Demystifying Climate Risk Volume I : Environmental, Health and Societal Implications [1 ed.] 9781527504240, 9781527500136

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Demystifying Climate Risk Volume I

Demystifying Climate Risk Volume I: Environmental, Health and Societal Implications Edited by

Carole LeBlanc

Demystifying Climate Risk Volume I: Environmental, Health and Societal Implications Edited by Carole LeBlanc This book first published 2017 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2017 by Carole LeBlanc and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-0013-6 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0013-6

IN MEMORIAM

To Ed Helminski Physicist, policy advisor, and publisher as well as a founder of the International Workshop on Solvent Substitution, central to the successful implementation of the Montreal Protocol in protecting the Earth’s ozone layer. Always gracious; often funny.

To Dr. John Stemniski Brilliant Draper Lab chemist, member of the Chemical Technical Options Committee (CTOC) of the Montreal Protocol, and individual recipient of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Stratospheric Ozone Protection Award. My curmudgeon of a mentor and friend.

CONTENTS

Figures and Tables...................................................................................... ix Preface ........................................................................................................ xi Acknowledgements .................................................................................. xiii Introduction ............................................................................................... xv Section I. Environmental, Health and Societal Impacts (in alphabetical order by author) Chapter One................................................................................................. 3 Zika Virus Introduction and Emergence in the United States (U.S.) Dr. Charles Benjamin Beard Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 23 Death by Degrees: The Health Crisis of Climate Change in Maine, U.S. Karen D’Andrea Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 31 Putting Women in Power: An Analysis of Enabling Factors for Increasing Women’s Participation in the Clean Energy Sector of the Global North Margareta Roth Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 67 Sustainable Forestry Initiative Certification and Carbon Markets– Opportunities and Barriers for SFI Program Participants in Maine Alison Truesdale

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Contents

Section II. The Special Case of Africa (in alphabetical order by author) Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 117 Climate Change and Sub-Saharan Africa: Agriculture and Food Security Nexus Chizoba Chinweze Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 137 Ecological and Infectious Disease Impacts of Hydropower in Sub-Saharan Africa Bethany Taylor Section III. Advances in Education and Communication Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 151 Indicators: Leveraging Science to Communicate Climate Change Impacts and Risks Michael Kolian Conclusion ............................................................................................... 173 Index ........................................................................................................ 175

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures Figure 1.1 Transmission electron microscope image of Zika virus.................4 Figure 1.2 Mosquito vectors of Zika virus. Aedes aegypti; Aedes albopictus............................................................................................... 4 Figure 1.3 Zika tower in the Zika Forrest, near Entebbe, Uganda .................... 5 Figure 1.4 Timeline for Zika virus response events–January– December 2016 .................................................................................... 6 Figure 1.5 Common symptoms associated with Zika virus infections .......... 7 Figure 1.6 Estimated range of Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus in the United States (U.S.), 2016........................................................ 10 Figure 1.7 Current global Zika situation–WHO, February 2016 .............. 11 Figure 1.8 Laboratory-confirmed Zika virus disease cases reported to ArboNET by state or territory......................................................... 12 Figure 3.1 Investment in power capacity, 2008-2015 .............................. 34 Figure 3.2 Renewables’ share of power generation................................. 34 Figure 3.3 Renewable energy employment by technology ...................... 35 Figure 3.4 Tertiary degrees awarded by gender ........................................ 44 Figure 3.5 STEM degrees awarded by gender ......................................... 45 Figure 3.6 Renewable energy production in comparison to female STEM graduates .................................................................................. 46 Figure 3.7 Renewable energy production in comparison with gendersensitive energy policy......................................................................... 47 Figure 4.1 Illustration of carbon credit market .......................................... 73 Figure 4.2 Offset carbon credits as of 12/14/16 ....................................... 74 Figure 4.3 Defoliated spruce and fir from Maine and Canada during the 1970s-1980s spruce budworm outbreak......................................... 88 Figure 5.1 Sub-Saharan Africa ............................................................... 118 Figure 5.2 Soil moisture content in Sub-Saharan Africa ......................... 121 Figure 5.3 Population in food crisis (Integrated Food Security, IPC, Phase 3 or higher) as of January 2016 ............................................ 124 Figure 5.4 Share of food groups in total dietary energy supply and ‘stunting’ map............................................................................ 126 Figure 5.5 Root zone plant-available water holding capacity in millimeters (mm) ........................................................................... 129

x

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 6.1 Schematic of a hydroelectric power dam .............................. 138 Figure 6.2 Zambezi River dam, Zambia .................................................. 139 Figure 6.3 Inga dam I, Democratic Republic Congo ............................... 139 Figure 6.4 Number of people with no access to electricity in 2012, International Energy Agency (IEA) ................................................... 141 Figure 7.1 Key components of EPA’s national climate indicators framework ........................................................................................ 155 Figure 7.2 Connecting climate change indicators to health pathways ............ 158 Figure 7.3 Date of ice thaw for selected U.S. lakes, 1905-2015 .............. 160

Tables Table 2.1 Air quality forecast legend, U.S. .............................................. 25 Table 3.1 Opportunities Index ranking ...................................................... 41 Table 4.1 Steps in calculating carbon credits............................................ 78 Table 4.2 Penalty rates associated with early termination ...................... 83 Table 4.3 Sustainably managed acreage in Maine .................................. 85 Table 4.4 Survey questions..................................................................... 86 Table 4.5 Carbon credit projects in Maine as of December 2016, by acreage ............................................................................................ 91 Table 6.1 Potential disease impacts of large dam projects ...................... 143

PREFACE

On November 10, 2016, United States (U.S.) Senator Angus King, (Independent, Maine) presented, Maine and Climate Change: The View from Greenland as part of the Margaret Chase Smith Lectureship on Public Affairs. The Lectureship was endowed in 1989 by the Margaret Chase Smith Foundation in honor of Senator Smith’s contributions to the state of Maine and to the nation. Senator King communicated much of the same information at a follow-up event at the University of Maine on November 16–explaining the causes and impacts of climate change over time; talking about what it was like to see Greenland’s melting glaciers firsthand; and encouraging the student body to learn more about the science of climate change. An advocate of climate science, the senator carries a ‘climate change’ card in his pocket, explaining that: “…the graphs on the card are the simplest and clearest way to show not only the unprecedented and growing amount of CO2 in our atmosphere, but also its close correlation to global temperatures in the past. As our climate continues to change and we strive to adapt…it is important that everyone appreciate the context of our situation with respect to data from the past.”

While my family from Massachusetts often visited Maine, I’m a fairly new full-time resident of the state, having recently retired from many years of climate-related work. Maine is truly an exquisitely beautiful state, endowed with many environmental gifts throughout all of its seasonal changes. It comes as no surprise to me that native as well as ‘newbies’ to the state feel strongly about environmental issues and their consequences, both to human health and to nature. On June 1, 2017 (just days before this book was finished), U.S. President Donald Trump, fulfilled a campaign promise by announcing his intention of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. The agreement is the seminal global policy enacted to help ensure the world’s retreat from everincreasing temperatures. On the same day, the U.S. Climate Alliance was announced. The alliance was spearheaded by the states of New York, California and

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Washington, whose combined economies, according to the World Resources Institute, would be the fifth largest in the world. Entrance into the Alliance was swiftly followed by the states of Massachusetts and Vermont, both of which have Republican governors. At this writing, a total of 13 governors have joined the Alliance whose objectives include: “…achieving the U.S. goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions 26-28 percent from 2005 levels by 2025 and meeting or exceeding the targets of the federal Clean Power Plan.”

In addition, 17 U.S. governors have released individual statements in support of the Paris Agreement and 211 city mayors have adopted the Agreement’s goals. To ensure that the U.S. remains a world leader in the reduction of carbon emissions, 125 cities, 9 states, 902 businesses and investors, and 183 colleges and universities have signed a similarly motivated declaration.1 It is important to note that regionally enacted goals to reduce pollution may be easier to more accurately track and to monitor for progress. Carole LeBlanc Wells, Maine, USA

1

The declaration represents 120 million Americans and $6.2 U.S. trillion economic power (www.wearestillin.com).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editor would like to thank workshop co-chairs Barbara Kanegsberg, President BFK Solutions, LLC and Edward T. (Tom) Morehouse Jr., National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) as well as the presenters and attendees to the First Annual International Technical Workshop on Climate Risk. A special thanks in memory of Piers Sellers, then Acting Director of the Earth Sciences Division at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. A climate scientist for many years, British-borne astronaut Sellers’ discussion with Leonardo DiCaprio in the National Geographic documentary, Before the Flood, was particularly moving, following his diagnosis of cancer. Having broken my leg in a nasty fall that required surgery and a year-long recuperative period, I was considering cancelling the workshop. Though I never met Dr. Sellers, he graciously and kindly responded to my emails during this extraordinarily difficult time. His courage inspired me to continue this work. Finally, the editor also thanks Cambridge Scholars Publishing for making this treatise possible.

INTRODUCTION

This book and its counterpart on industry and infrastructure are distillations of the First Annual International Technical Workshop on Climate Risk held in the autumn of 2016 in Wells, Maine in the United States (U.S.), an area of the country known for its environmental beauty. The workshop was serendipitously held only weeks before the U.S. presidential election. 7KH SUHPLVH RI WKH ERRN LV WKDW ORQJ EHIRUH WKH 3DULV $JUHHPHQW VFLHQWLVWV HQJLQHHUV EXVLQHVV PHQ DQG ZRPHQ SXEOLF RIILFLDOV DFDGHPLFLDQVDQGQRQ-JRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQV1*2V WKURXJKRXWWKH 86 DQG WKH ZRUOG ZHUH KDUG DW ZRUN LQ WU\LQJ WR VROYH WKH P\ULDG RI SUREOHPV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK DQWKURSRJHQLF LH KXPDQFDXVHG  FOLPDWH FKDQJH7KHOHJLVODWLYHIRUFHRIWKH0RQWUHDO3URWRFROLVQRZLQVXSSRUWRI WKH $JUHHPHQW¶V NH\ HPLVVLRQ UHGXFWLRQ JRDOV E\ LWV LQFOXVLRQ RI K\GURIOXRURFDUERQV +)&V  µVXSHU¶ JUHHQKRXVH JDVHV XVHG IRU UHIULJHUDWLRQ DQG DLU FRQGLWLRQLQJ ,W ZDV WLPH IRU WKH VHDVRQHG OHDGHUV ZKR LPSOHPHQWHG WKH 3URWRFRO WKH ZRUOG¶V PRVW VXFFHVVIXO LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUHDW\IRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHDWPRVSKHUHWRVKDUHWKHLUNQRZOHGJHDQG ZLVGRPZLWKWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQRISROLF\PDNHUVWHFKQLFDOSURIHVVLRQDOV DQGHGXFDWRUVEHIRUHWKDWH[SHUWLVHZDVORVW Based on contributors’ expertise and the multidisciplinary nature of climate change, topics ranged from an update on the outbreak of the Zika virus in this book to design modifications of drainage systems in response to increases in extreme weather events5. Material is organized into major themes, while maintaining each author’s individual writing style. This first volume on environmental, health and societal implications covers (in order of their appearance in the text): 

7KH  8QLWHG 1DWLRQV &OLPDWH &KDQJH &RQIHUHQFH KHOG 1RYHPEHU  'HFHPEHU  WKDW QHJRWLDWHG D FRQVHQVXV GRFXPHQW RQ WKH UHGXFWLRQ RI FOLPDWH FKDQJHIURPWKHFRXQWULHVLQDWWHQGDQFH  2ULJLQDOO\ LQWURGXFHG E\ WKH FKHPLFDO LQGXVWU\ WR UHSODFH R]RQHGHVWUR\LQJ FKORURIOXRURFDUERQV &)&V  +)&V DUH  WLPHV PRUH SRWHQW WKDQ FDUERQ GLR[LGH&2 ZLWKDQDWPRVSKHULFOLIHWLPHRI\HDUV  8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 'HYHORSPHQW 3URJUDP  \HDUV RI WKH 0RQWUHDO 3URWRFRO 3DUWQHUVKLSVIRU&KDQJH1RYHPEHU  $YDLODEOH LQ WKH VHFRQG YROXPH ³'HP\VWLI\LQJ &OLPDWH 5LVN 9ROXPH ,, ,QGXVWU\DQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLPSOLFDWLRQV´

Introduction

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1. 2. 3.

Environmental, health and societal impacts; The special case of Africa; and Advances in education and communication.

The second category became apparent only upon specific contributors’ depictions of the disparate nature of human suffering caused by climate change across the globe. A separate volume covers industry and infrastructure implications. The purpose of bringing these various communities of practice together was to: x Leverage the many climate-related successes to date to inspire future innovations through ‘lessons learned’; x Ensure that new atmospheric environmental regulations are timely communicated and economically executed; and x Identify business opportunities for related sustainable development efforts. $V HGLWRU , ZDV VWUXFN E\ FRQWULEXWRUV¶ GLYHUVH ILHOGV DQG EDFNJURXQGVDOOZRUNLQJWRZDUGVWKHFRPPRQJRDORIFOLPDWHSURWHFWLRQ &RQVHTXHQWO\VHYHUDOPLQLLQWHUYLHZVRIDXWKRUVDUHLQFOXGHGDQGSURYLGH SHUVRQDOLQVLJKWVRWKDWWKHVWXGHQWUHDGHUPLJKWFRQVLGHUOHQGLQJKLVKHU RZQYDULRXVWDOHQWVWRWKLVHQGHDYRUDVZHOO It is my fervent hope that the contents of both volumes of Demystifying Climate Risk do just that: by translating the science of climate change, for advocates and naysayers alike, through real-life stories as told by practitioners themselves, the book’s contributors, to whom I owe such gratitude and respect. Should we be successful, then U.S. Senator King’s words will ring true: “Now is the time to address current and near-future climate related challenges. From clean and renewable energy sources, to efficiency technology and standards, to emission-reducing policies and incentives, there are many options at our disposal, many of which can foster economic growth and job creation. Like other complex challenges we have overcome in our past, no one single step will stop or reverse climate change alone; but, in combination, they represent a comprehensive framework that will help us pass on a stable and hospitable climate to future generations.”

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Chapter Summaries Chapter One: Zika Virus Introduction and Emergence in the United States (U.S.), by Dr. Ben Beard, clearly explains the origin, transmission, diagnosis and symptoms of this mosquito-borne disease. The first known cases of human infection by a mosquito bite in the continental U.S. occurred in Florida in July 2016. Fetal infection can result in brain abnormalities such as microcephaly and other congenital defects. The spread and, subsequently, the control and prevention of the disease are determined by a number of factors, including environmental conditions that influence vector (i.e., disease-carrying organism) populations. Human behavior, which is also influenced by climate and weather, is likewise a significant risk determinant. Chapter Two: Death by Degrees: The Health Crisis of Climate Change in Maine, U.S., by Karen D’Andrea, details the report of the same name by the Physicians for Social Responsibility Maine Chapter. The original 2000 report was updated in 2015. This paper outlines the report’s findings for recent increases in asthma, allergies and vector-borne diseases for the state of Maine associated with global warming. In particular, the incidence of Lyme disease, which is carried by the deer tick, increased by 1300 percent (%) from 1998 to 2012 and can be considered the ‘poster child’ for climate change in Maine. Chapter Three: Putting Women in Power: An Analysis of Enabling Factors for Increasing Women’s Participation in the Clean Energy Sector of the Global North, by Maggie Roth, focuses on the disparate participation of women in the burgeoning fields of solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower, biofuels and ocean/tidal power in the developed countries of North America and Europe. This disparity may be due to factors such as a lack of requisite education, since data shows that while women compose 58% of college graduates, they represent only 4% of graduates in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM). The correlation between gender-sensitive energy policies in countries with a higher percentage of female STEM graduates is not straightforward, however. Besides clarifying the issues of education and policy, the paper recommends continued investment and research in clean energy as well as workplace flexibility, combating industry-based stereotypes, mentoring for leadership and training opportunities to further enable women’s participation in the sector. Finally, Ms. Roth makes pointed recommendations for policymakers, women themselves, academia and corporations.

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Chapter Four: Sustainable Forestry Initiative Certification (SFI) and Carbon Markets–Opportunities and Barriers for SFI Program Participants in Maine, by Alison Truesdale, thoroughly details the study of Maine’s SFIcertified landowners’ participation in carbon credit programs. The study is the result of collaboration between Maine’s Implementation Committee of the SFI and Keeping Maine’s Forests (KMF). California has the dominant cap-and-trade carbon credit market in North America, paying the highest prices for forestry projects that offset carbon emissions from the state’s industries. Upon surveying the nine SFI participants in Maine, a heavily forested state, seven responded and reported to KMF that they had considered getting carbon credits through the California market, but had presently decided against it. Factors influencing their decision included costs, risks and the 100-year commitment required by carbon projects as not worthwhile at current credit prices. In particular, regulatory ambiguity of covered insured losses with regard to spruce budworm infestation, expected to occur in Maine two to three times within 100 years, may be too risky for current and prospective program participants. Carbon credits remain a viable option for landowners whose forestland portfolios have areas with high carbon stocking that can be maintained over the long term. Higher credit prices or poor wood markets could also tip the balance in favor of improved forestry management projects. Chapter Five: Climate Change and Sub-Saharan Africa: Agriculture and Food Security Nexus, by Chizoba Chinweze, provides an overview of the status of food security for the 800 million inhabitants of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 70% of whom rely on local agriculture for their sustenance. Climate change and, in particular, variability in rainfall amounts could have catastrophic results for SSA’s 2,455 million hectares (mha), 173 mha of which are currently under cultivation, as approximately 97% of all crop land is rainfed and 43% of SSA’s land mass is already composed of arid and semi-arid agro-ecological zones. Moreover, agriculture is SSA’s most important economic sector, representing 70% of the labour force and 35% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Factors exacerbating climate change in SSA include endemic poverty, hunger, high prevalence of disease, chronic conflicts, low levels of development and low adaptive capacity. The confluence of these conditions can lead to dramatic swings in food prices as well as personal incomes. If related United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are to be met, more concerted investments must be made and climate risk management strategies implemented.

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Chapter Six: Ecological and Infectious Disease Impacts of Hydropower in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Bethany Taylor, juxtaposes SSA’s energy needs with environmental and health considerations. In 2014, more than 620 million people, 80% of whom live in rural areas, lacked access to electricity in SSA. SSA is the only region in the world where the number of people living without electricity is increasing faster than efforts and progress to provide it. Renewable hydropower (that is, electric power that stores the potential energy of water in a reservoir and uses the kinetic energy of falling water) is currently contributing to more than 50% of electricity in 25 African countries but generally does not serve rural areas. While investment costs are high, once constructed, a hydropower plant has low operating costs, long plant life, no direct waste and low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Dams and reservoirs in SSA to produce hydroelectric power, however, can have devastating and long-lasting effects on the health of local, upstream and downstream populations as well as ecological systems, including: sedimentation and erosion associated with impacted river flow, displacement and drowning of terrestrial flora and fauna, loss of habitat, changes in migration patterns. Most notably, plant construction may also lead to the creation of localized, humid microclimates, which may be further exacerbated by global warming, leading to increased vector populations such as malaria-causing mosquitoes. Annually, 500 million cases of malaria are reported globally with 90% of infections occurring in SSA. Rural populations are also vulnerable to typhoid, cholera, dysentery, gastroenteritis and hepatitis if access to clean water supplies is interrupted during construction. Consequently, an Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment, or ESHIA, must make clear the risks and benefits of hydropower on a case-by-case basis, involve local populations in decision-making processes and include recommended malaria control measures. Chapter Seven: Indicators: Leveraging Science to Communicate Climate Change Impacts and Risks, by Michael Kolian, provides an overview of how indicators can be used to communicate climate change impacts and risks. In 2016, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released its latest version of the report, Climate Change Indicators in the United States, summarizing a key set of indicators related to the causes and effects of climate change. A total of 37 indicators are grouped into six categories: GHGs; weather and climate; oceans; snow and ice; health and society; and ecosystems. EPA’s indicators are (1) derived from observed or measured data, (2) have a scientifically-based relationship to climate change, and (3) rely on peer-reviewed science and sources of data from

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federal government agencies. The paper describes the indicator framework which includes (1) collaborative partnerships, (2) methods for transparent documentation and evaluation of indicators, and (3) the goal of advancing the science through the ongoing development of additional indicators. Indicators can be used to support resource planning and decision-making, especially with regard to resilience and adaptation planning. Indicators can also characterize patterns of observed changes and help reveal the relevancy of those changes. A few observed changes are mentioned such as sea level rise and coastal flooding. Lastly, indicators are important to better understand the important but complex connections between climate change and human health and well-being. Carole LeBlanc Wells, Maine USA

SECTION I. ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND SOCIETAL IMPACTS

CHAPTER ONE ZIKA VIRUS INTRODUCTION AND EMERGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S.) C. BEN BEARD, PH.D.1

Disclaimer: The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Abstract Zika virus is a mosquito-transmitted virus in the family Flaviviridae, closely related to dengue and yellow fever viruses. The virus is transmitted primarily through the bite of an infected mosquito, chiefly by Aedes aegypti and occasionally by Aedes albopictus. Before 2007, very few cases of Zika had been documented. Zika virus infections were first reported in the Americas in March 2015. Since that time, cases have spread throughout the Americas with the first cases of locally-transmitted 1

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Division of Vector-Borne Diseases, Fort Collins, Colorado (CO), U.S. Dr. Beard joined CDC’s Division of Parasitic Diseases, where he served as Chief of the Vector Genetics Section from 1999 to 2003. In 2003, he moved to CDC’s Division of Vector-borne Diseases in Fort Collins, CO to become Chief of the Bacterial Diseases Branch. In this capacity, he coordinated CDC’s programs on Lyme borreliosis, tick-borne relapsing fever, Bartonella, plague, and tularemia. In addition to his work as Chief of the Bacterial Diseases Branch, in 2011 Dr. Beard was appointed as the Associate Director for Climate Change in CDC’s National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases where he coordinated CDC’s efforts to mitigate the potential impact of climate variability and disruption on infectious diseases in humans. Currently he serves as Deputy Director of CDC’s Division of VectorBorne Diseases. During his 25-year tenure at CDC, Ben has worked in the prevention of vector-borne diseases, both in the domestic and global arenas. For additional biographical insights to the author’s work, see the ‘Following-up’ section at the conclusion of this chapter.

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Chapterr One

Zika illness reported in the t U.S. in Ju uly 2016. Thee most seriouss concern with Zika iss the risk of congenital Ziika virus infeection, which has been associated w with birth defeects in 10% of o fetuses or innfants from completed pregnancies with laborattory-confirmed d recent Zikaa virus infection. Zika A has likely been in nfluenced virus introduuction and sppread in the Americas by a numberr of contributinng factors inclluding global ttravel, immuno ologically naïve humann populations, poor living conditions, c innadequate public health resources, aand environm mental conditiions conducivve for populations of competent m mosquito vectoors to thrive.

Introdu uction Zika is caussed by infection with the Zika virus, a single-strand ded RNA virus in the family Flavivviridae1 (Fig. 1.1). 1

Fig. 1.1. Traansmission elecctron microscope image of Z Zika virus [Pho oto credit: Cynthia Golddsmith]

It is closelyy related to dengue, d yellow w fever, Japaanese encephaalitis, and West Nile vviruses and is transmitted primarily p by m mosquitoes, chiefly c by Aedes aegyppti and occasioonally by Aed des albopictus (Fig. 1.2).

Fig. 1.2. Mossquito vectors of o Zika virus. Left L image, Aeddes aegypti; rig ght image, Aedes albopicctus [Photo creddits: James Gatthany]

Zika Virus Introducttion and Emerg gence in the Uni nited States (U.S S.)

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Additional modes of traansmission allso have beenn reported2, 3 and are discussed beelow. In 1947,, scientists firrst identified the t virus in a rhesus monk key in the Zika forest nnear Entebbe,, Uganda4 on the t northern sshore of Lake Victoria. The febrile rhesus monkkey had been n caged in thhe forest canopy as a 1 sentinel for a yellow feveer study (Fig. 1.3).

Fig. 1.3. Zikaa tower in the Zika Forrest, near n Entebbe, U Uganda [Photo credit: C. Ben Beard]

The virus w was also recovvered from thee mosquito, A edes africanu us, caught in the same forest4. Priorr to 2007, no outbreaks andd only sporadic human o cases of Zikka were repoorted5. While it is likely thhat previous outbreaks were not reecognized duee to the symp ptoms Zika shhares with maany other diseases, thee first reporteed outbreak off Zika occurreed in 2007 in n the state of Yap, Fedderated States of Micronesiia.5 The outbrreak in Yap reesulted in an estimatedd 5,000 infecctions in a population of leess than 7,000 0 people. Based on a serosurvey, 73 7 percent of the populatioon was infecteed and 18 2 and percent of tthose infectedd developed clinical illnesss. Between 2013 2014, over 330,000 suspecct cases were reported r from m French Polyn nesia and other Pacifiic islands2,6. The first casses of Zika iin the Americas were reported in Brazil in Maarch 2015 where infectionss were associaated with Pan American n Health Guillain-Barrré syndromee2,7. In May 2015, the P Organizationn issued an alert regardin ng the first confirmed Zika virus infection inn Brazil. On January J 22, 2016, 2 the U.S S. Centers forr Disease

6

Chapter One

Control and Prevention activated its Emergency Operations Center to respond to the Zika outbreak in the Americas and increased reports of birth defects and Guillain-Barré syndrome in areas affected by Zika8 (Fig. 1.4).

