf seine Konkretisierungen werfen. Umso mehr überrascht es, dass Kelsen keine klare Stellung in dieser Debatte genommen hat. III.

Das Desinteresse für die Rechtswissenschaft (Kelsen)

Bezüglich einer Kontroverse, die sich im Rahmen der Wiener Schule entwickelt, liegt es nah, nach der Stellung des Gründers und produktivsten Autors dieser Schule zu suchen. Im Jahr 1951 erinnerte Verdross an die Merkl/Sander Debatte und verortete Kelsen auf Sanders Seite gegen Merkl.63 In Wahrheit scheint Kelsen eher im Hintergrund geblieben zu sein. Die Frage nach der Rolle der Rechtswissenschaft betrifft das Problem der Auslegung, und es wurde oft bemerkt, dass Kelsens Ausführungen zu

Merkl (Fn. 6), 248 aaO, 248, Fn. 1. aaO, 250. Merkl (Fn. 21), 88. Vgl. auch Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre, 1920, 96. 62 Merkl (Fn. 6), 249. 63 Verdross (Fn. 56), 1123. 58 59 60 61

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?

diesem Thema – trotz des Eröffnungsversprechens der Reinen Rechtslehre64 – nicht sehr ausführlich sind.65 Kelsen hat nie, wie Sander, die Möglichkeit einer echten Rechtswissenschaft geleugnet. In diesem Sinn steht er also näher bei Merkl (1). Er hat aber nicht beabsichtigt, zu der Entwicklung der Rechtswissenschaft beizutragen. Sein theoretisches Werk hat er fast ausschließlich der Ontologie des Rechts (Rechtstheorie) und nicht der Epistemologie der Rechtswissenschaft (Rechtswissenschaftstheorie) gewidmet66 (2). Kelsens Behauptungen, die eine Nähe zu Sander zu beweisen scheinen, müssen in diesem Kontext gesehen werden (3). So kann man auch die überraschende theoretische Regression erklären, die Kelsen mit der Theorie der „Alternativermächtigung“ bewirkt hat (4). 1.

Keine Leugnung der Rechtswissenschaft

Wie Sander selbst bemerkt, hatte Kelsen nie die Absicht, die traditionelle Rechtswissenschaft zu zerstören.67 Nie hat er, wie Sander, deren Unmöglichkeit behauptet.68 Ganz im Gegenteil hat Kelsen die Aufgabe der Rechtswissenschaft darin gesehen, nach dem „Rahmen,“ den verschiedenen Auslegungsmöglichkeit eines Rechtssatzes zu suchen.69 Obwohl Kelsen nicht viel über der Methode dieser wissenschaftlichen Auslegung zu sagen hatte, verträgt sich dieser Ansatz schwerlich mit einer Leugnung der Rechtswissenschaft. Vor allem hat Kelsen sehr früh ein paar Intuitionen ausgedrückt, die Merkls These stark beeinflusst haben.70 Kelsens Ausführungen über dem Unterschied zwischen H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Studienausgabe der 2. Auflage 1960, hg. von Matthias Jestaedt, 2017, 1 (Originalpaginierung). 65 Vgl. Christoph Schwaighofer, Kelsen zum Problem der Rechtsauslegung, in: Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre, Ergebnisse eines Wiener Rechtstheoretischen Seminars 1985/96, hg. von Robert Walter, 1986, 232; Stanley Paulson, Kelsen on Legal Interpretation, Legal Studies (1990), 136; Heinz Mayer, Die Interpretationstheorie der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Schwerpunkte der Reinen Rechtslehre, hg. von Robert Walter, 1992, 61; Ludwig Adamovich, Reine Rechtslehre und Hermeneutik, in: Für Staat und Recht, Festschrift für Herbert Schambeck, hg. von Johannes Hengstschläger et al., 1994, 132; Matthias Jestaedt, Wie das Recht, so die Auslegung. Die Rolle der Rechtstheorie bei der Suche nach der juristischen Auslegungslehre, ZöR (2000), 138 f.; Stanley Paulson, Formalism, ‘Free Law’, and the ‘Cognition’ Quandary: Hans Kelsen’s Approaches to Legal Interpretation, University of Queensland Law Journal (2008), 7; Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law, A Kelsenian Perspective, 2011, 107; Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, Zur Interpretationstheorie von Hans Kelsen, in: Gedenkschrift Robert Walter, hg. von Clemens Jabloner et al., 2013, 52. 66 Zu diesem Unterschied, s. z. B. Oliver Lepsius, Themen einer Rechtswissenschaftstheorie, in: Rechtswissenschaftstheorie (Fn. 20), 3. 67 Sander (Fn. 19), 525. 68 Vgl. z.B. aaO, 522. 69 Kelsen (Fn. 64), 349. 70 Vgl. z.B. Merkl (Fn. 3), 292; Adolf Merkl, Justizirrtum und Rechtswahrheit (1925), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. I/1 (Fn. 6), 370, Fn. 1. 64

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Nichtigkeit und Vernichtbarkeit71 bilden die Ursprung von Merkls These. Nur hat Kelsen im Unterschied zu Merkl nie weiter in diese Richtung gesucht. 2.

Eine Theorie des Rechts, nicht der Rechtswissenschaft

Kelsens reine Rechtslehre ist eine Theorie des Rechts, und nicht der Rechtswissenschaft. Kelsens Interesse liegt, wie gesagt, bei der Ontologie, nicht der Epistemologie. Er versucht hauptsächlich zu erklären, wie das Recht funktioniert. Und wenn die reine Rechtslehre eine „Theorie der Interpretation“ beinhaltet, dann nur als „allgemeine Rechtslehre,“ und nicht als Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft.72 Der Schwerpunkt diese Theorie der Interpretation ist also die „authentische Auslegung,“ das heißt die Aktivität der Rechtsorgane, und nicht die wissenschaftliche Auslegung. Die wenigen Bemerkungen Kelsens über die wissenschaftliche Auslegung bilden bestenfalls einen Exkurs zur Rechtswissenschaftstheorie. Kelsen unterstreicht, dass die Bemerkungen der Rechtswissenschaft vom Standpunkt des Rechts gleichgültig sind: sie haben keine Auswirkung auf sein Funktionieren. Vor allem kritisiert er die dogmatischen Ansätze, die anstreben, die einzige Lösung in jedem rechtlichen Fall anzugeben.73 Kelsen hat nur betont, was die Rechtswissenschaft nicht tun könnte.74 Seine Bemerkungen sind negativ, destruktiv, aber fast nie konstruktiv.75 Diese Herangehensweise muss man in Erinnerung behalten, um ein Missverständnis von Kelsens Lehre zu vermeiden. 3.

Ein Interesse für die Entscheidung, nicht für die Erkenntnis

Im 1914 veröffentlichten Aufsatz „Über Staatsunrecht,“ scheint Kelsen, die Existenz eines Fehlers im Herstellungsprozess einer Norm mit den rechtlichen Konsequenzen seiner Feststellung zu verwechseln. Wenn ein Akt durch einen Mangel getroffen ist, der keine Nichtigkeitsgrunde sondern nur eine Anfechtungsgrunde ist, dann schafft er eine gül-

Kelsen (Fn. 39), 483. Kelsen (Fn. 64), 1: „Die Reine Rechtslehre […] ist allgemeine Rechtslehre […]. [S]ie gibt eine Theorie der Interpretation.“ 73 Vgl. Robert Walter, Das Auslegungsproblem im Lichte der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Festschrift für Ulrich Klug zum 70  Geburtstag, hg. von Günter Kohlmann, Bd. 1, 1983, 189 f.; Rudolf Thienel, Kritischer Rationalismus und Jurisprudenz, 1991, 183; Horst Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 2. Aufl., 1990, 153 f.; Pfersmann (Fn. 28), 808. 74 Mayer (Fn. 65), 62. 75 Walter (Fn. 72), 190. 71 72

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?

tige Norm, solange die Mangel vom zuständigen Organ nicht festgestellt worden ist.76 Aber die Tatsache, dass die Rechtswissenschaft nicht in der Lage ist, diese Norm zu vernichten, bedeutet nicht, dass sie nicht in der Lage ist, diesen Mangel festzustellen. Kelsen interessiert sich aber nur für die Unfähigkeit zu entscheiden, er vernachlässigt die Fähigkeit zu erkennen: „die Frage, ob ein solcher Fehler dem Akte anhafte oder nicht, ist keineswegs bloß eine rechtslogische; sie wird nicht von der Autorität der individuellen Vernunft, sondern vor der des Staates entschieden.“77 Deshalb sei es ungenau, in solchem Fall von einem fehlerhaften Akte zu sprechen: solange dieser Mangel vom zuständigen Organ nicht festgestellt worden ist, reicht dieser Mangel nicht an „die juristische Erkenntnisebene.“78 Also dürfe „man einen anfechtbaren Staatsakt nicht vor durchgeführtem Anfechtungsverfahren für fehlerhaft erklären.“79 Die Sander erinnernde Verwechslung zwischen Entscheidung und Erkenntnis erscheint deutlich in dieser Formel der „juristischen Erkenntnisebene,“ und wird noch klarer in einem vierzig Jahren später veröffentlichten Aufsatz. Dieser Text bildet einen Antwort zu jenem Aufsatz, in dem Verdross an die Kontroverse zwischen Sander und Merkl erinnerte.80 Kelsen vermeidet aber diese Debatte, anstatt Stellung zu nehmen. Er interessiert sich nur für die Zuständigkeit, Normen zu schaffen oder zu vernichten, und überhaupt nicht an die Erkenntnisfunktion der Rechtswissenschaft. Kelsen erklärt nicht genau, was die Rechtswissenschaft erkennen kann. Er wiederholt nur, wieder und wieder, dass sie nichts entscheiden kann.81 Wenn zum Beispiel nur ein Gericht dafür zuständig ist, ein Gesetz für verfassungswidrig zu erklären, sei die Aussage der Rechtswissenschaft bezüglich der Verfassungsmäßigkeit des Gesetzes „rechtlich irrelevant,“82 „juristisch sinnlos.“83 Aber die ÄhnlichKelsen (Fn. 39), 483: „Solange der Staat den vermeintlichen oder behaupteten Mangel nicht autoritativ festgestellt hat, muss der von irgend jemandem für fehlerhafte gehaltene Akt als Staatsakt angesehen und respektiert werden. Solange nicht staatlicherseits der behauptete Fehler festgestellt ist, hat der Staatsakt wie ein fehlerloser alle von der Rechtsordnung vorgesehenen Wirkungen.“ Hervorhebung im Original. 77 Ebd. Hervorhebung nicht im Original. 78 aaO, 511. 79 Ebd. 80 Verdross (Fn. 56). 81 Hans Kelsen, Was ist ein Rechtsakt? (1951), in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, hg. von Hans Klecatsky / René Marcic / Herbert Schambeck, Bd. 2, 1968, z. B. 1131: „Die Rechtswissenschaft als Wissenschaft kann keine Normen produzieren, sie kann nur die im Rechtsverfahren von Rechtsorganen produzierten Normen […] beschreiben“; 1134: „diese [die Rechtswissenschaft] kann […] überhaupt nichts entscheiden“. Hervorhebung nicht im Original. 82 aaO, 1132. Vgl. auch Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1945, 154: „The opinion of any other individual is legally irrelevant.“ 83 Kelsen (Fn. 80), 1135: „Kann man juristisch sagen, dass der Präsident seine Kompetenz überschritten habe? Ist ein solches Urteil, wenn es von einem juristischen Schriftsteller ausgesprochen wird, etwas anderes als eine juristisch irrelevante Interpretation der Amerikanischen Verfassung, der die juristische relevante Interpretation des Präsidenten selbst entgegensteht, der zuständig ist, die Verfassung anzuwenden und daher auch zu interpretieren? Ist es nicht juristisch sinnlos, unter solchen Umständen zu behaupten, der Präsident habe seine Kompetenz überschritten […]?“ Hervorhebung nicht im Original. 76

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keit mit Sander soll hier nicht täuschen: diese juristische Irrelevanz bedeutet nur, dass diese rechtswissenschaftlichen Analysen keine juristischen Wirkungen herbeiführen. Kelsen schreibt nicht, dass sie nicht von wissenschaftlichem Interesse sind, auch wenn er damit nicht viel anfangen mag. Die Unterscheidung zwischen authentischer und wissenschaftlicher Auslegung hat nämlich nicht die geringste Verbindung zur Möglichkeit einer wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis des Rechts.84 Die Geltung einer Norm bedeutet nicht, dass sie konform zu höheren Normen ist.85 Und umgekehrt: die Rechtswissenschaft kann keine Norm setzen, das heißt aber nicht, dass sie das Recht nicht erkennen kann. Trotz des Anscheins behauptet Kelsen nicht, dass eine rechtliche Norm unbedingt völlig konform zu höheren Normen ist. Sein einziges Anliegen ist zu betonen, dass sie gültig ist. Kelsen insistiert nur auf die rechtliche Zuständigkeit des Rechtsorgans. Die Frage der Erkennbarkeit der Rechtsordnung durch die Rechtswissenschaft beantwortet er nicht. Kelsens vorherrschende Interesse für die Entscheidungsmacht (das heißt: das Recht) entwickelt sich auf Kosten der Erkenntnisfähigkeit (das heißt: der Rechtswissenschaft). 4.

Eine Regression: die Theorie des Alternativermächtigung

Dank dieser Bemerkung kann man ein Rätsel der reinen Rechtslehre erklären. Kelsen hat Merkls Stufenbaulehre schnell angenommen. Die Fehlerkalkültheorie, die eine wesentliche Ergänzung der Stufenbaulehre ist, hat Kelsen aber nicht einmal erwähnt. Warum? Die ersten Intuitionen, die Merkls beeinflusst haben, finden sich ja bei Kelsen. Warum hat Kelsen das Fehlerkalkül nicht explizit angenommen? Warum hat er statt dieser schönen Theorie das wackelnde Gebäude der alternativen Ermächtigung entwickelt? Die Antwort beruht auf Kelsens Desinteresse für die Rechtswissenschaft. Die alternative Ermächtigung ist kein Instrument der Rechtswissenschaft, sondern eine Beobachtung über das Funktionieren des Rechts. Um eine Norm als gültig zu betrachten, muss man annehmen, dass eine höhere Norm zum Erlass dieser Norm ermächtigte. Kelsen fragt sich nicht, wie die Rechtswissenschaft die Rechtswidrigkeit erkennen könnte. Diese Erkenntnis entwickelt keine rechtliche Wirkung und liegt deshalb außer Kelsens Interesse. Im Vergleich mit der Fehlerkalkültheorie ist die alternative Ermächtigung ein theoretischer Rückschritt.

Vgl. Pfersmann (Fn. 28), 827 f.; Riccardo Guastini, Réalisme et anti-réalisme dans la théorie de l’interprétation, in: Mélanges Paul Amselek, 2005, 438. 85 Vgl. Eugenio Bulygin, Cognition and Interpretation of Law, in: Cognition and Interpretation of Law, hg. von Letizia Gianformaggio / Stanley Paulson, 1995, 21 und 23. 84

Welche Rolle für die Rechtswissenschaft?

Mit der Fehlerkalkülstheorie kann man beobachten, dass eine Norm trotz ihrer Mangelhaftigkeit gültig ist.86 Mit der Alternativermächtigung behauptet man die Gültigkeit der Norm und versucht anschließend diese Gültigkeit rechtstheoretisch zu begründen.87 Mit dieser Theorie vermeidet Kelsen die Debatte über die Rolle der Rechtswissenschaft. Kelsen übernimmt also nicht Sanders Skeptizismus. Er vertritt überhaupt nicht die Unmöglichkeit einer Rechtswissenschaft. Auf dem Bereich der Epistemologie hat er sich aber kaum gewagt. Seine Zurückhaltung bezüglich der Rechtswissenschaft öffnet den Weg zu den skeptischen Entwicklungen von Sander und Troper. Merkls Theorie ist stärker. Er unterscheidet die Rechtswissenschaft von seinem Objekt, aber er vergisst sie nie. Gerade hierin liegt das doppelte Rechtsantlitz. Diese Formel ist oft mit der Idee verbunden, dass jeder Rechtsakt gleichzeitig eine Normanwendung und eine Normsetzung ist.88 Aber dieser wichtiger Aufsatz behandelt auch ein anderes Thema,89 nämlich die zwei Standpunkte, von denen aus das Recht betrachtet werden kann: der Standpunkt der Rechtsanwendung und der Standpunkt des Rechtswissenschaft.90 Merkl vernachlässigt nicht die Rechtswissenschaftstheorie. Und so hat er, im Unterschied zu Kelsen,91 eine echte Theorie der wissenschaftlichen Interpretation entworfen.92 Es sollte deshalb nicht verwundern, dass die Juristen, die eine kritische Rechtswissenschaft zu entwickeln versuchen, eine festere Stütze bei Merkl als bei Kelsen finden.93 Thomas Hochmann

Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Faculté de droit, 57, rue Pierre Taittinger, F-51096 Reims Cedex, [email protected]

Merkl (Fn. 3), 294. Vgl. kritisch Rainer Lippold, Gilt im Deutschen Recht ein Fehlerkalkül für Gesetze? Eine Untersuchung des Problems des verfassungswidrigen Gesetzes auf der Grundlage der Reinen Rechtslehre, Der Staat (1990), 196; Rainer Lippold, Recht und Ordnung, 2000, 412 ff. 88 Merkl (Fn. 6), 234. 89 Ebd.: „Aber noch in einem anderen Sinne kann man von einem doppelten Rechtsantlitze sprechen.“ 90 aaO, 246: „Hinter welchem dieser beiden Rechtsantlitze birgt sich das wahre richtige Recht?“ 91 Vgl. Matthias Jestaedt, Methoden(r)einheit und Disziplinenvielheit  – Das unvollendete Verwissenschaftlichungskonzept der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Gedenkschrift Robert Walter (Fn. 65), 226. 92 Adolf Merkl, Zum Interpretationsproblemn (1916), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. I/1 (Fn. 6), 63–83. 93 Vgl. z.B. Walter (Fn. 72); Jestaedt (Fn. 65); Otto Pfersmann, La production des normes: production normative et hiérarchie des normes, in: Traité international de droit constitutionnel, hg. von Michel Troper / Dominique Chagnollaud, Bd. 2, 2012, 484–528. 86 87

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Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül Wie geht das Recht mit Fehlern um?*1 RODRIGO GARCIA CADORE

Alternative Authorization v. Fehlerkalkül How does the law cope with legal errors? Abstract: Who decides that the process of law creation has been conducted “incorrect-

ly” in a specific legal case and what follows from this decision? These questions split the Vienna Circle around Hans Kelsen in the formation years of the Pure Theory of Law. In an attempt to manage those issues two “diametrically opposed” models have arisen: the one of the primacy of jurisprudence (Adolf Julius Merkl) and the so-called primacy of the legal process (Fritz Sander). The ensuing debate ultimately mobilizes the entire Viennese School and provides occasion for the development of creative readings of the problems at stake. The aim of this essay is to reconstruct and contrast Fehlerkalkül (calculus of non-conformity) and Alternativermächtigung (alternative authorization) as available strategies to cope with the problem of legal errors in such a way that central differences of opinion between the two main architects of the Stufenbau theory are revealed, namely between the Pure Theory of Law as it is conceived by Merkl and the Kelsenian Pure Theory of Law. By achieving clarity about the conceptual divergences and the different theoretical backgrounds of these models, which are not to be washed away and must be taken seriously, the respective gains and losses (prices to be paid) of knowledge attached with each of these solution attempts to the problem of “unlawful law” should become easier to identify. Keywords: alternative authorization, Fehlerkalkül, legal dynamics, Adolf Julius Merkl,

Hans Kelsen, legal errors Schlagworte: Alternativermächtigung, Fehlerkalkül, Hans Kelsen, Adolf Julius Merkl, Re-

chtsdynamik, Rechtsfehler

* Für zahlreiche wertvolle Anregungen bedanke ich mich herzlich bei Herrn Professor Dr. Matthias Jes-

taedt.

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Eine der intensivsten schulimmanenten Auseinandersetzungen in den Anfangsjahren der Reinen Rechtslehre ist diejenige um das Problem des sogenannten „rechtswidrigen Rechts“. Ausgelöst durch einen Beitrag Hans Kelsens (1881–1973) zum „Staatsunrecht“ im Jahr 19131 findet eine auf hohem rechtstheoretischem Niveau ausgetragene Diskussion statt, die die brillantesten Schüler der ersten Generation der Kelsen-Anhänger polarisiert. Die Quintessenz der Debatte besteht darin, eine plausible Antwort auf die Frage zu liefern: Wer entscheidet, dass die Rechtserzeugung in einem bestimmten Rechtsfall „fehlerhaft“ betrieben worden ist, und mit welchen Konsequenzen?2 Die Lösungsversuche setzen auf abweichende Kandidaten für den ersten Teil der Fragestellung: das dem Recht unterworfene Individuum, die Rechtsorgane oder die Rechtswissenschaft. Einerseits plädiert Adolf Julius Merkl (1890–1970) im Rahmen seiner reiferen Version des „Irrtumskalkül“-Konstrukts vehement für das Primat der Rechtswissenschaft. Rechtens ist, was die Rechtswissenschaft qua spezialisierte Wissensform der Juristen als Recht erkennt. Anderseits macht Fritz Sander (1889–1939), der gefallene Engel der Gründungsjahre, die Unvermeidbarkeit des Primats des Rechtsverfahrens geltend, wonach als Rechtsfehler nur das nachträglich anerkannt werden kann, was von den zuständigen Rechtsorganen zuvor als (Un-)Recht bestimmt wurde. An der Diskussion beteiligen sich mit unterschiedlichen rechtstheoretischen Vorschlägen auch andere Mitglieder der Wiener Schule der Rechtstheorie. Kelsen selber oszilliert lange Zeit unentschieden zwischen den Auffassungen seiner streitenden Schüler, entscheidet sich dann aber für eine Auffassung zur Rechtsfehlerproblematik, die sich eher der Lösung Sanders annähert, also der Leugnung der Möglichkeit von Rechtsfehlern als rechtstheoretische Kategorie. Er definiert die sogenannte „Alternativbestimmung“. Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist, Fehlerkalkül und Alternativermächtigung als Umgangsstrategien mit der Rechtsfehlerproblematik dergestalt zu rekonstruieren und zu kontrastieren, dass zentrale Auffassungsunterschiede zwischen den „Architekten“ des rechtlichen Stufenbaumodells aufgedeckt werden, nämlich zwischen den Reinen Rechtslehren Merkls und Kelsens.3

Zuerst erschien der Text 1913 als Separatdruck von dem erst 1914 in der Grünhuts Zeitschrift publizierten Beitrag: Hans Kelsen, Über Staatsunrecht. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Frage der Deliktsfähigkeit juristischer Personen und zur Lehre vom fehlerhaften Staatsakt, Grünhuts Zeitschrift für das Privat- und Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart 40 (1914), 1–114 = HKW 3, 439–531. Siehe auch zum Thema: Hans Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 32 (1914), 202–245, 390–438 (418–435) = HKW 3, 359–425 (412–423). 2 Marinus Maurits van Praag, Die Rechtsfunktionen, Alphen aan den Rijn 1932, 88. 3 Einige Auffassungsunterschiede sind jüngst untersucht worden, siehe: Patrick Hilbert, Fehlerkalkül oder Alternativbestimmung – zu den Strategien der Geburtshilfe im Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 72 (2017), 549–576 und Thomas Hochmann, Les théories de la „prise en compte des défauts“ et de l’„habilitation alternative“, in: Thomas Hochmann, Xavier Magnon und Régis Ponsard (Hrsg.), Un classique méconnu: Hans Kelsen, Paris 2019, 301–326. 1

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

I.

Der Fehlerkalkül4

1.

Von der Rechtskraftlehre zur Lehre des Fehlerkalküls

Der Fehlerkalkül (in männlicher Form) wird von Merkl in Konnex mit seiner Rechtskraftlehre eingeführt. Aus der Einsicht in die relative Unveränderbarkeit der Rechtserscheinungen, die zur Permanenz neigen und nur nach den Maßgaben des Rechtssystems selbst erzeugt, geändert oder vernichtet werden dürfen,5 ergibt sich die Gleichwertigkeit aller Rechtsbedingungen für die Erzeugung neuen Rechts.6 Beim diesbezüglichen Schweigen des positiven Rechts führe jedes durch den Intellekt konstatierbare Defizit bei der Erfüllung der Rechtserzeugungsbedingungen zum Scheitern des Rechtserzeugungsversuchs. Die Rechtskraftlehre verkörpert Merkls Konzept der Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts, die in wenigstens zwei Richtungen mit unterschiedlichen normativen Ansprüchen ausstrahlt. Nach außen gewendet, manifestiert sie sich in der Selbstbestimmung des positiven Rechts. Das positive Recht in seinen verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen bestimmt, was als Recht gilt. Neue Rechtserscheinungen entstehen und augenblickliche Rechtserscheinungen vergehen ausschließlich und allein nach den Maßgaben des Rechts. Rechtsveränderung kann nur als rechtsimmanente Operation prozessiert werden. „Die Geltung ist das Symbol der Selbstreproduktion des Rechts“,7 sodass rechtliche Geltung nur unter den von dem eigentlichen Validationssystem „Recht“ gesetzten Bedingungen erlangt werden kann: „An den (positiv)rechtlich dafür vorgesehenen Institutionen, Prozeduren und Kompetenzen vorbei kann keine Norm zu einer Rechtsnorm der betreffenden Rechtsordnung werden.“8 Die sich aus der relativen Unveränderlichkeit der Rechtsnormen, d. h. aus der Rechtskraft jeder Rechterscheinung ergebende Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts lässt sich nach außen folglich als „Undurchdringlichkeit“ des Rechtssystems übersetzen. Das Rechtssystem zeigt sich fundamental abgeneigt gegen fremde Eingriffe auf seine Selbstprogrammierung. „Nur durch Delegation von Seiten“ des Rechtssystems „kann eine diesem System a priori fremde Erscheinung a posteriori zu deren Bestandteil werden“:9 Ohne Delegation von Seiten der eigengesetzlichen Rechtsnormwelt keine Rechtsänderung.

Im Folgenden wird der Versuch unternommen, die Lehre des Fehlerkalküls systematisch in ihren grundlegenden Umrissen darzulegen. Eine Evolution und Änderungen berücksichtigende diachronische Darstellung dieser Thematik in der Reinen Rechtslehre Merkls wird einer anderen Gelegenheit vorbehalten. 5 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft, entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff, Wien 1923, 244. 6 Adolf Julius Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz, Juristische Blätter 47 (1918), 425–427; 444–447 und 463– 465 (446). 7 Niklas Luhmann, Die Geltung des Rechts, Rechtstheorie 22 (1991), 273–286 (280). 8 Matthias Jestaedt, Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts. Normativität, Kausalität und die Antwort der Verfassung, 5 (Typoskript – Im Erscheinen). 9 Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 238. 4

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Nach innen gewendet erweist sich in der Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts eine besondere Ausdrucksform der Normativität des Rechts, sprich: des Befolgungs- und Anwendungsanspruchs der Rechtsnormen. Sie kommuniziert die normative Erwartung, dass die Rechtsakteure, vor allem die Rechtsorgane, sich an die durch die vorgegebenen Rechtsvorschriften gezogene Schiene bei der Rechtsanwendung bzw. Rechtserzeugung halten. Die künftige Rechtserzeugung hat sich an der „eingeschlagenen Entwicklungslinie des Rechts“10 zu orientieren. Die anzuwendenden Rechtnormen markieren einen Horizont von zulässigen Rechtserzeugungsmöglichkeiten und es wird von dem internal point of view11 aus erwartet und beansprucht, dass die Rechtsakteure „auf den vom Recht vorgezeichneten Wegen Recht zu erzeugen imstande sind“.12 Daraus geht der Rahmencharakter der rechtsbedingenden Normen hervor, die als Deutungsschema für die Qualifikation der weiteren Rechtsoperationen als rechtmäßig/rechtswidrig dienen. Das positive Recht erhebt den normativen Anspruch, die Wirklichkeit der Rechtserzeugung innerhalb bestimmter Grenzen, der durch das anzuwendende Recht aufgerichteten Schranken, zu konfinieren. 2.

Die Rechtserzeugungsstrukturen zwischen Kognition und Dezision

Die Grundstruktur des Rechtssystems weist ein „Abhängigkeitsverhältnis“13 zwischen bedingenden Rechtsnormen und bedingten Rechtserscheinungen auf. Eine Rechtserscheinung gilt, weil sie dem bedingenden Normenkomplex entsprechend erzeugt wurde und solange sie nach den von diesem Rechtssystem statuierten Bedingungen nicht vernichtet bzw. derogiert wird.14 Das Abhängigkeitsverhältnis signalisiert eine Kognitionskomponente in der Rechtserzeugung. Der (rechts)erkennende Intellekt konfrontiert die prätendierte, erlassene Rechtserscheinung mit den als Maßstab dienenden bedingenden Normen und konstatiert die Entsprechung oder Nicht-EntAdolf Julius Merkl, Das Recht im Spiegel [Lichte] seiner Auslegung [Anwendung], Deutsche Richterzeitung 8 (1916), Sp. 584–592; 9 (1917), 162–176, 394–398, 443–450; 11 (1919), 290–298 (175). 11 Klassische Wendung in Herbert L. A. Hart, The concept of law, Oxford 1961, 86 ff. 12 Matthias Jestaedt, Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts. Normativität, Kausalität und die Antwort der Verfassung (Anm. 8), 5. 13 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues, in: Alfred Verdross (Hrsg.), Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht, Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre, FS Hans Kelsen, Berlin 1931, 252–294 (279). 14 Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird der sogenannte zweite Stufenbau, nämlich der Stufenbau nach der Derogationskraft nicht thematisiert. Siehe dazu aber: Robert Walter, Der Stufenbau nach der derogatorischen Kraft im österreichischen Recht: Zum 75. Geburtstag von Adolf Julius Merkl, Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung 20 (6. April 1965), 169–175 und Jörg Kammerhofer, Robert Walter, die Normkonflikte und der zweite Stufenbau des Rechts, in: Clemens Jabloner et al. (Hrsg.), Gedenkschrift Robert Walter, Wien 2012, 237–256. Für die Herausforderungen, die die Fehlerkalküllehre der Idee eines Stufenbaus nach der derogatorischen Kraft bereitet, siehe Rainer Lippold, Recht und Ordnung, Statik und Dynamik der Rechtsordnung, Wien 2000, 400–420. 10

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

sprechung der bedingten Erscheinungen, d. h. das Gelingen oder Scheitern eines Rechtserzeugungsversuchs. Die Rechtserzeugung wie die Rechtsvernichtung erfolgt dabei durch Delegation bzw. Kompetenzverteilung innerhalb des Rechtssystems. Ein zuständiges Rechtsorgan wird zur Rechtserzeugung auf Basis der Rechtsanwendung berufen. Auf jeder Stufe des Rechtsgewinnungsverfahrens werden rechtserzeugende, autoritative Entscheidungen getroffen. Dem rechtlichen Delegationszusammenhang sind Entscheidungsmomente kongenial. Statik qua Ableitbarkeit und Dynamik qua Entscheidbarkeit greifen bei jedem Akt der Rechtserzeugung wie der Rechtsvernichtung ineinander. Rechtsinhalt wird angewandt, transportiert und individualisiert über Dezisionen, Willensakte, sodass die bedingenden Normen beanspruchen, den Rechtsorganen rechtlich begrenzte Kompetenzen, d. h.: Rechtsentscheidungsmacht, zu übertragen. Sobald diese Delegation vorgenommen wurde, verliert sie jedoch die Oberhand über die Rechtsproduktion. Mit dieser Kompetenzübertragung geben die bedingenden Normen das Heft aus der Hand: „Die Geister, die gerufen wurden, lassen sich nicht mehr bannen“!15 Diskrepanzen zwischen den bedingenden Normen und den mit der Prätension der Rechtlichkeit gesetzten neuen Erscheinungen können nicht ausgeschlossen werden. Und genau da setzt der Fehlerkalkül an, sprich: bei der Menschlichkeit bzw. Fehleranfälligkeit der Rechtserzeugung. 3.

Die eigengesetzliche Fehlerhaftigkeit der Rechtsentscheidungen

Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts in der Lesart Merkls spiegelt sich exemplarisch bei seiner Rekonstruktion des Umgangs des positiven Rechts mit „Fehlern“ wider. Aus der durch statische Kognitionsmomente mediatisierten dynamischen Struktur der Rechtsordnung geht die Einheit des Rechts in seiner rechtserkenntnismäßig konstituierten Differenz zum Nicht-Recht hervor: der Erkenntnisgrund des Rechts ist derselbe wie der des Nichtrechtes.16 Die Kehrseite der Selbstbestimmung der Rechtlichkeit menschlicher Entscheidungen durch das positive Recht ist (mangels Fehlerkalküls) die Ausgrenzung „fehlerhaft“ erzeugter Normen aus dem Bereich des gültigen Rechts. Auch was als Rechtsfehler zu erkennen ist, wird als solcher nach den Maßgaben des Rechts bestimmt. Die „Rechtsrichtigkeit“ wird systemintern als „Rechtmäßigkeit“ verarbeitet. Das Rechtsverfahren liest die eventuell auftauchenden „Rechtsfehler“ als (In-)Konsistenzprobleme neu. Fehlerhaftigkeit erscheint als Rechtswidrigkeit bei der Rechtsanwendung/Rechtserzeugung. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Verordnungsgewalt im Kriege, Juristische Blätter 44 (1915), 375–376, 387–388 (von der Zensur gestrichen), 509–512; 45 (1916), 397–399, 409–411, 493–495, 505–507, 517–519; 48 (1919), 337–341 (511). 16 Vgl. René Marcic, Die bedingte Natur des positiven Rechts, Juristenzeitung 15 (1960), 198–203 (200).

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Nach außen gewendet immunisiert die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts die positiv-rechtlichen Operationen gegen die Anmaßungen außerrechtlicher Normativitätsformen. Die (Un-)Vollkommenheit der Rechtserscheinungen lässt sich nicht aufgrund systemexterner Maßstäbe beurteilen. Logische Fehlschlüsse, moralische Fehler, Ungerechtigkeiten, strategische Irrtümer, politische Ungeschicktheiten usw. sind in der Grammatik des Rechts nicht ohne weiteres als Rechtsfehler zu verstehen. Außerrechtliche Kriterien für die Evaluierung der „Korrektheit“ und Gültigkeit der erlassenen Rechtserscheinungen müssen „durch das Nadelöhr positivrechtlicher Erzeugungsvoraussetzungen geführt werden“,17 um rechtlich relevant bzw. um maßgeblich für die Beantwortung der Frage nach der Rechtsfehlerhaftigkeit einer Rechtserscheinung werden zu können. Nach innen gewendet deckt die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts die möglichst ausdifferenzierte Regulierungsgestaltung der Rechtsfehlerfolgen auf. Sie sorgt je nach positiver Rechtordnung für unterschiedlich ausgefeilte und komplexe „Rechtswidrigkeitsregime“.18 Nicht nur was als Rechtsfehler zu qualifizieren ist, sondern auch wie gravierend jeder Rechtsfehler in Bezug auf die valide Entstehung einer Rechtserscheinung zu wirken hat, wird lediglich mit Rekurs auf die Rechtsnormen qua Selektionsschema entschieden werden können. Welche Rechtsfehler zu welcher Reaktion einer Myriade möglicher Umgangsstrategien gehören, selektiert und sortiert das positive Recht selbst aus. Die Vorstellung der Grundstruktur des Rechtssystems qua Abhängigkeitsbeziehung zwischen bedingenden und bedingten Rechtserscheinungen hebt die Funktion der Rechtserzeugungsregel als Erkenntnisgrund weiterer Rechtsgestalten hervor. Die Überprüfung der Rechtswidrigkeit der Rechtserzeugung setzt die Unterscheidung von Ranghöherem und Rangniedrigerem, von Form und Formmangel,19 voraus und wird durch die Erkenntnis des rechtlichen Deutungsschemas konditioniert. Das erkennende Subjekt konfrontiert den mit dem Anspruch auf Rechtserzeugung auftretenden Willensakt mit dem Komplex bedingender Rechtsnormen, die institutionelles Setting, Kompetenzen, Verfahren und möglicherweise auch den Inhalt der künftigen Rechtsnormen mitzubestimmen versuchen. Gesucht wird nach der „Entsprechung“ zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, bedingender und bedingter Erscheinung, sodass man von einem mehr oder weniger statischen „Norm-Norm-Ableitungszusammenhang“20 reden könnte. Die Dynamisierung des Rechtserzeugungsverfahrens über die sukzessiven Ermächtigungen zur Schaffung von neuem Recht und zur Anwendung von rechtlichen

Matthias Jestaedt, Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts. Normativität, Kausalität und die Antwort der Verfassung (Anm. 8), 5. 18 Matthias Jestaedt, Selbstand und Offenheit der Verfassung, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (Hrsg.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Bd. XII: Normativität und Schutz der Verfassung, Heidelberg 2014, 327–382 (352). 19 Vgl. René Marcic, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Reine Rechtslehre, Wien 1966, 29. 20 Konzept in Matthias Jestaedt, Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein…, Tübingen 2006, 42. 17

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

Sanktionen durch die Rechtsorgane bringt aber die Möglichkeit von „Abirrung“, „Abweichung“, „Devianz“, „Diskrepanz“, „Dissonanz“, „Entgleisung“, „Nicht-Deckung“, „Nicht-Entsprechung“, „Nicht-Übereinstimmung“ und/oder „Unableitbarkeit“21 zwischen bedingenden und bedingten Rechtserscheinungen mit sich. Das erkenntnismäßig feststellbare Auseinanderfallen von Rechtserkenntnis und Rechtserzeugung plausibilisiert im Modell Merkls die Handhabe der Kategorie „Rechtsfehler“ – als Signum für die Differenz zwischen dem durch die Rechtswissenschaft konstruierten Rahmen für die rechtmäßige Rechtserzeugung und dem Produkt der autoritativen Entscheidung des zuständigen Rechtsanwenders. Die „Rechtsfehler“ besetzen die Stelle eines Anzeigers des Abdockens zwischen der Rechtsordnung laut Rechtserkenntnis und der Rechtsordnung laut Rechtserzeugung, weshalb die Bezeichnung der doppelten Rechtsordnung nicht völlig unangebracht sein dürfte.22 Mit dieser Devianzmöglichkeit rechnet, ja kalkuliert das positive Recht. 4.

Der Fehlerkalkül als Devise der Interdependenzunterbrechung

Das positive Recht selbst spannt eine tolerierbare „Fehlerlatitüde“,23 indem ausdifferenzierte Fehlerreaktionsmechanismen vorgesehen werden,24 die am Maß der bedingenden Norm gemessen für die Geltung bzw. rechtliche Wirksamkeit defizitärer Rechtserscheinungen sorgen.25 Zum Wesen des Fehlerkalküls gehört die „Verbindlichmachung solcher potentiell rechtswidriger Staatswillensäußerungen“ durch die kontingent vom positiven Recht auszugestaltende „Gutmachung des Fehlers“.26 Es handelt sich um ein positivrechtliches Instrumentarium zur Widerspruchsbehebung,27 das Merkl bedient sich sämtlicher Ausdrücke, um das Auseinanderfallen von Rechtserkenntnis und Rechtserzeugung zu charakterisieren. Hier wird auf einen ausführlichen Nachweis verzichtet. 22 Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Verordnungsgewalt im Kriege (Anm. 15), 511. 23 Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 298. 24 Fehlervorsorgestrategien können auch den positivrechtlichen Fehlerkalkül integrieren, dem eine Antizipationslogik  – dem Konzept nach  – innewohnt. Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 293. In diese Facette des Fehlerkalküls qua Fehlervorsorge zoomt Johannes Buchheim, Subjektive Rechte als Fehlerkalkül, in: Ruwen Fritsche et al (Hrsg.), Unsicherheiten des Rechts. ARSP-Beiheft 162, Stuttgart 2020, 223–236. 25 Merkl definiert Fehlerkalkül als „jene positivrechtliche Bestimmung, die es juristisch ermöglicht, dem Staat solche Akte zuzurechnen, die nicht die Summe der anderweitig positivrechtlich aufgestellten Voraussetzungen ihrer Entstehung und damit ihrer Geltung erfüllen, die es erlaubt, solche Akte trotz jenes Mangels als Recht zu erkennen“. Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 293; Siehe auch ders., Die gerichtliche Prüfung von Gesetzen und Verordnungen, Österreichisches Zentralblatt für die juristische Praxis 39 (1921), 569–609 (434 ff.); ders , Justizirrtum und Rechtswahrheit, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 45 (1925), 452–465 (458); ders., Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, Berlin 1927, 196 ff.; ders., Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues (Anm. 13), 491 ff. 26 Adolf Julius Merkl, Individualismus und Universalismus als staatliche Baugesetze, Internationale Zeitschrift für Rechtstheorie 8 (1934), 243–265 (254). 27 Adolf Julius Merkl, Justizirrtum und Rechtswahrheit (Anm. 25), 451. 21

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ermöglicht, dass erkenntnismäßig nicht mehr auf einen Komplex von bedingenden Rechtsnormen rückbeziehbare  – weil außerhalb des Rahmens erzeugte  – bedingte Rechtserscheinungen in den einheitlichen Rechtserzeugungszusammenhang Eingang finden. In gewissem Sinne modifiziert der Fehlerkalkül die Rechtserzeugungsregel, ja das anzuwendende Recht. Er reduziert das intendierte Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zwischen den Rechtserscheinungen auf ein Minimum und sorgt für eine Art von Interdependenzunterbrechung. Auch die „fehlerhaften“ Rechtserscheinungen sind gültig, solange das positive Recht selbst für diese Geltung sorgt. Im rechtlichen Validationssystem bleibt immer „ein mehr oder minder großer unauflösbarer Rest von Diskontinuität bestehen“.28 Die bedingte Rechtserscheinung muss „bis zu einem gewissen Minimum von Bedingungen […] der rechtlichen Erzeugungsregel entsprechen“,29 sie kann aber je nach positivrechtlicher Konfigurierung qua fehlerhafte, unvollkommene Rechtserscheinung bestehen bleiben, ohne dem Maximum der Bestimmungen von Form und Inhalt zu entsprechen. In dieser Konstruktion ist ein Minimum an Rechtsanwendung nicht verhandelbar, denn „in der nächsttieferen – wenn man will: nächsthöheren – Rechtsschichte muß sich nun die [vorhergehende Fremdprogrammierung] wiederfinden“,30 damit man für die in Frage kommende Rechtserscheinung noch einen Erkenntnisgrund parat hat. Indem ein Minimum von einem Maximum an Rechtsbedingungen unterschieden wird, schafft der positivrechtliche Fehlerkalkül Raum für die rechtstheoretische Disjunktion von rechtlichem Können und rechtlichem Dürfen31 bzw. von Rechtswirksamkeit und Rechtmäßigkeit.32 Solange eine Rechtserscheinung sich im Bereich des Rechtskönnens bewegt, existiert sie rechtlich, ist sie rechtswirksam, auch wenn sie in einer unzulässigen Form oder mit unzulässigem Inhalt erlassen wurde, d. h. wenn sie außerhalb der Grenzen des Rechtsdürfens gesetzt wurde. Der Fehlerkalkül verarbeitet den Richtigkeitsanspruch im Recht als Rechtmäßigkeitsanspruch und beschreibt die Spannung zwischen Normativitätsanspruch der Rechtserscheinungen und Positivität/Wirklichkeit der Rechtsentscheidungen durch die zuständigen Organe als eine dem Recht immanente Konstante, die sich bei jeder Stufe der Rechtskonkretisierung aufs Neue wiederholt. Der sogenannte fehlerhafte Rechtsakt weist rechtliche Mängel auf, aber „nur seine Unrechtmäßigkeit, nicht der Widerspruch

Adolf Julius Merkl, Das Problem der rechtlichen Kontinuität und die Forderung nach der Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 5 (1926), 497–527 (509). 29 Adolf Julius Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Anm. 25), 192. 30 Adolf Julius Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz (Anm. 6), 427. 31 Ausführlich dazu siehe Philipp Reimer, Können und Dürfen. Zur rechtstheoretischen Zentralität eines unterschätzten Begriffspaars, Rechtstheorie 48 (2017), 417–439. Siehe auch Matthias Jestaedt, Vom Beruf der Rechtswissenschaft  – zwischen Rechtspraxis und Rechtstheorie, in: Horst Dreier (Hrsg.), Rechtswissenschaft als Beruf, Tübingen 2018, 227–255 (244–246). 32 Vgl. Philipp Reimer, Die Unabhängigkeit von Rechtmäßigkeit und Rechtswirksamkeit, Rechtstheorie 45 (2014), 383–414. 28

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

zu jedem beliebigen Wertsystem, nur der Widerspruch zum Rechtswertsystem, zur Rechtsordnung, macht einen Staatsakt in technischem Sinne zum ‚fehlerhaften‘“.33 5.

Das Primat der Rechtswissenschaft

Die Möglichkeit der Korrektur eines Fehlers saniert die Fehlerhaftigkeit der unvollkommenen Rechtserscheinungen, die doch gelten, obwohl sie laut der rechtswissenschaftlichen Vernunft nicht rechtmäßig sind. Das rechtliche Können erklärt die Geltung eines unzulässigen, weil außerhalb der Schranken des Dürfens erzeugten, Rechtsaktes. Wenn der Bogen des Könnens eigentlich nur angesichts der weiteren möglichen Reaktionen auf „rechtserzeugende Rechtserkenntnisfehler“34 gespannt wird, stößt dieses Spiel bei der Entscheidung einer letzten, der Rechtskontrolle nicht mehr unterworfenen Instanz, an seine Grenzen. Erst hier wird das starke Primat der Rechtswissenschaft von Merkl aktiviert. Es ist die Aufgabe der Rechtstheoretiker, Fehler, Inkongruenzen zwischen bedingenden und bedingten Rechtserscheinungen als solche (an)zuerkennen und dementsprechend diese in die Domäne des Nicht-Rechts zu verweisen.35 Die durch die bloße Vorstellung des positiven Rechts als dynamischer Delegationszusammenhang gerufenen Geister bzw. fehlerhaften Rechtserscheinungen will Merkl an der Spitze des Fehlerkalküls mit der Fackel der rechtstheoretischen Vernunft verbannen können. Die Beantwortung der „Grundfrage“ nach der Rechtswahrheit „fällt nie in die Kompetenz des Objekts, sondern des Subjekts“, ist „nie Kompetenz der Rechtspraxis, ausschließlich Kompetenz der rechtlichen Theorie“.36 II.

Die Alternativermächtigung37

1.

Denken von der Kompetenz her

Während Merkl das Problem des rechtswidrigen Rechts letztendlich als Problem der fehlerhaften Rechtserscheinungen darlegt, auf der Erkennbarkeit der Fehler beharrt

Adolf Julius Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Anm. 25), 192. Matthias Jestaedt, Wirken und Wirkungen höchstrichterlicher Judikatur – Rechtsprechung von Grenzorganen aus Sicht der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Clemens Jabloner (Hrsg.), Wirken und Wirkungen höchstrichterlicher Judikatur, Wien 2007, 9–34 (29). 35 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 286–287. 36 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Das Recht im Spiegel seiner Auslegung (Anm. 10), 447. 37 Genau wie bei der Darstellung des Fehlerkalküls beansprucht die vorliegende Auseinandersetzung mit der Lehre der Alternativermächtigung keine Kartographie der unterschiedlichen Formulierungen dieses Konstrukts in der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens, sondern meint, eine systematische, treue Rekonstruktion der reiferen Version dieser Lehre anbieten zu können. 33 34

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und unter anderem nach der substanziellen Bestimmung der Rechtswahrheit fragt, die er über Umwege der Rechtswissenschaft zuspricht, schildert Kelsen diese Problematik primär als diejenige des Normenkonflikts.38 Ausgangspunkt und Horizont der Fragestellung ist die Einheit des Rechts.39 Fragt sich Merkl in diesem Zusammenhang „Was ist die Wahrheit?“ und weist auf die Rechtmäßigkeit als Maß bzw. Kriterium für die Behandlung dieser Fragestellung, wirft Kelsen unmittelbar die Frage nach der Entscheidungsmacht auf und arbeitet diese Irritation systemimmanent als eine Kompetenzangelegenheit aus. Die Frage, „ob eine von einem Rechtsorgan erzeugte Norm der ihre Erzeugung oder auch ihren Inhalt bestimmenden höheren Norm entspricht“, kann nicht von der Frage getrennt werden, „wer zur Entscheidung der vorangehenden Frage von der Rechtsordnung ermächtigt ist“.40 „Rechtswidriges Recht“ ist daher der Anlass zur Ausarbeitung einer Ermächtigungstheorie bzw. einer Theorie des rechtlichen Könnens,41 die mit der Theorie des rechtlichen Dürfens aber nicht richtig verbunden wird. Bei der Behandlung des Problems des „rechtswidrigen Rechts“ wird  – vermutlich bewusst! – in den reiferen Werken Kelsens die Semantik der „Rechtsfehler“ eher vermieden.42 Genau wie Merkl sieht Kelsen im dynamischen Operationsmodus des positiven Rechts, dessen selbstreferentielle Anwendung bzw. Weitererzeugung auf die Entscheidung autoritativer Instanzen angewiesen ist, eine strukturelle, von der Rechtsverwirklichung nicht weg zu definierende „Rechtsfehlerquelle“. Sobald Rechtsmacht für die Rechtsanwendung und Rechtserzeugung delegiert wird, entsteht die nicht eliminierbare Möglichkeit autoritativer Rechtsentscheidungen, die sich durch Rechtserkenntnis nicht auf den Rahmen der anzuwendenden Rechtsnormen zurückführen lassen. Anders als Merkl löst Kelsen diese Angelegenheit aber rechtstheoretisch in die Eigendynamik des Rechts auf, indem er die rechtlichen Fragen primär als Ermächtigungsfragen rekonstruiert und aus der „Rechtsfehler- bzw. Fehlerfolgefrage“ eine „Kompetenzfrage“ macht. Die Quelle des Problems ist zugleich die Quelle seiner Lösung; das Gift wird zum Antidot. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik [fortan RR1], Wien 1934, 84–89; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Mit einem Anhang: Das Problem der Gerechtigkeit [fortan RR2], Wien 1960, 271–280. 39 So schon deutlich in den frühesten Thematisierungen der Alternativermächtigung, wenn auch mit einem noch etwas mehr substanzialistich beladenen Verständnis der Einheit des Rechts. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus, Charlottenburg 1928, 22. 40 Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 272. 41 Zur Prominenz der Ermächtigung (des rechtlichen Könnens) bei der Strukturierung der Rechtsdynamik in der Reinen Rechtslehre siehe Stanley Paulson, Ermächtigung: Grundmodalität der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Erich Schweighofer / Meinrad Handstanger / Harald Hoffmann et al. (Hrsg.), Zeichen und Zauber des Rechts. Festschrift für Friedrich Lachmayer, Bern 2014, 21–34. Noch früher: Stanley Paulson, An Empowerment Theory of Legal Norms, Ratio Juris 1 (1988), 58–72. 42 Anders ist die Lage in den früheren Schriften. Pars pro toto: „Darin, daß die ‚normwidrige‘ Norm aufgehoben werden kann oder daß ein Organ ihretwegen bestraft werden soll, liegt dasjenige, was man besser als mit ‚Normwidrigkeit‘ (‚Verfassungswidrigkeit‘, ‚Gesetzeswidrigkeit‘), mit ‚Mangel-‘ oder ‚Fehlerhaftigkeit‘ der Norm bezeichnet“, Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 96. 38

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

2.

Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts: „Einen anderen entscheiden zu lassen“43

Die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Rechts qua differentia specifica des (modernen) positiven Rechts manifestiert sich  – in der Grundmelodie der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens  – nicht zuletzt in seinem „Gerichtsrecht“-Charakter.44 Im sich dynamisch in Gestalt eines Entscheidungsnetzes bzw. einer Entscheidungsordnung strukturierenden positiven Recht wird der Rechtsindividualisierungsakt auf jeder Ebene des Rechtsgewinnungsverfahrens durch ein „von dem Verpflichteten verschiedenes, objektives ‚Organ‘ besorgt“.45 Die Einsicht in diese Facette der Positivität des Rechts  – „Kein Recht ohne Gericht!“46  – ist zugleich das, was die Möglichkeit der Meinungsunterschiede zwischen den Parteien eines Rechtsstreits, der Lesart der rechtlichen Lage durch die Rechtswissenschaft und der diesbezüglichen Entscheidung eines Rechtsorgans besonders prägnant erkennbar macht und was die Fehlerhaftigkeit der Rechtsentscheidungen gewissermaßen wieder invisibilisiert, indem die Meinung des Rechtsanwenders als die einzige rechtserhebliche Meinung wahrgenommen wird.47 Das Ausblenden des Organmoments48 bei der Auseinandersetzung mit Rechtsproblemen weist auf ein Überbleibsel der Naturrechtslehre hin,49 genauer: auf ein ethisierendes Rechtsverständnis beim Umgang mit rechtlichen Problemen.50 Typisch für diese Rechtsauffassungen ist die Vorstellung eines unmittelbaren, rechtserheblichen Zugangs der individuellen, autonomen Vernunft zu den rechtlichen Vorgaben.51 Die Vgl. Jakob Faig, Beziehungsprobleme – Überlegungen zur Theorie des Fehlerkalküls, in: Ruwen Fritsche et al (Hrsg.), Unsicherheiten des Rechts. ARSP-Beiheft 162, Stuttgart 2020, 209–222 (276). 44 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Die Idee des Naturrechts, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 7 (1927/1928), 221–250 (239). 45 Hans Kelsen, Die Idee des Naturrechts (Anm. 44), 237. 46 Hans Kelsen, Die Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtlehre, entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtsatze, Wien 1911, 35 = HKW2, 21–878 (120). 47 Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm.  38), 245: „Vom Standpunkt der durch Menschen anzuwendenden Rechtsordnung kommen nur Meinungen von Menschen darüber in Betracht, ob ein bestimmter Mensch einen bestimmten Mord begangen hat. […] Wenn die generelle Rechtsnorm angewendet werden soll, kann nur eine Meinung gelten. Welche, das muß durch die Rechtsordnung bestimmt werden. Es ist die Meinung, die in der Entscheidung des Gerichtes zum Ausdruck kommt.“ 48 Dies in der Entstehungsgeschichte der Reinen Rechtslehre hervorgehoben zu haben ist das bleibende Verdienst von Fritz Sander. Vgl. z.B. Fritz Sander, Der Begriff der Rechtserfahrung, Logos 11 (1922–1923), 285–308 (299 ff.). 49 Vgl. Karl Olivecrona, Law as a fact, 2. Aufl., London 1971, 268 ff. 50 „Fast die gesamte herrschende Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtswissenschaft fußt auf dem uralten Dogma von der Normativität des Rechtes: Recht ist ihr ein Inbegriff von Normen, Imperativen, Vorschriften, Willensäußerungen, Wunsch- und Befehlsätzen, ein Komplex von Bedeutungen, der in nahem Zusammenhang mit der Ethik steht, also ein Sollen, das über jedes Sein hinausgreift“, Fritz Sander, Der Begriff der Rechtserfahrung (Anm. 48), 286. 51 „Nur eine Rechtslehre, welche am Dogma von der Normativität des Rechtes festhält, richtet ihren Blick nicht auf in Rechtsverfahren aktuelle, sondern in Rechtssätzen potentielle Norminhalte, sucht den Umgang dieses potentiellen Norminhaltes durch die formallogischen Mittel der ethisch-politischen Postulate folgenden Auslegung zu ermitteln“, Fritz Sander, Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung? Kritische Studie zur Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 2 (1921), 511–670 (557–558). 43

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Entscheidung über die Rechtmäßigkeit oder Rechtswidrigkeit einer menschlichen Handlung wird nun dezentralisiert bzw. nicht durch die Interposition einer Autorität mediatisiert. Im sich aus dieser Lesart ergebenden Modell fordert das Recht von den handelnden Rechtssubjekten ein bestimmtes Verhalten, das durch Interpretation zu bestimmen ist.52 Die Rechtsnormen sprechen das Individuum unmittelbar an,53 sodass Herr Jedermann auch dazu berufen ist, zu entscheiden, was Rechtens ist. Das heißt auch, Recht von Schein-Recht zu unterscheiden, und zwar mit dem Anspruch, die auf Erkenntnis basierte Entscheidung mit Rechtsbindung auszustatten. In diesem Gedanken findet die Idee der „Fehlerhaftigkeit“ der Rechtsakte wie die Sprechweise der „Rechtsfehler“ ihren Raum. Darin liegen die tiefen Wurzel der herkömmlich rechtswissenschaftlichen, eher statisch gefassten und materiell beladenen Behandlung der „Rechtsfehlerproblematik“, gegen die sich die Reine Rechtslehre Kelsens der Intuition Fritz Sanders folgend in gewissem Sinne wendet. 3.

Die Differenzierung von Rechtmäßigkeit und Rechtswidrigkeit als Aufgabe des positiven Rechts

Im Validationssystem der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens hingegen gibt es keinen Raum für „Rechtmäßigkeit“ oder „Rechtswidrigkeit“ schlechthin. Berücksichtigt man das eigengesetzliche Funktionieren der Rechtsmaschinerie, ergibt die Rede über eine Rechtswidrigkeit an sich keinen Sinn.54 Die Rechtmäßigkeit wird in Relation zum Inhalt der Entscheidung des zuständigen Rechtsorgans konstituiert. Rechtsindividualisierung und -konkretisierung ereignen sich im Verlauf eines Verfahrens, in dem eine Kette von sukzessiven Entscheidungskompetenzen sichtbar wird. Will man erfahren, was Rechtens ist, muss man auf die Bestimmungskraft der zuständigen Rechtsanwender bei jeder Stufe des Rechtsgewinnungsverfahrens warten. „Rechtswidriges Recht“ und „normwidrige Rechtsnorm“ erweisen sich in dieser Variante der Reinen Rechtslehre als Selbstwidersprüche. Alles, was im Bezug auf das Koordinatensystem des Rechtserzeugungszusammenhangs von einem zuständigen Rechtsorgan als Recht bestimmt wird, ist rechtmäßig. Mit einer dem Fehlerkalkül ähnlichen Begrifflichkeit macht Kelsen geltend, das positive Recht „rechnet mit rechtswidrigem Recht und bestätigt dessen Existenz gerade dadurch, daß es mannigfache Vorkehrungen trifft, es zu verhindern und einzuschränken“.55 Im gleichen Zug, in dem Vgl. Christoph Kletzer, The Idea of a Pure Theory of Law, London 2018, 16–20. Sander bezeichnet als „Grundvoraussetzung“ der von ihm bekämpfte „Rechtsdogmatik“ die Auffassung, „daß das ‚Recht‘ an die menschliche Subjektivität [der Rechtsunterworfenen] gerichtete Normen oder Imperative bedeute[t]“. Fritz Sander, Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung? (Anm. 51), 519. 54 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 274. 55 Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 84; Vgl. auch ders , RR2 (Anm. 38), 271. 52 53

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

es „unerwünschte Normen gelten läßt, nimmt es diesen den eigentlichen Charakter der Rechtswidrigkeit“.56 Der Rechtswissenschaft steht die Aufgabe zu, die Maschinerie der Rechtserzeugung und Rechtsvernichtung reflexiv zu rekonstruieren. Die zuständigen, dazu ermächtigten Rechtsorgane und nicht die Rechtswissenschaft entscheiden, was rechtmäßig und was rechtswidrig ist.57 Die Rechtswissenschaft darf sich die Berichtigung der angeblichen „Rechtsfehler“ der Rechtsanwender nicht anmaßen, will sie ihre das Recht lediglich beschreibende Kompetenzen nicht überschreiten. 4.

Der Alternativcharakter der Ermächtigungsnormen

Die Zentralisierung der Entscheidungsbefugnisse über Ermächtigungsnormen schafft selbstverständlich nicht das Erkenntnis- bzw. Urteilsvermögen der in der Rolle der Rechtswissenschaftler agierenden Individuen aus der Welt. Bei der Betrachtung der dynamischen, durchgängig selbstreferenziellen Erzeugung und Vernichtung des positiven Rechts macht man immer wieder die Erfahrung, dass in unterschiedlichem Maß rechtliche Determinierung auf dem Weg der Rechtskonkretisierung verloren gehen kann und und zum großen Teil auch verloren geht.58 Die Lehre der Alternativermächtigung ist die von Kelsen konzipierte Lösung für die rechtswissenschaftliche Beschreibung der Entstehung geltenden Rechts in solchen Situationen. Es kommt also darauf an, die eigengesetzlichen Rechtsoperationen zu rekonstruieren. Wie die Rechtstheorie den alltäglichen Befund der – laut der Rechtsdogmatik oder den in eine Rechtsstreitigkeit verwickelten Parteien – außerhalb des rechtmäßigen Rahmens liegenden Entscheidungen auseinanderdröseln kann, steht dabei im Fokus. „Das peinliche Faktum eines ‚doppelten Rechtsbodens‘“59 kann nicht vermieden werden. Mit ihm muss die Rechtstheorie umgehen. Beobachtet man, dass sich Rechtsnormen in einer konkreten Rechtserfahrung als solche durchsetzen, die durch die „autonome Vernunft“ nicht auf den durch den anzuwendenden Rechtsnormenkomplex demarkierten Rahmen zurückzuführen sind, ist davon auszugehen, dass die als Deutungsschema fungierenden Ermächtigungsnormen einen alternativen Charakter besitzen:60 Das zur Anwendung des Rechts berufe-

Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 84–85. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Was ist ein Rechtsakt?, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 4 (1951–1952), 263–274 (265 und 268). 58 Hans Kelsen, Die Idee des Naturrechts (Anm. 44), 248. 59 Hans Kelsen, Die Idee des Naturrechts (Anm. 44), 248. 60 Kelsen verwendet leicht unterschiedliche Begriffe für die Bezeichnung des in der Lehre der Alternativermächtigung beschriebenen Phänomens: „Alternation“ (Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, in: VVDStRL 5 (1929), 30–88 (79)), „Alternativ-Bestimmung“ (Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 86) und „Alternativ-Vorschrift“ (Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 88.). In der unter der Betreuung Kelsens aus dem deutschen Manuskript in die englische Sprache übersetzten „General Theory of Law

56 57

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ne Rechtsorgan kann entweder die durch die bedingenden Rechtsnormen vorselektionierten möglichen Rechtsinhalte in der durch den vorgegebenen Komplex geltender Normen beanspruchten Form konkretisieren, oder eine neue Rechtsnorm zur Geltung bringen, die keine der durch den Rechtsrahmen positiv markierten Möglichkeiten – frei nach C. Möllers – aktualisiert. Der durch die höherrangigen Rechtsnormen vorgegebene Weg für die künftige Rechtserzeugung fungiert in so einer Konstellation beobachtbarer, als geltendes Recht hingenommener „rechtswidriger Rechtsentscheidung“ nicht als eine eindeutige Bestimmung, sondern muss im Sinne einer „Alternation“ verstanden werden: „entweder so, aber wenn nicht, dann auch – beinahe beliebig – anders“.61 Das Konstrukt der Alternativermächtigung ermöglicht die Unterbringung von durch die kognitiven Fähigkeiten des Beobachters konstatierten „Rechtswidrigkeiten“ in der formellen Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Rechtmäßig ist dementsprechend alles, was sich als Recht im Gang des Rechtsverfahrens durchsetzt. Das Effektivitätsprinzip, wie Kelsen sich hier ausdrückt, begrenzt das Legitimitätsprinzip.62 Vom Standpunkt der Rechtsbindung aus gleichwertig, würden sich die durch die direkte Ermächtigung gedeckten Rechtsnormen von denen der alternativen Ermächtigung lediglich dergestalt unterscheiden, dass den Ersteren durch das vorgegebene geltende Recht eine Art Präferenz geschenkt wird.63 Der bestehende Rechtsrahmen markiert positiv eine Fülle von Möglichkeiten der Rechtserzeugung, er äußert einen rechtlichen Vorzug, der sich des Weiteren darin äußern kann, dass das positive Recht die „rechtswidrige Rechtserzeugung“ als Vernichtbarkeitsgrund reguliert oder die Verantwortlichkeit des Rechtsorgans dafür vorsieht. In der nicht hinreichend ausdifferenzierten Begrifflichkeit der Kelsenschen Lesart des Problems steht Rechtmäßigkeit für den Bezug auf das Rechtserzeugungsverfahren und wird nicht sauber von der Rechtsand State“ heißt es „alternative prescription“ (Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge 1945, 159). In der auch von Kelsen betreuten französischen Übersetzung der ersten Auflage der Reinen Rechtslehre liest man „dispositions alternatives“ (Hans Kelsen, Théorie pure du droit, Paris 1953, 131). Die kanonische Formulierung befindet sich in: Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 273 und 277, wo die Rede von „Alternativbestimmungen“ ist. Siehe noch Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Wien 1979, 200. 61 Hans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit (Anm. 60), 79. 62 Hans Kelsen, RR 2 (Anm. 38), 280. Diese Auffassung unterscheidet sich von früheren Stellungnahmen Kelsens zu der Rechtsfehlerproblematik: „Allein das Prinzip der Selbstlegitimation der Rechtsakte hat seine Grenzen: Letzten Endes ist es doch die rechtstheoretische Vernunft, die auf den Grund ihrer Hypothesis zum einheitlichen System zusammengeschlossenen Tatbeständen ihren rechtlichen Sinn, ihre spezifische Bedeutung verleiht […]“ Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin 1925, 278. Liest man die verschiedenen Formulierungen Kelsens zu dem Thema im Laufe seines Lebenswerks losgelöst von der Betrachtung der schulimmanenten Kontroversen innerhalb des Kelsen-Kreises, kann man nicht anders als sich mit Erstaunen fragen, ob in der Brust Kelsens eigentlich zwei Herzen schlugen. Die Schwankungen des Haupts der Wiener Schule müssen im Zusammenhang mit den Auseinandersetzungen mit seinen Schülern behandelt werden, was einer anderen Gelegenheit vorbehalten wird – sie spiegeln die Existenz unterschiedlicher Lesarten der Reinen Rechtslehre in den Gründungsjahren der Wiener Schule der Rechtstheorie wider. 63 Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 278. In der ersten Auflage der RR war von einer Disqualifikation der über den Weg der Alternativbestimmung erzeugten Rechtsnorm gegenüber der durch die direkte Regelung der Ermächtigungsnorm gedeckten Rechtserscheinung die Rede. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 87.

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

geltung unterschieden. Sie referiert eher die Verbindlichkeit des Rechts nach außen als die Konformität zur Erzeugungsregel. Soweit in diese aber auch eine Alternativbestimmung integriert wird,64 fehlt im Repertoire der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens ein Signum für die Rechtswidrigkeit der Rechtserzeugung, da die allumfassende rechtliche Ermächtigung alles verrechtlicht. 5.

Der mangelnde Fehlerbegriff oder: Das Primat der Rechtserzeugung

Die Alternativermächtigung läuft daher auf ein Fehlerkalkül ohne Fehler hinaus.65 Dies mag für eine verblüffende und in Verlegenheit setzende Beschreibung rechtlicher Phänomene sorgen, ist aber immanent betrachtet kein Fehler, sondern Programm in der Matrix der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsenscher Art. Sogar die „Gesetzwidrigkeit“ einer Entscheidung oder die „Verfassungswidrigkeit“ eines Gesetzes werden dabei in Anführungszeichen gesetzt. In ihrem rechtswissenschaftlich kritischen Potenzial werden diese Kategorien als Meinungsunterschiede zwischen der rechtsrelevanten autoritativen Entscheidung und den nicht rechtsverbindlichen Interpretationen anderer entschärft. „Von der Interpretation durch die Rechtsautorität zu sagen, sie sei richtig oder falsch, ist juristisch sinnlos; denn selbst wenn sie vom Standpunkt reiner Erkenntnis falsch wäre, ist sie doch Recht, d. h. Norm, und als solche weder wahr noch falsch […]“.66 Die Lehre der Alternativermächtigung ist prägnanter Ausdruck des Primats der Rechtserzeugung in der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens, indem der Standpunkt des autorisierten Rechtsanwenders eingenommen und privilegiert wird. „Wenn ein gültiger Akt des rechtsanwendenden Organs keine der vom Standpunkt der Rechtswissenschaft möglichen Deutungen der anzuwendenden Rechtsnorm darstellt, kann der wissenschaftliche Jurist nur feststellen, daß durch diesen Akt neues Recht […] erzeugt wurde.“67 Mangels präziser Formulierungen und Arrondierung des Konzepts kulminiert die Alternativermächtigung in einer Art Selbstermächtigung der in ihrer Stellung qua autorisierten Rechtsanwendern kraft eines gewissen institutionellen Settings stabilisierten Rechtsorgane. Auch außerhalb des Rahmens der anzuwendenden Normen liegende Entscheidungen schaffen geltendes und rechtmäßiges Recht, das letztendlich als solches von den eigenen rechtserzeugenden Organen bestimmt wird. Deren rechtsschöpferische Betätigungen sind über den Weg der Alternativbestimmungen ohnehin vom Mantel der Rechtmäßigkeit gedeckt.

64 „Diese beiden Normen bilden eine Einheit.“ Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 273. Schon ähnlich in Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 86. 65 Vgl. Johannes Buchheim, Fehlerkalkül als Ermächtigung?, Rechtstheorie 45 (2014), 59–78 (70). 66 Hans Kelsen, Was ist die Reine Rechtslehre?, in: Demokratie und Rechtsstaat, Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Zaccaria Giacometti, Zürich 1953, 143–162 (150–151). 67 Hans Kelsen, Was ist die Reine Rechtslehre? (Anm. 66), 151.

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III.

Fehlerkalkül vs. Alternativermächtigung

Ausgehend von der Konturierung des Fehlerkalküls und der Alternativermächtigung als konkurrierende Modelle für die Rekonstruktion des Umgangs des positiven Rechts mit „Rechtsfehlern“ durch die Rechtswissenschaft lassen sich philosophische, rechtwissenschafts- und rechtstheoretische Annahmen und Implikationen der unterschiedlichen Ansätze identifizieren. Sich Klarheit über diese Divergenzen und deren Wurzeln zu verschaffen, soll eine nüchternere Einschätzung der Potenziale und Grenzen der beiden Lesarten der Rechtsfehlerproblematik ermöglichen. Dass die eine rechtstheoretische Lösung sieht, was die andere nicht sehen kann, ist nicht zuletzt dadurch bedingt, dass sie unterschiedliche Perspektiven, ja Blickwinkel, für die Annäherung an das Problem auswählen. 1.

Philosophische Annahmen

Der Merklsche Fehlerkalkül fügt sich philosophisch gesehen in ein rechtstheoretisches Gebäude ein, das aufgrund der Annahme relativer Unveränderlichkeit des Rechtlichen (der Rechtskraft) eruiert wird. Die Sandersche Rechtsauffassung, der sich die Rechtskraftlehre Merkls als diametral entgegengesetzt versteht,68 rekonstruiert das Recht nicht nur in Bewegung, sondern als Bewegung (Recht ist Rechtsänderung). Sieht Merkl in der Rechtkraft das statische Gegengewicht zum dynamischen Prozess der stufenförmigen Rechtskonkretisierung im Delegationszusammenhang,69 wobei das normative, kontrafaktische Anspruchsmoment der rechtlichen Verhaltensteuerung hervorgehoben wird, radikalisiert Sander die dynamische Betrachtung durch seine Lehre des Verfahrenscharakters allen Rechts und meint das zu einem statischen rechtlichen Weltbild führende Dogma der Normativität des Rechts überwinden zu müssen.70 Die Alternativermächtigung Kelsens nutzt Elemente beider Konstrukte, die sich auf unterschiedliche philosophische Voraussetzungen stützen, in einem – nicht unproblematischen – Versuch, statische (Kognition) und dynamische Momente (Dezision) von Rechtssystemen zu vereinbaren. Das Rahmen-Theorem71 ruft z. B. den Norm-Norm-Ableitungszusammenhang in Erinnerung, macht aber zugleich die Entscheidungsdependenz der Rechtserzeugung besonders sichtbar. Verweist die Erkenntnis der Gültigkeit und Rechtmäßigkeit von Rechtsnormen, deren Abstammung sich über den Weg der direkten Regelung durch

Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 284. Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), VI. Fritz Sander, Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung? (Anm. 51), 516 ff. Die konsolidierte Formulierung des Konzepts der anzuwendenden Rechtsnorm als eines Rahmens befindet sich in: Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 348–349. Früher schon so in: Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 94–95. 68 69 70 71

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

die höherrangigen Rechtsnormen nicht mehr rekonstruieren lässt, auf die Positivität des (sich immer aufs Neue erzeugenden) Rechts, beharrt gleichzeitig der Versuch einer Verankerung der außerhalb des Rahmens der expliziten Erzeugungsregel getroffenen Rechtsentscheidung in einer impliziten anzuwendenden Norm auf dem Normativitätsanspruch des Rechts. Wo es keinen ausdrücklichen Sinngehalt gibt, der zu einer bestimmten, schon gefallenen Entscheidung ermächtigt, muss der Alternativcharakter der Ermächtigungsnorm vorausgesetzt werden. Die „rechtswidrige“ Rechtsschöpfung bleibt Rechtsanwendung unter der Voraussetzung einer alternativen Autorisierung. Ihre Geltung beruht genau wie die der rechtmäßigen Rechtserscheinungen auf „einer ihrer Erzeugung vorangehenden präexistenten generellen Norm“,72 die das Rechtsgewinnungsverfahren alternativ regelt. Auch bei dem klassischen Thema des Verhältnisses zwischen Ratio und Voluntas im Recht scheiden sich die Geister Merkls und Kelsens. Entkoppelt der Fehlerkalkül Wahrheit von Autorität, indem der Rechtswissenschaft die „Kompetenz“ zugesprochen wird, fehlerhaften Rechtserscheinungen den Geltungsanspruch abzuerkennen,73 verschmilzt die Alternativermächtigung die beiden, indem die Rechtswahrheit zum Inhalt der Äußerungen der Rechtsorgane relativiert wird. Eine dem Rechtserzeugungszusammenhang extra-systematische Wahrheit ist dabei nicht relevant. Rechtsgröße entsteht bei Kelsen wie bei Sander nur in Relation zum dynamischen Rechtsverfahren. 2.

Rechtserkenntnistheoretische Dissonanzen

Rechtserkenntnistheoretisch gesehen liegt dem Merklschen Fehlerkalkül eine Rechtswissenschaftsauffassung zugrunde, die der Rechtstheorie letztendlich eine Kontrollfunktion gegenüber der Rechtspraxis zuspricht: Vom Richterstuhl der rechtswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis aus wird determiniert, was Rechtens ist.74 Die Rechtswissenschaft maßt sich

Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 273. Vgl. z. B. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 286–287. Über einen langen Umweg werden kraft des Primats der Rechtswissenschaft Merklscher Art aber doch Wahrheit und Autorität im Modell des Fehlerkalküls wieder verkoppelt, wenn das positive Recht keine weitere Korrekturmöglichkeit in Bezug auf fehlerhafte Rechtserscheinung vorsieht und es der Rechtswissenschaft zusteht, Recht von Unrecht bzw. Nicht-Recht „autoritativ“ zu (unter)scheiden. Was rechtsfehlerhaft ist, darf am Ende des Tages nicht als Recht gelten. 74 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz (Anm. 6), 450; ders., Das Recht im Spiegel seiner Auslegung (Anm. 10), 172; ders., Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 286. Vielleicht nirgendwo anders kommt das Merklsche Primat der Rechtswissenschaft klarer zum Ausdruck als in folgendem Satz: „Äußert sich der Irrtum in entgegengesetzter Richtung, indem ein verfassungsmäßiges Gesetz oder eine gesetzmäßige Verordnung wegen vermeintlicher Rechtswidrigkeit für aufgehoben erklärt wird, so schafft auch diese Fehlerkenntnis nicht Recht; das bedeutet nun aber: es braucht vom Bundespräsidenten nicht exequiert, es braucht auch von der ‚zuständigen‘ Behörde nicht als aufgehoben kundgemacht zu werden, ja es darf dies im Grunde gar nicht“, Adolf J. Merkl, Die gerichtliche Prüfung von Gesetzen und Verordnungen (Anm. 25), 569. 72 73

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die Prärogative an, die „Errata“ der Rechtspraxis zu schreiben. Die Alternativbestimmung Kelsens beruht ihrerseits auf der Zusprechung einer ex post facto deskriptiven Intentionalität zur rechtstheoretischen Beschäftigung mit dem Recht: Die Rechtswissenschaft wird bei der Frage nach dem Rechtlichen auf das positive Recht verwiesen. Ausschließlich die dazu ermächtigten Rechtsorgane können im vorgesehenen Rechtsverfahren den getroffenen Rechtsentscheidungen ein rechtserhebliches Erratum hinzufügen, bzw. einen von ihnen als rechtswidrig gedeuteten Rechtsakt vernichten. 3.

Rechtstheoretische Implikationen

a.

Rechtliches Können und rechtliches Dürfen

Die Ermöglichung der Disjunktion der Rechtsgeltung von der Rechtmäßigkeit, des rechtlichen Könnens vom rechtlichen Dürfen durch den Fehlerkalkül rekonstruiert in einer plausibleren Weise die Praxis nicht nur des positivrechtlichen, sondern auch des rechtsdogmatischen Umgangs mit „Fehlurteilen“, indem man Defizite bei der Rechtserzeugung an dem immanenten Maßstab der Rechtsvorschriften messen kann, ohne die Geltung der autoritativen Entscheidungen der Rechtsorgane in Frage zu stellen. Fehlerbestimmung und Fehlerfolgenregime werden entkoppelt. Solange positivrechtliche Korrektur- bzw. Reaktionswege bestehen, gilt sogar die „rechtswidrige Rechtserscheinung“ fort. Die Konsequenzen eines „rechtwidrigen Rechtsaktes“ sind positivrechtlich kontingent geregelt. Rechtswidrigkeit impliziert nicht Nichtigkeit und bedeutet auch nicht notwendig Vernichtbarkeit des entsprechenden Rechtsaktes. Die von Kelsen nur grob skizzierte Alternativermächtigung verkoppelt Rechtsgeltung und Rechtmäßigkeit, verquickt durch ihre Formulierung Können und Dürfen: Alles was rechtlich geschieht, wird rechtmäßig; alles was ein Rechtsorgan entscheiden kann, darf es auch entscheiden; was rechtsautoritativ entschieden wird, ist rechtsauthentisch. b.

Statik vs. Dynamik: Verhaltenssteuerung und Rechtserzeugungsstrukturen

Der Fehlerkalkül zeigt sich als Bemühen, die verhaltenslenkende, die Erwartungen der Rechtsunterworfenen stabilisierende Normfunktion des Rechts nicht von einer rechtsdynamischen Betrachtungsweise zu trennen. Man könnte sagen: Die durch die Figur der Entsprechung zu den bedingenden Normen konstruierte Kategorie der Rechtmäßigkeit zeichnet einen Bereich des rechtlichen Dürfens aus, der sich mit dem des rechtlichen Könnens nicht deckt. Nicht alles, was man rechtlich kann, darf man rechtlich auch. Der von Merkl angekündigte Bremsmechanismus, der der Dynamik des Rechtsverfahrens entgegenwirkt, wird geliefert. Der Fehlerkalkül beharrt auf dem Normativitätsanspruch des Rechts schlechthin und verweigert sich, sich mit einer

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

„anything goes“-Einstellung den Entscheidungen der Rechtsorgane zu unterwerfen. Ein statisches Minimum an Ableitbarkeit aus den bedingenden Normen muss sein.75 Durch die Alternativbestimmung wird das Recht zum Kriterium für die Entscheidung der dieses Kriterium autoritativ determinierenden Rechtsorgane, d. h. die autoreferenzielle Rechtserzeugung wird thematisiert, was eher an die Radikalisierung der Rechtsdynamik durch das Sandersche Rechtsverfahren erinnert, bei dem das Recht sich nur in Bezug auf das Koordinatensystem der Urteile der zuständigen Rechtserzeuger konstituiert.76 Mann kann hier von einer „Normanspruchsvergessenheit“77 sprechen: In den Fokus gerät nicht die Verhaltenssteuerung durch das Recht, sondern geraten die Rechtserzeugungsstrukturen.78 c.

Zwischen Anforderungsmodell und Prozessbetrachtung

Dem Fehlerkalkül haftet noch eine Sichtweise an, die man als „Anforderungsmodell des Rechts“79 bezeichnen könnte, das sich noch sehr für die Frage nach der durch das Recht beanspruchten Handlung der Normadressaten interessiert, wobei das Begriffspaar rechtmäßig-rechtswidrig eine relevante Orientierung liefert. Die Alternativermächtigung denkt hingegen das Recht von der Kompetenz zur Entscheidung her und fokussiert auf die rechtliche Selbsterzeugung: Nicht, was vom Recht gefordert wird, sondern, wie das Recht die Realität schematisiert, nämlich wie Rechtsrelevanz im Flow des Rechtsverfahrens konstituiert wird, steht primär auf dem Spiel. d.