Fig. 1.4. Timeline for Zika virus response events–January–December 2016. Source: Oussayef NL, Pillai SK, Honein MA, et al. Zika Virus—10 Public Health Achievements in 2016 and Future Priorities. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2017;65:1482-1488. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6552e1

Zika Virus Introducttion and Emerg gence in the Uni nited States (U.S S.)

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By Februaryy 2016 when the t World Heealth Organizaation declared d the Zika virus outbreak a Publicc Health Em mergency of International Concern 00,000 cases w were estimated d to have somewhere between 440,,000 and 1,30 occurred in Brazil.9 On July 19, 2016, thee Florida Department of Heealth announcced that it was investiggating a posssible non-travel associated case of Zikaa virus in Miami-Dadee County, andd on July 29th h, it informedd CDC that Zika Z virus infections inn four people likely l were caaused by bites of local Aedees aegypti mosquitoes. These casees were the first known occurrence of local v transmiission in thee continentall United mosquito-boorne Zika virus States8,10.

Clinical illness Following aan incubationn period of 3–14 days aftter being bitteen by an infected mosquito11, Ziika virus inffection can be asymptom matic or pically characcterized by a tetrad of symptomaticc. Zika virus disease is typ symptoms inncluding acutte onset of fev ver, maculopaapular rash, arthralgia, a and conjuncctivitis, all off which may not n be present nt in any given n case of illness5 (Figg. 1.5).

Fig. 1.5. Com mmon symptom ms associated with Zika viruus infections. Left L panel, tetrad of mostt common sympptoms; right paanel, blotchy rassh that is characcteristic of Zika. [Contennt provider: CD DC]

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Chapter One

Headache and muscle pain are also commonly reported. Symptoms, which typically last several days to one week, are generally mild. Severe disease requiring hospitalization is uncommon, and fatalities are rare. Fatal cases of Zika virus disease have been associated with severe thrombocytopenia12,13. While these cases are reminiscent of severe dengue, both the timing of symptom onset and the theorized mechanism of thrombocytopenia appear to be different from what has been reported for severe dengue12. The most serious concern associated with Zika virus infection is congenital Zika syndrome, a pattern of congenital anomalies linked to Zika virus infection during pregnancy14. If Zika virus infection occurs in a pregnant woman, the virus can pass from the woman to her fetus, resulting in infection of the developing infant. Fetal infection can cause microcephaly and other severe brain defects14. Congenital Zika infection has also been linked to abnormal eye development, hearing loss, limb deformities, and growth impairments15. In 2016, according to data reported to CDC from 44 U.S. states via the U.S. Zika Pregnancy Registry, 1,297 pregnancies with possible recent Zika virus infection were reported in the U.S. Zika virus-associated birth defects occurred in 10% of fetuses or infants from completed pregnancies with laboratory-confirmed recent Zika virus infection. Additionally, birth defects were reported in 15% of fetuses or infants of completed pregnancies with confirmed Zika virus infection in the first trimester16. These findings emphasize the serious risk for birth defects caused by Zika virus infection during pregnancy.

Diagnosis Diagnosis of Zika virus infection relies on detecting either viral RNA that indicates current Zika infection or specific antibodies that may indicate recent infection, depending on prior exposure to Zika or related flaviviruses such as dengue. Viral RNA detection utilizes a nucleic acid test (NAT) that is currently recommended for use within 2 weeks of symptom onset due to the limited window of time in which the virus is circulating in peripheral blood. An anti-Zika IgM serologic test is recommended for detecting anti-Zika antibodies that can be indicative of recent Zika virus infection. If a symptomatic person lives in or recently traveled to an area with active Zika virus transmission, he or she should be tested. NAT testing should be performed for any pregnant woman who develops Zika symptoms or has sexual partners who test positive for Zika. A positive NAT test is confirmatory for Zika infection. A negative NAT test in a symptomatic pregnant woman should be followed up with both

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Zika virus IgM and dengue virus IgM antibody testing. A positive IgM test result in this instance should be viewed with caution due to the possibility that exposure to Zika or dengue may have occurred prior to pregnancy. Asymptomatic pregnant women who have traveled to areas with posted CDC Zika Travel Notices or who have had sex with someone who has traveled to such areas should be tested using both NAT and IgM testing. Pregnant women who remain asymptomatic while living in an area of active Zika virus transmission should be tested at least three times during pregnancy using NAT testing. A woman living in an area of Zika virus transmission may also consider IgM testing for the presence of pre-existing IgM antibody as a part of pre-conception counseling. Recommendations for Zika testing are subject to change as new information becomes available. The most up-to-date information regarding which tests should be performed, the diagnostic specimen of choice, the timing of testing in regard to symptom onset, categories of risk, and other relevant questions can be found at the following website: https://www.cdc.gov/zika/hcproviders/types-of-tests.html.

Transmission Zika virus is transmitted primarily by Aedes mosquitoes in the subgenus Stegomyia, among which Ae. aegypti is by far the most important vector species for transmission in humans1,17. Sylvatic transmission, as originally described in Africa, was linked to the zoonotic Stegomyia vector Ae. africanus in a transmission cycle involving non-human primates4. Putative or confirmed vector species in human outbreaks to date include Ae. albopictus, Ae. hensilii, and possibly Ae. polynesiensis1, 18. While a sylvatic cycle involving non-human primates has been identified in Africa, it is not yet known whether or not such a cycle will develop in the New World with non-human primates or other mammalian species. In the continental U.S., while both Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus are present (Fig. 1.6) to date all locally-transmitted cases have been linked to Ae. aegypti. Vertical transmission has been observed at low rates in Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus for multiple flaviviruses and has been suggested for Zika virus based on a recent laboratory study19. This study showed that using experimentally-inoculated Ae. aegypti, vertical transmission to progeny could be achieved in a small proportion of individuals, reporting a filial infection rate of 1:290. No transmission took place in Zika virus inoculated Ae. albopictus mosquitoes. The investigators suggested that this phenomenon could possibly allow for survival of infected mosquitoes at low levels

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Chapterr One

during adveerse conditionns in inter-ep pidemic perioods. To date, vertical transmissionn of Zika viirus has not been observved in field--collected mosquitoes. Therefore, thhe epidemiolo ogic importannce of these laaboratory observationss is yet to be determined. d

Fig. 1.6. Estim mated range off Aedes aegypti (left) and Aedes es albopictus (riight) in the United Statess, 2016. Sourcee: https://www.ccdc.gov/zika/veector/range.htm ml

In additiion to mosquuito-borne transmission, Ziika virus tran nsmission has been rreported to occur o by a number n of oother routes including intrauterine and perinataal transmissio on, sexual traansmission, laaboratory exposure annd blood transsfusion1, 3. Th he most imporrtant of these by far is transmissionn that can occcur from a prregnant womaan to the fetu us leading potentially to microcephhaly, a cond dition which occurs at a rate of somewhere between 1 annd 13%, with h a greater riskk associated with first trimester inffections16,20

Current siituation Zika virus continues to spread globaally to new ar areas where competent mosquito veectors are preesent. Currenttly, the Worldd Health Org ganization (WHO) repoorts 84 countrries, territoriess, or sub-natioonal areas wh here local, vector-bornee transmissioon has occurrred, includingg 61 areas with w new introductionn or re-introdduction since 2015 with onngoing transm mission21. WHO further reports 18 areas where transmission was reported d to have occurred priior to 2015 orr where transm mission is occcurring but no ot related to recent iintroduction and five areeas where trransmission has h been interrupted bbut remains at a risk due to the t presence oof competent mosquito vectors. Casses continue too be reported,, but the expan ansion to new countries and regions appears to bee leveling off222 (Fig. 1.7).

Zika Virus Introducttion and Emerg gence in the Uni nited States (U.S S.)

11

Fig. 1.7. Currrent global Zikaa situation–WH HO, February 20016. Source: http://www.w who.int/emergeencies/zika-virus/situation-repoort/13-october-2 2016/en/

As of A April 26, 20117, 5,264 Zik ka virus diseease cases haave been officially reeported in the United States, including 44,963 travel-aassociated cases, 224 locally-acquiired mosquito o-transmitted cases in Flo orida and ugh other rouutes includin ng sexual Texas, and 77 cases accquired throu boratory transm mitted, and person-top transmissionn, congenital infection, lab person throuugh an unknoown route (htttps://www.cddc.gov/zika/geeo/unitedstates.html).. While local mosquito-born m ne transmissioon has been reeported in only two sttates, Floridaa and Texas, travel-associiated cases have been reported in 449 states and the t District off Columbia (F ig. 1.8). The statees with the grreatest numbeer of travel-re lated cases ass of April 26, 2017 incclude Florida (1,134), New York (1,021)), California (4 444), and Texas (326)) (https://www w.cdc.gov/zikaa/intheus/mapss-zika-us.html).

12

Chapterr One

Fig. 1.8. Labboratory-confirm med Zika virus disease cases rreported to Arb boNET by state or territoory (as of Aprill 26, 2017). Sou urce: https://www.ccdc.gov/zika/inntheus/maps-zik ka-us.html

Zika Virus Introduction and Emergence in the United States (U.S.)

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Prevention and control While several vaccine candidates are currently being evaluated, no vaccine is available for protection against infection with Zika virus. Consequently, primary prevention efforts are directed individually against the known routes of transmission, which include mosquito-borne, sexual transmission, congenital transmission, laboratory-acquired, and potentially through blood transfusion and tissue transplants. To reduce the risk of exposure to infected mosquitoes, CDC recommends wearing long-sleeved shirts and pants to cover exposed skin and applying U.S. Environmental Protection Agency-approved repellants to skin or clothing, according to the product label. Efforts should also be made to empty or flush waterholding containers around homes or workplaces that may harbor developing stages of mosquitoes. Some examples of Ae. aegypti larval development sites include birdbaths, old tires, trash, and flowerpots or planters. It is also important to maintain intact screens on doors and windows. More information on preventing exposure to mosquitoes can be found at the following website: https://www.cdc.gov/zika/prevention/ prevent-mosquito-bites.html. Pregnant women should avoid travel to areas where Zika virus is known to occur. The most up-to-date information for travelers is available at https://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/index.html. Couples who are trying to get pregnant should consider avoiding non-essential travel to areas with Zika. Condoms can reduce the chance of getting Zika from sex. To be effective, they must be used from start to finish during vaginal, anal or oral sex. If a pregnant women or her partner develops symptoms of Zika or has concerns, she should contact a doctor or healthcare provider. Additional information on pregnancy concerns can be found at https://www.cdc.gov/ zika/pregnancy/protect-yourself.html. Effective control of Ae. aegypti mosquitoes is very difficult to achieve and for this reason has focused on combinations of approaches used together in an integrated vector control or management strategy that usually targets multiple developmental stages of the mosquito vector. Typical methods and approaches include property inspection and subsequent removal of larval mosquito development sites, applying insecticides to kill mosquito larvae or adults, and deploying traps that kill mosquitoes. Insecticides may be applied by backpack sprayers, through truck-based spraying or fogging, or via aerial application. Additional information is available at the following websites: https://www.cdc.gov/ zika/prevention/controlling-mosquitoes-at-home.html; https://www.cdc.

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Chapter One

gov/chikungunya/pdfs/Surveillance-and-Control-of-Aedes-aegypti-andAedes-albopictus-US.pdf. Several novel approaches for controlling mosquito vectors of Zika virus have been developed and are in different stages of evaluation for their effectiveness at reducing mosquito populations and the subsequent risk of infection to humans. These include releasing male mosquitoes that cannot successfully mate due either to genetic modification or the presence of Wolbachia bacteria23,24. Both of these methods have been used in strategies to reduce vector populations. Another approach involves a population replacement strategy in which Wolbachia-infected male and female mosquitoes are released23. The Wolbachia spread through local mosquito populations, reducing their competence for transmitting the Zika virus. All three of these methods are being evaluated, either in the 86 or abroad, and have great promise for reducing the risk of Zika virus infection in humans.

Climate and weather as determinants of vector distribution, abundance and disease emergence It has been suggested that climate change and El Niño should be viewed as contributing factors to Zika virus emergence in the Americas25. Some of the anticipated trends associated with climate change include longer and warmer summers, shorter and milder winters, and an increased frequency of severe and unpredictable weather events such as storms, heat waves and droughts, including possible intensification of El Niño events26-30. Temperature and precipitation can have a significant influence on mosquito survival and reproduction. In the U.S. there is typically a northern-most boundary that defines where a particular mosquito vector can survive. This threshold is usually species-specific and defined primarily by temperature. Because of the correlation between altitude and temperature, there is typically also an elevation threshold. As the climate warms, the distribution of mosquito vectors is expected to change, allowing for mosquitoes to survive at more northern latitudes and higher elevations30. At warmer temperatures, mosquitoes complete development from egg to adult more quickly, leading to larger vector populations and subsequent greater transmission risks31. Bloodmeal digestion can occur more quickly, as well, leading to a shorter period of time between bloodmeals. For Zika virus to be transmitted, the adult female mosquito must feed on an infected person. Once it feeds, the virus must escape the mosquito midgut and migrate to the salivary glands so that upon the next bloodmeal the virus can be transmitted. The time between when the mosquito acquires the

Zika Virus Introduction and Emergence in the United States (U.S.)

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virus to when it is capable of transmitting the virus is called the extrinsic incubation period. At warmer temperatures, this time period is shortened, leading to a greater likelihood that transmission will occur before the mosquito dies32,33. Consequently milder winters and early springs together with warmer summer temperatures lead to larger mosquito populations, enhanced virus amplification, and increased subsequent risk for disease in humans if the virus is present in vector populations30, 34-37. Since Ae. aegypti is a container-breeding mosquito, rainfall can also influence mosquito population levels in a given location38,39. The effect of precipitation, however, is more complicated than that of temperature on mosquito development and population growth. Moderate amounts of rainfall have been correlated with larger mosquito populations due to increased larval habitat. High winds, excessive rainfall, and flooding, however, can potentially have deleterious effects, killing infected adult mosquitoes and washing away larval development sites. It is important to note that the nuisance mosquitoes that breed in flooded areas associated with tropical storms and hurricanes are typically not the mosquito species that are transmitting human disease pathogens30,40. As mentioned above, climate change is expected to influence weather patterns such as the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events. El Niño refers to a sea surface warming event in the equatorial Pacific Ocean, which often leads to changes in the patterns of precipitation and temperature across many regions of the world, including the United States. Weather effects in the United States attributed to El Niño are typically seen in the cooler months of the year and are characterized by cooler and wetter seasonal weather41. In the fall of 2015, the NOAA Climate Prediction Center issued an El Niño Advisory, reporting a strong El Niño condition that would likely persist into the spring of 2016. El Niño events are not caused by climate change, nor are they expected to occur at greater frequencies due to climate change. Greater El Niño intensity, however, is a potential concern of global warming that warrants further investigation42. According to the NOAA Climate Prediction Center, the 2015-2016 El Niño event was one of the strongest events in recorded history, significantly affecting temperature and precipitation patterns across the United States. El Niño events have been linked to increases in the occurrence of some vector-borne diseases, such as Rift Valley Fever in Kenya, due to increased rainfall associated with El Niño in that region and the subsequent impact on mosquito populations43. It is unclear, however, what direct impact it has had on the current Zika virus outbreak in the Americas due to numerous other influencing factors such as global travel and the movement of infected humans, living conditions, introduction of the

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disease into an immunologically naïve human population, and public health resources for responding to local disease outbreaks. While it has been suggested that the recent El Niño event contributed to the Zika outbreak in the Americas25, the challenge is in determining what portion of the current outbreak can be attributed to the El Niño event and subsequent larger than normal mosquito populations during the critical time period in the disease-affected areas, against the background of the other contributing factors mentioned above. One additional consideration is that human behavior, which is also influenced by climate and weather, contributes very significantly to exposure risks for vector-borne diseases like Zika. Increased time indoors during daylight hours when Ae. aegypti is more active, may decrease exposure risk. Economic disparities that can result in lack of access to airconditioning and subsequent reliance on windows that may not be adequately screened may lead to a greater risk to Zika virus exposure. Access to healthcare is also important and can potentially influence both prevention awareness and disease outcome27.

Summary and conclusion The global Zika virus epidemic has resulted in a number of observations that are new to the world of vector-borne diseases. These include multiple alternative transmission routes, including sexual and congenital transmission and the direct link to serious birth defects, which have never before been reported for any other mosquito-borne disease agent. Significant challenges exist, including the need for better diagnostic tests, particularly one that will distinguish recent infections with Zika and dengue, which are currently co-endemic in many parts of the Americas. There is also a great need for novel effective prevention and control tools in light of insecticide resistance and the growing public sentiment against the use of synthetic pesticides. Many questions remain regarding the prospects for Zika establishment in the New World, including the existence of possible non-human reservoirs, the potential role of Ae. albopictus, which has a much broader distribution in the U.S. than Ae. aegypti, and the contributions of weather patterns and climate change to disease emergence. Additional research is needed to better understand how a sustained pattern of milder winters, earlier springs, and longer and warmer growing seasons are likely to influence the multi-annual cyclic patterns associated with many arboviral diseases. Long term vector surveillance work is necessary in order to document how milder winters and the increase in numbers of frost-free days will affect the northern limits of important

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vector species like Ae. aegypti. Despite the lack of understanding of many of the issues surrounding Zika transmission and its spread, steps can and should be taken to minimize the adverse health effects. Paramount among these is the commitment to maintain a strong public health system so that when diseases such as Zika occur in new areas, they will be quickly detected and reported, allowing prevention and control activities to be rapidly and effectively mobilized.

Bibliography 1. Kuno G, Chang GJ, Tsuchiya KR, Karabatsos N, Cropp CB. Phylogeny of the genus Flavivirus. Journal of virology. 1998 Jan 1;72(1):73-83. 2. Petersen LR, Jamieson DJ, Powers AM, Honein MA. Zika virus. New England Journal of Medicine. 2016 Apr 21;374(16):1552-63. 3. BarjasǦCastro ML, Angerami RN, Cunha MS, Suzuki A, Nogueira JS, Rocco IM, Maeda AY, Vasami FG, Katz G, Boin IF, Stucchi RS. Probable transfusionǦtransmitted Zika virus in Brazil. Transfusion. 2016 Jul 1;56(7):1684-8. 4. Dick GW, Kitchen SF, Haddow AJ. Zika virus (I). Isolations and serological specificity. Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. 1952 Sep 1;46(5):509-20. 5. Duffy MR, Chen TH, Hancock WT, Powers AM, Kool JL, Lanciotti RS, Pretrick M, Marfel M, Holzbauer S, Dubray C, Guillaumot L. Zika virus outbreak on Yap Island, federated states of Micronesia. N Engl J Med. 2009 Jun 11;2009(360):2536-43. 6. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Rapid risk assessment: Zika virus infection outbreak, French Polynesia. 14 February 2014. Stockholm: ECDC; 2014. http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/Zika-virus-FrenchPolynesia-rapid-risk-assessment.pdf 7. World Health Organization. Zika virus microcephaly and guilllainbarré syndrome. Situation report. 17 March 2016. http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/204633/1/zikasitrep_17Mar20 16_eng.pdf 8. 8Oussayef NL, Pillai SK, Honein MA, et al. Zika Virus —10 Public Health Achievements in 2016 and Future Priorities. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2017; 65:1482-1488. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6552e1 9. Plourde AR, Bloch EM. A literature review of Zika virus. Emerging infectious diseases. 2016 Jul;22(7):1185.

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10. Likos A. Local Mosquito-Borne Transmission of Zika Virus—MiamiDade and Broward Counties, Florida, June–August 2016. MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 2016;65. 11. Krow-Lucal ER, Biggerstaff BJ, Staples JE. Estimated Incubation Period for Zika Virus Disease. Emerging infectious diseases. 2017 May 15;23(5). 12. Sharp TM, Muñoz-Jordán J, Perez-Padilla J, Bello-Pagán MI, Rivera A, Pastula DM, Salinas JL, Mendez JH, Méndez M, Powers AM, Waterman S. Zika virus infection associated with severe thrombocytopenia. Clinical Infectious Diseases. 2016 Jul 14:ciw476. 13. Swaminathan S, Schlaberg R, Lewis J, Hanson KE, Couturier MR. Fatal Zika virus infection with secondary nonsexual transmission. New England Journal of Medicine. 2016 Nov 10;375(19):1907-9. 14. Rasmussen SA, Jamieson DJ, Honein MA, Petersen LR. Zika virus and birth defects—reviewing the evidence for causality. New England Journal of Medicine. 2016 May 19;374(20):1981-7. 15. Honein MA, Dawson AL, Petersen EE, Jones AM, Lee EH, Yazdy MM, Ahmad N, Macdonald J, Evert N, Bingham A, Ellington SR. Birth defects among fetuses and infants of US women with evidence of possible Zika virus infection during pregnancy. JAMA. 2017 Jan 3;317(1):59-68. 16. Reynolds MR. Vital Signs: Update on Zika Virus–Associated Birth Defects and Evaluation of All US Infants with Congenital Zika Virus Exposure—US Zika Pregnancy Registry, 2016. MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 2017;66. 17. Musso D, Gubler DJ. Zika virus. Clinical microbiology reviews. 2016 Jul 1;29(3):487-524. 18. Ledermann JP, Guillaumot L, Yug L, Saweyog SC, Tided M, Machieng P, Pretrick M, Marfel M, Griggs A, Bel M, Duffy MR. Aedes hensilli as a potential vector of Chikungunya and Zika viruses. PLoS Negl Trop Dis. 2014 Oct 9;8(10):e3188. 19. Thangamani S, Huang J, Hart CE, Guzman H, Tesh RB. Vertical transmission of Zika virus in Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. The American journal of tropical medicine and hygiene. 2016 Nov 2;95(5):1169-73. 20. Johansson MA, Mier-y-Teran-Romero L, Reefhuis J, Gilboa SM, Hills SL. Zika and the risk of microcephaly. New England Journal of Medicine. 2016 Jul 7;375(1):1-4. 21. WHO Situation Report Zika Virus, 10 March 2017. http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/254714/1/zikasitrep10Mar17eng.pdf?ua=1 22. WHO Situation Report Zika Virus, 2 February 2017.

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http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/254507/1/zikasitrep2Feb17eng.pdf?ua=1 23. Yakob L, Walker T. Zika virus outbreak in the Americas: the need for novel mosquito control methods. The Lancet Global Health. 2016 Mar 31;4(3):e148-9. 24. Mains JW, Brelsfoard CL, Rose RI, Dobson SL. Female Adult Aedes albopictus Suppression by Wolbachia-Infected Male Mosquitoes. Scientific Reports. 2016;6. 25. Paz S, Semenza JC. El Niño and climate change—contributing factors in the dispersal of Zika virus in the Americas?. The Lancet. 2016 Feb 20;387(10020):745. 26. Karl TR, Melillo JM, Peterson TC (Eds) Global climate change impacts in the United States. Cambridge University Press; 2009 Aug 24. 27. Melillo JM, Richmond TC, Yohe GW, (Eds) Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment. U.S. Global Change Research Program. 2014, 841 pp. doi:10.7930/J0Z31WJ2. 28. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2016. Climate change indicators in the United States, 2016. Fourth edition. EPA 430-R-16004. www.epa.gov/climate-indicators. 29. Balbus J, Crimmins A, Gamble JL, Easterling DR, Kunkel KE, Saha S, Sarofim MC. Climate Change and Human Health. The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United States: A Scientific Assessment. 2016:25-42. 30. Beard CB, Eisen RJ, Barker CM, Garofalo JF, Hahn M, Hayden M, Monaghan AJ, Ogden NH, Schramm PJ. Chapter 5: Vector-borne diseases. The impacts of climate change on human health in the United States: A scientific assessment. US Global Change Research Program. 2016:129-56. http://dx.doi.org/10.7930/J0765C7V 31. Bar-Zeev, M. 1958. The effect of temperature on the growth rate and survival of the immature stages of Aedes aegypti (L.). Bull. Entomol. Res. 49: 157–163. 32. Focks, D.A., R.J Brenner, J. Hayes, and E. Daniels. 2000. Transmission thresholds for dengue in terms of Aedes aegypti pupae per person with discussion of their utility in source reduction efforts. Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 62: 11–18. 33. Hopp, M.J. and J.A. Foley. 2001. Global-scale relationships between climate and the dengue fever vector, Aedes aegypti. Clim. Change 48: 441–463.

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34. Rueda LM, Patel KJ, Axtell RC, Stinner RE. Temperature-dependent development and survival rates of Culex quinquefasciatus and Aedes aegypti (Diptera: Culicidae). Journal of medical entomology. 1990 Sep 1;27(5):892-8. 35. Gage KL, Burkot TR, Eisen RJ, Hayes EB. Climate and vectorborne diseases. American journal of preventive medicine. 2008 Nov 30;35(5):436-50. 36. Mills JN, Gage KL, Khan AS. Potential influence of climate change on vector-borne and zoonotic diseases: a review and proposed research plan. Environmental health perspectives. 2010 Nov 1;118(11):1507. 37. Marinho RA, Beserra EB, BezerraǦGusmão MA, Porto VD, Olinda RA, dos Santos CA. Effects of temperature on the life cycle, expansion, and dispersion of Aedes aegypti (Diptera: Culicidae) in three cities in Paraiba, Brazil. Journal of Vector Ecology. 2016 Jun 1;41(1):1-0. 38. Koenraadt CJ, Harrington LC. Flushing effect of rain on containerinhabiting mosquitoes Aedes aegypti and Culex pipiens (Diptera: Culicidae). Journal of Medical Entomology. 2008 Jan;45(1):28-35. 39. Barrera R, Amador M, MacKay AJ. Population dynamics of Aedes aegypti and dengue as influenced by weather and human behavior in San Juan, Puerto Rico. PLoS Negl Trop Dis. 2011 Dec 20;5(12):e1378. 40. Thai KT, Anders KL. The role of climate variability and change in the transmission dynamics and geographic distribution of dengue. Experimental Biology and Medicine. 2011 Aug 1;236(8):944-54. 41. Ropelewski CF, Halpert MS. North American precipitation and temperature patterns associated with the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Monthly Weather Review. 1986 Dec;114(12):2352-62. 42. Wang C, Deser C, Yu JY, DiNezio P, Clement A. El Niño and Southern Oscillation (ENSO): A Review. InCoral Reefs of the Eastern Tropical Pacific 2017 (pp. 85-106). Springer Netherlands. 43. Chretien J, Anyamba A, Small J, Britch S, Sanchez, JL, Halbach AC, Tucker C, Linthicum KJ. 2015. Global Climate Anomalies and Potential Infectious Disease Risks: 2014-2015. PLOS Currents Outbreaks. 2015 Jan 26. Edition 1. doi: 10.1371/currents.outbreaks.95fbc4a8fb4695e049baabfc2fc8289f

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Following-up Workshop chair: Besides your very important work at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), you’re also involved with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. What is your focus there? Dr. Beard: I served on the peer review panel for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Grand Challenges in Global Health program when it was first initiated in 2004. My participation specifically was with Grand Challenges 7 and 8, which focused on novel strategies for preventing vector-borne diseases. More recently, I collaborated with scientific program staff from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in organizing a two-day meeting in February 2017 that was hosted by CDC and the CDC Foundation in Atlanta, GA on innovative methods for controlling mosquito vectors of Zika virus infection. Over 160 scientists from around the world met to discuss the state of the science, successes, and challenges in reducing the burden of illness caused by the mosquito Aedes aegypti, which transmits Zika, dengue, and yellow fever viruses. Workshop chair: Can you give us a brief explanation of the theory behind introducing genetically modified mosquitoes in Florida to fight the Zika virus? Dr. Beard: The proposal to release genetically engineered (GE) mosquitoes in Florida to prevent Zika virus transmission is based on the concept that the specific mosquitoes that would be released are male mosquitoes that do not bite or transmit disease. As you probably know, only female mosquitoes bite and ingest blood for the purpose of producing eggs, potentially transmitting dangerous disease agents when they bite. The GE male mosquitoes under consideration for release in Florida have been engineered to be sterile. As a consequence when they mate with wild female mosquitoes, no offspring are produced, and the male GE mosquitoes die after they have mated - they do not persist. This type of an intervention is referred to as a sterile insect technique or population reduction method for mosquito control. This approach differs from what we typically think of when we talk about releasing genetically modified organisms, which usually involves replacing naturally-occurring animals or plants with an engineered species that through GE technology is better or safer than those that occur naturally.

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The mechanism of action for GE mosquito technology being considered in Florida involves a gene that has been put into the mosquitoes that keeps the mosquitoes from developing. In the laboratory, this gene can be "turned off" by growing the mosquitoes in an environment that has a very specific chemical signal or repressor that can be added to the water where the mosquitoes are being grown and turns off the otherwise mosquito-lethal gene. When the male mosquitoes are released in the wild, where the specific chemical signal is absent, the gene "turns on" and does it work. The whole system is quite clever and has been shown to be safe and effective in a number of field studies conducted outside of the U.S. in efforts to control other diseases carried by the same mosquito that transmits Zika virus. Workshop chair: I noticed that you were the photographer for one of the figures in your chapter, a picture taken in Uganda, near Entebbe. What are your responsibilities when you travel for the CDC? Dr. Beard: The image you refer to was taken in the Zika Forrest just outside Entebbe, Uganda on the Kampala-Entebbe Road. Uganda hosts one of the most unique historical tributes to the study of emerging arboviral (arthropod-borne) diseases in the entire world in the Zika Tower, which was originally constructed to study the ecology of jungle yellow fever. CDC’s Division of Vector-borne disease has been working collaboratively for over 20 years with the Uganda Ministry of Health through the Entebbebased Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI). The collaboration was established originally around surveillance of emerging arboviral diseases but was greatly expanded in scope and mission in 2004 with the opening of the UVRI-CDC Center for Vector-Borne Disease Research in Arua, in the West Nile region of northwestern Uganda. This facility was established to conduct plague diagnosis, treatment, prevention, and control work in the region. When I travel to Uganda and other international sites for CDC it is for a variety of reasons, including to meet with corresponding government officials, to coordinate with project collaborators, to provide guidance to ongoing studies, and occasionally to take part in disease outbreak responses such as the Ebola outbreak that occurred in West Africa in 2014 and 2015—I was deployed to Sierra Leone during the peak of the crisis there.

CHAPTER TWO DEATH BY DEGREES: THE HEALTH CRISIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN MAINE, U.S. KAREN A. D’ANDREA1

Introduction In 2000, Physicians for Social Responsibility Maine Chapter (PSR Maine), a statewide nonprofit organization comprised of several thousand medical and healthcare professionals and advocates, published a groundbreaking report entitled Death by Degrees: The Emerging Health Crisis of Climate Change in Maine (DbD) that focused on the impact of climate change on public health. In 2015, PSR Maine released the updated version–Death by Degrees: The Health Crisis of Climate Change in Maine.

Report findings The new report was condensed and organized to meet a primary goal–keep the report readable and concise for the Maine public and policy makers. Changes in climate impact Maine citizens’ health through (1) rising 1

Karen D’Andrea is the Executive Director for Physicians for Social Responsibility Maine Chapter where she has led the organization for six years. She holds two undergraduate degrees with graduate work in addiction counseling. She has been working with nonprofit organizations for 18 years as a consultant and volunteer specializing in small shop and nonprofit start-up management and administration. Ms. D’Andrea has been working on issues related to health and climate while at PSR Maine, during her work with other organizations, and on her public affairs radio show. For additional biographical insights to the author’s work, see the ‘Following- up’ section at the conclusion of this chapter.

Chapter Two

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temperatures, (2) rising sea level and (3) weather extremes. These three primary outcomes of global warming are linked to a number of health concerns. The DbD is focused on key Maine areas of concern for public health, including: x x x x

Asthma and allergies; Vector-borne diseases; High heat and humidity and Extreme weather.

This paper focuses on the report’s findings for asthma, allergies and vector-borne diseases for the state of Maine.

Asthma and the air pollution connection According to the American Lung Association’s 2014 State of the Air report, 80 percent (%) of Maine’s population is at risk from ozone or particulate pollution. These individuals are most commonly the elderly, children, and those who have respiratory ailments, but the report also includes those living in poverty. According to the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), 17 days in 2013 were forecast in one or more areas in Maine as moderate (yellow) and another six days were considered unhealthy for sensitive groups (orange). (Fig. 2.1). There are two categories beyond the orange descriptor: red or unhealthy (health advisory) and purple or very unhealthy (health alert). Numerous studies2 link ozone with the aggravation of asthma, impaired immune function, greater susceptibility to respiratory infections (such as bronchitis and pneumonia) and lung tissue damage. The symptoms include coughing, shortness of breath, and eye and throat irritation. Of these conditions, asthma is a special concern. Asthma is increasing in Maine.3 Children are most vulnerable because their airways are smaller, and they breathe more rapidly than adults. According to the national Center for Disease Control, our state has one of

2

National Climate Assessment, US Global Research Project, 2014, Chapter 9 Human Health, p 222, references 1,2,3, http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/sectors/human-health 3 Burden of Asthma in Maine, Maine CDC, 2008, http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/population-health/mat/documents/2008asthma-burden-report.pdf

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the highest occurrences of asthma in the nation (lifetime asthma prevalence) –15.7% of adults in Maine compared to 10.3% nationally.4 Air quality descriptor Good

Moderate

Color code

Health effects

GREEN No Health Notice. No health impacts expected in this range. It’s a great day to be active outside! YELLOW Limited Health Notice. Sensitive people should consider reducing prolonged or heavy exertion. Watch for symptoms such as coughing or shortness of breath. These are signs to take it easy.

Unhealthy for ORANGE Health Notice. People with heart or lung sensitive groups disease, the elderly, teenagers and children should reduce prolonged or heavy exertion. It is okay to be active outside, but take more breaks and do less intense activities. Watch for symptoms such as coughing or shortness of breath. Asthmatics should follow their action plans and keep quick relief meds handy. Those with heart disease should watch for palpitations, shortness of breath or unusual fatigue and contact your health provider of necessary. Table 2.1. Air quality forecast legend, U.S. Source: http://www.maine.gov/dep/air/ozone/

Physicians do not fully understand what causes asthma, but warmer weather likely will make it worse. One study found that warmer average temperatures and higher humidity are associated with increased pediatric asthma prevalence5, possibly because higher temperatures are associated 4

Asthma in Maine, CDC, 2008, http://www.cdc.gov/asthma/stateprofiles/Asthma_in_ME.pdf 5 Changes in weather and the effects on pediatric asthma exacerbations, Division of Allergy and Immunology; Children's Hospital of Michigan, Wayne State University School of Medicine, Detroit, Michigan, 2009, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19788019

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Chapter Two

with higher levels of allergen exposure. More generally, however, asthma is associated with air pollutants such as ozone and particulate matter.

Allergies Tree pollen is a common allergen, and Maine is a heavily forested state, so when temperatures start rising in the spring, pollen counts rise as well. A number of studies show that with longer warm seasons, allergy causing pollens will be more prevalent and in the air for a longer period of time.6 Another study finds that pollen will double by 2040.7 Many scientists believe that rising temperatures and lengthening growing seasons will create favorable conditions for an even wider variety of pollen-producing plants, leading to an increase in levels of airborne pollen and spores that aggravate respiratory disease, asthma, and allergic disorders. Hay fever sufferers in Maine are likely to experience more attacks, during more months of the year, and for those whose allergy symptoms go beyond a few sneezes and itchy eyes, an extended allergy season could mean sleepless nights and lowered productivity.

Vector-borne diseases Considered by some to be the ‘poster child’ of climate change in Maine, Lyme disease is carried by deer ticks. Maine has 14 tick species, but the deer tick is the only one that carries Lyme disease. It is the most commonly reported vector-borne illness (disease carried by a host like a tick or mosquito) in the United States.8 Lyme disease is dramatically on the rise in Maine. In 1994, Lyme disease cases totaled 33. In 1998 this figure more than doubled to 76 cases.9 In 2012 the rate rose to 1,095 cases or over 1,300% in 14 years and continued to rise in 2014 up again to

6

Climate Change Extends Allergy Season, Douglas Fischer et al, Scientific American, February 21, 2011, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/climatechange-extends-allergy-season/ 7 The Year 2040: Double the Pollen, Double the Allergy Suffering?, American College of Allergy, Asthma, & Immunology, November 9, 2011, http://www.acaai.org/allergist/news/New/Pages/TheYear2040DoublethePollenDou bletheAllergySuffering.aspx 8 US CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/lyme/stats/index.html 9 DHS EPI, Summary of Trends in Select Reportable Diseases Annual Frequency and Five Year Mean/ Median, Maine 1994-1998, based on MMWR year

Death by Degrees: The Health Crisis of Climate Change in Maine

27

1,381.10 A warming trend could increase Maine’s tick populations, and with warmer winters permitting people to enter tick-infested habitats earlier in the season, the risk for transmission of the disease increases.

Conclusions All three parameters examined: asthma, allergies and Lyme disease have seen consequential increases in the state of Maine recently. These increases have been shown to be associated with recent increases in temperature and hence, climate change. These findings have significant impacts on Maine’s current and future healthcare preparedness and public health. A detailed presentation on the report, Death by Degrees: The Health Crisis of Climate Change in Maine is planned for the 2nd Annual International Technical Workshop on Climate Risk in October 2017. Training materials and opportunities available from PSR Maine will also be discussed.

Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the other lead authors of the DbD report: Norman T. Anderson, MSPH; Lani F. Graham, MD, MPH; Daniel S. Oppenheim, Ph.D., M.D.; Paul F. Perkins, M.D. and Peter D. Wilk, M.D. She would also like to acknowledge the contributions of: Doug A. Dransfield, M.D.; Faye E. Luppi, J.D.; Mark R. Hyland, M.S.; James H. Maier, M.D. and Sydney R. Sewall, M.D.

10

Maine CDC Report to the Maine Legislature, Lyme Disease, February 2, 2015, http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/infectious-disease/epi/vectorborne/lyme/documents/Lyme-Legislative-Report-2015.pdf

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Following-up Workshop chair: Could you tell us a little bit about your public affairs radio show? Ms. D’Andrea: I hosted a weekly public affairs show, Sound Ecology on our local community radio station for 11 years. Over 500 shows of which only about a handful or so were prerecorded. It gained a great deal of popularity in Maine because it covered important topics with a wide range of guests from all over Maine and the world. The show hosted the first ever, in Maine, gubernatorial debate on environmental issues and 2 of the 3 candidates that year attended. Topics ranged from climate to nuclear weapons to pesticide spraying on local sidewalks. Guests have included some well-known activists like Julia ‘Butterfly’ Hill from her perch on Luna, a redwood tree in California, Jesuit priest and peace activist Philip Berrigan, consumer advocate and former presidential candidate Ralph Nader, members of the Gwich'in tribe from Alaska, and so many more passionate local and national leaders taking a stand to protect Earth and our environment. It was really an amazing and inspirational experience. Workshop chair: You have a very different background than most other contributors to this book, specializing for many years in the nonprofit world but in different capacities. In your opinion, what are some of the critical skills necessary for a successful career in this sector? Ms. D’Andrea: I am a specialist among specialists. As someone who runs a small shop, single staffer nonprofit organization, a broad working knowledge of all aspects of nonprofit management is critical. While fulfilling the role of executive director, you must also have excellent fundraising and messaging skills. You are the volunteer coordinator as well as the social media maven. Your ability to administer and report on the financial health of the organization is as important as the programmatic work. Being able to prioritize work is likely one of the most essential skills. Balancing deadlines for grant writing, legislative work and educational programs can be challenging. Your ability to recruit and utilize volunteers for specific tasks becomes paramount and making them feel needed and loved for their efforts is vital. This is a job that almost literally requires you to be a master of all trades.

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Workshop chair: It doesn’t appear that you will be bored anytime soon! Is there anything that you would like to do, a career goal perhaps, that you haven’t had the time to complete yet? Ms. D’Andrea: There are two things in life I’d still like to do…own a campground in northern Maine or Vermont and go back to school for a law degree. Once I help solve the problems of the world as a nonprofit executive, I’ll likely have some more time…

CHAPTER THREE PUTTING WOMEN IN POWER MARGARETA ROTH1

An analysis of enabling factors for increasing women’s participation in the clean energy sector of the Global North: Introduction The energy system of the world is transforming—it is moving away from oil and fossil fuels to cleaner, more localized energy options. In 2015, dollar investment in clean energy globally grew to nearly six times its 2004 total with a record of more than $300 billion U.S. (McCrone 2015), and it is estimated that the annual investment in new renewable power capacity is set to rise by 2.5 to more than 4.5 times between now and 2030 (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2013). The rapidly increasing growth of this sector also means that there is a rising demand for employment. Around the world, clean energy employed—directly or indirectly— more than 7.7 million people in 2014, which was an 18 percent (%) increase from 2013 (Ferroukhi et al. 2015). The expansion of the clean energy sector, and the mounting need for workers with technical skills, 1

Maggie Roth has worked at the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in Gland, Switzerland and at IUCN's Global Gender Office in Washington, DC where she was a subject matter lead on sustainable development and climate change mitigation. Previously, she served as manager for TetraTech’s Forest Carbon, Markets and Communities (FCMC) program. There, she managed a team to develop the FCMC program for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and worked with new, results-based forestry management, REDD+, first negotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Originally working as a journalist, she received a M.Sc. in Environmental Sciences and Policy with a concentration in Environmental Planning from The John Hopkins University in 2016 with a capstone thesis upon which this paper is based. For additional biographical insights to the author’s work, see the ‘Following-up’ section at the conclusion of this chapter.

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means that there are growing opportunities for those with relevant education and skills to find jobs, specifically in relation to engineering, manufacturing and construction. In theory, these opportunities should be equally available to both men and women, and countries investing in clean energy should see a rise in employment for both women and men. However, research suggests that the clean energy sector is not genderneutral and in fact ignores gender, or remains ‘gender-blind’—ignoring the gendered impacts, barriers and opportunities for participation—with women constituting fewer than 6% of technical staff and below 1% of top managers in the sector worldwide (UN Women 2012). While there is increasing evidence of the importance of gender equality for clean energy in developing countries, often referred to as the ‘Global South’, there is limited documentation of women participating the clean energy sector in industrialized nations—particularly the ‘Global North’2. From engineers and technicians to board members and CEOs, women offer leadership, solutions and technical skills that the energy sector currently seeks; yet many necessary and potentially enabling factors for increasing women’s participation in the sector go largely ignored or remain gender-blind. A lack of women in clean energy is not only an issue of filling an employment pipeline; it also affects the bottom line of business. Gender parity in the workplace is smart economics, as it can lead to more balanced and efficient organizations with stronger financial results. The relatively nascent clean energy sector offers incredible prospects for empowering women to gain their rightful place in the workforce through better-paid, non-traditional jobs (Rustico 2012). However, in order to prevent marginalizing women and to reverse trends that have occurred thus far, a combination of traditional and innovative strategies are needed to ensure both women and men participate equally and are afforded the same opportunities in the clean energy sector. This involves a conscious effort by policy and decision makers, as well as sector and corporate leaders and academic institutions, to embrace a paradigm shift that links the environmental and social consciousness of women with clean energy jobs, specifically technical roles that require education and expertise in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM). 2

While there is no simple, agreed, unambiguous term for a group of countries that vary over a variety of characteristics, including geography, economy and culture, the term ‘Global North’ in this case represents the chosen countries in North America and Europe that fit the UN Human Development Index (HDI) criteria— keeping in mind that it is not a homogenous entity, especially in terms of energy demand, production and use.

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The clean energy sector Clean energy3 is energy that is derived from natural processes that are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed and generate little to no pollution or emissions, such as: solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower, biofuels and ocean/tidal power. Clean energy has a number of compelling attributes that make it increasingly desirable to both developed and developing countries as compared with conventional fossil fuel technologies. In view of the economic, environmental, and infrastructure advantages that clean energy offers, it is poised to provide the majority of new power generation in the coming years. In 2014, global new investment in renewable power and fuels rose 17% from the previous year to $270.2 billion, as estimated by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (REN21 2015). In 2015, the trend continued, as clean energy investment broke new records and is currently projected to receive twice as much global funding as fossil fuels (Randall 2016). The vast majority of worldwide clean energy investment occurs in in the world’s largest economies, such as China, the United States (U.S.), the European Union, Japan, India and Brazil—combined, the G-20 accounted for more than 90% of global clean energy investment over the past decade (Pew 2015). At the same time, clean energy investment in developing countries is also growing—up 36% in 2014 from the previous year to $131.3 billion (REN21 2015). It is most likely that the scale and scope of both clean energy investment and deployment is expanding in emerging economies in response to national development goals, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), local priorities for the environment and health, and international cooperation to reduce global energy poverty4 (Pew 2015). Over the next 15 years, more than 5,570 GW of electricity generation will be added around the world. Renewable energy technologies are expected to fulfill 60%, or 3,000 GW, of the 5,570 GW, compared with less than 30% from fossil energy sources (Pew 2015). As evidenced in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, investment in renewables power capacity over the past seven years is beating fossil fuels at a rate of almost two-to-one.

3

In the case of this project, “clean” and “renewable” energy are used synonymously, as the employment sector for both are considered the same. By definition, renewable energy is energy from a source that isn’t exhausted when the energy is consumed, whereas clean energy doesn’t leave behind harmful byproducts, such as pollution or greenhouse gases. 4 Energy poverty is defined as a lack of access to modern energy services.

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Fig. 3.1. Investment in power capacity, 2008-2015; Source: BNEF

Fig. 3.. Renewables’ share of power generation; Source: BNEF

The world’s leading countries for clean energy employment in 2014 and 2015 closely align with those doing the majority of investing in the sector—China, the U.S., the European Union, India and Brazil—however, new markets have begun to emerge, including Indonesia, Japan, Bangladesh, Colombia, Argentina and Mexico (Ferroukhi et al. 2015). It is clear that clean energy is the energy of the future, and as investment in renewable technology continues to increase, so too will the demand for sector workers. However, there are a wide variety of roles across the clean energy value chain that tend to be dispersed across employment sectors, ranging from sales and marketing, to technicians and engineers; thus

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35

specific information related to these jobs are not often captured in national statistics, making it difficult to assess the true state of employment in the sector using hard data. As the industry expands, specific employment needs are expected to grow—careers in clean energy typically require technical skills and subject matter knowledge in STEM and there are increasing opportunities for employment and professional advancements in related career tracks, including research and design; manufacturing; and systems installation and management (U.S. Department of Labor 2010) (Fig. 3.3).

Fig. 3.. Renewable energy employment by technology; Source: IRENA

Gender and clean energy The term ‘gender’ refers to the socially constructed roles of women and men, rather than biologically determined differences. The gender roles of men and women, with their accompanying responsibilities, constraints, opportunities, and needs, are defined by a particular society. Most often, children learn gender roles as a part of their socialization process and the roles can change over time, varying widely within and across cultures (Ramakrishnan 2009). Gender equality is not only a women’s issue—both men and women must be involved to order to advance gender equality. When it comes to gender equality in the energy sector, the debate is often

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distinguished by the question of who are the beneficiaries of energy and the fact that the availability of energy services affects men and women differently, depending on the energy applications with which they are most involved (Banda, 2005). For instance, the type and quantity of energy available and its associated price have differentiated impacts on men and on women because they use energy for different purposes. Men and women also have varied levels of access to different fuels, thus shortages may affect one gender more than the other. For example, people with low incomes are highly vulnerable to changes in energy prices, especially in colder countries when more energy is needed for heating in winter. In Europe, women tend to be the majority among those with lower incomes and assets, and more than one-fifth of female lone pensioners experience fuel poverty (Burkevica 2012). Variations in energy availability, production and consumption due to policy changes or to direct intervention can provide diverse opportunities and challenges for both women and men. Yet, “…most energy policy debate and legislative frameworks have taken a gender neutral or a gender-blind approach to energy pricing, rural energy policy, and energy technology in the sense that energy policies continue to fail to recognize the differences in the needs and assets of women and men” (Clancy 2004)

For example, in urban areas in the Global North and South, women tend to use public transport more frequently than men, so petroleum fuel price increases fall disproportionately on women, particularly those from low-income groups (Clancy 2004). In cases where people are supposed to take an active role in improving energy supplies, as in many rural energy technology projects, the opportunities for, and constraints on, participation are gender differentiated, as well as the likely benets (Muchiri 2008). Energy decision makers, however, often do not understand the relationships between gender roles and energy availability and associated opportunities, while most energy issues, methods, and technologies of critical importance to women go un- or under-researched (UN Women 2009). Whether or not energy policy is focused on the Global North or Global South, it is necessary that it moves beyond targeting only access to, use of and benefits from energy and instead takes a more genderresponsive approach that also recognizes both women and men’s ability and desire to professionally engage in the sector. One way of ensuring engendered clean energy policy is by creating awareness among policymakers. Globally, it is imperative that policymakers recognize the potential of women in the energy sector, as well as the value of their work,

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in order to design gender-equitable energy policies and legal frameworks that can support clean energy and employment creation. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support this case and a need exists for more gender-disaggregated data in the energy sector—not only quantitative data about energy use, but also qualitative data about the sort of choices women and men want to make across the energy value chain.