Interpretationsfragen und Strukturanalyse

Die Rechtserzeugung wird über den Fehlerkalkül von der anzuwendenden Norm aus betrachtet. Man fragt dabei nach der rechtmäßigen Handlung in einer ex ante Perspektive. Fehlerfragen werden zu Interpretationsangelegenheiten. Konfrontiert mit einer Rechtsentscheidung, will man rechtswissenschaftlich noch sagen können: Es hätte Zur statischen „Befangenheit“ der Merklschen Rechtsdynamik siehe: Fritz Sander, Zur Methodik der Rechtserfahrung, Kant-Studien 28 (1923), 283–310 (307); Josef Kunz, [Buchbesprechung] Adolf Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft, entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff. Eine rechtstheoretische Untersuchung (1923), Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 4 (1925), 355–362 (359). 76 Fritz Sander, Kelsens Rechtslehre, Eine Kampfschrift gegen die normative Jurisprudenz, Tübingen 1923, 130. 77 Vgl. Alexander Somek, Wissen des Rechts, Tübingen 2018, 33. 78 Zu den Implikationen eines dynamischen Verständnisses des Rechts vgl. Rainer Lippold, Recht und Ordnung (Anm. 14), 133 ff. 79 Dies wird brillant rekonstruiert von Christoph Kletzer  – m. E. Sanderschen wie Olivecronas Geist atmend – als „demand model of functioning of law“. Vgl. Christoph Kletzer, The Idea of a Pure Theory of Law (Anm. 52), 16–20. 75

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dem vorgegebenen positiven Recht gemäß anders sein sollen. Daher die sprachliche Bezeichnung gewisser Rechtserscheinungen als „fehlerhaft“, die Beibehaltung des „Rechtsfehlers“ als eine anschlussfähige rechtstheoretische Kategorie. Die Alternativermächtigung kapituliert vor dem Befund der schon außerhalb des Normrahmens getroffenen Entscheidungen und bietet einen Rekurs für deren Deutung als rechtmäßiges Recht. Auch die die Fremdprogrammierung ignorierend geschaffene Norm integriert das positive Recht. Was interessiert, ist zu erklären, wie es dazu kommt. Die Pointe dabei ist, die variationsfähigen, möglichen Szenarien der aktuellen Rechtserzeugung zu beschreiben, in der „rechtswidrige Rechtsnormen“ problemlos als Anreiz für weitere Rechtskommunikationen fungieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund gewinnt die in dieser Konstruktion auf das rechtliche Können verweisende Ermächtigung Zentralität bei der Beschreibung des positiven Rechts, denn auch rechtmäßige Rechtserscheinungen können von den zuständigen Autoritäten vernichtet werden.80 Nicht zufällig sind im Modell Kelsens Interpretationsfragen weitgehend ein rechtspolitisches Problem81 – so wie es auch bei Sander der Fall ist. Dabei geht es nicht darum, die Grenzen der zulässigen Entscheidungen, den Bereich der Rechtmäßigkeit zu demarkieren, sondern die dem Rechtssystem immanente Konstitution rechtlicher Relevanz bzw. Rechtsbindung einheitlich zu rekonstruieren. Anders sieht Merkl den Platz der Auslegungslehre in den Rechtswissenschaften. „Denn die Resultate der Jurisprudenz sind Ergebnisse der Auslegung, die Interpretation selbst (und nicht deren Methodenlehre) ist die Funktion der Jurisprudenz“.82 Die Lehre der Alternativermächtigung ist eben keine Interpretationsthese, sondern sie stellt einen Beschreibungsversuch der Strukturen des positiven Rechts dar,83 sodass die Verarbeitung des Phänomens des „rechtswidrigen Rechts“ plausibilisiert wird. e.

Das Problem der Entscheidung letzter Instanz

Der Fehlerkalkül Merkls stößt bei den Entscheidungen letzter Instanzen an seine Grenzen, wenn keine positivrechtliche „Korrektur“ mehr vorgesehen ist.84 Dabei sieht „Der objektive Grund“ für die Vernichtbarkeit einer Rechtserscheinung ist „die von der Rechtsordnung vorgesehene Möglichkeit, in einem dazu bestimmten Verfahren die andere, von der angefochtenen Entscheidung nicht verwirklichte Alternative zu definitiver Geltung zu bringen“  – und eben nicht eine angebliche „Rechtswidrigkeit“ an sich der angefochtenen Rechtserscheinung, Hans Kelsen, RR 2 (Anm. 38), 273–274. 81 Hans Kelsen, RR1 (Anm. 38), 108; Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 350. 82 Adolf Julius Merkl, Zum Interpretationsproblem, Grünhuts Zeitschrift für das Privat- und Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart 42 (1916), 535–556 (537). 83 Vgl. Riccardo Guastini, Realismo e antirealismo nella teoria dell’interpretazione, Ragion pratica 17 (2001), 43–52 (48); ders , Réalisme et anti-réalisme dans la théorie de l’interprétation, in: Mélanges Paul Amselek, Bruxelles 2005, 432–443 (438). 84 Vgl. Christoph Kletzer, Kelsen’s Development of the Fehlerkalkül-Theory, Ratio Juris 18–1 (2005), 46–63 (51). 80

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

sich Merkl genötigt, der Rechtswissenschaft eine Richterrolle gegenüber der Rechtspraxis anzuvertrauen. Mangels vorgesehener Fehlerreaktionsmechanismen sollte man die fehlerhaften Entscheidungen gelten lassen. Da aber der Kunstgriff der Lehre des Fehlerkalküls darin besteht, die Geltung defekter Rechtserscheinung in den positiv-rechtlich gewährleisteten Beseitigungschancen oder Gleichgültigkeitserklärungen zu verankern, verliert das Konstrukt im Fall definitiver Rechtsentscheidung teilweise seine Erklärungsmacht. Die Alternativermächtigung Kelsens, die die „Fehlerhaftigkeit“ der rechtserzeugenden Akte und deren Produkte eher unsichtbar macht, da sie schnell wieder in das rechtmäßige Recht rückgekoppelt werden, kennt dieses Problem nicht. Der zu zahlende Preis ist aber anscheinend nicht geringer.85 Die Lehre der Alternativermächtigung macht sich eine Art Ausnahmezustand zu eigen, indem das positive Recht die Möglichkeit des sich über die normativen Rechtsvorgaben Hinwegsetzens durch autoritativen Entscheidungen auf jeder Ebene des Rechtsgewinnungsverfahrens normalisiert. Von einer „permanenten Revolution“ – die aber invisibilisiert wird – könnte sogar die Rede sein, „denn unter dem Vorzeichnen der Rechtsdynamik kann alles, was ‚rechtsstatisch‘ als ‚Fehlerhaftigkeit‘ gedeutet werden könnte“, durch den Alternativcharakter der Ermächtigungsnormen absorbiert werden.86 f.

An den Grenzen der Rechtserkenntnis

Bei der Setzung des i-Tüpfelchens in den jeweiligen rechtstheoretischen Modellen zum Umgang mit der Möglichkeit „rechtswidrigen Rechts“ verweisen beide Varianten der Reinen Rechtslehre, namentlich die Merklsche und die Kelsensche letztendlich auf das Jenseits der rechtlichen Programmierung stricto sensu. Der Fehlerkalkül als rechtstheoretisches Konstrukt ermächtigt die Rechtswissenschaft zur Erkenntnis und Entscheidung über das geltende Recht in Namen einer Verstärkung der Normativität bzw. der Anspruchsdimension des Rechtlichen. Scheiden die Rechtsordnungen der

Von der Lehre der Alternativermächtigung kann gesagt werden, was Horst Dreier zur Interpretationstheorie der Reinen Rechtslehre Kelsens äußerte: „Sie rettet ihre Wissenschaftlichkeit, so will es scheinen, um jegliche Praxisrelevanz, verstanden als direkte Einflußnahme auf die reale Rechtsgestaltung zu verlieren. […] Anleitende Kraft kann die Rechtswissenschaft insofern kaum entfalten. […] Kelsen, der angetreten war, die Rechtswissenschaft auf die Höhe einer echten Wissenschaft zu heben, muss offenbar am entscheidenden Punkt, dem der Auslegung und Anwendung des Rechts, kapitulieren“, Horst Dreier, Der Preis der Moderne – Hans Kelsens Rechts- und Sozialtheorie, in: Elif Özmen (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsens Politische Philosophie, Tübingen 2017, 3–27 (23–24). 86 Vgl. Alexander Somek, Rechtssystem und Republik, Wien 1992, 489. Kammerhofer zieht in diesem Zusammenhang die Möglichkeit in Erwägung, auf jeder Ebene der stufenförmigen Rechtskonkretisierung eine neue Grundnorm vorauszusetzen, die die – über die von Kelsen benannte „indirekte Regelung“ der Rechtserzeugungsregel gedeckte – Norm als eine eher zu einer unterschiedlichen Normenordnung gehörige Rechtsnorm deutet. Vgl. Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective, London 2011, 293. 85

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Rechtserkenntnis und der Rechtserzeugung aus, bestimmt der das Rechtsverfahren beobachtende Rechtswissenschaftler, was Rechtens ist, bzw. was durch das vergangene/vorgegebene Recht von den Rechtsanwendern erwartet und gefordert wird. Die Alternativermächtigung redet einem Primat der Rechtserzeugung das Wort. Zwischen den konkurrierenden Rechtsdeutungen der in Frage kommenden rechtlichen Deutungsschemata gibt sie der durchgesetzten, der effektiv gewordenen, durch die zuständige Autorität erzeugten Norm den Vorzug. Die Entscheidungsdimension des Rechts bzw. die Rechtspositivität wird im Ergebnis einer dynamischen Betrachtung des Rechts qua Rechtsgewinnungsverfahren auf den Punkt gebracht. Dynamisch gesehen lässt sich kaum ein Grund dafür finden, dass die vergangenen Rechtsnormen zulasten der gerade zu erzeugenden Rechtserscheinungen privilegiert werden. Auch die außerhalb des kognitiv festgestellten Rahmens getroffene Entscheidung gilt als Rechtsnorm. Letztlich verweist die Reine Rechtslehre Kelsens auf die Effektivität, ja auf die durchgesetzte Macht, die sich selber aus ihrer Durchsetzung für Rechtsmacht erklärt. IV.

Unterschiedliche Baupläne

Die Divergenzen zwischen den „Architekten“ der Reinen Rechtslehre bei der Behandlung der „Rechtsfehlerproblematik“ entlarven grundlegend verschiedene Rechtswissenschaftskonzepte. Wie hoch Merkl den Stellenwert der Erkennbarkeit der Fehler mit deren folgerichtiger Verbannung in das Nicht-Recht ansetzt, manifestiert sich darin, dass er davon die „Existenzberechtigung der Jurisprudenz“87 abhängig macht. „Die Eingliederung in die Rechtshierarchie bedeutet die Unterordnung unter höhere Rechtsgebilde, wobei die Frage, ob das Unterordnungsverhältnis gewahrt ist, sehr wohl eine logische Überprüfung zuzulassen scheint. Die Bestreitung dieser Überprüfungsmöglichkeit [schließt] zugleich den Verzicht auf eine Rechtswissenschaft von irgendwelchem Inhalt in sich [ein].“88 Steht der Rechtswissenschaft ein kritisches Potenzial gegenüber der Rechtspraxis nicht zu, konsentiert man mit der Ent-Stufung der Rechtsordnung, der Stufenbau selbst implodiert, also büßt das Rechtssystem seine Grenze ein. Die bloße Idee der Rechtsanwendung wird entleert. Für Kelsen genügt es andererseits, dass das Recht als eine souveräne, nicht vom Jenseits her weiter ableitbare, normative Ordnung vorausgesetzt wird. Eine selbständige Rechtswissenschaft erfordert eine eigengesetzlich operierende Rechtsnormativität.89 Ob diese Eigengesetzlichkeit mit den Gesetzen der Logik oder der rationalen Erkenntnis vereinbar sein muss, spielt für Kelsen keine Rolle. 87 88 89

Adolf Julius Merkl, Justizirrtum und Rechtswahrheit (Anm. 25), 465. Adolf Julius Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz (Anm. 6), 444. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff, Tübingen 1922, 87.

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

In gewissem Sinne liegen dem Fehlerkalkül und der Alternativermächtigung unterschiedliche Rechtsweltbilder zugrunde.90 Merkl scheint es wichtig zu sein, die Grenzen des Rechtlichen zu ziehen. So umfasst in der Grammatik Merkls das Nicht-Recht als kontradiktorischer Gegensatz zum Recht auch dessen konträre Erscheinungen, das Unrecht.91 Das „rechtswidrige Recht“ soll durch die Rechtswissenschaft in den Bereich des Außer-Rechtlichen verwiesen werden. Kelsen redet einer Version der von Sander früher artikulierten König-Midas-These das Wort.92 Aus der Warte des Rechtssystems ist das Nicht-Recht nicht sichtbar, es lässt sich nicht erfassen. Alles, was das Recht im Rechtsverfahren ‚anfasst‘, wird Recht.93 Dank der Devise der Alternativermächtigung auch rechtmäßig. Dem Grenzcharakter der eigentlichen Problematik der Grenzziehungsversuche gemäß,94 begleiten diese schulimmanente Diskussion gelegentlich politische bzw. weltanschauungsbasierte Bemerkungen. Der Befürworter der Reinen Rechtslehre qua individualistischer Rechtstheorie,95 Adolf Merkl, sieht in der Kontrolle der Rechtspraxis durch die Rechtswissenschaft das letzte Bollwerk des Rechtsunterworfenen gegen die Staatsgewalt, nämlich den „Triumph des durch das Kollektivum vergewaltigten Individuums über dieses Kollektivum“.96 Kelsen seinerseits macht sich viel öfter Sorgen um die anarchischen Konsequenzen einer radikalen Dezentralisierung der Bestimmung der Rechtlichkeit. Soll der Herr Jedermann regelmäßig bestimmen können, was rechtmäßig ist, verliert das Recht seine widerwillige Durchsetzungsmacht, werden die Normansprüche des Rechts nicht mehr plausibel.97 V.

Aus den (Rechts-)Fehlern lernen

Aus der vielschichtigen Debatte um den Umgang des Rechts mit „Fehlern“ scheint sich bei allen Konstruktionsunterschieden wenigstens ein gemeinsames Resultat zu ergeben: Die Bedeutung der Rechtmäßigkeit für die rechtlichen Operationen wird relativiert, die Zentralität dieses Attributs einer Rechtserscheinung als rechtstheoretische Kategorie wird deplatziert. Durch den Fehlerkalkül Merkls via Begriffspaar Zu den Hintergründen beider Modelle, vgl.: Patrick Hilbert, Fehlerkalkül oder Alternativbestimmungen – zu den Strategien der Geburtshilfe im Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung (Anm. 3), 556 für den Fehlerkalkül und 565–566 für die Alternativbestimmung. 91 Vgl. Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 291. 92 Vgl. Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 282. 93 Fritz Sander, Staat und Recht, Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der Rechtserfahrung, Bd. 2., Wien 1922, 1202– 1203. 94 Zur herausfordernden Natur der Frage nach der Möglichkeit „rechtswidrigen Rechts“ vgl. Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Anm. 62), 278 und 299. 95 Adolf Julius Merkl, Individualismus und Universalismus als staatliche Baugesetze (Anm. 26), 247. 96 Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Anm. 5), 284. 97 Vgl. z. B. Hans Kelsen, RR2 (Anm. 38), 275. 90

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Dürfen und Können zwar deutlicher als durch die Alternativermächtigung Kelsens, die sich aber doch in einer Gestalt rekonstruieren lässt, dass man eine Rechtmäßigkeit nach außen qua Rechtsverfahrensbezogenheit98 von einer Rechtmäßigkeit nach innen qua Rückbeziehbarkeit auf den rechtlichen Rahmen ausdifferenziert. Der (inhaltlichen) Rechtmäßigkeit nach innen trägt der Fehlerkalkül Rechnung. Seine Weiterbildung und Verfeinerung anhand der Unterscheidung von Können und Dürfen vergrößert die Kommunikationschancen der Rechtstheorie mit dem sprachlichen Gebrauch und der Denkweise der Rechtsdogmatiken, indem sie ihnen sowohl ein anschlussfähiges Instrumentarium für die Markierung des Raums zulässiger Rechtsentscheidungen liefert, als auch ein erklärungsmächtiges Modell für das Verständnis der positiv-rechtlich vorhandenen, möglichen Reaktionen auf fehlerhafte Rechtserscheinungen anbietet. Die Alternativermächtigung kümmert sich von einer rechtsstrukturellen Perspektive aus hingegen eher um die Rechtmäßigkeit nach außen und macht besonders stark darauf aufmerksam, dass „Rechtsfehler“ – das, was in den Augen der Rechtsdogmatik fehlerhaft aussieht – die Maschinerie des Rechts nicht blockieren. In beiden nun so neukalibrierten Modellen erweist sich die Rechtmäßigkeit oder Rechtswidrigkeit einer Rechtserscheinung als möglicher Anknüpfungspunkt bzw. als Anreiz für weitere Kommunikation im Rechtssystem. Rechtmäßigkeit ist ja oft Kampfbegriff, taugt in der rechtlichen Alltagspraxis als Streitgegenstand. Wie Kelsen übrigens schon 1914 geltend machte: „Es ist im Grunde genommen unrichtig, wenn man bei theoretischer Behandlung des Problems des fehlerhaften Staatsaktes stets von der stillschweigenden Voraussetzung ausgeht, daß der fragliche Fehler mit absoluter Sicherheit festgestellt oder feststellbar ist.“99 Der Fehlerkalkül und die Alternativermächtigung thematisieren die tagtäglichen Auffassungskonflikte bezüglich dessen, was rechtskonform ist und was nicht. Sie entblößen, wenn auch mit unterschiedlichen Akzenten, das rechtswidrige Recht als ein durchgängiges Rechtsphänomen. Bringt die Alternativermächtigung die Rechtsdynamik auf den Punkt und verweist den Rechtstheoretiker auf die Entscheidungen der Rechtsorgane, ermöglicht der Fehlerkalkül eine rechtsdogmatische Rechtsschichtendarstellung, die sich am Rechtsdürfen orientiert, um sagen zu können, was vom positiven Recht bei jeder Stufe der Rechtskonkretisierung normativ verlangt wird, welche Erwartungen von der rechtlichen Normativität stabilisiert werden.

„Rechtmäßig“ ist in diesem Sinne Nichts als das Zeichen dafür, dass der in Frage kommende Akt „in einem vom Recht geordneten Verfahren“ erzeugt wurde. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Anm. 62), 277. Hier findet man einen Anknüpfungspunkt für die Differenzierung zwischen Rechtsgeltung und Rechtmäßigkeit stricto sensu, die von Kelsen selber nicht präzise vorgenommen wurde. 99 Hans Kelsen, Über Staatsunrecht (Anm. 1), 92 = HKW 3, 439–531 (513). 98

Alternativermächtigung vs. Fehlerkalkül

Beide Modelle tragen dazu bei, der Problematik des rechtlichen Umgangs mit „rechtwidriger Rechtserscheinung“ den Status der „partie honteuse“100 der Rechtstheorie zu rauben, ohne ihr den Status einer Erkenntnisherausforderung zu entziehen. Die Rechtsfehlerproblematik zwingt dazu, über die fundamentalsten Fragestellungen der Rechtstheorie nachzudenken. Sie fordert Klarheit über die unterschiedlichen möglichen Betrachtungsstandpunkte und deckt ein Spezifikum der rechtlichen Operationen in der Perspektive der Reinen Rechtslehre(n) auf: die Markierung von Rechtserzeugungsmöglichkeitshorizonten durch Ermächtigungen, das Zusprechen von rechtlicher Relevanz durch autoritative Deutungsschemata. Rodrigo Garcia Cadore

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Staatswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie, Abteilung 3: Rechtstheorie (LS Prof. Matthias Jestaedt), Hebelstraße 25 (Hinterhaus), 79104 Freiburg im Breisgau, [email protected]

100

Fritz Sander, Merkls Rechtslehre, Prager Juristische Zeitschrift 4 (1924), 16–31 (26).

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Kelsen meets Cognitive Science The Pure Theory of Law, Interpretation, and Modern Cognitive Pragmatics BENEDIKT PIRKER *1

Abstract: The present paper examines Kelsen’s take on interpretation in the framework

of his Pure Theory of Law and contrasts it with later legal theoretical perspectives on interpretation and the findings of modern cognitive linguistics and pragmatics. A nuanced picture emerges. Kelsen’s views on the inevitability of interpretation withstand scrutiny, whereas his “frame” conceptualization of language appears wanting in light of modern knowledge on the operation of language in communication. By comparison, some later theoretical contributions such as literalist approaches see their foundations questioned even more fundamentally. Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Interpretation, cognitive linguistics, prag-

matics, Relevance Theory Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Auslegung, Kognitive Linguistik, Pragma-

tik, Relevanztheorie

I.

Introduction

Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law addresses numerous questions of legal theory. The present paper focuses on its take on legal interpretation, and contrasts this take with the more recent emergence of cognitive linguistics, in particular cognitive pragmatics. * University of Fribourg. The author thanks Jennifer Smolka as well as the participants of the 2018 IVR

German Section’s Conference “Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions”, in particular Matthias Jestaedt and Clemens Jabloner, for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. All internet resources have been last accessed on January 31 2019.

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The goal is to work out to what extent Kelsen’s point of view can still be useful today or needs to be revised. To approach the subject, we use two core ideas of Kelsen – the inevitability of interpretation and his conceptualization of language – as starting points; we then contrast these points with selected later relevant developments in legal thinking. Finally, we demonstrate what cognitive pragmatics has to say on the matter. The approach of law and pragmatics used here has been developed in the field of international law and its interpretation.1 Consequently, the paper takes its examples and some of the literature from this field. Kelsen’s later work has also extensively dealt with international law.2 However, like Kelsen’s theoretical contributions to the law the present paper aims to provide some generally applicable conclusions, notably with regard to language in law and the phenomenon of interpretation. II.

Preliminaries

Before we engage with individual points in Kelsen’s oeuvre3 that elicit commentary from a linguistic perspective there are some preliminaries to be settled. First, as resorts clearly from his work, Kelsen aims to contribute to the development of the legal science as an independent discipline, independent in particular with regard to politics and legal politics.4 He is not a linguist, or trying to contribute to linguistics. Interpretation is also not the sole or primary focus of his work. The point of the present paper is therefore not to criticize Kelsen for not being a linguist or for not taking into account a state of knowledge that was simply not available to him. Instead, Kelsen’s work provides a useful starting point to set out elements of modern linguistics that may help lawyers to better understand the phenomenon of language. Kelsen’s views are still part of the knowledge of many lawyers today. To explain present day linguistic findings against the backdrop of Kelsen’s work ideally makes them more palatable and relatable for lawyers.

Jennifer Smolka / Benedikt Pirker, International Law and Pragmatics – An Account of Interpretation in International Law, International Journal of Language & Law 5 (2016), 1–38; Benedikt Pirker / Jennifer Smolka, Making Interpretation More Explicit: International Law and Pragmatics, Nordic Journal of International Law 86 (2017), 228–266; Jennifer Smolka / Benedikt Pirker, International Law, Pragmatics and the Distinction Between Conceptual and Procedural Meaning, International Journal of Language & Law 7 (2018), 117–141. Whereas the focus lies on interpretation to date, the approach could also be used for the drafting of international treaties or domestic legislation. 2 Bardo Fassbender / Helmut Philipp Aust, Basistexte: Völkerrechtsdenken, 2012, 52. 3 The present focus lies on Kelsen’s earlier work. See on hints about interpretation in Kelsen’s later work Matthias Jestaedt, Wie das Recht, so die Auslegung – Die Rolle der Rechtstheorie bei der Suche nach der juristischen Auslegungslehre, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 55 (2000), 133–158, 139 footnote 16. 4 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 1. 1

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

Second, terminological clarity is needed. The present paper has initially somewhat interchangeably spoken of cognitive linguistics and cognitive pragmatics, while choosing the latter for its title. Linguistics encompasses numerous directions of research. For the present purposes, semantics and pragmatics are most relevant. The two notions will be set out in more detail below. Moreover, linguistic research can be undertaken with different emphases. Many approaches focus e. g. on the role of social conventions in interpreting meaning. Often, they are called externalist approaches because they focus on phenomena external to the human mind. By contrast, internalist approaches focus on what is happening in the human mind. Their emphasis is more psychological. For example, in pragmatics they would focus less on elements of conveying meaning in language use that are based on social conventions, but rather on the functioning of language as explained by universal, psychological features of the human mind.5 We will see this explained in more detail with Relevance Theory. Crucially, approaches focusing on what happens in the human mind are typically also referred to as cognitive. With regard to some approaches to cognitive pragmatics like Relevance Theory, scholars disagree as to whether it even still constitutes part of linguistics or whether it should already be counted as part of the broader field of cognitive sciences.6 With all this in mind, the present contribution uses linguistics as an umbrella term. Cognitive linguistics designates linguistic approaches that focus on the operation of the human mind and its role in communication. Cognitive pragmatics is an approach to pragmatics, the study of language use, with a cognitive focus. These clarifications should help to avoid confusion in the following discussion. III.

The inevitability of interpretation

Kelsen perceives interpretation as omnipresent and inevitable. Against the background of later voices in legal theory, we find that Kelsen’s views are quite modern. Modern linguistics confirms the baselines of Kelsen’s thinking, although it refines them somewhat. 1.

Kelsen on the necessity of interpretation

Kelsen examines the “problem of interpretation” in the framework of his inquiry into the hierarchical structure of the legal system. Despite this slightly different focus, inSee for a more detailed overview Benedikt Pirker / Jennifer Smolka, The Future of International Law is Cognitive – International Law, Cognitive Sociology and Cognitive Pragmatics, German Law Journal 20 (2019), 430–448. 6 Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1), Account of Interpretation, 5. 5

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terpretation for him moves from the higher level of the structure of the legal system to the lower level. For example, a statute as the general norm is interpreted so that it can be applied to a concrete material fact, to arrive at an individual norm (e. g. a judicial decision).7 In Kelsen’s view, there is always interpretation. Not only law-applying authorities, but also individuals who need to understand the law to avoid sanctions or legal scholars describing positive law have to interpret the law, even though the legal consequences are different in each case.8 In this process, there are always external circumstances to be taken into account for Kelsen. Notably, he argues that a higher-level norm can never be binding with respect to every detail of a lower-level act putting it into practice. There always remains a range of discretion9: If official A orders official B to arrest subject C, B must use his own discretion to decide when, where, and how he will carry out the warrant to arrest C; and these decisions depend upon external circumstances that A has not foreseen and, for the most part, cannot foresee.10

This is not only how hierarchies between norms operate in Kelsen’s account. It is also a very fundamental feature of the operation of language in light of cognitive pragmatics, as will be shown below. 2.

The doctrinal and legal theoretical debate on the necessity of interpretation

Some selected examples from a long and rich debate on interpretation in various fields of law and legal theory offer contrasting views. Marmor argues that interpretation is not always necessary and that there is a fixed, semantic content of the law because of which there is no difficulty for understanding the relevant communication in some cases.11 Contrary to other conceptualizations of language,12 Marmor strongly insists on the existence of natural language, in the sense Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (translated by Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson), 1997, 77, pointing also to interpretation of the constitution and of individual norms such as judicial decisions. 8 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (translation from the second (revised and enlarged) German edition by Max Knight), 2009, 348. 9 Kelsen (footnote 7), 78. 10 Ibid., 78. 11 It should be noted that in more recent writing, Marmor seems to have somewhat changed views and begins to recognise an increased role for pragmatics in determining what an utterer has meant with an utterance, see Andrei Marmor, ‘Defeasibility and Pragmatic Indeterminacy in Law’ in: Pragmatics and Law – Philosophical Perspectives, (eds.) Alessandro Capone / Francesca Poggi, 2016, 15–32, 18. We nonetheless present the early, classic approach he suggested for interpretation as a phenomenon. 12 See e. g. Stanley Fish’s views in section IV.3.1. 7

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

that meaning is for him semantically determined by the rules and conventions of natural language.13 Such semantic determination means for Marmor that no interpretation is necessary in certain cases. Relevant aspects of the context are “common knowledge” between speaker and hearer that the latter can easily grasp.14 Interpretation is in his view a unique type of reasoning or understanding limited to the ascertainment of utterances that are not semantically determined. Therefore, interpretation must ascertain the communicative intent of the author, or of a stipulated hypothetical speaker, whose identity is explicitly defined by law or is presupposed by a particular interpretation offered.15 Another distinction drawn typically in the context of theoretical debates on interpretation in United States constitutional law is that between interpretation and construction. According to this distinction, interpretation is limited to the elucidation of the semantic meaning of a legal text. By contrast, construction means putting such meaning into effect by applying it in specific cases.16 Supposedly, only where the semantic meaning of a text is vague, an interpreter must enter the “construction zone” and have recourse to extra-textual material to apply a particular provision.17 Both presented views rely strongly on the idea of a high degree of semantic determinacy of language to develop their particular concept of interpretation. Some have challenged Marmor’s concept of interpretation at a legal-theoretical level. Notably, Endicott argues that interpreting in the sense of a process of identifying reasons is necessary in the first place to determine whether there is any indeterminacy in a communication, i. e. to determine what a communication means. This interpretation serves to resolve doubts as to what conclusion is to be reached on a communicative act. Interpretation’s role ends if no such conclusion can be reached, and then there is indeterminacy.18 Nonetheless, such theoretical assessments do not venture further into the intricacies of linguistic meaning. Summing up, “indeterminacy”, “the law is clear”, “interpretation vs. construction” and similar statements stem from a rich tradition in legal philosophy and theory. What is suggested at this point is, however, not to add another nuance to this theoretical body of work. Cognitive pragmatics rather is the attempt not to slice the same cake

Andrei Marmor, Law and Interpretation: Essays in legal philosophy, 1997, 64. Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law, 2011, 140. See in more detail Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, 2005, 9 ff. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 34 (2011), 65, 65. 17 Lawrence Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, Constitutional Commentary 27 (2010), 95, 108. 18 Timothy Endicott, Interpretation and Indeterminacy: Comments on Andrei Marmor’s Philosophy of Law, Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 10 (2014), 46–56, 51–52. 13 14 15 16

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differently, but to assess the cake using a completely different toolbox.19 The paper thus turns to the linguistic distinction between semantics and pragmatics. The reasoning process that legal theory sees in action in “interpretation” is only superficially the same as the view developed by modern linguistics. 3.

The necessity of interpretation and cognitive pragmatics

As the above discussion has shown, there is disagreement among lawyers over whether law always needs to be interpreted to be applied or whether there can be “clear” cases where no interpretation is necessary, i. e. where “semantics” does all the work. Kelsen appears to argue the first position, adding that there are always external circumstances that need to be taken into account. Let us now assess what linguistics says on this point. Of course, linguistics will not answer this exact question, as it has not asked this question in the first place. Rather, certain approaches of linguistics will deal with how communication succeeds. For this purpose they focus on the actual operation of language. What linguistics can show us is that interpretation in the sense of requiring both a text and extra-textual elements for comprehension is inevitable, and language (and with it legal texts) is much less semantically determined than lawyers tend to think. When is interpretation necessary? To answer the question from a linguistic point of view, we must retrace the notions of semantics and pragmatics. As becomes visible, the way language works is always a comprehension process that for lawyers comes close to what they understand as “interpreting” and taking into account circumstances external to a written text, i. e. the “norm text”.20 Semantics is concerned with meaning that is encoded in the formal components of language. By contrast, pragmatics looks at the way in which the mentioned components with encoded meaning are used in particular contexts to communicate thoughts.21 Semantics and pragmatics can be said to rely on distinct models of how communication operates. A code model suggests that communication is encoded, directly or indirectly, in language. An inferential model argues that a communicator provides evidence of their intention to convey a meaning which is, in turn, inferred by the audience on the basis of the evidence provided as well as contextual information and the audience’s

See also on the very selective and fragmentary reception of linguistic ideas in legal theory generally Dietrich Busse, ‘Semantik des Rechts: Bedeutungstheorien und deren Relevanz für Rechtstheorie und Rechtspraxis’ in: Handbuch Sprache im Recht, (eds.) Ekkehard Felder / Friedemann Vogel, 2017, 22–44, 26 ff. 20 See generally on the difficulty of lawyers to connect their legal notions and categories (such as interpretive methods) with the notions and categories of semantics and pragmatics Alan Durant / Janny H. C. Leung, ‘Pragmatics in legal interpretation’ in: The Routledge Handbook of Pragmatics, (eds.) Anne Barron / Yueguo Gu / Gerard Steen, 2017, 535–549, 536. 21 Robyn Carston, ‘Legal Texts and Canons of Construction: A View from Current Pragmatic Theory’ in: Law and Language, (eds.) Michael Freeman / Fiona Smith, 2013, 8–33, 9. 19

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

knowledge.22 These models should not be seen as exclusive, but in practice operate simultaneously. Verbal comprehension can thus be described as including decoding of linguistic information as one input to an inference process that yields an interpretation of a speaker’s meaning.23 This – pragmatic – perspective suggests that the simultaneous operation of the two models is necessary because meaning is linguistically underdetermined. Put differently, the intended meaning to be conveyed in communication is only partly decodable from linguistic elements. As a consequence of this linguistic underdeterminacy, an addressee must contextually enrich or adjust meaning in a number of ways to infer the speaker’s meaning.24 Let us look at an example to illustrate these concepts. Take the question “Can you pass me the salt?”. Part of the meaning of the linguistic items in the example, such as “salt”, can be decoded. However, it cannot be decoded whether the interrogative sentence is to be understood as a request or as a question. This must be contextually inferred. Typically, in a situation where the speaker and addressee sit at the dinner table with the salt shaker standing in front of the addressee, the addressee will infer that the question is to be understood as a request and not as a question about their physical ability to pass the salt. The omnipresence of decoding and inference in processes of communication is not limited to everyday conversations, but can just as well be observed in legal contexts. Take the seemingly simple example of the word “or”. Put simply,25 “or” only has a minimal semantics. Namely, it is a kind of coordination, a syntactic construction in which two phrases or sentences conjoined by “or” form a single processing unit. This processing unit is true if one or both of the phrases conjoined by “or” are true.26 Put differently, “or” encodes a so-called inclusive reading: “P ∨ Q” is logically equivalent to “P or Q or both”. This minimal encoded meaning can be used to convey a pragmatically modified or rather enriched meaning: “P or Q but not both”, i. e. an exclusive reading.27 The ex-

Deirdre Wilson / Dan Sperber, ‘Relevance Theory’ in: The Handbook of Pragmatics, (eds.) Laurence Horn / Gregory Ward, 2006, 607–632, 607; Sandrine Zufferey / Jacques Moeschler, Initiation à l’étude du sens, 2012, 88. 23 Jacques Moeschler, Pragmatics, Propositional and Non-Propositional Effects. Can a Theory of Utterance Interpretation Account for Emotions in Verbal Communication?, Social Science Information 48 (2009), 447–463, 452. 24 Wilson/Sperber (footnote 22), 613; Carston (footnote 21), 12–13. 25 See in much more detail on the problem of conceptual and procedural meaning and other aspects of “or” and similar words Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1), Conceptual and Procedural Meaning, 121 ff. 26 Maria Aloni, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016, Disjunction (sections 3, 6 and 7, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disjunction/). 27 A cross-linguistic comparison reveals in this context that some languages do not have any connective meaning “or” or connectives that encode semantic distinctions not identified within logic; the exclusive vs. inclusive distinction is thus not necessarily relevant to all languages, see Coralie Chevallier / Ira Noveck / Tatjana Nazir / Lewis Bott / Valentina Lanzetti / Dan Sperber, Making Disjunctions Exclusive, The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 61 (2008), 1741–1760, 1744. 22

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clusive reading is compatible with the semantics of “or” in the sense that at least one of the conjoined phrases or sentences is true.28 An example for the relevance of these distinctions in law can be found in the recent decision of the International Criminal Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber on the Prosecutor’s request for a ruling on whether the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of members of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh.29 Article 7 (1) (d) of the relevant Rome Statute30 includes “[d]eportation or forcible transfer of population” as one of the crimes against humanity that are within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Chamber had to interpret the provision to decide whether it contained a single crime or two separate crimes. It ultimately found that there were two separate crimes, but based on interesting arguments. As its core argument, the Chamber held that the ordinary meaning of “or” provided a very strong indication that the provision contained two crimes.31 Then, it added a number of supporting arguments relying on additional materials, the status of the relevant crimes in other international law, the object and purpose of the Statute and its own previous jurisprudence.32 Based on the previous findings, “or” is, however, more complex than the Chamber interprets it to be. The ordinary meaning of “or” is thus a weaker argument than the Chamber suggests. If we take the phrase “ordinary meaning” to mean the meaning that can be taken from the text without context, i. e. by decoding and not by drawing inferences, “or” does not mean what the Chamber says it means. The decoded meaning would be “deportation or forcible transfer of population or both”. This makes a reading possible under which the two are only one crime (“deportation and forcible transfer of population”). This could be a reading according to which the Statute clarifies what crime (not crimes) we are supposed to imagine under Article 7 (1) (d) of the Statute by expressing it in two exemplary ways (“something along the lines of deportation, forcible transfer of population”). That is, of course, the opposite of how the Chamber read “or”. The Chamber’s exclusive reading of “or” only emerges from inferences drawn from the other arguments relied upon by the Chamber. The example shows thus that an interpreter has to pragmatically enrich “or” for it to mean “deportation or forcible transfer of population, but not both”. The Chamber’s conclusion can still be defended, as it only partly relies on its approach to ordinary meaning. Nonetheless, linguistics shows that the inferenc-

Caterina Mauri / Johan van der Auwera, ‘Connectives’ in: Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics, (eds.) Allan Keith / Katarzyna Jaszczolt, 2012, 347–402, 393. 29 International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Request under Regulation 46 (3) of the Regulations of the Court, Public Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19 (3) of the Statute, Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, 6 September 2018. 30 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 United Nations Treaty Series 3. 31 Para 54 of the decision. 32 Paras 55–59. See in more detail also Benedikt Pirker / Jennifer Smolka, The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s Reading of “or” in the Myanmar Jurisdiction Ruling: On the Relevance of Linguistics to Interpretation, EJIL:Talk! Blog, 2 October 2018. 28

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

es drawn from the interpretation of “or” are essential and that the ordinary meaning of “or” is much less evident than the Chamber’s reasoning suggests. The fact that the Chamber speaks of a “strong indication” illustrates simultaneously that in reality communicators do not separate semantic from simultaneous pragmatic processes. Based on a sound understanding of the semantic and pragmatic process of language comprehension, it becomes clear that law – as it is based on language – cannot operate without processes that lawyers would classify as interpretation. There is no fundamental “closedness” of the semantic part of language, only an extremely limited “content” that can be taken independently of context from the text. Language simply does not operate in this way. Decoding is intertwined with inference; and in this sense, at least under a charitable reading Kelsen seems to be correct in finding (in his own context) that there is always interpretation, and that external circumstances must always be taken into account. The operation of decoding and inference also casts doubt on the interpretation/construction distinction. Linguistically speaking, we are not in the presence of separable kinds of processes. In both cases, language is processed for communication purposes. Yet, the linguistic terminology cannot and is not intended to replace legal categorizations. Of course, lawyers can thus continue to distinguish between interpretation and construction, or develop their own notion of what interpretation means.33 These legal categorizations fulfil useful functions after all. For example, the interpretation/construction distinction is a somewhat necessarily vague normative claim that at some point while processing language an interpretive agent is going “too far”; the legal consequence is that a particular burden of legitimation has to be fulfilled to justify such behaviour. IV.

Kelsen and the conceptualization of language between code and inference

A second topic that looms large within the Pure Theory of Law’s account of interpretation is its conceptualization of language – namely reliance on the notion of a “frame”. This approach can be contrasted with other current conceptualizations. In light of cognitive pragmatics the picture of a frame reveals itself to be unsatisfactory. But cognitive pragmatics also requires some rethinking of other, more recent attempts to refine the way lawyers look at language.

This corresponds to some extent to the discussion on the “Wortlautgrenze” or limits of the wording of a norm often evoked in the (German-speaking) doctrine. Linguists have rather convincingly shown – as the subsequent discussion of Relevance Theory and loosening and broadening should demonstrate, too – that this is a reductivist, unrealistic perception of the operation of language. In particular, its reductivism focuses excessively on the semantics of words, to the detriment of any larger unit of text (or even texts as such). See with further references Busse (footnote 19), 28–29. 33

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1.

Kelsen’s conceptualization of language

When Kelsen speaks of cases of intended and unintended “indeterminacy”, a certain perception of language that is not uncommon among lawyers becomes apparent. Indeterminacy, for Kelsen, is the “ambiguity of a word or a phrase used in expressing the norm”; the “not unequivocal” linguistic “sense” of the norm.34 There is, of course, a difference between the norm and its “linguistic expression”.35 This becomes clear when Kelsen speaks of cases where there is a discrepancy between the linguistic expression of a norm and the will of the norm-issuer.36 But exactly how these situations of indeterminacy come about, what role language plays in them and how an actual understanding of such a linguistic expression of a norm eventually emerges seems to be left aside. The technicalities of methods of interpretation and of how indeterminacy emerges also do not seem to be his focus. Legal theorists have criticized his views in this regard as incomplete or unconvincing.37 Nonetheless, his dicta are of interest as they offer a certain perception of language widely held by lawyers. Note that Kelsen describes a norm to be applied in situations of indeterminacy as a “frame within which various possibilities for application are given”, leaving a number of options of conformity.38 Interpretation is then the discovery of this frame, namely “the cognition of the various possibilities”. This leads to not one correct decision, but possibly a number of decisions of equal standing even if only one of them ultimately becomes positive law, e. g. through a judicial decision.39 Kelsen refutes the “traditional” theory that would suggest that in this interpretation process, one correct decision can be reached based on the positive law alone.40 Such a theory would describe the process as a mere intellectual act of clarification or understanding, the interpreter using only their reason and not their will.41 Kelsen disagrees. The methods of interpretation do not help either in his view, as they can be used to reach opposing conclusions, without any criterion to decide when to use one or the opposite method.42 Even the weigh-

Kelsen (footnote 7), 79. As it has been put in earlier legal-theoretical writings, the language of a norm can be described as its representation, see e. g. early Robert von Mohl, Staatsrecht, Völkerrecht und Politik – Bd. 1 Staatsrecht und Völkerrecht, 1860, 107. Arguably, additional knowledge on the functioning of language becomes, notwithstanding, even more important, as interpretation remains the only approach to identify a norm in law, see early Hans Klinghoffer, ‘Über mehrfache Auslegungsmöglichkeiten’ in: 33 Beiträge zur reinen Rechtslehre, (eds.) Rudolf Aladár Métall / Hans Aufricht, 1974, 153, 163. 36 Kelsen (footnote 7), 79. 37 See e. g. Stanley L. Paulson, Kelsen on legal interpretation, Legal Studies 10 (1990), 136–152; Jestaedt (footnote 3), 141 ff. with further references. 38 Kelsen (footnote 7), 80. 39 Ibid., 80. 40 Ibid., 81. 41 Kelsen (footnote 8), 351. 42 Kelsen (footnote 7), 81–82. 34 35

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

ing of interests (Interessenabwägung) is merely a “formulation of the problem, not a solution”.43 Interpretation is to be understood as the “cognitive ascertainment” of the meaning of the object of interpretation; its results are typically several possibilities within the “frame”, all of equal value; only one of them becomes an individual norm if chosen by e. g. the court at issue.44 The real question of interpretation is thus necessarily for Kelsen neither one of cognition of the positive law nor of legal theory, but of legal policy.45 It is thus a “function of will” to arrive at an individual norm through applying e. g. a statute. The positive law must authorize any value judgments and norms of morality which are used to arrive at any final determination of the individual norm.46 Such norms are then and thereby transformed into positive law.47 Otherwise, positive law can only give a negative qualification to all other norms such as social values, moral rules etc.; namely, that they are not part of positive law.48 2.

Cognitive pragmatics’ conceptualization of the operation of language

At this point, cognitive pragmatics can be brought into play to engage in more detail with Kelsen’s position and other views about language in the context of law. We focus for this purpose on one prominent approach, Relevance Theory.49 Relevance Theory can show us with a focus on the human mind – thus its designation as a cognitive theory – how communication can succeed. Relevance Theory as a pragmatic theory claims that the pragmatic “side” is much richer than the “semantic” side in communication.50 It postulates a model of ostensive-inferential communication. The communicator (speaker) must explicitly or overtly show a communicative intention to communicate a particular piece of information to the addressee (ostension); the addresse has to infer the piece of information (inference).51 Decoding is put in a position subservient to inference, although it does not become irrelevant.52 Any utterance, i. e. a word or sentence uttered by a communicator, involves a linguistically coded piece of evidence; a correct interpretation in

Kelsen (footnote 8), 352. Ibid., 351. Kelsen (footnote 7), 82. Ibid., 83. Kelsen (footnote 8), 354. Ibid., 353. This should not mean it is the only possible one; moreover, it also has its critics, see in more detail Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1), Conceptual and Procedural Meaning, 121; see also Louise Cummings, Pragmatics: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, 2005, 122 ff. 50 Ewa Walaszewska, Relevance-Theoretic Lexical Pragmatics, 2015, 35. 51 Zufferey/Moeschler (footnote 22), 108. 52 Walaszewska (footnote 50), 35. 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

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Relevance Theory is ultimately a joint product of linguistic information, contextual premises and deductive processes.53 The linguistic underdeterminacy of meaning is seen as an essential property of natural language.54 Relevance Theory suggests in this regard that an addressee must always contextually enrich or adjust meaning in different ways to infer the communicator’s meaning.55 This concerns the implicit and explicit content of utterances.56 Take an example. Peter says to Mary “It is four o’clock” and intends to communicate that they will be late for a meeting starting at four o’clock. Mary can decode elements of Peter’s utterance, for example “four o’clock”. Certain explicit elements will require, moreover, that Mary enriches and adjusts their meaning by inference. Four o’clock could be on any day, anywhere in the world. Peter, however, probably intends to express that it is four o’clock in the afternoon on that exact day at the exact place they find themselves at. This content thus falls on the explicit side, although it is inferred. There are, at the same time, implicit elements that must be inferred. Mary knows that they are to attend a meeting at four o’clock. She can thus infer from the situational context – not from the explicit parts of Peter’s utterance – that Peter is implying they will be late for the meeting.57 If language is so underdetermined in the first place, successful communication may appear to be nearly impossible. In Relevance Theory, the principle of relevance as a fundamental feature of human cognition provides an explanation for the frequent success of communication. Human cognition in communication as in other matters always aims to achieve a maximum of cognitive effects in exchange for a minimum of processing effort. There is thus a relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure that can be described in a number of steps. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects; test interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility; stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.58 Positive cognitive effects in this account are worthwhile differences to an individual’s representation of the world, for example a true conclusion59 or in law the establishment of a legally convincing interpretation of a norm.60 Communication works in this manner because it relies on the human ability to read each other’s minds. Mind-reading is to be understood based on the so-called intentional stance as the capacity to form fallible hypotheses of what is happening in the interlocutor’s mind

Moeschler (footnote 23), 452. Robyn Carston, ‘Relevance Theory and the Saying / Implicating Distinction’ in: The Handbook of Pragmatics, (eds.) Laurence Horn / Gregory Ward, 2006, 633–656, 654. 55 Carston (footnote 21), 12–13 ; Wilson/Sperber (footnote 22), 613. 56 Walaszewska (footnote 50), 35. 57 See for a more extensive discussion Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 241 ff. 58 Carston (footnote 21), 28. 59 Wilson/Sperber (footnote 22), 608. 60 Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 237. 53 54

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and what he or she intends to communicate.61 Take our example of “It is four o’clock”. Mary will in all likelihood find it unsatisfactory to stop her interpretation of Peter’s utterance at the point where he tells her the time. By drawing additional inferences, she will reach sufficient positive cognitive effects, i. e. a satisfactory interpretation of Peter’s utterance. Thereby her expectation of relevance will be satisfied. Thus, Relevance Theory as a core theory of modern cognitive pragmatics aims at building a psychologically plausible, empirically testable62 pragmatic theory of meaning and utterance interpretation in context.63 At the same time, it must be noted that the theory takes an individualist and psychological64 and not a sociological perspective.65 Relevance Theory thus does not consider that conventions of language use66 are issues of pragmatics, but rather leaves them to sociology.67 It assumes that social conventions can be reduced to the knowledge about them accessible in the individual’s mind.68 3.

Later accounts in legal theory, Kelsen, and cognitive pragmatics

On the basis of these insights into Kelsen’s views and cognitive pragmatics provided so far, we can now turn to other approaches in legal theory. Innumerable later accounts have dealt in one way or another with language in legal theory and its role in law and

Jacques Moeschler / Antoine Auchlin, Introduction à la linguistique contemporaine, 2009, 178 ; Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance, 1987; Moeschler (footnote 23), 453, relying on Simon Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind, 1995. 62 Deirdre Wilson, ‘Relevance Theory’ in: The Oxford Handbook of Pragmatics, (ed.) Yan Huang, 2017, 79–100, 81; Billy Clark, Relevance Theory, 2013, 334. 63 Dan Sperber / Gloria Origgi, ‘A pragmatic perspective on the evolution of language’ in: Meaning and Relevance, (eds.) Deirdre Wilson / Dan Sperber, 2012, 331–338, 331. 64 Susan Foster-Cohen, Relevance Theory, Action Theory and second language communication strategies, Second Language Research 20 (2004), 289–302, 289 and 294; Diane Blakemore, Understanding Utterances: Introduction to Pragmatics, 1992, 4. 65 Blakemore (footnote 64), 92; Carmen Curcó, ‘On the Status of Procedural Meaning in Natural Language’ in: Procedural Meaning: Problems and Perspectives, (eds.) Victoria Escandell-Vidal / Manuel Leonetti / Aoife Ahern, 2011, 33–54, 37. 66 See on the distinction between conventionalist and non-conventionalist approaches to the study of language Pirker/Smolka (footnote 5), 441–442. 67 Anne Reboul / Jacques Moeschler, La pragmatique aujourd’hui: une nouvelle science de la communication 1998, 172. 68 Louis De Saussure, Procedural pragmatics and the study of discourse, Pragmatics & Cognition 15 (2007), 139–159, 142. There are other linguistic approaches that focus on the social determination of linguistic behaviour. Only part of them, however, pursue the goal of explaining natural language understanding procedures. This is, for example, often not the case with Speech Act Theory and approaches to the study of discourse in a broad sense, which are rather tools for an analyst of language, see ibid., 140 and 145. With regard to legal linguistics, there are some approaches that ground linguistic rules in social conventions of use. They often follow up on Wittgenstein’s work, see Friedemann Vogel, ‘Zwischen Willkür, Konvention und Automaten – Die interdisziplinäre Suche nach Bedeutungen in Recht und Gesetz’ in: Zugänge zur Rechtssemantik – Interdisziplinäre Ansätze im Zeitalter der Mediatisierung, (ed.) Friedemann Vogel, 2015, 3–17, 3 ff. 61

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interpretation generally. We necessarily restrict ourselves again to some example cases that show how scholars have perceived language in their quest to unravel the mystery of legal interpretation. Then, we contrast these approaches with the core findings of Relevance Theory and cognitive pragmatics. 3.1

Textualist, author-centred and social conventions-based accounts of interpretation

A number of approaches have developed by criticizing each other. Therefore, we treat them together presently. For a start, there are “textualist” positions such as Marmor’s. Such views, often also referred to as literalist positions, argue that meaning is fully contained in a text as it is. There is no need to look into any other elements to obtain the meaning, such as an author’s intent or a legal act’s drafting history. In other words, language is as a fixed code under these views. Meaning can fully be enshrined in such an account, independently of context. An opposite account stems from literary criticism and has been brought to the legal realm prominently by Stanley Fish.69 For him, words have no inherent meaning; they can mean anything an author wishes them to mean.70 Language and its meaning are thus based on the author’s intent. In international legal interpretation, Koskenniemi has developed a strand of thought going in a similar, yet somewhat less extreme direction.71 In his view, arguing on the basis of a natural code in language is a camouflaged attempt to impose a particular speaker’s ideology or political interpretation on others in the context of legal interpretation.72 Interpretation – namely the interpreting agent – thus practically always “creates” meaning rather than discovering it in his view.73 Opposing this view, Bianchi suggests a slightly different perspective. Strongly based on Fish’s idea of interpretive communities, he argues that there must be a middle-way International law scholars have also picked up these ideas, see e. g. Andrea Bianchi, ‘Textual Interpretation and (International) Law Reading: The Myth of (In)Determinacy and the Genealogy of Meaning’ in: Making Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy, (eds.) Pieter Bekker / Rudolf Dolzer / Michael Waibel, 2010, 34–55. 70 Stanley Fish, There is No Textualist Position, San Diego Law Review 42 (2005), 629–650, 647. 71 Koskenniemi is often counted among the proponents of the Critical Legal Studies movement within international law; it should nonetheless be noted that his work does not seem to follow some of the more extreme perspectives that would e. g. suggest that applying the law is always solely about non-legal, political interests of those with power, a mere pretense or rhetorical means, see Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, 1993, 152. Such a position would appear to render any closer engagement with linguistics and law nugatory. 72 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Reissue with a new epilogue), 2005, 18. 73 Ibid., 531. See for a sceptical appraisal Sergio Dellavalle, Law as a Linguistic Instrument Without Truth Content? On the Epistomology of Koskenniemi’s Understanding of Law, ZaöRV 77 (2017), 199–233, 232– 233. 69

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

between formalist approaches that suggest that everything is in the text and radical critical approaches that give no intrinsic value to the text. In his view, we should examine sociological aspects to the interpretative process.74 Under this approach of a turn to sociology, meaning is thus a product of social relations formed by interpretive communities and their strategies. Following up on this trend, Venzke’s work has in this regard turned the focus on the interpreting agents as law-creators. Interpretation “makes” international law in his view, in the sense that interpretation is not only clarifying pre-existing meaning, but engaging in its construction.75 What is not always addressed in sufficient clarity in these accounts is whether they consider language to be a completely social or natural product, in the sense that interpretive communities can create practically any meaning without constraints.76 In light of Relevance Theory and cognitive pragmatics, both literalist as well as Fish’s author-centred approach to meaning are hardly tenable. With what we know through modern cognitive pragmatics, it appears implausible and empirically untenable that semantic meaning, or the plain or literal meaning of a text in lawyer’s diction, could be in any way complete or self-contained. If not even a word like “or” can be read independently of context, it appears hard to uphold claims such as the ones developed by Marmor. An author-centred approach or Koskenniemi’s depiction of natural language codes constituting camouflaged attempts to impose a speaker’s ideology must equally be rejected as imprecise. Of course, the choice of lexical items by a speaker matters. But, as Relevance Theory’s account shows, there is a certain latitude for the addressee’s mind to interpret these items, inferring additional elements from context, their own knowledge etc. Author-centred approaches would give language a capacity to contain meaning that it simply does not have, as linguistics shows. Language is ultimately a natural product in so far as it relies on fundamental, universal features of the human cognitive system to function, but it also relies on social conventions as part of what is considered to be meaning. At the same time, this criticism should not be taken too far. Koskenniemi’s argument that any interpreter “creates” law, already developed in a different context by Kelsen and taken up by others, possesses merit. If communication – and in the present context interpretation  – is so fundamentally dependent on contextual elements, by

Bianchi (footnote 69), 53. See also Fouad Zarbiev, Le discours interprétatif en droit international contemporain: un essai critique, 2015. 75 Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law  – On Semantic Change and Normative Twists, 2012. This is becoming somewhat of a mainstream view, see e. g. writing on Kelsen with a rather classic positivistic approach Katharina Berner, Authentic Interpretation in Public International Law, ZaöRV 76 (2016), 845–878, 850. 76 See in this regard hints in this direction in Venzke (footnote 75), 46; Andrea Bianchi, ‘Law, Time, and Change: The Self-Regulatory Function of Subsequent Practice’ in: Treaties and Subsequent Practice, (ed.) Georg Nolte, 2013, 133–141, 136–137. 74

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means of the very functioning of the organ processing language, namely the human mind, there is no interpretation that does not in some major or minor way impact on the original intention with which a (legal) text was written. The turn to sociology suggested by scholars like Bianchi and Venzke to study meaning in international law can be accepted only partly. As a rather obvious starting point, sociology is not concerned with the operation of language. It is thus not its purported mission to help us understand phenomena of interpretation, unless one wants to focus merely on the behaviour of certain groups or communities in the larger context of interpretation.77 It comes as little surprise in this context that an examination of references to language in the relevant works shows that legal scholars engaged in sociological inquiries seem to overwhelmingly rely exclusively on the code model of language.78 As shown above, this is outdated in light of the newer findings of pragmatics. 3.2

Hermeneutics and cognitive pragmatics

Hermeneutics is yet another approach to interpretation.79 As has been criticized e. g. in international law, it has not been given a lot of room in the classic literature on the subject of interpretation.80 As a prominent example, Gadamer describes interpretation as a fusion of horizons between the interpreter and the text. In conversation like in interpretation, the horizons of interlocutors or interpreter and text must merge so that interpretation can succeed.81 Application, as the fundamental circularity problem of hermeneutics would put it, is not a first understanding developed of a given universal and then an application to a concrete case (e. g. of a norm); rather, application is the very understanding of the universal, e. g. the text.82 The interpreter’s situation, for Gadamer, is not an obstacle to interpretation, but conditions the very possibility of interpretation. This contradicts Kelsen’s positivistic account of interpretation. It is impossible to “methodologically bracket” the situation

See for a critical appraisal of Bianchi’s and Venzke’s work in this regard Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1), Account of Interpretation, 17 ff. 78 Pirker/Smolka (footnote 5), 7–8. 79 For example, Dworkin has taken up Gadamer’s views in his contributions to legal theory, see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 1986, 55. See in more detail on Dworkin Daniel Peat / Matthew Windsor, ‘Playing the Game of Interpretation: On Meaning and Metaphor in International Law’ in: Interpretation in International Law, (eds.) Andrea Bianchi / Daniel Peat / Matthew Windsor, 2015, 3–33, 15–16. 80 See, e. g. already early Outi Korhonen, New International Law: Silence, Defence or Deliverance?, European Journal of International Law 7 (1996), 1–28; Jörg Kammerhöfer, Review – A Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law, European Journal of International Law 20 (2009), 1283; on the neglect of philosophical hermeneutics specifically, see Fouad Zarbiev, Review – R Kolb, Interprétation et création du droit international, Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009), 211–212, 212. 81 See on legal interpretation Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 1989, 321–336. 82 Ibid., 341. 77

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

to gain a standpoint ensuring access to an original range of meaning of a norm.83 The excluded background assumptions are vital and also contain normative assumptions. The latter contradicts Kelsen’s view that value-free interpretation of the law is possible (before actively deciding in favour of one solution).84 However, for Gadamer legal interpretation is nonetheless not arbitrary, as e. g. the judge as an interpreter is bound by the legal system and constrained to justly weigh “the whole” to reach a judgment including an interpretation.85 Hermeneutics adds important elements to the picture. Most crucially, it focuses on the influence of external circumstances and the situatedness of the interpreter. Thereby, it brings similar aspects to lawyers’ attention as Relevance Theory does. Phrased differently and in more relevance-theoretic terminology, one could paraphrase Gadamer as suggesting that interpretation is not possible without an interpreter’s mind – including its contextual and encyclopaedic knowledge and other influencing factors – processing that which is to be interpreted. Relevance Theory can add an explanation of why the “merging” of horizons between e. g. an interpreter and a legal text should occur and be felicitous in the sense of reaching an interpretation. The reason that this “merging” exists and works can be found in the mentioned principle of relevance, i. e. human cognition’s feature of searching for the maximum of relevance and using the mentioned intentional stance for this purpose.86 3.3

Kelsen’s “frame” conceptualization and cognitive pragmatics

Based on this tour d’horizon of later approaches, let us assess Kelsen’s views in light of modern pragmatics to see how they fare compared to what we have seen. As shown, under Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law he conceives of the norm as a “frame” and argues that interpretive methods do not operate to achieve a correct result on their own, but merely carve out the possible interpretive solutions of a norm. It may be easiest to show with the help of two examples in the following how cognitive pragmatics suggests refinements to Kelsen’s views. These refinements concern first the metaphor of the frame and second the role of interpretive methods in the actual interpretation process of the human (lawyer’s) mind. The first chosen example is taken from international law scholarship.87 In a wellknown treatise on the practice and interpretation of international treaties, Aust, the Hans Lindahl, Gadamer, Kelsen, and the Limits of Legal Interpretation, Phänomenologische Forschungen (2002), 27–49, 35–36. 84 Ibid., 35–36. 85 Gadamer (footnote 81), 329. 86 See in more detail also about the problem of “mutual knowledge” versus “mutual manifestness” Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1), Account of Interpretation, 22–23. 87 See for the discussion of a similar example in an international dispute settlement situation ibid., 12. 83

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author, describes an example of in his view “good” interpretation.88 Under the section title “implied terms”, he argues that sometimes it is necessary for international tribunals to “imply a term” without, however, thereby revising a treaty. He then provides an example that did not “end up in court”. In 1982 during the Falklands conflict there was at one point not enough accommodation in the territory held by the British for the approximately 10,000 Argentine prisoners of war (POWs) captured on land in the final stages of the conflict. The tents that they should be provided with had been lost at sea because the ship carrying them was sunk by the enemy. After consultations with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Kingdom decided to hold the POWs on merchant ships and warships in Falklands waters until their repatriation. Now, the relevant Article 22 of the Third Geneva Convention prescribes that such prisoners “may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness”. Under a literal approach to interpretation, it would appear rather straightforward for any legal commentator to suggest that the United Kingdom violated the norm; holding POWs on ships is not, as prescribed, holding them on land. Aust, however, argues in his book that this is not the case. As the primary purpose of the Convention is the welfare of POWs, in his view one can “imply a term” in the norm. This has the effect that a party is allowed to hold POWs on ships if there are circumstances beyond its control and holding them like this would be preferable to leaving them on land without sufficient protection from weather conditions. Aust concludes that “[g]ood interpretation is often no more than common sense”. As indicated, the example may lend itself to dogmatic criticism. However, it also constitutes a good example of the explanatory force of a linguistic approach to interpretation. If we take Kelsen’s frame approach, we would now use the methods of interpretation to find out the various possible interpretations that “fit within” the frame of the norm. A look through the prism of cognitive pragmatics, however, provides us with a more realistic picture and at the same time an explanation for the seemingly blatant way in which Aust seems to “overlook” the wording of the norm he is confronted with. A relevance-theoretic account would suggest that Aust is both decoding the concept “land” and at the same time enriching his interpretation pragmatically.89 There is a process of so-called broadening or loosening of the linguistic content encoded in “land” at play.90 The concept of “land” encodes a certain decodable meaning, for example the assumption that land is firm ground that may border on water but is different from it. Semantic meaning is, however, underdetermined.91 The decoded meaning of

Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2013, 221–222. The example is discussed in more detail and with several other arguments in Pirker/Smolka (footnote 5). 89 As he is doing this with respect to an explicit element of the utterance, namely “land”, it is called an explicature, Kristin Börjesson, The Semantics-Pragmatics Controversy, 2014, 114. 90 Carston (footnote 21), 12. 91 Ibid., 1–2. 88

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“land” must therefore be pragmatically enriched. This may result in a so-called ad hoc concept.92 In the formation of such a concept, the semantic content of a lexical item is pragmatically adjusted based on the principle of relevance to express conceptual content that may be narrower (narrowing) or looser (loosening) than the decoded meaning.93 At the same time, this is not to be confused with any non-literal use.94 In our example, Aust can thus be said to modulate the linguistic content of “land” with remarkable effect, all based on context. Article 22 joins another condition to the obligation to intern POWs on land, namely affording “every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness”. What Aust calls to read an implied term into the norm seems to be to develop the notion of “land” so as to include the second condition (without, however, arguing expressly so at the legal level). “Land” is thus “land” only under certain conditions, namely with regard to protection from the elements and weather conditions. Aust narrows the conceptual meaning of “land” in this manner. Then, he loosens the previously narrowed explicit content, relying on the fact that accommodation and protection from the elements can also be provided on ships. The conceptual content of “ship” makes available sufficiently similar information to the narrowed ad hoc concept of “land”, such as “firm ground”. The linguistic content of “land” is thus loosened so it includes “land” that is adjacent or even continguous, even if this “land” is technically located on top of water. Because of this loosening following the initial narrowing of the linguistic content of “land”, the ad hoc term no longer applies to land that lacks adequate accommodation; holding POWs on ships becomes for Aust the only option compliant with the norm. If we accept this view and thus observe how Aust reached the ad hoc conceptual understanding of “land”, the “frame” view of a norm appears to be rather misleading. The language of a norm seems to be less a frame in which various interpretations can fit. Certainly, this may appear to be at first the result of operations of interpretation. In fact, however, taking into account such issues as loosening and narrowing, there is much more diversity and leeway within the operation of language than the picture of the “frame” admits. Under a truly linguistic understanding, we have to accept that processes such as broadening and loosening happen, that the encoded content is thus much less definitive than lawyers’ intuition would suggest, and that inferences affect the explicit and implicit content of utterances. Rather than a “frame”, a norm is thus linguistically speaking an “anchor point” or “pointer” for the cognitive process of communication, or in our case, legal interpretation. Again, this should in no way be misconstrued as an “anything goes” argument or a plea for interpretation relying on any non-literal use of language. The “frame” metaphor may be valid as a matter of principle, Wilson/Sperber (footnote 22), 618. Börjesson (footnote 89), 117–118. Carston (footnote 21), 11–12. For example, such a non-literal use could be a metaphor as in “John is a bulldozer” (with John being an actual person with a strong will). 92 93 94

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but so diffuse that it becomes nearly pointless. Simply, we will understand better how humans process language by relying on modern linguistics. 3.4

Kelsen’s view on interpretive methods and cognitive pragmatics

In light of the previous findings, it is rather straightforward to agree with Kelsen that in and of themselves, interpretive methods will not lead to one irrefutably correct solution. This is already the case because they are too broad to reach such a supposedly specific result. However, this does not mean that they do not play a role at all. There have been some early attempts to link the operation of pragmatic maxims and of interpretive methods and to explaining the relationship between these two sets of principles.95 In essence, if we look at the process of interpretation as Relevance Theory would explain it, there is the mentioned process of following a path of least effort in computing cognitive effect, testing interpretive hypothesis in order of accessibility and of stopping when the expectations of relevance are satisfied. Interpretive maxims such as those of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties96 for the case of international law and international treaties would then influence the inferences to be drawn.97 Notably, they appear to be manifest as contextual assumptions and act as implicit premises that affect the strength and acceptability of inferences.98 This can be clarified with another example, this time with a criminal prohibition. In EU law, recently a new regulation on market abuse entered into force harmonising certain elements of the law including the prohibition of insider trading. However, Germany made a mistake while aligning its law with the new legal situation. The relevant German prohibition was abrogated one day too early, leading to a factual situation in which insider trading was permissible for a whole day in Germany. This was obviously a mistake, as all parties involved in drafting the law agreed.99 A lay person would thus have tried to find an interpretation that takes into account this error. The German legislator ordered the German prohibition to lose its force with 2 July 2016 and the EU prohibition entered into force with 3 July 2016. Linguistically, there would be – as seen See for a first tentative attempt Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 262–263, see also Carston (footnote 21); Busse (footnote 19), 34; see with regard to so-called Gricean principles Fabrizio Macagno / Douglas Walton / Giovanni Sartor, Pragmatic Maxims and Presumptions in Legal Interpretation, Law and Philosophy 37 (2018), 69–115. 96 See Articles 31–33, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 United Nations Treaty Series, 331. 97 See for a less benevolent take on international law’s rules of interpretation in legal theory Jörg Kammerhofer, Taking the Rules of Interpretation Seriously, but not Literally? A Theoretical Reconstruction of Orthodox Dogma, Nordic Journal of International Law 86 (2017), 125–150, 143–144. 98 Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 263. 99 See on the legal details of the case Christoph Rothenfußer / Christian Jäger, Generalamnestie im Kapitalmarktrecht durch das Erste Finanzmarktnovellierungsgesetz, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2016), 2689–2695, 2689–2690. 95

Kelsen meets Cognitive Science

above – a possibility to loosen the meaning of 2 July somewhat so that an ad hoc concept could emerge that allows for the German prohibition to remain into force for the whole day of 2 July. Nonetheless, a lawyer will balk at the prospect of interpreting the law so as to extend the punishability of behaviour retroactively. Consequently, interpretive maxims cut off certain inferences in this example. In a nutshell, Kelsen’s basic point about interpretive methods’ imprecision can thus be accepted. Matters are, however, more complicated. Rules of interpretation do not simply not lead to one clear, “correct” result. Norms of interpretation put prevailing constraints on both utterer and addressee with the aim of facilitating successful communication.100 There is thus no one rule of interpretation that decides matters on its own. Interpretive rules influence the balance of cognitive effects and processing effort, so that certain interpretations – due to the increased cognitive effect it takes to uphold them – would appear more far-fetched and require additional reasoning to be justified. The latter point also clarifies that, in line with Kelsen’s view, evaluative judgments remain necessary under a linguistic perspective on legal interpretation.101 V.

Conclusion

The present paper has examined Kelsen’s take on interpretation in the framework of his Pure Theory of Law and contrasted them with later theoretical perspectives and the findings of modern cognitive linguistics and pragmatics. A nuanced picture emerges. Of course, a number of points can arguably be refined with more recent scientific knowledge on how language is processed in the human mind. Nonetheless, at least on a charitable reading several points of Kelsen remain acceptable. By comparison, some later theoretical contributions see their foundations questioned more fundamentally. Notably, the notions of decoding and inference show very clearly that – as Kelsen also states – there always has to be interpretation, and all theories based on an assumed complete, context-free semantic content that allows successful interpretation must be rejected. Linguistics also confirms Kelsen’s views on the law-creating character of interpretation and the inconclusiveness of methods of interpretation. By contrast, his “frame” conceptualization of language is not particularly helpful, as a closer look at Relevance Theory and cognitive pragmatics demonstrates. Still, it is closer to the current state of knowledge as some other theoretical approaches, e. g. the idea of a purely author-centred way of conveying meaning through language or of language’s meaning being ultimately determined purely by social conventions. Hermeneutics is much more in line with cognitive pragmatics, although it can still learn from e. g. Relevance

100 101

Carston (footnote 21), 24. Pirker/Smolka (footnote 1), 264; Smolka/Pirker (footnote 1), Account of Interpretation, 29 ff.

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Theory with regard to the actual motivations underlying language processing in the human mind. In conclusion, it should be noted as perhaps the most important lesson that Kelsen did what made sense in his time. Today’s lawyers should no longer be happy with any simplistic approaches, for example leaving linguistics aside and “escaping” to sociology or relying on outdated or incomplete theories of communication. There is much value to be found in recent scientific findings of cognitive pragmatics that lawyers would be well advised to take into account. Arguably, such an approach would also be in line with Kelsen himself, who aimed to challenge traditional doctrines of his time. The Pure Theory of Law may not be able to provide us with a tenable theory of interpretation for today, but it can most certainly pass on its spirit of contestation of the existing “dogma”. Benedikt Pirker

Institut für Europarecht, Avenue de Beauregard 11, CH-1700 Freiburg, [email protected]

III.

Die Anwendung der Reinen Rechtslehre auf Rechtsordnungen / Applying the Pure Theory of Law to Legal Orders

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie LENA FOLJANTY

Hans Kelsen, Private Law, and Democracy Abstract: In the field of private law, the pure theory of law has received little attention,

although Kelsen challenged the traditional understanding of private law profoundly. In order to locate private law within the hierarchical structure of law, he reformulated key concepts such as subjective law and private autonomy and questioned the divide public law and private law. In this contribution, Kelsen’s conception of private law is brought together with his conceptions of judiciary lawmaking and of democracy. By this, an unfamiliar view of Kelsen’s conception of law is presented, which offers material for reflecting on the current challenges of private law. Keywords: Pure Theory of Law, Hans Kelsen, Private Law, Judge Made Law, Democracy,

Private Autonomy Schlagworte: Reine Rechtslehre, Hans Kelsen, Privatrecht, Richterrecht, Demokratietheo-

rie, Privatautonomie

Die wieder erwachende Kelsen-Rezeption der vergangenen Jahre fand zumindest in Deutschland vorwiegend im öffentlichen Recht statt,1 das Privatrecht blieb von ihr weitgehend unberührt. Und auch in der internationalen Forschung zu Kelsen gibt es nicht viele Abhandlungen zu Kelsens Privatrechtskonzeption2 – wobei mit dem Buch Zuerst Horst Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 1990; nun Matthias Jestaedt (Hg.), Hans Kelsen und die deutsche Staatsrechtslehre, 2013. 2 Rafael Encinas de Munagorri, Kelsen et la théorie générale du contrat, in: Carlos Miguel Herrera (Hg.), Actualité de Kelsen en France, 2001, 109–119; Natalino Irti, Privatautonomie und Staatsform. Kelsen und das Privatrecht, in: Agostino Carrino / Günther Winkler (Hg ), Rechtserfahrung und Reine Rechtslehre, 1995, 3–14; Klaus Adomeit, Heteronome Gestaltungen im Zivilrecht (Stellvertretung, Weisungsbefugnis, Verbandsgewalt), in: Adolf Merkl / Alfred Verdross / René Marcic / Robert Walter (Hg.), Festschrift für Hans Kelsen zum 90  Geburtstag, 1971, 9–21. 1

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von dem italienischen Rechtsphilosophen Michele Prospero „Hans Kelsen: Normativismo e diritto privato“ von 2012 nun Belastbares vorliegt.3 Auch der Kreis um Kelsen befasste sich vorwiegend mit dem Staatsrecht,4 eine Ausnahme war hier allenfalls die Brünner Schule, wo sich zum Beispiel mit Jaromír Sedláče, Vladimír Kubeš, Karel Gerlich oder František Bauer durchaus namhafte Zivilrechtler finden.5 So wurde die Reine Rechtslehre denn auch von Zeitgenossen als ein primär die Staatsrechtswissenschaft adressierendes Projekt wahrgenommen  – allerdings als eines, vor dem sich auch die Zivilrechtswissenschaft in Acht zu nehmen habe. In seiner Polemik gegen die Reine Rechtslehre schrieb Ernst Fuchs Ende der 1920er Jahre: „Zwar treibt der Kelsenismus bisher seine Bovigusherde hauptsächlich auf den staatsrechtlichen Gefilden umher. Aber die Gefahr ist nicht zu unterschätzen, daß er auch auf das zivilrechtliche Gelände übergreift.“6 Die Sorge von Fuchs war voll und ganz unbegründet – wenn wir die Entwicklung der Privatrechtswissenschaft in Deutschland in den Blick nehmen, so bestand die Gefahr, dass Kelsens Lehren rezipiert werden könnten, zu keinem Zeitpunkt. Zunächst versperrten Freirechtsschule und Interessenjurisprudenz den Weg, sodann konkretes Ordnungsdenken und nationalsozialistische Gemeinschaftsideologie, in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit christliches Naturrecht und Wertungsjurisprudenz,7 später sozial- und wohlfahrtsstaatliche Ansätze.8 Wenn Natalino Irti von einem „tiefliegenden Unverständnis zwischen Privatrechtswissenschaft und den Kelsenschen Theorien“9 spricht, so trifft er zumindest für die deutsche Privatrechtswissenschaft unzweifelhaft den Nagel auf den Kopf.

Michele Prospero, Hans Kelsen: Normativismo e diritto privato, 2012. Siehe Robert Walter u. a. (Hg.), Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen Die Anfangsjahre der Reinen Rechtslehre, 2008; Axel Johannes Korb, Kelsens Kritiker Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rechts- und Staatstheorie (1911–1934), 2010. 5 Vladimír Kubeš / Ota Weinberger (Hg.), Die Brünner rechtstheoretische Schule (Normative Theorie), 1980. 6 Ernst Fuchs, Gesunder Menschenverstand, Neu-Wiener Begriffsnetz und französische „neue Schule“, Die Justiz, Bd. 4 (1928/29), 129 (140). Außerhalb der Brünner Schule v. a. Fritz Schreier, Reine Rechtslehre und Privatrecht, in: Alfred Verdross (Hg.), Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre, 1931, 309–353. 7 Zur Kontinuität antipositivistischer Ansätze in der Privatrechtstheorie des 20. Jahrhunderts Überblick bei Joachim Rückert, Schlachtrufe im Methodenkampf – ein historischer Überblick, in: ders. / Ralf Seinecke (Hg.), Methodik des Zivilrechts – von Savigny bis Teubner, 3. Aufl. 2017, 541–608; zur Nachkriegszeit auch Ilka Kauhausen, Nach der Stunde Null: Prinzipiendiskussionen im Privatrecht nach 1945, 2007; Lena Foljanty, Recht oder Gesetz Juristische Identität und Autorität in den Naturrechtsdiskussionen der Nachkriegszeit, 2013, bes. Kap. 5. 8 Zur Rechtstheorie der 1970er und 1980er Jahre gibt es bislang nur wenige historisierende Analysen, siehe aber Hasso Hofmann, Rechtsphilosophie nach 1945, 2012, 29 ff.; Foljanty (Fn. 7), 349 ff.; Ulfrid Neumann, Rechtsphilosophie in Deutschland seit 1945, in: Dieter Grimm (Hg.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner Republik, 1994, 145 (164 ff.) sowie Eric Hilgendorf, Die Renaissance der Rechtstheorie zwischen 1965 und 1985, 2005, dort S. 58 ff. zu den über die 1960er Jahre hinaus fortdauernden „Ressentiments gegen den liberalen Positivismus“ Kelsens. 9 Irti (Fn. 2), 11. 3 4

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie

Auch wenn Kelsen Staatsrechtslehrer war, so hat er sich doch mit seinem Anspruch, eine umfassende Rechtslehre zu entwickeln, selbstverständlich auch mit dem Privatrecht befasst. In allen seinen Hauptwerken – den „Hauptproblemen der Staatsrechtslehre“ (1911), der „Allgemeinen Staatslehre“ (1925), der „Reinen Rechtslehre“ in erster und zweiter Auflage (1934 und 1960) und in dem Nachlasswerk „Allgemeine Theorie der Normen“ (1979) – finden sich einschlägige Passagen. Abgesehen von dem auf Französisch verfassten Aufsatz „La théorie juridique de la convention“, den er im Genfer Exil verfasste und der 1940 in der Zeitschrift „Archives de philosophie du droit et de sociologie juridique“ erschien, steht das Privatrecht in seinen Schriften jedoch nicht im Mittelpunkt. Um die Privatrechtskonzeption Kelsens nachzuzeichnen, ist es daher nötig, Passagen aus verschiedenen Werken zusammenzulesen. Deutlich zu erkennen sein wird der ideologiekritische Zugriff auf die tradierte Zivilrechtslehre. Mein Hauptinteresse gilt dabei den Ausführungen Kelsens, in denen eine Verbindung zwischen Rechtslehre und Demokratietheorie angedeutet wird. In welches Verhältnis setzte er das Privatrecht zur Demokratie? Was gibt Kelsen uns im Nachdenken über ein demokratisches Privatrecht mit auf den Weg? Meine Überlegungen stützten sich dabei auf nur wenig Material: Nur an einer einzigen Stelle bringt er Privatrecht und Demokratie explizit zusammen. Um den Mangel an Ausführungen Kelsens zu kompensieren, werde ich daher einen Umweg gehen – einen Umweg über das Richterrecht, das ich als Bindeglied zwischen Privatrecht und Demokratie ins Spiel bringen möchte. 1.

Das Privatrecht

Die Grundidee von Kelsens Privatrechtskonzeption ist schnell benannt. Er gliedert das Privatrecht in das Gesamtsystem des Rechts ein und stellt damit alle Versuche in Frage, ein vor- oder außerstaatliches Privatrecht anzunehmen. Grundbegriffe des Privatrechts wie Privatautonomie, subjektives Recht und Rechtssubjekt werden im Lichte ihrer Bedeutung innerhalb des Stufenbaus der Rechtsordnung re-formuliert. Privatautonomie ist für Kelsen nicht gegeben, sondern erst durch das Recht geschaffen, das Rechtssubjekt nicht bereits vorgefunden, sondern erst durch das Recht konstituiert, das subjektive Recht lediglich der „Reflex einer Pflicht“ und die Dichotomie von öffentlichem Recht und Privatrecht kein „absoluter Wesensgegensatz“. Schauen wir uns dies genauer an. a.

Privatautonomie soweit vom positiven Recht gewährt

Kelsen geht von der Grundfigur des Privatrechts, dem Vertrag aus. Seine Überlegung ist einfach und naheliegend: Der Vertrag kommt durch freie Einigung zwischen zwei Individuen zustande. Die Freiheit hierzu ist im Rahmen einer modernen Rechtsord-

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nung keine überpositiv vorgegebene, sondern eine durch das Recht selbst geschaffene.10 Privatautonomie ist dann eine zentrale Kategorie des Privatrechts, wenn sie vom Recht selbst vorgesehen ist.11 Freiheit ist nicht vorstaatlich. Sie ist kontingent und muss durch positives Recht  – idealerweise durch Verfassungsrecht  – abgesichert werden. Das Gleiche gilt für die zweite Grundfigur des Privatrechts, das subjektive Recht. Auch das subjektive Recht gebe es nur, weil das objektive Recht die Voraussetzung hierfür geschaffen habe.12 Soweit überrascht Kelsen nicht, er befindet sich vielmehr in einer Linie mit Zeitgenossen, die von dem Credo „kein Privatrecht ohne Staat“ ausgingen.13 Hatte die Aufklärung das autonome Subjekt und das freie Privatrecht zu Grundpfeilern modernen Rechts erhoben, verkehrte sich dieses Verhältnis im Zuge von Systembildung und Verrechtlichung im Laufe des 19.  Jahrhunderts. Am Ende der pandektistischen Durchdringung des Rechts stand die Einsicht Windscheids, dass Rechte eine „von der Rechtsordnung verliehene Macht bzw. Herrschaft“ seien,14 eine Einsicht, die durch soziologische und rechtsrealistische Ansätze zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts noch unterstrichen wurde.15 b.