Gender, clean energy and the Global North While much of the gender and energy discourse has focused on the Global South due to the clear development importance of energy in these women’s lives, energy issues in richer countries also have important implications for gender relations, female political participation, and sustainable development. Evidence is emerging, based centrally on work in the United Sates and the European Union, that there are common policy challenges in both the Global North and South with respect to the difficulties of mainstreaming gender in the energy policy debate, and national legislative and local regulatory frameworks that address gender and energy issues (Clancy 2004). For example, in the Global North, the direct involvement of many women in energy issues came about through political opposition to nuclear power and women-led resistance, as in Europe after the Chernobyl disaster. In proposing alternatives to nuclear power, women began to actively organize together and promote renewable energy, however when the movement became ‘professionalized’, women experienced that men took over the strategic positions and ultimately weakened women’s opportunities to influence political agendas (Roehr 2001). There is a distinct gender dimension in the way women’s and men’s lives in the Global North are affected by energy and that the ‘gender neutrality’ of energy must be challenged. For example, low income people often live in housing with poor insulation and use second-hand or older generation equipment that are not energy efficient. They also often have to pay for their electricity and gas using pre-paid systems that are generally charged on a higher unit cost basis than households with monthly billing systems (Clancy 2004). In the Global North, women with low incomes are disproportionately found as heads of households, either as single parent families or, due to their greater longevity than men, living alone at pensionable age. Many of these factors can contribute to high energy costs for people on low incomes, with negative effects falling especially on women who have restricted options.

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(QHUJ\ LV D FRPPRGLW\ WKDW SURYLGHV VHUYLFHV DQG RIIHUV MRE RSSRUWXQLWLHVKRZHYHUWKHUROHRIVXVWDLQDEOHHQHUJ\LQUHODWLRQWRJHQGHU KDVPRVWRIWHQEHHQFRQVLGHUHGLQDGHYHORSLQJFRXQWU\FRQWH[WDQGIURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI LWV FRQWULEXWLRQ WRZDUGV PRYLQJ ZRPHQ DQG WKHLU IDPLOLHVRXWRISRYHUW\²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¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ 67(0 ILHOGV WKDW LV DWWULEXWHG WR D P\ULDG RI IDFWRUV UDQJLQJIURPELDVHGKLULQJWRKRVWLOHZRUNHQYLURQPHQWVWRIHZHULQIRUPDO WHFKQRORJ\WUDQVIHURSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGOLPLWHGPHQWRULQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQG LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK IHPDOH OLNHPLQGHG SHHUV 5\DQ   ,Q WKH 86 IRU H[DPSOH ZRPHQ DUH XQGHUUHSUHVHQWHG DW DOO OHYHOV RI WKH 67(0 FDUHHU SLSHOLQHIURPLQWHUHVWDQGLQWHQWRIPDMRULQJLQD67(0ILHOGLQFROOHJHWR KDYLQJ D FDUHHU LQ D 67(0 ILHOG VXFK DV FOHDQ HQHUJ\ ZLWK VWXGLHV VKRZLQJWKDWJLUOVORVHLQWHUHVWLQPDWKDQGVFLHQFHGXULQJPLGGOHVFKRRO DQG 67(0 LQWHUHVW IRU JLUOV LV ORZ LQ FRPSDULVRQ WR WKHLU PDOH FRXQWHUSDUWV0RGLHWDO  While there are very few gender-disaggregated statistics for the renewable energy industry, figures for the energy sector in the Global North show disheartening trends. For example, in Germany: “the share of female technical staff in the energy industry is around 6%, in decision making positions 4%, and in the top-management less than 1%.” (Hoppenstedt-Analyse 2000)

Across developed countries, women in the energy industry work primarily in administration, sales, finance, catering, and personnel. In reality, women have vast accumulated knowledge and experience gained from using technologies with a clear set of criteria for what meets their needs. Drawing on women’s experiences, and working in partnership with women to develop Renewable Energy Technologies (RETs), will provide technologies that have a sustained use and create a viable market. Women in the Global North have also shown active interest in promoting renewable energy; for example, women in Germany established a cooperative to generate electricity for the grid using wind power because they were committed to

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39

sustainability and responsible attitudes towards the environment (Delfs 2000). There is concern, from both social justice and economic perspectives, that women are not gaining access to the clean energy value chain broadly, which is resulting in a loss of quality human resources. As exemplified in many other sectors, integrating women into all levels of the energy value chain can lead to more effective and sustainable clean energy initiatives, unlock greater return on investments, and increase the opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Pearl-Martinez 2014). In Europe, studies show that women tend to show higher environmental awareness than men (Burkevica 2012), however, when women are excluded from energy governance, decision-making processes are more likely to result in projects and policies that do not incorporate women’s distinct needs, knowledge, and contributions. Women still struggle for equal representation in the energy sector, as evidenced by the mere 4% of World Energy Council (WEC) Chair Positions and 18% of WEC Secretary Positions they hold (IUCN 2015).5 The role of women in politics, organizations, communities, and family life points to: “valuable leadership opportunities that can bring about positive change created by using energy as an instrument to achieve multiple objectives linked to social justice, environmental protection, and economic empowerment.” (Clancy 2004)

While it is evident that energy is not gender-neutral in the Global North, there remains a need for more gender-sensitive energy policies that equitably address the gendered structural constraints that limit performance and advancement in the clean energy sector, especially for women. The dearth of empirical evidence from which broad conclusions can be drawn, such as the lack of systematic collection of sexdisaggregated statistical data by energy ministries, is a barrier for developing gender-sensitive clean energy policy. The lack of empirical evidence results in an inability to draw broad conclusions, formulate meaningful policy, enable participation across the energy value chain, and inform decision making at all levels (Clancy 2004). In theory, policy can create an enabling environment that ensures and inspires women’s participation in the sector, but this needs to be reinforced by academic 5

This statistic is based on information available for chairs and secretaries from 92 nations. National Member Committees to the WEC each have a chair and secretary who represent national perspectives and interests in the energy dialogue of the WEC.

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support to pursue STEM fields, peer networks and opportunities for mentorship and learning.

A lack of gender-sensitive data In the Global North, the energy sector is not gender-neutral, as decisions around energy affect men and women differently. Historically, the clean energy sector—specifically policy related to clean energy—has been gender-blind, and to date, little attention has been devoted to studying and analyzing the gender aspects of renewable energy policies in developed countries—particularly in relation to job creation and sector employment. In order to meet the urgent need for improved sex-disaggregated data and research on women’s participation in clean energy sector of industrialized countries an analysis was undertaken to determine if in the Global North, a lack of gender considerations in energy policy negatively affects women’s involvement in the clean energy sector—from STEM education to labor force participation. To better understand the landscape of women’s participation in the clean energy sector, national-level data were collected, combined and analyzed in order to provide the most accurate representation of the gendered state of country’s energy sector labor force. The results of the data analysis were combined to create an Opportunities Index (Table 3.1), ranking countries to determine which was most ‘ripe’ or primed to increase women’s participation in the clean energy sector. Using standard deviations, countries with a green average rank are those that are generally strongest across all indicators6 and have the most primed enabling factors for increasing women’s participation in the clean energy workforce (average rank below 6.44). Countries with a yellow average rank fall in the medium category (within one standard deviation of the mean), and countries in the pink tier are considered to have the lowest or fewest opportunities for increasing women’s participation (average rank above 12.04). Spain, Canada and the U.S. (in blue) are the three countries with gender-sensitive energy policy.

6

Indicators are: Women graduating with tertiary STEM degrees; Women’s participation in the industry labor force; Gender-sensitive energy policies; Gender pay gaps; and Clean energy production.

Putting Women in Power

Table 3.1. Opportunities Index ranking Country

Average rank

Denmark

3.8

Italy Spain

4.6

Belgium

7.4

Czech Republic

7.4

Germany

7.6

Greece

7.8

Slovenia

8.4

Ireland

8.6

France

8.8

Sweden

9

Estonia

9

Luxembourg

9.4

Austria

9.4

Finland

9.8

United Kingdom

10.4

Norway

12

Switzerland United States

13.2

Netherlands Canada

13.8

6.4

13.5 13.8

Key Strongest performance across all indicators on average Moderate performance across all indicators on average Low performance across all indicators on average Countries with gender-sensitive national energy policy

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Analysis of gender-sensitive energy policies While some countries did include gender keywords from the quantitative analysis in their policies, laws, acts, articles and mandates, only Spain, Canada and the U.S. included gender and/or women in their national energy policies. Czech Republic, Ireland and the Netherlands did include minor gender-sensitive language in policies outside of national energy policy; however in the context of the documents and reflection these inclusions, the implications of the language and use are not consequential enough for further qualitative analysis.

Canada A Shared Vision for Energy in Canada is Canada’s most recent (2007) energy policy and is built on its energy plans developed by individual provinces and territories. It sets out a seven-point action plan that aims to strike… “a balance between a secure energy supply, environmental and social responsibility, and continued economic growth and prosperity.” (The Council of the Federation 2007)

The document makes one reference to women's inclusion and participation in energy sector, specifically stating that the country should: “strive to continually improve access and training for Canadians, notably for those traditionally under-represented in the work force, such as Aboriginal peoples, youth, women, persons with disabilities, visible minorities, and older workers.”

Canada also included five gender-specific keywords in the Foundation for Sustainable Development Technology Act, with men and women being referenced in regards to having representative boards and contributing to member representation.

Spain Spain’s National Renewable Energy Action Plan 2011-2020 purposes to address the Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of renewable energy, with a 10% target for energy from renewable sources to be achieved by Member States in energy consumption in the transportation sector by 2020. It references gender once, as it states:

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“a ‘gender-balanced’ team champions energy conservation in an office” .

U.S. The U.S. Strategic Energy Plan was developed to include a full range of energy options to support the country’s transition to a secure clean energy system, aligned with national policies, and encouraging innovation, job creation, economic growth, while also contributing to increased manufacturing and exports. The document includes two specific references to women and gender—one in regards to women's inclusion in energy sector and the other in the context of Women in Clean Energy programs. The U.S. also included gender-sensitive keywords in the following documents: Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (revised 2014); Energy Policy Act of 1992; Energy Policy Act 2005; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007; Clean Air Act; and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.

Correlations To enhance the Opportunities Index, data was analyzed to see what trends and relationships existed within and between indicators. As STEM degrees are often a prerequisite for the energy sector workforce, a gendered analysis of Global North countries was conducted. Results showed that women earn 58% of college degrees, more than men in almost every country (Fig. 3.4), yet less than 4% of women’s degrees were in STEM fields, compared to 19% for men (Fig. 3.5). To better understand the relationship between women graduating with STEM degrees and countries that value (produce) clean energy, the two indicators were graphically correlated (Fig. 3.6). The representation shows that while there is not a direct correlation, countries that performed well in the Opportunities Ranking were seen to be producing a greater percentage of clean energy and have a higher percentage of women graduating with STEM degrees.

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Fig. 3.4. Tertiary degrees awarded by gender; Source: 2UJDQLVDWLRQIRU(FRQRPLF&R RSHUDWLRQDQG'HYHORSPHQWOECD data

Putting Women in Power

Fig. 3.5. STEM degrees awarded by gender; Source: OECD data

45

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Fig. 3.6. Renewable energy production in comparison to female STEM graduates; Source: Opportunities Index

Finally, to assess whether there was any relationship between countries with gender-sensitive energy policies and countries that value (produce) renewable energy, the two related indicators were compared (Fig. 3.7).

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Fig. 3.7. Renewable energy production in comparison with gender-sensitive energy policy

In the clean energy sector, an array of projects in both industrialized and developing ranging from energy for cooking, heating and lighting to infrastructure construction, to energy policy and planning, are establishing how operationalizing gender approaches can improve performance and increase benefits for women, as well as men, particularly in regards to employment opportunities. For example, the U.S. C3E Program that fosters connections among women working in renewables and facilitates a global network for women advancing clean energy. Yet, while there is increasing documentation of the importance of gender equality for clean energy in developing countries, there is limited evidence and sectorspecific statistics of women’s participation in the clean energy sector of the Global North. In most industrialized countries, women hold a minority of jobs in the energy industry in general. The share of female employees is estimated to be about 20-25%, with most being in administrative and public relations positions (Baruah 2016).

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Analysis of findings The expected results for this trend analysis in comparison with the actual findings paint strikingly different pictures. It was hypothesized that there would be a strong correlation between countries that have gender-sensitive energy policies and countries that have a higher percentage of women being awarded STEM degrees, more women participating in the industrial labor force, and lower gender wage gaps, however that was not necessarily the case. Of the three countries with gender inclusion in their national energy policies, Spain ranked the highest, in third place, with the U.S. and Canada trailing far behind, in 19th and 21st (out of 21) place respectively. The leader, in terms of having the strongest and most enabling factors for increasing women’s participation in the clean energy work force was Denmark, followed by Italy and Spain. Among the countries ranked, Denmark has the highest percentages of women graduating with STEM degrees (35%), one of the smallest gender pay gaps (7%), and an extremely high percentage of electricity produced from renewable sources (nearly 50%).7 It is interesting to note that Denmark has a relatively low percentage of women participating in the industry labor force (9%). Italy came in second place, with a high percentage of women graduating with STEM degrees (34%) and women participating in the industry labor force (14%). Spain ranked third, and was the only country in the Opportunities Index that received a high score and also had gender-sensitive energy policy. With a quarter of STEM degrees being awarded to women, a small gender wage gap (9%) and 26% of energy coming from renewable sources, Spain is poised to increase women’s participation in the clean energy workforce. Interestingly, the report Study on Employment Associated to the Promotion of Renewable Energies in Spain in 2010 finds that women represent approximately 26% of the renewable energy labor force in Spain, with 64% of women working in administrative jobs or sales, while areas directly involved in industrial production show smaller percentages of women. The U.S. presents a noteworthy study, as it demonstrated some of the strongest gender-sensitivity in policy—referencing women and girls in relation to education and technology access—something almost every 7

The country of Iceland presented the highest percentage of electricity produced from renewable sources (89%), however due to a lack of data on women STEM graduates, the country was excluded from the Opportunities Index. It is likely that the country would have fallen in the middle of the ranking, as it exhibited a low percentage of women in the industry labor force, as well as a relatively average gender wage gap and no gender-sensitive energy policy.

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Forest management For improved forest management projects, the additionality criterion means the forest protocol represents an extra layer of proscriptions, over and above what is required by state regulations and sustainability certification standards, and beyond the ‘common practice’. This paper will focus on the forest management requirements in the 2015 Compliance Offset Protocol: U.S. Forest Projects, although it should be noted that early forestry offset projects were registered using the previous (2014) protocol. Eligibility requirements for forest offset projects are as follows: 1. Projects must be located within the contiguous 48 states, or specific parts of Alaska; 2. The Offset Project Operator must demonstrate that the forest is sustainably managed; and 3. Projects must be managed under a “natural forest management” regime. The latter two requirements are designed to ensure that projects will be managed so that carbon stocks will be maintained over the course of the

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project. Forests are considered sustainably managed if they are third party certified under the Sustainable Forestry Initiative, the Forest Stewardship Council, or the American Tree Farm System. Alternatively, lands can be managed under a federal- or state-sanctioned sustainable management plan, or with uneven-aged silvicultural practices with canopy retention averaging at least 40% across all the forestland owned by the Offset Project Operator (whether part of the project area or not).

Natural forest management The “natural forest management” requirement includes the following provisions: x A project’s standing live tree carbon stocks must consist of at least 95% native species. x If even-aged management is practiced on a watershed scale up to 10,000 acres (or the project area, whichever is smaller), projects must maintain no more than 40% of their forested acres in ages less than 20 years, and certain harvest size and buffer area requirements must be met. x Generally, projects must maintain one metric ton of carbon per acre or 1% of standing live tree carbon stocks, whichever is higher, in standing dead tree carbon stocks to diversify the forest structure and provide wildlife habitat. x Projects must maintain the standing live tree carbon stocks within the project area over any 10 consecutive year period during the project life, except as follows: o Any decrease is demonstrably necessary to substantially improve the project area’s resistance to wildfire, insect, and/or disease risks; o The decrease is associated with a planned balancing of age classes; o The decrease is due to an unintentional reversal; or o The decrease in standing live tree carbon stocks occurs after the final crediting period (during the required 100-year monitoring period) and the residual live carbon stocks are maintained at a level that assures all credited standing live tree carbon stocks are permanently maintained. Forest offset projects must not:

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x experience a decrease in standing live tree carbon stocks that results in the standing live tree carbon stocks falling below the forest project’s baseline standing live tree carbon stocks (derived from the mtCO2e/acre for the project’s assessment area) or 20% less than the forest project’s standing live tree carbon stocks at the project’s initiation, whichever is higher; nor employ broadcast fertilization.

Part II. Survey results of Maine land SFI participants Large landowners (with over 10,000 acres) in Maine include families, forest products companies, logging contractors, nonprofit conservation organizations, tribes, real estate investment trusts (REITs), timber investment management organizations (TIMOs), and the public (state and federal government). In general, it should be noted that many of Maine’s large landowners do not manage their own land, but hire forest management companies for this purpose. Consequently, the decisionmaking body that sets overall financial and management goals differs from the one that makes and executes day-to-day forest management decisions. Table 4.3. Sustainably managed acreage in Maine Acres in Maine certified as sustainably managed by third parties as of August 18, 2016 Certification program SFI and FSC dual certification SFI only FSC only American Tree Farm System Total

Acres 3,378,242 2,874,277 1,680,701 375,000 8,308,220

Source: Ken Laustsen, Maine Forest Service, personal communication; November 7, 2016

There are 8.3 million acres in Maine certified as sustainably managed (Table 4.3). Seventy-five percent (6.3 million acres) are SFI-certified. In the summer of 2016, Keeping Maine’s Forests emailed the nine companies that manage these lands a survey regarding their past and future assessments of carbon credit programs. The questions were open-ended so

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that the survey didn’t predispose the respondents toward specific answers. The questions were as follows (Table 4.4): Table 4.4. Survey questions Survey of SFI participants 1. Have you ever considered entering into any carbon credit program? a. Why, or why not? What were your reasons for investigating carbon credit programs (or not)? 2. Have you pursued entering into any carbon credit program? a. If yes, what activities did you engage in to explore carbon credit programs (e.g., looked into hiring an expert to evaluate the viability of credits for my land; conducted an analysis of the costs and benefits; reviewed the forestry protocol, etc.)? b. If no, why not? 3. Are you currently engaged in a carbon credit project? a. If so, when was/will your project be listed? On which registry? b. For those who looked into carbon credit programs but decided against pursuing a project, what made you decide not to pursue carbon credits for your land? Please be as specific as you can be.

Seven of the nine surveys were returned. All the respondents had considered a carbon credit project on their lands; some had been looking into the feasibility of a project as long ago as 2008. Most companies had been approached by, or worked with, one or more firms that develop carbon projects. Several land management companies said that they had considered carbon projects several times, or on an ongoing basis. Uniformly, land managers said they considered carbon projects for the potential revenue. Two also responded that they wanted to understand their options with regard to the carbon credit programs. Land managers are clearly diligent in investigating carbon credit programs. They reported having done analyses of the fiscal impacts of entering into a carbon credit program, they looked at more than one potential carbon project area, and they consulted with various experts. Some also said that they periodically review the carbon credit program rules and forestry protocol.

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Respondents’ reasons for not enrolling land None of the seven survey respondents had enrolled SFI-certified land into a carbon credit program. Their responses as to why varied in content and detail. Following is a synopsis of all the reasons cited; many of these reasons are closely associated with one another.

Length of commitment The time commitment of maintaining and operating a forest offset project for 100 years (or longer, if credits were obtained for growth after the initiation of the project) was a universal concern. Often the length of the commitment was mentioned in conjunction with other concernsícost, risk, or impact on forest management–as an exacerbating factor.

Risk and uncertainty Risk and uncertainty were prominent factors that kept land managers from enrolling land in carbon credit programs. The impact of spruce budworm infestations is one specific concern. Spruce budworm has a natural cycle of 30-40 years, with the potential to affect Maine’s forests two or three times over the course of a 100-year carbon project. The next infestation has begun in Quebec and New Brunswick, with early signs of the insect occurring in northern Maine. During the last outbreak in Maine, 20-25 million cords of spruce and fir were killed by the caterpillars, although there is no way to accurately predict the severity of the impending outbreak. Land managers are, in some cases, using presalvage harvests to remove healthy mature spruce and fir whose needles are the food that the insect feeds on. The hope is that presalvage cuts will reduce the severity of the infestation and that landowners can earn revenue from the trees before they are killed through successive years of defoliation. How such harvests will be treated under a carbon agreement is unclear. At least one land manager has asked the Air Resources Board to clarify whether presalvage harvests would be considered LQWHQWLRQDO RU XQLQWHQWLRQDO UHYHUVDOV :KLOH WKH IRUHVW SURWRFRO DOORZV IRU SODQQHG UHYHUVDOVWREDODQFHDJHFODVVHVRUZKHUH

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Chapter Four “the decrease is demonstrably necessary to substantially improve the project area’s resistance to wildfire, insect, and/or disease risks”,11

Fig. 4.3. Defoliated spruce and fir from Maine (top) and Canada (bottom) during the 1970s-1980s spruce budworm outbreak

There has not been a clear answer from the ARB as to how they would view presalvage harvests. As IFM projects in general are still a relatively new type of offset credit, this may be because the ARB does not, yet, have an agreed-upon mechanism for determining when a presalvage harvest has been demonstrated to be necessary. In any case, with the prospect of having to either pay back credits for a reversal due to presalvage harvests or allow a substantial volume of spruce and fir to die on the stump and then having to harvest other species to meet wood supply agreements

11

See 3.1(b)(1)(A), pages 21-22 of Compliance Offset Protocol: U.S. Forest Projects; California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board; Adopted June 25, 2015.

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(which would also risk credit repayments for intentional reversals), the decision was not to enter into a carbon credit program at all. Other perceived risks mentioned by survey respondents included: uncertainty about the accuracy of the required modeling (especially when accounting for Maine tree species’ shorter life cycle and the mortality caused by spruce budworm); the adequacy of the buffer pool to cover losses due to windthrow and spruce budworm; and how the long-term encumbrances might be perceived and valued by timberland lenders and buyers. Two survey respondents were concerned that future FIA updates would reduce the additionality on the lands they manage. One cited easements on others’ lands that disallow harvesting as a factor that they had no control over, but which would diminish additionality on the lands they manage over time.

Forest protocol restrictions Some provisions of the ARB forest protocol are a concern for Maine’s SFI participantsíprimarily, the regulation of even-age management that restricts clearcutting and shelterwood harvests. In Maine, where the life spans of some common tree species are significantly shorter than in California and spruce budworm infestations must be managed, even-age management is an important management tool for stimulating tree growth. Even-age management also provides early successional wildlife habitat which can help landowners meet sustainability certification standards.

Value of credits versus costs of the program over 100 years The survey respondents were concerned with the costs of entering into a carbon agreement and maintaining a carbon project. Project development costs (inventory, modeling and project documentation, verification, and offset transactions) vary widely, but are approximately $150,000 for the smallest offset projects. In addition, landowners must set aside at least $200,000 to cover long term project maintenance and operations costs over 100 years or more for ongoing modeling, inventories and verifications. If a consultant is needed to conduct a feasibility study, that is a significant, additional cost. Two other reasons were given by one forest land manager as to why they did not enter into carbon credit programs. First, a substantial portion of the lands they manage are covered by a working forest conservation easement that was purchased using Land for Maine’s Future (LMF) bond funds. The easement includes language that has been interpreted as

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prohibiting lands protected through the LMF program from participating in carbon credit programs. In fact, the current template for working forest easements purchased with LMF bond funds expressly extinguishes the right to use land to mitigate for development elsewhere, “as might otherwise occur in cluster zoning laws, transfer of development rights schemes, and carbon sequestration and carbon dioxide credit programs.”12

Second, the manager noted that subdivision of land under a carbon agreement is difficult and complicated. Land managers summed it up by saying that carbon credits were simply not valued highly enough to make carbon programs worthwhile. As one person put it, “where there are good markets for wood, it pays more to grow and harvest that wood.” While higher credit prices will not address all the concerns raised by the survey respondents, they would address cost and, to some extent, risk concerns. One land manager thought that a price of $20 per carbon credit (roughly double the current price) would be enough to have them enroll land in a program.

Current carbon credit projects in Maine Despite these barriers to participation in carbon markets, as of December 2016, there have been six projects that have obtained carbon credits in Maine (Table 4.5). Clearly, some landowners are finding benefits to entering into carbon agreements.

12

Maine Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry; Drafting Guidelines for Working Forest Easements Funded by the Land for Maine’s Future Program, adopted by the Land for Maine’s Future Board June 25, 2002; page 610. The exact language of the LMF-funded working forest easement template has changed over time; earlier language did not mention carbon credit programs specifically, but has been interpreted to disallow entry into the regulatory market while allowing entry into the voluntary market.

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Table 4.5. Carbon credit projects in Maine as of December 2016, by acreage

Project name

Ownership type (OPO)

# Acres

# Offset credits

Carbon market

Initial credits/ acre

Passamaquoddy Tribe 98,532 3,218,469 CA ARB 33 Tribe Lyme Grand TIMO (GLS 19,552 599,217 CA ARB 31 Lake Stream Woodlands, LLC) Farm Cove NGO (Downeast Community 19,118 284,043* CA ARB 13 Lakes Land Trust) Forest Project Katahdin Iron NGO Works voluntary (Appalachian 9,037 123,344 14 Ecological market Mountain Club) Reserve Alder Stream NGO (Northeast 1,530 36,596** CA ARB 20 Preserve Wilderness Trust) Howland NGO (Northeast 552 54,017*** CA ARB 79 Research Forest Wilderness Trust) Source: California Air Resources Board: https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/issuance/arb_offset_credit%20issua nce_table.pdf and embedded links to project documentation; and the Climate Action Reserve: https://thereserve2.apx.com/myModule/rpt/myrpt.asp#top, accessed January 11, 2017. * Includes 242,131 credits for carbon stocks at project initiation and 41,912 credits for growth. ** Includes 31,290 credits for carbon stocks at project initiation and 5,306 credits for growth. *** Includes 43,687 credits for carbon stocks at project initiation and 5,165 credits for growth.