Der Primat der Pflicht

Doch Kelsen blieb nicht bei der Feststellung stehen, dass es kein Privatrecht ohne Staat gebe. Wie konsequent er die Einordnung des Privatrechts in den Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung denkt, wird deutlich an seinen Ausführungen zum Begriff des subjektiven Rechts, der Sequenz, in der er am nachhaltigsten mit der traditionellen Privatrechtskonzeption aufräumt. Das subjektive Recht war Kelsen zufolge nicht nur einfach abhängig vom objektiven Recht, wie bereits Windscheid festgestellt hatte. Es tauge genau genommen überhaupt nicht als Grundfigur des Privatrechts: Es sei seiner Natur nach weniger ein Recht, denn der „Reflex einer Pflicht“.16 Kelsens Überlegung war die Folgende: Durch einen privatrechtlichen Vertrag verpflichten sich die Parteien zu einer Leistung. Der Inhalt der hierdurch geschaffenen primären Norm ist somit zunächst einmal eine Pflicht – nicht ein Recht. Wird diese Pflicht verletzt, so kann die Rechtsordnung die Berechtigung verleihen, die Erfüllung der Pflicht oder den Ersatz des aus der Nichterfüllung resultierenden Schadens vor Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1. Aufl. 1934 (im Folgenden RR1), 43; ders., Reine Rechtslehre, 2. Aufl. 1960 (im Folgenden: RR2), 174 f. 11 Ebd. 12 Ebd. 13 Marietta Auer, Der privatrechtliche Diskurs der Moderne, 2014, 63 ff. 14 Bernhard Windscheid, Pandekten, Bd. 1, 85 f. 15 Auer (Fn. 13), 63 ff. 16 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 2. Aufl. 1923 (im Folgenden: HdSL), 570; ebenso RR1, 46. 10

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie

Gericht geltend zu machen. „Jeder Rechtssatz muß notwendigerweise eine Rechtspflicht, er kann aber auch möglicherweise eine Berechtigung statuieren“, schrieb er hierzu in der ersten Auflage der Reinen Rechtslehre.17 Bereits in den „Hauptproblemen der Staatsrechtslehre“ hatte er sich eingehend mit der Konzeption des subjektiven Rechts durch die Privatrechtswissenschaft des ausgehenden 19. Jahrhunderts befasst, namentlich mit der Interessentheorie Jherings und der Willenstheorie Windscheids, und den materiellen Charakter dieser Konzeptionen scharf kritisiert. Sie wiesen eine Nähe zum Naturrecht auf, das das subjektive Recht ebenfalls materiell-politisch, anstatt formal-juristisch begreife.18 Die materiellen Gesichtspunkte – das Interesse oder der Wille des Berechtigten – seien aber aus juristischer Sicht unerheblich für die Frage, ob eine Rechtspflicht bestehe und ob diese durch den Berechtigten eingeklagt werden könne.19 Die traditionelle Lehre sitze einer Verwechslung auf, indem sie auf materielle Gesichtspunkte rekurriere: „[D]as Recht ist Form und nicht Inhalt, ist Schutz und nicht Geschütztes.“20 Nur wenn dies erkannt werde, könne die Struktur des Schutzes, den das objektive Recht gewähre, zutreffend beschrieben werden: „Damit wird das subjektive Recht nicht als ‚Wille‘ oder ‚Interesse‘ oder als ‚Gut‘ oder wie sonst die von der Rechtsordnung geschützten Objekte benannt werden mögen, sondern selbst als Schutz, als Bestandteil der Rechtsordnung, nämlich als der Rechtssatz erkannt und zwar als der Rechtssatz in einer besonderen Beziehung auf ein Subjekt.“21 Das Privatrecht von der Pflicht her zu denken, mutet eigentümlich an, war es doch eine Errungenschaft der Aufklärung, nicht Pflichten, sondern Freiheiten und Rechte zum Ausgangspunkt des Privatrechts zu machen.22 Der Rechtsverkehr zwischen Privaten sollte nicht länger unter dem Eingriffsvorbehalt der Obrigkeit stehen, die Freiheitssphäre der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft geschützt werden. Der Primat des öffentlichen Rechts, der sich im Absolutismus entwickelt hatte, sollte gebrochen und ein autonomes Privatrecht begründet werden.23 Im österreichischen ABGB findet sich dies mit aller Deutlichkeit, doch auch das ein knappes Jahrhundert jüngere deutsche

RR1, 47 f. HdSL, 570 ff. HdSL, 570. HdSL, 619. Ebd. Joachim Rückert, HKK vor § 1, Rn. 69 ff. Dieter Grimm, Zur politischen Funktion der Trennung von öffentlichem und privatem Recht in Deutschland, in: ders., Recht und Staat in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, 1987, 84–103. Zur gleichermaßen gegen Absolutismus und Revolution gerichteten Stoßrichtung eines staatsfrei konzipierten Privatrechts Michael Stolleis, Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht im Prozeß der Entstehung des modernen Staates, in: Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem / Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann (Hg.), Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht als wechselseitige Anforderungen, 1996, 41 (57). 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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BGB war vom Anspruch und nicht von der Pflicht aus konzipiert.24 Hiergegen richteten sich anti-liberale und anti-individualistische Angriffe auf die Privatrechtskodifikationen von konservativer und rechter wie auch von sozialistischer Seite in den 1920er, 1930er und 1940er Jahren sowie in der frühen Nachkriegszeit. 25 Es besteht kein Zweifel, dass Kelsen die von ihnen bemühte Pflichtenrhetorik nur allzu gut kannte. Die Pflicht in den Mittelpunkt der Privatrechtskonzeption zu rücken, hatte bei Kelsen allerdings wenig zu tun mit essentialistischen Vorstellungen von dem Recht vorgegebenen (sittlichen) Pflichten, wie sie der anti-liberalen Pflichtenrhetorik zugrunde lagen.26 Pflichten wurden in Kelsens Konzeption erst durch das Recht erzeugt – durch die rechtliche Ermächtigung, einen Vertrag zu schließen, was grundsätzlich heißt: in Freiheit. Von den Pflichten auszugehen, war keine substantielle, sondern eine konzeptionelle Entscheidung, die es möglich machte, dem subjektiven Recht einen klar umrissenen Platz im Stufenbau zuzuweisen. Indem er die Pflicht ins Zentrum seiner Überlegungen zum Privatrecht rückte, machte Kelsen sichtbar, dass das subjektive Recht erst entsteht (a.) durch die Verletzung einer vereinbarten Pflicht und (b.) durch die durch das objektive Recht verliehene Ermächtigung, die Erfüllung der Pflicht vor Gericht geltend zu machen. Mit dem Fokus auf die Pflicht wurde das subjektive Recht also gerade nicht aus der Privatrechtskonzeption eliminiert, ihm wurde vielmehr ein Platz im Stufenbau zugewiesen, indem es definiert wurde als die durch die Rechtsordnung verliehene Macht, Klage zu erheben. c.

Eingeschränkte Autonomie des Privatrechts

Doch nicht nur, dass Kelsen die Privatautonomie unter den Primat des objektiven Rechts stellte und die Pflicht und nicht das subjektive Recht zum normlogisch zentralen Begriff machte: Er stellte auch in Frage, ob das Prinzip der Freiheit überhaupt als ein Wesensmerkmal des Vertragsrechts und damit als Kernstück des Privatrechts anzusehen sei. Der Vertrag war für Kelsen ein Akt der Normsetzung. Zwar erkannte er die Autonomie der Rechtsetzung als Charakteristikum des Vertrages an und stellte ihm die Heteronomie der Rechtssetzung durch den Gesetzgeber gegenüber. In seinem im Jahr 1940 erschienenen Aufsatz zur Theorie des Vertrages unternahm er es aber aufzuzeigen, dass der Gegensatz zwischen vertraglicher und legislativer Rechtsetzung

Joachim Rückert, in: ders. / Lena Foljanty / Thomas Pierson / Ralf Seinecke, Berliner Schuldrecht  – eine neue Epoche?, in: Thomas Duve / Stefan Ruppert (Hg.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Berliner Republik, 2017, 504 (520 ff.). 25 Joachim Rückert, Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch – ein Gesetzbuch ohne Chance?, JZ 2003, 749–808. 26 Zur antiliberalen Pflichtenkonzeption im bürgerlichen Recht und ihrem Wiederaufleben in der Schuldrechtsreform Rückert, Berliner Schuldrecht (Fn. 24), 520 ff. 24

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie

nicht vorgegeben, sondern relativ sei.27 Weder regele ein Vertrag notwendig nur individuell-konkrete Normen im Gegensatz zum abstrakt-generellen Gesetz, noch sei die personelle Geltung eines Vertrags stets nur auf die vertragsschließenden Parteien begrenzt. Es gebe zahlreiche Ausnahmen, wovon insbesondere das kollektive Arbeitsrecht und das Recht der juristischen Person zeugten. Kelsen machte deutlich, dass es eine politische Entscheidung sei, die Autonomie zum Grundprinzip des Privatrechts zu erheben.28 Am Beispiel von Verträgen zugunsten oder zulasten Dritter argumentierte er, dass das für die Autonomie wesentliche Prinzip der Identität der normsetzenden und der verpflichteten Parteien nicht zwingend vorgegeben sei. Die Rechtsordnung könne vielmehr auch andere Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten eröffnen. „[R]ien n’empêche un ordre juridique de stipuler qu’une norme conventionnelle peut avoir des effets juridiques quant aux tiers, c’est-à-dire quant aux sujets autres que les parties contractantes. Ni la nature de la volonté humaine, ni celle du droit n’y font obstacle.“29 Auch wenn das Element der Autonomie fehle oder stark eingeschränkt sei, könne ein Normsetzungsakt als privatrechtlicher Vertragsschluss bezeichnet werden.30 Zugleich insistierte er, dass die Autonomie des Privatrechts stets eine eingeschränkte Autonomie sei. Er stellte klar, dass auch dort, wo Autonomie zum Grundprinzip erhoben sei, von voller Freiheit keine Rede sein könne. Anders als die liberalen Theoretiker des 19. Jahrhunderts integrierte er damit die Einsicht, dass sich rechtliche Autonomie in Bindung und Beziehung realisiert, in seine Vertragsrechtslehre. Der Vertrag setze voraus, dass sich zwei Menschen auf Normen einigten, an die einer von beiden oder auch beide gebunden sein sollten. Damit sei der Kompromiss im Vertrag angelegt: „La norme fondamentale de la convention n’est pas: tu dois seulement ce que tu veux – qui est la norme de l’autonomie pure; mais: tu dois, ce que non seulement toi, mais aussi un autre veux.“31 d.

Keine Trennung von öffentlichem Recht und Privatrecht

Mit der Einordnung des Vertrags als Akt der Normsetzung, der sich nicht kategorisch, sondern nur graduell von der heteronomen Normsetzung durch den Gesetzgeber unterscheide und mit der Relativierung der Bedeutung der Autonomie unterzog Kelsen nicht nur das tradierte Privatrechtsverständnis einer grundlegenden Revision. Er stellte vielmehr auch die Trennung von Privatrecht und öffentlichem Recht und damit die Autonomie der beiden Teildisziplinen in Frage. Das Privatrecht und das öffentlichen

Hans Kelsen, La théorie juridique de la convention, Archives de philosophie du droit et de sociologie juridique, Bd. 10 (1940), 33–76. 28 Kelsen, La théorie juridique de la convention (Fn. 27), 48. 29 Kelsen, La théorie juridique de la convention (Fn. 27), 74. 30 Kelsen, La théorie juridique de la convention (Fn. 27), 68. 31 Kelsen, La théorie juridique de la convention (Fn. 27), 63. 27

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Recht seien nicht wesensverschieden.32 Während das öffentliche Recht Ermächtigungen zur individuell-konkreten Normerzeugung an Hoheitsträger verleihe, basiere das Privatrecht auf der Delegation von Normerzeugungskompetenzen auf private Akteure. Beide fügten sich damit in gleicher Weise in den Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung ein. Auch wenn sich die ermächtigten Akteure unterschieden, liege kein qualitativer oder struktureller Unterschied vor. Alle Ausführungen Kelsens zum Privatrecht zielten auf die Eingliederung des Privatrechts in den Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung. Das Privatrecht diente Kelsen als Material, um die strukturelle Einheit des positiven Rechts herauszuarbeiten. 33 Es ging ihm darum, wie Dieter Wyduckel treffend bemerkt hat, die privatrechtliche „Teilfunktion im staatlich organisierten Rechtssystem“ herauszuarbeiten und aufzuzeigen, dass die Trennung in die Teildisziplinen des öffentlichen Rechts und des Privatrechts keinesfalls normlogisch vorgegeben ist, sondern nur ein möglicher Gesichtspunkt ist, nachdem das positive Recht strukturiert werden kann.34 Doch nicht nur normlogische, sondern auch ideologiekritische Überlegungen lagen dem zugrunde. Durch die konsequente Eingliederung in den Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung und das Aufzeigen der fließenden Grenzen zwischen den beiden Rechtsgebieten sollte das Verhältnis zwischen politischem Gestaltungsspielraum und rechtlicher Kontrolle sichtbar gemacht werden. Dies galt zu allererst für das Privatrecht, das im 19. Jahrhundert als außerstaatlich und damit unpolitisch konzipiert worden war.35 So schrieb Kelsen, dass „die Verabsolutierung des Gegensatzes von öffentlichem und privatem Recht auch die Vorstellung [erzeugt], als ob nur der Bereich des öffentlichen Rechts, das ist vor allem das Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrechts, die Domäne der politischen Herrschaft, diese aber aus dem Gebiet des Privatrechts völlig ausgeschlossen sei.“ Die Trennung von Privatrecht und öffentlichem Recht verhindere die Einsicht, „daß das im rechtsgeschäftlichen Vertrag erzeugte ,private‘ Recht nicht minder Schauplatz der politischen Herrschaft ist wie das in Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung erzeugte öffentliche Recht.“36 Private Rechte seien „in demselben Sinn politische Rechte sind wie diejenigen, die man allein so zu bezeichnen pflegt, weil beide, wenn auch auf verschiedene Weise, Anteil an der staatlichen Willensbildung, das ist aber an der politischen Herrschaft haben“.37

RR1, 111; dazu auch Dieter Wyduckel, Über die Unterscheidung von Öffentlichem Recht und Privatrecht in der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Werner Krawietz / Helmut Schelsky (Hg.), Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, 1984, 113–128. 33 Wyduckel (Fn. 32), 119. 34 Wyduckel (Fn. 32), 128. 35 Hans-Peter Haferkamp, The Science of Private Law and the State, in: Nils Jansen / Ralf Michaels (Hg.), Beyond the State: Rethinking Private Law, 2008, 245–267. 36 RR1, 113 f. 37 Ebd. 32

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie

e.

Zusammenfassung

Das Privatrecht nicht als vor- oder außerstaatlich zu denken, war sein Ziel, das damit verfolgte Programm ein ideologiekritisches: Die Kontingenz privatrechtlicher Institute und Grundfiguren sollte sichtbar gemacht werden. Und mit der Einsicht, dass auch ganz andere Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten bestünden, sollte der politische Charakter des Privatrechts aufgezeigt werden.38 Anders als in herkömmlichen Privatrechtskonzeptionen üblich, sah Kelsen als wesentlichen Inhalt privater Rechtserzeugung die Pflicht an. Aus Pflichten könnten dann subjektive Rechte werden, wenn die Rechtsordnung die Macht zur gerichtlichen Geltendmachung einräume. Kelsen zeigte damit die Abhängigkeit des subjektiven Rechts von den höherrangigen Normen des Stufenbaus auf, zum anderen aber auch seine Bedeutung für die Erzeugung von Normen niedrigeren Ranges – also von Gerichtsentscheidungen. Das subjektive Recht war für Kelsen nichts anderes als eine „Gewährung der Teilnahme an der Rechtserzeugung.“39 In den Fokus rücken damit die Gerichte als Orte der Rechtserzeugung. Diesen möchte ich daher im Folgenden den Blick zuwenden. 2.

Die Gerichte

Kelsens Ausführungen zum Privatrecht stammen aus den 1910er bis 1930er Jahren. Sie fallen damit in eine Zeit, in der sich die Rechtstheorie verstärkt den Gerichten und der richterlichen Rechtsschöpfung zuwandte, während das Gesetz in die Schranken verwiesen wurde. Während in der Staatsrechtslehre der Methodenstreit tobte,40 propagierte die Freirechtslehre in der Zivilrechtswissenschaft einen starken, ungebundenen Richter und die soziologische Jurisprudenz forderte eine Einbeziehung von gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Überlegungen in Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtspraxis.41 Zugleich war eine Re-essentialisierung durch neo-idealistische Strömungen zu beobachten.42 Diese für sich genommen sehr unterschiedlichen Strömungen waren sich in einem Punkt einig: Sie stellten alle den Richter stärker in den Mittelpunkt der Rechtsschöpfung, als es die Jurisprudenz des 19. Jahrhunderts getan hatte.43 Weit stärker als das öffentliche Recht war das Privatrecht der Ort, an dem das Richterrecht erprobt, dogmatisiert und theoretisiert wurde. Hierzu Peter Römer, Die Reine Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens als Ideologie und Ideologiekritik, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Bd. 12 (1971), 579–598. 39 RR1, 49. 40 Siehe nur Michael Stolleis, Der Methodenstreit der Weimarer Staatslehre, 2001. 41 Zum Ganzen Jan Schröder, Gab es eine (Privat-)Rechtstheorie in der Weimarer Republik?, in: Martin Löhnig / Mareike Preisner (Hg.), Weimarer Zivilrechtswissenschaft, 2014, 151–173. 42 Schröder (Fn. 41). 43 Ebd. 38

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Auch an Kelsen ging diese Entwicklung nicht vorbei. Seine Reine Rechtslehre wandte sich gleichermaßen gegen den Richter als „Subsumtionsautomaten“, wie auch gegen den von jeder Bindung an das Gesetz befreiten Richterkönig der Freirechtsschule. Der Idee eines „Subsumtionsautomaten“ erteilte er schon deswegen eine Absage, weil eine bloße Rechtsanwendung ohne eigene Wertung normtheoretisch überhaupt nicht möglich sei. Die generelle Norm, die in der Gerichtsentscheidung zur Anwendung komme, sei niemals eine vollständige. Die individuelle Norm, die in der richterlichen Entscheidung geschaffen werde, sei nicht bereits in der generellen Norm enthalten, sie werde vielmehr erst durch einen Willensakt des Gerichts geschaffen.44 Die Idee, durch bloße Interpretation könne die eine richtige Entscheidung gewonnen werden, sei nichts als eine Fiktion.45 Sie werde von der Rechtswissenschaft um der „Illusion der Rechtssicherheit“ willen aufrechterhalten, so Kelsen46 – eine Ideologie also, die es zu de-mystifizieren galt. Unter Ideologieverdacht stand auch die Idee des Richterkönigs, der, ungebunden an das Gesetz, Einzelfallgerechtigkeit walten lassen sollte. Dieser folge statt dem Gesetz einer selbstgesetzten generellen Norm, so Kelsen – das hieß für ihn nichts anderes als: Naturrecht.47 Kelsens Modell war das des Richters, der innerhalb eines vom Gesetz gesetzten Rahmens im eigenen Ermessen eine individuelle Norm setzte.48 Der Unterschied zwischen dem Fall, in dem ein Richter als Gesetzgeber fungiere, also offen Rechtsfortbildung betreibe, und normaler Rechtsanwendung sei „graduell“ – beides seien Fälle der Rechtserzeugung.49 Der Unterschied liege einzig in dem Umfang des Ermessens des Gerichts, also in der Frage, wie eng oder wie weit das Gesetz den Rahmen ziehe, in dem die Entscheidung getroffen werden müsse.50 Recht ist damit in gewisser Weise immer auch Richterrecht. Die Reine Rechtslehre berührte sich in dieser Hinsicht mit der Freirechtslehre, wenn auch die Ausgangspunkte völlig andere waren. Kelsen selbst schrieb, gewiss nicht ohne Spitze, dass die Reine Rechtslehre durch die Einsicht in den Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung erst eine theoretische Grundlage für eine der Hauptpositionen der Freirechtslehre geliefert habe: „Indem das Gesetz als bloßer Rahmen erkannt wird, der durch die rechtserzeugende Tätigkeit der Rspr. und Verwaltung erst ausgefüllt werden muß, indem im richterlichen Urteile ebenso wie im Verwaltungsakt nur die Fortsetzung eines Prozesses der Rechtserzeugung erblickt wird, in dem die Gesetzgebung nur eine vorangehende Stufe darstellt, betont die reine Rechtslehre, gestützt auf die Erkenntnisse der Freirechtsschule, daß auf Grund des Gesetzes, im Rahmen des Gesetzes meist eine Mehr44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, 1979 (im Folgenden: ATN), Anm. 180, 358. RR2, 353 f. Ebd. RR2, 258 f. RR2, 250. Ebd. Ebd.

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie

heit von Entscheidungen möglich ist.“51 Welche dieser möglichen Entscheidungen getroffen werde, liege im Ermessen des Gerichts. Es handele sich um einen „Willensakt“, der sich „keineswegs nur durch die Beziehung auf das Gesetz rechtfertigt.“52 Noch deutlicher als bei Kelsen findet sich ein Bekenntnis zum Richterrecht bei Adolf Merkl. In seiner Schrift „Gesetzesrecht und Richterrecht“ (1922) schrieb er, das Gesetz sei nur „Zwischenform, Rohprodukt des Rechtes“.53 Es erhalte erst durch die richterliche Entscheidung in einem konkreten Fall seine endgültige Form. Die herrschende Rechtslehre verkenne dies. Sie gebe daher dem Richterrecht keinen angemessenen Platz: „Das Gesetzesrecht wird gewissermaßen als die Regel, das Richterrecht als die Ausnahme gedacht. Dem Gesetze wird, wenn auch nicht die Fähigkeit, so doch der Wille zur Alleinherrschaft im Rechtsbereiche zugemutet, das Richterrecht nur zu oft noch als eine Art Eindringling angesehen.“54 Merkl forderte offensiv, den Prozess der Rechtsschöpfung als einen „arbeitsteiligen“ zu verstehen, an dem der Gesetzgeber wie auch die Gerichte ihren Anteil hätten.55 Auch wenn dies sich ganz nüchtern aus normtheoretischen Überlegungen ergibt, klingt in den Worten Merkls durchaus eine gewisse Sympathie für das Richterrecht an. Und auch bei Kelsen findet sich eine solche. In der unter dem Einfluss der in den USA gesammelten Erfahrungen stehenden zweiten Auflage der Reinen Rechtslehre schreibt er, dass eine Anerkennung von Präjudizien eine konsequente Fortführung des Gedankens sei, dass Gerichte Recht erzeugten. Soweit hierbei generelle Normen erzeugt würden, handele es sich um eine „Dezentralisierung der Gesetzgebungsfunktion.“56 3.

Die Demokratie

Wir haben gesehen, dass das Privatrecht, eingegliedert in den Stufenbau, auf die Durchsetzung von Pflichten durch die Gerichte verweist. Doch diese staatliche Einhegung ist in dem Modell Kelsens eine flexible, denn Rechtsprechung ist immer auch richterliche Rechtsschöpfung, der ein gewisser Ermessensspielraum zur Verfügung steht. Auch wenn Kelsen seine Normtheorie und seine Demokratietheorie strikt trennte, finden sich in seinen Ausführungen Stichworte, die einladen, nach Verbindungen zwischen beiden zu fragen. So spricht er für das Privatrecht davon, dass private Recht-

Hans Kelsen, Juristischer Formalismus und reine Rechtslehre, JW 1929, 1723 (1726). Ebd. Adolf Merkl, Gesetzesrecht und Richterrecht (1922), Nachdruck in: Hans Klecatsky u. a. (Hg.), Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule, Bd. 2, 1968, 1615 (1624). 54 Merkl (Fn. 53), 1616. 55 Adolf Merkl, Freirecht und Richterfreiheit (1920), Nachdruck in: Hans Klecatsky u. a. (Hg.), Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule, Bd. 2, 1968, 1573 (1577). 56 RR2, 256; ähnlich auch Fritz Pardon, Reine Rechtslehre und Richterrecht, in: Werner Krawietz / Helmut Schelsky (Hg.), Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, 1984, 369 (379). 51 52 53

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serzeugung „Anteil an der staatlichen Willensbildung“ und damit an der „politischen Herrschaft“ gewähre.57 Für das Richterrecht weist das Stichwort der „Dezentralisierung der Gesetzgebungsfunktion“ in eine entsprechende Richtung.58 Ich möchte im Folgenden versuchen, eine Brücke zu schlagen zwischen der normtheoretischen Reinen Rechtslehre und der Demokratiekonzeption, die Kelsen in seinen Schriften zur politischen Theorie entfaltet. Hierfür werde ich zunächst das Verhältnis von Privatrecht und Demokratie, sodann das Verhältnis von Richterrecht und Demokratie in den Blick nehmen. Methodisch werde ich damit die Pfade der Reinen Rechtslehre verlassen. Und doch kann sich ein solches Unterfangen lohnen, wenn es darum geht, gegenwärtige Herausforderungen eines zunehmend richterrechtlich geprägten und jenseits des demokratischen Nationalstaates organisierten Privatrechts zu reflektieren. a.

Private Rechtserzeugung und Demokratie

Der liberale Geist, der Kelsens Privatrechtskonzeption zugrunde liegt, zeigt sich besonders deutlich dort, wo es um den Vertragsschluss als Kern privatrechtlicher Rechtserzeugung geht. Während Kelsen auf der einen Seite das Privatrecht vollständig in den Stufenbau der Rechtserzeugung eingliedert und auf den Akt der Gerichtsentscheidung zurückführt, erinnert er auf der anderen Seite daran, dass das Privatrecht auch als Ort zivilgesellschaftlicher Rechtserzeugung gedacht werden kann – also von unten. Während das öffentliche Recht „der typische Fall einer autokratischen Rechtserzeugung“ sei, schreibt Kelsen in der Reinen Rechtslehre 1934, sei der „privatrechtliche Vertrag eine ausgesprochen demokratische Methode der Rechtsschöpfung.“59 Bereits in der Allgemeinen Staatslehre heißt es: „Dieser relativ höchste Grad demokratischer Rechtserzeugung findet sich in weiterem Ausmaße auf der untersten Stufe des sogenannten Zivilrechts. Es ist die typische Form rechtsgeschäftlicher Willensbildung.“60 Autokratie und Demokratie sind die Begriffe, mit denen Kelsen die Pole seiner politischen Theorie markierte. Beides sind Idealtypen; sie kommen, wie Kelsen einräumte, kaum in Reinform vor.61 Autokratie und Demokratie als Herrschaftsformen seien relevant für die Frage, wie in einem Gemeinwesen Recht erzeugt wird – und dies gelte für alle Stufen der Rechtserzeugung.62 In einem demokratischen Staatswesen müsse also grundsätzlich nicht nur die Erzeugung von Gesetzen demokratisch organisiert

57 58 59 60 61 62

RR1, 114. RR2, 256. RR1, 110. Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1925 (im Folgenden: AStL), 367. AStL, 327. AStL, 321.

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie

sein, sondern auch die Erzeugung von Normen niederer Stufe63 – im Privatrecht sind das die individuellen vertraglichen Abreden. Kelsen relativierte diese Aussage an anderer Stelle. Private Rechtssetzungsmacht könne durch die Gesetzgebung eingeschränkt werden, ohne dass das Recht damit undemokratisch würde, heißt es in der zweiten Auflage der Schrift „Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie“, in der er sich eingehend mit dem Verhältnis von Freiheit und Demokratie auseinandersetzte. In dem Maße, in dem die der staatlichen Ordnung Unterworfenen an der Erzeugung der Ordnung beteiligt seien, entkoppele sich die Demokratie von der individuellen Freiheit.64 Die rechtsgeschäftliche Willensbildung stellte für Kelsen somit zwar eine ideale Form demokratischer Rechtserzeugung dar, ein normatives Gebot, Rechtsetzung stets entsprechend zu organisieren ergab sich hieraus für ihn aber nicht. b.

Gerichtliche Rechtserzeugung und Demokratie

Was für Rechtsgeschäfte und Verträge gilt, gilt ebenso für die Vollziehung von Gesetzen durch die Gerichte. Gegen die Staatslehre der konstitutionellen Monarchie gewandt, in der das Volk zwar an der Gesetzgebung beteiligt war, die Vollziehung jedoch autokratisch organisiert worden sei, schrieb Kelsen in der Allgemeinen Staatslehre: „Daß dem Volke nicht nur die Gesetzgebung, sondern auch die Vollziehung möglichst unmittelbar zustehen solle, versteht sich als demokratische Forderung von selbst.“65 Konkret und pragmatisch gedacht sollte die Vollziehung von Gesetzen durch gewählte Kollegialorgane erfolgen – gewählt, um das Volk zu beteiligen, kollegial, da dies schon durch die Möglichkeit der „Rede und Gegenrede“ mehr Demokratie verspreche, als die Entscheidung durch Einzelne.66 Das klingt soweit schlüssig – und weitreichend. Doch kaum ausgesprochen, nahm Kelsen dies auch schon wieder zurück. Seine Sorge galt dem Prinzip der Gesetzesbindung: Werde die Vollziehung in die Hand von gewählten Kollegialorganen gelegt, so bestehe die Gefahr, dass diese „keineswegs die Gesetzmäßigkeit ihrer Akte als höchstes Ziel ansehen.“67 Eine auf Gesetzmäßigkeit zielende Vollziehung gerate daher fast zwangsläufig mit den Idealen der Demokratie in Konflikt, so Kelsen.68 Um der Legalität willen seien daher in gewissen Schranken autokratische Formen der Vollziehung hinzunehmen – „und zwar im Interesse der Erhaltung der Demokratie selbst“.69 Kelsen 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

Ebd. Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 2. Aufl. 1929, 10. AStL, 362. Ebd. AStL, 366. Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, (Fn. 64), 70 ff. AStL, 366 f.

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plädierte für einen Kompromiss: Um dem Gesetz zur Geltung zu verhelfen, brauche es eine autokratische Struktur in Rechtsprechung und Verwaltung. Darin solle aber soweit als möglich den lokalen Entscheidungsinstanzen Ermessen eingeräumt werden.70 Die Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Ermessen findet sich bei Kelsen, wie auch bei seinen Mitstreitern Adolf Merkl und Alfred Verdross vor allem in Bezug zu Verwaltungsentscheidungen. Doch dies darf nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass der Begriff des Ermessens bei allen drei Autoren weiter gefasst ist: Er ist nicht allein auf die Verwaltung zugeschnitten, sondern bezeichnet vielmehr allgemein den Entscheidungsspielraum, der auf jeder Ebene des Stufenbaus der Rechtsordnung unweigerlich gegeben ist.71 Ermessen ist dem Modell der dynamischen Rechtserzeugung im Stufenbau inhärent: Auf jeder Stufe besteht eine Bindung an die Normen der höheren Stufe, die den Rahmen der Entscheidung auf der unteren Stufe vorgeben. Innerhalb einer jeden Stufe ist jedoch Freiheit bei der Rechtserzeugung gegeben. Ein qualitativer Unterschied zwischen Verwaltungs- und Gerichtsentscheidungen besteht in dieser Konzeption nicht.72 Auch richterliche Entscheidungen fänden im Rahmen des „vom Gesetz freigelassenen Ermessens“ statt, wie Kelsen in seinen demokratietheoretischen Schriften nicht ohne ein gewisses Pathos schreibt.73 Obgleich er, wie dargelegt, auch die Gefahren eines zu weitgehenden Ermessens für die Realisierung der Gesetzesbindung sah, galt seine Sympathie doch einer Dezentralisierung von Entscheidungen. In seinem Vortrag zur Demokratie von 1927 heißt es denn auch: „Nur bei weitgehender Ermessensfreiheit ist eine ersprießliche Funktion demokratischer Verwaltung zu erwarten“74 – das gleiche könnte für die Rechtsprechung gelten. 4.

Demokratie, Richterrecht, Privatrecht: Reflexionsfundus

Der Versuch, Kelsen „von unten“ zu lesen, mag seine Grenzen haben. Kelsen zu einem Parteigänger einer Deregulierung zugunsten privater Rechtssetzung und richterlicher Rechtschöpfung zu stilisieren, ist sicher abwegig. Doch das Experiment hat gezeigt: Kelsens Theorie lässt sich nicht nur von der Grundnorm und von der Verfassung her denken, sondern vielmehr auch vom individuellen Vertrag und vom lokalen Richter. Es entsteht das Bild eines dynamischen Rechts von unten, dem vom Stufenbau ein Rahmen gegeben wird. Nimmt man seine demokratietheoretischen Schriften ernst,

Hans Kelsen, Demokratie (1926), Nachdruck in: ders., Verteidigung der Demokratie, hrsg. v. Matthias Jestaedt und Oliver Lepsius, 2006 (im Folgenden: Demokratie), 128 f. 71 Ausführlich dazu Alfred Verdross, Das Problem des freien Ermessens und die Freirechtsbewegung, ÖZÖR, Bd. 1 (1914), 616–644. 72 So auch Thomas Elsner, Das Ermessen im Lichte der Reinen Rechtslehre, 2011, 112 ff. 73 Demokratie, 52. 74 Ebd. 70

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie

steht Kelsen für eine gewisse Dezentralisierung bei gleichzeitiger Wahrung des durch die Rechtsordnung gegebenen Rahmens. Auf die in der Privatrechtswissenschaft seit über einem Jahrzehnt virulenten Diskussionen um staatliche Interventionen, Deregulierung, Transnationalisierung und Entstaatlichung von Rechtsprechungsorganen gibt Kelsen keine Antworten. Kelsens Äußerungen zum Privatrecht sind knapp, die zu einem demokratischen Privatrecht erst recht. Er bietet keine voll ausformulierte Theorie, nicht für die Zeit, in der er lebte und wirkte, nicht für eine spätere. Doch das bedeutet nicht, dass seine Gedanken heute ohne Bedeutung wären. Sie bieten Anregungen für die Reflexion heutiger Herausforderungen. Zum Schluss möchte ich daher auf der Grundlage von Kelsens Konzeption einige Gedanken zum gegenwärtigen Privatrecht formulieren: (1) Kelsen legt nahe, das Privatrecht als ein voll und ganz in den Stufenbau integriertes Rechtsgebiet zu verstehen. Dies bedeutet, dass es kein vorpositives Privatrecht und auch kein Reinheitsgebot des Privatrechts gibt. Gesetzgeberische Intervention in das Privatrecht stellen auf Grundlage der Reinen Rechtslehre grundsätzlich kein Problem dar. Privatautonomie ist kein Proprium des Privatrechts. Der Gesetzgeber hat sie zu schützen, soweit die Verfassung dies gebietet. Darüber hinaus obliegt ihm die Gestaltungsfreiheit. Es mag bessere oder schlechtere, angemessenere oder unangemessenere Gestaltungen des Vertragsrechts geben – Kelsen erinnert daran, dass die Ausgestaltung im Einzelnen nicht eine Frage der Wahrheit ist, sondern eine Frage, um die politisch gerungen werden muss. Dies gilt gerade dort, wo es darum geht, gleichen Zugang zu privater Rechtssetzung zu verschaffen, also tatsächliche Gleichheit im Privatrechtsverkehr zu schaffen, z. B. im Bereich des Antidiskriminierungsrechts. Bei der Einführung des Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes (AGG) im Jahr 2006 war dieses von Vertretern der Privatrechtswissenschaft als illegitimer Eingriff in eine vorstaatlich gedachte Privatautonomie vehement bekämpft worden. Die Wogen haben sich mittlerweile geglättet und es hat sich eine eigenständige „Bereichsdogmatik“ entwickelt.75 (2) Privatrecht kann, wie jedes andere Recht auch, nur durch Recht erzeugt werden. Das bedeutet, dass auch private Rechtssetzung einer Ermächtigung durch das positive Recht bedarf. Private Ordnungen sind nicht schon deswegen Recht, weil sie tatsächlich gegeben sind.76 Sie werden vielmehr erst dann zu Recht, wenn die Rechtsordnung sie als solche anerkennt. In einer demokratischen Rechtsordnung ist dies schon deswegen von Bedeutung, weil positives Recht demokratisch legitimiert ist. Die positiv-

Anna Katharina Mangold, Von Homogenität zu Vielfalt, in: Thomas Duve / Stefan Ruppert (Hg.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Berliner Republik, 2018, 461 (484 ff.). 76 Anders in den aktuellen Theoretisierungen privater Ordnungen, siehe z. B. Gregor Bachmann, Private Ordnung Grundlagen ziviler Regelsetzung, 2006. 75

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rechtliche Ermächtigung zu privater Rechtssetzung stellt somit zugleich die Rückbindung an den demokratischen Gesetzgeber sicher.77 (3) Kelsen erinnert an den grundsätzlichen Wert privater Rechtssetzung als einer demokratisch-zivilgesellschaftlichen Form der Rechtserzeugung. Die Idee gleichberechtigter Teilhabe an dieser Rechtserzeugung mutet angesichts des Ungleichgewichts zwischen Unternehmen und Verbrauchern in der modernen Massengesellschaft romantisch an. Die ursprüngliche Idee einer „bürgerlichen“ oder, in heutigen Begriffen gesprochen, „zivilgesellschaftlichen“ Rechtserzeugung spielt im gegenwärtigen Privatrechtsverständnis allenfalls eine Nebenrolle. Indem er daran erinnert, dass das Privatrecht einen Rahmen bereithält, in dem sich Individuen und private Verbände an der Herstellung von objektivem Recht beteiligen können, geht Kelsen zu dieser Idee zurück. Wenn er schreibt, dass private Rechtserzeugung „Anteil an der staatlichen Willensbildung“ gewähre, so mag dies in erster Linie normtheoretischen Erwägungen geschuldet sein. Er nimmt jedoch zugleich eine gesellschaftspolitische Verortung des Privatrechts vor, zeigt er doch auf, dass mit der privaten Rechtserzeugung politische Gestaltungsmacht der Individuen wie auch zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure verbunden ist.78 (4) Die Frage, wie ein Richterrecht auszusehen hat, dass demokratischen Anforderungen genügt, ist in einer Zeit, in der eine „schleichende Verschiebung der Normsetzungsmacht von der Legislative zur Judikative“ beobachtet wird79 und die als „Zeitalter des Richterrechts“ bezeichnet wird,80 von zentraler Bedeutung. Kelsens Antwort lautete, dass ein demokratisches Richterrecht sich dadurch auszeichne, dass es sich im vom demokratisch legitimierten Gesetz vorgegebenen Rahmen bewege, also die Gesetzesbindung respektiere, ohne dabei die Beweglichkeit aufzugeben, den gegebenen Entscheidungsspielraum zu nutzen und eine auf den konkreten Einzelfall zugeschnittene Norm zu setzen. Indem er den Ermessensspielraum und damit den politischen Charakter der gerichtlichen Entscheidung aufzeigt, macht Kelsen die richterliche Rechtssetzung für die Öffentlichkeit diskutierbar. Ist nun heute eine zunehmende Bedeutung des Richterrechts zu beobachten, so ließe sich auf Grundlage dieser Einsicht argumentieren, dass ein Mehr an Richterrecht auch ein Mehr an Transparenz verlan-

Florian Rödl, Private Law beyond the Democratic Order?, AJCL 56 (2008), 743–767; Anne Röthel, Entstaatlichung des Rechts, in: Deutsche Sektion der Internationalen Juristen-Kommission e. V. (Hg.), Entstaatlichung des Rechts, 2014, 17 (22 f.); anders Nils Jansen / Ralf Michaels, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, AJCL 54 (2006), 843 (880 f.). 78 In diesem Sinne auch Irti (Fn.  2). Ähnliche Überlegungen bei Gralf-Peter Calliess, Die Zukunft der Privatautonomie, in: Gesellschaft junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler (Hg.), Prinzipien des Privatrechts und Rechtsvereinheitlichung, 2001, 85 (96 ff.). 79 Bernd Rüthers / Christian Fischer / Axel Birk, Rechtstheorie, 9. Aufl. 2016, Rn. 236. 80 Eduard Picker, Richterrecht und Rechtsdogmatik, in: Christian Bumke (Hg.), Richterrecht zwischen Gesetzesrecht und Rechtsgestaltung, 2012, 85 (94). 77

Hans Kelsen, das Privatrecht und die Demokratie

ge – und gegebenenfalls auch ein Mehr an Reflexion auf dem Gebiet des Prozessrechts. Denn wer in welchem Ausmaß vor Gericht Gehör findet, ist eine Frage, die in Zeiten zunehmender richterlicher Normsetzung nicht nur für die individuelle Rechtsdurchsetzung, sondern auch für die Gewährung gesellschaftlicher Teilhabe bedeutsam ist. (5) Mit Kelsen lässt sich damit die Diskussion um die Frage, wie auf die Veränderungen des privaten Rechtsverkehrs reagiert werden kann, zurück in den politischen Raum verlegen. Die Beschäftigung mit seinen Ausführungen zum Privatrecht wie auch zum Richterrecht haben gezeigt, dass auch in diesen Bereichen sein Projekt eines der Transparenz ist, das politische Gestaltungsräume als solche sichtbar und damit diskutierbar macht. Transparenz und Diskutierbarkeit mögen nicht ausreichen, um heutige Komplexität zu bewältigen; doch die Erinnerung an ihre Bedeutung lohnt auch und gerade in Zeiten zunehmender Rechtserzeugung außerhalb nationaler Parlamente. Statt auf Dogmatik und Expertendiskurs zu setzen, wie dies in der Privatrechtstheorie häufig geschieht,81 lässt sich mit Kelsen in eine andere Richtung denken. Seine von Ulrike Lembke so treffend auf den Punkt gebrachten Projekte des wertrelativistischen Universalismus, der partizipatorischen und pluralistischen Demokratie und der Entmachtung der Dogmatik zugunsten der politischen Rechtssetzung stehen dem Privatrecht der heutigen Zeit gut an.82 Lena Foljanty

Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsgeschichte, Hansaallee 41, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, [email protected]

Siehe nur, mit weiteren Nachweisen Jansen/Michaels (Fn. 77), 862 f., 879. Ulrike Lembke, Weltrecht – Demokratie – Dogmatik, in: Matthias Jestaedt (Hg.), Hans Kelsen und die deutsche Staatsrechtslehre, 2013, 223–240. 81 82

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Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law and their Applicability to a Critical Analysis of the Theory of Administrative Law FERNANDO MENEZES 1

Abstract: The traditional opinion of jurists, particularly within the scope of administrative

law, is based on the theoretical constructions of the dichotomy “public law vs. private law.” Hans Kelsen’s critical approach to this topic allows not only a more precise scientific understanding of the issue but also an improvement to the function of public administration in the context of a rule of law system. The specific case of traditional French thought on administrative law, strongly present in various Western legal systems, including the Brazilian one, offers a propitious field for a reconstruction attempt according to the conceptual framework of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Léon Duguit, public and private law, auton-

omy and heteronomy principles, theory of administrative law Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Léon Duguit; öffentliches Recht und Pri-

vatrecht, Prinzipien der Autonomie und Heteronomie, Theorie des Verwaltungsrechts

I.

Introduction

In his autobiographical piece Selbstdarstellung, written in 1927, Hans Kelsen indicated three dualisms that provided the basis for the then prevalent theory of law which the Pure Theory of Law opposed and argued were inconsistent. The dichotomies were (i) The author registers his gratitude to Rodrigo Cadore, for the discussion of the ideas presented in this paper, and the bibliography related to them, opening perspectives for further development; and also to Mariane Comparato, Georghio Tomelin, Guilherme Carvalho and Fernanda Hapner for the English version of the manuscript. 1

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law in a subjective sense vs. law in an objective sense; (ii) public law vs. private law; and (iii) law vs. state.2 The object of the present article is to analyze Kelsen’s critique of the dichotomy (ii.) public law vs. private law and to connect it to a perspective of the theory of administrative law. First, it is important to point out some preliminarily caveats concerning the use of the expressions “public” and “private” and the different meanings they can assume in the legal language. Indeed, the dichotomy “public” and “private” can refer to three different scenarios: a) the total accessibility to knowledge (for instance, in defense of transparency) versus a reserved and personal treatment (in the interests of privacy);3 b) human activities aiming at the supply of the vital needs of men (“labor”)4 versus the activities that aim to produce the artificial world in which the human species lives  – which transcends the existence of each individual  – and the corresponding activities for the social and political interaction of men in their condition of plurality (respectively “work” and “action”);5 c) utility from the point of view of the interests of the abstract entity that personifies human society versus utility from the point of view of individual interests.6 The latter is usually the meaning referred to by legal theory when it considers the dichotomy of public and private law. Nevertheless, even this meaning, which was already present in Roman law, can be traced back to different perspectives in contemporary

Here is how the author himself presents the problem: “Aus der Einsicht, dass das Recht notwendigerweise Norm sei, ergab sich mir, dass alles subjektive Recht auf objektives rückzuführen und der ganze für unsere Rechtssystematik so verhängnisvolle Dualismus von objektivem und subjektivem Recht aufzuheben sei. Aus dem Gegensatz zweier Systeme: eines Systems des objektiven Rechts und eines Systems der subjektiven Rechte musste eine intrasystematische Differenz werden. Eine durchaus analoge Notwendigkeit ergab sich mir auch für den Dualismus von öffentlichem und privatem Recht. Während meiner Arbeit an den Hauptproblemen waren mir die politischen Tendenzen noch nicht klar, die sich in der traditionellen Theorie hinter dem Dualismus von objektivem und subjektivem, privatem und öffentlichem Recht verbergen. […] Mit der Vertiefung in die auf höchste Methodenreinheit abzielende Kantische Philosophie Marburger Richtung schärfte sich mein Blick für die zahlreichen höchst bedenklichen Trübungen, die die juristische Theorie durch bewusste oder unbewusste politische Tendenzen der Autoren erfährt. […] Nunmehr erkannte ich auch den dritten und bedeutungsvollsten Dualismus, der der herrschenden Lehre zugrunde liegt, den Gegensatz von Recht und Staat, der die beiden früher genannten Gegensätze von subjektivem und objektivem, privatem und öffentlichem Recht fundiert” (Hans Kelsen, Selbstdarstellung, in: Hans Kelsen Werke: Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, ed. Matthias Jestaedt, 2006, 22–24). 3 Celso Lafer, A reconstrução dos direitos humanos: um diálogo com o pensamento de Hannah Arendt, 2006, 243. 4 Hannah Arendt, A condição humana, 2008, 15. 5 Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Junior, Introdução ao estudo do direito, 2007, 133; Lafer, (footnote 3), 262 ff. 6 We apply here the classical distinction proposed by Ulpianus (Digest – 1.1.1.2): “Hujus studii duæ sunt positiones, publicum et privatum. Publicum jus est quod ad statum rei Romanæ spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem: sunt enim quædam publice utilia, quædam privatim”. 2

Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law

law. In sum, the concepts of public law and private law are usually differentiated on the basis of three sets of criteria:7 a) the organic criteria, founded on the quality of the people in question; e. g. if government agents are present in the legal relation, it means it will be under the ruling of public law; b) the material criteria, based on the content of the rules, in relation to the interests they intend to protect: public interests (of the community as a whole), or private interests (of private members of the community); c) the formal criteria, based on the form of legal relations, those of public law characterized by “procedures of constriction and unilateral action”, and those of private law based on the “free agreement of wills”. The combination of these non-exclusive criteria resulted in the elaboration of a theoretical notion for the identification of what is called “public law”. This is the notion of an “administrative (legal) regime” in the scope of administrative law from the perspective of traditional jurists, especially in its French matrix.8 Although this is not a theme included in the main object of this article, it is interesting to briefly register the incoherence of labeling law using the dichotomy “public law vs. private law” without discriminating whether the use of the word “law” refers to legal doctrine or jurisprudence (the “legal science”) or to a normative order. The use of labels such as “public” or “private” in jurisprudence is not accurate. (Legal) Science is not public or private. The limit between these concepts is narrow and fluid. This differentiation can hardly be used for the purpose of the division of labor in the faculties of law. The impropriety of the qualification also applies to law as a normative order. Adopting Kelsen’s perspective from the outset,9 legal norms – whether they take the form of a legislative act or a contract – are always part of the legal system and ultimately refer to an act of the state as a centralized legal order and, in this sense, do not carry the public or private adjectives. It makes even less sense to label a specific normative act as public or private. Is the Civil Code private law? Even if it contains, as does the Brazilian Civil Code, rules on expropriation or on public property – topics usually ascribed to the realm of public law? And what would be the limits of the normative set to be con-

We follow the thesis of Maurice Duverger, Élements de droit public, 1995, 20–21. Maurice Hauriou opens his Précis precisely with a chapter entitled “le régime administratif ”, whose three essential elements are: a) “un principe d’action, le pouvoir administratif, dérivé du pouvoir exécutif ”; b) “un objectif à atteindre, l’accomplissement de la fonction administrative”; c) “une méthode pour atteindre ce but, l’entreprise de gestion administrative” (Maurice Hauriou, Précis de droit administratif et de droit public, 1933, 7–8). 9 Kelsen, La Théorie Juridique de la Convention, Archives de Philosophie du Droit et de Sociologie Juridique, 1–4 (1940), 63. 7 8

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sidered in such an analysis, in order to classify normative acts as public or private? A statute? Or an article in a statute? Or a subdivision of such an article? Thus, it seems that neither “law” as science nor as a normative order can be adequately reconstructed as being public or private. Rather, these adjectives are simply instruments of presentation. They facilitate the communication in the praxis of legal language, but at the expense of creating a great margin of imprecision. The gains of knowledge which may be found in the discussion of a possible useful meaning for the distinction between public and private in the context of the scientific reconstruction of the legal relations remain to be investigated. Having established these premises, this article aims to apply Kelsen’s critique to the way in which the traditional legal theory – especially under the clipping of administrative law – works with the dichotomy “public law vs. private law” in Brazil. This discussion confronts Kelsen’s ideas to the French main administrativist thinking, which has great influence in Western legal systems and thought, both from the traditional perspective and from the perspective of the criticism developed in France by Léon Duguit, an important interlocutor of Kelsen in demystifying legal thinking. II.

Why Brazilian administrative law as a case study?

A few more introductory words are required to justify the relevance of this reference to the Brazilian case. Brazil is a great laboratory for comparative law analysis, especially in the fields of constitutional and administrative law. Initially, Brazil adopted a typical French model. Then, it adapted the North American system of jurisdiction without wholly abandoning the ideas of French jurists. More recently, Brazil moved towards the German constitutional practice. This miscellany resulted certainly in an original outcome, but created, at the same time, some inconsistencies, mainly due to the rather careless and uncontextualized transposition of foreign theoretical ideas. Since its independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil had shaped its administrative institutions according to the French model. During the Napoleonic period, French law consolidated its structures based on – and I highlight two points that are most relevant to the development of this article – (i) the so-called summa divisio between “public law and private law”; and (ii) a system of duality of jurisdictions between administrative and judicial jurisdictions. With the proclamation of the Republic in Brazil at the end of the nineteenth century, Brazil opted for a substantial reform and for the explicit adoption of the US model of a federal state, organized under a presidential system with a unified jurisdiction of the courts. In spite of this change of models in the Brazilian federation scenario, throughout the twentieth century and, to a certain extent, up to present times, traditional French

Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law

structures have continued to serve as the foundation of the academic studies on administrative law and of the practice of the Brazilian public administration. In this sense, almost all Brazilian jurists continue to refer to the division of law between the public and private spheres, without the critical awareness that such division lacks both theoretical and practical foundations. This paper aims to explore this point in order to contrast traditional thinking with Hans Kelsen’s ideas. III.

The traditional French view and its transposition to Brazil

In France, according to Charles Eisenmann,10 academic scholars of administrative law traditionally have discussed the distinction between public and private law from two perspectives. The first is more abstract and seeks a theoretical foundation for the distinction. The second is more concrete and seeks to use the distinction as a criterion for the distribution of powers (competences) between the administrative jurisdiction and the legal jurisdiction. In the first perspective, the mainstream converges at the concept that in public law there are rules that assert special prerogatives of unilateral and self-executing action in favor of the public administration. This special regime of public law is conceived on the grounds of the position of superiority which the state (or the public administration as one of its manifestations) is supposed to possess in relation to individuals as a consequence of its attribute of sovereignty. In general, the traditional view involves the acceptance, as an a priori, of the superiority of the state in relation to individuals and, therefore, also of the supremacy of the will and the interest of the state in the sphere of legal relations, without further scientific justification for its claim on the basis of the content of existing normative acts. A discordant thought, however, emerged from Léon Duguit, who diverged from the received view among legal scholars and, in this regard, even from his colleagues at “École du Service Public”. Duguit was Kelsen’s partner in some important initiatives that sought to foster a scientific and realistic, demystifying vision of the law, such as the bilingual Revue Internationale de la Théorie du Droit / Internationale Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts, of which they were the founders and original editors, together with František Weyr11.

Charles Eisenmann, Cours de droit administratif, 1982, 306 ff. Revue Internationale de la Théorie du Droit / Internationale Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts. Brünn: Éditions Polygraphiques / Zürich: Rudolf Rohrer. The journal was published from 1926 to 1939. After the decease of León Duguit, in December 1938, Zaccaria Giacometti and Roger Bonnard joined the board of editors. The main objectives and premises of this original scientific project are clearly presented in the preface of the first volume (1926). 10 11

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According to Duguit, the distinction between public and private law can be reasonable in terms of self-enforced sanctions applied by the state, or for didactic utility, but not in the sense of absolute separation. In his words: J’estime qu’on ne saurait trop énergiquement protester contre une pareille conception. Elle est contraire à la vérité des faits et surtout elle conduit forcément à donner, au moins en apparence, une base juridique à la toute-puissance de l’Etat12.

Duguit13 founded his objection to this distinction on the basis of his denial of the personality of the state14 and of his conception that rulers are common individuals, “imprisoned like others by the bonds of social solidarity”, which is the “foundation” of both public and private law. Duguit15 also explained that public and private law are not distinguished by the “method” that is imposed on their study, as there is only one method, applied to jurisprudence as a social science. The French author also refuted the claim that public and private law could be distinguished by the nature of the legal acts that would result from each of them because of an alleged qualitative difference between the wills that had created those acts. Indeed, he “strongly rejected” the proposition of the superiority of the will resulting from the puissance publique.16 However, Duguit17 accepted the distinction between public and private law following one criterion: the mode of the applicability of legal sanctions, “how to apply the sanction” being the decisive question. The explanation for this distinction was based on the fact that it was the state who held, with exclusivity, the power to impose sanctions in a given legal order. Thus, in situations where the state is in a position to require a given conduct from a person, it may use material force for that purpose. Hence the idea of bénéfice (or privilège) du préalable, which leads to self-enforceable administrative acts both in the sense Léon Duguit, Traité de Droit Constitutionnel, 1927, 685. Duguit, Manuel de droit constitutionnel, 1923, 42. Treating the state, as is traditionally done, as a person endowed with sovereignty which expresses the collective will is for Duguit (L’état, le droit objectif et la loi positive, 1901, 9) a “fiction imagined to justify the power of the strongest, an ingenious fiction invented by the holders of the force to legitimize this force, and nothing more”. The facts that correspond to reality in this matter are: a) the existence of “human groups based on the community of needs, on the diversity of individual skills, on the reciprocity of services rendered” and; b) the existence, in these groups, of “individuals stronger than others, either because they are better armed, or because they are recognized as holders of a supernatural power, because they are the richest, or because they are the most numerous, being able, thanks to this greater force, to make themselves obeyed by others”. These facts have to be considered when referring to the state, which, in essence, expresses the human group, fixed in a determined territory, in which the strongest impose their will on the weakest; and political sovereignty expresses the power of the strongest over the weakest. 15 Duguit, Manuel de droit constitutionnel, 1923, 43. 16 Duguit, ibid, 44–45. 17 Duguit, ibid, 46–47. 12 13 14

Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law

of taking the decision independently of judicial procedure and in the sense of executing the decision ex officio, once the state is the law itself in action. On the other hand, the use of force for the enforcement of a legal relationship by individuals depends on the intervention of the state through its legal apparatus. Nevertheless, the predominant view of French jurists (not Duguit’s) is misunderstood and uncritically accepted in Brazil, leading to the wrong conclusion that the so-called public law regime rules the public administration, which now enjoys a position of supremacy in its legal relations. The reception of this view, already improper from the theoretical point of view, has an aggravating factor in the Brazilian case: the lack of connection with the valid positive law and, moreover, the lack of connection with the operating institutional setting – to consider the second above mentioned perspective as it was framed by Eisenmann. As for this second perspective in France, the distinction between public law and private law has the practical utility of serving as an element of the distribution of jurisdictional competences. As a general rule, the application of public law indicates the jurisdiction of the administrative courts, and the application of private law leads to the jurisdiction of the judicial courts.18 However, in Brazil the practical dimension of the issue is lost, since there is no duality of jurisdictions. Worse, the tendency of traditional dogmatic thinking is to suppose that there is a “one-size-fits-all” regime of unilateral and self-executing prerogatives of public administration – presumably according to the Constitution, even if not written there. This all-encompassing regime is said to be applicable to any legal relationship in which public administration is present, even when confronted with eventual concrete regulations by the enacted law that explicitly point to a different regime. The result of this tendency is not only inconsistent from the theoretical point of view, but also entails authoritarian positions, causing legal uncertainty connected to the functioning of the public administration. IV.

Public and private law according to Kelsen’s ideas

The present section of this paper aims to emphasize that the administrative law thinking could achieve important theoretical improvement with the adoption of Kelsen’s ideas. As a consequence, the legal order could function more properly under the requirements of a rule of law system. Kelsen19 – in harmony with Duguit, although through distinct arguments – denied the separation, in absolute terms, that traditional theory made between public law and

18 19

Eisenmann, (footnote 10), 306, 342, 348. Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 280.

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private law from the point of view of the legal relations. In the traditional view, private law would imply a relation between subjects in positions of equality, subjects of the same value, while public law would imply a relationship between a “super- and a subordinate subject” with diverse legal values. However, when we investigate the situation more closely, it becomes clear that the subjects in the relation are the same: the subject of an obligation is subjected only to the authority of the norm that creates the obligation, not to the person who creates the norm.20 The true difference lies in the methods of creating the law. Within the public law regime, the legal order allows the subjects that act as state organs the faculty to compel the administered ones by unilateral manifestation of will. On the other hand, in socalled private relations, the parties commonly participate in the creation of the binding norm.21 But these different ways of creating the law are derived from options taken by the legal system and not from the supposedly superior position of one of the parties in the legal relationship. An additional aspect of this phenomenon should be remarked upon: “the Pure Theory of Law, from its universalistic viewpoint, always directed toward the whole of the legal order […], sees in the private legal transaction just as much as in an administrative order an act of the state, that is, a fact of law-making attributable to the unity of the legal order”22 – in this case, an act of law-application by means of the individualization of general norms. Still, according to Kelsen: The difference between administrative law, as public law, and private law does not lie in the fact that the relationship between State and private person is different from the relationship between private persons but in the difference between a heteronomous and an autonomous creation of secondary norms.23

In short, the same notions of autonomy and heteronomy used to distinguish the democratic and autocratic forms of state24 are present in this distinction. On the other hand, it does not mean that the proper mode of normative production, which might be called “public law” or “administrative law”, must be regarded as typical of autocratic states. At different levels of the same legal order, different forms of legal production can have a different application. Thus, a democratic production of general legal norms may be linked to an autocratic production of individual legal norms and,

20 21 22 23 24

Kelsen, General theory of law and state, 1961, 205. Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 281. Kelsen, ibid, 282. Kelsen, General theory of law and state, 1961, 205. Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 281; and General theory of law and state, 1961, 205.

Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law

conversely, an autocratic production of general legal norms may be linked to a democratic production of individual legal norms.25 Therefore, it would be more coherent from the point of view of the general theory of law, and – to resume the example explored above – it would be more consistent with the Brazilian institutional reality, to conceive “public” and “private” as normative production techniques established by the legal order and not as species of law regimes aprioristically attached to different subjects and distinguished in an evaluative way. Finally, to conceive the distinction between public and private law as something absolute – expressing, in the first case, the relation of subjects of different value – has no scientific character, but rather an ideological one, which can lead, for example, to an attempt to reduce the mandatory character of the laws to the public administration, or even to the suggestion that there is no domination, but only coordination between the parties in private law relations.26 In other words, the pretension of an absolute distinction between public law and private law by the traditional theories, associating public law with the relations in which the public administration is present, can have a different result from what was first intended. This association may suggest, supposedly in the name of serving the public interest, a performance of the administration not linked to the law, but “merely within the framework of the law and, in an emergency […] even against the law”, in a “unfettered realization of the state’s purposes”.27 V.

Final considerations: degrees of autonomy and heteronomy in the creation and application of the law

Summarizing the ideas stated above, the solid basis on which Kelsen’s analysis is founded is the recognition of two fundamental principles which define different modes of creation of legal norms: autonomy and heteronomy, each depending on whether the individual to be bound by the norm participates in its production or not. This distinction applies to the process of elaboration of legal norms in a more general and abstract sphere – democracy and autocracy being the ideal examples28. It is also applicable to the sphere of individual and concrete norms, where we have the contract as an example of normative production governed predominantly by the principle of autonomy. Here are Kelsen’s words, in a specific study on the subject of the contract:29

25 26 27 28 29

Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 284; and General theory of law and state, 1961, 299–300. Kelsen, Pure theory of law, 1967, 282–283. Kelsen, ibid, 282. Kelsen, General theory of law and state, 1961, 284. Kelsen, (footnote 9), 63.

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[…] le caractère propre de cette procédure de création du droit, qu’on appelle convention, apparaît, lorsqu’on le compare aux autres procédures de création du droit. Et alors se dégagent (envisagés sous l’angle de la liberté, qui est le point décisif pour la création des liens normatifs) deux types idéaux, deux méthodes possibles de création des normes : hétéronomie et autonomie ; l’individu, que la norme liera, participe ou ne participe pas à son élaboration. La loi dans l’autocratie, dans la monarchie absolue, représente une approximation aussi grande que possible du cas de l’hétéronomie, le contrat de droit privé, une approximation aussi grande que possible du cas idéal de l’autonomie (c’est pourquoi nous parlons d’‘autonomie privée’). Mais dans les deux cas, ce ne sont que des approximations.

Interpreting Kelsen’s thought, it can be suggested that, also as to the applicability of the norm – either tendentially general and abstract such as a statute, or tendentially individual and concrete, such as a contract – there is also a basic difference between an execution done directly by a subject that is part of the legal relationship to which the other must submit or by the use of a legal instance external to the relationship, equidistant from the parties (e. g., the Judiciary, or an arbitral tribunal). The direct enforcement by one of the parties runs parallel to the heteronomous production of law: the subject to whom the enforcement is directed receives its effects without influencing the decisions that govern it, just as the subject that is bound by the norm does not participate in its production. The enforcement carried out by a legal instance external to the relationship can be considered, in turn, parallel to the autonomous production of law: the subject to which the enforcement is directed debates with the other part of the relation before the impartial judge, presenting his arguments and defending his point of view, just as the subject that is bound by the norm participates, stating, expressing his own will, in its production. Then, if there is a consistent and scientifically observable difference between the autonomous or heteronomous creation and application of the law (although a relative difference, as a matter of degree), it is reasonable to use distinct names to characterize them. A more precise meaning for the “public vs. private” dichotomy applied to legal relations can therefore be: the “public” associated with the predominantly heteronomous process of creation and application of legal norms; and the “private”, the predominantly autonomous process of legal creation and application. A peculiar case of a legal relationship which lends itself well to illustrating this analysis – as Kelsen did in his Théorie Juridique de la Convention – concerns the contracts’ regime. Contracts, taken in a broader sense, already express essentially an autonomous way of creating the law: they manifest the lawmaker’s perception, from the point of view of legislative policy, that certain normative matters should be left to the decision of the parties involved:

Hans Kelsen’s Ideas on Public and Private Law

Le législateur veut laisser aux sujets de droit le soin de régler eux-mêmes leurs intérêts économiques et autres, et parce qu’il estime qu’une réglementation indépendante et autonome de ces intérêts est la solution la mieux indiquée et la plus juste.30

However, one could associate the adjective “public” with the legal form “contract” without any contradiction with what has just been said: the public contract – called “administrative” – entails a greater degree of heteronomy in its execution. Moreover, this heteronomy is the basis of a main principle of the administrative act, which is its self-enforceability, both in the sense of taking the decision independently of judicial procedure and in the sense of enforcement of the decision ex officio 31 It should be noted that this reading of the self-enforceability of the administrative act is another way of explaining the phenomenon of legality applied to the administration, as something different from the principle of legality applied to individuals. When the legal system states that “nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for by law”32, and that, in the absence of law, any individual conduct is permissible, it recognizes that there is a space in which individuals may give expression to their free will. The situation of the administration, or the state, to speak more broadly, is different. Because the state is not a natural substance, but consists of an abstraction, a fiction created by man, its existence is essentially linked to the law as a system of norms. In fact, it overlaps with the legal system itself. In other words, the state is not a being endowed with will: its will does not correspond even to the subjective will of its agents, but to the “objective will” of the law. Thus, in the absence of legal norms, the state has no “freedom” and does not even exist; therefore, it cannot act. Summarizing the reasoning for self-enforceability: if the state is the law itself in action, it is understandable that its actions are, as a rule,33 self-enforceable. This is the sense of “public”. Once the distinction between legal relations of public law and private law in the terms proposed above is finally accepted, the use of the concept “public law” (or administrative law, in particular) for a legal relationship will only mean this relationship results from a process of creation and application of the law that follows a specific technique, based on heteronomy. In any case, it is a relative distinction involving degrees, not a qualitative one. Kelsen’s approach of conceiving private and public as different normative production techniques based on a balance between autonomy and heteronomy not only has

Kelsen, ibid, 48 Duguit (footnote 13), 46–47. Here quoting the classic text of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man from 1789. “As a rule” because the law itself may choose a different solution, for example, requiring judicial action to take certain measures. 30 31 32 33

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the virtue of greater theoretical precision but also allows the conscious improvement of the dynamics of the creation and application of the law in the context of a democratic system under the rule of law. Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah. A condição humana (10th edition). Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 2008 (translated from the 1958 English edition by Roberto Raposo). Duguit, Léon. Traité de droit constitutionnel, t. I (3rd edition). Paris: Ancienne Librairie Fontemoing & Cie., 1927. – . Manuel de droit constitutionnel (4th edition). Paris: Éditions Panthéon Assas, 2007 (facsimile edition of Paris: Fontemoing, 1923). – . L’état, le droit objectif et la loi positive. Paris: Dalloz, 2003 (facsimile edition of Paris: Fontemoing, 1901). Duverger, Maurice. Élements de droit public (13th ed.). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995. Eisenmann, Charles. Cours de droit administratif, t. I. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1982. Ferraz Junior, Tércio Sampaio. Introdução ao estudo do direito (5th edition). São Paulo: Atlas, 2007. Hauriou, Maurice. Précis de droit administratif et de droit public (12th edition). Paris: Dalloz, 2002 (facsimile edition of Paris: Sirey, 1933). Kelsen, Hans. Selbstdarstellung, in: Hans Kelsen Werke: Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, ed. Matthias Jestaedt. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006. – . Pure theory of law. Clark: The Lawbook Exchange, 2005 (translated from the second German edition by Max Knight and originally published: Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). – . General theory of law and state. New York: Russell & Russell, 1961 (translated by Anders Wedberg). – . La théorie juridique de la convention. Archives de Philosophie du Droit et de Sociologie Juridique, n. 1–4 (10e année). Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1940. Lafer, Celso. A reconstrução dos direitos humanos: um diálogo com o pensamento de Hannah Arendt. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2006. Fernando Menezes

Universidade de São Paulo – Faculdade de Direito, Largo de São Francisco, 95, São Paulo, SP, Brazil, 01005-010, [email protected]

Problems of Translation and Interpretation A Kelsenian Commentary on Positivist Originalism D. A. JEREMY TELMAN

Abstract: According to William Baude and Stephen Sachs, originalism is U. S. law because

judges generally interpret the Constitution in accord with originalism and judges never disavow originalism. Because originalism is law, and because judges have a duty to uphold the law, Baude and Sachs contend, judges should be bound by originalist method in constitutional interpretation. This essay offers a Kelsenian critique of Baude and Sachs’s defense of originalism. Baude and Sachs have not explained how originalism can provide substantive legal norms that govern the law of interpretation, nor have they established that originalism in any way limits the mechanisms for distinguishing lawful from unlawful paths in U. S. constitutional history. Keywords: Pure Theory of Law, Originalism, interpretation, US Constitution, Legal pos-

itivism, Hans Kelsen Schlagworte: Reine Rechtslehre, Originalismus, Auslegung, US-Verfassung, Rechtsposi-

tivismus, Hans Kelsen

I.

Introduction: Kelsen Matters

Up until now, in my work on Kelsen, I have diagnosed the reasons for American ignorance of Kelsen, attempting to persuade my U. S. colleagues that our neglect of Kelsen is a product of the sociology of education unrelated to the intrinsic merits of Kelsen’s approach.1 I reiterate my findings from that earlier work in Part II. In Part III, I provide D. A. Jeremy Telman, A Path Not Taken: Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law in the Land of the Legal Realists, in: Hans Kelsen Anderswo, ed. Robert Walter, et al , 2010, 353–76; D. A. Jeremy Telman, Selective Affinities: On U. S. Reception of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory, in: The Fruits of Exile: Central European Intellectual Immigration to America in the Age of Fascism, ed., Richard Bodek & Simon Lewis, 2010, 40–58; D. A. 1

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a short overview of the theoretical movement for originalism in interpretation of the U. S. Constitution. Finally, in Part IV, I offer an example of what a Kelsenian intervention into an American debate can offer. William Baude and Stephen Sachs have offered a contingent defense of originalism in constitutional interpretation based on Hartian positivism.2 Originalism, they argue, either is our law (Baude) or is endorsed by positive law and is a theory of lawful legal change (Sachs). Having accepted that reality, they contend, one cannot avoid the conviction that legal decision-makers ought to pursue originalist interpretation, consistent with their duty and their oath to uphold the law. From the perspective of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, Baude has not explained how originalism can provide substantive legal norms that govern the law of interpretation, and Sachs has not established that originalism in any way limits the mechanisms for distinguishing lawful from unlawful paths in U. S. constitutional history. II.

Hans Kelsen in America: A Missing Persons Report

Why has the U. S. academy never had much interest in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? Some leading U. S. legal theorists have a straightforward explanation for their lack of interest in Kelsen: either Hart proved Kelsen wrong about fundamental issues,3 or, in a slightly more generous approach, there are things of value in Kelsen, but the same ideas can be found in the writings of other legal thinkers,4 who come without the unnecessary burden of Kelsen’s neo-Kantian apparatus and who had the good sense to write in English.5 However, precisely because of his outsider status, Kelsen’s legal theory can speak to us in ways that other approaches, more grounded in the Anglo-American legal systems, cannot. For example, Kelsen’s pure theory of law raises interesting challenges to Baude and Sachs’s purportedly positivist defense of originalism in constitutional interpretation. Supplementing the excellent work of Stanley, Paulsen,6 Michael Steven Green,7 and others, my earlier work explored six sociological explanations for why Kelsen has nev-

Jeremy Telman, The Reception of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the United States, in: L’Observateur des Nations Unies 24 (2008), 299–315. 2 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, Colum L Rev 115 (2015), 2349–2408, 2352; Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, Harv L & Pol’y Rev 38 (2015), 817–88, 819. 3 Brian Leiter, Why Don’t American Philosophers of Law Talk about Kelsen?, Brian Leiter’s Legal Philosophy Blog (Oct. 3, 2007). 4 Lawrence B. Solum, Should We Study Kelsen?, Legal Theory Blog (Oct. 5, 2007). 5 Leiter (footnote 3). 6 Stanley L. Paulson, Die Rezeption Kelsens in Amerika, in: Reine Rechtslehre im Spiegel ihrer Fortsetzer und Kritiker, ed. Ota Weinberger & Werner Krawietz, 1988, 179–202. 7 Michael Steven Green, Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, Ala L Rev 64 (2003) 365–413, 366.

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er appealed to an American audience. My aim was not to offer a comprehensive treatment of the subject immune to supplementation. Rather, I sought to highlight some overlooked causes of the neglect of Kelsen in the U. S. academy. The first relates to the differences between the continental and common law legal systems, three turn on the nature of legal education in the United States, and two address the political and theoretical obstacles Kelsen faced when he arrived in 1939. The paramount translation difficulties that Kelsen faced and faces still today in the United States have little to do with language. The biggest, perhaps insuperable, obstacle to an American engagement with Kelsen is the abstract, theoretical nature of his approach. The American approach to law is empirical, relating to social facts.8 For Kelsen, by contrast, only certain social facts, those pertaining to the generation of legal norms, are relevant to legal science.9 American legal practitioners and scholars rarely consider the nature of law in the abstract, divorced from its application to particular scenarios.10 U. S. lawyers have developed a drive that hardens into an instinct to test legal rules by considering them in the context of a range of scenarios, real or imagined. Our inductive approach has little use for legal norms conceived as abstractions. Even if one could overcome the basic lack of fit between Kelsen’s way of theorizing about the law and Americans’ lived experience of it, one would still need to introduce Kelsenian approaches into our system of legal education so that there could be a broad audience receptive to such approaches. But there too the challenges are daunting. First, our law students come to us having completed their first degrees. They have already experienced a liberal arts education, and they come to law school with the aspiration of attaining a professional degree that will lead immediately to well-compensated employment. Their appetite for theoretical approaches has been sated, and law schools increasingly face pressures to prepare students for the practicalities of the bar exam and practice.11 Second, even if U. S. law professors were inclined to teach legal theory, very few of our students have the background to work with, let alone master, a philosophical system as complex as Kelsen’s. Faculty members would also find Kelsen’s work perplexing, because the vast majority of law professors have J. D.s but have never done doctoral work in any field. In order to assimilate Kelsen’s approach to law into their thinking, U. S. academics would have to undertake a complete rethinking of their understanding of their fields and their approaches to legal pedagogy.12 Third, Kelsen’s approach to legal education would be very hard to translate into our common-law, case-based, teaching method. A Kelsenian law course would not be structured like a

8 Ibid , 366. 9 Ibid , 385. 10 Telman (footnote 1), Selective Affinities, 47; Telman (footnote 1), Reception, 303. 11 Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 369; Telman (footnote 1), Reception, 308–10. 12 Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 373–76; Telman (footnote 1), Reception, 313–14.

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conventional law class, and the students might flee thinking they had accidentally wandered into a graduate seminar.13 Kelsen’s arrival in the United States could not have been more poorly timed, from the perspectives of both the intellectual and the political environments in which he landed. Kelsen arrived in the United States when the reigning model for legal reasoning was legal realism. His potential American colleagues regarded his system as, at best, not legal realism, and, at worst, a new version of the legal formalism that the realists had rejected.14 Finally, the American academy distrusted legal positivism, which they regarded as politically anemic, given its inability to protect Central Europe from Nazism’s Gleichschaltung of legal institutions.15 Kelsen arrived in the United States along with much of the intelligentsia of Central Europe and at a time when enrollments at American universities were declining as a result of World War II. Recent scholarship suggests that such practical considerations also contributed significantly to Kelsen’s inability to find work at a U. S. law school.16 III.

Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation

Although one U. S. scholar has identified seventy-two separate versions of originalism, I find it helpful to think of three broad strains within the movement,17 each of which plays some part in my assessment of Baude and Sachs’s positivist defense of originalism. First, popular originalism began as a backlash against the perceived excesses and progressive political activism of the Warren and Burger Courts.18 Populist originalists are political heirs to the eighteenth-century anti-Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans, who valued individual liberty and states’ rights and distrusted the federal government. According to popular originalists’ republican principles, because judges are not elected, they should defer to the legislature and not make law. Among academics, this position is best represented by Raoul Berger, Robert Bork, and Christopher Wolfe.19 At the same time, popular originalists demand that judges invalidate legislative

Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 367–69. Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 361–62; Telman (footnote 1), Reception, 46. Telman (footnote 1), Path Not Taken, 362–63; Telman (footnote 1), Selective Affinities 46–47; Telman (footnote 1), Reception, 304–05. 16 Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists, 2017, 268–69. 17 Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, N Y U L Rev 84 (2009), 1–96, 14. 18 Stephen Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, U Ill L Rev (2008) 1185–1223, 1188. 19 Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law (1977). 13 14 15

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enactments that they regard as infringing on individual rights, such as the right to bear arms20 or property rights. 21 Second, Larry Solum has provided two principles, the fixation thesis and the constraint principle, to which all versions of academic originalism adhere in different ways. The fixation thesis provides that the meaning of each constitutional provision was fixed at the time of its adoption.22 The constraint principle means that all constitutional decision-makers (although as we shall see most originalists focus on the judiciary) should be constrained by that original meaning.23 These principles distinguish originalism from non-originalism, but they also leave room for a great deal of variation within the family of originalist theories. Finally, Baude and Sachs’s understanding of originalism highlights the capaciousness of Solum’s big-tent originalism.24 Their originalism comprises three elements. First, consistent with Solum’s two principles, they regard the original meaning of the Constitution to be “the ultimate criterion for constitutional law.” Second, they temper this bit of originalist dogma by embracing “the validity of other methods of interpretation or decision.” Finally, Baude and Sachs maintain that “our law is still the Founders law, as it’s been lawfully changed,” encompassing constitutional precedent (if “lawful”) and even changed circumstances “to the extent that they lawfully derive from the law of the founding.”25 This “inclusive originalism” constitutes what they call “the positive turn” in originalism. Whatever originalism is, they maintain, it is U. S. law. Their positivist defense of originalism has a contingent normative component: because judges are bound to uphold the law, they must interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent with originalist principles.26 Their positive turn in originalism “evokes the basic tenets of legal positivism: that the content of the law is determined by certain present social facts and that moral considerations do not determine whether legal statements [are] true or false.”27 Originalism is “our law,” they claim, because courts interpret the Constitution in accordance with originalist tenets, broadly construed, and because judges never reject such originalism as the basis for constitutional interpretation.28 At first this seems like an odd claim, because part of the fun of being an originalist is the bitter pleasure of denounc-

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008). Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U. S. 469 (2005); Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff “?, Pepp L Rev 33 (2006) 335–84. 22 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U Ill L Rev (2018) 1935–84, 1941. 23 Ibid , 1942. 24 Sachs (footnote 2), Originalism as a Theory, 821, 822. 25 William Baude & Stephen Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, Greenbag 2d 20 (2016) 103–08, 104. 26 Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2353. 27 Ibid , 2351, n. 5. 28 Ibid , 2371–86. 20 21

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ing non-originalist court rulings.29 The claim is less odd, given how broadly Baude and Sachs construe originalism. Their originalism entails constitutional construction or liquidation, presumptions, such as the presumption of constitutionality, and common-law background rules (such as waiver), adherence to precedent, widely accepted practices lacking originalist pedigrees, and a recognition that judges exercise discretion in choosing which legal rules to apply and how to apply them.30 Despite its inclusivity, their originalism has “bite,”31 as is clear from the approaches that they reject. They specifically reject the notion that the U. S. Constitution can be and has been changed through an informal amendment process. They reject the notion that our actual working Constitution consists of the constitutional practices that contemporary Americans can be said to have accepted, as opposed to the written manifestations of consent embodied in the document itself. They reject these approaches based on their empirical claim that they do not accurately track what the law is.32 IV.

Positivist Originalism: A Theory and Four Challenges

Before elaborating my critical comments on Baude & Sachs’s writings on originalism, I want to recognize some of their unique contributions. Most importantly, their attempts to provide a positivist defense of originalism, if taken up in the community of originalist scholars, could provoke a very useful inquiry into the nature of law and constitutional adjudication in the United States. That discussion could extend beyond the originalist scholarly community, because Baude and Sachs, like Jack Balkin,33 have done great work demonstrating through their “inclusive originalism” that differences between the originalist and non-originalist narratives of U. S. constitutional history are a matter of degree. They have also contributed richly to the discussion of the law of interpretation in the United States.34 They stress the difference between linguistic and legal ambiguity. In the debates surrounding originalism, non-originalists focus on textual ambiguities that originalism cannot resolve,35 while originalists claim that linguistic analysis can resolve textual vagueness and ambiguity. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport contend that modern techniques allow us to discern the meaning of the constitutional text by applying the original methods of interpretation.36 Corpus linguistics scholars think that they can use computerized searches to specify the orig29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

Ibid , 2354; Sachs (footnote 2), Originalism as a Theory, 826. Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2356–60. Baude & Sachs (footnote 25), Originalism’s Bite. Ibid., 2364–65. Jack Balkin, Living Originalism, 2011. William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, Harv L Rev. 130 (2017), 1079–1147. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, B U L Rev. 60 (1980), 204–38. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 2013, 199.