Most of Maine’s carbon projects have been initiated by NGOs.13 Since 75-90% of the income from carbon credit programs comes from the up13

To date, the lands in Maine that have been enrolled in carbon credit projects have been FSC-certified rather than SFI-certified; this is based on only a few projects and appears to be largely a result of a tendency for Maine NGOs to have preferred FSC certification. There is no limitation of the SFI certification program with regard to the potential for enrollment of SFI certified lands in carbon offset projects.

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front payment for existing carbon stocks, the landowners who will benefit most are those with older growth and less need for timber revenues going forward. The Katahdin Iron Works Ecological Reserve, Alder Stream and Howland Research Forest projects are all operated by entities that prohibit all harvesting on these lands. The other projects are operated by entities that do allow harvesting, but presumably are confident they will not risk significant reversals due to harvesting or natural events. The Lyme Grand Lake Stream project is the only one initiated by a TIMO. With this project, Lyme Timber Company entered into a carbon agreement with the understanding that part of the proceeds would go toward lowering the price of the land for their buyer, Downeast Lakes Land Trust. The trust was able to obtain the forest land at a reduced price, and assumed the operation and maintenance costs of the project. These costs may be somewhat reduced since their Farm Cove Community Forest project is adjacent to the Grand Lake Stream project, and the trust can, perhaps, take advantage of some efficiencies. There is a wide range of credits earned per acre. Northeastern projects typically earn 10-25 credits per acre at initial issuance. The Passamaquoddy and Howland projects demonstrate that the value of carbon projects increases the longer the forest has been conservatively managed. The Howland Research Forest is dominated by spruce and hemlock stands that average 140 years old, but that’s a rare occurrence in Maine where the forests have been managed for 250 years.

Landownership type and culture The predominance of NGOs in the group of carbon project operators in Maine points to another factor which influences whether and when landowners enter into the carbon market: the legal structure of the landowner and their organizational mission. Each institution has its own legal structure, history and culture that influence its values and tolerance for risk and regulatory oversight. There are some institutional landowners that have made a commitment to offsetting climate change consistent with their organizational mission (e.g., the Appalachian Mountain Club); others have a fiduciary responsibility to provide an income stream to shareholders (e.g., family landowners). These are all important decisionmaking characteristics that come into play when making a 100-year commitment. The length of time for which a landowner plans to hold the land is a factor. TIMOs, REITs and Industrial landowners who are not structurally committed to long-term ownership must factor into their decision-making

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process that a carbon project may affect the sale price of a piece of land. On the other hand, it can also enable the seller to benefit from the initial credit sale, while leaving the long-term project costs to the new landowner (as with the Lyme Grand Lake Stream project). Different owner types have different needs in terms of revenue streams. Some owners, such as NGOs, may not require much or any revenue from timber. Others may depend on a steady income from timber revenues and may see the California forestry protocol as potentially conflicting with their needs. Likewise, family ownerships rely on a steady stream of timber revenues over the long term. Carbon credits may pay off up front, but the long-term costs may mean that the carbon revenues need to be held in escrow for project operation and maintenance costs rather than used for shareholder income, making the project less attractive as a source of revenue.

Incentives for landowners to enter carbon credit programs In sum, there is a robust, if short-term, market for carbon credits through 2020 that Maine forest landowners can take advantage of. There are important considerations for each landowner entering into the carbon credit market, and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to deciding whether the costs and risks are worth the tangible and intangible benefits. Despite the deterrents discussed above, there are important incentives for all landowners which include: x Payments for conservative harvests, or no harvesting; x Revenue from otherwise unmerchantable wood; and x The opportunity to diversify revenue streams–from harvesting and from carbon. In addition, some landowners may be able to: x Capitalize on the expertise, staff and software needed for sustainability certification in order to manage a carbon project over the long-term; and x Monetize carbon value that exists as a consequence of conservation or preservation practices that are part of the organization’s mission or practice, but that would otherwise be unrealized.

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Part III. Strengths, limitations, opportunities and constraints of carbon credit programs for SFI participants The California ARB cap and trade regulations and Improved Forest Management protocol represent both potential opportunities and constraints for forest landowners in Maine who are managing their lands in accordance with forest sustainability certification criteria. There are also strengths and weaknesses in the forest landowners’ decision-making processes, along with a culture and history that make them more or less likely to consider entering into carbon credit programs.

Landowner strengths Since participation in one of the three sustainability certification programs (through the Sustainable Forestry Initiative, Forest Stewardship Council, or the American Tree Farm programs) is the primary means of satisfying the forest sustainability criterion for eligibility to participate in carbon credit programs, being an SFI participant is an asset for those seeking credits. All the carbon credit programs recognize that sustainable harvests are a prerequisite for maintaining carbon levels in managed forests. Participation in SFI and other sustainability certification programs have other benefits, however, that are not as obvious. Certification programs have their own programmatic and practical requirements that confer advantages to participants seeking carbon credits. Sustainability certification requires the same centralized organizational, decisionmaking, record-keeping, and program monitoring structures that are necessary to develop and maintain a carbon credit program. In addition, both certification and carbon offset programs require: x Sufficient ownership and tree cover to make forest and/or carbon management fiscally feasible; x Compliance with applicable laws and regulations; x Natural forest management practices; x Sustainable harvesting levels; x Forest monitoring activities; x Forest inventory data collection; x Growth and yield projections; and x Independent third party verification. These requirements, in turn, necessitate having highly qualified staff who can utilize sophisticated software and sampling and inventory

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methodologies (or the capacity to manage relationships with consultants that provide these capabilities). The costs and rigor of carbon credit projects mean that landowners who are participants in sustainability programs have a substantial advantage in developing and/or maintaining a carbon project over non-certified landowners. Relative to their certified peers, non-certified landowners that participate in carbon offset projects will likely be more reliant on hiring new staff, training their own staff, and/or contracting with consultants over the 100 years of the carbon project, incurring additional project operations and maintenance costs. Certification also necessitates that the landowner be willing to accept and manage long-term agreements. Forestry in general, but managing for sustainability and for carbon credits particularly, require long-term planning in accordance with performance standards. The forestry expertise, record keeping, staffing and practices that certified landowners have in-house enable them to conduct and implement these long-term plans, but also enable them to take on the operations and management of a carbon credit project with less additional effort, time, and expense.

Landowner limitations There are some characteristics of forest landowner organizations that may make them less likely to participate in carbon credit programs. Landowners who manage their lands extensively and intensively, whose annual harvest levels equal or exceed net annual growth, or who maintain their forests with stocking levels that are comparable to the regional average, are less likely to have sufficiently large areas with stocking levels that exceed common practice to be good candidates for a carbon credit project. The forestland is less likely to earn enough credits to cover the costs of project development, operations and maintenance, and reversal risk. Ownerships with many shareholders (particularly family holdings) may resist carbon credit programs due to their relatively complex decision making structure, and because they may prefer to distribute income immediately rather than set aside a portion of the proceeds from carbon credits to cover long-term project operations and maintenance costs. Owners who are institutionally or culturally averse to risk, regulation, or long-term agreements are also likely to find carbon credit programs unpalatable.

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Programmatic constraints Maine’s SFI participants who responded to the survey for this paper mentioned several aspects of the ARB program that had prevented them from applying for carbon credits. The biggest challenges for them were the costs and risks of a carbon project over 100 years, weighed against the current markets for wood and relative ease of subdividing and selling land. Maine landowners and managers are particularly concerned about the lack of clarity regarding how reversals from presalvage harvests will be handled by the ARB. Spruce budworm infestations can be expected to occur two or three times over the minimum 100-year life of a carbon project, and if credits must be repaid for reversals from presalvage harvests, depending on the magnitude and intensity of the outbreak, it could pose a considerable risk to the viability of a project. The limitations on clearcutting and shelterwood harvests are a lesser deterrence for landowners, but a deterrence nonetheless. In general, the “natural forest management” proscriptions on even-age management in the Forest Protocol are misaligned with management practices of most large commercial ownerships in Maine. Even-age management is a common tool in the state, and Maine forestry regulations already restrict clearcutting. At the same time, millions of acres in Maine are managed to sustainability standards. It is not clear that the Forestry Protocol adds anything of value to the offset carbon credit market beyond the state regulations and sustainability certification rules, and for landowners, it only represents another layer of regulation, requiring additional training, monitoring and reporting. For certified landowners whose lands are encumbered by working forest conservation easements funded by Land for Maine’s Future bonds, obtaining carbon credits for use in a compliance program such as the California ARB cap-and-trade program is likely prohibited. The precise easement language has changed over time and it is not clear whether every iteration applies to carbon credit programs, but language in the current easement template specifically prohibits the landowners from obtaining carbon credits to offset ‘development’ elsewhere. Regardless of the language, the effect is the same: some landowners may have not pursued carbon credits due to the actual or perceived legal obstacle.

Programmatic opportunities Some uncertainties in the regulatory language and the carbon credit market argue for entering into carbon agreements sooner rather than later.

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Because the ARB program is currently set to expire in 2020, there is a narrow window within which to obtain credits under the current regime. It is not clear whether or when new regulations will be written to support California’s stated commitment to reduce GHGs until the year 2030. The current program may represent the proverbial bird in the hand (although the voluntary market will remain as an opportunity for landowners). As the benchmark for additionality is updated through the Forest Inventory Analysis, the ‘common practice’ average mtCO2e/acre may increase. This possibility would make it harder to demonstrate additionality over time and creates an incentive to enter the market before the next update. Landowners’ cost-benefit analyses may shift in favor of carbon credits with the currently depressed prices for wood, demonstrating the value of having an additional source of forest revenue from carbon. Credit prices could also increase in the near future. Finally, costs could be somewhat reduced by conducting certification and carbon audits simultaneously.

Considerations for landowners contemplating carbon credits x Carbon credit programs reward past conservative forest management by monetizing existing carbon stock levels that are above the average for the surrounding ecoregion. Carbon credits should not be considered a substitute for harvest income, but rather a diversification of income from forest resources. Land managers who currently manage their forests in alignment with SFI, FSC or ATFS certification standards and are generally conservative in their forest management approach should not expect to significantly change their management practices in order to have a viable carbon credit project. x Areas that a landowner voluntarily manages under reduced or light harvest protocols including riparian zones, aesthetic buffers, and hardto-access stands can make significant contributions to an ownership’s overall carbon project performance. Overall, the challenge to creating an economically viable project is identifying project areas where maintaining high carbon stocking does not conflict with, but rather complements, the landowner’s current and planned management approach. x All economically viable projects must have sufficient carbon across the project area to cover the costs of project design, operation and maintenance. Economic viability is a function of: o Acreage, site productivity, and growing season; o Management objectives;

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x

x x x

x

x x

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o Project onsite carbon density per acre in relation to the applicable ARB common practice; o Project development and ongoing operations and maintenance costs; o Credit prices; and o Fiber markets. For projects that get credits for both existing carbon stocks and growth, generally project revenue is front-loaded with 75-90% of project revenue credited for the existing stocks over common practice at project initiation. Growth-only projects are generally not financially viable. Forest landowners who are actively maintaining higher stocking levels and intend to do so over the long term are more likely candidates for carbon credit programs. While Maine currently has one carbon project area as small as 552 acres, most landowners will find that the high costs of a carbon project can only be offset by credits on an ownership of thousands of acres. SFI participants and lands certified under other sustainability certification programs meet a key eligibility threshold for carbon credit programs, but more importantly, have the resources and expertise to manage a carbon project and can realize some cost savings by performing monitoring, inventories, and annual reporting in-house. Organizations with many shareholders may find it more difficult to commit to a 100-year carbon project than those with one or a few decision-makers due to the reduced flexibility in forest management and limitations the shareholders may place on the use of the credit proceeds. Any organization that is culturally averse to regulation and long-term agreements will find it difficult to commit to encumbering land with a carbon agreement. Organizations that intend to hold their land over the long-term (e.g., conservation groups and family ownerships) must be assured the carbon credits will more than offset the associated costs over the entire 100-year life of the project. TIMOs and REITs that are likely to sell land in less than 100 years and can pass the annual revenues and long-term project operations and maintenance costs on to the new owners also need to consider the impacts of the carbon agreement on their exit strategy— including potentially constrained markets and discounted land sales prices. REIT-owned lands outside of Maine under carbon agreements have been sold, but it is not clear to what extent the carbon agreement

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affected the sale price. Furthermore, given the variability of the future price of carbon credits and individual project costs, it would be difficult to predict the future effect of carbon agreements on land prices. x Clearcuts and presalvage harvests are sometimes warranted, but risk financial penalties for reversals when harvest volumes exceed growth. x The Land for Maine’s Future Working Forest Conservation Easement language currently prohibits enrolling lands that are conserved using LMF funds in carbon credit programs. Unless the state of Maine changes the terms of the working forest easement template, landowners interested in both working forest easements and carbon credit programs will have to choose one over the other.

Opportunities to increase enrollment in carbon offset programs The ARB regulations are in effect until 2020 and allow regulated entities to obtain offset credits through November 1, 2021. While the California legislature has committed to a further reduction of statewide GHG emissions to 2030, the cap-and-trade and offset programs have not yet been renewed and the program’s continuation is still being debated. Quebec has linked their forestry offset program with California’s so that Canadian landowners can obtain credits in the California market, and Ontario is in the process of doing the same14. While the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI, covering the New England states, Delaware, Maryland and New York) has the regulations in place to accept forestry offsets projects and has adopted California’s forest offset protocols, so far, no one has sought carbon credits for forestry projects in the RGGI market, and so a price for forestry offset credits has not been set. There may be opportunities to influence the development of the ARB’s and Canadian provinces’ forestry offset credit programs to facilitate the enrollment of lands certified as sustainably managed. The following regulatory changes would be a step in that direction: x National forest management The natural forest management practices required in the Forest Protocol are, to some extent, redundant for Maine lands managed to 14

British Columbia and Manitoba are also in the process of developing carbon markets that will “harmonize” with California’s. However, these markets are not yet active.

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SFI sustainability standards. Certification programs already prescribe forest management practices that maintain some level of ecological co-benefits, although there is a debate as to the relative appropriateness of the ARB and SFI standards. ARB should give consideration to state regulations and certification requirements that meet the intent of the Forest Protocol requirements, and future revision to the ARB protocol should examine the extent to which the protocol’s requirements are appropriate for ecosystems outside California. x Presalvage harvests Presalvage harvesting is a critical tool for land managers who wish to minimize the fiscal impacts of infestations of insects and pathogens. This paper has discussed the risk of penalties posed by presalvage harvests of spruce budworm-infested stands, but there are other insects and diseases that landowners may manage through presalvage harvests. These types of harvests enable the landowner to realize the value of the wood before the trees die and potentially control the spread of the insect or pathogen. Only presalvage harvests that remove more volume than growth since the last annual report risk penalties for an intentional reversal, but landscape-scale infestations may warrant such harvests, and landowners should not be penalized for prudent management. The Forestry Protocol should provide a way to conduct some reasonable level of presalvage operations as a planned harvest and/or an unintentional reversal. x Auditing efficiencies While the processes for sustainability certification audits and carbon credit programs’ verification audits differ, their frequency is very similar. Conducting both audits simultaneously appears to be a simple way to reduce the time and associated costs of land managers’ staff’s assistance with the audits. x Working forest conservation easement language “Carbon sequestration and carbon dioxide credit programs” are specifically prohibited under the language of Maine’s current Land for Maine’s Future working forest easement template. It is not clear whether the purpose of this prohibition is due to a concern that landowners would be ‘double-dipping’ (receiving payments from both the LMF bond funds and the carbon market for the same environmental benefit), or because of a ‘leakage’ concern (where the benefits from encumbering land with an LMF easement are undone to one degree or another by enabling environmental

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degradation elsewhere). Both concerns are unfounded. The ARB has regulations for Avoided Conversion (i.e., conservation easement) offset projects which preclude double dipping by only allowing landowners to obtain credits for carbon stocks above the level resulting from simple compliance with the terms of the easement. There is no ‘leakage’ from ARB Improved Forest Management projects because these projects earn credits for sequestered carbon and are not used to mitigate or augment development elsewhere—the credits offset existing emissions; not additional emissions. Landowners with property under an LMF working forest conservation easement should not be precluded from earning credits for carbon sequestered on sustainably managed lands, as all ARB-approved projects are. Until the Working Forest Easement language under the Land for Maine’s Future Program is changed, lands covered by these easements will presumably be limited to the voluntary carbon credit market. x Credit prices For many landowners, the decision whether to enter the carbon credit market is strictly a matter of financial return and risk. Viable carbon projects are those where carbon represents a diversification of income from the forest rather than a substitution for harvest income. However, harvest income and carbon credits do compete with each other in terms of their relative risks and management demands. Obviously, the incentive for landowners to enroll land in carbon credit programs increases as carbon credit prices increase. Some Maine landowners have commented that, when wood markets are healthy, carbon credit prices would need to be in the $20-$30 per credit range to make the costs and risks of a carbon project worthwhile. As the carbon credit markets approach this price, many new forest offset projects may be registered.

Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank advisors: Mark Berry, M.S.; President and CEO, Schoodic Institute Ivan Fernandez, Professor in the School of Forest Resources, Climate  Change Institute and the School of Food and Agriculture at the 8QLYHUVLW\of Maine Sherry Huber, Maine TREE Foundation and KMF Steering Committee member George Jacobsen, Ph.D.; Climate Change Institute, Maine State

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Climatologist and Professor Emeritus at the University of Maine Dylan Jenkins, M.S.; Vice President of Portfolio Development, Finite Carbon Kenneth M. Laustsen, M.F.; Biometrician, Maine Forest Service John McNulty, President and CEO, Seven Islands Land Company David Publicover, D.F., Senior Staff Scientist/Assistant Director of Research, Appalachian Mountain Club Tom Rumpf, M.F.; former Conservation Strategy Advisor of The Nature Conservancy in Maine and KMF Steering Committee chair Patrick Sirois, Director of the Maine Sustainable Forestry Initiative

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Following-up Workshop chair: You graduated from Vassar College with a BA in Philosophy. How has that education influenced your environmental work? Ms. Truesdale: Philosophy is concerned with truth and ethics, so it’s the perfect discipline for questions of environmental policy. Philosophy taught me to question commonly held beliefs and how to put those beliefs into context. Environmental policy does the same thing on a societal level: it focuses on situations, ‘truths’ and creates laws, ‘context’ in order to change the situation for the common good. Whether policies and laws are effective and whether the means by which they create the common good are ethical are additional questions that philosophy can address. Philosophy requires clear writing skills, too. Workshop chair: How did you first come to work in sustainable forestry management? Ms. Truesdale: I started working in land use planning when I was hired by a consulting firm to draw land use maps for towns’ comprehensive plans (back in the dark ages, pre-GIS). As a philosophy major, working at the proverbial 3,000-foot level appealed to me. I was lucky in that the person who hired me made a point of mentoring people who worked for him, so soon I was also working on editing and laying out publications for state agencies. A few of those publications were about best management practices, including one for loggers. Later, I did research for two consecutive comprehensive plans for Maine’s Unorganized Territories or UT, where the dominant land use is forest management. I also worked on three concept plans for land in the UT, where landowners are granted the right to develop in appropriate areas in exchange for conservation easements on other areas. These experiences introduced me to the history of forest management in Maine, conservation issues, and current forestry and land use regulations. Because I had worked for the state and landowners, I was able to understand forestry issues from both the public and private sector perspective. Working as Coordinator for Keeping Maine’s Forests has validated for me the importance of having both perspectives. Sustainable forestry management is one way in which the private sector has responded to public concern over forest resources. My work at KMF requires an understanding of the efficacy, limitations, and unrealized potential of similar non-regulatory approaches to environmental stewardship.

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Workshop chair: How important is sustainable forest management in response to global climate change? Ms. Truesdale: According to the Pinchot Institute, the world’s forests are offsetting 10-15% of all carbon emissions annually. The largest sinks are the boreal forests of Russia and the temperate-zone forests of the U.S., Europe and China; tropical forests represent a slight source carbon emissions due to deforestation. In the U.S., forests are estimated to offset 10-20% of our carbon dioxide emissions. (Forest Carbon Conservation and Management: Integration with Sustainable Forest Management for Multiple Resource Values and Ecosystem Services; Sample et al., Pinchot Institute, 2015). Forests are, therefore, an indispensable resource for mitigating climate change. As Constance Best at the Pacific Forest Trust points out (Generating New Revenue for Conservation from Ecosystem Services: An Introduction to California’s Carbon Market; February 4, 2016), forests are the largest, most expandable carbon sink; they represent a low cost, longterm bank for excess atmospheric carbon. Best believes the climate crisis cannot be solved without increasing forest sequestration. Sustainable forest management is a minimal requisite for maintaining or increasing carbon sequestration, and is recognized as such in the California Resources Board’s Forestry Protocol—third party certification of sustainable forestry practices is a threshold criteria for applying for or receiving carbon credits. Maintaining existing stocks of carbon, however, is considered ‘sustainable’ forestry. While sustainable forest management is necessary to an effective response to climate change, it is not sufficient. To increase forest carbon sequestration, additional payments to landowners for this environmental service will be needed. Current carbon credit programs primarily reward the protection of old growth. Payments to allow established forests to grow older and for replanting need to be higher in order to make increased carbon storage economical for forest landowners.

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Appendix Table 1. Supersection statistics for Maine as of May 20, 2015

Supersection Assessment area Associated species Aroostook Hills and Lowlands Conifer Bog Aroostook Hills and Lowlands Lowland Hardwoods

Aroostook Hills and Lowlands

Aroostook Hills and Lowlands Northern Hardwoods Aroostook Hills and Lowlands Pine Forests Aroostook Hills and Lowlands Poplar/Birch Aroostook Hills and Lowlands Spruce-Fir

Central Maine & Fundy Coast & Ebayment

Central Maine & Fundy Coast & Ebayment Conifer Bog

Common practiceabove ground Site class carbon mean (mtCO2e/acre)

Black spruce, white All cedar, tamarack Balsam poplar, black ash, American elm, red maple, birch, sycamore, cherry, All white ash, yellow poplar, basswood, sugar maple Black cherry, white ash, yellow poplar, basswood, birch, red All maple, sugar maple, beech Eastern white pine, eastern hemlock, red All pine Aspen, gray birch, paper birch

All

Balsam fir, eastern hemlock, Norway All spruce, red spruce, white spruce Black ash, American elm, red maple, cottonwood, elm, ash, black locust, red maple, All sugarberry, hackberry, green ash, sweetbay, swamp tupelo, willow

51.9

35.9

56.0

179.7

54.4

49.3

45.3

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Table 1. Supersection statistics for Maine as of May 20, 2015

Supersection Assessment area Associated species

Central Maine & Fundy Coast & Ebayment Lowland Hardwoods

Central Maine & Fundy Coast & Ebayment Northern Hardwoods Central Maine & Fundy Coast & Ebayment Pine Forests Central Maine & Central Maine & Fundy Coast Fundy Coast & & Ebayment Ebayment Poplar/Birch Central Maine & Fundy Coast & Ebayment Spruce-Fir

Lower New EnglandNorthern Appalachia

Black ash, American elm, red maple, cottonwood, elm, ash, black locust, red maple, sugarberry, hackberry, green ash, sweetbay, swamp tupelo, willow Black cherry, white ash, yellow-poplar, red maple, sugar maple,beech, yellow birch Eastern white pine, eastern hemlock, northern red oak, white ash, pine, red maple, oak, red pine, white oak, red oak, hickory Aspen, birch, gray birch, paper birch, pin cherry

Common practiceabove ground Site class carbon mean (mtCO2e/acre)

All

53.2

High

75.7

Low

80.2

All

96.9

All

55.4

Balsam fir, eastern hemlock, larch, red All spruce, balsam fir, white spruce Black ash, American elm, red maple, river High birch, sycamore, Lower New sassafras, England-Northern persimmon, silver Appalachia Mixed maple, sugarberry, Hardwood hackberry, elm, green Low ash, sweetbay, swamp tupelo, pecan,

55.5

129.2

98.9

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Table 1. Supersection statistics for Maine as of May 20, 2015

Supersection Assessment area Associated species

Lower New England-Northern Appalachia Northern Conifer

Lower New England-Northern Appalachia Northern Hardwood

Lower New EnglandNorthern Appalachia

Lower New England-Northern Appalachia Oak-Hickory

willow, yellow poplar, white oak, northern red oak Eastern hemlock, eastern red cedar, eastern white pine, eastern hemlock, northern red oak, white ash, Norway spruce, red pine, red spruce, tamarack, white spruce Aspen, birch, black cherry, white ash, yellow poplar, cottonwood, elm, ash, black locust, hard maple, basswood, maple, beech, birch, paper birch, red maple, sugar maple, beech, yellow birch Black locust, black walnut, chestnut oak, black oak, scarlet oak, northern red oak, post oak, blackjack oak, red maple, oak, southern scrub oak, white oak, hickory

Common practiceabove ground Site class carbon mean (mtCO2e/acre)

High

120.4

Low

101.1

High

113.6

Low

102.9

High

144.9

Low

128.0

Lower New England-Northern Appalachia Eastern red cedar, All Shortleafoak, pine, pitch pine Loblolly-Oak

69.5

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Table 1. Supersection statistics for Maine as of May 20, 2015

Supersection Assessment area Associated species Maine-New Brunswick White cedar, Foothills and tamarack Lowlands Conifer Bog Balsam poplar, Maine-New black ash, American Brunswick elm, red maple, Foothills and silver maple, Lowlands sweetbay, swamp Lowland tupelo, sycamore, Hardwoods pecan Maine-New Brunswick Willow, black Foothills and cherry, white ash, Lowlands yellow poplar, Northern basswood, beech Maine-New Hardwoods Brunswick Maine-New White pine, eastern Foothills and Brunswick hemlock, red oak, Lowlands Foothills and white ash, jack pine, Lowlands Pine red oak, pitch oak. Forests Hickory Maine-New Brunswick aspen, gray birch, Foothills and paper birch Lowlands Poplar/Birch Maine-New Brunswick Foothills and Balsam fir, eastern Lowlands Sprucehemlock, larch, Fir Norway spruce, red spruce, white spruce

Common practiceabove ground Site class carbon mean (mtCO2e/acre)

All

58.5

All

44.6

All

59.2

All

73.6

All

50.1

All

55.0

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Table 1. Supersection statistics for Maine as of May 20, 2015

Supersection Assessment area Associated species

White Mountains

Balsam poplar, black ash, American elm, red maple, chestnut oak, black oak, scarlet oak, White Mountains cottonwood, All Mixed Hardwoods northern red oak, river birch, sycamore, sweetbay, swamp tupelo, white oak, red oak, hickory, willow

White Mountains Northeast Spruce-Fir

White Mountains

Common practiceabove ground Site class carbon mean (mtCO2e/acre)

Aspen, birch, balsam fir, black spruce, eastern hemlock, gray birch, northern white cedar, paper birch, red spruce, balsam fir, tamarack, white spruce

High

Aspen, birch, balsam fir, black spruce, eastern White Mountains hemlock, gray birch, Northeast Spruce- northern white Low cedar, paper birch, Fir red spruce, balsam fir, tamarack, white spruce Black cherry, cherry, High white ash, yellow White Mountains poplar, hard maple, Northern basswood, maple, Hardwood beech, birch, red Low maple, sugar maple, yellow birch

48.7

53.3

49.3

70.4

74.7

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Table 1. Supersection statistics for Maine as of May 20, 2015

Supersection Assessment area Associated species

Common practiceabove ground Site class carbon mean (mtCO2e/acre)

Eastern white pine, White Mountains eastern hemlock, Northern Pine northern red oak, All Forest white ash, pine, red pine

93.6

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Fig. 1. Compliance offset protocol U.S. forests supersections–Northeast

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ners in Maine (22016) Fig. 2. General categories off large landown

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Table 2. California Air Resources Board Carbon Credit Issuance Table for Maine Projects as of December 28, 2016 Project Name

ARB Reporting Project ID # Period by Start Date Reporting Period

Reporting Vintage ARB Offset Period Year Credits End Date Issued/ Vintage Year

CAFR000204/27/2010 12/31/2011 A CAFR0002DLLT Farm Cove 01/01/2012 12/31/2012 B CAFR0002DLLT Farm Cove 01/01/2013 12/31/2013 C CAFR0105Alder Stream 12/15/2006 12/31/2006 A CAFR0105Alder Stream 1/1/2007 12/31/2007 B CAFR0105Alder Stream 1/1/2008 12/31/2008 C CAFR0105Alder Stream 1/1/2009 12/31/2009 D CAFR0105Alder Stream 1/1/2010 12/31/2010 E CAFR0105Alder Stream 1/1/2011 12/31/2011 F CAFR0105Alder Stream 1/1/2012 12/31/2012 G CAFR0105Alder Stream 1/1/2013 12/31/2013 H CAFR0106Howland Forest 10/8/2008 12/31/2008 A CAFR0106Howland Forest 1/1/2009 12/31/2009 B CAFR0106Howland Forest 1/1/2010 12/31/2010 C CAFR0106Howland Forest 1/1/2011 12/31/2011 D CAFR0106Howland Forest 1/1/2012 12/31/2012 E CAFR0106Howland Forest 1/1/2013 12/31/2013 F CAFR5195Passamaquoddy 5/28/2014 8/31/2015 A CAFR5317Lyme-GLS 9/30/2013 9/29/2015 A TOTALS Invalidation timeframe for all of the above: 8 years DLLT Farm Cove

ARB Date of Offset ARB Credits in Issuance Forest Buffer Account

Start of Invalidation Timeframe

2011

242,131

46,577

11/12/2013

11/12/2013

2012

40,888

7,867

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2013

1,024

197

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2006

31,290

6,008

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2007

758

146

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2008

758

146

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2009

758

146

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2010

758

146

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2011

758

146

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2012

758

146

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2013

758

146

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2008

43,687

8,388

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2009

1,033

199

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2010

1,033

199

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2011

1,033

199

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2012

1,033

199

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2013

1,033

199

8/31/2016

8/31/2016

2015

3,218,469

509,808

11/22/2016

8/31/2015

599,217

115,050

8/9/2016

9/29/2015

4,187,177

695,912

2015

SECTION II. THE SPECIAL CASE OF AFRICA

CHAPTER FIVE CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY NEXUS CHIZOBA CHINWEZE1

Abstract Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with approximately 800 million people, has approximately 70 percent (%) of its population living off the land. The total land area is 2,455 million hectares (mha), of which 173 mha are under cultivation. Arid and semi-arid agro-ecological zone encompass 43% of the land area. The rural communities in the region depend on subsistence agriculture for sustenance which is largely rain-fed; that also accounts for 35% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 45% of the foreign exchange earnings. It then follows that in the face of climate change and climate variability there will be production uncertainty associated with rainfall variability. The impacts will hamper crop and livestock development and heighten security issues/communal conflicts in the region. Food security will be more difficult to achieve. 1

Chizoba Chinweze is Director of Research/Development and Chief Consultant for Chemtek Associates, Lagos, Nigeria. Ms. Chinweze has 23 peer-reviewed scientific publications and is a contributing author to the United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP’s) Global Environment Outlook Volume 5 (GEO 5). She was a participant at UNEP’s Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) liaison meeting on climate-related geo-engineering in London in June 2011 which produced the CBD Technical Series 66, Geoengineering in Relation to the CBD: Technical and Regulatory Matters. Chizoba is a Member of the Environmental Regulatory Research Group of the University of Surrey, U.K and a Fellow of Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD) International, cohort 12. For additional biographical insights to the author’s work, see the ‘Following-up’ section at the conclusion of this chapter.

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This papper reviews thhe trends of ag gricultural devvelopment in SSA, the consequencees of climatte change on n agriculturall production and the livelihoods of the rural population, p fo ood security, rrural developm ment and challenges oof conflicts in the region. Itt also reveals tthe vulnerabillity of the rural poor too changes in raainfall pattern ns and the wayy forward.

Introdu uction From a globbal perspectivve, three majo or recent devvelopments highlighted the importaance of agricuulture and fo ood policy: ( 1) the 17 Su ustainable Developmennt Goals (SDG Gs) for a univ versal Agendaa 2030 for Su ustainable Developmennt adopted in September 2015 2 at the Un United Nationss (UN) in New York; (2) the Pariss Agreement adopted as an outcome off the UN mate Change Conference (COP21), whiich aims to strengthen Global Clim the global rresponse to thhe threat of climate c changge and (3) Th he Rome Declaration on Nutritionn and the Fram mework for A Action adopteed by the utrition (ICN22) in 2014, wh hich calls Second International Connference on Nu mitments to eraadicate malnu utrition in for actions aand renewed global comm all its form ms. These will shape thee regional acctions for ag gricultural developmennt and food seccurity.

C Climate chaange facts in n Sub-Saharran Africa Sub-Saharaan Africa (S SSA), the stud dy area, com mprises all thee African countries thaat are fully or partly located d south of the Sahara (Fig. 5.1). 5 1

Fig. 5.1. Subb-Saharan AfrLFD (in darNHUVKDGLQJ

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In is important to know what climate change is, in order to understand its risks and consequences on the livelihoods in the SSA region. Climate change is defined as a large-scale, long-term shift in the planet's weather patterns or average temperatures.2 In the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) usage, climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.3 The IPCC has reported a warming of approximately 0.7° Celsius (C) over most of the African region during the twentieth century.4 This warming occurred at the rate of about 0.05°C per decade, with slightly more warming in the season from June to November than from December to May. A temperature rise of about 0.1°C per decade is expected for the next two decades, even if greenhouse gas (GHG) and aerosol concentrations are kept at year 2000 levels. IPCC has reported that extreme events, including floods and droughts, are becoming increasingly frequent and severe. Certain regions of Africa are more prone to such extreme events than others. It is probable that the increased frequency of recorded disasters is a result of a combination of climatic change and socio-economic and demographic changes. The key vulnerable sectors identified by IPCC (2007b) include agriculture, food and water.5 SSA is expected to suffer the most not only in terms of reduced agricultural productivity and increased water insecurity, but also in increased exposure to coastal flooding and extreme climatic events, and increased risks to human health. Climate change is considered as posing the greatest threat to agriculture and food security in the 21st century, particularly in many of the poor, agriculture-based countries of SSA with their low capacity to effectively cope.6 Africa’s vulnerability to climate change is exacerbated by a number of non-climatic factors, including endemic poverty, hunger, high prevalence of disease, chronic conflicts, low levels of development and low adaptive capacity.

Trends in agricultural development Agriculture is the most important sector in SSA, accounting for over 70 percent (%) of the labour force,7 35 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 45% of the foreign exchange earnings. The region with approximately 800 million people has about 70% of its population living

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off the land. The total land area is 2,455 million hectare (mha), of which 173mha are under cultivation (annual and perennial crops). Arid and semiarid agro-ecological zone encompass 43% of the land area.8 A large proportion of the population lives in rural areas, relying on subsistence agriculture. Smallholder farmers are the mainstay for food production amid poverty and deprivations, making little contribution to food security. Agriculture in SSA involves shifting cultivation, marked by low productivity which lagged considerably behind that of other continents, with little application of science and technology.9 The agricultural system is predominantly run by smallholder farmers, who account for 80% of all the farms.10 They ‘own’ and manage small parcels and patches of land which may be community land vested by the state. It is worth noting that in the SSA, there are still issues of land tenure and indigenous people’s rights and gender elimination. Access to and/or rights over land are predominantly based on ancestry, tradition, customs or culture and are not necessarily backed by domestic legislation. Often, enforceable statutes are lacking and/or the land is state owned with rights to access for indigenous people never properly defined.11 Rain-fed agriculture is the dominate source of food production in SSA, covering around 97% of total crop land and exposing agricultural production to high seasonal rainfall variability.12,13 The dependence of agriculture in SSA on rainfall is a major constraint for its productivity. Irrigation systems accounts for just 4% of the area in production, compared with 15% in Latin America, 39% in South Asia and 29% in East Asia.14 With rapid and uncertain changes in rainfall and temperature patterns due to climatic variability, agricultural production is threatened, leading to food price shocks and increasing the vulnerability of the smallholders to rural poverty.11 The dependence of poor farmers on rainfed agriculture makes SSA economies the most vulnerable in the world to climatic changes.15 Additionally, approximately 65% of the land area in Africa is in the drylands.16 Soil moisture stress constrains land productivity on 85% of soils in Africa. Insufficient nutrient replacement in agricultural systems on land with poor to moderate potential leads to soil degradation,17 resulting in limited productivity. In addition, land and water are sometimes the sources of conflicts within and between communities. Figure 5.2 shows the soil moisture content in SSA.

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Fig. 5.2. Soil moisture content in Sub-Saharan Africa

Although agriculture contributes immensely to the national economic growth of most countries in SSA, its development faces daunting challenges which climate risk will compound, thereby exacerbating poverty, hunger and under-nutrition. Agriculture in SSA is deeply dependent upon atmospheric and hydrological (i.e., water) cycles. Alterations in these cycles can threaten crops and reduce productivity further from what are already low levels. The IPCC has drawn attention to the severe effects that

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shifting rainfall patterns and extreme weather events will likely have on SSA.18 Drought, flooding, desertification, rising temperatures and sea levels and invasive species are projected to reduce yields in some SSA countries by as much as 50% by 2020, and net crop revenues could fall by as much as 90% by 2100. Climate-related risk has already affected the production of some staple crops. Higher temperatures have impacts on yields and changes in rainfall affect crop quality and quantity.19 Furthermore, agricultural mechanization is weak and declining, and the state of the agribusiness industry is still nascent.10

Food security and climate change Food security is defined as a: “situation…when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.20

Three components of food security in this definition are: availability, access and utilization, all of which are climate sensitive. Availability relates to crop productivity and food stocks. Access is characterized by the ability of an individual or household to obtain food, depending on food prices, market accessibility, employment and distribution of wealth. Utilization is the ability of humans to derive full biological benefits from food based on nutritional value, socio-cultural values and food safety. Food insecurity occurs when food systems are stressed such that food is neither available nor accessible, or utilization is constrained.21

Food crisis The most direct impact of climate change on food security is on availability as a result of yield reduction. Our study area SSA has one of the world’s fastest growing populations, but the growth rate of food production has not kept pace. This has led to a food deficit.22 At the end of 2015, several food crises were triggered by extreme climate events due to the El Niño phenomenon. The El Niño phenomenon is characterized by warmer-than-usual sea surface temperature in the Pacific. It occurs every three to seven years, and last for six (6) to twentyfour (24) months. The current El Niño started around late winter or early spring 2015, and lasted until at least March 2016. The El Niño

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phenomenon is associated with droughts, cyclones, heavy rains and floods which disturb agricultural and livestock production or destroy crops and other assets.23 Since an El Niño is usually at its strongest from November to March, southern hemisphere harvests are most likely to be affected as that is the main growing season in most countries south of the equator.24 The impact of the drought due to El Niño was forecast to continue throughout 2016, particularly in the Sahel, Ethiopian highlands and Southern Africa. A large part of southern Africa was hit by a severe drought at the beginning of the 2015-2016 crop season, which led to a state of emergency in several provinces of South Africa, in Zimbabwe and Lesotho. Malawi, Angola and Namibia were also badly affected, as were the southern parts of Mozambique and Madagascar. Severe El Niño droughts also affected several countries in the Horn of Africa and some parts of West Africa. The impacts of the current El Niño phenomenon have been particularly high in Ethiopia (which is facing the worst drought in 30 years). Climatic events exacerbate food crises especially in countries with prolonged armed conflicts such as Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in northern Nigeria and areas around Lake Chad. The global hotspots of severe food crises that emerge are mainly in Africa-in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan), Central Africa (CAR and DRC), Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho and Angola in southern Africa, and Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Niger in West Africa (Fig. 5.3). Increases in agricultural productivity can be met only if SDG action 2a is implemented, that is, by increasing investments directly in rural subsistence agriculture and infrastructure. This includes enhanced international cooperation, agricultural research and extension services, technology development and plant and livestock gene bank to enhance agricultural productive capacity in developing countries, particularly in least developed countries.

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Fig 5.3. Poppulation in food crisis (Integrated Food Seecurity, IPC, Phase P 3 or higher) as off January 20166, absolute num mbers (source––global analysiis of food 2016)

Food pricing p and climate chaange Climate chaange have beeen linked with h food prices shocks and, therefore, t limiting acccessibility to food. Recall that SDG taarget 2.1 callls to end hunger and ensure accesss by all peoplee (in particulaar, the poor an nd people i infan nts) to safe, nnutritious and sufficient in vulnerablle situations, including food all yearr round by 2030. Access or the abilityy to acquire food is influuenced by food price, income leveel, the physicaal and social environment, government and trade policies.25 IIn SSA countries, househo olds fail to aaccess food for f many reasons suchh as high food prices, acceess to marketss, the level off poverty, employmentt condition, edducational stattus and properrty rights.26 In rural SSA, the majority m of th he population practices su ubsistence d increase agriculture. Climate channge impacts on agriculturall output could hat could the prices oof major cropss and for mosst vulnerable populations th mean less acccess to food.. Under this condition, c the poorest people are the most harmeed. The 20155/2016 El Niñ ño has createed havoc in Southern Africa and Ethiopia wheere the worstt droughts in 30 years hav ve led to d prices, loss oof incomes fo or farmers severe harveest failures wiith higher food and food insecurity. Betw ween 2014 to March 2016,, prices have increased

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by 183% in Randfontein, South Africa; 242% in Malawi; 106% in Maputo; 155% in Dar es Salaam; 92% in Zambia, and by a surprising low 10% in Zimbabwe.27 The UN World Food Programme estimated in March 2016 that 15.9 million people in the region, not counting those in South Africa, were: “highly food insecure more than 40 million rural and 9 million poor urban people are at risk due to the impacts of El Niño’s related drought and erratic rainfall.”28

There is often a ‘hungry season’—the planting season from June to August—when there is not enough food to carry a household to the next harvest. Families have to depend upon market purchases and this is difficult for households with very low incomes.29 The late 2007 and early 2008 food price spike prompted world leaders to put food high on the agenda of international discussions. Although the rest of the world’s food supply is now relatively stable, this is not true for SSA countries. Here, food systems seemed to have failed, markets are erratic and food prices continue to soar at the expense of the wellbeing of poor people.

Nutrition and climate risk By 2030, SDG target 2.2 is to end all forms of malnutrition, and by 2025, achieve the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under five years of age. The nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons should also be addressed. Climate-related risk can exacerbate undernutrition through inadequate dietary intake by a combined pathway of low food availability/ accessibility and health care practices.30 When food is available and accessible to a household, it does not always mean that the household is food secure; food must be nutritious, safe and socially acceptable for the members of the household.31 Determinants of food utilization include the ability to physically and biologically use the available food.32 If food sources are not able to contribute to a balanced, nutritious diet, then the implications for health and productivity of the population could be significant.33 Health is of vital importance to the ability to engage in livelihood activities and make a valuable contribution to society, as well as for personal quality of life.34 Average per capita food consumption ranges between 0.7 and 0.8 tons of food per year. Recently, it decreased to less than 0.7 tons. This is because population has been growing at a faster rate compared to food

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production.10 Evidence also shows that food consumption patterns in the region change as income grows (Fig. 5.4). The diets in the higher-income groups represented by the fifth quintile of the income distribution (Q5) are more diversified compared to the diets of the low-income group (the first quintile of the income distribution-Q1). Despite SDG target 2.2, it is estimated that 3 out of 10 children under five years of age are still stunted in most SSA countries.35 The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2015 report indicated that SSA is the region with the highest prevalence of undernourishment in the world–at 23.2%, or almost one in every four people.36 As the population of the region grows to approximately 1.5-2 billion by 2050, food production levels will need to quadruple to avert starvation and a major food crisis.

Fig. 5.4. Share of food groups in total dietary energy supply and ‘stunting’ map (Source FAO, 2015)

Agriculture, food security and livelihoods Agriculture is closely tied to human welfare and livelihoods in SSA. It is important for food security in two ways: it produces the food people eat;

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and (perhaps even more important) it provides the primary source of livelihood for about 70% of the workforce. 37 If agricultural production is adversely affected by climate change, the livelihoods of large numbers of the rural poor will be put at risk and their vulnerability to food insecurity increases. Understanding household food security means situating it within the context of livelihoods. The livelihood of the majority of the population, which is directly or indirectly related to agriculture, is being threatened by risks associated with climatic change and variability due to its impacts on agriculture which is highly susceptible to climatic patterns and, invariably, rural income. Particularly vulnerable to these climatic changes are the rain-fed agricultural systems which account for approximately 96% of overall crop production on which the livelihoods of a large proportion of the region’s population currently depend.38 As agricultural output is reduced, so is rural income, given that agricultural sector employs over 70% of the labour force in the region. This has a negative effect on both the household and individual levels. As agricultural livelihoods become more precarious, the rate of rural– urban migration may be expected to grow, adding to the already significant urbanization trend in the region. The movement of people into informal settlements may expose them to a variety of risks, including outbreaks of infectious disease, flash flooding and food price increases.39 SSA is the poorest region in the world, it still has the largest proportion of people living below the poverty line of all world regions, with the GDP annual growth declining from 4.6% in 2014 to 3.0% in 2015.40 Poverty in SSA reduces the capacity of the rural populace, who heavily depend on rain-fed agriculture, to cope with and adapt to short- and long-term climatic shocks.41 Over the past 30 years, GDP growth per capita in SSA has averaged 0.16% per year and this is synonymous with the economy of the countries in the region. In almost all of SSA production is dominated by agriculture which is marked by low productivity. Research shows that for each 10% increase in small-scale agricultural productivity (which is the dominant base) in SSA, almost 7 million people are moved above the dollar-a-day poverty line. Although SDG goal 1 calls for the end of poverty in all its form by 2030, an overwhelming majority of people in SSA live on less than $1.25 a day. In 2012, 501 million people, or 47% of the population of SSA, lived on $1.90 a day or less, a principal factor in causing widespread hunger.42

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Water and agriculture Agriculture is responsible for 70% of the world’s freshwater withdrawals.43 With growing demand for water resources from all sectors, it is projected that by 2025, thirteen countries in SSA will experience water stress and another ten countries will suffer from water scarcity. With global warming, changes in rainfall and temperature patterns are likely to be inevitable and will negatively affect water availability. Water availability for crop growth largely determines crop productivity. The water supply to support plant growth is determined by several factors which include amongst others: the amount of rainfall, the proportion of rainfall that infiltrates the soil and is not lost to runoff or evaporation, the capillary rise of water from the groundwater, the soil depth to which the roots penetrate to acquire water (and nutrients) and the plant-available water holding capacity of soil in the rootable soil volume.44 Rainfall amounts, and hence the storage capacity in the soil root zone have a large influence on yield and yield stability. Figure 5.5 depicts the root zone plant-available water holding capacity for SSA. The wide variations in agro-climatic conditions of the region influence the soil profile and hence the water availability which has important implications for agriculture. In the Sahelian and Saharan climate of the far north, the uncertain and very brief rainy season prohibit crop agriculture, but in other zones rainfall is broadly sufficient for rain-fed agriculture. Spatio-temporal variations, however, affect agriculture, causing excess water and droughts which are more problematic for agriculture than low annual rainfall. It is worthy to note that agriculture is the backbone of overall growth for the majority of countries in the region and essential for poverty reduction and food security; but water stresses (soil moisture content) linked to climatic variability has strongly undermined the role of agriculture in poverty reduction and enhancing livelihoods and food security.

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Fig. 5.5. Root zone plant-available water holding capacity in millimeters (mm) (Source: Global Yield Gap and Water Productivity Atlas, GYGA)

Conclusion It has been shown that Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the highest vulnerability to climate change impacts on earth, with resultant effects on agricultural productivity. This presents serious challenges for economic growth, human health and well-being, rural livelihoods, raw material availability and overall development. Climate risk has hampered agricultural commodity markets in terms of price and availability, translating to hunger and poverty. Climate-induced changes affect net incomes, consumer foods and food prices. At risk are more than 800 million food-insecure people—mostly in rural areas and dependent to some extent on agriculture for incomes—who live on less than $1 per day and spend the majority of their incomes on food. SSA still has the largest proportion of people living below the poverty line of all world regions45.