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inal meaning of words used in the U. S. Constitution.37 Baude and Sachs introduce a theory of interpretation that resolves ambiguities and vagueness through legal rather than linguistic means. The law of interpretation imposes meaning on legal documents, even where linguistic analysis, standing alone, cannot resolve indeterminacy. For example, the rules of linguistic interpretation may provide no resolution to the meaning of a hopelessly vague insurance contract. However, the law of interpretation provides a solution, interposing a clear legal principle, contra proferentem, according to which such contracts are construed against the drafter. In the case of an ambiguous insurance contract, courts favor the interpretation offered by the insured. Similarly, where plaintiff has the burden of proving her claims, she loses if the trier of fact is unable to conclude that plaintiff ’s theory of the case is superior to that of the defendant.38 Baude and Sachs describe originalism in various ways. They claim that it is law, a Hartian secondary rule of change, and a part of the law of interpretation.39 In the space remaining, I will offer four criticisms of Baude and Sachs’s positivist defense of originalism from the perspective of the pure theory of law. First, I maintain that originalism cannot be “our law,” because originalism is a mode of constitutional interpretation and has none of the characteristics of law. Second, in making their claim that “originalism is our law,” Baude and Sachs seem to have lost sight of what law is. Discovering what law is and how it is made is the pure theory of law’s primary object.40 Baude and Sachs make their claim based on a review of case law, but U. S. law does not come, in the main, from courts. Not only is their review of case law inadequate, they look for law in the wrong place. Third, Baude and Sachs’s positivist defense of originalism is based on what courts do. However, according to Kelsenian positivism, one cannot reason from an is to an ought. Assuming that courts are engaged in interpretation and that the law is the Constitution, court decisions articulate only individual norms. Such norms are useful in settling disputes, but they can neither establish nor supplant higher norms. Those norms derive their validity from the normative legal order and not from a mode of interpretation. Finally, setting aside the is/ought distinction, Baude and Sachs acknowledge that a lot of decisions, while not disavowing originalism, are incorrect “from an originalist perspective.”41 If our law is whatever courts do, as Baude and Sachs seem to believe, their acknowledgment of so many “incorrect” decisions indicates that originalism does not capture what courts do. On the contrary, opposition to what courts do is what gave rise to originalism in the first place.

Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, Yale L J 127 (2018) 788–879. Baude & Sachs (footnote 34), Law of Interpretation, 1111–12. Sachs (footnote 2), Originalism as a Theory, 818, 833; Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2356. Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans. 1992 (1934), § 1, 7. 41 Baude & Sachs (footnote 25), Originalism’s Bite, 108. 37 38 39 40

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1.

No Positive Law Requires Originalism

Most fundamentally, when Baude and Sachs claim that originalism is “our law,” they do not explain what they mean by “law,” and they do not explain how originalism, a mode of constitutional interpretation, could be a legal norm. Baude and Sachs argue that judges in particular, pursuant to their oath and professional obligations, should follow the law. Because originalism is our law, they argue, judges are bound by their oath to uphold the Constitution and follow the law. That means that they are legally obligated to issue originalist decisions.42 However, the law provides for no remedy if a judge issues a non-originalist opinion. Positive law requires that “if A is, then B ought to be.”43 That is, if a delict occurs, punishment should follow. If I commit a criminal act, the law provides a detailed code, according to which my crime will be categorized, and sentencing guidelines, pursuant to which I will be punished. Private law similarly provides penalties for breach of contract, tort, trespass to property, etc. Not all criminals are captured or punished, and not all contract breakers or tortfeasors are called to account. 44 However, a legal norm that never results in punishment is invalid under the doctrine of desuetude.45 This is so not only as a matter of Kelsenian positivism. Hart also acknowledges “that the theory of law as coercive orders . . . started from the perfectly correct appreciation of the fact that where there is law, there human conduct is made in some sense non-optional or obligatory.”46 Nonetheless, judges are perfectly free to issue originalist or non-originalist opinions. Adherence to originalism remains optional, not obligatory. The law provides no consequences for non-originalist judges, and consequences are what differentiate legal obligations from other kinds of normative constraint. If originalism is our law, it is a law that has never been enforced and for which an enforcement mechanism is utterly lacking. Originalism as law cannot even be said to have expired under desuetude because it never operated as a legal norm. It is really an example of lex imperfecta, which is best understood as expressing not legal norms but moral or customary admonitions.47 Citizens are expected to stand for the national anthem, but there is no legal sanction for failing to do so. Kelsen defines a delict as something to which the positive legal system could appropriately respond with a coercive act.48 If originalism were our law, judges who issue non-originalist opinions would be committing constitutional delicts. However, the only legal remedy available Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2394–95. Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 11(b), 24. Ibid., § 11(b), 25. Ibid , § 30(d), 63. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. 1994, 82. Thomas A. J. McGinn, The Expressive Function of Law and the Lex Imperfecta, Roman Leg Trad 11 (2015) 1–41, 26–39. 48 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 14(b), 29. 42 43 44 45 46 47

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for judicial improprieties is impeachment,49 and no judge has ever been impeached or even disciplined for authoring non-originalist opinions. The law provides no sanction for the delict of non-originalist constitutional adjudication. Nor could there be a legal sanction. The purpose of a system of laws is to encourage people “to behave so as to avoid the threatened coercive act”; that is, the punishment that follows as a consequence of a delict.50 Originalism provides no guidance as to expected behaviors; it is a family of theories incapable of resolving disputes.51 Originalists often disagree on how particular cases ought to be decided, and some originalists, including Baude and Sachs for the most part, refuse to comment upon particular cases, reluctant to permit such details to interfere with the elaboration of their theoretical models.52 Originalism thus fails to provide the sort of guidance we look for in legal norms. American legal scholar Andrew Coan recently published a short thought experiment, exploring the consequences of two opposing hypothetical amendments to the U. S. Constitution.53 The first provides that “originalism is not our law and never has been.”54 The second provides, “The United States Constitution, including this Amendment, shall be construed to reflect the original public meaning of its text as amended.”55 Coan explores the ramifications of such hypothetical amendments for originalists and non-originalists, but what interests me here is Stephen Sachs’s response, which was published together with Coan’s essay.56 Sachs acknowledged in passing that Coan’s first hypothetical amendment would indeed invalidate Baude and Sachs’s claim that originalism is “our law.”57 However, Sachs’s more pointed response has nothing to do with positivism. He instead argues that “the substantive effect of [the first hypothetical amendment] would be unambiguously bad” and that the moral status of originalism and of our law more generally is not so tractable as to be settled by new law.58 Coan’s thought experiment should have pushed Sachs to defend his positivist take on originalism. Sachs’s response instead suggests that he is not a positivist at all. He is not an originalist because he thinks originalism is law; he is an originalist because he

Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, Northwestern U L Rev 112 (2018), 789–837, 806 & n. 75. 50 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 12, 26. 51 James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, Fordham L Rev 82 (2013) 433–52, 435; Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, Georgetown L J 99 (2011) 713–78, 719–20. 52 Baude & Sachs (footnote 25), Originalism’s Bite, 108. 53 Andrew Coan, Amending the Law of Constitutional Interpretation, Duke J Const’l L & Pub Pol’y 13 (2018), 85–102. 54 Ibid., 87. 55 Ibid., 88. 56 Stephen E. Sachs, The Law and Morals of Interpretation, Duke J Const’l L & Pub Pol’y 13 (2018) 103–14. 57 Ibid., 103. 58 Ibid , 103. 49

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thinks originalism is good and that non-originalism is bad.59 Legal positivism does not traffic in such value judgments. Coan’s thought experiment may not have succeeded in its purpose, which was to show that non-originalist modes of constitutional interpretation are unavoidable,60 but it did reveal that a very thin veneer of positivism conceals Sachs’s more substantive commitments to originalism. Sachs argues that “Coan’s thought experiment cannot prevent debate over the moral status of our law, because it’s just as embedded within a legal system as anything else.”61 Sachs, returning to positivist mode, then laments the tendency in American constitutional scholarship to conflate legal and moral duties.62 His response to Coan enacts rather than counters that tendency. The positivist response must concede, as Sachs does, that Coan’s first hypothetical amendment, providing that originalism is not our law, would negate positivist originalism. However, as a positivist originalist, Sachs should argue that Coan’s second hypothetical amendment, providing that originalism is our law, is unnecessary, because originalism already is our law. Sachs makes no such argument. Baude and Sachs contend that originalism is U. S. law because originalism is what courts do. But Kelsen’s pure theory of law emphatically rejects any basis for the validity of a legal norm other than the validity of some other (higher) legal norm.63 Coan has shown how one could unambiguously make originalism our law. Absent some legal norm, such as Coan’s second hypothetical amendment, no higher norm validates originalism as a legal norm of constitutional interpretation. 2.

The Role of Courts as Lawmakers

In response to Coan, Baude and Sachs might claim that there is no need for a statute inscribing originalism into our constitutional order because judges have already put it there through their lawmaking power. However, Baude and Sachs have not established that judges are empowered under the U. S. Constitution to make law. A positivist approach must identify the institutions empowered to promulgate laws. From the perspective of positive law, whether originalism is our law cannot turn on what judges do, unless judges are lawmakers.64 Baude and Sachs assume that judges are lawmakers, but originalists have not uniformly embraced that perspective. Sachs himself acknowledges that the courts’ as-

59 60 61 62 63 64

Sachs (footnote 56), Law and Morals, 104–05. Coan (footnote 53), 88–93. Ibid., 110. Ibid., 113. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Max Knight, trans. 1967 (1960), 193–94. See Stanley L. Paulson, Introduction, in: Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, xvii, xxv–xxix.

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sumed roles as lawmakers is controversial precisely because that role is not obviously conferred upon them by positive law.65 The U. S. Constitution does not confer constitutional law-making power on the courts expressly.66 Early originalists assumed that judges are not and ought not to be constitutional lawgivers.67 While there is some controversy over whether the Framers contemplated a judicial check on the constitutionality of legislative enactments,68 the historical record seems pretty clear that the expectation was that, if such judicial power existed, it was to be exercised rarely,69 and it involved a great deal of deference to the political branches.70 It may be that, while the Framers did not think that courts could make law on their own, they could, in clear cases, invalidate legislative or executive actions that exceeded constitutional authority. Originalism itself does not resolve the status of courts as generators of legal norms. With the help of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, we can hypothesize three possible originalist positions. One originalist perspective would treat judicial law-making as an act of constitutional usurpation, a second might find judge-made constitutional law legitimate. However, the third approach, most consistent with Kelsen’s pure theory of law, treats courts as announcing individual norms, not general constitutional norms. This intermediate position makes a much more modest claim for courts’ law-making power than do Baude and Sachs. Originalists who hold the first position believe that the Framers of the U. S. Constitution did not contemplate judicial review of legislative acts. They may not regard judicial pronouncements on constitutional law as binding law.71 They are not alone. There have been times in U. S. constitutional history when presidents and governors have refused to comply with the legal rulings of the U. S. Supreme Court, believing their own powers to execute the laws superior to the courts’ interpretive powers. President Andrew Jackson rendered the Supreme Court’s ruling in Worcester v Georgia72 nugatory by forging ahead with his Indian removal policy. Although historians doubt that he ever said “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it,” his actions at least suggested sentiments consistent with that pronouncement.73 President Jackson also did not think himself bound by the Court’s determination that Congress had the Sachs (footnote 56), Law and Morals, 113. Raoul Berger, Against an Activist Court, 31 Cath U L Rev 31 (1982) 173–80, 176. Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1977; Wolfe (footnote 19). 68 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 2004; Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 2008. 69 The Federalist (A. Hamilton), Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961, Number 78, at 502, 506. 70 Eric J. Segall, Constitutional Faith, 2018. 71 Kramer (footnote 68); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v Madison, Duke L J (1969) 1–47, 26–29. 72 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 73 Joseph L. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and Morality, 21 Stan L Rev 21(1969), 500–31, 524–25. 65 66 67

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power to establish a national bank,74 contending that “[t]he Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution.”75 Abraham Lincoln similarly did not think the Court’s Dred Scott76 decision was binding on the U. S. government.77 The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of the late 1790s,78 protesting the Alien and Sedition Acts, and the nullification crisis of the early 1830s,79 opposing the so-called Tariff of Abominations, indicate significant support for interpretations of the Constitution in which the states retain their sovereignty and are the ultimate arbiters of constitutionality. Southern governors drew on that decentralized view of authority to interpret the Constitution when they engaged in massive resistance to the Court’s requirement that public schools be racially integrated.80 For such originalists and for such executive officers, courts do not have law-making power simply because they claim it. Kelsen notes that a military junta might confuse its putsch for a legitimate military action.81 Similarly, a judge who purports to make constitutional law may in fact be engaged in an act of usurpation. The legal consequences of such a usurpation could be impeachment or other disciplinary actions. More likely, a higher legal authority (a higher court or a legislative body) will invalidate the ruling. A court that acts ultra vires by deciding cases over which it has no jurisdiction cannot give rise to new legal norms. A second group of originalists concludes that the Constitution adopted constitutional review as part of the common-law heritage that was included implicitly as an unwritten supplement to the Constitution’s text.82 Many originalists are willing to accommodate precedent; some even allow following non-originalist precedent.83 If that is so, one can rely on case law to establish that originalism is a part of our law. Baude and Sachs’s inclusive originalism could thus allow for judicial review, if only because

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316 (1819). Andrew Jackson, Veto Message ( July 10, 1832), in: 32 Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897, James D. Richardson ed., 1896, 1139, 1145. 76 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U. S. 393 (1856). 77 Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myths of Cooper v Aaron, Georgetown L J 107 (forthcoming 2019), manuscript at 4, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142846. 78 Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798 & Nov. 14, 1799), reprinted in: 5 The Founders’ Constitution, Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987, 131–35; James Madison, Virginia Resolutions Against the Alien and Sedition Acts (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in: James Madison, Writings, Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999, 589–91. 79 Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights and the Nullification Crisis, 1987. 80 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Brown II, 349 U. S. 294 (1955). 81 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 3, 9–10. 82 See Scott Douglas Gerber, The Supreme Court Before John Marshall, U St Thomas L J 4 (2018) 27, 38–39. 83 McGinnis & Rappaport (footnote 36), 175; Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, Const Comment 22 (2005), 311–48, 328. 74 75

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judicial review has been an established constitutional precedent since at least 1803.84 Still, judge-made law, even if valid, accounts for a very small portion of our constitutional norms. Baude and Sachs have not suggested that originalism informs legislative or regulatory processes, which generate the vast majority of our constitutional norms, a topic I will explore below. The third path, consistent with originalism, best captures the implications of Kelsen’s pure theory for constitutional adjudication. Judges take note of certain facts and issue individual norms applicable to that set of facts.85 In so doing, a judge is not establishing constitutional norms but applying those norms to a specific set of facts.86 In a common-law system, with binding precedents and stare decisis, the individual norm may well have ramifications beyond the individual case. However, because each court judgment results from a particular factual scenario, legal decision-makers often will not know whether new situations come within the ambit of the individual norm that the court announces. Even in a precedent-based and hierarchical court system, lower courts may determine that new cases are legally distinguishable from prior cases that establish binding precedents. On that basis, judges enjoy the discretionary authority to apply or not to apply individual norms announced by higher courts to similar but not identical cases. Within the Kelsenian system, however, judge-made law is never the ultimate test of legality. From the perspective of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, judicial opinions and administrative decisions are functional equivalents, distinguished only by the judiciary’s relative independence.87 To the extent that judicial opinions or other individualized norms drift from constitutional norms, the institutions that generate higher norms can invalidate them.88 Sachs adopts this position, but only with respect to originalist opinions that overturn non-originalist precedent, contending that the originalist interpretations are “in some sense already the law.”89 But his is an idealist position, in which originalist interpretations conform to some notional constitution. In reality, originalist interpretations are just as likely as non-originalist interpretations to be overturned by the proper law-generating authority. Originalism might lead to the conclusion that courts establish binding constitutional norms or that they have no authority to state constitutional norms at all. Kelsen’s pure theory of law adopts a middle position. Courts play a vital role in the realization and concretization of legal norms. But they do so on the individual level and they cre-

84 85 86 87 88 89

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 137 (1803). Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 5, 11–12; § 28, 56–57. Ibid , § 31(c), 68. Ibid., § 31(d), 68–69; Kelsen (footnote 63), Pure Theory, 263–64. Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 31(h), 72–73. Sachs (footnote 2), Originalism as a Theory, 826.

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ate only contingent norms. Courts announce only individual norms, subject to checks from authorities empowered to promulgate higher legal norms.90 3.

Originalism within the Political Branches

My third criticism of Baude and Sachs stems from their near-exclusive focus on judgemade law. Legislatures and executive agencies promulgate the vast majority of our constitutional norms. Executive agencies do so pursuant to statutory directives, but U. S. legislators are not part of the process of checking low-level legal norms against the basic norm that the Constitution embodies. These facts pose a fundamental problem for Baude and Sachs, but it is one that they can easily remedy, at least on the conceptual level, by expanding their inquiry to determine whether originalism also informs legislative and regulatory constitutional lawmaking. I have my doubts, however, that originalism guides our political branches. Baude and Sachs clearly know that case law is only a part of our law – after all, originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation, and the U. S. Constitution is not judge-made law. However, when it comes to questions of legal interpretation, they focus almost exclusively on case law, as though judges were the only ones who said what the law is. Their very interesting work on the law of interpretation includes some discussion of legislative processes, but only as an aid in determining how law should be interpreted. They do not discuss what institutions might be doing the interpretation, and their main focus remains on constitutional adjudication and case law.91 The focus on judge-made law is typical of contemporary originalism. Most originalist theory centers on the judiciary, as if judge-made law were the whole of the law. Few remark on the irony: originalism, which began as a critique of the perceived judicial activism of the Warren and Burger Courts, now elevates the judiciary to the center of constitutional inquiry. A movement that insisted that judges not legislate from the bench now limits its examination of constitutional interpretation exclusively to those same judges. Tellingly, on the rare occasion when Baude and Sachs discuss constitutional decision-making in the executive branch, it is to acknowledge scholarship that is outside of the broad confines of their inclusive originalism.92

90 91 92

Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 31(c), 68. Baude & Sachs (footnote 34), Law of Interpretation. Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2397–98.

Problems of Translation and Interpretation

4.

Originalist Rhetoric and Judicial Practice

If judges are lawgivers, then calling our law “originalist” appears to be inaccurate. No law-giving authority has issued a valid edict that requires judges to adopt originalism as their mode of constitutional adjudication, and most originalists do not think that our constitutional jurisprudence has been consistently originalist. Baude and Sachs acknowledge that originalists have been quite critical of what judges do. As Justice Scalia put it memorably: It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of both feet, yea, even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean.93

Baude and Sachs themselves have a list of cases that they think are wrongly decided from the perspective of originalism.94 Bad decisions do not invalidate the methodology, Baude and Sachs claim, any more than a bad call by a scorer undermines the rules of the sport.95 But if judge-made law is our law, then these incorrect opinions are our law just as much as are opinions that fit within the bounds of Baude and Sachs’s inclusive originalism. Baude and Sachs’s positivism focuses on the Court’s rhetoric, both on its adoption of originalism rhetoric and its refusal to disavow originalism expressly. However, even if the law is what the courts say it is, it is not clear why the proper positivist approach is to focus on rhetoric rather than on the courts’ legal conclusions. As Richard Primus pointed out in commenting on Baude’s work, if we focused only on what politicians say, we might conclude that our politics are theocratic. After all, politicians frequently invoke God in the United States, and they never denounce God.96 Even within the realm of case law, Baude and Sachs’s positivism describes an interpretive methodology that does not actually help decide cases. They claim that all case law employs originalism as an interpretive methodology. The majority opinions are originalist; the dissents are originalist. A judge deploying originalist methodology can still get a case wrong “as a matter of originalism.”97 Indeed, Baude has gathered extensive evidence that, unlike popular originalists, academic originalists no longer believe that originalism can restrain judges.98 If originalism does not help to decide cases, it is hard to know what it means to say that it is our law.

93 94 95 96 97 98

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, U Cin L Rev 57 (1989), 849–65, 852. Baude & Sachs (footnote 25), Originalism’s Bite, 108. Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2371–72, citing Hart (footnote 46), 144. Richard Primus, Is Theology Our Politics?, Columbia L Rev Sidebar 116 (2016) 44–60. Baude & Sachs (footnote 25), Originalism’s Bite, 104. William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, U Chi L Rev 84 (2017), 2213–29, 2215–17.

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Baude and Sachs encourage the resolution of ambiguities in the constitutional text through the law of linguistic interpretation rather than through theories of interpretation sounding in linguistics or through appeals to extra-legal norms.99 In their view – and here they are quite similar to original methods scholars, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport – the law of interpretation, as it existed at the time of the Framing, can resolve most disputes regarding the Constitution’s meaning. Proving that claim would require an exercise in historical reconstruction. To the extent that their positivist defense of originalism requires empirical support, it diverges from the pure theory of law, where law is law without regard to the facts. Moreover, while Baude and Sachs have identified numerous elements of the law of interpretation, they have no compelling argument that originalism is a part of that law. The law of interpretation can resolve legal disputes not because it is what courts do but because it is law. It is firmly established in our common-law system and often embodied in statutes as well. Originalism is neither a common-law nor a statutory rule. It may be that Baude and Sachs are not engaged in legal science at all; they are legal sociologists. They are not explaining what law is and how it is generated; rather, they are explaining why, through interpretive processes that are a matter of judicial discretion, judges choose some norms rather than others.100 Within the law of interpretation, Kelsen acknowledges that the norm is but a frame.101 Legal norms provide the frame within which various interpretations can arise, but those interpretations do not involve cognition and application of higher norms but exercises of will in the furtherance of legal policy.102 Judges resolve issues within the framework of the legal norm by consulting non-legal normative systems.103 V.

Conclusion: Is Positivist Originalism Possible?

While much of what I have had to say here is critical, I do want to emphasize that Baude and Sachs’s work is interesting, inventive, and important. Others seek to ground originalism in their personal values, be they libertarian, consequentialist, Aristotelian, majoritarian, or supermajoritarian. Baude and Sachs correctly note that judges should not be in the business of deciding cases on the basis of their personal political or theoretical commitments, and if they are bound by originalism, they ought to be bound by originalism because it is law.

99 Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2360. 100 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 7, 14. 101 Ibid § 36, 80–81; Kelsen (footnote 63), Pure Theory, 350–51. 102 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 38, 82; Kelsen (footnote 63), Pure Theory, 353. 103 Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 38, 83.

Problems of Translation and Interpretation

Still, I think Baude and Sachs are simply wrong, as an empirical matter, to think that originalism either is or has ever been our law, and they are wrong, as a matter of Kelsenian positivist theory, to think that it could be our law even if it were what courts do. They look for a positive basis for law in the wrong place. In the U. S. system, the political branches, not courts, take the lead in generating high-level positive legal norms. Nobody has studied whether they do so according to an originalist model. From the perspective of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, Baude and Sachs’s arguments do not establish a basis for a claim that originalism in constitutional interpretation is a part of the positive law of the United States. Originalism is not an independent source of law, and no lawmaker has established it as a part of our substantive law, either as part of our law of interpretation or a Hartian rule of change. If some legislature attempted to dictate to courts the mode of interpretation that they were to apply to constitutional matters, as Andrew Coan has suggested they might, such an act would raise significant separation of powers issues under the normative system established by the U. S. Constitution. By so arguing, I do not intend to offer a refutation of originalism. As a mode of constitutional interpretation, originalism yields various possibilities for application. These possibilities retain their validity if they can be reconciled with higher norms. This is true of all manners of interpretation, not just originalist modes of interpretation. Baude and Sachs acknowledge that originalism is not the only mode of constitutional interpretation.104 They merely claim that originalism is the primary mode of constitutional interpretation and that, in case of a conflict, originalism prevails.105 This is an empirical claim. I think it is false, but its truth or falsity is irrelevant in a Kelsenian system, in which “there is simply no method according to which only one of several readings of a norm could be distinguished as ‘correct.’ ”106 D. A. Jeremy Telman

Valparaiso University Law School, 656 S. Greenwich St., Valparaiso, IN 46383, USA, [email protected]

104 105 106

Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2355; Baude & Sachs (footnote 25), Originalism’s Bite, 104. Baude (footnote 2), Our Law, 2371. Kelsen (footnote 40), Introduction, § 37, 81.

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Kelsen’s Monism and the Structure of Global Law On the Relevance of a Kelsenian Account for the Polycentric International Law TOMASZ WIDŁAK* 1

Abstract: In contrast to Gunther Teubner’s and Andreas Fischer-Lescano’s view, this arti-

cle argues for continued relevance of a Kelsenian approach in face of the structural problems of modern international legal system. Legal scholars often take their own discipline’s terminological and explanatory shortcomings in explaining ‘global law’ phenomena for granted and fall back for methodological guidance on sociological approaches, like the systems theory. This article argues that Kelsen’s and Merkl’s conceptual tools, including the Stufenbaulehre, remain relevant for descriptive and explanatory purposes in relation to transformations of the international legal system, including its inherent polycentrism, heterarchy or the emergence of transnational private regulatory regimes. Keywords: Hans Kelsen, international law, global law, polycentric, Stufenbaulehre, Stufen-

bau Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Völkerrecht, Global Law, polyzentrisch, Stufenbaulehre,

Stufenbau

Introduction: global transformations of international law

The assumption from which the following argument departs is that the present international law is undergoing a profound transformation that touches upon its structure. A more sophisticated international legal order has been taking shape that includes, besides the traditional law between nations (ius inter gentes, in the doctrinal view of the

University of Gdańsk, associate professor of law; This article is part of a research project financed by the National Science Centre, Poland (DEC-2016/23/D/HS5/02613). *

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discipline), the ius gentium, or the law of the larger international community, a new order on the universal level. In this context, an ascending paradigm of the so-called ‘global law’ has been gaining currency in the recent years among scholars, although it is far from being defined or clearly conceptualised by legal theory and philosophy, let alone the scholarship of international law.1 Clearly, the notion is used in various contexts and is ascribed with different meanings and the ‘global law discourse’ has been confronted with criticism for blurring the clear-cut picture and undermining the functions of the traditional international law, together with its elaborate and well-fitting arsenal of legal notions, understandings and doctrinal concepts.2 The global law discourse is usually connected with the need or aspiration for overcoming the barrier, or even divide, between the ‘international’ and ‘national’ realms (understood as ‘spheres of action, structures of authority and forms of normativity” in Neil Walker’s description).3 Therefore, it is essential for the proponents of a more universal view of the present legal world, among other aims, to overcome the primordial and determinative position of statehood or sovereignty as the strongest structural organising principle of the global legal order. This is self-evident in view of legal phenomena such as the standing of global non-governmental organizations, governance by and through transnational regulatory regimes, the increasing role and demand for regulation of the global commons (climate, sea, space) or the emergence of normative forms such as jus cogens norms of international law, erga omnes obligations or universal jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of international character. Yet, global law, or globalization of law, remains ambiguous; it does not merely equal contemporary international law,4 neither it is entirely any other concrete order of positive rules, nor merely an aspiration or guiding ideal,5 although comprehending its essence as a dynamic state of becoming, which includes pre-positive instances rather than a closed set of complete norms, has been accounted for as its important trait.6 One of the most pervasive features of the current process of globalization of law is its plurality understood as multiplicity of overlapping legal and other normative orders that a single person may be simultaneously subject to. This dimension of global law is perhaps one of its most problematic traits in the eyes of legal scholars, because of its structural consequences. Acknowledging that globalization of law involves not only permeability of the boundaries between legal orders, but also fracture, fluidity

1 For a recent attempt to conceptualize global law in legal theory cf. Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law,

2015. 2 See William Twinning, Globalisation and Legal Theory, 2000, 14–24; cf. Richard Collins, The Slipperiness of ‘Global Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 37 (2017), 714–739. 3 Cf. Walker (note 1), 12. 4 Cf. Willem van Genugten, Public International Law: a Forerunner in the Field of Global(ization of) Law, Tilburg Law Review 17 (2012), 159–167. 5 Cf. Randall Lesaffer, The Lighthouse of Law, Tilburg Law Review 17 (2012), 153–158. 6 Walker (note 1), 23, 27.

Kelsen’s Monism and the Structure of Global Law

and polycentrism7 of the very structure of the domain, so far occupied by international law and state law, poses a serious challenge to existing representations of the archetypical order. For instance, this uncertainty is brought about by the debate over the pressing issue of the ‘fragmentation of international law’, which has become sort of a signum temporis of the scholarship of international law at the beginning of the new millennium.8 The turn of legal scholarship to sociological theories

As the result of the above-mentioned changes, as well as due to the intensiveness and dynamics of the academic discourse on the ‘law beyond the state’, there is an observable shortage of proper vocabulary for explaining, among other issues, the ontology and structure of the legal world at the global level. Thus, the legal academia has been struggling to cognize the new realm not easily describable by traditional legal notions of public international law, which rely heavily on the idea of the state being the central subject and unit of analysis. This semantic and conceptual crisis, or perhaps merely the erosion of the traditional paradigm of international law,9 sooner or later was bound to create a methodological vacuum and draw critique from outside of the core of the discipline. As a result, there has been a pronounced turn to other theoretical approaches by legal scholars, often representing more or less ‘alien’ methodological lineage in relation to traditional positivist legal scholarship.10 One of the most influential of them are those originating in sociology, especially the social systems theory as interpreted by Niklas Luhmann11 and adapted by Gunther Teubner12. Using theoretically developed

Cf. Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, Tilburg Law Review 17 (2012), 177–199. 8 For the general overview of fragmentation, see the report by International Law Commission chaired by Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 2006, A/CN.4/L.682; Martti Koskenniemi / Päivi Leino, Fragmentation in International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, Leiden Journal of International Law 15 (2002), 553–579; cf. Mads Andenas / Eirik Bjorge (eds.), A Farewell to Fragmentation Reassertion and Convergence in International Law, 2015. 9 Cf. Tomasz Widłak / Jerzy Zajadło, Constitutionalisation: A New Philosophy of International Law? in: Fragmentation vs the Constitutionalisation of International Law A Practical Inquiry, eds. Andrzej Jakubowski / Karolina Wierczynska, 2016, 15–31. 10 It is worth noting that the ‘law and globalization’ movement is akin to interdisciplinary and plurality of methodological approaches, especially influenced by sociology, whereas ‘traditional’ local approaches to law have been typically focused on formalistic and positivistic analysis constituting a ‘methodic monism’. See Lesaffer (note 5), 157; cf. Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking, 2016, 234–238. 11 Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie, 1984. 12 Gunther Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society, 1988; recently see Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalisation, 2012. 7

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and sophisticated terminology and methodology, these approaches have been able to describe and explain the complex network of international legal regimes as a reflection of the social systems’ dynamics. The purpose of this article is not to analyse, nor to criticise social systems approach. It is worth pointing out however, that these external approaches, inspiring as they may be, at the end of the day tend to downplay the normativity of law and reduce legal theoretical problems to epiphenomena of social dynamics, politics, power or any other forces that they deem as foundational. The example of social systems theory discussed here serves rather as an illustration of a wider issue of the largely uncritical methodological turn in the scholarship of international law. The problem of legal theory is not in engaging with external insights, which may be seen as an indication of its inclusiveness, but rather in the methodological ease with which the legal scholarship in some cases depreciates more internal, normative analysis. Such is the instance of the Kelsenian Pure Theory of Law, often being called forth as an example of a prima facie outdated, formalistic approach, allegedly useless for the task of describing and explaining the complex structure of the global legal system. An example of such a critique can be found in the work by Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano: Even if it were possible, albeit with great effort, for political regulatory regimes to subordinate themselves to a State hierarchy of legal norms, constituted in line with Kelsen’s and Merkl’s stratified methodology, and in which national legal acts, national legislation, national constitutional law and international law would be capped by a law that could be construed as an international constitutional law, the emergence of autonomous non-statal regimes necessarily collapses the hierarchy.13

The above quote represents a simplified and misconceived account of Hans Kelsen’s and Adolf Merkls’s Stufenbaulehre, which itself constitutes a method of a formal and dynamic analysis of the structure of any legal order. Contrary to what Teubner and Fisher-Lescano seem to suggest, it does not imply by itself any concrete hierarchy of the ‘sources’ of law,14 interpreted as particular types of legal acts or branches of law, neither does it demand any expanded multi-level structure (in a form resembling a ‘pyramid’, as universally depicted). Kelsen never spoke of any such essential international constitutional law; he may have only understood his Grundnorm as a sort of a constitution in a purely formal, logical-legal sense (Verfassung im rechtslogischen Sinne).15 Its role may be foundational but not substantively ‘constitutional’  – the conclusion

Andreas Fischer-Lescano / Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, Michigan Journal of International Law 25 (2004), 1012. 14 See Jörg Kammerhofer, Sources in Legal Positivist Theories: The Pure Theory’s Structural Analysis of the Law, in: The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law, eds. Samantha Besson / Jean d’Aspremont / Sévrine Knuchel, 2017, 343–364. 15 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1992, 202, 228–230. 13

Kelsen’s Monism and the Structure of Global Law

which norms are constitutional, i. e. axiologically or substantively central for the particular legal order, depends entirely on the positive contents of the law, not on the concepts of the Pure Theory or its methodological assumptions. Stufenbau of a legal order should be comprehended as an epistemological tool – a structural principle ordering the sequence of legal norms as pure forms. The point here, however, is not to make an argument relating only to Teubner’s and Fischer-Lescano’s statement, but rather to make a case for the contrary thesis and to unfold the capabilities of the normativistic approach in the context of global law. In the following part of this article, I will focus on reconstructing a possible model structure of the global legal order, understood as the overarching legal system that includes, besides international law or state law, also other components, such as non-state regimes mentioned by Kelsen’s critics. The concept of legal order

The concept of legal order plays a key role in Kelsenian description of the structure of global law.16 It is defined as ‘an aggregate or a plurality of general and individual norms that govern human behavior’.17 The state is thus, according to Kelsen, merely a personification of a legal order, a ‘common point of imputation for certain acts of individuals’.18 Adequately, when the state as a complete legal order ‘bestows personality’ upon legal subjects, it only establishes rights and obligations of further personified orders – juristic persons. Even though they may be phrased as rights or duties of organizations, corporations etc., these norms ultimately aim at regulating the behavior of individual human beings.19 This means that these rights and obligations are related (imputed) to the unity of a ‘corporate’ order as a personified, partial legal order (Teilrechtsordnung).20 This is precisely the case of legal persons, such as associations (communities), which are partial orders in relation to the municipal legal order, constituting in this case a complete legal order.21 The relationship between the state and the legal person (corporation) is the relation of delegation of the partial order by the overall complete order. Legal norms are primary in this context, and the very concept of personality as a doctrinal construct is secondary to them – not vice versa. A person (physical, legal) is therefore a certain description, an ‘auxiliary concept of juristic thinking’22 – a typi-

The assertion that the concept of legal or normative order is central for global law is also shared by other approaches, although according to some accounts its normative nature is disputed; see Hans Lindahl, Legal Order and the ‘Globality’ of Global Law, Tilburg Law Review 17 (2012), 168–176. 17 Hans Kelsen, The Concept of the Legal Order, The American Journal of Jurisprudence 27 (1982), 64. 18 Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures 1940–41, 1942, 75. 19 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2012, 97. 20 Kelsen (note 15), 270. 21 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1945, 96–99. 22 Kelsen (note 19), 97. 16

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fication of a specific team or a bundle of norms. A natural or legal person – according to Kelsen – does not ‘have’ legal obligations and subjective rights, but rather is these rights, the unity of the norms constituting them.23 In this way, a kind of continuum arises, in which, the positive law in principle does not know any limitations to the possibility of constructing legal subjectivity and personality. It is true to say that Kelsen granted the state with priority in the normative architecture of international law24. However, his ‘Leviathan’ has been completely desacralized due to the radical criticism of sovereignty that took place in his 1920 book Das Problem der Souveränität 25 As an effect, sovereignty was reduced by Kelsen to a quality of a legal order pertaining to the relation between municipal and international law.26 A state legal order may be called sovereign if it is directly dependent on the international legal order.27 In other words, there has to be a direct link between the sovereign order and international law; sovereignty becomes Völkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit.28 Therefore, the norms of international law as a general legal order are bound to define municipal law by delimitating its territorial, personal, substantive and temporal dimensions of its ‘existence’ or validity. The state, as a result, becomes a legal order limited in its dimensions as defined by international law.29 The situation is similar for all other legal orders or communities, which are also partial orders – some relative to state law, others to international law. It is possible to distinguish three variables that differentiate them typologically. The first one determines the static and the second the dynamic aspect of centralization or decentralization.30 The principle of static centralization, originally referred by Kelsen to the national order, was based primarily on the criterion of the territorial scope of the validity of the norms. This however, may only be of secondary importance in the context of global law, which hardly relates to any specific territory in a clear way. Therefore, I propose a typology of legal orders according to the modified static criterion of the substantive scope of regulation: from relatively particular to total ones. Particular orders or communities would have a narrow, more detailed or even particular subject matter of regulation and thus jurisdiction over individual rights (for instance: international postal system), while the total (complete) ones would be those that regulate rights and obligations of individuals concerning a relatively wide field of human activity, like

Kelsen (note 15), 177. See Hans Kelsen, Zur Grundlegung der Völkerrechtslehre. Ein Auseinandersetzung mit Heinrich Drost, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 1 (1946/1948), 69. 25 Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre, in: Hans Kelsen Werke 4 (ed. Matthias Jestaedt), 2013. 26 See Hans Kelsen, Sovereignty and International Law, Georgetown Law Journal 48 (1960), 628. 27 Ibid., 632. 28 Hans Kelsen, Souveränität, in: Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, 1962, 281. 29 Kelsen (note 19), 94. 30 Hans Kelsen (note 21), 303–316. 23 24

Kelsen’s Monism and the Structure of Global Law

in the case of maritime law or international financial regulations. The second criterion of differentiation of legal orders pertains to the degree of dynamic centralization, which refers to the method of creation and application of the norms of a given order. Decentralization in this case proceeds along the horizontal increase in the number and collegiality of the organs or institutions creating general and individual norms of a given order. The global reach and prevalence of human rights law with its dense network of decision-making and promoting institutions could serve an example of such a dynamically decentralized structure, while the regime on the control of the use of force tends to be left in the hands of as few institutions as possible with relatively small number of members having a decisive say, as is the case with the Security Council of the United Nations. The third useful typology of legal orders could be established along the lines of the criterion of directness of regulation in relation to human individuals. This is particularly relevant in the case of supranational regulations. Individual legal communities can be sorted according to this criterion from indirect (or distant) orders, which create only potential and not directly accessible rights and obligations for individuals, perhaps only for those acting in the capacity of organs of communities, up to substantially direct ones, which use norms to shape the legal situation of human beings as their primary subjects. International criminal law is one of the most obvious candidates for a direct legal order, while for instance nuclear non-proliferation regime is rather distant – concerning primarily the states and scarcely directly touching upon the legal status of an individual. International regimes

Having agreed with the above reasoning, it is easy to observe that any entity established in the sphere of global law, that may be imputed with rights or duties beyond the context of particular state’s law, such as an international organization, a community of states, international corporation, non-state organization – in principle qualifies as a legal order within the structure of global law. These orders differ only in terms of their completeness and partiality in relation to each other as well as by the degree of centralization. This is particularly true of all those orders which, if not directly valid under international legal norm, originate under state law, including the so-called ‘non-state’ subjects usually being juristic persons (associations) established under one or another state legal order.31

According to the Kelsenian approach, one can see these entities as members of global legal structure, especially when they are also recognized or empowered by international law or other regimes (for instance, they hold consultative status basing on Art. 71 of the U. N. Charter). However, along the Kelsenian line of thinking, it is not possible to reverse the direction of reasoning – one cannot infer the status of these entities 31

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It is imperative to see in the analogical way the status of the so-called international regimes, which may be defined as sets of norms, procedures and institutions, focusing on specific issues that require international regulation.32 They produce formal and informal decision-making structures with a broad scope, generally going beyond the institutional framework of individual international organizations or relevant multilateral international agreements.33 What is meant here is the full spectrum of this phenomenon, considering two basic types: the first includes traditional regulatory regimes as sets of norms and procedures originating in the public legal sphere and usually arising in specific functional areas of international legal regulation (public regimes). They are created primarily by states in cooperation with international organizations and sometimes even with sub-state actors and use traditional methods of lawmaking as known to public international law, such as treaties or jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. The situation of these regimes is in fact similar to that of international organizations or other entities like the legal communities. The difference is that these types of regimes constitute legal orders, that are usually more decentralized and less clearly institutionalized than international organizations. One of the most recent examples of such a regime in statu nascendi is the climate change law or international climate law regime.34 More challenging for a Kelsenian inspired approach is the case of the second type of regimes, often referred to as ‘private’ due to their non-state or non-public origin and inherently global nature. Lex mercatoria,35 or international trade law regime is one of the paradigmatic examples of such a private type. Their trait is that these regimes function effectively outside the jurisdiction and framework of any particular state law or public international organization, so they cannot be explicitly related as partial to any of the other of the above-mentioned ‘public’ orders. It may even happen that such regimes are genuinely autonomous normative orders, developing their para-juridical institutions and methods of applying norms, resolving disputes and developing their norms through their own specific dispute resolution system. An example of such a case would be the international sports law (lex sportiva).36 Obviously, the key question is, whether it is possible to consider these forms as legal orders under the global law system, since the nature of their pedigree is often unclear. The response of the traditional

from the empirical facts, for instance that their actual political, law-making, economic or socio-cultural significance as sociological ‘actors’ on the world stage. 32 Cf. similar definition in Margaret A. Young, Introduction: The Productive Friction between Regimes, in: Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation, ed. Margaret A. Young, 2012, 9. 33 See Anu Bradford, Regime Theory, in: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. R. Wolfrum, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil, Accessed June 19, 2018. 34 See Kyle W. Danish, An Overview of the International Regime Addressing Climate Change, Sustainable Development Law and Policy 7 (2007), 10–15. 35 See Stephan W. Shill, Lex mercatoria, in: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. R. Wolfrum, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil, Accessed July 27, 2018. 36 Cf. Ken Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, Entertainment Law 2 (2003), 1–18.

Kelsen’s Monism and the Structure of Global Law

positivistic legal theory to this issue would be manifestly negative, while the systems theory steps in with its sociological explanations and approaches, applied to theory of law precisely in response to this problem of ‘private’ or ‘stateless’ law in the first place. The abovementioned case of lex mercatoria as described by Teubner or, more recently, the lex digitalis of the Internet are among the most prominent examples.37 A possibility to conceive of private regimes as legal orders being part of the construed positive structure of the global legal system may be open along the Kelsenian line of thinking. The basic relationship between norms in the legal system is constituted by the dynamic principle of formal delegation of one norm by another. This in turn creates a ‘chain of validity’38 that transmits the normativity and the quality of legality from the basic norm (Grundnorm) down to the subsequent norms in the system. On the one hand, this delegation steaming from the general order (for instance international law) equips the private autonomous regime as a partial order with a competence of defining or providing for the particular, detailed elements of a legal norm, which would later in turn be reconstructed in the act of law’s application as a complete legal norm (that is a norm containing antecedent elements up from the basic norm and the general international law all the way down to the individual norms of the partial order).39 On the other hand, a delegation by a higher norm constitutes a dynamic act of authorization of the indicated authority on a lower level, empowering it to create further norms. Thus occurs a legitimate transmission of authority (competence) to create individual legal norms. This means that a further (downstream) delegation may be subject to any limitation as to the subject, object, temporal and even territorial scope, as is the case with the delegation of state legal orders by international law. Kelsen states explicitly that the unity of the dynamic system rests on the uninterrupted sequence of delegations.40 Against this background, it becomes clear that the relationship of delegation between the norms or orders (complete and partial) is logical, but not necessarily chronological. Therefore, a specific regime, already ‘existing’ as a matter of fact, to the extent that it consists of norms, may be secondarily delegated by a norm belonging to the order of international law or, more broadly, of global law. In such instance, the relation of delegation that Gunther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations. Societal Constitutionalism beyond the Nation State, in: The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, eds. Petra Dobner / Martin Loughlin, 2012, 332. 38 The phrase was coined by Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law Essays on Law and Morality, 1979, 125. 39 The concept of a complete legal norm involves the reproduction in a microscale of the entire gradual structure of the legal order within the contents of a concrete, reconstructed individual legal norm, perceived from the ex post facto perspective of its application. The act of applying the law, located at the end of the ‘chain of validity’, even if it primarily reflects the standards (norms) of a given private regime, objectively also includes the relevant norms of all preceding levels of the legal system up to the Grundnorm. All preceding norms in this chain are antecedents that condition the final act of coercion, making it an act of application of the law. See Stanley L. Paulson, How Merkl’s Stufenbaulehre Informs Kelsen’s Concept of Law, Revus – Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law 21 (2013), 38–39, doi:10.4000/revus.2727, Accessed July 11, 2019. 40 Kelsen (note 21), 400. 37

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links the Grundnorm’s global law system to the norms of the hitherto isolated normative order is established. This replaces the possible particular basic norm of the previously non-legal normative order, making it part of the legal system. Kelsen himself describes this type of reasoning as ‘the Midas principle’ by referring to the name of the mythological king whose touch turned anything into gold.41 In a similar fashion, everything that the universal legal system links to by way of normative delegation, acquires a legal character, or becomes part of law. The previously autonomous non-legal order becomes connected to the source of normativity of the law.42 Nonetheless, doubts may arise. Why an effective regime should risk questioning and verification of its self-developed standards in the first place? Those rules are usually being developed basing on the regime’s own specific context rationality, precisely suited for its own ends. By submission of the regime to the larger legal system, they essentially become open for limitation or repeal against the contents of higher legal norms. Also, this ‘connection’ to the larger legal order by definition means the implementation of social control and a pattern of coercion, which is characteristic of the law.43 Given that the social organizational ‘sanctions’ specific of a given private regime, such as exclusion (e. g. under the sports law system) or non-certification turn out to be effective, why would the regime want to resort to legal instruments? Moreover, the reason for the creation of such regimes is often precisely the need to avoid the heteronomous (external) character of regulation typical of the law – they often arise by way of self-regulation of the subjects involved, and therefore require implementing some kind of ‘softer’ degree of persuasiveness as compared to traditional public legal regulation. Such an argument may in fact seem convincing, however it only works under the assumption that the particular private regime operates correctly (as designed) under normal circumstances and is not biased by partisan interests, particularly of those actors, whose activities the regime is designed to constrain. As long as an autonomous, largely private regime functions properly and is well-balanced in terms of aims and values, it can continue to be effective without the aid from legal norms. If, however, it finds itself in a crisis situation, it may turn out to be more prone to collapse or regaining its functional capacity by reform than a legal public regime. Examples range from various financial market and banking self-regulation private regimes, operating and collapsing, sometimes spectacularly, in both recent and more distant past,44 to the failed

Kelsen (note 15), 282. Cf. The opposite view, that the ‘transmission’ of normativity (validity) between norms within the Stufenbau cannot occur: András Jakab, Probleme der Stufenbaulehre: Das Scheitern des Ableitungsgedankens und die Aussichten der Reinen Rechtslehre, ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 91 (2005), 333–365. 43 Kelsen (note 15), 34–59. 44 See eg. Lori Qingyuan Yue / Jiao Luo / Paul Ingram, The Failure of Private Regulation. Elite Control and Market Crises in the Manhattan Banking Industry, Administrative Science Quarterly 58 (2013), 37–68. 41 42

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attempts of private regulation to keep down international roaming tariffs in the EU.45 Among other possible causes, those failures may be due to the fact, that an isolated extra-legal autonomous rationality, which stands at the foundation and purpose of such systems’ function may become corrupted and undermined easier than the normativity and authority of the whole legal system. The price for the autonomy and self-regulation is paid by the fact that the regime runs on bare efficiency, which in turn reduces the importance of its standards to the realm of the factual. This implies, that the regime simply stands or falls with certain facts which justify its creation and functioning in the first place. The remarkable flexibility of action that private-regulation may entail, often also turns out to be its Achilles’ heel in a crisis situation. In contrast, due to separation of Sein and Sollen and axiological neutrality in its application, the law in a comparable crisis situation may be reasonably expected to be far more resilient to pressures from both the inside and the outside of the system. Third monism: the plurality of various legal orders and the primacy of international law

In contrast to the abovementioned widely held stereotypes about Kelsen’s normativism, the assumptions of the Pure Theory of Law in fact do allow for a diverse, flexible configuration of the structure of the modern global law. Apart of the two well-known variants of monism with the primacy of international law and with the primacy of municipal law,46 which are useful only in the context of considering the particular relation between two orders: a state legal order and the international legal order, it is also worth considering a more pluralistic version of monism, called here the ‘third monism’. Kelsen writes: (…) two norm complexes may form a single system of norms also in that fashion that both orders are coordinated, that is, that their spheres of validity are delimited against each other. This coordination, however, presupposes a third, higher, order which determines the creation of the other two (…)47

This setting in fact allows for a plurality of orders within the unity of one system. It suggests however, that the relations between the orders within the system are orderly or structured in analogous way to the relations between individual norms within any given legal order. Moreover, some orders may have equal position to each other in the

See Fabrizio Cafaggi / Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation. Mapping the Labyrinth, Dovenschmidt Quarterly 1 (2012), 15–32. 46 See e. g. Hans Kelsen, The Concept of the Legal Order, trans. Stanley L. Paulson, American Journal of Jurisprudence 27 (1982), 75–84. 47 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 2005, 332. 45

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system; for instance, several states are directly delegated by the ‘third’ higher order coordinating and delimiting the others, thus they are equal in being directly delegated by international law. This variation of the pluralistic monism has a clear potential for objectivizing international law, as the delegation principle in operation between the various legal orders creates the unity of the entire legal system. For Kelsen, the supreme overall order that delegates the state orders is, of course, the universal international law. Its contents and scope of jurisdiction, as well as other features such as the degree of centralization, remain an open question. Because it is the highest order and the most complete one within the whole system, international law needs therefore to be general and universal in terms of matter that it can choose to regulate. In such a view, all the other orders in the system are of course partial to international law. In addition, as any other legal order, this superior coordinating international law can hypothetically be shaped freely in terms of the degree of centralization or directness (depth) of regulation. This opens the way for envisaging different conceptions of international law: from the minimalist version as the of coordination and limitation48 to denser and more centralized models, embracing it’s potential for constitutionalisation.49 Nothing in the above argument on the structural relation between international law and the multitude of state legal orders prevents it from being extended further by embracing other constitutive elements of the contemporary global legal system. Other legal entities and juristic persons listed above, and even international regimes qua legal orders, may be envisioned as parts to the structure of the global law. Depending on the specific case, most individual organizations or regimes may be defined as partial legal orders in relation to international law, state law or even to other non-state orders. Any such relatively centralized order can therefore be delegated by a norm of another specific legal order, virtually at any level of the ‘chain of validity’ of the global legal system. This creates subsequent, relatively centralized clusters of norms on different levels of the structure. In the following part, I will argue that inclusion of these different partial orders makes the overall structure rather heterarchical than traditionally hierarchical. Polycentrism

The notion of ‘polycentrism’ or ‘multi-centricism’ represents the thesis that in the contemporary legal system numerous decision centers coexist in the same normative plane

See Danilo Zolo, Towards a Modern, Realist Philosophy of International Law, in: Jura Gentium, Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale, http://www.juragentium.org/topics/thil/en/zolo. htm, Accessed July 27, 2018. 49 See Jan Klabbers / Anne Peters / Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2009. 48

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and at the same time, especially as far as law creation and application is concerned.50 Each of the ‘centres’ can generate its own sub-system or partial legal order concentrated around local axis of hierarchy within the larger system. Polycentrism therefore explicitly denies the notion of only one central, clear hierarchy of law-creation or application within the modern legal order. The distinguishing feature of this theoretical model is however, that although the existence of a hierarchical relationship between the various ‘centers’ is generally denied, all of them undoubtedly operate within the same system, and thus tend to be mutually conditioned, at least in a functional way. In addition, the individual ‘centers’ often create their own hierarchies, which means that a holistically perceived multi-centric system appears as a kind of heterarchy. This is clearly seen in municipal law of modern states; for instance, the judiciary in many European countries forms multiple hierarchies. The administrative courts often have their own supreme tribunal, civil and criminal (or general) courts are headed by a supreme court and all are often balanced by a separate constitutional court. However, polycentrism is not a concept which descriptive usefulness is limited only to the municipal context. On the contrary, it seems convergent with the contemporary pluralistic approach to global law.51 However, it does not equal the fragmentation understood as an extreme autonomization of particular legal orders. The difference between polycentrism and fragmentation or global legal pluralism is that in the end of the day, the narrative of polycentrism upholds the systemic nature of international law and, in a broader perspective, of the whole of global law. ‘Polycentric’ may be thus interpreted to mean a certain degree of diversity or competition, however only within the context of basic epistemic unity of the normative order. From the Kelsenian perspective, polycentrism without normative unity would amount to political or even power pluralism – a notion barely specific or relevant to legal science. The concept of polycentrism may adequately serve to describe the complex normative sphere of global legal system in the Kelsenian interpretation. The polycentric system indicates, that apart of including the basic norm within it and the foundational order emanating directly from it, that is either the universal international law, or – according to some other accounts – its reinterpretation as an international constitutional law, there is room for numerous other partial legal orders. They are either states (municipal orders) delegated directly by international law, as well as other orders of different degree of centralization, located in different ‘spaces’ (or on different ‘levels’) of the system. In general, these local orders may be in fact more centralized (at least in one of the possible dimensions of centralization discussed above) than the universal order

See in general e. g. Marek Zirk-Sadowski / Marcin Golecki / Bartosz Wojciechowski (eds.), Multicentrism as an Emerging Paradigm in Legal Theory, 2009. 51 See Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, in: Reflections on Global Law, eds. Shavana Musa / Eefje de Volder, 2013, 45–67. 50

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of international law itself, constituting substantially dense local ‘pockets’ of norms (including institutions and procedures) within the larger system. For instance, the legal regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be considered as an example of such a denser, more centralized statically and dynamically sub-order within the global legal system. At the same time, these local legal orders may generate further partial orders, delegated either by one order alone or jointly, in cooperation with other orders (e. g. states) – for instance when they are founded on the basis of a multilateral treaty. Such a polycentric structure with multiple delegations can hardly constitute a simple hierarchy. However, this configuration does not deny in any way the Grundnorm that ensures the unity of the whole system. All the legal orders within the system’s structure are conjugated within one chain of validity (even though it may have several branches). The nature of this link is at least by formal delegation, which ultimately allows for tracing the normativity of the whole and its parts back to the one basic norm. Hierarchy, heterarchy or panarchy?

It has been repeatedly suggested above, that in the case of the structure of international law or even more so the overall global law, the term ‘hierarchy’ may not be epistemically adequate. Instead of the basic supremacy relation suggested by using the word ‘hierarchy’, the case of international or global law requires more nuanced descriptions of its specific, complex multistage structure. This does not mean however, that hierarchical relation should be rejected altogether; as pointed out above, it is inherent to Merkl’s and Kelsen’s doctrine of Stufenbau. Nonetheless, the hierarchical relation was understood by Merkl in a rather minimalistic and formal way, pertaining to the fundamental subordination of the so-called derivative norms (abgeleitete Normen) to the basic norm (Grundnorm). This refers to the core binary configuration of two kinds of norms: conditional and conditioned (bedingende und bedingte), which is sufficient and defining for any legal order.52 In other words, hierarchy essentially exists only between the basic norm and its immediate derivatives, so to say, ‘first order norms’, but is not essential on the lower levels (does not require further secondary delegations). Adding to this the fact that the basic norm is to be understood as a transcendental assumption of normativity, and is not a positive norm in itself,53 the conclusion may be that a hierarchical nature of a relationship between two positive legal norms is not defining for the concept of a legal order. Delegation of one positive norm by another in any given positive

Adolf Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff, 1923, 210. Merkl however would not agree as his concept of an Ursprungsnorm was a sort of a legal condition and not merely a supposition as is the case of one of the possible Kelsenian interpretations of Grundnorm used here. More on the Kelsen’s account of the Grundnorm in the context of international law see Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law A Kelsenian Perspective, 2011, 241–261. 52 53

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legal system is obviously common, however in extreme cases it remains a possibility, not a necessity. This leads to the conclusion, that contrary to widely held accounts of Kelsenism, hierarchy, especially a multi-level one, is not a determinative characteristic of the structure of a legal order, at least amongst its positive-norm members. As suggested earlier, the structure of the global legal system could also be described in terms of a heterarchy. This term, as used in social sciences, usually refers to such a configuration between individual elements in a system, that does not imply any permanent privilege of one over another. Heterarchies are often characterized by mutual dependencies between individual elements, position and role of which may vary depending on the current needs of the system, making the whole configuration necessarily dynamic. The notion has been used to describe either circular or networked systems, where each element disposes numerous connections (relations) with many other elements at the same time.54 Although heterarchy may often be perceived as an antithesis of hierarchy, in essence the relationship between the two terms is dialectical and both types of systems can co-exist. It is sometimes even implied that heterarchy is a broader category.55 This amounts to the perception of heterarchy as a possible relationship between numerous, equivalent hierarchies. In the context of the above analysis of the structure of the global legal system, it can be concluded that the system of normative dependencies, especially the plurality of delegations between numerous partial orders within the global law system, may be seen as exhibiting such heterarchic features. This includes also the possibility of existence of local normative hierarchies within the overall structure of the global law, for instance among norms within particular partial legal orders such as municipal law. This model, however, may still be interpreted as insufficiently considering the role and place of the fundamental body of general international law or its part interpreted as the global dimension of this law. What I am referring to is the primary legal order of the global legal system, the one that is directly delegated by the Grundnorm. Alternatively, it can be perceived as a network of universal norms of global relevance that affects it at every point of its normative structure or – to put it in other words – ‘encases’ the entire pluralistic architecture consisting of the numerous partial orders. For the purposes of adequate description of this Kelsenian reconstruction, it is worth considering yet another concept of a ‘panarchy’.56 The term consists of the Greek words pan- (‘παν’ – all, everything) and -archy (from ‘ἀρχή’ – government, power) and can be interpreted as

See Satoshi Miura, Heterarchy. Social Sciences, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica. com/topic/heterarchy, Accessed July 27, 2018. 55 Carole L. Crumley, Heterarchy. in: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, https://www. encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/heterarchy, Accessed April 27, 2018. 56 See Lance H. Gunderson / Crawford S. Holling (eds.), Panarchy Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems, 2002, 5. 54

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the universal system of governance, encompassing the totality of its entities.57 In the present context, panarchy would therefore refer to the meaning and the role played by the abovementioned global or universal element of international law. It can therefore be used to describe the system as consisting of the universal, perhaps constitutional, ‘superstructure’ and the heterarchy of numerous partial legal orders delegated by it. In other terms, it can refer to a network or a normative environment in which the heterarchic configuration of state and other legal orders, including the non-state regimes is embedded. Conclusion

Kelsen’s universal theory of legal order as well as his and Merkl’s remarkable Stufenbaulehre pave the way for a meaningful conceptualization of a global legal system, even as it stands today – in constant flux, polycentric, multilevel and predominantly non-territorial. Kelsen remains to be one of the very few legal scholars who developed foundations for a legal theory of international law of such complexity and extent.58 This sets the pure theory of law to be one of the few distinctively legal approaches that can be put up by legal scholarship against the advancing global governance or systems theory methodologies, which are drawing on non-legal (non-normative) rationalities. It is imperative therefore, that neo-Kelsenian project of global law is further explored and developed as one of legal science’s possible responses. On the one hand, as it has been shown, application of Kelsenism for the analysis of the structure of global legal system by no means can be dismissed as out of date. On the other hand, it is also not a sinister hegemonial project pursuing a world state tyranny. Kelsenian account of global law is epistemic, not political in its nature. Its application shows that it is the explanatory and normative power of an adequate legal theory what is essential in addressing the transformative challenges of international law. Tomasz Widłak

University of Gdańsk, ul. Jana Bażyńskiego 6, 80-309 Gdańsk, Poland, [email protected]

The word is sometimes also related to the Greek mythological god Pan, symbolizing the universal laws; see James P. Sewell / Mark B. Salter, Panarchy and Other Norms for Global Governance: Boutros-Ghali, Rosenau, and Beyond, Global Governance 1 (1995), 373–382. 58 Cf. Similar observations by L. Murphy, Law Beyond the State: Some Philosophical Questions, European Journal of International Law 28 (2017), 203–232. 57

Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of the Hierarchy of Norms beyond National Law ANNE KÜHLER

Abstract: The idea of a hierarchy of norms, an important element of Hans Kelsen’s Pure

Theory of Law, faces massive criticism in legal doctrine and theory when it comes to law beyond the state. In current European constitutionalism it is criticized on empirical, normative and epistemic grounds. The article analyses and discusses this critique. The central argument defended in this article is that this criticism is too comprehensive because there is a way to understand the idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law in a productive manner. The proposed understanding of this idea depends on adopting an internal point of view. It departs from Kelsen’s theoretical framework but maintains that two invaluable insights of Kelsen are of particular interest in this debate: the epistemological value of the hierarchy of norms beyond national law and the political character of the question. Keywords: hierarchy of norms, legal monism, international law, law of the European Un-

ion, European constitutionalism, constitutional pluralism Schlagworte: Normenhierarchie, rechtlicher Monismus, Völkerrecht, Recht der Europäis-

chen Union, europäischer Konstitutionalismus, Verfassungspluralismus

I.

Introduction

In this article, I want to explore the current critique of the idea of the hierarchy of norms beyond national law. This idea remains the unresolved subject of vital disputes in controversies about the legal framework of Europe. Whereas the hierarchy of norms (with the Constitution as the supreme law) is widely acknowledged in the constitutional tradition of many democratic states and seen by many as essentially linked to modern constitutionalism, it faces massive criticism in legal doctrine and legal theory when it comes to law beyond the state. In current European legal theory, it is criticized

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on empirical, normative and epistemic grounds. I will examine this criticism in the context of constitutional pluralism. The central argument defended in this article is that this criticism encompasses too much because there is a way to understand the idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law in a constructive manner, using its potential in times when international law and EU law are often under attack in the national arena. The proposed understanding of this idea depends on adopting an internal point of view. It departs from the theoretical framework of the Pure Theory of Law but maintains that two of Hans Kelsen’s invaluable insights are of particular interest for explaining the importance of the hierarchy of norms beyond national law: the epistemological value of this idea and the political character of the question. It should be stressed, however, that this article is not about applying Kelsen’s concept of the hierarchy of norms to the complex relationships between the different legal orders in Europe. Moreover, it contains some preliminary thoughts about the usefulness of an idea that was central to Kelsen’s thinking. Although Kelsen contributed considerably to its proliferation, the idea has spread independently of other aspects of his work in international legal discourse. I will first try to sketch some core aspects of Kelsen’s view on the idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law in order to illustrate how this idea has emancipated itself from Kelsen’s theoretical background (II). I will then argue that it constitutes a normative concept of constitutional democracy (III.), assess the current critique of this idea in the context of European constitutionalism (IV.), and draw a conclusion (V.). II.

A few remarks on Kelsen’s view on the hierarchy of norms and on the emancipation of this idea in international legal doctrine

The idea of the hierarchy of norms is an important element of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law.1 Kelsen relied on the theory of the “Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung” developed by Adolf Julius Merkl,2 and incorporated it into the Pure Theory of Law.3 The idea of legal Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 1923, XV; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 62–89, 129; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 228–282. 2 Adolf Merkl, Das Recht im Lichte seiner Anwendung, in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, ed. Hans R. Klecatsky / Rene Marcic / Herbert Schambeck, 1969, 1167–1201; Adolf Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz, in: Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Dorothea Mayer-Maly / Herbert Schambeck / Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann, 1993, 227–252; Adolf Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft, 1923, 211 et seq; Adolf Merkl, Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaus, in: Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre, Festschrift Hans Kelsen, ed. Alfred Verdross, 1931, 252–294. 3 Kelsen adopted Merkl’s theory to his Pure Theory of Law under the title “Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung” in the first (1934) and second (1960) edition of “Reine Rechtslehre”, and under the title “the hierarchy of the norms” in “General Theory of Law and State” (1945). See also Kelsen, Hauptprobleme (footnote 1), XV. Kelsen addressed the hierarchy of norms between state law and international law already in Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, 1920, 111 et seq. 1

Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of the Hierarchy of Norms beyond National Law

hierarchies is old and can be traced back to natural law traditions, serving as a means to legitimise and to structure the law.4 But Kelsen connects the hierarchy of norms with his theory of law as a dynamic system of norms in order to deliver a justification for his positivist theory of law. The hierarchy of the norms is established by the specific relations between the norms in a legal system (“hierarchy of conditions”): The higher norm determines the conditions of validity of the lower norm. A valid norm has the capacity to grant the power to create and validate lower norms. Each legal norm derives its validity from a higher norm. This chain of validity can be traced to the Grundnorm or basic norm which is not a norm of positive law but rather a hypothesis of juridical thinking. The function of the hierarchy of norms is to establish the identity and the formal unity of law created by the basic norm. Hence, the law is a hierarchical system regulating its own creation. Kelsen argues on this basis that law is a system that is autonomous from other normative systems such as morality: law is a self-contained order and morality must play no part in identifying the law.5 Kelsen applies the hierarchy of norms to his theory of international law, advocating for a monistic reading of international law. The main elements of legal monism according to Kelsen include the following: National and international law form a single legal order (system of norms) because they receive their validity from the same source.6 For Kelsen, such a unitary system of international and national law is “only” an epistemological postulate. However, it is a logical necessity because it is impossible to conceive of simultaneously valid norms belonging to different systems.7 Kelsen considers it equally possible that the relationship between national and international law could be conceived on the basis of the primacy of national law rather than of international Werner Krawietz, Reinheit der Rechtslehre als Ideologie?, in: Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, ed. Werner Krawietz / Ernst Topitsch / Peter Koller, Rechtstheorie (Beiheft 4) 1982, 409; Horst Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 1986, 130; Robert Walter, Der Aufbau der Rechtsordnung, 1964; Theo Öhlinger, Der Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung, 1975, 9. 5 Juan Antonio García Amado, Grundnorm und Gewohnheitsrecht bei Kelsen, in: Hans Kelsen: Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20 Jahrhunderts, ed. Stanley Paulson / Michael Stolleis, 2005, 96; Peter Koller, Zur Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaus, in: Hans Kelsen: Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20 Jahrhunderts, ed. Stanley Paulson / Michael Stolleis, 2005, 106 et seq. 6 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 134 et seq.; Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 333 et seq. See on Kelsen’s theory of international law Jörg Kammerhofer, Hans Kelsen in Today’s International Legal Scholarship, in: International Legal Posivitism in a Post-Modern World, ed. Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont, 2014, 81–113; Jörg Kammerhofer, Hans Kelsen’s Place in International Legal Theory, in: Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, ed. Alexander Orakhelashvili, 2011, 143–167; Joseph Gabriel Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, British Yearbook of International Law, 17 (1936), 74. 7 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 134–135; Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 329. See Paul Gragl, Legal Monism Law, Philosophy and Politics, 2018; Christoph Kletzer, The Normative Jinx, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 37 (2017), 98–813; Jörg Kammerhofer, Kelsen – Which Kelsen? A Reapplication of the Pure Theory to International Law, Leiden Journal of International Law, 22 (2009), 225–249; Alexander Somek, Monism: A Tale of the Undead, in: Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek, 2012, 372; Alexander Somek, Kelsen Lives, The European Journal of International Law, 18 (2007), 409–451; Alfred Rub, Hans Kelsens Völkerrechtslehre Versuch einer Würdigung, 1995. 4

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law. The choice between these alternatives is to be made on political rather than legal grounds.8 Whereas for Kelsen, there is a choice between the primacy of international law and the primacy of national law, it was his student Alfred Verdross who developed the understanding of legal monism that national and international law form one single legal order, in which international law “wenigstens in seiner obersten Spitze” (at least on top) is superior to the national legal orders.9 However, in current legal doctrine and practice, legal monism has emancipated itself from this theoretical background. For a scholar mainly educated in Switzerland, this is no surprise, since “moderate monism”, which is still seen as the dominant theory of the relationship between national and international law in Switzerland, does not tackle questions about the basic norm. In fact, the “theory” that is nowadays labelled as legal monism seems to be a “reduced” theory consisting mainly of two elements: international and national law form a single unitary legal order (no act of transformation into domestic law is required) and the relation between national and international law is hierarchical (primacy of international law v. domestic law in cases of conflicts as a principle with exceptions).10 Even though legal monism and the idea of a hierarchical relationship between different normative orders are often ascribed to Kelsen in current constitutional and international legal discourse, these concepts appear to be detached from Kelsen’s theoretical framework in current legal doctrine and practice. Legal monism, as it is applied in case law and described in the textbooks, has evolved to take the status of a somewhat “practical theory” or a theory sui generis and the idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law is discussed and applied mostly without reference to legal positivism (or natural law theories following Verdross) – it stands on its own and is occasionally seen as a useful doctrinal tool even by scholars who disagree with Merkl or Kelsen.11 The idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law is therefore strongly associated with the work of Hans Kelsen, but it is important to highlight the independent status of this idea in current international legal discourse.12

Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1945, 373; Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (footnote 3), 111. 9 Alfred Verdross, Völkerrecht und staatliches Recht, in: Die völkerrechtswidrige Kriegshandlung und der Strafanspruch der Staaten, 1920; Alfred Verdross, Grundlagen und Grundlegungen des Völkerrechts, Niemeyers Zeitschrift für internationales Recht, XXIX (1921), 65; Alfred Verdross, Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes auf Grundlage der Völkerrechtsverfassung, 1923, VI. See also Robert Walter, Die Rechtslehren von Kelsen und Verdross unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Völkerrechts, in: Hans Kelsen und das Völkerrecht Ergebnisse eines internationalen Symposiums in Wien (1 –2 April 2004), ed. Robert Walter / Clemens Jabloner / Klaus Zeleny, 2004, 37–49. 10 Walter Kälin / Astrid Epiney / Martina Caroni / Jörg Künzli, Völkerrecht, 2016, 110; Anne Peters, Völkerrecht, 2016, 196–197; Knut Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 2018, 47; Daniel Thürer, Verfassungsrecht und Völkerrecht, in: Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, ed. Daniel Thürer / Jean-François Aubert / Jörg Paul Müller, 2001, 186 et seq. 11 See Gragl (footnote 7), 78 with further references. 12 Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, The American Journal of International Law, 100 (2006), 291–323. 8

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III.

Legal hierarchy as a normative concept of constitutional democracy

The idea of a hierarchy of norms plays a role in international legal discourse, but much more so on the domestic level. In the constitutional tradition of many democratic states, the hierarchy of norms (with the Constitution as supreme law) is widely acknowledged and seen by many as essentially linked to modern constitutionalism.13 It constitutes a normative concept of constitutional democracy operating as “a check on the hubris of unbound liberty, both the collective and the individual”.14 It ensures that the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing fundamental values trump other values and norms.15 Within the constitutional state, the hierarchy of norms is an instrument for limiting state power.16 It binds all state powers to the Constitution. This manifests the outright political function of the hierarchy of norms. Several arguments are put forth to highlight the value of this idea. The following six arguments feature prominently: (1) The hierarchy of norms enables a structuring of the legal system that aligns the lower ranked law with the higher ranked law.17 This increases the transparency and rationality of legal argumentation. (2) A second argument in favour of a hierarchy of norms can be deduced from Kelsen’s formal account with a view to the assumption that a normative system should not make contradictory requirements: the formal ranking of criteria of validity will prevent such conflicts or solve them if they arise. From a practical point of view, the ranking allows to establish a rule for conflict resolution (“lex superior derogat legi inferiori”), which provides legal certainty in an increasingly complex legal system and facilitates conflict resolution.18 (3) Third, it is argued that the hierarchy of norms promotes the effectiveness of the higher norms. Due to the aforementioned structuring, the hierarchy of norms raises the significance of the higher ranked law and facilitates its implementation, thereby allowing for its greater effectiveness.19 (4) A fourth argument in favour of the hierarchy of norms is its guiding and legitimizing function because the principles of the higher level serve as a guidance and legitimation for the lower ranked law.20 (5) The hierarchy of norms also establishes a validity relationship between norms and enables to determine the possibilities of creating valid new law (according to the Constitution). It facilitates Joseph H. H. Weiler, Prologue: global and pluralist constitutionalism – some doubts, in: The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, ed. Gráinne de Búrca / Joseph H. H. Weiler, 2012, 16–18; Dieter Grimm, Types of Constitutions, in: The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld / András Sajó, 2012, 103; Jutta Limbach, Vorrang der Verfassung oder Souveränität des Parlaments?, 2001, 9, 13–17. 14 Weiler (footnote 13), 17. 15 Ibid. 16 Anne Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas, 2001, 61. 17 Merkl, Prolegomena (footnote 2), 252 et seq. 18 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 84 et seq. 19 Peters (footnote 16), 60–61. 20 Ibid; Anne Peters, Rechtsordnungen und Konstitutionalisierung: Zur Neubestimmung der Verhältnisse, Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 2010 (65), 46. 13

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the traceability of valid law to a common source. (6) Last but not least, considering its already mentioned political character, the hierarchy of norms with the Constitution as the ultimate source is an idea which fits well into a political philosophy of constitutionalism.21 The aforementioned six arguments for a hierarchy of norms are appealing, not least from the standpoint of legal practice. However, it is important to take into account that their success does not depend on formal considerations alone, but also on the normative (substantive, material) content of the point of reference at the top of the hierarchy. The idea of a hierarchy of norms is not an end in itself, it is only of conditional and instrumental value because it is dependent on the value of the highest norm(s). Therefore, to argue for a hierarchy of norms does not mean that evaluating different interests, principles and perspectives is unnecessary. The hierarchy requires deliberate structuring, aligned with a normative basis. We need a reason for ranking specific norms higher than others. The reason is that we consider the higher norms especially important and fundamental. In this sense, the idea of a hierarchy of norms is a means to an end, namely to foster constitutional values. IV.

Criticism of the concept of a hierarchy of norms in the context of European constitutionalism

1.

The pluralist turn in European constitutionalism

Before discussing current arguments against the hierarchy of norms in the context of European constitutionalism, it seems appropriate to characterize the pluralist turn in European constitutionalism. The diverse legal orders (national, supra-, trans- and international) in Europe have evolved to form a more and more complex system. However, the relationships between them are far from clear. Hierarchy could be seen as a key concept in order to structure these relationships, for instance, like in the monistic tradition.22 But in the European context, the monistic approach in international and supranational law has come under pressure. Instead, the legal architecture in Europe is currently often described in terms of constitutionalism and pluralism.23 The prevalent, though not uncontested, view in current theory and practice of the European legal Matthias Mahlmann, Normative Universalism and Constitutional Pluralism, in: New Developments in Constitutional Law Essays in Honour of András Sajó, ed. Iulia Motoc / Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque / Krzystof Wojtyczek, 2018, 281–282. 22 See the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL (1964) ECR 585. 23 Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now, European Law Journal (1995), 259; Ingolf Pernice, Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht, in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrertagung, 60 (2001), 153; Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, The Modern Law Review, 65 (2002), 317; Klemen Jaklic, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU, 2014, 30. For a critical account, see 21

Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of the Hierarchy of Norms beyond National Law

arena today is that there are multiple and overlapping coexisting legal orders such as the laws of the States, the law of the European Union, the law of the United Nations and the law of the Council of Europe. These different legal orders each make their own constitutional claims.24 The current situation is described as pluralist because the relations between those legal orders are said not to be hierarchical, but heterarchical. From the point of view of the Member States of the European Union for example, it seems appropriate to recognize that the “legal orders of Member States are not hierarchically integrated into the European legal orders”,25 because national courts on occasion resist such a subordination. A famous early example was the Maastricht decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 1993, in which the Court held that “the Federal Constitutional Court will examine whether legal acts of the European institutions and organs are within or exceed the sovereign powers transferred to them.”26 As is well known, the resistance of national courts to a complete subordination of national laws to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the law of the European Union did not remain undetected by legal theory. The (alleged) absence and denial of hierarchies in the European constitutional practice have been crucial for the development of constitutional pluralism. It was MacCormick who famously argued in his contribution to the European Law Journal in 1995 after the Maastricht decision that “(t)he most appropriate analysis of the relations of legal systems is pluralistic rather than monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical. The legal system of Member States and their common legal system of EC law are distinct, but interacting systems of law, and hierarchical relationships of validity within criteria of validity proper to distinct systems do not add up to any sort of all-purpose superiority of one system over another.”27 So, MacCormick challenged the then conventional wisdom that Community law was supposed to have absolute supremacy over the Member States’ legal orders. Whereas the idea of constitutional pluralism has developed, spread and diversified,28 evolving into a new and very influential scholarship, almost all its protagonists agree on one point: they criticise the idea of legal hierarchies beyond national law. I will now take a closer look at this criticism in the context of European constitutionalism. Three current forms of criticism shall be briefly examined: an empirical

Matthias Jestaedt, Der Europäische Verfassungsverbund, in: Verfassungswandel im europäischen Staaten- und Verfassungsverbund, ed. Christian Calliess, 2006, 111 et seq. 24 Weiler (footnote 13), 14. 25 Matthias Mahlmann, Conditioned Hierarchies of Law in Europe. Content, legitimacy and default lines, in: Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2012/2013, ed. Astrid Epiney / Stefan Diezig, 2013, 395; Mattias Kumm, Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and Limits of Constitutional Pluralism, in: Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek, 2012, 39. 26 BVerfGE 89 (1993), 155, 188. 27 MacCormick (footnote 23), 259. 28 See Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek, Introduction, in: Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek, 2012, 4.

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account (with a view to the practice of courts), a normative account and an epistemological account. I will discuss these arguments and first ask whether it is true that there is no hierarchy of norms in the world of European public law and how we can sensibly frame this empirical question. 2.

Empirical account

Constitutional pluralists argue that the idea of a hierarchy does not adequately describe the reality of European public law.29 The courts in Europe construe a pluralist structure of the European legal order, holding that the legal orders of the Member States are not hierarchically integrated into the European legal order (or, indeed, into the international legal order).30 In particular, it is argued that conflicts between competing legal orders are not hierarchically regulated.31 A famous case in point in this respect is the aforementioned Maastricht decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which seems to confirm the empirical claim with regard to the relationship between national law and the law of the European Union. A similar argument is possible from the point of view of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the relationship between EU law and international law. The position taken in Kadi I (2008) can be called “robustly pluralist” because it emphasizes the separateness, autonomy and constitutional priority of the EU legal order over international law.32 Also, the famous Lisbon decision of the German Constitutional Court (2009)33 and the Bosphorus decision of the European Court of Human Rights (2005) can be appropriately interpreted in the light of constitutional pluralism.34 Indeed, the idea of constitutional pluralism proved to be very influential not only for legal theory, but also for judicial practice. But the first point of criticism is perplexWalker (footnote 23), 337; Miguel Poiares Maduro, Contrapunctual law: Europe’s constitutional pluralism in action, in: Sovereignty in Transition, ed. Neil Walker, 2003, 501; Jean L. Cohen, Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A Constitutional Pluralist Perspective, in: The Philosophy of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson / John Tasioulas, 2010, 274–275. See also the critique of Gunther Teubner with respect to law in general: Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many Bodies. The Self-Deconstruction of the Law’s Hierarchy, Law and Society Review 31 (1997), 763; Gunther Teubner, “And God Laughed …”: Indeterminacy, Self-Reference and Paradox in Law, in: Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate, ed. Christian Joerges / David M. Trubek, 1989, 399–434. 30 Kumm (footnote 25), 39; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 2012, 50. 31 Poiares Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism, in: Constitutional Pluralism in Europe and Beyond, ed. Matej Avbelj / Jan Komárek, 2012, 69. 32 ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, ECR I-6351. 33 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 und 2 BvR 182/09, Judgment of 30 June 2009. 34 ECtHR, Case 45036/98, Judgment of 30 June 2005, Bosphorus v Ireland. 29

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ing because this “empirical” claim is at the same time easy and difficult to understand. It is easy to understand with respect to the notion of a hierarchy of regimes based, for instance, on a common Grundnorm, because there are good reasons to accept, from an empirical standpoint, that there is no such hierarchy between the different legal orders in Europe, i. e. the laws of the States, the law of the European Union and the law of the Council of Europe.35 It is also evident that there is no single European legislator and no central supreme court of Europe establishing a hierarchy of norms that would be analogous to the situation within a federal state. There is no formal “Constitution” of Europe that would substitute the national Constitutions and allow for a constitutional hierarchy in analogy to the law of constitutional states. And national courts do sometimes claim the supremacy of “their” law, thus rejecting the superiority of EU law or international law. Therefore, as a description of European legal orders from an “external point” of view36 the idea of a hierarchy admittedly does not adequately describe the reality of European public law. But there is more to it than that. The hierarchy of norms is dependent on the way we think about law and on our interpretation of the law. When we take into account the insider’s perspective,37 focussing on the persons who participate in the practice of the courts in Europe, there are good reasons to assume that the idea of a hierarchy of norms is alive because it is part of their understanding of the relationships between legal orders and of their legal repertoire for solving conflicts between norms. The empirical claim therefore loses much of its force when we take into account the internal point of view. From this perspective, the hierarchy of norms constitutes a methodological concept, a hermeneutic tool or a regulative idea of legal natives that guides the interpretation and serves for conflict resolution. But how can the existence of a methodological idea or a hermeneutic tool be “empirically proved”? One suggestion is to look at the decisions of courts. The idea of the hierarchy of norms is alive because courts in Europe apply it in cases when they have to decide in conflicts between norms of different legal orders. As was shown, it is true that in some instances, courts do not accept the unconditional supremacy of international or European Union law. But the hierarchy of norms is nevertheless an idea that guides and constrains considerations concerning the relations between normative orders. It is present in disputes about the relationship between different legal orders, even when courts do not accept the primacy of internaWerner Schroeder, Das Gemeinschafsrechtssystem, 2002, 203, 251; Dana Burchardt, Die Rangfrage im europäischen Normenverbund, 2015, 62; Michael Potacs, Das Verhältnis zwischen der EU und ihren Mitgliedstaaten im Lichte traditioneller Modelle, Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 65 (2010), 117–139. 36 I borrow the distinction between the external and the internal point of view from Klaus Günther, Rechtspluralismus und universaler Code der Legalität: Globalisierung als rechtstheoretisches Problem, in: Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunft der Öffentlichkeit, Festschrift für Jürgen Habermas, ed. Lutz Wingert / Klaus Günther, 2001, 557. 37 On the internal point of view, see Günther (footnote 36). 35

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tional law over other legal orders in Europe in the outcome of a concrete case. The fact that the “deviation” from the hierarchy of norms has been intensely discussed and justified in these cases shows the importance and the influence of the idea. The Kadi I decision serves as an example because it maintains the principle that international law enjoys supremacy over the European Union legal order, but holds that the relevant instruments of international law must satisfy certain requirements such as the protection of fundamental human rights in order to be granted supremacy. Therefore, the hierarchy of norms as a tool used in juridical practice (conflict rule or regulative idea) has to be distinguished from a formal hierarchy of regimes or of legal orders beyond the States.38 There is no such hierarchy of regimes; nevertheless, the idea of the hierarchy of norms is a guiding principle of adjudication, an intentional process of structuring the law and connecting legal norms and systems.39 Furthermore, and as a second important caveat of the empirical criticism of the hierarchy of norms, even if we did not accept a formal (internal) hierarchical principle to structure the relations between the different normative orders of states, the European Union, the UN, and the ECHR, there is at least a formal (source-based) hierarchy of norms as a rule for the regulation of conflicts within the regime of the UN, as manifested in Article 103 of the UN Charter. Article 103 determines that in the case of a conflict between obligations under the UN Charter and obligations for Member States under any other international agreement, their Charter obligations shall prevail. The rationale for this hierarchy is the importance of the United Nations, especially for the maintenance of international peace and security. Additionally, there are often implicit, but widely accepted material hierarchies guiding the relations between normative orders in the world of European (and international) public law. This can be seen in the case of the priority of jus cogens norms over other international norms as concretized in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Jus cogens norms represent fundamental values of the international community.40 Such “material hierarchies” represent a further important caveat of the empirical claim. Therefore, it seems at least plausible to argue that the empirical claim has important caveats. I would like to counter the empirical claim by saying that there is an influential idea called “the hierarchy of norms” in the world of European public law. This idea does influence our thinking about the relations between national, supranational and international law. But it does not apply unconditionally and is contested in many instances. Whether this is desirable or not is the next question. Mahlmann (footnote 25), 395; Samantha Besson, Theorizing the Sources of International Law, in: The Philosophy of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson / John Tasioulas, 2010, 183. 39 See Burchardt (footnote 35), 62. 40 Besson (footnote 38), 183; Erika de Wet, Sources and the Hierarchy of International Law, in: The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson / Jean d’Aspremont, 2017, 632. Such hierarchies of international legal norms are not to be equated with the existence of a hierarchy of sources of international law. The sources of international law, as they are listed in Article 38 ICJ Statute, are not ranked. 38

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3.