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Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, in SSA will mean meeting specific SDGs which includes; to enhancing investment finance in agriculture (SDG2), to ending hunger in Africa by 2025 (SDG2), to halving poverty by 2025 through inclusive agricultural growth and transformation (SDG1), to boosting trade in agricultural commodities and services (SDG2), to enhancing resilience of livelihoods and production systems to climate variability and other climate-related risks (SDG13). Mutual accountability to assist African countries in reaching the targets under these respective SDGs requires global and local commitments. Adaptation to climate change in SSA is achievable, but requires larger and more coordinated investments, as well as institutional changes that deliberately address the impacts of climate risk. Unless the livelihoods of poor farmers and the natural resources upon which they depend are made more resilient—through coping better with current climate variability— the challenge of adapting to future climate change would be difficult for most and perhaps impossible for many. There is need to bring new and proven climate risk management tools to address the concerns of farmers and stakeholder investors, thereby helping to build strategic and tactical climate risk management approaches into agricultural planning and activities.46

Bibliography 1. “Political definitions of major regions according to the UN” https://web.archive.org/web/20100420040243/http://esa.un.org/unpp/d efinition.html#SSA last assessed 14/11/2016 at 3.43a.m. 2. http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-guide/climate-change last accessed 11/11/16 at 4.02pm. 3. IPCC. 2007. Synthesis Report. https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/mains1.html last accessed 11/11/16 at 4.16pm. 4. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2007a. Climate change 2007: the physical science basis 5. IPCC. 2007b. Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. 6. Shah, M., Fischer, G. and van Velthuizen, H. (2008) Food Security and Sustainable Agriculture. The Challenges of Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied

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Systems Analysis; Nellemann, C., MacDevette, M., Manders, T., Eickhout, B., Svihus, B., Prins, A. and Kaltenborn, B. (eds) (2009) The Environmental Food Crisis. The environment’s role in averting future food crises. A UNEP rapid response assessment. Arendal, UNDP. NEPAD (2002) Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme. 7. Chinweze, C.U, Abiola-Oloke, G.Z, Kennedy-Echetebu, C and Jideani, C.N (2012): “Land Grabs and its Consequences on Rural Livelihoods in the sub-Saharan African Region: Agriculture and Food Security Nexus”. Proceedings and paper presentation at the Planet under Pressure Conference, organized by the global-change programmes of the International Council for Science (convened by the Environment Change Institute, University of Oxford, London). March 26-29, 2012. London. 8. FAO (2001): Farming System and Poverty - Improving Farmers' Livelihoods in a Changing World: Sub-Saharan Africa. 9. Chauvin, N.D, Mulangu, F and Porto, G (2012) Food Production and Consumption Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa: Prospects for the Transformation of the Agricultural Sector. Working Paper, Regional Bureau for Africa. UNDP. 10. Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa AGRA (2014). Africa Agriculture Status Report 2014: Climate Change and Smallholder Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nairobi, Kenya. Issue No. 2. Available from: https://ccafs.cgiar.org/publications/africa-agriculturestatus-report-2014-climate-change-and-smallholder-agriculture-sub 11. Graham, A., Aubry, S., Kunnemann, R and Suurez, S.M – (FIAN) ‘Land Grab Study’ CSO Monitoring 2009-2010.’Advancing African Agriculture’ (AAA). 2010. The impact of Europe’s policies and practices on African agriculture and food security. 12. Calzadilla, A., Zhu, T., Rehdanz, K., Tol, S. J. R., & Ringler, C. (2008). Economic-wide impacts of climatechange on agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. University of Hamburge Working Paper FNU170, Hamburg, Germany. 13. Cooper P.J.M,Dimes, Rao J, K.P.C. Shapiro B, Shiferawa B. and Twomlow S. (2008) Coping better with current climatic variability in the rain-fed farming systems of sub-Saharan Africa: An essential first step in adapting to future climate change? 14. World Bank. (2007). World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. Washington D.C: The World Bank. 15. Conway, G., and Waage. J. (2010). Science and Innovation for Development. London: UK Collaborative on Development Sciences.

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16. Gnacadja, L. 2010. New Sustainable Drylands Initiative and Partnership between COMESA and the MDG Centre. Paper presented at ICRAF forum, Nairobi, Kenya, January 13. 17. Eswaran, H., R. Alcatraz, E. van den Berg, and P. Reich. 1997. An assessment of the soil resources of Africa in relation to productivity. Geoderma 77:1-18. 18. IPCC (2007). “Africa. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K, 433-467. 19. Met and WFP (2012) Climate Impact on Food Security and Nutrition: A review of existing knowledge. Met Office, Hadley Centre. U.K. 20. FAO (2002) The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2001. Rome: FAO. 21. Thompson H.E, Berrang-Ford .L and Ford J.D (2010) Climate Change and Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Systematic Literature Review. Sustainability 2010, 2, 2719-2733. 22. IAASTD (2009) Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Report. International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development. Edited by: McIntyre B.D; Herren R.H; Wakhungu J and Watson T.R 23. Nkunzimana T., Custodio E., Thomas A.C., Tefera N., Perez Hoyos A., Kayitakire F. (2016). Global analysis of food and nutrition security situation in food crisis hotspots; EUR 27879; doi:10.2788/669159 24. Wiggins S and Keats S (2016) Food Prices: El Nino Bites. ODI Research report. January 2016. 25. Connolly-Boutin, L and Smit, B. (2015) Climate change, food security, and livelihoods in sub-SaharanAfrica. Reg Environ Change (2016) 16:385–399. 26. Brown ME (2009) Markets, climate change, and food security in West Africa. Environ Sci Technol 43: 8016–8020. 27. Wiggins S and Keats S (2016) Food Prices: World market calm, but havoc in Southern Africa and Ethiopia. ODI Research report. March 2016. 28. World Food Programme, 2016, El Niño: Undermining Resilience. Implications of El Niño in Southern Africa from a Food and Nutrition Security Perspective, Rome: World Food Programme. 29. Thompson HE, Berrang-Ford L, Ford JD (2010) Climate change and food security in sub-Saharan Africa: a systematic literature review. Sustain 2(8):2719–2733. doi:10.3390/su2082719 30. Ibid.

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31. Renzaho AM, Mellor D (2010) Food security measurement in cultural pluralism: missing the point or conceptual misunderstanding? Nutrition 26(1):1–9. doi:10.1016/j.nut.2009.05.001 32. Vink N (2012) Food security and African agriculture. S Afr J Int Aff 19(2):157–177. doi:10.1080/10220461.2012.706489 33. Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security (2009). In Proceedings of World Summit on Food Security, Rome, Italy, 16–18 November 2009. 34. Stock, R. (2004) Africa South of the Sahara: A Geographical Interpretation; The Guildford Press: New York, NY, USA, 2004; pp. 224-238. 35. FAO (2015). Regional overview of food insecurity: African food security prospects brighter than ever. Accra, FAO. 36. FAO (2015) The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015. Food and Agricultural Organization Rome 2015. 37. FAO (2008) Climate change and food security: a framework document. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome. 38. World Bank (2016a) Rainfed agriculture. http://water.worldbank.org/topics/agricultural-watermanagement/rainfed-agriculture. Accessed 8 December 2016. 39. Serdeczny. O.; Adams S., Baarsch F., Coumou D., Robinson A., Hare W., Schaeffer M., Perrette M and Reinhardt J (2016) Climate change impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa: from physical changes to their social repercussions. Regional Environmental Change January 2016. 40. World Bank (2016b) Regional dashboard: poverty and equity, SubSaharan Africa. http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/SSA. Accessed 8December 2016. 41. Barnichon, R., and S. Peiris. 2008. Sources of Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of African Economies 17 (1): 729–746; Conway, G., and J. Waage. 2010. Science and Innovation for Development. London: UK Collaborative on Development Sciences. 42. Ibid. 43. IWMI, 2007. Water for Food, Water for Life: A Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture. Earthscan, London and International Water Management Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka. 44. Leenaars J.G.B., T. Hengl, M. Ruiperez Gonzalez, J. Mendes de Jesus, G.B.M. Heuvelink, J. Wolf, L. van Bussel, L. Claessens, H. Yang and K.G. Cassman, 2015. Root zone plant-available water holding capacity of the Sub-Saharan Africa soil, version 1.0. Gridded functional soil information (dataset RZ-PAWHC SSA v. 1.0). ISRIC report 2015/02.

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Collaboration project of Africa Soil Information Service (AfSIS) and Global Yield Gap and Water Productivity Atlas (GYGA). ISRIC World Soil Information, Wageningen. 108 p. 15fig.; 8 tab.; 66 ref. 45. World Bank: 2015b. 46. Cooper PJM, Dimes J, Rao KPC, Shapiro B, Shiferaw B and Twomlow S (2006) Coping better with current climatic variability in the rain-fed farming systems of sub-Saharan Africa: A dress rehearsal for adapting to future climate change? Global Theme on Agroecosystems Report No.27. International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 24 pp.

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Following-up Workshop chair: What it is like to be on the frontlines of climate change and human vulnerability in Africa? Ms. Chinweze: I have passion for the well-being of my people, and I came to realize that Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and this spurred my interest. The poor state of our economic development and low adaptive capacity made our people more vulnerable than any other group to climate change as over 70% of the population relies on traditional rain-fed agriculture for sustenance thus making food security/raw material availability a challenge. I hope that our situation can be made better by implementing fully science-based policies. Workshop chair: You’ve worked with the United Nations on very difficult environmental issues that impact public health. What has that experience been like, both good and bad, including challenges? Ms. Chinweze: One of my most interesting and also challenging work is the impact of oil spilled into a community stream (which is the only source of water) on women’s health. Although water pollution impacts human health in general, in this instance, the women are the most vulnerable to this relatively localized environmental hazard/pollution, through skin infection and other associated health issues as they go to fetch water and carry-on domestic works. In Africa, women are the custodians of their families and home; they fetch water for cooking, washing/cleaning and fodder. Thus, their domestic work exposes them to health risks. This work served as a mean of raising awareness on health inequalities and to address public health issues. It is common knowledge that health risk is high in low income African communities. As it is, we can only achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals that are health-focused if environmental issues are properly addressed. One of my major challenges is working under constraint, with limited resources. Workshop chair: I can see where science-based policies and UN Sustainable Development Goals, the SDGs described in your chapter, go hand-in-

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hand. But is there anything an average person can do to help, even if they’ve never been to Sub-Saharan Africa? Ms. Chinweze: A lot can be achieved by collaborating with persons on ground working at the local scales; so that truly ‘no one is left behind’; thus meeting the UN's global goals that promise inclusiveness.

CHAPTER SIX ECOLOGICAL AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE IMPACTS OF HYDROPOWER IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BETHANY TAYLOR1

Abstract As the need for electricity increases in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), ecological and infectious disease impacts must be taken into consideration when plans for electricity development are created. SSA is immersed in an era of hydropower dam building with intent to increase economic development and promote energy production. Unfortunately, this has a significant impact on the environment and health of human populations, and the future impacts of dam development on climate change and emerging infectious disease outbreaks are not well researched. Africa continues to be the area of the world where hydropower is able to play the greatest role in future economic development and therefore it is vital to understand the ecological and infectious disease impacts of hydropower in SSA.

1

Bethany Taylor has had the privilege of traveling to 15 different countries on five continents over the last 20 years. In Namibia and Ethiopia, Bethany became aware of the significant impact climate change and development is having on local village and community health in Sub-Saharan Africa. The impact of a hydropower dam construction project on a particular Namibian tribe spurred her interest in researching this topic further. Her journeys inspired her to pursue a career in medicine and today she is in her last year in the University of New England’s premed program. A mother to five adopted children from Ethiopia, Ms. Taylor is passionate about bringing medical care to those most in need. For additional biographical insights to the author’s work, see the ‘Following-up’ section at the conclusion of this chapter.

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Introdu uction Hydroelectrric power is a renewable en nergy source th that stores the potential energy of w water in a reserrvoir, using th he kinetic eneergy of falling g water to generate meechanical enerrgy in a turbine, which is converted to electrical energy by a transformer and sent outt to the electrric grid. Wateer is held behind the ddam forming a reservoir an nd then relea sed at certain n times to spin the bladdes of the turbbine.

Fig. 6.1. Scheematic of a hyddroelectric poweer dam https://etrical.wordpress.com m/power-generaation/2

Examplees of hydroeelectric powerr plants in S SSA can be seen in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.

 2

A power eleectrical and highh voltage engin neering web porrtal “to thosee who are interrested in powerr electrical, highh voltage and energy e systems eengineering andd you are most welcome w to shaare your knowleedge.”

Impacts off Hydropower in i Sub-Saharann Africa

Fig. 6.2. Zam mbezi River dam m, Zambia (4)

Fig. 63. Ingadam I, Democrratic Republic Congo C (2)

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The benefits and issues of hydropower plants There are a multitude of inherent benefits to the development of hydropower. Although initial investment can be relatively high, hydropower has the lowest operating costs and longest plant life compared with other large-scale generating options. Additionally, plants may offer a number of side benefits when implemented as part of a multipurpose water resource development plan. Specifically, plants can contribute to irrigation needs and support food production.(3) Once a plant is constructed, it produces no direct waste and has considerably lower output levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon dioxide (ଶ ) than fossil fuel powered energy plants.(3) Hydropower is a renewable and reliable energy source and it is uniform in its power generating capability, whereas the sun may not always shine, and the wind may not always blow, rivers at the sites of construction always flow. The creation of a reservoir generally guarantees a continual source of potential energy creation. Other benefits include flood control measures for protection of towns and fields downstream, and the creation of reservoirs for recreational activities such as swimming and boating.(3)

Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa As of 2014, more than 620 million people living in SSA lacked access to electricity. This is half of the global total. SSA is the only region in the world where the number of people living without electricity is increasing faster than efforts and progress to provide electricity access. Approximately 80 percent (%) of those without access reside in rural areas and population growth in both urban and rural areas is expected. (1) Fig. 6.4 depicts population numbers in African countries living without access to electricity. Africa remains an area of the world where hydroelectric power has a significant role to play in economic development. Many African nations describe their hydro-potential as one of their most valuable resources. Hydropower is currently contributing to more than 50% of electricity in 25 countries in Africa. (3) However, it must be considered that the majority of energy production from a hydropower plant does not serve rural areas but has typically been used to increase access in urban areas of SSA.

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Fig. 6.4. Num mber of peoplee with no acceess to electricitty in 2012, Intternational Energy Agenncy (IEA)3 (1)

Twoo main issuees surrounding hydroopower dam ms While hydroopower plant production has the potentiial to address many of SSA’s elecctricity shorttage problem ms, there arre two main issues surroundingg their developpment to consiider: 3

IEA is com mposed of 29 member m states, including the U United Kingdom m and the United Statess.

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x The physical and ecological impacts associated with construction of hydroelectric dams; and x The negative health impact on surrounding communities in relationship to the development of these plants. Before any project is begun, an Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment (ESHIA) must be completed. The ESHIA report must be given serious consideration as every large dam poses ecological, social and health impacts.

Ecological impacts of hydropower dams in Sub-Saharan Africa Hydropower construction and operation has significant ecological impacts that will impact the climate, area habitats, fauna and flora, cause sedimentation and erosion, and, most significantly, impact river flow. The formation of a large reservoir can create a micro-climate with year round elevated humidity levels around the reservoir. Construction of the dam and construction of new roads to enable access to construction areas causes fragmentation of terrestrial habitats, causing wildlife and human disturbance and displacement. Reservoir filling may result in displacement and drowning of terrestrial fauna and flora. Bird populations can additionally be affected by loss of breeding and foraging habitat inundated by the reservoir. Migration patterns of fish and other aquatic species may be blocked or diverted by the dam, potentially causing disruption to spawning and foraging and eventually leading to a possible decrease in genetic variation in the river. Construction activities lead to significant soil disturbance, increasing the risk of soil erosion and degradation. A dam holds back sediments that would naturally replenish downstream ecosystems; when this takes place, a recapture of sediment downstream is accomplished by eroding the riverbed and banks. Riverbeds downstream of dams are typically eroded by several meters and can extend for tens or even hundreds of kilometers (km) below a dam. Sediments are critical for maintaining habitats downstream of the dam such as the maintenance of deltas, barrier islands, fertile floodplains and coastal wetlands. The alteration of a river’s flow and sediment transport causes sustained environmental impacts. To begin construction of a dam, the river is diverted around the main construction site via a diversion tunnel, resulting in only localized changes and disruption during the construction phase. However, upon becoming operational there is significant pressure to quickly fill the reservoir, and a significant flow volume of the river is

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captured until the reservoir filling is complete. This is a process that can take years, depending on the size of the reservoir. During regular operation of the plant, water flow is regulated through the turbines based on energy production needs. This significantly and consistently modifies downstream river flow. Disrupted or altered water flow changes the quantity and timing of the flow impacting aquatic and riparian life downstream.

Infectious disease impacts of hydropower dams in Sub-Sahara Africa While the ecological impacts are many, the impacts on human health from dam construction are equally as intense. It is essential the public health risks are adequately assessed and addressed. Large dams impact human health not only at the reservoir and dam location, but additionally upstream, downstream and regionally.(5) Potential disease impacts are outlined in Table 6.1. Table 6.1. Potential disease impacts of large dam projects Impact area Construction area Upstream catchment and river Reservoir area Downstream river Irrigation areas Resettlement areas Regional

Disease impact Water-related diseases, sexual transmitted diseases Water-related diseases, difficulties with access to health facilities Increased vector-borne diseases, water-related diseases Water-related diseases Vector-borne and water-related diseases Communicable disease, waterrelated diseases Macro-economic impacts on health, health impacts of climate change

Case studies and ESHIA reports of large construction projects have shown that construction areas have an influx of workforce, increasing the demand for casual sex and causing an upsurge in prostitution and sexually transmitted diseases, including human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). Households and

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communities close to reservoirs may lose access to river water and natural springs leading to forced use of unsanitary water sources, which in turn, leads to a myriad of water-related diseases. Common waterborne diseases associated with dam construction include typhoid, cholera, dysentery, gastroenteritis and hepatitis. These diseases occur when human and animal excrement enters and contaminates water supplies. Additionally, parasites found in water such as giardiasis and cryptosporidium can cause diarrheal diseases and infection. Due to involuntary resettlement of human populations that were living in dam and reservoir construction areas, rises in communicable diseases are seen as well. Further complicating the issue is that these rural populations rarely have access to adequate health care. One of the most studied impacts of dam building on infectious disease is an increase in vector-borne disease and, specifically, the prevalence of malaria. Dams and irrigation schemes transform the local ecosystems and substantially change the nature of malaria risk. The increased prevalence can be directly correlated to increased vectors surrounding the building of a reservoir. Moreover, the role of climate change has already been shown to impact populations of disease-carrying insects.(6) Particularly notable is the fact that close to 90% of all malarial deaths worldwide occurred in SSA in children under five years of age.(7) Global annual incidence of clinical malaria is estimated to be 500 million cases with 90% of all infections occurring in SSA.(7) Therefore, current recommendations conclude that malaria control measures should be mandatory in areas of dam construction.

Conclusions Increases in electricity demands in SSA must be considered in light of the ecological and infectious disease impacts, including those vector-borne diseases shown to be associated with global warming. Moving forward, there needs to be continued research, education and political commitment for the conservation of ecosystems when dam construction is considered. Infectious disease impacts must be acknowledged and dealt with to preserve human health, especially for the most vulnerable. Health truly depends on society’s capacity to manage the interaction between human activities and the environment in ways that safeguard and promote health. Therefore, we must critically consider the impacts of our decisions to bring positive impacts and problem solutions to the increasing needs for energy in SSA.

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Bibliography 1. Africa Energy Outlook: A focus on energy prospects in SubSaharan Africa. Retrieved from: https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO 2014_AfricaEnergyOutlook.pdf 2. Alaindg, I. CC BY 2.5, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2432650 3. Bartle, A. (2002). Hydropower potential and development activities. Energy Policy. 30(14):1231-1239. DOI:10.1016/S0301-4215(02)00084-8 4. Bird, Ben. 2005. Benbbb. Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons. Public Domain. https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3168000 5. Lerer, L., Scudder, T. (1999). Health impacts of large dams. Elsevier. Environ Impact Assess Rev. 19:113-123. 6. Patz JA, Epstein PR, Burke TA, Balbus JM. (1996). Global Climate Change and Emerging Infectious Diseases. JAMA. 275(3):217-223. doi:10.1001/jama.1996.03530270057032 7. Yewhalaw, D., Legesse, W., Van Bortel, W., Gebre-Selassie, S., Kloos, H., Duchateau, L. & Spreybroeck, N. (2009). Malaria and water resource development: The case of Gilgel-Gibe hydroelectric dam in Ethiopia. Malaria Journal 8(21) doi:10.1186/1475-2875-821

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Following-up Workshop chair: Five kids and going back to school. It’s a cliché, but how are you managing? Ms. Taylor: Five kids and going back to school is definitely difficult and not for the faint of heart! I think the key to ‘managing it all’, comes in acknowledging that I simply don't have it all together! However, there are a few ways I'm learning to manage. First, I had to manage my expectations—I was not going to have the perfectly clean, well-organized, structured home I did when I was staying home with my kids full time. Additionally I just did not have the time to be the straight A, 4.0 GPA student I would have loved to work towards. Attending a kid’s soccer game, or band concert was important to me, even if it meant an hour less of study time some nights. Secondly, I knew I needed the support of my family. Having a husband who is willing to take on extra stuff around the house has gifted me with the time I needed to invest in my studies. Having kids who understand that sometimes I just can't attend an event and that they need to take on more responsibility of their own has also helped! Finally, I needed to be more organized (something I'm still working on!). I don't have as much free time and certainly can’t ‘wing it’ on a day-to-day basis. Finding a good planner, thinking ahead, and learning to say, “No”, to some things has been key in this season of my life. Workshop chair: Do you know what specialty you'd like to practice in medicine yet? Ms. Taylor: The field of medicine is certainly broad, but I've begun to narrow down what I hope to pursue as a specialty. Becoming an infectious disease doctor is my goal, and that will require four years of medical school, a residency in internal medicine, and then a fellowship in infectious disease. I also have an interest in how climate change affects emerging and infectious disease outbreaks and hope to continue growing in my understanding of this relationship. Workshop chair: It was evident that your international travels really helped inform your chapter. Can you tell us: what does the term, “environmental justice”, mean to you?

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Ms. Taylor: There is a proverb that says, “Once our eyes are opened, we can't pretend we don't know what to do. We will be held responsible to act.”

Throughout my life and because of my extensive traveling my eyes have been opened to numerous injustices, which has provided the motivation to “act” and pursue environmental justice. The EPA defines environmental justice as: “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin or income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies.”

This can be contrasted though with environmental injustice, which occurs when governments or companies build environmentally detrimental infrastructure in minority communities. This exposes minority groups to environmentally hazardous conditions often because they lack the social and political power to do anything about it. When thinking through energy solutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, environmental justice means assuring that indigenous and minority groups are informed and empowered rather than taken advantage of.

SECTION III. ADVANCES IN EDUCATION AND COMMUNICATION

CHAPTER SEVEN INDICATORS: LEVERAGING SCIENCE TO COMMUNICATE CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND RISKS MICHAEL J. KOLIAN1

Abstract Communicating the science of climate change is fundamental to building knowledge, awareness, education and for transitioning toward actionable planning and decisions. In 2016, the United States (U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released the latest edition of the report, Climate Change Indicators in the United States (EPA 2016), summarizing a key set of indicators related to the causes and effects of climate change. EPA compiles and regularly updates these indicators to track and document relevant measures of climate change in the U.S. Collectively, the indicators represent authoritative information by leveraging the latest science and serve as a key resource for communicating to a broad range of audiences, including educators, decision-makers, and the public. The 1 USEPA, Office of Atmospheric Programs (OAP), Washington, DC. Michael Kolian has worked at EPA for 16 years and specializes in climate change science and impacts. He is the lead author of the EPA report, Climate Change Indicators in the United States and is co-chair of the U.S. Global Change Research Program’s Indicator Working Group. Mike works on several assessments to inform EPA’s climate-related regulatory actions and analyzes and publishes data collected by EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program and other programs. Prior to working on climate change for EPA, Mike was program manager for EPA’s national air quality and trends monitoring programs and worked on numerous assessment activities related EPA’s Clean Air Act regulations including the Acid Rain Program. He has a Master of Science in Public Health from Tulane University’s School Public Health and Tropical Medicine. For additional biographical insights to the author’s work, see the ‘Following-up’ section at the conclusion of this chapter.

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availability of credible, transparently documented data and information for informing decisions related to resilience and adaptation planning is particularly useful as resources for such efforts are typically constrained. All of EPA’s indicators are derived from observed or measured data, have a scientifically-based relationship to climate change, and rely on peerreviewed science and sources of data from federal government agencies (e.g., Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC], National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA], and U.S. Geological Survey [USGS]), international and nongovernmental organizations such as the National Audubon Society, and several academic institutions. Consistency among the indicators is achieved by using a standard set of evaluation criteria, including usefulness, objectivity, data quality, transparency, and the ability to meaningfully communicate the phenomena depicted by the indicator. A reliable set of national and regionally relevant indicators for tracking the causes and effects of climate change in the U.S. (and globally) helps in communicating foundational climate science and turning knowledge into action by supporting resource planning and decision-making. Lastly, indicators are important for helping us better understand the important connections between climate change and human health and well-being. KEYWORDS: communicating climate science, indicators, impacts, risks, observed trends

Introduction The signs of climate change are clearly evident in a number different measures. Increasing global temperatures during the past century have led to many observed changes, including declines in Arctic sea ice, changing rain and snowfall patterns, changes in streamflow and snowmelt-related runoff (Melillo et al., 2014), and more extreme climate events–like heavy rainstorms and record high temperatures. These observed changes are linked to the rising levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in our atmosphere, caused by human activities. One important way to track and communicate the causes and effects of climate change is through the use of indicators. An indicator, defined simply, represents the state or trend of certain environmental conditions over a given area and a specified period of time. Indicators are used to help monitor environmental trends, track key factors that influence the environment, and identify effects on ecosystems and society.

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This chapter largely focuses on EPA’s climate indicators effort, which aims to effectively leverage and communicate the science and impacts of climate change, assess trends in environmental quality, and inform decision-making. EPA has developed a suite of 37 climate indicators that span a range of scales and sectors and are based on the synthesis of readily available, peer-reviewed datasets. Results of EPA’s effort are published in a printed report and a website that summarize each indicator; highlight the far-reaching significance of these issues and their possible consequences for people, the environment, and society; and transparently document the underlying data source(s) and analytical methods. Building on the most recent report, the fourth edition, EPA plans to continue adding to the set of indicators and partnering with data providers and others to expand the information base and keep current with the latest scientific information.