Normative account

A second strand of criticism holds that the diverse legal orders in Europe should not be hierarchically structured.41 They should be accepted as autonomous systems with equally legitimate claims to authority. As the former Advocate General at the European Court of Justice Poiares Maduro incisively puts it: “Heterarchy is superior to hierarchy as a normative ideal in circumstances of competing constitutional claims of final authority”.42 The normative criticism of the idea of a hierarchy of legal orders lies at the core of the pluralist vision of the “new world order”. It departs from the state-centred picture of constitutionalism, acknowledging the constitutional claims of a plurality of legal orders, while maintaining that none can assert supremacy over another.43 In the context of constitutional pluralism, it entails institutional conceptions concerning the European Union in its relationship with the Member States such as the thesis of divided sovereignty. I understand the “classic constitutional pluralist” claim as a plaidoyer for admitting that national state law or national constitutionalism are not the only legitimate constitutional sites. The normative claim is often put forth in the context of questions regarding the legitimacy and perhaps autonomy of European Union law. What is at stake then, is the possibility for national courts, in certain constellations, to claim the supremacy and legitimacy of “their” law and not to accept the primacy of European or international law. But just as with regard to the empirical account of criticism, here again, the normative claim perplexes. After all, it does not exclude the possibility that, for instance in legal practice, there is value in a hierarchy of norms beyond national law as an idea, a methodological tool, a presumption, a conflict rule, a structuring principle, or a regulative ideal. What is the value of the hierarchy of norms beyond national law? Some arguments in favour of this idea have been mentioned in the context of constitutional democracy: its function in structuring the law, facilitation of conflict resolution and legal certainty, ensuring greater effectiveness, guidance and legitimation of the higher ranked law. These arguments apply equally to the law beyond the state.44 But in the international context, the aspect of political philosophy needs to be highlighted. The hierarchy of norms with international law on top is an idea that fits the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism because it emphasises the importance of the global community. Therefore, the political character of the idea of a hierarchy of norms obviously does not only come to bear within the paradigm of the nation state. Kelsen highlighted the political character of this idea also for law beyond the state. To him, the question of 41 42 43 44

Walker (footnote 23), 337; Poiares Maduro (footnote 31), 75; Cohen (footnote 29), 274–275. Poiares Maduro (footnote 31), 75. Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, 1999, 104. Weiler (footnote 13), 17.

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whether international law or national law should be ranked higher in the hierarchy, is an entirely political decision.45 This part of Kelsen’s theory of international law highlights one of his motives for establishing a Pure Theory of Law: to postulate purity in legal sciences in order to protect the legal sciences from political influence and from instrumentalization by ideologies.46 If the Pure Theory of Law is the foundation of Kelsen’s theory of international law and the latter an application of the former, his theory of international law plays a part in this critical intention of demasking political ideologies like imperialism or pacifism.47 The Pure Theory of Law reduces these ideological influences to political arguments. The clarity with which Kelsen identified the political nature of the decision concerning the hierarchy of norms beyond national law is remarkable and still topical – but it must be acknowledged that he conceived of the term “political” mainly in a pejorative sense48 and that he declared the question to be political without explicitly taking sides in the controversy.49 Be that as it may, it is one of the invaluable insights in this debate that arguing for or against the superiority of international law has significant political implications.50 But this insight should be turned into a constructive argument. Contrary to Kelsen, I do not think that the legal sciences could be entirely separated from political philosophy or be indifferent to it. When applied to the interpretation of international law, the commitment to a – possibly conditional, leniently applied – priority of international law is of utmost political importance given the collective action and coordination problems that the world faces. It also touches upon the commitment to multilateralism. In comparison, heterarchy appears to be an instrument for weakening a precious achievement that should not be weakened, namely the achievement of a body of international law that applies equally to all and that entails individual rights also applying equally to all.

Kelsen held: “Die Entscheidung … liegt ausserhalb der Rechtswissenschaft. Sie kann nur durch andere als wissenschaftliche, sie kann durch politische Erwägung bestimmt werden.”, see Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 345. 46 Ernst Topitsch, Einleitung, in: Hans Kelsen, Aufsätze zur Ideologiekritik, ed. Ernst Topitsch, 1964, 11–27; Ernst Topitsch, Hans Kelsen – Demokrat und Philosoph, in: Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, ed. Werner Krawietz / Ernst Topitsch / Peter Koller, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 4, 1982. 47 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 345; see also Rub (footnote 7), 130. 48 For a critical account see Lando Kirchmair, Die Theorie des Rechtserzeugerkreises, 2013, 180. 49 On this question, see Gragl (footnote 7), 110 with further references. 50 A Swiss example of the political implications of the idea of the hierarchy of norms is the Self-determination Initiative (“Swiss law, not foreign judges”, “Selbstbestimmungsinitiative”) of the Swiss People’s Party. This popular initiative sought to alter the way in which Switzerland treats international agreements in case of a ‘conflict’ between those agreements and Swiss constitutional law. It aimed to lay down in the Constitution what should happen when a popular initiative is incompatible with an international agreement in certain areas. In such a situation, Switzerland should consistently seek to ensure that the Constitution takes precedence: it should not be able to apply the agreement unless it is approved by referendum. It should also have to amend the agreement by renegotiating it with the relevant countries. If that was impossible, it should withdraw from the agreement. The Swiss electorate voted on the popular initiative on 25 November 2018 and rejected it. 45

Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of the Hierarchy of Norms beyond National Law

That is why the notion of “conditioned hierarchies” that embraces formal and material aspects offers a promising approach to the question of the hierarchy of norms beyond national law.51 Conditioned hierarchies of norms carve out a space for constitutional principles from a strict understanding of hierarchy. Such principles include the protection of human rights, democratic legitimacy, the rule of law or judicial review. In the context of the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism, a convincing argument is made for the general presumption “in favour of applying the law of the more extensive legal order over the law of the more parochial one, unless there are countervailing concerns of sufficient weight that suggest otherwise”.52 In this spirit, Kumm contends that “the refusal of a legal order to recognize itself as hierarchically integrated into a more comprehensive legal order is justified, if that more comprehensive order suffers from structural legitimacy deficits – relating to human rights protection of democratic legitimacy – that the less comprehensive legal order does not suffer from.”53 Indeed, the concept of conditioned hierarchies proves to be very productive for explaining judicial practice in Europe and when dealing with questions about the relations between different normative orders since it leaves scope for balancing different perspectives.54 4.

Epistemic account

Arguably the strongest attack on the concept of a legal hierarchy beyond national law consists in epistemic claims. The argument is that the different stakeholders, for instance the EU and the Member States, international actors and States, represent distinct sites with incompatible epistemic conditions.55 They have different epistemic starting points and there is no neutral perspective from which their claims can be reconciled. They should therefore be treated as epistemically incommensurable. Because of the incommensurability of their claims, it is not possible to construe a relation in the

Mahlmann (footnote 25), 407; Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Democracy Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement, NYU Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06–40 (2006). 52 Kumm (footnote 25), 65. 53 Ibid. 54 The “conditioned instrumental value” of the hierarchy of norms for the protection of human rights is mirrored in the European human rights case law. Two cases that involved acts of the UN Security Council serve as examples. First, the ECJ’s (already mentioned) Kadi I decision indicates that the blind acceptance of higher ranked norms (e. g. the UN law) does not foster the protection of human rights, when the UN’s institutions have constitutional deficits. Second, the Behrami case of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) demonstrates that adherence to the hierarchy of norms does not per se promote the protection of human rights. In Behrami, the ECtHR took a legal monist position vis-à-vis international law, and decided to defer and therefore to exempt UN Security Council legal acts from fundamental rights review. Thus, the monistic approach was to the detriment of the rights of the individual. 55 Walker (footnote 23), 317; Gunther Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente, 2012, 229. 51

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form of a hierarchy between the different legal orders. It follows from this argument that pluralism is an adequate framework because it denies the existence of an absolute, external point of observation from which to resolve a conflict. This third strand of criticism seems problematic as well. The epistemic account considers the different orders too abstractly as systems or entities that cannot interact, and underestimates the possibility of communication between those legal orders. It thereby disregards the internal point of view of those who actually work at the intersection of the different legal orders and neglects the perspectives of those protagonists. Legal experts, lawyers and judges in all kinds of institutions and organizations apply the law in concrete cases and decide in cases of normative conflict. They all claim to make use of the language of law that is determined by certain factors such as dogmatic requirements, mechanisms and patterns found in precedents, legal sources and traditional conflict rules. Such determining factors must necessarily be acknowledged and followed by the protagonists when referring to law – even when the adequate interpretation of those requirements may be controversial and contested in a concrete case.56 The act of solving legal cases is carried out by persons who share an understanding of certain principles and background assumptions on how to apply the law.57 The assumption of a set of shared legal principles, tools and patterns does not lead to uniform conceptions of a universal legal order but it strongly relativizes the epistemic critique that there is no possibility of a common standpoint. For this reason, the epistemic criticism does not adequately reflect the practice of courts. At the same time, the epistemic critique overestimates the very concept of the hierarchy of norms which takes a methodological stance (in the sense of a “Denkfigur”) especially about solving conflicts of law. A hierarchization of legal norms with regard to the relations of the respective legal orders is a conscious process connecting legal norms and orders, and thereby relativizing the self-referential character of those orders.58 It is therefore the perspective of legal practice that deeply challenges epistemic pluralism. The “different constitutional sites” are not monolithic blocks existing independently in a separate empire apart from human beings. On the contrary, jurists can embrace a theoretical construction that contains a hierarchy of norms and courts in most instances do accept EU law as higher ranked than domestic law. In this context, the epistemological aspect of the hierarchy of norms is another important aspect of Kelsen’s writings. According to Kelsen, accepting a connection between international and national law necessarily presumes them as simultaneously Klaus Günther, Normativer Rechtspluralismus – Eine Kritik, in: Das Recht im Blick der Anderen Zu Ehren von Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, ed. Thorsten Moos / Magnus Schlette / Hans Diefenbacher, 2016, 64–82. 57 Ibid. 58 Werner Krawietz, Die Lehre vom Stufenbau des Rechts, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 5 (1984), 255, 266 et seq.; Krawietz (footnote 4), 408 et seq.; Burchardt (footnote 35), 62; Peter Gailhofer, Rechtspluralismus und Rechtsgeltung, 2015, 256. 56

Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of the Hierarchy of Norms beyond National Law

valid.59 In other words, the perception of two normative orders as simultaneously valid necessitates a connection;60 we must necessarily conceive of them as both being valid and related to each other61 and on a Kelsenian reading, the connection between national and international law is established by the hierarchy of norms.62 Kelsen’s conviction is that we cannot cognize the law if we do not understand it as an interrelated whole.63 In other words, we cannot grasp the law without some notion of unity. But Kelsen emphasized repeatedly that the unity of all law is only an epistemological kind of unity.64 By contrast, dualism (“pluralism”) is an epistemological impossibility to him. Even if Kelsen went very far regarding the “logical necessity” of the alleged unity, it seems plausible that we must assume a relation between norms and orders when applying the law. In light of the current debate about epistemic pluralism, we realize that Kelsen’s theory has much to offer to those who actually work at the intersection of the different legal orders. V.

Conclusion

The current criticism of the concept of hierarchy is comprehensive and entails different notions and distinct contexts of this concept. In order to get a clearer picture, it seems important to distinguish on an analytical level between at least four different notions of legal hierarchies beyond national law: (1) the hierarchy of regimes or of legal orders, (2) the hierarchy of sources of international law as a statement about the rank of legal sources, (3) hierarchy as the basis of a hermeneutic conflict rule (lex superior derogat legi inferiori)65 and (4) the formal or material hierarchy (primacy) of certain legal norms based on their formal source or on their higher (supreme) value. It is possible and appropriate to argue for a hierarchy of norms as a (hermeneutic) conflict rule (3) and as the formal or material priority of certain norms based on their formal source or on their higher value (4) while denying a formal hierarchy of regimes

Kelsen, Problem der Souveränität (footnote 3), 111. Kammerhofer (footnote 7), 233. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 329. Gragl (footnote 7), 129. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 134, following Kantian epistemology (Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft ( Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1781/1787), A 89–90/B 122). See Kammerhofer (footnote 7), 234. 64 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 134; Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1960, 328 et seq.; Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951, 328 f. 65 In German, this dimension is often called “Anwendungsvorrang” as opposed to “Geltungsvorrang”. 59 60 61 62 63

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based, for instance, on a common Grundnorm (1) and a hierarchy of the sources of international law (2). Kelsen did not elaborate on all of these distinctions. But he was right in highlighting the political character of the question and in defending the epistemological value of the idea of a hierarchy of norms beyond national law. To sum up, the current attack on the idea of a hierarchy of norms is too comprehensive. Moreover, the focus on heterarchy obscures some of the true problems of our times. How can we account for the enormous importance of international law given the collective action and coordination problems that the world faces? In light of populist movements, nationalist tendencies and outright attacks on international law in Europe and elsewhere: How can we strengthen a global legal order, multilateralism, law-based relations between States, the international rule of law, and overcome mere power politics? The idea of a hierarchy of norms is of course not the best nor the only tool with which to strengthen international legality and the rule of law, but it is a useful one. That is why in my opinion, we should not underestimate the virtues of this idea. It is not God-given or imposed on us. It should not be unconditioned but must leave room for balancing different perspectives. It requires deliberate structuring, aligned with a normative basis. We need a reason for the higher rank of norms. The reason is that we consider the higher norms especially important and fundamental. A legal hierarchy may help to bind and control power, to enhance legal certainty, the rule of law and human rights, if the reference point at the top of the hierarchy is tied to such principles. This must also apply to the worlds of European constitutionalism. However, such substantive, material and political arguments for the relevance of a hierarchy of norms transcend the framework of Kelsen’s theory. To argue for the relevance of the hierarchy of norms in this way most probably means to argue with Kelsen against Kelsen. Anne Kühler

Senior Researcher and Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Zurich, Treichlerstrasse 10, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland, [email protected]

IV.

Ideengeschichtlicher Kontext / Kelsen in Context

Fuller and Kelsen – Fuller on Kelsen* FREDERICK SCHAUER

Abstract: The relationship between Lon Fuller and Hans Kelsen is complex and impor-

tant, but remains understudied. Fuller, the most prominent American legal philosopher of Kelsen’s time, was not only knowledgeable about Kelsen’s fame and writings, but was also sympathetic to Kelsen’s personal situation. Yet at the same time Fuller used Kelsen as his foil in attacking legal positivism, and appears to play a substantial role in Kelsen’s relative invisibility, even today, in North American legal philosophy. This article seeks to explore and explain the complex relationship between these two important figures. Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Lon Fuller, legal positivism, natural law, Pure Theory of Law,

Harvard Law School Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Lon Fuller, Rechtspositivismus, Naturrecht, Reine Re-

chtslehre, Harvard Law School

I.

It is a commonplace that Hans Kelsen’s work is, in the words of Jeremy Telman, “almost completely unknown in the legal academy and the legal profession in the United States.”1 And by way of providing some evidence for this conclusion, we can observe that Kelsen is mentioned not once in any of the books or articles by Ronald Dworkin, legal positivism’s leading American critic, nor is he mentioned at all in various prominent American works on legal positivism, including, for example, those by Larry Alex-

Thanks to Jeremy Telman and Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac for helpful comments, conversation, and references. See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Introduction: Hans Kelsen for Americans, in: Hans Kelsen in America – Selective Affinities and the Mysteries of Academic Influence, ed. D.A. Jeremy Telman, 2016, 1–16. See also D. A. Jeremy Telman, A Path Not Taken: Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law in the Land of the Legal Realists, in: Hans Kelsen anderswo / Hans Kelsen Abroad, ed. Robert Walter / Clemens Jabloner / Klaus Zeleny, 1994, 353–376. *

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ander and Emily Sherwin,2 Jules Coleman,3 Kenneth Einar Himma,4 Gerald Postema,5 and Anthony Sebok.6 Nor does he appear in a 1973 book designed as the basic text in a course on jurisprudence and the philosophy of law.7 Given Kelsen’s prominence in Europe, in Latin America, and in much of the rest of the academic world, his invisibility in legal philosophy in North America generally, and in the United States in particular, is curious. And it is especially curious now in light of the fact that it was not always so. In the late 1930s Karl Llewellyn engaged, albeit critically, with Kelsen’s work,8 as did Edwin Patterson, even if not quite so critically, in his 1940 textbook on jurisprudence.9 But after the Second World War, Kelsen’s jurisprudential presence in the United States began to suffer a precipitous decline, and this despite the fact that Kelsen taught and wrote in the United States from his 1940 arrival at Harvard until his death thirty-three years later at the University of California.10 Although several scholars have valuably speculated on the causes of the absence of Kelsen’s footprints in post-War American legal theory,11 virtually no attention has been paid to the intellectual connections between Kelsen and Lon Fuller, the latter arguably being the most well-known and influential American legal philosopher in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The aim of this paper is to explore this connection, not so much as to make definitive causal claims about the influence of Fuller on Kelsen’s recession in the American jurisprudential background as to suggest that examining the relationship may tell us something not only about Kelsen, but also about Fuller. II.

Lon Fuller’s relationship with Kelsen personally and with Kelsen’s scholarship is complex. As with many other American intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century (and earlier),12 Fuller was a fluent reader of professional and academic German, Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law, 2001. Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, 2001. Kenneth Einar Himma, The Nature of Law: Philosophical Issues in Conceptual Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, 2011. 5 Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 1986. 6 Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence, 1998. 7 George C. Christie, Jurisprudence: Text and Readings on the Philosophy of Law, 1973. 8 See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules (ed. Frederick Schauer), 2011 (1938–1939), 46, 51. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences – Especially Sociology, Harvard Law Review 62 (1949), 1286–1305, 1290. 9 Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law, 1953 (1940), 259–265. 10 See Nicoletta Ladavac, Philosophy of Law and Theory of Law: The Continuity of Kelsen’s Years in America, in: Telman (Hans Kelsen in America, footnote 1), 229–248. 11 See Brian Bix, Kelsen in the United States: Still Not Understood,” in: Telman (Hans Kelsen in America, footnote 1), 17–30; Telman A Path Not Taken, (footnote 1). 12 Including, most notably, Karl Llewellyn (see footnote 8), who not only was fluent in German, and who not only referred to Kelsen’s writings in his own books and articles, but who also served as a decorated 2 3 4

Fuller and Kelsen – Fuller on Kelsen

and references to untranslated legal and philosophical scholarship written in German appear throughout the Fuller corpus. More particularly, Fuller read and engaged with Kelsen’s work, especially Reine Rechtslehre, long before it had been translated into English.13 And soon after the first English translation into English of that work had been published,14 Fuller made it a required (and not inexpensive) text in his course in Jurisprudence at the Harvard Law School.15 Perhaps more importantly, Fuller and Kelsen had some number of personal connections, most prominently with respect to Kelsen’s desired and eventual emigration to the United States after the rise of Nazism made his remaining in Austria or Germany no longer a professionally fruitful or personally safe option. Although Fuller himself, who had served on the law faculties at the University of Oregon, the University of Illinois, and Duke University, did not have a permanent Harvard Law School appointment until 1940, he had met Kelsen, with an introduction arranged by Harvard’s Roscoe Pound, in Europe in 1938.16 Given this time line, it is likely that Kelsen’s honorary Harvard LL.D. in 1936 was initiated by Pound, and likely as well that Pound, presumably with the support (or at least not the opposition) of Fuller and others, was the motivating force behind the invitation to Kelsen to deliver the prestigious Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at the Harvard Law School in 1941. Although Kelsen spent most of the years from 1940 to 1942 at Harvard as a visiting research fellow, he was not, to his deep disappointment, offered a permanent professorship.17 The reasons for this have been lost to history, although Kelsen’s lack of fluency in English at the time, his inability to teach basic American law courses, and the post-Depression financial issues all appeared to play some role, as did the alleged opposition of senior faculty in international law.18 We do not know where Fuller stood on the issue of a permanent professorship for Kelsen at Harvard, but we do know that he actively sought to find Kelsen a position elsewhere, including at the University of Illinois, Fuller’s own former academic home.19

member of the German army in the First World War. See William Twining, Two Works of Karl Llewellyn, Modern Law Review 30 (1967), 514–530, 514. 13 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechstlehre, 1934. 14 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight, 1967. 15 This is a personal recollection of the author, dating from the Fall semester of 1969 at the Harvard Law School. 16 See Robert S. Summers, Lon L Fuller, 1984, 5–9. 17 See Carlo Nitsch, Holmes Lectures, 1940–1941, in: Hans Kelsen, Diritto e Pace Nelle Relazioni Internationali, 209, v. 18 See Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, Hans Kelsen (1881–1973), Bibliographical Note and Biography, European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), 391–400; Nitsch (footnote 17); Thomas Olechowski, Hans Kelsen, the Second World War and the U. S. Government, in: Telman (Hans Kelsen in America, footnote 1), 101–112. 19 See references in footnote 18, and also Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries, Harvard Law Review, 130 (2017), 2434–2462, 2446–2447 footnote 54.

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Even apart from general biographical and historical interest, the relevance of these personal and intellectual connections between Fuller and Kelsen lies in suggesting that Fuller’s connections with Kelsen, on a personal level, seem likely to have engendered some sympathy, and that Fuller’s German fluency likely made him especially familiar with Kelsen’s writings, reputation, and influence. And it is against this background that we can evaluate, with perhaps unexpected implications, the treatment of Kelsen in Fuller’s own writings. III.

The various reasons for Fuller’s likely sympathy with Kelsen on a personal level make even more surprising the strong and almost-vitriolic tone with which Fuller treated Kelsen as the exemplar and standard-bearer of the version of legal positivism20 that Fuller persistently wished to attack. Although Fuller’s attack on legal positivism is nowadays associated most prominently with Fuller’s side of his famous 1958 debate with H. L. A. Hart,21 and with Fuller’s subsequently published The Morality of Law,22 in fact Fuller’s earliest, strongest, and most extended challenge to what he perceived to be the core commitments of legal positivism are to be found in his 1940 book, The Law in Quest of Itself.23 It is in this book that Fuller first took issue with legal positivism’s insistence on the distinction between the legal is and the legal ought, a distinction, as Fuller well recognized, that was much earlier offered, explicitly and with vehemence, by Jeremy Bentham24 and then by John Austin.25

It is hardly clear that the form of legal positivism that Fuller wished to attack could fairly be attributed to Jeremy Bentham, to John Austin, to Hans Kelsen, or to H. L. A. Hart, but exploring Fuller’s understandings and misunderstandings of legal positivism would take us too far afield. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism Realism, Columbia Law Review, 99 (1999), 1138–1164, 1139; Frederick Schauer, Fuller’s Internal Point of View, Law and Philosophy, 13 (1994), 285–312; Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, Michigan Law Review, 93 (1995), 2054–2132. 21 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, Harvard Law Review, 71 (1958), 630–672, responding to H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Harvard Law Review, 71 (1958), 593–629. 22 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 1969 (rev. ed.). 23 Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, 1940. 24 See Jeremy Bentham, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. Philip Schofield, 2010 (1780– 1782); Postema (footnote 5); Arnon Ben-David, The Distinction Between the Expository and the Censorial Modes in Enquiry in Bentham, Revue d’études Benthamiennes, [online], 9 (2011); Xiaobo Zhai, Bentham’s Exposition of Common Law, Law and Philosophy, 36 (2017), 525–560. 25 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. Wilfrid E. Rumble, 1995 (1832). And see Roscoe E. Hill, Legal Validity and Legal Obligation, Yale Law Journal, 80 (1970), 47–75; D. N. MacCormick, Law, Morality and Positivism, Legal Studies, 1 (1981), 131–145. 20

Fuller and Kelsen – Fuller on Kelsen

Fuller, as is well-known,26 resisted, then and subsequently in all of his later writings, the distinction, at least in law, between the is and the ought – between what the law is and what the law ought to be – and for reasons that foreshadowed Ronald Dworkin’s later position to substantially the same effect.27 But in using Kelsen as a foil for his critique of legal positivism and of positivism’s commitment to the distinction between is and ought, Fuller recognized the role that oughts – norms – played in the Kelsenian scheme. And of course Fuller had no disagreement with Kelsen’s view that the science of law was the science of oughts. But Fuller did object to the distinction between what law is and what law should be, and he did use Kelsen’s dismissive reference to “wish law” (“Wunschrecht”28) as the foil for the argument. Moreover, Fuller took Kelsen’s now well-known ethical non-cognitivism as exemplary,29 but it is at this point that matters become more complex. For Fuller, who was plainly an ethical cognitivist of some sort,30 ethical non-cognitivism was wrong, and perniciously and dangerously so, and so it seemed to Fuller especially in 1940 in The Law in Quest of Itself. But although Kelsen was a non-cognitivist about ethics and morality, and although Kelsen was plainly a legal positivist of his own variety, Fuller’s mistake was in believing and insisting that there was some sort of necessary connection between Kelsen’s legal positivism and Kelsen’s ethical non-cognitivism, and also between legal positivism generally and ethical non-cognitivism generally. But Fuller’s conclusions in this regard appear initially to be a mistake, in part because most modern and not-so-modern positivists appear to reject Kelsen’s meta-ethical views but nevertheless develop positivist accounts of the nature of law. Bentham’s utilitarianism is the most prominent example, of such a cognitivist positivist, but he is hardly the only example.31 See especially Kristin Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller, 2012; Kristin Rundle, Fuller’s Internal Morality of Law, Philosophy Compass, 11 (2016), 499–506; Kenneth I. Winston, Introduction, in: Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L Fuller, ed. Kenneth I. Winston, rev. ed. 2002 (1981), 23–58; Kenneth I. Winston, Is/Ought Redux: The Pragmatist Context of Lon Fuller’s Conception of Law, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 8 (1988), 329–349. 27 The rejection of a strong is/ought distinction is implicit (and sometimes explicit) in Dworkin’s conception of law as interpretation, as developed principally in Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), and then developed further in the various essays in Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2008), especially “Thirty Years On,” at 187–222. For useful explication, see James Donato, Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpretation, Stanford Law Review, 40 (1988), 1517–1541; Carlos S. Nino, Dworkin and Legal Positivism, Mind, 89 (1980), 519–543. 28 See Johann Braun, Einführung in die Rechtstheorie – Der Gedanke des Rechts, 2011, 272. 29 See generally Shia Moser, Ethical Non-Cognitivism and Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, University of Toronto Law Journal, 29 (1979), 93–113. 30 See Rundle (footnote 26); Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, Journal of Philosophy, 53 (1956), 697–705; David Luban, Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, Social Philosophy and Policy, 18 (2000), 176–205; Connie S. Rosati, Is There a “Higher Law”? Does It Matter,” Pepperdine Law Review, 36 (2009), 615–630. 31 For description and discussion of the various cognitive meta-ethical commitments of many (but not all) legal positivists, see Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, in: The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism, ed. Robert P. George (1996), 31–55. 26

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But here is where the complexity sets in. For although ethical cognitivism is arguably a necessary condition for most (although maybe not for Fuller’s) versions of anti-positivism,32 including but not limited to classical or traditional natural law theory,33 the reverse is not the case. Ethical non-cognitivism is not a necessary property or presupposition of virtually any version of legal positivism, nor is ethical non-cognitivism a property or presupposition of the separation of law and morality in Bentham and Austin’s sense of separation,34 or the separation of the legal is and the legal ought more generally. As with Bentham and Austin, most obviously, it is entirely possible to believe that there are knowable moral rights and moral wrongs but believe as well not only that the law can and does often diverge from this knowable morality, but also both that (contingently) the content of the law can be identified without reference to that morality, and that the concept of law is such that morality would not be a necessary property of law in all possible legal systems in all possible worlds.35 So although non-cognitivist natural law is, roughly, impossible, cognitivist legal positivism is not only possible but widely extant.36 And thus Fuller, in assuming that Kelsen’s non-cognitivism was a necessary component of his or anyone else’s legal positivism, mistakenly attributed ethical non-cognitivism and what Fuller believed to be its pernicious consequences to legal positivism, without recognizing the foundational disconnections between the two.37 IV.

But although Fuller, mistakenly in my view, uses Kelsen as the foil for his argument that the flaw of legal positivism resides in its non-cognitivism, Fuller spends far more of his time (and pages) attacking Kelsen for the purity of the Pure Theory, or at least what Fuller took to be the purity of the Pure Theory. Part of the problem with Fuller’s attack on the Pure Theory, however, is that Fuller mistakenly confused, in the felici-

Fuller was in fact an ethical cognitivist, but two of the main pillars of his legal philosophy – the rejection of the distinction between the is and the ought, and the necessity of looking to purpose both to identify and to interpret law – are compatible with a wide variety of non-cognitivist views about morality. 33 As exemplified in the writings over the years of, for example, Thomas Aquinas, William Blackstone, and John Finnis. See generally Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, 2002; John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 1980; Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics, 2006; Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, ed. Robert P. George, 1992; John Finnis, Natural Law Theories, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu), 2015 (2007). 34 See Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, New York University Law Review, 83 (2008), 1035–1058. 35 A valuable discussion is Torben Spaak, Meta-Ethics and Legal Theory: The Case of Gustav Radbruch, Law and Philosophy, 28 (2008), 261–290. 36 See footnote 31. 37 See also Schauer, Positivism as Pariah (footnote 31). 32

Fuller and Kelsen – Fuller on Kelsen

tous phrasing of Iain Stewart, the pure theory of law with a theory of pure law.38 But Kelsen did not believe that there was pure law in the sense that Fuller imagined him as believing, and Kelsen never believed that legal institutions and the phenomenon of law did or could exist in isolation from other social phenomena, nor did he believe that the substance of law and the structure and design of legal institutions could not be, or should not be, evaluated from a political or sociological standpoint. Kelsen’s purity is about the purity of cognition,39 or the purity of academic inquiry, and he hardly denied that law could be examined from a sociological point of view, however sceptical he might have been about the philosophical value of such an inquiry. And thus Fuller, like Julius Stone after him,40 erred, in part, by misunderstanding just what Kelsen meant by describing his theory of law as “pure.” But although Fuller’s mistake is regrettable, nevertheless the purity of the pure theory, even from the perspective of what Kelsen mean by purity, exposes a deeper divide between Fuller’s understanding of his enterprise and how Kelsen his own. As is made explicit in The Law in Quest of Itself, and assumed less explicitly in many of his later writings, Fuller was most interested in writing for, and teaching, lawyers and judges.41 And thus it is not surprising that Fuller was concerned to define law, insofar as he defined law at all, as pretty much coextensive with what lawyers and judges actually do.42 Moreover, because Fuller was at least enough of a legal positivist to recognize that there could be and was immoral positive or human law, he wanted lawyers and judges, in their professional activities, and in the name if the law, to try to improve the defects in the existing positive human law. From the perspective of the lawyer or the judge, therefore, or at least from the perspective of the morally good lawyer or judge – from one form of an internal point of view43 – the distinction between the legal is and the legal ought no longer appeared to Fuller to be so important, or even so correct. In terms of the professional activities – the behavior – of the good lawyer or the good judge (or the good law student), every application of morally suboptimal positive law presented an opportunity to improve that law. And if this is the case, then for the practicing lawyer or judge the sharp distinction between what the law is and what the law ought to be can no longer, Fuller believed, be sustained. Iain Stewart, Kelsen Tomorrow, Current Legal Problems, 51 (1998), 181–196. This is well-recognized in Edwin W. Patterson, Hans Kelsen and His Pure Theory of Law, California Law Review, 40 (1952), 5–10. See also Lars Vinx, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Legality and Legitimacy, 2007; Joseph Raz, The Purity of the Pure Theory, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 35 (1981), 441–459. 40 Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasoning, 1964. 41 See Schauer (footnote 20). Fuller’s entire career was spent teaching aspiring practicing lawyers (and judges) in American law faculties. 42 This understanding of law as closely aligned with what lawyers and judges do, with what counts as law, and with what lawyers and judges should use in argument and decision, is especially apparent in Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, Harvard Law Review, 62 (1949), 616–645. See Frederick Schauer, Fuller’s Fairness: ‘The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,’ University of Queensland Law Review, 35 (2016), 11–20. 43 Schauer (footnote 20). 38 39

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From this perspective, much of the difference between Kelsen and Fuller can now be explained by their quite different views about the relationship between law and what lawyers (and judges) do. Fuller in The Law in Quest of Itself explicitly charges Kelsen with not offering an explanation of what lawyers actually do, and of what lawyers actually should do, a charge to which Kelsen would almost certainly plead guilty, and without embarrassment. And that is because Kelsen insisted on the distinction between law and what lawyers do, and insisted that no legal act  – no decision of a judge, for example – was completely determined by the law.44 This is exemplified Kelsen’s famous metaphor of the law being the frame without a picture.45 For Kelsen, and these days for, most prominently, Joseph Raz, who distinguishes between law and legal reasoning,46 law properly so-called is merely a subset of what lawyers and judges do.47 But for Fuller, and, more recently, for Ronald Dworkin, law is, almost by definition, virtually co-extensive with what lawyers do,48 or at least with the full array of legal, moral, political, and social sources and norms on which lawyers and judges might rely for their decisions and for their judgments. If, with Fuller, one seeks a conception – or definition, if you will – of law that captures the broad scope of the professional activities of lawyers and judges, and if, with Fuller, one seeks a conception of lawyers’ and judges’ behavior and professional practice that imposes on them the morally desirable task of pressing against morally suboptimal law if and when it appears, then it is not surprising that Fuller would choose Kelsen as his target. Fuller may well have erroneously attributed ethical non-cognitivism to legal positivism, and thus may have erroneously used Kelsen’s ethical non-cognitivism to make a moral argument against legal positivism. And Fuller, in later being so persuaded by Gustav Radbruch, may well have mistakenly attributed to legal positivism the grave wrongs of the Third Reich, as Stanley Paulson has persuasively argued.49 But in choosing Kelsen, more than Bentham (whose work on legal theory specifically was largely unknown in 1940 and even in 1958) and Austin (whose work on legal theory was very much known and discussed in 1940 and 1958), as his principal foil, Fuller may have selected an entirely appropriate opponent for the claim that lawyers and judges should have an understanding of the legal enterprise that incorporated the moral duties of participants in that enterprise. And because Fuller thought it necessary to have a concep-

“[E]very law-applying act is only partly determined by law.” Kelsen (footnote 14), 349. Kelsen (footnote 14), 245. And also at Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, ed. Bonnie L. Paulson and Staney L. Paulson, 1992, 80. 46 Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, Ratio Juris, 6 (1993), 1–15. 47 And perhaps at best a subset. Whether lawyers should argue from the law, and whether judges should decide according to the law, are questions to which neither Kelsenian nor Razian legal theory can provide an answer. 48 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 1986; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977. 49 Stanley L. Paulson, Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the “Positivist” Theses, Law and Philosophy, 13 (1994), 313–359. 44 45

Fuller and Kelsen – Fuller on Kelsen

tion of law that tracked this understanding of the legal enterprise, it is hardly surprising that so much of his attack on legal positivism was transformed into an attack on Kelsen. V.

We thus return to the causal question about Kelsen’s contemporary North American invisibility. And to address that question we should understand the way in which legal philosophy in North America is practiced – principally in faculties of law whose primary role is the production of lawyers. Unlike some universities elsewhere, American universities do not have faculties or even departments of legal philosophy, and it is the rare American law faculty that has more than one legal philosopher. And although there are plainly boundary issues about who does or does not count as a legal philosopher, jurisprude, or legal theorist, it is not surprising that Fuller spent most of his career as the only legal philosopher on his faculty, and most of his career teaching and writing as much about the law of contracts as about jurisprudence, and teaching and writing for audiences of aspiring or practicing lawyers. As a result, Fuller’s attempt to merge a theory of law with a theory of what lawyers and judges do, and with a normative theory of what lawyers and judges ought to be doing, is the expected function of legal theory in the professional institutions that Fuller inhabited for his entire career. And thus when Fuller used Kelsen as the standard-bearer of a view he wished to attack, perhaps he was using Kelsen as a standard-bearer for a conception of the task of legal philosophy, and a conception of the relationship between law and morality, that was inconsistent with the standpoint from which, and the role in which, Fuller found himself. And because that standpoint and role still characterizes the North American law faculty, perhaps Kelsen’s contemporary marginality in North America is a function not only of his views being dismissed, often hastily and unfairly, by a figure so influential as Fuller, but also because Kelsen’s views of the tasks of legal philosophy do genuinely fit awkwardly with what American law faculties even now see themselves as doing. Frederick Schauer

David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, 580 Massie Road, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903, USA, [email protected]

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The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas A Case of Scientific Plagiarism?* URSZULA KOSIELI Ń SKA-GRABOWSKA

Abstract: Alf Ross is recognised as the leading Scandinavian legal theorist of the twentieth

century. Hans Kelsen – Ross’s first master – immensely influenced Ross’s thinking, to the point where Ross was even accused of plagiarising Kelsen’s original ideas. The paper deals with the problem of scientific plagiarism, discussed in the context of a similar concept that is commonly used in the field of art. It appears that Ross’s ideas, though strongly inspired by Kelsen, were innovative and insightful. And Ross’s own analysis of the early version of the Reine Rechtslehre was critical enough to absolve him from any charge of intentional plagiarism. Keywords: Alf Ross, Hans Kelsen, plagiarism, Pure Theory of Law, Scandinavian legal re-

alism, Kelsen reception Schlagworte: Alf Ross, Hans Kelsen, Plagiat, Reine Rechtslehre, skandinavischer Rechts-

realismus, Rezeption Kelsens

The label “plagiarist” can ruin a writer, destroy a scholarly career, blast a politician’s chances for election, and cause the expulsion of a student from a college or university. Richard Posner1

I owe special thanks to Professor Stanley L. Paulson for his helpful comments and invaluable help with the English translation of excerpts from Hans Kelsen’s Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, Allgemeine Staatslehre and Alf Ross’s Theorie der Rechtsquellen. I would like to thank the organisers and all the participants of the IVR German Section’s Conference, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions (Freiburg 2018) for the open and stimulating discussion. 1 Richard Posner, On Plagiarism. In the wake of recent scandals some distinctions are in order, The Atlantic (April) 2002, Accessed January 18, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/04/ on-plagiarism/302469/. *

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Alf Ross was one of Hans Kelsen’s most prominent Schüler. Ross arrived in Vienna at the beginning of 1924 and spent over a year there, learning, studying new ideas and participating in seminars and private classes at Kelsen’s home. Ross truly admired him: ‘He was like Napoleon, who by squeezing a corporal’s ear could make him perform miracles.’2 In his letters to Frederik Vindig Kruse, Ross expressed his avid fascination with Kelsen’s new approach to legal philosophy, jurisprudential methods and the fundamental concepts of the Reine Rechtslehre 3 Ross’s scholarship in Vienna culminated in his doctoral thesis: Theorie der Rechtsquellen: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des positiven Rechts auf Grundlage dogmenhistorischer Untersuchungen. Ross submitted his thesis to his home Law Faculty of Copenhagen University in Autumn 1926. The evaluation committee was composed of the university professors Viggo Bentzon,4 Knud Berlin,5 Frederik Vinding Kruse6 and Jørgen Jørgensen7 (a unique expert in the domain of philosophy; however, being a newly appointed professor, he had very limited power and influence). The configuration of the committee was quite unfortunate for Ross8; so, not surprisingly, the evaluation committee rejected his dissertation. Among other things, Ross was accused of being: ‘full of affectation’ [in language] with the inclusion of many needless loan-words and an entirely unnecessary learned apparatus, which ‘must be ascribed to youth’. […][‘]He feels the need to add to the Danish vocabulary words like […] “philosophico-theoretical”, although all these new artificial words do not add anything to a real understanding of the subject’. In addition to these were the meaningless and irritating Germanic neologisms: ‘gain-laying’ (widerlegen), ‘walting’ (walten) and so on.9

Ross’s alleged errors were his focus on ‘the question of how something is perceived as law’ instead of on ‘the causes of the origin of law’ or ‘the question of what law should be’, and of showing a ‘lack of maturity’. The committee stated that his conclusions were ‘far

Jens Evald, Alf Ross. A life, 2014, 64. Evald (footnote 2), 85. Viggo Bentzon (1861–1937) was Professor of Maritime Law at Copenhagen University, and from 1918– 1919, he was the rector of the university. 5 Knud Berlin (1864–1954) was Professor of Public and Icelandic Law at Copenhagen University. 6 Frederik Vinding Kruse (1880–1963) was Professor of Property Law at Copenhagen University. 7 Jørgen Jørgensen (1894–1969) was Professor of Philosophy at Copenhagen University, and the author of the famous dilemma – cf. his Imperatives and Logic, Erkenntnis 7 (1937–1938), 288–296. 8 According to Evald (footnote 2), 82 f., Prof. Bentzon, due to his eyesight problems, was spared as much as possible from having to read the whole thesis. As he stated in the review: “I could not verify Alf Ross’s choice of literature.” Prof. Berlin was “a legal scholar of the old school and he had a deeply utilitarian view of the task of legal science” and, as Evald states: “The philosophy of law had never been an area of interest to Berlin and he apparently had no knowledge of new European trends in legal philosophy.” And Prof. Kruse was a person “with no knowledge of real life who was both rigid and suffering from several errors of judgment”. 9 Evald (footnote 2), 84. 2 3 4

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

too marked by German legal philosophy’.10 For a young and revolutionary scholar, this was a devastating verdict. In 1927, Ross’s life reached a turning point. Following the advice of Gunnar Myrdal, he moved to Uppsala and began his research work under Axel Hagerstöm’s supervision. Two years later, on the 28th of May 1929, he received a PhD (in philosophy) at Uppsala University, based on the thesis that had been rejected in Copenhagen. In the same year, the thesis was published (with no changes) in the book series edited by Kelsen11 (which, incidentally, Ross dedicated to his ‘Napoleon’). The academic reactions to his book were shattering. Vindig Kruse wrote: A young jurist Alf Ross has been strongly affected by Kelsen during his journeys and the fruit[s] of his labours in this area [are] now available in this work. It is not only externally that this work belongs to the Vienna School – it is dedicated to Kelsen […] – but it is, even though it is critical of certain theories or postulates of Kelsen, in reality, in its abstract speculative spirit and methodology – the ‘critical transcendental logic’ in his own phrase – a work by a strongly influenced a[coly]te.12

Bentzon emphasised that Ross was ‘far too influenced by the Vienna School’. He also stated that: Naturally one can often see what he has learned at home, but he either does not quote his domestic sources or thinks that he wins his victories too easily since not he, but his domestic teachers have often thought the thoughts that he drops into the fire.13

Also, Poul Andersen (the father of Danish administrative law14) shared a similar opinion; namely, that the thesis was simply ‘too German’.15 Although none of the reviews contained any direct accusations of plagiarism, it was quite obvious what veiled insinuations the reviewers had hidden beneath their words (‘strongly influenced’, ‘does not quote domestic sources’, ‘too German’, ‘strongly affected’) – allegations concerning the replication of other scholars’ ideas, especially German ones. Unfortunately, this was not an isolated allegation, nor the only harsh criticism Ross received during his career. In 1933, Ross published his second book: Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis Zugleich Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der Rechtswissenschaft 16 This

Evald (footnote 2), 86. Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des positiven Rechts auf Grundlage dogmenhistorischer Untersuchungen, Wiener Staats- u. Rechtswissenschaftlichen Studien 13 (1929). 12 Evald (footnote 2), 104–105. 13 Evald (footnote 2), 106. 14 Ragnhildur Helgadottir, The Influence of American Theories on Judicial Review in Nordic Constitutional Law, 2005, 171. 15 Helgadottir (footnote 14). 16 Alf Ross, Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis. Zugleich Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der Rechtswissenschaft, 1933. 10 11

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treatise was in turn strongly influenced by his new Swedish master, Axel Hägerström, and it was dedicated to him. Shortly afterwards, one of Hägerström’s Swedish students, Anders Wedberg, wrote the review of Ross’s Kritik. He directly stated that ‘the theory produced [by Ross] is not the fruit of his own research.’17 He stressed that the pathetic preface, in which Ross pointed out the antimetaphysical character of his book, was simply not enough, as the whole of Ross’s work was based upon Hägerström’s realistic legal philosophy, whilst within the rest of the book, Hägerström was quoted only four times, and for this there was no excuse. From this very moment onwards, the stigma of ‘plagiarism’ accompanied Ross, even after his death in 1979. In 1986, Preben Stuer Lauridsen expressed the opinion that ‘virtually all Ross’ fundamental ideas were fully developed in Kelsen’s work’.18 It is also worth noting that Ross’s biographer, Jens Evald, maintains that Ross: never went further in his investigation than his role models […] The originality of Ross’ work is primarily to be found in his ability to transfer philosophical theories and discussions into legal philosophy and thus create new, fruitful discussions concerning the foundations of the study of law, tasks, methods and concepts, which taken as a whole can be seen as a new scientific paradigm that replaced older paradigms.19

Ross’s biographer did not make an open claim of plagiarism against him; nevertheless, he firmly states: ‘it is common in Denmark to regard Theorie der Rechtsquellen as an imitation of Kelsen’s ideas of jurisprudence.’20 Is it really the case that Ross did not create his own, new and original approach to law and legal science? That his only scientific ‘achievement’ was the transformation of the ideas of others? That he plagiarised Kelsen in the Theorie der Rechtsquellen? Before dealing with these specific questions concerning the originality of Ross’s works, more general questions require some discussion regarding what plagiarism, copying, imitation and transformation consist of. In particular, questions concerning the extensions of these concepts are important here: Where are the borders between the original work and the copy, the imitation, the transformation etc.? Additionally, from the methodological viewpoint, the main problem concerns from where – and how – these new ideas come into the mind of the author. In the legal sphere, copyright law protects authors against plagiarism and determines what is legally protected (cf. the legal concepts of the public domain, fair use, licensed materials etc.21); however, there is no precise definition of many of the terms used in the Anders Wedberg, Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis, Svensk Juristtidning 1 (1933), 433. Preben Stuer Lauridsen, Kelsen og Ross, in: Samfunn, rett, rettferdighet: festskrift til Torstein Eckhoffs 70-årsdag, ed. Anders Bratholm / Torstein Eckhoff / Torkel Opsahl / Magnus Aarbakke, 1986, 681 ff. 19 Evald (footnote 2), 225. 20 Evald (footnote 2), 213. 21 In the USA, whether a use is fair will depend on the specific facts of the use. It is decided by a court on a case-by-case basis after balancing the four factors listed in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. 17 18

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

field. Terms such as ‘plagiarism’, ‘transformation’, ‘paraphrasing’, not to mention ‘similarity’, ‘derivation’ (which constitute derivative work), ‘transformation’, or ‘aesthetic difference’ have often been the objects of legal controversy. One may say that copying 100 % of someone else’s work via a copy&paste operation is a ‘clear’, ‘easy’ example of plagiarism, whereas a 100 % innovative piece of work is not, but what about the rest? Is copying 20 % of someone’s work tantamount to plagiarism? However, there have been many ‘clear cases’ of plagiarism.22 In several cases concerning the infringement of copyrights, judges have dealt with the penumbra of uncertainty of the abovementioned terms, trying to define them so as to determine the borderline between originality and plagiarism.23 Yet, no precise definitions of the terms in question have commonly been accepted, nor has the exact, precise and sharp borderline between fair use, transformation and plagiarism been established. The partial solution to solving the problem is a regulative (or even a stipulative) definition, which is used in anti-plagiarism software such as Turnitin, where an ‘acceptable’ quotation level has been established.24 It has to be noted that not only does it not solve the ‘borderline’ problem, but its use is limited to written works. Yet, plagiarism does not only apply to written works, but to any field dealing with human inventiveness, discovery and creativity such as music, painting, design or simply the invention of new ideas. A great number of experts from various fields have attempted for decades to define and determine the borderline between originality and plagiarism.25 In the literature on the subject, four different kinds of plagiarism are usually distinguished in reference to linguistic works: (i) direct plagiarism (a word-for-word transcription of a section of

For example, famous Belgian artist Luc Tuymans used a photo of a politician made by Katrijn Van Giel to create his own sculpture with, stating that it was a parody, which is protected by EU law, and he was found guilty of plagiarism. Jonah Lehrer, the journalist from The New Yorker, first plagiarised himself then fabricated quotations from Bob Dylan in his book about creativity. Freed Zakaria, a CNN correspondent and editor at Time magazine, plagiarised sections of another writer’s article about gun control. Han van Meegeren plagiarised Brazilian artists, Matheus Lopez Castro and Rubens LP, and Polish artist Adrian Knopik. Michel Houellebecq was also accused of plagiarism; namely, of copying the descriptions from Wikipedia and other websites. 23 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc (2018); Star Athletica v Varsity Brands (2018); Lenz v. Universal Music (2018), Penguin Random House v. Colting (2018); Temple Island Collections Ltd v New English Teas Ltd, (2012), Zeccola v Universal City Studios Inc (1982); Cuisenaire v Reed (1963), Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd v. Paramount Film Service Ltd (1934); Corelli v. Grey (1913), and many more. 24 Russell K. Baker, Barry Thornton, Michael Adams, An Evaluation Of The Effectiveness Of Turnitin. Com As A Tool For Reducing Plagiarism In Graduate Student Term Papers, College Teaching Methods & Styles Journal, 4(9), 2008, Accessed September 10, 2018, https://doi.org/10.19030/ctms.v4i9.5564. 25 Cf. Walter Enders, Gary A. Hoover, Whose Line Is It? Plagiarism in Economics, Journal of Economic Literature XLII (2004), 487 ff.; Johndan Johnson-Eilola, Stuart A. Selber, Plagiarism, Originality, Assemblage, Computers and Composition, 24 (2007), 375 ff.; George Buelow, G. Originality, Genius, Plagiarism in English Criticism of the Eighteenth Century, International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, 21(2) (1990), 117 ff., Accessed June 19, 2018, doi:10.2307/837018; Originality, Imitation, and Plagiarism: Teaching Writing in the Digital Age, ed. Caroline Eisner / Martha Vicinus, 2008; Morris Freedman, The Persistence of Plagiarism, the Riddle of Originality, The Virginia Quarterly Review 70 (1994), Accessed June 25, 2018, https://www.vqronline.org/essay/persistence-plagiarism-riddle-originality. 22

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someone else’s work, without attribution and without quotation marks); (ii) self-plagiarism; (iii) mosaic plagiarism (interlaying someone else’s phrases or text within one’s own research); and (iv) accidental plagiarism (neglecting to cite the sources, misquoting them, or unintentionally paraphrasing a source by using similar words, groups of words, or sentence structures without attribution).26 All of them share the same core; namely, using someone else’s work as one’s own (so-called unreferenced use). It has to be noted, however, that only in the case of direct plagiarism is the differentiation between the original and the plagiarised piece not at all complicated – in the present-day situation, thanks to new and elaborate computer programmes, we can easily find the instances of copy&paste plagiarism. The investigation concerning the nature and limits of plagiarism, copying, imitation and transformation can be undertaken in various ways, the most orthodox of which would probably be the analysis referring to the context of the discovery of scientific ideas.27 However, such an approach would mean that the examination of the empirical psychological aspects of scientific discoveries could only elucidate the essence of the concepts discussed in an indirect way. The other option is to elaborate upon another unorthodox approach, for example, by comparing the phenomena of inventions in science with the analogous phenomena taking place outside the scientific domain. In order to check this aspect, the domain of artistic painting will be discussed and referred to. In my opinion, the chosen, unconventional method can be both interesting and fruitful, since within painting, as within science, we usually deal with invention, discoveries, masters, schools, imitations, copies and plagiarism. Certainly, the law and literature (L&L) movement could be another option for a potential comparative conceptual analysis, but, in the terms of this inquiry, I do not find it an appropriate alternative, since the L&L movement mainly focuses on the analysis of the relations between law and literature and that is not the objective of this current investigation. So, let our first question be: How should we define copy and imitation in the art of painting?28 In such a domain, the borderline between copying and imitation is also hard to establish. Quite often, imitation is understood as something that is made or

Panya Luksanapruksa, Paul Millhouse, Guidelines on What Constitutes Plagiarism and Electronic Tools to Detect it, Clinical Spine Surgery 29(3) (2016) 119 f., Accessed June 25, 2018 doi: 10.1097/ BSD.0000000000000371; Rajesh Singh Laishram, Nepram Sanjib Singh, Plagiarism: A concern for editors, Journal of Medical Society 27(1) (2013), Accessed June 25, 2018, doi: 10.4103/0972-4958.116619; Izet Masic, Plagiarism in Scientific Research and Publications and How to Prevent It, Materia Socio Medica 26(2), (2014), 141 ff., Accessed June 25, 2018, doi: 10.5455/msm.2014.26.141-146. 27 Cf. Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge, 1938. 28 Imitation is understood not as an imitation of the theory of art related to the imitation of nature in art, but as an imitation of the work of another artist. 26

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

produced as a copy,29 but at the same time, imitating is often perceived as an acceptable general learning method (i. e. children learn by imitating adults, apprentices imitate their masters). Artists, on their path to creative maturity, usually go through the stage of copying and imitating their masters’ works, then on to the transformation of old ideas, eventually reaching the phase of mastery in their own right.30 This applies to the art of painting, music or writing.31 In the history of art one can find many examples confirming this common pattern of a talented artist’s career: first you imitate, then you transform it, then you create your own, completely original(?) style. In its heyday – namely, in the Renaissance period – both copying and imitation were traditional methods that novices employed to learn their master’s style.32 Rembrandt’s studio is historically one of the most famous workshops. Trainees studied his past works and tried to imitate their master’s style: the colours, compositions, painting techniques etc.33 The Dutch master tutored dozens of artists. Some of them were just mediocre painters but the most talented not only imitated Rembrandt, but after that educational phase, they went through the stage of transforming their master’s works, to eventually creating their own, original style. Rembrandt’s famous apprentice, Govaert Flinck,34 and his works, are the best examples of the evolution of an artist. Flinck’s art developed from an imitation of his master’s style in Self-Portrait (1639), through Bust of an Old Man and Portrait of a Man (both dated 1645 and regarded as Flinck’s first departure from Rembrandt’s style35) to A Young Woman as a Shepherdess, painted in the manner known as the Flemish style pioneered by Rubens and Van Dyck.36 He became the leading painter in Amsterdam after abandoning Rembrandt’s chiaroscuro. The same can be said about the masters and scientific schools. The characteristic feature of a scientific school is the relation between the master and his disciples or followers. It does not matter if the influence of a master (and the school) is spatially or culturally limited. The

Richard Shiff, The Original, the Imitation, the Copy, and the Spontaneous Classic: Theory and Painting in Nineteenth-Century France, Yale French Studies 66 (1984), 28 f.; Harold Ogden White, Plagiarism and Imitation During the English Renaissance: A Study in Critical Distinctions, 1935, vii. 30 Chiaki Ishiguro, Takeshi Okada, How Can Inspiration Be Encouraged in Art Learning?, in: Arts-Based Methods in Education Around the World, ed. Tatiana Chemi / Xiangyun Du, 2018, 220 ff.; Scott Shields, The Art of Imitation, The English Journal 96 (6) (2007), 56 ff.; Noël Carroll, Art, Creativity, and Tradition, in: The Creation of Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics, ed. Berys Gaut / Paisley Nathan Livingstone, 2003, 218 ff. 31 Anis Bawarshi, Genres as Forms of In(ter)vention, in: Eisner/Vicinus (footnote 25), 77 ff.; Caroline Eisner, Martha Vicinus, Introduction, in: ibid., 3 ff. 32 Bruce Cole, The Renaissance Artist at Work: from Pisano to Titian, 1983, 180 ff.; John Paoletti, Gary Radke, Art in Renaissance Italy, 2005, 20 ff. 33 Svetlana Alpers, Rembrandt’s Enterprise: The Studio and the Market, 1988, 70 ff.; Holm Bevers, Drawings by Rembrandt and His Pupils: Telling the Difference, 2009, 1 ff. 34 Hilbert Lootsma, Tracing a Pose: Govert Flinck and the Emergence of the van Dyckian Mode of Portraiture in Amsterdam, Simiolus: Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Art 33(4) (2007/2008), 221 ff. 35 Josua Bruyn, Book Review: Sumowski’s Gemälde der Rembrandt-Schüler, II, Oud-Holland 101 (1987), 226. 36 Erna Kok, Zonder vrienden geen carrière De succesvolle loopbanen van de zeventiende-eeuwse kunstenaars Govert Flinck en Ferdinand Bol, De Zeventiende Eeuw 27(2) (2011), 328. 29

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members of a scientific school share a specialisation in a particular field, a common methodology, accepted initial hypotheses and/or theories.37 Obvious examples are the Vienna Circle, the French School of Exegesis, the Vienna School of Legal Thinking, or British historical jurisprudence. The second question is as follows: What, then, does transformation stand for? One can find various definitions of transformation (such as the definition of plagiarism), but the common definitional element is the change made (by the artist) to the original work. The following questions thus arise: When does transformation begin? How much must the original painting be changed in order not to be called an ‘imitation’ or a ‘copy’? A marked change? A 20 % or a 50 % change? What must the creator change? The colour? The technique? Both? According to the Longman dictionary, ‘transformation’ is ‘a complete change in someone or something’38 but in the theory of art, a precise definition of the transformation itself does not exist, nor is the necessary degree of change established to call it ‘a complete change’. When dealing with the nature of transformation and the particular object, the only common component is the use of someone else’s work as the point of departure. Someone else’s idea acts as the crucial starting point and the ‘modifier’ does some creative work that is then presented as his own work. The original piece is recognisable in the transformed painting ‘just’ as a source of inspiration.39 The problem of transformation and transformative or derivative work has been the object of many litigations, including the problem of appropriation in art.40 It is not an easy task to determine the borderlines of ‘transformation’, ‘plagiarism’ etc. in art. It always involves the personal aesthetical evaluation of a judge, unless we are dealing with a copy&paste case (however, even in such cases, the painting might be an ‘original piece of art’, as Sturtevant’s works proved41). It requires answering fundaKazimierz Opałek, Zagadnienia teorii prawa i teorii polityki, 1986, 39. The Longman dictionary: “to transform  – to completely change the appearance, form, or character of something or someone, especially in a way that improves it”. Accessed August 20, 2018 https://www. ldoceonline.com/dictionary/transform. 39 Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, The Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts, 30 (2006–2007), 219 ff. 40 Eric D. Gorman, Appropriate Testing and Resolution: How to Determine Whether Appropriation Art is Transformative Fair Use or Merely an Unauthorized Derivative, Darren Hudson Hick, Appropriation and Transformation, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 43 (2012), 290 ff.; Dave Davis, Copyright Perspectives: “Appropriation Art” – Transformative Use, or Derivative Abuse?, 29 August 2017, Accessed July 2, 2019, http://www.copyright.com/blog/appropriation-art-transformativeuse-derivative-abuse/; William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 113 (2000), Accessed August 20, 2018, doi: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/133/. 41 Elaine Frances Sturtevant (née Horan; 1924–2014), also known simply as “Sturtevant”, was an American artist. She achieved recognition for her carefully inexact repetitions of other artists’ works. Sturtevant did far more than replicate, but her “copied” or transformed renditions of other artists’ works defined her career. Her goal was to question the borderline between original and copy, invention and plagiarism. She stated that relations were “constantly up for negotiation” ( Jason Farago, Good artists copy, great artists steal, 12 November 2014, Accessed August 23, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20141112-great37 38

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

mental questions regarding what plagiarism is, the limits of fair use, the scope of transformation and many others. By studying the past and present-day court interpretations, we can further our knowledge of many important doctrines and concepts within the copyright field.42 For example, in the early case Folsom v. Marsh (1841), when the term ‘fair use’ appeared for the first time in the context of plagiarised excerpts in a biography of George Washington: The plaintiff claimed the defendant used excerpts of letters from the plaintiff ’s earlier published and copyrighted biography. Whilst the defendant had copied 353 pages of the plaintiff ’s multivolume work, the copied material amounted to less than 6 percent of the total. However, the court held for the plaintiff, finding that the defendant had copied the most important material in the plaintiff ’s earlier volumes […] Judge Story included concerns about how much of the original work was taken, and stated that the issue was one of whether ‘piracy’ occurred […] Judge Story’s discussion in the Folsom case sets forth the elements that were later folded into the four-factors fair-use test of Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.43

For instance, it seems appropriate to discuss the so-called thematic inspiration. When looking at Picasso’s El Almuerzo sobre la hierba (Luncheon on the Grass), there is no doubt that Édouard Manet’s Le déjeuner sur l’herbe (Luncheon on the Grass) was the source of the Spaniard’s inspiration. But Manet was not the inventor of the Le déjeuner thematic idea.44 The French painter conceived his Déjeuner after viewing Titian’s Concert champêtre (Pastoral Concert) in the Louvre museum.45 There are, of course, many more examples of such transformations in painting. Manet’s Olympia (1863) is a reworking of Titian’s Venus of Urbino (1538), which, in turn, is a reworking of Giorgione’s Sleeping Venus (1508), which, in turn, is also a reworking of one of the woodcut illustrations of Francesco Colonna’s Hypnerotomachia Poliphili (1499). All the paintings mentioned above, however much they have been inspired by other artists, unquestionably are masterpieces per se. Every artist added something new, removed some elements, or changed the original idea and created something new – and original. Sometimes the technique was changed, sometimes the colour, perspective, or composition. These paintings reveal not only the chains of transformation, but the enormous progress made in painting as well. Nota bene, chains of transformation in scientific theories are also traceable. Just to

artists-steal). This meant that she was faking Warhol, Lichtenstein, Johns and many others; however, with the permission of the original author. Some even lent her their paintings such as Warhol. Cf. Belinda Bowring, Sturtevant: On Art and Its Time, Afterall: A Journal of Art, Context and Enquiry, 18 (2008), 82 ff. 42 Cf. James Meese, Users, and Pirates. Copyright Law and Subjectivity, 2018. 43 Martine Courant Rife, “Fair Use”, Copyright Law, and the Composition Teacher, in: Eisner/Vicinus (footnote 25), 148. 44 Robert Shore, Beg, Steal and Borrow: Artists against Originality (An Elephant Book), 2017, 83 ff. 45 David Platzer, Picasso and his masters: an exhibition juxtaposing Picasso with the artists who influenced him is an almost overwhelmingly rich experience, Apollo. Academic OneFile (Dec. 2008), 99 ff.; Jennifer DeVere Brody, Black Cat Fever: Manifestations of Manet’s “Olympia”, Theatre Journal 53(1) (2001), 95 ff.

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give one German example of such a chain: Emil Lask, Gustav Radbruch, Arthur Kaufmann, and, last but not least, Ulfrid Neumann and Frank Saliger. The education of the painting apprentices, their paths towards their own mastery and the development of their art, can be compared to their counterparts in academia. Studying under the supervision of the master or professor, exploring one master’s works, and then the transformation of ‘old ideas’ (or, simply, the ideas of others) all direct the scholar towards the level of mastery and eventually the apprentice becomes the master – or even surpasses the master. There are many famous examples of the mastery of the student who surpassed the teacher, just to name a few: Caravaggio who trained under Simone Peterzano, Verrocchio who taught Leonardo da Vinci, Velázquez who served as an apprentice under Francisco Pacheco, Raphael Santi whose father placed him in the workshop of the Umbrian master Pietro Perugino, Titian and Gentile Bellini, Cézanne and Camille Pissarro, and, last but not least, Édouard Manet who studied under Thomas Couture. The progress in science has been explicated by numerous theories. Niels Bohr’s ‘principle of correspondence’ (1913) states that a new theory replacing the current one in any given field is its generalisation and at the same time its modification and improvement.46 For example, the theory of special relativity (Einstein) is the ‘correspondence generalisation’ of classical mechanics and the general theory of relativity is the ‘correspondence generalisation’ of special relativity. This principle is indeed the basic principle of the progress of every advanced science.47 The cumulative view of scientific progress conceives development as accumulating knowledge. Popper’s falsificationism and Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions grasp the concept of scientific progress differently. Both philosophers claimed that science does not grow simply by accumulating new established truths upon the old ones. According to Kuhn, a theory’s change is not cumulative or continuous (except perhaps during periods of so-called normal science).48 The earlier achievements of science are rejected, replaced and reinterpreted by new theories and conceptual frameworks.49 However, many philosophers of science claim that the scientific revolution does not violate the principle of correspondence (in its Bohrowian sense). Similarly, this is also explained in Imre Lakatos’s theory. The research programme, according to this Hungarian philosopher, consists of a series of theories in

Niels Bohr, Über die Serienspektra der Element, Zeitschrift für Physik 2(5) (1920), 423 ff., Accessed June 22, 2018, doi:10.1007/BF01329978 (English translation in: Niels Bohr: Collected Works. Vol.  3. The Correspondence Principle 1918–1923, ed. Rud Nielsen, 1976, 241 ff.). 47 Władysław Krajewski, Correspondence Principle and Growth of Science, 1977, viii. 48 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, 172 ff.; Erik Jürmann, Thomas Kuhn: Theory of Progress or Theory of Change?, Bachelor’s Thesis in Philosophy, 2016, Accessed August 20, 2018, http://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/10062/55581/Erik_Jurmann_BA.pdf; Richard L. Purtill, Discussion. Kuhn on Scientific Revolutions, Philosophy of Science 34(1) (1967), 53 ff. 49 Ilkka Niiniluoto, Scientific Progress. Accessed August 22, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ scientific-progress/. 46

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

which the ‘hard core’ (a set of theories referring to shared ideas), or the core of the programme, remains unchanged, whilst its ‘protective belt’ (auxiliary hypotheses that take on the burden of possible falsification, adapting the programme) is subject to changes.50 No matter which theoretical explanation will be accepted as adequately elucidating the process of scientific progress, the historians of science (such as Herbert Butterfield, who emphasised the importance of conceptual transformation rather than the infusion of new empirical information51) seem to agree that great scientific discoveries and new paths of scientific development are not the work of explorers of new experimental facts but of scientists who are able to look at the current achievements in a given field and develop new theoretical concepts.52 So, again, the ‘old master’s’ ideas are usually the point of departure. Scientific development occurs due to subverting, criticising and transforming old concepts, and the subsequent creation of new concepts, ideas and theories. In painting, what needs to be changed within a transformed work could be the (i) technique, (ii) colours, and (iii) composition. When compared with science, these elements seem to be somehow analogous to the (i) metatheory or methodology, (ii) the basic concepts used within a theory, and (iii) its main theses. At this point I assume that we are already prepared to return to Ross’s case, and the accusation of plagiarism, or, at the very least, the imitation of Kelsen’s ideas. To present an adequate assessment of plagiarised scientific work one needs to make the analogous effort to examine comparisons that are usually made within art53; namely, to compare elements of the original theory and the supposedly ‘imitative’ one. Without a doubt, the comparison of the whole of Kelsen’s and Ross’s theories is fraught with many difficulties. The most important issue is linked to the evolution of the ideas presented in both theories. So, to begin with, one has to establish an acceptable periodisation of Kelsen’s work, on the one hand, and of Ross’s work, on the other. However, as regards to Kelsen, the periodisation of his work was and still is the object of thought-provoking disputes. One famous controversy of this kind took place between Stanley L. Paulson54 and Carsten Heidemann.55 According to Paulson,

Alan Musgrave, Method of Madness, in: Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, ed. Robert S. Cohen / Paul K. Feyerabend / Marx W. Wartofsky, 1976, 458 f. 51 Carl T. McIntire, Herbert Butterfield. Historian as Dissenter, 2004, 158 f. 52 Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science. A Contemporary Introduction, 2005, 70 ff. 53 Original painting vs. Copies or Reproductions. Accessed March 18, 2018, https://www.caldwellgallery. com/original_copies.html. 54 Cf. Stanley L. Paulson, Toward a Periodization of the Pure Theory of Law, in: Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory a Diachronic Point of View, ed. Letizia Gianformaggio, 1990; idem, On the Origins of Kelsen’s Spätlehre, in: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: A Juxtaposition. Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte 20 (1997); idem, Introduction, in: Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed. Stanley L. Paulson / Bonnie Litschewski Paulson, 1998, xxiiif; idem, Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18(1) (1998); idem, Review article. Arriving at a defensible periodization of Hans Kelsen’s legal theory, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19(2) (1999). 55 Cf. Carsten Heidemann, Die Normen als Tatsache Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens, 1997. 50

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three periods can be distinguished in Kelsen’s theoretical evolution: The first, of ‘critical constructivism’ (1911–1921), the second, the longest one, being his ‘classical’ period (1921–1960), and the third, his late ‘sceptical’ period (1960–1973). The question of the periodisation of Ross’s work is even more complicated, since – as Ross openly admits – ‘I have never (such as Lundstedt) experienced any ‘conversion’ but felt the different phases of my thinking to be steps in a continuous evolution.’56 Thus, the question arises as to what should be compared in order to assess the grounds for the plagiarism charge against Ross? I choose some elements selected from Kelsen’s Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (2nd ed. 1923) and Ross’s Theorie der Rechtsquellen (1929). There are important reasons for such a choice. First and foremost, the basis for this decision is the fact that Ross’s Theorie got the harshest reviews, being described as an imitation of his Vienna master’s work. Second, it is undeniable that Theorie der Rechtsquellen was written under Kelsen’s strong influence (‘Ross did not come back to Copenhagen with a heap of notes and drafts awaiting a stage of new reflection and elaboration but with a finished manuscript’57). For the comparison, the following concepts were chosen: one belonging to the metatheoretical level (‘is’ (Sein) and ‘ought’ (Sollen)), one belonging to the level of methodology (‘legal science’) and three basic theoretical concepts (‘validity’, ‘basic norm’ (Grundnorm), ‘will of the state’). The juxtaposition between Ross’s and Kelsen’s ideas is shown in the following table (my emphasis). The concepts compared on the chart below show many similarities, but also essential divergences between Kelsen’s and Ross’s ideas. This observation is not very revealing unless the allegations of plagiarism made against Ross are accepted: ‘plagiarism’ in the sense that it is presented at the beginning of the analysis. Without a doubt, Kelsen made a big impact on Ross’s early work and the Scandinavian realist admitted it explicitly: Apart from some minor papers Theorie der Rechtsquellen (1929) is my first published work. It was written (in Danish) during a study tour in Europe [from] 1923–26 and is to a high degree influenced by the legal thinking of Hans Kelsen whom I met in Vienna [from] 1924–25.58

Alf Ross, Autobiografía intelectual, ed. R. Hernández Martín, Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho. Nueva Epoca IV (1987), 277. 57 Knud Waaben, Alf Ross 1899–1979: A Biographical Sketch, European Journal of International Law 14(4) (2003), 661. 58 Ross, (footnote 56), 273. 56

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

Kelsen

Ross ‘is’ (Sein) and ‘ought’(Sollen)

Ein vollkommener Gegensatz zwischen Naturgesetz und Norm ist nur möglich auf Grund einer vollkommenen Disparität von Sein und Sollen. A complete contrast between natural law and norm is possible only on the basis of a complete disparity of ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Der Gegensatz von Sein und Sollen ist ein formal-logischer und insolange man sich in den Grenzen formal-logischer Betrachtung hält, führt kein Weg von dem einen zum andern, stehen beide Welten durch eine unüberbrückbare Kluft getrennt einander gegenüber. The antithesis of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is a formal-logical one, and as long as we find ourselves within the limits of formal-logical analysis there is no path leading from the one to the other and two worlds are separated from each other by an unbridgeable gulf. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 2nd ed. 1923, 7 f.

Das Recht als reines Sein (die soziologischen Theorien), das Recht als reines Sollen (die normative Rechtswissenschaft) und das Recht sowohl als Sein wie als Sollen (Kultur-Seins-Theorien). Mehr Möglichkeiten scheint es nicht zu geben. […] Wir können deshalb mit mathematischer Sicherheit feststellen: wenn man uns in der im Vorangegangenen dargestellten Kritik der drei erwähnten Theorien beistimmt, gibt es nur einen möglichen Weg, den man zu gehen versuchen kann, um zu einer annehmbaren Rechtstheorie zu gelangen – nämlich die gemeinsame Voraussetzung anzugreifen, auf der die drei erschöpfenden Theorien beruhen, den kategorial radikalen Unterschied zwischen Sein und Sollen. Ob dieser Weg auch wirklich zu einem Resultat führen wird, können wir nicht von vornherein wissen. The law as pure ‘is’ (the sociological theories), the law as pure ‘ought’ (the normative jurisprudence) and the law both as ‘is’ as well as ‘ought’ (cultural-‘is’-theories). It seems to be no more possibilities. […] Therefore, we can state with mathematical certainty: if one agrees with the above-mentioned critique of the three mentioned theories, there is only one possible way to follow in order to arrive at an acceptable legal theory; namely, to attack the common assumption on which the three exhaustively theories rest, i. e. the categorically radical distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Whether this path will really lead to a result, we cannot know from the outset. Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1929, 265 f.

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Kelsen

Ross Legal Science

Das Ziel, auf das die ‘Hauptprobleme’ gerichtet sind und das seither auch all meine anderen Arbeiten bestimmte, ist eine reine Rechtslehre als Theorie des positiven Rechtes. […] die Rechtswissenschaft die Rechtssätze nur aus dem Material des positiven Rechtes, insbesondere der Gesetze, bilden darf… The goal to which the Hauptprobleme is directed, and which has from this very moment determined all my other works, is a Pure Theory of law conceived as a theory of positive law. […] Legal science may form the legal propositions based only on the material of the positive law, in particular the statutes… Kelsen, Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (1923), p. V In einem völlig anderen Sinne wird das Wort Gesetz gebraucht, wenn man – nicht vom explikativen, sondern normativen Standpunkte aus – darunter jene Sätze versteht, die ein bestimmtes Geschehen vorschreiben, indem sie die Forderung eines gewissen Verhaltens aufstellen, ein Sein oder Nichtsein befehlen: ein Sollen statuieren. Die Logik, Grammatik, Ästhetik, Ethik und Rechtswissenschaft sind die Disziplinen, die sich mit solchen ‘Normen’ befassen: ihre Betrachtungsweise wird darum als normative bezeichnet. In a completely different sense, the word ‘law’ is used when we understand – not from an explicative, but from normative point of view – those sentences which prescribe a particular event by establishing the demand of a certain behaviour, i. e. to command an ‘is’ or ‘non-is’; to set an ‘ought’. Logic, grammar, aesthetics, ethics, and legal science are the disciplines that deal with such ‘norms’: their approach is therefore termed normative. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 1923, 6

Wir kommen so zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Frage nach dem ‘Wesen’ des Rechtes, seinem ‘Begriff’, identisch sein muß mit der Frage, wie rechtliche Erkenntnis möglich ist. Die Reflexion über das Wesen des Rechts ist Reflexion über den Charakter der Rechtswissenschaft. We come to the conclusion that the question of the “essence” of law, of its “concept”, must be identical with the question of how legal knowledge is possible. Reflection on the nature of law is reflection on the nature of legal science. Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen (1929), p. 200 So long as there is law, there will be normative jurisprudence. On this point I again agree with Kelsen. I too do not share the conception that the usual doctrinal exposition should disappear and be replaced by a sociology of law. My only claim is that the doctrinal point of observation is a temporary abstraction, and that its propositions for the purpose of an epistemological critique must be interpreted so that the normative content (the doctrine) is not seen as a content of cognition but as a fact that, as a fragment of a larger context of reality, is itself an object of cognition. Ross, The 25th Anniversary of the Pure Theory of Law (1936), 254. Translated by H. P. Olsen (Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2011), 243–272)

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

Kelsen

Ross Validity

Die Norm soll nicht wie Naturgesetz Seiendes erklären, sie soll ein Neues schaffen, ein Geschehen hervorbringen. Allein auch die Norm „gilt“ nicht, weil und insofern sie „wirkt“; ihre Geltung besteht nicht in ihrer Wirkung, in ihrem tatsächlichen Befolgtwerden, nicht in einem Sein (Geschehen), sondern in ihrem Sollen. Die Norm gilt, sofern sie befolgt werden soll; der Zweck der Norm ist wohl ihre Wirkung. Sie kann, aber sie muß nicht ihren Zweck erfüllen; auch die wirkungslose Norm bleibt Norm. Für die spezifische „Soll“-Geltung der Norm bleibt die Realisierung ihres Zweckes bedeutungslos. The norm should not explain law of nature, it should create something new to bring about an event. The norm as such is not valid because and insofar as it “works”; its validity does not consist in its effect, in its actual adherence, not in Is (event), but in its ‘ought’. The norm is valid provided that it ought to be followed; the purpose of the norm must be its effect. It can, but it does not have to fulfil its purpose; even the ineffective norm remains the norm. For the specific ‘ought’ – validity of the norm, the realization of its purpose remains meaningless. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 1923, 14

Kelsen will keineswegs erklären, was es bedeutet, daß eine Norm Geltung hat. Er sagt bloß, daß, wenn wir begründen wollen, dass eine Norm Geltung hat, das nur geschehen kann, indem wir ihre Geltung auf eine andere Geltung zurückführen. […] Die Aussage „die Norm N gilt“, muß absolut verstanden sinnlos sein. Sie muß auf folgende Weise umgeformt werden: Die Norm N1 gilt relativ zur Norm N0, d. h., N1 lässt sich logisch von N0 ableiten, und nichts anderes. Hierin liegt von Anfang an ein Fehler in Kelsens Problemstellung. Kelsen übernimmt – sicher unter Einfluß der historischen Kontinuität – die übliche Problemstellung, nach der nach dem Grunde, weshalb das Recht gilt, und nicht danach, was es bedeutet, und wie erkannt werden kann, daß das Recht gilt, gefragt wird. Kelsen does not want to explain what it means that a norm is valid. He merely says that if we want to establish that a norm is valid, this can only take place by referring its validity to another validity. […] The statement ‘the norm N is valid’ is meaningless if understood in an absolute sense. It must be transformed in the following way: The norm N1 is relatively valid to the norm N0, i. e. N1 can be logically derived from N0, with no exception. This is an error in Kelsen’s formulation of the problem right from the start: Kelsen accepts – surely under the influence of historical continuity – the usual approach to problem, according to which we ask about the grounds of validity and not what validity means and also how it can be recognized that the law is valid. Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1929, 260

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Kelsen

Ross Basic norm (Grundnorm)

Dieser Stufenbau mündet in der die Einheit der Rechtsordnung in ihrer Selbstbewegung begründenden Grundnorm. Indem diese allererst ein das Recht erzeugendes Organ einsetzt, bildet sie die Verfassung in einem rechtslogischen Sinne. Und indem der solcherweise geschaffene Gesetzgeber Normen setzt, die die Gesetzgebung selbst regeln, entsteht – als nächste Stufe – die Verfassung im positivrechtlichen Sinne. Doch liegt die ‚Konstitution‘, d. h. die Konstituierung der einzelstaatlichen Rechtsordnung, die Begründung ihrer Einheit, eigentlich in der als Verfassung im rechtslogischen Sinne bezeichneten, nicht gesetzten, sondern nur vorausgesetzten Grundnorm. This hierarchical, structural construction results in the basic norm, which is justified by the self-movement of the legal order understood as the unity. Since the basic norm creates the very first lawmaking body, it forms the constitution in a legal-logical sense. And since the legislator created norms in such a way that legislation itself is regulated, the constitution itself emerges – at the next level – in a juridico-positive sense. That is what the ‘constitution’ consist in, i. e. the constituting of the national legal system, the establishment of its unity, actually in terms of the constitution, in the juridico-logical sense, to an issued norm, but only a presupposed basic norm. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität, 1920, 29, 33 Anm., 97 Anm., 107 Ein [dynamisches System] liegt vor, wann die Grundnorm sich darauf beschränkt, einen bestimmten menschlichen Willen zur Setzung von Normen zu ermächtigen. […] Die von der Grundnorm ermächtigte Autorität kann dann ihrerseits wieder, sei es für den ganzen Bereich ihrer Zuständigkeit, sei es nur für einen Teilbereich, eine andere Autorität delegieren. A [dynamic system] is at hand when the basic norm confines itself to authorizing a certain human will to issue a set norms. […] The authority empowered by the basic norm can then, for its part, delegate power to another authority, be it for the whole area of its competence, even if only for one subarea. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre,1925, 99, 249, 251

Das Ideal für die normative Erkenntnis ist ein vollständiges, zusammenhangendes System, wo alle Elemente sich im Verhältnis zu einer obersten Norm – der Grundnorm – ableiten lassen. Das ist auf die beste Weise in Kelsens System zum Ausdruck gekommen. Kelsen hat nur einseitig die deduktive Entstehungsweise aus einer vorausgesetzten Grundnorm betont, aber, wie wir gezeigt haben, muß es von einer solchen Betrachtungsweise aus unfaßlich bleiben, welche Grundnorm Deduktionsbasis bilden soll. Das läßt sich nur durch vorausgehende Induktion bestimmen. Nur in der Weise wird die Positivität des Rechtes verständlich. Es ist kein Widerspruch, dass die Entstehungsweise zugleich induktiv und deduktiv ist; denn, wie wir mehreremale gesagt haben, sind diese nicht verschiedene und entgegengesetzte Prozesse, sondern ein und derselbe koordinierende Prozeß, von zwei Seiten gesehen. The ideal for normative knowledge is a complete, coherent system, where all elements can be derived in relation to a supreme norm – the basic norm. This is expressed in the best way in Kelsen’s system. Kelsen has only unilaterally emphasized the deductive mode of origin from a presupposed basic norm, but, as we have shown, it must remain incomprehensible from a view point that the basic norm seen as the basis of deduction. This can only be determined by previous induction. Only in this way can the positivity of law be understood. It is not a contradiction that the mode of origin is simultaneously inductive and deductive; because, as we have said several times, these are not different and opposite processes, but one and the same coordinating process, viewed from two sides. Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1929, 281

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

Kelsen

Ross Will of the State

In nationalen, religiösen, wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaften mag es zu einem Gesamtwillen kommen, nicht aber in einen rechtlichen, im staatlichen Verbande. Das, was hier als einheitlicher Wille erscheint, das Gesetz […], kann unmöglich als Gesamtwille des Staatsvolkes gelten. […] Daß die Mehrheit der Parlamentarier und deren Willensäußerung identisch sei mit dem gesamten Staatsvolke und diesen Willen, ist eine juristische Fiktion, die von Standpunkte der Psychologie – und das ist in dieser Frage der der organischen Staatstheorie – unhaltbar ist. In national, religious, scientific community a collective will may arise, but not in a legal, or state organization. What appears here as a unified will, the law […], can not possibly be considered as the collective will of the people of the state. […] The fact that the majority of parliamentarians and their expressions of will are identical with the people’s will of the entire state and this will, is a legal fiction, is untenable from the standpoint of psychology – and that is the standpoint of the organic state theory. […] die Identifizierung von Staatswillen und Gesamtwillen eine nicht scharf genug zu verdammende Fiktion ist. […] the identification of the will of the state and the collective will is a fiction that can never be condemned too sharply. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 1923, 165 f., 399

Das Gesetz existiert (ist da) und ist Recht. Das Gesetz (das Recht) wird dann auch vom Verfasser [i. e. Julius Binder] in naiv-positivistischer Weise als der faktische Volkswille definiert. Wie unter den „Willens-theorien“ erwähnt, ist diese Definition selbstverständlich ein Zirkel. Denn der „Volkswille“, der „Gesellschaftswille“ tritt doch nur rechtschaffend als Staatswille hervor, d. h. durch formgebenden Normen darüber, wie der Staatswille zur Existent gelangt, bestimmt. Diese Normen können aber nur rechtliche sein – wodurch der Zirkel offenbar wird. The statute exists (is at hand) and is law. The statute (law) is then also defined by the author [i. e. Julius Binder] in a naïve-positivist way as the factual will of the people. As mentioned under “Will Theory”, this definition is obviously circular. For the “will of the people”, the “will of society” only emerges, legally speaking, as the will of the state, i. e. it is determined through formulating norms about how the will of the state comes to exist. But these norms can only be legal – what makes the circle evident. Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1929, 255

Despite the fact that we can observe a certain correspondence between the concepts presented in the chart, no copying and no plagiarism occurred. For instance, Ross agrees on the necessary distinction between ‘is’ (Sein) and ‘ought’ (Sollen), yet in this short excerpt, one can clearly see that he attempts to invent a category to include both Sein and Sollen. According to Ross, Kelsen did not explain what validity means (which, as the quote shows, is not accurate); moreover, Ross claimed that law had no other ‘validity’ than an empirical one. The Danish scholar partially agrees with Kelsen on the nature of legal science, but he tried to stress the factual element, which later turned into the claim that the propositions of legal science should be predictions about how judges will decide future cases. When it comes to the basic norm, Ross tried to prove that the mode of its origin was simultaneously inductive and deductive. Additionally,

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Ross’s analysis of the concept of the will of the state shows clearly that he, again, agreed with his master; however, his argument, being logical, was far more credible. This short juxtaposition and the analysis of Theorie of Rechtsquellen demonstrates that Ross was inspired by Kelsen, had analysed similar issues and had maybe even ‘fallen in love’ (as Bentzon claimed à propos regarding his dissertation59). However, Ross’s theory can hardly be classified as ‘imitation’ or ‘plagiarism’. To make a final point, once again let us examine the famous Longman dictionary definition of ‘plagiarism’. First, it is defined pragmatically, as an activity ‘when someone uses another person’s words, ideas, or work and pretends they are their own’; second, as the result or product of such an activity, as ‘an idea, phrase, or story that has been copied from another person’s work, without stating where it came from’. Does this definition apply to Ross’s work? The answer is negative when we compare the ideas presented above in the table. But what about the remainder of his book? In the whole volume, Kelsen is mentioned 153 times and there are over 40 footnotes referring to his works. That sounds fair (especially in comparison to the four footnotes in Ross’s Kritik referring to Axel Hägerström’s ideas), but the number of references is, of course, not decisive evidence. In my opinion, what could help in evaluating scientific work, as much as in art (compare e. g. the Sturtevant and Warhol case60), is the opinion of the creator of the original idea; that is, the judgement made by the individual whose work was allegedly ‘plagiarised’. Consequently, we can perhaps reformulate the Longman definition by adding a clause of exception: ‘Plagiarism’ happens: (1) when someone uses another person’s words, ideas, or work and pretends they are their own, (2) unless the original author has authorised (or even welcomed) such a use of her/his ideas. Undoubtedly, the author of the allegedly plagiarised work knows best if his/her work has been plagiarised, or not. Therefore, such a subjective clause is in order as a supplement to the objective condition expressed by (1). Thus, we can claim that Kelsen’s theory was truly an important stimulus for Ross and he has never denied it: Of crucial importance to me was the impression I received during my stay in Vienna from Professor Hans Kelsen’s captivating researcher personality. Thanks to the inspiration I received, I made the plan for the present work, and when I worked it out, the thought of Professor Kelsen’s encouraging suggestion was often the best help.61

In this context, what is crucial for Ross’s ‘plagiarism’ case is Kelsen’s reaction to Ross’s letter from the 15th of November 1932. The Danish scholar, after receiving harsh reviews concerning Theorie der Rechtsquellen, wrote to his Vienna master. In the letter, dated 27th of November 1932, Kelsen not only expressed his support, but he explicitly evalu59 60 61

Evald, (footnote 2), 129. Shore, (footnote 49), 14 ff. Ross, (footnote 11), VII.

The Impact of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory on Alf Ross’s Ideas

ated Theorie as independent scholarship. He wrote: ‘Dass diese [Ihre wissenschaftliche Entwicklung] über die Anregungen hinaus geht, die Ihnen die reine Rechtslehre geboten, begrüsse ich.’62 Even if we agree with Ross’s biographer Jens Evald that ‘Kelsen’s letter can, however, also be read as an expression of the fact that the master was satisfied that his apprentice reproduced his ideas’, should we not take into account how the master himself evaluated the book? If plagiarism is a kind of stealing,63 should not the robbed person’s opinion matter? Should not the creator’s or inventor’s assessment – in our case Kelsen’s approval and high estimation of Ross’s work  – be essential in the evaluation of the originality of Ross’s work? We have already answered these questions positively by adding a condition of exception (2) to the Longman definition. Finally, I would like to quote Kelsen’s general advice to Ross on academic work, which seems to be, in my opinion, very important, not only for young scholars facing accusations of plagiarism, but also for problems of other sorts within any given university career: More important and first of all more satisfying than [any] university career is the consciousness of the creative power, the certainty that one has something to say in his field.64 Urszula Kosielińska-Grabowska

Department of Political Science, Pedagogical University of Cracow, Podchorążych 2 30-084 Kraków, Poland, [email protected]

“That it [your scientific development] goes beyond the suggestions offered to you by the pure theory of law, I appreciate.” Cited by courtesy of Jens Evald, who shared a copy of Hans Kelsen’s letter to Alf Ross with me (dated November 27, 1932). 63 The word “plagiarism” comes from the Latin “plagiarius” = “thief ”, from “plagium” = “hunting net”. 64 In original: “Wichtiger und vor allem befriedigender als Universitätskarriere, ist das Bewusstsein schöpferischer Kraft, die Gewissheit, dass man auf seinem Gebiete etwas zu sagen hat”. Excerpt from Hans Kelsen’s letter to Alf Ross (dated November 27, 1932). Cited by courtesy of Jens Evald. 62

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Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre Die Turiner Schule und die Rezeption Hans Kelsens in Italien MARIO G. LOSANO

Abstract: The mid-19th century reforms introduced philosophy of law into the Kingdom

of Piedmont. Later, following Italian unification, these then spread to all universities throughout the new state. In Turin the legal philosopher Gioele Solari considered a command of German to be essential; thus in 1932 two of his students went to Germany, with Norberto Bobbio going to Heidelberg to meet Husserl, and Renato Treves travelling to Cologne to meet Kelsen. Treves then translated the first edition of the Reine Rechtslehre in 1933, which thereby became known also in Italy. Bobbio on the other hand “converted” to Kelsen only in 1949 and it was under his aegis that the second edition was translated in 1966, which became established in Italy also through his teaching. Keywords: Beginning of the legal philosophy in Italy, Norberto Bobbio and Edmund Hus-

serl, Renato Treves and Hans Kelsen, European Dictatorships and Universities, Exile and Teachers, Pure Theory of Law in Italy Schlagworte: Anfang der Rechtsphilosophie in Italien, Norberto Bobbio und Edmund

Husserl, Renato Treves und Hans Kelsen, Europäische Diktaturen und Universitäten, Exil und Dozenten, Reine Rechtslehre in Italien

1.

Die Rechtsphilosophie und die Schule von Turin

Die Verbreitung von Kelsens Theorien in Italien ist eng mit dem Unterricht der Rechtsphilosophie an der Universität von Turin verbunden. Dieser Unterricht weist

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eine längere Tradition auf, sodass man von einer „Turiner Schule“ sprechen kann.1 Diese Tradition bezieht sich nicht so sehr auf die methodologische oder doktrinelle Einheit, sondern eher auf die persönliche enge Verbundenheit zwischen den Lehrmeistern und ihren Schülern: eine Tradition, die seit mehr als einem Jahrhundert andauert. Die Geschichte der Rechtsphilosophie in Turin beginnt im Königreich Piemont noch vor der Einigung Italiens, als mit der Reform von Minister Cesare Alfieri 1846 das Lehrfach „Rationale Rechtsprinzipien“ eingeführt wurde. Das war eines der Ergebnisse der damals günstigen Haltung gegenüber dem Liberalismus und sollte 1848 im Albertinischen Statut gipfeln. 1846 wurde der Lehrstuhl für „Enzyklopädie und Rechtsgeschichte“ Pietro Luigi Albini anvertraut.2 Das Lehrfach bestand aus zwei Teilen: Einem analytischen Teil, den wir heute als „Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft“ bezeichnen würden, und einem Teil, der die Rechtsgeschichte betraf. 1849 übernahm Albini den Lehrstuhl für „Rationale Rechtsprinzipien“: Dies sollte den Beginn für die Rechtsphilosophie in Turin einläuten. Diesem Thema widmete Albini 1857 sein Buch „Prinzipien der Rechtsphilosophie“. Albini war Mitglied der Kommission für die Reform des Rechtsunterrichts an der sabaudischen Universität und über dieses Thema unterhielt er eine rege Korrespondenz mit Karl Mittermaier. Als Ergebnis dieser Aktivitäten wurde die Doppel-Disziplin der juristischen Enzyklopädie in zwei voneinander unabhängige Lehrstühle aufgeteilt, und zwar in „Rechtsgeschichte“ (im Titel von Albinis Buch aus dem Jahr 1847 liest man „in Italien“, denn zu jener Zeit gab es noch kein „italienisches Recht“) und in „Rechtsphilosophie“. Mit der Einigung Italiens im Jahre 1861 wurde die sabaudische Gesetzgebung auch auf das neue italienische Königreich angewendet und die Rechtsphilosophie, die sich auch aus dem Briefwechsel zwischen Albini und Mittermaier entwickelt hatte, somit ein Pflichtfach an allen Universitäten des neuen Königreiches. Es ist an dieser Stelle nicht möglich, die verschiedenen Richtungen der Rechtsphilosophie jener Jahre in Italien zu analysieren. Es sei lediglich darauf hingewiesen, dass sie sich – mit einigen Ausnahmen einzelner Dozenten – von den allgemeinen philosophischen Ansätzen von Rosmini und Gioberti inspirieren ließen, jedoch in Turin mit einer konstanten Ausrichtung: dem Interesse für die sozialen Probleme. Ich habe schon auf die Kontinuität der persönlichen Verbindung unter den verschiedenen Dozenten hingewiesen, die nacheinander den Lehrstuhl in Turin innehatten. Auf Pietro Luigi Albini, von 1863 bis 1872, folgten über kurze Zeiträume verschiedene Dozenten; dann konsolidierte sich die Turiner Schule mit Giuseppe Carle von 1872 bis

Über die Turiner Schule und, im Allgemeinen, über Bobbio und seine Welt: Mario G. Losano, Norberto Bobbio Una biografia culturale, Carocci, Roma 2018, 510 S. 2 Mario G. Losano, Alle origini della filosofia del diritto a Torino: Pietro Luigi Albini (1807–1863) Con due documenti sulla collaborazione di Albini con Mittermaier, Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 2013, 104 S.; id., I carteggi di Pietro Luigi Albini con Federico Sclopis e Karl Mittermaier (1839–1856) Alle origini della filosofia del diritto a Torino, Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 2014, 304 S. 1

Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre

1917, auf den von 1918 bis 1948 Gioele Solari und schließlich von 1945 bis 1972 Norberto Bobbio folgten: also exakt ein Jahrhundert Rechtsphilosophie in Turin. Nur zwei absolut außergewöhnliche Ereignisse unterbrachen für kurze Zeit diese Kontinuität: die zwei Weltkriege. Es handelte sich nicht nur um eine didaktische Kontinuität, sondern auch um eine Kontinuität der Zuneigung, denn jeder der Schüler schrieb eine Biografie über seinen Lehrmeister: Solari über Carle, Bobbio über Solari. Parallel zu dieser persönlichen kommt die europäische kulturelle Kontinuität, denn zur französischen Kultur – die im sabaudischen Piemont immer präsent war – kam das Interesse für die deutsche Kultur hinzu, deren Wurzeln im Bereich der Rechtsphilosophie in der Beziehung zwischen Albini und Mittermaier lagen. Auch für Gioele Solari, den Lehrmeister von Bobbio, konnte man ohne Deutschkenntnisse kein Rechtsphilosoph sein. So traten seine Schüler, die nach Abschluss ihres Universitätsstudiums eine akademische Karriere anstrebten, den Weg nach Deutschland an. 2.

Die Schule von Turin und die Reise nach Deutschland im Jahre 1932

Norberto Bobbio (1909–2004) erinnert sich, dass in seinen Jugendjahren, d. h. um 1930, „Deutschland die Heimat der Philosophie, des Rechts und der Rechtsphilosophie war“. Er fährt fort: „Die bedeutendsten italienischen Philosophen der vorhergehenden Generation, Giorgio Del Vecchio, Adolfo Ravà und auch Gioele Solari, mein Lehrmeister, waren von der deutschen Kultur geprägt. In ihren Büchern finden wir zahlreiche Hinweise und Zitate aus Werken, die in den berühmtesten Universitäten Deutschlands entstanden waren. Die englische und amerikanische Literatur war hingegen nahezu unbekannt“.3 Bobbio promovierte in Turin 1931 als Rechtsphilosoph an der Juristischen Fakultät und 1934 in Theoretischer Philosophie an der Philosophischen Fakultät. Gleich nach seinem Hochschulabschluss schrieb er 1931 an Solari, dass er die Universitätskarriere einschlagen wollte, jedoch eine mit eindeutig nicht-kelsenscher Orientierung: Er wolle sich dem Studium des Neukantianismus widmen, denn „nur in einer bewussten und sicheren Kritik dieses Modells sind die Grundlagen und die Berechtigung der neuen Philosophie“ zu finden.4 In der Zeit zwischen den zwei Universitätsabschlüssen schob er 1932 in seine Ausbildung eine Reise nach Deutschland ein. Er unternahm sie mit dem Turiner Freund und

3 Norberto Bobbio, Diritto e potere Saggi su Kelsen, ESI, Napoli 1992, S. 5 (Prefazione); Norberto Bobbio, Diritto e potere Saggi su Kelsen, (hrsg. von Tommaso Greco und mit einer Einführung von Agostino Carrino), Giappichelli, Torino 2014, S. 1. 4 Norberto Bobbio a Gioele Solari, Rivalta Bormida, 28 agosto 1931, in: Angelo D’Orsi, La vita degli studi Carteggio Gioele Solari – Norberto Bobbio 1931–1952, Angeli, Milano 2000, S. 91–94.

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künftigen Rechtssoziologen Renato Treves (der sich in Köln mit Hans Kelsen traf) und mit dem künftigen Wissenschaftsphilosophen Ludovico Geymonat (der in Göttingen seine Mathematikstudien vertiefte). Die Freundschaft dieser drei Gelehrten hielt ein ganzes Leben lang (trotz der unterschiedlichen wissenschaftlichen und auch politischen Interessen), aber wir wollen unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die brüderliche Freundschaft zwischen meinen Lehrmeistern Norberto Bobbio und Renato Treves konzentrieren, denn diesen beiden ist die Verbreitung der Reinen Rechtslehre in Italien und darüber hinaus zu verdanken. a)

Bobbio in Heidelberg: seine Begegnung mit Husserl

Bobbio hielt sich in Heidelberg auf, wo er seine Kenntnisse der Husserlschen Philosophie vertiefte, was sich für ihn jedoch nur als ein kurzfristiges Interesse erwies. Der „Philosophie der Krise“ näherte sich Bobbio (wie er 1944 schrieb) „mit entgegengesetzten Gefühlen: mit Anziehung und mit Abstoßung“, denn „man kann sich nur durch die eigene Erfahrung davon befreien“.5 In Wirklichkeit stellt das gelungene Buch von 1944 über La filosofia del decadentismo (Die Philosophie des Dekadentismus) für Bobbio „den Wendepunkt zwischen seiner ersten und seiner zweiten Lebensphase“ dar,6 denn es beendet die „Vorgeschichte“ seiner intellektuellen Tätigkeit. Die eigentliche Geschichte seines geistigen Wirkens beginnt in der Demokratie der Nachkriegszeit und maßgeblich mit seiner „Bekehrung“ zu Kelsen im Jahre 1949. Abschließend kann man sagen, dass der Aufenthalt in Deutschland im Jahre 1932 zu verschiedenen Ergebnissen für die zwei Turiner Freunde führte: „Während Kelsens Verbreitung in Italien mit Treves begann, [so Bobbio,] […] gab es nie eine Fortsetzung meiner Studien über die Phänomenologie“.7 b)

Treves in Köln: seine Begegnung mit Kelsen

Renato Treves (1907–1992), der wie Bobbio ein gebürtiger Turiner und Schüler von Gioele Solari war, promovierte mit einer Arbeit über Saint-Simon und wollte sich eigentlich weiter mit Positivismus, Soziologie und Sozialismus befassen.8 Aber die Jahre Norberto Bobbio, La filosofia del decadentismo, Chiantore, Torino 1944, 124 S.; Zitate auf S. 9, 10, 8 der Premessa. 6 Norberto Bobbio, De senectute e altri scritti autobiografici, Einaudi, Torino 1996, S. 151. 7 Bobbio, Diritto e potere, zit., S. 5. 8 Norberto Bobbio, Renato Treves, “Atti dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino”, 1993, Bd. 127, S. 97–103; id., Ricordo di Renato Treves, “Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto”, 1993, S. 3–12; Mario G. Losano, Renato Treves, sociologo tra il Vecchio e il Nuovo Mondo. Con il regesto di un archivio ignoto e la bibliografia di Renato Treves, Unicopli, Milano 1998, VIII, 210 S. 5

Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre

nach 1930 waren die am wenigsten geeigneten Jahre für derartige Studien: Der Faschismus hatte gerade seinen größten Erfolg und Treves konzentrierte seine Studien folglich auf den Idealismus, auf die neukantianische Schule von Marburg und auf Hans Kelsen. Deshalb wählte er 1932 Köln als Ziel seiner Reise nach Deutschland und traf sich mit Kelsen. Aus dieser Reise stammt sein Buch von 1934: Il diritto come relazione (Recht als Beziehung Essay über den zeitgenössischen Neukantianismus). 1933 musste Kelsen als erster die Willkür der Diktatur erfahren: Er wurde von der Universität Köln als Sozialist verwiesen und musste sich eine andere akademische Position außerhalb Deutschlands suchen. Zu diesem Zweck schrieb Kelsen eine Zusammenfassung seiner Reinen Rechtslehre und schickte sie an die Kollegen verschiedener europäischer Universitäten, damit sie diese übersetzten und in einer Zeitschrift ihres Landes veröffentlichten. Der größte italienische Rechtsphilosoph jener Jahre war Giorgio Del Vecchio in Rom und Kelsen schickte auch ihm jenen Aufsatz mit der Bitte, ihn in der „Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto“ („Internationale Zeitschrift der Rechtsphilosophie“) zu veröffentlichen, die Del Vecchio leitete und in der schon vorher ein Artikel von Kelsen erschienen war. Del Vecchio kannte die Schwierigkeiten, mit denen sich Kelsen in Deutschland herumschlagen musste, denn Del Vecchio selbst – obwohl Faschist – war auch Jude. Bei Del Vecchio überwog jedoch sein akademisches Pflichtgefühl: Der Aufsatz von Kelsen konnte nicht in der Zeitschrift von Del Vecchio veröffentlicht werden, denn hierin wurden nur Originalaufsätze veröffentlicht; doch platzierte er den Aufsatz noch im selben Jahr, 1933, in einer anderen bedeutenden italienischen wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift9 und die Übersetzung wurde einem jungen Italiener anvertraut, der Kelsen persönlich kannte: Renato Treves. 1967 erinnert sich Treves an seine Begegnung mit Kelsen folgendermaßen: „Ich lernte Kelsen in Köln im September 1932 kennen. Ich hatte ihm einen Besuch abgestattet, da ich zu jener Zeit an seinen Schriften arbeitete und mir von ihm einige Erklärungen über die philosophische Grundlage seines Gedankens erhoffte. Während des Besuchs jedoch sprachen wir nicht nur über technische Themen der Rechtsphilosophie; das Gespräch betraf auch andere Themen und vor allem die politische Lage jener Tage. Der Sieg der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung war erkennbar und Kelsen […] machte keinen Hehl aus seinen Absichten, Deutschland schnellstmöglich zu verlassen und in ein anderes Land gehen zu wollen, wo er seine wissenschaftliche und didaktische Arbeit in Freiheit fortführen könnte. – Kurz nach meinem Besuch schickte mir Kelsen die maschinengeschriebene Abschrift einer neuen unveröffentlichten Arbeit, welche die erste noch unvollständige Fassung des Werkes enthielt, das wir hier vorstel-

Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto Metodo e concetti fondamentali. Traduzione di Renato Treves, “Archivio Giuridico Filippo Serafini”, 1933, Bd. 110, n. 2, S. 121–171. Dieser Text zirkulierte später selbstständig als Sonderdruck: Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto Metodo e concetti fondamentali. Traduzione di Renato Treves, Società Tipografica Modenese, Modena 1933, 53 S. 9

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len“,10 d. h. die erste Ausgabe der Reinen Rechtslehre, mit der wir uns in Kürze befassen werden. c)

Geymonat in Göttingen: Ausrichtung zur Philosophie der Wissenschaft

Zwei Worte zu Ludovico Geymonat (1908–1991): Er promovierte 1932 in Mathematik und zwei Jahre später promovierte er (wie Bobbio) bei Annibale Pastore auch in Theoretischer Philosophie. Nach seiner Reise im Jahre 1932 mit den zwei Freunden aus Turin, die ihn nach Göttingen führte, ging er 1934 zu einem Studienaufenthalt nach Wien. Dieser Aufenthalt sollte für seine Zukunft als Wissenschaftsphilosoph richtungweisend sein: Er nahm Kontakt zum Wiener Kreis und insbesondere mit Moritz Schlick und seiner Schule auf.11 Geymonat wurde ein renommierter Wissenschaftsphilosoph und (im Unterschied zu Bobbios und Treves’ gemäßigten Positionen) vertrat er in der Kommunistischen Partei Italiens radikale linksgerichtete Standpunkte, weshalb er von der Partei ausgeschlossen wurde. 3.

Bobbio als Antikelsenianer: seine Dissertation

An der Universität verfolgte der knapp zwanzigjährige Bobbio den damals in Italien vorherrschenden Gedanken, d. h. den Idealismus von Benedetto Croce. Das war damals die einzige Möglichkeit, dem faschistischen Einheitsgedanken jener Jahre zu entkommen und sich einem Philosophen anzuschließen, der schon 1925 das Manifesto degli intellettuali antifascisti (Das Manifest der antifaschistischen Intellektuellen) veröffentlicht hatte. In dieser Dissertation, mit der Bobbio 1931 in der Juristischen Fakultät promovierte, findet man zwei Hinweise auf Kelsen. Beide sind einigermaßen kritisch, aber sie zeigen, dass Bobbio die Reine Rechtslehre schon genau kannte: „In Deutschland führte die Rechtswissenschaft zu einem starren Formalismus, welcher in der Neukantianischen Philosophie von Stammler und Kelsen mündete“;12 außerdem: „führte Kelsen diesen Formalismus, der vermutlich von Kant abgeleitet worden war, zu seinen äu-

Renato Treves, Prefazione [Milano, 1967], S. 11, in: Hans Kelsen, Lineamenti di dottrina pura del diritto, Einaudi, Torino 1967, 227 S., bis heute mehrmals neuveröffentlicht. Vgl. außerdem: Hans Kelsen – Renato Treves, Formalismo giuridico e realtà sociale. A cura di Stanley L. Paulson, Edizioni scientifiche italiane, Napoli 1992, 211 S. 11 Zu Geymonat vgl. Norberto Bobbio, La mia Italia, Passigli, Firenze 2000, S. 96–112; id., Ludovico Geymonat (1908–1991), “Atti dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino”, 1993, Bd. 127, S. 73–80 (fast wörtlich wiedergegeben in id., Ricordo di Ludovico Geymonat, „Rivista di Filosofia“, 1993, S. 3–19). 12 Norberto Bobbio, Filosofia e dogmatica del diritto, Tesi di Laurea in Filosofia del Diritto, 1931, S. 150; unveröffentlichtes Typoskript, aufbewahrt im Archivio Storico dell’Università di Torino. Eine Bewertung von 10

Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre

ßersten Konsequenzen“, sodass „die Rechtswissenschaft zur formellen Wissenschaft par excellence wurde; die Allgemeine Rechtslehre neigte tendenziell dazu, sich in eine ‚Reine Rechtswissenschaft‘ zu verwandeln“.13 Diese aseptischen Formulierungen sind nicht respektvoller Ehrfurcht geschuldet, denn der junge Bobbio erlaubte sich gerne auch bissige kritische Formulierungen. Zum Beispiel haben die antihusserlianischen Anmerkungen von Julius Kraft – „kelsenianischer Rechtsphilosoph und demzufolge Formalist“  – für Bobbio den Beigeschmack der Bemerkungen eines Kunstlaien zu einem modernen Bild – „obwohl sie häufig auch zutreffen und anregen zum Nachdenken“.14 In einem Buch des Jahres 1934 betont Bobbio kritisch, dass „die Neukantianer bei der Analyse der juristischen Erfahrung die Rechtsbegriffe zur Kategorie erhoben hatten“; sie hatten jedoch „kein Kapitel hinzugefügt, das vorher fehlte“, sondern „sie hatten einzig und allein den unmissverständlichen Sinn verdreht“.15 Der neukantianischen Philosophie, die ihm unfruchtbar erscheint, zieht der junge Bobbio den damals in Italien dominierenden Neuidealismus von Croce und Gentile vor. Diese Auffassung der Rechtsphilosophie ist auch in den ersten akademischen, zweifellos antiformalistischen Büchern von Bobbio vertreten: „Damals war ich nicht so sehr ein Nicht-Kelsenianer, sondern vielmehr ein Anti-Kelsenianer“,16 schrieb er 1992, und Jahre später bezeichnet er selbst seine Annäherung an die Reine Rechtslehre von Kelsen als eine „Bekehrung“.17 Der Verweis auf diese Bekehrung taucht auf diesen Seiten mehrmals auf und es ist deshalb angebracht, darauf hinzuweisen, dass Bobbio selbst diese Bezeichnung benutzt: „Ich spreche von ‚Bekehrung‘, denn nur so erkläre ich einerseits die Vergessenheit, in die ich meine vorangegangenen juristischen Schriften geraten ließ, und andererseits das schon mehrmals wiederholte Geständnis, dass mit dem gewaltsamen Bruch mit der Vergangenheit, der zwischen 1934 und 1946 die Geschichte unseres Landes kennzeichnete, ein Bruch meines privaten und öffentlichen, intellektuellen und moralischen Lebens einherging. Incepit vita nova“.18

Bobbios Stellung in seinen Lehrjahren gegenüber Kelsen ist zu finden in Mario G. Losano, Norberto Bobbio. Una biografia culturale, S. 214–219. 13 Bobbio, Filosofia e dogmatica del diritto, Tesi di Laurea, zit., S. 163 f. 14 Bobbio zitiert: “Kraft, Von Husserl zu Heidegger (Leipzig 1932)” (Bobbio, La fenomenologia di Husserl, Tesi di Laurea in filosofia teoretica, 1934, S. 192 f., Fn 2; unveröffentlichtes Typoskript, aufbewahrt im Archivio Storico dell’Università di Torino. 15 Bobbio, Filosofia e dogmatica del diritto, Tesi di Laurea, zit., S. 200; seine Kritik des Neukantianismus endet auf S. 205. 16 Bobbio, Diritto e potere, zit., S. 5 (Prefazione). 17 Losano, Norberto Bobbio. Una biografia culturale, zit., S. 218 f. 18 Bobbio, Diritto e potere, zit., S. 7, vgl. auch Losano, Norberto Bobbio Una biografia culturale, zit., S. 218 f.

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4.

Treves als Kelsenianer: die Übersetzung von Kelsen und das Exil

Die Verfestigung des Faschismus zwang Treves zu einer radikalen Veränderung seines Lebens. Wie von Bobbio in der bereits erwähnten Passage festgestellt, geht Kelsens Rezeption in Italien erst mit der Übersetzung von Renato Treves (von dem ich in Kürze sprechen werde) einher, obwohl der erste von Kelsens Aufsätzen schon 192419 ins Italienische übersetzt worden war und sogar einige seiner Aufsätze über die Demokratie unter der Schirmherrschaft des faschistischen Ministers Bottai20 in der Schule für Korporationsstudien der Universität Pisa übersetzt und veröffentlicht wurden. Der Aufsatz von Kelsen über seine Reine Rechtslehre des Jahres 1933 entstand im Jahr der Machtübernahme des Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland. Fünf Jahre später verabschiedete auch Italien seine ersten rassistischen Gesetze. So schiffte sich Treves 1938 nach Argentinien ein, in ein Exil, das bis zum Kriegsende dauern wird. Seine argentinischen Erlebnisse und seine Studien der Rechtssoziologie (ein Fach, das er später – bei seiner Rückkehr nach Kriegsende – nach Italien bringen wird) wurden in Studien vertieft, auf die wir hier nur verweisen können;21 wir wollen unsere Aufmerksamkeit mehr auf die italienische Rezeption der Reinen Rechtslehre lenken. Sie begann mit der bereits erwähnten Übersetzung von 1933, die Renato Treves von Del Vecchio anvertraut worden war. Jener Artikel in der Fachzeitschrift und der entsprechende Sonderdruck kursierten nur unter Fachleuten, denn die deutsche und die italienische Diktatur kontrollierten das kulturelle Leben immer eingehender, verabschiedeten rassistische Gesetze (welche die Veröffentlichung und sogar die Erwähnung von Schriften jüdischer Autoren verboten) und schließlich bereiteten sie den Krieg vor, der in Deutschland 1939 und in Italien 1940 ausgebrochen ist.

Die erste in Italien veröffentlichte Schrift Kelsens ist aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach Diritto pubblico e privato, “Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto”, 1924, S. 340–357. Ein Panorama der Rezeption Kelsens in Italien findet sich in: Mario G. Losano, La fortuna di Kelsen in Italia, in id., Forma e realtà in Kelsen, Comunità, Milano 1981, S. 179–212. 20 Über das Interesse der Pisanischen Faschisten für Kelsen als Theoretiker der Demokratie, vgl. meine Einführung Tra democrazia in crisi e corporativismo in ascesa: il primo libro italiano di Hans Kelsen, in: Hans Kelsen – Arnaldo Volpicelli, Parlamentarismo, democrazia e corporativismo. Prefazione e cura di Mario G. Losano, Nino Aragno Editore, Torino 2012, S. 7–79. 21 Carlo Nitsch, Renato Treves esule in Argentina, Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 2014, 239 S.; Mario G. Losano, Renato Treves, sociologo tra il Vecchio e il Nuovo Mondo. Con il regesto di un archivio ignoto e la bibliografia di Renato Treves, Unicopli, Milano 1998, VIII, 210 S. 19

Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre

5.

Der Beginn der Demokratie in Italien und Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zu Kelsen (1949)

In seinen frühen Werken ist Bobbio sehr kritisch jedoch respektvoll gegenüber Kelsen; nach und nach verwandelt sich dieser Respekt in Aufmerksamkeit und schließlich verwandelt sich die Aufmerksamkeit in Zustimmung. Diese Annäherung erfolgte in Padua im Laufe seiner Vorlesungen 1940–1941 über die Rechtsquellen (durch „einen Paragraphen über den Stufenbau des Rechtssystems, der mich seit damals faszinierte“) und in den Vorlesungen im darauffolgenden Jahr 1941–1942 über das subjektive Recht („die letzten Seiten enthalten eine mit deutlicher Zustimmung präsentierte Darstellung der kelsenianischen Kritik am subjektiven Recht“).22 Am Ende wurde diese offensichtliche Sympathie für Kelsen im Jahre 1949 in der Kritik an der allgemeinen Rechtstheorie von Francesco Carnelutti deutlich: Der oberflächlichen Kritik von Carnelutti setzt Bobbio eine Erläuterung der kelsenianischen Lehre entgegen, die einer Zustimmung gleichkommt. „Wenn ich ein Datum bestimmen müsste, mit dem meine Werke der Reife beginnen“, so Bobbio, „würde ich das Jahr 1949 angeben, als ich in Italien eine Analyse und einen Kommentar zur Teoria generale del diritto (Allgemeine Rechtstheorie) von Francesco Carnelutti“23 veröffentlichte. 6.

Die Rückkehr von Treves und „Die Reine Rechtslehre“ als Band (1952)

Treves konnte sich erst nach seiner Rückkehr nach Italien im Jahr 1947 der Verbreitung der Reinen Rechtslehre widmen. Für jene, die aus rassistischen oder politischen Gründen entlassen worden waren, sah das Gesetz nun die Wiedereingliederung in die vorherige berufliche Position vor, aber die Verfahren waren schwerfällig und erforderten viel Zeit. Erst zu Beginn der 1950er Jahre konnte Treves wieder seine Übersetzung des Kelsenschen Textes aufnehmen und so schlug er dem von Giulio Einaudi geleiteten Turiner Verlag eine neue italienische Auflage vor. In der Zwischenzeit war Norberto Bobbio – mit dem Treves während seines argentinischen Exils immer in Verbindung geblieben war – von der Universität von Padua zu jener von Turin zurückgekehrt und zwar auf den Lehrstuhl von Gioele Solari. Bobbio war auch ein einflussreicher Berater im Einaudi-Verlag. Nach Diktatur und Krieg konnte die Schule von Turin wieder ihre Aktivitäten aufnehmen.

Bobbio, Diritto e potere, zit., S. 6. Norberto Bobbio, Prólogo a la edición española, in Contribución a la teoría del derecho. Edición a cargo de Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Fernando Torres, Valencia 1980, S. 10. Eine sorgfältige Darstellung von Bobbios rechtstheoretischem Denken ist in der Einleitung zu jenem Buch enthalten: Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Bobbio y el positivismo jurídico italiano, S. 15–58; und vor allem im wichtigen Buch von Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Filosofía y derecho en Norberto Bobbio, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid 1983, 509 S. 22 23

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Dank des wieder aufgefrischten Kontakts zwischen Bobbio und Treves übernahm der Einaudi-Verlag 1952 die Überarbeitung und die Veröffentlichung einer Neufassung des 1933 übersetzten kelsenianischen Aufsatzes. Der Text von 1933 erfuhr einige Änderungen, die Treves folgendermaßen zusammenfasst: „Teil dieser Arbeit wurde von mir aus dem nicht veröffentlichten, deutschen Original mit dem Titel Die Reine Rechtslehre Grundlegende Methoden und Konzepte, 1933 im ‚Archivio Giuridico‘24 übersetzt. Die vorliegende Arbeit ist die völlig neue Übersetzung des umfassenderen Werkes samt Vorwort, das 1934 im Verlag Franz Deuticke, Leipzig und Wien, unter dem Titel Reine Rechtslehre Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik erschien.“25 In der Übersetzung bei Einaudi wurde der deutsche Untertitel weggelassen und der Titel des Bandes war nur Die Reine Rechtslehre. Diese gekürzte Formulierung machte später eine geringe Änderung des Titels erforderlich; doch damit werden wir uns in Kürze befassen. Das Buch wurde in die von Antonio Giolitti und Norberto Bobbio 1943 gegründete „Collana di cultura giuridica“ („Reihe der Rechtskultur“) aufgenommen; nach 1945 wurde diese in „Reihe der Rechts- und Politikkultur“ umbenannt. Das Buch aus dem Jahre 1952 ist umfassender als der Artikel von 1933, denn Treves hat ein Vorwort des Übersetzers hinzugefügt sowie Kelsen zwei Aufsätze, die er in den Vereinigten Staaten geschrieben hatte.26 Mit dieser Ausgabe von 1952 beginnt also die erfolgreiche Verbreitung der Reinen Rechtslehre in Italien, die sich mit den zahlreichen darauffolgenden Ausgaben dieses Werkes und mit der Übersetzung der zweiten deutschen Ausgabe im Jahre 1960 weiter behauptet hat. 7.

Die zweite Ausgabe der „Reinen Rechtslehre“ (1966)

Es ist gebräuchlich, dass der Verlag, der ein Werk eines Autors übersetzt hat, die Option auf die Übersetzung des folgenden Werkes hat. So hat der Einaudi-Verlag 1960 auch die Übersetzungsrechte der zweiten Ausgabe der Reinen Rechtslehre erhalten. Dieses Werk unterschied sich von dem des Jahres 1952, das Renato Treves in Italien vorgelegt hatte. Die Grundauffassung war dieselbe, aber der Umfang der zweiten Ausgabe stieg deutlich an. Von der ersten Ausgabe konnte man, wie von den Seiten Senecas, nichts wegnehmen; zur zweiten Ausgabe konnte man, wie zu den Seiten Ciceros, nichts hinzufügen. Wenngleich dem Werk derselbe konzeptuelle Ansatz zugrunde lag, waren die

Vgl. Fn. 9. Renato Treves, Prefazione del traduttore, S.  15, in: Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto, Einaudi, Torino 1952, 203 S. 26 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, “Harvard Law Review”, 1941, S. 44–70; id., Causality and Imputation, “Ethics”, 1950, S. 1–11. Beide Essays waren schon von Kelsen selbst in die Auflage von 1934 der Reinen Rechtslehre aufgenommen worden. 24 25

Bobbios „Bekehrung“ zur Reinen Rechtslehre

zwei Ausgaben sehr unterschiedlich und deshalb benötigte die zweite Ausgabe eine neue Übersetzung. In jenen Jahren kam ich an die Juristische Fakultät in Turin; ich besuchte die Seminare von Bobbio und legte bei ihm am 3. Juni 1959 meine erste Prüfung ab: Dieses Datum stellt den Beginn einer über vierzigjährigen Verbundenheit dar. Mit einer Vertrauensgeste, die mich heute noch verwundert, betraute Bobbio mich – der noch sein Student war – mit der Übersetzung der zweiten Ausgabe der Reinen Rechtslehre.27 Das Übersetzen von Kelsen unter der Aufsicht von Bobbio war für mich eine unvergleichliche Bildungserfahrung. Im Laufe der Übersetzungsarbeit und in der Erwartung ihrer Veröffentlichung schickte mir Hans Kelsen mehrere Briefe mit Korrekturen und Ergänzungen, die ich in der Endversion der Arbeit berücksichtigte und die jetzt in der Studienausgabe von 201728 aufgenommen worden sind. Die Briefe wurden überdies getrennt veröffentlicht.29 In jenem Schriftwechsel beschlossen wir auch, die Titel der zwei kelsenschen Werke des Einaudi-Katalogs zu differenzieren: die Ausgabe von Treves des Jahres 1952 bekam den Titel Lineamenti di dottrina pura del diritto (Grundzüge der Reinen Rechtslehre),30 während der klassische Titel Die Reine Rechtslehre der zweiten italienischen Ausgabe von 1966 vorbehalten wurde. Der Anhang über die Gerechtigkeit der zweiten deutschen Ausgabe wurde in Italien als getrenntes Büchlein veröffentlicht.31 Die drei Werke von Kelsen gibt es noch heute im Katalog des Einaudi-Verlags und seit ihrer Veröffentlichung trugen sie nicht nur in Italien, sondern auch im Ausland, besonders in den romanischen Ländern zur Verbreitung der Reinen Rechtslehre bei. Treves hatte seine Kontakte mit den südamerikanischen Kollegen sowie mit den spanischen Kollegen aufrechterhalten, die während des Franquismus ihr Land verlassen hatten und erst nach 1975 nach Spanien zurückgekehrt waren. Die Gelehrten Gregorio Peces Barba aus Madrid und Celso Lafer aus São Paulo sowie ihre zahlreichen Schüler Die Übersetzung war 1962 fertig, die Veröffentlichung verzögerte sich jedoch, weil die Reihe im Verlag Einaudi umgestaltet wurde: Hans Kelsen, La dottrina pura del diritto. Saggio introduttivo e traduzione di Mario G Losano, Einaudi, Torino 1966, CIII, 418 S. (Nuova Biblioteca Scientifica Einaudi). Vgl. § 3.7. (Bobbio e la filosofia del diritto nella casa editrice Einaudi), in: Losano, Norberto Bobbio. Una biografia culturale, zit., S. 185–187. 28 Die Korrekturen, die Hans Kelsen mir für die italienische Übersetzung zusendete, wurden als Fußnoten in der italienischen Ausgabe aufgenommen; auf Deutsch sind sie nun in: Reine Rechtslehre Studienausgabe der 2  Auflage 1960, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2017, einverleibt, mit einem Kommentar des Herausgebers Matthias Jestaedt, S. LXXX ff. 29 Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac (Hrsg.), Con esattezza kelseniana Precisazioni sulla Dottrina pura del diritto nelle lettere di Kelsen a Losano, Giuffrè, Milano 2003, XIV, 98 S.; das Buch enthält auch die Schrift von Ruth Erne, Eine letzte authentische Revision der Reinen Rechtslehre, „Rechtstheorie“ (Beiheft 5: Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen), 1984, S. 35–62. 30 Hans Kelsen, Lineamenti di dottrina pura del diritto. Traduzione di Renato Treves, Einaudi, Torino 1967, 227 S. (Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi). 31 Hans Kelsen, Il problema della giustizia. A cura di Mario G. Losano, Einaudi, Torino 1975, XXXIX, 133 S. (Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi). 27

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beziehen sich auf Bobbio und – sowohl durch Bobbio wie auch direkt – auf Kelsen. Bobbio hatte sich einen lustigen Reim ausgedacht: „Di una cosa io mi glorio: | della scuola di Gregorio“ (Auf eine Sache bin ich stolz: | Auf die Schule von Gregorio). 8.

Bobbio von der Rechtsphilosophie zur Politikphilosophie: die kelsenianische Kontinuität (1972)

Wie bei Kelsen enthält auch die Lehre Bobbios sowohl die Rechtsphilosophie wie auch die politische Theorie. Bis 1972, als er zur Fakultät für Politische Wissenschaften wechselte, beschäftigte sich Bobbio vorwiegend mit der Rechtsphilosophie. Ab jenem Jahr überwogen bei Bobbio die politologischen Studien, auch wenn sein Interesse für die Rechtsphilosophie nicht verschwand.32 So endet das Jahrhundert der Rechtsphilosophie in Turin: Es fing im Jahr 1872 mit Giuseppe Carle an und endete im Jahre 1972 mit dem Wechsel von Bobbio zur Fakultät für Politische Wissenschaften. Kelsen begleitete Bobbio auch in dieser Phase seiner Überlegungen, denn Bobbio berief sich ständig auf den Begriff der Verfahrensdemokratie, der von Kelsen stammte. Wir können hier abschließend bemerken: Mit dem Jahr 1972 hatte sich die Reine Rechtslehre von Kelsen in Italien etabliert und Juristen und Politologen können – billigend oder ablehnend – nicht umhin, sich darauf zu berufen. Mario G. Losano

Accademia delle Scienze, Via Maria Vittoria 3, 20121 Turin, Italien, [email protected]

Dieser Periode in Bobbios Leben ist die ganze Parte terza meines Bandes Norberto Bobbio Una biografia culturale, zit., S. 325–452, gewidmet. 32

Did Walter Jellinek Invent Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm? STANLEY L. PAULSON

Abstract: Walter Jellinek (1885–1955), in Gesetz, Gesetzesanwendung und Zweckmäßigkeits-

erwägung (1913), offered a clear statement of a basic norm. Kelsen criticized Jellinek’s concept in some detail in Das Problem der Souveränität and then returned to the issue in later work, in a far more relaxed way. It is not at all obvious that Kelsen was influenced by Jellinek in his own work on the basic norm. Still, the comparison of their respective approaches and, in particular, Kelsen’s reactions at different points in his work to Jellinek are instructive. Keywords: Walter Jellinek, Hans Kelsen, basic norm, validity, genesis, legal change Schlagworte: Walter Jellinek, Hans Kelsen, Grundnorm, Geltung, Genese, Rechtsänderung

The career of Hans Kelsen’s basic norm (Grundnorm) has been one of notoriety. Some have found it simply baffling – to draw on Churchill, “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”. One way of contending with the basic norm is largely to ignore it, a stance evident in certain circles favourably disposed to Kelsen’s legal philosophy. Kelsen himself, however, seems to have placed great stock in the notion, writing that “the presuppositions of legal cognition are implied as a part of the sense of the basic norm”,1 that “the normative import of all the material facts constituting the legal system” is “[r]ooted in the basic norm”,2 that the basic norm “confers law-creating power”3 and therefore represents “the point of departure for a procedure: the procedure for creating the positive law”.4 Hans Kelsen, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus (Charlottenberg 1928) [hereafter: PhG], § 10 (26) (emphasis in original). All translations from German texts stem from the author and Bonnie Litschweski Paulson. 2 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Oxford 1992), a translation by Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson of the first edition of the Reine Rechtslehre [hereafter: LT], § 29 (58). 3 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (Cambridge, Mass. 1945) [hereafter: GTLS], 116. 4 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, second edition (Vienna 1960) [hereafter: RR 2], § 34(c) (202). 1

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Should one seek to lend a modicum of sense to this most puzzling of all the concepts in Kelsen’s répertoire, various approaches are at hand. For example, it would be reasonable to track the various forms of the basic norm, where “form” is for the most part taking its cues from Kelsenian norm theory.5 Thus, the form adumbrated in the third and fourth quotations in the previous paragraph suggests the empowering norm qua form of the basic norm, to wit: the basic norm qua ultimate basis of the empowerment to issue legal norms.6 Or, one might turn to the ostensible functions of the basic norm, say, a grounding function alongside an explicative function, and this alongside a unifying function.7 In the present paper, my tack is to ask: did Walter Jellinek invent Kelsen’s basic norm? Therein lies a set of interesting developments, turning both on what Jellinek was up to and on how Kelsen responded. Walter Jellinek,8 in a major treatise, Statute, Statutory Application, and an Examination of Purposiveness (1913), introduces his own basic norm or, as he puts it, the

See generally Stanley L. Paulson, “The Makings of a Radical Norm Theory”, in Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie Robert Alexys System, ed. Martin Borowski et al. (Tübingen 2017), 589–630. 6 It turns out, not surprisingly in my view, that the basic norm qua ultimate empowerment is the most frequently encountered characterization of the basic norm in Kelsen’s writings. See e. g. Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff (Tübingen 1920), § 17 (at 101 n.); Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin 1925), § 19(c) (at 99), § 36(a)(b) (at 249, 251); Kelsen, PhG (Fn. 1), § 3 (at 12), § 8 (at 19), § 9 (at 20), § 10 (at 21); Kelsen, LT (Fn. 2), § 30(a) (at 59); Kelsen, GTLS (Fn. 3), at 113, 116; Kelsen, RR 2 (Fn. 4), § 34(b)(c)(g) (at 199, 202–3, 219). (These references to Kelsen’s texts on the characterization of the basic norm qua ultimate empowerment are meant to be representative, but they are of course by no means exhaustive.) 7 See e. g. Stanley L. Paulson, “A ‘Justified Normativity’ Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law?” in Institutionalized Reason. The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, ed. Matthias Klatt (Oxford 2012), 61–111, at 85–92; Stanley L. Paulson, “Das regulative Prinzip als Rettung der Reinen Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens?” in Wissenschaftsphilosophie im Neukantianismus, ed. Christian Krijnen and Kurt Walter Zeidler (Würzburg 2014), 259–88. 8 Walter Jellinek (1885–1955), son of the celebrated public lawyer and legal theorist Georg Jellinek, studied public law with the giants in the field, to wit: he was awarded the doctorate in 1908, supervised by Paul Laband in Strassburg; his Habilitation, completed in 1912, was supervised by Otto Mayer in Leipzig. Jellinek held a professorship first in Kiel, then in Heidelberg, where he was professor of law to the end of his life, with the exception of the Nazi period (ousted from his professorship in 1935 on the authority of the notorious statute of 7 April 1933). Jellinek’s main field of research was administrative law. Along with the treatise cited below (Fn. 9), his treatise Verwaltungsrecht is significant (see Fn. 10); it went through five editions, the last of them published posthumously (1966). Jellinek’s doctoral dissertation, Der fehlerhafte Staatsakt und seine Wirkungen (Tübingen, 1908), is an influential study of the treatment accorded to mistakes in the law; Kelsen, in an early paper, discusses the book at length, see Hans Kelsen, “Über Staatsunrecht”, Grünhuts Zeitschrift für das Privat- und Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart 40 (1914), 1–114, at 47–95, in Hans Kelsen Werke, ed. Matthias Jestaedt (Tübingen 2008 ff.), over 30 vols. projected [hereafter: HKW with volume no.], HKW 3, 439–531, at 476–515. The secondary literature on Walter Jellinek’s life and work includes Klaus Kempter, Die Jellineks 1820–1955 Eine familienbiographische Studie zum deutschjüdischen Bildungsbürgertum (Düsseldorf 1998), 440–97 et passim; Kempter’s treatise is unusually rewarding. See also Martin Schulte, “Walter Jellinek (1885–1995)”, in Staatsrechtslehrer des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Peter Häberle et al. (Berlin 2015), 299–311. Jan Ziekow, “Die Einhelligkeit der Rechtsentscheidung – Zu Leben und Werk Walter Jellineks”, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 111 (1986), 219–30; Klaus-Peter Schroeder, “Eine Universität für Juristen und von Juristen”. Die Heidelberger Juristische Fakultät im 19 und 20  Jahrhundert (Tübingen 2010), 457–68 et passim. In his treatise A History of Public Law in Germany 1914–1945, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Oxford 2004), at 147, 185–6, 190, and 202–4, Michael Stolleis gives the reader a glimpse into Jellinek’s role at meetings during the Weimar period of the Association of German Public Law Teachers. 5

Did Walter Jellinek Invent Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm?

“highest principle of all legal systems”.9 He introduces this “highest principle” as follows: If in a community, a highest wielder of power – be it the people, be it a monarch, be it a particular social class – is at hand, then what he or it commands ought to be obeyed.10

Jellinek points out that this principle, while utterly distinct from the law of nature, can nevertheless be compared with it in certain respects. [I]t has the same inviolability as the law of nature. Just as with the law of nature, the [highest principle of all legal systems] is independent of reality; reality consists simply of instances of the application of the [respective] principles. Revolutions, the formation of states, the destruction of states, constitutional norms, and so on are material facts to which the highest principle attaches effects.11

Thus, the highest principle, Jellinek is claiming, attaches “effects” to various “material facts”. What sorts of effects does Jellinek have in mind? He argues, for example, that a constitutional norm cannot specify that the organ it has established as lawmaker is “more powerful” than the various social forces in reality. “[I]n a revolution, the lawmakers will fall along with everything else”.12 Thus, in an idiom familiar from James Bryce and A. V. Dicey, Jellinek is contending that no claim of legal sovereignty can reach beyond the social forces in reality that represent political sovereignty.13 What is the status of Jellinek’s principle? Does he understand it as normative in character? His answer stems from a very brief commentary on a passage from Hobbes’s De Cive. Hobbes writes: [W]e may understand likewise as a Corollarie in the naturall state of men, That a sure and irresistible power confers the right of Dominion, and ruling over those who cannot resist.14

Jellinek quotes the latter clause of Hobbes’s text (beginning with “That”) and concludes that Hobbes’s principle is a “practical rule”, a “dictate of right reason”, which is

9 Walter Jellinek, Gesetz, Gesetzesanwendung und Zweckmäßigkeitserwägung (Tübingen 1913) [hereafter: Gesetz], 27 ( Jellinek’s emphasis omitted). 10 Ibid. 28, 178. Jellinek’s “highest principle” turns up in later works, too. See Walter Jellinek, Verwaltungsrecht, 1st edn (Berlin 1929), at 112–13 and 113 n., in the 2nd edn (1929), at 112 and 112 n., and in the 3rd edn (1931), 119 and 119 n. 11 Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn. 9), 28. 12 Ibid. 27. 13 See James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, 2 vols. (Oxford 1901), vol. 2, at Essay X (49–111); A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th edn (London 1915), at 68–83. 14 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive. The English Version. Originally entitled: Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society (first publ. Latin 1642, English 1651), ed. Howard Warrender in the Clarendon Edition of the Philosophical Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. 3 (Oxford 1983), ch. 1, xiv (50) (emphasis in original).

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to say that it is normative in character.15 Jellinek’s own principle, however, is different; it counts as a “theoretical explanation of legal reality”.16 This is not to say that Jellinek would have his principle understood as empirical rather than normative. His principle and the law of nature are neither empirical nor normative; both are “independent of reality”17 and occupy, so to speak, a third sphere. Jellinek puts his principle to work in explaining legal change. “Every change in reality”, he writes, “is understood only through the idea of cause and effect.”18 And changes in the law? How are they to be understood? On the one hand, natural causality is pervasive in the law. On the other, peculiarly legal changes – that a statute becomes valid at a particular point in time, that it is abrogated at a later point in time, and so on – are “certainly not explained by way of ascriptions of natural causality”.19 The required explanation, whatever it comes to in the end, is to be sharply distinguished from explanations stemming from natural causality. In speaking of peculiarly legal changes, Jellinek employs the language of causation, but in a framework that is altogether distinct from natural causality. The theory he defends turns on the idea of a “double cause”. The statute is the primary cause, and the application of the statute – the instantiation of the type of fact set out in the antecedent of the hypothetically formulated statutory provision – gives rise to the concrete material fact as the secondary cause. “The legal consequence emerges from the combined effect of two causes.”20 Quite apart from the question of whether this causal terminology is helpful, Jellinek is clear on the distinction between his position and that of natural causality.21 Kelsen, in The Problem of Sovereignty (1920), raises three objections to Jellinek’s scheme. First, he writes, “the highest principle of all legal systems” cannot be embedded in a legal community, for this highest principle first establishes the community. Apparently Kelsen understands Jellinek’s highest principle as constitutive of the legal community. Jellinek might have a rejoinder here. He might ask: must the “highest

Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn.  9), 28 n. Oddly enough, Jellinek does not quote the passage from De Cive that would justify his claim that Hobbes’s principle counts as a “dictate of right reason”. The passage from De Cive in question here follows directly upon the text Jellinek quotes, and it reads: “Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature (i e ) of War, by reason of that equality of power, and other humane faculties they are endued withall. Wherefore to seek Peace, where there is any hope of obtaining it, and where there is none, to enquire out for Auxiliaries of War, is the dictate of right Reason; that is, the Law of Nature, as shall be shewed in the next Chapter.” Hobbes, De Cive (Fn. 14) (emphasis in original). See also Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (first publ. 1651), at ch. 13 and 14. 16 Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn. 9), 28 n. 17 Ibid. 28. 18 Ibid. 26 (emphasis in original). 19 Ibid. (emphasis in original). 20 Ibid. 27. 21 Not at all clear, however, is the question of how Jellinek’s “highest principle of all legal systems” serves to explain peculiarly legal changes. 15

Did Walter Jellinek Invent Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm?

principle” be independent of that which it constitutes? If certain rules serve to constitute a game, are they not, so to speak, embedded in the game? Next, Kelsen turns to a related objection: the presupposition of a “highest wielder of power”, Kelsen contends, is a petitio principii, for one becomes a highest wielder of power only by means of the “hypothesis of a ‘highest’ authority”.22 This is obscure, but it appears that Kelsen, in referring to the “hypothesis of a ‘highest’ authority”, is making reference to his own basic norm. Here, too, Kelsen is apparently treating Jellinek’s principle as constitutive. Then, however, Kelsen pulls the rug out from under us, announcing that these are not “decisive objections”.23 Indeed, one is tempted to add, they do not count as objections at all, for they represent the very confusion that Kelsen, elsewhere in his writings, goes to great pains to clear up: the confusion between genesis and validity, Genese und Geltung.24 That is, it is possible to interpret Jellinek’s “highest principle” in either of two ways – either in terms that reflect its manner of coming into being or in terms that reflect its status, whether – a standard reading of “validity” – it holds. Thus, the principle might be understood as constitutive – Kelsen’s interpretation of Jellinek’s principle – or as validating. If, now, Jellinek’s own reading of the principle reflects the latter interpretation, namely the highest principle as validating, then Kelsen cannot legitimately raise objections that turn on Jellinek’s “highest principle” as a constitutive principle – not, at any rate, without adducing arguments to the effect that Jellinek’s own reading is mistaken. Simply to attribute to Jellinek the constitutive reading, without further ado, is to construct a strawman. Kelsen, however, is ready with a third objection to Jellinek’s principle. As we have seen, Jellinek argues that his highest principle enjoys the same “inviolable” status as the law of nature. “Like the law of nature”, Jellinek writes, “the highest principle cannot be abolished.” Kelsen replies: [T]his parallel to the law of nature could be discussed were it not for the fact that Walter Jellinek’s juridical law of nature gives expression to the relation of cause and effect… [T]his confounding of natural reality with legal reality is something I must emphatically reject.25

Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (Tübingen 1920) [hereafter: PS], § 24 (at 98 n.), in HKW 4 (Fn. 8), at 363–4 n., quoting from Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn. 9), 27. 23 Kelsen, PS (Fn. 22), § 24 (at 98 n.), in HKW 4 (Fn. 8), at 363–4 n. 24 Kelsen offers an elegant statement of the distinction: “The psychological determination [of an idea] is irrelevant to the (logical) validity of the idea, the truth of its content. The thought process whose content is the Pythagorean theorem is, for the correctness of the theorem, inconsequential.” Kelsen, PS (Fn. 22), § 3 (16) (emphasis in original). Indeed, the statement can be compared favourably with Frege’s: “No description of … mental processes which precede the forming of a judgement of number … can ever take the place of a genuine definition of the concept.” Gottlob Frege, Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau, 1884), § 26 (34). 25 Kelsen, PS (Fn. 22), § 24 (at 98 n.), in HKW 4 (Fn. 8), at 363–4 n. 22

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This criticism of Kelsen’s is not warranted. Jellinek addresses peculiarly legal changes, and it is in this context that he distinguishes the statute as the primary cause from the concrete material fact as the secondary cause. Nothing here warrants the claim that Jellinek has confounded “natural reality with legal reality”. One could go further in spelling out Jellinek’s rejoinder. For example, he might reply to Kelsen that he is working with two altogether separate distinctions. First, there is the distinction between the normative and the empirical, with Jellinek’s “highest principle” addressed to the former and the law of nature addressed to the latter. Second, there is the distinction between, on the one side, the two spheres – one normative and the other empirical – and, on the other side, a third sphere, that in which both Jellinek’s “highest principle” and the law of nature are found. It goes without saying that one can quarrel with Jellinek’s distinctions. But to proceed as though he had not made these distinctions, to say, as Kelsen does, that Jellinek “confound[s] natural reality with legal reality”, marks a failure on Kelsen’s part to address Jellinek’s position. The examination of Kelsen’s objections to Walter Jellinek prompts the thought, gender aside: “Methinks the lady doth protest too much.” Many years later, Kelsen refers once again to Walter Jellinek, suggesting, this time around, that Jellinek played a key role in the development of the basic norm as Kelsen understands it. Challenging his critic, Albert Volanthen, who writes that “[t]he basic norm is one of the most fundamental innovations of the Pure Theory of Law”,26 Kelsen, nothing if not pugnacious, rejects Volanthen’s suggestion. As Kelsen explains, writing in 1966: I first employed the concept of the basic norm, namely, as a “highest norm, presupposed as valid”, in an article … that appeared in 1914… . But, as I expressly acknowledged in my monograph The Problem of Sovereignty, … Walter Jellinek (in a monograph of 1913) spoke of a “highest principle of all legal systems”, which he formulated in a manner very similar to my own formulation of the basic norm. … Walter Jellinek’s “highest principle of all legal systems” is different from my basic norm, as I explain in the work cited above, but the two are so similar that I cannot be characterized as the “inventor” – or, as Volanthen puts it, the “discoverer” – of this concept.27

Albert Volanthen, Zu Hans Kelsens Anschauung über die Rechtsnorm (Berlin 1965), 30. Kelsen, “Rechtswissenschaft oder Rechtstheologie”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 16 (1966), 233–55, at 241 (emphasis and quotation marks in original). Kelsen also mentions Walter Jellinek in a second paper from this period, Hans Kelsen, “Recht, Rechtswissenschaft und Logik”, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 58 (1966), 545–52, at 549. Here he speaks of an “earlier parallel” between his own basic norm and Walter Jellinek’s, inviting the attention of the critic to whom he is responding here, Ch. Boasson, to the discussion of Jellinek’s views as taken up by Kelsen in The Problem of Sovereignty. Here, too, the thrust of the paper stands in sharp contrast to the treatment Kelsen accords to Walter Jellinek in The Problem of Sovereignty. 26 27

Did Walter Jellinek Invent Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm?

This, it scarcely need be added, is rather more charitable to Jellinek than Kelsen’s estimate in The Problem of Sovereignty. What general conclusions can be drawn? Nothing in Kelsen’s remarks in the 1966 paper suggests that he was actually influenced by Jellinek. One the one hand, one might speculate, when Kelsen writes that he “cannot be characterized as the ‘inventor’… of this concept”, he is perhaps suggesting that he is willing to share the limelight with another thinker, Walter Jellinek, where the initial development or “invention” of the basic norm is concerned. On the other hand, the reader may well protest, it is not obvious that this bit of speculation can be taken seriously. Perhaps Kelsen’s position in the paper is simply a reflection of his polemical stance vis-à-vis Volanthen. Of course we do not know. It is, however, of interest in this connection that Kelsen’s remarks in the 1966 article devoted to Volanthen’s monograph are strikingly polemical. In any case, what he says in 1966 is clearly not a view that he was prepared to defend in The Problem of Sovereignty. As one would expect, a number of people in legal theory offered their views on Kelsen and Walter Jellinek vis-à-vis the basic norm. Fritz Sander, the enfant terrible of the Vienna School of Legal Theory and a gifted and unusually well-informed student of Kelsen’s work, contended in a paper of 1924 that Jellinek’s basic norm and Kelsen’s are “identical”.28 Sander’s comparison is interesting. He invites attention to the fact that (i) both basic norms are conceptual necessities, not legal norms, (ii) both have reference to the unity of law,29 and (iii) both are inviolable. Still, there are also undeniable differences. Jellinek’s three-sphere scheme, with the “highest principle” and the law of nature found in a third sphere,30 has no counterpart in Kelsen’s theory, and Kelsen, unlike Sander, introduces a number of basic norm forms, not just the form that reflects the idea of the unity of law. By 1924, the date of Sander’s paper, this plurality of basic norm forms was fairly clear. Others, too, have introduced the notion of a basic norm, for example, Edmund Husserl, who takes up a basic norm at several points in the “Prolegomena” to his Logical Investigations.31 My focus in the present paper, however, has been on Walter Jellinek. Can one say – drawing on my title – that Walter Jellinek invented Hans Kelsen’s basic norm? I am inclined to answer negatively. Of course we cannot rule out a possible

See Fritz Sander, “Merkls Rechtslehre”, Wissenschaftliche Vierteljahrsschrift zur Prager Juristische Zeitschrift 4 (1924), 16–31, at 24. A comparable claim stems from Walter Jellinek, Grenzen der Verfassungsgesetzgebung (Berlin 1931), at 16 n. 30; there Jellinek writes that “Kelsen’s fundamental norm” (Ursprungsnorm) is not essentially different from [his own] highest principle”. Hermann Heller, Souveränität (Berlin and Leipzig 1927), at 55 n. 155, repr. Heller, Gesammelte Schriften, 3 vols., ed. Christoph Müller, 2nd edn (Tübingen 1992), vol. 2, 31–202, at 77 n. 155, turns to both concepts, Jellinek’s and Kelsen’s, with blistering criticism. 29 See, on this, Jellinek, Gesetz (Fn. 9), at 175, to which Sander (Fn. 28) refers. 30 See the text at Fn. 17 above. 31 See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations (first publ. 1900), 2 vols., trans. J.N. Findlay (London, 1970), vol. 1, § 14 (at 85–6), § 16 (at 87–8). 28

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influence stemming from Jellinek, but it seems more likely that Kelsen is following the cues that he had first set out in Main Problems in the Theory of Public Law (1911). In Main Problems, Kelsen is contrasting at this point the stance of the jurist with that of the moral philosopher. He writes that the question: “why ought the legal norm be complied with and applied?” is off limits for the jurist. Indeed, he continues, “the very posing of this question seems on first glance to be absurd”. And it remains absurd for as long as one is considering the matter from the standpoint of jurisprudence. For it is intrinsic to the concept of the legal norm from the outset that the legal norm ought to be complied with and applied. The idea of the legal norm qua ‘norm’ already contains the qualification that the legal norm ought to be complied with and applied, so that this question would be tantamount to asking, say, why ought a norm that ought to be complied with be complied with?32

The punch line comes at the end of the quotation, and it underscores Kelsen’s view that this line of enquiry is nonsense, the result of proceeding as though jurisprudence, with its distinctly formal stance, could sensibly pose and answer the overriding material questions. What happens, now, if everything is in fact turned upside down? What happens if the formal stance of jurisprudence is set aside and, with it, the idea that the legal norm is a formal concept? Only then, from the standpoint of a “more general, higher norm”, can one make sense of the question of obligation: If … one does not assume the normative character of the legal norm to be a self-sufficient, independent quality, not derivable from anything else, then the question of why a legal norm ought to be complied with can be understood as a question about the more general, higher norm that is superior to the legal norm at issue. For it is according to this higher norm that behaviour complying with the legal norm appears to be commanded, to be obligatory.33

This “more general, higher norm” is a norm of morality or religion. Of course one is free from this standpoint to pose the question of obligation as a material question. Unless everything is in fact turned upside down, however, the jurist will not have this freedom. It is for the moral philosopher to weigh critically an answer to the question of obligation, while for the jurist the normative character of the legal norm is an unshakeable presupposition, beyond all discussion. For the jurist, the knowledge that a legal norm conflicts with a moral norm cannot in any way change the fact that he recognizes even this legal norm as a norm, that is, he

Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Tübingen 1911) [hereafter: HP], 352 (emphasis and quotation marks in original), in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), 481. 33 Kelsen, HP (Fn. 32), 352, in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), 481. 32

Did Walter Jellinek Invent Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm?

does not doubt that it ought to be complied with and applied. Any other stance on the part of the jurist would have him sawing off the very branch on which he sits.34

Kelsen also refers to presuppositions in the Foreword to the first printing of Main Problems, writing that his point of departure, in addressing the problems of legal science, is “rooted in a Weltanschauung, presuppositions that are subjective and do not lend themselves to discussion”.35 Presupposition proves to be the key concept in Kelsen’s work on the basic norm in his first efforts, in 1914 and 1915,36 and then continuing right up to, but not including, the remarkable treatise of 1928, The Philosophical Foundations of Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism At that point, a great deal changes. On the one hand, Kelsen builds certain constraints into the basic norm with an eye to meeting the minimal but necessary requirements of legal cognition, and, on the other, he takes steps in the direction of an argument – a neo-Kantian transcendental argument – with an eye to undergirding the basic norm as his means of grounding the legal system.37 But this is material for another occasion. Stanley L. Paulson

Hermann Kantorowicz-Institut, Juristisches Seminar, Leibnizstr. 6, D-24118 Kiel, [email protected]

Kelsen, HP (Fn. 32), 353 (my emphasis), in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), 481, see also Kelsen’s use of the verb “to presuppose” in HP, at 352, in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), at 481. 35 Kelsen, HP (Fn. 32), v, in HKW 2 (Fn. 8), 54. 36 See Hans Kelsen, “Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung”, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 32 (1914), 202–45, 390–438, at 216–17, in HKW 3 (Fn. 8), 359–425, at 371; Hans Kelsen, “Eine Grundlegung der Rechtssoziologie”, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 39 (1914/15), 839–76, at 849–50, in HKW 3 (Fn. 8), 317–58, at 329–30. 37 See Kelsen, PhG (Fn. 1), §§ 10–12 (at 21–6), § 35 (at 64). 34

359

Rechtliche Natur des Staates nach Leonid Pitamic The Legal Nature of the State according to Leonid Pitamic MARIJAN PAV Č NIK

Abstract: Leonid Pitamic considers the state as a normative phenomenon. Its core con-

sists of legal rules saying which territory, population and organizations belong to the state and to which organizations this quality cannot be attributed: “The state is a juridical organization of men which is (1) established on a certain territory, which is (2) subject directly to international law, but which has (3) authority over all juridical organizations on its territory save those which depend directly upon international law.” Thus, Pitamic qualifies the concept of the sovereignty of the state. The state is the highest juridical organization on its territory, yet international law, to which it is subject, is positioned higher. International i. e. supranational rules are a necessary condition for sound relations among states. Keywords: state, state as juridical organization, sovereignty of the state, international law,

human order, Leonid Pitamic Schlagworte: Staat, Staat als Rechtsorganisation, Staatssouveränität, Völkerrecht, men-

schliche Ordnung, Leonid Pitamic

1.

Einführung

Leonid Pitamic (1885–1971)1 war ein Zeitgenosse Kelsens. Kelsens Biograph Métall berichtet, dass Kelsen noch während des (Ersten) Weltkriegs, als er begann die Frage

Über Pitamic siehe Adolf Merkl, Prof. Dr. Leonidas Pitamic zum 70.  Geburtstag, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 7 (1956), 145–147; Ivan Tomšič, Leonidas Pitamic in memoriam, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 23 (1972), 201–203, und Marijan Pavčnik, Leonid Pitamic (1885–1971), in: Leonid Pitamic, Na robovih čiste teorije prava / An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre (Hrsg. und Einführungsstudie: Marijan Pavčnik), 2005. Nachdruck: 2009 (in der Fortsetzung abgekürzt als „Pitamic, An den 1

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der Souveränität zu erforschen, ein Privatseminar gründete, wo ein Kreis von jüngeren Forschern offen über rechtstheoretische Probleme diskutierte. Zu ihnen gehörten Adolf Merkl (1890–1970), Leonid Pitamic und Alfred Verdross (1890–1980), nach Kriegsende schlossen sich noch andere an.2 Aus diesem Kreis entstand allmählich „Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule“, die „sich im wesentlichen unter dem unmittelbaren Einfluss Hans Kelsens entwickelt hat.“3 In Pitamic’ Fall spielten auch Merkls Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues (zusammen mit dem sogenannten Fehlerkalkül) und Verdross’ Naturrechtstheorie (zusammen mit seiner Ansicht über die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes) eine bedeutende Rolle. 2.

Der Staat als Rechtsvereinigung oder Rechtsorganisation

Kelsens Ausgangspunkt, dass Sollen (die Norm) nur aus Sollen und nicht aus Sein hervorgehen kann, klingt bei Pitamic in der Behauptung nach, dass man (normative – Anm. M.P.) Rechtseigenschaften nur aus Rechtseigenschaften deduzieren kann: „Maßgebend ist nur das Verhältnis der durch positivrechtliche Formalzeichen bestimmten Gruppe der Normen zu ihr positivrechtlich über- und untergeordneten Gruppen, was jedoch mit der Rechtskraft der Norm identisch ist.“4

Die normative Ansicht weitete er auch auf den Staat, die Staatsorgane und die Verhältnisse unter ihnen aus. Pitamic stellte schon in seiner Abhandlung Plato, Aristoteles und die reine Rechtstheorie (1921) fest, dass Plato und noch stärker Aristoteles „bei Erforschung der Begriffe Staat, Staatsbürger, Gesetz etc. streng normativ vorgingen“5 und fähig waren, methodischen Synkretismus zu vermeiden.6 Am Beispiel von Aristoteles’ Politik7 begründet er, dass für den Staatsbegriff „die Idee des Staates als OrdGrenzen der RR“), 337–340. – Der Verfasser dieses Beitrags hat sich schon mehrfach mit Pitamic beschäftigt. Aus diesem Grund gibt es einige Überlappungen mit den früheren Aufsätzen; siehe insbesondere die Abhandlungen: 1. An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre, in: Pitamic, An den Grenzen der RR (Fn. 1), 153–173; 2. Leonid Pitamic, in: Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner, Klaus Zeleny (Hrsg.), Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen Die Anfangsjahre der Reinen Rechtslehre, 2008, 325–350; 3. Methodologische Klarheit oder gegenständliche Reinheit des Rechts? Anmerkungen zur Diskussion Kelsen – Pitamic, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie – Beiheft 136 (2013), 105–129; 4. Methodological Clarity or the Substantial Purity of Law? Notes on the Discussion between Kelsen and Pitamic, Ratio Juris, 27 (2014) 2, 176–189; und 5. Čista teorija prava kot izziv / Reine Rechtslehre als Anregung, 2015. 2 Rudolf Aladár Métall, Hans Kelsen Leben und Werk, 1969, 29. 3 Métall, Hans Kelsen (Fn. 2), 29. Siehe auch Walter, Jabloner, Zeleny, Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen (Fn. 1). 4 Leonid Pitamic, Ustava in zakon (Verfassung und Gesetz), Slovenski pravnik, 36 (1922), 9. 5 Leonid Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 2 (1921), 700. 6 Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5), 683. 7 Aristoteles, Politik, III, 1278b: „Staatsverfassung aber bedeutet Ordnung des Staates, der anderen Ämter und vor allem des wichtigsten über alle; das wichtigste nämlich über alle ist die Lenkung des Staates, Staatslenkung aber bedeutet die Staatsverfassung.“ Zitiert nach der Reclam Ausgabe (1989); übersetzt von Franz F. Schwarz.

Rechtliche Natur des Staates nach Leonid Pitamic

nung, als Verfassungs- oder Rechtsordnung“ wesentlich ist.8 Für jede Verbindung ist „die Idee, das System, die Art der Verbindung, und nicht das Verbundene als entscheidend erkannt.“9 Pitamic erkennt, dass gerade darin eine Parallele besteht zwischen der altgriechischen Auffassung, „die von den konstruktiven Hilfsmitteln der modernen Jurisprudenz frei war“, und der Reinen Rechtslehre, welche „die Verselbständigung, Verdinglichung, Hypostasierung dieser Hilfsmittel wieder auflöst und sie lediglich als Hilfsmittel juristischer Denkökonomie gelten lassen will.“10 Das Grundwerk, in dem Pitamic die normative Natur des Staates untersucht, ist die slowenische Monographie Država (Der Staat, 1927 – nachgedruckt 1996 und 2009).11 Sie ist seiner Natur nach eine „allgemeine Staatslehre“.12 Pitamic übersetzte das Werk in leicht geänderter Form ins Englische und veröffentlichte es 1933 unter dem Titel A Treatise on the State beim amerikanischen Verlag J. H. Furst Company (Baltimore, Maryland).13 Er vertrat die Erkenntnis, dass des Staates ständiger Kern „eine Rechtsvereinigung oder Rechtsorganisation von Menschen“ sei. Im Mittelpunkt des Staates stehen wieder Rechtsnormen, die besagen, welches Gebiet, Volk und welche Gewalten zum Staat gehören und welchen Organisationen diese Qualität nicht zusteht: Der Staat ist „die Rechtsorganisation von Menschen auf einem bestimmten Gebiet, die unmittelbar dem Völkerrecht untergeordnet ist und der alle Rechtsorganisationen auf diesem Gebiet untergeordnet sind mit Ausnahme jener, die selbst unmittelbar vom Völkerrecht abhängen.“14

3.

Der Inhalt des Buches Der Staat

Pitamic’ Država (Der Staat) ist in sechs Kapitel aufgeteilt, die sich auf eine abgeschlossene Weise mit der rechtlichen (normativen) Natur des Staates befassen. Das erste

Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5), 688. Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5), 688. Siehe auch Alfred Verdross, Abendländische Rechtsphilosophie, 2. Aufl., 1963, 44. Vgl. Hans Kelsen, Gott und Staat, Logos, 11 (1922/23), 261–284. Zitiert nach dem Nachdruck in: Hans Klecatsky, René Marcić, Herbert Schambeck, Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule Ausgewählte Schriften von Hans Kelsen, Adolf Julius Merkl und Alfred Verdross, 1968, Bd. 1, 180. 10 Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5), 684. 11 Siehe auch die Abhandlung: Leonid Pitamic, Les déformations du raisonnement, sources d’erreurs dans les théories de l’Etat, Revue internationale de la théorie du droit, 1 (1926), 47–58; darin fasste er seine Auffassung vom Staat zusammen, die er ein Jahr später im Buch Država (Der Staat) entwickelte. 12 Siehe J. L. Kunz, A Treatise on the State. Von Leonidas Pitamic. 301 S. Baltimore: J. H. Furst Comp. 1933. Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 14 (1934), 2, 259. 13 Siehe ibidem, S.  259–261.  – Diese englische Übersetzung ist jetzt auch im Nachdruck erhältlich; sie wurde vom slowenischen Justizministerium im Herbst 2008 in Auftrag gegeben. 14 Leonid Pitamic, Država (Der Staat), 1927 (Dieses Buch wurde 1996 und 2009 anastatisch nachgedruckt.), 44. 8 9

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Kapitel spricht über das Wesen des Staates (S. 1–64).15 Der zweite Teil untersucht die Staatsformen (S. 65–174). Im dritten Teil ist von Staatsnormen die Rede (S. 175–271). Der vierte Teil analysiert die Staatsorgane (S.  272–445). Der fünfte Teil befasst sich mit dem Staat und dem zwischenstaatlichen Recht (Völkerrecht) (S. 446–455), während der sechste Teil das Verhältnis des Staates zu nichtstaatlichen Organisationen betrachtet (S. 456–464). Aus Platzgründen möchte ich mich besonders auf das Kapitel über das Wesen des Staates konzentrieren. 4.