About the indicators EPA has a long history of developing and tracking indicators for various programmatic and scientific purposes (EPA 2017). This section provides an overview of EPA’s climate indicator effort which benefits from this previous experience. More specifically, the section summarizes a few of the key findings from EPA’s published indicators and describes the key components of EPA’s indicator effort, including an established framework that involves collaborative partnerships, methods for transparent documentation and evaluation of indicators, and the goal of advancing the science through the ongoing development of additional indicators.

Why use indicators? Indicators are an effective means for distilling and communicating technical information. They help to simplify the science and characterize patterns of observed change (such as the magnitude, rate, or timing of change). Indicators can also help people understand the relevance of these changes. Indicators helps to provide context in order to connect the dots between climate change and our lives and values (e.g., Why does this matter to me?). They also provide an evidence-based foundation for informing decisions and further investigation. Indicators can provide an important reference or benchmark with which to compare to future, expected changes. Because indicators greatly facilitate the communication of complex and inter-related information they can be useful to a wide-variety of audiences including the public. Furthermore, when indicators of long-term trends are placed into

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meaningful context such as with specific events or sites that people care about (e.g., the timing of first leaf and bloom in the spring or effects of storms to coastal cultural heritage sites) it promotes a deeper understanding of the importance of certain changes. EPA’s climate indicator resource (print report and website) is designed to be useful for scientists, analysts, decision-makers, educators, and others who can use climate change indicators as a resource for: x Assessing trends in environmental quality and factors that influence the environment. x Effectively communicating relevant climate science information in a sound, transparent, and easy-to-understand way. x Informing science-based decision-making for existing and future climate-related policies and programs. There are currently 37 indicators grouped into 6 categories– Greenhouse Gases, Weather & Climate, Oceans, Snow & Ice, Health & Society, and Ecosystems–that look at the composition of the atmosphere, fundamental measures of climate, and the extent to which several climatesensitive aspects of the oceans, snow and ice, human health, society, and ecosystems are changing.

A few observed changes2 x Average annual carbon dioxide levels recently exceeded 400 parts per million for the first time in at least 800,000 years. x Average surface temperatures have risen across the U.S. since 1901, with an increased rate of warming over the past 30 years. Eight of the top 10 warmest years on record for the contiguous 48 states have occurred since 1998, and 2012 and 2015 were the two warmest years on record. x Arctic sea ice: The September 2016 sea ice extent was more than 700,000 square miles less than the historical 1981–2010 average for that month—a difference more than two and a half times the size of Texas. Since 1979, the length of the melt season for Arctic sea ice has grown by 37 days. It starts melting 11 days earlier and it starts refreezing 26 days later than it used to, on average.

2

See the associated indicator figures and maps and a more comprehensive set of key findings in Appendix A.

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x Sea level (relative to the land) rose along much of the U.S. coastline between 1960 and 2015, particularly the Mid-Atlantic coast and parts of the Gulf coast, where some stations had increases of more than 8 inches. x Coastal flooding: Tidal flooding is becoming more frequent along the U.S. coastline. Nearly every city with a long-term measurement site has experienced an increase in tidal flooding since the 1950s, with the largest increases in the Mid-Atlantic region. x Ragweed pollen season: Warmer temperatures and later fall frosts are increasing the length of ragweed pollen season, which has increased at 10 out 11 locations studied in the central U.S. and Canada since 1995. x Streamflow: In parts of the country with substantial snowmelt, winterspring runoff is happening at least five days earlier than in the mid-20th century at most stream gauge sites. The largest changes have occurred in the Pacific Northwest and Northeast.

An established indicators framework Collaboration Built on partners and committed contributors

Publication

Data Sources

Clear commuication and transparent documentation

Leverage peerreviewed, publically available data

Expert Review Established external peerreview process

Selection Criteria Consistent approach for screening and evaluation

Figure 7.1. Key components of EPA’s national climate indicators framework

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EPA’s indicators are not intended to inform highly specific decisions. Rather, they are intended to provide foundational, quantitative climate science and context to then be used in conjunction with other more focused information for planning and policy action decisions. As such, these indicators are intended to be national and regionally relevant to support analysis of the effects and impacts of climate change on the natural environment and human health. Key components of EPA’s indicator framework are shown in Figure 7.1 and described in more detail below: x Collaboration: This effort greatly benefits from collaborative partners at other government agencies, NGOs, and academic institutions who collect and make available the indicator data, provide subject-matter expertise, and periodic review of updates. These partners have also helped to develop some of the underlying analytical methods (e.g., publications to the scientific literature) reflected in EPA’s indicators. x Data sources: The data supporting the indicators are discoverable with traceable documentation. All of EPA’s indicators are based on peer-reviewed, publicly available data from government agencies, academic institutions, and other organizations. In addition to being published here, these data sets have been published in the scientific literature and in other government or academic reports. x Indicator criteria: EPA screens, evaluates, and selects each indicator using a standard set of criteria that consider usefulness, data quality, and relevance to climate change. This process ensures that all indicators are consistently evaluated and based on credible data. For more information about EPA’s indicator criteria and selection process, see the technical support document available at: www.epa.gov/climate-indicators. x Expert review: EPA’s printed report, along with all of EPA’s climate change indicators and supporting documentation undergoes peer-review by independent technical experts. x Publication: EPA’s report, the corresponding website, and the accompanying detailed technical documentation are designed to ensure that the indicators are presented clearly in an easy-tounderstand manner and transparently documented. Some indicators are more directly influenced by climate than others (e.g., indicators related to health outcomes), yet they all have met EPA’s criteria and have a scientifically-based relationship to climate. EPA’s

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report does not attempt to identify the extent to which climate change is causing a trend in an observed indicator. Connections between human activities, climate change, and observed indicators are explored in more detail elsewhere in the scientific literature. EPA’s indicators generally cover broad geographic scales and many years of data, as this is the most appropriate way to view trends relevant to climate change. After all, the Earth is a complex system, and there will always be natural variations from one year to the next—for example, a very warm year followed by a colder year. The Earth’s climate also goes through other natural cycles that can play out over a period of several years or even decades. Thus, EPA’s indicators present trends for as many years as the underlying data allow.

Understanding the connections between climate change and human health Of particular interest to EPA is highlighting the importance of and continued need for indicators that examine the effects of climate change on human health and society. Climate-related health indicators are critical not only for tracking and measuring health impacts of climate change but also, more importantly, for identifying areas where public health protection is needed most. To ensure that response measures are effective and adverse health effects are avoided, it is important for climate-related health indicators to be clear, measurable, timely, and closely linked to changes in climate. While some climate and health indicators exist, the relationship between the impacts of climate change and health effects is complex. Thus, it is critical to explore ways to highlight this connection and provide the necessary context, including where the uncertainties are, for communicating the effects of climate change on health and society. Climate change poses many threats to the health and well-being of Americans, from increasing the risk of extreme heat events and heavy storms to increasing the risk of asthma attacks and changing the spread of certain diseases carried by ticks and mosquitoes. EPA’s 2016 climate change indicators report includes a section that highlights key concepts from U.S. Global Change Research Program’s (USGCRP’s) recent Climate Change and Human Health Assessment (USGCRP 2016) to help demonstrate how indicators provide important information for better understanding the connections between climate change and human health effects.

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Fig. 7.2. Connnecting climatee change indicattors to health paathways The three exxamples abovee show how cllimate impactss can affect heealth. The numbered ccircles identifyy where clim mate change iindicators pro ovide key information oon changes occcurring at diffeerent points aloong the pathwa ays. Other factors can pplay a role in determining d a person’s p vulnerrability to clima ate-related health outcom mes.

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What can indicators tell us about climate change and human health? The impacts of climate change on health are complex, often indirect, and dependent on multiple societal and environmental factors. Tracking changes in climate impacts and exposures improves understanding of changes in health risk, however, even if the actual health outcome is difficult to quantify. It is important to link changes in impacts, exposure, and health effects together for a broader understanding of health risk. For example, the flooding pathway in Figure 7.2 shows how indicators of certain climate impacts like sea level, heavy precipitation, and coastal flooding could be used by state and local health officials to better understand changes in human exposure to contaminated waters (a health risk). By recognizing changing risks, these officials can better understand how climate change affects the number of people who get sick with gastrointestinal illnesses (a health outcome). Similarly, how indicators of changes in extreme temperatures can be used to communicate changes in people’s risk of exposure to more severe and frequent heat waves. Thus, even where health data or long-term records are limited or where the links between climate and health outcomes are complex, indicators play an important role in understanding climate-related health impacts.

Community connections One of the best ways to reach audiences otherwise not engaged is to explain climate-related changes in a context that is relevant to their lives, including implications that could affect them. In other words, one can use indicators to help connect the dots between climate change and people’s lives and values. EPA uses features such as “Community Connection” and “A Closer Look” in certain chapters of the report (e.g., Cherry Blossom Bloom dates in Washington, D.C.) that focus on a particular region or localized area of interest to augment the report and engage readers in particular areas or topics of interest within the U.S. For example, longterm trends in lake ice cover in the northern U.S. reveal that lakes are freezing later and thawing earlier than they used to (see Figure 7.3). The timing and duration of ice cover on lakes and other bodies of water affects shipping and transportation, hydroelectric power generation, and recreation. For example, warmer-than-average temperatures over last two winters have meant changes to the Sebago Lake Ice Fishing Derby, one of Maine’s largest. The Sebago Lake portion of the derby has been cancelled the last two years.

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Fig. 7.3. Datee of ice thaw forr selected U.S. lakes, 1905–20015

In another eexample, regiions in the faar north are w warming moree quickly than other pparts of the woorld, and this pattern is exppected to contiinue. The Tanana andd Yukon rivers in Alaska provide a paarticularly no oteworthy record of noorthern climatte because, fo or a century oor more, locaal citizens have recordeed the date whhen the ice on n these rivers sstarts to movee or break up each sprring. In fact, some towns have annual competitions to guess when the icee breakup willl occur. Since, 1917, the Nenaana Ice Classiic competitionn on the Tanaana River in central A Alaska has paidd several million dollars inn winning to th he people who come cclosest to gueessing the exaact date and time of day when w the river ice wiill break up. A similar trad dition exists inn Dawson Ciity on the Yukon Riveer, just across the border in n Canada, wheere breakup dates have been recordded since 18966. River ice breakup b is moore than just a friendly competitionn, though. Icee breakup is an a important time of transsition for communities that rely onn these relatively remote and free-flow wing wild rivers for traansportation, subsistence hu unting and fisshing, and oth her needs. In addition,, early thawinng can lead to t severe ice movement, jamming, j damage to infrastructuree, and destrucctive floods. T The data colllected by these comm munities highliights how thee river ice breeakup dates in n Nenana and Dawsonn City have chhanged over tim me.

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Conclusion EPA compiles and presents a suite of indicators that provide valuable empirical information on the causes and effects of climate change. Indicators are evaluated by their relationship to climate (e.g., sensitivity to climate forcing), the quantity and quality of associated measurement data, and their ability to effectively communicate information necessary for making informed decisions. Indicators are valuable tools that enable tracking of the status, rates of change, or trends in climate-relevant measures. There will always be a need and demand for authoritative, transparently derived climate-related indicators and thus, the ongoing tracking and continued improvements to the indicators is essential. One of the most important benefits of using indicators is in communicating the science to a wide audience. Finding ways to highlight aspects of these changes that resonate with people’s lives provides a powerful means to enhance understanding of climate change and facilitate planning and decisions in response. The indicators compiled through EPA’s effort reflect a growing body of research and scientific evidence on the causes and effects of climate change. Collectively, the indicators represent clear and compelling evidence that climate change is happening now with implications for human health and society. Indicators of climate change are expected to become even more numerous and to depict even clearer trends in the future. Continued partnership with experts and data providers is critical to being able to harness and provide access to the vast amount of climate science information being generated as new and more comprehensive indicator data become available.

Acknowledgements The author would like to acknowledge the support provided by Carole LeBlanc, chair of the First Annual International Technical Workshop on Climate Risk held in October 2016 at Wells, Maine, in making the workshop synthesis come to publication. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

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Bibliography 1. Dudley, R.W., Hodgkins, G.A., McHale, M.R., Kolian, M.K., and Renard, B. 2017. Trends in snowmelt-related streamflow timing in the conterminous U.S. Journal of Hydrology 547:208–221. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2017.01.051 2. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2017. Report on the Environment. Accessed June 2017. www.epa.gov/roe 3. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2016. Climate change indicators in the U.S., 2016. Fourth edition. EPA 430-R-16-004. www.epa.gov/climate-indicators 4. Melillo, J.M., T.C. Richmond, and G.W. Yohe, Eds. 2014. Highlights of climate change impacts in the U.S.: The third National Climate Assessment. U.S. Global Change Research Program. 5. USGCRP 2016. The impacts of climate change on human health in the U.S.: A scientific assessment. Crimmins, A., J. Balbus, J.L. Gamble, C.B. Beard, J.E. Bell, D. Dodgen, R.J. Eisen, N. Fann, M.D. Hawkins, S.C. Herring, L. Jantarasami, D.M. Mills, S. Saha, M.C. Sarofim, J. Trtanj, and L. Ziska, Eds. U.S. Global Change Research Program. http://dx.doi.org/10.7930/J0R49NQX 6. USGCRP 2016b. Gamble, J.L., J.Balbus, M.Berger, K. Bouye, V. Campbell, K. Chief, K. Conlon, A. Crimmins, B. Flanagan, C. Gonzalez-Maddux, E. Hallisey, S. Hutchins, L. Jantarasami, S. Khoury, M. Kiefer, J. Kolling, K. Lynn, A. Managan, M. McDonald, R. Morello-Frosch, M.H. Redsteer, P. Sheffield, K. Thigpen Tart, J.Watson, K.P. Whyte, and A.F. Wolkin, 2016: Ch.9: Populations of Concern. The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the U.S.: A Scientific Assessment. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, 247-286.http://dx.doi.org/10.7930/J0Q81B0T

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Following-up Workshop chair: You’ve worked on a number of assignments throughout your 16-year career at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). One of them is the Acid Rain Program. What does that program do? Mr. Kolian: Getting a job at EPA—I was absolutely thrilled! I wanted to make a difference in protecting the environment and making it a better place for all. I began my career working on various aspects of EPA's Acid Rain Program or ARP. ARP was established under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) amendments and requires major emission reductions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), the primary precursors of acid rain, from the power sector. Workshop chair: How has this first Agency experience impacted your current work in climate change? Mr. Kolian: My experience at ARP helped form the basis of my appreciation of how scientifically-based, sensible regulations can deliver monumental benefits to human health and the environment. At the heart of it all was data: power plant emissions data, allowance data, and environmental—air quality, stream and lake chemistry—data. With lessons learned and a deep history in the value of data and long-term monitoring, I've transitioned to helping to better characterize the impacts and risks of climate change. One of the most underestimated parts of dealing with climate change is wrapping your arms around it and effectively communicating it. Workshop chair: To that last point, I would guess that lots of people would find the data you work with pretty boring. How do you talk about this information in ways that engage your audiences? Mr. Kolian: One of the best ways to reach audiences is to explain climate-related changes in a context that is relevant to their lives. In other words, help connect the dots between climate change and people’s lives and values and address the question: Why does this matter to me? It’s important to focus on a particular region or localized area of interest to augment analytical findings from the data to engage readers in particular topics of interest within the U.S. For example, warming temperatures are shortening

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the overall length of time that many lakes are frozen. Why does this matter to me? It matters to ice fishermen, pond hockey skaters, and snowmobilers that rely on thick ice cover during the winter for recreation. Explain these changes in the context of how people may relate or be affected by these changes. It makes a huge difference in communication and improves audience awareness of the issue.

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Appen ndix Summarry from EPA A’s climate change c indiccators in thee U.S., 4th editiion: A few observed o chaanges Indicator: G Greenhouse gas g concentra ations Concenttrations of carrbon dioxide and other grreenhouse gasses in the atmosphere have increased since thee beginning of the indusstrial era. Almost all of this increaase is attributtable to humaan activities.2 Average annual carbon dioxide leevels recently exceeded 4000 parts per million m for the first timee in at least 8000,000 years.

Fig. 1. Global atmospheric concentrations c of o carbon dioxidde

U.S. and glob bal temperatu ure Indicator: U Averagee temperaturess have risen across the conttiguous 48 staates since 1901, with aan increased rate r of warmiing over the ppast 30 years. Eight of the top 10 w warmest yearrs on record have h occurredd since 1998. Average

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global tempperatures show w a similar trend, and all oof the top 10 warmest years on record worldwiide have occu urred since 1 998. Within the U.S., temperatures in parts of the North, the West, and A Alaska have increased the most (Fiigure 2).

Fig. 2. Rate oof temperature change c in the U.S., U 1901–20155

Sea level Indicator: S Relative sea level rosee along much h of the U.S. ccoastline betw ween 1960 and 2015, pparticularly thee Mid-Atlantiic coast and pparts of the Gulf coast, where som me stations registered r increases of m more than 8 inches (see Figure 3). Meanwhhile, relative sea s level felll at some loccations in Alaska and tthe Pacific Noorthwest. At those sites, eveen though abssolute sea level has risen, land elevaation has risen n more rapidlyy.

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Fig. 3. Relativve sea level chaange along U.S. coasts, 1960–22015

Coastal flood ding Indicator: C In partneership with Naational Ocean nic and Atmosspheric Admin nistration, EPA develooped a coastal flooding indiicator based oon minor or “n nuisance” flooding thrresholds. Wheen water risees above this level, minor flooding typically occcurs in somee streets, many storm drainns become ineffective, and a coastaal flood advisoory may be isssued. As relattive sea level rises due to climate chhange, one off the most notticeable conseequences is an n increase in this type of coastal floooding. Floodiing typically ooccurs during g seasonal high tides (““king tides”) and storms th hat push wateer toward the shore. In recent yearss, however, cooastal cities aree increasinglyy flooding on days d with less extremee tides or littlee wind, even on o sunny dayss (see Figure 4). 4 Floods are happeniing more ofteen as rising sea s level reduuces the gap between

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average sea level and the height of the land. The Mid-Atlantic region suffers the highest number of coastal flood days and has also experienced the largest increases in flooding. Since 2010, Wilmington, North Carolina, has flooded most often—49 days per year—followed by Annapolis, Maryland, at 46 days per year. The Mid-Atlantic’s subsiding land and higher-than-average relative sea level rise both contribute to this increase in flooding.

Fig. 4. Frequency of flooding along U.S. coasts, 2010–2015 versus

Indicator: Arctic sea ice The September 2016 sea ice extent was more than 700,000 square miles less than the historical 1981–2010 average for that month—a difference more than two and a half times the size of Texas. Evidence of the age of Arctic sea ice suggests that fewer patches of ice are persisting for multiple years (i.e., generally thick ice that has survived one or more melt seasons) (see Figure 5). The proportion of sea ice five years or older

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has declinedd dramaticallyy over the reccorded time pperiod, from more m than 30 percent oof September ice in the 198 80s to 9 perceent in 2015. A growing percentage oof Arctic sea ice is only on ne or two yearrs old. Less old, multiyear ice im mplies that thhe ice cover is thinning, w which makess it more vulnerable tto further meltting. Since 1979, the lengthh of the melt season s for Arctic sea icce has grown by 37 days. Itt starts meltingg 11 days earllier and it starts refreezzing 26 days later l than it ussed to, on averrage.

Fig. 5. Age off Arctic sea ice at September minimum, m 19833–2015

Ragweed polllen season Indicator: R Warmer temperaturess and later fall fa frosts alloow ragweed plants to produce pollen later intto the year, potentially pprolonging the allergy season for m millions of peeople. The length of ragw weed pollen seeason has increased at 10 out of 11 locations stud died since 199 5 (see Figure 6).

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Fig. 6. Changge in ragweed pollen p season, 1995–2015

Streamflow Indicator: S In partnnership with U.S. Geolo ogical Surveyy, EPA deveeloped a streamflow indicator relatted to four key y measures off streamflow, including the timing oof winter and spring s runoff (snowmelt ( runnoff) based on n analysis of the date oof winter-spriing center of volume. v Warm ming temperaatures can lead to sevveral impactts related to streamflow timing. Changes in snowmelt-reelated stream mflow timing g have impplications fo or water availability and use as weell as ecologiccally relevant sshifts in stream mflow. A long-term trrend toward an a earlier datee could be caaused by earliier spring snowmelt, m more precipittation falling as rain insteead of snow, or other changes in precipitationn patterns. This T indicatoor provides the first nationwide analysis of historical h tren nds in snowm melt-related strreamflow timing for thhe U.S. and uses u streamflow w data througgh 2014. In paarts of the country withh substantial snowmelt, winter-spring w rrunoff is happ pening at

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least five daays earlier thhan in the mid d-20th centuryy at most gau uges. The largest channges have occuurred in the Pacific Northw west and North heast (see Figure 7).

Fig. 7. Timing of winter-spriing runoff in th he U.S., 1940–22014

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CONCLUSION

This book, along with its counterpart, Demystifying Climate Risk Volume II: Industry and Infrastructure Implications, provides a ‘snapshot in time’ of the climate-related work conducted by dedicated professionals from different fields participating in the 1st Annual International Technical Workshop on Climate Risk. These laudable efforts are our contribution to the global community working hard to address the burgeoning challenges of climate change. Yet we remain convinced that, given the status of the world’s warming climate and the still lingering inertia of global initiatives, current collective efforts by our global community remain inadequate to protect future generations. In June 2017, the American Renewable Energy Institute (AREI) hosted the webinar, Teaching Systems Thinking to Fill the Climate Literacy Gap. The expert panel concluded that multi/inter-disciplinary approaches to climate challenges are essential and commendable, and addressed the following themes: x Existing and emerging ways to teach systems thinking about climate disruptions, mitigation, adaptation and risk management; x How community colleges can be central to better preparing the workforce for climate risk decisions; and x The validity of the climate literacy gap and its impact on the workforce as well as concepts for developing the national/ international capacity to support climate literacy.1 The 2nd Annual International Technical Workshop on Climate Risk for the autumn of 2017 in Maine is in the planning stage. It is our intention to 1

The webinar is a product of the Security and Sustainability Forum (SSF) a public interest organization that: “produces learning events about climate security, which we define as the threats to society from a changing climate and related disruptions to natural systems. Our main products are free webinars that convene global experts on food and water security, public health, economic vitality, infrastructure, governance and other impacts that must be solved in meeting climate security challenges.” http://securityandsustainabilityforum.org/

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Conclusion

continue our theme of systems thinking as an essential approach to addressing the multitude of challenges posed by climate change. By so doing, it is hoped that the workshops, in conjunction with other international, national and regional efforts, will continue to more equitably improve the quality of life for the planet’s 7.5 billion current inhabitants and help protect the natural environment upon which those lives depend. Carole LeBlanc Wells, Maine, USA

INDEX

A acid rain 163 adaptation xx, 152, 173 allergies xvii, 24, 26, 27 anthropogenic xv Arctic 152, 154, 168, 169 asthma xvii, 24, 25, 26, 27, 157 B bronchitis 24 budworm xviii, 69, 87, 88, 89, 96, 100 C chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) xv cholera xix, 144 congenital xvii, 4, 8, 11, 13, 16 consumption 36, 42, 55, 125, 126 cryptosporidium 144 cyclones 123 D Deforestation 104 dengue 3, 4, 8, 9, 16, 21 diet 122, 125, 126 discrimination 49, 54 drought…14, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128 dysentery xix, 144 E El Niño 14, 15, 16, 122, 123, 124, 125 Encephalitis 4 environmental justice 6, 147 erosion xix, 142

F fauna xix, 142 flora xix, 142 fossil fuel 31, 33, 72, 78, 140 G gastroenteritis xix, 144 gross domestic product (GDP) xviii, 117, 119, 127 genetically engineered 22 giardiasis 144 global warming xvii, xix, 15, 24, 128, 144 Guillain-Barré (syndrome) 5, 6 H hepatitis xix, 144 hunger xviii, 119, 121, 124, 127, 129, 130 hurricanes 15 hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)...xv, 72 I improved forest management (IFM) 68, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 83, 88, 94, 101 irrigation 120, 140, 143, 144 L Lyme disease xvii, 26, 27 M malaria xix, 144 malnutrition 118, 125 microcephaly xvii, 8, 10 migration xix, 128, 142 mitigation 173 monkey (rhesus) 5 Montreal Protocol xv

176 N natural forest management 83, 84, 94, 96, 99 P Paris Agreement xv, 118 pathogen 15, 69, 100 pesticide 16, 28 pneumonia 24 pollen 26, 155, 169, 170 pollution 24, 33, 73, 135 precipitation 14, 15, 159, 170 R ragweed 155, 169, 170 reforestation 73, 75, 76 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 68, 71, 99 Renewable Energy Technologies (RETs) 33, 38, 57 resilience xx, 130, 152 Rift Valley Fever 15

Index S sustainable development goal (SDG) xviii, 33, 118, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 135 sedimentation xix, 142 sequester/sequestration 70, 72, 74, 75, 76, 80, 82, 90, 100, 101, 104 starvation 126 stunt/ing 125, 126 T thrombocytopenia 8 tick xvii, 26, 27, 157 tides 167 turbine 138, 143 typhoid xix, 144 W water stress 128 Y yellow fever 3, 4, 5, 21, 22