Die Souveränität als Qualifikation des Staates

Für Pitamic’ Definition des Staates ist es charakteristisch, dass sie den Begriff der Staatssouveränität als der höchsten Rechtsgewalt relativiert. Die Staatsgewalt ist die höchste Gewalt auf einem bestimmten Territorium und bezüglich der Menschen, die sich darauf befinden, nach außen ist sie jedoch dem Völkerrecht untergeordnet. Die Staatssouveränität ist mit dem Bestehen des Völkerrechts unvereinbar. Der Staat ist die höchste Rechtsgewalt nach innen, auf ihrem Territorium sind alle Rechtsorganisationen außer den internationalen dem Staat und nur über ihn, also indirekt dem Völkerrecht untergeordnet.16 Dadurch erhält die Souveränität als Qualifikation des Staates „ihre ursprüngliche Bedeutung, nämlich ‚höher‘ (lat. superanus – M. P.) anstatt ‚höchster‘“.17 Der Staat ist also die höchste Rechtsorganisation auf dem Staatsterritorium, höher als er ist jedoch das Völkerrecht, dem der Staat untergeordnet ist. Völkerrechtliche Normen sind die Bedingung für die Festigkeit der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen.18 5.

Die Wirksamkeit und die Normativität des Staates

Der Umstand, dass der Staat von Pitamic normativiert wird, bedeutet nicht, dass der Staat für ihn lediglich und ausschließlich „ein ideelles System von Rechtsnormen“ ist. Wenn im Text nur Seitenzahlen angeführt sind, bedeutet das, dass ich mich auf Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), beziehe. 16 Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 40. 17 Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 40. Pitamic’ Ansicht über die Souveränität des Staates stimmt mit Kelsens Ansicht über die Zukunft des Völkerrechts überein; das Dogma der Staatssouveränität muss die Souveränität des Einzelstaates überschreiten. Siehe Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, 1920, 320. 18 Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 37. Vgl. auch Kelsen, der in seinem Werk Das Problem der Souveränität (Fn. 17) Pitamic’ Abhandlung Die parlamentarische Mitwirkung bei Staatsverträgen in Österreich (1915) zitierte und dabei darauf aufmerksam machte, dass Pitamic monistisch konstruiert, wenn er das Verhältnis zwischen Staats- und Völkerrecht behandelt. Siehe Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5), 176–177. 15

Rechtliche Natur des Staates nach Leonid Pitamic

Der Staat ist auch tatsächliche Gewalt, die sich „als die höchste Rechtsorganisation eines Staates“ gefestigt hat. Der Staatsgewalt kommt die Qualität der „Rechtsgewalt“ und somit „einer legitimen normativen Rechtsquelle“ auf einem bestimmten Gebiet zu, wenn sie durch das Völkerrecht bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt. Die Wirksamkeit des „ideellen Systems der Normen“ (das ist ihre Übereinstimmung, sagt Pitamic, mit den Geschehnissen in der Welt der Ursachen und Wirkungen) ermöglicht und verursacht, dass das Recht positiv und dadurch überhaupt Recht ist, so wie andererseits die Wirksamkeit des Rechts eine Bedingung dafür ist, dass auch der Staat selbst positiv ist. Wirksam müssen insbesondere jene Rechtsnormen sein, die Pitamic mit dem Staat gleichsetzt. Von diesen fundamentalen Rechtsnormen sagt er, dass sie die höchste, reale und wirksame Rechtsorganisation auf einem bestimmten Gebiet darstellen.19 Fundamentale Normen, die die höchste Rechtsorganisation (den Staat) bilden, beziehen sich auf gesetz- und verfassungsgebende Organe.20, 21 Diesen Normen rechnet er als „nicht weniger wichtig“ auch alle jene Normen zu, die „bestimmten Organen die Zuständigkeit erteilen, dass sie die höchsten Normen, insbesondere die Verfassung, endgültig auslegen.“22 Es ist von besonderer Bedeutung, dass von diesen Normen auch die Normativität des Rechts abhängt: Sobald der Staat mit auf einem bestimmten Gebiet geltenden fundamentalen Rechtsnormen identisch ist, bedeutet das, dass auch alle anderen auf diesem Gebiet geltenden Rechtsnormen den ersteren Normen untergeordnet werden müssen.23 Keineswegs ist es jedoch der Staat, der – mit Pitamic’ Worten – „an der Quelle“ des Rechts steht: Wenn man die Staatsgrenzen überspringt, ist da noch das Völkerrecht,24 schließlich handelt es sich um die Frage der Natur des Rechts, der die Menschlichkeit das Grundkriterium der Rechtlichkeit ist.25

Siehe Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 7, 14–17. Ibidem, S. 16. Vgl. Pitamic, Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5): „Es ergibt sich also: Staat bedeutet die Gemeinschaft der Verfassung; Verfassung ist die Organisation oder die Ordnung der Behörden. Es findet sich bei Aristoteles keine Spur von einer Subjektivierung oder Hypostasierung dieser Ordnung in einer Staatspersönlichkeit, wohl aber nennt er in einer durchaus passenden Metapher die Verfassung, d. i. die oberste Rechtsordnung, gewissermaßen das ‚Leben‘ des Staates (S. 686).“ Siehe auch Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 16. 22 Pitamic, Država (Der Staat, Fn. 14), 17. 23 Ibidem, S. 17. 24 Ibidem, S. 446 ff. 25 Die Genese von Pitamic’ Ansicht betreffend die Natur des Rechts erörtere ich in Marijan Pavčnik, An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre (Die Rechtsauffassung von Leonid Pitamic), in: Pitamic, An den Grenzen der RR (Fn. 1), 153–173; Marijan Pavčnik, Die Frage der rechtlichen Grundnorm (Pitamic’ Brief an Hans Kelsen), Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 96 (2010) 1, 87–103. Siehe auch Ulfrid Neumann, Leonid Pitamic, An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre. Herausgeber und Einführungsstudie: Marijan Pavčnik. Ljubljana 2009 (Erstausgabe 2005), Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 97 (2011) 2, 279–281. 19 20 21

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6.

Die Spannung zwischen Macht und Moral

In diesem Zusammenhang machte er auch in Verbindung mit den Rechtsnormen ausdrücklich auf die inhaltliche Bedeutung der Moral und der Grundrechte aufmerksam. Bezüglich der Grundrechte stellt er ausdrücklich fest, dass sie zwar tatsächlich positivrechtlich definiert werden, jedoch als Naturrechte „eine wichtige Voraussetzung für die Existenz des positiven Rechts sind“ (S. 203). Mutatis mutandis betrachtet er auch das Verhältnis zwischen Macht und Moral, zwischen denen immer eine entsprechende Spannung besteht. Durch die positivrechtliche Regelung der Grundrechte wird gerade bezweckt, dass die Spannung zwischen Macht und Moral nicht zu stark wird (siehe S. 205). 7.

Methodologische Klarheit der Rechtswissenschaft

Zur Zeit als Država (Der Staat) geschrieben wurde, hat Pitamic bereits eine klare Front gegenüber der Reinen Rechtslehre (auf ihrer damaligen Entwicklungsstufe) bezogen.26 Sein grundlegender Einwand war es, dass eine normative Methode den Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft nicht einseitig definieren kann.27 Im Gegensatz zur gegenständlichen Reinheit des Rechts, die von Kelsen begründet wurde, sprach sich Pitamic für einen methodologisch reinen Ansatz, an das Recht heranzugehen, aus. Es liegt in der Natur dieses Ansatzes, dass er neben der normativen Methode auch die soziologische und axiologische Seite des Rechts und des Staates berücksichtigt. Im Mittelpunkt stand zweifellos die normative Methode, die auf dem Grundsatz der normativen Zurechnung aufbaute. Neben dieser Methode berücksichtigte er auch die soziologische und insbesondere die axiologische Methode. Er unterschied scharf zwiÜber die Periodisierung von Kelsens Theorie siehe insbesondere Stanley L. Paulson: 1. Toward a Periodisation of the Pure Theory of Law, in: Letizia Gianformaggio (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory A Diachronic Point of View, 1990, 11–47; 2. Introduction, in: Hans Kelsen: Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, 1992, XVII–XLII; 3. Introduction, in: Stanley L. Paulson, Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (Hrsg.), Normativity and Norms Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, 1998, XXIII ff.; 4. Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 18 (1998), 153–166; 5. Arriving at a Defensible Periodization of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 19 (1999), 351–364; 6. Konstruktivismus, Methodendualismus und Zurechnung im Frühwerk Hans Kelsens, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 124 (1999) 4, 631–657; 7. Der Normativismus Hans Kelsens, Juristenzeitung 61 (2006) 11, 529–536 (530, Fn.  11). Vgl. Carsten Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens, 1997, 23 ff., 43 ff. Für Pitamic, seine Entwicklung und seine kritische Behandlung der Reinen Rechtslehre ist vor allem die Zeit von Kelsens „Hauptproblemen der Staatrechtslehre“ (1910) bis zur Erstauflage der „Reinen Rechtslehre“ (1934) bedeutend. Über diese Zeit siehe auch Matthias Jestaedt, Von den „Hauptproblemen“ zur Erstauflage der „Reinen Rechtslehren“, in: Robert Walter, Werner Ogris, Thomas Olechowski (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsen: Leben – Werk – Wirksamkeit, 2009, 113–135. 27 Über das Verhältnis zwischen Forschungsmethode und -gegenstand siehe die kritischen Ausführungen von Günther Winkler, Rechtstheorie und Erkenntnislehre, 1990, 89 ff., 147 ff., 184 ff. 26

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schen den Methoden, weil er sich der Fallen bewusst war, die methodologischen Synkretismus begleiten. Wenn man dem ausweicht, erreicht man, dass sich die Methoden gegenseitig unterstützen.28 8.

Kelsens Reaktion

Kelsen berücksichtigte teilweise die Kritik von Pitamic 29 Kelsen setzte als selbstverständlich voraus, dass man von positivem Recht nur dann sprechen kann, wenn seine Normen wenigstens im Durchschnitt gesellschaftlich wirksam sind, und versuchte eine entsprechende theoretische Lösung zu finden. Bis zu Pitamic’ Abhandlung Denkökonomische Voraussetzungen der Rechtswissenschaft (1917) ist es Kelsen nicht gelungen, diese Lösung so zu definieren, dass sie innerhalb der Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre bleiben würde. Kelsen hat sich der Problematik der Grundnorm genähert.30 In der Abhandlung Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung (aus dem Jahr 1914)31 stellt er ausdrücklich fest, dass jede juristische Konstruktion „von bestimmten Normen als gültigen Rechtssätzen ausgehen“ müsse.32 Für Kelsen ist es typisch, dass die Auswahl dieses Ausgangspunktes keine juristische, sondern eine politische Frage ist und „daher vom Standpunkt juristischer Erkenntnis immer den Anschein von Willkürlichkeit haben“ muss.33 Siehe Leonid Pitamic, Denkökonomische Voraussetzungen der Rechtswissenschaft (in der Fortsetzung abgekürzt als „Denkökonomische“), Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 3 (1917), 367. 29 Hans Kelsen, Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze, 1923, XV. An dieser Stelle wurden vier Abhandlungen von Pitamic zitiert: Denkökonomische (Fn. 28); Eine „Juristische Grundlehre“ (1918), Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 3 (1918), 734–757; Plato, Aristoteles und die Reine Rechtstheorie (Fn. 5), und Kritische Bemerkungen zum Gesellschafts-, Staats- und Gottesbegriff bei Kelsen, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 3 (1922), 531–544 (in der Fortsetzung abgekürzt als „Kritische Bemerkungen“). Alle diese Abhandlungen sind nachgedruckt in: Pitamic, An den Grenzen der RR (Fn.  1). Alle Abhandlungen, die in diesem Buch nachgedruckt sind, haben eine doppelte Seitenangabe: zuerst steht die Seite aus dem Erstdruck (in Klammern), dann folgt die laufende Nummer des Buches. – Die Sekundärliteratur, die Pitamic’ Beitrag zu den Problemen der Bestimmung der Grundnorm berücksichtigt, ist in den folgenden Aufsätzen von Pavčnik zitiert: 1. An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre (Fn. 1), 166–167, Fn. 67 und 73; 2. Leonid Pitamic (Fn. 1), 332–333, Fn. 19, 30 und 33; 3. Die Frage der rechtlichen Grundnorm (Pitamic’ Brief an Hans Kelsen), Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 96 (2010) 1, 96, Fn. 37. Siehe auch Aleš Novak, Metamorfoze Kelsnove temeljne norme in Leonid Pitamic (Methamorphoses of Kelsen’s Basic Norm and Leonid Pitamic), Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, 68 (2008), 203–232. 30 Robert Walter, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Gedankens der Grundnorm, Schriftenreihe des Hans Kelsen-Instituts, 18 (1992), 49. 31 Hans Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 32 (1914), 202–245, 390–438. 32 Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz (Fn. 31), 216. 33 Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz (Fn. 31), 217. Siehe auch Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz (Fn. 31), 413–414: „Es ist stets eine metajuristische, im Grunde eine politische Frage, welche Norm man derart als letzte oder oberste ansehen will, daß man auf eine weitere juristische Rechtfertigung ihrer Geltung 28

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Pitamic ist überzeugt, dass Kelsen seinen Gedanken über die Wirksamkeit des Rechts übernommen und in einer geänderten normativisierten Form ausgedrückt hat: zunächst über die Norm des Völkerrechts und dann noch als den Inhalt der Grundnorm. Kelsen hat, sagt Pitamic, „die erwähnte Idee vervollständigt, weil er das, was ich nur als das Erkenntnisprinzip für konkrete Staatsrechte vorschlug, als Norm ins Völkerrecht einbrachte.“34 Kelsens erkenntnistheoretisches Prinzip wurde „zum Inhalt einer Rechtsnorm erhoben“ und soll damit als juristisches Prinzip fungieren. „Dadurch, daß das Faktische zum Inhalt einer Norm wird, erfährt es“, so Kelsen, „einen ganz eigenartigen Bedeutungswandel, es wird sozusagen denaturiert, schlägt in sein Gegenteil um, wird selbst zum Normativen.“35 Pitamic wird durch diese Lösung nicht zufriedengestellt, weil dadurch „das grundlegende erkenntnistheoretische Problem nur um eine Stufe zurückgeschoben wird und wieder im Völkerrecht auftreten muss.“36 Er drückt dieselben Bedenken auch angesichts der Grundnorm aus, wie sie von Kelsen in der ersten Auflage des Werkes Reine Rechtslehre (1934)37 formuliert wurde. Pitamic kommentierte es so: „Diese Ordnung ist also das ‚empirische Material, das sich der rechtlichen Deutung darbietet‘. Dieses Material muss also bereits vorliegen, bevor die Grundnorm, die ja ihren konkreten Inhalt aus diesem Material schöpft, angewendet werden kann. Das Ausleseprinzip für dieses Material ist aber keine Norm, sondern das ‚tatsächliche Verhalten von Menschen‘, also ein Seinsfaktum, das außerhalb der normativen Sphäre liegt; daher enthält auch die ‚Ordnung‘, die durch den früher erwähnten Tatbestand erzeugt wird, an und für sich kein rechtliches Sollen; diese Qualität soll ihr ja erst durch die Grundnorm verliehen werden. Nun ist aber eine bloß hypothetische Norm nicht imstande, Seinstat-

verzichtet. Irgendwo muß jede juristische Betrachtung auf einen solchen letzten Punkt stoßen, auf dem das ganze System der juristischen Konstruktion ruht, gleichsam von außen her gestützt.“ Vgl. Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz (Fn. 31), 435 ff. 34 Leonid Pitamic, Nove smeri v pravni filozofiji (Neue Richtungen in der Rechtsphilosophie  – in der Fortsetzung abgekürzt als „Nove smeri / Neue Richtungen“), Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, 1 (1921), 18. Vgl. auch die Buchbesprechung: Hans Kelsen: 1. Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Tübingen 1928) und 2. Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff (Tübingen 1928), Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 7 (1928), 641–642. 35 Siehe Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Fn. 17), 99, 240–241: „Was dort als ein mehr oder weniger erkenntnistheoretisches Prinzip angegeben wurde: der Grundsatz, jene Ursprungsnorm zu wählen, aus der sich in deduktiver Entfaltung eine Rechtsordnung ergibt, mit der das tatsächliche Verhalten der Menschen, deren Handeln den Inhalt der Rechtsordnung bildet, in relativ größter Übereinstimmung steht, das tritt hier – weil zum Inhalt einer Rechtsnorm erhoben – als juristisches Prinzip auf. / Dadurch, daß das Faktische zum Inhalt einer Norm wird, erfährt es einen ganz eigenartigen Bedeutungswandel, es wird sozusagen denaturiert, schlägt in sein Gegenteil um, wird selbst zum Normativen.“ Vgl. auch Stanley L. Paulson, A Role of Hermann Cohen in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law?, in: Frank Saliger (Hrsg.), Rechtsstaatliches Strafrecht Festschrift für Ulfrid Neumann zum 70  Geburtstag, 2017, 284, Fn. 7. 36 Pitamic, Nove smeri / Neue Richtungen (Fn. 34), 18. Siehe auch Kritische Bemerkungen (Fn. 29), 351. 37 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934. Nachdruck: Scientia Verlag Aalen 1994, 65 ff.

Rechtliche Natur des Staates nach Leonid Pitamic

sachen als gesollt zu autorisieren oder zu rechtfertigen, da sie ja als ‚hypothetisch‘ selbst Rechtfertigung bedarf.“38

Die Entwicklung von Kelsens theoretischen Standpunkten bestätigt die Fundiertheit der Angaben von Pitamic, dass Kelsen (in einem bestimmten Umfang39) seine kritischen Ausführungen darüber aufgenommen hatte, wie man die Wirksamkeit des Rechts derart begründen könnte, dass sie annehmbar und mit der Reinen Rechtslehre vereinbar wäre. Ungeachtet der Intensität dieses Einflusses auf Kelsen40 ist es eine Tatsache, dass ihn Kelsen nicht in jenem Punkt vertiefte, wo sich das Normative und das Faktische, das Faktische und das Normative überschneiden41, sondern ihn in einem solchen Maße aufnahm und kanalisierte, dass die Ausgangspunkte der Reinen Rechtslehre unangetastet blieben.42 In diesem Kontext stellte schon Behrend sehr bestimmt fest, dass durch „die Aufnahme des faktischen Effektivitätsmomentes in die Grundnormformulierung“ das rein normlogische System der Reinen Rechtslehre nicht ge-

Leonid Pitamic, Čista pravna teorija in naravno pravo (Die Reine Rechtslehre und das Naturrecht), Razprave pravnega razreda Akademije znanosti in umetnosti v Ljubljani, 1 (1941), 180. Siehe auch die Buchbesprechung: Hans Kelsen: Reine Rechtslehre (Leipzig, Wien 1934), Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 15 (1935) 3, 414. 39 Darüber sprach Pitamic auch in einem umfangreichen Brief, den er am 16. 8. 1957 Kelsen sandte: siehe Pavčnik, Die Frage der rechtlichen Grundnorm (Pitamic’ Brief an Hans Kelsen, Fn. 29), 87–103. Von Bedeutung ist z. B. diese Stelle: „Ich sage nicht, dass meine Ausführungen den Grund zu Ihrer Einstellung geboten haben, aber vielleicht haben sie Ihre Auffassung bestärkt. Freilich haben Sie mein seinerzeitiges ökonomisches Prinzip nicht als solches aufgenommen, sondern Sie haben die Wirksamkeit in anderer Weise in Ihren Ideengang eingereiht (hervorgehoben von M. P.). Wie ich von der Mach’schen wurden Sie, wie mir scheint, von der Kant’schen Philosophie beeinflusst, zwar nicht vom kategorischen Imperativ Kants, sondern von seiner Kategorienlehre. (…) Diese hypothetische Grundnorm spielt also für die Rechtswelt eine ähnliche Rolle, welche die Kategorien nach Kant überhaupt haben. Wie die Kategorien unserer Sinnenwelt, so ist ihre Grundnorm dem positiven Recht gegenüber transzendental, denn sie ist nicht im positiven Recht gesetzt, sondern vom Rechtsforscher vorausgesetzt, um das positive Recht als gesollt zu erkennen“ (91–92). 40 Vgl. Leonid Pitamic, Die Frage der rechtlichen Grundnorm, in: Völkerrecht und rechtliches Weltbild Festschrift für Alfred Verdross, 1960, 210. Nachdruck in: Pitamic: An den Grenzen der RR (Fn. 1). Siehe auch Jürgen Behrend, Untersuchungen zur Stufenbaulehre Adolf Merkls und Hans Kelsens, 1977, 94: „Kelsens Aussage, dass die Grundnorm als hypothetischer Denkakt nur auf solche Rechtsordnungen bezogen wird, die von den Rechtsunterworfenen befolgt werden und damit im wesentlichen wirksam sind, entspricht dem von Pitamic herausgearbeiteten denkökonomischen Prinzip.“, siehe auch 73 ff. Ebenso Rudolf Thienel, Kritischer Rationalismus und Jurisprudenz, 1991, 117–118: „Und auch Kelsen hat – unter ausdrücklicher Berufung auf Pitamic – die Auswahl gerade der effektiven Ordnungen als Rechtsordnungen damit begründet, dass dies dem Grundsatz der Erkenntnisökonomie entspreche, weil man damit jene Ordnungen erfasse, denen die Realität am nächsten komme.“ 41 Vgl. Pitamic, Die Buchbesprechung Kelsen: Das Problem der Souveränität (Fn. 34), 642. 42 Vgl. mit Kelsens Formulierungen der Grundnorm in seinen späteren Werken; siehe besonders Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1945, 116–117, Reine Rechtslehre, 2. Aufl., 1960. Nachdruck: 2000, 209, und Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, 1979, 203 ff. 38

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sprengt wird, da die „Geltung und Wirksamkeit einer Rechtsordnung streng voneinander getrennt bleiben.“43 Pitamic’ Stärke war es, dass er ein Gespür für die Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre hatte.44 Es handelt sich insbesondere um soziologische und axiologische Stellen, aus denen Normativität entsprießt und auf die sie sich auch stützt. Im Mittelpunkt befindet sich jedenfalls die normative Dimension des Rechts und des Staates. Der rechtliche (normative) Aspekt des Staates ist – ob man es will oder nicht – derjenige, dem die Rechtswissenschaft nicht ausweichen kann, sie sollte ihn jedoch auch mit anderen Gesichtspunkten befruchten und im Dialog mit ihnen das Spezifikum und die Reichweite des Staates als einer „Rechtsorganisation (hervorgehoben von M. P.) von Menschen auf einem bestimmten Gebiet“ begründen. 9.

Methodologischer Beitrag von Pitamic

Pitamic’ methodologischer Ansatz ist breiter als Kelsens. Die methodologische Breite ermöglichte ihm, dass er – wenigstens auf seine Weise – schärfer die Bedeutung der normativen Zurechnung bewerten konnte, als das Kelsen möglich war. Für Pitamic war es sehr charakteristisch, dass er auch hinter jedem noch so komplexen normativen Aufbau den Menschen sah, der das Agens des Rechts ist und für den das Recht bestimmt ist. Diese Frage ist am empfindlichsten bei einer juristischen Person (z. B. dem Staat), hinter der sich verschiedenste Individuen „verstecken“ können. Für Pitamic ist die Frage der normativen (rechtlichen) Zurechnung immer auch eine Ethikfrage. „Wir dürfen nicht vergessen,“ schrieb er in seiner Abhandlung Kritični pogledi na juridično osebo (Kritische Betrachtungen über die juristische Person), dass „das Individuum die Grundlage jeder Gesellschaft ist, dass ‚omne jus hominum causa‘ ist und dass auch die Gesellschaft nicht bestehen kann ohne das Grundprinzip jeder Moral: dass der Mensch individuell für seine Handlungen verantwortlich ist.“45 Soziologische und axiologische Grundlagen und Grenzen, die den Staat als Rechtsorganisation umschließen, negieren nicht die Normativität des Staates und die Bedeutung dieser Normativität, sie sind allenfalls ein Impuls und Agens, die dem Staat als einer Organisation von Menschen auf einem bestimmten Gebiet Sinn geben. Diese kurze methodologische Mitteilung kann, wenn man sie konsequent ausführt, der normativen Theorie des Staates neue Dimensionen und auch einen neuen Auftrieb Behrend, Untersuchungen zur Stufenbaulehre Adolf Merkls und Hans Kelsens (Fn. 40), 94. Vgl. dazu auch Robert Walter, Wirksamkeit und Geltung, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, N. F.  11 (1961), 536 ff. 44 Siehe auch die Buchbesprechung: Neumann, Leonid Pitamic, An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre (Fn. 25). 45 Leonid Pitamic, Kritični pogledi na juridično osebo (Kritische Betrachtungen über die juristische Person), Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, 4 (1925), 242. 43

Rechtliche Natur des Staates nach Leonid Pitamic

geben. Jegliches Beharren bei der reinen Normativität (des Rechts und/oder des Staates) stößt – ob man es will oder nicht – auf unüberwindliche Hindernisse, die nur jene Theorie überwinden kann, die anstatt auf gegenständlicher Reinheit auf einer angemessenen methodologischen Reinheit der Erkennung des Rechts und/oder des Staates aufbaut. Die Normativität des Rechts46 und/oder des Staates ist tatsächlich deren wesentliches Merkmal, jedoch ein Merkmal, das in den Wertungs- und soziologischen Raum, in dem die Menschen tätig sind, eingeordnet werden muss. Marijan Pavčnik

Faculty of Law, Poljanski nasip 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slowenien, [email protected]

Vgl. mit den Stellungnahmen in der tschechischen Theorie des Rechts: Vladimir Kubeš, Ota Weinberger (Hrsg.), Die Brünner rechtstheoretische Schule (Normative Theorie), 1980; Miloš Večeřa, František Weyr, 2001, und Tatiana Machalová, Ondřej Horak, Die Rezeption der Reinen Rechtslehre in der tschechischen Rechtswissenschaft, in: Robert Walter; Clemens Jabloner; Klaus Zeleny (Hrsg.), Hans Kelsen anderswo, 2010, 187–202. 46

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Kelsen was no Relativist Reading Hans Kelsen in the Light of Isaiah Berlin’s Value Pluralism ULRICH WAGRANDL

Abstract: We do not have to take Kelsen’s relativism at face value. Indeed, what he calls

value relativism makes much more sense if read in the light of Isaiah Berlin’s value pluralism. In comparing Kelsen and Berlin, this paper sets out to liberate Kelsen’s theories of the problematic legacy of relativism. It does so to give Kelsen’s work a better foundation that is less fraught with problems. Kelsen and Berlin concur in that the question of values is one of value conflicts; that in such conflicts, there is no rational solution; that therefore, a choice, that is, a decision must be made; that nevertheless, this decisionism does not prevent compromise, but on the contrary, enables it; and that this kind of pluralist decisionism is a good foundation for liberal democracy. Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Isaiah Berlin, relativism, pluralism, decisionism, democracy Schlagworte: Hans Kelsen, Isaiah Berlin, Relativismus, Pluralismus, Dezisionismus,

Demokratie

The view that moral principles constitute only relative values does not mean that they constitute no value at all; it means that there is not one moral system, but that there are several different ones, and that, consequently, a choice must be made among them. Thus, relativism imposes upon the individual the difficult task of deciding for himself what is right and what is wrong. […] Relativism is rejected and – what is worse – misinterpreted, not because it morally requires to little, but because it requires too much.1 – Hans Kelsen

1 Hans Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays, 1957, 22.

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The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. Indeed, it is because this is their situation that men place such immense value upon the freedom to choose; for if they had assurance that in some perfect state, realisable by men on earth, no ends pursued by them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and agony of choice would disappear, and with it the central importance of the freedom to choose.2 – Isaiah Berlin

1.

Introduction

Much has been said about relativism in general and its flaws in particular. This paper will not delve into this debate. What it tries to do is to liberate Kelsen’s thoughts of the problematic legacy of relativism by reading them in a value pluralist way. It does so not out of interest for relativism and its problems, but because it cares about Kelsen’s theories.3 In doing so, it hopes to give them a better, that is to say, less fragile, foundation. It aims to show that Kelsen’s theories of law and of democracy do not suffer if we leave relativism out. Kelsen does not need relativism; in fact, he was no relativist at all – at least, not in the usual sense. In order to bring Kelsen’s relativism into perspective and to eventually redefine it, this paper wants to compare Kelsen’s thoughts to those of Isaiah Berlin. As we will see, both scholars share a number of ideas, although it is not known whether they have met. Their biographical similarities – both of Eastern European, Jewish origin, both spending a good part of their lives in the Anglo-Saxon academia – and their work on human values (relativism for Kelsen, pluralism for Berlin) calls for a closer examination. In comparing Kelsen and Berlin, this paper not only wants to shed new light on Kelsen, but also to open a new avenue of research concerning possible cross-influences between the two. It is pure speculation, but since Isaiah Berlin was friends at Oxford with H. L. A. Hart, and as Hart knew Kelsen, they might even have heard of each other.4 Apart from biographical resemblance, why compare Kelsen and Berlin? And why hope to better understand Kelsen’s work in doing so? As this paper will try to point out, relativism and pluralism look strikingly similar. Kelsen has called himself a relativist throughout his life, whereas Berlin only gradually came to label his view ‘plural-

Isaiah Berlin, Liberty Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy, 2002, 213–214. A vindication of a kind of Kelsenian relativism is offered by Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, Relativism and Religion Why Democratic Societies Do Not Need Moral Absolutes, 2015. 4 Kelsen cites Berlin approvingly in Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edition, 1960, 100, regarding the free will problem, something not irrelevant to the present subject. Footnotes have been omitted in the English translation. 2 3

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ism’. Expectably, Kelsen’s relativism is more thoroughly theorized and more vigorously defended. Coming from the German-speaking academia of his time, he was deeply steeped in Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy. His theory of relativism evolved as a necessary prelude to his theory of law. In order to adequately grasp natural law – and to subsequently refute it – he had to elaborate on its philosophical basis.5 All natural law doctrine is founded upon ‘value absolutism’, as Kelsen says, although this term interestingly first appears only in his writings on democracy and philosophy, not in those on law. The first edition of his Pure Theory from 1934 mentions neither relativism or absolutism in contrast to the first edition of his Essence and Value of Democracy from 1920.6 The second edition of the Pure Theory from 1960, however, contains lengthy reflections on the subject.7 As we will see later on, value absolutism essentially is the belief that values are objectively given. Its logical counterpart, value relativism, in turn is the basis for Kelsen’s project, a positivist legal theory that expressly rejects natural law and thus has to consider that values are not objectively given, but autonomously created. Hence they are ‘relative’ to the individual creating them. Berlin’s value pluralism evolves from his background in the history of ideas. It is less rigorously underpinned than Kelsen’s relativism, but more elegant, and is amenable to common sense (which Kelsen, alas, mostly is not). It starts from the observation, traceable to Machiavelli, that not everything that is good can be reconciled. Whereas Machiavelli has, in general, a bad reputation for advocating ruthlessness in politics, Berlin finds him interesting for something else: his insight that what might be good in a certain respect might be bad in another, without there being a possibility to reconcile the two. Values, therefore, seem to be plural, and some of them can come into conflict. Pluralism maintains that in such a situation, a tragic decision is needed, as the conflict cannot be solved by a rational inquiry into which value is higher, better, or truer.8 Berlin then traces the history of pluralist thought through the enlightenment, and especially romanticism,9 unto the great ideological struggles of the 20th century. His famous distinction between the hedgehog, which knows one thing, and the fox, which knows many things, also has its roots here.10 Of course, the fox and Berlin are pluralists, while others have famously adopted the hedgehog’s perspective.11 This difference is similar to Max Weber’s distinction between the ethics of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik)

See e. g. Hans Kelsen, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus, 1928, reprinted in: Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule, vol. I, ed. Hans Klecatsky / René Marcic / Herbert Schambeck, 2010, 231–287. 6 See Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 1920, 36–37, reprinted in: Verteidigung der Demokratie, ed. Matthias Jestaedt / Oliver Lepsius, 2006, 31–33. 5

7 See Kelsen (footnote 4), 18, 65–69. 8 See Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy, 2013, 33–100. 9 See Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, ed. Henry Hardy, 2nd Edition, 2013, 219–252. 10 See Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, ed. Henry Hardy, 2nd Edition, 2013. 11 See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 2013.

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and the ethics of conscience (Gesinnungsethik),12 as Berlin has indicated.13 It is essentially the question if one is willing to subordinate everything to one single principle and to follow through with it, regardless of the consequences, or if one acknowledges that different principles can legitimately pull in different directions. Pluralism, as is easy to tell, is the basis for an ethics of responsibility. 2.

Values and norms

In order to compare Kelsen’s and Berlin’s take on values, we need to inquire into the nature of values. This account will closely follow Kelsen’s thoughts on the subject, as he devoted considerable effort to those questions which Berlin touched only en passant. A common understanding of values is that they are something we aspire to realize. They are a standard for measuring human behaviour and as such, they are norms. The value of liberty does not tell us that we are free. Rather, it commands us to strive towards it, to hold it dear, to avoid anything detrimental to it, and to fight its opponents. Thus, the value of liberty serves to judge our behaviour: have we done as liberty requires? As always, Kelsen’s definitions are more specific.14 According to Kelsen, values are not norms, but are constituted by norms. To have value is to conform to a certain norm. Value therefore refers to facts: they have value when they are in conformity with a norm. In this sense, there are no ‘free-standing’ values, but to speak of values is to render a judgment, stating that a certain behaviour is good, which means that it conforms to a norm commanding such behaviour. Thus, if a norm of morality obliges us to help the poor, the concrete act of helping someone in need has value. Kelsen’s very specific definition of value has not much bearing on our present discussion. Indeed, it seems that he sometimes uses values interchangeably with norms, and that is what we will do as well. It is closer to the common use of the term, where a value indicates, as described above, something that serves as a standard and thus is a norm. There is one aspect, though, where we must follow Kelsen’s very normative approach. Kelsen goes on to speak of the validity of values. They can be valid or nonvalid, just like norms, which means that they either exist or do not exist. Their validity is absolute if they exclude the possibility of contradicting values, and only relative if they do not (or cannot) exclude their opposite. Here we encounter Kelsen using the term relativism in connection with values, and that is why we must emphasize this point. Two things are striking: relativism refers to the validity of values and to their

Max Weber, Politik als Beruf, in: Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 1, vol. 17, ed. Horst Baier / M. Rainer Lepsius / Wolfgang J. Mommsen / Wolfgang Schluchter / Johannes Winckelmann, 1992, 237. 13 See Seyla Benhabib, Exile, Statelessness, and Migration Playing Chess with History from Hannah Arendt to Isaiah Berlin, 2018, 164 et seq. 12

14 Kelsen (footnote 4), 16–24.

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possible conflict – not to their content. But how do values get valid in the first place? For Kelsen, values are constituted by norms, and norms are created by subjects. There is no imperative without an imperator, no ought without will.15 Values therefore only exist because someone wills them, that is, has created them by an act of volition. It is a positivist approach because it traces back every norm to a positive, human act.16 Everything normative, be it the law, morality, custom, or values, originates in the human will only. Humans are capable of moral judgments. They are because they have autonomy, and thus create values for themselves. Relativism refers, as mentioned, to the validity of values. All values humans create are equally valid. Their validity comes from being created by autonomous subjects. They are equal because their originators are equal: as humans, they are equally endowed with autonomy, that is the capability to morally legislate for oneself. This line of reasoning deals a first blow to Kelsen’s staunchly defended relativism. He might not have extended his own relativism far enough, or understood its implications. But he firmly stood on the ground of a (neo-) kantian conception of cognition and morality, which in turn presupposes a non-relativistic account of individual human autonomy.17 3.

The conflict of norms and the clash of values

Relativism does not seem to be the perfect label for Kelsen’s ideas: his so-called relativism is the question of the conflict of values and its solution. This is a rather interesting take on the subject. Indeed, Kelsen says that values are relative because they can conflict, that is, because one value cannot exclude the other. In his Pure Theory, he writes: “the values as established by our norm-creating acts cannot claim to exclude the possibility of opposite values.”18 Non-exclusion means conflict, and this is vital because: Where there is no conflict of interest, there is no need for justice. A conflict of interests exists when one interest can only be satisfied at the expense of the other; or, what amounts to the same, when there is a conflict between two values, and when it is not possible to realize both at the same time; […] when it is necessary […] to decide which one is more important, or in other terms, to decide which is the higher value, and finally: which is the highest value. The problem of values is in the first place the problem of conflicts of values, and this problem cannot be solved by means of rational cognition.19

15 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, 1979, 3, 23. 16 Kelsen (footnote 5), 276. 17 Kelsen cannot shed his being influenced by Kant, on whom he frequently drew, even when he disagreed with him, see

e. g. the lengthy footnote in Kelsen (footnote 4), 102–105, or his epistemological contemplations, to be discussed later on. 18 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 1967, 67. 19 Kelsen (footnote 1), 4.

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This formulation reminds one of the conflict of norms, a subject to which Kelsen devoted much time and effort. What happens when two legal norms, like ‘A is prohibited’ and ‘A is allowed’, contradict each other? During his lifetime, Kelsen developed at least three different answers this problem. His first position was to apply the logical law of noncontradiction to legal norms, so that only one of two contradicting norms can be valid.20 He even goes so far as to apply this thought to law and morality in general, saying that from the viewpoint of law, morality is not valid and vice versa.21 But the late Kelsen, becoming ever more the realist, denies this for two reasons. The law of noncontradiction cannot be applied to norms, because they are statements of ought. Because logic only deals with statements of is, a contradiction of norms is not the same as a contradiction of declarative sentences.22 The real point seems to be, however, that to talk about a conflict of norms only makes sense when both norms are valid,23 something we will encounter in Berlin’s writings as well. Only then is there a tension between two contradictory claims. This kind of situation would be no conflict if one simply could act according to a rule of logic, and could demonstrate that one of the two norms is not valid in the first place. The conflict we are trying to make sense of would disappear in the same second it occured. Positive law may have rules on how to deal with such situations: the principles of lex posterior, lex specialis, lex superior. But Kelsen emphasises that these are rules of a given legal order, which may lack them, not universal properties of law or postulates of logic. At any rate, they often do not solve a conflict, but only push it further away. Imagine a legal norm stating that whenever morality contradicts the letter of the law, one should follow the law and disregard morality. Form a moral point of view, this rule has not solved anything: if we deem it immoral to always blindly follow the law, the conflict between law and morality pops up again. Kelsen is at his most realist, though, when he says that one can simply want contradictory things. The law originates in the acts of will of the lawgiver, and this lawgiver may change its mind or want mutually exclusive things at the same time; even more so when we consider that the lawgiver is made of fallible humans. Only values having an equally good pedigree can clash. Other values can clash too. But it is not the same thing: the conflict between something good and something bad is easy to solve. You just have to opt for the good (this is what the notion of the good implies). But when values are of equal worth, the conflict is between good and good. Only this kind of opposition is a proper value conflict. It is this clash of equally legitimate values that Kelsen has in mind when he speaks about relativism. Values are relative because they can conflict; they can conflict because they are equal; they are equal

Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 27. Hans Kelsen, Naturrecht und Positives Recht, in: Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule (footnote 5), 177–200 (180); Kelsen (footnote 4), 361. 20 21

22 Kelsen (footnote 15), 168. 23 Kelsen (footnote 15), 80, 172, 177.

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because they come from individuals who are equally endowed with autonomy. Kelsen does not say that all values are equally good. He possibly cannot, because this denies the very idea of values. Values tell us what is right and what is wrong. To have them is to discriminate between what is desirable and what is despicable. Kelsen, too, has his values and judges the world accordingly. His so-called relativism only states that others will have other values, that their conflict is inevitable, and that to be locked in conflict does not mean that one of the two values is necessarily worse than the other. His is therefore a formal account of relativism that only says that conflicting values still are values. It means that a conflict of values cannot be solved by demonstrating that one side is wrong, and therefore has no value at all. This would be the easy-tosolve opposition between good and evil, which is no conflict at all, because it is clear which side to choose. In such a situation, the evil value turns out to be no value at all because values are only those that are of worth. Kelsen would reject this. Because values originate in the human will, they can take any content one can want, and still be values. They therefore can clash with other values without losing their ‘valueness’. Their being values is not determined by their content, but by their originating in an act of value creation. This parallels Kelsen’s positivism: the law is not content-sensitive as well; the law can have every content whatsoever and still be law. What matters is the procedure of norm creation, not their content. Thus, Kelsen is not a nihilist who simply denies that there are such things as values. He is likewise not a relativist in the sense that he thinks that all values are equally good. He is not a solipsist who thinks that his, and only his values are the right ones. He is not, as we will see, someone who he calls an ‘absolutist’, who thinks that there is a single, highest, and absolute value from which flows everything else. He is, in fact, a pluralist, who simply acknowledges that there are many values that inevitably conflict, without one of these values turning out to be false. Kelsen’s relativism is the insight that values can conflict and still be values. 4.

What are value conflicts?

The conflict of values, thus, turns out to be the crux of the matter. This is the first of many indicators that Kelsen and Berlin have more in common than previously thought. Whereas Kelsen’s definition of values is more sophisticated, it is Berlin’s work which gave rise to more elaborate conceptions of value conflicts.24 We will therefore continue our inquiry in Berlinian terms, which, as will become clear, seamlessly fit into a Kelsenian perspective. There seem to be three different kinds of value conflicts: inSee e. g. Thomas Nagel, Pluralism and Coherence, in: The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin, ed. Mark Lilla / Ronald Dworkin / Robert B. Silvers, 2001, 105–111 (106); Connie Aarsbergen-Ligtvoet, Isaiah Berlin: A Value Pluralist and Humanist View of Human Nature and the Meaning of Life, 2006, 12 et seq. 24

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compatibility, incommensurability, and opposition (or contradiction). Incompatibility is easy to explain but hard to swallow. It follows from the limits of resources, of time, and of space that define human life. One cannot have it all: either be a world-famous pianist or a renowned brain surgeon. She whose idea of an accomplished life requires to be both will probably end in despair. This insight must hold true for utopias as well: in the state of perfect communism, the day still has 24 hours. A (somewhat simple) communist, who, as we will see, adheres to value absolutism, will not acknowledge this conflict, but will look for an error or a sign of evil, and therefore probably say that in the state of true communism, people will simply be free of incompatible goals. This is to deny that values can conflict and still be values, and to think that when values conflict, one must necessarily be right and the other wrong, and thus, no value at all. Kelsen’s and Berlin’s concern was to resist this line of thought. It begins by acknowledging the limits of human lives, and stepping back from utopian aspirations. The second kind of conflict is incommensurability. It means that some values do not share the same currency. They cannot be traded against each other, because they have no common denominator. They are not interchangeable, and the loss of one cannot be compensated by the gain of another. They simply are different and cannot be made identical. The popular conflict between liberty and security is such an example. A famous quip says that a people which trades liberty for security does not deserve both. But this is only valid if one presupposes that liberty is the higher value, and that in such a conflict, security must always yield. And that presupposes that they can be graded on the same scale, that they both have a certain weight, but that the weight of liberty is always greater. Incommensurability denies that values can be operated with in this way. He who is always anxious and easily frightened will want more security, and will be ready to sacrifice some liberty in the process. This is because liberty has not so much bearing on the plans he has made for his life. He would not know what to do with more liberty. But he knows that he wants security, because he has a certain concept of what his life should look like, and to accomplish that, he needs security, but not necessarily liberty. In this situation, liberty and security are not interchangeable. For him, a loss of security cannot be compensated by more liberty. The inverse is true as well: she who is very critical of authoritarian pretensions, the overreach of anti-terrorism legislation and law-and-order politics in general will want more liberty and less security. But not because they are interchangeable, but because security has no, or not as much, worth for her idea of the good life. She is opposed to the politics of security, and she would not know what to do with it. Likewise, she will not be persuaded when someone tells her that we need more security and must be ready to accept a decrease in liberty. One value cannot compensate the other. Incommensurability therefore means that values are primarily valid and of worth for those who have them, and that value conflicts arise even if every party has only the best intentions. The last kind of value conflicts is opposition, or contradiction. Some values are not simply different, but pitted against each other. That means that some values consist in

Kelsen was no Relativist

the rejection of other values. Liberalism and communism are not simply incompatible, in the sense that one cannot be both at the same time. This is true enough. But their conflict runs deeper. Communism is founded upon the express rejection of liberalism, and liberal democracy has come to mean, especially after the Second World War, the rejection of communism. This means that a real communist cannot be indifferent towards liberalism in the way a pianist could be indifferent to brain surgery. Some values only make sense in their antagonistic dimension. A vegan cannot be indifferent towards meat lovers, a pro-life person not towards pro-choice people. This is not to say that such conflicts must always revert to outright civil war. Tolerance is possible. In fact, tolerance only makes sense in such conflicts, as it consists in bearing what one opposes. Value conflicts can occur within the same person. This proves more than anything else that two opposing values can be valid at the same time, and that one can genuinely want to fulfil both of them, even though one knows this to be impossible. What remains is a tragic choice that will result in the loss of one of these values. A famous example by Santre deals with a young Frenchman who feels he is compelled to take up arms with the Résistance movement to fight the Nazis, but also to stay with his mother whom the war has already cost her home, her family and her livelihood. If he goes into battle, he betrays his mother, if he stays with her, he betrays his nation. The conflict of values is genuine: he sincerely wants to uphold two opposing values; and the conflict is genuine because he sincerely wants both. If he had a penchant for one side, he would know what to do, but he has not. In such a conflict, there is no solution. If there were one, the young Frenchman would simply need to apply it, and the conflict would disappear. If he could measure, weigh, compare the values between which he is torn, he could simply act accordingly. But his conflict is genuine because he cannot. 5.

Against value absolutism and value monism

The insistence on conflict, that defines Kelsen’s and Berlin’s works on the subject, is explained by what both authors opposed. Thus, it seems worthwhile to inquire what Kelsen actually means by value absolutism, and in doing so define his position ex negativo. Value absolutism only is the consequence of something else, namely, metaphysical absolutism. According to Kelsen, this is the view that there is an absolute reality, independent of the knowing subject. In rejecting that, we may call Kelsen an idealist, subjectivist or constructivist, because he thinks, in the footsteps of Kant, that reality is created in the process of cognition, and therefore depends on the subject; thus, is relative.

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[A] relativistic epistemology […] interprets the process of cognition as the creation of its object. This view implies that the human subject of cognition is – epistemologically – the creator of his world, a world which is constituted in and by his cognition. Hence, freedom of the knowing subject is a fundamental prerequisite of the relativistic theory of knowledge. […] Since the laws of cognition originate in the human mind, the subject of cognition may be considered the autonomous lawgiver. His freedom is autonomy.25

Kelsen needs to reject absolute reality because it would necessarily encompass values as well. It seems that in Kelsen’s idea of the absolute, there is no distinction between is and ought. If there is absolute reality, it must coincide with with absolute value. The absolute necessarily implies perfection. Absolute existence is identical with absolute authority as the source of absolute values. […] It is essentially connected with the view that value is immanent in reality as a criterion or emanation of the absolute good, and consequently, the tendency to identify truth (that is, conformity with reality) and justice (that is, conformity with an absolute value).26

This line of critique sounds familiar to Kelsen’s supporters and detractors, as it is the gist of Kelsen’s rejection of natural law. Metaphysical absolutism leads to value absolutism. In denying that values, as everything else that is normative, only come from humans, and in insisting that there are objective values discernible in nature, one naturally also must appeal to practical reason. In Kelsen’s words, this would be cognition leading to statements of ought, which for him is impossible, as we saw, because an ought can only be created by an act of volition. Whereas Kelsen emphasizes the equal pedigree, and thus equal validity of all human values, Berlin is not concerned with such questions. Rather, what he stresses throughout his writings is that values – no matter how they came about – can clash, and that we are forced to choose between them. This is meant to subvert the classical, Platonic idea that all values form a coherent whole, a pyramid with one single, highest and absolute value at the top. This false conception takes the form of ‘three unquestioned dogmas’, as Berlin puts it. First, every genuine question is supposed to have one, and only one true answer. Second, this truth is thought to be accessible to humans. Third, true answers to genuine questions cannot contradict each other, so that they form an orderly system.27 For the question of value conflicts, this means that every apparent contradiction will in the end reveal itself to rest on error (if unintended), or outright evil (if done on purpose). There can be, in this sense, no ‘legitimate’ conflict of values, but only one true value and many pseudo-values detracting our attention. This idea 25 Kelsen, (footnote 1), 200. 26 Kelsen (footnote 1), 199. 27 Berlin (footnote 9), 221–222.

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lends itself, regarding the future, to a teleological view of history: tomorrow, all value conflicts will be solved; and to a sense of Weltschmerz regarding the present: today, the world is bad and people are misled. It is worthwhile to look at a longer quotation from Berlin, if only for the genius of his language: Thinkers from Bacon to the present have been inspired by the certainty that there must exist a total solution: that in the fullness of time, whether by the will of God or by human effort, the reign of irrationality, injustice and misery will end; man will be liberated, and will no longer be the plaything of forces beyond his control – savage nature, or the consequences of his own ignorance or folly or vice; that this springtime in human affairs will come once the obstacles, natural and human, are overcome, and then at last men will cease to fight each other, unite their powers, and co-operate to adapt nature to their needs (as the great materialist thinkers from Epicurus to Marx have advocated) or their needs to nature (as the Stoics and modern environmentalists have urged).28

Value conflicts, therefore, disturb the harmony in which men are supposed to live. Hence the will, discernible in humankind’s history of ideas, to either explain value conflicts away, or to use them as a pretense for domination. In Berlin’s view, however, conflicts do not only exist (nobody will deny that), but they are inevitable: not contingent, but conceptually necessary to the adequate understanding of human autonomy. There can be many highest values, some of which contradict or even oppose each other. As autonomous subjects, humans need to make their choice and be ready to accept the loss of those values against which they opted. The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist, seems to me to be not only unattainable […] but conceptually incoherent. […] Some of the Great Goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed to choose, and every choice entails an irreparable loss.29

One might even go so far as to say that individual autonomy only makes sense in a world of non-monist, thus pluralist values. When every moral question can, in principle, be resolved by looking at the pyramid of values, no choice is needed. Indeed, such choice would be absurd: because who needs to choose truth? Truth imposes itself, truth is heteronomous. Only if absolute truth cannot be obtained, if there is no preordained hierarchy of ends, is there room for meaningful choice. Choice entails that there are at least two equally good options (if one were better, there would be no need to choose). But choice also entails that one cannot have what one did not choose:

28 Berlin (footnote 9), 225. 29 Berlin (footnote 9), 14.

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To assume that all values can be graded on one scale, so that it is a mere matter of inspection to determine the highest, seems to me to falsify our knowledge that men are free agents, to represent moral decision as an operation which a slide-rule could, in principle, perform.30

Here Berlin rejects, just like Kelsen, the possibility of practical reason: There is no slide-rule of justice. 6.

Conflating truth with justice: the dangers of absolutism and monism

Both Kelsen and Berlin reject absolutism, or monism, respectively, not only on philosophical grounds. Their position is decidedly political: both are liberals, and both think that absolutism, or monism, is dangerous. To think that the perfect life, free of all conflict and contradiction, is an unattainable ideal may be called apolitical – to uncritically accept things as they are, to passively bear, and not to actively change society. Berlin anticipates this charge a monist would bring against him: For every rationalist metaphysician, from Plato to the last disciples of Hegel or Marx, this abandonment of the notion of a final harmony in which all riddles are solved, all contradictions reconciled, is a piece of crude empiricism, abdication before brute facts, intolerable bankruptcy of reason before things as they are, failure to explain and to justify …31

But the contrary is true, at least for Kelsen and Berlin, because absolutism and monism are incompatible with democracy (for Kelsen) and with individual liberty (for Berlin). We will see that Kelsen, as well as Berlin, as a way out of the conundrum of pluralism, advocate for compromise. A true value absolutist, just as a value monist, however, cannot be open to compromise. If one really thinks that there are absolute, objectively knowable values, and that all moral conflicts have, in principle, one true solution, to compromise is to step away from justice. In this sense, practical reason gives us (maybe not all of us, but only philosopher kings) the means to ascertain what is the true answer to a moral problem. As we saw, however, values, as statements of ought, cannot be true or false, only valid or invalid. Hence they do not flow from reason, but from will, and thus the solution to value conflicts cannot always be discovered by thinking hard, but only by deciding, by choosing one value over the other. A value absolutist, or monist, would deny this, because if there really is truth, then no decision is needed, just as nobody would say: I have decided that planet Earth is a sphere. If every value is traceable to the summum bonum, he who has knowledge of this summum bonum cannot com-

30 Berlin (footnote 2), 216. 31 Berlin (footnote 2), 213.

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promise, because he knows (or purports to know) what is good and what is bad, and what justice requires in cases of value conflicts. Thus, value absolutism and value monism both are characterized by the conflation of truth and justice. For Kelsen, this is a cardinal sin, as truth only refers to facts, whereas justice means to be in accordance with a norm considered just, and thus refers to the normative, as we already saw. This conflation has two consequences. First, it follows that in cases of value conflicts, one value must necessarily be false, and thus no value at all. Therefore, adherents of this value will be cast as mistaken, at best, or as evil, at worst – according to whether their adherence to untruth was unintentional or deliberate. They will, however, never be seen as equals, and compromise with them will not be possible, because truth cannot compromise with lie. The second consequence is that there will always be some who claim to have better knowledge of justice – truth – than others. Because values, in this view, do not flow from autonomy, with which everyone is equally endowed, but from special insight in nature, the will of God, the laws of History, the essence of the people, and so on, those who are in the know will self-righteously claim leadership, be it a Committee of Public Welfare, High Priests, the vanguard Party or the Führer. The belief […] in absolute values irresistibly leads – and has always lead – to a situation in which the one who assumes to possess the secret of the absolute good claims to have the right to impose his opinion as well as his will upon the others who are in error. And to be in error is, according to this view, to be wrong, and hence punishable.32

This problem is masterfully captured Kelsen’s account of the trial of Jesus in the Gospel of St. John. He has Jesus say ‘It was for this that I was born, and for this that I came to the world, to give testimony for truth’, to which Pilate replies with a question: ‘What is truth?’. Kelsen goes on to note that Jesus gives no answer and that Pilate did not expect one, because, as both knew, the mission of Jesus was not truth, but justice.33 In value absolutist fashion, Jesus proclaims truth and justice at once: divine justice is truth as well, as it can, via the revelation, be known, that means, be grasped through cognition. This is why Jesus is unimpressed when Pilate resorts to a popular vote. For Pilate, the relativist, as Kelsen calls him, justice is a matter of deciding value conflicts, and as he represents the culture of democratic Rome, he orders a referendum. As we know, the people decide against Jesus, the representative of divine truth. A value absolutist must claim that the people have erred or were intentionally evil, and Christian doctrine subsequently has done so. A value pluralist, however, has no need for this line of thought. Pluralism sees the the legitimacy of having equally valid options, and hence the necessity of decision. They are not equally valid because of their equally good content,

32 Kelsen (footnote 1), 206. 33 Kelsen (footnote 1), 1.

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but because they flow from equally autonomous decisions of equally autonomous subjects. Value pluralists will be ready, however, to question their own dogmas and to take a new decision, if needed. They have to, because they cannot only be pluralists for other people’s values, and absolutists for themselves. 7.

Another kind of decisionism

It follows from what we saw so far that value conflicts can have no ‘solution’ in the proper sense of the word. Having defined values as originating in human acts of will, and value conflicts as those in which values assert themselves against each other, and where no value will reveal itself to be lower, or false, to speak about solution is to gloss over what is at stake here. This term suggests that with the right solution, conflicts will dissolve. It subliminally introduces a criterion of right and wrong that aims at revealing that one of the two conflicting values is no value at all. The conflict is thus solved by demonstrating that it was based on an error, on a false understanding of value, and that, while it may have looked like a genuine confrontation of two contradicting principles, in fact, it was none. Kelsen cannot adhere to this understanding of the word ‘to solve’, even though he uses it (in German, he employs ‘lösen’, which carries the same problems). Thus, to ‘solve’ a conflict does not mean to make it go away. Indeed, by insisting that to solve a conflict of values requires yet another value judgment, both Kelsen and Berlin can be described as decisionists. Although this term is somewhat tarnished because of its use by Carl Schmitt,34 it is useful to describe a specific outlook that acknowledges the limits of rationality in the realm of values. By now, it has become clear that Kelsen and Berlin share, with Max Weber actually,35 the assumption that ultimate values are not amenable to scientific inquiry. Within the work of Hans Kelsen, this can be based upon three different, but interrelated aspects. As we have seen, the act of will – the element of volition – plays an important role in Kelsen’s thought. An act of will is nothing else than a decision, and that is why it makes sense that for Schmitt, Kelsen’s legal positivism is composed of normativism and decisionism.36 The decision recurs in Kelsen’s (somewhat meager) theory of interpretation. He curtails legal scholarship’s ambitions to find the one true answer to every interpretative problem. Rather, scholars should only draw a ‘frame of interpretation’ and expose the many meanings and See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 2005, 5: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception”; Carl Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens, 1934, 20. 35 See Benhabib (footnote 13), 165 et seq., who calls Berlin a decisionist and traces his thoughts back to Weber. She is referring to Max Weber, Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 19 (1904), 22–87 (30). 36 Schmitt, Über die drei Arten (footnote 34), 24. 34

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solutions to a given issue. There is no right answer, or rather, it is up to the empowered official (the judge, mostly) to pick a solution out of the panoply of possibilities. This solution becomes law not because it is right, but because a decision has been made in favour of it.37 But Kelsen’s theory nonetheless saves us from short-handedly dismissing any attempt to sincere legal reasoning, as a (rather vulgar) form of pure Schmittian decisionism (or legal realism?) would have us do. The official empowered to authentically interpret a provision is still bound by it, and by the provisions that confer authority on her. Otherwise, the vindication of legal scholarship that was Kelsen’s lifelong project would make no sense, just as the ideas of the Stufenbau38 and the Fehlerkalkül.39 Thus, Kelsen is no decisionist in the Schmittian sense. The decision does not come out of nowhere, nor is it inexplicable.40 The decision consists in acknowledging the limits of what is positively knowable, and to pursue nonetheless. It is a gesture of humility. This is why value pluralism is amenable to compromise, as we will shortly see. But there is a third element in Kelsen’s thought that makes him a decisionist, and that is is theory of democracy. Democracy, in a Kelsenian perspective, must presuppose value pluralism (or relativism, as Kelsen says). Only if values are plural, is there meaningful choice, and elections only make sense when the absolute good is unknown. Otherwise, why vote in the first place? In fact, the [very] assumption that knowledge of absolute truth and insight to absolute values are possible confronts democracy with a hopeless situation. For what else could there be in the face of the towering authority of the absolute Good, but he obedience of those for whom it is their salvation? There could only be unconditional and grateful obedience to the one who possesses – i. e. knows and wills – the absolute Good.41

This reveals Kelsen to be a liberal decisionist. His decisionism is not a violent self-imposition, is not forcefully bringing order into chaos. It considers itself to be the second-best option; the only option that remains once we have understood that the absolute good is out of reach. It is a decisionism of resignation, and thus a self-restraining decisionism. I claim that Berlin’s emphasis on the necessity of choice is nothing else but that. What we have, then, is much more of a Weberian decisionism than a Schmit-

37 Kelsen (footnote 4), 242, 351; (footnote 18), 350–351. 38 Kelsen (footnote 4), 228 et seq; (footnote 18), 221 et seq. 39 Fehlerkalkül (anticipation of errors) is the idea that the law expects some errors to be made in its crea-

tion and provides for certain corresponding procedures and remedies. The key feature is that because the law anticipates that some legal acts will be, in fact, illegal, it confers them interim validity until they are invalidated by an organ empowered to do so. Kelsen adopted this idea from Adolf Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff, 1923, 277, 291–297. Fehlerkalkül is the reason why unconstitutional statutes must be obeyed until a Constitutional Court has annulled them. 40 As Schmitt would have it, see Schmitt, Political Theology (footnote 34), 31 et seq. 41 Hans Kelsen, The Essence and Value of Democracy, 2013, 102.

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tian one.42 It is a liberal decisionism because it frees us from bowing to the law in the way we would have to submit ourselves to truth and justice. The law commands obedience not because it is true, or just, but because it has been decided upon by the competent authorities. Only then is it possible to dissent from the law and still be honest and just. The moment law, truth, and justice are conflated, to disobey the law is to relegate oneself to lie and to injustice. The legitimate existence of a minority in a democracy presupposes, as Kelsen explained, that it is not totally wrong, because the majority, and the law it creates, is not totally right.43 The minority can only be treated as legitimate if it is not forced to believe in the truth and justice of what the majority has decided. A decision that makes no claims to truth and justice, but only to the relevant procedures, frees the minority of that imposition. Only a decisionistic account of democracy can explain why it is legitimate that majorities change, and that the laws are altered again and again. It is legitimate because the majority does not represent the immutable precepts of truth and justice, but the temporarily empowered persons to take temporary decisions.44 As Herrmann Lübbe surmises, this is a problem for deliberative theories of democracy. The ‘force of the better argument’ leaves no space to dissent, because to resist the better argument is to be unreasonable, and thus, negligible. Law, truth and justice are conflated all over again: “One notices: to identify the binding force of political decisions with the binding force of discursively established truth has either totalitarian or anarchic consequences.”45 Kelsen and Berlin certainly were not deliberative democrats. 8.

Pluralism, decision, and compromise

To call Kelsen (and Berlin, for that matter) decisionists seems to contradict their commitment to compromise. Indeed, for all their emphasis on choice, judgment and acts of will, both think that there need not always be an either-or-decision. A closer look will reveal this to be quite obvious: first, compromises are decisions as well. Second, only a pluralist, who acknowledges that there often are many legitimate, but opposing values at stake, will be ready for compromise, because she knows that her values are not the only ones, and because the values of other people cast her in perpetual doubt. A value monist, or absolutist, however, will always see compromise as only the sec-

See also Christian Schwaabe, Freiheit und Vernunft in der unversöhnten Moderne Max Webers kritischer Dezisionismus als Herausforderung des politischen Liberalismus, 2002, 191. 42

43 Kelsen (footnote 41), 103. 44 The quest for a liberal decisionism is associated with the work of Hermann Lübbe. See Hermann Lüb-

be, Theorie und Entscheidung Studien zum Primat der praktischen Vernunft, 1971, 12; Praxis der Philosophie, Praktische Philosophie, Geschichtstheorie, 1978, 65; Fortschrittsreaktionen Über konservative und destruktive Modernität,1987, 48 ff.; Philosophie nach der Aufklärung Von der Notwendigkeit pragmatischer Vernunft, 1980, 161–178. 45 Lübbe, Philosophie nach der Aufklärung (footnote 44), 162–163 (my own translation).

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ond-best option, or even as an outright treason of his principles. Monists can make compromises too, to be sure. But they hardly will have any more legitimacy than the unsatisfying predicament of a temporary modus vivendi, inevitable, perhaps, but not right. Berlin, on the other hand, advocates for a middle-ground precisely because of his pluralist reluctance to subordinate everything to one single principle. But if one believes this doctrine [monism] to be an illusion, if only because some ultimate values may be incompatible with one another, and the very notion of an ideal world in which they are reconciled to be a conceptual (and not merely practical) impossibility, then, perhaps, the best that one can do is to try to promote some kind of equilibrium, necessarily unstable, between the different aspirations of differing groups of human beings […] and to promote the maximum practicable degree of sympathy and understanding, never likely to be complete, between them.46

This way, a decisionist pluralism espouses tolerance as one of its greatest virtues. Based on what we have seen so far, it is no coincidence, then, that tolerance and compromise also are central to Kelsen’s thought. In fact, pluralism (or relativism in Kelsen’s words) breeds tolerance, which breeds compromise. He who views absolute truth and absolute values as inaccessible to the human understanding cognition must deem not only his own, but also the opinion of others at least as feasible. […] The stronger the minority, however, the more the politics in a democracy become politics of compromise. Similarly, there is nothing more characteristic of the relativistic worldview than the tendency to seek a balance between two opposing standpoints, neither of which can by itself be adopted fully, without reservation, and in complete negation of the other.47

What about decisionism, then? Is not compromising the very opposite of deciding? Only if we inadvertently follow a Schmittian decisionism, in which a sovereign decider acts outside normal procedures.48 Obviously, this is not what Kelsen and Berlin can have in mind. Following their rejection of practical reason, though, they also cannot think that compromise simply occurs spontaneously after an exhaustive discussion. Kelsen and Berlin are not adherents of deliberative democracy, and therefore compromise cannot be conceived of in discursive terms. Still, it is possible do reconcile a decisionist reading of Kelsen and Berlin with their insistence on tolerance, equilibrium and the middle ground. Examined closely, compromises reveal themselves to be decisions as well, even twofold decisions, for that matter. Parties pursuing conflicting aims based on contradicting values must first take the decision to abandon the extreme 46 Berlin (footnote 9), 18, 50. 47 Kelsen (footnote 41), 103. 48 See, e. g., the concept of sovereign dictatorship in Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship. From the origin of the mod-

ern concept of sovereignty to proletarian class struggle, 2014, 117.

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position, which means to stop demanding that their claim ought to be met in full. This is a decision because any value whatsoever demands complete, and not only partial satisfaction, and to move away from this ideal is the first choice – thus: sacrifice – to be made. It is a choice made with regard to other values, not at stake in the present conflict, but hopefully valid for both parties; for instance, tolerance, mutual understanding, but also the need for expeditious action, the will to appear resolved towards a third party, and so on. To open oneself to compromise, then, is in itself a compromise. The second decision constituting any compromise is to decide on the matter itself. As the ‘solution’ does not flow from practical reason, it must be created in the act of opting for it. Even the best compromise is dead if no one wants it. Compromises therefore have to be willed, they need a choice in favour of them. This is why every time we do not agree spontaneously, we resort to procedures at whose end stands a decision: the act of voting in Parliament is the perfect example. Members of Parliament vote because they do not agree, and they vote for the compromise they have reached because without vote, there would be none. 9.

Conclusion: Kelsen was a pluralist

In comparing Kelsen’s views on the question of values and their conflict with those of Berlin, it became apparent that Kelsen’s relativism can be reconstructed as a Berlinian pluralism. We do not have to take Kelsen’s self-description as a relativist at face value. In fact, his so-called relativism is not what we usually associate with that therm. This is so because the word ‘relative’, for Kelsen, only denotes that values depend on those who create them, and because everyone is equally endowed with autonomy (that is, the capacity to give oneself moral principles), such values may clash, so that it is not possible to discern which value is the better, higher or truer one. His relativism is thus a formal one, just like his theory of law: leaving out questions of the content of the law, and concentrating on problems of norm, or value creation. All values are ‘relative’ because their pedigree is equal since they all derive from equally autonomous individuals. In insisting on individual autonomy, Kelsen’s relativism is, in one central aspect, not relativistic at all. But to delve into the problems of relativism has not, as indicated, been the aim of this paper. It is precisely because of such problems that it attempted to leave relativism aside and to read Kelsen’s relativistic thoughts in a value pluralist way. Pluralism is not problem-free, of course. But it serves as a more stable foundation for Kelsen’s work because the claims it makes are more modest. Pluralism leaves open the question whether values are objectively given, or not. Berlin, for his part, defended himself against the allegation of relativism and believed in objective values. If everything was relative, so he thought, we would not be able to understand each other. The very fact that one can comprehend why someone holds something dear and despise it nonetheless proved for Berlin that values have an objective existence. He only

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posited that there are many of them.49 But we need not burden pluralism with such considerations. Its central insight is that values can come into conflict without one value being necessarily inferior, wrong or no value at all. On the contrary, a conflict of values is genuine if and only if the values that clash are of equal importance. The present paper claims that this Berlinian thought is Kelsenian as well, and that therefore, Kelsen’s relativism is, in fact, a pluralism. Pluralism entails decisionism. In this aspect, too, Kelsen and Berlin are on the same page. A conflict of values needs to be terminated (not ‘solved’ in the proper sense) by making a choice, that is, a decision. Berlin talks about the inevitability of tragic choices in an almost existentialist fashion. Kelsen justifies it by claiming that values, as statements of ought, always flow from an act of volition, not cognition, and that therefore, there is no practical reason. One gets out of value conflicts by making yet another value judgment, not by applying one’s knowledge. This kind of decisionism could be identified with Carl Schmitt. But that would be premature, since both Kelsen and Berlin, for all their talk about choices, were staunch defenders of equanimity, compromise, and tolerance. How does this fit together? It works by recognizing that compromises, too, are decisions. To compromise means to decide to give up extreme positions, and it means to decide for the solution that has been agreed, since it does not flow from practical reason, but needs to be supported by an active and deliberate choice. Decisionism is one possible foundation of liberal democracy, but certainly the foundation that Kelsen and Berlin would have agreed upon. To decide means not to claim any higher authority than the power that comes from institutions and procedures. While this may sound shallow, even immoral to some, it actually is liberating. The existence of a legitimate minority as well as the possibility to legitimately dissent from the law only make sense if the majority cannot and does not proclaim the immutable precepts of truth and justice. Kelsen and Berlin would have agreed that truth and justice are unattainable ideals. Theirs is not an attitude of futility and of despair, however, but one of confidence and of resolve: To decide in the face of uncertainty is to be truly free. Ulrich Wagrandl

Verfassungsgerichtshof, Freyung 8, 1010 Wien, [email protected]

49 Berlin (footnote 9), 11.

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The Democratic Value of Law Hans Kelsen on the Theory and Praxis of Relativism FEDERICO LIJOI

Abstract: The Pure Theory of Law means the guarantee of a science, which is neutral with

respect to subjective values and the elaboration of a scientific analysis of law. The principle that no values should prevail over others means primarily that all of them must be afforded the same opportunities to enter into comparison and competition with each other. Each value thus has a dignity that is equal to all others, because here value-freedom means relativism. Relativism, therefore, does not mean an indifference to values, but an alternative to the two extremes of dogmatism and scepticism. The main purpose of my paper is to illustrate the characteristics of Kelsenian relativism with a particular reference to two important aspects of his thought: on the one hand, the relationship between form and content, and on the other, the relationship between truth and freedom. Keywords: Law, Relativism, Form, Freedom, Value, Democracy Schlagworte: Recht, Relativismus, Form, Freiheit, Wert, Demokratie

1.

The ‘difficult’ formalism of the Pure Theory of Law

The Reine Rechtslehre represents the most important contribution that Hans Kelsen made to legal theory and the philosophy of law in the twentieth century. Its purity offers the guarantee of a science that is indifferent to subjective values, especially political ones, and that provides a scientific analysis of law. However, one must not let its purported neutrality lead one to conclude that its meaning and relevance transcend the historical and political situation in which it was formulated and developed. On the contrary, the institutions of the Habsburg Empire offered the young Kelsen an excellent opportunity for engaging in a discriminating reflection. In his ‘autorisierte Biographie’, R. A. Métall provides the following quotation by Kelsen:

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Angesichts des österreichischen Staates, der sich aus so vielen nach Rasse, Sprache, Religion und Geschichte verschiedenen Gruppen zusammensetzte, erwiesen sich Theorien, die die Einheit des Staates auf irgendeinen sozial-psychologischen oder sozial-biologischen Zusammenhang der juristisch zum Staat gehörigen Menschen zu gründen versuchten, ganz offenbar als Fiktionen. Insofern diese Staatstheorie ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der Reinen Rechtslehre ist, kann die Reine Rechtslehre als eine spezifisch österreichische Theorie gelten.1

The context of the Habsburg Empire represents not only the background to the Reine Rechtslehre, but also the driving force behind it: his awareness of a problematic relationship between law and society, between political institutions and a pluralism of values, pushed Kelsen towards a formulation of law with the aim of constructing a model for the coexistence of nationalities that would be able to overcome the contrasts and political inequalities between the provinces of the Empire. It is no coincidence that the young Kelsen immediately devoted his academic activity to the themes of Austrian public law (stimulated in particular by the lectures of Edmund Bernatzik in Vienna and of Georg Jellinek in Heidelberg) and electoral law, as evidenced by his studies on the Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (1911), the Kommentar to the new electoral law for the Reichsrat (1907), and the essay on Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz (1914). Furthermore, in 1911 Kelsen was given his first teaching post as Privatdozent of public law and the philosophy of law, teaching a course on the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich. It will therefore be useful to start with a brief look at Austrian constitutional history, especially the troubled transition from the monarchy to the republic, in order to introduce the main thesis of this essay. This consists in the idea that, through the realization of a doctrine that was ‘indifferent to values’ and therefore pure, Kelsen did not intend to separate the law from its real and concrete substratum, i. e. from the values it contains, but instead that he wished to establish a method for managing and resolving the conflicts between the values that were so characteristic of modern society, in a particular way and in a new way. As paradoxical as it may seem, for Kelsen the Reinheit of legal science represents the only possibility for law to recover ‘adherence’ to its object. In Kelsen’s thought a certain conception of the law is at stake, which can rightly be defined as formalist, although in a way that is very peculiar and indeed difficult The ideality and purity of the Rechtslehre constitute the premise – and, one could say, also the promise – of a ‘return to reality’: to that same political and social reality which, precisely because it had become surprisingly conflictual and problematic, had stimulated Kelsen to respond to the urgent therapeutic need for a Reinigung of the nineteenth-century

1

R. A. Métall, Hans Kelsen Leben und Werk Eine autorisierte Biographie, Deuticke, Vienna 1969, 42.

The Democratic Value of Law

Staatslehre, which he considered inadequate2 and no longer able to satisfy the exacting demands of modern knowledge. Finally, I would like to show that, especially in the period of imperial Austria, and therefore during the bitter confrontation between parliament and government that is typical of constitutionalism, although Kelsen’s project of a Reine Rechtslehre initially seemed to be a defence of the positive, rather than the natural, character of the law, during the republican phase it then revealed its true character as an affirmation of the intrinsically democratic nature of the juridical form. 2.

From the constitutional conflict to the parliamentary democracy

Brauneder wrote that ‘in 1848, Austria became one of the constitutional monarchies’.3 In his Österreichisches Staatsrecht (1923) Kelsen describes the Pillersdorf Constitution4 (the Aprilverfassung) as a ‘law of the absolute monarch, without any cooperation (Mitwirkung) of popular representation’.5 Despite its commendable drawing up of Grundrechte (§§ 17–31), it was severely criticised by the liberals, first of all because the monarch possessed an absolute veto on the deliberations of the parliament (§ 15), as well as the power to adjourn it and dissolve it at his will. (§ 16). Moreover an appointed senate was associated with an elected chamber of deputies as a ‘behindernde Kugel’, in such a way that the parliament did not correspond to the model of pure popular representation. In the aftermath of this concession by the sovereign, the dissatisfaction of the students and the population forced the Imperial Court to issue a proclamation (the Mai-Novelle) which instituted a Reichstag with a single-chamber, elected by universal suffrage and endowed with the rights of a constituent assembly. A commission was set up within it which had the aim of drafting a constitution, but as soon as it had prepared its Entwurf the Reichstag was dissolved and in March 1849 the emperor introduced a new constitution (the Märzverfassung), which fully restored monarchical absolutism.

Carl Schmitt instead refers to the outdated aspects of parliamentarianism in his famous essay Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, Duncker & Humblot, Munich and Leipzig 1923. 3 W. Brauneder, Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Österreich 1848 bis 1918, in A. Wandruszka / P. Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918 Im Auftrag der Kommission für die Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie (1848–1918), Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. VII/1, Vienna 2000, 69–237. 4 Politische Gesetzsammlung LXXVI, Nr. 49; see also E. Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze mit Erläuterungen, Manz, Vienna 1911, 102 ff. On the source of this constitution, particularly with reference to the belgische Verfassung of 1831, see W. Brauneder, Die Verfassungsentwicklung, cit , 91 ff. 5 H. Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht Ein Grundriss entwicklungsgeschichtlich dargestellt, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1923, 1. 2

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The draft drawn up by the parliament of Krems6 was particularly important, even though it never entered into force. Kelsen defined its content as ‘crucial for future constitutional development’7 and pointed out its similarities to the Republican Bundesverfassung. On the liberal model of the Paulskirche of Frankfurt it gave the monarch a veto that was only suspensive (§ 160) and in § 1 it stated the principle of popular sovereignty (‘alle Staatsgewalten gehen vom Volke aus’). The transition from a constitutional to a parliamentary monarchy envisaged by the Entwurf was evidently considered too threatening for the rights of the crown. It was no coincidence that over the next few years (1849–1860), from the Märzverfassung to the Sylvesterpatent of 1851 and the Organische Grundsätze of 1852, there was a strengthening of absolutism: ‘above all a repeated accentuation of the rights of the crown’ and an emphasis on ‘the unity of the whole monarchy’.8 The Oktoberdiplom of 1860, which proposed a cautious return to constitutionalism, with more room for federalism and parliamentary Mitwirkung, was replaced in the following year by the centralist Februarpatent (1861). Nevertheless the pressing demands for a constitution did not simply disappear. Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, Romanians, Slovenes, Croats and, above all, the Kingdom of Hungary, were all claiming autonomy and representation. The budget deficit, the huge public debt, the Schleswig-Holstein question and the war against Prussia also played a decisive role. After the closure of parliament and the Sistierung of the Februarpatent in 1865, the development of a constitution resumed with the Dezemberverfassung, which sanctioned the Austro-Hungarian compromise in 1867, and which Brauneder defines as a ‘parliamentary constitution’.9 It strengthened federalism (§§ 11 and 12 of L. 141),10 introduced the separation between judicial and ad-

The system of governance outlined in the Kremsier Entwurf is conceived in accordance with the principles of Hochkonstitutionalismus. In § 41 we find the first clear formulation – absent from the Aprilverfassung – of the principle of legality, i. e. of the subordination of the rights and powers of the monarch to the text of a constitution. On this point see the entry “Constitution”, in K. Rotteck / K. Welcker (ed.), Das Staats-Lexikon: Encyklopädie der sämmtlichen Staatswissenschaften für alle Stände, vol. IV, Brockhaus, Leipzig 1860, 94–112. 7 H. Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht, cit., 3. 8 A. Dudan, La monarchia degli Asburgo Origini, grandezza e decadenza, vol. II, C. A. Bontempelli, Rome 1915, 269. On this point, see also E. Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, cit., 168–169. 9 W. Brauneder, Die Verfassungsentwicklung, cit., 206–207; F. Tezner, Die Volksvertretung, Manz, Vienna 1912, 122–156. 10 A. Dudan, La monarchia degli Asburgo, cit., 162. On this point see P. Petta, Il sistema federale austriaco, Giuffrè, Milan 1980, 22. The Dezemberverfassung consisted of five laws: n. 141, which amended the law concerning the Reichsvertretung Act of 1861; n. 142, on the general rights of citizens for the kingdoms and countries represented in the Council of the Empire; n. 143, on the establishment of a court of law of the Empire; n. 144, on judicial power; and n. 145, on the exercise of governmental and executive power. 6

The Democratic Value of Law

ministrative power (§ 14 of L. 144),11 and provided a catalogue of civil and political rights.12 The constitution of 1867 remained in force until the fall of the Habsburg Empire in 1918. During this period the conflict between crown and parliament continued to rage. Even the struggle between federalists and centralists was exacerbated. In 1873 there was a serious economic and financial crisis, which had a profound and lasting effect on liberalism and its economic ideology of the free market.13 On the political level, it led to a re-evaluation of the role of the state in the economy, because, as Wandruszka explains, ‘that moment saw an end to the myth that the free play of economic forces would lead to the continual growth of well-being in general, and at that time in Austria the idea was rekindled that the state has the task, and indeed the duty, to protect the economically weaker classes’.14 Although law n. 15 of 26 January 1907 – the so-called Beck15 electoral reform – abolished the system of curias and introduced universal suffrage for men over 24 years of age,16 parliamentary life, especially after 1878, was greatly damaged by the abuse of the decree of urgency17 in § 14 of law n. 141: ‘There was the period between ‘67 and ‘78,

‘The administration of justice will be separated in all instances from the political administration’ (§ 14, L. 144). In § 6 we read that ‘the judges are autonomous and independent in the exercise of their functions’, in the sense that ‘in the exercise of their office of judge – unlike the administrative authorities – they are subject only to the law and not to the orders of higher authorities’ (see H. Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht, cit., 46). Finally, in § 15 the establishment of an administrative tribunal is announced, before which anyone who ‘claims that his rights are damaged by a decision or by an order of an administrative authority, may decide to assert his claims’. 12 These rights were the right of citizenship (§ 1), equality before the law (§ 2), freedom of movement and the right of active and passive electorate (§ 4), inviolability of property, personal liberty and domicile (§ 5, § 8, § 9), right of petition (§ 11), right of association and assembly (§ 12), freedom of opinion (§ 13), freedom of faith and conscience (§ 14), freedom of science and its teaching (§ 17), equality of the nations within the state (§ 19). 13 A. Dudan, La monarchia degli Asburgo, cit., 206 and 208. 14 A. Wandruszka, La socialdemocrazia austriaca 1867–1920, in P. Schiera (ed.), La dinamica statale austriaca nel XVIII e XIX secolo, il Mulino, Bologna 1981, 39–40. 15 On this point, see H. Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht, cit., 27; Id., Kommentar zur österreichischen Reichsratswahlordnung (Gesetz vom 26  Jänner 1907, RGBl Nr  17), Manz, Vienna 1907. 16 On this point, see Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht, cit., 27, in which we also read a critique of the violation of the principle of equality due to the exclusion of women from the vote in the 1907 reform. 17 The constitutional standardization of the emergency decree constitutes an example of progress with respect to the absolute state. However, the idea of subordinating – albeit at a later moment – these measures to the approval of parliament, according to the logic of the Rechtsstaat and, therefore, of the legal constructibility of the action of the state, struggled to be affirmed. For example, as regards the obligation to present parliament with the motivations for the urgent measures adopted, § 87 of the Märzverfassung, by revoking the wording contained in § 157 of the Kremsier Entwurf, did not provide for any deadline or any penalty in the event that this obligation might not be fulfilled. In addition § 120 provided for the possibility to adopt Verordnungen with the force of a definitive (not provisional) law, i. e. that did not require the approval or justification of parliament for their adoption. Even more radically § 13 of the Februarpatent neither provided for any explicit assumption of responsibility of the ministry, nor did it request the subsequent approval by parliament of the provision adopted. Some progress was made with § 14 of the Dezemberverfassung, which 11

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in which the parliament was able to make itself respected; then […] the crown and the court took control again and now – despite all the universal suffrage, and indeed now worse than before – the parliament in Austria is alive but it vegetates and it often sleeps, leaving the way clear for the absolutism of the § 14.18 The Sarajevo attack of June 28, 1914, the declaration of war against Bosnia and the military and economic catastrophe that ensued, were the death-knells of the Austrian Empire. During the period of the First Austrian Republic Kelsen took on an important role in public life. In 1918, after completing his military service as the direct representative of the Kriegsminister, he was commissioned by Karl Renner, at that time the Chancellor of State of the Austrian Provisional Government, to draw up the final draft of a republican constitution to be submitted to the national assembly. The essential political policies were a federal structure and a representative system. The model to be followed, ‘so weit dies tunlich schien’, was the preussian one of the Weimar constitution, which was a course of action that ‘doch war nur in einem sehr geringen Masse möglich, da Renner in der Loesung der Presidentschafts-Frage einen weit demokratischen Standpunkt einnahm als die Weimarer Verfassung’.19 To a head of state who, according to art. 60, was to be elected by the Federal Assembly and not by the people, a constitutional court was therefore added, as a guarantee that the functions of the state would be carried out correctly. For Kelsen, who saw it as ‘mein persoenlichstes Werk’, this was ‘der juristische Kern der Verfassung’20 in a jurisdiction that had no precedents in the history of constitutional law, because ‘bisher hatte noch kein Gericht die Kompetenz erhalten, Gesetze wegen Verfassungswidrigkeit mit genereller nicht auf den Einzelfall beschraenkter Wirkung aufzuheben’.21 Kelsen’s enthusiasm did not last long after he was elected as a constitutional judge in 1919 and as a permanent rapporteur in 1921, because in 1929 a radical constitutional reform proposed by the Christian-Social Bundeskanzler Ignaz Seipel ‘hatte in erster Linie zum Ziel, die Macht des Bundespresidenten und damit der ganzen Exekutive wesentlich zu verstaerken und so eine Regierung auch ohne Parlament moeglich zu

allowed for the provisional validity of the provision, and parliamentary approval was required within four weeks of its publication, on pain of the revocation of the measures adopted. Nevertheless § 19 of the same law gave the emperor the power to adjourn or dissolve parliament, which predictably threatened the existence of popular representation in the event of a contrary vote. On this point, see G. D. Hasiba, Das Notverordnungsrecht in Österreich (1848–1917) Notwendigkeit und Mißbrauch eines ‘Staatserhaltenden Instrumentes’, Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna 1985. 18 A. Dudan, La monarchia degli Asburgo, cit., 175. 19 M. Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006, 68–69. 20 Ibid., 69. 21 Ibid.; G. Bongiovanni, Reine Rechtslehre e dottrina giuridica dello Stato H Kelsen e la costituzione austriaca del 1920, Giuffrè, Milan 1998, 141 ff.; S. Lagi, Il pensiero politico di Hans Kelsen (1911–1920) Le origini di Essenza e valore della democrazia, Name Edizioni, Genoa 2008, 161–190.

The Democratic Value of Law

machen’,22 and led to a reorganization of the Constitutional Court, the judges of which were now no longer elected by parliament, but by the government. This was an attack on judicial independence that Kelsen considered intolerable, especially because ‘eine der wesentlichsten Funktionen des Gerichtshofs die Kontrolle der Verfassungsmaessigkeit von Regierungsakten war’.23 Deeply embittered and exposed to repeated political attacks and personal criticism, Kelsen left Vienna and accepted a post at the University of Cologne. Appointed a professor of international law in August 1930, he spent three ‘sehr angenehme’ years there24 and in 1932 he was elected dean of the Faculty of Law. But the Austrian experience was not an isolated episode. In a letter of December 16th 1930 addressed to William Rappard, referring to a positive review of Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre written by his student Eric Voegelin (the ZÖR issue is dated 1931, but it is certain that Kelsen already knew its content, as he was the director), the Austrian jurist denounced ‘the influence of certain intellectual currents that are growing in Germany – not for the benefit of science  – for which it is fashionable to replace exact conceptual determination and empirical research with the romantic construction, oriented only toward the feelings’. And he concluded that ‘today it is genuinely difficult for young people to escape this intellectual fashion, especially since – clearly for political reasons – it has the applause and support of some very influential professors’.25 In 1933 Kelsen was one of the first professors in Germany to be dismissed by the Nazi government. He managed to obtain authorization for expatriation and accepted a position from the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva. Rudolf Métall relates how Carl Schmitt, nominated with Kelsen’s support as the successor to Fritz Stier-Somlo, who had died of heart disease the previous year, was the only one among his colleagues in the faculty of Cologne who did not sign the letter of protest against Kelsen’s dismissal from the University of Cologne, written on the initiative of the new dean, Nipperdey.26 3.

The dangerous contradiction of using dictatorship to defend democracy

As mentioned above, the nature of Kelsen’s struggle in defence of the positivity of law during the period of the constitutional monarchy was revealed even more clearly durM. Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, cit., 71. On this point and others, see: P. Petta, Schmitt, Kelsen e il ‘custode della costituzione’, in Storia e politica, XVI, 1977, 505–551. 23 M. Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, cit., 79. 24 Ibid., 81. 25 Letter by Hans Kelsen to William Rappard, Cologne, 16 December 1930, Vienna University Archive. 26 R. A. Métall, Hans Kelsen: Leben und Werk, cit., 61; R. Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, C. H. Beck, Munich 2009, 294 ff.; C. Schmitt, ‘Solange das Imperium da ist’ Carl Schmitt im Gespräch 1971, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2010, 92. 22

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ing the years of the First Austrian Republic, when it was transformed into a struggle for the democratic production of law. The idea proposed in the Hauptprobleme that legislation is a function of society and not of the state reached its full realization in the nomodynamic interpretation of the principle of legality, which Kelsen began to elaborate from 1914,27 but which was not definitively formulated until 1920, in Das Problem der Souveranität. The democratic context of republican Austria is thus the place where the scientific analysis of law, initially elaborated to debunk the ideological character of the nineteenth-century Staatslehre and its monarchical institutions, reveals its potential value, taking on the systematic form of an original ‘democratic legal positivism’. In the following pages I intend to show how this connection between legal form and democracy emerged to its full extent in the precise moment when democracy was seriously threatened, in the years when dictatorship was looming and when autocracy, also from a theoretical point of view, was dramatically considered as the only solution to the alleged inadequacy of the forms of democratic government and its parliamentary institutions.28 Kierkegaard’s statement that ‘if one really wants to study the universal, one only needs to look around for a legitimate exception’29 seems to be very relevant to this situation. I would like to start from a passage in the last paragraph of Verteidigung der Demokratie, a short essay published by Kelsen in 1932, the year he was elected dean of the Faculty of Jurisprudence of Köln, which was a critical moment for Weimar Germany. Kelsen wrote as follows: ‘wer für die Demokratie ist, darf sich nicht in den verhängnisvollen Widerspruch verstricken lassen und zur Diktatur greifen, um die Demokratie zu retten’.30 Although couched in a rhetorical form, this passage expresses the extremely important theme of the contradiction that Kelsen identifies between democracy and dictatorship. The first thing to note is that it is not a contradiction between law and non-law, i. e. between law and force. In § 46 of the Allgemeine Staatslehre, Kelsen affirms that dic-

On this point, see H. Kelsen, Reichsgesetz und Landesgesetz nach österreichischer Verfassung, in Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 32, 1914, 202–245, 390–438. 28 This was certainly Schmitt’s position. Together with Kelsen, the following jurists instead fought in favour of democracy: H. Heller, Freiheit und Form in der Verfassung, in Die Justiz, 5, 1929–30, 672–677: 672; E. Fraenkel, Abschied von Weimar? (1932), in Id., Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, Nomos, Baden Baden 2011, 481–495: 488; O. Kirchheimer, Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitt’s ‘Legalität und Legitimität’, in Id., Von der Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus: die Auflösung der demokratischen Rechtsordnung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt on the Main 1981, 113–151. 29 S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling. Repetition, in Kierkegaard’s Writings, VI, edited and translated with an introduction and notes by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1983, 227. 30 H. Kelsen, Verteidigung der Demokratie (1932), in M. Jestaedt / O. Lepsius (ed.), Hans Kelsen Verteidigung der Demokratie, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006, 237. Kelsen’s implicit reference is obviously the position of Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1931; H. Kelsen, Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein? in Die Justiz, 6, 1931, 576–628. 27

The Democratic Value of Law

tatorship is just as much a legal order as democracy, so that ‘was als Willkür gedeutet wird, ist nur die rechtliche Möglichkeit des Autokraten, jede Entscheidung an sich zu ziehen. Ein solcher Zustand ist ein Rechtszustand, auch wenn er als nachteilig empfunden wird’.31 As in a democracy, also in a dictatorship the will of the state appears as the content of a norm, and it is therefore subjected to the principle of legality. A dictatorship is not rechtswidrig, that is to say Unrechtsstaat, but Rechtsstaat, just as a democracy is. I wish to define this peculiar contradiction by referring to the theory of contrariety adopted by Aristotle: democracy and dictatorship are the contraries of the same genus (the law), just as black and white are the contraries of the genus of colour.32 We need to understand whether this contrariety also implies a scale of values involving a progression from the lower legal value of dictatorship to the higher legal value of democracy. In this case, the specific difference between democracy and dictatorship brings out a difference of value within the legal form. Kelsen considers the legal form as the genuine essence of the principle of legality. Within it (wenn A soll B) the action of the state (B) is seen as the consequence of a condition (A), and thus not as an arbitrary and immediate action, but as one that is conditioned and mediated. This Grundform des Rechts is the result of two fundamental theoretical moves: the statement of the Sein-Sollen dualism and the elimination of the dualisms within Sollen: between subjective right and objective law on the one hand, and between private and public law on the other hand. 3.1.

The Sein-Sollen dualism

The Sein-Sollen dualism originated in the context of the contraposition between formalism and anti-formalism, spawned by juridical positivism. While Kelsen was certainly a formalist, he did not conceive of the form of law as the outcome of a process of logical abstraction, but rather as the product of a transcendental analysis (Kritik). Kelsen’s doctrine therefore appears to be closer to legal dogmatics33 than to the soci-

31 32 33

H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1925), Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, Vienna 1993, 336. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1018a 25–31. H. Kelsen / R. Treves, Formalismo giuridico e realtà sociale, Esi, Naples 1992, 39–54.

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ology of law. Having recourse to Neo-Kantianism34 as a movement of reaction to ‘empirical positivism’,35 Kelsen argued that law has an ideal rather than a natural existence. Kelsen made contact with the Neo-Kantian school of Baden (Windelband, Rickert, Lask) during his stay in Heidelberg, when he attended Georg Jellinek’s seminar in 1908. In Leipzig, Jellinek had been first a student and then a friend and colleague of Windelband.36 In the Begriffsjurisprudenz of Jellinek and his predecessors, Gerber and Laband,37 Kelsen identified a useful application of the (Neo-)Kantian contraposition between Sein and Sollen,38 i. e. of the effort to establish the autonomy of practical reason before theoretical reason, that of value before reality, and that of law before nature. Gerber, in his Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts (1865), was the first jurist who endeavoured to satisfy ‘das Bedürfniss einer schärferen und korrekteren Präzisierung der dogmatischen Grundbegriffe’,39 by elaborating, in the field of public law, the distinction between two Betrachtungsweisen: that of natural knowledge and that which pertained to legal knowledge.40 A decade later, in Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches (1876), Laband followed this up by asserting that ‘alle historischen, politischen und philosophischen Betrachtungen – so werthvoll sie an und für sich sein mögen – sind für die Dogmatik eines konkretes Rechtsstoffes ohne Belang und dienen nur zu häufig dazu, den Mangel an constructiver Arbeit zu verhüllen’.41 Finally Jellinek developed M. Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, cit., 23: ‘Die für die Rechtswissenschaft unerlässliche Methodenreinheit schien mir durch den von keinem Philosophen so scharf wie von Kant betonten Gegensatz von Sollen und Sein gewährleistet. Die kantische Philosophie war mir daher von allem Anfang an Leitstern. Ich akzeptierte sie zuerst in jener Form, die sie durch die Philosophen der südwestdeutschen Richtung, vor allem durch Windelband, erhalten hatte’. On this point, see what Kelsen wrote in the Preface to the second edition (1923) of Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, Scientia Verlag, Aalen 1984: ‘Im Anschluß an die Kant-Interpretation Windelbands und Simmels wird mir das Sollen zum Ausdrucke für die Eigengesetzlichkeit des von der Rechtswissenschaft zu bestimmenden Rechtes zum Unterschied von einem ‘soziologisch’ erfaßbaren sozialen Sein’ (VI). 35 M. G. Losano, Sistema e struttura nel diritto, vol. II Il Novecento, Giuffrè, Milan 2002, 28 ff. 36 J. Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2000, 19; C. Jellinek, Georg Jellinek. Sein Leben, sein Werk, in ‘Neue österreichische Biographie ab 1815’, vol. VII, Amalthea, Vienna 1931, 136 ff. 37 H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, cit., VII–IX. 38 S. L. Paulson, Introduzione, in H. Kelsen / R. Treves, Formalismo giuridico e realtà sociale, cit.: ‘Georg Jellinek could be considered as the author who influenced Kelsen the most. Undoubtedly, in this context we think above all of Jellinek’s contributions to public law, but the work of Georg Jellinek, a good friend of Max Weber, also reflects a philosophical conviction: the Neo-Kantianism of Heidelberg’ (13). 39 C. F. von Gerber, Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts, 3rd edn, Bernhard Tauchnitz, Leipzig 1880, V; M. G. Losano, Sistema e struttura nel diritto, vol. I Dalle origini alla Scuola storica, Giuffrè, Milan 2002, 306– 307. 40 C. F. von Gerber, Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts, cit., 1–2. 41 P. Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, vol. I, 2nd edn, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Freiburg 1888, XI (preface to the second edition); W. Wilhelm, Zur juristischen Methodenlehre im 19  Jahrhundert, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt on the Main 1958, 5: ‘Von Bergbohm, dem Zeitgenossen Labands, stammt das Wort, Jurisprudenz sei ‘gereinigtes Denken’. Sucht man eine bündige Formel für Labands Wissenschaftstheorie, so ist sie in diesem Wort zu sehen’ (7); P. Zorn, Die Entwicklung der Staatsrechts-Wissenschaft seit 1866, in Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts, I, 1907, 65; M. Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, vol. 34

The Democratic Value of Law

Gerber’s idea by elaborating, in the Allgemeine Staatslehre (1900) the famous ‘ZweiSeiten-Lehre’, the doctrine of the two sides of the state, according to which the same object, the state, could be understood either from a sociological point of view or from a strictly normative one. These attempts, albeit imperfect, all aimed exclusively at making jurisprudence an authentic and autonomous science.42 For Kelsen law consists of a series of hypothetical legal propositions (objective value judgements). Value (Sollen) and reality (Sein) constitute the object of legal science and that of natural science respectively,43 and they are forms of representation of a single (modally indifferent) substratum 44 In both cases, science is the science of forms, and therefore of judgements: on the one side those of the law (as scheme of interpretation), and on the other side those of nature, which are synthetic. This does not mean, as claimed by those who accused Kelsen,45 that law, in its role as a judgement, is a product of the science of law, and that it therefore loses its authoritative origin, but that law is a function of knowledge, since the legal norm is properly speaking the sense of an act of will (Sinngehalt eines Willensakt), and not the act of will itself. According to Kelsen, legal science, as a (pure) legal theory of law, therefore has an analytical rather than a constitutive function. It does not establish the norms, but only extracts from the law – understood as a series of synthetic judgements – its fundamental form (Grundform). Therefore we must not confuse the synthetic function of the value judgements which constitute the law with the analytical function that pertains to the judgements of juridical science. Let us now examine Kelsen’s critique of the dualisms of Sollen.

II, 1800–1914, C. H. Beck, Munich 1992, 331 ff.; E. Schwinge, Der Methodenstreit in der heutigen Rechtswissenschaft, L. Röhrscheid Verlag, Bonn 1930, 7. 42 H. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1911: ‘Nur daß ich die Trennung zwischen Sein und Sollen, zwischen explikativer und normativer Betrachtung gerade der Rechtswissenschaft gegenüber schärfer durchführe, als es bisher üblich war, und für diese Disziplin eine rein normative Betrachtung in Anspruch nehme’ (VI). 43 On the asymmetrical relationship between critique of the science of nature (transcendental philosophy) and legal science as a pure doctrine of law, see H. Kelsen, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht, Deuticke, Vienna and Leipzig 1922. 44 On this point, see H. Kelsen, Die Rechtswissenschaft als Norm- oder als Kulturwissenschaft (1916), in H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A. Verdross, Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, Europa Verlag, Vienna 1968, 65; Id., Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Manz, Vienna 1979, 44–48. 45 On this point, see F. Sander, Staat und Recht Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der Rechtserfahrung, Deuticke, Vienna and Leipzig 1922; Id., Kelsens Rechtslehre Kampfschrift wider die normative Jurisprudenz, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1923. See also A.-J. Korb, Kelsens Kritiker Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rechts- und Staatstheorie (1911–1934), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2010.

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3.2.

The dualisms within Sollen

The critique of the first dualism within Sollen, between subjective right and objective law, is directed against the idea that such a thing as natural, namely pre-juridical, rights exist, such as the right to property (here John Locke comes to mind46). In the Allgemeine Staatslehre (1925), the subjective right is defined as ‘rechtlich geschütztes Interesse’ (as in the case of Jhering), or as ‘rechtlich gewährleistetes Wollen’ (as Windscheid defines it).47 Immediately afterwards Kelsen specifies that ‘in beiden Fällen ruht der Akzent auf einem metarechtlichen, jenseits des Rechts in seinem spezifischen Eigensinn liegenden Moment, demgegenüber das Recht nur als Mittel, als Schutz- oder Garantiemittel [… ] in Betracht kommt’48 According to this theory, therefore, the subjective right is considered logically and temporally prior to the objective law. The fundamental idea is that originally only subjective rights existed (the prototype of which is the right to property) and only at a later stage the objective law, such as the legal order of the state, was added to these rights in order to endorse and protect the rights that had arisen independently of the legal order itself. A few pages further on, it becomes evident that according to Kelsen this distinction between subjective right and objective law only reproduces the opposition between natural law and legal positivism: ‘Es ist die Idee der angeborenen, unzerstörbaren oder auch ‘erworbenen’ Rechte des Individuums, die seit je mit der Prätention aufgetreten ist, absolute Schranken gegen das positive Recht aufzurichten. In dem Dualismus von objektivem und subjektivem Recht verbirgt sich somit auch der Alte Dualismus von positivem Recht und gerechtem, natürlichem Recht’.49 But it is in the General Theory of Law and State (1945) that Kelsen provides the most lucid account of the political character of this distinction. Here it is obvious that Kelsen believes that the theory of subjective rights ideologically deforms the positive nature of law (if this is scientifically analyzed), rendering non-modifiable and therefore impossible to produce legally (either autocratically or democratically) a certain number of rules and prescriptions directed at the behaviour of the Normadressaten (so that, for example, the violation of the right to property is punished not only because it is against the law, i. e. malum prohibitum, but above all because it is against nature, i. e. malum in se). The whole passage is as follows: Though logically untenable, the theory of the priority of rights is of the utmost political significance. Its purpose is obviously to influence the formation of law, rather than to analyze the nature of positive law. If the legal order cannot create but merely guarantee J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689–90), C. B. Macpherson (ed.), Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis-Cambridge 1980. 47 H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, cit., 55. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., 59. 46

The Democratic Value of Law

rights, it cannot abolish existing rights either. It is then legally impossible to abolish the institution of private property, nay, legislation is then incapable of depriving any particular individual of any particular proprietary right of his. All these consequences of the doctrine of the priority of rights are in contradiction to legal reality. The doctrine of the priority of rights is not a scientific description of positive law but a political ideology.50

As regards the second dualism within Sollen, between private and public law, Kelsen strongly argues against the existence of a political Mehrwert of the public power, which allows the state to pursue the public interest in a manner that is untrammelled, i. e. legibus solutus As I pointed out in the previous paragraph, the story of the Habsburg Empire was characterized by a bitter struggle between the parliament and the government, and by the ceaseless attempts made by the monarchical institutions to circumvent the principle of representation and legality. The aim was to block the parliamentary development of the constitutional monarchy by causing it to revert to the practices of an absolutist government. Two means were employed to reach this aim: on the one hand the doctrine of the distinction between formal law and material law, and on the other hand the theory of administration as a free activity of the state. In both cases, the purpose was to free the state, as an administration, i. e. as an expression of royal power, from the legal system, guaranteeing it a sphere of free action not regulated by the norms produced by parliament. ‘Es ist der der deutschen Staatstheorie politisch zwar geglückte, rechtslogisch aber mißglückte Versuch’ – writes Kelsen – ‘ein Stück des monarkischen Absolutismus auch unter der Geltung der konstitutionellen Verfassung zu konservieren’.51 Whereas previous to the development of the constitutional system ‘hatte Gesetz stets nur die eine Bedeutung einer bindenden, das heißt rechtspflichtenschaffenden oder einen Rechtssatz formulierenden Vorschrift der kompetenten staatlichen Autorität, ohne Rücksicht auf die besondere Form, in der diese Vorschrift erlassen wurde’,52 in his formulation of the distinction between formal law and material law Laband introduced the explicit distinction between legal norms that have the form of the law, i. e. deliberations by parliament that are then sanctioned by the monarch and enacted, and norms that, despite not having the form of the law, nevertheless possess its substance, because they establish legal obligations.53 The fact that both these types of norms are defined as law means that the monarch and the administrative authorities are implicitly legitimized to institute legal obligations without submitting them to

50

80.

H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1945,

H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (1920), Scientia, Aalen 1960, 27. H. Kelsen, Zur Lehre vom Gesetz im formellen und materiellen Sinn, in H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A. Verdross, Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, cit., 1534. 53 On this point, see P. Laband, Das Budgetrecht, Guttentag, Berlin 1871. 51 52

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the procedure of parliamentary formulation. The notion of law in the material sense thus resulted in maintaining, in the constitutional state, a ‘materielles Gesetzgebungsrecht’54 directly entrusted to the monarch and the administration, both of which preserved the power to institute legal obligations running parallel to the formal legislative power of the parliament.55 The same intention of introducing Machtreservate in favour of the executive power was supported by the doctrine, advocated by Otto Mayer, that administration was a free activity of the organs of the state. The primacy of the administration over the private subjects of civil society was in this case justified by the fact that it alone could interpret, and therefore realize, the public interest. According to Mayer, only the State, understood as Macht that was free from the constraints of the legal system, was able to mediate the conflicts of the Gesellschaft, the energies of which (for example, in the activity of political parties) could not be activated except in terms of a divisive particularization of the common good.56 The first dualism within Sollen is used by the bourgeoisie as a protection against the state (the King), while the second dualism within Sollen is used by the state to prevail over society (the bourgeoisie). As we have seen, this contraposition between state and society perfectly reflects the structure and the characteristics of constitutional monarchy. 3.3.

The identity of state and law

The main thesis of Kelsen’s Rechtslehre, the identity of state and law, follows on from this criticism of the dualisms within Sollen. But what exactly does this thesis entail?

H. Kelsen, Zur Lehre vom Gesetz im formellen und materiellen Sinn, cit., 1540. On this point, see also Kelsen’s critique of the principle of the division of power in H. Kelsen, Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie des Staates, Rudolf M. Roher, Vienna 1926, § 58. 56 This theory is expressed in the two volumes of Otto Mayer’s Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht (1895–1896), and above all in his essay Zur Lehre vom öffentlichrechtlichen Vertrage, in Archiv für öffentliches Recht, 3, 1888, 1–86, which Kelsen would explicitly oppose in 1913 with his Zur Lehre vom öffentlichen Rechtsgeschäft, in Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 31, 1913, 53–98, 190–249. On this point see, inter alia, the essays by M. Fioravanti, Otto Mayer e la scienza del diritto amministrativo and Kelsen, Schmitt e la tradizione giuridica dell’Ottocento, now in Id., La scienza del diritto pubblico, cit., 451–518 and 605–656. Kelsen’s critique of the primacy of the state over civil society does not, however, make him a liberal anti-statist thinker. The image of a purely economic-private form of civil society is completely alien to Kelsen. From a political point of view, in the preface to the first edition of the Hauptprobleme (1911), he proclaims himself a ‘neo-liberal’ (XI), which means that he considers himself among those who were opposed to the excesses of Manchester Liberalism, by advocating social legislation and moderate regulatory interventions by the state. For a lucid definition of neo-liberalism, see C. Mortati, Le forme di governo Lezioni, Cedam, Padua 1973, 47. Kelsen’s critique of liberalism is radical in Politische Weltanschauung und Erziehung, in H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A. Verdross, Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, cit., 1506–1507, in which he adopts a position that is rather close to ‘collectivism’. Finally, in Hans Kelsen im Selbstzeugnis, cit., 61, he explicitly declares his adherence to the ideals of social democracy. 54 55

The Democratic Value of Law

First of all, it means that if the state is nothing but the form of society (as stated in the Hauptprobleme), then, since the state is law, law is the ‘Form der Gesellschaft, die als das substantielle Element, als der Inhalt dieser Form zu denken ist’.57 The most lucid sense of the thesis that identifies state and law lies in the critique of constitutional monarchy with its opposition between state and society, that is to say in the same motive that prompted Kelsen to debunk the ideological character of the dualisms within Sollen. It is not too difficult to find the error at the root of Kelsen’s criticism of these two dualisms. In fact he stigmatizes the attempt to naturalize a subjective affirmation of value, so as to ideologically elevate it above all others and place it outside the positive creation of law.58 In this case, precisely because it emerges as the main result of a scientific critique of ideology, the structure of the legal form not only confirms that authentic law is only positive law, but it also seems to convey a certain interpretation of that positivity. According to this interpretation, the prohibition against immunizing subjective values corresponds to the obligation to subject them to discussion, and to the duty of not making them exempt from criticism. This is a particularly important point, as I believe that the operation of purification of the Rechtswissenschaft necessarily entails a preference for a certain form of society, which means a certain kind of state. In this sense, the indifference to values implied by the neutrality of the scientific method does not produce an immoral or amoral law, which is something that Kelsen has often been accused of,59 but also makes it possible to identify the kind of state, i. e. the specific approach towards managing conflicts between values, that can be considered worthy of modern knowledge, and particularly of the scientific spirit that characterizes it.60

H. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme, cit., 410. On this point, see H. Kelsen, Gott und Staat (1922), in H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A. Verdross, Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, cit.: ‘Der Dualismus von Staat und Recht bedeutet nicht nur einen logisch-systematischen Widerspruch, er ist inbesondere auch die Quelle eines rechtlich-politischen Mißbrauchs. Er ermöglicht, im Gewande rechts- und staatstheoretischer Argumentation rein politischen Postulaten gegen das positive Recht zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen. Der Dualismus von Staat und Recht wird zu einem Dualismus zweier verschiedener, miteinander in Widerspruch stehender Normsysteme, von denen man das eine unter dem Namen “Staat”, Staatsraison, Staatsinteresse (auch öffentliches Wohl, öffentliches “Recht”) immer dann zur Geltung bringt, wenn das andere, das “positive” Recht, zu einer für die Herrschenden, die in Wahrheit mit diesem “Staat” identisch sind, unerwünschten Konsequenz führt’ (186–187). 59 On the relationship between law and morals, see H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn (1960), Verlag Österreich, Vienna 2000: ‘Nimmt man an, daß das Recht seinem Wesen nach moralisch ist, dann hat es keinen Sinn, unter Voraussetzung eines absoluten Moralwertes die Forderung zu stellen, daß das Recht moralisch sein soll. Eine solche Forderung ist nur dann sinnvoll [… ], wenn die Möglichkeit eines unmoralischen, moralisch schlechten Rechtes zugegeben, wenn also in die Definition des Rechtes nicht das Element eines moralischen Inhalts aufgenommen wird’ (68). 60 On the ‘scientific spirit’ of modernity, see S. Freud, Die Zukunft einer Illusion, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Vienna 1927; J. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, Minton Balch, New York 1929. On the connection between democracy and education, see inter alia J. Dewey, The Ethics of Democracy (1888), in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey The Early Works (1882–1898), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale 57 58

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Although it cannot be denied that Kelsen presents his inquiry as free from value and from any preference concerning the models it describes, it seems equally evident that Kelsen’s critique of ideology has a superior value as a practical, and ultimately political, guide. This is not just a ‘side effect’ of purity, but its ‘practical consequence’. As Kelsen points out in Justiz und Verwaltung, first published in 1929: ‘Man sieht, zu welch bedeutsamen praktischen Konsequenzen eine falsche Theorie vom Wesen des Staates [… ] führen kann und welch eminent praktische Bedeutung eine gereinigte Lehre hat’.61 4.

The degree of law: on the deformability of the form

Now I’d like to return to the idea that the indifference to values required by the neutrality of the scientific method leads Kelsen to attribute a higher value to democracy than to dictatorship, by commenting on a passage in Das Problem der Souveranität (1920) that concerns the conditions for exercising the right of secession in a federal contract, as for example in the case of a threat to vital interests (but it could also refer to a right to emergency legislation, a Notverordnungsrecht). Kelsen states as follows: Durch einen solchen Inhalt wird allerdings die Rechtsform bis zur äussersten Grenze ihrer Aufnahmsfähigkeit gespannt. Hier droht der Inhalt schon die Form zu sprengen. Immerhin, solange nicht jede Interessengefährdung als Bedingung dieses Rechtes gesetzt, solange die Bundesordung nicht nur zu solchem Verhalten verpflichten will, das, weil im eigenen Interesse der Subjekte, von ihnen selbst gewollt wird, solange die mögliche Differenz von Sollen und Wollen nicht auf Null sinkt, ist formell die Rechtsidee gewahrt.62

In this passage Kelsen shows that when the content of the legal obligation coincides with the will of the subject who is under obligation, the form of Sollen implodes, because the existence of the obligation is undone by any behaviour that does not correspond to it. As we know, for Kelsen the idea of law requires instead that the juridical obligation (i. e. Geltung) should remain indifferent to the will of Normaddressaten (i. e. Wirksamkeit). I wonder if this relationship of indifference between form and content, and especially the concept of a zero degree to which such indifference can be reduced, with the risk of undoing the legal form, can be used to interpret the relationship between society and its form, i. e. the law, when it comes to the formation of the will of the state. Such a

1969, vol. I (1882–1888), 227–249; Id., Democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education, The Macmillan company, New York 1916; G. Calogero, La scuola dell’uomo, Sansoni, Florence 1939. 61 H. Kelsen, Justiz und Verwaltung (1929), in H. Kelsen, A. Merkl, A. Verdross, Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, cit., 1796. 62 H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, cit., 308.

The Democratic Value of Law

situation, in which the form is stretched to the furthest limits of receptivity and is thus at risk of being undone, might occur when the subjects involved in the formation of juridical conditions – that is to say those facts to which the action of the State is attached in the primary norm – are limited to only one of the interested parties that constitute society, as in the case of a dictatorship. The resulting totalization of the part, or of the party, therefore represents a type of content, i. e. a type of state, which, although juridically qualified, is located at the extreme limit of the form. For this reason, although Kelsen includes dictatorship within the law, he places it at the very furthest limit of the legal form, which it almost oversteps to reach the kind of naturalization inherent in the ideology of natural law and in that of public power as Mehrwert. This fascinating image of the form that can be deformed and undone seems to me very useful and fruitful in order to understand correctly what ‘indifference to the content’ means for Kelsen. The indifference of the legal form to values by no means implies that, since one value is worth the same as another, it doesn’t matter whether society takes the form of an authoritarian or a democratic state. In fact it has nothing to do with nihilistic relativism. Instead it means that no value can be subtracted from discussion and placed above others without corrupting the perfection of the legal form. Therefore, in order for no value to prevail over others, and for the law to remain a form because it is not exclusively assigned a single value, every value must have an equal possibility of being subject to discussion, and thereby competing and contributing to the formation of the public will.63 The idea that the state is identical to the law, and that it is therefore the form of society, thus means, to adopt another image, that it represents the circumference on which subjects and values are arranged, all of which are equidistant from the centre. Kelsen’s relativism is nothing but this equal distance from the centre. In Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1929) he writes: ‘Darum ist der Relativismus, die Weltanschauung, die der demokratische Gedanke voraussetzt. Demokratie schätzt den politischen Willen jedermanns gleich ein, wie sie auch jeden politischen Glauben, jede politische Meinung, deren Ausdruck ja nur der politische Wille ist, gleichermaßen achtet’.64 This is what is meant by ‘indifference of the form to the content’ and ‘indifference of the law to values’. I think that the image of the form as a circumference aptly expresses the idea that the neutrality of juridical science as regards values does not imply any nihilistic relativism or lack of interest in the question of value on Kelsen’s part. On the contrary, the neutrality of science allows him to discover the highest and most effective form of law in parliamentary democracy (and herein lies ‘die praktische Bedeutung der reinen Rechtslehre’). Therefore, for Kelsen the democratic state is the most genuinely scientific form of society (let us consider, once again, the central idea of the Hauptprobleme, On this point, see Kelsen’s preference for the proportional electoral system, in H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1929), in Hans Kelsen Verteidigung der Demokratie, cit., 193–204. 64 H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1929), cit., 226. 63

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according to which legislation is a function of society, and not of the state, as Jellinek instead believed65). Here Kelsen highlights a structural correspondence between the neutrality of science and the relativism of parliamentary democracy. He includes dictatorship within the law, but at its lowest possible level, at which the form is the most deformed, since – precisely because it subtracts (by law) a certain value from debate, which is reserved for the immediate production of the autocrat – it does not possess a method for resolving conflicts of interest. This is because within it, as Kelsen acutely notes: ‘es hier überhaupt an der Möglichkeit politischer Strömung und Gegenströmung fehlt’.66 Again in Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie Kelsen uses the terminology of psychoanalysis to explain this concept, attributing a special ability to democracy, namely: ‘den politischen Affekt der Masse über die Schwelle des sozialen Bewußtsein zu heben, um ihn hier abreagieren zu lassen’, while in an autocracy ‘ruht das soziale Gleichgewicht […] gerade umgekehrt auf der Verdrängung des politischen Affekts in einer Sphäre, die man individualpsychologisch mit dem Unterbewußtsein vergleichen könnte’.67 Whereas for this reason democracy, unlike dictatorship, is safeguarded from the danger of a revolution that might destroy it, nevertheless it is the victim of a paradoxical privilege inasmuch as the freedom of political self-determination that follows from the perfection of its legal form ‘directly favours its enemy’. Kelsen writes that ‘it’s a paradoxical privilege of this form of government, a doubtful advantage which it has over autocracy that it may, by its own specific methods of forming the will of the state, abolish itself ’.68 Therefore, on the one hand, in accordance with its scientific spirit, democracy – because it offers expression to all values – constructs political truth through discussion and compromise, replacing the top-down paternalism of dictatorship with the bottom-up approach of a ‘fatherless society’.69 On the other hand, however, it exposes itself to a mortal, but inevitable, danger, because the peculiar value of relativism categorically rules out its imposition by force. Unlike Rousseau, in fact, Kelsen claims that one cannot force people to be free.70 Freedom can only be freely chosen, and this also applies to democracy, which is founded H. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme, cit., 433, 465 ff. H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, cit., 202. Ibid. H. Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy (1955), in Hans Kelsen Verteidigung der Demokratie, cit., 292. Ibid., 291: ‘On the whole, democracy has no ground which is favourable to the principle of authority in general and to the Fuehrer-ideal in particular. Insofar as the father is the archetype of authority, because it is the original experience of all authority, democracy is, according to its own idea, a fatherless society’. On this point, see also S. Freud, Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Vienna 1921; P. Federn, Zur Psychologie der Revolution: die vaterlose Gesellschaft, Anzengruber-Verlag Brüder Suschitzk, Vienna and Leipzig 1919. 70 J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, Livre I, Chapitre VII (Du Souverain): ‘Afin donc que le pacte social ne soit pas un vain formulaire, il renferme tacitement cet engagement qui seul peut donner de la force aux au65 66 67 68 69

The Democratic Value of Law

upon freedom. In fact it is from the freedom that it accords to its members that democracy derives its strength and nourishes its only possible self-defence mechanism: those who want democracy, because they want relativism, cannot at the same time want a value that excludes all other values, thereby attempting to escape from the tiring and never-ending process that is part and parcel of democratic life. The democratic conviction of the relativity of all convictions is both the poison that democracy injects into its political organism and the antidote to this poison, in such a way that authoritarian impulses are short lived, because they are defused by the same relativism that allowed them to arise in the first place. In 1927, in The Public and its Problems, John Dewey claimed that ‘the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy’.71 In 1932 Kelsen wrote that if the ‘people in parliament’ no longer want democracy, then they have simply ceased to be democratic, and so democracy – which persuades but doesn’t compel, educates but doesn’t oblige – can only hope that the people will want it again one day. No external guarantee or ‘father figure’ can relieve the democratic citizen from the endless search for civil cohabitation. This is why, as Kelsen writes: ‘die Erziehung zur Demokratie wird eine der praktischen Hauptforderungen der Demokratie selbst’.72 And so, when it is surrendered up to an ill-educated people, democratic relativism can lead to nothing but the appalled realization of its own defeat: ‘Man muss seiner Fahne treu bleiben, auch wenn das Schiff sinkt; und kann in die Tiefe nur die Hoffnung mitnehmen, dass das Ideal der Freiheit unzerstörbar ist und dass es, je tiefer es gesunken, um so leidenschaftlicher wieder aufleben wird’.73 Federico Lijoi

Università di Roma ‘La Sapienza’, Via Carlo Fea 2, 00161 Roma, [email protected]

tres, que quiconque refusera d’obéir à la volonté générale y sera contraint par tout le corps: ce qui ne signifie autre choses sinon qu’on le forcera à être libre’. 71 J. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1927), in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey The Later Works (1925–1953), Southern Illinois University Press, London and Amsterdam 2008, vol. II (1925–1927), 325. 72 H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, cit., 219. 73 H. Kelsen, Verteidigung der Demokratie, cit., 237.

411

Salvaging Scientific Socialism? Hans Kelsen’s Attachments and Detachments to Austro-Marxism REUT YAEL PAZ / MAXIMILIAN WAGNER

Abstract: This contribution situates Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1934) together with

his earlier political involvement with Austro-Marxism during the 1920s. The move here is two-fold: after a brief discussion of the cultural milieu of the Austro-Marxists in Vienna, it unpacks Kelsen’s positionality within the group first assembled in 1907. More specifically, in order to distil Kelsen’s critical attachments to the Austro-Marxists, the focus here is on Kelsen’s debate with the jurist/sociologist Max Adler (1873–1937) primarily over the ‘dismantling of the capitalist state machinery’. Whereas such contextualization salvages Kelsen’s political commitment to scientific socialism, it also sheds light on the importance of this ‘phase’ in Kelsen’s later intellectual development. Keywords: Historical contextualisation, Vienna, Austro-Marxism, scientific socialism,

Max Adler, the concept of the state Schlagworte: Historische Kontextualisierung, Wien, Austromarxismus, Wissenschaftli-

cher Sozialismus, Max Adler, Staatsbegriff

Hans Kelsen, who drafted the Austrian constitution and acted as a judge in the Austrian Constitutional Court, a court he himself had conceived, was first and foremost a legal scientist. Kelsen’s serious scientific but also political engagement with other scholars and texts is often overshadowed by the originality of his 1934 Pure Theory of Law (Reine Rechtslehre). His somewhat Platonic legal interest in securing ‘a hole in

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time’ for the law in its purest form – separated from social reality and the moral ideal – was driven by methodological, even mathematical, precision.1 His attempts at scientific purity cannot, and should not, remain detached from Kelsen’s eventful life. Born in Prague, Kelsen grew up in Vienna, where he got his first professorship after converting from Judaism, and established a name for himself in numerous legal fields. Kelsen never concealed his favouritism for social democracy, even if he never formally committed to the party.2 Karl Renner (1870–1950) ‘the father of the (Austrian) Republic’ – an ‘Austro-Marxist’ who shared Kelsen’s socialist convictions and particularly his insistence on the protection of minorities and multi-culturalism – asked Kelsen, while Kelsen acted as the state chancellor of the provisional government, to participate in the drafting of the new Austrian Constitution. One of Kelsen’s drafts was adopted.3 Arguably, Kelsen’s dedication to the socialist cause while maintaining political independence officially made it possible for Renner to entrust Kelsen with this task.4 Be that as it may, it was Kelsen’s ‘socialist’s commitments,’ as they are often described, that were responsible for his dismissal from the Constitutional Court in 1930.5 He relocated to Cologne but was stripped of his teaching duties by the Nazis shortly after becoming dean in 1933. Kelsen then escaped to Geneva and eventually to the United States where he settled in Berkley. After his retirement in 1952, Kelsen continued to research, lecture worldwide and publish. Despite the lack of recognition he received

Reut Yael Paz, Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law as ‘a Hole in Time’ / La Théorie pure du droit de Hans Kelsen comme “un trou dans le temps”, Monde(s) 7 (2015), 75–94. 2 As Clemens Jabloner writes, Kelsen “never actually joined a political party” (Clemens Jabloner, Kelsen and His Circle: The Viennese Years, European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), 368–385, at 368). 3 Fore more on Kelsen’s contribution to the Austrian Constitution, see Thomas Olechowski, Der Beitrag Hans Kelsens zur österreichischen Bundesverfassung, in: Hans Kelsen: Leben  – Werk  – Wirksamkeit, ed. Robert Walter / Werner Ogris / Thomas Olechowski, 2009, 211–230; Jochen von Bernstoff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen Believing in Universal Law, 2010, 272–278. Reut Yael Paz, A Gateway Between a Distant God and a Cruel World: The Contribution of Jewish German Scholars to International Law, 2012, 180; Ewald Wiederin, Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof als Schöpfung Hans Kelsens und sein Modellcharakter als eigenständiges Verfassungsgericht, in: Schutz der Verfassung, ed. Thomas Simon / Johannes Kalwoda, 2014, 283–306. 4 Agustín E. Ferraro, Kelsen’s Highest Moral Ideal [Review of Jochen von Bernstorff, Der Glaube an das universale Recht Zur Völkerrechtstheorie Hans Kelsens und seiner Schüler, 2001], German Law Journal 3 (2002), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=200. 5 More specifically, it was due to the political issue of remarriages in Catholic Austria: a Catholic-led campaign smearing Kelsen’s name followed his participation in abolishing the ‘Dispensehen’ decision from the regular courts (1928). “This decision was intended to put an end to the competency-exceeding repeal by regular courts of official permissions for remarriage following a divorce. According to Austrian constitutional law, this power of repeal belonged only to the Administrative Court, not the regular courts. The conservative government, which opened itself increasingly to Fascist influences from the end of the 1920s, used this decision to abolish the independent status of constitutional court judges, which was replaced with a panel of politically appointed judges.“ (von Bernstoff (footnote 3), 278). 1

Salvaging Scientific Socialism?

in the United States,6 Kelsen obtained eleven honorary doctorates as well as other international awards. During his lifetime he managed, against all odds, to assemble 400 works translated into 24 different languages. Hans Kelsen died on 19 April 1973.7 The quality, depth and gravitas of Kelsen’s approach triggered attention, criticism, polemics and condemnations that were and are still discussed in numerous shapes and formats. In spite of the attention that Kelsen’s work gets – including this edited volume – there always seems to be more that can be excavated. This is exemplified perfectly by the little attention paid to Kelsen’s involvement with Austro-Marxism, particularly in English language scholarship. His later debates with the Bolshevik/communist legal theorists are also mostly overlooked or ignored.8 That these debates remain sidelined if not neglected entirely in histories of Kelsen,9 may be excused (or at least understood) given the twentieth-century Cold War atmosphere. The disregard for legal positivism that continued from the Weimar period and the Nazi period could not have helped.10 That these contributions are still overlooked – even now after Kelsen’s work has begun to receive more interest from contemporary scholars – needs to be rectified.11 Although much of these theoretical and historical confrontations cannot be discussed in the present context (Kelsen alone dedicated at least four monographs and two longer articles to socialist and communist theories12) the overarching intention of the following contribution is to contextualize Kelsen and his 1920s scholarship in its original Austro-Marxist milieu. Note that we follow KelsAs David Kennedy puts it: “Kelsen has come to be treated as a leftover European philosophizer who could never quite get with the program in the United States after the war, and is remembered as much for his tin ear towards specific international legal issues as for his old worldly philosophical argument.“ (David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, Utah Law Review 7 (1994), 7–118, at 103). 7 For more on Kelsen’s biography see Paz (footnote 3). 8 Notable exceptions: Stanley L. Paulsen / Michael Stolleis (eds.), Hans Kelsen Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20  Jahrhunderts, 2005; Raffaele de Giorgi, Wer rettet Marx vor Kelsen?, in: Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, Werner Krawietz / Helmut Schelsky (eds.), 1984, 463–483; Werner Krawietz / Ernst Topitsch / Peter Koller, Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 1982; Hans-Kelsen-Institut (ed.), Reine Rechtslehre und marxistische Theorie, 1978. From a Marxist perspective: Umberto Cerroni, Marx und das moderne Recht, 1974, 137–173. 9 See for instance Mónica García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law, 2014; Jörg Kammerhofer Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective, 2010, but also Paz (footnote 3). 10 See for instance Michael Stolleis, Reluctance to Glance in the Mirror: The challenging face of German Jurisprudence after 1933 and Post-1945, 2002. 11 As argued elsewhere, this renewed interest itself can also be a reaction to the historical anxiety Kelsen’s dominant scholarship induced, which after attempts at self-appropriation was then suppressed and perhaps still needs to be overcome within the discipline of international law (See Reut Yael Paz, A Forgotten Kelsenian? The Story of Helen Silving-Ryu (1906–1993), The European Journal of International Law 25 (2015), 1123–1146). 12 Hans Kelsen, Sozialismus und Staat: Eine Untersuchung der Politischen Theorie des Marxismus, 1st Ed. 1920; 2nd Ed. 1923; Die politische Theorie des Sozialismus, Oesterreichische Rundschau 19 (1923), 113–135; Marx oder Lassalle: Wandlungen in der politischen Theorie des Marxismus, 1924; Allgemeine Rechtslehre im Lichte materialistischer Geschichtsauffassung, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 66 (1931), 449–521; The Political Theory of Bolshevism: A Critical Analysis, 1948; The Communist Theory of Law, 1955. 6

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en’s lead in his general distinction between, on the one hand, socialism – he admits to being a socialist – and his interchangeable use of communism, Bolshevism and Marxism on the other hand. While this glaring lack of distinction by such a meticulous scientist should remain an open query, it necessitates a more serious examination of the Austro-Marxists because this movement – of friendships and comradery – was his intellectual reference point during the 1920s. Importantly, Kelsen was a leading member of this group, even if others saw his contributions as coming from its ‘right,’ more conservative side, and he considered himself ‘an outsider.’13 The importance of this socialist ‘phase’ in his intellectual development should not be discarded even when Kelsen’s vehement and consistent rejection of Marxism is considered. Kelsen’s relationship with Marxism, the Austro-Marxists and other forms of socialism is hardly linear nor straightforward. As he discloses in his Autobiographie: “from the very beginning, I was in complete agreement with the democratic program of the Austrian Party, which did stand fundamentally on the ground of Marxism, but which had practically nothing to do with the anarchistic state theory of Marx and Engels.”14 Kelsen’s liaison with Marxism leads him into an almost obsessive need to restructure its scientific inconsistencies. Here we attempt to explore what such theoretical preoccupation could mean, especially for the development of his 1934 Pure Theory of Law, which succeeded his Austro-Marxist moment. We begin with a brief discussion of the cultural milieu of the Austro-Marxists and then unpack Kelsen’s positionality within the group. Detour into Vienna’s Wertvakuum?15

Assembled around 1907, the Austro-Marxists, who were also referred to as the Austrian School of Marxism or the ‘second generation’ of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (founded 1889), sought to construct a ‘third way’ to social democracy. Relying on the dangerous yet energizing tension between defending social difference and securing harmony, they sought to avoid the German example that followed Eduard Bernstein’s revisionism and Russia’s bloody revolution.

For more on the Austro-Marxist ‘left’ wing, ‘right’ wing and in general see for instance Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp, Otto Bauer (1881–1938): Thinker and Politician, 2016; Janek Wasserman, Östereichische Aktion: Monarchism, Authoritarianism, and the Unity of the Austrian Conservative Ideological Field during the First Republic, Central European History 47 (2014), 76–104; Gerhard Botz, Austro-Marxist Interpretation of Fascism, Journal of Contemporary History 11 (1976), 129–156; Norbert Leser: Sozialismus zwischen Relativismus und Dogmatismus, 1974; Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus, 1968. 14 Hans Kelsen, Autobiographie, in: Hans Kelsen Werke (ed. Matthias Jestaedt), Vol. 1, 2007, 29–91, at 58–59. 15 In 1948 Hermann Broch identified Vienna as the centre of Wertvakuum: as the source of the problems characterizing the modern world (See Steven Beller, Vienna and the Jews 1867–1938 A cultural history, 1989, 1). 13

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Otto Bauer, one of its leading thinkers, argued retrospectively in 1937 that the term Austro-Marxists comes from the American publicist Louis B. Boudin (1874–1952), who coined it to establish a much-needed distinction between other socialist movements and the theoretical contributions of Austrian socialists in the early twentieth century.16 There were many crossover influences and mutual stimuli between Austro-Marxist intellectuals, each representing many shades of red in ‘red Vienna,’ especially during the 1920s.17 Whatever the label’s origin, from 1904 onward, the movement’s platform was composed of three regular publications: the Blätter zur Theorie und Politik des wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus / Marx-Studien (1904); Der Kampf (1907) and a journal published by the Viennese Sociological Society (1907) that was led by the rabbi/sociologist/philosopher and pedagogist Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854–1923). The Austro-Marxist movement embraced the momentum at the end of World War One to achieve firmer links between socialist theory, political transformations and a closer affinity to democratic parliamentarism. The goal to entrench ‘unity in diversity’ was heightened,18 but harder to sell to the disillusioned, weary and frightened public of the crumbling Habsburg Empire. The superiority of the German nation was used as the very thin albeit necessary thread.19 That the group’s predominant socio-cultural and religious identity was Jewish – virtually all Austro-Marxists except for Karl Renner were born into Jewish families – was neither forgiven nor forgotten.20 In brief, the paradoxical atmospheric conditions of Vienna  – a city governed by an anti-Semitic party since 1895 but also the birthplace of Zionism – is engraved in the scholarship and convictions of the Austro-Marxists.21

Norbert Leser (footnote 13), 11. More specifically Boudin attributed the Austrian socialists with the manner in which they modernized the theory of value familiarity, theory of marginal utility/exchange, which “by origin and popularity, England has as much claim upon it as Austria.” (See more in Louis B. Boudin, The Theoretical System of Karl Marx in the Light of Recent Criticism, 1907, 85.) 17 The Austro-Marxists and the Austrian School of Economics “reflected similar influences and demonstrated mutual awareness of their respective approaches … (Both) placed special emphasis on distortions in the structure of prices as fundamental to the propagation of capitalist crises.” While for the Austrians “these distortions were autonomous to the market process, coming particularly from the state, for the Austro-Marxists its origin was in the normal workings of a capitalist economy. See more in William A. Darity, Jr. / Bobbie L. Horn / Rudolf Hilferding, The Dominion of Capitalism and the Dominion of Gold, The American Economic Review 75 (1985), 363–368, at 364. For more on the theory of value by the Austrian school see Friedrich von Wieser, The Austrian School and the Theory of Value, The Economic Journal 1 (1891), 108–121. 18 Wolfgang Grassl / Barry Smith, A Theory of Austria, in: From Bolzano to Wittgenstein: The Tradition of Austrian Philosophy, ed. János C. Nyíri, 1986, 11–30. 19 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (footnote 13), 7. 20 While Wilhelm Jerusalem, who has completed his Rabbinical title by the Jewish community in Prague, the others were of Jewish descent. (i. e. Friedrich Adler (1879–1959) the son of the founder of the Austrian Social Democratic Party Viktor Adler; Rudolf Hilferding (1877–1941); Otto Bauer (1881–1938); Gustav Eckstein (1875–1916); Tatiana Grigorovici (1877–1952); Max Adler (1873–1937); Alfred Adler (1870–1937); Otto Felix Kanitz (1894–1940)), see more in Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century, 2004, 85–86. 21 See more in Paz (footnote 3), 27. 16

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Whereas it is hard to estimate the exact timeline of Kelsen’s association with the Austro-Marxists, the fact that Renner asked him to draft the Austrian Constitution at the end of the war is informative. Kelsen remained in Vienna during the war as due to a serious lung infection he was deemed ‘fit only for office work’ by the military authorities. It was during this time that he was trusted by the empire to act as an advisor to the military and justice administration and as the legal advisor to the Minister of Defense. He was also appointed as the personal advisor of the Minister Colonel General Stoeger-Steiner on issues of military and international law. In other words, Kelsen got a front row seat at the end of the Habsburg Empire and the final demise of Fin de Siècle.22 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp attempts to sum up the concerns of the Austro-Marxists as “centred around the neo-Kantianism of the Baden and Marburg schools, Ernst Mach’s empirio criticism, Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law, Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of marginal utility, the works of Eduard Bernstein and Vladimir Lenin, the historical works of Karl Lamprecht and Karl Grünberg, and the sociological theories of Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel and Max Weber.”23 While it is clear that Kelsen was an important figure to add to this respectable list – because it shows the multi-faceted and mutual influences just discussed above – it neglects an important fact: Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law was published almost exactly when the Austro-Marxists disintegrated during the bitter Austrian Civil War of 1934. Unpacking Kelsen’s debates with the Austro-Marxists in toto is a task beyond the remit of this essay, so it suffices to focus on the debate with the jurist, sociologist and philosopher Max Adler (1873–1937) during the 1920s.24 Whereas Kelsen arguably came In his autobiographical note Kelsen describes his personal experience of the last weeks of the Habsburg Empire in the following anecdote: “I can still vividly remember one of my last conversations with the minister. I had been summoned to the minister via phone in the middle of the night. He received me in his dressing gown in his private office in the official residence he had in the building of the Ministry of War. He handed me the text of a telegram that President Wilson had sent in response to the officer by the Austro-Hungarian government to grant the nationalities of the monarchy the right of self-determination, and he asked me to comment on Wilson’s statement. While I was reading Wilson’s response, the minister put on his uniform jacket and invited me to go into his office. On the way there we had to pass the ballroom that was part of the minister’s residence. At that point the minister said to me that it was embarrassing to live in such splendid chambers during such a terrible time. “Especially, Your Excellency, if one knows that one is the last Minister of War of the monarchy.” “You are crazy,” he responded, “how can you say something so awful!” To the very last moment, the old officer, even though he had no illusions about the magnitude of the military defeat, could not believe it possible that an empire of four hundred years could simply vanish from the stage of history. When I took my leave in person a short time later, he stood there in his office deathly pale. On the drive into the Ministry, the mob had pelted his car with stones, a shard of glass had injured him on the cheek. He shook my hand and said with emotion: “You were right. I am the last Minister of War of the monarchy.” (Kelsen (footnote 14), 49–50 as quoted in Paz (footnote 3), 178–179). 23 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (footnote 13), 8. 24 For his debates with Otto Bauer, see Norbert Leser, Kelsens Verhältnis zum Sozialismus und Marxismus, in: Krawietz/Topitsch/Koller (footnote 8), 423–437, at 430 f.; Hans Kelsen, Otto Bauers politische Theorie, Der Kampf 17 (1924), 50–56, and Bauers response: Das Gleichgewicht der Klassenkräfte, Der Kampf 17 22

Salvaging Scientific Socialism?

from the socialist ‘right’ and Adler from the ‘left,’ Kelsen was also in the prime of his life. Apart from having a respectable professorship, he had just finished drafting the Austrian Constitution, helping to establish its court and acting as a judge in that court. Adler, however, was only an associate professor at the faculty of sociology (although he was trained in law) and was often seen as politically “unimportant.”25 Given the difficulties of being both a Jew and a Marxist in Vienna at the time,26 it is no surprise that his political activities were not taken seriously.27 Kelsen displays his clear appreciation of Adler’s work – in fact they both admit the high esteem they have of each other in their respective book prefaces. There is a lasting significance in Adler’s ‘leftist’ attempt to create theoretical foundations of a ‘transcendental Marxism’ combining neo-Kantian epistemology with a Marxist approach to sociology.28 And indeed together with the post-1968 revived interest in critical theory, there was renewed engagement with Adler’s work, who was now considered the most interesting Austro-Marxist.29 As Nobert Leser argues, Adler’s lasting contribution is nothing short of the epistemological foundation of the social sciences and “thereby socialism.”30 As discussed below in more detail, this debate proves Kelsen’s dedication to the socialist cause. His practical engagement with Austrian politics accounts for his familiarity with Marxist theory. Its nuances are significant if we are to understand what was at stake for the Austro-Marxists in the 1920s but also might explain Kelsen’s tight embrace of the purity of law a decade later. We next discuss Kelsen’s 1920 book Socialism and State: an Inquiry of Marxisms’ Political Theory (Sozialismus und Staat: eine Untersuchung zur Politischen Theorie des Marxismus) or rather its much revised 1923 edition that responds to Adler’s 1922 Marxist conception of State: a Contribution to the Distinction between Sociological and Legal Methods (Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus: ein

(1924), 57–67; for his sympathies towards Karl Renner, see Norbert Leser, Hans Kelsen und Karl Renner, in: Hans-Kelsen-Institut (footnote 8), 41–62. Interestingly, Kelsen calls Renner’s Die soziale Funktion der Rechtsinstitute (1904) the only contribution of lasting value („Leistung von Rang“), see Hans Kelsen, Sozialismus (footnote 12), Rechtslehre, 71. For the overall topic, see Gerald Mozetič, Hans Kelsen als Kritiker des Austromarxismus, in: Krawietz/Topitsch/Koller (footnote 8), 445–457. 25 As Eric Voegelin describes, Max Adler’s politics were unimportant enough to even be arrested by the government (see Eric Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, Revised Edition with Glossary, 2011, 112). 26 See more on these difficulties in Paz (footnote 3). 27 In fact, were it not for Kelsen’s intervention on Adler’s behalf, the latter’s Habilitation might have never been awarded by the rampant anti-Semitists of Vienna University. (See Gerald Mozetič, Über den Stellenwert transzendentaler Argumente bei Hans Kelsen und Max Adler Ein Vergleich, in: Paulson/Stolleis (footnote 8), 302–316, at 303; Michael Siegert, Warum Max Adler nicht Ordinarius wurde, Neues Forum 215 (1971), 30–31. 28 Adler confesses his leftist agenda and conviction in Demokratie und Rätesystem, 1919, for more see Alfred Pfabigan, Hans Kelsens und Max Adlers Auseinandersetzung um die marxistische Staatstheorie, in: Hans Kelsen-Institut (footnote 8). 29 See for instance Alfred Pfabigan, Max Adler. Eine politische Biographie, 1982; Max Adler, Ausgewählte Werke (ed. Alfred Pfabigan), 1982. 30 Leser (footnote 13), 72.

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Beitrag zur Unterscheidung von Soziologischer und Juristischer Methode). In other words, the debate begins with Kelsen’s first edition of Sozialismus und Staat, it moves through Adler’s presentation at the Vienna University in 1921 – which as Adler describes it in 1922 was the trigger for his Staatsauffassung des Marxismus – that he indeed dedicates to “the critique delivered by my friend and respected colleague the Vienna University Professor Hans Kelsen.”31 The Foggy Land of Utopia – Kelsen’s Critique of Marxism

Arguably, Hans Kelsen was among the first and best compilers of the fragmentary statements Marx made about the state with the outspoken intention of formulating (and criticizing) a Marxist approach to political theory.32 Kelsen’s critique of Marxists of all shades could be divided into two mains parts: first, he deconstructs Marxism’s theoretical foundations, then he moves on to criticise its normative implications. Basically, Kelsen criticizes Marxist ‘sociology’ for falling short of accounting for the normativity of social phenomena; secondly, he identifies Marxist political thought with anarchism, ultimately surrendering the individual to the dictatorship of a planned economy while stripping it of individual and political rights. From neo-Kantian epistemology, Kelsen derives a distinction between nature and society and establishes an irreducible difference between natural sciences and normative theories. In science, the principle of causality applies, ergo if A, then B must follow. In normative theoretical terms, however, this attribution involves an ought – if A, then B ought to follow. Keeping this distinction in mind, any attempt at analysing society – “the epitome of social phenomena”33 – could only be undertaken in the spirit of a normative theory.34 As Kelsen argues in Socialism and State, such a theoretical design differs fundamentally from what Karl Marx and his followers understood as ‘sociology,’ namely, a theory that “examines purposes and actions … with regard to their causes and effects, i. e. explains them causally.”35 Kelsen’s primary concern here, as elsewhere, was to look at the normativity of social orders.36 For him, normativities are regularly neglected by attempts to dissolve social phenomena into cause-effect relations.

Max Adler, Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus: ein Beitrag zur Unterscheidung von Soziologischer und Juristischer Methode, 1964 [1922], 7. 32 Harold J. Bermann, Review of Hans Kelsen, Communist Theory (footnote 12), University of Pennsylvania Law Review 104 (1955), 444–446. 33 Kelsen, Sozialismus (footnote 12), 20. 34 In Kelsen’s terms: “Für den ganzen Bereich des Sozialen, gilt eine von der Kausalgesetzlichkeit der Natur wesensverschiedene Eigengesetzlichkeit ” (Ibid., 12). 35 Ibid, 4. 36 From his earlier works see for instance Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht, 1922. 31

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Marxists also fail in their dialectical method of ‘sociology.’ Instead of making a clear separation between the science of sociology that addresses the normative nature of social phenomena, they mix politics and science. For Kelsen, it is problematic that Marx and the Marxists argue for a unity between theory and practice, masking their activism as science, ultimately confusing political with scientific socialism. This is Kelsen’s toughest criticism of Marxist ‘sociology’: the “almost tragic syncretism of methods” and “strange blending of a causal-explanatory with a normative-valuing view.”37 This specific critique by Kelsen seems to be misunderstood generally. Alfred Pfabigan, for instance, argues that Kelsen’s criticism lacks a proper reading of Das Kapital as “the main work directly relevant for the methodological approach,” which, in turn, makes his study of Marx somewhat eclectic and sloppy.38 More specifically, it is argued, also by others, that Kelsen overlooks important works such as Marx’ Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, that he blends together works by the ‘young’ and by ‘old’ Marx as well as quotes sociological studies next to Marxists/Socialist congressional conventions.39 Some authors even went so far as to suggest that Kelsen was not familiar with the writings of Marx and Engels altogether.40 The only ‘fault’ Kelsen admits to having is of a terminological nature, namely that although he consistently rejects ‘historical’ definitions of state and/or society – because the state for him is not necessarily a capitalist state and the society is not only the bourgeois society – he nonetheless resorts to these ‘historical’ material concepts to make his argument clearer.41 This, however, does not justify accusing Kelsen of lacking scientific precision. Kelsen was perfectly aware of the different quality and origins of the works he quotes. He himself remarked that Karl Marx makes certain arguments for the sake of political agitation only, or that Marx, at times, speaks as a political activist, not as a scholar of economics, and that the ‘old’ Marx had outgrown some of his idealistic prejudices.42 Furthermore, Kelsen never set out to give an authentic representation of Marx’s theory of society, whatever that would entail, because, as Kelsen reminds his readers tirelessly, he is solely interested in the political theory, a theory not instilled by Karl Marx himself but by Marxists, Austro-Marxists included. He follows Marx in saying that he too “is certainly not a Marxist.”43 Arguably, it is for this reason that Kelsen dedicates an entire chapter to the Communist Manifesto and underlines it as “theo-

Ibid. 3. Pfabigan (footnote 28), 74. Ibid. 74; Cerroni, (footnote 8), 137–173. Hermann Klenner, Rechtsleere Verurteilung der Reinen Rechtslehre, 1972. In a 5 page footnote Kelsen explains: “Ich mag gelegentlich einen solchen Gesellschaftsbegriff – als den der herrschenden Lehre – für die Diskussion vorausgesetzt haben; nie haben ich ihnen als meinen eigenen konzediert.” (Kelsen, Sozialismus (footnote 12), 21–25). 42 Ibid. 18, 27–33, 93. 43 “ce qu’il y a de certain c’est que moi, je ne suis pas Marxiste” (Brief von Engels an an Eduard Bernstein, MEW 37, 386–390, at 388. 37 38 39 40 41

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retical basis of modern socialism,” while Das Kapital gets almost no mention at all. In fact, it is mentioned when Kelsen describes Das Kapital as “the bible of the proletariat.”44 Perhaps because Kelsen is not a true believer he avoids the movement’s bible and focuses on different sources? Either way, to argue that Kelsen was ignorant of the writings of Karl Marx is groundless. After criticising Marxist sociology, Kelsen focuses on how Marxist political thought is another form of revolutionary anarchism. For Kelsen anarchists want to abolish all forms of coercion, while Marxists want to overthrow the state. Since Kelsen equates the state with coercion, his logical deduction is to identify anarchism and Marxism, given the latter also demands the ’dismantling of the capitalist state machinery’.45 True, the anarchists seek the immediate destruction of the state and the Marxists assume it will simply wither away with victory over the antagonist class society. But this just proves that the main difference between anarchism and Marxism is in degree, not in nature. Kelsen’s argument equating Marxism with anarchism seems to touch a soft spot. It was this point that got Kelsen’s engagement with Marxists most attention and counter-critique (or Anti-Kritik in German). This is especially clear in Adler’s 1922 reaction. In his Marxist Conception of State he strongly rejects this equation entirely. Adler is personally offended by Kelsen’s identification of anarchism in Marxism. In any case, he argues that anarchism does not necessarily mean chaos: anarchists do not reject the importance of force and coercion in securing peace and maintaining inner harmony. Instead they argue that both remain important to resolve social conflict.46 However, in the future society to come, any form of repression will not be applied by a state actor – an agent of capitalist exploitation – but by civic organisations. In other words, the state as a tool of class oppression alone would wither away. Moreover, Adler accuses Kelsen of placing his own idealistic distinction between science and politics at the centre of Marx’s methodological monism, thereby doing it great injustice. According to Adler, under the false pretense of criticizing Marxism, Kelsen only reviews a pseudo-Marxist political theory from the perspective of neo-Kantian epistemology. 47 From Kelsen’s point of view, the state indeed appears to be a neutral tool.48 The state only shows a tendency to exploit the workers in the same way that an axe shows the tendency to cut

Kelsen, politische Theorie des Sozialismus (footnote 12), 207. Ibid. 149 f. „Trotzdem aber ist es doch richtig, daß auch der Anarchismus eine Ordnung anstrebt und daher nicht den Zwang überhaupt ablehnt, sondern nur den aus der Klassengegensätzlichkeit hervorgehenden Zwang einer Herrschaftsordnung“, see Adler (footnote 31), 218–219. 47 Ibid. 65. 48 Significantly, for Kelsen, the state was not an instrument of class oppression, but a „spezifische Form des gesellschaftlichen Lebens, die sehr variable Inhalte aufnehmen kann, um ein Mittel gesellschaftlicher Technik, mit dem die verschiedensten Zwecke erfolgt werden können “ Kelsen, Sozialismus (footnote 12), 13. 44 45 46

Salvaging Scientific Socialism?

down trees.49 For Adler, however, the state is not just any form of coercion, a neutral kind of force, but one with a specific historical content: the exploitation and expropriation of the working masses is characteristic of antagonistic class society.50 With the progressive realization of socialism, classes would cease to exist and hence the state wither away. However, Adler admits that even after the abolition of an antagonistic class society we are bound to be left with crime and the need for punishment. Nevertheless, these acts would be lowered to isolated incidents, because crime too “will be diminished up to a kind of social pathology.”51 In a much-revised 1923 edition of his 1920s book, Socialism and State, Kelsen criticizes Adler as hopelessly utopist. According to Kelsen, for socialism to be what it is supposed to be, it ought to be liberated from the utopian promise of an anarchic society in which “all men will become a nation of brothers.”52 It is here that Kelsen attempts to salvage scientific socialism, which is his political commitment, to begin with. It is also what differentiates his work in the 1920s from his later turn to pure theoretical construction in the 1930s. Kelsen criticizes Adler for being tautological: his inability to admit that anarchism is in fact anarchism – the absence of force – and that the state is the sole proprietor of coercion, for better or worse. The utopian promise to end all forms of oppression is not only dangerous but would never succeed without force or coercion. The only way to oppress and replace violence is – with violence. In this respect, Kelsen concludes, the sober experience of a state is a better advisor than speculative dialectic. For Kelsen, as unfortunate as it might be, capitalism is suited best to fit the human condition. After taking a Freudian turn here, Kelsen almost turns Nietzschean when he invokes the will to power. Only in oppressing man’s natural instincts such as envy and ambition could culture as a whole progress. Again, however unfortunately, only the state would be a strong enough force to oppress human nature itself. The anarchist/Marxist tradition that Kelsen sees as working in unison fundamentally overestimates or indeed underestimates human nature. “Whoever believes that it is possible to build the palace of the future from other material than human nature rests hope on a different kind of human nature that exists.” This can only lead us, as Kelsen insists, to the “foggy land of utopia” (Nebelland der Utopie).53

49 50 51 52 53

Ibid, 15. Adler (footnote 31), 74, 84. Ibid. 296 f. Kelsen, Sozialismus (footnote 12), 111. Ibid. 110 f.

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Back to Lasalle – an apotheosis of the state?

In the Austro-Marxist context of the 1920s, the problematic relationship between state and socialism was not only theoretical. While the Marxists were less significant, they remained an important radical and forceful minority. Kelsen argues, in his 1924 pamphlet, Marx or Lasalle, that they were able to make virtue out of necessity, and theoretically reject the power that was impossible to seize. Almost with a lament, Kelsen argues that this political theory was bound to collapse in practice at the very moment when the socialist movements got more powerful in different countries, be it Austria, Germany or Russia.54 The ‘catastrophic fiasco’ of Bolshevism did not help. It is not without satisfaction that Kelsen reports only a year after his debate with Adler that eventually a socialist theory of the state did emerge as an “apotheosis of the state, which stands in striking contrast to Marx-Engels’ rejection of the state.”55 The protection of the state is arguably one of the main reasons Kelsen engages with Marxist theory to begin with. At the end of his debate with Adler, in the second edition of Socialism and State, Kelsen empathically takes the side of the head of the German workers’ movement, Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864), who takes a pro-state position. Kelsen’s embrace of Lassalle does not mean that he produces a better theory than Marx.56 Instead, it is because Lassalle envisioned a better policy to get there. It was Lasalle who stood “on solid ground in terms of what can be achieved in the foreseeable future” and would take into account the “national and state-affirming sentiment of the German workers” – a sentiment Kelsen shares.57 A decade after Marx oder Lassalle, Kelsen was pushed out of Austria and retreated into the Pure Theory of Law. His experience with the politics but also scientism of Austro-Marxism does not just fade. Kelsen abandoned his scrutiny of Austro-Marxism when he turned to legal purity in 1934, when his whole world was not only turned upside down but also began to be systematically exterminated. Nevertheless he does write a thorough scrutiny and response to Bolshevik notions of legality after he resettled and eventually escaped Europe for the United States. The Political Theory of Bolshevism: A Critical Analysis was published in 1948 and The Communist Theory of Law in 1955. Whereas the former is dedicated to dissecting the paradoxical contradiction between Bolshevik anarchical theoretical basis and its de facto totalitarian practice, in the latter, he logically demonstrates how, despite Marxist denunciation of natural-law doctrine, the Communist Theory of Law was essentially based upon notions of natural law.

54 55 56 57

Kelsen, Marx oder Lasalle (footnote 12), 271. Ibid. 272. Pfabigan (footnote 29), 78 ff. Kelsen, Sozialismus (footnote 12), 207.

Salvaging Scientific Socialism?

Kelsen’s style and urgency of his critique in these two books hardly matches his previous debates. Something important was lost. He no longer speaks of socialism. Certainly not of a possible combination between scientific socialism. While his critique now is as thorough as it always was, it is now dryer and lacks his previous passion and commitment. This is hardly surprising: Instead of his older socialist/Austro-Marxists peers, who fought for a different middle ground between reformism and Bolshevism, Kelsen now focusses on the communist/Marxist/Bolshevik internationalist legal theorists who were hardly scientific or socialist let alone utopian in the true sense of the words. One of the reasons, Kelsen’s debates with Marxists receives little attention, may be the need to see Kelsen as a liberal democrat, a relativist, instead of the scientific socialist that he actually was. This certainly makes his theory more comfortable. That he does not go out of his way to rebuke this liberal entitlement – for instance, in his 1955 Communist Theory of Law there is almost no mention of his previous works – could only mean that this suited him. After all, and as unfortunate as it is, his political commitments hardly got him, or anyone, anywhere. Leaving them behind with the ashes of Austria made perfect sense. Kelsen was now ready to substitute his political engagement with social scientism with the Pure Theory of Law that corresponded academic needs better, in any case. While Kelsen’s political commitment still needs to be reckoned with, the way it was undermined with the rise of fascism and Stalinism explains his desire to retreat – together with his scientific socialism – into the “hole in time”. Bibliography

Max Adler, Demokratie und Rätesystem, 1919 Max Adler, Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus: ein Beitrag zur Unterscheidung von Soziologischer und Juristischer Methode, 1964 [1922] Max Adler, Ausgewählte Werke (ed. Alfred Pfabigan), 1982 Harold J. Bermann, Review of Hans Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law (footnote 12), University of Pennsylvania Law Review 104 (1955), 444–446 Otto Bauer, Das Gleichgewicht der Klassenkräfte, in: Der Kampf 17 (1924), 57–67 Steven Beller, Vienna and the Jews 1867–1938 A cultural history, 1989 Jochen von Bernstoff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen Believing in Universal Law, 2010 Gerhard Botz, Austro-Marxist Interpretation of Fascism, Journal of Contemporary History 11 (1976), 129–156 Louis B. Boudin, The Theoretical System of Karl Marx in the Light of Recent Criticism, 1907 Umberto Cerroni, Marx und das moderne Recht, 1974, 137–173 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp, Otto Bauer (1881–1938): Thinker and Politician, 2010 William A. Darity, Jr. / Bobbie L. Horn / Rudolf Hilferding, The Dominion of Capitalism and the Dominion of Gold, The American Economic Review 75 (1985), 363–368 Agustín E. Ferraro, Kelsen‘s Highest Moral Ideal [Review of Jochen von Bernstorff, Der Glaube

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an das universale Recht. Zur Völkerrechtstheorie Hans Kelsens und seiner Schüler, 2001], German Law Journal 3 (2002), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index. php?pageID=11&artID=200. Raffaele de Giorgi, Wer rettet Marx vor Kelsen?, in: Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, ed. Werner Krawietz/Helmut Schelsky, 1984, 463–483 Wolfgang Grassl / Barry Smith, A Theory of Austria, in: From Bolzano to Wittgenstein: The Tradition of Austrian Philosophy, ed. János C. Nyíri, 1986, 11–30 Hans Kelsen-Institut (Ed.), Reine Rechtslehre und marxistische Theorie, 1978 Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED (Ed.), Marx-Engel-Werke, Vol. 35, 1967 Clemens Jabloner, Kelsen and His Circle: The Viennese Years, European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), 368–385 Matthias Jestedt (Ed.), Hans Kelsen Werke, 2007 Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective, 2010 Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht, 1922 Hans Kelsen, Sozialismus und Staat: Eine Untersuchung der Politischen Theorie des Marxismus, 1st Ed. 1920/2nd Ed. 1923 Hans Kelsen, Die politische Theorie des Sozialismus, Oesterreichische Rundschau 19 (1923), 113–135 Hans Kelsen, Marx oder Lassalle: Wandlungen in der politischen Theorie des Marxismus, 1924 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Rechtslehre im Lichte materialistischer Geschichtsauffassung, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 66 (1931), 449–521 Hans Kelsen, The Political Theory of Bolshevism: A Critical Analysis, 1948 Hans Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law, 1955 Hans Kelsen, Autobiographie, in: Matthias Jestedt (Ed.), Hans Kelsen Werke 1, 2007, 29–91 Hans Kelsen, Otto Bauers politische Theorie, in: Der Kampf 17 (1924), 50–56 Hermann Klenner, Rechtsleere, 1972 David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, Utah Law Review 7 (1994), 7–118 Werner Krawietz / Ernst Topitsch / Peter Koller (Eds.), Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, 1982 Werner Krawietz / Helmut Schelsky (Eds.) Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, 1984 Norbert Leser, Kelsens Verhältnis zum Sozialismus und Marxismus, in: Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, eds. Werner Krawietz / Helmut Schelsky / Peter Koller, 1984, 423–437 Norbert Leser, Hans Kelsen und Karl Renner, in: Reine Rechtslehre und marxistische Rechtstheorie, ed. Hans-Kelsen-Institut, 1978, 41–62 Norbert Leser, Sozialismus zwischen Relativismus und Dogmatismus, 1974 Norbert Leser, Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus, 1968 Gerald Mozetič, Hans Kelsen als Kritiker des Austromarxismus, in: Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, eds. Werner Krawietz / Ernst Topitsch / Peter Koller, 1984, 445–457 Gerald Mozetič, Über den Stellenwert transzendentaler Argumente bei Hans Kelsen und Max Adler. Ein Vergleich, in: Hans Kelsen Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtshistoriker des 20 Jahrhunderts, eds. Stanley L. Paulsen / Michael Stolleis, 2005, 302–316 Thomas Olechowski, Der Beitrag Hans Kelsens zur österreichischen Bundesverfassung, in: Hans Kelsen, eds. Robert Walter / Werner Ogris / Thomas Olechowski, 2009, 211–230

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Alfred Pfabigan, Hans Kelsens und Max Adlers Auseinandersetzung um die marxistische Staatstheorie, in: Reine Rechtslehre und marxistische Rechtstheorie, ed. Hans-Kelsen-Institut, 1978 Alfred Pfabigan, Max Adler Eine politische Biographie, 1982 Michael Siegert, Warum Max Adler nicht Ordinarius wurde, Neues Forum 215 (1971), 30–31 Thomas Simon / Johannes Kalwoda (Eds.), Schutz der Verfassung, 2014 Stanley L. Paulsen / Michael Stolleis (Eds.), Hans Kelsen Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20  Jahrhunderts, 2005 Reut Yael Paz, A Forgotten Kelsenian? The Story of Helen Silving-Ryu (1906–1993), The European Journal of International Law 25 (2015), 1123–1146 Reut Yael Paz, A Gateway Between a Distant God and a Cruel World: The Contribution of Jewish German Scholars to International Law, 2012 Reut Yael Paz, Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law as ‘a Hole in Time’ / La Théorie pure du droit de Hans Kelsen comme «un trou dans le temps», Monde(s) 7 (2015), 75–94 Mónica García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law, 2014 Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century, 2004 Michael Stolleis, Reluctance to Glance in the Mirror: The challenging face of German Jurisprudence after 1933 and Post-1945, 2002 Eric Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, Revised Edition with Glossary, 2011, 112 Robert Walter / Werner Ogris / Thomas Olechowski (Eds.), Hans Kelsen: Leben  – Werk  – Wirksamkeit, 2009 Janek Wasserman, Östereichische Aktion: Monarchism, Authoritarianism, and the Unity of the Austrian Conservative Ideological Field during the First Republic, Central European History 47 (2014), 76–104 Ewald Wiederin, Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof als Schöpfung Hans Kelsens und sein Modellcharakter als eigenständiges Verfassungsgericht, in: Schutz der Verfassung, eds. Thomas Simon / Johannes Kalwoda, 2014, 283–306 Friedrich von Wieser, The Austrian School and the Theory of Value, The Economic Journal 1 (1891), 108–121 Reut Yael Paz

Senior Researcher, Public Law and International Law Faculty of the Justus-Liebig University, Giessen, Licher Straße 76, 35394 Gießen, [email protected] Maximillian Wagner

PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law of the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, [email protected]

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Hans Kelsens Reine Rechtslehre weckt die Aufmerksamkeit der Rechtswissen­ schaften auch noch nach einem Jahrhundert – in Zuspruch wie in Wider­ spruch. Sowohl die Aneignungs­ als auch die Widerlegungsversuche sind mitunter von Missverständnissen und Ausblendungen geprägt. Während sich die Forschung recht intensiv mit bestimmten Schriften und Konzepten Kelsens auseinandersetzt, haben andere seiner Schriften, beispielsweise unübersetzte Werke, sowie die Werke weiterer wegbereitender Mitglieder der „Wiener rechtstheoretischen Schule“ international wenig Beachtung gefunden. Eine Debatte um die Reine Rechtslehre in und zwischen den unter­ schiedlichen Kulturen und Traditionen ist daher besonders vielversprechend. Dieser Band vereint kritische, neutral­analytische und zustimmende Beiträge, die die Reine Rechtslehre aus philosophischer, rechtstheoretischer, ideengeschichtlicher und rechtsdogmatischer Perspektive durchdringen. Die Autorinnen und Autoren analysieren diesen Zugang in einem inter­ nationalen und inter­ wie intradisziplinären Rahmen; ihnen gelingt es so, die Reine Rechtslehre vorurteilsfrei und offen als Zugang sowie Forschungsfeld zu würdigen und nach der Relevanz, die ihre Thesen heute noch beanspruchen können, zu fragen.

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